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June Woo Kim

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By

June Woo Kim

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ABSTRACT

IDEOLOGY AND URBANIZATION IN SOUTH KOREA

By

June Woo Kim

This study uncovered a distinctive pattern of urban development in South Korea. Power is extremely concentrated in the Korean urban system. Most decision-making takes place in Seoul. However, population is decentralized among many cities. Income discrepancies among cities is not significant. And the contrast between wealthy neighborhoods and poor ones in Seoul is not as stark as in other major cities in the world.

This pattern of urbanization stems from the importance of the developmental state in Korean society. The "regulatory" states in the West limit themselves to guaranteeing the basic functioning of the market, whereas the developmental state in Korea intervenes to promote the market.

The ideology of the developmental state guides practical policies. Gramsci defines "hegemonic ideology" as "a socially embedded world view serving the interest of a class accepted by the majority of the population."

Korea's bureaucrats adhere to an ideology I call Confucian developmentalism. The power of Seoul in the Korean urban system reflects Confucian ideology. The spread of wealth in the Korean urban system reflects Korean developmentalism – an emphasis on the development of the nation as a

whole rather than the pursuit of individual wealth. Extensive investment in infrastructure, development of industrial estates, and revenue sharing all contribute to reducing income differentials across cities.

Equitable urban development in Seoul stems from developmental mobilization by bureaucrats. Urban development provides necessary public infrastructure for the masses and amenities such as housing for the middle class. Extensive revenue sharing among wards guarantees a minimum level of social services in different neighborhoods.

Seoul is not demographically a primate city by world standards even though its great population size does leave room for concern. Investment in industrial estates and transportation in the provinces offers alternative migration destinations besides Seoul. Other measures to control population migration include (1) designation of green belts around Seoul, (2) compulsory relocation of factories in Seoul, (3) expansion of educational opportunities outside of Seoul, and (4) decentralization of secondary government agencies.

This dissertation is dedicated to my mom (Myeung Hae Lee), dad (Yung Che Kim), sys (Soo Im Kim), and bro (Sung Jee Kim)

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INTRODUCTION

> Jakarta, Indonesia's capital and largest city ... is a crowded city of jarring contrasts. From a vantage point atop one of the city's shimmering high-rises, other modern skyscrapers displaying the corporate logos of multinational businesses and bustling six-lane highways filled with cars and trucks stretch out for miles through the smoggy haze. At street level along the major avenues, the sights, sounds, the smells of heavy vehicle traffic remind a visitor of Southern California highways ... Although there are very few trees or green areas in this city of concrete and glass, there is a veneer of great commercial activity, prosperity, and growth. The sprawling downtown area of tall buildings is home to scores of luxury hotels and restaurants, sleek office buildings, and upscale shopping arcades ... But in the less visible parts of the city, in slums off the main avenues and sprawling squatter settlements and shantytowns on the outskirts of the metropolitan area, the masses of Jakarta live starkly different lives. The fortunate few work in manufacturing industries producing commodities like clothing or athletic shoes for global markets where pay is about the rupiah equivalent of US $2 a day; others are employed as "entrepreneurs" in less formal enterprises like vending and driving bajai taxis (small, noisy, three-wheeled cabs).
>
> Smith (1996: 1-2).

Inequality seems to be a ubiquitous element in urban life. Severe levels of spatial polarization are obvious even in wealthy metropolises in the West. A good example is New York. If you visit the Metropolitan Museum of Art, you might know that the census tract directly north (between Fifth and Park Avenue from 86th to 91st) had the highest average family income in New York in 1990. At over $301,000 average family income, it is just a short cab ride from the Bradhurst section in Harlem (Bradhurst Avenue to Frederick Douglas between

West 145th and West 150th) which had the lowest average family income of just $6,000 in 1990. Few would put that area on their list of "must-see" New York sites, yet the contrast is very significant (American Sociological Association, 1996).

Metropolitan areas in the Third World share the same problem with even more human suffering and despair. On top of the above-mentioned polarization within the metroline, most Third World cities face severe uneven development among cities in their national urban system. Third World nations tend to have an extreme concentration of power, population, and economic activities in their largest cities. Bangkok, the capital of Thailand, is 25 times larger than the next largest city, Chiang Mai (Lanegran, 1998). Most of these primate cities are national capitals as well. As the host city of Thailand's traditionally strong central bureaucracy, Bangkok exerts its power over Thailand's other cities (London, 1980). The majority of Thailand's factories are located in the metropolitan Bangkok area. Quite naturally, Bangkok enjoys a much higher per capita income than other cities in Thailand (Lanegran, 1998).

Even though some of the people in those countries might be proud of the impressive skylines in their capitals, the human suffering and injustice caused by the neglect of other cites is not a joking matter. Urban residents in other cities not only get small paychecks but also endure limited educational opportunity, poor health care, and less-than-adequate social amenities. For example:

> The Ivory Coast provides a striking example of the singular magnetism of the capital ... In 1968, the eight-story, 500-bed Center Hospitalier Universitaire, one of the largest and most modern hospitals in all of Africa, was built in the luxurious Cocody quarter, home of high government officials – the funds given by France were originally intended for twelve regional hospitals (Cohen, 1974, 229; Gugler & Flanagan, 1977: 282).

This study first examines the "unevenness" of urban development in South Korea (hereafter Korea) in comparison with the experiences of other countries. The time frame of the analysis is from the early 1960s to the mid 1990s with a special focus on the time period from 1961 to 1987 which I believe best represents the operations of the developmental state in Korea.

Power concentration in the Korean urban system is extreme. All decision-making seems to be taking place in Seoul. However, the population is modestly decentralized among other cities. Income discrepancies among cities is not significant. Nor is the contrast between wealthy neighborhoods and poor ones in Seoul as stark as in other major cities in the world.

This urban pattern deviates from the assumption that power, population and wealth go hand in hand. Most urban researchers think that uneven urbanization is a function of the economy, and that the less developed countries have more serious urban inequalities than developed countries on each dimension: power, population, and wealth.

I name this puzzling pattern of urbanization in Korea, "Confucian developmental urbanization," as I believe that the phenomena can be understood only by using a concept widely accepted among social scientists

studying the economic development of Northeast Asia; the developmental state. As will be detailed later on, many scholars argue that the state in Korea has been more in charge of the society than the "regulatory" states in the West. The bourgeoisie was not the powerholder in Korean society. Bureaucrats made the important decisions about what to produce, how to produce, and how to reinvest the surplus.

In contrast to the Western bourgeoisie who believed in the high ideal of political freedom and the concept of a self-regulating market, Korean bureaucrats have not cared much about either democratic procedures or the sanctity of private property rights. The age-old Confucian tradition of "rule by the scholar-official" helped the public bear elitist decision-making by meritocratically chosen bureaucrats. The experience of Japanese colonialism (1910-1945) convinced Koreans of the need for national economic development even at the cost of the "self-regulating market." As will be explained in detail, the Korean hegemonic ideology from the 1960s can be regarded as Confucian developmentalism.

I believe that this study contributes to the existing urban literature in the following ways. First, this study lays the ground for additional urban studies using the Gramscian notion of "hegemonic ideology" as a conceptual tool. Second, four distinct dimensions of uneven urbanization are analyzed. This may help future researchers understand uneven urbanization at the national level, and facilitate international dialogues comparing different urban combinations around the globe. Third, I uncover a distinct combination characteristics in

Korean urbanization and term it "Confucian developmental urbanization," as I believe that it results from a hegemonic ideology. This may help those interested in Korean urbanization to understand the phenomena in its totality. Fourth, the concept, "Confucian developmentalism," can be used to understand other social aspects of Korean society. My analysis of the developmental state and its ideology since the early 1960s provides a more balanced understanding of Korea. Fifth, my analysis of how "Confucian developmentalism" was translated into different dimensions of urbanization, provides a dynamic way of understanding uneven urbanization as an expression of class interest and the capacity of a class to go beyond its narrow interest.

The main task of this study is to find out how the ruling ideology of the developmental state in Korea guided the actual practices of urban development. Chapter 1 starts by examining the concept of ideology in the writings of Antonio Gramsci. My own interpretation of his notion of ideology is presented and will be used as the working definition of ideology throughout the chapter. Ideologies in some other societies will be also examined from a comparative perspective and their relationship with urbanization will be mentioned. In chapter 2, the details of "Confucian developmental urbanization" will be presented along with explanations as to why this pattern is a new phenomenon deserving attention. Chapter 3 attempts to answer the question of "who actually shaped Korean urbanization from the early 1960s to the mid 1990s?" This chapter reviews previous attempts to understand the issue of uneven urbanization in Korea, and ends with describing how the bureaucrats in Korea came to be powerful decision

makers since the 1960s. Chapter 4 attempts to show how the ideology of Confucianism and nationalistic developmentalism held by high bureaucrats in Korea motivated them to shape urban Korea in a specific way. Chapter 5 looks into the urban policies and practices of bureaucrats guided by their ideology.

CHAPTER 1. IDEOLOGY AND URBANIZATION

> When the Chinese Communists began to sweep toward victory in their civil war with the Nationalists in 1948 they came into control of large cities for the first time – first in Manchuria, and subsequently across all of mainland China ... Although some radical elements among the new rulers advocated dispersing up to half of the population of cities such as Shanghai to the countryside, more moderate voices prevailed, and the Chinese Communists did not adopt the radical measures against urbanism that their Cambodian pupils later did. The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party recognized that much of the strength and vitality of Chinese society depended upon her cities, and that ways had to be found to purge them of their evils and utilize their strengths. They set out this task immediately, utilizing the experiences they had gained in their rural base areas, advice and models borrowed from their Soviet allies, and ad hoc experiments and improvisations designed to cope with unfamiliar problems.
>
> Some of the fundamental goals of the Chinese Communists in this urban reform effort can be stated fairly simply. Foreign control and influence should be eliminated. Cities should become spartan and productive places with full employment, secure jobs with a range of fringe benefits, minimal income and life style differences, an end to conspicuous consumption and lavish spending, and with decent consumption standards for all. Crime, prostitution, drug addiction, begging, and other social evils should be eliminated (Whyte and Parish, 1984:15-6).

In spite of the power of ideology in changing cities as shown in the case of socialist urbanization, there has been ambivalence regarding the link between ideology and urbanization. For example, Sjoberg (1965) takes technology to be the key variable for explaining the nature of the industrial city. Sjoberg (1965:252) adds that ideology has a secondary importance, saying that "the scientific method seems to support and is itself sustained by an ideology that gives rise to and promotes the democratic process, and such norms as

universalism and emphasis on achievement in modern bureaucracies."

However, Sjoberg (1965:220) also states that ideology facilitates urbanization by providing people a rationale for living and for dying:

> Nowadays most nations, large and small, are striving to achieve a higher degree of industrial urbanization. Indeed, some countries are taxing all their resources to achieve this goal ... Social orders farther down the scale that have recently thrown off the colonial yoke have set their sights on imitating the powerful nations. Most significant of all is the fact that societal rulers are implementing such policies even at the expense of the traditional authority structure that supports their own power position. They recognize that unless the society industrializes and urbanizes, it may revert to its former colonial status, a possibility that is so repugnant that industrial urbanization becomes the lesser of the evils.

Ideology is also a secondary variable for Marxist urbanist, Castells (1977). It is a mask the ruling class is wearing in order to keep people from understanding the urban contradictions resulting from capitalist class relations. For example, Castells argues that suburbanization in the US can be attributed to the interest of monopoly capital. The role of suburbanization in the process of capitalist accumulation was not limited to the capital directly invested in the production of housing, highways, and public facilities. Rather, the whole suburban social form became an extremely effective apparatus of individualized commodity consumption and reproduction of existing class relations (Castells, 1977:388):

> The shopping centers and the supermarkets were made possible by suburban sprawl, as were the new leisure activities (from the drive-in restaurant or cinema to the private swimming pool). But even more important was the role of the single-family house in the suburb as the perfect design for maximizing capitalist consumption. Every household had to be self-sufficient, from the refrigerator to the TV, including the garden machinery, the do-it-yourself instruments, the electro-domestic equipment, etc.
>
> At the same time the suburban model of consumption had a very clear impact on the reproduction of the dominant social relationships. At the most elementary level, this whole domestic world was built on borrowed money and the chronic indebtedness tied individuals into the job market and into society in general in a most repressive way. Any major deviation or failure of individuals to conform could immediately be countered by withdrawal of access to consumer credit. Mass consumption also meant mass dependency upon the economic and cultural rules of the financial institutions.

Castells (1977:388) argues that the pervasive "return to nature" ideology is just a "myth" persuading the mass of wage workers that a degrading relation to nature experienced in the industrial work process can be compensated for by a satisfying relation to nature in "the community."

However, Castells (1977:180) acknowledges the "relative autonomy" of ideological symbols. For instance, Jeffersonianism, a fine egalitarian ideal, leads, in practice, to an increase in inequality between communities and barriers of social distance through all kinds of discriminatory land-use regulations: large-lot zoning, minimum house-size requirements, exclusion of multiple dwellings, restrictive building codes and so on (Castells, 1977:180,392).

One interesting finding of my own is that Sjoberg and Castells are using the term ideology with different connotations. To Sjoberg (1965), ideology has

more relevance in preindustrial cities which functioned as governmental and religious centers. On the other hand, Castells (1977) treats ideology as something deceptive if not insignificant.

I believe that ideology needs to be taken seriously and defined without negative connotations. This is why I start this chapter with the interpretation of Gramsci's major concepts: "ideology" and "hegemonic ideology." Ideologies seem to have more relevance when they are not defined as abstract ideas but as embodied in the social practice of individuals and in the organization within which social practices take place. Moreover, some of the ideologies are more important because they are widely accepted across different classes in a society.

Maybe ideology is part of the answer to one of the fundamental questions of human history: how have the few have been able to dominate the many? Ruling classes feel most secure when what they preach is embraced by the masses and not just imposed upon the people at the point of a bayonet. When what they preach loses its status as the common sense of the common people, their privileged status is also in jeopardy.

As Eckert (1993:110) aptly points out, history is richly stocked with forgotten classes, cliques, parties, and other groups who for one reason or another were unable to move beyond the realm of coercion to popular support. Eckert (1993) cites the recent collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe for contemporary examples of such failure.

After providing a working definition of ideology and hegemonic ideology, the possibility of different ideologies in advanced capitalist societies as explored by Gramsci will be examined. Gramsci was aware of the weakness of liberalism in Italian society as contrasted with the strength of bourgeoisie ideology in Western Europe and the US.

To better understand hegemonic ideology in modern Korea, the US and Japan will be used as reference points. The hegemonic ideology in the US is "Lockean liberalism." In Japan, it is "Confucian developmentalism." Lockean liberalism supports social relations that are "economically unequal but politically equal" and Confucian developmentalism supports "politically authoritarian but economically egalitarian" social ties.

As will be detailed in chapter 4, Korea's hegemonic ideology is also Confucian developmentalism. As Korea shares the same type of hegemonic ideology as Japan, I will briefly explore the link between ideology and urbanization in Japan. As will be briefly mentioned in the conclusion, Korea has become more willing to embrace Lockean liberalism since the mid-1990s. This makes the link between American ideology and urbanization not only a good counter-reference but also a future possibility in Korean urbanization. Having that in mind, the continuum between Confucian developmentalism in Japan and Lockean liberalism in the US may help us understand Korean urbanization as part of the bigger picture.

Gramsci and Ideology

What kept Marxists puzzled during the time of Gramsci (1891-1937) was the absence of socialist revolution in Western Europe. Boggs (1984:154) aptly explains how the Marxist assumption that the proletariat in the developed capitalist societies was an inherently revolutionary force came to be questioned:

> Classical Marxism derived much of its ideological strength from a convincing theoretical projection of imminent capitalist crisis leading to systematic breakdown ... As the Erfurt Programme of German Social Democracy made clear in 1891, the capitalist mode of production could not be expected to survive its own explosive contradictions – an optimism buttressed by an underlying mood of scientific certainty. By the turn of the century, however, this scenario was beginning to lose its credibility, especially in the more advanced countries (England, Germany, France, Sweden, Holland) where capitalism had in fact consolidated its economic and political power, and where the working class was not being transformed into a cohesive revolutionary force. Instead of the anticipated class polarization, leading to widespread socialist consciousness and insurrectionary politics, the overwhelming trend was toward stabilization, a fragmented class consciousness, and political reformism.

Ideology became an issue. Rosa Luxemberg was one of the Marxists who shared this doubt and started to look into the question of worker consciousness. From Luxemburg's perspective, the problem was proletarian "immaturity," in which subjective factors lagged behind objective conditions (Boggs, 1984:154).

Gramsci took a slightly different approach, looking into the ideological dominance of the bourgeoisie. According to Gramsci, the resilience of Western

capitalism stems from the bourgeois leadership in civil society through organizations such as schools, the media, churches, trade unions and political parties (Salamini, 1981; Bellamy and Schecter, 1993).

In one of the best-known passages in *Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci (1971:238; as cited in Simon 1982:28) explains how civil society functioned as "a fortress" of capitalism in Western Europe:

> In Russia the state was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between state and civil society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed.

Whether Gramsci's emphasis on ideology deviates from the Marxian belief in the primacy of material conditions in human history is beyond the boundary of this study to answer. This section has the modest goal of outlining the concepts of "ideology" and "hegemonic ideology" in the Gramscian sense.

I will just point out that Gramsci firmly believed in the importance of the material base but also felt there was room for ideology in Marxian logic. In his article, *The Modern Prince*, Gramsci vehemently argues that Marxism is not synonymous with economism (1957:155):

> One point of reference for the study of economism and for understanding the relationship between structure and superstructure is that passage from *The Poverty of Philosophy*, where Marx says that an important phase in the development of the social group is that in which the single components of a trade union do not struggle any longer only for their own

> economic interests, but for the defense and development of the organization itself. This should be remembered together with Engel's statement that only in the "last analysis" is the economy the mainspring of history (in his two letters on Marxism published also in Italian), and taken together with the passage in the *Preface to the critique of Political Economy* where it says that it is in the field of ideologies that men become aware of the conflict which takes place in the economic world.

Gramsci (1957:156-61) states that economism (1) does not take account of the formation of economic classes but assumes a mean and usurious self-interest, (2) has reduced economic development to a succession of technical changes, and (3) has resulted in fatalistic finalism. In such ways of thinking, Gramsci (1957:160) asserts, there is no understanding of how mass ideological facts always lag behind mass economic phenomena and how the automatic drive of the economic factor is slowed down, cramped, or even broken up momentarily by traditional ideological elements.

For Marx, "ideology" means "false consciousness." Ideology is a distortion of reality; but even more, it stands reality upon its head (Lichtman, 1975:47). In *The German Ideology*, Marx explains the distortion; power over material production confers power over the production of consciousness (1967:438; as cited in Lichtman, 1975:53-4):

> In every epoch the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling ideas, that is, the class that is the ruling material power of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual power. The class having the means of material production has also control over the means of intellectual production. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas, hence of the

> relationships which make one class the ruling one and therefore the ideas of its domination. The individuals who comprise the ruling class possess among other things consciousness and thought. Insofar as they rule as a class and determine the extent of a historical epoch, it is self-evident that they do it in its entire range. Among other things they rule also as thinkers and producers of ideas and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age. Their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch.

I think Gramsci firmly agreed that bourgeois ideology was used to legitimate their exploitation of workers. However, it seems he did not think that an ideology is necessarily false. Each ideology is the same in that it serves the interest of a class, but different in the class served.

Gramsci's creativity is his ability to change the meaning of "ideology" while staying in the Marxian tradition. For him, communism is also an ideology, a morally superior ideology representing the interest of workers. So, communist leaders are preachers of this "true" ideology and critics of "false" capitalist ideologies.

I interpret Gramsci's notion of ideology as "a socially embedded worldview serving the interest of a class." I used the expression "socially embedded" because of the historical materiality Gramsci assigned to the term "ideology." Simon (1982:58-60) argues that the Gramscian notion of ideology is not individual fancy, rather it is embodied in communal modes of living and acting:

> For Gramsci, ideology is more than a system of ideas ... Ideologies have material existence in the sense that they are embodied in the social practice of individuals and in the organization within which these social practices take place. These organizations include the political parties, trade unions and other organizations forming part of civil society; the various apparatuses of the state; and economic organizations such as industrial and commercial companies and financial institutions. All these bodies play a part in elaborating, sustaining, and spreading ideologies.

The term "worldview" is used to represent the broad nature of ideology. Boggs (1980: 60) argues that the Gramscian notion of ideology encompasses the whole range of values, attitudes, beliefs, cultural norms, and legal precepts that permeate a society. As a worldview, ideology guides the everyday lives of people like religion does. According to Gramsci (1971:367; Simon, 1982:58), ideology is equivalent to "a religion understood in the secular sense ... a unity ... between a conception of the world and a corresponding norm of conduct."

Gramsci seeks to demonstrate that every socially embedded worldview "serves the interest of a class" by analyzing how professional organizations evolve into a class. In the first moment of collective political consciousness, a professional organization does not have a class consciousness. Group solidarity falls short of spreading to other groups in the class (Gramsci, 1971:181):

> A tradesman feels obliged to stand by another tradesman, a manufacturer by another manufacturer, etc., but the tradesman does not yet feel solidarity with the manufacturer; in other words, the members of the professional group are conscious of its unity and homogeneity, and of the need to organize it, but in the case of the wider social group this is not yet so.

In the second moment, class consciousness is reached but is still mostly preoccupied with class interest in the economic field and not yet forming an ideology that can seriously contend with other worldviews (Gramsci 1971:181):

> Already at this juncture the problem of the State is posed – but only in terms of winning politico-juridical equality with the ruling groups: the right is claimed to participate in legislation and administration, even to reform these – but within the existing fundamental structures.

In the third moment, one becomes aware that one's own corporate interests, in their present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too (Gramsci, 1971:181):

> This is the most purely political phase, and marks the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures; it is the phase in which previously germinated ideologies come into confrontation and conflict, until only one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself throughout society – bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a "universal" plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups.

In this third moment, an ideology becomes "hegemonic," another term of Gramsci's. I understand "hegemonic ideology" as equivalent to "ideology accepted by the majority of the population." Every ideology basically serves the

interest of a class, but some come to be perceived by other classes as serving the broader "public interest." Then, the ideology is "hegemonic."

In order for a class to become hegemonic, it has to go beyond sectional, or what Gramsci calls "economic-corporate" struggles. And, the class must be prepared to become the national representative of a broad block of social forces (Simon, 1982:23).

A class succeeds in securing ideological hegemony over society through leadership (which is based on consent) and not through domination (which is based on coercion). Gramsci wrote (1971:365; Salamini, 1981) that leadership is what makes and keeps a group dominant over other groups:

> A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise 'leadership' before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to 'lead' as well.

The term "hegemony" is derived from the Greek *hegeisthai*, which means "to be a guide" or "to be a ruler" (Pellicani, 1981:32). With this term, Gramsci sought to express the idea that the supremacy of one class over others can not be reduced to a relationship of mere coercion; on the contrary, the dialectic of "dominant class – dominated class" is almost always based on a tight web of relationships that imply direction; in other words, it suggests the capacity of the upper class to satisfy certain objective needs of a society, such as legal administration, management of economic and administrative activities, cultural

production, and elaboration of models of exemplary behavior (Pellicani, 1981:32).

Having defined hegemonic ideology, it is useful to examine its characteristics in anticipation of my later application of the term to urbanization in Korea. Hegemonic ideology has several characteristics: (1) national-popular, (2) common-sense oriented, and (3) and contradiction-embracing.

Hegemonic ideology has national-popular elements which do not arise out of the relations of production. For example, a nation which is oppressed by another develops traditions of struggle for national liberation, and in the course of history the people of every country develop powerful ideas, expressed by terms like 'patriotism' and 'nationalism' which can, as Gramsci says, have the force of popular religions (Simon, 1982:42-3). A hegemonic class is one which succeeds in combining these patriotic struggles and ideas with its own class interests so as to achieve national leadership (Simon, 1982:43).

Once an ideology has been accepted and internalized by the majority of the population, it appears as "common sense," i.e., as the "traditional popular conception of the world" (Gramsci, 1971; as cited in Boggs, 1984:161). Common sense is not rigid or fixed. In his essay, *The Study of Philosophy*, Gramsci (1971:326) wrote about the flexible, enriching nature of commonsense:

> Every philosophical current leaves behind a sediment of 'common sense'; this is the document of its effectiveness. Common sense is not something rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming itself, enriching itself with scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have entered ordinary life.

Even though he doesn't mention much about this issue, I believe he was aware of the contradictory nature of hegemonic ideology. Common sense is full of contradictions. Common sense is the uncritical and largely unconscious way in which a person perceives the world, often confused and contradictory, and compounded of folklore, myths, and popular experience (Simon, 1982:25).

As all classes who contend for hegemonic position try to embrace "traditional" or "national-popular" elements in a society, there are logical inconsistencies in hegemonic ideologies. For example, one may find it logically incoherent to combine Marxism and nationalism. To Gramsci, however, it may be perceived as an appropriate strategy for the proletariat as combining nationalism helps to build a system of alliances. In *Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci pointed out the need for communists to be "intellectuals who are conscious of being linked organically to a national-popular mass (1971:204)" rather than elites separated from the masses.

Having developed a working definition of "ideology" and "hegemonic ideology," I will now focus on how Gramsci dealt with the issue of ideology in comparative perspective and show how his analysis can be extended to shed some light on the case of Korean ideology.

Different Ideologies?

Gramsci thought that bourgeois ideology in Italy was different from other Western European countries. "Liberalism" was the hegemonic ideology in most Western European countries. But bourgeois ideology in Italy fell short of being liberal and failed to draw legitimacy from the masses.

Gramsci associated economic liberalism in Western Europe with free trade and minimal state regulation over economic activities on behalf of the bourgeoisie (1971:159-160):

> The ideas of the Free Trade movement are based on a theoretical error whose practical origin is not hard to identify; they are based on a distinction between political society and civil society, which is made into and presented as an organic one, whereas in fact it is merely methodological. Thus it is asserted that economic activity belongs to civil society, and that the state must not intervene to regulate it. But since in actual reality civil society and state are one and the same, it must be made clear that *laissez-faire* too is a form of state "regulation", introduced and maintained by legislative and coercive means. It is a deliberate policy, conscious of its own ends, and not the spontaneous, automatic expression of economic facts. Consequently, *laissez-faire* liberalism is a political programme dealing with a fraction of the ruling class which wishes to modify not the structure of the state, but merely government policy; which wishes to reform the laws controlling commerce, but only indirectly those controlling industry.

Gramsci associated political liberalism with the separation of state powers. The division of powers in the state enables a rotation of leading-class parties in government and channels regulation in a way favorable to the

bourgeoisie (Gramsci, 1971:160). According to Gramsci (1971:246), making posts elective, through a permanent Constituent Assembly or the election at fixed intervals of the Head of State, gives the illusion of satisfying popular demand.

In contrast, the Italian bourgeoisie failed to establish liberalism as the hegemonic ideology. Gramsci found the answer in Italian history. According to Gramsci, the *Risorgimento* of the 1860s and 1870s, despite its vision of Italian unification, did not achieve a bourgeois-democratic revolution as in France where the Jacobin force awakened and organized the national-popular collective will (Boggs, 1984:172-3). The architect of unification had been the Moderate Party, composed of the followers of the Piedmontese monarchy and the agrarian elites (Bellamy and Schecter, 1993:148). With the sole purpose of maintaining their socio-economic position by securing political power, they achieved this goal through a mixture of conquest and power-broking with foreign nations, the bourgeoisie, and sections of the working class (Bellamy and Schecter, 1993:148-9). Southern peasants were not included in the system based upon collusion between Northern industrialists and Southern landowners, leaving Southern Italy in "the status of a semi-colonial market, a source of savings and taxes" (Gramsci, 1971:94; as cited in Boggs, 1984:174).

Italy's late entrance into the capitalist system led to a less liberal state. Economic nationalism won out over liberalism (Boggs, 1984:49). In *Origins of the Mussolini Cabinet*, Gramsci (1978:129) also points out the absence of

separation of powers within the state and the predicament of the Italian bourgeois state:

> No separation of powers had yet taken place; parliamentary prerogatives were very limited; there did not exist large scale parliamentary political parties. At that time, the Italian bourgeoisie had to defend the unity and integrity of the State against repeated attacks by reactionary forces, represented above all by an alliance between the big landowners and the Vatican. The big industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, led by Giovanni Giolitti, sought to resolve the problem with an alliance between all the urban classes ... and the class of agricultural wage laborers. What was involved, however, was not some parliamentary process. It was rather a question of paternalist concessions of an immediate kind, which the regime made to the toiling masses organized in trade unions and agricultural cooperatives.

Korea, since the 1960s, shares a characteristic with Italy before the WWII: the absence of hegemonic bourgeois liberalism.

American Ideology vs. Japanese Ideology

As already summarized, Gramsci discussed the complexity of ideology and the existence of different ideologies among capitalist societies. I will now compare the ideological compositions of Japan and the US as a prelude to the analysis of hegemonic ideology in Korea. Japan and the US have dominant positions in the world economy. In *The Modern Prince*, Gramsci (1957:170) mentioned that ideologies in more developed countries diffuse to less developed countries where they combine with local worldviews. As a matter of fact, Japan and the US have exerted the most foreign influence over the history of modern

Korea. Japan colonized Korea from 1910-1945. After that, South Korea came under the geo-political umbrella of the US. About 37,000 US forces are still stationed in Korea (Korea Times, 1998).

