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LIBRARY
Michigan State
University

 

 

 

This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

BUILDERS OF THE MODEL T:
Some Aspects of the Quality of Life and Social History
of Highland Park 1910-1927

presented by

Clarence Odell Hooker

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

PhD. degree in History

 

 

(laid/W1 Ew/Lw

Major professor

Date February 26, 1988

 

MSU is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771

 

 

 

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remove this checkout from
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BUILDERS OF THE MODEL T:
Some Aspects of the Quality of Life and Social History
of Highland Park 1910-1927

By
Clarence Odell Hooker

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1988

ABSTRACT
BUILDERS OF THE MODEL T:

some ASPECTS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE AND
SOCIAL HISTORY OF HIGHLAND PARK 1910-1927

BY

Clarence 0. Hooker

This dissertation is an initial step into the
exploration of the history of Highland Park, Michigan; it
he a study which is easily classified as labor history,
community studies and social history. The primary aim is
to understand how the Ford Motor Company‘s production,
employment and nanagerial policies at the Crystal Palace
influenced the quality of life of the City of Highland
Park and the average Model T worker.

In an effort to build a profile of the population of
Highland Park, the study relies heavily on numerical
data, especially census reports, and a variety of
statistics found in the Ford Motor Company Archives, the
Bentley Historical Library and the Burton Historical
Collection.

The study concludes: (1) Demographic
transformation was one of the most immediate results of

employment practices at the Crystal Palace, and the rate

of population change was greater in Highland Park than
in any other city in the US. (2) While Ford's
Sociological Department worked to create a new type of
worker, a new class of managers was incubating in the
Crystal Palace; this study argues that this ‘new class of
managers' played a greater role in displacing skilled
workmen than the inmugrants that Ford sought to
Americanize. (3) Highland park may have been the earliest
case of a city to 'deteriorate' as a result of a major
automotive company's decision to relocate a primary
facility. (4) Vhihe it is correct to argue that Ford
led the automotive industry in the employment of black
workers, the argument needs to be modified to reflect the
reality that Ford hired a sdgnificantly smaller
percentage of blacks in the Crystal Palace. (5) More
generally, it was found that many workers profited from
Ford policies. Whatever advantages accrued to Model T
workers, they were often achieved at the expense of

privacy, autonomy, and perhaps dignity and self-esteem.

Copyright by
Clarence O. Hooker

1988

Abstract
List of Tables

List of laps

Introduction

Chapter One:

Chapter Two:

Chapter Three:

Chapter Four:

Chapter Five:

Chapter Six:

Chapter Seven:

Conclusions

Appendices

Bibliography :

TABLE OF COITEITS

Highland Park Before The Crystal
Palace: The Genesis of a Midwestern
Island Community

Birth of The Hodel T Assembly Line:
The Big Event In The History of
Highland Park

The Model T Cohort and The Demographic
Transition of Highland Park

Taylor-lads: Occupational
Stratification In The Crystal Palace

Ford’s Welfare Vork: Americanization
And The Holding of the Ford Ian

Ford Hen Living In: Boarding and
Boarders in Highland Park c.1910-1927

Black and Vhite Workers in the Shadows
of the Crystal Palace: Some Concluding
Observations on the Quality of Life in
Highland Park and Vicinity 1910-1927

: Appendix A

Appendix B

Page
11-111
iv-vi

vi

9-30

31-56

57-84

85-130

131-168

169-184

185-236
237-245
246-250
251-266

267-281

Table

LIST OF TABLES

DETROIT REGION (BEA# 71) POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS INCLUDING PERCENT FOREIGN

BORN; PERCENT BLACK; RATIO OF MALES TO FEMALES;
PERCENT POPULATION ADULT; VALUE ADDED PER
CAPITA IN MANUFACTURE; AND NUMBER IN TOTAL
POPULATION 1860-1960

MAJOR GROUPS IN DETROIT 1910 AND 1930

FOREIGN BORN VHITE BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
HIGHLAND PARK 1920 AND 1930

TOTAL POPULATION OF HIGHLAND PARK FOR
1910, 1915,, 1920 AND 1930 BY SEX, RACE
AND RATIO OF MALES TO FEMALES OVER

21 YEARS OF AGE

TOTAL POPULATION OF HIGHLAND PARK, MICHIGAN:
NUMBER AND RATIO OF MALES TO FEMALES OVER
21 BY ENUMERATION DISTRICT, 1915

BLACK POPULATION OF HIGHLAND PARK IN TVLEVE
ENUMERATION DISTRICTS BY NUMBER OF MALES
AND FEMALES, 21 AND OVER, 1915

TOP-TEN EMPLOYERS IN HIGHLAND PARK RANKED
BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES, 1920

NUMBER OF HOURLY EMPLOYEES AT THE CRYSTAL
PALACE: 1911-1933

NUMBER OF MODEL Ts PRODUCED EACH YEAR 1908-1927

DETROIT WORKERS IN METAL INDUSTRIES BY
OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION, 1891

FORD EMPLOYEES AS OF JANUARY 1917: BY
OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION

vi

Page

59

63

64

68

73

74

80

86

87

98

99

AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY OCCUPATIONS BY SKILL
CLASSIFICATION AND NUMBER EMPLOYED,
DETROIT 1920

NATIONALITIES AND RELIGIONS OF FORD'S
CRYSTAL PALACE EMPLOYEES IN JANUARY 1916
BY NUMERICAL PROMINENCE

OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF HIGHLAND PARK AUTOMOTIVE
WORKERS, BY ETHNIC GROUP AND OCCUPATIONAL
CLASSIFICATION

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF FORD'S CRYSTAL PALACE
EMPLOYEES: A COMPARISON BY PERCENT FOR 1914 AND
1916

PHYSICALLY SUB-STANDARD EMPLOYEES IN THE
CRYSTAL PALACE TABULATED FROM INFORMATION ON
44,500 WORKERS

A SAMPLE OF INJURIES IN THE CRYSTAL PALACE
WHICH WERE RECORDED DURING 1914 AND 1915

COMPARATIVE STATUS OF LIVING CONDITIONS OF
CRYSTAL PALACE WORKERS AS DETERMINED BY
SOCIOLOGY DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATIONS,

1914, 1915 AND 1916 BY PERCENT

URBAN LEAGUE'S COUNT OF BLACK IMMIGRANTS:
MAY 1920

NUMBER OF ROOMS OCCUPIED, FAMILY SIZE,
AND RENTS PAID: A SAMPLE OF 407 DETROIT
HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD 1918

YEARS OF SERVICE IN THE CRYSTAL PALACE FOR
45,351 WORKERS AS OF APRIL 25, 1925

WORKER PRODUCTIVITY FOR THE MODEL T FORD
1909-1913, BY MONTHLY AVERAGE

DAY WAGES IN THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY, ABOUT
1910

NUMBEDR AND PERCENT OF FORD WORKERS BY
OCCUPATION 1913

vii

115

119

122

152

155

158

177

192

199

246

247

247

248

A.5

A.6

l.

1.2

3.

7.

1

1

1

AGES OF 44,519 EMPLOYEES IN THE CRYSTAL

PALACE AS OF APRIL 25, 1925 249
VOTE ON NEW CHARTER BY WARDS: JUNE 25, 1918 250
LIST OF MAPS
ZUNZ'S: “DETROIT AND ENVIRONS' 10

MAP OF THE CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK: WAYNE COUNTY
MICHIGAN 11

PLAT OF HIGHLAND PARK, MICHIGAN, SHOWING
BOUNDARIES OF ENUMERATION DISTRICTS AT THE
SPECIAL CENSUS OF NOVEMBER 15, 1915 69

LEVINE'S: CITY OF DETROIT 1926, WITH

PERCENTAGE DENSITY OF BLACK POPULATION,
ARRANGED BY 1925 CITY CENSUS ZONES 194

viii

I NTRODUCT I OH

Scholars devoted to the study of the history of
Detroit and the automotive industry have recently
called for a change in focus. Meyers, for example has
noted that while biographies and autobiographies of the
emperors and barons of the automotive industry abound,
the histories of the workers have not been written. In
stark contrast to the history of the barons which has
been given so much attention, the history of automotive
workers such as those who toiled in Ford's Highland Park
plant (i.e., the Crystal Palace) remains hidden in the
Corners of the shops and departments throughout the
automotive belt (Meyer, 1981:4). Nora Faires is among
those who have made a call for a change in the focus of
studies aimed at elucidating the history of Detroit and
the automotive industry.

In her recent review essay, Nora Faires concluded
that the books of Babson, Meyer and Zunz all added to
the limited understanding of Detroit's ethnic groups of
the late nineteenth centuries; "the influx of foreign-
born workers of the Highland Park plant undergirds
Meyer's discussion of the changing policies implemented

in the factory; the shifting fortunes of the city‘s

immigrant groups is the centerpiece of Zunz's analysis,
and accounts of immigrant workers weave through Babson's
saga (Faires, 1985:16). But, and this is the important
point, ”despite each author's concern with ethnic
issues, the thinness of the secondary literature shows
through the books, diluting their descriptions of the
city's changing ethnic mosaic" (Faires, 1985:5). Given
her special interest in women's history, Faires is most
emphatic in noting that "the paucity of research on the
lives of the city's women and the isolation of women‘s
history from the mainstream of social history
impoverishes all three books" (Faires, 1985:5). It is
in the final paragraph of her astute critique that
Faires makes the most useful appeal for a change in
focus. Here, she argues that the full historical
reconstruction of Detroit's past will require that we
know more about domestic servants, beauticians, waiters,
and Janitors; more about those outside the paid labor
force, such as those tending children, the unemployed,
and the aged; and more about various neighborhoods in
the vast urban expanse, from the central city to the
suburb. (Faires, 1985: 17).

If the perspectives of Meyers and Faires are
correct, as this writer believes they are, then it is

time for two shifts in focus. First, it is time to

shift from Henry Ford, Ransom E. Olds, Walter Chrysler,
the Dodge Brothers, et al., that is from the so-called
emperors and barons of Detroit, to the heretofore
anonymous men, women and children whose energy fueled
the industrial expansion, and whose collective biography
is hidden in a variety of statistical reports, personnel
department narratives, and (perhaps) in Upton
Sinclair's, THE FLIVVER KING. Secondly, it is time to
analyze Detroit in terms of the larger regional
context; that is to say in terms of Wayne County and the
surrounding counties out of which Detroit was carved.
And, at the same time, it is necessary to understand how
various neighborhoods and suburbs within Detroit were
shaped by Detroit's growing pains. As Warner has put
it, it is time to ask, “What is the changing
distribution of population and economic activities
within a changing area?" And, "where did Newark fit
into the settlement patterns of New York:" (Warner,
1977:68); or as it is more appropriate in this instance,
where did the city of Highland Park fit into the
settlement scheme of Detroit?

Olivier Zunz's book, THE CHANGING FACE OF
INEQUALITY: URBANIZATION, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND
IMMIGRATION IN DETROIT 1880-1920 (1982), has dominated

this writer's thinking about how to analyze the

interaction between the Ford Motor Company and the
community of Highland Park. Recognized as a modern
classic, Zunz's study has shown the relationship of
industrial growth and changing patterns of inequality,
but has not specified the impact of particular
industries or firms. Utilizing a variety of
sophisticated statistical and sampling techniques, and
focusing on industrial expansion, land use patterns, and
inter-ethnic social mobility, Zunz's work builds upon
earlier studies (among which David Katzman, Stephen
Thernstrom, and Forester B. Washington's studies are
prominent), and an. impressive array of primary
materials. Among the major findings of this important
study is that, by 1920, race and class had replaced
ethnicity as the best explanation of inequality in
Detroit. That is to say, "translated into city's space,
inequality took many faces, from largley self-imposed
segregation. of 'the nineteenth. century’ ethnic
communities, to the enforced segregation of Blacks in
the twentieth century“ (Zunz, 1982: 403).

Generally speaking, Zunz's work is important
because it has added to our understanding of the
relationship of race, ethnicity and class to industrial
growth in early twentieth century Detroit;and because,

as a 'methodological guidebook' it is incomparable.

More significantly however, Zunz's book is important
because in its brilliance, it demonstrates the need for
studies which focus more directly on the quality of life
of a particular locality (e.g., a six sided-block), and
on a particular people, and which considers the
consequences of industrial expansion and contraction.
In the final analysis, as Faires has concluded, Zunz's
work demonstrates the need for a shift in focus.

This study of the umbilical connection between
the City of Highland Park and the Ford Motor Company is
conceived as an initial response to those who recognize
the need for a new focus which (1) gives primary
consideration to the wage-laborer and the underclass of
the automotive empire; (2) gives systematic
consideration to the quality of life, and understands
the quality of life to be a function of industrial
expansion and contraction; and (3) looks at these
concerns from a historical perspective. In short, by
focusing on a select group at a very particular point in
the history of the automotive industry, this research
hopes. to contribute to the understanding' of how' the
expansion. and contraction of the Crystal Palace
affected the quality of life in Highland Park.

Even though Highland Park, or what this researcher

has come to think of as the town that the Model T built,

was the birth place of the modern assembly line, and the
first city which clearly owed its existence to the
automotive industry, relatively little scholarly
attention has been devoted to understanding the social
history of this small, yet extraordinarily important
community. With the exception of Ellen Hathaway's two
books, the HISTORY OF HIGHLAND PARK (which was written
for children), and FROM WILDERNESS TO CITY, along with
the ubiquitous paragraph or two in prominent works such
as Nevins and Zunz's, there are apparently no published
studies focusing on the history of Highland Park. To
reiterate then, in an effort to add to our knowledge of
the region, the principal aim of this research is to
understand the historic relationship between the Ford
Motor Company and Highland Park, and to understand how
that relationship affected the quality of life in that
municipality c.1910—1927.

More specifically, and in the order in which they
appear in this dissertation, the present analysis of the
relationship» of the expansion. and. contraction. of the
Ford Motor Company in Highland Park and the quality of
life in that community includes the following. Chapter
One, ”Highland Park Before The Crystal Palace: The
Genesis of a Midwestern Island Community,” provides

some insight into what the community was like before the

coming of the Crystal Palace; and a special effort is
made to identify the movers and shakers, and to show how
they helped to shape the economdc life of the community,
and to lay the foundation for its transformation.
Chapter Two, ”Birth of The Model T Assembly Line: The
Big Event In The Social History of Highland Park,“ is a
discussion of the main features in the evolution of the
production processes in the Crystal Palace c.1910-1914;
the goal in this chapter is to show how advances in
machine-tool technology laid the foundation for the
"logical next step," the moving assembly line whose
appetite for labor resulted in an unprecedented,
explosive change in the size and composition of the
community. Chapter Three, ”The Model T Cohort and The
Demographic Transition of Highland Park," outlines the
major demographic changes resulting from the demands of
the new system of production, and attempts to understand
these changes as part of a larger trend. Chapter Four,
"Taylor-Made: Occupational Stratification In The Crystal
Palace," looks at the new pattern of stratification in
the plant, and a special attempt is made to explain how
the principles of scientific management contributed to
the development of a new manager-class. Chapter Five,
"Ford's Welfare Work: The Americanization And Molding of

The Ford Man," is an assessment of the impact of Ford‘s

profit-sharing plan and its affect on Ford workers;
special attention is directed towards understanding the
work of Ford's Sociological Department and its
effectiveness in improving the quality of life of the
"ethnics" who labored in the Crystal Palace. ”Ford Men
Living In: Boarding and Boarders c.1910-1927," the sixth
chapter, is a discussion of home and housing conditions
in Highland Park and Ford's efforts to improve them.
The next chapter , "Black and White Workers in the‘
Shadows of the Crystal Palace: Some concluding
Observations on the Quality of Life in Highland Park and
Vicinity 1910-1927," is based on findings presented in
preceding chapters and additional material relating to
the Black community. The nain goal of this chapter is
to shed some light on the quality of life in Highland
Park by contrasting Highland Park with a distinctly
different community. Finally, the "Conclusions,"
makes note of some of the most important findings,
discusses some of the key data problems, and considers
the direction that future research might take.

Throughout this study, the major aim has been to
identify' a strategy, and sources of data which will
permit the longtitudinal analysis of (quality of life
issues, and. with. a little luck, to «engender further

study of the Crystal Palace and Highland Park.

CHAPTER ONE

HIGHLAND PARK BEFORE THE CRYSTAL PALACE:
THE GENESIS OF A MIDWESTERN ISLAND COMMUNITY

Highland Park, first known as Woodwardville,
and later Whitewood before becoming Highland Park in

1889, was carved out of a virtual wilderness where the

life cycle was determined by the seasons. Wild
animals, including deer, bear, and turkeys were
plentiful , and honey bees and mosquitoes were
numerous.1 A variety of trees thrived in the area,

pine, elm, and oak trees dotted the landscape, but the
whitewood tree was especially prominent.2 In the
spring, the fragrance of flowering fruit trees and
berry bushes mingled with the scents of wild animals
in various stages of their reproductive cycles, the
barnyard manures, and the heavy springtime odor of
hogs. Summer harvests gave way to the cool breezes of
fall which carried ducks, geese and other fowl in
their southward migration while the reds, yellows and
oranges of the trees painted, first the horizon and
then the landscape. Cold, deep white winters slowed
the pace of human and animal life, as the cycle

started anew.

MAP 1.1
DETROIT AND ENVIRONS

 

CANADA

.0“.- Imam

3%
10M

 

CANADA

 

 

 

 

MAP 1.2

MAP OF THE CITY OF
HIGHLAND PARK

'3' TN!

CITY

HIGHLAND "BARK

WAYNE CCU

hflCFNQAN

acanc .. .' . moo'

 

12

This erstwhile wilderness is located about
six miles northeast of downtown Detroit in what was
once Greenfield Township, and lies entirely within
the city linuts of Detroit. Trapezoidal in shape and
about 647 feet above sea level, Highland Park's 2.98
square miles. are bisected by Woodward Avenue;
McNichols Road (formerly Six Mile Road) marks the
northern boundary, while Tuxedo and Tennyson Avenues
are the southern boundary of Highland Park. The Grand
Trunk Railroad right-of-way and Thompson Avenue serve
as the eastern and western boundaries respectively.
It was as a result of an accident that this wilderness
was opened to settlement.

The entire city of Detroit was destroyed by
fire in 1805; in order that a new court house and jail
could be built, the federal government gave the city
of Detroit permission to sell land north of Grand
Boulevard, including: the swamp land. where Highland
Park would be built. Thus, it was as an indirect
result of the 1805 fire that federal lands were
publicly sold.

In 1818 the 'highland', which was separated
from Detroit by a swamp, was purchased by Judge
Agustus B. Woodward, but owing to the obstacles

presented by the swamp, his attempts to found a

13

village were unsuccessful. The swamp was also the
major obstacle for B.F.H. Withersell, another Detroit
judge who attempted to found a village in l836f‘
Although there were settlers, the area would not
achieve the status of a village until Captain William
H. Stevens' efforts had attracted enough financial
backing to eliminate the swamp.

Most of the early settlers were New England
Prostestants. The first known settler, Richard Ford,
(not related to the Henry Ford Family) a farmer of
English descent arrived in c.1818. Ford built his
cabin on a ridge which was separated from Detroit by a
swamp; the ridge (i.e., the highland) has since been
leveled, but it was the geographic feature for which
the village would ultimately be named. Richard Ford's
son, George Thomas Ford was born c.1843 in Greenfield
Township. The Fords were farmers who tilled the soil
with a wooden plow; in addition to losing crops to
flooding low lands, bear, dear and wild turkeys also
contributed to losses. George T. Ford later developed
a prosperous wholesale business.

The Richard Riley, Tyler, and Pallister
families were also among the early settlers. Richard

Riley was a native of Yorkshire England, arriving in

the United States in 1830, he brought a wife and three

14

children to settle in Greenfield Township. Mary Riley
Maskill, one of the three children stated that, "I
came to Detroit with my parents in 1831. We settled
on land near Greenfield. It was a dismal wilderness
then, with great forests filled with Indians.” 5 The
Riley family apparently owned land on both sides of
English Settlement Road, later renamed Glendale
Avenue. Howell S. Tyler came in an ox-cart from
Vermont, arriving on March 17, 1849§ The Howell farm
extended from the alley north of Waverly to Monterey,
and from Waverly to Hamilton. Having taken eight
weeks to sail from England to America, William, Robert
and George Pallister arrived in 1846; Robert took up
farming on land located at Woodward and Pallister
Avenues. Ten years later, three more brothers, Paul,
Thomas and Joseph arrived in Detroit and walked to
Robert's farm; Paul and Thomas took up farming in
Hamtramck?

Several families in the second cohort of
Highland Park's settlers, most notably the Langdon,
Mott and Fitzgerald families, were distinguished
through providing soldiers for the Union Army during
the Civil War. John Langdon came to America in 1830
when he was two years old; upon the death of his

father, John became the ward of his uncle, Jared

15

Davison who was living in Highland Park. As a young
man, John Langdon bought a twenty acre farm on
Woodward Avenue. In 1862, John Langdon enlisted in
the 24th Michigan Infantry.

John T. Mott was born on April 4, 1846 in
Franklin Connecticut, and later moved to Port Huron
with his parents. John was among the first volunteers
to come forward for the Union cause during the Civil
War; he joined Company B of the 16th Michigan Infantry
on August 13, 1861. During the war John Mott was
cited for bravery and promoted to second lieutenant;
after approximately three years of service, he was
discharged from Company C of the 16th Michigan
Infantry on May 12, 1863. After the war, John
(affectionately known as Uncle John) opened a general
store at the southeast corner of Woodward and Davison.
John Mott married into one of the original families of
Highland Park; on March 19, 1874 he wedded Emily A.
Davison. Both the marriage and the general store
prospered. Even though Adolphus Thombley was already
operating a post office out of his home in 1873, Mott
Opened the Whitewood Post Office (the name of the
community had not yet been changed to Highland Park)

8
in his store in 1876. Unlike Langdon and Mott who

16

served as Michigan volunteers, Fitzgerald joined the
Union forces before moving to Michigan.

James D. Fitzgerald was born in Castle Gregory
Ireland on March 30, 1825. In 1841, Fitzgerald
arrived in the United States, settling in Vermont in
the fall of the year; the following year he moved to
Cleveland Ohio, and then to Beria, Ohio where he
worked in stone quarries. Fitzgerald's wife to be,
Mary C. Runion had been born in Prescott, Canada on
January 20, 1835; the wedding took place in 1850, and
in due time produced four children (Mary A., who would
ultimately become Mrs. William Davison, Ella, Jennie
N. who would become Mrs. George Pell, and the only son
James Fitzgerald Jr.). Having enlisted in Company B of
the 65th Regiment of the Ohio Volunteers, Fitzgerald
was wounded and subsequently given a disability
discharge. It was not until 1864 that the Fitzgerald
family moved to Michigan, initially settling in
Detroit on Woodward Avenue, but within _a year
purchasing a thirty acre farm in Highland Park. In
addition to his farm work, Fitzgerald worked as a
landscape gardener for Senator Thomas Palmer.
Fitzgerald, known throughout the community' for his
kindness, died July 1883; Mrs. Fitzgerald died on June

2, 1917.9

17

To the extent that the Langdon, Mott and
Fitzgerald families inter-married with. first cohort
settlers, and were principally farmers, they were
typical Highland Parkers----Protestant farmers,
seemingly in agreement about issues of mutual concern.
It appears that most of the farms were approximately
twenty acres (there were several thirty acre farms,
and it is conceivable that some were larger). Thomas
V. Brown, was able to purchase a Gaar Scott threshing
engine in 1890 and threshed grain throughout the
region for twenty six years; he recalled threshing for
the Davisons, Tylers, Pallisters and Fords in Highland
Park. Brown also recalled that during one harvesting
season, he threshed oats for a whole week on Senator
Palmer's farm at Six Mile and Woodward Avenue. In
addition to the major efforts devoted to grains,
Isobel Stonehouse recalled that other farm work was
also important.

George Stonehouse and his family, including a
young daughter named Isobel, left England for America
in 1851; after traveling for seven weeks, the
Stonehouses landed in Detroit at the southern end of
Pontiac Plank Road, where they were met by George's
brothers, Jabez, et a1. Isobel recalled that the

spring of the year saw the considerably hard work of

18

clearing land before planting crops; the land between
the tree stumps was sown with grain, small patches of
potatoes and fields of corn. Mrs. Stonehouse did her
marketing in Detroit, bartering berries and farm
produce for staples such as sugar, flour and salt;
while George did the work ‘of a veterinary and, like
other farmers (all of whom apparently had one or more
hunting dogs), hunted for deer, bear and other wild
game. Considered together, life as experienced by the
Stonehouses, Langdon, Mott and Fitzgerald families was
typical for the second cohort of Highland Parkers.
Except for adding their numbers to the
population, the second cohort of settlers did not
experience life much differently than had the first
cohort. It was the third wave of settlers, the real
movers and shakers coming in the latter decades of the
nineteenth century, who would begin significant
diversification in the economy of Highland Park. For
example, established. in. 1891, the first factory' in
Highland Park was the McAlpine Shoe factory}O it was
located on the north corner of Woodward and Colorado
Avenues in the old waterworks building owned by
Captain Stevens. In addition to the McAlpine Shoe
factory, the Seiss Wagon factory and Percheon's

Blacksmith Shop were prominent among the non-farm

19

economic activities in late nineteenth. century
Highland Park. In other words, it was the third
generation, including Stevens who would be the most
influential among them, Voorhis, Siess, Smith et al.
whose non-farm economic interests would contribute to
significant changes in Highland Park.

Robert Smith came to Highland Park c.1900, and
he is representative of residents who would live with
one foot in the past, and the other in the twentieth
century. While working at the Union Market on
Cadillac Square, he met George Ford who often sold
calves and hogs at the market. Ford invited Smith to
visit his farm located at Ford and Woodward Avenues in
Highland Park; apparently, Smith was favorably
impressed and purchased a lot on the corner of John R
and Stevens Avenue where he built an 18'x 24'
framehouse at the cost of about $350.00. Reminiscing
about life on the farm, Smith related that he bought a
prize jersey cow (formerly owned by Senator. Palmer)
from Joe Marshall, and had to get up at four in the
morning to milk the cow, and feed the chickens (which
roosted under the house until he was able to build a
chicken coop) before leaving for the market located
in downtown Detroit. To get to the market, he rode his

bicycle as far as Holznagle's (the local florist's),

20

and rode the street car from there. Smith also
recalled that in order to cook or wash, he had to
carry water from the neighbors; on Saturdays he took
his weekly bath in a wash tub behind the stove. Smith
was apparently well liked by many people, and in 1912
he was elected village treasurer, in which capacity he
served for twenty seven years while being opposed by
no more than three candidates for that office}1

Siess and Voorhis were among the third
generation of settlers whose primary work included
non-farm activities. Charles August Siess was the
village wagon-maker and blacksmith. In 1882 Siess
leased four acres from Stevens and moved his family
from his mother-in-law's farm on Holbrook Avenue and
Russel Street, to a little house near his shop.
During the economic difficulties of 1893, Siess went
out of business, but the family continued to live in
the area and some of them would work in the Crystal
Palace.

George Voorhis, who would become the village
assessor in 1913, came to Highland Park with his
father and mother, and three younger children (Fred,
Alice and Dora) around 1895. Mr. Voorhis came from
Detroit to Highland Park as the proprietor of the

Highland Park Resort Hotel and the race track which

21

had been leased from Captain William Stevens; the
resort was situated on 58 acres with Oakland and
Woodward avenues as the east and west boundaries, with
Manchester on the south. The main attractions of the
resort were a well producing nuneral water (which was
used for medicinal purposes), and harness racing.
Voorhis leased the track to the Highland Park Jockey
Club which brought professional horses .and. drivers
during the trotting season (the racing took place
during June and September). The hotel had 15 rooms
and was usually filled to capacity; the rooms were
reserved for owners of horses, their families and
jockeys. George VOorhis reported that, according to
City Hall records, in 1895 a tax totaling $164.00 was
levied against the 58 acres where the hotel and race
track were located and the personal property of the
Highland Park Jockey Club which were assessed at
$33,000.00.12 This hotel and. race track, for the
moment owned and operated by the Voorhis family, would
later be sold to the Ford Motor Company and become the
site of the Crystal Palace.

The one eyed, Captain William H. Stevens stands
out as the most prominent personage in Highland Park's
early growth and development. Stevens was born in New

York state in 1819, and moved to Wisonsin and then to

22

Michigan while he was still a youngster. In Michigan,
he became acquainted with some men employed by the
Summit Mining Company (this company was .apparently
based in Boston); Stevens managed to get himself hired
by the company as an "official land looker,' or
prospector, in the copper regions of Michigan. Taking
valuable lessons he had learned while working for the
Summit Mining Company, Stevens went to Colorado to
seek his own fortune in mining. Stevens did succeed
in making a considerable fortune in silver nuning in
Colorado, and returned to the Detroit area in 1887 and
began a vigorous effort to 'develop' the swamplands
north of Detroit. Stevens was able to attract the
support of Senator Thomas W. Palmer in a scheme to
develop portions of the 'highland' area north of
Detroit. In addition to lending his name to Steven's
efforts, Senator Palmer donated one—hundred acres of
his Log Cabin Farm to be used as a Detroit Park;
located north of the 'highland,‘ the one-hundred acres
donated by Senator Palmer were low and wet, therefore
sewers were dug to drain the park site. Since the
park had been donated to the public, public funds were
used to pay for the drainage sewers. Apparently to no
one's surprise, the drainage sewers also brought

drainage to the swamps between the 'highland' and the

23

Detroit River. With the obstacle of the swamp
removed, the village of Highland Park (previously
known as Woodwardville and Whitewood), with about 400
inhabitants was officially etched into Greenfield
Township in 1889?"3

More than any other individual in the third
generation of Highland Parkers, Captain Stevens had
his hand in shaping daily life in Highland Park.
Stevens helped to lay out the streets, and loaned
money to people to build their homes. Stevens also
played an important role in bringing the streetcar to
the village in 1886; improved versions of the
streetcar ran on Woodward Avenue for seventy years
(1886-1956), and it was the last line to run in
Michigan. In 1892 Highland Avenue was the first
street to be graded, and in 1909 the world's first
mile of concrete road. was. laid. on 'Woodward. Avenue
between Six Mile and Seven Mile Roads. While Stevens,
a real mover and shaker, was instrumental in the
development of Highland Park's infrastructure, he
showed a special interest in schools.

The first village schools were the direct
result of Stevens’ efforts. In 1892 the second floor
of the waterworks building, located on the corner of

Colorado and Woodward, and owned by Stevens, became a

24

school house. Stevens bought furnishings and supplies
for the school, and hired Edna Phelps to teach the
class of 16 children that fall. The next year Clifton
Gordon was hired to teach the older children in the
same room where Edna Phelps continued to instruct the
younger children. Sometime during the year, the
school was moved to a smore on the corner of McClean
and Woodward Avenues. The first building to be
especially constructed as a school was a four-room
building located on the south side of East Buena Vista
near Woodward; known as the Stevens' School, it opened
with an enrollment of 75 pupils. Soon after the
completion of the Stevens' School, Robert Barber
arrived in Highland Park to become the village's first
superintendent of schools.lu

Having devoted much of his energy, influence,
and financial resources to building the village of
Highland Park, at a ripe 82 years of age, Stevens
died in 1901 in his farm home at the present site of
McGregor Library. Stevens' civic influence continued
to be felt when, after his death the daughter of his
close friend, David Whitney, bought the Stevens' house
and used it as a home for 'backward', crippled and

homeless children” Later the children‘s .home was

given to the City of Highland Park for use as a

25

library, and in 1926 the stonehouse was replaced by
the impressive structure which now houses the McGregor
Library. At this writing, the McGregor Library is the
only known repository of Highland Park's first
newspaper, the HIGHLAND PARK TIMES which began
publication in 1909. 1&1 1917 another weekly, the
HIGHLAND PARK NEWS was published by Arthur Kingsley.
After a period of ndlitary service, Kingsley returned
to Highland Park and purchased the HIGHLAND PARK
TIMES, which he combined with the HIGHLAND PARK NEWS
to found the HIGHLAND PARKER, which was published
until 1926. It is appropriate that these records
have been deposited on the site which was "home" to
Captain William H. Stevens.

cxuncidentally, Steven's death was a harbinger
to a new era in Highland Park. Throughout the lives
of the first two generations of settlers, and for much
of the life-time of the third generation, Highland
Park was typical of mid-western island. communities
such as those studied by Robert Wiebe.15 Wiebe has
suggested that in the late nineteenth century, America
was essentially a ”nation of loosely connected
islands“----like Highland Park. Wiebe began his
analysis by noting that the purpose of his study was

to describe the break down of island communities and

26

the emergence of a new system; he then characterized
island communities as satellites of larger communities
(i.e., Highland Park is seen as a satellite of
Detroit), to which they looked for "markets and
supplies, credit and news.“ Weibe observes that life
in the island communities was regulated by the rhythms
of agriculture: ”the pace of the sun's day, the

working and watching of the crop months, the cycle of

the seasons."‘5 In the same sense as the agricultural
harvests, society and social life were also
predictable.

Island communities such as Highland Park were
remarkably stable with little evidence of internal
conflict. As Wiebe has expressed it, these communites
were, "usually homogeneous, usually Protestant“
communities enjoying an inner stability which the

coming and going of members did not disturb.

Moreover, even when new towns and villages were
established in other locations, continuity and
stability were undisturbed because the gathering

families brought the same famil iar habits and
l

customs. 7 The- homogeneity of these communities,

apparently, contributed to the lack of significant

open conflict.

27

From a distance the towns and villages
characterized as island communities appeared to be
levelled democracies, “sustaining neither' an
aristocracy of name nor an aristocracy of occupation,"

But, despite appearances and the lack of
conflict, “each community was divided by innumerable,
fine gradations;" at the top sat a few men who not
only had greater wealth than their neighbors, but who,
owing primarily, to their contacts outside of the
community, controlled access to wealth. These men---
-merchants, bankers, successful farmers, etc.----were
referred to as ”mister" or “major" (or 'captain' in
the case of Stevens in Highland Park), not “Bill” or
"Sam"}8 Although differences in religion, language,
and skin color distinguished individuals, groups, and
even entire communities from each other,
characteristically, the island community was an
ethnically, culturally and religiously homogeneous
society without overt, socially important conflict.
Before January 1, 1910 when the first Model T Ford was
built in the Crystal Palace, Highland Park was a
typical island community, but all of that was about to
change.

Of the many changes wrought in Highland Park by

technological innovations, production, employment, and

28

social policies emanating out of the Crystal Palace, a
few had an observable impact on the social order and
quality of life experienced in the community. If the
quality of life (QOL) is defined ”as a function of the
objective conditions and subjective attitudes
involving a defined area of concern,” and neasured by
social, economic, political, health and environmental
indicators, then it is clear that the QOL experienced
by the third and fourth cohort of Highland Park's
residents was radically different from that of earlier
settlers; and it is clear that most of the difference
in the QOL can be attributed to the influence of the

1
Ford Motor Company. 9

29

FOOTNOTES
Chapter One

1. This sketch of early life in Highland Park is based
primarily on information given to Ellen Hathaway by
members of the Highland Park Historical Society. Many
of the charter members of the soicety were direct
descendents of early settlers. What appears to be the
original typescript of this information may be found
in Highland Park's McGregor Library/Museum; pages in
this document are not consecutively numbered. This
document is hereinafter identified as HPHS.

2. WPA Writer's Project in Michigan, MICHIGAN: A GUIDE
TO THE WOLVERINE STATE (1937), 290.

3. WPA, 1937: 289-293.
4. HPHS, 1946: passim.

HPHS, 1946: passim.

0101

HPHS, 1946: passim.
7. HPHS, 1946: passim.
8. HPHS, 1946: passim.
9. HPHS, 1946: passim.
10. HPHS, 1946: passim.
11. HPHS, 1946: passim.
12. HPHS, 1946: passim.
13. HPHS, 1946: passim; WPA, WOLVERINE STATE,290.
14. HPHS, 1946: passim.
15. HPHS, 1946: passim.

