

**WINNING ISN'T EVERYTHING:
HOW LARGE SCALE MILITARIZED INTERVENTIONS CAN UNDERMINE POST WAR STATE
CAPACITY, STABILITY AND DEMOCRATIZATION**

By

Brian J. Crothers

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Political Science - Doctor of Philosophy

2014

ABSTRACT

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While much study has been directed toward the post war consequences of “impartial” militarized intervention considerably less attention has been paid to the consequences of intervention when states are biased for or against a specific actor. In fact, interventions fitting the peace-building or transitional assistance model of intervention represent only a small subset of a much larger class of militarized intervention. I argue that many of the standard assumptions regarding democratization, post war state capacity, and post war political violence adopted from experiences with the peace building models may not hold for this more generalized case.

Building on the concepts of Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) I develop a Strategic Heterogeneity Framework which seeks to explain how differences in an intervener’s goals and strategies influence outcomes of post war state capacity, domestic stability (non-violence), and democratization. I conceptualize intervention strategy along two dimensions, bias and intensity. Bias indicates whether the external actor (intervener) has a strong preference for or against a domestic actor or in an unbiased case is “impartial” to the relevant belligerents. Intensity refers to the amplitude of the intervener’s commitment and degree of intrusion into the politics and society of their target. High intensity strategies are those where the external intervener becomes the predominant political actor. In low intensity strategies the external actor is more

an equal or junior partner. The Strategic Heterogeneity Framework anticipates that the bias and intensity sets up certain structural and agent-specific incentives and/or dis-incentives to democratize, build indigenous political capacity, and mitigate post war violence. This study develops and tests hypotheses derived from Strategic Heterogeneity Framework.

As there is already a large qualitative and growing quantitative literature on unbiased peace operations, I chose to focus my empirical effort on the understudied biased dimension of militarized intervention. I identify two categories of biased intervention strategy: intervention partnerships and intervention patronage. Partnerships represent the low intensity variant where external actors facilitate but allow or require their targeted partner to remain the dominant political actor. In a patronistic intervention the external actor is predominant and the supported target is essentially a proxy or client to the external patron.

Empirically, I find that patronistic strategies are generally “winning” strategies. External actors who provide the preponderance of military and political capacity tend to achieve their near term political aims; however, winning isn’t everything. These same strategies set up perverse incentive structures which tend to create more authoritarian, less capable, and more violent post-war states. Partnership strategies, however, are no more likely to win a war than cases of non-intervention, but conditional on winning, democratization tends to be consistent with the degree of democratization that standard economic and social indicators would predict. The same holds for building state capacity. Partnerships also appear to reduce post war violence relative to cases of non-intervention and patronistic interventions alike.

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Chapter 1. The Goals and Strategies of Militarized Interventions

Introduction

Taking stock of the last ten to fifteen years of militarized interventions in wars where the primary dispute was over regime change, these actions appear unlike the 90's. Back then, the UN was typically looked at as the primary legitimate actor in interventions and the primary goals were impartiality and compromise for the sake of peace. More recently; however, interveners have tended to pick desired "winners" and "losers". For instance, NATO chose the Albanian Kosovars to win and Serbia to lose the Kosovo war. The United States intervened against the Taliban in Afghanistan in favor of the Northern Alliance. It also intervened to oust Saddam Hussein in Iraq in order to replace with a Western-styled democracy that would ideally be more sympathetic to US interests. Also, Russia intervened on behalf of South Ossetia against Georgia, France intervened on behalf of the internationally recognized governments of Cote de Ivoire and Mali, NATO intervened specifically against Mohmar Qadaffi in favor of the Benghazi rebels, and the US may in the future intervene militarily against the regime of Bashir al-Assad. It is likely Assad is already receiving covert military aid from Iran.

It's also important to note the vast differences in strategies employed in these interventions. The US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan were either planned or evolved into massive ground occupations that were both politically and socially intrusive. The political situation in these countries after 10 years of war is still highly volatile. France deployed limited ground forces in Cote de Ivoire and Mali which essentially softened targets that their supported partners could then engage and destroy. While there are undoubtedly still tensions, the prospects for these countries look somewhat brighter than the cases of either Iraq or

Afghanistan. The Libyan intervention looked much like Kosovo, primarily a NATO air war, but this time with no large scale post-conflict UN intervention. While a low level pro-Qaddafi insurgency still exists, the prospects of somewhat more representative and effective governance seem more likely. How much better (or worse?) might it have been with a concomitant UN peacekeeping force? These observations all point to an interesting puzzle. How do different intervention strategies, prejudiced as well as impartial, impact the prospects for particular post-war outcomes? Could “strong” strategies that are likely to ensure victory be fundamentally weak in terms of the post war environment, as they appear to be in Iraq and Afghanistan? Could “weak” strategies actually be more advantageous in terms of establishing peace and governance in the aftermath of war?

This study advances a framework and theory explaining how goals and strategies of military intervention impact post-civil war democracy, capacity and political violence outcomes. I argue that contemporary research has overlooked the importance of intervener’s intentions in a conflict and particularly that different goals and strategies can enhance or constrain the way states are shaped after war. Intervention is common in civil wars and intervener’s strategies match military means to preferred political ends. A key political end is often the outcome of the war itself--who wins and how strong they are after winning. Outcomes along with the strategies employed to pursue them significantly shape the degree of post-war state capacity, political violence and democratization. Thus, my first objective is to demonstrate that heterogeneity in intervener’s goals and strategies as well as the outcomes actually achieved help to explain the degrees of capacity, violence and democracy post conflict states experience. Not only do the scars of intervention linger into the post-war era, but, more importantly, the

strength of the intervention can potentially turn into a weakness after the fighting stops. Often these weaknesses can instigate tensions between goals of building state capacity, maintaining domestic stability and advancing democratization.

I argue that much of the contemporary influential scholarship mistakenly treats post war stability and democracy as natural complements. Scholars and practitioners often assume either a strategic preference for democratic regimes or the necessity of democratic process as a means for achieving increased capacity or the reduction of violence.¹ Neither is correct, without conditions. I suggest instead that the complementarity of these qualities is actually confined to a narrower set of contexts. The possibility of a non-democratic post-conflict peace as well as a non-democratic “strong” state emerging from war also needs to be evaluated. Under certain circumstances non-democracies may emerge who can create the capacity and institutionalization needed to foster a relatively calm post-war order. For instance, the Bolsheviks defeated the last of their challengers in 1922. Then, despite its “backwardness” and the interruption of World War II, went on to build a superpower empire. Furthermore, I argue scholars and practitioners need to take seriously the idea that under some circumstances, democratization as a component of intervention is not an optimal policy. Democratization calls for troop levels, deployment durations, and resource commitments that may be unachievable or at least unsustainable. If the process is left incomplete or tackled too timidly it can spark the same violent competition interveners attempted to halt in the first place. More importantly, in order to democratize after war an intervener and their local ally must first win the war. Intervention strategies designed to ensure a decisive military victory may actually undermine

¹ See for example Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Paris and Sisk(2009); Dobbins et al (2007)

democratization and stability goals in the post war environment. In other words strategies designed to bring a quicker end to the fighting may be mismatched to the goals of democratization. Successful interventions can create political conditions where democratic outcomes are unlikely to take root and can actually foster more instability and capacity degeneration.

Thus, my second objective is to explain under what conditions both post war stability and democracy are achievable and under what conditions they are non-complementary. In short, I propose to develop and test a theory of military intervention that explains how different strategies of intervention lead to distinctive post-war outcomes based on the choices of interveners and the context in which they operate.

Heterogeneous Goals: Stability and Democracy

It is a mistake to assume, as much influential literature does, homogeneity in intervener's goals and strategies. A key contribution this study makes is to identify that intervening states prioritize stability and democracy aims differently, which implies differences in the ways (methods) and means (resources) brought to bear to achieve those aims. For instance, peace operations are typically assumed to place high priority on both democratization and stability and build their strategies accordingly. Some interveners, however, may be willing to trade units of democracy in favor of more political capacity for their allies. Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues (2003) showed, for instance, that interveners rationally prefer authoritarian puppets (small coalitions) to larger democratic coalitions. A puppet knows it serves at the pleasure of its patron and is therefore more likely to comply with its patron's

aims. These authors demonstrated that 75% of defeated large coalition states were replaced by smaller coalitions whereas small coalitions became larger only 15% of the time.

Other interveners may be fearful of a rival's power but lack the material resources to decisively defeat their opponent in an interstate contest of arms. They may instead choose to back domestic rebellions in the target as a way of weakening that rival. Idean Saleyan (2009) showed, for example, international rivals are more likely to provide external basing for rebel groups operating in their opponent's territory. The rationale here is that a rival's rebel opposition provides a low cost alternative to direct action in keeping a state's opponent weak. If cross-border rebels are willing to do the fighting then the intervening state needs to commit less of its own resources across its borders. The intervener does not necessarily need the rebels to win, he only needs to keep them fighting. Intervening to destabilize seems rational then, especially if the intervening state cannot win decisively on its own strength. States engaged in international rivalries have sometimes based their opponent's rebel groups. These rivals have also been willing occasionally to up the ante and provide more direct combat support, with the intent of weakening their international rival. For instance, the Rwandan government has supported a number of rebel groups of its Congolese neighbor to the West, Libya supported Chadian rebels in the north, and Honduras supported the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. This support is meant to keep rebels viable and the rival government off balance.

Still other interveners may have the resources and political will to foster both stability and democracy, but may be faced with a target whose domestic context forces the intervener to prioritize one over the other. For instance, there may be no pro-democratic ally to back or the popularly supported pro-democratic faction is decisively maligned to the intervener's

interests; for example Hamas in the West Bank, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. From an intervener's perspective, a limited democracy or non-democracy that excludes or limits the power of these maligned interests may be preferable to the popularly democratic alternative. In any case, preferences for stability and democracy need to be problematized rather than assumed. We must also remain aware that even successful cases of democratization after intervention have often involved periods of non-democratic transition, as in the US trusteeship of Japan after World War II.

Not only can we not presume to know *ex ante* the intervener's priorities for stability or democracy outcomes; we cannot presume these goals, even if jointly pursued, are jointly achievable. Nevertheless, influential peace building/state-building literature often advances democratic process as a necessary element to concepts of state capacity or stability (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, Paris and Sisk 2009, Patrick 2011, Dobbins et al. 2007). For instance, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) require a democracy score of '3' from their democracy variable as a necessary and inherent component of strict post conflict peace. Similarly Patrick's (2011) index of state weakness or capacity includes citizens' freedoms and voice as inherent to the state's measure of strength. Rather than assuming democracy and stability are natural allies and in most cases mutually achievable, this study problematizes both, seeking to explain how the strategic choices of interveners and domestic context interact to create and constrain opportunities for both.

A large literature on authoritarian states supports this position. It attests to the fact that capacity generating and violence managing state institutions can develop without democratization (Gandhi 2008, Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, Przeworski et al. 2000, Collier,

Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2008). Furthermore, another school of thought argues that democracy is better sequenced at later intervals of the intervention and state-building processes. These scholars argue that when mass participation outpaces the institutional capacity to sustain it, politics can take a populist or nationalist bend, which can be disorderly and destabilizing (Deutsch 1961, Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002, 2005). The quantitative evidence supporting this claim is often contested, but a closely related qualitative literature has also traced through a number of case studies demonstrating how democratization and hasty electoral processes encourage new forms of violence and political instability within a society (Hoglund 2008, Reilly 2008, Snyder 2000, Lyons 2004). Others have suggested that a push for democratization also slows down economic recovery, one facet of state capacity (Flores and Nooruddin 2009). It seems misguided therefore to presume that a successful intervention strategy *requires* an input of democratic process. Scholars as well as practitioners should at least be cautious to the possibility that a given intervention strategy is likely to affect both outcomes; stability and democratization, differently. Democratization needs to be treated as an independent consequence of post-war state building, not an inherent element of it. See Figure 1-1.




Figure 1-1: Generic Models of Post War Outcomes

Heterogeneous Intervention Strategies: Partnership versus Patronage

If the actual goals of interveners vary, then it would also seem that no singular strategy is best for achieving this wide array of aims. That is, if we accept there are different destinations to be arrived at, then there are also different ways of getting to those destinations. For instance, if ending violence is a primary aim of an intervention; this goal can, in theory, be achieved with or without considering democratization and with or without considering the post war capacity or strength of the state. Intervening states could achieve their aims either by supporting an autocrat to power who oppressively ends the violence. This autocrat, however, may face a legitimacy deficit which foments the instability his rule was meant to thwart. Alternatively, states could authorize a multilateral UN peace mission with a mandate to break up the violence and install a power sharing regime. Imposed democratization may carry

legitimacy initially and defuse conflict, but without a favorable social context this can rapidly turn into a violent ethnic or nationalistic disaster (O' Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Lipset 1959, Mansfield and Snyder 2005, Przeworski et al. 2000, Schneider 2009). Both scenarios entail tradeoffs. With no readily apparent best answer, intervening states make difficult choices on whether and how best to intervene. We need to empirically investigate these relationships between intervention strategies and its outcomes. Only then can we gain clarity on how these different strategic choices impact propensities for particular post war outcomes.

I introduce a framework that categorizes interventions in terms of their *bias*, which describes whether the intervener intervenes on behalf of a warring faction or specifically against a particular faction. A second dimension, *intensity*, describes how politically and militarily intrusive interveners become in pursuing their preferred goals. For example, in the current conflict in Syria, Iran could be categorized as biased in favor of the Assad regime. This is because Iran is attempting to confer an advantage to Assad by introducing military capabilities such as intelligence gathering, counter-insurgency aid, and alleged direct combat support (Agence-France Press 2013, Black 2012). If the US or NATO were to militarily assist the rebels this counter-intervention would also be considered biased. Though, in this case, the bias would more likely be against Assad and not necessarily for the rebels. The direction of bias; however, is less relevant than the degree of bias. A strong bias for or against a primary faction implies an overarching goal of military victory or defeat for some primary faction. This will tend to make the nature of operations more offensively oriented and thus more lethal military capabilities are likely to be introduced. Operations will likely focus on the destruction of the opponent's war making capabilities including the destruction of their fighting force, supporting

infrastructure, and safe havens. These might include invasion, close air support, counter-insurgency, and other offensively oriented operations; see the right side of Figure 1-2.

Alternatively, the intervener can approach the target state as an unbiased or impartial actor, as is often assumed in United Nations and other multilateral peace missions. These interventions in principle are neither tilted for nor against particular factions. Goals are oriented toward conciliation and accommodation and operations oriented toward an 'active defense'.² In practice peacekeepers may have to eliminate the most intransigent of spoilers, but they generally try to avoid force on force engagements while still maintaining robust domestic security (Dobbins et al. 2007, Fearon and Laitin 2004, Fortna 2008a, Jarstad 2008a, Downs and Stedman 2002). Operations can take the form of protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure. They may include disarming and demobilizing belligerents. If fighting is still active, intervening forces may try to create red lines, buffer zones, and no-fly zones to keep artillery and aircraft out of range and prevent opposing belligerents from making contact. Ultimately intervention troops are there to end hostilities, facilitate reconstruction and foster locally legitimate governance. The capabilities brought to bear reflect those priorities; see left-hand side of Figure 1-2.

² As used here active defense refers to a military doctrinal term that characterizes a limited offensive role. The idea of an active defense permits offensive operations in defense of an area of responsibility (AOR) but strictly limits employment of offensive capabilities to prevent or preempt an enemy attack, not for territorial gain or expansion.




Figure 1-2: Intervention Bias and Intensity

The second dimension of military intervention focuses on degree of intensity. Intensity addresses how much control the intervener exerts over political and military priorities of the target ally. If the ally can be said to be autonomous, or not excessively influenced by the intervener then the intervention is low in intensity. If the intervener makes most of the political and military decisions on behalf of their client, and-or supplies the preponderance of military capability then the intervention can be said to be of high intensity. In most cases, the degree of intrusion and foreign resources is positively correlated, where the greater the ratio of intervener resources to domestic ally resources the more intensely the intervener dominates the political and military sphere.

Through intensity, interveners are either enablers or dominant actors. Low-intensity intervention implies the intervener acts as an enabler. External supporters play a support role,

and commit sufficient resources to help domestic actors fill capability gaps while the partner works to build its own capacity. Political and military priorities are still nominally set by domestic actors. Foreign assistance in biased interventions may be in the form of intelligence gathering or combat support. Assistance in unbiased interventions may include monitoring support, disarmament and demobilization support, peace-keeping support, and emergency humanitarian assistance. Regardless, interveners act as supporters to locally controlled efforts.

On the high end of the intensity spectrum intervening states become dominant actors. They often bring the preponderance of military capabilities and often set the political and military priorities of the supported target. In unbiased interventions, the intervener may play role of a peace-builder or peace maker. Interveners deploy large troop contingents capable of providing immediate security, reconstruction, and transitional assistance. The goal is to impartially get the nation back on its feet, but domestic forces may be crowded out or subordinated to interveners for most of the operation. Biased high intensity intervention strategies tend to involve large contingents of the foreign supporter's armed forces. Alternatively, these interventions may entail substantial support of a local client the intervening state controls as the US did in Nicaragua with the Contras and Iran did with Hezbollah in Lebanon. After victory, the intervener ostensibly turns over rule to their domestic ally and withdraws or substantially draws down its support.

I argue that bias and intensity interact creating various incentives for supported allies to pursue particular military outcomes (e.g. victory, stalemate, compromise) and to democratize, build local capacity and build legitimacy in the war and post war environment. The first impact of an intervention strategy is to make particular war outcomes more or less likely. As an

intervener moves higher or lower on the bias and intensity dimensions its preferences and resolve change with respect to a military outcome. High bias implies a strong preference for a winner or loser but not necessarily a strong commitment to seeing that victory though. Conversely, high intensity implies a strong stake and commitment of resources, but not necessary to the benefit of any one side. The strategic choices of interveners thus influences the outcomes local actors are likely to pursue. Local actors who receive high bias-high intensity support for their allies are likely incentivized to pursue a military victory. These local actors will have extensive political and military support on which they can draw upon to make that victory happen. A low biased-high intensity actor however may try hard to impose a negotiated settlement, preferring a neutral solution to a conquest. Local actors unable to overcome their opponent or the impartial interveners have some incentives to reach a compromise rather than pursue victory.

More importantly, these strategies impact how much “self-help” is required from the supported faction. The more self-reliant factions are during war the more likely they can adapt those competencies to effective post war governance. Capable coalitions during war are more likely to produce capable states after war. Similarly, the more self-reliant the faction, the more legitimate their rule is likely to be perceived. Capable factions in war are more likely to earn the perceived right to rule after war. My Strategic Heterogeneity Framework explains how various strategies generate these incentives and quantitatively and qualitatively test their implications.

It is important to note that contemporary peace building and transitional assistance literature already confirms some of these intuitions. For instance, a number of scholars have noted a dependency dilemma with states receiving transitional aid. The dilemma manifests

such that the more intensive the aid recipient states obtain from their patrons, the more recipients are disincentivized to build local capacity. By deferring and deflecting calls for reform, recipient states try to keep their patrons in place, nursing off their capabilities rather than growing self-sufficient (Keohane 2003, Krasner 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2004). Jarstad (2008a) identifies a systemic dilemma in peace operations whereby intense operations for the sake of security undermines the development of democracy. Edelstien (2009) notes that as peace interventions become larger and more intrusive, resentment builds which can in some instances rekindle violence. Most of these studies also seem to concur that while less intensive operations might be desirable for a number of reasons, they are also more prone to failure.

Much less analysis is available however for the biased half of Figure 1-2. Quantitative work on the post war consequences for interveners actively participating in occupations, insurgencies, counter-insurgencies, allied foreign internal defense or any other intervention designed to either protect or overthrow the authority of the regime in power is much less developed. This is unfortunate because these kinds of operations constitute the majority of external state interventions. As Table 1-1 shows, biased interventions occur twice as often as more impartial ones do. In fact, most peace operations occur in the context of some other biased intervention, another reality not accounted for in much of the peace building literature. In light of these observations and the apparent increase in major power involvement in regime wars it seems crucial to develop a better understanding of the post-bellum consequences of biased interventions. A center piece of this current study is filling some of that void.

Table 1-1: Cross Tabulation of Regime Wars that Experienced Biased and Unbiased Interveners 1975-2009

		Unbiased UN peace op		total
		no	yes	
Biased intervener	no	49	5	53
	yes	39	26	65
Totals		87	31	118

Data adapted from Regime War dataset. 49 of the 119 cases are the baseline category of non-intervention. There are 31 cases of unbiased intervention and 65 of biased, more than twice as many. Of the 65 biased interventions in the dataset 39 were completely biased and the other 26 experienced some form of UN intervention in addition to prejudiced interveners. Only 5 cases in the dataset experienced unbiased intervention only.

I conceptualize two subcategories of biased interventions. The first are partnerships which occupy the high bias-low intensity quadrant of the bias-intensity coordinate system. Partnership strategies are generally designed to provide direct military support to an ally, but at lower costs to the intervener. These strategies are designed to add short term capacity to an ally's capabilities with an expectation that the ally still takes the lead in developing an organizational and institutional capacity to war fight and state build. Put another way, partnerships moderately enhance the ally's prospects for victory and all the post conflict advantages victories confer without excessive political or military interference from the intervener.

A patronistic intervention occupies the high bias-high intensity quadrant of the bias-intensity coordinate system. Here, the intervener substantially interjects its own resources and capabilities in place of the client's in hopes of a quicker and more certain outcome, usually victory. Interveners assume a dominant role in both military and political decision making for their client. The clients also bypass much of the 'normal' domestic capacity generation and state building processes that would otherwise accompany civil war. These strategies

deemphasize the legitimacy gains that either a domestic self-help victory or a hurting stalemate can confer on a post-war order. Consequently, the client attains a disproportionate degree of power relative to the amount it earned by its own efforts. This makes the client largely beholden to the preferences of her patron. Patron preferences substantially influence the nature of the postwar regime as well as the capacity and stability of the state.

Key Findings

Overall, I show that patronistic strategies are generally “winning” strategies. External actors who provide the preponderance of military and political capacity tend to achieve decisive victories and attain political power. However, winning isn’t everything. These same strategies set up perverse incentive structures which tend to create more authoritarian, less capable, and more violent states. Even in cases where the interveners are able to impose some democratization it often comes at the cost of state capacity and increased post war political violence. This bears out in case analyses as well. Partnership strategies, however, are not significantly more likely to win a war than cases of non-intervention, but conditional on winning, democratization tends to be consistent with the degree of democratization that standard economic and social indicators would predict. The same holds for building state capacity, these interventions do not significantly enhance or detract from the degree of capacity other common predictors would otherwise suggest. Partnerships do appear; however, to confer an advantage in reducing post war political violence relative to cases of non-intervention and patronistic interventions. The light foot print of these operations avoids the severe legitimacy deficits associated with more intense forms of intervention and makes managing dissent in the aftermath of war more achievable.

More importantly, unless concepts of democratization, stability, and capacity are disaggregated as they are in this study, it would be impossible to assess the real impacts of intervention. For instance, in a “stability + democracy” variable like the Doyle & Sambanis’ (2000, 2006) *peacebuilding success*, the underlying degree of democratization or stability could be masked by the other component. A country like Kosovo, for example, would be coded a peace building ‘failure’. This is because Kosovo has not enjoyed any interval in its post conflict history from 1999-2010 that did not contain at least a low level violence or contested sovereignty component. Yet, the institutions of democratization profoundly improved Kosovo’s democracy score. As I will show in the case examples later, its democracy score (XPolity) raised 3 points compared to their score as a province of Serbia prior to 1999 while it was in transition; and raised a total of 7 points by the time it became an independent state in 2008. The peace building Rather than observing a generic peace “failure” we observe a “successful” democratization which nevertheless incurred a lot of violence and instability. By separating democratization from stability it becomes clearer that the intervention strategy applied in this case had a positive impact on democratization, even though it exerted little effect on violence.

A different strategy might have a larger impact on stability, but the society itself remains largely authoritarian which might also be flagged a ‘failure’. This could again mask the real underlying impacts of an intervention. Eritrea for example was one of the most domestically non-violent states in my regime war dataset after its war for independence. Yet this case could potentially be coded a “failure” if the democratization criteria called for a successful case to be

at least an anocracy (Polity \geq -5).³ Furthermore, if democracy were fused or conflated with capacity, Eritrea's strong authoritarianism (Polity =-6, -7 after 2001) might lead one to conclude it was also low capacity. However; extractive measures of capacity, such as relative political capacity (RPC), reveals that Eritrea had one of the most successful relative post war recoveries of any state in the dataset (more on this in Chapter 6). The intervention strategy employed in Eritrea corresponded to better stability and capacity, despite a poor absolute showing in democracy. In short, variance in interveners' strategies implies a variation in post war outcomes as well. Now, in order to explore these relationships more systematically I need to define clearly the relevant concepts in this study.

Key Concepts and Definitions

Regime War

The Strategic Heterogeneity framework described above applies to regime wars. I define regime wars as wars in which the main issue of contestation is the right of a sitting government to continue to rule within the internationally recognized boundaries of a state. This contestation can arise either as a civil war or in limited cases of interstate war. In civil wars incumbent governments are pitted against an organized domestic opposition who seeks to redefine the regime in ways that either put rebels in power themselves (revolution) or remove the authority of the current regime over a portion of territorial state and transfer it to the rebels (i.e. secession).⁴ An intervener in these wars participates as a joiner to one of the

³ To be fair, Eritrea did in fact meet the Doyle and Sambanis criteria; however had Eritrea's Polity score been just one point lower it would register a failure on D&S scale as well.

⁴ By this definition cases of "extrastate" wars involving colonial powers are included in the definition of civil war on the grounds that a domestic opposition rises to challenge the authority of an incumbent (colonial) government.

contesting factions. Regime wars also include interstate wars where the initiator seeks to remove the incumbent regime from power as the primary strategic aim but does not seek territorial gains for itself (e.g. the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan). With victory the initiator installs new leaders and new rules of the game the intervener believes are better suited to its foreign policy interests. This replacement regime is nominally sovereign, though in practice the intervener may still maintain significant influence.

Military Intervention

Of central importance to this study is the concept of military intervention itself. I define military intervention as the direct or indirect use of military power to influence the outcome of a violent political contest. Direct use of military power includes the use of foreign troops in combat operations. Combat operations include the use of ground troops in combat, impositions of no-fly-zones as well as sea based air and missile attacks against an opponent. Ground troops are the most common force associated with combat operations. Indirect use of military power involves the augmentation of an ally's combat power through joint operations or force protection provided through basing access. The support does not involve the interveners' forces in offensive combat operations. Typical support may include ground and aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, co-operative intelligence gathering, and combat logistical support.⁵ While the intervener's forces may not be actively killing its ally's opponents, its military capabilities are integral to the combat effectiveness of their ally. Indirect support also occurs when interveners allow their ally access to their own territory for military purposes.

⁵ For example the United States since 2001 has established the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. The task force performs non-combat intelligence and counter-terrorism tasks in support of the Philippine Armed Forces operations.

Here the intervener's military forces act as a deterrent or real threat to unauthorized forces who contemplate crossing their international border. Simultaneously, the intervener allows the ally coalition to operate in its territory increasing its survivability and combat effectiveness.

This definition is consistent with international legal interpretations as well. For example, the International Court of Justice in its decision against the United States regarding US support for Nicaraguan Contras states:

It considers that if one State, with a view to the coercion of another State, supports and assists armed bands in that State whose purpose is to overthrow its government, that amounts to an intervention in its internal affairs, whatever the political objective of the State giving support. It therefore finds that the support given by the United States to the military and paramilitary activities of the *contras* in Nicaragua, by financial support, training, supply of weapons, intelligence and logistic support, constitutes a clear breach of the principle of non-intervention (International Court of Justice 1986).

The legal definition above does not consider explicitly the status of the foreign party when its actions are on behalf of a target government, but it does establish a context of an attempt at regime change. My definition relaxes the assumption that support is given to an opposition "armed band" and allows for the possibility that external states may seek to coerce internal oppositions in defense of a ruling government. It also establishes that intervention can involve indirect as well as direct (combat troop) assistance. So the use of foreign military resources for protection, logistics, and intelligence is consistent with an international legal interpretation as well.

Intervention Strategy

Military intervention strategies relate who an intervener supports and with what methods and resources in order to obtain their political objectives. Strategies map out how many and what kinds of forces are deployed and the types of operations these forces will conduct. Operations can be major offensives, counter-insurgency, humanitarian assistance,

etc., including any number of combinations. The size of the force and the tasks it will perform vary between interveners and can vary across interventions by a single intervener. In all cases though, strategies are designed to meet the intervener's political objectives at acceptable costs. So while larger more intense interventions may seem superior to smaller ones, the value of the outcome to an intervener is not necessarily worth the cost of a very large force. Also important is the fact that the relationship between strategy and objectives is a probabilistic one. A good strategy is no guarantee of good outcome. A strategy intended to produce victory for an ally may nevertheless end in compromise or stalemate, with all its attendant consequences.

Military Outcomes and Regime Change

Intervention strategies can directly affect the propensity for certain military outcomes. For instance, a high bias-high intensity operation would presumably increase the likelihood of the supported side achieving a military victory. Military outcomes, in turn, define how a violent military contest ends and affects the propensity toward achieving particular political outcomes; that is whether the sitting regime survives, falls, or changes as a result of victory stalemate or compromise.

Sitting regimes survive one of two ways. The first is through a government victory. If government forces win a decisive military victory they destroy their opponent's capacity and or will to fight. The ante-bellum ruling coalition reasserts its primacy and authority across the entire territorial state and maintains sole control of the state apparatus. This is in fact the most common outcome. The second way a regime survives is through a stalemate. In a stalemate the government is unable to defeat their opponent but neither are they defeated by their opponent. A case of dual sovereignty continues to exist over the territory (Quinn, Mason, and

Gurses 2007). The nominal ruling coalition continues to enjoy *de jure* sovereignty over the state and its institutions, but may not exercise *de facto* authority across its entire territory. The rebel opposition may in fact politically control some parts of the countries territories reducing the overall political reach of the government.

A grey area exists in the realm of a compromise or negotiated settlement. These cases often involve some change in the rules of the game and some change in the composition of government through power sharing. Because rules and composition of the government are altered relative to the antebellum status quo, it constitutes a “change” in regime. However, the ante-bellum ruling coalition may still retain a preponderance of political and economic power. Though they must now share some of their power they nevertheless also survive the challenge of the rebels by not being outright defeated. So, these cases exhibit attributes of both regime survival and change. Ultimately, I classify these cases as ones of regime survival because antebellum status quo leaders choose to allow new members and modify their existing rules. Though rebels may extract high costs these same rebels could not impose this choice on the status quo regime. An intransigent government could plausibly accept a stalemate rather than grant political concessions. Cases of such regime survival exist in places like El Salvador after their civil war was ended in 1991 and in Nepal when the Maoists were conceded seats in the Nepalese government in November of 2006

Regimes can also change in two other ways. In the case of successful revolution victorious rebels turn into the new government, exert their political primacy over the country and assume control of the state’s institutions. In secessions victorious rebels compel prior sitting governments to relinquish sovereignty over a portion of the country. Rebel elites

become the ruling coalition of a carved out portion of the old state's territory and construct their own independent state institutions within their newly defined borders.

Democracy and Democratization

Democracy in this study pertains to an explicit set of rules, institutions, and practices that define a governing regime. The rules include a right to free and fair competition for political power and the right to participate in selecting those in power for all adult citizens (Dahl 1972). Institutions are in place to administer elections, provide appropriate checks and balances on the unlimited and arbitrary use of political power and to ensure the regime's integrity (Stepan and Skach 1993, O' Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Finally, the vast majority of citizens and elites alike practice those rules (Linz and Stepan 1996b). Democracy can be a part of effective state-building, but state building does not necessarily have to include democracy to effectively build capacity.

Democratization then is the advancement toward greater degrees of democracy. This can occur by two means. First is the strengthening of democratic institutions in terms of openness and fairness of who is permitted to compete for political power, who is allowed to select those to be empowered, and what issues are up for debate and decision (agenda). It can include rules enfranchising a larger group of citizens and new governing practices that allow issues onto the agenda in order to compete for votes. Second, democratization can be achieved by further liberalization. Liberalization opens up political society. It provides for free press, property and speech protections as well as the right to form political and civil associations. To the degree these rights are upheld it offers further checks and balances against government power as well as increases competition. Free press and free speech allows the calling out of

government officials and the dissemination of information on how politicians behave. The rights to freely associate allow citizens to mount stronger and more coordinated oppositions to current government policies and practices (assuming these oppositions are enfranchised under current rules); effectively increasing the competitiveness for power in future elections. Democratic interveners often attempt democratization through liberalizing reforms in their targets, though not always.

State Capacity, Capabilities and State building

State capacity is the second post-conflict empirical quantity of interest. Conceptually it describes the latent potential of the state. It is the ability of the state to draw upon its organizational, material and human resources to create governing capabilities. These capabilities in turn assist the state in achieving its political goals. A state with limited resources can nevertheless be high capacity to the extent that it makes better use of those resources than a state more endowed but utilizing less. While capacity is analogous to the concept of efficiency, it is not quite the same. Capacity relates to a latent input, how much of a state's resources can be made available for any number of purposes. Efficiency relates to output, how well a process performed relative to a theoretical maximum. For example, a high capacity state may be able to extract upwards of 20% of its citizens productivity toward state goals. This is equivalent to saying a state's tax revenues are 20% of its gross domestic product. If the state is efficient than all of 20% is put to effective use, none is wasted. An inefficient state may have high capacity but through corruption and waste lose many of the capabilities their capacity should otherwise afford them.

States building is the process of constructing an ever more functional state. It is the process by which underlying capacity is converted into actual capabilities which allow states to achieve their goals, including becoming a strong modern state. While there is no universal consensus of what the capabilities of a modern high capacity state are or ought to be, four are common to many conceptualizations. These functions are providing physical security as well as political, economic and social order. Physical security protects subjects and territory from the threats of domestic and international actors. Political order provides for effective implementation and enforcement of enacted laws. It encapsulates both the solidity and effectiveness of government. Economic order consists of the policies and regulations that allow for economic growth and integration into global or regional economies. Finally social order refers to policies and practices that mitigate social grievances within a society. It encapsulates well-being--e.g. education, health and basic subsistence. To the extent governments become more competent in any or all of these they build "stronger" states.

War can create incentives which encourage coalitions to build capacity so that this capacity can be converted to military capabilities. It also pits the war making capabilities of one opponent against that of another. One consequence of this contest is that if coalitions can grow or exploit their capacity more efficiently than their opponent then they can create advantages on the battlefield which help them win the contest. The overarching desire to win can increase the impetus to develop these efficiencies (Tilly 1985, Levi 1981, Organski 1997). War also destroys a state's capacity. As soldiers are killed, resources consumed and political life altered by the conduct of war, the very institutional basis, manpower and material that underwrites a state's capacity is eroded. This erosion means fewer resources are available for the state to

sustain or create new capabilities. If destruction outpaces the countervailing rates of capacity growth the coalition may be weakened and eventually defeated or forced to the negotiating table.

Political Stability and Violence

Political stability is the last of the three major post war outcomes under investigation in this study. Conceptually, stability pertains to the peaceful management of political dissent. Dissent does not necessarily have to be absent in a polity for that polity to be stable, but differences are managed to an extent that most members of a society do not expect or anticipate a change in what is accepted as normal political intercourse. As some political scientists put it, stability implies accepted political rules and practices are expected to persist indefinitely (Schneider 2009).

Political stability is also linked closely to political legitimacy. A regime is legitimate to the extent it is the “the only game in town” and has earned (or consolidated) the right to rule in the minds of a relevant majority (Linz and Stepan 1996a). I argue though that this right does not necessarily have to be democratically earned. In the context of a post conflict society, it typically means the government or rebel group has defeated all serious challenges to its rule and is the sole dominant political actor; or combatants have reached a hurting stalemate and come to accept a power sharing arrangement (Rustrow 1970, Zartman 1985). Though governments and rebels alike may promise a democratic program, power sharing arrangement or liberalizing reforms, it is entirely possible that the regime can be repressive, quite exclusive in who can rule and who selects who comes to power. To the extent that the affected society sincerely complies with their ruler’s decrees and attempts no serious challenge to the new

status quo, rulers can be said to have legitimacy. Compliance with their decrees may be begrudgingly but it is real.

Once the domestic regime, its rulers or its policies are contested outside of normal political intercourse legitimacy is lost and instability can emerge. Instability manifests in a number of forms: strikes, protests, riots, terrorism and in more severe cases recidivism back to insurgency and civil war. Instability can also set up a vicious circle of declining capacity and capabilities which in turn can foster more volatility. Instability *taxes* the capacity of states by compelling the state to expend more energy enforcing compliance or enacting knee-jerk policies in attempt to mitigate the disorder. Consequentially, the expected persistence of a given set of rules, institutions and practices comes into question.

The actions of foreign interveners can compound this problem to the degree their strategies enhance or diminish the legitimacy of their target. Who an intervener supports and how intently can add or detract from the in power group's perceived right to rule. Supporting a popular government against terrorists or a popular insurgency against tyrants may garner support, whereas propping up an otherwise inept government who ought to be replaced by an alternative coalition can undermine legitimacy. The ways in which interveners join a conflict also matters. A massive and intrusive intervention can feel like an occupation eroding the legitimacy of an intervener's client. Local rulers may appear as puppets or lackeys to foreign or colonial master. A moderate more limited scope mission, however, can give ownership of the war making-state making processes to domestic belligerents, enhancing the victor's legitimacy at the end of conflict. In short, stability is impacted not only by the outcomes of war but can to a substantive degree be impacted by how the war was fought.

Plan of the Study

The remainder of this study sets out to develop and test hypothesis regarding the implications of biased intervention. Chapter 2 examines the question of whether intervention strategy alters incentives to pursue decisive victories versus alternative war outcomes. I demonstrate that regime wars that attract biased interveners are more likely to end in decisive military victories. More importantly, the more intense an intervention (patronage strategy), the higher the propensity for victory. This holds especially if the intervener sides against a sitting government. A high bias-high intensity intervention on behalf of a sitting government interestingly has a counter-intuitive effect of forcing a compromise. This is likely due to an appreciation of current and future capacities of the government and the incentives of the intervener. In short, during the conflict the government coalition likely has a highly favorable balance of power with the presence of a foreign patron. This capacity makes it harder for rebels to win and may in turn make them more amenable to compromise. Also, interveners do not want to face an indefinite commitment to their ally, so they may pressure that ally to compromise, especially if rebels are willing to concede some of the intervener's demands. The threat of protracted insurgency may also encourage interveners to pressure their partners to compromise. Governments, realizing they will become weaker if their external ally backs out may also then be willing to compromise. Thus, government strength in war and some power of rebels to extract costs creates the counter-intuitive result of encouraging compromise.

Chapter 3 explores the implications for intervener's strategy on democratization. It shows that high intensity strategies and victory both discourage democratization. That is, patronistic strategies have anti-democratic implications which are only made worse by success.

The logic behind this outcome is simple enough. When an intervener provides most of the war fighting capabilities the supported client faces few imperatives to open its coalition to a broader membership. The client requires little from their own domestic constituency therefore they offer that constituency very little.

A notable exception to the rule is the case of democratic patrons. It is presumable that non democratic states do not normally encourage democracy in the states they intervene upon. A democratic patron, however, may or may not insist that their client institute democratic or liberalizing reforms. On one hand, Suzanne Werner(1996) notes states prefer regimes that are more similar to their own, so democratic patrons may prefer that their clients also be democratic. On the other hand Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) note that intervention occurs because the intervener wants a foreign policy good. These goods are more likely to be sustained with a puppet versus a locally accountable democrat; therefore even democracies may prefer less democratic clients.⁶ Empirically however, the client of a democratic patron whose is victorious will tend to exhibit greater degrees of democratization than states receiving no assistance. Democratization in the case of partnerships tends to reflect the degree of democratization that other social and economic indicators would otherwise predict. These strategies neither add nor subtract significantly from the normal expectations of democratization.

Chapter 4 demonstrates that the price of victory and democratization through high intensity interventions is a deficit in post war stability and capacity. This chapter shows that

⁶ Bueno de Mesquita et al. actually uses the term small coalition for puppets and large coalition to imply a more accountable ruler. Large coalitions are not definitively democratic but are often interpreted to imply democratic systems.

states who receive patronistic aid tend to exhibit lower levels of state capacity and higher degrees of instability relative to post war states who receive no intervention. The democratic character of the intervener has no bearing on these outcomes. This occurs in part as a consequence to the organizational and institutional incentives set up by patronistic interventions. Because the patron does most of the war-fighting, the client has few incentives to build an indigenous war making capacity. This lack of self-help means that clients are organizationally and institutionally less mature than other states that received no intervention and experience lower levels of capacity and stability as a consequence.

Partnerships strategies on the other hand are no more or less likely to cause target state vulnerability to low state capacity. Surprisingly, partnerships actually improve stability relative to non-intervened upon states. Arguably this is because the intervention was sufficiently small that the ruling coalition was able to exploit some additional breathing room to create enough local capabilities to manage domestic dissent and build internal legitimacy. Well-tailored intervention strategies may also confer external legitimacy to a post conflict regime. Partnerships reinforce commitments to the post war regime to maintain the peace while avoiding the pitfalls associated with perceptions of occupation. Potential spoilers/challengers cannot attract sufficient support to challenge the new status quo and are discouraged from operating out of bounds from normal political intercourse.

The final two chapters explore selected cases of regime war in more detail. In these cases I employ process tracing to show how an intervener's choice of strategy impacted its likelihood for victory, incentives for democratization and capacity development and the target state's ability to manage domestic dissent and violence. I also trace how regime characteristics

of the intervener interact with strategy to influence democratization of the target. Chapter 5 explores the incentive structures created through high bias-high intensity patronistic interventions. I explore the cases of Syria's intervention in Lebanon and NATO's intervention in Kosovo. The cases are similar in light of the fact that the intervener abolished the antebellum regime and set up one closer to its own preferences. They differ in that the intervener was authoritarian in one context and democratic in the other. In the Lebanese case Syria sought a compliant Lebanese ruling coalition who would accommodate Syrian interests in a larger regional strategy against its adversary Israel and rivals in the conservative Arab states. Syria's intervention stunted Lebanon's indigenous political development and ultimately set up a 14 year puppet state that finally fell in the Cedar Revolution of 2005. To this day however, Syria still plays a substantive and deleterious role in Lebanese politics.

The second case is that of the NATO intervention in Kosovo. This case examines how democratic patrons are seemingly compelled to establish democracies as part of their strategy of intervention but nevertheless undermine the quality of that democracy and their concomitant goals of stability and capacity by pursuing a high intensity strategy. In order to preserve regional tranquility NATO felt it had to marginalize the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and its patriarchs lest they provoke nationalist hostilities with Serbia and their own minority Serb communities. The KLA and its premiere successor party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), were blocked from the positions of power and prestige they felt they earned as the nation's liberators; to be replaced by NATO and UN preferred moderates who during the war were largely discredited for their failed intervention-seeking policies. Former KLA groups then resorted to post war violence and intimidation as well as turned to criminal enterprises which

undermined legitimate capacity development to get what the NATO imposed system denied them. While Kosovo emerged as an ostensibly democratic state nine years after NATO intervened, it was plagued with bouts of instability and uncertain state capacity as democratic goals continuously competed with rather than symbiotically reinforced capacity and stability priorities.

Chapter 6 explores how lower intensity intervention strategies-- partnerships-- can actually encourage democratization, capacity development, and domestic political tranquility. I explore the Eritrean Independence struggle. Eritrea demonstrates the potential for positive capacity growth, relative domestic stability and some democratic advancement (though short lived) as a consequence of intervention "self-help. The fact that Eritrea had no democratic interveners acting on its behalf also lends credibility to the claim that the democracy gains that were made were in fact created by the imperatives of self-help and not confounded by democratic interveners. Though an extremely poor state, Eritrea's relative capacity and cohesion (stability) increased remarkably. Eritrea enjoyed support from its neighbor Sudan as an ally of convenience. Sudan offered no offensive combat support, but provided invaluable defensive and logistic support. Eritrean rebels were allowed to establish headquarters and logistics centers at major Sudanese ports and cities, which protected them from Ethiopian strikes and allowed rebels to sustain a large and dispersed force almost indefinitely. Rebels were still reliant on their own where-with-all to develop their fighting capacity and hold and govern captured territory. To accomplish this, the primary resistance group the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) developed an essentially social democratic model of political-

military organization to attract a broad base of popular support.⁷ It also innovated a number of organizational efficiencies to create the capacity it needed to cope with the capabilities of its much larger opponent. This “self-reliance” model proved remarkably effective in generating both the capacity and legitimacy the EPLF needed to wage war with Ethiopia. It used this capacity to attract rebel allies in Ethiopia. By 1988, Eritrea had turned the tide of the war against Ethiopia’s Dergue regime and by 1991 had won de facto independence. Amazingly for as poor as Eritrea is, it still registers high marks for relative capacity and internal stability.

This case also demonstrates the democratic dangers of victory. The early years (1991-2000) showed some democratic promise. The EPLF/PFDJ enfranchised women, held a free and fair referendum for independence in 1993, and elected a transitional government who authored Eritrea’s constitution. Eritrea’s first (and thus far only) president Isaias Afwerki was freely and fairly elected under the referendum’s provisions. Having eliminated all other opposition groups in the course of fighting, however, the victorious EPLF /PFDJ faced no sufficiently organized and capable post-war challengers. President Afwerki has yet to implement all the constitutional reforms his party authored and ratified in 1996. Elections that were supposed to have been conducted in 2001 were indefinitely postponed under the pretext of the continuing border dispute with Ethiopia since 1999. In sum, the EPLF/PFDJ maintained the liberalizing reforms it needed to attract followers during the war, but once the new regime was victorious and firmly established in power it ceased promoting new reforms.

⁷ In earlier phases it was Marxist inspired. However ,once the Soviet Union sided against the Eritreans they dropped Marxism in favor of more Western oriented social democratic models

Chapter 2. Intervention Strategy and Winning

Introduction

Wars of regime change have taken center stage in recent international politics. The Arab Spring witnessed relatively pacifistic regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt, but the path to change in Libya and presently Syria has been much more tumultuous. Governments and rebels in these countries no doubt sought the help of foreign friends to help them defeat their adversaries. In the case of Syria, we witnessed an alleged willingness on the part Russia and Iran to prop up the challenged regime of Bashir al-Assad; but reluctance by the United States and its Western allies on side of the rebels. Presently only Turkey and Israel have made small incursions into the fray, and those primarily in retaliation for ordinance that crossed their international borders (Agence-France Press 2013, Black 2012, Kenner 2012). If one steps back to take an eagle's eye view of intervention in wars of regime change, one discovers that the majority (55%) of these wars experienced direct military intervention , where direct implies access to troops, access to the military infrastructure of the intervener, or unfettered access to the intervener's territory to conduct military operations. If "soft" support is included, support such as the transfer of weapons, financial and non-combat material aid, and training, then 85% of these wars experience some form of external interference.¹ This raises an important question from the perspective of academics and practitioners alike; how do these variances in intervention strategies shape the outcomes of these wars?

Though foreigners sometimes initiate a regime war by invading to topple a sitting government--e.g. the United States invasion of Afghanistan-- most regime wars are wars within

¹ Based on Correlates of War data version 4; 1975-2009

states. Studies of these types of wars offer a launch point for discerning which factors of war and intervention influence war outcomes. Studies of intrastate wars however have paid insufficient attention to how intervention strategies, particularly biased strategies, affect war outcomes. Most studies instead focus on how other characteristics of the war, such as structural conditions of the state, or broadly defined dyadic characterizations of government and rebels affect the likelihood of a particular kind of war termination (Cunningham, Skrede Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009, Mason and Fett 1996, Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999, Licklider 1995, DeRouen and Sobek 2004). Those that have studied the role of intervention and war outcome have done so with broad strokes, ignoring the potential heterogeneity of intervener goals and strategies, and tending to treat interventions as if one size fits all, or focusing on the ‘fact-of’ termination rather than the mode (Regan 2002, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008, Gent 2008). These studies tell us that interventions generally tend to lengthen war; biased interventions make wars shorter while multilateral interventions have no effect on the duration of war and that interventions on behalf of governments and rebels have different risks for concluding in a victory, compromise or stalemate. What are missing in these studies are explanations of which interventions on behalf of governments and/or rebels are likely to produce particular outcomes. Under what conditions do governments win or rebels? When do they compromise? By assuming relative homogeneity in interventions, scholars have not reliably distilled whether certain intervention strategies victory more likely over compromise or a compromise over stalemate, etc.²

² Patrick Regan (2000, 2002) has probably advanced the quantitative literature on biased intervention the furthest. He found that a mixed strategy of intervention, one that applies both financial and troop support is more likely to end a conflict, but did not take the next step which is to explain what kind of termination is most likely.