The contrast between hegemonic ideologies in the US and Japan is also of interest. As mentioned, Gramsci thought liberalism had most rooted in the US. On the other hand, liberalism is absent from Japanese ideology (Morishima, 1982).

Fajnzlber's (1990) article on the United States and Japan as models of industrialization shows how ideologies in the two societies are different and how they diffused into the ideologies of neighboring developing countries. According to Fajnzlber (1990), key aspects of the development patterns in Korea and the Latin American NICs – Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico – may be understood as outgrowths of efforts to emulate the Japanese and American development experiences, respectively. Having Japan as the source of inspiration, post-1960 Korea emphasized saving, strategic industrialization, and international competitiveness.

Latin American elite strata, on the other hand, sought primarily to reproduce the "American way of life." Latin American development is characterized by (1) consumption trends that are heavily skewed in favor of urban elite groups at the expense of the rural and lower income majorities and (2) productive structures that are biased toward production for domestic rather than external markets (Fajnzylber, 1990:324-5).

Fajnzylber (1990:325-6) argues that different development patterns in Japan and the United States are at least partially rooted in their distinctive contemporary histories:

> The internal legitimacy of Japanese political leadership is inextricably linked with the successful recovery of national dignity. As a smaller insular nation with scarce national resources, Japan has constructed its economic power via careful sectoral strategies and long-range planning. In return, the resulting pattern of vigorous growth has legitimated the Japanese political leadership and existing institutional arrangements. On the other hand, the United States has become accustomed to the role of the paramount global power in the post World War II era. The United States has served as a model for other nations by virtue of its language, the strength of its currency, the attractiveness of its affluent life-style, and its productive, continental economy.

As reflected in their economic development pattern, the hegemonic ideologies in the US and Japan are quite different. Whereas U.S. hegemonic ideology is best represented by Lockean liberalism, the Japanese counterpart is Confucian developmentalism.

Lockean Liberalism in America

> We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it.[1]

There is not much disagreement that liberalism has been the hegemonic ideology in the US. Gramsci regarded the United States as the society in which the liberal bourgeoisie had established the most complete ideological hegemony. Gramsci attributes strong bourgeois hegemony in the US to (1) the absence of a feudal stage of development, (2) an optimistic vision of progress through economic growth implanted by the early colonialists, and (3) a strong presence of the Protestant ethic emphasizing efficiency, private property, and profits (Boggs, 1984: 178-80).

Fukuyama (1989:5), who made the sensational argument about "the universalization of Western liberalism," believes that liberalism in America has not changed much since the *Declaration of Independence,* and the basic principles of liberalism in America cannot be improved upon. Huntington (1981) also argues that liberalism has been broadly supported by most elements in American society and has changed little in the course of two hundred years.

Then, how have previous thinkers defined liberalism in America? In *The Liberal Tradition in America*, Hartz (1955:4) claimed to use the term "liberalism" in the classic Lockean sense, and Lodge (1975) defined American liberalism using the term "Lockean ideology" as composed of three elements (1) individualism, (2) property rights, and (3) a limited state. These meanings of liberalism came to the US across the Atlantic Ocean from England just as

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[1] Thomas Jefferson, 1975 "The Declaration of Independence" p. 235 in *The Portable Thomas Jefferson* edited by Merrill D. Peterson. Baltimore, MD:Penguin.

Confucianism in Japan can be traced to the teachings of Confucius in China across the East China Sea.

According to Locke, society is made up of independent individuals who contract with others into a community (Dunning, 1905:232; Simon, 1951:391). In *The Second Treatise of Civil Government*, Locke describes how this voluntary formation of society is associated with political equality and the rule of the majority (1946:127; as cited in Simon, 1951:391):

> Men being ... by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent ... When any number of men have ... consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest ... For that which acts any community being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way, it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority ...

Locke does not think human nature is communitarian. He does not believe in organic social principles, nor does he adhere to a moral philosophy based upon a vision of community (Lodge, 1975: 93).

The rights of property come from the status of "atomized" man. Because Locke regarded individuals as the proprietors of their own person, they are able to acquire property freely (Locke 1959:58; Post, 1986:149): "Whatsoever he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left in it, he hath mixed

his Labor with and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property."

Locke's dictum that "The great and chief end ... of Men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property (*The Second Treatise of Civil Government* Section 124)" is echoed some one hundred years later by Madison in *The Federalist Papers* in these words (Lodge, 1975:101): "The protection of these faculties [the diversity in the faculties of men from which the rights of property originate] is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results."

The role of the state also starts with the needs of individuals. According to Locke, the purpose of social contracts among individuals is the protection and preservation of property in the broad sense of the word – that is life, liberty, and estate – against dangers both from within and without the community (Dunning, 1905:232). Dunning (1905:232-3) argues that the voluntary nature of political authority leads to a state limited in power:

> The social contract involves an agreement by each individual to give up his natural right of executing the law of nature and punishing offences against that law. Each resigns, not all his natural rights, as Hobbes held, but merely this single right. This right, moreover, is given up, not to any particular person or group of persons, but to the community as a whole. The society thus becomes, by the act of individuals who form it, vested with the functions of determining what are against the law of nature and punishing violations of that law; and these functions constitute, in Locke's view, the whole scope of political authority. There is in this conception nothing of that absolute, unlimited, and uncontrollable sovereignty which was the soul of Hobbes' system.

"Politically Equal but Economically Unequal"

> According to the Census Bureau, from 1989 to 1993 the typical American household lost $2,344 in real annual income, a fall of 7 percent. Practically all the rise in national income went to the top one fifth (with 48.2 per cent of national income against the bottom one fifth's 3.6 per cent), while the earnings of college educated workers stagnated, and the number of households in poverty (with less than $14.763 per annum at 1993 prices) increased from 13.1 per cent to 15.1 per cent. In other words, the average American family paid for the windfall gains of the rich, while the poorest families paid most of all. The "liberated" free market meant free handouts for the rich paid for by the poor. As Robert B. Reich, Secretary for Labor, remarked, "America has the most unequal distribution of income of any industrialized nation in the world." (Perkin, 1996:35)

This section focuses on two urban-related characteristics of liberalism in America: one is the much-touted "political equality" and the other is the less-publicized "economic inequality."

The political aspect of Lockean liberalism has been well known to the American people. Locke's two basic premises are reflected in the *American Declaration of Independence*: All men are born free and equal; and the origin and basis of government is in the consent of the governed (Lodge, 1975:93).

Locke's "political equality" emphasizes individualism and the limited state. Closely tied to Lockean individualism is the idea of equality implied in the phrase "equal opportunity" (Lodge, 1975:10). In the American colonies, the removal of overt distinctions between classes (titles and so forth) and British libertarianism

had produced a situation where political equality was taken to be the basic presupposition of all government (Ingersoll and Mattews, 1991:56).

In *A Letter Concerning Toleration* published in 1689, Locke argues that government may not interfere with any individual's religious beliefs (Ingersoll and Matthews, 1991:36). This public-private dichotomy eventually develops the groundwork for the creation of civil rights, that is, rights individuals have that neither the state nor society may interfere with. In the United States, this idea of civil rights finds its clearest expression in the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution, usually called the Bill of Rights (Ingersoll and Mattews, 1991:37). The reason why Fukuyama claims that American ideology has changed little, even with the inclusion of women and minorities, may be because those changes have taken place within the basic premises of liberalism; that is "political equality."

Of course, the abstract values of liberty and equality mean nothing without the ability to fulfill them. Ingersoll and Metthews (1991:95) raise a provocative question:

> A person residing in the United States possesses a theoretical freedom or right to leave that country for any other place in the world. That theoretical freedom does not, however, put the money in his or her pocket that will permit the exercise of this right. Isn't a person similarly situated, but who possesses the means to exercise the abstract right of free movement, actually more free than one who does not?

The economic means to fulfill basic rights in America is a more contentious aspect of American ideology, as it is obviously not one of the manifest elements. Some scholars deny that there are negative characteristics in American liberalism. For example, Fukuyama (1989:9) argues that the underlying legal and social structure of the US has remained fundamentally egalitarian and moderately redistributionalist. According to Fukuyama (1989:9), economic inequality in US society should not be blamed on liberalism but on the legacy of premodern conditions, such as slavery and racism.

One way to evaluate Fukuyama's argument about economically egalitarian liberalism is to go back to the historical origin of Lockean ideology. Polanyi (1944:38) argues that the struggle between King and Parliament was partly because the Tudors and early Stuarts used the power of the Crown to slow down the process of economic growth until it became socially bearable – employing the power of the central government to relieve the victims of the transformation, and attempting to canalize the process of change so as to make its course less devastating.

According to Polanyi (1944:33-4), economic liberals insisted on judging social events from the economic viewpoint and were willing to achieve improvement at the price of social dislocation. Polanyi (1944:35) called enclosures "a revolution of the rich against the poor":

> The lords and nobles were upsetting the social order, breaking down ancient law and custom, sometimes by means of violence, often by pressure and intimidation. They were literally robbing the poor of their share in the common, tearing down the houses which, by the hitherto unbreakable force of custom, the poor had long regarded as theirs and their heirs'. The fabric of society was being disrupted; desolate villages and the ruins of human dwellings testified to the fierceness with which the revolution raged, endangering the defenses of the country, wasting its towns, decimating its population, turning its over-burdened soil into dust, harassing its people and turning them from decent husbandmen into a mob of beggars and thieves.

By placing the sanctity of the individual's quest for property over social protection, Locke provided a logic that embraces economic inequality. Because property was something inherent in the individual and subject to only minimal regulation by government, Locke's notion of a free market economy became an individualist liberal dogma (Ingersoll and Mattews, 1991:91-2).

Second, the Lockean position regarding property rights led to a belief that since property is sacred in its own right, men of property deserve power and honor (Lodge, 1975:109). Locke argued that those who have used their labor to appropriate property are these who have most obeyed God's will – they are the most rational as well as the most industrious (Post, 1986:149-50).

Third, Locke's proclamation of property as a natural right was designed to justify the rights of a rising group of acquisitive entrepreneurs against the monarchy (Lodge, 1975:101-2).

Locke was less tolerant when it came to the issue of poverty. He was a determined enemy of beggars and the idle poor, believing that an impoverished family had no right to expect leisure for its children after they passed the age of three (Laslett, 1967:43; Lodge, 1975:102).

Lockean logic later influenced the ideas of Adam Smith and Charles Darwin. Locke's individualism was reinforced by Smith's emphasis on man's self-reliance, his "constant effort to better his own condition," which if allowed to progress in a free, competitive environment, would insure a good community" (Lodge, 1975:101). This belief was at the root of Smith's labor theory of value: "The property which everyman has is his own labor, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable (Wealth of Nations, Book I Chap. X, Part 2)" (Lodge, 1975:101). Implicit in early America's conception of property rights was the assumption that if each individual used his property for his own self-interest, a good community would result (Lodge, 1975:115).

During the 1880's, the Lockean basis for laissez-faire capitalism received an important boost from Charles Darwin's notion of natural selection (Lodge, 1975:119). Darwin's discoveries were translated into human terms by the English sociologist Herbert Spencer, who argued that, as with animals, so with men – the fit survive. His trip through America in 1882 was greeted with religious enthusiasm (Lodge, 1975:119). Spencer railed against social legislation as an infringement upon individual rights and the sanctity of the contract (Lodge, 1975:119)

Thus, Lockean liberalism in US included Locke's emphasis on property rights but also competition and survival- of-the-fittest. The emphasis on "competition" as the means to acquire more property came from Smith. Lockean liberalism absorbed the Smithian idea that the uses of property are best controlled by each individual proprietor competing in an open market to satisfy individual consumer desires.

The notion of "survival of the fittest" was added to Lockean liberalism mainly by Darwinian idea that the inexorable process of evolution is constantly working to improve nature. The Darwinian idea helped emerging capitalists argue that inequity is an inevitable consequence of some men pursuing their self-interest with more passion and skill than others, a system of distribution by natural selection that Keynes compared to giraffes with the longest necks getting nearest to the trees "by dint of starving out the others." (Eckert, 1993:121).

This more aggressive version of Lockean liberalism imported by America comes close to Polanyi's (1944) description of the liberal creed:

> The idea that the economy should be organized through self-regulating markets; where markets are natural and spontaneous contacts between buyers and sellers; where labor, land and money are commodities for sale on the market; where anything interfering with market competition distorts the collective interests; and where the economy is thus separated from the polity and in command.

Lockean liberalism explains why the capitalists in America have been self-righteous about their enormous wealth. In 1892, for example, at the height of early American capitalism, the authors of a book on the "marvelous career" of financier and railroad speculator Jay Gould wrote that (Eckert, 1993:121):

> The equitable distribution of wealth, the riches that arise from the soil, the climate, the intelligence, the toil, the skill, the thrift of the country at large is a most difficult problem, and has thus far been an impossible task. If there is a mass of value in the possession of one man equal to $100,000,000, can we be quite sure that in the long run and in the largest way, it would be better to parcel it out into a hundred fortunes of a million each, or that any further subdivision would more completely answer the highest social requirements.

At the end of the nineteenth century, business leaders answered the attacks on the abuses of big business by asserting that business is the temple of America's traditional ideology, from where all blessings flow (Lodge, 1975:120). The iron-master Abram S. Hewitt protested popular hostility to business (Kirkland, 1956:127; Lodge, 1975:120):

> It is curious that the mass of the people of this country should fail to recognize their best friends, because corporations have been the only barrier between the despotism of ignorance and the invasion of the rights of property. Doubtless they abuse their privileges at times, but they alone have the ability and courage to resist attack, and they are doing the work which was done by Jefferson and Madison in the early years of the Republic.

Lastly, how was liberalism able to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the common people? The most obvious answer is the electoral process. As Eckert (1993:116) has pointed out, capitalist ideological hegemony in the West has rested on the historical role of the bourgeoisie not only in generating national wealth but also in championing revolutionary values of economic and political freedom that have great popular appeal. Gramsci (1971:246) was aware of this popular appeal, but critically commented that "in Republics, the election at fixed intervals of the Head of State gives the illusion of satisfying this elementary popular demand."

One might be puzzled about the economic aspect of liberalism. As mentioned, economic liberalism implies "economic inequality." In America, economic liberalism has been interpreted as meaning "economic opportunity." It may have something to do with America's rich resources and dependence on immigrants as sources of labor which have made the motto of the "American dream" appealing.

Education is another factor that has sustained the "American dream." Even with the inadequate educational environment in many American schools due to limits on local financing, the American dream still serves as a "meritocratic illusion." All these factors help explain why the American corporate class has sustained its powers without conceding more egalitarian policies to the working class, such as national health care, as in Europe.

Confucian Developmentalism in Japan

> Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects are united in loyalty and filial piety and have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education (Imperial Rescript on Education issued by the Meiji Emperor in 1890).

Just as American capitalists took Lockean liberalism as self-evident truth, Japanese bureaucrats since the Meiji revolution considered Confucian developmentalism as their orthodox religion. Just as the American elite found their "universal truth" helpful in legitimating their appetite for profit, the governing elite in Japan since 1868 has been pleased with the role of "modern religion" in maintaining the prestige and power of the organization they belong to.

I argue that Confucian developmentalism has three defining characteristics that are symmetrical counterparts to Lockean liberalism: (1) familism, (2) managed national economy, and (3) extensive state.

Whereas individualism in the Lockean tradition meant the individuals' freedom from the restrictions of the communitarian feudal order, familism in Confucianism means keeping individuals within the boundary of family, extended family, family-like organizations, and the family state. Individuals can not be separated from family because "self-cultivation," the utmost value in Confucianism, starts from cultivating meaningful relationships with family

members (Tu, 1998a:13). Confucianism has tremendous faith in the possibility of ordinary human beings becoming awe inspiring sages through personal and communal endeavor (Tu, 1998a:8).

The emphasis on family had significant political ramification as it made a family the unit of governance. When Confucius (551-479 B.C.) was asked why he did not take part in government, he responded by citing a passage from an ancient classic, the *Book of Documents*, to show that what one does in the confines of one's private home is politically significant: "Simply by being a good son and friendly to his brothers a man can exert an influence upon government!" (Tu, 1998a:12). When Confucius responded that taking care of family affairs is itself active participation in politics, he made it clear that family ethics is not merely a private and personal concern because the public good is realized by and through it (Tu, 1998a:13). Confucians are fond of applying the family metaphor to the community, the country, and the universe: addressing the emperor as the son of Heaven, the king as ruler-father, and the magistrate as the "father-mother official" (Tu, 1998a:13).

A famous passage in the *Great Learning* shows the importance of family as a linkage between personal cultivation and public affairs (Smith Jr., 1959:13):

> Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, the whole kingdom was made tranquil and happy.

This incremental nature of the Confucian political world may have something to do with the distinctiveness of familism as contrasted with individualism and collectivism. Mencius (371-289 B.C.), who was allegedly educated by a student of Confucius's grandson, criticized the ideologies of Mo Tzu's collectivism and Yang Chu's (440-360 B.C.) individualism (Tu, 1998a: 14,15). During the period of 550-200 B.C., a golden age in classical Chinese thought which is known as the age of the "hundred philosophers," Mo Tzu advocated "universal love" and Yan Chu argued for the "primacy of the self." Mencius contended that the result of the Moist admonition to treat a stranger as intimately as one would treat one's own father would be to treat one's own father as indifferently as one would treat a stranger, and excessive attention to individual self-interest will lead to political disorder (Tu, 1998a:4,15).

This emphasis on family has been one of the integral elements in Japanese Confucianism as well. In Japan, Confucianism was introduced via Korea about 404 A.D. (Smith Jr., 1959). During the Tokugawa Era (1603-1867), Confucianism was a moral code for the samurai class and gradually spread to rich farmers and merchants (Morishma, 1982). Confucian family ethics are found in guild regulations during Tokugawa times (Smith Jr., 1959):

> We shall require children to respect their parents, servants to obey their masters, husbands and wives, brothers and sisters, to live in harmony, and the young to revere and cherish their elders, in short, we will endeavor to lead the people to walk righteously.

With the Meiji revolution (1867), Confucianism became a hegemonic ideology. One of the values in the *Imperial Rescript on Education* was filial piety: "Our subjects are united in loyalty and filial piety and have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof." Postwar Japan has maintained familism through various institutions. For example, lifetime employment and seniority-based wages and promotion, and company (rather than trade) based unions all share an emphasis upon the company as a "family" and therefore encourage relationships between employees and the company which are not viewed as contractual but as moral commitments (Ornatowski, 1996:582). Morishima (1982:8) acknowledges that modernization in Japan did not replace familism with individualism:

> Throughout Japanese history up to the present individualism has never prospered, and, as a result, a strong, serious advocacy of liberalism has been virtually non-existent. The Japanese have been required to obey their rulers, to serve their parents, to honor their elders ...

The second defining characteristic of Confucian developmentalism, "managed national economy," came from putting national wealth above private property. The emphasis on national economic development in Japan started with the slogan of the Meiji revolution: "a rich country and a strong army."

However, the formation of developmentalism as a unique economic paradigm took place only after the Manchurian Incident in 1931 (Gao, 1997). Japan's attempt to solve economic problems by expanding its military power in mainland Asia, drove Japan into a military confrontation with Western powers

who had vested interests in East Asia (Gao, 1997:73). Branded an aggressor by allegedly "racist" Western countries, the global trend toward resumed block economies led the Japanese to articulate an economic ideology geared to strengthen national production in preparation for full-scale war.

"Competition" and "Profit" had to be managed for the good of the national economy during the war period of 1931-1945. For example, cartels were established in each industry to prevent "excessive competition" from forcing private companies into bankruptcy (Gao, 1997:26). The profit principle was strongly challenged not only by the managed flow of capital into the munitions industries but also by the bureaucratic control over dividends in private companies (Gao, 1997:27).

Despite the postwar changes in Japan's economic institutions and national purpose, developmentalism has remained fundamental to Japanese industrial policy (Gao, 1997:14). The ideology advocates an economic system based on private ownership and market economy, but run with the goal of augmenting national wealth rather than individual well-being.

In order to achieve this national objective, profit and competition are still managed. The pursuit of shareholders' profit was still regarded as conflicting with the national goal of building up competitiveness in strategic industries, which required companies to invest more and pay out less in dividends (Gao, 1997:185). Liberalization of trade and capital investment since the 1960s did not lead to greater competition. As underscaled business operations were perceived to be the major disadvantage of Japanese companies in competition

with Western companies, the state tried to limit competition through government regulations and by encouraging cartels and business groups (Gao, 1997:236).

The Third defining characteristic of Confucian developmentalism, "extensive state," is the result of the first two characteristics. The need to intervene in the market for national development makes the state's role more than simply a design to protect people and their property as in Lockean liberalism. Instead, the state needs to set national priorities and implement them even at the expense of private profits.

The Confucian notion of "rule by the educated" also gives bureaucrats legitimacy to guide and mobilize people. Like social interaction in a family, education means "self-cultivation." The Confucians believed that the self-cultivated are not only philosophers but also teachers and statesmen (Tu, 1998a:4). By giving legitimacy to the "scholar bureaucrats," Confucius rejected the status quo during his time, which held that wealth and power spoke the loudest (Tu, 1998a:7).

It is a duty of a scholar to serve the country as a bureaucrat. According to Mencius, scholars were busy serving their kings and society, just as farmers were busy farming (Lou, 1997:30). Zi Xia, one of Confucius' students, remarked, "Those who have done well at their official post should teach after retirement and those who are excellent at their studies should become officials to serve their king, state, and society" (Lou, 1997:30).

The ideology, "rule by the educated," can be materialized only through a meritocratic recruitment system. In the case of China, for 2,000 years, from the

Han Dynasty to the end of the Qing Dynasty, all the rulers took Confucian ideas as their own guidelines and standards for selecting and training government officials (Lou, 1997:29). Mastery of Confucian thought, through memorization of the "Five Classics" and the "Four Books," was the entry test into the Chinese civil service (Frederick, 1997:196).

Chinese scholar-bureaucrats recruited through this meritocratic process had interpretive power that went far beyond the typical, professional bureaucracy analyzed by Weber (Yue, 1997:78). The discretion of bureaucrats was considered so valuable that it extended into the interpretation of laws. "The doctrine of the Mean," one of the most important Confucian classic works, recorded an anecdote of King Ai of *Lu* asking for a way of governing, and Confucius answering him very clearly: "All the guidelines and policies in governing by Emperor Wen and Emperor Wu of the Zhou Dynasty are recorded in books. The trouble is that there are no appropriate people to carry them out. If there are worthy officials, the state can be well-governed; if there are not, the state will be in chaos" (Lou, 1997:31).

The fact that Confucianists insisted that "governing all depends on man" did not mean "law" was unnecessary, but showed that human initiative played a more important role than law (Lou, 1997:32). Xun Zi, one of the original Confucian thinkers, also reiterated that good officials are the crux of governing correctly, making perfect laws, and putting them into effect (Lou, 1997:33). As law can not automatically play a role without human beings, he stressed that we should select good officials to carry out the law (Lou, 1997:34).

Meritocratic recruitment establishes and strengthens the bureaucrats' position in a society. This meritocratic recruitment system enabled bureaucrats to keep the power of a monarch in check. As Yue (1997:77) points out, a monarch could execute someone or abolish a law at will, but he could not wantonly destroy a bureaucratic colony or culture. When emperors and bureaucrats share the tenets of Confucianism, the opinions of bureaucrats who are well versed in Confucian classics can not be ignored easily (Frederickson, 1997). A centralized bureaucracy, enjoying a stable supply of able bureaucrats, can preempt royal-aristocrats or a local military elite from rising to power.

Japanese Confucianism shares this principle of "rule by the educated." Morishima (1982:17) mentions that "a society in which Confucianism prevails is a kind of "diploma society" in which people are distinguished by their educational attainments." Morishima also describes how the expansion of education during the Meiji period helped Confucianism to achieve the status of national ideology (1982:17):

> According to a Confucianist interpretation made during the Meiji period, the essence of a samurai lies in his education, so that a farmer, a merchant or a worker was regarded as a 'samurai' if he was well educated. In fact, even in the late Tokugawa period, it was not exceptional for an educated farmer or merchant to marry the daughter of a samurai. As education spread in the Meiji era, the 'samurai' class supporting Confucianism expanded, and in this way it became the national ideology rather than the ideology of only the government and the elite.

Morishima was also aware of the distinctiveness of the "rule by the educated" in contrast to other types of social hierarchy such as "the rule by the propertied." Morishima argues that the possibility of social mobility through education prevented the Japanese from seeing their economy from the Western point of view as consisting of a capitalist and working class even after capitalism was established during the Meiji era (1982:17).

It is only since the Meiji revolution that Confucianism rose as a truly hegemonic ideology in Japan. Morishima (1982:49-50) claims that Confucianism was embraced only by the samurai class during the Tokugawa period. "Rule by the educated" came when "the Meiji government established a modern education system and then employed able university graduates in the government sector irrespective of their family backgrounds" (Morishima, 1982:17-18).

For the selection and training of a modern elite, which at the same time primarily meant staffing the government ministries, the Imperial University, now known as Tokyo University was selected (Kerbo and McKinsky, 1995:138). Many Tokyo University graduates entered the civil service through competitive exams. "Of the ninety-seven men who were appointed as higher-civil service trainees ... in the 1888-1891 period, all but nine were Todai graduates" (Kerbo and McKinsky, 1995:86).

"Economically Egalitarian but Politically Hierarchical"

> A person in a position of authority is a Confucian, because that doctrine supports the status quo. Out of power or office, they become Taoists, because Taoism rejects both worldly authority and individual responsibility. As death approaches, a person turns to Buddhism, because that faith offers hope of immortality (Chinese saying).
>
> We oppose laissez-faire capitalism because the extremely selfish motivation and the excessive free competition will deepen the gap between the rich and the poor. We also oppose socialism because its proposal to destroy existing economic institutions and to eliminate the capitalist class will disturb the course of national development. Our doctrine is to sustain the economic system of private ownership, and we will try within this framework to avoid class conflict and to pursue societal harmony by the efforts of individuals and the power of the state[2].

Based on the three defining elements of Confucian developmentalism, I extract the urban-related characteristic of the ideology in Japan as: "economically egalitarian but politically hierarchical." The "economically egalitarian" aspect comes from the need for equality in the process of national mobilization prescribed in developmentalism. Gao (1997:81) reports that state control over labor relations from 1931 to 1945 reveals an important facet of Japanese nationalism: To mobilize workers for the national program, the state had to provide a certain degree of economic equality in distribution.

The Japanese state often acted as a buffer between the conflicting interests of capital and the working class in order to maximize national resources in support of war (Gao, 1997:81). As mentioned earlier, profits of capitalists were tightly restrained by bureaucrats. Under the Wage Control Ordinance in

1940, wages were determined by government formulations considering age, years of experience, region and type of work, and the total amount to be paid in wages was also limited (Morishima, 1982:133). This regulation narrowed the gap between workers, Morishima argues (1982:133).

Gao (1997:296) argues that postwar developmentalism has also been sustained by nationalism. And, nationalism will not work if there is a deep gap in the distribution of economic welfare among citizens. Serious income inequality can dampen popular enthusiasm for the national mission. Mobilizing the whole country to respond to the external challenge, the politics of Japanese industrial policy have often resulted in the development of governance mechanisms aimed at reducing domestic conflicts. This reduction of conflict was materialized by ensuring a relatively fair share of the pie by major economic actors at several critical moments in modern Japanese history (Gao, 1997:296). For example, the institutionalization of lifetime employment and seniority-based wages since the 1960s meant sharing the fruit of economic development with the laborers.

The continuing need for the state to mobilize people even after WWII can be partly attributed to Japan's lack of natural resources and dependence on trade. Maybe that is why the educational system in Japan is considered a national priority, whereas investment in human resources is subject to a cost-benefit evaluation in the US (Fajnber, 1990). The issue of equity in this national mobilization is like feeding soldiers well in a military campaign. Failure to

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[2] The opening declaration of the major representative of the German historical school in Japan, the Social Party Association, in 1897 (Sumitami 1986:115; Gao, 1997:61)

equalize income, at least relatively, divides the "national soldiers" into individuals and classes.

Describing Japan as "a nation at war in peace," Garon (1997:8) reports that Japanese bureaucrats repeatedly invoked the image of war and the country's vulnerability even when the country was neither at war nor getting ready for one.

In this respect, developmentalism has been to a significant degree embraced by the Japanese people as well. Garon (1997:235) seems to be puzzled with the extraordinary willingness of the Japanese people to manage their own lives and make real sacrifices for the sake of the nation state. This ability to identify other citizens as part of us, in turn, may have brought about the consensus necessary for the redistribution.

Having investigated the enigma of Japanese egalitarianism, I link the other urban-related characteristic, "politically hierarchical," with the Confucian tradition. Contrary to the voluntary nature of social contract between individuals in Lockean liberalism, Confucianism offers two less-than-politically-free choices: "hierarchical" or "authoritarian." There are two schools of thought on the issue of authority in Confucianism: populist and legalist. I think the populist school has a "hierarchical" view of human relationships, whereas the legalist school has an "authoritarian" conception.