16. Robert H. Wiebe, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), xiii and 1-10.

17. Wiebe, SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1-10.

30

18. Wiebe, SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1-10.

19. For a more complete discussion of this definition
of the quality of life (QOL), and the rationale behind
it, see Appendix B.

Copyright by
Clarence O. Hooker

1988

CHAPTER TWO

BIRTH OF THE MODEL T ASSEMBLY LINE:
THE BIG EVENT IN THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF HIGHLAND PARK

There is no doubt that the major event in the
social history of Highland Park was the 'birth' of the
moving assembly line where the Model T was built; this
event was the basis for the economic, political and
social transformation of Highland Park. The new social
order brought to the Crystal Palace with the birth of
the assembly line was replicated throughout the
community, and in the final analysis it meant a
redistribution of the tangible and the aesthetic values
associated with the quality of life in Highland Park.
The overall objective of this chapter is to provide a
brief description of events and innovations leading up
to the production of the Model T on the world's first
mass production-automated assembly line. The chapter
begins with a discussion of some of Henry Ford's early
'tinkering' and 'entreprenurial' adventures, followed
by a sketch of the sequence of events leading up to
the transfer of production of the Model T from the Ford

Plant at Piquette and Beaubien streets, to the Crystal

31

32

Palace in Highland Park. The chapter then turns to a
consideration of some of the primary innovations in
machine-tool technology and their relationship to the
invention (birth) of the moving assembly line.

Born on a farm in Dearborn, Michigan in 1863,
Henry Ford was destined to play the leading role in
revolutionizing automotive production. While he was a
youngster living in Dearborn, Ford often worked as a
water boy for farmers in. Whitewood (the village of
Whitewood would later become Highland Park); the task
of a water boy was to keep the tanks of steam driven
threshers filled. At the age of sixteen, urged on by
his mechanical interests, Ford left Dearborn and nmved
to Detroit where he worked as a nachinist's apprentice
in a shop that was building marine engines for the lake
trade, and within a few' years he had achieved the
status of journeyman, and was hired to travel along the
waterfront and to the larger farms where he installed
and repaired steam and gasoline engines.1 In
subsequent years, Ford became the chief engineer (i.e.,
machine operator) at the Edison Illuminating Company,
which later became Detroit Edison; in 1896, during his
employment at Edison, Ford built his 'quadricycle‘.
Within a few years of the early experiments with the

'quadricycle', Ford attracted the financial support of

33

local businessmen, and in 1899 the Detroit Automobile
Company was formed with Henry Ford as the mechanical
superintendent. Owing primarily to Ford's doubts about
the adequacy of the horseless carriage produced by the
Detroit Automobile Company, and perhaps to Ford's
interest in racing, the company was dissolved.

The first fruit of Ford's interest in racing the
horseless-carriage was harvested at Grosse Pointe where
he drove his racing carriage to victory over Alexander
Winton of Cleveland, Ohio. As a result of his
victory in the internationally proclaimed race of
horse-less carriages, Ford again attracted financial
backing from some of the local businessmen who had
been involved in organizing the short-lived Detroit
Motor Company; now late in 1901 they provided the
financial backing for the organization. of the Henry
Ford Company. Apparently, again unfulfilled, Ford left
the Henry Ford Company to pursue his interest in
racing. While the company was renamed and reorganized
to produce Henry Leland's. Cadillacs, Ford built two
more racing cars during 1902, and one of them
established an American speed record in a race at
Grosse Pointe.

Encouraged by an increasingly efficacious supply

of knowledge about the mechanics of automotive

34

vehicles, and bouyed by his racing successes, Ford
resumed work on a two-cylinder passenger car, "and he
persuaded a new, less prestigious group of investors to
join him in forming the Ford Motor Company in 1903“”
The newly organized Ford Motor Company produced over a
thousand cars in 1903. In 1904 and for several years
thereafter, the Ford Motor Company introduced a
succession of new models, including the four-cylinder
Model N during 1906-7. The Model N was the first
sustained attempt to build and market an inexpensive
vehicle that was not a horseless-buggy, and it "gave as
good or better service than the much more expensive
cars of the period.“5 Between 1903 and 1905, the Ford
Motor Company was among the top four American producers
of automotive vehicles; in 1906 Ford became number one.
The Ford Motor Company's mercurial rise to the
number-one position among automotive manufacturers was
assured when the plant on the corner of Piquette and
Beaubien streets was streamlined in 1904-1905. The
changes included dividing up certain tasks into simple
operations that less-skilled workers could perform.
Under the new arrangement, these workers pushed huge
bins of parts up and down the rows of stationary cars,

with each work gang stopping to install a particular

part---—-a fender, wheels, the dashboard, etc.----before

35

moving to the next car.‘ As a result of the changes
introduced in the plant at Piquette and Beaubien
streets, production rose considerably; but not rapidly
enough, especially after the introduction of the Model
T in 1908, to keep up with demand.

When the Model T was brought out in 1908,
"assembly techniques were much the same as they had
been in Strelow's carpenter shop five years earlier."7
With the soaring demand for the Model T, it became
apparent that, even though the Ford plant at Piquette
and Beaubien was only three years old, it was already
out of date. The site chosen for the new facility, the
Crystal Palace, was the fifty-eight acres occupied by
the Highland Park Resort Hotel and the race track,
located well within the orbit of the city of Detroit.
Since this area had been relatively slow in developing,
it was possible to find a sufficiently large tract of
land at a 'good' price, and where three railroads
(Michigan Central, the Grand Trunk, and the Detroit
Terminal Railroad) converged. Moreover, since Henry
Ford had been born here in Greenfield Township, and had
worked in this area when he was a young boy, he was
already quite familiar with the site. Thus, it was in

Highland Park on a plot of land covering about sixty

acres that the Ford Motor Company institutionalized the

36

product i on and assembl y methods that wou l d
revolutionize automotive production.

While Ford and his associates were rightfully
proud of their accomplishments at the Piquette Street
plant, and considered that facility to be as good as,
perhaps a little better than, any automobile factory in
the world,9 they were even more proud of the 'Crystal
Palace,‘ as some called the Highland Park building
which was being erected by the leading architect of
the times, Albert Kahn, assisted by Gray, Ford's chief
construction engineer from 1909-1915.10'The Crystal
Palace was uniquely situated in both the spatial and
temporal evolution of industrial technology, and
"represented [the] full realization of the American
system of production and the maturation of the modern
industrial age it transcended craft techniques in
the metal and the carriage and wagon trades and moved
toward the sophisticated,capital-intensive technologies
of the auto-industrial age."11

The design of the Crystal Palace was advanced
beyond. anything previously known in the industry. In
1913 the chairman of the board of Dodge Brothers,
Frederick J. Haynes expressed the generally held view

that the Ford Motor Company possessed the best factory

arrangement for car production known in the United

3‘?

States. Similarly, F.L. Faurote, a noted author of
books and articles on automobile manufacturing declared
that this facility was one of the most efficient plants
he had seen anywhere; and having visited all of the
principal manufacturers, Ford's construction engineer,
“was satisfied that the works were unequalled."‘ With
the exception of a few ornamental bricks, the Crystal
Palace was built of steel, concrete and glass; on
bright days the more than fifty thousand square feet of
glass allowed the structure to be flooded with
sunlight. With its four stories, its length of 865
feet, and breadth of '75 feet, the Crystal Palace was
the largest building under one roof in Michigan}
According to descriptions recorded c.1910, the
buildings comprising the Crystal Palace were unique,
and quite different from previous factory construction.
There was a craneway between each pair of buildings,
and the roof of the craneway was glass so that the
entire length of the building was lit with natural
light. The heating and air-conditioning plant was on
the roof; and the roof was also designed to ventilate
the buildings. The waste air, on its way out, heated
the craneway without added expense. The layout of the
building facilitated the unloading and loading of

freight cars. An especially unique feature enabled raw

38

materials to be hoisted as near the roof as possible,
letting the work down in the process of manufacture.
Thousands of holes were cut through the floors so that
the parts that started in the rough on the top floor
gravitated down through chutes, conveyors, or ‘tubes,
and finally became a finished article on the ground
floor}4' Clearly, the innovations that would catapult
the Ford Motor Company into its number one position
among automotive manufacturers were to be found in both
the design of the Crystal Palace, and in new uses of
machine-tool technology.

In a characteristically poignant manner, the FORD
TIMES noted that the move from the Piquette and
Beaubien facility to the Crystal Palace was
accomplished, ”without a brass band, a ball, a
Clambake, or even a speech from the mayor.'1:; The move
was quick and remarkably efficient; On December 31,
1909 the Ford Motor Company was shipping all of its
cars from the Piquette and Beaubien plant, but on
January 1, 1910 most of the cars were being shipped
from the Crystal Palace. Extensive planning had
assured that -the department-by-department transfer
would go smoothly. Although only about one-quarter of
the Crystal Palace had been completed at the time of

the transfer, production continued without

39

interruption. The first part of the Crystal Palace to
be finished housed the most important elements of
production: “the machine shop for making engines,
transmissions, and axles, the main room for assembling
cars, the radiator shop, the painting room, and the
shipping room."16

Eckstein has noted that, the ten years 1899-1909
witnessed a ramarkable economic development which
assured Michigan' s leadership in the American
automotive industry. 17 Thus, in 1910 when the Ford
Motor Company transferred production of the Model T to
Highland Park, the revolution of organizational and
production technology in the automotive industry was
already well under way; but there remained many
obstacles to be cleared before the revolution would be
completed. An immediate concern was the practice of
subcontracting.

During the decade of the 1890s Henry Ford had
been one among many 'tinkerers' who built homemade
cars, and as late as 1903 the production precesses at
the Ford Motor Company were much like those of other
automotive manufacturers. During the formative years
of the industry, it was common to subcontract (i.e.,

farm-out) the production of parts and components to

outside machine shops and foundaries. Beginning in

40

1906, and more rapidly with the introduction of the
Model T in 1908, the Ford Motor Company manufactured
more and more of its own parts and components; and by
1920 Ford, like other automotive companies produced all
of the major parts and components, while some of the
small and minor parts continued to be subcontracted.l8
The subsumption of the production of the major parts
and components was an important, indeed critical step
toward the system of continuous production which was
achieved late in 1914.

Despite the fact that automotive manufacturers
had begun to subsume the production of the major parts
and components, automotive production in 1910 remained
a relatively complicated, inefficient processs which
consisted of (1) the foundary production of castings.
which were machined into individual parts, (2) the
assembly of individual parts and components, (3) and
finally, the assembly of parts and components onto the
vehicle. The Ford Motor Company, within the space of a
few years, would lead the way in revolutionizing every
aspect of automotive production.

Technological changes implemented in Ford's
Highland Park plant, herein also referred to as the

Crystal Palace, were directly related to efforts to

increase the supply of the ever popular Model T. As

41

the quantity of Model Ts produced increased, so did the
Ford Motor Company's demand for labor. Given the short
supply of skilled mechanics who could machine and
assemble parts for the Model T, Ford resorted to the
hiring of less-skilled and non-skilled workers. It
was under the conditions of a shortage of skilled
mechanics that the Ford Motor Company increased its
workforce from an estimated 450 in 1908, to about
14,000 in 1913. By 1914, three-quarters of Ford's wage
laborers were foreign—born, and about half of these
workers were immigrants from southern and eastern
Europe who lacked "traditional industrial skills.“19
Under existing conditions it would have been difficult
to significantly increase the volume of production, but
the fact that such a large proportion of Ford's newly
recruited laborers were non-skilled and foreign-born
presented an inmediate obstacle to the increased
production of the Model T. Fortunately for the Ford
Motor Company, recent improvements in nachine-tool
technology meant that these were obstacles which Ford
managers and engineers were able to resolve by re-
designing machines, by further rationalizing work tasks
and routines, and by the rearrangement and integration
of production processes. Thus, although on a scale

and with a degree of sophistication theretofore unseen,

42

Ford, "... relied on the traditional American solution
to labor shortages. Technical and organizatonal

innovation displaced skill.”'

The changes in Ford's manufacturing processes

were aimed at developing and perfecting mass
production. According to Henry Ford himself, ”Mass
production is focusing upon a manufacturing
operation. . . seven different principles: power,
accuracy, economy, continuity, system, speed and

repetition."'21 The foundation upon which the seven
principles were to be laid, was standardization in
product design, i.e., standardization in the design of
the Model T. Between 1908 and 1914 the Ford Motor
Company implemented and perfected three types of
innovations which led the way in revolutionizing
industrial production in general , and automotive
production in particular. The first of the three
innovations was consistent with the manufacturing
trends of the period; it involved an increasingly
specialized use of machinery in the production
processes. The second innovation was based on the
standardization of parts and components of the Model T;
this second tier of innovations consisted of the
increasingly more [cost] efficient synchronization,

organization and mechanization of the production and

43

assembly processes. The third type of innovation,
which will be given more detailed consideration in the
following chapter, was aimed at creating (inventing) a
new type of machine operator. The “five-dollar day“ or
the “guaranteed minimum wage” was one of the primary
incentives offered to workers, and the Sociology
Department, the Americanization. program: and. the Ford
Security Department were among the principal
instruments employed in creating and perfecting the new
type of worker.

The primary aim. of the Ford Motor Company's
early innovative uses of nachinery was to "... select,
design and construct machine tools and attachments to
match the skill level of the labor force. The
innovative uses of jigs and fixtures were among the
initial efforts to optimize the production of unskilled
labor." (Note: Jigs and fixtures were work-holding
devices which adapted nmlti-purpose and special—purpose
machines for the high volume production of_identical
parts. Technically speaking, a jig held work but was
not fastened to the machine. A fixture, often referred
to as 'furniture' or 'appliance' by engineers, also
held work but was fastened to the table or bed of the

22

machine.l ' Thus, it was initially through the use of

jigs and fixtures that the Ford Motor Company was able

44

to accomplish the high volume production of identical
parts. While thousands of innovative jigs and fixtures
remained prominent in the high volume production of
identical parts, special use machines, such as those
used in the production of the Model T cylinder block
and pistons, became increasingly important.

In the early days at Ford, ". . . the engine
block was apparently passed by hand from one work
station to another to have various operations
performed."~2:3 The Foote-Burt Company made a number of
special use machines for the Ford Motor Company; among
these were machines built especially for drilling the
Model T cylinder block, and for machining pistons. The
Foote-Burt multiple drilling machine was arranged to
simultaneously drill all forty-five holes in the
cylinder block. As described by Abel and Colvin, the
process was quite simple: "The cylinder is jigged into
position, the operator throws the starting lever, the
machine is equipped with automatic stop and reverse,
the operator takes the cylinder out and the work is
done." In this instance, forty-five separate
operations were: accomplished with one special-purpose
machine. Similar improvements were made in machining

Model T pistons.

45

Improvements in the production of Model T
pistons may also serve to demonstrate how special-use
machines were used during the early phase of skill
displacement. Except for placing the casting on the
inverted spindle and starting the machine, the
machining of pistons had become entirely automated.
According to Colvin's 1913 description, the top of the
pistons were faced off at the same time that the
outside diameter was being turned and three piston-ring
grooving tools were automatically fed to the required
depth. The feed was automatically tripped, and the
cutters were automatically returned to their starting
position. Therefore, all the machine operator had to
do was to release the clamp which held the pistons in
position, slip out the retaining pins and put another
piston on the spindle.25

In the same sense that innovative uses of jigs
and fixtures, and the uses of ever more powerful
special—purpose machines was important in transferring
skill from worker to machines in the production of
parts like the Model T cylinder block and pistons, the
synchronization of production processes was an
important element in the development of "continuous" or
"progressive" production. "Progressive production and

progressive assembly involved the arrangement of men

46

and machines and the coordination and synchronization
of productive operations;" and this was, as Meyer has
observed, the next logical step from the division of
labor and the use of advanced specialized machine
tools.‘26 Progressive production began c.1912-1913 in
the nachine shops which produced finished metal parts,

and then was gradually adapted to the assembly

2

operations during 1913-1914. 7
As described by Arnold, "Progressive production
was the . . . scheme of placing both machine and hand

work in a straight line sequence of operations, so that
the component in progress will travel the shortest road
from start to finish, with no avoidable handling
whatever."28 In order to achieve the constant and
continuous movement of raw materials, parts and
components, it was necessary for Ford engineers to
develop many new devices which included gravity work-
slides and rollways that moved work: by' hand, and
endless chains and endless conveyor belts, and overhead
cranes which moved work from location to location. The
revolutionary changes in the production and assembly of
the magneto and the chassis are excellent examples of
both the pace and the significance of innovation within

the Ford Motor Company.

47

The flywheel magneto provided the electrical
charge to ignite the fuel in the Model T and was the
first component to be assembled on the moving assembly
line. The assembly of the magneto changed radically
between May 1913 and March 1914. By May 1913, it was
normal for one skilled-worker to assemble from 35 to 40
magnetos in a nine-hour day. As Arnold has noted, the
assembly was done by experienced men, "but was not
uniformly satisfactory as desired, and was costly
as all one-man assembly must of necessity be
forever.“ In May of 1913, Ford managers and
engineers subdivided the task into twenty-nine separate
operations and added a chain-driven conveyor to move
the magneto from one worker to another. With continued
experimentation and modification, productivity
increased dramatically; by the end of March 1914,
fourteen workers assembled 1,335 magnetos in an eight-
hour day. Thus, "even though the working day was
reduced by one hour, the assemblers more than doubled
their average productivity and produced an average of
95 magnetos per person each clay."30 Similar strides
toward increased efficiency were made in the assembly
of the chassis.

During the period 0:1913-1914, Clarence Avery

was the principal agent in the coordination and

48

synchronization of production in the various
departments of the Crystal Palace. By the end of 1914
Avery had succeeded throughout the Highland Park plant
in replicating the pattern of increased efficiency
which had been seen in the magneto department. After
about an eight month period during which the production
routines in each of the departments in the Highland
Park: plant were analyzed, the necessary timing
schedules were worked out, and one by one (those)
operations were revamped so that finally, continuously
moving conveyors delivered assembled parts to the final
assembly floor. The resulting efficiency in production
was phenomenal, in some instances parts were put
together six times faster.

The ultimate challenge during the period of
1913-1914 was the chassis assembly; it was the chassis
line to which the thousands of parts and components
flowed, and it was here that they would be assembled to
the chassis, and here that the Model T would take its
shape. According to the recollection of one worker, in
1903 the assembly of automobiles at the Ford Motor
Company was entirely manual: The cars were assembled on
the spot, to which the chassis, the motor and the body
were brought. "As near as I can remember," said the

worker, the body was brought on a hand truck, and was

49

lifted up and placed onto the chassis, and after the
car was assembled, "one fellow would take hold of the
rear end and one of the front end, and they'd lift the
whole thing up! . . . . "I would say there would be
just one or two men for each assembly, as near as I can
remember."31 The chassis assembly procedures
apparently did not change significantly in the decade
between 1903 and 1913.

H.L. Arnold's description of the Model T chassis
assembly process in 1913 lends further support to the
contention that little in this process had changed
since 1903. According to Arnold, "First, the front and
rear axles were laid on the floor, then the chassis
frame with springs in place were assembled with the
axles, next the wheels were placed on the axles, and
the remaining components were successively added to
complete the chassis."32 With this method of assembly,
250 skilled assemblers with the assistance of 80 non-
skilled "component carriers" were able to_ assemble
6,182 chassis per month; at this rate, the assembly of
one chassis required an average of twelve and one-half
workman hours.

In August of 1913, Ford managers and engineers
had begun the experimentation which would synchronize

chassis assembly with the already improved production

50

of the thousands of parts and components which were
combined to make the Model T. In September of that
year, engineers had experimented with a "rope and
windlass" which was used to pull the Model T chassis
along a row of parts and components. As the chassis
moved along the rows of parts, six skilled assemblers,
accompanied by their helpers, walked along side the

moving chassis and attached the various parts and

components. This "rope and windlass" technique
lessened chassis assembly time considerably; more
specifically, assembly time for each chassis was

reduced by about fifty percent to five hours and fifty
minutes. Additional improvements followed in October.
In October, Ford engineers mechanically pulled
the chassis along a line of 140 stationary assemblers
who stood near supplies of parts and components which
they attached to the passing chassis; this innovation
further reduced chassis assembly time to slightly less
than three hours per worker. Before the end of 1913,
changes in the length of the assembly line and the
number of assembler-stations resulted in greater
efficiency. The "endless chain-driven" conveyor which
was developed in January 1914, and the April 1914
modifications which introduced the 'man-high line'

(i.e., work stations were raised or lowered so that

51

they were about waist high) to eliminate more of the
unnecessary and non-productive movements of workers,
marked the last in the series of experiments and
innovations which combined to reduce chassis assembly
time from twelve and one-half hours to one hour and
thirty~three minutes.

The formation of the Ford Motor Company in 1903,
the introduction of the Model T in 1908, and the move
from the Piquette and Beaubien streets to the Crystal
Palace during the last days of 1909 had marked the
initial phase of a "major technological phenomenon of
this century."‘33 From the outset, that is beginning on
January 1, 1910, production in the Crystal Palace was a
constant stream of experimentation, innovation and
modification. Beginning with the standardization of
design of the Model T, the innovative uses of jigs and
fixtures, the designing and adaptation of special-use
machines, the synchronization of production and chassis
assembly operations, and the incorporation of the
mechanical conveyor system were major accomplishments.
Finally, September and October of 1913, and January and
April of 1914 witnessed improvements in chassis
assembly, and by June 1914 Ford managers and engineers

were sufficiently satisfied so that the new chassis

52

assembly line was incorporated as the final phase in
the world's first continuous-production assembly line.
Unmistakable evidence of the technological
revolution could be seen in 1915, by which time, "the
fifty-six acre Highland Park facility had dozens of
buildings, 55,000 humming machines, fifty miles of
belting, and one and one-half miles of conveyor track
and 18,000 workers."3u While the technological
revolution was being consolidated in the Crystal
Palace, the community of Highland Park was experiencing
some primary affects. One of the most thoroughly
sensationalized results could be seen on January 5,
1914 when Ford announced a profit sharing plan and
people flocked to Detroit and Highland Park to reap the
promised bonanza which was scheduled to begin on
January 12.35 Ford hired only a fraction of 10,000
angry job seekers who, threatening to break into the
plant, pressed against the gates of the Crystal
Palace. Plant guards inside the gates and city fire
trucks parked outside drenched the crowd (it was 9-10
degrees below zero), driving the people back and caking
their clothes with ice. Infuriated, the crowd out the
city's fire hoses, attacked policemen, and broke

hundreds of plant (Palace) windows along Manchester

before dispersing. '3 But, even before the announcement

53

of the $5 day the Ford Motor Company had attracted
thousands to Highland Park. The following chapter
seeks to understand, (1) the relationship between the
labor needs of the Ford Motor Company and the
demographic transformation of Highland Park, (2) and to
understand how the Ford Motor Company succeeded in the

invention of a new breed of worker.

54

FOOTNOTES

Chapter Two

1. Kieth Sward, THE LEGEND OF HENRY FORD (New York:
1948; Atheneum, 1975), 10.

2. George S. May, A MOST UNIQUE MACHINE: THE MICHIGAN
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY (Grand
Rapids, Michigan: Erdman's, 1977), 107.

3. Alan Nevins, FORD, THE TIMES AND THE MAN (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), 213-219; Peter
Eckstein, "The Automobile In Michigan: A Case Study of
Regional Development" (Unpublished, 1984), 7-8.

4. Eckstein, "The Automobile In Michigan," 7-8.

5. Eckstein, "The Automobile In. Michigan," 8; James
Flink, AMERICA ADOPTS THE AUTOMOBILE (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1970), 268.

6. Steve Babson, WORKING DETROIT, (New York: Adama
Books, 1984), 29.

7. Sward, THE LEGEND OF HENRY FORD, 32.

8. Sward, THE LEGEND OF HENRY FORD, 33.

9. Nevins, FORD, 451; Henry Ford, MY LIFE AND WORK,
1922:73. Ford stated that it was the best in the
"country," but he probably would not have been wrong in
saying, "the world."

10. Nevins, FORD, 451-2.

11. Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY, 3.

12. Nevins, FORD, 454;

13. Nevins, FORD, 452.

14. Nevins, FORD, 453.

15. Nevins, FORD, 452; FORD TIMES, January 1910.

16. DETROIT JOURNAL, 15 January , 1910; Nevins, FORD,
453.

55

17. Eckstein, "The Automobile In Michigan," 2.

18. Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY, 12; Rae, 1965:17-18;
Epstein, 1928:23-101; Nevins, 1954:220-386.

19. Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY, 10.

20. Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY, 10.

21. Nevins, FORD, 8.

22. Fred H. Colvin and Lucian L. Haas, JIGS AND
FIXTURES, New York, 1943:1; Franklin D. Jones, JIG AND

FIXTURE DESIGN, New York, 1920: 1-13iMeyer, FIVE DOLLAR
DAY, 26.

23. FMCA/ Oral History Section: "The Reminiscences of
Max F. Wollering."

24. Oliver J. Abell, "Making The Ford Motor Car," IRON
AGE, June, 1912, 1389; Fred Colvin, "Machining' Ford
Cylinders," AMERICAN MACHINIST, August, 1913, 846.

25. Colvin, "Machining Ford Cylinders."

26. Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY, 29.

27. Horace L. Arnold, "Ford Methods and Ford Shops,"
ENGINEERING MAGAZINE, 1914, 510.

28. Arnold, "Ford Methods and Shops," 510; Meyer, FIVE
DOLLAR DAY, 33.

29. Arnold, "Ford Methods and Shops," 1914, 510.

30. Arnold, "Ford Methods and Shops," 510; Meyer, FIVE
DOLLAR DAY,33.

31. FMCA/ Oral History Section: "The Reminiscences of
John Wondersee."

32. Arnold, "Ford Methods and Shops," 33-2; Mayer, FIVE
DOLLAR DAY, 34.

33. Glazer, DETROIT, 81.
34. Nevins, FORD, 9.

35. DETROIT NEWS, 6, 7 January 1914; Babson, WORKING
DETROIT, 31.

56

36. Babson, WORKING DETROIT, 32.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MODEL T COHORT AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
OF HIGHLAND PARK

The objective of this chapter is to understand
the connection between the growth and expansion of the
Ford Motor Company, the introduction of the moving
assembly line, and the demographic transition of the
community of Highland Park and its implications for the
composition of the workforce in the Crystal Palace.
The analysis is based primarily on the 1910, 1920 and
1930 United States Census reports, and on a special
census of the population of Highland Park which was
conducted by the United States Census Bureau during
November of 1915.

Before turning to a discussion of some of the
details of the demographic transition of Highland Park,
it should be noted that the demographic changes in the
Detroit region are part of a larger trend. More
precisely, the shift in location and composition of the

US population may be described as part of a world-wide

57

58

phenomenon----i.e., "the demographic transitionJ" The
years between 1890 and 1920 serve as the approximate
dates at which the United States and Europe reached the
"modern state," which is characterized by a slowb
growing population.1 For the US, the transition has
meant that during each decade since 1860, the
population has grown more native born (except 1860-
1870), less black, and more female. And, in every
decade since 1860, (except 1940-1970) the population
has also contained a growing proportion of adults and a
smaller proportion of persons under the age of twenty.
Value added in manufacture per capita has also mounted
with each decade since 1860? It is within this larger
context that the present study hopes to understand the
demographic transition of Highland Park.

Warner's analysis of the demographic transition
of the USA includes the generalization that, "During
the nineteenth century maleness was not strongly
associated with manufacturing areas one way or the
other, but since 1920 the two have increasingly
diverged;"3 the statistics in Table 3.1 suggest that
this generalization either does not apply to the
Detroit region, or (perhaps) that the statistics need
to be refined. More specifically, the period of

increase in "manufacturing" [SMFG/PER CAP in Table

59

3.1], was also a period during which the male to female
ratio was the greatest; this is clearly contrary to
Warner's expectatioms. For the puposes of this study,
what is important is that the apparent inconsistencies
between Warner's generalizations with the historic
pattern of manufacturing and population composition in
the Detroit region, support this researcher's
contention that an understanding of the economic and
social history of the region, can only come from the

study of cities like Highland Park and Hamtramck.

TABLE 3.1
DETROIT REGION (BEAN71):POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS INCLUDING PERCENT FOREIGN BORN,
PERCENT BLACK, RATIO OF NALES TO FENALES, PERCENT ADULT POPULATION, VALUE ADDED
PER CAPITA IN HANUFACTURE, AND NUMBER IN TOTAL POPULATION 1860-1960

IFOREIGN SBLACK NALES/IOO SADULTS SNFG/ POPULATION

 

BORN FEHALES PER CAP

1860 26.7 1.1 106,8 49,4 18. 272,992
1870 28.7 1.3 105.3 50.4 45. 375,617
1880 28.3 1.2 104.3 52.8 39. 472,662
1890 29.5 1.0 101.6 55.5 67, 577,529
1900 25.6 1.0 100.4 58.0 96. 687.848
1910

1920 25,1 3.0 116.6 62.7 660. 1,649,460
1930 21.0 5.6 109.6 61.6 537. 2,636,967
1940 16.7 6.3 104.7 65.1 392 2,886,605
1950

1960 8,8 13,3 97.9 59.2 1137. 4,582,233

 

Source: Sea Bass Uarner Jr, and Sylvia Fleisch, HEASUREHENTS FOR SOCIAL HISTORY,
Sage Publications (1977) 'Appendix B' excerpts. Uarner noted that, the exact data
vhich have been eeployed for the above aentioned book are on coeputer tape as
'Socioeconoaic Indicators for Functional Urban Regions in the United States, 1820-
1970' (ICPSRO7506), vhich are available for eeebers of the Inter-University
Consortiue.

60

Warner' further' generalized. that, "During “the
twentieth century concentrations of women and factories
are found more and more together. [Moreover], one might
note that femaleness and factories and bdg cities are
three characteristics postulated as the companions of
the modern stage of the demographic transition.JI Here
again, Warner's observation seems contrary to the
experience of the Detroit region. For example,
femaleness in the Motor City is not dominant until the
era of deindustrialization is well under way;5 In each
instance, Warner's generalizations confirm the need to
further disaggregate the social statistics of the
Detroit region, and to focus on communities like
Highland Park, and to analyze the various groups within
such communities. Therefore, as this study now turns
to a discussion of the expansion of the automotive
industry and the demographic transition. of lHighland
Park, it must be recalled that it is a transition that
occurred within a larger regional context.

With the establishment of the Olds Motor
Company in 1899, followed by Cadillac (1902), Ford,
Packard and Hupp (1903), and Hudson (1904), the
foundation for Detroit's future was in place; and
beginning in 1909 with Ford's high-volume, low cost

production. of the Model T, the sustained. growth. of

61

Detroit and the automotive industry was assured.
Hence, "Detroit's growth trajectory was set by the
rhythm of auto production;"6 and Detroit became, "a
place where----more than anyplace in the United States-
---the industrial society was changing the way people
lived."7

Of the many primary changes which came in the
wake of the innovations leading to automated production
and assembly technology, the demographic transformation
of Detroit and its environs is among the most easily
identifiable. In 1900 Detroit was a city of 285,784
people, most of whom lived in ethnic neighborhoods near
the Detroit River. Census reports show that by 1910
the population had grown to 465,766. By 1920 the
population had grown to 993,000, and by the 1930 census
to 1,720,000. While the population of Detroit
practically doubled during each of the three decades
after 1900, the city also increased its territorial
base. The annexation of outlying lands increased the
size of the city from 28.35 square miles in 1900 to
more than 40.00 on 1910, and to more than 80 square
miles in 1920. Both the increase in population and the
expansion of the city boundaries were fueled by the

8

automotive industry.

62

In order to insure a sufficiently large supply
of labor to feed the growing appetite of the automotive
industry, corporate and public officials were
aggressive in their efforts to attract workers to the
Detroit area. As early as August 1907, the Detroit
Board of Commerce asked immigration officials at New
York's Ellis Island to steer foreign workers to the
city, and "the Employer's Association of Detroit placed
advertisements in nearly 200 newspapers across the
country, encouraging both skilled workers and immigrant
laborers to come to the Motor City."S?IIt appears that
the EAD served as something of a 'labor trust' for area
manufacturerslll It may be argued then, that the
comparatively rapid increase in the size of Detroit's
population was a 'mare' reflection of the labor needs
of the automotive industry. "In 1908 the automotive
industry in the city gave employment to only 7,200
workers. In 1909 some 17,000 were employed,... By 1915
the figure increased to 81,000. In 1916, even prior to
America's entrance into World War I, the industry
employed 120,000 persons,"10 and by 1920, that figure
had risen to- 135,000. If nothing else, these
statistics (See Tables 3.2 and 3.3) should leave the
impression of the rapidity with which the population of

the Detroit region and the automotive workforce grew.

63

TABLE 3.2

MAJOR GROUPS IN DETROIT, 1910 AND 1930

 

1910 1930
% of total % of total

Total Population 466,000 100% 1,720,000 100%

Black 5,700 1% 125,300 7%
Foreign Born or

Children of

Foreign Born 345,000 74% 1,018,000 59%

Polish ? Polish 13%

German 29% Canadian 11%

Canadian 16% German 8%

Russian 6% Italian 4%

Austrian 5% English 4%

Irish 4% Russian 3%

English 4% Scottish 2%

Italian 2% Irish 2%

Hungarian 2% Hungarian 1%

Scottish 1% Yugoslavian 1%

Belgian 1% Czechoslovakian 1%

(1%=about 4,700) Austrian 1%

Belgian 1%

Greek 5%

Finnish §%

Mexican §%

Syrian/Lebanese 5%
(1%=about 17,000)

 

Source: Steve Babson, WORKING DETROIT, 1984:27.

64

TABLE 3.3

FOREIGN BORN WHITE BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH: HIGHLAND PARK
1920 AND 1930

 

COUNTRY OF BIRTH #1920 #1930
Armenia 606 442
Austria 537 121
Belgium 8 25
Bulgaria 37 24
Canada (French) 119 333
Canada (Other) 3609 4043
Czechoslovakia 113 114
Denmark 97 61
England 1445 2660
Finland 102 174
France 87 90
Germany 558 521
Greece 253 181
Hungary 559 136
Ireland 417 436
Italy 970 979
Yugoslavia 282 339
Lithuania 40 35
Netherlands 45 40
Norway 79 82
Poland 230 219
Rumania 473 356
Russia 580 312
Scotland 411 1250
Sweeden 180 199
Switzerland 33 47
Syria/Palestine 500 360
Wales 50 64
Mexico 7 0
Spain 0 22
Turkey 0 514
All Others 234 183

Totals 12,661 14,362

 

Source: United States Department of Commerce. Bureau of Census.
ABSTRACT OF THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1920 AND 1930.

65

While all of the major immigrant groups were
represented among the industry's new workers, not all
groups were equally represented, not all of the
automotive manufacturers got their 'fair share' of
immigrant workers, and not all neighborhoods received
the new arrivals in equal proportions. Therefore, in
order to understand how' the automotive industry is
related to demographic change in the Detroit region, it
will be necessary to further disaggregate the
statistics shown in Table 3.1. As suggested by Warner,
the basic question is, where did Highland Park fit into
the settlement patterns of Detroit, and more pointedly,
"What is the changing distribution of p0pulation and
economic activities within a changing area?"ll That
is to say again, that while the emphasis here is on
Highland Park, it should be understood that the changes
noted herein are part of a larger, more complex
regional transformation. On this basis ‘then, giving
special attention to changes in (a) total population,
(b) color and ethnic origin, (0) and male/female ratio
and age composition, this study now turns to an
analysis of the 1900-1930 census reports for Highland
Park.

