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MIGRATION AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A RURAL COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTHWEST REGION OF SAUDI ARABIA

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ABSTRACT

MIGRATION AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
A RURAL COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTHWEST
REGION OF SAUDI ARABIA

By

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This study explores the past and present migration patterns of people from a rural community in the Southwest Sarat region of Saudi Arabia. A broad theoretical approach is employed to explain variations in migration strategies over time. Individual, household, and community levels are taken into account; rapidly changing regional and national contexts are considered.

To assess the phenomenon of migration as manifested in this community: 1) I interviewed community elders to overview its socio-economic history; 2) through government statistics and official reports, and available litrature on Saudi Arabia, I explored the recent critical stage of socio-economic development of Saudi society; 3) all households in this community were surveyed to get a perspective on its socio-demographic structure; 4) I interviewed spokespersons for a selected sample of households to obtain in-depth information on livelihood and migration strategies; and 5) relevant migration information was collected by following-up migrants from the community at their places of residence.

Prior to 1950, the community of study was a relatively self-sufficient peasant village that subsisted on farming, herding and temporary male labor migration to urban centers

in the Hijaz region. With the spread of formal education and an increase in governmental employment opportunities over the last thirty years, subsistence production was abandoned, and the community and its households became totally oriented to the modern money economy.

These new socio-economic changes induced by the structural transformation of Saudi society, socially, economically, and politically reshaped the rural sector and this particular community. Concomitantly, the earlier pattern of temporary labor migration by males declined in favor of long-term moves of whole families. Since 1960, more than 140 families of the community have moved away to urban centers and Southwest regional towns.

The recent rural-urban migration has affected a redistribution of population in Saudi Arabia, accelerating a depopulation of the countryside, and furthering the demise of the traditional sector.

Migrants from the community of study still maintain ties with their village kin and the community; they visit the village periodically; they send remittances to needy relatives in the village; and male migrants send an annual pay to a "common fund" of their respective kinship group.

Within the new socio-economic context of Saudi Arabia, the return of migrants to their area of origin is predicated solely on realizing similar "life chances" available to them in other parts of the country.

To Mohammed Abdallah Al-Eissa, the Director of Social Security Center Of Muhail, Tehahama of Asir, who relinquished an affluent life, a more celebrated career to care for his mother, whom was kept distant from her son by a delibrate class-conscious uncle.

To my wife, Jawahir, and my children, Amal, Sami, Manal, Naseem and Nada, whose loving care and patience made it easier for me to finish this project.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

The main objective of this study is to explain variations in migration strategies (through time) of individuals and households in a rural community of the Asir mountain region. In particular, it tries to establish: 1) a clear characterization of the rural community past and present migration patterns; 2) how and why the traditional pattern was abandoned and subsequently replaced by a new pattern of geographic and social mobility; and 3) what the impacts have been of this new pattern both at the community and the household levels.

The main premise, here, is that rural-urban migration in Saudi Arabia has taken a new pattern during the last three decades. As such, migration strategies of individuals and households have shifted from a temporary "target" male labor migration to permanent and semi-permanent migration types. It is thus the purpose of this study to explore those changes in patterns of migration and then to relate them to changes in household livelihood strategies and the overall structural transformation of the Saudi society.

A clear comprehension of recent trends in rural-urban migration in Saudi society is essential, because; 1) rural-urban migration has been extensive during the last three decades as evidenced by population growth of urban centers and regional towns, and depopulation of the rural side (The Ministry of Planning, 1975; 1984); 2) the massive rural-urban population turn over was accompanied by heavy inter-sectoral labor shifts which were characterized by heavy engagements in the government (service) sector and the abandonment of traditional sector (Kassovi, 1983); and 3) efforts by the Saudi government to slow down rural-urban migration have not met with great success. Despite the massive build up in rural infrastructure (roads, health care, education, and transportation), creation of government jobs in rural areas, and the institution of numerous incentives to revive traditional agriculture, the rate of rural-urban migration is still considerably high (Chamieh, 1981).

The argument pursued here is that the growth of the oil sector and the concomitant monetary wealth that was accrued has resulted in an overall restructuring of the Saudi economy, a consequence of which is the undermining of the traditional subsistence economy, and the erosion of its logic. As such, the flow of oil wealth to the Saudi society has presented new opportunities in the soon to become dominant service sector. Faced with this new situation, rural households opted for new

and more assuring livelihood strategies that continually withdrew them out of subsistence activities and into off-farm state employment. It is through this that I try to look into and explain recent socio-economic changes and shifts of rural household livelihood strategies and rural-urban migration patterns.

Another primary concern of this research is to explore the theoretical issues surrounding the phenomenon of migration and to reconsider the methodological problems encountered in this type of study. To this end, it attempts to deploy an "integrated" approach for the study of internal migration in order to build 'middle level' theory and to create a methodology which captures the super-structural considerations while maintaining sensitivity to the individual actors.

A review of the literature shows that explanations of migration are generally sought at two different levels of analysis from two contending perspectives. At one level, the micro (individualist) approach focuses on individuals and their respective migration decisions. At another level, the macro (historical structuralist) perspective looks into the conditions under which people move or formulate their migration decisions. As such, it attempts to tie migration decisions to underlying structural-historical forces which, in effect, mold the on-going every day conditions (Wood, 1982).

Both approaches, in their attempt to explain migration, had failed to completely develop an integrated theory of migration. The historical-structuralist perspective, in attempting to explain population movements by means of "historical analysis" of macro level structures, only produces generalities about migration over time. It thus fails to generate an understanding of the "individual" decision to migrate and the multitudinous variations. At the micro-level, the individualist approach attempts to explain migration decisions by focusing on the individual, thus failing to consider/integrate the larger 'context' in which migration decisions are made (Oberai and Bilsborrow, 1984).

In this study, I attempt to apply a broader approach to the study of rural-urban migration through integration of the theory and methodology of the various migration approaches. Theoretically speaking, migration decisions are conceived of as the outcome of the interaction between (micro) individual characteristics and perceptions, 'areal characteristics' (local and regional), and (macro) societal parameters mediated by the household.

To further elaborate, the individuals' characteristics (age, sex, and education) and perceptions of available opportunities both in and outside their local communities influence their respective decision to migrate. The individuals, nonetheless, construct their migration strategies as part of their overall livelihood strategies in response to local and

regional imbalances of labor, land, and capital, as well as health, eduction, and other social amenities. Most of these imbalances can be traced back to the on-going process of the structural transformation and unbalanced development in society.

The household, in turn, regulates the individual's migration decisions by virtue of its overall livelihood strategies which are developed according to the dictates of household's physical and non physical resource endowments. As such, the size and quality of landholding and dwelling, and presence of savings [as well as number, age-sex composition, education, skill levels, and knowledge of members], all shape the household's livelihood strategies among which are migration strategies of households and the individuals who comprise them.

Regional Context

This study is set to investigate migration patterns and strategies of the rural household in the Asir mountain and highlands region, southwest Saudi Arabia. The region presents a unique opportunity for pursuing research on rural socio-economic changes. It exhibits diverse environmental conditions in terms of topography, climate, and soil. Yet, at the same time, it shares a common history of domestic economic activities, is culturally distinct, and still maintains the largest rural population in the country (Abdulfattah, 1981). It is

characterized by a semi-arid climate and receives between 200 and 700 mm. of rainfall annually, most of which falls between April and June (Abdulfattah, 1981). Rainfall is less variable in the mountains and subsequent runoff permits sufficient water to supply crops to maturity, allowing for the region's stable agricultural production. Nevertheless, the region is ecologically fragile, and environmental conditions require highly diversified agricultural practices (Al-Otaiby, 1981).

The most common form of land tenure is family ownership, which is perpetuated by Arab culture and Islamic laws of inheritance (Lipsky, 1959). Usually, each family owns two types of agricultural land, rain-fed and irrigated. Because rain-fed agriculture is subject to the vagaries of weather, the household, traditionally, relies more heavily on irrigated lands, which are more productive due to their better soil quality. During most of the history of this region, subsistence agriculture has been the predominant form, with production geared to satisfy family consumption needs (Abdulfattah, 1981).

Traditionally, the primary crops included wheat, sorghum, and barley, complemented by vegetables and fruit. The family comprised the primary source of agricultural labor. The use of communal labor also played an important role during times of peak labor demands, such as harvesting, digging of wells, and housing construction. Exchange of labor and a nominal meal were typical forms of labor remuneration. An additional source

of labor was provided by those without land of their own, with payment being the provision of room and board and a share of the crop.

In the past, the level of technology was limited to hand tools and animal traction. These required large labor inputs, which were primarily supplied by family members (Dostal, 1983). While land preparation was usually left to men and seeding to women, the remaining agricultural tasks were jointly performed by both sexes. Children assisted their parents by looking after young ruminants, guarding the crops from pillage by animals and birds, and tending to their younger siblings.

For the past three decades the basic structure of traditional agriculture within the region has undergone significant alteration as a result of the increased expansion of the market into local economies and the attendant need for cash income to meet the requirements of a 'modernizing' economy. Although the basic agricultural practices have not changed, subsistence agriculture ceases to exist as a 'necessary moment' in the household livelihood strategies. As such, with the expansion of better off-farm employment opportunities both in urban areas as well as the rural side, the rural household was able to shift to more profitable off-farm employment and rely less on subsistence production. Furthermore, this shift of household sustenance strategies not only resulted in the withdrawal of the more able-bodied rural labor force out of

traditional agriculture, but it also necessitated an all new pattern of migration. The latter is characterized by a major out-migration stream of the entire family household, large rural-urban population turn over, and rural depopulation.

Methodology

The main concern of this study is to investigate individual/household migration strategies in relation to household's livelihood strategies and to the recent structural transformation of Saudi society. For such analytical purposes, a large rural community was selected for field research. While such selection in many ways is not representative of the southwest region or the Saudi society for that matter, nevertheless it presents certain advantages:

1- At the expense of generalization, the selection of one community enhances better in-depth description and historical analysis of the community socioeconomic changes, which is pertinent to the study of migration in terms of causes and consequences, as well as understanding the shifts in patterns of migration.

2- Since the Asir mountain region is a composite of many tribes of variant social organization and cultural mores, the selection of one-tribe community eases concerns of chaos of tribal socio-cultural differences. This becomes germane to the study since emphases when examining changes on the rural household migration strategies are upon the

effects of the wider socioeconomic changes, which need not to be confused with cultural differences.

During the process of selection of the community, extra care was administered in order to allow for better analysis of the matter in hand. First, criterion of the size (number of dwelling units) of the community was pre-set at one hundred and twenty dwelling units in order to allow for appropriate intra-community analyses; second, the community, while it is far removed from the immediate urban effect, needs not to be isolated. It, thus, becomes pertinent that the community is fully articulated with the wider Saudi society in terms of access to the market and off-farm employment, communication, education and social amenities.

Beside available reports and other written materials on Asir socioeconomic history, two official documents were extensively reviewed during the first pre-phase of community selection. These are:

1- Socio-economic Survey of Villages and Hijar in The Kingdom (Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, 1983). This was organized in extensive classification reports of villages and hamlets of Saudi Arabia. Each report is devoted to one region (or province), and has an extensive classification of the region's rural community by (estimated) size, distance from the regional capital, type of social amenities, education facilities, communication links, and state-organized services.

2- The Emirate of Asir Location and General Services Survey (Emirate of Asir, 1983). This was sponsored and coordinated by the province government. In many ways, it is similar to the Sogreah's survey except it was done by local government officials who possess better knowledge of the region's rural communities and had better access to relevant government reports and documents. The main objectives of the survey were to: 1) present a descriptive account of the Emirate nine 'sub-provinces' in terms of location, climate, topography, population size, and socioeconomic activities; 2) supply comprehensive information to state officials on the type and quality of government-built facilities and services; 3) propose a new plan for the expansion of health, education, and communication facilities; and 4) fine-tune the proposed administrative restructuring of the regional government.

Both documents were instrumental in the pre-selection phase as they provided background information on rural communities and state-run services, and helped in the process of eliminating unsuitable communities.

In the final pre-selection phase, five finalist communities were repeatedly visited in order to gather more background information on size of community, economic activities, available state facilities, and an estimate of migrants. Key local authorities, such as school principals, heads of tribes, and health dispensary doctors and social

observers, were interviewed to cross-validate information on these communities and gain better entry to the field research phase.

The community of Shahran Bani Milk of Tamniah was selected for the study. It is located about 55 Kilometers south of the city of Abha and belongs to Sha'af Shahran sub-Emirate. It constitutes the largest community of Tamniah. It was purposely selected because: 1) traditionally it was one of the most prosperous agriculture-based communities; 2) it still retains more than half of its native population; 3) it is well-articulated with the wider society as illustrated by the presence of education, health, and transportation facilities; and 4) its size of one hundred and fifty-nine households is appropriate for in-depth analysis, yet it is manageable.

My methodology was devised to take into account (as best as possible) the different determinants of migration at different levels of analysis. For that purpose, an integration of a variety of techniques which weave together both quantitative and qualitative data is essential. Accordingly, my techniques involved the collection of the following:

1- Individual and Household Data

A survey of households in the selected rural community was conducted in order to obtain a broad perspective of the diversities and commonalities among its households. The survey phase involved the collection of the following types of information:

1.1 Socio-demographic data

During the first phase of field research, household's basic socio-demographic data were gathered. These included type and size of household, residential type, household income, as well age, sex, relation to household head, education, and occupation of each household's member. This was done for the entire population of the community. It laid the ground for the subsequent in-depth phase of the survey.

1.2 In-Depth Household Production and Migration Data

Focused interviews to explore variations of economic activities, migration strategies, and resource endowments of households were administered to 75 randomly selected households. Data gathered for this phase were: 1) agricultural and non-agricultural economic activities of household; 2) size and access to agricultural land, fixed property such as real-estate, and other economic enterprises; 3) household income-contributing members by age, sex, relation to household head, eduction, occupation, place of work, and place of residence; 4) past economic activities and migration experience of the head of household, including number of migration instances, destination, date, duration, and reason of migration in each instance; 5) recent migration experience of other household members; 6) socio-demographic data of household migrant family members, including place of residence, date, and reason of migration, as well as family ties between the migrant and his natal family.

For methodological considerations and in order to be able to draw inferences about the entire community using in-depth data from the sampled 75 households, it is necessary to make certain that this sample does represent the entire community. For this reason, the sample was compared with total population using age/sex, education/sex, and work status/sex distributions. The results are presented in the following three tables:

TABLE 1.1
COMPARING AGE/SEX DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLED AND TOTAL POPULATION OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH

	Sample			Total Population		
Age	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
< 21 years	65.9	64.4	65.2	63.1	61.9	62.5
21 to 40 Years	14.3	19.8	17.5	15.6	19.5	17.6
41 to 60 Years	15.6	13.4	15.5	14.7	12.5	13.6
Over 60 years	4.2	3.4	4.5	6.6	6.1	6.3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N=)	(314)	(292)	(606)	(545)	(543)	(1088)

TABLE 1.2
COMPARING EDUCATION/SEX DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLED AND TOTAL POPULATION OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH

	Sample			Total Population		
Eduction	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Illiterate	43.3	63.4	53.0	42.4	65.7	54.0
Read	10.8	6.5	8.7	8.4	5.7	7.1
Read & write	13.2	7.5	10.4	14.5	7.9	11.2
Elementary	12.7	13.7	13.2	13.2	11.8	12.5
Intermediate	9.9	6.5	8.3	9.9	7.0	8.5
Secondary	7.0	2.4	4.8	7.9	1.8	4.9
Two-yr college	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.0	0.3
Four-yr college	2.5	0.0	1.3	3.1	0.0	1.5
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N=)	(314)	(292)	(606)	(545)	(453)	(1088)

TABLE 1.3
COMPARING WORK STATUS/SEX DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLED AND TOTAL POPULATION OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH

	Sample			Total Population		
Work Status	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Non-labor force						
Unemployed	1.3	3.4	2.3	0.9	5.0	2.9
Retired	0.3	1.4	0.8	0.9	1.7	1.3
Pre-schooler	30.9	25.7	28.4	26.9	23.1	25.0
Studying						
Elementary	21.7	18.5	20.1	22.2	19.9	21.0
Intermediate	7.6	8.2	7.9	8.4	8.5	8.5
High school	5.7	6.5	6.1	5.7	5.3	5.5
University	0.6	0	0.3	1.3	0	0.6
Housewife	0	33.6	16.2	0	33.9	16.9
Self employed						
Farmer	2.2	0	1.2	4.4	0	2.2
Carpenter & smith	0.6	0	0.3	0.4	0	0.2
Free enterpriser	0.6	0	0.3	0.7	0	0.4
Gov't Bureaucracy						
Servant	12.1	1.7	7.1	9.9	1.7	5.8
Driver	1.3	0	0.7	0.9	0	0.5
Imam	0.6	0	0.3	1.1	0	0.6
Clerk	5.1	0	2.7	6.1	0	3.0
Engineer	0	0	0	0.4	0	0.2
Teacher	6.0	1.0	3.7	4.9	0.9	2.9
Adminstrative official	1.0	0	0.5	1.3	0	0.7
Millitary/Police						
Soldier	0.3	0	0.2	1.3	0	0.6
Officer	1.6	0	0.8	1.8	0	0.9
Colonel	0.3	0	0.2	0.6	0	0.3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N=)	(314)	(292)	(606)	(546)	(542)	(1088)

1.3 Migrants' Data

About 150 families of Shahran Bani Malik have emigrated to larger towns of the country during the last thirty years. In order to construct profiles of migrants, basic socio-demographic data, place of residence and year of migration of each migrant were gathered with the help of relatives and key informants.

While I was quite successful in gathering sufficient socio-demographic and migration data about male migrants (N=169), this was not the case for female migrants. Even though, indirectly, I was able to note more than 100 cases of female migrants, I was not able to acquire comparable information on them. The realities of Saudi culture create enormous difficulties for a field researcher to obtain reliable information about females even if we are simply talking about migration pattern. Moreover, most male informants typically express great displeasure when asked any questions pertaining to women. So, I am forced to refer only to those females (N=26) for whom I had some information and which I regarded as reasonably valid, because it was reported by relatives. This limitation, of course, restricts my analysis and comparisons to male migrants, but nonetheless sufficient information on female migrants was gathered to venture a reasonable discussion of their attributes.

An in-depth information on migration was also gathered through interviewing a sample of 51 male migrants drawn from

the documented male migrants. I followed these migrants up and talked with them at the place of destination. While my sampling was intended to be random, the difficulty of tracing and finding all of the documented male migrants made it impossible to attain randomness. Instead, I was forced to do a "convenience sample"; all migrants whom I was able to trace were interviewed. The purpose of these in-depth interviews was to get a first hand account from migrants on their decision to migrate, why they migrated, and what the consequences of migration were for the individual migrant and his family.

2- Community Background

In order to fully comprehend household's (past and present) livelihood strategies, including migration strategies, community level aspects must be integrated into the analysis. The community's socio-economic history is particularly essential for migration analysis since it describes the local parameters under which the household operated (and interacted with) in the past. This includes past social organization, economic activities and available means of production, land-tenure and inheritance systems, degree of cohesion and social integration, forms of co-operation and assistance, and kinship ties. All of these, undoubtedly, had regulating effects not only on the household's migration strategies, but on the community overall pattern of migration as well. Due to inadequacy of written history and documents,

past aspects of the community was assembled by interviewing key village figures and elders.

Recent socioeconomic changes which are felt at the community level are also very important for understanding shifts in migration and sustenance strategies of the rural household. As such, these changes have redefined the bases for social organization, co-operation and assistance, and the overall social cohesion of the community. Subsequently, the household is forced to operate under new opportunity/pressure structure.

Depending upon the new circumstances, local structures, and commitments, the new opportunity/pressures may broaden or limit opportunities for diversification of household livelihood strategies, and may reinforce or weaken its older forms of social organization. Furthermore, access to off-farm employment, modern education, health, transportation facilities, and other social amenities all play intervening roles on the individual/household's decisions of whether to seek better 'life chances' outside the community or be content to stay in the village. Recent aspects of the community, thus, were pieced together using the available quantitative data as well as in-depth interviews to cover the qualitative aspects.

