

THESIS

2

2000

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES



3 1293 02058 2049

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled


DOES IT PAY TO BE NICE? THE EFFECTS OF EXPECTANCY
VIOLATIONS, NORM TRANSGRESSIONS, AND RECIPROCITY
OPPORTUNITY ON ATTRACTION AND RECIPROCITY TOWARD
A FAVOR-GIVER

presented by

Amani G. El-Alayli

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

M.A. degree in Psychology


Major professor

Date 05/10/00

LIBRARY

Michigan State University

PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record.
 TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due.
 MAY BE RECALLED with earlier due date if requested.

DATE DUE	DATE DUE	DATE DUE
MAR 06 2001		
Ar 04112002		
051103		
MAR 29 2003		
091304		

**DOES IT PAY TO BE NICE? THE EFFECTS OF EXPECTANCY VIOLATIONS,
NORM TRANSGRESSIONS, AND RECIPROCITY OPPORTUNITY ON
ATTRACTION AND RECIPROCITY TOWARD A FAVOR-GIVER**

By

Amani G. El-Alayli

A THESIS

**Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of**

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Psychology

2000

ABSTRACT

DOES IT PAY TO BE NICE? THE EFFECTS OF EXPECTANCY VIOLATIONS, NORM TRANSGRESSIONS, AND RECIPROCITY OPPORTUNITY ON ATTRACTION AND RECIPROCITY TOWARD A FAVOR-GIVER

By

Amani G. El-Alayli

Previous research has found that when someone violates a norm and/or expectation to provide a favor, the recipient tends not to like this favor-giver very much in spite of the fact that the donor appears to have gone to great lengths to help (Clark & Mills, 1979; Kiesler, 1966; Morse, Gergen, Peele, & van Ryneveld, 1977; Schopler & Thompson, 1968; Worchel & Andreoli, 1974). The current investigation examined three potential mechanisms that may account for this phenomenon: perceived unpredictability of the donor, felt obligation to reciprocate, and psychological reactance due to threatened freedom of reciprocity behavior. To test these mechanisms, expectancy, norm, and prior knowledge of a reciprocity opportunity were manipulated and their effects on attraction and reciprocity toward a favor-giver were examined. The unpredictability hypothesis predicted perceived unpredictability of the donor to be negatively correlated with liking and to mediate the effects of expectancy/norm violations on attraction. The felt obligation and reactance hypotheses expected derogation of the violating favor-giver only to occur when participants had no prior knowledge of an opportunity to reciprocate. Moreover, the felt obligation hypothesis predicted highest reciprocity toward the violating favor-giver whereas the reactance hypothesis predicted lowest reciprocity toward this expectancy and norm violator. Partial support for each of the three mechanisms was obtained.

Copyright by

AMANI G. ELALAYLI

2000

☞ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ☞

☞ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ☞

☺ I would love to dedicate this thesis to my adorable niece and nephews,
Maggie, Zack, Sammy, Ryan, and Adam, for always being able to make me laugh! ☺

☞ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ☞

☞ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ✨ ☞

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have many people to thank for the completion of this thesis. First I would like to thank my undergraduate mentor, Dr. Robert Hymes, whose dynamic lectures first got me excited about social psychology. He was a wonderful mentor and was very supportive in helping me make the transition to graduate school.

I would also like to acknowledge my friends and colleagues, Deborah Abber, Keith Niedermeier, and Matthew Gates. They have provided me with tremendous emotional support and encouragement whenever it was needed. Special thanks goes to my good friend and colleague, Peggy Chin, with whom I had the pleasure of beginning and continuing my graduate career. Her support along the way was invaluable. Without these friends, the adjustment to graduate school, the overcoming of obstacles, and the completion of this thesis would have been much more difficult and much less enjoyable.

Lastly, I would like to thank my committee members, Drs. Lawrence Messé, Norbert Kerr, and Allen McConnell, whose guidance and insightful comments left this thesis, and my research abilities, much improved. My advisor, Dr. Messé, has been more supportive than I could have ever expected an advisor to be. He was always there to share his experiences and provide empathy, warmth, and encouragement whenever I was faced with any concerns. His guidance and excellence in methodology have also helped me to improve my research skills dramatically. He was also able to provide me with constructive criticism while simultaneously increasing my confidence as a researcher.

Thanks, Larry!

PREFACE

As a student in a graduate course on group processes, I developed an interest in the topic of social norms. I learned that when an individual is given a certain role title, s/he behaves differently and is treated differently by others (e.g., Messé, Kerr & Stattler, 1992). Such findings led me to wonder how individuals might react to inconsistencies between role expectations for another person and that person's actual behavior. More specifically, I became interested in how individuals would react toward a person who violates expectations and/or norms just to do them a favor. As a result, I turned to the empirical and theoretical literature on this topic to see the extent to which such behaviors had been studied. Although research in the area is not very extensive, under the guidance of Dr. Lawrence Messé, I uncovered some interesting findings which led to the ideas behind the current investigation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	x
LIST OF FIGURES.....	.xii
 CHAPTER 1	
INTRODUCTION.....	1
Importance of Norms and Expectations.....	1
Reactions Toward a Favor-Giver Who Violates Norms and/or Expectations.....	4
Possible Mechanisms Underlying Derogation of a Violating Favor-Giver.....	12
Unpredictability as a Negative Attribute.....	12
Felt Obligation to Reciprocate.....	15
Psychological Reactance from Receiving a Favor.....	21
Summary and Theoretical Considerations.....	29
Attraction Toward the Favor-Giver.....	29
Summary of Mechanisms.....	29
Potential Moderators.....	29
Sufficient Number of Violations.....	31
Threshold versus Additive Effects.....	31
An Alternative Mechanism: Ulterior Motive Attributions.....	32
A Second Alternative Mechanism: Threat to Self-Esteem.....	34
A Third Alternative Mechanism: Derogation by Association.....	36
Operation of More than One Mechanism.....	37
Reciprocity Toward the Favor-Giver.....	38
The Current Investigation.....	40
 CHAPTER 2	
METHOD.....	43
Participants.....	43
Overview.....	43
Design.....	43
Materials and Procedure.....	45
Introduction by Experimenter.....	45
Work Task.....	46
Manipulation of Expectation.....	47
Manipulation of Norm.....	48
Rating and Payment.....	49
Manipulation of Knowledge of Opportunity to Reciprocate.....	49
Expectancy and Norm Manipulation Checks.....	50
Measure of Supervisor Evaluation.....	50
Introduction to Departmental Task.....	51

Measure of Temporary Affect.....	51
Manipulation Check for Knowledge of Reciprocity.....	52
Measure of Importance of Freedom of Reciprocity.....	52
Measure of Reciprocity.....	53
Measure of Attributions.....	54
Measure of Belief in the Importance of the Norm of Reciprocity.....	54
Measure of Intolerance of Ambiguity.....	54
Measure of Suspicion.....	55
 CHAPTER 3	
RESULTS.....	56
Pilot Tests.....	56
Believability of +1 Rating.....	56
Construction of Norm of Reciprocity Beliefs Questionnaire.....	56
Scenario Studies to Pre-test Manipulations.....	57
Manipulation Checks.....	58
Expectation Manipulation.....	58
Norm Manipulation.....	58
Knowledge of Reciprocity Manipulation.....	59
Construction of Attraction and Unpredictability Factors.....	61
Unpredictability as a Negative Attribute: Attraction Findings.....	62
Felt Obligation and Reactance: Attraction Findings.....	68
Felt Obligation and Reactance: Reciprocity Findings.....	72
Supplementary Findings.....	84
Temporary Affect.....	84
Attributions.....	84
Additional Findings.....	86
 CHAPTER 4	
DISCUSSION.....	88
Summary of Main Findings.....	88
Unpredictability Mechanism: Attraction Findings.....	89
Felt Obligation and Psychological Reactance Mechanisms: Attraction Findings.....	90
Felt Obligation and Psychological Reactance Mechanisms: Reciprocity Findings.....	91
Potential Explanations for Unpredicted Results.....	93
 CHAPTER 5	
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS.....	104
 APPENDIX A	
Supervisor Record Sheets.....	108

APPENDIX B	
Measures.....	112
APPENDIX C	
Factor Loadings from Principal Components Analysis.....	127
APPENDIX D	
Removal of Problem Data.....	129
APPENDIX E	
Analysis of Variance Results.....	132
REFERENCES.....	135

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 - Summary of Main Predictions.....	42
Table 2.1 - Listing of Tasks, Materials, and Manipulations.....	44
Table 3. 1 - Attraction Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation and Norm with Unpredictability as a Covariate.....	64
Table 3.2 - Attraction Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation and Intolerance of Ambiguity under Conditions of <i>No Prior Knowledge</i>.....	66
Table 3.3 - Attraction Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Prior Knowledge of an Opportunity to Reciprocate and Importance of Freedom of Reciprocity with Unpredictability as a Covariate.....	69
Table 3.4 - Attraction Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation, Norm, and Importance of Freedom of Reciprocity with Unpredictability as a Covariate.....	70
Table 3.5 - Reciprocity Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation and Prior Knowledge of an Opportunity to Reciprocate.....	73
Table 3.6 - Reciprocity Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Norm and Prior Knowledge of an Opportunity to Reciprocate.....	73
Table 3.7 - Reciprocity Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation, Norm, and Prior Knowledge of an Opportunity to Reciprocate.....	76
Table 3.8 - Reciprocity Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation and Importance of Freedom of Reciprocity.....	78
Table 3.9 - Reciprocity Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Norm and Importance of Freedom of Reciprocity.....	79
Table 3.10 - Reciprocity Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation, Norm, and Prior Knowledge of an Opportunity to Reciprocate for Recipients Placing <i>High</i> Importance in Freedom of Reciprocity.....	81
Table 3.11 - Reciprocity Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation, Norm, and Prior Knowledge of an Opportunity to Reciprocate for Recipients Placing <i>Low</i> Importance in Freedom of Reciprocity.....	82

Table A.1 - Factor Loadings from Principal Components Analysis.....	127
Table A.2 - The Effects of Expectancy, Norm, and Knowledge of a Reciprocity Opportunity on Attraction Toward a Favor-Giver.....	132
Table A.3 - Attraction Toward a Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation and Norm <i>Without</i> Unpredictability as a Covariate (ANOVA means).....	133

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 - Reciprocity Toward an Expectancy/Norm Violating Favor-Giver as a Function of Recipients' Knowledge of an Opportunity to Reciprocate: A Path Diagram.....	103
--	------------

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

How would you feel about a total stranger who violates a norm and an expectation for the sole purpose of helping you? This thesis attempts to answer this question and to explore some social psychological mechanisms that may be responsible for recipients' reactions to such unusual favors. First, the importance of norms and expectations to our society is discussed. Then the literature on reactions to expectancy and/or norm violating favor-givers is reviewed. Following this, the potential mechanisms that may play a role in eliciting these reactions are described extensively. And finally, the investigation that was created to test these mechanisms is introduced.

Importance of Norms and Expectations

"The capacity and the need to have, to make, to follow, and to enforce rules are of cardinal importance for human social existence... For without rules, there can be neither society nor culture..." (Fortes, 1983, p. 6). Do people conform, then, because they understand the important role that social rules (i.e., norms) play in maintaining human society?

Thibaut and Kelley (1959/1986) would probably have agreed with this suggestion. They defined "norms" as behavioral rules that are accepted to some degree by most everyone involved in a social context. They proposed that norms serve an array of invaluable functions in our everyday lives. For example, norms provide a positive alternative to the use of interpersonal influence in controlling behavior. Partly based on

research by Frank (as cited in Thibaut & Kelley, 1959/1986), the authors maintained that norms encounter less resistance and produce even more economically and efficiently certain consequences than would the application of interpersonal power. Some subsequent research (e.g., Micheline & Messé, 1974) has also supported this notion. Also, Wispé and Lloyd (as cited in Thibaut & Kelley, 1959/1986) found that both powerful and weak individuals appear to benefit from the regularity and control that the mutually acceptable rules provide. Therefore, people appear to profit more from and be less reactive to conformity to norms than to the use of power tactics (cf. Micheline & Messé, 1974).

Thibaut and Kelley (1959/1986) also mentioned that norms are beneficial in that they prescribe stable, automatic interaction sequences. Because norms are based on consensus, most individuals will conform to them without the need for external control mechanisms. Individuals may even feel intrinsic pleasure from conforming because norms often reflect widely held values (e.g., see Hertel & Kerr, in press, as presented by Kerr, 2000). Consequently, norms tend to form automatic behavioral sequences, which minimize conflict and uncertainty in interactions. They provide us with a sense of predictability, which makes us more comfortable living in our world. Automatic interaction sequences also minimize process loss (Steiner, 1972) by relieving people of the burden of constant vigilance, communication, and decision-making. In fact, it is suggested that one reason people develop norms is to synchronize behaviors, thereby using their time more efficiently and increasing productivity (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959/1986).

Another benefit of norms, as suggested by the independent research efforts of Arsenain, Merei, and Wright in the 1940s (as cited in Thibaut & Kelley, 1959/1986), is

that they increase group solidarity and security. Therefore, norms appear to help promote unity, a characteristic that is highly regarded by society.

Considering all of the benefits of norms, it is easy to see why Fortes (1983) and Thibaut and Kelley (1959/1986) concluded that these social rules are an important mechanism for promoting the smooth functioning of society. If Thibaut and Kelley (1959/1986) were correct in their assertions, then norms are, indeed, an integral part of everyday life. They provide efficiency, productivity, predictability, regularity, synchronicity, unity, and peace.

It is likely that these psychological benefits may accrue from other types of expectations as well. For example, expectations that we have about another's behavior may be based on widely-held norms or on that person's previous behaviors. Either way, fulfilled expectations produce the same benefits. Thus, it is no wonder that consistency of behavior and conformity to norms are such powerful issues for most people. Perhaps individuals follow norms and expectations, at least in part, because they believe in the importance of such social rules and personal expectancies. If this is the case, it is likely that individuals might react negatively toward someone who violates norms or other types of expectations. If so, would individuals even disparage the expectancy/norm violator when they stand to benefit from the violations?

Reactions Toward a Favor-Giver Who Violates Norms and/or Expectations

One of the goals of this research was to examine whether individuals might dislike someone who violates a norm and an expectation just to do them a favor. Morse, Gergen, Peele, and van Ryneveld (1977) suggest that they would disparage this favor-giver, in spite of the fact that they would benefit from his/her unusual behavior. This suggestion is quite paradoxical, especially in the face of literature demonstrating that individuals appear to be *more* attracted to those who provide them with help, especially when it is voluntary, deliberate, or costly (Gergen, Ellsworth, Maslach, & Seipel, 1975; Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966; Greenberg & Frisch, 1972; Gross & Latané, 1974; Nemeth, 1970). Unfortunately, as discussed below, Morse et al. (1977) did not describe the conceptual basis for this somewhat counterintuitive hypothesis. Nevertheless, their investigation did find empirical support for their ideas.

Morse et al. (1977) had students participate in a music-identification contest during which their goal was to guess the names of songs and singers after listening to short clips of music. In all conditions there was a "quizmaster" who provided unsolicited hints to the contestants to help them win a prize. Thus, the quizmaster always appeared to do a favor for the participants. Morse et al. manipulated expectations by having a "supervisor" tell the students beforehand that their quizmaster had either usually provided hints to contestants in past sessions (expectation confirmed condition) or rarely provided hints (expectation violated condition). The quizmaster also either appeared to violate a norm or not violate a norm. To do this, the supervisor either told the participants that it was against the rules for the quizmaster to give hints in their session (norm violated condition) or that it was not against the rules (norm not violated condition). Thus, the

expectation was based on consistency of behavior while the norm involved obedience to legitimate authority.

The study yielded some interesting results. With regard to attraction,¹ Morse et al. (1977) found a significant interaction such that the participants were least favorable toward the quizmaster when he violated both a norm and an expectation in providing the hints. In other words, the quizmaster was liked the least when he violated both the supervisor's rule against helping and participants' expectation that they would not get any help because the quizmaster rarely provided it in the past. There were no differences in ratings across the other three conditions. Therefore, Morse et al. found support for their argument that a favor-giver would only be derogated when s/he behaves in *both* an unexpected and counternormative manner to provide the favor. Because no main effects were found, the authors concluded that neither an expectation violation nor a norm violation alone would sufficiently lead to derogation of a favor-giver. Rather, they asserted that both types of violations must be committed in order for derogation to occur.²

However, there may have been a potential confound in Morse et al.'s (1977) study that reduced the reactivity of the separate norm and expectancy violation manipulations. The authors stated that in South Africa, where the study was conducted, hint-giving was a

¹ Consistent with most previous research on this topic (e.g., Morse et al., 1977), the terms "attraction" and "liking" are used throughout this thesis to refer to the favorability of the personality ratings of the various favor-doers.

² It is important to consider, however, that Morse et al. (1977) do not define and distinguish the concepts of norm and expectation beyond the different manipulations that they used to operationalize these constructs. However, the present thesis distinguishes between norms and other types of expectancies by using the term "expectation" to refer only to personal expectations about specific individuals (e.g., based on that person's previous behaviors) and the term "norm" to refer to expectations about anyone who might be in a particular situation where social rules are made salient.

typical feature of this type of record contest. As a consequence, participants may have come to the study with an established normative expectation that the quizmaster would provide them with hints. Perhaps confirmation of this initial informal norm prevented the participants from viewing the favor-doer as especially unusual in the single-violation conditions. After all, their initial expectation of help would have been confirmed in every condition since hints were always provided. Thus, it could be that only a double violation was sufficient to counteract their initial anticipation of receiving hints. In other words, perhaps help was only perceived as purely unexpected or counternormative by the participants in the double-violation condition.

There is also another reason that hint-giving may have only been seen as unusual in the double-violation condition. Perhaps when the quizmaster violated only the expectancy or the norm, this single violation was overlooked in the face of the normative or consistent behavior that he also exhibited. When *both* expectation and norm were violated, however, the quizmaster's hint-giving behavior may have appeared to be nothing but unusual. Without any discounting information, the recipients may have been forced to attribute the quizmaster's actions to some negative personality attributes. Therefore, the possibility remains that a strong single expectancy or norm violation might be enough to cause recipients of a favor to derogate their benefactor.

In fact, some research is consistent with this speculation (Clark & Mills, 1979; Kiesler, 1966; Schopler & Thompson, 1968; Worchel & Andreoli, 1974). For example, Kiesler (1966) found that individuals liked a stingy partner even better than a generous one when role expectations suggested that being stingy was appropriate. Kiesler had pairs of subjects participate in a word game with instructions to either cooperate or compete

with each other in order to win a monetary prize. Each subject was led to believe that his partner had won most of the money by the end of the session. At this point, the partner (really the experimenter) either shared or did not share his winnings with the subject. Kiesler found that participants liked the partner most when he appeared to behave in accord with the initial "role requirement." Thus, partners who were told to cooperate and indeed shared their winnings later and those who were told to compete and did not share their winnings later were liked the most. Those partners who behaved out of role, however, were derogated even when the participant received a tangible reward as a result. Thus, even though the contest was over, initial norms prevailed and transgressions led to the derogation of a favor-giver.

Schopler and Thompson (1968) also conducted an investigation that found a single expectancy or norm violation to be sufficient in reducing attraction toward a favor-giver. Participants received a rose from the experimenter during either a formal or an informal interview. The authors suggested that the favor was only inappropriate when provided during the formal interview. Participants in this condition tended to like the experimenter less than those who received the rose in the informal condition but it was not reported whether this difference was statistically significant. Thus, once again, a single norm violation may have sufficiently decreased liking of a favor-doer.

Worchel and Andreoli's (1974) study is also relevant. In this experiment, the researcher in charge gave the subject a stack of papers to sort while a confederate was sitting right next to her. In the favor condition, the confederate helped the participant sort the papers. Earlier in the session, the participant was either informed that she would later be cooperating with the confederate to win a monetary prize, that they would be

competing for a prize, or that they would not be interacting later. Participants who received help liked the favor-giver the least when they expected future competitive interaction with her. Interestingly, this occurred in spite of the fact that the confederate was apparently not aware of the nature of the future interaction. Thus, even a violation of a norm that had not yet been established led to decreased liking of the favor-giver.