Table 3.2 shows that the percent of foreign-

born white in the population of the Detroit region

66

ranged from a high of 29.5% in 1890, and down to 25.6%
in 1900 and 25.1% in 1920. The US Census shows that
the foreign—born white population in Highland Park was
27.2 in 1920 and 27.1 in 1930. Generally speaking, it
can be said that for the period under consideration,
the proportion of foreign-born white in the Detroit
region approximated that in Highland Park.
Furthermore, a cursory inspection of Tables 3.1 and
3.3 reveals that Canada provided Highland Park with
its largest contingent of immigrants in both 1920
(28.5%) and 1930 (28.1%), and England provided the
second largest number of foreign-born whites in both
1920 (9.0%) and 1930 (18.4%). Italians ranked third
(7.6%) at the 1920 census, and the fourth (6.8) most
numerous at the 1930 census. Table 3.3 clearly shows
that all of the major immigrant groups were represented
in the Highland Park population, and that English
speaking countries [Canada and England in the period
between 1910 and 1930, and Scotland in the decade
between 1920-1930] were most prominent as points of
origin, and Italy provided a significant immigrant
population for the entire period. It is worth noting
that the English-speaking countries and Italy provided
a greater proportion of immigrants to Highland Park,

than to the region as a whole (compare data in Tables

67

3.2 and 3.3). Although immigrants often lived in
ethnic neighborhoods which had been well established by
1900, there was a considerable variety in settlement
patterns.

Highland Park is an excellent, perhaps the
best exampLe, of how during the early decades of the
twentieth century, demographic change in the region is
directly related to the rise of the automotive empire.
"At the time of Ford's arrival in Highland Park its
population was approximately 425 persons, but within a
year it soared to 4,120. [And] following Ford's
announcement of the five-dollar mdnimum daily wage in

January 1914, the number of residents increased to

12
46,499 in 1920." This "wonderful" increase in
population. made Highland Park one of the biggest
13
population gainers in the whole country. The decline

in Highland Park's population was equally precipitous;
the rate of increase slowed in the decade of the 1920s,
reached a peak of 52,959 by the 1930 census, and began
a decline which reduced the population to 50,810 in
1940. By 1980 the population of Highland Park had
dropped to 27,909, a level which approximated the 1915

level of 27,170.1LL

(58

TABLE 3.4

TOTAL POPULATION OF HIGHLAND PARK FOR 1910, 1915, 1920 AND 1930 31 GET, RACE AND RATIO OF
NALES TO FENALES OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE

 

10111 1 1 10155 5501155 11155 21+/
051505 POPULATION 1115 FENALE 21+ 21+ 100 5510155
1930 52,595 27,357 25,592
1920 15,199 25,555 20,313 17,971 13,191 133.7
1915 27,170 11,721 12,199 10,050 3,052 121.9
1910 1,120 2,152 1.953 1,233 1,237 95.3
111115 33115
1930 '11511530'11
1920 33,391 17,707 15,537 11,191 9,337 119.2
1915 27,100 11,537 12,113 10,031 3,021 125.0
1910 1,105 2,151 1,951 1.225 1,231 95.0
31101
1930 1:111 535 535
1920 353 193 155 133 11
1915 57 21 33 19 25
1910 15 11 1 7 3

 

Source: United States Departeent of Coeeerce.
Fifteenth Census Reports: 'Hichigan Census,‘ and the 'Speciai Census of the Population of
The sale/100 feaale ratios are based on these

Highland Park, Nichiqan, Noveeber 15. 1915.'
reports and coaputed by this researcher.

Bureau of Census. Thirteenth, Fourteenth and

69

MAP 3.1

J.

 

he

 

 

me O! new rm. mom. ”"0 ”mama or manual

DISTRICTS AT rm: mouz. 0333178 01' 30733383 15. 1015.

 

 

70

The rate of change in Highland Park's population
is indeed remarkable. According to a tally taken by
village officials in 1914, there were 22,000 residents
in Highland Park. At the request of the village
council, the request having been made through the
village attorney to the president of the United States,
the United States Bureau of the Census conducted a
special census of the village of Highland Park. - The
special census began on November 15, 1915 and was
completed in six days; this count revealed that the
population of the village was 27,170. During the period
between the 1914-tally and the special census of 1915,
Highland Park gained Eh170 residents, an increase of
23.5 percent. But, during the five years and seven
months between the decennial census of 1910 and the
special census of November 1915, Highland Park gained
23,050 residents; this was an increase of 559.5
percent!

Given that both Highland Park: and. Hamtramck
owed their growth almost exclusively to the automotive
industry, and given their adjacent location, the
contrasts in their settlement patterns are especially
interesting. Both Highland Park and Hamtramck are
independent cities within the city of Detroit. With

the Dodge Brothers' plant as its driving force,

71

Hamtramck grew from a village of a few hundred people
in 1900, to a city of 48,615 in 1920, and to 56,268 in
1930.15 The population increases in Hamtramck and
Highland Park were very similar in number, but the
settlement patterns were completely different. Babson
notes, for example, that although English-speaking
immigrants were dispersed throughout the area, there
was a greater than usual concentration in Highland
Park. Adding to the existing English-speaking
community, "The new Ford plant in Highland Park
attracted nearby colonies of Finns, Yugoslavs,
Rumanians, and Lithuanians, while the Dodge Brothers'
sprawling plant in Hamtramck drew Polish immigrants
north from Poletown."

In an analysis of occupational stratification
and residential segregation in Detroit and its
surrounding communities, Zunz noted the contrasts
between Highland Park and Hamtramck. Zunz wrote:

Hamtramck was a working-class community
dominated by one ethnic group: 65.8% of
the city's heads of households were Poles
and another 4% native-born Americans of
Polish parents; 85% of them were factory
workers, 43% skilled or semiskilled and
42% unskilled, leaving, then only hand-
full of white-collar positions, mostly
shopkeepers. In short, Hamtramck was a

extension of the city's Polish community.

Highland Park was completely different.
Even though the Ford Motor Company employ-
ed many immigrants and more Blacks than

72

any of the other auto companies, Highland
Park was inhabited primarily by native
white American and other Anglo-Saxon
workers. Of a sample of 202 heads of
households, only two were Poles, one Hun-
garian, and one Black. In addition to the
60% skilled and unskilled workers, 42% of
Highland Park families were headed by
native white American or generally Anglo-
Saxon white-collar workers. Parts of
Highland Park, then, were made up of resi-
dences of an ethnically homogeneous group
of workers, different from that of neigh-
boring Hamtramck, and another part of it
was a middle-class neighborhood.l7
Zunz's description of Hamtramck: and. Highland
Park shows that while these two cities were similar in
some important ways, there ‘were :significant
differences. Especially interesting is the apparent
fact that Hamtramck was an ethnically homogenous
community in which residential segregation was based on
class (i.e., occupational status). Highland Park, on
the other hand, was ethnically more heterogenous and
consisted of two communities, one of which may be
described is primarily WASP and white-collar, while the
other may be described as ethnically mixed, working
class with a few blacks. The occupational
stratification and ethnic segregation in Highland Park

was underscored by the influx of an exceptionally large

number of young immigrant males.

73

TABLE 3.5

TOTAL POPULATION OF HIGHLAND PARK, MICHIGAN: NUMBER AND RATIO OF
MALES TO FEMALES OVER 21 BY ENUMERATION DISTRICT, 1915

 

 

DISTRICT #MALES #FEMALES MALES/100 FEMALES
1 772 905 85.3
2 732 756 96.8
3 985 982 100.3
4 575 667 86.2
5 902 835 108.2
6 945 674 140.2
7 1685 989 170.3
8 1799 687 262.8
9 235 210 111.9
10 280 259 108.1
11 526 524 100.3
12 624 564 110.6
Source: United. States Department of Commerce. Bureau of The

Census. SPECIAL CENSUS OF THE POPULATION OF HIGHLAND PARK,
MICHIGAN: NOVEMBER 15, 1915. Male/Female ratios computed by this
researcher.

74

TABLE 3.6

BLACK POPULATION OF HIGHLAND PARK MICHIGAN IN TWELVE
ENUMERATION DISTRICTS BY NUMBER OF MALES AND FEMALES,
21 AND OVER, 1915

 

 

DISTRICT
# MALES # FEMALES MALES 21+ FEMALES 21+

1 3 7 3 6

2 6 12 4 9

3 - 1 — -

4 - 3 — -

5 - 2 — 3

6 — 2 - 2

7 11 5 9 3

8 1 - 1 -

9 _ _ _ _

10 - - - -

11 — — - -

12 3 1 1 1
TOTAL 57:

24 33 21 26

Source: Department of Commerce. Bureau of Census,

Special Census of The Population of Highland Park,
Michigan, November 15, 1915.

75

When. the 1910 and. 1915 ratios of :males to
females in Highland Park (110.3/100 in 1910, and
118.3/100 in 1915) are compared to the ratios of males
to females during 1910 in the United States (106/100),
the state of Michigan (107.3/100), and the city' of
Detroit (106.6/100), the magnitude of Highland Park's
truly phenomenal character is evident.

A comparison of the male to female ratio
among those who are "21 and over" at the 1910, 1915 and
1920 census reports (See Table 3.4), reveals an
especially significant increase in the ratio for the
decade between 1910 and 1920. With the exception of
1920, when the ratio for the Detroit region is 116
males to 100 females (See Table 3.1), the Highland Park
ratio is significantly higher than that of the region.
More specificially, the male to female ratio changed
from 95.8 in 1910, to 124.9 in 1915, and 133.1 in 1920.
By 1930 the ratio was down to 106.9; a ratio which is
much closer to that of the Detroit region. Further
analysis, that is to say the comparison of the male to
female ratio of the 1920-Native White population with
the 1920-Total Population, reveals a difference which
may be attributed to the large number of immigrant-
males in the population. The foreign-born white

population was 27.2 percent in 1920, and the male to

76

female ratio among those in the twenty-one and over
grouping was 162.3/100. Although this ratio for
Highland Park is unusually high, it is consistent with
the general pattern wherein, "Maleness in a population
[i.e., a high male to female ratio] has always been
associated in America with areas of many foreign
immigrants since migrants were disproportionately
male."18

Among those who were twenty-one years of age
and over, the male to female ratio in Highland Park
(1915) is most startling when the population is
disaggregated to enumeration districts. Generally
speaking, the districts which. had. the largest
populations and the highest male to female ratios were
closest, while the districts with the lower ratios
were farthest away from the Crystal Palace.
Specifically, and in the order of their nearness to the
Crystal Palace, the ratios were an alarming 261.8,
170.3, 140.2 and 110.6 for districts 8, 7, 6 and 12
respectively. In other words, four districts near the
Crystal Palace contained respectively 50.2% and 36.2%
of Highland Parks males and females over twenty-one
years of age; and the average male to female ratio for

these districts was 173.4/100, while the overall ratio

77

for the twenty-one and over age group was 124.9 (See
Table 3.5).

The male to female ratio in the twenty-one and
over black population of Highland Park (1915) was quite
different from that of the white population. To begin
with, black females were more numerous than black
males, and with the exception of district 7, there were
more females in each district where blacks were
counted. In fact (See Table 3.6), there were three
districts (4, 5 and 6) where black females lived and no
black males were counted, and four districts (3, 9, 10
and 11) where no blacks lived. In sum, more than 50%
of the black females in this age group lived in
districts where the male to female ratio favored
females (85.3 and 96.8 in districts 1 and 2
respectively), and approximately 25% lived in districts
where no black .males lived” The statistical
description of the male to female ratio of blacks in
Highland Park is no less astounding than those for
whites, and together, they add up to reveal an
aberrant demographic profile for Highland Park.

The demographic profile of Highland. Park was
aberrant in at least two ways. First, although not
unlike that of many towns which were rapidly

industrializing and urbanizing, the high male to female

78

ratio was contrary to the national trend. Secondly,
not only was the male to female ratio in the opposite
direction of the national trend, the ratio was large
when compared to most other cities in the region.
While it is clear that the "surplus" i.e., "the number
or proportion above 50-50 ratio,"19 is directly related
to the region's automotive industry, the consequences
of the "surplus" of males is open to a number of
interpretations. One consequence of the "surplus" of
males was that the long established tradition of taking
in boarders and lodgers came under attack as a threat
to the family.

Whatever the particular (local)
consequences of the "surplus" of males (or females) for
the practice of taking in lodgers .and boarders, it
remains that the demographic transition has had some
important affects. Characterized by a male to female
ratio which increasingly favors females, increased
longevity, widening sex differences in mortality, aging
populations, low fertility, etc., the demographic
transition has given "rise to new circumstances between
men and women that force alterations in sex roles;"20
in Highland Park, these new roles were shaped in a

"boom town" environment.

79

It goes without saying that the particular
male to female ratio in Highland Park and the "boom
town" environment were the direct result of Ford's
production schedules and. employment practices.
Perhaps even more profoundly than the Detroit described
by Babson, Highland Park was "like prospecting towns in
the old West,... full of single men... Living in houses
and small hotels near the factories or on the city's
lower East side, these bone-weary workingmen relied on
the city's numerous saloons for escape from the lonely
grind of factory labor."21 Clearly, Highland Park was
a "boom town" nourished by Ford, but urbanologists have
noted that, "there is a very strong cultural influence
in the differential locations of men and women and that
variations are not a simple function of
industrialization and urbanization,"22 nor are they the
exclusive result of any one firm in Highland Park.

In any case, regardless of the variety of
cultural influences and despite the "evils" such as
those denounced by Veiller et al., there is no doubt
that "any’ non. parental adult" in. the nineteenth. or
twentieth century household, whether a boarder who was
employed in the Crystal Palace, grandparent, spinster
aunt, or servant, "was a candidate for personal,

significant relationships," and the presence of such an

E30

TABLE 3.7

TOP TEN EHPLOYERS IN HIGHLAND PARK RANKED BY NUHBER
OF EMPLOYEES, 1920

 

 

NATURE 05 nfineen EHPLOYEO:
NAHE OF FIRM BUSINESS hALES FEHALES UNDER 16 TOTAL
Ford Motor Co. Automobiles 10,511 978 6 11,189
haxvell Hotor Automobiles 3,999 212 9 1,211
Co. Inc.
Oetro:t United Car Building 531 5 - 636
Railway
Michigan State Telephone 20 168 - 188
Telephone Co. Service
Detroit H111 1 Cream 86 10 - 96
Creamery Co.
Ideal Box Lunch Lunch 1 Baked 60 23 - 83
Goods
H.S.H. Lunch Baked Goods 12 22 - 61
Co, -
Pittman's 3 Coal 1 Ice 51 - - 51
Dean Co.
Highland Park Milk 3 Cream 18 1 - 19
Creamery
Harding H.U, Lueber 13 1 - 17

SBO11E1-1Nichig3n Depgrtnen111NE-IARRN3 THIRT1-SEVENTH -ANNOA111REPORTT--;F;ctory
Insppection,'/ by county: 286-287.

 

 

81

adult was a considerable contrast to the strict mother-
father pattern in the US since 1900."23 In Highland
Park, single men (and/or perhaps married men living way
from their own household) who labored in automotive
plants were: a significant number of those who ‘were
candidates for the personal, significant relationships
described by Warner. In Highland Park, their wages,
more often than not, were paid at the Crystal Palace
(See Table 3.7).

In sum then, the foregoing chapters began with a
narrative of the major events unfolding in Highland
Park before the Building of the Crystal Palace, and it
was noted that before Henry Ford, Captain William H.
Stevens was the most influential individual in
determining the direction of Highland Park's
deveIOpment. Following the brief outline of Highland
Park's history, an effort is made to outline the
changes in machine-tool technology and organization
that culminated in the creation of the world's first
automated production and assembly system. Then,
attention was focused on the demographic transition of
the Detroit region; here, it was shown that in
response to the labor needs of a rapidly growing
automotive industry, the increase in the population and

the male to female ratio was greater in Detroit than in

82

the nation as a whole, and proportionally, even greater
in Highland Park. Moreover, it was noted that a few of
the enumeration districts accounted for the most
phenomenal aberration in the demographic transition of
Highland. Park; Finally, it was: suggested that the
enormous "surplus" of immigrant males and the practice
of lodging and boarding [each deserving of seperate
investigations which are well beyond the scope of this
study] are important to the full understanding of the
social history of the labor cohort which ‘built the
Model T. Generally speaking, the aim of this chapter
has been to describe the demographic context out of
which Ford invented the "continuous production assembly

line worker."

83

FOOTNOTES
Chapter Three
1. Sam Bass Warner, and Sylvia Fleish, MEASURES OF
SOCIAL HISTORY (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Press,
1977), 17.

2. Warner and Fleisch, MEASURES OF SOCIAL HISTORY, 17-
18.

3. Warner and Fleisch, MEASURES OF SOCIAL HISTORY, 20.

4. Warner and Fleisch, MEASURES OF SOCIAL HISTORY, 20-
21.

5. Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, THE
DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA (New York: Basic Books,
1982).

6. Hill, 1984:313.

7. Olivier Zunz, THE CHANGING FACE OF INEQUALITY:
URBANIZATION, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND IMMIGRATION IN
DETROIT, 1880—1920 (Chicago, Illinois: The University
of Chicago Press, 1982), 309.

8. Raymond R. Fragnoli, THE TRANSFORMATION OF REFORM:
PROGRESSIVISM IN DETROIT AND AFTER 1912-1933 (New York:
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1982), 8-9.

9. Steve Babson, WORKING DETROIT, (New 'York: Adama
Books, 1984), 23.

10. Sydney Glazer, DETROIT: A STUDY IN URBAN
DEVELOPMENT (New York, 1965), 79.

11. Warner and Fleisch, MEASURES OF SOCIAL HISTORY, 68.
12. WPA, MICHIGAN, 290.
13. HIGHLAND PARKER, (February 20, 1920), 4.

14. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of The Census,
"Special Census of Highland Park, November 1915."

84

15. Bureau of Census, 1915: "Census of Highland Park."
16. Babson, WORKING DETROIT, 25.

17. Zunz, THE CHANGING FACE OF INEQUALITY, 354.

18. Warner and Fleisch, MEASURES OF SOCIAL HISTORY, 19.
19. Kingsley Davis and Pietronella van den Oever,
"Demographic Foundations of New Sex Roles," POPULATION
AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 8 No. 3 (September, 1982), 499.

20. Davis and van den Oever, "Demographic Foundations
of New Sex Roles, 499.

21. Babson, WORKING DETROIT, 24.
22. Chester L. Hunt, "Female Occupational Roles and

Urban Sex Ratios in the United States, Japan and the
Philipines," SOCIAL FORCES, 43 (March 1965), 412, cited

in Sam Bass Warner, Susan Blomberg, et al. "A Census
Probe Into Nineteenth-Century Family History: Southern
Michigan, 1850-1880," JOURNAL OF SOCIAL HISTORY, 5

(Fall 1971), 35.

23. Warner, Bloomberg et al., "Family History: Southern
Michigan," 33.

CHAPTER FOUR
TAYLOR-MADE:
OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION IN THE CRYSTAL PALACE
Revolutions in machine-tool technology, the
synchronization of manufacturing and assembly, and the
automated conveyors had been combined to create the
continuous production process, and the flood of raw
labor (consisting' largely' of single, immigrant males)
had been channeled to the gates of the Crystal Palace.
Hence, the first phase of a major revolution in American
manufacturing had been completed. Before the revolution
would be consolidated, it was necessary to replace the
old regime with a new set of social relations, i.e., a-
new occupational hierarchy.

Table 4.1 is a record of the number of hourly
employees at the Highland Park plant, that is to say at
the Crystal Palace, between 1911 and 1933, and Table 4.2
records the number of Model Ts produced during each of
the nineteen years (1908-1927) that the car was in

production.

86

 

TABLE 4.1
NUMBER OF HOURLY EMPLOYEES AT THE CRYSTAL PALACE:
1911-1933
YEAR NUMBER
1911 3,488
1912 5,710
1913 13,198
1914 14,000
1915 18,028
1915 31,298
1917 35,245
1918 32.531
1919 43,080
1920 49.337
1921 31,745
1922 44.194
1923 63,168
1924 61,759
1925 50,555
1925 41,325
1927 31,051
1928 33,125
1929 13,444
1930 3.551
1931 1,840
1932 780
1933 524

 

Source: The statistics for the years 1911, 1912 and 1913
were taken from FMCA Accession 6, Box 31. The remaining
figures were extracted from Nevins' FORD 1954, and the
source was given as the Ford Motor Company Industrial
Relations Analysis Department. iMeyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY.

87

 

 

TABLE 4.2
NUMBER OF MODEL Ts PRODUCED EACH YEAR 1908-1927
YEAR NUMBER
1908 309
1909 13,852
1910 23,739
1911 54,000
1912 82,400
1913 199,100
1914 240,700
1915 372,251
1916 586,203
1917 834,663
1918 382,247
1919 828,545
1920 1,038,448
1921 939,652
1922 1,315,000
1923 2,055,300
1924 1,991,532
1925 1,605,534
1926 1,631,299
1927 385,679
Source: FMCA Accession 922 , " Model T Production

Statistics."

88

With the exception of the cutbacks in both
levels of 1employment and. in production. which. may' be
associated with WW1 and the 'recession' of 1920, these
tables reveal a pattern of virtually continuous growth
in. the number' of hourly' employees .and. the number‘ of
Model Ts produced. The increased levels of employment
and production were accomplished by dramatic changes in
the ethnic, skill-level and. class. composition. of the
workforce. This chapter seeks to comprehend: (1) the
extent to which Frederick Winslow Taylor's "scientific
management" was the basis of the new occupational
hierarchy, (2) the origins of the new manager-class,‘
and its position in the production process, (3) and how
the quality of worklife of the Model T cohort of Ford
workers was affected by the revolution. Herein, the
analysis is driven by this researcher's opinion that
existing scholarship has not given sufficient attention
to the manager-class.

Much of the writing, both the scholarly and the
somewhat more journalistic, which analyzes the
transformation of the Ford Motor Company has more or
less focused on the invention of automated production
and assembly process, the $5 daily-wage, and the welfare

work of the Sociology Department. The particular

89

emphases have, of course, varied in accordance with the
scope of the author's objective.

Glazer, for example, exclaimed that Ford's Highland
Park plant saw the inauguration of two revolutionary
practices which set the pace for the expansion of the
automotive industry, and thereby for the transformation
of the Detroit area. The first of the revolutionary
practices was the introduction of the mass-production
assembly principle, which Glazer rightfully-
characterized as a major technological phenomenon of
this century; the second practice, continued Glazer,
the minimum $5 daily-wage was one which soon
revolutionized wage scales throughout the nation.
Similarly, in THE CAR CULTURE (1975), James Flink
remarked that Ford's major innovations----the movable-
belt assembly line, the five dollar a day wage, the
Model T and the Fordson tractor----influenced America in
the twentieth century more than the Progressive Era and
the New Deal combined.:3 In part, because of the fanfare
with which they were announced, and perhaps because of
the particular perspectives of some writers, the
implementation of the continuous assembly line and the
$5 daily-wage have tended to overshadow the equally, if
not more important changes which brought a new breed of

managers into the production process.

90

Writing in 1975, Nelson is among the writers who
has been especially attentive to the revolution in
management. According to Nelson, there were three
essential elements in the transformation of the Ford
Motor Company: the first was, "a technological dynamic,
as technological innovation produced, often
inadvertently, fundamental changes in the factory
environment and in human relationships that derived from
it," the second element was a managerial dynamic, as
managers attempted to impose order and system on the
manufacturing organization," the final element, Nelson
argued, was a "personnel dynamdc, as managers began
deliberate efforts to organize and control the factory
labor force."' Unlike many observers, Nelson has
attached a major significance to both the intellectual
and the human dimensions of the managerial revolution.

Regarding the significance of the creation of a
manager-class, Peter F. Drucker has asserted that,
"Indeed, Scientific Management is all but a systematic
philosoPhy of worker and work. Altogether it may well
be the most powerful as well as the most lasting
contribution America has made to Western thought since
the Federalist Papers." Along with Drucker, Nelson and
Chandler, the most prominent scholars of the

transformation of the Ford Motor Company, including

91

Nevins and Meyer, and the less complimentary observers,
Dunn and Sward, have all recognized the significance of
the managerial revolution.

In each case, although from different critical
perspectives with different emphases, noted scholars
have concerned themselves with the relationship of
Taylorism, i.e., scientific management to (1) increased
production, (2) problems associated with the flood of
"unskilled" labor, (3) and the consequential
displacement of "skilled" craftsmen. Yet, despite the
eloquence and fastidiousness with which authors have
analyzed Ford's implementation of Scientific Management,
the analyses have often suffered for having taken a
perspective which attempts to understand how the
"Taylorized" pattern of social relations in the Crystal.
Palace gave control of the production processes to
managers, without giving due consideration to the
origins of this newly created manager-class. Although
Braverman's work (1974) does not focus exclusively on
the Ford Motor Company, his observations regarding
scientific management and the new manager-class are most
instructive.

Referring to the political economy in which the
social and technological revolutions of the Crystal

Palace took place, i.e., the context out of which the

92

new manager-class was born, Braverman has pointed out
that the social formation of monopoly capital had its
beginnings in the latter decades of the nineteenth
century. "It was then that the concentration and
centralization of capital, in. the forni of the early
trusts, cartels and other forms of combination, began to
assert itself, it was consequently then that the modern
structure of capitalist industry and finance began to
take shape."6 In an earlier chapter, entitled, "The
Origins of Management," Braverman noted that, in a
setting of :rapidly' revolutionizing' technology‘ ‘the
capitalist, ". . . brought into being a wholly new art
of management, which even in its early manifestations
was far more complete, self-conscious, painstaking, and
calculating than anything that had gone before."?’ With
respect to the insertion of the manager-class into the
production equation, Braverman noted that, "It was not
that the new arrangement was 'modern,' or 'large' or
'urban' which created the new situation, but rather the
new' social relations which now frame the production
process," and the antagonism between the owners for
whose benefit the process is carried on, ‘those who

manage, and the production workers who provide the

8 .
labor."‘

93

Braverman recognized the significance of the
displacement of skilled craftsmen and the appearance of
increasingly large numbers of "unskilled workers." But,
unlike some other writers, especially Meyer and Nevins,
Braverman argued that the displacement of skilled labor
is deeply imbeded in the capitalist mode of production;
and in accordance with Taylor's principles of scientific
management, the replacement of skilled craftsmen with
unskilled labor entails (indeed, depends upon) the
creation of a managerial class which functions as a
buffer between the antagonistic interests of the
production workers and the owners, and as the repository
of skill in the production process. In other words, the
displacement of skilled craftsmen involved much more
than merely replacing skilled labor with unskilled
labor, it embodied a whole new set of social and class
relations.

Prior to the technological revolution which brought
with it a managerial revolution, labor was socially
divided, but the rationalization of tasks, (i.e., the
detailed division of labor) which subdivided human labor
into its lowest common denominators: (1) labor of the
mdnd, (2) and labor of hand, would wait for the
revolution in assembly and production technology. In

the context of the Ford Motor Company and the Crystal

94

Palace, as elsewhere in manufacturing in the early
decades of the twentieth century, the labor of the mind
was given to the newly created, white collar manager-
class, while the labor of the hand was left for the blue
collar unskilled worker. According to Braverman's
assessment, "The separation of hand and brain is [was]
the most decisive single step in the division of labor
taken by the capitalist mode of production." At
bottom, the transfer of knowledge employed in production
(i.e., skill) to managers, partially fulfills the
conditions of the first principle of scientific
management, which may be characterized as ". . . the
disassociation of the labor process from the skills of
the worker," or as "the principle of separation of
conception from execution."'

While the distinction between managers and
production workers may be symbolized by white and blue
collars respectively, Braverman has cautioned that the
traditional distinctions between "manual" and "white
collar" labor has virtually ceased to have meaning in
the modern world of work.11 Braverman continued, "It
was not the color of the employee's collar, still less
the mode of payment on an annual or monthly basis as

distinguished from the daily or hourly wage of the

manual worker, that in themselves had a determinate

95

meaning, but rather the whole complex of social position
and position in the enterprise and the labor process
that these terms symbolized."12 As presently suggested
by Braverman, and certainly as demonstrated in a variety
of statistics and reports in the FMCA, the method of
distinguishing between owners, managers and workers on
the basis of white and blue collars, or on the basis of
the manner in ‘which. one is paid, is inaccurate and
(perhaps) musleading; Kalleberg and Griffin have devised.
an alternative way to make the distinction.

Kalleberg and Griffin have distinguished between
workers, managers and employers on the basis of
responses to two questions: (1) the first question asks
whether the respondent is self-employed; (2) the second
question asks whether the respondent supervises anyone
as part of their job. Those who answer "yes" to both
questions are employers, those who answer "no" to both
questions are workers, and those who answer "no" to the
first question and "yes" to the second. question. are
managers].3 The hypothetical situation in which the
workforce in the Crystal Palace responds to the
Kalleberg/Griffin questions, Reitell's descriptive list
of "important operations in the automobile industry,"

Zunz's sample of 1920-Detroit and Highland Park

occupations, and Meyer's discussion of social relations

96

in the Highland Park plant (along with a variety of
statistics from the FMCA), are sufficient to provide a
reasonably good sketch of the origins and function
(i.e., consolidation) of the manager-class.

Meyer has described the social relations of shops
and factories of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. According to Meyer, present scholarship and
existing fragmentary evidence suggests that the typical
work relationships in the carriage and wagon shops, the
small automobile factories, and the metal working shops
retained an essentially "artisan character." That is
to say that, generally speaking, skilled mechanics
controlled the labor process and were centrally involved
in both the mental and physical aspects of the
productive operations of the workshop or factory. In
this pre-revolutionary environment, the skilled workers
supervised unskilled laborers and/or helpers who did the
physically most strenuous tasks in production. Even in
the technologically advanced shops and factories, the
dominant pattern of social relations was one in which
the fundamental division in the workforce was between
the skilled "mechanic" and the unskilled "laborers."11+
Meyer also noted that a symbolic manifestation of the
social relations of the workplace may be seen in

photographs of the period which often showed skilled

97

workers wearing white shirts and ties, while the
unskilled worker is seen wearing the more conventional
blue collar or traditional immigrant clothinguls

The social relations which Meyer described are
numerically illustrated in table 4.3, which shows the
proportions of mechanics, specialists, unskilled workers
and foremen in an 1891 sample of workers in Detroit's
metal industries. It will be noted that in this sample,
which probably typified the period, mechanics
represented 39 percent of the workforce, while the less
skilled specialists and unskilled workers represented 59
percent of those involved in production. The foremen,
representing 2 percent of the production workforce were,
as suggested by their income and age, and as verified by
the conditions of production in the metal working
industries, essentially upgraded mechanics. The major.
point to be made here is that, while there is clearly a
division of labor which may be understood in terms of
the symbolic 'white' and 'blue' collars, the reality is
that despite the differences in income (see table 4.3),

most of the workers were physically involved (albeit in

varying degrees) in the production processes.

98

TABLE 4.3

DETROIT WORKERS IN METAL INDUSTRIES BY
OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION, 1891

 

Occupation Number Percent 1 Weekly X Age
Nechanics 153 39 12.58 32
Specialists 117 30 8.18 24
Unskilled 113 29 6.60 27
Fore-en 9 2 19.67 38

TOTAL 392 100 9.95 29

 

Source: This is an adaptation of a table that appears in Meyer
(1982). Meyer noted the sources as, "A Canvas of Agricultural
Implement and Iron Working Industries in Detroit," in MICHIGAN
BUREAU OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS, EIGTH ANNUAL REPORT
(Lansing, Michigan 1891)1-151. The statistics reported here are the

result of a computer analysis of a one in ten sample of the
original data (Meyer, 1982:46).

In contrast to the distribution of production
workers shown in table 4.3, the occupational
classification of Ford's employees in January 1917
(table 4.4), reveals a dramatic change in the workforce
of the erstwhile trend-setter of the automotive
industry. Most important, of course, is the appearance
of technical workers (13%), clerks (4.2%), and salaried
supervisors (0.4%) who were not present in. the 1891

saumple.

99

TABLE 4.4

FORD EMPLOYEES AS OF JANUARY 1917:
BY OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION

 

Occupation Group Number Percent
Specialists 22,652 55.3
Unskilled 5,986 14.6
Technical 5,391 13.2
Foremen 3,523 6.2
Clerks 1,710 4.2
Inspectors 1,533 3.7
Skilled Trades 1,003 2.4
Salaried Supervisors 198 .4
TOTALS 40,966 100.0

 

Source: FMCA Accession 940, Box 16, "List of Trades and
Occupations and Number of Men Employed in Same." See
also, Charles Reitell, "Machinery and Its Effect Upon
the Workers in The Automobile Industry," ANNALS AAPS,
116 (November 1924) 37-43; Meyer, 1982.

100

When those classified as foremen (6.2%) and
inspectors (3.7%) who were present in the 1891 sample,
are added to the former, it adds up to a manager-class
which. was not physically involved. in. production; and
which equals 28 percent of those employed. As
demonstrated in tables 4.3 and 4.4, a revolution had
indeed taken place. What follows is attempt to
understand the relationship of Frederick Winslow
Taylor's "principles of scientific management" to both
the revolutionary process and its consequences.

Before turning to a consideration of

"Taylorism" and its place in the technological and

managerial revolution in the Crystal Palace, it is
important to place Talyor's work in its proper
perspective. The emergence of management engineering,

or "scientific management" as it was popularly known,
can be associated with the enormous increase in the size
and complexity of American corporations between the
Civil War and 0.1900. ” In a manner similar to that
in the professions of medicine, law and education which
became increasingly specialized and segmented in
response to the demands and opportunities offered by a
rapidly growing, and increasingly complex industrial
society, industrial engineers recognized an opportunity

to create a new specialization within the profession of

101

industrial engineering; but, unlike other established
professions, such as medicine and law, scientific
management carried relatively little traditional
[intellectual] baggage."l7 More precisely, it may be
noted that the origin of modern personnel management is

to be found in "two converging strands in American

economic life." "One is the movement which has been
designated 'welfare work.‘ The other, associated with
the profession of engineering, is Scientific 1
Management."

At the outset, "efficiency" was the primary

concern of engineers who became associated with the
development of the 'new profession,' that became known
as management engineering. Their traditional concerns
had been with material, structure, and machine process,
but in the midst of revolutionary developments in
corporate oraganization, and machine and tool
technology, it soon became apparent that "efficiency"
could only be achieved when the workman was taken into
consideration. This new direction taken by some
engineers around the beginning of the twentieth century,
is symbolized 'by the most famous of the engineers,
"Frederick W. Taylor. . . who remains best known for his
'discovery' that the methods of work and the methods of

management could and should be improved, that is for

102

Scientific Management."19 It is generally conceded that
Frederick Winslow Taylor is the "Father of Scientific
Management,"20 and students who search the literature
of American management will find abundant evidence that
the "aims, principles and procedures first presented by
Taylor have, like the ripples of a stone cast into a
pool, spread out into American industry, although many a
management of 1929 [and beyond] may not know the source
of that which it believes or practices."21

Among the critical steps towards the insertion of
mechanical engineers into the "management engineering"
mold, the first was taken with the founding of the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (A.S.M.E.) in
1880. It should be noted that a variety of
specializations, such as accounting and marketing had
already developed within corporate structures, but
" There is [however] no such evidence of early
application of the principles of specialization to labor
administration. Before 1900, the day-to-day relations
with labor were in the hands of foremen." 22

By 1886 a new direction was made apparent. At
the annual meeting of A.S.M.E. in Chicago on May 26, the
first in a long series of papers on management were

presented to the members. Two of the papers, one by

Captain Henry Metcalfe entitled, "The Shop Order System

103

of Accounts, "23 and a second by Oberlin Smith,

"Inventory Valuation of Machinery Plant,"21+ had no
lasting impact on the development of "management
engineering," but a third paper by Henry Townsend, "The
Engineer as an Economist," in which the presenter
reminded his listeners that the engineer's value to any
firm was [ultimately] measured in dollars and cents,
stands out as a watershed in industrial management. The
discussion following the presentation of these three
papers was lively, and one of the persons involved was a
thirty-five year old engineer who had joined A.S.M.E. in
1885;25 his name was Frederick Winslow Taylor. Here in
1886, is where Taylor began his contribution to
management engineering. His first formal presentation
to A.S.M.E. would not come until 1895.

