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Michigan State
University

 

 

 

 

 

This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

MIGRATION AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A RURAL
COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTHWEST REGION OF SAUDI ARABIA

presented by

ABDULLAH A . AL-OTAIBY

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph . D . degree in SOCIOLOGY

 

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Major professor

Date 1 November 1989

 

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MSU Is An Affirmaive Action/Equal Opportunity Inetitmion

MIGRATION AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
A RURAL COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTHWEST
REGION OF SAUDI ARABIA

BY
Abdullah A. Al-Otaiby

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology

1989

ABSTRACT
MIGRATION AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:

A RURAL COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTHWEST
REGION OF SAUDI ARABIA

BY
Abdullah A. Al-Otaiby

This study explores the past and. present 'migration
patterns of people from a rural community in the Southwest
Sarat region of Saudi Arabia. A.broad theoretical approach is
employed to explain variations in migration strategies over
time. Individual, household, and community levels are taken
into account: rapidly changing regional and national contexts
are considered.

To assess the phenomenon of migration as manifested in
this community: 1) I interviewed community elders to overview
its socio-economic history: 2) through government statistics
and official reports, and available litrature on Saudi Arabia,
I explored the recent critical stage of socio-economic
development of Saudi society: 3) all households in this
community were surveyed to get a perspective on its socio-
demographic structure: 4) I interviewed spokespersons for a
selected sample of households to obtain in-depth information
on livelihood and. migration strategies; and 5) relevant
migration information was collected by following-up migrants
from the community at their places of residence.

Prior to 1950, the community of study was a relatively
self-sufficient peasant village that subsisted on farming,

herding and temporary male labor migration to urban centers

Abdullah A. Al-Otaiby
in the Hijaz region. With the spread of formal education and
an increase in governmental employment opportunities over the
last thirty years, subsistence production was abandoned, and
the community and its households became totally oriented to
the modern money economy.

These new socio-economic changes induced by the struc-
tural transformation of Saudi society, socially, economically,
and politically reshaped the rural sector and this particular
community. Concomitantly, the earlier pattern of temporary
labor migration by males declined in favor of long-term moves
of whole families. Since 1960, more than 140 families of the
community have moved away to urban centers and Southwest
regional towns.

The recent rural-urban migration has affected a re-
distribution of population in Saudi Arabia, accelerating a
depopulation of the countryside, and furthering the demise of
the traditional sector.

- Migrants from the community of study still maintain ties
with their village kin and the community: they visit the
village periodically: they send remittances to needy relatives
in the village: and male migrants send an annual pay to a
"common fund” of their respective kinship group.

Within the new socio-economic context of Saudi Arabia,
the return of migrants to their area of origin is predicated
solely on realizing similar "life chances" available to them

in other parts of the country.

To Mohammad Abdallah Al-Eissa, the Director of Social
Security Center Of Muhail, Tehahama of Asir, who
relinquished an affluent life, a more celebrated career to
care for his mother, whom was kept distant from her son by a
delibrate class-conscious uncle.

To my wife, Jawahir, and my children, Amal, Sami,
Manal, Naseem and Nada, whose loving care and patience made

it easier,for me to finish this project.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Several people assisted me in undertaking and
completing this study. My deepest appreciation and gratitude
go to my advisor and committee chairman, Professor Harry K.
Schwarzweller, without whose help this manuscript could not
have been completed. His great insight into the sociology of
migration and social research gave me the needed guidance in
the critical phase of my study.

I feel fortunate to have distinguished members of the
Sociology Department as an advisory committee. My special
thanks go to Professor Allan Beegle, William Faunce and
Chris Vanderpool for their advice, guidance and valuable
suggestions. I am, also, grateful to Professor Alford Welch
of the Department of Religious Studies for his critical
review of my dissertation and valuable suggestions.

During the phase of field research, I had the chance to
meet many kind people in the southwest of Saudi Arabia. I
thank from the deepest of my heart the people of Tamniah,
whose generosity and openness made the field research a
pleasant and valuable experience. My special thanks go to
Abdulrahaman A. A~l Hamoudh of King Saud University at Abha,

Dr. Abdurahman Abo al-Hassan of the Health Dispensary of

iii

Tamniah, Mohammed Mushabab, Ali Hassan, Ali Mussa, Abdallah
Farhan and Saleh bin Ali.

Many people, friends and relatives have stood by me
during crucial times of study and my stay in East Lansing,
helping me financially and giving me all the needed moral
support. I especially thank my close friends, Abdullah S.
Akkooz and Khalil I. Al-Soughair; my elder brother, Awadh A.
Al-otaiby: and my cousin, Mohammed K. Al-oteiby.

I, also, would like to express my greatest thanks to
Professor Nasir A. Al-saleh, the former chairperson of the
Department of Geography, College of Social Science,
Ummalqura University, and Dr. Saudi Al-Subai'ee, the dean of
College of Social Science, Ummalqura University. Both, in
their own ways, have given me outstanding support.

Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my
friend and colleague, Andrew Davidson, with whom I shared
the 'academic' experience of the last six years. Through
this time we had our quarrels and good times, but in the end
we both have been able to strengthen our respective research

and our commitment to sociology.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABIIES O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 O ........... O O O O OVii
Chapter
ONE 0 INTRODUflION. O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O ..... O O O O O O O O O O O O 1

Statementofthe Problem..........................1
RegionalContext.................................5
Methodology......................................8
1- Individual and Household Data .............11
2- Community Background ........ .16
3-TheLargerContext............... ....... ..17
Organization of the Dissertation ...............19

TWO. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO MIGRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
"Methodological Individualism" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Structuralist-Functionalism.....................24
HistoricalStructuralism 26
Multi-Disciplinary Research on Mobility . ..... . . .29

THREE. THE LARGER CONTEXT-The Role Of The State . . . . . . . . . . 39
Introduction....................................39
Saudi Arabia: A Historical Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
The Growth of State Capitalism and Destruction

of Old Modes of Production 50

Mechanisms of State Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

1- State Capital Outlays 56

2- Public Consumption 61

3- Public Disbursements and Largesse . . . . . . . . . 67
The State, Socioeconomic Development, and

Migration: Implications and Conclusions . . . . . . . 79

FOUR. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY AREA . . . . . . . . . . . . .87
Socio-EconomicHistory 89

1- Forms of Social Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91

2- LandOwnership 94

3- Organization Of Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98

4- Mode of Co-operation and Assistance . . . . . . 100

5- Modes of Complementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6-ModesofExchange................ ..... ...1o7

Subsistence Production and Migration . . . . . . . . . . . 110

FIVE TAMNIAH, TODAY...................................115
Introduction...................................115
CommunityCharacteristics 118

1- Age-Sex Distribution ...... 118
2-Householdsize 119
3-HouseholdTypes 120
Shahran Bani Malik and The Larger Context:
Opportunities and Pressures 121
1- Introduction of Formal Eduction and
Its Impacts on the Community ............123
2- Off-Farm Employment and

Subsistence Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . 129
Conclusions and Implications . . . ...... . ..... . . . . 143
SIX. THE CHANGING NATURE OF MIGRATION:
THECASEOFTAMNIAH”................... ..... ...l45
Declining Importance of Subsistence
Agriculture, and Temporary Migration . ...... 150

RecentMigration Trends 155
Destination of Migration 160
Migration, Family Ties, and Remittances ...... 165
Conclusions and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

SEVEN. THE PROCESS OF MIGRATION: A CLOSER LOOK .. ..... ...174
Migrant'sBackground...........................176
Migrant's Experience in Destination ............179

ChoosingDestination........................181
MigrantandFamilyTies.................. ...... 184
Causes and Consequences of Migration:

CaseStudies.................................186

1-EarlyMigrants 187

2-RecentMigrants 195
Conclusions And Implications 202

EIGHT. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ....... .........204
Theoretical and Methodological
Implications of the Study 215
Relevance of the Study to
SaudiArabia.................................220
Recommendations for Future Research ............225

BIBLIOGMPHYOOOOOOOOIOOOOOOO0.0.0.000...0.0.0.00000000000229

vi

TABLE

1.1

LIST OF TABLES

COMPARING AGE/SEX DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLED AND
TOTAL POPULATION OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH ......13

COMPARING EDUCATION/SEX DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLED AND
TOTAL POPULATION OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH ......13

COMPARING WORK STATUS/SEX DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLED AND
TOTAIIPOPULATION'OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH.......14

OIL INCOME & OUTPUT OF SAUDI ARABIA
FORSEmflEDYEnS.COCOOOCOOCOOOOOOOC0.0.0.... ....... 55

FINANCIAL ALLOCATION FOR THREE DEVELOPMENT
PLANS (1970-85) (SR MILLIONS) ..... ..56

EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC’SECTOR.(MID 1975) .............59

DEVELOPMENT IN EDUCATION AND GROWTH OF STATE
EXPENDITURE FOR EDUCATION (1970-1983) ................62

FOREIGN NATIONALS ENTERING AND LEAVING SAUDI
ARABIA AND NUMBER OF WORK/RESIDENCE PERMITS
GWED1974—1982 (1,000) OOOOOCOOOCCIIOOOOOOOO ....... 65
STATE ALLOCATION'TO SOCIAI.SECURITY (1970-1983) ......66

PRIVATE AND INVESTMENT LOANS DURING THE PERIOD
1395-14061: (1975-1986) (SR MILLION) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70

CROPPED AREAS IN AGRICULTURAL LANDHOLDING BY MAIN
REGIONS IN THE EARLY 19608 AND EARLY 19708 ...........81

AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT BY REGION: COMPARISON
BETWEEN THE EARLY 19608 AND EARLY 19708 ..............82

POPULATION ESTIMATES OF MAJOR URBAN CENTERS
AND REGIONAL.TOWNS OF SAUDI ARABIA (1974--1990) ...... 85

TYPES OF DWELLING BY COMMUNITY SUB-DIVISIONS
OFSWBANIMLIK' TWIAHOOOOOOOOOCOOOOO0.0.0.0118

AGE/SEX STRUCTURE BY COMMUNITY SUB-DIVISIONS,
SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH .........................119

HOUSEHOLD SIZE BY COMMUNITY SUB-DIVISIONS,
SHAHRAN'BANIIMALIKQ TAMNIAH ................... ...... 120

HOUSEHOLD TYPES BY COMMUNITY SUB-DIVISIONS OF
SWBANIMLIK' TWIAHCOCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.121

HOUSEHOLD TYPE BY ANNUAL INCOME (1,000 SR),
SWWIWK' TWIM.OOOOCOOCCCOOCOOOOOOOOO0.131

WORK STATUS BY EDUCATION OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK,
TAMNIAH FOR AGES ABOVE 15 YEARS OLD ............ ..... 132

WORK STATUS BY SEX OF FOUR AGE GROUPS OF
SWMIWIK' TWIAH0.0..0.0.0.00000000000000134

INSTANCES OF OUT-MIGRATION FROM TAMNIAH BY CURRENT
HOUSEHOLD MALE MEMBERS BY YEAR OF MIGRATION
MDPRESENTAGE .OCCCCOCOOOOCCOCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO.152

INSTANCES OF OUT-MIGRATION FROM TAMNIAH BY CURRENT
HOUSEHOLD MALE MEMBERS BY YEAR OF MIGRATION
“DDMTIONOFMOVE .OOCOOOOOCCOOOCOOOOO0.0000000000153

INSTANCES OF OUT-MIGRATION FROM TAMNIAH BY CURRENT
HOUSEHOLD MALE MEMBERS BY YEAR OF MIGRATION
ANDREASONFORMIGMTION00......0.0.0.00000000000000154

MARITAL STATUS AND AGE, COMPARING THREE STUDY
GROUPSOFMIGMTS0.0...O'COCOOOOOCIOOCIOOOOOO00.0.0158

MIGRANT'S CLOSEST RELATIVES IN VILLAGE, COMPARING
MESWDYGROUPS OOOCOOOCOCOCOO0.000000000000000000159

MIGRATION DESTINATION BY YEAR.OF'OUT-MIGRATION ......161

WORK STATUS OF ADULT MALE MIGRANTS AND
NON-MIGRANTS OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK ..................162

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENTS OF ADULT MALE MIGRANTS
AND NON-MIGRANTS OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK ..............163

BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT MIGRANT WORKS IN,
BYDESTINATIONCOOOOOOOOOOCOOOCOCOCUCO0.00000...0.00.165

FREQUENCY OF VISITS TO TAMNIAH BY MIGRANTS

LIVING LESS THAN 300 KM FROM VILLAGE,
BYCIDSESTKININVILIAGEeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee000000000168

viii

FREQUENCY OF VISIT TO TAMNIAH BY MIGRANTS
LIVING 300-700 KM FROM VILLAGE, BY CLOSEST
KININVILMGE..OCCOOOOOOOOOOCOOOOOCO0......0.00.00.168

FREQUENCY OF VISIT TO TAMNIAH BY MIGRANTS
LIVING MORE THAN 700 KM FROM VILLAGE,
BchSESTKININVILMGE..OOOOCCOOOOOOCOOOOOO ..... .169

MARITAL STATUS AND AGE OF MIGRANT- BY CURRENT
PLACE OF RESIDENCE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS) . ..... 176

WORK STATUS AND AGE OF MIGRANT PRIOR TO INITIAL
MIGRATION FROM VILLAGE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS) ..177

REASON FOR MIGRATION BY AGE OF MIGRANT AT
TIME OF INITIAL OUT MIGRATION FROM VILLAGE
(SELECTEDSIMAIAEMIGRANTS) ..OOOCOCOOOCOOOOOOO ...... 177

WHO ACCOMPANIED MIGRANT BY AGE AT INITIAL OUT-
MIGRATION FROM VILLAGE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS) ..178

YEAR OF MOVE TO CURRENT DESTINATION BY YEAR
OF INITIAL OUT-MIGRATION FROM VILLAGE
(SEI‘ECTEDSIMALEMIGRANTS) ..OCOOOOOOCOOOOOOOOOO0.0.179

PREFERRED PLACE OF RESIDENCE OF MIGRANT BY CURRENT
PLACE OF RESIDENCE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS) ......180

TYPES OF HELP OFFERED BY MIGRANT TO RECENT FELLOW
MIGRANTS (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS) ................183

ECONOMIC TIES OF MIGRANT WITH PARENTAL FAMILY, BY
REGION OF RESIDENCE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS) .....186

ix

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Wen

The main Objective of this study is to explain variations
in migration strategies (through time) of individuals and
households in a rural community of the Asir mountain region.
In;particular, it tries to establish: 1) a clear characteriza-
tion of the rural community’ past and present migration
patterns: 2) how and why the traditional pattern was abandoned
and subsequently replaced by a new pattern of geographic and
social mobility: and 3) what the impacts have been of this
new pattern both at the community and the household levels.

The main premise, here, is that rural-urban migration in
Saudi Arabia has taken a new pattern during the last three
decades. As such, migration strategies of individuals and
households have shifted from a temporary "target" male labor
migration to permanent and semi-permanent migration types. It
is thus the purpose of this study to explore those changes in
patterns of migration and then to relate them to changes in
household livelihood strategies and the overall structural

transformation of the Saudi society.

2

A clear comprehension of recent trends in rural-urban
migration in Saudi society is essential, because; 1) rural-
urban migration has been extensive during the last three
decades as evidenced by population growth of urban centers and
regional towns, and depopulation of the rural side (The
Ministry of Planning, 1975; 1984); 2) the massive rural-urban
population turn over was accompanied by heavy inter-sectoral
labor shifts which were characterized by heavy engagements in
the government (service) sector and the abandonment of tradi-
tional sector (Kassovi, 1983); and 3) efforts by the Saudi
government to slow down rural-urban migration have not met
with great success. Despite the massive build up in rural
infrastructure (roads, health care, education, and transporta-
tion), creation of government jobs in rural areas, and the
institution. of numerous incentives to revive traditional
agriculture, the rate of rural-urban migration is still con-
siderably high (Chamieh, 1981).

The argument pursued here is that the growth of the Oil
sector and the concomitant monetary wealth that was accrued
has resulted in an overall restructuring of the Saudi economy,
a consequence of which is the undermining of the traditional
subsistence economy, and the erosion of its logic. As such,
the flow Of Oil wealth to the Saudi society has presented new
opportunities in the soon to become dominant service sector.

Faced with this new situation, rural households opted for new

3
and. more (assuring' livelihood. strategies that. continually
withdrew them out of subsistence activities and into off-
farm state employment. It is through this that I try to look
into and explain recent socio-economic changes and shifts Of
rural household livelihood strategies and rural-urban migra-
tion patterns.

Another primary concern of this research is to explore
the theoretical issues surrounding the phenomenon of migration
and to reconsider the methodological problems encountered in
this type of study. To this end, it attempts to deploy an
"integrated" approach for the study Of internal migration in
order to build ‘middle level' theory and to create a method-
ology which captures the super-structural considerations while
maintaining sensitivity to the individual actors.

A review of the literature shows that explanations of
migration are generally sought at two different levels of
analysis from two contending perspectives. At one level, the
micro (individualist) approach focuses on individuals and
their respective migration decisions. At another level, the
macro (historical structuralist) perspective looks into the
conditions under which people move or formulate their migra-
tion decisions. As such, it attempts to tie migration
decisions to underlying structural-historical forces which,

in effect, mold the on—going every day conditions (Wood,

1992).

4

Both approaches, in their attempt to explain migration,
had failed to completely develop an integrated theory of
migration. The historical-structuralist perspective, in
attempting to explain population movements by means of
"historical analysis" of macro level structures, only produces
generalities about migration over time. It thus fails to
generate an understanding Of the "individual" decision to
migrate and.the multitudinous variations. At the micro-level,
the individualist approach attempts to explain migration deci-
sions by focusing on the individual, thus failing to con-
sider/integrate the larger 'Context' in which migration deci-
sions are made (Oberai and Bilsborrow, 1984).

In this study, I attempt to apply a broader approach to
the study of rural-urban migration through integration Of the
theory and methodology Of the various migration approaches.
Theoretically speaking, migration decisions are conceived of
as the outcome of the interaction between (micro) individual
characteristics and perceptions, 'areal characteristics'
(local and regional), and (macro) societal parameters mediated
by the household.

TO further elaborate, the individuals' characteristics
(age, sex, and education) and perceptions of available Oppor-
tunities both in and outside their local communities influence
their respective decision to migrate. The individuals,
nonetheless, construct their migration strategies as part of

their overall livelihood strategies in response to local and

5
regional imbalances of labor, land, and capital, as well as
health, eduction, and other social amenities. Most of these
imbalances can be traced back to the on-going process of the
structural transformation and unbalanced development in
society.

The household, in turn, regulates the individual's migra-
tion decisions by virtue of its overall livelihood strategies
which are developed according to the dictates of household's
physical and non physical resource endowments. As such, the
size and quality of landholding and dwelling, and presence of
savings [as well as number, age-sex composition, education,
skill levels, and knowledge of’ members], all shape the
household's livelihood strategies among which are migration
strategies of households and the individuals who comprise

them.

Wart

This study is set to investigate migration patterns and
strategies Of the rural household in the Asir mountain and
highlands region, southwest Saudi Arabia. The region presents
a unique opportunity for pursuing research on rural socio-
economic changes. It exhibits diverse environmental conditions
in terms of topography, climate, and soil. Yet, at the same
time, it shares a common history of domestic economic activi-
ties, is culturally distinct, and still maintains the largest

rural population in the country (Abdulfattah, 1981). It is

6
characterized by a semi-arid climate and receives between 200
and 700 mm. of rainfall annually, most of which falls between
April and.June (Abdulfattah, 1981). Rainfall is less variable
in the mountains and subsequent runoff permits sufficient
water to supply crops to maturity, allowing for the region's
stable agricultural production. Nevertheless, the region is
ecologically fragile, and environmental conditions require
highly diversified agricultural practices (Al-Otaiby, 1981).

The most common form of land tenure is family ownership,
which is perpetuated by Arab culture and Islamic laws of
inheritance (Lipsky, 1959) . Usually, each family owns two
types of agricultural land, rain-fed and irrigated. Because
rain-fed agriculture is subject to the vagaries of weather,
the household, traditionally, relies more heavily on irrigated
lands, which are more productive due to their better soil
quality. During most of the history of this region, subsis-
tence agriculture has been the predominant form, with produc—
tion geared to satisfy family consumption needs (Abdulfattah,
1981).

Traditionally, the primary crops included wheat, sorghum,
and barley, complemented by vegetables and fruit. The family
comprised the primary source Of agricultural labor. The use
of communal labor also played an important role during times
of peak labor demands, such as harvesting, digging of wells,
and.housing construction. Exchange of labor'and.a:nominal meal

were typical forms of labor’remuneration» An additional source

7
of labor'was provided by those*without land of their own, with
payment being the provision of room and board and a share of
the crop.

In the past, the level of technology was limited to hand
tools and animal traction. These required large labor inputs,
which were primarily supplied by family members (Dostal,
1983). While land preparation was usually left to men and
seeding' to ‘women, 'the remaining' agricultural tasks ‘were
jointly performed by both sexes. Children assisted their
parents by looking after young ruminants, guarding the crops
from pillage by animals and birds, and tending to their
younger siblings.

For the past three decades the basic structure of tradi-
tional agriculture within the region has undergone significant
alteration as a result of the increased expansion of the
market into local economies and the attendant need for cash
income to meet the requirements Of a 'modernizing' economy.
Although the basic agricultural practices have not Changed,
subsistence agriculture ceases to exist as a 'necessary
moment' in the household livelihood strategies. As such, with
the expansion of better off-farm employment opportunities both
in urban areas as well as the rural side, the rural household
was able to shift to more profitable Off-farm employment and
rely less on subsistence production. Furthermore, this shift
of household sustenance strategies not only resulted in the

withdrawal Of the more able-bodied rural labor force out of

8
traditional agriculture, but it also necessitated an all new
pattern of migration. The latter is characterized by a major
out-migration stream of the entire family household, large

rural-urban population turn over, and rural depopulation.

mm

The main concern of this study is to investigate
individual/household. migration strategies in relation to
household's livelihood strategies and to the recent structural
transformation of Saudi society. For such analytical purposes,
a large rural community“was selected for field research. While
such selection in many ways is not representative Of the
southwest region or the Saudi society for that matter, never-
theless it presents certain advantages:

1- At.the expense Of'generalization, the selection of one com-
munity enhances better in-depth.description and historical
analysis of the community socioeconomic Changes, which is
pertinent to the study of migration in terms Of causes and
consequences, as ‘well as understanding' the shifts in
patterns of migration.

2- Since the Asir mountain region is a composite of many
tribes of variant social organization and cultural mores,
the selection of one-tribe community eases concerns of
chaos of tribal socio-cultural differences. This becomes
germane to the study since emphases when examining changes

on the rural household migration strategies are upon the

9
effects of the wider socioeconomic changes, which need not
to be confused with cultural differences.

During the process of selection of the community, extra
care was administered in order to allow for better analysis
of the matter in hand. First, criterion of the size (number
of dwelling units) of the communitwaas pre-set at one hundred
and twenty dwelling units in order to allow for appropriate
intra-community analyses: second, the community, while it is
far removed from the immediate urban effect, needs not to be
isolated. It, thus, becomes pertinent that the community is
fully articulated with the wider Saudi society in terms of
access to the market and off-farm employment, communication,
education and social amenities.

Beside available reports and other written materials on
Asir socioeconomic history, two official documents were
extensively reviewed during the first pre-phase of community
selection. These are:

1- Socio-economic Survey of Villages and Hijar in The Kingdom
(Ministry Of Municipal and Rural Affairs, 1983). This was
organized in extensive classification reports of villages
and hamlets of Saudi Arabia. Each report is devoted to one
region (or province), and has an extensive classification
Of ‘the region's rural community’ by (estimated) size,
distance from the regional capital, type of social ameni-
ties, education facilities, communication links, and state-

organized services.

10

2- The Emirate of Asir Location and General Services Survey
(Emirate of Asir, 1983) . This was sponsored and coordinated
by the province government. In many ways, it is similar to
the Sogreah' 3 survey except it was done by local government
officials who possess better knowledge of the region's
rural communities and had better access to relevant
government reports and documents. The main Objectives of
the survey were to: 1) present a descriptive account Of the
Emirate nine 'sub-provinces' in terms of location, climate,
topography, population size, and socioeconomic activities;
2) supply comprehensive information to state officials on
the type and quality Of government-built facilities and
services; 3) propose a new plan for the expansion of
health, education, and communication facilities: and 4)
fine-tune the proposed administrative restructuring of the
regional government.

Both documents were instrumental in the pre-selection
phase as they provided background information on rural
communities and state-run services, and helped in the process
of eliminating unsuitable communities.

In the final pre-selection phase, five finalist commu-
nities were repeatedly’ visited in. order to (gather' more
background information on size of community, economic acti-
Vities, available state facilities, and an estimate of
migrants. Key local authorities, such as school principals,

heads of tribes, and health dispensary doctors and social

11
observers, were interviewed to cross-validate information on
these communities and gain better entry to the field research
phase.

The community of Shahran Bani. Milk. of’ Tamniah. was
selected for the study. It is located about 55 Kilometers
south of the city of Abha and belongs to Sha'af Shahran sub-
Emirate. It constitutes the largest community Of Tamniah. It
was purposely selected because: 1) traditionally it was one
of the most prosperous agriculture-based communities: 2) it.
still retains more than half of its native population; 3) it
is well-articulated with the wider society as illustrated by
the presence of education, health, and transportation facili-
ties: and 4) its size of one hundred and fifty-nine households
is appropriate for in-depth analysis, yet it is manageable.

My methodology was devised to take into account (as best
as possible) the different determinants of migration at
different levels Of analysis. For that purpose, an integration
of a variety of techniques which weave together both quantit-
ative and qualitative data is essential. Accordingly, my
techniques involved the collection of the following:

1- MW

A survey of households in the selected rural community
was conducted in order to obtain a broad perspective of the
diversities and commonalities among its households. The survey
Phase involved the collection of the following types of

information:

12

1-1 Sociezdemesranhis_sata

During the first phase Of field research, household's
basic socio-demographic data were gathered. These included
type and size of household, residential type, household
income, as well age, sex, relation to household head, educa-
tion, and occupation of each household's member. This was done
for the entire population of the community. It laid the ground

for the subsequent in-depth phase of the survey.

1-2 mm
W

Focused interviews to explore variations of economic
activities, migration strategies, and resource endowments of
households were administered to 75 randomly selected house-
holds. Data gathered for this phase were: 1) agricultural and
non-agricultural economic activities of household; 2) Size
and access to agricultural land, fixed property such as real-
estate, and other economic enterprises: 3) household income-
contributing members by age, sex, relation to household head,
eduction, occupation, place of work, and place of residence:
4) past economic activities and migration experience of the
head of household, including number of migration instances,
destination, date, duration, and reason of migration in each
instance: 5) recent migration experience of other household
members: 6) socio-demographic data of household migrant family
members, including place of residence, date, and reason of
imigration, as well as family ties between the migrant and his

natal family.

13

For methodological considerations and in order to be able
to draw inferences about the entire community using in-depth
data from the sampled 75 households, it is necessary to make
certain that this sample does represent the entire community.
For'this reason, the sample was compared with total population
using age/sex, education/sex, and work status/sex distri-
butions. The results are presented in the following three
tables:

TABLE 1.1

COMPARING AGE/SEX DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLED AND TOTAL
POPULATION OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH

 

 

 

 

 

Sample Total Population
Age Male Female Total Male Female Total
< 21 years 65.9 64.4 65.2 63.1 61.9 62.5
21 to 40 Years 14.3 19.8 17.5 15.6 19.5 17.6
41 to 60 Years 15.6 13.4 15.5 14.7 12.5 13.6
Over 60 years 4.2 3.4 4.5 6.6 6.1 6.3
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(N= ) (314) (292) (606) (545) (543) (1088)
TABLE 1.2

COMPARING EDUCATION/SEX DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLED AND
TOTAL POPULATION OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH

 

 

 

 

Sample Total Population
Eduction Male Female Total Male Female Total
Illiterate 43.3 63.4 53.0 42.4 65.7 54.0
Read 10.8 6.5 8.7 8.4 5.7 7.1
Read 6 write 13.2 7.5 10.4 14.5 7.9 11.2
Elementary 12.7 13.7 13.2 13.2 11.8 12.5
Intermediate 9.9 6.5 8.3 9.9 7.0 8.5
Secondary 7.0 2.4 4.8 7.9 1.8 4.9
Two-yr college 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.3
Four-yr college 2.5 0.0 1.3 3.1 0.0 1.5
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

(N= ) (314) (292) (606) (545) (453) (1088)

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15
1.3 Mi§I§n§fiL_Di§s

About 150 families of Shahran Bani Malik have emigrated
to larger towns of the country during the last thirty years.
In order to construct profiles of migrants, basic socio-demo-
graphic data, place of residence and year Of migration of each
migrant were gathered with the help Of relatives and key
informants.

While I was quite successful in gathering sufficient
socio-demographic and migration data about male migrants
(ti-169), this was not the case for female migrants. Even
though, indirectly, I was able to note more than 100 cases of
female migrants, I was not able to acquire comparable infome-
tion on them. The realities of Saudi culture create enormous
difficulties for a field researcher to obtain reliable
information about females even if we are simply talking about
migration pattern. Moreover, most male informants typically
express great displeasure when asked any questions pertaining
to women. So, I am forced to refer only to those females
(N-26) for whom I had some information and which I regarded
as reasonably valid, because it was reported by relatives.
This limitation, Of course, restricts my analysis and com-
parisons to male migrants, but nonetheless sufficient informa-
tion on female migrants was gathered to venture a reasonable
discussion of their attributes.

An in-depth information on migration was also gathered

through interviewing a sample of 51 male migrants drawn from

‘v

0',

f.

16

the documented male migrants. I followed these migrants up and
talked with them at the place Of destination. While my
sampling was intended to be random, the difficulty Of tracing
and finding all of the documented male migrants made it
impossible to attain randomness. Instead, I was forced to do
a "convenience sample": all migrants whom I was able to trace
were interviewed. The purpose of these in-depth interviews was
to get a first hand account from migrants on their decision
to migrate, why they migrated, and what the consequences of
migration were for the individual migrant and his family.
2- W

In order' to fully’ comprehend. household's (past. and
present) livelihood strategies, including migration stra-
tegies, community level aspects must be integrated into the
analysis. The community‘s socio-economic history is particu-
larly essential for'migration analysis since it describes the
local parameters under which the household operated (and
interacted with) in the past. This includes past social
organization, economic activities and available means of
production, land-tenure and inheritance systems, degree of
cohesion and social integration, forms of co-operation and
assistance, and kinship ties. All of these, undoubtedly, had
regulating effects not only on the household's migration
strategies, but on the community overall pattern of migration

as well. Due to inadequacy of written history and documents,

IA.‘
Bu-

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3“.

‘nn
uVI

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filo:
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17
past aspects Of the community was assembled by interviewing
key village figures and elders.

Recent socioeconomic changes ‘which are felt at ‘the
community level are also very important for understanding
shifts in migration and sustenance strategies of the rural
household. As such, these changes have redefined the bases
for social organization, co-operation and assistance, and the
overall social cohesion of the community. Subsequently, the
household is forced to operate under new opportunity/pressure
structure.

Depending upon the new circumstances, local structures,
and commitments, the new opportunity/pressures may broaden or
limit Opportunities for diversification of household liveli-
hood strategies, and may reinforce or weaken its Older forms
Of social organization. Furthermore, access to off-farm
employment, modern education, health, transportation facili-
ties, and other social amenities all play intervening roles
on the individual/household's decisions of whether to seek
better 'life chances' outside the community or be content to
stay in the village. Recent aspects of the community, thus,
were pieced together using the available quantitative data as
well as in-depth interviews to cover the qualitative aspects.
3- Water;

For a clear understanding of socio-economic Changes at
‘Uhe household and community levels, it is essential that we

highlight the processes of structural transformation of Saudi

 

 

 

 

18

society over the past thirty years. Here, the main focuses are
on the complexities of economic growth and the new socio-
economic restructuring, which have affected all segments of
society and the traditionally subsistence-based regions, in
particular. Through the use Of secondary data of government
statistics and documents and historical writings on Saudi
Arabia, an attempt is made to assemble information on these
structural transformations, and to elaborate on the course of
development pursued by the state.

A. guiding assumption. of this analysis is that the
burgeoned oil revenues and the state control over'it.has given
the latter the fiscal independence and leverage to assume the
leading role in the process of development, reorganization of
the economy, and control over all other social and political
spheres of society. To elaborate on the state development
schemes, my discussion will center on three domains which
define the mechanisms of the state's development plans. These
are state capital outlays, public consumptions, and public
disbursements. Through this analysis, it is hoped that we
clarify the role Of the state in the new socio-economic
processes, and we become more able to distill its implications
for analyses and understanding of socio-economic changes and

migration in Saudi society today.

19

: 'I' EH
Dissertation

This dissertation is organized into two parts. The first
part includes four chapters: an introductory chapter, which
deals with the research problem and outlines the methodo-
logical framework and the relevant data sources:

Chapter two addresses the theoretical issues encircling
migration studies and subsequent methodological considera-
_ tions. The main.purpose, here, is not to provide an exhaustive
listing of the theoretical frameworks which deal with migra-
tion, but rather to present the scope and diversity Of the
main contending approaches to the study of migration.and.point
out their deficiencies;

Chapter three elaborates on the recent critical stage of
socio-economic development of Saudi society as was designed
and pursued by the state. As such, it is an attempt to
delineate the impacts of the state's development schemes on
the reorganization and integration of the segmented Saudi
society, and to distill their ramifications for migration;

Chapter four sketches-out the socio-economic background
of Shahran Bani Malik through the use of available qualitative
data. It is a retrospective portrayal of the past aspects of
the community as conceived by its elders, i.e. how it func-
tioned economically, socially, and politically.