Clark and Mills (1979) also found a single norm violation to be sufficient in generating negative reactions. They manipulated whether recipients of a favor preferred a communal versus exchange relationship with their benefactors. In a communal relationship, the norm is to help partners only in response to their needs. Tit-for-tat exchange, however, is only appropriate in exchange relationships. Participants were unmarried male college students who were led to believe that they would be working with an attractive partner who was either single or married. It was expected that when participants were paired with the married partner, they would prefer an exchange relationship. But when they were paired with the single partner, they would prefer a communal relationship. In all conditions, participants were urged to help their partner with a task by giving her some of his materials so she could complete a project more quickly. In the favor conditions, she (really the experimenter) reciprocated by passing him one of her research participation extra credits. In the no-favor conditions, she simply thanked the participant. Clark and Mills found that when the woman was married, the reciprocal favor resulted in greater liking of the partner than when no favor was provided. But when the woman was single, participants liked her less when she provided the favor than when she did not. In this latter condition, the favor was in violation of the expected, or at least desired, normative conditions.

Although these investigations support the possibility that a single expectancy or norm violation may cause recipients of a favor to derogate a donor, there are a few studies inconsistent with this suggestion as well (Brehm & Cole, 1966; Morse, 1972; Suls, Witenberg, & Gutkin, 1981). However, the lack of a derogation effect in these studies can be explained.

In the Brehm and Cole study, which is discussed in greater detail later, participants in both the favor and no-favor conditions were told to base their impressions of the favor-giver solely on his responses to questions that would be asked and to avoid being influenced by any external factors. Participants were strongly urged to be accurate and unbiased in the relevant conditions. Consequently, it is not surprising that they were successful in preventing the favor from affecting their impressions of the favor-giver in any way.

The Suls et al. investigation found that a norm violating altruistic act led to the greatest liking of the favor-giver. However, this investigation used observers rather than recipients as raters of the likability of the favor-giver. Clearly, observers are likely to generate very different reactions than recipients. Moreover, the effect was only found for adults. Grade-school children actually liked the norm violating altruistic favor-giver less than someone who was just returning a favor.

In Morse's (1972) study, participants worked on a puzzle, which was introduced as an "eye-hand coordination task" in order to win a monetary prize. The experimenter either told them that s/he would provide help later (by showing a picture of the puzzle) or would not provide help. Expectancies were then either confirmed or disconfirmed. When help was given, there was a trend for participants to like the favor-giver more when it was

unexpected than when it was expected. However, this difference was not statistically significant. Moreover, there was also a trend for participants to see the experimenter as less helpful in the unexpected conditions when a favor was provided than when one was not. Thus, although there is a little evidence to the contrary, the literature appears to provide greater support for the notion that a norm or expectancy violating favor-giver would not be liked very much.

Overall, there is quite a bit of evidence that a *single* expectancy or norm violation might be sufficient in causing derogation of a favor-giver. Morse et al. (1977) were the first to suggest that *both* an expectancy and norm violation must occur in order for derogation to take place. Unfortunately, the bases for their predictions and the explanation of their results were not very descriptive. In introducing their predictions regarding attraction, they simply stated that it seemed unlikely that either an expectancy violation or a norm violation by itself would sufficiently produce derogation of an aid-giver. They suggested that the two events must co-occur but did not indicate why this might be the case.

In their discussion of the results, however, they briefly mentioned two possible reasons for this view. The first was that individuals may generally dislike expectancy violators and norm violators but that these separate tendencies alone may be insufficient to counteract the liking that individuals would typically experience towards someone who does them a favor. However, Morse et al. (1977) did not articulate the reasoning behind this threshold of disfavor notion. The second explanation provided by Morse et al. was that, in the framework of Thibaut and Kelley (1959/1986), unexpected counternormative behavior may be seen as a more negative outcome than expected counternormative

behavior. They suggested that only the former may be sufficiently negative to lead to the derogation of a favor-giver. Morse et al. did not elaborate on this idea either, however. For example, they did not discuss the reasons that counternormative behavior may be seen as a negative outcome. Therefore, their reasoning remains somewhat nebulous due to a lack of discussion regarding underlying mechanisms.

The purpose of the present investigation was to conduct a conceptual replication of Morse et al. (1977) and to further extend their work by testing some possible mechanisms that may account for people's reactions to expectancy and norm violating favor-givers. Three potential mechanisms affecting attraction toward such benefactors are considered. The first idea is the view of unpredictability as an undesirable attribute (e.g., Kiesler 1973). The other two are based on Gouldner's (1960) "norm of reciprocity." Specifically, the second mechanism involves the possible consequences of a feeling of obligation to reciprocate a favor (Uehara, 1995). The third involves psychological reactance experienced by the recipient due to expectations of reciprocity (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981).

Possible Mechanisms Underlying Derogation of a Violating Favor-Giver

Unpredictability as a Negative Attribute

One potential mechanism that could account for the derogation of a violating favor-giver is the perception that the favor-giver is unpredictable. As Kiesler (1973) writes:

In considering the functioning of norms, theorists have made several assumptions: (a) Persons have a need for predictability in social interaction; (b) norms function to increase the predictability of behavior; and (c) norm violators are perceived as unpredictable. Thus, disliking may result from a norm violator's unpredictability. (p.354)

It seems reasonable to assume that this same logic would also apply in understanding reactions to violators of other types of expectancies as well. For example, expectancies based on someone's previous trends in behavior surely increase predictability, probably to at least the same extent as normative standards do. Thus, one possible reason that individuals may derogate a favor-giver who violates both a norm and an expectation is that the person would be perceived as being highly unpredictable. People may simply dislike unpredictability, regardless of whether its consequences are favorable or unfavorable. Gergen and Jones (1963) found, in fact, that a (normal) stimulus person was disliked as a function of his unpredictability and not the consequences of his unpredictable behavior.

Kiesler (1966; 1973) made use of various theories to explain why individuals might perceive expectancy/norm violators as being unpredictable and why people might dislike unpredictable others. Thibaut and Kelly's (1959/1986) social exchange theory can provide one potential explanation. According to this theory, much behavior is guided by a goal to maximize benefits and minimize costs. According to Kiesler, the theory also implies that

irregularity resulting from expectancy and norm violations is a potential cost. Thus, an individual is likely to be less satisfied with an outcome and the person responsible for it when violations occur.

Kiesler (1966; 1973) also discussed an alternative explanation based on Goffman's (1959) role-theory perspective. According to Goffman, norms are developed so that individuals can come to a consensus about the definition of a situation. This allows them to have a sense of predictability and control over each other. In violating a norm, then, a person would be forcing others to reject their definition of the situation. These individuals would then dislike the person who was responsible for their lost sense of predictability.

In addition, Kiesler (1966) briefly suggested that Carlsmith and Aronson's (1963) version of expectancy theory could provide a third potential explanation. According to Kiesler's interpretation of this perspective, dissonance is aroused when an individual encounters an unexpected event. If perceptions of the event itself cannot be easily distorted, then the unpredictable person responsible for the event should be liked less. Kiesler suggested that one example of an event that is difficult to distort is receiving some sort of unexpected tangible reward. Kiesler did not discuss the reasoning behind these ideas, however.

There is some evidence that norm violators are perceived as unpredictable and are thus liked less. Kiesler (1973) had participants listen to a tape-recorded conversation and evaluate the personality of one of the speakers. This speaker was a college student who was discussing her inability to concentrate on studying due to the fact that her boyfriend had not called her. She was either speaking to a dormitory counselor or to a faculty member. In the former case, her behavior was appropriate, but in the latter, it was

counternormative. Participants perceived the student as behaving less appropriately and liked her less when she was speaking to a professor than when she was speaking to a counselor. This finding is consistent with the notion that perceived unpredictability is responsible for the derogation of someone who violates a norm. Kiesler found the reverse pattern when she set up a situation where unpredictability was preferred, but, in these conditions only, participants were asked to avoid imposing any value judgments in describing the student's traits. Perhaps, then, participants overcompensated for bias by liking the norm violator more than the speaker who did not violate a norm.

However, overall the research provides little support for the suggestion that unpredictability mediates the derogation of a norm and/or expectancy violator.

Unpredictability was not examined as a mediator in Kiesler's (1973) study because it was inferred from the manipulations rather than measured. Moreover, in Kiesler's (1966) role requirement study described earlier, unpredictability was measured but not found to be a significant mediator of the effects of role inconsistencies on derogation. It is possible, however, that because unpredictability was measured using only a single item, actual mediation may have gone undetected due to a lack of sensitivity of the measure.

Therefore, while there is no strong evidence in the literature for the mediation of unpredictability, it is still a plausible mechanism to account for derogation. It is reasonable to expect that derogation of a favor-giver *may* occur to the extent that the individual behaves in an unpredictable manner.

Both Kiesler (1973) and Kiesler (1966) appeared to deal with norms, rather than other types of expectations. However, following Kiesler's logic, perceived unpredictability could potentially result from the violation of either a norm, an expectation, or both, as

long as the degree of unpredictability exceeds some threshold of tolerance. Thus, while Morse et al. (1977) suggest that both a norm and an expectation violation must occur, the unpredictability mechanism suggests that a single violation might suffice. As mentioned earlier, there is a possibility that the manipulations in Morse et al.'s study were not strong enough to separately lead to the degree of unpredictability necessary to cause derogation of the target. Thus, in Morse et al.'s study, both the expectation and the norm violation may have been needed to exceed participants' threshold of tolerance for idiosyncrasy.

Thus, the unpredictability notion provides one potential explanation for the reason individuals tend to derogate expectancy and/or norm violating favor-givers. Whereas the unpredictability notion only makes predictions regarding attraction toward a favor-giver, the next two theories, felt obligation and psychological reactance, also make predictions regarding reciprocity.

Felt Obligation to Reciprocate

As mentioned, there is a second mechanism that could potentially explain the dislike of a norm and/or expectancy violating favor-giver. It involves feeling a sense of obligation to reciprocate favors (see Fisher et al., 1981; Gouldner, 1960; Greenberg, 1980; Uehara, 1995). Gouldner's (1960) "norm of reciprocity" is of primary relevance here. Part of this norm is a universal moral obligation to return any favors that one receives. Gouldner suggests that the degree of obligation that one feels depends on the perceived value of the benefit received. Thus, when an individual receives a large favor, s/he would likely feel a strong sense of duty to return the favor. This may occur, for example, when the favor is perceived as out of the ordinary or unjustified. Feeling an uncomfortable sense of indebtedness, the individual would surely be motivated to reduce perceptions of

obligation by reciprocating the favor. According to Uehara (1995), moral obligations to return a benefit are at least as motivating as the desire to get back when you give. In fact, an individual may feel so obligated to another person upon the receipt of a large favor that s/he might even resent the favor-giver until reciprocity can take place.

This reasoning can explain why individuals might derogate someone who violates a norm and/or expectation to do a favor for them. In essence, a favor is likely to be perceived as greater when it appears that the benefactor violated a norm or expectation violations in order to provide it. In engaging in at least one violation, it may appear that the favor-giver really went out of his/her way to help. Thus, the recipient would feel a very strong sense of obligation to reciprocate the favor. This could then result in resentment and dislike of the favor-giver, particularly if the recipient sees no opportunity to reduce his/her sense of obligation by paying the favor-giver back.

Uehara (1995) reviews various lines of research that provide support for the experience of felt obligation and its consequences. First, she cites some evidence for the existence and prevalence of the norm of reciprocity. Specifically, research has found support for the existence of the norm among various types of individuals and in various regions of North America (Antonucci, Fuhrer, & Jackson, 1990, Greenberg & Shapiro, 1971, Ingersoll-Dayton & Antonucci, 1988, Schreiber & Glidewell, 1978, Shumaker & Jackson, 1979, Uehara, 1987, Wentowski, 1981, as cited in Uehara, 1995). There is also research consistent with the notion that people feel a sense of obligation to reciprocate when they receive favors from others. For example, individuals have been found to be more likely to request help when they believe that they will have a chance to reciprocate the favor than when they perceive no opportunity to do so (DePaulo, 1978, as cited in

Fisher et al., 1981; Greenberg & Shapiro, 1971, Morris & Rosen, 1973, as cited in Fisher et al., 1981 and Uehara, 1995; Gross & Latané, 1974). Moreover, Castro (1974) found that individuals are also more likely to request future aid if they had been able to repay benefactors in the past. It was also shown that help that is not as costly to the benefactor is more likely to be sought out or accepted (Castro, 1974; DePaulo & Fisher, 1980, as cited in Fisher et al., 1981). Thus, people have such strong beliefs in the norm of reciprocity that they may not even want to request or accept favors unless they believe that they will be able to reciprocate them.

Moreover, other research that Uehara discussed suggests that not only do we avoid "overbenefiting" from a relationship, but we also tend to perceive ourselves as "underbenefiting," even if reality must be distorted in order to do so (Antonucci, 1985, Beckman, 1981, O'Connell, 1982, 1984, Palo-Stoller, 1985, Poulin, 1993, Weinberg, 1992, Wentowski, 1981, as cited in Uehara, 1995). Weinberg describes this phenomenon as a "debt-reducing bias." Consistent with this idea, there is also evidence that individuals are more distressed when they are overbenefiting than when underbenefiting, even though the latter is also an inequitable relationship (Ingersoll-Dayton & Antonucci, 1988, Roberto & Scott, 1984, Van Tilburg, 1992, as cited in Uehara, 1995). Thus, the felt obligation mechanism may be more plausible than any negative feelings that may result from inequity or inequality.

In addition, other research suggests that negative consequences may result from feelings of obligation. For example, when an individual does not expect to have a chance to reciprocate, s/he tends to feel frustration or other adverse feelings, including resentment toward the favor-giver (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Greenberg, 1980; Fisher, Nadler, &

Whitcher-Alagna, 1983, Greenberg & Shapiro, 1971, Shumaker & Jackson, 1979, as cited in Uehara, 1995). Moreover, individuals have been shown to have more positive feelings toward a favor-giver when they are provided with the opportunity to reciprocate than when they have no such opportunity (Castro, 1974; Gross & Latané, 1974). Meeting reciprocity obligations, and even the mere ability to reciprocate, have also been associated with increased self-esteem, greater pride, greater life satisfaction, better emotional and social functioning, and more positive personal well-being (Black, 1985, Hays, Chauncey, & Tobey, 1990, Israel, Hogue, & Gorton, 1983, Rook, 1987, Stevens, 1992, Wentowski, 1981, as cited in Uehara, 1995). Another investigation even found that a helper who asked for something in return was liked more than one who did not (Gergen et al., 1975). Therefore, there is clear support for the idea that felt obligation may generate negative affective consequences and that these potentially negative reactions are reduced when recipients reciprocate the favor, or at least believe that they are able to do so in the future.

All of the above research is consistent with the notion that a sense of felt obligation may be responsible for the derogation of an expectancy and/or norm violating favor-giver. It is possible, then, that resentment toward a favor-giver occurs when an expectancy and/or norm is violated because the favor is seen as very big under these circumstances, thus inducing sufficient felt obligation to trigger negative reactions.

It is important to note that participants in previous research were typically not aware ahead of time that they would be given a chance to reciprocate. They may have derogated the violating favor-giver out of frustration or resentment from thinking that they would not be able to return the favor, thereby reducing their sense of obligation. Perhaps if the violating favor-giver was evaluated *after* participants were given a chance to

reciprocate, or if they merely knew ahead of time that they would have such an opportunity, derogation would not have occurred. It is reasonable to expect that under these conditions the recipients would have known that their sense of obligation was only transient. Thus, there would no longer be any hostility toward the favor-giver. Under these circumstances, attraction level might have even been the same, if not greater, toward the violating favor-giver because the favor was so out of the ordinary.

In fact, in the study by Suls et al. (1981), uninvolved adult observers liked the favor-giver more as favors became greater and more unexpected. As outside observers, the raters in this case were able to observe the acts of kindness without being subject to feeling obligated to the donor. Thus they were able to evaluate the favor-giver more objectively. This circumstance might be somewhat similar to a recipient's experience if s/he knows that feelings of obligation would only be temporary. As mentioned earlier, there is some evidence that individuals are more favorable toward a favor-giver when they are given a chance to reciprocate than when they have no such opportunity. Therefore, according to felt obligation theory and research, attraction toward a norm and expectancy violating favor-giver should differ as a function of whether or not the beneficent has knowledge about a chance to reciprocate. Again, derogation should not occur when the recipient has prior knowledge that s/he will be able to pay back in kind.

The felt obligation notion can also be applied to reciprocity behavior. As indicated earlier, Gouldner (1960) believes that felt moral obligation is positively correlated with favor magnitude. As such, larger favors should result in greater felt obligation to reciprocate and thus greater reciprocity.

Tesser, Gatewood, and Driver (1968, as cited in Fisher et al., 1981) have found, in fact, that perceived indebtedness increases with the value of the favor received. Moreover, many other investigations have found reciprocity to increase with the size of the favor (Berkowitz & Friedman, 1967, Fisher & Nadler, 1976, Greenberg & Bar-Tal, 1976, Kahn & Tice, 1973, Levanthal, Weiss & Long, 1964, Pruitt, 1968, Stapleton, Nacci, & Tedeschi, 1973, as cited in Fisher et al., 1981; Gergen et al., 1975; Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966; Greenberg & Frisch, 1972; Gross & Latané, 1974; Nemeth, 1970; Wilke & Lanzetta, 1982). This set of results is clearly consistent with felt obligation theory.

However, few investigations have looked at the effects of favor-doer norm or expectancy violations on reciprocity. As asserted earlier, it is likely that individuals would perceive greater obligation towards a favor-giver when a norm and/or an expectation were violated to provide the favor. Consequently, if an individual is confronted with someone who does such a favor, s/he is likely to reciprocate a great deal more than if no violations took place.

There is one study that is partially consistent with this suggestion. A reciprocity measure was included in Morse et al.'s (1977) quiz show study. After completing the measure of attraction toward the supervisor, contestants were surprised with an opportunity to reciprocate by volunteering to help the quizmaster on an unrelated task. When the experiment appeared to be over, the supervisor handed the participant a note ostensibly written by their former quizmaster. It explained that the person who had been their quizmaster was actually a medical student who badly needed help with his anatomy project. In the note, the participants were asked to indicate how much time they would be

willing to devote to helping their former quizmaster by allowing him to measure various parts of their bodies.

Based on felt obligation theory, one might expect the most reciprocity in the double-violation condition. However, the only finding was an expectation main effect, but the direction of this effect was consistent with felt obligation theory. When the quizmaster violated an expectation based on his past actions, participants were more willing to spend time on the anatomy project. Although felt obligation would also predict the same effect for norm violation or an interaction such that both violations must co-occur in order for reciprocity to be high, neither of these patterns emerged. Thus, felt obligation theory is well-equipped to explain Morse et al.'s attraction findings, but can only partially explain their reciprocity findings.

The only other research on reciprocity toward a norm and/or expectancy violating favor-giver is inconsistent with felt obligation theory. In fact, Brehm and Cole (1966), Worchel et al. (1976), and Schopler and Thompson (1968) all found some evidence that directly contradicts the pattern of reciprocity predicted by felt obligation. These studies, which are described in the next section, found that under some conditions, a favor involving some type of violation led to less reciprocity than either no favor at all or one that was expected/normative. These results can be best explained by the third potential mechanism, psychological reactance, as described below.

Psychological Reactance From Receiving a Favor

The third potentially relevant mechanism involves Brehm's concept of "psychological reactance" (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). According to this idea, when an individual believes that one of his/her free behaviors has been threatened, s/he

feels an undesirable restriction of freedom.³ Brehm suggests that if freedom of the restricted behavior is of some importance to the individual, then "psychological reactance" would be aroused. Reactance is defined as a strong desire to re-establish freedom of behavior. In order for freedom to be directly restored, a person would have to engage in the threatened behavior. Thus, an individual experiencing reactance would be highly motivated to engage in the behavior(s) that s/he has learned s/he cannot or should not perform. According to Brehm and Brehm, reactance may also include adverse emotional consequences, such as feelings of resentment toward the person or object threatening one's freedom of behavior.

A good example of reactance might be an interaction between a teenager and her parents where the parents adamantly tell the teen that she is not allowed to go to a concert with her friends. As a consequence, a once mildly attractive concert suddenly becomes a must-do event for the teen. The concert becomes so enticing that the teen even sneaks out of the house to attend it. This increased motivation to attend the concert would stem from the daughter's perception that her parents threatened her once free behavior to go out with her friends. Because attending the concert was of some importance, the daughter wanted to re-establish her sense of freedom by ultimately going to the concert. It is likely that she also resented her parents, at least temporarily, for threatening this freedom.

