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A RE-IMAGINED COMMUNITY: MOSCOW SINCE THE FALL OF
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A RE-IMAGINED COMMUNITY: MOSCOW SINCE THE FALL OF COMMUNISM
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THE RACIALIZATION OF NON-RUSSIANS

By

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ABSTRACT

A RE-IMAGINED COMMUNITY: MOSCOW SINCE THE FALL OF COMMUNISM AND THE RACIALIZATION OF NON-RUSSIANS

By

Meredith L. Roman

This work uses Russian newspapers and Human Rights Watch/Helsinki reports to examine how the fall of Communism has affected the lives of all “people of color” who live and/or work in Moscow. By people of color, I am referring to all groups and individuals who do not have light skin and physical characteristics typical of Slavs from both the former Soviet republics and beyond. These include representatives from the Caucasus (Azeris, Georgians, Chechens, Armenians, etc.), Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Asian subcontinent (Arabs, Iranians, Kurds, Afghans, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Indians, etc.). Under Communism, all these peoples were welcomed into the Soviet community because it was officially imagined as an inclusive brotherhood of peoples based on the principles of internationalism. Consequently, popular racism was never reinforced or fueled by the state. In striking contrast, with the fall of Communism municipal authorities have used official discourse and the registration system as the two main tools to racialize people of color in the capital. Administrative and law enforcement officials’ treatment of dark-skinned non-Russians since the Soviet Union’s demise proves that the Moscow community has been re-imagined officially not only as non-Communist but also as white and Slavic. The official reconceptualization of the capital from an inclusive multinational community to an exclusively white community has meant that the darker the skin color or the less Slavic the features an individual has the more abuse he/she is subjected to at the hands of police and city bureaucrats. Although this racialization process is continuing just as the community is being constantly reconfigured, this paper focuses primarily on the five year period from 1992-1997 when “black” was defined not only as African but also as Caucasian and Central Asian.

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In Loving Memory of
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INTRODUCTION

On 31 August 1999, the eve of the Moscow City Day celebrations, a bomb exploded in the Okhotny Row mall on Manege Square near the Kremlin injuring 41 people, seven of them seriously. Approximately eight days later, on September 8th at 11:58 P.M. a bomb went off in an apartment building at No. 17/19 Guryanov Street in southeast Moscow killing 92 people and injuring 264 others, 73 of them seriously. Less than a week later on September 13th at 5 A.M. an explosion rocked apartment building No. 3 at 6 Kashirskoye Highway in Moscow leaving 121 dead (twelve of them children) and nine injured. Federal Security Service [FSB] officials immediately implicated Chechen terrorists as responsible for these three bombings and imposed a heightened security regime on the city which targeted not only Chechens but all individuals of Caucasian nationality. Municipal authorities even attempted to prevent Caucasians from merely entering the capital, a measure which Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov emphasized needed to be legislated.¹ The FSB could have blamed any of these dark-skinned Caucasian nationalities for these terrorist acts but it was Grozni not Tblisi or Baku that Moscow sought to invade for a second time. In July 1996 a Moscow resident commented on the relationship between the then recent trolleybus bombings in the capital which were also attributed to Chechen terrorists and the escalation of Russian activity in Chechnya which applies to the September 1998 situation as well. “The real Chechen war,” he astutely observed “was being fought in Moscow.”²

This work examines how the fall of Communism has affected the lives of all “people of color” who live and/or work in Moscow and thereby indirectly addresses the questions of why these accusations against Chechens were so readily accepted at the official and popular levels and why all individuals of Caucasian nationality immediately came under suspicion in the wake of these bombings. By people of color, I am referring not only to Caucasians but to all groups and individuals who do not have “fair complexions and features typical of Slavs” from both the former Soviet republics and



beyond. In addition to the Caucasus, these include representatives from Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Asian subcontinent (Arabs, Iranians, Kurds, Afghans, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Indians, etc.). Under Communism, all these peoples were welcomed into the Soviet community because it was officially imagined as an inclusive brotherhood of peoples based on the principles of internationalism. Racism was officially nonexistent and if it did exist it was only at the popular level and was never reinforced or fueled by the state. In striking contrast, with the fall of Communism municipal authorities have used official discourse and the registration system as the two main tools to racialize people of color in the capital. Administrative and law enforcement officials' treatment of dark-skinned non-Russians since the Soviet Union's demise proves that the Moscow community has been re-imagined officially not only as non-Communist but also as white and Slavic. The official reconceptualization of the capital from an inclusive multinational community to an exclusively white community has meant that the darker the skin color or the less Slavic the features an individual has the more abuse he/she is subjected to at the hands of police and city bureaucrats.³ Although this racialization process is continuing just as the community is being constantly reconfigured, this paper focuses primarily on the five year period from 1992-1997 when "black" was defined not only as African but also as Caucasian and Central Asian.

The fall of Communism precipitated both a crisis of Russian national identity and incited Russians' fears of the "other" and the "outsider." These xenophobic fears and this crisis of Russian national identity largely stemmed from the fact that initially Russians did not know who the other was or on what grounds the boundaries of the post-Communist community were drawn. The collapse of the friendship of peoples forced the former big brother to question who was the other or outsider? and what did he/she look like? In order to define themselves Russians needed to distinguish who or what the outsider was as a way of demonstrating what they as Russians were not. Tim McDaniel emphasizes that throughout history because Russians subconsciously conceptualize of the world in pairs of

absolute alternatives Russian national identity has been to an unprecedented extent based on negative self-definition or “defined in opposition to something else.”⁴ Moscow officials helped give an easily identifiable face to the other or the outsider (through both official discourse and the enforcement of the registration system) and thereby facilitated the reconstruction of Russian national identity and the boundaries of the post-Communist community. Authorities constructed the outsider as a dark-skinned predatory male, largely although not necessarily Muslim with non-Slavic features and in this way reconceptualized the community as white, Slavic and to some degree Orthodox. A clear division consequently has emerged in post-Communist Moscow between those who fall within and those who fall outside the conceptual boundaries of the newly imagined community. This development is consistent with Russian history because as McDaniel argues Russians’ binary consciousness has always generated a sharp societal division between those who did and did not belong to the community.⁵

However, it was not dark skin alone which was the reason for the exclusion of the person of color from the newly imagined community but what that dark skin indicated, namely that the individual lacked a basic knowledge and understanding of the “Russian idea.” Discussion of the Russian idea, a term and concept debated among nineteenth century Slavophiles, was revitalized by the collapse of the Soviet Union and has come to be regarded again as the heart of what it means “to be Russian.” This idea emphasizes the community over the individual, disdains self-interest in favor of the common good, privileges order above law and professes the belief that Russia is destined to embark on a different if not hostile road to that taken by the West.⁶ Ignorant of these principles, dark-skinned non-Slavs staying in Moscow flaunt their goods in the capital’s markets which they “buy low and sell high,” prey on innocent Muscovites as drug traffickers, weapons dealers, auto thieves and racketeers, act as parasites on the capital’s resources without giving anything back to the community in return and thereby jeopardize the Russian idea’s vision of reestablishing a community distinct from and morally superior to



what exists in the West. This is a serious offense for McDaniel emphasizes that Russians have always been able to acknowledge the advanced nature of Western society while emphasizing the superiority of the Russian community.⁷ Even under Communism the Party stressed how the Soviet socialist community with its basis on the multinational friendship of peoples was superior to the Western capitalist community. In order to retain its historical claim, Luzhkov has called for the physical expulsion of dark-skinned non-Russians (especially Caucasians) from the post-Communist community.

The source base of this paper rests largely on information found in Russian newspapers and in reports published by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki organization. In regards to newspapers it is necessary to acknowledge the ownership of and/or political orientations of each. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, *Novia Izvestia* and *Kommersant-Daily* as controlled by Boris Berezovsky and *Izvestia* as operated by Vladimir Potation and the Inters group were generally considered supporters of President Yeltsin rather than Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov. The *Moscow Times* is owned by Independent Media overseen by Derek Saucer which disseminates the magazines *Cosmopolitan* and *Playboy*. Vladimir Gusinsky and Media-Most control the Sem Dnei Publishing House which produces the newspaper *Sevognya*. *Moskovskie novosti* has virtually lacked a consistent political orientation while another paper *Moskovsky komsomolets* controlled by a magnate typically has supported Luzhkov.⁸ While this work acknowledges the fact that newspapers operated by Yeltsin allies had a vested interest in depicting one of his political adversaries, Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov unfavorably, it does not dismiss their arguments as invalid. This is because condemnations of Luzhkov and of what transpired in the capital were not confined to one publication and were largely supported by the investigations of the Human Rights Watch/Helsinki organization. For example, *Izvestia* writers have been joined by *Sevognya*, *Kommersant-Daily* and most importantly Human Rights Watch/Helsinki activists in denouncing the registration system as “antiforeigner legislation,” as harking back to the days of serfdom and as signaling the return to a

historically disgraceful era.⁹ Furthermore, papers that were considered to be in Yeltsin's corner criticized him for his indifference to the racist actions of Moscow law enforcement officials during the October 1993 state of emergency.¹⁰ Finally, despite the fact that *Izvestia* journalists have been at the forefront of denouncing the mayor for his campaigns to rid the capital of individuals of Caucasian nationality, that newspaper along with *Moskovsky Novosti* has published several reports about the high representation of Caucasians in the capital's crime scene.

Chapter one examines how the Soviet Union was officially imagined as an all-inclusive, multinational community and how officials used Moscow as the stage from which to project this image to the world. It also explores the conceptualization of the relationship between Russians and non-Russians (both Soviet and non-Soviet nationalities) and briefly discusses the purpose of the Soviet registration system.

The collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated three major processes important to this work: the re-imagining of the Moscow community; the reconceptualization of the relationship between Russians and non-Russians; and the consequent racialization of the representatives of these non-Russian nationalities who are living and/or working in the capital. Chapters two and three examine the nature of these new conceptualizations and the racialization process and the means by which they have been accomplished, namely through official discourse and the registration system. The processes of reconceptualization and racialization are interrelated and complementary, for by racializing dark-skinned non-Russians as "blacks" Moscow authorities have then deliberately re-imagined the capital as white and Slavic in order to exclude them. More specifically, chapter two concentrates on how a discourse of disorder has racialized people of color, incited racist feelings among the populace and has allowed Moscow to operate above federal and international law. Chapter three is divided into two parts and focuses on how administrative and law enforcement officials' enforcement of the registration system has racialized dark-skinned non-Russians in the capital.



CHAPTER 1: THE SOVIET UNION AS THE FRIENDSHIP OF PEOPLES

The Soviet Union was officially imagined as an inclusive community founded on the friendship of the multinational peoples who inhabited its borders. Soviet leaders began to systematically emphasize the peace, solidarity and friendship which existed among them in the mid-1930s when the country was faced with German rearmament, the Spanish civil war and conflict between China and Japan.¹ The Party enlisted historians to depict this friendship of peoples as having deep historical roots. The official version of history that consequently emerged in the history textbooks of each of the national republics was that “in the struggle against the common enemy, Tsarism, the friendship of our peoples took on its initial shape...It became a brotherhood of peoples based on the greatest historical cause, on the construction of a new Socialist society, on the movement towards Communism.”² Although it began to develop under tsarism, this friendship reached its highest level under Communism. In 1950 Khrushchev declared this friendship of peoples to be that which “make(s) our Motherland invincible.”³

Official rhetoric essentially attributed the indestructibility of this friendship of peoples and the strength of this inclusive multiethnic, multiracial community to the Party’s promotion of national differences. Lenin had consistently taught his disciples that encouraging the development of non-Russians’ national identities would lead to internationalism.⁴ Brezhnev testified to the wisdom of his teacher’s paradoxical instruction when he declared some fifty years later that “Socialism has long...proved that the more intense is the growth of each national republic, the more apparent becomes the process of internationalization.”⁵ In his essay “The U.S.S.R. as a Communal Apartment” Yuri Slezkine discusses how the Soviet system promoted this development of non-Russians’ national identities by giving each of them their own room which they were advised to decorate and adorn. Because of this Leninist formula for internationalism even in the late 1930s when the number of officially sponsored rooms or non-Russian nationalities decreased as the size and decoration of the Russians’ room became more



elaborate, Moscow never launched any concerted effort to eradicate the national identity of these national minorities but instead encouraged the remaining rooms to become even more distinct from their neighbors.⁶

The Party's intention in actively encouraging the development of the non-Russian nationalities was to make them definitively distinct from but not the equal of Russians.⁷ Although Soviet propaganda persistently emphasized the equality that existed among large and small nations, in practice Russians occupied another level in this friendship of peoples. Soviet leaders did not use this inequality which existed between themselves and non-Russians to render the latter "alien," "black" or even "criminal" and never blatantly declared Russians to be a superior people. Instead they "euphemized" or "sanitized" their superiority by framing it in positive familial terms which elevated Russians to the role of big brother or first among equals. In December 1936 *Pravda* characterized the Great Russian People as "'first among equal participants of this brotherly union of peoples.'"⁸ The 1955 *Kratky Filosofsky Slovar* stated that "'all peoples and nations of the U.S.S.R., see in the great Russian people their best friend and guide, their elder brother, who played a decisive role in the struggle for the victory of the proletarian revolution and triumph of socialism.'"⁹ With Russians as big brother, the non-Russian nationalities consequently emerged as "little brothers," faithful Communists ever ready to come to the aid of their Russian big brother to whom they were expected to show their eternal gratitude.

Non-Russians were required to express eternal gratitude to their Russian elder brother because as little brothers they were considered the chief beneficiaries of the Soviet system for which he was responsible for founding. Jeffrey Brooks emphasizes how propaganda made it clear that non-Russians like Stakhanovites "could be nothing outside the (Soviet) system."¹⁰ In 1942 Kalinin, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet expounded on the benefits of the Soviet system on the Caucasus which he characterized as "'the most enlightening demonstration of the reforming beneficial effect of the Soviet system on the psychology and character of people...The Caucasians have

now become a social people who see in the collective system their bulwark, the foundation of material prosperity and a higher intellectual life...the whole Caucasus has become one mountain village for its peoples. The whole Soviet land, from border to border, has become their beloved home.”¹¹ *Pravda* likewise attributed Uzbeks’ and other non-Russians’ achievements to the Soviet system “rather than to indigenous pre-Soviet Uzbek (and other non-Russian) traditions.” Propaganda portrayed these national minorities as making pilgrimages to Moscow to present their “cultural offerings” to their elder Russian brother to whom they owed their uplifted existence. These offerings included everything from musical and theatrical performances to art and architectural exhibits.¹²

Non-Russians themselves followed the script and supported their official image as little brothers and the system’s chief beneficiaries by consistently giving thanks and praise to their elder brother for their civilized existence. The Kirghiz poet Dzhangaziev wrote “Thank you from the land of the Kirghiz,...Thank you, beloved Russian brother, to whom I owe my life.” A national poet from the Uzbek SSR, Gafur Gulyam wrote “‘You are kind, you are truly greater, Oh how dear you are to me, my own, my Russian brother-elder!’” Similar sentiments were captured in the non-Russian republics’ national anthems. The Azeri SSR anthem sang of how “‘the mighty Russian brother is bringing to the land the triumph of freedom and...we have strengthened our friendship and our kinship with him.” In November 1959 Chairman of the Presidium of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet declared that “‘As in a family the elder brother is always regarded with esteem and respect, so in our great family of peoples we regard with respect, esteem, love, devotion and fidelity our dear elder brother, the great Russian people from which all peoples are learning to build a new life, and are learning courage, heroism, self-sacrifice and wisdom.”¹³

Soviet leaders sought to convince themselves and the world that the Soviet Union was in both theory and practice an inclusive, multinational community based on the



friendship of peoples. Consequently, in the mid-1930s in conjunction with the friendship discourse officials launched a concerted effort to make non-Russians more visible and thereby render the imagined community as real as possible. Pictures of non-Russians donning ethnic garb and/or hairstyles began to appear more frequently in the all-union press, those who looked most distinctly non-Russian were particularly exhibited as labor heroes at agricultural conferences and served as delegates at republican and national congresses.¹⁴ Thus especially during the 1930s, to “look non-Russian” was to some degree advantageous for members of non-Russian nationalities.

