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EASTERN EQUATORIA AND THE WHITE NILE TRADE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A FRONTIER, 1840-1900

By

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ABSTRACT

EASTERN EQUATORIA AND THE WHITE NILE TRADE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A FRONTIER, 1840-1900

by

Abannik Ohure Hino

Until about the early nineteenth century, the region that today constitutes Eastern Equatoria was an isolated region of Africa with little if any contact with the outside world. The isolation, however, came to an end with the opening of the White Nile to modern navigation in 1839 and the introduction of the White Nile trade. Both these developments were initiated by the Turco-Egyptian colonial state in Northern Sudan to exploit the natural resources of the Upper Nile regions. From then on, foreign commodities of high local value (glass beads, cowrie shells, copper bracelts, cotton cloths, etc.) flowed into the region. Thus began the integration of Eastern Equatoria and other isolated Upper Nile regions into the expanding international trade.

The broad aim of this study is to examine the social and political impact of this interaction on Eastern Equatoria. Unlike the existing literature whose main focus is the activities of foreigners (merchants and succeeding colonial governments) in that interaction, this study focuses instead on local responses to the process. It argues that the activities of the outsiders in the region were only part of the equation and that local participation was never as passive as the existing literature makes it out to be. On the contrary, local actors/agents (who were by definition local elites) often took the initiative to advance and protect

their political and economic interests not only within their local societies but also against those of their foreign counterparts. The high point of their autonomy was in the 1840-1860 period, when they monopolized all of the trade in the hinterland. Even after the foreigners seized the initiative, local factors continued to be important throughout the process.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study would have been more difficult to realize without the support of certain individuals. First and foremost I would like to extend my thanks and gratitude to my major advisor, professor Harold G. Marcus. Not only was tireless in his support of me throughout my graduate study at Michigan State University, he was a constant source of insight, encouragement, assistance and guidance throughout the course of this study. For this and more I am thankful and deeply indebted to him.

I would also like to thank the other members of my committee, professors David Robinson, Alan Fisher, and John Hinnant. They too gave me encouragement and support, while their searching questions and comments were all helpful in giving this study a sense of direction. I am especially thankful and grateful to professor David Robinson for his detailed comments and penetrating criticisms. His contribution will last beyond this study.

Finally, I would like to thank professor Jay Spaulding and his wife, and my colleague, Dr. Stephannie Beswick. I am grateful for their moral support and informative comments and suggestions. Spaulding's generous contribution went further than that, however. He willingly agreed to substituted for professor Alan Fisher when commitments abroad made it impossible for the latter to attend my oral defense of this study, for which I am grateful.

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

Map 3. GONDOKORO AND SURROUNDINGS 1859–1862
(from M. T. von Heuglin, *Reise in das Gebiet des Weissen Nil*)

INTRODUCTION

Until about early nineteenth century, Eastern Equatoria was an isolated on of Africa with little if any contact with the outside world, and was therefore tively untouched by the bustling international trade that had been penetrating -Saharan Africa from about 1400.[1] The isolation is due to several graphical factors, the first of which is its distance from the sea. Eastern atoria is located almost in the center of the African Continent and, therefore, of the farthest regions from the African coasts.[2] Consequently, it was one of last regions of the Continent to be penetrated by the international trade. ond, the distance from the coast was compounded on one hand by the opian highlands and the East African Rift Valley, hampering it further from the Sea and the Indian Ocean international trade. An additional major obstacle the rugged and arid conditions of northwestern Kenya.

Closer home, the main barrier to Eastern Equatoria's communication with outside world was the sudd. A vast region in central Southern the area of the e of Maine, the sudd is swampland whose maze of floating islands of tation block the river channel for most of the year. It was therefore a barrier of munication not only with lands to the north but also within Southern Sudan Consequently, while northern and western areas of Southern Sudan were cting (albeit exploited) with the Islamic states of Darfur and Funj by at least Eastern Equatoria was shielded from those interactions by the sudd.[3]

By 1800, however, Eastern Equatoria's relative isolation came to an end, d this de-enclavement was a result of penetration from two regional trades. The st was the so-called Fazughli-Fadasi trade, which came from the northeast. The zughli-Fadasi trade probably originated from two sources: one from Northern dan, and the other (finally) from the Ethiopian highlands via Oromo (Galla) untry. The two streams then converged on the Sobat-Pibor River Valley into e trade. From there, it crossed the flood plain and finally entered Eastern uatoria via Lafon, with the Anuak (Vinco's Gnaghi?) and Murle being the main ermediaries with Lafon.[4] While the trade-goods of the so-called Fazughli-Fadasi de may have been of many kinds, blue glass beads appear to have been the ost important. And while it is difficult to assess the socio-economic impact of the zughli-Fadasi trade on Eastern Equatoria, a stratum of oral traditions within the ion suggest that it was socially disruptive, causing conflict and break-ups of al communities and kinship groups.[5]

At about the same time as the Fazughli-Fadasi trade, or shortly thereafter, Zanzibari trade also entered Eastern Equatoria from the south via the East can kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro.[6] And perhaps because of its superior anization, as well as because of the kingdom's relative proximity, the Zanzibari e eventually eclipsed the Fazughli-Fadasi trade. Even Lafon itself was tually drawn into its orbit.

But it was the White Nile trade that decisively put an end to the isolation of ern Equatoria. This latter trade was introduced by the Turco-Egyptian colonial rnment in 1841, and the regime's objective for introducing it was to exploit the

ory and other natural resources of the Upper Nile region for its coffers. To this nd, the government annually organized trading expeditions to the upper reaches the Nile, shipping large quantities of beads, copper bracelets, and other luxury oods to be exchanged for ivory and other valuable local products. The White Nile ade thus initiated a period of more direct and intense relationship between astern Equatoria and the Turco-Egyptian colonial state in Northern Sudan, and s relationship led eventually to its annexation in 1870.

Meanwhile, the dramatic increase in the foreign luxury goods tended to omote trade contacts among the various socio-linguistic groups inside Eastern uatoria itself. The first to benefit from this trade were naturally middlemen from cieties along the Nile. But as their "stores" of ivory and other resources got hausted, they turned to the hinterland and made trading missions there, often ng established local exchange networks. In time, local demands began to tate as to the types of goods that could be exchanged. For example, while iron- icient areas might prefer exchanging their ivory with worked iron, others might ead prefer livestock or grain. It is in that sense that the White Nile trade often comes an extension of the local subsistence- and utility-oriented exchange works. To that extent, these local products ceased to have a purely sistence or utility value, thereby opening up limited trading opportunities to sant producers. In the final analysis then, the White Nile trade had far- ching consequences for Eastern Equatoria (and Southern Sudan generally) rnally as well as internally, and it is all these issues that are the focus of this ertation.

The dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part comprises chapter I l II, and it is devoted to the examination of the political economy of the Turco-yptian colonial state in Northern Sudan.[7] The premise for part one is that the gins of the White Nile trade are found in the problems and imperatives of the rco-Egyptian political economy.

Chapter One focuses on agricultural policies. It starts with a short roductory background on various aspects of Northern Sudan's pre-conquest onomy, and then moves on to a detailed examination of the fiscal policies of the rco-Egyptian colonial regime. It argues that the overriding goal of the colonial te was to make the colony economically viable and self-supporting, and that to nieve this objective it needed to transform the colony's labor and productive ources. Hence the introduction of a high tax regime and compulsory cash-crop duction policy. It further suggests that despite these measures, state coffers ntinued to suffer serious budget deficits, and the introduction of the White Nile de was part of its efforts to find other sources of revenue to meet the budget uirements.

The chapter also examines the effect of the fiscal policies on the peasants, concludes that despite attempted reforms, the lot of the peasants continued to eriorate, and that by the 1840s many of them were driven off the land. Initially, ie of the losers sought employment in the new service sector or with the ernment. Others, however, took to trading in the frontier. This economic cation intensified in the 1850s and 1860s, which coincided with the lifting of al monopoly of the White Nile trade. Many of the uprooted peasants this

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rtuitous opportunity and entered the employ of the White Nile traders, serving em mostly as soldiers.

Chapter Two continues with the theme of political economy, but with a cus on commerce. It examines how the establishment (as well as the economic d fiscal policies) of the colonial state helped promote trade and commerce. It arts with an analysis of the conditions of the Sudanese peasants and traders with e view to determining the factors that enhanced or hindered their participation in e new commercial opportunities. It concludes that partly because of their lack of sh money, and partly because of the system of state monopolies, only a few danese benefited from the opportunities. Consequently, the beneficiaries were stly foreigners, especially Europeans and Levantines. The chapter then moves to examine the reasons for the ascendancy of these foreign traders, their ggle and eventual success against the state monopoly system, and their eover of the White Nile trade. The rest of the chapter is then devoted to the dy of the history and development of the Khartoumer side of the White Nile le.

Part II of the Dissertation comprises Chapters Three through Seven, with h chapter focusing on the different aspects of developments in Eastern atoria since the introduction of the White Nile trade. Chapter Three examines local network of the White Nile trade. It starts with a general overview of the al structure (and their underlying ideology) in Eastern Equatoria in efforts to erstand the economic and social basis of the local trade network. It observes recognizing the economic importance of the White Nile trade as a new and

unprecedented source of high-value items, with equally unprecedented opportunities for accumulation of wealth (and therefore its potential for destabilization), the traditional elites in the region took control of the trade and monopolized it for themselves. The rest of the chapter then moves to examine each of the local networks radiating from Gondokoro.

Chapter Four deals with the phase of the White Nile trade during which the foreign traders (Khartoumers) established trading stations in Eastern Equatoria itself. It starts with an analysis of the reasons--both structural and local--for the shift, and then proceeds to examine the varying local responses and reactions to the alien intrusion. It then moves on to assess the sociopolitical significance of this phase of the White Nile trade. It concludes that the conflict that ensued with the alien intrusion was not just over control of the trade; it also represented a subtle process of local social transformation, as the Khartoum traders gradually extended and then established themselves as rulers over large areas of the region.

Chapter Five deals with the state intervention and then annexation of Eastern Equatoria and, indeed, Southern Sudan as a whole. It starts with an examination of the driving motives behind the move, which were (a) to suppress the slave trade, and (b) to exploit the commercial and agricultural potential of the equatorial lakes region as urged by the recently arrived explorers John Speke and James Grant. After an assessment of the two factors, it concludes that although suppression of the slave trade was the expressed motive for the annexation, exploitation the region's economic resources was, in fact, the primary motive force. It then discusses the evidence to support this contention. The rest of the chapter

then devoted to an examination of the government of the province, focusing pecially on the governorships of Samuel W. Baker, Charles G. Gordon, and hin Pasha. The policies and plans of these governors are examined, and an sessment of their successes and/or failures made.

Chapter Six focuses on the collapse of the Turco-Egyptian colonial rule in stern Equatoria in particular. It argues that the collapse of the regime was a nsequence of the economic problems which beset Egypt beginning at least in e mid-1870s. The result was a steady reduction of financial support from Cairo. make up for the shortfall, officials in the Sudan had to raise taxes. In Equatoria, wever, the problem was exacerbated by the sudd which blocked the river in 78 and for eighteen months thereafter prevented the delivery of salaries and er needed materials for the province. Consequently, increased taxation (or ter tribute) in Equatoria had a sense of urgency about it. But its implementation voked local resistance, thus began a vicious resistance-suppression cycle ch ultimately destroyed the basis of government in the region. But the final v was the Mahdist revolution which overthrew the Turco-Egyptian colonial me in 1885, thus destroying any hope of relief for the beleaguered forces in atoria. Most of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of these events in tern Equatoria.

Chapter Seven examines the Mahdist rule in Eastern Equatoria. It start with ef narrative on the background of the Mahdi (Muhammad Ahmad), and then es on to a discussion of the socioeconomic conditions in Northern Sudan that e possible the outbreak and success of the Mahdist revolution. Most of the

chapter is, however, devoted to an examination of the Mahdist efforts to establish their rule in Eastern Equatoria. It argues that the fundamental problem confronting the Mahdists was basically the same as that faced by the previous regimes--lack of supplies. And like their predecessors, the Mahdists had to take the supplies by force, thus repeating the same destructive cycle that ultimately undermined the Turco-Egyptian regime in the region. However, the final blow to the Mahdist regime was the European colonial onslaught gripping Africa at the end of the century. For Omdurman, the end came with the crushing defeat of its forces in the battle of Karari. While in Eastern Equatoria, the combined Anglo-Congolese force under Colonel Cyril Godfrey Martyr did the job.

A Note on Sources

A student of Southern Sudan history has remarked that "... Southern Sudan has been the cradle of modern social anthropology as it has developed in Great Britain and elsewhere," and that "any student of African ethnography may now be expected to attain a familiarity with the cardinal texts on the Azande, Nuer and Dinka, the works of the late Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard and his protégés."[8] Unfortunately, this rich ethnographic literature has not been replicated in the area of history. Thus, whereas the historiography of most regions in Africa has grown by leaps and bounds over the last half-century, that of Southern Sudan has been particularly anemic, probably for quite understandable reasons.[9]

Many general secondary works have been consulted for this dissertation, but only a few of them were particularly important for our understanding of (Northern) Sudan's nineteenth century political economy. Two of them are by Jay

Spaulding and Anders Bjorkelo.[10] Although Spaulding's work focuses on pre-nineteenth century, it however provides a good picture of the evolution of Sinnar's political economy until the Turco-Egyptian conquest in 1821. Bjorkelo's, on the other hand, focuses on Northern Sudan's economy during the Turco-Egyptian regime. Although these authors do not make that connection, this dissertation argues that the chronic economic and fiscal problems bedeviling the Turco-Egyptian economy in Northern Sudan forced the authorities to launch the White Nile trade. Furthermore, Khartoum's dogged determination to maintain its control over it underscores the trade's importance as a significant source of official revenues. These policies do therefore establish a clear connection between Eastern Equtoria and the Turco-Egyptian colonial economy.

With regards to Eastern Equatoria itself, the only important secondary sources are the pioneering history works of Richard Gray and Robert Collins.[11] These two books are particularly important because they cover the period studied in this dissertation. Although they are excellent works (in fact, they are still the standard textbooks for the nineteenth century history of Southern Sudan), their main shortcoming is, however, their preoccupation with the activities of alien forces in Southern Sudan (the Khartoumers, the Turco-Egyptian government, and the Mahdists), and the contribution of the local people to that history seemed secondary or even incidental.[12] This dissertation attempts to redress this shortcoming by focusing instead on the local responses to both the opportunities and dangers which these alien forces presented. This approach offers a balanced picture of the interface between the local peoples and the alien forces.

However, the main sources for this dissertation are the reports of travellers, plorers, and even traders who rushed to Eastern Equatoria (or Southern Sudan nerally) following the opening of the Nile to modern navigation in 1840. These vellers and explorers often published their observations of the life and customs the people they came in contact with. While some of their observations were accurate, others were quite on target. However, since it is not possible to give a ief assessment of the contribution of each report, I will therefore indulge in some neralization by way of grouping them.

The first set of primary documents are reports by traders who participated in e White Nile trade. Some of these traders wrote books and/or journal articles on eir travels many of which are rich with accounts of the life and customs of the ople they came in contact with. While there are many of such accounts, the es with direct relevance to Eastern Equatoria include those by Antoine Brun-llet, John Petherick, and Andrea de Bono. Not all traders published their counts, however. Instead, some left their accounts in the form of letters to nds and relatives. This latter group of documents have been collected and olished by Paul Santi and Richard Hill as The Europeans in the Sudan.[13]

The second set of primary documents are reports and letters by Catholic ssionaries who worked in the Sudan beginning in 1846. Some of these ssionaries made visits to Eastern Equatoria between 1846 and 1851, all in rch of suitable places to establish their mission stations. However, the first sionary to settle in Eastern Equatoria was Fr. Angelo Vinco. He came in 1851 stayed in Bilinyang under the protection of the royal family there. Vinco died

ıd was given an elaborate royal burial in Bilinyang in 1852. Other missionaries ıme in the following years, and by 1856 they had established a mission in ɔndokoro complete with a school. Some of these missionaries left written counts of their travels and stay in the region, and these accounts have been llected and published into a book entitled The Opening of the Nile Basin.[14]

The third set of firsthand accounts are by travelers and explorers. While re were many of these travelers and explorers in the Sudan, the most portant, as far as Eastern Equatoria is concerned, are by John Henning Speke; muel White Baker; Wilhelm Junker; Gaetano Cassati.

John Henning Speke and James Grant were sent to East Africa by the yal Geographical Society to "discover" the source of the Nile. After a long and uous journey through modern Tanzania, they achieved their objective. They ı followed the Nile and eventually reached Gondokoro in February 1863. Their ount of this northward journey[15] is useful for information on people south of dokoro.

Samuel Baker also travelled to the Sudan for exploration. He and his wife hed Gondokoro in February 1863, just days before Speke and Grant arrived e. Speke and Grant urged him to continue with his journey and fill in the gaps they had left. However, because of insecurity problems on the road to the ı, the Bakers were forced to make an eastward detour through Latukaland. ı there, they travelled to Acholiland and then to Bunyoro, where he overed" Lake Albert. Their travels in the region lasted two years, after which returned to Khartoum, and then to Europe. Baker later published these

adventures,[16] and his information is very useful for understanding the situation in the eastern and southern districts of Eastern Equatoria during these early years of penetration of the hinterland by the traders.

Wilhelm Junker came to the Southern Sudan twice. The first time was in 1876-1878, during which he explored the lower reaches of the Sobat River and the western tributaries of the Nile. He came back in 1879 to explore the Nile-Congo watershed region, a task which he finished in four years. Junker stayed in Makaraka district for a significant part of this four-year exploration, and his accounts of his sojourn there provides a valuable information on the western districts, especially Makaraka, during the period of Turco-Egyptian colonial rule in the South.[17]

The next significant explorer was Gaetano Casati. An Italian geographer, Casati was sent to the Southern Sudan by the Milan Geographical Society in response to a request by the Governor of Bahr el-Ghazal province, Romolo Gessi. Casati's job was to map out the Bahr el-Ghazal River, and one of the terms of his employment was that the province would pay his living expenses. Unfortunately for him, shortly after his arrival in Bahr el-Ghazal, Romolo was recalled and eventually dismissed from the service. Casati was left behind, literally abandoned. Almost destitute, he retired to Mangbetuland (in eastern Central African Republic) where he lived for nearly three years. Governor Emin Pasha rescued and brought him to Equatoria, where he entered the service as Captain. Casati's account[18] provides also important information on the western districts, especially Makaraka,

ring the Turkiyya. It also contains a significant amount of information on events
at led to the collapse of that regime.

The last important traveller was J.A. Mounteny-Jephson. He was a member
staff of the Relief Expedition led by Henry Morton Stanley to rescue Governor
hin Pasha who had been cut off in Equatoria by the Mahdist revolution. He
ached Eastern Equatoria in 1888, visiting several garrisons there to talk to the
diers explaining the new orders from Cairo to evacuate the province. His
count of the expedition which he later published[19] is therefore an important
urce of information on conditions in the country in the last years of the Turco-
yptian regime in the province.

Finally, the last important set of primary sources are writings by government
cials who had served in the province. The most important of these officials
re Samuel Baker, Charles G. Gordon, Emin Pasha, and Romolo Gessi. Except
Romolo Gessi who was governor of Bahr el-Ghazal, these officials served as
ernors in Equatoria. Gessi himself served in Equatoria before his appointment
he governorship of Bahr el-Ghazal province. Other important officials in this
egory are Gaetano Casati and Col. C. Chaillé-Long. Although these sources
t be treated with caution because of certain official or political biases of their
ors, overall they are reliable.

es and References

Although very little is known of the history of Eastern Equatoria prior to the nineteenth century, it is sidered that its present peoples are a product of a tural process of interaction of peoples of Nilo-

aharan and Afroasiatic group of languages, and that this rocess dated back to about 3000 B.C. See Christopher nret, "Population Movement and Culture Contacts in the outhern Sudan," in John Mack and Peter Robershaw (eds.) ulture History, pp. 19-48; and Peter Robertshaw, "Eastern quatoria in the Context of Later Eastern African rehistory," in Ibid., pp. 89-100.

In fact, the Continent's geographical center, Source Yubu, in Southern Sudan, just west of Eastern Equatoria.

For the relationships between these parts of Southern dan with the Islamic savannah states of Darfur and Sennar, e Rex O'Fahey, "Fur and Fartit: The History of a Frontier," Mack and Robertshaw, Culture History in the Southern dan: Archaeology, Linguistics and Ethnohistory (Nairobi: itish Institute in Eastern Africa, 1982), pp. 75-87; and tricia Mercer, "Shilluk Trade and Politics from the Mid-venteenth Century to 1861," in Journal of African History, l. XII 3(1971), pp. 407-426. For the Greek and Roman peditions, see L. P. Kirwan "Greek and Roman Expeditions to e Southern Sudan," in John Mack and Peter Robertshaw (eds.) lture History in the Southern Sudan, pp.71-74.

"Angelo Vinco, First Christian to Live Among the Bari. His Journeys, 1851-1852" (hereafter "His Journeys"), in Las Toniolo and Richard Hill (edts. & trans.) The ening of the White Nile Basin: Writings by Members of the tholic Mission to Central Sudan on the Geography and nicity of the Sudan 1842-1881 (London: Oxford University ss 1974)), p. 90. Vinco's observation regarding Lafon's de with people to the east or northeast seems to be ported by Latuka oral tradition which says that before the te Nile trade, there existed a bead called amulle. In uka, Murle country was called "Mulle," and this may gest that "amulle" came from Murle country. A second irect evidence of this trade is suggested by the term la." In most of Eastern Equatoria, white or light plected people are called "gala," or "gila." The primary ning of this term is racial. It denotes light-complected ple including Europeans. The secondary meaning denotes social sphere of modern government with its technical and rcive power. Writers (including this one) have argued the term suggests contact (probably commercial) between region and the Oromo (until recently called "Galla") of iopia. See Abannik O. Hino, "A History of Plains-Otuho, 0-1920," (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Institute of African Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, 1980), pp. 83-84. further reference to the Galla-Lafon trade, see (Antoine)

M. Brun-Rollet, Le nil blanc et le Soudan: Études sur l'Afrique centrale; moeurs et coutumes des sauvages (Paris: Librairie de L. Maison, 1855), p. 113; and Simon Simonse, Kings of Disaster: Dualism, Centralism and the Scapegoat King in Southeastern Sudan (Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1992), p. 45. A possible alternative explanation for the term, however, may be that it originated from the "wikalat" or "agency" system of the White Nile traders.

5. The disruptive nature of the trade is perhaps best symbolized by that eloquent motif, quite widespread in the region, in which the daughter of the chief (in others the daughter of two sibling brothers) accidentally swallows a bead. The bead, as it turned out, belonged to the chief's brother, who demands that the bead be restored back to him. He was so adamant in his demand that he refused to accept any kind of compensation. In the end, the chief was forced to disembowel his daughter to retrieve the bead and restored it to his litigant brother. However, because this resolution had exacted such a high price, the two brothers broke up and went their separate ways.

6. Trade goods from the East African Coast did not reach Buganda until the reign of Kabaka Kyabuga (c. 1763-1780). Initially, Buganda obtained these trade goods in return for ivory it raided from her weaker neighbors, which explains why it took long for the Zanzibari trade to reach Eastern Equatoria. For the trade between the East African Coast and the interlacustrine kingdoms, see Edward A. Alpers, The East African Slave Trade (Nairobi: The East African Publishing House, 1967), pp. 14-15, and 22-23.

. Until the annexation of the South in 1870 and Darfur in 874, Egypt's original colony in the Sudan comprised the rovinces of Dongola, Berber, Sinnar, and Kordofan. Partly ecause of their earlier annexation, and partly because of heir proximity to Khartoum, these provinces were better ntegrated into the colony's structure than others.

. John Mack and Peter Robershaw, "Introduction," in Culture istory in the Southern Sudan: Archaeology, Linguistics, and thnohistory (Nairobi: British Institute in Eastern Africa, 982), p. 1.

. The main obstacle appears to be the forbidding research nvironment imposed by the civil war that has persisted there nce 1955.

). Jay Spaulding, The Heroic Age in Sinnar (East Lansing:

Michigan State University, 1985), and Anders Bjorkelo, From King to Kashif: Shendi in the Nineteenth-Century (Bergen: University of Bergen, 1984).

11. Richard Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, 1839-1889 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), and Robert O. Collins, The Southern Sudan, 1883-1898: A Struggle for Control (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1964). These books are on Southern Sudan as a whole, but they contain substantial parts on Eastern Equatoria.

12. However, in fairness to Richard Gray and Robert, it has to be pointed out that their two works belong to the first generation of African history when the focus seemed to have been what outsiders (foreign traders and colonialists) did in Africa.

13. M. (Antoine) Brun-Rollet, Le Nil Blanc et le Soudan: Études sur l'Afrique Centrale; Moers et coutumes des Sauvages (Paris: Librairie de L. Maison, 1855); John Petherick, Egypt, the Soudan and Central Africa; With Explorations from Khartoum on the White Nile to the Regions of the Equator, Being Sketches from Sixteen Years' Travel (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1861); Mr. and Mrs. Petherick, Travels in Central Africa and Explorations of the Western Nile Tributaries, 2 vols. (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1869); Andrea de Bono, "Voyage au Fleuve Blanc en 1861," in Nouvelles Annales des Voyages de la Géographie, de l'Histoire et de l'Archéologie (n. d.); and Paul Santi and Richard Hill, The Europeans in the Sudan, 1834-1878 (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1980). Of course, not all the traders left written records of their observations and/or business activities in Southern Sudan. And if all of them did, at least not all the records by everyone of them has come to light.

14. Elias Toniolo and Richard Hill (trans. & Eds.) The Opening of the Nile Basin (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1974).

15. John Henning Speke, Journal to the Discovery of the Sources of the Nile (London: 1864).

16. Samuel W. Baker, The Albert N'Yanza: Great Basin of the Nile and the Exploration of the Nile Sources, 2 vols. (London: MacMillan & Co., 1866).

17. Wilhelm Junker, Travels in the Years 1875-1886, 3 vols. (trans. A. H. Keane) (London, 1890)

18. Gaetano Casati, Ten Years in Equatoria and the Return

ith Emin Pasha, 2 vols. (London: Frederick Warne & Co., 891).

9. J.A. Mounteny-Jephson, Emin Pasha and the Rebellion at he Equator (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & ivington, 1890).

PART I

The Turco-Egyptian Colonial Political Economy and the Origins of the White Nile Trade

CHAPTER ONE

TURCO-EGYPTIAN COLONIAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

The Turco-Egyptian colonial conquest of the Sudan in 1820-21 was a tershed point in the history of the Sudan. The relatively brief military mpaign by the conquering armies of Muhammad 'Ali, Ottoman Viceroy of ypt, brought an abrupt end to the political independence of the peoples and gdoms of the Sudan. The most important of these kingdoms was the almost funct Funj Kingdom, or Sultanate, of Sinnar, whose territories became the re of the new colony.[1] By the mid-1870s, the colonial government was cognized over most of modern Sudan.

It was however in the social and economic areas that the impact of the lonial relationship was felt deepest by the Sudanese. The conquest had been dertaken largely for economic motives, and required the transformation of or and its redirection for the benefit of the capitalist interests. To gauge the ure of this social and economic impact, an outline of the pre-conquest ioeconomic conditions in the Funj Kingdom is necessary.

Pre-conquest Political Economy

On the eve of the Turco-Egyptian conquest, the Funj Kingdom of Sinnar in the process of transforming itself from a feudal social order to one in h capitalist institutions and relations dominated. The birthplace of these talist institutions was in the enclaves of Islamic religious communities, which become quite common by the mid-eighteenth century.[2] Part of the credit for

his development is attributable to the King of Sinnar himself. Acting in his apacity as patron of Islam in his Kingdom, the king undertook to foster and cilitate the activities of Muslim clerics and missionaries in his state. One way which the king expressed this concern was by making land endowments to ligious leaders. These endowments were permanent and irrevocable, and ere to be held by the holy men as milk (private property) as defined by Islamic w. Given the nearly feudal, agrarian structure of the society, the endowments presented the ultimate gift that the monarch could make.

The endowments became a critical resource, indispensable to the ependence and sustenance of the religious communities. Furthermore, they re to be held by the holy men as milk (private property) as defined by Islamic . The royal cessions were unprecedented in terms of the Funj kingdom's land ure system. Traditionally all land belonged to the king, although his subjects ld hold it as usufruct. The royal monopoly was dramatized in such formal e occasions as the appointment of state officials or the creation of new inistrative districts/provinces.

During such occasions, the King's proclamation was accompanied by the ance of a land charter to the new offices. In contrast to the lands ceded to eligious leaders, however, such charters did not represent permanent ation but entitled the beneficiary to exploit the labor and produce of his ects.[3] The king still reserved the right and the power to revoke that privilege, deed often happened when the grantee died or fell out of favor. All this was

marked contrast to the permanent nature of land donations made to the aders of religious enclaves.

The holy men did not however rest content with their freehold but sought her privileges that would further consolidate their economic independence and litical autonomy. Their accumulation of rights and privileges was a gradual ocess. For example, the holy men sought and obtained immunity from secular thorities, as well as personal exemption from taxation. In time, the tax-exempt tus was extended to residents in their religious enclaves, enabling them to vote their energy and resources to meeting their religiously sanctioned igations, including payment of the fitra and the zakah.

The religious leaders also won exemption from restriction of movement side of one's jurisdiction, a ban imposed on the rest of the society. This right novement, along with the right to trade and to sponsor markets, to own slaves , in due time, to purchase land, all these facilitated the movement of goods property between the religious members. Their overall impact was to sform the religious community into a social entity markedly different from that e general society. Its hallmark was the right to private property and its osition unencumbered by the socio-political rigidities of Sinnar's feudal social r. Naturally, the primary beneficiaries were leaders of these communities enjoyed administrative and judicial powers. First and foremost they kept fees and fines from litigations. Second, as religious figures, they mulated wealth and land through endowments. And third, they acted as utors for those unable to take charge of their own affairs.[4]

The holy men thus controlled large landholdings, which could be rented to nants who paid "land tax" (Khurj).[5] If the tenants lived in the enclave they also id the fitra and the zakah. The profits and other proceeds so derived were nvested in land or other economic ventures. The land accumulations by the igious leaders gradually eroded the almost sacrosanct notion that all land longed to the king, an idea which constituted the cornerstone of the extant dal order. In time the "virus" caught on the wider society, resulting in a limentary market in farmland.

The ability of the religious leaders to appropriate the privileges and mforts of the nobility was not lost on some of their immediate secular ghbors, who sought their protection, and some even began paying taxes to m rather than to their higher secular authorities.[6] So important did the gious leaders become that ambitious men aspired to the position. They had earn Islamic scriptures and law sufficiently well to leave the original enclave to blish a new one elsewhere in the Kingdom. The multiplier effect of this ess on the social fabric gradually weakened loyalty to the established feudal al order.

Geography, however, imposed certain limits on the growth of religious munities, especially in the desert region north of the confluence of the White he Blue Nile. This region suffers from a relative scarcity of farmland, with ulture possible only through irrigation. The upshot is that farming is ned largely to the river valley. Naturally, this limited resource base could not e the continuous stress and strain of exploitation made necessary by the

xpanding human population. Under the conditions of material deprivation in hich the northern desert region often found itself, social adjustment took the rm of increasing individualism and competition for the limited resources.

The second factor influencing the north's response relates to Egypt, which ad often sought to exert its religious and political influence on the Sudan. though that objective sometimes led to direct and overt political action,[7] it stly was served through peaceful intercourse with the peoples of the Sudan. yptian Muslim missionaries traveled back and forth between the two countries selytizing. On the other hand, Sudanese aspiring to a clerical vocation often ined access to Egyptian religious educational institutions.[8]

But perhaps Egypt's greatest influence came through trade. As an gral part of the bustling eastern Mediterranean, Egypt imported from the dan slaves, camels, ivory, ostrich feathers, rhinoceros horns, gum arabic, etc.[9] ile many of these products were consumed domestically, others were xported to Europe and the Orient and thus comprised a significant source of pt's foreign exchange earnings.[10] Sudan's growing importance to the ptian economy is reflected in the surge of trade between the two countries ughout the eighteenth century.[11]

Sinnar's feudal classes wanted the same privileges and rights that had n granted to the religious leaders. The more powerful of them, especially the incial lords, began to defy the king's monopoly over long-distance trade. started organizing caravans to regional and international markets, all in

ntravention of the established Funj rule that such trade was the royal erogative.

But defiance of the King's monopolistic trade policy was not just an conomic act of self-interest. It was also, in the final analysis, a political fiance, an abrogation of the King's power. The contest, though fundamental, oked no dramatic struggle with the king, and its outcome was foregone as a sult of the apparent weakening of central authority. Powerful provincial or local ds were then able to treat their particular land grants as private property, never ievable by the king at his wish. Thus the nobility joined the clerics in fostering d alienation and commercialization, forging an ideological alliance with them.

The nobility was unwilling, however, to completely embrace the open tem implied by the ideology of the clerics. On the contrary, they were ermined to preserve their privileges of birth and found it necessary to redefine social status of the clerics. The result was a three-tier social structure, with nobility at the top, commoners at the bottom, and clerics in the middle. In , traders and businessmen were also assigned to the middle social tier. This al engineering was formalized through a legal idiom, according to which the lle classes were subject to Islamic law, while the peasants and commoners nued to be ruled under traditional Funj law. The change required the intment of Islamic judges into the national judiciary.[12]

The long-term consequences of these developments were disastrous for ional authority. Defiance of the Sultan's prerogatives over critical areas of and trade by his subordinate seriously undermined the central government.

Whatever the King's initial resistance to that ongoing ideological rebellion, it had evidently become muted by the second half of the eighteenth century: by then the requirement for the King's confirmation of any land transaction was largely ignored. In time even the formality of the confirmation by a local official also disappeared, hence the political disintegration of the kingdom.

Mode and Media of Exchange

The social and political impact of the bourgeois influences was less dramatic, in fact even conservative, in the realm of exchange. Throughout the first two centuries of its existence, the Funj Kingdom hardly used any coinage in its exchange system. By the early eighteenth century, however, coined money began to make a significant appearance, mostly in the Kingdom's capital city, Sinnar. The coinage was not minted by the national treasury but was brought in by visiting foreign traders (Khawajas) and remained largely restricted to their hands. Only a limited number of indigenous Sudanese officials in charge of the King's trade[13] had some access to the foreign money.

Nevertheless, the coins did not assume the role of an "all-purpose" medium of exchange. Instead they were absorbed and incorporated into the exchange system and became one of several varieties of units of exchange, which included gold, livestock, dhurra (grain), beads, and dammur (locally made cotton cloth).[14] The exchange capacity of each of these was open-ended but one could only be used for purchasing certain types of goods. To this extent, therefore, all such units of exchange, including the foreign coins, were "limited-purpose" or "special-purpose" money.

The vast majority of the units were themselves commodities, creating an alytical problem, in that a transaction contracted through such currencies fers an ambiguity of whether or not the exchange was a barter transaction as nd in pre-capitalist economies. The distinction is important because simple rter in pre-capitalist economies is oriented towards subsistence needs, ereas in market-oriented economies, exchange as well as production of mmodities emphasizes the profit motive. It is, however important to point out at these two modes of exchange are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In ct, they can and indeed do often coexist. But in situations of coexistence, nbiguity is removed by the existence of an "all-purpose" medium of exchange. the case of the Funj economy under study, the ambiguity of the units of change (i.e., as subsistence goods on the one hand, and as currencies on the ner) tends to obscure the capitalist relations that had become common by the ter part of the eighteenth century.

Nonetheless, certain commodity currencies gradually emerged as the referred media of exchange. Dhurra, for example, became the most common dium of exchange in the northern desert region, due in large part to the ennial shortage of locally produced food. Next in frequency was the tob mmur (locally produced cotton cloth).[15] As a rule, both dhurra and dammur e used for small purchases, whereas livestock such as cattle, camels, goats heep, and also Spanish dollars (Maria Theresa or Carlos IV Dollar) were l for large transactions.

The evolution of commodity currencies in the southern rainland region is less clear, largely due to a paucity of information. Nonetheless, there is no reason to suppose that it was different from that of the north, for despite the drift toward political disintegration, there was still a measure of acceptance of the King as nominal head. To this extent, therefore, there was a degree of political and economic integration. In fact, the southern region became the main supplier of food items for the north. Merchants from there supplied northern markets with large quantities of dhurra and dammur,[16] thus indicating that these two commodity currencies were equally dominant as media of exchange in the southern rainland region.

An important development in the evolution of media of exchange was the attempt, also in the latter half of the eighteenth century, to introduce a national coined currency.[17] The policy behind the introduction was to enhance and refine the exchange system so as to promote the economy, and also to better control the inflow of foreign currencies and their possible negative impact on the economy. Unfortunately, the scheme eventually fell through: because of its high quality, the newly introduced national coin was bought up by foreign traders for the purpose of melting them down. By the end of the eighteenth century the coin had virtually "fled" the country and was nowhere to be found in the Kingdom. The country thus reverted to being coinless, while Spanish dollars continued to concentrate in the cellars of the few big local and foreign traders and some state officials.

The Sha'il System

Dependence upon commodity currencies as media of exchange had one major drawback which ultimately led to far-reaching social consequences. A good example in this regard is dhurra. As an essential commodity, the Funj traditional distributive system guaranteed its supply, especially in times of food shortages. The institutional workings of distributing dhurra to the people required that in times of famine the nobility distributed stored grain to relieve the affected population. But with the onset of capitalism, the nobility tended to rescind the injunctions of this traditional "moral economy," opting instead for the lure of profit. To this end they appropriated more and more of the tax grain for commercial purposes. The venality of the nobility denied the Sinnarians, particularly the lower peasant strata, a critical source of survival.

This state of affairs enriched the merchants. They bought up most of the grain and, when there were food shortages, sold it to needy families under the credit institution called the sha'il (literally, "carrying" but generally translated as the "lien"). The specific workings of the sha'il system consisted of the following: during periods of food shortage, impoverished peasants could go to a big merchant and contract from him the needed amounts of dhurra. The contract undertaken committed the family to repay the merchant at the end of the harvest. While the repayment was to be in dhurra, the contract did not specifically state as. Repayment was given in monetary terms, and the estimate given was well above the actual market value of the borrowed dhurra, which enabled the merchant to garner profits.

Based on the available sources, the sha'il system was quite widespread, rticularly in the northern desert region. There, the combined impact of pulation increase, fragmentation of landholdings due to increasing acceptance Islamic laws of inheritance, and land aggrandizement by the wealthy and the werful, all became socially quite telling. Complicating the economic process re weather fluctuations, which often brought famine.

Unable to expect relief from state officials anymore, the poverty-stricken asants had no option but to place themselves at the mercy of a sha'il contract. e debt often became a vicious cycle, as it extracted more and more dhurra d thus helped to perpetuate the food deficit situation among the peasants. sperate people moved south to the rainland region where there was a relative undance of available arable land. Another option was to move to towns or oad to Egypt to take a chance at the growing service industries there. This te of affairs remained relatively unchanged until the Turco-Egyptian conquest 820-21.

Post-conquest Political Economy

The Turco-Egyptians had undertaken the conquest of the Sudan primarily economic reasons, but found their new possession lacking resources. The ed wealth of gold and other precious minerals was nowhere to be found; e were not even slaves. The conquerors concluded that to make the colony e required transformation of its productive and labor resources. To achieve objective required developing an appropriate administrative and fiscal ture.

Fiscal policy was of immediate and critical importance. Under the Funj, Sudanese paid a variety of taxes. In the northern riverine region, for mple, the traditional waterwheel, or saqiya, was critical for eking out a living. e Funj rulers therefore decided to tax each saqiya five Maria Theresa dollars. the other hand, in the rainland region, where arable land was relatively ntiful, taxation was based on the estimated harvest; and among nomads ation on the number of animals owned. Over and above these regular taxes ne dues and obligations such as presents, corvée, and other services owed to local lord or landlord.

This contrasted rather with the structure of taxation used in Egypt where peasants paid several taxes: to the central treasury, to the local landlord, and he local district administration. They also paid a capitation tax, house tax, fessional tax (e.g. on trade and crafts), and taxes on animals and date trees. ddition, there was land tax rated according to class.

The colonial government sought to institute the Egyptian tax structure, some modifications to suit Sudan's local circumstances. However, like their j predecessors, Cairo did not envisage its uniform application throughout the ny. In the northern riverine region where social and property relations were e clearly defined, the Egyptian tax structure was found to be more or less ble. In the southern rainland region and among the nomads, on the other l, the new taxation consisted of a subtle blend between Egyptian and xisting Funj tax practices.

There is no unanimity of sources regarding the precise tax rates, however. According to the "Funj Chronicle," the rates fixed were 15 dollars per slave, 10 dollars per head of cattle, 5 dollars per sheep or donkey, and between 12 and 23 dollars per saqiya.[18] But according to G.B. Brocchi, people with no appreciable property were taxed five dollars each.

In the southern rainland region, taxation adopted pre-existing Funj practices. For example, while land was not directly taxed, each village furnished dhurra, the quantity of which was based on the area of land cultivated. Another charge was placed on the harvest, and each village paid a surtax, often in sheep and butter. Taxation in the southern rainland appears to have been largely motivated by the army's need for food.[19]

To the majority of the poor Sudanese, these taxes were exorbitantly high. Existing market prices of some of the items at the time seem to justify this conclusion. For example, the price of a cow was about 6 dollars; that of an adult male slave about 20 dollars, while that of a youthful female slave was about 30 dollars.[20] Furthermore, a comparison of pre-and post-conquest saqiya tax underscores the magnitude of the increase. In the Funj days, the saqiya tax was assessed at about 5 dollars, whereas the Turco-Egyptian rulers required between 12 and 23 dollars. Added to the high cost was the initial insistence by the authorities that the taxes be paid in specie, itself a major problem for a cash-scarce country.

sistance and Rebellion

There was immediate and spontaneous reaction to this taxation policy. olent rebellion broke out in February 1822, a mere four months after the mpletion of the conquest and the introduction of the taxes. The rebellion rted first in the Gezira ("Peninsula" districts between the Niles) and spread idly to other parts of the colony. Isolated military garrisons were attacked and en destroyed. In response, government troop columns crisscrossed the length d breadth of the colony putting down the rebellion. By the autumn of 1822, lence had ebbed, only to be reignited in October by the assassination in endi of Isma'il, son of Egypt's Viceroy and Commander of the army in Sinnar. ould take nearly two years more before the rebellion was finally brought ler control.

Nonetheless, the rebellion was not universal. There were groups or viduals who opposed the regime but who were unwilling to risk their lives. se people chose passive tactics, the most common of which was to flee from ernment-controlled areas to hideouts near and far. The wholesale exodus of ated groups proved enormously harmful to the economy, for it significantly drastically reduced the taxable population base.[21]

On the other hand, there were those who chose collaboration. The most inent of these collaborators were the Sha'iqiyya. Although the first to offer ance to the invading Turco-Egyptian forces, after surrendering, the iyya became indispensable supporters of the regime, being employed as ar soldiers and tax collectors. For their collaboration, they were awarded serted lands of the rebellious Abdallab, former overlords of the northern

riverine region. In many ways, the support of the Sha'iqiyya was crucial for the successful suppression of the rebellion.

Post-Rebellion Policy: Appeasement and Co-option

The post-rebellion days were sobering for the government. The magnitude and length of the rebellion brought home the vulnerability of the regime itself. The government therefore found it necessary to conciliate the population and entice the fugitives to return home and reoccupy their lands.

'Uthman Bey Jarkas al-Birinji, the new Daftardar (military Commander-General), admitted candidly in early 1825 that the tax assessments were indeed too high and that they were the cause of the rebellion. He therefore decided to lower the rates and so notified Cairo.[22] By June of the same year, his successor, Mahu Bey, after consultation with a number of Sudanese notables, went one step further: he decided to waive cash payment of taxes for three years.[23] Considering the fact that cash money was scarce, the decision itself represented a major concession.

To make up for the shortfall, the government decided to raid peoples beyond the frontiers for anything valuable that could be resold for cash. For example, in 1825 the nomads of Qadarif lost 3,000 camels, which were subsequently sold for 27,000 dollars.[24] Slave raids into the southern Blue Nile region, in the Nuba mountains, or against the Nilotics up the White Nile, showed the same objective.[25]

Meanwhile, the government found that what it needed was an administrative infrastructure that would give it a measure of legitimacy in the

eyes of the Sudanese. The existing administrative structure consisted, broadly, of four provinces (ma'muriyya): Dongola, Berber, Sinnar, and Kordofan, each headed by a governor or Ma'mur. In 1826 the latter title changed to Mudir, and each became an autonomous province or mudiriyya. In 1833, centralization was implemented, and the title "mudir of the Sudan" was introduced. In 1835, the title of the new office was changed to Hikimdar, which literally means "commissioner" but has been generally translated as "Governor-General." For the first time the colony had an overall local head to whom the provincial governors were now accountable.

Below the mudiriyya was the Kashiflik (or district), whose head was called he Kashif, and the qa'imagamate (subdistrict). There were 10 or so a'imagamates in a Kashflik, and each of them was headed by an official called qa'imaqam. At the bottom of the structure was the village under the control of shaykh (village chief); a group of 10 or 15 villages constituted a qa'imagamate.

Sudanese participation in this administrative structure was mostly limited the position of village shaykh,[26] although some locals became collaborators. rhaps no group typified that collaborationist role more than the Sha'iqiyya. ter surrender, the Sha'iqiyya were incorporated into the colonial forces as gular soldiers and were used as militia. They also performed certain n-security tasks, the most important of which was tax collection, a grim affair the public. The exercise lacked order and regularity, in some ways embling a raid.

Not employed on a paid basis, their remuneration came in the form of commissions on the taxes they were able to collect. The more taxes they collected, the higher their remuneration. The Sudanese concluded that the Sha'iqiyya were traitors who were hurting rather than representing the interests of their fellow Sudanese. The usurpation of the lands of the Abdallab, for example, all in reward for their collaboration with the invaders, was for the Sudanese a grim reminder of the extreme extent to which the Sha'iqiyya would go. It was these kinds of resentment-causing behavior by government that the new policy attempted to minimize. The reevaluation and weighing that naturally followed in the aftermath of the 1822 rebellion resulted in some significant modification in the administration. The government decided to allow a measure of Sudanese participation in government, inaugurating a policy of cooption.

Under the new policy, the office of ga'imagam was abolished and its functions and duties were transferred to a variety of Sudanese traditional ruling classes.[27] This shift did not, however, necessarily imply the reestablishment of the old traditional hierarchies with their attendant loyalties and/or alliances. Naturally, the government ruled that possibility out, and it did so through its appointive powers.[28] Consequently, the government tended to appoint from among the lower traditional elites who, as a result of their weaker position, were willing to cooperate with the government.

The main ingredient of the appeasement policy required the involvement of Sudanese in both the assessment and collection of taxes through a system of local government in the form of councils of notables at both local and provincial

levels.[29] To facilitate the interchange between the government and the councils, each provincial council elected a shaykh al-mashaykh (paramount shaykh) as an intermediary.

Once this new local government system was in place, the colonial authorities had the machinery to effect the kind of social transformation they had sought all along. At the outset, it was vitally important to repair the deplorable condition of the country wrought by the consequences of the rebellion. Serious depopulation had occurred, severely reducing the tax base. It became important for the authorities to resettle the large displaced and refugee populations on their lands. The collaboration of Sudanese notables in that endeavor proved indispensable, and many successfully persuaded their constituents to return home.

Nonetheless, it remained official policy that the Sudan should pay the cost of its own administration and development. In addition, it was expected to remit profits to the mother country's treasury in Cairo. In light of the scarcity--indeed absence--of exploitable mineral products, it became increasingly clear that the sources of those revenues and profits would have to be found elsewhere. Revenues from customs and trade dues, as well as from the service sector in general, were inadequate for these institutions which were not yet well-developed. Agriculture was therefore deemed the main sure source from which the requisite revenues would ultimately come.

First, following Egyptian agrarian practices, the state encouraged greater exploitation of the land already in the hands of the peasants. To this end, they

made a more comprehensive list of cultivable land, using the feddan (an Egyptian measurement unit) as the basic unit of land tax. To ensure the success of that policy, cooperation of the local leaders became crucial. Several incentives were offered to the chiefs for that cooperation, the most important of which was tax exemption. The "Funj Chronicle," reflecting the view of the Sudanese notables, sums it up tersely in the following lines:

> The Shaykh Abd al-Gadir advised him [the Governor- General] to exempt the chief men among the people from taxation in order to obtain their good will in the development of the country. And he did so, and the result of this policy was apparent, for, as an example, if he exempted one of the fakis or chiefs from payment of ten Kada'as, the man so exempted at once reassured the people and persuaded them to return to their lands so that Khurshid Agha [then Governor-General] obtained from them one or two hundred Kada'as or more: Thus owing to his wisdom and the farsightedness of his advisors [i.e., the notables] the development of the country progressed and the population increased.[30]

Apart from underlining the critical importance of the cooperation of the chiefs in the execution of this agricultural policy, the above quote also makes it clear that land taxation remained the cornerstone of the new economic policy. That is, while the taxable item base may have remained stable, or may have even fluctuated depending on contingencies, land taxation acquired renewed crucial importance. Thus, whereas land taxation was to be the cornerstone of the government's fiscal policy, cash-crop production would help generate further revenues for the government and put monies in the hands of the producers themselves and thus turn them into potential consumers. The peasants were encouraged--in fact compelled--to devote portions of their farmlands to production of the selected cash crops: indigo, sugar cane, and cotton.

The singular importance of the cash-crop policy was further emphasized
hen the government established large public schemes for agricultural
oduction. Lands on which the schemes were established generally had been
used, but some of them had been bought up or expropriated and were now
rked by government slaves. In the northern irrigated districts the lands so
quired were not always prime land, and in order to make them productive,
nstruction of large numbers of saqiyas was undertaken.

The cash-crop policy, however, produced certain significant social and
nomic consequences. First and foremost, the selected crops required the
cation of three critical and often scarce resources: land, water, and labor. In
northern riverine region where these resources were not abundant, the
h-crop dissipated food production. Moreover, the cash-crops consumed a lot
ater, requiring on the average a saqiya per feddan.

Resource investment presupposed the availability of flood plains or
ds, where water was relatively easy to obtain. Such choice land was
rally in the hands of the wealthy landowners. The new cash-crop policy,
fore, imposed painful cutbacks on lands usually devoted to food crop
uction. Those with insufficient farmland decided to devote their small
gs to cash-crop production, and therefore had to find some other land for
crops. The latter generally were poorer in quality and frequently needed
labor to improve them,[31] and this may have been the main reason for the
se in the number of saqiyas in the colony, especially in the northern

riverine districts. The net result of this process was less and less food being produced.

Despite all this, by the end of harvest time the cash crops had few if any compensations for the exertions of the majority of the peasants. The main villain n this was the official monopoly requiring the producers to sell the cash-crops to he government. Besides being the sole buyer, the government also decided the rice at which the crops were to be sold. Consequently, the prices were always rtificially low, usually 30 percent below their real market value, and sometimes ven lower. Some peasants experienced a further disadvantage in that the ising of cash crops often necessitated building saqiyas at a tax of 20 dollars iece, which cut further into what little profit, if any, they were able to make. In e final analysis, the government was the direct beneficiary of the cash-crop licy, and the peasants were the losers.

The net long-term result was declining food productivity. The occurrence years of food shortage and famine became increasingly frequent by the late 30s. For example, in the years 1835-1837 a severe famine hit the country, d the Governor-General in Khartoum had to act like the good Funj lord of the days: he opened the shuna to feed the starving immigrants from the ntryside. Poorer peasants often got ruined, and as often had to pick up what left of their belongings and emigrate south to the rainland districts; others ght alternatives in the service sector in towns.

As time went on, there was a growing peasant outcry over the cash-crop y, which, however, did not seem to evoke much official sympathy. Social

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fferentiation had intensified in post-rebellion days, with Sudanese local
overnment functionaries greatly profiting from the existing situation both in
rms of money and land aggrandizement. Merchants also tended to benefit
om the colonial economy, especially during food shortages, which enabled
em to bring into play the mechanisms of the profitable sha'il institution.
cause of their prosperity, these two important local groups had too much at
ke in the system to want to overhaul it. Consequently, the peasants' growing
cry against the cash-crop policy went unheard, and the deterioration of
nomic conditions for them continued.