The second part of the dissertation is devoted to data
analysis of recent socioeconomic changes in Shahran Bani Malik

as it became fully articulated with the larger society. This

20

is divided into four chapters: chapter five is an attempt to
characterize the larger societal opportunities/pressures on
Tamniah, how these were perceived by the community inhabi-
tants, and what was their outcome. Using individual, household
and community data, I will describe how the community was
socially and economically transformed as the Older mode of
subsistence and self-reliance crumbled;

Chapter six is devoted to migration analysis. Building
on analysis from chapter five and with use of available
migration data, I will elaborate on shifts in migration
patterns, how they came about, and what was their outcome;

Chapter seven is devoted to further analysis of the
migration process. I will use in-depth information and case
studies to elucidate the intricacies of recent rural to urban
migration, in terms of how’and.why it happened, and subsequent
outcomes for the migrant and his family, i.e., I want tO
discuss when and why he chose to out-migrate, what was his
situation before out-migrating, what is he doing now, how is
he adjusting in destination, and how does he keep-in-touch
with his relatives in Tamniah. Furthermore, through discussion
Of case studies, I will look at variations pertaining to year
of out-migration, age at out-migration, and reason for out-
migration in order to provide the underlying analysis of
migration.

In the final chapter of the dissertation, I will draw

conclusions both about socio-economic changes and migration

i..."
.51

'5' 0‘
“.4
I

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Die.

1E3

21
in the community of Shahran Bani Malik and attempt to distill
future implications for rural development in Saudi Arabia.
Lastly, I will try to appraise my theoretical and methodolo-
gical approach to the study of migration and determine its
utility and contribution to the understanding of the pheno-

menon .

'r_!

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO MIGRATION

My research seeks to investigate variations in migration
strategies adopted by rural households in response to changing
socioeconomic conditions. Three basic theoretical approaches
inform previous studies of migration -- methodological indivi-
dualism, structural functionalist, and historical-structural

perspective.

It considers all social life as revolving around con-
scious, rational perceptions and calculations of the in-
dividuals, who are therefore implicitly considered to be
ahistoriCal "free" social agents. This approach highlights a
common set of variables at the individual level and generates
testable hypotheses according to the accepted criteria Of
empirical research. Social scientists adhering to the in-
dividualist approach locate migrants' motivations firmly in
economic factors, although social, cultural, political, and
psychological factors also receive some attention. Neoclassi-
cal economists represent the mainstream Of this approach when

they use the "push-pull" framework, wherein migration is

22

23

equated with the geographic mobility of workers responding to
imbalances in the spatial distribution of production factors
(i.e. , land, labor, capital, and natural resources)
(Rothenburg, 1977). From this perspective, rural-urban
migration is considered to be equilibrating and a
”development-fostering" process that operates to correct the
rural-urban, inter-urban, and. interregional imbalances in
factors of production (Spangler & Myers, 1977; see also Wood,
1982). Many critics of the neoclassical model, however, have
postulated that labor migration between different sectors
(traditional-modern or subsistence-money economy) is not a
self-regulating process, but rather is a cumulative one that
leads to more impoverishment of the less-developed regions
(Portes, 1978; Wood, 1982). Research findings suggest.that.the
rural exodus and concomitant urban expansion in many develop-
ing countries often impose conditions detrimental to restoring
an economic equilibrium among different sectors of such
developing economies (Amin, 1974: Rhodes, 1978).

Recently, new impetus to this perspective has been given
by attempts to redefine the model in the light of criticism.
Harris and Todaro (1970), for example, have tried to account
for continued high rural-urban labor migration to over-
urbanized areas with high unemployment rates. Yet, their
quantifications still fail to address fundamental failings of
this perspective, especially its core assumption of the

calculating individual, Homo economicus, and of the "income

24

differential" variable as the sole determinant Of migration
flows (Binsbergen and Meilink, 1978: Wood, 1982).

The major flaw of the individualist approach, according
to Wood (1982:303) is that:

the internal consistency of the model of individual

decision making is at the expense of a broader under-

standing of the structural factors relevant to the study

of both causes and consequences of population movements.

What is at issue is not the assumption that individuals
behave rationally or that they seek economic advantages, but
the underlying causes of structural parameters within which
the individuals make their decisions. In other words, observ-
ing the behavior of homo economicus without looking at the
processes of the system (which cannot be discovered from
individual behavior or motivations) amounts to no more than

a reductionist approach incapable of developing an integrated

theory of migration.

5! ! 1' !_£ !. ii

The structural-functionalist approach, as an alternative
to the individualistic approach, begins with the patterns of
social relationships that create enduring sections/groups
(rural versus urban, communities, ethnic groups, formal
organizations, kin groups, sex and age cohorts, and so on),
which through both cooperative and conflictual interaction
produce an integrated and self-perpetuating society. Since
migration is conceived as one way these interactions serve

positive functions for the sections or groups involved

25

positive functions for the sections or groups involved
(Gluckman, 1961: Skinner, 1965), the focus is on the inter-
linkings between the different sectors or groups in both
departure and.destination areas. These interlinkings are seen
to occur through the diffusion of ideas, values, techniques,
and incomes (Perkin, 1975) . The result is a stress on the
rather positive effects of migration and migrants on both
origin and destination areas (Berg, 1965; Mitchell, 1969).

While structural in orientation, structural-functional-
ism leans heavily toward the individualist approach. It is
concerned more with the individual migrant and thus proceeds
to collect data about the migrant, such as characteristics,
motivations, and attitudes (Perkin, 1975: see van Binsbergen
& Meilink, 1978) . The primary occupation is with cultural dif-
ferences among the different segments involved in migration.
These cultural differences, as many critics indicate, are
merely surface phenomena Of more fundamental economic and
political factors that perpetuate divisions in society (Amin,
1974: Binsbergen & Meilink, 1978). These critics, therefore,
point to this approach's neglect Of the underlying causes of
migration which operate at different levels (i.e., local,
regional, national, and so on). A related weakness is the
failure to incorporate history, beyond descriptive terms, into
the analysis of migration -- thus leaving beyond purview the
structural transformations of societies that are so much a

part of the underlying causes of migration.

26

Waugh

The third approach to the study of migration considered
here is the historical-structuralist perspective, which
attempts to analyze and explain migration at the social
structural level, regardless of the motivations and percep-
tions of individual migrants. It is this perspective's theory
of social structure, however, which sets it apart from other
structuralist approaches. It looks at contemporary under-
developed societies as a composite of qualitatively different
sectors (or modes of production), i.e. the capitalist versus
theidomestic.or rural sector; The internal structure and dyna-
mics of each of these is determined not by formal-organiza-
tional or ideological elements, but by the ways in which
production and reproduction occur. This always implies
conflicts revolving around the control Of production and
reproduction, and around the expropriation of products or
surpluses (van Binsbergen et a1, 1978, 1985).

When studying migration, historical-structuralism empha-
sizes the nature of interaction or articulation between the
different sectors of a social formation. It especially views
rural migration and circulation as the direct result of the
penetration of capitalism, which, in order to fulfill its
labor requirements, creates cash needs in peasant and tribal
societies through mechanisms such as new currencies, head

taxes, trade stores, etc. Adults (especially males) are thus

27

forced to migrate to earn the necessary cash for these
emerging needs. As a consequence, regional differences are
intensified, village economies deteriorate due to losses of
labor and because households have to subsidize migrant
members, and social differentiation of rural society is either
initiated or enhanced (Amin, 1974: Mukherji, 1985). It thus
becomes clear that this perspective considers migration's
effects upon rural communities tO be negative and exploitative
(see Amin, 1974: Meillassoux, 1975).

Historical-structuralism does not treat migration as a
discrete dimension of social reality subject to separate
investigation, but insists that population movement can be
examined "only in the context of historical analysis of the
broader structural transformations underway in a particular
social formation" (Wood, 1982:302). The usefulness of this
method of analysis lies in the way it links the material and
social conditions of everyday life to movements of the economy
as a‘whole, such.that.the structural parameters which underlie
individual decisions are highlighted. However, critics of this
approach have chastised its adherents for assuming too Often
that non-capitalist forms Of production were socially and
economically undifferentiated, and thus "did not subsequently
filter the impact of capitalist forces according to the
principles of indigenous, domestic production" (Chapman and
Prothero, 1982:618). They further note that this perspective

suffers from an inability to incorporate the macro-structural

28

forces, such as spatial imbalances in wages, employment, and
amenities, with micro-level factors that do indeed differen-
tially motivate individual actors. There is thus no attempt
to conceptualize the nature of the decision-making process.
For example, it neglects identifying such variables as social
networks and.other specific costs and.benefits that affect the
decision, propensity, and the direction of the migratory
stream (Dinerman, 1978: Portes, 1978: Wood, 1982).

At this juncture, it becomes abundantly clear that each
of the three approaches provides only partial explanations of
migration. While each contributed to one understanding Of
contemporary labor mobilities and migration streams, they
suffer from a common shortcoming. As pointed out by many
critics, these approaches share the false assumption of an
existing dichotomy between the individual and society. On one
hand, the individualist (empiricist) approach, with its many
variants, is driven by an "implicit notion Of voluntarism in
which society is assumed to be the sum product of the inten-
tional actions of individuals" (Forbes, 1984:156). The
historical-structuralist.perspective, on the other hand, more
often than not assumes that society is external to the
individual and imposes heavy constraints upon behavior. As
such, the larger political economy is seen as the sole
determinant of population movements (Oberai and Bilsborrow,

1984; Forbes, 1984).

29
The problem of 'individual vs society' and 'voluntarism
vs determinism! has, thus far, plagued.migration research and
hindered the development of an integrated approach that is
capable of enhancing the formulation of a comprehensive

testable theory of migration.

MW
Recent multi-disciplinary research on mobility has
stressed the need for integrating existing approaches, both
theoretically and. methodologically. From the theoretical
angle, the main attempt is associated with 'human geographers'
who borrow from such sociologists as Bourdiew (1977) and
Giddens (1979) . The latter is credited for developing the
concept Of 'structuration' which emphasizes the interdepen-
dence Of human agency and social structure in time and space.
Giddens argued two important points. First, the need to
transcend the notion of an existing division between indivi-
dual and society and instead should both be theorized as
individual in society and society in individuals. As Abrams
illuminates:
The problem of agency is the problem of finding a way of
accounting for human experience which recognizes simul-
taneously and in equal measure that history and society
are made by constant and more or less purposeful indivi-
dual action and.that individual action, however purpose-
ful, is made by history and society (1982, xiii).

Second, Giddens stresses that individuals and societies

are "embedded in a particular historical configuration Of time

30

and space, which itself is the creation of history, society,
and individual action" (Gregson, 1986) . The main theme of
Giddens' presentation is that of duality rather than dualism,
where there is interdependence between history, society, and
purposeful action of individuals. These are of equal weight
and neither society nor individuals are assumed to exert
greater influence upon events than the others. This contrasts
with the dualistic notion so characteristic of conventional
social theory and social science, where individual and
society, subject and object, macro and micro are treated as
opposed discrete entities.

The use of Giddens' new theoretical framework for
empirical research is still very scanty even though many
express intentions of doing so (Smith, 1983: Gregson, 1984).
Thus far it has been applied, though loosely, by human
geographers to the study of migration. This is what has been
termed time-geography, where a researcher focuses on an
'individual trajectory' through time and space in order to
create a 'geographical biography' of a population within a
constrained environment (Parkes and Thrift, 1980).

Critics of Giddens' formulation point to the inability
to transcend dualism which is the main feature of social theory
and social science. This forces each into a separate duality.
As Gregson (1984) notes, most. of’ Giddens' reformulation
presents "a decomposition and partial recombination of what

already exists, (i.e. ,) dualism, rather than a genuine attempt

31

of creating something else..." (p.201). Stressing the need to
overcome dichotomy between the individual and society, Forbes
(1984) posits a 'two-way dialectical relationship', "in which
time, space, and society selectively influence the individual,
and just as importantly the way the individual feeds back.into
(and ultimately, reproduces) the society and transforms it"
(p. 160). One may add, that while these proposals can help
resolve some problems of disjuncture between discrete levels
of analysis, they nonetheless are still of little use. Only
until compatible methods of enquiry, which encompass both
human agency and social structure, will the pitfalls of
dualism be avoided. This, then, will allow us the opportunity
to advance the development of an integrated approach to the
study of migration that is both capable of advancing the
formulation of a comprehensive theory of migration while
maintaining theoretical coherence to the understanding of
development as a whole.

The second attempt at reconciling the existing approach
to the study of migration is that Of Wood (1981: 1982). After
citing the polarization between existing perspectives as the
main cause of the fragmentation and general limitation Of
migration literature, Wood offered a middle ground. He
proposed the household as an intermediate unit of analysis in
order to develop an integrated approach that encompasses the
determinants of behavioral parameters and the factors

motivating human actors. Wood contends that as long as the

32
household is the 'unit of production and consumption' , an
integration of the previous approaches to migration seems
possible by analyzing household behavior as it interacts with
its social and physical environment.

The household, in Wood's scheme, is defined as "a group
that insures its maintenance and reproduction by generating
and disposing of a collective income fund" (Wood, 1982:312).
As such, it.may'or’may not.be co-residential, linked.by family
ties, or structured by kinship bonds.

In terms of this definition, the key components are
"generating" and "disposing". These are key in the sense
that: 1) both facilitate a fuller count of household.members,
who are neither fixed by blood nor are curtailed by space: 2)
through both components one may gain a better insight into
{a} sources of income and income generating activities, {b}
ways of income disposition, and (c) household location in the
socioeconomic ladder of the whole society, but particularly
in the local community. .

There are, however, several limitations to WOod's use
and conceptualization of the household. The first has to do
with his definition of the household, which he strictly bases
on economic criteria while ignoring all other attributes. In
this way, the group within the household are individuals tied
by their calculations concerning income which they pool
together. Nothing is said of how the group is formed or what

kind Of relationships each of its individuals has to one

33
another. This implies that cooperative economic activities
supersede family, kinship ties or co-residentiality.

The second problem emanates from the uncertainty of who
to include or exclude from the household and how to draw
boundaries of households. For instance, in some communities,
such as peasants and tribal communities, where cooperation,
share of product, and economic assistance are predominant,
the boundaries of household are rendered so uncertain that
one may rightfully consider the whole community as one large
household.

The third limitation of Wood's formulation is related to
methodological considerations. His use Of the household as an
alternative unit of analysis to mediate between the individual
and the larger context is doubted. As noted by Bach and
Schraml (1982), the mere use Of a cost-benefit analysis of an
individual who is making calculations on the bases of his/her
membership in a "group" is merely the economic reductionism
of neoclassical economics.

If we are to pursue links between group behavior and
migration decisions of individuals within that group, we must
incorporate the intricacies of the decision-making processes
within the group. In other words, a researcher who is set to
evaluate the mediating effect Of the household on individual
purposeful behavior and decisions must be able to determine:
1) how does the sense of belonging to a "group" affect the

individual's behavior. This sense of belonging must be looked

34
at not only from the economic angle, but also from other
angles such as social, cultural, ethnic, etc.: 2) At what time
and space distance does this "sense of belonging" weaken or
become non-existent. This is particularly crucial for migra-
tion studies since it brings us to the baSes of inclusion of
an individual to a "household". Recent rural-urban migration
in.many developing countries is characterized by long-term or
semi-permanent.moves, where the migrant becomes detached from
his/her natal household, engages in non-traditional activi-
ties, and is exposed to an all new environment. One, thus,
must ask how much this detachment has impacted the migrants'
sense of belonging to a rural household. The exposure to new
social and cultural environment, undoubtedly, exerts great
pressures on migrants who are young, probably'with some educa-
tion, and may not conform to the traditional value system of
a rural community: 3) household membership must clearly be
distinguished from kinship ties. This becomes crucial when we
evaluate membership status of both temporary and permanent
rural migrants, and the remittances accrued by the rural
household from.both groups. The literature informs us of many
situations where the head Of household or another adult member
has to migrate for part of the year in order to complement the
household domestic production. Their remittances, thus, are
part of household sustenance strategies. The permanently
migrant.kin, to the contrary, is no longer'a household.member.

He, where (occasionally) remits to his natal family, more

35

Finally, Wood's formulation poses problems when applied
to empirical research. These are related to operationalizing
such terms as generating, disposing, maintenance, reproduc-
tion, and collective income. While it is easy to theorize in
the ideal world of abstracts, it is an extremely stringent
task to operationalize in the real world of objects and
subjects. While it is possible to do so, it is incredibly
complex.

To' critique the concept of household as presented by Wood
(1982) is not to desert it, but rather to conceptualize it on
better grounds. Basing the concept strictly on income pooling
criterion divests the household of most Of its important
aspects, and, as noted above, relegates it to economic
reductionism.

This study attempts to apply a more holistic approach to
the study of rural-urban migration. Theoretically speaking,
migration decisions are conceived of as the outcome Of the
interaction between (micro) individual characteristics and
perceptions and (macro) societal parameters mediated by the
household.

To further elaborate, the individuals' characteristics
(age, sex, and education) and perceptions of available oppor-
tunities both in and outside their local communities,
influence their respective decision to migrate. The indivi-
duals/households, nonetheless, construct their migration

strategies as part of their overall livelihood strategies in

36
response to regional imbalances Of labor, land, and capital
as well as health, education, and.other social amenities. Most
Of these imbalances can be traced back to the on-going process
of the structural transformation and unbalanced development
in society.

The household, in turn, regulates the individual '3 migra-
tion decision by virtue of its overall physical and non-
physical resource endowments. Accordingly, the size and
quality of landholding and dwelling, and presence Of savings
[as well as number, age-sex composition, education, skill
levels, and knowledge of members], all have a definite role
in migration strategies of households and, therefore, the in-
dividuals which comprise them.

As rural households Of different combinations of land,
labor, and other resources interact with the dynamic struc-
tural constraints and opportunities present within the larger
society, one expects each to adopt distinct livelihood
strategies. From this perspective, household livelihood
strategies reflect the household's internal structure, but
are regulated by external socioeconomic forces. The formation
of migration decisions, then, will be investigated by
examining: 1) household composition: in terms of size of the
household, age, gender, employment, and educational attain-
ment, relation to head of household and place Of residence of
each member: 2) migration instances of the head Of household

by date, duration, destination, and reason for migration:

37

3) migration instances Of other adult members of household
(during recent years) by date, duration, destination and
reason for migration: 4) division Of labor among activities
--agricultural non-agricultural--, and domestic; 5) forms of
access to land, labor, and other production factors: 6)
Off-farm and/or urban employment by age, gender, and relation:
and by type, duration, and form and/or size of remuneration:
7) sources of income: subsistence production, commodity sales,
rent, remittances, earnings from off-farm and/or urban
employment and occupations, government aids and/or incentives:
and 8) household cooperation and mutual exchange.

This method of analysis, rather than considering
migration as separate from other livelihood considerations,
analyzes it as an integral component of the household's
maintenance and reproduction over time. Each of these com-
ponents conditions and, in turn, is conditioned by the other.
Each household, then, creates its own social and organiza-
tional constraints to increase migration by household members.
The presence of external opportunities, however, provide a
competitive context within which households may change, or
abandon current production and migration strategies. The
ability to alter present strategies is, nonetheless, shaped
by strategies previously adopted in response to then-prevai-
ling socioeconomic and physical conditions. In the long run,

those households able to adopt complex livelihood strategies

38
--such as combining urban and agricultural employment-~are

better able to minimize risks in an uncertain environments.

CHAPTER THREE

THE LARGER CONTEXT-The Role of The State

W

There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia has undergone a
massive economic and social transformation during the last
three decades. From, more or less, subsistence and nomadic
forms Of production, the country was transformed into a
'modern' money-oriented economy in a Span of thirty years.
These transformations impacted rates and patterns of migra-
tion, and the overall population distribution.

Unfortunately, no systematic attempts have been made to
relate the new mobility pattern to the recent economic struc-
turing. As such, very little is known in terms Of concrete
consequences Of the path of development launched by the state
upon migration and population shifts.

Migration is hardly a recent phenomenon in Saudi Arabia.
What is at issue is the way it is conceived. At the risk of
banality, most approaches to migration treat it as the result
Of the overall process of what is popularly termed moderniza-
tion, where society'is merely readjusting itself to the larger
impulses of economic rationalization and attendant specializa-

tion in the division Of labor. To conclude that the new

39

40

economic Opportunities in urban areas are behind the present

migration trends is simply to state the Obvious.

The questions largely remain unanswered because they
remain unasked. But in order for us to fully grasp the com-
plexities of migration, it is first necessary to formulate
questions which go to the heart of the issue. These concerns
may be summarized as follows:

1- what are the underlying structural causes Of mobility
within the Saudi context. In other words, how can we relate
and explain mobility trends by focusing on the complexities
of economic growth and the new socioeconomic restructuring
of the Saudi society:

2- more Specifically, how have the underlying social relations
of production and attendant forces of production been
reshaped and reformulated, especially with regard tO
lineage based societies: and

3- how have global, regional and national configurations
joined in defining the context and limits Of Saudi
society.

In sum, we must highlight aspects of socio-economic
development, which have the greatest relevance for migration
and population movements.

Saudi Arabia has undergone massive population shifts
throughout the last three decades. But while migration itself
is not new, present trends differ from earlier patterns Of

target migration, labor circulation and nomadic wanderings.

41

These types of migration have not disappeared. Nonetheless,
they were upstaged by the present pattern of rural-urban
migration. This recent pattern is characterized by massive
regional population displacement, residential relocation of
entire families, and the permanent or semi-permanent nature
Of the family moves. The outcome has been dramatic, as evi-
denced by large population losses within the traditional
heavily populated rural areas, and concomitantly large
concentration. of ‘population. in the :major cities of. the
Kingdom, such as Riyadh, Jeddah, Makkah, and Dammam. Urban
population growth in the regional towns has been no less
dramatic. For example, the population of Khamis Mushait and
Abha of the southwestern region, respectively, increased from
2000 and 4000 in 1939 to over 60,000 and 40,000 by 1978
(Abdulfattah, 1981).

Before proceeding with description and analysis of what
happened, we must answer two critical questions...what is it
that we mean by the state?...and why must we integrate the
role of the "state" into the analyses of development and
migration?

As Giddens (1987) notes, there are twoidefinitions Of the
state in ordinary language: "The state, sometimes means an
apparatus of government or power, or sometimes the overall
social system subject to that government or power" (p. 17).

A clearer working definition which is essentially a

Weberian one is that Of Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985). They

42
"consider the state to be a set of organizations invested with
the authority' to :make binding' decisions for’ people and
organizations juridically located in a particular territory
and to implement these decisions using, if necessary, force"
(p. 47).

One clear connotation of their definition is that of the
state being an "instrument of domination", which is determined
by interrelations between the various parts of the state
apparatus and the.powerful classes. This implies a second role
of the state, that Of a "corporate actor", which exists in its
own right and possesses interests of its own (Cardoso, 1979).

The "state” as an actor'or an institution.recently became
the interest and subject of analysis of an extraordinary
number of studies of diverse theoretical inclinations, from
all social science disciplines, and with a wide range of
topics (Skocpol, 1985: Lee, 1988). As Skocpol (1985) notes:

Students of Latin America, Africa, and Asia have
examined the roles of states in instituting comprehen-
sive political reforms, helping to shape national
development, and bargaining with multinational cor-
porations. Scholars interested in the advanced in-
dustrial democracies of Europe, North America, and Japan
have probed the involvements of states in developing
social programs and in managing domestic and interna-
tional problems... Economic historians and political
economists theorized about states as institutors of
property rights and as regulators and distorters Of
markets...(p.3).

In relation to the contemporary Third World, there is a
consensus among comparative social scientists that the state

has greatly increased its roles, Obligations, and power over

society across three domains (or capacities):

43

First, the extractive capacity of the state has expanded,
thus leading to its rampant involvement in the accumulation
process. This extractive capacity, which in most instances
means complete control over vital resources, and centraliza-
tion of economic planning, enables the state to: 1) carry out
its role in the appropriation process and capital accumulation
by those in power and the dominant classes: and 2) further
facilitate transnational linkages with advanced capitalist
states and multinational corporations.

Second, as military activities and means of violence
grew, coercion became a determining element in the state
structure and the social formation as a whole (Tilly, 1985:
Collier, 1979). It is argued that the state coercive capacity
over society inmost Third World countries is central in
maintaining prevailing social structural conditions and
inequalities (Lee, 1988).

Third, Since the end of World War II, the explosive
expansion in national education systems enabled the state
incorporative capacity, particularly, in.promoting nationhood
and legitimacy (Meyer et. al., 1979). In this respect, mass
education became the vehicle for creating citizens, and
"instills loyalty to the state, and acceptance of the obli-
gations to vote, go to war, pay taxes..." (Lee 1988, p. 4).

In sum, the state, especially in the contemporary Third

World, is clearly the "central figure" with its monopoly over

44
the means of production, exchange, violence, and citizen-
making.

With regard to migration, most studies concentrate on
states' policies designed to exert tighter control on migra-
tion, alter the rates of rural-urban migration, enhance tran-
sitions from one mode of production to another, or extend the
accumulation process. For example, many studies investigated
states' policies of land reform programs, introductions of
labor intensive technologies, or the impacts of the deepening
penetrations of the capitalist mode of production by colonial
states (Peek and Standing, 1982).

Most international regions, such as Sub-Sahara Africa,
Latin America, and East Asia, have received their share of
studies concerning states' policies and migration. studies on
the Middle East, however, are still scanty and short of
examining the real impacts of states' policies regarding
migration. Here, it is important to bear in mind that when we
talk about states' policies regrading migration, our concerns
are with those policies that promote an overall structural
transformation Of economy and society, rather than migration-
oriented policies. This emanates from a deep conviction, which
stresses the importance of understanding the relevance of the
broader structural transformation Of a particular social
formation to migration.

This chapter is an attempt to bring to focus the struc-

tural effects on migration. I will attempt to relate rural to

45

urban migration of the last three decades to the recent socio-
economic changes and development plans pursued by the Saudi
state. The starting premise is that the emergence of the state
as the chief controller of the primary resource (oil) and the
subsequent growth of state capitalism have given the state the
leverage to, first, completely restructure the economy, and
second, to strengthen it's hegemony over the different
segments of the society.

The consequences Of this have been the undermining of the
older modes of production, and reformulating previous bases
of social-stratification, all leading to the creation Of a new
socio-economic order which is congruent with the new power
structure. On less abstract grounds, the state relentlessly
undertook national development plans, which, to say the least,
led to the creation of immense urban economic opportunities,
an accelerated process of urbanization, and a concomitant
deterioration of the traditional sector, all of which con-
tributed to the new mobility pattern and population dis-
tribution.

Before we proceed with the description and analysis of
the state development schemes, we must be aware of the: 1)
types of data available: 2) types of inferences to be drawn
from these data in relation to what happened in rural com-
munities, and new rural-urban.migration trends in particular;

Essentially, the available data that we will use are

government-supplied statistics and reports. Beside being

46
macro-level, the data in many respects lack details that are
necessary for direct inferences. Also, the data reliability
are sometimes questionable since they have a propaganda
overtone.

In relation to migration, these data permit no direct
inductive reasoning. As such, no available regional or
national data on internal migration, except some estimates on
the growth of urban population. These are still of little
value, since we cannot accurately isolate impacts of natural
increase and international migration upon growth of urban
population.

Bearing in mind these limitations, our inferences and
conclusions will be deductive. As such, through character-
ization Of the state's created Opportunities in education and
employment, schemes of fund allocations and income distribu-
tions, we will present the conditioning variables of the
larger' context, ‘under'*which. rural communities and. Saudi
society had Operated during the last three decades. Moreover,
the use of micro-level data from the community of study in the
following chapters will further illustrate the impacts of the

state's development schemes upon migration.

47

Prior to the unification process that took place during
the first three decades of the century, most of what is known
today as Saudi Arabia consisted Of a composite of many seg-
mented economies and societies. Great regional differences
existed in the form of social organization, political forma-
tion, and forms Of production. Subsistence production pre-
vailed over most of the western and southern regions, while
trade and the provision of essential services typified the
function of urban cities of Hijaz and the eastern coast towns
and seaports. A nomadic form of production dominated the
central and north central regions (Najd and Hayil) and was
complemented by merchant cities. The nomadic population roamed
across these regions and subsisted through camel-breeding.
Camels were of primary importance, serving both as a means of
exchange with settled communities and for transportation of
goods across Arabia, from the northern cities of Mesopotamia
and Syria.

The settled communities in the northern and central
regions prospered as trade centers and merchant stops. The
availability Of water resources (mainly springs) , nonetheless,
permitted the cultivation of food grains, mainly dates due to
their ability to withstand prohibitive desert conditions.

The relation between nomadic and settled communities was
one of economic and political interdependence. While the

Bedouin tribes functioned as autonomous (political and

48

ideological) units, their articulation with merchant towns
was for mutual survival. Access to markets was crucial to
Bedouins for selling their livestock.and obtaining the neces-
sities they were unable to produce. The city-state communities
of the northern and central regions primarily functioned as
market.places and route steps of transit trade. For'the nomads
who were the "masters of the desert", their cooperation was
vital to maintain trade flows by keeping caravan routes Open
and safe.

Conflicts and tensions did exist among the nomadic tribes
and between the nomads and settled communities. Power strug-
gles and warfare persisted throughout the history Of the dif-
ferent tribes and centered primarily over the distribution and
redistribution of the meager and ever shifting desert resour-
ces (Arafat, 1985). The rigidity of environmental conditions
undoubtedly played a decisive role over population size and
distribution. As such, water availability (rain and under-
ground water) helped determine settlement sites, as well as
the variant modes of existence in Arabia.

Historically, the population of Arabia kept balance with
natural resources and economic realities through out-migration
to the northern neighboring territories of Syria and Mesopo-
tamia.

The persistence through time of nomadic and subsistence
modes of production in Arabia was only made possible through

out-migration as higher levels of productivity proved

49

unfeasible under the twin constraints of environmental
conditions and technology. Both modes of production were
economically stagnant because neither'was capable of generat-
ing and/or sustaining economic growth. Moreover, they were
equally incapable of resource consolidation and accumulation
by a privileged class. The underlying nature of these systems
was predicated on mutual cooperation, assistance, and commu-
nality. This aspect had continually offset any intensive
intra-system economic exploitation. Rather, it was survival
and coping with the limiting physical environment that figured
into the logic of such communal systems and not accumulation.
Furthermore, the inherent basis Of class structure and class
conflicts was not built on an edifice of economics. And while
there were intra-tribal socioeconomic differences, these were
not the foundation of a specifically economic class structure.
To the contrary, it was patriarchy, seniority, and gender
which served to differentiate these societies. Elders (males)
comprised the dominant class and exercised absolute power over
their'households and tribes as well. The nature of inter-class
conflict, however, never became so intense as to threaten the
basis of these patriarchal groups. This is especially true of
the nomadic tribes who used to be in too constant movement and
struggle with contending tribes to engage in intense intra-
tribal conflicts.

The Arabian cities, except the Hijaz towns of Makkah and

Jeddah, were extensions of the nomadic economy and tribes in

SO
terms of their economic relations, internal structures and
cultural mores. These cities served primarily as exchange
centers for’nomads and, as a result, never'were able to foster
the development of manufacturing. In addition, due to their
great distance to each other, as well as the scarcity of
resources, the limited amount of exchange did not support a
complex class structure with a high degree of class differen-
tiation. All of these and the constant incursions by nomadic
tribes nullified economic development and structural transfor-
mations. To this end one may conclude that Arabia throughout
its history was stagnant, lacked significant societal integra-
tion, and in fact had no single identifiable society, polit-
ically, socially, and economically (Islami and Kavoussi,

1984) .

W
W

During the formative years of the Saudi state, and in
fact until the 1940s, the royal family was occupied with the
unification process, regional conquest, and consolidation of
power. Economically speaking, King Abdulaziz was financially
dependent on levies (zakat) on crops and animals, funds
received from Oil companies for oil concessions, and limited
British assistance. Later, with the annexion Of Al-Hasa and
Hijaz regions, state finances improved. markedly (Philby,
1968). Oil production began in 1938, but soon had to stop

until the end of World War Two. It, thus, did not figure into

51

the State's income until 1948, when.it accounted.forwmore than
fifty'percent.of the budget. During this period, the state was
not in a position to offer any kind of social reform, intro-
duce socio-economic changes, or promote political and social
integration of the society. By the year 1958, however, the
situation had changed. The state had become financially
'independent' from its subjects and whatever they produced
(Arafat, 1985). During this year, revenues accrued from Oil
export amounted to SR 1,241 million or 82% of total revenues
(ibid).

The emergence of oil as the primary income-generating
resource had profound economic, social, and political impli-
cations for Arabian societies and their patrimonial regimes.
Oil by its very nature presents qualities that are especially
magnified in the context of underdevelopment. One of the more
interesting theoretical conceptualizations of oil revenues and
its impacts upon underdeveloped societies is that of Mahdavy
(1970). He suggests that we look at oil revenues received by
exporting countries as an external rent. In other words, these
revenues are no different than, say, payments received by the
Egyptian government from ships for the right to pass through
the Suez Canal.

