.. . 133%.? A 2.3.. fl... . .; ...:...¥af . fifi; s . re..- . r . . h l-Gt. -I - “ ’ ‘ >h‘ h‘q‘agg _ I‘\’ ’0 ; TL. \ a...“ -j been more than generous. I must also thank David who has shown interest in my dissertation work, and has supported Steve’s love of the Lakers (seeing as I couldn’t possibly root for the purple and gold). My committee was instrumental in helping me to navigate the research and writing process. Through coursework, research, and teaching Cleo Cherryholmes, Bob Floden, David Plank, and Gary Sykes all mentored me in both the intellectual and practical aspects of this dissertation. I would especially like to thank Gary who served as my committee chair, and graduate advisor. His guidance and critical reading of my work were invaluable. From the time that I began conceptualizing my dissertation research, I was a part of numerous writing groups. The people with whom I worked were a source of emotional support, intellectual guidance, and badly needed editing skill. Even though my early writing gave Phil Kelly a headache, as the policy king, he was one of my earliest role models at MSU. Devon Brenner, my first friend in graduate school, has seen my writing and thinking evolve tremendously. Without her, I might never have been able to write my dissertation proposal. Susan Wallace-Cowell and Heather Pleasants were both skilled “writing therapists.” Together we learned the important connection between cooking, eating, and writing, as well as the value of friendship during the difficult dissertation process. When Susan and Heather abandoned me (i.e. got jobs and moved), Joan Hughes and Brian Yusko were kind enough to let me join their writing group. Joan and Brian helped me over the final hump of the dissertation, reading excessively long chapters. I will be eternally grateful to Joan for reminding me that “its” and “it s are not the same word. vi 91.5 ..‘~ mum . Kill". SJ Roy}? ,'.u; 5 met I‘. -' "T715 01 \\ x‘\ aid alt: .. “I “1}" I . 7‘ “L This dissertation absolutely would not have been completed without Karla Bellingar, transcription queen, goddess of the universe. Her Speed and skill made it possible for me to complete all of my interviews on-schedule. I would also like to acknowledge the kindness and patience of Lisa Roy. There are very few people I know that would allow a graduate student to borrow a transcription machine for over a year (not to mention the laptops). I also need to thank Jeannie Patrick, who was there across from the office whenever I needed her help or technical assistance. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my friends, without whom I might never have survived graduate school. From my TE cohort group to the Power Penguins inner-tube water polo team, my friends have offered me love, support, crisis management, and even much-needed comic relief. Through my relationships with my friends, colleagues, mentors, and research participants I learned that while the dissertation is a solo project, it is not one completed alone. vii barfhbics ....... L" I? E; f“ "'9 ‘ ., I.5-uib>~-»-- . Canines of C Ll Gait-r Schwi - .1 b 1.0:", \"fl- ~53 . I -~ .3: Rm :cu ) I" .4. Lenard Du; FT..." I P‘Ing A‘ ~'\ Tl- n. .. ll‘3 ‘0‘ _‘ \ un's\r:1~'.‘]t\n .LTTCTII Accw; .i 4; =L'ii.rr.:.1'31 Em 4' i100} 01:43:? S -, o v ‘o TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables .................................................................................................................... xiv List of Figures ................................................................................................................... xv Chapter I Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 Critiques of Current Educational Accountability Systems .............................................. 2 Charter School Theory .................................................................................................... 3 Chapter II Literature Review ................................................................................................................ 9 A General Definition of Accountability .......................................................................... 9 Competing Accountability Systems .............................................................................. 11 The Interaction of Multiple Accountability Systems .................................................... 13 Current Accountability Research .................................................................................. 15 Accountability Relationships ........................................................................................ 18 Early Charter School Research ...................................................................................... 21 Charter Schools in Michigan ......................................................................................... 25 Where Do We Go From Here? ...................................................................................... 30 Chapter III Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 33 Conceptual Framework ................................................................................................. 33 Accountability Frameworks ...................................................................................... 34 Using the Conceptual Framework ............................................................................. 4] viii lteSartple: Sehwls and l. Shad-BIN Pamerm iHex Dill Source One: Inter Del: Source III 0; In; Dar Source Three: I). ittirrlpts ~ . 'j'ls' [\ a-‘W' fi-Teptzens of Accountai‘ Hie Accountabtlttx Fr: impending Frame“ I first Frameu orks tempering Frame“ ork :ezezntibtltt} :5 Mon 5 .1“). I‘ ' "N A‘s . -CZ-‘i‘t- M :~w1ng Accounta‘r It...“ . ....I.h} of Agents The State of khchj ,. Ctr. SihOOl District II. Elementan 3&5. SE33; difl'ds I. 4' ' 3.\'..ICII(" \ w. :II‘S. I (st. . L: M“. ~\..I,‘l‘-, EV - .. d . The Sample: Schools and Participants .......................................................................... 42 Schools ...................................................................................................................... 42 School-Based Participants ......................................................................................... 44 Data Sources .................................................................................................................. 45 Data Source One: Interviews with Principals and Teachers ..................................... 45 Data Source Two: Interviews with Agents of Accountability ................................... 49 Data Source Three: Documentation .......................................................................... 50 Data Analysis ................................................................................................................ 51 Chapter IV Conceptions of Accountability .......................................................................................... 55 How Accountability Frameworks Can Interact ............................................................. 57 Compounding Frameworks ........................................................................................... 57 Congruent Frameworks ................................................................................................. 59 Competing Frameworks ................................................................................................ 59 Accountability as More than A Framework .................................................................. 60 Chapter V Compounding Accountability Frameworks: The Case of Mann Elementary School ....... 61 Hierarchy of Agents ...................................................................................................... 61 The State of Michigan ............................................................................................... 65 City School District ................................................................................................... 69 Mann Elementary School .............................................................................................. 79 Standards ................................................................................................................... 81 Indicators ................................................................................................................... 84 Incentives and Sanctions. .......................................................................................... 89 dercss. but of the Schwlfl Gimmes of the Hat Comprtmcmlmtw {dismantling of At Multiple Expct'mtn‘v: Eggs \l limes! Accountqh; 1;! Sic-it Academy ........... lit: Product Academic Exccllc' Chatter Barium pll'flll 1m 0h Cmc Em? 1‘“ Tc uch Mamie Pr. ~~~~~~~~ Redress. ..................................................................................................................... 91 Impact of the School/Principal .................................................................................. 92 Consequences of the Hierarchy ..................................................................................... 93 Compartmentalization ............................................................................................... 94 Understanding of Accountability .............................................................................. 95 Multiple Expectations ............................................................................................... 96 Chapter VI Congruent Accountability Frameworks: The Case of Dwight D. Eisenhower Public School Academy .............................................................................................................. 101 The Product ................................................................................................................. 103 Academic Excellence -- Standards and Testing ...................................................... 103 Character Building -- Morals and Discipline .......................................................... 104 Parent Involvement .................................................................................................. 105 Exemplary Teachers ................................................................................................ 106 A Marketable Product ................................................................................................. 107 Finding and Targeting a Market Niche ....................................................................... 108 Eisenhower: A Successful Franchise .......................................................................... 119 Academics ............................................................................................................... 121 Teachers .................................................................................................................. 124 Parent Involvement .................................. I ................................................................ 126 Character Development ........................................................................................... 129 Buying in 3 Sellers Market .......................................................................................... 132 Con gruent Accountability Frameworks ...................................................................... 136 .. . . 6‘ rim-m rcgoumrl‘tr kulhi‘.‘ “I: i listen of the femur .tgphing for Chu Agent T31: A \\' or 11267533 & #3: Agent :4: Parent (tumor. Ewe; History. Pm 1; 3.15163 Brett mE ECU!