The viceroy's visit to the Sudan in 1838-39, however, offered an
portunity which the peasants sought to exploit. Throughout his journey to
rtoum, Muhammad 'Ali was continuously assailed with the demand to abolish
pulsory indigo-growing.[32] Disturbed by the depth of resentment against the
cy, the viceroy relented and ordered the abolition. Unfortunately for the
sants, their victory was short-lived. Fearing the measure's negative impact
evenues, Khartoum waited until Muhammad 'Ali was back in Egypt and then
eeded to reinstate compulsory indigo-growing.[33]

In the long-run, however, it was a combination of natural and economic
rs that eventually brought an end to the compulsory aspects of cash-crop
ation. Of primary impact in this regard was the deleterious effect of indigo
ugar cane cultivation on the soil. Apart from their insatiable demand for
these two crops also tended to exhaust the soil rather quickly. Under
onal agriculture, the way to restore the fertility was to leave the soil fallow

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for several years; another method was to scatter-broadcast a generous amount of nitrous earth on the land. Under the pressures of colonial agriculture, however, it became increasingly difficult to keep up with these soil resuscitation methods. The growing land shortage did not allow for fallow practice or crop rotation except in large landholdings. Even the application of nitrous soil tended to fall into neglect because the amount of labor required often far outweighed its economic advantages. Since nitrous soil was found only in a few places, soil exhaustion made for a significant reduction in productivity.

Transportation difficulties were another major hindrance to cash-crop production. The main means of transportation was the camel, and to move thousands of tons of processed indigo and raw cotton to markets in Cairo required mobilization of large numbers of camels, which in turn, called for a large maintenance expenditure on the animals themselves. In the long run, this acquisition of camels reduced the pool of available animals. Not surprisingly, therefore, by the 1840s stockpiles of produce could be found lying in warehouses for years, awaiting transportation. Declining cash-crops, combined with transportation constraints, led the government ultimately to abandon its monopoly policy and to relax compulsory cash-crop production.

The Development of Farm Slavery

While the cash-crop policy was devastating to many peasants, some with land and water resources benefitted significantly. They could and did mobilize their economic assets to acquire labor.[34] Despite the growing land-impoverishment, the labor market had hardly begun to take root. The

Sudanese still regarded as demeaning the idea of working for others to earn a ving. Potential employers therefore had to depend increasingly on the slave narket.

Slavery antedated the Turco-Egyptian conquest of the Sudan. In feudal unj, however, owning slaves was a prerogative bestowed upon the King and a mited number of the nobility. Even then, the institution of slavery was directed serving military and bureaucratic purposes.[35] Over time, particularly by the econd half of the eighteenth century, these feudal strictures began to crumble, nd individuals outside the nobility began to own slaves.[36] Farm slavery panded rapidly in the nineteenth century as a consequence of the economic licies of the colonial government.

Crucial to this institutional transformation of slavery was the practice by colonial government of dumping, directly or indirectly, surplus onto the open rket. The goal of officially organized slave raids was to capture slaves for scription into Muhammad 'Ali's army. The annual raids were very successful, surplus slaves over and above those needed became too expensive to ntain.[37] Meanwhile, as the state coffers were empty, and continued to suffer ilitating liquidity problems, the army went for months or even years without .[38] To solve this problem, the government decided to compensate the iers in slaves, which they promptly sold for cash. The state continued to use type of compensation until the end of government-sponsored slave raids in 840s.[39] The surplus slaves attracted estate owners interested in the

ɔmmercial agriculture, and many acquired large numbers to cultivate their
rms.

Although slave ownership was expensive because of the attendant slave
x and the necessary maintenance costs, there were advantages which
tweighed these costs. For one thing, slave labor freed the slave master from
ependence on surviving forms of traditional labor organizations, such as the
ldan, which entailed the sharing out of the proceeds among the contracting
embers.[40] By contrast, slave labor enabled the master to keep all of the
oceeds of his produce. Secondly, investment in a saqiya involved high capital
d overhead costs in addition to tax. Land owners could substitute the number
saqiyas possible on their lands and substitute that with slave labor. Thirdly,
ve labor freed the slave master from a variety of domestic and agricultural
ties, thereby enabling him to spend his time and energy either in leisure or
ɔnomically profitable activities, principally trade and commerce. Finally, farm
very led to the prosperity of commercial agriculture, particularly in food crops.
e growing impoverishment of many peasants, especially in the northern
rine provinces, coupled with expanding urban populations, guaranteed a
e market and profits for commercial farmers.

Recent historical studies indicate that most of these slaves were imported
Sinnar and Kordofan.[41] Farmland in these two regions was in relative
dance, but the relative scarcity of labor was a major constraint to expansion
riculture. The injection of slaves into the economy helped to reduce this

bor bottleneck. During his travel through Kordofan in the 1840s, John etherick observed farm slavery there:

> [The farmer wants] a slave to assist him in the cultivation of his land...To make up for the deficiency of labor amongst the free population, those who can afford it resort to slavery: and it is for domestic, but more popularly for agricultural purposes that it is required. The majority of the population are therefore slaveowners; a few families possessing less than two or three, while many own from fifty to a hundred slaves.[42]

bservers estimated that government slave raids (ghazwas) brought some 0,000 to 12,000 slaves annually to Kordofan, not including those imported by ivate individuals, groups, and/or merchants.[43]

In Sinnar, the town of al-Masallamiyya is usually given as an archetypical xample of agricultural expansion in that province.[44] The town was inhabited ostly by merchants; in that sense it was representative of how people with milar means took advantage of the opportunity proffered by the slave labor arket. They bought scores of slaves, settled them in villages, and with their or successfully exploited the possibilities of both rainfed and irrigated riculture. Expansion of the latter was underscored after the colonial conquest the introduction of saqiyas in the province.[45]

However, the relative agricultural prosperity enjoyed by the southern annah provinces could not obscure Sudan's continuing long-term economic ine. Egypt continued to look to the country as a source of materials and ies to support Muhammad 'Ali's industrial and agricultural undertakings. For nple, thousands of oxen were exported from the Sudan in the 1830s for use aft animals on irrigation projects in Egypt, at a time when the Sudanese

were required to grow cash crops.[46] The loss of draft animals tended to hurt the productivity of irrigated agriculture over the long haul. Also, in the wake of the disappointing results of the mineral exploration during Muhammad 'Ali's visit in 1838-39, officials apparently decided to wring the monies from the people themselves. Thus, whereas following centralization in 1833, an estimated revenue of 25,000 kis (purse, each 500 piastres) was collected from the colony as a whole, under governor-general Ahmad Pasha (1838-43), the annual estimate rose to 33,000 kis in addition to 7,000 kis from the slave raids.[47]

This trend was even better highlighted by the annual revenue estimates of the Berber province. In 1821-22, Governor Mahu Bey put his province's annual revenue estimate at 1,587,000 piastres (or 3,174 kis). By the late 1830s and early 1840s, the figure rose to between 2,950,000 and 3,000,000 piastres, or nearly double the 1821-22 figure.[48] A further burden was the tribute that Cairo demanded of the Sudan from time to time. Authorities, however, often found it hard to find the money because of the poverty of the people. For example, governor-general Khurshid Pasha wrote to Muhammad 'Ali explaining why he could not get much money to send to Cairo: "If my Sinnarians [i.e. Sudanese] cultivated ten times more than they actually do, they will have nothing but cereals and animals to give you, and no money at all."[49] Muhammad 'Ali shot back in a manner betraying ignorance of the financial difficulties with which the local authorities in the Sudan were grappling:

> I do not conceive how each time that I ask you for tribute, you object on the grounds of the poverty of the subjects, whom I have given you to govern; they have got two Niles whereas I have got

only one; make these lazy ones work like I do in Egypt, and they will become rich.[50]

In 1841-42 Cairo demanded a tribute of 10,000 ounces of gold. The official price of an ounce was 350 piastres, but the high demand doubled the gold's market price. In order to collect the tribute, every shaykhship or group was made to contribute, and those who failed to meet their quota of gold were charged at the market rate of 700 piastres for every ounce not collected.[51] The amount of gold thus collected far exceeded the amount requisited, but in the process many people were ruined financially.

The 1840s also saw the weakening of Muhammad 'Ali's personal power due to senility and poor health, and he died in 1849. Some officials in the Sudan took advantage of the absence of his decline to unleash their own abuses. But perhaps more important, Muhammad 'Ali's successor, Abbas I (1849-53), was a conservative who sought to depart from some of the progressive policies of his predecessor. He undermined efficient government in the Sudan by appointing, in rapid succession, four weak governors-general. Furthermore, he reverted to using appointment to the Sudan as a means of banishing political enemies or undesirables.[52] Naturally, such officials were in no mood to perform their duties with a sense of commitment. Instead, they were more apt to compensate themselves through fiscal and financial irregularities.

The negative, cumulative effect of all this became very apparent on the land. Hamilton graphically captured this deterioration process:

> The banks of the Nile between Chartum and Berber are little cultivated, the waterwheels [i.e., saqiyas] for irrigation are rare, and the people principally subsist on the abundant crops which they

can raise without labour by sowing after the rains. This neglect of the immense natural resources of the country is in some ways attributable to the slothful character of its black inhabitants, but still more to the exactions of the government which paralyze industry, and are gradually causing an emigration of the people southwards.[53]

This emigration was not just a movement from one part of the colony to another; frequently it took the form of flight to frontier lands beyond government control. The depopulation caused a corresponding drop in tax revenues. To make up for the loss, the government had either to increase individual tax rates or to impose higher revenue quota on the remaining local communities. These measures, in turn, caused more people to emigrate, continuing the vicious cycle.[54]

The situation did not improve much under Muhammad Sa'id Pasha, for he Sudan did not seem to enjoy priority in his preoccupations. During his official isit to the Sudan in 1856-57, however, Muhammad Sa'id was so appalled by hat he saw that he introduced administrative and tax reforms:

(a) the administration of the Sudan was decentralized;

(b) restrictions on movement were removed, land tax rates were to be reduced, and taxation on local communities (i.e., communal quotas) would, where it occurred, have to take into account the factor of emigration;

(c) decisions on tax rates were to be made in conjunction with local shaykhs, who, rather than the irregulars (bashibazuq), would be in charge of measuring lands, counting saqiyas, etc.;

(d) a council of notables would be established to advise the provincial governor and to negotiate taxes with him, thus mediating between him and the shaykhs;

(e) nomads who also cultivated would pay tax on their farmland; and

(f) corvée and other extra levies were to be abolished and anything the government wanted would be paid for at 2 percent above its market price.

The reforms attempted to address popular grievances. The government, for example, viewed emigration as flight from the land, and did not hesitate to confiscate and dispose of the "deserted" lands. On the other hand, kinsmen did not wish to give up the patrimony left behind by the emigré. They therefore struggled to maintain and pay taxes levied on these abandoned lands, thus incurring more labor taxes and burdens. The guarantee of freedom of movement along with the reduction of taxes by the viceroy was therefore a welcome measure that helped mollify this sore problem. Similarly, the proposed involvement of local leaders and notables in policy, assessment, and collection of taxes appeared also to have been a big relief because it reduced the arbitrary behavior that frequently characterized the government's conduct.

Having said this, however, it is also apparent that the reforms had one major weakness, in that they tended to deal almost exclusively with agricultural taxes. Consequently, as observers and critics suggest, the tax reform program amounted to substituting agricultural taxes for the poll tax. For example, the Ismads had their taxes cut by half.[55] This reduction made the government more dependent than ever on agricultural taxes for its source of public revenues, with the result that most of the tax burden fell on farmers. This feature of the reforms led to a drop in government revenues and hence serious budget deficits. Therefore, unless Cairo was prepared to send in state grants and other subsidies to make up for the shortfall, officials found themselves compelled to renege on some aspects of the reforms. Reversal seems mostly to have affected the

farmers, with the predictable result that they began to clamor for reinstatement of the old tax structure.[56] On the other hand, many more abandoned their land to escape these onerous taxes. The net result was growing food shortages, skyrocketing prices, and further economic deterioration.

By 1862 the whole of Sa'id Pasha's reforms had to be reversed, as it was blamed for deepening the economic difficulties. Musa Pasha Hamdi, the new Governor-General, therefore reintroduced most of the essentials of the pre-1857 system. As described by V. Heuglin:

> Formerly only peasants and Arabians [nomads] were taxed directly...and the taxes were collected by their own Sheikh [shaykh], on whom no proper check could be kept and who pocketed as much as he pleased. This system is now being changed by the appointment of paid tax collectors, and a revision of the assessments themselves has been set on foot...Now merchants and manufacturers, all officials, servants, sailors. etc. are to be taxed.[57]

The trouble was that the government's efforts at reform were subverted by he higher taxes. Many were tripled or even quadrupled, resulting in the evenues rising by as much as 125 percent.[58] Yet, this rather extravagant policy as not tempered by undertaking any economies. On the contrary, the overnment increased the size of its salaried personnel by pressing thousands of rm slaves into the army. And because the projected expenditures were not ways matched by actual revenues, the shortfall was made up with loans from airo--so much so that by 1865 Khartoum owed Cairo 163,000 kis. But equently, the monies had to be somehow squeezed from the Sudanese xpayers themselves. Matters became worse when, by 1866, Cairo demanded ayment of the loans. To repay, Governor-General Ja'afar Mazhar Pasha

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adopted the policies of retrenchment, expenditure cuts, and tax rises. According to one observer, Ja'afar Mazhar Pasha increased the taxes in 1866-67 by one- and two-thirds. These tax increases drove many peasants off the land, many of them entering the service of the White Nile traders as soldiers.[59]

In the years that followed, official efforts were exerted to neutralize the fiscal policies of Ja'afar Mazhar. The efforts were primarily administrative and consisted of yet another attempt at decentralization, coupled with the appointment of two native Sudanese as provincial governors.[60] It was felt that, as natives of the country, these Sudanese governors were in a unique position to establish rapport with fellow Sudanese; they enjoyed better insight into the root cause of the continuing agricultural crisis and would be able to prescribe the right solution. The seriousness of the prevailing financial crisis situation was underscored by the fact that despite the increase of taxes in the period 1863-1871, by a factor ranging from 60 percent to over 90 percent, most provinces experienced significant deficits in their budgets. Berber province, for example, was 8,000 kis in arrears in 1870.[61]

The contemplated tax reforms focused on the need for a new and fair cadastral survey, which was undertaken in 1870-1871. Compared to the survey used since the 1820s, the new one allowed more land per saqiya. As a consequence of its implementation, however, the provinces' annual revenues experienced a further drop. Alarmed by the drop in revenues, Cairo ordered the imposition of the old system. This reversal of a well-conceived reform policy clearly highlights the kind of dilemma the authorities were faced with--choosing

between the welfare of the people, on the one hand, and budgetary necessities on the other. In almost all cases, the latter inevitably triumphed.

By the 1860s, talks of or attempts at fiscal reform became even more unrealistic in light of the government's expansionist policies. The decisive step happened in 1863, when the government annexed the predominantly Shilluk country up the White Nile to the mouth of the Sobat river, and dubbed it the White Nile Province, with headquarters at Fashoda.[62] In 1871 Equatorial Province, a vast region stretching south of the latter province and into what is today northern Uganda, was annexed.[63]

Similar efforts were set in motion in 1869 for the annexation of the Bahr el-Ghazal, a move defeated by the slave traders and merchants led by Zubayr Rahma Mansur. Faced with this formidable power, the government delayed the region's annexation until 1873, when it settled on the artifice of appointing Zubayr as governor. Finally, the Kingdom of Darfur was annexed in 1874, making the boundaries of the colony roughly coterminous with those of the modern Sudan Republic.[64]

Although the imperial expansion was in many respects intricately connected with pressures from the international anti-slavery movement, it is important to bear in mind that the relationship between these two movements was generally a fortuitous one. The contemplation of the creation of an Egyptian Central African Empire dates back to the days of Muhammad 'Ali himself, and the driving force behind that quest was Egypt's incessant search for, and control of, important economic resources, especially minerals. In fact, as early as 1836

Muhammad 'Ali had considered taking control of the source of the Nile, believing that minerals might be found there. Driven by the pseudo-science of his time, he hoped to turn Central Africa into an El Dorado, and to this end he wrote to the Governor-General of the Sudan:

> The sources of the Nile should be on the same latitude as [South] America. Now, as metals are found in abundance in America, no doubt they will also be found at the sources of the Nile. But you need a capable man to go there with troops at his command to search for the gold deposits...If you and your troops attain your goal, you will perpetuate among men the memory of your deeds till the end of time. You will add a glorious page to the history of our Egypt...[65]

This dream of minerals in Central Africa was, in 1863, replaced by the attraction of its commercial potential.

On June 1 1863, Captains John Speke and James Grant had an interview with Isma'il, the new viceroy. The two officers had come down the Nile after "discovering" its source. They presented an attractive picture of the commercial potential of the Great Lakes region.[66] Khedive Isma'il seized this to extend Egyptian control into that region. It would seem therefore that Cairo's imperial expansion was inspired by Egypt's economic self-interest and not the result of the anti-slavery movement. Extension of Egyptian control of the Red Sea Coast during the same period was similarly inspired.

The annexation of these territories proved, however, expensive. Samuel Baker's expedition to annex the Equatorial Province, for example, cost the Egyptian treasury some £1,000,000.[67] And although the annexation of Bahr el-Ghazal and Darfur received less international publicity, they were equally expensive, especially because they involved long military campaigns. But

perhaps more important was the financial difficulty of maintaining the administration of these frontier provinces. It proved difficult for the government to generate the necessary revenues for the upkeep of the provinces. For example, tribute levied on the White Nile province generated only £15,000 per year.[68] This sum was too small to compensate for the expenses of military campaigns which the government often undertook to suppress local rebellions.

Even more expensive were the government's efforts to suppress the slave trade. Until the intrusion of the colonial government in the early 1870s, the Khartoum traders controlled large areas of the South, and slavery and the slave trade were basic factors sustaining their commercial establishments there. But following annexation suppressing slavery and the slave trade became a major objective of the government, thus dealing a major blow to the commercial interests of the traders. First, since the ivory trade was often the cover for the slave trade, the government declared official monopoly over ivory in order to eliminate that pretext.[69]

However, because the traders posed a real threat to the government on account of their large private armies, officials decided to drive a wedge between them so as to undermine their unity. On one hand, the government offered to incorporate these private soldiers into its army as irregulars, and on the other it threatened to deport those who refused the offer back to the North. For the traders, the message was clear: since they were banned from trading in ivory and slaves, they were in fact being asked to quit the region. Those who were too weak to resist packed up and left quietly. But the powerful ones like Zubayr wad

Rahma decided on resistance but eventually lost. Most, however, relied on more subtler instincts; they tried to hold their followers together while temporizing with the administration and biding their time for an opportune moment to reassert themselves.

But in the end, the defection of many of their followers to the government side foredoomed any prospects of an organized resistance.[70] For most of the defectors, the foreclosure of the business enterprises meant the loss of their livelihood. The immediate problem confronting them, therefore, was what to do next. Most dreaded the idea of returning to the North, simply because they had very little, if any, to show for their long employment with the traders in the South. They had been paid in kind, e.g. linen, coffee, sugar, tobacco, caps, cattle, and slaves,[71] at artificially inflated prices. In the late 1850s and early 1860s, for instance, the salary of a soldier serving with a trader was 10 shillings a month, and by the 1870s this was increased to £2 (or 195 piastres, hereafter pts.).[72] Nevertheless, this apparent increase did not keep pace with inflation. For example, a piece of cotton cloth costing £1 (or 97 1/2 pts) in Khartoum had a market value of £6 (or 585 pts.) in the trading stations in the South. Therefore, if the same cotton cloth was used in payment in lieu of cash, it would have been worth several months of pay. With this and other kinds of clever devices, most of the traders' soldiers were financially broke. George Schweinfurth, a contemporary traveller to the area, observed:

> It is very seldom that the man are Wary enough to keep independent of the agent [of the trader] in their requirements, or are able, even in the course of many years, to lay in Khartoum any considerable amount of money.[73]

Most of the items received as salary were commodities evidently destined for immediate consumption rather than resale. The exception was slaves, which could be resold for cash. But more commonly the slaves were kept for domestic and farm chores, thereby providing a semblance of dignity to their masters. For example, exploitation of slave labor might lead to the production of food surpluses, which the master could then sell to itinerant traders for cash or consumer goods. In other words, slave-ownership offered the soldier the possibility of a comfortable existence including wealth.[74]

Nevertheless, even this modest lifestyle was in danger of being lost to the new government demand. Rather than face the ignominy of returning home penniless and re-entering a life of poverty and political subjugation, most of the traders' men opted for integration into government service. Naturally, the main attraction here was the allure of regular pay and the prestige associated with it.

This long overview of the political economy of Northern Sudan reveals that for the overwhelming majority of the population, the social and material conditions continued to deteriorate, especially during the Turkish colonial period. Driven off the land by both land commoditization and excessive taxes, many rural populations, mostly the more productive segment, migrated to towns to try their hands at jobs in the government or private sector. Others, however, sought opportunities in trade not only within the colony, but also in the frontier regions, especially in Southern Sudan following the opening of the White Nile trade in 1839. These trading opportunities and the traders' collective or individual successes or failures, were themselves products of the colonial political

economy. Therefore, to better understand the development and significance of the White Nile trade, we need to proceed to examine the transformation of trade and commerce under the colonial political economy. Moreover, efforts to suppress the slave trade, an integral part of the ongoing White Nile trade, led to protracted conflicts and confrontations with the traders, resulting in further expenditures. All this seriously undermined any kind of profitable exploitation of the commercial and natural resources of the region. And in many cases the government in these frontier provinces, unable to provide even for the basic needs of its troops, resorted to a predatory form of economy along with tactics that were not much different from used by the slave traders.

On the other hand, the intrusion of the colonial government into the Upper Nile regions dealt a major blow to the commercial interests of the ivory and slave traders. Indeed, slavery and slave trade were basic institutions that sustained the commercial establishments of the White Nile traders in those regions. Many people depended upon these institutions for a crucial part of their services and income. But following annexation, slavery and the slave trade came increasingly under attack.

The first, and perhaps most important step was the declaration of ivory as a government monopoly.[75] Since the ivory trade was the cover under which slave-trading was carried, the imposition of government monopoly over it eliminated that pretext. What is more, the monopoly seriously undermined the economic and political power base of those big and powerful traders for whom ivory was the primary source of wealth. Moreover, suppressing the slave trade,

an integral part of the ongoing White Nile economy, led to protracted conflicts with the traders, resulting in further expenditures. All this seriously undermined any kind of profitable exploitation of the commercial and natural resources of the region. And in many cases the government in these frontier provinces, unable to provide even for the basic needs of its troops, resorted to a predatory form of economy along with tactics that were not much different from those used by the slave traders.

Note

Notes and References

1. The Various "tribal" districts (or Dars) had asserted their independence and were under varying degree of control by their local lords. Any suzerainty that might have been still accorded to the sultan was no more than symbolic--so much so that during the conquest, the sultan's attempt to rally the various local lords against the invading armies received little heed. Consequently, initial resistance tended to be local.

2. Unless otherwise stated, much of the analysis that follows in this segment is based on Jay Spaulding's The Heroic Age in Sinnar (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1985).

3. For a comparable and illuminating situation in which this socio-political relationship is analyzed, see Gene Ellis, "The Feudal Paradigm as a Hindrance to Understanding Ethiopia," in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 24, 2(1976), 275-295.

4. These disabilities included old age, youth, and physical or mental disabilities.

5. Due to scarcity of specie, the religious leaders often accepted the payment of taxes in kind. In this way, they were not different from their secular counterparts.

6. Spaulding, The Heroic Age in Sinnar, 171. It is important to note that for this process to happen, it often needed the explicit or implicit blessing of the local secular leader.

7. The Baqt, a treaty signed between Egypt and Christian Nubia, stands out as a good example of formalized political relations between the two countries.

8. The Azhar Islamic University was the main training institution that regularly offered scholarships to Sudanese students. It even established the so-called Sinnar House for the accommodation of Sudanese students.

9. For a detailed study of the Sudan-Egyptian trade, Terence Walz, Trade Between Egypt and Bilad al-Sudan, 1700-1800 (Cairo, 1978).

10. Abannik O. Hino, "Sudan in the Political Economy of Egypt in Early Nineteenth Century: a Preliminary Survey," (Mimeographed paper (1984), 1.

11. Walz, Trade, 32-39. Because of its proximity to Egypt, and also because of the scarcity of arable there, the northern desert region of the Funj kingdom, was involved more in this trade than the southern provinces.

12. Jay Spaulding, "The Evolution of the Islamic Judiciary in Sennar," in International Journal of African Historical Studies, 10, 3(1977), 408-426.

13. In feudal Sinnar, three recognizable and relatively autonomous spheres of exchange existed. For information see Jay Spaulding, "The Management of Exchange in Sinnar, c. 1700," in Leif O. Mangger (ed.), Trade and Traders in the Sudan (Bergen: Department of Anthropology, University of Bergen, 1984). See also Jay Spaulding and Lidwien Kapteijns, "Pre-colonial Trade Between States in the Eastern Sudan, ca. 1700-1900," in African Economic History, No. 11 (1982), 29-62.

14. Anders Bjorkelo, From King to Kashif: Shendi in the Nineteenth-Century (Bergen: University of Bergen, 1984), 58-59.

15. Ibid. Commenting on these commodities/currencies, Jay Spaulding argues that in general, when they were bought in large quantities, a commercial intent was assumed. On the other hand, smaller purchases presupposed directing items so purchased towards subsistence or use values.

16. Ibid., pp. 40, 45, and 54.

17. Spaulding, Heroic Age, 236-37.

18. G.B. Brocchi (1825) suggests that the taxes were estimated at 15 dollars per slave, 15 dollars per cow, and 15 dollars per beast of burden. Brocchi gives the estimates in pound sterling figures, but I have converted them into dollars on the basis of contemporary exchange rates, which was 4 shillings to a Spanish dollar. For the varying if conflicting tax figures, see Richard Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 1820-1881 (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 14.

19. Ibid., 14-15.

20. Ibid., p. 15.

21. The estimates of Sudanese dead as a consequence of the rebellion vary. Some put the overall figure at 50,000. Naturally, the extent of destruction varied from region to

region. For example, Shendi district appears to have suffered most of the casualties, largely because the people there were directly responsible for the assassination of Isma'il, the viceroy's son. Consequently, the casualty rates there were probably the highest in the colony. R. Harmann, a traveller who arrived in the colony several decades after the rebellion, puts Shendi's casualty figures at 30,000, while Pucker-Muskau (1843) asserts that half the population of Shendi was killed. In addition to these casualties, the rebellion caused depopulation through flight. Indeed, many whole communities took this strategy. For example, some 12,000 Arakiyin, along with their leader Shaykh Ahmad al-Rayyah, fled to the Ethiopian borderlands. They returned ten years later, and only because the authorities promised them amnesty and lenient taxes. So common were wholesale flights that an observer estimated that by the late 1830s only one-third of the pre-conquest population remained in their homes, with the rest having fled or migrated to Ethiopian borderlands, Darfur, or other hideouts beyond the reach of the government. This is no doubt exaggerated insofar as the estimate is meant to stand for the colony as a whole; however there may be merit to it if applied to certain districts like Shendi.

22. Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 20.

23. Ibid.

24. Bjorkelo, From King to Kashif, . 162.

25. Reda Mowafi, on the other hand, claims that the objective of these raids was to secure slaves for recruitment into the army to be stationed in the Sudan itself. According to her, garrisoning the Sudan with Egyptian troops had become a heavy charge on the Egyptian treasury, and that Muhammad 'Ali decided to reduce this cost by replacing Egyptian with black battalions. However, the small number of slaves captured in these raids do not justify the expenses the government incurred. In 1827, for example, a three-month expedition against the Dinka of the White Nile brought in 500 slaves only, while another in 1830 against the Shilluk brought in 200 slaves. The results were the same with expeditions against the Nuba or the Ingessana in the Blue Nile region. And yet in the 1822-1823 raids the government was able to garner 30,000 slaves, and the key to their success was because those raids were undertaken expressly for the capture of slaves for Muhammad 'Ali's military campaigns in Syria and the Hijaz. These comparative figures suggest that the raids Reda Mowafi discusses were undertaken mainly

for booty. See Reda Mowafi, Slavery, Slave Trade and Abolition Attempt in Egypt and the Sudan (Malmöt: Esselte Stadium, 1981), 18-23.

26. There were rare exceptions to this. For example, in September 1820, Tanbal Muhammad Idris, Mak of Argo, was appointed to Kashif and allowed to continue to rule his district under the latter title. He was, however, responsible to his superior, the Egyptian governor of Dongola province. This appointment appears to have been a reward for his submission to the invading colonial army. However, it seems that the main motivating factor was an attempt to undermine any long-term resistance of the fugitive Mamlukes, erstwhile rulers of that district. The latter had arrived in the district around 1811, after their failed attempt to overthrow Muhammad 'Ali's government. As these renegade soldiers fled Doongola in the face of the Egyptian invading army, it naturally became important to erase any enduring Mameluke political influence there. And because the local population were heavily oppressed under the Mameluke rule, the appointment of a local prince might have been deemed as the best way to undermine any such Mameluke political traces.

27. Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 23. The government, however, avoided the use of traditional Sudanese titles and thus, in effect, abolished them.

28. Besides, most of the troublesome local leaders were either killed during military encounters, or had fled the country.

29. Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 20.

30. H. A. MacMichael, "Funj Chronicle," in his A History of the Arabs in the Sudan, Vol. II (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1967), p. 394. While the author of the "Funj Chronicle" is still unknown, apart from the fact that he is believed to have been a native Sudanese, he was not necessarily an ardent critic of the colonial government. Indeed, he seems to have been a man with multifaceted sympathies. As a government employee, he tended generally to side with government authority. On the other hand, he appears to have been a pious Muslim and to this extent was unsympathetic to things less Islamic. And as a Sudanese, he tended to present mostly the Sudanese point of view of things. See Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 96, fn. 1.

31. Only wealthy individuals were able to overcome the labor

problem by purchasing slaves for farm labor.

32. Richard Hill, On the Frontiers of Islam: Two Manuscripts Concerning the Sudan Under Turco-Egyptian Rule (London: The Clarendon Press, 1970), 66-67.

33. Bjorkelo, From King to Kashif, 131-32.

34. Ibid., 117.

35. Jay Spaulding, "Slavery, Land Tenure and Social Class in the Northern Turkish Sudan," in International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. XV, I (1982), 8-9. Also, for some theoretical perspectives, though not necessarily specific for the Sudan, see Paul E. Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

36. The number of such private slaves, however, was very small. In the region north of the Niles confluence up to the Egyptian border, for example, there were about 4,500 slaves, or 4 percent of the total population. But even then, most of these slaves belonged to the noblemen and were used as retainers. By the end of the nineteenth-century, however, slaves in the whole of northern Sudan were said to constitute one-third of the population, almost all of whom were employed as agricultural slaves. See Spaulding, "Slavery, Land Tenure and Social Class," 8-9.

37. The annual estimates of slaves captured were between 25,000 and 40,000.

38. Cairo was always slow in sending salaries, and when they did deliver money it was always inadequate for the many government employees, some of whom had not been hired through the proper channels.

39. By that time, private interests had become organized enough to take over the business and organization of the slave trade.

40. Bjorkelo, From King to Kashif, 118-122.

41. Ibid.; Spaulding, The Heroic Age; and Hassan Abdel Aziz Ahmed, "The Turkish Taxation System and its Impact on Agriculture in the Sudan," in Middle East Studies, Vol. XXVI, (1980), 105-114.

42. John Petherick, Egypt, the Soudan and Central Africa (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1861),

108, 128.

43. Ibid., 244, 248-249. It is, however, probable that his remarks about the extent of farm slavery in pre-colonial Kordofan are exaggerated.

44. Hill, On the Frontier of Islam, 32-36.

45. Spaulding, "Slavery, Land Tenure and Social Class," p. 14; Bjorkelo, From King to Kashif, 14; Hill, On the Frontiers of Islam, 29-31.

46. Bjorkelo, From King to Kashif, 144.

47. One kis was about 500 piastres. Bjorkelo, Ibid., 159.

48. Ibid.

49. As quoted in Spaulding, The Heroic Age in Sinnar, 240

50. As quoted in Bjorkelo, From King to Kashif, 159.

51. Hill, On the Frontiers of Islam, 55-56.

52. Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 84-89.

53. J. Hamilton, Sinai, the Hedjaz and Sudan, Wanderings around the Birth-Place of the Prophet and Across the Aethiopian Desert from Sawakin to Khartoum (London, 1857), p. 381. Note, however, the seeming contradiction in the line "and the people principally subsist on the abundant crops which they can raise without labor by sowing after the rains." According to Bjorkelo, Hamilton is referring here to a growing reliance on flood land along the river banks for raising crops. He also suggests that emigration was mostly by the productive segment of the population, leaving the less productive, mostly women, children and the elderly.

54. Bjorkelo, "From King to Kashif," 136-37.

55. Ibid., pp. 167-68; Hassan Abdel Aziz Ahmed, "Turkish Taxation System," 109-110.

56. Petherick, Egypt, the Sudan and Central Africa, 130.

57. Theodore von Heuglin, "Travels in the Sudan in the Sixties. Translations from Petermann's Mitteilungen. Letters from Th. v. Heuglin to Dr. Petermann, July 1862 to January 1863," in Sudan Notes and Records (hereafter S.N.R.) Vol. XXIV (1941), 145-46.

58. Bjorkelo, "From King to Kashif," 172.

59. Thibaut, cited in G. Douin, Histoire de règne du Khédive Ismail, Vols. iii/1 and iii/2, (Cairo: 1933-1941), 455. The peasant flight from the land by peasants obviously hurt agriculture, and the deteriorating situation resulted in the famine of 1864-65 during which the price of dhurra in Khartoum rose to 120 pts. per ardabb. And just as during the famine years of 1835-37, the government had to distribute dhurra among the destitute of Khartoum, Kassala, and Berber.

60. The first Sudanese to occupy a provincial governorship was Muhammad Bey Rashikh; he was made governor general of the combined provinces of Khartoum and Sinnar. Another Sudanese general governor was Husayn Bey Khalifa al-Abbadi, who became governor of Berber in 1869, and general governor of the combined provinces of Berber and Dongola in 1871.

61. Bjorkelo, "From King to Kashif," 174.

62. Richard Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, 1839-1889 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 74.

63. Ibid., chapters 3 and 4.

64. The extended Sudanese colonial state included parts of modern Uganda, Zaire, and the Central African Republic.

65. Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 32.

66. Gray, History, 78-86.

67. Ibid., 103.

68. Ibid., 99.

69. Samuel W. Baker, Ismailia. A Narrative of the Expedition to Central Africa for the Suppression of the Slave Trade (London: MacMillan and Co., 1874)

70. Ibid.

71. Romolo Gessi, Seven Years in the Sudan (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1892), 51.

72. Lawrence Mire puts the retainer's salary at £6 a month. See Lawrence Mire, "Al-Zubayr Pasha and the Zariba Based Slave Trade in the Bahr al-Ghazal, 18555-1879," in John Ralph Willis (ed.) Slaves and Slavery in Muslim Africa, Vol. II (London: Frank Cass, 1985), 113.

73. The slaves thus owned locally by the traders were generally employed in three main occupations: (a) as attendants of their masters; (b) farm hands; and (c) domestics, mostly young attractive females. See Georg Schweinfurth, The Heart of Africa, Vol. I (London: Sampson and Martston and Company, 1874), 136; also Mire, "Al-Zubayr Pasha and the Zariba Based Slave Trade", 113

74. Few slaves were, however, available for private ownership by the subordinate staff. This limited supply of slaves was partly by design, for the trader feared that allowing employees to own many slaves might enable them to establish their own power base, thereby hurting his own political and business interests. On the other hand, the limited availability was also in part due to a diminishing supply. In the early years, the violence that followed in the wake of the alien intrusion in the South produced a large supply of slaves. The Azande wars of expansion also contributed to it. While the kings and princes retained many these slaves for local exploitation, others were sold to the Khartoum traders. However, by the 1860s, and through the subsequent period, the level of violence had abated and a degree of equilibrium and relative stability had been somehow achieved. The anti-slavery campaign by the government contributed also to the decline in the numbers of slaves. Even in Bahr el-Ghazal, where the traders were more firmly established, the most number of slaves that a soldier owned was three. See Schweinfurth, The Heart of Africa, Vol. II, p. 420.

75. Samuel W. Baker, Ismailia (London: MacMillan and Co., 1874)

CHAPTER TWO

COLONIAL COMMERCE AND THE WHITE NILE TRADE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS OF A COLONIAL ECONOMY

The previous chapter examined the Turco-Egyptian colonial political economy and its impact on the subject population. The deep and pervasive socioeconomic frustration, evident in widespread dislocation and emigration of rural communities, was clearly the hallmark of that impact. However, that melancholic picture leaves unexplained the fate of the victims as they struggled to win survival in what was clearly an unforgiving sociopolitical environment. While the opportunities and strategies of adaptation in that struggle were limited, trade and commerce presented an attractive choice for many people. It is this arena on which this chapter focuses. It examines how colonial policies helped transform rade and commerce, and how both the victims and the beneficiaries of the new ociopolitical dispensation took or attempted to take advantage of the economic pportunities it proffered.

The harsh economic problems brought on by colonial rule imposed onsiderable stress and strain on traditional social institutions and networks of utual support, undermining them as instruments of survival. Indeed for some eas and regions, the notion of "subsistence" no longer held sway as the "market inciple" took center stage. As peasants got pushed off the land or became arginalized, it became imperative for the victims to look elsewhere for pplemental resources, or even a new livelihood.

These coping strategies were many and intricate, with each household combining and coordinating them according to its labor capacity. But the backdrop to all of this activity was the continuing expansion of market exchange relations which perforce affected or became increasingly a dominant factor underlying most of the economic behavior. Increasingly, therefore, survival strategies by peasants involved the acquisition of commodity products for sale in the marketplace, which in turn contributed to further expansion of commerce. It is ironic that expansion and transformation of commerce laid in no small measure in the economic difficulties of the peasants, a fact significant enough to merit some discussion.

The perennial stimulus to commercial activity for most of the peasants was the rising cost of living forced by tax, tribute, and corvée obligations. The persistent demand (occasionally compromised according to local exigencies) that these political obligations be paid in cash, forced many people to sell some of their assets to meet them. The initial impact of the demand may not have been keenly felt, due largely to the cushion (usually thin) provided by the variable nature of peasant production. The diversification was based on the one fundamental feature of peasant production, which is that each household produced most of its needs, often with some surplus storable in one form or another. It was this thin margin of surplus which tended to mitigate the initial impact of the government's fiscal policies. As capitalist relations intensified under the aegis of the colonial state, however, the thin safety margin vanished rapidly. Indeed as the food-deficit ation increased, peasants were forced to market whatever urban dwellers, erchants and caravans would buy.[1]

The rebellion which broke out in the Autumn of 1822, and came to an end two years later, accentuated the erosion of the peasant economy. Indeed the rising was itself the culmination of a deep-seated frustration the peasants felt regarding their declining economic status. Its purported objective, unarticulated as it may have been, was at least to redress their grievances if not to drive out the alien conquerors altogether. But its outcome was a resounding defeat for the rebels, thereby freeing the colonial authorities to proceed with their plans to establish firmer foundations of capitalist social relations. From the perspective of the government, therefore, the rebellion and its outcome provided a rare opportunity to extinguish still lingering obstructive feudal and other pre-capitalist tendencies.

In the previous chapter, reference was made to the rebellion's negative impact on the demographics of the colony. Here, however, we want to examine how it impacted on trade. Needless to say, the destructive impact of the rebellion was immense both in human and material terms. The resulting destitution forced people to sell anything that could be bought. And so long as the struggle for survival lasted, the marketplace continued to provide them some reprieve.

The general economic decline was reflected in the denigration of the term allaba, trader. That is, whereas previously "jallaba" generally described a successful if at times modest Sudanese trader, during the Turco-Egyptian colonial period the term lost the prestige associated with it. Henceforth the Arabic term aajir (pl. tujaar, lit. "merchant"), or the more colloquial Khawaja[2] (a term applied to foreign and usually light complected traders), were adopted to describe the

wealthy Sudanese merchant. But the field was swarming with all sorts of other categories of traders whose status was below that of the jallaba. The latter group were for all practical purposes hawkers and peddlers, and in the local vernacular were referred to as *sababa (sing. sababi), tashasha (sing. tashashi),* or *musababin (sing. musababi)*. Despite these different terms, however, the roles they filled in the marketplace were, according to Anders Bjórkelo, indistinguishable:

> The traders who operated on a small scale, both in terms of goods and number of markets visited, and who formed the majority of the itinerant traders, were called sababi (pl. sababa), tashshashi (pl. tashshasha) or more often musababin (sing. musabbabi). The latter were seen everywhere, with their donkeys and small selection of commodities obtained from the nearest town, roaming from village to village. These traders need to be distinguished from the jallaba.[3]

It is not surprising, therefore, that remarks by nineteenth-century observers testify to the presence of traders of all categories, including hawkers, peddlers, brokers, speculators, and, of course, merchants and traders of more substance. Market days in urban or local centers provided a veritable arena for the mingling of all these categories. That curious scene was further heightened when variously garbed peasants and nomads from the hinterland joined in the whole market fray, bringing with them all sorts of items for sale or barter.[4]

The rebellion and the overall declining economic conditions were problematic to commerce in yet another sense. A significant portion of the affected population was forced to move to frontier areas particularly on the eastern, southern, and western rim of the colony. In retrospect, however, these immigrant settlements turned out to be economically important. They became collecting points for ivory, coffee, ostrich feathers, gum arabic, slaves, etc. Visiting traders would buy them for resale in the market centers in the colony. As the frontier

settlements emerged as important commercial centers, the colonial state sought to bring them under its own suzerainty. After annexation, they were transformed into staging posts for further expansion of the colonial frontier.

The large numbers of participants in the marketplace says more about expansion in exchange relations than it necessarily explains economic growth and expansion. Indeed, the evidence is overwhelming that the economy remained perilously stunted. The increase in the number of domestic traders, for example, was not accompanied by corresponding growth in the number, quantity and quality of customers and commodities. In fact most of the trade and commodity exchange was in small, low value and low bulk articles. The economic fragility derived partly from problems arising from the government monopolies and the process of monetization.

The ability to participate in the market depended upon an individual's possession and access to certain critical resources. Foremost in this regard was cash money. After the conquest, the colonial authorities tried to rationalize the media of exchange by introducing Egyptian currency and establishing its exchange rate in relation to other local media of exchange. The rates thus introduced were then enforced through the government's fiscal policies and institutional workings. The Sudanese soon succumbed to the logic of the situation and began to evaluate their assets and commodities in monetary terms.[5] Thus unlike in pre-conquest days, there was now an "all-purpose" money, access to which determined an individual's economic status.

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While monetization was in itself a positive development, certain economic and business practices by both rich merchants and high government officials tended to deny many of its benefits to the less wealthy. Hoarding and speculation are cases in point. Hoarding cash removed from circulation substantial quantities of specie, affecting substantial sections of the population, particularly the primary producers, who received little cash money. And what little cash circulated in the countryside, was extracted through taxation. At the national level, periodic cash tribute to Cairo by the national treasury or, in times of decentralization, by the respective provincial treasuries, completed the absorption of cash money and left little liquidity in the economy as a whole.

The combined impact was to weaken primary producers, who were generally unable to exploit the opportunity offered by a cash-poor economy. This unhealthy situation reduced investments in the secondary and tertiary sectors and limited the availability of customers and clients. Government sugar and indigo processing factories did not help the local economy as labor there was filled by public slaves.[6] Moreover, the products of these factories were shipped for sale in Egypt rather than consumed locally. In addition, the government's monopoly system also handicapped the economy.

The Monopoly System and Its Impact on Trade

The system of government monopoly over trade had been an established practice in the Ottoman empire. With the encroachment of European powers into the empire in the early nineteenth century, however, the system came increasingly under attack until its final abandonment by the Treaty of Balta Liman of 1838.[7]

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However, the application of the treaty to the Sudan was blocked by the fact that the Sudan was the personal property of the viceroy of Egypt. In 1845, this claim was sustained in a Paris ruling:

> Sinnar and Kordofan, having never formed part of the Ottoman Empire and being the spoils of a personal conquest by Mohmmad Ali, could not be included in the terms of the treaty of 1838. Further as gum Arabic and senna were the spontaneous products of deserts and uninhabited land, they should be considered as the exclusive property of the Egyptian Government.[8]

Muhammad Ali consequently sought to substantiate this plausible legal expediency. In a letter to the daftardar, 'Uthman Jarkas al-Birinji, dated November 1, 1824, the viceroy announced that exports were to be controlled by a government monopoly.[9] Any product in the Sudan that commanded a high demand in the international market or in the domestic market in Cairo was to be put on the monopoly list.[10] These included gum Arabic, ivory, ostrich feathers, indigo, senna, and slaves. The producers of these items had to sell them to appointed government agents, whereas the other goods were left to the enterprise of private merchants and traders.[11]

Because of Sudan's anomalous legal status, customs dues on, say slaves, were paid at Aswan, an Egyptian border town. On the other hand, customs dues on imports entering Egypt from overseas were paid at Egyptian ports, principally Alexandria. On entering the Sudan, customs dues on the imports were paid at the same rates.[12] Consequently, the price of imported goods in the Sudan was prohibitively high, which was hurtful to Sudan's economic interests. The point is that in their import/export relations, Egypt treated the Sudan not as its colony but rather as a sovereign state independent of Egypt.

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Seen in conjunction with the monopoly rule, this import/export relationship represented an appropriation of Sudan's resources to benefit Egyptian state coffers. In order to make up for these losses, the colonial government was in part compelled to impose high taxes on the subject population, which had a negative impact on Sudan's domestic trade. That is, having lost revenues through the monopoly ban, officials in the Sudan sought to meet their budgetary requirements by erecting customs houses throughout the colony. But since this proliferation impeded trade, the only way to overcome the economic weakness of the colony was to alter, albeit gradually, the fundamental structure of the monopoly system.

Privatization of Trade and the Dominance of European Traders

The presence of private European traders in Turco-Egyptian Sudan dates back to the early years of the conquest itself. In fact these traders were part and parcel of the general influx of Europeans into the Ottoman empire following the termination of the Napoleonic wars in 1815. For many veterans, the Ottoman dominion with its newly-introduced modernization programs (the Nizam al-Jadid), presented an opportunity to continue and perhaps even advance their careers. Muhammad 'Ali employed many of them in government, especially in the industrial and public work departments.

But it was in the military arena, especially in Muhammad 'Ali's territories, where a few of these men were accorded special prominence. There, they helped establish and staff military academies, and acted as instructors and advisors in the various military units.[13] Upon their retirement, a grateful Muhammad 'Ali granted them the privilege of trading in his empire, even in those articles prohibited under

the monopoly ban. Jean-Marie F. Vaissière, for example, had been useful in Muhammad 'Ali's wars in Arabia. He had performed an outstanding job advising and fighting alongside Ibrahim Pasha, the commanding officer and viceroy's son. When in 1824 the monopoly policy for the Sudan was announced, Muhammad 'Ali wrote to the then Ma'mur of Kordofan exempting Jean-Marie-François Vaissière, arguing that "this officer was with my son at the siege of Da'riya; I look upon him as an old acquaintance."[14] Although this statement by Muhammad 'Ali has a personal ring to it, it is likely that the privilege he bestowed on Vassière was none other than an *appalto*. Helen A. B. Rivlin defines the *appalto* as:

> an arrangement by which exclusive privilege was given to one or several merchants to deal in a particular item of commerce. A contract between the government and the *appaltore* (contractor, farmer) was entered upon for one or more years and stipulated that the total quantity of the product in question would be delivered to the *appaltore* at a price fixed in advance. The *appaltos* were put up for auction and the farmer often used his privilege to compensate himself for the price he paid.[15]

Other prominent French Egyptian servicemen turned-traders included George Thibaut, Alexandre Vaudey, J.A. Vayssière, and Messrs. [?] Vigoreux (elsewhere spelled Vigoureux), [?] Chiron, and [?] Petitjean.[16] Others, as Ferdinand Lafargue, came from the Egyptian civil service or started off as employees of established traders, as was the case of Antoine Brun-Rollet and the Poncet brothers. A few others, such as Edouard de Cadalvene and J. de Breuvery, did not have the military or civil service connection, but started off as independent traders. In fact de Cadalvene was the representative of French banks in Cairo, and it is likely that all these traders were also *appaltoris*. The fee a merchant paid for his *appalto* probably varied according to the particular product

he was permitted to trade in, the quantity stipulated, and the duration of the period. For example, in 1813 the viceroy granted Carlo Rossetti exclusive rights over senna from Sudan in return for a price of 150 purses, or about £3,500 per annum.[17]

The European mercantile presence in the Sudan was not exclusively French: of the Italian traders, Adolofo Antognoli, Angelo Castelbolognesi, and Flaminio Magrini were the most prominent. As a matter of fact, of the various European nationality groups represented in Egypt, Italians were numerically preponderant.[18] Their influx to Egypt was largely the result of the wars of the Risorgimento (which broke out periodically between 1848 and 1866) and of the Giovine Italia movement a decade or so earlier. The upshot of all this was that Italian became the *lingua franca* of the Europeans both in Egypt and the Sudan.[19] And along with French refugees or ex-servicemen, many Italians gained positions in Egyptian military and civil service.[20]

But regardless of whether they were in the government service or bona fide traders, Europeans exercised a disproportionate influence on the Sudan trade on several counts. First, they had wider and better connections with the capitalist world and were well attuned to its culture and workings, especially with respect to financial and credit institutions. Expansion in Egyptian import and export trade attracted European traders to Egypt, with the result that several European banking companies established branches in Alexandria. For example, the Anglo-Egyptian Banking Company Ltd. had a branch there.[21] French banks also sought to profit

from this expanding Egyptian import-export trade, and to this end set up an office in Cairo with Edouard de Cadalvene as their representative.[22]

Secondly, European traders enjoyed the protection of their countries through their respective consuls and consular agents in Cairo and Khartoum respectively. Indeed, some of these officials were themselves traders. For example, the trader George Thibaut was French consular agent in Khartoum since 1829; John Petherick became Britain's vice-consul in Khartoum in 1858; Jirjis Bulus, a Coptic merchant, was consular agent of Persia; in 1859 Franz Binder, an Austrian trader, was acting Sardinian vice-consul in Khartoum. He also acted as an official of the Austrian consulate at Khartoum in 1852, 1857-58, 1861-62, and in 1863; and a certain Copt active in the White Nile trade with four boats of his own represented the United States.[23]

The advantages these traders-cum-diplomats enjoyed are best exemplified by the *firmans* issued by viceroy 'Abbas Pasha to Konstantin Reitz when the latter was appointed Austrian chancellor to the Khartoum consulate in 1851. The *firmans* assured Reitz of (1) exemption from payment of customs when entering Nubia; (2) access to transport at government prices and permission to use the official courier service between the Sudan and Egypt; and (3) a land grant in Khartoum where the permanent consulate would be built.[24] Considering the fact that these consular officials came to the Sudan with cargoes of trade goods, exemption from transit taxes must have been the ultimate privilege. Even in Cairo some of these traders-cum-diplomats--such as Annibale Rossetti representing Tuscany, and Mikhail Tossitza representing the new Kingdom of the Hellenes--

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were business associates of Muhammad 'Ali himself. Indeed, Muhammad 'Ali even granted Rossetti a private monopoly over the marketing of gum arabic and senna, which seemed to contradict the government monopoly ban.[25]

The European diplomatic and business networks negatively affected Sudanese traders. Commercial success came increasingly to depend on substantial capital outlay. European traders had access to credit institutions and banks in Cairo or Alexandria. In fact, access to financial credit was a matter of course for those European traders that operated as agents of commercial firms, e.g. Ferdinand Lafargue and Angelo Castelbolognesi. Furthermore, Europeans in government service were not above using their public positions for commercial gain. Indeed their low remuneration (as they perceived it) along with greed, made them want to supplement their incomes by trading on the side. For example, Dr. J.B Gad, upon accepting the offer to work as a personal physician to the Governor-General of the Sudan, departed for the post carrying with him cash and merchandise to the value of 100,000 piasters.[26] This figure is a good indication of the extent of resources a well-placed government official (and most European officials were well-placed) could mobilize.