This chapter contributes to the war outcome literature by explicitly developing and testing hypotheses which distinguish different strategies of intervention and explains how these different strategies correlate to war outcomes. The distinction is useful in at least three ways. First, it takes a stronger capabilities approach to intervention. Modern intervening states can introduce an array of capabilities into a combat zone which enhances the military capacity of their local allies. Military interventions are most commonly associated with the introduction of foreign ground troops into a target country, but interveners can provide a host of other capabilities which enhance the combat power of their ally. These include cooperation in intelligence sharing, providing a wide array of air support and surveillance missions, as well as providing access to territory which provides defensive protection and the opportunity for offensive military surprise.³ These capabilities, in combination with or in spite of troops, confer certain battlefield advantages to the ally at the very least keeping rebels or struggling governments viable much longer than the case where groups have no support. These augmented capabilities in turn affect the risks associated with a particular type of outcome. As capabilities change so do the likelihoods of victory, stalemate or compromise.

Second, characterizing interventions through their strategies also accounts for the intervener's own willingness to accept costs and risks. In homogenizing biased intervention strategies scholars have tended to overlook the fact that some interventions have been as small as a few hundred troops or as large as a few hundred thousand.⁴ These differences are meaningful, they reveal strong information about how much cost and risks interveners are

³ For instance, Turkey allowed Iraqi soldiers to march through Turkish territory in order to launch surprise attacks on Iraqi based PKK rebels.

⁴ The US intervention in Iraq launched with a force of 285,000 and peaked at around 320,000 troops.

willing to assume in the course of conflict as well as how much value the intervener places on the prize. Relatedly, intervention strategies reveal the local partners liabilities; that is, how much of its own capacity a local coalition must generate itself if it wishes to win. This question of local capacity is explicitly addressed in Chapter 4. Most importantly, it seems almost common knowledge that the amount or intensity of capabilities brought to bear matters just as much, if not more than the mere fact of these capabilities being brought to bear. Yet, studies of militarized interventions often fail to account for this in explaining war outcomes.

Lastly, and closely related, different strategies may be designed with specific outcome goals in mind and therefore make those outcomes more likely than others. Sometimes interveners want an outright victory; sometimes they may prefer their supported group just remain viable enough to force a compromise--which the intervener will also likely be party to. A full scale invasion looks quite a bit different than a peace-keeping force. It may even be the case in interstate rivalries that State A intervenes on behalf of his State B's rebel group in the hopes that a perpetual stalemate keeps State B weak (Salehyan 2009). In any case, ignoring the heterogeneity in interveners' goals (which outcomes are preferred) can mask important elements of a strategy that would suggest that in a particular case victory is more likely than compromise or stalemate or vice versa.

In the remaining sections I conduct a brief literature review on the factors that promote decisive military victories and compromise settlements in terminating civil wars. Next, I derive testable implications for how biased intervention strategies, both partnerships and patronistic, affect the propensity for particular war outcomes. Then, I lay out my research design and test these hypotheses. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of results and possible implications for

post-war outcomes. This final section also sets up later chapters where I show that though certain elements of an intervention helped achieve a favorable short term outcome, these same elements can also be associated with longer term deleterious effects.

Brief Literature Review

A seminal work in the civil war subfield and arguably the work which inspired much of the subsequent scholarship on war outcome is Licklider's "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlement in Civil War" (Licklider 1995). He established that war outcomes have consequences, namely that wars which produce a victory are less likely to recur than wars that end in negotiated settlements. This also provides the rationale for pursuing victory in the first place. He argued the reason negotiations fail are because negotiated settlements allow the competing factions to maintain their capacity to resist, while victories tend to destroy the other sides ability to resist, making resumption of the war less likely. This of course sparked the question, what are the determinants of whether a war is resolved through victory or a negotiated settlement?

Mason and Fett (1996) used formal modeling and statistical evidence to illustrate when belligerents are more likely to pursue outright victory or accept a negotiated settlement. The key determinates for them related to the characteristics of the war itself. Wars were likely to continue until one side was victorious as long as either side expected that the future utility for victory was higher than present utility for compromise; that is, when probability estimates for victory were high, war deaths were kept low, the expected time to victory was short or the payoff of victory large. When both sides expected that costs of continuing the war were greater than the value of victory itself then both sides would negotiate. In general, the longer the war

and more costly it was would increase the likelihood of negotiation and reduce the likelihood of victory. They also argued that the larger the government army the more disproportionate battle deaths were likely to be and the more likely governments were to win.

DeRouen and Sobek (2004) looked to the capacity of states to explain both the duration and ultimate outcomes of civil war. Their findings supported some previous findings relating to outcome but contradicted others. For instance, DeRouen and Sobek found that large state armies increase the likelihood of all outcomes relative to ongoing war, not just government victories.⁵ Simply put, a large army makes for shorter wars, but all potential outcomes were more likely: government as well as rebel victory, stalemate or compromise. More importantly, state capacity (measured as bureaucratic quality) had the expected effect of reducing the likelihood of rebel victory, but it also had the counterintuitive effect of making government victory also less likely as well. The authors surmised that rebels do not seek decisive force-on-force engagements when facing a stronger state. Rather, they will go into insurgency mode and attempt to erode the state over a protracted period of time. Alternatively, rebels may simply recognize they cannot defeat a strong state and are therefore more predisposed to accept a stalemate or compromise. Finally, the authors noted that if state geography favors insurgency, rebel probabilities of victory, compromise, and truce are all more likely.⁶ In sum, high state capacity makes victory for the rebels much less likely but does not necessarily confer any victory advantages to the government itself.

Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009) extended the capacity analysis to include rebel capabilities as well. They expressed capacity in relative terms as a ratio of rebel force

⁵ See also (Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999)

⁶ See also (Fearon and Laitin 2003)

strength compared to the governments. They found that when rebel military capabilities are stronger or at parity with the government's, that outcomes more favorable to rebels are likely (i.e. victory or settlement). Two other proxies for capacity, territorial control and legal political wing, yielded somewhat more sketchy results. Territorial control by rebels tends to keep wars enduring but there is no evidence confirming or disconfirming the increased likelihood of a decisive outcome. A legal political wing was more likely to make wars end but it remains ambiguous as to whether a negotiated or decisive outcome is more likely as a consequence.

None of the above mentioned studies, however, accounts for the role of interveners' capacity and capabilities. Civil wars are not isolated to the troops and local capabilities governments or rebels can bring to bear. Local capabilities more often than not are augmented by foreign powers on one side or the other, and these capabilities are not necessarily accounted for in a government and rebel size or capacity measures. This study corrects this shortfall by explicitly examining the intervener's contribution to military capacity, and testing the impact it has on military outcomes.

A number of studies have looked directly on the impact foreign interveners have on regime wars, but most have also missed important nuances in their constructs of intervention or wars of regime change. Walter showed third party security guarantees can help belligerents overcome their domestic security dilemma and make negotiated settlements more likely (Walter 1997, 2002). An important corollary to her claim however, is a finding that an actual bargain (versus negotiation talks) is more likely when a de facto stalemate is already acknowledged by both sides. In other words, impartial third parties do not really shape war

outcomes; instead, they “lock-in” a tentative consensus already achieved by the local belligerents (and any biased interveners acting on their behalf).

Suzanne Werner (1996) investigated when foreign imposed regime changes are more likely and what factors contribute to its success or failure. Key to her analysis is the fact that in order to impose a regime change, the challenger must win. Thus, a state once invested is more likely to escalate and continue to the point of victory (i.e. successful regime change) rather than limit their aims. She also notes that large differences between intervener and target regime impacts whether regime change is successful. Explicitly, democratic regimes are more likely to view non-democratic regimes as a greater threat and will therefore try harder to win⁷. Foreign initiated regime changes however are only a small subset of regime wars. It is unclear how well these findings carry over onto the more common category of regime war, internationalized civil wars.

Balch-Lindsay et al (2008) examined the impacts of biased interventions in civil wars. They found support for the claim that when one side receives a biased intervention, while the other does not; that the side receiving aid is more likely to be victorious. However, this advantage diminishes with time. Interventions that last a long time lose their initial effectiveness. Balanced interventions--i.e. intervention + counter-intervention-- lengthen the duration of wars and significantly reduce the likelihood of rebel victories or negotiated settlements. Governments still maintain a slight edge in the probability of victory. They also find support for the claim that governments who negotiated in past wars are less likely to win outright current wars, and that more capable states make decisive outcomes more likely than

⁷ For other arguments as to why democracies fight harder see (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003)

negotiated outcomes. Gent (2008) found evidence that a biased intervention on behalf of one party is likely to trigger a counter-intervention on behalf of the other. These studies however fall victim to the charge that they treat intervention as one size fits all. For instance, can interventions really be considered “balanced” if one side gets minor aid as say the Taliban received from Pakistan while the other side receives massive troop support such as the 30,000 plus US troops the Karzai regime can call upon for assistance; most likely not. Researchers can gain more clarity on likely war outcomes by accounting for the nature and characteristics of the interventions themselves.

In sum, while the literature to date has presented many useful insights into how particular outcomes are achieved in wars of regime change they often do not reach deep enough into the dynamics of intervention that most of these wars experience. Studies focusing on the characteristics of the war itself have tended to neglect the role of interveners or categorize intervention as a one size fits all phenomenon. State/rebel capacity studies have done a better job focusing on the capabilities of governments and rebels, but pay insufficient attention to the capabilities (and limitations) that foreign interveners may also bring to the fight. Peace building and third party impartial interventions offer important insights on the impact of interventions after war, but in so doing fail to consider that the specifics of agreements reached are often a consequence of battlefield realities and the prior failed or successful (biased) strategies that brought them about. Impartial interveners do not shape war outcomes so much as they attempt to lock in those already achieved. By conceptualizing interventions as different types designed to achieve different goals, this study seeks to add

greater clarity as to when and how different intervention types contribute to the likelihood of specific war outcomes, especially victories.

Biased Interventions and the Expectation of Decisive Outcomes

The heterogeneity of goals and capabilities that can be introduced into regime wars leads to the conclusion that different strategies have different likelihoods of decisive and negotiated war outcomes. This section explores one aspect of that claim by developing and testing hypotheses for how biased interventions; those that employ either a Partnering or Patronistic strategy, are linked to particular war outcomes.

Partnership strategies are characterized by relatively high-bias and low intensity. In practice, this means the intervener has a preference for who wins or loses but the value of victory is not high enough or urgent to warrant a more forceful response. The intervener wants to help but at the same time it is more conscientious of its own costs. Specific strategies may entail logistical, intelligence, and combat operations support. At a peak, partnerships may even include the employment of small or moderate contingents of foreign troops in ground combat operations. In all cases, the goal is keeping the supported side viable as it musters its own domestic war making capacity until a victory or settlement can be achieved. Since the goal is implicitly not to lose one expectation is that when either side is supported with a partnership, the opponent is less likely to achieve a decisive victory. This can be restated as:

H1: When coalitions are supported via a strategy of partnership their opponents are less likely to achieve victory relative to outcomes of compromise or stalemate

A stronger variant of this hypothesis follows the conventional intuition that support of any type augments the capabilities of the supported side and makes this side more likely to achieve victory.

H2: When coalitions are supported with a partnership strategy they are more likely to be victorious compared to other war outcomes (opponent victory, compromise or stalemate). Victory is also a more likely outcome compared to the probability of victory in non-interventions.

The presence of interveners also undoubtedly creates new information and expectations about capabilities. As governments or rebels see more troops, more weapons, and perhaps even better military tactics and techniques employed on the battlefield, it may cause leaders to reassess their comparative strength, the resolve of their opponent (and the opponent's ally) in the face of these new capabilities and the value of pursuing a decisive versus negotiated outcome of the war (Goemans 2000, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008, Fearon 2004). A coalition receiving partnership support, believing it can sustain itself longer or inflict more harm on its opponent, may hold out for an eventual victory or ask for more than an opponent is willing to concede in a compromise settlement. In cases where partner capacity cannot decisively overcome an opponent's war making capacity this can drag a war on in a protracted stalemate.

Additionally, as Cunningham notes, while interveners may enter a conflict in support of a particular side, the aims of intervening states may not be completely congruent with the aims of the side they support. Because they are lending support, they will expect some voice in a

final settlement. The presence of a partner introduces another veto player into the mix, which reduces the win set of compromises all parties can agree to (Cunningham 2010, Tsebelis 2002). In sum, both capacity miscalculation and the narrowing of mutually agreeable bargains could undermine compromise outcomes in favor of stalemates were victories cannot be achieved.

H3: When coalitions are supported with a partnership, the likelihood of a compromise solution is reduced relative to stalemates.⁸ The likelihood of compromise is also reduced compared to the probability of compromise in non-intervention.

Patronistic intervention strategies are characterized by both high bias and high intensity. High bias means the intervening states has a definite preference for outcomes. It is on the side of its client. More so, the high intensity dimension reveals that the value of the outcome for the intervener is high; enough so that it is willing to commit a significant amount and variety of resources to the fight. This includes in many cases putting a substantial numbers of their own troops in harm's way. In short, patronistic strategies imply the introduction of a significant amount of lethal and non-lethal capabilities to the fight. As such we might expect the side which receives patronistic support is more likely to win compared to other outcomes as well as compared with less intense strategies.

H4: When coalitions are supported with patronistic strategies they are more likely to be victorious compared to other outcomes and are more likely to be victorious compared to partnership and non-intervention strategies.

⁸ The expectation of increased likelihood of victory is already captured in Hypothesis 2

Research Design

Methodology

I use multinomial logit models to test the hypotheses constructed in the previous sections. Multinomial logit is an appropriate choice based on the fact that multiple categorical outcomes are possible and these outcomes are not necessarily ordered. The multinomial logit model is limited however in the fact that the coefficients cannot be interpreted in a straight forward manner. The coefficients represent likelihoods relative to one of the other nominal categories. Underlying probabilities are masked. For example, the dependent variable in this study, *war outcome*, has four possible end states. If end state '4' (stalemate) is chosen as the baseline, the model only reveals how much more or less likely end states 1-3 are relative to 4. It cannot directly reveal how end state 1 relates to end state 2 or end state 2 to end state 3, etc. These relationships are however derivable from any single model (Long 1997). For ease of comparison I run the regression using two different baselines, compromise and stalemates.

It is also analytically important to consider how similar war outcomes are related across different strategies. For instance, how much more likely is a victory for either side given a partnership on its behalf compared to the case of non-intervention? How much more effective is a patronistic intervention than a partnership or non-intervention for either side? Do interventions generally discourage compromise or is compromise discouraged when one particular side receives external military support? To make these types of comparisons I used CLARIFY to simulate predicted probabilities of a baseline non-intervention profile and profiles that were identical in all respects except receiving a particular type of intervention. I then

calculated first differences and 95% confidence intervals to determine whether these differences within outcomes were meaningful.

Cases

I define regime wars as wars in which the main issue of contestation is the right of an incumbent government to continue to rule within the internationally recognized boundaries of a state. Regime wars include both civil wars where rebels seek to replace the central government in total, and secessionist wars where rebels seek to redefine the ruling regime of a portion of an original territorial state. It also includes a subset of interstate and extrastate wars where the initiating state seeks regime change as its primary objective (versus territorial control) but works beside or through some domestic agent to achieve its goals. Cases are drawn from the Correlates of War (CoW) Version 4 datasets from wars ongoing as of 1975-2009 that meet the regime war criteria.⁹ From this definition, 121 wars were identified.

Next these wars were categorized as to whether they experienced biased intervention. A biased intervention occurs if a state which is not a primary warring party participates by providing militarized aid to one of the primary parties. Primary warring parties are themselves, the parties that formed the original incompatibility (Petterson 2011, Hogbladh, Petterson, and Themnér 2011). Secondary parties are additional parties to the war--i.e. not essential to the incompatibility.¹⁰ Militarized aid consists of the provision of *troops* for combat or direct voluntary access to the intervener's military infrastructure and territory. Data on militarized

⁹ Specific datasets include the interstate war v4.0; intrastate wars v4.1; and extrastate wars v4.0. Cases are limited to wars that were ongoing as of 1975 or started after because of limitations of other supplemental datasets; specifically, the UCDP External Supporter Dataset Version 1 which covers the period of 1975-2009

¹⁰ In cases where external states initiated the war through or alongside a local proxy, I define the local proxy as the primary party and the controlling external state as a secondary party. This is to maintain conceptual consistency of the idea that the foreign power is an intervener in the target as opposed to a conqueror.

support is collected from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) External Support Project v1. One exception to this rule is troop support. I code troop intervention if either CoW or the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset provides indication of external combat troop support.

Coding the Strategy of Interveners

Finally, interventions were categorized as to the specific strategy used to assist primary warring parties. Strategies describe how secondary parties participated to achieve their goals. They were coded either as either *partnership* or *patronistic*. To operationalize partnerships I first consider only the subset of interventions on locally formed group. A locally formed group is one where the leadership is indigenous to the target state and the group itself was created to address local incompatibilities prior to an intervener's involvement.¹¹ I then coded as partnerships all interventions for which the supported group received direct support below the threshold of troops--i.e. access to military (intelligence) infrastructures and territory. This is reasonable because as the concept of partnership is defined, the target ultimately controls the processes through which these resources are employed. This is not to say that interveners do not have a say; but without a physical presence they cannot veto or redirect current operations.¹² The intervener defers to its target ally.

¹¹ Locally formed groups are essentially an independent entity from the intervener supporting them. I attempt to exclude movements that were created by external actors for their own political agenda. For example Laurent Kabila's Alliance for the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADFL) was a creation of Paul Kagame and Yoweri Museveni rather than a legitimate domestic opposition. Kabila was a Congolese face to attach to their desired intervention in Zaire (Stearns, 2010). While local grievances are at play the group was constituted primarily and officered by foreigners. In these cases, the groups are coded as clients receiving patronistic intervention from their external supporters.

¹² External partners could feasibly deny continued future support if clients do not direct resources how the intervener prefers; but this is unlikely because as Werner (1996) and Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2003) note, once a state intervenes it assumes some audience costs. Withdrawing short of achieving goals will appear as either a bad initial decision or an incompetent lack of resolve.

The trickier part of coding partnerships is determining, when troops are involved, whether these troops primarily played a support role or a domineering role. If foreign troops mainly augment capabilities and enable their ally to continue prosecuting the war it is a partnership. However, if the intervener deploys relatively large contingents of troops and begins to “take over” the ally’s military and political functions, pursues its own aims using the ally as a proxy or conducts most of the fighting, the strategy is patronistic. In practice, to distinguish between troop partnership strategies and patronistic strategies I looked for evidence from 4 primary sources that the intervening troops did not do any of the following: Pursue a clearly independent agenda on target territory, establish a large occupation force --i.e. did not deploy the preponderance of power, direct their ally’s military or political actions--i.e. did not establish interim governments or government positions that the foreign powers controlled, and as already mentioned did not form the resistance group itself.¹³ If any of these actions were evident then the intervention was coded patronistic, otherwise I coded the intervention a partnership. Figure 2-1 depicts a decision diagram of the coding procedures.

¹³ The sources used to code included Cunningham’s (2010) dataset on the independence of intervener’s aims, Clodfelter’s (2008) *War and Armed Conflicts 3rd ed.*; DeRouen and Heo’s (2007) *Civil Wars of the World Vols. 1&2*, and Sarkees & Wayman (2010) *Resort to War 1816-2007 (Washington D.C.: CQ Press)*, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualties and Other Figures, 3rd Ed. (Jefferson, NC: Mc Farland & Company)*, If case studies in any of these sources contradicted each other, or I felt there was insufficient information to make a coding decision I consulted additional historical sources.




Figure 2-1 Coding Decision Diagram for Categorizing Intervention Strategies

A few brief examples can illustrate how different interventions are coded.¹⁴ Syria's intervention in Lebanon would be coded patronistic on the grounds that Syria had an agenda that was independent of the primary grievance (initially the influx of Palestinians from Jordan). Rather than resolve the Palestinian issue or the indigenous sectarian grievances, Syria used both as leverage to puppetize various Maronite and Muslim ruling coalitions. Lebanon became a Syrian client-state in a larger regional political game. The US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan are coded patronistic on the grounds that the US fielded the largest military in the theater, commanded and controlled most of the fighting, and assumed an interim governing role until an acceptable government could be installed. Rwanda's and Uganda's support of Laurent Kabila's Alliance for the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADFL) is coded patronistic on the grounds that the ADFL was essentially chartered and led from Kigali.

¹⁴ I have also created a coding notes appendix that details how I justified the coding of each case.

Kabila did not have the means or influence apart from his patrons to establish and control his resistance movement (Stearns, 2010). Cuban support of the Ethiopian regime in the Ogaden War; however, is considered a partnership. The Cubans fought back the Somalis and Ogaden rebels but left Ethiopia to its own devices, and nominally independent of its ultimate Soviet backers, to contain other rebellions in the Tigray and Eritrean provinces. Support was limited to the battlefield itself. In short, partnership strategies were coded if the supported group is indigenously formed, the intervener provides direct support other than troops, or troop support that does not contradict or supersede the target's military and political control. All patronistic interventions involved the use of combat troops; furthermore, these troops either support a "local" resistance group created by interveners, direct the military and political actions on their side of the conflict, or represent the preponderance of military capability in the target state.

Control Variables

Military Capacity: Military personnel are one indicator of a target government's capacity. Mason and Fett find that the size of a government's army is associated with increased odds of a government victory, while De Rouen and Sobek claim that a large army can have the counterintuitive effect of making a government victory less likely as rebels will avoid direct confrontation and employ insurgent tactics. In either case I want to control for the size of the army both to insure that any increased or decreased probability in victory is a consequence of the additional resources and capacity the intervener contributes and not simply a factor of the state's capacity. I use the *milper* variable in the Correlates of War National Military Capabilities Dataset coded in the year the war started divided by the total population to get my variable

military capacity. For cases of colonial wars I use the milper and population values for the colonizer.

In a handful of cases population was not available for the start year of the war. In these cases I estimated a predicted value of population regressing calendar year on the first five recorded observations available after the start year. In six of the cases the size of the army was also not available in the start year of the conflict but available either the first calendar year before the start of the war or the first calendar year after the war. I used these values as an estimate. In one case, Liberia, data on military personnel was missing for five consecutive years, while population data was available for the start year. In this case I linearly interpolated the size of the force from the last prewar observation to the first post war observation to get approximately 4000 troops, and compared this result with size of battles and troop data from Clodfelter (2008). The differences were comparable, within 1000 or a difference of .03 troops/1000 citizens.¹⁵

War Duration: A general consensus has developed in the literature that as wars endure the likelihood of victory is diminished for both governments and rebels. One exception is Cunningham et al. finding that rebels may have a marginal advantage in achieving victory as the war goes on. In either case the effects of duration need to be controlled for. I code the duration in months from initial onset to final termination.

War Costs: Empirical evidence suggests that war costs can also influence outcomes. Specifically, costlier wars are expected to make both rebels and governments willing to negotiate (Walter 2002). Version 4 of the Correlates of War data records estimates for both sides of conflict

¹⁵ Results of the interpolated data and when the case is dropped were virtually indistinguishable in the regression analyses that follow.

rather than states only. I calculate war costs by summing the battle deaths on both sides of the conflict, dividing that sum by the number of war months, then dividing by the total population. The units essentially describe the proportion of the target population depleted each month of the war.

Economic Development: Economic development has been linked to shorter wars and more likely decisive outcomes as opposed to negotiated settlements (Balch-Lindsay et al 2008). This is because more developed societies presumably have access to more sophisticated, and in a military sense, more lethal technologies. Access to lethal technologies should help governments shorten wars and defeat rebels not likely to have as permissive access to these weapons. I use Balch-Lindsay's (2008) measure of economic development taking the natural log of the sum of primary electric consumption and iron and steel production as coded in the CoW National Military Capabilities dataset.

Separatist Conflicts: Separatist conflicts have been linked to being both more tractable with regard to negotiated settlement as well as more intractable. For instance Mason & Fett (1996) argue that because separatist conflicts do not threaten the core of a central government, these types of conflicts ought to be more amenable to negotiation. Walter (2004) however argued that governments are more likely to resist giving into secessionist demands. This is because granting concessions to one group may embolden other groups to ask for concessions as well. The government in order to avoid the breakup of its state has incentives to squash any and all separatist demands. CoW codes a variable for war type which describes the general nature of the war. One type (war type==5) describes civil war over local issues and includes actions that seek to modify the treatment of a particular group, change the local regime or secede from the

state wide system. Each of these descriptions is consistent both with the separatist idea that the demands do not directly threaten the core of the central government, while at the same time potentially risking the chance that by conceding any of these demands, other social groups will ask for more (see also Sarkees & Wayman 2010). I create a dichotomous variable that is coded '1' if CoW indicates it is a war over local issues (secessionist/autonomy) and zero otherwise.

Ethnic War: Licklider (1995) argued that wars of identity are likely to be much more intractable compared to wars over ideology. This is so primarily because identity represents an indivisible good that cannot easily be bargained over. Thus, ethnic wars are expected to be less likely to produce a negotiated settlement as compared to a decisive outcome. I rely on Doyle and Sambanis' ethnic war variable from their civil war dataset of civil wars to identify cases of ethnic war. A number of cases in this study extend beyond the time frame of Doyle and Sambanis dataset. In these cases I first looked to see if the disputants had a history of fighting that extended into the Doyle and Sambanis dataset. If it did and that previous war was coded as an ethnic war then I coded the later one ethnic as well. Otherwise, I relied on historical and case study sources to make a judgment of whether or not a chief incompatibility lay across ethnic lines.

Post-Cold War: Fortna notes an empirical trend of victory rates going down as a function of time particularly after the cold war (Fortna 2009). She reasons that the end of Cold War created more space for peace-building and thus made draws or negotiated settlements more attractive than what they would have been when the US and Soviet Union were constantly threatened by

each-others interventions in all corners of the globe. I code a dichotomous indicator of post-cold war for all regime wars beginning in or after 1989.

Results

Results for the multinomial logit analysis are recorded in Table 2-1. Results are reported first for the probabilities of government and opposition victories relative to compromise outcomes and the last three models report coefficients relative to stalemate outcomes. Again, while coefficients and standard errors are reported for different baselines, all of the parameters are derivable from a single baseline model. Underlying probabilities of outcomes are also not discernable directly from multinomial logit models, so I also report a table of mean predicted probabilities generated from CLARIFY simulations of the model coefficients. These results are reported in Table 2-2. The simulation profiles are calculated for post-cold war probabilities of each strategy where all continuous variables to their means and all other dichotomous variables, except the strategy under test to zero.¹⁶ Finally, I calculate first differences and 95% confidence intervals of the baseline with each of the strategies to test for significance of the strategies relative to non-intervention. These differences are depicted graphically in the figures accompanying the description of results. The remainder of this section discusses hypothesis testing and finding by each strategy type respectively.

¹⁶ War intensity is actually set to its median value. A small subset of outliers skews the mean into its fourth quartile, but does not substantively change regression results when excluded. I interpret the use of the median value as a more “typical” predicted probability of outcomes.

Table 2-1: Multinomial Logit Model of Victories

	Gov Victory (vs. compromise)	Rebel Victory	Gov Victory	Rebel Victory (vs. stalemate)	Compromise
	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>
<i>Partner-gov</i>	1.75* (1.04)	1.18 (1.06)	0.81 (.7)	0.23 (.75)	-0.94 (1.02)
<i>Patron-gov</i>	-4.39*** (1.25)	-3.86*** (1.34)	-2.73** (1.17)	-2.19* (1.21)	1.66 (1.07)
<i>Partner_rebel</i>	-0.55 (.94)	0.3 (.99)	-0.38 (.59)	0.48 (.74)	0.18 (.9)
<i>Patron_rebel</i>	1.28 (1.2)	3.33*** (1.1)	-0.06 (1.07)	1.99** (.95)	-1.34 (1.32)
<i>Military capability</i>	131.20* (73.06)	136.97* (71.96)	6.07 (11.42)	11.85 (24.87)	-125.13* (74.34)
<i>war months</i>	-0.03*** (.01)	-0.03*** (.01)	-0.02*** (.01)	-0.02*** (.01)	0.01 (.01)
<i>war intensity</i>	-3.23 (2.19)	0.11 (.07)	-2.4 (2.48)	0.94 (1.73)	0.83 (1.75)
<i>econ dev</i>	-0.25 (.2)	-0.31 (.27)	-0.21 (.17)	-0.28 (.23)	0.03 (.21)
<i>sepratist</i>	1.71** (.8)	1.13 (.94)	0.6 (.65)	0.03 (.65)	-1.11 (.84)
<i>ethnic war</i>	-1.56 (.99)	-1.65* (.96)	-0.97* (.57)	-1.06* (.64)	0.59 (.94)
<i>post-cold war</i>	-2.90*** (.91)	-2.36** (.95)	-1.73** (.78)	-1.19 (.74)	1.17 (.81)
<i>constant</i>	6.67*** (2.36)	6.31** (2.72)	4.84*** (1.84)	4.49* (2.31)	-1.83 (2.36)
<i>N</i>	119				
<i>pseudo R-Sqr</i>	0.2451				
<i>Log-Likelihood</i>	-120.48				

(std err); *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table 2-2: Predicted (mean) Probabilities of Intervention Strategies

	baseline	Gov partner	Gov patron	Rebel Partner	Rebel Patron	Counter Intervene
Gov Victory	0.376	0.549	0.043	0.245	0.167	0.400
Rebel Victory	0.244	0.224	0.044	0.354	0.671	0.349
Compromise	0.112	0.031	0.567	0.158	0.023	0.044
Stalemate	0.267	0.197	0.345	0.243	0.138	0.208

Government Partnerships

Hypothesis 1 which states a partnership on one side should reduce the likelihood of victory on the other is not supported. In Model2 and Model4 which report the likelihood of rebel victory relative to compromise and stalemate, the coefficient for *government partner* is not in the anticipated direction. It is positive but not significant. This implies that rebel victories are still more likely than compromise or stalemates even when governments have assistance. It does not necessarily imply government interveners actually benefit rebels. Instead, what is more likely happening is that increased government capabilities are narrowing the opportunities for compromise, and forcing belligerents to commit to decisive war aims; victory if possible otherwise stalemate. This conclusion is supported partially by the predicted probabilities reported in Table 2-2. The table shows that when governments have a partner, government victory is the most likely outcome, followed by rebel victory. Probabilities for compromise and stalemate are reduced relative to a non-intervention though stalemates still trump compromise in absolute terms.

Hypothesis 2 states that partnerships in general are more likely to produce victorious outcomes relative to other outcomes. This hypothesis is supported for some outcomes but not generally. In Model 1 the coefficient for government partner is positive and significant at a $p < .1$ level. This suggests that governments' propensity for victories are increased relative to compromise when governments enjoy external partnerships. According to the predicted probabilities in Table 2-2, the difference in likelihood of victorious versus compromise outcomes jumps from a 27 percentage point difference (0.38-0.11) to a 54 percentage point difference (0.55-0.03). In comparison to stalemates, the coefficient for government partner in

Model 3 is positive but not significant. Victories tend to occur more often but insufficient evidence exists to claim victories are significantly more likely to occur than a draw. Finally, Figure 2-2 plots the differences in probabilities relative to non-intervention. In this case the data show a government victory is about 17 percentage points more likely but this difference fails conventional significance tests.




Figure 2-2: Predicted probability change of Government Partner vs. Non-Intervention

Hypothesis 3 claims the likelihood of compromise is reduced when either faction receives partnership support. This hypothesis is affirmed in comparison to non-intervention. Compromise appears 8 percentage points less likely to occur compared to non-intervention and the results are significant at $p < .1$.¹⁷ Also, the coefficient for *government partner* in Model 5 suggests that stalemates are also more likely to occur than compromise within the context of partner intervention, but these results are not significant. Referring to Table 2-2, both

¹⁷ I varied the control covariate parameters individually from their 10th percentile to the 90th in this simulation and all the proceeding ones to check for change in significance relative to baselines. Unless otherwise noted, the significance or non-significance of an outcome was not affected by a change in the profile parameters. In this instance, compromise was still significantly less likely under all of these conditions.

categories experience a small drop--6-8 percentage points--relative to non-intervention and the distance between them increases 2 points, from 15 percentage points to 17.

In short, the impact of government partnerships appears substantive, about a 17 point increase in the probability of government victory compared to non-intervention, and greater than 50/50 chance in absolute terms; but these results are statistically still uncertain. What does appear a bit more certain is the observation that partnerships on behalf of governments reduce the incentive to compromise. This makes practical sense. Governments receiving partnerships are nominally still masters of their own destiny; they are not likely to be compelled to negotiate. Furthermore, the augmentation of capabilities, *ceteris paribus*, should increase their propensity for a decisive victory.

Government Patronistic Support

Hypothesis 4 anticipates that higher intensity strategies should lead to victory when compared to other outcomes and strategies. The multinomial models and corresponding predicted probability simulations however reveal a number of counterintuitive results. The most prominent results include a finding that patronistic interventions on behalf of governments reduce the probability of victory for both governments and rebels alike. In Models 1-4 the coefficient for the *government patron* term is negative and significant in all four cases. This implies that within the context of an intervention compromise or stalemate are more likely outcomes than a government victory or rebel victory, despite the nominally large increase in government capabilities. Similarly the probability changes plotted in Figure 2-3 suggest similar relations with respect to non-intervention. High-intensity interventions on behalf of

governments reduce the likelihood of victory for both governments and rebels compared to the case of non-intervention; furthermore, the probability of compromise is significantly increased.




Figure 2-3: Predicted probability change of Government Patron vs. Non-Intervention

The original hypothesis was motivated by an expectation that the increased resources (especially troop presence) and commitment by the intervener increased the likelihood that the supported side would attain victory, but in the case of governments other countervailing tendencies may be at work. A perceived increase of government capacity may encourage rebels to use insurgent tactics rather than seek a decisive victory (DeRouen and Sobek 2004). Rebels will rely on ambushes, raids, and other hit and run tactics to avoid force-on-force engagements yet erode government capacity (and political will) over time.¹⁸ If rebels cannot win, they may prefer a negotiated settlement that affords them some measure of power and security versus the uncertainty of a prolonged stalemate.

¹⁸ Though beyond the scope of the present study, the claim that a high-intensity strategy incentivizes insurgent tactics, which preclude victory, can be tested more directly. The test would involve interacting patronistic strategies with data on rebel use of insurgent tactics, available in Kalyvas and Balcelles (2010). If the interaction term were negative and significant with respect to victory, it would suggest that the combination of strategy and its likely response is indeed precluding victory.

Governments and their allies, meanwhile, will find that they must spread their large forces thin to protect all critical targets. This disbursement neutralizes offensive capability and forces governments into a defensive posture. With most resources allocated to protecting government resources rather than destroying rebel resources, the government cannot win, even if it is also not likely to lose while interveners are present. If a decisive victory appears out of reach or at least too costly in terms of time, treasure or domestic political “face”, patrons are likely to prefer quicker outcomes to protracted ones and conclusive outcomes to uncertain ones. These patrons may use what leverage they have over their supported clients to push a compromise (versus an uncertain indefinite stalemate).¹⁹

In sum, both sides may actually have strong incentives to compromise when governments receive high-intensity interventions. A ruling coalition that is too strong with the help of patrons and too weak without them cannot win easily. Such coalitions are too vulnerable without the support of a patron and too strong to draw their opponent out in the presences of the intervener. The supported government is more likely to comply with patron demands to reach a reasonable settlement given the coalition’s continued need for patron support and the patron’s need to end the war with “results”. Government elites who refuse risk being abandoned or replaced by more compliant clients of their patrons. Rebels are more likely to settle because ‘something’ is better than ‘nothing’ and a third party guarantor who has a stake in a stable outcome makes enforcement of any agreement reached between the primary belligerents more credible (Walter 1997).

¹⁹ It is also important to consider that under such circumstances the rebels have bargaining leverage. Any agreement reached is probably more credible given third party interests than without them.




Figure 2-4: Difference in Probability for Patronistic vs Partnership Strategies on Behalf of Governments

Finally, Figure 2-4 above compares the first difference of predicted probabilities between government patronistic strategies and partnerships strategies. Results are similar to the comparison of patronistic strategies to non-intervention. Government and rebel victories are significantly less likely. A compromise solution is much more likely compared to partnerships. Lastly, the tendency for stalemate increases with a patronistic strategy but these results are not statistically distinct from the probability associated with partnerships. Decisive victories are most likely when they are supported with partnerships or not at all.

Rebel Partnerships

Across the five models the *rebel partnership* term exhibits the anticipated direction but is not significant in any case. Rebel partnerships do not significantly increase the likelihoods of any outcomes relative to others. Though not conclusive, the coefficient for *rebel partner* is negative in Model 1 and Model 3, suggesting government victories tend to become less likely relative to compromise and stalemate when rebels have outside assistance. Relatedly, in

Models 2 and 4 the positive coefficients for rebel suggest an increased, though not significant, trend of rebel victory. In terms of predicted probabilities, the results appear analogous to the case of partnership for governments. See Table2-2. The most likely outcome of a rebel partnership is a rebel victory, followed by a government victory, then stalemate and compromise. The same logic driving outcome tendencies when governments have partnership support seem to be at play when rebels enjoy partnerships.

Rebel partnerships also do not increase the propensity of any particular outcome when compared to a baseline of non-intervention. From Table 2-2 a government's probability of victory drops 13 percentage points and a rebel's probability of victory increases 11 percentage points with rebel partnerships, but these differences are not distinguishable from the baseline. Also, unlike governments, rebels appear to be slightly more inclined to compromise when they have external supporters. The probability of a compromise outcome increases about 5 percentage points when rebels have partners, but this a relative increase of about 45%. An increase in rebel capabilities may give some states pause to consider a settlement, but generally speaking compromise remains the least likely overall outcome. Figure 2-5 below plots the probability change of war outcomes for a rebel partnership versus the case of non-intervention.




Figure 2-5: Predicted probability change of Rebel Partner vs. Non-Intervention

Rebel Patrons

The findings for patronistic support to rebels are of particular importance. A high intensity strategy on behalf of some opposition group seems the most intuitive approach for an external actor who has a high value for forced regime change. High intensity interventions notionally give external actors a greater say in local politics. The increased investment of military resources should also make a decisive victory much more likely. Models 2 and 4 support this expectation. The coefficient for *rebel patron* in both models is positive and significant. A rebel victory is significantly more likely than a compromise settlement or stalemate within the context of intervention. Similarly when rebel patronistic support is compared to the case of nonintervention rebel victories are significantly more likely and this result is significant with a 95% confidence interval, see Figure 2-6.




Figure 2-6: Predicted probability change of Rebel Patron vs. Non-Intervention

Rebel patronistic support also seems to significantly undermine compromise. In model 1 the positive coefficient for rebel patron suggests that even despite a potential disadvantage government victory is relatively more likely than compromise. In Model 2 rebel victory appears significantly more likely as the coefficient is positive and attains statistical significance. Similarly, in model 5 the negative coefficient suggests that compromise is less likely relative to stalemate. This undermining of compromise is made clearer in Table 2-2. The probability of compromise drops from .11 to about .2 when rebel patron support is compared to non-intervention. This corresponds to a relative 80% drop. Figure 2-6 shows this difference plotted with its 95% confidence interval, revealing that the drop is not only substantive but significant as well.

This finding also raises an important question. Why does patronistic support encourage compromise when it is done on behalf of governments and discourage it when rebels receive it? The answer likely lies in the strategic compulsion for governments to defend their rule. When rebels are disadvantaged by high intensity support to the government they can invoke an

insurgency option, avoiding confrontation except in those circumstances where rebels have a local advantage. Governments on the other hand claim to be legitimate rulers of the country. They and their patrons must bear the costs of defending anywhere and everywhere rebels may attack. Over time this can be a costly and capacity draining endeavor. However, if governments surrender contested turf, back down, or retreat in the face of a challenge they in effect cede their right to rule. In order to maintain their power and legitimacy they must fight, even if at a disadvantage. So, while governments may have a hard time drawing out and defeating rebel insurgents, rebels have a much easier time drawing out governments into decisive battles. Because governments can be forced to fight even when vulnerable, the incentives to negotiate with these vulnerable governments are weaker. Rebels and their allies would rather achieve a victory and set up regime rules to their own preferences rather than negotiate with the current government.

Finally, comparing the two biased rebel support strategies to each other reveals that while the likelihood of rebel victory was significant compared to the case of non-intervention, the results compared to partnership strategies are more uncertain. Probability changes are plotted in Figure 2-7 with their 95% confidence intervals. The mean difference in probability for rebel victory is 32 percentage points, but the difference is not significant under standard conventions of significance. On the other-hand the probability of compromise remains significantly less likely when rebels have patronistic support versus partnership. In fact, Table 2-2 reveals that compromise is most likely when governments have patrons followed by those wars where rebels have partners.




Figure 2-7 :Predicted probability change of Rebel Patron vs. Partnership

In sum, rebel patronistic support appears a winning strategy; rebels are more likely to win with patronistic support than without it. The difference is substantial and significant with respect to non-intervention improving the likelihood about 43 percentage points. Patronistic interventions on behalf of rebels appear 33 percentage points more likely to achieve a rebel victory than partnership support, but the available evidence cannot support that the difference is statistically meaningful. It is quite possible that patronistic interventions are no more likely to victory on average despite its increased costs for the intervener. Later Chapter 4 demonstrates that patronistic strategies come with post-war baggage, especially when they are accompanied by a victory. For many interveners the greater uncertainties associated with partnerships in terms of achieving a favorable war outcome may be worth the risk when compared to the more certain adverse post-war effects of patronistic strategies.

Control Covariates

Looking at controls, the positive and significant coefficients for *military capacity* indicate that strong state armies make government and rebel victories more likely than a compromise but no significant relationship exists between victory and stalemate. On the other hand Model 5 suggests that stronger state armies make compromise much less likely than stalemate. This fits well the miscalculation and insurgency explanations. Simply put, a government who is strong in terms of military capacity is more likely to fight for a decisive outcome; it does not believe it has to compromise. This forces the rebels into one of two choices, they must also fight for decisive victory, or protract the conflict until it can recruit and field a force large enough to defeat the government. Both of these options move the fighting away from a compromise settlement. Thus victories and stalemates are the more likely outcomes with large forces.

Duration as in many other studies has a negative impact on victory relative to other outcomes. The longer the war the less likely either governments or rebels are likely to win. *Economic development* appears to have no significant impact on the likelihood of victory. The positive and significant coefficient of *separatist* in Model1 supports Walter's (2004) claim that wars for partition or autonomy are likely to be resisted more. Governments appear more likely to try to win than to settle these wars. Ethnic wars are difficult to interpret. The coefficients in model 1 are not significant suggesting that governments are no more likely win than to compromise. Model 3 suggests though that stalemate relative to government victory is more likely. Coefficients in the rebel model suggest both compromise and stalemate are more likely than rebels winning an ethnic war. This implies that governments are no more likely to win a

war that is fought over identity versus ideological issues, but they appear to have more resolve not to be defeated compared to an ideological contest. Finally, as Fortna (2009) contended victories are much less likely after the cold war, and significantly more likely to end in a compromise settlement. Model 3 suggests that stalemates are also more significantly more likely relative to government victories but not as much as compromises.




Figure 2-8: Summary of Findings with Respect to Outcome

Implications

Figure 2-8 above summarized the results of this study. The plots redisplay the difference in predicted probability plots of Figures 2-2 through 2-7 in terms of each of the four possible outcomes. In addition I included a simulation of partnership intervention/counter-intervention where both antagonists receive low intensity external support.²⁰ These results overall seem to

²⁰ This is analogous to simulating proxy wars or post-Cold War rivalries where major or middle powers provided low level assistance to local belligerents, for example if the US and its allies were to support favorable factions of the Syrian rebels to counter Russian and Iranian combat support of Bashir Assad's regime.

imply two general rules. The first is that high bias high intensity interventions are generally mismatched to the goal of government victory (Figure 2-8a, 2-8c). Government patronism is a “winning” strategy in the sense that the supported government is highly likely to remain in power, the probability of a client’s outright defeat is 1 in 25. However, intervening states employing these strategies in the hopes of helping an ally government defeat its domestic challengers are likely to be disappointed. Compromise with government opponents is the most likely outcome.

Why this is the case is probably the combination of several factors. Conceptually, intervening states choose large scale interventions with the aim of securing a quick and decisive victory for their client and concomitantly securing their own national interests. Large interventions though simply encourage rebels to protract the war and rely on low level insurgency until their circumstances improve. Decision on the battlefield is delayed rather than hastened. Also, the presence of a large foreign intervention force likely drains the legitimacy of the government asking for or tolerating such an “occupation”. As legitimacy plummets more government supporters may defect to alternative coalitions which can deteriorate some of the resources and capacity ruling elites relied on to fight the war, increasing costs to those who remain faithful. As costs mount compromise may become a more attractive option. Finally, as costs accumulate and the war drags on interveners themselves begin to search for an exit strategy, even if it is short of victory. All of these factors can steer war outcomes away from the decisive outcomes for which the strategy was originally designed.

Lower intensity interventions actually seem to be more strategically appropriate when an intervening power prefers supporting a sitting government.²¹ Government partnerships on average increase the likelihood of government victory but whether this increase is really different than when no intervention is applied at all is uncertain. In real terms the odds are better than 50/50. One explanation for why these interventions may be more effective than their more intense counterparts is that the smaller commitment of foreign resources may actually relieve some pressure on interveners to produce quick results with respect to their own domestic constituencies. A small or even moderately sized deployment does not gain as much attention as a large scale occupation or take-over. For example, the US gets very little public pressure to pull its forces out of the Philippines, though it has been assisting the Philippine government for years ward off Abu Sayif militants and various other ethnic and ideological insurgent groups challenging the central government's rule.

The second rule of interventions appears to be that the "best" rebel strategies depend on the political aim. In a typical regime war scenario, rebels are the weaker of the contesting forces. The support of a rebel patron; however, enhances the capabilities of rebels and makes them more formidable challengers to the state. If the goal is to defeat the sitting government and replace it, then patronistic interventions are much more likely to accomplish that objective

²¹ One challenge to this interpretation is that the choice of intervention strategy may be the consequence of a selection effect. Interveners may select patronistic interventions over partnerships because the government is perceived to likely be defeated unless the intervener acts strongly. In this case a non-victory outcome may be the consequence of government weakness, not necessarily the influence of strategy. I attempted to account for this in two ways. First the control for military capability at least partially controls for influences of government strength or weakness. Additionally, I looked for a potential selection effect by comparing the frequency of patronistic support when governments were weak (below the sample mean) indicated by the measure of military capacity and when they were strong. About 9% of "weak" governments received patronistic support. Strong states received patronistic support in 13% of the cases. These differences were not statistically significant in Pearson chi-square tests. Though not conclusive this suggests that intervening states select patronistic strategies at similar frequencies. The decision to intervene strongly is based on more than just their targets "strength" or "weakness" and that bias from potential selection effects is small.

(Figure 2-8b). Given states cannot typically refuse a challenge, rebels with strong support make sitting governments considerably more vulnerable to defeat.

At issue though is whether high-intensity interventions are actually necessary. Patronistic strategies are significantly more likely to help rebels win, but are not statistically distinct from a rebel partnerships odds of victory. In other words, rebel patrons are more likely to secure a victory than if they had not intervened at all, but their intervention may be overkill in the sense that the likelihood of victory is not statistically different than that of a partnership. If an intervener's goal is simply to weaken or drain a state by making the government much less likely to win, as is the case in many strategic rivalries, rebel partnerships appear to be almost as effective as patronistic interventions (Figure 2-8a). In short, if winning is a priority than patronism is indeed the best strategy, otherwise and analogous to the case of governments, the risks associated with a smaller scale intervention may be worth the rewards in intervention costs while still maintaining a high probability of achieving the intervention's aim, a non-victory for "bad" governments.

Conclusion

Intervention strategies are heterogeneous both the goals that interveners strive for and more importantly the strategies states employ to achieve those goals. These strategies reflect the costs interveners are willing to bear, the capabilities they can or are willing to bring, and the values they place on particular outcomes. This chapter sought to take intervention strategy into account as it relates to the goal of attaining a preferred war outcome. Specifically, I sought to determine which strategies tend to produce specific war outcomes and for whom. I distinguished two types of biased intervention strategies, partnerships and patronism.

Partnerships are characterized by high bias and low intensity, meaning interveners attempt to provide sufficient resources to keep their client viable without exerting excessive control over military operations. Patronistic interventions, on the other hand, are characterized by both their high bias and high intensity. Interveners provide the preponderance of capabilities but also exert the preponderance of control. Their domestic ally may become little more than a proxy force, but a much more powerful one than they would have been without help.