Four years after Frederick A. Halsey delivered a
paper in which he introduced the element of "time", a
proposition in which Taylor had long been interested, as
a consideration in devising incentive pay,26 Taylor
presented his first paper to A.S.M.E. The paper was
titled, "A Piece Rate Systemn Being“ a Step Toward
Partial Solution of the Labor Problem." 27 For the next
several years, thinking among engineers continued to

focus primarily on using wages as a means of achieving

efficiency on the part of workers. It was Taylor's

104

opinion that "the greatest obstacle to efficient
production was poor management, simply because employers
knew little about the elements of production."28 In
other words, Taylor believed that the emphasis on wage
incentives as a means of achieving efficiency in
production was misdirected. Therefore, Taylor
"attempted to remedy the misdirection of attention in
the 1903 meeting of A.S.M.E. in Saratoga, where he read
his famous paper, "Paper Number 1003," which bore the
title, "Shop Management,"29 and in which he outlined the
principles through which management could unite high
wages with low labor costs. 30 As in the case of the
"Piece Rate" paper, the "Shop Management" paper "failed
to stimulate sympathetic interest in the idea that a
day's work could be measured,"1 and thereby be used as
the foundation for achieving efficiency in production.
It was not until eight years later that the Eastern Rate
Case hearings of 1910-1911 gave Taylor's ideas a sudden
vogue under the name of "Scientific Management.‘32

Innovations in the Crystal Palace and the

explication of the principles of scientific management

were developed simultaneously. There is no doubt that
Ford engineers were aware of Taylor's work; for
example, ". . . Flanders in his improved tooling system

at Piquette, Hawkins in his departmentalization, and

105

P.E. Martin in his elementary time studies, had
doubtless caught some of "Taylor's ideas.'3-‘3 Among
managers in the Crystal Palace, Clarence W. Avery had
the broadest grasp of scientific management. "He had
read widely, knew the latest European and American
advances in engineering, and kept in touch with the
ideas of men like Frederick Winslow Taylor." And, as
Nevins has reminded us, the year (1911) that the Crystal
Palace was in full use, "was the year in which Taylor
published THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT, and
laid before Congress his report on the Taylor system."
Moreover, Taylor himself recognized the independent
implementation of the principles of which he is the
recognized inventor.

According to the record as reported by Nevins,
Taylor lectured to Detroit area engineers and managers
on at least two separate occasions. In 1909 Taylor
spoke for more than four hours at the Packard plant, and
late in 1910 he addressed a group consisting of more
than six hundred superintendents and foremen employed in
Detroit area industries. On the latter occasion, Taylor
was told that, "without special prompting or counsel,"
several Detroit area firms "had anticipated his ideas."
Being informed of this development, Taylor expressed his

interest and stated that it was the "first instance in

106

which a group of manufacturers had undertaken to install
the principles of scientific management without the aid
of experts." Clearly then, as Nevins concludes,
independent of Taylor's work, the machine process in the
automotive industry (most notably in the Crystal Palace)
was generating and perfecting its own procedures. It is
significant that "plant engineers and production
superintendents, knowing little theory but schooled in
machine-shop, foundry, and. assembly room . . . were
creating a system of management to meet" their practical
problems. "Ford, Willis, Galamb, Emde, and Sorensen may
well have learned something from Taylor, but they could
also have taught him something."37 Whatever the role
played by Taylor's scientific management, the revolution
in the Crystal Palace would soon be consolidated.

In 1924 Reitell described some of the effects of
the revolution; he wrote that, "So pronounced have been
the changes that they record definite influences upon
worker's wages, upon his mental actions and.reactions,
upon his physical being, and upon the whole8social and
industrial fabric of which he is a part."3 Reitell
continued by noting that within a century, inventions
such as the steam engine, the cotton gin, the

typewriter, the radio, the telephone and the automobile

were all witnesses "of a conquering* of mankind. over

107

blind nature." "But," he added, "there is a backfire to
all of this mechanical achievement. The workers by the
millions in malls and factories are being shaped to meet
the demands of these rigid machines. The requirements
of dexterity, alertness, watchfulness, rhythmic and
monotonous activities, coupled with a lessening of mmch
of the older physical requirements, are registering
results that portray a new type of worker in
industry."39 In more recent times, Stephen Meyer has.
echoed Reitell's remarks.

Meyer maintains that the new industrial technology
which had become a reality in the Crystal Palace, "was a
mixed social blessing, and perhaps even a curse which
promised a material cornucopia for all," while exacting
incredible social costs. Following the implementation
of the new technology, "The world of work would never be
the same again. . . the worker's daily routine became
more monotonous and more repetitive. It dramatically
altered the social structure of the shop, the factory,
and, in fact modern industrial society. . . . Indeed,
the new industrial technology had a profound impact on
modern social ei'cistence"l+O

While the tools were being perfected and raw

immigrant labor flocked to the gates of the Crystal

Palace, there was an equally profound revolution of

108

another sort in the offing. Frederick Winslow Taylor
referred to scientific management as a "great mental
revolution." Taylor asserted that scientific
management involved a complete mental revolution on the
part of the workingman, and on the part of those in
management (i.e., foremen, superintendents, owners of
the firms, and boards of directors). For the workingman
the mental revolution would mean a reorientation "as to
their work, toward their fellow men, and toward their

employers;" for the managers it meant rethinking "their

duties toward their fellow workers in management,
toward their workmen, and toward all their daily
problems." "And," Taylor emphatically added, "without

this complete mental revolution on both sides scientific
management does not exist."’

Whether or not the system which was instituted in
the Crystal Palace was drawn directly from. Taylor's
work, it was clearly in line with his prescriptions, and
therefore, the principles outlined by Taylor offer an
excellent framework within which to analyze the process
and the results of Ford's managerial revolution.
Recognized as the "father of scientific management," and
the "original efficiency expert," Frederick Winslow
Taylor had begun careful time and motion studies in the

machine shop of the Midvale Steel Company in 1881, and

109

in 1893 in Philadelphia he opened an office where he
worked as a consultant in shop management and
manufacturing costs.43 In describing his book, Taylor
wrote that, "This book is written mainly with the object
of advocating high wages and low labor cost as the
foundation of the best management, of pointing out the
general principles which render it possible to maintain
these conditions even under the most trying
circumstances, and of indicating the various steps which
the writer thinks should be taken in. changing from a
poor system to a better type of management." Taylor
maintained that scientific management, "in its essence,
consists of a certain philosophy, which results,
in a combination of four great underlying principles of
management." In brief, the four principles included:
(1) the development of a true science, (2) the
scientific selection of the workman, (3) his scientific
education and development, and (4) intimate friendly
cooperation between the management and the men.“5

It may be argued that, in the Crystal Palace, the
first, second and third principles of scientific
management were accomplished simultaneously. In his
testimony to the House of Representatives' Special

Committee, Taylor stated that the first principle

involved managers in the deliberate collection of "the

110

great mass of traditional knowledge which in the past
has been in the heads of workmen." This "first
principle may be called the development of a science to
replace the old rule-of-thumb knowledge workmen had
and of which there was no permanent record."[‘16

Taylor outlined the second principle when he
testified that, it "is the scientific selection and the
progressive development of the workingmen;" and "the
third of the principles of scientific management is the
bringing of the science and the scientifically selected
and trained workmen together."l+7 Certainly, the Ford
workmen were not "scientifically selected," and
therefore, the second and third principles were not
literally accomplished. But the objectives were
achieved through the scientific selection and
progressive development of tools and machines, rather
than through the scientific selection of workmen; that
is to say, in the initial stages of the production of
the Model T, the conditions which principles two and
three were expected to satisfy, were created primarily
through the use of tools and the arrangement of
machines, rather than by the scientific selection and
education of workmen.

The fourth principle, Taylor continued in his

testimony, "is perhaps the most difficult of the four

111

principles of scientific management for the average man
to understand."48 Worded somewhat differently in SHOP
MANAGEMENT (1911), the fourth principle calls for an
almost equal division of the actual work of the company
between workmen and management. "That is, the work
which under the old type of management practically all
was done by the workmen, under the new is divided into
two great divisions [classes], and one of these
divisions is deliberately handed over to those on the
management side." L19 In the Crystal Palace, the
successful implementation of the principles of
scientific management was marked by the emergence (late
in 1914) of mass produced Model Ts from the continuous
production and assembly lines.

Meyer, in his unusually perceptive and meticulous
study, noted three areas in which Ford's new industrial
technology (a technology which coincided with the
fulfillment of the four principles of scientific
management), had a dramatic impact on the character of
work and on the social relations at the workplace.5“'"
First, the new technology transformed the tasks and
routines in the various shops and departments of the
Crystal Palace, so that the "traditional notion of skill

was completely removed from the tasks and routines of

the workman." Second, a new system of 'workplace

112

stratification and new patterns of social relationships
emerged as the "deskilled specialist" became the
principal occupation—group, and foremen, subforemen,
"straw bosses," clerks, and inspectors increased their
numbers. Finally, the new technology brought with it a
new method for the control of the "deskilled
specialist." "The design of machines, the arrangement
of men and machines, the new forms of record keeping and
inspection, and the new means of mechanical conveyance
all controlled the pace, the intensity, and the quality
of production."50

From the perspectives of workplace stratification
and social relations, the net result of the new
technology was the insertion of a new factor in the
production equation. The new factor was the MANAGER.
That is to say that, if prior to the introduction of the
new technology the value of production (Pv) could be
measured by capital (0) and labor (1), then after the
new technology had been implemented, the value of
production was a function of capital, management (m) and
labor; Pv=c+l became Pv=c+m+l.

The formulaic expression [Pv=c+m+l] is imprecise
and perhaps too simple to be of much use. But, it is

sufficient to suggest that in order to understand the

significance of the new managerial factor, it is

113

necessary to distinguish between management and labor,
and it is necessary to specify the hierarchy within
these two occupational classes; this necessity is one
upon which Reitell's work: sheds considerable light.

In 1924 Reitell noted that changes in how the
automobile was produced, added to the existing confusion
associated with terms such as "skilled, semi-skilled and
unskilled workers."51 .More recently, further confusion
has been added by the use of terms like "deskilled" and
"deskilling"'52 While such phrases are intuitively
appealing, they are ahistorical and, unfortunately, they
detract from the most profound change in workplace
stratification, i.e., the insertion of the manager
class. Fortunately, Reitell outlined an excellent
alternative to such phrases.

Reitell wrote that, "in lieu of unskilled,
semiskilled and skilled there now exist tenders who
operate machines, the technical force who design, plan
schedule, route and cost the work, the clerks,
inspectors and foremen who record all the mdscellaneous
activities of the shop, check the quality and quantity
of production and who keep watch on the flow of
materials." According to Reitell's observations,

"important operations in the automobile industry" could

be reduced to the six primary groups which he listed:

114

(I) The Machine Tenders, (II) The Assemblers, (III)
"Skilled Workers," i.e., those with a trade, (IV)
Inspectors and Testers, (V) The Helpers, (VI) The
Laborers.5u Reitell added that, in the eleven years
between 1912 and 1923, Groups I and II, consisting of
machine tenders and assemblers, grew to represent a
larger proportion of the total workforce, while Groups
III and VI, "skilled workers" and common laborers
decreased as a proportion of the total workforce.

Reitell's classification is invaluable, but with the
exception of "Inspectors and Testers" included in Group
IV, the manager-class is excluded. Table 4.5

complements Reitell's classification scheme.

115

TABLE 4.5

AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY OCCUPATIONS BY SKILL CLASSIFICATION
AND NUMBER EMPLOYED, DETROIT 1920

 

CLASSIFICATION OCCUPATION NUMBER
White Collar Inspector 42
" Accountant 10
" Salesman 9
" Engineer 6
" Stock Clerk 6
Skilled and
semi-skilled Machinist 195
" Foreman 66
" Toolmaker 53
" Painter 29
" Assembler 27
" Carpenter 18
" Millwright 18
" Mechanic 17
" Trimmer 17
" Repairman 16
" Electrician 12
" Woodworker 11
" Bricklayer 11
" Auto body builder 10
" Auto body maker 9
" Finisher 9
" Steamfitter 9
" Grinder 9
" Holder 8
" Blacksmith 6
" Motor Assembler 5
Unskilled labor
" Laborer 184
" Machine hand _ 22
" Auto worker 12
" Sheet metal worker 12
Unskilled Service
Worker Watchman 6

 

Source: This table is based on data which appears in
Zunz's, THE CHANGING FACE OF INEQUALITY (1982), "Table A
3.2;" Zunz's table is based on a stratified sample of
4,864 heads of household who were counted in the 1920
United States Census.

116

Table 4.5 is based on a stratified sample of 4,864

heads of household counted in the 1920 United States

census, and is a valuable supplement to Reitell's
classification of workers. When summarized, the table
reveals that 73 workers were classified as "white

collar;" there were 555 skilled and semi-skilled, and
230 unskilled workers in the sample. Considered along
with Reitell's classification of workers involved in the
"important operations in automobile production," it will
be noted that only Group III/Inspectors and Testers may
be categorized as white collar workers; moreover, it
will be observed that the number of inspectors (42/864)
is consistent with Reitell's assertion that this group
of workers included about five-percent of the total.
Together, the foregoing tables (4.3, 4.4 and 4.5), and
Reitell's classification of automotive workers record a
change from the workplace hierarchy which had prevailed
in the 1891 sample.

Among the many changes wrought by the new factory
system pioneered by Ford, the displacement of the
foremen by the manager-class was, perhaps, the most
profoundly important. Prior to the advent of the new
factory system which has been described by one writer as
"Fordism,"56 it was common for manufacturers to entrust

most aspects of the day-to-day operations to first-line

117

57
supervisors (i.e., foremen) and other skilled workers
Typically, "the technicians, clerks and other staff
specialists----not to mention the union representatives-

---who domdnate the present-day manufacturing plant were
unknown in the late ninteenth century factory."
Clearly, "before 1900 and in most factories before 1920,
the foreman was the undisputed ruler of his department,
gang, crew or shop."58 The foreman's status and
authority, which were usually achieved through the
acquisition of a "skill," were based on several
important functions which the foreman performed:
First, and most important, he "got the work out;" a job
that varied according to the degree of management
participation 111 production decisions. .A second

function was to interpret the management's policies to

the workers, . . . Finally, the foreman hired, trained,
59

motivated and disciplined workers." Although

nineteenth century managers and foremen seldom

distinguished the three activities from "getting the
work out" and enforcing the employer's rules, the
foreman's personnel function (in the new system) became
the responsibility of 'expert' managers. While firms
such as the Ford Motor Company gradually reduced the
foreman's power to recruit and train the factory labor

force, they also added new personnel programs outside

118

the foreman's jurisdiction that ultimately reinforced
the trend toward centralized control over employee
recruitment and training,60 and eventually extended that
control into the homes of the workers.

As the internal authority structure of the Ford
Motor Company was overturned, i.e., as skilled workers
and foremen were displaced by the manager-class, there
was also a significant change in the size and ethnic
composition of the workforce (See table 4.1 for a record
of the increased number of "Hourly" employees.)
Generally speaking, it would be correct to conclude that
the ethnic composition in the Crystal Palace was merely
a reflection of the ethnic make-up of the region as a
whole. Richard Lee, who headed Ford's first Personnel
Department, and who preceded Samuel Marquis as head of
the Sociological Department, noted the significance of.
foreign-born employees in the Crystal Palace. Lee stated
that, among those employed in the Highland Park plant,
there were fifty known nationalities and one unknown.
In. summary, Lee noted. that, "Out of ‘the [8,000] men
working here, there are 73 that did not know what they
were, 1,829 Americans, 1,812 Poles, 1,465 Russians, 522
Roumanians, 366 Germans and 137 Servians [sic]"

"So you can see, the foreign element predominates."

Lee's statement is borne out in table 4.6.

119

TABLE

NATIONALITIES AND RELIGIONS
EMPLOYEES IN JANUARY 1916

4.6

OF FORD'S CRYSTAL PALACE
BY NUMERICAL PROMINENCE

 

Nationality

 

American
Polish
Canadian
Italian
Roumanian
German

5

Religion

Roman Catholic
Protestant
Greek Catholic

Jewish

Number
12,-553
5,280
1,392
1,197
1,002
1,001

1}

13,586
12,427
1,550

995

 

Source: Ford Motor Company

Accession

62 , Box 59 .

nat i onal i t 1 es were recorded,
hundred persons employed in the Crystal Palace.

Archives, Dearborn Michigan,

iMore than fifty other
each with less than one-

120

Table 4.6 is further testimony to the prominence
of the "foreign element;" here, it is shown that in
January 1916, while most of the employees at the Crystal
Palace were "American," Polish, Canadian, Italian,

Roumanian. and. German workers [along with fifty' other

nationalities, each with less than one hundred
employed], were significant among the total number of
employees. Since the Roman Catholic religion is often

included as an ethnic characteristic of the foreign
workers who came to the Detroit area during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the fact that
13,586 employees at the Crystal Palace were designated
"Roman Catholic" also attests to the prominence of the
"foreign element."

It goes without saying, of course, that although
the ethnics were prominent in their numbers, they were
not proportionately distributed throughout the workforce
hierarchy; One Ford Motor Company official (c.1914)
noted that, while the percentage of foreign people who
come to work as laborers in the Highland Park plant was
rather high, they were of various "types." More
precisely, the official continued:

You see, in the machine lines, I would say

they were more or less Americans or they were

maybe of German descent or people of that
type, you know. More skilled help was

121

naturally the American type, but we did secure

a lot of Austrians and Germans, you know, good

die makers, you know. I would say the highest

percentage was an American type.

In the lower classifications, such as

press operators or grinders or laborers,

well, we had the foundry here, foundry help.

In the beginning it was a lot of Russian,

Polish, Croatian, Austrian, people of that

type. We didn't have any Negroes until WWI.

That was the beginning of the migration of the

colored people in Detroftgz

The Ford official's assessment of the proportion
of the various "types" of workers employed in the
Crystal Palace, and the particular classes of jobs that
they held, is confirmed in the 1920-United States Census
report which included statistics on job classification
by nationality. According to Zunz's analysis of a
sample of the 1920 statistics, the "American type"
occupied the white collar, skilled and semi-skilled
positions in the hierarchy of Highland Park's workforce,
while the "lower classification" was reserved for the
Polish, Croatian, Italian, and other "people of that
type." In short, the testimony of Ford officials,
combined with the statistics recorded in table 4.7,
strongly suggest that virtually all of the manager-class
would come from the ranks of the "American type!" In

some ways, the bias in favor of the "American type" is

both ironic and paradoxical.

122

TABLE 4.7

OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF HIGHLAND PARK AUTOMOTIVE WORKERS,
BY ETHNIC GROUP AND OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION

 

Ethnic Group/ Occupational Classification

& Number
White Skilled and Unskilled
Collar Semi-skilled *(wl) (sw)

 

Native White

American/80 32.5 42.5 6.3 6.3
British/17 17.6 47.1 29.4 ---
Canadian:

English/13 23.1 46.2 15.4 7.7
American/13 30.8 38.5 15.4 ---
Brt/Am /4 --— 25.0 --- 25.0
German Am/9 11.1 66.7 --— ---
British Am/7 42.9 14.3 14.3 14.3
Italian/7 -—- 28.6 57.1 14.3
Armenian/6 -—- 33.3 16.7 16.7
Irish Am/3 --- 66.7 --- ---
Swiss Am/3 66.7 33.3 --- ---

German /2 ~-- ——— -__ _-_

Other Foreign

 

born/22 22.7 31.8 31.8 4.5
Other Native
born/5 20.0 40.0 20.0 ---
TOTALS: /164 49 77 27 11
PERCENT ‘ 25.7 40.3 14.1 5.8

 

Source: This table is based on, "Table 13.5" in Zunz'z,
THE CHANGING FACE OF INEQUALITY (1982), 358-9. Zunz's
statistics are derived from 1920 United States Census,
and represent the results of an equal probability sample
of heads of households in Highland Park. '

* (wl) and (sw) designate wage labor and service worker

123

The bias is ironic in two respects. In
discussions regarding the displacement of the artisan
class, the artisan is usually cast as the victim of the
villainous, "unskilled" immigrant worker whose lowly

habits allowed him to live on lower wages than those

required by the artisan. Since it was rational to
employ labor at the cheaper rate, ii: is generally
surmised, that the artisan was replaced by the
immigrant. The present analysis strongly suggests that
the foregoing scenario is ahistorical (at least
incomplete). It would be more correct to argue that

while the artisan was replaced, he was not replaced by
the immigrant, but by the manager-class, almost none of
whom were of the "immigrant type!" Secondly, the bias
is also ironic in that, while it is often recognized
that Taylor's scientific management may have been the
basis for stratification in the Crystal Palace, there is
only silence on the question of, "How scientific was the

selection of the manager-class?"

124

FOOTNOTES

Chapter Four

1. As conceived here, the 'manager-class' in the Crystal
Palace is thought to be like the 'class' defined by E.P.
Thompson. Thompson agrees with R. Dahrendorf in
recognizing that, "Classes are based on the differences
in legitimate power associated with certain positions,
i.e., in the structure of social roles with respect to
authority expectations.... An individual becomes a
member of a class by playing a social role relevant from
the point of view of authority ....He belongs to a class
because he occupies a position in a social organisation;
i.e., class membership is derived from the incumbency of
a social role."(Thompson cites, R. Dahrendorf, CLASS AND
CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY, 1959, 148—9).

Thompson's elucidation of Dahrendorf emphasized that,
"The question, of course, is how the individual got to

be in this 'social role,’ and how the particular social
organization (with its property-rights and structure of-
authority) got in: be there. And, Thompson continued,

"these are historical questions."

With this, then, along with Thompson, "By class I
understand an historical phenomenon, unifying a number
of disparate and seemingly unconnected events, both in

the raw material of experience and in consciousness. I
emphasize that it is an historical phenomenon. I do not
see class as a "structure," nor even as a "category,"

but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown
to have happened) in human relationships."

In sum then, "The class experience," of managers in the
Crystal Palace, as for class experiences elswhere, "is
largely determined by the productive relations into
which men are born----or enter voluntarily." Note: See
E.P. Thompson, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS
(New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 9-11.

125

2. Sydney Glazer, DETROIT: A STUDY IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
(Bookman Associates, 1965), 81.

3. Robert C. Ackerson, "Historiography: Some Milestones
In Automotive Literature," MICHIGAN QUARTERLY, No. 4
(1980) and No. 1 (1981), 768.

4. David Nelson, MANAGERS AND WORKERS: ORIGINS OF THE
NEW FACTORY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1880-1920
(Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press,
1975), ix.

5. Peter F. Drucker, "Work and Tools," in Melvin
Kranzberg and William H. Davenport (eds.) TECHNOLOGY AND
CULTURE (New York, 1972), cited in Harry Braverman,
LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATON OF WORK IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1974), 88.

6. Braverman, THE DEGRADATION OF WORK, 252.

7. Braverman, THE DEGRADATION OF WORK, 65.

8. Braverman, THE DEGRADATION OF WORK, 69.

9. Braverman, THE DEGRADATION OF WORK, 126.

10. Braverman, THE DEGRADATION OF WORK, 113; 114.

11. Braverman, THE DEGRADATION OF WORK, 326.

12. Braverman, THE DEGRADATION OF WORK, 349.

13. Arne Kalleberg and Larry Griffen, "Class,
Occupation, and Inequality in Job Rewards," AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 85: 731-768.

14. Stephen Meyer III, THE FIVE DOLLAR DAY (Albany, New
York: State University of New York Press, 1981), 42-43.

15. Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY, 43.

16. Milton J. Nadworny, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND THE
UNIONS 1900-1932, Harvard University Press, Cambridge ,
Massachusets 1955, "The Origins of the Taylor System,"l-
13; Wiebe, SEARCH FOR ORDER,151; Eilbirt, "The
Development of Personnel Management in the United
States," BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW, KXXIII (1959):345.

126

17. Wiebe, SEARCH FOR ORDER, 151. Similarly, Eilbirt
has observed that there is no evidence of the
application of specialization to labor administration
before 1900; and that in 1900, there did not yet exist a
comprehensive personnel department, as we know it today.
See, Henry Eilbirt, "The Development of Personnel
Management In The United States," in BUSINESS. HISTORY
REVIEW, XXXIII, 1959, 346, 350.

Moreover, it should be noted that prior to Taylor's
established efforts, there were those who demonstrated
an interest in "time" as a consideration in improving
efficiency in production, none are found to have a
direct link to Scientific Management. Among Taylor's
predecessors, Charles Babbage is especially noteworthy.
See footnote number 2, page 155 in Nadworny: Babbage was
among England's most renowned mathematician who, in
1832 published, ON THE ECONOMY OF MACHINERY AND
MANUFACTURES, which was a treatise on his observations
of English and French factory methods, and his own ideas
about good business practices. As Taylor would argue
about three-score years later, Babbage believed that in
order to remove friction between employer and employee
resulting from inappropriate levels of production, it
was of the utmost importance to determine scientifically
the amount of work a man could do. Although he
considered timing workers with a watch, be believed a
better average of the general rate of production could
be obtained by asking various employers what quantity
was considered a fair day's work. Babbage also
emphasized the need for knowledge of the costs of
production, and advised that a division of labor in

management functions be instituted in factories. Taylor
probably never heard of Charles Babbage, and probably
never read the latter's book. It remained for the

chroniclers of the scientific management movement to
discover Babbage and mark him as an indirect forerunner
of modern management protagonists. See C. Berterand
Thompson, ed. , SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (Cambridge ,
Massachusetts, 1914); Frank B. Copley, FREDERICK W.
TAYLOR: THE FATHER OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (2 volumes,
New York, 1923) 278-279; Harlow 8. Person, GRAPHICAL
ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (New York, 1944).

18. Eilbirt, "Development of Personnel Management,"1-13.

19. Eilbirt, "Development of Personnel Management,"1-13.

127

20. The Taylor Society, (edited by H.S. Person)
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN INDUSTRY, 1929 (Harper and
Brothers Publishers, New York):xviii; Nelson, MANAGERS
AND WORKERS, 55; Copley, 1923:passim. Nelson has noted
(see fn 3, page 186 in Nelson, 1975:186), that Frank
Barkley Copley, FREDERICK W. TAYLOR, 2 vols. (New York,
1923), remains the most valuable source on Taylor's
career prior to 1900. Copley had the assistance of
Taylor' s widow and disciples and included much
information not available elswhere.

21. Person, "The Origin and Nature of Scientific
Management," 1929:12.

Frederick Winslow Taylor was born in Philadelphia in
1856 of well—to do parents, and had the benefit of
education in Philadelphia, France and Germany as well as
at Exeter Academy where he graduated at the head of his
class. Taylor reconsidered plans to study law at
Harvard, and at the age of 19 became an apprentice
pattern maker and machinist in a Philadelphia firm.
When his apprenticeship ended in 1878, he took a job as
a laborer at the Midvale Steel Company. In six years,
he progressed through the positions of gang boss,
assistant foreman, and foreman in the machine shop;
through master mechanic and chief draughtman to chief
engineer of the plant. On his own, he took engineering
courses offered by Stevens Institute of Technology in
Hoboken, and in 1883 he received his degree in
mechanical engineering. After more than a decade at
Midvale, Taylor decided to embark on a career as a
"management consultant." Armed with his ideas on
planning, research, the differential piece rate, and the
stop watch, he sought to widen the influence of his
managemnet practice and ideas. In May 1898, Taylor was
hired to reorganize the shop at Bethleham Steel, and it
was here that Taylor's experiments bore their greatest
fruits, and where the system reached maturity. Despite
his successes at Bethleham Steel, Taylor was
dissatisfied there and willingly accepted a note from
President Linderman dated April 17, 1901, which read, "I
beg to advise you that your services will not be
required by this company after May 1st , 1901. "
(Nadworny, 1955:11). One of the first tasks he took
after his retirement was to write "Shop Management" for
the purpose of advertising the management system; which
it did indeed, and thereby established the A.S.M.E. as
the parent organization of "management engineering."
(Nadworny, 1955: 1-13). Nelson, MANAGERS AND WORKERS,
1975, Chapter Four "The Rise of Scientific Management,"

128

also traces the development of Taylor's career and is
especially attentive to the conflicts between Taylor and
his disciples.

22. Eilbirt, "Development of Personnel Management,"356.
23. American Society of Mechanical Engineers,
TRANSACTIONS (New ‘York, 1886), Number’ 7:440-468.;
Nadworny, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND THE UNIONS,1.

24. A.S.M.E., 1886:433-439.

25. Person, "The Origin and Nature of Scientific
Management,"7.

26. Frederick A. Halsey, "A. Premium! Plan. for Paying
Labor," in A.S.M.E., TRANSACTIONS, 1891: 755-764. '

27. A.S.M.E., TRANSACTIONS, vol XVI, 1895:856-858.

28. Eilbirt, "Development of Personnel Management,"1-13;
Nelson, MANAGERS AND WORKERS,61-68.

29. Frederick W. Taylor, SHOP MANAGEMENT (New York,
1911).

30. Person, "The Origin and Nature of Scientific
Management,8; Nadworny, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND THE
UNIONS,7.

31. Person, "The Origin and Nature of Scientific
Management,7.

32. Henry L. Gantt, who first worked with Taylor at
Midvale, and later became his chief assistant, and
Carl Earth, 1: mathematician played important roles in

solving many problems, and played key roles in spreading
and implementing the "Taylor" idea. The Barth slide
rules, marked one the the great advances in the Taylor
system. Sanford E. Thompson was also among the early
insiders who played a key role in the development of the
Taylor system; Thompson who had extensive training in
the building trades, became a specialist in time study.

See, Interstate Commerce Commission, EVIDENCE TAKEN BY
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF
PROPOSED ADVANCES IN FREIGHT RATES BY CARRIERS, August
to December, 1910, 61st Congress, 3rd session
(Washington, 1911), 4:2660-67. ‘

129
33. Alan Nevins, FORD, THE TIMES AND THE MAN (New YORK:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), 468.
34. Nevins, FORD, 474.
35. Nevins, FORD, 468.
36. Nevins, FORD, 468-9.
37. Nevins, FORD, 469.
38. Charles Reitell, "Machinery and Its Effect Upon The
Workers in The Automotive Industry, " THE ANNALS,
November 1924, 37.
39. Reitell, "Machinery and Workers," 37.
40. Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY, 35-36.
41. Frederick Winslow Taylor, "Testimony Before The
Special Committee of the House of Representatives to
Investigate The Taylor and Other Systems of Shop
Management/19L2fl' in Taylor, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (New
York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947), 27.
42. Taylor, "Testimony Before HR." 27.
43. Nevins, FORD, 468.

44. Taylor, "Principles of Scientific Management/1911,"
in Taylor, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT, 22.

45. Taylor, "Principles of Scientific Management/1911,"
fn. page 130.

46. Taylor, "Testimony Before HR," 40-41.
47. Taylor, "Testimony Before HR," 42.
48. Taylor, "Testimony Before HR," 44.
49. Taylor, "Testimony Before HR," 44.
50. Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY, 37-38.

51. Reitell, "Machinery and Workers," 39.
52. Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY.

53. Reitell, "Machinery and Workers," 39.

130

54. Reitell, "Machinery and Workers," 39.
55. Reitell, "Machinery and Workers," 40.

56. According to Rothschild, who is often credited with
coining the phrase, it (i.e., 'Fordism') was the
technology of mass assembly-line production which was
made possible by the rapid expansion of output and
capital investment. The new technology was based on
machinery, [management], and on the "rational"
reorganization of work to fit the rhythm of the new
machinery.

Rothschild explained that, "In the neW'cwganization of

auto production, unskilled. workers were seen 'by
management as rather simple machines which happened to
be alive--—-Henry Ford expressed this attitude most

clearly in his description of factory life: "A business
is men and machines united in the production of a

commodity and both the men and the machines need
repairs and replacements.... Machinery wears out and
needs to be restored. Men grow uppish, lazy or
careless...fl' Note: See Emma Rothschild, PARADISE LOST:

THE DECLINE OF THE AUTO-INDUSTRIAL AGE (New York: Random
House, 1973), 34.

57. Nelson, MANAGERS AND WORKERS, 34.
58. Nelson, MANAGERS AND WORKERS, 42.
59. Nelson, MANAGERS AND WORKERS, 43.
60. Nelson, MANAGERS AND WORKERS, 101.

61. FMCA/Accession 940, Box 18: "Mr. Lee's Talk to the
First Group of Investigators, April 15, 1914."

62. FMCA/Accession 940, Box 16: "Interview with William
P. Baxter."

CHAPTER FIVE
FORD'S WELFARE WORK
AMERICANIZATION AND THE THE MOLDING OF THE FORD MAN
It has already been noted that. within the
historical context of large-scale industrialization and
urbanization during the latter part of the nineteenth
century, modern personnel management had its origin in
'welfare work' and 'scientific management,‘ being two
converging strands in American economic life (See
Chapter Four); and the relevance of Taylorism to the
implementation of employment engineering in the Crystal
Palace has also been discussed. This chapter focuses
on the welfare work accomplished by Ford's Sociology
Department, and Ford's Americanization campaign
centered in the Ford English School, both of them
embodied and symbolized in the famous Five Dollar Day,
and thereby adds two sides to the triangle of the
system of nmdern personnel management that created the
Ford Man.
There is no doubt that the major event in the
social history of Highland Park was the announcement of
the profit-sharing plan, better known as. the Five-

Dollar Day. During meetings early in January 1914, the

131

1132

board of directors of the Ford Motor Company had
discussed wages and had allotted $10,000,000 for a
profit-sharing plan. A few years later, Samuel Marquis
referred to the plan as the "granddaddy of company-
initiated reform plans," and explained that the plan
involved rationalizing the Ford employment and wage
structure by reducing the number of Job categories,
regularizing pay scales, reducing the foreman's power
to hire and fire employees, and raising the pay of
certain classes (M5 employees to a five-dollar
minimum.1 As simply as this, the basis for the most
famous labor-management reform in the annals of

American business, the Ford Five Dollar Day had been

etched into the historical record. As initially
conceived, the profit—sharing plan supplemented and
extended earlier reforms which, in the rapidly

developing tradition of Frederick Winslow Taylor's

"scientific management," had been aimed at making the
administration of the Ford factory more efficient. In
contrast to John R. Lee's reforms of October 1913

emphasizing the more scientific management of labor,
the Five Dollar Day added the extra dimension of
welfare activities to the industrial betterment program

2

of the company.

133

On Monday afternoon. of .January’ 5, 1914 the
announcement of the reforms came with much fanfare; the
press release stated that on January 12, 1914 the Ford
Motor Company, "the greatest and most successful
(company) in the world would inaugurate the greatest
revolution in ... rewards for workers ever known in the
industrial world":3 ‘The press release explained that
the foundation of the revolution was a pmofit-sharing
plan which would increase the minimum daily wage of
qualified workers to five dollars; it was also noted
that three eight—hour shifts would replace the existing
two nine-hour shifts, and that 4,000 more workers would
be added to the existing workforce of 15,000. The
objective of this chapter is to understand (1) the
intellectual and social context into which the plan was
introduced; (2) to understand the Sociological
Department which was created to implement the plan; (3)
and. to ‘begin an assessment of the overall
effectiveness of the Sociological Department in
upgrading the quality of life of those working in the
Crystal Palace, and the Highland Park community; and
finally, (4) to understand the "Americanization" of
Ford workers.