The effects of all this on native Sudanese traders generally was to push them to the margins of commerce. Indeed, Sudanese traders, even the most successful of them, started at the bottom and worked themselves up. For example, some of them began as employees of the wealthier Levantine or European traders, and it took them time before they could save up sufficient capital to launch their own independent trading career. The European and

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Levantine traders were content to have partnership relations with Sudanese traders. They supplied their Sudanese counterparts with goods and commodities which they were to sell in return for a percentage of the profit. Sudanese traders used this relationship to advance their profession, since it allowed them access to the much needed imported goods. Adolfo Antognoli, for example, employed 11 Sudanese to work for him in eastern and western Sudan,[27] and it is very likely that their relationship was based on partnership. Another method was for European and other wealthy foreign traders to provide credit to Sudanese at high interest rates.[28]

The White Nile Trade and the Abolition of the Monopoly Rule

Despite their comparative advantage over their Sudanese counterparts, European traders were not always successful. Indeed, with the exception of a few like George Thibaut and Ferdinand Lafargue, most of them made only modest profits while many others ran into bankruptcy. The situation changed favorably for the traders in February 1842, when, according to the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838, the Egyptian government formally abolished its trade monopolies in the Sudan.[29] Although the lifting of the monopoly ban was less complete, it nevertheless provided traders the opportunity to expand their business interests. And what is more, the abolition attracted an influx of foreign traders. As Richard Hill writes:

> During the ten years since the death of Ahmad Pasha Abu Adhan [i.e. from 1843 to 1853] a steadily increasing number of foreign traders had come to Khartoum attracted by the relaxation of the state trading monopoly. Salim Qapudan's voyages up the White Nile had blazed the trail of trade and the easy profits from the commerce in slaves and ivory had emboldened the traders to ask for what they

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Needless to say, the market became more competitive, and lower profits led traders to exert pressure on the government to abolish its monopoly on the few remaining commodities.

Government monopolies on ivory and gum Arabic were finally lifted in 1842, and quickly reduced government revenues. For example, the annual export of gum Arabic from the Sudan was between 30,000 and 34,000 qantars (1 qantar = 44.928 kgs.), and profits which a gum trader could make is exemplified by Alexandre Vaudey. In 1849, when the government abolished its monopoly over gum Arabic, Vaudey traveled to Kordofan where he bought large quantities of gum Arabic, paying producers thirty piastres per qantar. He then paid "Beduins" forty piastres *per qantar* to take his goods to Cairo. In all, three hundred camels carried the cargo, to Cairo and Alexandria, where the market price was two hundred and fifty piastres *per qantar*. Thus, whatever customs duties and other incidental expenses he had to pay *en route*, clearly Vaudey turned a handsome profit.[31] Clearly, then, the abolition of monopolies represented a huge loss of state revenues.

The government therefore reversed the bans in 1843. However, the volte face provoked loud protests from European traders and their consulates in Cairo and Khartoum, and forced the government finally to yield in March 1848. However, the next years, to offset revenue losses, Governor-General 'Abd al-Latif Pasha issued an order which stated:

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1. That the Egyptian Government will henceforth receive in payment of current contributions & arrears, from the Natives Gum at Sixty Piasters per Cantar, at all their Depots.

2. [That] in case the Natives prefer disposing of their Gum to Merchants they are at liberty to do so, provided they obtain an advance of price, but if any individual is found to sell under the quoted price (sixty piastres) the sheigh [shaykh] of his village in punishment will receive one thousand curbaches [lashes with cowhide whip] & the vender for every Piastre that he sells under sixty Piastres per Cantar, one hundred curbaches.[32]

The key in this order was the minimum price. As long as the monopoly was in force, the price paid to gum producers was 25-30 piastres *per qantar*, while the price in the international market was up to two hundred and fifty piastres *per qantar*, which brought huge profits to the government. Clearly, the government stood to lose huge revenues by abolishing the monopolies. The imposition of a minimum purchase price well above the local market price seems to have been a device to offset the damaging effects of abolition. That is, the sixty-piastre minimum price would induce the producers to dispose of their gum to government agents. On the other hand, the same price was too high for private traders to make dealing in gum Arabic worthwhile. Consequently, the government was able to corner the gum market without formally imposing a monopoly. As for ivory, the Governor-General also took measures to retain control over the White Nile trade. For example, dealers were required to organize themselves into consortiums and to pay one-third of their ivory to the government. In response, the traders and their consulates mounted pressure on the government and, by 1852, succeeded in having any direct government interference removed.[33]

It would seem therefore that when the government finally lifted the monopolies in 1852, it did so as much in response to European diplomatic

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pressure as because it concluded that abolition was consistent with its long-term policy of rationalizing an unsatisfactory economy. Indeed, despite the influx of traders as well as monetization, the circulation of cash was generally restricted to the small monied classes. As Endre Stiansen observes, "ivory [and other commodities in the Sudan trade] changed hands as part of a more complicated transaction involving elements of barter because it is doubtful that [traders] would have traveled...to Khartoum carrying thousands of dollars."[34] But probably the most important consideration in abolishing the monopolies was the worsening government budget deficit. The usual solution of remedying the problem by increased taxation was counterproductive not only politically but economically as well, since the tax burden often resulted in land abandonment by peasants. Therefore, it would seem that, rather than depend on this traditional solution, abolition of monopolies seemed to offer a better way. First, the government felt that because of their access to banks and other financial institutions, the traders were therefore better able to exploit the new trading opportunities in the Southern Sudan. Therefore, by allowing them free trade, the government hoped the traders would inject large funds into the Sudanese economy.[35] Second, the government would tax the White Nile trade and also extend facilities and services to the traders and charge them one-third of their ivory for these services.

As it turned out, trading in the Upper Nile region required even more capital expenditure. The merchandise in demand in that region had to be secured in Egypt or abroad, and transportation costs included the hire of boats, crew,

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servants, and other required personnel. The process of trade is perhaps best expressed by Adolfo Antignoli writing to his mother from Khartoum:

> Yesterday I did good business in guns and I have more than doubled my expenditure. I have also sold beads at three times what they cost and, to give you some idea of the earnings, it is enough to tell you that I have sold 150 boxes of percussion caps which I had sent to me from Marseilles by a ship which leaves tomorrow [for the Upper Nile region]... Twenty guns which cost me 12 dollars each in Alexandria have sold for 30 dollars each to the same ship...
>
> In three or four months I hope to have sold the goods, if I am able at once to buy a few thousands dollars-worth of ivory I could return to sell it in Cairo. And then, about August, I could leave Cairo to return here because next year I can fit out a ship for myself. I want to winter on the White Nile for it is there that people can procure much ivory against beads. But what would you! To go on the White river I need at least sixty jolly servants and now these people are not satisfied with 3 scudi a month, besides, I shall need equipment, food and ammunition...[36]

Jean-Alexandre Vayssière, however, represents the process in a real practical situation. During a trading expedition in the Upper Nile region in 1853-4, for example, he spent over 20,000 piastres for the purchase of merchandise and provisions, excluding the cost of hired boats and personnel.[37] Clearly, the Upper White Nile trade favored the trader with means, a situation most suited to the trader-cum-banker. Antoine Brun-Rollet is a prime example in this respect. He was associated with a British trading firm, Joyce, Thurburn & Co., based in Alexandria, and their business relationship went back to 1839. The financial and business advantages which Brun-Rollet derived from this relationship is clear from the following note by Joyce written in 1851:

> In the year 1839, we [Joyce, Thurburn & Co.] made Advances in Manufactures & Cash to Mr. Brun Rollet, a Sardinian subject, on the understanding that the Manufactures should be sold and that the proceeds together with the Cash advanced should be invested for Joint account in the products of Sennaar & Kordofan which were forwarded to us for realization.

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> ....The results having proved satisfactory we were induced to renew our operations on a larger scale especially as the trade in Gums & Ivory were then declared to be free. We consequently advanced a further sum in Cash to Mr. Rollet together with a large consignment of Manufactures on the same understanding as in 1839.[38]

Not surprisingly, Brun-Rollet and Alphonse de Malzac fitted out a big trading expedition consisting of three boats and costing the sum of 120,000 francs (or 480,000 piastres).[39]

Another trader who benefited from association with a trading firm in Alexandria was the Transylvanian, (Karl) Franz Binder.[40] A pharmacist by training, Binder came to Egypt in 1850 literally penniless and worked as a baker and then as a carpenter in Cairo. In 1851 Binder got a job with the merchant house of Landauer & Co. in Alexandria, to take goods from Egypt to the Sudan to sell on behalf of the company. In addition to the manufactures, Binder was given 500,000 piastres in ready cash for running expenses, and one of the plans was for him to go up the Nile to participate in the ivory trade in Southern Sudan. Binder arrived in Khartoum in late November 1852, but by that time the annual expeditions had already sailed to the South. Binder had therefore no choice but to dispose of his wares in the North, using most of the proceeds for buying gum Arabic. And when the expedition returned, he bought ivory. All told, he had 137 camel loads of gum Arabic and ivory which he took to Cairo.[41]

Binder did not renew his contract with Landauer & Co., however his next employment was with the leader of the Roman Catholic Mission to Central Africa, Fr. Ignaz Knoblecher. His job was to be interpreter and agent for a group of missionaries heading for Khartoum; in return, he received free transportation and an interest-free loan. Binder took advantage of these favorable terms and his

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stocks were among the four hundred camel loads that the missionary group took to Khartoum. Once again, Binder arrived too late to go down South, but he was able to dispose of his wares in markets around Khartoum, and he used the proceeds to buy Sudan goods including three lions, two leopards, and a civet cat all of which he took to Cairo where he sold them at handsome profits.

Binder was soon back in Khartoum, leading another Catholic missionary group, and then returned back to Cairo. After these successful trips, Binder had enough capital to expand and diversify his business, and he eventually emerged as the richest European merchant in the Sudan. He was active in the financial credit sector, and, considering the high interest rates in the Sudan which were usually above thirty-six percent, his profits were high. As one of de Malzac's principal creditors, at his death in 1860, Binder bought the latter's trading stations in Bahr el-Ghazal for 2,500 dollars or 50,000 piastres. Richard Gray considers this a paltry price because de Malzac was one of the biggest ivory traders and slave raiders in Southern Sudan; in fact de Malzac's trading empire was so extensive that he employed interpreters for five languages.[42] Endre Stiansen suggests that the "paltry" price can be explained as de Malzac having used his assets in the South as security against the loan. Therefore, when de Malzac's estates were brought to the auction block in the Austrian consulate, Binder deducted the amount owed him, and the 2,500 dollars he paid was the difference.[43]

There were, however, other traders who were wealthy enough to finance their own business enterprises, as did John Petherick and Alexandre Vaudey. For the others, there were two avenues open to them. First, soon after the abolition of

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the monopolies, ivory traders were required to form a consortium to whom the government would then provide services such as boats and escort.[44] Although the fees charged for the services were quite high, the traders found it worthwhile because it enabled them to pool their resources. The second option was either to secure the necessary capital from credit institutions, or to enter into a partnership with an investor.[45]

Given the considerable capital requirements, only a few Sudanese traders tried their hands at the ivory trade, and then only through a consortium with Europeans. However, their contribution in this consortium must have been relatively small; for whereas their European partners received 1/4 of the consortium's proceeds, the Sudanese partners received 5/12, with the government receiving the remaining 1/3 as taxes and fees for services it rendered to the traders.[46] These superior-subordinate roles were eventually to reverse in the mid-1860's, but until then the native Sudanese traders had to make the best of their situation.

This stage of the White Nile trade may be regarded as the European-dominated phase. In its early stage it followed a pattern that had been established during the preceding government monopoly phase. That is, it was characterized by the absence of established permanent stations. Traders sent their expeditions up the White Nile in November-December, the best period for trading in the South for two reasons. First, it coincided with seasonly winds which facilitated navigation southward. Secondly, the dry season in the South generally begins in December, a period when the all-absorbing agricultural tasks have been completed and

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people could then turn to a more leisurely lifestyle or to other less demanding, often entertaining, economic pursuits such as hunting and fishing, or even trading. In short, it was the most suitable period for trading.

Once the boats arrived in the South, they would work up and down the shores of the Nile, mooring at strategic places to trade with local communities or to rest. When the trading season ended with the onset of the rainy season in April or May, the Khartoum traders often left their remaining stocks with middlemen, probably as a down or advance payment against goods promised. There were certain advantages in this arrangement. First, some ivory dealers from the interior arrived too late for the trading season, and therefore these late-comers could still sell their ivory and other local products to the middlemen. Second, during the year customers from far and near could still come and dispose of their products with the middlemen; or the latter themselves traveled to the interior to sell the trade goods to customers there. The accumulated proceeds were then stored and handed over to the trader when he returned the next trading season, providing a head start in the competition for market share of the ivory trade. Brun-Rollet best expresses the thinking of the traders in regard to this issue when he said:

> Le peu de durée de la saison sèche ne nous permettait pas un séjour assez long pour nous mettre à même d'établir des relations avec les tribus voisine, d'où les Bary [Bari] tiraient l'ivoire qu'ils nous vendaient. Je cherchai donc à me créer chez eux des relations, des amis influents, actifs, intéressés, qui pussent nous servir d'intermédiaires ou de courtiers auprès des peuplades de l'intérieur, ou bien de protecteurs zélés pour les gens que je pourrais laisser dans le pays pour continuer mes achats jusqu'au retour de mes barques.[47]

The growth in the White Nile ivory trade, as well as in the number of traders participating in it, is evident in the increase in the number of boats arriving in

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Gondokoro annually. In 1852, only about a dozen came, but in 1856, the number rose to 40, and then to 80 by 1859, and 120 by 1860. This increase was matched by a corresponding growth in the quantity of ivory shipped out; according to John Petherick, the volume of ivory rose from 400 quintals in 1851 to 1,400 quintals in 1859.[48] Growth continued thereafter, for in 1866 the Prussian consular representative at Khartoum reported that on average from 3,000 to 3,500 qantars (or 135-158 tons) of ivory arrived in Khartoum from the White Nile.[49]

The influx of traders led to a reduction of their respective market share and profit margins. By 1855, the markets were so glutted that beads and other media of exchange began to lose their purchasing power. As "stores" of ivory along the Nile depleted the European recession of 1858 added to the difficulties, since demand lessened.[50] In efforts to overcome this problem of shrinking profits, several traders tried to increase the ivory output by shifting away from trading and into hunting elephants.

Increasing the output of ivory through hunting proved to be a short-term solution, however. Endre Stiansen estimates that in the peak years, more than 10,000 elephants were killed in the Upper Nile Basin;[51] however, considering the ever-increasing numbers of traders flocking to the region, even this large slaughter was not enough to sustain significant profits for long. The traders had therefore to penetrate further and further into the interior, and establish hinterland hunting camps as trading stations, locally called *zaribas*. Their establishment required garrisons of armed men to guard, run, and maintain them; hence the recruitment of Northern Sudanese to fill those roles. However, this development occurred in

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Bahr el-Ghazal and, to some extent, in the Sobat basin in today's Upper Nile region. In Eastern Equatoria, meanwhile, the river-based trading system was maintained largely because, as will be argued in the next chapter, the established local trade network was still holding there.

The first European trader to initiate this novel system was Alphonse de Malzac. He established a hinterland station at Rumbek. In addition, he also set up a river bank station at Meshra er-Rek, which acted as a débouche to his hinterland business network. De Malzac employed some 200 armed men equipped with 180 muskets and ammunition, and two canon and hunting muskets.[52] So far-flung was De Malzac's trading network that he employed interpreters for five different languages.

Not surprisingly, de Malzac's methods were soon emulated by other European traders. The latter included the Englishman John Petherick, the Austrian and acting Sardinian vice-consul in Khartoum, Franz Binder, Delphine Barthelemy, John Kleincznick, Jean Alexandre Vayssière, and the two brothers Ambroise and Jules Poncet. There were also traders of Maltese, Ionian, and Levantine origins,[53] most of whom maintained their respective stations (zeribas). While we do not know the exact number of river and hinterland trading stations established during this time, nor the number of agents and armed personnel manning them, Romolo Gessi estimated in 1879 that each zeriba in the Bahr el-Ghazal had between 200 and 300 riflemen.[54]

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Gondokoro: The Epicenter of A Trading Network

The fulcrum of the White Nile trade in Eastern Equatoria was the Bari village of Gondokoro, the terminus of the navigable stretch of the White Nile, as the Bedden and the Fulla rapids a couple of miles upstream made further navigation impossible. Gondokoro was first reached in 1841 by the third government expedition. The serene panoramic view of its environs must have been welcome after the onerous difficulties attending the crossing of the sudd, the extensive maze of swamps and "floating islands" in central Southern Sudan.[55]

But perhaps more important was the friendly attitude of the local people themselves and their ability to deliver ivory and other trade goods. Indeed, the Zanzibar trade through Buganda and Bunyoro had penetrated Bariland by the time government expeditions began arriving there, and this was evident in the fact that the local Bari chief, Loganu, wore laces of blue glass beads, copper rings and a long wide blue cotton shirt.[56] This prior commercial contact apparently predisposed the Bari to trading, for they readily came up with ivory and other trade goods desired by the expedition:

> While traversing about 130 miles more than the previous year, we have discovered certain strong peoples, whose numbers and courage might have been a source of danger, considering our poor means of defence. We were prudent and they showed themselves generous, and the small gifts we made them procured for us on their side a hospitality worthy of the "natural man"...They brought us oxen, animals of all kinds and elephant tusks of excellent ivory to exchange for glass beads.[57]

This friendly and positive encounter set the stage for the central importance of Gondokoro in the White Nile trade. Virtually all the boats of the annual expeditions sent by the government during the monopoly phase headed for

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Gondokoro. And the out-take of ivory was so significant that Brun-Rollet and several other European traders began talking about colonizing the region south of latitude 4º North.[58]

Gondokoro's growing commercial importance was not lost on Christian missionaries, particularly the Roman Catholics. Indeed, missionaries showed the excitement among the European scientific community that followed in the wake of the successful penetration of the White Nile in 1841. They saw the opening of the White Nile to navigation as an opportunity that could enable them to establish mission stations in central Africa. A Roman Catholic mission was immediately opened in Khartoum in 1842, and on April 3, 1846, a Papal decree was issued establishing the Vicariate Apostolic of Central Africa was created.[59]

Doing Christian work in the Sudan, however, was no easy task. Financial difficulties bedeviled the enterprise right from the beginning, forcing the closure of the mission in Khartoum in 1845. It was however reopened in 1848, after some successful fund raising, principally in Austria.[60] Almost immediately efforts were directed towards opening a mission station at Gondokoro. In the winter of 1849, two of the missionaries in Khartoum accompanied the government expedition to Gondokoro with the intent of leaving one behind to lay the foundations of the mission. The colonial authorities, however, were worried about their ivory monopoly and ordered the two missionaries back to Khartoum.

The circumstances were, however, more auspicious the following year. Abd al-Latif had been dismissed as governor general as a result of intense pressure from the traders and their consulates,[61] easing the rules about

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monopolies. As did the traders, for Fr. Angelo Vinco sailed to Gondokoro with two boats borrowed from Brun-Rollet On arrival he decided to settle in Bilinyang, adjacent to Gondokoro and also the residence of Nyigilo and his royal family. By 1855 the mission's grass-thatched structures gave way to brick houses, and a school was opened in 1856.[62]

All in all, the river-based trading system still held in Eastern Equatoria generally and Bariland in particular until about 1862, and its persistence there suggests that the terms of trade were still favorable for the Khartoum traders. Consequently, the Khartoum traders did not see the need to penetrate the interior and establish trading stations there. Why did the river-based trading system persist in Eastern Equatoria when it had become a thing of the past in the rest of the Nile Valley in Southern Sudan? The answer to this question lies in the local trade network in Eastern Equatoria itself. To be sure, the Khartoum traders were very important as suppliers of high-value foreign luxury goods, but they were only one part of the equation; the other half comprised local traders themselves and their networks. Therefore, to complete our understanding of the White Nile trade during its river-based phase, the analysis must now proceed to examine the local trade network itself: its features, organization, principal actors, the types of products produced and how they were produced. These objectives merit an extensive examination and are therefore treated in the next chapter.

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1. In 1838, Ignatius Pallme visited the market-place of El-Obeid town and provides a vivid picture of its organization and lay-out. Most of them came from peasants, and they included camels, cows, sheep, goats, asses, sour milk, butter, lard, garden and wild fruits, food grain e.g. dukhn (bulrush). Of particular significance, however, were wood and grass dealers. Pallme observed that their stands occupied a large part of the market-place, for, he comments, *as wood and grass may be collected by anyone, there is considerable competition in this branch* (my italics for emphasis). See, Pallme, Ignatius, Travels in Kordofan (1844), 267 and 287.

2. Several students of the Sudan have in recent times attempted to study the processes leading to the emergence of the various categories of native Sudanese traders. For more eloquent statement on the subject see, Jay Spaulding and Lidwien Kapteijns "Pre-colonial Trade Between States in the Eastern Sudan, 1700-1900" in African Economic History, No. 11, 1982, 29-62; Terence Walz, Trade Between Egypt and Bilad al-Sudan 1700-1800 (Cairo, 1978); Anders Bjórkelo, From King to Kashif: Shendi in the Nineteenth Century (Bergen: University of Bergen, 1984), 219-222.

3. Anders Bjórkelo, "From King to Kashif," 221-222.

4. For an idea of articles sold in markets see footnote no.1 above. In some of the more prosperous towns, such as al-Matamma, articles sold were more diversified and included many valuable items e.g. gold, silver, cotton stuffs, etc.

5. Jay Spaulding, The Heroic Age in Sinnar (East Lansing: African Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1985), 244.

6. The secondary sector of the economy was represented by the small number of light industries such as soap, indigo, sugar, and cotton-ginning mills.

7. For a detailed treatment of the system of monopoly in Egypt under Muhammad 'Ali, see Richard Hill, Egypt in the Sudan (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).

8. Quoted in Paul Santi and Richard Hill (trans & ed.) in the "introduction" to their The Europeans in the Sudan, 1834-1878

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19. Santi and

(Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1980), 13-14.

9. Richard Hill, Egypt in the Sudan (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 49.

10. Felix Mengin, Historie de l'Egypte sous le gouvernement de Mohammed-Aly (Paris: 1823), Vol. II, 433-35.

11. However, a few European traders were allowed to trade in the prohibited goods, e.g. Rossetti, John Petherick, etc. The concession so granted was usually in recognition of the services rendered by the grantee to the viceregal government.

12. Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 42.

13. There were, of course, other Europeans employed by the viceregal government especially Italians. Since the end of the Napoleonic wars, more and more Europeans came to the Ottoman Empire as refugees, escaping the upheavals brought on by the failed revolutions of the 1840s.

14. Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 49.

15. Helen A. B. Rivlin, The Agricultural Policy of Muhammad Ali in Egypt (Cambridge, Mass.: 1961), 180.

16. Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 78. Hill does not give the full names of Vigoreux, Chiron, and Petitjean, and this omission makes it difficult to establish their full identity. Indeed, they are not even listed in his Biographical Dictionary of the Sudan (London: Oxford University Press, 1970). Nevertheless, their last names suggest clearly that they were French.

17. J.L. Burckhardt, Travels in Nubia (London, 1822), 49. The high annual tax paid by Rossetti for his *appalto* in gum Arabic suggests that gum was a very lucrative commodity. The *appalto* system was also significant in one important respect--it had much in common with the traditional *iltizam* (tax-farming system) found in the Ottoman Empire. To that extent, it was part and parcel of the revenue-generating institutions which Muhammad 'Ali crafted to finance his expanding regime.

18. It is nonetheless important to remember that Italy was then only a geographical expression, divided as it was among many kingdoms and principalities, some of which were even under the jurisdiction of neighboring countries.

19. Santi and Hill (trans. & eds.), European Traders in the

Sudan, 8-9.

11. Paternostro, a
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12. Santi and Hil
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25. Ibid. Also

26. Santi and
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27. Ibid., 19

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Sudan, 8-9.

20. Paternostro, as Secretary General to the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was the highest ranking Italian in the Egyptian government.

21. Santi and Hill (trans. & eds.) The Europeans in the Sudan, 192.

22. Hill, A Biographical Dictionary, 93.

23. For biographical information on these individuals, see Hill, Biographical Dictionary. Even the United States of America was no exception in this system of trading consuls, and her consular representative in Khartoum was a Copt. Although the name of the latter is not mentioned in the records, it is very likely that it was a member of the Shenuda family. Samuel Baker comes close to giving his identity when he said: "one of the [slave] traders [in Gondokoro] was a Copt, the father of the American Consul at Khartoum; and to my surprise," he continues, "I saw the vessel full of brigands arrive at Gondokoro, with the American flag flying at the mast-head." The Pethericks also make a reference to him in their book. See Baker, Albert N'Yanza: Great Basin of the Nile and the Exploration of the Nile Sources (London: MacMillan & Co., 1866), Vol. I, 68 and; Mr. and Mrs. Petherick, Travels, 152.

24. Endre Stiansen, "Overture to Imperialism: European Trade and Economic Change in the Sudan in the Nineteenth Century," (Ph.D. Dissertation submitted to the University of Bergen, Norway, 1993), 227-28.

25. Ibid. Also see footnote no. 10 above.

26. Santi and Hill (trans. and eds.) Europeans in the Sudan 1834-1878, 27-8.

27. Ibid., 198.

28. In 1860, the interest rates were 36%. Three years later, according to Samuel Baker, they were even as high as 100%. See Samuel Baker, Albert N'Yanza, Vol. I, 12.

29. A year later, however, the government sought to retain monopoly over *senna* and gum Arabic, arguing that the two were products that grew naturally far out in the desert in no-man's land. Although the re-imposition of government monopoly over these two products was challenged by the traders as an abrogation of the 1838 treaty, the government's

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31. Richard Hill,

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36. A letter o
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37. "The Journ
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38. Joyce, Th
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39. Ibid. The

40. Much of
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point of view was sustained in a Paris court of arbitration on the matter. For details leading to the Paris court decision, see page 7 above.

30. Richard Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 86.

31. One *qantar* was the equivalent of 44.928 kg.

32. Petherick to Murray, Kordofan, 21 June 1850, quoted by Stiansen in his "Overture to Imperialism," 79-80.

33. According to Stiansen (p. 83), by the time 'Abd al-Latif's order was revoked, the pattern of European traders had shifted from the gum to the newly-opened ivory trade in Southern Sudan. He also argues further (p. 147) that although ivory was (in effect) one of the monopolized commodities prior to 1852, the fact that European traders persisted suggests either that the monopoly price was pegged high enough for merchants to find ivory trade attractive; or that the traders were able to avoid government monopoly through clandestine export to Egypt or the Red Sea.

34. Endre Stiansen, "Overture to Imperialism," 94.

35. Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, 1839-1898 London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 23. For example, whereas the richest native Sudanese trader might have no more than 30,000 piastres worth of merchandise, a European, by contrast, could muster worth 400,000 piastres or more. For a comparison of financial resources between Sudanese and European traders, see Björkelo. From King to Kashif, 226.

36. A letter of Adolfo Antignoli to his mother October 18, 1857 in Santi and Hill (trans. & eds.), Europeans in the Sudan, 194-5.

37. "The Journal of Jean-Alexandre Vayssierre, 1853-4 in Santi and Hill (trans. & eds.) The Europeans in the Sudan, 122.

38. Joyce, Thurburn & Co. to Murray, Alexandria 15 April 1851, quoted in Stiansen "Overture to Imperialism," 51-2

39. Ibid. The exchange rate was 1 franc to 4 piastres.

40. Much of the information on Franz Binder here is based on Stiansen's "Overture to Imperialism," 95-106.

41. Stiansen, p. 99, estimates that one camel carried five *qantars* of ivory, and seven of gum Arabic.

42. Gray, History,

43. Stiansen., "Ove

44. Elias Tewfik
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46. Ibid., p. 96
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47. Antoine M
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48. Gray, Histo

49. Stiansen., "

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51. Gray, Hist

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1861, 132.

54. Romolo G
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42. Gray, History, 51, 47-48.

43. Stiansen, "Overture to Imperialism," 102-3

44. Elias Toniolo and Richard Hill (trans & eds.) The Opening of the Nile Basin (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1974), p.

45. Stiansen distinguishes three types of partnership: (a) that in which the investor hires the services of a trader; (b) that in which a trader/borrower hires capital (the financial partnership proper), and; (c) the real partnership in which all members contribute both capital and services. However, he cautions that these categories are ambiguous in real life, and that "the nature of any given partnership will also be affected by whether the partners have committed themselves to limited or unlimited liability." Stiansen, "Overture to Imperialism," 32-3.

46. Ibid., p. 96. In 1851, the government reportedly charged 1,300 piastres a month for each of its boats rented, suggesting that the White Nile trade was an important source of income to the government.

47. (Antoine) M. Brun-Rollet, Le Nil Blanc et le Soudan: Études sur l'Afrique Centrale (Paris: Librairie de L. Maison, 1855), 186-7.

48. Gray, History, 31-32.

49. Stiansen, "Overture to Imperialism," 88-9.

50. For the effects of this recession, see Adolfo Antognoli's letter to Dr. Nicolao Ceru and Ign. Domenico Ceru, dated June 11, 1858 in Santi and Hill (trans. & eds.), The Europeans in the Sudan, 201.

51. Gray, History, 31-32. Stiansen, 89 and 190.

52. Adolfo Antognoli's letter to his brother Amadeo, dated Khartoum, May 10, 1858, in Santi and Hill (trans. & eds.) The Europeans in the Sudan, 199-200.

53. At the time Malta, Ionia and the Levantine were under British dominions. See John Petherick Egypt, the Soudan and Central Africa (Edinburgh London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1861), 132.

54. Romolo Gessi Seven Years in the Sudan (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, 1892).

55. Gray, History,

56. Ibid., 18.

57. In A.C. Beato
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58. S. Melly, Rha
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59. Ibid., 57.
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61. Hill, Egyp

62. Gray, Hist

55. Gray, History, 17 and 37.

56. Ibid., 18.

57. In A.C. Beaton "A Chapter in Bari History", in Sudan Notes and Records (Khartoum: 1934), 185-6.

58. G. Melly, Khartoum and the Blue and White Nile (London, 1855), 112.

59. Ibid., 27. The boundaries of the vicariate were extensive, stretching from Abyssinia in the east to the Guinea coast to the west, and southward to the Ruwenzori mountains (also referred to as Ptolemy's Mountains of the Moon) on the Uganda-Zaire border. For the history of this early phase of the Catholic Church in the Sudan, see D. McEwan, A Catholic Sudan--Dream, Mission, Reality; A Study of the Roman Catholic Mission to Central Africa and Its Protection by the Hapsburg Empire from 1846 to 1900 (1914) (Rome; 1987).

60. The funds were raised in Austria with the help of the Austrian Emperor, Franz Josef I. Traditionally, France was the protector of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire. That protection was extended to the Prefecture of Abyssinia when the latter was created in 1839. Therefore, the Apostolic Vicariate of Central Africa based in Khartoum should have been under France. However, the Hapsburgg Monarchy argued that the protection it offered since the Franciscan mission (Mission of the Thebais) in Upper Egypt should therefore be extended to the Apostolic Vicariate of Central Africa.

61. Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 85.

62. Gray, History, 24-7 and; 36-44.

PART II

The White Nile Trade and the Political Economy of Eastern Equatoria

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CHAPTER THREE

THE WHITE NILE TRADE AND THE LOCAL TRADE NETWORK

The previous chapter was devoted to the study of the external (Khartoum) side of the White Nile trade, whose success depended on the local demand and supply situation in Eastern Equatoria. Without favorable local trading opportunities, the White Nile commerce itself may not have survived as long as it did. Therefore, this chapter is devoted to the study of the local side of the White Nile trade with the view to identifying its network as well as understanding the nature of its operations.

Existing literature on the nineteenth-century ivory trade in East Africa reveals that it was largely under royal control, but also determined by a nexus of political, cultural, and customary practices. Therefore, to understand Equatoria's White Nile trade, it is important to know the nature of production and reproduction of the societies in which it operated. The tool often employed for gaining such an insight is the theory of social formation.

The theory of social formation calls for a detailed description and analysis of a given society with respect to its production (that is, the exploitation of its economic resources--land, livestock, fishing, hunting, gathering and fauna generally) and reproduction (that is, the society's superstructure, relations of production, and the panoply of supporting ideologies). By the nineteenth century most societies in Eastern Equatoria, as indeed in the rest of East Africa, had developed beyond the level of the domestic economy, and into complex social

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organizations.[1] Each had a superstructure complete with ideologically or politically based mechanisms for the appropriation of "surplus" for the support of the elites. In much of the literature of this period, these societies have been generally described as "tributary societies."

One of the salient features of "tributary" societies is that ideology, rather than economics, plays a primary role in the reproduction of the social relations of production. For example, kinship ideology operated as the mechanism through which rights and duties were clearly defined, and all kin relationships were considered reciprocal and therefore non-antagonistic. Likewise, the right to leadership, ritual performance, or to the means of production (such as agricultural land) were determined on the basis of kinship, that is, one had to belong to a particular descent group. In the final analysis, then, the position of the traditional elites is generally determined ideologically rather than economically.

Similarly, the division of labor and the position of the elites in the production process was determined by certain ideological constructs which explained and perpetuated their dominant position in the society. For example, the elites were believed to be mediators between the society and the supernatural world, able to intercede with the supernatural powers on behalf of the society.[2] Therefore, to ensure benefits and blessings from the supernatural powers, it was essential for the society to maintain good relations by paying tribute and giving gifts on chance misfortune. This ideology thus became the mechanisms for the appropriation of "surplus."[3]

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Among the Latuka, for example, the rainmaker (hobu) was the supreme spiritual and temporal head of the society.[4] At the end of the harvest he received a certain portion of the crops from each of the villages under him. Also, the hunting season was inaugurated with the "royal hunt" (called elaya), whose kills were exclusively for the rainmaker, and he continued to receive a portion of meat during the rest of the hunting season. Moreover, he monopolized elephant tusks, leopard-skins, and lion-skins, and he took half of various valuable hides. In addition to all of these royalties and tribute, the rainmaker also appropriated "surplus" labor through corvée.

Apart from the royalties and tribute payments outlined above, the rainmaker received payments for "administrative" and judicial duties, for example, litigations, petitions, fines, and, most important of all, payments for rain. The last were made in kind—grains, livestock, metal (mostly worked or rust iron), hides, skins, and elephant tusks.[5]

Below the rainmaker were other ritual functionaries called aballok (sing. aboloni). The most important of them were amonye-miji (head of the village"), who performed rites for the settlement's health and fertility; amonye-mangat (head of the village ward or moiety), who performed similar rites for this unit; and amonye-fau who performed rites to insure success in hunting, in war, and also to ward off pests and predators.[6] These positions came from certain lineages, with candidates selected not by the rain-maker but by the ruling warrior class (monyo-miji). Like the rainmaker, aballok also enjoyed certain royalties and privileges.

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Important to our understanding of "tributary" societies is the division of labor based on age and sex at the level below the elites. Among males, the elders performed certain duties in the process of production, usually the heavier ones such as clearing the land for farming. They also looked after cattle. The junior males, on the other hand, were usually assigned lighter tasks, such as looking after calves or goats, while women did virtually all the housework, in addition to certain agricultural tasks such as weeding. The elders' duties were deemed as socially more important than those performed by juniors and women, and this belief justified the domination of the male elders over women as well as over junior males.[7]

While the particularities of the Latuka social structure cannot be generalized for all societies in Eastern Equatoria, it is, nonetheless, safe to say that differences that existed among them were largely of degree rather than kind. At any rate, with the exception perhaps of the Makaraka, societies west of the Nile exhibit a lesser degree of the features of the Latuka model; whereas those east of the Nile, including the Bari, can be said to conform to that model.[8] Whatever particular differences existed between these tributary societies, it is nevertheless clear that the chiefs were its beneficiaries, and not unnaturally, they jealously sought to maintain the system along with their exclusive rights and privileges.[9]

The chiefs recognized the economic importance of the trade as a new and unprecedented source of high-value items, with equally unprecedented opportunities for accumulation of wealth. It was an opportunity because of the

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potential for wealth and power it offered; and it was a challenge because of the political problems it could unleash for the chiefs. Unless it was somehow controlled, the economic opportunities that the White Nile trade offered might have easily undermined the established tributary social order, and the chiefs' exclusive rights and privileges.

The chiefs therefore imposed monopolies over the trade, and justified the decision on the basis of the established tributary ideology. Given their prior accumulations, the chiefs came to dominate the trade.[10] Secondly, this pattern of trade also had an added if unintended advantage, in that it put the elites in direct contact with the White Nile traders. thus enabling them to watch the activities of the foreign traders closely.

The Bari chiefs had the greatest advantage because of their location along the Nile, especially the royal house at Bilinyang. From the start in 1841, when the first government expedition broke into the local scene, the Bilinyang royal house became entwined with the White Nile trade. The central figure in the White Nile was Nyigilo, the brother of Chief Logonu of Bilinyang. As the most senior person in the royal house after the king, he became the contact man, or diplomat, between the royal house and the White Nile traders[11] and came to play a dominant role in the local White Nile trade.

In 1841, Nyigilo's diplomatic skills and friendly demeanor had so impressed the first government expedition to reach Bariland that subsequent expeditions continued to seek his friendship and assistance. His importance in the White Nile trade is further indicated in 1844, when he went to Khartoum on

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Nyigilo promptly and enthusiastically embarked upon his newfound career as a middleman, and from then on, the government's annual expeditions left their unsold merchandise with him. During the year, Nyigilo would sell the merchandise either to visiting customers from the interior, or he would himself travel to the interior to barter them there. He would then give the proceeds to the expedition when the latter returned the following year.

The success of Nyigilo's trading ventures became evident during the trading expedition of 1850. Fr. Emanuele Pedemonte, who then witnessed one of the trading days in Gondokoro in that year, had this to say:

> He [Nyigilo] was busy trading ivory throughout the day; during the year he had gathered together as much ivory as he could, so that...the present expedition obtained more ivory...than the preceding one.[13]

And Nyigilo's success was such that by 1851, he had a well-established trading network that encompassed Lafon and Latuka in the east, to which he traveled frequently.[14] In 1851, for example, Vinco made a trip to Gondokoro to establish a mission there with the support of Nyigilo. But on arrival there he was disappointed to find that "Nyigilo had gone off to Lotuka (sic.) to exchange the

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beads given him by the [government] expedition for oxen, rams and other things. Thus he was absent when I arrived."[15]

Both Nyigilo and the royal house must have benefited immensely from these extensive commercial contacts. Therefore, the royal house was determined to maintain control of the local trade, a policy directed not only against local competitors, but also against the White Nile traders themselves. There were thus two monopolies over the White Nile trade, one by the colonial government in Khartoum, and the other by the local rulers in Southern Sudan.

However, in 1851, the colonial government lost control of the trade to private traders. The collapse of Khartoum's trading monopoly was largely the culmination of the Commercial Convention between Britain and the Ottoman Empire signed at Balta Liman in August 1838. That Convention provided, among other things, for free trade throughout the Ottoman Empire. However, because the abolition of the monopoly policy would lead to the loss of significant revenues, Khartoum resisted its implementation. With its abandonment in 1851, however, a large number of private traders rushed to the South. Competition led to attempts to by-pass the middlemen to establish commercial relations with suppliers.

As the pressure of Khartoum traders grew, local rulers found it increasingly difficult to maintain control. First the destruction of local monopolies was, for the outside traders, a matter of political principle. That is, since they had escaped Khartoum's control, there was no reason why they should concede it to the local rulers. Secondly, it was also a matter of economic survival for

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Evading local monopolies appears to have occurred after the mid-1850s, for there is an increasing reference to the Khartoum traders transacting business with all sorts of people. Another indirect evidence can be found in Fr. Morlang's reports of 1859. In that year, Morlang accompanied a trading expedition from Gondokoro to Bibio (on the Yei river), where he met two Bari immigrants—Neangara and Lungasuk (Morlang's Lungashu). According to Morlang, both Neangara and Lungasuk were chiefs and businessmen.

The presence of these Bari immigrants in Yei district was connected with the White Nile trade. Their chiefships were obviously based on something other than inheritance, because, as indicated earlier in this chapter, one's lineage was the basis of succession to the office. Secondly, since there is no evidence that they were chiefs in Bariland prior to their migration, it is safe to assume that their chiefship was based on their wealth.

Lungasuk was originally head of Mokido village on the west bank of the Nile, south of Gondokoro. Sometime in the 1850s he became an important middleman in the White Nile trade, supplying the Khartoum traders with ivory and other trade items collected from areas west of the Nile, including the Yei river district. His trading activities carried him throughout the western territories, and he was locally renowned as a traveler.[16] Yei district's centrality attracted him, and he settled there.

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In conclusion, it can be said that in general, Lungasuk's career, as well as the information he gave Morlang, suggest that the movement of Baris into the Yei district was principally in connection with the White Nile trade. Thus, while some lowly Baris might have been forced by certain misfortunes, such as famine, upon a lonely road of migration, others were, by contrast, goaded on by commercial interests, traveling to the interior as agents and middlemen of the White Nile traders. The fact that some of these migrants eventually managed to establish themselves as "chiefs" in their new communities says much about the fluidity of social structures in the Yei district itself.

Having said that, it is, however, possible that Morlang could be somehow inaccurate in referring to these Bari immigrants as chiefs. For, with the exception of Makaraka, societies in the Yei district seemed more segmentary than anywhere in Eastern Equatoria, and clans seem to have been autonomous political units. Consequently, it was clan heads who held political and religious positions of power and authority, and, therefore, it was only they who could thus be called chiefs. Therefore, the basis of chiefship of the immigrant Baris must have laid outside this clan-based social structure. As already mentioned, the wealth they accumulated from their trading activities made them "rich men," which in the local vernacular was often translated as "big men," or simply as "chiefs."

One other possible explanation for the chiefships of these Bari immigrants in the Yei River district was their rainmaking. Apparently, rainmaking was a new institution in the district, and it seems to have been introduced there by Baris.

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Indeed, until quite recently, many of the rainmakers in Yei district had Bari ancestry.[17] It is possible that Lungasuk, Neangara, and other Bari immigrants to the Yei river district might have claimed to be rainmakers, and in the Bari vernacular, as well as in the vernacular of the Bari-speaking people generally, the concept "rainmaker" was synonymous with "chief."

The Local White Nile Trade Network In The Yei River District

Nyigilo, Neangara, and Lungasuk, as well as being important examples of Bari participants in the trade, were also an example of the network of local traders that connected local trade in the Yei river district with that of the White Nile through Gondokoro. However, the White Nile trade appears to have penetrated Yei first through southern Bahr el-Ghazal, apparently due to the pioneering efforts of John Petherick, who was one of the first to ascend the Bahr el-Ghazal river in 1855. Shortly thereafter, the firm penetrated deeper and deeper, both southward and westward. Petherick himself visited his commercial empire twice, reaching Zandeland in 1858, probably the first European to do so.[18] Naturally, Yei district was drawn into the local trading networks entering it from southern Bahr el-Ghazal.

The existing information provides some insight into the impact of that trade, which led first to the emergence of a small group of professional elephant-hunters. The most important of these elephant-hunters were Umba Weri-Benetit and Chief Neangara of Bibio, and their elephant-hunting appears to have been a well-coordinated activity. For example, Umba Weri-Benetit and his hunting band

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Their success coincided with the arrival of a trading caravan from Gondokoro, which enabled them to dispose of the ivory locally. In the past, the hunters had two options to dispose of the ivory: travel to trading stations in southern Bahr el-Ghazal, or wait to sell it to some passing middlemen. Initially most of Yei's ivory went to Petherick's trading stations in southern Bahr el-Ghazal, and then to Gondokoro as its importance grew.

Unfortunately, Morlang failed to record the actual transaction between Umba Weri-Benetit and the visiting caravan.[20] Instead, Morlang records the festive atmosphere in the wake of the successful hunt, and suggests that the object of celebration was the quantities of meat that the four elephant kills provided for the village.[21] Nevertheless, for Umba Weri-Benetit and his hunting band, the primary goal of elephant-hunting was to secure ivory with which to purchase the luxury items of the White Nile trade.

Apart from the presence of professional elephant-hunters, other evidence of Yei's importance in the White Nile trade exist as well. For example, during his short stay in Bibio, Morlang observed a brisk market activity, and says that the participants came from all ranks of life, with many people making two days' journey to sell their farm produce in Bibio market. Morlang was particularly struck with the cheap prices offered in the market:

> Everything is very cheap here, and in trade beads are counted singly one by one. I bought plump hens, long-haired billy goats, corn, butter, flour and Indian corn, etc..[22]

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Despite his positive impression of the Bibio market, however, Morlang fails to note whether or not it operated on a daily or some other regular basis. It seems safe to assume that it operated on some regular basis, at least twice a week. This assumption is based on the fact that Neangara, being a prominent trader and middleman, was likely able to procure a fairly regular supply of the luxury items either from Gondokoro or from southern Bahr el-Ghazal, which therefore required their disposal at some regular interval. At any rate, the trading caravan from Gondokoro with which Morlang traveled must have filled the market with stocks that took at least several days to exhaust. Interestingly, certain aspects of the market, particularly the standard measures used, recall those observed in Shendi by Buckhardt in the early 1820s in Northern Sudan. Morlang wrote:

> One day a group of [people] coming from Tubu, about one day's journey away, brought white *durra*, beans, honey, a certain fruit like *ful* of Kurdufan [peanut], which tasted like chestnuts, to the market and was [sic.] selling at a cheap price. They were selling twelve cupped handfuls of beans for two *borjok* beads, four handfuls of groundnuts for one *manshur* bead.[23]

Elsewhere, Morlang was able to buy a pot full of corn for only two pigeon-egg beads. Obviously, the main reason for the low prices of these basic commodities stemmed from the productivity of the land. This abundance, along with the fact that ivory was relatively plentiful naturally made Yei a favorite place for the local and White Nile traders.[24]

The Local White Nile Trade in the Eastern Districts

The eastern districts were also a major source of ivory supply. In fact, if the written record is anything to go by, the eastern districts may have been

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perhaps more important than Yei until the government effectively abolished its monopoly over ivory in 1852. Certainly Nyigilo's frequent trading visits to the eastern districts bespeaks of their importance as a source of ivory.[25]

The Gondokoro-Latuka Trade

As far as Latukaland was concerned, the tributary system outlined earlier made it possible for the chiefs to accumulate large quantities of ivory. In the oral data I collected in 1977 and 1979, there was much controversy over this matter.

Some informants argued that the killer of the elephant took one tusk and gave the other to the rainmaker. Others held that the other was given to the *monye-miji* (age-set) of his *amangat* (i.e. ward or moiety) to be kept by them as their common property. They went on to say that while the moiety was free to dispose of it as it saw it fit, they usually gave it to the rainmaker (*hobu*) in payment for rain. However, from my analysis of the data, it appears that these two seemingly opposing positions represent two different practices governing the disposal of elephant tusks. The first way was for people living in the capital, while the second was for the people outside the capital.[26] But whatever the method of disposal of elephant tusks, eventually most of the ivory ended up with the rainmaker. And as has been discussed earlier, it is not surprising that the chiefs in general, and the rainmakers in particular, dominated the local side of the White Nile trade. For all of these reasons, Latukaland was a productive region for Nyigilo's ivory business, which may explain why he frequented the area.

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But the trade between Bariland and the eastern districts was also a two-way traffic, as chiefs from the eastern districts often visited Gondokoro for business reasons. For example, Mayyia II of Loronyo is reported to have come to Gondokoro in 1851.[27] While the details of his stay are generally wanting, it is very likely that he sought to secure the luxury goods directly from the White Nile traders themselves, bypassing such middlemen as Nyigilo. The visiting chiefs sought to establish good business and personal relations with the White Nile traders, even inviting the latter to visit the eastern districts. Thus, upon the completion of his visit to Gondokoro, Mayyia II is reported to have returned to Loronyo with a party of the White Nile traders.[28]

Participation in the Gondokoro-Latukaland trade, however, was not the monopoly of Latuka chiefs based in Loronyo alone. Other Latuka chiefs elsewhere were also active participants, particularly the Hujang faction based in Tirrangore. In 1861, Andrea de Bono traveled to Liria to negotiate with chief Legge for a passage to Lafon. De Bono appeared to have known the precise geographical location of Tirrangore, for he pointed at the Lopit mountains, all the while telling his companion, Dr. Alfred Peney, that Kamiru's (his Comotro) hometown (i.e Tirrangore) was located near the foot of the mountains.[29] First, this incident shows that de Bono knew Kamiru personally. Secondly, it also raises the possibility that de Bono might have been to Tirrangore at some point in the past. Alternatively, he could have learned all of the information from Kamiru himself, possibly in Gondokoro. That Kamiru was an important participant in the White Nile trade became clear in 1862. In that year, according

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to Samuel Baker, Kamiru personally played a role in the establishing of the trading station in Tirrangore.[30]

However, it would seem that Loronyo supplied more ivory than Tirrangore, this for two reasons. First, after the break up of their kingdom sometime in early nineteenth-century, the majority of the kingdom remained loyal to Mayyia's dynasty based in Loronyo, and this meant that Loronyo's tribute base was larger compared to that of Tirrangore. Second, Loronyo controlled much of the middle valley of the Hoss and the Hinatye rivers (on maps Koss and Kinatti respectively). These areas are rich in wildlife, especially the Hinatye valley. Samuel Baker, who passed through the area in 1863, was so impressed with its wildlife that he refers to Latuka as a game country.[31]

The Latuka themselves seem to have recognized the economic importance of the Hinatye middle valley not only for wildlife, but also for its fish and fauna, the most important of the latter being the *doleib* tree. For these reasons, the Latuka sought to take control of the territory. According to their oral tradition, the territory belonged originally to a people whom they call Segelle, whose main center was Faciti. However, following a series of military campaigns the Latuka eventually wrested effective control of the territory during the eighteenth-century. Thereafter, they exploited the resources of the area, particularly fish and wildlife. And in the nineteenth century, settlers from Loronyo moved into the area to establish Lohiri settlement.[32] Thus, although fish may have been the original reason for wresting control of the territory, its rich wildlife,

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The Gondokoro-Lafon Trade

The Lafon-Gondokoro ivory trade may have been more important than the trade with the Latuka. As already mentioned above, Lafon is strategically located at the lower valley of the Hinatye and the Hoss rivers. The Hinatye is a river which, in its middle course, tends to flatten out into a flood plain. Consequently, in many places during the rainy season the flood plain becomes for all practical purposes a sheet of water. However, when the rainy season ends, the floods recede into the many deep and wide depressions. These perennial water-holes along with the presence of very good vegetation including elephant grass, make the area a prime grazing ground for all sorts of wildlife.

Like Latuka, the people of Lafon exploited wildlife and fish. Elephant hunting was especially important, since elephant killers enjoyed so much personal and public respect and prestige that their opinion and leadership was frequently sought in public matters.[33] Naturally, the effect of such a custom was to ensure a great supply of ivory.

There is no information available on the distributive system in Lafon; however, I assume that it was a variant of the tributary system outlined earlier in this chapter.[34] If so, the Lafon chiefs must have had a lot of ivory and other wildlife products which were sought in the White Nile trade. In fact, this supply may have been the reason why so many traders sought to travel there.

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The importance of the Gondokoro-Lafon trade was apparent even before 1851. Indeed, it may have been that contact which inspired Fr. Vinco to travel there:

> I had already tried to penetrate into their country many times before but my efforts had failed, because of the many and serious prejudices the Beri [Lafon] entertain against white men ...[35]

Angelo Vinco was finally able to fulfill his dream on 24 June 1851, when an escort of thirty men arrived to guide Vinco to Lafon. This was Vinco's first journey within the region since settling in Bilinyang in that same year. Because of that visit, Vinco was uniquely qualified to comment on the nature of the Gondokoro-Lafon trade. Unfortunately, he seems not to have left much information on that subject, perhaps because he was not a man of details. Indeed, the most he said on the subject is:

> The people of Berri [Lafon] traded principally in tobacco, ivory, giraffe's hair, tame bulls and hides of wild bulls, while the Bari have iron, salt and beads.[36]

While in Lafon, Vinco made an important observation regarding the widespread nature of trade contacts in the region. For example, he observed that until the introduction of the White Nile commerce, Lafon had little if any (long-distance) trading contact with Gondokoro or Bariland in general; instead, Lafon dealt with people Vinco calls Gnaghi (probably Anywak), who apparently lived in the country east or northeast of Lafon. However, following the introduction of the White Nile trade, Lafon's trade was re-oriented towards Gondokoro.[37] Since Lafon was well endowed with wildlife including elephants, it is very likely that it became a main source of ivory flowing to Gondokoro. Lafon's importance in this regard is suggested by the fact that in 1861 Andrea de Bono,

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probably the most prominent ivory trader in Eastern Equatoria at that time, negotiated with Chief Legge of Liria in order to be allowed passage to Lafon. In the event, the request was rejected, because, as will be discussed later, such a passage was tantamount to ceding to de Bono Legge's important source of ivory.