3- <u>The Larger Context</u>

For a clear understanding of socio-economic changes at the household and community levels, it is essential that we highlight the processes of structural transformation of Saudi

society over the past thirty years. Here, the main focuses are on the complexities of economic growth and the new socio-economic restructuring, which have affected all segments of society and the traditionally subsistence-based regions, in particular. Through the use of secondary data of government statistics and documents and historical writings on Saudi Arabia, an attempt is made to assemble information on these structural transformations, and to elaborate on the course of development pursued by the state.

A guiding assumption of this analysis is that the burgeoned oil revenues and the state control over it has given the latter the fiscal independence and leverage to assume the leading role in the process of development, reorganization of the economy, and control over all other social and political spheres of society. To elaborate on the state development schemes, my discussion will center on three domains which define the mechanisms of the state's development plans. These are state capital outlays, public consumptions, and public disbursements. Through this analysis, it is hoped that we clarify the role of the state in the new socio-economic processes, and we become more able to distill its implications for analyses and understanding of socio-economic changes and migration in Saudi society today.

Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized into two parts. The first part includes four chapters; an introductory chapter, which deals with the research problem and outlines the methodological framework and the relevant data sources;

Chapter two addresses the theoretical issues encircling migration studies and subsequent methodological considerations. The main purpose, here, is not to provide an exhaustive listing of the theoretical frameworks which deal with migration, but rather to present the scope and diversity of the main contending approaches to the study of migration and point out their deficiencies;

Chapter three elaborates on the recent critical stage of socio-economic development of Saudi society as was designed and pursued by the state. As such, it is an attempt to delineate the impacts of the state's development schemes on the reorganization and integration of the segmented Saudi society, and to distill their ramifications for migration;

Chapter four sketches-out the socio-economic background of Shahran Bani Malik through the use of available qualitative data. It is a retrospective portrayal of the past aspects of the community as conceived by its elders, i.e. how it functioned economically, socially, and politically.

The second part of the dissertation is devoted to data analysis of recent socioeconomic changes in Shahran Bani Malik as it became fully articulated with the larger society. This

is divided into four chapters: chapter five is an attempt to characterize the larger societal opportunities/pressures on Tamniah, how these were perceived by the community inhabitants, and what was their outcome. Using individual, household and community data, I will describe how the community was socially and economically transformed as the older mode of subsistence and self-reliance crumbled;

Chapter six is devoted to migration analysis. Building on analysis from chapter five and with use of available migration data, I will elaborate on shifts in migration patterns, how they came about, and what was their outcome;

Chapter seven is devoted to further analysis of the migration process. I will use in-depth information and case studies to elucidate the intricacies of recent rural to urban migration, in terms of how and why it happened, and subsequent outcomes for the migrant and his family, i.e., I want to discuss when and why he chose to out-migrate, what was his situation before out-migrating, what is he doing now, how is he adjusting in destination, and how does he keep-in-touch with his relatives in Tamniah. Furthermore, through discussion of case studies, I will look at variations pertaining to year of out-migration, age at out-migration, and reason for out-migration in order to provide the underlying analysis of migration.

In the final chapter of the dissertation, I will draw conclusions both about socio-economic changes and migration

in the community of Shahran Bani Malik and attempt to distill future implications for rural development in Saudi Arabia. Lastly, I will try to appraise my theoretical and methodological approach to the study of migration and determine its utility and contribution to the understanding of the phenomenon.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO MIGRATION

My research seeks to investigate variations in migration strategies adopted by rural households in response to changing socioeconomic conditions. Three basic theoretical approaches inform previous studies of migration -- methodological individualism, structural functionalist, and historical-structural perspective.

"Methodological Individualism"

It considers all social life as revolving around conscious, rational perceptions and calculations of the individuals, who are therefore implicitly considered to be ahistorical "free" social agents. This approach highlights a common set of variables at the individual level and generates testable hypotheses according to the accepted criteria of empirical research. Social scientists adhering to the individualist approach locate migrants' motivations firmly in economic factors, although social, cultural, political, and psychological factors also receive some attention. Neoclassical economists represent the mainstream of this approach when they use the "push-pull" framework, wherein migration is

equated with the geographic mobility of workers responding to imbalances in the spatial distribution of production factors (i.e., land, labor, capital, and natural resources) (Rothenburg, 1977). From this perspective, rural-urban migration is considered to be equilibrating and a "development-fostering" process that operates to correct the rural-urban, inter-urban, and interregional imbalances in factors of production (Spangler & Myers, 1977; see also Wood, 1982). Many critics of the neoclassical model, however, have postulated that labor migration between different sectors (traditional-modern or subsistence-money economy) is not a self-regulating process, but rather is a cumulative one that leads to more impoverishment of the less-developed regions (Portes, 1978; Wood, 1982). Research findings suggest that the rural exodus and concomitant urban expansion in many developing countries often impose conditions detrimental to restoring an economic equilibrium among different sectors of such developing economies (Amin, 1974; Rhodes, 1978).

Recently, new impetus to this perspective has been given by attempts to redefine the model in the light of criticism. Harris and Todaro (1970), for example, have tried to account for continued high rural-urban labor migration to over-urbanized areas with high unemployment rates. Yet, their quantifications still fail to address fundamental failings of this perspective, especially its core assumption of the calculating individual, Homo economicus, and of the "income

differential" variable as the sole determinant of migration flows (Binsbergen and Meilink, 1978; Wood, 1982).

The major flaw of the individualist approach, according to Wood (1982:303) is that:

> the internal consistency of the model of individual decision making is at the expense of a broader understanding of the structural factors relevant to the study of both causes and consequences of population movements. What is at issue is not the assumption that individuals

behave rationally or that they seek economic advantages, but the underlying causes of structural parameters within which the individuals make their decisions. In other words, observing the behavior of homo economicus without looking at the processes of the system (which cannot be discovered from individual behavior or motivations) amounts to no more than a reductionist approach incapable of developing an integrated theory of migration.

Structuralist-Functionalism

The structural-functionalist approach, as an alternative to the individualistic approach, begins with the patterns of social relationships that create enduring sections/groups (rural versus urban, communities, ethnic groups, formal organizations, kin groups, sex and age cohorts, and so on), which through both cooperative and conflictual interaction produce an integrated and self-perpetuating society. Since migration is conceived as one way these interactions serve positive functions for the sections or groups involved

positive functions for the sections or groups involved (Gluckman, 1961; Skinner, 1965), the focus is on the interlinkings between the different sectors or groups in both departure and destination areas. These interlinkings are seen to occur through the diffusion of ideas, values, techniques, and incomes (Parkin, 1975). The result is a stress on the rather positive effects of migration and migrants on both origin and destination areas (Berg, 1965; Mitchell, 1969).

While structural in orientation, structural-functionalism leans heavily toward the individualist approach. It is concerned more with the individual migrant and thus proceeds to collect data about the migrant, such as characteristics, motivations, and attitudes (Parkin, 1975; see van Binsbergen & Meilink, 1978). The primary occupation is with cultural differences among the different segments involved in migration. These cultural differences, as many critics indicate, are merely surface phenomena of more fundamental economic and political factors that perpetuate divisions in society (Amin, 1974; Binsbergen & Meilink, 1978). These critics, therefore, point to this approach's neglect of the underlying causes of migration which operate at different levels (i.e., local, regional, national, and so on). A related weakness is the failure to incorporate history, beyond descriptive terms, into the analysis of migration -- thus leaving beyond purview the structural transformations of societies that are so much a part of the underlying causes of migration.

Historical Structuralism

The third approach to the study of migration considered here is the historical-structuralist perspective, which attempts to analyze and explain migration at the social structural level, regardless of the motivations and perceptions of individual migrants. It is this perspective's theory of social structure, however, which sets it apart from other structuralist approaches. It looks at contemporary underdeveloped societies as a composite of qualitatively different sectors (or modes of production), i.e. the capitalist versus the domestic or rural sector. The internal structure and dynamics of each of these is determined not by formal-organizational or ideological elements, but by the ways in which production and reproduction occur. This always implies conflicts revolving around the control of production and reproduction, and around the expropriation of products or surpluses (van Binsbergen et al, 1978, 1985).

When studying migration, historical-structuralism emphasizes the nature of interaction or articulation between the different sectors of a social formation. It especially views rural migration and circulation as the direct result of the penetration of capitalism, which, in order to fulfill its labor requirements, creates cash needs in peasant and tribal societies through mechanisms such as new currencies, head taxes, trade stores, etc. Adults (especially males) are thus

forced to migrate to earn the necessary cash for these emerging needs. As a consequence, regional differences are intensified, village economies deteriorate due to losses of labor and because households have to subsidize migrant members, and social differentiation of rural society is either initiated or enhanced (Amin, 1974; Mukherji, 1985). It thus becomes clear that this perspective considers migration's effects upon rural communities to be negative and exploitative (see Amin, 1974; Meillassoux, 1975).

Historical-structuralism does not treat migration as a discrete dimension of social reality subject to separate investigation, but insists that population movement can be examined "only in the context of historical analysis of the broader structural transformations underway in a particular social formation" (Wood, 1982:302). The usefulness of this method of analysis lies in the way it links the material and social conditions of everyday life to movements of the economy as a whole, such that the structural parameters which underlie individual decisions are highlighted. However, critics of this approach have chastised its adherents for assuming too often that non-capitalist forms of production were socially and economically undifferentiated, and thus "did not subsequently filter the impact of capitalist forces according to the principles of indigenous, domestic production" (Chapman and Prothero, 1982:618). They further note that this perspective suffers from an inability to incorporate the macro-structural

forces, such as spatial imbalances in wages, employment, and amenities, with micro-level factors that do indeed differentially motivate individual actors. There is thus no attempt to conceptualize the nature of the decision-making process. For example, it neglects identifying such variables as social networks and other specific costs and benefits that affect the decision, propensity, and the direction of the migratory stream (Dinerman, 1978; Portes, 1978; Wood, 1982).

At this juncture, it becomes abundantly clear that each of the three approaches provides only partial explanations of migration. While each contributed to one understanding of contemporary labor mobilities and migration streams, they suffer from a common shortcoming. As pointed out by many critics, these approaches share the false assumption of an existing dichotomy between the individual and society. On one hand, the individualist (empiricist) approach, with its many variants, is driven by an "implicit notion of voluntarism in which society is assumed to be the sum product of the intentional actions of individuals" (Forbes, 1984:156). The historical-structuralist perspective, on the other hand, more often than not assumes that society is external to the individual and imposes heavy constraints upon behavior. As such, the larger political economy is seen as the sole determinant of population movements (Oberai and Bilsborrow, 1984; Forbes, 1984).

The problem of 'individual vs society' and 'voluntarism vs determinism' has, thus far, plagued migration research and hindered the development of an integrated approach that is capable of enhancing the formulation of a comprehensive testable theory of migration.

Multi-Disciplinary Research on Mobility

Recent multi-disciplinary research on mobility has stressed the need for integrating existing approaches, both theoretically and methodologically. From the theoretical angle, the main attempt is associated with 'human geographers' who borrow from such sociologists as Bourdiew (1977) and Giddens (1979). The latter is credited for developing the concept of 'structuration' which emphasizes the interdependence of human agency and social structure in time and space. Giddens argued two important points. First, the need to transcend the notion of an existing division between individual and society and instead should both be theorized as individual in society and society in individuals. As Abrams illuminates:

> The problem of agency is the problem of finding a way of accounting for human experience which recognizes simultaneously and in equal measure that history and society are made by constant and more or less purposeful individual action and that individual action, however purposeful, is made by history and society (1982, xiii).

Second, Giddens stresses that individuals and societies are "embedded in a particular historical configuration of time

and space, which itself is the creation of history, society, and individual action" (Gregson, 1986). The main theme of Giddens' presentation is that of duality rather than dualism, where there is interdependence between history, society, and purposeful action of individuals. These are of equal weight and neither society nor individuals are assumed to exert greater influence upon events than the others. This contrasts with the dualistic notion so characteristic of conventional social theory and social science, where individual and society, subject and object, macro and micro are treated as opposed discrete entities.

The use of Giddens' new theoretical framework for empirical research is still very scanty even though many express intentions of doing so (Smith, 1983; Gregson, 1984). Thus far it has been applied, though loosely, by human geographers to the study of migration. This is what has been termed time-geography, where a researcher focuses on an 'individual trajectory' through time and space in order to create a 'geographical biography' of a population within a constrained environment (Parkes and Thrift, 1980).

Critics of Giddens' formulation point to the inability to transcend dualism which is the main feature of social theory and social science. This forces each into a separate duality. As Gregson (1984) notes, most of Giddens' reformulation presents "a decomposition and partial recombination of what already exists, (i.e.,) dualism, rather than a genuine attempt

of creating something else..." (p.201). Stressing the need to overcome dichotomy between the individual and society, Forbes (1984) posits a 'two-way dialectical relationship', "in which time, space, and society selectively influence the individual, and just as importantly the way the individual feeds back into (and ultimately, reproduces) the society and transforms it" (p. 160). One may add, that while these proposals can help resolve some problems of disjuncture between discrete levels of analysis, they nonetheless are still of little use. Only until compatible methods of enquiry, which encompass both human agency and social structure, will the pitfalls of dualism be avoided. This, then, will allow us the opportunity to advance the development of an integrated approach to the study of migration that is both capable of advancing the formulation of a comprehensive theory of migration while maintaining theoretical coherence to the understanding of development as a whole.

The second attempt at reconciling the existing approach to the study of migration is that of Wood (1981; 1982). After citing the polarization between existing perspectives as the main cause of the fragmentation and general limitation of migration literature, Wood offered a middle ground. He proposed the household as an intermediate unit of analysis in order to develop an integrated approach that encompasses the determinants of behavioral parameters and the factors motivating human actors. Wood contends that as long as the

household is the 'unit of production and consumption', an integration of the previous approaches to migration seems possible by analyzing household behavior as it interacts with its social and physical environment.

The household, in Wood's scheme, is defined as "a group that insures its maintenance and reproduction by generating and disposing of a collective income fund" (Wood, 1982:312). As such, it may or may not be co-residential, linked by family ties, or structured by kinship bonds.

In terms of this definition, the key components are "generating" and "disposing". These are key in the sense that: 1) both facilitate a fuller count of household members, who are neither fixed by blood nor are curtailed by space; 2) through both components one may gain a better insight into (a) sources of income and income generating activities, (b) ways of income disposition, and (c) household location in the socioeconomic ladder of the whole society, but particularly in the local community.

There are, however, several limitations to Wood's use and conceptualization of the household. The first has to do with his definition of the household, which he strictly bases on economic criteria while ignoring all other attributes. In this way, the group within the household are individuals tied by their calculations concerning income which they pool together. Nothing is said of how the group is formed or what kind of relationships each of its individuals has to one

another. This implies that cooperative economic activities supersede family, kinship ties or co-residentiality.

The second problem emanates from the uncertainty of who to include or exclude from the household and how to draw boundaries of households. For instance, in some communities, such as peasants and tribal communities, where cooperation, share of product, and economic assistance are predominant, the boundaries of household are rendered so uncertain that one may rightfully consider the whole community as one large household.

The third limitation of Wood's formulation is related to methodological considerations. His use of the household as an alternative unit of analysis to mediate between the individual and the larger context is doubted. As noted by Bach and Schraml (1982), the mere use of a cost-benefit analysis of an individual who is making calculations on the bases of his/her membership in a "group" is merely the economic reductionism of neoclassical economics.

If we are to pursue links between group behavior and migration decisions of individuals within that group, we must incorporate the intricacies of the decision-making processes within the group. In other words, a researcher who is set to evaluate the mediating effect of the household on individual purposeful behavior and decisions must be able to determine: 1) how does the sense of belonging to a "group" affect the individual's behavior. This sense of belonging must be looked

at not only from the economic angle, but also from other angles such as social, cultural, ethnic, etc.; 2) At what time and space distance does this "sense of belonging" weaken or become non-existent. This is particularly crucial for migration studies since it brings us to the bases of inclusion of an individual to a "household". Recent rural-urban migration in many developing countries is characterized by long-term or semi-permanent moves, where the migrant becomes detached from his/her natal household, engages in non-traditional activities, and is exposed to an all new environment. One, thus, must ask how much this detachment has impacted the migrants' sense of belonging to a rural household. The exposure to new social and cultural environment, undoubtedly, exerts great pressures on migrants who are young, probably with some education, and may not conform to the traditional value system of a rural community; 3) household membership must clearly be distinguished from kinship ties. This becomes crucial when we evaluate membership status of both temporary and permanent rural migrants, and the remittances accrued by the rural household from both groups. The literature informs us of many situations where the head of household or another adult member has to migrate for part of the year in order to complement the household domestic production. Their remittances, thus, are part of household sustenance strategies. The permanently migrant kin, to the contrary, is no longer a household member. He, where (occasionally) remits to his natal family, more

Finally, Wood's formulation poses problems when applied to empirical research. These are related to operationalizing such terms as generating, disposing, maintenance, reproduction, and collective income. While it is easy to theorize in the ideal world of abstracts, it is an extremely stringent task to operationalize in the real world of objects and subjects. While it is possible to do so, it is incredibly complex.

To critique the concept of household as presented by Wood (1982) is not to desert it, but rather to conceptualize it on better grounds. Basing the concept strictly on income pooling criterion divests the household of most of its important aspects, and, as noted above, relegates it to economic reductionism.

This study attempts to apply a more holistic approach to the study of rural-urban migration. Theoretically speaking, migration decisions are conceived of as the outcome of the interaction between (micro) individual characteristics and perceptions and (macro) societal parameters mediated by the household.

To further elaborate, the individuals' characteristics (age, sex, and education) and perceptions of available opportunities both in and outside their local communities, influence their respective decision to migrate. The individuals/households, nonetheless, construct their migration strategies as part of their overall livelihood strategies in

response to regional imbalances of labor, land, and capital as well as health, education, and other social amenities. Most of these imbalances can be traced back to the on-going process of the structural transformation and unbalanced development in society.

The household, in turn, regulates the individual's migration decision by virtue of its overall physical and non-physical resource endowments. Accordingly, the size and quality of landholding and dwelling, and presence of savings [as well as number, age-sex composition, education, skill levels, and knowledge of members], all have a definite role in migration strategies of households and, therefore, the individuals which comprise them.

As rural households of different combinations of land, labor, and other resources interact with the dynamic structural constraints and opportunities present within the larger society, one expects each to adopt distinct livelihood strategies. From this perspective, household livelihood strategies reflect the household's internal structure, but are regulated by external socioeconomic forces. The formation of migration decisions, then, will be investigated by examining: 1) household composition: in terms of size of the household, age, gender, employment, and educational attainment, relation to head of household and place of residence of each member; 2) migration instances of the head of household by date, duration, destination, and reason for migration;

3) migration instances of other adult members of household (during recent years) by date, duration, destination and reason for migration; 4) division of labor among activities --agricultural non-agricultural--, and domestic; 5) forms of access to land, labor, and other production factors; 6) off-farm and/or urban employment by age, gender, and relation; and by type, duration, and form and/or size of remuneration; 7) sources of income: subsistence production, commodity sales, rent, remittances, earnings from off-farm and/or urban employment and occupations, government aids and/or incentives; and 8) household cooperation and mutual exchange.

This method of analysis, rather than considering migration as separate from other livelihood considerations, analyzes it as an integral component of the household's maintenance and reproduction over time. Each of these components conditions and, in turn, is conditioned by the other. Each household, then, creates its own social and organizational constraints to increase migration by household members. The presence of external opportunities, however, provide a competitive context within which households may change, or abandon current production and migration strategies. The ability to alter present strategies is, nonetheless, shaped by strategies previously adopted in response to then-prevailing socioeconomic and physical conditions. In the long run, those households able to adopt complex livelihood strategies

--such as combining urban and agricultural employment--are better able to minimize risks in an uncertain environments.

CHAPTER THREE

THE LARGER CONTEXT-The Role of The State

Introduction

There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia has undergone a massive economic and social transformation during the last three decades. From, more or less, subsistence and nomadic forms of production, the country was transformed into a 'modern' money-oriented economy in a span of thirty years. These transformations impacted rates and patterns of migration, and the overall population distribution.