Certainly, as Mahdavy (ibid.) points out, the revenues
(social surplus) amassed from oil has very little to do with
the production process of domestic economies of the gentle;

states. Moreover, oil is a capital-intensive industry, so to

52
speak, and certainly does not require a large labor force to
function efficiently. For instance, the oil sector in Saudi
Arabia only employed about twenty thousand laborers in 1976,
including expatriate labor (Shaw, 1983).

Another salient aspect of oil is the fact that it is
owned solely by the state. No other societal group can claim
its ownership, nor can they contest the control of it. Added
to this is the fact that no social class was W
exploited in the process of Oil extraction. On the contrary,
the outflow of oil wealth has benefited a large spectrum of
Oil producing societies, both directly and indirectly. A
consequence of this was the growing 'independence' Of the
state from other social groups and from the society as a
whole. As such, the state no longer needed.to tax its subjects
nor was it susceptible to the influence of powerful social
groups such as merchants or particular tribes. Needless to
say, the state emerged as a powerful entity in its own right
(Arafat, 1985).

In the case of Saudi Arabia, Oil added more peculiarities
to the newly found state:

First, the relative coincidence Of state formation with
the rise of the oil revenues as the dominant sector of the
economy gave the state the legitimacy and leverage to con-
solidate its power while pursuing its self-prescribed devel-

opment plans.

53

Second, as we retrospectively look at the economic condi-
tions of Arabia prior to Oil exports (except for a few urban
centers), the rest of the country had.to cope with environmen-
tal vagaries and lived at or below levels of subsistence.
Consequently, the state faced little resistance to its
development plans, designs for Oil wealth appropriation, and
skewed patterns of income distribution. Moreover, it was able
to dictate the degree and nature of participation of its
citizens in the socioeconomic development of the country, as
well as other important affairs.

Third, the Saudi royal family, being the unifier Of a
traditionally tribal (segmented) society, had the Opportunity
to form the state apparatus according to its preferences. For
example, in order to consolidate its position, the better edu-
cated Hijazi urbanite middle class was recruited for admini-
strative jobs, while the state armies were built according to
tribal affiliations.

Fourth, in the context of dependency and underdevelop-
ment, the outcome of the excessive extraction of oil and the
huge revenues appropriated helped fuel the creation of both
a consumerist society and an unproductive domestic economy.
Faced with a 'backward economy', where no meaningful indus-
trialization existed coupled with a largely unproductive
agricultural sector, Oil revenues served as income for the
society as a whole. The very nature of the state policies, in

fact, proved to be the most critical aspect of the Oil boom.

54

To reaffirm its position, the state laid the ground for a
society in which private consumption would constitute the
primary economic activity, and in order to accomplish this:
1) large subsidies for a wide range of essential goods were
put forth: 2) provision of government sector jobs was made
available to any male Saudi citizen unable to find employment
elsewhere, making the state the largest employment sector in
the country (table 3.3): 3) provision of free services and
income subsidies in cash and other incentives: and 4) an open
economy where imports, speculation, and the service sector
dominate the economy (Islami & Kavoussi, 1984: see Lawson,
1985).

The pumping of oil wealth into the society for circula-
tion has, undoubtedly, given the appearance of economic
affluence and productivity. The truth of the matter, however,
is that it actually retarded the productive base of the
economy (the traditional sector). Compounding this, large
masses of the population were enticed into the speculation of
urban property which drove inflated prices even higher, the
importation of consumable goods, and the creation of service
and commercial enterprises predicated on the excessive use of
expatriate labor (al-Naqeeb, 1987). These will be dealt with

in greater depth in the next section.

55
W

On.the empirical side of the issue, Oil revenues steadily
rose during the 1960s and sky-rocketed during the 19703 as a
result of price hikes and output increase (OPEC, 1984). As we
see in table 3.1, the state amassed great wealth from 1970
and onward but particularly between 1973-1984.

To facilitate the absorption of this wealth, the state
initiated three five-year development plans beginning the
fiscal year 1970. These plans provided a framework for the
distribution of state expenditures in each of the five year
spans (table 3.2). While emphases and expenditures of each
plan differed from the others, all of them, nonetheless, do
attest to the growth of state capitalism and the overwhelming
state control over resources and their distribution.

TABLE 3.1

OIL INCOME 8 OUTPUT OF SAUDI ARABIA
FOR SELECTED YEARS

 

 

 

Year Revenues Daily output
(millions (1,000 barrel
dollars) per day)

1940 2.50 NA

1950 57.00 NA

1960 355.00 NA

1965 664.00 2037.6

1970 1214.00 3563.9

1974 22574.00 8243.9

1977 36540.00 8949.8

1980 102212.00 9630.0

1981 113200.00 9498.9

1982 76000.00 6177.0

1983 46100.00 4197.1

1984 43700.00 3651.9

 

Sources: OPEC. 1984 Annual

56

Instead of trying to review and analyze the development
plans, it is more useful to adopt.a new scheme recently propo-
sed by al-Naqeeb (1985: see also Sweezy, 1964). He suggests
that we outline mechanisms of expenditures in the rentier
state into three essential domains: State Capital Outlays,
Public Consumptions, and Public Disbursements.

TABLE 3*. 2

FINANCIAL ALLOCATION FOR THREE DEVELOPMENT PLANS
(1970-85)* (SR MILLIONS)

 

 

1st Plan 2nd Plan 3rd Plan
Sector (1970-75) % (1975-80) % (1980-85) %
( amount) ( amount) ( amount)
Agriculture,
indus 8 utili 06,033.3 10.7 092,135.0 18.5 261,800 44.8
Education 10,198.7 18.7 080,123.9 16.1 129,600 16.5

Hlth 8 pers. 02,443.0 4.4 033,212.8 6.7 061,200 07.8
Trans 8 com. 14,086.8 25.1 112,944.6 22.7 249,100 31.8
Bureaucracy 10,466.5 18.6 038,179.2 7.7 031,400 04.0
Defense 12,944.7 23.1 078,156.5 15.7 Not included
Food subi/aid - - 063,478.2 12.7 49,600 06.1

 

Total Plan 56,223.0 100% 498,230.2 100% 782,700 100%

 

Sources: Ministry of Planning. 1975 Ing_§gggnd_pexglgp;
nent_21an:l975-1980. p. 529;Tng_131;g_213n: 1980-1985 p. 88.

* Total of Third Plan excludes (i) transfer payments, (ii)
non civilian sector, (iii) foreign aids.
1‘ State_§anital_gntlaxa

Oil revenues have made the state, in a span Of two dec-
ades, a giant financial corporate entity capable Of financing
labor, material goods, and services which are either sold to
the populace at very low subsidized prices or given free. The
first aspect Of this involved the building of the requisite

physical infrastructures of transportation, communication,

57

education, health, defense and internal security, water, and
electricity. The rapid development of the physical infrastruc-
ture had profound effects on the domestic economy which were
more far reaching than its mere appearance. It created a
dominant construction sector that lured the private sector
into construction activities which also necessitated the
importation of expatriate labor and attracted foreign con-
struction businesses. Furthermore, the injection of 'Petro-
Riyals' into construction activities, particularly during the
1975-85 period, along with the inflow of expatriate labor,
resulted in high inflation rates, housing shortages in urban
areas, and necessitated excessive imports of practically all
consumable goods. The government, thus, was forced to expand
its subsidies and price support programs, further expand its
social security scheme, and initiate extensive interest-free
housing loan programs.

The second realm of state capitalism is government
bureaucracy. In order to expand it's hegemony, further the
forces of stability, and add to the institutional pillars of
support, the state dramatically expanded government
bureaucracy.

Until early 1953, the Saudi bureaucracy was essentially
non-existent. Only the King ruled personally and informally,
with the help Of members of the royal family (Uthaimeen,
1986). Except for three ministries (Foreign Affairs, Finance,

and Defense) the council Of ministers was not formed until

58
1953, and even then it consisted exclusively of the Royal
family members (Arafat, 1985, Uthaimeen, 1986). During the
late 19503 and the 19608, the Saudi society, however, went
through a period of adversity as an outcome of the state
detribalization policies, prolonged droughts, deterioration
of traditional agriculture, and the state reform program of

1962. The latter had profound far-reaching implications for

Saudi society because:

1- it laid the ground for an extensive welfare state with the
initiation of free health care, free education at all
levels, and an extensive social security program.

2- it marked the onset of the state commitment to provide
employment for all male citizens.

3- it emphasized the need for 'modernization' via projects
such as constructing an extensive road network, developing
water resources, expanding public utilities and forming
agricultural and industrial banks.

4- it relaxed policies for imports to exempt many food items
from custom duties. Later, these policies were extended
further to, in effect, set the tempo for an open economy
where import activities assumed the dominant economic role
in the country.

5- most importantly, it institutionalized the state dominance
over the development process in the country.

While the reform program of 1962 laid the ground for the

continued development of the state bureaucracy, its growth

59
accelerated after 1974 when the state coffers burgeoned from
oil revenues. The result was a steady expansion of the state
civilian sector during the 1975-1985. For instance, in 1974
the state employed only 162,439, but by 1983/84 the figure
jumped to 470,000 (Ministry of Finance, 1984). This, in
effect, has made the state the largest single employer in the

country since the year 1975 (Birks & Sinclair, 1980) (table

 

 

 

 

3.3) 0
TABLE 3.3
EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR (MID 1975)
Non
Total Saudi % Saudi %

Sector Employ. Employ. Employ.
Agriculture 585,550 530,650 51.7 54,900 7.6
Mining & quarr. 27,000 15,400 1.5 11,600 1.6
Manufacturing 65,900 21,550 2.1 44,350 6.1
Construction 239,300 35,900 3.5 203,400 28.1
Utilities 20,350 7,200 0.7 13,150 1.8
Trade & finance 204,200 65,700 6.4 138,500 19.1
SerVice (govt.) 503,700 277,100 27.0 226,600 31.4
Transp & communi. 103,800 72,900 7.1 30,900 4.3
Total 1,749,800 1,026,400 100.0 723,400 100.0

 

Source: Birks and Sinclair, 1980. A;ab_nanpgggz. p. 163

Critics have pointed to the many aspects and implications
of the expansion of state bureaucracy. First, in order to
satisfy the different groups in the society, the state imple-
mented this expansion both in size and scope. As such, it ex-
panded the Ministers Councils from fourteen to twenty six. All
of these ministry positions, except for four, were, primarily,

delegated to the middle class technocrats (Uthaimeen, 1986).

60

Furthermore, the state established forty six middle level
public corporations. These were independent from ministries
and "emerged to absorb young educated Saudis, co-opt them
through high salaries, and satisfy some of their desires for
participation in nation building" (Islami and Kassouvi,
1984:22). Lastly, it. accommodated. the :majority’ of rural
migrants by providing them with full state employment regard-
less of their skill or education qualifications (Arafat, 1985:
Uthaimeen, 1986).

Second, the state pledge to provide jobs for all Saudi
(male) citizens regardless of skills or education, the expan-
sion of mass education, the extension of the transportation
network, and the continuous decline of the traditional economy
(agriculture and pastoralism) re-enforced a massive rural-
urban migration trend that had begun during the late 19505.
Undoubtedly, the relative economic prosperity of urban areas,
as a result of oil wealth spillovers, and government subsidies
on various goods including food stuffs, strengthened the pull
factors for rural families to migrate to urban centers.

Third, as Uthaimeen (1986) explains, state employment
was attractive for rural migrants because:

The state bureaucracy never fires its employees: in-
stead, it guarantees steady income, has fewer working
hours, requires no job qualifications except [Saudi]
nationality, has less discipline, and less competitive
than the private sector. But most importantly, unlike
the case of imported labor, the wages and salaries of

the Saudi national labor force are.set.by the state, not
by the free labor market (p.277).

61

Fourth, the "jobs-for-all" state policy stymied the
emergence of an industrial labor force to be comprised of
rural migrants. To the contrary, rural to urban migrants found
it more attractive to secure employment with the state rather
than other sectors of the economy (see table 3.3).

In sum, the state bureaucracy has become a forceful mechan-
ism through which the royal family-cum-state increased its
dominance, improved its legitimacy, and bought time from
pressing issues of developing productive national labor force.
2- W121:

As oil revenues increased, so did the state's willingness
to invest in public programs. Since the declaration of the
reform program of 1962, the state initiated comprehensive free
mass education, free health care, and subsidized municipal
services. These, among others, are not self-supportive and
must be budgeted for every fiscal year. Regardless of the
nature, quality and purpose of providing these public ser-
vices, the shear size of the expenditures accrued to them, and
the fast rates of expansion are so astounding that the state
has tied its future inexorably to petro-revenues. Let us
consider some of these programs.

Education

Education by far is the best manifestation of the state
welfare programs. Until 1964, modern education existed in a
very limited.scope. The state was only able to initiate public

school in urban areas and nearby vicinities. Even then, these

62
were limited in numbers and accommodating capacities. More
notably, public schools were primarily for boys and mostly
limited to elementary schooling. By 1970, however, the state
was able to expend more on education and began to expand
education vertically and horizontally. In a span of fourteen
years (1970-1983), the number of schools rose from 3,107 to
13,428, and the number of students (male & female) rose from
547,000 to 1,836,000 (Ministry'of Planning, 1983) (table 3.4).
TABLE 3.4

DEVELOPMENT IN EDUCATION AND GROWTH OF STATE
EXPENDITURE FOR EDUCATION (1970-1983)

 

 

Number

of

Number

of

Number

of

Number

of

Schools Teachers Students Students

Expenditure
on Education

 

 

(Male) (Female) (million sr)

Year (1,000) (1,000)
1970 3,107 23,118 412 135 667
1971 3,283 23,856 455 152 1,150
1972 3,659 27,627 488 181 1,591
1973 4,254 31,907 537 211 2,233
1974 4,689 37,942 598 255 3,760
1975 5,634 43,777 672 311 12,941
1976 6,536 51,176 712 354 13,977
1977 7,497 58,201 760 391 15,049
1978 8,695 63,557 806 423 15,155
1979 10,018 70,468 874 466 17,396
1980 11,070 78,309 952 511 21,294
1981 11,379 86,007 991 572 26,248
1982 12,619 95,233 1,060 641 31,864
1983 13,426 104,524 1,131 705 27,791
Sources: Ministry of Planning. Achievements of the
Dgxglgpmgg§_glag§_1390-1403 (1970-83) pp. 233, 240; Ministry

of Finance, §§§;;§§;g§l_Xg§;bggk, vol. 11, p. 16 vol. 17, p.93
SANA. W. P. 102.

63

Another aspect of the state's education policy is the
creation of incentives for education. Not only did the state
provide free education and all it's essentials, but it selec-
tively put monetary incentives for some programs in selected
regions. For instance, all college students receive monthly
allowances of about 600 SR. plus room and board at nominal
rates.

A further example of state incentives for education is
its policy implemented for the Tehamma regions of Muhail and
Jizan provinces. In order to better school attendance and
persuade the peasant families to enroll their children in
school, the government instituted monthly allowances for all
students in general education (elementary, intermediate, and
high schools) in 1979'. Certainly, this is very commendable as
it dramatically improved school enrollments, but the residual
effects (so to speak) of the program must be scrutinized.
Unquestionably, education is the primary means used to
indoctrinate Saudi youth into the general system. And by
providing allowances for students, the state also created a
'respectable' income for the peasant family. This and other
subsidy programs, along with social security payments, have
become the main source of income for thousands of rural
families who otherwise would subsist through agriculture and

herding or seek employment opportunities in urban areas. While

 

1
(1977).

Council of Ministers decree number 689 in 15-5-1397 H.

64

subsistence agriculture in the southwest region was never a
thing of prosperity, it nonetheless was a viable choice for
centuries. In. effect, these jprograms fostered the rapid
decline of subsistence economy in Tehamma, Asir, and Jizan
provinces and furthered the demise of its agricultural base,
but, at the same time, slowed down rural to urban migration
rates from the mid-1970s and onward.

In closing, while the expansion of mass education was
rather impressive, its outcome is not. The flood of thousands
of high school and college graduates has yet to fit into the
country's need for skilled and semi-skilled labor. If it was
not for the ever expanding government bureaucracy, unemploy-
ment for the schooled Saudis would be very high since they did
not possess the necessary skills and training to participate
in productive activities. In testimony, we only need to look
at the ever expanding size of expatriate labor in Saudi Arabia
(see table 3.4). It is for this reason that one must question

the very intent of Saudi education.

65

TABLE 3.52
FOREIGN NATIONALS ENTERING AND LEAVING SAUDI ARABIA AND
NUMBER OF WORK/RESIDENCE PERMITS GRANTED 1974-1932 (1,000)

 

 

 

Re- New Resid. New &

Total Total Entry Resid. Permits Extend.
Year enter. leav. Visas permits Renewals Permits
1974 811 776 201 159 N.A. N.A.
1975 1,255 1,089 215 228 N.A. N.A.
1976 1,598 1,338 415 489 N.A. N.A.
1977 2,219 1,883 652 522 N.A. N.A.
1978 2,372 2,307 N.A. 606 N.A. N.A.
1979 2,485 2,424 N.A. 687 N.A. N.A.
1980 2,371 2,783 1,380 ' 669 2,329 2,998
1981 2,844 3,610 1,198 632 2,240 2,872
1982 3,318 3,022 1,669 663 2,658 3,321

 

Source: Ministry of the Interior, Passport and Civil
Status Dept-.fiiat1EEiQBl_X2£1229315§31§§_112A21A22_(1974-82)-
Sesial.§esnritx_£regram

This is another example of the state public disbursement
programs. Essentially, it was meant for the old, the perma-
nently disabled, orphans, single women with no support, and
disaster stricken families. During ‘the 19703, however,
requirements were relaxed to allow practically anybody with
the 'right contacts' to become a beneficiary of the program.
This is especially true in rural areas, where the program
people too often relied upon heads of tribes and/or villages
for information about applicants. The number of recipients,
as a result, jumped from 200 thousands in 1970 to over one

million in 1981 ( Ministry of Planning, 1983) (table 3.6).

 

2Pilgrimage are not included

66

.xa6~.6 .amma .666 u.>66 “magnum acsmme
.mamAMIMdmammdMNMQIHmlmmmmawdedmd .mcaccoam no >aumaca: “mousom

.Ammuosmav

 

 

6.66m6 6.666a 666.6mm 6.6aa 666.6aa 6.~66a 666.6am nmma
6.6mam 6.amma 666.m6m 6.66a 666.aaa 6.mpma 666.6mm mama
6.n~6n 6.m66a 666.666 6.am 666.66 6.66m 666.666 amma
6.a6mm 6.666a 666.~66 6.6aa 666.mm a.66m 666.666 66ma
6.a6mn «.666a 666.6«6 m.m~a 666.66a n.6mm 666.6«6 mmma
6.6mmn 6.6mm 666.666 6.66 666.6» 6.666 666.666 mmma
6.66am n.666 666.~66 ~.~6 666.m6 a.m~6 666.na6 puma
6.6n6m 6.6m6 666.6m6 m.mm 666.66 a.~66 666.an6 6mma
6.6mm~ 6.666 666.666 6.6 666.6a 6.6mm 666.m~6 mmma
6.a6na n.66a 666.666 «.6 666.6m a.n6a 666.6~m 6pma
6.m66 «.ms 666.~6n 6.n 666.6~ 6.66 666.-n nmma
6.a66 p.66 666.66N n.~ 666.~a 6.6m 666.66N mama
6.a66 m.m6 666.6nm n.~ 666.6a 6.66 666.6mm anma
6.a66 6.a6 .666.6ma m.~ 666.aa 6.mn 666.66a omma
Aaooccov scaaaw: .uocom Sofiaaa: .uosom Gawaaax .uocom moo»
Ammo 6666‘ .mm. 66 .mm. 66 Ammo 66
Hon ucooad assoad amnasz acooad Robin: #:5054 amaszz

 

oocnumwmmd Had

 

mucoumammd uoaaom

 

mucoumammc anasmmm

 

 

Aaomam aosam.

m.n CHOQE

AnamAIOFmdv NBHmDUNm AdHUOm OB 20H5400QQ< HE<Em

67

The amount provided to a beneficiary is not substantial,
but it approximates the wage of an unskilled urban worker.
And, as Arafat (1985) points out, when the payment lagged
behind wages of urban workers prior to 1974, the number of
recipients dropped sharply only to rise again after the
government raised its payment in 1975. Since most of the
program beneficiaries are rural people, the program has the
affect. of’ deterring' rural recipients from. seeking' urban
employment in order not to lose their payments. By the same
token, it delayed the proletarianization of potential rural
wage workers, as more and.more families become beneficiaries.
Most.importantly, it.has lessened work.ethics and struggle for
living in many rural communities3
3- W

The most striking phenomenon of the 19705 and early 19805
is the state's relentless efforts to disburse funds through
extensive subsidy programs, price supports and control, free
loans and outright gifts. While some of these were initiated
during the late 19605, their impacts on a large scale were
only felt after the 1973 oil boom when the state found the
means to control the entire population by instilling economic
dependence of the populace on government largess.

Food and non-luxury items received priority from the

state. In order to minimize the effects of high inflation

 

3- This is especially true in the Tehamma regions, where
social security in combination with student allowance and other
subsidy programs, have made up income in excess of subsistence.

68

rates, the government implemented a price support program for
all imported basic food items. Moreover, tariffs, where they
were not dropped, were reduced to three percent for all
imports. The subsidy programs also included fuel and utilities
such that taxes were dropped on all types of fuels, while
rates for electricity were reduced significantly (Uthaimeen,
1986) .

Land_5119fmsnt_§shemsa

By far, the largest impact exhibited by the government
schemes are those of land allotment schemes which took effect
from 1974 and thereafter. We may outline these as follows:

First, as a result of the state's emphases on infrastru-
ctural building (primarily for education, health, government
bureaucracy, transportation, and public housing), the state
was inclined to pay generously for private properties that
were appropriated for government projects. Generally, the main
beneficiaries were, by far, the upper middle class and upper
class who, through their connections with the elite state
functionaries, were able to obtain access to such properties,
claim ownership, and later were reimbursed at very generous
terms.

Second, the housing shortages of the early seventies
prompted the government to introduce two major programs: 1)
subsidized housing, and 2) housing loans. The first included
large state controlled and financed projects in the major

urban areas at a cost of around 20 billion SR. The ministry

69
of housing was in charge of the subsidized housing programs.
Other ministries and public corporations have also built their
own housing projects for their employees (Ministry of
Planning, 1983).

The second program is an extensive interest-free loan
program provided to any Saudi male over 25 years of age for
the purpose of constructing an owner-occupied house. The
government created a public corporation called The Real Estate
Development Fund "Bank" to manage and distribute the loans.
There were no rigid criteria for eligibility. Any Saudi male
can apply for one loan by providing a proof of property
ownership and a blue print design for the house to be con-
structed. Usually the loan covers about 70% of the cost of a
nuclear family housing unit and is payable in twenty-five
years with a discount of up to 30 percent for prompt payments
(Ministry of Finance, 1986). (table 3.7).

The program by design favors urban areas since it gives
more money for housing units in towns than in the rural side.
Moreover, it is easier to process title papers for urban
properties than their rural counterparts where finalizing
ownership papers may become impossible due to overlapping

between tribal and individual rights of land ownership“.

 

‘- The upper limit of housing loans is fixed at 300 SR

thousands for urban areas and 200 SR thousands for rural areas
(Ministry of Finance & National Economy, 1986).

70

TABLE 3.7
PRIVATE AND INVESTMENT LOANS DURING THE PERIOD
1395-1406H (1975-1986) (SR MILLION)

 

 

 

 

 

Fiscal ngsing_Lean§ ' Ingesfment__LgaDs
Year Number Value Number Value
95/96 34,189 8,197 NA NA
96/97 46,955 13,536 439 1,042
97/98 3,832 955 139 277
‘98/99 34,407 8,690 419 675
99/400 33,190 8,185 287 460
400/401 28,593 6,956 202 385
401/402 31,133 8,052 196 459
402/403 35,359 9,438 230 495
403/404 29,400 7,917 165 356
404/405 26,215 7,131 124 421
405/406 18,844 5,159 88 284
Total 322,117 84,216 2,289 4,854
Source : Ministry of Finance . Ree]. Eetete Development

Egng.Annual Report 1405/1406 (1986).

The immediate impact of the program was the price
escalation of urban properties as everybody scrambled for a
land lot to take advantage of the loan. This, in effect,
created a class of land speculators who, through collusion
with influential elite state functionaries, got access to
unclaimed urban lands, proceeded to sell them at inflated
prices and consequently got rich overnight with the windfall
profitss.

The government for its part also contributed to land
speculation through land allotment programs. These programs

entitle adult Saudis (mainly males) to a lot in an area of

 

5 Due to lack of control on the part of government, prices of

urban property sky-rocketed to more than one hundred fold in major
towns, such as Riyadh, Makkah, Jeddah, and Dammam.

71

his choice. Of course, not everybody who applied got one, as
contacts with government people played a major role in the
size, quality, location, and probability of receiving a lot.
By the same token, thousands were able to take advantage of
their contacts and consequently accrued great wealth through
land speculation and real estate investments. Moreover,
housing construction in urban areas became investment enter-
prises for thousands of households as family members began to
combine housing loans and.build larger'units, which they later
rent or sell for sizable profits. This was made possible by
the large influx of rural migrants and imported labor since
the demand for housing remained relatively constant.

Undoubtedly, the most astounding impact of the program
occurred at the national level. The combined impact of govern-
ment projects and private construction made this area the
dominant sector of the economy. As such, imports of construc-
tion.materials and labor became the commanding phenomena from
1974 onward ( Arafat, 1985: Islami & Kassouvi, 1984: Shaw,
1983: Uthaimeen, 1986).
W

The traditional sector, due to the inherent parameters
of limited land size and quality, water, and technology, was
never prosperous. These conditions, however, went from bad to
worse after the mid-19505. At this time, thousands of farmers
abandoned agriculture and opted for out-migration to urban

areas as new economic opportunities opened up. Mass education

72
also helped accelerate the deterioration of rural life as it
stripped agriculture of the young labor force who increasingly
enrolled in school and sought opportunities in other more
economically rewarding sectors of the economy.

The government attempted to breath renewed life into this
ailing sector by initiating several price subsidy programs and
production loans. Typically, the government subsidizes up to
50% of input costs, purchases farmers outputs at very high
prices, facilitates interest-free loans, distributes free land
for any Saudi farmer, and allowed land rights to private firms
of agro-based projects. Needless to say, the government
subsidy programs were widespread and certainly very expensive
as expenditures for agriculture reached 93 billion SR. during
the second and third development plans (1975-85) (SAMA, Annual
Report: 1984, p. 15) (see table 3.2).

In order to appreciate the government's role in agricul-
ture, it is important to critically review the policies for
agriculture. From the beginning, the designers of development
plans stated that intentions and goals for the agricultural
sector were to improve agricultural conditions, raise output
and improve the sector share of GDP, release surplus and
redundant labor, and, at the same time, slow down rural-urban
migration rates (Ministry of Planning, 1975). While these are
very comforting goals, they were, nonetheless, conflicting in

nature. Essentially, this points to the general lack of any

73
basic understanding of subsistence agriculture and its
conditions in Saudi Arabia on the part of the planners.

First, the prohibitive constraints of land size and
quality, water resources, and the extant land-tenure system
of fragmented land holdings preclude efforts to easily
transform subsistence agriculture.

Second, the injection of capital through subsidy programs
in effect minimized any potential transformation as it helped
preserve the existing land-tenure system, and lessened strains
of the emergent cash economy by introducing cash and input
subsidies. Further expansion of agriculture was thus dis-
couraged as subsidies nullified the need for this. While
subsistence agriculture did continue, it did so more as a "way
of life” than as a necessary moment in the household's
reproduction.

Third, the logic of subsistence economy, which is based
on provision of "basic needs" for the producing unit, under-
mines efforts of structural transformation and rural develop-
ment. As Arafat (1985) poihts out, the production of surplus
output is not a necessary condition for the economic survival
of the producing unit. To the contrary, it is the consumption
levels of the producer that too often are adjusted to the
amount produced.

Fourth, it is the non-competitive nature of subsistence
agriculture that hinders potential investments and/or develop-

ment. In other words, peasants do not have to depend on

74
marketing their produces in order to recover costs, obtain a
return on land or accumulate capital, nor are they under
pressures of losing their land which is quite secured by the
existing land-tenure system.

Fifth, the government subsidy programs are based on the
premise that, through capital injections, the manipulation and
substitution of factors of production will occur and lead off
transformation and agricultural development. In other words,
the development planners concluded that injection of capital
through interest free loans, input and output subsidies and
price supports will lead to increased productivity and
improvements in farmers' income, encourage modernization of
farming methods to the point of rationalization and adoption
of labor-saving techniques. The final (and much desired)
outcome is the release of labor’which will alleviate manpower
shortages in other sectors (Ministry of Planning, 1975).

The infusion of capital through subsidies did contribute
to better farming techniques and larger outputs, but it was
not enough to transcend constraints (emergent as well as in-
herent) to the overall agricultural development. The basic
problem with the planners' argument is that it assumes the
existence of market-oriented agriculture where cheapening of
one factor of production (such as capital) will lead to
substitution of other expensive factors (such as labor or
land). This has not been the case, though. Subsistence farm-

ing only uses cheap family (non-wage) labor and in the

75

meantime is restricted by the land-tenure system. Still,
another related problem is that even when farmers are able to
re-orient their operation towards the market by growing vege-
tables and other cash crops, there are no guarantees that they
will get adequate returns in urban markets due to stiff
competition from subsidized and/or cheap imports.6

Sixth, the claim made by policy makers that raising the
productivity of agriculture and incomes accrued to farmers
will ultimately put a stop to rural-urban migration is plain
nonsense. What is at the heart of the issue is not just
agricultural impotence but, rather, the new emerging struc-
tural (overall) transformation of the economy. As such, the
creation of attractive employment opportunities in other
sectors, particularly in the government sector, greatly
outweighed those found in family farming. This has led to
inter-sectoral redistribution of labor and, consequently, a
steady stream of rural-urban migrants. It is also interesting
to note that migrants, according to the logic of Pareto

optimality, had made the right choice for themselves by

 

6- The volume and prices of imported foodstuff and other

agricultural produces make family farming operations incapable to
compete and/or develop into a market oriented enterprise.

76

abandoning the land and opting for non-agricultural employ-
ment.7

Seventh, despite the government's (proclaimed) vested
interest in traditional agriculture, the distribution of sub-
sidies, loans, and land does not favor the western and
southern subsistence-based regions. Of all regions, these two,
thus far, continue to receive the least percentage of sub-
sidies, loans, and land allotments. It was, rather, the
central and northern regions of large-scale farmers and
agribusinesses that received and continue to receive more than
two-thirds of funds and subsidies allocated to agriculture.
For example, during the period between 1975 and 1985, the
western and southern regions' share of agricultural subsidies
and loans decreased from twenty-six percent to thirteen, while
the northern and central regions' share rose from sixty-four
to eighty percent for that same period (Nowshirvani, 1987).

Equally important is the way in which subsidies, loans,
and the distribution of free land were structured to favor
large farmers and agribusiness projects. Since 1975, the
ceiling of Agricultural Bank loans rose from 12,000 SR to 20
SR millions. Furthermore, laws for agricultural land dis-

tribution were also reformulated in order to accommodate large

 

7-It can be easily demonstrated that the net economic gains
for individuals who migrated greatly exceeds the lost value of
potential farm output. (For elaborate discussion see Arafat, (1985)
Development with Unlimited Supplies of Imported Labor: A Case Study
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Ph. D. dissertation, the American
University. p. 222).

77

farmers and agricultural-based projects, most of which are

owned by urban merchants and elite state functionaries. Prior

to 1975, the distribution of free land to Saudi farmers was

limited to ten hectares, but since then climbed to 400

hectares for companies and organizations and 4,000 for special

projects (Joffe, 1985). Naturally, land constraint and water
availability have limited small farmers of the western and
southern regions to small subsidies, loans, and free land
allotments. By the same token, the northern and central
regions, where available virgin land and plentiful deep under-
ground waters are available, have permitted the creation of

a capitalist agricultural sector characterized by highly

mechanized farms. These types of farming operations are

generally owned by private businessmen and state officials and

operated mainly by foreign labor (Nowshirvani, 1987).

What is frustrating about this newly created agricultural
sector is the fact it was not built on sound economics. To the
contrary:

l- Agribusiness projects prospered only as a result of heavy
subsidies and price supports. For example, in 1984 alone
the government paid about 3,700 SR millions more to buy
domestic wheat than to import it (M) .

2- Agribusiness projects rely on foreign labor and rarely use
Saudi labor except for sales and distribution.

3- Except for poultry and vegetables, most crops do not fit

into the country's consumption needs, as in the case of the

78
heavily subsidized production of wheat, where most of the
output is allocated for foreign aid or sold in interna-
tional markets at prices far below its actual cost of
production.

4- The maintenance of these projects is at the expense of the
depletion of precious underground water resources. What is
alarming about this is the fact that the state heavily in-
vests in sea-water desalination projects, whereby sub-
sidized.water resources are made available for the private
sector to waste on questionable enterprises.