Next, I developed hypotheses for how these strategies should correlate to war outcomes. I then demonstrated through multinomial logit analysis and through simulated predicted probabilities that partnerships do confer some advantages with respect to victory. In the logit analysis a partnership on behalf of governments made governments significantly more likely to be victorious than terminate the war through compromise. Counterintuitively, government partnerships were also significantly more likely to produce a government victory than a high intensity strategy. Rebel partnerships appear to make rebel victory the most likely outcome, but these results were not significant with respect to other outcomes in the context of intervention and the same outcome compared to a context of non-intervention.

The multinomial logit and simulation analyses revealed in the cases of patronistic interventions that rebels do remarkably well in terms of increasing their probability of victory while governments do remarkably poor. Rebel patrons create a large and significant increase in the likelihood of victory for their clients, upwards of a 40 percentage point improvement compared to non-intervention, and significantly more likely than a compromise. Government patrons on the other hand are more likely to lead their client to stalemate and most likely into some form of negotiated settlement. This is sufficient as far as keeping seated governments in

power, but if victory is the goal for target governments, strong interventions on their behalf are not the means to achieve it.

War outcomes however are not the end of the story; rather they are the pretext to one. Intervention strategies can be a major driver of war outcomes, but victory or compromise are never the ultimate end, just a means to it. Regime wars are actually fought to settle the issue of who rules as well as to set up favorable conditions (ideally peace and stability) for governing in a new post war context. The way in which interveners actually intervene is likely to shape that context. In other words, interventions impact the target society's post war context beyond the war outcomes produced. So, while it is certainly valuable to know how biased interventions affect the propensity for military outcomes, it is also important to consider the lingering effect intervention strategies have on post war contexts.

One key contextual factor is the nature of the post war regime itself. Intuitively victors get more of a say in the construct of a post war regime than compromisers, and it seems logical that interveners who contribute more to a war effort will demand a larger say in that construction than those who made smaller contributions. Also, what interveners ask for likely depends on the nature of their own regime. Intervening democrats and autocrats are likely to have different preferences for how the target state is governed and can impose those preferences to different degrees depending on the outcome of war itself. In short, how a war ends and how the war was fought, and who fought in the war influences how a state is governed in the post war. It is this question to which the next chapter is addressed.

Chapter 3. Democratization and Intervention Strategy

Introduction

I have argued in the previous chapters that interveners' experience vast heterogeneity in the goals and strategies that they pursue in war. Second, that specific paths or strategies can enhance or detract from the propensity toward achieving these goals. Finally, that this heterogeneity has implications both for the outcomes of war and war's aftermath. An almost taken for granted assumption for many of these interventions is the imposition of a more liberal or democratic regime. This goal of democratization has been pursued using a variety of military strategies. Consider just the United States in the last 15 years. For example, Operation Allied Force in Kosovo was primarily a US led air war with a follow-on NATO and UN led peace support mission. The Afghan war was initially small scale, relying on US Special Operations Forces Alpha Teams in conjunction with US Air Force close air support and then turned into a moderately sized conventional force as insurgent forces regrouped and gained in strength. The Second Gulf War was a massive invasion and military occupation from the start. Lastly, US participation in Libya's civil war was another air only war. Unlike Kosovo, however, the US and its allies "partnered" with Libyan rebels unlike the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) rebels in the late 90's. Other differences include the observation that, in the later three there were no follow-on peace support operations. Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya all received various degrees of international assistance but there were no "Blue Helmet" operations on the ground. The United States' allies were in some cases partners and in some cases clients or receivers of patronistic support. In all cases the allies benefited as victors, but each experienced differing degrees of democratization and stability as well. This chapter investigates to what extent the

relationship between intervention strategies may have impacted the degrees of democratization.

Like the case of militarized intervention and war outcome, the impact of war intervention on post war outcomes remains understudied. An extensive literature exists on the dynamics of post conflict peace-building and democratization; unfortunately, these interventions represent only a small subset of all interventions in regime change wars. More often than not regime wars experience some form of biased intervention than either non-intervention or impartial intervention. More importantly, preceding biased interventions often go unaccounted for in studies of post-conflict peace operations. The active role of biased interveners during the course of a war is potentially a key force that shapes the favorable or unfavorable context peace-builders face. More specifically, variations in the intensity of biased intervention can have a systematic impact on the “degree of difficulty” peace keepers confront when they begin their own post-conflict operations (Fortna 2004, Gilligan and Stedman 2003, Regan 1998).

Consequently two issues emerge. First, the implications of peace operation interventions apply to only a narrow subset of all regime war interventions. Biased interventions occur twice as frequently as their unbiased counterparts. If a majority of regime wars experience some form of biased intervention, we ought to try and say something about how this bias influences postwar outcomes apart from as well as alongside its unbiased counterpart. Second, the failure to account for preceding biased interventions introduces a potential omitted variable bias on peace keeping impacts on democratization. In other words, if successful democratization requires favorable peace keeping contexts; and biased intervention

intensity systematically impacts these same post war contexts (which it likely does), then peace operations may be taking undo credit (or blame) for the influences of biased actors. This study accounts for both, allowing their influences on democratization to be estimated more precisely.

A second issue this study addresses is to correct a tendency in contemporary influential scholarship to mistakenly conflate democratization with state capacity, or to assume that democratization and political stability are jointly achievable. For instance, Hendrix (2010) identifies a number of prominent studies where state capacity is operationalized as a Polity score or Scalar Index of Polity (SIP) score.¹ Operationalizing state capacity as a democracy score implies that greater degrees of democratic institutionalization (automatically) correlate to greater degrees of governance capacity.² However, Cheibub (1998) showed that tax ratios, which Hendrix identified as one of the most appropriate measures of state capacities, democracies and non-democracies perform about the same. In other words, democracy is no guarantee of a state's competence to generate capability.³

Similarly, the peace building literature often pushes democracy as the surest way for ensuring post-conflict peace, essentially equating democratization with greater peace (stability). The potential for violence and aggression is weakly acknowledged but quickly washed away with an assumption of appropriate democratic safeguards will negate the violence and instability. Take for example the account given by Dobbins and co-authors:

¹ See (Hendrix 2010) for a discussion of the use of polity scores as a measure of capacity. Influential studies that have conceptualized polity or SIP scores as a measure of political capacity or stability include (De Rouen & Sobek 2004, Doyle & Sambanis 2000; Fearon & Laitin 2003, Gates et al 2006, Hegre et al 2001)

² State capacity in these studies is conceptualized as either the state's ability to repress or the institutional quality. See Hendrix, 2010 pg276

³ See also (Kugler and Arbetman 1989b)

“Thus in most cases, the creation or recreation of institutions deriving their authority from popular suffrage offer the intervening authorities the only practical means of transferring power back to an indigenous government and leaving behind a peaceful society...
... Safeguards for minorities and checks on majorities need to be designed to ameliorate rather than exacerbate existing fissures” (Dobbins et al, 2007, pg. 189-90)

These accounts often fail to assess whether and to what extent democratic safeguards actually quell violence and instability. There is some evidence in the qualitative peace keeping literature that democracy and stability run in opposite directions, that is democratization fosters instability, but quantitative studies have yet to evaluate the extent of this phenomenon, how much does it destabilize? Separating democracy and stability as independent outputs of the same intervention process affords the opportunity to evaluate interventions in terms of how much democratization they produce and at what cost.

In sum, this study focuses specifically on the dynamics of biased interventions and its influence on post war democratization. I set out to show that different intervention strategies exert different effects on the degree of democratization. Partnerships, which are high bias and low intensity, tend not to exert a strong effect at all on the degree of democratization. These interventions neither enhance nor diminish a states democratizing potential. It is likely that supporting interveners in these cases to not push hard for a strongly democratic regime. The light footprint of interveners indicates a desire to be somewhat hands off and a tacit acceptance of the current characteristics of the regime or regime-to-be. Patronistic interventions on the other hand tend to project an anti-democratic effect, reducing the degree of democratization in post war states. These results are contingent on the war outcome achieved as well as the regime characteristics of the intervener. Victories tend to autocratize states further, while democratic interveners who participate on the winning side tend to negate the anti-democratic effects of patronistic strategies and victory. Mature democracies who

employ patronistic strategies may even achieve net positive gains with respect to democratization.

In the next sections I conduct a brief review of post conflict democratization literature illustrating how this study fits in. Following this I develop hypotheses regarding degrees of democratization based upon the democratic incentive structures partnership and patronistic strategies set up with respect to governance. Afterward, I lay out my research design. I then discuss results. Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of this study.

Literature Review

A central question in the intervention and democratization literature is whether and to what extent third party countries can inject democracy on a target country. Early studies focusing primarily on United States interventions appear sanguine on the prospects democratization. These studies suggest that exogenous democratization is both possible and has been relatively successful. Meernik (1996) for instance finds that, "Ultimately, military intervention appears to promote democracy in sufficient number of cases not only to warrant its future employment but also continued academic inquiry (pg.400) . He found that when US ground troops were deployed to foreign soil the most common prominent outcome was no change in the degree of democratization. However, crisis countries that received US intervention were more likely to democratize than others that received no US intervention. In other words, intervention in and of itself was no guarantee of a greater degree of democracy, but relative to other troubled states who did not receive a US invention, those that did tended to display increased levels of democratization afterward.

Though Meernik did not investigate differences in the strategies and substance of interventions he does hint at the importance of strategy. Specifically, he finds that when democratization is an overt policy of the United States, operationalized as Presidential public proclamations, it is more likely to be successful than when it is not official policy. Peceny (1999) finds similar results. In his study of US interventions, which expands across the entire 20th century, he finds interventions themselves do not promote democratization but when the US promoted pro-liberalization policies democratization was more likely.

A second wave of intervention and democratization studies emerged with Pickering's update of the Pearson and Baumann International Military Intervention dataset (Pickering and Kisangani 2009, Pickering and Peceny 2006, Pickering 1999, Pearson, Baumann, and Pickering 1994, Pearson and Baumann 1993). The IMI dataset identifies intervention as any crossing of a border of a target state in the context of a dispute. It also sought to identify how large the incursion was, on whose side, as well as primary goals. The key advantages of this dataset is that it enabled researchers to parse out cases based on particular research interests (e.g. those hostile to a government versus friendly, humanitarian, territorial, economic, etc.). In terms of findings, the most relevant to the present study is a consistent finding that democratic interveners in general left behind more democratic states (Hermann and Kegley 1996, Kegley and Hermann 1997, Gleditsch et al. 2007 , Gates and Strand 2008). It is important to caveat that while many researchers do find a positive link between democratic interveners and democratized targets, some are less optimistic about democracy's longer term prospects. Gleditsch et al (2007) and also Gates and Strand (2008) find that post war democratic regime decay much faster than their non-war counterparts, and that democratic gains (a positive

change of 2 in Polity scores) was likely to decay as short as one year after the war. Unfortunately, these studies make no attempt to link specific intervention goals or strategies with democratic outcomes.

There are many useful insights to be gained from the literature on peace-building and multi-lateral interventions and democracy, though much of literature tends to be more qualitative than quantitative. On the quantitative side Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) find evidence that strict peace-building success or a “participatory peace” was more likely with UN interventions than without. They also found that strong operations (analogous to my concept of high intensity strategies) the more likely was a participatory peace. Unfortunately the bar for democratization was set rather low, anything greater than a 3 on their scale or equivalently -7 on the Polity2 scale counted as “participatory”. So to imply or infer that participatory peace building success is democracy enhancing seems misleading.

Pickering and Peceny (2006), however, lend more credible support to the claim that UN interventions can promote democratization. In their study democratization was defined more stringently as actually having achieved a minimum threshold of democracy, a score of ≥ 6 for three consecutive years on the Polity2 scale. Under these criteria they found that UN supportive interventions are more likely to produce democracies within 5 years of the intervention. However, Pickering and Peceny’s study includes cases that set a threshold of conflict much lower than that of civil war, making direct comparison difficult. It is possible that UN positive effects on democratization may be driven by cases falling below the threshold of war and not necessarily in the tougher cases of war.

A number of studies though cast some doubt on the ability of UN or other consent based peace builders to promote democracy. For instance Fortna (2008) identified a security-democratization dilemma. She finds that while peacekeepers are beneficial for providing security and mitigating mistrust, they are unaccountable locally and tend to crowd out indigenous growth of democratic practices. Gurses and Mason (2008) argue that the positive effects Doyle and Sambanis find for participatory peace are a result of their failure to control for war outcome, that is peace keeping operations (PKOs) are picking up the effects of the outcomes which precede them. They find that when outcome is controlled for; negotiated settlements had a significant positive effect on democratization, but that PKO's themselves were no longer significant. Finally, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) make the case that the UN, particularly in the Security Council, is a mixture of democracies and non-democracies. This mixture has the result that UN operations will contain a mixture of public goods provisions to satisfy democratic states and private goods provisions to satisfy non-democratic states. Ultimately, the mixture of goals serves to potentially undermine democracy. They found weakly significant results that UN interventions actually reduce the size of a target country winning coalition. This coalition size parameter is often linked to more democratic governments⁴

Bueno de Mesquita and co-authors (2003) also study the underlying incentives intervening nation-states have to democratize their targets. They develop a game theoretic argument using their Selectorate Theory to argue that states with larger winning coalitions (democracies) as well as smaller winning coalitions (autocracies) will tend to replace target regimes with smaller winning coalitions. That is, interveners in general tend to prefer autocratic

⁴ The other two indicators used in their study Polity2 and Electoral competitiveness were both insignificant.

“puppets” to more democratic alternatives. The principle reason is that interventions are viewed as a foreign policy public good. In order to secure the good and remain in power the intervener needs to be assured that the target will cooperate in providing the good. Target cooperation is more likely when the target itself is accountable to a smaller winning coalition whom it can satisfy with private goods. A larger winning coalition leaves the target leader vulnerable to replacement and their intervener’s foreign policy goals to disruption. Thus, interveners will prefer smaller coalitions.

While the Selectorate Theory account is the most formally rigorous explanation of the preference for less democratic regimes other studies have also produced similar findings. Peceny (1999) for instance found that US Presidents take an initially “realist” approach to interventions. They will only push for liberalization/democratization when they view the target government as aligned with US interests; otherwise a more compliant dictatorial regime was preferred. Liberalization was much less likely if the US opposed the target government. Also, Pickering and Peceny (2006) found that US interventions in support of a target government were a perfect predictor of non-democracy⁵. Thus while US intervention may have liberalized some states no foreign government receiving a supportive US intervention had managed to meet the threshold requirement for democracy. US interventions hostile to the incumbent however were more likely to become democratic.

There are a variety of reasons that might explain the somewhat mixed findings of these studies. One of the more obvious factors is the differences in methodologies and datasets. Many of the studies allow a considerably low threshold for intervention; boots on the ground in

⁵ It should be noted that US intervention implies unilateral US intervention. In a multilateral context (NATO or the Allied Powers after WWII) the US has a better track record for democratization (e.g. Germany Japan and Croatia).

the context of a dispute. These disputes may never reach the criteria for war even by the low standards of the Uppsala Conflict Data Set of 25 battle-related deaths. As Gleditsch (2007) has pointed out many of these cases may be systematically linked to cases that were ripe for democratization anyway; that is democratic change was not likely to be seriously--i.e. militarily--contested in the first place. Another common factor among these studies is that they appear to treat all interventions as equal and discount the role of strategy. Recall, for instance, both Meernik and Peceny find that when the US overtly states democracy as a goal, the likelihood of democratization increases. Peceny finds similarly. Neither author, however, examines whether interventions that were paired with these democratic statements looked different than those that were not. It is possible that these researchers may have overlooked systematic differences in the ways these interventions were carried out. Pooling all interventions as if they were of a single kind may have drowned out important systematic distinctions.

This claim can be substantiated even more through careful consideration of the Doyle and Sambanis results; who to their credit take strategy more seriously. Notwithstanding definitional problems; it matters for their participatory peace building successes that the UN had a strong mandate and larger pool of resources, which are associated with multidimensional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. These latter two operation types are also much more politically intrusive than the former. This is to say Doyle and Sambanis are essentially accounting for the differences in strategies. Even a casual reading of their case studies would seem to suggest that if the strategy had been different--i.e. a traditional PKO versus a multidimensional PKO -- outcomes may have been drastically different as well. This seems blatantly obvious, but no studies on biased interventions that I am aware of actually account for

these important differences. The biased analog of a traditional PKO is treated the same as the biased analog of a multidimensional PKO, the same as an observer mission, etc.

This chapter's primary contribution to the literature then is to examine the impacts of intervener strategy on post war outcomes. It looks at the "hard cases" of intervention where attempted regime change leads to war in order to better determine the impacts of intervention on democratization within this context. It also takes seriously the notions of Meernik and Peceny that democratic countries have to want democracy in their targets in order to achieve it, but goes one step further by testing whether there may be systematic differences in interventions which achieve greater levels of democratization versus those that do not. Second, and more generally, this work expands on the ground breaking work of Doyle and Sambanis. Where they investigated the impacts that impartial intervention strategies had on the prospects for participation and peace; this study does much the same for more biased interveners. It focuses specifically on the impacts of biased intervention on democratization. Finally, it is the first study, as far as I am aware of, that investigates simultaneously the effects of both partial and impartial interveners on democratization. Most studies focus on one side or the other but rarely both. By controlling for the effects of both biased and unbiased interveners we can gain a more precise estimate of the impacts of both.

Partners, Patrons and Post War Democratization

How does democratization occur after a regime war? Generally speaking one or both of two different processes happens. First, domestic constituencies demand it and have sufficient bargaining leverage with the state or the state's challenger to realize it. Both the state and rebel challengers can be thought of as opposing warring coalitions. Each coalition needs a

minimum threshold of war making capacity to overcome their opponent's war making capacity and subdue them; or at least garner a more favorable bargaining position if the conflict must ultimately end in compromise. To gain this capacity the coalitions must acquire material and human resources--i.e. taxes and troops. Domestic constituents are reluctant to pay taxes and enlist in militias or armies without appropriate compensation. If one must pay taxes to and risk life for a coalition, one is likely to want some degree of "voice" and accountability of that same coalition. Thus warring coalition leaders will bargain with domestic constituents offering increased levels of democratization (accountability and voice) in exchange for taxes and manpower power (Rasler and Thompson 1989, Tilly 1985, Weinstein 2005, Levi 1981). Rebels may argue as well that they can offer a more democratic alternative to the current regime in hopes of securing more support and resources. Governments for their part may offer reforms in order to convince citizens to continue to support them or at least not support the rebels--i.e. acquiesce to their continued rule if they do not enthusiastically support it. Both coalitions will include just enough to extract the war-making resources they need.

Regime structures to include democratization can also be influenced externally from intervening foreign powers. Strong interveners can impose or demand democratization as a consequence or condition for their support. This demand might be persuasive in character as in cases where interveners help an established warring faction achieve its aims. For example the US began encouraging democratic forms for its Salvadoran allies in the late 1980's early 1990's. Regime structures can also be imposed as in cases where interveners essentially take over for their allies as Syria did in Lebanon or Egypt in Yemen.




Figure 3-1: Warring Coalitions and their Generation of War Making Capacity

From the perspective of the warring coalition, it needs a minimum threshold of war-making capacity to sustain its war effort which it can create from a combination of the domestic and foreign support available. In a pristine case, non-intervention, external support is unavailable and the warring factions are totally reliant on domestic support for their war making capacity. The larger this domestic constituency, the more resources the warring coalition can extract and the more popular support the coalition is likely to have. This also means that the warring coalition will likely have to concede to some degree of democratization in exchange for this support. This occurs because the size of the supporting coalition increases. If an external intervener is available then the warring faction can substitute contributions it would otherwise rely on domestic constituents for to generate the necessary war making capacity. See Figure 3-1 above. Because of this potential substitution effect the domestic coalition need not be as large as in the pristine case and therefore the pressure for

democratization not as great. Smaller coalitions are more susceptible to cooptation through private gains rather than more public (democratic) gains (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).

Intervening states may or may not levy their own demands on the characteristics of a post war regime. Some interveners can be indifferent or actually prefer a more autocratic regime, believing an autocrat can more successfully deliver the intervener its preferred policies in a post war context (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Others, particularly liberal democratic interveners, may demand some degree of democratization as a consequence of their intervention. Following the literature of the democratic peace, a democratized target is more likely to expand the “zone of peace” making future wars with and within the target less likely (Hegre et al. 2001, Doyle 1986, Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand 2009, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002, Kant 1983).⁶ Also, Werner (1996) argues that differences in authority patterns evoke fear and increased perceptions of threat because these different patterns represent different alternatives toward rule. She finds that regime change interventions are more likely the greater the political differences in authority patterns. One further implication of her findings, though she does not explicitly test for this, is that when interveners succeed the changed regime of the target more closely resembles that of the intervener. In other words, democracies feel less threatened by the authority patterns of other democracies and are more inclined to push targets toward democratization. Overall, the ultimate degree of externally influenced democratization is going to depend on the democratic disposition of the intervener, whether or not the intervener desires a democratic outcome; and the importance of the intervener’s contribution to the warring coalition’s net war-making capacity.

⁶ Gleditsch et al (2009) on the other hand find no support for the claim that democracy reduces the likelihood of internal conflict.

The importance of an intervener to a warring coalition hinges on the intensity of the intervention strategy. Partnership interventions are typically designed to be a smaller footprint operation from the perspective of the intervener. The intervener has a stake in the outcome, that is, there are some foreign policy goods to be gained; but the choice of a smaller footprint suggests the stakes must be more carefully balanced with costs. While costs are much less drastic for third party interveners than for primary disputants they can still be significant. The loss of blood, treasure, and reputation for getting involved in a quagmire or losing a war can cost intervening governments their continued right to rule (Buono de Mesquita and Siverson 1995, Colaresi 2004, Debs and Goemans 2010, Goemans 2000). To optimize the balance of risk and reward the intervener may provide limited forces to protect their ally, along with weapons and training, and if the partner is a neighboring state may even permit border crossing and safe havens. In every case though, the intervener avoids absolute aims (Werner 1996); leaving the target to do the bulk of the fighting.

On the supported partner's end they are still facing a "tough" case (Gent 2008). Victory is often uncertain without the help of the intervener. Yet the intervener's help is also limited, therefore the supported target must still attempt to extract sufficient resources from its own population to keep the balance of power in its favor. Leaders of such groups may be more willing to make some political concessions to gain support and access to these resources. For instance, Syria receives partnership support from Iran in the form of Hezbollah fighters. This support was clandestine in the early part of the war but more overt after 2013. Despite this moderate support, The Assad regime is still locked in an arduous struggle with Syrian rebels. Foreign assistance helps the regime, but the regime still fights hard to control territory. As late

as 2013 the Assad regime has offered political reforms in the hopes of reducing the domestic and international pressure on his regime.

Incentives change though if the intervener is more absolute in her aims as is implied in patronistic interventions. In this case the intervener invests more heavily to ensure a preferred outcome. Investment can include deployment of a large occupation force, political takeover or creation of key institutions and organizations in order to more effectively manage the target coalition. The target in such cases becomes a proxy for the intervener, essentially a tool through which the patron works to accomplish her own aims. Because the target is showered with resources and has little need to appeal to its own population in order to extract aid, it has fewer incentives to democratize (Ross 2004). In the example above, if Assad's allies were to provide extensive support, such as large contingents of Iranian Republican Guards or perhaps Russian troops as well, Assad would likely feel less pressure to cave into democratization demands and remain authoritarian. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H1: Democratization is more likely when a warring party received no intervention from an external ally compared to a patronistic intervention. Conversely, patronistic interventions are significantly less democratic than non-intervention.

H2: Democratization is less likely when a warring party received patronistic intervention from an external ally compared to a partnership intervention.

Though the likelihood of democratization is more positive for partnership intervention than patronistic, the effect on democratization relative to the case of non-intervention is likely

small. This is because partnership interventions set up countervailing incentives to democratize. On the one hand, warring parties can extract some resources from an external ally which discourages democratization to an extent. The warring coalition is somewhat less reliant on their domestic constituency. On the other hand, the strength of the intervention is small. The intervener does not provide preponderant force nor the expansive resources required to successfully launch a democratization project, so the warring coalition must still rely substantively on their domestic constituency. Thus, while partnership interventions add to a warring coalition's overall war making capacity, the trajectory toward democratization is not likely to be much different than the case of non-intervention. This hypothesis can be stated formally as:

H3: The degree of democratization associated with partnership interventions is not likely to be significantly greater or lesser than a case of non-intervention.

The democratic character of the interveners themselves is also likely to influence the nature of the post war target regime. As mentioned previously a democratic intervener is more likely than a non-democratic intervener to exert some pressure on their supported coalitions to enact some democratizing reforms. This pressure can come about from a liberal impulse to expand the democratic zone of peace or may be a reaction to fear of non-democratic regimes. An important caveat to this claim though is that liberalizing or democratizing a society cannot be done easily or cheaply. Such operations involve not only terminating the conflict and maintaining some semblance of post war security, but other operations are required such as arranging power sharing agreements, setting up elections and perhaps restructuring domestic political institutions (Jarstad and Sisk 2008, Paris and Sisk 2009). This requires a massive influx of

resources and in some cases a transitional political administration that oversees a regime transition. This is not to say that democratic partners cannot encourage and provide assistance toward democratization. Rather, if democracies were to push for democratized targets it is more likely in the context of a high intensity (patronistic) intervention, where the intervener exerts the preponderance of military and political control. These factors lead to the hypothesis:

H4: Democratization is more likely when a warring party in power received help from a democratic intervener compared to the case of non-intervention.

H5: The democratizing effect of democratic interveners will be significantly larger for patronistic support compared to partnership support.

The possibility remains that in order to secure any democratic reforms a democratic intervener has to help its partner or client actually win in order to implement their desired reforms. Short of a clear victory, any belligerent in a compromise settlement will be wary of granting too many participatory rights to their opponents. The sides may make concessions on the margins in order to reach a settlement, but not necessarily the large scale reforms advanced democratic interveners might envision.⁷ A clear victory however reduces the threat to the coalition who is in power considerably. Arguments that democratization is presently dangerous for a target society will appear increasingly illegitimate. Having secured a victory and eliminated the most dangerous threats, democratic interveners may be in a more tenable

⁷ If bargaining demands are too high in terms of how much participation the opponent is allowed in a successor regime the belligerents may prefer to fight it out.

position to encourage or impose more extensive reforms. Thus the hypothesis above can be reformulated as:

H6: Conditional on victory; Democratization is more likely when a warring party in power received help from a democratic intervener compared to the case of non-intervention.

H7: Conditional on victory; the democratizing effect of democratic interveners will be significantly larger for patronistic support compared to partnership support.

Research Design

Dataset and Cases

To create the dataset for this analysis I started with the regime war dataset as described in Chapter 2.⁸ This set includes 119 cases of regime war derived from the Correlates of War dataset Version 4 including wars that were ongoing as of 1975 through 2009. Each war was characterized as to whether or not either side in a regime war received biased intervention support--i.e. one of the warring factions received combat troop aid, joint operations support, or deliberate access to intervener territory for shelter or offensive maneuver. Lastly each case of intervention was coded for whether the government and or opposition received partnership or patronistic support from an external state.

Each case was then extended into a maximum of 20 postwar war-year observations or until the year 2010. Post war years begin the year a war terminates and end at the onset of a new war. The analysis includes 116 cases with an average of 10 postwar observations each for

⁸ Appendix A contains a description of the original coding of the regime wars dataset.

a total of 1132 postwar-year observations. The dependent and independent variables under test are measured and coded for each of these post war observations.

Dependent Variables

The key variable of interest in this study is the degree of democratization that occurs at the end of a war for regime change. To measure the level of post war democracy I use Vreeland's (2008) XPolity variable. The Xpolity variable is highly correlated to the standard Polity2 variable except that it has potentially contaminated elements of the original polity variable removed.⁹ In cases where there are missing component values due to interregnum or interruption I use the same procedure outlined by Marshall and Jaggers (2010) to interpolate Xpolity scores with the exception that interruptions (-66) are recoded '0' rather than missing. I do this because generally speaking the political challenges and conflict transition issues a country faces are plausibly similar whether foreign elites manage the transition or domestic ones do. Marshal and Jagger's coding convention for the Polity2 variable converts domestic interregnums (-77, the period of polity interruption) as '0's; so I follow this same logic in coding foreign imposed interruptions.¹⁰ To maintain consistency with the Polity2 variable the Xpolity variable is similarly labeled *Xpolity2*.

Independent Variables

In many cases of militarized intervention both the government and its challenger receive some form of support. This raises the question of which interventions ought to be analyzed in

⁹ Certain elements of the polity score, particularly the participation elements, are influenced by the presence of war. Thus in studies that relate polity score to the onset or aftermath of war it is desirable that these potentially contaminated components be removed

¹⁰ I also tested values of 1, -1, and -2 as potential equivalent polity scores during occupations (-66). These scores do not substantively change results. Also, results do not change substantially when Polity2 vs. Xpolity 2 is regressed

the context of the post war. Because this study's primary focus is on the outcomes after war, I care more about the aid the party in power at the end of a conflict received. Conceivably, the party in power has a greater say in the makeup of post war order. If one side loses and does not come to power, I do not expect the strategies of its supporters to play a strong role in post war outcomes. The strategies of the victor or dominant power shape the post war context more directly. For instance, if an incumbent government stays in power, I analyze the case as either one where that government either received help and maintained power or did not receive help and still maintained power regardless of the aid the opposition received. Because the government is still the coalition in power, its preferences and strategies are likely to have a more dominant influence than a challenger and its allies who were successfully resisted. If that government received its own external support that external ally may have a say, otherwise a government receiving no intervention support will push its own preferences. The same holds true if the challenger wins power. It is treated as receiving aid if it had an intervener and is now in power and as not receiving aid if it gained power without the help of an intervener, regardless of the aid the old government received. Again, the challenger's dominance in the post war order implies its strategies and preferences matter more.

Following this logic I coded two terms *partner-in-power* and *client-in power* to denote whether an intervener's target partner or client gained power at the end of the war and with what strategy. *Partner-in-power* is a dichotomous indicator that denotes the case where an intervener employed a partnership strategy with its target and that target is in power. *Client-in-power* similarly denotes the case of a patronistic strategy that put the target in power. If the

coalition in power received no external help both terms are coded zero and indicates non-intervention on behalf of that coalition.

Finally I code another dichotomous variable *democratic intervener* which denotes a case where at least one intervening country on the side of the coalition in power was a full democracy. In order to be consistent with my definition for targets that become democracies I use the Xpolity2 indicator described above. I consider an intervening country democratic if the Xpolity2 variable is greater than or equal to five at the end year of the war.¹¹

Controls

There are also a host of alternative explanations for why a country achieves greater or lower degrees of democracy in the aftermath of war. I employ a similar battery of controls that Fortna and Huang (2009) used in their study of post-civil war democratization to control for these potential alternative explanations (see for example Fortna and Huang 2009; Fortna 2008).

War outcome has the potential to impact the degree of democratization in a post conflict society. Gurses and Mason (2008) for instance argued that victors in a war are likely to be wary of sharing power with those factions whom they just defeated. Victorious coalitions therefore tend to be less democratic. On the other hand, negotiated settlements or compromises are likely to be more democratic because opponents unable to decisively defeat their adversary in battle are more likely to view democracy as a way to constrain their behavior. Fortna however in at least two different studies found no relationship between outcome and democratization (Fortna 2008b, Fortna and Huang 2009). I create two outcome terms *victory*

¹¹ In the case of long wars, the polity score of the intervener can change over the course of the war. I assume that the disposition of the intervener at the time the war concludes matters most and is in fact what influences how they influence their supported target. Therefore I use the score at the war's end.

and *compromise*. Both are derived directly from the Correlates of War dataset. *Victory* denotes a decisive military victory and is coded 1 if either the current government or challenger wins and zero otherwise. *Compromise* is also a dichotomous variable and denotes cases where the combatants cease hostilities based on a mutual agreement or concessions. Wars that end in stalemate or fall below the threshold of war are coded as the residual category.

One of the most consistent findings in the democratization literature is that states with higher incomes are more likely to democratize (Boix 2011, Boix and Stokes 2003). Others argue quite convincingly that income does not necessarily promote democracy but rather inoculates democracy from autocratic backsliding (Przeworski et al. 2000). In either case income is an important factor to democratization. I measure income as real GDP per capita taken from the Penn World Tables v. 7.1. Where necessary I supplemented with data from the World Bank Databank indicators. As a last resort I converted data from Fearon and Laitin (2003) using a consumer price index conversion factor from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics to convert their 1985 constant dollars into 2005 constant dollars.

Identity has often been described as an indivisible good that cannot easily be bargained over. Because of this some scholars have argued that wars of identity are likely to be much more intractable compared to wars over ideology (Licklider 1995). Donald Horowitz suggests this ethnic intransigence and fear of being dominated can impede the development of democracy within these societies (Horowitz 1985, 1993). I construct a variable *ethnic war* which indicates that a war was fought primarily over identity issues. The variable is coded dichotomously; '1' if the war was ethnically based, '0' otherwise. I rely on Doyle and Sambanis' ethnic war variable from their civil war dataset of civil wars to identify cases of ethnic war as a

first cut. A number of cases in this study extend beyond the time frame of the Doyle and Sambanis dataset, however. In these cases I first looked to see if the disputants had a history of fighting that extended into the Doyle and Sambanis dataset. If it did and that previous war was coded as an ethnic war then I coded the later one ethnic as well. Otherwise, I relied on historical and case study sources to make a judgment of whether or not a chief incompatibility lay across ethnic lines¹².

Political scientists have also expressed a concern that heterogeneous identities can impact the development of democracy. A number of studies suggest that ethnic fractionalization indicates the potential for social cohesion in a society. Social cohesion is necessary for the effective transition and consolidation of democracy. Therefore, greater degrees of fractionalization can interrupt this cohesion and democratization potential (Horowitz 1993, Schneider 2009). I create an *ethnic fractionalization* variable which accounts for the ethnic diversity of a society. Ethnic fractionalization measures the likelihood that any two individuals selected at random are from different ethnic groups. Again my primary source for constructing the variable is the dataset from Doyle and Sambanis. When necessary I supplemented data from Alesina et al.(2003).

Modernization theory posits that democracy is more likely to emerge in those areas where economic development is more advanced. The mechanism driving democratization is the rise of a middle class, industrialization and urban concentration and education (Boix 2011, Diamond 1992, Lipset 1959, Przeworski et al. 2000). A growing middle class creates a larger sector of the population that can exist relatively independent of the government. This

¹² These sources were primarily (Clodfelter 2008, DeRouen and Heo 2007, Sarkees and Wayman 2010)

independence also gives them a political stake in good governance. Industrialization, urbanization, and education all create cross cutting ties of people and ideas which breeds tolerance and more diverse associations. It stands to reason that countries more economically developed prior to the start of the war might be more inclined to demand more democratic governance after the conclusion of war. To proxy economic development I sum the natural logs of the state's primary electric consumption and iron and steel production from the Correlates of War National Capabilities Dataset.¹³ I code the value at the start of war lagged one year.

A supposed "resource curse" has also been implicated as a mechanism that suppresses the democratic advancement of a number of countries. A large literature on the resource curse suggests that states endowed with significant stocks of marketable natural resources can divert revenues from these resources toward cooptation and enriching a narrow circle of elites rather than provide public goods. With the most threatening factions coopted, ruling elites have little incentive to develop representative and accountable institutions (Ross 2001, 2004). Thus, resource rich countries are less likely to democratize. I used the oil indicator from Doyle and Sambanis (2006). This indicator is coded '1' if the country derives 30% or more of its income from oil revenues.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, many authoritarian states lost their "Black Knight" patrons opening new opportunities for domestically led democratization (Huntington 1991, Levitsky and Way 2010, Boix and Stokes 2003, Geddes 2007). I construct a *post-cold war* variable and code it 1 for all observation years that occur in 1989 and after. This variable

¹³ This is the same measure Balch-Lindsay (2008) use in their analysis of Civil War outcomes and duration. Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) also use electric production as an indicator to measure development in their study of peacekeeping.

controls for potential democratic influences that are not necessarily the direct consequences of a militarized intervention by a foreign democratic state, but originate from the opening of political space caused by the fall of communism.

Relatedly, United Nations Peace Operations have been touted as a positive force for post war liberalization and democratization. Others have criticized the UN as well as being mostly ineffectual. Regardless, the realities of UN peacekeeping are that peacekeepers often try to implement democratic reforms in their targets. Their presence, even as observers or monitors can alter the incentives of belligerents to negotiate and compromise rather than pursue dominance. Peace operations can reinforce or contradict the strategies of biased interveners, and need to be accounted for. To control for the potential democratization influences of the UN I code a dichotomous indicator *unop* '1' if the target country had a UN operation on the ground at the end of or within 1 year of the end of a war. I gathered data directly from the UN department of peacekeeping website (UN DPKO).

Fortna and Huang (2009) note another potential problem associated with studies of democratization or autocratization. This is that cases that are already at the negative and positive ceilings have little room to maneuver. Countries that are already highly democratic cannot become more democratic and thus may demonstrate a declining tendency toward further democratization. Similarly already strong autocracies reach a ceiling on the degree of authoritarianism. Pre-war democracy controls can serve to pull these extreme values in. A second interpretation of this control can also be as democratic memory. In this view, countries with previous experiences with democracy are more likely to democratize further because they

learn from previous successes and failures and improve their democratizing processes with each iteration(Schneider 2009).

Fortna and Huang recommend that to truly capture the post war democratization effect, that the democracy score at the end of the war be used as a control. This ensures that transitions or disturbances during the course of war are excluded in accounting for post war democratization. In this case however, I am interested in capturing the impacts of intervention strategy on democratization both during the course of war and its continued trajectory after. Given this, the prewar level of democracy seems a more appropriate control.¹⁴ Another objection that might be raised is that regime stability may be in flux even prior to the start of war, thus a snapshot of the democratization score just prior to the war may not be as representative of the real facts on the ground. To mitigate these concerns I take the average level of democracy during the 5 year period prior to war start (see also Toft 2010).

Finally, time is a potential factor impacting democracy. Fortna and Huang note that many studies of post war democratization have conflicting results because different studies use different “snapshots” of post war democratization. These studies look, two, five, ten and even 20 years out from the war event (Fortna and Huang 2009, Gates and Strand 2008, Gleditsch et al. 2007 , Gurses and Mason 2008). Time could be contributing to democratic degradation as defeated groups regain strength and challenge leaders once again. Contrarily, peace years may afford domestic democrats the opportunity to habituate themselves to democracy and make even further democratic advances. I include a variable *post war years* that counts the number

¹⁴ See Fortna and Huang (2009, pg7-9) for a thorough discussion of prewar, post-war and war inclusive democracy controls. They comment in their paper that prewar controls are indeed appropriate if the researcher is interested in the effects of war itself (pg7).

of years that have passed since the end of a war to control for the impacts time itself may exert on a society's democratic advancement.

Methodology

Given the continuous nature of my dependent variable I employ ordinary least squares regression on pooled war-year observations of the data. To control for potential heteroskedasticity in the error terms, I use clustered standard errors grouped by country. Also, my hypotheses make claims about the degree of democratization based on different strategies and different characteristics of the intervener. A standard regression table can demonstrate the statistical relationship to a fixed baseline, in this case non-intervention on behalf of the party in power, but the data does not immediately present statistical relations, particularly the covariance, between independent variables. For instance, the difference in the democratization effect for patronistic intervention strategies relative to partnership strategies is a key focus of this study just as much as is the comparison of these strategies to the case of non-intervention. An OLS table can show the magnitudes of each of the coefficients and whether these parameters are statistically different than non-intervention (the baseline) but not each other. In order to measure the effect of different strategies when compared to each other I calculate first differences from simulated predicted values using CLARIFY. These simulations show whether relationships between profiles of interest are in fact different from each other. Another benefit of this approach is that the results yield a direct measure of the difference as well as the uncertainty in the degree of influence between the profiles of interest. One could

also employ F-tests to test that any combination of variables are not equal to each other, but the F-statistic produced indicates only that a difference exists (or not) and cannot directly produce the magnitude or confidence interval associated with differences in strategy.

Results

Hypothesis 1 posits that coalitions in power who receive patronistic support are likely to be less democratic in the post war than coalitions receiving no intervention support. This claim receives some support from model 1 in Table3-1. The sign of the *client-in-power* coefficient is negative and significant. In practical terms this finding supports the notion that a coalition who receives a preponderance of support from an external ally has few incentives to offer its domestic constituents democracy. The client can generate sufficient war making capacity relying on a smaller contingent of insiders, and substituting the bulk of their war fighting capacity needs from the resources of their external patron. This smaller domestic contingent is co-opted more easily with private goods than public ones, and so elites concerned with gaining or maintaining their power will use a portion of available resources to pay off this smaller group, relying on the intervener's resources to meet their war-fighting needs.

Hypothesis 2 posits that patronistic interventions are also less democratic than partnership interventions. This claim is partially substantiated by the coefficients in model 1. In the model both coefficients are negative, but the amplitude of the *client-in-power* term is more negative than that of the *partner-in-power* term, implying that patronistic interventions are less democratic than partnership interventions. The model cannot however depict whether the difference in strategies on average is statistically meaningful.

Table 3-1: Intervention Strategy and Degree of Democratization

Variable	model1	model2	model3
<i>Partner-in-power</i>	-0.05 (.47)	-0.55 (.58)	-0.38 (.63)
<i>Client-in-power</i>	-1.43* (.62)	-1.70** (.58)	-1.63** (.53)
<i>dem intervener</i>		1.06 (.57)	
<i>dem partner</i>			0.67 (.64)
<i>dem client</i>			0.5 (1.09)
<i>victory</i>	-1.19 (.6)	-1.03 (.65)	-1.1 (.63)
<i>compromise</i>	0.03 (.87)	0.33 (.92)	0.21 (.91)
<i>UNop</i>	2.05** (.63)	2.03** (.63)	2.06** (.63)
<i>econ dev</i>	0.47*** (.09)	0.49*** (.09)	0.48*** (.09)
<i>oil</i>	-2.34*** (.59)	-2.29*** (.57)	-2.35*** (.58)
<i>ethnic fract</i>	0.38 (1.02)	0.51 (.99)	0.54 (1.01)
<i>ethnic war</i>	-1.54** (.57)	-1.54** (.56)	-1.56** (.56)
<i>post-cw</i>	0.98* (.45)	1.02* (.46)	1.00* (.46)
<i>rgdp/cap-pre</i>	0.32*** (.08)	0.31*** (.08)	0.31*** (.08)
<i>xpolity2-pre</i>	0.45*** (.07)	0.46*** (.07)	0.45*** (.07)
<i>post war years</i>	0.08* (.04)	0.08* (.03)	0.08* (.04)
<i>constant</i>	-3.62** (1.13)	-4.01*** (1.15)	-3.88** (1.16)
<i>N</i>	1132	1132	1132
<i>R-squared</i>	0.5869	0.5938	0.5894

(std err) *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

To test for a meaningful difference in the democratization effects of the strategies I calculated a first difference in the degree of democratization obtained from a baseline profile of partnership and patronistic interventions. This baseline sets all continuous values to their mean

and all dichotomous variables to zero with the exception of victory which is set to '1'.¹⁵ In the first profile the *partner-in-power* term is set to '1' to indicate a victorious partner. In the second profile *client-in-power* is set to '1' and this result is subtracted from the first. This first difference is plotted in Figure3-2 at a 95% confidence interval. The substantive difference was 1.4 points on the Xpolity scale with a range spanning approximately .5 to 2.5. Since the range does not cross zero results can be interpreted to mean that there are distinct differences in effects between the two strategies.

In practical terms, the results support the claim of the continuing importance of domestic coalitions in partnership interventions. Partnership interventions tend to be smaller scale in terms of the contributions of an external ally, therefore the warring coalition is more dependent on their domestic constituents for resources. Even though a partner may increase a coalition's war making capacity, these partners do not necessarily do so at a level where coalition elites can afford to discount local support. Warring factions who have partners still rely a great deal on domestic constituencies and therefore are more inclined to offer some democratization in exchange for resources. For instance, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front offered women, youth, and the rural poor participatory rights typically denied to them by traditional Ethiopian/Eritrean elites. In exchange these groups became fighters and laborers for the independence struggle. Chapter 6 actually examines the Eritrean case in detail.

¹⁵ Victory is the most frequent outcome of regime war and is an important parameter in profiles in later chapters. As such it seems reasonable to code it a '1'. The value for victory does not change the difference results. Since OLS is a linear model a change in the independent variable coefficients essentially scales the value for democracy. This scaling effect is essentially washed out in the differencing process; it is common to both profiles.




Figure 3-2: Democratization Difference between Partnership and Patronistic Interventions (base model)

Hypothesis 3 is essentially a null hypothesis, but postulates important effects. It anticipates that countervailing incentives created by access to an intervener’s resources as well as a continuing need to extract domestic sources in a partnership intervention will create conditions which make the net democratization effect of partnerships appear essentially the same as non-intervention. In these cases the warring coalition has some access to external resources which enhance its power and disincentivizes democratization; however, partner support alone is often insufficient to tip the balance of capacities in favor of the supported target. The warring coalition is still heavily reliant on its domestic supporters. Therefore, it must still offer some degree of democratization in order to increase its pool of extractable resources. The coefficient for the partner-in-power coefficient in Model 1 supports this claim. Its magnitude is .05, which is negligible on the Polity scale, and non-significant. This combination suggests that the value is not very distinguishable from zero or no effect. In other words, a

partnership has little impact on the democratic trajectory of a target country.¹⁶ This can also be interpreted as suggesting partnerships do not substantially disrupt the normal socio-economic processes that typically determine how democratic a society can be. More bluntly, partnerships do not derail endogenous democratic processes.

Model 2 and Model 3 test whether the mere presence of a democratic intervener participating on the side that gained or maintained power influences further democratization. Model 2 pools both strategies while Model 3 separates the strategies of democratic partnerships and patronage. Neither model supports the hypothesis that the participation of a democratic intervener alone is sufficient to increase the degree of post war democratization. In both models the coefficients for the democratic intervener terms were in the anticipated direction but failed to reach conventional levels of significance. Furthermore, it is evident from the magnitude and standard errors of the *democratic partner* and *democratic patron* terms that there is no statistical difference in the effect. Hypotheses 4 and 5 are disconfirmed.

To test whether democratic change is conditional on democratic interveners actually winning I developed a series of interaction terms combining strategy, victory and democratic intervener indicators. These interaction terms are reported in Models 4-7 and capture the marginal effects of patrons and partners who win, as well as the effects when these interveners are democratic. The interaction terms are all dichotomous and indicate whether or not the interactive condition is present. For instance the variable *victor*client* indicates the target is receiving patronistic support and its war outcome was a military victory. Under this construct

¹⁶ Although partnerships have little effect on democratization as this chapter demonstrates, these same interventions have substantive and distinct effects on other post war outcomes, particularly post war violence which is addressed in Chapter 4.

the baseline coefficient for *victory* can be interpreted as the effect of victory on democratization for the case of non-intervention. The coefficient for *victory* in all four of these models are negative and significant at least at the $p < .01$ level. Thus, in a “pristine” case of war where there is no outside interference; victory has a negative democratizing effect on the post war outcomes. In short, victors do not share power outside their coalition.

Model 4 serves as a baseline specification to examine whether or not democratic interveners drive democratization results conditional on victory. It includes two interaction terms a victorious client and victorious partner. The democratic interaction is purposefully omitted from this model and inserted in later models in order to compare whether or not democratic interveners drive any democratization results. The coefficients for both terms are positive but only significant for the *victor*client* term. These results suggest a strong intervention strategy may be necessary to impose some form of democratization. If this two-way interaction term were to lose statistical significance in the presence of a three-way interaction term that included democracy, it would suggest that the three-way interaction is a necessary condition for strong postwar democratization.

Model 5 adds three-way interactions of democratic interveners, victory and strategy. An important result emerges from this model. First, the coefficient for three-way interaction term of a victorious democratic client is negative, significant and substantively large. This term supports the claim that democracies engaging in large scale interventions do tend to democratize their targets. Second, the two-way interaction term *victor*client* is no longer significant. In other words it is the three-way combination of being a democratic intervener, a victor and intervening strongly that drives post-war democratization. Democratization appears

most likely to occur when democracies intervene strongly and defeat their client's opponents.

No other combinations aside from the three-way interaction have a strong or significant effect.