In a manner of speaking, Ford profit-sharing was

like much of the welfare work which was common during

134

the early decades of the twentieth century. Rooted to
some extent in the intellectual traditions of the
Social Gospel and Progressivism, "industrial
betterment" and "industrial welfare work," as it was
then called, was as diverse as were the companies
wherein they were instituted. The leading
institutional proponent of welfare activities, the
National Civic Federation, reflected the diversity of
welfare policies and programs when it attempted to
define the boundaries of welfare work. According to
the National Civic Federation's definition, industrial
betterment or industrial welfare work of the era
involved, "special consideration for physical comfort
wherever labor is performed; opportunities for

recreation; educational advantages; the providing’ of

suitable sanitary homes ... plans for saving and
lending nmney, and provisions for insurance and
pensions." In short, welfare work was aimed at

improving the quality of life of industrial workers and
their families.

There is no doubt that the above definition
conforms fundamentally to the stated objectives of
Ford's profit-sharing plan; and, as far as the
definition goes, the Ford Motor Company was like many

other companies. But, the Ford Motor Company was also

135

different from other companies in some important ways;
a major difference, as it appears to this researcher,
was the zeal and absolute conviction with which the
Sociological Department operatives pursued their
objectives. The Health and Safety program within the
Crystal Palace, and the effort to upgrade the 'home and
housing conditions', and the "Americanization" program
are excellent examples of Ford's commitment.

On the basis of official statements,
organizational and operational reforms within the Ford
Motor Company, and the reported results of Sociological
Department operations, it is reasonable to conclude
that what motivated the Ford Motor Company to develop
and implement the profit-sharing ‘plan, of *which. the
five-dollar minimum wage was a part, was the desire to
(1) increase efficiency in production, and therefore
increase profits by reducing the rate of turnover in
the labor force; (2) give workers a "stake" in
contributing to the increased production while re—
shaping the workforce to suit the needs of the new
industrial system; and (3) to upgrade the quality of
life of the workforce. Regarding some of the
accomplishments attributed to the profit-sharing plan,
one top level official remarked that, as evidenced by

the fact that with the profit-sharing plan, the "Ford

136

Motor Company made more cars and greater earnings than
ever before," the Five-Dollar Day was the greatest
success for the Ford Motor Company." Another official
said, "I think the Ford profit-sharing plan made real
citizens out of our employees, out of the type that
never would have been [real citizens] otherwise."6
Henry Ford himself had much to say about the profit-
sharing plan; he often hastened to assert: (a) that the
plan was not charity, but profit-sharing based on the
level of production and sales, (b) that employees
should use their share of the profits to upgrade the
quality of their lives, (c) and that the plan was the
best cost-cutting device ever introduced by the

company. Regarding the reforms associated with the

profit-sharing plan, Nevins has captured the sentiment.

which is most often expressed. Nevins concluded that,
"The enlightened new labor rules, the five-dollar
minimum, and the struggle of the Sociological

Department to raise living standards constituted,
despite inescapable shortcomings, a lustrious chapter
in the history of the company and a nenmrable page in
the record of American industry."7

It has already been suggested that part of what
motivated the implementation of the profit-sharing plan

were the diseconomies associated with the enormous

137

turnover in the workforce of the Crystal Palace?
Although there were a number of plausible explanations
for the high turnover (including the preference for
more 'suitable‘ work elsewhere), John R. Lee's poll of
the workforce during the summer of 1913 revealed that
much of the dissatisfaction among workers resulted
from: (a) work-days that were too long, (b) wages that
were too low, (c) unsanitary and otherwise undesirable
shop conditions, (d) bad housing, (e) and perhaps most
importantly, the unintelligent and often abusive
handling of men by foremen and superintendents.9 The
combination of factors contributing to dissatisfaction
with conditions in the Crystal Palace, and perhaps the
availability of more 'suitable' work. elsewhere, may
explain why in December 1912, 776 men (the highest in
number company history) were discharged; and why in
1913 the Ford Motor Company needed to hire 52,445 men
to maintain a workforce of 14,000, and why in March of
1913 the number of five-day men, i.e., men quitting
without notice or explanation, was 5,156. In any case,
the high turnover was undoubtedly a compelling argument
for the worker reform package introduced the following

10
year.

The reforms, sometimes referred to as the "Lee

Reforms," to which the profit-sharing plan was a

138

supplement, were inmflenented 1J1 1913. Apparently in

response to the dissatisfaction recorded in the poll
11

taken during the summer, on October 12, 1913 the

Ford Motor Company introduced: (1) a 15 percent wage
increase, (2) El new skill-wages classification system,
(3) and created the Employee‘s Savings and Loan
Association. The skill-wage classification system was
the result of an analysis of the content of each Job.
Following the analysis, jobs were organized into a
graded hierarchy wherein each Job was classified and
ranked according to skill-level. "The new system," Lee
concluded, "was a broad plan for the stratification of

workers in the plant along clearly defined lines and on

the basis of definite standards."12 Along with the new
system of Job classification, and the Employee's
Savings and Loan Association, a major change in
departmental organization was made; the Ford

Employment Office became the Ford Employment
Department, and it gxadually acquired and centralized
the functions which had been in the foreman's domain,
and it became responsible for all phases of labor
relations.

Having alloted $10,000,000 to the profit-sharing
plan, the board of directors appointed John R. Lee to

implement the plan, and left it to him to work out the

"details." Among the first actions taken by Lee was
the establishment of the department which would be the
primary instrument for implementing the plan.
Reflecting the apparent fact that sociology had,
"matured and gained acceptance as an academic
discipline for the study, analysis, and management of
the affairs of men," the Sociological Department was
named after a similar institution in Rockefeller's
Colorado Fuel and Iron Company.13 In 1914, O.J. Abell
estimated that the Sociological Department was staffed
by about 100 investigators, including physicians on
the medical staff, and others who were among the most
trusted employees of the Ford Motor Company; according
to Abell, later in 1914 the Sociological Department
numbered about 200, before leveling off to a permanent
staff of 50 personal“ On July 3, 1915 an internal
source stated, contrary to Abell's estimates, that "...
our Sociological Department, which now consists of
about 20 men, is lwhat is left of the initial
appointment of 75..." 5 Here, the accuracy of Abell's
estimates is not at issue, but the disparity between
the estimates of an astute outsider with privileged
access, and those of internal sources may suggest that

the Sociological Department appeared to be, and was

reported to be larger and doing more than it was ever

140

equipped to do. In any case, whatever the size of the
Sociological Department ' s staff, it set out to
accomplish tasks of a size and scope which,
theretofore, were unprecedented in the annals of
welfare capitalism.

From the outset, the central task of the
Sociological Department was to determine whether or not
workers were eligible to participate in the profit-
sharing plan, and to advise those who were not eligible
as to how they might become eligible to share in the
profits of the company. In order to determine

eligibility, 11m; Sociological Department investigated

everyone employed, except high level managers and
supervisors; those investigated included salesmen,
foremen, clerks and factory workers. The determination

of eligibility was largely,at the discretion of the
investigators, all (If whom were apparently "good Ford
men" of the type the company hoped to create. It was
not until early in 1915 that the "Sociological
Department Instructions for Investigators" emerged with
detailed nethods for the determination of eligibility.
In essence, the instructions codified the criteria
which had been used up to that point; generally
speaking, to be eligible a worker had to exhibit or

demonstrate thrift, good. Ihabiten and. good. home

141
17
conditions. Additionally, in an effort to stem the
flood of Job seekers who appeared at the gates of the
Crystal Palace shortly after the announcement of the
Five-Dollar Day, a six-month residency in the Detroit
area became a condition of eligibility.

With thriftiness, good habits, good home
conditions, and a six-month residency as the conditions
of eligibility, 10 percent of the employees failed to
qualify on the basis of age or sex (unmarried men and
females were categorically excluded from profit-
sharing), and another 40 percent could not qualify
without raising their standards to meet those outlined
by Ford.18 Not only was there an age and sex bias
against participating in the profit-sharing plan, the
fact that out of 1400 employees who were in the first
group to qualify for profit-sharing, 1,381 were of
British ancestry, suggests that there was a strong bias
against the ethnics.]"9 To a large extent then, the
mission of the Sociological Department was to reform
the "ethnics" so that they might qualify for
participation in the profit-sharing plan.

The manner in which the work of the Sociological
Department was initially organized and the work

distributed, official reports and the "reminiscences"

of Sociological Department staff and other officials of

142

the Ford Motor Company, as well as statements made by
some of the ethnics who were the objects of reform, all

suggest that it was believed that the desired reform

depended on the restoration, maintenance and/or
creation of "good home conditions." In short, as Meyer
has put it, "A fundamental premise of the Ford program

was a particular middle-class vision on the role of the
family and the home in the formation of social and
cultural values."20 8.8. Marquis expressed the
sentiment which appears to have dominated official
thinking' in the Ford Motor Company' about the
relationship of cultural values to production in the
Crystal Palace; Marquis stated that, "... the family is
the foundation of the church and the state." Marquis
continued, "We found that it is the foundation of right-
industrial conditions as well. Nothing tends to lower
a man's efficiency more than wrong family relations.én'

Chapter Six of this paper will discuss the home
and housing conditions of Ford workers in Highland Park
more fully, but for the moment it should be noted that
there was clearly room for improvement, and that as
part of efforts to increase efficiency in production,
there can be no doubt that the Ford Motor Company took

the task of uplifting its workers seriously. From

another perspective, it is apparent that the commitment

143

to improve production through improving home and
housing conditions, was part of a general effort aimed
at "Americanizing" the workforce employed in the
Crystal Palace. In order that Ford's efforts to
Americanize the workforce may be viewed in its proper
perspective, this study now turns to a discussion the

larger "Americanization Movement."
Americanization

According to an extensive survey conducted in
1918 (February to June) under the auspices of the
Committee on Public Information and the National
Americanization Committee, "Americanizing" the
industrial workforce was a :multidimensional movement
which included private and voluntary, state and
municipal, and federal involvement?2 Three
overlapping, yet distinct phases and two groups of
protagonists ney' 1x3 seen 1J1 the Anericanization
movement. The first phase, having begun sometime
before the turn of the century, was clearly in evidence
when, by the end of the century, a movement actively to
encourage "Americanization" of [the 'new immigrants']
had begun to stir; ‘ A second phase evolved out of

"the wartime drive for unity, spearheaded by Creel's

144

Committee on Public Information, led naturally to a
campaign for accelerated "Americanization" of
newcomers.21+ A third phase is marked by a post-war
economy that saw both prosperity and depression, an
intensified, more militant, effort to organize the
workforce; this phase also witnessed. government
involvement to a degree which had not been anticipated
by management. Throughout these three phases,
proponents of the Americanization movement expressed
views, supported ‘objectives,’ and implemented programs
which were often in conflict with each other.

Kennedy and Higham have suggested that one
element which may be associated with the first phase
of the Americanization movement consisted of
settlement house workers and social reformers, among
whom Lillian Wald, Jane Addams, and Josephine Roche,
and many people associated with the American Union
Against Militarism were prominent. Frances Kellor, a
leader in the Committee for Immigrants in America,
founded in 1914 to promote the education of immigrants
and to protect them from predatory padrones and
employers, was especially prominent. In this faction,
the first concern was for the immigrants themselves;
they strove to "temper as well as improve the ordinary

course of assimilation by providing a receptive

145

environment for Old World. heritageen JPreaching ‘the
doctrine of immigrant gifts, Jane Addams and her fellow
workers concentrated less on changing the newcomers
than on offering them a home." The countervailing
faction in the Americanization movement was a coalition
that consisted of "old-stock Americans who feared for
the continued ascendency of their cultural values and
social position, and businessmen who sought to
discipline a troublesomely varied labor force."25
But, the war cemented the loose coalition of business
interests and, if only temporarily, drove the reformist
(Progressive) faction into the camp harboring business
interests.

It is worth noting that, generally speaking,
industrialists did not concern themselves with
Americanization until the labor shortages of 1914
presented the spectre of production levels far below
demand. Notable exceptions before 1910 include
International Harvester which wanted workers to become
good Americans while learning to think and talk
intelligentlyr about important operations 111 the
factory.2'6 As early as 1907, the industrial secretary
of the YMCA, Peter Roberts, had started a language and
citizenship program for factory workers, and he ably

2?

adjusted the program to the needs of corporations.

146

In the Detroit area, the Ford Motor Company
led manufacturers in adopting "Americanization"
objectives. The seed of what would become a full blown
Americanization campaign in 1914 could be found in the
FORD TIMES in 1908; the TIMES was incessant in
exhorting Ford workers (primarily Americans and Germans
at this time) to ingest the American work ethic. One
example of many early entreaties was embodied in a New
Year's resolution for Ford workers which stated, "Of my
own free will and accord, I sincerely covenant with
myself, . . . To exalt the Gospel of Work, ... To keep

head, heart, and hand so busy that I won't have time to

think of my troubles. Because idleness is a disgrace,

low' aim is criminal, and work minus its spiritual
28

quality becomes drudgery." While the Ford Motor

Company would take the lead during the second phase
in "Americanizing" workers in the Detroit area (and in
the whole of the USA), "the Americanization movement
at Ford was not an isolated eccentric phenomenon, but
a well publicized symptom of a general trend in
Detroit;" Ford's Americanization progran: was
recognized as "One of the most extensive and best
organized efforts made by an industry for the

. 30

Americanization. of foreign-born, . . . , and its

n

'UCCES

[f I

was so impressive to "local proponents of

(

147

Americanization activities that they convinced the
Detroit Board of Commerce to promote Ford's methods in
other local factories. Thus, what had started as a
purely eocnomic program at the Ford plant, soon
became the basis of a broad patriotic and nationalistic
endeavory

In an effort to replicate and disseminate the
program at Ford, in 1915 the Detroit Board of Commerce
spawned the Detroit Americanization Committee whose
primary cfificial purpose included the promotion and

inculcation of the principles of American institutions

and good citizenship, . . . and the exhortation and
assistance of immigrants "to learn the English
language, the history, laws and government of the

United States, the rights and duties of citizenship;-
and in becoming intelligent Americans."32 It should be
noted that in the same year, the National
Americanizaton Committee was also formed, under the
leadership of Frances Kellor, with the more limited
goal of celebrating national Independence Day by
bringing together "all Americans, wherever born."33

From the outset, the Detroit Americanization
movement was dominated by the large employers of the

city, and "they set the tone and policy." ' The

eleven-member Americanization Committe of Detroit, a

148

commitee within the Detroit Board of Commerce, included
six representatives of Letroit's leading corporations:
including; .Henry W. Hoyt, vice-president of the Great
Lakes Engineering Company; F.S. Bigler, president of
Michigan Bolt and. Nut Company; Ernest 1“ Lloyd,
president of Lloyd Construction Company; John R. Lee,
director of the Ford Sociological Department; Horace
Rackham, an attorney and "capitalist" who was Ford's
legal counsel; and W.E. Scripps of time Scripps Motor
Company, Scripps-Booth Cycle Car Company, and the
DETROIT NEWS. In addition to those representing
big business,the committee included Frank D. Cody,
assistant superintendent of the city schools, A.J.
Tuttle, U.S. District Court Judge, A.G. Studer, general
secretary of the Y.M.C.A, and Oscar B. Marx who was the
mayor of the city, and a businessman. Levine noted
that the committee included two other members who
deserved mention, One is Fred Butsel, a Detroit
attorney, JBWiSho always interested 1J1 social causes,
and a man who will appear in the story of the
leadership of the Detroit Urban League. The second man
is Chester M. Culver, general manager of the Employer's
Association of Detroit (EAD); the EAD was
unquestionably the most powerful group in the city, and

every worker, whatever his nationality or race, was in

149

some way dependent upon it. Often, he was dependent in
ways he would never know.36 Culver would also appear
in the affairs of the Detroit Urban League.

As stated by one Ford official, "It is our aim and
object to make better men and better American citizens,
and to bring about a larger degree of comforts, habits,
and higher plane of living among our employees...."37
Meyer has pointed out that, in some ways Ford's
Americanization program was unique, and in other ways
it was like the Americanization programs of other
manufacturers and industrialists. Despite the fact
that there were many Americanization programs, and
perhaps because of the vigor with which Ford's efforts
were publicized, the Ford program served as a model for
a city-wide Americanization campaign in Detroit. And,
in 1915, Detroit in turn became the model for the
National Americanization Day Committee and its national
campaign for thg assimilation of immigrants into
American society.3 If the profit-sharing plan was the
principal instrument through which Ford's workers would
be Americanized, and the work to upgrade home and
housing conditions was a major component of
Americanization, then the Ford English [language]

School was the avenue where full assimilation would be

assured.

150

The organizer of the Ford Emglish School, which
was concidentally first located in the old Stevens
School, was Peter Roberts who was hired by the Ford
Motor Company in April 1914. Roberts, an educator who
was officially associated with the YMCA, had published
an English language textbook (ENGLISH FOR COMING
AMERICANS, 1909), which became the foundation for the
instruction of immigrant workers of the Crystal Palace.
"The core of the program centered around domestic,
commercial, and an industrial series of lessons which
applied the English language to different aspects of
the immigrant worker's life." As described by Marquis
in 1916, the Ford English School which was established

for immigrants employed in the Crystal Palace, provided

five compulsory courses: "There is a course in industry

and efficiency, a course in thrift and economy, a

course in domestic relations, one in community
40

relations, and one in industrial relations."

A 1916 report on the Ford English School revealed
that in a class of 518 workers, there were 163 Poles,
134 Russians, 46 Austrian, 28 Italians, 23 Hungarians,
20 Germans, 16 Rumanians, 13 Jews, and 11 Bohemians.
The remainder of the 518 persons enrolled, presumably
fewer than 10 in any one group, represented 28

41
nationalities. Apparently owing, at least in part, to

151 ‘

the efforts of the language school and the incentive of
profit-sharing, between 1914 and 1917 the percentage of
English speaking employees rose from about 59 to 88
percent (see table 5.1)1+2 From 1915 to 1916, the
company reported that some 16,000 workers graduated
from the Ford English School, and Ford statistics
indicate that while 35.5 percent of the workforce did
not speak English in 1914, only 11.7 percent did not
speak the language in 1917.1+3

While speaking the English language may have been
the most readily observable sign of the transformation
of immigrant workers, Ford officials believed that
marital status, home ownership, a savings account and
life insurance were important indicators of a worker's
desire and willingness to be transformed into the
preferred type of worker. Table 5.1 suggests that
there was a steady increase in the percentage of
workers in the Crystal Palace who succeeded in fitting
into the mold of the preferred type of worker. The
ability of a greater percentage of Ford workers to
speak the English language, and improvements in home
and housing conditions may be considered as indications
of the Ford Motor Company's commitment to improving the

quality of life of Ford's workers, while improving

efficiency in production. FMrther evidence of Ford's

152

overall commitment to upgrading the quality of life of
Ford 'workers may be seen in the health. and safety

record in the Crystal Palace.

TABLE 5.1

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF FORD'S CRYSTAL PALACE EMPLOYEES:
A COMPARISON BY PERCENT FOR 1914, 1915 AND 1916

 

Characteristic 1914 1915 1916
Married 59 76 70
Citizens 39 45 51
English Speaking 64 76 87
Buying or Owning:

(a) a home 12 27 27

(b) a lot 6 11 14
With Bank Accounts 44 66 42
With Life Insurance 19 43 48

 

FMCA/Accession 62, Box 59/ Note: In 1917 24,533 workers in the
Crystal Palace were married, and 9,335 werer single, see
FMCA/Accession 572, Box 27.

153

Consistent with the objective of upgrading the
quality of life of Ford workers, the Ford Motor Company
was apparently very much concerned with safety.
[Production workers have heartily disputed that such a
concern was paramount in the Crystal Palace.) A
superior safety record during much of the 1910s and
19205, and the Ford Motor Company's top ranking among
auto companies ney' be considered as evidence of
Ford's concern for safety. The Health and Safety
Department was created as part of the 1914 reforms, and
in addition to providing a variety of medical services,
the newly instituted department issued monthly accident
reports on a variety of physical conditions and
diseases that existed among employees. Table 5.2 is
based on data such as those recorded by the Health and
Safety Department; the table suggests that, despite
concerted efforts and a superior record for safety,
both occupational diseases and injuries resulting from
accidents contributed significantly to the poor
physical condition of many of the employees in the
Crystal Palace.

In the automotive industry, as well as elsewhere
in the industrial world, there were and still are
occupational hazards that may have deleterious effects

on the health of workers. Occupational hazards include

154

accidental injury and conditions in the workplace that
may be considered to be "normal" but which are
associated with the cause of certain diseases. Arnold
and Faroute have reported on the notoriously unhealthy
conditions in the foundry; it was reported that foundry
workers suffered from severe heat and lack of
ventilation, and "the air during work hours cannot be
endured. by' workmen. save those possessing :respiratory
organs of the nest robust description, and many
visitors are unable to walk through the Ford greyiron
foundry...because they cannot breath. the .air.'l'lJ4
Conditions such as those described by Arnold and
Faroute, and conditions in other parts of the factory
have been associated with particular diseases. Lowery
observed that jobs connected with painting and metal
finishing carried the most severe health problems in
the auto industry; and lead poisoning, tuberculosis and
silicosis led the list of job related diseasesfl‘i table
5.2 shows that c.1925, 629 workers in the Crystal
Palace were experiencing serious respiratory conditions

comparable to those noted by Lowery.

155

TABLLE 5.2

PHYSICALLY SUB-STANDARD EMPLOYEES IN THE CRYSTAL PALACE
WES.

CONDITION: NUMBER
Chest: TBC; serious lung trouble; asthma 629
Deaf; and deaf and dumb 111
Epileptics and mental conditions 187
Eyes: Blind 51
Blind in one eye 187
Bad Vision 1032
Feet: Amputated 31
Toes amputated 104
Deformed, crippled, etc. 312
Hands: Fingers Amputated 1390
Hands Amputated 13
Deformed, crippled, etc. 227
Heart: high blood pressure 417
Hernias (conservative estimate) 5000
Kidneys and bladder (conservative estimate) 800
Legs: Amputated 121
Deformed, crippled, etc. 423
Nervousness 122
Paralysis 56
Rheumatism/arthritis 505
Spine and Back 264
Stomach (ulcers) 552

Miscellaneous: anemia, bladder, cancer, deformed, cripples, dropsy,
gall stones, goiter, head fractures, hemorrhoids, locomotor staxa,
sleeping sickness, and temporary concessions for bronchitis,

Wee—J59.

Source: FMCA/Accession 940, Box 16, "Samuel M. Levin Papers," dated
April 25, 1925

156

Table 5.2 also records the fact that amputated
limbs were a major source of incapacity among employees
in the Crystal Palace. Specifically, the table shows
that there were 1390 amputated fingers, 121 legs, 13
hands, and 31 amputated feet. It comes as no surprise
then, that- in the Ford Motor Company the most common
cause of permanent disability in the early 1920s was
the loss of fingers or parts of fingers.”6 It has been
widely publicized that the the Ford Motor Company made
a concerted effort to hire handicapped workers who
might be found in the Detroit area. One official
recalled that in the 1920s it was no longer necessary
to look outside the Ford "family" to find handicapped
workers, "... we had enough of our own company
liabilities to take care of .... It helped the employee
and the Ford Motor Company. The company didn't have to
pay workmen's comp because the man was employed}+7
Despite the high number of injuries, it is quite clear
that most injuries were "slight".

The Michigan Department of Labor classified
injuries resulting fronl accidents as fatal, serious,
severe or slight. A survey of reports published during
the period under consideration shows that in the

Crystal Palace the vast majority of injuries were

slight. While there is a wide variation in the number

157

of days that slightly injured persons were disabled (0-
24), it was not possible, except in cases of the nwre
extreme severe injuries, to determine by the number of
days lost whether the injury was slight or severe.48 It
is worth noting that while injuries of all classes
appear to be evenly distributed among the various age
groups of employees, a sample of injuries reported
during 1914 reveals that there was a disproportionately
large number of injuries in the 18-25 age group at a
time when the mode was 25 and the median was about 30

49

years of age.

158

TABLE 5.3

A SAMPLE OF INJURIES IN THE CRYSTAL PALACE WHICH WERE
RECORDED DURING 1914 AND 1915

 

Years of Age Number of Injuries
1914 1915
18-25 100 78
25-30 54 93
30-35 27 48
35-40 28 30
40-45 13 22
45-50 8 15
50—55 4 7
55-60 2 1
60-65 - 1
65-75 - -
75—85 - -
TOTAL 236 295

 

Note: Injuries to workers under 21 years of age: 1914 (N/390) 22:
1915 (N/300) 10.
Source: MICHIGAN’ DEPARTMENT OF’ LABOR ‘THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL. REPORT
1914, and MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF LABOR THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT
1915, "Record of Accidents Given by Counties." (pp. 315-321 for
1914, and 367-372 for 1915).

159

Given what has been said about occupational
hazards, it may be argued that in 1914 the high rate of
injury among the 18-25 years old employees resulted
from a greater exposure to high risk jobs, inexperience
on the part of workers, and/or "speed-ups", etc.
Alternatively, it can be argued that, in contrast to
the mode of 25 years of age in 1916, the nmde in 1914
was lower, and this characteristically lower age in
1914 is the best explanation of the comparatively high
number of injuries in 1914 to employees 18—25 years of
age. The sample [N/295] of injuries reported in 1915
reveals a more even distribution among the workers
whose age closely approximated the median (See table
A.5).

Accidental injuries involving Ford's workers who~
were under 21 years of .age, needs; to be understood
within the context of their employment in metal-
nenufacturing in Michigan» The Children's Bureau of
the U.S. Department of Labor conducted a study of
representative metal-manufacturing companies in
Michigan; it was reported that 11 percent of all
employees were persons under 21 years of age. Of those
under 21 years of age, 99 percent were over 16, and
about two-thirds were between 19 and 21.50 In 1918,

"there were 1,905 industrial accidents to minors,

160

resulting in. death, dismemberment, or incapacity for

work lasting from 15 days to 1 year. A large number of

these accidents occurred in the metal-working
51

industries," in which the auto industry was a nejor

employer; it is in this context that Ford's record
should be analyzed.

During 1914 there were about 390 recorded injuries
in. the Crystal Palace, 22 involved. workers. who ‘were
twenty-one or fewer years of age. All of the reported
injuries in this age group were classified as "slight".
F. Syzmerski, age 16 was injured on March 11, 1914 and
was disabled for one day; and W. Johnson was injured on
October 13 and disabled for four days. Syzmerski and
Johnson were the youngest among workers who reported
injuries, all other injured workers were 18 or more
years of age, and most of these were 19 or 20 years of
age. The year of 1915 recorded a dramatic decrease in
injuries to workers under twenty-one years of age; a
total of about 300 injuries among all workers were
reported, and 10 of these involved this youthful group.
Again, there are several plausible explanations for the
significant decrease in injuries to workers of this age
group, but in this writer's opinion, the decrease most
probably resulted fron: a decrease in the number of

young workers employed in production, and from the

161

comparatively vigorous safety program of Ford's Health

and Safety Department. Whatever the cause of the
decrease, the Ford Motor Company is deserving of
applause for its superior safety record. The record of

injuries to workers between the ages of 25 and 40 is
considerably less deserving of applause. (See table 5.4
above.)

In sum, it may be observed that the Ford Motor
Company's apparent commitment to improving the quality
of life of its workers by (a) upgrading home and
housing conditions, (b) Americanizing the workforce,
(c) and minimizing the risk of injury in the workplace,
were doubly motivated. That is to say, Ford's efforts
were based on the assumption that an improved quality
of life was essential to the achievement of optimal
efficiency in production. Despite the duality in
motivation, several indicators of the cflflective aspect
of the quality of life suggest that the quality of life
of the labor force which produced the Model T was
higher (i.e., set the standard) than that of other
automotive workers in the Detroit area. The
comparatively high quality of life of the builders of
the Model T was achieved at the expense of privacy,
autonomy, and perhaps dignity and self-esteem. Ford

officials, scholarly and journalistic writers, and the

workers have often disagreed on whether the and
justified the means; one critic's remarks seem to
summarize the thinking most often encountered by this
researcher: Ida Tarbell, who visited the Crystal Palace
with the intention of exposing the abuses of Ford's
paternalism, was so thourghly impressed. by what she
saw, that she told the Detroit Executive Club that, "I
don't care what you call it----philanthropy,
paternalisnn autocracy----the results; whicl: are being
obtained are \«Mflfli all you cxn1 set against them, and
the errors in the plan will provoke their own

remedies.

163

FOOTNOTES

Chapter Five

1. FMCA/Accession 63, Box l: 8.8. Marquis, "Profit
Sharing;" John. R. ILee, "The’ So-Called. Profit Sharing
System in the Ford Plant," Annals AAPSS, 45 (May 1916)
299 and 308; O.J. Abel, "The Making of Men, Motor Ca's,
and Profits," IRON AGE, 95 (January'fifi 1915) 37; John
A. Fitch, "Ford of Detroit and his Ten Million Dollar
Profit Sharing Plan," SURVEY 31 (February 7, 1915) 545-

2. Stephen Meyer III, THE FIVE DOLLAR DAY (Albany, New
York, 1981), 108.

L0

FMCA/Accession 940, Iflmt 16: "Press Release on Pdve
Dollar Day;" NEW YORK TIMES, January 6, 1914. Almost
immediately, Highland Park: was flooded. with. job
seekers. See, DETROIT NEWS, January 5-7,10, 1914;
DETROIT‘ TIMES, January’ 7-10, 1914; DETROIT NEWS
JOURNAL, January 12, 19141 DETROIT FREE PRESS, January
12-14, 1914.

4. Daniel Nelson, MANAGERS AND WORKERS: ORIGINS OF THE
NEW FACTORY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1880-1920
(Madison, 1975),101. For discussions (If the various
origins and assumptions about welfare work, see: Henry
Eilbirt, "The Development of Personnel Management In
The United States," BUSIN SS HISTORY REVIEW, XXXIII,
1959; Don D. Lescohier, "Working Conditions," in volume
3 of John R. Commons, et al., HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1396-1932 (New York, 1935); Leon P.
Alford, "The Status of Industrial Relations,"
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, Vol. 41 (June, 1919); U.S.
Bureau (ME Labor Statistics BULLETIN, number 250, page
13.

5. Charles E. Sorensen, MY FORTY YEARS WITH FORD (New
York, 1959), 142. Sorensenfis opinion is» an; are the
opinions cfl' all observers, undoubtedly teased but
representative cu? Ford insiders and sympathizers.
James Couzens, who at the time was vice president of
the Ford Motor Company, stated in a press inverview
that he thought the profit-sharing plan was good, and
that it might serve as an example for other employers
(NEW YORK TIMES, January 6, 1914). On the other side
of the issue, Meyer has suggested that, "In the end,
Ford paternalism failed, and, perhaps, even proved

164

irelevant [sic]. Remembering that the Five Dollar Day
was but a part of a larger effort which included the
Americanization campaign, Meyer's remarked that,

"Perhaps the most significant feature of the Ford
Americanization progran: was its failure and «eventual
termination," clearly, Meyer's remark is significantly
biased in a direction opposite of Henry Ford, Couzens,
Liebold, and et al.(See Stephen Meyers, "Adapting The
Immigrant To The Line; Americanization in the Ford
Factory, 1914-1921." JOURNAL OF SOCIAL HISTORY, 14
(Fall, 1980)).

6. FMCA/Oral History Section: "The Reminiscences of
E.G. Liebold," 226.

7. Allan Nevins, FORD: THE TIMES, THE MAN , THE COMPANY
(New York, l954),550.

8. The problem of 'turnover' was a major concern at the
Crystal Palace as elswhere in the automotive industry.
Eilbirt (1959) has noted that, around 1910 the "a new
idea" played an important part in advancing personnel

administration” Specifically, Ln an environment bent
on achieving efficiency in production, the computations
of Alexander, Fisher, et. al., revealed theretofore
hidden costs of considerable magnitude in labor
turnover. "After c.1910, one could scarcely read any
subsequent treatment having to cu: with labor, whether
written by friend or critic, executive, physician,

psychologist, psychiatrist or any academic student,
which omits some mention of turnover as a universal
evil to be avoided." Moreover, "Less than a decade had
passed before some were concluding that," the key
measure of incompetent was the level of turnover
(Eilbirt, 1959:356); Magnus W. Alexander, "Hiring and

Firing," Annals AAPSS, Volume 65 (May, 1919); Boyd
Fisher, "Methods of Reducing the Labor Turnover,"
Annals (May 1919).

9. FMCA/Accession 940, Box 17: " Instructions to
Investigators."

12. Lee, "Profit Sharing System," 300; Meyer, FIVE

DOLLAR, 104.

13. FMCA/Accession 63 A: 8.8. Marquis, "Memo on Profit
Sharing" ca. 1916. As reported by Meyer (p.115) the
first memo clearly suggesting a "Sociological"
Department was dated November 1914; See FMCA, Accession
683, Box 1, "Letter to Cleveland Branch, April 29,

165

1914. Kryder noted that Marquis disdained the use of
the phrase "welfare work" altogether and instead spoke
of "sociological" or "educational work." See Leeanne
Giannomne Kryder, "Humanizing the Industrial Workplace:
The Role of the Early Personnel Manager 1897-1920,"
HENRY FORD MUSEUM AND GREENFIELD VILLAGE HERALD, vol.
XIV, 1985, p.18.

14. Oliver' J. Abell, "The Ford. Plan. for ZEmployees,"
IRON AGE, January 29, 1914; Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY,
127.

15. FMCA/Accession 62, Box 19: Letters to Lacking and
Helfman, and Lacking and. Hanlon fronl Leibold, dated
July 3, 1915.

16. Both Stephen Meyer (1981), and Alan Nevins (1954)
have written extraordinarily incisive chapter-length
discussions on the Sociological Department. Hence,
this study includes only the details which are
essential to the elucidation of questions raised in
this study.

17. FMCA/Accession 940, Box 17: "Instructions to
Investigators."

18. The Crystal Palace had about 250 women workers at
the time. A vocal outcry from feminist leaders such as
Helen Keller, Anna Howard. Shaw, et. al., apparently
persuaded the Ford Motor Company to include women in
profit-sharing.(Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY).

19. FMCA/Accession 62, Box 58: "Report of Sociological
Department," October 12, 1914.

20. Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY, 123; Boris Emmett, "Profit
Sharing in the United States," BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, 208 (1916) , 106; Ford Motor
Company, "Helpful Hints," 13.

21. FMCA/Accession 293, Box 1: "Profit Sharing."

22. Harold C. Hill, "The Americanization Movement," THE
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY Vol. XXIS, No. 6 (May
1919), 613.

23. Kennedy, OVER HERE: WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY,
63.
2A. Kennedy, OVER HERE: WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 63.

166

25. John Higham, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (New York: Athenum, 1963)
236; cited in Kenndy, 1980:64.

26. Gerd Korman, INDUSTRIALIZATION: IMMIGRANTS AND
AMERICANIZATION, Madison, 1967:144; see also, Korman's
"Americanization at The Factory Gate," INDUSTRIAL AND
LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 18 (April 1965),396-41.

27. Korman, INDUSTRIALIZATION: IMMIGRANTS AND
AMERICANIZATION, 144); Nelson, MANAGERS AND WORKERS,
144.

28. FORD TIMES, 2 December 1908:1; Meyer, FIVE
DOLLAR DAY, 68—69.

29. Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY, 68; Zunz, CHANGING FACE OF
INEQUALITY, 313; Nelson, MANAGERS AND WORKERS, 144-
145.

30. Hill, "The Americanization Movement,"633.

31. Nelson, MANAGERS AND WORKERS, 144-145.

32. ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF THE AMERICANIZATION

COMMITTEE OF DETROIT, Art I, sec 2 (1925) ACD
Papers:3.

33. Higham, STRANGERS IN THE LAND, 243; Hill, "The
Americanization Movement," 617; Zunz, CHANGING FACE OF

INEQUALITY, 1982: 313.