Unfortunately, no systematic attempts have been made to relate the new mobility pattern to the recent economic structuring. As such, very little is known in terms of concrete consequences of the path of development launched by the state upon migration and population shifts.

Migration is hardly a recent phenomenon in Saudi Arabia. What is at issue is the way it is conceived. At the risk of banality, most approaches to migration treat it as the result of the overall process of what is popularly termed modernization, where society is merely readjusting itself to the larger impulses of economic rationalization and attendant specialization in the division of labor. To conclude that the new

economic opportunities in urban areas are behind the present migration trends is simply to state the obvious.

The questions largely remain unanswered because they remain unasked. But in order for us to fully grasp the complexities of migration, it is first necessary to formulate questions which go to the heart of the issue. These concerns may be summarized as follows:

1- what are the underlying structural causes of mobility within the Saudi context. In other words, how can we relate and explain mobility trends by focusing on the complexities of economic growth and the new socioeconomic restructuring of the Saudi society;

2- more specifically, how have the underlying social relations of production and attendant forces of production been reshaped and reformulated, especially with regard to lineage based societies; and

3- how have global, regional and national configurations joined in defining the context and limits of Saudi society.

In sum, we must highlight aspects of socio-economic development, which have the greatest relevance for migration and population movements.

Saudi Arabia has undergone massive population shifts throughout the last three decades. But while migration itself is not new, present trends differ from earlier patterns of target migration, labor circulation and nomadic wanderings.

These types of migration have not disappeared. Nonetheless, they were upstaged by the present pattern of rural-urban migration. This recent pattern is characterized by massive regional population displacement, residential relocation of entire families, and the permanent or semi-permanent nature of the family moves. The outcome has been dramatic, as evidenced by large population losses within the traditional heavily populated rural areas, and concomitantly large concentration of population in the major cities of the Kingdom, such as Riyadh, Jeddah, Makkah, and Dammam. Urban population growth in the regional towns has been no less dramatic. For example, the population of Khamis Mushait and Abha of the southwestern region, respectively, increased from 2000 and 4000 in 1939 to over 60,000 and 40,000 by 1978 (Abdulfattah, 1981).

Before proceeding with description and analysis of what happened, we must answer two critical questions...what is it that we mean by the state?...and why must we integrate the role of the "state" into the analyses of development and migration?

As Giddens (1987) notes, there are two definitions of the state in ordinary language: "The state, sometimes means an apparatus of government or power, or sometimes the overall social system subject to that government or power" (p. 17).

A clearer working definition which is essentially a Weberian one is that of Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985). They

"consider the state to be a set of organizations invested with the authority to make binding decisions for people and organizations juridically located in a particular territory and to implement these decisions using, if necessary, force" (p. 47).

One clear connotation of their definition is that of the state being an "instrument of domination", which is determined by interrelations between the various parts of the state apparatus and the powerful classes. This implies a second role of the state, that of a "corporate actor", which exists in its own right and possesses interests of its own (Cardoso, 1979).

The "state" as an actor or an institution recently became the interest and subject of analysis of an extraordinary number of studies of diverse theoretical inclinations, from all social science disciplines, and with a wide range of topics (Skocpol, 1985; Lee, 1988). As Skocpol (1985) notes:

> Students of Latin America, Africa, and Asia have examined the roles of states in instituting comprehensive political reforms, helping to shape national development, and bargaining with multinational corporations. Scholars interested in the advanced industrial democracies of Europe, North America, and Japan have probed the involvements of states in developing social programs and in managing domestic and international problems... Economic historians and political economists theorized about states as institutors of property rights and as regulators and distorters of markets...(p.3).

In relation to the contemporary Third World, there is a consensus among comparative social scientists that the state has greatly increased its roles, obligations, and power over society across three domains (or capacities):

First, the extractive capacity of the state has expanded, thus leading to its rampant involvement in the accumulation process. This extractive capacity, which in most instances means complete control over vital resources, and centralization of economic planning, enables the state to: 1) carry out its role in the appropriation process and capital accumulation by those in power and the dominant classes; and 2) further facilitate transnational linkages with advanced capitalist states and multinational corporations.

Second, as military activities and means of violence grew, coercion became a determining element in the state structure and the social formation as a whole (Tilly, 1985; Collier, 1979). It is argued that the state coercive capacity over society in most Third World countries is central in maintaining prevailing social structural conditions and inequalities (Lee, 1988).

Third, Since the end of World War II, the explosive expansion in national education systems enabled the state incorporative capacity, particularly, in promoting nationhood and legitimacy (Meyer et. al., 1979). In this respect, mass education became the vehicle for creating citizens, and "instills loyalty to the state, and acceptance of the obligations to vote, go to war, pay taxes..." (Lee 1988, p. 4).

In sum, the state, especially in the contemporary Third World, is clearly the "central figure" with its monopoly over

the means of production, exchange, violence, and citizen-making.

With regard to migration, most studies concentrate on states' policies designed to exert tighter control on migration, alter the rates of rural-urban migration, enhance transitions from one mode of production to another, or extend the accumulation process. For example, many studies investigated states' policies of land reform programs, introductions of labor intensive technologies, or the impacts of the deepening penetrations of the capitalist mode of production by colonial states (Peek and Standing, 1982).

Most international regions, such as Sub-Sahara Africa, Latin America, and East Asia, have received their share of studies concerning states' policies and migration. Studies on the Middle East, however, are still scanty and short of examining the real impacts of states' policies regarding migration. Here, it is important to bear in mind that when we talk about states' policies regrading migration, our concerns are with those policies that promote an overall structural transformation of economy and society, rather than migration-oriented policies. This emanates from a deep conviction, which stresses the importance of understanding the relevance of the broader structural transformation of a particular social formation to migration.

This chapter is an attempt to bring to focus the structural effects on migration. I will attempt to relate rural to

urban migration of the last three decades to the recent socio-economic changes and development plans pursued by the Saudi state. The starting premise is that the emergence of the state as the chief controller of the primary resource (oil) and the subsequent growth of state capitalism have given the state the leverage to, first, completely restructure the economy, and second, to strengthen it's hegemony over the different segments of the society.

The consequences of this have been the undermining of the older modes of production, and reformulating previous bases of social-stratification, all leading to the creation of a new socio-economic order which is congruent with the new power structure. On less abstract grounds, the state relentlessly undertook national development plans, which, to say the least, led to the creation of immense urban economic opportunities, an accelerated process of urbanization, and a concomitant deterioration of the traditional sector, all of which contributed to the new mobility pattern and population distribution.

Before we proceed with the description and analysis of the state development schemes, we must be aware of the: 1) types of data available; 2) types of inferences to be drawn from these data in relation to what happened in rural communities, and new rural-urban migration trends in particular.

Essentially, the available data that we will use are government-supplied statistics and reports. Beside being

macro-level, the data in many respects lack details that are necessary for direct inferences. Also, the data reliability are sometimes questionable since they have a propaganda overtone.

In relation to migration, these data permit no direct inductive reasoning. As such, no available regional or national data on internal migration, except some estimates on the growth of urban population. These are still of little value, since we cannot accurately isolate impacts of natural increase and international migration upon growth of urban population.

Bearing in mind these limitations, our inferences and conclusions will be deductive. As such, through characterization of the state's created opportunities in education and employment, schemes of fund allocations and income distributions, we will present the conditioning variables of the larger context, under which rural communities and Saudi society had operated during the last three decades. Moreover, the use of micro-level data from the community of study in the following chapters will further illustrate the impacts of the state's development schemes upon migration.

Saudi Arabia: A Historical Overview

Prior to the unification process that took place during the first three decades of the century, most of what is known today as Saudi Arabia consisted of a composite of many segmented economies and societies. Great regional differences existed in the form of social organization, political formation, and forms of production. Subsistence production prevailed over most of the western and southern regions, while trade and the provision of essential services typified the function of urban cities of Hijaz and the eastern coast towns and seaports. A nomadic form of production dominated the central and north central regions (Najd and Hayil) and was complemented by merchant cities. The nomadic population roamed across these regions and subsisted through camel-breeding. Camels were of primary importance, serving both as a means of exchange with settled communities and for transportation of goods across Arabia, from the northern cities of Mesopotamia and Syria.

The settled communities in the northern and central regions prospered as trade centers and merchant stops. The availability of water resources (mainly springs), nonetheless, permitted the cultivation of food grains, mainly dates due to their ability to withstand prohibitive desert conditions.

The relation between nomadic and settled communities was one of economic and political interdependence. While the Bedouin tribes functioned as autonomous (political and

ideological) units, their articulation with merchant towns was for mutual survival. Access to markets was crucial to Bedouins for selling their livestock and obtaining the necessities they were unable to produce. The city-state communities of the northern and central regions primarily functioned as market places and route stops of transit trade. For the nomads who were the "masters of the desert", their cooperation was vital to maintain trade flows by keeping caravan routes open and safe.

Conflicts and tensions did exist among the nomadic tribes and between the nomads and settled communities. Power struggles and warfare persisted throughout the history of the different tribes and centered primarily over the distribution and redistribution of the meager and ever shifting desert resources (Arafat, 1985). The rigidity of environmental conditions undoubtedly played a decisive role over population size and distribution. As such, water availability (rain and underground water) helped determine settlement sites, as well as the variant modes of existence in Arabia.

Historically, the population of Arabia kept balance with natural resources and economic realities through out-migration to the northern neighboring territories of Syria and Mesopotamia.

The persistence through time of nomadic and subsistence modes of production in Arabia was only made possible through out-migration as higher levels of productivity proved

unfeasible under the twin constraints of environmental conditions and technology. Both modes of production were economically stagnant because neither was capable of generating and/or sustaining economic growth. Moreover, they were equally incapable of resource consolidation and accumulation by a privileged class. The underlying nature of these systems was predicated on mutual cooperation, assistance, and communality. This aspect had continually offset any intensive intra-system economic exploitation. Rather, it was survival and coping with the limiting physical environment that figured into the logic of such communal systems and not accumulation. Furthermore, the inherent basis of class structure and class conflicts was not built on an edifice of economics. And while there were intra-tribal socioeconomic differences, these were not the foundation of a specifically economic class structure. To the contrary, it was patriarchy, seniority, and gender which served to differentiate these societies. Elders (males) comprised the dominant class and exercised absolute power over their households and tribes as well. The nature of inter-class conflict, however, never became so intense as to threaten the basis of these patriarchal groups. This is especially true of the nomadic tribes who used to be in too constant movement and struggle with contending tribes to engage in intense intra-tribal conflicts.

The Arabian cities, except the Hijaz towns of Makkah and Jeddah, were extensions of the nomadic economy and tribes in

terms of their economic relations, internal structures and cultural mores. These cities served primarily as exchange centers for nomads and, as a result, never were able to foster the development of manufacturing. In addition, due to their great distance to each other, as well as the scarcity of resources, the limited amount of exchange did not support a complex class structure with a high degree of class differentiation. All of these and the constant incursions by nomadic tribes nullified economic development and structural transformations. To this end one may conclude that Arabia throughout its history was stagnant, lacked significant societal integration, and in fact had no single identifiable society, politically, socially, and economically (Islami and Kavoussi, 1984).

The Growth of State Capitalism and Destruction of Old Modes of Production

During the formative years of the Saudi state, and in fact until the 1940s, the royal family was occupied with the unification process, regional conquest, and consolidation of power. Economically speaking, King Abdulaziz was financially dependent on levies (zakat) on crops and animals, funds received from oil companies for oil concessions, and limited British assistance. Later, with the annexion of Al-Hasa and Hijaz regions, state finances improved markedly (Philby, 1968). Oil production began in 1938, but soon had to stop until the end of World War Two. It, thus, did not figure into

the State's income until 1948, when it accounted for more than fifty percent of the budget. During this period, the state was not in a position to offer any kind of social reform, introduce socio-economic changes, or promote political and social integration of the society. By the year 1958, however, the situation had changed. The state had become financially 'independent' from its subjects and whatever they produced (Arafat, 1985). During this year, revenues accrued from oil export amounted to SR 1,241 million or 82% of total revenues (ibid).

The emergence of oil as the primary income-generating resource had profound economic, social, and political implications for Arabian societies and their patrimonial regimes. Oil by its very nature presents qualities that are especially magnified in the context of underdevelopment. One of the more interesting theoretical conceptualizations of oil revenues and its impacts upon underdeveloped societies is that of Mahdavy (1970). He suggests that we look at oil revenues received by exporting countries as an external rent. In other words, these revenues are no different than, say, payments received by the Egyptian government from ships for the right to pass through the Suez Canal.

Certainly, as Mahdavy (ibid.) points out, the revenues (social surplus) amassed from oil has very little to do with the production process of domestic economies of the <u>rentier</u> states. Moreover, oil is a capital-intensive industry, so to

speak, and certainly does not require a large labor force to function efficiently. For instance, the oil sector in Saudi Arabia only employed about twenty thousand laborers in 1976, including expatriate labor (Shaw, 1983).

Another salient aspect of oil is the fact that it is owned solely by the state. No other societal group can claim its ownership, nor can they contest the control of it. Added to this is the fact that no social class was directly exploited in the process of oil extraction. On the contrary, the outflow of oil wealth has benefited a large spectrum of oil producing societies, both directly and indirectly. A consequence of this was the growing 'independence' of the state from other social groups and from the society as a whole. As such, the state no longer needed to tax its subjects nor was it susceptible to the influence of powerful social groups such as merchants or particular tribes. Needless to say, the state emerged as a powerful entity in its own right (Arafat, 1985).

In the case of Saudi Arabia, oil added more peculiarities to the newly found state:

First, the relative coincidence of state formation with the rise of the oil revenues as the dominant sector of the economy gave the state the legitimacy and leverage to consolidate its power while pursuing its self-prescribed development plans.

Second, as we retrospectively look at the economic conditions of Arabia prior to oil exports (except for a few urban centers), the rest of the country had to cope with environmental vagaries and lived at or below levels of subsistence. Consequently, the state faced little resistance to its development plans, designs for oil wealth appropriation, and skewed patterns of income distribution. Moreover, it was able to dictate the degree and nature of participation of its citizens in the socioeconomic development of the country, as well as other important affairs.

Third, the Saudi royal family, being the unifier of a traditionally tribal (segmented) society, had the opportunity to form the state apparatus according to its preferences. For example, in order to consolidate its position, the better educated Hijazi urbanite middle class was recruited for administrative jobs, while the state armies were built according to tribal affiliations.

Fourth, in the context of dependency and underdevelopment, the outcome of the excessive extraction of oil and the huge revenues appropriated helped fuel the creation of both a consumerist society and an unproductive domestic economy. Faced with a 'backward economy', where no meaningful industrialization existed coupled with a largely unproductive agricultural sector, oil revenues served as income for the society as a whole. The very nature of the state policies, in fact, proved to be the most critical aspect of the oil boom.

To reaffirm its position, the state laid the ground for a society in which private consumption would constitute the primary economic activity, and in order to accomplish this: 1) large subsidies for a wide range of essential goods were put forth; 2) provision of government sector jobs was made available to any male Saudi citizen unable to find employment elsewhere, making the state the largest employment sector in the country (table 3.3); 3) provision of free services and income subsidies in cash and other incentives; and 4) an open economy where imports, speculation, and the service sector dominate the economy (Islami & Kavoussi, 1984; see Lawson, 1985).

The pumping of oil wealth into the society for circulation has, undoubtedly, given the appearance of economic affluence and productivity. The truth of the matter, however, is that it actually retarded the productive base of the economy (the traditional sector). Compounding this, large masses of the population were enticed into the speculation of urban property which drove inflated prices even higher, the importation of consumable goods, and the creation of service and commercial enterprises predicated on the excessive use of expatriate labor (al-Naqeeb, 1987). These will be dealt with in greater depth in the next section.

Mechanisms of State Expenditures

On the empirical side of the issue, oil revenues steadily rose during the 1960s and sky-rocketed during the 1970s as a result of price hikes and output increase (OPEC, 1984). As we see in table 3.1, the state amassed great wealth from 1970 and onward but particularly between 1973-1984.

To facilitate the absorption of this wealth, the state initiated three five-year development plans beginning the fiscal year 1970. These plans provided a framework for the distribution of state expenditures in each of the five year spans (table 3.2). While emphases and expenditures of each plan differed from the others, all of them, nonetheless, do attest to the growth of state capitalism and the overwhelming state control over resources and their distribution.

TABLE 3.1
OIL INCOME & OUTPUT OF SAUDI ARABIA FOR SELECTED YEARS

Year	Revenues (millions dollars)	Daily output (1,000 barrel per day)
1940	2.50	NA
1950	57.00	NA
1960	355.00	NA
1965	664.00	2037.6
1970	1214.00	3563.9
1974	22574.00	8243.9
1977	36540.00	8949.8
1980	102212.00	9630.0
1981	113200.00	9498.9
1982	76000.00	6177.0
1983	46100.00	4197.1
1984	43700.00	3651.9

Sources: OPEC. 1984 Annual Statistical Bulletin

Instead of trying to review and analyze the development plans, it is more useful to adopt a new scheme recently proposed by al-Naqeeb (1985; see also Sweezy, 1964). He suggests that we outline mechanisms of expenditures in the rentier state into three essential domains: State Capital Outlays, Public Consumptions, and Public Disbursements.

TABLE 3.2
FINANCIAL ALLOCATION FOR THREE DEVELOPMENT PLANS (1970-85)* (SR MILLIONS)

Sector	1st Plan (1970-75) (amount)	%	2nd Plan (1975-80) (amount)	%	3rd Plan (1980-85) (amount)	%
Agriculture, indus & utili	06,033.3	10.7	092,135.0	18.5	261,800	44.8
Education	10,198.7	18.7	080,123.9	16.1	129,600	16.5
Hlth & pers.	02,443.0	4.4	033,212.8	6.7	061,200	07.8
Trans & com.	14,086.8	25.1	112,944.6	22.7	249,100	31.8
Bureaucracy	10,466.5	18.6	038,179.2	7.7	031,400	04.0
Defense	12,944.7	23.1	078,156.5	15.7	Not included	
Food subi/aid	-	-	063,478.2	12.7	49,600	06.1
Total Plan	56,223.0	100%	498,230.2	100%	782,700	100%

Sources: Ministry of Planning. 1975 The Second Development Plan: 1975-1980. p. 529; The Third Plan: 1980-1985 p.88.
* Total of Third Plan excludes (i) transfer payments, (ii) non civilian sector, (iii) foreign aids.

1- State Capital Outlays

Oil revenues have made the state, in a span of two decades, a giant financial corporate entity capable of financing labor, material goods, and services which are either sold to the populace at very low subsidized prices or given free. The first aspect of this involved the building of the requisite physical infrastructures of transportation, communication,

education, health, defense and internal security, water, and electricity. The rapid development of the physical infrastructure had profound effects on the domestic economy which were more far reaching than its mere appearance. It created a dominant construction sector that lured the private sector into construction activities which also necessitated the importation of expatriate labor and attracted foreign construction businesses. Furthermore, the injection of 'Petro-Riyals' into construction activities, particularly during the 1975-85 period, along with the inflow of expatriate labor, resulted in high inflation rates, housing shortages in urban areas, and necessitated excessive imports of practically all consumable goods. The government, thus, was forced to expand its subsidies and price support programs, further expand its social security scheme, and initiate extensive interest-free housing loan programs.

The second realm of state capitalism is government bureaucracy. In order to expand it's hegemony, further the forces of stability, and add to the institutional pillars of support, the state dramatically expanded government bureaucracy.

Until early 1953, the Saudi bureaucracy was essentially non-existent. Only the King ruled personally and informally, with the help of members of the royal family (Uthaimeen, 1986). Except for three ministries (Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Defense) the council of ministers was not formed until

1953, and even then it consisted exclusively of the Royal family members (Arafat, 1985, Uthaimeen, 1986). During the late 1950s and the 1960s, the Saudi society, however, went through a period of adversity as an outcome of the state detribalization policies, prolonged droughts, deterioration of traditional agriculture, and the state reform program of 1962. The latter had profound far-reaching implications for Saudi society because:

1- it laid the ground for an extensive welfare state with the initiation of free health care, free education at all levels, and an extensive social security program.