Soviet leaders also promoted intercultural activity in order to make non-Russians more visible and to further prove to themselves and the global audience that the Soviet Union was genuinely an inclusive, multinational community. Stalin proclaimed that all Soviet nationalities uniquely enriched world culture and beginning in the mid-1930s he called on them to share these valuable contributions as part of this friendship of peoples. Armenian music was consequently played on Kazakh radio, Uzbek art was displayed in Azerbaijan galleries, and Tajik poetry was recited in the Ukrainian SSR.¹⁵ Most significantly, because Soviet leaders used Moscow as the primary stage from which to project this image of the Soviet Union as a multinational community, the policy of intercultural activity systematically brought non-Russians to Moscow. Beginning in 1936 and continuing until the outbreak of war a series of festivals known as *dekady* (ten-day period) were held in the capital which allowed for the exhibition of officially sponsored non-Russian people. In the first year this included Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Georgians, in 1937 Uzbeks and Tajiks, in 1938 Azeris, in the fourth year Kirghiz and Armenians made the pilgrimage and finally 1940 welcomed Azeris, Tajiks and Belorussians.¹⁶ Yuri Slezkine characterized this type of intercultural activity as “one of the most visible aspects of Soviet official culture” which was ingrained in popular consciousness from the mid-1930s through 1980.¹⁷

As a result of the Soviet state's persistent commitment to projecting the image of the Soviet Union as an all-inclusive community based on the peace and friendship of peoples, even when this "brotherhood" started to crumble, Soviet television news broadcasts initially provided no coverage of the ethnic strife which erupted in various regions.¹⁸ Such coverage would have required Moscow to both depict non-Russians in a negative manner and to explain how ethnic conflict which was officially non-existent existed. Thus the official images disseminated throughout the union and most especially on display in Moscow over a nearly fifty year period were non-Russians as cultural figures: Azeris as artists, Armenians as poets, Georgians as musicians and Uzbeks as dancers. These official images of non-Russians would be replaced in the post-Communist period by Azeris as drug traffickers, Armenians as number-runners, Georgians as car thieves and Uzbeks as weapons dealers.

The Party used Moscow as the stage from which to project the image of the Soviet Union as an all-inclusive, multinational community by systematically inviting individuals from African and Asian countries to study in its institutions of higher learning.¹⁹ These students, in whom Soviet leaders clearly had a vested interest because of their desire to spread socialism to Third World nations were provided with scholarships, generous stipends and the opportunity to be firsthand witnesses to the workings of the Communist system without any fear for their safety.²⁰ The clearest example of this accommodation of students from Third World countries can be found in the establishment of the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University the announcement of which was made by Khrushchev in February 1960 during his address at the Hadja Mada University in Indonesia.²¹ In 1958 when Soviet leaders started accepting significantly larger numbers of students into the capital's university system from Asia, Africa and Latin America, they discovered the problems of training foreign students in regular higher education facilities. The Friendship University which was renamed Patrice Lumumba University in 1961 after the Congolese revolutionary's assassination was to address these problems.²²

Unlike the average Soviet institution of higher learning which Africans and Asians also continued to attend, the Friendship University was organized to cater to the needs and interests of African, Asian, and Latin American students. Thus, for example visual learning was often emphasized over the straight lecture and students were not required to study the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) as they would have been had they attended any other Soviet educational institutions.²³ If the student lacked a high school level education or could not speak Russian s/he was enrolled in a three-year or one-year preliminary training program which would precede his four year academic or five year medical program.²⁴ In addition to their monthly stipend, students did not have to pay for transportation to Moscow, for their tuition, textbooks, housing, furniture, winter clothing and medical care.²⁵ The Soviet Union's stated mission in opening its universities to foreign students and in establishing the Friendship University was to eradicate the backwardness which was the legacy of Western imperialism. Moscow officials claimed they were helping the newly independent countries remain independent by educating and training specialists.²⁶ The Friendship University observed the Independence Days of the students' various home countries in order to emphasize this mission.²⁷ Soviet officials' primary objective was therefore no longer to produce good Communists but to prepare Africans to run non-Communist institutions including professional academies, student agencies and trade unions.²⁸

Soviet leaders were largely successful in presenting the country's image as an inclusive, multinational community. Many African Americans flocked to the Soviet Union because they did believe in this official image of the Soviet Union as a community which had discovered the cure for racism.²⁹ Communist leaders had invited many of them to live and work in Moscow as a means of furthering the image of the Soviet Union as an all-inclusive, multinational community. These invitees included African American technicians, cultural figures, pilots and skilled laborers both those who were and were not affiliated with the Communist Party. African Americans were well-represented in the

Communist University for the Toilers of the East (also known as the Far East University) in Moscow which the Comintern had established in 1921 for the instruction of Communist Party leaders. The Party made their black invitees as visible as possible by giving them places on reviewing stands in Red Square for May Day celebrations and having them elected to the Moscow Soviet alongside such figures as Stalin, Molotov and Khrushchev.³⁰ The state also sought to make African Americans feel as welcome as possible by making them the beneficiaries of a reverse racial inequality which allowed them to jump to the front of long lines, to receive goods and services for free and to earn high salaries.³¹ The majority of these black pilgrims who came on specific Moscow invitation were not displeased with their findings. Paul Robeson explained how “in the Soviet Union I felt like a person for the first time.” Robeson marveled at how in school children were taught to treat people equally and how no thought was even given to skin color.³² Yelena Khanga whose African-American grandfather moved to the Soviet Union in 1931 to help build this new society without racism testified to this. In her autobiography *Soul to Soul*, Khanga explained how unlike blacks in American schools she was “never made to feel less intelligent, less capable, less likely to achieve than my white schoolmates.”³³ William Patterson was impressed by the absence of racism when he was sent to the Soviet Union by the Communist Party Worker’s School in 1927 to study its cure. During his four year residence in Moscow Harry Haywood was subjected to only one instance of racial insult and when this occurred the man (who reportedly was drunk) was detained by bystanders until the police arrived.³⁴

Although the Soviet Union did become a “mecca of human rights” for oppressed people of color all around the world, African and Asian students were not always treated in a manner which was consistent with official discourse. One African student who left his program prior to its completion testified to this slippage between image and reality when he explained that “Russians consider us an inferior race and treated us accordingly.” Many Russians resented blacks because of the privileged treatment they received and

because they were never as grateful and subservient to their gracious Communist benefactors as everyday Russians thought they should be.³⁵ Significantly, the racism these students experienced took place on an individual rather than official level. Etienne Balibar has emphasized the importance of making the distinction between sociological racism (racism from below) and institutional/official racism (racism from above) and this is especially important when comparing the Communist and post-Communist periods.³⁶

The integral difference between these two eras is that the popular racism that African and Asian students experienced was not supported by official racism under Soviet rule. Instead, Soviet leaders counteracted it by systematically pumping out positive propaganda in an attempt to demonstrate to the world and to themselves that the Soviet Union as proven in the Moscow experience was an inclusive community based on racial equality.³⁷ Moscow released booklets lauding the merits of Lumumba and Moscow State Universities by incorporating the voices and testimony of the African and Asian students whom they so nobly served. In striking contrast to the comments of the African student mentioned above, Kom David Dagobert explained that “‘After the lecture (at Moscow State University) we would often go for a walk and wherever we went, Muscovites would come up to us, ask us about our country and our people. We saw what warm feelings that Russians cherished for us and how concerned they were for the destiny of long-suffering Africa.’”³⁸ Other students were quoted praising the Soviet Union for schooling them in modern science and for helping Africa truly liberate itself.³⁹ Two separate students from India and Sudan claimed that Muscovites demonstrated their infinite hospitality “‘everywhere-in the streets, at the University, or in their homes’ and thus “‘we are never allowed to feel, even for a moment, that we are in a strange country.’”⁴⁰ Gunad Prasad Mukerji explained that what really “‘strikes us Hindus...is the complete absence of racialism or discrimination.” He emphasized that as testimony to Russians’ commitment to humanism everyone from Somalis to Vietnamese received equal medical treatment in Moscow hospitals.⁴¹

The relationship between Russians on the one hand and Africans, African-Americans and Asians on the other was not couched in familial terms as was their relationship with the non-Russian Soviet nationalities. Instead of the big brother/little brother dichotomy, Africans and African-Americans' subordination to Russians was framed in a positive manner in a teacher/student dichotomy. Russians instructed them in the tenets of Communism and schooled them in the practical skills they needed to remain independent of Western capitalists. While Soviet leaders portrayed white Western capitalists in a blatantly negative manner, the images of Africans and African-Americans disseminated in the Soviet media and schools were consistently as victims of oppression. This imagery fueled Russians feelings of intellectual superiority⁴² and paved the way for Africans' and African-Americans' post-Communist racialization.

Communist leaders never used the registration system as a tool by which to racialize non-Russians in Moscow. Soviet society was officially imagined as an inclusive community and the *propiska* or residence permit system merely allowed authorities to guarantee that everyone had his proper place. The Bolsheviks had initially abolished the internal passport and residence registration systems through a 20 June 1923 statute "On the Establishment of Identity" because they constrained an individual's freedom of movement.⁴³ However in 1932, Soviet leaders reinstituted the residence permit system thereby making possession of a *propiska* mandatory for all citizens sixteen years and older in order to receive an education, get married, and obtain legal employment. They justified such actions on the ideological level as the necessary means by which to expel "class, alien elements" while more practically seeking to curtail the growth of large cities by curbing the exodus from the famine ravaged countryside.⁴⁴ The registration system required an individual to obtain formal permission to live and work in Moscow and this permission if granted took the form of a stamp in the person's internal passport.⁴⁵ This regime allowed law enforcement officials to monitor peoples' movement by confining every citizen to one legal place of residence.

During the Communist era, Moscow's status as the "most privileged city" in the Union where consumer goods were relatively abundant and its place as the stage from which the image of the Soviet Union as an inclusive community was projected rendered the Moscow *propiska* highly coveted and difficult to obtain.⁴⁶ Stalin had done his best to establish Moscow as the center of Soviet life and a visit to Moscow for an honored *kolkhoznik* was considered a reward in itself.⁴⁷ Although Moscow remained an overwhelmingly Russian city in terms of population throughout the Soviet period, Russians could never legitimately claim the city as their own. Its primary identity was as the capital of a multinational Union of peoples and in 1960 Brezhnev declared that "'to make Moscow a model Communist City is the bounden duty of the entire Soviet People.'"⁴⁸ For these reasons, Moscow occupied a special place in Soviet legislation. Special laws were instituted in April 1958 which invested Moscow authorities with the power to cleanse the capital of individuals who were engaged in socially suspect activity.⁴⁹ Residence decrees were periodically adopted (on 25 June 1964 and 27 April 1972) which rendered entry into Moscow increasingly difficult and an extremely detailed set of passport laws (were implemented in February 1975 which) identified the twenty-three categories of people who could be registered as residents of the capital.⁵⁰

By euphemizing the existing power relations between the Russian and non-Russian people through the use of the big brother/little brother dichotomy, Soviet officials were claiming that this friendship had become so close and had reached such a high level under Communism that the Russian and non-Russian nationalities considered each other as not merely friends but brothers. Little brother status as the system's principal beneficiaries meant wide cultural autonomy but denial of the full political power which was integral to Russians' identity as the elder or superior sibling. This fundamental component of ethnic Russian identity which denied non-Russians their political independence ultimately proved problematic for the existence of this brotherhood of peoples. This is because political independence was the end goal of all the nationalistic rhetoric which the Soviet system

paradoxically fueled.⁵¹ Non-Russians renounced the fidelity and respect which the system claimed they owed their “dear elder brother” by seceding from the Soviet Union thereby ending the friendship of peoples which in the words of Khrushchev had been the source of the country’s “invincibility.” Moscow was able so quickly to portray and conceive of their former little brothers as criminals and parasites because according to the logic of the official Soviet script non-Russians’ foolish secession from the system in which they were the chief beneficiaries simply meant their degeneration to their pre-Soviet uncivilized existence. Non-Russians’ degeneration to criminals justified Moscow’s reimagining of the community to exclude them.

CHAPTER 2: THE FALL OF COMMUNISM AND THE RISE OF THE STATE OF DISORDER

In a work entitled the *Foundations of Ethnography* from the early 1970s, Soviet ethnographers made it a point to note in their discussion of the physical anthropology of ethnic groups of the Caucasus that “the majority of the population is dark in pigmentation...(but that)...Lighter color hair and eyes can be found among the population of Western Georgia in the mountains of the High Caucasus and also among the Abkhaz and Adyges.”¹ For roughly seventy years, the Soviet system had worked to develop the distinct national identities of many of the peoples from this region and other non-Slavic areas, but the fall of communism has reduced all of them to their “dark pigmentation.”

In his essay, “The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusions, Fabrication and Choice,” Haney-Lopez explained how when Mexico gained its independence, American leaders did not conceive of its residents as a race. However twenty years later, due to changes in American interests, in dominant ideology and in political, social and economic conditions, “Mexicans” became racialized or degraded in racial terms, and transformed from a nationality to a race.² Upon the fall of the Soviet Union, the dominant ideology obviously collapsed and Russians’ interests and the political, social and economic conditions in Moscow underwent drastic changes. Official propaganda about non-Russian nationalities and the friendship of peoples disappeared as the little brothers turned ungratefully on their Russian big brother, gaining their independence and the complete political power which he had consistently denied them and which had been so integral to his national identity. Russians sought to maintain some form of inequality (no longer in its positive, familial form) between themselves and their non-Russian former colonials as a result of the latter’s acquisition of complete political independence. The former colonial master accomplished this by racializing the non-Slavic nationalities, by systematically speaking of them and treating them in a demeaning manner. Through this dehumanizing rhetoric and policy, officials lumped together all dark-skinned



non-Slavs irrespective of their national differences into the discursively constructed category “blacks.” The myriad of different nationalities from the Caucasus were especially reduced in legislation, the media and popular thinking into what quickly became the extremely derogatory if not racial categories of “individuals of Caucasian nationality” and “Caucasians.”³

A class component clearly exists in this post-Communist racialization process for all official rhetoric and corresponding measures against non-Slavic nationalities have been geared towards portraying the former little brothers as “criminals” and “parasites.” Consequently, for “Azeris,” “Georgians,” “Chechens” the fall of Communism has meant their transformation from what the Communist era had made distinct nationalities who contributed positively and uniquely to world culture into a criminal Caucasian race. As the term “little brothers” suggests, initially authorities targeted the dark-skinned male in their racializing discourse and enforcement of the registration system and not his female counterpart. The man of color was racialized as predatory and criminal (morally weak) as opposed to effeminate and physically weak and his mere presence in the public sphere was denounced as dangerous. The image of the dark-skinned woman as criminal and or dangerous has not been as readily available to authorities because Moscow’s ethnic criminal organizations are predominately male and the Caucasian vendors in the capital’s markets who are resented for “buying low and selling high” are overwhelmingly men. However, because race has its own “autonomous effectivity” which renders every dark-skinned individual suspect⁴ it is not surprising that by 1997 law enforcement officials began defining women of color as a threat to societal order by increasingly subjecting them to the daily harassment that dark-skinned men had been victims of since the Soviet Union’s collapse.