Mencius, who can be said to represent the populist school, acknowledges the "hierarchical" nature of human society but emphasizes reciprocity in human relations. In the *Book of Mencius*, Mencius presents a hierarchical division of

labor (Tu, 1998b:124): "There are those who use their minds and there are those who use their muscles. The former governs; the latter are governed. Those who govern are supported by those who are governed." However, Mencius's "populist" appeal is evident when he says that the people are more important than the state, and the state is more important than the king, and the ruler who does not act in accordance with the kingly way is unfit (Tu, 1998a:15). The spirit of mutuality is everywhere in his writings. On the relationship between ruler and minister, Mencius says (Tu, 1998b:126):

> If a prince treats his ministers as his hands and feet, they will treat him as their belly and heart. If he treats them as his horses and hounds, they will treat him as a mere fellow countrymen. If he treats them as mud and weeds, they will treat him as an enemy.

Han Fei Tzu represents the legalist group arguing for an authoritarian social order devoid of the spirit of mutuality. The primary concern is not the well-being of the individual persons involved but the particular pattern of social stability which results from rigidly prescribed rules of conduct (Tu, 1998b:123). Han Fei Tzu (Tu, 1998b:122) says: "The minister serves the king, the son serves the father, and the wife serves the husband. If the three are followed, the world will be in peace; if the three are violated, the world will be in chaos."

Confucianism can be said to have a "hierarchical" nature as both the populist and legalist schools consider respect for authority an important virtue and take political authority as an essential factor for the maintenance of social

order (Tu, 1998b:130). Confucian classics mostly support the authorities. The first item in the list of approved attitudes and behavior from the *Analects of Confucius*, (Wright, 1962:8) urges submissiveness to authority:

1. Submissiveness to authority – parents, elders, and superiors
2. Submissiveness to mores and norms
3. Reverence for the past and respect for history
4. Love of traditional learning
5. Esteem for the force of example
6. Primacy of broad moral cultivation over specialized competence
7. Preference for nonviolent moral reform in state and society
8. Prudence, caution, and preference for a middle course
9. Noncompetitiveness
10. Courage and sense of responsibility for a great tradition
11. Self-respect (with some permissible self-pity) in adversity
12. Exclusiveness and fastidiousness on moral and cultural grounds
13. Punctiliousness in treatment of others

There is no doubt that Confucianism was a "hierarchical" ruling ideology that supported the class system in ancient China. Confucius and his disciples lived in the era of warring states in China, and the first priority of the ruler was to maintain order (Creel, 1957; Tong-so Pak, 1986:491). In an effort to maintain order, stratified relationships were created within the family and among different classes in society were created (Tong-so Pak, 1986:491). The ideology of "rule of man" dictates to society as parents do to their children. In ancient China, there were four classifications of people: scholar-bureaucrats, farmers, workers, and merchants (Frederickson, 1997:30).

Confucianism has the idea of "the mandate of heaven" which comes from ancient China, and can be traced to the *Book of Documents*, "Heaven sent

people down to earth and selected the virtuous to be princes and teachers. Help the king and you will be loved all around, and I will be with you to punish the guilty and reward the innocent." (Chu-chin Kang, 1986:437).

I argue that modern Confucian societies can be either "hierarchical" or "authoritarian." Japan and Singapore are good examples of modern Confucianism. Both countries share Confucianism as a ruling ideology (Frederickson, 1997; Bellows, 1989). Both countries are governed by bureaucrats highly educated and competent. Singaporean bureaucrats have allied with political elites less known for their political openness, their Japanese counterparts have enjoyed more democratic partners since WWII.

One may find it easy to say that the Confucianism practiced by Singaporean elites is authoritarianism. However, one might find it awkward to accuse postwar Japanese bureaucrats of practicing authoritarian Confucianism considering the electoral process in place. Even though Charlmers Johnson (1995:48) regards the post WWII Japanese governing system as "soft authoritarianism," I believe that Japan after WWII is better characterized as "hierarchical."

Modern Japan started as an "authoritarian" Confucian nation, however. The Meiji bureaucrats vested themselves not only with the secular authority of modernization but also with the same Confucian authority that the leaders of the feudal state had claimed by acting in the name of the imperial throne (Cutts, 1997:52). This "emperor system" following the Meiji Restoration of 1868 was administered by a small corps of military officers, civilian bureaucrats, and police

(Garon, 1997:5). Situating themselves above society, Japanese officials molded Japanese minds through "thought police" and a highly centralized set of institutions such as the national school system, the military, a network of State Shinto shrines, and numerous hierarchical organizations (Garon, 1997:5).

One of Japanese history's most famous documents, the 1890 *Imperial Rescript on Education* issued by the Meiji Emperor, put the guiding philosophy frankly: loyalty and filial piety toward the Empire (Cutts, 1997:10). In the government's view, the sole purpose of teaching history was to foster reverence for the emperor; teaching children about the French Revolution or the American Declaration of Independence, and thereby acquainting them with such concepts as freedom, equality, humanism, and independence, could only work to the disadvantage of the government (Yamazumi, 1989:234).

Things changed after WWII. School principals no longer read the Rescript aloud to ceremonial gatherings of student bodies on national holidays. There is no "thought police." Electoral process has been put in place.

But Japan is still governed by an educated elite. The meritocratic recruitment system is still intact. Higher civil servant positions are dominated by Tokyo University graduates. The Ministry of international Trade and Industry in 1995 took 75 percent of its new fast-trackers from Todai, and the Home Ministry and the National Police Agency were not far behind, with 72 percent each (Cutts, 1997:5). Despite the fact that the Japanese constitution gives legislative power exclusively to the elected members of the Diet, it is the bureaucrats who actually initiate and draft virtually all important legislation (Johnson, 1997:123).

Johnson (1997:48) pointed out the hegemony of an elite working within a formal system of legality and popular sovereignty.

The "hierarchical," not "authoritarian," nature of Confucianism in modern Japan has translated into less intrusive social control on people. Gao (1997:21) claims that through the paradigms of industrial policy the Japanese state not only provides individual Japanese with a "way of seeing things," but it also blinds them as it deprives them of the power of independent judgement. Garon (1997) documents how "moral suasion" by the government continued after WWII. For example, the "National Salvation Savings Campaign" supervised by Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo in 1946 shows how the government had a hand in manufacturing this consciousness. The Prime Minister's Office structured public opinion polls so as to give respondents few choices but to agree with the statements, then touted these surveys as proof that the people themselves believed in the idea (Garon, 1997:174). In the mid-1990s, the widespread sense of crisis and pessimism in Japan occasioned a return to more visible efforts to manage society. Bureaucrats and the media tout the "collapse of the bubble economy" as a moral lesson for the Japanese people and only by returning to the habits of diligence, thrift, and conservation of resources, officials argue, will the nation maintain its position in world markets and preserve social stability (Garon, 1997:232).

In the area of education, the attempts for social control have been more visible. In 1956, the Diet changed the system for selecting members of educational boards from an elective system to an appointive one and the

Ministry of Education toughened its inspection on social science studies textbooks (Yamazumi, 1989:240). From the 1970s, the government has attempted to revive the *Imperial Rescript on Education* (Yamazumi, 1989:241). In 1974, the prime minister, Tanaka Kakuei, wrote (Yamazumi, 1989:241): "Education today over emphasizes intellectual development at the expense of moral development. While we fatten children's intellect their morals starve ... Much of the Imperial Script expresses universal moral principles. It has qualities that transcend its form, that speak to us today as then."

Confucianism in modern Japan legitimates itself through the same mechanisms as in the past. The meritocratic recruitment of the elite through national civil servant examinations continues to have a strong popular appeal as it preempts playing the system for oneself or a family member. The Confucian belief in the association between scholarship and morality is still alive. In modern Japan, there is still a high trust in public administration (Frederickson, 1997:201).

US vs. Japan: Ideology and Urbanization

I can only mention a few studies that link ideology and urbanization in the US and Japan. Comparing localities in Japan and America, Cupaiuolo (1994) started with the values in each nation's Constitution. Whereas the Japanese Constitution enacted in 1947 stipulates regulations pertaining to the organization and operation of the local entities, the U.S. Constitution is totally silent on local governments. The American local system reflects the long-held belief that no

government should be too powerful, thus separating power between national government and local government. The centralized approach of Japan has produced a system of local government characterized by standardization and equity, while the decentralized approach of the United States has produced one characterized by autonomy and diversity.

Interested in why the Japanese central government has tried to control local governments, whether they are successful or not, Akizuki (1995:364) argues that Japan's political leadership in the late nineteenth century shared certain national goals such as "enrich the nation and strengthen the military," which were given much higher priority than local preferences. These fundamental conditions have been translated into a belief shared by both elites and the masses that the central bureaucrats are morally, technically, and administratively superior to local bureaucrats.

Studying the urban development of Philadelphia from eighteenth century to the 1930s, Warner brings in a value which sounds similar to Lockean liberalism: privatism. According to Warner (1968:3-4), privatism became the American tradition by the time of the Revolution and can be defined as follows:

> Its essence lay in its concentration upon the individual and the individual's search for wealth. Psychologically, privatism meant that the individual should seek happiness in personal independence and in the search for wealth; socially, privatism meant that the individual should see his first loyalty as his immediate family, and that a community should be a union of such money-making, accumulating families; politically, privatism meant that the community should keep the peace among individual money-makers, and if possible, help to create an open and thriving setting where each citizen would have some substantial opportunity to prosper.

Privatism encouraged building for the interest of the businessmen at the expense of the common citizens. The people who planned, or who sat on planning commissions were downtown merchants, utility, transit, and bank directors, real estate men, railroad and ocean transport carriers, and a few professionals (Warner, 1968:206). All the projects were to bring traffic to the downtown, to beautify it, and to raise or maintain downtown business property values while ignoring the needs of other sections of the city (Warner, 1968:207-14).

Barnekov, Boyle, and Rich (1989) argued that various urban renewal programs since the 1960s reveal the influence of privatism. According to Barnekov etc. (1989:53), there has been a widespread belief that it was the private sector, particularly large corporations, that possessed the creative leadership and economic resources to help the urban poor. This notion has not proved viable as public-private partnership in many urban redevelopment projects resulted in uneven development limited to downtown areas.

Thus it seems that at least some studies confirm the "politically equal but economically unequal" urban ideology in the US and "economically egalitarian but politically hierarchical" characteristic in Japanese urban ideology. With this US-Japan spectrum in mind, one may find the following chapters examining urbanization and ideology in Korea more interesting. In chapter 4, it will be explained that Korea since the 1960s shares an ideology similar to that of

Japan. Since the mid 1990s, however, Korean elites have been taking American ideology more seriously.

CHAPTER 2. CONFUCIAN DEVELOPMENTAL URBANIZATION

Confucian developmental urbanization in Korea is characterized by extreme power concentration in Seoul, moderate population dispersion in the urban system, and low income disparities among and within cities. This pattern which I call "Confucian developmental urbanization" has been only partially understood. Two reasons have kept previous researchers from understanding this urban pattern accurately and in its totality. One is the "correspondence assumption" that led urbanists to assume that the distribution of power, population, and wealth go hand in hand. The other is "selective cognition" leading scholars to embrace only those facts that fit well with their theoretical inclination.

The "correspondence assumption" is wide spread among urban ecologists. Walter Christaller, a German geographer, assumed that the functional order of central places in the urban system is related to their population size (Bradford and Kent, 1977:6,10). The order of a central place depends upon the type of goods and services it produces which in turn depend on the spatial distribution of suppliers and consumers. A larger set of goods and services mean more people employed (Bradford and Kent, 1977:9). For example, in a study of thirty-three central places in Snohomish County in Washington State, Berry and Garrison (1959) showed a linear relationship

between population size and functional importance in the urban system (Bradford and Kent, 1977:22).

Hawley (1950:122) argues that the size of a population imposes limits on both the extent of specialization and the number of different activities that may be carried on simultaneously. Hawley cites Adam Smith's dictum that the degree of specialization is directly related to the size of the market (Smith, 1931:17; Hawley, 1950:122):

> There are some sorts of industry, even of the lowest kind, which can be carried on nowhere but in a great town. A porter, for example, can find employment and subsistence in no other place. A village is much too narrow a sphere for him; even an ordinary market town is scarcely large enough to afford him constant occupation.

The self-regulating market is held to link population, function, and wealth. A higher income level is inevitable with a higher level of specialization. Due to labor specialization, the heartland metropolis will experience a rising wage first. Some industries will then be priced out of the high-income labor market and will move to low income cities or regions (Berry, 1971: 116).

Dependency and world system theorists also share the correspondence assumption. London (1979) argued that power concentration necessarily shifts economic development toward the urban areas where the power elite resides. Bangkok was his prime example. As civil and military officials monopolized

power in the capital, they channeled a disproportionately large amount of resources to Bangkok through fiscal, educational, and other institutional policies.

Gugler and Flanagan (1977) also mention how the power holders in West Africa did the same thing after independence. When state functionaries took over power from colonialists, resources poured into the capital at the expense of other cities (Gugler and Flanagan, 1977:282):

> The Ivory Coast provides a striking example ... 499 out of the country's 617 industrial enterprises are located in Abidjan and 60% of the jobs in the "modern" sector of the economy are found there.

Market-oriented human ecology theory and Marxism-influenced dependency perspectives first arose as efforts to explain situations in Europe after the bourgeois revolution. Big cities meant factories, crowds, money, and powerful capitalists. But these perspectives, as I shall see, do not fit the Korean situation.

"Selective cognition" is also an issue. Mills and Song (1979) argued that Korean urbanization during the third quarter of the twentieth century fit Western modernization theory, but they focused on wealth and population decentralization and did not pay enough attention to the capital city, Seoul.

Nemeth and Smith (1983:183), who are world system theorists, can be credited for acknowledging that "the capital, Seoul, is dominant functionally and culturally in many ways over other Korean cities." However, they too stayed

away from this puzzling phenomena by choosing to emphasize other aspects of Korea's urbanization.

This issue of uneven urban development will be revisited in chapter 3 where I examine what previous urban researchers consider to be the causes of urbanization. The remainder of this chapter will cover the four dimensions of urbanization, and the details of Korean urbanization for each dimension.

Dimensions of Urbanization

Four dimensions of urbanization will be examined. Three are about the interurban distribution of resources, such as power, population, and wealth. The fourth concerns the intraurban distribution of wealth. I basically identified the dimensions which have been of interest to previous researchers. Gugler and Flanagan (1977) mention three dimensions of urban inequality in West Africa between 1950 and 1970.

1. The imbalances between life chances in the urban and rural sectors.
2. Among cities, the concentration of limited resources in the capitals and/or primate cities.
3. Within cities, the economic disparity between the masses and a small wealthy elite.

London (1980), explaining the dominance of Bangkok in the urban system of Thailand, distinguishes functional primacy (which can be political, economic, social and cultural-symbolic) from size primacy (which is the population of the biggest city compared to the size of other cities or to the total urban population).

Carol Smith (1985) also distinguishes function from population. She found that population size is not a good measure of urban functions, as indicated by the number of lawyers and industrial establishments. She reported a huge discrepancy between population primacy and functional primacy in Guatemala. In 1970, Guatemala City was 16 times bigger than the second largest city, Quezaltenango. However, the industrial establishments ratio between Guatemala and Quezaltenange was just 8:1.

"The Seoul Republic": Power Concentration in the Capital City

Koreans say; "everything is in Seoul." Those who do not live in Seoul feel like they are disempowered. The companies they work for have their headquarters in Seoul. Important decisions concerning their city or town are in the hands of high officials in Seoul. This feeling of frustration is carried on to the next generation. Korean students try their best to get into a handful of prestigious universities in Seoul thus acknowledging that the city is a ticket to good connections and jobs. Requiring non-capital regions to remain as the arms

and legs of the Seoul empire can be politically explosive causing regional factionalism. Jong Ki Kim et. al. (1991) mention that the non-capital region residents resent concentrated decision making in Seoul and complain about government-led regional development.

The dominance of Seoul over other cities dates back to the establishment of the Chosun Dynasty in 1392. After extensive searches, the founding king, Song-Gye Yi, decided to build his capital where today's Seoul stands. It was conveniently located in the middle of the Korean Peninsula close to all parts of the country (See Figure 1 and Figure 2). The Han River also provided easy transport access making Seoul ideal for the new capital. The four inner mountains were natural ramparts and a setting for the construction of the city wall (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 1998). The King built royal shrines, palace buildings, and a fortified wall surrounding the capital making Seoul the center of bureaucratic power. Japanese colonial rule from 1910 to 1945 did not change the status of Seoul. Bureaucratic departments proliferated at the government-general headquarters in Seoul (Cumings, 1997:148).

Figure 1. Map of Northeastern Asia



Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government. 1998. <http://www.metro.seoul.kr> Korea.

Figure 2. Map of Korean Peninsula

Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government. 1998. <http://www.metro.seoul.kr> Korea.

This "Seoul Republic" refers to the concentration of Korea's decision making process in Seoul. In 1995, the headquarters of 27 out of Korea's 30 largest corporations in terms of annual sales were located in Seoul.[3] The biggest corporations are virtually all in Seoul. Korea had 10 of the global Fortune 500 companies measured by revenue in 1998: Daewoo Group (18), SK (71), Hyundai Corp. (105), Samsung Corp. (121), Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. (142), Samsung Life Insurance Co., Ltd. (180), LG International Corp. (236), LG Electronics (270), Korea Electric Power Corporation (294), and Hyundai Motor (359). All resided in Seoul.

Seoul is also Korea's center of education, information, and culture. Seoul National University (SNU) is the most prestigious in Korea. SNU outshadows all others in terms of graduates who passed national examinations for professions such as the civil service, law, and accounting, or who are chief executives of companies (Nature 1994:644). Major corporations stationed in Seoul tend to locate their research institutes in or around Seoul. For example, Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology (SAIT), which acts as the central laboratory of the 26 companies of the Samsung group, is located just south of Seoul. In 1993, nearly half (450) of Samsung's 1,000 researchers (not including 13,000 development engineers) were at SAIT along with 150 administrators and technical support staff (Nature, 1993:382). All the major newspaper publishers

[3] It is according to the 1996 version of "World Scope" database, produced by World Scope/Disclosure Partners, a joint venture of Wright Investors' Service (WIS) and Disclosure Incorporated. The database contains comprehensive information on 13,312 companies in 47 countries.

and broadcasting companies are also located in Seoul. Markusen & Gwiasda's (1994) description of multilayering of functions in and around Tokyo as "New York (financial capital) + Greater Detroit (industrial center) + Washington, D.C. (political capital) + San Francisco (high-tech agglomeration) + Boston (preeminent educational city)" seems to fit Seoul as well.

To examine the degree of power concentration in the Korean urban system by world standards, I came up with a rating system. For comparability with other countries, only the economic dimension has been taken into consideration. The business management-coordination function is measured by the percentage of headquarters of major companies located in one area[4]. The largest corporations in terms of 1995 sales were selected. Up to 20 financial and up to 20 non-financial corporations were included. Only countries where I can pull out more than 5 corporations in total were included. In cases where there were more than 5 financial corporations on the list, the economic capital of the country was determined by the distribution of those corporation headquarters. Otherwise it was decided by the number of non-financial corporations' headquarters.

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[4] The information about the locations of headquarters is from the October, 1996 version of "World Scope" database. Countries include those with the largest capital markets worldwide. Data is extracted from documents filed with stock exchanges in all countries and from other sources (e.g., Ministry of Finance in Japan). Business and financial publications are used as a supplement. Data is drawn from at least one financial daily newspaper in each country. Additional information is received directly from most companies, commonly the annual report to shareholders. The distinction between financial and non-financial are based on the industry group/class classifications in the database. The group/class covering financial sectors are as below: bank, commercial bank, commercial finance companies, insurance, insurance companies, investment companies, real estate investment trust, land & real estate, other financial, other financial services, personal loan, rental & leasing, savings & loan, and securities brokerage.

The preference for financial corporations over non-financial corporations in the measurement reflects the importance of the service production sector in the vitality of urban economy. Drennan (1991:36) argues that core cities retain their dominant position as the center of information-based services:

> Producer services firms have expanded in New York city and national nodal cities because the benefits of agglomeration are far more important to producer service firms than to manufacturing headquarters. Producer service firms are information-intensive; information is complex, nonrountine, and not internal to the firm. Mergers and acquisitions require teams of highly specialized lawyers, investment bankers and consultants.

After the economic capital was decided upon, the number of headquarters for both financial and nonfinancial categories which are located in city were counted. The sum is divided by the total number of corporations and multiplied 100 times, which leads to the percentage of corporation headquarters located in the functional capital.

Power is concentrated in Seoul even by world standards. Table 1 shows that Korea ranked 8th out of 38 countries. Seoul had 33 out of 40 of Korea's top financial and nonfinancial companies, or 82.5 percent concentration. Those with urban systems displaying greater concentration than Korea are mostly Third World countries in Asia and Latin America: Philippines (1st), Thailand (2nd), Chile (3rd), Malaysia (4th), Argentina (5th). Two Scandinavian countries were ahead of Korea as well: Finland (6th) and Belgium (7th). Japan and Taiwan

were in the middle ranking 20th and 21st each. North American countries (US, 34th and Canada, 33th) showed relatively low power concentration. Some other European countries showed the most decentralized urban power distribution: Poland (38th), Switzerland (39th), Italy (40th), Netherlands (41st).

Table 1. The Degree of Power Concentration in Different Urban Systems

Ranking	Country	Functional Capital (FC)	Functional Primacy Davis' Index (= E/F)	# of Financial Hqs in F. C. out of B (A)	Total # of top financial HQs up to 20 (B)	# of Non-Financial HQs out of D (C)	Total # of top Non-Financial HQs 20 (D)	A + C (E)	B + D (F)
1	Philippines	Manila	100	20	20	20	20	37	40
2	Thailand	Bankok	97.5	20	20	19	20	39	40
3	Chile	Santiago	97	12	13	20	20	32	33
4	Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur	92.5	19	20	18	20	37	40
5	Argentina	Buenos Aires	90.5	1	1	18	20	19	21
6	Finland	Helsinki	89.5	15	18	19	20	34	38
8	Korea	Seoul	82.5	17	20	16	20	33	40
8	Belgium	Bruxelles	82.5	16	20	17	20	33	40
9	Ireland	Dublin	82.4	13	14	15	20	28	34
10	Indonesia	Jakarta	82.1	16	19	16	20	32	39
11	Peru	Lima	81.5	5	7	17	20	22	27
12	Venezuela	Caracas	78.6	3	3	8	11	11	14
14	U. Kingdom	London	77.5	16	20	15	20	31	40
14	South Africa	Johannesburg	77.5	14	20	17	20	31	40
15	Turkey	Istanbul	76.5	12	14	14	20	26	34
16	New Zealand	Auckland	73.1	5	6	14	20	19	26
17	France	Paris	72.5	18	20	11	20	29	40
18	Austria	Wien	71.1	13	18	14	20	27	38
19	Japan	Tokyo	70	15	20	13	20	28	40
20	Taiwan	Taipei	68.8	11	12	11	20	22	32
21	Sweden	Stockholm	67.5	16	20	11	20	27	40
23	Hungary	Budapest	66.7	0	0	6	9	6	9
23	Mexico	Mexico City	66.7	7	10	13	20	20	30
24	Pakistan	Karachi	62.1	8	9	10	20	18	29
25	China	Shanghai	57.1	0	1	12	20	12	21
26	Spain	Madrid	52.5	10	20	11	20	21	40
27	India	Bombay	50	2	4	10	20	12	24
28	Australia	Sydney	45	10	20	8	20	18	40
30	U. S.	New York	42.5	8	20	9	20	17	40
30	Canada	Toronto	42.5	12	20	5	20	17	40
31	Denmark	Kobenhavn	37.5	7	20	8	20	15	40
32	Colombia	Bogota	35.7	4	9	6	19	10	28
33	Brazil	Sao Paulo	35.3	8	14	4	20	12	34
34	Poland	Warsaw	35	2	4	5	16	7	20
35	Switzerland	Zurich	32.5	8	20	5	20	13	40
36	Italy	Rome	30	7	20	5	20	12	40
37	Netherlands	Amsterdam	25	5	20	5	20	10	40
38	Germany	Muenchen	20	5	20	3	20	8	40

Seoul: Crowded but not Overpopulated

Despite Koreans' concern about overpopulation in Seoul, Seoul is not highly overpopulated by world standards. It is true that Seoul is packed: Seoul comprises only 0.6 percent of the total land area of Korea (See Figure 3), but the population of Seoul in 1993 was 10.9 million, 24.8 percent of Korea's total population (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 1994). The packed megacity has high living costs and long commuting hours. Housing prices are several times more expensive in Seoul than in Korea's other major cities and it is not uncommon for Seoulites to spend four or five hours a day commuting.

However, Korea has other cities with considerable population: Pusan 3.9 million, Taegu 2.3 million, and Inchon 2.1 million (See Figure 4 and Table 2). Seoul is 2.8 times bigger than the next biggest city. There are other countries with much higher primacy: Peru (10.1), Philippine (9.3), and France (7.4) (UN, 1995).

For comparative purposes, I use the Davis Index[5]. There are other indexes: (1) the percentage of the biggest city out of the total urban population and (2) the population ratio of the biggest city to the second biggest one. The first has a severe shortcoming: nations have different definitions of what constitutes an urban area making cross-country comparison almost impossible. The second index covers the population of only the two biggest cities, thus not representing the larger picture.

[5] The Davis Index is 1st largest city's population divided by the population sum of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th largest cities.

Figure 3. Map of Major Administrative Areas in South Korea, 1994 (Unit = Square Kilometer[6])



Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government. 1994. *Comparative Statistics of Major Cities* Korea.

[6] One square kilometer equals 0.3861 square mile

Figure 4. Map of Major Urban Areas in South Korea.



Source: Ki Tae Kim. 1999. "Sensitive Map of Korea." <http://firefox.postech.ac.kr>

Table 2. Population Size of Major South Korean Cities in 1993 (in thousand).

Seoul	10,925
Pusan	3,868
Taegu	2,315
Inchon	2,144
Kwangju	1,250
Taejon	1,191
Songnam	731
Puchon	724
Ulsan	755
Suwon	714
Anyang	589
Chonju	550
Chongju	490
Ansan	401
Changwon	400
Masan	385
Kwangnung	342
Pohang	323
Koyang	307
Chinju	257
Uijongbu	255
Cheju	243
Mokpo	227
Iri	217
Kumi	210
Kunsan	205
Chonan	203
Yosu	185
Chunchon	183
Kunpo	178
Wonju	176
Sunchon	161
Kangnung	154
Nonsan	153
Kimhae	149
Kyongju	145
Chungju	141
Sihung	132
Kuri	128
Chinhae	126
Andong	118
Cheshon (Chechon)	109

Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government. 1994. *Comparative Statistics of Major Cities* Korea.

The Davis index covers four cities. Also, as it is a ratio, it is less vulnerable to different boundary definitions. If the largest city's population is underestimated, a similar underestimation will take place for the other three cities which helps mitigate the bias.

In measuring the population of cities, the unit of analysis is not the "city proper" but the "urban agglomeration." According to the U.N. [7] (1996) definition, "City proper" is defined as a locality with legally fixed boundaries and an administratively recognized urban status which is usually characterized by some form of local government. "Urban Agglomeration" refers to the population density contained within the contours of a contiguous territory inhabited at urban levels of population density without regard to administrative boundaries. It incorporates population in a city or town plus the suburban fringe lying outside of, but adjacent to, the city boundaries.

The U.S. is the best country to illustrate the differences between the two concepts. The city boundaries of the U.S. are drawn by vote of the ballot box, but the U.S. Bureau of Census reports the metropolitan area based on the degree of economic integration using indicators such as the percentage of

[7] The primary source of data is a set of questionnaires sent annually and monthly to about 220 national statistical services and other appropriate government offices. Data forwarded on these questionnaires are supplemented, to the extent possible, by data taken from official national publications and by correspondence with the national statistical services. When U.N. data were not available or complete, national statistics publication were also used for Ireland (Central Statistics Office. Various Years. *Ireland: Statistical Abstract* Dublin), Taiwan (Executive Yuan. Various Years. *Social Indicators in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China* Taipei), Hungary (Central Statistical Office. Various Years. *Statistical Yearbook of Hungary* Budapest), Philippines (National Statistical Coordination Board. Various Years. *Philippine Statistical Yearbook* Makati, Metro Manila).

commuters. These two different ways of making boundaries do make a difference[8].

I prefer metroline over citylimit because the administrative boundary is not comparable among countries with different administrative systems. Some countries, however, have concepts which can be somewhat between "city proper" and "urban agglomeration." These concepts are "municipality," or "special city." Those terms are basically administrative, but somewhat reflect the degree of population density and economic integration. Taiwan has a concept "municipality" which is applied to Taipei and Kaohsiung, the two biggest cities in Taiwan. Korea is like Taiwan in that Seoul is a "Special City" and several major cities have the status of "Provincial City."

Unfortunately, Korea does not have population data at the metropolitan level. As U.N. researchers have done (1996), I use Special City or Provincial City population data as the estimates for urban agglomeration. This can be somewhat problematic because the Seoul Metro Area, like other major cities in Korea but even more so, is bigger than Seoul Special City's administrative boundary considering the frequent commuting from suburbs of Seoul and some adjoining cities' economic dependency on Seoul.

The case of Japan is also relevant because the overflow of Tokyo is similar to Seoul. The U.N. actually uses two different urban agglomeration

[8] When measured by using the concept "city proper," the most populous city in Canada in 1991 was Montreal (1,017,666), followed by Calgary (710,677), Toronto (635,395), and Winnipeg (616,790). But Toronto becomes the largest city when "urban agglomeration" is used, with a population of 3,893,046 leaving behind Montreal (3,127,424), Vancouver (1,602,502), and Ottawa (920,857) (See U.N. 1996).

boundaries for Tokyo: *Tokyo-to* (Tokyo Prefecture) and "Tokyo Metropolitan Area." *Tokyo-to* (Tokyo Prefecture) comprises the 23 wards plus 14 urban counties (shi), 18 towns (machi) and 8 villages (mura). The "Tokyo Metropolitan Area" comprises the 23 wards of *Tokyo-to* plus 21 cities, 20 towns and 2 villages (U.N., 1996).