In the current framework, the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960) can limit one's freedom of behavior when one receives a favor from someone. The normative pressure to reciprocate the favor would impose a restriction on an individual's freedom *not* to reciprocate (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). According to Brehm and Brehm, normative

³ The term "free behaviors" is used loosely by Brehm and Brehm (1981) to include such things as the freedom to act, think, believe, or feel certain things.

pressures are quite strong so it would take a fair amount of reactance to motivate an individual to violate the norm of reciprocity. Thus, it is likely that reactance would only be aroused as a result of receiving *large* favors in situations where it is of some cost to reciprocate. In other words, the freedom not to reciprocate must be somewhat important to the recipient and the favor-giver must impinge upon this freedom to a great extent by performing a substantial favor.

According to reactance theory, if these criteria are met, recipients would be motivated to avoid reciprocating (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Moreover, the favor-giver who caused such discomfort would likely be derogated by the recipients. As noted in the previous section, there is a host of literature demonstrating that individuals avoid overbenefiting and that receiving favors often leads to negative feelings, even resentment toward the favor-giver. Also mentioned earlier were the findings that inappropriate and/or unexpected help leads to less liking of a favor-giver. In another study that is consistent with reactance theory, Ladieu, Hanfman, and Dembo (1947, as cited in Fisher et al., 1981) found that injured and incapacitated individuals disliked their aid-givers to the extent that the help they received restricted their freedom of behavior. Thus, there is support for the suggestion that individuals may derogate a favor-giver who violates a norm and/or expectancy because they would feel that the favor restricted their freedom of behavior.

This noted, psychological reactance theory, like felt obligation, can provide a potential explanation for the attraction findings obtained by Morse et al. (1977). Perhaps reactance, and thus target derogation, only occurred in the double-violation condition for the same reason that felt obligation may have been greatest in this condition, namely, because the favor may have been seen as greatest and most out of the ordinary. As a

consequence, participants may have felt much pressure to reciprocate and thus perceived a greater threat to their freedom of behavior. They may have then derogated the favor-giver because he was to blame for the arousal of their reactance.

If this notion is correct, perhaps reactance occurred because participants in Morse et al.'s (1977) study, and in other similar investigations, were not aware that they would get the chance to reciprocate later. Had they known, they may have foreseen the opportunity to *avoid* reciprocating the favor. Therefore, mere knowledge that they would have been able to respond to the favor-giver would have allowed them to anticipate being able to re-gain their lost freedom. Consequently, they may not have felt resentment toward the benefactor because they would have been aware that s/he only restricted their freedom of behavior temporarily.

Thus, although for very different reasons, reactance would predict the same pattern of favor-giver evaluations as that suggested by felt obligation theory. Both would expect derogation of a favor-giver to occur only when a favor is perceived as large, as when a norm and/or expectation is violated. Moreover, it would be consistent with both theories to expect that dislike of a favor-giver would only take place when individuals do not perceive an opportunity to reciprocate. Again, some evidence of this has been noted earlier.

Due to their similarity, it is important to compare and contrast psychological reactance and felt obligation. They are similar in that they are both products of the norm of reciprocity. Moreover, they generate essentially the same predictions regarding attraction toward a favor-giver. It is clear, however, that they differ in their most important aspect: the motivational component. As noted, psychological reactance is a

strong urge to avoid reciprocity behavior whereas felt obligation promotes an urge to go to great lengths to reciprocate. Thus, the two mechanisms involve completely different motivations and subsequent reciprocity behavior. The predicted *emotional* experiences arising from these very different motivations, however, are nearly identical. Feelings such as distress, frustration, or resentment toward a favor-giver could logically arise from either type of motivation if an opportunity to reciprocate freely is thwarted or unavailable. However, these reactions are only secondary while the motivations toward certain reciprocity behavior are the essence of felt obligation and psychological reactance.

In fact, Brehm (1966) and others suggest that the key indication of reactance arousal is engagement in the once free behavior. In the current context, the behavior would be less than appropriate reciprocity. Reactance theorists typically believe that it is not *essential* for derogation to occur because it is not instrumental in the reduction of reactance (Brehm & Cole, 1966; Worchel & Andreoli, 1974). The definition of reactance refers strictly to the motivation to engage in certain behaviors that restore freedom. There is no indication that certain affective consequences *must* occur as a result of reactance. They are simply common by-products.

Thus, the best indication of whether reactance or felt obligation results from receiving a favor is the degree to which individuals are motivated to reciprocate the favor. Felt obligation theory would clearly predict high reciprocity as a response to receiving large favors, whereas the theory of psychological reactance would predict that individuals would reciprocate the *least* when favors are large. Because a favor is perceived as quite out of the ordinary when an expectation and/or norm violation takes place, feelings of reactance and felt obligation would lead to very different reciprocity behavior in this

circumstance. If felt obligation is experienced, an individual would be inclined to pay back the violating favor-giver quite generously in order to relieve an uncomfortable feeling of indebtedness. However, if reactance is experienced, participants would be more inclined to restore their freedom of action by engaging in the threatened behavior, i.e., minimal or no reciprocity.

Thus, reactance cannot explain the reciprocity findings obtained by Morse et al. (1977). Reactance theory would have expected participants to reciprocate the least to the quizmaster who violated both a norm and an expectation. However, not only did reciprocity fail to decrease for the violation conditions, but expectancy violations even generated more reciprocity. Thus, the reciprocity data from this study are clearly more consistent with felt obligation. Therefore, although reactance theory can be used to explain Morse et al.'s attraction findings, it fits the overall data quite poorly since it predicts reciprocity findings antithetical to those obtained in the study.

However, some other investigations have found that individuals do avoid reciprocating large favors under reactance-arousing conditions (Brehm & Cole, 1966; Schopler & Thompson, 1968; Worchel, Andreoli, & Archer, 1976). Schopler and Thompson (1968) found that individuals reciprocated inappropriate favors less than appropriate favors. As mentioned earlier, in their study, the favor-giver gave the participant a rose in either an appropriate or inappropriate situation. Following this nice gesture, this "unemployed salesman" asked participants if they would be willing to hand-wash a new blouse that was on the market in order to test it for durability. Participants then indicated how many consecutive days they would be willing to do so. Those in the inappropriate (formal) favor condition offered to wash the blouse much less than those in

the appropriate (informal) favor condition. This is precisely what reactance theory would predict.

Brehm and Cole (1966) found that receiving a counternormative favor even led to less reciprocity than receiving no favor at all, but only when importance of behavioral freedom was high. In this experiment, participants received a free soft drink from a confederate posing as another participant. This was an especially inappropriate and unexpected favor because the confederate did not even buy one for himself. Importance of behavioral freedom was manipulated by telling the participants that it was either important or not important to be able to report an accurate first impression of the confederate. It was suggested that this freedom of evaluation was threatened when the confederate provided the favor. Following this, participants evaluated the confederate and were then given a chance to reciprocate the favor. The experimenter asked the participant and the confederate if one of them could sort some papers for her. She then placed the stack of papers in front of the confederate and observed how long it took the participant to join in and help.

As expected, when importance was high, lower reciprocity took place when the participant received a soft drink than when no favor was provided. However, as mentioned earlier, derogation of the favor-giver did not occur as reactance theory might predict. But, again, this is not surprising since participants in the high importance conditions were urged to be unbiased in their evaluations. They were even told that accuracy of first impressions was associated with success in life. Therefore, Brehm and Cole's study may still be considered supportive of the tenets of reactance theory because the measurement of attraction was invalid due to this methodological flaw.

In a similar study, Worchel et al. (1976) also found some evidence for decreased reciprocity under reactance-arousing conditions. However, this effect only occurred when a certain type of attribution was made for the favor. Worchel et al. manipulated importance of behavioral freedom in about the same way that Brehm and Cole did. Later, the participant was asked to administer a picture-identifying task to the confederate. The confederate appeared to win some money for her performance on the task. She then gave half of her winnings to the participant. Thus, in all conditions the confederate provided this somewhat unusual favor. Later in the session, the experimenter gave the confederate and the subject each a stack of data sheets to sort. The confederate received a stack about four times the size of that received by the subject. The reciprocity measure was whether or not the participant offered to help the confederate.

Worchel et al. expected reciprocity to be less likely in the high importance condition than in the low importance condition. Interestingly, they found that this effect only emerged when participants were led to believe that the confederate's favor occurred as a result of a special relationship between them (unique interaction attribution condition). The study also supported reactance predictions of attraction toward the favor-giver. Worchel et al. found that evaluations of the favor-givers were less favorable when it was important to rate them accurately than when it was not important. This occurred even when specific attributions for the favor were not induced. Interestingly, derogation took place in spite of the fact that this study had the same methodological flaw as the Brehm and Cole study. Overall, there is a fair amount of research that supports reactance theory predictions.

Summary and Theoretical Considerations

Attraction Toward the Favor-Giver

Summary of Mechanisms. Three mechanisms have been proposed as possible explanations for the reason(s) individuals might derogate someone who provides a favor that is out of the ordinary, such as one that involves norm/expectancy violations. Unpredictability, felt obligation, and reactance theories have all been discussed as potential mechanisms involved in this process. The unpredictability mechanism suggests that derogation occurs because the favor-giver is perceived as unpredictable and this characteristic is considered to be a negative attribute. The felt obligation mechanism suggests that the favor-giver is liked less because large favors are capable of producing uncomfortable feelings of moral obligation to reciprocate. The reactance mechanism suggests that the favor-giver is resented because s/he restricts the recipient's freedom of reciprocity behavior.

Potential Moderators. Norm and expectancy relevant behavior have been discussed at length to be potential variables involved in the three processes. There are other variables that may be involved as well. As mentioned earlier, knowledge regarding any potential reciprocity opportunities may be a key factor. If recipients are not aware of any future opportunities to reciprocate a large favor, very negative reactions should result from either felt obligation or reactance. If the chance to reciprocate is anticipated, however, individuals should not experience such negative reactions from these mechanisms. Knowledge of a reciprocity opportunity does not have implications for the unpredictability mechanism, however. This mechanism simply suggests that a favor-giver

would be disliked to the extent that s/he violates norms and/or expectations, regardless of whether an opportunity to reciprocate is available or not.

If the unpredictability mechanism is operating, it should also be valuable to consider individual differences in tolerance of ambiguous people or situations. Budner's (1962) concept of "intolerance of ambiguity," then, should be relevant to the involvement of unpredictability in reactions to a favor-giver. To the extent that perceived unpredictability might mediate the relationship between norm/expectation violations and derogation of a favor-giver, intolerance of ambiguity should play a role. Specifically, individuals who are intolerant of ambiguity should derogate the violating favor-giver more than those who are tolerant. Thus, intolerance of ambiguity may be an important personality characteristic involved in such responses.

It is also likely that individual differences in the value placed on the norm of reciprocity might play an important role. Although the reciprocity norm is strong and may even be ubiquitous, individuals probably differ in the degree to which they value it. Individuals' belief in the reciprocity norm should primarily have implications for felt obligation. To the extent that felt obligation is involved, individuals placing high importance in the reciprocity norm should derogate a favor-giver more under the relevant circumstances than individuals who do not value the norm as much. It is also possible that reactance may produce these same results as well.

Also mentioned earlier, the perceived importance of freedom of reciprocity behavior is another factor to be considered. Its implications have already been discussed with regard to reactance. Brehm (1966) and Brehm and Brehm (1981) consider it to be an important instigator of reactance. Perceived importance may be a meaningful variable

involved in felt obligation as well, but for different reasons. Specifically, if individuals feel a moral obligation to reciprocate favors, then it is likely that they would prefer to have freedom in their reciprocity behavior. Thus, theory would suggest that importance is a *cause* of psychological reactance, whereas it may be a *consequence* of feelings of obligation. Either way, greater importance placed on the freedom of reciprocity should be associated with greater derogation of the favor-giver when the favor is seen as large and either reactance or felt obligation are elicited.

Sufficient Number of Violations. As mentioned earlier, it is also important to consider the possibility that derogation of a favor-giver may occur when only one violation takes place. Research in support of this possibility was discussed above. Only one investigation (Morse et al., 1977) found that both an expectancy and a norm violation were essential. Therefore, it is very possible that a single norm or expectancy violation alone might be sufficient in generating perceptions of unpredictability, felt obligation, or reactance.

Threshold versus Additive Effects. This raises another issue, the issue of additive versus threshold effects.⁴ A high threshold of tolerance effect for attraction toward the favor-giver appeared to emerge in Morse et al.'s (1977) study. Specifically, attraction was only low in the double-violation condition while the single and no violation condition means did not differ. However, research that finds derogation to result from a single violation implies that either a low threshold or an additive pattern is more plausible. In the case of a low threshold effect, single and double violations should generate the same degree of derogation. Thus, an interaction would result. If the effects are additive,

⁴ Brehm and Brehm (1981) also raise this unresolved issue with regard to reactance.

however, two main effects would emerge. In other words, each transgression would be sufficient in leading to less liking of the favor-giver but a double-violation would generate even more derogation.

An Alternative Mechanism: Ulterior Motive Attributions. The current investigation focuses on testing three potential mechanisms that may account for the derogation of a violating favor-giver. However, there are at least a few other plausible mechanisms. One of these is the suggestion that derogation only results when recipients believe that the donor had an ulterior motive for providing such a large favor. It is possible that a violating supervisor would only be disliked if recipients assume that the favor is the result of an expectation to get something in return.

A study by Brounstein and Sigall (1977, as cited in Brehm & Brehm, 1981) supports this ulterior motive explanation. In the study, a confederate provided a favor to the participant. The researchers had the confederate's pay either appear to be dependent on the participant's evaluation of the favor-giver or not dependent on it. Dependency had no effect on liking when the favor was performed before the dependency manipulation. However, when the favor was performed after the manipulation, high dependency led to decreased liking. It is likely that in this latter condition, participants perceived an ulterior motive while receiving the favor from someone who would later benefit from the recipient's evaluation.

The perception of an ulterior motive could generate derogation via many processes, such as attributing negative characteristics (e.g., selfishness) to the donor or experiencing a higher degree of reactance or felt obligation. For example, the perception of an ulterior motive might cause increased psychological reactance because the recipient

learns that the favor-giver is definitely trying to influence his/her behavior. Alternatively, the perception of ulterior motive might increase felt obligation because one might feel more obligated to reciprocate if it is clearly expected by the donor.

Although the ulterior motive mechanism is plausible, it is not compatible with most previous research. An ulterior motive is unlikely to have been perceived in most of the studies that have found derogation of a violating favor-giver. For example, in Worchel and Andreoli's (1974) study, efforts were made to minimize any ulterior motive attributions by leading participants to believe that the confederate did not know what type of interaction they would have together later. Also, in Morse et al.'s (1977) quiz show study, participants completed the measure of attraction *before* learning that the quizmaster wanted something in return. However, in Kiesler's (1966) study, one of the attraction measures did follow the receipt of the favor so it is possible that recipients believed that their partner provided the favor in order to receive a positive evaluation. The ulterior motive mechanism is most likely to have been in operation in the Schopler and Thompson (1968) study because the inappropriate favor was provided by a salesman, albeit an unemployed one, introducing a new product.

Thus, although it is unlikely to have been responsible for derogation in most studies, the perception of an ulterior motive causing negative reactions remains plausible. In order to prevent the operation of this mechanism, the current investigation took efforts to minimize the possibility that recipients might attribute the favor to an ulterior motive.

There is also a chance that other types of attributions for the favor may be responsible for the derogation of a favor-giver. However, research on attributions of a favor provided by an expectancy/norm violator is limited and very inconsistent, so no

predictions can be made (Worchel & Andreoli, 1974; Worchel et al., 1976). Nevertheless, to explore some of these possibilities, the current investigation did include a supplementary measure of attributions for the favor.

A Second Alternative Mechanism: Threat to Self-Esteem. Another potential mechanism might be a threat to self-esteem that individuals may experience upon receiving large favors (see Fisher et al., 1981). The receipt of help may generate perceptions of failure, inferiority, and/or dependence, which could potentially lead to other negative responses such as disliking the favor-giver. It is reasonable, then, that one might not like someone who does not think highly of him/her.

Some past research is consistent with this notion. Some of the evidence for this process comes from studies finding that individuals seek less help from physically attractive (Nadler, 1979, as cited in Fisher et al., 1981) or similar donors (Nadler, Fisher, & Streufert, 1976). If threat to self-esteem were not an issue, these donor characteristics should not matter much.

Also, other work has found that recipients accept less help on ego-involving tasks than on non-central tasks (Gergen, Morse, & Kristeller, 1973, as cited in Fisher et al., 1981). The authors suggest that individuals are uncomfortable receiving help on a task that is important to them. Clearly self-esteem loss would be more of a threat when tasks are relevant.

This avoidance of help on ego-involving tasks has been shown to particularly occur for recipients high in self-esteem (Tessler & Schwartz, 1972; Wallston, 1976, as cited in Fisher et al., 1981). Also, high self-esteem people seek help more frequently when they are aware that many others also needed help on the same task (Nadler & Porat, 1978,

Tessler & Schwartz, 1972, as cited in Fisher et al.). Thus self-esteem does appear to be involved and individuals with high self-esteem may engage in self-esteem maintenance strategies by only accepting help when it is less threatening to do so.

Recipients have also been found to obtain more help and like favor-givers more when help is offered, rather than when it must be requested (Broll, Gross, & Piliavin, 1974; Piliavin & Gross, 1977). It is likely that recipients would experience greater threat to self-esteem when help must be sought out by them. Moreover, when recipients have greater perceptions of need, they tend to seek help less, have more negative attitudes about receiving help, and have less attraction toward the source of their help (Calhoun, Dawes, & Lewis, 1972, Franklin, 1975, Mikesell & Calhoun, 1971, as cited in Fisher et al., 1981; Morse & Gergen, 1971). These reactions might occur as a result of embarrassment stemming from their high need.

And, as mentioned above, recipients who are anonymous or who are not expecting to meet their helper are more likely to request favors. It is possible that recipients feel less threat to self-esteem when they do not have to face their benefactor. Thus, there is much research consistent with the notion that perceived threat to self-esteem may affect reactions to offers of help.

However, threat to self-esteem is not likely to have driven the derogation of the violating favor-givers in most of the previous research discussed earlier. Given the nature of the favor manipulations, the favors that were given (e.g., receiving an extra research credit, receiving a flower, or receiving help on an easy paper sorting task) did not imply that the recipient was substandard in any way (Clark & Mills, 1979; Schopler & Thompson, 1968; Worchel & Andreoli, 1974).

It is possible, however, that a threat to self-esteem mechanism was in operation in the Morse et al. (1977) study. In that study, the contestants were probably not aware of their performance relative to others. And more importantly, the quizmaster provided hints to help the contestants answer the questions correctly. Although this took place in every condition, participants might have been especially likely to perceive failure when the quizmaster both broke the rules and behaved out of character to provide these contestants with help. Perhaps the contestants believed that other previous participants did not need the hints that they were given. Thus, the operation of a threat to self-esteem mechanism may have occurred. However, it should also be noted that hint-giving was a standard feature of these types of contests. One might argue that threat to self-esteem from the expectancy and norm violating quizmaster would be less likely to occur because hints were expected and normative to some extent. Nevertheless, the current investigation took efforts to reduce the potential for self-esteem threat by informing participants in all conditions that their performance was comparable to that of previous participants.

A Third Alternative Mechanism: Derogation by Association. Another potential mechanism involves negative affective responses that may arise from having associated with an expectancy or norm violator. This is particularly relevant for norm violations. Perhaps a recipient might feel that the favor-giver made him/her an "accomplice" in the norm violations that took place in providing the favor.

In Morse et al.'s (1977) study, the contestant may have felt guilty or uncomfortable as a result of perceiving him/herself as playing a role in the rule-breaking. However, this explanation cannot account for the derogation of an expectancy violator unless the recipient does not want to be part of the donor's unpredictability. Overall, the derogation

by association mechanism may have been responsible for the quizmaster attraction findings in Morse et al.

Due to the nature of the favors provided in the other investigations on reactions to a violating favor-doer, the possibility that the recipients felt like an accomplice in a negative act was minimal. This is simply because the favors in the violation conditions did not involve breaking any specifically stated rules and were thus not illicit in any way. Although it deserves mention, this is an unlikely explanation for the derogation of a violating favor-giver in most previous research.

Operation of More Than One Mechanism. Additional theoretical issues also deserve some attention. For instance, although each of the primary mechanisms discussed can sufficiently account for benefactor derogation, it is also possible that more than one mechanism can operate simultaneously. For example, it may be that derogation often results from both felt obligation *and* the target's perceived unpredictability. Similarly, derogation may occur as a result of both reactance and perceived unpredictability. It is unlikely that individuals would simultaneously experience both reactance and felt obligation, however, due to their incompatible motivations. Nevertheless, the other two combinations are very possible.