The dark-skinned woman poses a different type of threat to the capital’s law and order than her male counterpart. Moscow officials do not necessarily conceive of her as constituting disorder for the capital in terms of crime but see the woman of color as

threatening disorder in the sense of placing a greater burden on the capital's resources. This is because she is frequently accompanied by her children and her presence often communicates to city officials and residents that the man to whom she is almost always connected intends on staying in the city beyond the short-term period. The dark-skinned woman who is in Moscow by herself can also be considered dangerous because she constitutes a threat to the sexual purity of the newly imagined white, Slavic community and to the maintenance of the strict boundary between black and white.

Haney-Lopez emphasized that races are relationally constructed and that the "denigration of Mexicans" was inseparable from "the celebration of Anglos, something Etienne Balibar defines as hetero-referential and auto-referential racism."⁵ Similarly, the denigration of Chechens, Azeris, Armenians and Uzbeks is inseparable from the celebration of Russians for by racially defining individuals of Caucasian and Central Asian nationality Russians are also racially defining themselves. Therefore Russians have gone from their role as big brother to that of racial superior.

The collapse of the Soviet Union similarly rendered Africans' and Asians' identity as students of Communism and the corresponding teacher/student dichotomy irrelevant. Similar to the big brother/little brother relationship between Russians and the Soviet national minorities, Russians reconceptualized what had essentially been a positive power imbalance or unequal relationship between themselves and Africans and Asians (epitomized in the teacher/student dichotomy) into a negative one, racial superior/inferior. Consequently, Russians, the former teacher became racial superior by remaining indifferent to and actively encouraging the racialization of Africans and Asians.

Along with the racial, class and gender components of the racialization process which has rendered the man of color "black," "criminal" and "predatory," the process also contains a religious component which renders the dark-skinned Caucasian or Central Asian "Muslim." As discussed earlier, Tim McDaniel argues that to an unparalleled degree Russian national consciousness always has been defined in opposition to something else.⁶

Accordingly, the fall of Communism has caused increasingly more Russians to identify themselves as Orthodox while prompting Russian officials to overemphasize the religious identity of Caucasians and Central Asians as Muslims. Referring to oneself as Orthodox has become another way of identifying oneself as an ethnic Russian and therefore does not necessarily mean the person is a believer, attends Church or partakes in the Sacraments. Similarly, Russian officials' policy of exaggerating individuals of Caucasian and Central Asian nationalities' affiliations with Islam has inadvertently inspired more of them to identify themselves as Muslims.⁷

These developments in identity formation are most relevant in Moscow where the equation of dark-skin with Islam and crime has become commonplace and where Orthodoxy as a component of Russian national identity has become most popular. While more Russians have come to consider themselves Orthodox this has especially been the case among Russians who live in Moscow. In 1993, among all Russians 35 percent of those within the 55-90 age group identified themselves as Orthodox, 32 percent in the 16-25 group, and 27 percent in both the 26-40 and 41-54 age groups. Among Muscovites the differences in percentages are significant: 51 percent of those who ranged in age from 55-90 identified themselves as Orthodox, as did 58 percent of Muscovites in the 16-25 age group, 45 percent in the 26-40 group and 48 percent among individuals 41-54 years of age.⁸ Since the fall of Communism Moscow leaders have symbolically reaffirmed their commitment to the city's identity as the Third Rome by undertaking the very expensive project of reconstructing the Cathedral of Christ the Savior which Stalin had destroyed in the 1930s and which in many ways has become the capital's new defining symbol.⁹

In July 1994, residents on Ostrovityanov Street in Moscow desecrated the stone which marked the place for the future site of an Islamic Center and had written "Blacks Out" on a nearby apartment building. When interviewed inhabitants of this neighborhood revealed that they equated the three elements of "mafiosi-Caucasian-Muslim." They expressed concern that they might have to call on the Cossacks to defend them from the

“blacks” (namely Caucasians, Azeris, Chechens, Dagestanis) who had invaded the capital with their criminal ways and threatened its identity as the Third Rome with their designs to make it “the Second Mecca.”¹⁰ The Congress of Russia’s Communities organized a demonstration against the building of this Islamic Cultural Complex and incited the crowds with exhortations that “Your children will be dismembered and roasted on skewers for shish kebab.” They also drew up a petition to Luzhkov in which they warned that the construction of the Muslim complex would precipitate an increase in the incidence of crime and drug addiction, which would mean undermining our Christian foundations and threaten(ing) our safety.”¹¹

With the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow lost its identity as the capital of a multinational union of peoples and its value as the stage from which Soviet officials projected the image of a country that had discovered the cure for racism. Just as non-Russians were no longer conceived of as little brothers or students of Communism, Moscow was no longer conceived as the capital of Communism or of a multinational brotherhood of peoples. Corresponding with the official reconceptualization of the relationship between Russians and non-Russians from big brother/little brother or teacher/student to racial superior/inferior, the fall of Communism has also precipitated the reconceptualization of the capital’s community from multinational and Communist to exclusively white and democratic. Moscow authorities have used official discourse and the capital’s registration system as the primary and complementary tools¹² by which to racialize people of color in the capital while re-imagining the capital’s community as white and Slavic in order to exclude them. Whereas Communist leaders had used official discourse to praise non-Russian peoples, post-Communist municipal authorities use it to systematically degrade and dehumanize them. Post-Communist Moscow officials have also discovered a new use for the Soviet era registration system. They have used it as one of the primary tools to racialize non-Russians.

The Discourse of Disorder and the Racialization of People of Color

Moscow officials have used a discourse of disorder in which outsiders are denounced for allegedly precipitating a crisis of law and order in order to racialize dark-skinned non-Russians in the capital. Both ethnic Russian colonists and non-Russian colonials are among the outsiders in Moscow who have come from various corners of the empire and who have thus precipitated this alleged crisis. However, it is the latter's presence which is of the greatest concern to Moscow officials. Dark-skinned former colonials who serve as the most visible reminders of empire are those whom authorities are looking to defend the capital against by racializing them and by re-imagining the capital's community as white and Slavic in order to exclude them. However Moscow officials always codify their fears of a "threatening black presence" in the capital as a concern with "migration," "the influx of outsiders," or "the prevalence of unregistered individuals." Thus the terms "outsiders" and "unregistered individuals" consistently serve as code words for people of color.¹³ Municipal authorities routinely characterize outsiders as an "inherently destabilizing force," as criminals who precipitate an increase in crime, and as parasites who overburden the capital's resources and infrastructure.¹⁴ They have even warned that the large number of these outsiders regardless of whether they are refugees, internally displaced persons, asylum-seekers or illegal immigrants, "threaten the city with 'pollution,' 'spreading of various diseases,' and 'economic damage.'"¹⁵ Whereas Communist authorities had considered the settlement of white, Slavic colonists throughout the Soviet empire as beneficial to the non-Slavic population, post-Communist officials denounce the settlement of dark-skinned former colonials among the indigenous white Russian population in Moscow as a threat to the moral, sexual and socio-economic order.¹⁶ Muscovites, who are overwhelmingly of Slavic background, generally understand that officials are speaking of dark-skinned individuals when officials use the term "unregistered individuals" or "outsiders" simply because they are more inclined to consider outsiders to be those who do not look like them.

According to the logic of this discourse of disorder, a crisis of law and order exists in the capital because unregistered individuals (read: people of color) are inherently criminal. The characterization of Moscow as a city under siege and in need of defense from these outsiders is a necessary component of the discourse of disorder yet it is largely inconsistent with reality. Human Rights Watch has reported that “Moscow accounts for only a small share of Russia’s refugee population...Moscow’s share of CIS refugees and displaced persons accounts for a mere 1.5 percent of the Russian Federation total, whereas Moscow constitutes 5.8 percent of the country’s population.”¹⁷ However because this official discourse of disorder has succeeded in racializing the outsider as dangerous, “with danger defined through presence, particularly masculine presence in the public sphere,” regardless of the real number of outsiders in Moscow there are always too many.¹⁸ The mere presence of dark-skinned individuals in the community is considered a threat to law and order because race has its own “autonomous effectivity” and thereby renders every dark-skinned individual “a priori a suspect, a potential criminal; a potential agitator.”¹⁹ By depicting people of color as disruptive and criminal serves as evidence that they lack the basic qualities of decency and civility to even qualify for Muscovite citizenship and admission to the imagined community.

The characterization of outsiders or unregistered individuals as criminals constitutes an important aspect of the racialization of dark-skinned non-Russians and has given rise to a separate discourse of black criminality. Although law enforcement officials have found that residence permits have never historically succeeded in deterring crime, Luzhkov has consistently invoked the inordinate number of crimes outsiders commit as justification for preserving the registration system.²⁰ Luzhkov’s dismissal of these findings betrays that his real targets in maintaining the regime are not criminals (for this would mean including Slavs and excluding a significant number of non-Slavs) but instead people of color whom he casts as the visible scapegoat for the capital’s crime problems in order to justify their expulsion. Sergei A. Kovalyov, chairman of the Presidential Human

Rights Committee astutely observed that “‘it’s easier to catch blacks than to catch criminals.’”²¹

Individuals from the Caucasus are especially singled out in this racializing discourse of criminality. Journalists have accused the capital’s authorities of fostering Muscovites’ associations of crime with Caucasians by consistently using the term “Caucasian” when speaking of both the power of organized crime as well as of the imperative to “cleanse” the capital.²² Luzkhov justified the deportation of large numbers of Caucasians from Moscow by arguing that it was a necessary step in liberating the city from criminal organizations.²³ *Izvestia*’s Irina Dement’eva argued that officials frequently publish short reports about the crimes of the dark-skinned former little brothers like Chechens, Azeris, and Georgians in great disproportion with the general crime statistics in order to create an aura of danger around individuals of Caucasian nationality. She condemned the Russian Ministry of Security for deliberately affecting how uninformed Muscovites viewed Chechens on an everyday basis in the capital’s markets and train stations through incessant discourse and media images about a “Chechen mafia” consistently excluding from their portrayal of Moscow’s Chechen community the “good Chechens,” namely the children, students on Moscow visas, workers, servants, maids, cultural workers, scientific workers, economists, lawyers and police officers who positively contribute to the community.²⁴ It would be inaccurate to argue that Caucasians and dark-skinned individuals were not associated with crime at the popular level during the Communist era. However the significant difference between the Communist and post-Communist periods is that these popular stereotypes are no longer being systematically countered by official images of dark-skinned non-Russians as loyal Communists and cultural figures. One woman from the Caucasus explained that “‘They say we are lazy, that we steal, that we are parasites on the backs of Moscow...For forty-five years I slaved for this country and now, because I am from the Caucasus, I’m treated like a human being of the lowest sort.’”²⁵ Actively promoting the Russian masses’

popular association of people of color (especially Caucasians) with crime translates into greater support for Moscow when it pursues imperialist policies in regions of the former empire.²⁶

Although journalists have been at the forefront of condemning Moscow officials for actively promoting the association of crime with individuals of Caucasian nationality, they do acknowledge that this portrayal does have some basis in reality. In November 1992, as published in *Moskovsky Novosti*, the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department (CID) reported that 82% of narcotic dealers were from the Transcaucasus. It explained that the most powerful of the nationalities from this region were Azerbaijanis who numbered between 15,000-20,000 and who had successfully taken over the business of the Gypsies, Armenians, and Georgians in the capital's drug market.²⁷ In October 1994 *Izvestia* reported that Azeris had the most numerous criminal organizations in Moscow, followed by Chechens, Dagestanis, Armenians, Georgians, Ingush and Tatars.²⁸ Both *Izvestia* and *Moskovsky Novosti* have discussed the specialties of each of these ethnic criminal organizations: Chechens were prominent in the illegal export of petroleum, petroleum products, rare-earth metals, as well as the banking and auto business (stolen cars) which caused them to frequently clash with Russian criminal organizations; Azeris controlled drug-trafficking and monopolized trade in the capital's markets; Tatars were active in economic crime, blackmailing and racketeering; Armenians thrived in the business of thefts from and of automobiles, swindling and bribery; Georgians mastered burglary, theft, robbery and hostage-taking; Ingush were involved in gold mining and weapons; Dagestanis specialized in prostitution as well as mercenary, violent and property crimes; and Ossetians dabbled in the weapons trade, racketeering and blackmailing.²⁹

In 1994, *Izvestia* reported that over fifty percent of crimes were committed by individuals from the Transcaucasus and North Caucasian republics and that over the past seven years the criminal rate among representatives from these regions had increased by 250 percent.³⁰ Two years later the figures *Sevognya* published from the deputy director

of Moscow's regional administration for combating organized crime, Mikhail Suntsov, were lower.³¹ Suntsov claimed that individuals from the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia committed only 17% of all crimes propagated by non-Muscovites and he attributed Caucasians' involvement in criminal activity to the drastic deterioration in the political and economic conditions in these areas and the active vigilance of local law enforcement organizations. Furthermore, he argued that Azeris were still the most habitual offenders in Moscow out of all individuals of Caucasian nationality because of the significant size of the capital's Azeri diaspora. Suntsov explained that its well-organized criminal operations had allowed it to gain a virtual monopoly over all street and market trade (not to mention narcotics) through which they made significant amounts of money illegally and which they then "'laundered' in legal enterprises."³² At the same time in 1996, Moscow law enforcement officials expressed increasing concern about the growing involvement of Armenian and Dagestani criminal organizations in "extortion involving hostage-taking and racketeering targeted against commercial enterprises." While the activity of these ethnic criminal organizations was increasing, Suntsov explained that Chechen groups had become less active and had "'ceased to have any substantial influence on the crime situation in the capital."³³ Such figures are surprising when considering the official image of Chechen as criminal which has emerged from Moscow authorities' discourse and policies. Although journalists and human rights officials acknowledge Caucasians' high representation in the capital's criminal underworld they emphasize that this does not justify the denunciation and treatment of all individuals of Caucasian nationality as criminals.