Table 3-2: Regression Tables Democratic Interveners

<i>Variable</i>	model4	model5	model6 full model	model7 poor only
<i>partner-in-power</i>	-0.88 (1.)	-0.87 (.96)	-0.21 (.56)	-0.14 (.73)
<i>client-in-power</i>	-3.48*** (.91)	-3.52*** (.97)	-2.20*** (.58)	-2.52** (.73)
<i>victory</i>	-1.76** (.69)	-1.85*** (.67)	-1.45*** (.53)	-2.24** (.70)
<i>victor*partner</i>	1.12 (1.16)	0.94 (1.17)		
<i>victor*client</i>	2.89** (1.27)	1.96 (1.17)		
<i>dem*victor*partner</i>		0.57 (.63)	0.7 (.62)	
<i>dem*victor*client</i>		4.88*** (.69)	5.32*** (.69)	
<i>compromise</i>	0.28 (.79)	0.28 (.76)	0.11 (.81)	0.13 (1.29)
<i>UNop</i>	2.07*** (.58)	2.17*** (.51)	2.17*** (.53)	1.86* (.89)
<i>econ dev</i>	0.48*** (.1)	0.49*** (.09)	0.48*** (.09)	0.54** (.19)
<i>oil</i>	-2.21*** (.66)	-1.93*** (.64)	-2.00*** (.59)	-2.15** (.72)
<i>ethnic fract</i>	0.64 (1.03)	0.61 (.99)	0.48 (.98)	0.41 (1.08)
<i>ethnic war</i>	-1.78*** (.57)	-1.92*** (.58)	-1.79*** (.56)	-2.34** (.72)
<i>post-cw</i>	0.89** (.43)	0.7 (.45)	0.75 (.46)	0.56 (.67)
<i>rgdp/cap-pre</i>	0.31*** (.08)	0.30*** (.08)	0.30*** (.08)	
<i>xpolity2-pre</i>	0.45*** (.08)	0.50*** (.07)	0.50*** (.07)	0.46*** (.08)
<i>post war years</i>	0.08** (.03)	0.09*** (.03)	0.09*** (.03)	0.04 (.04)
<i>constant</i>	-3.32*** (1.18)	-3.19*** (1.13)	-3.42*** (1.08)	-2.09 (1.91)
<i>N</i>	1132	1132	1132	853
<i>R-Squared</i>	0.5994	0.6246	0.6186	0.5626

(Std err) ; *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

For the sake of some parsimony, I drop the two-way interaction terms for *victor*partner* and *victor*client* in my full model specification. The terms are not theoretically meaningful by themselves nor are they statistically distinctive. Also, dropping them does not adversely impact the overall fit of the model. The information loss calculated as a difference in BIC score amounts to 4 points.¹⁷ Results parallel the previous model. The strong and significant coefficient for *dem*victor*client* partially supports Hypothesis 6 which posits that victorious democratic interveners will contribute greater degrees of democratization than those states which received no intervention support. However, the coefficient for a victorious democratic partner is positive but not significant. Ultimately, this implies that substantial post war democratization occurs only when democracies intervene intensely and win.

Finally, Hypothesis 7 proposes that the impact to democratization when democratic interveners employ partnership strategies is significantly different than when those same democracies employ patronistic strategies. In other words, the strategies are different from each other as well as non-intervention. In order to test this claim I calculate another set of first differences using predicted values from a CLARIFY simulation to illustrate the difference in effect of the various strategies. The profiles are the same as those used for Model 1 with the three-way interaction terms included. Results are reported in Figure 3-3 below with a 95% confidence interval. The net effect of a democratic patron on democratization is just above 2.5 points higher than with a democratic partner. This difference also does not cross zero suggesting a meaningful difference in effect and affirming Hypothesis 7.

¹⁷ Long (1997, pg112) recommends that a 6 point difference is strong evidence of a difference of fit. With only a four point difference I choose model 6 which has two fewer terms.




Figure 3-3: First Difference Plot of Democratic Patrons vs. Partner Interveners

One objection that might be raised in regards to the findings so far is that it reflects a selection bias with respect to poor states and patronistic interventions. Governments and rebels that are in states that are very poor are less likely to have the resources to mount an effective offensive against their opponent. They are more likely to need the extensive resources offered by a patron relative to a better off state who can make do with less external interference. Thus patronistic interventions may simply be a proxy indicator for extremely poor states which is itself often a predictor of lower degrees of democracy (Diamond 1992, Przeworski et al. 2000). To affirm that patronistic interventions were not simply a proxy for poor states I conducted two additional tests. First, I established a poor state threshold equal state per capita incomes falling below the 33rd percentile of incomes for a given year from 1975-2009. If a state's per capita income was below this threshold prior to the onset of war, measured using my pre-war income variable it was designated a poor state. I then compared the proportion of poor states who received patronistic support to non-poor states receiving

intervention in a simple cross table, Table 3-3. The table actually reveals that states that are not poor experience a slightly higher proportion of interventions than poor states. A chi-square test suggests that the expected proportion of patronistic interventions from poor states do not significantly deviate from those of non-poor states. Poor states and non-poor states experience similar frequencies of patronistic interventions. A patronistic strategy thus is not necessarily a proxy indicator for poor states.

Table 3-3: Distribution of Patronistic Interventions between Poor and Not Poor States

Intervention	Poor State (%)	Not Poor (%)
Patronistic	14%	24%
Non Patronistic	85%	76%
Pearson chi-square=1.0336 Pr=.309		

More importantly, we want to ascertain that it is not simply the fact that poor states tend to be the victims of war that is driving democratization results. The pre-war income variable *rgdp/cap-pre* is positive and significant in all the models suggesting that wealthier states are more likely to experience greater degrees of democratization. But this variable alone cannot clarify that within the subset of poor states, patronistic strategies have an effect independent of just being poor. To address this concern Model 7 regresses post war democratization for only the states coded poor. If the *client-in-power* term is still significant for this subset then we can have even greater confidence that elements of patronistic strategies do in fact reduce democratizing potential and that it is not simply a matter of being a less wealthy state. The coefficient for *client-in-power* is in fact still negative and significant affirming that elements of patronistic intervention strategies impose their own anti-democratic effects.

In terms of the control covariates *compromise* does not appear to have a strong democratizing effect. The coefficient for *compromise* is in the expected direction but highly uncertain, the standard error is larger than the coefficient itself. Thus compromise cannot be said to encourage democratization in the longer run. This is consistent with the findings of Fortna and Huang.

Other controls behave as expected. A UN operation increased democratization as expected. Interestingly, when the base model is run without accounting for intervention strategies, the impact of UN interventions diminishes by .6 points.¹⁸ This lends some credence to the claim that previous studies that find small or no impacts for UN intervention on democratization may be picking up negative effects of biased interveners preceding them. In this case once biased interveners are accounted for the impacts of the UN become more pronounced.

The *economic development* variable demonstrates a positive and significant relationship with democratization. More developed countries are more likely to democratize in the post war era. *Oil* has a strong negative effect on the degree of postwar democratization. This variable is often interpreted as suggesting that states endowed with high degrees of natural resource wealth can set up rentier states. These states are able to dole out patronage from the rents received on oil and are therefore less reliant on the support and income of the general population. They face little pressure to democratize. *Ethnic fractionalization* appears to have no substantive or significant impact on democratization. Ethnic diversity in and of itself is neither a threat to nor boom to democratization. The *Ethnic war* coefficient, however, is

¹⁸ I do not report this model in the tables but results can be made available upon request.

negative and significant at $p < .01$. This coefficient implies that wars fought over identity issues are less likely to democratize to the same degree as states engaged in non-ethnic war. In these situations ethnic groups in power fear the potential ramifications if their rivals were to gain increased shares of power. The *post-cold war* indicator is positive and significant in the baseline model but loses its significance in the full model. This can be interpreted to suggest that the end of the Cold War perhaps weakly influences the degree of democratization but more important is whether or not a post war state in fact had the support of a democratic intervener. *Xpolity2pre* exhibits a positive and significant effect which is more consistent with democratic memory¹⁹. That is, states with some democratic experiences are likely to carry that knowledge forward to shape the post war regime (Schneider 2009). The control for income, *rgdp/capita-pre* has already been discussed. Finally, there seems to be a relatively slow time trend with respect to democracy. The *post war year* count variable is also positive and significant indicating there is in general a slow process of liberalization as states are more distanced from their prior wars.

Conclusion

Figure 3-4 depicts simulated range plots using the profiles described earlier to depict the differences between partnership and patronistic strategies both generally (bottom figures) and when they are employed by democratic interveners (top). Biased interventions are not in general great stimulants to post war democracy. Partnerships strategies do not exert a strong or significant effect and patronistic interventions tend to exert a strong but generally anti-democratic effect. These effects are likely driven by the incentives the intervention strategy

¹⁹ A negative coefficient would have been more consistent with the democratic/autocratic ceiling explanation. The negative coefficient would pull negative *Xpolity* values more positive and positive values more negative thus avoiding extreme values.

sets up. Elites of warring factions are able to substitute foreign resources for what they would otherwise have to extract from a domestic constituency. This in turn alleviates some of the pressures for democratic concessions in exchange for these resources. How much relief the supported target gets is related to the intensity of the strategy. Partners provide significant aid but not unlimited aid. Supported leaders still bear the preponderance of responsibility to run an effective military campaign during the war and effective government after. While they may not have to appeal to broader bases because of their partner's support they also cannot afford to alienate potential domestic supporters. Consequently, the net democratization effect of a partnership is to reinforce the status quo. That is partners generally to not enhance or detract from the level of post war democratizations.




Figure 3-4: Range Plots of Differences in Democratization for Various Militarized Intervention Strategies

On the other hand, patrons intervene to win and shape the postwar context to maximize their foreign policy benefits. Clients benefit from their patron's commitment. They

gain access to many more resources than a typical partner would be willing to provide. Because the patron provides much of what a client coalition needs, provided the client remains compliant, the client is even less reliant on their local population. They may even be able to jettison some of their undesirable 'insiders' in order to shorten the size of the winning coalition whom they must satisfy. The patron may also prefer this, as smaller coalitions are more easily managed and reduce their foreign policy uncertainty. Thus, patronistic interventions tend to have strong autocratizing tendencies.

Democracies change this dynamic somewhat. A democratic partner may encourage some democratization, but his smaller role in the prosecution of the war does not gain him substantial bargaining leverage. The difference in democratization is not much different than the case of non-intervention. In short, token forces sent from democratic interveners to an ally are not likely to encourage substantial reform. If the commitment is small the leverage they have is small.

A democracy executing a patronistic strategy seems likely to encourage a significant degree of post war democratization, on average approximately 3 full points. It is important to consider what a 3 point change actually means. To get a three point bump on the Polity scale one or two of the following must occur: either elections must be installed where they previously did not exist, elections must become more competitive than in the past or a legislature or judiciary must get some degree of veto power or independence that it previously did not have. So, the real effect is quite substantive. Ruling elites are somewhat more constrained and their continued tenure is somewhat more reliant and satisfying the demands of their citizens. Unfortunately, the price for this democratization may be too high. Chapter 4

will go on to reveal that the same strategies that encouraged high degrees of democratization also set in motion counter-incentives to develop strong state capacity and in many instances encourage an increase in the resort to political violence. Democracies with an itch to intervene and impose democratic reforms in the states they assist may have to ask whether the democracy they install is worth the cost.

Chapter 4. State Capacity, Stability and Intervention Strategy

Introduction

States emerging from the toils of regime war need to generate both the will and capabilities to fulfill the basic governing functions of modern states. These functions include providing physical security for state territory and citizens as well as providing basic political and economic order. State capacity is a concept political scientists use to describe how much or how well states can provide these basic functions. Robust states have the capacity to protect their subjects and their territories from global, regional and domestic threats as well as to provide for basic economic well-being within the state. Weak states are unable to meet some or all of these basic functions. Capacity has been shown to inoculate states from the onset or recurrence of civil wars (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Walter 2004); enhance a government's ability to implement peace agreements and restore some sense of security to people's lives and property (DeRouen et al. 2010); mitigate the degree of domestic political violence within their own society (Benson and Kugler 1998); bolster regime survival (Przeworski et al. 2000); protect a state from the spillovers of war and pathologies of neighboring states (Braithwaite 2010); and resist the incursions of transnational terrorists and criminal syndicates (Patrick 2011).

Unfortunately, a large body of evidence also points to the fact that wars, at least initially, destroy state capacity both locally and collaterally (Collier 1999, Kang and Meernik 2005, Mason 2009, Gleditsch 2007, Murdoch and Sandler 2002). This reduction in turn leaves states vulnerable to new waves of violence and human suffering from domestic as well as external threats even after the fighting stops. Furthermore, the ways in which wars are fought and end--their issues of contention, duration, severity and outcome--have also been linked to

propensities for future violence and recurring war (Fortna 2008a, Licklider 1995, Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007, Toft 2010, Walter 2004, Werner and Yuen 2005).

While numerous studies in the contemporaneous literature link war characteristics and processes to post-war capacity and violence; fewer of these studies, have focused on the role of militarized interventions. Of those studies that do explore external intervention and capacity building the emphasis has focused on multilateral peace-building or transitional assistance missions, overlooking more prevalent unilateral and biased intervention (Caplan 2005, Doyle and Sambanis 2006, Fearon and Laitin 2004, Jarstad 2008a, Paris and Sisk 2009, Fortna 2008a). Post war state capacity is often a reflection of the decisions made in preceding interventions. For example, the US decision to dismantle the Iraqi army during the Second Gulf War had tragic consequences for Iraq's security many years after the fighting stopped. Though the peace building and transitional assistance literatures undoubtedly enrich our understanding of how intervention processes work to rebuild or degrade states and diffuse or foment the potential for future violence; the aims of biased interventions often diverge from the peace-building norm. These differences can alter local actors' incentives to cooperate and participate in post war state building and violence management processes. In short, the links between biased interventions and capacity or violence need more empirical study in their own right.

This chapter studies the empirical relationship between heterogeneous intervention strategies and both post war capacity and violence. In a war-time setting states and rebel groups alike employ their extractive and organizational capabilities to acquire the human and material resources needed to prosecute wars and distribute those resources when and where needed. Groups more capable of generating war capacities relative to their opponents will

eventually end up in power. When the war ends, coalitions can adapt their endogenous war-making capacities toward fulfilling the requisite functions of state governance. Coalitions need not generate all their war-making capacity domestically though. They can receive some resources externally. Capacities not generated domestically however are not necessarily available to apply toward post war governance. Thus, those winners that were better able to develop and extract domestically sourced war-making capacities are likely to be in a stronger position to provide effective governance in the post war context.

The impacts of intervention strategies can thus linger long after the war by the way they influenced domestically generated capacity development. Interveners to varying degrees can substitute their own capabilities in lieu of the local ally developing these endogenously. If the intervener is patronistic, for instance, the client gets many of its immediate war needs met, freeing it to pursue more narrow interests while the patron does the bulk of the fighting and supplies the client with resources that do not have to be extracted from the domestic public. A client's focus on narrower interests however distracts her from building more robust domestically generated war-making capacity which in turn limits the backbone on which to build a post war governing capacity. A partnering intervener however is defined by that intervener's expectation that their ally to bring more of its own capabilities to bear. This increased pressure compels the supported coalition to actually develop more capacity locally. They must find greater public or elite support for military supplies and infrastructure. If these partners fail, then they do not survive to govern post-conflict. If they do survive, the larger domestic base of infrastructure and resources will port over to governing capabilities putting these states in stronger positions moving forward.

The degree of political violence in a post-war society is also directly influenced by choices of intervention strategy. Direct effects operate through a legitimacy mechanism where legitimacy simply refers to a regime's perceived right to rule. A government perceived as legitimate is probabilistically less susceptible to post war challenges to its authority and policies compared to governments perceived as less legitimate. A post-war government's legitimacy is highest when it has a sufficient coalition of domestic supporters and demonstrated sufficient war-making capacity such that it defeated rivals or compelled them to seek a negotiated settlement. In short, a legitimate post war government is one that either achieved an out-right victory in war or survived the onslaught of a capable challenger on its own merits.

Biased interventions can alter the perceived legitimacy of post war governments in at least two ways. First, it can reduce the size of the domestic coalition that government needed to win. With a greater proportion of the population politically marginalized or disenfranchised from the ruling coalition the opportunities for violent dissent increase. Second, interventions can frustrate the natural expectations of a war's outcome fomenting resentment and resistance to the victorious coalition. Simply put, citizens expect the side with the most favorable balance of local capabilities to eventually win. Strong or reasonably supported governments should defeat weakly supported rebels. Similarly weak states should be defeated by strongly supported rebellions. Interveners can upset this balance by introducing capabilities that were not considered in citizens' calculus of likely outcomes. To the degree these capabilities disrupt what most citizens expected, citizens will become increasingly hostile. This is analogous to Werner and Yeun's (2005) findings on imposed peace settlements. The greater the distance between the imposed settlement and what belligerents felt they could have gained by

continued fighting the more fragile is the peace. The “losers” will resist and escalate at the earliest opportunities.

In the following sections I proceed to conduct a brief review of the literature on post war state capacity building and recurring war and political violence. I highlight gaps in our current knowledge of the linkages between these concepts and explain how this study can plug some of these gaps. Next, I develop hypotheses which account for variations of post war capacity and political violence based upon the strategic choices of biased interveners. Following this, I lay out my research design and discuss empirical results. Lastly, I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of empirical findings on the decisions of if and how to intervene.

Literature Review

War Outcome and State Capacity

War’s influence on the capacity of states has received increase attention since the start of the new millennium. Much of this increased attention is likely due to the perceived increase in political violence associated with the collapse of Cold War empires and especially in the realization of a “weak-state” threat posed in the aftermath of September 11. Scholars and practitioners alike are increasingly interested in identifying factors that make or keep states weak in terms of their capacity to govern. One question likely to be raised is does the manner of war termination matter to the degree of post war state capacity? Early work by Organski and Kugler (1980) identified the so-called Phoenix Factor in interstate wars. The Phoenix Factor stated in essence that states generally recover ante-bellum levels of political and economic capacity within two decades after war. Victors and neutrals lose capacity marginally and recover at a steady rate. Losers initially suffer greater capacity deficits but also tend to

experience a much more rapid rate of recovery as these states mobilize resources more efficiently to restore lost power. Kugler and Arbetman (1989a) later refined this proposition finding that although recovery in economic capacity is rapid, the recovery of destroyed political structures is not as strong. War in other words can leave states politically weaker.

In the civil war literature, state capacity is most often studied in relation to the onset of war or propensity for violence, but is often overlooked as a product of war itself.¹ When it has been studied the potential connections between modes of war termination, i.e. war outcomes, and follow on state capacity are still often overlooked. Paul Collier (1999), for instance, found that states experiencing longer duration civil wars were more likely to recover economically, while states experiencing shorter ones were likely to continue to experience decline. Chen et al (2008) investigated how post war states recover their capacity relative to non-warring states using a number of economic and social indicators which operationalized state capacity. Their study revealed that post conflict countries grow their GDP roughly 2.4 points higher on average for the first seven post conflict years than states that have not experienced conflict. They also note a weakly accelerated growth in investment rates relative to non-warring states. On the other hand, indicators of the capacity to provide social goods (e.g. health and education) were less clear cut, improving relative to pre-war baselines but not in relation to global trends. In short, these authors find evidence suggestive of a Phoenix Factor for intrastate wars but these growths or declines are not linked to the modes of war termination and the incentives they

¹ In these cases state capacity is an independent variable and onset is the dependent variable. See for example Benson and Kugler (1998), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Sambanis (2004), Buhaug (2006), Fjeld and Desoya (2009), Hendrix (2010).

foster to mobilize capacity development. This study takes a step in that direction by exploring outcome-capacity linkages for regime wars.

Intervention Strategy and State Capacity

Quantitative studies of the relationship between biased interventions and post war outcomes are also in short supply. The majority of the quantitative literature focuses instead on how intervention and post war capacity explains other post war outcomes. This overlooks the direct influences intervention may have on capacity. Furthermore, most studies that do explore the impact of war processes on post war environments either ignore intervention outright or narrowly focus on the role of UN or multilateral peace-keeping operations. Scholars often discount the fact that biased interventions are more common than impartial interventions and even in the context of a peace intervention that biased actors can also influence war and post-war environments. Some of the limited scholarship available suggests post war capacity regeneration substantially undermined or reinforced based upon the actions of biased interveners.

For instance, Kang and Meernik (2005) explore the impacts of a peacekeeping presence on post war economic growth. They find that increased peace keeping presence, measured as troops per unit area, encourages economic growth. They reason that UN presence signals to capital holders that the international community is committed to peace and stability in the targeted state, therefore these holders may be more willing to invest. On the other hand, Pickering and Kisangani (2006) also conducted a study of the impact of military intervention on

economic capacity.² Their study however included any biased intervention where 1000 or more troops crossed an international border. Interventions were coded either “supportive” or “hostile” referenced to the sitting government and neutral or unbiased interventions were dropped. The authors find that interventions which support the target government in non-democratic states actually reduce economic growth.

A brief comparison of these studies suggests that bias matters. A biased intervention under certain conditions may undermine some of the positive capacity growth that Kang and Meernik find for impartial interventions. However, Kang and Meernik also tie the degree of capacity growth in part to the intensity of the intervention. More UN troops, more growth. Unfortunately, most of the quantitative work on biased interventions treats the intervention itself as one size fits all. For instance in Pickering and Kisangani’s study an intervention of 1000 is analytically equal to an intervention of 100,000. More study is needed to assess how the intensity of biased intervention influences overall capacity outcomes and how these compare to their unbiased counterparts.

A large branch of qualitative literature also supports my claim that strategy, particularly intensity matters. This literature tends to be policy oriented and focused more narrowly on the peace keeping and multi-lateral transitional assistance missions, but key recommendations from this literature have important implications for the capacity generation incentivized through biased interventions as well. Policy recommendations typically converge on four central points: security is the top short term priority, rapid economic recovery is important to sustain peace building successes, assisting nations must be beware of creating dysfunctional

² Pickering and Kisangani and Kang and Meernik all used GDP/capita growth as a measure of increasing or decreasing state capacity.

political and economic dependencies, and peace builders or transitional authorities must be sensitive to issues of local culture, ownership of local governance and sovereignty issues (Caplan 2005, Fearon and Laitin 2004, Krasner 2004, Keohane 2003, Ignatieff 2003). These last two recommendations particularly attest to a growing concern among academics and policy advocates that heavy handed strategies (degree of intensity?) or strategies inappropriately matched to local contexts (degree of bias?) can produce dysfunctional local governance including sub-optimal capacity generation. In a peace operation context these dysfunctions are presumably unintended consequences. However, biased interveners are likely to impose more deliberate distortions, especially as they become the more preponderant force. Picking sides and or helping too much or too little changes the incentives for the supported side to develop their own local organizational capabilities. Supported coalitions can become over reliant on their foreign allies. Additionally, picking sides and intruding too intensely can also trigger political and cultural grievances which erode the legitimacy of a coalition in power making cooperation toward developing capacity more difficult. This study seeks to formulate a theory and test implications for biased interventions impact state capacity development through the ways they incentivize building local organizational competence and legitimacy. It is also a step toward bridging some of the gaps in the biased and unbiased intervention literatures as well as highlighting their distinctions.

Intervention and the Intensity of Violence

A number of pioneering studies have explored the connections of militarized interventions, both biased and unbiased, on processes of war violence. Regan for instance looked at the role unilateral interventions played in civil war duration. He found that biased

interventions on one side of a dispute could shorten a civil war but that unbiased or counter-balanced interventions would lengthen it (Regan 2002). In earlier studies he found that “mixed” strategies that included both economic and military elements of intervention are more likely to end civil wars (Regan 1996, 2000). Unfortunately, Regan and a number of other scholars who built on his work never looked at the influences of biased intervention beyond the war (See for example Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004, Cunningham 2006). More study is needed to assess whether these different intervention strategies can hold the peace longer once obtained or more robustly contain the extent of post war violence.

Most work that does explore the impacts of intervention and degree of post war violence again seems to focus on multi-lateral peace keeping or transitional assistance operations. The seminal study of Doyle and Sambanis(2000) found that strict, or participatory, peace keeping success was more likely the stronger the mandate. Specifically, multi-dimensional peace keeping strategies would more likely hold the peace for two years compared to operations with weaker mandates. The success of these weaker peace operations were dependent on either an enforcement mandate, which typically involves authorization to suppress one or more of the belligerent actors, and-or a less hostile conflict to begin with. Fortna(2008a) built off the work of Doyle and Sambanis by attempting to improve the research design. Rather than look at various snap shots of post conflict intervals, she applied a duration model design to Doyle and Sambanis’ data.³ She found that low order consent based peace keeping missions were no more or less a hazard to peacekeeping success than higher order

³ She also added a handful of cease fire cases that were not coded in the 2000 Doyle and Sambanis dataset. See Fortna (2008) for a description of the cases.

consent based peacekeeping, but that peace enforcement missions tend to be less successful than the consent-based operations more generally.

The genius of both these studies is an awareness of the relevance of an intervener's strategy to the prospects for peace. Particularly relevant are the connections of perceivably biased fighting during war and the prospects of post conflict peace or violence. Specifically, the peace enforcement operations in both the previous studies are distinguished by the fact that they involve the direct application of force to suppress one or more belligerent in a conflict. They join in the fighting and to some extent act with bias. This raises two concerns. First, Doyle and Sambanis' findings suggest that some bias, even though they do not call it out explicitly, may actually reduce the intensity required to contain the violence, even if it is more fragile as Fortna suggests.⁴ More importantly, if the influences of peacekeepers fighting in war are indeed correlated to violence management success after war, then the research design of these studies is flawed from omitted variable bias. In particular other state actors (not affiliated with the peace operation) who may also have joined the active fighting and thus impacted the post war propensity for peace are not accounted for. UN and other post conflict peace operations may be taking undue credit or blame for the influences of other actors. My research design accounts for the influences of external fighting forces as well as post-conflict peace operations within the same modeling framework.

Fortna's (2008b) other major contribution was a qualitative analysis which connects the activities of peace keepers to the perspectives for those whom peace keepers actually keep peace. She presents evidence showing that peace is kept through the mechanisms of *changing*

⁴ In other words if you can target specific bad actors you don't need to expend more efforts trying to contain all actors.

incentives for war to peace, reducing uncertainty in monitoring and compliance, preventing and controlling accidents, and preventing political abuse through *foreign interim administration and control*. What is crucial in light of this study is that target subjects themselves admit that they do in fact respond to changes in incentives and to some degree foreign control of administration of local process. The incentives biased interveners offer are likely different than those of traditional peace operators and needs to be considered more explicitly. Again, this study attempts to theorize about how different strategies incentive or disincentivized violence and tests their implications.

Finally, a number of studies seem to converge around a central idea that interventions that are consensual in nature tend to be more successful in maintaining peace. Interventions that are perceived as aggressive or biased or impose a foreign dictated outcome on a target are more likely to devolve back into violence. Fortna's finding regarding peace enforcement was already mentioned. Edelstien (2009) writing on the "obsolescing welcome" of foreign interveners notes consent based missions are less likely to wear out peace-builders' welcome giving them more time to rehabilitate the target society. In other words, the consensual nature of intervention confers legitimacy to the intervener for a period of time and to the post-bellum coalition they are supporting. Elites and the masses are more likely to cooperate in generating capacity and managing post-war dissent. Occupations perceived locally as "adversarial" to one or more of the relevant factions lose their legitimacy much more rapidly. These tend to devolve into increased dissent, violence and mission failure.

Edelstien's study is also noteworthy in the fact that he at least qualitatively addresses the relevance of intervention intensity to post war stability and capacity as well. He notes that

an intervention that is too big undermines local control over security and governance. Occupiers tend to take on major governance roles which undermine local organizational development and legitimacy. When sovereignty is ultimately transferred, the governing coalition is often less capable than it might have been if allowed to be more self-sufficient or been allowed more time to develop. Additionally, the larger occupation presence undermines the credibility that interveners will actually leave. This further depletes the legitimacy of the intervener and their supported coalition. As time goes on, more and more citizens may direct their energies toward expelling interveners, which can detract from capacity development and more critically foment increasing dissent and violence (see also Pape 2005). Lastly, he notes that if too little intervention occurs, post bellum governments may be too limited in their own capabilities to manage violence and exert effective control over the state.

On the quantitative side Walter provides statistical evidence which demonstrates that impartial third party guarantees increase the likelihood of the survival of a negotiated peace(Walter 1997, 2002). This peace is sustained because impartial third parties are credibly able to relieve the primary belligerents of their domestic security dilemma. However, other scholars have articulated a fairly compelling counter argument. Werner and Yuen (2005) argue, for instance, that foreign interveners can exacerbate a peace deal if they impose an agreement upon former belligerents which does not match up with what belligerents expect they could have gotten by continuing to fight. But, if the agreement matches the convergence of belligerents' expectations then third parties are largely unnecessary. The agreement is self-enforcing. Using a measure for the difference in capabilities between two belligerent states, Werner and Yeun find that foreign imposed settlements were more likely to break-down the

more capabilities between belligerents changed. While their study looked at the breakdown of peace between states, there is no theoretically compelling reason to suggest the same logic would not work within an internal war context.⁵ Foreign imposed outcomes in the context of regime war may also breakdown as the balance of capabilities shift between supported coalitions and their opponents, especially as the intervener looks to withdraw.⁶

In sum, the present study seeks to build on the previous literature in two ways. First, recognizing that both biased and unbiased interveners can be acting to incentivize or disincentivize violence, this study seeks to quantify the impacts of both. Fortna, Edelstien, Werner and Yuen all point toward an understanding that target citizens respond to perceived neutrality and bias of interveners, but quantitative assessments of how much or little they respond is lacking. This study will be a first cut in that direction. Second, the quantitative and qualitative peace-building literatures as represented by Sambanis, Fortna and Edelstien also point to the fact that strategic intensity may also matter. Having no military capabilities on the ground can lead to control and stability dilemmas and having too much force on the ground may also become dysfunctional. There is good reason to suspect that these dependency and capability dilemmas are not confined to the peacekeeping realm. This study seeks to expand our knowledge of militarized interventions by extending the analysis of post war violence and stability to biased intervention strategies, uncovering the propensities toward violence that

⁵ In Werner and Yuen's study states are essentially modeled as homogenous units with a measure of war making capacity. This same unitary assumption ought to hold for sub-state units as well. The government is one "state" or unit whose war making capabilities have the potential to shift over time and the rebels are another "state" or unit whose capabilities can also shift. If one side appears to have a marked advantage relative to the other, a previously imposed agreement may be abandoned in pursuit of a "better bargain" employing violence. More importantly, this hints that any unit's endogenous ability to generate war making capacity has implications for the expectation of violence.

⁶ This is also contingent upon the opponent not being eradicated in the case of a supported coalition's victory as the outcome of war itself.

these high and low intensity variants exert on a target. This study aims to paint a clearer and more integrated picture of how varying combinations of bias and intensity enhance and detract from a target society's net incentives to grow state capacity and manage internal dissent.

Intervention Heterogeneity and the Incentive to Build Capacity

Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors maintain that ruling elites have to satisfy a certain sized winning coalition within a broader polity in order to maintain power. This winning coalition empowers ruling elites and receives some form of political goods from these rulers in exchange for their support. Depending on the nature of these winning coalitions, rulers face varying incentives whether to provide private goods, such as economic patronage, in order to pay off a handful of essential power brokers to maintain their rule; or public goods, such as public infrastructure and social welfare in order to satisfy a broader coalition of citizens whose support is needed to maintain power. (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). In either case, rulers must extract and distribute resources from the polity in order to generate these private and public goods.

Regime wars emerge when a challenging coalition (typically a domestic rebellion, but sometimes foreign powers acting through a domestic proxy) challenges the ruling coalition's right to rule. The challenger offers an alternative mix of public and private political goods to members of the polity not a part of the ruler's winning coalition. The now competing coalitions strive to generate the war making capacity needed to overcome their opponent and establish or reestablish their own legitimate right to rule. As coalitions generate greater levels of capacity they are able to attract or sustain greater numbers of supporters.

In a pristine case of civil war, coalitions' war capacity must be generated endogenously, each coalition is the *sole producer* of their available capacity and there is no recourse to foreign supplied resources. Governments and challengers ask their current support bases for fighters and greater portions of their excess productivity. They may also attempt to reach out to new constituencies as a means of increasing the base of resources they can draw upon. These appeals for additional support come with costs. As more is asked of coalition members more is likely to be demanded by these same members. Meeting these demands is not easy. Coalition elites must assure their longer standing members that the share of political rewards they are accustomed to is not in permanent jeopardy while at the same time supplying new members the rewards necessary to maintain their support.

Just as important, gaining acquiescence from supporters does not necessarily imply that these new resources can actually be collected and distributed when and where they are required. Current administrative structures, like any resource pipeline, have finite reservoirs and throughput. Only so much can be gathered at collection points and only so much can be pushed through a given line at a given time. This line must be upgraded if it is to handle larger reservoirs and higher throughputs of resources.

To solve both the new demands for political goods and the problems of appropriately allocating resources for the war itself coalitions must become more efficient, generating more and wasting less. Elites are thus incentivized to develop new organizational and administrative competencies in order to collect these additional resources, increase their throughput and ultimately allocate them toward appropriate military and political ends. Once created, the efficiencies and competencies gained in generating the coalition's endogenous war capacity

become relatively stable capabilities available for adaptation to the needs of future peace time governance. For example, war time organizations instituted to collect battle field intelligence can become post-war criminal intelligence agencies that assist in maintaining law and order. The infrastructure and logistics organs that distribute war-time material do not suddenly disappear. They remain and can be adapted to distribute peace time political goods. Combat medics become peace time health-care providers, and so on. In sum many of the capabilities generated in war can be transformed into peace time governance capacities in the aftermath war. The need for endogenous resource extraction encourages capacity growth.

A second alternative to maintaining or growing capacity is to acquire it from external sources. Rather than attempt to take more from within a society, coalitions may look to foreign powers to help tip balances of capabilities in their favor. Foreign powers may also simply impose it, whether or not it was asked for. From the perspective of the locally supported coalition this support is generally less costly to employ and may be a preferred means of generating capacity relative to endogenous support. This is because resources can be acquired without having to admit new domestic members or new demands into the coalition. A smaller domestic winning coalition ostensibly means each current member can receive a greater share of the available political goods. Second, the foreign intervener has already paid many of the employment costs to exploit these resources. It is cheaper for coalition elites to use provided capabilities than to produce and use these same capabilities themselves. For instance, foreign troops are trained, armed, and draw their salaries from their home government. The intervener has already won the support of its homeland coalition in order to provide the financial and other material aid to the local partner or client. The supported coalition is therefore not

burdened with the need to increase its capacity to train, provide weapons for and pay these troops or justify itself to a larger base of domestic supporters in order to employ troops. It can pursue other narrower aims such as maintaining the current coalition.

This is not to say, however, that there are no pressures on the supported coalition to build new competencies. Coalitions may still have to develop some competencies which allow them to coordinate and interoperate with their external partner. If two or more command structures cannot plan or communicate with each other their effectiveness in combat may still be sub-par. This requires some institutional capacity development on the part of target and supporter alike. Similarly, the influx of intervener resources may still potentially represent a throughput problem. Interveners in addition to supporting their own fighting forces in the target country can potentially provide additional material and financial aid for which they do not provide the additional pipeline once it reaches the target's depots. The supported target may still be stuck with some burden for allocating and distributing these resources. It will have to invest in capacity development.

In practice then the incentive for supported targets to grow capacity is intricately tied to the particular intervention strategy foreign supporters pursue. In the simplest case, non-military intervention, foreign supporters provide no militarized aid and therefore the domestic warring factions have strong incentives to build and maintain their own endogenous capacities. They must recruit, train and arm troops from their own society, develop internal means of collecting and distributing war resources, and build enough organizational and institutional capacity to sufficiently satisfy supporter's demands. Conditional on winning, all of these

resources and experiences are available to be adapted towards the demands of governance once war ends.




Figure 4-1: Intervention Strategies and Incentives for Capacity Generation

Intervention however may or may not inspire local capacity development. In the case of a patronistic strategy, the external intervener is said to have a high stake in a particular outcome. The intervener pursues its foreign policy goals through its client, therefore to get the desired gains its client must be in a position of power in order to provide them. The intervener's goals are thus more absolute aiming for decisive military victory. Consequently, the patron also provides its client with considerably more of its own material and organizational competencies giving it a preponderance of capabilities. With this preponderance however comes more intense control by the patron over the client's military and political decision-making.

The client is essentially a *user* of resources rather than a producer. The patron pays most of the production costs for organization and capacity generation; the supported clients

invest in capabilities to use what is provided. When the war is over and the patron's resources dry up, the client is left with nothing to use. Because they also had no strong incentives to invest in the production of capacity during war, they will tend to be organizationally and institutionally weaker in a post-war environment. Their ability to generate state capacity is degraded. This leads to my first hypothesis:

H1: Targets receiving patronistic intervention support are less likely to develop post war state capacity relative to groups who come to power without the military assistance of an external intervener

In the case of partnerships interveners are postulated to be more selective and conservative in terms of the blood and treasure they are willing to risk. They have a stake in the target polity, but they believe they can satisfy their foreign policy needs within a wider range of outcomes. Consequently, intervening partners will make important contributions, but will tend to commit less both militarily and politically placing the bulk of responsibility squarely in the hands of their supported target. In this context, supporting interveners and supported coalitions are *joint producers* of capacity. The target receives non-trivial aid from its partner, but it must nevertheless still draw upon domestic sources of support and extraction in order to maintain its war fighting capacity. Therefore, it must also continue to make investments in production competencies to extract more of these resources and allocate them appropriately. Similar to the pristine case where coalitions are sole producers, the fact that target was still responsible for some (perhaps even most) of their own capacity means that the target will have a number of organizational and institutional competencies it can transform into post war

governance capabilities. Conditional on holding power after the war, a partnership supported coalition will generate more capacity than a patronistically supported coalition.

H2: Targets in power receiving partnership intervention support generate more post war capacities relative to factions who came to power through patronistic support.

How qualitatively different partnerships are from a pristine case of non-intervention remains an empirical question. Within the context of a partnership, interveners may provide some niche capabilities that enhance their local allies overall war-time effectiveness or a wide range of diffuse capabilities. If interveners provide niche capabilities then partnership interventions will look much more like non-intervention because the locally supported faction is on the hook to provide a much broader range of capabilities for itself. If the intervener however provides a smaller degree but broader swath of capabilities, then the supported coalition may experience incentives to develop more user oriented capabilities rather than produce them locally. This can make partnerships appear as simply a lighter form of patronism.

My inclination is to argue for the former. First, niche capabilities can be mobilized and sustained more cheaply than full-spectrum capabilities. Partnership strategies are predicated on an assumption that interveners have a stake in the war but desire to keep their own costs down. Second, smaller more niche capabilities tend to be more maneuverable and defensible than more robust and static capabilities. This attribute makes the intervener's forces less vulnerable to attack by hostile forces, which also weighs heavy in the minds of decision makers. The supported local coalition thus experiences stronger incentives to produce rather than use. Partnerships will thus in general exhibit greater capacity generation than patronistic

interventions but will generate capacity that is slightly less than or equal to the capacity generation associated with non-intervention.

H3: Targets in power receiving partnership intervention support will appear no different in terms of capacity than factions who came to power without the assistance of a foreign intervener

Intervention Heterogeneity and Post-War Political Violence

The strategic choices of interveners also directly and indirectly influence the degree of political violence and disorder in the aftermath of war. The indirect influences on violence are actually mediated through the direct influence of intervention strategies on post war state capacity. States capable of generating greater degrees of capacity are more likely to possess the organizational and institutional wherewithal to manage post war dissent and violence (Paris and Sisk 2009, Paris 2004). Rulers transform some of this capacity into the public and private goods citizens demand, co-opting them into acceptance and acquiescence to the government's rule (Buhaug 2006, DeRouen et al. 2010, Fjelde and De Soysa 2009, Thyne 2006). Additionally, capacity can also be transformed into coercive capabilities required to monitor and repress potential dissenters which should also temper the degree of dissent and violence (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Fjelde and De Soysa 2009). This leads to the following hypothesis:

H4: States capable of generating more post war capacity are less susceptible to postwar dissent and violence.

Intervention strategies also directly influence the degree of post war dissent and violence through a legitimacy mechanism. In a pristine post war environment where no foreign military actors are involved, legitimacy is conferred to a ruling coalition based upon its demonstrated ability to muster superior capacity through their supporters and either co-opt or compel the polity to comply with the government's policies and acquiesce to its rule (Tilly 1985, Levi 1981). This coalition may be small where members control a concentrated proportion of the state's domestic resources, or somewhat larger where many members control more diffuse bases of resources. Regardless, dominant coalition's right to rule is established by the fact that no other alternative coalition can muster sufficient capacity to challenge ruler's claims over the polity or to offer its members a better bargain. In a Weberian sense the dominant coalition has a preponderance of support and capabilities with which to exercise coercion, control territory, and regulate political and economic relationships (Mann 1984).

Intervention strategies distort this pristine archetype. Through the intensity dimension external interveners exert varying degrees of political and military control over their targets. They do this by essentially becoming substitute members of their supported targets winning coalition and thereby crowding out other domestic would-be members of a winning coalition. For example, in a pristine scenario a coalition might need the support of four groups of actors; A, B, C, and D. These four groups implicitly have bargaining leverage with elites through which they could levy demands as part of their support to Coalition ABCD. However, intervener V enters the fray and consequently coalition elites no longer require the support of groups C and

D.⁷ These groups who might otherwise have been a part of the winning coalition are now crowded out of the new coalition ABV and no longer receive the benefits of being a part of that coalition. In the eyes of members of group C and D, Coalition ABV becomes less legitimate. These groups are more likely to seek to undermine the government and perhaps organize alternative coalitions with which to challenge the state rather than acquiesce or cooperate with it. Worse, as Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) note, interveners themselves have incentives to puppetize their partners or clients, keeping their coalitions small and more manageable in order to maximize their own foreign policy gains. Strong interveners in other words may impose their own restrictions on who is allowed to participate on top of the restrictions already imposed by coalition elites. Again, the rejected groups become part of a larger pool of disgruntled disenfranchised citizenry susceptible to engaging in post war violence.

Finally, substitution erodes the local exercise of sovereignty and self-determination even within the winning coalition. This denial of sovereignty may be intentional as in the case of puppetizing local elites, but it can also be done simply for the sake of near term efficiency (Fearon and Laitin 2004, Ignatieff 2003, Keohane 2003, Krasner 2004). Regardless, foreign political intrusion can provoke increased nationalistic sentiments among coalition elites and their supporting masses over the frustration of not being in control of their own destiny. These sentiments may eventually turn violent (Caplan 2005, King and Mason 2006).⁸ For example, Syrian domination of Lebanese politics throughout the late 70's and 80's provoked mass

⁷ Elites may even prefer this at some level because it reduces the size of the domestic coalition for which spoils must be shared.

⁸ Robert Pape (2005) also makes a similar argument regarding terrorism and suicide bombing. In brief he claims the more a foreign intervener is perceived to be occupying and exerting undue influence on a homeland the more likely a subset of citizens of that homeland are to engage in suicide terrorism. It is a strategy of the weak not unlike the circumstances losers of a regime war might feel in the aftermath.

defections into Lebanon's various sectarian militias and the violence that ensued. US political dominance in Iraq sparked violent demonstration from Shia militias whose political party sponsors were in fact a part of the sitting government throughout the US occupation, not to mention the frustrations engendered by US control of Iraq's security forces. Similarly, massive riots broke out across Kosovo in 2004 which are attributed in part to the slow transfer of sovereignty to the elected Kosovar government.

Patronistic interventions are thus more likely to incite post war political disorder. This is because patronistic strategies by design are resource intensive and highly intrusive. They appear much like occupations. Patrons often interject large scale military forces, political advisors, and a host of other material capabilities to their client which crowd out local ownership and within the client's coalition. As more domestic actors are marginalized and increasingly experience frustration at the perceived loss of sovereignty and self-determination, grievances are accentuated and nationalistic sentiments are sparked which can foment into more severe post war violence.

H5: Targets in power receiving patronistic intervention support will experience more political disorder than factions who came to power without the assistance of a foreign intervener.

Partnership interventions may also be susceptible to some of the same resentments associated with patronistic intervention but they are typically designed in ways that put the supported target in a dominant role. Though the intervener may exercise some influence, local coalition members will have greater access to key military and political posts. Local elites will

also exercise more sovereign control over local politics than those supported by patronistic interveners. Furthermore, as more resources are required to generate war-fighting and governance capacities, coalitions are more likely to accommodate the greater number of members who control these resources. Ruling elites are thus more likely to give the most relevant members of a polity a sufficient enough stake in the post war state so as to discourage crippling defections and violent dissent.⁹

H6: Coalitions in power receiving partnership intervention support will experience significantly less political disorder compared to factions who came to power with the assistance of a patron.

H6a: The post war political disorder experienced from partnership interventions is indistinguishable from the average disorder associated with non-intervention.

Another alternative hypothesis worth considering is the notion that a well-designed partnership may actually confer some international legitimacy on a supported faction which facilitates the development of local legitimacy and curbs tendencies toward post war dissent more so than a case of non-intervention. The domestic partner's legitimacy is enhanced through two mechanisms. First, the fact of an intervention calls attention to the perceived justice in a government's or rebel's cause by important states in the international community. International alarm for the destabilizing local and regional consequences of a rebel groups profiteering or backing of a people's right to self-determination may bolster local support and

⁹ Note that while more members are admitted into the coalition this does not imply a more democratic regime, membership may be opened up only to a small few who control vital resources that coalition elites desire.

acquiescence to the supported coalition. For instance, British intervention in Sierra Leone against Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in May 2000 legitimized the Kabbah government and finally dampened violent dissent within Sierra Leone. Second, militarized intervention is a strong signal of resolve. Would-be dissenters may be deterred from stirring up disorder based on the credibility of the intervener to act. This credibility is enhanced if the intervener's welcome is not worn out by too strong or too intrusive an intervention. In short, partnerships are more likely to confer increased legitimacy on the domestic partner in a way that further reduces post war violent dissent relative to the case of non-intervention.

H7: Targets in power receiving partnership intervention support will experience post war political disorder at levels less than factions who came to power without the assistance of a foreign intervener

Research Design

Dataset

This study explores the impacts of intervention strategy both on the outcome of post war political capacity as well as on post war disorder. It draws on the expanded regime war dataset described in Chapter 3. The expanded set extends each case of the dataset to 20 years of post war observations or the next onset. Data for various measures of capacity and political violence are rarer than data on democratization and war characteristics consequently the sample set is somewhat smaller. Overall, 79 cases were analyzed where cases received 8 observations on average for a grand total of 613 postwar observations. Each war case is categorized as to whether the domestic belligerents received any external military

interventions and if so what strategy type was employed to provide aid. Strategies were coded according to the criteria laid out in Chapter 2 and that chapter also briefly describes a handful of coded examples.

Dependent Variables

The first key quantity of interest is the degree of state capacity post war regimes are able to generate. The extant civil war literature features a number of different conceptualizations of capacity which generally fall into three broad dimensions, co-optive or political goods oriented, degree of institutionalization and the coercive-extractive capabilities of a coalition.

A number of studies have operationalized the co-optive dimension of capacity in terms of expenditures (see for example Fjelde and De Soysa 2009, Thyne 2006). Expenditures conceptually relate to the amount of goods governments provide, how much the government doles out. These measures have been criticized though for potentially masking an underlying fiscal and capability weakness (Hendrix 2010). In other words, states can and often do spend more than they collect in revenue. This is especially true in the developing world. If governments have to borrow or rely on foreign aid to make these expenditures, the state may not be as viable a governing entity that the indicators might otherwise suggest (Hendrix, 2010).

Another set of operationalizations have attempted to capture the institutional dimensions by measuring Polity scores or Scalar index of polity (see Gates et al. 2006). I have argued however that democracy (as well as autocracy) indicators are theoretically flawed. These measures assume that particular forms of governments are inherently more or less capable of mobilizing and distributing resources to perform state functions than others. This

study explicitly seeks to separate the influences on regime characteristics from the ability to execute the functions of statehood.

Finally, the coercive-extractive conceptualization posits states which are able to build the institutions of extraction and actually acquire greater volumes of resources have more means at their disposal with which to accomplish state aims (Kugler and Domke 1986). Fearon and Laitin's seminal study on the onset of civil war included this type of conceptualization. They measured state capacity as GDP/capita and argued that this measure proxies government resources available to build the infrastructural reach to monitor dissident activity as well as build the counter-insurgency--i.e. coercive--capabilities to repress rebel violence (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

The GDP per capita measure has also been criticized as noisy. Fearon and Laitin conceded that this measure could not distinguish between the two mechanisms they proposed stifled insurgency. More critically, Collier et al (2004) described the GDP/capita indicator not as a measure of capacity but as measure of rebel opportunity costs. Quite simply, their conception suggests opportunity costs to rebel are lower in poorer states. Buhaug (2006) argued GDP/capita was a useful measure of capacity but that it represents the state's ability to co-opt citizens and undertake reforms to address grievances. That is, GDP/capita represents the ability to generate public (or private) political goods. All of these conceptualizations share a common factor in the sense that GDP/capita measures the domestic base of resources from which expenditures can be drawn; however, all these conceptualizations fail to adequately capture the organizational and institutional capabilities of states.