It is also possible that various combinations of the primary and alternative mechanisms can co-occur or even be more directly related to each other. For example, it was mentioned that there is a possibility that perceptions of an ulterior motive might cause increased psychological reactance or felt obligation. Of course, the independent operation of more than one mechanism is also plausible. The current research focuses only on the initial three mechanisms described while attempting to minimize the operation of any

alternative mechanisms. Therefore, only simultaneous operation among these three mechanisms is tested in the current investigation.

Thus, in considering attraction toward an expectancy/norm violating favor-giver, one should take all of the following into account: potential mechanisms involved; knowledge regarding a reciprocity opportunity; intolerance of ambiguity; norm of reciprocity beliefs; importance of free reciprocity behavior; single versus double violation effects; additive versus threshold effects; and the possibility of simultaneous operation of more than one mechanism.

Reciprocity Toward the Favor-Giver

Only two of the three theories can make predictions about reciprocity. The unpredictability perspective has no basis for making any predictions regarding reciprocity. It is possible that unpredictability might be negatively correlated with reciprocity but this not need to be shown for the theory to be supported. Reciprocity behavior is a critical outcome, however, in determining whether felt obligation or reactance mechanisms are at work. One assumption is that a favor will be perceived as larger when a favor-doer violates a norm and/or expectancy. Felt obligation theory would suggest that the greater a favor is, the more individuals will seek to fulfill their obligation to reciprocate. Thus, when a favor-giver breaks rules or expectations in providing the favor, greater reciprocity should be observed. Reactance, however, would predict the opposite pattern. Larger favors should generate the least reciprocity, due to the recipient's desire to re-establish freedom of behavior.

As previously mentioned, mixed results on reciprocity are evident in the literature. Moreover, none of the mechanisms can completely account for the pattern obtained by

Morse et al. (1977). Thus, it is important to examine the operation of both felt obligation and reactance simultaneously with the appropriate related variables discussed above in order to gain a clearer picture of which process(es) take place.

The Current Investigation

The purpose of the current investigation was to conduct a conceptual replication of Morse et al.'s (1977) study with some extensions that permitted examination of the three potential underlying mechanisms described above. To do this, participants were told that they would participate in a "business-setting simulation" during which they would be assigned the role of "worker." They were further informed that each worker had a "supervisor" (really the experimenter) who was in charge of paying the worker for his/her work product. The supervisor always appeared to pay the participant very generously. Expectations and norms regarding payment were manipulated in a manner similar to that used by Morse et al.

Moreover, an additional manipulation regarding participants' knowledge of a future opportunity to reciprocate was included. Upon receiving the supervisor's generous payment, participants were either told nothing about a chance to reciprocate or were told that they would later get the chance to pay the supervisor for participation in an unrelated task.

Following the supervisor's apparent allocation, participants were asked to evaluate the supervisor. Then they were all given the opportunity to reciprocate the favor by paying the supervisor for the unrelated task. Attraction and reciprocity toward the favor-giver were the major dependent variables, as in previous research.

Various additional measures were included to further explore the implications of the three mechanisms for evaluations of a favor-giver. To further test the unpredictability mechanism, items relating to unpredictability were included in the supervisor evaluation and participants' intolerance of ambiguity was measured. To further test felt obligation

and reactance, a questionnaire assessing norm of reciprocity beliefs was included along with a measure of importance of the freedom of reciprocity. Additionally, measures of temporary affect and favor attributions were included for exploratory reasons.

The major predictions made by each of the three mechanisms are summarized in **Table 1.1**. However, for simplification, these predictions assume that the double-violating favor-giver is perceived differently than the single-violating favor-giver (i.e., an additive effect or a high threshold effect). As discussed above, the low threshold explanation may suggest otherwise.

Table 1.1**Summary of Main Predictions**

Mechanism	Attraction Predictions	Reciprocity Predictions	Additional Predictions
Unpredictability as a Negative Attribute	lowest attraction in double-violation conditions, regardless of prior knowledge of reciprocity	no predictions	--highest perceived unpredictability in double-violation conditions --unpredictability as a significant mediator of effects on attraction --findings should especially hold for participants high on intolerance of ambiguity
Felt Obligation	lowest attraction in double-violation, no prior knowledge condition	most reciprocity double-violation conditions	--findings should especially hold for participants who highly value norm of reciprocity --perhaps especially true for participants who place high importance in freedom of reciprocity
Psychological Reactance	lowest attraction in double-violation, no prior knowledge condition	least reciprocity in double-violation conditions	--findings should especially hold for participants who place high importance in freedom of reciprocity

Chapter 2

METHOD

Participants

Participants consisted of 300 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Michigan State University. They participated in this study as partial fulfillment of one of their course requirements.

Overview

Participants were informed that they would be participating in a business simulation study during which they would play the role of worker. About half-way through the study, each worker received a generous payment from the supervisor for a work task that was completed. This generous payment favor either confirmed or violated a payment expectation (when one was given) and was either in accord with or against a payment rule that the supervisor was instructed to follow (when one was given). Participants were later given a chance to evaluate the supervisor and reciprocate the favor. Some participants had prior knowledge of this opportunity to reciprocate, while others did not know ahead of time.

Design

The basic design was a 3 (expectation) x 3 (normative standard) x 2 (knowledge of opportunity to reciprocate) between-subjects factorial. The expectation manipulation had three levels: strict, generous, or no payment expectations. For the norm manipulation,

participants were led to believe that the supervisor was instructed to follow a strict payment rule, a generous payment rule, or no rule at all. With regard to the third independent variable, participants either had or did not have prior knowledge of their subsequent opportunity to reciprocate. In all conditions, participants received a generous payment from the supervisor. Thus, the expectation and norm conditions included violation, confirmation, and no information control conditions. Refer to **Table 2.1** below for a listing of the manipulations and measures in the order that they were presented to the participants.

Table 2.1

Listing of Tasks, Materials, and Manipulations

1. Creativity task
2. Expectation manipulation
3. Norm manipulation
4. Rating and payment from supervisor
5. Knowledge of reciprocity opportunity manipulation
6. Manipulation checks for expectancy and norm
7. Measure of supervisor evaluation (attraction and unpredictability)
8. Measure of temporary affect
9. Manipulation checks for knowledge of reciprocity opportunity
10. Measure of importance of freedom of reciprocity
11. Measure of reciprocity
12. Measure of attributions
13. Measure of belief in the norm of reciprocity
14. Measure of intolerance of ambiguity
15. Measure of suspicion

Materials and Procedure

Introduction by Experimenter. Participants arrived in groups of five and were welcomed by one of three female experimenters who introduced the study to them. They were told that they would be participating in a "business simulation" and that they would be playing the role of "workers" in a workplace. They were further told that each worker would be assigned to his/her own "supervisor." Participants were informed that the supervisors were actually other undergraduate students who volunteered to participate in a number of these sessions for extra credit. They were led to believe that these supervisors were waiting in a nearby room. In actuality, there were no supervisors.

The experimenter told the participants that they had been randomly assigned to be part of a 2-person, separate work space, business simulation. In doing so, they would be working in worker-supervisor pairs but would not meet or have any face-to-face contact with their supervisor. Specifically, each worker was to perform his/her duties in a separate cubicle in one room, while the supervisors sat in separate cubicles in a different room to perform their supervisory duties. To justify this worker-supervisor separation, participants were told that the goal of that particular simulation was to minimize bias on the part of the supervisor. In order to sound more convincing, the experimenter mentioned that other types of simulations were also being conducted where the workers interact with each other or with their supervisors.

Participants were further informed that, in order to make the business simulation more realistic, they would even get paid for their work. They were told that their supervisors would be using raffle tickets as payment and that participants could win up to three prizes of \$25 each with the raffle tickets earned during the study. A random drawing

was to be held at the end of the semester to award these prizes.

After signing a statement of informed consent, they were given more information about the study. The experimenter told the participants that the main purpose of the study was to examine the capacity to be creative in different work settings. As the workers, then, they would be asked to perform a creativity task, which involved drawing three pictures. Their end products would then be slipped in an envelope and taken to their respective supervisors. Participants were told that each supervisor's role was to rate his/her worker's project on creativity and then pay the worker in raffle tickets. The supervisor would use a -5 (very negative) to +5 (very positive) scale to report his/her subjective reaction to the work and then decide how much to pay the worker.

Work Task. The researcher handed the worker three sheets of paper with random markings on them (e.g., one with an incomplete circle with a diagonal line crossing through it). She instructed the participants to incorporate the markings on each page into as creative a picture as possible. They were told that they would have ten minutes to complete all three. The experimenter explained to the participants that there were no right or wrong answers because it was a completely subjective task. The experimenter continued:

Your supervisor's going to rate your work simply based on his/her own *opinions* of what's creative—and we've noticed that that varies a lot depending on which supervisor you have.... Because creativity is so subjective, you probably won't be able to predict how high of a rating score you'll receive. This is also true in many real business settings, like advertising agencies, where workers may complete a project and have no idea how clever their boss will think it is.

This extensive explanation was included in an attempt to reduce any pay expectations that workers may form on the basis of their perception of the quality of their work or their creative ability.

The researcher then gave the drawing materials to the workers and told them that she would be leaving the room so they could complete the tasks in private. Participants were instructed not to talk to each other at this time or during any other point in the session. To further minimize contact, they were completely separated by walls and curtains. Upon leaving the room, the researcher led the participants to believe that s/he was going to make sure all of the supervisors were in the other room waiting.

After ten minutes had passed, the experimenter returned and asked the participants to finish up their pictures and put them into an envelope labeled with their worker number. The experimenter then collected the envelopes and appeared to deliver them to their supervisors, when in fact, she just dropped them off in another room. She then returned and said that it would take a few minutes for the supervisors to make their ratings and assign payment. She said that she would then go pick up an envelope for each one of them from their assigned supervisor. In the envelope would be a slip of paper with a number from -5 to +5 indicating their creativity rating. Also enclosed in the envelope would be the number of raffle tickets that they were awarded by their supervisor. While they appeared to be waiting for the supervisors to evaluate the pictures, the expectation and norm manipulations were introduced.

Manipulation of Expectation. The experimenter introduced the supervisor expectancy manipulation first. The researcher handed each of the participants a "Supervisor Record Sheet," which ostensibly was a record of the ratings and, in the experimental conditions, the number of raffle tickets that their own supervisor had assigned to previous workers (see Appendix A for examples of these record sheets). The researchers explained that it would be the job of the workers to record the rating and

payment they were about to receive on the record sheet. Participants were then asked to look over the sheet so that they fully understand the information that would be requested of them. This was done mainly to call participants' attention to the expectancy information.

Participants in the experimental expectation conditions received one of two versions of this record sheet. Each illustrated that the supervisor previously gave creativity ratings from -2 to +2 for the efforts of the ten workers previously assigned to them. One of the versions, however, showed that the supervisor had assigned anywhere from eight to ten raffle tickets in the past (generous expectation condition), while the other showed that the supervisor had assigned only one to three raffle tickets in the past (strict expectation condition). The researcher went on to say "We are noticing that some supervisors are strict in terms of worker pay (giving out only a couple of the raffle tickets) while others are generous (giving out most of the ten available tickets)." Participants were then told that they could glance over the last column of their supervisor's "Record Sheet" if they wanted to see how strict or generous their own supervisor had been in past sessions. For the no expectation control, participants received a similar supervisor record sheet, but their version only had past creativity ratings on it without any payment information indicated. Each participant was presented with a new record sheet with all of the numbers circled in pencil in different handwriting in order to make it more realistic.

Manipulation of Norm. In the no norm condition, participants were told "There aren't any rules about how strict or generous your Supervisor should be in paying you; so your Supervisor can pay you with as little or as many of the available raffle tickets as he or she wants to." In the strict and generous norm conditions, they were told:

This particular work session will be one in which your Supervisor will not be allowed to assign payment freely. Rather, to make sure we simulate a particular kind of company atmosphere, your supervisor has been instructed to be strict (generous) in assigning you raffle tickets for your work. Company regulations in this simulation dictate that your supervisor allocate raffle tickets specifically within the range of about 1 to 3 (8 to 10) raffle tickets for your payment. It is completely against company rules for your supervisor to be generous (strict) in paying you.

It was further explained that although the supervisor's payment decisions would be made in private, as they are in many real business settings, s/he has been explicitly instructed to follow company rules.

Rating and Payment. Following the expectation and norm manipulations, the researcher left the room once again and returned with the rating and payment envelopes. Participants opened their envelopes in private and read a folded slip of paper indicating, in all cases, that their creativity rating was +1. Each participant also found a generous payment of nine raffle tickets in his/her envelope. They were asked to transfer this information onto the record sheet and set their tickets aside. The experimenter then collected the record sheets.

Manipulation of Knowledge of Opportunity to Reciprocate. Following this, knowledge of reciprocity was manipulated. Participants in the prior knowledge condition were told:

By the way, although your supervisors are not aware of this, the tables will be turned later and *you're* actually going to get to assign payment to *them* for their participation in another task. I'll give you the full details about this later. I just thought I'd mention it now because this is the first session that we're going to do this. Your supervisors don't even know about it yet. You'll be the first participants to get the chance to pay them like they've paid you. Both you and your supervisor are going to fill out a departmental survey later and you'll be in charge of assigning payment to both yourself and the supervisor.

The experimenter then told the participants that this opportunity would come after completing some of the written measures. Individuals in the no prior knowledge condition

were simply told that they and their supervisors would be filling out a departmental survey later in the session.

Expectancy and Norm Manipulation Checks. Participants were then asked to complete a brief questionnaire consisting of three manipulation check questions. They were asked to use a Likert-type scale from 1 (disagree very much) to 7 (agree very much) to express their agreement with the statements. The two statements of interest were “The supervisor behaved in accord with his/her past behavior” and “The supervisor followed the instructions s/he was given precisely as directed.” These were used to assess expectancy and norm manipulation effectiveness, respectively (refer to **Appendix B** for all written measures).

Measure of Supervisor Evaluation (Attraction and Unpredictability). The researcher then introduced the supervisor evaluation measure. She explained:

This information is useful because one of the goals of this research is to examine differences in supervisors' characteristics. Keep in mind that your ratings will *not* be used to judge your supervisor in any way. We're just interested in your perceptions of your supervisor's personality and working style. Your supervisors don't even know that they're being rated by their workers. In fact, they'll never even know that they've been evaluated or what scores they receive. We don't want them to know now that they'll be evaluated partly because we're afraid that might sway the decisions they make when performing their duties.

The experimenter then passed out the evaluation measure. It consisted of 22 sets of bipolar adjectives. Each pair was presented in 10-point semantic differential format with 0 attached to one adjective and 9 attached to its opposite. Five of these items were used by Morse et al. (1977) in their composite measure of attraction: unlikable-likable, mean-kind, helpful-unhelpful, unfriendly-friendly, and good-bad.⁵ Sixteen additional items

⁵ Morse et al. (1977) also used the dimension, good-looking—ugly, but this was eliminated in order to prevent confusion and/or suspicion in the participants due to the fact that they had not seen their supervisor.

were included to get a more complete picture of participants' perceptions of their supervisors, including perceptions of their supervisors' unpredictability and related characteristics. These additional adjective pairs were: straightforward-manipulative, dishonest-honest, easy-going-temperamental, mature-immature, annoying-pleasant, submissive-dominant, hostile-calm, stubborn-yielding, obedient-disobedient, predictable-unpredictable, impulsive-restrained, rational-irrational, inconsistent-consistent, typical-unusual, independent-conforming, and conventional-rebellious. While administering the evaluation measure, the experimenter informed the participants that she would be leaving to go administer the "departmental task" to the supervisors. She then pretended to do so.

Introduction of Departmental Task. Following participants' completion of the supervisor evaluation, the experimenter told them that she was going to stop the business simulation study for a few minutes to administer the departmental survey she mentioned earlier. She told participants that the ethics committee for the psychology department was interested in collecting data about how participants feel while they are participating in psychological research. The researcher explained that the psychology department supplied some of the researchers with this brief questionnaire and asked them to administer it in the middle of their experimental sessions. She apologized for the interruption and then administered the "departmental survey," which really consisted of a measure of temporary affect, manipulation check questions for knowledge of reciprocity, and a measure of importance behavioral freedom.

Measure of Temporary Affect. This measure was a version of Diener and Emmons's (1984) temporary mood state questionnaire. It consisted of nine mood adjectives for which participants were to indicate on a 7-point scale, from "not at all" to

"extremely much," the degree to which they were currently experiencing each mood. The moods consisted of happy, joyful, pleased, enjoyment/fun, unhappy, depressed, frustrated, worried/anxious, and angry/hostile.

Manipulation Check for Knowledge of Reciprocity. The supposed departmental questionnaire also addressed questions regarding payment in the current experiment in order to tap knowledge of reciprocity. Participants were asked to answer a couple of questions regarding their knowledge of their subsequent reciprocity opportunity. Specifically, they were asked if they would be receiving any compensation, who would be in charge of such compensation, and whether they would have a say in anyone else's pay. The question of interest was, "Will you have any say in how much anyone else will be paid for their participation in this departmental survey?" They could respond with answer choices, "yes," "no," or "don't know."

Measure of Importance of Freedom of Reciprocity. The theory of psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981) suggests that reactance will only occur if freedom of the threatened behavior is of some importance to the individual. Therefore, a measure assessing participants' perceived importance in their freedom to receive and have control over the raffle tickets was included as the third and final portion of the "departmental questionnaire." It consisted of three seven-point items ranging from "extremely unimportant" to "extremely important." These were, "How important is it for you to receive payment/compensation for completing this departmental task?" and "How important is it for you to have a say in how much payment/compensation you receive for completing this type of departmental task?" and "How important is it for you to have a say

in how much payment/compensation others will receive for competing this type of departmental task?"

Measure of Reciprocity. Following their completion of the departmental questionnaire, participants were given the chance to pay themselves and their supervisor for filling it out. The experimenter told them:

As I said, the supervisors are filling this out too even though it's not part of their commitment to this research project. Because it is something extra for them to do, we'd like to pay the supervisors for their participation in this departmental task. It's also something extra for you, so we think you should be able to decide if you would like some extra payment of this departmental task also.

The psychology department gave us a little extra money for collecting this data, but not much, so we decided to just add it to the money you can win with the raffle tickets and then assign payment in raffle tickets again. This is actually the first and only session where your particular supervisors will be earning raffle tickets too. We thought that since your supervisor decided how much payment you would receive during the business simulation study, that it would only be fair if you were in charge of assigning payment for the departmental task. So, I'm going to give you nine blank raffle tickets and ask you to decide how many of the nine you would like to give to your supervisor and put them in this envelope marked 'supervisor pay.' Although your supervisors weren't allowed to do this, you can keep whatever raffle tickets remain after you've paid the supervisor.... There aren't any rules for how you should assign payment so you're completely free to allocate the tickets however you want.

The reason participants were told that they can keep any remaining raffle tickets was to make this reciprocity be somewhat costly as it was in Morse et al. (1977). Another reason was to make the reciprocity decision more important to the participants.

Participants were also told that the supervisors would not be receiving the payment envelopes until after the experiment was over in case it might affect their behavior during the business simulation. In reality, this was said to reinforce the idea that the supervisors never had any knowledge about getting paid themselves. When the participants finished paying the supervisors, the experimenter collected the supervisors' envelopes and set them

aside. She then apologized for the interruption and appeared to resume the business simulation study. Participants were then asked to complete a final packet of questionnaires that was comprised of the measures described below.

Measure of Attributions. This measure was a free-response question asking the participants to write down why they think their supervisor gave them the specific amount of payment they had received. This question was intended to tap participants' payment attributions and other thoughts. It was also helpful in providing an indication of participants' suspicion.

Measure of Belief in the Importance of the Norm of Reciprocity. The next questionnaire assessed the extent to which participants valued the norm of reciprocity on a general level. The questionnaire pitted "repaying those who have been nice to you" against four other virtues. For each pair of virtues, participants were asked to indicate which was more important and to what degree. They did this by choosing one of ten points, with one virtue anchored at "0" and the other at "9."

Measure of Intolerance of Ambiguity. The next questionnaire was Budner's Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (1962). It asked participants to indicate on a 7-point Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) how much they agreed with 16 general statements regarding their tolerance/intolerance of ambiguous situations. Some examples are, "The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals, the better," "People who fit their lives to a schedule probably miss most of the joy of living," and "Often the most interesting and stimulating people are those who don't mind being different and original." The latter two are reverse-scored items.

Measure of Suspicion. As a final task, participants were asked to respond to some suspicion items. The most important item was, "Please describe, in your own words, what you believe was the purpose of the study in which you have just participated."