Another type of racializing discourse has emerged from the rhetoric of disorder which like that of criminality singles out Caucasians. Human rights investigators and Izvestia journalists have denounced Moscow officials for particularly blaming Caucasians not only for the capital's escalating crime rate but also for its economic crisis.³⁴ The *kulak* was the class scapegoat in the Soviet countryside and his purported exploitation of

the poorer peasants demanded his liquidation. Similarly, individuals of Caucasian nationality have become the scapegoats for the capital's economic problems. A rhetoric of economic exploitation not unlike its Soviet predecessor has risen up around Caucasians which depicts them not only as criminals but also as ruthless exploiters who are responsible for keeping the prices high in Moscow's markets.³⁵ *Izvestia* journalists have emphasized how individuals from the Caucasus had not always been portrayed as or perceived as the enemy but that this changed when reports began to circulate that "too many of them" were flooding into the capital, that merchants from this region were draining Russia dry, and that it was their monopoly of the trade in Moscow's markets that kept prices so high.³⁶ Human Rights Watch denounced municipal authorities for blaming non-Russians especially those of Caucasian nationality for the capital's severe economic crisis which resulted from the collapse of the administrative-command economy. Caucasians are an easy target for such accusations because during the Communist era, they often served as small traders, selling fresh fruit, flowers and vegetables in the markets of northern Russia which they had obtained from the 'black-market economy' that thrived in Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Ethnic Russians and other Slavs typically were not as well represented in this type of work. Consequently, when the country embarked on a path towards a free-market economy, individuals of Caucasian nationality were in a more advantageous position to capitalize on it than Slavs who worked in science, industry and other sectors of the economy. Caucasians' greater experience with private enterprise and their high level of geographical mobility as migrants rendered many of them well-disposed for Moscow's marketplaces. Therefore, Moscow authorities and the mass media found it easy to make individuals of Caucasian nationality the scapegoat for the capital's economic problems and simply conducted "an ill-disguised racist campaign demonizing traders" from this region.³⁷

This official racialization of Caucasian merchants couched in a discourse of economic exploitation has only fueled racism at the popular level. Russians who consider

themselves “true” workers engaged in “honest” “productive” work resent Caucasian traders for making more money than they do. Most of these sedentary Russians are accustomed to the state trade and fixed prices of the markets of the Communist period and thus they disdain as criminal the Caucasian who buys low and sells high. Consequently, the term “individual of Caucasian nationality” as used in post-Communist Moscow has acquired the negative associations of “wild free market capitalism” and “speculation.”³⁸ Thus the livelihood of many Caucasians which requires that they constantly be in Moscow’s markets makes them even more visible and vulnerable to police abuse. As a result of the October 1993 clean-up campaign of individuals of Caucasian nationality, many of Moscow’s markets’ southern traders were expelled. Although these dark-skinned merchants from the Caucasus had been consistently blamed for keeping the prices high in Moscow through their alleged monopoly of the markets, *Izvestia* reported that Luzhkov’s deportation of a significant number of them had caused prices to increase by 100-200 percent.³⁹

By making outsiders the scapegoats for the capital’s crime, economic and even housing problems, Moscow officials have exonerated themselves and the political system itself of any blame.⁴⁰ The hetero-referential and auto-referential components of this racializing discourse of disorder are quite evident for Slavic Moscow officials have posited themselves as representatives of a superior law-abiding race⁴¹ by speaking of dark-skinned outsiders as a destabilizing, criminal force. Municipal authorities have proven the validity of the statement that racism historically reduces the complex to the simple because they have blamed outsiders (read: dark-skinned individuals) as one unified, pathological whole for all societal ills. In this manner, Moscow officials have glossed over the real roots of the capital’s major economic and societal problems and any chance of seriously addressing them.⁴²

The fall of Communism has made it easier for Muscovites to recognize the enemy because he is no longer identified by his class status but by his skin color and non-Slavic

features. Although municipal officials have provided the public (read: white residents of Moscow) with some degree of reassurance by identifying groups outside the officially imagined community as the threat to society,⁴³ their primary objective has been to convince Muscovites that a crisis of law and order exists in the capital because of this outsider or black presence. During the October 1993 state of emergency police posted notices in buildings throughout the city calling on Muscovites to make use of the twenty-four confidential hot lines to give information on violations of the registration system or on other issues concerning the preservation of societal order.⁴⁴ The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Luzhkov himself have called on upstanding Muscovites fulfill their duty by notifying law enforcement agencies of the addresses of any individuals whom they suspect to be residing in the capital without a residence permit. *Izvestia* condemned this as an invitation for denunciation and claimed that such blatant recruitment of informers was not even known in the Stalinist era.⁴⁵ Inhabitants of the capital or of any city are more inclined to suspect outsiders or unregistered individuals to be those who neither look like them (because they have darker skin, eyes and hair) nor act like them (because they have different customs). Human Rights Watch/Helsinki has thus criticized this policy for both encouraging Muscovites to differentiate dark-skinned individuals from the rest of the capital's populace and for promoting the popular association of people of color with crime.⁴⁶ This is clearly a case where official racism reinforces popular racism for state discourse about the disorder outsiders wrought only validates Muscovites' condemnation of their dark-skinned neighbors' customs as barbaric. The "alien" cultures of people of color in Moscow are considered to be either the cause if not the most blatant indication of the breakdown of this putative traditional "Russian way of life."⁴⁷

In the aftermath of the October state of emergency, *Nezavisimaya gazeta* reported that Muscovites considered Luzhkov justified in calling on them to inform on all "blacks" who had invaded the capital's community.⁴⁸ Muscovites' enthusiastic response to this official call prompted the characterization of the capital as a "city of informants or

stool-pigeons,” a characterization which does not fall far from that of Soviet society.⁴⁹ A Georgian woman explained how old Russian women in her neighborhood serve as informants to the cops on the activity of “individuals of Caucasian nationality” and how they have notified the police when relatives have come to visit her in the capital.⁵⁰ When a Georgian woman from Abkhazia asked a police officer how they knew of her and her family’s whereabouts since they had only recently arrived in the capital, he explained that it “was very simple” because neighbors had learned to inform on “individuals of Caucasian nationality” and police were vigilant “not dozing.”⁵¹ The registration system is supposed to deter crime but the mayor’s call for informants only fosters corruption by allowing neighbors of dark-skinned non-Russians to extort money from the latter as the price for not informing them.⁵² Even after this officially declared October 1993 state of emergency was over, municipal authorities were successful in convincing Muscovites that a crisis of law and order exists in the capital. In 1995, Helsinki Watch investigators reported that most Muscovites considered law enforcement officials’ campaigns against “blacks” in the capital as a necessary “compromise” of human rights in order to uphold the law and order to which true Muscovites (read: ethnic Russians) were entitled. Ninety percent of those polled responded that they were “extremely worried” about Moscow’s crime rate and they believed that the existence of the registration system was integral to the preservation of law and order.⁵³

Whereas the state originally refrained from providing coverage of the ethnic conflicts which erupted throughout various regions of the empire, this policy changed by the last days of the Soviet system and especially following its official collapse. This strife conveniently worked to reinforce the former older brother’s claim that his non-Russian younger brothers were incapable of governing themselves without his guidance and were degenerating to their pre-Soviet uncivilized existence because of their secession. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki accused the media of deliberately skewing its coverage of the ethnic conflict which rocked places like Nagorno- Karabakh and Southern Ossetia.

Activists argue that instead of elaborating on the true causes and the arguments of both sides the media depicted these ethnic conflicts as the result of mere hooliganism or as rooted in the inherently violent nature of these non-Russian peoples. The media's focus on the violent deportations and pogroms rather than the peaceful demonstrations and strikes fostered among the populace the image of Caucasians as "wild mountain men" and further reinforced the propaganda that they were nothing but violent barbarians without the Soviet system.⁵⁴ This kind of coverage deliberately affects how Muscovites view representatives or refugees from these regions who arrive in the capital seeking refuge. The only logical conclusion that Muscovites could draw is that their presence will only succeed in threatening the capital's law and order.

By seeking to convince Muscovites that a crisis of law and order exists in the capital as a result of the threatening black presence, Moscow officials have succeeded in inciting popular racist feelings. The existence of *chernofobiya*, a fear of dark-skinned non-Russians and *Kavkazfobiya*, a fear of individuals of Caucasian nationality at the official level has only legitimized and promoted it among the Russian masses.⁵⁵ The official discourse of disorder and government efforts to foster the association of crime with individuals of Caucasian nationality has fueled popular fears and stereotypes and made it more acceptable to express them. In May 1992 *Izvestia* printed the letters of numerous readers who lauded the actions of law enforcement officials against Chechens during the February 1992 round-up, welcomed similar measures against Azeris and other Caucasians, and insisted that the police's brutality was necessary in order to protect the inhabitants of Moscow and to cleanse it of the dregs of society who were taking over and "buying (it) up." Irina Dement'eva, an *Izvestia* journalist emphasized that such a public response would have been unthinkable under Communism just a few years earlier.⁵⁶

Russian newspapers publish advertisements of apartments for rent advising individuals of Caucasian nationality against applying because only Russians qualified.⁵⁷ The Ghanian writer, Kester Klomegah claimed that racist cartoons, pejorative terms and

inflammatory statements had become fixtures in the Russian press and that in an article about the murder of an African studying at Patrice Lumumba University, *Moskovsky Komsomolets* had reported that this institution was one of the best for learning foreign languages because “black monkeys” begin to speak Russian only a few months following their departure from the African rain forest. He criticized *Argumenty i Fakty* for referring to the African students at Patrice Lumumba University as “children” and explained how racial slurs which included “filthy nigger,” “chocolate,” “black monkey or ape,” “Snickers,” and “Uncle Ben” had become commonplace in the press and on the streets.⁵⁸ Human Rights Watch/Helsinki investigators have similarly found that popular animosity towards people of color had come to be expressed freely in public and that the racial cry “You Blacks-Get out of Russia” was heard quite frequently on the metro, on the buses and in the markets.⁵⁹

Moscow officials’ success at inciting Muscovites’ racist feelings through their discourse of disorder and corresponding racialization of dark-skinned non-Russians, has been captured in statistics released by the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Sociological Research, its Center for the Sociology of Interethnic Relations as well as the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion and Human Rights Watch/Helsinki. The Institute’s Center for the Sociology of Interethnic Relations reported that whereas in 1992, 32 percent of Muscovites polled responded that the city’s interethnic relations were stable, this figure had plummeted to 14 percent in 1995. Likewise, those Muscovites who sensed the existence of a certain degree of interethnic tension in the capital steadily increased from 34 percent in 1992, to 46 percent in 1993 to 49 percent in 1994 and 51 percent in 1995.⁶⁰

Municipal authorities have singled out individuals of Caucasian nationality in their discourse of crime and disorder and statistics reveal that Muscovites have the most hostile feelings towards these Caucasians. Human Rights Watch reported that between 30 and 34 percent of ethnic Russians surveyed in 1994 said they did not trust Azeris, Armenians, or

Chechens.⁶¹ The Institute of Sociological Research reported in late July 1996 that of all non-Russian nationalities Muscovites had the most negative feelings towards Caucasians, as 28 percent of those polled expressed animosity towards them, a number which they claimed had increased significantly from 18 percent in 1995.⁶² The All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion reported in May 1998 that Russians felt the most hostility for Azeris and Chechens and that of all Russian cities ethnic intolerance was most rampant in Moscow.⁶³ One journalist has argued that anti-Caucasian sentiment has replaced anti-Semitism as the major xenophobic force in the capital. Similarly, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki investigators reported in 1998 that it was no longer Jews but ethnic Caucasians who constituted the primary targets for the manipulation of popular ethnic xenophobic feeling.⁶⁴ This hardly means that Jews are no longer discriminated against or that anti-Semitism is non-existent but simply that for the time being they have ceased to be the main scapegoat.

Sevognya and *Moskovsky komsomolets* have both argued that racist feelings had noticeably started to emerge in Moscow in 1993 and that by 1997 they had taken the organized form of roughly twenty different skinhead groups whose members numbered over 10,000. They explained that although they all had different orientations, these groups targeted individuals who by their assessment were “non-white” including Africans, African-Americans, Asians, Caucasians or essentially anyone whom authorities had succeeded in racializing as blacks.⁶⁵ The All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion reported that in the fall of 1993 more than 60 percent of Muscovites were to some degree “anti-black.”⁶⁶ Similarly, in 1996, the Center for the Sociology of Interethnic Relations found that for Muscovites under the age of twenty, 58 percent had negative feelings towards non-Russians.⁶⁷ These findings indicate that official discourse had succeeded in promoting the development of racist feelings among Muscovites thereby creating a well-spring of approval for their racist enforcement of the registration system which will be discussed below.

The Discourse of Disorder as the Justification for the Existence of the Registration System

Moscow officials have not only used the discourse of disorder to racialize dark-skinned non-Russians and incite popular racism against them, but also to justify the continued existence of the registration system and to allow Moscow to operate as its own state above federal and international law. In 1991, the USSR Constitutional Supervision Committee had abolished the residence permit system (effective 1 January 1992) because it violated an individual's right to freedom of movement. However cities which were threatened by substantial levels of in-migration due to the empire's collapse immediately ratified municipal legislation reinstituting the regime.⁶⁸ Moscow was especially affected as individuals from various regions of the crumbling empire flocked to the former capital, fleeing severe economic crises, ethnic conflicts and rampant unemployment, all of which were direct or indirect products of Moscow's policies. Mayor Yury Luzhkov adamantly insisted that the only way to "defend" the capital from this "revenge" of the empire and preserve stability and order was through the maintenance of the Soviet *propiska*. In 1993, President Yelstin sought to eliminate the last municipal vestiges of the registration system through the ratification of the constitutional law "On the Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation to the Freedom of Movement and Choice of Place of Arrival and Residence within the Boundaries of the Russian Federation." Luzhkov conveniently used the October 1993 state of emergency in Moscow as reason to postpone and ultimately avoid implementing this new constitutional law. Even after the end of this officially declared state of emergency, Moscow's mayor continued to claim that a crisis of law and order still existed in the capital thereby precluding any chance of abolishing the *propiska* and abiding by the Constitution in the near future.

Luzhkov and Moscow officials are actually the "winners" by depicting themselves as losers in the struggle for the restoration of public order because it augments their power and resource base.⁶⁹ The Moscow Migration Service has been accused of actually

padding the figures of the number of unregistered individuals in the capital in order to receive more money and justify their police measures against dark-skinned “undesirables.”⁷⁰ Most significantly, Luzhkov’s successful employment of this discourse of disorder allows Moscow to operate as its own state above federal law. A Federal Migration Service official has responded to complaints about Moscow officials’ efforts to deport refugees by explaining that they were in Moscow not Russia and that Luzhkov’s clean-up directives overrode federal legislation.⁷¹ Thus, whether or not a crisis actually exists in the capital is unimportant. What is important is how municipal authorities have used these claims to gain if not consolidate their desired position of power.⁷² 1995 federal reforms recognized the need to maintain some form of registration system but sought to replace the Soviet era *propiska* in the capital with a system which operated more on the basis of notification rather than permission. However, Luzhkov insisted that the city would not observe the new federal law “On the Right of Citizens of the Russian Federation to the Freedom of Movement, Choice of Place to Stay and Place of Residence in the Confines of the Russian Federation” until the crisis-like conditions which existed in the capital ended.⁷³

Consequently, Moscow’s registration system remained inconsistent with federal standards and the capital continued to exist independent of the state. Newcomers to Moscow are required to make their presence in the capital legal by registering with the police or more specifically with the Directorate for Visas and Registration (UVIR) in order to obtain a temporary residence permit. Whereas federal laws give an individual three days in which to register if the visit is expected to exceed nine days, Moscow, a.k.a. “the city under siege” allots that same individual a mere twenty-four hours if the visit will exceed two days. Human rights officials point to the fact that this twenty-four hour period is insufficient time for people to learn how to register but that it conveniently benefits the city’s coffers by creating a significant number of law breakers.⁷⁴ Although all CIS citizens must register within twenty-four hours of their arrival, dark-skinned non-Russians are the

ones most often caught as offenders because they are more visible on Moscow streets than ethnic Russians who are also non-Muscovites. For the majority of the time this paper covers this temporary residence permit was valid for a maximum of forty-five days and once those forty-five days expired the person had to go through the bureaucratic hassle of trying to extend that stay or else be subjected to steep fines if not ultimate expulsion.