2- it marked the onset of the state commitment to provide employment for all male citizens.

3- it emphasized the need for 'modernization' via projects such as constructing an extensive road network, developing water resources, expanding public utilities and forming agricultural and industrial banks.

4- it relaxed policies for imports to exempt many food items from custom duties. Later, these policies were extended further to, in effect, set the tempo for an open economy where import activities assumed the dominant economic role in the country.

5- most importantly, it institutionalized the state dominance over the development process in the country.

While the reform program of 1962 laid the ground for the continued development of the state bureaucracy, its growth

accelerated after 1974 when the state coffers burgeoned from oil revenues. The result was a steady expansion of the state civilian sector during the 1975-1985. For instance, in 1974 the state employed only 162,439, but by 1983/84 the figure jumped to 470,000 (Ministry of Finance, 1984). This, in effect, has made the state the largest single employer in the country since the year 1975 (Birks & Sinclair, 1980) (table 3.3).

TABLE 3.3
EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR (MID 1975)

Sector	Total Employ.	Saudi Employ.	%	Non Saudi Employ.	%
Agriculture	585,550	530,650	51.7	54,900	7.6
Mining & quarr.	27,000	15,400	1.5	11,600	1.6
Manufacturing	65,900	21,550	2.1	44,350	6.1
Construction	239,300	35,900	3.5	203,400	28.1
Utilities	20,350	7,200	0.7	13,150	1.8
Trade & finance	204,200	65,700	6.4	138,500	19.1
Service (govt.)	503,700	277,100	27.0	226,600	31.4
Transp & communi.	103,800	72,900	7.1	30,900	4.3
Total	1,749,800	1,026,400	100.0	723,400	100.0

Source: Birks and Sinclair, 1980. Arab Manpower. p. 163

Critics have pointed to the many aspects and implications of the expansion of state bureaucracy. First, in order to satisfy the different groups in the society, the state implemented this expansion both in size and scope. As such, it expanded the Ministers Councils from fourteen to twenty six. All of these ministry positions, except for four, were, primarily, delegated to the middle class technocrats (Uthaimeen, 1986).

Furthermore, the state established forty six middle level public corporations. These were independent from ministries and "emerged to absorb young educated Saudis, co-opt them through high salaries, and satisfy some of their desires for participation in nation building" (Islami and Kassouvi, 1984:22). Lastly, it accommodated the majority of rural migrants by providing them with full state employment regardless of their skill or education qualifications (Arafat, 1985; Uthaimeen, 1986).

Second, the state pledge to provide jobs for all Saudi (male) citizens regardless of skills or education, the expansion of mass education, the extension of the transportation network, and the continuous decline of the traditional economy (agriculture and pastoralism) re-enforced a massive rural-urban migration trend that had begun during the late 1950s. Undoubtedly, the relative economic prosperity of urban areas, as a result of oil wealth spillovers, and government subsidies on various goods including food stuffs, strengthened the pull factors for rural families to migrate to urban centers.

Third, as Uthaimeen (1986) explains, state employment was attractive for rural migrants because:

> The state bureaucracy never fires its employees; instead, it guarantees steady income, has fewer working hours, requires no job qualifications except [Saudi] nationality, has less discipline, and less competitive than the private sector. But most importantly, unlike the case of imported labor, the wages and salaries of the Saudi national labor force are set by the state, not by the free labor market (p.277).

Fourth, the "jobs-for-all" state policy stymied the emergence of an industrial labor force to be comprised of rural migrants. To the contrary, rural to urban migrants found it more attractive to secure employment with the state rather than other sectors of the economy (see table 3.3).

In sum, the state bureaucracy has become a forceful mechanism through which the royal family-cum-state increased its dominance, improved its legitimacy, and bought time from pressing issues of developing productive national labor force.

2- Public Consumption

As oil revenues increased, so did the state's willingness to invest in public programs. Since the declaration of the reform program of 1962, the state initiated comprehensive free mass education, free health care, and subsidized municipal services. These, among others, are not self-supportive and must be budgeted for every fiscal year. Regardless of the nature, quality and purpose of providing these public services, the shear size of the expenditures accrued to them, and the fast rates of expansion are so astounding that the state has tied its future inexorably to petro-revenues. Let us consider some of these programs.

Education

Education by far is the best manifestation of the state welfare programs. Until 1964, modern education existed in a very limited scope. The state was only able to initiate public school in urban areas and nearby vicinities. Even then, these

were limited in numbers and accommodating capacities. More notably, public schools were primarily for boys and mostly limited to elementary schooling. By 1970, however, the state was able to expend more on education and began to expand education vertically and horizontally. In a span of fourteen years (1970-1983), the number of schools rose from 3,107 to 13,428, and the number of students (male & female) rose from 547,000 to 1,836,000 (Ministry of Planning, 1983) (table 3.4).

TABLE 3.4
DEVELOPMENT IN EDUCATION AND GROWTH OF STATE EXPENDITURE FOR EDUCATION (1970-1983)

Year	Number of Schools	Number of Teachers	Number of Students (Male) (1,000)	Number of Students (Female) (1,000)	State Expenditure on Education (million sr)
1970	3,107	23,118	412	135	667
1971	3,283	23,856	455	152	1,150
1972	3,659	27,627	488	181	1,591
1973	4,254	31,907	537	211	2,233
1974	4,689	37,942	598	255	3,760
1975	5,634	43,777	672	311	12,941
1976	6,536	51,176	712	354	13,977
1977	7,497	58,201	760	391	15,049
1978	8,695	63,557	806	423	15,155
1979	10,018	70,468	874	466	17,396
1980	11,070	78,309	952	511	21,294
1981	11,379	86,007	991	572	26,248
1982	12,619	95,233	1,060	641	31,864
1983	13,426	104,524	1,131	705	27,791

Sources: Ministry of Planning. Achievements of the Development Plans 1390-1403 (1970-83) pp. 233, 240; Ministry of Finance, Statistical Yearbook, vol. 11, p. 16 vol. 17, p.9; SAMA, Statistical Summary, P. 102.

Another aspect of the state's education policy is the creation of incentives for education. Not only did the state provide free education and all it's essentials, but it selectively put monetary incentives for some programs in selected regions. For instance, all college students receive monthly allowances of about 600 SR. plus room and board at nominal rates.

A further example of state incentives for education is its policy implemented for the Tehamma regions of Muhail and Jizan provinces. In order to better school attendance and persuade the peasant families to enroll their children in school, the government instituted monthly allowances for all students in general education (elementary, intermediate, and high schools) in 1979[1]. Certainly, this is very commendable as it dramatically improved school enrollments, but the residual effects (so to speak) of the program must be scrutinized. Unquestionably, education is the primary means used to indoctrinate Saudi youth into the general system. And by providing allowances for students, the state also created a 'respectable' income for the peasant family. This and other subsidy programs, along with social security payments, have become the main source of income for thousands of rural families who otherwise would subsist through agriculture and herding or seek employment opportunities in urban areas. While

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[1] Council of Ministers decree number 689 in 15-5-1397 H. (1977).

subsistence agriculture in the southwest region was never a thing of prosperity, it nonetheless was a viable choice for centuries. In effect, these programs fostered the rapid decline of subsistence economy in Tehamma, Asir, and Jizan provinces and furthered the demise of its agricultural base, but, at the same time, slowed down rural to urban migration rates from the mid-1970s and onward.

In closing, while the expansion of mass education was rather impressive, its outcome is not. The flood of thousands of high school and college graduates has yet to fit into the country's need for skilled and semi-skilled labor. If it was not for the ever expanding government bureaucracy, unemployment for the schooled Saudis would be very high since they did not possess the necessary skills and training to participate in productive activities. In testimony, we only need to look at the ever expanding size of expatriate labor in Saudi Arabia (see table 3.4). It is for this reason that one must question the very intent of Saudi education.

TABLE 3.5[2]
FOREIGN NATIONALS ENTERING AND LEAVING SAUDI ARABIA AND NUMBER OF WORK/RESIDENCE PERMITS GRANTED 1974-1982 (1,000)

Year	Total enter.	Total leav.	Re-Entry Visas	New Resid. permits	Resid. Permits Renewals	New & Extend. Permits
1974	811	776	201	159	N.A.	N.A.
1975	1,255	1,089	215	228	N.A.	N.A.
1976	1,598	1,338	415	489	N.A.	N.A.
1977	2,219	1,883	652	522	N.A.	N.A.
1978	2,372	2,307	N.A.	606	N.A.	N.A.
1979	2,485	2,424	N.A.	687	N.A.	N.A.
1980	2,371	2,783	1,380	669	2,329	2,998
1981	2,844	3,610	1,198	632	2,240	2,872
1982	3,318	3,022	1,669	663	2,658	3,321

Source: Ministry of the Interior, Passport and Civil Status Dept. Statistical Yearbook series 1394-1402 (1974-82).

Social Security Program

This is another example of the state public disbursement programs. Essentially, it was meant for the old, the permanently disabled, orphans, single women with no support, and disaster stricken families. During the 1970s, however, requirements were relaxed to allow practically anybody with the 'right contacts' to become a beneficiary of the program. This is especially true in rural areas, where the program people too often relied upon heads of tribes and/or villages for information about applicants. The number of recipients, as a result, jumped from 200 thousands in 1970 to over one million in 1981 (Ministry of Planning, 1983) (table 3.6).

[2]Pilgrimage are not included

Table 3.6
STATE ALLOCATION TO SOCIAL SECURITY (1970-1983)
(Saudi Riyal)

Year	Regular Assistance		Relief Assistance		All Assistance		
	Number of Benef.	Amount (SR) Million	Number of Benef.	Amount (SR) Million	Number of Benef.	Amount (SR) Million	Amount per case (SR) (annual)
1970	187,000	39.4	11,000	2.3	198,000	41.7	652.0
1971	226,000	47.6	10,000	2.3	236,000	49.9	601.0
1972	275,000	58.4	12,000	2.3	287,000	60.7	601.0
1973	322,000	68.4	20,000	3.8	342,000	72.2	669.0
1974	327,000	143.1	26,000	5.2	353,000	148.3	1301.0
1975	427,000	394.0	16,000	8.5	443,000	357.5	2554.0
1976	531,000	442.1	64,000	53.9	595,000	496.0	2638.0
1977	613,000	625.1	69,000	62.2	682,000	687.3	2182.0
1978	658,000	855.0	77,000	75.4	735,000	930.4	3993.0
1979	723,000	924.3	103,000	125.9	826,000	1050.2	3861.0
1980	753,000	960.1	99,000	118.7	852,000	1078.8	3981.0
1981	757,000	968.0	87,000	91.0	884,000	1059.0	3823.0
1982	798,000	1375.0	111,000	148.0	909,000	1523.0	5128.0
1983	810,000	1402.0	114,000	138.0	924,000	1540.0	4984.0

Source: Ministry of Planning. Achievements of Development Plans, (1970-83). (Saudi Arabia: Gov't Pub. 1983, p.261).

The amount provided to a beneficiary is not substantial, but it approximates the wage of an unskilled urban worker. And, as Arafat (1985) points out, when the payment lagged behind wages of urban workers prior to 1974, the number of recipients dropped sharply only to rise again after the government raised its payment in 1975. Since most of the program beneficiaries are rural people, the program has the affect of deterring rural recipients from seeking urban employment in order not to lose their payments. By the same token, it delayed the proletarianization of potential rural wage workers, as more and more families become beneficiaries. Most importantly, it has lessened work ethics and struggle for living in many rural communities[3]

3- Public Disbursements and Largesse

The most striking phenomenon of the 1970s and early 1980s is the state's relentless efforts to disburse funds through extensive subsidy programs, price supports and control, free loans and outright gifts. While some of these were initiated during the late 1960s, their impacts on a large scale were only felt after the 1973 oil boom when the state found the means to control the entire population by instilling economic dependence of the populace on government largess.

Food and non-luxury items received priority from the state. In order to minimize the effects of high inflation

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[3]- This is especially true in the Tehamma regions, where social security in combination with student allowance and other subsidy programs, have made up income in excess of subsistence.

rates, the government implemented a price support program for all imported basic food items. Moreover, tariffs, where they were not dropped, were reduced to three percent for all imports. The subsidy programs also included fuel and utilities such that taxes were dropped on all types of fuels, while rates for electricity were reduced significantly (Uthaimeen, 1986).

Land Allotment Schemes

By far, the largest impact exhibited by the government schemes are those of land allotment schemes which took effect from 1974 and thereafter. We may outline these as follows:

First, as a result of the state's emphases on infrastructural building (primarily for education, health, government bureaucracy, transportation, and public housing), the state was inclined to pay generously for private properties that were appropriated for government projects. Generally, the main beneficiaries were, by far, the upper middle class and upper class who, through their connections with the elite state functionaries, were able to obtain access to such properties, claim ownership, and later were reimbursed at very generous terms.

Second, the housing shortages of the early seventies prompted the government to introduce two major programs; 1) subsidized housing, and 2) housing loans. The first included large state controlled and financed projects in the major urban areas at a cost of around 20 billion SR. The ministry

of housing was in charge of the subsidized housing programs. Other ministries and public corporations have also built their own housing projects for their employees (Ministry of Planning, 1983).

The second program is an extensive interest-free loan program provided to any Saudi male over 25 years of age for the purpose of constructing an owner-occupied house. The government created a public corporation called The Real Estate Development Fund "Bank" to manage and distribute the loans. There were no rigid criteria for eligibility. Any Saudi male can apply for one loan by providing a proof of property ownership and a blue print design for the house to be constructed. Usually the loan covers about 70% of the cost of a nuclear family housing unit and is payable in twenty-five years with a discount of up to 30 percent for prompt payments (Ministry of Finance, 1986). (table 3.7).

The program by design favors urban areas since it gives more money for housing units in towns than in the rural side. Moreover, it is easier to process title papers for urban properties than their rural counterparts where finalizing ownership papers may become impossible due to overlapping between tribal and individual rights of land ownership[4].

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[4]- The upper limit of housing loans is fixed at 300 SR thousands for urban areas and 200 SR thousands for rural areas (Ministry of Finance & National Economy, 1986).

TABLE 3.7
PRIVATE AND INVESTMENT LOANS DURING THE PERIOD 1395-1406H (1975-1986) (SR MILLION)

Fiscal Year	Housing Loans		Investment Loans	
	Number	Value	Number	Value
95/96	34,189	8,197	NA	NA
96/97	46,955	13,536	439	1,042
97/98	3,832	955	139	277
98/99	34,407	8,690	419	675
99/400	33,190	8,185	287	460
400/401	28,593	6,956	202	385
401/402	31,133	8,052	196	459
402/403	35,359	9,438	230	495
403/404	29,400	7,917	165	356
404/405	26,215	7,131	124	421
405/406	18,844	5,159	88	284
Total	322,117	84,216	2,289	4,854

Source: Ministry of Finance. Real Estate Development Fund.Annual Report 1405/1406 (1986).

The immediate impact of the program was the price escalation of urban properties as everybody scrambled for a land lot to take advantage of the loan. This, in effect, created a class of land speculators who, through collusion with influential elite state functionaries, got access to unclaimed urban lands, proceeded to sell them at inflated prices and consequently got rich overnight with the windfall profits[5].

The government for its part also contributed to land speculation through land allotment programs. These programs entitle adult Saudis (mainly males) to a lot in an area of

[5] Due to lack of control on the part of government, prices of urban property sky-rocketed to more than one hundred fold in major towns, such as Riyadh, Makkah, Jeddah, and Dammam.

his choice. Of course, not everybody who applied got one, as contacts with government people played a major role in the size, quality, location, and probability of receiving a lot. By the same token, thousands were able to take advantage of their contacts and consequently accrued great wealth through land speculation and real estate investments. Moreover, housing construction in urban areas became investment enterprises for thousands of households as family members began to combine housing loans and build larger units, which they later rent or sell for sizable profits. This was made possible by the large influx of rural migrants and imported labor since the demand for housing remained relatively constant.

Undoubtedly, the most astounding impact of the program occurred at the national level. The combined impact of government projects and private construction made this area the dominant sector of the economy. As such, imports of construction materials and labor became the commanding phenomena from 1974 onward (Arafat, 1985; Islami & Kassouvi, 1984; Shaw, 1983; Uthaimeen, 1986).

Agricultural Subsidies and Loans

The traditional sector, due to the inherent parameters of limited land size and quality, water, and technology, was never prosperous. These conditions, however, went from bad to worse after the mid-1950s. At this time, thousands of farmers abandoned agriculture and opted for out-migration to urban areas as new economic opportunities opened up. Mass education

also helped accelerate the deterioration of rural life as it stripped agriculture of the young labor force who increasingly enrolled in school and sought opportunities in other more economically rewarding sectors of the economy.

The government attempted to breath renewed life into this ailing sector by initiating several price subsidy programs and production loans. Typically, the government subsidizes up to 50% of input costs, purchases farmers outputs at very high prices, facilitates interest-free loans, distributes free land for any Saudi farmer, and allowed land rights to private firms of agro-based projects. Needless to say, the government subsidy programs were widespread and certainly very expensive as expenditures for agriculture reached 93 billion SR. during the second and third development plans (1975-85) (SAMA, Annual Report: 1984, p. 15) (see table 3.2).

In order to appreciate the government's role in agriculture, it is important to critically review the policies for agriculture. From the beginning, the designers of development plans stated that intentions and goals for the agricultural sector were to improve agricultural conditions, raise output and improve the sector share of GDP, release surplus and redundant labor, and, at the same time, slow down rural-urban migration rates (Ministry of Planning, 1975). While these are very comforting goals, they were, nonetheless, conflicting in nature. Essentially, this points to the general lack of any

basic understanding of subsistence agriculture and its conditions in Saudi Arabia on the part of the planners.

First, the prohibitive constraints of land size and quality, water resources, and the extant land-tenure system of fragmented land holdings preclude efforts to easily transform subsistence agriculture.

Second, the injection of capital through subsidy programs in effect minimized any potential transformation as it helped preserve the existing land-tenure system, and lessened strains of the emergent cash economy by introducing cash and input subsidies. Further expansion of agriculture was thus discouraged as subsidies nullified the need for this. While subsistence agriculture did continue, it did so more as a "way of life" than as a necessary moment in the household's reproduction.

Third, the logic of subsistence economy, which is based on provision of "basic needs" for the producing unit, undermines efforts of structural transformation and rural development. As Arafat (1985) points out, the production of surplus output is not a necessary condition for the economic survival of the producing unit. To the contrary, it is the consumption levels of the producer that too often are adjusted to the amount produced.

Fourth, it is the non-competitive nature of subsistence agriculture that hinders potential investments and/or development. In other words, peasants do not have to depend on

marketing their produces in order to recover costs, obtain a return on land or accumulate capital, nor are they under pressures of losing their land which is quite secured by the existing land-tenure system.

Fifth, the government subsidy programs are based on the premise that, through capital injections, the manipulation and substitution of factors of production will occur and lead off transformation and agricultural development. In other words, the development planners concluded that injection of capital through interest free loans, input and output subsidies and price supports will lead to increased productivity and improvements in farmers' income, encourage modernization of farming methods to the point of rationalization and adoption of labor-saving techniques. The final (and much desired) outcome is the release of labor which will alleviate manpower shortages in other sectors (Ministry of Planning, 1975).