Following this, participants turned in their completed measures and were asked to fill out and turn in their raffle tickets. They were informed that they would be notified if they won a monetary prize. At that time, participants were thanked, debriefed, and dismissed.

Chapter 3

RESULTS

Pilot Tests

Believability of +1 Rating. A pilot test was conducted in order to be sure that participants in the actual study would believe that they deserved a +1 rating for creativity on the incomplete figure drawing tasks. Forty-four participants worked on the same drawing tasks as those in the actual study and then estimated the creativity score that they believed they would get from a supervisor based on those drawings. On a scale from -5 (very negative evaluation) to +5 (very positive evaluation), the average was +1.29. Thus, the closest round number would be +1, making that the optimal choice for believable false feedback.

Construction of Norm of Reciprocity Beliefs Questionnaire. A pre-test was used to construct the questionnaire assessing individuals' beliefs regarding the importance of the norm of reciprocity. Perceived importance of various virtues was assessed to find some that were similar in importance to repaying others. These were then all pitted against "repaying those who have been nice to you" and participants were asked to rate their *relative* importance. The reason participants were not just asked to rate the importance of this reciprocity virtue on its own is that ceiling effects may have been a problem. With the virtue anchored against similarly important virtues, a more sensitive and valid measure was expected. The final measure is in Appendix B.

However, the questionnaire may have been invalid in spite of these efforts because it produced no effects, including no correlation with actual reciprocity. Thus, the details

concerning the construction, hypotheses, and analyses regarding this questionnaire will not be discussed further.

Scenario Studies to Pretest Manipulations. Scenario versions of both the quiz show study (Morse et al., 1977) and the creativity task business simulation study were constructed. These were used to make sure that the expectation and norm manipulations for the business simulation were both effective and at least as strong as those used by Morse et al. The expectation manipulation was effective for both scenarios and was stronger for the business simulation. The norm manipulation in the business simulation, however, was both too weak and less effective than that in the quiz show scenario. A second version of the business scenario was created using stronger manipulations. The manipulation checks revealed that these changes were successful. Thus, these newly-constructed stronger manipulations were then used in the live study.

Manipulation Checks in the Present Study

Expectation Manipulation. An ANOVA revealed that the expectancy manipulation was successful, $F(2, 287) = 133.58, p < .0001$. On average, those in the expectancy confirmation condition (where the supervisor had given all generous payments in the past), agreed with the statement, "The supervisor behaved in accord with his/her past behavior." Those in the expectancy violation condition disagreed with the statement, on average. The means were 6.22 and 2.96, respectively, on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1, disagree very much, to 7, agree very much. The mean score for the no expectancy group was 5.83. A Tukey post-hoc test revealed that the mean in the expectancy violation condition was significantly different from that of both the expectancy confirmation condition and the control ($ps < .0001$). Interestingly, the post-hoc test also found that those in the expectancy control condition did not differ from those in the expectancy confirmation condition ($p = .19$). Thus, the supervisor was perceived as behaving consistently even in the absence of information regarding his/her consistently generous behavior.

Norm Manipulation. An ANOVA also revealed a successful norm manipulation, $F(2, 287) = 51.03, p < .0001$. On average, those in the norm confirmation condition (where the supervisor obeyed a generous payment rule) agreed with the statement, "The supervisor followed the instructions s/he was given precisely as directed." Those in the norm violation condition disagreed with the statement, on average. The means were 5.88 and 3.68, respectively, on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1, disagree very much, to 7, agree very much. The mean score for the no expectancy group was 5.71. A Tukey post-hoc test revealed that participants in the norm violation condition agreed with the

statement significantly less than those in either the norm confirmation condition or in the control (p s < .0001). Once again, those in the norm control condition did not differ from those in the norm confirmation condition on the manipulation check. Thus, the supervisor was perceived as behaving in a normative manner even in the absence of information regarding the operating norm.

Because the participants in the no norm and no expectation control conditions perceived the supervisor as being normative and consistent, respectively, data from these participants are not very informative. Therefore, for the sake of interest and practicality, the focus of the subsequent ANOVAs and simple effects tests will be on comparing the violation and confirmation conditions only.⁶ However, all effects were tested within the framework of the larger design using the pooled error term across all conditions. Also, contrasts with the appropriate control groups were performed where relevant.

Knowledge of Reciprocity Manipulation. The effectiveness of the knowledge of reciprocity manipulation was assessed by examining participants' responses to the item asking whether they would have any say in determining anyone else's pay during the session. Responses were coded as a 3-point scale, with 1 = "yes," 2 = "don't know," and 3 = "no." This variable was then entered as a dependent measure in an ANOVA. The

⁶ The confirmation conditions were chosen over the controls for two reasons. First, these conditions are more analogous to the violation conditions, thus allowing for more appropriate comparisons. The reason for this is that both the violation and confirmation conditions include information regarding the supervisor's previous behavior and both include a normative standard presented by the experimenter. The control conditions, however, alter the situation more drastically by presenting no expectancy and norm information at all. The second reason for using the confirmation conditions is that they provide increased confidence in understanding how the participants perceived the supervisor because the situations were *constructed* in order to elicit certain perceptions.

analysis revealed a significant difference between the prior knowledge and no prior knowledge conditions, $F(1, 256) = 16.74, p < .0001$.

The mean difference was quite small, however. Means for the no knowledge and knowledge groups were 2.85 and 2.51, respectively. Although more participants answered "no" in the no knowledge condition than in the prior knowledge condition, the majority of participants in both groups responded with a "no." Thus, there were many participants in the prior knowledge condition who incorrectly indicated that they would not have a say in anyone else's pay during the session. However, these errors were probably largely due to a misinterpretation of the manipulation check question. Participants appeared to be confused about this item because some of them left it blank or asked the experimenter in charge for help at this point in the study. Thus, the manipulation may have been stronger than would be suggested by participants' responses.

Construction of Attraction and Unpredictability Factors

The likability and unpredictability factors were constructed based on the results of a Principal Components Analysis with Varimax rotation with the number of factors specified as two.⁷ All 21 supervisor evaluation items were submitted to the analysis. The likability and unpredictability factors were the chief factors extracted, with eigenvalues of 5.19 and 4.60, respectively. The likability factor consisted of ten bipolar items with likable, kind, helpful, friendly, good, honest, easy-going, mature, pleasant, and calm on the positive poles. These items had factor loadings ranging from 0.42 to 0.82 after rotation. The internal consistency, assessed using Cronbach's alpha, was 0.87 for this attraction factor. The unpredictability factor consisted of seven items, namely, unpredictable, disobedient, unusual, rebellious, inconsistent, irrational, and impulsive on the high unpredictability poles. These items had factor loadings ranging from 0.61 to 0.82. Cronbach's alpha for these seven items was 0.85, also indicating high reliability of the measure. Refer to **Appendix C** for the rotated factor loadings for both factors.

⁷ To maximize power, control groups were included in this analysis and in the internal consistency and correlational analyses.

Unpredictability as a Negative Attribute: Attraction Findings

The first set of hypotheses to be tested are those related to Kiesler's (1973) ideas and the unpredictability mechanism. It was predicted that unpredictability would be perceived as a negative attribute and that individuals would derogate a favor-giver who violates norms/expectations because that person is perceived as unpredictable.

The first hypothesis to be tested was the suggestion that a favor-giver might be perceived as more unpredictable when s/he violates an expectation and/or a norm to provide the favor. To test this, a norm by expectation ANOVA was conducted with unpredictability as a dependent variable. Problem data were excluded from all analysis.⁸

Two main effects were revealed. As predicted by the hypothesis, those in the expectancy violation condition perceived the supervisor as more unpredictable than those in the expectancy confirmation condition, $F(1, 232) = 25.00, p < .0001$. The means were 4.77 and 3.50, respectively, on a 10-point scale. Similarly, participants in the norm violated condition rated the supervisor as more unpredictable than those in the norm followed condition, $F(1, 232) = 15.93, p < .0001$. These means were 4.60 and 3.62, respectively. No interaction was revealed, suggesting that the effects of these violations are additive. Consistent with the manipulation check results, contrast analyses revealed that the analogous expectancy control ($M = 3.40$) and norm control ($M = 3.75$) conditions did not differ from the expectancy and norm confirmation conditions, respectively ($ps = .99$ and $.45$).⁹

⁸ Because of the highly complicated and deceptive nature of the study, data from many participants had to be dropped from all analyses. Refer to **Appendix D** for details regarding these exclusions.

⁹ All contrasts for all analyses involved using F-tests but only ps were given for the sake of simplicity.

As indicated earlier, the unpredictability hypothesis would further suggest that the favor-giver would be liked less if s/he violates an expectation and/or a norm. An expectancy by norm by knowledge of reciprocity ANOVA was performed with supervisor attraction as the dependent measure. An analogous ANCOVA with unpredictability as a covariate was also performed to test for mediation. Unpredictability emerged as a significant covariate, $F(1, 232) = 4.24, p < .05$, but it did not eliminate any of the significant findings that emerged in the original ANOVA. In fact, including unpredictability as a covariate increased the F-values. Because the same pattern of results emerged for both analyses and unpredictability accounted for some of the variance, the results from the ANCOVA are discussed. Refer to Tables A-2 and A-3 in **Appendix E** for the ANOVA results.

The ANCOVA revealed some significant results, but all were antithetical to the unpredictability hypothesis as well as the felt obligation and reactance hypotheses. A main effect for expectancy revealed that participants liked their supervisor more when s/he violated an expectation ($M = 6.17$) than when s/he confirmed an expectation to be generous ($M = 5.53$), $F(1, 226) = 7.60, p < .01$. A main effect was also revealed for norm, $F(1, 226) = 5.81, p < .05$, such that participants rated their supervisor more favorably when s/he broke a rule in order to be generous ($M = 6.11$) than when s/he followed a rule to be generous ($M = 5.57$). These main effects were qualified by a significant expectancy by norm interaction, $F(1, 100) = 5.30, p < .05$. Adjusted cell means are shown in **Table 3.1**. The mean in the no expectancy, no norm group was 5.32. All means were on a 10-point scale from 0 to 9 with higher scores indicating more positive evaluations of the supervisor.

Simple effects tests to further explore this interaction revealed that it was due to greater liking of the supervisor in any of the violation conditions than in the double-confirmation condition ($ps \leq .001$). None of the violation conditions differed significantly from each other. Thus, the pattern reveals a low threshold effect, such that increased liking of the supervisor occurred to the same extent regardless of whether an expectation violation, a norm violation, or both took place.

Further analyses using contrasts revealed that attraction in the double-confirmation condition did not differ from that in the no expectancy, no norm control. Means for the single- and double-violation conditions were all higher than the control, but one of these differences was only marginally significant ($ps = .02$ to $.07$). Thus, a generous supervisor

Table 3.1

Attraction Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation and Norm with Unpredictability as a Covariate

Norm	Expectation	
	Confirmation	Violation
Confirmation	4.95 _a *	6.12 _b *
Violation	6.00 _b *	6.22 _b *

Note. Attraction was based on ten items, each ranging from 0 to 9. The means for the average score of these ten items are presented in the table. High scores indicate more attraction. Means that do not share subscripts differ significantly at $p < .05$. Means marked with a * are significantly different from reciprocity in the no expectation, no norm control ($M = 5.32$) at $p < .05$. A * indicates a marginally significant difference from the control.

was liked more when there was at least one violation of an expectation or a norm to be generous than when no information was given.

Thus, the patterns revealed by the simple effects and contrast analyses directly contradict the unpredictability hypothesis, the felt obligation and the reactance hypotheses. Although derogation did not take place in the expected cells, other evidence for the operation of each of the three mechanisms was still investigated.

Other than the expected derogation, the unpredictability hypothesis also predicted a negative correlation between unpredictability and likability to emerge. As predicted, a significant, albeit small, negative correlation was revealed, ($r = -0.13$, $p < .05$). However, in light of the evidence that perceived unpredictability was overlooked when participants received a large favor (i.e., in the violation conditions), correlational analyses were performed for the violation and no violation groups separately. For all conditions where at least one violation occurred, no correlation emerged ($r = .02$, $p = .80$). However, for those conditions where no violations took place, a highly negative correlation was revealed ($r = -.43$, $p < .0001$). Thus, it appears that participants disliked a supervisor who was perceived as unpredictable unless they benefited from his/her unpredictability.

Another prediction made by the hypothesis was that individuals scoring high on Budner's Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale (1962) would especially derogate the expectancy/norm violating favor-giver. In other words, this individual difference was originally expected to moderate the hypothesized derogation of the target. Although derogation did not take place in the appropriate conditions, intolerance of ambiguity was still examined.

A median split was used to divide high and low scorers on the scale and this dichotomous variable was entered into the expectation by norm by knowledge ANCOVA as another factor. Because unpredictability was not a significant covariate in this model, it was removed from the analysis. The only significant result involving intolerance of ambiguity was its three-way interaction with expectancy and knowledge, $F(1, 210) = 5.33, p < .05$. To examine this interaction more closely, separate ANOVAs were performed for each knowledge condition. A significant expectancy by intolerance of ambiguity simple interaction only emerged for participants who had no prior knowledge of a reciprocity opportunity, $F(1, 103) = 4.71, p < .05$. Means for this no knowledge group are presented in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2

Attraction Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation and Intolerance of Ambiguity under Conditions of No Prior Knowledge

Expectation	Intolerance of Ambiguity	
	Low	High
Confirmation	5.33 _a	5.43 _a
Violation	6.46 _b *	5.38 _a

Note. High scores indicate more attraction. Means that do not share subscripts differ significantly at $p < .05$. Means that do not share subscripts differ significantly at $p < .05$. Means marked with a * are significantly different from reciprocity in the no expectation control ($M = 5.04$) at $p < .05$.

As seen in the table, increased liking toward the expectancy violating supervisor disappears for people high on intolerance of ambiguity. Simple effects tests reveal that the mean in the low intolerance, expectancy violation condition was significantly greater than the other three ($ps < .05$). But this pattern did not emerge for norm nor did it emerge under conditions of prior knowledge. Also, it was expected that high intolerance individuals would like the violator less than the confirmer, but this did not occur.

Felt Obligation and Reactance: Attraction Findings

One of the major predictions of both the felt obligation and the reactance hypotheses was that the supervisor would be disliked most if s/he violated a norm and an expectation to help when the recipients were not aware that there would be an opportunity to reciprocate. As indicated in the previous section, derogation of the double-violator was not borne out. In fact, the opposite pattern emerged. Moreover, the three-way ANOVA and ANCOVA described above did not reveal the predicted expectation by norm by knowledge interaction. The only significant or marginally significant effects or interactions for likability were those indicated in the previous section, namely expectation and norm main effects qualified by an expectation by norm interaction. As mentioned, all of these patterns run counter to the felt obligation and reactance hypotheses as well as the unpredictability hypothesis.

To further test the reactance hypothesis, perceived importance of the freedom of reciprocity (i.e., having control over the raffle tickets) was included in the analysis. Reactance theory predicts that when freedom of behavior is considered important, more reactance will be aroused. In this case, that would result in greater dislike of the supervisor in the violation conditions. Importance of freedom of behavior was measured by taking the average of the three importance measures described earlier. A Principal Components analysis with Varimax rotation revealed that all three items loaded on the same factor, with loadings from .76 to .90. Cronbach's alpha for these items was 0.80, indicating high internal consistency. A median split was performed on the importance variable to make it dichotomous.

Subsequently, an expectation by norm by knowledge by importance ANCOVA was conducted for the attraction measure. Once again, unpredictability was entered as a covariate. The findings involving importance were a significant knowledge by importance interaction, $F(1, 208) = 4.53, p < .05$, and a significant expectation by norm by importance interaction, $F(1, 208) = 4.69, p < .05$.

Means for the knowledge by importance interaction are presented in Table 3.3. Simple effects tests revealed that the knowledge by importance interaction emerged due to less liking of the supervisor in the no prior knowledge, high importance condition than in the others ($ps < .05$). The remaining means were not significantly different from each other. Thus, individuals who highly valued their freedom to allocate tickets and had no prior knowledge of any reciprocity opportunity were least attracted to the supervisor. This pattern could represent a threshold of reactance or felt obligation pattern. In other

Table 3.3

Attraction Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Prior Knowledge of an Opportunity to Reciprocate and Importance of Freedom of Reciprocity with Unpredictability as a Covariate

Knowledge	Importance of Behavior	
	Low	High
No prior knowledge	6.01 _b	5.37 _a
Prior knowledge	5.81 _b	6.05 _b

Note. High scores indicate more attraction. Means that do not share subscripts differ significantly at $p < .05$.

words, it appears that both high importance and no prior knowledge were needed in order to exceed the threshold of reactance and/or felt obligation to lead to derogation.

As mentioned, an expectation by norm by importance interaction also emerged. Adjusted means are shown in **Table 3.4**. Simple effects tests were conducted for the high and low importance groups separately. Within the low importance group, participants liked the double-violating supervisor the most, but one of these differences was only marginally significant ($ps = .005$ to $.06$). No other significant differences emerged but the

Table 3.4

Attraction Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation, Norm, and Importance of Freedom of Reciprocity with Unpredictability as a Covariate

Norm	Expectation	
	Confirmation	Violation
Low Importance		
Confirmation	5.34 _a	5.90 _a
Violation	5.96 _a	6.64 _b *
High Importance		
Confirmation	4.36 _a *	6.28 _b *
Violation	5.97 _b	6.10 _b *

Note. High scores indicate more attraction. Within the low importance group, means that do not share subscripts differ significantly at $p \leq .06$. In the high importance group, means that do not share subscripts differ significantly $p < .05$. Means marked with a* are significantly different from reciprocity in the no expectation, no norm control ($M = 5.25$) at $p < .05$.

trend of the means suggests that participants tended to like the double-confirming supervisor the least with an increase in liking for each violation committed. Contrary to the reactance and felt obligation predictions, participants who placed high importance in their freedom to allocate tickets liked the supervisor less when s/he confirmed both a norm and an expectation to help than when one or more violations took place ($p_s < .005$). The single- and double-violation cells did not differ significantly.

Another simple effects test revealed that high importance participants liked the double-confirming supervisor even less than their low importance counterparts ($p < .05$). There was a marginally significant difference between high and low importance participants' ratings of the double-violating supervisor ($p = .07$). Thus, within the double-confirming and double-violating conditions only, the patterns are consistent with reactance and felt obligation. However, as a whole, these data do not support the reactance hypothesis because derogation did not take place in the double-violation condition for either the low or high importance groups.

The adjusted mean in the no norm, no expectancy control was 5.25. Contrast analyses revealed that the low importance participants liked only the double-violating supervisor significantly more than the supervisor in the control ($p < .005$). High importance participants liked only the expectancy violators more than the supervisor in the control ($p_s < .05$). They liked the double-confirming supervisor significantly less than the supervisor in the control ($p < .01$).

Felt Obligation and Reactance: Reciprocity Findings

Unlike the unpredictability hypothesis, the felt obligation and reactance hypotheses made predictions regarding reciprocity as well as attraction. Concerning reciprocity, the felt obligation hypothesis expected participants to reciprocate the most toward the supervisor when the favor was perceived as large, i.e., when the supervisor violated an expectation and/or a norm to do the favor. The reactance hypothesis predicted the opposite pattern; that participants would reciprocate the least when violations were committed. It further suggested that reciprocity for large favors would be especially low for individuals who placed high importance in their freedom to allocate raffle tickets.

An expectation by norm by knowledge by importance of behavioral freedom ANOVA was performed to simultaneously examine these hypotheses. Reciprocity was measured as the number of raffle tickets awarded to the supervisor subtracted by the number of tickets kept for oneself. Thus, the possible range of reciprocity values is -9 to +9 with higher numbers indicating higher reciprocity. Contrary to the hypotheses, there were no significant main effects for expectation and norm nor an interaction between the two. However, expectation by knowledge, norm by knowledge, and expectation by norm by knowledge interactions did emerge. With regard to importance of behavioral freedom, the results revealed a main effect of importance, and expectation by importance, norm by importance, and expectation by norm by knowledge by importance interactions. Details regarding all of these findings are presented below.