A 9 July 1997 decree extended the maximum time period for which a newcomer was initially allowed to register from this forty-five days to six months. Although the decree also reduced the registration fee significantly from 1.5 million (at the time roughly \$259) to 250,000 rubles (approximately \$43), the Moscow City Department of Internal Affairs (GUVD) began to require that CIS visitors who were staying with friends or family for more than forty-five days “pay 250,000 ‘rent’” to Moszhilservis which supplies gas, electricity, maintenance and sewage to the capital’s housing complexes. This 250,000 ruble rent is in addition to and does not replace the 250,000 ruble basic registration fee required of CIS citizens. Thus an Armenian from Yerevan who is visiting friends in the capital for more than forty-five days had to pay 500,000 rubles up front out of an average monthly salary of 83,000 rubles when he registers with police. Let it be known that federal legislation unlike municipal laws states that the only registration fee required of an individual is one percent of the monthly minimal wage to cover basic government procedure. Additionally, federal law clearly stipulates that CIS citizens (who do not need a visa to enter Russia) have the right to register in the same manner as Russian citizens. However, the procedures and fees discussed above apply to CIS citizens alone and not Russian citizens who are also non-Muscovites. Significantly, the only Russian citizens who are subjected to these fees are ethnic Chechens.⁷⁵ Luzhkov explained that he would discuss amending the legislation so that ethnic Chechens would be considered “Russians” and not have to register as foreigners only after the Chechen government agreed to a peace treaty with Russia.⁷⁶

In regards to the registration system, Luzhkov's claims that a crisis of law and order exists in the capital has not only allowed him to act above federal law but also international laws to which Russia is a signatory. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki activists denounce Moscow's registration system for violating Russia's commitment to Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which guarantees that "everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence."⁷⁷ Furthermore, because an individual without a residence permit cannot obtain lawful employment, medical treatment in a state hospital or school enrollment for their children the registration regime violates the rights of children to medical care and education as guaranteed in Articles 24 and 28 of the UN Convention as well as an individual's right to work as upheld in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.⁷⁸

Another way in which Luzhkov's claims of crisis allow Moscow to operate outside the domain of federal and international law is in regards to "black" refugees and asylum-seekers from both the former Soviet republics and beyond. Moscow officials have decreed that only CIS and Baltic citizens who have a permanent Moscow residence permit or have close relatives who do are eligible for refugee or asylum status.⁷⁹ Consequently, the Federal Migration Service (FMS) often refuses to accept the applications of dark-skinned asylum seekers informing them that there is no possibility that they will receive refugee status in the capital.⁸⁰ Because the overwhelming majority of Moscow's population is Slavic, this policy essentially guarantees the capital's continued monoethnic composition and thereby reinforces its official reconceptualization as white and Slavic. However, this system blatantly violates federal and international laws which uphold an individual's right to asylum. The decentralized and disorganized state of the FMS means that most refugees are unaware of these stringent restrictions on eligibility prior to their arrival in the capital and are then not even able to remedy their situation by applying for asylum for other regions of the Russian Federation.

Furthermore, what makes their situation even worse is that Moscow authorities have made it necessary for refugees to register with the police along with all other outsiders and visitors, thereby placing them in an even more vulnerable position than they were in under the Soviet system. The problem as a Moscow city prosecutor, Vera Pestrakova explains it is that police registration requires proof of a place to live and 18 square meters of living space when most refugees arrive in the city without a place to stay. As a result refugees become trapped in a vicious cycle in Moscow, where they lack status and protection, and where because of their “often distinctive looks,” they are victimized by law enforcement officials for violating the registration system.⁸¹

Refugees living in fields or abandoned lots are unable to meet the proof of residency requirements for registration⁸² and are thus reduced to routinely bribing law enforcement officials not to expel them for their unregistered status. Refugees who the government had at one time settled in Moscow hotels are not in a much better position. Under the pressure of privatization and the desire to sell the hotels, hotel directors frequently refuse to give these refugees the proof of residence documents that they need for police registration in hopes of forcing their departure. The Moscow Migration Service (MMS) has not tried to stop this practice because it wants to resettle all refugees outside the capital. Many refugees resist being removed from their jobs in the capital and resettled in remote areas where the medical and other services are not as highly-developed. The MMS has had a history of issuing resettlement assignments which were nonexistent or were already inhabited by other families and has even evicted refugees without giving them any resettlement assignments.⁸³

The city under siege also defies international and federal law at the expense of African refugees who are seeking asylum in the capital. Russia is obligated by international agreements (the 1951 UN Convention of refugees and its 1976 Protocol) to review applications from all displaced persons in the country, determine within a three month period whether to confer refugee status, and pay for the deportation of those who

are denied such status. However, Russian officials have avoided these requirements “by refusing even to accept asylum applications from refugees. This de facto policy leaves non-Soviet refugees without any legal status, neither as refugees nor even as displaced persons awaiting a decision on status.” Consequently, refugees who have fled conflict-ridden countries like Angola and Rwanda are subjected to police harassment and are unable to gain lawful employment and housing in Moscow.⁸⁴ Representatives of Migration Services justify their violations of international standards by claiming that Moscow cannot afford to deport those who are refused refugee status and by the simple claim that they don’t want to occupy themselves with individuals who would rather gain permanent residence in the wealthier nations of the West. However, human rights officials have emphasized that “despite its own problems, Russia also has a moral responsibility to accept these refugees, most of whom have fled wars in Afghanistan and Africa in which the Soviet Union was a direct or covert participant.”⁸⁵ As a result of these racist policies against blacks from the CIS and beyond, Lidia Grafova of the independent organization of the Coordinating Council for Aid to Refugees and Forced Migrants has denounced the government-sponsored Federal Migration Service as one of the “primary culprits in denying the rights of refugees.”⁸⁶

CHAPTER 3: ENFORCEMENT OF THE REGISTRATION SYSTEM AND THE RACIALIZATION OF PEOPLE OF COLOR

Part I: Political and administrative officials' implementation of the registration system

Luzhkov's exhortations that a crisis of law and order exists in the capital have also allowed Moscow to operate above federal and international laws in the enforcement of the registration system. While the mere existence of the Moscow registration system is in itself a violation of federal and international laws, the manner in which it is enforced by law enforcement and administrative officials infringes on countless other human rights and serves as a major tool in the racialization of dark-skinned non-Russians. In theory the system does not discriminate by race or ethnicity because it is supposed to "defend" Moscow from all outsiders. However, administrative and law enforcement officials have identified the true "outsiders" to be people of color by primarily enforcing registration laws against them.¹ Representatives of the Chechen diaspora in Moscow explained how "the registration process has been implemented exclusively toward dark-skinned immigrants, and then capriciously at best."² Diederik Lohman, director of the Moscow office of Human Rights Watch/Helsinki explained that the capital ostensibly gives the appearance that it welcomes visitors when it "In fact,...remains a closed city at least to what I would call unwanted guests - Chechens, Caucasians, Central Asians, refugees from the Third World..."³ Through the racist enforcement of the registration system administrative and law enforcement officials have sought to make the official reconceptualization of the community as white and Slavic a reality.

In principle, registration and entry (even if it's just temporary) into Moscow should be simple as long as the individual has a place to stay. However, because this community has been officially and popularly reimagined as white and Slavic registration is often an unsuccessful ordeal for the dark-skinned individual. Thus instead of operating as a form of notification to municipal authorities the registration system has continued to function in

a fashion much like that of the Soviet era when by registering an individual was seeking permission to be in the city. Municipal authorities have frequently denied “dark-skinned” immigrants registration, have established bureaucratic obstacles which prevent many of them from receiving it, and have even frightened significant numbers into not even attempting to register⁴ much in the same way that officials in the American South had frightened blacks into not registering to vote. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki reported in 1997 that the majority of asylum seekers “confront a range of obstacles by which they are effectively denied the opportunity to register with the police as residents of Moscow: their failure to do so means they are deemed to be in Moscow illegally.” Members of the capital’s Chechen diaspora explained how Chechens are frequently given the bureaucratic run-around if not physically kicked out of police stations when they have attempted to register.⁵ Director of the independent Coordinating Council for Aid to Refugees and Forced Migrants, Lidia Grafova explained that ever since Luzhkov had launched his October 1993 clean-up campaign to evict Caucasian merchants from the capital, a de facto prohibition of registering Chechens has existed. In his 1995 meetings with representatives of the Moscow Chechen community (which he himself characterized as significant in number between 20,000-40,000 and deep-rooted), Luzhkov vowed to “‘carefully consider’” reconfiguring the capital’s registration procedure for Chechens. Mukhadi Israilov, a Moscow State University professor and 29 year resident of Moscow dismissed this promise as “a purely propagandistic statement.”⁶ Some non-Russians have found that the only way to gain registration and receive a temporary propiska is through bribery. Farkhun Atachiev, a twenty-four year old Azeri explained that he “‘had to keep shoving money across the desk until the police finally agreed to register him.’”⁷

Like their “black” CIS counterparts, African and Asian refugees suffer from administration officials’ abuse of the registration system. Individuals from countries outside the former Soviet Union who are able to submit an application for asylum are also required to register with the police in order to make their presence in the capital

completely legal. However, the central Directorate for Visas and Registration (UVIR) typically refuses to register them. One Somali refugee explained that when he tried to register in the summer of 1996 with the UVIR he was told that the agency did not “recognize refugees” and would only register him if he purchased a plane ticket to Somalia. When one Afghan refugee who had an UNHCR identification card tried to register in the Southern Administrative District of Moscow he was ordered to report to the central UVIR where he was then informed that he lacked the right to register.⁸ Badin Galalia, a Kurdish refugee from Iraq, attempted to register with the UVIR but was told by officials that his UNHCR and MMS certification cards were invalid and they threatened him with arrest if not deportation.⁹ Even Africans and Asians who are awaiting word on their status from the MMS are considered illegal aliens as long as their UNHCR and MMS certification cards do not bear a UVIR stamp signifying police registration. Therefore, individuals from various African countries are represented in the capital’s holding centers (operated by the UVIR) for failing to have registered or for being denied registration. For example, in December 1996 two Somali refugees who had been waiting three years for status determination and whose MMS cards had not yet expired were placed in one of the capital’s holding centers because they were not registered.¹⁰ Officials’ efforts to deport these refugees “to the countries in which they fear persecution” is a blatant violation of Russia’s commitment to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.¹¹

City officials have transformed their official discourse of black criminality into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Denying dark-skinned individuals registration encourages many of them to turn to criminal activity because without a *propiska* they are unable to gain lawful employment.¹² Therefore, while the registration system is supposed to deter crime it actually promotes it because of the way in which administrative officials abuse it. If Caucasians, Central Asians and Africans are not criminals in the obvious sense of complicity in narcotics, robbery or any other criminal activity then Moscow officials have at least made them criminal or forced them to become “unwilling law-breakers” by

rendering it nearly impossible for them to register and gain a legal existence in the capital. Because his existence in Moscow is illegal, the dark-skinned immigrant has no rights and thus is even afraid to lodge a complaint with police and city officials when he is denied registration.¹³ Muscovites in general consider the judicial system to be rife with corruption and lack a basic understanding of the rights that it is supposed to afford them. This is even more the case for dark-skinned non-Russians.¹⁴ Human rights activists emphasize that people of color should be denied permanent or temporary residence for only legitimate reasons such as public health concerns, national security interests, or if it threatens the rights of others. They advise that the person be notified in written form the specific reasons for his rejection so that the document could be used in court if the denial was ever appealed.¹⁵ Human Rights Watch/Helsinki officials argue that those seeking asylum and who have UNHCR identification cards should not be required to register with the police because most are unaware of what is required of them, are afraid to do so, or are simply denied registration by hostile authorities.¹⁶

Preventing if not denying registration to dark-skinned individuals allows officials to conduct periodic campaigns to nominally cleanse the city of all unregistered people when specifically targeting blacks. For this reason Moscow has been characterized as the forerunner among all Russian cities in “cleansing” itself of ethnically “undesirable elements.”¹⁷ These campaigns allow Moscow officials to literally shape the community in the manner in which they have reimagined it since Communism’s fall. In May 1997 Luzhkov ordered the Russian, Moscow and Moscow Province migration services to expel illegal refugees and forced migrants from the capital. Human Rights Watch emphasized that “refugees are illegal because Moscow has refused to register most of those coming to Moscow from the conflicts in the Caucasus.”¹⁸ Human rights activists have repeatedly denounced Luzhkov for signaling out individuals from the Caucasus in his directives to police to cleanse the city of unregistered people.¹⁹

Luzhkov's October 1993 campaign to rid the capital of unregistered people (read: people of color) served as a major contributory factor in the racialization of dark-skinned non-Russians and revealed that the capital's community had been reimagined as white and Slavic. Because of authorities' equation of crime with outsider status (read: dark skin) the mayor justified this clean-up operation (in the midst of the armed battle between President Yeltsin and representatives of the Parliament) by emphasizing the need to protect the capital from unregistered people (read: blacks) because of the inordinate number of crimes they commit. Human rights officials and journalists denounced this crusade as another deliberate attempt by Luzhkov to foster negative images of Caucasians and Central Asians among Muscovites.²⁰ Moscow officials detained roughly 14,000 individuals and deported between 9000 and 12,000 others who they claimed had violated the registration regime.²¹ Aleksei Smirnov, director of the Moscow Human Rights Research Center claimed that the majority of individuals who registered complaints against the police to the Human Rights Research Center during the mayor's "clean-up" operation, did not incur law enforcement officers' wrath because they had broken any laws or violated the curfew but simply because they didn't "look Russian."²² Similarly, journalist Yury Shchekochikhin argued that following the October 1993 shelling of the White House, provincial Interior Ministry Units rounded up herds of Caucasians simply because they didn't "look right."²³ The Society for the Defense of Human Rights in Central Asia, the Memorial human rights organization, and the Helsinki Watch and the organized a press conference at which they denounced the persecution, violence, beating and the illegal eviction of dark-skinned refugees which occurred during the October 1993 state of emergency. *Sevognya* reported how Central Asian political emigres who were "awaiting the status of political refugee" were threatened with deportation back to their homelands which for most would have meant a return to prison life.²⁴ This clean-up campaign betrays Luzhkov's realization that anti-Caucasian/anti-black feelings among the populace had become a strong political force

which allowed him to conduct such a racist campaign against dark-skinned non-Russians without any serious political repercussions.²⁵

As a result of Luzhkov's incessant claims that a crisis of law and order exists in the capital, by 1996 these campaigns to cleanse the city of unregistered people had assumed the form of pseudo-military operations to which Moscow officials assigned military code names. These have included Operation Regime, Operation Law and Order, Operation Arsenal, and Operation Signal.²⁶ Moscow officials seemingly play the role of colonial governors in the tradition of the British Empire by using military code names for these operations against the capital's "colonies" of dark-skinned former colonials.²⁷ Luzhkov launched Operation Regime immediately following the terrorist bombings of two Moscow trolleybuses on the 11th and 12th of July 1996 in order to stabilize conditions in the capital by cleansing it of all "elements dangerous to society." Roughly 23,000 heavily armed Interior Ministry forces invaded the capital combing over its streets, apartment buildings and metro stations, targeting people of color but most especially individuals from the Caucasus. Moscow's minority leaders argued that regardless of Moscow officials' claims to the contrary, police predominately checked the documents of Chechens, Azeris, Armenians and any other dark-skinned individuals during their raids on markets and apartment buildings. On 14 July 1996, *Moskovsky Komsomolets* reported that as part of Operation Regime police called one of their writers and inquired how long he had been a resident in Moscow simply because he had an Armenian name. An official of the Moscow-supported Chechen government, reported that police had raided Chechens in their apartments, 12,000 of whom were officially registered.²⁸

The physical abuse that law enforcement officials rained on Azeris during their Operation Regime market raids ended up in hospitalization for at least two of the victims. In their specific raid of the Cherkizovskii market on 18 July 1996 police beat nearly a dozen Azeri merchants and destroyed their registration papers in the process. The Azerbaijani embassy in Moscow responded by officially registering a complaint with the

district prosecutor's office. A week later masked law enforcement agents raided the Krasnogvardeiskii market, "destroyed 100 million rubles worth of fruits and vegetables" and confiscated what was left of the goods. Representatives of the Azerbaijani embassy again accompanied some of the victims of police abuse from this raid to the procuracy in order to register their complaints.²⁹ During his visit to Moscow in the wake of this Operation Regime, the President of Azerbaijan, Geidar Aliyev met with mayor Yuri Luzhkov and police chief Nikolai Kulikov and expressed concern for the safety of the capital's large Azeri community which then consisted of roughly 240,000 people. While acknowledging Azeris' high representation in criminal activity and emphasizing his interest in helping the mayor reduce the capital's crime level, Aliyev denounced Luzhkov's anti-crime campaigns for being directed against nationalities instead of specific individuals and condemned law enforcement officials' blanket suspicion of putative "persons of Caucasian nationality."³⁰

Nezavisimaya gazeta has warned that the eviction of Caucasians and Central Asians from the capital is prime material for Islamic extremists and would not help the fate of ethnic Russians who lived in the Caucasus and Central Asia because these deported "national minorities" could easily incite the local population against them.³¹ Similarly, Georgy Melikyants of *Izvestia* questioned Moscow officials' lack of concern with possible repercussions and revenge in the former colonies as a result of the former imperial capital's discriminatory policies and actions against non-Russians.³² However another journalist from *Izvestia* pointed out that such repercussions might be the exact intention of city and state officials. Irina Dement'eva has argued that Moscow officials launch attacks on Chechens in the capital in order to precipitate violent retribution against Russians in Chechena-Ingushetia, thereby granting Russia reason to intervene in the region.³³

The February 1992 round-up of individuals who appeared to be of Chechen nationality served as one of the first major steps in the racialization of non-Russian nationalities in Moscow and in defining the capital as an exclusively Slavic community.