The boundary of *Tokyo-to* can be said to be similar to Seoul Special City as both are administrative boundaries and also a boundary around the urban core with significantly integrated suburbs. Tokyo Metropolitan area is *Tokyo-to* plus some portions of three adjoining prefectures (*ken)*, which are *Chiba-ken, Saitama-ken,* and *Kanagawa-ken* (National Land Agency, 1997).

I believe that this metropolitan level population data, which is not available in Korea, reflect the actual level of economic integration in the Tokyo area better than the population data for *Tokyo-ku* (which is similar to the concept of Seoul Special City). The population of Metropolitan Tokyo Area was 32.7 million whereas the population of *Tokyo-to* was 11.8 million in 1996 (National Land Agency, 1997).

The case of Taiwan is also similar. The population of Taipei Municipality in 1995 was 2.6 million whereas the population of Taipei-Keelung Primary Metropolitan Area was 6.2 million.

My use of Special City or Regional City population as substitute for metropolitan area data can be justified for two reasons. First, it is beyond the scope of this project to actually draw a metropolitan area line and calculate the

population. Some authors, such as Soon-Jhe Jo (1992) used the term Seoul Metropolitan Area which includes Seoul, Inchon (the fourth largest city in Korea), and a region surrounding Seoul (which is called Kyonggi-do) (See Figure 3). I believe this boundary is too broad, because it includes a lot of rural areas. By using this boundary, the population of the Seoul Metropolitan Area is inflated to 20.4 million in 1994, which is the sum of Seoul Special City (10.8 M), Inchon Regional City (2.2 M), and Kyonggi-do (7.4 M) (Bureau of Statistics, 1995).

Soon-Jhe Jo's boundary is commonly called the "Capital Region," and is a regional not a metropolitan concept. Japan has the same term Capital Region, which is the Tokyo Metropolitan Area plus some portions of other surrounding four prefectures: *Ibaraki-ken, Tochigi-ken, Yamanashi-ken, and Gumma-ken.* The population of the Tokyo Capital Region soars up to 40.6 million whereas the Tokyo Metropolitan Area population is just 32.7 million (National Land Agency, 1997).

The second justification is that as I am using the Davis Index, which is a ratio, the bias will not be that severe. The population of Taipei Municipality divided by the population sum of Kaohsung Municipality, Taichung City, and Tainan City in 1994 is .90. The same Davis index for Taiwan's Metropolitan Areas in 1995 is 1.10 (Table 3). In 1990, the population of *Tokyo-to* divided by the population of Yokohama, Osaka, and Nagoya is 1.48. The Metro Area Davis' Index for the same year is 1.58 of which the population order is: Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, and Kitakushu (Table 4).

Table 3. The Population of Taiwan's Major Cities with Different Boundaries in 1990

	In 1994		In 1995	
	Close to 'City Proper"		Metropolitan	
	Population Unit = 1.000 persons			
1st largest	Taipei Municipality	2,654	Taipei-Keelung Primary Metropolitan Area	6,230
2nd largest	Kaohsiung Municipality	1.416	Kaohsiung Primary Metropolitan Area	2,624
3rd largest	Taichung City	833	Taichung-Changwha Primary Metropolitan Area	1,891
4th largest	Tainan City	703	Tainan Primary Metropolitan Area	1,158
Davis' Index	.90		1.10	

Sources:

Executive Yuan. 1996. *Urban and Regional Development Statistics* Republic of China

UN. 1995. *World Urbanization Prospects: The 1994 Revision* NY.

Table 4. The Population of Japan's Major Cities with Different Boundaries in 1990

	Close to 'City Proper'		Metropolitan	
	Population Unit = 1.000 persons			
1st largest	Tokyo-to (Tokyo Prefecture)	11,856	Tokyo Metropolitan Area	25,013
2nd largest	Yokohama City	3,220	Osaka Metropolitan Area	10,482
3rd largest	Osaka City	2,624	Nagoya Metropolitan Area	2,939
4th largest	Nagoya City	2,155	Kitakyushu Metropolitan Area	2,448
Davis' Index	1.48		1.58	

Sources:

Statistics Bureau. 1996. *Japan Statistical Yearbook* Japan.

UN. 1995. *World Urbanization Prospects: The 1994 Revision* NY.

As in Taiwan and Japan, I believe that the Davis Index using nonexistent metropolitan population data for Korea would be a bit higher than Davis Index using Special City and Regional City population, because the suburbanization of the capital city has outgrown the three provincial cities in the index. However, as the Davis Index is a ratio, my underestimation of Seoul Metropolitan Area in comparison with other cities should be moderate as demonstrated with data on Taipei and Tokyo.

Population in the Korean urban system can be said to be moderately decentralized (Table 5). In 1990, Seoul ranked 14th out of 38 countries with a Davis Index of 1.36[9]. Third World countries in Asia and Latin America were on top of the list: Thailand (1st), Philippine (2nd), Peru (3rd), Argentina (4th), Chile (6th) with more than 3.0 on the Davis Index. US and Canada again demonstrated a balanced population distribution with rankings of 29th and 31st.

[9] Most data on the major urban agglomerations around the globe are from two publications by UN: (1) UN. 1996. *Demographic Yearbook* NY, and (2) UN. 1995. *World Urbanization Prospects: The 1994 Revision* NY. The primary source of the this UN data is a set of questionnaires sent annually and monthly to about 220 national statistical services and other appropriate government offices. Data forwarded on these questionnaires are supplemented, to the extent possible, by data taken from official national publications and by correspondence with the national statistical services. Information on the size of urban agglomerations in Taiwan are from: Executive Yuan. 1996. *Urban and Regional Development Statistics* Republic of China

Table 5. The Degree of Population Concentration in Different Urban Systems

Ranking	Country	Demographic Capital	Demog raphic Davis' Index	Year
1	Thailand	Bankok	7.79	90
2	Philippines	Manila	4.17	90
3	Peru	Lima	4.03	90
4	Argentina	Buenos Aires	3.52	90
5	Hungary	Budapest	3.45	90
6	Chile	Santiago	3.3	90
7	France	Paris	2.7	90
8	Austria	Wien	2.53	90
9	Mexico	Mexico City	2.22	90
10	Denmark	Kobenhavn	2.2	93
11	Finland	Helsinki	1.59	93
12	Japan	Tokyo	1.58	90
13	Indonesia	Jakarta	1.38	90
14	Korea	Seoul	1.36	90
15	Ireland	Dublin	1.35	86
16	Turkey	Istanbul	1.26	90
17	United Kingdom	London	1.22	90
18	Colombia	Bogota	1.17	90
19	Pakistan	Karachi	1.14	90
20	New Zealand	Auckland	1.13	91
21	Taiwan	Taipei	1.1	95
22	Sweden	Stockholm	1.03	90
23	Brazil	Sao Paulo	1.01	91
24	Spain	Madrid	0.98	91
25	Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur	0.9	90
26	Venezuela	Caracas	0.88	90
27	Poland	Katowice	0.83	90
28	Switzerland	Zurich	0.79	93
29	United States	New York	0.71	90
30	Canada	Toronto	0.68	90
32	Belgium	Bruxelles	0.66	90-91
32	Germany	Essen	0.66	90
33	Australia	Sydney	0.65	91
34	Italy	Milan	0.61	90
35	South Africa	Cape town	0.59	90
36	China	Shanghai	0.54	90
37	India	Bombay	0.51	90

Korean Cities: Homes of the Middle Class

Korean cities are hardly attractive places for the lower class, and this is especially true of Seoul. A white paper on Seoul city published by the Seoul metropolitan government in 1998 states that the housing price in Seoul is 11 times the average income per resident, as compared to 3.4 times in New York and 7.7 times in Tokyo. The homeownership rate of Seoul city in 1993 was 68.5 percent (Seoul City University, 1994). Welfare programs for urban residents in Korea are also inadequate.

You can easily find class-segregated residential areas in Seoul. Seoul has squatters on various hillsides of the city. Most of Seoul's squatter residents are rural migrants who came to the capital during the 1960s and 1970s. Dreaming of the good life in the big city, the migrants embraced any jobs they could find. Many became construction workers, street vendors or housemaids. Some of the luckier ones landed jobs at factories or took up taxi driving (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1988:86).

In contrast, some areas look more affluent. The development of the Southern part of the Han River is a good example. Including 4 wards, Kangdong-gu, Kangnam-gu, Songpa-gu, and Socho-gu (See Figure 5), this area was included in the city in 1963, but was left rural until the 1970s when the government devised a land development plan for solving a housing shortage problem. Now these are well-planned residential areas for middle and upper class residents (Rii, 1996).

Figure 5. Map of Seoul.

Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government. 1998. <http://www.metro.seoul.kr> Korea.

However, Seoul has few of the plywood shantytowns that are scattered throughout Hong Kong, Manila, and other Asian cities. It has none of the bombed-out devastation of New York's South Bronx or Harlem where rotting fire escapes, shattered windows and vacant lots mark the landscape (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1988:84).

Signs of showy consumption by Seoul's economic elites is not extreme by world standards. Even though some wards have fancier shopping districts and affluent residents, it is less compared to the ostentatious housing and high-end shopping malls found in America's suburban cities.

Seoul, like other cities in Korea, is a city of the middle class. Table 6 shows that the discrepancy in monthly income per capita in 1993 among the 22 wards in Seoul is minimal. For example, the highest figure for Kangnam was 982,859 won (US$ 1,218) which is almost identical to that of the lowest one, 949,010 (US$ 1,176) won for Yongsan.

Comparison with New York shows that Seoul's intracity inequality is low by world standards. With fewer districts, income discrepancy in New York was much more serious than in Seoul. Manhattan recorded annual income per capita of $27,862 in 1989, which is almost three times that of the number for the Bronx, $10,535 (Table 6).

Seoul's well-developed public transportation system, including extensive subway lines, makes the lives of citizens who do not own a car less miserable. One can usually find places for shopping and entertainment right in the neighborhood. Most of the streets are safe for night walking.

Table 6. Income Disparity in Seoul and New York

Seoul (1993)		New York (1989)	
gu (ward)	Average Monthly ncome (Won)	Boroughs	Per Capita Income ($)
Kangnam	982,859	Manhattan	27,862
Songpa	981,658	Staten Island	17,507
Uunpyong	979,983	Queens	15,348
Kangdong	971,956	Brooklyn	12,388
Sodaemun	971,203	Bronx	10,535
Kuro	969,875		
Kangso	969,517		
Kwanak	967,924		
Socho	965,940		
Yangchon	965,732		
Chongno	965,378		
Nowon	964,934		
Mapo	964,586		
Tongjak	960,597		
Yongdungpo	959,926		
Tongdaemun	959,383		
Songbuk	958,976		
Tobong	958,819		
Songdong	955,721		
Chung	955,149		
Chungrang	952,040		
Yongsan	949,010		

Bureau of the Census. 1990. 1993. *Census of Population: Social and Economic Characteristics of New York*

Lee, Bun-Sung, Eui-Seop Lee and Hyeon Park. 1995. "Estimation of Urban Productivity Indicator for the Influence of Traffic Congestion in Seoul." Pp 249-276. In *Cities and Nation: Planning Issues and Policies in Korea* Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, Seoul: Korea.

It is my impression that there is an even less income inequality in other Korean cities. The favorite destination for the displaced during Korea's compressed industrial revolution has been Seoul. Unfortunately, my extensive efforts to secure comparable information on other major Korean cities bore no fruit, making intracity inequality comparisons between Seoul and other cities impossible. The data on the income per capita figure of Seoul wards in 1993 (Table 6) were from a report published by a government-sponsored research institute.

Seoul is not the Wealthiest City in Korea

Korea's overall urban system is not that unequal, at least in economic terms. In 1995, according to the official statistics from the National Statistics Office, the Gross Regional Product (GRP) per capita for Seoul was 7,868 thousand won[10], which did not deviate that much from other major cities, such as 8,027 thousand won (Inchon), 6,556 thousand won (Kwangju), 6,464 thousand won (Taejon), 6,198 thousand won (Pusan), and 6,162 thousand won (Taegu) (See Table 7).

Seoul's figure was not much different from that of Korea's ten regions, of which the highest was 11,090 thousand won (Kyongnam) and the lowest is 6,571 thousand won (Kangwondo). It is quite surprising that there are cities and regions with higher Gross Regional Product (GRP) per capita than Seoul.

[10] In 1995, one thousand Korean won equals 1.2892 US dollars.

Table 7. Gross Regional Product per capita for Major Korean Cities and Provinces in 1995 (Unit = 1,000 won[11])

Major Cities		Provinces	
Inchon	8,027	Kyongsangnamdo (Kyongnam)	11,090
Seoul	7,868	Kyongsangbukdo (Kyongbuk)	8,631
Kwangju	6,556	Chollanamdo (Chonnam)	8,355
Taejon	6,464	Chungchongbukdo (Chungbuk)	8,265
Pusan	6,198	Chungchongnamdo (Chungnam)	7,829
Taegu	6,162	Kyonggido	7,718
		Cheju	6,996
		Chollabukdo (Chonbuk)	6,842
		Kangwondo	6,571

Source: The National Statistical Office. 1997. *Social Indicators in Korea* Korea.

[11] In 1995, one thousand Korean won equals 1.2892 US dollars.

Comparison with US data shows that the US urban system lags behind Korea. The US Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov) reports that in 1989 the per capita income of New York City was $16,281, deviating a bit more from other cities in the USA than Seoul did from other cities in Korea: $19,695 (San Francisco), $16,188 (Los Angeles), $12,899 (Chicago), $9,809 (Philadelphia), and $9,443 (Detroit). Whereas Seoulites earn about 28 percent more than residents of the poorest among the Korea's biggest six cities, New Yorkers are about 72 percent more affluent than the residents of Detroit.

When estimated by regional figures, many other nations seem to lag behind Korea in terms of intercity equity. The income per capita of Greater London (9,677 pounds[12]) far surpassed any other comparable regional figures in 1997 including that of England as a whole (8,160 pounds) and the lowest one, Wales (7,245 pounds) (Office for National Statistics, 1996:12).

Bangkok compared with other regions makes Korea look like a model case. According to "Pocket Thailand Figures" published in 1994 by Sukhum & Sons, the Gross Regional Product (GRP) per capita of Bangkok in 1989 was 112,912 Baht[13]. This figure was way above those of other regions: 73,268 Baht (Vicinity of Bangkok), 40,824 (Eastern), 29,053 (Central), 26,927 (Western), 21,790 (Southern), 17,370 (Northern), and 11,460 (Northeastern).

Bangkok citizens are about 10 times richer than those living in the poorest region. Residents in the Greater London are 33 percent more affluent than

[12] In 1997, one British pound equals 1.65 US dollars.

those in the poorest region in England, Wales. Paychecks of Seoulites are only 20 percent bigger than those of comparable counterparts.

In short, Confucian developmental urbanization in Korea is characterized by extreme power concentration in Seoul, moderate population dispersion in the urban system, and low income disparities among and within cities.

[13] In 1994, one thousand Thai Baht equals 21.28 US dollars.

CHAPTER 3. AGENCY IN URBAN KOREA: THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

> Human settlements aren't amoeba and biological metaphors are poor substitutes for theories of change founded upon actual human practices, intentions and desires.
>
> Hill & Fujita (1995: 9)

Urban researchers tend to view urbanization as primarily shaped by "economic" forces. Gurr and King (1987:3) argue that there is ironic agreement between the neo-conservative right and the neo-Marxist left in the United States and Britain that urban growth and decline is a function of economic forces. According to Gurr and King, the left attributes urban decay to the migration of private capital in pursuit of greater profit margins. On the other hand, the conservatives believe that the fate of cities should be left to the regenerative forces of the market which will save those cities which deserve to be saved.

This belief is also common among those who study uneven urbanization in Third World countries. Both the human ecology/modernization perspective and dependency/world system theory focus on the role of the market in shaping the urban landscape in cities of the developing world. The former focuses more on innovation whereas the latter takes on its exploitative nature.

This chapter tries to answer the question, "who has shaped urban Korea?" However, only a profile of the agent will be presented here. The question of "why" and "how" will be answered in the following chapters. Chapter

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4 will examine the ideology of Confucian developmentalism which inspired the bureaucrats who make up the developmental state in Korea. Chapter 5 will deal with how the hegemonic ideology has been put into practice in urban Korea.

I start by reviewing how the two main theories have answered the issue of agency in urbanization and how they have applied their answer to the Korean case. Both schools, argue for the dominance of capitalists in urban Korea but this may be inaccurate. The bourgeoisie has not been the powerholder in Korean society.

Compared to the "regulatory states" in the West, who limit themselves to overseeing the basic functioning of the market, the "developmental state" in Korea intervened and promoted the market. The rise of bureaucrats as the key decision-makers in urban Korea will be described.

The "Natural" Market: The Human Ecology/Modernization Perspective

Human ecology/modernization theory believes that it is mainly the market which determines urban outcomes. Spatial distribution of population, power, and wealth are all dependent on the "natural" market. The market changes cities along a simple and linear path: from "preindustrial city" to "industrial city."

The idea of the "natural" development of the market is well presented in Adna Weber's (1967) book: *The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century*. The growing concentration of the population in the US cities is viewed as an outcome of market force as embodied in factors such as the application of machine power

to agricultural production and the attendant job-displacing effects that "encourage" migration to cities (Weber, 1967; Timberlake, 1985:4). Market activity is a "natural" force (Weber, 1967:185; Timberlake, 1985:4-5):

> [E]conomic development, or the integration of isolated social and economic groups, demands the concentration of a portion of the population in commercial cities. Similarly, ... the enlargement of the market, which is one aspect of the process of growth of industrial society from the village economy to the world economy, has brought about centralization in the manufacturing industries and enforced the concentration of another portion of the population in industrial, or ... commercial cities.

Concerning the distribution of power, Keyfitz (1965) argues that a city dominates its surrounding territory largely by force and organization in preindustrial societies. But as a society industrializes, the dominance of the city over the hinterland is determined principally by the efficiency of production.

Urban ecologist, McKenzie (1927:32) argues that with the development of communication and transportation, spatial dominance is more characterized by economics rather than political matters:

> As the agencies of communication improve and as the impediments to movement are overcome, the world becomes organized on the pattern of a spider's web ... All the old boundaries, both local and national, are gradually losing their significance; routes, rather rims, are becoming the subject of stressed attention. Modern competition is between regions and centers rather than cultural and political areas. While political boundaries continue to receive much attention, nevertheless their modern significance is with reference to the movements of commodities and people rather than the movements of armies.

Sometimes, the notion of the "natural" market as an agent is well camouflaged. For example, Sjoberg (1967:214) regards technology and social norms as the driving forces of urbanization. However, Sjoberg (1967:215) distinguished three types of urbanization which represent evolutionary phases: the preindustrial, the transitional, and the industrial. I argue that Sjoberg had already made up his mind as to who the agent was when he formulated this natural course of urban evolution. Each phase of urbanization is already assumed to be shaped by the degree of capitalist development. Sjoberg's (1967:229) description of a typical industrial city is also a conclusion about "who" shaped this kind of city:

> Industrial cities, in contrast to preindustrial ones, are more likely to revolve about a commercial and/or industrial focus than around a religious-governmental complex. Symbolically as well as physically, the typical industrial city's commercial and industrial edifices tower over those of government and religion.

Embracing the market as the agent means believing in its "self-regulating" nature. According to the modernization theorists, the working of the market determines the spatial distribution of resources such as wealth, power, and population.

The theory of "rank size distribution" shows how the market shapes the urban system in a country. It is mainly a model for the distribution of population

in an urban system, but it is linked to the diffusion of wealth and power as well. Economic growth sustained over long periods results in progressive, and also optimum, integration of the space economy leading to "rank size distribution," according to Berry (1971). In a city system that conforms to the rank-size rule, the second largest city is one-half the size of the largest, the third largest city is one-third the size of the largest, and so on.

Based on the experience of Great Britain and the United States in the 19th century, El-Shakhs (1972) argued that countries increase demographic primacy values during the traditional stage of development (prior to take-off), reaches a peak during the early stage of development (or economic transition) and decrease steadily with economic maturity.

At the initial stage of development, resources are poured into one city until economies of scale are achieved. Development in technology and economic means of production tends to be concentrated in space. This centripetal process of concentration shifts, from a local to a regional to a national scale. Equipped with overhead facilities, external economies and political power, the primate city comes to serve as the center of innovation. It is at this stage that regional inequality and differences are intensified, and the primacy curve reaches its peak.

But at some point, the diffusion mechanism asserts itself. Further developments in transportation and communication, along with changes in the factors of production and market areas, leads to a decentralization of economic activity and, of course, a decrease in urban primacy. Simply put, rising wage

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levels in the primary city pushes industry out to the hinterland leading to the development of other cities by the "trickle down effect" (Berry, 1971; El-Shakhs, 1972).

Those who regard the market as the primary agent tend to believe that Western urbanization is the higher order and other countries will follow this "proven" course of history. Sjoberg (1967:220) equates industrial urbanization in the West to "the good life with freedom and plenty for all."

Sjoberg (1967:230) believes that things have gotten better at least in urban America:

> Just as the lines between classes, ethnic minorities, and occupations are less clearly drawn in the industrial-urban milieu, so too they are much less obviously spatially. But what about the many studies pointing to "islands of segregation" in highly industrialized cities? These cases dramatize the fact that complete residential equality for all urbanites has not been attained; nor is there unlimited social and spatial mobility. With some exceptions, such as the Negroes in America, these enclaves are fewer and less isolated today than in the past, for advancing industrialization has drawn various "minority groups" increasingly into the mainstreams of community activity.

When modernists see Third World urbanization not following their prescribed path, they tend to blame "the spell of tradition" which keeps the market from doing its job. For example, Ginsburg argues that Southeast Asian cities are less effective as modernizing media compared to Western equivalents partly because of the "traditional" nature of their industrial activity which is

characterized by a more "personal" relationship between suppliers and customers (Ginsberg, 1972: 49).

For human ecology/modernization theorists who had a hard time explaining the severe intra-urban segregation and concentration of resources in the primate cities of Southeast Asia and Latin America, Korean urbanization was a model case proving that the market works. Korea's urban system was held to follow the path of the Western countries.

According to Mills and Song (1979:48), the primacy Index of the Korean urban system was 1.36 in 1949. It rose to 1.53 in 1970, and fell slightly to 1.51 in 1975. Thus, despite the concentration of people in Seoul, Korea is not a highly primate country by world standards.

"Trickle-down" of wealth is also visible in the Korean urban system, according to Mills and Song. The newly industrialized cities of the Southeastern coastal region are growing rapidly by accommodating migrants during the 1960s and 1970s. Ulsan (See Figure 4), home city of Hyundai Motors, is a good example. The population of the city increased from 30,000 in 1960 to 253,000 in 1975 (Mills and Song, 1979:53).

Urbanization also improved the well-being of the urban poor in Korea. Mills and Song (1972:172) point out that the number of squatters has decreased since the early 1970s.

Dependency/World System Theory

Dependency/world system theorists agree with the human ecology/modernization thesis that the market is the agent of urbanization. However, more critical-minded dependency/world system people do not think the market is "natural." On the contrary, these scholars argue that the market works to maximize the profits of the bourgeois class.

Castells (1973:13-14) points out the historical link between bourgeoisie and the rise of capitalist urbanization in the West. According to Castells, the medieval city represents the emancipation of the mercantile bourgeoisie in its struggle to free itself from feudalism and the central power. Then, the development of industrial capitalism resulted in the social domination of the industrial bourgeoisie in the city. This capitalist domination was not a technological fact; it was the expression of the capitalist logic that lay at the base of industrialization.

Dependency theory regards the "world market," in which Third World countries are dependent upon the interests of the Western capitalists, as the agent of national urbanization in Southeast Asia and Latin America. Frank (1972:59-60) explains how the primate cities of Latin American countries can be better explained by the exploitative nature of the world market:

> On the basis of the complete introduction of the whole of the continent into the sphere of the world market, under British hegemony, there began the systematic exploitation of the resources of the primary sector demanded by the new industrial economies and parallel with this, the creation of the network of services and transport necessary to these activities ... Thus, the Argentine and Uruguay, founded on the extraordinary expansion of cattle rearing and on the fusion of interests between the mercantile bourgeoisie of Buenos Aires and the landowners of the interior, experienced high economic growth, with a concentration of all the tertiary functions in the capital, already a privileged place as an exporting port.

Frank (1972:5-6) argued a web of exploitation channels through space in a "metropolis-satellite relationship":

> Just as the colonial and national capital and its export sector become the satellite of the Iberian (and later of other) metropolis of the world economic system, this satellite immediately becomes a colonial and then a national metropolis with respect to the productive sectors and population of the interior. Furthermore, the provincial capitals, which thus are themselves satellites of the national metropolis - and through the latter of the world metropolis - are in turn provincial centers around which their own local satellites orbit. Thus, a whole chain of constellations of metropolis and satellites relates all parts of the whole system from its metropolitan center in Europe or the United States to the farthest outpost in the Latin American countryside.

Naturally, the world market is blamed by dependentistas for bringing on extreme uneven urbanization in the Third World. The urban experiences of Latin America have been characterized by a strong imbalance in the urban network in favor of one predominating urban area; a lack of jobs and services for the new urban masses; the segregation of the social classes; and a polarization

of the system of stratification as far as consumption is concerned (Castells, 1977:57).

For Nam, the exploitative nature of the world market accounts for uneven urbanization in Korea as well. Nam (1988) applied the "dependent urbanization" theory to the Korean urban system from 1960 to 1980. According to her, one of the most critical aspects of Korean dependent development has been the maximization of profits through reduction of labor costs in export-oriented industrialization.

According to Nam (1998:108), the Korean urban system was characterized by "overurbanization" and consequent an increase in primacy, especially in the 1960s. The concentration of capital, infrastructural support, as well as other types of benefits directed to a few big firms located in Seoul, effectively encouraged the growth of Seoul. These urban biased policies "pushed" the rural population to cities, especially to Seoul. This rapid urban growth created marginality and poverty because urbanization developed much faster than the structural requirements for labor in the urban sector. Even though the 1970s was characterized by decentralization, Korean urbanization was again marred by regional inequalities.

The world system perspective can be viewed as an elaboration of dependency theory. Whereas dependency theory has two categories (core and periphery), world system theory adds one more (semiperiphery). The world system perspective argues that a country's position in the international economic system constrains patterns of urbanization. Class structures and the state are

mediating variables between a nation's world system position and the urban structure of a society. The mediating variables are critical elements but they must be understood in the context of a nation's role in the global system (Smith, 1996).

David Smith (1985, 1996) attributes the relatively balanced urban hierarchies of South Korea with the nation's semiperipheral position in the world capitalist system. According to Smith, Korea has not belonged to the periphery of the world market as have most other Third World countries. During Japanese colonialism (1910-1945), Korea was seen as a strategic military link to Manchuria and a buffer against western colonialists in China. Unlike the western powers, Japan invested heavily in transportation infrastructure in her colonies and built factories there. Well-integrated railroad and port networks helped diffuse urban growth in Korea early on. The country became a corridor for trade between Tokyo and the frontier area, as well as a staging ground for subsequent Japanese pushes into Asia (Suh, 1978; Smith, 1996:128). With Japan's invasion of Manchuria, there began a conscious policy to expand heavy industries in Korea for military purposes (Suh, 1978; Smith, 1996:128). The diversification of the Korean economy resulted in industries locating near the factors of production serving to develop urban areas in all regions of the country and to incorporate these cities in a system of interdependence (Nemeth and Smith, 1985).

Due to Korea's geopolitical position as a bulwark against communism, Korea stayed under the US umbrella during the Cold War. Export manufacturing

proved to be a boon for Korean urbanization as factories need not locate close to a concentrated domestic market. Export-oriented industrialization locates plants close to land, labor and raw materials, often most plentiful in outlaying regions, and to coastal transport platforms to overseas markets (Nemeth and Smith, 1985; Smith, 1996). Korea's more balanced urban system is accompanied by a relatively low degree of informal activity and intra-urban inequality, according to Smith (1996:138).

The Developmental State as the Agent

There are urban researchers who acknowledge the role of the state in shaping urbanization, although often as a secondary agent. One of them is Brian Berry, a sophisticated modernization theorist. Berry (1971) understood that some previously colonized developing countries in Southeast Asia were not experiencing "filtering down" effects. Berry recommended the "growth pole" strategy, which focused on investment in medium sized cities. Berry argued that the allocation of public investments would stimulate the filtering process by creating an alternative magnet for migrants.

I argue that the state was the primary, not a secondary agent, in Korean urbanization since the early 1960s. As the issue of "how" the Korean state led Korean urbanization will be detailed in chapter 5, I focus here on how the state arose as the agent of social change during the period.

Whereas the capitalist-led market rules society in many Western countries, the state has ruled society in Korea. Korea had a state-society

relationship similar to other Northeast Asian countries such as Japan or Taiwan, which made the path of Korean urbanization different from other developing countries. The Korean state since the 1960s can be regarded as a "developmental state" and it has intervened in and promoted the market rather than letting the market take its course.