Curiously, de Bono's failed negotiations with Legge seems to have been the last time Lafon was mentioned in the written record. However, the silence about Lafon should not be viewed as indicating that it had ceased to be important in the ivory trade. Instead, the silence can be explained in two ways: that Lafon had diverted much of its trade to Liria, which is likely, or to some other points on the Nile, especially Bor, after Ibrahim Baaz, a Syrian trader, had established his trading firm there.

The Lokoya-Gondokoro Trade

The Lokoya occupy a territory between the Latuka and the Bari. A rugged mountainous country with hardly any perennial rivers, Lokoyaland was not particularly endowed with elephants. The chiefs therefore adopted a policy that sought control of the ivory trade passing through their country. And since they were renowned for their military prowess, they were able to enforce the policy with significant success.

Secondly, the White Nile trade appeared to bring prosperity to Bariland, and this wealth may have excited Lokoya's cupidity, and they sought to cash in on it by raiding and rustling Bari cattle, thereby intensifying ethnic hostility. Indeed, Lokoya-Bari wars were quite frequent throughout the early 1850s.[38]

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That Nyigilo was able to skirt this hostile atmosphere in his trading contacts with the Lokoya and other peoples in the east is a testimony to his diplomatic skills.

By the early 1860s, Lokoya chiefs were active traders. For example, during his journey from Gondokoro to Latuka through Liria, Samuel Baker met chief Tombe of Tollogo, whom he recognized at once as the chief he had actually seen many times before in Gondokoro.[39] Baker had been there only for six weeks before making the journey, and that he saw chief Tombe in Gondokoro many times during that relatively short period says a great deal about Lokoya chiefs' active participation in the White Nile trade. Indeed, it may have been this successful adaptation that eventually helped establish them as effective intermediaries in the Lafon-Gondokoro ivory trade. However, since the details of Lokya's trade policies relate to the next chapter, we will defer them until then.

Famine Crisis in Bariland and its Impact on the Local Trade Network

The continuing influx of traders in Eastern Equatoria led to stiff competition and reduced profits. What made matters worse, however, were difficulties that developed in the local supply situation in the closing years of the 1850s. At the core of these difficulties were economic crises touched off by several consecutive years of drought and famine. The source of information on the drought is Fr. Franz Morlang who, by the time he made these observations, had lived in Gondokoro for about four or five years. In July 1859, Morlang made a trip to Liria, and, enroute he found the road strewn with human skeletons and bodies, all victims of drought and famine. Commenting on the devastation of the famine, Morlang wrote:

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> As in previous years, also this year the hunger months among the Bari began in the months of April, May and June. Owing to the lack of rain, the people have even been unable to find the leaves and herbs which they normally cook and eat. The cattle, whose blood had been drawn off and sold, were dying of weakness. The girls and the women surrendered themselves to the merchants for morsels of kisra and contracted syphilis, and several died a miserable death...and the whole country was affected....Everywhere there was robbery and murder...[40]

The drought and famine also impacted the chiefs. They were, by definition, rainmakers or ritual functionaries whose primary duty was to insure the fertility of the land. Consequently, the environmental crisis spelled dire consequences for them. That rainmaking was such a risky business was observed by Vinco as early as 1851:

> This chief [Subek of Bilinyang] has one of the most difficult and dangerous jobs among the Bari, for he has either to make rain or die....Like his predecessors, he has to give the impression that...he is able to produce clouds and make rain fall or stop....Woe to him, however, if a drought persists. In such a case the natives all gather in his hut, and after intoxicating themselves with many gourds of yawa [a local brew] tear his stomach open with a spear.[41]

That was precisely the fate which the persistent drought and famine of the late 1850s implied for the chiefs. They were therefore generally fixated on their own survival, and they became disinterested in trade. Considering the fact that the chiefs were the backbone of the local trade network, the White Nile commerce deteriorated.

The traders reacted by penetrating the hinterland to establish their own trading stations there. To be sure, this response had been tried five or more years earlier in areas to the north of Bariland. Adoption of that strategy in Eastern Equatoria suggests that until then the White Nile traders enjoyed favorable terms of trade in that region. It would seem, therefore, that the chaos

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In order for the traders to succeed in establishing those stations, they needed an armed contingent to guard and protect them. Arming guards was also a sign of the deterioration of relations between the Bari and the traders themselves. For example, in 1858 the Duke d'Aumont had an unpleasant encounter with the Bari, which prompted him to write that "of all the tribes on the White Nile [the Bari] were the most feared."[42] Considering the positive opinion which the traders had of the Bari until the mid-1850s, the Duke's remark reveals the extent of the Bari's hostility toward the foreigners, brought on by the extended famine crisis.[43] Even the Catholic mission station in Gondokoro did not escape the negative impact of the famine, because it became the object of increasing theft and robbery. The change naturally shattered the sense of optimism regarding the future of the mission itself. In fact in 1858, Morlang himself admitted that the increasing thefts and robberies did indeed endanger its very existence.

The Bid to Establish Trading Stations in the Hinterland

Paradoxically, although the famine conditions posed a great obstacle to the continuation of trade in Bariland, the situation also facilitated the penetration of the hinterland of Gondokoro. The sharply reduced Bari population was unable to resist the traders. For example, by 1859 the population of Gondokoro village had dropped from twenty-one to only three households.[44] Second and more important, the crisis undermined the social and political stability of Bari society

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and, ultimately, created a power vacuum within it. Once more, Morlang provides us a view of these chaotic developments within Bari society:

> Bands of robbers and assassins were on the prowl stealing cattle....Chiefs Medi [Mödi], Burgodischi, Cuaka [Suaka] killed several of the thieves with their own hands and threw them into the river. Each day, the bodies or mutilated parts of bodies, could be seen floating in the river, including those of infants.[45]

So destructive were these forces that some Bari elders were nostalgic about the "good old days," when traditional chiefs exercised their power and prerogatives, thereby insuring social and political cohesion and stability. The reminiscences of these elders were recorded by Father Kaufmann as follows:

> According to the natives, there was better order in the country when they had their common king who lived at Belenyan [Bilinyang]. He dealt swiftly with robbers and murderers, had their hands severed, and sometimes even ordered their heads to be cut off. At present time, however, each village has to look after itself...[46]

A version of these disintegrative forces within Bari society is recorded in Father Spagnolo's *Bari Grammar* as follows:

> ...the Bari quarrelled among themselves and the villages came into conflict; this village would invade that and those would invade others. When they had collected for a large dance to which all came and danced by clans, they always fell to fighting...[47]

In view of this implosion, the balance of power and initiative naturally shifted in favor of the White Nile traders. First, although belonging to different trading firms stationed in Gondokoro, the traders were nevertheless united in defense of their property against the Bari; second, they had a decided military advantage because of their firearms. and. third, they had food and trade items which they could use to buy support and patronage. An example of how a

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> We threatened immediately to hang them at the yard-arm of our boat, then we gave them a handful of beads promising to burn down their village if a single grain of our pile of durra was missing.[48]

Once the traders overcame the resistance of the Bari, they were able to penetrate the hinterland and establish trading stations there. Ironically, the Bari themselves became instrumental in the process of penetration, serving as porters and interpreters.

Initially, according to Father Kaufmann, many Bari took up service with the traders to escape their miserable life of hunger and famine. Most of them, he went on to say, stayed away (as porters) as long as they could.[49] However, it is very likely that some of them planned on reinvesting part of their income on ventures to rebuild their fortunes. Whatever their initial motivation, the Bari soon became renowned for their association with the traders. For example, during his long business travels from Bahr el-Ghazal through Yei district, Petherick observed many Baris in his station in Wayo, "numbers of whom...were constantly retained in service at the station." Apparently, as Robert Brown observed, the Bari continued to be important in their role as porters and interpreters even after the annexation of the Equatoria province by the Turco-Egyptians:

> It is certain that when an Egyptian station was established at Gondokoro, many of the Bari became partially civilised and learned sufficient Arabic to find the employment about the military stations, as interpreters, translaters and inspectors. [50]

This chapter has examined the local dimension of the White Nile trade, its growth, important local personalities involved and how all of these were

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indispensable its overall success. It ended with the analysis of the social and political problems brought on by the extended drought and famine that settled in Eastern Equatoria in the late 1850s, and how these problems undermined and in effect destroyed the local trade network. In the end, in their determination to continue with the ivory trade, the White Nile traders themselves had to move in to the hinterland and establish trading stations there. That move was a new departure in the relations between the White Nile traders and local people in Eastern Equatoria, first, because it enabled the traders to assume control of the local trade network, and, second, it represented a major step yet in the incorporation of the vast hinterland of the Southern Sudan and adjoining territories into the Sudanese colonial economy and, by extension, into the larger capitalist-world economy.

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Notes and References

1. Although a better understanding of the dynamics of the societies in Southern Sudan has been hampered by the relative absence of historicalworks, much can nevertheless be learned about them from anthropological works which are relatively abndant.

2. Among the Dinka, for example, the "master of the fishing spear" was regarded as the spiritual head of the "tribe." The same was true with respect to the "leopard skin chief" among the Nuer. Consequently, disregarding their advice was believed to bring ill luck to the individual or community concerned. And among the Shilluk (one of the few kingdom states in Southern Sudan), besides being the supreme judge and ruler of the state, the Reth (King) was regarded not only as the spiritual head of the society but also as the reincarnation of Nyikang, the founder of the kingdom.

3. Khalid Ahmed Mustafa Hagar, "Dynamics of Socioeconomic Transformation Among the Nilotes of Southern Sudan," unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Connecticut, 1980, pp. 80-88. However, once the goods were appropriated, the recipient often used them for expanding and maintaining his power and influence through redistribution or patronage.

4. In most anthropological literature, the rainmaker is viewed as a mere ritual functionary, with little real power beyond that. Among the Latuka, however, the rainmaker wields real political power.

5. Some aspects of Latuka sociopolitical system resemble some of those observed by Jay Spaulding in the feudal Funj kingdom. See Spaulding, The Heroic Age in Sennar (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1985), 80, 81-2, and 127-8.

6. Amonye-miji and amonye-fau seem to exist as two separate positions only in Loronyo. In the rest of the villages, the functions of both positions were performed by amonye-miji. For more details on the description and duties of the various ritual functionaries among the Latuka, see Andreas Grüb, The Lotuho of the Southern Sudan (Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 1992), 121-128.

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male ranked according to his age. For a more detailed analysis of their age classes, see David I. Kertzer and Oker B.B. Madison, "African Age-set Systems and Political Organization: The Latuka of Southern Sudan," in L'Uomo 4(1): pp. 85-109. Also, idem, "Women's Age-set Systems in Africa: The Latuka of the Southern Sudan," in Christine L. Fry (ed.) Dimensions: Aging, Culture, and Health (New York, 1981), 109-130.

8. With respect to the societies in the southeastern corner of the Sudan (the Toposa, Didinga, and the Boya), Maj. Powell-Cotton observed that authority there "rests not in the hands of any great chief, but [in those] of a number of elders who preside over the various family divisions." Anthropologists have since confirmed Powell-Cotton's observation, and because age is the primary basis of authority, these societies have been described as "gerontocratic." For details, see Percy P. H. Powell-Cotton, In Unknown Africa: A Narrative of Twenty Months' Travel and Sport in Unknown Lands and Among New Tribes (London: Hurst and Blackett, Limited, 1904), p. 387; and Harald K. Müller, Changing Generations: Dynamics of Generation and Age-Sets in Southeastern Sudan (Toposa) and Northwestern Kenya (Turkana) (Saabrücken and Fort Lauderdale: Verlag Breitenbach Publishers, 1989), 57. Müller, however, disagrees with the "gerontocratic" label. Instead, he sees these societies as "socio-political systems in which a balance prevails between two principles, those of seniority and consensus." Ibid.

9. Kenneth Okeny's insightful "Political Structures and Institutions in the Southern Sudan" is an important contribution in this regard. Okeny examines five societies in Southern Sudan: two kingdom states (the Shilluk and the Azande); two societies (Dinka and Nuer) whose political system he describes as "decentralized democracy;" and then the Acholi, whose political system he describes as lying somewhere between the two systems above. He concludes that most of the societies in Southern Sudan were of this latter system. Okeny also underscores the economic pre-eminence of the elites of these societies, and explains that their economic pre-eminence was due to tribute and other forms of payment. The article's shortcoming (albeit understandable) is that although it covers the better half of the nineteenth century, it hardly assesses the impact of external forces (such as the White Nile trade) on these societies. See Kenneth Okeny, "Political Structures and Institutions in the Southern Sudan," in The Role of Southern Sudanese in the Building of Modern Sudan (Khartoum: Juba University, 1986), 33-53.

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10. On the other hand, a stranger traveling to a foreign land, often found it in his best interest to report to local authorities. In medieval Funj, a political institution (adhari) was delegated to receive such strangers. See Jay Spaulding, The Heroic Age in Sennar, 109.

11. This diplomatic practice appears to have been quite common in the region. For example, Kamiru's role in the Gondokoro-Tirrangore trade is quite comparable to that of Nyigilo's; so was Mayyia's in the Loronyo-Gondokoro trade. In Yei district, chief Neangara's son performed similar duties.

12. Apparently Nyigilo travelled to Khartoum again in the early 1850s at the behest of Mgr. Knoblecher, who had come to Gondokoro to supervise the establishment of the mission station there. See Gray, History of the Southern Sudan, p. 22; and Toniolo and Hill (edits. & trans.) The Opening of the White Nile Basin (1974), 8.

13. Emanuele Pedemonte, "A Report on the Voyage of 1849-50", in Toniolo and Hill (edits. & trans.) The Opening of the White Nile Basin, 64.

14. For this commercial network, see Gray, History of the Southern Sudan, pp. 35, 38; Angelo Vinco, "his Journeys," in Toniolo and Hill (edits. & trans.) The Opening of the White Nile Basin, 64.

15. Vinco, "His Journeys," in Toniolo and Hill (edits & trans.) The Opening of White Nile Basin, 77.

16. Morlang, "South-Westwards from Gondokoro to the Makaraka and Makarayang or Niam Niam or Cannibals," in Toniolo and Hill (edits. & trans.) The Opening of the White Nile Basin, 122.

17. Leonard F. Nalder (edit.), A Tribal Survey of Mongalla Province (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 192-222.

18. Petherick was quickly followed by other traders including de Malzac, Franz Binder, Jeremy Barthelemy, Jules Poncet, Ambroise Poncet, Alphonse de Malzac, etc. For Petherick's travels in the region, see his Egypt, the Soudan and Central Africa, (Edinburgh and London, 1861), pp. 456-64. Also E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "A History of the Kingdom of Gbudue (Azande of the Sudan," in Zaire, Vol. X, (Brussels: 1956), 462.

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28. Ibid,

Makaraka," in Toniolo and Hill (edit. & trans.) The Opening of the White Nile Basin, 117, 119.

20. Morlang's failure to record the actual transaction might be because such deals had become so common that he took them for granted. Unfortunately, however, this omission makes it difficult for us to gain an insight into the price structure as well as the terms of trade in Yei district.

21. Morlang, Ibid.

22. Morlang, "South-Westwards from Gondokoro to the Makaraka," in Toniolo and Hill (edits. & trans.), The Opening of the White Nile Basin, 120.

23. Morlang, "South-Westwards from Gondokoro to Makaraka," 121. Regarding the use of "handfuls" as standard measures in Shendi market, see J.L. Buckhardt, Travels in Nubia (London: 2nd. edition, 1978), 216. Indeed, measuring by the handful was common in the Funj kingdom of Sennar.

24. For reference to the low prices in Yei district, see Morlang, "South-Westwards from Gondokoro to Makaraka," p. 121; and for reference to the abundance of elephants in the Yei river area, see Mr. & Mrs. Petherick, Travels in Central Africa, 267.

25. For references to Nyigilo's trips to eastern districts, see pp. 8-10 above.

26. Informants interviewed on this subject included Vittoriano Ofire (Torit, August, 1977); Gaetano Imang (Hiyala, March, 1979); Aussa Okotong (Tirrangore, March, 1979); Federiko Ayahu (Hiyala, March, 1979); Ottileng Anyaa (Loronyo, March, 1979); and Foccho Orryomo (Loronyo, February, 1977).

27. At the time, Mayyia II was probably still an heir apparent, while his mother, Ohila Ibur, was the reigning rainmaker. For Mayyia's visit to Gondokoro, see Bruno, "Storia Lotuko", p. 176. This article is one of many compiled in a book published in Milan in 1970 by members of the Verona Fathers, a Catholic Mission Society which has been working in the Sudan since the mid-nineteenth century. The book is written in Italian, and the translation of the particular information cited here was given to me by Professor Peter Garretson of Florida State University, Tallahassee.

28. Ibid, p. 176.

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29. Andrea de Bono, "Voyage au Fleuve Blanc en 1861," in Nouvelles annales des voyages de la géographie, de l'histoire et de l'archéologie (n. d.) 21.

30. Baker, Albert N'Yanza, Vol. I, 165, 181.

31. Ibid., Vol. I, 135, 137, 172, and 245.

32. In time, however, they were challenged by Lafon, a Lwo-speaking people who, after breaking off from the Anywak sometime in the eighteenth century also, moved and settled in the lower valleys of the two rivers. For reference to these local conflicts, see Abannik O. Hino, "A History of Plains-Latuka, 1800-1920" (An M. A. Thesis submitted to the Folklore Department, Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, 1980), pp.50-2.

33. It is very likely killing certain animals such as lions or leopard also earned the individual that coveted status.

34. I have not been to Lafon personally, but I was told that many aspects of their social organization are in many respects similar to those of the Latuka.

35. Vinco, "His Journeys," in Toniolo and Hill (edits. & trans.) The Opening of the White Nile Basin, 85.

36. Ibid., p. 90. Probably the hides of "wild bulls" refers to such wild animals as buffaloes, giraffes, etc., which were considered good for a shield.

37. Ibid., p. 90. Vinco's observation regarding Lafon's trade with people to the east or northeast seems to be supported by Latuka oral tradition which says that before the White Nile trade, there existed a kind of bead called *amule*. In Latuka, Murle country was called "mulle," and this may suggest that "amule" came from Murle country. For more details on trade relations between Lafon and the Oromo (Galla) on one hand, and the Kuenda (Ganda?) on the other, see (Antoine) M. Brun-Rollet, Le Nil Blanc et le Soudan: Études sur l'Afrique Centrale (Paris: Librairie de L. Maison, 1855), 116-123. This account is based on information from Fr. Angelo Vinco. Although the identity of many of the place names given are difficult to establish, others are quite accurate, which says much about the quality of the information Vinco gleaned.

38. During his stay in Gondokoro in the early 1850s, Fr. Vinco observed that wars between the Bari and the Lokoya were frequent. See Vinco, "His Journeys", in Toniolo and Hill

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39. Baker, Albert N'Yanza, Vol. I, 115-17.

40. Morlang, "South-Eastwards from Gondokoro to the Lirya," in Toniolo and Hill (edits. & trans.) The Opening of the White Nile Basin, p. 110. Also, Fr. Anton Kaufmann, "The White Nile Valley and Its Inhabitants," in Ibid., 189.

41. Angelo Vinco, "His Journeys," in Toniolo and Hill (edits. & trans.) The Opening of the White Nile Basin, 77.

42. Quoted in Gray, History, 43, footnote no. 4.

43. For positive remarks on the Bari, see Emanuele Pedemonte, "A Report on the Voyage of 1849-50," in Toniolo and Hill (edits. & trans.) The Opening of the White Nile Basin, 61, 62, and 63. See, also, Anton Kaufmann, "The White Nile Valley and Its Inhabitants," in Ibid., 179.

44. See, Morlang, South-Eastwards from Gondokoro to the Lirya," in Toniolo and Hill, (edits. & Trans.) The Opening of the White Nile Basin, 110.

45. Ibid.

46. Anton Kaufmann "The White Nile Valley and Its Inhabitants," in Toniolo and Hill (edits. & trans.), The Opening of the White Nile Basin, 181.

47. Quoted in, A.C. Beaton, "A Chapter in Bari History," in Sudan Notes and Records, Vol. XVII, (Khartoum: 1934), 181.

48. Quoted in Gray, History, 41.

49. Anton Kaufmann, "The White Nile and Its Inhabitants," in Toniolo and Hill, (edits. & trans.) The Opening of the White Nile Basin, 184. In 1859, Morlang joined a caravan of Petherick's men going to the Yei river area, some 100 miles west of Gondokoro. The caravan had over 100 Bari porters, and probably most of them offered their services in return for food.

50. For reference to the role the Bari played in facilitating the penetration, see Mr. and Mrs. Petherick, Travels in Central Africa, 267; and Robert Brown, Story of Africa and Its Explorers, Vol. II, (London: 1892-5), 111-12.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT TRADING STATIONS

The shift of the White Nile trade from riverside- to hinterland-based stations was a short, logical process. In the previous chapter, reference was made to the continuing influx of traders into the region, the increasing competition for market share, and consequent declining profit margins for the traders, especially after the European recession of 1858.[1] Two local factors were equally, if not more, crucial in that downward spiral. The first of these had to do with the nature of local supply itself.

The local White Nile trade was a "gathering" activity, undertaken largely on a part-time basis. That is, although a few of the traders like Nyigilo devoted a good part of their time in its pursuit, most of the trade goods, especially ivory, came mainly from traditional economic activities such as hunting. But the ability of the local "producers" to secure these commodities at a rate satisfactory to the White Nile traders depended on two factors, foremost of which was the natural endowment of the area concerned. But perhaps more important was the nature of weapons used in the procurement of these hunting products. Elephant-hunting was essentially a risky business, and the primitive nature of traditional weaponry did not encourage many people to participate on a regular or professional basis.

Increasing the supply of ivory required a significant reduction of the risks involved, necessitating the transformation of local elephant-hunting techniques. The only realistic way to achieving that goal was through the introduction of

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firearms, not an attractive proposition for the traders, since that would radically affect the balance of power in favor of the local peoples. The traders chose therefore to move into the interior and, through use of firearms, help reverse the persistent problem in the local ivory supply.

The second and probably the most important local factor in the downward spiral was the extended drought and famine of the late 1850s, which caused the chiefs major political difficulties and debilitating consequences for the trade. Because of their power and ability to command resources and labor, the chiefs naturally had become the mainstay of the local White Nile trade network. However, because of the political difficulties brought on by the famine crisis, the chiefs were often locked in a struggle for their own survival, causing the local White Nile trade to suffer.[2]

The Penetration of the Hinterland

As the famine crisis eliminated or rendered local agents and middlemen ineffective, especially in Bariland, the White Nile traders increasingly assumed the responsibility of "producing" the required trade items themselves. It was therefore the famine crisis that precipitated the new policy—the penetration of the hinterland. The penetration of the interior was at first cautious and this caution took the form of an expeditionary phase, which lasted from about 1858 through 1860. As the firms entered the hinterland, they required armed contingents for their security. Henceforth, the creation of private armies became standard practice of all the firms operating in the region.

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In its operation, the structure of the expeditionary phase consisted of the following: during the off-season, the overseer dispatched groups of his armed men into the interior to procure ivory and other products. These products were then brought back to Gondokoro, where they were stored until the end of the next trading season, at which point they were shipped for disposal in the commercial markets in Khartoum and/or abroad. This process was repeated again for each year during the expeditionary phase.

It appears that at first the expeditionary phase was confined almost exclusively to Yei district. Interestingly, with the brief exception of the Makaraka, the traders met with no hostile reception anywhere in the district. The apparently friendly attitude towards the traders was not perhaps accidental, for the district enjoyed relatively stable economic and social conditions. In 1859, Fr. Morlang was struck with the fertility of the land and the relative abundance of food there:

> The climate of the area around the river Yei appears to be quite healthy and the soil fertile. There is only one month a year when there is no rain...There is an abundance of [cultivated] edible plants and unlike Bari country there is no yearly famine here...[3]

Secondly, the easy penetration was partly due to the acephalous societies in that district. In Yei lived some of the most segmented ethnic groups in the region as a whole. People lived in small clusters of clan- or kinship-based agricultural communities, each with a chieftain or clan head, who mediated between the community and the ancestral spirits and in family or intra-clan disputes and insured the fertility of the land. Thus, in addition to mediating in conflicts and disputes, the clan head acted also as a fertility priest.[4]

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For example, among the Kakwa, Pajulu, and the Nyangbara, the institution of both the rain-maker and clan head exist; but the latter enjoyed more actual power and authority than the former. As a matter of fact, rain-making and rain-makers appear to have been relatively new institutions borrowed from the Bari. In fact, many offices in Yei district were of Bari origin, and rain-making as an institution was not well integrated in the power structure of these societies. As such, rain-makers existed only as private individuals.[5] The result was that power tended to reside in a series of small and highly localized entities, with little or no coordination between them. That sociopolitical fragmentation inevitably put them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the power of the traders.

Thirdly, Yei had been in contact with the White Nile trade for a long time via Bahr el-Ghazal, where penetration had occurred much earlier.[6] This long history can be explained partly by Yei's geographical contiguity with Bahr el-Ghazal, and partly because of the relative abundance of elephants there,[7] a factor which did not escape the attention of the White Nile traders. Therefore, the extent of its incorporation into the merchant capitalist structure represented by the White Nile trade may have been far stronger than is perhaps realized. Prior exposure may therefore explain its receptiveness to the penetration of the traders.

The expeditionary phase worked reasonably well for the Khartoum traders, indicating that ivory reserves were still available in countries beyond the chaos in Bariland. A measure of how well the process worked can be seen partly from the demographic shift in Gondokoro's population: whereas its Bari population decreased as a result of the famine, by contrast its foreign commercial community

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rose rapidly to about 700 by 1859.[8] The relative success of the expeditionary phase is further indicated by the rise in the number of boats visiting Gondokoro. From the 40 boats arriving there in 1856, that number doubled by 1859.[9] With this rapid expansion and the resultant competition, local supply could not keep pace, and supply problems developed again. Thus, by 1861, the White Nile traders had to raise the stakes even higher by finally taking the unprecedented measure of establishing trading stations in the region.

The transition from riverside- to hinterland-based trading stations and the keen competition that developed is perhaps best demonstrated in the career of John Petherick himself. He had been employed by the viceregal government as a mineralogist, and prospected for coal in Upper Egypt, the Red Sea hills and Kordofan until 1848. Upon leaving government service, he became a gum arabic trader in Kordofan and, in 1853, he moved to ivory trading on the White Nile. With the decline of profits in the last half of the 1850s, the survival of his company was once again threatened.

Like his competitors, Petherick believed that the problem lay with the local supply situation, and he decided to establish his own hunting units.[10] He asked his Government to intervene with the Egyptian authorities to allow him import into the Sudan "five hundred muskets, eighty elephant-rifles, and two tons of lead for his two hundred men located," he went on to say, "amongst turbulent and warlike tribes." By 1862, some of the weapons he obtained were used by elephant-hunters in his station in Yei district.[11]

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Other traders did not have to seek permission from any authority to import their military wares; they simply went about their business as they pleased. The only limiting factor for them was their means and abilities. Indeed, when the Prussian Baron Harnier ascended the White Nile and reached Gondokoro in 1860, he found "the three notorious dealers, de Bono, Shenuda, and Khurshid Aga, in full possession of despotic authority over the negroes of that country".[12]

Conflict over Trade Routes: The Lokoya vs. the White Nile Traders

As outlined in the previous chapter, the hostility of the Lokoya to the White Nile traders was motivated largely by their desire to protect and maintain control of the trade and trade routes passing through their country. Since their country was not particularly well endowed with elephants, the Lokoya refused to allow traders to penetrate their country.

They did not apparently differentiate between the White Nile traders and the missionaries stationed in Gondokoro. In 1851, for example, chief Legge perceived Vinco's visit as an attempt by a Khartoumer to break into Liria's control of the trade passing from the eastern district to Gondokoro. Not surprisingly, he ordered an ambush and, but for a timely escape, Vinco almost came to a sorry end.[13] In 1859, Fr. Morlang was accorded similar, if perhaps less hostile, treatment. Morlang sought to propagate Christianity in Liria, as evidenced by the exchange of religious ideas between him and the people there. However, he had to cut short his visit because of demonstrated indifference, if not in fact hostility, towards him. Perhaps partly because of that frustration, Morlang came out with an unfavorable

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impression of Chief Legge, describing him as "a wild-looking man." He went on to say that Legge was about seven feet tall, and had between thirty and forty wives.[14]

Richard Gray claims that Morlang's visit was, in fact, undertaken in the company of a trading expedition, but that all such expeditions were received coldly.[15] If the reception was indeed cold, the attitude so displayed was certainly consistent with Lokoya's policy. Indeed, subsequent hostile actions suggest that maintaining control of trade remained Liria's long-standing policy. Not surprisingly, the policy brought Liria into conflict with the Khartoum traders.

The first occurred in January 1860. Having successfully penetrated the western district, the traders sent an expedition, whose size is yet unknown, to Liria. Upon arrival, it was attacked, losing five of its men and the rest fled.[16] The traders were concerned that such hostile actions would increase if left unchecked, and might ultimately lead to abandonment of expeditions to the interior, thereby denying direct access to lucrative sources of ivory in the region as a whole. Accordingly, the traders organized and sent a large punitive expedition against Liria.

The expedition consisted of some 150 armed men, plus an unspecified number of local Bari allies. Liria rose to the occasion, assembling a large force which it then placed in ambush in its narrow ragged mountain valley. In the encounter, 130 of the traders' men perished in the attack, and many of the 20 survivors were wounded. The rout did not spare the Bari allies either, as untold numbers of them shared the same sorry fate as the Khartoumers. The outcome of that encounter stopped the traders for more than a year.[17]

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The next move came in April 1861, and was undertaken by the notorious Maltese trader, Andrea de Bono. Accompanied by the physician Alfred Peney, De Bono traveled to Liria with a small retinue in order to approach Chief Legge for safe passage to Lafon. De Bono was able to witness first hand both Legge's political shrewdness and his military power. When he came to meet de Bono, Legge was accompanied by an army of several hundred men, all of them armed with traditional weapons. And as he approached the negotiating "table," Legge cautiously detached a small contingent to stand guard during the proceedings.[18] Unfortunately for de Bono, the outcome of the negotiations was a disappointment, as Chief Legge refused safe passage to Lafon. Reporting on the results, de Bono wrote:

> ...il nous dit qu'il ne nous aurait jamais donné un guide, parce [que] nous lui aurions enlèvé le commerce de l'ivoire que la tribu des Berri [Lafon] fait à Liria.[19]

Legge regarded his strangle-hold of the eastern trade routes as fully justified. Since his country had no elephants, most of the ivory that fell into his hands originated outside of his country. Therefore, if he was to continue participating in the ongoing ivory trade, he had to maintain that strangle-hold. By the time violence and enslavement erupted following the penetration of the hinterland, Liria had become a major market for the spoils of war. In February 1862, for example, de Bono's men entered into hostilities with the Madi and the Kuku, and confiscated considerable property. Most of the cattle were sold to Legge for ivory, and some was given as presents, along with many slave girls. Fr. Morlang, still in Gondokoro, witnessed these proceedings and recorded them as follows:

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> An expedition has arrived from Loki [Upland or Southern Bari] ... bringing slaves and cattle; it is said that they have been amongst the Madi and Cucu [Kuku], that they have killed people, burnt huts, and seized ivory and slaves. With the stolen cattle they will buy ivory from the Liresi [i.e. from the people of Liria], and if a chief wants to keep a slave girl they give him one or two.[20]

Samuel Baker, who passed through Liria in 1863, that is, two years after de Bono's abortive negotiations with Legge, was keen enough to observe the reason behind Legge's strangle-hold of the eastern trade routes. According to Baker, most of Legge's ivory came from Berri [Lafon] and, mistakenly, from the Oromo (his Galla) countries further east. He goes on to say that Legge purchased this ivory with beads, copper bracelets and hoes he obtained from Gondokoro. Baker concludes:

> Although there were few elephants in the neighbourhood of Ellyria [Liria], there is an immense amount of ivory, as the chief is so great a trader that he accumulates it to exchange with the Turks [White Nile traders] for cattle.[21]

But by the time Baker arrived there, the local political situation in Lokoyaland, indeed in Eastern Equatoria as a whole, had dramatically changed in favor of the traders. They already had broken through the Lokoya strangle-hold of the eastern trade routes and established trading stations in Latukaland, by circumventing Lokoyaland and penetrating southward through Acholiland.[22] The impact of this move affected Legge's relative political autonomy and independence and thus significantly reduced his bargaining power. Indeed, the change seems to have affected his demeanor for Baker found him less than majestic; indeed, he actually thought of him as something of a buffoon. Legge nonetheless retained a considerable measure of influence and power over the traders themselves. His authority is quite apparent from the way the traders treated him as an ally rather

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than a client. Baker observed that the presents Legge received were, in fact, tribute or customs duties:

> Ibrahim explained to him who I was, and he [Legge] immediately came to ask for the tribute he expected to receive as "black mail" for the right of entree into his country.[23]

He charged the White Nile traders the exorbitant price of 20 cows for a large tusk. The traders rationalized their acceptance in terms of the convenience of proximity of Liria to Gondokoro: "it is a convenient station, ... [and] being near to Gondokoro, there is very little trouble in delivering the ivory on shipboard."[24] Chief Legge also profited immensely from the violence and slave-raiding consequent to the establishment of trading stations. He provided a good market for the looted goods, which the traders provided in an attempt to curry his favor and friendship. A sense of the power still possessed by Legge, even after he lost control of the eastern trade routes, is quite apparent from Baker's graphic portrait of 1863:

> .... Of all the villainous countenances that I have seen, that of Legge excelled. Ferocity, avarice, and sensuality were stamped upon his face. [He is] about the greatest rascal that exists in Central Africa.[25]

Thus, whatever the extent of his waning power by 1863, Legge remained a principal player in the unfolding local drama. He was certainly responsible for crafting an effective policy that for a long time successfully thwarted and frustrated the White Nile traders wanting to enter Lokoyaland. In so doing, his people came to be respected, thereby sparing them from the violence and devastation that the traders habitually visited on other less formidable people.[26]

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The White Nile Traders vs. Local Societies: A Struggle for Control

The penetration of the hinterland by the traders did not always go unchecked. Local hostility and resistance to the traders was the outcome of a complex of factors, and the form and nature it took varied from one society to another. In some areas the hostility evoked by the traders was motivated by a deep sense of fear and suspicion that naturally arises when a people are faced with what they perceive as an invasion of their country. This response was general with certain sections of southern Bari and neighboring Madi and Kuku.[27] In other places, after an initial friendly reception, the traders provoked fighting by their overbearing behavior and demands. The Latuka are here a case in point. In yet others, local hostility was partly and largely motivated by the desire of the leadership to maintain control of trade and trade routes passing through their country. As we have seen, the Lokoya well characterized this situation. But regardless of the nature of local reaction, the traders had thereby gained footholds throughout the country.

Thanks to their military superiority, the traders gradually extended their power over the region. Having been thwarted in the east by the Lokoya, the traders, with a greater sense of purpose and determination, now turned their attention to the south. Their resolve must have been well-informed with certain expectations. Curiosity about the territories south of Gondokoro stemmed from the great question of the source of the Nile. Efforts were therefore expended in connection with that quest, and Gondokoro, being the southernmost terminal of the navigable river, naturally became the advance post from which to tackle that problem. Thus besides the traders, Gondokoro also received a smattering of

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travellers and explorers, who in their varying ways and means, contributed to the fuller picture of the emerging geography of the region.[28]

The traders were naturally the beneficiaries of this scientific quest. They must have heard of the powerful interlacustrine kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro, their trade lines to Zanzibar, and their reputed wealth in ivory and other resources. With all such information carefully collated, the traders decided to move south, convinced that high commercial dividends awaited them. They adopted a tough attitude as they moved south, resorting to a liberal use of firearms to break up any opposition. The southern Bari suffered the most, with considerable loss of life. Further south, a section of the Madi experienced a similar fate. Many survivors were taken "prisoners," and villages were left as smoldering heaps of ashes.[29]

Further south in what is today northern Uganda, friendliness replaced hostility, thanks to the favorable local disposition left there by the Zanzibari trade. The leading spirit in the process of penetration was the Maltese trader, Andrea de Bono. One of the first to adopt the expeditionary system, he quickly realized that even more profits could be had through establishing his own permanent stations in the interior. Thus, by 1861, De Bono had established two trading stations in Yei, among the Nyangbara and the Makaraka respectively. In the same year, he also had set up another station at Gulufi in Madiland far to the south of Gondokoro. The latter station appears later to have been transferred to Faloro, also in Madiland.[30] And before long, de Bono was joined in this process by other traders such as Petherick, Khurshid Aga etc.[31] Thus by the time of conflict between the

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Lokoya and the traders, the transformation of the trade in Eastern Equatoria from its expeditionary phase into one with "permanent" trading stations in the hinterland was underway in earnest.

The rush to establish trading stations in the interior proceeded with such rapidity that, by 1862, even Latukaland had trading stations established. One was at Tirrangore (Baker's Tarangolle), the other at Loronyo, Baker's Latome.[32] According to Baker, the initial penetration of Latukaland was from the south through Acholiland. Baker goes on to say that its accomplishment of that task was due to Kamiru.[33] The latter was, indeed, a very influential person, as attested to not only by Baker but also by Latuka oral tradition. He was the brother and righthand man of Hujang II, the head of the rival Latuka faction based in Tirrangore. However, given his power and influence in the kingdom, it is likely that Kamiru was crucial in influencing the establishment of the trading station in Tirrangore and, by extension, Latukaland.[34]

Fr. A. Bruno, by contrast, claims that the establishment of trading stations in Latukaland came about only as a result of successful negotiations between the White Nile traders and the Lokoya. He continues that in these negotiations, the Lokoya finally granted the traders access to Latukaland through their territory.[35] If Bruno's assertion is correct, the negotiations with the Lokoya may have been in connection with the establishment of a trading station at Loronyo. With a trading station having been established in Tirrangore, Loronyo needed one itself. It is also possible that the reverse process was the case, with Loronyo taking the initiative,

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Soldiers and the Hinterland Trading Stations: the Number Count

It is difficult to establish the exact number of trading stations established in Eastern Equatoria at this early date. And although the picture becomes less blurry by 1863, thanks to the reports of Petherick, Speke, Grant, and Baker[37], the question of the exact number of trading stations still remains unsettled. First, some of the so-called permanent stations were really temporary, used initially and primarily for gaining access into desired territories. Once entry was gained, the transit station was often promptly abandoned. Sites followed one another in rapid succession, complicating any attempt at pinning down the exact number of those stations that were "permanent." Secondly, some of the stations enjoyed the designation of the name only, but were in fact no more than transit points between stations, with no resident soldiers. Mugi and Doro between Gondokoro and Faloro to the south are cases in point.[38] And thirdly, some of the more successful stations (mostly in Yei district) had several substations, each with an agent and a small retinue of soldiers. This kind of situation is only vaguely referred to in the records, and the details are therefore missing.

Nonetheless, the data suggest that in early 1863 there were the following stations in Eastern Equatoria. In Yei district there were five major stations: two belonging to Andrea de Bono, two to Petherick himself, and one to Khurshid Aga. In the eastern districts there were two trading stations, both of them in Latukaland: one in Loronyo (Baker's Latome, from Mayyia's alias, Lotimoi) belonging to the

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Coptic trader, Shenuda, and the other in Tirrangore (Baker's Tarangolle) owned by Khurshid Aga. In late June 1863, the latter was moved to Obbo in Acholiland (on the Sudan side) owing to growing security problems for the traders in Tirrangore. In the southern district, on the other hand, there were, by 1863, two trading stations, both of them associated with Andrea de Bono.[39]

At the center of this sprawling commercial frontier was Gondokoro, complete with stores and depots of the various trading firms in the region. At the height of the annual trading season, life at Gondokoro picked up tempo, becoming, in the words of one writer, "a sort of Yukon gold-rush camp in the tropics." Indeed, its panorama was enlivened with a view befitting a major docking town, as it was adorned with "a flotilla of boats, with flags of many nations."[40] There were thus altogether as many as ten trading stations in the whole of Eastern Equatoria, including Gondokoro.

Related to the issue of the number of trading stations is the population of soldiers. While the exact count of soldiers remains elusive, the record seems to suggest that the average station had more than 100 soldiers, while the bigger ones had more than 200. Faloro in the south and Wayo in Yei district are examples of the bigger stations. Gondokoro, on the other hand, had about 700. Therefore, the total of northern Sudanese soldiers in Eastern Equatoria by 1863 may have amounted to well over 2000. When local auxiliaries (mostly slaves and interpreters) are added, the total *zeriba* population was probably more than double the 2000 figure. Over the years, the number continued to rise, but whatever the

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increase, it never matched that in the Bahr el-Ghazal region which, by 1879, was estimated at 55,000.[41]

The introduction of the military element in the White Nile trade was motivated primarily by pragmatic considerations--to ensure the security and safety of property and personnel. It nonetheless had the immediate effect of altering the existing balance of power between the traders and the local peoples which, until then, hung delicately, prompting one prominent student of the region to remark that it was at an impasse.[42] Although the stalemate was not necessarily bad, so long as profits continued to be made, the increasing conflict between the local peoples and the traders, as well as the internal chaos within Bari society on the other, had begun seriously to undermine the profitability of the trade. It was then at that point that the new system of hinterland-based trading stations was introduced; and with it, the balance of power shifted increasingly in the traders' favor.[43]

Secondly, the new hinterland-based system took on a more direct role in the process of transformation of the region's societies. The prerequisite was for capitalist interests to assume a dominant sociopolitical position in relation to local social formations. Given the particular form of that capitalist penetration and the sociopolitical realities of the local situation, the process of attaining dominance depended on military means. Not surprisingly, the process brought the traders into conflict with local societies. The violence reflected the underlying process of social transformation, of which slavery was a symbol, and a clash between the traders

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Introduction of Slavery and Slave Trade in Eastern Equatoria

A. Local Servile Institutions as a Factor in the Rise of Slavery and Slave Trade

The institutions of slavery and slave trade were absent prior to the coming of the White Nile traders. Nonetheless, clientage existed, and servile groups such as war captives or destitute groups/individuals were forced to attach themselves to more powerful or wealthy individuals. Examples would be the jogo (war captives) among the Makaraka; the batonge among the Kaliko; the kajua or 'dupi among the Kakwa and Bari; and 'dupi wuri among the Pajulu; etc..[44]

Probably the best example of clientage in Eastern Equatoria approaching formal slavery comes from the Mundari, a small pastoral Bari-speaking group to the north of the Bari. The word for "client" in Mundari language is timit (pl. timisi or Tumonuk). According to Jean Buxton, a timit was "a man who because of misfortune or misdeed has lost his kin group or has been expelled from it, and having neither property nor kin seeks to attach himself to a chief (mar) or other notable who will act as his protector."[45] While poverty may have contributed to the timit's low social status, it was not however the principal reason for it. Instead, the timit's low social status was fundamentally because he was an alien with no kins to protect and guarantee his rights and privileges. A fellow Mundari was less likely to be a timit, because his kinsmen would quickly come to his rescue. Consequently, the timisi among the Mundari came mostly from neighboring ethnic communities such as Dinka, Atuot, Moru, Bari, Nyangbara, and Aliab.

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In terms of their duties as clients, Jean Buxton observes that the work of the client differed little in kind from that of any adult Mundari. Their work included cultivating their master's fields, building and repairing their houses, grain stores, and kraal for goats. Their work was not usually rewarded with beer, as was usually the case with work performed by non-kin. The timit also accompanied his master in his journeys, acting as his guard, porter, protector, and messenger. Buxton suggests further that the timit's social status was inherited by his descendants, and that removing themselves from the stigma depended on their ability to build up their cattle herd independent of the master. After they had established their own cattle wealth, clientage diminished progressively and the timisi were eventually incorporated into the master's kinship group.

Several conclusions can be drawn from this clientship among the Mundari. First, it is clientage and not slavery, because the low status of the timit ended once he was able to established himself economically.[46] In this regard, the mar-timit relationship among the Mundari is comparable with that of the creditor-debtor under the lien or the sha'il system. The difference, however, is that clientship among the Mundari was both a social institution and a process by which aliens were incorporated into the local kinship groups.

Second, some aspects of clientship among the Mudari appear not to be indigenous. They seem instead to have resulted from the destructive chaos introduced in the region by the alien forces--slave traders, the Turkiyya, and the Mahdists--that came to the Southern Sudan in the second half of the nineteenth century.[47] The destitution resulting from those chaos lent themselves to the

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avarice and opportunism of many, especially the strong. In fact, Buxton alludes to this fact, and suggests further that the institution weakened with the return of stability:

> From what the Mundari say it would appear that in the past there was a higher proportion of clients, many families of whom are said to have died out during the last century, when slave-raiding dispersed Mandari (sic.) groups. Famine years and epidemics among herds also made it impossible for chiefs to provide for their retainers. [However] many conditions which made clientship attractive, or a survival factor in the past, no longer apply.[48]

In fact, in her later and more detailed study on the same subject of Mundari clientship, especially in those sections of the book dealing with the earlier history of the Mundari, clientship seemed nonexistent.[49]

The relative absence of indigenous institutions of slavery had far-reaching consequences for the region. It meant that, whereas the demand for slaves by the White Nile traders was strong, the supply side was not there to meet it. This, in turn, meant that the responsibility for introducing and maintaining the institutions of slavery and slave trade fell on the traders themselves and their associated soldiery. This state of affairs had direct bearing on the manner by which the traders obtained their supply of slaves: it meant that the supply side had to be "forced open" through violence "externally" directed by the traders themselves.[50]

B. Slavery and Slave Trade: The Underlying Economic Rationale

The slave trade had been an important part of the White Nile economy ever since the river was opened to modern navigation in 1839. However, until the establishment of trading stations in the interior, the incidence of enslaving activity in Eastern Equatoria was limited. Indeed, operations for obtaining slaves occurred

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only during the return journey of the traders, and took the form of kidnapping clients who had come to sell items to the traders themselves. The victims were thus unsuspecting by-standers, and the areas affected were mostly to the north of Gondokoro and generally outside of the region under study.[51]

As the volume of trading increased, however, Bariland itself became subject to the same slave-stealing activity. This phenomenon may have been one of the reasons why, by 1852, the Bari had begun calling the White Nile traders murderers and robbers. And by 1854, the Bari, probably for the first time, entered into a direct military confrontation with the traders. In that encounter, Alexandre Vaudey, the Sardinian Consul in the Sudan, along with many of his men, was killed.[52]

As a result of the increase in the "slave-stealing" activity, the contribution of the White Nile region to the total volume of Sudan's slave trade rose correspondingly, although, relative to other areas of the Sudan, it remained small. According to Georg Schweinfurth, the total volume of slaves originating from the Bahr el-Gebel (the White Nile region south of the Shilluk country, including Eastern Equatoria) was estimated by 1860 at about 1,000 annually; whereas that originating from the Bahr el-Ghazal in the same period ranged from 4000-6000 per year.[53] Given the large number of slaves in the Sudan, these figures suggest that Southern Sudan was still a minor source even by this late date.

These figures have, however, been severely criticized as significantly lower than the actual numbers of slaves captured in the two regions. Josef Natterer, the Austrian Consul-Agent in Khartoum, for example, estimated that slaves sold in the Shilluk market town of Kaka by 1860 was about 2,000 annually. He goes on to

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Even with the higher figure, the total was small compared to the total volume of Sudan's slave exports whose main catchment areas continued to be (a) southern Blue Nile (Ingessana) and western Ethiopia and; (b) the Nuba Mountains, and the adjoining districts straddling Kordofan and Bahr el-Ghazal. Unfortunately, no estimates are available for the numbers of slaves on the domestic market. Nonetheless, it is safe to assume that the volume of the domestic slaves must have been high, since exported slaves alone were estimated in 1860 to be about 15,000-20,000 annually.[55] Such a high export figure would suggest that the volume of slaves retained for the domestic market must have been several times more.

With the establishment of trading stations in the hinterland, however, slave raiding and trading ceased to be a casual activity. Instead, it became an important and even a necessary condition for the functioning of the White Nile trade itself. That is, the slave trade became an important facet of the White Nile trade, with substantial amounts of the profits being increasingly derived from it. Not surprisingly, it was pursued with intensity, fostered by the growing financial expenditure that the new White Nile trade imposed on the traders.

The following examples may help gauge the extent of this growing expenditure. The average monthly salary of a station soldier was 10 shillings, in addition to transportation costs and other overheads incurred en route to the post.[56] An important expense, for example, was a five-months' advance payment

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Unfortunately for the traders, however, these growing financial expenditures were not always offset by profits from ivory; on the contrary, profits continued to decline. Finance capital was also scarce, a problem reflected in high interest rates. Thus, in order to continue operating in the trade, the firms often had to borrow money from credit markets at rates that ranged from 36 to 60%,[58] thus cutting further into profit margins.

Indeed, the dilemma the traders faced was not unlike that which the colonial Turco-Egyptian regime faced in the first 40 or so years of its existence in the Sudan. That is, maintaining a standing army called for the expenditure of large financial resources. Since the resources were generally wanting, the traders had to find ways to circumvent the problem. The most obvious solution was for them to make payment in kind, a practice adopted by the government during the early decades of the colonial period. The traders provided the overvalued merchandise such as cotton cloth, sugar, glass beads, salt, copper, *tarabush* (hats), cattle, etc..[59]

An important new item introduced among the merchandise list was slaves. Indeed, as one would expect, slaves became the most common form of payment for the soldiers. First, their capture was relatively cheap and therefore cost the firm very little. Second, acquisition of slaves by the soldiers became popular because they provided certain much needed services, such as domestic chores, farming, or

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as wives or concubines (wet nurses). And if those captured were young boys, they became their master's assistants, helping him in carrying his gun during trips or his seat when within the premises of the station.[60] It would seem that these boys were being trained for a future military career as slave-soldiers.[61]

Third, slaves could be sold either locally or in northern markets, where they fetched handsome prices. In that case, the proceeds of the sale were deposited in the master's account in Khartoum. In that case, such slaves were simply handed over to the master's family or relatives in the North. For all the reasons above, trading stations organized slave-raiding. Mire says that at any one time (after a raid) an Arab soldier had between ten and twenty slaves on hand, and that most of these slaves were destined for sale. Only a few slaves (usually two to three) were retained for domestic or farm use.[62]

C. Slavery and Slave Trade: the Violence of an Underlying Process of Local Social Transformation

With their soldiers, the traders were able to enter into direct conflict with local communities, whether through "provocation," or through aggression. But more generally, they took advantage of existing local traditional hostilities by "insinuating themselves in these conflicts."[63] In view of the relative absence of local institutions of slavery, the traders undertook raiding and war as standard mechanisms to acquire slaves.[64] Meanwhile, a far more significant development occurred, a process, if perhaps forced, of local social transformation. This phenomenon seems important in light of the composite picture of the so-called Greater Nile Valley that emerges from recent studies.

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The historical literature regarding the process of development of trade and commerce in the "Greater Nile Valley"[65] reveals the critical importance of the contradiction between the state (*sultan*) and regional lords for control over land and trade. This is the notion which Janet Ewald succinctly calls the "dilemmas of political rule." That is, while the *sultan* claimed the ultimate right and control over land and trade, in practice he had to transfer these rights to his regional allies as a means of obtaining and guaranteeing their support for the crown. For their part, and for much the same reasons, the regional allies, in turn, transferred these rights to their own local favorites. This process resulted in a structure of relations that Jay Spaulding calls as a system of sub-infeudation.

The devolution of these rights could, and often did, enable the various subordinate allies to establish their own autonomous power bases, thus threatening the very foundation of the *sultan's* power. In response to this threat or its potential, the *sultan* or regional lord often revoked the grant and conferred it upon potential allies. The result was a palimpsest of ever changing relations between the *sultan* and various regional lords. The dialectic led ultimately to the gradual erosion of central authority and control over land and trade and to an increase of power of regional leaders. Perhaps more important, however, for the considerations of this study, was the *sultan's* loss of control over trade. The deprivation enabled the emergence of private merchants who, in the long run and as a result of primitive accumulation, were eventually able to exert strong influence over the state. In the final analysis, therefore, the traders tended to thrive where a

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state with an infrastructure commensurate with their interests already existed. In that particular sense, therefore, traders followed the state.[66]

Coming to the Southern Sudan, however, the model outlined above did not seem to apply; for some of the state's essential ingredients--regional lords, land, trade, and standing armies--were generally missing. For example, no standing army existed anywhere. Instead, there was a citizen-soldiery which could be summoned on ad hoc basis, that is, whenever the need arose. The lack of a standing army made these societies generally militarily and politically weak, with the power of the chiefs embedded more in ideological notions rather than in actual military power. Secondly, land--the primary means of production--was everywhere in abundance, with the right of ownership and disposal invested not in any one individual but in the community as a whole.[67] This situation inhibited land alienation and commoditization which, in turn, prevented the replication of the sociopolitical dynamics that "the dilemmas of political rule" unleashed in the Northern Sudan and Egypt. It certainly inhibited the rise of private traders and, by so doing, contributed significantly to perpetuating the tributary social structure obtaining in the Southern Sudan as a whole.