Another popular measure of state capacity is tax-ratios, typically measured as a proportion of tax revenue to GDP.¹⁰ It hosts several theoretical and empirical attributes that make it an attractive and justifiable measure. First, it more closely approximates actual levels of endogenously available resources. Taxes represent what surplus resources governments can generate from within its own society unlike expenditures, which can be supplemented by external aid. It is the reservoir states can draw from to create public and private goods for supporters if external support were to dry up. This includes the public good of physical and human security. Second it proxies the organizational reach or capabilities of the state. States need to build organizational and bureaucratic capabilities in order to collect and monitor compliance with tax policies. Thus the more efficient the bureaucracy the more that actually ends up in state coffers. Similarly if states have the know-how to build the structures and networks to collect resources, this same know-how can be applied to reallocate them for public or private purposes. Third, tax ratios also proxy a legal-coercive dimension of the state. To the extent that people actually surrender the required surplus, versus non-compliance, it suggests that the state has the power and legitimacy to make these demands (govern) in the first place. Finally, it is more robust than other capacity measures in that it can empirically discriminate, particularly among poor states, the capable from the less capable. For example, imagine two states each with a GDP of \$100. The first collects taxes at 30% of GDP and the second only 15%.

¹⁰ Tax ratios are have been used in a number of comparative and international politics studies as a measure of state capacity or state strength. See for example Cheibub (1999), Levi(1988), Thies (2004,2006,2010), Cardenas(2010)

Though these states are similarly poor, it is clear that the first one is more capable than the second. The first state can extract twice as much given a similar economic endowment.^{11 12}

The second dependent variable of interest is the level of post war violence. A number of datasets are available which record various conflict event data below the threshold of war. The Cross National Time Series (CNTS) dataset developed by Arthur Bank's is one of the most comprehensive in that it provides global coverage over a large time span for a number of popular indicators. It also appeared to have the best coverage of conflict indicators for the post war observations of my dataset. I construct two measures of intrastate violence from the CNTS dataset: 1815-2008. The primary indicator, *conflict index*, is derived from eight categories of conflict events recorded in Bank's data. The tallied events include non-violent protest, strikes, government crises/emergencies, political or military purges, assassinations, riots, guerilla/terror attacks, and revolution attempts (regardless of actual success). To code the ordinal variable I developed a 4-tiered hierarchy of violence and then assigned the code associated with the highest level event observed for each post war observation. The four tiers are:

- 0: no conflict events coded for post war year
- 1: Non-violent disorder: protests, strikes, government crises
- 2: Low-violence events: purges/executions, assassinations, riots
- 3: High- violence (sub-war) events: guerilla/terrorist attacks, attempted revolution

¹¹ Relative measures, such as relative political capacity (RPC), are another useful measure but can potentially mask this distinction. RPC is a measure of actual extraction relative to expected extraction. In the example, if the expected extraction were 30% and 15% respectively, both states would receive a score of 1. This would hide the fact that the first state actually extracts twice as much as the other, and is arguably more capable, *ceteris paribus*.

¹² It is also an interesting sidebar to note Hendrix (2010) found tax-ratios to be one of the most theoretically and empirically justifiable measures of capacity. Hendrix found tax ratios were highly correlated with the three strongest latent factors in his analysis of over 15 measures of state capacity.

As another robustness check I created a weighted conflict indicator (*wci*) that is the natural log of the weighted sum of the previous eight indicators used to create the weighted CNTS variable. The assigned weights in the Bank's data appear to be subject to change across different versions of the dataset, so for consistency I assigned the weights reported in the CNTS 2010 Handbook (pg12).¹³ For cases where the untransformed weight was zero, no-events, I recoded the *log-wci* variable 0 to indicate the same non-event. This variable produces a scale of violence that ranges from 0 or no-events on the low end to just above 10 on the extreme high end.

Independent Variables

I consider the intervention strategies which assisted the coalition that is in power at war termination to have predominant influence in the post war context.¹⁴ Following this logic I coded two terms *partner-in-power* and *client-in power* to denote whether the coalition in power received partnership support or patronistic support during the course of a war. *Partner-in-power* is a dichotomous indicator that denotes the case where an intervener employed a partnership strategy with its target and that target is in power. *Client-in-power* similarly denotes the case of patronistic strategy (the coalition in power is a "client" of the intervener) that put the target in power. If the party in power received no external help both terms are coded zero. This is the baseline category.

¹³ For instance the 2010 handbook suggests weights changed as of October 2007 (pg12). The weights applied were: Assassinations -25, Strikes-20, Guerrilla Warfare -100, Government Crises -20, Purges -20, Riots-25, Revolutions-150, and Anti-Government Demonstrations -10. (See CNTS Handbook 2010)

¹⁴ Refer to the research design section of Chapter 3 partner/client in power variable descriptions for a more detailed defense of this claim.

Controls

Scholars have increasingly debated whether or not war outcomes influence the duration and quality of peace as well as the development of capacity. One school of thought suggests that victory can promote a longer lasting peace and a potential to develop better local capacities. This is because having vanquished their opponents; victors have a freer hand to pursue preferred policies due to a less threatening post war context (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007, Weinstein 2005). Others argue that compromise promotes peace, especially if backed with security and power sharing guarantees (Walter 1997, 2002, Fortna 2003). In order to take these potentially confounding explanations into account, I create dichotomous indicators for the outcomes of *victory* and *compromise*. The indicators are coded '1' to denote the specific outcome.

War costs or war intensity has also been identified both as an instigator of continuing conflict and as a suppressor of future conflict. The "revenge" hypothesis suggests that as battle deaths accumulate, survivors experience an increased sense of animosity and duty to make retribution for fallen compatriots' sacrifice. Therefore they fight harder or reengage in fighting when opportunities present themselves (Walter 2004, Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007). On the other hand, dead people do not pay taxes or show up for work. This means that the greater loss of human life associated with more intense wars may also impede a state's ability to generate capacity and engage in future fighting. I construct a *war intensity* variable which is operationalized as the per capita death rate per month. It is constructed by first calculating the ratio of battle deaths to the population and then dividing that ratio by the total number of war months. It is the same variable constructed in Chapter 2 to measure war severity.

It is also important to distinguish the effects of peace operations and biased interventions in the presence of each other. Peace operations set up their own structure of incentives which may reinforce or counteract those established by biased interventions. For instance peace efforts may potentially reinforce dependency incentives created in war with respect to capacity building but counteract the propensity for renewed violence once the conflict is terminated. Failure to control for their presence can potentially mask or overestimate the underlying influence of biased interventions. I create a variable *unop* to indicate the presence of UN peace operators. The variable is coded '1' if peacekeepers were present during the last two years of a war or within one year of the war's conclusion.¹⁵

In order to grow or attain higher levels of capacity, states may need to have already achieved a certain level of capabilities and development. Poorly developed states arguably do not have the technological and material resources to grow or attain these higher levels of capacity. Relatedly, development also tends to give a greater segment of society a political stake in social outcomes, including war. Therefore, citizens of more advanced societies may form higher expectations of post war quality of life and be more prone to engage in dissentious political activities if leaders cannot keep up with their demands (see for example Deutsch 1961). This argument can also be turned on its head, where the argument goes that greater pre-war capacities would tend to deter additional war and violence because more developed states have more to lose. To account for the influence economic development exerts on both post war capacity and incentives for violence I use Balch-Lindsay's et al (2008) measure of

¹⁵ The two year window before war termination is the same criteria used to identify biased intervention (see Chapter 2). I extended the range to an additional 1 year (post war years ≤ 1) to allow for peacekeeper mobilization and deployment at the conclusion of wartime hostilities.

economic development one year prior to war start. This measure is the natural log of the sum of a state's iron and steel production and electricity consumption prior to the start of war.

A vast literature also exists which debates whether or not oil specifically and natural resources more generally, contributes to a state's capacity or weakens it. In the pro-capacity account states can choose to build institutions of extraction which can funnel oil revenues into state coffers. The revenue is not tax revenue per se, but cash is cash and it can buy the coercive and co-optive capacities states need to implement their policies and effectively govern (Smith 2004, Snyder 2006, Morrison 2009). An alternative rentier account professes that access to oil rents disincentivizes further political or economic development. Rulers can co-opt most challengers posing a threat to their rule. Furthermore, because oil rents are easy to extract few incentives exist to develop institutions of extraction that reach into a state's society. State penetration is kept relatively low despite above average wealth and thus states are generally weaker (Fearon 2005, Humphreys 2005). Finally, many studies of "greed" tie oil wealth to the onset and recurrence of violent conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2005). Others claim the link may not exist (Thies 2010). In any case to control for the impacts of natural resources I code a dichotomous *oil* variable. *Oil* is coded '1' for all country years where oil revenues represented 30% or more of total GDP. Data comes from the World Bank Datasets supplemented by data from Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and Fearon and Laitin (2003).

Ethnicity and identity issues have also been tied to the durability of peace and somewhat to the development of capacity. In the case of recourse to violence a general consensus has been established which suggests violence motivated by identity issues is more intractable than when the issue is ideology. A number of studies also support the thesis that

ethnic conflicts are more susceptible to future violence (Fortna 2004, Licklider 1995). When who an individual “is” becomes the *casus belli* of a regime war fear and mistrust are likely to remain high. These elevated fears in turn can provoke higher degrees of post war violence.

Ethnic diversity may also play a role in capacity growth. Heterogeneity and associated ethnic fears can make it difficult for governments to build the trust and cooperation necessary to build the institutions which encourage high state capacity generation (Easterly and Levine 1997, LaPorta et al. 1999). I use two controls for account for ethnic influences. The first is a dichotomous measure of *ethnic war*. This indicator is coded ‘1’ when the war was fought primary along identity lines. The second indicator is *ethnic fractionalization*. It measures the likelihood that any two individuals drawn randomly from the target population will belong to the same ethnic group. The primary sources for ethnic war and fractionalization data were Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and Alesina (2003).

High levels of democracy as well as autocracy have been associated with a lower risk of violent conflict; whereas countries in a middle range of anocracies have been more conflict prone (Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand 2009, Hegre et al. 2001, Fearon and Laitin 2003). Similarly there has been some debate in the literature as to whether or not democracies or autocracies are better able to mobilize and extract from their respective populations (Cheibub 1998, Przeworski et al. 2000). I use a one year lagged version of Vreeland’s Xpolity indicator to control for potential regime type influences(Vreeland 2008). The Xpolity variable is a modified Polity score which removes potentially endogenous components related to civil war onset.

State per capita income has been demonstrated as one of the most robust predictors of domestic conflict. States with higher per capita income are generally less susceptible to internal

violence. Income also has the potential to impact capacity to the extent that it represents productively that produces a surplus to be extracted. Developing states may produce a small surplus which can be transformed into capacity. However, states that host primarily a subsistence economy may be limited in what surplus is available to extract, even if rulers have the legitimacy and the organizational means to do so. I control for income using the Penn World Table indicator for real gdp/capita, supplemented by Word Bank data.

Finally, in the capacity model I include three economic variables purported to affect taxation rates specifically. These include trade, mining and agricultural revenues as a function of GDP(see for example Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al. 2011, Cheibub 1998). Trade and mining have been proposed as easy revenue handles. Governments can extract these revenues without having to rely on direct taxation and a larger state apparatus to manage it. Agricultural products, however, are more volatile in terms of price. Governments presiding over a primarily agrarian economy may experience limited opportunities to collect taxable revenue if prices fall. In any case these structural economic factors may play a role in shaping how much states can reasonably tax.

Methodology

I employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the influence of intervener strategy on post war state capacity. This approach is appropriate given the continuous nature of the *tax ratio* and *relative political capacity* dependent variables. I cluster observations on countries to control for potentially correlated error terms within countries.

To test the impact of strategy on post war violence I employ ordered logit regression on the *conflict threshold* variable also using clustered standard errors. I prefer the ordinal variable

for two reasons. First it does a better job distinguishing between thresholds of violence. One limitation of the continuous weighted conflict index is that it cannot distinguish between a score that is the result of a number of small events versus one particular large event. Second, the ordinal specification is less sensitive to the arbitrary weight specifications inherent in the weighted conflict index. For example using the continuous weighted conflict index, a handful of peaceful strikes and protests could have the same weight as a terrorist attack or revolution attempt that kills hundreds. Similarly a country with 3 revolutionary attempts would be weighted more heavily than another country that experiences only one attempt but kills 3 times as many people as the first. More observed attempts of heavily weighted events can potentially inflate the violence scores of some countries even if the actual destruction is less. The ordinal variable, though less sensitive to smaller changes in intensity, allows for better distinctions of kind. For instance 2 non-violent protests are arguably less intense in terms of violence than a political assassination. Whereas the weights of the continuous measure would essentially see these events as equivalent, the ordinal variable can distinguish that the occurrence of non-violent protests is less severe than political assassinations and purges. As a check for robustness I retain the *log-wci* and perform OLS regressions on the same covariates as in the ordered logit model. I note any differences in the discussion.

Finally, some of the hypotheses call for comparisons between partnership and patronistic interventions. As a point of interest I also explore the countervailing and reinforcing effects of biased and unbiased interventions operating in the same conflict environment. To make these comparisons I employ CLARIFY simulations to predict capacity and violence levels of standard profiles of several of the models and then calculate first differences and confidence

intervals to test for significance. The profiles are similar to those of the previous chapters. In the baseline profiles all continuous variables are set to their means, dichotomous variables are set to 0, with the exception of victory which is set to 1. I set the victory coefficient to 1 because a great majority of regime wars terminate with a decisive military outcome. The intervention models then have the appropriate parameters turned on and comparisons are made of the differences of effect between the parameters of interest.

Results:

The models in Table 4-1 report estimates on post war state capacity measured as *tax ratio*. The first model reports a base line estimate using the key independent variables and controls which are broadly expected to have an influence on state capacity. The second model incorporates the three economic controls which are hypothesized to impact tax revenues specifically. Though adding the additional controls reduces the sample size by 16% the substantive results do not appear to change much. The second model also demonstrates a superior fit to in terms of both a measure of r-squared and AIC. As such the following discussion is based on the full model.

Table 4-1: Post War State Capacity and Intervention Strategy

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Tax/GDP</i>	
	basic model	full model
<i>partner-in-power</i>	-1.94 (1.75)	-2.34 (2.01)
<i>client-in-power</i>	-4.60* (1.83)	-5.93** (2.05)
<i>victory</i>	-0.45 (2.73)	1.35 (2.54)
<i>compromise</i>	-0.55 (4.32)	-0.5 (4.3)
<i>war intensity</i>	-0.30** (.1)	-0.24* (.1)
<i>UNop</i>	4.97* (2.12)	4.84* (1.97)
<i>tax/gdp-pre</i>	0.31* (.15)	0.23 (.15)
<i>rgdp/cap-post</i>	0.03 (.23)	-0.42 (.39)
<i>econ dev</i>	-0.02 (.48)	0.41 (.44)
<i>oil</i>	-0.82 (1.95)	-1.65 (1.92)
<i>trade</i>		0.06* (.02)
<i>mining</i>		0.28 (.2)
<i>agriculture</i>		-0.1 (.06)
<i>ethnic fract</i>	-5.49 (3.96)	-5.17 (3.68)
<i>ethnic war</i>	4.19* (1.8)	4.06* (1.8)
<i>xpolity2 (t-1)</i>	0.29 (.25)	0.03 (.27)
<i>Post war year</i>	-0.19 (.12)	-0.08 (.1)
<i>_cons</i>	11.27 (6.04)	7.53 (6.28)
N	582	487
R-Squared	0.3372	0.4209

(Std err); *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

The effect of the client-in power variable is substantively negative and statistically significant. These results confirm the insights of Hypothesis 1. A target who comes to power through the help of a patron will on average extract 6% less revenue than states that come to power without the military assistance of a foreign ally.¹⁶ This is because patrons relieve their clients of much of the burden of capacity generation. The patron supplements its own capabilities and incentivizes their client to develop more user oriented competencies (or dependencies) rather than pay the costs of cultivating a broader base of support and developing the institutions of extraction and societal penetration needed to generate war capacity endogenously. These governments are then less capable of generating capacity in a post war context because the interveners resources dry up as the imminent dangers of war pass, and the capabilities they do have are geared toward using versus producing. The US experience with the Karzai regime in Afghanistan is a contemporary case in point.¹⁷

Hypothesis 2 posits that partnerships incentivize joint production of capabilities. The intervener provides capabilities that supplement a larger proportion of larger domestic capacity development. Testing this hypothesis required comparing expected values of capacity for partnerships and expected values for patronistic interventions and comparing the differences. I used CLARIFY to simulate expected values and calculated first differences to test for a meaningful capacity generation differences. Positive but somewhat weak evidence exists to support claims that partnerships and patronistic interventions are different kinds of

¹⁶ To put the tax loss in perspective, the world average military spending in terms of a gdp ratio from 1988-2011 was 2.7%. The tax loss represents more than double the entire military budget an average state otherwise spends.

¹⁷ Karzai's regime has essentially developed a patronage network that funnels US monetary aid to his supporters (regime maintenance) and a security force which augments US capabilities, but is not as capable with respect to autonomous operations.

intervention in terms of post war capacity generation. The differences in capacity are significant if a single-tailed (90% confidence interval) is applied, see Figure 4-2. This criteria is justifiable given the directional nature of the hypothesis, however the evidence is not as strong under more conventional two-tailed test criteria. As more data become available on the tax revenues of particularly war-torn countries the evidence for a distinction may in fact become stronger. In more pragmatic terms though these findings suggests that joint production of war capabilities is significantly less destructive to the post war coalition receiving partnership help than more intense interventions.




Figure 4-2: Comparison of Intervention Strategies and Differences in Capacity Generation

Hypothesis 3 posits that partnerships are not significantly different than non-intervention in terms of post war capacity generation. In technical terms this is supported. Partnership interventions are not statistically different than non-intervention in terms of capacity generation. Ideally, however, the coefficient for *partner in power* would be closer to zero if partnerships were truly no different than the non-intervention case. The partner in

power coefficient is actually more than one standard error distant in the negative direction. This suggests some caution in stating that the effects are equal. A more conservative interpretation of the data is to explain that joint production of capacity can potentially disincentivize some endogenous capacity development but that this effect is less severe than cases of patronistic support.

One plausible explanation for the negative capacity generation impacts may reside within the supported groups themselves.¹⁸ In other words partnerships encourage joint production of capabilities to a specific extent but some supported factions simply respond better to these incentives better than others. Determining which groups respond better is beyond the scope of this analysis but a brief example can illustrate the point. During the early phases of the Eritrean War of Independence the two primary rebel groups the ELF and its break away successor the EPLF received similar financial support and military protection from Sudan. The ELF felt it less necessary to cultivate a broader base of local support and kept their movement primarily Islamic. They maintained inefficient patronage based networks that privileged a limited few and alienated many Eritreans in the process. The EPLF, a breakaway of the ELF; however, believed that to be successful against Ethiopia they needed to effectively mobilize all of Eritrean society through a program of “self-reliance” as well as capitalize on limited foreign support (Doornbos and Tesfai 1999 pg256) . EPLF leadership, under similar structural incentives invested in plans and programs that reached out to more marginalized segments of Eritrean society, as well as in organizational efficiencies that built up EPFL military

¹⁸ Another alternative may be that my presumption that interveners prefer more easily employed and deployed capabilities to employing and deploying more robust capabilities is inaccurate, and diffuse capabilities which encourage more user oriented incentives are more prevalent than I anticipate. A future research agenda which explores what capabilities interveners provide when they intervene as a partner can shed further light on the issue.

capabilities while it protected against Ethiopian infiltration. The EPLF amassed enough militarily capability to defeat their parent-rivals the ELF in the early 80s. By the end of that decade the EPLF was advancing on the major port city of Massawa and toward the capital of Asmara to eject Ethiopia once and for all. Research on factors that cause some groups to respond better to a set of incentives than others also promises to a fruitful line of future inquiry.

For the present study, Hypothesis 3 is conservatively rejected. Although the partner in power coefficient is technically not different than zero, and thus statistically not different from non-intervention, the available evidence nevertheless supports a claim for a less certain but generally small negative effect. Partnerships are generally less detrimental to local capacity development than patronistic interventions but some underlying disincentives may linger which prevent these coalitions from reaching more optimal capacity.

One might expect that a side that won a war would have a head start in terms of developing post war capacity because winning would imply the victor had already generated a greater degree of capacity in order to overcome an opponent compared to a scenario where the two opponents compromised, and thus did not have to try harder to generate the continuing capacity to win. The signs of the coefficients for *victory* and *compromise* are consistent with this proposition; victors appear to generate more capacity, whereas compromisers lower their capacity slightly as suggested by the negatively signed coefficient. However, neither of these coefficients is significant. At this point there is insufficient evidence

to suggest that either mode of war termination is superior or inferior in terms of the post war capacity these outcomes are likely to generate.¹⁹

Another war characteristic, war intensity, also demonstrates a negative and significant impact on capacity. States which experience more violent wars appear less capable of building and reconstituting capacity compared to states experiencing lower levels of war violence. This makes intuitive sense. More of the human and material capital needed to rebuild is likely destroyed and not useable for the purposes of rebuilding. Also, survivors having been personally ravaged by war are unlikely to be willing to turn over with what little they have to the government. These governments in turn may feel more constrained in how much they can ask for without provoking further dissent.

Whether UN peace keeping makes a meaningful and sustainable contribution to the state building and post war recovery of war torn states is a matter of continuing and lively debate. Some argue that the UN through facilitating the construction of better institutions or reducing the domestic security dilemma can make it easier for belligerents to cooperate and maintain peace (Jarstad 2008b, Walter 2002). Others argue that UN effects are at best transient and tend to revert states to their previous and dysfunctional governing structures (Barnett and Zurcher 2009). The findings of this study appear to support the former contention. The results are both substantively positive and highly significant, implying peace operations encourage greater degrees of capacity development compared to states that do not receive UN intervention. Although, as some critics are apt to point out, this improved capacity does not

¹⁹ I ran regressions of the tax ratio variable interacting the *victory* variable with *partner-in-power* and *client-in-power* indicator. Theoretically, this interaction tests for whether partners or clients exert an additional marginal effect on capacity, conditional on winning. The results were neither a substantively better fit nor individually or jointly significant. I dropped them for the primary analysis.

necessarily improve the quality of lives of war victims or lift weak states meaningfully out of poverty or weakness.




Figure 4-3: Influence of UN intervention with other Biased Interventions

More important are the implications for post war capacity growth when biased interveners support the post war ruling coalition and the UN operate in the same war context. This occurs in approximately two out of every three UN interventions in regime war. I noted in the preceding literature review that many studies of the impact of UN interventions often overlook the lingering influences biased interventions may exert on a post war context. Consequently, peace scholars and practitioners may be passing unwarranted praise or blame on UN peace efforts when these effects are more properly attributed to biased interveners. This claim is born out somewhat in Figure 4-3. This figure plots the capacity differences for the UN operating alone and in the context of other biased interventions. It also reveals an important insight. The overall capacity effect is positive for the UN when there were already pre-existing incentives to develop local capacity. So, in cases where the coalition was the sole producer or

joint producer of capacity, the UN can leverage this initial endogenous capacity and help states plug capacity gaps or generally improve upon it. These states can generally do better with respect to what the post war ruling coalition could expectedly do on its own.²⁰ However, if the coalition in power experienced fewer prior incentives for capacity generation, such as the case when they have patronistic supporters, the UN can perhaps lessen but not entirely undo the degenerative effects of a patronistic intervener's influence. The UN in other words is not as effective at turning coalitions from users into producers.

Prewar tax ratios and trade revenue appear to be the only structural economic indicators which exert statistically significant effects. In the basic model a state with a higher tax ratio before the war is significantly more likely to maintain a higher tax ratio after the war, but when the additional economic indicators for trade, mining and agriculture are added to the model, antebellum tax ratios lose their significance. Nevertheless, states that have already built institutions of extraction will tend to reconstitute them more easily after the war. The coefficient for trade is also significant implying trade provides an easy tax handle. States with high trade volumes will have an easier time taxing than states that are less integrated into global and regional economies.

Results from the other economic indicators are not significant at conventional levels. So while the coefficients point to general trends there is insufficient evidence to make strong empirical claims. The model shows though that wealthier post war states tax less on average than their poorer counter parts but states that were more economically developed prior to the war tend to tax more. This seems to suggest that more developed states may require more

²⁰ Doyle and Sambanis make a similar claim with respect to peace building success in terms of non-violence. That is, states with more local capacity before peace builders arrive are more likely to hold to the peace.

capital to recover. *Oil* also appears to exert a negative impact on state capacity, consistent with rentier hypotheses. States with easy access to oil revenues are less inclined to rock the tax boat. Movable resources on average provide a small bump but a high agricultural economy deflates taxation somewhat.

Moving on to social characteristics to the target polity, ethnicity appears to have significant but countervailing effects on post war capacity. On the one hand, minority groups will hesitate to empower an ethnic coalition who might use the state apparatus against them. They will be loath to provide such governments with more of their surplus productivity. This is evident in the finding that more ethnically diverse societies, measured as *ethnic fractionalization*, generate significantly lower rates of capacity, holding all else constant. This result is substantively strong but not significant. On the other hand, other evidence suggests the in-power groups fearing the consequences of losing their power are willing to be taxed more in order to pay for their security and privileged positions. If the preceding war was ethnically motivated, as indicated by the *ethnic war* variable, governments tended to be able to extract more state resources from their citizens, *ceteris paribus*.

Lastly, level of democracy after war and post war years appears to have no significant or substantive impact for a state's potential to grow capacity. The coefficient for the *Xpolity2* indicator is both small and insignificant. Democratic and autocratic regimes alike are on relatively equal footing when it comes to extracting their society's resources. Likewise the coefficient for post war years is small and non-significant. It suggests a slight downward tendency as states age, but this is not unique to post conflict states.

Table 4-2 displays the primary results for analysis of post war political disorder and intervention. The primary dependent variable, *conflict index* is depicted in the first model. This variable is the ordinal measure of domestic political violence. The second model reports results from the logged modified weighted conflict index (*log-wci*). Since both measures provide an increasing measure of the degree of disorder, negative coefficients imply a reduction in violence whereas positive coefficients imply increased violence. First and most importantly the models lend support to Hypothesis 5 which states that patronistic interventions will provoke greater degrees of political disorder than cases of non-intervention. The *client-in-power* is positive and highly significant for both conflict variables indicating that the propensity for and the intensity of violence increases with these types of interventions. When foreign powers intrude extensively into the politics of their host, or they exercise the preponderance of force they are resented more heavily. This resentment is also directed at the supported domestic coalition because it becomes clear that the ruling coalition would not enjoy the power it has without excessive foreign intrusion. Defeated opponents or marginalized elites may resort to public displays of grievance and nationalist appeals to undermine the post-bellum regime. These groups may not be capable of outright challenges to the post war regime, but may rely more on other means of resistance such as assassinations, inciting riots and guerilla tactics to erode the ruling coalition's hold on political order. Case in point; even after the Ta'if accords ended the civil war in Lebanon and established a more equitable consociational government, resentment at Syria's hegemony in the Lebanese political system sparked a long and steady stream of anti-Syrian violence from various Christian and Muslim sects. Tactics included

assassinations of key Lebanese political figures both pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian, a number of terror/guerilla attacks as well as continued militia warfare particularly in the south.²¹

Table 4-2: Political Disorder and Intervention Strategy

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Conflict index</i>	<i>log-wci</i>
<i>partner-in-power</i>	-0.56 † (.33)	-0.6 † (.34)
<i>client-in-power</i>	1.21** (.44)	1.37** (.5)
<i>victory</i>	-0.80* (.38)	-0.5 (.35)
<i>compromise</i>	-0.81 (.69)	-0.64 (.67)
<i>UNop</i>	-0.97** (.37)	-1.40** (.43)
<i>econ dev</i>	0.19** (.07)	0.17** (.05)
<i>oil</i>	-0.84* (.36)	-1.01* (.39)
<i>ethnic fract</i>	2.53*** (.6)	2.51*** (.7)
<i>ethnic war</i>	-0.2 (.33)	-0.16 (.42)
<i>war intensity</i>	1.28 (2.11)	0.12*** (.02)
<i>rgdp/cap-post</i>	0.03 (.03)	0.06 (.04)
<i>taxgdp(t-1)</i>	-0.04* (.02)	-0.05* (.02)
<i>Conflict index-pre</i>	0.21 (.15)	
<i>log-wci-pre</i>		0.13 (.13)
<i>xpolity2 (t-1)</i>	0.03 (.04)	0.06 (.05)
<i>Post war year</i>	-0.08*** (.02)	-0.09*** (.02)
<i>_cons</i>		1.74 † (.95)
N	613	613
(pseudo)/R-sqrd	0.1167	0.2565

(Std Err); †p<.1,*p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.001

²¹ Chapter 5 explores the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in greater detail.

The coefficient for *partner-in-power* is negative and significant at the $p=.1$ level suggesting that partnerships tend to reduce the degree of post war violence, at least with respect to a one tailed test. This finding suggests that softer strategies of intervention may actually confer some additional external legitimacy to the supported coalition, lending confirming support to Hypothesis 7, and disconfirming Hypothesis 6a. By not excessively meddling, foreign powers undercut attempts by their coalition’s opponent to engage in nationalistic appeals and cry foul over perceptions of being militarily occupied. Light foreign support confers some external legitimacy and presents a credible commitment to would be challengers that the intervener will defend the rule of the post war coalition in power. Consequently, fewer subjects are likely to contest the ultimate outcome. In short, states with partners do better than “self-help” at least with respect to post-war violence.




Figure 4-4: Comparisons of Partnership Interventions with Patronistic and Non-Intervention

Figure 4-4 plots predicted probability changes and associated confidence intervals of partnerships compared to patronistic interventions and partnerships compared to non-intervention. The graph to the left depicts the difference of probabilities between standard profiles of partnership and patronistic interventions. The plot illustrates that non-violent and non-events are significantly more likely under partnerships, while high intensity violence is significantly less violent.²² This plot then lends general support to Hypothesis 6 which states partnerships will generally experience significantly less disorder compared to patronistic intervention. An F-Test assessing whether or not the partner-in-power and client-in-power coefficients were equal for the modified weighted index variable also supports the distinction. The p-value for this test was $p < .0001$. A summary and comparison of the mean probabilities for each conflict event for all three strategies is depicted below in Figure 4-5.




Figure 4-5: Comparisons of Mean Probabilities for Intervention Strategies.

²² I also varied each model parameter from the 10th to 90th percentile or from 0 to 1 individually. Changing the parameters did not impact significance testing.

Lastly, Hypothesis 4 hypothesizes an expectation that greater levels of post war state capacity put states in a more favorable position to provide basic security and address social grievances. I used a lagged version of the tax ratio variable as the measure of capacity. Lagging the variable allows time for collected revenues to actually be transformed into capabilities as well as reduces potential simultaneity bias. The coefficient for the tax/gdp indicator is negative and significant in both models, providing confirmatory evidence that more capable post war states are better able to manage post bellum violence. Since logit models are difficult to interpret as far as the change in underlying probabilities, I also plot the predicted probability of a high violence event from the 5th to 95th percentile using the mean profile for non-intervention as described above. The plot is illustrated in Figure 4-6.




Figure 4-6: Probability of High Intensity Violence as a function of Capacity (Non-Intervention)

A more important implication is that the violence problem that strong biased interventions provoke directly through perceptions of occupation and illegitimacy are compounded by the fact that these same interventions also undermine the generation of state

capacity to deal with the problem. To illustrate the indirect impact (the impact mediated through the intervention's influence on capacity) I conducted another simulation. In this simulation I construct two profiles. The first is identical to the mean profile for a patronistic intervention. The important feature of this model is that capacity is fixed at the mean. To avoid confusion with other profiles in this analysis I call this profile Patron Profile 1. The second profile, named Patron Profile 2, is identical to Patron Profile 1 except that I subtract 5.93 percentage points from the mean tax ratio. Conceptually, this profile represents the additional hit clients of patronistic interveners take relative to non-intervention on their post war capacity. This hit also changes the overall probability of violence. I then calculate the mean probability and the first difference of means for high level violence in each profile. This difference conceptually represents the indirect effect intervention imposes on violence. It is the additional influence toward violence that occurs as result of the average capacity loss created by patronistic interventions. These results are illustrated in Figure 4-7. The additional influence due to indirect effects is approximately 4.5 percentage points.




Figure 4-7: Illustration of the Indirect Effect of Patronistic Intervention

Several scholars of civil war have claimed that victory in war has a tendency to keep wars from recurring (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007, Toft 2010, Licklider 1995). This is because when one side is defeated it is either eliminated outright or incapacitated such as to no longer present a serious threat. Because the vanquished are scattered or destroyed they may also be less able to spark various forms of sub-war violence. The negative and significant coefficient of the victory variable in the first model of Table 4-2 lends some support to this claim. Victorious coalitions in power tend to face generally lower levels of violence.²³ This finding is not necessarily robust though. When the *log-weighted conflict index* variable is estimated the coefficient is still negative but loses statistical significance. The compromise indicator is also negative but not-significant in both models. This implies that compromise outcomes may reduce propensity for post war violence somewhat; but not enough to be distinguishable from cases where wars remain unresolved.

In terms of control variables UN operations appear once again to be a positive force for improving post conflict environments. The coefficient is negative and strongly significant in both models suggesting that the presence of peacekeepers can work to contain the violence. Again, it is important to try to understand the impact of UN interventions in light of other biased interventions that occur in a context of the same war. A comparison of the *client-in power* and *UN operation* coefficient estimates for the log weighted conflict index model shows these coefficients to be approximately equal and opposite. This implies the UN can restore the

²³ I also tested several models interacting the intervention and victory outcome variable to test whether democratic patronistic or partnership victories were more or less violent relative to other victories. No significant interactions occurred.

legitimacy undermined by patronistic intervention. The net effect is approximately equal to the level expected for the case of non-intervention, *ceteris paribus*.




Figure 4-8: Probability of Violence Comparison of Patron +UN vs. Non-Intervention

I also analyze the difference with respect to the ordinal conflict index variable. Figure 4-8 plots the probability differences of a mean intervention profile that includes both a patronistic and UN component compared to the non-intervention baseline. Statistically, the probabilities of violence are not distinct from the case of non-intervention. UN participation reigns in some of the violence as indicated above and brings these violence levels closer to the predicted levels associated with non-intervention. Nevertheless, the probability difference for high intensity violence is on average still approximately 5 percentage points higher. The negative effects of patronism are not completely erased. Similarly, the probability of non-violent resistance and non-events are improved but on average to not cross the threshold of

better than self-help. Overall a target appears slightly better off not having been intervened upon at all relative to experiencing the countering influences of patronistic and UN components of an intervention. It is also worth noting that the coefficients for the partner-in-power variables in both models support the proposition that the UN can enhance or reinforce violence mitigation when self-help or joint-help incentives are already in place. I do not plot the results but CLARIFY simulations reveal that a UN intervention in combination with a partnership intervention reduces the probability of high intensity violence an additional 8.5 percentage points compared to partnerships alone and 16.5 percentage points compared to UN interventions alone.

Pre-war economic development is positive and significant in both models. This finding lends support to modernization accounts regarding violence. That is, states which are more advanced are likely to have more at stake politically and economically in the aftermath of war, and therefore more likely to engage in dissentious political behavior, all else being equal.

Oil states however do not appear to be as prone to post war strife as indicated by a substantively negative and significant coefficient. As some scholars have suggested, Oil revenues are easily expropriated by states. Governments can then use these revenues to either coopt remaining opposition or to develop a stronger coercive capacity in order to deter post war challenges to their rule (Morrison 2009, Smith 2004, Snyder 2006).

Ethnic fractionalization also appears to have a deleterious effect on post war violence. The coefficient is large positive and statistically significant, suggesting that more heterogeneous societies are more likely to experience higher levels of post war violence. Interestingly, whether the war itself was fought over ethnic issues does not appear to matter. This may be

because even though wars are not necessarily fought over identity issues per se, the underlying political or ideological issues still divide along ethnic or sectarian lines. For instance, Mozambique's civil war was fought primarily over whether the state would exist as an anti-colonial Marxist state or maintain strong relations with their previous colonial masters. Recruiting for Frelimo and Renamo however still occurred largely along ethnic lines. Similarly, the rich-poor divide of Lebanon's civil war significantly overlaps with the Christian-Muslim divide. Though the war originated as a clash between Lebanese "traditionalist" forces against "progressive" forces, targets were more likely to be selected based on sectarian affiliations than actual support for or against traditional/progressive forces. In either case ethnic fractionalization is probably picking up the effects of targeting a more easily identified enemy, even if the identity in and of itself is less relevant.

War intensity demonstrates no effect when the ordinal measure for conflict intensity is used but does appear increase violence when the continuous model is run. In both cases though, the coefficient is positive. This finding lends some support to Walter's revenge hypothesis.²⁴ The significance of the weighted conflict variable is likely tied to the fact that the weighted indicator provides a more sensitive measure of the extent of disorder. The ordinal variable may be too coarse in this instance to pick up changes in the intensity of violence.

Neither pre-war levels of conflict nor post war income or democracy levels exerted a significant effect on post war violence. The positive coefficients suggest that prior conflict, greater wealth and more democratic institutions all contribute to more hostile post war environments, but the underlying impacts appear small. See Table 4-3. Moving from the 5th to

²⁴ The revenge hypothesis (Walter 2004) links recurring war with increasing prior war battle deaths, whereas war weariness correlates increasing war duration with lower propensity for future conflict.

95th percentile in income increases the risk of high intensity violence by 4.7%. Rich and poor societies experience roughly the same propensities for post war violence. Similarly, moving from the most dictatorial to most democratic regime changes the probability of high intensity violence by only 8.7%.²⁵ The granting of freedom appears to open the door to violence somewhat. Thus democratization or autocratization in and of itself is not likely to be a major player in the intensity of violence. States that were violent before the start of a war are much more likely to violent after it as well. A state engaged in violent activity prior to war increases its post war propensity for violence by about 9.3%. Finally, the coefficient for post war years is negative and significant though the effect is small. States slowly become less violent as time passes from the last war.

Table 4-3: Probability Changes associated with income, democratization and pre-war conflict index

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Delta</i>	<i>Pr change</i>
Real GDP/Cap	5->95 percentile	4.7%
Xpolity	min to max	8.7%
Prewar Conflict index	1 to 3	9.3%
Partner in Power	0 to 1	-12.4%
Client in Power	0 to 1	27%

Conclusion

This chapter sought to estimate and quantify the impacts of biased intervention strategy on post war capacity and political violence. It was motivated by the logic that governments face

²⁵ I also ran a model which included a squared term for Xpolity. Including the square term did not significantly or substantively change the main results. However, including the square term revealed that most of the violence occurs in the run up to democracy from negative Xpolity values to low positive ranges. As higher levels of democracy were obtained the violence diminished somewhat, though violence associated with more democratic scores is still higher than severe autocratization. The vertex of the Xpolity parabola in this model occurs between the values of 3 and 4.

different incentives to develop their own local capacities and manage post war violence based on the kind of aid interveners provide.

Intervention partnerships were hypothesized as setting up incentive structures similar to those that exist in the case of non-intervention. In short, the aid of the partner, though precious, is generally not enough on its own to surmount the challenges of an adversary coalition. The coalition receiving partnership support must still generate the preponderance of its capacity from domestic sources. Consequently, this war making capacity is available post war for state-building if that coalition is in power. Statistically, this bore out. Partners who were in power after war were not significantly different in terms of capacity than those coalitions who came to power without the aid of a foreign ally. Though statistically partnerships were not different than the case of non-intervention there may be some incentives to free ride or over rely on the capabilities a partner brings to the fight. These incentives may be tied to whether interveners provide more robust or niche capabilities. Future research can provide new insights into this relationship.

On a more positive note, Partnerships also appear to confer an advantage with respect to managing post war violence. This advantage is due in part to the additional capacities coalitions can draw from their partners to combat their opponent, but it may also be due in part to the credible signaling of support to the post war coalition in power (or perhaps antipathy to the opponent). Regardless, the intervener's perceived commitment to their partner may be sufficient to deter many post war challengers. A partnering strategy also undercuts perceptions of occupation and that the supported coalition is unable govern effectively on its own merits. Statistically, the partner-in-power indicator was significant when

covariates were regressed on both the ordinal and weighted conflict index. Substantively, partnerships reduce the propensity for high intensity violence approximately 13 percentage points compared to cases of non-intervention for a standard mean profile and 39 percentage points relative to patronistic support.

Propensity for violence increases with patronistic interventions because as the intervener intrudes more, perceptions of occupation and unjust interference mount, not to mention that the capacity reducing effects of this strategy also makes managing violence in the post war context more difficult. Statistically, patronistic interventions are 27% more likely to experience high intensity violence relative to cases of non-intervention. I estimated the indirect contribution, which is mediated through the degradation of capacity, to be about 4.5 percentage points.

On a final note, a standard exhortation in political science research warns that correlation is not causation. The statistical tests conducted so far present strong evidence of a link between intervention strategy and various post war outcomes; but regression models cannot establish causality in these links. In the next chapter I briefly examine for cases of interventions employing partnering and patronistic strategies by both democratic and non-democratic interveners and process trace the incentive structures set up during these interventions. The cases are Lebanon, Kosovo and Eritrea with some supplemental analysis of other instances. I show that these different strategies did indeed affect local actor's choices of whether or not they established more democratic regimes, developed more endogenous state capacity and more effectively managed post war violence. These differences in turn lend credibility to the claim that biased intervention strategies have some causal power.

Chapter 5. Tracing the Incentive Structures of Patronistic Interventions

Introduction

An overarching theme of this study is the observation that militarized interventions cannot and should not be treated as a one size fits all activity. States act with different degrees of bias and intensity when considering intervention in other states or territories. Despite the attention impartial (unbiased) UN sponsored peace missions have received in the literature, more often than not when states employ military force across international borders in the context of an intrastate or interstate regime change struggle it is in opposition to or in support of a specific local faction, even if it is sometimes one the intervener conjures itself.

Nevertheless, this study proposed two general categories of these more biased interventions. The first was a partnership strategy of intervention. In a partnership, the faction receiving support is the dominant member of the expanded coalition and the intervener plays a junior or supporting role. Because the intervener is less committed to the fight the receiving partner bears more of the burden of responsibility for the war effort. Consequently, the receiver is incentivized to develop a larger base of domestic supporters and is encouraged to become a joint producer (along with the intervener) of war making capacity. The endogenous organizational and institutional capacities this coalition develops can then be adapted after war to meet the needs of post war governance and state building. Partnerships thus encourage self-help in ways similar to the case of non-intervention. Because recipients of partnership interventions typically require wider bases of local supporters they will tend to be more democratic. Also because the capacities they must rely on come primarily from domestic sources these states, conditional on not being defeated, are likely to enjoy greater degrees of

post war state capacity. Similarly because they won their struggle mostly on their own merits, that is the intervener did not too dramatically alter the balance of domestic power, the local victor is likely to enjoy more legitimacy as a rightful ruler and therefore also less post war violence. The previous two chapters demonstrated empirically with respect to partnerships that levels of post war democratization are consistent with what would be expected in similar cases of non-intervention; That is, partnerships do not alter significantly the democratic trajectory the recipient is already on. Similarly, degrees of state capacity were not significantly different than the expectation under conditions of non-intervention. In terms of post war violence, the degree was significantly lessened. Partnerships can positively contain violence.

In patronistic strategies, the subject of this chapter, interventions are more intense. The intervener himself is the dominant actor assuming responsibility for the bulk of the fighting and often assuming some measure of political or military control of the recipient's coalition as well. When the intervener has the preponderance of force and capabilities the recipient is incentivized to become a user of capacity rather than a producer. The recipient is less reliant on domestic bases of support; therefore it does not open its coalition to new members. It becomes less democratic. Similarly, because the intervener does the bulk of the fighting, the client is freed up somewhat to pursue narrower interests, rather than develop new sources of state power the client will work to consolidate its existing power. Consequently, local organizational and institutional capacity will go un- or underdeveloped. The client is also more likely to face a post war legitimacy deficit because in this case it is the intervener who was victorious not the client. Concerns of occupation and of being ruled by proxy can foment nationalistic sentiments and domestic turmoil. Post war clients are likely to experience more violence than those who

receive partnership support or no intervention support at all. The previous two chapters demonstrated empirically that recipients of patronistic interventions tend to be less democratic, more violent and less capable than their non-intervention and partnership counterparts. A democratic patron can however leave behind a more democratic client but democratic interveners like their authoritarian counterparts cannot overcome the negative incentives that reduce capacity and increase violence.

This chapter sets out to demonstrate these trends by exploring two different cases of patronistic intervention. These cases include the Syrian intervention in the Lebanese Civil War and NATO's and the subsequent United Nations intervention in Kosovo. The first illustrates the experiences of a non-democratic intervener the second explores whether and how much different the experience is for a democratic one. Both cases might easily be explained as an intense identity conflict crossing ethnic as well as sectarian lines. In the case of Lebanon the Maronite-Christians are loosely pitted against Sunni, Shia and Druze Muslims. In Kosovo, the conflict pits Orthodox Serbians against predominantly Muslim Albanians. In both cases though, the presence of a patronistic intervener creates an equally intense fault-line within ethnicity and confession. Thus, Christians fight Christians and Shia fight other Shia in Lebanon in response to the machinations of their Syrian intervener. Similarly Albanians are pitted against each other as well as against Kosovar Serbs as NATO and UN interveners maneuver to achieve their own core political objectives after the bombing stopped.

Capacity outcomes were also surprisingly similar. In both cases the intervener was the primary post war security provider. Syria's intervention all but dissolved Lebanon's national army and kept the various militias divided and fighting one another. The most likely post war

security apparatus in Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was disbanded. Democratic and non-democratic intervener alike also created gridlock in the governing institutions and stunted capacity growth through efforts to marginalize and block potential political spoilers and pursue their own core interests. Syria moved to prevent popular independents and a genuine Lebanese nationalism from interfering with its local and regional designs vis-à-vis Israel and the other Arab states. Similarly NATO and the UN moved to dampen a hasty move toward Kosovar independence by blocking the more aggressively nationalistic factions from power and holding for itself control over key institutions of government until the Western countries were ready to negotiate Kosovo's independence with Belgrade and Moscow. Ire or fear directed at the external intervener's occupation and the intervener's political machinations in both cases diverted the locals from growing local capacity.

In sum, intervener's heavy handedness in war and after it undermined post war capacity growth and violence management. Democratization as well was no panacea for the reduction of violence or increase in state capacity. On the other hand, UN involvement in the case of Kosovo arguably lessened the sting of biased intervention. UN involvement gave Kosovo access to many resources that no doubt kept it from becoming a completely failed state after the Kosovo war. Regardless, the outcomes associated with patronistic intervention were generally sub optimal if not outright poor.

Lebanon

Lebanese Historical Context

Lebanon is a case that epitomizes the deleterious impacts of poor indigenous state-building made worse by the intervention of Syria. While Israeli interference also played an

important role in the fate of Lebanon, Syria emerged the ultimate victor, and the post-war Lebanese state the Israelis imagined was trumped and overshadowed by Syria's domination. So, to conserve time and space I analyze the Lebanese war and post war context from a Syrian vantage point. To begin, the traditional Lebanese political elite, the za'im deliberately kept the state and its military weak so as to preserve their control over their economic interests and patronage networks. This weakness was enshrined in the National Pact of 1943 which spelled out informally how Lebanon was to be governed. In essence it maintained a 6:5 balance of Christian to Muslim representation in the National Assembly and reserved certain high political offices for each of the major religious sects. The president was to be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni, the Speaker of the National Assembly a Shi'a and the Chief of the General Staff a Druze. Most representatives were the political clients of one of the major za'im families on whom they relied for financial and turnout support. Lebanese politics was thus primarily a bargaining forum, where za'im through their representatives competed for pieces of the state pie (Najem 2012).