5- Since these projects are in areas far removed from the re-
latively heavily populated rural areas of the southern and
southwestern regions, they have not contributed to the
stated goals of reversing recent rural to urban migration
trends. Moreover, harsh environmental conditions and low
wages discourage the participation of Saudi wage workers.

In sum, large commercial-oriented farms and projects do
not possess the ingredients of successful business enterprises
and will probably fade when subsidies and prices supports are
cut or water resources become depleted.

In the final analysis, the traditional agricultural
sector, which still preserves about fifty percent of the
potential labor force in the country, has not benefited
greatly nor has it responded favorably to any of the govern-
ments programs to regenerate it. This is obvious as it only

contributed one percent to the country GDP and only 3.4

79
percent to its non-oil GDP from 1960 to 1980 (SAMA: Annual
reports, 1983) . One cannot help but to think that in the
context of economic restructuring with total dependence on oil
revenues and the open-door economic policies, subsidies for
traditional agriculture are simply meant to serve as income
supplements for rural families, and not for raising agricul-

tural productivity.

eve
° m ' s c

The main objective of this chapter has been to charac-
terize the socioeconomic development of Saudi Arabia as
designed and pursued by the state in the last three decades;
how oil has prominently figured into the state development
schemes: the outcome of the socioeconomic restructuring imple-
mented by the state: and finally, how these new structural
parameters have impacted rates, patterns, and duration of
migration. While it remains difficult to fully comprehend the
ramifications of the course of development adopted by the
state, one nonetheless may highlight the most pronounced of
these.

As the increments of wealth suddenly burgeoned, so too
did the state's suzerainty over the society: economically,
politically, and ideologically. The main aspects of this have
been the overwhelming dominance of the bureaucracy which in
turn bureaucratized the economy, universalized formal educa-

tion, and rapidly expanded welfare programs.

80

The societal effects of the state's actions are no less
profound and easily traceable in all domains. Since the oil
boom of the mid-19705, Saudi society subsisted on oil income,
depended heavily on imports, and gradually abandoned its
traditional economic base. The foremost features of this have
been the sudden unproductive nature of sizable segments of the
society as underemployment and masked unemployment prolifer-
ated. Furthermore, the indigenous labor force decreased in
importance, as influxes of expatriate labor quickly dominated
the active sectors of the economy. Finally, and most impor-
tant, is the deterioration of the traditional sector of the
economy. While the welfare of the rural population, on the
main, has improved, this cannot be attributed to the produc-
tivity of the traditional sector as it lost its prominence to
the new and ever expanding government service and construction
sectors.

This general course of 'development' from the mid-19505
onward exhibited a profound and far-reaching effect on migra-
tion, altering the rates, patterns and duration. Within the
framework of push-pull factors, we may be able to highlight
the major regional and sectoral patterns of migration which
occurred during the last three decades.

First, from the late 19505 until 1974 inter-regional
seasonal labor migration continued. The main feature of this
was labor circulation and seasonal migration from the south

and southwest subsistence-based regions to urban centers of

81
the western region and the commercial agricultural centers and
urban areas of the central and northeastern regions. This
resulted in a pronounced decrease in the area under cultiva-
tion in the sending regions and a concomitant expansion of
agricultural lands in the central and northeastern regions.
This is readily seen in table 3.8
TABLE 3.8

CROPPED AREAS IN AGRICULTURAL LANDHOLDING BY MAIN
REGIONS IN THE EARLY 19608 AND EARLY 19708

 

 

(Area in thousand of hectares)

 

 

Permanent Crops Field Crops Ttotal
Region 1960-4 1973/4 1960-4 1973/4 1960-4 1973/4
Eastern 1.5 8.2 1.8 3.4 3.3 11.6
Central 13.6 18.0 48.2 29.0 61.8 47.0
Qaseem 10.5 12.8 26.9 89.5 37.4 102.3
Hayil 1.5 6.0 4.3 4.0 5.8 10.0
Northern 1.2 2.2 4.0 1.2 5.2 3.4
Medina 2.9 6.1 1.6 2.8 4.5 8.9
Makkah 2.3 13.2 98.3 67.1 100.6 80.3
Jizan 0.1 0.8 184.0 43.0 184.1 43.8
Southern 10.3 2.2 38.0 36.5 48.3 38.7
Total 43.9 80.0 407.1 351.2 451.0 395.2

 

Sources: "Agricultural Survey," in §£§Li§§i§§l.l§§£2293
1965- -68: WW. 1974 vol I Pp
10-12.

Unpaid household labor also declined in most of the
sending regions at this time except in the Southern regions,
where the use of female labor increased dramatically. The
latter, as a matter of fact, became the dominant source of
labor in the Southern regions of Asir, Bishah, and al-Baha,
where it accounted for more than fifty percent of the total

agricultural labor. This rise of women participation was the

direct result.of seasonal male labor“migration (Arafat, 1985).

82
Wage labor also increased in size as well as importance
in all receiving regions, particularly in Qaseem and north-
eastern regions where commercialization of agriculture came

to dominate (Joffe, 1985: Arafat, 1985: Nawshrivani, 1987)

(table 3.9)
TABLE 3.9

AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT BY REGION: COMPARISON
BETWEEN THE EARLY 19608 AND EARLY 19708

 

 

Number of Worker
per hectar

(thousands of workers)
Household Labor Hired Labor

 

 

 

Region 1960-4 1973/3 1960-4 1973/4 1960-4 1973/4
Eastern na 12.1 Na 87.3 6.0 8.6
Central 14.5 24.7 5.4 28.1 0.3 1.1
Qaseem na 30.3 Na 19.3 0.3 0.5
Hayil 6.3 16.4 0.6 4.1 1.2 2.0
Northern 7.0 7.9 1.3 1.0 1.6 2.6
Medina 9.9 14.2 2.4 4.8 2.9 2.1
Makkah 75.6 69.6 4.6 15.3 0.8 1.0
Jizan 64.1 48.7 4.9 18.3 0.4 1.5
Southern 51.4 218.8 1.0 29.6 1.1 6.4
Total NA 442.8 NA 207.9 0.6 1.6
Soul-“068: "Agricultural Survey. " MW,
1965-68: Q9mRrehensi25.185r1221tnral__geasu§. 1974. vol-I.

tables 16-18.

Second, as a result of the drought of the 19505, detri-
balization policies of the state, and the expansion of new
employment opportunities in the oil and government sectors,
the nomadic tribes of the North, Central, and North Central
regions began to settle. While they did not abandon altogether
their old traits of camel raising and herding, they became
increasingly dependent on government aids and subsidies. The
state, in turn, motivated by desire to detribalize the nomads
them into the new order initiated several

and 'integrate'

83

settlement schemes. The best example of these projects, which
happened to be the last, is the Haradh Project designed for
the Al-Murrah tribe of the northeast. This agricultural-cum-
settlement project was built in 1960 and was located at the
Haradh oasis (approximately 240 KM east of the capital in Wadi
Sahba). The state spent over 100 SR.million on the project for
the provision of necessary goods and services for the newly
established community (Alabbadi, 1981).

Settlement projects not only helped alter the mobility
patterns of nomads, but it had deeper economic, social,
political, and ideological ramifications for the Bedouins as
well as the state. In an attempt to justify the state's role,
Al-Farra (1973) argues that the state's detribalization
policies contributed to the national cohesion and increased
the central authority of the state. More importantly, this
scheme helped to sunder older 'traditional' social relations
and fostered the development of an embryonic 'modern' class
structure (Al-Farra, 1973: Islami and Kassouvi, 1984).

Third, the new socioeconomic order facilitated by oil
revenues and the state's efforts to centralize bureaucracy
set forth an even stronger and more extensive pattern of rural
to urban population shifts. This was characterized by per-
manent and/or semi-permanent moves of rural families. Essen-
tially this occurred during the same time frame as the other
patterns but was different in that its import for Saudi

society had far'greater'impact. But while it began during this

84

same time period, it accelerated after the oil embargo and.the
reconstitution of OPEC following the October War of 1973. The
lack of adequate information on this matter, however, has led
to speculations as to the rates and regional differences of
rural-urban migration, with some scholars arguing that rural
to urban migration came to a halt as a result of government
programs after 1975 (Arafat, 1985). On closer inspection of
extant data, however, it appears that this conclusion was
premature as every other indication points to the continued
outward drift of rural populations to major urban centers and
regional towns. In the last ten years, the populations of
major urban centers of the country grew by about thirty
percent on the average. The growth of populations of regional
towns, too, are equally or more substantial than those of
major urban centers. Taking into account both international
labor migration and natural growth, the residuals do substan-
tiate a continuous rural to urban population drift (table
3.10)

The government programs undeniably have delayed potential
massive rural drifts from the relatively heavily populated
regions of the south and southwest. These programs, however,
did so only through injection of capital, which is electively
used by recipients as an income source. To this end these
programs have not accomplished their main stated goals of .
raising rural productivity and releasing excess labor to the

to-be-created rural industries. To the contrary, they have

85
had the twin impact of withdrawing rural families out of
traditional agriculture while preserving large unproductive
labor in rural areas. It is ironic that development planners
elusively consider the mere presence of potential labor in the
rural countrysides as productive agricultural labor, where,
in fact, agricultural productivity went downward from the
outset of the 'Development' Plans.
TABLE 3.10

POPULATION ESTIMATES OF MAJOR URBAN CENTERS AND REGIONAL
TOWNS OF SAUDI ARABIA (1974-1990)

 

 

 

REGION 1974 1980 1985 1990
(projected)
Central
Riyadh 666,840 805,563 942,911 1,103,620
Kharj 42,347 51,156 59,878 70,084
Afif 66,361 80,106 93,834 109,827
Buraydah 76,442 92,344 108,088 126,511
Western
Jeddah 565,068 682,619 799,006 935,187
Makkah 369,913 446,866 523,056 612,206
Taif 282,909 341,762 400,033 468,214
Medina 198,186 239,414 280,235 327,997
Eastern
Dammam 127,844 154,439 180,771 211,581
Qatif 88,648 107,089 125,348 146,712
Hofuf 128,345 155,044 181,479 212,410
Mubarraz 54,325 65,626 76,815 89,907
Northern
Tabuk 74,825 90,390 105,802 123,835
Ar'ar 33,351 40,289 47,158 55,195
Hayil 59,677 72,091 84,383 98,765
Southwestern
Al-khamis 71,653 86,559 101,317 118,585
Abha 61,359 74,123 86,761 101,549
Muhayil 32,365 39,097 45,764 53,564
Albaha 32,10 38,777 45,389 53,125
Beljershi 38,525 46,539 54,474 63,758
Sabya 61,285 74,034 86,656 101,426
Najran 47,501 57,382 67,166 78,614
Bisha 41,540 50,181 58,737 68,748

 

Source: Ministry of Planning. 1984.
W Unpublished Data -

86

In the following chapters, I will examine, with the help
of micro and community level data, the impacts of the state's
development schemes upon the socio-economy and patterns of
rural-urban migration of a southwest rural community during
the last three decades. Furthermore, in the light of informa-
tion and arguments presented in this chapter, I will attempt
to show how rural households have interacted with the dynamic
of the new opportunities/pressures structure presented in the
'larger Saudi society, and how the structural parameters and
household characteristics have interactively shaped and
reshaped household livelihood strategies and redefined the

bases of socioeconomic class in the rural community.

CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF
THE STUDY AREA

The selected study area.is located.about fifty kilometers
south of the city oanbha. It is called.Tamniah. The area lies
on the crest of the escarpment overlooking Tihammat Shahran.
It is a part of extensive high mountains of a tabular appear-
ance that extend southward for more than fifty kilometers.
Tamniah is about 2290 meters above sea level. The tabular
appearance and a somewhat plate-like shape introduce the name
Sahn Tamniah which translates to Tamniah plate. The rock
formations are mainly massive crystalline rocks that are
covered in some localities by a metamorphosed sandstone or a
basaltic layer of tectonic and volcanic origins. As a matter
of fact, Sahn Tamniah is said to be situated on a volcanic
cone, a claim supported by the abundance of underground water,
which is stored in a large unpermeable basin believed to be
the mouth of a dead volcano (Brown, 1960: 1972).

The latitudinal and altitudinal location of the area
gives rise to distinct climatic conditions. Being on the crest
of the escarpment with an altitude of about 2290 m., the area
temperature is on the cool side with a moderate (about 9C.

deg.) seasonal range. The estimated annual mean temperature

87

88
is around (15 centigrade) but during winter months it gets
much colder. Rainfall is dependable and high. It averages
around 500 mm annually. The area, very distinctly, has a
winter-spring rain pattern, with about thirty percent during
the winter months, and about fifty-seven percent during the
spring months. November and February are the rainiest months
of the year. Both.account for about thirty-five percent of the
mean annual rainfall (Abdulfattah, 1981). The dependability
of rain and low incidence of evapo-transpiration give rise to
a relatively dense and extensive vegetational cover. Tamniah,
and Sha'af Shahran in general, is known for its forests and
beautiful scenery which blends very nicely with the landscape.

Sahn Tamniah takes a rectangular shape of about eight by
two kilometers of semi-flat land. Six villages extend over
this stretch. These are divided between the two tribes in-
habiting the area. To the north lie Dar Othman, A~l Yanfa',
and Al-Qariah, which are of Shahran descent, and south there
are A~l Ali, Al-Qarn, and A~lJaleeha of Kahtan descent. Tradi-
tionally, there are only minor cultural differences between
the two tribes residing in the area.

Field research was carried out in two of the Shahran
villages: A~l Yanfa' and Dar Othman. These two constitute one
community. As such, they share agricultural and pastoral
lands, residents of the two are related by blood and marriage,
have similar background, and share all social norms. Together

they are known as Shahran Bani Malik. The community is about

89

55 KM. from Abha, and about 60 KM. from Khamis Mushait; the
other major regional town in the region. It used to be among
the most prosperous rural communities in the region. Aided by
semi-flat topography, Tamniah villages, and particularly those
of Shahran, have a relatively sufficient and easily reclaim-
able agricultural land. It is only in the recently claimed
lands where they have resorted to man-made terrace systems to
extend the agricultural area.

The relative sufficiency of cultivated land coupled with
the rather dependable underground water resources and rainfall
led to the preservation of a staple agricultural economy. This
was based on grains production (wheat, sorghum, and barley).
Historically, the area was known for its affluence and crop
surpluses. It is common to find (Madafin) ground halls being
hand dug in massive rocks for storing surplus crops, espe-
cially sorghum and barley. As reported by village elders,
there are about 200 such storage areas in the village of
A~1Yanfa' alone. On the average, each holds around 200 kg.
Households generally store what is in access of their consump-
tion needs. Traditionally, the stored crops were used for

barter with the nomads.

s O -3 i 11. !o
The community socio-economic history to a large extent

is not known. Besides the lack of written documents and

history, available oral history, at best, covers the last

90

sixty some years, and is not as reliable as thought to be. For
instance, community elders who are the main source of oral
history only give a partial view of the past. As such, they
present it as a glorious history of prosperity, co-operation
and assistance, while ignoring the community internal con-
flicts, hardships, and injustices. Furthermore, outside
influences on the community's socioeconomic development are
hard to trace or to be given proper weight. For instance,
Tamniah was invaded by the Turks in 1912 when its tribes
refused to ally with them and pay taxes. The battle is
recorded as a major event, but its socio-economic consequences
are still not known. Given these limitations, one cannot help
but to base the analysis of socio-economic history on oral
communication which, to a large extent, is constricted to the
last sixty years.

Tamniah villages, so typical of The Asir (Sarat) region,
had a history of subsistence economy based on agriculture and
pastoralism. Grains production, especially wheat and sorghum,
(Thurah) were the main crops. Barley also used to be culti-
vated, but only on a limited basis. Due to the importance of
wheat and sorghum for household consumption and exchange, the
bulk of landholding was usually devoted to the two, with the
marginal lands being left to barley production. Vegetables and
fruits were seldom grown in the past since they did not figure
in the household diet, except for onions and tomatoes. The

latter had been introduced to the region by the Turks prior

91

to World War One. The lack of adequate market in the regional
towns and the costly access to the Hijaz urban centers of
Taif, Makkah, and Jeddah kept vegetable production in all Asir
region to aiminimum, This was the case until some twenty years
ago, when vegetable production extended both in the area of
cultivation and varieties grown. The development of good
markets in the regional towns of Abha and Khamis Mushait, and
the easy access to the large Towns of Hijaz as a result of
improvements in means of transportation, were among the
factors behind the new emphases on vegetables production. The
emergent needs for cash was the other factor of an equal
importance as farm families, in compliance with the emerging
national economy, began to diversify agricultural production.
Vegetable production, however, has not sustained any measur-
able growth because agriculture, generally, lost its impor-
tance as a result of the attractions to off-farm government
employment.
1- WM

Historically, the form of social organization that
dominated the southwestern region and most of the Arabian
Peninsula is the tribe. It is a kinship unit formally based
on descent (real or imagined) from a common ancestor through
the male line (Senani, 1983). Tamniah is inhabited by two
tribes: Shahran.and.Kahtana These are among the largest tribes

in the country and, certainly, in the southwestern region.

92
They extend west to the Tihamma region and east to the
foothills of the Hijaz Plateau.

The two researched villages are from the Shahran tribe.
Both carry their ancestors' name (Yanfa' and Othman). They
descended from.the same sub-section (or band) of Shahran Bani
Malik. The name is derived from "Malik Ibn Anzah": their
believed ancestor (personal communication). The two villages
through most of their known history functioned as one socio-
political unit with one head of tribe (Sheikh) and council of
elders. They were, however, economically independent except
during times of crises.

Since the last quarter of the 19th century, the community
came under the "Sheikhdom" of A~1Hamoodh. This family is well
known in the southwest region, had many inspiring leaders who
successfully led the community through difficult crises and
conflicts with rival tribes and others such as the‘Turks. More
importantly, the A~1Hamoodh family is credited for building
a strong social organization based on cooperation, assistance,
accountability, and obedience to the head of tribe and council
of elders. As a matter of fact, the (Sheikh) head of tribe,
traditionally, had the full power to imprison, punish, banish,
and fine any fellow villager found guilty of an infraction or
misconduct.

While both villages, more or less, have a history of
subsistence production, nonetheless, each emphasized different

activity. A~lYanfa' emphasized agriculture with herding as a

93

complementary source of subsistence. Dar Othman, to the
contrary, depended on lumbering for sale, with crop production
coming second and herding third. These specializations. are the
result of inequalities in the distribution of farm lands.
A"lYanfa', being the larger and stronger clan, strengthened
their hold on the better, more accessible, and easy to
guard/protect land. People of Dar Othman, left only with a
relatively easy to protect strip of land, which cannot meet
all subsistence needs of the village, diverted their attention
to the nearby forestry of alJurrah and to herding.

Here, one may point out the problem of inter-tribal
raids, which traditionally posed a constant threat to the
community and its agricultural produce, and was a major
obstacle to expansion of agricultural lands. While arable
lands were relatively available, the community in fear of
rival tribes looking for revenge and/or burglary confined
itself to the easily defended part of Tamniah. In testimony
of fear of enemies, all communities of the southwestern region
are landmarked by defense castles or towers, built in stra-
tegic locations. There are eleven such towers (Gasabh/ pl.
gasub) in the Sahn Tamniah. These are round, about twenty-five
feet high, and built of stone and mud. They resemble chimneys,
only they are wider in diameter and shorter. During conflicts
and bad times, the community men, armed with rifles, used to

take turns guarding the community, especially the working

94
people. These towers also were used for storing wheat crop
surplus, which needs better ventilation.

To this end, the community was characterized by economic
sufficiency and stability. Aided by the semi-flat topography,
fertile soil, and dependable water resources, Shahran Bani
Malik. seldom Ihad any' major’ economic hardship in recent
history. Traditionally, it used to produce all of its needs
from wheat (the staple food), sorghum, and barley. Herding
used to be the second major economic activity. Each family
used to own a herd of goats and sheep to complement agricul-
ture for’household.needs, and for exchange in the area market.
Herding as a major activity, however, was only practiced by
a handful of families. Those on the main lacked sufficient
agricultural land. The third, but limited activity, was trade.
Household domestic and production needs, which are not
available locally, were usually brought by a few villagers
who used to work as merchants from towns of the west coast
such as Jizan, Subia, and al-Hago. Clothes, kerosine, coffee,
pottery, and draught animals were the primary traded goods.
2- Win

Land ownership in the community of Tamniah and the
Southwestern region as a whole is, generally, the outcome of
two factors:

1- At the regional level, there are the common tribal lands,
where boundaries are drawn between tribes or bands of the

mother tribe. Within these boundaries, the tribe has a

95
legal right to the land for agriculture, lumbering, and
pastoralism. These boundaries are not always constant due
to conflicts and tribal wars. The reputation and strength
of the tribe contribute to the maintenance and/or expansion
of its territories.

2- At the village level, ownership of agricultural land was
initially established by the inheritance system. Relatives
of a deceased head of household (or a patriarch) divide his
belongings, including land. This is done according to the
Islamic "Shari'a" laws of inheritance, which set shares
according to gender and relation to the deceased. For
example, the son gets twice as much as the daughter, and
lateral relatives get shares according to closeness of
relation to the deceased.

The inheritance system is seen by many (including the
writer) as a major contributing factor to the dynamics of land
ownership in Islamic countries. Most of the writings on
inheritance, however, amount to no more than an arithmetic
analysis of inheritance and its effects on land fragmentation.
Nothing is said of the redefining of socioeconomic status at
the household and the community levels. Such shifts of land
ownership and, subsequently, of socioeconomic status of
members of the household, due to inheritance, may have many
consequences, some of which are grievous to the household and
to the peasant community. The landholding, for instance, might

have to be divided into small tracts of no economic viability.

96
Some families may have to shift its production strategies in
order to adapt to the new situation. Others may resort to
migration to secure subsistence.

Whereas the inheritance system.may hold the key to ques-
tions of land ownership in.Tamniah community, one nonetheless
must not ignore the many factors which, historically, affect
maintenance and expansion of this ownership. Inequality in
this matter had operated both between and within households
in Tamniah. Households of better socioeconomic status, good
representation in the council of village elders, historically,
had better access to the better and/or more easily expandable
land. The demographic situation of the household from a
generation to the next, potentially, regulated the household
ability to expand its land through buying or reclamation. I
Households of good stock of workers have better opportunities
to dispense some labor on new land. Labor short households,
to the contrary, may have to abandon some of their cultivated
land.

Inequality within households takes many forms. There are
inter-gender inequalities, which were set by both the inher-
itance system and the community social norms. For example,
females always inherit smaller shares than males of equal
relationship to the deceased. This applies to all of the
Arabian Peninsula and most of the Islamic world. In Islam, the

man is obligated with the family's 'bread-winning', and thus

97
always is accorded twice as much as the woman's inheritance‘
share.

Another gender inequality, being the product of social
norms of the southwestern region, is a tacitly manufactured
social rule *which. obstructs the- female relative of the
deceased to ask and/or claim her share of inherited land. This
rule contradicts the Islamic law of inheritance, but as they
say "female inheritance is legalized by Shari'a, prohibited
by (norm) Shimah". The deprivation of women from inheritance
only applies to inheritance of land. The woman, of course, can
ask for her share through the legal system and will get it.
She and her immediate family (husband and children), however,
will have to bear the consequences. Beside the social rejec-
tion, the community may boycott the family in future marriage
arrangements. Still some families may take back their
daughters who are married in that family. If, on the other
"hand, the woman chooses to give away her share to her natal
family, a big thanksgiving party will be thrown in her honor,
and a white flag will be raised on her natal family roof for
three days attesting to the woman's generosity. The latter
custom, sometimes, did extend a little bit further when the
family sends the social servant (Dawshon) to the*weekly market
carrying the white flag and praising the woman's matrimonial
family for what the woman did. This norm, while it is very
unjust to women, nonetheless, helped protect agricultural land

from extra fragmentation and maintained its ownership in the

98

same kinship. In a sense, it is the only answer given to the
question as to why the woman was not willingly accorded her
share of inherited land. It is, precisely, the fear of the
family that it is going to be shared in its most vital owning
(the land) by outsiders. As one villager put it, "I raise my
daughter, give her to an other family for nothing...now they
want to share my children's land?!" Furthermore, one must
not neglect the fact that it is the moral obligation of the
woman's natal family to take care of her in old age.

Intra-gender inequalities among males of the household
are rather subtle. The more apparent inequalities stem from
inheritance. As mentioned above, relationship to the deceased
determines the shares each household member is entitled to.
There are, however, other inequalities stemming mainly from
injustices, as a result of the power structure within the
household and the community as a whole. It must be said,
however, that partition of land is not resorted to unless the
household becomes so extended, or when some of the heirs ask
for their shares. The land, otherwise, will be collectively
managed, and the crop shared.
3- MW

Agricultural production in Tamniah, as is the case in a
subsistence economy, used to be organized around household
members. The main agricultural tasks are collectively per-
formed by adult members. Division of labor among agricultural

tasks and between members of the household of different age

99

and sex is dependent upon the availability of household adult
laborers. When adult juniors (male and female) are in good
enough numbers to carry out agricultural tasks, the seniors
and children are, usually, left with minimum work loads. Male
juniors are given the task of plowing and irrigation, with
female juniors (daughters and daughters-in-law) helping in
land preparation, spreading natural fertilizer, sowing, and
harvesting the crop. The seniors will be left with easy tasks
to perform, less physical jobs such as supervision and.market
activities. Children (under fifteen) are assigned to guarding
the fields from pillage, and looking after young ruminants.
If, on the other hand, the adult juniors are not available
sufficiently, as is the case in nuclear families, all agricul-
tural tasks are collectively performed, with a great flexibil-
ity in the division of labor between household members of
different sex and age. Women, however, used to be overworked
with the added burden of the domestic (house) work. They must
bring water, firewood, and do all other domestic tasks.

Non-household labor, historically, has been used. Beside
the communal labor, which will be fully discussed later, there
used to be other forms of remunerated labor. Sharecroppers
were the more common type. Those usually were fellow villagers
who lacked sufficient and/or good land. Others used to come
from.nearby areas such as those south and southeast of’Tamniah
which were frequently struck by drought, and had less than

sufficient underground water resources. These areas are

100
inhabited by the Kahtan tribe which is one of the most
travelled tribes in Arabia, mainly due to drought out-breaks
and fragility of environment.

Those coming from outside Tamniah used to work on a
seasonal basis. Usually the sharecropper used to bring all of
his family, and stay for two seasons or more depending on the
situation in their natal areas and work availability in
Tamniah. Some sharecroppers, as a matter of fact, had bought
some land and resided in the area ever since coming. Another
source of outside labor were the Yemenites. Those used.to»come
from South Yemen, either as Sharecroppers or hired labor.
Nowadays, North Yemen male laborers are the main source of
non-family labor in the area. They work for a monthly salary
and/or sharecropping, and send remittances to their families.

Beside the sharecroppers, there used to be the harvest
helpers. They were either from Tamniah, or migrant laborers
and their families who used to come mainly from Kahtan areas.
They used to work for board, food, and a small share of the
harvest.

4- Wage

Up until the late 19505, Tamniah, as is the case with
most mountain peasant communities of the Southwestern regions,
was less accessible due to lack of good roads and means of
transportation. People of Tamniah used to travel on foot for
up to seven hundred kilometers in order to reach the Hijaz

cities of Taif and Makkah. The difficulty of movement through

101

mountainous regions had kept the flow of people and goods to
a minimum. Only basic, locally unavailable, and easy to carry
goods were brought to the community. Prior to the mid-1950s,
the community of Shahran Bani Malik was characterized by less
differentiation both in size of landholding and in agricul-
tural activities. Only a handful of households were
distinguished in terms of size of landholding, had better
savings, and possessed better housing. The rest, in the main,
owned between two and eight pieces of land with an average
size of 160 sq. meter for each. Furthermore, most households
at least owned one draught animal, a simple plow, beside the
other agricultural production necessities of simple metal and
leather tools. Lack of great differentiation, coupled with the
fact.that the logic of this peasant community systemnwas based
on subsistence and survival, had permitted the development of
a social system of a great degree of cooperation, assistance,
and complementarity.

Mutual and instituted co-operation and assistance are
the characteristic feature of the Arabian tribal (nomads and
settled) groups, but with varying forms and degrees. The
community of Shahran Bani Malik, typically, had a history of
group-cohesiveness. Aligned.under the 'Sheikhdom' of a strong
and charismatic family (A'lHamoodh), they had built a system
of social organization and rules that practically covered most
spheres of their life. In what follows I will briefly outline

the main aspects of this system.

102

W

Self sufficiency in labor'is.hard to obtain all year long
in subsistence-oriented communities. Tamniah, being no excep-
tion, historically relied upon communal labor to fulfill
production and construction needs. Even though most of the
households used to engage in the cultivation of small pieces
of land, they nonetheless had to resort to labor cooperation
in certain times and situations. Harvesting, which is a labor-
intensive operation in traditional agriculture, represents the
optimum of labor co-operation. The household which cannot
manage by itself used to call in neighbors and relatives to
help cut the crop. Men usually used to do the cutting, and the
women bundle up the crop and carry it to the threshing floor
(Jareen/pl. Jurun). The latter is a round stone-built floor
of about forty feet in diameter and has a pole at the circle.
Threshing is done by animals (oxen and donkeys) which were
usually aligned side by side and tied from the neck to a
wooden pole. Men usually help lead the animals and turn the
crop upside down. Winnowing is also done by men, with women
raking up the hay and cleaning the floor. Harvest helpers
usually were remunerated by meals, labor, and/or a small part
of the crop either before or after it was threshed.

Labor co-operation, in some cases, did extend to cover
all agricultural operation. For example, when two (not
necessarily kin) families who were short of labor, tools

and/or animals agree to work interchangeably in each others'

103
land during the whole growing season, and at the end of the
season they divide up the crop. This was rather extreme, but
the more common was aiding each other through certain tasks,
such as plowing, sowing, etc. Reciprocation, which used to be
in kind, involved other forms of labor and meals.

During housing construction, and especially after walls
had been built, the owner used to call on fellow male
villagers to help do the roofing. This used to take a day of
work, and the workers were usually reciprocated by a meal.
Other tasks requiring labor co-operation are the cutting and
bringing home of large timbers to be used as a house pole
and/or roof support. House maintenance and decoration are the
women's job. Depending on the task difficulty, women usually
cooperate and reciprocate in kind.

Beside labor cooperation, there were also the borrowing
of production needs, such as tools and animals. The peasant
family, generally, only owned one draught animal, and.when it
needed another animal for such.tasks a5jplowing, which require
two draught animals, it borrowed the other one from neighbors
and/or' relatives for' a return in kind. Furthermore, in
situations of large animal loss (a cow or an oxen), the
village people used to compensate the loser by buying the
animal meat even if it was only to be thrown away. Still
another form of assistance is when needy families send their

teenagers to the better-off families during harvesting and

104

threshing to get some (Kasb) . They usually do not go home

empty handed.

WWW

Beside the above mentioned cooperation, which is of the
mutual type, other economic cooperation and assistance were
set by the head (Sheikh) and.council of elders of the village.

Agricultural harvest, being crucial to the subsistence of the

whole community, received most of these institutions:

First, the village with the help of the Sheikh, chooses
between three and twelve men from different kinships, called
Asharah. Their job was to witness every household crop after
it was threshed, and take 1/12th of the whole crop. This is
called 'Ushur' which translates to 1/10th, but in recent
history only 1/12th was taken:

Second, after all this was gathered from all farmers and
brought to the village storage, it used to be divided into
the following:

1- Seventy percent to be distributed among the village poor,
according to family size and need. When the village has a
bumper crop, only a part of this will be distributed. A
part of the remaining, usually, was stored for village
guests, and.the rest was sold in the area market with money
being saved and/or spent on such crises as big debts,
costly marriage of a village member, and a return help to
other villages or tribes. If there were no such needs or

crises in the immediate future, the money used to be

105
divided among village kinship groups (Badanah/ pl. Bidan)
according to their sizes.
2- Twenty percent goes to the workers who collected the
'Ushur'.
3- Five percent was the share of the village Sheikh.
4- The remaining five percent usually was sent to the head of
the mother tribe (Shahran).

Beside the 1/12th instituted locally, there was the
matter of the five percent (Zakah) instituted by the Islamic
'Shari'a' law. This is usually collected by the state workers
at the season end.

Today, things have changed. With the money economy, every
village male member, eighteen years or older, is required to
pay 100 hundred Saudi Riyal annually to be used.during crises.
This also applies to village out-migrants who either send the
money or have a relative pay it to the tribe.

5- Wash

The mountain peasant communities of the southwestern
region had always attempted to be self-sufficient in produc-
tion, consumption, and other needs. While they had solved
labor shortages through co-operation and exchange of labor,
other needs had to be fulfilled differently. Aside from the
land, there are other means of production, which require
specializations. These involve the presence of a carpenter,

a blacksmith, and a leather craftsman.

106

The community of Shahran Bani Malik used to have three
families specializing in carpentry, blacksmith, and leather
crafting. All three families are from the Kahtan tribe. Their
ancestors moved to Tamniah during late 18905. All of these
crafts are viewed as demeaning jobs. Up to now, there are no
inter-marriages between those three families and the rest of
the community. They have to find out-of-village marriage
partners for their sons and daughters. The three craftsmen
used to fulfill the community needs of making and repairing
agricultural and house tools. Usually, materials of large
tools such as a plow (Lumah) , a house door or window are
brought by the owner. The carving or making of the tool is
done for“money’or'ajpart of the crop. The same applied for the
blacksmith and leather treater.