The infusion of capital through subsidies did contribute to better farming techniques and larger outputs, but it was not enough to transcend constraints (emergent as well as inherent) to the overall agricultural development. The basic problem with the planners' argument is that it assumes the existence of market-oriented agriculture where cheapening of one factor of production (such as capital) will lead to substitution of other expensive factors (such as labor or land). This has not been the case, though. Subsistence farming only uses cheap family (non-wage) labor and in the

meantime is restricted by the land-tenure system. Still, another related problem is that even when farmers are able to re-orient their operation towards the market by growing vegetables and other cash crops, there are no guarantees that they will get adequate returns in urban markets due to stiff competition from subsidized and/or cheap imports.[6]

Sixth, the claim made by policy makers that raising the productivity of agriculture and incomes accrued to farmers will ultimately put a stop to rural-urban migration is plain nonsense. What is at the heart of the issue is not just agricultural impotence but, rather, the new emerging structural (overall) transformation of the economy. As such, the creation of attractive employment opportunities in other sectors, particularly in the government sector, greatly outweighed those found in family farming. This has led to inter-sectoral redistribution of labor and, consequently, a steady stream of rural-urban migrants. It is also interesting to note that migrants, according to the logic of Pareto optimality, had made the right choice for themselves by

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[6]- The volume and prices of imported foodstuff and other agricultural produces make family farming operations incapable to compete and/or develop into a market oriented enterprise.

abandoning the land and opting for non-agricultural employment.[7]

Seventh, despite the government's (proclaimed) vested interest in traditional agriculture, the distribution of subsidies, loans, and land does not favor the western and southern subsistence-based regions. Of all regions, these two, thus far, continue to receive the least percentage of subsidies, loans, and land allotments. It was, rather, the central and northern regions of large-scale farmers and agribusinesses that received and continue to receive more than two-thirds of funds and subsidies allocated to agriculture. For example, during the period between 1975 and 1985, the western and southern regions' share of agricultural subsidies and loans decreased from twenty-six percent to thirteen, while the northern and central regions' share rose from sixty-four to eighty percent for that same period (Nowshirvani, 1987).

Equally important is the way in which subsidies, loans, and the distribution of free land were structured to favor large farmers and agribusiness projects. Since 1975, the ceiling of Agricultural Bank loans rose from 12,000 SR to 20 SR millions. Furthermore, laws for agricultural land distribution were also reformulated in order to accommodate large

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[7]-It can be easily demonstrated that the net economic gains for individuals who migrated greatly exceeds the lost value of potential farm output. (For elaborate discussion see Arafat, (1985) Development with Unlimited Supplies of Imported Labor: A Case Study of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Ph. D. dissertation, the American University. p. 222).

farmers and agricultural-based projects, most of which are owned by urban merchants and elite state functionaries. Prior to 1975, the distribution of free land to Saudi farmers was limited to ten hectares, but since then climbed to 400 hectares for companies and organizations and 4,000 for special projects (Joffe, 1985). Naturally, land constraint and water availability have limited small farmers of the western and southern regions to small subsidies, loans, and free land allotments. By the same token, the northern and central regions, where available virgin land and plentiful deep underground waters are available, have permitted the creation of a capitalist agricultural sector characterized by highly mechanized farms. These types of farming operations are generally owned by private businessmen and state officials and operated mainly by foreign labor (Nowshirvani, 1987).

What is frustrating about this newly created agricultural sector is the fact it was not built on sound economics. To the contrary:

1- Agribusiness projects prospered only as a result of heavy subsidies and price supports. For example, in 1984 alone the government paid about 3,700 SR millions more to buy domestic wheat than to import it (ibid.).

2- Agribusiness projects rely on foreign labor and rarely use Saudi labor except for sales and distribution.

3- Except for poultry and vegetables, most crops do not fit into the country's consumption needs, as in the case of the

heavily subsidized production of wheat, where most of the output is allocated for foreign aid or sold in international markets at prices far below its actual cost of production.

4- The maintenance of these projects is at the expense of the depletion of precious underground water resources. What is alarming about this is the fact that the state heavily invests in sea-water desalination projects, whereby subsidized water resources are made available for the private sector to waste on questionable enterprises.

5- Since these projects are in areas far removed from the relatively heavily populated rural areas of the southern and southwestern regions, they have not contributed to the stated goals of reversing recent rural to urban migration trends. Moreover, harsh environmental conditions and low wages discourage the participation of Saudi wage workers.

In sum, large commercial-oriented farms and projects do not possess the ingredients of successful business enterprises and will probably fade when subsidies and prices supports are cut or water resources become depleted.

In the final analysis, the traditional agricultural sector, which still preserves about fifty percent of the potential labor force in the country, has not benefited greatly nor has it responded favorably to any of the governments programs to regenerate it. This is obvious as it only contributed one percent to the country GDP and only 3.4

percent to its non-oil GDP from 1960 to 1980 (SAMA: Annual reports, 1983). One cannot help but to think that in the context of economic restructuring with total dependence on oil revenues and the open-door economic policies, subsidies for traditional agriculture are simply meant to serve as income supplements for rural families, and not for raising agricultural productivity.

The State, Socioeconomic Development, and Migration: Implications and Conclusions

The main objective of this chapter has been to characterize the socioeconomic development of Saudi Arabia as designed and pursued by the state in the last three decades; how oil has prominently figured into the state development schemes; the outcome of the socioeconomic restructuring implemented by the state; and finally, how these new structural parameters have impacted rates, patterns, and duration of migration. While it remains difficult to fully comprehend the ramifications of the course of development adopted by the state, one nonetheless may highlight the most pronounced of these.

As the increments of wealth suddenly burgeoned, so too did the state's suzerainty over the society; economically, politically, and ideologically. The main aspects of this have been the overwhelming dominance of the bureaucracy which in turn bureaucratized the economy, universalized formal education, and rapidly expanded welfare programs.

The societal effects of the state's actions are no less profound and easily traceable in all domains. Since the oil boom of the mid-1970s, Saudi society subsisted on oil income, depended heavily on imports, and gradually abandoned its traditional economic base. The foremost features of this have been the sudden unproductive nature of sizable segments of the society as underemployment and masked unemployment proliferated. Furthermore, the indigenous labor force decreased in importance, as influxes of expatriate labor quickly dominated the active sectors of the economy. Finally, and most important, is the deterioration of the traditional sector of the economy. While the welfare of the rural population, on the main, has improved, this cannot be attributed to the productivity of the traditional sector as it lost its prominence to the new and ever expanding government service and construction sectors.

This general course of 'development' from the mid-1950s onward exhibited a profound and far-reaching effect on migration, altering the rates, patterns and duration. Within the framework of push-pull factors, we may be able to highlight the major regional and sectoral patterns of migration which occurred during the last three decades.

First, from the late 1950s until 1974 inter-regional seasonal labor migration continued. The main feature of this was labor circulation and seasonal migration from the south and southwest subsistence-based regions to urban centers of

the western region and the commercial agricultural centers and urban areas of the central and northeastern regions. This resulted in a pronounced decrease in the area under cultivation in the sending regions and a concomitant expansion of agricultural lands in the central and northeastern regions. This is readily seen in table 3.8

TABLE 3.8
CROPPED AREAS IN AGRICULTURAL LANDHOLDING BY MAIN REGIONS IN THE EARLY 1960s AND EARLY 1970s

(Area in thousand of hectares)

Region	Permanent Crops 1960-4	Permanent Crops 1973/4	Field Crops 1960-4	Field Crops 1973/4	Ttotal 1960-4	Ttotal 1973/4
Eastern	1.5	8.2	1.8	3.4	3.3	11.6
Central	13.6	18.0	48.2	29.0	61.8	47.0
Qaseem	10.5	12.8	26.9	89.5	37.4	102.3
Hayil	1.5	6.0	4.3	4.0	5.8	10.0
Northern	1.2	2.2	4.0	1.2	5.2	3.4
Medina	2.9	6.1	1.6	2.8	4.5	8.9
Makkah	2.3	13.2	98.3	67.1	100.6	80.3
Jizan	0.1	0.8	184.0	43.0	184.1	43.8
Southern	10.3	2.2	38.0	36.5	48.3	38.7
Total	43.9	80.0	407.1	351.2	451.0	395.2

Sources: "Agricultural Survey," in Statistical Yearbook 1965-68; Comprehensive Agricultural Census, 1974, vol. I, Pp. 10-12.

Unpaid household labor also declined in most of the sending regions at this time except in the Southern regions, where the use of female labor increased dramatically. The latter, as a matter of fact, became the dominant source of labor in the Southern regions of Asir, Bishah, and al-Baha, where it accounted for more than fifty percent of the total agricultural labor. This rise of women participation was the direct result of seasonal male labor migration (Arafat, 1985).

Wage labor also increased in size as well as importance in all receiving regions, particularly in Qaseem and north-eastern regions where commercialization of agriculture came to dominate (Joffe, 1985; Arafat, 1985; Nawshrivani, 1987) (table 3.9)

TABLE 3.9
AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT BY REGION: COMPARISON BETWEEN THE EARLY 1960s AND EARLY 1970s

	(thousands of workers) Household Labor		Hired Labor		Number of Worker per hectar	
Region	1960-4	1973/3	1960-4	1973/4	1960-4	1973/4
Eastern	na	12.1	Na	87.3	6.0	8.6
Central	14.5	24.7	5.4	28.1	0.3	1.1
Qaseem	na	30.3	Na	19.3	0.3	0.5
Hayil	6.3	16.4	0.6	4.1	1.2	2.0
Northern	7.0	7.9	1.3	1.0	1.6	2.6
Medina	9.9	14.2	2.4	4.8	2.9	2.1
Makkah	75.6	69.6	4.6	15.3	0.8	1.0
Jizan	64.1	48.7	4.9	18.3	0.4	1.5
Southern	51.4	218.8	1.0	29.6	1.1	6.4
Total	NA	442.8	NA	207.9	0.6	1.6

Sources: "Agricultural Survey," Statistical Yearbook, 1965-68; Comprehensive Agricultural Census, 1974, vol.I, tables 16-18.

Second, as a result of the drought of the 1950s, detribalization policies of the state, and the expansion of new employment opportunities in the oil and government sectors, the nomadic tribes of the North, Central, and North Central regions began to settle. While they did not abandon altogether their old traits of camel raising and herding, they became increasingly dependent on government aids and subsidies. The state, in turn, motivated by desire to detribalize the nomads and 'integrate' them into the new order initiated several

settlement schemes. The best example of these projects, which happened to be the last, is the Haradh Project designed for the Al-Murrah tribe of the northeast. This agricultural-cum-settlement project was built in 1960 and was located at the Haradh oasis (approximately 240 KM east of the capital in Wadi Sahba). The state spent over 100 SR million on the project for the provision of necessary goods and services for the newly established community (Alabbadi, 1981).

Settlement projects not only helped alter the mobility patterns of nomads, but it had deeper economic, social, political, and ideological ramifications for the Bedouins as well as the state. In an attempt to justify the state's role, Al-Farra (1973) argues that the state's detribalization policies contributed to the national cohesion and increased the central authority of the state. More importantly, this scheme helped to sunder older 'traditional' social relations and fostered the development of an embryonic 'modern' class structure (Al-Farra, 1973; Islami and Kassouvi, 1984).

Third, the new socioeconomic order facilitated by oil revenues and the state's efforts to centralize bureaucracy set forth an even stronger and more extensive pattern of rural to urban population shifts. This was characterized by permanent and/or semi-permanent moves of rural families. Essentially this occurred during the same time frame as the other patterns but was different in that its import for Saudi society had far greater impact. But while it began during this

same time period, it accelerated after the oil embargo and the reconstitution of OPEC following the October War of 1973. The lack of adequate information on this matter, however, has led to speculations as to the rates and regional differences of rural-urban migration, with some scholars arguing that rural to urban migration came to a halt as a result of government programs after 1975 (Arafat, 1985). On closer inspection of extant data, however, it appears that this conclusion was premature as every other indication points to the continued outward drift of rural populations to major urban centers and regional towns. In the last ten years, the populations of major urban centers of the country grew by about thirty percent on the average. The growth of populations of regional towns, too, are equally or more substantial than those of major urban centers. Taking into account both international labor migration and natural growth, the residuals do substantiate a continuous rural to urban population drift (table 3.10)

The government programs undeniably have delayed potential massive rural drifts from the relatively heavily populated regions of the south and southwest. These programs, however, did so only through injection of capital, which is electively used by recipients as an income source. To this end these programs have not accomplished their main stated goals of raising rural productivity and releasing excess labor to the to-be-created rural industries. To the contrary, they have

had the twin impact of withdrawing rural families out of traditional agriculture while preserving large unproductive labor in rural areas. It is ironic that development planners elusively consider the mere presence of potential labor in the rural countrysides as productive agricultural labor, where, in fact, agricultural productivity went downward from the outset of the 'Development' Plans.

TABLE 3.10
POPULATION ESTIMATES OF MAJOR URBAN CENTERS AND REGIONAL TOWNS OF SAUDI ARABIA (1974-1990)

REGION	1974	1980	1985	1990 (projected)
Central				
Riyadh	666,840	805,563	942,911	1,103,620
Kharj	42,347	51,156	59,878	70,084
Afif	66,361	80,106	93,834	109,827
Buraydah	76,442	92,344	108,088	126,511
Western				
Jeddah	565,068	682,619	799,006	935,187
Makkah	369,913	446,866	523,056	612,206
Taif	282,909	341,762	400,033	468,214
Medina	198,186	239,414	280,235	327,997
Eastern				
Dammam	127,844	154,439	180,771	211,581
Qatif	88,648	107,089	125,348	146,712
Hofuf	128,345	155,044	181,479	212,410
Mubarraz	54,325	65,626	76,815	89,907
Northern				
Tabuk	74,825	90,390	105,802	123,835
Ar'ar	33,351	40,289	47,158	55,195
Hayil	59,677	72,091	84,383	98,765
Southwestern				
Al-khamis	71,653	86,559	101,317	118,585
Abha	61,359	74,123	86,761	101,549
Muhayil	32,365	39,097	45,764	53,564
Albaha	32,10	38,777	45,389	53,125
Beljershi	38,525	46,539	54,474	63,758
Sabya	61,285	74,034	86,656	101,426
Najran	47,501	57,382	67,166	78,614
Bisha	41,540	50,181	58,737	68,748

Source: Ministry of Planning. 1984. Preliminary Population Estimates. Unpublished Data.

In the following chapters, I will examine, with the help of micro and community level data, the impacts of the state's development schemes upon the socio-economy and patterns of rural-urban migration of a southwest rural community during the last three decades. Furthermore, in the light of information and arguments presented in this chapter, I will attempt to show how rural households have interacted with the dynamic of the new opportunities/pressures structure presented in the larger Saudi society, and how the structural parameters and household characteristics have interactively shaped and reshaped household livelihood strategies and redefined the bases of socioeconomic class in the rural community.

CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY AREA

The selected study area is located about fifty kilometers south of the city of Abha. It is called Tamniah. The area lies on the crest of the escarpment overlooking Tihammat Shahran. It is a part of extensive high mountains of a tabular appearance that extend southward for more than fifty kilometers. Tamniah is about 2290 meters above sea level. The tabular appearance and a somewhat plate-like shape introduce the name Sahn Tamniah which translates to Tamniah plate. The rock formations are mainly massive crystalline rocks that are covered in some localities by a metamorphosed sandstone or a basaltic layer of tectonic and volcanic origins. As a matter of fact, Sahn Tamniah is said to be situated on a volcanic cone, a claim supported by the abundance of underground water, which is stored in a large unpermeable basin believed to be the mouth of a dead volcano (Brown, 1960; 1972).

The latitudinal and altitudinal location of the area gives rise to distinct climatic conditions. Being on the crest of the escarpment with an altitude of about 2290 m., the area temperature is on the cool side with a moderate (about 9C. deg.) seasonal range. The estimated annual mean temperature

is around (15 centigrade) but during winter months it gets much colder. Rainfall is dependable and high. It averages around 500 mm annually. The area, very distinctly, has a winter-spring rain pattern, with about thirty percent during the winter months, and about fifty-seven percent during the spring months. November and February are the rainiest months of the year. Both account for about thirty-five percent of the mean annual rainfall (Abdulfattah, 1981). The dependability of rain and low incidence of evapo-transpiration give rise to a relatively dense and extensive vegetational cover. Tamniah, and Sha'af Shahran in general, is known for its forests and beautiful scenery which blends very nicely with the landscape.

Sahn Tamniah takes a rectangular shape of about eight by two kilometers of semi-flat land. Six villages extend over this stretch. These are divided between the two tribes inhabiting the area. To the north lie Dar Othman, A~l Yanfa', and Al-Qariah, which are of Shahran descent, and south there are A~l Ali, Al-Qarn, and A~lJaleeha of Kahtan descent. Traditionally, there are only minor cultural differences between the two tribes residing in the area.

Field research was carried out in two of the Shahran villages; A~l Yanfa' and Dar Othman. These two constitute one community. As such, they share agricultural and pastoral lands, residents of the two are related by blood and marriage, have similar background, and share all social norms. Together they are known as Shahran Bani Malik. The community is about

55 KM. from Abha, and about 60 KM. from Khamis Mushait; the other major regional town in the region. It used to be among the most prosperous rural communities in the region. Aided by semi-flat topography, Tamniah villages, and particularly those of Shahran, have a relatively sufficient and easily reclaimable agricultural land. It is only in the recently claimed lands where they have resorted to man-made terrace systems to extend the agricultural area.

The relative sufficiency of cultivated land coupled with the rather dependable underground water resources and rainfall led to the preservation of a staple agricultural economy. This was based on grains production (wheat, sorghum, and barley). Historically, the area was known for its affluence and crop surpluses. It is common to find (Madafin) ground halls being hand dug in massive rocks for storing surplus crops, especially sorghum and barley. As reported by village elders, there are about 200 such storage areas in the village of A~lYanfa' alone. On the average, each holds around 200 kg. Households generally store what is in access of their consumption needs. Traditionally, the stored crops were used for barter with the nomads.

Socio-Economic History

The community socio-economic history to a large extent is not known. Besides the lack of written documents and history, available oral history, at best, covers the last

sixty some years, and is not as reliable as thought to be. For instance, community elders who are the main source of oral history only give a partial view of the past. As such, they present it as a glorious history of prosperity, co-operation and assistance, while ignoring the community internal conflicts, hardships, and injustices. Furthermore, outside influences on the community's socioeconomic development are hard to trace or to be given proper weight. For instance, Tamniah was invaded by the Turks in 1912 when its tribes refused to ally with them and pay taxes. The battle is recorded as a major event, but its socio-economic consequences are still not known. Given these limitations, one cannot help but to base the analysis of socio-economic history on oral communication which, to a large extent, is constricted to the last sixty years.

Tamniah villages, so typical of The Asir (Sarat) region, had a history of subsistence economy based on agriculture and pastoralism. Grains production, especially wheat and sorghum, (Thurah) were the main crops. Barley also used to be cultivated, but only on a limited basis. Due to the importance of wheat and sorghum for household consumption and exchange, the bulk of landholding was usually devoted to the two, with the marginal lands being left to barley production. Vegetables and fruits were seldom grown in the past since they did not figure in the household diet, except for onions and tomatoes. The latter had been introduced to the region by the Turks prior

to World War One. The lack of adequate market in the regional towns and the costly access to the Hijaz urban centers of Taif, Makkah, and Jeddah kept vegetable production in all Asir region to a minimum. This was the case until some twenty years ago, when vegetable production extended both in the area of cultivation and varieties grown. The development of good markets in the regional towns of Abha and Khamis Mushait, and the easy access to the large Towns of Hijaz as a result of improvements in means of transportation, were among the factors behind the new emphases on vegetables production. The emergent needs for cash was the other factor of an equal importance as farm families, in compliance with the emerging national economy, began to diversify agricultural production. Vegetable production, however, has not sustained any measurable growth because agriculture, generally, lost its importance as a result of the attractions to off-farm government employment.

1- Forms of Social Organization

Historically, the form of social organization that dominated the southwestern region and most of the Arabian Peninsula is the tribe. It is a kinship unit formally based on descent (real or imagined) from a common ancestor through the male line (Senani, 1983). Tamniah is inhabited by two tribes; Shahran and Kahtan. These are among the largest tribes in the country and, certainly, in the southwestern region.

They extend west to the Tihamma region and east to the foothills of the Hijaz Plateau.

The two researched villages are from the Shahran tribe. Both carry their ancestors' name (Yanfa' and Othman). They descended from the same sub-section (or band) of Shahran Bani Malik. The name is derived from "Malik Ibn Anzah"; their believed ancestor (personal communication). The two villages through most of their known history functioned as one socio-political unit with one head of tribe (Sheikh) and council of elders. They were, however, economically independent except during times of crises.