According to Chalmers Johnson (1987), the East Asian developmental state arose first in Japan, but four defining elements are also present in Korea and Taiwan. They are: (1) stable rule by a political-bureaucratic elite strong enough to deter political demands that would undermine economic growth; (2) cooperation between public and private sectors under the overall guidance of a pilot planning agency; (3) sustained public investment in education for everyone and the equitable distribution of returns from high speed growth; (4) a government that respects and uses methods of economic intervention based on the market price mechanism.

Even though scholars may have similar conceptions about the developmental state, they often differ in as to what the contrasting state concept should be. Johnson (1982) himself contrasts "developmental state" with "regulatory state." The United States is a good example of a state in which the regulatory orientation predominates, whereas Japan is a good example of a state in which the developmental orientation predominates.

A regulatory, or market-rational, state concerns itself with the forms and procedures of economic competition, but it does not concern itself with substantive matters. For example, the United States government has many

regulations concerning the antitrust implications of the size of firms, but it does not concern itself with what industries ought to exist and what industries are no longer needed. The developmental, or plan-rational state, by contrast, has as its dominant feature precisely the setting of such substantive social and economic goals.

Korea's developmental state began in 1961 with the military coup led by General Chung Hee Park. Park could seize absolute power partly because of Korea's weakened social structure. War and land reform had destroyed many of the old social loyalties, the middle and working classes were insufficiently large and organized to muster an effective opposition, and business monopolists were parasitically addicted to government patronage (Cotton, 1992; Lie, 1992).

More to the point, Park changed Korea's class structure. Before Park's takeover, dense patronage networks tied government leaders to the big business elite. After seizing power, Park, himself, took on the role of final arbiter, with the backing of the military and technocracy (Olsen, 1980). The state-business relationship actually grew closer under Park but the state now had the upper hand (Amsden, 1989). State officials conditioned their favor upon industry's contribution to the development of Korea[14] (Amsden, 1989; Lie, 1992).

Park undoubtedly had the Japanese developmental state in mind. He placed his coup in the same lineage as the Meiji Reform in Japan, the modernization of China under Sun Yat-Sen, and Nasser's revolution in Egypt (Park, 1963). He especially identified with the Meiji Reform. When Park

[14] upon good export performance, for example.

marched across the Han river, which flows through the center of Seoul, he was casting himself in the role of the Meiji emperor (Amsden, 1989).

Park's regime followed several institutional precedents set in Japan. The creation of the Economic Planning Board, responsible for budgeting and planning the national economy, began high-level bureaucratic coordination and social mobilization for economic development (Cumings-Woo, 1995). Like Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Korea's Economic Planning Board (EPB) was elevated above all other economic ministries. The head of EPB was even given the status of Deputy Prime Minister. The government also created, again, on the Japanese model, a Ministry of Construction, charged with physical planning and building the nation (Alam, 1989).

The Park regime exerted state autonomy on the model of Japan's developmental state. First, the regime acquired hegemony over economic decision-making. The Economic Planning Board was in charge of planning and budgeting but also handled price control, foreign aid, loans and investment, and technology transfer (Jenkins, 1991). The EPB authored four Five-year Plans during the Park period, providing for budgetary and other policy actions.

Second, state officials exerted control over the financial system. The government nationalized the banking system immediately after the coup (Amsden, 1989; Alam, 1989). Responsibility for monetary policy was transferred from the Bank of Korea to the Executive in 1962. The government created its own commercial banks and financial institutions. A system of official guarantees

for foreign loans, introduced in 1964, extended the government's control even further (Alam, 1989).

Third, state officials used subsidies to shape corporate behavior, including low-interest loans and tax breaks (Lie, 1992; Gittelman, 1988). The Park regime sought to stimulate targeted industries by giving long-term credit to select firms at negative real interest rates. Exporters enjoyed a 30 percent income tax break and paid no customs duties on capital goods imports (Gittelman, 1988; Amsden, 1989).

Fourth, the majority of Korea's parliamentary statutes originated with bureaucratic officials not with lawmakers. Administrative policies were orchestrated within the bureaucracy itself with a great deal of internal policy-coordinating and consensus-building (Cumings-Woo, 1995).

The Korean bureaucracy has often looked to the Japanese precedent in policy formation, as well. For example, Cumings-Woo (1995) reports on a policy innovation survey among Korean civil servants in which 43% of the bureaucrats surveyed listed "foreign examples" as the source of new policy. When asked to choose the country with the most similar policy environment, most respondents chose Japan, explaining they studied Japan so closely for that reason.

I try to measure the degree to which a state is developmental, and see how Korea compares with other countries mostly using data from World Bank[15] (Table 8). Three variables are used to operationalize the developmental state variable according to Johnson's (1987) definition: (1) percentage of expenditure

on education out of Gross National Product (GNP)[16] during selected years between 1980 and 1990, (2) ratio of income held by the top 20% to that held by the bottom 20% in 1990[17], and (3) the ratio of average savings to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 1980-92[18]. The first and second variables are direct measures of sustained public investment in education and the equitable distribution of income. The third is an indirect measure of government intervention targeted for high growth.

Korea ranked 2nd among 38 countries with an average Z score of 1.02. The result confirmed the arguments of many scholars who claim that Northeast Asian countries such as Taiwan (1st), Korea (2nd), and Japan (3rd) are developmental states. Jenkins (1991) argues that the superior economic performance of the East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) lies in the existence of a developmental state with a high degree of relative autonomy from local classes and class fractions. He further mentions that Taiwan and Korea historically inherited effective state organizations from the Japanese colonial period. Economic decision-making in both countries has been highly centralized with pilot agencies in charge of planning and implementation of major policies. The control of state over the financial system was crucial in ensuring the implementation of policies.

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[15] For Taiwan, I used *Taiwan Statistical Data Book* published in 1993 by the Council for Economic Planning and Development.

[16] World Bank. 1997. *World Development Indicators on CD-ROM.* Washington D.C.

[17] World Bank. 1994, 1996. World Development Report Washington D.C.: Oxford University Press.

[18] World Bank. 1997. *World Development Indicators on CD-ROM.* Washington D.C.

Table 8. Developmental State Index

	COUNTRIES2	Developmental State Index (Average of Za)	-Z Score of rich20%/poor20%	rich20%/poor20%	Z score of % edu. expenditure out of GDP	% education expenditure out of GDP ('80-'92)	Z score of gross domestic savings % out of GDP	gross domestic savings (% of GDP, average 80-92)
1	Taiwan	1.15	.59219	5.15	.	.	1.71072	32.48
2	Korea	1.02	.48949	5.70	.87211	5.45	1.69091	32.38
3	Japan	.80	.74861	4.31	.01606	4.23	1.63145	32.08
4	Malaysia	.61	-.62172	11.67	.	.	1.84640	33.16
5	Canada	.60	.23828	7.05	1.853	6.83	-.29856	22.34
6	Belgium	.55	.70271	4.56	1.787	6.74	-.83518	19.63
7	Netherlands	.54	.71331	4.50	.83090	5.39	.08714	24.28
8	Hungary	.52	.96343	3.16	.09495	4.35	.49418	26.34
9	Finland	.50	.44008	5.97	.80499	5.35	.25940	25.15
10	Poland	.49	.82052	3.92	-.1347	4.02	.77468	27.75
11	Austria	.41	.	.	.56242	5.01	.26396	25.18
12	Denmark	.41	.22050	7.15	1.768	6.71	-.76048	20.01
13	Switzerland	.34	-.04538	8.58	.54358	4.98	.51095	26.42
14	Sweden	.32	.69238	4.61	1.020	5.66	-.74829	20.07
15	Italy	.26	.42870	6.03	.73434	5.25	-.37783	21.94
16	Indonesia	.23	.64593	4.86	-1.350	2.30	1.37991	30.81
17	South Africa	.17	.	.	-.3113	3.77	.65425	27.15
18	Germany	.10	.47936	5.76	-.1723	3.97	-.01348	23.78
19	Thailand	.08	.00402	8.31	-.6645	3.27	.89512	28.36
20	Venezuela	.05	-.36836	10.31	.23979	4.55	.28685	25.29
21	France	-.01	.15835	7.48	.36931	4.73	-.56687	20.98
22	Australia	-.04	-.23408	9.59	.44821	4.85	-.34277	22.12
23	Spain	-.06	.73013	4.41	-.3866	3.66	-.51656	21.24
24	New Zealand	-.06	-.08033	8.76	.13734	4.40	-.24368	22.62
25	China	-.07	.33531	6.53	-2.622	.50	2.09032	34.39
26	U. S.	-.07	-.10828	8.91	1.260	5.99	-1.36876	16.94
27	Ireland	-.29	.	.	-.0852	4.09	-.49370	21.35
28	Peru	-.29	-.40136	10.49	-.2194	3.90	-.24825	22.59
29	India	-.30	.67736	4.69	-1.007	2.79	-.56840	20.98
30	Argentina	-.41	-.46917	10.85	-.2194	3.90	-.53791	21.13
31	U. K.	-.42	-.24144	9.63	.35047	4.71	-1.37638	16.90
32	Mexico	-.55	-.98651	13.63	-.7140	3.20	.05360	24.12
33	Philippines	-.56	.18223	7.35	-1.120	2.63	-.73761	20.12
34	Chile	-.69	-1.613	17.00	-.0781	4.10	-.39308	21.86
35	Colombia	-.91	-1.334	15.50	-.8553	3.00	-.54553	21.09
36	Turkey	-1.15	.	.	-1.473	2.13	-.82299	19.69
37	Pakistan	-1.28	.67122	4.73	-1.848	1.60	-2.66153	10.42
38	Brazil	-1.68	-4.431	32.14	-.4314	3.60	-.17203	22.98
Total	38	38	34	34	36	36	38	38

According to Jenkins, the bureaucracy is much more politicized in Latin America. The upper, and in many instances even middle, level civil servants are political appointees. Economic decision-making is also much less centralized than in East Asia. A large number of government ministries and agencies are involved in formulating economic policy. The banking system was in private hands leaving the state with less leverage in guiding industrial development.

Malaysia ranked 4th, and Canada 5th. It is interesting to see that ranking 6th through 15th are all European countries: Belgium (6th), Netherlands (7th), Hungary (8th), Finland (9th), Poland (10th), Austria (11th), Denmark (12th), Switzerland (13th), Sweden (14th), and Italy (15th).

More laissez faire economies such as the U.S. (26th), Ireland (27th), and United Kingdom (31st) were near the bottom along with other Third World countries in Latin America and Asia: Peru (28th), India (29th), Argentina (30th), Mexico (32nd), Philippines (33rd), Chile (34th), Colombia (35th), Turkey (36th), Pakistan (37th), and Brazil (38th).

This chapter started by reviewing the two main theories have answered the issue of agency in urbanization and how they have applied their answer to the Korean case. Both the human ecology/modernization perspective and dependency/world system theory argue for the dominance of capitalists in urban Korea.

This chapter ends with arguing that the primary agent in urban Korea is the developmental state, not the bourgeoisie. Compared to the "regulatory

states" in the West, who limit themselves to overseeing the basic functioning of the market, the "developmental state" in Korea intervened and promoted the market. The rise of bureaucrats as the key decision-makers in urban Korea was described.

CHAPTER 4. CONFUCIAN DEVELOPMENTALISM IN KOREA

> We have been born into this land, charged with the historic mission of regenerating the nation ... overcoming the existing difficulties for the rapid progress of the nation, we will cultivate our creative power and pioneer spirit. We will give the foremost consideration to the public good and order ... Realizing that the nation develops through creative and co-operative activities and that national prosperity is the ground for individual growth, we will do our best to fulfill the responsibility and obligation attendant upon our freedom and right, and encourage the willingness of the people to participate and serve in building the nation ... (The Charter of National Education in 1968)

In 1968, the "The Charter of National Education" was publicly declared by President Park. The charter shows how Confucianism (as represented by words such as "responsibility and obligation," and "public order") well marries developmentalism (as represented by words such as "building the nation," "public good," and "national prosperity"). The military government required the charter, which was reminiscent of the "Imperial Rescript on Education" during the Japanese colonial era, to be contained in all the textbooks of all schools and to be recited at all public events (Shinil Kim, 1995:10).

Ironically, more students began to enjoy education from that year. The open-door policy in education was extended in 1968 in accordance with the charter (Adams and Gottlieb, 1993:130). Under the new admissions policy, every student who completed primary education could advance to middle school

as the entrance examination to middle school was abolished. Implementing this new policy meant increased enrollment in middle schools in excess of the planned targets (Adams and Gottlieb, 1993:130).

The above has been the irony of Korean society since the 1960s. The society has been "politically authoritarian (hierarchical since 1987) but economically egalitarian." How can a society be economically egalitarian under the rule of military dictatorship?

Some might point out the fact that the fruit of fast economic growth seemed to be unevenly distributed, with the industrial bourgeoisie having the lion's share at the expense of marginalized classes such as workers and farmers. Especially suppression of the labor movement led to continuous resistance from workers who demanded higher wages. These scholars might agree with Evans' (1987) explanation of the dreadful combination of repressive politics and extreme social polarization based on the experience of Latin America.

In Latin American theorizing, the authoritarian state prevents labor from organizing on behalf of its economic interests thereby creating the conditions for a growing disparity of salaries between skilled and unskilled labor as well as a growing gap between incomes of wage earners and returns to capital (Evans, 1987:219). However, Korea shows an egalitarian income distribution by world standards in the midst of dictatorial rule by President Park. Korea's gini coefficient for "Before Tax Household Income" was 0.351 in 1970, as contrasted with Mexico's 0.567, Brazil's 0.550, 0.404 in the USA, and 0.335 in Japan

(Maddison & Associates, 1992:11). Evans seems to be perplexed by the absence of severe inequality in Korea, saying (1987:209, 222):

> In East Asia, the authoritarian state has clearly played the expected role in repressing labor's demand, but repression has not been accompanied by increasing levels of inequality ... income distribution in which the top 10 percent of the population gets one-half of what their counterparts in major Latin American NICs receive - and less than the share received by the richest 10 percent under a popularly elected government in the United States.

This chapter attempts to explain why the bureaucratic elite in Korea could have been "politically authoritarian" and "economically egalitarian" at the same time. The hegemonic ideology of the Korean elite since the 1960s, Confucian developmentalism, as expressed well in the *Charter of National Education*, will be examined.

When explaining this modern ideology, I depend heavily on the ideals of President Chung Hee Park. As I will explain in detail, Park changed the nuance of Confucianism and developmentalism in modern Korea. Confucianism was born again with more emphasis on loyalty toward the state as in Meiji Confucianism in Japan. Park also changed Korea's politically-charged nationalism into developmentalism.

Park's ideals effectively penetrated the high-ranking bureaucrats. Below are three mechanisms that helped bureaucrats to internalize the ideals of President Park (Yong-Whan Hahn, 1996).

First, President Park extensively used the Office of the Presidential Secretariat. The Senior Secretary for Economic Affairs was one of the most important staff members for the President in managing development programs from a nationwide perspective. The best economic bureaucrats were recruited into this office as administrative assistants, giving them not only the pride of recognition but also a good opportunity to learn how to make economic policies and programs from a broader national perspective rather than from a narrow ministerial viewpoint. Moreover, after two to three years of successful service in the Blue House (the White House of Korea), these bureaucratic elites were sent back to their home ministries usually with promotions. No doubt they would become powerful missionary-agents in disseminating the President's ideals among the bureaucracy.

Second, President Park publicly dramatized clear, cold-blooded, and very consistent criteria for reward and punishment by using "the New Year Briefing Session." During the months of January and February, President Park visited the offices of every minister and governor to get briefings on plans and strategies for the current year and the preceding year's performance. Only those who achieved one hundred percent or more of the planned target could survive or be promoted. Those who failed to achieve a satisfactory level would be fired without exception. This triggered a positive attitude toward change and innovation, and a greater concern for results rather than procedural legality.

Third, President Park relied heavily upon a number of "Bulldozer" type administrators who were deeply committed to the realization of Park's ideals.

These bulldozers worked extremely hard, not paying much attention to difficulties or constraints of any nature. They just pushed the program through until the target could be realized. The President provided them with every possible means of support and defended them from all possible attacks. They reciprocated with achievements far better than the President had expected. Nak-Sun Lee, one of the bulldozers who was the Director of the National Tax Administration from 1962 to 1966, achieved the miraculous success of a 66 percent increase in tax revenues within one year of his appointment.

Reviving Age-Old Confucianism in the Early 1960s

When President Dae Jung Kim, the first President from the opposition party since 1961, was sworn into office in 1998, Korea witnessed the start of a national campaign; the "new intellectuals movement." On December 5, President Kim said that the "new intellectuals" are people who add value to society through innovation regardless of whether they have a college degree or official certification. By favoring creativity over "schooling" and innovation over hierarchy, the movement seeks to "de-Confucianize" Korean public life (Korea Herald, 1998a). Putting aside the importance of yet another government-initiated-national-campaign, one could see the lingering influence of Confucius in modern Korea.

Confucianism rose to the rank of a hegemonic ideology in Korea when the Chosun dynasty was founded in 1392. Supplanting Buddhism, which had been the official state religion of the preceding Koryo dynasty, Confucianism was used to legitimize the new Confucian elite (Ro, 1993).

Their dominance was institutionalized by putting into place a new meritocratic access to government positions. The means to becoming a bureaucrat in the Chosun dynasty was, in most cases, through the state civil service examination on Confucian classics (Yong-mo Kim, 1976: 76). Even though there were no limitations on commoners sitting in the examinations, the scholar class practically held a monopoly over access to these exams (Su-gon Yi, 1986: 104).

In spite of this class limitation, the recruitment system was fiercely competitive which helped scholar-bureaucrats to expand the power of the state and their stake in it. About only one out of every thirty applicants could pass the preliminary exam. Of those who passed the preliminary exam, only half could pass the main exam (Yong-mo Kim, 1976:77).

This meritocratic elite recruitment gave Confucian bureaucrats a tool for keeping the power of the king in check (Yong-mo Kim, 1976:78). Similar to the case in China, the consensus decision-making based on the tenets of Confucianism made bureaucrats not just aides but also consultants and sometimes critics (Tong-so Pak, 1986). Korean kings did not enjoy autocratic power like the absolute monarchs of Western states due to this nature of Korea's consensus politics (Tong-so Pak, 1986:495).

As this bureaucracy expanded to the local level, so did the power of bureaucrats. The new rising bureaucrats pushed for tighter central control of local governments upon the establishment of the Chosun dynasty. The pluralistic local administration - which varied according to the royal authority and disposition of the party in power - was reorganized into a three-tiered hierarchy: central government, provinces, and counties (Su-gon Yi, 1986: 105).

Heads of local government were now dispatched from the central government (Tong-so Pak,1986: 499). A system of secret inspectors supplemented the official method of controlling local government. Due to these measures, the formation of a local political force that could effectively challenge the central government during the five hundred years of the Chosun dynasty was almost impossible (Tong-so Pak, 1986:198-9).

Just like in ancient China, Confucianism during the Chosun Dynasty was "authoritarian" in that it explicitly legitimized the class hierarchy. People were divided into four groupings according to their occupation - scholar-gentry, peasants, artisans, and merchants – a division referred to as the four classes in the *Book of Documents* (Won-son Pak, 1986:563).

The scholar-gentry were the *literati* who cultivated Confucian learning and virtue and were considered the highest of the four classes (Won-son Pak, 1986:563). Peasants were in the second class but were well regarded for their agricultural labor. Agriculture was considered to be the foundation of all life. Peasants established the customs of the nation with the scholar class (Won-son Pak, 1986:563).

It is difficult to tell how much this ruling ideology was accepted by the masses during the period. In reality, many Confucian scholars failed to live up to the high standards of the moral code. Palais (1996:1003) reports that many of the officials placed private interest over the public good, took bribes to enrich themselves and their families, exploited peasants and slaves to increase their wealth, and foreclosed on mortgages to expand their landed properties instead of fulfilling their role as moral exemplars for society at large. Palais (1996:1003) also points out problems with statecraft such as maladministration, bureaucratic factionalism, unfair taxation, and deterioration of national defense.

Challenges against the class-hierarchy ideology by the masses seems to be conspicuous from the seventeenth century onward as exemplified in the buying and selling of family documents by illegitimate offspring, and escapees from slavery (Yong-mo Kim, 1986). This brought about upward mobility in status in the late Chosun Dynasty, both in urban and rural areas (Yong-mo Kim, 1986:745).

For example, the scholar class in Taegu city in 1870 was 42.5 percent of the population which is a dramatic increase from 19.4 percent in 1684. For the same period, the percentage of slaves was reduced from 39.8 percent to 2.2 percent (Yong-mo Kim, 1986:744). The boldest challenge to the ruling ideology came in 1894 with the Tonghak (which means Eastern Learning as contrasted to Western Knowledge) peasant revolt repudiating the class hierarchy (Yong-mo Kim, 1986:746-7).

However, such revolts were infrequent during the Chosun Dynasty and the attack on Confucianism was rare. It seems that the masses, mostly farmers, wanted a Confucian benevolent government characterized by fair taxation and no abuse by officials rather than overthrow of the class system.

My argument may be partially supported by the fact that the masses accepted Confucianism as a daily code of life. Even though peasants never gave up animistic spirit worship and shamanism, they were eventually converted to Confucian ancestor worship and patrilineal family organization (Palais, 1996:1003). Mahn Kee Kim (1991) mentions that Koreans became more faithful to the tenets of Confucianism than Chinese people. He contrasts the case of Japan where Confucianism provided a norm of behavior for the warrior class in the upper echelons of society but failed to penetrate into the ordinary life of farmers, merchants, and artisans.

Another supporting fact is the anti-colonial demonstration in 1919, which broke out on the day of the funeral of the last monarch, Emperor Kojong. The protest, called the March First Movement, successfully mobilized the Korean masses as shown in the number of demonstrators killed (7,509), wounded (15,961), and arrested (46,948) (Simons, 1995:134). It shows that the last monarch had enough lingering loyalty from the Korean people to evoke a nationalist movement on the day of his funeral.

From 1910 on, Japanese colonial bureaucrats replaced members of the indigenous scholar class as rulers. Upon the signing of the Treaty of Annexation between Korea and Japan on April 29, 1910, General Terauchi Masatake, an

army general and the former Minister of the Army of Japan, became the first Governer-General. Yamagata Isaburo, a civilian and former Minister of Communications of Japan, was appointed Administrative Superintendent on October 1, 1910 (Hong Hae Yoo, 1973:55).

All administrative posts in the new government were held by Japanese (Hong Hae Yoo, 1973:55). Even with the announced policy of appointing qualified Koreans to official posts later on, Koreans comprised only 12 percent of the high official positions at or above the rank of *soninkan* (which means the third rank) in 1943 (Han-kyo Kim, 1973:45). Even those Koreans with higher ranks were kept out of positions of substantive power. Out of the 87 people who served as bureau directors in the central administration in 1943, only two were Koreans, both in the Bureau of Education (Han-kyo Kim, 1973:45).

In contrast to the notion that Confucianism became obsolete under the Japanese rule, it seems that Confucianism maintained its position as a ruling ideology even though it changed its form according to the need of the new alien masters. The new masters, Japanese modern bureaucrats, not only supported indigenous Confucianism in Korea but also planted their own version of Confucianism in Korean soil. Concerned to identify Japanese rule with traditional Korean ways, the colonial government in Korea was conciliatory and protective towards Korean Confucianism (Wi Jo Kang, 1973: 71). Whether because of support from the colonial government or not, the response of Korean Confucianists to the Japanese colonial government was not as antagonistic as that of other elements in Korean society (Wi Jo Kang, 1973:71).

Over time, indigenous Korean Confucianism assimilated to Japanese Confucianism. Japan's Meiji Government, which replaced the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1868, was not anti-Confucianist (Wi Jo Kang, 1973:67). In fact, the new regime was itself a product of Confucian historicism (Wi Jo Kang, 1973:67). Morishima (1982) also argues that the Meiji revolution was carried on by lower class warriors who had retained Confucianism but blended in Shintoism as a catalyst to promote nationalism. This combination was perfectly suited to the construction of a constitutional monarchic regime based on a modern bureaucracy.

Even though Han-kyo Kim (1973) points out that excessive power concentration in the Governor-General and the lack of career mobility made the colonial bureaucracy in Seoul underdeveloped, the Japanese Government General of Korea was a powerful centralized bureaucratic machine modeled after the Japanese Meiji system (Jong Hae Yoo,1973; Woo-Cummings,1995). There is no doubt that this alien bureaucracy was dedicated to strengthening state power through extended local control and establishing meritocratic recruitment.

A highly centralized system of local government was established as a control measure for Japanese colonial rule (Jong Hae Yoo, 1973:56). Significant power was delegated to the provincial governors who were appointed by the Governor-General of Korea (Jong Hae Yoo, 1973:56). Provincial governors appointed provincial civil servants and other executive heads such as mayors, county chiefs, and district leaders (Jong Hae Yoo, 1973:64). Cumings

(1997:152) argues that the Japanese effectively penetrated below the county level and into the villages for the first time, effectively demolishing the old balance and tension between bureaucrats and the landed scholar class.

Added to the old county-level pivot of central magistrate, local clerks, and landed families was a centrally controlled, highly mobile national police force, responsive to the center and possessing its own communications and transportation facilities (Cumings, 1997:152). In place of the old Korean system, the Japanese instituted a modern civil service which, in the main, followed the lines of the Imperial Japanese services (Woo-Cumings, 1995). Provision was made for a high and a low examination of candidates, for salaries and allowances , and for the appointment, resignation, and dismissal of officials (Ireland, 1926: 104; Woo-Cumings, 1995:439).

Meiji Confucianism manifested itself as the Japanese attempted to mold Koreans into loyal Japanese subjects for whom Emperor worship and the Shinto shrine would have as much appeal as it had to the Japanese people (Smith Jr., 1959). The objective of Japanese education in Korea shows this combination of Confucianism and Shintoism. The first educational ordinance for Koreans, promulgated one year after the annexation, was "the making of loyal and good subjects" (Wonme Dong, 1973: 156). Ritualized formality framed everyday school activities: the ceremonial recitation of the *Imperial Rescript on Education* and the *Imperial Oaths*, training in sword exercises, weekly morning assemblies, veneration of the Japanese Emperor's portrait on commemoration days, listening to heroic stories, and visits to Shinto shrines (Jung 1985; M. J. Rhee, 1997: 70).

I believe that this Meiji Confucianism may have been even more authoritarian in Korea than in the land where the Emperor actually resided. Morishima (1982) argues that Meiji Confucianism resulted in a paternalistic and an anti-individualistic Japan. On top of that, the burden of being the aggressors made it difficult for the Japanese to eliminate the old authorities in Korea. Japan left the Korean landlord class, mostly Confucian scholars, intact as local surrogates for colonial rule (Cumings, 1984).

The Meiji Confucianism imposed on the Korean people seems to have failed to gain acceptance by the Korean people. The violent destruction of nearly every Shinto shrine in Korea after the defeat of Japan in 1945 shows the extent to which this effort had failed (Smith Jr., 1959:182). Also, as a result of indigenous Confucianism being utilized by the Japanese government, Confucian strength in Korean society, at the end of Japanese rule, was almost nil (Wi Jo Kang, 1973:72).

The First Republic of Syngman Rhee (1948-60) seems to record the first fall of Confucianism as a governing state ideology in Korea since the 14th century. The state of affairs during his reign should probably be characterized as personalism rather than bureaucratic governance. Bureaucratic appointment under Rhee was less than meritocratic (Kwang Woong Kim, 1987:101-2; Evans, 1995: 51-2):

> Under Rhee, the civil service exam was largely bypassed. Only about 4 percent of those filling higher entry-level positions came in via the civil service exam. Nor were those who entered the higher civil service able to count on making their way up through the ranks via a standard process of internal promotion. Instead, higher ranks were filled primarily on the basis of "special" appointments.

The ruling elite during the Rhee regime were not bureaucrats; instead Syngman Rhee and his "clique" dominated the politicians in his Liberal Party (*Chayudang*). Rhee's charismatic authority, not consensus among bureaucrats, became the pillar of political order (Quee-Yong Kim, 1983:14). The informal transition of power during his reign shows the obvious personalized nature of political institutions during his time (Quee-Yong Kim, 1983:15-16):

> After 1956, Rhee turned over the major responsibility of governmental administration to his ministers, and most of his power in political and governmental affairs to Yi Ki-bung. Yi became the most powerful man in the country, as the Speaker of the National Assembly, the de facto chairman of the ruling Chayudang (the Liberal Party), and also de facto chief of the executive branch. He had personal control over the process of elite recruitment. Virtually all important government officials were appointed, promoted, and dismissed by Yi's authority. There was no tendency on Yi's part, however, to override the authority of Rhee, to whom his loyalty was unquestionable. Rhee did not allow him to innovate or lead and he was by nature no mover or leader of men. He had the virtues of humility and sincerity as well as the personal trust and support of the President. The relationship between the two men, however, went beyond the realm of politics when the childless Rhee adopted Yi's eldest son, Kang-sok ... Thus the political link between Rhee and Yi became a comprehensive personal bond, a relationship which could not be broken by political considerations alone (Quee-Yong Kim, 1983:15-16).

The military coup in 1961 by General Chung Hee Park signaled the resurgence of bureaucrats as the governing elite. Afraid of the possibility of revolt from the military, Park established a firm control over the military through various measures including forcing early retirements of his potential rivals, outright purges, and the extensive use of security forces to supervise the activities of higher officials (Yung Myung Kim, 1992:113). Even though the majority of cabinet posts within the first cabinet of the Military Revolution Commission were occupied by military men, by 1963 only 5 out of 18 cabinet members were from the military (Wan Ki Paik, 1991:52-3). President Park arduously blocked political intervention in the policy process by insulating the bureaucrats from political pressures (Young-Whan Hahn, 1996).