34. Zunz, CHANGING FACE OF INEQUALITY,313; Levine,
INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 28.

35. Members of the Education Committe of the Detroit
Board of Commerce to Corporation Executives, May 1915,
ACD Papers; also Membership lists and communications in
A. J. Tuttle AMC Papers, MHC; Zunz, CHANGING FACE OF
INEQUALITY, 314; Levine, INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 27—28.

36. Levine, INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 28.

37. FMCA/Accession 683: "Letter to Cmeha, January 29,
1914; cited in Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY, 150-1.

38. Gregory Mason, "Americans First: How the People of
Detroit Are Making Americans of Foreigners in their
City," OUTLOOK, 114 (September 27, 1915), 200; 8.8.
Marquis, "The Ford Idea in Education," in National

167

Education Association, ADDRESSES AND PROCEEDINGS, 1916,
Volume 64 (1916), 911-916 passim; Clinton C. DeWitt,
"Industrial Teachers," in United States Bureau of
Education, PROCEEDINGS AMERICANIZATION CONFERENCE, 1919
(Washington, D.C., 1919), 116; also Ester Evrett Lape,
"The English First Movement in Detroit," IMMIGRATION IN
AMERICA REVIEW, 1 (September 1915), 46-50; Meyer, FIVE
DOLLAR DAY, 161.

39. FMCA/Accession 940, "Preliminary Report of Work
Done Teaching the English Language to Employees of the
Ford Motor Company at Stevens School, Highland Park,
Michigan, June 12, 1914; Peter Roberts, ENGLISH FOR
COMING AMERICANS (New York, 1909), 20-23, passim;
Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY, 157.

40. 8.8 Marquis, "The Ford Idea in Education," 911—916
passim; Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY, 156.

41. FMCA/Accession 1, Box 21: "Report on Ford Language
School, March 1916."

42. FMCA/Accession 571, Box 27; FMCA/Accession 62,
Box 59.

43. FMCA/Accession 572, Box 31.

44. Horace L. Arnold and Fay L. Faurote, FORD METHODS
AND THE FORD SHOPS, (New York, 1916), 330.

45. Joel John Lowery, " Labor Relati ons i n The
Automobile Industry During the Nineteen Twenties," MA
Thesis, Michigan State University, 1958.

46. FMCA/Accession 572, Box 27: "Report of Safety
Activities."
47. FMCA/Oral History' Section: "The Reminiscences; of

William P. Baxter," 15.

48. State of Michigan, "Record of Accidents Given by
Counties," in DEPARTMENT OF LABOR THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL
REPORT (1915).

49. FMCA/Accession 62, Box 59.
50. U.S. Department of Labor Children's Bureau, MINORS

IN AUTOMOBILE AND METAL-MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN
MICHIGAN (Bureau Publication No. 125, 1923) 57-59.

168

51. U.S. Department of Labor, MINORS IN .AUTOMOBILE
INDUSTRIES, 57-59.

52. Fisher, "How to Reduce Labor Turnover," 33.

CHAPTER SIX
FORD MEN LIVING IN:
BOARDING AND BOARDERS IN HIGHLAND PARK c.1910-1927
During the seventeenth, eighteenth, and much of
the nineteenth century, boarding was one of the major
ways in which the biologically defined limits of the
American family were breached "by an instrumental
relationship based on economic and service exchange."
Modell and Hareven have outlined what appears to be a

universally appropriate assessment of the motives and

immediate consequences of taking in boarders: While
characteristics of the housing market, variances in
income and employment, and demographic changes all

affected the overall pattern of boarding, it is clear
that economic factors were the primary considerations.
Families which took in boarders profited in a variety of
ways,(1) they were able to receive a 'brokerage fee' for
adapting dwelling places of various sizes to the needs
of (usually) unmarried immigrants of their own social
level and standard of living; (2) they earned an income
for work performed by the wife or other woman who was
recognized as the authoritative female in the household;
(3) they acquired possible access to an income during

periods of their own illness or unemployment; (4) and

169

170

they made it possible for many widows and single women
in their forties, fifties, and sixties to maintain their
own households rather than live wdth their relatives.
Clearly, the practice of taking in boarders had its
advantages.

In Highland Park, the boarding of Ford workers was
big business; in fact some houses, like those on
Manchester near McGregor Library, were built especially
for boarders? The "want ads" section of area
newspapers carried the call of those seeking board and
those seeking teerders. A typical advertisement read,
"Wanted 2 men in good German home, near Ford factory:
steam heat, privileges, good meals $8 Hem 2584-R."
Similarly, another ad read, "Protestant Christian Ford
Man. can partly pay for room: and board. by occasional
driving of lady's car: References. Near Palmer Park, Box
18, HP." While advertisements may suggest that
boarding was a big business, there is no doubt that most
boarders found their way to rooming houses through word
of mouth, and they most likely roomed in Ihouseholds
where the ethnic, economic, etc. realities were similar
to their own.

Despite the apparent social, psychological and
economic benefits of taking in boarders, by 1910 the

widespread practice of "boarding and lodging within the

171

family had been under attack for a quarter of a
century,..."5 With the large influx of immigrants
beginning in the 1870s, the: practiCe of 'boarding .and
lodging had come under attack from certain reform-minded
persons, and by the end of the nineteenth century the
noted housing reformer, Lawrence Veiller, and other
Progressive reformers had begun to refer to the
institution of boarding and lodging as, "the lodger
evil." Veiller wrote that, "room: overcrowding: as we
know it in America is almost entirely wrapped up with
the lodger evil; and, Veiller added, "Aside from its
impact on the family, lodging and boarding was clearly
associated with 7the decline of neighborhoods and with
social disorder." Some of the conditions described by'
Modell and Hareven could be found in Highland Park; and
by 1914, Ford officials were also concerned about the
negative consequences of boarding.

Housing conditions in sections of Highland Park
were abominable. According* to the description. of a
local newspaper, Ford workers had, "taken up living
quarters in thoroughfares that formerly were delightful,
exclusive residence streets, crowding the dwellings to
their utmost capacity." "Apparently, "there were a
number of houses in Highland Park in which these

foreigners used the beds in three shifts of eight hours

172

each 24 hours each day. These houses had beds in
practically every room, even renting out cots in the
attic and bath rooms." Home and housing conditions
were such that in 1917 Henry Ford himself, "toyed with
the idea of building an extensive housing complex
divided into areas to house different ethnic groups,
each with its own community center, school and stores."
Already, by 1914, Ford officials had been expressing a
din: View! of the consequences of 'boarding (i.e., poor
home and housing conditions) on the quality of life cm
Ford. workeren and. its impact (n1 production 1J1 the
Crystal Palace.

Among Ford Motor Company officials it was widely
believed that a major obstacle to the creation and
maintenance of the "desired" home condition was the
presence of boarders. Given that boarders. created an
undesirablel hone environment, and. an undesirable home
environment was believed to affect the productive
capacities of Ford workers, it followed that the
presence of boarders in the households of Ford workers
was believed to have reduced production in the Crystal
Palace. S.S. Marquis summed up the sentiment which
appears to have dominated the Ford Motor Company's
official thinking about boarders; Marquis stated that,

"... the family is the foundation of the church and the

173

state. We found that it is the foundation of right
industrial conditions as well. Nothing tends to lower a
10

man's. efficiency more than. wrong family' relations."
As a consequence of the perception that boarders had a
negative impact on production in the Crystal Palace,
Sociological Department workers were specifically
instructed to discourage the well established American
tradition of boarding.

That the Ford Motor Company took the presence of
boarders seriously, may be seen in a variety of records
kept In! the Sociological Department and published
reports. Emmett published the story of a worker whose
living conditions were believed to be typical of the new
immigrants who flocked to the Detroit area.11 This
particular worker was a German Catholic who had migrated
from the German area of Poland. Ihn 1914, the worker's
family consisted of a wife and f'our children. The
Sociological Department investigator described the
worker as having "poor habits" which included drinking
and smoking. The investigator described the worker's
environment as a neighborhood of foreigners living in
one and two-story frame houses which were all apparently
in poor condition; and of course, the investigator noted
that the neighborhood was unacceptable for the

habitation of a Ford Man. "This man," wrote the

174

investigator, "lives in a dirty unsanitary but and has a
room full of boarders, who sleep 3 and 4 to a room.

Some of the boarders go through the room where the man

and his wife sleep to reach their own room." Moreover,

the investigator added, “The wife looks .haggard from

overwork. She and the children are as dirty as their
12

surroundings."

Similarly undesirable conditions were reported by
other investigators. William H. Pickel found one
worker, his. wife» and ‘three» children, along ‘with :four
male roomers, living in oneJ large room which was
partitioned by a cheap curtain.:3 Another investigator
reported the situation of a worker named Joe Kostruba
who, along with his wife and children had emmigrated
(c.1912) from Russia. Kostruba reportedly lived in
Highland Park at 812 Beaubien. Street; the house was
described as a one and one-half story framehouse which
was old and tumbled-down. At the time of the
investigation, the house was occupied by Kostruba's
family consisting of a wife and six children ranging in
age from 12 years old to a nursing baby, and three other
families, one of which was a black familyfuf

In cases such as those described above, which were

apparently quite numerous among workers in the Crystal

Palace, the investigators would normally refuse to

175

certify the worker as eligible to participate in the
profit-sharing plan; or the investigator might find that
the worker was eligible to participate, but only on the
condition that the additional income provided by
participation be used to maintain home conditions
comparable to those exhibited by the Armenian machine
operator whose story was recorded by Porter. According-
to Porter, the Sociological Department investigator
reported that this Armenian worker was a Catholic who
had been living in the Detroit area for 3 to 5 years.
The worker boarded in an apartment which was occupied by
two men and one woman; the apartment consisted of five
rooms and a bath. 15

Another interesting case of a "reformed"
worker was recorded by Emmett. Having been advised by
the investigator to discontinue the practice of taking
in boarders and to move to a better neighborhood, a
German Catholic worker who had been found living in a
"dirty unsanitary hut," apparently in a fashion typical
of workers who_were initially denied participation in
the profit-sharing plan, "purchased a lot in the suburbs
on which was built a three room structure where he and
his family lived without boarders. By August 1915, the
investigator rewarded the reformed worker by approving

him for participation in the plan, and in December the

176

investigator reported that, "Our employee is making
wonderful progress with his share of the profits. His
home is comfortably furnished; the family is neat and
clean." Furthermore, the investigator added, "He can
now speak English, and he has taken out [the] first
naturalization papers":L The incentive of profit-
sharing was so great, and the guidance of Sociological
Department investigators so persuasive, that 13,000
families moved during the first year of the plan.

It is impossible to know from existing evidence
the degree to which standards may have changed and the
precise impact of the Sociological Department in
improving the percentage of "good home conditions."
Table 6.1 suggests that some changes probably occurred
in home conditions, quality of neighborhoods, and the
habits of those who worked in the Crystal Palace.
Specifically, for 1914, 1915 and 1916, table 6.1 shows
changes from 47 to 70 and 87 percent respectively, in
"good home conditions," while showing a commensurate
decrease in "poor" home conditions from 23, to 3 and 2
percent respectively for 1914, 1915 and 1916.17 By 1917
88 percent of the workers' homes were rated "good," 10
percent "fair" and 2 percent "poor." Not surprisingly,
Canadian and English workers had the highest percentage

of "good" homes, 97 and 96 percent respectively, while

177

only 75 percent of the Italian, and 76 percent of the

Rumanian homes were rated "good."

TABLE 6.1

COMPARATIVE STATUS CW IJVING CONDITIONS OF CRYSTAL PALACE WORKERS
AS DETERMINED BY SOCIOLOGY DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATIONS, 1914, 1915 AND
1916 BY %

 

Year
Status 1914 1915 1916
Home Condition:
Good 47 70 87
Fair 30 28 11
Poor 23 3 2
Neighborhood:
Good 41 66 81
Fair 40 32 18
Poor 19 2 1
Habits:
Good 80 66 73
Fair 19 33 26
Poor 1 l 1
Citizenship: 39 45 51

 

Source: FMCA Accession 62, Box 59/ "Social Statistics of Home Plant
as of January 12, 1916."

178

For many workers, especially the ethnics, the
prospects of establishing "good home conditions"
(according to Ford's standards) were not good in 1914,
and by 1920 the prospects had diminished considerably.
According to Marquis, a "genuine" housing shortage
existed, and consequently, Ford softened its preference
for single family dwellings. Marquis remarked that, "In
the old days, if a worker lived in bad housing we could
tell him to get it straightened out, now we beg the
Board of Health to let him stay in a condemned house}:9
Whatever the motives and the net affect of the
Sociological Department's efforts to imporve the home
and housing conditions of .Ford workers, the record

shows many cases where the Sociological Department was

directly responsible for improved conditions.

One case is especially interesting; it is
interesting not only because of the exceptionally large
number of boarders involved, but because it also attests
to the importance of the income earned by taking in
boarders. In this particular case, a married workman
lived in a rented house with his family which included a
wife and five children; in addition to the worker's
family there were eighteen boarders living in the house.
"The investigator found that the couple, neither of whom
spoke English, had rented [the] house for $80 a
month, and were realizing a gross income of more than
$300 monthly. This and the husband's factory earnings
had enabled them to save $890." The workman, of
course, was not approved for participation in the
profit-sharing plan. This case apparently warranted
special attention, and after some effort on the part of
the investigators, the workman was persuaded to invest
part of his savings in a house on the outskirts of the
city. After three months he was put on the profit-
sharing plan, and the investigator found that the
family had been transformed.

Many observers, especially those close to the Ford
Motor Company, applauded the contributions that the
profit—sharing plan made to the improvement of housing

conditions, and therewith, improvements in the QOL of

180

some Ford workers and their families. For example, one
investigator wrote that, "It is more than one year that
I have been working in the Sociological Department of
the Ford Motor Company, and I am glad to substantiate
that our investigative work has been highly successful
and that a significant progress is evident regarding the
home and living conditions of our employees and their
understanding of the intentions of the profit-sharing
plan."21 Although it is quite possible that, like many
assessments recorded by Sociological Department
investigators, the statement by John Clarken, who was
the Chief Housing Inspector of the Board of Health of
the City of Detroit, may be biased in its confirmation
that housing conditions of Ford's employees did
improve. Clarken wrote that, "...it has been my
observation that the conditions under which the Ford
employees; are living Zhave been. greatly improved,
especially in certain sections of the city where they
live in large numbers."22 Despite biases in reports
regarding the improved. bone and housing‘ conditons of
Ford Workers, there is no doubt that, owing to the work
of the Sociological Department, and the "Ford" real-
estate and housing-construction companies, the
conditions did improve. Nevertheless, there is

considerable evidence suggesting that the improvement

181

was not constant, and that not all Ford workers
benefitted equally.

Speaking in favor of a cooperative housing plan on
June 25, 1920, Edsel B. Ford remarked that, "There seems
to be an1 impression that housing conditions are
improving. This idea is not borne out by actual
conditions. Housing conditions in this area are just-
not so acute because large numbers are for the summer
living in tents and shacks which will not furnish them
proper shelter in the winter,..J' Ford also noted that
reports from the public schools showed that large
numbers of families were leaving the city, and it
appeared therefore that conditions had improved. More
importantly, Ford added that, "The houses for sale and
rent in this city at the pwesent time are still beyond
the reach of the man earning from 36.00-37.00 per day.
This class of men makes up the bulk of our
employees..."23 It appears then, that the honel and
housing conditions of many Ford workers imroved during
the early phase of the profit-sharing plan, and the
conditions of many other workers were not affected while
the home and housing conditions of other workers
certainly deteriorated during the early 1920s. Whatever
the overall state of the home and housing conditions of

Ford workers, the program to upgrade those conditions

182

was but part of a larger effort aimed at "Americanizing"

the workforce.

183

FOOTNOTES
Chapter Six

1. John Modell and Tamara K. Hareven, "Urbanization and
The Malleable Household: An Examination of Boarding and
Lodging in Anerican Families," in Michael Gordon (ed.),
THE AMERICAN FAMILY IN SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(New York: St. Martins Press, 1978),52.

2. Modell and Hareven, "An Examination of Boarding and
Lodging in American Families," 59.

3. Interview: Katherine Hill, Librarian-Curator,
Megregor Library/Museum, October 1986.

4. HIGHLAND PARKER, 2 January 1927.

5. Modell and Hareven, "An Examination of Boarding and
Lodging in American Families," 51.

6. Robert W. DeForest and Lawrence Veiller, THE TENEMENT.
HOUSE PROBLEM, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1903)
1: 60.

7. DeForest and Veiller, THE TENEMENT HOUSE PROBLEM, 60-
61.

8. DETROIT SATURDAY NIGHT, Volume 7, Number 21. (July
19, 1913).

9. FMCA/Accession 62, Box 28: "Outline of Suggestions
For Housing of Employees of Henry Ford at Ford Tractor
Plants and the River Rouge."

10. FMCA/ Accession 293, Box 1: "Profit Sharing;" also
cited in Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY, 133.

11. Boris Emmett, "Profit Sharing in the United States."
BULLETIN OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (1916), 99—
100, cited in Meyer, FIVE DOLLAR DAY.
12. Emmet, "Profit Sharing," 99-100.

13. FMCA/ Accession 940, Box 17: "Human Interest Story
Number—One."

184

14. FMCA/ Accession 940, Box 17: "Human Interest Story
Number~Nine," reported by F. Andrews.

15. Harry Franklin Porter, "Giving The Men A Share: What
It's Doing for Ford," SYSTEM 31 (March 1917), 267.

16. Emmet, "Profit Sharing," 99-100.

17. FMCA/ Accession 62, Box 59: "Social Statistics of
Home Plant as of January 12, 1916."

18. FMCA/ Accession 62. Box 59: "Social Statistics of
Home Plant as of January 12, 1916."

19. FMCA/ Accession 293, Box 1: “8.8. Marquis."

20. Nevins, FORD, 559.

21. FMCA/ Accession 940, Box 17: A.E. Gruenberg,
"Progress Among Foreigners Since Proclamation of Profit

Sharing Plan," June 3, 1916.

22. FMCA/ Accession 940, Box 17: "The Board of Health,"
nd.

23. FMCA/ Accession 940, Box 17: "8.8 Marquis Papers/
Frank Hill Papers."

CHAPTER SEVEN

BLACK AND WHITE WORKERS IN THE SHADOWS OF THE PALACE:

SO.E OBSERVATIONS ON THE QUALITY OF LIFE 1910-1927

The aim of this chapter is to elaborate on
the lives of the Model T cohort of workers by putting
some flesh on the statistically reconstructed skeleton
of the inhabitants of Highland Park}- The fundamental
objective [If previous chapters remains, that is; to
understand how the combination of the new manufacturing
and managerial technology adopted in the production of
the Model T, and the resulting demographic transition
of the region affected the quality of life experienced
in particular segments of the community. Following the
EPA definitions and prescriptions regarding the study
of the quality of life, and focusing on (a) migration,
(b) home and. housing conditions, (c) employment and
income, (d) health, (e) and political power, this
chapter attempts to contrast the quality of life

experienced by the Black community with that

experienced in Highland Park.

185

186

The vast majority of Blacks, wherever they lived
in the region, had a shared experience which made them
one people, and which was manifest in the quality of
their lives. In an attempt to shed some light on the
small number of blacks who made their way into the
Crystal Palace, this section expands upon the
experience of Ossian Sweet (pronounced "ocean"), an
extraordinary Black Detroiter, in order to experience
the larger Black Detroit and, perhaps, thereby to
see Highland Park more clearly.

Ossian Sweet was born in Orlando, Florida in the
late 1890s. He was the eldest of ten children born to
a household headed by a Methodist preacher. As a young
boy, Sweet witnessed an event which would have a deep
and lasting effect on him, and on those with whom he
came in contact. One day he saw a mob consisting of
what appeared to be thousands of white people driving a
young black boy down a road near the Sweet home. While
hiding himself, Sweet saw the mob pour kerosene on the
boy and set fire to his flesh. He heard the boy's
tortured screams pierce the air, and after a while when
the crusty body no longer cried out, he listened to the
gleefully triumphant howls of the drunken mob as they
celebrated their work, and "He saw them laughingly take

pictures of the scene and then watched in horror as

187

dozens of whites pulled souvenirs of bones and flesh
off the charred remains."

Sweet left home when he was twelve years old and
worked at numerous jobs, including bellboy, waiter on
steamships and in hotels, Pullman-porter, and janitor
before attending Wilberforce University' in. Ohio and
Medical School at Howard University in Washington, D.C.
By 1925, Ossian Sweet was "A young man barely in his
thirties, married, with an infant daughter, he was a
physician and surgeon, and specialized in gynecology,"
living in the city of Detroit. Sweet, like the vast
majority of Black Detroiters, never lived in Highland
Park and never worked in the Crystal Palace. But,
despite his 'professional status,‘ Sweet did have much
in common with the 'average' Black Detroiter; and here
it is a—serted that the few blacks living in Highland
Park and working in the Crystal Palace had much in

common with the larger community of Black Detroit.

Migration

Black inmngrants 1J1 significant numbers first

appeared i1: Michigan about 1840. .At this time there

were 707 Negroes in Michigan and 193 in Detroit, and by

 

188

1850 the number had increased to 2,283 and 587
respectively; among these migrants was a small colony
of ex-slaves who settled in Cass County, but the
largest settlement of blacks, nearly one-quarter of
Michigan's Negro population, lived in Detroit in 1850.
Most of these early settlers were descended from free
Negro migrants from urban centers in the state of
Virginia; they came from Richmond, Fredericksburg, and
Petersburg.5 When contrasted with the waves of blacks
who would arrive later, these early migrants were but a
mere splash in an ocean of black souls in search of
better lives.

The black immigrants were pushed from the
socially' and. economically inhospitable conditions in
their homestates of Alabama, Georgia, Florida and
Tennessee;6 in some cases floods and boll-weevil pests
had made it virtually impossible for those who would
emmigrate to make a living.7 Their movement was
vigorously stimulated by labor agents who were seeking
to supply the labor needs of 23 rapidly growing city;
the agents enticed the willing migrants with offers of
free transportation, promises of higher wages, improved
working conditions and greater social freedom.

The vast majority of black people who came to the

Detroit area came in one of two waves. The first wave

189

was part of the 'great migration,’ which brought blacks
during 1916-17 to alleviate a labor shortage that
resulted from the fact that WW I had disrupted the flow
of immigrants who might normally have been expected to
meet the labor needs? and the fact that certain other
members of the workforce had been drafted or had
volunteered to do military service. The second wave in
1924-1925 brought a few like Ossian Sweet, and many
thousands of others, especially, single black men in
their prime, to fill a vacuum in the labor force
created by legislation restricting immigration into the
United States.10

The immigration of blacks to the Detroit area
was part of a larger, more complex movement that Donald
described as a social phenomenon representing the
maladjustment of 500,000 Negroes;Ll Generally speaking,
the north and western parts of the United States saw an
increase in the black population from 1,078,336 in 1910
to 1,550,754 in 1920; an increase of 472,448 or
approximately 44 per cent. Within the context of this
movement, Michigan experienced an increase in the Negro
population of 251 per cent, that is from 17,115 in 1910
to 60,082 by 1920. Of this number, 35,097 migrated to
Detroit and most others settled in southeastern

12

Michigan communities. More than any other city in

190

Michigan. Detroit attracted the migrants;
specifically. the city's increase in the black

population was an astounding 6.23.4 per cent, that is
from 5,751 in 1910 to 41,532 in 1930.13 What is
important is that during this period, the percentage
increase in Detroit's blacks was the highest in the
nation, followed by Cleveland, Ohio with an estimated
increase of 307 per cent while all other urban
communities in the United States which had more than
25,000 blacks in 1920 had increased less than 150 per
cent.lu

This massive movement of manpower from the south
to Detroit was often viewed with alarm.15 The DETROIT
NEWS sensationalized the 'great migration' in articles
and editorials in which the mes‘age was clear: "Negroes
Open Drive On City. Advance Contingents of 50,000
Southerners Expected by Summer, Arrive Daily."l6 In
another report the NEWS declared, in an editorial,
that the natural home of the Negro is in the South and
the South should revise its racial policies and call
"him" back.17 Despite the admonition of the NEWS,
for the time being, blacks did not in significant
numbers return to the south, in fact the flood of

migrants continued. Forester B. Washington, the

first head of the Detroit branch of the Urban League,

191

reported that "1,000 Negroes a month were arriving in
the city" in May, June, and July of 1917; by 1920 it
was estimated that over 1,000 blacks were arriving each
week.18 During the month of May in 1920, Washington
sent an Urban League worker to meet the three trains
which daily brought the majority of the mdgrants, and
the count at the train station revealed the totals in
table 7.1:

Noting that, by the fall of 1916 a massive wave
of black immigrants had begun to arrive in Detroit,
Thomas has summarized the phenomenon. During the
months of May, June and July of 1916 an estimated
1,000 black immigrants arrived each month; and an
estimated 25,000 arrived in 1916-1917.19 Remarkably
then, the vast majority of the more than 40,000 blacks
counted in 1920 had come to Detroit in one year! The
second wave coming in 1924-1925 brought in over 40,000
new black immigrants, thus by 1926 85 percent of the
black population had come to Detroit during the decade
between 1916 and 1926. "Both waves were heavily
influenced by the increase in the value of Detroit's
manufacturing products, triggered by the rapid

20
industrial expansion of 1914."

URBAN LEAGUE'S

192

Table 7.1

COUNT OF BLACK IMMIGRANTS: MAY 1920

 

Monday May 3, ....... 216
Tuesday May 4, ...... 245
Wednesday May 5,.... 215
Thursday May 6, ..... 274
Friday May 7, ....... 272
Saturday, May 8,.... 217
Sunday, May 9, ...... 371
Total 1,809

 

Source:
A Survey
Northern
Period,"

Forrester B. Washington,

of the Conditions

"The Negro in Detroit:
of a Negro Group in a

Industrial Center during the War Prosperity

Detroit 1920.

193

Housing

For the vast majority of Black Detroit, without
respect for occupation and social class, the housing
situation was abominable! Consider, fcm‘ example, a
house on St. Antione Street, just off Adams, which was
occupied by fifteen regular tenants and a varying
number of transients; this place had six rooms, no
toilet or bath, and rented for $75 a month....The
people were all black and were living in Detroit's
black ghetto already filled to bursting.21

George Edmund Haynes, a trained sociologist and
contemporary authority of the Model T era has offered
an assessment which is based largely cm: a sample of
407 households. Haynes noted that housing was the
most pressing problem of Detroit's Black new—comers.
Haynes hastened to add that, "Houses for famdlies
involve not only the question of physical shelter but
the problems of sanitary and moral environment."22 The
housing problem was characterized by shortages which
resulted in overcrowding and excessive rents, moreover
much of the available housing was unfit for human
habitation, while restrictive covenants and. racial

discrimination prevented Blacks from moving into more

suitable environments.

194

        

 

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The housing problem in Detroit c.1900-1930 is
a subject about which there has been much commentary.
Citing Washington and several Urban League documents,‘=
Levine reported that early contingents of the great
migration immediately consumed all available housing,
and there was not a vacant house or tenement in the
black section of the city, where three or four
families crowded into nearly every apartment.24 In one
exemplary case, "Fourteen people lived in the attic of
a house on Napoleon Street." Crowded conditions were
made worse because "Housing with no indoor bathroom
facilities, no electric lights, and leaking water pipes
was commonplace."

Katzman reported that, even before the great
migration, housing for Blacks left much to be
desired.26 In describing alley-dwelling, Katzman
remarked that "Neither the alleys nor the dwellings in
them were well suited for human habitation;" former
sheds and stables were often converted into 'housing'
for one, two, or three families, where in 1911, the
alleys were still being used as a garbage dump and
posed serious health hazards. The short supply of
housing contributed to excessive rents paid by Black

occupants: "In 1911 an alley house between Hastings

and Rivard, occupied by two families and as many

196

boarders and lodgers as they could secure, rented for
$18 a month," and this arrangement was commonplace. A
few blocks away, in another alley community (i.e.,
shanty town) homes "built of rough boards in the
chicken coop style of architecture," rented for $10 a
month. A clearer meaning of the monthly rental rates
paid by Blacks may be seen when those rates are
contrasted with rates paid in the working-class
neighborhoods of 1909, where "older six-room dwellings
fully serviced by utilities rented for $10 to $12
monthly, and new dwellings rented for $18 to $22."27
Haynes was persistent in noting that the, so
called, 'lodger evil' was among the greatest problems
caused by the housing shortages. Haynes emphasized
that many families living in 1 to 4 rooms were
accommodating lodgers and that practically all families
recorded as living 1J155 or more rooms were taking in
lodgers, while all famulies living iJi'? or more rooms
had at least two lodgers. "In fact," Haynes continued,
"many homes of this size were run either as rooming
houses for profit or because the necessity of paying
the high rents" had turned them into rooming
houses.28 Continuing his discussion of the "pressing
problem" of the lodger evil, Haynes noted that, "There

were 7 famulies living-imiil room and keeping lodgers;

197

146 families were living in 2 or more rooms keeping
lodgers; only 100 families were reported as having no
lodgers and 98 were doubtful or unknown. Here we have
a pressure against wholesome family life which is
serious in the extreme."29 The housing problems refused
to go away! The housing situation for blacks was so
bad in the summer of 1919, that some men, with money in
their pockets, were forced to sleep in parks, and
others slept in cars and on pool tables.30 While a
survey of 1,000 families showed that over half of these
families took in. lodgers (usually single men), the
Mayor's Inter-Racial Committee reported that "sanitary
dwellings at a reasonable rent" were still "the
exception," and there were no reasonably priced
workingmen's clubs or hotels for black workers in
31

Detroit."

"In the area of several blocks bounded by
Beaubien and Hastings on the east and west and Napolean
and Brewster on the north and south lived the black
"alley dwellers." The year was 1911. In the rear of a
Beaubien Street lot stood an old shack, measuring some
fifteen by thirty feet. It had two levels; the lower
part was used as a shed and stable and the upper part

was intended for storage of bay. The lower part

remained a shed, but the hay loft had been converted

198

into a dwelling, partitioned off with rough lumber to
make two rooms and two recesses. In this rookery were
housed five persons—-a man, a woman, a young girl, and
two adult lodgers. The windows looked out onto an
alley where refuse collected through the winter. At
the entrance to the building was a large box of manure
which had been thrown out of an adjourning stable.

A similar shack stood in an alley between
Alfred and Brewster streets. Built of rough boards and

resembling a chicken coop, it was divided into four

rooms housing two black families. Each paid $5 a month
rent. The total value of the shack could not have been
more than $25. Another alley shed between Hastings and

Rivard streets, occupied by two families and varying
number of lodgers, paid its owner rental of $18 a
month. The families had long since given up trying to
keep out filthfl?2

Haynes noted that "One observer said he had seen
rooms occupied by two peOple where the most convenient
way to dress was to stand in the middle of the bed."33
Haynes qualified his statement by indicating that the
observer was probably exaggerating, but asserted that,
it is nevertheless "true that many buildings are very

badly overcrowded and are nothing more than dilapidated

shacks."

199

TABLE 7.2

NUMBER OF ROOMS OCCUPIED, FAMILY SIZE, AND RENTS PAID:
A SAMPLE OF 407 DETROIT HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD 1918

 

Rooms Occupied Family Size Rents Paid
71-5 169-2 57-315-819
63-] 108-3 45-335-339
50-nd 51-4 43-320-824
44-6 28-5 39-325-329
43-7 19-6 29-330-334
35-4 18-1 27-310-311!
34-3 10-7 21-340-344
24-2 3-8 13-845-354
16-12 1-9 4-360+
16-10 3-$(10
14-9
13-8

Totals: 407 . 1,241

 

Source: Haynes, NEGRO NEVCOMERS IN DETROIT 1918: 21-24.
nd=No data; 1: All one room households.

Reporting data provided by the Detroit Urban
League, Haynes stated that the usual size of houses or

apartments was 3, 4 CH‘ES rooms, and that many of them

were in the midst of saloons, gambling places or
" buffet flats." As described by Haynes, a " buffet
flat" is a "sort of high-class combination of a

gambling parlor, a 'blind tiger' and an apartment of

prostitution," which generally operated under police

200
protection.§q’ Haynes' assessment of the Ihousing
conditions for Blacks was confirmed by a number of
public agencies.

On the basis. of a 1916 study evaluating 96
working class homes, the Detroit Board of Health
found 1,974 persons occupying homes which were judged
to have a capacity for no more than 1,477 persons.
Moreover, it was found that only 11 of the 96 homes
were judged to have 'sanitary' bed conditions and less
than 20 of the homes were in compliance with the
plumbing codes.3‘5 Despite the fact that there was a
frenzy of housing construction, the housing shortage
persisted. A survey conducted in 1919 showed that
there was a shortage of approximately 33,000 housing
units; and. that 165,000 persons; were living 1J1 sub-
standard housing.

Levine has noted that "Housing was constructed
for 16,689 families in 1922; for 23,153 families in
1923; for 26,377 in 1924; for 26,679 in 1925; and for
27,287 in 1926,TT7 yet the demand, by far outstripped
supply. Between 1923 and 1928, over 50,000 housing
units were built in the Detroit area, but the shortage
remained.) On the basis of its own investigation in
1921, the Americanization Committee of Detroit

reported that many "Negroes" were living in shacks that

201

were not fit for human habitation, for which they were
paying exorbitant rents.39 The housing situation
outlined here is precisely the environment encountered
by Sweet, and which he sought to avoid by moving his
family into the house at 2905 Garlund Avenue.

During the summer of 1925 whites in various parts
of the city, as they had in years before, succeeded in
preventing blacks from: moving into "their"
neighborhoods. Generally' speaking, whites tried to
keep the Blacks in place by loosely organized urban
terrorism. As early as 1919, bombing and mob threats
had succeeded in discouraging Blacks from moving out of
the black ghetto and into white neighborhoods, and by
1925 when the Sweet family went on trial for murder,
the Ku Klux Klan was well established in Detroit and
had shown its strength by nearly electing their write-
in candidate (Charles Bowles) as the new mayor.uo The
Sweets knew, as much of the world would know when they
went to trial on a murder charge, what they were
getting into.

Sweet knew that his family would not be
welcomed to the neighborhood where he had paid a hard
earned $3,000 deposit on the $18,500-house at 2905

Garlund Avenue (near Charlevoix). In fact, expecting

trouble and doubting that 'police protection' would be

202
4].
forthcoming, the Sweets armed themselves "with seven
revolvers and automatic pistols, two rifles, a shotgun,
and about 400 rounds of ammunitionuZHaving informed
the police department of his intentions, on Tuesday
morning September 8, 1925 the Sweet household (note
composition of household) moved into their home.

Except for the constant parade of people who
passed the house (again, and again, and again, etc.),
and the policeman who were on the scene all day to keep
peOple moving, the first day in the new home was
relatively uneventful. At mndnight, 500 to 800 people
still stood outside the house, but by three o‘clock
(a m.) the crowd had begun to dissipate and by daybreak

43
everyone had scattered.

The morning of the second day was 'normal,' but
by late afternoon large crowds of people had gathered
near the house. Apparently startled at seeing the
horde milling about outside, someone in the house cried
out, "My God, look at the people!"uu Some of the mob

began to throw stones at the house, some shouted

curses, while ‘seventeen policemen stood within fifty

feet of the house. . . and did nothing to dissuade the
45

mob. Meanwhile, Ossian Sweet turned out the lights,

grabbed a gun and ran upstairs. Some of the members of

the household had not yet returned to the house from

203

their normal daily routine, and as they drove up in a
taxi and ran toward the front of the house, they were
pelted with bricks, stones, rocks and coal, as their
assailants screamed "Niggers! Niggers! They're niggers.
Get them! Get The Niggers!" Windows shattered!
Soon, shots came from within the house." Police
reinforcement arrived and the Sweets were arrested.
"Downtown on lower Beaubien in the huge new
police building of which official Detroit was so proud,
the prisoners were told that a man named Leon Breimer
had been killed and another, Erik Houberg' severely
wounded."u’8 It was the police chief who asked the
first question of Ossian Sweet: "Doctor, what business
do you have moving into a white neighborhood where you
49
are not wanted?"