“ THUR“ A SGlution‘l... merry of the C i C 4135.311313]. L011 tties, Agenl :5 The S‘L: 1 wsiik‘)1 BULfl’d if”, ..r;\~h31[£adc‘ E3187 A gent .. Chapter VII Competing Accountability Frameworks: The Case of The Community School ............. 142 History of the Community School, Part 1: Many Agents, Common Expectations ...... 143 Applying for Charter Status and Becoming a Public School .................................. 143 Agent #1: A Working School Board ....................................................................... 148 Agents #2 & #3: The Community School Leadership and Administration ........... 150 Agent #4: Parental/Community Support ................................................................. 153 Common Expectations ............................................................................................ 155 History, Part 1: Summary ........................................................................................ 162 Trouble’s Brewing . . .................................................................................................. 162 Faculty Turnover ..................................................................................................... 162 Changing Demographics ......................................................................................... 164 Leadership Difficulties ............................................................................................ 167 Financial Problems .................................................................................................. 168 A Solution? .............................................................................................................. 170 History of the Community School, Part II: More Agents, Changing Roles and Responsibilities, Many Expectations .......................................................................... 172 Agent #5: The Jaffe Partnership .............................................................................. 172 School Board: Changing Roles and Responsibilities .............................................. 174 School Leadership and Administration: Changing Roles and Responsibilities ...... 176 Enter Agent # 6: Jaffe School Leaders .................................................................... 180 Continuing Financial Issues .................................................................................... 184 Market Influences: Changing Roles for Parents/Community .................................. 187 Many (Unclear) Expectations .................................................................................. 191 xi 1.... ' ‘ I “I ‘ no 11;.» b ' t (trotting Actoun Exact VIII Futon 111g ACC Cement Actuun I": tingAcwu .1::s-ur.trbilit} Fr; Ideology \s. R: .tzzcuntrhilitx E: The Mann Elcr Ernhuu er P5 The Commum E5 6:75 on Tt‘at‘h 5mm: in“ C5 Téatl 'E'T'fzdix D: Sam: 323‘ K3}? Irten “181‘ .. ‘ a. p‘ \d‘ ‘F‘ Epilogue ...................................................................................................................... 199 Competing Accountability Frameworks ...................................................................... 200 Chapter VIII Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 206 Compounding Accountability Frameworks: Mann Elementary School ...................... 207 Congruent Accountability Frameworks: Eisenhower Public School Academy .......... 209 Competing Accountability Frameworks: The Community School ............................. 210 Accountability Frameworks and Accountability Environments ................................. 212 Ideology vs. Regulation ........................................................................................... 213 Accountability Environments ...................................................................................... 217 The Mann Elementary School Accountability Environment .................................. 217 Eisenhower PSA Accountability Environment ....................................................... 219 The Community School Accountability Environment ............................................ 221 Effects on Teachers ..................................................................................................... 223 Summary ..................................................................................................................... 224 Appendix A: Teacher Letter ............................................................................................ 229 Appendix B: Teacher and Principal Informed Consent .................................................. 230 Appendix C: Teacher/Principal Interview I Protocol ...................................................... 232 Appendix D: Sample Teacher/Principal Interview II Protocols ...................................... 233 Beth Kay; Interview 2 ................................................................................................. 233 Ruth Bea]; Interview 2 ................................................................................................ 235 Appendix E: Teacher/Principal Interview III Protocol .................................................... 237 Appendix F: Interview 1]] List Sheet ............................................................................... 239 xii train 0: Examples mix H: Inten icu Agenda 1: Agents of .Agetrht 1: Doc umcn \II I 'va.‘ ‘ - . J..- msmnt b c Appendix G: Examples of Accountability Diagrams ...................................................... 240 Appendix H: Interviewee Commentary/Response .......................................................... 242 Appendix 1: Agents of Accountability Interview Protocol .............................................. 244 Appendix J: Documents Collected .................................................................................. 246 Bibiliography ................................................................................................................... 248 xiii 72:1: 1 Proposed Agents ot " 1; Proposed Standardx heated lndreatt trx 723i: 4: Pn'tposed lneenttx e~ iele 5. hoposed Redress .\ 135236 Brief School Pruh 2: .‘ese Shoal-Based Edit; ,‘l 13‘: rm. :5: Agent Participants 72-159 Alina Elementary . .1: 10: Eisenhott er Puhlr 1,1 l: Communit} Sthu 195%: “ M 1.. DtlUanlS C 0] le LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Proposed Agents of Accountability ..................................................................... 36 Table 2: Proposed Standards ............................................................................................. 37 Table 3: Proposed Indicators of Performance ................................................................... 38 Table 4: Proposed Incentives and Sanctions ..................................................................... 39 Table 5: Proposed Redress Mechanisms ........................................................................... 41 Table 6: Brief School Profiles, 1997-98 School Year ....................................................... 42 Table 7: School-Based Educator Participants ................................................................... 45 Table 8: Agent Participants ............................................................................................... 50 Table 9: Mann Elementary Accountability Mechanisms .................................................. 97 Table 10: Eisenhower Public School Academy Accountability Mechanisms ................ 137 Table 11: Community School Accountability Mechanisms ............................................ 202 Table 12: Documents Collected ...................................................................................... 246 xiv Fgre l: litemreh) ot fee I: Pmsible Rel. Fgre}: Alarm Elemc Egret Eisenhuu er . 2'7;th 5: Communtt} F§261D3Hd Nomi tgre 7: Pat Homer' 3 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Hierarchy of Influence in The City School District ........................................... 63 Figure 2: Possible Relationships Between Ideology and Regulation .............................. 217 Figure 3: Mann Elementary Accountability Environment .............................................. 219 Figure 4: Eisenhower Accountability Environment ........................................................ 220 Figure 5: Community School Accountability Environment ............................................ 222 Figure 6: David Norman’s Accountability Diagram ....................................................... 240 Figure 7: Pat Homer’s Accountability Diagram .............................................................. 241 XV leaching and l rdcmddete .me disenteonstrtuener: lifetimes these \N arrested in the ace 5?; 1931 p.173 t :2: Fl ”9”.) nautmpl [0 emp -r' tihrlrtt ststet ll} “’3' - tan: extent t .err tr A ‘37» ‘d‘;fl.if~;‘ « Ht‘ lltCtr n LES-{rw ,- \ J-ihs dnd 8‘. ‘P ,__ CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Teaching and learning, the substantive work of American public education, are shaped and determined educational accountability systems. Public schools serve many different constituencies, each with different visions of what schools should accomplish. Oftentimes these visions conflict with one another, resulting in tensions that are then manifested in the accountability systems to which we attempt to subject our schools (Kirp, 1982 p.173). As a result, the varying stake-holders in American public schooling each attempt to employ a variety of accountability mechanisms], elements of an accountability system, that are intended to ensure that each audience of interest achieves to some extent their own vision of what schooling should look like. Accountability systems are the means by which roles and obligations are established and the process by which we determine the course of public education. Accountability systems dictate expectations, responsibilities, and expected outcomes of schools (Theobald & Mills, 1995). Thus, role of educational actors (i.e. students, teachers, administrators, etc.) are shaped by the nature of the accountability system employed. How educators understand and manage their roles and responsibilities and how stake-holders create a set of obligations and expectations constitutes a relationship through which accountability pI'OCCSSCS operate. CntquC‘ Public schools ‘41" 3333‘: of schools at the l 7;. it: communities \\ his rcr ‘3} locil dstnet entl‘ 5:333:33 accountabi‘ :32, in recent history. I refitteness and um: mmn 1993). She '3 that stress re xx ; .. that acettuntat‘tlzt starts into shape are meiotic intolxed in W of TEACH: “‘7 S.‘stem in .