All the repair services by the craftsmen used to be done
in exchange for an uncut amount of crop, depending on the
extent of the craftsman's service.

Beside mainly working to fulfill the community needs, all
those specialty people had businesses of their own. They used
to make tools and household necessities, which they took to
the area weekly market.

3 Another specialty of the southwestern mountain peasant
communities was the job of a social servant. Known by dif-
ferent names in different communities, the social servant
(Dawshon) had a range of duties. He used to announce happy

occasions such as births, circumcision and marriages, and take

107

care of animal slaughtering. Also, when mosque guests who
usually have no relatives in the area arrive, the social
servant takes the trouble of making arrangements. For example,
he used to inform the family whose turn it was to receive the
mosque ‘guests, carry“ out. invitations, if’ necessary, and
slaughter the animal to be fed to the guests, if required. For
such jobs he usually got in return some meat of the slaughter-
ed animal, a part of the crop, or some money.

The social servant also used to perform other jobs of a
more serious nature. During tribal conflicts and wars he used
to take messages between rivals. The safety of those mes-
sengers during wars, usually, was guaranteed by warring
tribes. It was rather abhorrent to kill a 'Dawshon'.

In most southwestern communities, the social servant is
not from the same tribe. Under some cases where no outsider
is available to replace a deceased social servant, a fellow
villager used to volunteer for the job, such as was the case
in the Shahran Bani Malik community. Like those other crafts-
men, the social servant lacks respect among community members,
and his family does not inter-marry with community members.
6- W

The southwestern communities have one-day weekly markets
known by their days of convening. Those are located in a site
central to the communities they served. Different kinds of
products (domestic and otherwise), such as animals and their

products, agricultural products and tools, and household's

108

consumable goods, (were sold in these markets by farmers,
nomads, and local as well as traveling merchants. The com-
munities of Sha'af Shahran have a Monday market known as Ibn
Hamoodh market, which is the family name of Shahran Bani Malik
head of tribe. Every tribe guarantees the safety of its market
during the day of marketing, so there will not be fighting or
quarrels.

Besides the area population, the market was (and is
still) attended by people coming from the surrounding areas
such as Abha and Khamis Mushait, but also by nomads coming
from as far as Tihamma in the west. Barter used to be the
common form of exchange up until the early 19505 when money
took over. While money has been known through all of the
Islamic history of Arabia, it was rather a scarce and costly
commodity, especially in isolated peasant and nomad communi-
ties. In recent history, the French silver Riyal was the
common currency, until the Saudi Riyal took over that role in
mid-19405.

The area local merchants used to bring consumable goods
like coffee, spices, salt, clothes, pottery and kerosine from
the western towns of Sabia, alHago and Jizan, and also the
Hijaz towns. These used to be exchanged for money if avail-
able, but mostly for cereals and domesticated animals. The
merchants, who are mainly from the neighboring al-Masqi com-
munity, in turn, used to take the cereal to Abha and Khamis

Mushait where it used to be sold to the regional merchants.

109

Camels and donkeys were the principal means of transportation
for the merchants. Nowadays, these local markets are still
active, but, to a large degree, are flooded.with the cheap and
more colorful Southeast Asian goods on the expense of the
local varieties. Except for ruminants and their produces and
agricultural products, all other indigenous goods are vanish-
ing due to their inability to compete against foreign con-
sumable goods.

While exchange was the main function of the periodic
markets, nonetheless, they served as convention centers to
work out inter-tribal conflicts, spread new ideas, and as
public announcement places. As a matter of fact, the Sheikh
of Shahran Bani Malik, who traditionally sponsored the area
market, used to have a (Madjlis) place, where he could be
reached by fellow villagers having disputes and visitors from
other tribes. Today, these still serve as market places, but
have lost their other function.due to the integration of these
tribal communities into the larger Saudi society, and the
diminishing role of the tribe as an organizing socio-political
unit.

Historically, Tamniah community, while it did most of its
dealings through its weekly market, did have nonmarket
dealings mainly with the nomads of Tihamma. The latter, driven
out by heat, usually ascend from Tihammat Shahran in early
summer. They usually have no interest in agriculture and have

to get their annual needs of cereals (mainly sorghum) from

110
Tamniah's farmers. The latter would, in turn, have saved some
of the winter croprto‘be dealt to the nomads. In exchange, the
farmers get animals and their produce and/or money, if avail-

able. In other cases, they dealt their cereal for delayed.pay.

Won

Prior to the major structural transformation of the Saudi
society of the last.three<decades,'migration.strategies of the
peasant communities were of different type, duration and
causes. In the southwestern region, migration strategies of
peasant communities were dictated by both the overall com-
munity subsistence needs and that of the individual house-
holds. In communities of frequent break-outs of drought and
water shortages, such as those of Bilad Kahtan and the east
slope of the Hijaz Plateau, out-migration might have been the
ultimate strategy for survival. In other areas, where favor-
able environmental conditions. prevail most of the ‘time,
migration was less important and served to complement the
household's subsistence production.

The Tamniah communities, particularly those of Shahran,
had selectively used migration to fulfill shortages in
subsistence production. Aided by a dependable subsistence
economy, labor cooperation, and mutual assistance, the
community had managed to keep out-migration to a minimum. Up
until the 19505, temporary labor“migration, to a largeiextent,

was the norm. This was more or less a form of "target".

111
migration, where the household dispatches to the Hijaz towns
one or more of its adult male members to seek 'gainful'
employment in order to buy the household's production and
subsistence essentials.

The household socioeconomic status, as is manifest in
size of landholding and possession of means of production,
played a major role in migration strategies of the peasant
household. Those who were not able to maintain subsistence and
self-sufficiency through the household agricultural land,
usually opt for temporary migration more frequently.

Even though underground water is abundant, there were
those who had difficulties making use of it, due to inability
to hand dig wells and/or marginality of their landholdings.
Those generally depend on rain-fed (Athari) agriculture. They
were more than others prone to economic hardships when rain
was insufficient or late to come, despite the community system
of cooperation and assistance. Under such conditions, these
households used to rely on temporary labor migration to secure
subsistence.

Shortages in means of production and household consumable
goods were the more common reasons for migration. For example,
when needs arise for a draught animal, a large tool or
construction materials, and/or money for required consumable
goods, the household resorted to migration to acquire such
necessities. It was (as reported by elders) a lot easier to

make use of temporary labor migration rather than part with

112
the household savings of crops or other possessions, such as
agricultural land, in order to meet such emerging needs.

The migration strategies, however, were generally
regulated by age-sex composition of the household. As such,
the number and age of adult male laborers dictated the will-
ingness and extent of use of migration. When the household
had adult male laborers in excess of its domestic needs,
generally, it made use of the extra labor in migration to
maintain good subsistence and improve means of production,
including agricultural land. On the other hand, if the house-
hold.was short of adult male laborers, it ruled out migration
in favor of sustaining an adequate domestic production.

Traditionally, the primary destinations of the south-
western labor migrants were the Hijaz towns of Taif and
Makkah. Historically, these towns presented good opportunities
for manual work all year long, but particularly during the
pilgrimage season. Migrants used to engage in such manual work
as construction and home delivery of drinking water (Sigayah) .
During' the jpilgrimage season, which. extends for’ several
months, there used to be good opportunities to serve the
pilgrims, engage in retail trading, and sell water.

Generally, the number of a household's migrants was
dependent upon the household's urgency of needs and its
age-sex composition. Commonly, the elder son (eighteen years
or older) and/or a younger brother of the head of household

were singled out for migration. Household heads, fifty years

113

and younger, also used to migrate temporarily during the off-
season and/or when the household had difficulties eking out
its subsistence locally, and had no available adult male
juniors. In other situations when the household had no adult
males, as in the case of female-headed households, an elder
son of a young age used to migrate. Young migrants, usually,
were looked after by fellow migrants, who arranged their stay
with urban families in need of a house or business helper.
They used to‘work.for a monthly’pay, send remittances to their
families, and stay for a full year, after which they returned
home.

Migrants used to stay away for a period ranging from
between six and two years, during which they took up manual
work and send money and other necessities back to their
families through returning migrants.

Village migrants used to travel on foot in groups of up
to twenty men. It used to take them approximately three
weeks. On their arrival to the destined town, they used to
live together and engage in the same line of work. The
duration of migration used to be variable. Depending on the
migrant's "target", generally, it ranged between six months
and two years. During this, the migrant used to keep in touch
with his family through the stream of coming and returning
migrants. The latter'used.to take back home remittances to the
migrants' families. By the time of their return, the migrant

would have saved enough money to buy a camel-load of household

114
essentials. Depending on needs, migration was repeated every

other year.

CHAPTER FIVE

TAMNIAH, TODAY

Inoroouotion

The larger structural changes experienced by the Saudi
society have affected all areas of Saudi Arabia; the study
area under consideration, Tamniah, presents no exception. But
while all areas underwent dramatic changes within Saudi
Arabia, these changes were filtered through different forms
of social organization and.value systems and thus communities
exhibited different results in the way they were reconnected
to the larger Saudi society. Tamniah.represents but one aspect
of these larger systemic changes. Prior to 1950 the study area
was a relatively self-sufficient peasant community that
subsisted on family farming, complemented by ruminant herding
and periodic male labor migration to the Hijaz urban centers.
Moreover it was a community with strong cohesive bonds visible
in various forms of communal assistance, cooperation, and
adherence to a set of socio-political rules and cultural
mores.

Since the 19505, however, forces of change have worked
to reshape Tamniah to the degree that the social basis of

subsistence was broken and bases of social class were

115

116
redefined. In light of this, older patterns of migration were
reshaped and took on new meaning. While some migrants do
return.now, as in the past, returning to the village is predi-
cated solely on realizing similar "life chances" present in
other parts of the country.

In the following three chapters, my main concerns are to
characterize the larger societal opportunities/pressures on
Tamniah', how these were perceived by the villagers, and what
was their outcome. Not only am I concerned about changes in
migration patterns, but also with the way the community was
socially and economically transformed as the older mode of
subsistence and self-reliance crumbled. Furthermore, I will
elaborate on exactly how structural changes refashioned the
community through its impact on different types of households.
Most studies related to socioeconomic changes in Saudi Arabia
have thus far failed to bring into focus how these changes
have differentially affected.differing communities, let alone
households. But to stop here still yields a partial view of
Tanmiah as people--individuals-- who give social action a
face. As such, I will conclude my analysis of migration with
individual case studies in order that the deeper meanings of
social change may become clear.

The communities of Tamniah, as previously stated, consist
of six villages. According to a preliminary enumeration survey

of households recently conducted by the Health Dispensary of

117

Tamniah, the overall population count of Tamniah communities

is approximately 4,000.

My study was carried out in the community of Shahran Bani

Malik, which.has a total population.count of 1,088 distributed

among 159 households. It consists of two villages; A~l Yanfa,

and Dar Othman. Based on kinship lines, spatial distribution,

and dwelling types, I was able to identify five sub-divisions

of the two villages:

1-

A~l Yanfa, which is the traditional home of the A~l Yanfa
band. It has the largest population and number of house-
holds, and. is dominated. by the ‘traditional mud/stone
dwelling types.

Dar Othman, the home of the A~l Othman band. It has lost
the majority of its inhabitants to long-term migration, and
many of its old dwelling units are abandoned. In the last
few years, however, ten modern houses were built by young
people and large extended families in the village.

A~l Dahmash, an extension of the old village of A~l Yanfa,
which is mainly inhabited by nuclear families and low
income female-headed. households. It. has a ‘variety of
dwelling types that range from modern construction to
corrugated zinc.

AsSharhah, which is inhabited by two of the A~l Yanfa
kinship groups. This is located about two kilometers from
the rest of the community. Traditionally, it was agricul-

tural land that was reclaimed from the slope facing Tehamma

118
in response to land pressure. Most of its dwellings are
recently built modern houses.

5- Al-Muhalal, which is the recent extension of the two
villages, and is inhabited by well to do extended and
nuclear families. Except for one dwelling, the remaining
houses of Al-Muhalal are recently built large modern houses

(table 5.1).

TABLE 5.1
TYPES OF DWELLING BY COMMUNITY SUB-DIVISIONS OF
SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH

 

 

 

 

 

Community sub-Divisions Total
Construction A~l Dar A~l Al- Al-
Type Yanfa Othman Dahmash Muhalal Sharhah
Modern 23.1% 52.6% 58.3% 94.1% 75.0% 43.4%
Stone/mud 72.5% 47.4% 16.7% 5.9% 20.0% 51.6%
Corrug. zinc 0% 0% 16.7% 0% 5.0% 1.9%
Wood-roof block 1.1% 0% 8.3% 0% 0.0% 1.2%
Mixed const. 3.3% 0% 0% 0% 0.0% 1.9%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(N= ) (91) (19) (12) (17) (20) (159)
WW
1- Age;§ex_niettitgtien: Approximately sixty-three percent

of inhabitants of Shahran Bani Malik are 20 years of age
or younger, and only six percent of the total population
are 61 years or older. The overall gender distribution is
more or less equal, but with some variations between age
categories, and also at the community sub-division level:

1) males slightly out-number females for the entire

119

community; and 2) as a result of higher incidence of male

migration,

category (table 5.2).

TABLE 5.2

AGE/SEX STRUCTURE BY COMMUNITY SUB-DIVISIONS,
SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH

females out-number males for the 21-40 age

 

 

 

 

 

Age Community sub-Division Total (N)

categories

(years) A~l Dar A~l Al-Mu AsSha

by gender Yanfa Othm. Dahm. halal rhah

Male
01-20 61.2% 50.9% 78.4% 67.1% 64.9% 63.2% (345)
21-40 14.5% 24.5% 15.7% 15.8% 13.0% 15.6% (85)
41-60 16.3% 13.2% 5.9% 14.5% 15.6% 14.7% (80)
> 60 8.0% 11.3% 0% 2.6% 6.5% 6.6% (36)

Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

(n: ) (289) (53) (51) (76) (77) (546)

(Mean) (24) (27) (15) (19) (23) (22)

Female
01-20 57.5% 64.7% 61.1% 62.8% 72.4% 61.8% (335)
21-40 20.9% 10.3% 27.8% 23.1% 16.1% 19.6% (106)
41-60 14.7% 17.6% 8.3% 6.4% 9.2% 12.5% (68)
> 60 7.0% 7.4% 2.8% 7.7% 2.3% 6.1% (33)

Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

(n= ) (273) (68) (36) (78) (87) (542)

(Mean) (24) (24) (20) (22) (18) (23)

Grand Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

(GR Na ) (562) (121) (87) (154) (164) (1088)

(GR Mean) (24) (26) (17) (20) (20) (22)

 

Z-Hoosoholoiizo
The majority of Shahran Bani Malik households (52%) have

between 6-13 members. Extended and polygamous families, of

course, are dominated by large families of up to eighteen

members per family (table 5.3).

120

TABLE 5.3
HOUSEHOLD SIZE BY COMMUNITY SUB-DIVISIONS,
SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH

 

 

 

 

 

Community sub-Divisions Total
H.Hold A~l Dar A~l Al- AsSh-
Size Yanfa Othm. Dahm. Muhal. arhah
1 Person 13.2 5.3 8.3 0 10.0 10.1
2--5 35.1 52.6 16.7 11.8 10.0 30.2
6--9 33.0 15.8 41.7 47.0 45.0 34.6
10--13 15.4 26.3 33.3 29.4 25.0 20.7
14--18 3.3 0 0 11.8 10.0 4.4
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(N= ) (91) (19) (12) (17) (20) (159)
(MEAN) (8) (8) (9) (11) (10) (9)

 

3- HoosoholdeRos

Shahran Bani Malik presents a wide variety of household
residential arrangements. These range from a single person
unit to multiple-family (extended/joint) households. The
nuclear family is quickly becoming the dominant residential
form, and accounts for about sixty percent of the community
total. There are, however, many other household forms: 1) old
widows living alone constitute about ten percent, and reside
mainly in old houses of A~l Yanfa: 2) single adults with
dependents (mainly children) constitute about eight percent:
3) about twenty-two percent of the community households are
extended families, where married sons are living with their
parents. This is typical offiAl-Muhalal, where parents and.sons
have :managed to build new large houses on family-owned
agricultural lands. Also, some married brothers still live in

joint households, and manage their income and consumption

121
jointly; and 4) many middle-aged males have taken a second
wife. The polygamous marriage is common among well-to-do high

government officials who are 40-57 years old (table 5.4).

TABLE 5.4
HOUSEHOLD TYPES BY COMMUNITY SUB-DIVISIONS OF
SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH

 

Community sub-Division Total (N)
Household

Type A~l Dar A~l Muh asSh-
Yanfa othm. Dahm. lal arhah

 

 

Single adult

 

Male 0 0 0 0 5.0 .6 (1)
Female 13.2 5.3 8.3 0 5.0 9.4 (15)
Male w/depend. 4.4 5.3 0 0 5.0 3.8 (6)
Female w/depend. 1.1 5.3 25.0 5.9 0 3.8 (6)
Nuclear family
No children 6.6 0 0 0 5.0 4.4 (7)
With Children. 49.5 57.9 58.3 29.4 55.0 49.7 (79)
Polygamous 3.3 0 8.3 17.6 10.0 5.7 (9)
Multiple families
Pare./Marri. Son 14.3 21.1 0 41.2 15.0 17.0 (27)
Married brothers 3.3 0 0 0 0 1.9 (3)
Pare./Marri. Sons 4.4 5.3 0 5.9 t) 3.8 (6)
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(N= ) (91) (19) (12) (17) (20) (159)
a a1 e
e ' s e

Prior to 1950 the community of Shahran Bani Malik was
relatively independent of the outside. It thrived on a strong
subsistence economy which allowed for self-imposed isolation.
In addition, fear of the outside facilitated the creation of
a strong socio-political organization that maintained communal
cohesiveness. It did have limited contact with neighboring

communities and the larger society through the necessity of

122
selling of surplus agricultural products and labor as well as
for procuring those items the community could not produce.
Nonetheless outside contact remained relatively limited due
to the encompassing 'logic' of the community. This sense of
isolation was also reinforced by the limited means of trans-
portation and communication.

Contact with outside communities was not without con-
flicts, arising from outside incursions, animosities, and
alliances. Nonetheless, outside contacts were seldom so in-
tense as to directly threaten the basis of communal integrity.
It was the relative consistency of the socioeconomic base
which acted as a buffer to the outside world. This cohesive-
ness preserved the subsistence orientation of Bani Malik and
thus channeled migration into temporary 'targets' distin-
guished by males who left the village intermittently for
'gainful' employment and returned when economic goals were
met.

Since 1950, as is the case with most Saudi rural com-
munities, Tamniah began to experience wide socioeconomic
changes as a result of an accelerated pace of articulation
with the larger society. An articulation process that was,
largely, due to the state actions as it began to centralize
its authority, integrate rural communities into the 'concept'
of Saudi Arabia, and push for a 'modernized' economy.

The primary mechanisms through which the state has pushed

for its development schemes have been formal education, provi-

123

sion of off-farm employment opportunities in the government
service sector including the military, continuous expansion
of transportation, communication, health infrastructures and
facilities. Furthermore, it continued to implement extensive
subsidy programs and largesse such as social security, price
supports, free loans and other income supplement schemes.

While each of these schemes has its own impacts on rural
communities, the spread of formal education and the creation
of off-farm employment opportunities, in urban as well as
rural areas, certainly have the greatest impacts. In the
following sections, I will attempt to show how these two
parameters have affected the socioeconomic base of the study

area .

PW
WEI}?!

Prior to 1948 Tamniah had no formal schools, although
informal education was in existence since the beginning of
this century. A traditional teacher from the nearby village
of A~l Ali used to teach male youngsters reading and writing
skills to read Quran. This was, however, very limited. Only
those who could afford to pay the teacher took advantage of
the opportunity. The school was set up into three short
sessions in order to accommodate the household labor/prod-
uction needs. The youngsters were split between morning and
afternoon sessions. A third session was also organized for
male elders in the evening after the day's work was done. In

this way, the school did not interfere with the household's

124
productive activities, nor did it alter the bases of household
economic activities. As such, it never qualified the learners
for off-farm employment, e.g., a government job.

After 1940 the state began its campaign for universal
formal education. In 1948 the government sent Tamniah its
first teacher to establish formal schooling. In the beginning
schooling was non-compulsory and restricted to boys for the
learning of the Quran. At.best this enabled students to master
basic reading and writing skills. Soon after this the curri-
culum expanded to include western-styled subjects to suit a
rapidly expanding government-planned economy.

Initially only those who could afford to part with their
children's labor were able to send their children to school.
Ten years later, however, the situation changed as the number
of teachers increased and the curriculum further expanded to
cover six years of elementary schooling. With the help of the
As'Sha'f state representative (Amir) , the school principal led
a campaign to enroll most school-age boys so that attendance
became socially compulsory.

The following analysis, more or less, is based on quali-
tative data. As such the existing empirical data, unfortu-
nately, does not fully facilitate proper quantitatively based
description and analysis of formal education at the community
level prior to the year 1970.

The initial and most devastating impact of schooling for

the household was the loss of labor. Households felt its

125

impact differently according to their class location and
attendant priorities and resources. While most households
viewed schooling as an investment for their children and
ultimately for the entire household, they responded differ-
ently due to differential access to immediate means of pro-
duction. In order to fully comprehend these different reac-
tions, it is necessary to stratify the community into the
following four qualitative classes which more or less repre-
sented the class structure of the community prior to 1950.
This captures the various perceptions of education and the
underlying meanings attached to it.

The first class consists of households with better re-
source endowments. Those with better land and sufficient labor
(i.e. , redundant labor) tended to be 'wealthier' and were able
to release excess labor. This class comprised the head of the
tribe (Sheikh) , his immediate kin, and the larger kinship
groups, who managed their farming operations jointly and thus
combined labor resources. It was this group-cum-class as a
matter of fact who first asked for the school and enrolled
their school-age boys when the school finally opened. Later
they were able to send their children for post-elementary
schooling in Abha.

The second group, in contrast to the first, consists of
the less fortunate families. Foremost among these were
households with inadequate land and labor resources, primar-

ily female headed households with young children, and orphans.

126

This group subsisted through sharecropping, community assis-
tance and/or temporary migration of male members. They saw in
children's education a chance of life-improvement. In a marked
difference from the first group, children of the second group,
on the main, were not able to pursue post-elementary educa-
tion, and instead were forced into immediate but less reward-
ing employment in the government as their aging elders became
unable to continue providing for the household. Orphans,
however, present a different case. Soon after they became
teenagers, they out-migrated and were able to combine self-
subsidence in urban jobs and schooling.

The third group, which was not fully enthused by the pro-
spect of losing child labor, had .a successful self-sufficient
domestic production. Their children (especially teenagers)
were an integral part of the family production success. They
were thus unable to fully commit to the idea of child school-
ing. As such, they usually became satisfied with sending one
child to school and for elementary schooling only. An inspec-
tion of enrollment records of the school during the first ten
years shows heavy drop-outs among this group. Only a few were
able to graduate from elementary. The common reasons for
dropping-out of school, as documented in the school's records,
are lack of interest on the part of children, continued
absence from school, and/or the guardian's wish.

The last group were those who engaged primarily in pasto-

ralism but also maintained a small farming operation. The

127

creation of a 'modern' school had a profound impact on their
mode of existence. Not only did they lose the labor from their
children for most of the year, but they also were forced to
shorten their annual (winter) migration to Tehamma in order
to accommodate the demands of the school schedule. Still, some
of them who were accustomed to migrating in the immediate
vicinity of Tamniah in search of better grazing areas found
that they were now compelled to settle permanently in the
village. While not giving up herding altogether, nevertheless
they were forced to minimize it and combine it with new
livelihood strategies. For some who had insufficient land
and/or labor, frequent migration by the household head or an
adult male member became the alternative household subsistence
strategy. Not only did their instances of migration increase,
but also the duration. Earlier instances of migration were
characterized by short migration durations of six months or
less to the urban centers of Taif and Makkah. Clearly migra-
tion represented a viable strategy to complement their
domestic production. From 1960 onward, however, migration
became more frequent, for longer durations, and eventually led
to long term migration of entire families.

While impacts of the school remained at the cost side for
the first ten-fifteen years, those who bore the cost began to
reap its benefits. As soon as their schooled teenagers reached
working age they became eligible for good-paying off-farm

jobs. An inspection of the available cross-sectional data

128

clearly points to the importance of eduction credentials as
the main qualifying criteria for the type and quality of
employment gained by household working members (table 5.5).
Generally, all those who obtained at least six years of
schooling were able to find full employment in the government
bureaucracy and the military as government clerks, officers,
and soldiers. These jobs pay in the range between 4,000 and
6,000 Saudi Riyal monthly. As for those who completed nine
years of schooling or higher, they were able to land better-
paying jobs as teachers and high administrative officials.
Their monthly salary ranges between 6,000 and 10,000 SR.

As eduction began to pay dividends in the forms of good-
paying jobs for those who invested in it, the people of
Tamniah became committed to their childrens' education. In
this respect they began to organize daily transportation to
Abha for intermediate school students as soon as the govern-
ment constructed paved roads connecting Sha'af Shahran with
Abha and Khamis Mushait in 1965. Moreover, they hectored the
Ministries of Education into locating an intermediate school
for boys and elementary school for girls in Tamniah. They
eventually succeeded and the schools were opened in 1970 and
1972 respectively. Later in 1981, they succeeded in obtaining
an intermediate school for girls.

Today, Tamniah and the nearby communities of Sha'af
Shahran are provided with educational facilities for all

levels of schooling except college. Important among these are

129
high schools for each gender, male and female adult education
programs, and a post-intermediate female teacher-training

program.

Z-Wmom
mm

The state efforts to build its apparatus especially the
bureaucracy and the military forces began to attract the young
adult males of the rural population since the early years of
the 19605. This attraction of better economic opportunities
forged by education credentials quickly became the deciding
force for the transition from subsistence agriculture to non-
agricultural off-farm employment. As such, it became easier
for young adult.males to opt for government jobs that are less
demanding and have better economic returns than subsistence
farming. In addition, this shift to off-farm employment was
further fueled by the emergence of cash needs to meet the
demands of the 'modernizing' economy. Under the new cir-
cumstances, rural households felt the need for a stable
monetary income.

While off-farm.employment opportunities opened.up during
the late 19505, its full impact was felt later when oil
revenues suddenly burgeoned after 1973, and the government
was in a position to pursue a full range of economic growth,
both at the national and.regional levels. It expanded its bur-
eaucracy, engaged in a wide scale of infrastructure build-up,
and was able to create full employment opportunities for most

Saudi males in the service sector both in urban centers and

130
rural areas, regardless of education credentials.
The ramifications of the shifts to off-farm employment are
great, both at the household and the community levels as well
as for domestic production and migration.

At the household level, acquisition of government employ-
ment by household members resulted in instant economic pros-
perity, changes in livelihood strategies, and future priori-
ties. Household income, of’course, became:directly'tied.to the
number and quality of off-farm employments landed by each
household. As we can see in the following table there are
great variations in household income: 1) more than 44 percent
of the community households acquire annual income of 45
thousands Saudi Riyal or less. This translates into about
2,500 SR monthly, which generally approximates payments of low
ladder (manual) government jobs; 2) widows and female headed
households procure the least annual income. Typically, these
depend on social security and relatives for support; and 3)
as a result of income pooling, multi-family households are

among the highest income groups (table 5.5).

SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH

131

TABLE 5.5
HOUSEHOLD TYPE BY ANNUAL INCOME (1,000 SR),

 

 

 

 

Household H.Hold Annual Income Total (N)
Type
S 15 16-45 46-95 96
Single adult
Male 0 100% 0 0 100% (1)
Female 86.7 13.3 0 0 100% (15)
Male with dependents 16.7 50.0 33.3 0 100% (6)
Female with depend. 83.3 0 0 16.7 100% (6)
nuclear family
No children 57.1 28.6 14.3 0 100% (7)
With children 7.6 36.7 36.7 19.0 100% (79)
Polygamous 0 0 22.2 77.8 100% (9)
Multiple families
Parents & married son 0 11.1 44.4 44.4 100% (27)
Married brothers 0 33.3 0 66.7 100% (3)
Parents & married sons 0 16.7 0 83.3 100% (6)
Total 18.2 26.4 28.9 26.4 100%
(N= ) (29) (42) (45) (42) (159)

 

Due to the rise and steadiness of household income as a
result of off-farm.employment, family agricultural production
kept declining. Besides losing the most able laborers to off—
farm employment, subsistence agriculture lost its importance
as a resource generator. Depending on the number and kind of
employment secured.by each.household, agricultural production
became confined to one piece of land (5% of an acre), and
almost exclusively worked by elder males. For instance, in
1987 only 4.2 percent of the community males engaged in
farming activities.

Of those, only seventeen percent were

below the age of 61 years, which further indicates the
declining importance of agriculture in the household income-

generating activities (table 5.6).

 

132

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133

Another salient aspect of the shift to off-farm employ-
ment is the decline of female participation in out-of-home
economic activities. Only about five percent of the community
adult females are working outside the house. Those are elder
femaleS‘working'as doorwomen.and servants inmgirls schools and
the health dispensary, and female elementary school teachers.
As for female participation in farming activities, it amounts
to zero percent (table 5.7).

As subsistence production declined, the household lost
its dominance as the basic unit of production. Consequently,
the encompassing 'logic' of the traditional household struc-
ture was undermined and household.morphology began to change.
The earlier'pattern of multi-generation (extended) households
lost its prominence to the nuclear family households (see
table 5.3).

The sudden openings of off-farm employment for house-
hold's adult.male members have, also, changed the household's
future priorities. As such, the household no longer needs to
control its adult juniors in order to consolidate its labor
resources and meet the requirements of domestic production.
As a result, most adult male juniors who migrated to urban
areas, became independent of their natal households were able
to pursue different economic opportunities, and establish

households of their own.

 

134

 

 

 

 

 

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b.m flflmdfi

135

At the community level, the deterioration of subsistence
production has resulted in the disappearance of communal
labor, and declines in co-operation and assistance among
villagers. Consequently, the community no longer functions as
an independent unit politically, socially, and economically.
Besides the socioeconomic changes, the state's actions, un-
doubtedly, have contributed greatly to the new situation. As
the government began to provide free services on a wide scale
and establish its socio-political institutions in rural areas,
local units lost their prominence. In this respect, the head
of tribe (Sheikh) and council of elders, who used to be in
charge of the socio-political process, lost all their func-
tions except for mere formalities. Under the new order the
state institutions took charge of education, health, social
services, civil order, and judicial functions. No longer is
the head of the tribe able to act with much power on the com-
munity political, social, and economic affairs.

Perhaps the most salient aspects of the new socio-
economic order at the community level are the undermining of
older bases of social class. Under the older kinship-based
system the bases of social class differentiation which
persisted for centuries in Arabia's settled communities were:
1- Resource Endowment: land and labor used to constitute the

primary' household resources and, thus ‘were among' the
indicators of the household class location in local com-

munities. Inter-household variations in size of land and

136

labor, however, were never great. On one hand, variations
in size of land were kept in check by an inheritance-based
land tenure system, availability of water resources,
limited technology, and existing topography. All these
parameters had restricted any noticeable land consolid-
ation. This was especially true in land-deficient.mountain
regions of southwest Arabia, where expansion of agricul-
tural land was only possible through construction of man-
made terraces. For instance, about eighty five percent of
households of Shahran Bani Malik own between two and ten
pieces of agricultural land with an average size of 160
square meter for each piece, and only three percent own
more than ten pieces. Labor, on the other hand, always
varies from one generation to the next according to the
dictates of demography and household composition. Tradi-
tionally, the household compensated for labor deficiencies
through.communal labor, joint-farming, and share-cropping.

Resource endowment was seldom so variable as to permit
a clear class differentiation at the local community level.
Also, community-instituted assistance, cooperation, and
sharing of crops lessened resource gaps between households
still further.
Tribal and Band Affiliation: traditionally, the tribe had
been the main fixture for community membership and the
organizing socio-political form that dominated the seg-

mented societies of Arabia. The community of Shahran Bani

137

Malik, being no-exception, exclusively consists of one
tribe. Within the community social class variations are not
very pronounced, partially due to the prevailing ideology
of these kinship-based solipsistic units, but most impor-
tantly due to the underlying 'logic' of the subsistence
mode of production and social relation of production. When
social class differentiations do exist, they were also
based on kinship affiliations. For instance, the community
under study consists of six kinship groups (or’bands). Each
has its own representative in the council of elders. While
in no way can they be considered as distinct strata, the
relative prosperity and sheer size of each group, however,
do contribute to the social location of its members.

Seniority and Gender: At the individual level, social
stratification in the patriarchal tribal groups of Arabia
are based on seniority and gender. In this respect, male
elders of the household have the upper status and control
the household's resources and vital decisions for produc-
tion, distribution, migration, and marriage. The working
male juniors come. second and usually are in charge of
production activities in the field. Female-elders comprise
the third status group. Except for some control over their
junior females (daughters and daughters-in-law), they have
limited input in what goes on inside or outside their
respective households. The fourth and much despised group

is female juniors. Daughters and daughters-in-law are

138
usually the most controlled and over-worked group in the
household (and the community as well). Besides fully
participating in domestic agriculture, they must do all
housework chores, bring house, needs of water and fire wood,
and of course bear children. They also have little say
about choice of a marriage partner.