Since the last quarter of the 19th century, the community came under the "Sheikhdom" of A~lHamoodh. This family is well known in the southwest region, had many inspiring leaders who successfully led the community through difficult crises and conflicts with rival tribes and others such as the Turks. More importantly, the A~lHamoodh family is credited for building a strong social organization based on cooperation, assistance, accountability, and obedience to the head of tribe and council of elders. As a matter of fact, the (Sheikh) head of tribe, traditionally, had the full power to imprison, punish, banish, and fine any fellow villager found guilty of an infraction or misconduct.

While both villages, more or less, have a history of subsistence production, nonetheless, each emphasized different activity. A~lYanfa' emphasized agriculture with herding as a

complementary source of subsistence. Dar Othman, to the contrary, depended on lumbering for sale, with crop production coming second and herding third. These specializations are the result of inequalities in the distribution of farm lands. A"lYanfa', being the larger and stronger clan, strengthened their hold on the better, more accessible, and easy to guard/protect land. People of Dar Othman, left only with a relatively easy to protect strip of land, which cannot meet all subsistence needs of the village, diverted their attention to the nearby forestry of alJurrah and to herding.

Here, one may point out the problem of inter-tribal raids, which traditionally posed a constant threat to the community and its agricultural produce, and was a major obstacle to expansion of agricultural lands. While arable lands were relatively available, the community in fear of rival tribes looking for revenge and/or burglary confined itself to the easily defended part of Tamniah. In testimony of fear of enemies, all communities of the southwestern region are landmarked by defense castles or towers, built in strategic locations. There are eleven such towers (Gasabh/ pl. gasub) in the Sahn Tamniah. These are round, about twenty-five feet high, and built of stone and mud. They resemble chimneys, only they are wider in diameter and shorter. During conflicts and bad times, the community men, armed with rifles, used to take turns guarding the community, especially the working

people. These towers also were used for storing wheat crop surplus, which needs better ventilation.

To this end, the community was characterized by economic sufficiency and stability. Aided by the semi-flat topography, fertile soil, and dependable water resources, Shahran Bani Malik seldom had any major economic hardship in recent history. Traditionally, it used to produce all of its needs from wheat (the staple food), sorghum, and barley. Herding used to be the second major economic activity. Each family used to own a herd of goats and sheep to complement agriculture for household needs, and for exchange in the area market. Herding as a major activity, however, was only practiced by a handful of families. Those on the main lacked sufficient agricultural land. The third, but limited activity, was trade. Household domestic and production needs, which are not available locally, were usually brought by a few villagers who used to work as merchants from towns of the west coast such as Jizan, Subia, and al-Hago. Clothes, kerosine, coffee, pottery, and draught animals were the primary traded goods.

2- Land Ownership

Land ownership in the community of Tamniah and the Southwestern region as a whole is, generally, the outcome of two factors:

1- At the regional level, there are the common tribal lands, where boundaries are drawn between tribes or bands of the mother tribe. Within these boundaries, the tribe has a

legal right to the land for agriculture, lumbering, and pastoralism. These boundaries are not always constant due to conflicts and tribal wars. The reputation and strength of the tribe contribute to the maintenance and/or expansion of its territories.

2- At the village level, ownership of agricultural land was initially established by the inheritance system. Relatives of a deceased head of household (or a patriarch) divide his belongings, including land. This is done according to the Islamic "Shari'a" laws of inheritance, which set shares according to gender and relation to the deceased. For example, the son gets twice as much as the daughter, and lateral relatives get shares according to closeness of relation to the deceased.

The inheritance system is seen by many (including the writer) as a major contributing factor to the dynamics of land ownership in Islamic countries. Most of the writings on inheritance, however, amount to no more than an arithmetic analysis of inheritance and its effects on land fragmentation. Nothing is said of the redefining of socioeconomic status at the household and the community levels. Such shifts of land ownership and, subsequently, of socioeconomic status of members of the household, due to inheritance, may have many consequences, some of which are grievous to the household and to the peasant community. The landholding, for instance, might have to be divided into small tracts of no economic viability.

Some families may have to shift its production strategies in order to adapt to the new situation. Others may resort to migration to secure subsistence.

Whereas the inheritance system may hold the key to questions of land ownership in Tamniah community, one nonetheless must not ignore the many factors which, historically, affect maintenance and expansion of this ownership. Inequality in this matter had operated both between and within households in Tamniah. Households of better socioeconomic status, good representation in the council of village elders, historically, had better access to the better and/or more easily expandable land. The demographic situation of the household from a generation to the next, potentially, regulated the household ability to expand its land through buying or reclamation. Households of good stock of workers have better opportunities to dispense some labor on new land. Labor short households, to the contrary, may have to abandon some of their cultivated land.

Inequality within households takes many forms. There are inter-gender inequalities, which were set by both the inheritance system and the community social norms. For example, females always inherit smaller shares than males of equal relationship to the deceased. This applies to all of the Arabian Peninsula and most of the Islamic world. In Islam, the man is obligated with the family's 'bread-winning', and thus

always is accorded twice as much as the woman's inheritance share.

Another gender inequality, being the product of social norms of the southwestern region, is a tacitly manufactured social rule which obstructs the female relative of the deceased to ask and/or claim her share of inherited land. This rule contradicts the Islamic law of inheritance, but as they say "female inheritance is legalized by Shari'a, prohibited by (norm) Shimah". The deprivation of women from inheritance only applies to inheritance of land. The woman, of course, can ask for her share through the legal system and will get it. She and her immediate family (husband and children), however, will have to bear the consequences. Beside the social rejection, the community may boycott the family in future marriage arrangements. Still some families may take back their daughters who are married in that family. If, on the other hand, the woman chooses to give away her share to her natal family, a big thanksgiving party will be thrown in her honor, and a white flag will be raised on her natal family roof for three days attesting to the woman's generosity. The latter custom, sometimes, did extend a little bit further when the family sends the social servant (Dawshon) to the weekly market carrying the white flag and praising the woman's matrimonial family for what the woman did. This norm, while it is very unjust to women, nonetheless, helped protect agricultural land from extra fragmentation and maintained its ownership in the

same kinship. In a sense, it is the only answer given to the question as to why the woman was not willingly accorded her share of inherited land. It is, precisely, the fear of the family that it is going to be shared in its most vital owning (the land) by outsiders. As one villager put it, "I raise my daughter, give her to an other family for nothing...now they want to share my children's land?!" Furthermore, one must not neglect the fact that it is the moral obligation of the woman's natal family to take care of her in old age.

Intra-gender inequalities among males of the household are rather subtle. The more apparent inequalities stem from inheritance. As mentioned above, relationship to the deceased determines the shares each household member is entitled to. There are, however, other inequalities stemming mainly from injustices, as a result of the power structure within the household and the community as a whole. It must be said, however, that partition of land is not resorted to unless the household becomes so extended, or when some of the heirs ask for their shares. The land, otherwise, will be collectively managed, and the crop shared.

3- Organization Of Production

Agricultural production in Tamniah, as is the case in a subsistence economy, used to be organized around household members. The main agricultural tasks are collectively performed by adult members. Division of labor among agricultural tasks and between members of the household of different age

and sex is dependent upon the availability of household adult laborers. When adult juniors (male and female) are in good enough numbers to carry out agricultural tasks, the seniors and children are, usually, left with minimum work loads. Male juniors are given the task of plowing and irrigation, with female juniors (daughters and daughters-in-law) helping in land preparation, spreading natural fertilizer, sowing, and harvesting the crop. The seniors will be left with easy tasks to perform, less physical jobs such as supervision and market activities. Children (under fifteen) are assigned to guarding the fields from pillage, and looking after young ruminants. If, on the other hand, the adult juniors are not available sufficiently, as is the case in nuclear families, all agricultural tasks are collectively performed, with a great flexibility in the division of labor between household members of different sex and age. Women, however, used to be overworked with the added burden of the domestic (house) work. They must bring water, firewood, and do all other domestic tasks.

Non-household labor, historically, has been used. Beside the communal labor, which will be fully discussed later, there used to be other forms of remunerated labor. Sharecroppers were the more common type. Those usually were fellow villagers who lacked sufficient and/or good land. Others used to come from nearby areas such as those south and southeast of Tamniah which were frequently struck by drought, and had less than sufficient underground water resources. These areas are

inhabited by the Kahtan tribe which is one of the most travelled tribes in Arabia, mainly due to drought out-breaks and fragility of environment.

Those coming from outside Tamniah used to work on a seasonal basis. Usually the sharecropper used to bring all of his family, and stay for two seasons or more depending on the situation in their natal areas and work availability in Tamniah. Some sharecroppers, as a matter of fact, had bought some land and resided in the area ever since coming. Another source of outside labor were the Yemenites. Those used to come from South Yemen, either as sharecroppers or hired labor. Nowadays, North Yemen male laborers are the main source of non-family labor in the area. They work for a monthly salary and/or sharecropping, and send remittances to their families.

Beside the sharecroppers, there used to be the harvest helpers. They were either from Tamniah, or migrant laborers and their families who used to come mainly from Kahtan areas. They used to work for board, food, and a small share of the harvest.

4- Mode of Co-operation and Assistance

Up until the late 1950s, Tamniah, as is the case with most mountain peasant communities of the Southwestern regions, was less accessible due to lack of good roads and means of transportation. People of Tamniah used to travel on foot for up to seven hundred kilometers in order to reach the Hijaz cities of Taif and Makkah. The difficulty of movement through

mountainous regions had kept the flow of people and goods to a minimum. Only basic, locally unavailable, and easy to carry goods were brought to the community. Prior to the mid-1950s, the community of Shahran Bani Malik was characterized by less differentiation both in size of landholding and in agricultural activities. Only a handful of households were distinguished in terms of size of landholding, had better savings, and possessed better housing. The rest, in the main, owned between two and eight pieces of land with an average size of 160 sq. meter for each. Furthermore, most households at least owned one draught animal, a simple plow, beside the other agricultural production necessities of simple metal and leather tools. Lack of great differentiation, coupled with the fact that the logic of this peasant community system was based on subsistence and survival, had permitted the development of a social system of a great degree of cooperation, assistance, and complementarity.

Mutual and instituted co-operation and assistance are the characteristic feature of the Arabian tribal (nomads and settled) groups, but with varying forms and degrees. The community of Shahran Bani Malik, typically, had a history of group-cohesiveness. Aligned under the 'Sheikhdom' of a strong and charismatic family (A'lHamoodh), they had built a system of social organization and rules that practically covered most spheres of their life. In what follows I will briefly outline the main aspects of this system.

Labor Co-operation

Self sufficiency in labor is hard to obtain all year long in subsistence-oriented communities. Tamniah, being no exception, historically relied upon communal labor to fulfill production and construction needs. Even though most of the households used to engage in the cultivation of small pieces of land, they nonetheless had to resort to labor cooperation in certain times and situations. Harvesting, which is a labor-intensive operation in traditional agriculture, represents the optimum of labor co-operation. The household which cannot manage by itself used to call in neighbors and relatives to help cut the crop. Men usually used to do the cutting, and the women bundle up the crop and carry it to the threshing floor (Jareen/pl. Jurun). The latter is a round stone-built floor of about forty feet in diameter and has a pole at the circle. Threshing is done by animals (oxen and donkeys) which were usually aligned side by side and tied from the neck to a wooden pole. Men usually help lead the animals and turn the crop upside down. Winnowing is also done by men, with women raking up the hay and cleaning the floor. Harvest helpers usually were remunerated by meals, labor, and/or a small part of the crop either before or after it was threshed.

Labor co-operation, in some cases, did extend to cover all agricultural operation. For example, when two (not necessarily kin) families who were short of labor, tools and/or animals agree to work interchangeably in each others'

land during the whole growing season, and at the end of the season they divide up the crop. This was rather extreme, but the more common was aiding each other through certain tasks, such as plowing, sowing, etc. Reciprocation, which used to be in kind, involved other forms of labor and meals.

During housing construction, and especially after walls had been built, the owner used to call on fellow male villagers to help do the roofing. This used to take a day of work, and the workers were usually reciprocated by a meal. Other tasks requiring labor co-operation are the cutting and bringing home of large timbers to be used as a house pole and/or roof support. House maintenance and decoration are the women's job. Depending on the task difficulty, women usually cooperate and reciprocate in kind.

Beside labor cooperation, there were also the borrowing of production needs, such as tools and animals. The peasant family, generally, only owned one draught animal, and when it needed another animal for such tasks as plowing, which require two draught animals, it borrowed the other one from neighbors and/or relatives for a return in kind. Furthermore, in situations of large animal loss (a cow or an oxen), the village people used to compensate the loser by buying the animal meat even if it was only to be thrown away. Still another form of assistance is when needy families send their teenagers to the better-off families during harvesting and

threshing to get some (Kasb). They usually do not go home empty handed.

Instituted Co-operation and Assistance

Beside the above mentioned cooperation, which is of the mutual type, other economic cooperation and assistance were set by the head (Sheikh) and council of elders of the village. Agricultural harvest, being crucial to the subsistence of the whole community, received most of these institutions;

First, the village with the help of the Sheikh, chooses between three and twelve men from different kinships, called Asharah. Their job was to witness every household crop after it was threshed, and take 1/12th of the whole crop. This is called 'Ushur' which translates to 1/10th, but in recent history only 1/12th was taken;

Second, after all this was gathered from all farmers and brought to the village storage, it used to be divided into the following:

1- Seventy percent to be distributed among the village poor, according to family size and need. When the village has a bumper crop, only a part of this will be distributed. A part of the remaining, usually, was stored for village guests, and the rest was sold in the area market with money being saved and/or spent on such crises as big debts, costly marriage of a village member, and a return help to other villages or tribes. If there were no such needs or crises in the immediate future, the money used to be

divided among village kinship groups (Badanah/ pl. Bidan) according to their sizes.

2- Twenty percent goes to the workers who collected the 'Ushur'.

3- Five percent was the share of the village Sheikh.

4- The remaining five percent usually was sent to the head of the mother tribe (Shahran).

Beside the 1/12th instituted locally, there was the matter of the five percent (Zakah) instituted by the Islamic 'Shari'a' law. This is usually collected by the state workers at the season end.

Today, things have changed. With the money economy, every village male member, eighteen years or older, is required to pay 100 hundred Saudi Riyal annually to be used during crises. This also applies to village out-migrants who either send the money or have a relative pay it to the tribe.

5- Modes of Complementation

The mountain peasant communities of the southwestern region had always attempted to be self-sufficient in production, consumption, and other needs. While they had solved labor shortages through co-operation and exchange of labor, other needs had to be fulfilled differently. Aside from the land, there are other means of production, which require specializations. These involve the presence of a carpenter, a blacksmith, and a leather craftsman.

The community of Shahran Bani Malik used to have three families specializing in carpentry, blacksmith, and leather crafting. All three families are from the Kahtan tribe. Their ancestors moved to Tamniah during late 1890s. All of these crafts are viewed as demeaning jobs. Up to now, there are no inter-marriages between those three families and the rest of the community. They have to find out-of-village marriage partners for their sons and daughters. The three craftsmen used to fulfill the community needs of making and repairing agricultural and house tools. Usually, materials of large tools such as a plow (Lumah), a house door or window are brought by the owner. The carving or making of the tool is done for money or a part of the crop. The same applied for the blacksmith and leather treater.

All the repair services by the craftsmen used to be done in exchange for an uncut amount of crop, depending on the extent of the craftsman's service.

Beside mainly working to fulfill the community needs, all those specialty people had businesses of their own. They used to make tools and household necessities, which they took to the area weekly market.

Another specialty of the southwestern mountain peasant communities was the job of a social servant. Known by different names in different communities, the social servant (Dawshon) had a range of duties. He used to announce happy occasions such as births, circumcision and marriages, and take

care of animal slaughtering. Also, when mosque guests who usually have no relatives in the area arrive, the social servant takes the trouble of making arrangements. For example, he used to inform the family whose turn it was to receive the mosque guests, carry out invitations, if necessary, and slaughter the animal to be fed to the guests, if required. For such jobs he usually got in return some meat of the slaughtered animal, a part of the crop, or some money.

The social servant also used to perform other jobs of a more serious nature. During tribal conflicts and wars he used to take messages between rivals. The safety of those messengers during wars, usually, was guaranteed by warring tribes. It was rather abhorrent to kill a 'Dawshon'.

In most southwestern communities, the social servant is not from the same tribe. Under some cases where no outsider is available to replace a deceased social servant, a fellow villager used to volunteer for the job, such as was the case in the Shahran Bani Malik community. Like those other craftsmen, the social servant lacks respect among community members, and his family does not inter-marry with community members.

6- Modes of Exchange

The southwestern communities have one-day weekly markets known by their days of convening. Those are located in a site central to the communities they served. Different kinds of products (domestic and otherwise), such as animals and their products, agricultural products and tools, and household's

consumable goods, were sold in these markets by farmers, nomads, and local as well as traveling merchants. The communities of Sha'af Shahran have a Monday market known as Ibn Hamoodh market, which is the family name of Shahran Bani Malik head of tribe. Every tribe guarantees the safety of its market during the day of marketing, so there will not be fighting or quarrels.

Besides the area population, the market was (and is still) attended by people coming from the surrounding areas such as Abha and Khamis Mushait, but also by nomads coming from as far as Tihamma in the west. Barter used to be the common form of exchange up until the early 1950s when money took over. While money has been known through all of the Islamic history of Arabia, it was rather a scarce and costly commodity, especially in isolated peasant and nomad communities. In recent history, the French silver Riyal was the common currency, until the Saudi Riyal took over that role in mid-1940s.

The area local merchants used to bring consumable goods like coffee, spices, salt, clothes, pottery and kerosine from the western towns of Sabia, alHago and Jizan, and also the Hijaz towns. These used to be exchanged for money if available, but mostly for cereals and domesticated animals. The merchants, who are mainly from the neighboring al-Masqi community, in turn, used to take the cereal to Abha and Khamis Mushait where it used to be sold to the regional merchants.

Camels and donkeys were the principal means of transportation for the merchants. Nowadays, these local markets are still active, but, to a large degree, are flooded with the cheap and more colorful Southeast Asian goods on the expense of the local varieties. Except for ruminants and their produces and agricultural products, all other indigenous goods are vanishing due to their inability to compete against foreign consumable goods.

While exchange was the main function of the periodic markets, nonetheless, they served as convention centers to work out inter-tribal conflicts, spread new ideas, and as public announcement places. As a matter of fact, the Sheikh of Shahran Bani Malik, who traditionally sponsored the area market, used to have a (Madjlis) place, where he could be reached by fellow villagers having disputes and visitors from other tribes. Today, these still serve as market places, but have lost their other function due to the integration of these tribal communities into the larger Saudi society, and the diminishing role of the tribe as an organizing socio-political unit.

Historically, Tamniah community, while it did most of its dealings through its weekly market, did have nonmarket dealings mainly with the nomads of Tihamma. The latter, driven out by heat, usually ascend from Tihammat Shahran in early summer. They usually have no interest in agriculture and have to get their annual needs of cereals (mainly sorghum) from

Tamniah's farmers. The latter would, in turn, have saved some of the winter crop to be dealt to the nomads. In exchange, the farmers get animals and their produce and/or money, if available. In other cases, they dealt their cereal for delayed pay.

Subsistence Production and Migration

Prior to the major structural transformation of the Saudi society of the last three decades, migration strategies of the peasant communities were of different type, duration and causes. In the southwestern region, migration strategies of peasant communities were dictated by both the overall community subsistence needs and that of the individual households. In communities of frequent break-outs of drought and water shortages, such as those of Bilad Kahtan and the east slope of the Hijaz Plateau, out-migration might have been the ultimate strategy for survival. In other areas, where favorable environmental conditions prevail most of the time, migration was less important and served to complement the household's subsistence production.