As the power of the armed forces was on the decline, bureaucrats moved to the top of the hierarchy (Olsen, 1980). The dominance of bureaucrats was indicated in the selection of economic ministers. During 16 years (1964-1979), only seven (14.9%) of the 47 economic ministers were ex-military men, compared to 46 (38.3%) of the 120 non-economic ministers. No military officers ever served as Minister of Finance during the period (Chung Kil Chung, 1986:38; Young-Whan Hahn, 1996:195).

The recruitment of the bureaucratic elite became more meritocratic. An open competitive examination for the higher civil service was introduced in 1963 (Hahn, 1996:192). From 1963 to 1981, the rate of competition was anywhere from 50 aspirants to one successful candidate all the way to 100 to one (Woo-Cumings, 1995:450). In addition to injecting new blood through these

examinations, government ministries established many research institutions staffed by highly professional experts with Ph.D. degrees (Young-Whan Hahn, 1996:193).

Not only did Park revive Confucianism by making the meritocratic bureaucrats the ruling elite, but he also took the role of a father-ruler himself. Park insisted on instilling a "can-do-spirit" in the minds of the Korean people. At the same time, he kept pointing out to people what was wrong with them. Park gave detailed attention to his speeches and many times corrected drafts prepared by aides or wrote them himself (Chosunilbo, 1999a). Park made many emotional speeches that were laced with anger, lamentation, discipline, and warnings. For example, his letter to educators at universities in the early 1960s says, "You should repent your past, as universities did not play their role ... giving out degrees randomly and creating social problems." To farmers, he wrote, "Several days ago, I flew over Kyonggi (the capital region) and saw fields that were not being cultivated or having their soil turned. You farmers must wake up and go about your business properly. In the future, those with inferior growing records will have their fertilizer allocation lowered" (Chosunilbo, 1999a).

The following excerpt from one of President Park's speeches shows how he combined filial piety with state loyalty: "Just as home is a small collective body, so is the state a larger community ... One who does not maintain a wholesome family order cannot be expected to show strong devotion to his state ... " (Tai, 1989: 17).

Familism, when extended to the state, meant an extensive state. Father-like rulers are intrusive in mobilizing people whether their governance is benevolent or autocratic. This modern Confucianism developed into several government-led movements, turning bureaucrats into father-like figures just like President Park.

The New Village Movement, which was initiated personally by Park, is one of the best examples of the extensive Confucian state. The Park's drew upon traditional virtue in the countryside to generate a patriotic national movement to improve rural households' incomes through cooperative efforts (Bong-Gyu Ha, 1989). The movement began in the early 1970s.

One of the projects of the movement was the green revolution designed to achieve rice self-sufficiency. A new crop, a japonica-indica cross with yield potential estimated at 30 percent higher than the varieties commonly cultivated in Korea, was developed by the late 1960s. In spite of ambivalence by scientists and farmers over rapid replacement of traditional varietal types because of concerns about taste and the need for more fertilizer input, the adoption and diffusion of the new varieties were aggressively pushed through bureaucratic mobilization. Varied strategies were used to gain farmer compliance (Burmeister, 1990:209):

> The Office of Rural Development director general captured one of the most common methods in this observation: "In Sinan-Gun Jeonnam-Do (Chonnam-Do) guidance workers persuaded famers to plant the new variety under the slogan "Visit Farmers Ten Times." Many farmers accepted the recommendation to save the guidance workers' "face." This

> mode of reaching agreement by pestering the opponents into stolid consent is apparently a time-honored approach in the Korean bureaucratic setting. More heavy-handed measures were employed when necessary – for example, using government-distributed fertilizer to coax compliance and, on occasion, physical destruction of traditional variety seedbeds. Not only extension workers, but other local county and township officials (county magistrates, township and village chiefs, chiefs of police, etc.), assumed responsibility for promoting new variety cultivation on predetermined plots within their physical jurisdictions.

In 1973, President Park brought the Factory New Village Movement before the public with the following slogan: "Treat the employees like family; Do factory work like my own personal work." (Bong-Gyu Ha, 1989:211). From the mid-1970s, the New Spirit Movement was headed by the daughter of President Park and resuscitated the traditional values of loyalty, filial piety, and observance of proprieties, directly drawn from the Confucian code of ethics (Keun-Hae Park, 1979; Bong-Gyu Ha, 1989:211).

Park also introduced a wired broadcasting system, comparable to the radio distributed by the National Socialists in prewar Germany, to facilitate the propaganda work (Young Jo Lee, 1990: 239). Villagers in the remotest areas were given speakers connected to an amplifier-equipped "wired broadcast office" through which catch-phrases, songs, and Park's public speeches were transmitted (Young Jo Lee, 1990: 239-40).

These mobilization efforts intruded on people through an administrative hierarchy reaching down to the neighborhood. The smallest administrative unit, made up of 14 to 20 households, called *ban* in Korean, were important points of

social mobilization and control. Once a month, all *ban* met to discuss local and national issues. One representative per household attended. Strong social pressures were put on households to attend and nonattendance incurred a fine of about 3,000 won (nearly half a day's wage for rural male laborers at 1982 prices), the money being used for some collective purpose agreed upon by the *ban* (Wade, 1983:17). The content of discussions at the *ban* meetings was prepared by the government. A special newspaper (12 or so pages) for those meeting, explained major government policies; gave agricultural instructions such as how to fight pests and diseases; and often devoted as much as half of the space to topics of nationalism and anti-communism (Wade, 1983).

The Confucianism held by the developmental state could be considered authoritarian since the bureaucracy dominated over the civil society. Young Jo Lee (1990) argues that Park's regime is similar to a "bonapartist" regime in the sense that the executive part of the state achieves a commanding power over all other parts of the state and over society, as described by Marx[20]. In 1972, the new constitution removed the limitations on presidential terms and empowered presidents to make political appointments, to nominate one-third of the National Assembly members, and to issue any emergency decree presidents deemed necessary (Bong-Gyu Ha, 1989: 175).

Even during the 1960s, when elections were competitive and held regularly, bureaucrats were not held accountable by the public. Woo-Cumings (1995:453) reports that the majority of parliamentary statutes during the Park

[20] Marx, Karl. 1963. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* New York, International Publishers.

regime originated with the bureaucracy and not with the lawmakers. Woo-Cumings (1995:453) also mentions that the Korean bureaucracy was not accountable to the legislature either. Woo-Cumings argues that economic policy-making was produced in the manner of a typical hierarchy (1995: 200-201):

> Policy guidelines are given initially in the basic guidelines formally approved by the cabinet and the president. These broad terms of reference are translated into more specific and operational plans by bureaucrats within the Economic Planning Board (EPB) under the EPB Chairman's direct command with the assistance of technical experts from outside. The business community immediately realized that once they act in accord with the preferences of government planners they will have great prospects for profit making and corporate expansion through the government's full backing.

"The mandate of development" continued on during the ruthless rule of President Doo Hwan Chun (1980-1987). Seeing himself as the legatee of Park's early successes, Chun was anxious to keep the economy moving (Gibney, 1992: 79). Not possessing Park's vision and dynamism, however, he was content to leave economic guidance and leadership to the bureaucrats (Gibney, 1992:79). Park's New Village Movement continued under the charge of Chun's brother (Gibney, 1992:83). "Park Confucianism" thus lived on within the bureaucrats even as they served "another Emperor."

The "hierarchical," although no longer "authoritarian," nature of Korean Confucianism can be still found. For example, the mobilization of people through *ban* organization is still in practice even though the authoritarian nature has been largely eliminated. The policy making process is still almost

exclusively in the hands of elite bureaucrats. The government constantly tries to mold people's minds with help from the media through various campaigns. For example, the "new intellectuals movement," which was designed to "de-Confucianize" public life in Korea, is being pushed by the central government.

Turning Political Nationalism into Developmentalism

On Feburuary, 25 1999, President Dae Jung Kim perplexed many Koreans by denouncing nationalism (Korea Herald, 1999a):

> The 21st century will be the century of the greatest revolution in human history. The days of narrow-minded nationalism are passing away. The scale of the world economy has now become too great to be supported solely by individual nations ... Indeed, nearly 6 billion inhabitants of this world are now walking out from old national boundaries into a new world of "universal globalism."

Then, he went on to list what he had achieved during his first year in the office for the ideal of "universal globalism" (Korea Herald, 1999a):

> I have advocated a transition to a truly open economy. I emphasized that in order to improve our economic fundamentals, it was necessary to open the market to foreign products and foreign investment. Further, I insisted that it was crucial to scrap the protective system of a government-controlled economy in favor of a few chaebol (large family-owned) firms ... The Korean government has carried out a bold program of deregulation ... Such a rapid and comprehensive program of deregulation will ... promote the development of a market economy and enhance the climate for foreign investment.

Terms are important in discussions. In the Korean debate about "economic nationalism" and "universal globalism," I argue that the term "developmentalism" should be used rather than "economic nationalism" to describe Korea's hegemonic ideology since the 1960s.

There are two reasons why developmentalism is a better choice. First, "economic nationalism" has negative connotations. Levi-Faur (1997:367) says that economic nationalism has been usually associated with a fascist political economy (Hitler's and Mussolini's economic policies, Mihail Manoilescu's political economy) and with the agendas of right-wing extremists (Patrick Buchanan in the USA) and social conservatives (the Euro-skeptics in the British Conservative Party).

The widespread negative perception of economic nationalism forced researchers in the field to argue that not every version is bad. Cohen (1991) distinguishes between "malign" and "benign" economic nationalism. According to Cohen (1991:47), malign nationalism seeks national goals relentlessly, even at the expense of others. Benign nationalism, by contrast, is prepared to compromise national policy priorities where necessary to accommodate the interest of others.

Second, developmentalism is a distinct ideology, and cannot be fully emcompassed by the term economic nationalism. Gao (1997) mentions several characteristics of developmentalism in Japan such as (1) strategic view of the economy which emphasizes upgrading of industrial structure, (2) limiting excessive competition to allocate resources more effectively at the national

level, and (3) rejecting the profit principle to attain growth and a more equitable distribution of income.

Having said that developmentalism is a distinct ideology, I should admit that developmentalism is indeed sustained by nationalism. The nationalism in Korea since the 1960s seems to be in line with other Third World nationalisms after WWII. Mayall (1990) stresses that nationalism in the Third World is perceived quite differently than in the West. Post-colonial nationalism is associated with progress, the transcendence of parochial loyalties and development (Mayall, 1990:111).

Taking India's ambitious second five-year plan in 1956 as an example, Mayall (1990:16) points out why modern nationalists need a program for economic transformation:

> Although European governments understandably resented the charge of neglect (arguing that they were responsible for building up the modern sectors of the colonial economies), from the nationalist viewpoint, the concentration on development was an appropriate response to a fundamental problem. Once alien rule had been dislodged, the new rulers faced the oldest question in politics: by what right do you rule? In the heady atmosphere of the anti-colonial struggle, the organization of a movement for self-government had been sufficient legitimation; once the goal had been achieved something more was required to underpin the exercise of power.

Obviously, Korean developmentalism is a response to the experience of Japanese colonialism, whereas Japanese developmentalism originated during the Meiji era under the Western imperial threat. The warrior class in Japan had to emphasize the relationship among different social classes in terms of shared

history and blood ties (saying that all Japanese were members of a big family, with the emperor at the top). On the other hand, the experience of economic domination by a modern Japanese emperor may have brought Koreans together, making them willing to sacrifice their individual and class interests in order to build a strong economy that would not repeat the humiliation again.

Developmentalism since the 1960s became a ruling ideology for the first time in Korean history. In contrast to Western Europe, where mercantilism had been the guiding principle of national economic policy as early as the fifteenth century (Reich, 1992:14), economic policy during Korea's Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910) was far from being outwardly aggressive. Until the late nineteenth century, Korea was considered to be "the hermit kingdom." Until the forced treaty with Japan in 1876, Korea was content with tightly regulated trade with China and Japan (Nahm, 1988).

Just as mercantilism in Western Europe was for the interest of the kings, queens, and the retainers who contrived, financed, and directed various schemes to accumulate foreign riches (Reich, 1992:13), isolationism during the Chosun Dynasty was for maintaining the economic base of the ruling Confucian bureaucrats.

The scholar bureaucrat class was also the landlord class. Yong-mo Kim (1986:748) points out that in 1905 the majority of rural farmers (84.1 percent) were poor tenants working for an extremely small number of big landlords. According to him, scholar bureaucrats (3.1 percent) and unemployed scholars (1.1 percent) in Seoul and regional cities constituted the absentee landlords and

the leisure class. By the end of the Dynasty, a tenant farmer's rent was paid by sharecropping on a fifty-fifty basis (Yong-mo Kim, 1986:738).

Palais (1996:1007) suggests that an emphasis on agricultural production and the concomitant denigration of industrial and commercial activity in Korean Confucian thought supported the preeminent economic and political position of the landlords by hindering the accumulation of wealth by artisans and merchants, and by preventing their participation in the competition for bureaucratic office.

Penetration by Japan and Western powers in the latter half of the nineteenth century threatened Korea's existence as a nation and thus stimulated three varieties of nationalism by different groups of people (Kwan-rin Lee, 1986). The first was by Confucian bureaucrats with nationalism sloganed: "defend orthodoxy and ban heterodoxy." Orthodox scholars tried to reform the society according to Confucian classics. Taewongun, who took power in 1864, led an energetic program to discipline the royal clans, bring in new blood, straighten bureaucratic practice, strengthen central control, and attack the tax privileges of the scholar class (Cumings, 1997:108). Believing in the virtue of the Sinic world order, he had a simple foreign policy: no treaties, no trade, no Catholics, no West, and no Japan (Cumings, 1997:100).

The following instance of Western contact shows why he took this path and how this isolationism could be popular among Korean people (Nahm, 1988:148):

> In the summer of 1866, a heavily armed American merchant ship, the General Sherman, consigned to a British firm, made a voyage to Korea to establish trade relations with the "hermit kingdom." ... After arriving in the middle of August at an inlet in the Taedong River ... it ran into a sandbank and was immobilized when the high tide receded ... The Magistrate of Pyongyang, Pak Kyu-su, informed the shipowner, W. B. Preston, and Captain Page, that he had no authority to negotiate with foreigners. The ship's 24-man crew seized a local official ... stole food and water from local inhabitants and also kidnapped women to the ship. As a result ... the local people, angry at "the crafty and beast-like foreigners," attacked the ship, burned it and killed all of its crew, including two Americans and a British citizen.

It seems to me that Taewongun and his followers were similar to the Japanese ultranationalistic intelligentsia before the Meiji revolution who advocated "honor the Emperor, expel the barbarians." Those Japanese militants were known for their terrorism against foreigners (Morishima, 1982:69).

The second nationalism by the end of the Dynasty was the "Tonghak (Eastern Learning)" movement by peasants. Seizing opportunity out of the erosion of traditional thought and the penetration of Christianity, Tonghak established itself as a new religion in 1860 combining Confucianism, Buddism, Taoism, and practices of lower-class popular religion (Kwang-rin Lee, 1986; Robinson, 1988).

The religious movement changed to a political movement as it raised issues of social equality and economic equity, reflecting the agonies of peasants due to Japanese agricultural exploitation and corruption in local government (Robinson, 1988; Tae Shin Chung, 1988). The opening of the country in the 1870s only deepened the plight of the peasantry. Rice was now going to Japan

in ever greater quantities, causing rapid rises in price (the profits of which went to middlemen) and inflation in the price of daily necessities (Cumings, 1997:116).

The movement demanded the abolition of the traditional social hierarchy and a halt to rice exports to Japan (Cumings, 1997:116). At least one hundred thousand peasants participated in the peasant uprising in 1894 and fought the Japanese army dispatched to Korea (Cumings, 1997:116-7). The explicit antiforeign statements of the Tonghak rebels emphasized their patriotism, introducing a unique nationalistic flavor to the movement (Robinson, 1988:23).

The third nationalism is the "enlightenment" ideology advocated by the more liberal among the scholar class. They preferred to give up the traditional system and learn from the technology, and especially the military prowess, of the foreign powers (Kwan-rin Lee, 1996:2). Following the signing of the Kanghwa Treaty, which opened the ports in 1876, the enlightenment activists developed into a political force, often called the "Enlightenment Party" (Cumings, 1997:111).

Activists in the Progressive Party like Ok-kyun Kim (1851-1894) urged the abolition of the scholar class in order to promote modernization (Kwan-rin Lee, 1996:4-5). Believing that working within the existing political system was impossible, he led a failed coup in 1884 with help from the local Japanese army (Cumings, 1997:112-3). The incident, which left at least seven Korean officials murdered and the king and queen held hostage, outraged many Koreans (Cumings, 1997:113).

I find it difficult to perceive any of the above three ideologies before Japanese colonialism as economic nationalism. Neither Confucian isolationism nor popular peasant xenophobia can be said to be economic nationalism, as these ideologies do not have one of the foremost objectives of economic nationalism mentioned by Gilpin (1987): industrialization.

The enlightenment thought does envision modernization as a national strategy. However, it seems like the advocates of this ideology didn't have a clue as to who was going to modernize Korea, as evident in their dependence on Japan for achieving political power. It seems to me that this lack of self-identity makes the liberal idea fall short of economic nationalism. In contrast, the Japanese Meiji revolution envisioned the samurai class as the agent of political and economic transformation, not any of the foreign powers.

Japanese colonialism (1910-1945) equated Korean nationalism with anti-Japanese sentiment. After the mass demonstrations calling for immediate Korean independence in 1919, Korean nationalism had become a mass phenomenon and was no longer a monopoly of Westernized intellectual elites (Robinson, 1998:3). The nationalist movement took many forms. With the help of local Koreans, Korean guerillas were strong in Manchuria (Cumings, 1987). Some chose nonviolent resistance focusing on issues like education and culture (Nahm, 1988). Others, like Syngman Rhee, depended on writing letters to the heads of foreign states.

It seems to me that Korean economic nationalism started to develop during colonialism in response to Japanese economic dominance and

exploitation. Yong-mo Kim shows some numbers indicating the poor economic condition of Koreans (1986:748):

> The landlord took from tenant farmers 74 to 76 percent of total production. During the Japanese occupation period, landlords constituted less than 4 percent of the total farm households but owned more than 65 percent of the total arable lands, while 18 percent of the population were independent farmers, and 80 percent of the tenant farmers cultivated land held by landlords. Japanese landlords constituted 2.5 percent, thus owning nearly half of the arable land. Those engaged in commerce and industry constituted 16.0 percent of the total households, but most in this category were laborers, and Korean workers represented ten times the number of Japanese workers, while most of the Japanese were big capitalists. Under the Japanese colonial policy, racial discrimination was enforced in wages ...

Yong-mo Kim (1986) correctly points out that this type of colonial class structure turned into a racial conflict, and Koreans came to conceive of class struggle in terms of nationalism, developing it into a national independence movement.

The case of Man-sik Cho's Products Promotion Society may be the best case of economic nationalism during the colonial period. Responding to Korea's dependence on the Japanese economy, he urged Koreans to patronize Korean products in order to promote a national economy based on native industry (Wells, 1985). He thought that through moral, mental, and practical training together with a campaign for unity, the people would avoid economic extinction and gradually reconstruct a viable economic base (Wells, 1985:855).

Even though moderately successful, it seems like the movement failed as it was not able to present a united front with communists. In-fighting among the nationalists divided the loyalty of the public. For Man-sik Cho it might have meant losing a significant portion of his possible supporters, that is, the workers. And, for communists, attacking nationalistic Christianity instead of conservative Confucianism was a strategic blunder (Wells, 1985:855).

During the presidency of Syngman Rhee, nationalism meant anti-Japanese sentiment. Public antagonism toward Japan and Syngman Rhee's own desire to exploit anti-Japanese sentiment to solidify his political power at home kept Korea from normalizing diplomatic relationship with Japan until 1965. Chong-sik Lee (1985) refers to the Japan-Korea relations during the Rhee presidency as "the clash of emotions" over the assessment of Japanese colonial rule in Korea. President Rhee, a life-time independence activist, was angered not only by what he considered intransigent Japanese policies against Koreans in Japan (which he viewed as a reflection of the Japanese attitude toward Korea), but also by Japan's refusal to acknowledge its misdeeds in Korea (Chong-sik Lee, 1985:24). On the other hand, it was simply impossible for most of those Japanese involved in colonial affairs to accept the notion that Japanese conduct before 1945 deserved Korean condemnation (Chong-sik Lee, 1985:27).

The clashes were also real, and one of them was over a fishery issue (Chong-sik Lee, 1985:36):

> Having concluded that the Japanese attitude toward Korea had not changed, the Republic of Korea (ROK) government proclaimed on January 18, 1952, its sovereignty over waters 50 to 60 miles off the Korean coast ... Korea took unilateral action ... (which) was the political equivalent of war as far as the Japanese were concerned ... President Rhee ordered his navy to capture Japanese fishing boats violating the Rhee line ... and some one thousand Japanese fishermen were sentenced to prison terms on October 13.

It was unfortunate Rhee was not very nationalistic where economic matters were concerned. Rather than indigenous industrialization, "Korean-American co-operation" was his economic philosophy (Oliver, 1954). Rhee said (Oliver, 1954:26):

> Without American aid ... we never could hope to revive our blasted and divided economy. United States military aid is helping us to build the army ... American technicians are helping us to organize the coal mining ... American fertilizers are providing the basis for the best crop year in our history.

Foreign aid was indeed extraordinary. Cumings reports (1997:306-7):

> We have seen that aid funds alone amounted to 100 percent of the ROK government budget in the 1950s ... One high point was 1957, when Korea drew $383 million in economic assistance from the United States, as against $456 million in domestic revenue. But then there was an additional $400 million in military aid in 1957, and another $300 million for the costs of US troops in Korea.

The fact that he was not willing to push ahead with a national economic policy also disqualifies President Rhee as a "developmentalist." In 1959, the Economic Development Council (EDC) finished a draft *Three Year Economic Plan*, which set 1960 as the first year (Hahn-Been Lee, 1968:90-91). The basic goal of the plan was to increase the Korean gross national product by approximately 5 percent annually (Hahn-Bean Lee, 1968:91). The plan, however, was shelved by the cabinet, who chose the maintenance of political control over long-term economic development (Hahn-Bean Lee, 1968:91).

President Park changed the shape of economic ideology in Korea. He discontinued the politically-charged practice of "Japan-bashing." He took a more "strategic" approach, willing to make a deal with "the devil." Recognizing the need for large infusion of foreign capital, Park took the vital but highly unpopular step of normalizing relations with Japan (Time, 1999). Park said (Do Sung Lee, 1995; Sae Jung Kim, 1996:144):

> There have been a lot of criticisms and objections on establishing a diplomatic tie with Japan on the grounds of being humiliating. However, can we keep our pride by constantly bagging wheat flours from the US? I do believe that this is the only way to build our economy. Even though it may be humiliating now, not normalizing the relations means greater humiliation from the Japanese later on. I will put my career on the line for this.

President Park risked a lot. To achieve the normalization of relations with Japan, the Park regime had to ignore the political opposition, manipulate the National Assembly, suppress student dissent, and stifle newspaper criticism (Gong-Gyu Ha, 1989:159). However, there is no doubt that the war reparation money and technology transfer Korea received from Japan was crucial in her economic development. Normalization with Japan in 1965 brought with it $800 million in economic aid (Time, 1999).

The economy was the first thing in President Park's mind. A study of President Park's major speeches delivered during the period of 1964-67 showed that more than 50 percent of 52,000 words centered around "economic development," "modernization," "reform," and "change." (Whang, 1985:248-50; Yong-Whan Hahn, 1996:187). President Park sought to endow the nation with an economic value worthy of the allegiance of the people, coining slogans such as "First is the economy, and second is the economy (Yong-Whan Hahn, 1996:108)." For him and his bureaucrats, economic development might have been the key to everything: legitimization, a political voice in international society, and military power.

However, Park was doubtful about laissez faire economies. In his book, Our *Nation's Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction*, he prefers a certain degree of intervention in the market (1970:37-8):

> There was once a time when the laissez faire policy was the only way to guarantee the maximum freedom of people's economic activities; but it was realized subsequently that such a policy was apt to widen the gap between the haves and have-nots and create massive unemployment. Hence, it was felt necessary to combine laissez faire with planning and for the State to directly and positively participate in economic activities so as to guarantee the economic welfare of the individual.

His long-term economic plans put national interest before private profit (1970:213-4):

> We must take a great leap forward toward economic order which will give priority to the public interest over the selfish pursuit of private profit at the expense of the people in ... this nation. In order to maintain the priority of the public interest, it is urgently necessary to have an economic plan or a long-range development program through which reasonable allocation of all of our resources is feasible.

It was President Park who compelled the bureaucrats to concretize and implement his economic goals (Yong-Whan Hahn, 1996:157-8):

> As soon as the military regime took over the power in May 1961, it decided to secure a plan that could be put into effect at the start of the following calendar year. Toward the end of 1961, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) finished the formulation of the First Five Year Economic Development Plan on the basis of the previous Economic Development Council plan, effective in January of the following year ... Adoption and vigorous implementation of the plan was a genuine reflection of the developmentalist aspect of the time orientation of the ... elite of the regime.

The first five year plan details five basic strategies (Chosunilbo, 1999b):

(1) A guided capitalist system will be introduced based on free enterprise which respects individual creativity but with government intervention in key sectors,

(2) Emphasis will be centered on the public sector upon which the government has direct policy measures,

(3) The ultimate goal for Korean economy is industrialization and so in the preparatory stage emphasis will be on securing energy supply sources, the increase of agricultural productivity, the expansion of key industries and SOC projects, employment expansion, national land development, increasing exports and technology promotion,

(4) Domestic resources and the work force will be utilized to the maximum in order to attract foreign investment,

(5) Increase in defense spending will be kept to the required minimum.

Even property rights are not absolute, according to Park (1970:218):

Neither state nor society can be the victim of the private greed of powerful interest groups ... Private ownership of production should be unconditionally encouraged except in instances where it is necessary to control it to stimulate national development and protect the interests of the people in general.

The principle of rejecting profit is directly related with the egalitarian nature of developmentalism. He wanted to limit the extreme profit-making by capitalists and at the same time see the rise of a middle class in Korea (1970:215-7):

> Our future policy should be to confiscate illegally acquired wealth and turn it back to the state treasury through a loophole-proof taxation system and utilize the increased revenue for education, social security, and other essential public services. To raise the mass of the people to middle class status in its modern terminology is the basic ideal of the democratic and cooperative society we are building.

The egalitarian nature of developmentalism can be understood out of a concern for mobilization. As Korea is a resource poor country, Park's military-campaign-like push for national development had to depend on human resources. And, the material inequality in the army should be kept at a minimum.

In this regard, it is informative to go back to the New Community Development Movement. Wignaraja (1996) reports how the movement had a "de-classing" element:

> Leaders from all parts of the country are brought in groups to participate in these programmes. Cabinet Ministers, senior government officials, university professors and other elites and technical experts also have to participate and exchange ideas with village leaders in a mutual learning process. Irrespective of status, all participants dress alike, eat the same food and sleep in the same dormitories during the training. This is part of de-classing and re-orienting the elite.

Burmeister (1990), who critically reported on the heavy-handed bureaucratic coercion to plant the new variety of rice, also acknowledges that Korea's green revolution lifted up rural income significantly.

For the economy as a whole, the average real wage increased at a rate of nearly 7% per annum during 1963-1975. During the same time period, average real wages in agriculture rose at about 5% a year (Rao, 1978: 386). Alarmed by the widening gap between average farm and non-farm incomes and the potential shrinkage of political support, the government began "new deal" for Korean farmers in 1968 with the first of a series of increases in government procurement prices for rice which within a few years took the domestic price well above world market levels.

Allied to the introduction and rapid spread of high yielding rice varieties after 1970, to growing subsidies for fertilizer and to a substantial shift of government investment to rural areas, this change in policy resulted in a very rapid increase in rice production and in real farm incomes (Moore, 1984: 59). Rao (1978: 388) points out that the resulting government deficits on grain and fertilizer were very large - about 2% of GNP in 1974 and 1975, excluding the amounts needed to finance the increase in stocks of grain and fertilizer.

The purpose of this chapter was to explain why the bureaucratic elite in Korea could have been " politically authoritarian" and "economically egalitarian" at the same time. By instilling his ideals in the minds of the high-ranking bureaucrats, President Park established Confucian developmentalism as the hegemonic ideology in Korea since the early 1960s. With Park as a father-ruler,

Confucianism was born again with more emphasis on loyalty toward the state. Familism, which is linked to the extensive state, gave the ideology an "authoritarian" tint.

Park also changed Korea's politically charged nationalism into developmentalism. Park put the national economy before private profit, making the bureaucrats in charge of "the guided capitalist system." As Korea is a resource poor country, Park's military-campaign-like push for national development had to depend on human resources. In order to make the mobilization successful, the material inequality in the country had to be kept at a minimum.

CHAPTER 5. IDEOLOGY AT WORK IN URBAN KOREA

This chapter describes how Confucian developmentalism planted its seed in the womb of Korean statecraft and gave birth to the baby called Confucian developmental urbanization. As the details of this hegemonic ideology have been already exposed in the previous chapter, this chapter will only focus on the way Confucian developmentalism has affected different aspects of urbanization in Korea.