In summary, we can safely conclude that the traditional
rural communities of Arabia are principally demarcated by
territorial tribalism, and their social organization are based
upon kinship ties and tribal affiliation. Their economic units
(households) are small, and their technology is simple. Land
consolidation and capital accumulation are weak and always .
kept in check by institutional means. This, however, does not
nullify attempts to stratify such communities into social
classes. Based on resource endowments, political power, and
(ideological) prestige, one may be able to sketch out four
qualitatively different social classes of the households in
the traditional community of Shahran Bani Malik: 1) the head
of tribe, his kin, and the council of elders comprise one
social class: 2) the second social class encompasses the
community male-headed member households: 3) the third class
is comprised of female-headed and orphans households: 4) non-
tribe in-migrant households are at the bottom of the social
class ladder. Those are still considered non-community
members. As such, they seldom have land ownership rights,

except through sale, do not participate in the community

139

affairs, never inter-marry with community members, and are
always considered. the lowest status group regardless of
resource endowments. This last group consists of three
families, whose forefathers moved in during late 18905. Each
of the three families used to specialize in one (socially
demeaning) craft such as carpentry, blacksmith, and leather
crafting.

The new socioeconomic changes gave birth to new social
categories, and as local communities relinguished their power
to the central government, the stratifying measures so charac-
teristic of traditional communities began to lose their impor-
tance, and are only maintained as a part of value systems.
Here, we must.point to the difficulties of developing a robust
measure of social stratification that is appropriate for our
particular setting in Saudi Arabia.

Social stratification analyses, for the most part, have
been developed by Western sociologists for purposes of
identifying social strata in industrialized societies,
particularly urban classes. It is generally based on a type
of measure, whereby individuals, families, or social groups
are ranked on a scale. According to Davis and Moore (1945),
individuals in society must be assigned a place in the social
structure, which is constituted by differential prestige of
various positions in society. Such conceptualization poses
many problems, which are related to: 1) the bases of the

prestige of any social position: 2) the subjectivity of such

140
bases: and 3) the problem of reconciling conflicts between
indices of stratification.

Typically, income, education, occupation, religion, and
ethnic background of head of household are the main indices
of social stratification. While such measures may suffice in
most urban settings of industrialized societies, they are
inadequate measures of social class in developing agrarian-
based societies.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, where rural communities are
going through a transitional phase, the older subsistence mode
of production lost its importance, and gave way to a money
economy. Consequently, the older bases of stratification are
in direct conflict with those of the new order. In this
respect, education, occupation, and income began to share
relevance with gender, patriarchy, and tribal affiliation,
which for long have constituted the bases of stratification.

The new indicators have somewhat rearranged the picture
of social status in Tamniah., i.e. they negatively impacted
the status of illiterate male elders, especially, the head of
tribe and clan leaders, whose social status has fallen as a
result of losing their political power within the community
and outside. The recent changes raised the status of educated
younger adult tribal male members who hold good-paying
government jobs. Not has only their income risen, but more
importantly their association with the government has given

them proper connections within the regional government to

141
constantly improve the community facilities of education,
health, and transportation. Furthermore, high administrative
officials are in a position to help other community members
finding employment in the government sector.

The positions of other groups of similar qualifications,
such as educated females and children of non-tribal families,
have not changed drastically. An example that comes to mind
is that of the leather-crafting family. As discussed earlier,
this family was always treated as a low-status family due to
its non-tribal. membership, and.‘more importantly, to its
engagements in the (socially demeaning) leather crafting.‘

When formal education became available, this family sent
its three sons to school. Two of them graduated from high
school and the third completed a college education. The high
school graduates hold good-paying government jobs '. The college
graduate became the principal of Tamniah intermediate school,
which is a prestigious and influential position.

Needless to say, the family became one of the richest
group in the community as a result of the high annual income
(280,000 SR) from government jobs and investments in real
estate. On the personal level the status of the three sons,
especially the school principal, have ascended. But, due to
vestiges of the older stratification system, the family was,
tacitly, denied marriage partners for its sons, and was forced

to look outside the territory of the Shahran tribe. Again the

142
reasons are not so much tribal affiliation, but the fact that
the family is identified with leather-crafting.

A second problem of developing a good measure of house-
hold social status is related to the choice of the individual
representing the household. As mentioned above, most social
stratification studies use attributes of the household head,
such as education, occupation, and income to position the
household in a social stratum. In the case of Tamniah this
becomes problematic. A high percentage of the community house-
hold heads are illiterate male elders, who engage in low
status government manual jobs with minimum pay. These indices,
however, do not necessarily reflect the true socioeconomic
status of their respective households. As a result of univer-
salized education and the continued need for educated people
to fill government positions, many households have younger
adult members who are educated, hold important government
jobs, and receive high salaries.

It thus becomes clear that, unless we combine attributes
of household members, and yet control for household size and
composition, any scale we develop will not truly reflect the

household's socioeconomic status.

143
W

In this chapter, with the help of community and household
data, we attempted to qualitatively and quantitatively measure
the impacts of recent socioeconomic changes upon Shahran Bani
Malik. In a span of less than 30 years, the community was
transformed from an agricultural-based, self-sufficient
community into a community subsisting on government jobs and
aid programs.

The introduction of formal education and the sudden
expansion of off-farm government jobs hastened the transition
from subsistence agriculture into a 'modern' money economy.
Today, every household in Tamniah subsists directly or '
indirectly on government jobs, and/or assistance.

Beside the great changes in mode of subsistence, the
community experienced wide changes socially and politically:
1) as the state took over, the community ceased to exist as
an independent socio-political unit; 2) communal cooperation
and assistance, while they did not disappear, have declined
markedly, and lost their 'logic' of continuity as the state
established its social security program; 3) as family agricul-
ture lost its importance in the household sustenance
strategies, the encompassing 'logic' of the traditional large
multi-generation household began to dissipate, leading to an
accelerated pace of nuclearization of the family, and the
breaking up of extended households, especially those of

migrant members.

144
As I will try to show in the following two chapters,
migration was greatly impacted by the new socioeconomic
changes. As such, the older pattern of temporary male labor
migration was abandoned in favor of long-term and semi-
permanent moves by entire families, as their providers were

able to obtain full employment with the state in urban centers

and regional towns.

CHAPTER SIX

THE CHANGING NATURE OF MIGRATION:
THE CASE OF TAMNIAH

The great socioeconomic changes within Saudi society
during the last three decades were paralleled by new mobility
patterns, as evidenced by massive population movements, and
an accelerated process of urbanization. Similar population
movements, of course, have occurred. in (other* developing
societies, but the Saudi case represents a unique situation.
In most third world countries the redistribution of population
is. generally' a concomitant. of industrialization (and ‘the
incorporation of rural economies into the world economy. In
the case of Saudi Arabia, the state's development schemes
deliberately encouraged "modernization" and centralization.
These state policies proved to be extremely influential
factors in establishing the pattern of population movement.

Since becoming fiscally independent, as a result of huge
oil revenues, the Saudi state emerged as the single most
dominant agent, of change in this once nomadic society. It
acquired the economic power to design national development
schemes that were in line with its own purposes, thus, the
state furthered.its hegemony. For'various reasons, the.state's

emphasis was on advancing urban-oriented development, which

145

146

eventuated in regional and sectoral imbalances, including a
continued decline of the traditional sectors. As noted in
earlier chapters, formal education, the creation of inflated
government-driven job markets, and the institution of income
subsidies, price supports, and loans, were the state's most
effective means to bring about the structural transformation
and integration of the once segmented Saudi society.

The ramifications of these development policies on
mobility patterns and migration streams have been far reaching
and may have gone beyond their intended objectives. As such,
the state's efforts to bring about societal integration,
encourage tribal pacification, and make possible centraliza-
tion of authority have resulted in an urban-oriented system
of formal education, an occupational structure that is
dominated by civil service jobs, extremely rapid urban growth,
and a general neglect of the rural sector. Agriculture, never
strong in Saudi Arabia, was even more weakened, and a new
pattern of movement out of the rural countryside was set in
motion, replacing the older pattern of seasonal labor migra-
tion.

This chapter aims to establish: 1) a clear characteriza-
tion of the rural community migration patterns in the past:
2) how and why this traditional pattern was abandoned and
subsequently replaced by a new pattern of geographic and

social mobility: and 3) what the impacts have been of this new

147
pattern both at the community and the household levels. Let
me explain:

First, I will characterize the older pattern of migration
which had persisted for the longer part of Tamniah known
history. My data are from in-depth interviews of seventy-five
randomly selected households in the community of Shahran Bani
Malik, Tamniah. Both quantitative and qualitative information
are used to explain these patterns. I will attempt to document
all past instances of migration by household members who
currently reside in the village. These instances total to 235
migrations, some of which date back to 1940. We have informa-
tion about date, duration, destination, and reason for each
migration instance as well as the age and sex of’each.migrant.
These data, of course, are skewed toward the older household
male members, particularly the heads of households, because
they have lived longer than younger members of the community
and had more time to migrate, therefore multiple migration
instances are common. Hence, we control the period of migra-
tion, which enables consideration of the factorial shifts in
migration strategies.

Second, I will describe and analyze the more recent
patterns of migration, which emerged during the last twenty-
five years, but particularly after 1972. For this purpose I
will use the following sources of information:

A- Information about migrant family members in seventy-five

households that I surveyed. This includes socio-demographic

148

information as well as the dates, destinations, length of
out-migrations, and reasons for migration of each
individual migrant in the selected households. Also, data
were collected on each migrant's ties to his/her natal
family, such as, frequency of visits to the village,
presence and type of economic ties (remittances/help)
between the migrant and the natal household.

A second data set is the outcome of the researcher's
attempt to document as best as possible the rest of the
community migrants. For this purpose, I worked with key
community and migrant informants. While I was quite
successful in gathering sufficient socio-demographic and
migration data about male migrants (N=111), this was not
the case for female migrants. Even though, indirectly, I
was able to note more than 100 cases of female migrants,
I was not able to acquire comparable information on them.
The realities of Saudi culture create enormous difficulties
for a male field researcher to obtain reliable information
about females, even if we are simply talking about migra-
tion pattern. Moreover, most male informants typically
express great displeasure when asked any questions pertain-
ing to women. So, I am forced to refer only to those
females for whom I had some information and which I
regarded as reasonably valid, because it was reported by
relatives. This limitation,. of course, restricts my

analysis and comparisons to male migrants, but nonetheless

149
sufficient information on female migrants was gathered to
venture a reasonable discussion of their attributes.

C- A third source of information.on migration is from in-depth -
interviews of a sample of fifty-one male migrants drawn
from the documented 169 male migrants. I located these
migrants and talked with them at their place of destina-
tion. While my sampling was intended to be random, the dif-
ficulty of tracing and finding all of the documented male
migrants made it impossible to attain randomness. Instead,
I was forced to do a "convenience sample": all migrants
whom I was able to trace were interviewed. The purpose of
these in-depth interviews was to get a first hand account
from migrants on their decision to migrate, why they
migrated, and what the consequences of migration were for
the individual migrant and his family. These data will be
discussed in a following chapter in conjunction with case
studies.

Third, I will compare migrants and non-migrants in order
to gain a better understanding of causes and consequences of
migration. Furthermore, I will explore the impacts of recent
migration patterns on the rural households, family networks
and, in general, the areas of origin and destination.

My purpose in gathering information on migrants was not
so much to quantify the pattern of rural community migration,
as it was to be able to describe and explain changes in the

community of Shahran Bani Malik over the years, why these

150
changes occurred, and to hypothesize (infer) from my findings
some implications relative to these processes and conditions

in similar rural communities in Saudi Arabia.

WW

u e ar ' t'o

Prior to the recent structural transformations of Saudi
society, the migration strategies characteristic of people in
Tamniah's peasant communities were quite different in type,
duration and causes than they are now. Except for a handful
of households, whose adult males used to specialize in trade,
most Tamniah communities, particularly those of Shahran, had
mainly used migration as a way to fulfill shortages in their
household's subsistence and production needs. Aided by a
dependable, traditional economy, co-operation in the use of
labor, and mutual assistance among villagers, the community
had managed to avoid the necessity of large-scale out-migra-
tion. Up until the 19505, temporary labor migration was the
norm. This was, more or less, a form of "target" migration,
where the household, periodically, dispatched one or more of
its adult male members to the Hijaz towns to seek 'gainful'
employment and to bring back to the household various essen-
tials for production and subsistence. No permanent migration
of individuals or of whole families had occurred prior to
1950. Thus, a primary reason for the earlier pattern of
migration was to reinforce subsistence agriculture. Migration

was seldom used as a desirable strategy for survival.

151

As subsistence production began to lose its basis of
continuity, so did temporary labor migration. Since the early
19605, temporary labor migration began to decline markedly,
giving way to new permanent and semi-permanent types of
migration. This was probably due to a re-orientation of, and
certainly associated with, the livelihood strategies among
rural households in response to inducements emanating from the
'modern' sector. In this respect, the requisites of formal
education and off-farm employment played a key role in the
shifting of migration patterns. Both necessitated longer dura-
tions of being away and, eventually, led to the permanent
residential relocation of migrating individuals and families.

Now, let me attempt to show how migration strategies
shifted in the community of Shahran Bani Malik, and how
individual migrants became totally oriented toward semi-
permanent and permanent moves away from the community.

As indicated, my analysis utilizes data from seventy-five
randomly selected households. The information includes migra-
tion experiences of household male members who currently
reside in Tamniah. Their migration experiences were tabulated
as instances of migration' (table 6.1). Clearly, these
instances are skewed toward over-representing the migration
of older males (41 years and older). Older men; 1) have
experienced a longer period of potential migration: 2) and,
consequently, are more likely to have had multiple instances

of migration (table 6.1) . The data set, however, is useful for

152
the description and analysis of the shifts in migration
pattern in terms of duration, destination, and reason for
migration. The unit of observation, of course, is 'instance'
of migration rather than the individual migrant. As such, all
of the comparisons are centered on these instances across

time.

TABLE 6.1
INSTANCES OF OUT-MIGRATION FROM TAMNIAH BY CURRENT HOUSE-
HOLD MALE MEMBERS BY YEAR OF MIGRATION AND PRESENT AGE

 

 

 

 

Present age Year of migration instance Total (N)
of the male

member 1973-85 1958-72 pre-1958

16-20 years 33.3% 66.7% 0% 100.0% (3)
21-40 years 71.4% 28.6% 0% 100.0% (28)
41-60 years 3.2% 57.7% 39.1% 100.0% (156)
2 61 years 2.9% 14.3% 82.9% 100.0% (35)
Total 12.2% 47.3% 40.5% 100.0%

(N= ) (27) (105) (90) (222)

 

As stated earlier, the older pattern of migration was
characterized by short duration, where male migrants typically
sought.manual work in the‘Hijaz towns.of Taif and Makkah. This
pattern was the dominant type prior to 1958. As such, it
accounts for more than ninety percent of migration instances
during that time. I

By the year 1958, however, temporary migration began to
decline:

First, temporary migration of six months and less lost

its dominance to a longer duration (six months to two years)

153
migration type. The general decline of subsistence production
was behind this shift in migration duration. As a result of
increased demands on cash, the continued declines of communal
labor, and losses of a vital labor source due to schools, the
majority of the community households were no longer able to
meet their subsistence needs through domestic production.
Subsequently, they were forced into a new migration type,
where their migrant members had to anticipate a longer period
of residence elsewhere, and the obligation to send back
remittances for the household's basic needs. This was very
typical of the 19605 before the community, eventually, was
able to re-orient its livelihood strategies toward the

'modern' sectors of the economy (table 6.2).

TABLE 6.2
INSTANCES OF OUT-MIGRATION FROM TAMNIAH BY CURRENT HOUSEHOLD
MALE MEMBERS BY YEAR OF MIGRATION AND DURATION OF MOVE

 

 

 

 

Duration Year of migration instance Total (N)
of

move 1973-85 1958-72 pre-1958

< 6 months 0% 37.1% 51.1% 38.3% (85)
6-23 months 22.2% 42.9% 40.0% 39.2% (87)
2-6 years 59.3% 12.4% 5.6% 15.3% (34)
> 6 years 18.5% 7.6% 3.3% 7.2% (16)
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%

(N= ) (27) (105) (90) (222)

 

Second, the year 1973 marked the end of the older migra-
tion pattern. No longer did the community members migrate
temporarily (six months and less) and/or seek manual work.

Since then, a longer duration of migration of two years or

154

more came to dominate. This type was associated with the
pursuit of education and urban government jobs (table 6.3).

Third, the year 1961 marked the beginning of family out-
migration. This was directly related to the continued declines
of subsistence agriculture, and the presence of. off-farm
employment, and educational opportunities in the major urban
centers of the country. While government jobs began to surface
during mid-19505, their real impacts on migration became
profound from the mid-19605 and onward, when family migration

started to become more common.

TABLE 6.3
INSTANCES OF OUT-MIGRATION FROM TAMNIAH BY CURRENT
HOUSEHOLD MALE MEMBERS BY YEAR OF MIGRATION AND
REASON FOR MIGRATION

 

 

 

 

Reason Year of migration instance Total (N)
for

migration 1973-85 1958-72 pre-1958

Government job 33.3% 20.0% 4.4% 15.3% (34)
Manual work 0% 69.5% 93.3% 70.7% (157)
Studying 48.1% 8.6% 1.1% 10.4% (23)
Accomp. Family 18.5% 1.9% 1.1% . 3.6% (8)
Total ' 100% 100% 100% 100%

(N= ) (27) (105) (90) (222)

 

Fourth, as a consequence of family out-migration, females
began to migrate for the first time to urban areas after 1958.
Before that time females had not migrated outside Tamniah,
except for a few whose families used to subsist on ruminant
herding. The few reported instances of female migration show

that females started to migrate only after 1958, and par-

155

ticularly after 1972. These few instances point to the fact
that females move in company of their families. In few
instances, young females, who had migrated to continue school-
ing, lived with close relatives (grand parents or a married
brother).

In summary, the period between 1958 and 1972 witnessed
a transitional phase between two migration patterns. The
first, so characteristic of subsistence-geared communities,
was dominated by temporary male labor migration. This was
followed by a transitional phase, as the community began to
adjust to the impulses of socioeconomic changes of the larger
Saudi society. And as these wider socioeconomic changes took
full force after 1972, Tamniah communities completed the
transition from subsistence production to the 'modern' money
economy. Consequently, migration strategies became channeled
into long term and permanent types. And while some migrants
do return now as in the past, returning to the village is
predicated solely on realizing similar economic opportunities
present in other parts of the country. In the following
section, with the use of data from migrants, we will detail
as best as possible the new migration pattern, and its impacts
on the study area.
Regent Mignetion Trends

During the last thirty years, waves of long-term migra-
tion from'Tamniah increased and led.to the residential reloca-

tion of approximately half the population of the community of

156
Shahran Bani Malik. The new migration trend, in contrast to
the older pattern of temporary male labor migration, is
characterized by out-migration of families. As a result, more
than 144 families of Shahran Bani Malik have moved to larger
towns and cities in the span of thirty years. In congruity
with the socioeconomic changes and the concomitant declines
of subsistence production, waves of out-migration started
during the late 19505, and increased during the mid-705 and

early 19805.

Before proceeding with a discussion of this recent migra-
tion trend, -it is pertinent that we take into account the
source of information. This will enable us to note biasesand
deficiencies related to each data set and, more importantly,
to guard against erroneous pooling of information from these
different sources.

As mentioned earlier, information was obtained from three
sources:

1- The first data set, which contains information on eighty-
six migrants, was gathered from a randomly selected sample
of seventy-five households in the community of Shahran Bani
Malik. This group will be referred to as group one (male)
and group two (females). Here, males out-number females by
a two to one (table 6.4). The reasons for the huge dif-
ferential are not so much the under-reporting of female
migrants, but more as a result of: 1) a higher incidence

of migration by single males, who account for twenty-

157

seven percent of migrant males of the group, compared to
only’ 3.6 percent. of single female ‘migrants. This is
consistent with the general pattern in Saudi Arabia, where
single females seldom move out of the natal household,
except under some circumstances, such as when parents get
divorced and their children must move with other relatives,
say, grand parents: 2) a higher percentage of adult
daughters (23%) who are reported to be living outside these
households are still living in Tamniah and its vicinity
compared to zero percent of adult male children. For that
reason, those females were not counted as migrants: and 3)
in the community of Shahran Bani Malik, it was found that
sons out-number daughters by about eight percent. The
reason for this may be the effect of a higher rate of
female infant mortality in the past due to the relative
neglect of female children prior to the introduction of
modern health utilities and the improvements in nutrition.

The second data set was assembled with the help of key
community and migrant informants. This set contains
information on the rest of the community's male migrants
(N=111), who will be referred to as group three. Attempts
to collect.data on female migrants, was to no avail and not
worthwhile. As such, informants were reluctant to talk
about non-relative females, and when they were pressed to
do so, they were not certain.of most of the information.

For'this reason, no females were included in this data set.

158
A closer inspection of this data set reveals that infor-
mants only reported male migrants who are 21 years of age
and older, and they also neglected to report single males
living with their out-migrating families. As such, single:
male migrants account only for eight percent of the second
group (table 6.4).
TABLE 6.4

MARITAL STATUS AND AGE, COMPARING THREE STUDY
GROUPS OF MIGRANTS

 

 

 

 

Current Migrant study group Total (N)
age and
marital Group one Group two Group three
status (male) (female) (male)
Single .
18-20 years 8.6% 3.6% 0% 3.0% (6)
21-40 Years 19.0% 0% 8.1% 10.2% (20)
Married
18-20 years 1.7% 21.4% 0% 3.6% (7)
21-40 years 39.7% 39.3% 44.1% 42.1% (83)
41-60 years 25.9% 32.1% 33.3% 31.5% (61)
Over 60 years 5.2% 0% 14.4% 9.6% (19)
Widowed
41-60 years 0% 3.6% 0% .5% (1)
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
(N= ) (58) (28) (111) (197)

 

3- The third data set was gathered through in-depth interviews
conducted in the major destination towns. These interviews
contain detailed information on fifty-one of the documented
169 male migrants. This data set is intended for in-depth
analysis of migration in the following chapter.

In sum, the total count of community out-migrants is 197.

Of those, males account for more than eighty-five percent. By

no means is this an indication of the total number of the com-

159

munity's migrants since: 1) spouses of married.male migrants,

who are exclusively from the community of Shahran Bani Malik,

are not included except for twenty-six female migrants: 2) all
migrant children of the second group, who are under 20 years
of age, are not included.

Further inspection of the first and second data sets also
reveals the following:

1- Of all married male and female migrants, 96.4 percent had
migrated with their spouses and children.

2- Of all male migrants who were reported by non-relative
informants, only twenty-six percent still have close
relatives (spouse, children, parents, and siblings) in the
village (table 6.5) . This further Strengthens our assertion
that today's migration trend is typified by family out-

migration.

TABLE 6.5
MIGRANT'S CLOSEST RELATIVES IN VILLAGE, COMPARING
THREE STUDY GROUPS

 

 

 

Closest Migrant study group Total
relatives

of migrant Group one Group two Group three

in Village (male) (female) (male)
Spouse/children 6.9% 0% 2.7% 3.6%
Parents/siblings 48.3% 75.0% 7.2% 28.9%
Siblings 25.9% 25.0% 16.2% 20.3%
Others 19.0% 0% 65.8% 42.6%
Unknown 0% 0% 8.1% 4.6%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
(N= ) (58) (28) (111) (197)

 

160
D !° !i E Hi !°

As a consequence of the socioeconomic changes and the
concomitant declines of subsistence production, waves of out-
migration from the community of study started during the 19505
and accelerated after 1971. As such, more than seventy-three
percent of the documented community migrants reportedly out-
migrated after 1971.

Four factors were (and continue to be) the main deter-
minants of a migrant's choice of destination. These are:
proximity to the village: past community knowledge: avail-
ability of education and job opportunities: and presence of
relatives and fellow villagers. As we can see from the
following table, regional towns of the Southwest have
attracted more than sixty-five percent of the documented
migrants, followed by the Hijaz region, and finally the
Central region. Four towns in particular account for ninety
percent of the community migrants. The nearby regional towns
of Abha and Khamis Mushait account for about sixty percent of
the reported migrants. Riyadh, being the capital, and with
better education and job opportunities, continues to receive
migrants from Tamniah at a steady rate of about sixteen
percent. And Taif, the traditional destination of southwest
migrant labor, was the main destination of early out-migrants
(table 6.6). In the following chapter, we will elaborate more

on the migrant's choice of destination.

161

 

 

 

 

TABLE 6.6
MIGRATION DESTINATION BY YEAR OF OUT-MIGRATION
Migrant's Year migrant left village Total (N)
destination
by region Pre-1970 1971-82 post-82
Southwest
Abha 30.2% 39.4% 36.0% 36.0% (71)
Al-khamis 18.9% 24.5% 28.0% 23.9% (47)
Dhran aljanoob 0% 1.1% 4.0% 1.5% ’ (3)
Al-areen 0% 0% 2.0% .5% (1)
Jizan 1.9% 2.1% 0% 1.5% (3)
Bilad Shomran 0% 1.1% 0% .5% (1)
Hijaz
Taif 28.3% 10.6% 8.0% 14.7% (29)
Makkah 1.9% 2.1% 0% 1.5% (3)
Jeddah 1.9% 2.1% 4.0% 2.5% (5)
Central
Riyadh 17.0% 16.0% 14.0% 15.7% (31)
Eastern
Alhafoof 0% 1.1% 2.0% 1.0% (2)
Others
U.S.A. 0% 0% 2.0% .5% (1)
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
(N= ) (53) (94) (50) (197)

 

As is the case with Tamniah non-migrants, government jobs
have attracted more than ninety-five percent of male migrant
workers. In a marked difference from the income-earners in
Tamniah, the migrants hold better jobs. Looking at table 6.7,
it is obvious that high percentage (35%) of male non-migrants
hold low-paying service non-skill jobs. Beyond an age
criterion, these jobs require minimum qualifications. While
the percentage of service job holders among migrants is also
high, migrants holding high-ranking jobs in the civil and
military sectors is noticeably higher than that of non-

migrants.)

162

TABLE 6.7
WORK STATUS OF ADULT MALE MIGRANTS AND
NON-MIGRANTS OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK

 

 

 

Work status Migrants Non-migrant
Retired 1.9 1.1
Self-employed
Farmer ' 0 12.4
Business 4.5 3.2
Government jobs
Servant (manual) 22.3 35.1
Military/police 12.7 9.2
High rank mili/police 7.6 1.6
Government clerk 26.1 17.8
High admin. Official 10.2 4.3
Teacher 14.6 14.6
Technician 0 0.5
Total 100.0% 100.0%
(N= ) (157) (185)

 

Undoubtedly, education is the key qualifying factor for
the type and quality of'government jobs. As tables 6.8-9 illu-
strate, there is a congruity of distribution of educational
attainments and the type and quality of employment. For
example, percentages of illiterates of both migrants and non-
migrants consistently correspond to their respective per-
centages of manual government jobs. Also, the distribution of
higher educational categories approximates those of higher
quality jobs. At any rate, more migrants seem.to have attained

more education, especially post-secondary.

163

TABLE 6.8

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENTS OF ADULT MALE MIGRANTS
AND NON-MIGRANTS OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK

 

 

 

Education Migrants Non-migrant
Illiterate 20.4 35.7
Read 8 write 5.7 17.8
Elementary 19.7 12.4
Intermediate 13.4 8.6
Secondary 17.8 15.1
Post secondary 21.1 9.7
Unknown 1.9 0
Total 100.0% 100.0%
(N= ) (157) (185)

 

The full ramification of government jobs and education
for out-migration is not totally clear and our findings may
prove to be inconclusive. On one hand, those who migrated have
better educational credentials and hold better jobs. On the
other hand, job markets are not equally distributed among
regions or towns. As a result of centralization and the urban
orientation of the government's development schemes, alloca-
tions of government jobs (in terms of quality and number) are
usually in favor of the major urban centers. As.a consequence,
those possessing more education and who are qualified for
certain positions in the civil and military sectors are always
more restricted in their choices of destination than others
of lesser qualifications, such as the illiterates.

The distribution of migrants as state's workers among
government branches is also interesting.

First, migrants are attracted to jobs in five Ministries:

Defense, Interior, Health, and the two Ministries of Public

164
Education. These five have been the primary targets for rural
migrants and nomads seeking state employment. All five were
vital in the state's centralization and bureaucratization
schemes and they facilitate a wide range of job opportunities
that suit practically every job-seeker, regardless of qualifi-
cations.

Second, in each of the four main destinations, migrants
are clustered in certain Ministries. For example, migrants to
Riyadh work mainly in the Ministry of Interior and the two
Education.Ministries; Taif migrants found state employment in
the Ministry of Defense due to the presence of a military
base, and also in the Education Ministries. The General
Presidency of Girls' Education, in particular, had attracted
older (especially earlier) Taif migrants of both genders for
janitorial and doorman's jobs (table 6.9).

This also points to the importance of contacts among
migrants. As such, earlier migrants always present recent
migrants with information, as well as with the necessary aid

to obtain a job in their respective place of work.

165

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 6.9

BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT MIGRANT WORKS IN, BY DESTINATION
Branch of Migrant's place of residence Total (N)
government
migrant Abha Khamis Taif Riyadh Other
works in Mushat Towns
Education 34.6 32.4 40.0 26.1 21.4 32.5 (49)
Interior 9.6 8.1 8.0 47.8 7.1 14.6 (22)
Defense 3.8 21.6 32.0 8.7 14.3 14.6 (22)
Health 19.2 18.9 8.0 4.3 14.3 14.6 (22)
Other govt 32.7 16.2 12.0 8.7 42.9 22.5 (34)
Priv. Sector 0 2.7 0 4.3 0 1.3 (2)
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(N= ) (52) (37) (25) (23) (14) (151)

'es emitt c

As indicated earlier, recent migration is typified by
family' migration. More than 140 of the documented. male
migrants of Shahran Bani Malik moved along with their im-
mediate families. This has many implications for the migrant
family, the rural household, and the area of origin.

Prior to the recent socioeconomic changes of the last
three decades, migration from this rural community was of the
temporary type where a household member migrated for a short
duration and returned back.with the funds for the household's
consumption and production essentials. This type of migration,
in effect, used to be geared toward the on-going household's
maintenance and reproduction strategies, and did not affect
the household's morphology or the membership status of the
migrant. Furthermore, this older migration pattern functioned

in the past to preserve the subsistence orientation and

cohesiveness of the community. As such, it used to complement

166
subsistence production, relieve the community during economic
crises, and never led to permanent out-migration of its
members.

Today, the situation has changed. The sudden openings of
long-term urban jobs necessitated permanent and semi-permanent
moves of job-seekers and.their immediate families. The instant
effect of this recent migration trend is the breaking up of
the traditional pattern of extended rural households.

Generally speaking, long distance married male migrants
who moved.with their'wives and children tend to ease away from
feeling integrally tied to their parental households. They
organize their incomes, consumption habits, and future
priorities independent of the parental households. This
applies, in particular, to earlier migrants to Taif and
Riyadh. Recent short distance migrants, however, are somewhat
different. Many young migrants in Abha and Khamis Mushait,
when they moved, took their aging parents along and continued
to live in large extended. households.) But other recent
migrants, who moved with only their wives and children to Abha
and Khamis Mushait, still have not completely broken economic
ties with their parents. As such, they often shoulder economic
responsibilities for their parents, usually in the form of
monthly remittances and shared investments.

Non-migrant sons, on the side of the dependency con-
tinuum, all still live and manage their income and.consumption

jointly with parents and even after they are married. This

167
is also) the case for several non-migrant married brothers,
who still live together in large joint households.

While the immediate effect of long-term migration has
been the breaking up of some rural households, kinship ties
never are broken. Family ties between migrants and their
families in the rural community are still strong and take the
form of frequent contacts and visits, and, to a lesser degree,
remittances. The frequency of a migrant's visits to the
village depends on the presence of close relatives in the
village and, of course, to distance of destination from
Tamniah. From the following three tables one can see that:
1- Migrants living in close proximity to Tamniah frequently

visit the village, except for those with only distant
relatives in the village: the latter tend to visit less
frequently. The majority of the close-by migrants reside
in Abha and Khamis Mushait, about 55 KM from village (table

6.10).

168

TABLE 6.10
FREQUENCY OF VISITS TO TAMNIAH BY MIGRANTS LIVING LESS THAN
300 KM FROM VILLAGE, BY CLOSEST KIN IN VILLAGE

 

 

 

Frequency Closest relatives in Village Total (N)
of visits

to Spouse/ Parents/ Siblings .Other
Tamniah Child siblings only kin
Weekly 66.7 15.6 22.6 19.7 20.5 (26)
Monthly 33.3 62.5 54.8 41.0 49.6 (63)
Once /3-months 0 15.6 3.2 3.3 6.3 (8)
Twice a year 0 0 3.2 6.6 3.9 (5)
Once a year 0 6.3 16.1 29.5 19.7 (25)
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(N= ) (3) (32) (31) (51) (127)

 

2- Most migrants now residing further away in the Hijaz region
visit their home village once a year: those with parents
back in the village, however, tend to visit twice a year.
The majority of the Hijaz migrants are earlier migrants and
reside in Taif, which is about 550 Km from Tamniah. Table
6.11 shows that most of these farther-distance migrants
have only distant relatives in Tamniah.