As mentioned, an expectation by knowledge and a norm by knowledge interaction emerged, $F(1, 204) = 6.45, p < .05$ and $F(1, 204) = 14.50, p < .0001$. As seen in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, it appears that there is a reactance pattern for participants with no prior knowledge of an opportunity to pay back the supervisor. In other words, reciprocity was

Table 3.5**Reciprocity Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation and Prior Knowledge of an Opportunity to Reciprocate**

Knowledge	Expectation	
	Confirmation	Violation
No prior knowledge	+5.46 _{ab}	+4.42 _a
Prior knowledge	+4.43 _a	+5.88 _b *

Note. Reciprocity was measured as the number of tickets given to the supervisor subtracted by the number of tickets kept for oneself. Thus, higher numbers indicate greater reciprocity. Means that do not share subscripts differ significantly at $p < .05$. Means marked with a * are significantly different from the analogous no expectation control ($M = +4.24$) at $p < .01$.

Table 3.6**Reciprocity Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Norm and Prior Knowledge of an Opportunity to Reciprocate**

Knowledge	Norm	
	Confirmation	Violation
No prior knowledge	+6.35 _b	+3.78 _a *
Prior knowledge	+3.97 _a *	+6.33 _b

Note. Reciprocity was measured as the number of tickets given to the supervisor subtracted by the number of tickets kept for oneself. Thus, higher numbers indicate greater reciprocity. Means that do not share subscripts differ significantly at $p < .05$. Means marked with a * are significantly different from the analogous no norm control ($M = +5.30$) at $p < .05$.

lower when there was an expectation or norm violation than when there was a confirmation. However, for those who did have prior knowledge, a felt obligation pattern emerged such that participants reciprocated more when there was a violation than when there was a confirmation.

Simple effects tests revealed that the expectancy by knowledge interaction was due to statistical significance of the felt obligation pattern for participants with prior knowledge. These participants tended to reciprocate more when the supervisor was unexpectedly generous than expectedly generous ($p < .05$). The reactance pattern in the no knowledge condition did not reach significance ($p = .16$). In other words, reciprocity was not significantly less toward a supervisor who violated an expectation than toward one who confirmed an expectation.

Contrast analyses were completed to examine differences between these means and the no expectancy control ($M = +4.24$). They revealed that reciprocity in the expectancy violation, prior knowledge condition was significantly greater than reciprocity in the control condition ($p < .01$). The remaining three means did not differ significantly from the control.

Simple effects tests to examine the norm by knowledge interaction found that participants who had prior knowledge reciprocated more toward a supervisor who violated a norm than toward one who behaved in a normative manner ($p < .005$).

Individuals without prior knowledge reciprocated less to the supervisor when s/he violated a norm than when s/he followed the rule ($p < .05$).

Contrast analyses were performed to compare these means to the no norm control ($M = +5.30$). They revealed that reciprocity in the norm violation, no prior knowledge

condition was significantly less than reciprocity in the control ($p < .05$). Reciprocity in the norm confirmation, prior knowledge condition was also significantly lower ($p < .05$). Based on the overall analyses for these two interactions, it appears that the felt obligation pattern of reciprocity occurs under conditions of prior knowledge of reciprocity whereas a reactance pattern appears under conditions of no prior knowledge, with the former being slightly more robust.

As mentioned, there was also an expectancy by norm by knowledge interaction, $F(1, 204) = 3.82, p = .05$. Some interesting patterns emerged. As seen in Table 3.7, an additive reactance pattern seems to occur under conditions of no prior knowledge. In other words, reciprocity decreased with each violation that was committed by the supervisor when participants did not know ahead of time that they would have a chance to reciprocate. However, when participants did have prior knowledge of the opportunity, they appeared to reciprocate more when the supervisor violated either a norm, an expectation, or both. This latter pattern is consistent with the high threshold of felt obligation notion and can also be seen in Table 3.7. With just one violation the supervisor exceeded the participants' threshold for feeling obligated to reciprocate, leading to higher reciprocity in any of the violation conditions.

Simple effects tests were performed to examine these patterns more closely. First, the simple main effects of expectation and norm were examined within the no prior knowledge conditions. Consistent with the additive reactance pattern, under conditions of no prior knowledge, reciprocity was lower in the face of a norm violation than a norm confirmation ($p < .05$). The mean difference for expectancy violation and confirmation did

not reach significance, however ($p = .16$). Thus, the additive reactance pattern is supported with the exception of the expectation main effect falling short of significance.

The felt obligation pattern under conditions of prior knowledge of an opportunity to reciprocate was also tested using simple effects analysis. Both expectancy and norm simple main effects emerged. Participants reciprocated more when the supervisor was unexpectedly generous than when s/he was consistently generous ($p < .05$). There was

Table 3.7

Reciprocity Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation, Norm, and Prior Knowledge of an Opportunity to Reciprocate

Norm	Expectation	
	Confirmation	Violation
No Prior Knowledge		
Confirmation	+7.00 _b [*]	+5.76 _{ab} [*]
Violation	+4.33 _a	+3.08 _a
Prior Knowledge		
Confirmation	+1.92 _a [*]	+5.63 _b
Violation	+6.60 _b	+6.11 _b

Note. Reciprocity was measured as the number of tickets given to the supervisor subtracted by the number of tickets kept for oneself. Thus, higher numbers indicate greater reciprocity. Within the no prior knowledge condition, means that do not share subscripts differ significantly at $p < .05$. Also, those marked with a ^{*} are significantly different from the analogous no knowledge, no expectancy, no norm control ($M = +2.90$) at $p < .05$. Within the prior knowledge condition, means that do not share subscripts differ significantly at $p < .005$. And those marked with a ^{*} are significantly different from the prior knowledge, no expectancy, no norm control ($M = +7.36$) at $p < .0001$.

also greater reciprocity toward the supervisor when s/he broke a rule to be generous than when s/he followed a rule to be generous ($p < .005$). Consistent with the threshold of felt obligation pattern, there was greater reciprocity when the supervisor committed one or more violations than when s/he was consistent and normative in his/her generosity ($ps < .005$).

Contrast analyses compared the means in no knowledge condition to the mean in the analogous no prior knowledge, no expectation, no norm control ($M = +2.90$). Only the norm confirmation means were significantly different from the control ($ps < .05$). Contrast analyses also compared the means in the prior knowledge condition to the mean in the prior knowledge, no expectation, no norm control ($M = +7.36$), which was considerably higher than the mean in the no knowledge control. Results indicated that only the mean in the double-confirmation cell was significantly different from the control in the prior knowledge condition ($p < .0001$).

The ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of importance, $F(1, 204) = 11.36$, $p < .001$. Consistent with the reactance notion, individuals who placed more importance in their freedom to assign raffle tickets reciprocated less ($M = +3.88$ tickets) than those who placed little importance in this freedom of behavior ($M = +6.38$). No other main effects were significant.

The ANOVA also revealed a marginally significant expectation by importance interaction, $F(1, 204) = 2.90$, $p = .09$, and a significant norm by importance interaction, $F(1, 204) = 5.51$, $p < .05$. As seen in Tables 3.8 and 3.9, these patterns are opposite to what reactance theory would predict. In looking at the means, it appears that reactance (decreased reciprocity in the face of a violation) was exhibited only by participants who

did not value their freedom of behavior in allocating raffle tickets. Contrary to reactance theory, a felt obligation pattern (increased reciprocity in the face of a violation) was evident for participants who perceived their freedom of this behavior to be important.

Simple effects tests conducted on the expectancy by importance interaction revealed that both the felt obligation pattern under high importance and the reactance pattern under low importance did not reach significance ($p_s = .14, .34$). Refer to the table for the pattern of significant differences across the four means.

Simple effects tests for the norm by importance interaction found the felt obligation pattern under high importance to be marginally significant ($p = .08$). Once again, the reactance pattern for low importance participants was not significant ($p = .12$). Refer to the table for other differences between the means.

Table 3.8

Reciprocity Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation and Importance of Freedom of Reciprocity

Importance	Expectation	
	Confirmation	Violation
Low	+6.29 _c [*]	+6.51 _{bc}
High	+3.09 _a	+4.41 _{ab}

Note. Reciprocity was measured as the number of tickets given to the supervisor subtracted by the number of tickets kept for oneself. Thus, higher numbers indicate greater reciprocity. Means that do not share subscripts differ significantly at $p < .05$. Means marked with a ^{*} are significantly different from the analogous no expectation control ($M = +4.24$) at $p < .005$.

Table 3.9**Reciprocity Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Norm and Importance of Reciprocity**

Importance	Norm	
	Confirmation	Violation
Low	+6.83 _c °	+5.93 _{bc}
High	+2.92 _a °	+4.58 _b

Note. Reciprocity was measured as the number of tickets given to the supervisor subtracted by the number of tickets kept for oneself. Thus, higher numbers indicate greater reciprocity. Means that do not share subscripts differ significantly at $p \leq .08$. Means marked with a ° are significantly different from the analogous no norm control ($M = +5.30$) at $p < .005$. A ° indicates a marginally significant difference from the control.

Contrasts for the expectancy by importance cells found that only the low importance, expectancy confirmation mean was significantly different than the no expectancy control mean of +4.24 ($p < .005$). Similarly, contrasts for the norm by importance cells found that the low importance, norm confirmation mean was marginally significantly greater than the no norm control mean of +5.30 ($p < .05$). Contrast analyses also found that the mean of the high importance, norm confirmation condition was significantly lower than the control ($p < .05$)

The final interaction revealed by the four-way ANOVA was a significant expectation by norm by knowledge by importance interaction, $F(1, 204) = 15.68$, $p < .0001$. To analyze this four-way interaction, separate expectancy by norm by knowledge

ANOVAs were performed for each level of importance. The means in the high and low importance groups are presented in **Tables 3.10 and 3.11**, respectively. Caution must be taken in interpreting these results due to the small sample sizes in some of the cells, as indicated in the tables. The three-way interaction was only significant in the high importance group, $F(1, 90) = 18.67, p < .0001$.¹⁰ The pattern of the means is consistent with the previous suggestion that felt obligation occurs under conditions of prior knowledge while reactance occurs under conditions of no prior knowledge.

For the high and low importance groups, simple effects tests were performed for each knowledge condition. The threshold of felt obligation pattern under conditions of prior knowledge was supported for those placing high importance on their freedom of behavior. More reciprocity took place in the single- and double-violation conditions than in the double-confirmation condition ($ps < .0001$). Thus, only a single violation was needed for the participants to feel obligated enough to reciprocate somewhat generously. The remaining three means did not differ significantly ($ps = .16$ to $.66$). Reciprocity was considerably low in the double-confirmation condition for high importance participants with prior knowledge ($M = -5.00$ tickets). This was same amount of reciprocity that took place in the high importance, no expectation, no norm, no knowledge control ($M = -5.00$). Contrast analyses revealed that the remaining three means in the prior knowledge condition were significantly greater than the control for high importance participants.

The trend of the means indicates that high importance participants tended to exhibit a reactance pattern, but this pattern was not significant. Also, it was not additive, as before. Only one violation was needed to elicit a reactance response. Reciprocity

¹⁰ The analyses revealed that for the low importance group, $F(1, 114) = 1.89$.

Table 3.10

Reciprocity Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation, Norm, and Prior Knowledge of an Opportunity to Reciprocate for Recipients Placing High Importance in Freedom of Reciprocity

	Expectation			
	Confirmation		Violation	
	<u>M</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>n</u>
No Prior Knowledge				
Confirmation	+5.67 _b [*]	6	+1.67 _{ab} [*]	3
Violation	+0.50 _a [*]	4	+3.60 _{ab} [*]	10
Prior Knowledge				
Confirmation	-5.00 _a	5	+5.60 _b [*]	10
Violation	+7.50 _b [*]	8	+4.82 _b [*]	11

Note. Reciprocity was measured as the number of tickets given to the supervisor subtracted by the number of tickets kept for oneself. Thus, higher numbers indicate greater reciprocity. Within the no prior knowledge condition, means that do not share subscripts differ significantly at $p \leq .05$. Within the prior knowledge condition, means that do not share subscripts differ significantly at $p < .0001$. Means in either group marked by a ^{*} are significantly different from reciprocity in the high importance, no expectation, no norm, no knowledge control ($M = -5.00$) at $p < .05$. A ^{*} indicates a marginally significant difference from the control.

Table 3.11

Reciprocity Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation, Norm, and Prior Knowledge of an Opportunity to Reciprocate for Recipients Placing Low Importance in Freedom of Reciprocity

	Expectation			
	Confirmation		Violation	
	<u>M</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>n</u>
No Prior Knowledge				
Confirmation	+8.60 _b	5	+7.13 _b	9
Violation	+5.73 _{ab}	11	+0.50 _a	2
Prior Knowledge				
Confirmation	+6.25 _{ab}	8	+5.67 _a	4
Violation	+5.57 _{ab}	7	+8.14 _b	6

Note. Reciprocity was measured as the number of tickets given to the supervisor subtracted by the number of tickets kept for oneself. Thus, higher numbers indicate greater reciprocity. Within the no prior knowledge condition, means that do not share subscripts differ significantly at $p < .05$. Within the prior knowledge condition, means that do not share subscripts differ significantly at $p < .05$. None of the means are significantly different from reciprocity in the low importance, no expectation, no norm, no knowledge control ($\bar{M} = +5.33$) at $p < .05$.

appeared to be lowest in the single- and double-violation conditions. However, only one of these means was significantly lower than the double-confirmation mean. This was the mean reciprocity toward the supervisor who only violated the norm. Contrast analyses comparing the no prior knowledge means with that in the control revealed that three of them were significantly higher ($ps < .05$) and one was marginally so ($p = .08$).

For low importance participants, one might expect less felt obligation. However, reciprocity was quite high in the prior knowledge, double-violation condition ($\underline{M} = +8.14$). This mean was only significantly different from one of the other three, though. Moreover, the mean in the double-confirmation condition was even slightly higher than the single-violation means, although not significantly so. None of the means were significantly different from the low importance, no expectation, no norm, no prior knowledge control ($\underline{M} = +5.33$).

In examining the low importance, no prior knowledge means, a high threshold of reactance pattern appears to have emerged in spite of participants' disinterest in receiving raffle tickets. These participants reciprocated the least to the double-violator but one of these differences was just short of marginal significance ($p = .097$). Also, the especially small n in the double-violation cell strongly reduces confidence in these results. Once again, contrasts revealed none of these means to be significantly different from the control.

Supplementary Findings

Temporary Affect. It was hypothesized that participants might experience a decrement in mood due to a sense of reactance or felt obligation when the supervisor violated a norm and/or expectation. This speculation was not supported for positive nor negative mood. Positive mood was measured as the average of the happy, joyful, pleased, and enjoyment/fun items. Cronbach's alpha for these items was .88, indicating high internal reliability. Negative mood was measured by averaging all of the negative mood items, namely, unhappy, depressed, frustrated, worried/anxious, angry/hostile. Cronbach's alpha for these items was .85.

An expectation by norm by knowledge ANOVA was performed for each dependent measure. The first ANOVA revealed only an expectancy main effect, $F(1, 103) = 11.80, p = .001$, such that participants with a supervisor who violated an expectation experienced more positive mood than those who had a supervisor who was consistently generous. Only a knowledge main effect emerged for negative mood, $F(1, 103) = 5.36, p < .05$. Interestingly, participants experienced more negative mood when they had prior knowledge of an opportunity to pay back the supervisor. Both of these findings are contradictory to predictions based on either reactance or felt obligation.

Attributions. The free-response attribution data were coded by rating the participants' opinions regarding any reasons that they believed they received such a generous payment. Responses were coded with regard to their fit into each of four categories of attributions: situational attributions, recipient attributions, supervisor attributions, or unique interaction/relationship attributions.

These categories were defined in a manner similar to those used by Worchel et al. (1976). A response was coded as a situational attribution if the respondent suggested that some pressures or aspects of the particular situation led to the payment behavior (e.g., "The supervisor was just following the rules" or "We only had ten minutes to draw the pictures so it was only fair to get paid a lot."). A response was coded as a recipient attribution if the participant suggested that it was his/her personality or manner of completing the task that caused the supervisor's generous payment to occur (e.g., "I'm a very creative person" or "The supervisor could tell that I worked hard on the task."). A response was coded as a supervisor attribution if the participant believed that it was something about the supervisor that made him/her behave generously (e.g., "The supervisor is a generous person" or "The supervisor was in a good mood."). A response was coded as a unique interaction/relationship attribution if the participant believed that there was something particularly special about his/her relationship with the supervisor that led to the generous payment (e.g., "My pictures weren't that creative but maybe the supervisor saw something special in them" or "We have the same taste in art."). To gain a more sensitive measure of attributions and to take into account the presence of mixed attributions, each participant's overall response was rated to the extent that it had themes of each attribution on a scale from "0," not at all suggested as a reason, to "4," suggested as being a very important reason for the supervisor's behavior.

Three-way ANOVAs were performed for each of the four attributions. The first was an expectancy by norm by knowledge ANOVA with situational attribution rating as a dependent measure.¹¹ As one might expect, a significant norm main effect emerged, $F(1,$

¹¹ Control conditions were not included in these analyses.

101) = 8.93, $p < .005$, such that participants rated situation as being a more important reason for the supervisor's behavior when the rule to be generous was confirmed than when it was violated. There was also a significant norm main effect on supervisor attributions, $F(1, 101) = 7.84$, $p < .01$, as indicated by a subsequent ANOVA. Consistent with the previous finding, participants rated the supervisor's internal characteristics as being less responsible for his/her generosity when the norm was confirmed than when it was violated. Recipient attributions were only affected by knowledge of a reciprocity opportunity, $F(1, 101) = 7.69$, $p < .001$. Specifically, participants believed themselves to have a greater impact on the supervisor's behavior when they were in the no prior knowledge condition than when they were initially aware of their chance to reciprocate. Interestingly, all participants had reciprocated by the time they filled out the attributional questionnaire but differences as a function of knowledge still emerged. No other main effects or interactions were revealed, including no condition effects on the unique interaction attribution, and no expectancy effects on any of the attributions made. Thus, derogation of the double-confirming supervisor probably did not result as a function of the generation of different types of attributions because no expectancy by norm interactions were revealed.

Additional Findings. An unpredicted correlation between liking and reciprocity toward the favor-giver emerged ($r = 0.29$, $p < .0001$). Therefore, increased reciprocity toward the favor-giver was associated with liking of that person. Liking was also examined as a covariate in an ANOVA with reciprocity as a dependent measure to see if it accounted for any of the findings. It emerged as a significant covariate, $F(1, 183) =$

12.47, $p < .0001$ but those interactions that were originally significant only became slightly more so.

Chapter 4

DISCUSSION

Summary of Main Findings

The initial goal of this investigation was to attempt to replicate the finding that individuals tend to derogate favor-givers who violate an expectation and/or norm to provide a favor. However, the reverse pattern was found in the current study. Individuals actually liked a favor-giver more when s/he violated a norm or an expectation than when s/he behaved in an expected and/or normative manner. While most previous research has found the opposite, and thus predicted, pattern, there were two previous investigations that found that increased liking resulted when either unexpected or counternormative favors were provided (Morse, 1972; Suls et al., 1981). Only one of these, though, measured the reactions of the recipients, themselves (Morse, 1972). The present study, however, was perhaps the first investigation to (unexpectedly) find that expectancy violations and norm violations independently generated increased liking of a favor-giver.

Another major goal of the current study was to test three potential mechanisms that could be involved in the predicted derogation of the favor-giver. These were unpredictability as a negative attribute, felt obligation, and psychological reactance. The first mechanism involves the possibility that an expectancy/norm violator might be perceived of as unpredictable and that unpredictability is viewed as a negative attribute. The felt obligation and reactance mechanisms were based on Gouldner's "norm of reciprocity" (1960). The felt obligation mechanism suggests that derogation might occur because individuals would resent a favor-giver who provides a big favor that causes them

to have strong feelings of obligation to reciprocate. When this mechanism is in operation, individuals have a strong desire to reciprocate. The reactance mechanism suggests that derogation might result from the experience of psychological reactance arising from a restriction in one's freedom *not* to reciprocate as a result of receiving a big favor. When reactance is experienced, individuals have a strong urge to withhold reciprocity. Contrary to the predictions of all three of the mechanisms, a favor-giver who violated a norm or expectation was actually liked *more* than one who behaved expectedly and normatively. However, as mentioned earlier, derogation need not occur if reactance or felt obligation mechanisms are in operation. Although the expected derogation did not occur in the violation conditions, evidence for the three mechanisms was still examined. Some findings were consistent with the ideas behind each of the mechanisms.