Another key aspect of Lebanese politics was a foreign policy that sought strong trade ties to the West while appearing militarily inconsequential to its neighbors in the region. To do this, the political elites kept their national army, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deliberately weak. The LAF was a moderately sized multi-sectarian force sufficiently capable of quelling the occasional riot in Beirut or deterring violence by sectarian militia's, but little else. A weak multi-sectarian army notionally kept Lebanon from appearing threatening to its neighbors and too weak to be a reliable military ally in any contest for Arab regional or cultural hegemony. This relative weakness also made the Army and the State appear less threatening to any of the

individual domestic religious sects. Elites hoped this configuration would encourage Lebanon's neighbors to essentially ignore it in the larger conflicts of the Middle-East, while it pursued trade relations as a "Switzerland of the Middle-East".

The first fissures in this delicate consociational balance appeared shortly after the expulsion of Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from Jordan after the Black September War, 1970. The Palestinians retreated into southern Lebanon after being routed by King Hussain's forces. Unfortunately for the Lebanese, the LAF was incapable of repelling the mass influx of PLO refugees. Consequently, the Palestinians became a "state within a state" presence in Lebanon and a destabilizing force radicalizing the underprivileged factions of Lebanese society. These underprivileged elements, primarily mainstream Muslims, had coalesced into a socialist leaning party, the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and sought an alliance with the PLO as a means of overturning the traditionally Maronite led national government.¹ Under the basic framework of this alliance the PLO would provide arms and soldiers to the LNM and in exchange a future LNM led government would grant sanctuary to the PLO in southern Lebanon as it pursued its intifada against Israel (Harris 2012, Hiro 1992, Najem 2012).

As tensions escalated between the LNM and traditional elites the armed forces essentially collapsed. This occurred because many rank and file soldiers, typically Muslim, began refusing to take orders from their predominantly Maronite officers. By 1975 the security situation became unstable as various political elites and communities were targeted for attack and the LAF was helpless to stop it. Unable to rely on the army, traditional elites turned more

¹ Harris (2012 pg 237) notes that Shia generally stood aloof in this phase of the conflict. A not insignificant number of Shia though were part of the various leftist groups which supported the LMN (Hiro, 1992)

and more to sectarian militias for protection of their enclaves(Mackey 1989). Civil war between the LNM and the militias over control of the Lebanese state had begun. Sectarian militias however were not keen on cooperating and coordinating with each other to launch a counter-attack. Consequently, by 1976 the LNM-PLO alliance managed to capture two-thirds of the territory of Lebanon (Hiro 1992).

This dismal state of affairs prompted President Suleiman Franjeh on 1 June 1976 to make a fateful decision and invite Hafiz al-Assad, President of Syria, to intervene on behalf of Lebanese traditionalists. Syria accepted this invitation and intervened but not as a “partner” of the Lebanese government. Instead, Assad sought to be a patron and hegemon in the Lebanese political landscape. He cultivated relationships with individuals and groups willing to become Syrian puppets in order to further larger Syrian ambitions. He would manipulate Lebanese politics through these clients as well as through threats of force and threats to withdraw protection throughout the war period and after(Hiro 1992).

Actual fighting during the course of the war revolved around two fronts. The first front was between the various militias themselves as each vied for power and control of their sectarian enclaves. The second was between various militias and Syria, as many Lebanese from all confessions, resented the apparent Syrian occupation. The war itself was an on again off again affair that saw the entrance and exit of both Israel and the United States. Syrian intransigence and political intrigue, Israeli missteps (the Shatila and Sabra massacres), and American reluctance to commit forces (especially after the 1983 Marine Barracks Bombing) saw the eventual withdraw of the latter two. By 1985 Syria was the dominant intervener, and war was at its highest pitch along both fronts (Harris 2012, Hiro 1992, Najem 2012).

By 1991, however, international attention in the Middle East was shifted on Iraq as Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait and threatened US interests in Saudi Arabia. Syria was suddenly positioned as an important coalition partner to the West and consequently gained a freer hand in Lebanon. Assad exploited this freedom of action to push for international support its political solution encapsulated in the Ta'if Accords and to the crush the last of the militia resistance. The war concluded in 1991 with General Michael Aoun's capitulation and exile to France. It was also the beginning of 15 more years of Syrian meddling in Lebanese politics through its various clients and puppets (Traboulsi 2007, Zahar 2002).

Syria: Goals, Strategy and Outcomes

The Damascus Regime had four overarching objectives to its intervention in Lebanon. First, Assad's biggest concern was that LMN-PLO ascendancy would prompt an Israeli intervention into South Lebanon which posed a direct security risk to Damascus' western flank. A strong but not excessively strong occupation force would neutralize the PLO threat without alarming Israel to the point of counter-intervening. This would be managed with tacit negotiations. Second, the Maronites still had strong relations with the West, particularly France and the United States. Assad also wanted to avoid a Western intervention which might frustrate his own designs and strategies as an Arab regional power. Again, as long as Syria did not appear to be overtly taking over Lebanon, the West would acquiesce to a regional power controlling the PLO rather than they themselves, especially if the Maronite community acquiesced. The "Arab Deterrent" played well to Western interests vis-à-vis the PLO. Third, Syria wanted to avoid the cantonization of Lebanon into Christian and Muslim mini-states, what

some referred to as “Little Lebanon”.² This would undermine Assad’s Baathist vision of Arab Nationalism as well as undermine the legitimacy of his own minority led government. Secession of Lebanese mini-states could diffuse into Syria proper destabilizing Syrian domestic politics. Thus, maintaining the façade of Lebanese consociational democracy was critical. Finally, Syria had a number of economic interests tied to the ports in Beirut. If Damascus could install pro-Syrian clients into the existing Lebanese political system, it could promote its own political and economic agenda through these Lebanese clients, while avoiding the accusations and responsibilities of outright conquest. In short, Syria’s strategy was to defeat the PLO, set itself up as the patron of the key Lebanese politicians, and present itself as the preferred peacekeeper in Lebanon to the international community (Hiro 1992, Najem 2012, Traboulsi 2007, Harris 2012).

Damascus devised a patronistic strategy favoring the status quo National Pact as the institutional basis for government. It would send a corps size force to engage the LNM-PLO alliance. This force was large enough to defeat the alliance but not so large as to appear overly threatening, particularly to Israel.³ Additionally, the force was strong enough to act as a credible peace-keeping deterrent once the immediate LNM threat was eliminated. Damascus, as the dominant “peacekeeping” force in the country, was also well positioned to install, back up or coerce its various clients while nominally preserving the institutional integrity of the Lebanese National Pact. It would not change the rules of the Lebanese political system per se. It would

² Little Lebanon is a term that describes the Christian Maronite vision of a Christian canton beginning essentially in East Beirut and extending through the Christian enclaves to the north.

³ A tacit agreement with Israel not to cross certain geographic “red lines” also eased tensions somewhat (Traboulsi, 2007).

seek to install its preferred actors and work within that system instead. The strategy was effective for the first two years of Syrian intervention.

By late July 1976, Syria had won a decisive victory and managed to broker a cease fire. Just over a month later Syria had succeeded in replacing President Franjeh with a pro-Syrian client Elias Sarkis. Through President Sarkis, Syria was able to secure the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) mandate which legitimized Syria's continued presence and involvement in Lebanese politics for another two years. If he had wanted to Assad could have ejected the PLO outright. Instead he decided to leave the PLO remnant intact as a deterrent and leverage against the Lebanese government and Israel. If these actors displeased Assad the PLO could be let loose. Otherwise as long as behavior was more to Syrian liking the ADF would rein in the guerillas (Gurses 2007, Hiro 1992).

In most respects Damascus' patronistic strategy was successful. Syria quickly won the fight against LNM-PLO, the institutions of the National Pact remained intact as desired, Syria installed key clients in the 1976 elections and Israel and the West stayed out. As Syria took the preponderance of responsibility for rolling back the LNM-PLO alliance; however, the other militias, particularly among the Maronites ceased fighting the LNM-PLO and directed their focus towards pursuing their own mini-states. Recognizing that the central government was toothless, sectarian elites moved to secure more narrowly focused economic and political objectives. Militias retreated and redeployed to protect their own sectarian enclaves. To secure their economic interests, political elites, captured their own ports on the coast of Lebanon; would import, export and tax at their own rates the goods trans-shipping through those ports; conscript new recruits; and generally administer and govern the territory under its control

(Najem 2012, Mackey 1989). In short, the non-LNM militias free-rode off of Syrian military capacities and exploited the Syrian imposed political weakness on the Lebanese state to grab control of as much territory and population that they could. Though the LNM-PLO alliance was defeated, the state itself was powerless. Power now resided in the militias and they continued to fight each other as well as Syria throughout the next two years.

By 1978 the strategy unraveled even further. First, Syria made no serious efforts to rehabilitate the Lebanese Armed Forces. As Syria's peacekeeping mandate was about to expire the LAF was still incapable of independently securing Lebanon. President Sarkis was compelled to extend the ADF mandate, which Damascus liked, but at the cost of a lot of political capital and legitimacy. Sarkis' waning popularity and lost political legitimacy also served as a catalyst to the reemergence of the traditional Maronite establishment. Bashir Gemayel, a Phalangist (right-wing) party leader and militia commander, exploited Sarkis' tainted image and more general anti-Syrian resentment to unite the Christian militias (Harris 2012, Hiro 1992, Najem 2012). He captured the Presidency in Lebanon's 1982 elections, but never served due a successful assassination attempt.⁴ His brother Amine Gemayel would ultimately take up the post.

More importantly, PLO raiding parties still managed to evade Lebanese and Syrian led ADF security forces to conduct various terrorist attacks across the Israeli border. These raids prompted Israel into strong reactionary responses in 1978 (Operation Litani) and 1982 (Operation Peace in Galilee). The first operation cleared PLO from south of the Litani River and established the South Lebanese Army, an Israeli client militia, in the area and the second

⁴ Syria in many accounts is implicated in the planning of the assassination attempt (Harris, 2012).

operation essentially cleared the PLO from all the way through Beirut. Israel would occupy parts of Beirut from 1982-1985 and would maintain an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) presence in south Lebanon from 1978-2000, well after the civil war ended (Hiro 1992).

With the ejection of the PLO and Israeli interference in Beirut, Syria lost much of its leverage; but it would not accede to a Maronite-Israeli victory. Instead, Damascus continued the war seeking to reestablish its' lost leverage by supporting a number of Muslim militias. Its primary clients were the Shia based Amal and Hezbollah groups but Damascus was also courting former LNM militia factions (primarily Druze) as well as cultivating aspiring next-generation Maronites as clients (Mackey 1989, Traboulsi 2007, Zahar 2002). Damascus used the Muslim militias to pressure Israel to withdraw from Beirut and Gemayel to resign his post. These militias took control of several suburbs surrounding the capital and served to keep constant strain on the Phalangist government. Syrian backed militias also used targeted assassinations and other terrorist tactics to force withdrawals from Israel as well as the Multinational Forces that had been deployed into the fray.⁵ Damascus also reversed its position on the antebellum status quo in order to gain Muslim support. Syria now sought to revise the National Pact by curbing the powers of the Maronite President and instituting a more equitable balance between Christians and Muslims(Hiro 1992, Najem 2012). This arrangement would become the basis of the Ta' if Accords that ultimately ended the war. At the same time Muslims were applauding the more equitable power sharing arrangement, Maronite elites were being fractured as prominent young elites were being drawn into the Syrian fold, such as

⁵ By October 1982 the US had also been drawn into the conflict in response to the alleged Israeli atrocities at Sabra and Shatila. The US Navy and Marines were part of a Multination Force (MNF) charged with restoring order in Beirut, which included protecting the Gemayel regime.

Elie Hobeiqa who was enticed to sign Syrian sponsored Tripartite Accords--the predecessor of Ta'if(el-Husseini 2012, Harris 2012). In effect, Syria's strategy remained patronistic throughout this phase of the war, but its goals switched from regime preservation to regime change. Different groups *within* sects as well as between them benefited from Syrian patronage but little else changed in the incentive structures for restoring state capacity and governance. While some might point to ethnic and sectarian animosities to explain Lebanese political dysfunction, it misses the important intra-sectarian fractures that were critical to the overall Lebanese political incoherence. The intra-sectarian strife, particularly within the Maronite and Shia sects, was a direct consequence of Syria's interference.

The war's final phase approached in 1988 as Gemayal's presidential term was about to expire. Syria attempted to reboot its strategy of installing a pro-Syrian client to the presidency. Damascus threw its support behind a compromise candidate Mikhail Dahir whom also had an implicit nod from the United States. Unfortunately, Dahir had little local legitimacy or political capital from which to draw majority electoral support. The failure to elect a president would usher in a leadership crisis that escalated violence but ultimately brought an end to the war (Hiro 1992).

When the National Assembly failed to elect a president Amine Gemayel used special provisions of the constitution to appoint fellow Maronite Michael Aoun Prime Minister, in blatant violation of the National Pact (which called for a Sunni appointment). The Muslims quickly rejected Gemayel's appointment and with Syrian backing recognized his previous Prime Minister Salim Hoss as the legitimate head of government. Thus two competing governments now existed in Lebanon.

Upon his ascendancy as official Prime Minister, General Aoun embarked on a War of Liberation to eject Syria once and for all. He appealed to Lebanese nationalism in the hopes of uniting the Christian militias once again against Syria. However, by January 1989 war weariness had finally prompted a number of regional actors to search for a permanent solution to the conflict. Syria, the United States and other regional powers began to discuss a new plan for Lebanese national reconciliation. Former ministers of the 1972 election, the last real Lebanese elections, met in Ta'if Saudi Arabia that September to hammer out a final settlement. This settlement would culminate in the Ta'if Accords which proposed an end to the war by setting the Christian and Muslims parliamentary balance to 1:1, curbing the powers of the Maronite president and calling for the discussion of redeployment of Syrian troops after a two year peace keeping period (Zahar 2002).

Meanwhile, Aoun's nationalistic appeals earned him some initial political capital. The Christians rallied behind him briefly, but soon internal power struggles prompted fighting among the Christian enclaves. A Syrian blockade of Christian controlled ports increased their misery and added pressure to end the war. Aoun, under this pressure, agreed to let the Ta'if process move forward but maintained that its provisions must include a permanent departure of Syria. When the accord failed to specify those terms and timelines Aoun rejected them. Elections under the Ta'if provisions went forward nevertheless. Elias Hrawi, another Syrian pick, was elected President and he quickly moved to dismiss Aoun. By this point, the US was courting Syrian support in its build up to Desert Storm. Consequently, it was prepared to turn a blind eye to Lebanon. When Aoun refused to go peacefully Syria attacked forcefully delivering the *coup de grace*. The war ended in 1991 with Syria and its clients victorious and Aoun and

other prominent leaders of the Maronite resistance exiled in France (Hiro 1992, Traboulsi 2007, Zahar 2002).

War and Post War Capacity

Patronistic support theory anticipates that because patronistic interveners encourage their clients to become users of capabilities rather than producers, these clients are made less capable. This is because many of the organizational and capability generating structures they would have otherwise had to have built domestically are instead provided externally. The client thus free rides off its patron to the extent that it can and is at a disadvantage once the patron scales back or withdraws. The accompanying opportunity costs of valuable military and political experience and organizational competence diminishes the ability to provide effective and coherent governance after war. Key institutions are more vulnerable to weakness, incompetence, and corruption. In the case of Syria's intervention in Lebanon, state capacity was set back in at least three major respects. First, endogenous security and coercive capacity was destroyed in the fact that Syria deliberately dismantled all viable organizational bases for Lebanon's future security. It destroyed the LNM-PLO alliance, divided the Maronites by encouraging intra-sectarian fighting, and blocked the development and reconstitution of an independent Lebanese national army (Hiro 1992). Second, Syrian backed political clients tended to be technocratic, less politically savvy and were often isolated from the real bases of political power and experience, residing with the za'im and the militia leaders (Harris 2012, Najem 2012). Thus, these politicians could not act as the point-men for a genuine Lebanese state building project. Lastly, Syrian post war political meddling stymied interest in pursuing genuine Lebanese pro-growth initiatives. Consequently, though Lebanon eventually recovered

to its ante-bellum growth levels, it was substantially and permanently weakened relative to its potential (Najem 2012).

Security as a dimension of state capacity takes on particular importance in war and post war contexts. Over the course of the conflict, there were three military or pseudo-military organizations that could have served as a potential basis for security and produced a genuine longer term governing capacity. Ideally, security capacity would have come from the Lebanese Armed Forces. The LAF however crumbled and rendered itself ineffective as violence intensified between the traditionalists and progressives. Syria was not directly responsible for this disintegration, but is culpable for the failure of the LAF to reconstitute as the ADF mandate in 1976 called for not to mention the Ta'if Accords 15 years later. Rather than allow the army to rebuild and answer to the Lebanese state, Syria blocked autonomous development and to the extent it did develop it was integrated into Syria's Arab Deterrent Force structure or later within the Ta' if peacekeeping structure. Also, in the post Ta'if period were many Lebanese officers used to attend French or other Western military academies, the newer batches of cadets were being schooled in Syrian academies (el-Husseini 2012). The LAF officer corps thus developed strong ties with their Damascan counterparts and loyalties to senior officers who were also Syrian protégés, most notably the Commander in Chief Emile Lahoud. The military thus was mostly incapable of operating against Syrian interests and contributed very little to Lebanon's state capacity. Again, this forced the Lebanese government into relying more on Syrian good will to tamp down militias both during and after the war (Hiro 1992, Harris 2012). The constraints placed upon the LAF would be particularly detrimental to curbing militia violence

and corresponding capacity destruction in the south; where Hezbollah presented itself as a much more capable “security force” than the national army.

The creation of the LNM-PLO alliance in the mid-1970s created a relatively consolidated body of Muslim capacity. The alliance by 1976 had succeeded in capturing two-thirds of the state. Much of this success can be attributed to the alliances ability to set aside sectarian differences and cooperate nominally under the banner of progressivism to overturn the Maronite dominated system. The LNM leveraged the Palestinians fighting capacity and the “state-within-a-state” organizational structures while the PLO leveraged the LNM political mobilization capacity to add Lebanese recruits to the fighting forces and transform the alliance into a legitimate Lebanese movement. I argue that had the alliance been successful, its organizational structures might have served as a prototype for post-war security operations. At the time Syria intervened the LMN-PLO alliance already controlled two-thirds of Lebanon and according to Harris the PLO had a “state budget” approximately equal to the legitimate state of Lebanon. The PLO had also convinced a number of Muslim army officers to defect into the PLO-LMN ranks. He further notes that the PLO was also already sustaining much of Lebanon’s economy and providing social and academic services, particularly in West Beirut and south Lebanon. Damascus’ goal, however, was to defeat the LNM-PLO alliance in order to prevent a potential Israeli intervention that would threaten its western flank. The alliances’ defeat ruined it as an effective fighting and political force. Though Syria left a PLO remnant intact, the Lebanese members of the alliance faded into other militias or from fighting all together and became increasingly suspicious of PLO activities. (Harris 2012). The break-up of the organization

destroyed its Lebanese character. The alliances organizational and institutional capabilities were lost for good.

The threat posed by the LNM-PLO had also encouraged Maronite elites to attempt to unite their various militias. They did so largely under the banner of the Lebanese Front.⁶ This front was led by the charismatic Bashir Gemayel and had become the primary counterforce to the LNM representing the interests of the traditional Maronite and Sunni political elites. In numbers it was roughly at parity with LNM (See Table 5-1), but to be successful it would have to operate as a united front. Intra-sectarian rivalries made this a challenge but a common enemy was encouraging the Christians to struggle through the process. This meant the component militias would have to rapidly adapt and integrate their organizational and institutional structures; settling their differences, and generally learning to work cooperatively with each other to cope with the LNM threat. According to el-Husseini (2012) they were doing just that. The group's primary function was combat oriented but from their inception in 1976 until about 1982 the group was also taking on other "state" social and economic roles, including policing, traffic management and various consumer protections. The Lebanese Front was establishing plans (with some under the radar assistance from Israel) to eject both the PLO and ultimately Syria. Had this group been able to maintain its cohesion under Bashir Gemayel, Lebanon might have been a viable Maronite dominated republic.⁷

⁶ The Lebanese Forces are also sometimes referred to the Lebanese Front, the "front" being the unified parent Christian parties and the "forces" being the actual combat forces.

⁷ Maronite domination was likely to have some of its own problems but one must consider that the antebellum status quo was satisfactory not only to the Maronites, but from particular za'im from the other confessions as well. The balance of political power was disrupted by the arrival of the PLO, but as the PLO and Syria was ejected it is not unreasonable to posit a reversion to the National Pact of 1943. The non-Maronite Za'im who benefited from the ante-bellum status quo could plausibly be coopted into a new Maronite led regime. Though he does not state this explicitly, Hiro (1992) seems to suggest that this is what the Gemayels and Israel hoped would happen.

Syrian intervention ultimately disrupted this process by sponsoring and effecting the assassination of Bashir Gemayel. The vacuum created after his death fractured the fragile alliance. The Maronites could not coalesce around another leader. Various young elites, notably Samir Geagea and Elie Hobeiqa, vied for control of the group. With Syria also holding in check the Palestinian threat, the various Christian elites were relieved of some of the burden of fighting the LNM. They thus took to fighting each other and re-securing their own enclaves. Syria, for its part, then simply took a back seat allowing the Christians to fight each other. The Maronites would never fully unite to recapture the central government; their militias would never be the basis of a post war security establishment (el-Husseini 2012, Hiro 1992).

Table 5-1: Size of Major Fighting Forces in the Lebanese Civil War

Army/Militia	estimate peak troops
Lebanese Front (combined strength)	25000
LNM-PLO (combined strength)	30000
LNM	5000
Phalangist	11000
South Lebanese Army	3000
Amal/Hezbollah	5000
Aoun's Militia (1988-1990)	8000
Syria	27000-35000
Israel	25000/76000

Data adapted from Hiro (1992) and Clodfelter (2008)

Another telltale sign of weak state capacity is the political disconnect between the sectarian leaders with war-making (coercive) capacity and the Executive Troika who ostensibly had legal authority to govern the state. Damascus saw to it that no Troika member had close political ties to militias, relying instead on Syrian patronage for their post. Most of Lebanon's political expertise resided with traditional elites who were in power prior to 1976, or militia elites who governed sectarian cantons during the war years (Zahar 2002, el-Husseini 2012,

Harris 2012). Syrian-backed substitutes were thus typically less experienced (many in the 90s were first termers) and handicapped by the fact that they could not easily tap the political veterans' expertise. Even if clients were politically astute, they could not easily or inconsequentially defy their patron's interests in pursuit of genuine Lebanese interests. These disconnects ensured that key political figures from each of the sects could not exercise an independent political or coordinated agenda. Syria as a last result could withhold its continued support or use its clients in the other sect to veto any agenda maligned to its interests (Najem 2012).

For example Assad's picks of Presidents had few connections to the major Maronite enclaves. Elias Sarkis was a technocratic central banker and Elias Hrawi came from a notable family but with strong ties to the Assads. Neither had close ties with the major Maronite political families nor the militias. Emile Lahoud, who succeeded Hrawi, was a prior Naval Commander and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces who had many connections to Syrian military intelligence and was politically allied with Hezbollah (Bosco 2009). Though generally not accepted as such, he touted himself as a man of the people, not affiliated with the dominant Maronite families. The post war Prime Ministers Salim Hoss and Omar Karami were also "independents". They replaced the traditional Sunni elites who had largely backed the LNM during the war. Omar Karami had name recognition as part of the Sunni political dynasty but he essentially lived in the shadow of his father and more notably his brother Prime Minister Rashid Karami who was assassinated in 1987. Hoss like Elias Sarkis was a technocrat and central banker with no other significant ties to traditional Lebanese politics. Finally, Nabih Berri who has been Speaker of the House since the founding of the Second Republic in 1992 was affiliated

with Amal, but Amal was at its core an anti-establishment movement. His organization for most of its existence sought the overthrow of “traditional” Lebanese politics and thus would not generally pose Syria a grave threat to its interests.

Table 5-2: Affiliations of the Executive Troika of Lebanon

Prominent Syrian Clients	Years	Affiliation	Position
Elias Sarkis	1976-1982	Maronite-Independent	President
Elias Hrawi	1989-1998	Maronite-Independent	President
Emile Lahoud	1998-2007	Maronite-Independent	President
Salim Hoss	1988-1989	Sunni-Independent	Acting-President
Salim Hoss	1987-1990 / 1998-2000	Sunni-Independent	Prime Minister
Omar Karami	1990-1992 / 2004-2005	Sunni-Independent	Prime Minister
Najib Mikati	2005	Sunni-Independent	Prime Minister
Nabih Berri	1992-2013	Shia-Amal	Speaker

Finally, though Lebanon has nominally recovered from the economic devastation of the war its economic capacity was severely crippled as a direct consequence of Syrian meddling. First, Syrian marginalization of the Maronite population discouraged significant foreign investment. It was the Maronites who chiefly had ties to France and other affluent Western countries. Western enterprises were reluctant to reestablish their businesses if the Maronite elites on whom they relied to protect their interests were no longer influential. Second, Syria could not resist the urge to exploit its role as Lebanon’s protector to advance its own post war economic interests. While the economy was generally the one functional area Syria genuinely left to the Lebanese, Damascus used its clients to push for labor accords which allowed a mass influx of Syrian workers into Lebanon during post war reconstruction. This amounted to using the Lebanon reconstruction effort as a source of patronage for Damascus. Syrian workers occupied between one-half to one million jobs in Lebanon. This resulted in high Lebanese

unemployment and a capital drain of an estimated \$1-billion as these labor remittances were transferred to Syria rather than remain in Lebanese economy (Najem 2012).

Most detrimentally, Syria refused to permit the Lebanese government to act forcefully in curbing militia violence below the Litani River. Syria continued to encourage Hezbollah's occupation of south Lebanon. This gave Assad back his spigot of violence for which he could use as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis Israel. Post war skirmishes between the Israeli sponsored SLA and Hezbollah added \$2-billion plus in post war economic damage. In order to cover these costs, Lebanon had to assume one of the largest government debts in the world and spends much of their government budget just servicing this debt (Country Watch Report 2013c, Najem 2012). This debt servicing and rebuilding of damaged infrastructure, a direct consequence of Syrian interference, would derail genuine capacity growth for many years after the war ended.

Post War Violence and Stability

Patronistic interventions delegitimize post war governments more so than non-patronistic interventions. This occurs because a government who relies on an external sponsor for its capabilities and capacity is more likely to be perceived as an unrightful ruler, and possibly a puppet to foreigners. Clients of a foreign intervener experience two strong forces that work to undermine their domestic legitimacy. First, access to patron capabilities creates conditions whereby rulers have opportunities to cut out local elites that might otherwise have been necessary to invite in order to create a winning coalition. These marginalized might-have-beens become dissent generators in a post war context. Second, and closely related, the client-government is primarily a user of the patrons capabilities and thus dependent and beholden to it. As domestic priorities appear more and more subordinate to the patron's, intervention will

appear more like occupation. Client-leaders will become resented for their policies and be viewed as illegitimate. As nationalistic resentment builds it can foment dissent and even resistance to government policies and ultimately escalate to political hostility and instability. This violence can take the form of riot and rebellion in protest of the new regime or the local government and its patron may resort to violent repression to push its agenda and protect its interests.

In Lebanon, Syria's intervention provoked a level of post war violence that was much higher than average compared to other states emerging from regime war. Figure 5-1a plots a histogram of the mean *conflict index* for states during their post war periods. The mean conflict index between the states in the regime war dataset figured at 1.44.⁸ Lebanon scored a 2.07 which placed it in the upper quartile of most violent post war states. This is consistent with expectation on patronistic interventions. This excess of violence stemmed from two sources. First, independently minded Lebanese resented Syria's presence as an occupation more than a peacekeeping intervention. Tensions were high between Syrian clients holding political power and their opponents. The groups frequently targeted each other for various forms of political violence, from protest to assassination. Second, even though the civil war had ended, militia violence continued in the south for almost another decade as the Hezbollah and Israeli backed SLA militias fought each other for dominance. Here, Syria's deliberate policy of legitimizing Hezbollah and blocking the Lebanese Armed Forces from securing the south (most Lebanese

⁸ Each histogram observation represents the average of the post war observations associated with a particular conflict. See Chapter 4's research design section for how the conflict index is constructed. The inter-state mean of 1.5 is the mean of these histogram observations.

preferred an end to *all* militia groups) fomented the resentment of many south Lebanese who turned to the SLA and Israel for support.




Figure 5-1: Average Post War Domestic Conflict Index (Lebanon)

Beirut was rife with political violence in the aftermath of the civil war. Assassinations, purges, car bombs and disappearances became part of the “normal” political landscape. Prominent political figures with anti-Syrian leanings were often the targets of these purges and assassinations. Michael Aoun had been driven into exile in France. Samir Geagea, the Commander of the Lebanese Forces after the death of Bashir Gemayal, had a strong Maronite

following. Damascus begrudgingly allowed him to have a ministerial position (without a portfolio) in the newly formed government in the attempt to garner legitimacy from the Maronites community (el-Husseini 2012, Najem 2012). However, as his following grew stronger as his anti-Syrian rhetoric louder, President Hrawi, revoked Geagea's amnesty; a protection all militia commanders enjoyed at the end of the war. The lifting of amnesty cleared the way for him to be charged with a number of war related crimes. In April of 1994 Geagea was tried and sentenced to death for his alleged role the assassinations of prominent war-period political figures, but the sentence was commuted to life in prison. The lighter sentence was likely to avoid a political backlash from Geagea's supporters and the Maronite community more generally. Interestingly, Geagea was the only militia commander to lose his general amnesty and receive sentencing. He was never convicted of the original charges brought against him; only the follow-on, which included disguising a militia as a political party. Amnesty International notes in its reports that Geagea was a political prisoner and that he and many of his colleagues were not given fair trials. El-Husseneni notes many of Geagea's compatriots were arrested, intimidated and tortured possibly under the pretext of banning membership to the anti-Syrian political party (el-Husseini 2012).

Even less fortunate was Rafiq Harari, the Sunni Prime Minister and one of Lebanon's chief economic architects. While he seems to have at times played nice with the Assad regime, he was independently wealthy with a number of Western business connections. He also had a strong base of support from Muslim and Christian communities. He began airing grievances of Syrian economic intervention inside Lebanon as well as a strong objection to the extension of Bashir Assad's client-President Emile Lahoud's term, resigning as Prime Minister over the

issue(Bosco 2009, Najem 2012).⁹ His protests fomented angst and instability in Beirut more generally as protests erupted in response to alleged economic corruption of Lebanon's economic system and in political opposition to constitutional amendments extending the presidential term limits(Harris 2012, Najem 2012). The straw that probably broke the camel's back though was an apparent connection to the USA and France sponsored UN Resolution 1559 calling for the withdraw of Syrian forces from Lebanon. El-Husseni suggests Harari, though his French connections may have been instrumental in advocating for and drafting the resolution. Harari was killed in a car bombing on February 14 2005. Syria, and Hezbollah operatives specifically, have been implicated in the plot (US Department of State 2012).¹⁰ In short, Syrian occupation changed politics as usual in Lebanon. Outsider elites used what power they had to air grievances, foment dissent and challenge in what ways they could Syria's policies in Lebanon. Syria and its Lebanese clients often responded by increasing violence and other forms of repression to intimidate Lebanese elites and the rank-in-file in order to protect its interests.

Most damaging though to post war "peace" was continued militia violence in the south. Most Lebanese also supported policies banning all the wartime militias. Damascus, however, saw things differently. During Ta'if Assad maneuvered to have Hezbollah militias exempted from the ban; on the grounds that the militia was necessary to resist Israeli interference in the

⁹ A prevalent norm of Lebanese political society was that the Maronite president only serves 1 six year term. This was enshrined in the National Pact and faithfully observed since the 1940s. Syria's client Elias Hrawi had already received a 4 year extension. The push to extend Lahoud a second term was a significant political departure from the National Pact as well as Ta if. Lahoud had already violated a second constitutional norm, which was conveniently amended, calling for high ranking military officials to observe a "waiting period" before running for civilian office.

¹⁰ Ironically, this was also the straw that broke Syria's back. The assassination of Harari sparked massive domestic and international protests, The Cedar Revolution, which ultimately forced Syria's withdraw.

south. Najem makes the point though that this function legitimately belonged to the Lebanese Armed Forces though, and many Lebanese would have preferred this arrangement. Specifically, the LAF and the Lebanese government might negotiate Israel's withdraw on conditions that the LAF secure the south. Such a withdraw though would end the rationale for Syria's continued presence. Also, the LAF would never attack across the border for fear of provoking Israeli retaliation. Damascus, on the other hand, preferred Hezbollah as "security provider" because it could operate with more freedom of action than the LAF. Hezbollah could be counted on to occasionally attack the Israelis across the border and more importantly could be disavowed. That is, the Hezbollah militia could be permitted or encouraged to conduct attacks on Israel without being directly linked to Syria. Assad would regain the spigot of violence, which he lost with the ejection of the PLO. He could once again influence the level of pain Israel experienced based upon "the incentives the Israelis provided for them [Syria] at the negotiating table" without putting his own troops in harm's way (Najem 2012, pg 103) The bottom line was Syria had more leverage over Israel with Hezbollah in control of the south than with national troops and this state of affairs provoked intra-state violence between militias in the south and some devastatingly violent encounters with Israel.¹¹

Interestingly, by 1996 and perhaps earlier, Israel itself was prepared to unilaterally withdraw from Lebanon on the conditions that all Lebanese militias be banned (including Hezbollah), the Lebanese Armed Forces assume security control of the south, and its proxy

¹¹ On two occasions, in 1993 and 1996 Hezbollah rocket attacks hit targets in Israeli territory prompting major retaliatory strikes; Operations Accountability and Grapes of Wrath. These operations collectively caused the displacement of over 300,000 Lebanese, 500 civilian casualties and the utter destruction of Hezbollah occupied neighborhoods. (see for example History Guy: Israeli-Lebanon Conflict)

militia the South Lebanese Army be allowed to integrate into the national army.¹² This sentiment was publically articulated in Benjamin Netanyahu's "Lebanon First" proposal. It most respects it was equivalent to UN Security Council Resolution 425 except that Israel would withdraw in phases, conditional on Lebanon's sincere efforts to disarm Hezbollah. Syria was of course an original supporter of the UN Resolution 425, but this new proposal ran counter to Damascus' interests. Specifically, the Lebanon First deal called for bilateral negotiations between Israel and Lebanon. Syria was to be sidelined, a dangerous demonstration and precedent setting event vis-à-vis the Lebanese political establishment. It could reduce Syrian influence as well as jeopardize the political prospects for its clients. Damascus and its Lebanese clients thus called the proposal a "non-starter" and it was outright rejected (Ellis 2009, Shlaim 2000). So, at point were genuine Lebanese interests might have dictated a bargain with Israel-- a withdraw in 1996 would have ended the SLA and Hezbollah militias, halted frequent refugee crises, and curbed the massive economic damage in the south that was a drain on the Lebanese economy--Syrian intrigues scuttled a potential solution. Consequently, Israel continued to provide leadership and support to its proxy the SLA. Hezbollah and the SLA militias skirmished throughout the period of 1992-2000 resulting in a number of civilian non-combatant deaths. Sadly, it would not be until after the expulsion of Syria in the Cedar Revolution of 2005 and the devastation of the Israel-Lebanese war of 2006 that Lebanon would finally assume state control of the south (CIA World Fact Book 2013). Had Syria and its political clients not

¹² The SLA would essentially remain intact but under the control (and accountability) of the government in Beirut. Syria rejected the plan and so it never came to pass. The SLA dissolved in 2000 when Israel unilaterally withdrew from South Lebanon.

dictated security policies in south Lebanon prior to 2005, the violence southern Lebanese experienced might have been considerably lessened.

Some observers might be tempted to attribute the large degree of post war violence to primarily ethnic or sectarian tensions. While these tensions did exist, they are ultimately unsatisfying as an explanation. For instance, in the militia fighting in the south Shia fought on behalf of both the South Lebanese Army and Hezbollah. Some Shia saw Syrian meddling as the greater of two evils others directed their ire toward Israel. Similarly, Maronites were also locked in bitter rivalry with each other. A Maronite president paved the way for a Maronite militia leader to be the *only* militia leader to be denied the general amnesty. Maronites in exile, such as Michael Aoun, evoked nationalistic sentiments speaking out from afar against Maronite clients bending to Damascus' will rather than the needs of Lebanon itself. In sum, nationalism and the frictions created by feelings of occupation and frustration offer an equal if not better account of the post war violence in Lebanon.

War and Post War Democratization

Finally, patronistic intervention theory anticipates that governments that come to power as the consequence of a patron's intervention have fewer incentives to democratize. The patron's support makes gaining local support less necessary in order to access the resources necessary to gain and maintain power, therefore the supported client is less likely to offer their subjects democracy or policy concessions in exchange for these same resources. Similarly, the patron's interests tend to benefit from this less democratic arrangement because by keeping their client's ruling coalition small, the patrons policy preferences are less vulnerable to popular disruption. This means patrons also have few incentives to encourage

their clients' democratization and may even actively attempt to work against it (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).

Popular support and legitimacy as a requisite to exercising political power is a common thread central to nearly all conceptions of democracy. Syrian intervention, though nominally upholding the consociational foundations of Lebanese government, created conditions both during and after the war in which candidates and client-incumbents in high office were not reliant on popular support and legitimacy to attain or maintain political power. Popularly supported candidates were often shut out of the political sphere in favor of figures that had Damascus' blessing, reducing the competitiveness and genuineness of alternative policies, a condition not as likely to exist in a case of non-intervention or low intensity partnership. Pro-Syrian Lebanese clients free from their communities' censure and isolated from their support were often prompted or coerced into promulgating policies that ran counter to the best interests of Lebanese society. Political power was more often exercised according to a rule of whether or not it conflicted with Syrian interests and not whether policies or politicians had the support of various Lebanese constituents. For instance, El Hussein (2012) notes all Lebanese politicians required the nod of Ghazi Kanaan, Syria's Chief of Intelligence in order to run for office. Kanaan and his successor Rustom Ghazalah were considered the most powerful men in Lebanon. The Intelligence Chiefs and Lebanese Client-Presidents would also collude to alter the constitution and manipulate elections (el-Husseini 2012, Harris 2012) The end result was a political system that remained nominally a consociational democracy; but its politics suggested something much more authoritarian and small-coalition centered. This would remain true for 15 years after the war until Syria was finally ejected by the Cedar Revolution in 2005. The depth

of nationalistic anti-Syrian sentiment was evidenced most profoundly in the first elections after the Cedar revolutions where the March-14th coalition won 93 of 128 electoral seats (Harris 2012).¹³

Damascus' intervention strategy disrupted and discouraged democratic development to the extent that Syria could make its support conditional on its preferred candidates getting political power. For example, Damascus used its "peace-keeping" leverage to install its preferred Elias Sarkis, in the 1976 elections. Sarkis had run for President in the 1972 as a reformist candidate but did not have substantial supports from his co-confessionals. He lost to Suleiman Franjeh, who was now beseeching Damascus' help in fending off the LNM-PLO alliance. Damascus however made it clear that her armies would only continue to fight the alliance if the Maronites agreed to vote Sarkis as their candidate in on the 8 May elections. Given the seriousness of the LNM threat (at this point the LNM controlled nearly two-thirds of Lebanon) the Maronites had strong incentives to comply. They traded the democratically representative nature of *their* preferred Presidential nominee for Sarkis and the expedience of Syrian military support. As it stood, Sarkis was the only nominee to the presidency in 1976. He faced no other competitor to the highest office in the land. To overcome the hurdles Sarkis might experience from the other sects, Damascus also instructed her Muslim clients, especially those likely to lose power and influence in a LNM dominates state, to also vote for Sarkis, giving him sufficient margin to clear the first round majority hurdle which if not crossed would warrant new elections. So, it came to pass that the wartime Lebanese President came to power

¹³ To be fair the March 14 coalition itself was split with a sub-coalition of Sunni and Druze receiving 72 seats and repatriated Michael Aoun's coalition receiving 21 seats. Regardless, the anti-Syrian coalition's sweep suggests the extent of Syria's penetration and Lebanese initial animosity toward it.

more because he served a patron's interests than that he had a legitimate domestic basis for support who had won a reasonably fair and competitive election. Other states in the region, Egypt, Libya and Iraq all registered vehement complaints regarding the manner through which Sarkis came to power and the policies he later promulgated while in power(Hiro 1992).

Syria could also use its disapproval of any Lebanese policy as a signal to its clients to incite disorder in an attempt to scuttle the current government. When Lebanon faced its leadership crisis in 1988, for instance, Syria fervently opposed Amine Gemayal's non-traditional appointment of a fellow Maronite to Prime Minister. Gemayal's appointment of Michael Aoun violated political custom but not necessarily the legality of the Constitution. Muslims were however, predictably outraged. Taking cues from Damascus, Gemayal's former Prime Minister Salim Hoss unilaterally announced his own Prime Ministership and formed his own cabinet in direct opposition to Aoun. This counter government could count on the backing of the Muslim militias as well as the Syrian occupation forces. Damascus also pressed other regional and international governments to recognize the Hoss government versus Aoun's. The facts on the ground however were that Lebanon now possessed two competing governments, one "legal" the other "legitimate", neither an icon for consociational democracy. The two governments' competition for supremacy marked one of the most violent periods of the conflict(Hiro 1992, Najem 2012).

Last but not least, Syria used its troops as an instrument of repression and intimidation to keep its preferred clients in power. Once the Ta'if Accords were implemented and Damascus had another mandate to "peacekeep" in Lebanon, it asserted its peacekeeping authority to restrict competition for political office and arrest or intimidate anti-Syrian competitors. It richly

financed its own clients, giving them a competitive advantage in costly electoral campaigns(Najem 2012). Many Lebanese resented that foreign money could buy domestic elections. Nevertheless, the fates of prominent political figures, such as the exile of Amine Gemayel and Michael Aoun, the arrest and imprisonment of Samir Geagea, and a host of prominent political assassinations and arrests, served notice that democratic opposition to Damascus was dangerous. El-Husseini notes that Syrian opponents including Setrida Geagea, the wife of Samir Geagea, who was also politically active “moderated their opposition” (el-Husseini 2012, pg 56). Finally, whatever could not be achieved in restrictions, threats and intimidation was achieved by manipulating electoral outcomes. Damascus gerrymandered elections to favor its clients. According to el-Husseini, Bassel Salluoukh a Lebanese political scientist notes Syria controlled substantial percentages of Lebanese seat appointments throughout the 1992,1996, and 2000 elections(el-Husseini 2012, pg 18). This gave Syria firm control over presidential elections, cabinet formation and a dominant influence in legislation. Consequently, Syria instructed its clients to vote in favor of extending Hrawi’s presidential term to nine years versus 6 years and the constitution was altered again to permit Emile Lahoud, an active military commander to run in 1998 and run again in 2004.

Syrian interference was so extensive that the Maronites unable to coordinate on an acceptable opposition candidates boycotted the elections of 1992 and 1996 hoping to delegitimize the results. Maronite turnout was less than 25% simply playing into Syria’s hands (Harris 2012). Afterwards, a number of Maronite political aspirants accepted Syrian dominance and largely played by Syrian rules as clients or at least allies in order to share in the spoils (el-Husseini 2012). In short, the direct interference of Damascus in the Lebanese political sphere

undermined democratic notions of choosing competing alternatives to policy and office, but Syria had no compelling reason to encourage these alternatives. Those who had the desire to derail Syrian designs had few incentives to come forward, as they were more likely to be targeted for neutralization. Those that were aspiring had every incentive to comply. Failure to comply meant at the very least being replaced by another more compliant aspirant or worse the victim of Damascus' reprisal.

In a sense, Syria's intervention is a straight forward case for how intervention can derail democracy. Syria's interests were directly tied to the outcome of who ruled in Lebanon. It acted during and after the war to assure that whoever came to power in the Lebanese central government would be congenial to Damascus' interests. These interests often came in direct contradiction to what a democratic Lebanon was likely to produce. Rather than lose its policy prerogatives, the economic benefits tied to Lebanon's ports and reconstruction, or the strategic benefits of hosting the Hezbollah militias in south Lebanon, Syria would obstruct or manipulate democratic development when it could and had no qualms plummeting Lebanon back into chaos and instability if necessary. Most Lebanese, for their part, preferred the injustices of Syrian hegemony and the subordination of Lebanon's development than the prospects of another war. Thus for 15 years plus after the conclusion of the civil war, Lebanon suffered in terms of its ability to generate state capacity, maintain stability and order, and reestablish the consociational democratic nature of its government.

Kosovo

Kosovo presents an interesting case in that it affords an opportunity to explore the dynamics of a country who is aided by a patronistic but democratic intervener. Democratic patronism appears to substantially improve the democratic quality of the target's governing institutions. This makes some sense. Scholars have offered a number of plausible explanations. Doyle suggests liberal democratic states feel a liberal impulse to democratize non-democratic states (Doyle 1986, 2005). Werner and Yuen among others have noted states often prefer to create states in their own image, mirroring their own institutions. Werner (1996) suggests democratic interveners perceive states that resemble their own (democratic) regime as less threatening. Thus, strong democratic interveners are more likely change target regimes to something more democratic. Now, if a patron's continued support or eventual departure is conditioned on instituting democratic practices then there are strong local incentives to comply. Compliance with the patron's plan keeps the patron's resources flowing in, and in the case of democracy-building the resources coming in are likely to be significantly higher than what the target could muster on its own including economic support, political support and a range of non-governmental organization support.

However, the underlying strategy is still patronistic. Democracy for democracy's sake is rarely the sole goal of interveners. These interveners still try to shape their target's political and economic environment and still invite many of the same perverse incentives to build a viable post war state. For instance, being democratic does not necessarily lessen the sting of occupation and frustrated local actors may succumb to the same nationalistic and anti-occupation sentiments that non-democratic occupiers evoke. Perhaps worse, the patron's

adherence to democratic norms may even exacerbate certain problems. Democratic norms, for example, may constrain intervener's ability to block spoilers and other "bad actors" from exercising political power. These actors if allowed to participate can then block consensus, create political gridlock, and undermine domestic state capacity development and growth. To the extent patrons do manage to marginalize these bad actors they expose their own democratic double standards; whereby intervening democrats take steps to assure their preferred actors have majorities or block non-preferred actors from taking a clear majority. Just like non-democratic instances of patronistic interventions, outsider elites become dissent generators or act violently outside of the political system to express their grievances. The resulting political context is one that is reasonably democratic but nevertheless rife with the underlying political and economic dysfunctions.

Kosovo fits this mold well. NATO and the UN desired democracy for the region. However unadulterated democracy posed a serious risk that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) its successor organizations and its political sponsor the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) might gain a majority of seats and a popular mandate to pursue an Albanian nationalist and independence agenda. The West and UN authority moved to limit the political power of the KLA complex while simultaneously upholding democratic norms.¹⁴ This created a Kosovo government that was considerably more democratic than what it experienced under Milosevic. Unfortunately, KLA frustration at being marginalized and broader frustrations of being occupied and having independence delayed fomented an undercurrent of domestic tension and violence. Worse, having been marginalized within the system the PDK and its allies often played spoiler

¹⁴ I define the KLA complex as those groups essentially dominated by the KLA after it was official disbanded in 1999. These groups include KLA political parties, militias, veterans groups, etc.

to NATO and UN designs creating gridlock and distractions within the Kosovo Assembly which undermined endogenous state capacity development. Ultimately, Kosovo entered the international system as a democratic state. It meets the Polity IV threshold for liberal democracy (Polity IV index=8), but this relatively young state is still plagued by the same corruption, political inefficiency, and general lack of capacity and stability a non-democratic patron effects on its own clients.

Another interesting facet of the Kosovo war is that NATO's high intensity biased intervention was followed by the largest of its time post conflict peace operation. This affords us the opportunity to trace how these peace operations mitigated some of the deleterious effects of the military intervention itself. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is criticized for a number of failures. For instance King and Mason, who were members of the mission, criticized it on grounds that it was unable to prevent huge postwar ethnic riots and moved too slowly in transitioning governance functions to Kosovo's Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (King and Mason 2006). David Phillips, a senior US diplomat involved in the political settlement, criticized it on grounds that Kosovo's ultimate political status was left ambiguous. Furthermore, bringing the United Nations into what was essentially a Western intervention gave Russia de facto control over the process which complicated the transition process to self-rule immensely(Phillips 2012). On the other hand, the wealth of resources and expertise brought by international donors and the security and governance programs Western governments introduced through the United Nations may indeed have kept Kosovo from becoming an outright failed state. UNMIK presided over a number of municipal and general elections which acculturated Kosovars to the peaceful alternation of political power and

increased the overall legitimacy of the electoral process. UNMIK also played a large role in the peaceful repatriation and rebuilding of Albanian refugees' homes. As much as Kosovars resented the UN intrusion at times, their common displeasure with the UN oddly became one political issue the various political factions could cooperate on. Most importantly, UNMIK's power to make recommendations on Kosovo's autonomy or statehood further incentivized Kosovar to cooperate in some good governance initiatives and self-manage the degree of violence more than what might otherwise be expected. UNMIK directors were among the loudest voices proclaiming Kosovars needed to demonstrate an ability to generate local capacity and manage dissent if they were to ever be allowed to truly self-govern. Ultimately, and despite a number of specific failures, the UN operated as a mitigating presence. UN transitional assistance allowed cooler heads to prevail and offset some of the most deleterious effects evoked from the militarized intervention and occupation itself.