The Tamniah communities, particularly those of Shahran, had selectively used migration to fulfill shortages in subsistence production. Aided by a dependable subsistence economy, labor cooperation, and mutual assistance, the community had managed to keep out-migration to a minimum. Up until the 1950s, temporary labor migration, to a large extent, was the norm. This was more or less a form of "target"

migration, where the household dispatches to the Hijaz towns one or more of its adult male members to seek 'gainful' employment in order to buy the household's production and subsistence essentials.

The household socioeconomic status, as is manifest in size of landholding and possession of means of production, played a major role in migration strategies of the peasant household. Those who were not able to maintain subsistence and self-sufficiency through the household agricultural land, usually opt for temporary migration more frequently.

Even though underground water is abundant, there were those who had difficulties making use of it, due to inability to hand dig wells and/or marginality of their landholdings. Those generally depend on rain-fed (Athari) agriculture. They were more than others prone to economic hardships when rain was insufficient or late to come, despite the community system of cooperation and assistance. Under such conditions, these households used to rely on temporary labor migration to secure subsistence.

Shortages in means of production and household consumable goods were the more common reasons for migration. For example, when needs arise for a draught animal, a large tool or construction materials, and/or money for required consumable goods, the household resorted to migration to acquire such necessities. It was (as reported by elders) a lot easier to make use of temporary labor migration rather than part with

the household savings of crops or other possessions, such as agricultural land, in order to meet such emerging needs.

The migration strategies, however, were generally regulated by age-sex composition of the household. As such, the number and age of adult male laborers dictated the willingness and extent of use of migration. When the household had adult male laborers in excess of its domestic needs, generally, it made use of the extra labor in migration to maintain good subsistence and improve means of production, including agricultural land. On the other hand, if the household was short of adult male laborers, it ruled out migration in favor of sustaining an adequate domestic production.

Traditionally, the primary destinations of the southwestern labor migrants were the Hijaz towns of Taif and Makkah. Historically, these towns presented good opportunities for manual work all year long, but particularly during the pilgrimage season. Migrants used to engage in such manual work as construction and home delivery of drinking water (Sigayah). During the pilgrimage season, which extends for several months, there used to be good opportunities to serve the pilgrims, engage in retail trading, and sell water.

Generally, the number of a household's migrants was dependent upon the household's urgency of needs and its age-sex composition. Commonly, the elder son (eighteen years or older) and/or a younger brother of the head of household were singled out for migration. Household heads, fifty years

and younger, also used to migrate temporarily during the off-season and/or when the household had difficulties eking out its subsistence locally, and had no available adult male juniors. In other situations when the household had no adult males, as in the case of female-headed households, an elder son of a young age used to migrate. Young migrants, usually, were looked after by fellow migrants, who arranged their stay with urban families in need of a house or business helper. They used to work for a monthly pay, send remittances to their families, and stay for a full year, after which they returned home.

Migrants used to stay away for a period ranging from between six and two years, during which they took up manual work and send money and other necessities back to their families through returning migrants.

Village migrants used to travel on foot in groups of up to twenty men. It used to take them approximately three weeks. On their arrival to the destined town, they used to live together and engage in the same line of work. The duration of migration used to be variable. Depending on the migrant's "target", generally, it ranged between six months and two years. During this, the migrant used to keep in touch with his family through the stream of coming and returning migrants. The latter used to take back home remittances to the migrants' families. By the time of their return, the migrant would have saved enough money to buy a camel-load of household

essentials. Depending on needs, migration was repeated every other year.

CHAPTER FIVE

TAMNIAH, TODAY

Introduction

The larger structural changes experienced by the Saudi society have affected all areas of Saudi Arabia; the study area under consideration, Tamniah, presents no exception. But while all areas underwent dramatic changes within Saudi Arabia, these changes were filtered through different forms of social organization and value systems and thus communities exhibited different results in the way they were reconnected to the larger Saudi society. Tamniah represents but one aspect of these larger systemic changes. Prior to 1950 the study area was a relatively self-sufficient peasant community that subsisted on family farming, complemented by ruminant herding and periodic male labor migration to the Hijaz urban centers. Moreover it was a community with strong cohesive bonds visible in various forms of communal assistance, cooperation, and adherence to a set of socio-political rules and cultural mores.

Since the 1950s, however, forces of change have worked to reshape Tamniah to the degree that the social basis of subsistence was broken and bases of social class were

redefined. In light of this, older patterns of migration were reshaped and took on new meaning. While some migrants do return now, as in the past, returning to the village is predicated solely on realizing similar "life chances" present in other parts of the country.

In the following three chapters, my main concerns are to characterize the larger societal opportunities/pressures on Tamniah', how these were perceived by the villagers, and what was their outcome. Not only am I concerned about changes in migration patterns, but also with the way the community was socially and economically transformed as the older mode of subsistence and self-reliance crumbled. Furthermore, I will elaborate on exactly how structural changes refashioned the community through its impact on different types of households. Most studies related to socioeconomic changes in Saudi Arabia have thus far failed to bring into focus how these changes have differentially affected differing communities, let alone households. But to stop here still yields a partial view of Tanmiah as people--individuals-- who give social action a face. As such, I will conclude my analysis of migration with individual case studies in order that the deeper meanings of social change may become clear.

The communities of Tamniah, as previously stated, consist of six villages. According to a preliminary enumeration survey of households recently conducted by the Health Dispensary of

Tamniah, the overall population count of Tamniah communities is approximately 4,000.

My study was carried out in the community of Shahran Bani Malik, which has a total population count of 1,088 distributed among 159 households. It consists of two villages; A~l Yanfa, and Dar Othman. Based on kinship lines, spatial distribution, and dwelling types, I was able to identify five sub-divisions of the two villages;

1- A~l Yanfa, which is the traditional home of the A~l Yanfa band. It has the largest population and number of households, and is dominated by the traditional mud/stone dwelling types.
2- Dar Othman, the home of the A~l Othman band. It has lost the majority of its inhabitants to long-term migration, and many of its old dwelling units are abandoned. In the last few years, however, ten modern houses were built by young people and large extended families in the village.
3- A~l Dahmash, an extension of the old village of A~l Yanfa, which is mainly inhabited by nuclear families and low income female-headed households. It has a variety of dwelling types that range from modern construction to corrugated zinc.
4- AsSharhah, which is inhabited by two of the A~l Yanfa kinship groups. This is located about two kilometers from the rest of the community. Traditionally, it was agricultural land that was reclaimed from the slope facing Tehamma

in response to land pressure. Most of its dwellings are recently built modern houses.

5- Al-Muhalal, which is the recent extension of the two villages, and is inhabited by well to do extended and nuclear families. Except for one dwelling, the remaining houses of Al-Muhalal are recently built large modern houses (table 5.1).

TABLE 5.1
TYPES OF DWELLING BY COMMUNITY SUB-DIVISIONS OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH

Construction Type	Community sub-Divisions					Total
	A~l Yanfa	Dar Othman	A~l Dahmash	Al-Muhalal	Al-Sharhah	
Modern	23.1%	52.6%	58.3%	94.1%	75.0%	43.4%
Stone/mud	72.5%	47.4%	16.7%	5.9%	20.0%	51.6%
Corrug. zinc	0%	0%	16.7%	0%	5.0%	1.9%
Wood-roof block	1.1%	0%	8.3%	0%	0.0%	1.2%
Mixed const.	3.3%	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	1.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N=)	(91)	(19)	(12)	(17)	(20)	(159)

Community Characteristics

1- Age-Sex Distribution: Approximately sixty-three percent of inhabitants of Shahran Bani Malik are 20 years of age or younger, and only six percent of the total population are 61 years or older. The overall gender distribution is more or less equal, but with some variations between age categories, and also at the community sub-division level: 1) males slightly out-number females for the entire

community; and 2) as a result of higher incidence of male migration, females out-number males for the 21-40 age category (table 5.2).

TABLE 5.2
AGE/SEX STRUCTURE BY COMMUNITY SUB-DIVISIONS,
SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH

Age categories (years) by gender	Community sub-Division					Total	(N)
	A-l Yanfa	Dar Othm.	A-l Dahm.	Al-Mu halal	AsSha rhah		
Male							
01-20	61.2%	50.9%	78.4%	67.1%	64.9%	63.2%	(345)
21-40	14.5%	24.5%	15.7%	15.8%	13.0%	15.6%	(85)
41-60	16.3%	13.2%	5.9%	14.5%	15.6%	14.7%	(80)
> 60	8.0%	11.3%	0%	2.6%	6.5%	6.6%	(36)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
(n=)	(289)	(53)	(51)	(76)	(77)	(546)	
(Mean)	(24)	(27)	(15)	(19)	(23)	(22)	
Female							
01-20	57.5%	64.7%	61.1%	62.8%	72.4%	61.8%	(335)
21-40	20.9%	10.3%	27.8%	23.1%	16.1%	19.6%	(106)
41-60	14.7%	17.6%	8.3%	6.4%	9.2%	12.5%	(68)
> 60	7.0%	7.4%	2.8%	7.7%	2.3%	6.1%	(33)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
(n=)	(273)	(68)	(36)	(78)	(87)	(542)	
(Mean)	(24)	(24)	(20)	(22)	(18)	(23)	
Grand Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
(GR N=)	(562)	(121)	(87)	(154)	(164)	(1088)	
(GR Mean)	(24)	(26)	(17)	(20)	(20)	(22)	

2- Household Size

The majority of Shahran Bani Malik households (52%) have between 6-13 members. Extended and polygamous families, of course, are dominated by large families of up to eighteen members per family (table 5.3).

TABLE 5.3
HOUSEHOLD SIZE BY COMMUNITY SUB-DIVISIONS,
SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH

H.Hold Size	Community sub-Divisions					Total
	A~l Yanfa	Dar Othm.	A~l Dahm.	Al-Muhal.	AsSh-arhah	
1 Person	13.2	5.3	8.3	0	10.0	10.1
2--5	35.1	52.6	16.7	11.8	10.0	30.2
6--9	33.0	15.8	41.7	47.0	45.0	34.6
10--13	15.4	26.3	33.3	29.4	25.0	20.7
14--18	3.3	0	0	11.8	10.0	4.4
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N=)	(91)	(19)	(12)	(17)	(20)	(159)
(MEAN)	(8)	(8)	(9)	(11)	(10)	(9)

3- Household Types

Shahran Bani Malik presents a wide variety of household residential arrangements. These range from a single person unit to multiple-family (extended/joint) households. The nuclear family is quickly becoming the dominant residential form, and accounts for about sixty percent of the community total. There are, however, many other household forms: 1) old widows living alone constitute about ten percent, and reside mainly in old houses of A~l Yanfa; 2) single adults with dependents (mainly children) constitute about eight percent; 3) about twenty-two percent of the community households are extended families, where married sons are living with their parents. This is typical of Al-Muhalal, where parents and sons have managed to build new large houses on family-owned agricultural lands. Also, some married brothers still live in joint households, and manage their income and consumption

jointly; and 4) many middle-aged males have taken a second wife. The polygamous marriage is common among well-to-do high government officials who are 40-57 years old (table 5.4).

TABLE 5.4
HOUSEHOLD TYPES BY COMMUNITY SUB-DIVISIONS OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH

Household Type	Community sub-Division					Total	(N)
	A~l Yanfa	Dar othm.	A~l Dahm.	Muh lal	asSh-arhah		
Single adult							
Male	0	0	0	0	5.0	.6	(1)
Female	13.2	5.3	8.3	0	5.0	9.4	(15)
Male w/depend.	4.4	5.3	0	0	5.0	3.8	(6)
Female w/depend.	1.1	5.3	25.0	5.9	0	3.8	(6)
Nuclear family							
No children	6.6	0	0	0	5.0	4.4	(7)
With children	49.5	57.9	58.3	29.4	55.0	49.7	(79)
Polygamous	3.3	0	8.3	17.6	10.0	5.7	(9)
Multiple families							
Pare./Marri. Son	14.3	21.1	0	41.2	15.0	17.0	(27)
Married brothers	3.3	0	0	0	0	1.9	(3)
Pare./Marri. Sons	4.4	5.3	0	5.9	0	3.8	(6)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
(N=)	(91)	(19)	(12)	(17)	(20)	(159)	

Shahran Bani Malik and The Larger Context: Opportunities and Pressures

Prior to 1950 the community of Shahran Bani Malik was relatively independent of the outside. It thrived on a strong subsistence economy which allowed for self-imposed isolation. In addition, fear of the outside facilitated the creation of a strong socio-political organization that maintained communal cohesiveness. It did have limited contact with neighboring communities and the larger society through the necessity of

selling of surplus agricultural products and labor as well as for procuring those items the community could not produce. Nonetheless outside contact remained relatively limited due to the encompassing 'logic' of the community. This sense of isolation was also reinforced by the limited means of transportation and communication.

Contact with outside communities was not without conflicts, arising from outside incursions, animosities, and alliances. Nonetheless, outside contacts were seldom so intense as to directly threaten the basis of communal integrity. It was the relative consistency of the socioeconomic base which acted as a buffer to the outside world. This cohesiveness preserved the subsistence orientation of Bani Malik and thus channeled migration into temporary 'targets' distinguished by males who left the village intermittently for 'gainful' employment and returned when economic goals were met.

Since 1950, as is the case with most Saudi rural communities, Tamniah began to experience wide socioeconomic changes as a result of an accelerated pace of articulation with the larger society. An articulation process that was, largely, due to the state actions as it began to centralize its authority, integrate rural communities into the 'concept' of Saudi Arabia, and push for a 'modernized' economy.

The primary mechanisms through which the state has pushed for its development schemes have been formal education, provi-

sion of off-farm employment opportunities in the government service sector including the military, continuous expansion of transportation, communication, health infrastructures and facilities. Furthermore, it continued to implement extensive subsidy programs and largesse such as social security, price supports, free loans and other income supplement schemes.

While each of these schemes has its own impacts on rural communities, the spread of formal education and the creation of off-farm employment opportunities, in urban as well as rural areas, certainly have the greatest impacts. In the following sections, I will attempt to show how these two parameters have affected the socioeconomic base of the study area.

1- Introduction of Formal Education and its Impacts on the Community

Prior to 1948 Tamniah had no formal schools, although informal education was in existence since the beginning of this century. A traditional teacher from the nearby village of A~l Ali used to teach male youngsters reading and writing skills to read Quran. This was, however, very limited. Only those who could afford to pay the teacher took advantage of the opportunity. The school was set up into three short sessions in order to accommodate the household labor/production needs. The youngsters were split between morning and afternoon sessions. A third session was also organized for male elders in the evening after the day's work was done. In this way, the school did not interfere with the household's

productive activities, nor did it alter the bases of household economic activities. As such, it never qualified the learners for off-farm employment, e.g., a government job.

After 1940 the state began its campaign for universal formal education. In 1948 the government sent Tamniah its first teacher to establish formal schooling. In the beginning schooling was non-compulsory and restricted to boys for the learning of the Quran. At best this enabled students to master basic reading and writing skills. Soon after this the curriculum expanded to include western-styled subjects to suit a rapidly expanding government-planned economy.

Initially only those who could afford to part with their children's labor were able to send their children to school. Ten years later, however, the situation changed as the number of teachers increased and the curriculum further expanded to cover six years of elementary schooling. With the help of the As'Sha'f state representative (Amir), the school principal led a campaign to enroll most school-age boys so that attendance became socially compulsory.

The following analysis, more or less, is based on qualitative data. As such the existing empirical data, unfortunately, does not fully facilitate proper quantitatively based description and analysis of formal education at the community level prior to the year 1970.

The initial and most devastating impact of schooling for the household was the loss of labor. Households felt its

impact differently according to their class location and attendant priorities and resources. While most households viewed schooling as an investment for their children and ultimately for the entire household, they responded differently due to differential access to immediate means of production. In order to fully comprehend these different reactions, it is necessary to stratify the community into the following four qualitative classes which more or less represented the class structure of the community prior to 1950. This captures the various perceptions of education and the underlying meanings attached to it.

The first class consists of households with better resource endowments. Those with better land and sufficient labor (i.e., redundant labor) tended to be 'wealthier' and were able to release excess labor. This class comprised the head of the tribe (Sheikh), his immediate kin, and the larger kinship groups, who managed their farming operations jointly and thus combined labor resources. It was this group-cum-class as a matter of fact who first asked for the school and enrolled their school-age boys when the school finally opened. Later they were able to send their children for post-elementary schooling in Abha.

The second group, in contrast to the first, consists of the less fortunate families. Foremost among these were households with inadequate land and labor resources, primarily female headed households with young children, and orphans.

This group subsisted through sharecropping, community assistance and/or temporary migration of male members. They saw in children's education a chance of life-improvement. In a marked difference from the first group, children of the second group, on the main, were not able to pursue post-elementary education, and instead were forced into immediate but less rewarding employment in the government as their aging elders became unable to continue providing for the household. Orphans, however, present a different case. Soon after they became teenagers, they out-migrated and were able to combine self-subsidence in urban jobs and schooling.

The third group, which was not fully enthused by the prospect of losing child labor, had a successful self-sufficient domestic production. Their children (especially teenagers) were an integral part of the family production success. They were thus unable to fully commit to the idea of child schooling. As such, they usually became satisfied with sending one child to school and for elementary schooling only. An inspection of enrollment records of the school during the first ten years shows heavy drop-outs among this group. Only a few were able to graduate from elementary. The common reasons for dropping-out of school, as documented in the school's records, are lack of interest on the part of children, continued absence from school, and/or the guardian's wish.

The last group were those who engaged primarily in pastoralism but also maintained a small farming operation. The

creation of a 'modern' school had a profound impact on their mode of existence. Not only did they lose the labor from their children for most of the year, but they also were forced to shorten their annual (winter) migration to Tehamma in order to accommodate the demands of the school schedule. Still, some of them who were accustomed to migrating in the immediate vicinity of Tamniah in search of better grazing areas found that they were now compelled to settle permanently in the village. While not giving up herding altogether, nevertheless they were forced to minimize it and combine it with new livelihood strategies. For some who had insufficient land and/or labor, frequent migration by the household head or an adult male member became the alternative household subsistence strategy. Not only did their instances of migration increase, but also the duration. Earlier instances of migration were characterized by short migration durations of six months or less to the urban centers of Taif and Makkah. Clearly migration represented a viable strategy to complement their domestic production. From 1960 onward, however, migration became more frequent, for longer durations, and eventually led to long term migration of entire families.

While impacts of the school remained at the cost side for the first ten-fifteen years, those who bore the cost began to reap its benefits. As soon as their schooled teenagers reached working age they became eligible for good-paying off-farm jobs. An inspection of the available cross-sectional data

clearly points to the importance of eduction credentials as the main qualifying criteria for the type and quality of employment gained by household working members (table 5.5). Generally, all those who obtained at least six years of schooling were able to find full employment in the government bureaucracy and the military as government clerks, officers, and soldiers. These jobs pay in the range between 4,000 and 6,000 Saudi Riyal monthly. As for those who completed nine years of schooling or higher, they were able to land better-paying jobs as teachers and high administrative officials. Their monthly salary ranges between 6,000 and 10,000 SR.

As eduction began to pay dividends in the forms of good-paying jobs for those who invested in it, the people of Tamniah became committed to their childrens' education. In this respect they began to organize daily transportation to Abha for intermediate school students as soon as the government constructed paved roads connecting Sha'af Shahran with Abha and Khamis Mushait in 1965. Moreover, they hectored the Ministries of Education into locating an intermediate school for boys and elementary school for girls in Tamniah. They eventually succeeded and the schools were opened in 1970 and 1972 respectively. Later in 1981, they succeeded in obtaining an intermediate school for girls.

Today, Tamniah and the nearby communities of Sha'af Shahran are provided with educational facilities for all levels of schooling except college. Important among these are

high schools for each gender, male and female adult education programs, and a post-intermediate female teacher-training program.

2- Off-Farm Employment and Subsistence Production

The state efforts to build its apparatus especially the bureaucracy and the military forces began to attract the young adult males of the rural population since the early years of the 1960s. This attraction of better economic opportunities forged by education credentials quickly became the deciding force for the transition from subsistence agriculture to non-agricultural off-farm employment. As such, it became easier for young adult males to opt for government jobs that are less demanding and have better economic returns than subsistence farming. In addition, this shift to off-farm employment was further fueled by the emergence of cash needs to meet the demands of the 'modernizing' economy. Under the new circumstances, rural households felt the need for a stable monetary income.