Unpredictability Mechanism: Attraction Findings. Three findings in particular supported the unpredictability hypothesis. First, a supervisor who violated an expectation or a norm was, in fact, seen as more unpredictable than one who did not. Second, there was a small but significant negative overall correlation between unpredictability and liking. However, contrary to the hypothesis, the tendency to dislike an unpredictable favor-giver was overlooked when recipients received a large favor as a result of this unpredictability. In other words, in the single- and double-violation conditions, there was no correlation at all between unpredictability and liking. In the no-violation conditions, however, a moderate-sized negative correlation emerged. The third piece of evidence for the unpredictability hypothesis was a finding involving participants' intolerance of ambiguity. It was predicted that individuals scoring high on intolerance would especially derogate the expectancy and/or norm violator. Participants scoring high on intolerance of ambiguity

did not derogate the violating favor-giver, but they did refrain from increasing their evaluation of the supervisor when s/he violated an expectation, as low scorers did. However, this pattern only occurred under conditions of no prior knowledge. Thus, the overall support for the unpredictability notion was quite weak.

Felt Obligation and Psychological Reactance Mechanisms: Attraction

Findings. The felt obligation and reactance hypotheses also received very minimal support regarding their predicted effects on attraction toward the favor-giver. Both of these notions led to the prediction that derogation would at least occur in the double-violation, no prior knowledge condition. As mentioned earlier, however, this three-way interaction did not emerge. Only the expectancy by norm interaction emerged and the means were in the opposite direction than would be predicted by both felt obligation and reactance. This was even true for individuals who placed high importance in their freedom of reciprocity behavior. However, consistent with reactance and felt obligation predictions, there was a marginally significant trend for high importance individuals to like the double-violating supervisor less than low importance individuals did. Interestingly, this pattern of greater derogation by high importance recipients was only significant for reactions to the double-*confirming* supervisor. Another finding consistent with both felt obligation and reactance was that under conditions of no prior knowledge, participants who placed high importance in their freedom to reciprocate liked the supervisor less than those who did not value this freedom. Overall, however, the support for these two mechanisms was quite weak with regard to attraction toward the favor-doer.

Felt Obligation and Psychological Reactance Mechanisms: Reciprocity

Findings. The reciprocity data were more encouraging for the felt obligation and reactance hypotheses. The unpredictability mechanism did not have implications for reciprocity behavior. However, reciprocity was the key variable in distinguishing the operation of felt obligation from that of reactance. Partial support for each mechanism was obtained. Prior knowledge of an opportunity to reciprocate played an unexpected and crucial moderating role. It determined whether recipients of the bigger favor would exhibit reactance or felt obligation patterns of reciprocity behavior.

Specifically, when individuals had no prior knowledge of a reciprocity opportunity, a reactance pattern emerged at the time of reciprocity. In other words, expectancy and/or norm violations led to decreased reciprocity. However, when individuals did have prior knowledge of an opportunity to reciprocate, they showed a felt obligation response. They reciprocated more in the face of one or more violations. The trend of the means suggested that the reactance effect was additive. A single violation was sufficient in causing decreased reciprocity, but both a norm and expectancy violation combined led to the least reciprocity. Felt obligation, however, produced a low threshold effect such that *either* a single or double violation led to an urge to reciprocate generously in the prior knowledge condition. Thus, the critical variable in determining whether reactance or felt obligation will be experienced appears to be whether or not the recipient of a favor knows ahead of time that s/he will have a chance to reciprocate.

Importance of behavioral freedom also played a substantial role in determining reciprocity behavior. Consistent with reactance and contrary to felt obligation, a main effect of importance revealed that participants reciprocated less when they placed high

importance in their freedom of reciprocity behavior than when they did not. However, consistent with felt obligation, high importance participants reciprocated more when an expectation or norm was violated than when one was confirmed. This last finding directly contradicts reactance theory.

An expectation by norm by knowledge by importance interaction also yielded some support for both mechanisms. Specifically, a felt obligation pattern emerged for both high and low importance participants with prior knowledge. However, consistent with felt obligation ideas, the pattern only reached significance for participants placing high importance in freedom of reciprocity. The reactance pattern for individuals with no prior knowledge was also evident for both high and low importance individuals. For high importance individuals, a single violation *tended* to be sufficient in eliciting a reactance response. However, for low importance individuals, a double violation was needed to elicit reactance. Surprisingly, though, only the latter pattern reached significance. Overall, the reciprocity data provide some convincing evidence for the occurrence of felt obligation under conditions of prior knowledge and reactance under conditions of no prior knowledge.

Potential Explanations for Unpredicted Results

Because the results did not completely support any of the mechanisms, various unpredicted findings deserve some explanation. First, there are several possible reasons why individuals did not derogate the violating supervisor. These are the possibility that (1) the material value of the favor was not high enough, (2) the violations were not great enough, (3) more interaction with the supervisor was needed, (4) the perception of an ulterior motive was necessary, or (5) a threat to self-esteem was necessary.

With regard to the first explanation, perhaps the favor was simply not worth enough to the recipients. If the favor were bigger (more tangibly rewarding), maybe the recipients would have been more likely to either perceive the supervisor as being unpredictable or to experience sufficient felt obligation or reactance. For example, if a supervisor in a similar study violated an expectation and a norm by paying a worker \$40 cash instead of a typical and mandatory payment of less than \$10, different results may have emerged. Perhaps this very valuable award would make the favor surprising enough to cause the recipients to perceive the supervisor as being very unpredictable. This increased unpredictability could then be sufficient enough to cause recipients to dislike the violating supervisor in spite of the nice favor s/he provided. Similarly, perhaps this exceptionally high payment would be sufficient enough to cause recipients to feel so obligated to reciprocate that they would even resent the favor-giver given that no opportunity to reciprocate is apparent. Likewise, perhaps only a very tangible reward would elicit a feeling of restriction of free behaviors. However, this cannot explain why the potentially moderate-sized favor in the current investigation not only failed to produce

derogation, but actually led to *increased* liking of the violating favor-giver. Therefore, this explanation is plausible, but it may not be very likely.

The second potential explanation is a related issue. It suggests that the favor may not have been perceived as large enough because the expectancy and norm violations that took place were not big enough. For example, if a good friend who has been stingy his entire life is all of a sudden very generous, this is quite a big expectancy violation. Or, if someone breaks a law to steal a television set to give as a gift, this is a substantially large norm violation. Either of these events should be more likely to activate any of the mechanisms for derogation than the events that took place in the current investigation. However, it must be noted that the expectancy and norm violations in the current study did produce strong effects on the dependent variables. Because of this and because their manipulation checks confirmed successful manipulation, this explanation may also not be a very likely one.

The third explanation suggests that participants might have responded differently had they had more interaction with the supervisor. For example, it is possible that having direct contact with the supervisor when s/he provided the favor might have elicited greater discomfort than indirect contact because of felt obligation or reactance. If the recipient never even sees the favor-giver, s/he might not feel as obligated or as restricted because both the favor and the supervisor are less threatening. Also, the salience of the violations themselves may be greater if future interaction is anticipated.

Some research is consistent with these suggestions. Kiesler, Kiesler, and Pallak (1967) suggest that norm violators are disliked more when future interaction with them is anticipated than when it is not. Moreover, Brehm and Brehm (1981) suggest that

anticipation of future interaction does elicit greater psychological reactance. And previous research has found that the anticipation of meeting a donor results in a decreased likelihood for a person to seek help (Nadler, 1979, as cited in Fisher et al., 1981) and more defensive attributions for having received it (Worchel & Andreoli, 1974). Other research has found that recipients who were not anonymous were also be more reluctant to seek help (Nadler & Porat, 1978, Shapiro, 1978, as cited in Fisher et al., 1981).

Noteworthy as well is the fact that most of the studies that have found derogation of a norm/expectation violating favor-giver employed procedures in which participants actually had and/or expected to have some direct contact with that person (e.g., Kiesler, 1966; Schopler & Thompson, 1968; Worchel & Andreoli, 1974). While the remaining two studies that found derogation did not involve face-to-face interaction, they still involved more personal interaction than the current study. The recipients of the favor in Clark and Mills's study (1979) believed that they were watching their partner on video. The contestants in the Morse et al. (1977) study had vocal interaction with their quizmaster over an intercom system. Thus, perhaps personal interaction or the anticipation of such interaction facilitates derogation.

Participants in the current investigation were told that they would never meet their supervisor. Thus, in all conditions, direct and future interaction were not anticipated. Perhaps participants would have felt more obligation or reactance if they had direct interaction with the supervisor or if they were told that they would be interacting later. Under those conditions, derogation may have resulted from the expectancy and/or norm violations. However, the *reciprocity* data in the current study suggest that felt obligation and psychological reactance *were* experienced. One might argue, then, that additional

efforts to elicit these experiences (e.g., through the anticipation of future interaction) were not necessary in the current study. Perhaps, then, it was not insufficient arousal of obligation or reactance that led to the unexpected attraction findings.

The fourth and fifth explanations involve two of the alternative potential mechanisms described earlier. The fourth explanation presents the possibility that the perception of an ulterior motive drives the derogation of a violating favor-giver. The current experiment, unlike most previous research, took great efforts to minimize the chance that recipients would perceive an ulterior motive for the supervisor's generosity. For example, participants were told that their supervisor was not aware that s/he would be evaluated or assigned payment by the participant. These efforts were assumed to be successful because responses to the free-response attributions measure suggest that participants did not attribute the favor to any ulterior motives. Perhaps if the supervisor's motives were left ambiguous, an ulterior motive would have been automatically suspected. Consequently, "good" attributions for the favor may have been made. Consistent with this notion, there is some evidence in the current study that suggests that some recipients simply attributed the favor to the supervisor's kindness or generosity.

Because the current study controlled for this alternative potential mechanism and did not find derogation, there is a chance that it may be responsible for some of the research that does find derogation. Thus, future research should examine the mechanism more systematically. If research finds that ulterior motive attributions do generate derogation, then it should also address whether this effect is mediated by increased psychological reactance or felt obligation.

The fifth explanation is the suggestion that derogation results from a threat to self-esteem that individuals might experience upon receiving large favors (see Fisher et al., 1981). As mentioned earlier, receiving a favor may result in the perception of failure, inferiority, or dependence, which could then cause negative affective responses such as derogation of a favor-giver. The potential for this type of threat was minimized in the current investigation, however. Participants should not have perceived feelings of failure because all participants received a moderate creativity score as compared to previous participants (as noted on the "Supervisor Record Sheet"). Moreover, the favor that was provided did not involve helping the participants with the actual creativity task. If it did, it might have suggested to them that the favor-giver perceived inadequacies in the worker's ability. Also, the creativity task may not have been very ego-involving to most participants. Thus, the current investigation made efforts to reduce the potential for a threat of self-esteem to take place and derogation of the violating favor-giver did not occur. Perhaps, then, a threat to self-esteem *is* a necessary requisite for derogation to occur, whether alone or in combination with any other.

Although these last two explanations suggest that some alternative mechanisms may have played a role, the other explanations suggest that some extraneous factors may have interfered with the operation of the original three mechanisms. In other words, not enough unpredictability was perceived or not enough felt obligation or psychological reactance was aroused because of some interfering variable. There is some evidence, in fact, that the violating supervisor may not have been perceived of as being unpredictable enough. Although higher than in the no violation conditions, unpredictability ratings in the violation conditions were actually near the midpoint of the scale.

Also, it is possible that with stronger feelings of felt obligation or reactance, derogation may be more likely to take place as it has in previous research. Unfortunately, the extent to which participants may have experienced felt obligation and reactance in the current study cannot be determined. There are several reasons, though, that this explanation may not be a likely one. First, as mentioned earlier, felt obligation and reactance were sufficiently aroused to affect reciprocity behavior in the current investigation. Thus, recipients did show evidence of these experiences. Moreover, Brehm and Brehm (1981) suggest that it takes *greater* amounts of reactance to cause failure to reciprocate than to elicit derogation. Consistent with this, Morse et al. (1977) found derogation but did not find reactance effects on reciprocity. Because failure to reciprocate occurred in the current investigation (in the no knowledge condition) and derogation did not, it cannot be a matter of degree of arousal if derogation happens more easily. The same might apply to felt obligation as well.

Moreover, if importance in the freedom to reciprocate is suggested to be associated with increased obligation and reactance, then derogation of the violating favor-giver should at least have occurred in the current study for high importance recipients. However, this was not the case in the current investigation. Most of the data even directly opposed this speculation. Also, as mentioned earlier, both felt obligation and reactance are primarily motivations with affective components that are only secondary in nature. Thus, reciprocity behavior is a greater indication of their operation than is derogation of a favor-giver. Although plausible, it is not very likely, then, that derogation did not occur because of insufficient arousal of felt obligation or psychological reactance.

Perhaps, then, perceived unpredictability, felt obligation, and reactance sometimes result in liking, rather than derogation, of someone who provides a big favor. Although there is some literature that suggests that derogation does occur, there is also some literature that suggests that, if anything, greater liking may result from these mechanisms. As mentioned earlier, Morse (1972) and Suls et al. (1981) found increased liking toward a violating favor-giver. Moreover, other research has found that when help is costly to the favor-giver, the recipient tends to perceive him/her as being more caring, concerned, and generous (Fisher & Nadler, 1976, Nadler & Fisher, 1978, as cited in Fisher et al., 1981), and, perhaps consequently, likes him/her more (Gergen et al., 1975). Greater liking of a favor-giver also results when help is apparently deliberate or voluntary (Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966; Gross & Latané, 1974; Nemeth, 1970).

These results do not suggest that the three mechanisms were not involved, however. In fact, some of these same investigations also found evidence for feelings of obligation and/or reactance. Research has found that voluntary help, costly help, and high amounts of help do, in fact, result in greater feelings of obligation to reciprocate (Berkowitz & Friedman, 1967, Fisher & Nadler, 1976, Greenberg & Bar-Tal, 1976, Kahn & Tice, 1973, Levanthal, Weiss & Long, 1964, Pruitt, 1968, Stapleton, Nacci, & Tedeschi, 1973, as cited in Fisher et al., 1981; Gergen et al., 1975; Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966; Greenberg & Frisch, 1972; Gross & Latané, 1974; Nemeth, 1970; Wilke & Lanzetta, 1982). Thus, perhaps mechanisms such as felt obligation often produce positive or neutral reactions to a favor-giver along with the expected motivational response. Future research should be directed at identifying and exploring any moderating variables that may account for the inconsistencies in the literature. Aside from the

potential variables mentioned here, some research also suggests that various individual differences may help determine whether receiving large favors is viewed favorably or unfavorably (Fisher et al., 1981; Gergen, 1974). Thus, there are many possible reasons that may explain why derogation of the violating favor-doer did not take place in the current study.

Another point that deserves attention is the lack of an interaction between knowledge of reciprocity and the norm and expectancy manipulations for attraction. One reason, though perhaps not a likely one, is that knowledge did not play a role because not enough unpredictability, felt obligation, or reactance was aroused to elicit derogation. Had derogation of the violating favor-giver occurred, it is possible that knowledge of reciprocity would have played a role moderating this response. Another possible reason is based on a previous investigation that found that having no opportunity to reciprocate resulted in negative consequences only for high self-esteem recipients (Nadler, 1986). However, self-esteem was not measured in the current investigation. It is also possible that the knowledge of reciprocity manipulation was not strong enough in the current study. The experimenters noticed that some participants seemed preoccupied with filling out their raffle tickets when the knowledge manipulation was introduced. Moreover, the manipulation check did not reveal a strong awareness of the knowledge condition by participants. However, prior knowledge was involved in some highly significant interactions affecting both attraction and reciprocity, so the manipulation must have affected many participants.

Another finding that deserves further examination is the fact that unpredictability and liking were only negatively correlated in the no violation conditions. It was expected

that this negative correlation would be especially high in the violation conditions but it was actually nonexistent in these circumstances. Again, perhaps this was because the violations that took place were not great enough. The reason the correlation emerged in the no violation conditions is because of people's "natural" tendency to dislike unpredictable others. In the violation conditions, this tendency was simply overlooked in the face of receiving the seemingly larger favor. Had the favor been even more unusual, unpredictability may not have been so overlooked.

Some of the major findings of this investigation demonstrated evidence for both felt obligation and reactance effects on reciprocity. As mentioned, felt obligation patterns only emerged when participants knew ahead of time that they would get the chance to reciprocate. Psychological reactance effects only happened when they did not have this knowledge.

A plausible explanation for this interesting pattern is that once recipients learn of a (big) favor granted by a norm/expectancy violating benefactor, they experience psychological reactance. When they are not aware of an upcoming reciprocity opportunity, reactance is maintained because the recipients see no opportunity to restore freedom of behavior. When they do know that they will be able to reciprocate, however, reactance is dissipated as a result of an expectation of being able to reduce it in the near future.¹²

¹² The idea that reactance may dwindle with the passing of time stems from research conducted by Crano & Messé (1970). Just as reactance is suggested to diminish over time, these researchers found cognitive dissonance to diminish over time. Participants were asked to write a counterattitudinal essay in order to receive a small or large monetary award. When issue attitude was assessed immediately after writing the essay, participants displayed the typical reverse incentive response. Those in the small reward condition had significantly more attitude change in the direction of the essay. Because of dissonance arousal, they attributed their essay-writing to their attitude rather than to their

Moreover, felt obligation may be aroused when the recipients are aware of a reciprocity opportunity because there is more time to think about how much they owe the favor-giver. Obligation then builds up over time. The recipients in this situation have time to make a rational decision regarding how much reciprocity the favor-giver deserves. Consequently, they reciprocate the most toward a favor-giver who goes out of his/her way to provide the favor. However, when the favor-giver is simply being consistent and following the rules, the recipients rationalize that they do not really owe the supervisor much, if anything. This explains why reciprocity in the current investigation was especially low in the double-confirmation cell when participants had prior knowledge. These relationships are depicted in Figure 1 on the following page. However, this path diagram is based on post-hoc ideas and should be tested empirically in the future.

insufficient payment. However, when they performed a distracter task and attitude was not assessed until well after the manipulation was imposed, participants receiving the large payment displayed the most attitude change. It was suggested that cognitive dissonance diminished over time for participants with insufficient pay justification, leaving only reinforcement effects for having received money for writing the essay. Similarly, perhaps reactance dissipated over time in the current study when participants had prior knowledge of a reciprocity opportunity causing felt obligation to be free to increase as time went on.




Figure 1. Reciprocity Toward an Expectancy/Norm Violating Favor-Giver as a Function of Recipients' Knowledge of an Opportunity to Reciprocate: A Path Diagram

Conclusions and Implications

In sum, the current investigation found that recipients of a favor liked their benefactor more when s/he violated a norm or expectation to provide it. The study also found that individuals do not like an unpredictable other unless they can benefit from their unpredictability (see also Kiesler, 1973). This research also revealed that when recipients of a favor know that they will later get the chance to reciprocate, they feel more obligated to reciprocate favors that are out of the ordinary. Consequently, to the extent that someone breaks a rule and behaves out of character to provide a favor, the recipient pays back the favor-giver. But, when recipients do not know that they will have a chance to reciprocate later, they experience increased psychological reactance as the favor becomes more unusual. This results in lower reciprocity toward a favor-giver who violates a norm and/or an expectancy than toward one who confirms them. As discussed in the previous section, other findings consistent with felt obligation and reactance were also obtained.

This research has implications for many domains. It is important to understand when individuals will respond negatively to receiving help or favors because aid-giving is a necessary part of society. As Fisher et al. (1981) put it, "receiving help is an integral component of the educational process, the health care system, the psychotherapeutic process, the welfare system, and the recurrent patterns of day-to-day life" (p. 367). When recipients experience negative reactions to receiving help or favors, they will probably not benefit as much in these domains. For example, they might not learn as much in school or at work; follow doctors' orders effectively; engage in enough disclosure in therapy; seek financial help when it is needed; or be able to effectively engage in successful relationships

with friends, family, acquaintances, or others. Clearly, it is important to understand how to minimize the potential for negative responses to receiving benefits from others.

Research in the area of reactions to expectancy and/or norm violations shows promise for understanding some of the situations in which help is unappreciated or aversive. Future research is needed, however, to illuminate more fully the role of any potential moderators and mediators that may play a role in these negative reactions. Given the rather complicated pattern of findings observed in the present investigation, as well as across past studies, it is likely that future research on reactions to a favor-giver will continue to generate interesting results. It is to be hoped that these efforts will ultimately yield compelling and definitive evidence identifying the processes and mechanisms underlying people's responses to the "kindness of strangers."

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

Supervisor Record Sheets (Expectancy Confirmation Condition)

Supervisor # A

Condition : 2-person, separate work space

Directions to participant: Circle the rating and the number of raffle tickets your Supervisor gave you.