On 14 February 1992, Russian Supreme Soviet Chairman, R.I. Khasbulatov held a ten-minute meeting in the White House with the directors of every Moscow hotel during which he first advised them against “accommodating” individuals from the Checheno-Ingushetia republic and then ordered them to evict those already residing there. He cited Moscow’s crime problems as justification for such measures and warned that if the directors failed to comply then they would be dismissed. Hotel directors subsequently carried out the Russian Supreme Soviet Chairman’s orders and police and OMON raided several hotels, arbitrarily arresting individuals who appeared to be of Chechen nationality. The fact that Khasbulatov is himself of Chechen nationality only served to legitimize the authenticity of his leading role in ordering these “preventative measures” against possible terrorist or criminal acts.³⁴ However all of the 37 individuals whom OMON forces rounded up from the Zarya Hotel were subsequently released because none proved to be weapon or drug dealers and one detainee was actually an Afghan war veteran receiving medical treatment in the capital. Irina Dement’eva of Izvestia argued that the roundup as a whole constituted part of the Russian ministry of Security’s efforts to ingrain in popular consciousness the notion of Chechens as “criminal” even though a mere 58 had been arrested on criminal charges in 1991. She condemned the Supreme Soviet the principle legislative power of a supposedly democratic Russian state for openly disregarding the Constitution and emphasized the absurdity of a parliamentary representative Khasbulatov giving orders to hotel workers.³⁵

Part II: Law Enforcement Officials’ Enforcement of the Registration System and the Racialization of People of Color

While official racism has clearly reared its ugly head in administrative officials’ enforcement of the registration system, it is most obscenely prevalent in the actions of law enforcement officials. Luzhkov’s employment of the discourse of disorder has given free reign to law enforcement officials to enforce the registration regime in a manner which violates basic federal and international human rights laws. Holly Cartner, the executive

director of the Human Rights Watch/Helsinki explained that “we do not question the need to monitor a civilian registration system or to maintain law and order...We deplore, however, the predatory way the Moscow police go about it. For them, the registration system means open season on non-Muscovites and refugees, open season for violence and bribes.”³⁶ Human rights officials and journalists criticize the registration system as a masked form of official racism nominally adopted to deter crime and restore law and order in the capital while actually giving free reign to law enforcement officials to abuse their power at the expense of people of color.³⁷ Human Rights Watch/Helsinki investigators concluded that “law enforcement authorities in Moscow...are not only failing to uphold Russia’s obligations to fight racial discrimination but indeed for approximately the past three years, have been conducting a campaign of harassment and brutality against dark-skinned people.”³⁸

Participants in the July 1996 roundtable of “Moscow News Media and Diasporas of Caucasian Peoples” concluded that xenophobia was on the rise among all Muscovites. However, they expressed the greatest distress about “official” hostility towards dark-skinned non-Russians among law enforcement officials.³⁹ The *Moscow Times* argued that by routinely referring to individuals of Caucasian nationality as “blacks” law enforcement officials believe that they have the right to harass and arbitrarily exact fines from them. One native of the Caucasus explained that, “whenever they get the chance, they like to remind us that they can round us up and drive us out of town like dogs.”⁴⁰ By 1995, less than five years after the official collapse of the friendship of peoples, Asadaga Mekhtiev, an Azeri merchant explained that “there is terrible harassment of Azeris, Georgians, and Armenians. As soon as they see that there are blacks, not Russians, that means they can arrest them immediately.”⁴¹ Accordingly, journalist Yury Shchekochikhin claimed that every night at least 80 percent of the individuals detained are Caucasians, whom he characterized as “the second-class citizens of our multinational state.”¹⁸⁹ Police have repeatedly told an ethnic Georgian from Abkhazia that they harass

people of color because they have a “quota” which requires that each law enforcement official apprehend at least ten individuals a day.⁴² African men are subjected to countless document checks in the markets, on public transportation and on the streets which not infrequently lead to their detention.⁴³

Refusing the dark-skinned individual registration renders his existence illegal in the capital and therefore makes him extremely vulnerable to police harassment if not direct expulsion. Svetlana Gannushkina, head of the *Grazhdanskoye Sodeystviye*, or Civil Assistance Group denounced the capital’s policy of rendering it nearly impossible for refugees to register because in addition to clean-up campaigns it allows police to extract bribes and exact their own form of justice from these most visible offenders.⁴⁴ In 1995 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki released a report entitled “Crime or Simply Punishment? Racist Attacks by Moscow Law Enforcement.” In it, investigators charged the militsia, the OMON (*Otriady militsii osobogo naznacheniia*) or Ministry of Interior special forces and road officers of the GAI (*Gosudarstvennoe agentstvo avtomobil’noi inspeksii*) or State Agency for Automobile Inspection for disproportionately victimizing people of color in their enforcement of registration laws.⁴⁵ Police abuse often assumes the forms of “identity checks, searches, degrading treatment, extortion or illegal seizure of property, detention and beatings.” Harassment can be so severe that for the person of color it means being stopped as many as ten times a day for document checks, being fined five times a day, being detained at the police station once a day (with the average holding time ranging from thirty minutes to five hours) and being subjected to physical abuse three times a day. In most situations, the detainee is released without being formally charged with any offense, but if he is it is usually for violating a certain aspect of the registration law, a traffic violation or on the suspicion of criminal, narcotics or weapons activity.⁴⁶

The official discourse of disorder and exhortations that a crisis of law and order exists in the capital allows law enforcement officials to conduct “group checks” or arbitrarily raid apartment buildings, dormitories, markets and hotels. Moscow City

Government Ordinance No 1122 from December 1993, “On Measures to Regulate Temporary Residence of Refugees Residing in Hotels and Government Dormitories of the City of Moscow” stepped up police officers’ authority in enforcing the residence permit laws in areas where predominantly dark-skinned individuals live.⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch investigators have found that during these “group checks” or raids, law enforcement officials routinely employ physical abuse and that OMON forces are more inclined to inflict this abuse than regular police officers.⁴⁸ OMON units typically “storm” the market or apartment building (sometimes breaking down doors in the process) dressed in military fatigues if not masks and armed with automatics. They then proceed to round up dark-skinned individuals often without even looking at their papers.⁴⁹ Occasionally they force the victims into human sacks in strategically parked buses where they “shock them with cattle prods,” spray them with a form of tear gas or beat them in the kidneys with their weapons. These victims are stripped of any money or valuables before being released and are rarely charged for any crimes.⁵⁰ Although human rights officials acknowledge the right of the Russian government to punish those who are in the country illegally, they emphasize that federal law allows law enforcement officials to use physical force only in cases of self-defense and not against individuals who have merely violated immigration or residence permit laws.⁵¹ Sergei Alekseyev of the Russian Academy of Sciences has argued that if Russia was going to return to an authoritarian system which restored order through force then her leaders should not conceal it behind exhortations of a crisis of law and order.⁵²

Consistent with this official discourse of disorder, law enforcement officials have implemented registration laws in a manner characteristic of a state of emergency by systematically violating dark-skinned individuals’ right to privacy.⁵³ These raids on private residences blatantly infringe on an individual’s right to privacy as protected by both article 25 of the Russian constitution and by article 17 of the ICCPR⁵⁴ while also depriving dark-skinned individuals of a safety zone into which to retreat from Moscow

law enforcement officials' abuse. Presidential Decree No. 1226 issued on 14 June 1994 renders both a search and arrest warrant unnecessary for these group "searches" as long as the police suspect that there is "sufficient evidence" that the individual has committed a crime.⁵⁵ In addition to pursuing a criminal suspect, Article 10 of the Law on the Militia extended law enforcement officials' right to enter individuals' private residences on count of accidents "and to 'protect the safety of citizens and public security in times of natural disaster, catastrophe, and ...massive disturbances.'" After each entry police are required to report to a prosecutor. Human Rights Watch investigators emphasize that under these legal stipulations checking fulfillment of the registration requirements does not qualify as a valid reason for entry.⁵⁶ However, they have found that Moscow police often consider an individual's skin color "sufficient evidence" to enter a home.⁵⁷

Local law enforcement officials have raided the apartments of most of the Somali refugees who inhabit the area surrounding Biryulova Street in southern Moscow beating, detaining, and fining their black occupants.⁵⁸ These home raids give police and OMON agents the opportunity to confiscate or damage property in the individual apartments out of the eyesight of witnesses who would be considered impartial. Abdulla Khamzayev, an ethnic Chechen and former Moscow judge, claimed that OMON forces ransacked his family's apartment "only because we are Chechens. Before cops wore uniforms. Now they come with stockings over their heads. That is so that they can say later that it was robbers. I don't know another country where representatives of the government conduct business with masks on." A Georgian woman questioned why the police came to her family's apartment armed with automatic weapons when it was only herself, her grandchildren, daughters and son-in-law who lived there. These raids undertaken under the guise of enforcing the registration laws reaffirms the connection between dark-skinned individuals, crime and moral danger and thus serve as tools in the racialization of Caucasian and Central Asian nationalities.⁵⁹

Government authorities' indifference to Moscow law enforcement officials' racist implementation of the registration system has only promoted the continued violation of human rights and furthered the racialization of non-Slavic nationalities. This official silence was especially glaring during the October 1993 state of emergency. The Society for the Defense of Human Rights in Central Asia, the Memorial human rights organization, and Helsinki Watch criticized the prosecutor's office and the state's human rights institutions for failing to condemn law enforcement and municipal officials' racist actions against Transcaucasians and Central Asians during this period.⁶⁰ *Nezavisimaya gazeta's* Lerman Usmanov and *Izvestia's* Marina Lebedeva condemned Yeltsin and the entire Russian Federation government in general for failing to assume an official stance on the Moscow law enforcement officials' racist treatment and mass deportation of Caucasians and Central Asians between October 3-October 17th. Usmanov emphasized how this void was filled by both Zhirinovsky's promises to take care of non-Russians and the so-called Russian democrats' vows to cleanse the entire country of them.⁶¹ At the municipal level, Luzhkov was not indifferent to the liberties taken by law enforcement and administrative officials during the October 1993 state of emergency but instead openly applauded them. *Sevognya* reported that the mayor thanked "public organizations, volunteer police aide detachments and democratically minded young people" for assisting these authorities in the clean-up operation. Aleksei Smirnov, director of the Moscow Human Rights Research Center criticized Luzhkov for instituting the state of emergency without taking precautions against law enforcement officials' abuse of power.⁶²

In 1997, Moscow leaders' continued inability or more disturbingly their unwillingness to "prevent and punish" law enforcement officials' routine violation of human rights on the pretext of implementing the registration system prompted Human Rights Watch/Helsinki to launch an investigation and issue their report entitled "Moscow: Open Season, Closed City." Human Rights Watch activists criticize municipal officials for not placing any legal restrictions on police enforcement of the registration system but for

allowing stipulations regarding sanctions to be so vague that allow individual law enforcement officials themselves determine whom to deport outright and whom to subject to countless fines. Consequently, police are free to abuse their power and enforce the laws in an arbitrary, discriminatory and violent way “characteristic of a state of emergency.”⁶³ In this manner, law enforcement officials’ implementation of the registration system reinforces Luzhkov’s discourse of disorder and his exhortations that a crisis of law and order exists in the capital. Chairman of Yeltsin’s presidential human rights committee Sergei Kovalyov has warned that “the lack of control over the actions of the security organs is the path back to a totalitarian regime.”⁶⁴

In addition to physical abuse, dark-skinned non-Russians are also subjected to arbitrary fines as law enforcement officials use the registration system to obtain “official” and “unofficial” revenue.⁶⁵ The de facto policy discussed above of denying or preventing people of color from registering, guarantees a large crop of “visible” unregistered people from whom police can exact fines to benefit both the city coffers and their own pockets. Thus not only is there a lack of incentive to abolish the capital’s registration system but there is actually a strong impetus for its continued observance. At least six separate law enforcement agencies conduct document checks in the capital which means that an individual can be fined several times a day because police neither issue a receipt of payment nor record the transaction at the station.⁶⁶ The fact that receipts are not issued and that violators are not required to sign a police report when detained suggests that most if not all of the money ends up in the law enforcement official’s hands rather than in the municipal treasury.⁶⁷ Vitalii Khachatryan, an Armenian refugee explained that police typically asked for and preferred U.S. money.⁶⁸

Despite law enforcement officials claims that they conduct passport checks randomly, in reality they are dictated by skin color. An ethnic Russian of Tajik citizenship explained how when walking with two ethnic Tajik friends in Moscow February 1994, police stopped all three of them but only asked to see the papers of his two ethnic

non-Russian companions for they had just assumed that he was a Muscovite or in the capital legally because of his appearance. However this Russian from Tajikistan produced his documents anyway explaining that he was an “outsider” or “a black-ass, too.”⁶⁹ Police do not waste their time checking identity papers of Slavic looking people (some of whom are legally outsiders) when they have a greater chance of earning money from dark-skinned individuals whom they know administrators routinely deny registration.