In achieving relatively even urbanization between and within cities, Confucianism and developmentalism have proved the way they can interact: synergetically. The same, mutually reinforcing effect has also prevented demographic primacy in Korea even though it is common in other Third World countries. The "egalitarian" nature of developmentalism was translated into urban reality with the help of "hierarchical" Confucian bureaucrats.

However, when it comes down to the issue of power, Confucianism and developmentalism interact differently; one prevails over the other. The decentralization of power in the Korean urban system hasn't materialized. "Authoritarian" bureaucrats haven't responded to the developmentalist call for spatial decentralization of power.

Bureaucrats in Seoul ably implemented development projects across the country, taking the role of patriarchs. Confucian developmentalism worked to

the interest of bureaucrats in so far as the ideology was about achieving even urban development. Building roads and distributing tax resources beyond the Seoul metroline, ordering factories to move out of Seoul, building massive middle-class apartments in various cities, redistributing tax money to poor neighborhoods in the cities, have been to the interest of the bureaucrats.

Meritocratic bureaucrats, who are mostly from middle class backgrounds, rarely own much land or run factories in their home cities. Civil servants are also somewhat insulated from local political demands as they are outside the direct electoral process. The growth of the national economy as a whole enables and legitimates the expansion of a bureaucracy elevated above the rest of society.

However, when people who do not live in Seoul started to complain that super-concentration of decision-making in the capital city runs counter to the rhetoric of developmentalism, the bureaucrats in Seoul showed a lukewarm attitude toward rectifying this type of unbalanced urban development. High bureaucrats in Seoul and nearby suburbs know that they are the ones responsible for the concentration of power. Central government ministries and agencies wield great power as they have guided the private sector since the early 1960s.

It is in the interest of bureaucrats to stay in Seoul where they find their power embedded in the intertwined links among government complexes, corporate headquarters, research institutes, financial institutions, and prestigious universities. Most of the high civil servants were educated in prestigious universities in Seoul. They enjoy the information and transportation

infrastructure of Seoul which make their rule easier. Seoul provides nice places to meet with their junior partners, corporate managers. And, the embedded power can potentially serve the interest of bureaucrats beyond their own generation. Bureaucrats want to stay in the capital so that their children can follow their paths by attending one of Seoul's prestigious schools.

The successes and limits of Confucian developmentalism show the potentials and boundaries of a hegemonic ideology in abiding by and venturing beyond a given class interest. A hegemonic ideology achieves results when it is the interest of the class who holds the ideology. But when an ideology implies achieving something at the expense of the hegemonic class, however partial the loss may be, every step of the way is a struggle if not a charade.

It is truly difficult for a hegemonic class to give up its own interest for the general good of the public. However, as soon as the masses regard this failure to be a serious infringement on their own interest, hegemony is being challenged. Even though it is beyond the scope of this study, Korea's serious problem of regional antagonism partly stems from the arrogance of bureaucrats expressed in the language of space. The longer the Confucian elite hold on to the sweet taste of power embedded in their "Seoul connection," the more difficult it is for them to inspire the "national-popular" fervor which Gramsci said is essential in maintaining the integrity of the hegemonic ideology.

Dispersing Resources beyond Seoul

> In the mid-1960s, after deciding that a highway between Seoul and Pusan was needed to link the economies of the two cities, the Korean government asked the World Bank and other sources of development funds for assistance. The government was turned down for various reasons, including the belief that the project was not justifiable on a cost-benefit basis.
>
> Korea proceeded to build the road on its own. Lacking the funds to contract the project to qualified foreign construction companies, the project was undertaken entirely with domestic efforts. Most of the equipment used was re-engineered from that left behind by the U.S. military after the Korean War. Small, inexperienced Korean companies joined together to meet the challenge. The project was successfully completed in just twenty months – far less time than anyone had expected – and at virtually no cost in foreign exchange ... The Seoul-Pusan Highway has become the cornerstone of Korea's industrial corridor and has been a key determinant of how the economy has evolved since.
>
> - Interview with a former minister of finance by Reinfeld (1997:4)

The construction of the Seoul-Pusan highway, which linked the capital city and the port city in the Southeast, was carried out just like a military campaign. President Park took the lead, from the inception to the implementation of the project. When President Park visited West Germany in 1964, he showed keen interest in the autobahn system (Chosunilbo, 1999c):

> Park's motorcade drove 160 km (99 miles) along the autobahn and made two stops for him to look at the scenery and inspect the road surface and facilities. Park asked President Reubke's protocol chief many questions regarding the autobahn, such as how it was constructed, managed and how much it cost ... He explained in detail to Park using a map of the country and Park took notes.

Before the construction began in 1968, Park flew a helicopter up and down the zone for weeks with a sketchpad on his knees accompanied by the engineers in the Ministry of Construction (Keon, 1977:78). Once the construction started, Park visited construction sites sometimes with specialists such as geologists or hydrologists to figure out the pending problems (Keon, 1977:79). Park also personally assigned young officers from the Army Corps of Engineers as overseers and troubleshooters for each section of the construction operation (Keon, 1977:79).

The construction of the Seoul-Pusan highway is one example showing the defining elements of developmentalism: an emphasis on the nation as a whole rather than private profit. The project was a tool for stimulating national economic development as a whole rather than an investment for profit based on cost-benefit analysis. It was not just the World Bank and private international finance who thought that the project was far from being financially sensible. The legislators, including those of Park's own party, also believed that its construction and maintenance costs would bankrupt the country (Keon, 1977:78). It is not difficult to imagine why people were so skeptical. Even when the highway was completed in 1970, there was only one passenger car per 519 people (Economic Planning Board, 1988). The Gross National Product per capita in 1970 was US$ 252 (Economic Planning Board, 1988).

Park led this national project with a Confucian mindset. He took the role of a father who would never stop persuading "his son-like subjects." At the rally

held in Taegu to celebrate the completion of the highway, the President said, "We have come to possess a greater self-confidence in ourselves. If we step up this effort towards modernization, the day will not be far off when we attain self-sufficient economy." (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1970).

Sometimes his playing the father role looks authoritarian. The oath he requested from the military engineers before they were dispatched to the highway construction site indicates the kind of mind-set he demanded from the Korean people in general. The oath required complete dedication and submission to the cause (Keon, 1977:79):

> "I hereby swear I will do my best for the prosperity and welfare of my homeland and my fellow-countrymen by devoting body and mind to my assignment and that I will receive gratefully any punishment should I be found guilty of failure in this connection."

The Seoul-Pusan highway shows how the dynamic chemistry of Confucian developmentalism was put into practice. Developmentalism, aiming at spreading economic development beyond Seoul to cities across the country, was facilitated by top-down Confucian leadership of held by President Park and his bureaucrats. Many may question the degree of success but few will deny the impact the Seoul-Pusan highway had in boosting national economic competitiveness and spreading economic opportunities beyond Seoul.

The mechanisms that translated Confucian developmentalism into relatively even development among Korea's cities have been (1) national land planning, and (2) intergovernmental relations.

The Korean constitution establishes Confucian developmentalism as the ideology of national land planning in Korea. The constitution says that the establishment of national land planning is a responsibility of the state and that planning should aim for efficiency and balance (Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, 1984a:1):

> Article 117. The land resources shall be protected by the State, and the State shall establish a plan for their balanced development and utilization.
>
> Article 119. The State may impose restrictions or obligations necessary for the efficient utilization, development and preservation of farm, forest and other land in accordance with the law.

The "spatially egalitarian" aspect of developmentalism can be found in the stated objectives of Korea's national land development plans. The basic goals of the First National Land Development Plan (1972-1981) emphasize efficiency but also spatially extensive development (Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, 1984a:20):

(1) To enhance efficiency in national land use and management.

(2) To expand and consolidate the development base for the national economy.

(3) To maximize the utilization of endowed natural resources consistent with the need of their conservation and protection.

(4) To improve the living environment for the people.

The goals of the Second National Land Development Plan (1982-1991) also focus on expansive and balanced development (Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, 1982:5):

(1) Human settlements in local areas will aim at balanced growth by reion and national security.

(2) Development potential will be expanded throughout the country by construction of industrial infrastructure.

(3) People's well-being will be enhanced by way of systematic improvement of the living environment.

(4) The nation's endowed resources will be best utilized, and the natural environment conserved.

The goals of the third plan (1992-2001) have a similar emphasis (Ministry of Construction, 1992:22):

(1) Create a regionally decentralized pattern of development.

(2) Establish productive and resource saving national land utilization systems.

(3) Improve the living environment of the people and conserve the natural environment.

(4) Provide development bases for the unification of the country.

Also, the "hierarchical" aspect of Confucianism is unabashedly declared in the plans. The Second National Land Development Plan specifies that one of the basic characteristics of the plan is to "... play a leading role, as a higher plan on a national scale, to guide regional plans" (Korea Research Institute for

Human Settlements, 1982:1). The Comprehensive National Land Planning Act of 1963 specifies that national plans dictate the nature and boundary of regional planning (Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, 1984b).

The national plans were prepared by the Ministry of Construction (MOC). The Ministry of Construction (MOC) was established in 1962, one year after Park's coup, in order to push forward massive investments in infrastructure such as the Seoul-Pusan highway. Only after the Comprehensive National Land Planning Act was enacted in 1963 did the Ministry of Construction (MOC) take charge of national physical planning.

The task of implementing the plans, however, has been shared with other ministries under the coordination of the Economic Planning Board (EPB) and the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE). Different ministries took leadership in implementing the national plans depending on the nature of the projects. In 1993, six ministries were responsible for administrating policies concerning national physical development (Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, 1993). They were the Ministry of Construction (MOC), Ministry of Transportation (MOT)[21], Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Resources (MOCIR), Ministry of Agricultural, Forest and Fishery (MOAFF), Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), and Ministry of Environments (MOE). In the same year, the Ministry of Construction was in charge of building ports, highways, industrial bases, dams and housing sites. The Ministry of Transportation (MOT) oversaw

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[21] In 1994, the Ministry of Construction (MOC) and the Ministry of Transportation were merged to form the Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT)

the construction of airports. The Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Resources (MOCIR) had control over industrial sites. Until 1994, the Economic Planning Board headed by the deputy prime minister coordinated the implementation of national land development plan with the power to evaluate the performance and approve budgets for each project (Reinfeld, 1997). From 1994 to 1998, the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) took over the coordinating role of the Economic Planning Board (EPB) as EPB merged with The Ministry of Finance and renamed itself MOFE.

The national land plans implemented by the central ministries maintained high hopes for "balanced spatial development" even though each plan had a different approach to realizing the goal. The First Comprehensive National Land Development Plan (1972-1981), which coincided with the later period of the Park regime (1961-1980), put more emphasis on building small cities away from Seoul. This so-called "growth pole" approach was meant to diffuse development effects from strategically selected large-scale development. Large-scale industrial complexes were designated outside the major cities and transportation infrastructure was built linking the booming cities to other parts of the country. The Second Comprehensive National Land Development Plan (1982-1991) also aims at decentralized and balanced growth but with a different strategy: "concentrated decentralization." (Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, 1984a:5). Rather than promoting small growth poles, it emphasized the promotion of regional centers.

Two policy areas in the national land development plans seem to have most helped achieve relatively even urban development: (1) developing industrial estates beyond Seoul and the capital region, and (2) building a transportation system that benefits cities located away from Seoul and the capital region.

The developmental state since the 1960s has been a major creator of "locational advantages" for industrial estates. Park and Markusen (1995:90-91) describe the development process of one of Korea's New Industrial Districts (NID) in Kumi, located in the Southeastern region:

> In 1969, when its fate was sealed, Kumi was a small agricultural village where not much had changed economically for generations. To build the industrial complex, land was reclaimed from the Nakdong River and a 12 Km embankment was built to rechannel the river's flow. Factories and dormitories were rapidly erected, filling up the grid lines laid down on planner's maps.
>
> The leading agent for Kumi's construction was the Korea Electronics Industrial Corporation, reorganized in 1974 as the Kumi Export Industrial Corporation (KEIC) ... KEIC is an arm of the national government, belonging to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, with its own special trust fund to finance land clearance and development. Over the years, KEIC's operations have been increasingly funded out of the proceeds of its land and energy activities, but its development policy is still overseen by the national government.
>
> Government subsidies and incentives have played a major role in inducing companies, both South Korean and foreign (mainly Japanese), to site plants in Kumi. Land clearance, site preparation, infrastructure, and water and energy supplies are ample and come cheaply, and efficient transportation links to Seoul and southern seaports are assured. Not all the inducements are physical in nature. Tax breaks, worker education and training programs, and a modest level of business services have been provided. Although a plant is supposed to be 'clean' to qualify as a Kumi resident, the government has tolerated both water and air pollution, an advantage to firms who find restrictions tightening in Seoul.

> The principal input into the production process in Kumi is labor, the target labor force being young women from the 400 villages within 15 Km of Kumi. KEIC has actively helped to recruit the labor forces by combing the high schools in rural areas.

As described above, the city was designed and laid out by the state, which also constructed incentive packages and in many cases strong-armed businesses into relocating within the districts. Indigenous entrepreneurship was almost entirely absent during the formation of the districts. There was no pre-existing labor force; it was created through recruitment and internal migration.

Park and Markusen (1995:88) argue that the instruments available to the Korean state to achieve its locational policies were powerful, not unlike the "command" structure determining new industrial city building in the former Soviet Union and China. Each local authority estimated the approximate amount of land needed for industrial purposes and required the Ministry of Construction (MOC) to change land zonings (Woo-Jin Kim, 1997:144). Land needed for various purposes was coordinated within the framework of the ten-year national land use plans (Woo-Jin Kim, 1997).

In order to enforce industrial estate development, the government fixed land prices in the designated areas, exempted taxes for the factories moving from Seoul or Pusan, and provided loans to the firms to be established in the industrial estates (An-Jae Kim, 1978).

The construction of industrial estates was implemented at an impressive speed. Starting with the Kuro industrial estate in Seoul, which opened in 1967,

the size of industrial estates stood at 5.2 square miles in 1970 (13.4 square kilometers). It rose to 63.1 square miles (163.5 square kilometers) in 1980 and jumped again to 35,090 square miles (90,884 square kilometers) in 1997 (An-Jae Kim, 1978; Ministry of Home Affairs, 1980, 1997).

From the 1960s, the state developed progressively more estates beyond Seoul and the capital region (Kyonggi province) (See Figure 3). The land in Korea's total industrial estates located in Seoul was only 1.2 percent in 1980. It dropped to .02 percent in 1997 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 1980, 1997). In terms of the number of employees in industrial estates, Seoul's proportion was only 17.7 percent in 1980. It fell to 5.6 percent in 1997 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 1980, 1997).

The pattern is similar at the regional scale as well, even though it is less impressive. In terms of industrial estate land size, the capital region took a significant but less than dominant proportion in 1980: 17.7 percent. It was cut to 5.6 percent in 1997 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 1980, 1997). In terms of the number of the employees in industrial estates, the capital region held 40.6 percent in 1980. It dropped to 38.2 percent in 1997 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 1980, 1997).

Transportation infrastructure was developed to connect the industrial estates to other parts of the country. As shown in the case of the Seoul-Pusan highway, almost all investment in Korea has been achieved by the initiatives of the state rather than the private sector. In spite of this strong-handed approach, investment on transportation has been an important equalizer in urban Korea.

The developmental state in Korea since the 1960s undertook substantial investments, often in the range of 6 to 8 percent of gross national product (GNP) per year, but almost never below 4 percent of GNP per year (Reinfeld, 1997). The length of highway rose to 1,025 miles (1,650 kilometers) in 1994 from zero in the mid 1960s. The annual cargo capacity of ports jumped from 15 million tons in 1966 to 276 million tons in 1994 (Korea Maritime and Port Administration, 1979; Economic Planning Board, 1995).

Seoul and the capital region have not dominated Korea's transportation infrastructure. The Incheon port, which is the only major port in the capital region, had only 13.4 percent of the total annual capacity of cargo holding in 1978. In 1994, the proportion remained about the same at 14 percent.

Seoul and capital region have not had a disproportionate share of the highway system either. In 1974, Seoul and the capital region together counted for 15.8 percent (Economic Planning Board, 1975). It remained almost the same in 1994 with 16.8 percent (Economic Planning Board, 1995).

Having discussed all the positive aspects of the development of industrial estates and construction of highways mainly undertaken under national land plans, I have to point out that many Koreans are not much impressed with what national planning has done to urban Korea. Especially, most residents in the Southwestern region (Chonnam and Chonbuk) have expressed outrage over the lagging development of cities in their provinces (See Figure 3).

It is true that the state-led investments were not evenly distributed across urban Korea. For example, the biggest new industrializing cities, such as Ulsan,

Pohang, and Kumi are located in the Southeastern region (Kyongbuk and Kyongnam) (See Figure 3 and 4). It seems like there are two major reasons why: political considerations and the legacy of past urban development. From 1961 to 1998, Korea's three successive presidents were from the Southeastern region. It is well-known that Kumi (See Figure 4) was chosen to be developed mainly because it is the hometown of President Park (Park & Markusen, 1995). The underdevelopment of the Southwestern region has been attributed to its political rebelliousness toward Park and subsequent presidents. Dae-Jung Kim, who became president in 1998 was a political dissident during the reign of President Chung-hee Park (1962-1979) and President Doo-hwan Chun (1980-1988).

Even before the alleged political considerations started in the 1960s, cities in the Southwestern region were not well connected with other cities in Korea. The existing railway transportation network connecting Korea to Manchuria during the Japanese colonialism connects the Southeastern region to Seoul. The Southwestern region had other natural disadvantages such as a shallow seashore, which makes it difficult to build ports and industrial estates around the ports.

However, I agree with Huzinec that the effort of the Korean state to disperse industrial facilities should not be overly criticized. Huzinec (1978) reported that even in the Soviet Union, the promotion of small industrial cities was difficult because of the merits of large cities as urbanization economies, economies of scale, and established social overhead capital (SOC).

Besides, I think that the regional discrimination did not take place at least in spending public money, developing industrial estates and building infrastructure. In 1994, the Southwestern region (including Kwangju city) had a population of only 5.5 million. For the same year, the Southeastern region (including Taegu city and Pusan city) had 13 million people. Considering that, the 317 km of highway that the Southwestern region had in 1994 doesn't look that bad compared to the 578 km in the Southeastern region. For the same year, the ratio in cargo handling falls short of the population ratios as well: 59 million ton for the Southwest versus 119 million ton for the Southeast (Economic Planning Board, 1995). During the period from 1978 to 1989, the percentage of industrial land supply in the Southwestern region was 25.6 percent of the total whereas the Southeastern region took 41.8 percent. As emphasized earlier, per capita income level between different cities does not show that much disparity in Korea. It is true that there are more Seoutheast industrial cities with income levels are higher than those of cities in the Southwest. However, not every city in the Southeast is flourishing. For example, the gross regional product (GRP) per capita of Kwangju, the regional center of the Southwestern region, was US$6,286 (5.073 million won) in 1993. The figure was higher than those of the major regional cities in the Southeastern region for the same year: Taegu with US$5,758 (4.647 million won) and Pusan with US$6,133 (4.950 million won) (National Statistics Office, 1995).

Now, I turn my attention to the other mechanism that implemented synergic Confucian developmentalism in Korean urban development: the

intergovernmental system. In chapter 1, I pointed out that Confucianism legitimates rule by educated bureaucrats as education is considered to be a process of self-cultivation.

Confucianism in intergovernmental relationship can be understood as the rule of the "highly-cultivated" over the "moderately-cultivated" within the bureaucracy. Confucianism is held by high bureaucrats in central ministries who believe that the Confucian notion of "good scholars make good rulers" should be applied to themselves not local bureaucrats. In Korea, there are different levels of civil service examinations and those who pass the higher level exam usually start their career at one of the ministries in Seoul. On the other hand, most local bureaucrats have passed lower level exams.

The high-ranking bureaucrats think that they are carrying forward a "benefiting-all" developmentalist mission. A researcher in the Korea Development Institute (KDI), a think-tank under the Economic Planning Board (EPB), represents the high bureaucrat's attitude about intergovernmental relations based on Confucian developmentalism (Wan-Soon Kim, 1974:21):

> Provision of financial aid to, and assertion of control over major expenditure programs by the central government is not to be condemned in general. It would be inefficient and uneconomical to have these functions carried out by a host of local governments without some degree of national control or nationally established basis for cooperation in the performance of such functions as roads, rivers, health, and education of which the benefits extend beyond the boundaries of a single province. In particular, Korea, setting out on a course of rapid industrialization, could entrust only limited functions to local governments which lack personnel of sufficient ability and knowledge to assist in the implementation of developmental expenditures.

The central bureaucracy in Seoul has managed to retain tight control over the provinces through institutional, technocratic, and financial coordination (Woo-Cumings, 1995:455). The centralization of the state power started with the suspension of the autonomous government system in 1961 by General Park (Myung-Rae Cho, 1991:163). Until recently, provincial governors as well as other important local bureaucrats down to the county level were appointed from Seoul and were rotated rapidly by the center (Woo-Cumings, 1995:455). For example, mayors of the major cities have been elected only since 1995. Financially, not much local revenue came from local taxes, and revenue shortfalls have been covered by transfers from the central government (Wan-Soon Kim, 1974:9). Local governments have effectively served as the central government's field offices to execute the centrally determined plans (Kim and Mills, 1988:164).

Within the central government, the supervisory organ for the entire local government machinery has been the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA). Until the mid-1960s, the Ministry controlled not only the personnel of the local governments but also their budgets, accounting and auditing, tax collection, local borrowing, and the disbursements of shared revenues (Wan-Soon Kim, 1974:7).

The control of the central government over the local governments is not limited to the areas under the influence of the Ministry of the Home Affairs

(MOHA). It is broader and more extensive because a great number of serial laws enable the various ministries to deal with their special functions, issuing directives and instructions to the provincial governors (Wan-Soon Kim, 1974:8). For example, the Ministry of Education assumes and supervises local educational financing (Wan-Soon Kim, 1974:7).

However, this hierarchical intergovernmental system also championed "egalitarian" developmentalism. The central government, which was responsible for 89 percent of all tax revenues in 1983, took more in proportion to Gross Regional Product (GRP) from high-income regions, resulting in a more equal distribution of disposable income. In 1983, individuals and corporations in Seoul paid 13 percent of their GRP for national taxes, Pusan paid 5.1 percent, and low income provinces each paid around 2-3 percent (Mera, 1988).

The central government redistributed money in the form of block grants and subsidies. These transfers were directed mainly to low-income provinces (Mera, 1988:225). In 1983, the percentage share of transfers to Seoul was only 2.8 percent. In contrast, other provinces (excluding cities such as Pusan, Daegu, and Incheon) had an average of 40.2 percent of their revenue from central government transfers (Mera, 1988:224). Two provinces in the politically oppressed Southwestern region had a larger proportion of the transfer in their total revenue: 47.7 percent and 46.5 percent.

Dispersing Populations beyond Seoul

The national land planning and intergovernmental system described in the previous section were also the mechanisms bureaucrats used to disperse population beyond Seoul. The job opportunities and provision of modest urban services in the booming cities outside Seoul have functioned as alternative destinations for migrants.

In this section, I will cover policies that specifically aimed to check the population explosion in Seoul or disperse population away from Seoul. As will be shown, these policies express the mutually-reinforcing nature of Confucian developmentalism. The policies used by bureaucrats to keep the number of Seoulites in check have been (1) designation of green belts around Seoul, (2) compulsory relocation of factories from Seoul, (3) expansion of educational opportunities outside of Seoul, and (4) decentralization of secondary government agencies.

As a physical barrier to urban sprawl, the first greenbelt of 55.4 square miles (143.4 square kilometers) was established around Seoul in 1971 (Soo Young Park, 1998:254). The greenbelt policy has been firmly and consistently administered. Landowners in the greenbelt are prohibited by law from constructing new buildings and changing existing land uses for purposes other than agriculture (Won-Yong Kwon, 1988:126).

The greenbelt policy has been always controversial because of its infringement on individual property rights. In the name of the public good, the

designation and enforcement of greenbelt areas denies the property rights of land owners by restricting land development and by not giving proper compensation in return. Won-Yong Kwon (1988:27) reports that residents in the greenbelt are disadvantaged by the relative decline in their property value.

Compulsory relocation of factories from Seoul emphasizes benefits to the public even at the expense of individual rights. The Industrial Distribution Law enacted in 1977 empowered the Minister of Trade and Industry (MOTI) to order firms to relocate away from congested zones (Soo Young Park, 1998:255). The government issued relocation orders to all types of factories in Seoul except those producing items of daily urban consumption such as printing and food (Won-Yong Kwon, 1998:124).

In terms of educational infrastructure, there have been government-dictated efforts to equalize the learning opportunities between Seoulites and non-Seoulites in order to restrict people's movement into Seoul. The concentration of educational opportunities in Seoul has been kept under control since the early 1970s. In 1970, an equalization program was introduced into school districts involving the abolition of the high school entrance examination (Song, 1980:87). It was intended to make several first-class Seoul high schools the equal with many others outside Seoul. In the same year, the transfer of middle and high school students into Seoul, except to join their families, was restricted (Song, 1980:87).

Enrollments in colleges in Seoul were strictly rationed from 1973 (Soo Young Park, 1998:254). Under the quota system, the number of students

attending colleges outside of Seoul has mushroomed. In 1972, Seoul had three times more college students on a per capita basis than the national average. In 1991, the proportion of college students in Seoul became almost the same as the national average (Jong Chul Kim, 1993:35).

According to the Confucian principle of "moral" governing, the "father-like" bureaucrats have been "forced" to set an example for the national task of population decentralization. In 1977, the Minister without Portfolio, who was assigned by the President to deal with the population redistribution problem, announced a package of programs to relocate secondary government offices and state-run corporations outside Seoul (Won-Yong Kwon, 1988:128). In 1983, four central government offices including the Ministry of Construction (MOC) reluctantly moved into a new administrative town (Kwocheon) just south of the administrative boundary of Seoul. Later on, many other ministry offices including the Economic Planning Board (EPB) moved there (Won-Yong Kwon, 1988:128).

In 1998, a third government complex was established near Taejon (See Figure 3), located 99 miles (160 km) south of Seoul, hosting 11 secondary government offices including the Office of Supply, the Small and Medium Business Administration, the Korean Industrial Property Office, the Office of Customs Administration and the Korean National Railroad. About 13,000 civil servants and families are expected to move to Taejon (Koreaherald, 1998b).

Building Middle Class Cities

> At the time in Italy and France similar blocks were under construction using funds from the Marshall aid program, and so I decided that we needed these skyscrapers rather than condominium style as there was not much land free ... In Seoul, several apartment blocks already existed, but these were lived in by poorer families ... I decided to change the impression of apartment blocks by inviting middle class families. I explained this to the Supreme Council including Kim Jong-pil (one of the military officers who joined Park's coup in 1961) and they all agreed. I asked USOM (United States Operations Mission) for the money necessary for construction, but the head of the housing section opposed this, saying how could a country with a per capita income of US$80 use some of the money to import elevators. As a result, I had to use government funds and make the apartments six stories instead of ten as we could not get elevators. We opted for a central heating system, but the public thought this was a luxury and so we resorted to briquette boilers in each apartment. There was also criticism on the toilet systems, but on this I stood firm, though we had to import them from Japan as there was no domestic manufacturer. I invited architects to design the buildings and as they had not seen overseas buildings they came up with uniquely Korean designs. The small apartments were to be rented out as I wanted as many people as possible to experience living in them (Chosunilbo, 1999d).

The first batch of six buildings was completed with 450 apartments on December 1, 1961. The above recollection was by Dong-Won Chang, the commander of the engineering battalion of the 2nd army command headquarters, who was later appointed president of Daehan Housing Corporation, right after the coup.

In 1962, he had a chance to take a look at the middle-class apartments in the Western standard (Chosunilbo, 1999e):

> I visited Rome and learned that my taxi-driver lived in an apartment. Wanting to see what it was like, I visited his home and found the interior was much better than the outside. I firmly believed in the apartment block ...

In 1968, he was made head of the Korea Housing Corporation and oversaw the building of massive apartments South of the Han River in Seoul (Chosunilbo, 1999d).

By 1977, more decent middle-class apartment complexes became visible in Seoul (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1977):

> Along the banks of the frozen Han River, south of central Seoul, stand new apartment complexes for miles on end. More such complexes are being built, steadily expanding on the still relatively open southern side of the river. These buildings are perhaps the most tangible expression of South Korea's rapid modernization and the emergence of the country's middle class. Inside one block, in one of the more spacious flats overlooking the river and the riverside highway, lives Whang Young Juhn, a manager with South Korea's biggest trading company, Samsung, with his wife and three children. Their 1,400 sq. Feet (132 sq meters) apartment has three bedrooms ...

Just as it emphasized national scale, developmentalism in Korea emphasized huge structures, the symbols of modernization. Confucianism was also important as the modernization projects depended upon state leadership. The speech of Chung Hee Park made at the new residential block in 1961 was a mixture of the Confucian rhetoric of "benevolent and responsible governance" and the developmentalist mentality of "all-out, enthusiastic self-mobilization of people for the goal of modernization" (Chosunilbo, 1999d):

> "Whenever I sat at the table to eat dinner, the lights would go out. If I lit a candle then the lights would come on and when I blew out the candle, the lights would go out. Now though I can have light all night long. We did not develop a new power source or increase capacity, so how is this possible? It is because our officials are not corrupt. First of all, all the governments must be efficient and honest. Secondly, people should have confidence in the government and support it. When the government and the people are united then there is a miracle. We have to create a miracle for the country in this generation."