From the point of view of the White Nile traders, therefore, the local social set-up was inadequate for their trading requirements. The relative absence of a powerful central authority, for example, was not reassuring in terms of the kind of security they required for their business. And because they were unwilling or unable to trust the local societies, the White Nile traders set out to establish a system commensurate with their requirements, one that sought to "establish

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themselves as a ruling caste transcending the barriers of tribal society."[68] To avoid conflicting claims over control of their territorial domains and, in a way, regularizing their status, the trading companies sought and bought from the government exclusive commercial rights over defined territories, even though these were outside the pale of government's authority. The traders then asserted property and political rights over their respective territories, monopolizing trade and levying taxes over the population therein. In other words, the traders became self-declared rulers over their territories.[69]

This conquest process was clear and, perhaps, even more complete in the Bar el-Ghazal than in Eastern Equatoria and, for this reason, can be instanced by the trader Mahjub al-Busayli. Having established himself the ruler of much of the territory of the Jur, Mahjub al-Busayli arrogated to himself the right to appropriate ivory therein. Furthermore, he claimed tribute in livestock, copper, iron, grain, honey, and so on. Local chiefs were coopted and assigned subordinate positions and were required to use their influence to provide all the needs of the station in return for the traders' support, which gave them internal power and external security hitherto unknown.[70]

It is partly in this context that slavery and associated violence can be understood. That is, the slave trade and the enclaves of the slave mode of production that emerged with the coming of the White Nile trade can be seen as the external manifestation of the subtle process of local social transformation that was being effected, if perhaps imperceptibly. Not unnaturally, the encounter was

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fraught with conflict and violence, as local societies tried to resist the traders' pretensions.[71]

Scholars of the region have tended to explain the violence in terms of cultural and racial clashes between the White Nile traders on the one hand, and the local Southern Sudanese peoples on the other. No doubt, ethnicity played a significant consideration in that conflict, comprising potent emotive symbols. However, particularistic factors themselves do not explain the context within which that conflict was fought. The fight was fundamentally a struggle over control of trade. To effect a change in the structure of that trade, and thus ensure its expansion, the outsiders necessarily sought to modify or, where possible, alter the social basis of the societies within which that trade operated. That is, they tried to promote a form of social relations more favorable to merchant capital, thereby shifting existing local tributary social formations.

To achieve that goal, two alternative, often complementary, strategies were followed. The first was to effect some form of alliance with local chiefs and undermining their traditional bases of power through making them increasingly dependent for their rule upon the traders. To this extent, the traders succeeded in anchoring that power in their hands. The second strategy was outright usurpation of power by the traders, especially where the chiefs were weak.

The traders, however, were bearers of a culture and an idiom that can be described as Islamic, an ideological prism through which to perceive the external world. Not surprisingly, that ideological construct became for the traders not only a paradigm for defining the nature of relations between them and the local peoples,

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but also an instrument in the task of effecting the necessary transformation of the local tributary social formations. Accordingly, the dichotomy Muslim/"Non-believer" grew rigid so as to be synonymous, wherever possible, with the "ruler" and the "ruled." This division, especially in light of the military superiority that the traders enjoyed, led inevitably to unrelieved tension and conflict with the various local peoples, a phenomenon that was synonymous with wars and conflicts associated with slavery and slave trading.

The process of expansion of the commercial frontier in the Southern Sudan was, at the same time, accompanied by the geographical exploration of the region, the most important efforts of which were those of John H. Speke, Jame A. Grant, and Samuel W. Baker.[72] Thus, not only did the international community come to know about and be moved by the extent of violence and destruction caused by wars and slave trading, but it also acquired a better knowledge and appreciation of the strategic and economic potential of the region. In their recommendations Speke and Baker were especially emphatic about the South's commercial potential. The region's increasing potential caused the viceregal government to move toward the eventual annexation of the equatorial region as a whole. These and other issues and processes will be addressed in the next chapter.

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1. For Antognoli's complaint, see Letter no. 10, "The Letters of Adolfo Antognoli, 1856-1868" (Chapter 9), in Paul Santi and Richard Hill (edits. & trans.), The Europeans in the Sudan, 1834-1878, (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1980), 201. Also, see Chapter Two above, especially endnote no. 38

2. I am here referring to the general discontent of the people against the chiefs (alias, rain-makers) because of the drought and the resulting famine. The severity of the famine frequently rent society apart, and the onus for the crisis was generally put on the chiefs, often with fatal consequences for them.

3. Morlang, "South-Westward from Gondokoro to the Makaraka and Makarayang or Niam Niam or Cannibals", in Elias Toniolo et el. (edits. & trans.), The Opening of the White Nile Basin (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1974), 124.

4. Morlang refers to them as monye. See Morlang, Ibid., p. 115.

5. Leonard F. Nalder (edit.). A Tribal Survey of Mongalla Province (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 192-222.

6. See Chapter 3 above, endnote no. 18.

7. Mr. and Mrs. Petherick, Travels in Central Africa and the Exploration of the White Nile Tributaries, Vol. I, (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1869), 267.

8. Morlang, "South-Westward from Gondokoro," 110.; and Samuel Baker, Albert N'Yanza; Great Basin of the Nile, Vol. I, (London: MacMillan & Co., 1866), 110.

9. Richard Gray, History, 31.

10. The establishment of trading stations in the hinterland was first applied in the Bahr el-Ghazal region before it was used in Eastern Equatoria. Petherick was one of the major businessmen in southeastern Bahr el-Ghazal, whence he gradually extended his business into the modern Yei area.

11. As British vice consul since 1849, Petherick used his official position to outbid his competitors. In 1859, for example, he applied for, and was granted, promotion to full Consul in Khartoum. In the letter outlining the reasons for

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such position, Petherick mentions the importance of protecting British trading interests in the Sudan. Since he was the only Englishman trading there, apart from a few other British subjects from the Levantine, his solicitation for promotion was for self-interest--to protect his own business interests. See 'Abbas Ibrahim 'Ali, The British, the Slave Trade and Slavery in the Sudan (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1972), 24. And for information on how many of the traders-cum-diplomats exploited their official position, see Chapter Two above, especially page 15-18.

12. Muhammad Fouad Shukry, Khedive Ismail and Slavery in the Sudan (Cairo: Librairie la renaissance d'Egypte, 1938), 125.

13. Angelo Vinco, "His Journeys", in Elias Toniolo et al. (edits.), The Opening of the White Nile Basin, 92.

14. Morlang, "South-Westward from Gondokoro," 112-113.

15. Gray, History, 56.

16. Nobody knows the particular incident that provoked the attack. One source, Kaufmann, suggests that during their visit in Liria, the visiting traders abused women.

17. For references to the conflict between the Lokoya and the traders, see Gray, p. 56. Samuel Baker seems to suggest that another incident did occur in 1862 between Liria and the traders, and that the traders lost 126 of their men in that encounter. See Baker, Albert N'Yanza, 120.

18. De Bono, "Voyage au Fleuve Blanc," 20-23

19. Ibid., 23.

20. Quoted in Gray, History, 57

21. Baker, Albert N'Yanza, 129.

22. Baker, Ibid., 101.

23. Ibid., 126-128

24. Ibid., 129.

25. Samuel W. Baker, Ibid., p. 127. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that Baker is here indulging in hyperbolic racism.

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inspired can be seen from the fact that the traders used them (in 1863) as a kind of bogeyman to frighten Baker away from following them to the east. In fact, the Lokoya maintained their relative autonmy (and hostility to the government) until 1874. In 1871, for example, they raided Gondokoro. When Samuel Baker took a reprisal action against them for the attack, the Lokoya responded by blockading the road between Gondokoro and Latuka, forcing communication between the two stations by a long detour route. The blockade was only lifted after Charles Gordon established good relations with them in 1874. In his report to Cairo about this accomplishment, Gordon said:

> Les Sheikhs natifs continuent d'apporter leur ivoire, une chose qu'on n[']a jamais fait auparavant et je suis très bien aise de vous informer que je pense que j'ai établi des bonnes relations avec les tribus Loquias (sic.), si je réussis avec ça, la distance d'ici à Latouka sera 4 jours au lieu dé 10 jours, il était nécessaire auparavant de faire une détour au cause de l'hostilité des Loquias.

See Muhammad Fuad Shukry, Equatoria Under Egyptian Rule: The Unpublished Correspondence of Col. (afterwards Major-Gen.) C. G. Gordon with Ismail Khedive of Egypt and the Sudan During the Years 1874-1876 (Cairo: Cairo University Press, 1953), 198 and 219.

27. Gray, History, 59.

28. The list of such travelers and explorers is quite impressive and includes a number of prominent people, such as the wealthy Liverpool merchant Andre Melly; the American poet and diplomat Bayard Taylor; and the Dutch Heiress Alexandrine Tinné who, along with her entourage, visited the White Nile in 1859-1864; Prince Muhammad 'Abd al-Halim Pasha; Duc d'Aumont et de Villequier and his companion, Gavellot (1856); Eugene de Pruyssenaere; Guillaume Lejean; Marchese Orazio Antinori; Theodor von Heuglin; Hermann Steudner; Alfred Peney (1860); Carlo Piaggia (1853); and Angelo Bolognesi (1856-7); etc..

29. Gray, 57.

30. De Bono, "Voyage au Fleuve Blanc," 17. Also, Mr. and Mrs. Petherick, Travels, I, (London: 1869), 125. For information on de Bono's station at Faloro, see John H. Speke, The Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile (London: 1864), 454; Baker, Albert N'Yanza, 83

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31. For information regarding the trading stations in Yei district, see Mr. and Mrs. Petherick, Travels, I, 125, 132, 141, 266-7, and 300.

32. The latter name probably originated from Mayyia II's *alias*, Lotimoi, but which was then rendered by the traders, albeit wrongly, as "Latome."

33. Baker, Albert N'Yanza, 141.

34. Hujang was affectionately called Imui, a name rendered by Baker as "Moy."

35. A. Bruno, Storia Lotuko, (Milan: 1970), 176. This piece of information was translated by Dr. Peter Garretson who himself speaks Italian well, I am very grateful.

36. Another possible interpretation might be that the negotiations with the Lokoya was initiated by Khurshid Aga or his agent because the station at Tirrangore belonged to him. Khurshid may have found the route to Tirrangore through Acholiland long and circuitous and, therefore, expensive; whereas one through Lokoyaland would have been more direct, relatively short and, consequently, cheaper. Very likely, it was with a view to gaining access to this more direct route that negotiations with the Lokoya were undertaken. All this implies that Lokoya's blockade policy was then in force. In the negotiations, the Lokoya may have found themselves amenable to compromise because of the *fait accompli* in Tirrangore. That is, with the establishment of the trading station in Tirrangore, it no longer made any sense for the Lokoya to insist on maintaining their long-held policy of blockade, hence acceding to Khurshid's request.

37. For their travelogues, look at the bibliography under their respective names.

38. Speke, Journal, 468-69.

39. Ibid., 453, 469.

40. "Foreword" (a reprint from Chapter Five of Alan Moorehead's The White Nile, in Baker, Albert N'Yanza, XV; and Mr. and Mrs. Petherick, Travels, 312.

41. Georg Schweinfurth, The Heart of Africa, Three Years' Travels and Adventures in the Unexplored regions of Central Africa, 1868-1871, Vol. II, (London: Sampson Marston and Company, 1874), 420.

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43. This shift in the balance of power was more evident in the Bahr el-Ghazal. There, indigenous communities within the sphere of influence of each zariba were virtual vassals of the Khartoumers. They cultivated the land, and supplied their zariba with food and porters. In return for these valuable services (or because of them), they were protected from the slave trade. See Lawrence Mire, "Al-Zubayr Pasha and the Zariba Based Slave Trade in the Bahr al-Ghazal 1855-1879," in John Ralph Willis (ed.) Slaves and Slavery in Muslim Africa, Vol. II (London: Frank Cass, 1985), 111.

44. For reference to the question of servile groups in Eastern Equatoria, see L.F. Nalder (edit. & trans.), A Tribal Survey of Mongalla Province (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 27.

45. Jean Buxton, "'Clientship' Among the Mandari of the Southern Sudan," in Sudan Notes and Records, Vol. XXXVIII, 1957, 101.

46. Ibid. The current literature on slavery in Africa seems to support the conclusion regarding the relative absence of indigenous institutions of slavery in the region under study. Of importance in this regard are Paul Lovejoy's Transformations in Slavery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) and Claude Meillassoux's The Anthropology of Slavery: The Womb of Ivory and Gold Alide Dasnois, trans. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991). Lovejoy's definitional chapter, "African Slavery" (especially p. 9) posits a social situation where slaves or servile groups exist but in which the society as a whole was not based on slavery; or the situation where a few people owned a limited number of slaves as conspicuous examples of wealth but not as workers, in which case slavery was incidental to the structure of society and the functioning of the economy. The same conclusion is also implied by Meillassoux.

47. It is interesting to note that some of the duties performed by the timisi are quite similar to those performed by slaves in the zaribas. See Georg Schweinfurth, The Heart of Africa, Vol. I, 172-178. See also Richard Gray, History, 61-62.

48. Buxton, "'Clientship' Among the Mandari," in Sudan Notes and Records, 100-101.

49. Jean Buxton, Chiefs and Strangers: A Study of Political

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Assimilation Among the Mandari (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1963), 1-66.

50. The term "violent" is used here with qualification. I am specifically alluding to the fact that as a result of the absence of local institutional mechanisms of slavery, violence had to be initiated and directed by the traders themselves to acquire slaves. And by "externally directed," I am referring to the fact that the capturing of slaves was always carried out by the White Nile traders themselves rather than by local peoples.

51. Fr. Ignaz Knoblecher, "The Official Journal of the Missionary Expedition in 1849-1850," in Elias Toniolo and Richard Hill, Opening of the Nile Basin, 54.

52. Elias Toniolo, "The First Century of the Roman Catholic Mission to Central Africa, 1846-1946", in S.N.R., Vol. XXVIII (1946), 105, 108; Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, 43.

53. Schweinfurth, The Heart of Africa, Vol. I, 429.

54. Gray, History, 53. It has, however, to be borne in mind that many, if not most, of the 2,000 slaves sold in Kaka that year originated from the neighboring Nuer, Dinka, and Shilluk areas, with few of them coming from Eastern Equatoria.

55. Ibid., 53. It has been also estimated that by the 1860s one-third of the population in the Northern Sudan were slaves. For this information, see Chapter One above, especially Endnote no. 23.

56. Mire puts the salary at £6 a month. See Mire, "Al-Zubayr Pasha and the Zariba Based Slave Trade in the Bahr al-Ghazal, 1855-1879," in John Ralph Willis (ed.) Slaves and Slavery in Muslim Africa, Vol. II (London: Frank Cass, 1985), 113.

57. Baker, The Albert N'Yanza, 71-72.

58. With respect to interest rates, see Gray, History, 51.

59. Ibid., P. 51. See also Mire, "Al-Zubayr Pasha and the Zariba Based Slave Trade," 113

60. Schweinfurth, The Heart of Africa, Vol. II, 420.

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that case, the excess slaves were kept in "reserve" in the station and were considered the common property of the station as a whole, and were employed in ways that served the general interests, such as labor or even common defense.

62. Mire suggests that the zaribas' soldiers were the primary source of the slave traffic that still persisted after Samuel Baker became governor of Equatoria. See Mire, "Al-Zubayr Pasha and the Zariba Based Slave Trade," 113-114.

63. Janet Ewald uses this phrase extensively in what may be one of the best works yet written on pre-colonial Sudan. See her Soldiers, Traders, and Slaves: State Formation and Economic Transformation in the Greater Nile Valley, 1700-1885 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).

64. The main reason for the long protracted "extraction" of slaves was, of course, the enduring demand for them both in the Northern Sudan and abroad, particularly in Egypt. The extent of failure in generating local interest in slaves is indicated by the fact that even where military action arose between traditionally hostile local societies, the capture of slaves, euphemistically referred to as "prisoners of war," never seem to have taken root at all. Even in situations of allied action with the traders, locals were more interested in taking cattle and/or other things than in capturing slaves. In fact, the kind of brigandage that emerged in some parts of West Africa in response to the existence of local or long-distance slave markets (Meillassoux, 1991: 143-323) failed even to materialize.

65. "Greater Nile Valley" is, paradoxically, a confining term, and refers specifically to Egypt and the Sudan rather than to all Nile countries that, at the very least, should include Ethiopia and Uganda.

66. This paradigmatic process is best articulated by Janet Ewald in her Soldiers, Traders, and Slaves, especially in Chapter 6. The theme also emerges in Spaulding's The Heroic Age in Sennar. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1985); Rex O'Fahey's State and Society in Dar Fur. (London: Oxford University Press, 1980) and; Terence Walz Trade Between Egypt and Bilad al-Sudan, 1700-1820. (Cairo: 1978).

67. This communal control over land was, however, either through clan-head, or through a council of elders.

68. Gray, History, 46.

69. Shukry, I

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69. Shukry, The Khedive Isma'il 119-20.

70. For this conquest process, see Janet Ewald, Soldiers, Traders, and Slaves, pp. 166-70; S. Santandrea, A Tribal History of the Western Bahr el-Ghazal. (Blogna: Editrice Nigrizia, 1964), 19; and Gray, History, 59.

71. Local resistance, often sporadic, was nonetheless long-drawn and protracted. It is, however, difficult to compress the story into a few pages, as that would do injustice to it. On the other hand, a more comprehensive treatment of the subject would be too unwieldy for this study. For a synopsis of the subject, see Abannik O. Hino, "Latuka Country: An Outline of the Process of Colonial Encroachment and Reaction to It - 1840-1900," in Northeast African Studies, Vol. 4, 3(1982-83), 39-49.

72. Whereas Speke would have liked the Egyptian government to move in and take control of the region, Baker, for his part, preferred a European power. For a discussion of Speke's and Baker's views, see 'Abbas Ibrahim Muhammad 'Ali, The British, the Slave Trade and Slavery, 22-42. Also, see Baker, Albert N'Yanza, 515-16.

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CHAPTER FIVE

STATE INTERVENTION AND THE ANNEXATION OF THE SOUTHERN SUDAN

By 1869, pushing aside any further hesitation, the Khedival government of Egypt finally decided that the time had come to make the bold move--the annexation of the Southern Sudan. From a long-term perspective, the decision can be seen as the logical culmination of the historical process of capitalist penetration of that region. From a short-term perspective, however, the action can be seen as the outcome of the interplay of two critical factors: the issue of slavery and the slave trade attendant on the White Nile trade. The international outcry against the slave trade and the consequent diplomatic pressure brought to bear on the Khedival regime--particularly by Britain and the British Anti-Slavery Society--forced the Egyptian government into adopting anti-slavery policies which, even though spasmodic and usually reluctant, ultimately led to the annexation of the Southern Sudan.

The second factor was the increasing realization of the economic potential of that region. Indeed since the abolition of its monopoly over the White Nile trade in the early 1850s, the government had watched with much interest the influx of traders to the region and came to believe that they were making large profits. For a long time, however, the government was not in a position to undertake any annexation plans. With the return of the Speke Expedition in 1863, however, a commitment to annexation was made forthwith. As will be discussed later in this chapter, upon their arrival in Cairo, John Speke and James Grant were treated to a

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grand reception and interview with the Khedive himself. In that interview, the travelers painted a rosy picture of the agricultural and economic attractions of the Equatorial lakes region, and urged its annexation. Immediately after the interview, the Khedive commenced the process.

Thus the economic factor was the more decisive in the run up to the annexation of the Southern Sudan. For sure, the attempt to suppress the slave trade was an important contributing factor, too. While the Egyptian authorities were never consistent about suppression because slavery conformed to Islam, they nonetheless capitalized on the issue to serve their imperial ambitions. Muhammad F. Shukry puts it best when he said that,

> [I]n order to succeed in this worthy effort [i.e. suppression of slavery], the adoption of a collateral policy of conquest and annexation was unavoidable: for the problem of suppressing the slave trade was in reality the same as that of strengthening the government at Khartoum, and the maintenance of Egypt's rights of sovereignty over the Sudan.[1]

Obviously this observation contradicts the view of some Egyptian and Sudanese historians who have argued that the annexation of Southern Sudan was primarily a humanitarian undertaking, driven by abolitionism.[2]

Egypt and the Suppression of the Slave Trade

The history and the process of the suppression of slavery and slave trade spanned over thirty years and was stimulated by government action sparked by humanitarian forces in Europe, especially Britain, and was largely forced upon a reluctant Egypt. Although the British Anti-Slavery Movement had been in existence for some time, the question of slavery and the slave trade in Egypt and the Sudan did not seem to catch its attention. This attitude changed in 1837, when

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the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, dispatched the abolitionist Dr. John Bowring on a fact-finding mission to Egypt and its dependencies.[3]

Upon his return to England, Bowring submitted a detailed report to the Foreign Office, which chose to take no action. The British Anti-Slavery Society, however, published Bowring's report, which became a weapon for its cause. Thomas Fowell Buxton, the leader and spokesman of the Society's faction in Parliament, made copious use of the report, when, in 1838, he submitted to the Government a plan to help abolish slavery and the slave trade in Egypt and the Sudan.[4] The nativism of the Anti-Slavery Society forced the British Government into exerting pressure on Egypt. The British Government and the Anti-Slavery Society thus began an organized and at times coordinated campaign against slavery and slave trade in the Sudan and Egypt.

Imbued with their success abolishing slavery in the Ottoman empire, the anti-slavers in Britain were naturally high in their optimism. Moreover, well-reasoned arguments were marshalled to prove that economically, slavery and the slave trade in the Sudan and Egypt were not so profitable as a "legitimate" commerce might be. On that basis, Dr. Bowring strongly argued that slavery and slave trade in Egypt and the Sudan could be brought to an end:

> I am much disposed to think that, if any commercial stations, or factories were introduced at Kordofan, Khartoum, and other central points on the Nile ... the slave trade would decay by itself, and be superseded by a peaceful legitimate commerce.[5]

"Legitimate" commerce, however, implied the existence of a system of free trade, and the abolitionists recognized that the government's monopoly system had to be destroyed, and they pushed Muhammad 'Ali in that direction. The latter

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disingenuously responded favorably: during his visit to the Sudan in 1838/9, the viceroy issued an order abolishing slavery in the Sudan forthwith. He also ordered the abolition of the practice of paying soldiers in slaves and the ghazwas, that is, official slave-hunting expeditions. And as if to underscore his sincerity, he liberated 500 recently captured slaves. The viceroy's actions were timed for applause at the General Anti-Slavery Convention held in London on June 12-23, 1840. In fact, at its conclusion, the convention officially praised Muhammad 'Ali for the measures he had taken during his visit to the Sudan, and exhorted him to abolish all the slave markets in his dominions.

However, it was soon discovered that Muhammad 'Ali was duplicitous, when Dr. R.R. Madden and Colonel Hodges, representatives of the General Convention in Cairo were told by Ignatius Pallme, a traveler who had just returned from the Sudan, that slavery and slave trade in the Sudan continued to flourish, that ghazwas were undertaken, and payment of personnel in slaves was recognized. Pallme reported that during the year ending August 1840, ghazwas undertaken by the government had netted over 10,000 slaves. He even asserted that during his visit to the Sudan, the Viceroy had ordered the governor of Kordofan to supply him with 5,000 slaves for his bodyguard.[6]

In fact, Muhammad 'Ali's orders had been calculated only to gain favorable publicity for him in the European press. This insincerity damaged Muhammad 'Ali's credibility in the eyes of both the British government and the Anti-Slavery Society. After being pressed hard by the British Consul-General, Muhammad 'Ali seemed to apologize, explaining that as an institution, the slave trade was "in

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conformity with the Mohammedan law" and that he could not legally abolish it.[7] Muhammad 'Ali's duplicity was a bitter experience for the anti-slavers and, from then on, it conditioned them not to trust the public statements of Egyptian authorities.

In 1848, Muhammad 'Ali became senile and was retired from office. His successor, Abbas I, was conservative, even reactionary, and suspicious of Western powers, fearing that they wanted to undermine Egypt's sovereignty.[8] He was hostile to Western culture generally, because he believed that it was inimical both to Egypt's established traditional ideas of government and to her way of life. And as if luck were on his side, the revolutionary events of 1848 in Europe in general and France in particular diverted much of European attention and influence in Egypt any way.[9]

Abbas's policies of reaction and retrenchment tended to undermine good government. Equally harmful to the morale of the government were his policies for the Sudan. For example, he was suspicious and distrustful of the governors-general there, fearing that they might establish themselves as independent rulers. Consequently, he appointed five governor-generals within a short period of only six years. Moreover, he viewed the Sudan as a place of banishment for officials he deemed politically subversive.[10] The net result was a political atmosphere that was not conducive to a fruitful relationship between him and Western powers in general and the Anti-Slavery Movement in particular. And when he died in 1854, nothing had been done in the way of suppressing slavery and the slave trade during his reign.

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Muhammad Sa'id, the next viceroy, was liberal, partly as a result of an education received from French tutors. In 1855, Sa'id consequently took the first real step towards suppressing the slave trade in the Sudan by sending a contingent of 800 soldiers to occupy the mouth of the Sobat river in an attempt to annex the region. However, the new territory was difficult for Khartoum to maintain, and in 1857 the enterprise was abandoned and the garrison there had to be withdrawn.[11]

The next attempt at suppression came that year, when during a visit to the Sudan, Sa'id declared the abolition of slavery and slave trade in the colony. Furthermore, he forbade the import of slaves from the Sudan to Egypt. But whatever his sincerity, he blundered the same way Muhammad 'Ali did. That is, in 1859 he placed an order for 500 black slaves, which he hoped to use as his bodyguard, with Musa Bey al-Aqqad, "a great trader in Cairo with whom he stood in friendliest relationship." In the summer of 1860, the al-'Aqqad Company managed to secure 92 of the slaves. This act may have further reinforced the cynicism with which the anti-slavers had come to view Egyptian authorities.[12]

Sa'id's measures were ineffective, as slavery and slave trade proceeded uninterrupted. In fact, both institutions gained momentum from 1860 onwards in the wake of the penetration and establishment of trading stations in the hinterland of the Southern Sudan. Indeed, it was believed in Khartoum that all traders on the White Nile either directly participated, or somehow connived with their agents in the seizure of slaves. The extent of the chaos is reflected by John Petherick's grim observation, made in May 1862:

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> In a word, legal commerce from Khartoum to Gondokoro is at an end--such a thing as trading with the natives is out of the question: they are prepared for flight or fight according to the density of population, and circumstances...[13]

Under intense pressure from European consuls in Cairo and Khartoum, the government was compelled to undertake stronger measures against the slave traders. In October, 1862, for example, the Governor-General, Musa Pasha Hamdi, ordered a detachment of soldiers to the White Nile to inspect boats for slaves. Furthermore, all merchants wishing to sail up the White Nile were required to furnish a list of their servants (employees) and to pay a tax equivalent to one month's salary for each of item.[14] The assumption here was that knowledge of the identity of employees would help to determine the identity of passengers returning from trading in the Southern Sudan. That is, it would help in determining whether any given passenger was or was not a slave.

Ironically, Sa'id's laudable actions did not receive the attention of the anti-slavery movement, which was then preoccupied with the heated debate in the United States that ultimately led to the Civil War.[15] However, with the successful outcome of the war for the "anti-slavers" and the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, the British Anti-Slavery Society could now turn their attention to the issue of slavery elsewhere, especially in the Middle East and Africa.

In Cairo, meanwhile, there was change of guard, Sa'id having died in January, to be succeeded by Khedive Isma'il. The new ruler had been educated in Vienna and Paris, and as his predecessor, was anxious to introduce European institutions and technology. It would therefore seem that given his liberal background, Isma'il would be susceptible to persuasion on the issue of abolition.

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However, perhaps more decisive than the viceroy's personal inclination was the influence of the second critical factor--the new realization of the economic and strategic importance of the Southern Sudan. This awareness assumed greater importance following the successful return, in 1863, of Captains John Speke and James Grant from their historic travels, which resulted in the "discovery" of the source of the Nile.[16] On June 3, 1863, the two explorers met Isma'il and told him about the agricultural and commercial importance of Buganda, Bunyoro and Karagwe, which Speke summarized in the following terse lines:

> Their sovereigns evinced a keen desire for commercial intercourse with civilized countries, while the climate appears far superior to, and the soil more promising than those of any region adjoining, either to the north or south.[17]

Initially, Speke was open to an Egyptian annexation of the region, but later opted for Britain, hoping that it would take the commercial advantages proffered by his "discovery." He foresaw profitable trade contacts between the equatorial kingdoms, the Southern Sudan and Britain, as indicated by the considerable market for European products which the Equatorial kingdoms had already established through Arab merchants from Zanzibar. In his opinion, however, the east coast of Africa was not a good base of operations for opening up the equatorial kingdoms because of the long overland route involved. To Speke, therefore,

> the other line of communication, and indeed the only natural one between the regions in question and the sea, is from Egypt by ascending the great White Nile...[18]

But in order to better reap the commercial benefits of the region, Speke proposed the assertion of imperial control over much of Southern Sudan and the

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establishment of legitimate commerce there, arguing that the power in possession of the river would virtually hold the country. Accordingly, he called for the immediate occupation of Gondokoro, from which place an embassy would then be sent to the court of Bunyoro. The equatorial kings were certain to "hail an opening for the products and manufactures of the world," consequently "the finest lands in the world would be open to Europe."[19]

Speke also saw another advantage in his scheme--that it would help in the suppression of the slave trade. Grafting the question of suppression of slavery and slave trade onto his imperial scheme, which no doubt brought the anti-slavers aboard, Speke argued that unless the armed gangs of the White Nile traders were checked, they would "annihilate the Kings of the Equator...in the same way as the Zanzibar Arab traders have dethroned the chief of Unyanyembe and established a colony of their own at Kaze."[20]

Speke's vision galvanized Isma'il into actions to extend Egyptian control over the region so as to preempt any European efforts. Thus soon after his interview with the travelers, Isma'il sent four steamers to patrol the White Nile. Furthermore, in November 1863, after a hurried visit to Cairo, the Governor-General, Musa Pasha Hamdi, trebled the tax on the White Nile trade. According to its European critics, this tax policy was undertaken with the aim of removing the remaining Western traders still involved in the White Nile trade. De Pruyssenaere was especially emphatic about the existence of such a plot to destroy European traders, citing various examples of discrimination in support of that assertion.[21]

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One should not dismiss the claims of these European critics as groundless, and this for the following reasons. First, once the government began contemplating the annexation of the Equatorial regions, it regarded the continuing presence of European traders in the region as possibly creating vested interests which western powers might want to translate into an imperial ambition.[22] Secondly, European traders were the main source of information filtering out to Europe about the Equatorial regions, and Cairo feared that this intelligence might be used to Egypt's own detriment. At least this was evident in the debate raging in Britain as to what method and who could best suppress slavery and the slave trade in the Sudan. The possibility that European powers might decide to obstruct or supplant Egypt in its imperial endeavor was at least implicit in that debate. That is, the discussion seriously questioned Egypt's sincerity or even ability to suppress slavery and the slave trade in the Sudan, thus implying that only a European power could be trusted to carry out the work.

The debate intensified after Samuel Baker arrived from his more than two years' exploration that led to the "discovery" of Lake Albert. Baker was outright in his condemnation of the Ottoman rulers in general and believed that Egypt was in favor of slavery. Arguing this point, he went on to say:

> I have never seen a Government official who did not in argument uphold slavery as an institution absolutely necessary to Egypt--thus any demonstration made against the slave-trade by the Government of that country will be simply a *pro forma* movement to blind the European Powers.[23]

Throughout his travels, Baker was always in the company of the White Nile traders, and he therefore knew a lot more about them and their activities and

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Baker was also contemptuous of oriental rule, believing it to be hopelessly incompetent. As a matter of fact, he thought that Egypt and Turkey themselves would be better off if they were brought under European government:

> ...there are no countries of the earth so valuable, or that would occupy so important a position in the family of nations, as Turkey...and Egypt under a civilized and Christian government. As the great highway to India, Egypt is the most interesting country to the English.[24]

Because of his fame and prestige, and because his books were popular with the British reading public and opinion-makers alike, Egyptian authorities naturally feared that Baker might influence British public opinion in favor of a British imperial intervention in the Equatorial region.[25] The viceroy quickly moved in personally to profit economically from the departure of the European traders. In May 1864 he founded the Aziziyya Company, a business in whose interest, well-being and management he took a personal interest by appointing the Crown Prince, Halim Pasha, as its president.[26] And while the company was founded expressly to trade in the Red Sea region, its operations secretly expanded to include the Upper White Nile region. Soon after his interview with Speke and Grant, Isma'il dispatched four steamers to Khartoum. And while the steamers actually belonged to the company, they were nonetheless represented as belonging to the Sudan government, thus reinforcing the European claim that the motivation of the policy was calculated not only to eject European traders, but also to benefit the viceroy personally.[27]

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Andrea de Bono was one of the few European subjects to survive the new regulations, and this for the following reasons. He was the first trader to penetrate and establish trading stations in what is today northern Uganda, which made him the sole proprietor of large areas in Madi and Acholi districts. By early 1863, he had penetrated Bunyoro and embroiled himself in the civil war there, siding with Rionga against King Kamurasi. He was apparently alone in exploiting these remote regions until the arrival there in early 1864 of Khurshid Aga's agent, Ibrahim. The latter also found it advantageous to his business to get embroiled in Bunyoro's civil war, taking the side of Kamurasi. In November 1864, Kamurasi rewarded Ibrahim by giving him more than 300 qantars of ivory. As Rionga's supporter, de Bono obviously required equally substantial amounts of ivory, which provided him with the wherewithal to meet the new tax requirements.

Secondly, de Bono had developed good working relations with the al-'Aqqad Company and eventually entered into partnership with it,[28] sometimes after the new policy went into effect, probably in 1864. And the driving force behind that business merger was probably the hostile local environment in which the two companies were operating but which they themselves had helped to create:

> As the two rival companies [i.e. de Bono's and al-'Aqqad's] had been forced to fraternize, owing to the now generally hostile attitude of the surrounding tribes, the[ir] leaders had become wonderfully polite, exchanging presents, getting drunk together upon raw spirits, and behaving in a brotherly manner--according to their ideas of fraternity.[29]

It is not important here to know if the merger was brought about by genuine business considerations. The point is that, since the al-'Aqqad Company was under the personal patronage of the viceroy himself, this political connection

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certainly benefited de Bono by giving him a close relationship with the establishment.[30]

But apart from that business association, or because of it, de Bono himself worked to accommodate to the Middle Eastern culture in general and to the Sudanese situation in particular. A sign of this self-adaptation is indicated by the fact that he was popularly known to fellow traders and to the establishment as Latif Effendi, a name given him probably in endearment. At any event, with most European traders pushed out, the stage was now cleared for the dominance of the White Nile trade by Arabs who included Abu Amuri, 'Aqqad, Idris Abtar, Wad Ibrahim, Shenuda, Khalil Shami, al-Busayli, Kutchuk 'Ali, Ghattas, and Muhammad 'Abd al-Samad.[31]

In 1865, the government introduced more taxes on the traders in the Southern Sudan. Some historians have interpreted this measure as one motivated primarily by the desire to suppress the slave trade, since, they argued, it forced some of the traders out of their zeribas. Indeed, among those affected was Andrea de Bono himself, who was thus forced to sell to the government all his zeribas, valued at £25,000, for the trifling sum of £5,000. Interestingly, after acquiring the stations, the government then turned around and leased de Bono's stations to the al-'Aqqad & Company at £3,000 per annum. Thus with de Bono's departure, the al-'Aqqad Company became the sole "proprietor" of the whole of Eastern Equatoria, whose area was estimated to be 90,000 square miles. To exploit this vast area, the al-'Aqqad Company established ten stations spanning its

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length and breadth, and over 30 steamers were used to bring in supplies and move out the proceeds to Khartoum.[32]

Nonetheless, the question remains: was the 1865 measure introduced to suppress the slave trade by dispossessing the traders of their zeribas? Indeed, while the measure had the effect of forcing out some of the traders, that outcome was not its intended objective. In my view, the primary motivation of the measure was fiscal. First, by 1865 the government was having budgetary problems resulting from overspending and even mismanagement, which in turn was due to an increase in the size of the army. Also, the newly acquired White Nile Province--predominantly Shilluk in its composition--became an expensive financial burden as the £15,000 collected in taxes from its native population proved inadequate to meet the cost of administration of that province. What is more, the government proved so inefficient in collecting taxes that, by 1865, £815,000 worth of taxes remained uncollected. Also, in 1865, a revolt by black troops broke out in Kassala, and the suppression of the revolt was costly. And the upshot of these financial difficulties was that the salary of many officials was six months in arrears. Indeed, the situation was so bad that Cairo felt obliged to send £130,000 in emergency aid. However, even this emergency fund proved quite insufficient, as it covered only the immediate budgetary needs.[33] In my opinion, these financial difficulties prompted the 1865 measure.

Second, had the introduction of taxes been motivated by the desire to suppress the slave trade, as Muhammad Fuad Shukry and Abbas Ibrahim Muhammad 'Ali claim, the government would not have leased abandoned stations

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to traders whose slaving credentials were well-established. Indeed, even as late as 1868, al-'Aqqad Company was known to be involved in slave trading. In that year, for example, the French Consul, Georges Thibaut, upon observing fifteen of his boats arriving in Khartoum bringing 800 qantars of ivory, commented: "... beau produits s'il n'était point taché de sang humain."[34] The extent of company-caused slave-trading and devastation of the country is well-documented in Baker's book, Ismailia. And yet it was to the al-'Aqqad company that the government decided to lease the stations it had acquired from de Bono.

Baker's Expedition and Annexation of Equatoria

The annexation of the Southern Sudan was one aspect of Isma'il's imperial design which extended to the annexation of the Somali Coast, the Nuba Mountains region, the acquisition of Massawa and Suakin through a lease from the Porte, and the planned but postponed invasion and annexation of Darfur.[35] Ironically, Samuel Baker, the very man who contemptuously dismissed oriental colonialism, was now appointed to head that very annexation effort. In early 1869, Baker was in Egypt as a member of the entourage of the Prince of Wales, who was invited to attend the celebrations marking the opening of the Suez Canal. Isma'il seized that opportunity to discuss his ideas with Baker, to whom he offered the leadership of an expedition to annex the Equatorial region. Baker accepted, and, on March 27, 1869, drew up the terms of his own contract of service with the Khedive. He began on April 1, 1869, and his contract was for a term of four years at £10,000 per annum.[36] On 5 April 1869, Baker wrote his brother John that:

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The viceroy was also generous with respect to supplies for the Expedition. Three steamers and two steel life-boats were ordered from England and commissioned for the expedition. Steam saw-mills, rockets, and Snyder ammunition, and £9,000 worth of tools, necessities and trade goods were also ordered. Also, 1,500 troops were put at Baker's disposal. Reflecting on the Viceroy's generosity, Baker noted in the same letter to John:

> I am to have any number (thousands if necessary) of troops as reinforcements, and I have a "carte blanche" for all expenses, appointment and everything pertaining to the expedition.[38]

The preamble setting forth the considerations that led to the decision to launch the expedition were contained in a firman which read as follows:

> We, Isma'il, Khedive of Egypt, considering the savage conditions of the tribes which inhabit the Nile Basin;
> Considering that neither government, nor laws, nor security exists in those countries;
> Considering that humanity enforces the suppression of the slave-hunters who occupy those countries in great numbers;...We have decreed and now decree as follows:-
> An expedition is organized to subdue to our authority the countries situated to the south of Gondokoro;
> To suppress the slave trade, to introduce a system of regular commerce...[39]

For most Egyptians, especially those connected with the affairs of their country, as well as for the ordinary citizen knowledgeable in world affairs, the proposed expedition caused great excitement, as it was yet another sign that their country was poised for a higher place in the assembly of nations. However, that excitement was not without uneasiness, one centered on the fact that the expedition was entrusted to a foreigner, a Christian for that matter. Significantly,

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the public utterance of this uneasy stirring came from the Governor-General of the Sudan himself, Ja'afar Mazhar Pasha. He submitted a report to the Khedive, pointing out the danger that lay in entrusting foreigners with important expeditions in Africa.[40] In spite of that opposition, Khedive Isma'il would not change his mind, and Samuel Baker proceeded to carry out his duties.

The expedition started off almost immediately. The advance column left Cairo in April, but it was not until the following January that Baker, bringing up the rear, finally arrived in Khartoum. When the governor-general was not able to get everything in place in time, Baker impatiently decided to leave for Gondokoro with a preliminary force of 800 men, 33 vessels and food supplies sufficient for seven months.

On February 8, 1870, Baker reached the sudd, an area of floating islands of papyrus and lichens that obstructs the river channel. Failing to cut their way through, the expedition withdrew to southern Shilluk (about 65 miles south of Fashoda) on April 2 and established a temporary station there. Baker called the station Tewfikeeyah (Tawfikiyya), a name given in honor of the Khedive's eldest son, Muhammad Tawfik Pasha.[41]

On September 15, 1870 Baker left for a brief visit to Khartoum, apparently to secure more supplies and boats. Expecting to find 30 vessels, he discovered that the governor-general had found only seven; nor had the steamers he had ordered from Cairo arrived. A disappointed Baker left Khartoum with what he had, called to and dismantled Tawfikiyya, and made for Gondokoro where he arrived on April 15, 1871.

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By then, Baker had used half the period of his contract, and he tried to hurry the gigantic task in the time left. His first task was to establish a garrison at Gondokoro, an endeavor in which he enlisted the support of Loro lo Loku, the Bari headman, a man wrongly referred to by Baker and subsequent writers as Alloron.[42] Baker named the garrison *Ismailia* (in honor Khedive Isma'il) and, on May 20, 1871, summoning his troops to a grand parade and ceremony, he formally proclaimed the annexation of Gondokoro. He then declared ivory a government monopoly and prohibited the slave trade.

Baker had a clear program for his province. Above all, he sought to *"crush the Slave Trade"* [his italics], establish a "powerful government throughout all those tribes now warring with each other," and to found a chain of trading stations "on the system adopted by the Hudson Bay Company." He also planned to establish a network of roads through corvée. In his own words, "tribute will be exacted in labour to be performed in opening-out roads, on the same principle as the road-tax in Ceylon."[43]

Above all, Baker was concerned about the economic viability of his province. Taking stock of his province's potential commercial resources, he listed "the natural productions [as] ivory, native flax, beeswax, and cotton," although he decided that agriculture was to be its economic backbone. The gist of this agricultural policy is contained in his letter to Lord Wharncliffe, in which he claimed that he hoped to effect:

> ...a vast improvement among the tribes...by the introduction of agriculture and commercial enterprise. I have large quantities of seeds of all kinds that would be adapted to the climate and soil of Central Africa, and that will confer a great blessing on the country.

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> No man shall be idle under my rule. If I free them from slavery, I shall insist upon their working for themselves. They will then desire to exchange their surplus produce for our manufacturers.[44]

Baker sought more than just the encouragement of general agriculture, but one centering on corn and cotton. To this end, he conceived of a policy which required that "every tribe...cultivate a certain amount of corn and cotton, in proportion to [its] population".[45] Thus shortly after arriving Gondokoro (Ismailia), and just as he had done in Tawfikiyya, he set his soldiers to clearing a piece of land and sowing it with various crops. And in order to encourage them to take farming seriously, Baker induced competition by promising to give prizes to those who could produce the finest specimens of vegetables. Even the domestic servants (both women and boys whom he had earlier liberated from slavery) were interested in the challenge.[46]

On paper, Baker's ideas on the economic development of his province were remarkably modern. He was influenced by the idea of "legitimate" commerce, which promoted the idea of development of agriculture as the best means of combating slavery in Africa. Baker came from a family with plantation estates in Jamaica and Mauritius, and it is possible that his idea of development through agriculture was influenced by that background.[47]

The implementation of Baker's general objectives, along with his agricultural policy, ran into great difficulties, however. The difficulties stemmed in large part from logistical problems, since the expedition was not able to secure its supplies in a timely fashion nor in sufficient quantities. And then there was the problem of crossing the sudd, which forced the expedition to camp in southern Shilluk for the better part of the year, and which drained the expedition's already meager

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resources. Apparently, this dire supply situation was a major consideration forcing Baker into an agreement with Abu Su'ud, the representative of the 'Aqqad Company.[48]

Unfortunately for Baker, the 'Aqqad Company did not fulfill its part of the deal, so that when the Expedition finally reached Gondokoro, logistical problems became even more acute. Because the locals would not sell him supplies Baker took them by force, just like his predecessors, the slave traders. Thus, on August 30, 1871, Baker led a force of 600 men on Bilinyang where, after a failed attempt to negotiate with the inhabitants, he proceeded to burn down the village. Supply problems nonetheless persisted, and by December the situation was such that the Deputy Commander of the force, Muhammad Ra'uf Pasha, suggested that the expedition should be abandoned. Baker decided, however, to raid Bari villages twelve miles south of Gondokoro and, in a month-long operation, secured provisions sufficient for over a year.[49]

But the major problem confronting Baker stemmed from the 'Aqqad Company, hitherto the sole government-authorized concern in the region. The leading spirit of the company was the ambitious and unscrupulous Abu Su'ud who, after the death of his father-in-law in 1871, became the sole representative of the Company in the Sudan. By 1869, the organization had an estimated 2,500 armed men serving the ten stations in this remote region. Abu Su'ud's hold over the area was so strong that he was referred by some of his followers as "Sultan."[50]

The basis for the company's hostility towards the expedition was two-fold. First, its primary objective was the suppression of the slave trade. Baker's

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contempt for slavery was solid and deep, and he believed that its suppression could only be achieved through a major reform of the White Nile trade itself. To this end, he opposed the government contract awarding sole trading rights in the province to 'Aqqad & Company, arguing that the contract recognized a formidable *imperium in imperio*. Perhaps fearing that this essentially political argument might not dissuade the Khedive, he added that the contract deprived the government of ivory which could immediately help defray the expenses of the Expedition. Since the Khedive would not revoke the company's contract, it was agreed that until its expiration on April 9, 1872, the 'Aqqad Company would be allowed to continue trading, provided that it paid its taxes.[51]

Other traders were also hostile to the Baker expedition. They exploited his need for supplies by blocking delivery, by influencing against the expedition, and the like, hoping that the expedition would run out of supplies and eventually be forced to withdraw to Khartoum.[52] Accordingly, avoiding Gondokoro, Abu Su'ud hastened to his stations in the south and even paid a quick visit to Masindi, capital of the kingdom of Bunyoro, where Baker believed Abu Su'ud sowed seeds of antipathy and hatred against the expedition.[53]

In spite of the obstacles, and to the obvious dismay of Abu Su'ud, on March 6, 1872, Baker and 212 troops eventually arrived at Patiko, where he left half of his force with most of his ammunition. He hurried on to Masindi, since the annexation of the Equatorial kingdoms was his central objective. During his first visit in Bunyoro in 1864/5, Baker had allied with king Kamurasi against Rionga. With Kamurasi's son, Kabarega, now on the throne, Baker naturally expected Kabarega

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to welcome him and support the objectives of the expedition. He hoped, especially, that Kabarega would welcome the opportunity to open up his kingdom to trade with Egypt. When Kabarega seemed to agree to all the objectives, on May 14 1872, Baker declared the annexation of Bunyoro.

Soon after the proclamation, however, it became apparent that Kabarega's apparent support of the expedition was based on his need to obtain support against the indomitable Rionga. When Baker would not agree, Kabalega attacked the expedition with 6,000 men. At first, Baker had the upper hand, beating back the enemy's initial assaults, but it soon became obvious that his small force was no match for his Bunyoro adversaries, and Baker ordered a retreat on June 14, 1872. Although subjected to harassment as it withdrew, the expedition finally reached Foweira on the Victoria Nile with amazingly few casualties.

Obviously this turn of events threatened Baker's plan, and he decided to overthrow Kabarega and replace him with Rionga. Baker therefore negotiated an alliance which was formalized in a *blood exchange* ceremony with the latter. Baker then proclaimed Rionga king of Bunyoro and declared him the legitimate representative of the Khedive. Leaving a force of 65 men with Rionga in Foweira, Baker left for Patiko.[54]

The saga of rebellion did not end there, however, for upon arriving at Patiko, Baker faced yet another rebellion, this time by the 200 of Abu Su'ud's armed men stationed there. Although outnumbered, Baker crushed the rebellion, killing half of the enemy force in the station, and confiscating 1,500 kantars of ivory worth £50,000. Compared to the high enemy casualties, Baker's force suffered

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only seven wounded. From that point on, he gained the military initiative over the armed bands of the 'Aqqad company, and was thus presented with an opportunity to realize his policy of expelling all the traders and their men from the province.

Surprisingly, Baker instead acted magnanimously towards his erstwhile enemies. His "greatest expedition of modern times" had been reduced into a puny force, and he badly needed reinforcements, more so in the light of the many serious local uprisings and rebellions in Bariland, Bunyoro and elsewhere. The solution to the problem as he saw it was to seek to coopt into his army as many of his erstwhile enemies as possible.

> If I had refused the enlistment of all immoral characters in the middle of Africa, I should have had what is now known in England as a skeleton regiment...In times of real weakness, it is frequently necessary to be severe...but after victory and success, I felt that an act of clemency might, even among half savages, be more binding than fetters.[55]

For their part, many of the impoverished renegades dreaded the idea of being forced to return to Khartoum with nothing to show for their sojourn in the South. Thus, of the 600 of Abu Su'ud's men in the stations of Fabbo, Faloro, and Farrangia, 312 joined Baker's army as irregulars. After a reinforcement of 280 men from Gondokoro arrived at Patiko, Baker's total force in the four stations rose to 620 men, enabling him to reinforce Rionga and take the offensive against Kabarega.[56]

On closer examination, however, it is apparent that Baker's expressed concern for his puny force was at best a secondary problem. He certainly needed a larger army than he had, but he did not have to abandon his long-advocated policy of expelling the traders and all their renegade soldiers from the province.

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Indeed, he could have achieved that very goal through a recruitment program among his many local supporters.[57] And yet Baker's rejection of the latter option clearly suggests that he had a different motive altogether.

It would seem, therefore, that in choosing to treat with his erstwhile enemies, Baker was most likely actuated by the daunting problem of maintaining effective control of the country. There was advantage to be had from his strategy of inclusion; the new men had a lot of experience about the country, which he sought to exploit. Baker argues that having in his army the very men who had formerly terrorized the country would somehow constitute a deterrent against any attempt at local rebellion. That is, their presence in the administration would be a constant reminder to the population that these men might once more assume oppressive control of the country should his benign administration be forced out through local rebellion.[58] Thus not only did Baker incorporate the renegades, but he also confirmed many of their high-ranking figures in responsible positions in government.