Ossian Sweet and the other 80,000 (approximately)
black immigrants arriving in Detroit 1914-1925 enriched
the city and multiplied (ad infinitum) the prospects
for' an improved quality' of life» for the immigrants
themselves, as well as that of the elite-class of
blacks who had come before them. Yet, that is in spite
of the prospects for change, "since 1915," "the
structure--economic, social, and political--that

proscribes black life has remained (too much) the

same." Reiterating the anachronistic quality of

204

black Detroit, Katzman wrote that, in Detroit, as
illustrated in his work and in Chicago and New York as
shown in the work of Allen Spear and Gilbert Osofsky
respectively,51 "there is a tragic sameness in the
lives of black people today and the past," and when
compared with other groups, "no group had changed so
little in more than half a century."5? With specific
reference to the ways in which backward development,
and everything it implies, was reflected in
residential segregation, Zunz recognized the
anachronistic character of Black Detroit.

Zunz recalled that Louis Wirth, writing in the
19205, led the way in developing the revolutionary
analytic model of residential succession in which it
was assumed that Blacks—-the last large group to enter
the city-—needed only to wait their turn to receive the
well-earned fruits of the toil;' Wirth's model
offered an optimistic projection which was not
confirmed by the realities of Detroit. In fact, as
Zunz has put it, "Blacks lived history in reverse:"54
While most ethnic neighborhoods flourished as cross—
class communities which provided a variety of
opportunities for an improved quality of life for its

members, Blacks were "atomized and dispersed." The

cross-class ethnic communities were transformed by the

205

emergence of a large industrial working class. As
ethnic bonds were being replaced by occupational bonds,
and as upwardly mobile residents moved up in class,
they deserted the communities which had nurtured them,
while "Blacks were drawn into an ever growing ghetto,
irrespective of their social status." The
contradiction of the growth of the Black ghetto was an
anachronism which contrasted sharply with the white
ethnic groups that became more and more segmented
along class lines in many sections of the metropolitan
area.’ Why?

Did the backward development of the black
community result from a failure to acculturate? Was it
because of a lack of education? Was it because of
racial prejudice? Or was the source of the failure to
capture the 'American dream', i.e., up and out, to be

found elsewhere?

Politics
Although pleck is writing about black Boston?6
she has identified an anachronistic pattern similar to

7
that in Detroit described by Zunz and Katzman?‘

Commenting on work that she did with Thernstrom, she

206

remarked that, it was found that black Southerners
were far more concentrated in menial jobs than Irish
immigrants and that, far from diminishing with
increased residence in the city, the racial gap in
occupational status only widened in the second
generation. Blacks born in the North were still
largely working in menial jobs, unlike their Irish
counterparts; most of the American born sons of Irish
immigrants were employed in. skilled trades, clerical
jobs, or factory work. Pleck and Thernstrom
concluded that black economic progress did not fit the
model of even the most limited example of nineteenth
century immigrant advance, that of Irish Bostoniansé‘a
"The familiar immigrant story of acculturation, then,
can be found here without the familiar element of
economic advance, and it was this discrepancy between
aspirations and incomes that so often shaped black
personal relationships and family life.é‘

Here, it has been suggested that the backward
development, i.e., the anachronism seen in the black
community of Detroit was not unlike that observed in
Boston. In each case, the paramount question is why?
Why did black immigrants, first and second generation,
not experience the same patterns of mobility as other

groups had experienced. More precisely, why did the

207

Ossian Sweets, John Washingtons, et al. of Detroit not
gain a share of the American dream? In the case of
Boston (and by hypothetical extension, in Detroit),
Thernstrom has e1 1 mi nated four reasons for the
concentration of blacks in menial Jobs: First, he
argued that rural background was not a fundamental
source of black inequality. Next, he dismissed the
suggestion that educational deficiencies contributed to
the poor economic showing of Boston's blacks at the
turn of the centuryx Third, he ruled. out ‘that
confinement to ghettos was a serious economic handicap
for black workers. Residential segregation, he found,
bore little or no relationship to occupational standing
for several groups of Boston workers.... Finally,
Thernstrom doubted the idea that fatherless families
were a significant deterrent to black occupational
advance. He noted that female-headed households in a
1960 study were more often found among white and black
poor, and if economic differences were held constant,
the male-absent household was only slightly more common
among blacks than whites. The elimination of these.
four alternative explanations compelled Thernstrom to
conclude that the major barrier to black economic
achievement was racial prejudice. Similarly, here it

is suggested.that it was racial prejudice which

208

prevented the ascendance of the Ossian Sweets, and
thousands upon thousands of blacks in Detroit.6Q
While it may be widely agreed that racial
prejudice goes a long way toward explaining the
concentration of blacks in menial Jobs, residential
segregation and the black ghetto, a more fundamental
question remains. That is, what were the political
conditions which encouraged official noninvolvement in
cases like the Sweet case; put another way, what was
the source of political impotence in black Detroit?
Several experts have noted that political reforms
of the early twentieth century operated to the
detriment of the black electorate. Having discussed
the various ways in which the black political elites
had become accustomed to the patronage system, Katzman
remarked that the change from the convention to a
primary system of selecting candidates served to block
Negroes from elective office. 1‘ Katzman also noted
that William M Tuttle Jr. and August Meier have
suggested that bringing about the political impotence
of the black community may have been an intended
result of the change from the convention to the primary
system.6’-"2' "Although party leaders sometimes endorsed

Negro candidates, black men met defeat in the

primaries. Comprising less than 2 percent of the total

209

population, Detroit Negroes had little hope of
nominating a black man themselves. The primaries made
it possible for caste feelings to predominate in
elections in Detroit.” In short, “the introduction of
the primaries in Detroit eliminated the black man from
office."§3

Forrester B. Washington has also noted the result
of the change from the convention system: The change
from the convention system of nominating candidates
which occurred about 1895, acted as a blight on the
Negro politically. Up until that year Negroes had held
many important municipal, county and state appointive
and elective positions. One Negro had been elected to
the City Council. Four Negroes had been elected to the
State Legislature. One Negro had been elected Circuit
Court Commissioner. But since 1894, when William
Ferguson was re-elected Estimator of the City of
Detroit, no Negro had been elected to public office.
Washington further explained that, with the convention

system which was used until about 1895, political

leaders got together and made up a ticket which was

submitted to the people at the election. Under the
convention system, "frequently a Negro was put on the
ticket to capture the Negro vote. If the ticket was

successful the Negro was elected. But since 1895, when

210

nominations were first made by popular vote, there has
not been enough Negroes nor enough white citizens who
would vote for a Negro to elect a Negro to office.
The change from the convention system to the primary
system effectively eliminated blacks from meaningfully
and purposely influencing public policy in Detroit, and
the charter adopted in 1918 added insult to impotence.
Levine remarked. that, "The coincidence of
events--the city government being restructured under a
new charter Just as the black migration was gathering
force and Detroit was beginning to feel its effect--
leads one to wonder what the course of local .race
relations might have been had the original primary
system remained."65 The Detroit Citizens' League made
a special effort to get ethnic minorities to support
the proposed charter, and recognized as political
leaders, the pastors of the Negro churches were of
special interest to the League. Blacks were assured
that “the at-large system would facilitate the election
of 'white men' who would be more concerned about the
condition of blacks than were the existing group of
aldermen.”66 One spokesman. reminded. the ‘black

electorate that, ”Experience has taught us that the

educated, cultured, 'big' white man has always been the

211

Negro's best friend and has always stood for equity and
Justice for his weaker brotherfl"67

It may also be noted that the DETROIT LEADER, "a
black newspaper, supported the new charter and advanced
the theory that black votes scattered in many different
wards could be united in city-wide elections." The
DETROIT LEADER, and other supporters of the charter
failed to note that such coalitions would be virtually
impossible to build and of little practical
consequence. In effect, supporters ”ignored the
greater likelihood that the concentrated black vote
would be diluted in at-large elections."68

By 1917, the ”good government group,” consisting
of the Detroit Citizens' League, and the Detroit Board
of Commerce, had succeeded in placing a proposition for
charter revision on the November ballot. In November,
the proposition received the endorsement of the voters.
The work of the commission elected to prepare the
revision received voter approval in June 1918.6 It
was Hayor James Couzens, former vice president and
major stockholder in the Ford Motor Company, and
future United States Senator, who would implement the
good government charter for Detroit?0

"By 1900 blacks were less in the neinstream of

American life than they had been in the previous four'

212

decades. With politics, their last important link with
the white community cut off by reform, blacks were left
even more isolated.“’ For Ossian Sweet and the black
community whose aspirations he represented, the lack of
political power neant that there was no protection; it
meant that blacks, without regard for income and
professional status, were forced to remain in the
ghetto while other‘immigrants improved the quality of
their lives by moving into different homes in different
neighborhoods.

Even during the best of times, as one
authority on the history of Black Detroit has noted,
"The black community in Detroit has (always) struggled
to increase and sustain its overall quality of lifeu"zz
Blacks huddled in Estroit"s near eastside ghetto were
plagued by "tough Jobs, scarce housing and poor
health."23 Citing the United States Department of
Commerce, "Mortality Statistics: Thirty-First Annual
Report: 1930,“ and Ulysses W. Boykin, A HANDBOOK ON THE
DETROIT NEGRO, Thomas has drawn a picture of the
relatively severe health. hazards faced by 'blacks in
Detroit?“ Given what is commonly known about the

relationship of home and housing conditions,

occupation, and the quality of health, the picture

213

drawn by Thomas, while not clearly discernable in
the data found in the Ford Motor Company Archives, is
not inconsistent with the fragments of evidence (see
table 5.2) which describe the experiences of the
comparatively small number of black workers employed
in the Crystal Palace.

Thomas reported that during the peak years of
black immigration to the Detroit area (1915-1920),
while the death rate of whites remained constant at
12.8 per 1,000, the death rate among blacks increased
from 14.7 per 1,000 to 24.0 per 1,000. In subsequent
years, the death rate for both blacks and whites
decreased, but death continued to visit blacks more
frequently: c.1925 and 1930, the death rates were
19.4 and 15.6 for blacks, and 10.4 and 8.7 for
whites.'7‘5 It is significant that from 1915 to 1941
tuberculosis, a disease often associated with
unsanitary conditions found in over-crowded housing,
and in the polluted air in the foundries and paint
departments in the automotive industry,76 was the
leading cause of death among blacks in Detroit. In
1915 tuberculosis claimed proportionally more than
twice as many blacks (207.7 per 1,000) than whites

(96.5 per 1,000). The rate of death attributed to

tuberculosis continued to rise among blacks, while

214

showing a significant decrease among whites. In
1920 and 1925 the rate for blacks was 237.0 and 300.2
per 1,000; and 76.5 and 59.5 per 1,000 respectively.
Moreover, as Thomas observed, "There were only four
years during this period (1915-1941) when
tuberculosis was not a principal cause of death among
blacks: 1935, 1939, 1940 and 1941. In those years,
heart diseases and pneumonia competed with each other
in claiming black lives."77

Married or single,- the housing and working
conditions experienced by Black workers employed in
the Crystal Palace (1910-1927) were worse than the
standards achieved by other groups. It is a widely
held view that in regard to the employment of Black
workers, the Ford Motor Company had. a more
progressive policy than other auto manufacturers.
While it is a view which is generally supported by
the evidence, especially evidence relevant to
employment in the River Rouge plant, it is not a view
which is appropriate to the reality of the Crystal
Palace. Generally speaking, Black workers were found
in Jobs with the lowest pay scales, Jobs which
required the greatest physical exertion, had the
highest accident rates and the greatest health

hazards; throughout the industry, it was commonly

215

understood that the least desirable Jobs were in and
around the foundry. It was only in the Rouge plant
that a significant percentage of Blacks were found in
some of the more desirable Jobs; in fact, at the
Rouge plant, Blacks were employed in all phases of
the nmnufacturing operation, including final
assembly. The situation in the Crystal Palace was
quite different.

According to one researcher, on February 9, 1914
William Perry became the first black employee of the
Ford Motor Company. Jim Price, another black worker
employed in the Crystal Palace, who had apparently
come into contact with. Sorensen who frequented a
tailor shop where Price had been employed, was among
the earliest Black workers in the Crystal Palace.
Price was apparently attracted to the Crystal Palace
by the profit-sharing plan, and persuaded Sorensen to
support his efforts to gain employment in the plant.
Price was given a Job in the tool crib, and Sorensen
said to him, "Jim, you're going to be the first
colored man here to get a J ob that means
something"?8

It should be recalled that the vast majority
of the Blacks who came to the Detroit area to work in

the automotive industry came in two waves. The first

216

wave was part of the "great migration," and came
during 1916-1917 to alleviate a labor shortage which
resulted from the fact that WWI disrupted the flow of
immigrants who might normally be expected to meet
labor needs, and the fact that other members of the
workforce had been drafted or volunteered to do
military service. The second wave came during 1924-
1925 to fill a void in the‘labor force created by
legislation restricting immigration into the United
States. Lewis noted that Ford‘s policy regarding the
employment of Blacks was the same as the policy that
characterized the Detroit area c.1914-1919. More
precisely, it was noted that on January 12, 1916 the
Ford Motor Company had 32,702 employees, 50 of whom
were black.7'9 One year later, (January, 12, 1917)
the company counted 36,411 employees and 136 were
Black, and by March the number of Blacks employed by
Ford had only risen to 200. Nineteen-eighteen saw an
important change in Ford's employment practices.

On the basis of personal contact with Sorensen,
the Reverend R.L. Bradby, pastor of the Second
Baptist Church in Detroit, established himself as an
'agent' of the Ford Motor Company, and apparently had
the authority to issue 'passes' allowing selected

individuals access to personnel interviewers in the

217
80

company. . Owing, in part, to passes from Bradby,
the number of Black workers in Ford's employee,
especially in the Rouge plant, increased
significantly. In 1918 the company hired 1,059 Black
men, and in '1919 a total of 1,597 were hired.81 By
1920, with 1,675 Blacks remaining on the payroll, the
Ford Motor Company had become the auto industry's
number-one employer of Black workers.

The recession of 1920-21 and the Great
Depression (1929 .and. early' 19305) found. many
automotive workers out of work, and many never
returned to the ranks of those employed in the
automotive industry. For those who remained, the
Rouge plant was a stronghold of Black workers. Of
the 8,756 Black workers employed by the Ford Motor
Company in 1940, all but 200 were employed in the
Rouge plant. The Model T assembly line had been shut
down in May of 1927, and by 1935 the total number of
workers, in what was once the showcase of the
automotive industry, had been reduced to 2,488, of
whom 20 were Black. In 1940, 18 Black workers could

be found in the Crystal Palace.

218
A Profile of Highland Park Residents and Ford Workers

For the purposes of developing a snapshot of
workers in Highland Park, one each of the two
distinctly different types of neighborhoods in
Highland Park have been selected for analysis. The
first type of neighborhood may be described as
having a decidedly greater proportion (more than 90%)
of households with ”families,” consisting of a
married couple and one or more of their children
and/or some other blood-related relatives than the
second type of neighborhood. The second type of
neighborhood is one in which the vast majority of
households included three or more boarders who were
not apparently blood-related to the head of the
household” More specifically, the neighborhoods
selected for consideration are districts number 3 and
7 as demarcated in the 1915 special census; for
the present purposes, it is assuned. that each. of
these neighborhoods approximates the six—sided block
employed by zunz (see Appendix A). Within the six-
sided block, which this writer has respectfully
designated a Zunz-square (i.e., Z-square), an
exemplary household on Highland Avenue in Zunz-square

number 3, and a few representative households on

219

Labelle and Pasadena streets in Zunz-square 7 have
been singled out for analysis?“

When the Ford Motor Company began production of
the Model T in Highland Park in 1910,, only a very
small percentage of ‘those whose lives: would. later
revolve around the production of the Model T’ had
arrived in the Detroit area; this group of employees
wase' comparatively insignificant in their numbers,
but certain aspects of their lives were
significantly different from the majority of workers.
Among those who are known to have been living in the
area before the opening of the Crystal Palace, Pioch,
Brown and Siess are probably representative of early
Ford employees who had settled in the Highland Park
area before 1910.

It may be recalled that Charles August Siess was
the blacksmith and wagon-maker in the village of
Highland Park in 1882, and that in the panic
(economic depression) of 1893, his business, along
with thousands of others throughout the US, failed.
Remnants of the Siess family were among those who, as
they had in the nineteenth century, lived in type-one
households. As early as 1910, Fred Siess, W. Siess,
and Henry Siess, all of whose occupations were listed

as "machinists" were boarding at 143 Highland

220
85

Avenue. Throughout the period during“ which. the
Model T was produced in the Crystal Palace, families
like the Siess family, in neighborhoods like the one
where they lived, continued to live in households
wherein the composition remained (essentially)
unchanged, while the demographic transition wrought
by the labor needs of the Crystal Palace, created
type—two neighborhoods wherein the vast majority of
the residents were boarders.

In the comparatively brief period between
1900 and 1920 the population of Highland Park
increased dramatically, and most, indeed, almost all
of the growth in the population was the direct result
of labor needs in the Crystal Palace. In 1900 there
were a nsre 427 inhabitants, but by 1910 that number
had increased by 846.9 percent to 4,120. By 1914
village officials estimated the population to be
22,000, and the special census taken by the Bureau of
the Census on November 15, 1915 counted 27,170
persons claiming residence in Highland Park; and
according to the last decennial census (1920) taken
before the Model T assembly lines in the Crystal
Palace were silenced, 46,499 persons were living in
the city.8.6 Most of the residents of Highland Park

were 'native white Americans' who, for at least part

221

of the period wherein the MODEL T was produced, lived
“in households much like those in enumeration district
(Zunz—square) number seven.

The rapid rate at which the population of
Highland Park increased, along with. austerity
policies resulting from World War I, and the economic
depression of the early 1920s, all contributed to a
perennial housing shortage in Highland Park. Despite
admonitions from Ford Motor Company executives and
managers, that Ford "Employees should not sacrifice
their family rights, pleasures and comforts, by
filling the house with roomers and boarders, nor
endanger their children's morals or welfare by
allowing them to associate with people about whom the
know little or nothing,"87 boarding continued to be a
prominent response to the housing and income needs of
the Crystal Palace workforce.

Selected at random (from within Z-square 7), and
therefore assumed to be typical of households taking
in boarders in 1910, was a home on La Belle Avenue
where a 44 year old German male head of household
gave his occupation as house decorator, lived with
his 46 year old wife, a dressmaker who worked at
home. This couple had three school-age children, an

8 year old boy and two daughters, aged 8 and 13.

222

Eight unmarried auto workers ranging in age from 17
to 36, including one who was the nephew of the head
of the household, boarded in this home.88

Another typical household among those taking
in boarders was found on Pasadena Avenue; in this
particular home a 40 year old man employed as an
electrician in “the automotive factory," lived with
his 29 year old wife,. whose occupation was listed as
boarding housekeeper, and their five year old son and
3 year old daughter. Five boarders lived in this
home: two were 18 years old, one of whom was an

electrician and the other a machinist; also among

the boarders, were a 21 year old clerk and two.
8
automotive assemblers aged 20 and 22. '9 In addition

to living in private homes, boarders also lived in
establishments that were operated especially for
boarders. One such abode on Pasadena Avenue was
operated by three sisters, Josephine , Carrie and
Hattie, aged 63, 50 and 47 respectively; their
boarding house served as home for 13 lodgers, all of
whom worked at the "auto factory.”

Having established the locations (Zunz-
squares) where two classes of Ford workers lived,
having shown something of the quality of home and

housing conditions in a number of particular

223

instances, it is possible to build. albeit in-

complete, a generalized profile of the quality of
life experienced in and around the Crystal Palace.
Owing in part to the work of scholars such as Chen-
Nan Li, and activist scholar-novelists such as Upton
Sinclair, but primarily because of records kept by
the Sociological. Department of the Ford Motor
Company, it is possible to contruct a group-biography
of the Model T cohort of Ford workers who lived in
Highland Park.

Li spent the summer of. 1925 working in the
Crystal Palace; during his tenure in the plant, he
recorded. certain information. and impressions .about
the lives of workers employed in the plant.
According to Li's observations, the workers lived
under all sorts of conditions; conditions which
ranged from indecent to refined extravagance. In
general, it appeared that the workers maintained a
fairly high standard of living. While it may be
argued that it is impossible to characterize the
average employee in the Crystal Palace, Li's
description of the “average Ford man" is instructive.

According to Id” in 1925 an average Ford-man
and his family were well fed; consumdng three

balanced, substantially plentiful meals each day.

224

When dressed in street attire, the worker looked like
the average American businessman. An average Fordman
was between thirty-five and forty years of age,9l' he
had a wife who was only slightly younger than he was
and who had given birth to two or three children?2
Apparently, the average wife worked hard at
housekeeping and frequently acquired a ”good income"

by taking in roomers and boarders. ' The Ford worker

was likely to own his house, or to have been buying

it on an installment contract; if he did not own his
own house, he probably rented an entire‘ flat
consisting of several rooms. In either case, the

worker was likely to have had "sufficient” space for
his family, and one or two rooms which were rented;
if the house or flat was in Highland Park, the room
or rooms were quite probably rented to a fellow
employee at the Crystal Palace.

The house, of course, was supplied with water,
gas, electricity, and other modern conveniences.
Among the workers' household furnishings, carpets,
davenports, and comfortable chairs are likely to have
been found along with a few books and a few pictures
on the walls. And, the worker may have had a

victrola or a piano, a telephone and perhaps a radio.

225

Moreover, he probably owned a car, most probably a
Model T Ford, which he drove to work. 91+

Most of the workers were married (See table
5.1), but many were not. The average unmarried
worker was most likely to be between twenty-three and
twenty-eight years old. If he lived in Highland
Park, he and at least one other unmarried Ford
worker would most probably have shared a rented
room in a house or apartment. The room would have
cost each worker 33.00-4.00 a week. The unmarried
worker was likely to take his meals in a resturant at
a cost of $1.00 to 81.30 per day. Generally speaking,
whether married or single in 1925, the worker who was
employed in the Crystal Palace appeared to maintain a
fairly high standard of living.

It should be remembered that a prominent figure
in the lives of many of these workers was the agent-
representative of Ford's Sociology Department. Many
workers resented the intrusion of the investigator,
even while they appear to have benefited from his
intervention. Clearly, improved status within the
Crystal Palace through participation on the profit

sharing plan, could not pay for the violation of

privacy. A little song which some workers sang,

226

suggests that there was indeed a great deal of

ambivalence toward the investigator:

Who is the guy

That asks you why

Your money is all spent,
and quiz----es you

and wif ----- ey too
About e-nor—mous rent?

Who counts the kids

and lifts the lids

To see that things are clean,
And sure he'll say

Most an-y day

Your bank book must be seen.

In—-ves--ti--gator

In--ves--ti--gator

The greatest man you really
ever knew.

In--ves--ti-—gator

In--ves--ti--gator
He starts the rocks a-piling up

fo . a
r you96

By 1929 the quality of life of Crystal Palace
employees had deteriorated drastically. The
description of the conditions experienced by one
worker in 1929, was probably quite typical of Crystal
Palace employees. The laid-off worker stated that,

"After 14 years and 3 months of the best endeavor for

227

the Ford Motor Company, I with thousands of others
have been sent home." The worker continued, "By
economy I have a comfortable home nearly paid for.
The rental of a few rooms supply most necessities. I
don't think we shall need any help from the community
fund, but unless the factories open up before long,
there will surely be dire suffering in Detroit."
This worker had not foreseen the depths of the Great
Depression, wherein all but the most fortunate Ford
workers would indeed suffer.

All of the workers were pioneers in a new
industrial age, whether they be among the relatively
few blacks, the large number of ethnics who would
soon be' 'Americanized', or the native white
Americans (WASPS) whose social mobility,
consciousness and differentiation was accelerated by
the profit sharing plan. Their lives, therefore,
enriched the lives of other workers who would follow
them. Workers, who having heard the kind hearted,
paternalistic pronouncements. and homilies of the
king (Henry Ford), and having seen the lights go out
in the Crystal Palace, while hearing the voices of
workers on the Model T assembly lines, understood
more fully, and without any doubt, the need to

organize.

228

FOOTNOTES

Chapter Seven

1. The 'statistically reconstructed skeleton‘ refers
to the relatively heavy use of 'numbers' in describing
Highland Park and Ford workers.

2. The definition of the QOL is critical. The reader
may wish to refer to Appendix B of this dissertation.

3. DETROIT FREE PRESS, 15 December 1987:9c.
4. Levine, INTERNAL COMBUSTION:159.

5. Katzman, BEFORE THE GHETTO:13.

6. Haynes, NEGRO NEWCOMERS IN DETROIT:8.

7. Donald, "Negro Migration,”485; Haynes, NEGRO
NEWCOMERS IN DETROIT26.

8. Donald, "Negro Migration,"486-87.
9. Haynes, NEGRO NEWCOMERS IN DETROIT:7.

10. Carlson, ”The Negro in ‘the Industries of
Detroit,"40; 74-76.

11. Donald, "Negro Migration,” 486.

12. William S. Rossiter, INCREASE IN POPULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 1910-1920 (Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1922),128.

13w Lt may be noted that Rossiter‘s observations are
not consistent with Donald's; Rossiter stated that
Michigan's increase was 352 percent, although the
increase in number amounted to only 42,000 persons.
The disparity between these two reported increases is
not at issue. In either case, the increase was
remarkable.

14. Rossiter, INCREASE IN POPULATION,128; Levine,
INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 44; U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of The Census, NEGROES IN THE UNITED STATES
1920-32:55; Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research,
THE NEGRO IN DETROIT, Section 2, "Population, 15. It
should also be noted that the increase in Detroit's

229

population was caused primarily by migration to the
city: of 528,000 people added to the population between
1910 and 1920, 412,000 were migrants. Natural increase
accounted for 109,000 new inhabitants (with an average
birth rate of 32 per 1,000 and a death rate of 15 per
thousand), and annexation of new territory to the city
brought only 7,000 new people into the expanded city
limits. [See Detroit City Plan Commission, MASTER PLAN
REPORTS: THE PEOPLE OF DETROIT (Detroit,1946),5, 11-12;
Ticknor, "Motor Cdty,“: 162; Zunz, 1982:287); Donald,
1921:483; See also,, W.E.B. DuBois, "The Migration of
Negroes," THE CRISIS, 14 (June 1917), 63-66.

15. While the emphasis here is on black immigrants to
the city of Detroit, it should not be forgotten that
their entrance coincided with the influx of southern
workers, generally, to Detroit, Pontiac, Lansing,
Flint, Saginaw, Toledo, and South Bend--the centers of
automobile production. Although the number of Blacks
increased significantly, it still was a relatively
small fraction of the total number of southern migrants
who found employment in the industry. And the fact
that from the beginning ‘of the industry's major
expansion Negroes were greatly outnumbered by southern
whites was to exert an important bearing on the
relation of Negro workers to the industry and to the
automobile unions." (Bailer, 1943:415).

16. DETROIT NEWS, 2 April, 1918.
17. NEWS, 25 January, 1918.

18. Forrester B. Washington, "The Negro in Detroit: A
Survey of the Conditions of a Negro Group in a Northern
Industrial Center during the War Prosperity' Period"
(Detroit, 1920); Zunz, INEQUALITY, 288.

19. Thomas cites ”Population," THE NEGRO IN DETROIT,
Detroi t Bureau of Governmental Research, 1926: 6;
Haynes, NEGRO NEWCOMERS, 77.

20. Thomas, "Black Urban Experience In Detroit," 57;
Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research,
"Population,"96.

21. Levine, INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 43, citing “Unsigned
(John C. Dancy) memorandum on housing, August 1919, DUL
Papers, Box 1, MHC.

22. Haynes, NEGRO NEWCOMERS, 21.

230

25. Washington, "The Housing of the Negro in Detroit,"
in THE NEGRO IN DETROIT (1920), DPL; Report to the
Urban League Board, October 1922. Detroit Urban League
Papers, Box 1. MHC; Report to the Urban League Board,
November 1922.

25. Levine, INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 125.

25. Levine, INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 125.

25. Levine, INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 125.

27. Katzman, BEFORE THE GHETTO, 74-75.
28. Haynes, NEGRO NEWCOMERS, 22.

29. Haynes, NEGRO NEWCOMERS, 23.

30. Detroit Bureau of Government Research (DBGR),
"Negro in Detroit," Vol. V:10.

31. DBGR, "Negro in Detroit," Vol. IV: 5.

32. Levine, INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 50-51; DETROIT NEWS
TRIBUNE, 4 June 1911.

33. Haynes, NEGRO NEWCOMERS, 21.

34. Haynes, NEGRO NEWCOMERS, 21; Haynes, "Negroes Move
North," SURVEY 41 (January 4, 1919):460.

35. The Detroit Board of Health, "Report to the Health
Officer on Housing and Health in Detroit," (1911):9-10.

36. FMCA/Accession 940, Box 5, ”Report on Mayor's
Housing Conference."

37. Levine, INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 4o.
38. PIPP'S WEEKLY, MarCh, April, and August 1928.

39. Detroit Board of Commerce, The Americanization
Committee of Detroit, ANNUAL REPORT, March 31, 1921:46,
in DPL and MHC/Bently.

40. Levine, INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 3-4, 167-190; Dancy,
SAND AGAINST THE WIND, 21-34; Kenneth T. Jackson, THE
KU KLUX KLAN IN THE CITY 1915-1930 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1967),27-143; Zunz, INEQUALITY, 324.

231

41. "On Tuesday morning, September 8, 1925, after
telling the police of his intentions, Ossian. Sweet
moved into the house. There were seven people making
the move with him. They were his wife; Henry Sweet,
his twenty-one-year old brother, a fourth year student
at Wilberforce University; Joseph Mack, Ossian Sweet's
chauffeur; Dr. Otis Sweet, another brother who was a.
Detroit dentist; William E. Davis, a friend of Otis'
who was both a pharmacist and a federal narcotics
agent; John Latting, a friend of Henry's, also a
student at Wilberforce; and Norris Murray, a chauffeur
and handyman. Since school was scheduled to reopen on
the fifteenth of September, both Henry Sweet and his
friend, John Latting expected to leave within the
week. Otis Sweet and William Davis planned to room
with the Sweet family for the winter. With the baby
Iva, who had been left with her grandparents, it was to
be a household of five." (Levine, 1976: 161). Levine
cites Haldeman-Julius, ”The Defendants in the Sweet
Murder Case," 27, 30-31; Dancy, SAND AGAINST THE WIND,
23-24; Recorder's Court File no. 60317-60318,
Recorder's Court, Detroit, Michigan; DETROIT CITY
DIRECTORY, 1925-26; Turner and Moses, COLORED DETROIT,
74.

42 . Hal deman-J ul 1 us , CLARNECE DARROW' 8 TWO GREAT
TRIALS, 32-36 Cited In Levine, 1976:162.

43. Levine, INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 162.
44. Levine, INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 163.
45. Levine, INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 163.
46. Levine, INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 164.

47 (Levine, 1976:164, DETROIT TIMES, 10 September,
1925; DETROIT NEWS, 10 September, 1925; DETROIT FREE
PRESS, 19, November 1925.

48. Levine, INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 164.

49. The Sweet trials received international attention,
both because of the issues involved, and because
Clarence Darrow was the defense lawyer. In the first
trial the jurors were unable to reach a verdict; seven
of the jurors favored aquittal and five held out for
the conviction of Ossian Sweet, Henry Sweet and Leonard
Morse on a charge of manslaughter (See Levine, 1976:
183; DETROIT TIMES, 27, 28 November, 1925; DETROIT

232

FREE PRESS 27, 28 November, 1925. In the second trial,
Henry Sweet was tried alone. Eloquently defended by
Darrow, he was acquitted and all charges against the
others were dropped by the prosecuting attorney, Robert
M. Tons (See Levine, 1976: 185-190; DETROIT NEWS, 21
July, 1927; DETROIT FREE PRESS, 22 July, 1927.

50. Katzman, BEFORE THE GHETTO, 2077208.

51. Allen H. Spear, BLACK CHICAGO: THE MAKING OF A
NEGRO GHETTO, 1890-1920 (Chicago, 1967; Gilbert
Osofsky, ”The Enduring Ghetto,“ JOURNAL OF AMERICAN
HISTORY, LV (September, 1968), 243.

52. Katzman, BEFORE THE GHETTO, 208.

53. Zunz, INEQUALITY, 398; Louis Wirth, THE GHETTO
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928): 283;
also, I. Krystol, ”The Negro Today Is Like the
Immigrant Yesterday,” NEW YORK TIMES: SUNDAY MAGAZINE,
11 September, 1966.

54. Zunz, INEQUALITY, 398.
55. Zunz, INEQUALITY, 398.

56. It has been argued that Pleck's book, BLACK
MIGRATION AND POVERTY: BOSTON 1865-1900, while it is
not about Detroit, it may offer something toward
understanding the relationship of developments in the
Crystal Palace to the quality of life in Highland Park
and adjacent communities. Pleck wrote: This book is
about the impact. of the city' and. racial poverty" on
Boston's Black community and family life between the
Civil War and the turn of the century. It examines
three features of black urban life: racial barriers in
employment, poverty, and. aculturation. It. seeks to
understand how racism contributed to black poverty, and
how' poverty was perpetuated.... The study concludes
that in the short run, the move from the South to the
North strengthened traditional slave folkways, but that
in the long run residence in. the city" gave blacks
access to the American dream without the economic
progress that was supposed to go with it.

57. Both Zunz and Katzman have used this term to
describe the experience of blacks in Detroit.

58. Pleck, BLACK MIGRATION AND POVERTY, 7-8.

233

59. Pleck, BLACK MIGRATION AND POVERTY, 3.
60. Pleck, BLACK MIGRATION AND POVERTY, 122-123.

61. Katzman, BEFORE THE GHETTO, 203. A recently
published book (Joe. T. Darden, Richard. Child Hill,
June Thomas and Richard Thomas, DETROIT: RACE AND
UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT, 1987), which. focuses on
developments since World War II, has also argued that
the political variable goes a long way toward
explaining the "uneven development" of certain areas in
the region, and by extension, the "uneven” treatment of
certain racial and ethnic groups. According to Darden
et al., “The political fragmentation of the region is
the single variable that best explains why certain
areas of the region suffer the most from the effects of
the massive extremes in regional economic development."
It was also asserted that, "the story of the growth and
development of black political power .... actually
begins with the black ndgration during and after WOrld
War I that paved the way for black political power in
Detroit. By the mid-19303 blacks had begun to shift
from the Republican party, the party of Abraham Lincoln
and Henry Ford (bestowers of freedom and jobs,
respectively), to the Democratic Party" (Darden, et
al., 1987:201-202).

62. See Tuttle's insightful, "Racism in the Progressive
Era: An Essay Review," WISCONSIN MAGAZINE OF HISTORY,
LIII (Spring, 1970), 228.

63. Katzman, BEFORE THE GHETTO, 203.

64. Forrester B. Washington, THE NEGRO IN DETROIT: A
SURVEY OF THE CONDITIONS OF A NEGRO GROUP IN A NORTHERN
INDUSTRIAL CENTER DURING THE WAR PROSPERITY PERIOD,
Research Bureau of Associated Charities of Detroit,
1920): no page number; see also Arthur C. Millspaugh,
"Bi-Partisanship And Vote Manipulation In Detroit,"
NATIONAL MUNICIPAL REVIEW, vol. V, No. 1 October, 1916:
620-626. For discussions of electoral politics in
Detroit of the 1930s, see David Grenstone, A REPORT OF
THE POLITICS OF DETROIT (Cambridge: Joint Center For
Urban Studies of Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and Harvard University, 1961), and Donald S. Hecock,
DETROIT VOTERS AND RECENT ELECTIONS (Detroit: Detroit
Bureau of Government Research, Inc., 1938). See‘also,
"Direct Legislation in Detroit, 1910-1925," in PUBLIC
BUSINESS, III (June 12, 1925).