It is not difficult to understand why the interaction between Confucianism and developmentalism has been middle-class oriented and thus somewhat egalitarian. For example, the building of high-rise apartments of decent size was in the absolute interest of bureaucrats. First of all, bureaucrats are going to need one of those units for their own families. Second, it is in line with national development using the middle class not only as the producers but also consumers of the ever-booming national economy. Third, building middle class cities across the country seems like a reasonable way to secure political support for bureaucratic rule.

Relatively even urban development within Seoul can be attributed to (1) extensive revenue sharing among wards, (2) state-managed supply of middle-class housing, and (3) extensive investment on public transportation.

The fiscal policy of Seoul city is quite similar to Korea's national policy. City hall redistributes tax resources in a "hierarchical" manner. Just as Seoul city's autonomy is short-changed due to the city's financial dependence on the

national government, wards in Seoul have to give up their own decision-making power as they are financially dependent on the Seoul city government.

However, just as poor cities and regions receive subsidies from the national government, less-well-off wards in Seoul receive subsidies from the city hall. Extensive revenue sharing among wards helped to guarantee a minimum level of social service in each neighborhood.

Ward revenues consist of local tax, non-tax income, designated financial sources, control grants, and subsidies. Local tax and non-tax sources are tied to the income level of each ward. Local tax items include tax on real estate and automobiles as well as on acquisition, registration and so forth. Non-tax income consists of property rents, fees, and miscellaneous items (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 1997).

The combined amount of local taxes on real estate and automobiles for the top two wards (Socho-gu and Kangnam-gu) in 1995 was 4.5 times larger than the sum of these taxes for the bottom two wards (Kangbuk and Keumchun[22]). The differences are mostly a function of wealth considering that the ratio of the population between the above two pairs of wards is just 1.4:1 for the same year (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 1997). Designated financial sources are usually insignificant in amount and do not correlate much with the wealth of each ward as it mainly consists of proceeds from disposal of properties and miscellaneous charges (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 1997).

[22] In Figure 5, it is spelled as "Kumchon-gu."

Control grants and subsidies are tools for revenue sharing with the poorer wards in Seoul. Control grants are designed to finance specific priority projects of the Seoul metropolitan government, and subsidies are matching-up money for wards in which local tax and non-tax income falls short of spending needs. During the period 1991 to 1995, the combination of local tax and non-tax income was about 60 percent of the total revenue whereas the transfers consisted of about 40 percent (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 1999: 485).

Table 9 shows that the total revenue of wards in Seoul in 1995 was 2,255 billion won (US$ 2.9 billion). This revenue was being divided into local tax (744), non-tax (665), designated financial sources (58), control grants (709), and subsidies (79). The share going to revenue transfers, which is the combined sum of control grants and subsidies, amounted to 34.9 percent of the total revenue.

The wards with the highest percentage of self generated financial support in 1997 (Chung, Socho, and Kangnam) did not receive any transfers from Seoul metropolitan government in 1998. These three wards were nearly self-sufficient: Chung-gu (96.4 percent), Socho-gu (94.2 percent), and Kangnam-gu (96.8 percent). By contrast, those wards with a lower percentage of financial self-support (Table 10) received the lion's share of transfers. Chungrang-gu, Kangbuk-gu, Tobong-gu, Uunpyong-gu, Tongjak-gu, and Kwanak-gu received subsidies and controlled grants which amounted to half or more of their budgets in 1998.

Table 9. Settled Revenues of General Account by *Gu* (ward) in 1995 (In Billion Won)

Total Revenue (A)	Local Tax	Non-tax Revenues	Designate Financial Sources	Control Grants (B)	Subsidies (C)	Percentage Share of Transfer (B+C)/A
2,255	744	665	58	709	79	34.9

Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government. 1997. *Seoul Statistical Yearbook.* Seoul, Korea.

Table 10. Public Financial Conditions by Ward in Seoul

Ward	Self-Support of Financial in 1997 (Percentage)	Transfers in 1998 (Sum of Control Grants and Subsidies) (In Billion won)	Transfers out of Total Budget in 1998 (Percentage)
Kangnam	96.8	-	-
Chung	96.4	-	-
Socho	94.2	-	-
Songpa	84.7	15	5.7
Yongdungpo	77.0	17	12.3
Chongno	65.5	27	17.5
Kangso	52.3	49	34.9
Yongsan	51.6	44	34.8
Yangchon	51.3	49	41.9
Kuro	51.3	47	39.8
Kwangjin	49.3	45	39.5
Kangdong	48.2	49	30.4
Mapo	48.2	55	36.2
Songbuk	43.6	59	38.4
Songdong	43.2	55	44.0
Nowon	42.3	64	40.6
Tongdaemun	41.4	62	41.5
Keumchun (Kumchon)	41.4	44	48.6
Sodaemun	40.4	57	45.0
Kwanak	39.3	65	48.9
Uunpyong	38.2	61	47.8
Chungrang	36.4	59	48.9
Tongjak	35.4	55	46.0
Kangbuk	34.8	56	54.4
Tobong	34.3	52	55.5

Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government. 1999. *Whitepaper on Seoul Metropolitan Governance*. Seoul, Korea.

The redistributing effect of these transfers (controlled grants and subsidies) is evident in Table 11. The tax burden per capita shows more discrepancies among wards than budget per capita. A resident in Chung-gu, the highest taxed ward, pays about 7.1 times more than the average Seoulite. A Nowon-gu resident, who pays the least amount of local tax, pays just about 40 percent of the average. Budget per capita centers around the average. A Chung-gu resident, who is contributing the largest chunk of the budget, receives about 3.3 times more than the average Seoulite. A Nowon-gu resident, who pays the least amount of tax, still enjoys about 79 percent of the average per capita budget in Seoul.

Another mechanism that implements Confucian developmentalism in Korean cities is the central provision of housing. Contrary to previous research that either emphasizes the Korean government's weak involvement in housing (Manjae Kim, 1992) or criticizes state intervention in the market for being inefficient and favoring only the upper and middle class (Deukho Cho, 1993), Woo-Jin Kim (1993) argues that state intervention was extensive, efficient, and middle-class oriented.

Table 11. Budget Per Capita and Local Tax Burden Per Capita by Wards in Seoul, 1998 (In Thousand Won)

Wards	Bedget Per Capita	Local Tax Burden Per Capita
Chung	980	581
Chongno	652	244
Kangnam	418	261
Socho	310	187
Yongdungpo	271	136
Yongsan	464	117
Mapo	352	66
Kangso	235	64
Songpa	220	92
Keumchun (Kumchon)	319	59
Kuro	288	57
Tongdaemun	345	57
Songdong	335	57
Kwangjin	253	55
Sodaemun	329	51
Kangdong	217	51
Songbuk	301	46
Tongjak	254	44
Yangchon	231	43
Uunpyong	237	36
Kangbuk	257	36
Chungrang	229	35
Kwanak	225	35
Tobong	231	34
Nowon	231	33
Average	293	82

Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government. 1999. *Whitepaper on Seoul Metropolitan Governance.* Seoul, Korea.

A fair judgement on Korean housing industry requires some historical background. Woo-Jin Kim (1997) describes the miserable housing conditions up until the 1950s:

> After independence from Japan and the subsequent partition in 1945, a large number of repatriated Koreans, from Japan and elsewhere, and refugees from North Korea entered the country. The symptom of this influx was the emergence of *Sangjajip*, a kind of poor housing, made of cardboard and other flimsy materials. It was common for between two and ten households to be sharing a house. To make matters worse, the Korean War (1950-53) destroyed or made uninhabitable about 600,000 housing units, equivalent to 18 percent of the housing stock, and a further million were estimated to be damaged to a lesser extent. More refugees from the North added to the serious housing problems. According to a North Korean source, the total reduction in the northern population between 1949 to 1953 was 1.13 million ... Every night, stations were full of homeless people. Moreover, unexpected typhoons and floods swept away about 30,000 housing units per year during the second half of the 1950s. Refugee camps or temporary shelters were built with the aid of UNKRA, AID and so on, to accommodate the refugees and the roofless. Housing standards and environments were not a concern ... Wooden boards and bricks were laid in a hurry on any open space to shelter people from the severe climate.

Since the early 1960s, the industrialization drive pulled up the demand for decent housing. The percentage of Koreans living in urban areas increased from 28.0 percent in 1960 to 70.8 percent in 1990. Seoul's population grew from 2.4 million to 10.5 million in the same period (Deukho Cho, 1993:35). Nuclear families were becoming the norm, further increasing the need for more houses.

The growing housing shortage led the government to intervene in the housing market through a drastic amendment of the Housing Construction

Acceleration Act in 1977 (Woo-Jin Kim, 1997:111-2). Price control was launched. The Housing-Related Saving Scheme entitled savings account holders preferential purchase rights to new apartment units at half to one-third of the open market price, and rights to housing mortgages when they purchased a house of 915 square feet (85 square meter) or less in size (Woo-Jin Kim, 1997:113). The scheme effectively drew savings from households into housing funds at low interest rates, supplied cheap loans to designated housing suppliers, and allocated houses at controlled prices to the savings account holders (Woo-Jin Kim, 1997:113). In 1990, 34.5 percent of urban households and around 200,000 units were part of this scheme (Woo-Jin Kim, 1997:179).

I believe this housing scheme expresses the synergetic interaction between Confucianism and developmentalism. This monopoly over the new apartment supply was used as a rather "intrusive" social control promoting developmentalist goals such as family planning, earning foreign currency, hard-working, and saving. Woo-Jin Kim (1997:114, 120):

> Those at the top of the waiting list, according to the amount and period of their savings with low interest, are rewarded for their fortitude by being able to buy a decent home at cheaper prices than the market price ... it gave people a discipline of hard work and high savings ... housing policy has been often used as an instrument by which wider social aims can be achieved. For example, priority in the allocation of new housing was given to those who practiced contraception when the government launched a strong family planning campaign; and, when the Middle East construction boom started, priority was given to those who worked overseas.

"Relatively egalitarian" developmentalism was also put into practice through (1) restrictions on land development gains, and (2) price control and size quotas. Quasi-governmental bodies such as Korea Land Development Corporation (KLDC) or public entities such as Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) under the Ministry of Construction, developed land, and the sale price of land developed by the institutions was tied into housing price controls (Woo-Jin Kim, 1997:144). Large size housing buyers subsidized small size buyers as homebuilders were required to build a portion of the small units at a low price (Woo-Jin Kim, 1997:147-8).

It is only "relatively" egalitarian as the scheme did not benefit lower class residents much. The scheme depends on the continual inflation of housing prices to some degree making it ever more difficult for those who don't have the saving accounts to enter the program (Woo-Jin Kim, 1997). Many middle and upper class people exploited the scheme by applying many times for the windfall gain through dividing up dwellings among household members and other illegal means (Deukho Cho, 1993).

Investment on transportation represents Korea's commitment to the middle class. Seoul is a good case as bureaucrats had to decide whether to spend tax money on the subway system or on roads. They chose the subway system and this means that the bureaucratic decision-making process may have been "top-down" but mainly served the interest of "those without their own means of transportation."

Beginning its first phase of operation in 1974, with the installation of Line 1, the subway system has developed into the city's main traffic system. In 1999, there were 4 subway lines that stretch 83 miles (133 kilometers) with 114 stations. The subway system transports about 29.8 percent of the total daily traffic. In order to reduce traffic congestion, the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) has expanded the system. The second wave of subway construction, currently underway, will add a total of 90 miles (145 km) to Lines 5, 6, 7, and 8. Upon completion of the second phase of subway construction, the subway will carry about 40 percent of the traffic (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 1998).

Seoul city has put its priority on the subway system rather than intercity-highways. In 1998, the total budget of the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) was 9,808 billion won (US$ 8.2 billion). For Roads and Transportation, 2,770 billion won (US$ 2.3 billion) was put aside. About 61 percent of the money for Roads and Transportation, 1,695 billion won (US$ 1.4 billion), was used for the construction of the subway (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 1998).

Holding on to the Power Embedded in Seoul

> As the head of the ministry in charge of the general affairs of government officials, Jung-Kil Kim explains that ... "The public service might appear to be just another hierarchy with a top-down structure, but it is a very rigid organization with enormously self-protective nature" (Korea Herald, 1998c).

> Plans to open a new government site outside of Seoul (and its near suburb) can be traced back to 1985, during Doo-hwan Chun's presidency. But they were foiled by most government offices' insistence on remaining in the capital. The ground for the present site wasn't broken till 1993 ... "But if Taejon ends up as the host of 10 auxiliary administrations, while other agencies of greater importance remain in Seoul, people will wonder what the fuss about a new administrative capital was about, after all," one government critic said, questioning the impact of dispersing the government's administrators (Korea Herald, 1998b).

Like in ancient China, the urban hierarchy during the Chosun Dynasty represented the bureaucratic order: national capital, provincial cities, and local cities. Even though manufacturing and commercial activities were most active in Seoul, this city was mostly known for its bureaucratic power. Bureaucrats actually ran the country, consulting about state affairs with the king. Seoul has been the hub of the central government since 1392.

The power of Seoul made the scholar class living there more powerful as the city functioned as a place for educating and placing bureaucrats. Yong-mo Kim (1976:83-4) reports that 52.8 percent of those who passed the main civil service examination were Seoul residents, the rest coming from provinces.

Provincial residents suffered not only the inconveniences in transportation and communications, but also institutional disadvantages.

Higher educational institutes were monopolized by Seoul. All four accredited schools and the National Academy were located in Seoul (Yong-mo Kim, 1976:76-77). Those who graduated from one of the four accredited schools were exempted from taking the competitive preliminary exam and applicants for the main exam were required to have taken 300 credits at the National Academy (Yong-mo Kim, 1976:76-77). In addition, there was the practice of providing the descendants of ministers with the privilege of applying for the main exam without passing through the preliminary exam (Yong-mo Kim, 1976:83).

To Confucian scholars, cities meant places for governance rather than money-making. And this Confucian notion seems to have helped maintain bureaucratic hierarchy in the urban system. Artisans and merchants were regarded with contempt as profit seemed to be their sole motivation (Won-Son Pak, 1986). Manufacturing and commerce were limited due to the prevalence of family economy and regulation by the state. A significant proportion of the artisans and merchants were producing or supplying specifically for the bureaucracy (Won-Son Pak, 1986). Many merchants were subsidized, often with monopoly licenses, to provide items to the king and upper class (Palais, 1996:1006). Skilled artisans were often employed by the state, in producing items such as brocades, silks, and fine pottery (Palais, 1996:1006).

Japanese colonial rule from 1910 to 1945 did not change the status of Seoul as a bureaucratic center. The imposed modernization did not mean the

dominance of a new bourgeoisie in urban Korea. The colonizers, themselves, had never experienced a bourgeois revolution. The strong, highly centralized colonial state mimicked the role that the Japanese state had come to play in Japan – intervening in the economy, creating markets, spawning new industries, suppressing dissent (Cumings, 1997:148).

Cumings (1997:148) reports how the colonial government turned Seoul into the nerve center of the country:

> The huge Oriental Development Company owned and funded industrial and agricultural projects and came to own more than 20 percent of Korea's arable land ... it employed an army of officials who fanned out through the countryside to supervise agricultural production. The colonial Bank of Korea performed central-banking functions ... Bureaucratic departments proliferated at the government-general headquarters in Seoul.

However, the educational importance of Seoul was scaled down as the country was being run by expatriate Japanese bureaucrats. Naturally, higher education was not promoted. Even with the assimilation-oriented education policy during the later days of colonialism, there was no government university in Korea until the Keijo (Seoul) Imperial University was officially organized in 1923 (Eugene Kim, 1973: 140). Even in this university, strict quotas were applied to Korean applicants limiting the percentage of Korean students to under 40 percent (Dong, 1973).

Power concentration in Seoul since the 1960s shows similarity to the past in the sense that it is the bureaucrats who represent the city. The supremacy of

bureaucrats over business was obvious as the Park regime followed the Japanese model of state-led development. State interventions in the banking sector sometimes substituted for risk assessment by bankers or investment consultants. Foreign loans used to be channeled through the state. Bureaucrats could literally make or break the companies:

> Shortly after seizing power in 1980 ... the government announced a new plan to reorganize the heavy and chemical industries along lines that would eliminate competition among rival domestic producers and created specialized monopolies for supposedly more efficient export production. In accordance with this new plan, Hyundai and Daewoo, the main competitors in the automobile and power-generation equipment industries, were to cease competition and effect an exchange of properties that would make each firm a virtual monopoly producer in one of those two areas. Chung Ju Yung of Hyundai and Kim Woo Chung (Kim Ujiung) of Daewoo were summoned to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and ordered to work out such an arrangement within a week. Both Chung and Kim reluctantly agreed to go along with the new state policy, and a deal was struck wherein Hyundai would takeover the automobile industry and leave the production of power plants to Daewoo (Eckert: 105-6).

The hierarchical structure of the bureaucracy centered in the capital city. The centralization of state power was secured when the military junta suspended the local autonomous government system in 1961. Local authorities were downgraded into de facto field offices to carry out the assignments ordered by the central state. Local elections at all levels, including mayors of the big cities, began to be held in Korea only from 1995. However, the scope of decisions by local government is still limited because of limited taxing power and legal rights.

The educational importance of Seoul heightened again. Seoul boasts the best universities in Korea along with the best of the best: Seoul National University (SNU). Just like Tokyo University in Japan, Seoul National University is specifically designed to educate the top bureaucrats. The dominance of SNU graduates is evident and is still deepening.

The dominance of SNU graduates in top bureaucratic elite recruitment began in earnest during the Park regime. For example, during Park's civilian rule (1964-1972), SNU graduates comprised 33.9% of the top bureaucratic elites and during his *Yushin* rule they reached 50.8% (Chul, 1994). Even in civilian president Young Sam Kim's first cabinet in 1993, SNU graduates constituted 65% of bureaucratic elites. The remaining bureaucratic fractions come from a few prestigious private universities in Seoul such as Yeonsei University and Korea University.

The amount of magnetism SNU and other prestigious universities add to Seoul is enormous because they build a network of people based in Seoul. The dominance of these schools over others is not solely based on their academic excellence. Talented high school graduates from "local" schools want to go to good universities in Seoul, fully acknowledging that they will benefit not because of the high quality education but because of the advantage of connections. The chance of making it in the system depends on which school one graduated from. Woo-Cumings (1995) mentions that school connections among bureaucrats are so important as to be one of the means to resolve inter-agency conflict.

The description of Confucian school networks by Jong S. Jun and Hiromi Muto (1995:126) might apply to the Korean case just as well:

> When a former bureau chief who served in the Economic Planning Agency was asked to describe his relationship with his immediate boss, he first stressed that he had been fortunate to have his *senpai* (senior) as a supervisor. His *senpai* (senior), like himself, graduated from law school at the University of Tokyo and shared his alma mater. Because of this connection, he was able to establish a highly paternalistic and trusting relationship. The personal relationship with another individual with the same educational .. connections not only influenced his intra-agency activity but also his inter-agency and inter-ministerial relationships when he sought advice, political support, or information.

The congregation of corporate headquarters in Seoul should be attributed to this existence of high officials in and around the capital city. This phenomena is quite similar to the case in Tokyo. Hill and Fujita (1995) report that the very existence of a strong state apparatus in Tokyo leads to the concentration of functions in the Tokyo region. State-led industrialization required businessmen to have smooth contact with Tokyo bureaus. The advantage of proximity leads influential groups - bureaucrats, politicians, executives in regulated and protected industries, third sector mediating associations and consultants – to conspire to continue Tokyo's functional primacy.

Similar to the experience of Tokyo, industrial capitalists flocked to Seoul in order to establish smooth contact with bureaucrats. Since the coup in 1961 and the emergence of the developmental state, Seoul came to have renewed significance. The central government selected strategic industries, developed

industrial estates, and exercised administrative and financial assistance extensively to support those industries. With the great influence of the central government, the domestic and international business transactions were consummated in Seoul where face-to-face contact with bureaucrats was possible (Hong & Kim, 1996).

CONCLUSION

This study has documented a new pattern of urban development associated with the developmental state. Power concentration in the Korean urban system is extreme. Most decision-making takes place in Seoul. However, the urban population is modestly diffused across other cities. Income discrepancies among cities is not significant. And the contrast between the wealthy neighborhoods and the poor ones is not as stark as in other major cities in the world.

This "Confucian developmental urbanization" questions the explanatory powers of the two main academic approaches: market-oriented modernization/urban ecology theory and Marxism-influenced dependency/world system perspective when it comes to Korea. Both theories assume that concentrated power, population, and wealth go hand in hand. This assumption doesn't fit Korea and perhaps that is because mainstream neoclassical economics and Marxism originated to explain the economic situation in Europe, after the bourgeois revolution. Big cities meant factories, crowds, money, and powerful capitalists.

In order to understand the pattern of urbanization in Korea, this analysis began by acknowledging the importance of the developmental state in Korean society. Compared to the "regulatory" states in the West, which limit themselves

to overseeing the basic functioning of the market, the developmental state in Korea intervened and promoted the market. The bourgeois class was not the powerholder in Korean society. Bureaucrats made the important decisions on what to produce, how to produce it, and how to reinvest the surplus.

Korea's developmental state began in 1961 with the military coup led by General Chung Hee Park. Park changed Korea's class structure. The state-business nexus actually grew closer under Park but the state now had the upper hand. State officials conditioned their favor upon industry's contribution to the development of Korea. "The mandate of development" continued during the rule of President Doo Hwan Chun (1980-1987). Seeing himself as the legatee of Park's early successes, Chun was more anxious than anyone to keep the economy moving by leaving economic guidance and leadership to the bureaucrats.

The developmental state is armed with its own ideology which guides practical policies. Following the position of Gramsci, I consider the acceptance of the ruling ideology by the public to be important in understanding the question of "by which right they rule" and "how they rule." My understanding of Gramsci's writings led to the working definition of "ideology" as "a socially embedded world view serving the interests of a class." "Hegemonic ideology" is considered to be "an ideology accepted by the majority of the population."

In order to see where Korea stands in the world of ideas at the global level, I contrasted the hegemonic ideologies in the US and Japan. Lockean liberalism in America is made up of (1) individualism, (2) property rights, and (3) the limited

state. Confucian developmentalism in Japan focuses on (1) familism, (2) a managed national economy, and (3) an extensive state.

Whereas Lockean liberalism philosophically freed individuals from the feudal order, Confucianism has kept individuals in the web of family and family-like organizations. While Locke's emphasis on property was embraced along with the later Locke-influenced classical economics and Darwinism, developmentalism focused on augmentation of national wealth and rejected concepts such as the sanctity of property rights, the insatiable pursuit of wealth, the "survival of the fittest," and the primacy of the self-regulating market even at the expense of social dislocation. These differences in ideology contain distinct urban-related characteristics: "politically equal but economically unequal" American urban ideology, and "economically egalitarian but politically hierarchical" Japanese conceptions of city-building.

Since the early 1960s, the bureaucratic elite in Korea passionately embraced Confucian developmentalism. Under the guidance of the "family state," with General-turned politician President Park as the head of the household, the developmentalist goal of economic growth has penetrated to every niche in the society. While acknowledging the authoritarian nature of the national mobilization, it should be understood that this hegemonic ideology has been embraced by many Koreans as well. While still harboring hate toward President Park's ruthless rule, especially during most of the 1970s, many Koreans still regard him as a person who put the national interest before his own

and led the country out of absolute poverty and dependency on the US in the 1950s.

As in all areas of Korea society, Confucian developmentalism has been put into practice by bureaucrats. The power of Seoul in the Korean urban system reflects the lingering Confucian ideology in Korean society. With the trust in Confucian tradition by the military dictators, Seoul drew power from its position in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Bureaucrats in Seoul add a magnetic character to the city that forces private capitalists to flock there.

The spread of wealth in the Korean urban system should be understood in the context of Korean developmentalism, which emphasizes the development of the nation as a whole rather than the pursuit of individual wealth. Extensive investment in infrastructure, development of industrial estates, and revenue sharing all contributed to reducing income differentials across the cities.

The equitable urban development within Seoul itself also stems from the developmentalist mobilization by bureaucrats. Urban development targeted the necessary public infrastructure for the masses and provided other amenities, such as housing for the middle class. Extensive revenue sharing among wards helped to guarantee a minimum level of social service in different neighborhoods.

Seoul is not a demographically primate city by world standards even though its sheer population size leaves enough room for concern. The investment in industrial estates and transportation in the provincial economies has helped to offer alternative destinations for internal migration besides Seoul.

Other measures devised to control population migration include (1) the designation of green belts around Seoul, (2) the compulsory relocation of factories in Seoul, (3) the expansion of educational opportunities outside of Seoul, and (4) the decentralization of secondary government agencies.

Things are changing in Korea, however. In my opinion, the fervor of Confucian developmentalism reached its peak when President Park was assassinated by his own intelligence chief in 1979. Since then, the system has been working as it was but without the steam or "genuine energy of the people." The massive demonstrations by both students and citizens during the 1980s brought democracy back to Korea in 1987. The financial crisis in 1997 was a heavy blow for the legitimacy of bureaucracy. The public, fully aware of who was running the Korean economy, viewed bureaucrats as ultimately responsible for the financial crisis. Whether that will lead Korea in the direction of Lockean liberalism remains to be seen. The Korean people are starting to take American ideas as genuine alternatives.

American ideology has now become a serious contender for disenchanted Korean minds. Bureaucratic regulations appear counterproductive, if not suspiciously corrupt. Newspaper editorials publicize that the nation has no other alternative but to adapt to American rules, blindly underscoring the "survival of the fittest" theory in order to stave off the current economic mess (Korea Herald, 1998c):

> In compliance with accelerating liberalization, Western values – more precisely American values – have become an outright virtue. Companies appear quick in introducing American business culture: the performance-based wage system has been a norm in many of the large business concerns, for instance ... the nation has no other alternative but to adapt to American rules ...

Urban policy is now also under attack. Jeong-sik Lee, who is a vice president of the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, argues that lessons from the current crisis include normalization and self-governance (Korea Herald, 1998e). According to him, distorted urban economic processes should be replaced by a "normal path" of economic operation. Politically influenced land management systems should be based on economic logic and market principles. The government's role as a distributor of resources will therefore be minimized along with the relaxation of various regulations, especially in the area of housing, land and construction markets. He continues:

> Competition based on "the rules of game" should be guaranteed to minimize the expected disorder of market functions that will accompany deregulation. Such deregulation should be aimed at expanding the role and scope of the private sector. In addition, the institutional environment should be reformed to meet international standards, thereby attracting foreign investment.

His views are similar to that of the IMF, preaching American values as an outright virtue in economic matters: legalizing lay-offs, adoption of performance-based wage system, deregulating M & A activities, minimizing government regulations in business, and lifting all controls on capital flow in and out of Korea. He simply transferred those principles to cities and regions. Fiscal subsidies for poor localities are regarded as similar to corporate welfare for incompetent Korean enterprises. He considers infrastructure investments targeting balanced regional developments as similar to the unprofitable, long-term, and market-share oriented behaviors of Korean firms. Foreign investment on urban projects is welcomed as in other sectors. As free agents, localities should have the right and duty to decide their future – like individual firms.

To be fair, I have to point out that the trend toward Lockean liberalism was something that has been witnessed since the early 1990s. "Efficiency" and "individual property" rather than "balanced national land development" have been the motive behind slowing changing urban policies. In 1994, it became easier to build factories and high-rises in Seoul (Korea Herald, 1994). In the same year, the government also enacted the Private Capital Inducement Law for Expansion of Social Infrastructure, granting private entrepreneurs the right to expropriate land for construction of public facilities (Heon-Joo Park, 1998:139). In 1997, the requirement for building small apartments for apartment developers was abolished except in Seoul and 14 other cities around Seoul (Nae-Yeo-Keong-Jae, 1997). From May 1998, the land market, together with the real estate market as a whole, has been completely open to foreigners (Heon-Joo

Park, 1998:139). In 1999, the central government is seriously considering abolishing greenbelt zones to curry the favors of voters owning the lands.

The effect of this Americanization on Korean urban development may be similar to what is happening in the Korean economy. Korea's unemployment rate rose from 2.6 percent in 1997 to 6.8 percent in 1998 (Korea Herald, 1999b). The income of urban workers in the bottom fifth of the income distribution dropped 17.2 percent in 1998 while the income of the top fifth dropped only 0.3 percent (Korea Herald, 1999c). As the middle and lower classes bore the brunt of the IMF induced structural adjustment policies in the form of lay-offs and reduced salaries, poor cities have had to endure financial degradation. As domestic and foreign capitalists see profit opportunities in liberalization, rich cities such as Seoul will profoundly benefit. Not only will income levels rise in relative terms but also a significant in-flux of population might be expected with the decline of provincial economies. As capitalists arise as new masters or ruling partners of bureaucrats, Seoul will be as powerful as before as the host city of the power holders.

Like their counterparts in the West, the new private elites may champion the high ideal of political freedom. However, they may also follow the suit of being "irresponsible leaders" by neglecting the need of the masses living in poor neighborhoods and less-than-affluent cities. A brotherly approach to poor wards and localities may be replaced with a cold-blooded, survival-of-the fittest mentality. Disparities in urban systems and urban places will be heightened and population concentration in Seoul will gain momentum. Power, however, will

remain in Seoul as private power holders continue to congregate in Seoul for the exploitation of its market, human resources, and foreign contacts.

To put it simply, liberalization will make Korean urban patterns more similar to that of other Third World countries resulting in an extreme power concentration in capital, a severe income disparity among and within major cities, and a population explosion in the capital city.

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