\l ?' th at \s as far Crimes the publi fill-“litre. inflexibl DEmOCIilllC 3U fitment of edueas .. .ss of school! fig] \-"J - ' \‘.. Jp“}n. ’\‘ ' Pl PIG-Cc ‘ C “i 31‘ .LI «331%; ,, “d «that: ”\l: Critiques of Current Educational Accountability Systems Public schools are traditionally held accountable by placing the operational control of schools at the local level, specifically with boards of education, that are elected by the communities which the schools serve and who create policies that are then carried out by local district employees (Wise, 1979 p.51). These democratically managed bureaucratic accountability systems that currently operate in American public schools have, in recent history, been criticized by a number of authors for their perceived ineffectiveness and unresponsiveness (for example Chubb & Moe, 1990; Gintis, 1995; Lieberman, 1993). Sheldon and Biddle (1998) argue that traditional accountability systems that stress rewards and punishments are “simple minded” (p. 166). They further argue that accountability systems that are focused on attempting to whip teachers and students into shape are destined to fail because they do not trust teachers and students to want to be involved in effective teaching and learning. Similarly, Paul DeWeese, (1994) chairman of TEACH2 Michigan Education Fund claims that “by 1989 the public education system in Michigan had evolved into a self protective, rule-driven, bureaucratic monopoly that was failing an extraordinary number of students” (p. 30). He further characterizes the public school system as one of exclusive franchise regardless of performance, inflexible and unwieldy regulation, policy gridlock, and inequitable finance. Democratic accountability systems focus heavily on the governmental management of educational organizations and make the following assumptions: 3) the business of schooling is relatively certain and codifiable; b) technologies and goals are agreed upon; c) procedures for meeting goals are simple and easily implemented; (1) there are established analysis strategies; e) there are few problems to be solved; and f) 5mm; totem gt}; Firestone 3: 8» finance indicati basilica“) based Chubb and .\ 3:33.33 control 0 fiesrm.lrehernn 3:33:33 accountal‘ fighter} en t iron or lZ’re'th‘TJllOn and itemtoobhnnin' A; "—4 *AfimmMpnni filming Ihe start - LOtttrot ol 3 t ,' :1 er Stilton] Ml SthOl following procedures is known to produce desired outcomes (Darling-Hammond, 1989 p.63; Firestone & Bader, 1992 p.13, p.35). Thus, both organizational structure and performance indicators are not determined by those most directly involved in teaching and learning. This constitutes a system in which organization and control are hierarchically based impositions upon practitioners (Wise, 1979 p.52). Chubb and Moe (1990) argue that the current arrangements supporting direct democratic control of American schools impose structures that are ill suited to effective education. Lieberman (1993) also argues that democratic accountability does not allow for public accountability. He proposes that, while democratic principles may establish the regulatory environment of American public schools, a pervasive government bureaucracy in the operation and maintenance of school accountability systems diminishes public capacity to obtain information or exercise their will. These circumstances exist because the system that provides the public with information about schooling is geared towards perpetuating the status quo and education providers account in self-interested fashion, supporting their objectives over that of the mass public (, p.92). Both Chubb and Moe as well as Leiberman conclude that new types of institutions, such as charter schools, must be created. Charter School Theory Charter school reform theory is based on themes of anti-bureaucracy and community control of education. Through expanded opportunities for parent and educator choice, charter schools attempt to restore the connection between parents and their children’s schools, as well as to establish greater correspondence between parental values and the education that their children receive. The assumptions of school choice theory -- riots must Momma!» necessitates the brerldiw 33333 competition in motions; and marhCl fetetzcil accountabilitf Crieli 19%. Beehive sealed to he aeeountal recessis detennrned h) ‘efizn et‘t‘ort. seek :iutor Sterne schooling \\ ill Liz-is to Operate trudit {iii-ls, llettemrrl regal,- s‘hitiing. then they mu :gietnentatmn of self—i 4-... "“3 Sch00l adt‘ot‘ a} "he Preferences 1573533 . merit of stundar 3.4; g‘ “gr-4;“ “‘46” 21nd SlUdcm “ ‘i‘un]t\’ ”er flat . \ UlS prOl‘fiSC schools must accommodate parent and student preferences, effective school reform necessitates the breakdown of current bureaucratic structures; choice systems will encourage competition and improvement in schools, there will be incentives for teacher innovations; and market forces are an efficient means of achieving goals -- define theoretical accountability for charter schools (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Fuller, Elmore, & Orfield, 1996). Because of their reliance on choice mechanisms, charter schools are intended to be accountable to the varied preferences of parents and students, and their success is determined by recruitment and retention of students. Charter schools, as a reform effort, seek autonomy from external regulation because they presume that effective schooling will result. In order to achieve the conditions necessary for charter schools to operate traditional accountability systems must be transformed in those schools. If external regulation and democratic accountability are the hindrances to effective schooling, then they must be replaced with an alternative. Autonomy and the implementation of self-imposed accountability mechanisms are the proposed alternatives by charter school advocates. Charter schools should be held accountable in the following ways: a) the preferences of students, parents and community members are central in the establishment of standards for both educators and schools; b) parental or community satisfaction and student performance serve as incentives and sanctions for compliance with community standards; and c) parents are able to exercise their “exit” option in the event that a school does not meet their needs (Hirschman, 1970). Those who support charter schools propose a market accountability framework, placing parents in the role of mgr} agents of account: firfinollc. Charter schools gill gazed l‘UlCIIUL‘lLICICS :i orcsed accountability ' men. For example. i grisforexpzinding seht I) l . All _l \i b . gii‘en more tle Leietntt'oilrty to parent~ :;r;t.l3.lie;th Hulpern e risers is simple and is 3333333 restriction. --L, .1. y'l‘i‘jl‘ m - ...ust be held Lit 3:} set for themsel t e s 3. rent and deresul 33‘ :1- \ UL \llklelI-n dgfid SlIt in 5 Ir». 1 , H LN. ..~ . dunes acfidcm' . serful mstnm . 1., '15. 1- . , ‘.\. ‘1‘ I Sell 00%“ s 3 (P- i‘ i. l' i‘ l!- ‘ .Il‘dtlno 'c 4 Nude <1: primary agents of accountability, as the best alternative to the current democratic framework. Charter schools attempt to strike a bargain -- freedom from democratically organized bureaucracies and deregulation in exchange for higher standards and/or self- imposed accountability. This point has garnered a great deal of political support and attention. For example, in his 10—point plan for education, President Clinton outlined his goals for expanding school choice and charter schools. Point five argues that schools should be given more flexibility, authority, and support “in return for greater accountability to parents and the public for high standards” (Clinton, 1997). Stated more bluntly, Keith Halpem and Eliza Culbertson (1994) argue that the premise of charter schools is simple and is based on the idea that schools “must be freed from the bureaucratic restrictions of traditional schools”. In return for this freedom, charter schools must be held accountable for results and required to measure up to the standards they set for themselves. These broad statements and assumptions about the power of autonomy and deregulation to affect change have bolstered the charter school movement and encouraged stronger state charter school legislation. Ravitch and Viteritti (1996) write that charter schools are “accountable to a public authority. In fact, the charter, which defines academic expectations and other legal responsibilities, often serves as a more powerful instrument for accountability than anything that exists for most ordinary public schools” (p.7). Thus, at its core, the charter school addresses accountability issues. In an attempt to reconfigure school accountability systems, charter schools are not demonstrating a trade or bargain, but layering more accountability mechanisms onto already burdened work environments (Neuman, 1998). Existing accountability systems, :3 the presence of den American schooling an M23. Retorm efforts 3:33.331 SCCOUlllJl‘l excitability S}Slt‘lll\ he multiple internal an . .i- , ~ Li'iffl'rt’llldllon 01 char siglsre hon school an Ci‘Ngg-J .35.... to multiple acct ::..re.ite multiple. pot ACCOUlll'ctblllH. If? 3 'l-Q ~ 9 ...3.ns...ps heroeen r -;ll ...i . ~w330k.lherndnr mi . ‘ . em on the mech. :5 .5qu g ll 5" “in ml Ed to empln} .smetiotts. it is imp A e. «UTE because “ea ‘ \ ‘fi‘ - :fikfly .P-i ‘fl 7‘"‘lh.\ll'i° “SUI ' -«,.:::z;tio n. Thus, “I dtlltjins“ ti ‘edUcahr t "’51): , ‘ Widlt‘d In“) (1 till i ' "l . “use! Cl " rs Undt and the presence of democratically organized bureaucracies are conceptually embedded in American schooling and are not “removable” at will, even in charter schools (Dom, 1998)3. Reform efforts, such as charter schools, instead of removing traditional educational accountability systems, add extra audiences, criteria, and agents of accountability systems. Michigan charter schools are a particularly interesting example of the multiple internal and external expectations placed on both schools and educators. The implementation of charter school legislation in Michigan provides an opportunity to explore how school accountability works. Michigan charter schools are, by design, subject to multiple accountability systems (i.e., from the State, communities, etc.). This can create multiple, potentially conflicting expectations for charter schools. Accountability, while composed of many mechanisms and ideals, is based on relationships between people. Individuals construct and maintain the organizations we call schools. The manner in which an accountability system operates is equally dependent on the mechanisms that are in place and the relationships between those who are entrusted to employ those mechanisms. To understand the impact of educational reform efforts, it is important to examine the experiences, perceptions, and interactions of educators, because “each individual has his or her own social history and an individual perspective on the world” (Fontana & Frey, 1994 p.374). Educators’ social histories and perspectives are, in part, the foundation of their beliefs and actions within a social organization. Thus, with “perspectives on and interpretations of their own and other actors’ actions”, educational actors’ understandings of accountability are a valuable piece to be incorporated into our own conceptualizations and theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1994 p.280). Educators’ understandings of accountability shaped the course of this research. lhisdisscrtatiun ex. high public edue rtwn rgrouserammatitm of h rehpment ofa framem the nature of the Widiltmxi Tr: research “‘35 gurdcd t ' lie-u doeducatnr, m, e e il'dtiEliOTlJi puhl l t‘ thich they are sthet‘ Hot 30. those LlEL‘mx thrhersehtxrls and n acctunuhilit} frame“ t llhatare the dit‘feret theimplementutrvn t 1 :3“: short to address t“ Mm Ht' . ‘ Mont} in three .\ 11"!” 'l '3 . "r41: \ddt‘dlltmili LiCCt tel schools as a r n «y. L‘... hrfs This dissertation examines the roles, perspectives, and values that stake—holders in Michigan public education hold surrounding issues of accountability. This allowed for a rigorous examination of how street level bureaucrats construe their work, the development of a framework for examining “the system”, and the opportunity to explore the nature of the relationships that develop surrounding issues of public accountability. The research was guided by the following three questions: 0 How do educators most closely associated with two Michigan charter schools, and one traditional public school make sense of and use the accountability frameworks to which they are subject? 