But in rejecting the opportunity to anchor his administration in local participation in the military, Baker, in addition to his deep distrust of the people, may have been also influenced by his racial prejudice. Declaring himself as no "nigger-worshipper," Baker shared many of the racial prejudices of his time. He seems even to have harbored the notion that Africans could only prosper under the tutelage of others, a thought which is apparent in the following remark: In no instance has he [the negro] evinced

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other than a retrogression, when once freed from restraint. Like a horse without harness, he runs wild, but, if harnessed, no animal is more useful.[59]

In the final analysis, therefore, Baker's change of policy had the effect of preserving many of the features of the system that existed under the traders. And because his efforts were confined to the stretch of territory along the Nile south of Gondokoro, his impact was not felt in outlying territories such as Latukaland or the Yei river districts. In these areas, the renegades continued to rule in their old ways. By the time Baker left office in April 1873, the administration he left behind marked only a slight improvement over the previous regime. This is probably what Richard Gray had in mind when, in assessing the impact of Baker's administration, he concluded:

> virtually all that Baker had accomplished was to effect the transfer of nominal sovereignty from Abu Su'ud to the government. Control over the scattered stations remained extremely slight...[60]

The Governorship of Colonel Charles Gordon

Charles George "Chinese" Gordon had no connections with Africa before his appointment by Khedive Isma'il to the position of Governor-General of Equatoria. However, by then Gordon had enjoyed a distinguished career in foreign service. For example, as a young captain in the Royal Engineers on loan to the Emperor of China, his suppression of the Taiping rebellion in 1864 made him an international figure. His personal charisma also commended him to the Egyptian government. Shortly after Baker's return to Cairo on the expiry of his duties, Egyptian authorities offered Gordon Equatoria, which he formally accepted on September 5, 1873, seeing it as a chance "to fight the slave trade."[61]

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Unlike Baker, Gordon did not have to contend with overcoming the formidable obstacles of the *sudd*, as shortly before his arrival the barrier had been cleared by an operation employing hundreds of soldiers under the direct supervision of the new Governor-General, Isma'il Ayub.[62] Thus, soon after arriving in Khartoum on March 13, 1874, Gordon made a quick get-acquainted visit to Gondokoro, arriving there in early April. His impressions were melancholic, for not only were the conditions of the troops stationed there appalling, but he also found that government, security, and revenue were non-existent.[63] Not surprisingly, upon returning to Khartoum, he clashed with the Governor-General over finance, and left Equatoria. After the disappointed visit to Khartoum, Gordon returned to Gondokoro in September, determined to make do with the resources at his disposal.

At first, his primary objectives was to open up Lake Albert to modern navigation, and then to press forward and secure communication with the kingdom of Buganda in order to capture its ivory trade "at present almost entirely directed through Zanzibar."[64] However, since the security situation in the province was inadequate to permit a rapid advance, Gordon decided to stabilize authority. In Gondokoro, for example, Gordon's power was confined to a radius of half a mile, a situation which he must have found particularly piquing, considering the fact that the town was the headquarters of the province.

He adopted a two-pronged approach to the problem: on the one hand, he had to establish a chain of stations along the Nile so as to secure safe lines of communication;[65] on the other, he needed to adopt a fair but firm policy towards

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the people with a view to establishing security and tranquility in the province, especially Bariland. Gordon proceeded therefore to establish two more stations in Bariland: Lado (which eventually replaced Gondokoro as the capital of the province in 1876) and Rejaf. And as he built further stations to the south, he followed a blend of toughness and leniency towards the Bari. Thus, he was as ready to take punitive action against them as make lenient gestures such as giving presents or returning some of the captured cattle. This policy secured the desired results, so that by July 1875, it was possible for an individual to travel safely between Gondokoro and Kirri.[66] However, sporadic resistance continued in southern Bari, especially in the Mugiri area. And on August 4, in what was probably one of their most successful attacks, Mugiri routed a detachment of Gordon's elite soldiers, killing all but four, but including the commander Linant de Bellefonds.[67]

In spite of these sporadic rebellions, Gordon gradually extended government control with each established station, but he continued to face the problem of securing provisions for his troops. Gordon was well aware of Baker's frustrations in this regard, and in order to avoid his predecessor's use of force, he tried two short-term remedies. The first was to establish a regular communication line between his province and Khartoum, and the second was to introduce taxation-in-kind to support the troops. Meanwhile, economic policies would be pursued that would spur local production, so that in time the government would be able to secure its necessities locally.

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Unfortunately for Gordon, the realities of the situation did not meet his expectations. For one thing, communication with Khartoum remained irregular, and secondly, there was still much resistance to the government, so that the taxation base was both relatively small and unstable. Thus, Gordon himself had to resort to force, rendering the security situation tenuous and ultimately undermining the establishment of orderly government and progressive policies. For example, Gordon had attempted to introduce coinage, whose objective was to create a new pattern of social relations that would, in his opinion, free the people from the crippling control of the chiefs. In his words, the innovation would undermine "the feudal system of chiefs [by letting] their subjects see that they can stand on their own feet."[68] However, this far-sighted policy was doomed to failure, for its ultimate success depended upon adequate security.

But Gordon's failure was not entirely due to the insubordination of the local peoples; the boisterous and the arbitrary ways of his soldiers and officials were also a major contributing factor. For example, the soldiers would rather confiscate ivory than buy it, and they were brutal toward the people. Thus, the officer in charge of Dufile station was caught abusing his native interpreters, and Wad el-Mak hung a native chief for not supplying him with porters. Finding that few of the officials cared or sympathized with the concept of fostering economic development or of establishing a system of justice over the "pagan" tribes beyond the immediate bounds of the station communities, Gordon, in a note of frustration and despair, commented that the soldiers "are about as likely to civilise these parts as they are to civilise the moon." Nevertheless, Gordon tried hard to bring discipline to his

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> ...I can do nothing more...and even if I did, I could not expect to change the habits of the officers etc. or of the natives. I feel it would be better for them to work out the problem of how to live together by themselves.[69]

This comment suggests that Gordon had thrown in the towel, and considering the superior military power his unruly officials and soldiers wielded, this resignation meant, in effect that, the establishment of an orderly administration in the province would continue to be a major problem.

In February 1877, Gordon was appointed Governor-General of the Sudan and left Equatoria. He was followed in rapid succession by the Americans Henry Goslee Prout and Alexander McComb Mason both of whom became sick and retired, and by August 1877, Ibrahim Fawzi, an Egyptian. Naturally, the turnover undermined what little administrative order there was in the province. Reports of flagrant abuse of power by local officials were rife. And even the governor himself, Ibrahim Fawzi, was caught exporting slaves in government steamers. Gordon reacted promptly to this somber news, and in October dismissed Fawzi, replacing him with Emin Pasha.

The Governorship of Emin Pasha

A Silesian Jew born in 1840 as Eduard Schnitzer, Amin Pasha had studied medicine in Germany and entered the Ottoman service, serving as a medical officer in Albania and Asia Minor for nine years before arriving Khartoum in 1875. Proclaiming himself a Turk and Muslim with the name Emin, he was in 1876 appointed Chief Medical Officer for Equatorial province where he was sent to serve

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under Gordon. Even as he was in the medical service, Emin successfully undertook diplomatic missions to Mutesa and Kabalega on behalf of his new Governor, Henry G. Prout. A man with gentle and patient manners, Emin was far better attuned than most of his European predecessors to work under a Middle Eastern government in Africa.[70]

Emin conceived of his responsibilities primarily in terms of promoting the economic development of his province based on two fundamental and interrelated factors. He worked to promote agriculture as the backbone of the economy. He was already experimenting with rice which he introduced from Buganda. He also promoted the cultivation of maize, coffee, cotton, and sugar, and encouraged the collection of Indian rubber. His second goal was to build communications, without which he could not see how any development could be sustained. Emin Pasha's dreams were not to be realized: first, the Nile became blocked with the *sudd*, and for eighteen months (1878-1880) there was no delivery of badly-needed supplies, placing great strains on the administration. Second, the Egyptian government began experiencing serious financial problems, to the extent that it necessitated the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry in early 1878. Gordon, who served on the commission, soon became acutely aware of the looming problem and, in efforts to reduce government expenditure, ordered the evacuation of stations on the Victoria Nile.[71]

Cut off from Khartoum by the *sudd* as he was, the looming financial problem may not have been apparent to Emin Pasha in Equatoria. However, the crisis soon revealed itself in the form of dramatically reduced numbers of steamers

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arriving at Lado, when the blockage of the *sudd* finally subsided in 1880. Indeed, from 1880 until the fall of Khartoum to the Mahdists in 1885, only a total of nine boats arrived, and three carried no merchandise at all. The new average of less than two boats annually, sharply contrasted with the past when tens of boats visited the province annually. Obviously the small number revealed a major reduction of financial and material support for the province, which inevitably imposed severe constraints on Emin Pasha's ability effectively to govern and implement his economic policies.

Meanwhile, the province generally experienced relative peace, thanks to the government monopoly over ivory. Although initiated by Samuel Baker, it was not until Gordon's rule that the monopoly was fully enforced, and the remnants of the traders forced out of the province. Thus in areas where the traders had been influential, the evictions removed a major source of friction and provided the opportunity for ethnic groups to recover from the chaos of the past decades.

This reconstitution allowed for better articulation of local interests and their harmonization with those of government stations. A measure of quiet and discipline began to settle in the province and, coupled with diplomacy, led to the expansion of government influence. Emin Pasha was the beneficiary of the long-term consequence of Baker's ivory policy, for which he took credit. But beyond this emerging core, however, violent expeditions continued to be the form of expansion, into the lands of the Lango and Buya in the east, and of the Kaliko to the west.[72]

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Although generally frustrated by declining financial support from Khartoum and by security problems that every so often ruffled the province's façade of tranquility, Emin Pasha was determined to establish the administration on a firmer footing. He was confident that this was both possible and worthwhile, especially in the light of the surplus of £5-6,000 that he was able to realize in his budget. With this determination in mind, he left for Khartoum in February 1882, intending to secure for his province the same autonomous powers that it had enjoyed under Baker and Gordon.

His dreams were not to be: the Mahdist revolution had broken out the previous August, and in the early skirmishes with government forces, the "dervishes" prevailed. Emin Pasha was, of course, unaware of these events, as he was far away in his relatively isolated Equatorial province. In fact, he did not learn of the Mahdists until he reached Sobat station while en route to Khartoum. As the rebellion cast its ominous shadow across the landscape, thus portending bad things to come, it became clear that suppressing the rebellion was going to be the main preoccupation of the government.

Emin Pasha's visit to Khartoum did not therefore accomplish much, and the obviously disappointed governor returned to his province to work with local resources. At first, and even though the rebellion was moving into the Bahr el-Ghazal, it did not influence Equatoria. Indeed, the province even posted another profit of £12,000 in 1883, thus strengthening the sense of relative tranquility prevailing there.[73] But before long, the contagion of rebellion caught on, forever

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1. Muhammad Fuad Shukry, Equatoria Under Egyptian Rule; The Unpublished Correspondence of Colonel (afterwards Major-Gen.) C. G. Gordon with Ismail Khedive of Egypt and the Sudan During the Years 1874-1876 (Cairo: Cairo University Press, 1953), 19. Egypt also used the pretext of suppressing the slave trade to annex nearly the whole of the west coast of the Red Sea and part of the Somali coast up to Ras Hafoun. See Reda Mowafi, Slavery, Slave Trade and Abolition Attempt, 76-80.

2. Foremost among these Egyptian and Sudanese historians are Muhammad Fuad Shukry, in his The Khedive Isma'il and Slavery in the Sudan (Cairo: Librairie la Renaissance d'Egypte, 1938) and; Abbas Ibrahim Muhammad 'Ali, The British, the Slave trade and Slavery in the Sudan (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1972).

3. This turning point was certainly significant, because it was in that same year that slavery in the Ottoman empire was officially abolished. However, although Egypt was a part of the Ottoman empire, the edict did not apply because of the special status and autonomy she enjoyed within the empire. This relationship was finally regularized by three Firmans issued by the Porte in 1841, and supported by European powers.

4. Buxton followed up by publishing two books on the subject. Thomas Buxton had, by 1835, succeeded Sir William Wilberforce as leader of the humanitarian faction in Parliament. In the years 1835-7, he served as chairman of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on slavery and slave trade. Among his books were The African Slave Trade (London: 1839), and The Remedy, Being a Sequel to the African Slave Trade (London: 1840).

5. John Bowring, Report on Egypt and Candia, P.P. (1840), 100 and cited by Abbas Ibrahim in his The British, the Slave Trade and Slavery, 11.

6. Abbas Ibrahim The British, the Slave Trade and Slavery, 17.

7. Abbas Muhammad, op. cit., 19.

8. The value of Egypt hinged on its strategic importance as the communication lane between East and West. In fact, the

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19. Cited

20. Gray,

21. Ibid.
127-8.

origins of the Suez Canal can be traced to when France sought to undertake its construction. To counter the offer, Britain proposed instead the building of two railway lines, one connecting Alexandria and the town of Suez, and the other connecting Alexandria, Cairo and Upper Egypt.

9. Richard L. Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 1820-1881, 84-85, and 87-88.

10. Richard Hill, Ibid., 84-89 and; Muhammad Fuad Shukry, Khedive Isma'il and Slavery, 96.

11. Richard Gray, History, 74-5.

12. Quoted in Gray, Ibid., 52. The question of Sa'id's order is also mentioned in Muhammad Fuad Shukry, Khedive Isma'il, 115-121 and; Abbas Ibrahim, 19-20.

13. Mr. and Mrs. Petherick, Travels in Central Africa, Vol. I, 142.

14. Gray, History, 76.

15. The debate is generally rendered, if perhaps simplistically, between the pro-slavery South and anti-slavery North. Obviously, the issues at stake were more complex than that. Perhaps the best work encapsulating this debate is Eric Foner's Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men; The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (London: Oxford University Press, 1979 edition).

16. In this historic expedition to "discover" the source of the Nile river, Speke and Grant traveled overland from Zanzibar to the source of the river at Ripon Falls. From there, except for some stretches, they followed the Nile northwards until Gondokoro, where they boarded a steamer to Khartoum and then to Cairo.

17. Quoted in Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa (London: 1952), 29.

18. Quoted in Richard Gray, History, 80.

19. Cited in Gray, Ibid., 80-81.

20. Gray, History, op. cit.

21. Ibid., 82 and; Muhammad Fuad Shukry, Khedive Isma'il, 127-8.

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23. Samuel B
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24. Ibid., Vo

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22. Such apprehension could be read into the growing pressure on the government from some of the European consuls or consular agents regarding the issue of slavery and slave trade in the Sudan.

23. Samuel Baker, Albert N'Yanza, Vol. II, (1962 edition) 517.

24. Ibid., Vol. I, xxix

25. Baker's two books, Albert N'Yanza, and The Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia and the Sword of the Hamran Arabs (London, 1874), enjoyed "best seller" list for a long time. In fact, the former book ran into three editions and was reprinted at frequent intervals afterwards.

26. Muhammad Fuad Shukry, Khedive Isma'il, 138.

27. Most of the European traders found the new imposts too high to pay and left the Sudan. Only Andrea de Bono and the Poncet brothers, Jules and Ambroise, complied. But by the time the policy was effected, however, the European trading presence in the Sudan had begun to wane. For example, Antoine Brun-Rollet, Alphonse de Malzac, Jean-Alexandre Vayssière and Jeremy Barthelemy all succumbed to the "murderous climate" of the Sudan. And of all the European traders, only Binder and Lafargue retired with comfortable profits. For details, see Gray, History, 72; and Muhammad Fuad Shukry, Khedive Isma'il, 138, 142, and 144-5.

28. Regarding this partnership, see Andrea de Bono's biographical information in, Richard Hill, A Biographical Dictionary of the Sudan (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 110-111.

29. Baker, Albert N'Yanza, Vol. II, 483 and 488.

30. Regarding the friendly relationship between the viceroy and Musa Bey al-'Aqqad, see Gray, Southern Sudan, 52. The 'Aqqad & Co. had a long trading history in the Sudan, with four of the family's prominent members involved: Hassan Musa al-'Aqqad, Muhammad Ahmad al-'Aqqad, Muhammad abu Su'ud Bey al-'Aqqad (who was also a high-ranking government official in the Sudan), and Musa Bey al-'Aqqad (also a high-ranking Sudanese government official). In terms of its White Nile operations, the company's most important agent there was Khurshid Aga. For biographical information on these individuals and also on Andrea de Bono himself, see Hill, Biographical Dictionary

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31. Importantly, however, only al-'Aqqad and de Bono himself were operating in Eastern Equatoria, while the rest of the traders were in the Bahr el-Ghazal. Inexplicably, however, although the motivation of the measure was the suppression of the slave trade, it was directed only at traders whose main route was the White Nile, rather than at all the Khartoumer merchants at work in the Southern Sudan as a whole. The result of this omission was that the overland trade routes extending from Kordofan into central and western Bahr el-Ghazal which were dominated mostly by Sudanese traders, were generally unaffected by the measure. Whether or not this lapse ultimately contributed to the rise of powerful Sudanese traders, such as Zubeir Rahma, is a possibility that needs to be examined.

32. Gray, History, 84-5. Muhammad Fuad Shukry, Khedive Isma'il, 141-42, and 145-48.

33. Regarding the details of these financial problems, see Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 112. Also, Muhammad Fuad Shukry, Khedive Isma'il, 140-1.

34. Gray, History, 84-5.

35. Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 134-5

36. Muhammad Fuad Shukry, Khedive Isma'il, 160 and 162.

37. B. MSS. S.W.B. to John Baker, 5/IV/69, as quoted in Gray, History, 87.

38. Quoted in Gray, History, 89-90.

39. Samuel Baker, Isma'ilia, A Narrative of the Expedition to Central Africa for the Suppression of the Slave Trade Organized by Isma'il, Khedive of Egypt (London: MacMillan & Co., 1890), pp. 3-4. Also, Muhammad Fuad Shukry, Khedive Isma'il, 161-162.

40. Muhammad Fuad Shukry, Khedive Isma'il, 156.

41. For details of the struggle with the sudd, see Baker's Ismailia, 17-32.

42. For the real name of Alloron, see A.C. Beaton, "A Chapter in Bari History," in Sudan Notes and Records (1934), 189. In Bari, the term "aloron" means "bad." Now, Baker and/or the traders may have inadvertently rendered "Loro" as "Alloron." Or, more likely, Baker may have deliberately distorted the name into "Alloron" as a way of discrediting

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43. Baker to
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44. Ibid.

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46. Baker,

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him after the headman had deserted him and joined hands with the Expedition's arch-enemy, Abu Su'ud. If so, Loro lo Loku must have been proud to wear the name as a sobriquet.

43. Baker to Lord Wharncliffe, 22/X/69, in T.D. Murray and A.S. White, Sir Samuel Baker. A Memoir (London: 1895), 150-53. The policy of substituting labor in lieu of cash taxes was not only practiced in Ceylon but also in parts of Turco-Egyptian Sudan, especially in Berber province under its native Sudanese governor, Husayn Bey Khalifa al-'Abbadi. Interestingly enough, it was also practiced by many European colonial administrators in Africa early in the twentieth century.

44. Ibid.

45. Baker to Lord Wharncliffe, Ibid.

46. Baker, Ismailia, 111-12.

47. Gray, Southern Sudan, 87-8.

48. This forced settlement at "Tawfikiyya" and the expenditure of the meager resources it necessitated must have made Baker realize the stark reality of the supply problem confronting the Expedition. This difficulty may have been the underlying reason for his brisk trip to Khartoum for the purpose of securing more supplies from the government. Having failed, however, Baker was forced into an agreement with the al-'Aqqad Company whereby the latter was to furnish the Expedition with its food requirements. Otherwise, the possibility of calling off the expedition was real.

49. To make sure the provisions would last that long, Baker sent back to Khartoum 800 ill and demoralized soldiers with 300 "dependents," leaving 500 behind. With this force, he was able to attempt the rest of his program. See Gray, History, 96-7.

50. For details of the relations between Baker and the al-'Aqqad Company, see Baker, Ismailia, Vol. I, 140, 150, 156-58, and Vol. II, 139-41. Also, Murray and White, Samuel Baker, 222; and Muhammad Fuad Shukry, Khedive Isma'il, 148-9.

51. Gray, History, 99.

52. According to the agreement, the company was to supply Baker with provisions and, in the event of war with the

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Vol. I, pp.
Isma'il, 167-9

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55. Ibid., 41

56. Ibid., 4

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natives, it was to support the expedition with 1,800 irregulars. Thus when Abu Su'ud reached Gondokoro in June 1871, he knew exactly what tactics to adopt against the expedition--to starve it of supplies. See Baker, Ismailia, Vol. I, pp. 159-60 and; Muhammad Fuad Shukry, Khedive Isma'il, 167-8.

53. Baker, Ismailia, 403 and 406.

54. Late that year Rionga, supported by the detachment and Lango contingents, attacked and, at least temporarily, defeated Kabarega, forcing him into refuge in a remote part of the kingdom. For details on this, see Baker's Ismailia, 403-5, and 432.

55. Ibid., 427.

56. Ibid., 423, 450-52.

57. For, if that was indeed his main concern, he could have drawn recruits from the many local populations that supported his administration. According Baker, the Acholi of Patiko and indeed the chiefdom of Payira in general under Rwot Jarma, were very supportive of his government. If so, they would have been more than willing to serve their "liberator."

58. Baker, Ismailia, 416-429. Indeed, in his contract with the al-'Aqqad Company, the latter was not only to supply Baker with provisions, but also to "provide him with 1,800 irregular troops in case of war with the negroes." See Reda Mowafi, Slavery, Slave Trade and Abolition Attempt, 70

59. Baker, Albert N'Yanza, 211. In the same chapter, Baker comments at length on what he perceives as the character and personality trait of the black man, and his views betray him as indeed sharing a lot in common with his pro-slavery contemporaries. Inter alia, he had this to say: "The negro has been, and still is, thoroughly misunderstood. However severely we may condemn the horrible system of slavery, the results of emancipation have proved that the negro does not appreciate the blessings of freedom, nor does he show the slightest feeling of gratitude to the hand that broke the rivets of his fetters." He also reached the conclusion that the black man was "imbued with a deadly hatred for the white men." see Ibid., pp. 208-216.

In fairness to Baker, it has to be pointed out that he recorded these views four years prior to his expedition, and was largely talking from a historical point of view. Even then, there is no indication that experience changed them.

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61. Ibid., 1

62. Shukry,

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64. Gray, Ib

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This racial factor may have been an important consideration in his refusal to recruit locals into his army.

60. Gray, History, 103.

61. Ibid., 104-5.

62. Shukry, Equatoria Under Egyptian Rule, 29

63. Gray, History, 106.

64. Gray, Ibid., 107.

65. By the time Samuel Baker left Equatoria in 1874, his original force of 1,800 had been reduced to 500, and all of them were stationed nearly in the three stations of Gondokoro, Fatiko, and Foweira. By December 1874 Gordon expanded the force to 1,885, distributed as follows: Foweira with 100 regulars, 100 irregulars; Fatiko (250 with 100); Dufile (100 reg.); Labore (60 reg.); Rejaf (8 reg.); Makaraka (20 with 300); Lado (180 with 50); Latuka (100 with 100); Bohr (10 with 150); Rabatchambé (30 with 150); Nasr (100 irreg.); and Sobat (25 with 50). See Shukry, Equatoria Under Egyptian Rule, 40

66. Gray, 107-9.

67. The detachment itself consisted of most of Baker's former elite unit, "The Forty Thieves." See Gray, p. 111. Also Baker, Ismailia, footnote no. 1, 423-4

68. Gray, History, 109.

69. Gray, Ibid., 114. G.B. Hill (edit.) Colonel Gordon in Central Africa, 1874-1879 (London: 1881), 123 and 139.

70. Gray, History, 135-8.

71. Emin Pasha re-established the stations on the Victoria Nile in 1880, after Gordon ceased to be Governor-General, probably in efforts to attract and promote trade between his territory and the kingdoms of Bunyoro and Buganda. Ibid., p. 146.

72. Even though the capital of the province had been moved to Lado, chief Alloton of Gondokoro, despite his past hostility to the government, proved particularly helpful in this expansion process. For example, he successfully persuaded chiefs Bepo and Rugong of Bilinyang and Liria respectively to cooperate with the government. Other local

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73. Ibid., 1

chiefs in the province did the same and/or even agreed to pay grain tax, e.g. among the Bari, Latuka, Pajulu, etc. Others even requested the establishment of a station in their areas. See Gray, 138-146.

73. Ibid., 154-60.

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CHAPTER SIX

EAST EQUATORIA AND THE END OF THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN COLONIAL RULE

The late 1870s and early 1880s were particularly difficult years for both Egypt and the Sudan. For the former, imperial expansion both in the Sudan and along the Red Sea coast became a costly exercise. And then there were the huge debts incurred in the building of the Suez Canal. Finally, there was the war with Ethiopia in 1877, which was both indecisive and expensive. Egypt consequently began to experience serious economic and financial problems. Indeed, even as early as 1875, debt repayment became increasingly difficult.[1] In reaction, creditor countries and bondholders established the "Caisse de la Dette," composed of the representatives of Britain, France, Italy, and Austria. In turn, the "Caisse de la Dette" established the "Dual Control," composed of Britain and France, whose duty was to supervise Egypt's revenue and expenditure and to insure the repayment of Egypt's international debt. The foreign control evoked nationalist resentment and ultimately led to the 'Urabi rebellion in 1882.

With regards to the Sudan, substantial resources were expended on suppressing the rebellion in Bahr el-Ghazal of Sulayman w. al-Zubayr and his allied slave traders. The rising broke out in July 1877, and was not crushed until 1879. At about the same time another rebellion erupted in Darfur under a pretender to the sultanate, and it stemmed from discontent with increased taxes. Although it was suppressed, other disturbances, however, broke out again in

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Darfur and Kordofan in 1879. And finally, the Mahdist revolution, which began in June 1881, eventually culminated in the overthrow of the Turco-Egyptian regime in the Sudan in 1885.[2] Naturally, suppression entailed high government expenditure, eating up resources and thus hamstringing any effective administration of the colony, especially in such remote provinces as Bahr el-Ghazal and Equatoria. Furthermore, in the six years preceding the fall of Khartoum, nine steamers arrived in Lado, and, of these, three brought no merchandise at all.[3]

The growing inability of the state to support its administration in Equatoria forced soldiers and government employees into dependence on local populations for necessities. Second, the decrease in trade-goods also hurt the economy of the province, and especially its revenues. Trade-goods long had become an important medium of exchange to secure ivory and other important local products. The government used them to pay its employees, who used them to purchase their necessities from traders or, more likely, from local producers. To this extent, therefore, the trade-goods were vital, not only for local trade but also for the province's revenues.

Their importance went beyond their commercial value into the political sphere. That is, they were used by the administration for creating and maintaining a network of patronage relations between the government and the local peoples through their chiefs. The government would give loyal chiefs privileged access to the trade-goods, and, in turn, the chiefs would use the merchandise to secure and maintain a network of local followers, or for paying and/or rewarding their services. To this extent, therefore, the trade-goods were essential for local political stability.

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Emin Pasha himself admitted the political importance of this kind of patronage when he said:

> If my eventual successor does not interact with the chiefs the way I do, he will have a very difficult time, since all the chiefs...feel personal loyalty towards me because I am generous to them and I take care of them from my own pocket at times when the government has no money.[4]

In the final analysis, therefore, because these trade-goods were indispensable to the economic well-being and political stability of the province, their growing scarcity had far-reaching consequences. In order to appreciate and better gauge its overall impact, it is important to look in some detail at the system of payment and provisioning adopted by the government in the South for its employees.

The administration wanted to avoid the logistical problems that nearly destroyed Samuel Baker's expedition. The government therefore sought its own food sources rather than to rely on the people, so to avoid conflict. Accordingly, a serious attempt was made under Charles Gordon to secure food from government stores in Khartoum. And in the event securing adequate supplies from Khartoum proved difficult, the next step was for the government to buy them locally. By Emin's time, however, this plan was carried a step further. That is, many of the local populations had submitted to the government, thus making it possible to introduce taxation (tribute) which was to be paid in food products. Its structure was apparently simple, and at its most ideal, it operated as follows:

> The owner of each hut was ... to pay a small basket of corn to [the] government, and this tax was collected twice a year. Small parties of soldiers commanded by some scoundrel of an officer would from time to time go out to collect it.[5]

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In practice, however, few government stations succeeded in obtaining supplies this way, but in 1888 Muggi came close. The success there was due to the genius of Abdullah Agha Manzal, the district chief whom Mounteney-Jephson praised for his intelligence, honesty, and integrity. Manzal was the only district administrator able to protect his people from being robbed by his own soldiers. Many local Bari consequently sought protection in his territory, where large herds of cattle could be found, and the land was extensively cultivated.[6]

This better situation in Muggi in 1888 can also be extended farther back in time to the core stations in Makaraka district in 1878, where Wilhelm Junker had been for over a year exploring and mapping. Junker thought that Makaraka was then the best district in Equatoria province, both for its political stability and economic prosperity, thanks to the cooperation and industry of its people and their chief, Ringio. No doubt, this prosperity was in no small measure due to the productivity of the land. Thus, whereas officials in less productive lands had to depend on tribute and plunder, in Makaraka stations officials put their large households and dependents into agricultural production. The resulting produce more than compensated for any shortfall of rations from tribute/taxes. Indeed, Junker's impression of Wandi in 1877, could also apply to most of the stations in Makaraka district:

> Wandi presents an agreeable contrast to the Nile *zeribas*, being much more openly built in the midst of extensive plantations, and surrounded by slight enclosures, calculated more for protection against the nightly visit of hyenas than against the attacks of hostile population.[7]

In some situations, however, the equilibrium between the garrisons and the surrounding community seems to have been partly due to delicately balanced

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power relations. Such an equilibrium was certainly the case in the Lohila and Tirrangore stations in Latuka district. In 1880 Lohila became a station garrisoned by 20 men, whereas Tirrangore was a station dating back to the early days of Gordon's governorship. As for Loronyo, which Emin mentions as a station, it is not at all clear that there was a garrison there. At any rate, the few soldiers were not in a position to indulge in extortion; instead, they probably preferred to supplement their income by farming. Indeed, it is clear from Emin's report on his visit to Latuka district in 1881, that the community was very well-disposed to the administration, but that the soldiers themselves, both in Lohila and Tirrangore, produced at least part of their own food.[8]

By contrast, the worse abuses of the tribute system were perpetrated in stations where relations with the natives were not friendly, or where the balance of power tipped in favor of the soldiers. In this type of political environment, conditions were not generally stable enough to allow the soldiers and officials to carry on with any significant amount of farming. Consequently, it was not possible to practice the ideal tribute system, and raiding (*ghazwa*) became the principal means of securing food and other types of necessities for the stations. However, as the population submitted and the situation stabilized, the territory was incorporated into the administrative structure and accordingly became less subject to the *ghazwa*. By then, it was time to move further afield and repeat the process of conquest.[9]

There were other approaches to tribute collection, as, for example, that of Lado, which was observed by Junker in 1878:

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> ....Corn, which formed the staple of the food supplies, was given out in regular rations to the soldiers from the stores at each station; officials received, when feasible, a corresponding amount of meat every day, and the soldiers every second, fourth or sixth day according to the number of cattle at disposal....When the tribute of the dependent negroes (nominally a fixed one) was insufficient, the quantity was made up by plundering the free [i.e. not yet annexed] negroes. At times there were 1,000 to 1,500 *ardeb* of *durra* in the stores at Lado, enough to cover the government rations for from three to five months, but far from sufficient for the whole consumption of many households, which counted their servants and slaves by the dozens... [10]

It is important to bear in mind that because Lado was a riverine provincial capital, it was therefore in some frequent contact with Khartoum. Provincial capitals (Fashoda being one of them) frequently received supplies from Khartoum, which significantly supplemented those from tribute and/or plunder. Second, because they were also the seat of the provincial government, the presence of the governor had a restraining influence, mitigating the usually harsh encounter between the government and the local peoples. This was certainly true with respect to Gordon and Emin, and the state of affairs in Equatoria was generally better than, say, in Bahr el-Ghazal or the White Nile province.

Available evidence indicates that payment was mostly in kind; at least this was the case in remote provinces, especially in the South. The articles given in payment had local value and could thus be used in barter with the people or with the traders. Through barter, government employees hoped to supplement their inadequate rations. The exceptions to payments in lieu of cash were only a tiny few, mostly Europeans and, probably, some of the high ranking Egyptian and Sudanese officials. Even then, the cash payments were rarely remitted to them directly but were deposited in their "bank accounts" in Khartoum.

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Put together, this payment system operated as follows: necessary provisions such as cloth and articles for barter were provided by the government and were issued to the soldiers at the discretion of the authorities. The system required regular shipments from Khartoum, which were dependent on a regular steamer service. The usually irregular service meant that government stores in remote provinces remained for the most part empty, and employees there were almost always in arrears. Not surprisingly, the arrival of a steamer bringing in the awaited wares and provisions became an important occasion, as Junker notes:

> On the arrival of a ship, the officials received at the discretion of the *mudirs* and governors something in lieu of pay, in proportion to the available goods or to the wealth of the recipient, and his account was charged with the value set by the government upon the goods received. The value so charged was invariably higher than the market value in Khartoum.[11]

Riverain stations were the first to be paid, while the hinterland stations would have to wait until, presumably, there were leftovers. This meant that payment problems were generally much worse there compared to riverine stations for two main reasons: first, their contact with the provincial capital depended to a large extent on weather conditions. In some areas, for example, rivers and streams were so swollen and the land so flooded that travel became virtually impossible. And even where travel was possible, it was not wise to expose the wares to rain and thus risk their ruin. Second, even if the weather were not a major factor, organizing the requisite number of porters during the rainy season was difficult, since most of the local population was preoccupied with agriculture.[12] The upshot of all these obstacles was that commodities remained in store in Lado until the dry season when they would be portered to their respective destinations.

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The hinterland stations consequently tended to depend almost entirely on tribute and/or plunder for their support. Once again Junker is on target when he said:

> As the government never sent a sufficient supply of wares into the negro districts, the demands of the officials could never be fully met....In fact the government was often in debt for years for the salaries of some of the officials in the more distant stations, who were enabled to meet their immediate wants by fleecing the neighbouring negroes without any interference on the part of their superiors.[13]

But, as already discussed, where it was not possible to extort because of the local military balance, officials had no option but to farm their own food.

Nevertheless, the overall picture is that of an administration whose basis, even by the end of the first decade of its rule, was at best shaky. That is, despite its long presence in the region, the government was not able to effect locally a significant social change on which to anchor its rule. It was therefore still struggling uneasily to establish its administrative bases. The major determinant of this variegation was the supply situation. Where contact with Khartoum was substantial, the government was able to satisfy its material needs. That is, the linkage with Khartoum made it possible for the government to build relations with the peoples on a less coercive or exploitative basis.

But where linkage with Khartoum was weak, supply was inadequate or even nonexistent, reliance on coercion and exploitation increased in proportion. In the final analysis, therefore, a situation of increased or continuing material and financial support from Khartoum was critical to the success and well-being of the government in remote provinces. The blockage of the Nile and the attendant decreasing support from Khartoum beginning in the late 1870s, therefore had far-

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reaching consequences for the administration in remote provinces, especially those in the Southern Sudan. It is to the effects of this that we must now turn.

Economic Consequences of the Blockage

The severe scarcities of necessities brought on by the blockage of the Nile, as well as by decreasing support from Khartoum, had far-reaching consequences for the survival of the regime in Equatoria. The government was now caught up in a situation where it had increasingly to live off its subject populations. First, this meant a rise in taxes (tribute) to offset the shortfall of supplies from Khartoum. Increased taxation drew local resistance, which in turn worsened the supply situation. Tax collectors became increasingly impatient, and the result was that many of the restraints on the collection of the tribute-taxes were thrown to the winds, thereby opening the tribute system to more and more abuse. In 1888, Mounteney-Jephson observed that in stations north of Dufile (i.e. in stations mostly in Bariland) had changed for the worse:

> The brutal soldiers would take goats, fowls and cattle, and even women and children from the natives who were afraid to oppose them, and they would often demand the payment of tax three or four times over in the year.[14]

This observation reveals a major departure from the situation which obtained in Bariland earlier, which was one of the first to submit to the government and was one of the districts where relations with the government were generally good and peaceful. Its administration was consequently stable and, therefore, the collection of the tribute-tax regular. But by 1888 Bariland was in rebellion, stemming from the acute supply situation brought on by both the blockage of the Nile and Khartoum's declining support.

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As might be expected, the government's pacification campaign laid waste to the countryside, and the resulting devastation resembled the damage done by the Khartoum slave traders. This destruction was especially notable in the western parts of the Equatorial province (mostly Zandeland) where the state-apparatus was under the control of Danaqla volunteers recruited from the militias of the former slave traders.[15] That is, these Danaqla recruits were constituted into an irregular force known as *khuteriyya*, whose main job was "to give more effect to the orders of the administrators and to look after the taxes levied on the crops."[16] During an official tour to western Equatoria in 1883, Governor Emin was literally shocked by the extent of destruction and anarchy there. Because the *khuteriyya* were exclusively Danaqla, the pillage and plunder was naturally blamed on Northern Sudanese [17]

In Eastern Equatoria, Bariland was most pillaged owing to the large number of troops stationed there. By 1876, for example, there were six stations in Bariland--Lado, Gondokoro, Rejaf, Bedden, Kirri, and Muggi. In 1883 Lado had 300 regular soldiers [*jihadiyya*] and 70 *tarajma* (sing. *turjuman*, local interpreters); Kirri had 70 regulars and 10 *tarajma*; Gondokoro 20 regular soldiers (in 1881); and Muggi 90 regulars (in 1888). And when the dependents of these personnel are added, the total number increases by at least seven times. During Gordon's time, for example, the dependents were estimated at about eleven per soldier; Junker, on the other hand, reckoned that, by 1878, each soldier counted his dependents by the dozen.[18] For Bariland, supporting such a large number of personnel became a daunting task.

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The role of the *khuteriyya* was less important in the administration of eastern Equatoria than that of the regular army, *jihadiyya*.[19] By 1888 the *jihadiyya* there and their officers were predominantly Southern Sudanese themselves, with a few Egyptians and Northern Sudanese here and there,[20] but neither of these facts seem to have mitigated the harsh taxation system in any significant way. For Bariland, then, the consequences of having to support a large number of troops, and, indeed, the whole state apparatus, led to the famine in Lado in 1878. Since the steamer bringing in supplies to Lado was then several months late, the town was short of food. For Junker himself, the scarcity of corn was so serious that he had to supplement his needs by purchasing some "old broken biscuits," paying 20 times their value.[21]

As early as 1878 Emin Pasha predicted the detrimental consequences of raiding and plunder still being carried out against Baris around Kirri and Muggi. Noting the disappearance of food, Emin plaintively remarked:

> ... this is the consequence of the system of plunder and robbery that is shamelessly carried out under the name of official provisioning. If no prompt and energetic measures are taken, the Government will lack the basis to maintain itself here within a period of two years.[22]

Sure enough, by 1882 the situation was as Emin had foretold. The combined impact of the lack of food provisions and trade goods led to discontent which undermined the stability of the province. Ironically, rebellion first came from within the ranks of the administration, and it was led by Lieutenant Colonel Bakhit Batraki.

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The Rebellion of Bakhit Batraki

Batraki was from the Nuba Mountains and originally came to Equatoria in the employ of the trading firm of John Petherick. Sometime in the early 1860s, Batraki entered government service as a regular soldier. His unit was part of the contingent sent by the Khedive Isma'il to fight in Mexico alongside the French during the latter's campaigns against Juarez. Upon return from Mexico, Batraki and his unit were sent south with Sir Samuel Baker's Expedition to annex the Equatorial province.[23] Baker transferred Batraki to the Civil Service Department, and in 1875, Charles Gordon appointed him *mudir* of Makaraka district, which by then had five stations (Wandi, Kabayendi, Makaraka Soughair, Rimo, and Ndirfi).[24]

In 1878, each of Makaraka's five stations had from 50-75 irregular (Danaqla/Northern) troops, an equal number of *tarajma* (interpreters, mostly from the local people), and 30 regular soldiers armed with Remington rifles. Of Batraki's assistants in this district, one was Nuba (Fadl Allah, in charge of Kabayendi); one Northern Sudanese (Abd Allah Abu Zed, Nazir of Rimo); one Egyptian (Ahmad Agha in charge of Makaraka Soughair); one Turkish (Ahmad Atrush, in charge of Wandi), who was also Batraki's second man in command; and, finally, the officer in charge of Ndirfi, whose name and origins are not known. Batraki's administration of Makaraka district was apparently successful, for the district was prosperous and was a main food supplier for Lado.[25]

In 1882, however, Batraki was summarily replaced by Ibrahim Muhammad "Guruguru" (a former slave trader in the region), whose assistant he was to become. Besides being a demotion for Batraki, more galling was the fact that until his appointment, Ibrahim Muhammad had been Batraki's secretary.[26]

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Naturally, Bakhit Batraki's reaction was to have none of it and to rebel. To this end, he mustered his troops in Makaraka and marched them on Lado, apparently intent on taking over the province himself. Emin acted promptly and sent a force which defeated him, although with difficulty. Batraki was then captured and sent in chains to Khartoum, where he seems to have languished in prison until killed by the Mahdists during their takeover of the city in June 1885.[27]

What can one make of Batraki's revolt? Was it an isolated incident of rebellion by one discontented but influential individual, or was it a result of some deeply and widely held grievance? This is a very difficult question to consider. And yet the basic elements that went into making the revolt seem important enough for one to speculate. First, his demotion, apparently unjustified, was as irregular as it was offensive. Secondly, his replacement was not only an inexperienced Arab, but one who until his appointment, was also his secretary. And, finally, his support was almost exclusively from the local population.

On the basis of a critical examination of the historical record relating to the subject, Batraki's rebellion seems to have been a case of class and racial conflict, as suggested by Gaetano Casati:

> But contrary to the hopes of the native party that he [Emin] had raised in the Makaraka territory he had granted entire confidence and discretionary power to the Arab, Ibrahim Mohammed Guruguru....Lieut-Col. Bachit [sic.] Bey, loved by the people for his common origin with themselves, and by the soldiers for his distinguished warlike virtues, could not submit to being placed in a position subordinate to a clever and celebrated slave dealer such as Ibrahim; he would not suffer the insult, and prepared to act.[28]

Casati was both an eyewitness and a participant observer in the administration of Equatoria. He therefore knew enough about the social conditions

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of the province to merit his statement.[29] Furthermore, his observation is to a large extent corroborated by Junker. In the course of his exploration of Makaraka district, Junker and Atrush became good friends, and through their close relationship Junker learned much about racial relations.

As for Atrush, he was quite a reliable source because he had lived in the district for a long time. In fact, his stay there dated back to the time when he was agent of John Petherick's trading company.[30] Therefore, like Casati, Atrush had observed what he described. According to information obtained by Junker from Atrush, Bakhit Batraki was generous to his subjects, whereas, by contrast,

> The Arabs, Egyptians and Turks in negro lands do not like associating in any way with the native; in him they see only a born slave on whom they seldom bestow a kind word; hence their intercourse with the natives is restricted entirely to official matters. The higher officials of negro origin, on the contrary, associate with the natives, who can more easily gain access to them, and therefore of course have more affection for them. The fundamental difference of views and opinions has made the relations between the pale (Arab-Turk) and the black officials and officers very strained. Amongst the lower classes, the irregular Nubian soldiers (*Khoterieh*) and the drilled line troops (*Gehadieh*) this coolness between the superiors is augmented to envy and hatred...[31]

Both Gordon and Emin were aware of this race-based antagonism and mistrust, and were apparently concerned about its negative impact on the administration of the province. In an effort to mitigate the conflict, Gordon sought to provide some racial balance in his administration by promoting a number of black officers, thus the background to the appointment of Bakhit Batraki, Rehan Agha, and Nur Bey to positions of authority.[32] Emin, on the other hand, was more explicit in his desire to reduce the influence of the Danaqla in Makaraka. He seems to have concluded that the main obstacle to the realization of Makaraka's

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economic potential were the Danaqla (Northern Sudanese) and their raiding. Therefore, soon after his appointment as governor of Equatoria in 1878, he adopted a policy which sought to remove or at least reduce Danaqla power. He wrote to Gordon, "I believe that under a rational system Makaraka and Rohl will be a paradise; it is essential however to eject the Danaqla."[33]

Yet, in 1882, Emin reversed that policy by his appointment of Ibrahim Muhammad and Yusuf Shellali to the *mudirship* of Makaraka and Rohl districts respectively. Batraki, on the other hand, was demoted to assistant of his erstwhile secretary, Ibrahim Muhammad. Why Emin took this irregular action against Batraki is a puzzle. Emin appears to have acted on the basis of complaints received from Atrush and even Ibrahim Muhammad himself against Batraki. Whatever Emin's justification, the action was personally humiliating to Batraki. But perhaps more important, the appointments of Ibrahim Muhammad and Yusuf Shellali aroused the suspicions and fears of the local people. For not only were they "Arabs," they had been also ruthless slave traders in those very same districts where they were appointed *mudir*.[34]

It is, of course, difficult to fathom the dimensions of this racial antagonism without reference to relevant concrete situations, especially those affecting the principal actors. In this regard, Bakhit Batraki's experiences become instructive. First, he was personally exposed to racial animosity almost on a daily basis through his lieutenant, Ahmad Atrush. Junker, who observed this rancor, noted:

> His wekil [sic.], Atrush Agha, especially, who was a genuine Turk despite his lowly origin (said to have been a water carrier in Khartoum), felt himself greatly superior to the dark-skinned Nuba...[35]

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Obviously, this racial antagonism was partly a result of power struggle between Atrush and Batraki and, in the final analysis, a manifestation of class conflict. The antipathy becomes clear in light of Atrush's background.

Atrush had also formerly worked for Petherick's company in Makaraka, but unlike Batraki, however, he remained with Petherick until 1865, when the company was disbanded and forced out of the Sudan. Atrush then passed on to the employment of Ahmad al-'Aqqad when the latter bought up Petherick's *zeribas*. Finally, when the government annexed Equatoria in 1870, and took over all the *zeribas* to consolidate the state ivory monopoly, Ahmad Atrush was coopted into the government and allowed to remain the administrator of Wandi station at a salary of £35 a month. Unfortunately, this arrangement proved unworkable because the cooptees, "with their ruffianly soldiers, were accustomed to oppress the natives with impunity." As already mentioned, Gordon sought to reduce this oppressive behavior by appointing trustworthy senior black officers to superior positions, explaining why Bakhit Batraki and Rehan Agha were posted to Makaraka.[36]

However, Ahmad Atrush was very resentful, his pride hurt because Batraki had once been his former colleague, probably a subordinate, in Petherick's company. And, finally, there was the racial dimension which was a major contributory factor in the animosity. Put together, these considerations made it difficult for Ahmad Atrush to submit to Bakhit Batraki. Indeed, as Junker observed, Atrush's "antagonism towards Batraki was obviously inspired by a rankling sense of thwarted ambition and official neglect." He goes on to say that, "[e]nvy and

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offended self-love tended to increase the friction [between them] and stimulate the intrigues of Atrush who was almost openly plotting for Bahit's [sic.] downfall."[37]

The overall conclusion that can be drawn from Bakhit Batraki's rebellion is that it was not the isolated incident it is generally assumed to be. To be sure, his unhappy experiences were in many ways personal. But given the larger picture of interracial relations of which these experiences were a good reflection, separation between what was personal or professional became difficult or even irrelevant. It is in this sense that Bakhit Batraki's personal experiences become symbolic of the wider social condition, explaining why his rebellion against Emin drew the spontaneous support of his fellow-soldiers as well as that of the local population. In the final analysis, therefore, Batraki's rebellion sprang from the pent up anger and frustration felt by many black soldiers and the local peoples (at least in Makaraka) on account of racial conflict and discrimination. At the very least, the appointment of Ibrahim Muhammad and Yussuf Shellali roused in the black officers fear of a reversal of the policy which, until then, had made it possible for them to gain power and to advance in their careers. As they perceived it, a return to the bad old days would erode at their gains and perhaps once more confer them to the lower echelons of the government. Given this underlying racial conflict among officials, it is surprising that historians of Southern Sudan seem to have overlooked or perhaps even ignored the social aspects underlying Bakhit Batraki's rebellion.[38]

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The Outbreak of Local Rebellions

A. The Makaraka Rebellion

The first major local rebellion in Equatoria occurred in Rohl and Shambe in February 1882,[39] and soon spread to eastern Equatoria, starting with Makarakaland. The rebellion was led by chief Ringio, a surprise to many in the government, for he long had been regarded as a key figure and supporter of the government. Indeed, this reputation dated back to the early 1860s, when Petherick's trading company arrived in Makarakaland. Impressed with his power and congenial spirit, the company decided to take him to Khartoum, to teach him Arabic, to impress him with the power and material wealth of the city, including the culture that produced it, and ultimately to turn him into a self-interested asset.

The gambit worked, for upon his return from Khartoum, Ringio became an ardent supporter of the traders and, subsequently, of the colonial government. Junker notes that Ringio "became quite familiar with the Arabic dialect current in Sudan," adding that he "was anxious to pass for 'a cultivated' Nubian." Perhaps a measure of the extent of his support for the government was the invaluable help he rendered to Gordon by transporting pieces of the steamer to the Albert Nile, an operation which cost the lives of more than 500 Makaraka. Furthermore, he was able to persuade his people to enroll as volunteer soldiers, so that by 1876, according to Felkin and Wilson, nearly all the volunteer soldiers in the Lado garrison were from the Makaraka district.

Ringio thus came to be regarded as "a true servant of the government," and was made head of the interpreters (*tarajma*) of the whole of Makaraka district. His rebellion was a clear indication that the government had become oppressive, even

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to him, especially after the suppression of Batraki's rebellion.[40] The newly assigned *mudir* of the district, Ibrahim Muhammad, moved fast and suppressed the rebellion ruthlessly, killing Ringio in the process.

B. The Bari Rebellion

At the end of 1883, the Baris exploded in violent rebellion against the government. Official records suggest that the rebellion was led by chief Loro-lo-Lako ("Loro son of Lako"; hereafter Loro.) of Gondokoro. But evidence reveals that Bepo-lo-Nyigilo (hereafter Bepo), the reigning rain-maker of Bilinyang, was the moving spirit behind the rebellion, although Loro was involved. In some respects Loro was to Bariland what Ringio was to Makaraka. Born in Gondokoro of commoner parents, he had a checkered career. Through his sister's marriage to Bepo, Loro came to be closely associated with the affairs of the royal family in Bilinyang and, ultimately, with the colonial state. As will be remembered from the narrative earlier in this research, the house of Nyigilo had a long history of intimate relations with the alien intruders.[41] The Bilinyang royal house came therefore to have strong commercial and political ties with the Khartoum traders. As a close associate of the royal house, Loro was part of this network.

When Baker annexed Equatoria and sought to eject the Arab slave traders Loro's trading interests were also hurt. Consequently, Loro sided with the traders. Loro's name appears in Samuel Baker's and in subsequent official records as "Alloron," which in Bari means "bad." Given Loro's reputation then as a sworn enemy of the government, the distortion of the name was altogether a befitting irony. Eventually, however, Loro submitted to Gordon, and thereafter became one

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of the main government supporters in Bariland. Indeed, Emin called him my "great friend and most trusted Bari chief,"[42] a consideration which made his rebellion seem surprising.

The rising was provoked by government seizure of 3,000 head of Bari cattle. The audacity of the raid is germane to the main thesis of this chapter--that the government was prompted into that action by its need for supplies. This interpretation becomes all the more persuasive considering the fact that, in Equatoria, Bariland was the government's core area.

The seizure of 3,000 head of cattle was something which Loro or Bepo could not ignore, since the government hit out at their vital interests. The tributary nature of these societies and the process of accumulation since the introduction of the White Nile trade, had worked to the benefit of the chiefs, who had amassed large numbers of livestock. Moreover, in light of the destructive impact of the initial official *ghazwas* and cattle epidemics, they were often among the few whose livestock survived these raids. That this was often the case may be instanced by the case of chief Hujang of Tirrangore in Latuka about whose cattle Emin observed,

> The breeding of sheep and cattle was once actively carried on here, but now, with the exception of Chief Maye's [sic.] numerous herds, only large flocks of sheep are to be seen.[43]

Therefore, once the *ghazwas* were reintroduced or the tribute-tax system abused, naturally the chiefs stood to lose the most, and they were therefore often the first to organize resistance interests. Renewed *ghazwas* in the early 1880s was thus the background to local rebellions in Equatoria, certainly to that of the Baris in 1883. Indeed, the devastation of the raids in Bariland was such that in

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places cattle disappeared altogether and people stopped paying bridewealth in cattle. It is therefore likely that most of the confiscated cattle belonged to the chiefs themselves, especially to Loro and Bepo, explaining why these two fomented the rebellion. Although Emin ordered the restitution of 700 of the cattle, the gesture was not enough to sooth the anger of the people. Emin acted promptly and, on June 27, 1884, had chief Loro captured and summarily executed. But even on his death, chief Loro was as defiant as ever, as the following remark attributed to him indicates:

> Now that you have taken me prisoner, you are welcome to kill me. I have lived long enough. The fame of having been a source of despair for your Baker, who could never defeat me, is enough for me.[44]

But Loro's execution only made matters worse for the government, as it produced a Bari rebellion under the leadership of Bepo himself supported by all the chiefs and people from Bilinyang in the north to Kirri in the south. The devastation made the Baris all the more determined to rid themselves of the government. The ferocity of the rebellion was such that Emin had eventually to order the evacuation of Gondokoro.[45] Chief Lako-lo-Rondyang (also known in official records as Abu Kuka) of Rejaf was the only one who remained loyal to the government, even contributing auxiliaries. But even so, the contribution was too little too late. Besides, his men soon deserted to the anti-government rebellion, and in December 1885, they killed chief Lako.