SUPERVISOR RECORD SHEET

<u>Worker Number</u>	<u>Subjective Rating from -5 (very negative reaction) to +5 (very positive reaction)</u>	<u>Number of Raffle Tickets Awarded</u>
1.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 <u>+2</u> +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 <u>9</u> 10
2.	-5 -4 -3 -2 <u>-1</u> 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 <u>9</u> 10
3.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 <u>+1</u> +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 <u>9</u> 10
4.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 <u>+2</u> +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 <u>10</u>
5.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 <u>0</u> +1 +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 <u>8</u> 9 10
6.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 <u>+1</u> +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 <u>9</u> 10
7.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 <u>+2</u> +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 <u>10</u>
8.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 <u>+1</u> +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 <u>9</u> 10
9.	-5 -4 -3 <u>-2</u> -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 <u>8</u> 9 10
10.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 <u>+1</u> +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 <u>9</u> 10
11.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
12.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
13.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
14.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
15.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

(Expectancy Violation Condition)

Supervisor # A

Condition : 2-person, separate work space

Directions to participant: Circle the rating and the number of raffle tickets your Supervisor gave you.

SUPERVISOR RECORD SHEET

<u>Worker Number</u>	<u>Subjective Rating from -5 (very negative reaction) to +5 (very positive reaction)</u>	<u>Number of Raffle Tickets Awarded</u>
1.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 <u>+2</u> +3 +4 +5	1 <u>2</u> 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2.	-5 -4 -3 -2 <u>-1</u> 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5	1 <u>2</u> 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 <u>+1</u> +2 +3 +4 +5	1 <u>2</u> 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
4.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 <u>+2</u> +3 +4 +5	1 2 <u>3</u> 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
5.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 <u>0</u> +1 +2 +3 +4 +5	<u>1</u> 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
6.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 <u>+1</u> +2 +3 +4 +5	1 <u>2</u> 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
7.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 <u>+2</u> +3 +4 +5	1 2 <u>3</u> 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
8.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 <u>+1</u> +2 +3 +4 +5	1 <u>2</u> 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
9.	-5 -4 -3 <u>-2</u> -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5	<u>1</u> 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
10.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 <u>+1</u> +2 +3 +4 +5	1 <u>2</u> 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
12.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
13.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
14.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
15.	-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

(Expectancy Control Condition)

Supervisor # A

Condition : 2-person, separate work space

Directions to participant: Circle the rating and the number of raffle tickets your Supervisor gave you.

SUPERVISOR RECORD SHEET

<u>Worker Number</u>	<u>Subjective Rating</u> <u>from -5 (very negative reaction)</u> <u>to +5 (very positive reaction)</u>										
1	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
2	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
3	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
4	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
5	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
7	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
8	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
9	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
10	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
11	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
12	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
13	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
14	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
15	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

Measures

(Expectancy and Norm Manipulation Checks)

Please answer the following three questions regarding the Supervisor's behavior. For each item, indicate the number from the following scale that most accurately describes your perception of the Supervisor's actions.

- 1 = DISAGREE very much**
- 2 = moderately disagree**
- 3 = slightly disagree**
- 4 = neither agree nor disagree**
- 5 = slightly agree**
- 6 = moderately agree**
- 7 = AGREE very much**

_____ The Supervisor behaved as one might expect.

_____ The Supervisor followed the instructions s/he was given precisely as directed.

_____ The Supervisor behaved in accord with his/her past behavior.

(Measure of Supervisor Evaluation – including Attraction and Unpredictability items)

This measure asks you to evaluate your Supervisor. The evaluation will provide us with information about your Supervisor's working style. Your ratings of the Supervisor will be used strictly to help researchers understand the relationship between personality factors and certain supervisor working styles. The evaluation will not be used to judge the Supervisor in any way. With this in mind, please rate your Supervisor on the following dimensions. For each item, circle the number from 0 to 9 that most accurately expresses your opinion of your Supervisor. You may not have sufficient information to answer some of the questions with certainty. In these cases, just try to guess, based on the Supervisor's behavior, how you think s/he might fall on the dimensions.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
unlikable									likable

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
mean									kind

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
helpful									unhelpful

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
unfriendly									friendly

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
good									bad

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
predictable									unpredictable

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
independent									conforming

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
dishonest									honest

continued on next page...

(Measure of Supervisor Evaluation continued)

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
impulsive									restrained

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
obedient									disobedient

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
rational									irrational

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
easy-going									temperamental

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
inconsistent									consistent

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
typical									unusual

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
mature									immature

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
conventional									rebellious

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
annoying									pleasant

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
submissive									dominant

continued on next page...

(Measure of Supervisor Evaluation continued)

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
hostile									calm
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
stubborn									yielding
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
straightforward									manipulative

(Departmental Task: Part I -- Measure of Temporary Affect)

**PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY**

**RESEARCH PARTICIPATION SURVEY
1998-2000**

This survey is part of a large scale research investigation being conducted by the ethics committee of the psychology department at Michigan State University. This research investigates participants' reactions to research experiences. This questionnaire is being administered in various research sessions being conducted by various experimenters. You have been randomly selected to participate in this study. This data will provide the ethics committee with information as to the mood state that participants generally experience while involved in different types of research studies. This is not an evaluation of the current study in which you are participating. If you have any further questions regarding this departmental project, your experimenter can provide you with the appropriate contacts at the end of the session. Thank you for contributing to the university's research.

PART I: Please circle the appropriate mark to indicate how much you are feeling the each of these emotions right now:

1. happy:

not at all | | | average | | | extremely

2. joyful:

not at all | | | average | | | extremely

3. pleased:

not at all | | | average | | | extremely

(Departmental Task: Part I continued)

4. enjoyment/fun:

not at all			average		extremely

5. unhappy:

not at all			average		extremely

6. depressed:

not at all			average		extremely

7. frustrated:

not at all			average		extremely

8. worried/anxious:

not at all			average		extremely

9. angry/hostile:

not at all			average		extremely

(Departmental Task: Part II -- Knowledge of Reciprocity Manipulation Checks)

PART II: Please answer the following questions regarding research payment for your participation in this departmental survey:

1. Will you be receiving any compensation (other than required course credit) for your participation in this departmental survey? _____ (please write 'yes,' 'no,' or 'don't know'). If you answered 'yes' to this question, please go on to answer number 2.

- 2(a). Please check the type(s) of compensation you will be receiving:
_____ cash payment
_____ check payment
_____ extra credit for a course
_____ other: Please describe: _____

- 2(b). Will your current experimenter be in charge of deciding how much payment you will receive for completing this task? _____ (please write 'yes,' 'no,' or 'don't know'.')

- 2(c). If you answered 'no' to the question above, please indicate the person who will be in charge of paying you for your completion of this departmental survey: _____

- 2(d). Will you have any say in how much you will be paid for your participation in this departmental survey? _____ (please write 'yes,' 'no,' or 'don't know').

- 2(e). Will you have any say in how much anyone else will be paid for their participation in this departmental survey? _____ (please write 'yes,' 'no,' or 'don't know').

- 2(f). If you answered 'yes' to question 2(e), please indicate for whom you will be making payment decisions (e.g., other participants in the study) _____

(Departmental Task: Part III – Importance of Behavioral Freedom)

- 3. How important is it for you to receive payment/compensation for completing this departmental task?**

extremely unimportant neutral extremely important

4. How important is it for you to have a say in how much payment/compensation you receive for completing this type of departmental task?

extremely unimportant neutral extremely important

5. How important is it for you to have a say in how much payment/compensation others will receive for completing this type of departmental task?

extremely unimportant neutral extremely important

We appreciate your participation in this survey.

Please hand this completed questionnaire to your experimenter and continue with the study in progress.

(Measure of Attributions)

Please write in your own words the reason(s) that you think the Supervisor gave you the specific amount of payment that you received for completing the creativity task. Please be as specific as possible.

This image shows a blank sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.

(Measure in the Belief of the Norm of Reciprocity)

Please answer the following questions regarding your opinions about certain human virtues. You may consider all of these virtues as important, but we are interested in learning which ones you believe are most important. Circle the number from 0 to 9 that most accurately illustrates the relative importance of the virtues below.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
having concern for family members is more important									being helpful is more important

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
repaying those who have been nice to you is more important									being honest is more important

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
having respect for one's elders is more important									repaying those who have been nice to you is more important

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
being honest is more important									being helpful is more important

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
having concern for family members is more important									having respect for one's elders is more important

continued on next page...

(Measure in the Belief of the Norm of Reciprocity continued)

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
repaying those who for have been nice to you								having concern for family members is more important	

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
being helpful is more important								having respect for one's elders is more important	

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
being honest is more important								having concern for family members is more important	

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
being helpful is more important								repaying those who have been nice is more important	

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
having respect for one's elders is more important								being honest is is more important	

(Budner's Measure of Intolerance of Ambiguity)

Please answer the following questions regarding your general opinions. Use the following scale to indicate how much you agree/disagree with the statements below:

- 1 = strongly disagree**
2 = moderately disagree
3 = slightly disagree
4 = neither disagree nor agree
5 = slightly agree
6 = moderately agree
7 = strongly agree

- _____ 1. An expert who doesn't come up with a definite answer probably doesn't know too much.
- _____ 2. I would like to live in a foreign country for a while.
- _____ 3. There is really no such thing as a problem that can't be solved.
- _____ 4. People who fit their lives to a schedule probably miss most of the joy of living.
- _____ 5. A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be done are always clear.
- _____ 6. It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a simple one.
- _____ 7. In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling small, simple problems rather than large and complicated ones.
- _____ 8. Often the most interesting and stimulating people are those who don't mind being different and original.
- _____ 9. What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar.
- _____ 10. People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don't know how complicated things really are.
- _____ 11. A person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or unexpected happenings arise, really has a lot to be grateful for.
- _____ 12. Many of our most important decisions are based upon insufficient information.

continued on next page...

(Measure of Intolerance of Ambiguity continued)

- _____ 13. I like parties where I know most of the people more than ones where all or most of the people are complete strangers.**
- _____ 14. Teachers or supervisors who hand out vague assignments give a chance for one to show initiative and originality.**
- _____ 15. The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better.**
- _____ 16. A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of looking at things.**

(Measure of Suspicion -- including fillers)

This type of questionnaire is typically administered at the end of many research experiments. Please answer the following standard questions regarding your opinions about the study in which you have just participated.

1. Did the researcher in charge treat you in a courteous, professional manner? _____

If no, please explain: _____

2. Were the instructions that you were given presented in a clear and understandable manner? _____

If no, please explain: _____

3. Was the purpose of this study explained to you in an honest and straightforward manner? _____

If no, please explain: _____

4. Please describe, in your own words, what you believe was the purpose of the study in which you have just participated:

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C

Table A.1

Factor Loadings from Principal-Components Analysis

Item:	Factor loading	
	Attraction Factor	Unpredictability Factor
likable (unlikable)	.79	.07
kind (mean)	.74	.17
unhelpful (helpful)	-.52	.04
friendly (unfriendly)	.76	.16
bad (good)	-.72	-.03
unpredictable (predictable)	-.04	.62
conforming (independent)	-.31	-.43
honest (dishonest)	.44	-.45
restrained (impulsive)	-.17	-.67
disobedient (obedient)	-.05	.73
irrational (rational)	-.31	.61
temperamental (easy-going)	-.73	-.02
consistent (inconsistent)	.00	-.73
unusual (typical)	.00	.78
immature (mature)	-.42	.58
rebellious (conventional)	.06	.82
pleasant (annoying)	.82	.01
dominant (submissive)	.11	.24
calm (hostile)	.69	-.18
yielding (stubborn)	.51	-.16
manipulative (straightforward)	-.33	.40
Eigenvalues	5.19	4.60
Percent Variance Explained	24.71	21.89

Note: Variables with loadings of .50 or higher on a factor were selected for inclusion if theoretically valid. Those with loadings of .40 to .49 were only included if they were theoretically valid *and* they contributed to internal consistency.

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX D

Removal of Problem Data

Data from 300 participants were collected for this investigation. However, 16% of the data were dropped due to various problems. 2% of the data were excluded on the basis of confusion or disinterest. These participants were not able to follow the directions and/or fill out the measures properly. For example, one participant did not speak English and consequently was not able to follow directions. Another participant informed the experimenter that she was not listening to the directions and later it became evident that she did not even realize that the raffle tickets she received were hers to keep. Another 6% of data were excluded due to problems during the sessions. Because the study was so complicated, the experimenters made mistakes on occasion. For example, in two of the sessions, the experimenter forgot to provide the payment to the workers at the appropriate time. The workers themselves also contributed to problems occurring during the sessions. Although participants were urged to remain quiet, they often blurted out comments when receiving their payment, particularly during the violation conditions. Some said out loud (in front of other workers) how much they were going to pay their supervisor back. Some said out loud that they received more tickets than they were supposed to get or that their supervisor was not consistent. Clearly these problems may have revealed the manipulations or influenced other workers' reciprocity behavior. Due to the highly deceptive nature of the study, another 8% of data were eliminated due to suspicion. Participants' suspicion was most evident in their free response measures, particularly the item included to assess such dubiousness. If participants indicated an awareness of the

manipulations or the dependent measures, their data were marked as suspicious. Their data were also dropped if they doubted the existence of their supervisor. Overall, 16% of data were eliminated due to confusion, disinterest, suspicion, or experimental problems. Only data from the remaining 251 participants were included in all statistical analyses.

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX E

Analysis of Variance Results

Table A.2

The Effects of Expectancy, Norm, and Knowledge of Reciprocity Opportunity on Attraction Toward the Favor-Giver

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>SS</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>F(r)</u>
Expectation (E)	1	4.979	4.979	4.099 **	4.032 **
Norm (N)	1	3.922	3.922	3.229 *	3.176 *
Prior Knowledge (K)	1	1.265	1.265	1.041	1.024
E X N	1	7.673	7.673	6.316 **	6.213 **
E X K	1	0.954	0.954	0.785	0.772
N X K	1	1.360	1.360	1.120	1.101
E X N X K	1	0.428	0.428	0.352	0.347
Error	101	122.695	1.215		
Pooled Error	227	280.355	1.235		

Note: F(r) refers to the F re-computed using the pooled error from all conditions (including controls). In this case, the pooled error was unusually higher than the error from the experimental conditions only. F's with p values < .05 are marked with **. Those that are marginally significant ($p \leq .09$) are marked with a *.

Table A.3

Attraction Toward the Favor-Giver as a Function of Expectation and Norm *Without* Unpredictability as a Covariate (ANOVA means)

Norm	Expectation	
	Confirmation	Violation
Confirmation	5.08 _a *	5.99 _b
Violation	5.99 _b	5.90 _b

Note. Attraction was based on ten items, each ranging from 0 to 9. The means for the average score of these ten items are presented in the table. High scores indicate more attraction. Means that do not share subscripts differ significantly at $p < .01$. Means that share subscripts do not differ significantly ($ps = .72$ to $.98$). A * indicates marginal significant difference from the control ($M = 5.47$), $p = .08$.

REFERENCES

REFERENCES

- Brehm, J. W. (1966). A theory of psychological reactance. New York: Academic Press.
- Brehm, S. S., & Brehm, J. W. (1981). Psychological reactance: A theory of freedom and Control. New York: Academic Press.
- Brehm, J. W., & Cole, H. (1966). Effect of a favor which reduces freedom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3(4), 420-426.
- Broll, L., Gross, A. E., Piliavin, I. (1974). Effects of offered and requested help on help seeking and reactions to being helped. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 4(3), 244-258.
- Budner, S. (1962). Intolerance of Ambiguity. Journal of Personality, 30, 29-50.
- Carlsmith, J. M., & Aronson, E. (1963). Some hedonic consequences of the confirmation and disconfirmation of expectancies. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 2, 151-156.
- Castro, M. (1974). Reactions to receiving aid as a function of cost to donor and opportunity to aid. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 4, 194-207.
- Clark, M. S., & Mills, J. (1979). Interpersonal attraction in exchange and communal relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(1), 12-24.
- Crano, W. D., & Messé, L. A. (1970). When does dissonance fail? The time dimension in attitude measurement. Journal of Personality, 38(4), 493-508.
- Diener, E., & Emmons, R. A. (1984). The independence of positive and negative affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 1105-1117.
- Fisher, J. D., DePaulo, B. M., & Nadler, A. (1981). Extending altruism beyond the altruistic act: The mixed effects of aid on the help recipient. In J. P. Rushton, & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Altruism and helping behavior: Social, personality, and developmental perspectives (pp. 367-502). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Fortes, M. (1983). Rules and the emergence of society. London, England: Royal Anthropological Institute.
- Gergen, K. J. (1974). Toward a psychology of receiving help. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 4(3), 187-193.

Gergen, K. J., Ellsworth, P., Maslach, C., & Seipel, M. (1975). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31(3), 390-400.

Gergen, K. J., & Jones, E. E. (1963). Mental illness, predictability, and affective consequences as stimulus factors in person perception. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67(2), 95-104.

Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Goranson, R. E., & Berkowitz, L. B. (1966). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3(2), 227-232.

Gouldner, A. (1960). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. American Sociological Review, 25, 161-178.

Greenberg, M. S. (1980). A theory of indebtedness. In K. Gergen, M. S. Greenberg, & R. H. Willis (Eds.), Social exchange: Advances in theory and research, 3-26. New York: Plenum Press.

Greenberg, M. S., & Frisch, D. M. (1972). Effect of intentionality on willingness to reciprocate a favor. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 8, 99-111.

Gross, A. E., & Latané, J. G. (1974). Receiving help, reciprocation, and interpersonal attraction. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 4, 210-223.

Kerr, N. L. (2000). Beyond Social Loafing: Motivation Gains in Groups. Presidential Address presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, IL.

Kiesler, S. B. (1966). The effect of perceived role requirements on reactions to favor-doing. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2, 198-210.

Kiesler, S. B. (1973). Preference for predictability or unpredictability as a mediator of reactions to norm violations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27(3), 354-359.

Kiesler, C. A., Kiesler, S. B., & Pallak, M. S. (1967). The effect of commitment to future interaction on reactions to norm violations. Journal of Personality, 35(4), 585-599.

Messé, L. A., Kerr, N. L., & Sattler, D. N. (1992). "But some animals are more equal than others": The supervisor as a privileged status. In S. Worchel, W. Wood, & J. A. Simpson (Eds.), Group processes and productivity, (pp. 203-223). Newbury Park: Sage.

Micheline, R. L., & Messé. (1974). Reactions to threat as a function of equity. Sociometry, 37(3), 432-439.

Morse, S. J. (1972). Help, Likeability, and Social Influence. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 2(1), 34-46.

Morse, S. J., & Gergen, K. J. (1971). Material aid and social attraction. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 1, 150-162.

Morse, S. J., Gergen, K. J., Peele, S., & van Ryneveld, J. (1977). Reactions to receiving expected and unexpected help from a person who violates or does not violate a norm. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13, 397-402.

Nadler, A. (1986). Help seeking as a cultural phenomenon: Differences between city and kibbutz dwellers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(5), 975-982.

Nadler, A., Fisher, J. D., & Streufert, S. (1974). The donor's dilemma: recipient reactions to aid from friend or foe. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 4(3), 275-285.

Nemeth, C. (1970). Effects of free versus constrained behavior on attraction between people. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 15, 302-311.

Pallack, M. S., & Heller, J. F. (1971). Interactive effects of commitment to future interaction and threat to attitudinal freedom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 17, 325-331.

Piliavin, I., & Gross, A. E. (1977). The effects of separation of services and income maintenance on AFDC recipients. Social Service Review, 51(3), 389-406.

Schopler, J., & Thompson, V. D. (1968). Role of attribution processes in mediating amount of reciprocity for a favor. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10(3), 243-250.

Steiner, I. D. (1972). Group process and productivity. New York: Academic Press.

Suls, J., Witenberg, S., & Gutkin, D. (1981). Evaluating reciprocal and nonreciprocal prosocial behavior: Developmental changes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 7(1), 25-31.

Thibaut, J. W., & Kelley, H. H. (1959/1986). The social psychology of groups. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Uehara, E. S. (1995). Reciprocity reconsidered: Gouldner's 'Moral Norm of Reciprocity' and social support. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 12(4), 483-502.

Wilke, H., & Lanzetta, J. T. (1982). The obligation to help: factors affecting response to help received. European Journal of Social Psychology, 12, 315-519.

Worchel, S., & Andreoli, V. A. (1974). Attribution of causality as a means of restoring behavioral freedom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 28(2), 237-245.

Worchel, S., Andreoli, V., & Archer, R. (1976). When a favor is a threat to freedom: The effects of attribution and importance of freedom on reciprocity. Journal of Personality, 44(2), 295-310.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIV. LIBRARIES



31293020582049