0 How do those agents of accountability most closely associated with two Michigan charter schools and one traditional public school create and make sense of those accountability frameworks to which they subject educators? o What are the differences in the perceived consequences (intended or unintended) of the implementation of accountability frameworks in the three schools in this study? In an effort to address these research questions, this dissertation provides rich cases of accountability in three Michigan schools. These cases are an attempt to describe and explain educational accountability in Michigan that provides insight into both the nature of charter schools as a reform, and issues surrounding power and authority in all public schools. i 333 Chgnltl 4 it)! lL : Trends Education 3 Sherman Dom \\ tit mom and orgim :ezzie influences. Th filming dCCUUl‘lldi‘li ffgriie schottls“ «Dr 71?“:fit‘fii one ope of 1 :eiiite school praetrt Chapter 1 Notes 1 See Chapter 4 for further explanation. 2 Towards Educational Accountability and Choice 3 Sherman Dorn writes that: “Schools, like other public bodies, have their own professional and organization dynamics that mediate, rather than automatically reflect, outside influences. Thus, when we speak of a political legacy of school policies [including accountability systems], that legacy is part of a larger negotiation over the role of public schools” (Dom, 1998). Democratically organized accountability systems represent one type of political legacy (Dorn uses statistics as another example) that mediate school practices. Academics. ed if onions for ho.“ ; if users er en furth 2:23: 3C:0Uhl.:l‘lltl} ‘J;st:zr..l‘)98t. Sllll t .tfeirrenn. Elmore. i'I'ittfltlb-llll)‘ as a j .. outer} for “r re American pU 311‘ ”1 Amene ar “51‘3“ Of an er "“ did huts ed ‘u. "‘“li‘al featt CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW Academics, educators, and policy-makers alike have all produced a complex mix of solutions for how accountability should be addressed in American schools. To muddy the waters even further, various constituencies define accountability differently. Some define accountability as a product (e. g. Gintis, 1995 p. 492) or rewards or sanctions (e.g. Olson, 1998). Still others define accountability as standards or even a problem (e. g. Abelmann, Elmore, Even, Kenyon, & Marshall, 1998). Some authors even define accountability as a process (e.g. Levin, 1974 p. 375). Regardless of how it is defined, Public outcry for “more accountability” as a solution to what is perceived to be a failure of the American public school system demands that we explore just what accountability means in American education. A General Definition of Accountability Accountability systems are based on a normative orientation that shapes the Character of a set of mechanisms or technical features. A normative orientation is the expression of an either tacitly or explicitly agreed upon decision regarding to whom, for what, and how educational organizations and the actors within them are held accountable The technical features of an accountability system are the mechanisms that reflect the normative orientation of those who hold educators and schools accountable. Acgttunl’dl‘illl} 5‘ metres. At its must b. 334350” \Vhen outwit meted: O 2 E —r A. mnirhrltt} has not l r2: thin outcomes at Educational 3. ersnraencres and pft its end. Clfiflllllltti‘ll‘ in” Texxartis ant ‘ liliOtmdn-t‘e. >- -’Jt«”4’ltli?‘.no . . 3‘“: 01’ dlx Accountability systems begin with two foundational elements, expectations and outcomes. At its most basic level, accountability can be reduced to a very simple equation. When outcomes meet or exceed expectations, accountability has been achieved: 0 2 E —9 A. Similarly, if outcomes fall short of expectations, then accountability has not been achieved: 0 < E ID A. But accountability systems consist of more than outcomes and expectations. Educational accountability systems are designed to ensure that schools serve their constituencies and produce an effective education based on social expectations. Towards this end, accountability systems include avenues for constituencies to nurture their goals by using rewards and sanctions. In other words, rewards, or sanctions are doled out based Upon performance. If we factor in potential rewards (R) or sanctions (S) as a means for encouraging or discouraging behaviors, the equation now can be written as: if 0 2 E ——> A R or if 0 < E E A S In the event that rewards or sanctions do not produce desired outcomes, Constituencies may desire a means by which they can appeal decisions made by those to Whom they have entrusted their authority (Wagner, 1989). That is, action may be taken to amend the situation - redress, or correction mechanisms (CM). As a result, the accountability equation now becomes: ifOZE—>A R or ' ifOA R or ifOA CM 10 the end. 3650mm erection medium-i“ In spth 0f the ;.:;o?3 rhetoric. any I'itettibtlil}. At‘t‘t‘ alertnsths anion :1 I legion. 1997 p. 43.1. Lesrgrnized. suppur. Within sehw tiling to “hem. ft essesrhle for edut‘a grim-cl Olilt‘cmes .1 «Wire nhether or Iii-*1! ~ $.33]: 1959 p 12; 31?", multiple diycr },::A--‘ . .1..-.:.:tt_lllill, and m d? In the end, accountability may be viewed as a series of rewards, punishments, and correction mechanisms based upon expectations and outcomes designated by authorities. In spite of the varied definitions of accountability that have become a part of the popular rhetoric, any one of the elements that comprise the system alone cannot define accountability. Accountability encompasses a broad range of outcomes, mechanisms, and relationships among individuals (Darling-Hammond, 1989 p. 60; Newmann, King, & Rigdon, 1997 p. 43). Thus, accountability systems attempt to define how schools should be organized, supported and governed. Within schools, accountability systems are primarily based upon structures dictating to whom, for what, and how educational organizations and educators are responsible for educational goals and objectives. These systems, in addition to outlining goals and objectives for educators, also provide the public with an opportunity to determine whether or not school processes are ethical, reasonable, and applicable (Wagner, 1989 p. 124). As a result, educational accountability systems endeavor to Satisfy multiple diverse goals for schools, including political, legal, bureaucratic, Professional, and market goals (Darling-Hammond, 1989). Competing Accountability Systems Numerous accountability systems operate simultaneously in American public schools, and rarely is only one system represented in the decision-making patterns of schools (Darling-Hammond & Berry, 1988 p. 8; Kirp, 1982). Numerous authors have chosen to name accountability systems in a variety of ways, including, but not limited to: technical, client, professional, moral, contractual, political, public, consumerist, personal, managerial, legal, and bureaucratic (see Becher, 1979; Burgess, 1992; Darling-Hammond, ll his}; Elmore & Asst» the accountability 3.} st accountability S} stem niessional. and mi: 1:333 gurde the dC\ {flirting general dct Democratic Accountabilit Profession-d] Accountabilit Market Accountabilit 1989; Elmore & Associates, 1990; Kogan, 1986). While there may be multiple names for the accountability systems that influence American public schools, there are three accountability systems that have become the major influences on schools — democratic, professional, and market. These systems represent three possible normative orientations that can guide the development and implementation of accountability mechanisms. The following general definitions are provided for the purposes of this discussion}: Democratic Schools are organized to support public goals through Accountability: government agencies, elected bodies, and appointed officials. Rules and regulations are created externally, and implemented by teachers. The normative orientation is presumed to be guided by the wants and needs of the majority of American society. Professional Schools are organized to support professional autonomy Accountability: and decision-making by teachers. Standards for entry into the profession and appropriate practice are determined within the professional body. The normative orientation is presumed to be guided by the expertise of the education profession. Market Schools are organized to support consumer choice in Accountability: school services. Consumers are free to choose among a variety of schools designed to meet specific student or community needs. The normative orientation is presumed to be guided by self-defined communities and parents. Democratic, professional, and market accountability systems do not exist in a vacuum, nor do they operate independently of one another. Darling-Hammond (1989) writes that accountability systems are appropriate under varying conditions, each with their own set of limitations. As a result she argues that no system operates independently. Since no one system can function effectively on its own, “hybrid forms are developed to provide checks and balances and to more carefully target vehicles for safeguarding the public 12 interest tori 3rd the punter iii. The result is a comr ti erected it ith 3 iii: The l lhtise MN m 3' jetteandiielimit the lc senate. Giten that t‘. pricier} agents of acct eel red to support tl‘; stem the politics Ul it each attemptin g to . firingt’ieirinterests a refintibilit} Systems These agents 0 3?"?‘4’150' t0 Prion ti l 3:123 {hat organizatit‘i ”MES essential to t 2‘73:ng d in [he 90:11 it) interest toward the particular matter they can best address” (Darling-Hammond, 1989 p. 62). The result is a complex American public school system in which multiple goals are being targeted with a variety of mechanisms. The Interaction of Multiple Accountability Systems Those who are authorized to hold schools accountable (agents of accountability) define and delimit the legitimate purposes and products of any public schooling enterprise. Given that there are many visions for American public education and multiple proposed agents of accountability, a variety of accountability systems have been developed to support those visions. Accountability systems structure the balance of power in the politics of American public schools. In many ways, agents of accountability are each attempting to attain a dominant position in the arena of public schooling, thereby placing their interests ahead of other potential influences on schools. Thus, choices about accountability systems are choices about allocations of power (Kirp, 1982 p. 139). Those agents of accountability to whom we delegate power and authority have an Opportunity to prioritize their interests over other competing agents. Stinchcombe (1965) argues that organizations must be structured so that “those people in society who control resources essential to the organization’s success will be satisfied that their interests are represented in the goal-setting apparatus” (p. 161). Renee Kuchapski (1998), in her historical review of accountability movements argues that educational accountability along with views of the collective good changes over time. She writes, “accountability is an abstraction of political ideology. As each new genre of liberalism emerged, it changed what education was to be held accountable for, how it was to be held accountable, and to whom” (p. 542). Kuchapski’s analysis articulates that educational accountability not only 13 r‘lf’tlS lit-it‘- iili‘ifltl‘ri \il ire West" I. .LfA5-5' l: at: mil 1‘ “"5. “ duh ‘Y" I . --.