TABLE 6.11

FREQUENCY OF VISIT TO TAMNIAH BY MIGRANTS LIVING 300-700 KM
FROM VILLAGE, BY CLOSEST KIN IN VILLAGE

 

 

 

 

Frequency Closest relatives in Village Total (N)
of visits

to Adult Parents/ siblings Other
Tamniah child siblings only kin
Twice a year 0 71.4 33.3 8.7 22.9 (8)
Once a year 100% 28.6 66.7 91.3 77.1 (27)

Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(N= ) (2) (7) (3) (23) (35)

 

169
3- Long distant migrants, living mainly in.Riyadh, manifest
a different visiting pattern. While the majority visit
once or twice a year, many, usually those with parents
and immediate family in Tamniah, tend to visit the area
at least four times a year (table 6.12).
TABLE 6.12

FREQUENCY OF VISIT TO TAMNIAH BY MIGRANTS LIVING MORE
THAN 700 KM FROM VILLAGE, BY CLOSEST KIN IN VILLAGE

 

 

 

 

Frequency Closest relatives in Village Total (N)
of visits '

to Spouse/ Parents/ Siblings Other
Tamniah child siblings only kin
Monthly 0 5.6 0 11.1 5.7 (2)
Once /3-months 100% 22.2 0 11.1 20.0 (7)
Twice a year 0 38.9 33.3 11.1 28.6 (10)
Once a year 0 33.3 66.7 66.7 45.7 (16)
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

(N= ) (2) (18) (6) (9) (35)

 

In sum, the presence of close kin in Tamniah influences
frequency of visits to Tamniah. Later, with the use of
information gathered from interviews with migrants, we will
explicate more the degree of contacts between the migrant and
his relatives back in the village.

While family ties between the migrants and their rural
household still persist in the form of reciprocal contacts and
visits, remittances by the migrant perform a less important
role in the maintenance and reproduction of the rural house-
hold. Generally speaking, there are five qualitatively
different types of remittances by migrants to their relatives

in the village:

170

1- Single sons generally provide remittances to their parents
on a monthly basis. The parents, for their part, save some
of this money to build a house and to pay dowry and.wedding
expenses for their sons' marriages.

2- Married sons remit regularly to help their aging and needy
parents. This is especially the case among Abha and Khamis
Mushait migrants.

3- Some migrant sons and/or brothers still pool part of their
income with respective relatives for the purpose of
building a new house back in the village or to invest in
a business project in an urban area. .

4- Some migrants, less frequently though, send monetary help
to their female relatives, such as mothers, aunts, and
widowed or divorced sisters.

5- The weakest type of remittances take the form of gifts-or
money given by migrants to aging and needy relatives when
they visit the village during holidays.

In sum, remittances, while still very vital for some
rural households, are no longer the driving force behind
recent migration, and are not expected as obligations by the
majority of rural households. Of eighty-six migrants in the
seventy-five surveyed households, only nineteen migrants send
remittances to their relatives back in the village, and only
five migrants pool their income with their village relatives.
Undoubtedly, the provision of social security by the govern-

ment to non-working elder persons and females with dependents

171
has relieved other able relatives from having to provide for
these needy kin. Thus, one may conclude that remittances by
long-term migrants, in the main, are sent to their relatives
as an expression of kinship loyalty and solidarity rather than
as a matter of economic necessity or obligation.
' ns

I have attempted to characterize and compare two distinct
migration patterns of Shahran Bani Malik. Moreover, I have
tried to show'how'migration represents a response to the wider
socioeconomic changes within the Saudi society.

The available data reveal two distinct migration pat-
terns, each formed under different socioeconomic parameters
affecting both local communities and the larger society.
Earlier, until approximately the early 19605, temporary male
labor migration was dominant. This functioned primarily to
complement a household's subsistence production. Migrants'
remittance, thus, was the driving force behind this migration
type. The recent long-term migration pattern, a responseto
the new socioeconomic changes within Saudi society, began.
during the late 19505, but accelerated after 1970. This
migration trend is, also, more often characterized by moves
of entire families. Under this migration pattern, remittance
occupies a less important role. Even though many migrants,
especially the young, still remit frequently, remittance is

no longer the driving force behind recent migration.

172

Rural people of Shahran Bani Malik shifted their migra-
tion strategies in response to the deteriorating subsistence
agriculture, emergent needs of cash income, and the improving
prospects of economic: opportunities in ‘urban. areas. The
pursuit of education and government jobs hastened the transi-
tion from temporary migration to the recent long-term migra-
tion.

The urban orientation of the state's development schemes,
thus far, continues to encourage rural depopulation and an
irreversible migration stream. Even though many long-term
migrants have returned to Tamniah, they did so only after
securing government employment in the area or in nearby
regional towns. The incidence of long-term migration, however,
has not slowed. Since 1971, more than 100 families have left
Tamniah, but invariably after the male head found a job in
the. government sector. .An inspection of types of works
obtained by migrants shows that more than ninety percent are
working in the government sector. This further attests to the
important role of the state in creating the conditions for a
massive long-term rural to urban migration.

Migrants of Shahran Bani Malik have generally chosen four
towns: Taif of the Hijaz region was the destination of early
uneducated migrants who usually settled for low ladder
(manual) government jobs: Riyadh, which continues to receive
about sixteen percent of the community migrants, mainly

because of the availability of more government jobs

173
opportunities, and diverse education and training programs;
the regional towns of Abha and Khamis Mushait, which flouri-
shed during the 19705 and 19805 as a result of expansions of
the regional government and allocations of funds to regional
development schemes, have received thus far more than sixty
percent of the community migrants.

Migrant's ties to his family and the village are still
strong and take the forms of frequent visits to village and,
to a lesser extent, remittance to parents and needy relatives,
especially females. As I will show in the following chapter,
long-term migration has paid for the migrant and his immediate

family, and as well for the rural household in Tamniah.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE PROCESS OF MIGRATION: A CLOSER LOOK

In the preceding chapter, I attempted to provide a
general picture of migration, both in the past and today, and
I drew inferences from available migration information on what
transpired in Tamniah. This information, to a large extent,
was provided by family members and village informants rather
than from the migrants themselves. It deals with the socio-
demographic characteristics of migrants, as well as with date,
duration, and destination of migration. While such an approach
may be sufficient for the general picture, nonetheless it
stops short of fully describing and analyzing what really
happened. For that reason, it was incumbent that I should
follow-up at least some of the migrants and gather first hand
accounts on the initial stages of migration.

My main purpose here is to uncover some of the more
subtle intricacies of migration in terms of how and why a
particular person decides to move and, subsequently, what the
consequences are for that migrant and his family. What was
the migrant's situation before out-migrating, what is he doing
now, how is he adjusting at the place of destination? Since
the Saudi society emphasizes family, it is important to note

how migrants keep in touch with relatives in Tamniah.

174

175
Furthermore, through case studies, I will look at variations
pertaining to year of out-migration, age at out-migration, and
reason for out-migration in order to explore the underlying
bases for migration.

My information derives from in-depth interviews with
fifty-one of the documented 169 community male migrants.
Initially, I tried for a random sample, but that proved to be
enormously time consuming, impractical, and frankly impos-
sible. There was also no attemptby me to gather information
on female migrants, mainly because: 1) it was impossible for
me to interview female migrants: and 2) females 'in Saudi
Arabia do not make migration decisions separate from their
male relatives. In effect, this was a 'convenience sample',
and was not representative of the entire migrant population.

My "sample" consists of forty-six married and five single
males. Except for four migrants, all are living now in Abha,
Khamis Mushait, Taif, and Riyadh. As table 7.1 shows, about

seventy-five percent are between 21 and 60 years of age.

176

TABLE 7.1
MARITAL STATUS AND AGE OF MIGRANT, BY CURRENT PLACE
OF RESIDENCE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS)

 

 

 

 

Age and Migrant place of residence Total (N)
marital
status Abha Khamis Taif Jeddah Riyadh Dhran

Mushat Aljonb
Single
18-20 0% 0% 0% 67% 33% 0% 100% (3)
21-40 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% (2)
Married
18-20 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% (1)
21-40 30% 39% 4% 4% 22% 0% 100% (23)
41-60 33% 20% 20% 0% 27% 0% 100% (15)
Z 61 29% 29% 43% 0% 0% 0% 100% (7)
Total 27% 27% 14% 6% 24% 2% 100%
(N= ) (14) (14) (7) (3) (12) (1) (51)

 

In the following, I will focus attention on: 1) back-
ground of the migrant and his first migration experience: 2)
experience in the current destination (last migration): and
3) ties and contacts with his rural kin and the rural com-

munity in general.

MW

As was observed.generally, about thirty-three percent of
the selected group out-migrated prior to 1971 (table 7.2). At
the time of out-migration, more than sixty percent were less
than 21 years of age. Not surprisingly then, about half had
been attending school and had attained at least six or more
years of schooling prior to out-migration. Only thirty-five

percent were farmers with minimal or no education.

177

TABLE 7.2 .
WORK STATUS AND AGE OF MIGRANT PRIOR TO INITIAL MIGRATION
FROM VILLAGE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS)

 

 

 

 

Work status Age at out migration Total
before out-

migration < 21 21-40 41-60 > 60
Unemployed 6.5% 6.7% 0% 0% 5.9%
Farmer 19.4% 46.7% 75.0% 0% 31.4%
Sheep herder 3.2% 6.7% 0% 0% 3.9%
Student 67.7% 6.7% 0% 0% 43.1%
Govt job-holder 3.2% 33.3% 25.0% 100% 15.7%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(N =) (31) (15) (4) (1) (51)

 

Since the mid-19505, subsistence farming began to
deteriorate and life opportunities in Tamniah dwindled,
especially fOr young adults and teenagers. Youths, contin-
uously exposed to new ideas through urban-oriented formal
education, soon realized that the pursuit of higher levels of
'schooling' and government jobs was the only way to better
oneself and to help the family. As evidenced in table 7.3,
more than 65 percent migrated out of the area in search of
work or educatione

TABLE 7.3

REASON FOR MIGRATION BY AGE OF MIGRANT AT TIME OF INITIAL
OUT-MIGRATION FROM VILLAGE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS)

 

 

 

 

Age at out-migration Total
Reason for
out-migration < 21 21-40 41-60 > 61
Pursue education 35.5% 20.0% 0% 0% 27.5%
Job requirement 6.5% 33.3% 50.0% 0% 17.6%
Search for work 41.9% 46.7% 25.0% 0% 41.2%
Move with parents 16.1% 0% 0% 0% 9.8%
Move w/ adult child 0% 0% 25.0% 100% 3.9%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

(N= ) (31) (15) (4) (1) (51)

 

178

The decision to migrate reflects an initial stage in the
break-up of the traditional rural household. Even though
approximately forty percent of the migrants that I interviewed
indicated. that they reached the. decision to :migrate in
collaboration with their relatives, an equal percent said that
they made this decision on their own. This was the case for
both the younger and older migrants, and clearly a deviation
from the earlier migration pattern under subsistence produc-.
tion, where the decision to migrate was a household matter.

During the process of initial migration, more than fifty
percent moved in company with their families or close rela-
tives. Most of the young migrants, however, out-migrated alone
(table 7.4). At that time, most of the young migrants were
single and moved in.pursuit of education or'a job. Eventually,
many young'migrants went back.to the village, got.married, and

remigrated along with their spouses.

TABLE 7.4
WHO ACCOMPANIED MIGRANT BY AGE AT INITIAL OUTTMIGRATION
FROM VILLAGE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS)

 

 

 

 

Migrant was Age at out—migration Total
accompanied
by: < 21 21--40 41--60 > 60

No one--alone 48.4% 33.3% 25.0% 0% 41.2%
Wife 6 children 6.5% 33.3% 75.0% 100% 21.6%
Parents & siblings 22.6% 20.0% 0% 0% 19.6%
Brothers 12.9% 6.7% 0% 0% 9.8%
Uncles 3.2% 0% 0% 0% 2.0%
Fellow villagers . 6.5% 6.7% 0% 0% 5.9%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

(N a') (31) (15) (4) (1) (51)

 

179

' . c ' na 0
A high percent of long-term migrants from the community
of Shahran Bani Malik chose to remain resident at the initial
place of destination. Once the migrant finds a job in an urban
area, he rarely moves elsewhere unless it is required for a
better job. This is especially true of those who migrated
after 1971 (table 7.5). Students, however, are an exception
to this trend. Once they graduate, they may go back to the
village if an appropriate job is available, or may move to

another town_as dictated by job location.
TABLE 7.5

YEAR OF MOVE TO CURRENT DESTINATION BY YEAR OF INITIAL
OUT-MIGRATION FROM VILLAGE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS)

 

 

 

 

Year of Year of migration Total (N)
move to

current Pre-1965 65-70 71-76 77-82 Post

destination 1982

Pre-l965 38.5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9.8% (5)
1965-70 15.4% 75% 0% 0% 0% 9.8% (5)
1971-76 23.1% 25% 46.2% 0% 0% 19.6% (10)
1977-82 15.4% 0% 23.1% 80% 0% 33.3% (17)
Post 1982 7.7% 0% 30.8% 20% 100% 27.5% (14)
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

(N =) (13) (4) (13) (15) (6) (51)

 

The propensity to stay in one town for a long time is
primarily due to the migrant's satisfaction with the situation
at the place of destination. Job security, the availability
of education and other social amenities, and the presence of
relatives and fellow villagers conceivably make urban resi-

dence a pleasant experience for most of the migrants.

180
When I asked migrants to appraise their situation now,
more than seventy-five percent indicated they were much better
off now than before migration. Generally, earlier migrants to
Taif and Riyadh perceive their situation now more positively
than before migration: they migrated under difficult situa-
tions,

and things are markedly improved. Older migrants,

recently moving to Abha and Khamis Mushait, contrary to
earlier migrants, perceive their situations less positively
than when they were in Tamniah. While noting improvements in
their livelihoods, they generally missed the village life.
Generally, most migrants are still emotionally tied to
Tamniah. When asked about a preferred place of residence, only
eight percent mentioned their current place of residence: more
than fifty-five percent prefer to live in Tamniah under
comparable life chances, i.e. if they could earn the same
income they currently enjoy. Younger migrants, however, prefer
to live in urban areas (table 7.6).

TABLE 7.6

PREFERRED PLACE OF RESIDENCE OF MIGRANT BY CURRENT PLACE OF
RESIDENCE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS)

 

 

 

Preferred Current place of residence Total
residence
place: Abha Khamis Taif Jeddah Riyadh Dhran.
Mushat Aljnob
Current Town 0% 7.1% 14.3% 0% 16.7% 0% 7.8%
Tamniah 57.1% 42.9% 71.4% 33.3% 66.7% 0% 54.9%
Abha 28 . 6% 0% 14 . 3% 0% 0% 100% ll . 8%
Al-khamis 0% 42.9% 0% ' 33.3% 0% 0% 13.7%
Makkah 7.1% 7.1% 0% 0% 8.3% 0% 5.9%
Jeddah 7.1% 0% 0% 33.3% 8.3% 0% 5.9%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(N= ) (14) (14) (7) (3) (12) (1) (51)

 

181
Won

As we noted earlier, the search for long-term employment
and the pursuit of education have motivated the recent rural-
urban migration in Saudi Arabia. Since the early 1960s, when
family agriculture became less viable, many individuals, as
well as families, were compelled to migrate in search of
better life opportunities in urban areas.

The choice of destination also is determined mainly by
job and educational opportunities. For example, while some
migrants cite different reasons, more than seventy percent of
the migrants that I interviewed chose a particular place of
destination because of job and educational opportunities.

Generally, job opportunities and education inspired long
distance migration to the Hijaz towns and Riyadh, whereas
migrants to the regional towns of Abha and Khamis Mushait
focused on other reasons besides job and education. About
thirty percent who migrated to the two regional towns said
that it was the presence of relatives that motivated them to
move there.

This, however, is not to suggest that Taif and Riyadh
migrants are isolated from their relatives. As a matter of
fact, more than two-thirds of those who migrated to Taif and
Riyadh indicated they had relatives there prior to their own
arrival. So, while they may have been inspired by job or
educational opportunities, undoubtedly the presence of

relatives added an incentive for long-distance migration.

182

The presence of relatives and fellow villagers at place
of destination was and still is a very important factor for
channeling the flow of migration. Since the beginning of the
19705, earlier migrants acted as a source of help, informa-
tion, and sanctuary for in-migrants: 1) they provided board
and food until the latter were able to be on their own: 2)
they gave financial help when needed: 3) they provided emo-
tional support during the process of adjustment to urban life
and the new cultural setting: and 4) most importantly, earlier
migrants used their knowledge, connections, and influence to
help recent migrants find work with the government (table
7.7). This is supported by the fact that in each of the four
major places to which.migrants tend.to move, the migrants from
Tamniah tend to be employed in one or two Ministries.

Migrants in each of the four major places of destination
also live in close proximity to one another. Many of them,
especially in.Abha and Khamis Mushait, bought or were awarded
a residential plot of land by the government where they
eventually built their own houses through a housing loan.

The residential concentration of migrants in certain
neighborhoods continues to keep them in close contact with
each other and with their rural communities. The Taif and
Riyadh migrants, in particular, are closer to each other than
those within Abha and Khamis Mushait. Certainly the close

proximity of the latter to Tamniah, where they can visit more

183
frequently, helps ease feelings of separation from rural

community and relatives.

TABLE 7.7
TYPES OF HELP OFFERED BY MIGRANT TO RECENT FELLOW
MIGRANTS (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS)

 

Type of help Year when migrant moved to Total
offered this town

 

Pre-l971 1971-82 post 1982

 

None 0% 14.8% 50.0% 21.6%
Ride to town 0% 7.4% 0% 3.9%
Temporary housing 50.0% 37.0% 28.6% 37.3%
Financial assistance 10.0% 14.8% 0% 9.8%
Help finding a job 40.0% 25.9% 21.4% 27.5%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
(N= ) (10) (27) (14) (51)

 

Generally, Tamniah migrants in both Riyadh and Taif get
together during holidays, social gatherings such as weddings,
and during visits by villagers. They also organize periodic
gatherings to converse about happenings where they reside, and
about village events. Sometimes this may require them to take
initiatives, such as helping a fellow migrant or sending
monetary help to needy or disaster stricken families back in
the village.

Migrant's ties with their respective village communities
are still strong. Each adult male migrant is required to send
annually an amount of 100 SR to the 'tribe fund'. Usually, the
special fund is used to help needy and disaster stricken
members, or during special events, such as a visit by an

important government official to the area. In sum, the

184
migrants' spatial detachment from the village is generally
not matched by a sense of disavowal of Tamniah and the Shahran

tribe.

MW

Recent socioeconomic changes in Saudi society have
profoundly affected the morphology and composition of the
household. In the past, an extended household was the predomi-
nant type, where livelihood strategies of both the household
and that of the individual were, to a large extent, insepar-
able. Even though individuals within a household.may indepen-
dently choose a livelihood strategy such as off-farm employ-
ment or temporary migration, their choices were, usually,
bounded by the overall household's strategies and needs.
Undoubtedly, the dominance of subsistence agriculture and the
importance of land in the past bonded households' individuals
regardless of age and marital status.

As rural communities were lured into off-farm employment
and the 'money' economy, both agriculture and the land lost
their importance in the overall livelihood strategies of the
rural household. Consequently, the encompassing logic of the
extended household was dealt a strong blow. While kinship. ties
remain strong, individuals no longer feel the need to link
their future with that of the larger household or, for that

matter, to the land.

185

Undoubtedly, long-term ‘migration contributed to the
declining importance of extended family households. Soon after
married male migrants and their spouses move out of the
village, they .tend to break away from full membership in
their parental households. As we can see in table 7.8: 1)
single migrants continue to remit to their natal households:
2) the majority of Abha and Khamis Mushait migrants, who are
mostly recent migrants, still hold strong economic ties with
their parents and siblings: 3) the majority of Hijaz and
Riyadh married migrants, living with their immediate families,
maintain a weaker form of economic linkages with parents and
siblings.

Even though the group of migrants I interviewed is not
totally representative of Tamniah migrants, I feel fairly
confidant in generalizing, as follows:

First, those ‘having' full economic ties with family
usually pool about twenty-five percent of their monthly income
with their parents and siblings. The pooled income, in turn,
is used to invest in urban real estate or businesses, to
buiLd a new house in the village, and/or to pay dowry for
spouses of younger brothers.

Second, after they obtain a job and buy an automobile,
single migrants usually send between fifteen to fifty percent
of their salaries to their parents. While most of this is used
by’ the family, single migrants expect, in return, full

financial support during marriage.

186

Third, married migrants who send monthly help usually

send it to an aging parent with dependents and a limited

income source, such as social security payments. Many of these

migrants send between 400 and 700 SR.monthly. Other migrants,

especially in Abha and Khamis Mushait,

instead of giving

money, bring food and other essentials when they visit needy

parents or a widowed female relative with dependents.

TABLE 7.8
ECONOMIC TIES OF MIGRANT WITH PARENTAL FAMILY BY REGION
OF RESIDENCE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS)

 

 

 

 

 

Economic ties Current residence Total
with natal family .
and marital status Southwest Hijaz Central
single
Complete close ties 0% 20.0% 8.3% 5.9%
Monthly remittances 0% 0% 8.3% 2.0%
Occasional help only 0% 0% 8.3% 2.0%
Married
Complete close ties 37.9% 0% 0% 21.6%
Monthly remittances 13.8% 20.0% 33.3% 19.6%
Occasional help only 13.7% 0% 25.0% 13.7%
No economic ties 34.5% 60.0% 16.7% 35.3%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
(N= ) (29) (10) (12) (51)
Qensee end Consegnences
o ' t o : as d'es

As indicated, each migrant cited a reason for out-
migration. While the majority specify the pursuit of education
and job as the two primary reasons, there were those who

migrated as dependents. But to judge a migrant's success (or

187

failure) on the bases of his stated reason or, for that
matter, the outcome of his migration is far short of examin-
ing the underlying causes of migration. For us to gain a
clearer picture of migration and to be able to discuss the
migrants' experiences in destination, we must highlight the
situation prior to migration in terms of a migrant's age and
socioeconomic status and year of migration.

It is, thus, useful to classify the sample according to
year of migration, age at migration, reason for migration, and
whether the migrant was a family provider, a dependent, or
just taking care of himself when he migrated. Following the
classification, I will overview some representative cases in
order to gain a better understanding of what really happened
both in terms of causes and consequences. Each migrant to be
used for case studies will be given a name different than his
in order to protect the migrant's identity.

The sample consists of two groups based on the date of
migration:

1- Wilts

During the 19505 and the 19605, Tamniah began to ex-
perience dramatic changes as it began to articulate its
institutions) more strongly with that of the larger Saudi
society.

First, with the introduction of formal education, young
males were re-oriented toward off-farm employment and urban

life in general.

188

Second, as urbanization. began to spread across ‘the
country, the prospect for better economic opportunities in
urban areas began.to attract rural people. As a result, tempo-
rary migration became more viable and long-term migration
surfaced for the first time in Tamniah. Since younger migrants
represent the more able-bodied labor force, both temporary and
long-term migration led to a deterioration of subsistence
agriculture, communal labor, and the community's cooperation
projects.

While most of the community's households were able to
combine both temporary migration and agriculture during the
period 1950-71, many were not as fortunate. Those who lacked
sufficient labor and land began to think urban and began
careers outside agriculture. In this respect, young as well
as older males, and individuals as well as families, started
to migrate in search of better life opportunities.

Of the sampled migrants, seventeen (33.3%) migrated prior
to 1971. Nine were 19 years of age or older. Before out-migra-
tion, none of the older group had secured an off-farm.job: all
were farmers. Generally, the older cohort that migrated before
1971 had to settle for low status government service jobs
requiring only minimal credentials. Among the older migrants,
two moved with their immediate families: both were in their
early thirties.

The first of the older migrants moved to Abha in 1962

with his wife. Prior to migration, Ibraheem (pseudonym) was

189
a farmer, and also took advantage of both the traditional and
the newly established elementary school to learn reading and
writing. Since he had no labor power but himself, agriculture
became an unrealistic source of subsistence, especially when
the prospects of off-farm employment were strong.

Soon after' migrating, Ibraheem. got a job *with the
Commission of Guidance, which demands less of its officials,
requires only basic reading, writing, and a good knowledge of
religious teachings, all of which he had prior to migration.
Thus, he was able to continue education until graduating from
high school. He moved alone to Riyadh in 1971, where he took
a second wife, and finished college while still keeping his
job.

Though he declares Riyadh as his place of residence, his
older wife and her children still live in Abah. Now he is 58
years old, has two households, and manages eighteen children
who are between 25 and 3 years of age. Two of his daughters
moved back to Tamniah after they got married. He still visits
the village monthly, and commutes back and forth between
Riyadh and Abha. He makes around (5,000) SR monthly from his
job, but also owns real estate which grants him some annual
return.

Another married migrant to move with his wife and
children was an illiterate, 34 year-old farmer we will call
Mosa. After he visited Taif and Makkah for short time periods,

and worked during the pilgrimage season during 1966 and 1967,

190
Mosa decided to move out along with his wife and son to Taif
in 1968. Even though Mosa had sufficient agricultural lands,
he was unable to eke out his family subsistence from the land
due to shortages of family labor, especially when communal
labor declined rapidly in the 19605.

Soon after moving to Taif, both Mosa and his wife
obtained low status government service jobs as a doorman/-
doorwoman at a female elementary school. He remained a
resident of Taif ever since. Now he is about 55 years old and
both he and his wife still hold the same jobs at the school.
He also took advantage of a government housing loan and built
a small house. In his spare time, Mosa drives and rents-out
a small truck, a 'Suzuki'. Both husband and wife make about
(4,300) SR monthly which, along with his part-time work, is
sufficient for a decent living. He has four children between
the ages of 35 and 8 years. The eldest son moved back to
Tamniah after finishing nine years of schooling, got married,
and now holds a clerical job with the government at the Post
Office of Al-Masqi. Aside from occasional visits by the
parental family, there are no other ties between the father
and his eldest son.

A second group of early migrants consists of six teenage
males between 10-18 years of age. Two moved with their
parents, enrolled in school and were able to finish post-
secondary education. Today, both are high school teachers and

leading a good life. In a manner of speaking, they had a

191

relatively easy situation since they were not burdened with
family responsibility. The situation, however, was not as easy
for the other younger early migrants. Even though their migra-
tion was economically advantageous, they experienced many
hardships from the time of moving until they reached adult-
hood. Two cases, in particular, provide some insight of the
pressures of having to migrate young with little or no support
either in the village or at the place of destination.

The first is the case of two teenage orphan brothers.
Prior to initial migration, Khalil and.Saleem lived with.their
aunt and subsisted on community help. Even though they had
five pieces of inherited farm land, they were unable to farm
it or rent it out due to common labor shortages in Tamniah.
In 1950, they moved along with temporary labor migrants to
Makkah. For four years they engaged in manual labor for self-
subsistence, while pursuing education at a night school. They
returned.to‘Tamniah in 1955, and stayed for one year, subsist-
ing on what they had saved. In 1956, both again migrated back
to Makkah and worked four more years in construction while
still continuing night school. In 1961, and after acquiring
some savings, they went back to Tamniah and worked the land
for two years. In 1963, with the intention to save for
marriage, they moved to the town of Unaiza in the central
region. There, they worked with a construction company for one
year, after which they went back to Tamniah and got married.

For the next six years, with the use of hired labor, they

192

engaged in farming, concentrating mainly on vegetable produc-
tion for sale. At the same time both continued night school
until they graduated. In 1969, they migrated to Riyadh to
pursue college educations, while leaving their families back
in Tamniah. During their stay in Riyadh, Khalil and Saleem
subsisted on the government students' allowance, sending part
of it to their families. Also, they rented out part of their
farm, which helped them get through college. After graduating
from college, they got assigned as intermediate school
teachers. The eldest was sent to Abha, while the younger
brother was sent to the Tamniah intermediate school, where he
is still teaching today.

After getting teaching jobs, both settled in their
respective places of residence. Each makes around 120,000 SR,
and owns a house in Abha, which was built through the govern-
ment's housing program. While they still visit each other
weekly, they no longer'pool their income, but always help each
other during times of need.

The second case of an early young migrant is that of a
ten year old boy who had to go it alone. Prior to initial
migration, Jabir lived with his mother and his older teenage
brother. The family is from the village of A~l Yanfa'. Due to
shortages both in land and labor, the family subsisted on
community help and from remuneration for herding done by the

eldest son.

193

Jabir attended school when it was first opened and
finished four years of elementary schooling before he mig-
rated. Even though Jabir insists that he migrated to continue
schooling, there is little doubt that he actually migrated in
search of better life chances. His first move was to Abha in
1954, where he stayed for a month waiting for transportation
to go to Taif. Jabir got ten Saudi Riyals from his mother to
help him on his way.

After moving to Taif, he worked for one year as a grocer
helper, staying in a rented place set up by the village for
temporary labor migrants. By year end, he moved temporarily
to Makkah and stayed with an older migrant from the village.
Two months later, he moved to Riyadh in company of other
village :migrants. During' his stay' in. Riyadh, Jabir' got
admitted into a‘government charity school, and lived there for
the next five years. After finishing the equivalent of a high
school degree, he applied.for'a government clerical job at the
Ministry of Health. I

With the help of friends, he got the job and.was assigned
to the Ministry chapter in Abha. After moving to Abha, Jabir
brought. along' his 'mother' and. brother, ‘where they lived
together for the next two years. By 1963, Jabir got married
and moved with his wife to Riyadh due to job requirements. His
brother migrated to Makkah, and worked there for the next

twenty years as a state guard. Their mother moved back to

194
Tamniah, living alone, but supported by her sons until she
died in 1971. .

Jabir lived in Riyadh for four years, until his job was
transferred to Taif. For the next sixteen years, he stayed in
Taif until he built a house in the village with the help and
supervision of a cousin. In 1983, he asked his superiors in
the Ministry of health to be transferred to Abha, and was
granted his wish. For the next three years, Jabir lived in
Tamniah, commuting daily to Abha. In 1987, he became eligible
for a promotion, but had to move to Riyadh in order to realize
it. Leaving his wife and eight children back.in.Tamniah, Jabir
moved alone to Riyadh. He is still waiting for a chance toiget
transferred back to Abha. Even though Jabir makes around
100,000 SR, he barely can cover the cost of living for'himself
and his family. To help the family, his eldest son quit high
school in 1987 and enrolled in a military school in Taif.

Judging from the experience of the four cases discussed
above, earlier migrants, while improving their situations
considerably, had to go a long way and to do many things
before realizing the full benefits of migration. In general,
earlier migrants who chose to stay for longer durations in
urban areas did so because village life had little to offer
at that time. In marked difference, temporary migrants of the
19505 and 19605 only went for special 'targets', such as to
complement subsistence production, improve production tools,

and to help younger siblings and children get an education.

195

2- t ' ant

While many Tamniah people were driven out of their home
village by the impacts of socioeconomic changes of the 19505
and 19605, the majority endured these changes and elected to
stay. By combining incomes from agriculture, remittances from
family members who had temporarily migrated, government jobs,
and.agricultural and.social security subsidies, they“were.able
to make it through the 19605. Some invested in education for
their children.

Earlier long-term migrants, so to speak, were driven out
of Tamniah when things no longer seemed to work for them
there. Also, when they migrated they were not sure of the
prospects, and none of them secured off-farm employment prior
to migration. Most had to settle for low-ladder service and
clerical government jobs.

In marked contrast, both young and older migrants of
the 19705 and 19805 migrated under better circumstances.

First, most of the recent migrants who moved out for
employment did so only when they secured or were assured by
friends and relatives of off-farm employment.

Second, younger migrants of the 19705 and 19805 had
better success than their earlier cohort in realizing what
they had migrated for. For example, students migrating to
continue college, to get special training, or to enroll in a

military school always were assured of a monthly student

196
allowance and board, and always secured a job soon after
graduation. Also, other young migrants who elected to go for
a job after finishing elementary schooling always found an
opening in the suddenly expanding military and civil sectors.
Furthermore, the presence of earlier migrants in places such
as Taif and Riyadh helped recent migrants to more easily
achieve what they migrated for.

Third, recent migrants did not migrate far from Tamniah.
Since 1971, Sixty-three percent of all documented migrants
moved to Abha and Khamis Mushait. The age factor, also,.is
very important in the propensity to migrate farther from the
village. While younger recent migrants tended to migrate
longer distances in pursuit of education and employment, the
majority of older migrants did not move far. This is espe-
cially the case for those 40 years old and above: more than
86 percent of them moved only as far as Abha and Khamis
Mushait.

Undoubtedly, the wealth of the 19705, as a result of oil
price hikes, gave the state an opportunity to expand its
regional development plans, creating more programs and jobs
for all regions. Suddenly, government jobs in Abha and Khamis
Mushait became available for the young and the old, the
qualified and the not so qualified. Expansion of the educa-
tional system, both in scope and size, also played a key role
in deterring families from long distance migration. Not only

can their children get higher-level education in nearby

197
destinations, but many of the less educated elders of both
genders were able to find openings for jobs as janitors,
guards, and door-persons.