Kosovo History and Context

Kosovo bears historical significance for both the Serbian and Albanian populations that live there. The Serbs remember Kosovo as the place where Prince Lazar in 1389 attempted to defend Serb lands from Turkish invaders. Though Lazar lost, Serbians invoke his memories as a source of nationalistic pride. Many prominent cathedrals and religious monuments of Serbia's Golden age remain in Kosovo lands. Albanians slowly migrated into the regions beginning in the 15th century. Unlike the Serbs living in the region, most of the Albanians converted to Islam under the Ottomans. By the 20th century they constituted the ethnic majority in Kosovo. After the Balkan Wars of 1912 Kosovo was ceded to Serbia. Albanians would become the minority in

the newly expanded Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes(Dziedzic and Kisinchand 2005, Judah 2008).

After World War II Kosovo became part of Josef Tito's Yugoslavia. The communists strove hard to suppress rising Albanian nationalism along with all the other nationalist movements fomenting in the wake of the war. Albanians felt that communist leaders in Belgrade were marginalizing them politically and culturally and agitated for greater equality. Tito attempted to redress Albanian grievances by declaring Kosovo an Autonomous Republic in the revised Yugoslavia Constitution of 1974. This declaration gave Kosovo rights similar to the other major republics, including its own governing assembly, a police force and a representative to the collective presidency. When Tito died in 1980, the leadership in Belgrade began to abrogate those rights. The Albanian's protested again, but this time their shouts fell on deaf ears(Dziedzic and Kisinchand 2005, Phillips 2012).

Slobodan Milosevic by 1989 had abolished the Kosovo autonomous republic all together and instituted direct rule from Belgrade. His platform of Serbian nationalism provoked fear and secessionist movements in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, as well as Kosovo. By 1991 the entire Balkan region was embroiled in war. Kosovo, however, followed a path different from the rest of the region. When Milosevic dissolved the autonomous republic a group of intellectuals led by Ibrahim Rugova formed a new political party the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) to resist the abrogation of Kosovo's status. The LDK organized elections to form a government that would "administer" the region informally while it was under Serbian control. Rugova became President of this shadow government and began appealing to Western governments, particularly the United States, to assist the Kosovars in their plight. Unlike other nationalist

leaders in the Balkans, Rugova advocated a strategy of non-violence insofar as how the Albanians should deal with Serbia. He was not a pacifist per se; rather, he was a pragmatist who realized Kosovo was too small to withstand the full might Serbia could bring to bear against her (Phillips 2012). He believed Kosovo's salvation would come from the diplomatic and coercive pressure the United States and Europe could bring. Unfortunately for Rugova, the West had no appetite for continued engagement in Balkan conflicts. Kosovo was set aside in favor of a peace deal for the more prominent conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. The West's pivot away from dealing with Kosovo inadvertently humiliated and discredited Rugova. He had lobbied hard to get a settlement for Kosovo in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords as well as the 1992 London Conference. When the Kosovo situation was all but ignored, his policy of non-violence seemed folly. Kosovars learned painfully it was the violent states that got attention and adjusted accordingly. Daalder and O'Hanlon more explicitly comment that "as long as violence did not escalate, it [Kosovo] would not be at the center of that [Balkan] policy" (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000, pg. 9)

By 1996 groups of Kosovar Albanians frustrated with LDK pacifism began organizing violent resistance movements. The most prominent of these groups came to be known as the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) backed by a political movement of expatriate dissidents the Kosovo People's League--LPK (Mulaj 2008). Early operations of the KLA amounted to little more than pinpricks. Kosovo was too poor and weapons were expensive to procure and smuggle to mount a robust resistance. The situation changed in 1997; however, with the collapsed political system in Albania. When the Albanian economy tanked from a nation-wide investment scandal, rioters began attacking government buildings and armories. Entrepreneurs sold these

weapons to Kosovars for pennies on the dollar. With access to cheap small arms and light artillery the KLA was suddenly able to outfit itself as a respectable fighting force. It soon conducted more sophisticated military operations (Mulaj 2008, Pettifer 2012, Phillips 2012). The Kosovo War officially started in the spring of 1998 when the KLA made an offensive push which captured 1/3 of the country(Sarkees and Wayman 2010)¹⁵. Milosevic retaliated fiercely, especially after the KLA had captured two strategically important mines and the town of Orahovac. The Yugoslav army and secret police forces obliterated KLA strongholds and towns in the Drenica region, burning homes, shooting livestock and razing crops. This ravaging became yet another incident of massive ethnic cleansing as between 200,000-300,000 Albanians became refugees (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000, Judah 2000).

This resurgence of ethnic cleansing alarmed the United States and Europe and they began applying more serious diplomatic pressure on Serbia. Their first attempt at coercive diplomacy led to the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) which began in October of 1998. The mission was headed by the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and called for monitoring a ceasefire and the Serbian withdraw of forces from Kosovo. While it averted a humanitarian catastrophe (thousands of Albanians fled into the mountains and winter was fast approaching) the mission was ultimately a failure. KVM personnel were unarmed and could do little to stop violence they observed. The mission amounted to little more than an internationally refereed strategic pause. This pause provided both the KLA and Yugoslav Army (VJ) breathing room to rearm and regroup. Hostilities escalated again in January 1999 when six Kosovar Serb Teens were gunned down in a pool hall. In reprisal Serb groups conducted a

¹⁵ David Phillips, who was part of the US delegation to Kosovo suggest it may have been as high as 40% (Phillips, 2012, pg92)

massacre in the town of Racak, where 45 Albanians were killed, including women, children and elderly (Judah 2000, 2008).

NATO attempted one last peace conference, calling on delegations from Serbia and Kosovo to meet at Rambouillet, an elegant chateau on the outskirts of Paris. This time Western diplomats tried to get both sides to compromise on a deal that would give Kosovo considerable autonomy, and in a “side note” from Madeline Albright the Kosovars were implicitly promised a referendum on eventual independence.¹⁶ Unfortunately, the distance between Kosovars and Serbians bargaining positions was too great, not to mention the divisiveness within the Kosovo delegation itself. Serbia refused to sign all together making a non-violent political solution seemed impossible. Russia made matters worse by declaring it would block any Security Council Resolution that called for the use of force in Kosovo. Milosevic, monitoring the conference from Belgrade, read this as a signal that the West was impotent to act and ramped up his ethnic cleansing campaign once again (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000).

By March 1999 all recourse to diplomatically resolving the crisis had been exhausted. The West took matters into its own hands and unilaterally authorized the use of force launching Operation Allied Force, another air war against Serbia.¹⁷ The purpose of the mission was to stop the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo, eject VJ forces out of Kosovo, and replace it with an international government in accordance with the principles of the Rambouillet conference until a political solution on the status of Kosovo could be negotiated (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000, US Department of Defense 1999).

¹⁶ Albright would go on to say that the referendum was one factor that would be considered in determining Kosovo's ultimate status. See (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000)

¹⁷ A number of accounts report that NATO had a tacit nod from the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, even though the Security Council itself was likely to be deadlocked. See Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000, pg75) or Judah(2000, pp272-3)

The NATO military intervention lasted 78 days. Bombing started on the 24th of March 1999 and concluded with a NATO victory on the 9th of June. The bombing campaign was followed by a NATO peace operation conducted by the Kosovo Forces (KFOR) and a UN transitional government mission authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK acted as the official government in Kosovo until 17 February 2008 when Kosovo declared its independence. As of June 2013 Kosovo's Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj declares 100 of 193 UN member states recognize Kosovo's statehood (Bytyci 2013).

NATO: Goals, Strategy, and Outcome

The primary military goal of NATO's intervention was to halt the incidence of ethnic cleansing in Europe's backyard. The United States and Europe had been criticized heavily for failing to intervene in the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina soon enough. They wanted to avoid being repeat offenders (Gow 2009)¹⁸. Politically, the United States and Europe wanted to settle the long term status of Kosovo. Without a long term settlement, any military operation would be little more than a stop gap measure on violence until another event triggered a new wave. The task was also complex. Resolving the crisis meant balancing the conflicting pressures exerted by the Kosovars on one side and Serbia and Russia on the other. The events at Rambouillet made it clear that Kosovars would not settle for less than independence nor would the Serbian authorities tolerate it. At the same time, Russians were concerned about the precedent a Kosovo intervention might set in regards to their own Muslim separatists in

¹⁸ Some of the more compelling quotes Gow cites includes President Clinton: " We couldn't have another Bosnia where the international community and Europe and NATO in particular kind of fiddle around for two and half years" as well as Secretary Albright: " Gentlemen remember that history is watching us and our predecessors sat in this room and watched Bosnia burn" (p307)

Chechnya (Judah 2008). This created a conundrum where a power sharing agreement or regional autonomy would not guarantee the end of violence, particularly from the KLA, and an overt strategy of regime change or direct support for secession was not going to work either. Therefore, NATO chose a middle path. It would conduct a strong military intervention to assure the pull back of Serbian forces in Kosovo. Serbia was to be removed from Kosovo period. This would be followed by an indefinite NATO led administration to govern Kosovo. In order to get Russian and Serbian buy-in this plan was altered to UN-led but primarily Western staffed UNMIK and KFOR peace support missions, encapsulated in United States Security Council Resolution 1244. Phillips, who participated as part of the US Kosovo delegation, suggests that key Western countries had independence in the back of their minds from the beginning. It was hoped that the ambiguity in this arrangement would provide the West, Serbia and Russia time and breathing space to negotiate a final political status (Phillips 2012, 116). Henry Perritt bolsters this point further noting that the Americans and Kosovar Albanians typically interpreted the mandate as a political trusteeship which would lead to a referendum regarding the “will of the [Kosovar]people” and ultimate independence (Perritt 2010, pp. 63-4).¹⁹

In the end, NATO opted for a patronistic strategy to achieve its objectives. A patronistic approach appeared necessary because there was no unified or politically acceptable Kosovar opposition on the ground to support. Rugova’s pacifistic policies meant that the LDK did not field an army; therefore there was no military force to “partner” with. Second, NATO wanted explicitly to avoid being associated with supporting the KLA. The KLA had been implicated in

¹⁹ References in UNSCR 1244 to consider the agreements at Rambouillet imply an eventual referendum on independence. The “side note” by Secretary Madeline Albright promising this referendum was what ultimately brought the Kosovo delegation to sign the agreement. A number of reconstruction policies such as privatization and changing the unit of currency away from the Serbian dinar also evince the notion of an eventual break-away.

committing a number of massacres and gross human rights violations. Senior diplomat Robert Gelbard went as far as calling the KLA terrorists (Gow 2009, Phillips 2012). Partnering with the KLA was politically unsustainable. Secretaries Albright and Cohen both painstakingly emphasized that US military power would not directly assist or rescue the KLA (Judah 2008, Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000). NATO would do the bulk of the fighting against Serbia on behalf of the Kosovo people and provide post war security for the transitional government that would follow.²⁰ These forces would also be tasked to oversee the disarmament of the KLA.

Some aspects of the NATO strategy might lead scholars and practitioners to argue the strategy was unbiased, that Westerners were truly agnostic about the ultimate political settlement, particularly when considering the ambiguous language of UNSCR 1244 regarding final status. There are two problems with this interpretation. First Chapter VII missions are generally authorized without consent of one of the parties. Though they are dubbed with less intimidating terms like peace enforcement or peace support, their underlying motive is to coerce one side, typically an intractable government to comply with international norms. There was no intent of separating belligerent parties while talks commenced. Kosovo was going to be administered by the West, not Belgrade. It was a matter of deciding Brussels or New York. The second problem is, as already mentioned; a number of accounts attest to the fact that as early as 1999 the United States recognized the only viable long term solution was independence--i.e. permanent separation. A number of UNMIK enacted policies, such as setting a new currency and establishing bilateral Free Trade Agreements with neighboring counties (independently

²⁰ The UNMIK operation was actually negotiated during the course of the bombing campaign to end it. UNMIK got the job as part of a compromise where Serbia agreed to allow a UN-led presence with a substantial NATO component in Kosovo versus NATO led. See for example Judah (2000) or Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000).

from Serbia) suggest a subtle move toward independence (King and Mason 2006). More tellingly, KFOR and Western governments engaged in intense crisis diplomacy to prevent Russian troops from occupying Pristina airport. A small contingent of Russians had “arrived” at the airport unexpectedly and had follow on forces been allowed to land Russia might have established a Serbian foothold difficult to extract. If the West were truly neutral about Kosovo’s political future such intense diplomatic efforts denying Russia overflight rights in every adjacent country make little sense. KFOR also refused to allow the Serbian military and police authorized in the UNMIK mandate to return to Kosovo.²¹ Finally, Chapter VII authority does not technically give intervening states the right to *create new states*, only to restore stability and order to existing ones--i.e. Serbia.²² Under a strict interpretation of Chapter VII, Kosovo could expect no better than significant autonomy with some sort of power sharing arrangement. The actions of major actors and implications of key UNMIK policies suggest a considerably more biased strategy, even if couched in UN terminology and legitimated through UN sponsored operations.

The war outcome was predictable but not necessarily inevitable. NATO had anticipated the war would last on the order of days maybe a couple of weeks. It dragged out for 78 days before Milosevic finally capitulated. Interestingly, it seemed for a while that Milosevic might actually be able to successfully hold out. NATO planners had run out of targets after 11 days. Finding new targets was difficult because target approval required ratification from all 14

²¹ King and Mason(2006) offer evidence suggestive that actual KFOR peacekeepers saw its mandate more as keeping Serbian VJ(army) and MUP(police) out more so than internal stability(see pp.54-5). In a personal discussion with Dr. Mathew Schwonek, Professor of East European History and Studies at United States Air Command and Staff College, he notes that had there been a meaningful presence of VJ or MUP this would have presented an obvious security issue and impediment to declaring independence in 2008. We would know of a “crisis” to remove the last of this Serbian presence. There is little if any historical evidence to suggest that this was in fact the case, so it is plausible to assume that in fact there was no substantive Serbian military/police presence after the June 1999 accords.

²² East Timor is the only other case of Chapter VII missions leading to the creation of a new state.

participating NATO governments. Some NATO partners were also restricted in what kinds of operations their particular governments would allow them to participate in. Keeping persistent pressure on the Serbian forces was a cumbersome and horribly inefficient process. It was not until the British under Tony Blair credibly threatened a ground invasion and the Russians themselves pressured Milosevic that he finally relented (Perritt 2010, Phillips 2012). The war officially ended on 9 June 1999 with the signing of the Kumanova Accord. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 establishing the KFOR and UNMIK missions were implemented the following day.

War and Post War State Capacity

Patronistic intervention theory anticipates that NATO's intervention would set up incentives that undermine state capacity, despite the fact that a liberal democratic intervener might try to encourage domestic capacity development. A push toward a more democratic regime however does not automatically construct an improved ability to generate state capacity. Other intervener core interests alongside democratic competition and potential political marginalization of important actors can actually gridlock or impede the development of post war capacity and good governance.

In the case of Kosovo, NATO's militarized intervention and aspects of KFOR's and UNMIK's follow-on interventions created conditions that undermined the development of state capacity during and after the war. First, NATO's militarized intervention inadvertently made them the "KLA Air Force". The KLA and its political wing the PDK were able to claim victory for what NATO actually achieved and use it to ride a popular wave of nationalist sentiment. Neither group, though, had sufficiently matured organizationally and institutionally to become a viable

nucleus of post war capacity building in either the security or political dimensions. Second, the imminence of the NATO campaign incentivized the more nationalist forces, Hashim Thaci's PDK party to stage a soft coup, placing themselves in a position as chief political partner to the West in the post-Milosevic context. When UNMIK ultimately rejected Thaci's provisional government, and in some ways set that government to take the hit for early UNMIK failures, it set the stage for bitter rivalry and gridlock in the Kosovar government, especially with Rugova's party. Finally, NATO and UNMIK hesitation to relinquish political control infuriated those who did serve in Kosovo's interim government. The local government's key agenda item then became wresting control away from UNMIK and NATO rather than actually exercising governance over those areas for which they did have control. Consequently, a number of important state building enterprises when un- or under-developed.

The KLA was the most obvious local proto-security force available in Kosovo after the Serbian Army was ejected. Rugova's party had sought to avoid conflict so the LDK did not have a proto-force of its own. Unfortunately for the KLA, while they were indeed armed, they were not trusted. NATO and UN leadership feared the KLA and PDK nationalistic independence agenda. A premature push for independence threatened a Western core interest of delay for the sake of maintaining good relations with Russia and Serbia in order to create more favorable conditions for a future status settlement. Second there were concerns about KLA "terrorism" and human rights abuses. The West was leery of attaching itself to the KLA explicitly though they did tacitly support the KLA during the bombing campaign. After Operation Allied Force had concluded, NATO and the UN moved quickly to disband the KLA and marginalize the PDK after "their victory". Thus the resources these groups had were not counted as part of Kosovo's

domestic security capabilities and in fact the West set these groups up to become spoilers and a drain on alternative capacity generation methods the international community introduced themselves.

The real capacity of the KLA however is often overstated or overestimated. Locally, KLA took a lot of credit for what NATO was actually accomplishing. The organization of the KLA was not sufficiently matured to be a useful nucleus of an army or domestic constabulary force in the first place. It was for all intents and purposes an insurgent group following a regionalized variant of the classical Maoist doctrine, and was in its earlier stages at that.²³ The KLA had never really held or governed territory in the ways the various Lebanese militias held territory as described earlier in this chapter. As a number of observers have pointed out, the KLA was nearly decimated in 1998. Its lax command and control structures gave zone commanders a lot of freedom of action without the senior oversight to curb overly ambitious or over-zealous operations. Consequently, KLA units were drawn into a confrontation that favored Serbia's conventional military and they were nearly wiped out, saved at the 11th hour by Western diplomacy through the Kosovo Verification Mission (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000, Pettifer 2012, Phillips 2012).

While the KLA took the opportunity to regroup and reorganize after October 1998, it was being attacked once again in force by March 1999. Milosevic had started his alleged Operation Horseshoe, a final attempt to ethnically cleanse Kosovo as NATO was bombing. As Pettifer has noted, the KLA in most instance could do little more than watch or retreat into the

²³ Pettifer (2012) chapters 3-5 detail the build-up and capabilities of the KLA insurgent force. Bottom line though is the KLA had no capabilities to control or govern territories as classic insurgent doctrine calls for in its more mature stages. They could conduct small scale guerilla-warfare at best. For cogent descriptions of classical insurgency doctrine see Chaliand (1994) *The Art of War in World History*, he dedicates one chapter to Mau's doctrine. Also see Galula (2006) Chapter 3.

forest, they were “helpless” (Pettifer 2012, pg 209). The successes they did have were a consequence of working directly with UK and US covert operatives, but here they were serving narrow patron interests not their own more robust future interests. They certainly took the credit that came with NATO successes, and these supposed exploits likely gave the Kosovar population and the KLA themselves the impression they were more viable or capable than they ought to be given credit for. Tim Judah offers an insightful comment:

“The KLA has to rank as one of the most successful military organizations in history. Its success has nothing to do with military prowess; it won no battles. It is, rather, thanks to the fact that emerging onto the scene at the right place, at the right time, it was able to have NATO win its war for it” (Judah 2008, pg 75)

In short the KLA had no robust capability. They were a relatively inexperienced militia.

Now, bringing back in concerns for KLA human rights abuses and criminality, UNMIK moved quickly to disband the group and absorb them back into civil society.²⁴ KLA soldiers who took Western offers were given well paid, but relatively undignified (from their perspective), jobs as part of an unarmed national guard, the Kosovo Protection Corp. The low status of these jobs of course infuriated many other KLA soldiers and officers who felt as the nation’s liberators they were entitled to more status and privilege. Many units of the ex-KLA transformed from an inexperienced militia to what King and Mason have dubbed a thugocracy. Bluntly, this meant they turned to crime. KLA units occupied a number of towns after NATO airpower liberated it. Rather than disarm and turn these towns over to the legitimate authorities, ex KLA set their own “mayor-ships” and “security companies”, taking over local government and businesses and running them like mafia organizations (King and Mason 2006, Blair et al. 2005). King and Mason

²⁴ It should also be noted disarming the KLA was used as an inducement to get Milosevic and Russia to agree to the intervention in the first place.

also note that it would take many months in some cases over a year to get adequate KFOR ground forces to police these areas. By that point; however, these ex-KLA organizations were firmly entrenched siphoning off town resources for patronage and personal gain. Whatever capabilities the KLA might have possessed were never transformed into endogenous capacity generation for the state. Instead KLA resources were directed at depleting the state even further. Combating KLA corruption and absence of rule of law would present a serious drain on Kosovo's resources and potential capacity which might otherwise have been spent reconstructing a stronger state.

The KLA's political wing fared no better. During the war years the KLA's political arm existed as the Kosova Peoples Movement (LPK) which was itself the merger of other predecessor militant groups. In February 1999 in anticipation of NATO bombing Hashim Thaci the movement's leader rebranded the movement as a political party the Democratic Party of Kosovo, appointed himself Prime Minister and his cohorts to various cabinet positions. These actions amounted to a coup d'état displacing Ibrahim Rugova's LDK government. Rugova in fact briefly joined Thaci's government and then broke away shortly after the bombing campaign (Perritt 2010). Though not popularly elected, Thaci enjoyed popular legitimacy as the political leader of the KLA resistance and for the international attention showered upon him at Rambouillet.²⁵ He had also earned notoriety as leader of the Albanian Rambouillet delegation and was considered by the West someone they could work with. Thaci for his part had hoped the West would work through him and thus legitimize his self-declared government (Phillips 2012). He harbored deep animosity for Rugova and his LDK party.

²⁵ Madeline Albright for example had declared him the only Kosovar (of the Rambouillet delegation) who seemed to know what they want and someone whom the US could work with.

Thaci's political party according to Pettifer however barely constituted a political shell (Pettifer 2012). The party was not prepared to compete against rivals in the post war period and lacked general political experience. Phillips also notes most of Thaci's ministers were close friends tied to his patronistic network or the KLA intelligence service. Most were inexperienced at general governance. Bernard Kouchner the first UNMIK Special Representative of the Secretary General did not trust Thaci nor believe he had domestic legitimacy (King and Mason 2006, Phillips 2012).²⁶ UNMIK ignored Thaci's government, appointed an interim unity government and then quickly worked to split the KLA vote for upcoming 2000 elections. Thaci's marginalization was also assisted by the fact that the PDK provisional government took the brunt of blame for the immediate poor post war conditions existing in Kosovo. Some of what Thaci was blamed for was technically the responsibility of UNMIK, but it served Western preferences to reduce the influence of the PDK.

Displacing Thaci infuriated him and as somewhat of an outsider he played the role of spoiler. He had seized control of a number of major municipal districts after the war and used that control to gain additional political leverage and advantage (Blair et al. 2005, Covey 2005, Narten 2009). He earned and intimidated enough popular support that his LDK rivals (more heavily supported by the West) could not win enough seats to form a government. Thaci's or his PDK proxies would have to be included as part of any governing coalition. Once in, rivalry primarily between Rugova's LDK and Thaci's PDK created gridlock and stalemate in the early

²⁶ It is the author's opinion that more likely he feared the kind of legitimacy Thaci had. Specifically a Thaci dominated government might actually have a lot of popularity and a mandate for independence which would push Kouchner or any future SRSG to move on independence before the West was ready.

post war election cycles.²⁷ The stalemated government found it difficult to move coherently on Kosovo's state building project (King and Mason 2006).

Finally, NATO's and UNMIKs perceived political interference by reserving and holding for themselves responsibilities for key institutions of government further gridlocked capacity development by inadvertently coaxing Kosovars into focusing on the wrong issues. NATO through KFOR was responsible for security and UNMIK held the portfolio for foreign policy to include economics and international political status. UNMIK also had veto powers over anything passed by the Kosovo Assembly. The Kosovo Assembly for its part was expected to manage the domestic portfolios in such areas as health care, education, transportation and communications. The West's reluctance to devolve powers stemmed from a genuine concern that independence minded Kosovars would provoke Serbia and Russia. Unfortunately the Kosovo's spent much of their legislative energies trying to wrest the powers they did not have from the West or futile attempts to exercise power in areas not under their control anyway (King and Mason 2006).

Policy debates themselves focused on issues outside the assembly's authority such as matters of sovereignty, denunciation of the UN and agreements it made with Belgrade and other countries, and debates over national symbols while ignoring important domestic development and governance matters. UNMIK regularly vetoed Assembly resolutions not in accord to UNSCR 1244 (Narten 2009). Each veto of the local assembly though undermined the legitimacy of the democratic process overall. The division of government between international

²⁷ Thaci also had a less intense rivalry with one of the KLA's former generals Ramush Haradinaj who was also head of the third place party the Alliance for the Future of Kosova (AAK). This rivalry would later intensify when AAK and LDK formed a coalition government in 2005 without Thaci.

and local also made it such that local elected officials could grandstand blaming UNMIK for all of Kosovo's domestic woes while ignoring the day to day issues of domestic governance. Dual government in essence set up incentives for Assemblymen to become users of UNMIK and NATO capabilities while at the same time affording them the opportunity to ignore their own domestic obligations. The international administration became scapegoats for poor health care, inadequate infrastructure, the fact that trash was infrequently collected and that educators rarely showed up to teach their classes among other problems, while local elected officials remained virtually unaccountable (King and Mason 2006, Phillips 2012). Mass riots would eventually break out prompting the West to accelerate its timeline in favor of an exit strategy led by Finnish former President Martti Ahtisarri. Kosovo would get its independence, but the political leaders it would leave behind lacked much needed experience on how to actually govern domestic affairs. These officials would set up politicized bureaucracies that are growth inhibiting or are themselves a part of Kosovo's endemic corruption problem (Phillips 2012).

Despite a number of patronistic intervention pathologies introduced by US and UNMIK preferences in Kosovo, the peace support mission was in some respects also a blessing. International intervention brought in a lot of financial and intellectual resources that Kosovo, on its own, might not otherwise have had access to. In terms of capacity, international involvement brought many benefits. For example, the Organization for Economic and Security Cooperation (OSCE) developed a highly touted police training program. Though UNMIK was often criticized for deploying too few police and taking too long to do it, the police training program brought needed expertise in legitimate law enforcement and civilian security. The

European Union helped Kosovo to reestablish its banking systems and put the Kosovo monetary system on the Deutsch mark and eventually the euro. This made Kosovo's economy more interoperable with the rest of Europe and more importantly, freed it from monetary manipulation from Belgrade(King and Mason 2006). The Europeans also helped Kosovo gain access to a number of international organizations and institutions that it could not access on its own due to its non-state status (Narten 2009). Finally, international assistance helped Kosovo set up its own customs tax. Kosovo had not had a strong system for collecting taxes in decades. The new taxes became a means for generating some state revenue which could then be reinvested into capacity development (King and Mason 2006). Though these positive contributions could not completely pull Kosovo out of its war induced political and economic mire, the peace support operation likely kept Kosovo from becoming a completely failed state.

Overall, Kosovo is still one of the poorest and weakest states in Europe. Its unemployment is about 47% with 17% of the population in extreme poverty. Phillips reports its income per capita at about \$2500, putting it on par with countries like Sudan, Yemen, and Pakistan. It is still relatively weak with respect to the rule of law and political corruption is rampant (Phillips 2012). While interveners cannot be blamed for all of Kosovo's woes, many of its present dysfunctions are the outgrowth of patronistic intervention policies by NATO countries and UNMIK during the war and reconstruction years. The fact that internationals were constantly on site to provoke focus on wrong issues, fix mistakes, take the blame and protect Kosovars from their own bad policies choices did not facilitate a long term trajectory toward domestic capacity generation.

Post War Violence and Stability

Patronistic intervention theory suggests that political violence is likely to be higher than average for any target whether or not their intervener is a democratic. The preferences of democratic interveners may be just as likely to clash with the expectations of relevant local actors over who has the inherent right to rule as those targets of a non-democratic intervener.

This is because even though democratic interveners may espouse democratic institutions and peaceful resolution of differences, foreign democrats may still impose outcomes that seem unnatural to the local context. Democratic intervention may impose certain actors into government or power sharing arrangements who were not expected to be there. These governments may be perceived locally as less legitimate. At the very least those who expected a greater share of power than what was actually imposed now carry a grudge. If they are a capable faction, such as one of the belligerents in a regime war, they may be incentivized to undermine the democrat's plan and attempt to restore a more natural balance. In short, democratic interveners harbor their own preferences for post-war outcomes and which actors are more likely to obtain these outcomes. These interests can clash with important actors on the ground and evoke the same frustrations of occupation and rule by puppet masters as their non-democratic counterparts, evoking similar levels of strife and instability.

Kosovo, despite its interveners' best intentions, was in fact one of the most turbulent post war transitions in the regime war dataset. The domestic conflict index for Kosovo, as described in Chapter 4, is depicted in Figure 2-5. Unfortunately, Cross National Time Series data was only available from 2008-2010; prior to this Kosovo was not a recognized state. For each of these three years of statehood Kosovo reported the maximum score 3. Ideally, we would like to

have a sense of the domestic violence in the international administration years. Constructing this score is complicated by the fact that Kosovo's parent state Serbia experienced its own domestic turmoil in the period after the Kosovo war, so these scores would likely obfuscate the degree of violence Kosovo itself experienced prior to 2008. In order to capture a quantified estimate of the domestic strife from the period of 2000-2007 I calculated my own conservative estimates using several case historical sources.²⁸ Adding these results to the ones categorized directly from the CNTS dataset Kosovo's mean domestic conflict score was estimated as 2.5, this is also depicted in Figure 5-2. Both calculations place Kosovo in the upper decade of post war violent states.

What explains Kosovo's violence? Some, but not all, undoubtedly can be attributed to ethnic animosity and revenge. Ethnic attacks and reprisals between Albanian and Serb were common in the early post-war years, and NATO's presence in time did manage to curb some of this violence, especially in the multi-ethnic towns to which forces were assigned (King and Mason 2006). Skirmishes between ethnic Serbs and Albanians were constant, particularly in the northern areas surrounding Mitrovica. These attacks were often revenge and counter-revenge attacks for the deaths and displacement of both communities at various phases in the war. KFOR and UNMIK were tasked with promoting ethnic reconciliation and drawing Serbs into post war political processes. This task was often complicated by the fact that Kosovo-Serb militant groups sponsored by Belgrade would intimidate and threaten local Serb leaders encouraging integration and reconciliation (Perritt 2010). Ethnic animosities have endured even though a

²⁸ Scores for Serbia prior to independence are likely to be contaminated due to potential strife in Serbia proper. To get an estimate for Kosovo independent of the rest of Serbia, I coded CNTS like events specific to Kosovo reported in King and Mason (2006) plus various Kosovo Country Watch Reports published by Country Watch Inc. I coded reported events for each year conservatively, so that any bias would be towards a tendency of non-violence. Nevertheless Kosovo still appears as one of the most strife ridden states in the dataset.

“reformed” Belgrade has encouraged reconciliation. After Kosovo declared its independence and years of pressure from the United States, Belgrade reversed its position and began encouraging Kosovo-Serbs to participate in Kosovo’s government. Unfortunately, even to the present day ethnic relations are tense. As recent as November 2013, OSCE representatives providing municipal election assistance had to be pulled out of polling districts in the north due to concerns of violence ultimately marring the legitimacy of those elections (BBC News 2013).




Figure 5-2: Average Post War Domestic Conflict Index (Kosovo)

Much of the violence in Kosovo is intra-ethnic violence between the various Albanian political factions. This fault line roughly pits the younger primarily rural based KLA and its successor parties the PDK and the Alliance for the future of Kosovo (AAK) against the intellectual and urban elites of Rugova and his LDK party. UNMIK and NATO's political preference were tacitly linked to an LDK led unity government. The West specifically maneuvered to keep KLA votes divided and thus prevent an undesired national independence agenda from prematurely taking hold. Consequently, ex-KLA and especially younger cohorts of Albanians made foreign occupiers the targets of violence (Perritt 2010).

This strife was fomented along two fronts. First, UNMIK's sluggishness in resolving Kosovo's final status and devolving sovereignty to local political institutions frustrated much of the population. It appeared as if UNMIK and NATO were breaking key promises in their own rather than Kosovar interests. Madeline Albright's "side note" is a good case in point. The side note was an implicit promise from the Secretary of State to Hashim Thaci, that if the Kosovars signed the Rambouillet Accords (from which UNMIK's mandate was ultimately derived) the US would push for a status referendum within three years. Albright was later photographed offering Thaci a diplomatic kiss, which was perceived by many as a signal of US intentions to promote what Thaci stood for--independence. No referendum ever took place; however, either in 2002 as it was implied or after (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000, Judah 2000, Phillips 2012).²⁹

UNMIK's habit of vetoing resolutions and policies passed by the Kosovo Assembly and its reluctance to turn over key governance functions to local authorities also frustrated a large majority of Kosovars. In one of the more infamous instances UNMIK had negotiated the

²⁹ Albright would go on to say in her autobiography and other statements that the referendum would be just one of the factors considered in Kosovo's ultimate status determination.

demarcation of a land border with neighboring Macedonia. The Kosovo Assembly however voted to reject UNMIK's agreement citing that UNMIK had not consulted the Kosovo people on a matter of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. UNMIK then vetoed and nullified the Assembly's resolution, under its powers from Security Council Resolution 1244 in order to push the deal through. This act infuriated the population. Political elites and local media began criticizing UNMIK heavily, referring to it as an occupation force and openly decrying that living under the UN was no better than being ruled by Belgrade (King and Mason 2006, Perritt 2010).

Also reinforcing fears and frustrations was increasing Russian assertiveness under Putin. Russia exercised considerable indirect influence in Kosovo through its vote on the Security Council. Putin publically opposed any deal calling for the independence of Kosovo and threatened to use its veto to block any agreement that dissatisfied its allies in Belgrade.³⁰ This gave Kosovars the impression that the UN might stay indefinitely, or worse, that the international community might ultimately abandon Kosovo and invite the prospects of another war (Judah 2008, Phillips 2012, Perritt 2010).

The issue came to a head in March 2004 with the Spring Riots which began in Mitrovica and spread to many of the urban centers including Pristina. The violence started in Mitrovica when three Albanian youths drown in the Ibar River after Serb teens allegedly let their dog loose upon them.³¹ Soon after, riots broke out in the north and Albanian youths started rioting in the capital and other cities. While ethnic violence was not uncommon in the north, it rarely triggered spillover violence in the urban centers and capital region. This feature marked the riot

³⁰ Some accounts suggest that the Russians were secretly more accepting of the idea of Kosovo independence. However when word of Russian pliability was leaked by some unknown US or UK source the Kremlin took a much harder line (Phillips 2012).

³¹ After subsequent investigations no bodies were in fact recovered. While not conclusive, the dog attack hints at a fabricated account meant to provoke hostilities (Perritt 2010)

as particularly dangerous. Also, while there was some targeting of opposing ethnic groups, much of the targeting in the urban areas was directed toward UNMIK itself. UNMIK buildings were fire bombed, cars turned over or vandalized and UNMIK-looking personal harassed. Meanwhile, KFOR or OSCE property, which was usually in close proximity to UNMIK's, was left untouched. This suggests more sophisticated coordination and planning with a purpose of protesting UNMIK, though the incident was ultimately classified as "spontaneous" (Perritt 2010). I have more to say on the potentially planned nature below, but the spontaneous account is justified by the fact that the vast majority of participants did likely join the fracas on a whim. More importantly, the large scale of the spontaneity evinced a deep undercurrent of frustration and resentment with the general political and social conditions of UNMIK led Kosovo. After the riots, negotiations regarding Kosovo's final status were taken much more seriously (Perritt 2010).

Second, though the United States and UNMIK preferred a democratic form of government they also preferred that it be dominated by more moderate actors whose agenda could be controlled to align with US and European interests. They specifically wanted to avoid a unified KLA successor party that would pursue a popular nationalistic independence agenda. This ran counter to a natural expectation that many Kosovars had, particularly Thaci's cohorts, that his KLA coalition would dominate the post war government and lead a more rapid charge toward independence. Western interference engineered political splits within the KLA ranks by encouraging multiple KLA leaders to form their own political parties and run for political office. By fracturing KLA unity the West was able to ultimately impose a unity government on the three major parties and marginalize the more intransigent factions of the KLA. The PDK was

blocked from the government for a brief period when AAK and LDK formed a coalition government in 2005. Consequently, KLA supporters were infuriated. As frustrations mounted they resorted to planning for mass violence, the Spring Riots of 2004 being one of the major events.

Some scholars have argued that there is some evidence to suggest many of the targets of the Spring Riots of 2004 were planned by various KLA successor groups. KLA veterans groups and other sympathetic organizations allegedly pre-planned some of the ethnic and UNMIK targets to attack. When the riots did break out these units then simply had to encourage the spontaneous mob toward attacking those particular targets. The rare instance of ethnic violence that did develop in the urban centers combined with the more evident systematic targeting of UNMIK identifiers could then be interpreted as a strong signaling instrument warning that matters would or could continue to get worse unless the internationals moved toward a final solution on Kosovo's political status. Perritt notes that Thaci may at least have been aware of the possibilities of attack as well as Rugova (Perritt 2010, Phillips 2012).³² Regardless the riots demonstrated that if the nationalistic voices could not argue within the political system for a move to rapid independence they would apply violent pressure from outside of it.

Western manipulations of Kosovo's political environment also encouraged the displaced PDK party to engage in other less severe but nevertheless violent forms of political manipulation and dissent. King and Mason note that the West was constantly plagued with trying to control Thaci. Thaci's party for instance still the largest of the KLA parties and

³² Interestingly, Thaci was out of the county when the riots occurred and had to be recalled back to the country in order to encourage calm.

maintained substantial connections and control over the former KLA intelligence service. They used these ties to intimidate political rivals into voting for PDK favored policies or more often to encourage competitive LDK competitors not to run for office, thus allowing PDK to capture more seats. Those rivals that ignored the warning were sometimes assassinated (Phillips 2012, Covey 2005). Thus, while the West might block Thaci directly from having influence in the government and might add legitimacy to the unity and coalition governments by having other prominent KLA leaders serve in high office (Generals Agim Ceku and Ramush Haradinaj were both at one time elected to Prime Minister), Thaci nevertheless exercised the influence he felt entitled to indirectly through violence and intimidation tactics.

One spectacular incident was the attempted assassination of President Rugova himself. Rugova had won elections in the fall of 2004 and formed a coalition government with Ramush Haradinaj of the AAK party who would become Prime Minister.³³ This deal blocked the PDK from the ruling coalition all together, relegating them to the opposition. UNMIK also acquiesced to the arrangement, which gave the appearance that they reversed their policy of rule by grand coalition. It looked like deliberate attempt to marginalize PDK influence further. When Haradinaj's tenure as Prime Minister was cut short by an indictment for war crimes from The Hague, he resigned the post leaving Rugova to nominate his successor.³⁴ As Rugova was heading to a meeting with European Union foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, to discuss the appointment a bomb detonated in a waste container as his car passed by. Rugova survived. Later, reporters and political analysts speculated that the bombing was an attempt by "former

³³ Ramush Haradinaj was a popular general of the KLA and founder of AAK party. The coalition he formed with Rugova would turn him into a bitter rival of his once KLA comrade Hashim Thaci.

³⁴ Haradinaj was ultimately acquitted on all counts by 2010.

guerillas” to influence the appointment of the new Prime Minister.³⁵ Though never stated (for political reasons), Thaci and the PDK were implicated in the attack. This attack was a signal to Rugova and Solona that PDK would not tolerate being excluded from the ruling coalition and that the West could not safely go forward with status negotiations and other key policies unless Thaci had a prominent place in government. Western intrigues would be countered with violent resistance (King and Mason 2006, Perritt 2010, Phillips 2012).

As in the case of state capacity, UNMIK’s presence also likely mitigated the intensity of violence that might otherwise have occurred. The most notable means is through protection of a number of Kosovo Serb enclaves throughout the region. As already noted, a lot of ethnic violence and atrocities did occur in the aftermath of war, typically as some form of revenge killing. As KFOR units deployed throughout the region and as civil police units came online, the degree of ethnic violence was reduced. In multi-ethnic communities distanced from the reach of Belgrade, KFOR and UNMIK had much higher success rates in encouraging political tolerance and multi-ethnic participation.

More importantly UNMIK under Martti Ahtisaari ensured that minority rights and political participation were enshrined into Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework, as he moved Kosovo toward independence. These codified rights met the basic protections Belgrade and Russia were demanding for Kosovo Serbs. When Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence after a de facto Russian veto of the Ahtisarri Plan, Russian objections centered on preserving minority rights fell flat (Perritt 2010, Phillips 2012). UNMIKs guidance of the Constitutional

³⁵ If Rugova had been successfully killed both of Thaci’s chief rivals would be out of power clearing the way for a stronger PDK influence. Some also suggest the attack was a warning. See for example NYT March 16,2005 “Kosovo Leader Survives Bomb Attack on Convoy”

Framework also set the foundation for acceptance into the larger international community. If Kosovo did not live up to its obligations to protect minority rights it would lose access to the finance and international institutions it was seeking to get into (Narten 2009). UNMIK also had a powerful stick more generally in terms of negotiating final status. A number of party chiefs were quick to warn that ethnic violence or any excess of political violence could be used by Belgrade and other detractors as evidence Kosovo was not prepared for statehood. The UNMIK “report card” was a credible deterrent to unconstrained violence. Ex-KLA leaders such as Thaci and Haradinaj were particularly vocal about containing the violence when the 2004 riots broke out. While both may have had some foreknowledge the riot was impending and both had some incentives to allow it to happen, they also quickly sensed the dangers of it getting out of control and took personal risks, by physically standing up to crowds in the fray in order to tamp it down (King and Mason 2006, Perritt 2010).

In all, Kosovo was still a violent country even after NATO’s bombing campaign. Some of this violence was likely to have occurred whether or not NATO and UNMIK put forces on the ground; this violence was the unfortunate consequence of decades of ethnic animosity and desire for revenge. However, intervention in many respects incentivized additional violence mostly intra-ethnic politically motivate among the Albanians and some directly targeting the West. As UNMIK began to lose credibly in terms of their motives and frustrations mounted over UNMIK incompetence, violence became an effective tool to protest the heavy handedness of the international government and to coax them to accelerate status negotiations. Furthermore, the West naively thought that it could contain the political ambitions of the largest of the KLA political parties--the PDK--by engineering a government that kept the KLA

divided and relegated to junior partner in a unity government. Though elections were democratically free and fair, the electoral system was designed in part to split and marginalize KLA influence. The West's interference scuttled what appeared to many a rightful ascendance of the KLA to power, especially given their popularity as national liberators. Various KLA actors, accustomed to bloodshed, had no qualms igniting simmering frustrations and employing violence to intimidate and pressure NATO, UNMIK and Kosovo ministers themselves into granting them power denied them through the democratic process. Thus free and fair democracy really meant a free and fear democracy.

War and Post War Democratization

If patronistic strategies have one other positive characteristic than its propensity to secure a decisive military victory, it is that in the hands of intervening democracies, it is likely to facilitate their target's transition to institutional democracy. This was empirically demonstrated in Chapter 3. The reasons for why intervening democracies might push democratization in their targets are simple but varied. Liberal altruism may inspire some democratic states to extend the democratic benefits and zone of peace they enjoy in their own society to others. Liberal fear may inspire democratic interveners to push for democracies because democracies are less threatening and more trustworthy than an unaccountable tyrannical or authoritarian regime. More pragmatically, if interveners are willing to expend resources deploying a large force and engaging in significant intrusion, they likely have genuinely strong security or economic interests in the country. Attaching democratization to these other security or economic aims is simply a means to legitimize their interference to domestic and international audiences. Regardless, democratic patrons bring a preponderance of resources to the fight and likely to

the post war context. If a democrat conditions their military and perhaps post war state building support on their recipient complying with democratic rules of the game, that client has strong incentives to acquiesce.

Kosovo's incentives to democratize after the war were straight forward. Most of the assistance Kosovo received from participating interveners and donor countries was conditioned on Kosovo becoming an autonomous democracy. NATO and UNMIK had a mandate after the war to prepare Kosovars for self-government and UNMIK chiefs were Kosovo's best friend in recruiting international donors for their rebuilding efforts. UNMIK also held Kosovo's 'report card' for self-rule. Kosovo was still on the hook to demonstrate compliance with basic human rights norms and to govern in the context of a multi-party democracy, which included minority access to political power. If Kosovo did not satisfactorily comply, UNMIK could give it a 'bad grade'. This meant no foreign nation was likely to recognize its independence, nor would they continue to supply it with donor aid. Also, its detractors in Belgrade and Moscow would use its noncompliance as a justification not to grant it statehood (King and Mason 2006, Perritt 2010, Phillips 2012). The United States and Europe would be hard pressed to legitimize their own actions in propping up the country to their domestic audiences. In short, unless it complied with Western democratic designs Kosovo would be isolated and neither physically secure or economically viable. It would only be a matter of time before the dream of independence died and Kosovo was once again subsumed into Serbia through war or international pressure.

More interesting is the observation that even before the war once Kosovars identified the United States and Europe as a potential ally against Serbia they had incentives to democratize their local government. Democratization would make Kosovo more like Europe

and the United States and separate it from the alternative ethno-authoritarianism of Milosevic. Second, democracy would lend the governing coalition, initially the LDK, local legitimacy and legitimacy with respect to well-to-do Albanian diaspora in the United States and Europe. This legitimacy allowed the LDK to “collect taxes” in the form of the Three Percent Fund. This fund paid for Albanian education, health care, public services, and funded LDK peaceful diplomatic efforts both with Serbia and the West (Judah 2000, Phillips 2012).

A key diplomatic initiative was engaging the diaspora to lobby on behalf of Kosovo. Well-connected Albanian diaspora were able to keep the Kosovo issue in front of politicians both in Europe and the United States. As Milosevic’s crackdown became more intense, it was increasingly hard for the West to turn its back on a nascent democracy. While the West could somewhat disassociate itself from the “terrorism” and inhumanity attached to the KLA, the fact that there was a non-violent aspiring democracy pleading for help was harder to ignore, especially since the United States and particularly Europe had an interest in stability in Europe’s “backyard” (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000, Gow 2009, Judah 2000). NATO governments would capitalize on all of these aspects to sell the intervention to their domestic audiences. Clinton cited this directly in his March 24th address to the nation right before Operation Allied Force.

In 1989 Serbia's leader, Slobodan Milosevic, the same leader who started the wars in Bosnia and Croatia and moved against Slovenia in the last decade, stripped Kosovo of the constitutional autonomy its people enjoyed, thus denying them their right to speak their language, run their schools, shape their daily lives. For years, Kosovars struggled peacefully to get their rights back. When President Milosevic sent his troops and police to crush them, the struggle grew violent... Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative. It is also important to America's national interest. (Clinton, 1999)

In short, the Kosovars by demonstrating democratic potential increased the likelihood of receiving the Western intervention they were looking for. Once the West did intervene they

had every incentive to sustain sufficient democratic progress in order to keep the West engaged until Kosovo secured its own independence.

In the end Kosovo became a democracy because it had to. NATO's strategy called for a democratic post war transitional government in the wake of their military operations and Kosovo would never realize its goal of independence without cooperating with NATO and the US on the issue of democratic governance. NATO's democratizing goals however were not always compatible with complementary interests for Kosovo's state capacity and stability. A number of the West's strategic components probably disrupted capacity development and stability. Rugova's not unreasonable anticipation of intervention may have incentivized him to forgo developing a security force in Kosovo. This was not a direct consequence of Western strategy per se, but illustrates that reliance on foreign capability even if just anticipated, can encourage actors to avoid bearing the costs and risks of domestic capacity development. More directly, The West's intentional marginalization of the KLA pushed many of its leaders and fighters into the criminal underworld where they became a constant drain on the security and economic capacities of the state. Western preferences to empower specific political actors while curbing the influence of others within Kosovo's democratic context set up incentives for factions to engage in violence with each other or play spoiler to gain leverage over their international interveners. Political violence fostered by international meddling also contributed to Kosovo's underlying instability and stalled progress on capacity development. Kosovo and its interveners can boast of Kosovo's success in terms of democratic institutions, but this case highlights that interventions have their limits. Intervenors generally cannot by their own

actions impose capacity or stability on a target state. These must come from within as the case of Eritrea in the next chapter illustrates.