§, :- "5 i ‘ H; A .-". K‘ at, "\I --‘ -7. ' C " § l s‘r & ”-2 ,. l" ... ~ - . reveals visions of the communal good, but whose influence most powerfully shapes the collective vision. If schools are structured to provide reassurances that public interests are represented, with the primary agents’ interests coming first, then we can view reforms of accountability frameworks as “power plays” where agents act to serve their own visions of education over the ideals of others. The three major accountability frameworks (introduced in the previous section) compete with and influence one another to determine: a) the nature and extent of regulatory control; b) how varied educational outcomes will be; and c) the beneficiaries of services provided in American public schools. As an ideal, accountability is simple and easy to understand (0 2 E —> A). It becomes a complex and controversial issue when we realize that there are multiple constituencies with varied expectations, each attempting to invoke different accountability mechanisms and achieve a variety of outcomes. Varied expectations, Outcomes, incentives, sanctions, and means for correcting substandard performance all Complicate what was once a simple series of “equations”. We discover that outcomes eXceeding expectations does not always produce accountability. If various stakeholders (i.e., parents, districts, the state) each have different exPectations of schools, then there is never a single E that can be universally entered into the equation 0 2 E —>A. In schools we might have, for example, E. = academic achievement, E2 = character development, or E3 = effective fiscal management. Second, for each possible desired expectation, there are multiple outcomes that can be produced. In the case of academic achievement, we could argue that 01 = test scores, 02 = portfolios, or 03 = teacher anecdotal assessments. For example if a parent expects a school to deve10p their child’s character (E2), then test scores (01), no matter how high, 14 iii to: be if ‘ ‘l l: l. AMA anyplaqe‘. Winn in. “a,“ JLi‘l .‘ ‘ u- ‘ ', 3:91 : ~wr 2|.7 ‘ «out: will not be satisfactory (O; > E2 [53> A). Or, if academic achievement is the expectation (E), a school system might only consider test scores as an appropriate outcome, and rich portfolios (02) may not be satisfactory, even if they do measure academic achievement (02 2 E. EDA). There are a vast number of possible expectations and outcomes, contributing to an immense number of possible equations. Current Accountability Research Research on accountability commonly focuses on one or two issues -- who is in charge or what is the desired outcome. Two recent articles “Accountability and School Performance: Implications for Restructuring Schools” by Newmann, King, and Rigdon (l 997), and “When Accountability Knocks, Will Anyone Answer?” by Abelmann and Elmore, et al., (1998) are no exception. Both articles attempt to describe and explain how accountability should work in schools. Ableman, et al., and Newmann, et a1. both explore the processes that are involved in enacting educational accountability. Newmann, King and Rigdon (1997) examine accountability as an issue of who has authority in schools. Thus, the authors distinguish between internal and external accountability mechanisms as a means of explaining how organizational capacity can be developed in schools. They argue that external accountability (created outside of an individual school) is difficult to implement, can undermine organizational capacity, and can contribute to a diminished sense of educator “ownership” of, commitment to, and authority within a school. They claim that externally created accountability mechanisms do not guarantee technical knowledge, skill, wise resource allocation, or a sense of commitment. Newmann et a]. identify externally derived accountability, such as 15 intern; '. h.3 effect: On t some of cc rah. r grains 5; SST’C‘L'Tanng 3397}. Tim iii. cit ec' {Tl V . “It .14 ”Wu. If X..‘t7r’?‘jn. - " u .‘u I95 7'" 4 ,\ \Li‘l K“ j l .‘ .“ ‘ Li '5“ democratic accountability, as problematic and a matter that must be addressed in order to build effective schools. On the other hand, according to Newmann et al., internal accountability is a source of cohesion that can build or be a result of organizational capacity to act. In other words, a school’s commitment to monitor its own progress and offer its own rewards or sanctions can lead to a higher level of commitment and skill. Similarly, consensus surrounding a school mission can lead to building an internal system (Newmann et al., 1997). Thus, for Newmann, et al., the important facet of accountability processes is who is involved in its creation. The point of import is that educators, as authorities, be involved in the determination of their own norms and standards, indicators of performance, rewards and sanctions, and opportunities for redress. It could be argued that N ewmann et al. are advocating an overarching system of professional accountability, by Placing power in the hands of teachers. In this argument, the authors have determined that the problem (for lack of a better term) with educational accountability is that we have not delegated enough 1‘cSponsibility and formal authority to teachers. Their view appears to advocate t1“ansforrning the normative orientation of a traditionally democratic accountability system With little consideration for the impact on either accountability mechanisms or the process as a whole. The debate over internal versus external accountability only addresses one feature of an accountability system -- who is in charge. Newmann’s argument proposes new authorities to determine appropriate outcomes and expectations. The delegation of authority to new constituencies is likely to change an accountability system through the 16 rrsierrrution of prefer etistence of other milk The Ablemunn 4 training hon school: :3eiiii internal accoun narrated ti'rth school circntintahrlity". as .tfelrtizinn and Elinor ::=n:eptiens of acciiu trgzrization; bi com Extending the it mt itll’itics of deVelor ntfitl‘imblllly mech :t'CC‘UlIlfibl l l W . Ablemann a frat i anS be!“ cc: :Yv- ht ‘? .‘ rhkl ‘ .iions (collet 31?;~_\ ‘ _ C transformation of preferred accountability mechanisms but does not eliminate the existence of other influences on schools. The Ablemann and Elmore piece (1998) also emphasizes the importance of examining how schools construct conceptions of accountability. However, they take the idea of internal accountability one step further by including constructs such as how those associated with schools think about accountability issues, their responses to “the problem of accountability”, as well as responses to external accountability mechanisms. Abelmann and Elmore (1998) posit the following assumptions: 3) schools have conceptions of accountability which are embedded in the day-to-day operation of the organization; b) conceptions of accountability are built from human interactions surrounding the work of schooling; c) school participants are active agents in the dynamics of developing and altering conceptions of accountability; and (1) external accountability mechanisms are only one of many factors influencing internal senses of aceountability. Ablemann and Elmore describe accountability as a set of relationships and interactions between responsibility (personal values, beliefs, individual discretion), exPectations (collective, shared norms), and mechanisms (developed both internally and externally). They claim that “schools are more likely to have powerful internal accountability systems -- formal or informal -- if the values and norms embodied in these systems are aligned with individual conceptions of responsibility and collective expectations of the school” (Abelmann et al., 1998 p. 5). Further, the power of an external accountability system is a “function of the alignment between the norms and values represented in these systems, and the internal accountability mechanisms of 17 stools" (Abelmann et irrtti'it'lll bill 3350 3 fun Alignment is th items a high degree c 13:: represented by : ratertubility system. iregh the careful se‘. cnegh socializing et - 1,1 \ b t .l. lnthis sense it. reliefs about to it hot 331:3 to give an indi tether or not their Eternal authorities. cencemed with who ..~..x.ructed. enactet AbEll‘titirin, ‘-.¥ k "Frla ‘ ‘ I ‘\ _. a. . “PA-1;: n: Spin: ‘m‘l‘CIEQ h ._ 1»:- Nu: ‘\%i-\‘h ‘Ilng ‘, ,_ .'?-1 ”a“ Et al schools” (Abelmann et al., 1998 p. 6). Accountability is not only the loci of a designated authority but also a function of the interaction between personal values and shared norms. Alignment is the issue of greatest interest here. The question of whether or not there is a high degree of consistency or a strong agreement between the expectations and values represented by accountability mechanisms will determine the effectiveness of an accountability system. Abelmann and Elmore argue that alignment can be achieved either through the careful selection of a group of educational actors with common values or through socializing educational actors to a common set of ideals (Abelmann et al., 1998 p. 5). In this sense what is of utmost concern is how educational actors’ values and beliefs about to whom they are responsible, for what they are responsible, how they are called to give an indication of performance, how they are rewarded or punished, and whether or not their practices and beliefs match their co-workers, communities, and external authorities. Unlike Newmann, et al., Ablemann and Elmore are not only concerned with who constructs the accountability system, but how that system is constructed, enacted, mediated, and even institutionalized. Accountability Relationships Abelmann, et al.’s (1998) emphasis on relationships and interactions between people brings the process of accountability, rather than the products, to the forefront. It is important to examine the process of accountability and to be concerned with how systems are constructed, but it is also important to investigate the nature of the accountability relationships that develop within that system. Both Newmann, et al. (1997), and Ablemann, et al. (1998) are arguing for the development of accountability environment 18 {ml tt’tll effectiVC 3} :-:gether. it seems :1? Accountahil :Jf‘lfll. and prugm. h: tell} to. suggest t' rel-d be separated t hhzdeach. The p their creation of sys iris. 1n the searc excitable for thei i'ltiZl’i people Chm). fiarnsihle. John 1 It is alreadx intrinsic is m POlitiCi; attoumdbl‘r 510‘ Eming l the aCCOUn‘ *1 local MP 5511116 SUl‘jc answembk flame \\ afll’ttng. (p. 1‘; «set. all indi t ii§3.y- table for a . 53-- n.