Further north, the Dinkas of Bor district also rebelled, and on December 31, 1884, wiped out the garrison of 107 men stationed there, capturing personal goods, firearms and ammunition. According to Gaetano Casati, the Bor attack

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was undertaken by a coalition of Bor, Agar, and Aliab Dinkas, on the one hand, and of a number of Nuer sections, on the other.[46] Further south, the Acholi, too, were in revolt. The ferocity and the ever-widening circle of local rebellion and the extent to which it shaped into some kind of coordinated movement is reflected in the composition of an attacking force on the government garrisons of Lado, Gondokoro, and Rejaf in October 1885. The rebels comprised contingents from the Bari, Mundari, Nyangbara, Pajelu, and Aliab and Bor Dinkas. The first four were Bari-Speakers, while the last two were Dinkas. This coalition was a new phenomenon, and it certainly bespeaks of the participants' common cause against the government. Nevertheless, despite their bravery, the coalition forces were repulsed with heavy losses, and among those killed in action in Lado was the Aliab leader, prophet Deng Tonj.[47]

C. The First Wave of Mahdist Invasion

The turbulence and rebellion that swept the Southern Sudan and, ultimately, the whole of the Sudan, beginning in the late 1870s, calls for a reassessment because historical writing on the crisis tends to subsume it under Mahdist influence, ignoring or even denying the legitimate basis of local rebellion in the South and, in effect, treating the people there merely as passive instruments of northern political designs. It has had the effect, therefore, of hindering a proper understanding of the nature and background of the rebellions in the South, as well as denying their independent contribution to the demise of the Turco-Egyptian regime. In order therefore to put things into perspective and thus correct the picture, the following discussion is in order.

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First and foremost, the chronology of the rebellions in the Southern Sudan alone refutes any notion that they were influenced or directed by the Mahdist rebellion in the North. Indeed, the notion of Mahdist influence does not even hold for Bahr el-Ghazal province. Thus, while the Mahdist rebellion broke out in 1881, Dinka insurrections had been on going in Bahr el-Ghazal since 1879. Although Governor Romolo Gessi was able to put them down, the problems continued. Indeed, after Gessi's departure in 1881, a wider and more ferocious rebellion reasserted itself in Bahr el-Ghazal. It started out, first, among the non-Dinka peoples in the western Bahr el-Ghazal province: the Togoyo in late 1881; the Njangulgule in August 1882; and the Shatt (in alliance with sections of the Bongo, Dembo and Shilluk Luo) in mid-January 1883. Although the government eventually won the contest, the victory was far from decisive. Indeed, the rebellion continued sporadically throughout 1883.[48]

In the meantime, the more serious and sustained Dinka rebellion, especially in the Rohl and Shambe districts, broke out in early February 1882, and by April had developed into a general Dinka rebellion. The rebellion was so intense that Governor Frank Lupton had to recall forces from western Bahr el-Ghazal and lead them against the rebellious Dinkas. During the months of April, May, June and July his commanders (principally Mahmud al-Mahallawi, Rifa'i Agha, and Sa'ati Bey) marched and countermarched through Dinka country in seemingly endless campaigns to put down the rebellion. The seriousness of the rebellion can be gauged from the fact that when the Dinka attacked Daym Zubayr in January 1884, the rebel force was estimated by Mahmud Mahallawi at 50,000 men,[49] which is

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probably an overestimate. Not to be outdone, the Nuer in Bahr el-Ghazal also joined in the rebellion. Mustering a force of several thousand men, they attacked and besieged Lang station for three days. Although they were eventually driven off, the government nevertheless lost 500 men in the assault.[50]

Meanwhile, in the north, the Mahdist rebellion broke out on August 12, 1881. For over two years thereafter, the Mahdists were preoccupied with intense military campaigns in the North, particularly in Kordofan province. Muslims throughout the country answered the call to take the *hijra* to *jebel* Qadir, among them the chief of the Rizayqat Baqqara, Madibbu. He arrived at *jebel* Qadir in early 1882, and returned during the same year to summon his people to the *jihad*.[51] When the Njangulgule, through chief Yanqu, sought and obtained the support of Madibbu in their struggle against the government, the Mahdist factor was added into the mix of the local causes of rebellion in Bahr el-Ghazal.

Even then, it is questionable whether the support Madibbu extended to Yanqu was Mahdist-inspired. True, Madibbu had made the *hijra* to the Mahdi at *jebel* Qadir and had turned his people to the *jihad*. But that does not automatically mean that the assistance rendered was Mahdist in inspiration. On the contrary, Madibbu seems to have extended support for his own reasons. That is, he was attracted by the lure of booty, and upon entering Bahr el-Ghazal, he began raiding Dinka for slaves. The Dinkas retaliated, thus turning the war into a Rizayqat-Dinka conflict rather than against the government. Governor Lupton moved quickly to take advantage of the situation and recaptured some of the garrison towns previously lost to the Dinka, including Rumbek.

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Thus, it was only after the summer of 1883 that one can perhaps speak of a Mahdist presence in Bahr el-Ghazal province. By then, the Mahdists had scored major military victories in many areas in the North, and had even taken over the whole of Kordofan province. It was therefore time for them to move further afield, including Bahr el-Ghazal province.[52] And given the already turbulent state of affairs there, the situation could not have been more auspicious for them, as all that the Mahdists needed to do was to establish alliances with the various rebel groups, many of whom already had caches of captured firearms.

Thereafter the leaders of the local allies carried the Mahdist green flag in battle. Robert Collins comments "it is extremely doubtful if this influence was ever anything but superficial." He goes on to argue that,

> Although the tribes had eagerly listened to the exhortations of Mahdist agents to join the jihad, they had, unlike the Arab tribes to the north, made war on the Egyptian Government to win their independence rather than to promote the spread of Mahdism.[53]

Nevertheless, the grave military situation resulting from this alliance is clear from Lupton's letter of August 17, 1883, written to Wilhelm Junker:

> I am afraid that unless the Mahdi is killed or his power broken before the rainy season is over, we shall be heavily attacked when the rivers are low to allow troops to wade through them.[54]

Even so, Lupton managed to hold on. Indeed, the situation even improved by the end of the year, for in September the government received new supplies of arms and ammunition.

But in April 1884 a Mahdist force of 5,000-8,000 men under the command of the *emir* Karam Allah Qurqusawi crossed into Bahr el-Ghazal province. This was the first Mahdist military presence in the Southern Sudan, and, at least as far

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as Bahr el-Ghazal is concerned, it can be said to mark the Mahdist phase in the province.[55] To make matters worse for Lupton, most of his soldiers and officials (mostly Northern Sudanese themselves) deserted to the enemy. Under these circumstances, he surrendered on April 28, 1884. To Emin he wrote:

> It is all up with me here. Everyone has joined the Mahdi, and his army takes charge of the *mudirieh* the day after tomorrow....Look out you. Some 8,000 to 10,000 men are coming to you well armed.[56]

The Situation in Equatoria

For the government, Equatoria's problems were almost exclusively internal and had nothing to do with the Mahdist influence.[57] By the end of May 1884, however, the problems in Equatoria ceased to be entirely internal, for, following the Mahdist occupation of Bahr el-Ghazal, Karam Allah dispatched letters to Emin demanding the surrender of the province. Panic-stricken, the officials at Lado hastily held a council on May 27, 1884, and decided unanimously to surrender. A delegation of six people was selected to travel to Daym Sulayman in Bahr el-Ghazal to submit to Karam Allah.[58] Indeed, it was under these tense circumstances that the rebellion of chief Loro of Gondokoro occurred.

Nevertheless, the month of June came and went without the expected Mahdist invasion of the province. Meanwhile, reports of Mahdist atrocities against the *jihadiyya* in Bahr el-Ghazal reached Equatoria. Naturally, this news upset the soldiers in Equatoria, and was certainly a critical factor in their decision, on July 3, to resist the Mahdists. To this end, all the northern garrisons (Rumbek, Ayak, and Bufi), western garrisons (Mangbetu and Zandeland), and those in the east in Latuka and Acholiland (Tirrangore, Lohila, Obbo, Pajule, etc.) were withdrawn and

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Meanwhile, after taking Bahr el-Ghazal, the Mahdists turned to Equatoria. On October 10 letters demanding the surrender of the province reached Lado, and shortly thereafter an advance force of 1,600 men, armed with Remington rifles, under 'Abd Allahi as-Samat, crossed into Equatoria.[60] The Mahdists first struck and captured the small station of Takfara, but on November 11, they failed to take Amadi, a major garrison with 1,100 regular troops. A second attack on the following day and a third on the 17th. were equally disastrous for the Mahdists. In fact, in all three assaults, the government suffered only one man wounded. 'Abd Allahi as-Samat therefore sought and obtained the support of the Aggar Dinkas and, on December 2, launched a fourth attack, which was repulsed with heavy losses, while the government lost 12 killed and 18 wounded.

Frustrated in all their attempts, the Mahdists laid siege to the garrison and waited for reinforcements, which arrived in January 1885. The reinforcement were commanded by the deserter Uthman Effendi, formerly Emin's clerk, but they proved insufficient to throw back the sortie made by the garrison on February 2. On that day, the Mahdists lost 50 men, including 'Abd Allahi as-Samat himself and his brother Mahmud. At this point, all seemed bleak to the attacking Mahdists but for the timely arrival of Karam Allah himself with a reinforcement of 2,000 men, which altered the military balance dramatically in favor of the Mahdists. Even then, the besieged garrison refused to surrender and, instead, attempted to fight its way

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The Mahdists quickly followed this victory by taking over Makaraka and advancing to within a few hours' march of Lado. Letters were again sent there demanding the surrender of the province, one of which reported the fall of Khartoum and the death of General Gordon. Emin decided on withdrawal southward. However, by the time he reached Muggi, the Mahdists also began their withdrawal to Bahr el-Ghazal, as they had exhausted their ammunitions and could not therefore press their advantage. By the end of June 1885, the Mahdists evacuated Equatoria altogether, ending the first phase of their activities there.[62]

The Mahdists' advance into Equatoria seems to have had the effect of temporarily freezing local rebellions. In Makaraka, for example, after the suppression of the Ringio rebellion, one would have expected the people there to rally to the support of the Mahdists. But what happened instead was that the people rallied to the support of the government, and in Bariland, after the initial rebellion of chief Loro, a certain sense of quiet seemed to descend on the land. Indeed, it is interesting to note that two months after Loro's execution, Chief Bepo himself could still lend a hand to Emin in order to save the garrison at Bor. Why this switch from opposition to cooperation with the government?

The people seem to have been initially inclined to support the Mahdists, but their atrocities in Bahr el-Ghazal and in Makaraka had a sobering effect. *Jihadiyya* deserters from the Mahdists, as well as other refugees, escaped into Equatoria in large numbers. They had witnessed or were themselves victims of Mahdist

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atrocities and they told people what they had seen. It was now evident that the Mahdists were not, in fact, the natural allies the people first thought they were. Under the circumstances, it became apparent that, if anything, the existing government was a lesser evil they could live with, at least temporarily.[63]

Soon after the Mahdist withdrawal, however, local rebellion in Equatoria began once more to build up, especially in Bariland, and for the same reasons. Indeed, because of the loss of Makaraka, which used to be a food supplier to Lado; and also because there was an influx of retreating soldiers, the government's food-supply situation in Bariland became worse. In fact, the question of lack of food was the main concern affecting the military decision of April 24, 1885:

> Considering that there is not corn enough in Lado, Rejaf, Bedden, etc., to support the men that have come from Makraka [sic.] as well as our own people, that the next harvest is still far off, that by sending our foraging parties we should exhaust our meagre supply of ammunition and be left at the mercy of the negroes, while, on the other hand, it is impossible to procure by any other means...it is resolved that the women and children shall be sent to the south...[64]

Indeed, when Emin left Lado on April 25 for the south in order to supervise the evacuations there, he left the most emphatic orders that the Bari should be well treated, lest they also should be roused to rebellion. But Emin's orders were ignored, and the soldiers proceeded to take food by force. Emin proved right, for the raiding produced a spontaneous Bari rebellion on October 4, 1885, led by Bepo himself. And on October 31, all the *tarajma* (i.e. Bari interpreters) fled from Rejaf. As a consequence, the government ordered the abandonment of Gondokoro. It is important to bear in mind that by the time the rebellion broke out in Bariland, the Mahdists had long left Equatoria. Thus, although the Mahdists had

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sent emissaries to Bariland prior to their withdrawal from Equatoria,[65] it is very unlikely that they had any role in the rebellion.

In the meantime, Emin was away in the south in Wadelai (at the northern end of Lake Albert), attempting to put in place an organization in connection with the projected evacuation of the garrisons to the south. Indeed, he had not been in Bariland since May. Commenting on the causes of the rebellion, an incensed Emin said:

> As long as I was present and prevented any interference with their affairs, and particularly any attacks on their herds, they remained comparatively quiet, though they were excited by the occurrences among the Dinka at Rumbek, and afterwards by the war against the Danaqla [Mahdists], who, by sending emissaries with all kinds of pretexts, tried to incite the Bari to revolt. The complete defeat of the soldiers sent to Bor...but, above all, the proceedings of the commanders of the stations at Lado, Rejaf, and especially Gondokoro, who, in spite of all warnings, made requisitions of cattle under all sorts of pretences--such are the causes which will lead to the loss of the whole Bari district;[66]

By 1888, the devastating consequences of this conflict for Bariland were evident in the many abandoned villages between stations:

> The Baris had long since abandoned their villages near the road, and had built new settlements behind a low range of hills lying some distance to the west. Emin's soldiers, by their overbearing ways and thieving propensities, ma de it impossible for the natives any longer to have their villages on the road. As we got further towards the north...I could see by the many marks of deserted villages, and the almost entire absence of cattle or goats, that the soldiers evidently robbed the natives to such an extent, that they were forced to leave their villages and cattle and remove their goods away from their thievish influence.[67]

Therefore, when the second Mahdists invasion of Equatoria occurred in October 1888, the Baris were receptive to the new invaders. For their part, as will

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be seen, the Mahdists learned from the mistakes during their first wave of their invasion in 1885, and did nothing that would risk alienating the local people.

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1. Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 158. By June 1875 the Khedive ordered steps to be taken to recover all sums owed to the government. See P.M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1898, 2nd. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 29.

2. For these details, see Ibid., 27-36.

3. Gray, History, 140. Simon Simonse, on the other hand, gives a smaller number of steamers arriving in Lado during the same period. According to him, not a single steamer arrived in 1882, and that only one came in 1883. Thereafter no steamer came to Lado until those that brought the Mahdists in 1888. See Simon Simonse, Kings of Disaster: Dualism, Centralism and the Scapegoat King in Southeastern Sudan (Leiden, New York, Kobenhaven, Koln: E. J. Brill, 1992), 97.

4. Quoted in Simon Simonse, Kings of Disaster, 98.

5. J.A. Mounteney-Jephson Emin Pasha and the Rebellion at the Equator (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1890), 123.

6. Mounteney-Jephson's favorable impression of Abdullah Agha Manzal and his garrison stemmed from the fact that they were the only of Emin's soldiers who willingly agreed to evacuation in accordance with Stanley's mission.

It is ironic that Muggi should be so exemplary. In the past, they were formidable opponents of the government. United under a spiritual leader named Moyok (in fact the followers called him *juök*), Muggi attacked reinforcements to Baker in 1874, killing 28 soldiers. In 1875 they attacked the government twice and wiped out elite troops. It was not until 1876 that they were pacified.

7. Wilhelm Junker, Travels in Africa During the Years 1875-1878 (trans. A.H. Keane) (London, 1890), Vol. I, 498. Gaetano Casati, in his Ten Years in Equatoria and the Return with Emin Pasha, Vol. I (London: Frederick Warne & Co., 1891), was equally impressed with the extensive and rich fields of the stations of Makaraka, especially those belonging to Ahmad Agha Akhuan at Makaraka Soughair and to Ahmad Atrush in Kabayendi. He admired the industry of the local population whom he regarded as particularly

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8. For details of Emin's information on Latuka, see his "In the Country of the Bari and Latuka," in Schweinfurth et al., (edits. & trans.) Emin Pasha in Central Africa, pp. 214-243. Also, see his "From Gondokoro to Obbo," 289-97.

9. The government's roughshod tactics were generally employed against areas recently occupied, to break down resistance or recalcitrance. Indeed, the tactics appear to have been adopted as a policy for creating an ever-expanding territory under government control. Muggi and Kirri are case in point. Both were established in 1876, but apparently because of resistance, they were subjected to such extensive raiding that by 1878 all cattle, grain, and sesame had virtually disappeared.

10. Junker, Travels in Africa, Vol. I, 497-98. An *ardeb* measured about 180 liters. With regards to plundering, even though Gordon criticized it as "brigandage of the worst kind," he seemed powerless to counter.

11. Junker, Travels in Africa, Ibid., 497.

12. In Liria in July 1881, for example, chief Rugong of Liria (son and successor of Legge) found it difficult to secure porters for Emin, precisely because people preferred to work on their farms rather than to sign up as porters. See, Emin Pasha in Central Africa, p. 221.

13. Wilhelm Junker, Travels in Africa, Vol. I, 497.

14. Mounteney-Jephson, Emin Pasha and the Rebellion, 123.

15. "Danaqla" was the term used by both government officials and the people in Equatoria to denote Northern Sudanese generally.

16. Wilhelm Junker, Travels in Africa, Vol. I, 288.

17. In the case of the Bahr el-Ghazal, the consolidation of power and influence of Arab settlers and traders following Romolo Gessi's departure was such that they recommenced their slave trading activities. In fact, the administration of Bahr el-Ghazal remained in the hands of the Danaqla until about 1879. For these details, see Gray, History, p. 155, 159; and Junker Travels in Africa, Vol. I, 284.

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18. In 1888, Mounteney-Jephson estimated that there were perhaps 8,000 of Emin's people in Equatorial Province. See his Emin Pasha and the Rebellion at the Equator, 110 and 238. See also Simonse, Kings of Disaster, 97; Junker, Travels in Africa, Vol. I, 498; and Schweinfurth et al. Emin Pasha in Central Africa, 215.

19. To be sure, there were Northern irregulars (*hotoriyya*) in Equatoria, but they were not many. In fact, there were only 70, all of whom, for reasons of security connected with the Mahdist rebellion, were sent and confined to the two southern stations of Tunguru and Mswa close. See Mounteny-Jephson, Emin Pasha and the Rebellion at the Equator, 198.

20. Robert O. Collins, The Southern Sudan, 1883-1898: A Struggle for Control (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1962), 51.

21. Wilhelm Junker, Travels in Africa, 494.

22. Quoted by Simon Simonse in his Kings of disaster, 97.

23. Richard Hill's biographical information on Batraki in the period from 1863 through 1880 is as follows: "Bakhit Bey Batraki appears to have been a soldier of some standing as he was made sm. [sergeant major?] on 12 January 1863 during the voyage to Mexico and awarded the M.M. 1867 with promotion to 1 lt. [First Lieutenant] on his return to Egypt, 28 May 1867, he served mainly in the Equatorial command where he rose the rank of lt.-col. [Lieutenant-Colonel]. In 1876 appointed governor of Makaraka only to be suspended in 1878 and reinstated about 1880 by General Governor Emin Bey. See Richard Hill and Peter Hogg, A Black Corps d'Élite: An Egyptian Sudanese Conscript Battalion with the French Army in Mexico, 1863-1867, and Its Survivors in Subsequent African History (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995), Appendix 1, 163-164.

24. Although transferred to the civilian department, Batraki, however, maintained his military rank and; indeed, he continued to rise in the ranks.

25. Wilhelm Junker, Travels in Africa, Vol. I, 288-89. Indeed, Col. Chaillé Long claims that Makaraka was regarded by the soldiers as "Land of Promise," "the Eldorado of my Arab soldiers." See his Central Africa: An Expedition to the Lake Victoria Nyanza and the Makraka

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Niam-Niam West of the Bahr el-Abiad (White Nile) (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1877), 247-48. See also Gray, Southern Sudan, 148.

26. Wilhelm Junker, Travels in Africa, Vol. I, 413.

27. Gray, History, 159. Richard Hill suggests that Batraki was not sent to Khartoum in chains but that he was transferred there as second in command of a Sudanese battalion under another officer from the Mexican campaign, Faraj Bey Muhammad al-Zayni. He goes on to say that on Faraj Bey's promotion to Brigadier General during the siege of Khartoum by the Mahdist forces, Bakhit Bey, with the rank of Colonel, took commandof two attalions but that he was killed during the Mahdist assault of the city on 26 January 1886. See Hill, A Black Corps d'Élite, 164. Bakhit Batraki's fate at the hands of the Mahdists at the fall of Khartoum is explained in the letter of Emir 'Umar Saleh, the Mahdist commander at the head of the Mahdist force sent to take over Equatoria. See Mounteney-Jephson's Emin Pasha and the Rebellion, 245-253.

28. Gaetano Casati, Ten Years in Equatoria, 284-85. Richard Gray seems to overlook this significant fact. To him, Batraki's rebellion only a demonstrated the difficulty Emin Pasha faced in exercising effective control over his officials.

29. In 1880 Governor Romolo Gessi wrote to the Milan Geographical Society asking for a geographer to map out Bahr el-Ghazal. The society sent out Gaetano Casati for the job. However, shortly after the latter's arrival in Bahr el-Ghazal, Romolo Gessi was recalled and eventually dismissed from the service. Casati was left behind, literally abandoned. Almost destitute, he retired to Mangbetuland where he lived for nearly three years. Emin rescued and brought him to Equatoria.

30. Atrush is probably Chaillé Long's Latroche, the headman of a trading station in Makaraka in 1874. Long describes Latroche as "one of those veteran ivory-hunters that years before had reached this country at the head of Dongolawee [Danaqla]." He goes on to say that Latroche "had successfully exploited ivory among the Makraka (sic.) Niam-Niam, had made many successful expeditions far into the interior," and that "when ivory had been declared a government monopoly, he had entered the government service." See Chaillé-Long, Central Africa, pp. 257-58.

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31. Wilhelm Junker, Travels in Africa, Vol. I, 479.

32. Another Nuba officer sent to Makaraka along with Batraki was Rehan Agha, also a Nuba. He was stationed with Fadl Allah (a Nuba cooptee) in Kabayendi, presumably to supervise the latter. Indeed, Junker seems to indicate that Fadl Allah was the man in charge in Kabayendi, but that when the latter died in 1878, Rehan Agha assumed control of Kabayendi. As for Nur Bey, he was also Nuba, and was mudir of Lado district. See Junker, Travels in Africa, Vol. I, 288-89; and Gray, History, 148.

33. Gray, History, 147.

34. Wilhelm Junker, Travels in Africa, Vol. I, 393.

35. Ibid., 289. Like Casati, Junker also knew these two men well. In fact, he was a personal friend of Atrush and knew what he was talking about.

36. Ibid., 355-56.

37. Ibid., 355-356.

38. For Richard Gray, for example, the rebellion was an example of insubordination by government officials which only demonstrated the difficulty, for Emin, in "exercising any effective control over officials or Danaqla." See Gray, History, 159.

39. The Rohl and Shambe were predominantly Dinka districts, which had been brought under Equatoria province in 1881. Before then, they were under Bahr el-Ghazal. For this reason the rebellion in these two districts was in many ways connected with conditions in Bahr el-Ghhazal. In fact, by April 1883, the rebellion spread to the rest of Dinkaland in Bahr el-Ghazal. And the reason local rebellions broke out in Bahr el-Ghazal first was probably because oppression was worse there than in Equatoria. In fact, as has been discussed earlier, the state-apparatus in Bahr el-Ghazal was very much dependent on the *khuteriyya*. Indeed, the old administrative structure of the slave traders was more or less preserved intact. For example, the governorships of both Zubayr wad Rahma and that of his son and successor, Sulayman wad Zubayr, spanned the period 1870-1877. Even when the governorship finally passed on to Romolo Gessi and Frank Lupton, effective power remained in the hands of Arab traders and settlers such as 'Uthman Bedawi and Abd Allah 'Abd al-Samad. Their power became virtually complete in the

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interregnum (of well over a year) between Gessi's departure in 1880 and Lupton's arrival at the end of 1881. But because the rebellion eventually spread to the rest of the Southern Sudan, it thereby becomes difficult to separate rebellions in Equatoria from those in Bahr el-Ghazal. See Gray, History, 157-59.

40. In spite of his cooperation, however, Ringio was not without complaints against the government, especially about the demand for carriers which was continually made on his people. He also complained against the malpractices of the government which were perpetrated under the guise of taxes. As early as 1878, he confided to Junker that these grievances created considerable disaffection with his people. For these complaints, as well as for biographical information on Ringio, see Gray, History, pp. 147-49; Junker Travels in Africa, Vol. I, 304, 434, 481-82; and Vol. II, 452; and Casati Ten Years in Equatoria, Vol. I, 253.

41. See Chapter 3 for the relationship between Nyigilo and the traders.

42. Simon Simonse, Kings of Disaster, 99.

43. Schweinfurth et al. Emin Pasha, 238.

44. Vita Hassan, Vol. II, 112, quoted by Simon Simonse Kings of Disaster, 99.

45. Casati, Ten Years in Equatoria, Vol. II, 285; and Simonse, Kings of Disaster, 102.

46. Casati, Ibid., 299. The story leading up to the government disaster in Bor appears to be the following: in the frantic days following the Mahdist advance on Equatoria, Emin decided on evacuating his northern garrisons to the south. The soldiers objected, preferring instead to withdraw to Fashoda by an overland march through Bor and Nuer countries. While sticking to his decision, Emin nevertheless gave the false impression that he agreed with the soldiers. To this end, he sent a reconnoitring expedition of 180 men from Bor towards Fashoda. On reaching Bahr ez-Zaraf, however, disagreement broke out in the expedition over whether or not to continue to Fashoda. Those against continuing prevailed, and the expedition had to retrace their steps. But they were ambushed and virtually annihilated by Bor Dinka, who then followed their victory by attacking and taking over the station.

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47. Casati, Ibid., 330; Gray, Southern Sudan, 161; and Simonse, Kings of Disaster, 99, fn. no. 74, 101.

48. However, because of their frustration with the lack of success against the government, some of these peoples, especially the Njangulgule under chief Yanqu, sought and eventually obtained the support of the Rizayqat under Madibbu. It was through this alliance with the Rizayqat that the Mahdist influence eventually came to Bahr el-Ghazal. For the details, see Collins Southern Sudan, 25-8.

49. In July 1882, the greater part of the garrison at Shambe, along with its commander, was destroyed while taking part in a cattle *razzia*. And a month later, a force of 75 *bazingers* (locally recruited soldiers) in Rohl was also wiped out to a man. By early 1883, many outlying stations in Dinkaland were overrun, including the garrison at Rumbek; and in September the government suffered a major defeat yet again, when Lupton's lieutenant, Rifa'i Agha, was killed along with 400 of his men. See Gray, History, 155-60; Collins, Southern Sudan, 22-42.

50. Collins, Ibid., 34.

51. Holt The Mahdist State, 1881-1898: A Study of Its Origins, Develiopment and Overthrow (Orford: At the Clarendon Press, 1958), 74.

52. Bara had fallen on January 6, 1883; while the capital of tKordofan province, el-Obeid, fell on January 19.

53. Collins, Southern Sudan, 37, and 40.

54. Lupton to Junker, August 17, 1883, quoted by Robert Collins from R. Buchta's Der Sudan unter ägyptischer Herrschaft (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1888), 286.

55. Karam Allah Qurqusawi knew Bahr el-Ghazal province quite well, having been a leading merchant and slave trader there. In fact, he was in Bahr el-Ghazal as late as June 21 1883, when he escaped after a conspiracy against the government was uncovered. According to the conspiracy, hatched by a cwertain Dunqulawi *faqi*, Shaykh Ibnouf an-Nasri, all the Danaqla in western Bahr el-Ghazal were to gather at Daym Idriss on June 20, 1883. They were next to seize the 800 local tribes recruits. Once this was accomplished, all of them were then to defect *en masse* to the Mahdi. The plot was, however, discovered, and

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Shaykh Ibnouf an-Nasri, his brother Muhammad an-Nasri, and Karam Allah Qurqusawi were forced to flee the province. See Collins, The Souther Sudan, 31-2.

56. Quoted in Gray, History, 159. After the surrender, the officials joined the ranks of the Ansar, while locally recruited soldiers and *bazingers* were seized and reclaimed by some of the Danaqla as their former slaves, and many of them were sold. The Mahdists then established a system in which the subject population was required to pay tribute, preferably in slaves, or else be plundered. By June, Karam Allalh sent 1,360 slaves to Shakka. He also complained to the Mahdi that,

> As the slaves taken as booty are exceedingly numerous in this part, and are continually arriving at the camp of the *mudir*, we are much pressed in dispatching them and in looking after them.

This Mahdist contempt for the soldiers and, indeed, for Southerners, alienated the *jihadiyya*, and was the main consideration in their determination to resist, especially in Equatoria. Indeed, that contempt was one of the reason for the popular uprising against the Mahdists that broke out throughout the South. See Collins, Southern Sudan, Ibid., 42 and 47.

57. Before this date, perhaps the first disturbance in Equatoria supposedly connected with any Mahdist influence was that of the Agar Dinka, who, on July 27, 1883, attacked and captured Rumbek. But, as already argued, the rebellion at Rumbek was part of the general Dinka rebellion whose causes were local rather than externally-induced by the Mahdists.

58. The members of the delegation so selected were: Emin himself, Dr. Vita Hassan, the Qadi of the province, the schoolmaster of Lado, Lt. Musa, Uthman Arbab, and Ahmad Baba. But later, Emin withdrew his name from the list.

59. While we have no knowledge of the total military force in Equatoria, it however include 2,000 long-time regular officers and men armed with Remington rifles. See Schweinfurth et al., Emin Pasha in Central Africa, pp. 467-68; and Collins, The Southern Sudan, 48.

60. Until the Mahdist takeover, 'Abd Allahi as-Samad was a slave trader in Bahr el-Ghazal. In fact he owned 17 stations there. See Junker, Travels in Africa, Vol. I,

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61. Schweinfurth et al. Emin Pasha in Central Africa, pp. 477-80; and Collins, The Southern Sudan, 50.

62. Collins, The Southern Sudan, 50-1. The Mahdists withdrew for three reasons: (a) they had exhausted their ammunition supplies; (b) there was a second jihadiyya mutiny in Bahr el-Ghazal; and © Karam Allah was asked to report to Khartoum for the investiture celebrations of the Khalifa.

In assessing the reasons behind the success in Equatoria against the Mahdists, Collins cites two factors. The first is that unlike Bahr el-Ghazal, many of the officers and nearly all the men ofthe battalions in Equatoria were Southern Sudanese themselves. In view of the racial antagonism discussed earlier, to resist the Mahdists was, for these Southern Sudanese soldiers, to defend the province for themselves. The second reason Collins gives is that these Southern Sudanese soldiers had a profound loyalty to the Khedive whom, he asserts, they looked upon with mystical awe. The latter reason is highly questionable, esecially because Collins does not give examples of the alleged blind devotion.

63. For examples of desertions from the Mahdists, as well as of the turmoil that resulted from the Mahdist onslaught, see Schweinfurth et al. Emin Pasha in Central Africa, 477-87.

64. Schweinfurth et al. Emin Pasha in Central Africa, 482-83. The underlines are mine for emphasis.

65. Gray, History, 161.

66. Schweinfurth et al. Emin Pasha in Central Africa, 488 & 490.

67. Ibid., 98.

CHAPTER SEVEN

EASTERN EQUATORIA UNDER THE MAHDIST COLONIAL RULE

Although the foundation of the Mahdist revolution lay ultimately in the unsettling socioeconomic conditions under the Turco-Egyptian regime, its origins can be in some sense traced to the psyche of Muhammad Ahmad, its progenitor. He was born on August 12, 1844 on Labab island in Donqula district in Northern Sudan. His family were very religious and claimed to be Ashraf, that is, descended from Prophet Muhammad, and his father, Abdallah, was a boat-builder, a trade that his brothers also inherited.

Largely because of his religious upbringing, Muhammad Ahmad decided at a very young age to pursue a clerical career. He began his formal religious education in the Gezira under *Shaykh* al-Amin Suwaylih. Upon completing the program, he moved to Berber for further studies with *Shaykh* Muhammad al-Dikayr Abdallah Khujali. And in 1861 he joined the Sammaniyya Order (*tariqa*) headed by Muhammad Sharif Nur ad-Da'im. After seven years of service and training there, Muhammad Ahmad finally received the license to serve as a *shaykh* of the Sammaniyya Order, and in that capacity he travelled about the country ministering to the faithful.[1]

In 1870, when his family relocated to Aba Island on the White Nile to exploit the timber there, Muhammad Ahmad moved with them. In 1872, he invited *Shaykh* Muhammad Nur ad-Da'im to settle at al-'Aradayb on the river bank nearby Aba Island.[2] Meanwhile, since beginning his clerical career, Muhammad Ahmad's

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His followers included 'Ali b. Muhammad Hilu, later to become one of his three *Khalifas*. In time his reputation began to eclipse that of the head of the Sammaniyya, *Shaykh* Muhammad Nur ad-Da'im, undermining relations between them, and the situation eventually degenerated into open hostility and conflict.

One day, Shaykh Nur ad-Da'im reportedly held a feast to celebrate the circumcision of his sons, during which music and dance were allowed. To Muhammad Ahmad this was an intolerable breach of the *Shari'a*, and he publicly rebuked his master for it. The humiliated Shaykh Nur ad-Da'im felt that the attack undermined his leadership as well as the discipline of the Sammaniyya itself, and, to preserve the integrity of the Order, he excommunicated Muhammad Ahmad.

Muhammad Ahmad quit Shaykh Muhammad Nur ad-Daim and transferred his membership to a rival Smmaniyya faction under the old and ailing *Shaykh* Qurashi w. al-Zain. When the latter died in 1880, Muhammad Ahmad took over the leadership of that rival faction.[3] It is believed that only after his return from the burial of his predecessor did Muhammad Ahmad begin to study the traditional prophecies of the Mahdi. As he read them, he began applying them to himself and, once convinced of his divine election to the sacred mission, began revealing the secret to a select few of his followers, including Abdullahi b. Muhammad, the future *Khalifa*. To convince them of his claims to this sacred mission, he claimed to have experienced a series of visions commanding him to take up the responsibility.[4]

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What is apparent from all these accounts is that Muhammad Ahmad had a fundamentally puritanical outlook, whose religious ideology became the prism by which he viewed and critiqued the world around him. Accordingly, it became self-evident to him that Sudanese Muslim society, and indeed the Muslim world in general, had abandoned the Islamic Faith and was immersed in corruption and worldly pleasures. And he felt it his moral and religious duty to purge the world of this corruption through an Islamic political revolution, hoping thereby to reestablish the just and equitable Islamic society as had existed under Prophet Muhammad. But rather than seek change through social and political reforms, he concluded that the solution to the problem was holy war (*jihad*). The Sudanese Mahdist revolution was a religious war, and because it was a *jihad*, it was incumbent on all Muslims to support it.[5]

Thus, on June 29, 1881, on Aba Island, Muhammad Ahmad publicly declared himself the Mahdi. The government first tried to dissuade him from his claims, but to no avail. The government then decided to suppress him by force and, on August 12, sent two companies of soldiers to arrest him. But the Mahdist insurgents ambushed and routed this military force. In this as in subsequent military planning and execution, the government proved particularly inept and dilatory. By contrast, the Mahdists were highly organized and, above all, committed to their cause, factors which more than compensated for any inferiority in firepower. Moreover, the Mahdi proved to be extremely adept in the production of propaganda. This, in addition to their military victories, attracted supporters in ever larger numbers. Thus, by the time the government woke up to the

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seriousness of the situation, the Mahdists had not only scored a string of military victories[6] but also had succeeded in rallying a large part of the country to their cause.

After a protracted struggle in Kordofan, the Mahdists captured Bara, the second most important town in the province, on January 6, 1883. And two weeks later, el-Obeid, the capital of the province fell. But perhaps the biggest victory was the destruction of the Hicks Expedition at Shaykan on November 5, 1883. The whole expedition of well over 10,000 men was annihilated; only 250 men managed to escape. Finally, on January 25, 1885, Khartoum fell, and with its fall began the Mahdist state.

The Social and Economic Causes of the Mahdist Revolution

The Mahdist revolution would not have succeeded without the social conditions which made the Sudanese people receptive to it. Probably the first outsider (i.e. non-Mahdist supporter) ever to attempt a study of the causes of the revolution in some objective fashion was Na'um Shouqayr, a Lebanese military officer and member of the Condominium regime. He cites four causal factors: the violence which accompanied the destruction of property and killing of the original Turco-Egyptian conquest. The second factor, says Shouqayr, was taxation which, besides being high, was also levied by force and accompanied by all sorts of illicit demands. The third reason comprised the government's efforts to suppress the slave trade, which struck at an important source of wealth and the basis of the domestic and agrarian economy of the country. Fourthly and finally, the

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Later historians have reexamined Shouqayr's interpretations and, while agreeing on the facts, nevertheless disagree on their validity as causes of the revolution. For example, Professor Peter M. Holt, whose work on the Sudanese Mahdist state has been generally acclaimed as one of the most authoritative, dismisses the first, the second, and the fourth. However, he fully endorses the third factor, the suppression of the slave trade as the most important, forming, in his own words, "A much more specific and immediate cause of discontent; one, moreover, which affected all classes of society and every part of the country."[8]

Holt argues further that, although sporadic demonstrations against slavery and the slave trade had been made by earlier viceroys, *Khedive* Isma'il took the most prolonged and concerted attempts at suppression. He then analyzes in detail the process of the suppression. On balance, Professor Holt is right in asserting the importance of the suppression of the slave trade as a primary cause of the Mahdist revolution. In order therefore to get a better understanding of its far-reaching import, I will attempt in the following account to demonstrate why this was the case.

To begin with, by the time of this "prolonged and concerted attempts at suppression," the theater of the slave trade was in the Southern Sudan, especially in the regions of Equatoria and Bahr el-Ghazal. Also by then, the perpetrators of the slave trade were mostly Northern Sudanese with a significant representation of Egyptians, Syrians, and Turks. While the exact number of these slave traders

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(generally known as the *jellabas*) and their support staff and soldiers is not known, it was nevertheless very large. In 1868 Georg Schweinfurth estimated the number of the slave traders and other Northern Sudanese settlers in Bahr el-Ghazal province at 10,000, in addition to their slaves who numbered between 50,000 and 60,000.[9] As regards Equatoria, while the figures were lower compared to those in Bahr el-Ghazal, they were nevertheless significantly high. Given their numbers, and more importantly their entrenched economic interests, the *jallabas* were adversely affected by the annexation of the Southern Sudan in 1869, and more so by the enforcement of anti-slavery measures that were soon implemented.

As has been already discussed in chapter six of this research, the enforcement of anti-slavery measures was more effective in Equatoria than in Bahr el-Ghazal, largely because of the efforts of Governors Samuel Baker, Charles Gordon, and Emin Pasha. By contrast, although Bahr el-Ghazal was also annexed, it nevertheless continued under the virtual control of the *jellabas*. Indeed, because of that control, Bahr el-Ghazal became a haven for the slave traders, so that those forced out of Equatoria by the anti-slavery measures fled there. It was not until 1879, following their rebellion against the government, that their control of Bahr el-Ghazal was brought to an end. To get an idea of these events in Bahr el-Ghazal, some details are here in order.

Initially, Muhammad al-Hilali, himself a slave and ivory trader in Bahr el-Ghazal until his appointment in 1869, was made governor of the same province, an appointment resisted by Zubayr w. Rahma, the most powerful trader in Bahr el-Ghazal and who was therefore unwilling to relinquish his supremacy in the area.[10]

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His stance led to intrigues between Zubayr and al-Hilali until 1872, when he assassinated the latter. In 1873, Zubayr moved against and defeated the Rizayqat who had been threatening his communication with Kordofan. Aware of the military power Zubayr wielded in the region, Governor-General Isma'il Pasha Ayyub confirmed him as governor of Bahr el-Ghazal and Shakka. In 1874, however, Zubayr invaded and conquered Darfur and also claimed its governorship, going to Cairo in 1875 to plead his case to the *Khedive*. Afraid of the threat he posed to the security of the state in the region, Zubayr was immediately detained on arrival in Cairo.

Meanwhile, his son, Sulayman w. Zubayr, remained as the virtual governor of Bahr el-Ghazal, a status confirmed by Charles Gordon, when he became Governor-General of the whole Sudan. However, in 1878, while Sulayman was away in Darfur helping to put down a rebellion, he left the province in charge of his deputy, Idris Bey Abtar, who declared himself governor, apparently with Gordon's connivance. Sulayman returned from Darfur and quickly put down Idris Bey Abtar's station, and then proclaimed his intention of not only conquering the Southern Sudan, but also of marching on Khartoum. Sensing the danger, Governor-General Charles Gordon appointed Romolo Gessi to suppress the rebellion and to take over the administration of Bahr el-Ghazal.[11]

Gessi quickly moved to suppress slavery and the slave trade. The issue of slavery and the slave trade was high on official agenda as never before, and as Governor-General, Gordon saw to it that this was the case. Moreover in August 1877, Egypt and Britain signed the Slave-Trade Convention, a document which,

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among other things, immediately terminated the slave trade throughout the *Khedive's* territory.[12] All these developments made it increasingly difficult for the traders to carry on with business as usual, and because of the restrictions, transactions in ivory and slaves had to be carried out in secrecy. Thus, when in 1878 Junker asked a trader in Bahr el-Ghazal about the state of affairs in the province, and especially about the commercial outlook, the latter complained that,

> The good times for trade vanished when the government began to monopolize the traffic in ivory, formerly entirely in the hands of private dealers or commercial companies, and commenced the administration of the provinces. The whole business was carried on with much risk of loss, and the profits had considerably diminished and were steadily declining. The traders were obliged to give "backsheesh" [kickback] to all the government officials, or they would have to contend with one difficulty after another, and be threatened with ruin.[13]

After Romolo Gessi crushed Sulayman's rebellion and then took charge of Bahr el-Ghazal, the situation for the traders worsened considerably. Moreover, the appointment of conscientious Europeans to the governorships of Equatoria, Bahr el-Ghazal and Darfur further undermined the traders interests.[14]

Furthermore, the rebellion convinced Governor-General Gordon that the traders were, indeed, a serious security risk to the state, and that it was high time they were dealt with severely. To this end, he ordered the *shaykhs* of the Baqqara to evict those traders (*jellabas*) that had settled in southern Darfur and Kordofan.[15] Gordon argued that these men provided the infrastructure for both the conveyance of slaves to markets in the North and fire arms and ammunition to the slave traders in the South. The *shaykhs* were instructed to harry any *jellaba* who refused to comply with the order. In light of the recent conflict between them and the traders both under Zubayr and Sulayman, the Baqqara were apparently only too happy to

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These prolonged and concerted policies hit at the very vitals of the economic and political interests of Northern slave traders and settlers in the Southern Sudan. Not unexpectedly, they resisted the government's policies both passively and actively. The Sulayman rebellion of 1878-1879, was probably their best organized military effort at violent resistance. But since the rebellion was crushed and Sulayman himself executed, the traders and settlers waited for an opportunity and a leader to lead them against the government.

Meanwhile in the North itself, the general economic and social conditions were far from satisfactory, and the main cause of discontent was increased taxation. As already discussed in Chapter One, high taxation caused emigration, first, to frontier lands beyond government control, and then to the South to work with slave and ivory traders. Furthermore, since emigrants were people in their twenties through forties, their departure had a two-fold impact on the economy. First, it took away the most productive segment of the agricultural workforce, thus hurting the peasant sector. Second, it reduced the taxable population, thus forcing the government to increase taxes on the remaining population in order to maintain needed revenue levels.[17]

In the final analysis, therefore, the whole country from North to South was seething with discontent. However, prior to the outbreak of the 'Urabi revolt in Egypt in 1880, and especially under the Governor-Generalship of Gordon, the government was strong enough to put down any rebellion, as indeed happened in

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the South. But in June 1879, Khedive Isma'il was deposed and replaced with his son, Muhammad Tawfiq. Disturbed by the deposition, Gordon left for Cairo the following month to personally acquaint himself with the new state of affairs, and, in 1880, he resigned from the Egyptian government service.[18]

In the meantime, Muhammad Ra'uf Pasha assumed the Governor-Generalship in Khartoum. Ra'uf was familiar with the affairs of the Sudan, having served previously in Equatoria under both Baker and Gordon, and, during the latter's governor-generalship, he served briefly as Governor of Equatoria and of Harar. But apparently Gordon was not satisfied with his performance and dismissed him from each of his governorates. Because of these unhappy experiences, Ra'uf had little sympathy for Gordon's policies. For this reason, he seemed to have adopted a laissez-faire attitude towards the issue of the slave trade, for he proceeded to dismiss Governors Romolo Gessi of Bahr el-Ghazal and J.B. Messadaglia of Darfur, both of whom had been effective in suppressing the slave traders. These dismissals not only conciliated the hurt feelings of the traders, but also practically revived the slave trade.[19]

Nevertheless these actions by Ra'uf came too late to save Egyptian rule in the Sudan. For in 1881 the 'Urabi rebellion broke out in Egypt. Meanwhile, almost simultaneously with the 'Urabi rebellion, the Mahdist revolt broke out in the Sudan on 29 June when Muhammad Ahmad declared his Mahdiship. While the 'Urabi rebellion eventually led to British intervention and occupation of Egypt in 1882, in the Sudan the Mahdists moved from victory to victory and, in June 1885, almost

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Equatoria and the Mahdiyya

As far as Equatoria is concerned, the Mahdist invasion began in April 1884, but in May 1885, the Mahdists withdrew to put down several *jihadiyya* rebellions in Bahr el-Ghazal. And by the end of the year they had left the South altogether to put down a Rizayqat rebellion in the North. Thus, the tattered administration of Emin in Equatoria was the only surviving symbol of any Turco-Egyptian presence in the Sudan.

All this changed in August 1888, however, when the Mahdists reinvaded Equatoria, this time by way of the Nile. They came aboard three steamers and six barges, their total number was 1,500 of which two-thirds were "Arabs," and one-third *jihadiyya*. They faced a fierce battle in Bor, and although apparently victorious, the Mahdists nevertheless lost many men.[20] The encounter was a rude awakening, reminding them not to take anything for granted, and instead to proceed with caution.

Consequently, rather than proceed direct to Lado, the Mahdists chose to send a contingent of troops under Taha Muhammad to Latukaland to reconnoitre so as to gain a better appreciation of the overall military and political situation in the country. Moreover, like the Dinkas of Bor, the Latuka were reputedly a warlike people, about which Taha Muhammad himself must have been fully aware.[21]

If so, the dispatch of the military contingent to Latuka was a very astute calculation, and the choice of Taha Muhammad for the task could not have been

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better, for his knowledge and experience in the area was quite extensive. Indeed, Taha Muhammad had originally come to Latukaland in 1863 as a horse-boy of Samuel Baker, remaining behind in the employ of the 'Aqqad company, eventually becoming a man of consequence. And when Gordon became Governor of Equatoria, he coopted Taha Muhammad into his administration and appointed him *mudir* of Latuka district.[22]

Contrary to the view that the Latuka were from the beginning hostile to the Mahdists. and that they had to be brought under control by force of arms, oral sources are instead unanimous that initially Taha and the Mahdists were well-received. The Latuka sought trade, for since the withdrawal of the garrisons from Latukaland in 1884, they had to travel to government stations in Bari- or Madiland to acquire trade-goods, particularly the blue-glass beads.[23] They hoped the Mahdist would save them the long journey.

Secondly, much of the friendly reception had to do with the internal politics of the Latuka themselves, especially the rivalry between Loronyo and Tirrangore, seats of Mayyia's and Hujang's factions respectively. In this regard, the initiative came from Wani, son of Mayyia and heir-apparent to the throne. He received the Mahdists at Lohiri village and provided them supplies. Wani next led the Mahdists against his arch-enemies, the Hujang royal house at Tirrangore.

Meanwhile, Chief Ajaru learned of the ill intentions of Wani, but nevertheless decided to send a large deputation to meet the Mahdists at Abalwa. The mission was led by his two younger brothers, Lomoro and Ihuli, and carried a large quantity of choice foods in addition to other presents. In fact, oral tradition

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says that Ihuli was the interpreter of the delegation because he spoke fluent Arabic. On reaching Abalwa, they marched in order, with the standard-bearer leading the way. Significantly, the standard they carried was one formerly used by the traders. Oral tradition asserts that the mission made a big impression on the Mahdists who then turned around against Wani and his deputation, and had them bound up and marched to the Nile where they were shipped to the North and to certain slavery.[24]

These assertions by oral tradition, especially those pertaining to the Arab-Islamic culture, should not be surprising; for Tirrangore had been, first, a trading center and, later, government headquarters for Latuka district for at least twenty-two years (1862-1884). Obviously such a period was long enough for Tirrangore to absorb a significant amount of the Arab-Islamic culture. This cultural influence may have been deeper among members of the royal house who, since the days of Kamiru in the early 1860s, were closely associated with these Arab-Islamic forces. Indeed, Chief Ajaru himself spoke fluent Arabic, for in 1881, before succeeding to the throne. Emin remarked of him as "a bright young man, who speaks Arabic fluently, and who is in dress and manners the exact copy of a Khartoum dandy."

Elsewhere, Emin records a fuller portrait which, for all practical purposes, makes Ajaru into virtual replica of a Khartoumer:

> Chief Ladjuri [Ajaru], the son of the old Moje [Imui] and the prince-royal, is...a naturalized Dongolawi, in language, as well as in customs and clothing. He even possesses donkeys to ride on which he bought from the Lopit who have brought them from the Irenga [Boya or Longarim].[25]

Furthermore, Ajaru must have been a very ambitious but capable young man, for, as Emin observed, he had effectively taken control of the government in

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Tirrangore, while the old man, Chief Hujang, functioned only as the nominal ruler of the country.[26] At any event, because of its Arab-Islamic cultural influence, its long history of association with the White Nile traders, and of Ajaru's ability to play the Mahdist, Tirrangore won over the Mahdists to its side, and Wani and Loronyo lost once more. Reflecting on these events, Governor Nalder concluded:

> "The Dervishes had a post at Tarangole [Tirrangore] in Chief Lajaru's [Ajaru's] time and with his help raided other recalcitrant Latuka sections, particularly that of Moya [Mayyia] at Loronyo where they killed many of the men and carried off large numbers of women and cattle."[27]

Having established a favorable position both in Bor and Latukaland, the Mahdists felt secure enough to move on to Bariland. On October 15, 1888, they reached Lado, which was deserted; they promptly occupied it and moved on to Rejaf, which they attacked and captured on the 19th.

As far as the Bari were concerned, the Mahdists could not have come at a better time. They had been locked in a vicious war with the Equatorials since 1885, and had driven them from Lado and Gondokoro. For this reason, Chief Bepo of Bilinyang joined forces with the Mahdists. Indeed, in their attack on the Rejaf garrison, the Mahdists were supported by hundreds of Bepo's Bari men. And following the fall of Rejaf, Bepo next moved against the village of Tokiman to settle accounts with them for the support they had given to his arch-rival, chief Lako-lo-Rondyang (alias, Abu Kuka) who was also the only Bari chief to support the Equatorial troops in their war with the Bari.