Participants in the July 1996 roundtable discussion on “The Moscow News Media and Diasporas of Caucasian Peoples” concluded that as a result of the registration system, Russian law enforcement officials considered individuals of Caucasian nationality and anyone with dark skin a substantial source of income.⁷⁰ One Azeri cigarette merchant who used to be fined several times a day by law enforcement officials eventually realized that it would be more economical to pay a large one-time fee (\$1000) to an indigent Muscovite and pensioner Marfa Alekseyevna, for her to register him as her 24 year old husband (at her own place of residence) for a five year period than to continue to pay small fines daily to Moscow police for five years.⁷¹ Discussing his situation in June 1995, a thirty-six year old Kurd from Azerbaijan explained that “on the street if you have black hair and a dark face they stop you often...If the fine is for 10,000 rubles they take 40,000 or 50,000. This usually happens once a day.”⁷² Aziz Mohamadi, an Iranian asylum-seeker explains that law enforcement officials often assess the fine by how much he has in his pocket: “since September of 1994 I have been receiving \$65 a month in support from [the humanitarian aid organization] Equilibre. One month the cops got it all. My job earns me only enough to pay off the police.”⁷³

In addition to the money Moscow police earn during daily passport checks many also have a more regular source of income which they receive from groups of unregistered refugees who are living in either makeshift housing or private apartments. These pay them an agreed upon monthly “fine” or “tax” in return for not expelling them.⁷⁴ In June 1995, the *Moscow Times* reported how Moscow police enjoyed a steady income from Tajik and

Nagorno-Karabakh refugees who live in cardboard shantytowns in the capital's eastern outskirts.⁷⁵ Human Rights Watch investigators found that by September 1997 police were "visiting" apartments of African and Georgian families with increasing frequency, each time demanding fines ranging from 50,000 (\$9) to 150,000 (\$27) rubles. Many African and Asian refugees are forced to move at least two if not three times each year because the fines become too burdensome or because the police threaten them with arrest if they refuse to move. Through both these apartment checks and identity checks on the streets, police reveal that they are more interested in establishing an informal system by which dark-skinned non-Russians pay them a regular, monthly "fine" than in helping them register properly.⁷⁶

If the dark-skinned individual does not have the amount of money which the police demand, he is typically detained in a jail cell referred to as the "monkey cage" until a relative or friend can post it.⁷⁷ Aslan Mustafa, a Kurdish asylum-seeker from Syria explained in June 1995 that the police descended on the market every hour looking only for money. "If you have money, there's no problem...If you don't have money they take you in and demand money anyway. They say, 'Go call a friend and have him bring some money.'"⁷⁸ Law enforcement officials frequently carry out body searches looking for money to meet the fines they arbitrarily level. Occasionally if the individual is unable to produce the money whether on his own merits or those of his friends, law enforcement officers force him to clean-up the precinct by mopping the floors and taking out the garbage.⁷⁹ Another popular strategy law enforcement officials have adopted in order to obtain the money they demand is to appropriate the dark-skinned individual's passport or other important papers in order to guarantee that he returns to pay the full amount demanded of him.⁸⁰ A Somali refugee discussed how on 11 June 1997 police told him that his MMS card was invalid and then confiscated his passport so that he would return from home with a 50,000 ruble fine for lack of registration.⁸¹ Several months earlier, in February 1997 law enforcement officials confiscated a young Tajik's passport on the

grounds that he could retrieve it once he was able to pay the fine they demanded of him for not being registered. However, this man ended up in a holding center for those awaiting deportation because he was not able to produce his passport when different law enforcement officials stopped him a couple of days later. If Moscow police had been even slightly interested in helping this man and other blacks make their existence in the capital legal and thereby eliminate some of the abuses they suffered, then they would not have confiscated this Tajik's passport and the passports of other non-Russians. This is because without their passports people of color are unable to register with the UVIR and are even more vulnerable to arrest if not expulsion.⁸²

Strong proof that the capital's community has been reimagined as white and Slavic lies in the fact that even those dark-skinned individuals who are actually able to register and obtain a temporary residence permit are still subjected to police abuse.⁸³ Human Rights Watch/Helsinki investigators have found that when conducting both individual passport checks as well as group checks or raids police detain, fine and physically abuse persons of color who have not violated the capital's registration laws and who are thus in possession of legal permits.⁸⁴ Law enforcement officials who actually look at the dark-skinned individual's temporary residence permit often refuse to recognize its authenticity. Police have the option of verifying a document's validity but this is a time-consuming, drawn-out process which until the system is fully computerized involves making phone calls to police precincts or housing boards which are not reached easily. Consequently, law enforcement officials often simply declare the document a fake and levy a fine without going through the hassle of making phone calls or computer checks.⁸⁵

Therefore, people of color who are properly registered are fined for beating the system and for overcoming the obstacles which are designed to keep them down. They are penalized for having dark skin and for not living up to the stereotypical image that officials had established of them. Blacks are fined for legally existing in a community which they are conceived of as not rightly belonging to because of the color of their skin.

A Kurdish man explained that in the marketplace where he worked the OMON forces “‘don’t (even) look at the propiska-If you’re dark-skinned (chernyi), it’s just ‘Let’s go.’”⁸⁶ Natasha Okhunova who has been in refugee housing in the capital since the Baku pogroms explained that they constantly fine dark-skinned, non-Russian men “‘for one reason or another. [Even] if there is a document, they say, ‘You still need this and this.’ In other words, they will find a reason to fine you.”⁸⁷ A 34 year old ethnic Georgian from Abkhazia explained how “‘in broad daylight” in the summer of 1996 law enforcement officials stopped him on the Arbat, tore up his temporary residence permit and told him “‘Now you don’t have registration. Let’s go to the station, you’re going to pay a fine.””⁸⁸

Police and OMON officials not only destroy legal residence permits, but they often refuse to recognize the validity of certification cards issued by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Moscow Migration Service (MMS). Consequently, when they routinely stop refugees on the streets or conduct raids on apartment buildings they often tear up these papers and then demand fines from them for not having proper identification. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki found that not only do law enforcement officials refuse to respect the UNHCR and MMS certification cards as valid identity documents (some dismissing them as “toilet paper”) but many are even ignorant of or feign ignorance of the existence of these institutions. Some police officers have alleged that the MMS was a private institution which issues false identification documents.⁸⁹

Dark-skinned non-Russians have no effective way to report instances of police abuse because the source of their injustice is also their main form of legal recourse.⁹⁰ By complaining to police officers about the actions of other police officers, people of color know that they will either be ignored or not believed. When Giorgi Papashvili, an ethnic Georgian (who sought refuge in Moscow after being wounded in the Abkhazian war) filed a complaint for the severe beating and robbery he endured at the hands of law enforcement officials on 6 April 1995, the police officer on-duty remarked “‘So what if we beat you up? You Georgians-how many Abkhazians have you beaten up?””⁹¹ A forty year old

Tajik journalist Iusuf Khakimov explained how although he and fellow Tajiks, Azeris and Armenians were subjected to physical and verbal abuse at the hands of the police, ““I did not go to the authorities to complain; it’s useless to appeal to anybody in Moscow.””⁹² The Ghanian writer, Klomegah explained how he has been assaulted and his documents confiscated not only by skinheads but also by police officers but that there was nothing he could do about it.⁹³ Elnur Talybov, an Azeri was rushed to the emergency room as a result of injuries he suffered at the hands of law enforcement officials during their raid of the Shukinskii market on the 29 July 1997. After finding out that his injuries were police inflicted, the hospital would not release a medical report attesting to them.⁹⁴ Law enforcement officials’ awareness that people of color lack any form of legal recourse, emboldens them and invests them with feelings of invincibility for it means that they do not have to answer to anyone but their own conscience for their actions against blacks.

As a result of law enforcement officials’ racist implementation and/or abuse of the registration regime and the absence of any legal recourse for blacks, people of color have been forced to adopt survival or self-preservation tactics in order to reduce the risk of harassment. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki investigators have found that the darker the individual’s skin color is the greater amount of abuse to which he is subjected. Consequently, groups or families often designate the lightest dark-skinned individual among them to run errands in an attempt to reduce the harassment and fines to which they are subjected while men of color “shave cleanly and regularly so as to look as light-skinned as possible.”⁹⁵ Non-Russian men testify that they are stopped more often when they do not follow this unwritten rule of survival. In July 1996, a 24-year old Azeri fruit and vegetable merchant in Moscow’s Butyrsky market who has a temporary residence permit explained how he is fined five to ten times a day when he does not shave (thus looking more non-Russian). He tolerates such harassment because by working in Moscow he makes thirty times more than his brothers in Azerbaijan who are employees of the Azeri government.⁹⁶

In addition to monitoring their appearance, dark-skinned individuals have resorted to restricting their movement in the capital in order to make themselves as least visible as possible. This has meant everything from avoiding public transportation in favor of private cars to actually placing themselves under de facto house arrest.⁹⁷ Human rights activists emphasize how the enforcement of the registration system has violated non-Russians' freedom of movement by intimidating them into not leaving the house out of a legitimate fear that they will be stopped, harassed, beaten, detained or fined regardless of whether or not they have a legal permit. A Tajik woman explained how she made her sons stay home as much as possible ““because otherwise it is too expensive; We go out for bread and end up paying 20,000 rubles [as fine or bribe to the police.] We let my daughter go on errands but she sometimes gets stopped too. We all try to stay home and keep quiet.””⁹⁸ As this woman alluded to, by 1997 sending out the women to do the errands had ceased to be an effective survival tactic among people of color in the capital for they had become increasingly subject to police harassment. Afghan women testified that they like their male counterparts had come to be stopped and harassed by police at least once a day.⁹⁹

In order to survive in the capital people of color have also found it necessary to carry as little money on them as possible, to pay the fine or bribe to law enforcement officials immediately when its demanded from them, to show no kind of resistance, to make no efforts to assert their rights and to refrain from registering any complaints with the police or from making known in their neighborhood the injustices they have suffered.¹⁰⁰ The self-preservation tactic that many black vendors have been forced to adopt is to simply abandon their stalls upon the approach of OMON or police forces. This survival tactic is rather costly for the dark-skinned trader because it results in a lot of down-time, sometimes leads to the spoiling of goods and allows law enforcement officials to have a free hand of their merchandise. However, choosing not to flee is also rather risky because police can still confiscate some of their goods while additionally demanding

a heavy fine, subjecting them to physical abuse and sometimes detaining them the latter of which also translates into serious down-time.¹⁰¹

Finally, another survival tactic or last resort response of dark-skinned individuals to the racist enforcement of the registration system has been flight. Blacks who ultimately choose this option come to find that despite their adoption of survival tactics the brutality, humiliation and financial loss of having dark skin in the capital is still too burdensome for them to stay.¹⁰² Because they had been forced to live in an environment where abuse and degradation were the everyday norms their departure would most accurately be described as indirectly coerced. A Somali refugee, Akhmed Muhammed Ali explained how five years of constant harassment, intolerable fines and physical abuse from Moscow law enforcement agents forced him to return to his native land in May 1997.¹⁰³ Dark-skinned individuals' primary objective in closely monitoring their appearance and restricting their movements is to significantly reduce their visibility in order to survive in a community into which they have not been imagined. The racist enforcement of the registration system has forced all people of color, regardless of whether or not they are in the capital legally to stay perpetually on guard and out of the gaze of law enforcement officials.

The systematic violation of dark-skinned individuals' human rights, in the form of passport checks, beatings, fines and apartment checks contribute to their dehumanization and racialization.¹⁰⁴ Significantly, most of this abuse committed on behalf of the struggle to restore law and order in the capital takes place in front of a Russian audience. Seeing people of color being stopped and harassed on the streets, in the markets and metro stations by white Slavic men in positions of authority on an everyday basis de-sensitizes Russians to it and reinforces their equation of dark skin with crime. Through these racist actions, justified as crime-detering measures Moscow authorities are not only communicating to their populace that dark-skinned non-Russians are outsiders who are not welcomed in the newly imagined community but are criminals who threaten the very existence and well-being of that community. An ethnic Georgian from Abkhazia who only

had a Georgian embassy refugee card for his identification was beaten and repeatedly called a “black-ass” by police in front of customers in the Pervomayskoe department store on 7 January 1997. He was eventually thrown in the “monkey cell,” subjected to further physical abuse and finally fined.¹⁰⁵ *Nezavisimaya gazeta* and *Izvestia* have warned that the eviction of non-Slavs or “blacks” from the capital encourages Muscovites to associate dark-skinned non-Russians’ with criminal activity.¹⁰⁶ Because of this socially constructed association of dark skin with crime, moral panic about the prevalence of racial violence is nonexistent in the capital as it is not considered a crime on either the popular or official level.¹⁰⁷ Consequently, in dealing with racial attacks police show greater concern with determining if the black victim was an illegal immigrant than with arresting his perpetrators.¹⁰⁸

By 1998, *Nezavisimaya gazeta* reported that racial assaults on Africans and Asians had become daily occurrences in Moscow. This development is hardly surprising considering what had become accepted discourse among both authorities and the masses since the fall of Communism as well as law enforcement officials’ systematic violation of blacks’ human rights in their enforcement of the registration system. In late May 1995, *Sevognya* reported that Chan Chung Tkhik, a Vietnamese diplomat was attacked by six Russians. Instead of coming to his aid, a police officer slapped him around, locked him in a cell with his attackers and released him only after the arrival of an embassy representative. The most punishment his attackers received was either a several hundred thousand ruble fine or a fifteen day jail sentence.¹⁰⁹ Officials of the Republic of South Africa, Sudan, and Kenya have lodged official complaints with the Russian Foreign Ministry regarding the rising incidence of racial violence and the lack of justice for its victims.¹¹⁰ Michael Waganda, a Kenyan historian and researcher who has lived in Russia for almost two decades emphasized how the fall of Communism has meant a loss of protection for foreigners in Russia and he criticized the State Duma and law enforcement officials for failing to seriously address the problem of racism.¹¹¹ An African professor

and fourteen year resident of Moscow, explained that ““Our world has been turned upside down. If before we had no problems in the hostels, today it’s the opposite. You can get accosted anywhere.””¹¹² Similarly, Choi Young Shik who served as chairman of the Association of Korean Students in Moscow explained that “In the past, this occurred only late in the evening or at night” but now the attacks occur in broad daylight, in the Metro stations and even against women.¹¹³ In September 1997, the daughter of a Kenyan diplomat in Moscow was assaulted and tossed into the Moscow River.¹¹⁴

The promotion and tolerance of racism among law enforcement officials and in the press has rendered justice non-existent for Africans and Asians in Moscow since the fall of Communism. An example of these forces at work conspiring against these “non-white” visitors can be seen in the murder of the nineteen year old Zimbabwean student, Gideon Chimusoro on 11 August 1992 by a police officer on the campus of Patrice Lumumba Friendship University. Despite the fact that numerous witnesses testified and forensic reports confirmed that Chimusoro was shot when trying to flee, the investigating officer Solovko insisted and several newspapers reported that the Zimbabwean was drunk and that the police officer had shot him in self-defense when Chimusoro tried to smash his head with bottles.¹¹⁵ Vladimir Ivanidze of *Moskovsky Novosti* as well as the Ghanaian writer Kester Klomegah emphasized how racist articles in the media have rendered it easy for the reader to believe such testimony of law enforcement officials.¹¹⁶ Ivanidze accused authorities of deliberately trying to incite feelings of racial intolerance and generate the desired popular response by reporting inaccurately on the incident and circulating stereotypical charges in the press particularly through the papers *Moskovsky Komsomolets* and *Vechernyaya Moskva*.¹¹⁷ The procuracy’s office never conducted a serious investigation and the police officer/murderer of Gideon Chimsoro was never brought up on charges but ended up studying to be an international lawyer at the Russian University of People’s Friendship.¹¹⁸ Similarly, the murdered Moscow State University journalism student from Rwanda, Jean-Claude Nsengiyumva received no respect or justice in the

press and from law enforcement officials. Ivanidze claimed that the press played its typical role by reporting inaccurately on the murder while the police conducted a reprehensible investigation dragging their feet so much that students requested that the Russian Ministry of State Security oversee the investigation. One of the guards in the dorm in which the murder took place explained that police merely dismissed any serious investigation and limited their eventual search to the floor on which the crime had been committed, claiming that the African's murderers probably could not be apprehended.¹¹⁹

While the Communist era had worked so hard towards establishing the distinct identities of Soviet national minorities, the post-Communist era has erased them by reducing people to their skin color. When city officials ordered operations specifically against individuals of Chechen nationality, police demonstrated that the real target was skin color for they used these directives to harass all blacks. As a result of the outbreak of war in Chechnya in December 1994 police abuse escalated not only against Chechens but also for all dark-skinned non-Russians. Afghan refugees and teenagers in the markets were consistently dragged down to police stations and forced to pay an average 100,000 rubles to the police for their release.¹²⁰ One Armenian who claims to be stopped frequently by militia and GAI explained that the soldiers fighting in Chechnya "who are militia officers come back (to Moscow) bitter. They don't care who you are Armenian, Chechen or [whatever]...He is just a 'person of Caucasian nationality.' It all starts building up in him, seeing us, and he looks for an excuse to find fault with something."¹²¹ When officials stepped up security in Moscow as a result of renewed fighting in Chechnya, a Chechen representative in the capital warned that "All this means is that 'black' and 'colored' passers-by will be stopped all the time in the street and searched...All these new repressions will affect not only Chechens, but refugees from Georgia, Abkhazia and Azerbaijan."¹²² As further testimony that it is skin color rather than actual nationality as indicated in an individual's internal passport that is targeted by law enforcement officials, ethnic Chechens who do not "look Chechen" or who look more Slavic are not stopped as

often by the police for document checks while ethnic Russian refugees from places such as Abkhazia who by police estimates don't "look Russian" are beaten and told that their passports are fake.¹²³

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Since the fall of Communism in connection with the reconceptualization of both the capital's community and the relationship between Russians and non-Russians the seemingly straightforward term "outsiders" has acquired dual meanings. The first definition of outsiders is the legal one which refers to all individuals who do not possess a valid Moscow residence permit. Although this includes representatives of all ethnic groups including ethnic Russians of Russian Federation or CIS citizenship, these outsiders are not as visible on Moscow's streets, on the metro or in its markets as are their non-Slavic counterparts. The second, more fluid definition of outsiders which unlike the first has no legal basis refers to all dark-skinned, non-Slavic looking individuals in the capital. This second definition has emerged from administrative and law enforcement officials' enforcement of the registration system because it is people of color whom they routinely deny registration and harass daily on the streets and in the markets. Skin color and not lack of Moscow registration documents marks outsider status in the minds of Moscow officials for even dark-skinned individuals who do have Moscow residence permits are still seen or mistaken on the streets as outsiders. They are harassed by law enforcement agents who frequently destroy their legal permits in the disbelief that they can be one of "us" instead of one of "them."