‘ ‘ :44 . -Lt" --. when one that will effectively guide the academic mission of schools. Taking these two arguments together, it seems appropriate to cast issues of accountability as issues of relationships. Accountability policies are simultaneously cyclical, philosophical, political, cultural, and pragmatic (Macpherson, 1996 p. 317). As previously mentioned, it would be folly to suggest that either democratic, professional, or market accountability systems could be separated from one another, yet it is imperative that we understand the aims behind each. The philosophical nature of accountability (that which guides authorities in their creation of systems) is often undermined by the pragmatic need for something that works. In the search for a means by which we can hold those who work in schools accountable for their multiple responsibilities, we must look at the many different ways in which people choose to approach their own understanding of for what they are responsible. John Lello (1993) writes that: It is already clear that there are different sorts of accountability: what is intrinsic to the work of the teacher is not always intrinsic to the work of the politician. The key question is whether these different sorts of accountability are in the same category. Is the financial accountability of a governing body comparable to the moral accountability of a teacher? Is the accountability of a parent in a school the same as the accountability of a local MP? The answer is that all of these people are dealing with the same subject but approaching it from different angles. Clearly they are all answerable in one way or another, but although they are not answerable in the same way they are all called to give an account, or to explain their actions. (p. 2) If, in fact, all individuals interpret accountability systems differently and presume to be accountable for a varying set of responsibilities, then we must take note of how it is that they address their sense of responsibility. When one attempts to understand what their responsibilities are and act on those understandings, they base their actions on their own interpretation of their 19 nsprrsihlities. rather that i‘ltt‘sillg‘lll argues that continuities: The trouble is that lhis is not merel} another uord. it 1‘ kinds: personal. p' contractual . . t} leg-:35 pornts out that u pits". grasping one' s res right imagine. Dom tl “eerily connected to t. :3: different questions eorntahilit)‘ and into How educators rs i. s' ‘v’ ' pnihilaies still sh '- #3533 ' 3....gette (1992). not K" a 31351 . w i a Sim-y“ “if \\ c fir ‘t'r- ”at @068 0n \\ ith "ii Mlh them to d '- L‘ .3' 351 . 1‘ HOW ll’llei "tigjhi ”null: ‘ \mS inclinefl 331’} . ,3 .. . C i"! .-.p;_ I V‘I‘ l. responsibilities, rather than on an authority’s definition of their responsibilities. Tyrrel] Burgess (1992) argues that education can only work when people realize and act on their responsibilities: The trouble is that people understand different things by accountability. This is not merely a problem of definition. If it were, we could simply use another word. It is rather that accountability can be of many different kinds: personal, professional, political, financial, managerial, legal, contractual . . (p. 5) Burgess points out that while it may be simple to argue that people should just “do their jobs”, grasping one’s responsibilities and acting on them may be more complex than we might imagine. Dom (1998) points out that in schools, fundamental issues of control are “directly connected to the purposes of accountability: individuals in different roles would ask different questions of accountability mechanisms”. How one understands accountability and interprets responsibilities may influence an accountability system. How educators define and understand accountability and their various responsibilities will shape the manner in which they choose to act in schools. John Bazalgette ( 1992), notes that the core meaning of accountability is the word ‘account’, or ‘to tell a story’, “if we as a society wish to make teachers and schools more accountable for what goes on within the walls of their classrooms, halls and playgrounds, we need to work with them to develop a language which focuses the kind of story we need to hear” (p. 151). How individuals understand the process of accountability, the different mechanisms included in that process and their products will color their stories. In turn, how these stories are colored will influence the implementation of an accountability system. 20 The nature o mechanisms thro entironment ts here hence their intend razes questions. sue gosernment ageneie has: a proposed ans nlzuonshtps “in fu Bureaucraeies are m :emunities. ACCOUmdbil Perl-Oman“. If‘manas 4 9 ‘h \ (I ‘1‘. ta filling 0n C fill? L, "‘ die - ,. thmgr SC 3:1.” ‘5 tu - mcd Cm The nature of an accountability system is not only dependent upon the existence of mechanisms through which individuals report their “progress”. The creation of an environment where accountability processes and relationships work productively to produce their intended results is the subject of great political and academic debate. It raises questions, such as: Do we want to allocate power to elected officials, the courts, government agencies, professional bodies, or the consumer? Charter school reformers have a proposed answer to these questions. They argue that accountability processes and relationships will function productively when the powers of democratically organized bureaucracies are minimized, and authority is delegated to local schools and communities. Early Charter School Research Both the political and academic rhetoric surrounding charter schools emphasize the pragmatic, expected outcomes of schools, rather than the nature of the accountability process or relationships. Whitty, Power, and Halpin (1998) comment that Accountability in charter schools is associated with the aim of identifying performance indicators for purposes of monitoring and evaluating schools. The authoritative nature of charter schools is predicated on the idea that self-management will lead to greater accountability and quality because they are created with the pretense of achieving prescribed educational objectives. (pp. 27-28) This emphasis on outcomes as accountability has led to both critiques of and skepticism about the charter school movement. Charter school theory presumes that if authority and agency is turned over to parents, communities, and teachers that the outcomes produced will naturally be those desired by public at large. This may not be the case. Autonomy in 21 etrhanee for outeo aernits or the resul I There are :15 their are proponent rceuntahilit) meel nrsittte educative e Hittg. 1994). For lfind no es quality of ti confrontatit lhernsels es end. ( p. 91 l “T " -..st arguments a: 7:17] ‘~ " u... t iOlLE‘ cannot ( i‘z’i“ a and; Of meIOnC _ Chmer sch Ieiiiantahilitv -~P€r1 " . ‘7‘ ‘2‘ ~' ‘\._. ‘ exchange for outcomes may not always yield either the freedom that choice supposedly permits or the results that are required. There are as many opponents to charter school theory and market orientations, as there are proponents. Most who are skeptical of charter schools and market accountability mechanism argue against them on the grounds that they do not promote positive educative environments (see for example Fuller, Elmore, & Orfield, 1996; Henig, 1994). For example, Pat Petch (1992) argues that: I find no evidence that it improves the quality of relationships, or even the quality of the product. Market accountability tends to be marked by confrontation rather than cooperation. Suppliers and consumers see themselves as separate groups and seldom cooperate to achieve a common end. (p. 91) Most arguments against charter schools take a similar tack, commenting on what charters and choice cannot do to solve the problems of American education. The result has been a battle of rhetoric. Charter school reform sparks discussion surrounding numerous issues of accountability, performance, and the process of schooling. Arguments both for and against charter schools touch all of these issues, as people highlight those areas that best support their own position. Whether or not market mechanisms and charter schools promote “good educations” or “more accountability” has been lost in the political and social rhetoric surrounding choice. The Carnegie Foundation (1992), in their Special Report on Choice, argues that choice has become so ideologically charged that thoughtful discourse has been suppressed. They further argue that “claims for school choice have been based more on speculation than experience” (p. xv), and there have been minimal attempts to report on both the problems and progress of choice reform efforts. The states 22 in: late adol‘l“d Chm” ermine chanet $3M“ r- eiuatronal environ men‘ lliere are {cu sli regarding charter schoo ~ore often than not. 8‘; can re deemed a suece l9‘39"; Wells. lop-cl. S reed to he conducted. [11302121] education see :ersequences and im' In some cases a: fault) legislation o gimp. unstetter. et al. (_ 1‘ *1 [hf-’3' hate set on filtnomg to do so. 1 hm Schools in A Charter SChOt' e” appanc accountab accountabilit‘ that have adopted charter school legislation have yet to put forth any serious efforts to examine charter school results and a great deal more needs to be investigated about the educational environments of charter schoolsz. There are few studies to date that have yielded substantive results or conclusions regarding charter schools. The research that has surfaced has been less than positive and, more often than not, states that it is too early to determine whether or not charter schools can be deemed a successful or beneficial reform (see for example Arsen, Plank, & Sykes, 1999; Wells, Lopez, Scott, & Holmes, 1999). Far more studies of charter school reform need to be conducted. However, in the first five or so years of their presence on the national education scene, have provided a glimpse of charter schools’ potential consequences and impact on accountability processes. In some cases, researchers have found that charter schools are not successful due to faulty legislation or implementation of regulatory mechanisms. For example, Wohlstetter, et al. (1995) argue that early charter schools have not been able to achieve all that they have set out to do because state legislation has not provided them with enough autonomy to do so. In much the same vein, the Hudson Institute’s Final Report on the Charter Schools in Action Project concludes that: Charter schools are thinly administered and meant to be free to distinguish their approach to education from that of conventional schools. They must be accountable for results, but not overburdened by red tape. If the accountability system is too onerous, it may deflect the school’s leadership from the pursuit of sound teaching and learning. If it is too prescriptive, forcing everything into the familiar categories of conventional schools, it may constrain the school’s ability to do things differently. Yet if it is too superficial it may not yield the requisite information. If too laid back, it may not detect serious trouble in time to take appropriate action. And if it is too flexible allowing each school to define its own terms, it may provide 23 n0 bJSlS for 1997 p. 19.) lacs: results do lttt‘ adare relatitel}; in ehazged in a charter seesaons than anstt Other results “recent educational i dersitied pros iders ¥’??