234

65. Levine, INTERNAL COMBUSTION, 7.

66. Raymomd R. Fragnoli, THE TRANSFORMATION OF REFORM:
PROGRESSIVISM IN DETROIT-AND AFTER 1922-1933 (New York:
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1982), 159.

67. Fragnoli, THE TRANSFORMATION OF REFORM, 159.

68. Fragnoli, THE TRANSFORMATION OF REFORM, 159. In
footnote 50, Fragnoli cites Marsh to R.J. Willes, June
13, 1918, Correspondence 4, DCL; and the DETROIT
LEADER, (undated) Scrapbook l, DCL.

69. John M.T. Chavez, "James Couzens: Mayor of
Detroit, 1919-1922" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Michigan State
University, 1970), 37.

70. See W.P. Lovett, "Detroit and It's New Charter“
NATIONAL MUNICIPAL REVIEW, vol. X. No.3 (March, 1921).

71. Katzman, BEFORE THE GHETTO, 211.

72. Richard Thomas, ”The Black Urban Experience in
Detroit: 1916-1967," in Homer C. Howkins and Richard
W. Thomas (ed) BLACKS AND CHICANOS IN URBAN MICHIGAN,
1979.

73. Thomas, "The Black Urban Experience in Detroit,"
60-62.

74. US Department of Commerce, "Mortality Statistics:
Thirty-First Annual Report, 1930;" and Ulysses W.
Boykin, A HANDBOOK ON THE DETROIT NEGRO, 1943 as cited
by Thomas.

75. Thomas, "The Black Urban Experience in Detroit,"
620
76. Not all blacks in the Detroit area lived in

boarding houses: By 1929 there was a small neighborhood
on the west side where about 15-20% of the black
population lived in their own homes” ZNevertheless,
boarding was the most typical experience, and in 1925
it was found that more than half of 1,000 black
famdlies surveyed were taking in boarders (PIPP'S
WEEKLY, November 23, 1929; and Washington, ”The Negro
in Detroit,“ Volume IV.

77. Thomas, "The Black Urban Experience," 62.

235

78. FMCA, Lewis' typescript essay, 1954:13.
79. FMCA/ Accession 62, Box 59.

80. FMCA/Accession 38, Box 118: "Bradby to Sorensen.”

81. FMCA/Accession 23, Box 3.
82. FMCA/Accession 62, Box 5.

83. FMCA/ Accession 38, Box 123: "Payroll Department
Report on number of Negroes employed at the Rouge
plant, February 21, 1940.

84. For a brief discussion regarding the rationale for
selecting a six-sided block (Z-square), within a
specified Bureau of Economic Analysis Region (BEA), see
Appendix A.

85. Downriver Genealogical Society Census Holdings
(DGS) 1850-1910, Roll 678.

86. U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the
Census. ABSTRACT OF THE FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1920; also, SPECIAL CENSUS OF THE POPULATION OF
HIGHLAND PARK, MICHIGAN, NOVEMBER 15, 1916.

87. Ford Motor Company, "Helpful Hints,” 1915: 13.

88. DGS.
89. DGS.
90. DGS.
91. Table 4.6 suggests a considerably lower average-

age of about 25-40.

92. In 1917 the American workers had an average of
1.27 children, while Poles (and presumably other
ethnics) had about 2.3. (FMCA/Accession 940, Box 16.)

93. There is considerable evidence that the income
earned by ‘wives' by caring for boarders was nearly as
important, and often more important, than the incomes
earned in wages at places like the Crystal Palace. One
study that does not focus on Detroit, is nevertheless
suggestive: Elizabeth Pleck, "A Mothers Wages: Income
Earning Among Married Italian and Black Women, 1896-

236

1911fl' in HERITAGE OF HER OWN (ed), Nancy F. Cott and
Elizabeth Pleck (1979).

Another study ("Standards of Living of Employees
of the Ford Motor Company in Detroit," MONTHLY LABOR
REVIEW, 30, June 1930), although indirectly, yet very
strongly, speaks to the significance of boarding.

94. The FORD TIMES, January 15, 1923 reported that
11,500 cars were driven to work in Ford plants (FMCA/
Accessionn 940, Box 16).

95. This profile of the “average Ford-man“ is based on
Li's observations .as reporeted in Chen Nan-Li, “A
Summer in The Ford Works,” PERSONNEL JOURNAL, 7 (June
1928) 118-32.

96. FMCA/Accession 1, Box 126. Fair Lane Papers:
"Wages and Hours-Program of Anniversary Dinner, January
12, 1915. This tune was apparenrtly sung to the tune
"Mister Dooley”.

97. FMCA/Accession 572, Box 14: "James Couzens to E.G.
Liebold, November 12, 1929.“

CON CLUS I ON

The Crystal Palace was an incubator which
fostered. revolutions in :machine-tool technology' and
served as a midwife at the inception of the manager-
class; this is a study these two revolutionary
changes, which within a remarkably short period of
time transformed Ford workers and the city Of Highland
Park. This dissertation is easily classified as
urban history, community studies, labor history, and
even 'new social history.’ It is important that this
study has grown out of a body of scholarship that is
calling for studies giving primary consideration to
the underclass of the automdtive empire} The
primary aim of this dissertation has been to
understand ‘ the critical details of how Ford's
production, employment and personnel policies in the
Crystal Palace effected the quality of life the city
of Highland Park and the 'average' worker in the
Model T cohort.

In order to lend a degree of cohesiveness
(to this study, while obviating the rationale for the
selection of particular data and units of analysis and
testing prospects for subsequent QOL research, the

definition of the 'quality of life' was selected with

237

238

great care. The definition is based on the assumption
that QOL studies should focus on the relationship
between the conditions of life and how those
conditions are experienced by a particular population;

in this study the definition is critically important

and throughout has served as a guide.2

Owing-to a widely recognized scarcity of
accessible historical data and the attendant traps,
studies taking the direction of this dissertation are
relatively few in number. This particular study is
plagued by several familiar data problem: (1)
traditionally, the underclass ' has not written
autobiographies, and their lives have not been
especially inspirational to biographers; (2) critical
census reports were destroyed by fire in the State of
Michigan Archives; (3) the 1920 U.S. Census Bureau's
“Manuscript“ records are closed until 1990; (4)
microfilmed copies of the HIGHLAND PARK TIES have
disappeared, and the remaining fragments of the
original news print are so poorly preserved that they
crumble at the touch; (5) and most debilitating of
all, "The Sociological Department folded and its
records were burned after the Reverend Dr. Samuel S.

Marquis, its head, resigned on January 25, 1921.“

239

Each of these is a major problem, yet enough data is
available to recommend a study such as this one.
Beginning with a narrative of the major events
unfolding in Highland Park before the building of the
Crystal palace, this study has noted that before
Henry Ford, Captain William H. Stevens was the most
influential individual in determining the direction of
Highland Park's development? Following the brief
outline of Highland Park's history, an effort is made
to outline the changes in machine-tool technology and
organization that culminated in the creation of the
world's first automated production and assembly
system.
The demographic transition of Highland
Park was among the immediate results of the
employment, production_ and personnel policies
incubated in the Crystal Palace. Focusing on the
demographic transition of Highland Park, it was shown
that in response to the labor needs of a rapidly
growing industry, the increase in the population and
the male to female ratio was greater in Detroit than
in the nation as a whole, and proportionally, even
greater in Highland Park. Moreover, it was Observed
that a few enumeration districts accounted for the

most phenomenal aberration in the demographic

240

ansition of Highland Parks. It was suggested that
a more thorough study of the enormous "surplus" of
immigrant males and the practice of lodging and
boarding are essential to the full understanding of
the Model T cohort of Ford workers.
In the course of outlining major changes in
the QOL as experienced in Highland Park before 1930,
an number of important, challenging and controversial
conclusions have been posited. For example, it has
been argued that the manager-class was a new element
in production in the Crystal Palace, and thus an
important factor in labor and industrial relations, as
well as in social relations in Highland Park and the
Crystal Palace. Moreover, it has been argued that
contrary to the standard interpretation which sees the
skilled worker as being replaced by immigrants who
were attracted to the Crystal Palace by superior wages
and working conditions, the present analysis strongly
suggests that skilled workers were supplanted by the
manager-class, almost none of whom were of the
'immigrant type.'6
It may now be observed that patterns of
deterioration in Highland Park, when compared with
the "deindustrialization" described by Harrison and

Bluestone, suggest that in 1927 Highland Park may

241

have been the earliest case of a city declining as a
result of the decision of a major automotive company
to relocate a primary facility.

Regarding the employment of black workers, Ford
had at least two different policies in hiring, one
for the Crystal Palace and another for the Rouge
plant? Only a few blacks were employed in the
Crystal Palace. The realization that the Ford Motor
Company's reputation for hiring black workers did not
apply to its hiring practices in Highland Park,
necessitated an important change in the research
strategy. Specifically, in deciding to analyze the
quality of life, it had been assumed that a
sufficiently large black population would be found in
Highland Park and the Crystal Palace to provide a
backdrop against which to compare and contrast the
majority of the workers in the Crystal Palace and
residents in Highland Park. Since so few blacks
lived in Highland Park and worked in the Crystal
Palace, the larger community of black Detroit was used
as a contrast for the QOL in Highland Park and the
Crystal Palace. Generally speaking, it was found that
the QOL experienced by blacks was worse than that
experienced in Highland Park. Ford hiring practices

worked directly against some of the goals which Ford

242

set for itself. Some of these conditions could have
been avoided by hiring more women, and thereby
achieving the balance which was thought to be
essential to good home conditions and to creation and
maintenance of an efficient work force.

There is no doubt that when contrasted with the
QOL experienced by earlier settlers, the~ QOL
experienced by the third and fourth cohort of Highland
Park's residents was radically different; most of the
difference can be attributed to the influence of the
.Ford Motor Company. For many residents of the Model
T cohort , the QOL was decidedly inferior. Generally
speaking, the evidence suggests that Ford's commitment
to improve the QOL of its workers was honest and well
intended, but the results of its various programs were
mixed. Among the programs aimed at improving the QOL
of Ford workers, (a) upgrading home and housing
conditions, (b) Americanizing the workforce, (c) and
minimizing the risk' of injury in the workplace were
prominent. In the sense that Ford's efforts were
based on the assumption that an improved QOL was
essential to the achievemnt of optimal efficiency in
production, policies aimed at improving the QOL of its

8

workers were self serving. Whatever advantages

accrued to Model T workers, they were often achieved

243

at the expense of privacy, autonomy, and perhaps
dignity and self-esteem.

Throughout the study, a major concern has
been to identify sources of data and to elaborate a
strategy which will permit the longtitudinal analysis
of quality of life issues, and with a little luck, to
encourage further -study of the Crystal Palace and
Highland Park. The findings of this dissertation
suggest that future study of Highland Park and the
Crystal Palace should consider the following: (1)
Consider a comparison with some other city in the
region. Hamtramck should be an especially good
choice for comparison. (2) In 1990 the 1920-census
will be open, and these will probably give a more
complete picture. (3) With the present ground work
completed, it is now possible to look meaningfully
into a wider data base such as church records, birth,
marriage, and death certificates, etc. It is hoped
that this dissertation will help to bring personal
records, including biographical and autobiographical
information. A recently published interdisciplinary
study by a team of experts has shown that, on a
series of indicators selected to demonstrate the
"uneven development" of regions (suburbs) in Detroit,

that Highland Park stands out as one of the most

244

rapidly deteriorating suburbs in the region. This
book, RACE AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT IN DETROIT, confirms
the assertiion of this dissertation, that Highland

Park deserves more attention.

245

FOOTNOTES
Conclusions

1. Faires, "Assembling The History of Detroit;"
Katzman, BEFORE THE GHETTO; et al.

2. See "Appendix B" in this dissertaion.
3. Flink, THE CAR CULTURE.
4. Hathaway, HISTORY OF HIGHLAND PARK.

5. The U.S. Department of Commerce, SPECIAL CENSUS OF
HIGHLAND PARK MICHIGAN, 1915, emphatically makes this
point.

6. See chapter four of this dissertation: Table 4.1,
and tables 4.2 through 4.7 all attest to the growing
importance of the 'new manager-class.'

7. The Model T assembly line had been shut down in May
1927, and by 1935 the total number of workers had been
reduced to 2,488, of whom 20 were black. In 1940, 18
black workers were employed. in 'the Crystal Palace.
Regarding the number of black workers in the Crystal
Palace, see: FMCA/Accession 23, Box 3; Accession 62,
Box 5; and Accession 38, Box 123 "Payroll Department
Report on. number of 'Negroes employed. at the Rouge
plant," February 21, 1940.

8. Ford officials often spoke about the significance
of improving the quality’ of life of Ford workers.
See, for example, FMCS/Accession 683: "Letter to
Omaha, January 29, 1914.

9. See "Highland Park," in tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.9 in
Darden, Hill, Thomas and Thomas, RACE AND UNEVEN
DEVELOPMENT.

APPENDICES

246

APPENDIX A

TABLE A.1

YEARS OF SERVICE IN THE CRYSTAL PALACE FOR
45,351 WORKERS AS OF APRIL 25, 1925

 

Years of Service Number of Workers
Less than 1 yr. 5,412
1 5,523
2 9,492
3 5,773
4 1,379
5 3,880
6 3,842
7 2,121
8 1,349
9 2,603
10 1,878
11 822
12 898
13 389
14 162
15 123
16 56
17 28
18 19
19 - 6
20 5

 

Source: FMCA Accession 40 Box 16. Note: FMCA Accession
62-2, Box 37 records records that as of October 29,
1921 there were 636 women employed in the Crystal
Palace; 554 of them worked in the factory, while 82
were designated as office employees.

247

TABLE A.2

WORKER PRODUCTIVITY FOR THE MODEL T:
MONTLY AVERAGE 1909-1913

 

Year Cars Mfg. Number of Productivity Index
Workmen

1909 1,059 1,548 .70 100

1910 ' 1,704 2,573 .66 94

1911 3,483 3,733 .93 133

1912 6,923 . 6,492 1.07 152

1913 15,284 13,667 1.12 160

 

Source: FMCA, Accession 922,"Model T Production
Statistics." The monthly statistics for men on roll
was averaged for each year. A simdlar table appears in
Meyer's FIVE DOLLAR DAY.

TABLE A.3

DAY WAGES IN THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY c.1910

 

Occupation Number Percent $Range Mean Wage
Foremen 9 6 3.00-7.00 5.01
Mechanics:

High Skilled 4O 28 1.75-5.20 3.90
Skilled 37 26 2.50-4.00 3.15
Laboreres 49 34 1.25-3.00 2.48
Miscellaneous 8 6 2.00-3.00 2.59

Total 143 100

 

Source: FMCA Accession 940 Box 18, "An eight page
sample of occupations from about 1910." This table
appears in Meyer, 1982:48.

248

TABLE A.4

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF FORD WORKERS BY OCCUPATION 1913

Occupation Number Percent
Operators 6,749 51
Skilled Operators 3,431 26
Unskilled: laborers; 2,795 21
helpers; & youth
Mechanics and Subforemen 329 2
TOTAL 13,404 100

 

Source: "Oliver J. Abelll, "Labor Classified on a
Skill-Wage Basis,” IRON AGE, 93 (January 1914),48; and
E.A. Rumley, “Ford's Plan to Share Profits," WORLD'S
WORK, 27 (April 1914), 665-6. This is an adaptation of
a table in Meyer, 1982:50.

249

TABLE A. 5

.AGES OF 44,519 EMPLOYEES IN THE CRYSTAL PALACE AS OF
APRIL 25, 1925

 

 

Age Number
Under 18 733
18-25 7036
25-30 8834
30-35 7527
35-40 7854
40-45 5393
45-50 3190
50-55 1909
55-60 1142
60-65 . 547
65-70 226
70-75 64
75-80 20
80-85 4
Source: FMCA/ Accession 40, Box 16. Note: Under 50
years of age, there were 40,407 employees, and there
were 3,192 over 50 years of age. Employees under 18
years of age were Trade School boys and special
students. A January 1916 report showed the average age

to be 30.89, with a mode of 25 and a median of 30.
This report also recorded that the youngest employee
was 16, and the oldest 76. (FMCA/ Accession 62, Box
59). '

250

TABLE A.6

VOTE ON NEW CHARTER BY WARDS

 

 

 

 

JUNE 25, 1918
Hard Yes No Percentage Yee Percentage lthnic

1 2439 102 95.6 53.5
2 1295 64 95.0 47.3
4 2242 117 95.0 48.1
8 1916 128 93.7 54.0
10 1855 186 90.9 55.9
6 1816 189 90.6 52.8
17 2748 350 90.2 61.0
21 1941 194- 90.1 56.1
14 2548 281 90.1 63.0
19 1628 194 89.3 63.0
12 1557 217 87.8 64.0
15 1759 267 86.8 59.8
16 1963 313 86.2 74.7
3 1124 216 83.9 65.5
18 840 200 80.7 78.2
5 751 208 78.3 72.6
13 1180 350 77.0 76.9
7 415 133 75.7 68.2
11 913 313 74.4 81.0
9 896 337 72.6 81.9
20 582 228 71.8 75.2
Detroit 32690 4587 87.7 64.0

 

S'o'"ur'ce: 'Fragn—ou, I982: T5518 III , p.403

APPENDIX B

THE ORIGINS, DEFINITIONS, AND INDICATORS:
SOME BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES AND COMMENTS ON
THE STUDY OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE

There are four issues around which the
following essay revOlves. The first concerns the
intellectual origins of Quality of Life (QOL) research,
and the relationship of earlier developments to the
study of the social history of Highland Park's first
cohort of automotive workers. Second, there is the
problem of defining (operationalizing) the QOL in a way
which serves as a nethodological guide, and which allows
for the systematic and consistent comparison of the QOL
across a wide variety of temporal and spatial domains.
There are also questions arising out of the current
debates in QOL and Social Indicators (SI) research about
the measurement of the QOL, which have a bearing on this
dissertation. Finally, there is the fundamental issue
regarding the extent to which the selection of factors
and indicators aimed at neasuring the QOL is determined
by current urban policy issues. The brief essay which

forlows is an attempt to respond to these four concerns.

251

252

The intellectual origins of Historical Demography,
or what has more recently been termed Social Indicators
(SI) or Quality of Life (QOL) research is deeply rooted
in the past. Willigan and Lynch (1982) have shown that
QOL scholarship may be traced back to three main sources
that include scholars who may be characterized as (a)
Methodologists, (b) Political Arithmeticians, (O) and/or
Theorists.

Epitomized by the work of John Gruant (1620-1687),
the Methodologists were often brilliant mathmeticians
who attempted to reveal patterns in changes in the
composition, density and mortality of populaitions.
Inspired mainly by the demand of governments for
information upon which borrowing and taxation policies
could be based, Methodologists concentrated on
attempting to describe and predict the size of
populations. The most immediate intellectual
beneficiaries of Gruant's work, namely Huggins, Hudde
and Dewit, were public administrators in Holland who
developed the first life tables. One of the important
dimensions of the work of Methodologists is that they
showed how birth, baptismal, and burial records could be
used to construct life tables (i.e., predictions of life

expectancy); their work was, and in fact remains the

253

conceptual and methodological basis for much of the
contemporary SI/QOL research.

The Political Arithmeticians, among whom ‘William
Petty is best known, took a quantam leap beyond the
Methodologists. First, they expanded their data
collection to regions outside their own localities.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, not only were
they interested in the size, density, male to female
ratio, and the age-mix of populations, within given
populations they began to research the relationship of
variations to occupation, the number of hearths,
location, etc. Moreover, what distinguished the
Political Arithmeticians from their predecessors was
their firm belief that their knowledge about "population
variables" would allow governments to govern better.
That is to say that knowledge of the population
variables allowed for control over the population and
its resources. In the same sense that Graunt et al.
provided the foundations of the methodology for QOL
research, Pettya and. Baron. de .Montyon. established. the
notion that statistical data on populations could be
used to "manipulate" and control the population; and
they did so while re-enforcing and refining the
methodological foundations. It is interesting to note

that the "population variables" outlined by Petty and de

254

Montyon are similar to the variables reported in modern
U.S. Census reports.

Theorists. most notably Malthus and Marx, were
those who were apparently somewhat less interested in
mathematics and methodology, and more interested in
developing grand theories about the relationship of
population to the use and. distribution. of resources.
Malthus, of course, argued that while population
increased geometrically, production increased
arithmetically----hence, the inevitable result (famine)
would be that population would grow beyond the capacity
of resources essential to its support. It was from
Malthus' work that the great "population controversey"
arose, the gist of which was that the survival of
humanity could be insured if "moral restraint" was ussed
in an effort to reduce the birth rate. The importance
of Malthus' work is that it spawned the widely held
belief that the size of populations can (should. be)
controlled; indeed must be controlled.

Marx's work (Grundrisse 1857-58) is equally
important in‘ that it can be argued that Malthus'
analysis was ahistorical and incorrect. Looking at the
population problem from a historical perspective, Marx
argued that the size of the population was related to

the rate of capital accumulation; specifically, he

255

argued that the proletariat reproduced itself more
rapidly than other classes because mortality was higher
among the proletariat, because of the demand for child
labor, and etc. The main point here is that capitalism.
according to Marx, was the main source of class
inequality, and that inherent in the institutions of
capitalism were the .seeds of social inequality, i.e.,
inequalities in the distributions of the means for
supporting an opitimum QOL.

Finally, what is important about Methodologists,
Political Arithmeticians and Theorists who have been
mentioned above (and many more who have not been
mentioned), is that traces of their work are apparent in
modern QOL research. As is characteristic of the
contemporary Annales School (take Braudel for example),
the intellectual ancestors of QOL research were freely
interdisciplinary in their work, they were involved in
applying their findings to the political and economic
circumstances in their communities (Baron de Moyen), and
they attempted to universalize their thinking.

Contemporary QOL/SI research has regenerated some
of the same questions raised by Graunt, Petty, Malthus,
et al. Within a growing body of scholarly QOL/SI
literature which has a bearing on the intellectual and

methodological issues of this dissertation, the U.S.

256

Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA), STUDIES IN
ENVIRONMENT-VOLUME II: QUALITY OF LIFE; Ben-Cheih Liu's
work, especially, "Quality of Life: Concept, Measure and
Results;" Larson and Wilford's, "The Physical Quality of
Lifez~A Useful Social Indicator?" and Lester Milbrath,
"A Conceptualization and Research Strategy for the Study
of Ecological. Aspects of the QOL," are particularly
important. What follows isqa brief discussion of these
and a few related studies.

Commenting on the state of the art of QOL and SI
research in 1972, the authors of the EPA sponsored study
noted that the "anticipation of the need for a new kind
of information (i.e., social indicators) could be traced

to attempts to assess and react to the impact of

Sputnik----the first7orbiting satellite launched by the
14”" 2
USSR in 1958." The orbiting of Sputnik was seen as

evidence that the United States had fallen behind the
USSR in an area of technological development which was
vital to US interests. Faced with the task of 'catching
up', and the apparent lack of a wide range of social
statistics which could serve as a basis for the
develoPment of a national catch-up strategy, the federal
government cOmmissioned Margaret Mead to devise a
"social indicators" index. The dual purposed of the SI

index was to guage the impact of Sputnik on American

society, while providing a scale against which the
success of catch-up programs could be evaluated.
Beginning with the pioneering work of Mead,
tremendous strides were made in the development Of a
social indicators index. By 1966 Daniel Bell was
calling for refinments:
What we need, in effect, is a system of

Social Accounts which would broaden our

concept of costs and benefits, and put

economic accounting into a broader frame-

work (to) move toward measurement of the

utilization of human resources in our social

information areas: (1) the measurement of

social costs and net returns of innovations;

(2) the measurement of social ills...; (3)

the creation of 'performance budgets' in

areas of defined social needs...; and (4)

indicators of economic opportunity and social

mobility.2 I/
In addition to Bell's article, 1966 witnessed the
publication. of two studies sponsored by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The first
was Bertram. Gross' discussion of social system
accounting in the US, followed by Raymond Bauer's study
which attempted to judge the impact of the space program
on US society.

The second wave of developments in SI research came

in the wake of domestic violence in the 1960s. The
seminal work was Elanor B. Sheldon and Wilbert E.

Moore's INDICATORS OF SOCIAL CHANGE: CONCEPTS AND

MEASUREMENTS, which served as a "textbook on the status

of economic and sociological research, and provided
policy makers with a series of scholarly analytical and
theoretical discussions of the demographic, structural,
distributive and aggregative features of American
society."

Heralding the need for "better social reporting,"
(1969) the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's
widely circulated publication, TOWARD A SOCIAL REPORT,
argued that in the future there would be a need for more
"data on the aged, on youth, and on women, as well as on
ethnic minorities;" data which would not only record
objective conditions, "but also [on] how different
groups of Americans perceive the conditions in which the
find themselves."5 Also in 1969, Otis Dudley Duncan
published an article in which it was argued that
progress toward the objectives outlined by HEW, must
depend upon (a) cohorts as the basic unit of analysis,
(b) a higher quality of replicative studies, (c) more
rigorous procedural steps, (d) greater data exchange
among researchers, (e) and. more attention to
calibration. Moreover, Duncan added that studies on
occupational change, environmental pollution,
victimization by crinunal acts, educational
opportunities, mental health, and value changes should

be accorded top priority.

259

Taking up tasks suggested by HEW, Duncan et al.,
Campbell and Converse's, THE HUMAN MEANING OF SOCIAL
CHANGE, developed the concept of "indicators for the
social psychology of the nation." Whereas earlier
studies (Sheldon and Moore's for example) had been
principally concerned with hard data related to the
socio-structural aspects of the nation, Campbell and
Converse were more concerned with "softer data" of a
more socio-psychological sort which are said to reveal
the attitudes, expectations, aspirations, and values of
the nation. Campbell and Converse took up some
important issues which had not been effectively included
in earlier studies; among these issues are questions
about time use, measures of community. the meaning of
work, alienation, etc. The work by Campbell and
Converse opened the door for the eclectic EPA symposium.

Fortified by the work of Campbell and Converse,
Sheldon and Moore, Duncan, and many others, the EPA
sponsored symposium (1972) succeeded in producing the
jointly authored landmark: STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENT-VOLUME
II-QUALITY OF LIFE (1973), by Kenneth E. Hornback, Joel
Guttman, Harold Himmerstein, Ann Rappaport and Roy
Reyna. Among the important contributions of the study
was the classification and assessment of the social

indicator factors which had previously appeared in the

260

literature; thus while providing a statement on the
history of QOL/SI research, the symposium outlined the
framework within which future QOL/SI scholarship would
develop. The operationalized definition of of the QOL
which came out of the symposium is of particular
relevance to the present study of the social history of
Highland Park, Michigan, and the Model T cohort of Ford
workers.

Based upon the assumption that the definition
"should focus on the relation between the conditions of
life and how those conditions are experienced" by a
particular population, "the QOL is defined as a function
of the objective conditions and subjective attitudes
involving a defined area of concern." As defined here,
there are six factors and subfactors whose statistical
indicators may be used to measure the objective aspects
of the QOL. For example, the "Economic Environment" is
a major factor and its subfactors are income, income
distribution, economic security, and work satisfaction;
the indicators include wage levels, per capita
disposable income, etc. More fully, the factors and
subfactors lead to the consideration of the following
parameters which take the form of questions:

I. The Social Factor includes demographic issues such as‘

(a) immigration as a force in the shaping of the
demographic profile? (b) household/family size and

261

composition? (0) patterns of turth, marriage and dying?
(d) and length of residence?

II. The Economic/Market Factor suggests questions about
employment and unemployment? (b) household disposable
income? (c) income support measures? (d) per capita
value added manufacture? (e) sources and allocation of
public revenue? (f) tax payments? (g) and the
relationship of economic status to social mobility?

III. Political Factor issues include questions about (a)
the number and distribution of qualified voters? (b) the
performance of elected officials on selected issues, (c)
political coalitions and affiliations? (d) and patterns
of electoral participation?

IV. The Health Factor concerns (a) the frequency and
distribution of sickness and disease? (b) mortality and
life expectancy? (c) medical expenses? (d) and the
availability’ and. use of medical care? [See coroner's
reports and death certificates].

V., The Physical Environment Factor considers (a)
percent deteriorated housing? (b) overcrowding/1. 01
persons per room? (c) .value of housing? (d) rental

costs? (e) percent owner/renter occupied? (f) plumbing?
(g) and location of housing?

Answers, even incomplete answers, to these questions
will help to explain how residence in Highland Park and
employment in the Crystal Palace are related to where
"a particular people" fall on the Quality of Life Index
(QOLI).

Regarding the problem of which sub-populations are
to be analyzed, the work of the symposium: is again
instructive. Based upon a "brief review" of relevant
literature, the symposium concluded that "geographic
location, education, age, ethnicity, health, sex,

political disposition, socio-economic status, and life

262

adjustment], were the optimum. dimensions along which
variations in perceptions and attitudes about
environmental subfactors may be divided. Since the
operationalized definition of the QOL posits both
objective conditions and subjective attitudes," it is
clear that the population will be subdivided the same
way in both the measurement of the objective conditions
and subjective attitudes. This point is reiterated
because of, the subtlety with which the authors of the
EPA study moved from a consideration of the literature
relevant to perceptions .and attitudes about the
environmental factor, to the construction of the list of
"representative" analytical categories which are to be
used in the assessment of the QOL as it is reflected by
both the objective and subjective indicators. Thus,
"Using (the) lists of QOL factors as one axis and the
analytical dimensions as the other axis, it is possible
to generate a series of QOL matrices, e.g., factors by
income matrix, factors by age matrix, etc. Each matrix
of data would show the relationship between the factors
and one of the population parameters.$3 With the
matrices serving as the summation of this esssay thus

far, the critical questions----those which must be

answered by actual research----remain: That is, is

263

historical research on the quality of life possible: If
so, along what lines is it possible?

Within the boundaries of established QOL/SI
scholarship, the historical analysis of the QOL can take
either of two paths. Given a QOL factor, and a
particular time and place with a specific sub-set of the
population (e.g. Economic Factor/income from wages,
Highland Park c.190021927, and adult females), one path
would be to use normative historical documentation and
whatever randomly generated statistics one may find.
Given the same set of objective circumstances, another
path would be to select indicators which are most
uniformly reported over the longest period of time. In
short, the choice is between evidence recorded in ii
diary or geneological record, and statistics reported in
census reports, city directories, etc. The task of the
historian is to make the best use of all of the
evidence; that is to move via the 'historical narrative'
from one type of data to the other.

Summarily then, the first two decades of QOL and SI
research may be characterized as having fostered “(1) a
growing interest in methodological rigor and the
recognition of the need to compare and validate various
research strategies; (2) an increased emphasis on the

development of standardized time series data, and the

264

expansion of the variety of statistics collected by
governmental agencies; (3) and the recognition of the
need for, and the expanded collection of subjective data
concerning occupational status, time budgets, mental
health, political participation, etc. However, in spite
of the impressive array of accomplishments outlined in a
growing body of literature on both basic and applied
social indicators research, at present there is no
unified theory or methodological consensus which guides
social indicators and quality of life research.9 The
failure to develop a theoretical and methodological
consensus is testimony to the complexities which bedevil
social indicators research----complexities which are
inherent in both the human subject and the nature of the
evidence, and which. are compounded by the countless,
often unclear motives of QOL scholars. But, contrary to
H.J. Dyos, who argues that "there can be no reliable
historical chart to the quality of urban life without a
new discipline for connecting the historical and
literary traditions of scholarship,"]"0 here it is argued
that an innovative application of the centuries old

disciplines of Public and Applied History are more than

adequate.

265

FOOTNOTES

Appendix B

1. Margaret Mead, et al., "Man in Space: A Tool and
_Program For the Study of Social Change," ANNALS OF NEW
YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, volume 72, no.4 (April 10,
1958), 165-214.

2. Daniel Bell, "The Adequacy of Our Concepts," in A
GREAT SOCIETY, edited by Bertram M. Gross (New York:
Basic Books 1966) 152.

3. Eleanor B. Sheldon and Wilber E. Moore, INDICATORS OF
SOICAL CHANGE: CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENTS (New York:
Russell Sage Foundation 1968).

4. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
TOWARD A SOCIAL REPORT, (Washington D.C. Government
Printing Office 1969).

5. HEW, SOCIAL REPORT.

6. Kenneth E. Hornback, Joel Guttman, Harold L.
Himmelstein, Ann Rappaport and Roy' Reyna, STUDIES IN
ENVIRONEMT-VOLUME II: QUALITY OF LIFE (Environmental
Protection Agency: Government Printing Office, 1973) 15.

7. Hornback, et al., QUALITY OF LIFE, 71.
8. Hornback, et al., QUALITY OF LIFE, 75.

9. Although there is a lack of consensus in many areas,
Lui's review of several empirical studies (i.e.,
LIFETIME MANAZINE, 1972; Wilson, 1967; and THE GEOGRAPHY
OF SOCIAL WELL-BEING IN THE US, by Smith, 1973), found
that while the studies were based. on 1different
definitions of the QOL, employed different criteria for
variable selection, and used different years, there was
(nevertheless) a very high correlation in state rankings
on the QOL barometer. (See: Ben-Chieh Lui, "Quality of
Life: Concept and Measure, and Results," in THE AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY volume 34, number 1,
January 1975).

Further evidence of convergence of a sort, may be
inferred from Larson and Wilford's assessment of the
PQLI. The Overseas Development Council (ODC) provides a
measurement called the Physical Quality of Life Index

266

(PQLI) which combines infant mortality, life expectancy,
and literacy into a single index.” The results of
statistical tests showed that any one of the three PQLI
variables would serve as well alone as the composite
index does in ranking life quality; that is to say that
the PQLI is not a major new indicator of inter-country
human welfare. (See: David. A. Larson. and. Walton ‘T.
Wilford, "The Physical Quality of Life Index: A Useful
Social Indicartor?" in WORLD DEVELOPMENT, volume 7,
1979. ‘

10. H.J. Dyos, "Some Historical Reflections on The
Quality of Life," THE QUALITY OF URBAN LIFE, edited by
Henry J. Schmandt and Warner Bloomberg, Jr.:38. '

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Archives and Special Collections

Burton Historical Collection: Turner, Arthur, and
Moses, Earl R. COLORED DETROIT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
DETROIT'S COLORED POPULATION AND A DIRECTORY OF THEIR
BUSINESSES, ORGANIZATIONS, PROFESSIONS AND TRADES.
Detroit, 1924.

Burton Historical Collection. Detroit Puiblic Library:
Washington, Forrester B. "The Negro in Detroit: A
Survey of the Conditions of a Negro Group in a
Northern Industrial Center During the War Prosperity
Period." (Detroit, 1920).

Ford Motor Archives. Dearborn, Michigan.

Mayor's Papers. Detroit Public Library.

Michigan Historical Collection at Bently Historical
Library, University of Michigan: Papers of Arthur J.
Tuttle. Americanization Committee of Detroit papers
1914-1931. ‘
Michigan Historical Collection at Bently Historical
Library, University of Michigan: Detroit Urban League
Papers. Board of Directors Minutes and Papers 1916-
1950. '

Michigan Historical Collection at Bently Historical
Library, University of Michigan: Detroit Urban League

Papers. Executive Secretary's General File [June
1916-June 1927].

NEWSPAPERS

DETROIT EVENING NEWS
DETROIT FREE PRESS
DETROIT NEWS

DETROIT SATURDAY NIGHT

DETROIT SUNDAY NEWS-TRIBUNE

 

281

HIGHLAND PARK TIMES

HIGHLAND PARKER

NEW YORK TIMES

THE DETROITER