For their part, the Mahdists seemed also to have learned from their mistakes during their first invasion of the South in 1884. They eschewed brutality, high taxes, and did not enslave the people. This expediency was expressed in a

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letter of October 27, 1888 to the Khalifa by the Mahdist commander of Equatoria, 'Umar Salih:

> As Emin and his Arab and Christian followers are the main concern, I have postponed the question of the Negroid and did not take anything from them except by exchange. When Emin is done with, we will treat the question of the Negroids with a view to their discipline, which is not now complete.[28]

After the fall of Rejaf, the Equatorial troops immediately abandoned all their remaining garrisons in Bariland and withdrew to Dufile (near the present-day Nimule) in Madiland. But a little over a month later the Mahdists followed them there, and a hard-fought battle ensued. Although the Mahdists lost heavily in the four-day contest, the Equatorial troops decided to abandon Dufile and retreated to Wadelai near Lake Albert. After this, the Mahdists sought to supplant the Turco-Egyptian rule and, to this end, they moved in and occupied the abandoned Egyptian stations between Rejaf and Wadelai. Initially, their rule within this riverain region seemed secure enough, at least until 1891. They also succeeded in occupying all the abandoned Egyptian stations in Makaraka, with the aid of chief Aya Tambia. This man and his family were among the few people in Equatoria province who were genuine converts to Islam during Mahdist rule.[29]

Despite this initial success at establishing the garrisons, the Mahdists began soon to experience difficulties extending their rule beyond their immediate environs because of the general security problems prevailing in the province. Firstly, although the people had welcomed the Mahdists initially, it soon became clear that they had no desire to submit to yet another foreign rule. Moreover, many of these peoples had in their possession large quantities of firearms which they had captured or bought during their war with the Equatorial troops.

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But even more perplexing were the large numbers of *tarajma* and *jihadiyya* deserters. Rather than withdraw to Egypt with the Stanley Expedition, these individuals chose instead to remain.[30] And while some of them joined the Mahdists, others chose to roam the countryside attracting large followings and often becoming the main source of actual or potential resistance to the Mahdists. But perhaps the most important threat to the Mahdists was the relatively large but still organized remnants of the Equatorial troops who refused to follow the Stanley Expedition and who remained at Wadelai (under Fadl el-Mula) and at Kavali (under Selim Agha Matara).[31] It was this array of actual or potentially dangerous opponents that the Mahdists set out to conquer or, at the very least, disarm, if they really wanted their rule to rest on a secure base.

But the Mahdists had not come to Equatoria only to conquer, but also to convert the people to Islam, for the driving force of Mahdism was Islam. And because Mahdism was a militant, fundamentalist religious ideology, it was difficult for its adherents to conceive of conquest as different from conversion. Indeed, the two terms were for them synonymous.

Therefore in light of the general insecurity prevailing in the province, achieving conquest and conversion required a very large military force which the Mahdists obviously lacked. For in spite of several reinforcements from Omdurman between 1888 and 1890, the death rate among the soldiers was so high that the total Mahdist force in the province remained at about 1,500 men.[32] Local recruitment was apparently unthinkable given the fundamentalist bent of Mahdism. Indeed, as is clear from the following letter of 'Umar Salih to the Khalifa, Mahdism

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seemed to require that only Muslims could be trusted to join and fight for the cause:

> There is no possibility of any recruitment or increase of the army, as is the case in other places in the Arab countries. Those Negroids whom we conquer cannot stand our customs, nor can they practice our rules, for they find our life strange. This religion of ours is very difficult for them to understand and follow and so they desert us.[33]

By the summer of 1890, however, this apparent precondition seems to change, for over 500 local recruits were enrolled in the Mahdist *jihadiyya*. In addition to new reinforcements from Omdurman, many of whom were, at any rate, exiles, the Mahdist fighting force rose to over 2,300 men. Although this was still far too small a force for purposes of conquest, nevertheless this is precisely what 'Umar Salih set out to do.

The small army may have been necessitated by the age-old supply problem which had bedeviled the Turco-Egyptian regime before them. That is, like their predecessors, the Mahdists in Equatoria received little or no material support from Omdurman. In fact, the supply situation was worse because scarce resources were diverted to the war fronts in the northern and eastern borders which were a priority to Omdurman. To obtain their supplies, then, the Mahdists also inevitably resorted to the *ghazwa*. Indeed, it is safe to assume that by 1890, they had exhausted the countryside around the garrisons and therefore needed to go further afield. Needless to say, raiding set in motion the very same centrifugal forces that had undermined the Turco-Egyptian regime.

Thus, by 1890 Equatoria was the scene of many local uprisings. In Makaraka, for example, a revolt led by a local medicine-man so exhausted the Mahdists that they, along with chief Aya Tambia (now 'Umar), were forced to

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retreat to Rejaf. And in the east the Mahdists raided Lafon in September 1890 for supplies. That they did not establish a garrison at Lafon is evidence that they had not, in fact, succeeded in subduing the people there. But the worst disaster for the Mahdists occurred in March 1891, in Wadelai, when they attempted to stamp out once and for all the remnants of the Equatorial troops still holding out there under Major Fadl el-Mulla. In this attack, the Mahdists suffered 700 of their men killed, and the remnants forced to withdraw to Rejaf.[34]

This string of defeats soon convinced the riverain people in Equatoria, particularly the Bari, that the Mahdists were not so invincible as they first appeared to be. Moreover, the Mahdists were so decimated that by December 1891 they numbered only about 1,338, which, in terms of firepower, was as follows: fewer than 500 with Remington repeating rifles, 670 with single-shot, breech-loading rifles, and 173 with double-barreled rifles. Thus, when the Mahdists dispatched two steamers under *emir* Hasib to collect ivory from a locality two-days' journey downstream of Rejaf (probably somewhere in Mundari or Bor country), the force was attacked and cut to pieces. One of the steamers was captured, while the *emir* and a few of his men managed to escape to Rejaf. This defeat appears to have been the signal for local rebellion which quickly spread to Bariland, including those who seemed to have submitted to the Mahdists. And what was more, some of the *jihadiyya* mutinied and, taking their guns with them, deserted to their tribal areas.[35]

In Bariland, the stronghold of rebellion was Barajak in the south, and it was led by prophetess Kiden. Thus when the Mahdists attempted to occupy the stations of Muggi and Kirri in 1890, a fierce battle ensued, and, as the battle raged

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on, many of the *jihadiyya*, most of them Bari, deserted the Mahdists. This tilted the balance of power in favor of Kiden's force, enabling the Bari to score a major victory against the invaders.[36] By October 1891, the situation had become so desperate that 'Umar Salih decided to abandon Rejaf and Bariland. The evacuation was carried through in December, and the whole Mahdist force was relocated to Bor.

Incensed by this withdrawal, the Khalifa replaced 'Umar Salih with the *emir* al-Haj Muhammad Abu Qarja, who was instructed to occupy Rejaf.[37] When the reinforcements arrived at Bor, they quickly marched on Rejaf, which they reoccupied in April 1893, and then proceeded to reassert Mahdist rule over the Bari. The Bari continued to resist both passively and actively, and the main center of opposition was Barajak in the south, where prophetess Kiden was still very much in control. Nevertheless, the reassertion of Mahdist rule continued apace, and in May 1893, a force of 400 men was sent under Ilyas 'Ali Kannuna against Kiden. Kiden'sr forces were routed, and she and thirty of her combatants were captured and brought to Rejaf, where they were executed.

Shortly thereafter, a new menace to the Mahdists appeared in Equatoria--the forces of the Congo Free State. On May 24, 1890, the Congo Free State had signed the "Mackinon Treaty" with the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC), which agreed not to take political action on the left bank of the Nile as far north as Lado, and to recognize the "sovereign rights" of the Congo State in the defined territory. In return, the Congo Free State ceded to the Imperial British East Africa Company a corridor extending from Lake Albert-Lake Edward and on to the

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northern end of Lake Tanganyika.[38] Armed with this treaty, the Congo Free State penetrated the region gradually, and on October 4, 1892, signed a contract with Fadl el-Mula by which the latter and his erstwhile Equatorial troops entered the service of the Congo Free State. Shortly thereafter, a force under Fadl el-Mula was ordered to travel to Dufile to reconnoitre.[39]

Rumors of these Congo Free State activities reached Omdurman, causing fears of an imminent "Christian" invasion of the Sudan from the South. The Khalifa sought for confirmation of these rumors. In response, an expedition of 480 men under Muhammad at-Tarayfi, and with the assistance 'Umar Aya Tambia was sent in August 1893 to Makaraka. When the expedition returned confirming the facts, the Mahdists held a war council at Rejaf and resolved on driving the Congo Free State out of Equatoria.[40]

This was the first time since 1891 that the Mahdists decided to undertake a major offensive. Command was given to 'Arabi Dafa' Allah, a relative of the Khalifa. Soon after his arrival in Rejaf on October 22, 1893, 'Arabi Dafa' Allah immediately set about unifying the rank and file, and by November he was ready to subdue the local populations before turning to the Congo Free State.

This was the first time since 1891, that the Mahdists ever decided to go on a major offensive. However, this change was not perhaps entirely due to the threat of the Congo Free State, it was also in part due to the organizing ability of 'Arabi Dafa'Allah. The latter was a relative of the *Khalifa*, who had been sent to Equatoria to take command of the Mahdists there. Soon after his arrival in Rejaf on October 22, 1893, 'Arabi Dafa'Allah immediately sat down to unify the rank and

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On November 11, 1893, a large force left Rejaf for Latuka. It is likely that this was a raiding party sent to secure food supplies, since about that time of the year it was generally harvest time. But whatever the objective, it appears that upon reaching their destination the Mahdists met a protracted resistance. Nevertheless, on December 22, 1893, according to Robert Collins, the Mahdists inflicted a heavy defeat on the Latuka and a large number of women and children were captured and enslaved. Collins goes on to say that the Latuka chief was forced to submit and accept Mahdism, as a symbol of which he was given the "bestowal of peace."[41] The victory turned out to be a brilliant military stroke by the Mahdists, for, according to Robert Collins, the

> great victory over the militant Latuka brought the ready submission of the Bari and other riverain Tribes. Seven great chiefs came in to make their submission and were accordingly sent down to Umm Durman [Omdurman] under Maqbul 'Abd Allah in command of a steamer taking 290 pieces of ivory, ninety of which had been given to the Mahdists by the chiefs as tribute.[42]

Obviously, this string of submissions by the local populations freed the Mahdists from any preoccupation with the local security situations, thus permitting them to concentrate on their efforts to check the advance of the Congo Free State into Equatoria. Thus, on January 10, 1894, the whole Mahdist garrison moved out of Rejaf towards Ganda, where the forces of Fadl el-Mula (now in the service of the Congo Free State) were stationed. On arrival there on January 25, however, the Mahdists learned that Fadl el-Mula and his erstwhile Equatorial forces had decamped already and left ten days earlier for Dufile. The Mahdists followed, and

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After this defeat, the Congo Free State decided to slow down their advance to the Nile Valley and to consolidate their position in the Wele Valley first before adopting any forward policy towards the Nile. Moreover, many local rebellions had broken out in the Wele Valley. By contrast, the Mahdists decided to go on the offensive. Flushed with their victory over Fadl el-Mula, a contingent of 700 Mahdists under the command of 'Ali Abd el-Rahman advanced westward and captured Ganda. And on March 12, 1894, they suddenly appeared and attacked the Congolese garrison of Mundu. Although they were eventually defeated and forced to withdraw, the forces of the Congolese Free State were so weakened that they abandoned Mudu and Akka and regrouped at Dungu.

Meanwhile the Mahdists once again began infiltrating the west, and by June 1894 they had crossed the Nile-Congo watershed region and established a post at Palembia near the Congo Free State garrison of Faradje. From this advance position the Mahdists stood, so to speak, face-to-face with the Congolese Free State.[43] By August, the Mahdist forward garrison at Akka under the *emir* el-Tahir had begun to organize a force which they planned to send against Dungu at the end of the rainy season. Learning of this, on August 21, 1894, the Congolese sent a reconnaissance force of 165 regular troops supported by local allies consisting of 2,000 spearmen and 150 riflemen. On September 2, the Mahdists ambushed and routed this force, capturing 50 Belgian riffles, 10 boxes of cartridges and a cannon and its shells, while losing 35 men.

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This was a critical moment for the Congo Free State, for if they were ever to realize what they set out to do under the Anglo-Congolese Agreement of May 1894, they had to deal once and for all with the Mahdist threat. Thus, on December 18, a column of Congolese force of 525 men supported by two platoons of chief Zemio's Azande irregulars, set out from Dungu against the Mahdists. On December 23, they joined battle with a 700-men Mahdist force, supported by 2,000 Azande belonging to chief Renzi. The Mahdists were roundly defeated and forced to retreat to Renzi's territory. Thereafter, the Congo Free State forces set about "pacifying" hostile populations, thus consolidating their position in the Wele Valley until the end of 1896, when they were ready to move decisively against the Mahdists and make a reality of what came to be Lado Enclave.

The defeat at Nageru was a turning point for the worse for the Mahdists. They had overstretched themselves and, despite their initial successes against the Congo Free State, the attrition rate began soon to tell on their numbers, not to mention the exhaustion of their military supplies. For not only were they fighting against the Congolese Free State, they also had to fight often against hostile local populations, rendering it difficult to maintain communications between their base at Rejaf and the chain of garrisons which they had established in Makaraka and in the Wele Valley. With the ever-present threat of local rebellion, the Mahdists definitely needed additional troops and military supplies for them to control effectively the line connecting these garrisons. Thus, by May 1895 the situation was so alarming that 'Arabi Dafa' Allah sent a frantic plea to the Khalifa to send in reinforcements and supplies. However, due to the difficulties with the *sudd*, 'Umar

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Salih did not reach Omdurman until two moths later. The Khalifa responded to the plea promptly, but was able to mobilize about 1,000 men.

These left Omdurman immediately, travelling aboard three steamers and seven boats. On arriving at Fashoda, however, they were diverted to fight in Shilluk country for several months, and they did not resume their journey to Rejaf until January 1896. When they reached Shambe, however, they were faced with a much worsened *sudd*. For months the group worked frantically to cut their way through, and it was not until May 1896 that the smallest of the steamers made its way to Bor. But by now, only 300 men remained, more than half of whom were rendered invalid as a result of fatigue, diseases, and privations endured during all the months of hard labor.

Meanwhile, 'Arabi Dafa' Allah had become so concerned for the security of his soldiers that towards the end of 1895, he ordered the withdrawal of all the garrisons from Makaraka and the Wele Valley.[44] Throughout 1896 the situation for the Mahdists was getting worse by the day. The *sudd* refused to budge; indeed, it did not disintegrate until late 1898. When 1897 came, therefore, 'Arabi Dafa' Allah decided to abandon the ongoing efforts on the *sudd* at Shambe and to withdraw the troops and those at Bor to Rejaf. So that all told, the whole Mahdist force in Equatoria was now reduced to 1,400 men.

But the need for reinforcements and new military supplies was not the only pressing problem facing the Mahdists; there was also the problem of supplies. Bariland had been devastated by conditions of insecurity and war since at least 1885, if not earlier. Indeed, the ruin seems to have been much worse under the

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Mahdists. As a result, many Baris fled their country and migrated to neighboring lands: to Lafon and Lulubo in the east, to Madiland and Acholi to the south, and to Kuku and Pajulu to the west.[45]

Therefore the concentration of forces at Rejaf aggravated the supply problems, which increasingly necessitated foraging raids but which only excited local hostility, often accompanied by further creation of refugees. Indeed, so pressing was the supply problem that by January 1897, they decided to venture into Zandeland. The target was the indefatigable enemy, Chief Gbudwe Mbio (known in the records as Yambio). However, after a month-long war with Mbio, the Mahdists were driven out with a loss 120 men, including many *emirs.*

While all this was taking place in the Mahdist camp, the Congolese Free State had been so successful in consolidating its position in the Wele Valley, so that by October 1986, they were all set to launch their expedition. The day came on 13 December 1897. On that day, the columns of the expedition left Dungu and picked their way slowly through Zandeland, recruiting local supporters as they went, even their formerly insuperable enemy, the Zande chief, Renzi.[46] On February 10, 1897, the columns arrived at Mt. Bereka, one day's march from the Nile. After resting for four days, the expedition pushed on to the former Egyptian station of Bedden, which they reached at ten in the morning the same day. Bedden was only 17 miles south of Rejaf, and it was not surprising that the Congolese patrols encountered roving Mahdist bands the same day.[47]

Realizing that the army of Congo Free State was suddenly upon them, 'Arabi Dafa' Allah responded by convening a war council, which resolved on

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immediate attack. On February 16, 1897, the Mahdists, commanded by Muhammad 'Ali Badi, left their Rejaf garrison and moved towards Bedden. Only a small force of 40 men under the command of 'Arabi Dafa' Allah was left behind to guard the base. At about 5:30 in the evening, the battle began. Although the Mahdists broke up and dispersed in this first encounter, the outcome was far from conclusive. At seven in the morning the following day, battle was again joined and raged on for about one hour, and this time around the outcome was not in doubt: it was a resounding victory for the Congolese. The Mahdists fled to Rejaf in disarray, leaving behind many of their men dead on the battlefield, including their commander, Muhammad 'Ali Badi.

The Congolese followed the fleeing Mahdists in hot pursuit up to Rejaf and, at about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day, attacked them in this Mahdist stronghold. Even though the Mahdists made a determined effort, within an hour's fighting, it was all over. The defeated Mahdists, with 'Arabi Dafa' Allah at their head, fled to Bor.

But 'Arabi Dafa'Allah was not the kind of man to give up easily. In Bor he reorganized his forces, and by the summer he was ready to move against the Congolese now based in Rejaf. Thus three times during the months of August and September he moved to within a few hour's march of Rejaf but at the critical point each time he withdrew back to Bor. Meanwhile, raiding parties were sent to harry foraging Congolese parties or to destroy their isolated outposts. Finally, on June 4, 1898, in the middle of the night the Mahdists silently advanced and suddenly fell on Rejaf. Because they were caught unawares, the Congolese force lost over half

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of their soldiers killed; they even nearly lost the garrison to the Mahdists. After this daring but successful effort, the Mahdists retired back to Bor, where they stayed put, hoping all the while for reinforcements before they could make any further move.

But the *Khalifa* was, however, in no position to save them, for by that time the juggernaut that was the Anglo-Egyptian forces under General Kitchener was already advancing against Omdurman On April 8, 1898, the Anglo-Egyptian forces inflicted their first major victory against the Mahdists in the battle of Umm Dabi, near the present-day town of Atbara, in which the Mahdists lost 7,000 killed and wounded. Five months later, in the climactic battle of Karari on September 2, 1896, the Anglo-Egyptian forces defeated the Mahdists, killing 11,000 and wounding another 16,000, thus destroying the Mahdist state.

When the Mahdist state collapsed, 'Arabi Dafa'Allah and his small force were still holding out at Bor; they were the Mahdist state's only surviving symbol, just in the very situation that Emin Pasha and his Equatorials were. But in November 1898, an Anglo-Congolese force under the command of Colonel Cyril Godfrey Martyr moved out of Rejaf to crush this remnant of the Mahdiyya in Bor. 'Arabi Dafa'Allah was not obviously in a position to fight; neither would he surrender. Therefore, he and his men fled to Darfur through Bahr el-Ghazal, and brought Mahdist resistance to an end.

For the Southern Sudan, the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium was in many respects the beginning of a new era. Slavery, official excesses and wanton destruction of life and property, which so characterized the

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rule of the past sixty years (under the slave traders, the Turco-Egyptians, and the Mahdiyya), began gradually to fade in the past.

Notes and References

1. There were then two rival factions of the Sammaniyya in the Sudan, one led by *Shaykh* Muhammad Sharif Nur ad-Da'im, and the other by *Shaykh* al Qurashi w. al-Zain, an old and ailing man.

2. P.M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 36-7.

3. Holt, Ibid., 48. In view of the age and ailing condition of *Shaykh* Qurashi w. al-Zain, some critics regard Muhammad Ahmad's change of loyalty as opportunistic.

4. Holt, The Mahdist State, 52-3.

5. For the wider ideological implications of Mahdism, see Thomas Hodgkin's "Mahdism, Messianism and Marxism in the African Setting," in P.C.W. Gutkin and P. Waterman (eds.) African Social Studies: A Radical Reader (London: Heinemann, 1977).

6. Apart from their first success against the two companies of government soldiers on Aba Island, the Mahdists defeated local opposition at Jebel Jarada (Oct. 24, 1881); on December 9, 1881, they routed a 400 men force from Fashoda supported by 1,000 Shilluks. And on May 30, 1882, near Jebel Qadir, they defeated another government force of 4,000 men commanded by Yusuf Shellali.

7. These four factors are restated in Holt's The Mahdist State, 32.

8. Ibid., 33.

9. Schweinfurth, The Heart of Africa, 427.

10. Zubayr w. Rahma owned thirty *zeribas* in the province, each with a large following of northerners. Indeed, in his campaign against the Rizayqat in 1873 and Darfur in 1874, he was able to muster an army of 7,000 men, a figure which was probably a fraction of the military power at his disposal. See Junker, Travels in Africa, Vol. I, 401; Gray, History,

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11. For further details on the struggle between the traders and the government in Bahr el-Ghazal, see Richard Gray, History, 120-35.

12. Holt, The Mahdist State, 37.

13. Junker, Travels in Africa, Vol. I, 425.

14. Apart from Emin and Romolo Gessi who were appointed governors of Equatoria and Bahr el-Ghazal respectively, another Italian, G.B. Messedaglia, was also named governor of Darfur province. In 1881 the German Rudolf Carl Slatin was appointed governor of Darfur.

15. While Gordon would have preferred that this measure be carried out by Kordofan officials, it became apparent that the province did not have the necessary means to do so; so, he resorted to the authority of the Baqqara traditional chiefs.

16. Holt, The Mahdist State, 39.

17. For details of the history of increasing taxation in the North and the resulting deterioration of socioeconomic conditions, see Chapter One of this research.

18. Gordon's resignation was probably due to lack of financial support from Cairo following *Khedive* Isma'il's fall. Moreover, since the main preoccupation of the Tawfiq government was to make monies to service the national debt, it became clear to Gordon that his policies in the Sudan would inevitably suffer.

19. Holt, The Mahdist State, 40.

20. Mounteney-Jephson, Emin Pasha and the Rebellion at the Equator, (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1890), 242.

21. The reputation of the Latuka as a warlike people is clear in the remarks of a number of Western observers who had been to the area, including Samuel Baker and Emin Pasha himself. On hearing of Muhammad Taha's entry into Latuka, for example, Emin remarked that Taha "must have at least 300 guns with him, for he would never dare to enter that country with less." Regarding the absence of the slave trade in Tirrangore and, by extension, Latukaland, he said:
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Danagla troops... and since that time...it has been a place for the exchange of ivory. I say expressly 'exchange' because owing to the warlike character of the inhabitants the slave trade could not be carried on here.
See Schweinfurth et al., Emin Pasha in Central Africa, 235-36); and Mounteney-Jephson, Emin Pasha and Rebellion, p. 117.

22. At that time the territory encompassed by Latuka district consisted of the following subdistricts: Tirrangore (headquarters), Obbo, Kuron, Marangole, and dependencies. See Schweinfurth et al., Emin Pasha in Central Africa, 513.

23. Oral information by: Foccho Orryomo and Ottileng Anyah (Loronyo, 1979); Santino Oppyaha Itorong (Loudo, 1979); and Odwa Haworu (Torit, 1979).

At the time of the arrival of the Mahdists in Latukaland, there were some Latuka in Labore station in Madiland. It is not clear whether or not these were soldiers or employees of the government. It is possible that they were visitors who had come to the station for trading purposes. But whatever they were, Emin ordered the *mudir* of Labore, Selim Aga Matara to send them back to Latuka to ascertain the identity of the intruders.

24. Some of the details of the Loronyo-Tirrangore conflict can be found in Abannik O. Hino, "Latuka Country: An Outline of the Process of Colonial Encroachment and Reaction to it, 1840-1900," in Northeast African Studies, 4, 3(1982-83), 39-49. Also, a version of these events can also be found in Simon Simonse, Kings of Disaster, 110-15.

25. Ajaru must have been also a very ambitious but capable young man, because, as Emin found, he had practically taken control of the government in Tirrangore, while the old man, Chief Hujang, functioned only as the nominal ruler of the country. For details, see Emin Pasha, Tagebücher, Vol. II, 196, quoted by Simon Simonse in Kings of Disaster, 113; and Schweinfurth et al., Emin Pasha, 236.

26. Schweinfurth, et al., Emin Pasha, 236.

27. Leonard F. Nalder (Comp.) A Handbook of Mongalla Province (London: 1937), 20. In 1898, Maj. Herbert H. Austin was told that the "Sultan of Latuka" had joined the Mahdists to save his country from devastation. See Herbert H. Austin, With Macdonald in Uganda: A Narrative Account of the Uganda Mutiny and Macdonald Expedition in the Uganda

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Protectorate and the Territories to the North (London: Edward Arnold, 1903), 153-168. For details of Mahdist activities in Latukaland, see Abannik O. Hino, "Latuka Country," 1982, 39-49.

28. Quoted in Collins, The Southern Sudan, 56.

29. Aya Tambia adopted 'Umar as his Islamic name; he even fought many Mahdists battles. In fact, his help was critical in enabling the Mahdists to send expeditions over the Congo-Nile watershed and into the Wele valley. And when the Mahdists were forced to withdraw from Makaraka to Rejaf in 1890, Aya Tambia went with them, whence he was sent to Omdurman and presented to the Khalifa.

30. Simonse, Kings of Disaster, 101; and Collins, The Southern Sudan, 60, especially footnote no. 18. By the time the Mahdists arrived in Equatoria, Emin's soldiers had mutinied, since they were opposed to Emin's policy of abandoning the province and returning to Egypt with the Stanley Expedition. For three months Emin and Mounteney-Jephson were placed under house arrest to await trial. They were released owing to the panic and crisis created by the second Mahdist invasion. It is very likely that the chaos and disorganization resulting from the mutiny made it easier for the Mahdists to take over Equatoria.

31. By March 1891, the remnants of the Equatorial troops at Wadelai were 1,500 men or more; they were commanded by Fadl el-Mula. Kavali was never brought under the Turco-Egyptian administration. Nevertheless, some of the Equatorial troops, who refused to go with the Stanley Expedition, settled there. And while there is no estimate of the number of the settlers in Kavalli, they probably comprised several hundreds. They eventually became the nucleus of the Uganda colonial force, the so-called Sudanese soldiers.

32. In one estimate, 'Umar Salih wrote to the Khalifa that the Mahdist troops in Equatoria were dying at the rate of about 20 a day. Obviously, 'Umar Salih exaggerated the death rate. For example, of the reinforcements sent in 1889, only one-third of them died, thus suggesting a lower death rate.

33. Collins, The Southern Sudan, 77.

34. Ibid., 82.

35. Ibid., 83-4.

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36. Simonse Kings of Disaster, 102.

37. However, it does appear that the *Khalifa* considered Abu Qarja dangerous. As such, the real intention in sending him to the South was to get rid of the danger his presence in Omdurman posed. But even his tranfer to the South was not apparently enough, for the *Khalifa* secretly instructed his Baqqara loyalists to assassinate him at the earliest opportunity. Unfortunately for the *Khalifa*, the plot was discovered en route to Equatoria and a fight ensued in which the Baqqara were defeated.

38. In early 1894 the British rejected the Mackinnon Treaty, and signed, instead, the Anglo-Congolese Agreement on April 12 1894, with King Leopold. Britain agreed to lease to the Congo State the left bank of the Nile as far north as Fashoda and as far west as latitude 30 degree east, and the lease would remain in force for the duration of the reign of King Leopold. This territory became the Lado Enclave. In return, King Leopold recognized the "British Empire" as defined in the Anglo-German Agreement of July 1, 1890, and he leased to Great Britain a strip of territory connecting British East Africa with the North end of Lake Tanganyika. See Collins, The Southern Sudan, 93-4, and 121-124.

39. The Equatorial troops themselves helped to incite local rebellions by their insubordination and raiding, which made them a liability to the Congo Free State.

40. However, local revolts and the indiscipline of local troops had so undermined the Congo Free State that officials decided that it was not possible for them to confront the Mahdists. So, in December 1893, they evacuated the riverain stations of Labore and Dufile.

41. Collins, The Southern Sudan, 113-14. Although I was not able to conduct any oral interviews in the Imotong Mountain region, the battle may have occurred in Iloli since an oral source I collected there in 1979 fits in very well with many of the details described by Collins.

42. Collins, The Southern Sudan, 114.

43. Some of the most serious rebellions were at Bomokand, in which the irregulars massacred the regular soldiers and took over the station; the massacre of the Bonvalet-Devos column by the people of Bili; and there were mutinies within the forces of the Congo Free State itself.

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44. This may have been also the time when the Mahdist post in Tirrangore was withdrawn.

45. Simonse, Kings of Disaster, pp. 104-05.

46. After the Mahdists had been driven out of the Nile-Congo divide, the Congo Free State emerged as the most powerful force in the Wele Valley, which fact enabled it to impose stability in the region.

47. By the time the Congolese force reached Bedden, the raiding party which the Mahdists had sent to Zandeland had just returned to base in Rejaf.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This dissertation is about the political economy of Eastern Equatoria during the nineteenth-century. A central influence was the White Nile trade, itself a product of political and economic forces generated by the Turco-Egyptian colonial state in Northern Sudan.[1] For this reason, chapters one and two were devoted to examining the economic and fiscal policies of the Turco-Egyptian colonial state with the view to understanding how its needs led to the "opening" of the White Nile trade.

In this regard, the introduction of the White Nile trade accelerated the process of incorporation of Eastern Equatoria--and indeed the whole of Southern Sudan--into the expanding international merchant capitalism represented by the Zanzibari and Fazughli-Fadasi trade. Before then, most of the societies in the region lived in relative isolation. To be sure, there was a certain amount of commodity exchange in local products such as worked-iron, grain, salt, ochre, and livestock. However that local commodity exchange was limited in extent, and was a result of either scarcities brought about by adverse local climatic conditions, or of uneven distribution of raw materials due to differences in flora and fauna.[2] With the introduction of the Zanzibari trade and the White Nile trade, however, foreign commodities of high local value (glass beads, cowrie shells, copper bracelets, cotton cloths, etc.) entered local economies in the region. And because these foreign commodities offered new opportunities for

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wealth and prestige, the quest for them led to increased commercial contact in the region, thus breaking the relative isolation of the societies there.[3]

During its first two phases,[4] the White Nile trade was largely a river-based system in which the Khartoum traders (and government expeditions before them) plied up and down the river, stopping here and there to do business at convenient locations, or for an overnight stay. The traders continued this trading pattern until the trading season came to an end with the onset of the rainy season, at which point they would return to Khartoum to make the necessary preparations for the next trading season. Sometimes the trading came to an end before the stocks were all sold. In that case, the leftovers were frequently entrusted to local middlemen or agents to dispose of during the rest of the year.[5]

What is apparent in this river-based trading system is that the government expeditions and the White Nile traders were only half of the equation. The other half consisted of local middlemen and agents in the region itself. Indeed, without these middlemen and agents, the system would not have worked, or at least it would not have lasted for as long as it did. When all is said and done, therefore, the longevity of this phase speaks of the effectiveness of the local response to the new trading opportunities proffered by the White Nile trade, which calls for an explanation of that response.

While a more definitive statement on the nature of this local response may have to await further research, the background of the local middlemen and agents mentioned in the sources suggest that the key to understanding the nature of this local response is to analyze the social formation of the societies in

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the region. In other words, one has to look at the productive and reproductive relations of the societies in the region, as well as at the ideologies maintaining and justifying those relations. And the evidence indicates that both the productive and reproductive relations were such that they met at least the minimum profit requirements of all the traders involved.

Not surprisingly, local middlemen and agents tended to be the elites of their societies. That is, they were kings, rain-makers, local or section chiefs, and ritual functionaries in general. These elites commanded large amounts of wealth realized through appropriating economic and labor surplus of their subjects, and it was this accumulated wealth which they disposed in the White Nile trade. While many items of their wealth were only of local value, others were precisely those sought by the Khartoum traders, e.g. ivory, leopard-skin, lion-skin, and other hides. Indeed, many of the latter products were frequently the prerogative of the elites.[6]

In the final analysis, however, the elites dominated the White Nile trade was by political fiat. That is, the commerce represented unprecedented opportunities for wealth, and the elites understood that it could also have destabilizing consequences on the established traditional social order for two main reasons. First, by making it possible for private individuals to obtain and dispose of goods and services through market mechanisms, an open trade system could seriously undermine the ideological basis of appropriation by the elites. Above all, it might make it possible for the *nouveau riche* to establish their own autonomous power base thus challenging the established traditional social

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However, since the trade was itself an extension of existing local exchange networks, this meant that subsistence- and utility-oriented products also entered its orbit. For example, while it was perhaps easier for local middlemen to exchange ivory in certain local areas for glass-beads, copper bracelets, or other Khartoumer goods, in other areas it was instead easier to obtain it for worked iron (such as spades, spear heads, arrow heads, etc.) livestock, or grain.[7] To that extent, many of the local products ceased to have a purely subsistence or utility value, thereby opening up limited trading opportunities to peasant producers but only at the local level.

In the final analysis, then, one can see two levels of trade operating locally. The first was long-distance trade (i.e. the Zanzibari and the White Nile trade) in which both local and Khartoumer commodities were market-oriented. This level of trade was dominated by local elites. The second level, on the other hand, was local trade which was generally aimed at meeting or supplementing subsistence and/or utility needs, and it was therefore essentially the same thing as that between ecological niches. Consequently, peasant producers tended to be dominant at this level of trade.

By the early 1860s, however, the river-based system came to an end when the Khartoum traders penetrated the hinterland and established their trading stations there. Existing literature argues that this change was in

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However, this research argues that in Bariland, the change was in response to the chaos and insecurity resulting from a three-year drought and famine in the late 1850s. The traditional elites were blamed for the drought, and some of them even lost their lives for it, e.g. Nyigilo. Since the elites were the backbone of the local-side of the White Nile trade, their political problems made it difficult for them to secure ivory and other local products. In response, to this slackening, the White Nile traders decided to penetrate and establish trading stations in lands beyond turbulent Bariland.

The shift to hinterland stations coincided with peasant crisis in Northern Sudan, especially in Berber and Dongola provinces, where land alienation was increasingly driving peasants away from the land. A large number of this displaced population was recruited by the Khartoumers to serve as soldiers in the new hinterland stations.[9]

The shift from river-based to hinterland trading stations had far-reaching consequences for the trade and, indeed, for the region as a whole. First, the establishment of trading stations in the hinterland was the beginning of a process which ultimately led to the economic elimination of local agents and middlemen. However, the middlemen (who were by definition local elites) tried to hold on, and the result was confrontation that resulted in widespread violence, including

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A paradigm has recently emerged which attempts to explain the historical development of trade and commerce in the so-called Greater Nile Valley.[10] According to the paradigm, while the state (*sultan*) claimed ultimate right over land and trade, in practice he delegated these rights to his regional representative so as to secure their support and loyalty. The regional representative, in turn, delegated similar rights to their local representatives, and the overall result of these structured relations was a system of sub-infudation.

However, the delegation of these rights often enabled the subordinate officials to establish their own autonomous power bases, which threatened sultanic sovereignty. In response to such developments, the sultan, or his regional representative, revoked the assignee's grant and conferred it upon a newly appointed official. Janet Ewald refers to this inherent contradiction as the "dilemmas of political rule," and this palimpsest of ever changing relations led gradually to the erosion of central authority over land and trade. However, loss of control over trade seems to have occurred faster, leading to the emergence of private merchants who, in the long run, and through primitive accumulation, exerted strong influence on the state. Thus, the traders tended to thrive where the sociopolitical set-up was best in keeping with their interests. To that extent, therefore, the traders followed the state.[11]

Coming to nineteenth-century Southern Sudan, however, the paradigm appears to be quite inapplicable. First, with the exception of the Shilluk kingdom,

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the nexus of state, land, trade, and regional lords was not so critical as it was in Egypt or Northern Sudan. For example, in most societies there, state power was generally weak, largely because they did not have a standing army, the main instrument of state power. Instead, what one had was a citizen-army. Consequently, the power of the chiefs was embedded more in ideological notions rather than in actual military power. On the other hand, land, the primary means of production, was in abundance almost everywhere, and was communally owned.[12] The combined impact of land availability and its communal nature was to inhibit the development of land alienation, thus preventing the emergence of the sociopolitical dynamics implied by the paradigm. It certainly inhibited the rise of private traders, thereby helping to preserve the tributary social structures obtaining in the Southern Sudan as a whole.

The Khartoum traders saw this sociopolitical set-up as generally incompatible with their commercial interests. For example, the relative absence of a powerful central authority did not provide the necessary security for their business, while the proliferation of local authorities tended to increase overhead costs.[13] Therefore, to effect a change in the structure of the trade with the view to its expansion, the traders found it necessary to alter the social basis upon which it operated.

One way was for the traders to insinuate themselves in local traditional conflicts by allying with one chief against another, especially where societies were strong. Although this strategy appeared to preserve the chief's traditional

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power basis. in fact it made the chief increasingly dependent on the traders for that power. Where societies were weak, however, the strategy was outright conquest and usurpation of power. In that case, the people were reduced to vassals and required to pay tribute in livestock, grain, honey, copper, iron, etc, while the chiefs were required to insure the collection of the tribute, as well as to meet the other needs of the stations.[14]

The traders clearly had, in the words of Richard Gray, "established themselves as a ruling caste transcending the barriers of tribal society." And as if to underscore this sociopolitical change, the traders divided the country among themselves and paid Khartoum an annual tribute in return for the right to exploit their respective territories.[15] Needless to say, as local societies resisted this takeover, the result was widespread violence which the traders used, in turn, for securing slaves both for use in their stations as well as for sale in slave markets in Northern Sudan and abroad, particularly in Egypt and the Middle East.[16]

Existing scholarship has tended to explain this expanding violence in terms of a cultural and racial clash between the White Nile traders and Southern Sudanese. No doubt these factors played a significant part in that violence, however, they do not explain the context within which that conflict was fought. To be sure, the traders were bearers of an Arab-Islamic culture and ideology which not only set them apart but often also became potent symbols of the underlying sociopolitical transformation implied by the conflict. However, fundamentally, the conflict was a struggle for control over trade.[17]

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The commercial expansion in Southern Sudan coincided with the European geographical exploration of East Africa, particularly the efforts focusing on the source of the Nile. Through the reports of these explorers, particularly those of John Speke, James Grant, and Samuel Baker, the international community got to know not only of the geography of the region, but also of its economic and commercial importance. Speke and Grant were so emphatic about the economic importance of the region that they went as far as to call for immediate occupation of Gondokoro and for the establishment of imperial control of much of Southern Sudan.[18] It was not therefore by coincidence that soon after his interview with Speke and Grant, viceroy Isma'il initiated measures which, by 1871, culminated in the annexation of Eastern Equatoria and most of Southern Sudan.

However, establishing an effective administration of the province proved difficult. First, Khartoum underestimated the problems of annexing the region and, accordingly, did not provide the expedition with the necessary resources. Consequently, Baker's efforts to establish a foothold and lay down the foundations of the administration of his province often became a desperate struggle. Baker's problems worsened especially after the al-'Aqqad company reneged supplying the expedition, forcing Baker to take his necessities from the population all by force. The resistance which these actions provoked, complicated the situation further, and it was only due to its military superiority that the expedition survived, albeit barely.

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The problem of inadequate financial and material support from Khartoum continued to be a perennial problem, and Baker's successor, Colonel Charles G. Gordon, attempted to solve it by establishing a regular steamer service between Gondokoro (and later Lado) with Khartoum. Gordon hoped that the boats would bring in regular supplies which could be placed in government stores to be issued regularly to the troops as rations. However, the boat service did not always come with regular or sufficient supplies, which suggested that Khartoum did not have enough budget for the province. Therefore, to meet the shortfall, and then only after establishing a degree of security and authority, Gordon introduced taxes (or tribute) which was paid in *dhurra* and was collected twice a year.

This taxation/tribute system became fairly established after Emin Pasha became governor. He was quite successful in establishing security and government authority over large areas, and the increase in tax (tribute) revenues which resulted from this extension enabled the governor to meet most of the basic food needs of his troops and civilian staff. Emin could therefore look to the future with much optimism. However, this optimism was not to be, for in 1877-1879 Khartoum was preoccupied with suppressing a series of rebellions in Bahr el-Ghazal, Darfur, and Kordofan. And what was more, the Mahdist revolution broke out in 1881. The suppression of these rebellions cost the central government scarce financial resources, resulting in lower budget allocations for remote provinces. The problem was further exacerbated for

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Equatoria by the sudd, which blocked the Nile for several years beginning in late 1878, making communication between Lado and Khartoum well nigh impossible.

The upshot of these financial difficulties forced the provincial government in Lado to meet the shortfall by increasing the taxes (tribute). Higher taxes drew local resistance, which in turn worsened the supply situation for the troops. The tax-tribute collectors in turn became impatient with this resistance and frequently resorted to force to obtain supplies for the troops. The vicious cycle of response and counter-response ultimately led into a situation in which the collection of tax/tribute degenerated literally into a raiding exercise. And what was more, the tax/tribute was often demanded three or four times over in the year.

Bariland was one of the districts that suffered most from the abuse of the tax/tribute collection because of the pressure to support the six garrisons based there. Not surprisingly, an organized rebellion broke out in Bariland in 1883 under the overall leadership of Bariland's principle figure, Bepo-lo-Nyigilo. The rebellion was triggered by the government's seizure of 3,000 head of cattle, most of which apparently belonged to Bepo himself. And by early 1884 the rebellion spread to the Mundari, Nyangbara, Pajelu and also to the Aliab and Bor Dinkas. Eastern Equatoria was thus already in the midst of a raging anti-government rebellion by the time the Mahdist advance force crossed into the province in October 1884. Although the Mahdists came to within a few hours' march from Lado, they however suffered high casualties. In fact, the losses were so high, and their position so tenuous, that by May 1885 they decided to withdraw to Bahr el-Ghazal. While the people might have been initially inclined to ally with the

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Mahdists, and some even joined them, Mahdist atrocities caused many others to rethink their position and to rally to the support of the government instead.

After the Mahdist withdrawal, however, local rebellions began once more to build up because of raiding by the troops. In Bariland the rebellion broke out in October 1885, led again by Bepo. The situation there worsened when shortly thereafter the Bari *tarajma* (interpreters) in Rejaf defected to the rebels, which prompted the government to abandon the less defensible garrison of Gondokoro. And by 1886 local rebellions gradually coalesced into one movement; for example, in their assault on Lado and Rejaf, the Bari were joined by the Aliab, Bor, Agar, Ciir, Mundari, Pajulu, and the Nyangbara. Although these coalition forces were repulsed with heavy losses from both garrisons, the rebellion continued nonetheless, and by 1887 Lado was evacuated and the troops concentrated in Rejaf. Therefore, when the Mahdists invaded Equatoria again in October 1888, the destruction, frustration, and anger suffered by the Bari were such that they quickly allied with the Mahdists against Emin's Equatorial troops.

However, no sooner had the Mahdists succeeded in supplanting the Equatorial troops than they began to experience the same supply problems that confronted every regime in Equatoria. Indeed, the supply situation was worse for the Mahdists, for soon after their military successes against the Equatorial troops in 1888, Equatoria ranked low on the Omdurman's priority list; as a matter of fact, Equatoria became a place of banishment for the opponents of Khalifa 'Abdullahi. Above all, in 1889 Northern Sudan experienced a severe drought which, in combination with the effects of war and the resultant breakdown of law

and order, diminished Omdurman's capacity to meet all the logistics and emergency situations of its troops, particularly those in distant provinces like Equatoria.[19] Consequently, the Mahdists there to obtain their supplies locally. However, since the people would not contribute voluntarily, the Mahdists resorted to taking the supplies by force. But this imposition in turn touched off widespread resistance which, combined with the difficulties of securing provisions, forced the Mahdists to evacuate Rejaf (and by extension Bariland) and relocate to Bor. Incensed by the withdrawal, the Khalifa sent reinforcements and ordered the reoccupation of Rejaf, which was done in June 1893.

However, by the, a new power, the Congo Free State, had also entered the scene intent on taking over Equatoria. Faced with this new "Christian" invasion, Omdurman revived interest in Equatoria and determined to defeat the "Christian" threat by sending large reinforcements to the province. With these reinforcements, the Mahdists were able to quell local rebellions and to confront the Congo Free State. Even then, their control of the country remained nominal, for apart from periodic foraging raids sent to the hinterland, they were based almost exclusively in Rejaf in Bariland. It was therefore Bariland that suffered most from the Mahdist occupation, and to escape this constant sequestration by the Mahdists, many Bari communities fled to neighboring peoples. The emigration exacerbated the supply situation for the Mahdists. It would seem, therefore, that the decision by the Mahdists to establish their posts in the Zaïre-Nile watershed was motivated as much by the need to confront the Congo Free State as by the desire to insure provisions from those fertile lands.

With the supply situation thus improved, the Mahdists were in a position to confront the Congo Free State. Initially, the Mahdists had the upper hand in the confrontation, but after the Congo Free State reorganized and consolidated its position in the area under its control, the fortunes reversed and the Mahdists lost ground steadily. Finally, on February 16 and 17, 1897, they were routed and their stronghold of Rejaf taken. The remnants retreated to Bor where they held out in the hope of receiving reinforcements from Omdurman. No help came, however, for Omdurman was by then engaged in a desperate struggle with the Anglo-Egyptian invasion of the Sudan that began in 1896.[20] Despite their precarious position in Bor, however, the Mahdists continued to harass the Free State forces in Rejaf; indeed, in one of their surprise attacks, they came close to taking Rejaf. But in November 1898, an Anglo-Congolese force commanded by Colonel Cyril Martyr marched on Bor and forced the Mahdists to retreat to Darfur. Thus, by the end of 1898 the Mahdist regime came to an end everywhere in the Sudan.

Footnotes and References

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1. Indeed, as recent local studies indicate, Egyptian secondary empire in the Sudan produced forces that were felt in areas and regions far beyond its confines. For analysis regarding the significance of this Egyptian secondary empire, see Janet Ewald's Soldiers, Traders, and Slaves: State Formation and Economic Transformation in the Greater Nile Valley (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990); and Lidwien Kapteijns's Mahdist Faith and Sudanic Tradition: History of Dar Masalit, 1870-1930 (London: 1985).

2. An example of exchange between ecological niches was that between Bariland and Lafon. Whereas Bariland had iron

and salt deposits, Lafon had cattle, ivory, hides, and other animal products. Consequently, trade with Bariland became a vehicle by which Lafon acquired these two important products, iron and salt.

3. It is important to note that because they were keenly sought, these foreign luxury goods helped increase exchange in local products. For example, in order to take advantage of different demands, local or White Nile traders might decide to exchange these coveted goods for products such as iron, grain, livestock, salt, etc. These would then be taken to where they were in demand and sold for ivory.

4. The first phase was from 1841 to 1852. During this phase, the White Nile trade was the monopoly of the government. Accordingly, the government sent annual trading to Eastern Equatoria. The second phase began in 1852 when the government abandoned its monopoly of the trade and opened it to private traders. However, the trade remained a river-based system until 1861, when the traders penetrated and established trading stations in the hinterland.

5. Since it was expensive to own or hire a steamer needed to participate in the White Nile trade, only traders who could afford it were able to take advantage of the new trading opportunities. Consequently, a small group of European and Levantine traders came to dominate the White Nile trade. Their domination was largely due to three factors: (a) they had access to financial credit institutions in Cairo or Alexandria; (b) some of them were trading consuls (i.e. traders-cum-consuls) in Khartoum, the immunities and privileges of which position they exploited to promote their business interests; and (c) those of them that were private individuals nevertheless placed themselves under the protection of one or other of the European consulates, which guaranteed them protection and rights under the 1841 Commercial Convention.

6. Among the Latuka, for example, leopard and lion skins were the prerogative of the rain-maker. The rain-maker also received one tusk of every elephant killed, and also half the hide of every giraffe killed.

With respect to other societies in the Southern Sudan, the Nuer have the institution of leopard-skin chief, who is believed to have a sacred association with the land, and had thus the power to bless or curse the land. For this reason, the leopard-skin chief was entitled to the leopard skin.

The Shilluk, on the other hand, believed that the leopard belonged to their sacred ancestor. Consequently, anyone who was found involved in transacting a leopard skin was fined a certain number of cattle which was to be paid to the Reth.

7. During his stay in Tirrangore, for example, Baker found that he could purchase supplies with salt and not with glass-beads. Also, in Liria he could purchase nothing for any article except *molotes*, i.e. locally made iron hoes. See his Albert N'Yanza, Vol. I, 129, and Vol. II, 224.

8. Endre Stiansen, "Overture to Imperialism; European Trade and Economic Change in the Sudan in the Nineteenth Century" (Ph.D. Thesis, the University of Bergen, 1993), 179. On the other hand, Richard Gray argues that the change was due to a market glut in beads.

9. Indeed, it can be argued that without this economic dislocation, the establishment of hinterland stations in Eastern Equatoria might have been delayed.

10. Janet Ewald restricts the term "Greater Nile Valley," only to Egypt and the Sudan, and not to the whole Nile valley which, at the very least, should include Ethiopia and Uganda.

11. This paradigm is best articulated by Janet Ewald in her Soldiers, Traders, and Slaves, especially in Chapter 6. The theme also emerges in Spaulding's The Heroic Age in Sennar; Rex O'Fahey's State and Society in Dar Fur and; Terence Walz, Trade Between Egypt and Bilad al-Sudan.

12. This communal control over land was, however, often exercised either through clan-head, or through a council of elders.

13. As they traversed the country, the Khartoumers were often required to make "presents" to chiefs. For example, while passing through Lokoyaland, Samuel Baker had to give presents to chiefs Tombe and Legge of Tollogo and Liria respectively, and the traders travelling with him. Moreover, the presents were quite substantial, for Baker gave Legge more than fifteen heavy copper bracelets and ten pounds of beads. See his Albert N'Yanza, Vol. I, 118 and 126-128.

14. This conquest was more successful in western Bahr el-Ghazal and parts of western Equatoria than in Eastern Equatoria. See Gray, History, 46 and; Shukry, The Khedive

Isma'il and Slavery in the Sudan (Cairo: Librairie la Renaissance d'Egypte, 1938), 119-20.

15. Although the payments were in part to regularize one's position with the government, they can also be interpret as rent, suggesting that Khartoum was now farming the South out to private traders even though that region had not been annexed yet. Endre Stiansen sees the process as follows. First, the hinterland stations were used for hunting. However, as excessive slaughter emptied large areas of elephants (he says more than 10,000 elephants were killed in the Upper Nile basin in the peak years), these stations were later transformed into "centres of a system of exploitation which divided the country between the ivory merchants and made the indigenous population subject to the lords of the *zaribas*." For the details of his analysis, see his "Overture to Imperialism," 183-198.

16. With respect to the increase in slave raiding, the driving force was the demand for slaves in Northern Sudan, Egypt, and other countries of the Middle East. As for the indigenous people, there appears to have been no interest in slaves, and this disinterest is indicated by the fact that even during their raids, these people appear to have been more interested in taking cattle and other kinds of booty than in slaves. In fact, the kind of widespread brigandage that some historians believe emerged in parts of West Africa in response to local and long-distance slave markets failed in Sudan to generate local interest in slaves. For an analysis of this phenomenon in West Africa, see Meillassoux, The Anthropology of Slavery: The Womb of Iron and Gold (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 143-323.

17. Local resistance, while often sporadic and not universal, was nonetheless long-drawn and protracted. It is, however, difficult to compress it into a few pages; on the other hand, a more comprehensive treatment of the subject would be too wieldy for this study, as the examination and analysis of its issues would be too involved as to merit a separate study. For a synopsis of the subject, see Abannik O. Hino, "Latuka Country," in, Northeast African Studies, Vol. 4, 3(1982-83), 39-49.

18. While Speke seemed indifferent as to who would undertake the occupation, Baker, on the other hand, believed that only a European power could be trusted to do it. To Baker, the ability to exploit the region's economic resources depended to a very large extent on suppressing

the slave trade there. Therefore, since oriental powers uphold slavery as a necessary institution, occupation by them would instead lead to the destruction of the region. For a discussion of Speke's and Baker's views on this, see 'Abbas Ibrahim Muhammad 'Ali, The British, the Slave Trade and Slavery in the Sudan (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1972), 22-42. Also, S.W.Baker, Albert N'Yanza; Great Basin of the Nile, Vol. II, (London: MacMillan & Co., 1866), 515-16.

19. Rudolf C. Slatin Pasha, C.B., Fire and Sword in the Sudan: A Personal Narrative of Fighting and Serving the Dervishes 1879-1895, trans., F.R. Wingate (London: Edward Arnold, 1897)

20. Despite their steadfast defense, the Mahdists were no match against the invading army and went from defeat to defeat. However, the biggest defeats were in the battles of Umm Dabi (April 8, 1898) and Karari (September 2, 1898) in which 7,000 and 11,000 Mahdists were respectively killed. Indeed, it was Karari that sealed the Mahdist fate.

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