‘-i‘fianities on am 3am OfOIeU'IeT. states that charter scl icing more accounta irritates that far mm t‘e tollou'ins concltr ITDCU“ “de‘ Oifbctr 'CCdUSC there 15 n ‘ECOmphsh “hell hehfld aCCOUnld} lionzer) Aur '3’lSldere 1., fit-Men; J 310B is“ llhrm (OilsmUen ClCS I"I \“ 9 a ’ ra’JHSible m R1211,“ ‘3 pm: - MI} CODClL L: xii-1:3 Of‘INIQ, \dfey - -\Pt)&‘ no basis for needed comparisons. (Manno, Finn, Bierlein, & Vanourek, 1997 p. 19) These results do little to provide an answer to the question of “do charter schools work?” and are relatively innocuous, revealing little about how the process of accountability is changed in a charter school environment. In fact, the concluding remarks open up more questions than answers. Other results are far more explicitly negative. Whitty et al. (1998) claim that “recent educational restructuring patterns do not lead to more community involvement, diversified providers, enhanced professionalism, better school effectiveness, or wider opportunities on any grand scale” (p. 127). Furthermore, Amy Stuart Wells in Beyond the Rhetoric of Charter School Reform: A Study of Ten California School Districts (1999) states that charter schools, generally, are unable to meet many of their claims, including being more accountable, and providing more autonomy and empowerment. Wells indicates that far more research is needed on charter school accountability, but she makes the following conclusions based on her California research: 1. The trade-off between autonomy and accountability does not pan out as expected because there is no clear or unified vision as to what charter schools are supposed to accomplish, what constituencies expect from these schools, and for what they should be held accountable. 2. It is unclear to whom charter schools should be most accountable (i.e., parents, state, authorizer). Authorities view their role in monitoring charter schools in a variety of ways that are embedded in a larger political context. These issues need to be considered when establishing an accountability framework. 3. Educators within charter school see themselves as being responsible to multiple constituencies, and it is unclear to them to whom and for what they should be most responsible. Wells’ primary conclusions regarding charter school accountability revolve around the absence of clear expectations on the part of authorities and unspecified goals on the part 24 of charter school petition. he idea that autonomy is Lieaucracyis had and no accomplish and for u hat '. shots. and educator pr accentahility in charter s "and hegins to l’CVC‘211 htm riationships \ttth others rte-lore the nature of tin attainment rich is ith h accountability system r-tofm scenario remai r: Michigan has 1 filii' r...tion. and the St Haaeter [h ' . e implerr 19:3, .. Jedi as the mark; kt‘h'. . adihll a h]: i313 defin ions and W lnhlichtD {to public fu d. lin the state. .'*“schools " of charter school petitioners. Wells notes that charter school reforms are predicated on the idea that autonomy is far more productive than bureaucracy, but she notes that not all bureaucracy is bad and not all autonomy is good. What charter schools are trying to accomplish and for what they should be held accountable are not clear. Issues of power, authority, and educator perceptions of their role all play a part in the development of accountability in charter schools. Wells touches on some of these more prominent issues, and begins to reveal how educator understandings of accountability and their relationships with others shape the nature of an accountability system, but she does not explore the nature of those perceptions and relationships. Charter schools provide an environment rich with both possibilities and perils for the future of education. How accountability systems and the nature of accountability relationships develop in this reform scenario remains to be seen. Charter Schools in Michigan Michigan has led the nation with groundbreaking charter school reform legislation, and the State government continues to strongly support charter schools3. However, the implementation of charter schools reform strategies in Michigan is not as clear cut as the market bargain might indicate. Charter schools in Michigan operate within a highly defined framework of accountability that involves a complex layering of mechanisms and authorities as well as numerous tensions and conflicts. In Michigan, charter schools are classified as public schools, meaning that they receive public funds and are subject to the same laws and legislation as any other public school in the state. Thus, charter schools operate within the framework of Michigan public schools, residing at the intersection of multiple accountability systems, requiring 25 educators to mana‘éC “L” mgponsihle to a not of accountability. The“ generations. their our guests. and any other Seaman. l993 ). The educators. The acetit elimination of many it. ahic'n to operate. lentrratic and mar schcols invite the 0- Cienccratic. mama Accountabr Henrnond. 1989). educators to manage numerous expectations and mechanisms. Michigan charter schools are responsible to a myriad of authorities who reflect the multiple forms and definitions of accountability. These include, but are not limited to: chartering agents, private corporations, their own school boards, the legislature, the school community, children, parents, and any other authorities to which all Michigan public schools are responsible (Neuman, 1998). These varied authorities all present regulatory pressures on schools and educators. The accountability process, theorized to be made smoother through the elimination of many external agents, has not evolved that way. Without a “free market” in which to operate, Michigan charter schools must, by design, accommodate at least democratic and market accountability systems. The form and nature of Michigan charter schools invite the operationalization of varied accountability systems (including democratic, market, and professional) in the day-to-day business of education. Accountability systems in this case do not appear to hybridize (Darling- Hammond, 1989), but layer. While Darling-Hammond suggests that accountability mechanisms may replace one another to form something of a patchwork quilt system, it seems as though accountability mechanisms are operating simultaneously, concurrently exerting influence. The result is not a hybrid, but a complex series of systems with multiple authorities which educators must manage. Since agents of accountability represent a spectrum of beliefs about to whom, for what, and how educators are responsible, Michigan charter schools are caught at the intersection of multiple policies and accountability systems and may represent a compromise, or partial realization of the bargain. Thus, it is unclear how the accountability process is playing out in Michigan charter schools. With multiple authorities developing numerous mechanisms to which educators are SUblCC“ “ relationship Mme“ es and manage their resl“ annual COMM”chC simultaneously \lte‘lt‘ acountahilit) and th Geske. Das l? acaretul balance be sate-mandated mar schcols in Mrchrga retract. In order he accredited by tl irganrzation. eurr Cenocratie S}'ste mm as u ell AS an inst “tits and needs . tismmfims of m te~ - . a All) khaner S‘ educators are subject, it is difficult to predict how schools will respond. How will the relationship between educators and authorities develop? How will educators understand and manage their responsibilities? The following discussion introduces two examples of potential consequences of the existence of multiple accountability systems operating simultaneously Michigan charter schools, the balance between democratic and market accountability and the tension between public and private interests in charter schools. Geske, Davis, and Hingle (1997) argue that “charter schools will have to maintain a careful balance between school autonomy and their requirement to comply with certain state-mandated minimum standards” (p. 21). Such is the casein Michigan. Charter schools in Michigan operate under a limited-time and revocable performance-based contract. In order to receive full funding and maintain their charters, these schools must be accredited by the State and meet state standards regarding issues such as school organization, curricula, and student outcomes. Thus, external state accountability (democratic system) in Michigan serves to provide parents and school community members as well as the State an opportunity to enforce their vision for schooling. As an instrument of educational reform, charter schools are intended to meet the wants and needs of subcommunities within American society, rather than to serve as instruments of mass socialization and common democracy. This conceptualization permits charter schools to define their own normative orientation while at the same time being subject to externally defined technical features of accountability systems. Since state minimum standards (and externally defined technical features) attempt to accommodate a diverse group of American communities to a certain extent, their implementation in charter schools poses some theoretical difficulties. Accountability to 27 he State. as defined l“ our commit“) hut K culture. and social cm The challenge for the oateornes for a dc mt tCesie et al., W97 1 Democratic; accountability that tensions indepenc anaes that using 5 aschool's existcn This may be true. ‘ eciauntability 5}- am 55 hOOl S. F0 mil SChOols v TE"datirernents ane- .Lts Imponunt r the State, as defined in Michigan, forces charter schools not only to accommodate their own community but to become a function of the compromises between the history, culture, and social contingencies of the many other communities of American society. The challenge for charter schools will be to promote common values and provide social outcomes for a democratic society while still fostering consumer sovereignty of choice (Geske et al., 1997 p. 23). Democratically initiated mechanisms are one standard and measure of accountability that charter schools must meet. These standards may influence educational decisions independently of market factors such as parental preferences. Nathan (1996) argues that using state standards to evaluate a charter school can provide results justifying a school’s existence as well help build community support of the school (p. 154). While this may be true, Nathan does not acknowledge or explore the potential interaction of accountability systems in charter schools and the impact it can have on those associated with schools. For example Neuman (1998) found that even though some Michigan charter schools were initiated for different communities and educational purposes, state requirements and testing seemed to “equalize” curricular decisions. State requirements were important not as a proxy for achievement, but as a weapon to be used against a school (evidence of “non-performance”). In her study, Neuman found that charter schools’ curricula were intentionally aligned with state tests even when in conflict with community educational ideals. Similarly, Wells (1999) found that charter schools often depend on bureaucracies (such as those in local districts) for support, thereby minimizing their rhetorical autonomy and reliance on market mechanisms. 28 ln addition to charter schools must Though the realloea break free from the e corporations. such a conditions. testing : erosion-making. l The central formal gem lmflmMst officials. pt hands of pr (p.431) Klan} charter sehc :edace the poo er t Pb and come presumably based souid hate less p. Hones er, sheets either. \\ simultaneousls as lit}. L, s.