In this way, police enforcement of registration laws affect not only unregistered people of color but also legally registered people of color who are typically suspected to be in the capital illegally simply because of their dark skin. Thus the system in practice perpetuates a societal division between "blacks" and "whites" by rendering all dark-skinned, non-Slavic looking individuals vulnerable to abuse to which Slavic looking individuals are largely immune.¹

Accordingly, the Moscow based Ghanian researcher and writer Kester Klomegah argued that while the Soviet era official slogans of "Peace, Friendship and Solidarity" had

suppressed racist feelings, in post-Communist Moscow, the black person confronted racism on a daily basis.

The reason why possession of legal residence documents does not even gain people of color temporary access or admittance to the capital's community is because it has been reimagined to include only those individuals with light skin and Slavic features. Therefore even those Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians who are Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or Russian Federation citizens who do not have Moscow residence permits and who are thus legally outsiders are assumed to be members of the imagined community. Consequently they are treated as such (as honorary members) until absence of documents betrays their true identity. In short, experience in Moscow since the fall of Communism has shown that inclusion in the newly imagined capital community is not guaranteed by legal residence permit but is instead based on skin color.

The emergence of exclusive and inclusive racism² in post-Communist Moscow serves as proof that the community has ceased to be officially imagined as inclusive and multinational. By definition exclusive racism seeks to rid the community of the racialized other while inclusive racism concedes the other's presence in the community but institutes an apartheid system which denies him the privileges of full citizenship. Historically the two have coexisted and the Moscow experience is no exception. Moscow officials' efforts to cleanse the body politic of dark-skinned individuals directly through clean-up campaigns and indirectly through the constant harassment of people of color which they hope will eventually lead to their departure constitute forms of exclusive racism. This same abuse and harassment can also be classified as inclusive racism because it hierarchizes society until the cleansing process is complete. By denying blacks registration and subjecting them to raids, fines, beatings and document checks, administrative and law enforcement officials are deliberately casting them as second class citizens if not members of an inferior criminal race. Luzkhov indirectly alluded to the objective of reimagining the capital as an exclusively Slavic community when he remarked that Muscovites should not

look at the expulsion of Caucasian traders from the markets as a loss of exotic fruits and vegetables but as a necessary return to markets filled with ““traditional Russian goods.””³

The Soviet system had established a precedent for blaming and punishing entire groups of people (whether they be a class or nationality) for the “sins” of some of its members and the ills of society. Because some wealthy peasants or *kulaks* exploited poorer peasants and because some Crimean Tatars collaborated with the German invaders, Moscow deported all whom they defined as *kulaks* as well as the entire Crimean Tatar nation, disregarding the existence of hard-working *kulaks* in the villages and loyal Crimean Tatars in the Red Army and partisan units. Similarly, in post-Communist Moscow authorities are using the existence of criminals and drug dealers among the capital’s national groups from the Caucasus, Central Asia and Africa as a reason to discriminate against if not expel individuals of Caucasian, Central Asian or African nationality. Just as Soviet officials justified the liquidation of kulaks as the necessary means by which to make the countryside safe for Communism, municipal authorities argue that the expulsion of people of color alone will make Moscow safe for democracy. Communists had identified the fluidly defined “kulaks” as the reason why peasants could not yet reap the benefits of the socialist system. Likewise, post-Communist Moscow leaders identify the presence of “blacks” (similarly defined quite loosely) whom they have succeeded in racializing as criminals and parasites as the reason why Muscovites are not yet enjoying the fruits of the democratic system. Having seemingly depicted themselves as warriors on the battlefield for democracy,⁴ post-Communist officials consistent with the Soviet tradition argue that any means including racist measures and violations of human rights justify the lofty ends of democracy.

Political authorities who seemingly constitute the officer corps and law enforcement officials who serve as infantrymen are not alone on this battlefield for democracy in post-Communist Moscow. Human rights officials and several concerned journalists are also fighting for the establishment of democracy in the capital. However

they target law enforcement officials and political authorities themselves as the true obstacles preventing the realization of democracy rather than dark-skinned non-Russians. The difficulty for human rights activists and journalists lies in determining where reality ends and racism begins in city officials' anti-crime campaigns. They concede the existence of criminals among these non-Russian diasporas in Moscow but emphasize that this warrants neither the blanket condemnation nor treatment of all people of color as criminals. They argue that such racist measures and blatant violations of human rights will never lead to democracy but actually threaten its existence especially in a nascent democratic country trying to shake its image as a totalitarian police state. Chairman of Yeltsin's presidential human rights committee and former Soviet dissident, Sergei Kovalyov warned that "the Bolsheviks justified their totalitarian regime with the struggle against crime."⁵ Likewise, Sergei Alekseyev of the Russian Academy of Sciences argued that although instituting public order and controlling crime were important Moscow officials had gone too far and were threatening the Russia's image as a country committed to democratization.⁶ *Izvestia's* Irina Dement'eva conceded that like other presidents Chechen President Dudayev probably did have agents in the capital. However, she emphasized that this did not justify round-ups of individuals solely on the basis of nationality.⁷ Journalists and human rights activists emphasize that the means by which to make the former Soviet capital safe for democracy is by bringing an end to such operations, by respecting human rights and by eradicating the pernicious train of thought that democratic ends can result from authoritarian means.

The collapse of the Soviet Union has precipitated the widescale movement of people to Moscow. The migration of Caucasians, Central Asians and Africans to the capital which had once promised them refuge, fleeing conflicts which imperial Moscow had a hand in instigating constitutes an integral aspect of the revenge of the empire on the former metropolis. Officials have responded by making it difficult for if not denying former colonials the right to register thereby making them illegal, "criminal," the "enemy,"

“black” and the moral “other.” Although living in Moscow had always meant a degree of privilege, what it means to be a Muscovite since the collapse of the Soviet Union has taken on a distinctly racial component. The main issue is not ethnicity or nationality for a person does not have to be of Russian nationality (as stated in one’s passport) to be a Muscovite. Instead an individual is only required to “look Russian.” As testimony to the constructedness of race and what it means to be “white” and “black,” the term “Caucasian” in the United States connotes a white privileged segment of the populace. In contrast, in post-Communist Moscow the term “Caucasian” has become derogatory and refers to “blacks” from the Transcaucasus and North Caucasian republics who are at the very most considered “second class citizens” if not criminals. Though they are deemed “black” they do not resemble the Africans who have also been racialized since the fall of the empire. This further supports Anne McClintock’s observation that “black” and “white” are categories based on the realities of power rather than appearance.

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⁸ “The Russian Media: Who Controls What?” *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 51, no. 33 (1999), 13-14.

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CHAPTER 1: THE SOVIET UNION AS THE FRIENDSHIP OF PEOPLES

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CHAPTER 2: THE FALL OF COMMUNISM AND THE RISE OF THE STATE OF DISORDER

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CHAPTER 3: ENFORCEMENT OF THE REGISTRATION SYSTEM AND THE RACIALIZATION OF PEOPLE OF COLOR

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⁶¹Usmanov, 1; Lebedeva, 19 Oct 1993, 5.

⁶²"Human rights Organizations...", 10.

⁶³*HRWH* 9, no. 10, 2-3, 17, 35.

⁶⁴Morrison, www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1995/Dec/14/story10.html.

⁶⁵HRWH 10, no. 8, 20.

⁶⁶HRWH 7, no. 12, 5; 9, no. 10, 37.

⁶⁷HRWH 9, no. 10, 20, 37-38, 17.

⁶⁸HRWH 7, no. 12, 29.

⁶⁹Ibid., 12.

⁷⁰Kamyshev, 17.

⁷¹Vladimir Chesnokov, "One Can Now Become a Muscovite For Up to Five Years," *Izvestia*, 17 June 1999, 2 in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 51, no. 24 (1999):15-16.

⁷²HRWH 7, no. 12, 27.

⁷³Ibid., 28.

⁷⁴Ibid., 23.

⁷⁵Ellen Barry, "Moscow: Little Refuge in a Turbulent Refugee Life," *Moscow Times* 24 June 1995 in *Moscow Times Online* [cited 12 Nov 1999], available at www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1995/Jun/24/story9.html; Internet.

⁷⁶HRWH 9, no. 10, 23-24, 26, 28-9.

⁷⁷Ibid., 20; 7, no. 12, 5.

⁷⁸HRWH 7, no. 12, 27.

⁷⁹HRWH 9, no. 10, 20.

⁸⁰HRWH 7, no. 12, 27.

⁸¹HRWH 9, no. 10, 21.

⁸²Ibid., 37.

⁸³Gessen, www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1997/Jul/19/story50.html.

⁸⁴HRWH 8, no. 7, 26

⁸⁵*HRWH* 9, no. 10, 32.

⁸⁶*HRWH* 7, no. 12, 18.

⁸⁷*HRWH* 7, no. 12, 28.

⁸⁸*HRWH* 9, no. 10, 32.

⁸⁹*HRWH* 7, no. 12, 14; 9, no. 10, 2, 20-1.

⁹⁰*HRWH* 9, no. 10, 4.

⁹¹*HRWH* 7, no. 12, 23.

⁹²*Ibid.*, 21.

⁹³Klomegah, www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1997/Nov/26/story34.html.

⁹⁴*HRWH* 9, no. 10, 30.

⁹⁵*HRWH* 7, no. 12, 5.

⁹⁶Babakian, www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1996/Jul/16/story4.html.

⁹⁷*HRWH* 7, no. 12, 14, 5; 8, no. 7, 26; 9, no. 10, 20.

⁹⁸In June 1995, 20,000 rubles was the rough equivalent of five U.S. dollars compared to bread which cost about thirty-five cents. *HRWH* 7, no. 12, 13-14.

⁹⁹*HRWH* 9, no. 10, 20-1.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁰¹*HRWH* 7, no. 12, 29.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁰³*HRWH* 9, no. 10, 21.

¹⁰⁴Again the parallels with the British treatment of empire blacks are striking, Cashmore and McLaughlin, 37.

¹⁰⁵*HRWH* 9, no. 10, 27-28.

¹⁰⁶Usmanov, 1; "The Nationality Column....," 14.

¹⁰⁷A similar situation developed during the 1970s in post-colonial British cities, Lawrence, 174.

¹⁰⁸British police were more interested in determining if black victims of racial violence were illegally in the country than with detaining their attackers, Benyon, 46.

¹⁰⁹Tanya Ambaye, "Youths, Cops Beat Diplomat," *Moscow Times*, 27 May 1995 in *Moscow Times Online* [cited 12 Nov 1999], available at www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1995/May/27/story2.html; Internet.

¹¹⁰German Aleksandrov, "Nazis terrorize foreigners in Moscow," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 7 May 1998, 2 in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 50, no. 18 (1998): 23.

¹¹¹Klomegah, www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1997/Nov/26/story34.html.

¹¹²Vail, www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1997/Feb/5/story71.html.

¹¹³Stefan Scholl, "Russian Right Extremists Supported by State and Society," *Moskovsky Novosti* 2-8 July 1998, 5.

¹¹⁴Klomegah, www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1997/Nov/26/story34.html.

¹¹⁵Vladimir Ivanidze, "Run, Negro, Run," *Moskovsky Novosti* 27 Sep - 4 Oct 1992, 1, 14.

¹¹⁶Vladimir Ivanidze, "'We Were Ready to Kneel Down, Fresh Murder of an African Student in Moscow,'" *Moskovsky Novosti*, 20-27 Dec 1992, 9; Klomegah, www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1997/Nov/26/story34.html.

¹¹⁷Ivanidze (27 Sep - 4 Oct 1992), 14.

¹¹⁸Klomegah, www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1997/Nov/26/story34.html; *HRWH* 7, no. 12, 16.

¹¹⁹Ivanidze (20-27 Dec 1992), 9.

¹²⁰Nikolai Burbyga and Besik Urigashvili, "How 'our' Afghans Ceased to Be Ours," *Izvestia* 6 October 1995, 3 in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* XLVII, no. 40 (1995): 28.

¹²¹*HRWH* 7, no. 12, 7.

¹²²Andrei Khalip, "City Security Tight in the Wake of Attack," *Moscow Times*, 16 June 1995 in *Moscow Times Online* [cited 12 Nov 1999], available at www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1995/Jun/16/story1.html; Internet.

¹²³*HRWH* 7, no. 12, 13; 9, no. 10, 28.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

¹Gordon discusses how in the British experience all blacks (former colonials) in British cities were assumed to be and therefore discriminated against as immigrants, Paul Gordon, *Policing Immigration: Britain's Internal Controls* (London: Pluto Press, 1985), 2.

²Balibar, 39-40.

³Osheverova and Bulanov, 5.

⁴This concept of a battlefield of democracy was used by Valery Vyzhutovich in an article entitled "Opravdanie negodyaev, pochemu propagandisty razizma i fashizma ostaiutsya beznakazannymi," *Izvestia*, 2 Aug 1994, 5.

⁵John Morrison, "Kovalyov: Rights Report to Reveal Growing Abuses," *Moscow Times*, 14 Dec 1995 in *Moscow Times Online* [cited 12 Nov 1999], available from [www.moscowtimes.ru/ archive/issues/1995/Dec/14/story10.html](http://www.moscowtimes.ru/archive/issues/1995/Dec/14/story10.html), Internet.

⁶Lebedeva, 23 Oct 1993, 4.

⁷Dement'eva, 19 Mar 1992, 3.

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
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