The urban orientation of the state regional development
schemes, which led to the concentration of government
establishments in Abha and Khamis Mushait, also encouraged
regional migration. With provisions assured for education,
health and other social amenities, the pace of urbanization
in both towns became astounding during the late 19705 and the
19805. Both towns grew in population by more than fifty
percent. The establishment of the housing-loan program in
1973-74 was particularly instrumental in concentrating
population in regional towns. Not only did the government
offer people large interest-free loans for housing, but vast
tracts of lands were bought-off by the government and were
redistributed to families free of charge. With all that going
on, investments in property, real estate, and construction
occupied.the minds of Saudis all over the country. Price hikes
in real property literally made millionaires out of simple
people who happened to own a piece of land or had been able
to invest in one.

In the study area, many households of both migrants and
non-migrants were able to take advantage of at least one
housing loan and a free piece of property. The younger
educated adults, in particular, were fast to take advantage

of the situation. Since they were more eligible for a free

198
plot of land, they applied for it, and soon applied also for
the free loan, both of which they got promptly, and in no time
they were constructing their modern houses in Abha and Khamis
Mushait. Later on, they got into investments, both in real
estate and land speculation.

In terms of real estate investments, those who stayed in
close proximity to the village or migrated to Abha and Khamis
Mushait had a relative advantage over earlier long distance
migrants. As it turned out, property during the mid-19705 was
much cheaper in the two regional towns than in the larger
urban areas of Hijaz and the capitol city of Riyadh. With
minimum savings and income pooling, most families could afford
to buy a piece of property and negotiate a housing loan.

In the following, I will use some case studies to
highlight characteristics of recent migrants, such as socio-
economic backgrounds, past.migration experiences, reasons for
recent out-migration, and their overall situation in their
destination. Due to the concentration of recent migrants in
Abha and Khamis Mushait, my case studies will be from these
two towns.

The first case is an illiterate man. Ahmed, now is 67
years old, has eight children between the ages of 40 and 12
years of age. He is from.the leading tribal kinship group, and
a close relative of the 'Sheikh'. He was, as.a matter of fact,
offered the head of tribe position when the former 'Sheikh'

died, but he turned it down. His last migration came in 1979,

199
when he permanently moved to Abha. This was, however, not his
first migration experience.

Even though the 'Sheikh' kinship group was traditionally
better off than the rest, it resorted to temporary migration
just like all families did, especially' during' times of
economic hardships. In 1937, when Ahmed was 18 years old, he
migrated to Taif and worked for the next six years in the
military. During that period, he used to send money to his
family regularly, while visiting Tamniah once a year.

By the end of 1942, he quit the army and went back to
Tamniah and worked in farming for the next few years. His
family by then owned more than ten pieces of agricultural
lands, most of which were irrigated. The family subsistence,
generally, was never in jeopardy, but Ahmid nevertheless
migrated temporarily for manual work. In a sense, temporary
migration, traditionally, was socially compulsory for young
adult males regardless of the urgency of needs. During the
period between 1944-47, he migrated three times to Riyadh and
worked in construction.

By the year 1948, he settled.in Tamniah, got married, and
worked in farming. In the beginning of 1962, when.the regional
markets of.Abha and Khamis Mushait.began to expand, the family
started to orient part of its agricultural production towards
vegetable production, using Yemenite migrants (both share-
cropper and hired). Here, it is important to note that, while

the prospect of production for the market was good in the

200
19605, few families were able to take advantage of this. For
one thing, not many could devote enough land to vegetables,
while keeping family subsistence requirements intact. More-
over, production for the market needs investments in hired
labor and transportation which not everybody could afford.

The engagement in vegetable production took.pressure off
family labor and.enabled Ahmid's family to invest.in.education
for its children. Ahmid's eldest son represents many young
people who relied on family support until adulthood. After
finishing elementary school, Abdullah was sent to Abha, where
he lived with fellow students from the village until graduat-
ing from high school. In 1969, he migrated to Riyadh to pursue
a college education. Both family help and the government's
student allowance got him through college. After graduating
from college in 1975, Abdullah went back to Tamniah, got
married, and migrated again with his wife back to Riyadh to
finish a post college diploma in public administration. In
1977, and after he finished the diploma, Abdullah got a
prestigious administrative job with the Emirate of Asir in
Abha.

In 1979, the parents and the rest of the family migrated
to Abha to live with their eldest son. The move came after the
family built a modern 22-room house in Abha. The move also
helped.the family's two younger sons to enroll in.high school,
which was not available in the area. Both sons graduated from

high school and took administrative jobs in the government.

201

After moving to Abha, Ahmid's family took the farm out
of production. The three sons who support the family make
around 18,000 SR a month. The family visits the village once
a month and still keeps a residence for vacation. Two of the
daughters are married. The eldest daughter still lives in
Tamniah, while the youngest lives in the United States with
her husband who is pursuing higher education.

The last case study is an illiterate 64 year old man.
Moshabab was the eldest of two sons. His parents owned six
pieces of farmlands. Early in 19405, he began to migrate
temporarily to Taif and Makkah, working in construction and
water delivery to urban residents, and sending the money back
to his family. After Moshabab got married in 1953, he discon-
tinued temporary migration and worked the farm along with his
brother and wife.

In 1960, Moshabab got a doorman job in Tamniah elemen-
tary school, which.he kept until he retired and moved with.his
wife and six children to Khamis Mushait in 1984. The family
chose to move there, because the two eldest sons got govern-
ment jobs in the town. Both sons continued schooling while
still living in'Tamniah.by commuting daily to Abha. The eldest
son qualified for teaching in elementary school after he grad-
uated from junior college, whereas the younger son holds a
technical job at the military base. Both are married and live
with their parents and younger siblings in a newly constructed

24-room.house. The father practices trades in the traditional

202
market of Khamis Mushait as a hobby. Their annual income is
around 150,000 SR, most of which is earned from the government
jobs of the two sons.

Moshabab visits Tamniah twice a month. His brother Saeed
still lives there and works as a custodian in Tamniah's inter-
mediate school, but also still does some farming in his part
time. Saeed usually works two pieces of the family farm for
tomatoes and wheat production with the help of hired labor on
a daily basis. In 1986, Saeed accrued around 6,000 SR from
sales of the tomatoe crop. The wheat is always consumed
domestically. The two brothers no longer share economic

9

responsibilities towards each other, but yet split the farm.

W

In this chapter, I tried to look closer into the in-
tricacies of the process of migration: when and how it
happened, why it happened, and what was the outcome for the
migrant and his family. I also used case studies to examine
variations pertaining to year of out-migration, age at out-
migration, and reason for out-migration.

According to the sample selected for in-depth informa-
tion, one generally can distinguish between two groups based
on year of out-migration:

1- Earlier migrants who moved prior to 1971. They, generally,
moved when family agriculture became less viable as a

result of the emerging needs of cash income, deterioration

203
of communal labor, and shortages of family labor. After
migrating, this group were pressed into low-ladder service
and clerical government jobs. Eventually, the situation of
most of them, especially the younger migrants, has improved
as they were able to pursue education which qualified them
for better government jobs. Earlier migrants, generally,

had chosen long-distance destinations, such as Taif and

-Riyadh.

Recent migrants of the 19705 and 19805 migrated under
better circumstance. As such, most of them, when migrating
for employment, did so only when they secured or were
certain of an off-farm employment. The majority of recent
migrants have chosen to migrate to Abha and Khamis Mushait,
when the two flourished in the 19705 and 19805 as a result

of expansions in the government job markets, and provisions

of education, health, and other social amenities.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study explored the migration strategies of in-
dividuals and households in the community of Shahran Bani
Malik, Tamniah in the Asir Sarat region of Saudi Arabia. It
is a region that has been experiencing very rapid socio-
economic changes. The aim was to comprehend how migration
patterns and the structural dynamics of.residential relocation
of rural populations are initiated and develop as integral
aspects of the adaptive strategies of rural households. I
applied a broad theoretical approach: explanations of migra-
tion are sought at all levels of social structure --indivi-
dual, household, local community, region, and national.

My approach necessitated a methodology that takes into
account various determinants of migration at different levels:

First, past migration strategies of the community were
examined in terms of economic activities, socio-political
organization, and modes of cooperation and assistance. Most
of this information was gathered by interviews with community
elders and other knowledgeable informants in the community.

Second, to comprehend the structural (macro) effects of

migration, I tried, with the aid of government statistics and

204

205

reports and writings on Saudi Arabia, to characterize the
recent critical stage of socio-economic development of Saudi
society. I wanted to bring to focus: 1) efforts by the Saudi
state in the process of development, centralization, and
societal integration: 2) how these development schemes
impacted different segments of the society, and especially
rural communities: and 3) how rural-urban migration patterns
were affected.

Third, in light of the structural transformations of
Saudi society, I examined present socio-economic aspects of
Shahran Bani Malik as the community began to fully articulate
with and became integrated into the larger society. In part-
icular, I elaborated on: 1) the impacts of formal education
and off-farm employment opportunities: 2) how the community
has responded: and 3) what the outcome was at the household
and community levels.

For these purposes I utilized: 1) a survey of all
households the community, obtaining basic socio-demographic
information for each household: and 2) focused interviews of
household heads in 75 randomly selected households to explore
variations in economic activities, migration strategies, and
basic resources.

Fourth, in light of recent socio-economic changes of the
local community and the larger society, I examined recent
migration patterns of Shahran Bani Malik: 1) how they differ

from the older patterns: 2) how they developed as an integral

206
part of recent individual and household livelihood strategies:
and 3) the outcome of these recent migration patterns.

For these purposes I gathered information on: 1) past
instances of migration by household members in the 75 randomly
selected households relative to those who currently reside in
the village (informing us of the date, duration, destination,
and reason for each migration instance as well as the age and
sex of each migrant): 2) migrant family members in these
households (including socio-demographic information as well
as the dates, destinations, length of out-migrations, and
reasons for migration.of each individual migrant): 3) the rest
of the community migrants, with the aid of key community and
migrant informants: and 4) a sample of 51 male migrants drawn
from the documented male migrants who were interviewed in
their current destination. These interviews helped me get a
first hand account from migrants on their decision to migrate,
why they migrated, and what the consequences of migration have
been for the individual migrant and his family.

Prior to 1950, Shahran Bani Malik was a relatively self-
sufficient peasant community that subsisted on family farming,
complemented by ruminant herding and periodic male labor
migration to the Hijaz urban centers. Moreover it was a
community with strong cohesive bonds visible in various forms
of communal assistance, cooperation, and adherence to a set

of socio-political rules and cultural mores.

207

Migration in association with subsistence production was
of the temporary male-labor-migration type. Except for a few
households whose adult males used to specialize in trade, the
rest of the community had mainly used migration as a way to
overcome shortages in their household's subsistence and
production needs. Aided by a dependable subsistence economy,
co-operation in the use of labor, and mutual assistance among
villagers, the community had managed to avoid the necessity
of permanent large-scale out-migration. Up until the 19505,
Shahran Bani Malik selectively used "target" migration, where
the household periodically dispatched one or more of its adult
male members to the Hijaz towns to seek gainful employment
and to bring back to the household various essentials for
production and subsistence. No permanent migration of indivi-

duals or of whole families had occurred prior to 1950. Thus,

.- 1149 ‘2‘01 0 tr i 0- 71 0 u- -. 01 a: 0
:10 s .16 a? ‘ ent'. l S .- 'S '1 ‘ -.°

01-" ’ u- -_ 0! -.‘ .‘ dmu e -S 4111 "-12- : o. in 0
samurai.

Since 1950, Shahran Bani Malik, as is the case with most
Saudi rural communities, began to experience wide socio-

economic changes as a result of an accelerated pace of

articulation with the larger society. MW
nee largely fine to stete eetions. The state began to centra-

lize its authorities, integrate rural communities into the

208
"concept” of Saudi Arabia, and push for a "modernized" eco-
nomy.

The primary mechanisms through which the state advanced
its development schemes have been formal education, provisions
for off-farm 'employment opportunities in the government
sectors, and the continuous expansion of transportation,
communication, and health infrastructures and facilities.
Furthermore, the state continued to implement extensive
subsidy programs and largess such as social security, price
supports, free loans and other income supplements schemes.

The introduction of mass formal education, and the sudden
expansion of off-farm government jobs, hastened the transition .
from subsistence agriculture to a modern money economy. The
main points relative to that transition are: A

First, with the introduction of formal education, young
males were drawn out of family agriculture and pastoralism,
and were re-oriented toward off-farm employment. Depending on
a particular household's stock of labor and land, and its
commitments to education, the decline of young male participa-
tion in home production necessitated instant changes in the
sustenance strategies of the majority of the community
households. In this respect, those who had traditionally
integrated child labor into their household's productive
activities suffered the most. As such, they were forced to
minimize the loss of young male labor by abandoning part of

their productive activities, such as herding. Others were

209
forced into more frequent temporary migration by household
heads and other adult males.

Second, the state efforts to build its governmental
apparatus, especially the bureaucracy and the military forces,
began to attract young adult males from rural areas since the
early 19605. This attraction to better economic opportunities,
forged by education credentials, quickly became the deciding
force for the transition from subsistence agriculture to non-
agricultural off-farm employment. Not only does off-farm state
employment demand less of its employees, but it also offers
better economic returns than subsistence farming. In addition,
this shift to off-farm employment was further fueled by the
emergence of cash needs to meet the demands of the 'moderni-
zing' economy. Under the new circumstances, rural households
felt the need for a stable monetary income.

While off-farm employment opportunities opened up during
the late 19505, its full impacts were greatly felt after 1973,
when oil revenues suddenly burgeoned, enabling the government
to pursue a full range of economic growth, both at the
national and regional levels.

The ramifications of these shifts to off-farm employment
areigreat, both at the household and.the community levels, and
also relative to domestic production and migration. Since
1973, Shahran Bani Malik became totally oriented toward off-
farm employment and a cash economy. While not abandoning

farming altogether, subsistence agriculture ceased to exist

210

as a necessary element in the household's sustenance stra-
tegies. In testimony to the declining importance of agricul-
ture, only 4 percent of Shahran Bani Malik people now engage
in farming activities. Of those, only 17 percent.are below the
age of 61 years. Furthermore, every household in the community
today benefits directly or indirectly from government jobs,
and/or assistance.

The changes in a typical household's modes of sustenance
induced many other changes. As a result of declines in
subsistence production, the household lost its dominance as
the basic unit of production. Consequently, the encompassing
logic of the traditional household structure was undermined
and household morphology began to change. The earlier pattern
of multi-generational (extended) households lost ground to the
nuclear family household.

At the community level, the acquisition of off-farm
employment and the concomitant deterioration of small scale
subsistence agricultural production have resulted in the
disappearance of communal labor, and declines in co-operation
and assistance. Subsequently, the community no longer func-
tions as an independent unit. politically, socially, and
economically. Besides general socioeconomic changes, delibe-
rate actions of the state undoubtedly have contributed greatly
to the new situation. As the government began to provide free

services on a wide scale, and to establish its socio-political

211
institutions in rural areas, local units lost many of their
reasons for being.

Another salient aspect of the new socio-economic changes
at the community level is the redefining of the bases of
social class. In this respect, gender, patriarchy, and tribal
affiliation, which for long have constituted the foundations
of stratification in the once segmented Saudi society, are
being undermined, and increasingly share relevance with edu-
cation, occupation and income.

Certainly, migration an integral social organizational
aspect of contemporary rural communities, was greatly impacted
by the socio-economic changes. The urban-orientation of Saudi
Arabian development programs, which resulted in urban-biased
formal education, an occupational structure dominated by civil
service jobs, extremely rapid urban growth, and a general
neglect of the rural sector, gave birth to a new pattern of
movement out of the countryside, replacing the older pattern
of seasonal labor migration.

In the case of Shahran Bani Malik, the community's
migratory behavior began to change since the late-19505. I
observed the following: .

First, since 1958, the temporary male labor migration so
characteristic of subsistence communities, gave way to a
longer-duration rural-urban migration, The general decline of
subsistence production induced this shift. As a result of

increased demands for cash, Continued declines of communal

212

labor, and losses of a vital labor source due to schools, a
majority of community households were no longer able to meet
their subsistence needs through domestic production. Subse-
quently, they were forced into a new form of migration, where
members of their family had to endure long periods of urban
residence, and to send back remittances for the household's
basic needs.

Second, since 1972, Shahran Bani Malik completely
abandoned temporary labor migration in favor of longer-term
and semi-permanent migration. This was associated with the
pursuit of education and urban government jobs. Long-term
migration also created the conditions for a rural exodus of
entire family households. While some families of Shahran Bani
Malik migrated out of Tamniah during the 19605, this process
intensified after 1972. More than 100 families from Shahran
Bani Malik.moved to major urban centers and regional towns in
the southwest.

The majority of long-term migrants of Shahran Bani Malik
have generally chosen four destinations: 1) Taif, the tradi-
tional destination. of southwest labor ‘migrants, was the
destination of early out-migrants: 2) Riyadh, the capital
city, and with better education and job opportunities,
continues to receive migrants from Tamniah at a steady rate
of about 16 percent: and 3) the nearby regional towns of Abha
and Khamis Mushait, which flourished during the 19705 and the

19805 as a result of expansions of the regional government

213
.and allocations of funds to regional development programs,
have received more than 60 percent of the migrants.

The impacts of recent long-term migration patterns have
been.profound.at the level of larger society, local rural com-
munities, and the household. At the national level, recent
rural-urban.migration eventuated in: 1) population concentra-
tion in urban centers and regional towns: and 2) heavy inter—
sectoral redistribution of labor from traditional agriculture
and pastoralism into government sectors, including the mili-
tary.

Recent urban migration fostered many changes at“the rural
community level: 1) an1accelerated.pace:of rural depopulation,
where in most instances Saudi rural communities have lost a
majority of their native population: 2) in combination with
the state's provisions for off-farm employment in rural areas,
it drew the most able-bodied labor force away from agriculture
and, thus, agriculture was relegated to a minor household
activity: and, 3) as rural communities abandoned their tradi-
tional base of subsistence, they ceased to function as
cohesive and independent units socially, economically, and
politically.

Recent long-term migration, which differs functionally
from older migration patterns, resulted in many changes at
the household level. The earlier temporary migration, geared
toward the on-going household's maintenance and reproduction

strategies, did not affect the household's morphology or the

214
membership status of the migrant. Remittances from temporary
seasonal migrants occupied an important role under the
traditional subsistence economy. To this end, temporary
migration was a household-planned strategy.

In.marked contrast, the recent long-term migration trend
affected. the :migrants' membership status in ‘their' natal
extended rural households. Generally speaking, married male
migrants who move with their wives and children tend to ease
away from feeling integrally tied to their parental house-
holds. They organize their incomes, consumption habits, and
future priorities independent of the parental households.
Furthermore, remittances are no longer the driving force
behind recent migration, and are not expected as obligations
by the majority of rural households.

Most importantly, recent long-term migrations are
initiated as individual rather than household strategies. As
a result of recent socio-economic changes, which undermined
traditional extended households, younger adult males began to
organize their livelihood strategies independent from their
parental households.

Even though long-term migration affects the membership
status of migrants in their respective rural households,
kinship ties never are broken. Family ties between migrants
and their families in the rural community are still strong and
take the form of frequent contacts and visits and, to a lesser

degree, remittances. All Shahran Bani Malik migrants still

215
visit the village. The frequency of a migrant's visits,
generally, depends on the presence of close relatives in the
village and, of course, on distance of destination from

Tamniah.

From the beginning I viewed the existing migration
research with an open mind, attempting to reconcile and make
use of its divergent approaches, and to explore the pos-
sibility of developing an integrated approach to the study of
migration. As seen by many, the general problem in migration
research is the imposition of a false dichotomy between the
particular and the universal or, to be more clear, "the
individual, his family and the local community on the one hand
and the larger political economy on the other" (Swidell,
1979:255). As a result, mobility research generally became
channeled into one of two contending approaches. The first is
the partial theories of migration which focus on the charac-
teristics and migration decisions of individuals as the latter
try to improve their welfare. This approach is often faulted
for being based on an implicit notion 0f voluntarism where
the society is assumed to be the sum product of intentional
actions of individuals. By contrast, the second approach
concentrates on the conditions under which people make their
decisions, thus tying explanations of migration into the

underlying structural-historical forces that create these

216
conditions. This perspective has been flawed for assuming,
more often than not, that society is external to the in-
dividual and exerts substantial constraints upon their
behavior (Forbes, 1984: Oberai and Bilsborrow, 1984).

An alternative theoretical framework to bridge the gap
between the micro and macro approaches is to consider and
analyze relationships between individual and society as a two-
way "dialectical" relationship. As such, we start with the
theoretical assumption that relationships between individual
and society are complex, and that both individual and society
impact upon and transform one another. Clearly, this is per-
tinent as it establishes the bases for developing an int-
egrated theory of migration, where both individual and
societal levels of analysis are relevant and important. My
approach was guided by this theoretical assumption, as
follows:

First, I attempted to integrate both the micro and macro
approaches by studying socio-economic changes and migration
at various levels-- individual, family, local community, and
society. In this respect, I show how the community of Shahran
Bani Malik has shifted from a subsistence mode of production
to a money economy in response to events at the national
level. 1

Second, I emphasized the relevance of history by examin-
ing past economic and socio-political aspects of the community

as well as characterizing the past migration patterns of the

 

 

217
community. Further, I related migration to the process of
socio-economic development in Saudi Arabia, showing how the
migration patterns of Shahran Bani Malik have shifted in
response to the path of economic development being pursued by
the Saudi state.

Third, I emphasized the interrelationship between
migration strategies and livelihood strategies. As such, I
viewed and analyzed migration as an integral part of "suste-
nance strategies" of individuals and households, and not as
a discrete phenomenon subject to separate investigation.

Fourth ,. I attempted to conceptualize individual migratory
behavior as an outcome of a set of relationship between the
individual, the economy and society. To further elaborate, I
focused on the individual's'trajectory‘through.space.and'time,
showing how social and economic as well as time and space
constraints have shaped migratory behavior of the people of
Shahran Bani.Malik, The value of this approach, which is being
used by human geographers, lies in the utility of developing
a methodology for the collection of longitudinal micro-level
data on human behavior over time and space (Forbes, 1984:159) .

My methodology, devised to take into account the dif-
ferent determinants of migration, proved to be fairly adequate
for the purpose at hand, but with some obvious shortcomings.
The shortcomings are related to: 1) inadequacies as well as
inaccuracies of published national and regional data and

information, since they are controlled and produced by

218

government agencies: 2) lack. of :migration data at both

national and regional levels, constricting the generaliza-

bility of the study since no comparisons between the community
of study and other levels of the society (regional and/or

national) were made explicit: 3) the inability to build a

robust socio-economic status scale has impeded the recognition

of clear boundaries between social strata at the community
level.

Thus I have learned that in order to advance the develop-
ment of an integrated approach to the study of migration it
is contingent upon us to realize the following: —

l- The need to incorporate the concept of household, both as
an organizing concept and unit of analysis since households
are "the primary arena for the expression of age and sex
roles, kinship, socialization, and economic cooperation
where the very stuff of culture is mediated and transformed
in action" (Netting, et al., 1984, P-.EEii)- But to utilize
the concept in a meaningful way, we must worry a lot about
formulating a useful perspective of household. A good
definition not be derived merely from an income pooling
criterion, but, instead, should incorporate both the unit
morphology (age-sex composition and inter-generational con-
figuration) and, more importantly, the way the unit or-
ganizes its production, maintenance, consumption, and

reproduction activities (functions).

2-

219

Data gathered at one level of analysis are not sufficient
to capture complexities of the migration process in terms
of causes, consequences, and the decision to migrate. For
instance, the analysis of data at the aggregate or macro-
level leads to generalities, and only indirectly helps in
understanding the decisions of individual/household to
migrate. By the same token, analysis at the micro-level
(individual/household) does not allow consideration of the
context in which the household decisions are made (Oberai
and Bilsborrow, 1984).

Inferences from data at one level of analysis to inves-
tigate relationships between social and economic variables
at other levels are risky and more often than not lead to
fallacies. For instance, the inference about individual
behavior from aggregate or macro-level data leads to the
"ecological fallacy" (Robinson, 1950), and the inference
from observations made at the micro-level (individual/
household) about the conditions or behavior of higher level
units leads to "individualistic fallacy" (Scheuch, 1974:-
138) . It is, thus, pertinent that data be gathered at
intermediate levels (community and region) besides the
micro and macro levels, in order to safeguard against
inference fallacies. Community and regional factors are of
particular importance for migration study since areal
characteristics or what is called "opportunity structures"

are recognized as major determinants of migration flows

220

(Ritchey, 1976). Information on community or areal charac-
teristics must be extensive to include all aspects of the
community. As charted by Bilsborrow (1984), these include
employment opportunities, wage levels, land-tenure system,
kinship ties, degree of cohesion and social integration,
inheritance systems, transportation and communication link-
ages, access to health and eduction facilities, politico-
economic power structure, climatic factors, and government
investment programmes (ibid. p. 413).

The need to integrate the role of the state and society
into the analyses of migration and the broad socio-economic
changes which characterize the specific epoch. As is the
case of most third world countries, the state becomes a
"central figure" in the process of development: it controls
and implements development plans, sets scales of income
distribution, and mediates between national and inter-
national forces. For us to comprehend the process of
mobility patterns, we must, also, look into the process of
socio-economic development in terms of how it came about,
who are the beneficiary groups or classes, and what are the
beneficiary regions. This, undoubtedly, will help explain
the emergence of particular mobility patterns at both

regional and national levels.

221
WWW

Today, a great challenge facing developing nations is to
control the flow of migration rural communities to urban
centers in order to maintain a balanced economic growth. It
is pertinent therefore that we monitor and study the great
socio-economic changes taking place in the rural countryside.
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the government is making special
efforts to curb the rates of rural-urban population drift.
This makes the comprehension of how and why rural people
pursue particular livelihood and/or migration strategies very
essential if development schemes are to prove beneficial
rather than detrimental to the well-being of people in the
society.

Recent rural-urban migration in Saudi Arabia presents a
unique case that is, in many ways, different from the ex-
periences of most contemporary developing nations. It is a
phenomenon that must be understood in the context of a
traditional tribal society which, in the span of a few
decades, have been under the impress of intense socio-economic
forces ‘not necessarily of its own making. Let me try to
explain: 1

First, this migration pattern is an outcome of the
state's socio-political and economic planning, which stresses
the need for societal integration, centralization, and
'modernization' . Unfortunately this has resulted in an urban-

oriented development process ' that created a strong pulling

‘IAI I I . -I-..

222

force for the rural population, and eventually leading to high
rates of rural-urban migration and the abandonment of the
traditional sector. By contrast, the recent migration ex-
periences of most Third World countries coincided with high
population growth in rural areas, mechanization of agriculn
ture, urbanization, industrialization and the incorporation
of rural economies into the world economy (Binsbergen and
Meilink, 1978: Forbes, 1984: Oberai, 1981).

Second, unlike in most other developing countries, rural
to urban migrants in Saudi Arabia are not channeled into
skilled technical and needed manual activities. Instead, the
government by virtue of its labor policies, which relies upon
the use of expatriate labor, has accommodated the rural and
nomadic migrants by expanding its bureaucracy, creating
abundant jobs for unskilled Bedouins and rural migrants, and
generally shielding the indigenous labor force from the market
forces.

Third, Saudi rural-urban migration of the last two
decades is characterized by long-term moves of entire fami-
lies. Certainly, this is different from other developing
nations where temporary migration and labor circulation still
constitute the norm (Chapman and Prothero, 1982). This type
of migration has many ramification for the migrant family and
the Saudi society as a whole: 1) contrary to temporary labor
migration, where the family of the migrant stays back in the

village and continues working the land, the move of the entire

223

family out of the village eventuates in the abandonment of the
land and the continued deterioration of small family agricul-
ture: 2) movement of the entire family to urban areas, which
more often than not leads to a permanent residency in urban
areas, generally is an irreversible process: and, 3) more
importantly, the bringing up of children and young adults in
urban setting cuts them of their rural roots, and limits the
possibilities of them going back to the village.

My study offers some timely insights into the agrarian
transition in Saudi Arabia as rural population shifted its
livelihood strategies from subsistence agriculture to a money
economy. In particular, it shows that: 1) the patterns of .
rural-urban.migration were greatly affected by the structural
transformation of the Saudi economy: 2) the spread of formal
education and the creation of off-farm employment oppor-
tunities by the state have led to the deterioration of
traditional agriculture: and 3) despite the massive build-up
in rural infrastructures, creation.ofigovernment.jobs in.rural
areas, and the institution of numerous incentives to revive
traditional agriculture, the rural-urban drift has accele-
rated, especially after 1971.

Here, we must bring back into question the very nature
of government development plans. Undeniably some of the
government's programs have delayed potential massive rural
drifts to urban centers from the relatively heavily populated

rural areas, especially of the south and southwest regions.

224

These programs, however, did so only through injection of
capital, which is electively used by recipients as an income
source. Furthermore, the urban orientation of government
development schemes, which includes the encouragement of
formal education, an occupational structure dominated by civil
service jobs, and the general neglect of self-sustaining
programs in the rural areas, continues to promote an irrever-
sible rural-urban population drift.

To this end, one may conclude that the Saudi Arabian
government's programs in rural areas have not accomplished
their main stated goals of raising rural productivity and
releasing excess labor to the rural industries that are being
planned, and other productive sectors of the economy. To the
contrary, they have had the twin impact of enticing rural
families out of traditional agriculture while maintaining a
largely service oriented, bureaucratic labor force in rural
areas.

The implication of these schemes to rural-urban migration
is far reaching. The retention of the rural population in the
countryside thus far is only made possible through the use of
oil revenues in the forms of subsidies, income supplements,
and less productive off-farm employment. These while generally
have raised the welfare of rural people can only continue so
far as there is enough revenues to spend. And as Arafat (1985)

points out "Any reduction in spending on the rural people will

225
erode sense of satisfaction and may gradually lead to a new
wave of internal migration" (p. 392).

Another critical implication of this path to socio-
economic development.is that the:Saudi society during the last
two decades have, practically, relied upon oil revenues to
finance all development projects and.maintain a high standard
of living especially in urban areas, while abandoning its
traditional way of living. The future of this path.of'develop-
ment, however, is uncertain. Since 1984, when.oil prices plum-
meted in the international markets, the government began a
process of recalculation: 1) it began to cut down on its
subsidy and. price support programs: 2) its) schemes for
employment of Saudis were reshaped to the degree that some
high school and college graduates are unemployed today: 3) it
began to limit the number of admissions to colleges: and 4)
it raised payments on various government's services, adding
burdens on the unemployed labor force.

One cannot help but to wonder what the Saudi situation
will be when the oil sector ceases to deliver: how the
millions of young people, who had.been brought up in affluence
and with little or no productive skills, will survive the
struggle for existence under a cruel environment and uncertain
geo-political picture: and how can a city like Riyadh, in the
middle of a desert, with no raison d'etre but administration,

and with over one million people, endure the harsh reality of

226
resource scarcity when the international prices of oil further

fall.

0 u c

The recent socio-economic changes in Saudi Arabia have
reshaped the lives of all Saudi people, affecting even the
basic values and social organizational aspects of society,
such as the concept of the work ethic itself, consumption
habits, kinship ties, and the likes. Findings from my study,
which focused mainly on rural-urban migration, suggests some
relational patterns and social phenomena that I believe merit
further research.

I have observed that the' very dramatic socio-economic
changes in Saudi Arabian society during the past two decades
and the concomitant shift to a pattern of long-term permanent-
type rural-urban migration have impacted in profound ways on
the interpersonal relationships that define rural households
and family life in Saudi Arabia. In contemporary Saudi Arabia
we are witnessing the emergence of some very important
questions relative to the changing pattern of rural-urban
migration and the changing structure of the Saudi Arabian
family. These may be posed as follows:

1- How has the traditional patriarchic family in Saudi Arabia
interacted with and been affected by this new form of
rural-urban migration? We need to comprehend the part

played by family and kin in channeling and facilitating

227

rural to urban migration, and at the same time to assess
the degree to which the recent geographic redistribution
and dispersion of members of the rural family have impacted
the structure and the internal dynamics of family life in
terms of household roles, norms of reciprocity, patterns
of mutual aid, kinship obligations, and decision-making
processes relative to work, child-rearing, and community
responsibilities.

2- How have governmental programs of human services, such as
social welfare, impacted upon the family and upon the
individual's feelings of responsibility and loyalty to the
family group. Certainly many of these programs have
facilitated the free flow of labor from rural to urban
areas.

My study, also, revealed that more than ninety percent of
the male labor force, both migrants and non-migrants from the
village, are presently employed in the government sector: less
than five percent are engaged in skilled or semi-skilled jobs.
Clearly, this points.tota serious question about the country's
manpower situation: the heavy reliance on foreign labor at the
lower echelons of the occupational structure. This, to many
scholars, seems to pose a threat to the sustainability of the
Saudi economic system. Is it a situation that is irreversible?
Would it not be in the interests of the Saudi state and its
people, both now and in the future, to have Saudi citizens

occupying all ranks of the occupational structure, including

228
the lower technical and manual labor positions? Surely the
occupational situation in rural villages throughout Saudi
Arabia merits special attention.

Questions such as these, which in one way or the other
involve the interrelationships between rural migration and
societal development, pose enormous challenges to future
researchers. Saudi society is experiencing some very basic
changes, many of which have been stimulated by governmental
programs to build a 'modern' nation. But we need to monitor
these changes very carefully, and we need to be especially
sensitive to their deeper meanings, if Saudi Arabia is to
maximize its human resources and to realize its ultimate -

potential as a nation.

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