‘ flue instmeti‘ In addition to the layering of democratic and market accountability mechanisms, charter schools must also manage the interaction between public and private interests. Through the reallocation of power parents, charter schools theoretically have the ability to break free from the external democratic system as well as the implied authority of private corporations, such as testing agencies. David Cohen (1979) points out that under current conditions, testing agencies such as Educational Testing Services (ETS) drive curricular decision-making. He writes that: The central problem of American education is a simple paradox: while formal governance arrangements vest nearly all authority and power in local and state education agencies that are either accountable to elected officials, power and authority have been gradually accumulating in the hands of people who are neither elected nor accountable to anyone who is. (p. 431) Many charter school supporters would argue that market accountability systems will reduce the power of “politically irresponsible” groups (like testing agencies) by making parents and communities the authorities. With parents directly choosing schools, presumably based on community ideals, these “politically irresponsible” groups in theory would have less power to determine the form and nature of school practices. However, charter schools cannot escape the influence of private interests in schools either. With the structure of a charter school dictating that it exists simultaneously as a local education agency and a local district, administrators become not only the “instructional leaders” but the “bureaucrats” as well. They must learn to deal with multiple roles and responsibilities. This transformation of the role of principal has opened the door for management companies and educational corporations to play an influential role in the daily operation of Michigan charter schools (Neuman, 1998). These 29 annuities and comorat : pretesstonal espenise. l senices and instruction; shtols. This construeti rauntahilit) systems. : At its core. chart realiocation of poster an it": ,0 .V ‘I orient lind ot accour' seething that is nets to of diat work in public needs asks public e reassign me asurab eecuntahle‘? For \\ h 1‘13. and the ansts er er- aane the nature c The Elation); fl is t ith stated in hot :‘fie'. ' I . t al. firm ' ' moi 00ls. 7);? . dfj ) clip 5/ \,' -. .1.) ’ ‘rts in)” .l , ”4(2qu companies and corporations exert influence on schools by nature of their purported professional expertise. It is unclear what effect the corporate provisions of financial services and instructional support will have on accountability processes in charter schools. This construction of new bureaucracies may complicate operation of accountability systems, as well as the development of accountability relationships. Where Do We Go From Here? At its core, charter school reform addresses issues of accountability. The reallocation of power and authority necessary for charter school legislation requires a different kind of accountability system and a reevaluation of the power of various authorities. The existence of multiple accountability systems in any one school is not something that is new to educators. Teachers, administrators, and the milieu of support staff that work in public schools can all attest to the fact that society, broadly speaking, repeatedly asks public education organizations to accomplish more and more, with increasingly measurable results. But if the questions are broad (To whom are educators accountable? For what are they accountable? How is it to be measured? How can we act?), and the answers multifarious (everyone, everything, etc.), how can we begin to examine the nature of accountability in American schools? The relationship of multiple accountability systems in Michigan charter schools, explicitly stated in both theory and law, presents a unique opportunity to examine the manner in which educational actors (teachers and principals) understand and manage their role within schools. The consequences of reforming accountability mechanisms are numerous, and deserve some exploration. While all public schools operate under multiple forms of accountability, charter schools in Michigan present a salient, clear 30 example of potentially c practice. As a result. tl‘. accountability relations Ernest. in an ens ironr The relationshi accountabilit} ssstems Ablemann and Eimtlft We cannot lens know host to t the tea) the} c accountabilit) beliefs of ind! do. about \\ ha influence of st are lcey factor accountabilit} is pressures for resui clzcies p . and mechani Edi- :atronal accounta 9L... JAE '. not operating \\ the" h . a C 'jUZSii'i c the realm of l leg-{sew ’ 5.3.4.] 5 3]} Percert'e I ”an - I example of potentially competing and conflicting visions of school accountability in practice. As a result, they are an appropriate site in which to investigate the nature of accountability relationships, surrounding the process (represented by accountability frames), in an environment of educational reform. The relationship between the intended results and enacted realities of accountability systems are mediated by how individuals understand accountability. As Ablemann and Elmore (1998) write: We cannot know how an accountability system will work, nor can we know how to design such a system, unless we know how schools differ in the way they construct responsibility, expectations, and internal accountability . . . Our research also suggests that the attitudes, values and beliefs of individual teachers and administrators -- about what students can do, about what they can expect of each other, and about the relative influence of student, family, community, and school on student learning -- are key factors in determining the solutions that schools construct to the accountability problem. (pp. 43-44) As pressures for results increase in American schools, the implications of accountability policies and mechanisms that are employed must be examined more thoroughly. Educational accountability systems are expected to yield a certain level of assurance to those not operating within a school that some measure of their educational goals and objectives are being achieved. However, these structures and mechanisms do not operate outside the realm of human action. Individuals subject to accountability systems do not necessarily perceive them as they are intended, and thus, the reality of their practice may vary. An examination of the ways in which individuals in both traditional public and charter schools understand and manage accountability systems and in turn accountability mechanisms, provides insight into the development of alternatives to the traditional public system. 31 Chapter 2 Notes 1 See chapter 3 for a more in depth discussion. 2 Two notable exceptions are, The National Charter School Study (http://www.ed.gov/pubs/charter3rdyear) and The Michigan Charter School Evaluation (http://www.wmich.edu/evalctr/charter/micharterhtml & http://www.mde.state.mi.us/reports/psaeval990l/pscfullreportpdf). These reports may yield some substantive data. 3 Michigan, along with Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Texas, all have “stronger charter laws” which are characterized by: 1) entities other than local boards being permitted to authorize charters; 2) a great deal of financial and legal autonomy; and 3) waivers for many state and local rules. (Bierlein, 1995 p.16) In addition, Michigan charter school law does not place restrictions on the number of charters allowed in the state. This stud) d one traditional pub accountability cons organizational sett accountability has.- of their mm and it can conceptualiz. :Sufd that ”...eae [Mi-techie on the afoar beliefs and CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY This study developed cases of three Michigan schools -- two charter schools, and one traditional public school -- through an examination of how educators and agents of accountability construct and make sense of accountability in their school or organizational settings. I chose to examine educational actors’ understandings of accountability based on the premise that educators’ “perspectives on and interpretations of their own and other actors’ actions” are a valuable piece to be incorporated into our own conceptualizations and theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1994 p. 280). Fontana (1994) has argued that “...each individual has his or her own social history and an individual perspective on the world...” (p. 374). These histories and perspectives are the foundation of our beliefs and actions within a social organization. Conceptual Framework I conducted a review of current research and theoretical work on both accountability and charter schools to build a conceptual framework for this study (for example Darling-Hammond, 1989; Newmann et al., 1997; Wagner, 1989; Wells, 1999). Additionally, as a member of a research team working in charter schools throughout Michigan, I drew on the data collected to develop the context, or a theory, about the accountability framework in which Michigan charter schools and their associated educational actors must operate. 33 Accountahil agents to whom "‘9 mfannation pros ids and the norms for l iDarling-Hammonc mechanism of an at ether features of 1hr are tied to: at those sections associate at a means of corre tenable or mechan ge‘i‘ifihra as a syster. IFill "accountabilr' CliXTde In Chuptc examples of the \‘ar Rel , . .l. as the Innuenc 1L. "ii’e'e'ork Accountability Frameworks Accountability systems are composed of five mechanisms: an agentl or set of agents to whom individuals are held accountable, standards or norms for performance, information provided as indicators of performance, incentives or sanctions associated with the norms for performance, and opportunities for redress or corrections of practice. (Darling-Hammond, 1989 p. 60; Newmann et al., 1997; Wagner, 1989). Each mechanism of an accountability framework functions appropriately only in relation to the other features of the established structure. For example, standards mean little unless they are tied to: a) those who create them; b) a means of implementing them; c) incentives or sanctions associated with meeting the standards; d) a means of assessing their worth; and e) a means of correcting them. Accountability cannot be considered as an independent variable or mechanismz. Rather, accountability is a set of mechanisms that operate together as a system. These mechanisms, processes, products, and relationships are what Icall “accountability frameworks”. The three accountability frameworks briefly described in chapter two (democratic, professional, and market) provide illustrative examples of the variety of accountability mechanisms that can operate within schools, as well as the influence of a normative orientation on the features of an accountability framework. Agents An agent is an individual or constituent “that receives information on organizational performance, judges the extent to which standards have been met, and distributes rewards and sanctions” (Newmann et al., 1997 p. 43). Agents function as “authors” of an accountability framework, as well as overseers of school performance. 34 As a result. agents accountability met responsibility and auricular normati' tools which serye ' The delega ofii'ho holds pour it egated authoritj nicer to determr n: shield demon strain the means through