Chapter 6. Tracing the Incentive Structures of Partnership Interventions

Introduction

The war for Eritrean Independence presents a good case for tracing the incentive structures created when biased interveners do not intervene intensely, but instead engage in an intervention partnership. Partnerships are distinguished from patronistic interventions in that the foreign intervener, in this case Sudan, does not substantially interfere in their target's politics, nor does it provide a preponderance of military capability. Sudan's support consisted of financial assistance and various degrees of access to Sudanese territory over the course of Eritrea's conflict with Ethiopia (Hogbladh, Petterson, and Themnér 2011, Connell and Killion 2011). I argue the chief value of this aid was that it gave the Eritreans a protected rear area. While Eritrean rebels were denied use of most of the strategic lines of communication in Eritrea herself, it nevertheless could run its own logistics lines of communication through the Sudan. Ethiopia's inability to touch Eritrean operations in Sudan without potentially provoking an expanded conflict allowed the rebels to sustain their forces in the field despite battlefield numerical and technical disadvantages and despite the Soviet Union's support of their enemy.

Though Eritrean rebels had a shield, they still lacked a sword; and it is swords that defeat enemies and win wars. Eritrea was compelled to forge this sword from the support and resources of its own people. Of the various resistance movements that emerged it was the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) who first recognized that the best way to achieve independence was through a broad based unified coalition capable of responding to political and battlefield conditions rapidly. It earned Eritreans' support by adopting a Marxist-Social Democratic political ideology that emphasized equality and (limited) participation rights of all

segments of Eritrean society. The fact that there were no democratic interveners to push for this kind of liberalization nor was there a large modernizing middle-class making participation demands lends additional credibility to the claim that the democratic gains that were achieved was a consequence of “self-help”. That is, the lack of foreign interference and the need for an expanded war fighting capacity created the incentives for EPLF to offer some liberalizing reforms. EPLF also innovated highly flexible yet centralized organizational structures which allowed it maximum efficiency and speed in employing available resources to meet military, political and social objectives that allowed it to overcome the raw disadvantage they had in terms of manpower and materiel. Not only did these adaptations help Eritrea to survive 30 years of Ethiopian counterinsurgency activity, Eritrea eventually won, overturning the regime that had annexed it since the 1960’s.

When the war ended, the EPLF had at least 17 years of experience building military and governing capacity in the areas it controlled, its senior cadre had closer to 30 years of experience. This meant that the EPLF government did not have to struggle building a state, it had a somewhat simpler task of adapting it’s already developed “state” institutions to peace time rule and extending its reach across the country. Eritrea emerged from war much more relatively capable and stable than most other states recovering from a civil war. However, while the EPLF government represented a slightly more liberalized and democratized government than what the Eritrean province experienced under Ethiopia it still remained largely centralized. Furthermore, once secure in victory, the new EPLF regime, now rebranded the Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), had no further incentives to liberalize or democratize. The

remainder of this chapter sets the Eritrean conflict in historical context and traces Eritrea's incentives toward self-help and relatively effective and stable domestic governance.

Eritrea History and Context

Eritrea can trace its history to some of the oldest human civilizations in existence. Throughout the centuries it belonged to various African and Islamic empires. Nine different ethnic groups claim it as their homeland. Eritrea became part of the Ottoman Empire in the 1500's until its colonial period began with the arrival of the Italians in 1885. Eritrea hosts large Muslim and Christian subpopulations, a legacy of both their Ottoman and Italian colonial experience. Eritrea's namesake is also inherited from the Italians; a name which means Land of the Red Sea (Connell 1993).

Eritrea's contemporary identity has been described as "an entity constructed from the encounters of Italian colonialism, Ethiopian hegemony and the post-1945 international state system" (Iyob 1995, pg3). Eritrea fared pretty well under Italian colonialism. It became the hub of the Italian African colonies, containing the port cities of Massawa as well as Asab in the south. As the hub, Eritrea benefited from appreciable investment in industry and infrastructure. The Italians introduced Eritrea to modern state systems, commerce, agriculture and social services. Europeans usually held senior positions in business and government but many Eritreans still obtained gainful employment in junior posts in the business sector and the middle and lower echelons of the colonial administration. Eritrean *askaris*, indigenous colonial soldiers, fought for the Italians against Somalia, Ethiopia and Libya and managed to capture territory from the northern parts of Ethiopia in the 1930's (Doornbos and Tesfai 1999, Iyob 1995).

Eritrea's fortunes changed with the outcome of World War II. The Italians lost to Allied Forces in World War II and control of the Eritrean colony passed to the British. London saw Eritrea as territory and resources to be parsed to its own established colonies. Ethiopia would receive the lands populated by the Christian highlanders while British Sudan would receive the lowland areas primarily populated by the Muslims. Much of the industry that the Italians build in Asmara, Massawa and other centers was also dismantled and shipped off to British Kenya. On a positive note, the British did allow for a free press and the formation of political parties. They also maintained many of the pre-existing Italian laws and administrative structures which easing the transition to British rule (Doornbos and Tesfai 1999, Wrong 2005).

The genesis of Eritrean resistance began when the British began divesting itself of its colonial holdings. Whether the British wanted an independent Eritrea or intended that it should be annexed to Ethiopia is a matter of historical debate. The United States; however, was interested in basing rights on the Hamasien plateau. It supported Emperor Haile Selassie's bid to annex Eritrea in part to secure a lease on what became Kagnew Station. The high elevation, over 7100 feet above sea level with very little surrounding electromagnetic noise made the station an ideal listening post and spy station to the Communist world. The Eritreans of course objected fiercely to the annexation. They lobbied through local media and political action campaigns for Eritrea's autonomy. The UN ultimately brokered a deal whereby Eritrea would be autonomous but federated to Ethiopia. This federal arrangement allowed Eritrea to be governed under its own constitution, but Ethiopia maintained foreign policy prerogatives as well as prerogatives over national commerce, transportation and most importantly taxation (Connell 1993, Kidane 2010, Wrong 2005)

Soon after Eritrea was federated, Emperor Haile Selassie began abrogating the Eritrean Constitution. Press freedoms were restricted, British political constructs were abolished and replaced with Ethiopian controlled ones, and most provocative was the “Amharitization” of Eritrea. Eritrean culture was suppressed in the schools, business and government and replaced by Ethiopian customs and language. Eritrea’s first resistance group the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) formed in 1958 and shortly thereafter the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) as well in 1961. These groups opposed Eritrea’s annexation and advocated for Eritrea’s cultural and political independence, either through political subterfuge and a coup d’état (the ELM); or through violent political revolution (the ELF).³⁶ Haile Selassie used the emergence of these groups to justify annexing Eritrea outright in 1962(Connell 1993, Iyob 1995).

By the early 1960 Ethiopian agents has also detected ELM subterfuge and dismantled the organization, clearing the way for ELF ascendancy. The ELF’s activities during this period; however, became increasingly violent and particularistic. Its Islamic agenda, patronage politics and brutal treatment of unsympathetic Eritreans made the group increasingly unpopular, especially among the Christian populations. Ethiopia exploited this unpopularity and attempted to drive a wedge in Eritrean society targeting the ELF’s movement as distinctively Islamist and Arab-centric and co-opting Eritrean Christians to attack it (Iyob 1995).

By 1973 fractionalization within ELF ranks prompted the formation of a splinter group, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). Frustrated with ELF brutality, divisiveness and patronage, the EPLF pursued a Marxist-Socialist agenda, promoting egalitarian and democratic

³⁶ It is interesting to note that Eritreans refer to their movement as resistance to Ethiopian annexation and not secession. Rebel leaders believed that if their movement were framed as secessionist, they would lose international legitimacy

aims in the hopes of mending social rifts and unifying the Eritrean people under a common banner. The EPLF's vision of an inclusive nationalism proved effective in gaining the support of much of the population, especially Christians and women. The EPLF grew in its organizational and warfighting capacity as Eritreans from all walks of life filed into its ranks. By the late 1970's it began overshadowing the ELF. The two groups attempted to work together but mistrust and animosity between leaders made all but basic tactical cooperation impossible. Fighting between the groups occurred until 1980 when the EPLF finally drove the ELF out of the country permanently (Connell and Killion 2011, lyob 1995, Pool 2001).

Interestingly enough, Ethiopia experienced its own Marxist turn in 1974 when a military junta, the Dergue, overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie and installed itself as the new regime. The first three years of Dergue rule was characterized by bloody infighting until Major Mengistu Halie Mariam emerged as Ethiopia's strongman. The regime change was mostly inconsequential to Eritrea as Mengistu Mariam's policies toward Eritrea were no different than Haile Selassie. The one advantage the regime change afforded was that while Ethiopia was in its throws, the ELF and EPLF launched a full scale assault in Eritrea and collectively were able to recapture 85% of Eritrea's territory by 1977, all of Eritrea except for the capital and the Port of Massawa (Sarkees and Wayman 2010, pg432, Tareke 2002).

Matters took a dramatic turn for the worse in 1978 when the Soviets announced their overt backing of Ethiopia. Soviet arms and Cuban troops entered the country giving Ethiopia the resources it needed to defeat a rebellion in the Ogden as well as roll back the Eritreans. The ELF and EPLF were forced to retreat into the mountains in the northern and western regions of Eritrea. Many rebels also fled to Sudan, who had allowed both groups to operate logistics bases

and administrative headquarters there. The conflict entered a lull from 1978 to 1982 as Eritrea tried to recover from the Soviet induced setback(Sarkees and Wayman 2010, Tareke 2002).

The hot civil war was reignited in 1982 when Mengistu Marian launched his bloody Red Star campaign. The campaign was a massive offensive designed to crush Eritrean rebels once and for all. However, the campaign stalled as Eritrea held their lines at their stronghold in Nakfa. Losses were high on both sides, approximately 43,000 killed (Tareke 2002, pg 488). The final acts in the independence struggle occurred in the late 1980's as Soviet support for Ethiopia dried up. Without replenishment of Soviet arms Eritrean fighters were once again capable of taking on Ethiopian forces. By 1988 Eritrea took Afabet, breaking out of their mountain side containment and opening a strategic corridor to Eritrea's lowlands. Soon after the EPLF captured the strategic port city of Massawa, and finally in 1991 captured the capital of Asmara and port city of Asab. As the EPLF was advancing on Asmara their allies and political protégés the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) were also advancing with other EPLF contingents to Addis Abba. The Dergue regime was deposed in 1991 and Mengistu Haile Mariam fled into exile in Zimbabwe. The EPLF was fortunate in that the Ethiopian government they would negotiate their independence with was their partners and the TPLF, now transformed into the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The groups agreed to a national referendum and on 24 May 1993 Eritrea declared its independence (Iyob 1995, Pool 2001, Sishagne 2001).

Sudan: Goals, Strategy, and Outcome

Sudan's role in the Eritrean conflict was minor but also critically important. As the colonial powers started withdrawing from the African continent in the late 1950s and 60s the Organization of African Unity agreed to respect the status quo boundaries of the colonial states.

This meant that in principle no African state would try to conquer the territory of another state. This agreement however did not stop various African leaders from encouraging, basing and even arming each other's rebel groups as a means of weakening their rivals. Sudan was no exception. Sudan's Islamic government had been facing an insurgent challenge from Christian groups in the south, predominantly the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Front (SPLF). Both Haile Selassie and Mengistu Mariam supported the southerners against the regime in Khartoum and so the Sudanese government responded in kind (Connell and Killion 2011, Sishagne 2001, Tareke 2009).

Sudan's overarching goal was simple. It wanted to deter Ethiopia from supporting the Sudanese rebels in the south. It would enter into a partnership of convenience with Eritrea, propping up Eritrean rebels in the hope that a stronger Eritrean rebellion would consume too much of Ethiopia's energies for it to continue supporting south Sudanese rebels. It was also a tit-for-tat bargaining strategy whereby Sudan could raise or cut support to Eritrea conditioned on the degree of support Ethiopia gave to Sudanese rebels. There were other perks to supporting Eritrea's rebels as well. Ethiopia's counter-insurgency operations in Eritrea created huge refugee problems for Sudan as Eritreans fled the brutality of Ethiopian soldiers. Khartoum leaders soon discovered; however, that border crossings were less frequent and their eastern regions more pacified when Eritrean rebels controlled the territory on the other side of their eastern border. Allowing Eritrean rebels to operate in their eastern regions eased the refugee burden, and reduced social, economic and political pressures on its eastern borders. Finally, a number of leftist and Islamic party leaders had a genuine sympathy for the Marxist and Islamic strains of the Eritrean movements. Local party leaders and operatives would allow the border

to remain relatively porous even during intervals where Khartoum's central government and Addis Abba were attempting rapprochement (Connell and Killian 2011).³⁷ Sudan's degree of support stabilized in the early 1980's as the hot war regained momentum. In fact, one of Eritrea's major counter-offensives in the Red Star Campaign was launched from Sudanese territory, crushing Ethiopia's western flank (Tareke 2002).

Sudanese direct support was not particularly strong, consisting of some financial support and uninhibited access to Sudanese territory. It offered no sustained combat assistance in any Eritrean offensive operations and it is unclear whether they even offered direct support in providing arms, though arms shipments from diaspora and other countries transited through Sudan (Connell and Killian 2011). This meant that Eritrea grew most of its fighting capacity internally, relying on local and diaspora communities to provide its fighting capacity. Much of Eritrea's firepower in fact came from successful raids on Ethiopian weapons caches located on Eritrean terrain. In a Robin Hood like fashion Eritreans would rob from the Ethiopians to arm themselves (Tareke 2009). So, just about any hardware the Ethiopians had, including advanced Soviet armaments, ended up at some point captured and in the hands of the Eritreans.

One crucial distinction in the military capabilities of the two forces was air power, which for the Ethiopians was also augmented by the Soviets. Ethiopian air superiority prevented Eritrea from ever converging or concentrating for sustained periods on any major urban center in Eritrea (Pateman 1990, 1998). It was also impossible to sustain large logistics bases in Eritrea because of their vulnerability to air attack. The EPLF for much of the struggle was limited to

³⁷ There were two general periods of rapprochement; the first was in the early 70's after General Al-Nimeiri survived a coup attempt by Eritrean sympathetic parties. The second case was from 1980-1983 after Mengistu Mariam's successes in Eritrea in 1978 and the Soviets helped him broker a deal. It collapsed in 1983 when Mariam began supporting Sudanese rebels once again. See (Connell & Killian 2011).

controlling the Sahel region in the north and north western highlands, where air operations were less effective and the mountainous terrain gave guerilla forces an advantage on the ground.

The strategic value of Sudanese support laid in the immunity it afforded Eritrean rebel's logistics to Ethiopian air attacks. The roads from Port Sudan and Kassala to the EPLF controlled territory in the north became like an African version of the Ho Chi Mihn Trail. Eritrean rebels could run small truck convoys from Sudanese cities into Eritrea providing food aid and other logistics support, including armaments to sustain the rebel movements. Because these lifelines were predominately outside of Ethiopian sovereign territory, the Dergue regime was hamstrung in its ability to interdict them and thus diminish Eritrean capacity. Even in periods of Ethiopian and Sudanese rapprochement, it would be next to impossible to identify and interdict such small convoys--much as it was in Vietnam. To target EPLF from their Sudanese bases risked violating Sudanese sovereignty, which could bring about a retaliatory response and an undesirable escalation of the conflict.³⁸ On the Eritrean side of the border, the Northern Highlands area of the Sahel provided mountainous cover which served as a defensive line and staging area for military hardware and food stuffs. Mountain cover and rough terrain made Eritrean forces and supplies less vulnerable to air attack. If Ethiopia did attempt attacks they were much more likely to kill innocent peasants in the countryside which promised to bring unwanted international attention, not to mention it undermined Ethiopia's simultaneous

³⁸ Sudan could plausibly retaliate with its own forces against Ethiopia or the author's opinion is more likely Sudan would simply step up its support for the various Ethiopian insurgencies and lobby other Arab states to do the same. This might trigger a Soviet response to restrain Ethiopia as the Soviets were also cultivating relations with some of these states.

counter-insurgency campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Eritrean countryside (Pateman 1990).

EPLF was mostly on its own as far as developing its own offensive war-making capacity and holding its territory, but this task was considerably simplified by the fact that access to Sudanese territory limited Eritrea's vulnerability to Ethiopian threats. Eritrea could sustain its army and the population centers under its control through these connections and concentrate its own fighting forces on eroding the capacity of the Ethiopians. Sudan also benefited by the erosion of Ethiopian capacity as well as by the increased political, economic and social stability on its eastern border.

War and Post War Capacity

Intervention support was critical to the survival and sustainment of the EPLF movement but not strong enough to tip them into victory. Support included financial and some material aid but more importantly included deliberate access to Sudanese territory and implicit military protection behind Sudanese lines. This allowed the EPLF to logistically sustain its fighting force, but it did not increase its offensive power. The EPLF was still self-reliant as far as overturning the Ethiopian led government. The Partnership Theory of intervention suggests that when support from interveners is small and less intrusive, then recipients are incentivized to "self-help" and develop more of their own endogenous war making and governance capacities. If the partner wins, these structures can then be more easily adapted to generating peace time capabilities.

With very limited foreign assistance, the EPLF had to turn to their own people to generate the material and political resources they needed to sustain their independence drive.

They called this policy *res'kha me'khal*, or self-reliance (Iyob 1995, pg 119) The EPLF's policy of self-reliance oriented its leaders toward creating efficiencies and organizational structures that gave them leverage over Ethiopia both militarily and politically. Leverage by itself was no guarantee of victory, but the EPLF's ability to adapt allowed it to consistently exploit opportunities Ethiopia presented to it. In seven major offensives Ethiopia even with the help of the Soviets failed to decisively defeat the rebels. When that support dried up the rebels were more than ready to take on a deteriorating Ethiopian force. Self-reliance also became the basis of how they would govern and deal with foreigners after the war. Eritrea would find home grown solutions first and avoid obligations to and compromises with foreign powers (Doornbos and Tesfai 1999)

This growth and adaptation of capacity is demonstrated in at least four different ways. First, EPLF adapted its administrative structures to get more productivity and resources from areas under its control. A key EPLF program included land-reform. The EPLF's administration and redistribution of land also earned it a lot of popularity with lower classes in Eritrea. Its improved land management techniques increased productivity which made more resources available to sustain fighting forces, but it also increased the quality of life for the rural poor, earning them more popular support. Second, EPLF organized and politically mobilized Eritrean diaspora around the world. These diaspora tended to be western educated professionals who lent their expertise toward building up EPLF's political administration and public services. This capacity demonstrated the EPLF was indeed a viable alternative to the Dergue. The diaspora networks were also instrumental in getting Eritrea international attention which provided the EPLF new political leverage against Ethiopia. Third, to hold and govern territory as well as contend

against the Ethiopian Army the EPLF had to construct a robust security capacity. It organized its fighting forces, the Eritrean People's Liberation Army (EPLA) as a uniquely modular force. This adaptation allowed the ELPA to rapidly transition from multiple roles as police constables, guerillas to conventional fighters. This structure allowed them to efficiently react to or exploit any conditions on the battlefield with Ethiopia. Finally, by cultivating good "foreign relations" with other enemies of the Dergue, particularly the Tigray People's Liberation Front, the EPLF was able to leverage more military capacity against the Dergue. The two groups' capacities to communicate and cooperate with each other also facilitated the post-Dergue political negotiations for Eritrea's independence and eased both groups' transitions from rebels to government.

First, the uncertainty surrounding external state support convinced the EPLF that a program of self-reliance was necessary. Eritrea attempted to be as self-sufficient as possible. One of its most popular initiatives was their land reform program. Land tenure arrangements in Eritrea concentrated power and wealth in the hands of a privileged few. Lower classes often owned no land and worked for a pittance as tenants of landed elites. Many plots of land also remained unproductive due to landlord absenteeism. The EPLF seized much of the land in its controlled territories and redistributed it more equitably. EPLF cadres also taught improved agricultural techniques and organized a number of successful farming cooperatives. Consequently, the land became more productive and new owners had greater economic resources which were soon remitted into the local economy. A portion of surpluses were collected as taxes and given to EPLF fighters so that they could continue to serve and still improved more Eritreans were encouraged to join the ranks. With these additional (and

motivated) human resources the EPLF could grow even larger fighting forces and political cadres which extended its reach into more uncontrolled or other contested territories(Connell 1993, Pool 2001).³⁹

Second, the EPLF also mobilized a substantial diaspora organization. Direct aid from sympathetic states was not forthcoming so the EPLF engaged the diaspora world-wide in the hopes of soliciting indirect aid. Their Marxist-Social democratic ideology appealed to many Western educated ex-patriots; much more so than the Islamist ideologies of its predecessors. The EPLF recruited many educated Eritreans back to the homeland and gave them important positions in their political and administrative cadres, instilling a genuine sense of empowerment. Many professionals were also deployed into the communities as doctors, veterinarians, and school teachers. These professionals provided health and other public services, unheard of under Ethiopia's Emperor or the Dergue. Access to health and veterinary care further improved agricultural productivity and education fostered political confidence and encouraged participation in EPLF's various people's assemblies (Connell and Killion 2011, Pateman 1998, Pool 2001). The peoples' perceived improvement in their quality of life reinforced the people's support for the EPLF. Again, the EPLF's capacity to win the hearts and minds of their own people meant that it could continue to tap the physical and intellectual resources from these people and grow their "state" even further.

Another interesting example of how the EPLF organized its diaspora networks to augment its political capacity is through the work of the Eritrean Relief Agency (ERA). The ERA was a diaspora organization established in the 1980's to solicit foreign donations to combat the

³⁹ Connell (1993) devotes a chapter to describing EPLF land reforms in a "model village". This chapter provides excellent insight into EPLF political and social organizational development.

Great Famine (1983-1985) and starvation in the Eritrean province. During the famine Mengistu Mariam blocked a number of NGO attempting to deliver aid to Eritrea claiming that such direct aid violated Ethiopian sovereignty. He argued all aid needed to be coordinated through Addis Ababa. Not surprisingly, food became a weapon in the hands of the dictator. Aid was cut off, as part of Ethiopia's counter-insurgency strategy. The ERA however could access EPLF bases in Sudan as staging points for distributing aid and leveraged the EPLF's logistics lines to get aid into the country, bypassing the Ethiopian blockade. The ERA then publicized accounts of successful aid delivery highlighting not only the brutality of Mengistu Mariam's counterinsurgency campaign, but its ineffectiveness as well--a double embarrassment (Pool 2001).

The EPLF also attacked small food convoys making their way into Ethiopian approved areas of Eritrea. It argued these convoys appeared military in nature and therefore presented themselves as legitimate targets. The ERA then stepped in and offered their services to coordinate safe passage for these relief convoys with the EPLF. Through this coordination scheme, International and Non-Governmental Organizations (IGOs/NGOs) recognized the EPLF as an important third party actor, again undermining Ethiopian attempts to marginalize the movement. As ERA agents engaged with international actors, particularly journalists, they would point out Ethiopian atrocities and failures and more importantly report on EPLF successes(Pool 2001). The ERA's new found capacity to draw international attention to Eritrea severely undermined Ethiopia's counterinsurgency campaign, and deterred some of its violent excesses. Ethiopia's freedom of action was limited while the EPLF's was becoming enhanced.

Eritrea's lack of foreign combat support meant that its fighting forces needed to be highly adaptable, performing both constabulary duties as well as combat. The EPLA adopted a modular organizational structure combining small unit flexibility with a centralized military hierarchy. Junior officers were accountable to senior leaders as far as implementing and enforcing EPLF directives, but were granted significant autonomy to plan military operations within their zones of responsibility. These operations amounted to guerilla operations harassing Ethiopian troops making it costly to control contested towns. Senior commanders could cobble platoons in their zones together into battalions, brigades and even divisions to conduct more conventional operations. Often these were raids on weapons depots and weakly defended positions in order to capture armament or attrite Ethiopian forces. The large units could then be dispersed back into smaller components to conduct smaller follow-on operations. The flexibility to rapidly transition from guerilla to conventional operations allowed the EPLF to exploit any changes in the battle field, giving it considerable combat advantages on the ground. The EPLF's mix of small unit and large unit tactics consistently threw Ethiopian forces off balance. Ethiopia generally suffered much higher casualty rates and capture rates despite their superior troop ratios(Connell 1993, Pool 2001, Pateman 1990).⁴⁰

More importantly combat platoons also had the dual responsibility of providing police services to EPLF controlled towns. This meant that rank and file soldiers were also well versed in constabulary practices. In the period after independence Eritrea had a ready-made police force. Soldiers did not have to learn how to become policemen; they had already been doing it

⁴⁰ Ethiopia's troop ratio advantage varied throughout the war but is bounded anywhere from about 4:1 to about 6:1 in specific engagements. For example during the critical battle of Nakfa the ratio was about 4:1 Tareke (2002: pg478-9). In the Battle of Afabet, considered the culminating point of the war, 5 EPLF Brigades and 3 mechanized battalions (approximately 20-25,000 troops by typical military formation size) are pitted against about 150,000 Ethiopians. See Tareke (2009, pg. 251) and Connell (1993 pg. 228).

for 20 years. Instead, much of the post war transition amounted to prioritizing police functions over military functions and replicating the EPLA force structure to the rest of the country. This process of adapting and reprioritizing was much simpler than attempting to build the capabilities from scratch.

Finally, The EPLF courted the Tigray People's Liberation Front as a potential partner against the Dergue. This set both groups up to leverage the war making capacities of the other. The EPLF provided TPLF soldiers military training and access to its logistics networks. In return, the TPLF cooperated in intelligence sharing and granted EPLF freedom of movement in TPLF controlled areas. By 1988 the two groups began planning coordinated offensives. These coordinated offensives put severe strains on Ethiopian forces. When rebel attacks were uncoordinated Ethiopia had the opportunity to shift its forces to meet the most dangerous threats with a maximal amount of force. Coordinated operations between the EPLF and TPLF meant Ethiopia had to simultaneously defend key positions in the Tigray and Eritrea provinces or risk having troops and key lines of communication cut off, including access to the Red Sea (Pateman 1990, Pool 2001).

Matters were made worse by the fact that Soviet aid had dried up. The fact that Ethiopia had been so heavily reliant on the Soviet hardware and expertise meant that once that support dried up, Ethiopian commanders had limited capacity and faculties to plan and conduct their own military operations. Their opponents however, had been grooming homegrown competent commanders for a decade and a half. In April of 1988 the EPLF broke the Ethiopian lines at Afabet opening a critical corridor into Eritrea's lowlands and the Port of Massawa. An Ethiopian counter offensive failed. By June, EPLF-TPLF forces had captured most of the Tigray

province and surrounded Ethiopian forces in the provincial capital in Mekele. Mekele fell in early 1989 and the Port of Massawa in early 1990. By May 1991 EPLF-TPLF forces were marching on both national capitals, Asmara as well as Addis Abba (Connell and Killion 2011, Sishagne 2001, Tareke 2009).

The homegrown alliance between the rebels also enhanced the political capacities of the respective organizations with respect to each other. The two groups already had a number of institutions and councils in order to operate with each other. In wartime these organizations trained soldiers, shared intelligence and developed strategic plans. After the war, these connections were adapted to facilitate both groups' transition to power. Their leadership councils negotiated the status of ports; Asab would be a free port and Ethiopia would have free transit through the Port of Massawa. The Eritrean leadership encouraged Eritreans living in Ethiopia to support the TPLF. This helped the TPLF more quickly consolidate its control of Ethiopia's urban centers. At the same time TPLF led Ethiopia provided financial loans to Eritrea to cover their first post war budget deficits. This helped provide some cash for soldiers and bureaucrats who had worked without pay for many years. The two groups also negotiated the status and timing of an Eritrean independence referendum as well as applied pressure to the Organization of African Unity and UN to recognize Eritrea's independence. In short, lacking outside supporters the two rebel groups evolved in ways that enhanced their interoperability with each other. This interoperability helped them leverage each other in war and very quickly normalize relations between the two governments after the fall of the Dergue. Sadly, cooperation degenerated over time as the two governments' incompatible domestic priorities

competed with each other. By 1999 the two groups were at war with each other (Sishagne 2001, Iyob 1995).

Within Eritrea, establishing general governance after independence was not a large stretch. The EPLF already had extensive experience in administering and governing territory. Its Central Committee became the country's legislature. The EPLA became the new police force and soldiers were already well practiced in constabulary functions. The new government bureaucracy drew on 80,000 to 90,000 "volunteers" from its rank and file to continue the day to day operations of the front.⁴¹ This bureaucracy had been responsible for providing basic public services for the regions under its control since the late 1970's. It relocated its central headquarters from the Sahel region to Amara and began the process of replicating the existing EPLF structures across the remainder of the country (Iyob 1995, Pool 2001, Doornbos and Tesfai 1999). To illustrate Eritrea's capacity growth I plotted Relative Political Capacity (RPC) data available from Arbeteman-Rabinowitz et al (2011). RPC data depicts a ratio of actual over expected tax revenues. The data shows a rapid ramp up of Eritrea's revenue generating capacity levels in its first decade as a state to levels consistent with other post war states. More interestingly, Eritrea's RPC score at their first year of independence was below the 5th percentile relative to other states at their first post war year. Within a decade Eritrea had approached the mean. As Eritrea was able to replicate its structures unimpeded, it grew.

⁴¹ Many of the "volunteers would go unpaid as the EPLF lacked capital shortly after independence. However after EPLF members protested and briefly took over government buildings, President Afwerki resolved to set a pay schedule. (Iyob 1995)




Figure 6-1: Eritrea’s Relative Political Capacity Growth

Post War Violence and Stability

Partnership intervention theory also claims that the self-help incentivized by smaller degrees of support produces greater domestic legitimacy which curbs political instability and violence. When there are no foreign occupiers or political masters, the coalition in power is more likely to be perceived as having earned the right to rule. The right is earned in the sense that the coalition reached a consensus on the form of regime they were striving for and created a preponderance of capability to attain it, without external inference. Not only did the coalition win, but it won “fairly”. The affected population is more likely to acquiesce to this rule. The winning coalition is also more likely to have eliminated most of its threats already. If any dissidents remain, they are fewer in number and likely to be disorganized and/or isolated. Their ability to provoke domestic conflict in the postwar context will be much more limited. Relatedly, the generally improved capacity outcomes of partnerships have an indirect effect on stability as well. A more capable post war partner can marshal available resources more

effectively to co-opt some groups of dissenters and if necessary coerce others. In either case the outcome is a more tranquil post conflict society.

The EPLF enjoyed large reserves of popular support and legitimacy after defeating Ethiopia. Their victory and popular support earned them a considerable grace period whereby they could get their house in order before the public started to become restless. This grace period and goodwill, combined with its effective organizational structures helped keep domestic strife to a minimum even though the entire state was in massive disrepair due to the war and living conditions were still generally poor. The dissent Eritrea did have to deal in the post war was smaller scale. It could manage these disturbances by simply co-opting the moderately aggrieved groups. It also helped that as sole victors the EPLF could shape the post war context in way that made it more difficult to act collectively against the new government. The EPLF had driven out its ELF and Ethiopian rivals and its policies of no ethnic or religious parties and advocacy groups made it difficult for radical dissenters to mobilize for collective action. Unfortunately Eritrea would eventually squander some of its earned good will after getting involved in a major border war with Ethiopia in 1999. Overall though, recourse to frequent or large scale internal violence was rare. Figure 5-4 depicts how Eritrea's post war violence compared to other countries in the regime war dataset. It was relatively peaceful in comparison.⁴² Its post war domestic conflict index average was .73, placing it in the bottom quintile of post war violence in states.

⁴² In all fairness, Eritrea since 2001 has come under increasing criticism for repression. See for instance Eritrea's Country Watch Report for 2013. Nevertheless, Eritrea's post war domestic conflict index average measured from the year of independence 1993 until 2010 scores in the bottom quintile of the Regime War Dataset.




Figure 6-2: Average Post War Domestic Conflict Index (Eritrea)

Eritrea faced three major challenges to post war domestic stability. None of these however has escalated beyond low intensity violence (riots, political purges, etc.). First, Eritrea still had to deal with residual violence and dissent from ELF spinoffs particularly the Eritrean Islamic Jihad. These groups were disgruntled with the predominance of Tigrays and Christians in the EPLF and especially with the promotion of women’s equality (Connell 1993, Connell and Killion 2011). Second, disgruntled segments of the EPLF particularly front line soldiers and women who felt they were being left behind resorted to protests at unegalitarian treatment relative to the leadership. Finally, intraparty dissenters began to speak more vocally after the border war to which the central government started resorting more harsh forms of repression; purges imprisonment and executions. Laws forbidding the formation of political parties or other advocacy groups based on religion or ethnicity along with the centralized pervasive nature of the EPLF apparatus made it extremely difficult for any of these dissenters to organize collective resistance against the central government.

The first set of challengers the EPLF faced were successor groups of the exiled ELF. One such group was the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) who received backing from General Omar Bashir of Sudan when he took power. Bashir had supported these rebels at the same time it was supporting the EPLF. He hoped that once Ethiopia was ejected the EIJ could wrest power from the EPLF and create a neighboring Islamic state and ally. The EIJ however was generally unpopular within Eritrea. Most preferred the EPLFs egalitarianism to the patrimonialism and Islamism associated with the former ELF. EIJ stirred up moderate troubles in the western provinces, ambushing vehicles and planting landmines along the western border towns, but for the most part was effectively contained by the Government of Eritrea (Connell 1993, Connell and Killion 2011)). Their activities significantly subsided by 1996.

A second set of domestic turmoil had been provoked within the lower echelons of the EPLF itself. Some segments looked to reverse the gains women had made during the liberation struggle and various EPLF women's groups protested in front of the President to secure the government's support of land ownership rights for women, which were for the most part granted (Connell 1993). More critically, in the early years after independence the new government was still cash poor. EPLF veterans and bureaucrats continued to work without pay and many expected that with the war's end their fortunes would improve. The top tier of Eritrean leadership; however, appeared to be living a bit more comfortably without making headway in addressing the plight of the rank-and-file. Frustrated and angered, some former soldiers and bureaucrats instigated protests and riots. One such crisis occurred in May of 1993, at the time the Provisional Government of Eritrea was preparing to announce its de jure independence. A group of armed EPLF fighters took over the airport in Asmara and several

government buildings, protesting their lack of salary and government corruption. The protest was peacefully resolved however when President Isaias Afwerki met the rioters at a local soccer field to hear their grievances. Afwerki co-opted these dissenters through a promise of prioritized pay and a promise to investigate corruption allegations. After the meeting Afwerki publically announced his recommitment to EPLF egalitarian principles and to an immediate scale of salaries for fighters ending the crisis. Proponents of the EPLF claim the bond of trust created between Afwerki and EPLF soldiers during the liberation struggle helped ease tensions between the rank-and-file and leadership (Iyob 1995, Pool 2001). More pragmatically, the senior leadership probably feared a split in the EPLF, especially a large faction of armed soldiers. The centralized structures of the EPLF made it easy for the leadership to reprioritize how resources were allocated so Afwerki avoided a serious confrontation by buying off these dissenters. The goodwill and comradery the EPLF engendered with its women and soldiers during 30 years of war no doubt played some role in creating bonds of trust and earned the provisional government some breathing room.

Connell notes that while there were some groups that were displaced as a consequence of EPFL ascendancy to the government, that most Eritreans supported the liberation movement and the nation building process. Major domestic political dissent did not start to escalate until Eritrea became entangled in the 1999 Border War with Ethiopia. Prior to that dissent was typically handled within the centralized EPLF structure. In most cases, disagreements at the highest levels were solved transferring offending ministers to marginalized posts (Pool 2001). After the border war however, factions within the old-EPLF became more vocal in their dissent as did some outside voices. President Afwerki began to resort to higher levels of oppression.

Key members of rival internal factions were arrested, executed or otherwise purged from party ranks after publishing critical articles of the president's domestic politics and foreign policy; most infamously the 'Group of 15' in May 2001 (Connell and Killion 2011, Wrong 2005). The firm grip that EPLF had over Eritrean society meant very little organized resistance could escape its attention and reaction. Michela Wrong also notes that mandatory military service kept more likely younger protesters occupied and sometimes these troops are forcibly rounded up and shipped off to the frontier. Failure to participate in this form of social control is a potential bar from jobs and university (Wrong 2005, pg 379).

In sum, Eritrea is far from perfect; but available evidence supports the claim that EPLF's victory and high level of popular support bought it an extended post war honeymoon, more so than any other African leader who accepted external intervention got (Connell 1993, Wrong 2005). Free of any accusations of foreign entanglements or occupation Eritrea enjoyed a relative passivity for the first eight years of existence. It was truly self-reliant. Its victory and accompanying "earned right to rule" helped the EPLF purge most of its early threats and coopt the masses away from dissent and towards the more important task of nation building. As its security situation and legitimacy started to decline with the border war, its highly developed centralized structure allowed it to maintain domestic social control and reign in domestic dissent after 2001.

War and Post War Democratization

It would be intellectually dishonest to claim Eritrea did not need some level of external support in order to sustain its movement. The challenge though was operating in an environment where the external support on any given day was highly uncertain. Michela Wrong

notes President Afwerki's harsh and scolding tone with African and other Great Power leaders hint at a frustration these powers did not intervene (Wrong 2005, pp 358-9). It implies the EPLF might have accepted more help had it been offered. The reality was however that EPLF help was limited. Depending on what factions were in charge on any given day in Sudan, South Yemen, or any other sympathetic country and on how much influence the Great Powers exerted over these sympathizers; Eritrea could find its arms, cash and freedom of action waxing and waning (Connell and Killion 2011, Pateman 1998).⁴³ The partnership theory of intervention suggests that weaker commitments of support from partners forces recipients to rely more on domestic support for generating war fighting capacity. Consequently, supported partners may extend greater democratic rights or liberalize their regime as a means of gaining this support. These rights may endure after a victory as the new rulers will require continued support as they attempt to consolidate power and rebuild the state. However, once victory is achieved the coalition no longer needs to be expanded. Victors are likely to limit reforms to what is already in place and to maintain that coalition which was sufficient to win as it works to consolidate the government. The EPLF recognized early that it would need a broader base of support to generate war making capacity and to govern their liberated areas. This recognition prompted them to institute political reforms inspired along Marxist and later social democratic ideologies. These ideas appealed to the Christians and a large array of traditionally marginalized social groups. Through their program of egalitarianism EPLF build a broad base of Eritrean supporters.

⁴³ For instance, Sudan experienced a number of coups and government transitions which impacted how freely and affluently Eritrean rebels could operate. Additionally, Soviet involvement on behalf of Ethiopia pressured a number of governments to cut off aid to Eritrea.

As a rebel government EPLF governance structure was one of “centralized democratization”. This model was highly authoritarian emphasizing decision making from the top down, in order to enforce discipline, maintain secrecy and quickly exploit war time opportunities. At the same time it championed liberalizing reforms, encouraging participation and debate from all elements of Eritrean society, especially in terms of optimizing and refining policy decisions that would generate needed war capacity. In practice this meant that EPLF leadership still maintained strict decision authority, but as a constituent or member one could elect members to or hold a seat as a member of EPLF Mass Assemblies or Village Assemblies. These representatives had some power to debate, advocate for and refine EPLF policies. The process worked such that senior EPLF leaders would state policy intentions, but the village and regional assemblies could debate over necessary modifications and proper implementation of these policies. Results were then fed up through the hierarchy for further consideration. First and second tier EPLF leaders were encouraged to be receptive to criticisms and often did make adjustments to their policies. This created a sense of accountability as well as a sense of meaningful participation among the masses. Furthermore, competent local assemblymen were identified and drawn from local assemblies to serve in the higher echelons of the EPLF. This promoted a sense of non-exclusionary government among, earning the EPLF more popularity, even though assembly members were ultimately expected to toe the party line (Iyob 1995, Pool 2001).

The EPLF’s National Democratic Program also asserted the participatory rights of for all Eritrean social groups targeting specifically women, urbanized youths, and peasant agriculturists. Traditional Sharia and Christian customary law often marginalized women and

youth in favor of elder men. Under the EPLF, women were permitted to hold land and property, marry through consent (vs. arrangement), divorce and were exempted from the genital mutilation customary to both the Muslim and Christian sects. After receiving EPLF political education many youths could find themselves holding a reserved seat on village assemblies, or as part of the professionalized EPLF political cadre, assigned to local or regional administrative duties. Last but not least, lower peasants were enfranchised. The count of representatives in various assemblies was set high in most villages and regional zones. This high count meant traditional elites and power brokers had to pay steep prices in any attempt to co-opt policies working against the interests of the lower classes and served to hold those elites in check(Pool 2001).

More important, EPLF courts became efficient in enforcing these rights. These courts were not bound by Ethiopia's law and red tape or to local customs. EPLF justices could consider local practices but judgments were proclaimed according to EPLF directives on equality which were considerably more permissive than traditional customs or Ethiopian law. Despite an authoritarian superstructure, traditionally marginalized groups could get their day in court much faster and with greater justice than what the Ethiopian court systems provided. This improved perception of equality and rights garnered the rebels a substantially broadened base of supporters(Connell 1993, Doornbos and Tesfai 1999, Pool 2001). These supporters would be instrumental in providing the human and material resources the sustained and grew the EPLF's warfighting and governing capacity.

Had the EPLF had a strong foreign backer many of these initiatives might be unnecessary. For instance, around 23% of the EPLF's fighting forces were women(Pool 2001, pg

95). In raw numbers this equated to between 18,000-20,000 soldiers, which is comparable to the number of combat troops the United States deployed to Afghanistan from 2002-2007 (Belasco 2009, pg 9, lyob 1995, pg 141).⁴⁴ Framing these numbers differently is instructive. For instance patronistic support equivalent to what the US provided Afghanistan (which in comparison to Iraq is also quite small) would have made female recruitment unnecessary, women fighters could be substituted with foreign fighters. Given the aforementioned traditional culture, liberalizing rights for this segment of the population would be highly unlikely. Similarly, foreign troops could have helped smaller cadres of EPLF hold govern their towns, making the investment in land reform and voluntary participation in the peoples' assemblies less necessary. The lack of foreign military support forced EPFL to recruit and rely on fellow Eritreans who were themselves committed to the nation building process.

After independence; however, EPLF leadership found few new incentives to expand its democratic programs, though it maintained the rhetoric and kept many of its existing programs intact. The village and mass assembly structures were extended across the country. Women and lower classes maintained their social and property rights. Religious and cultural education was permitted so long as EPLF core curriculum was incorporated as well. It also continued to emphasize the objectives of its earlier two congresses calling for provisions on human rights and freedoms of expression (Connell 1993, Doornbos and Tesfai 1999, lyob 1995, Pool 2001).

On the other hand, The EPLF military victory also assured that there was no other organized opposition to challenge it. Political competition was weak. Shortly after

⁴⁴ The 18,000 to 20,000 figure is estimated by multiplying .23 by the estimated 80-90,000 members that existed at the end of the conflict according to lyob. Belasco reports Afghan troop concentration between 5200 and 23000 in her Congressional Research Service report.

independence the EPLF rebranded itself as the Popular Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) with President Isaias Afwerki as its leader. Most senior positions in the PFDJ government were conferred by appointment. President Afwerki promulgated guidance regarding which PFDJ members, civic groups, and foreign advisors could participate in the drafting of the Eritrean Constitution and PFDJ's political program. The PFDJ promulgated laws that locked itself in as the only legal political party in Eritrea and with it the ability to limit competition. It argued the wartime experiences of fractionalization within its parent organization the ELF and Ethiopia's attempts to pit ethnic and religious groups against each other made national unity a national priority. Consequently the new provisional government outlawed political parties based on religion, ethnicity or region and refused to allow former ELF members to return to Eritrea unless they renounced their former affiliations (Connell and Killion 2011, Pool 2001). This decree critically undercut the most likely mobilization mechanisms would-be PFDJ challengers might use to build an alternative coalition. Also, when the Eritrean Constitution was ratified in May 1997 Afwerki delayed its implementation claiming the constitution could not be legitimately enforced without national elections which were scheduled in 1998 (Freedom House 2011). When the Border War erupted that same year Afwerki used it as justification to suspend elections even further claiming that the war among other external factors derailed Eritrea's political development and that these development and equality issues had to be addressed first (Eritrean Center for Strategic Studies 2010, Sanders 2007, Freedom House 2011).

Overall, the political regime the PFDJ instituted was a slight improvement to what Eritrea experienced under the Dergue, see Figure 5-5. The government was still highly authoritarian, but granted more liberties than what Eritreans experienced under Ethiopian rule.

This improvement lasted about seven years. As Afwerki came under increasing criticism for the debacle of the Border War and other foreign policy blunders in 2001 he began cracking down harder on intraparty critics as well as the press. He postponed elections indefinitely sighting foreign threats and the need for unity for Eritrea's survival. Eritrea's improved democratization lasted for its first seven years of statehood. While the story of Eritrea's trajectory toward democracy is currently a sad one; there is still a glimmer of hope according to Michela Wrong. She notes the hard work of EPLF democratization cannot easily be undone. A generation of Eritrean fighters will not easily let go of their aspirations. "I didn't spend 15/20/30 years on the front for *this*" is a common refrain(Wrong 2005, pg 390). Eritrea has tasted some of the fruits of democracy. It now possesses one of the key ingredients democratization scholars point to as a correlate of successful democracy, a past failure. Eritrea has democratic know-how. If and when Eritrea recovers from the economic and political development reversals of the war and the country settles into more normal relations, it will become increasingly difficult to ignore the ratified constitution Afwerki's party drafted and the elections it promised when the dangers of war had passed. This know-how created in struggle and unmodified by foreign occupiers may be the first steps towards a genuine climb to democracy in a post-Afwerki Eritrea.




Figure 6-3: Eritrea’s democratization Trajectory 1980-2010.

Conclusion

In sum, Eritrea’s partners were necessary for its independence from Ethiopia but not sufficient. The EPLF relied on a lot of “self-help” in order to achieve its aim of independence. This self-help tipped the EPLF towards offering increased liberalization and democratization so that it could attract a stronger support base and resources. It organized itself in a way such that most elements of Eritrean society felt enfranchised and able to participate, even if only in a limited way. It was a better alternative to what either of its principle rivals, the ELF or Ethiopia was offering. Once victorious however, the EPLF/PFDJ regime saw no more need to expand democracy. It retained the programs, centralized structures and institutions already in place but did not significantly expand them.

In terms of capacity the EPLF had 30 years of state building experience by the time it had won de facto independence. It adapted relatively quickly from the problems of liberation to

the problems of governance. The EPLF structures that existed in wartime were replicated, extended across the country and adapted to peacetime. Unlike many nascent governments, the EPLF/PFDJ did not face “new” crises in peacetime; rather their existing organization had a simpler task of reprioritizing existing governance and military functions and tasks. Finally, because the EPLF had defeated all of its enemies and maintained a significant base of support, it suffered relatively low post war political violence. Those that would contest the EPLF rule were either exiled during the liberation struggle, bought off, or marginalized from Eritrea’s only legal party.

Eritrea though is by no means a “model” example of successful post war state building. It is racked with accusations of human rights abuses, corruption and though it experiences very little internal violence; exiled dissidents to this day plot the PFDJ’s future demise. These dissidents cannot however build a coherent coalition the way the EPLF itself was able to. Eritrea was also ensnared into a territorial dispute and major war with it’s once ally the TPLF led government in Ethiopia. This border war stunted capacity growth and reversed some of Eritrea’s liberalization. The ongoing disputes with its neighbors have also forced Eritrea to make tough decisions on how to invest its capacity generating resources. It can defend itself militarily at the cost of economic growth and development or it can attempt to develop its economy but then it sees itself as vulnerable to its neighbors and unable to defend itself.

Nevertheless, we must take seriously the claim that minimal intervention set up incentives which forced the EPLF to cohere, cooperate, and generate endogenous capabilities or perish. Despite its extreme poverty and religious and ethnic diversity the EPLF build a broad based war fighting coalition, it earned more political legitimacy than any of its wartime partners

the TPLF and Sudan, it defeated a much larger neighbor, quickly established basic and effective governance, and generates just as much political capacity any other post war state, though it started with capacities that were only a third that of those same states.⁴⁵ Eritrea is not perfect but is certainly a noteworthy example of less in terms of intervention being more in terms of a viable post war state.

⁴⁵ Most writers on Eritrea point out that the EPLF/PFDJ enjoyed a large honey moon period of legitimacy. Some authors note that Ethiopia's TPLF government may have been pressured into the Border war due to perceptions of being the "little brother" of the EPLF-TPLF alliance. Furthermore Sudan and break away South Sudan are consistently at the top of most lists of state fragility of which legitimacy and hostile political fractionalization is often a key factor.

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