While off-farm employment opportunities opened up during the late 1950s, its full impact was felt later when oil revenues suddenly burgeoned after 1973, and the government was in a position to pursue a full range of economic growth, both at the national and regional levels. It expanded its bureaucracy, engaged in a wide scale of infrastructure build-up, and was able to create full employment opportunities for most Saudi males in the service sector both in urban centers and

rural areas, regardless of education credentials.

The ramifications of the shifts to off-farm employment are great, both at the household and the community levels as well as for domestic production and migration.

At the household level, acquisition of government employment by household members resulted in instant economic prosperity, changes in livelihood strategies, and future priorities. Household income, of course, became directly tied to the number and quality of off-farm employments landed by each household. As we can see in the following table there are great variations in household income: 1) more than 44 percent of the community households acquire annual income of 45 thousands Saudi Riyal or less. This translates into about 2,500 SR monthly, which generally approximates payments of low ladder (manual) government jobs; 2) widows and female headed households procure the least annual income. Typically, these depend on social security and relatives for support; and 3) as a result of income pooling, multi-family households are among the highest income groups (table 5.5).

TABLE 5.5
HOUSEHOLD TYPE BY ANNUAL INCOME (1,000 SR), SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH

Household Type	H.Hold Annual Income				Total	(N)
	≤ 15	16-45	46-95	≥ 96		
Single adult						
Male	0	100%	0	0	100%	(1)
Female	86.7	13.3	0	0	100%	(15)
Male with dependents	16.7	50.0	33.3	0	100%	(6)
Female with depend.	83.3	0	0	16.7	100%	(6)
Nuclear family						
No children	57.1	28.6	14.3	0	100%	(7)
With children	7.6	36.7	36.7	19.0	100%	(79)
Polygamous	0	0	22.2	77.8	100%	(9)
Multiple families						
Parents & married son	0	11.1	44.4	44.4	100%	(27)
Married brothers	0	33.3	0	66.7	100%	(3)
Parents & married sons	0	16.7	0	83.3	100%	(6)
Total	18.2	26.4	28.9	26.4	100%	
(N=)	(29)	(42)	(46)	(42)	(159)	

Due to the rise and steadiness of household income as a result of off-farm employment, family agricultural production kept declining. Besides losing the most able laborers to off-farm employment, subsistence agriculture lost its importance as a resource generator. Depending on the number and kind of employment secured by each household, agricultural production became confined to one piece of land (5% of an acre), and almost exclusively worked by elder males. For instance, in 1987 only 4.2 percent of the community males engaged in farming activities. Of those, only seventeen percent were below the age of 61 years, which further indicates the declining importance of agriculture in the household income-generating activities (table 5.6).

TABLE 5.6
WORK STATUS BY EDUCATION OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH
AGES ABOVE 15 YEARS OLD

Work status	Education						Total	(N)
	Illiterate	Read/write	Elementary	Intermediate	High school	College		
Non-labor force								
Retired	5.1%	0%	0%	1.1%	0%	0%	2.8%	(15)
Unemployed	8.0%	4.9%	4.6%	4.6%	0%	0%	5.7%	(31)
School	0%	9.8%	40.0%	73.7%	37.7%	0%	21.2%	(115)
Housewife	60.9%	4.9%	18.5%	2.3%	0%	0%	33.9%	(184)
Self-employed								
Agriculture	8.0%	2.4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	4.2%	(23)
Business	2.1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1.1%	(6)
Government								
Service job	15.9%	53.7%	12.3%	0%	0%	0%	13.7%	(74)
Military/police	0%	19.5%	4.6%	9.2%	1.9%	0%	3.7%	(20)
Clerk	0%	2.4%	15.4%	8.0%	24.5%	10.0%	6.1%	(33)
Teaching	0%	0%	1.5%	1.1%	32.1%	65.0%	5.9%	(32)
High adminst. job	0%	2.4%	3.1%	0%	3.8%	25.0%	1.7%	(9)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
(N=)	(276)	(41)	(65)	(87)	(53)	(20)	(542)	

Another salient aspect of the shift to off-farm employment is the decline of female participation in out-of-home economic activities. Only about five percent of the community adult females are working outside the house. Those are elder females working as doorwomen and servants in girls schools and the health dispensary, and female elementary school teachers. As for female participation in farming activities, it amounts to zero percent (table 5.7).

As subsistence production declined, the household lost its dominance as the basic unit of production. Consequently, the encompassing 'logic' of the traditional household structure was undermined and household morphology began to change. The earlier pattern of multi-generation (extended) households lost its prominence to the nuclear family households (see table 5.3).

The sudden openings of off-farm employment for household's adult male members have, also, changed the household's future priorities. As such, the household no longer needs to control its adult juniors in order to consolidate its labor resources and meet the requirements of domestic production. As a result, most adult male juniors who migrated to urban areas, became independent of their natal households were able to pursue different economic opportunities, and establish households of their own.

TABLE 5.7
WORK STATUS BY SEX OF FOUR AGE GROUPS OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK, TAMNIAH

	Male				Female				Total
	Age				Age				
Work status	16-30	31-45	46-60	> 61	16-30	31-45	46-60	> 61	
None									
Retired	0	0	1.6	11.1	.7	0	0	27.3	2.8%
Unemployed	3.7	2.0	0	0	17.6	0	3.9	0	5.7%
School	57.9	0	0	0	39.0	0	0	0	21.2%
Housewife	0	0	0	0	39.0	98.5	82.4	69.7	33.9%
Self-employed									
Agriculture	0	0	6.5	52.8	0	0	0	0	4.2%
Business	0	0	6.5	5.6	0	0	0	0	1.1%
Government									
Service job	1.9	20.0	67.7	30.6	0	1.5	13.7	3.0	13.7%
Military/police	10.3	12.0	4.8	0	0	0	0	0	3.7%
Clerk	15.0	26.0	4.8	0	0	0	0	0	5.9%
Teaching	9.3	28.0	4.8	0	3.7	0	0	0	5.9%
High admin. job	1.9	12.0	3.2	0	0	0	0	0	1.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N=)	(107)	(50)	(62)	(36)	(136)	(67)	(51)	(33)	(542)

At the community level, the deterioration of subsistence production has resulted in the disappearance of communal labor, and declines in co-operation and assistance among villagers. Consequently, the community no longer functions as an independent unit politically, socially, and economically. Besides the socioeconomic changes, the state's actions, undoubtedly, have contributed greatly to the new situation. As the government began to provide free services on a wide scale and establish its socio-political institutions in rural areas, local units lost their prominence. In this respect, the head of tribe (Sheikh) and council of elders, who used to be in charge of the socio-political process, lost all their functions except for mere formalities. Under the new order the state institutions took charge of education, health, social services, civil order, and judicial functions. No longer is the head of the tribe able to act with much power on the community political, social, and economic affairs.

Perhaps the most salient aspects of the new socio-economic order at the community level are the undermining of older bases of social class. Under the older kinship-based system the bases of social class differentiation which persisted for centuries in Arabia's settled communities were:

1- Resource Endowment: land and labor used to constitute the primary household resources and, thus were among the indicators of the household class location in local communities. Inter-household variations in size of land and

labor, however, were never great. On one hand, variations in size of land were kept in check by an inheritance-based land tenure system, availability of water resources, limited technology, and existing topography. All these parameters had restricted any noticeable land consolidation. This was especially true in land-deficient mountain regions of southwest Arabia, where expansion of agricultural land was only possible through construction of man-made terraces. For instance, about eighty five percent of households of Shahran Bani Malik own between two and ten pieces of agricultural land with an average size of 160 square meter for each piece, and only three percent own more than ten pieces. Labor, on the other hand, always varies from one generation to the next according to the dictates of demography and household composition. Traditionally, the household compensated for labor deficiencies through communal labor, joint-farming, and share-cropping.

Resource endowment was seldom so variable as to permit a clear class differentiation at the local community level. Also, community-instituted assistance, cooperation, and sharing of crops lessened resource gaps between households still further.

2- Tribal and Band Affiliation: traditionally, the tribe had been the main fixture for community membership and the organizing socio-political form that dominated the segmented societies of Arabia. The community of Shahran Bani

Malik, being no-exception, exclusively consists of one tribe. Within the community social class variations are not very pronounced, partially due to the prevailing ideology of these kinship-based solipsistic units, but most importantly due to the underlying 'logic' of the subsistence mode of production and social relation of production. When social class differentiations do exist, they were also based on kinship affiliations. For instance, the community under study consists of six kinship groups (or bands). Each has its own representative in the council of elders. While in no way can they be considered as distinct strata, the relative prosperity and sheer size of each group, however, do contribute to the social location of its members.

3- Seniority and Gender: At the individual level, social stratification in the patriarchal tribal groups of Arabia are based on seniority and gender. In this respect, male elders of the household have the upper status and control the household's resources and vital decisions for production, distribution, migration, and marriage. The working male juniors come second and usually are in charge of production activities in the field. Female-elders comprise the third status group. Except for some control over their junior females (daughters and daughters-in-law), they have limited input in what goes on inside or outside their respective households. The fourth and much despised group is female juniors. Daughters and daughters-in-law are

usually the most controlled and over-worked group in the household (and the community as well). Besides fully participating in domestic agriculture, they must do all housework chores, bring house needs of water and fire wood, and of course bear children. They also have little say about choice of a marriage partner.

In summary, we can safely conclude that the traditional rural communities of Arabia are principally demarcated by territorial tribalism, and their social organization are based upon kinship ties and tribal affiliation. Their economic units (households) are small, and their technology is simple. Land consolidation and capital accumulation are weak and always kept in check by institutional means. This, however, does not nullify attempts to stratify such communities into social classes. Based on resource endowments, political power, and (ideological) prestige, one may be able to sketch out four qualitatively different social classes of the households in the traditional community of Shahran Bani Malik: 1) the head of tribe, his kin, and the council of elders comprise one social class; 2) the second social class encompasses the community male-headed member households; 3) the third class is comprised of female-headed and orphans households; 4) non-tribe in-migrant households are at the bottom of the social class ladder. Those are still considered non-community members. As such, they seldom have land ownership rights, except through sale, do not participate in the community

affairs, never inter-marry with community members, and are always considered the lowest status group regardless of resource endowments. This last group consists of three families, whose forefathers moved in during late 1890s. Each of the three families used to specialize in one (socially demeaning) craft such as carpentry, blacksmith, and leather crafting.

The new socioeconomic changes gave birth to new social categories, and as local communities relinguished their power to the central government, the stratifying measures so characteristic of traditional communities began to lose their importance, and are only maintained as a part of value systems. Here, we must point to the difficulties of developing a robust measure of social stratification that is appropriate for our particular setting in Saudi Arabia.

Social stratification analyses, for the most part, have been developed by Western sociologists for purposes of identifying social strata in industrialized societies, particularly urban classes. It is generally based on a type of measure, whereby individuals, families, or social groups are ranked on a scale. According to Davis and Moore (1945), individuals in society must be assigned a place in the social structure, which is constituted by differential prestige of various positions in society. Such conceptualization poses many problems, which are related to: 1) the bases of the prestige of any social position; 2) the subjectivity of such

bases; and 3) the problem of reconciling conflicts between indices of stratification.

Typically, income, education, occupation, religion, and ethnic background of head of household are the main indices of social stratification. While such measures may suffice in most urban settings of industrialized societies, they are inadequate measures of social class in developing agrarian-based societies.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, where rural communities are going through a transitional phase, the older subsistence mode of production lost its importance, and gave way to a money economy. Consequently, the older bases of stratification are in direct conflict with those of the new order. In this respect, education, occupation, and income began to share relevance with gender, patriarchy, and tribal affiliation, which for long have constituted the bases of stratification.

The new indicators have somewhat rearranged the picture of social status in Tamniah., i.e. they negatively impacted the status of illiterate male elders, especially, the head of tribe and clan leaders, whose social status has fallen as a result of losing their political power within the community and outside. The recent changes raised the status of educated younger adult tribal male members who hold good-paying government jobs. Not has only their income risen, but more importantly their association with the government has given them proper connections within the regional government to

constantly improve the community facilities of education, health, and transportation. Furthermore, high administrative officials are in a position to help other community members finding employment in the government sector.

The positions of other groups of similar qualifications, such as educated females and children of non-tribal families, have not changed drastically. An example that comes to mind is that of the leather-crafting family. As discussed earlier, this family was always treated as a low-status family due to its non-tribal membership, and more importantly, to its engagements in the (socially demeaning) leather crafting.

When formal education became available, this family sent its three sons to school. Two of them graduated from high school and the third completed a college education. The high school graduates hold good-paying government jobs. The college graduate became the principal of Tamniah intermediate school, which is a prestigious and influential position.

Needless to say, the family became one of the richest group in the community as a result of the high annual income (280,000 SR) from government jobs and investments in real estate. On the personal level the status of the three sons, especially the school principal, have ascended. But, due to vestiges of the older stratification system, the family was, tacitly, denied marriage partners for its sons, and was forced to look outside the territory of the Shahran tribe. Again the

reasons are not so much tribal affiliation, but the fact that the family is identified with leather-crafting.

A second problem of developing a good measure of household social status is related to the choice of the individual representing the household. As mentioned above, most social stratification studies use attributes of the household head, such as education, occupation, and income to position the household in a social stratum. In the case of Tamniah this becomes problematic. A high percentage of the community household heads are illiterate male elders, who engage in low status government manual jobs with minimum pay. These indices, however, do not necessarily reflect the true socioeconomic status of their respective households. As a result of universalized education and the continued need for educated people to fill government positions, many households have younger adult members who are educated, hold important government jobs, and receive high salaries.

It thus becomes clear that, unless we combine attributes of household members, and yet control for household size and composition, any scale we develop will not truly reflect the household's socioeconomic status.

Conclusions and Implications

In this chapter, with the help of community and household data, we attempted to qualitatively and quantitatively measure the impacts of recent socioeconomic changes upon Shahran Bani Malik. In a span of less than 30 years, the community was transformed from an agricultural-based, self-sufficient community into a community subsisting on government jobs and aid programs.

The introduction of formal education and the sudden expansion of off-farm government jobs hastened the transition from subsistence agriculture into a 'modern' money economy. Today, every household in Tamniah subsists directly or indirectly on government jobs, and/or assistance.

Beside the great changes in mode of subsistence, the community experienced wide changes socially and politically: 1) as the state took over, the community ceased to exist as an independent socio-political unit; 2) communal cooperation and assistance, while they did not disappear, have declined markedly, and lost their 'logic' of continuity as the state established its social security program; 3) as family agriculture lost its importance in the household sustenance strategies, the encompassing 'logic' of the traditional large multi-generation household began to dissipate, leading to an accelerated pace of nuclearization of the family, and the breaking up of extended households, especially those of migrant members.

As I will try to show in the following two chapters, migration was greatly impacted by the new socioeconomic changes. As such, the older pattern of temporary male labor migration was abandoned in favor of long-term and semi-permanent moves by entire families, as their providers were able to obtain full employment with the state in urban centers and regional towns.

CHAPTER SIX

THE CHANGING NATURE OF MIGRATION: THE CASE OF TAMNIAH

The great socioeconomic changes within Saudi society during the last three decades were paralleled by new mobility patterns, as evidenced by massive population movements, and an accelerated process of urbanization. Similar population movements, of course, have occurred in other developing societies, but the Saudi case represents a unique situation. In most third world countries the redistribution of population is generally a concomitant of industrialization and the incorporation of rural economies into the world economy. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the state's development schemes deliberately encouraged "modernization" and centralization. These state policies proved to be extremely influential factors in establishing the pattern of population movement.

Since becoming fiscally independent, as a result of huge oil revenues, the Saudi state emerged as the single most dominant agent of change in this once nomadic society. It acquired the economic power to design national development schemes that were in line with its own purposes, thus, the state furthered its hegemony. For various reasons, the state's emphasis was on advancing urban-oriented development, which

eventuated in regional and sectoral imbalances, including a continued decline of the traditional sectors. As noted in earlier chapters, formal education, the creation of inflated government-driven job markets, and the institution of income subsidies, price supports, and loans, were the state's most effective means to bring about the structural transformation and integration of the once segmented Saudi society.

The ramifications of these development policies on mobility patterns and migration streams have been far reaching and may have gone beyond their intended objectives. As such, the state's efforts to bring about societal integration, encourage tribal pacification, and make possible centralization of authority have resulted in an urban-oriented system of formal education, an occupational structure that is dominated by civil service jobs, extremely rapid urban growth, and a general neglect of the rural sector. Agriculture, never strong in Saudi Arabia, was even more weakened, and a new pattern of movement out of the rural countryside was set in motion, replacing the older pattern of seasonal labor migration.

This chapter aims to establish; 1) a clear characterization of the rural community migration patterns in the past; 2) how and why this traditional pattern was abandoned and subsequently replaced by a new pattern of geographic and social mobility; and 3) what the impacts have been of this new

pattern both at the community and the household levels. Let me explain:

First, I will characterize the older pattern of migration which had persisted for the longer part of Tamniah known history. My data are from in-depth interviews of seventy-five randomly selected households in the community of Shahran Bani Malik, Tamniah. Both quantitative and qualitative information are used to explain these patterns. I will attempt to document all past instances of migration by household members who currently reside in the village. These instances total to 235 migrations, some of which date back to 1940. We have information about date, duration, destination, and reason for each migration instance as well as the age and sex of each migrant. These data, of course, are skewed toward the older household male members, particularly the heads of households, because they have lived longer than younger members of the community and had more time to migrate, therefore multiple migration instances are common. Hence, we control the period of migration, which enables consideration of the factorial shifts in migration strategies.

Second, I will describe and analyze the more recent patterns of migration, which emerged during the last twenty-five years, but particularly after 1972. For this purpose I will use the following sources of information:

A- Information about migrant family members in seventy-five households that I surveyed. This includes socio-demographic

information as well as the dates, destinations, length of out-migrations, and reasons for migration of each individual migrant in the selected households. Also, data were collected on each migrant's ties to his/her natal family, such as, frequency of visits to the village, presence and type of economic ties (remittances/help) between the migrant and the natal household.

B- A second data set is the outcome of the researcher's attempt to document as best as possible the rest of the community migrants. For this purpose, I worked with key community and migrant informants. While I was quite successful in gathering sufficient socio-demographic and migration data about male migrants (N=111), this was not the case for female migrants. Even though, indirectly, I was able to note more than 100 cases of female migrants, I was not able to acquire comparable information on them. The realities of Saudi culture create enormous difficulties for a male field researcher to obtain reliable information about females, even if we are simply talking about migration pattern. Moreover, most male informants typically express great displeasure when asked any questions pertaining to women. So, I am forced to refer only to those females for whom I had some information and which I regarded as reasonably valid, because it was reported by relatives. This limitation, of course, restricts my analysis and comparisons to male migrants, but nonetheless

sufficient information on female migrants was gathered to venture a reasonable discussion of their attributes.

C- A third source of information on migration is from in-depth interviews of a sample of fifty-one male migrants drawn from the documented 169 male migrants. I located these migrants and talked with them at their place of destination. While my sampling was intended to be random, the difficulty of tracing and finding all of the documented male migrants made it impossible to attain randomness. Instead, I was forced to do a "convenience sample"; all migrants whom I was able to trace were interviewed. The purpose of these in-depth interviews was to get a first hand account from migrants on their decision to migrate, why they migrated, and what the consequences of migration were for the individual migrant and his family. These data will be discussed in a following chapter in conjunction with case studies.

Third, I will compare migrants and non-migrants in order to gain a better understanding of causes and consequences of migration. Furthermore, I will explore the impacts of recent migration patterns on the rural households, family networks and, in general, the areas of origin and destination.

My purpose in gathering information on migrants was not so much to quantify the pattern of rural community migration, as it was to be able to describe and explain changes in the community of Shahran Bani Malik over the years, why these

changes occurred, and to hypothesize (infer) from my findings some implications relative to these processes and conditions in similar rural communities in Saudi Arabia.

Declining Importance of Subsistence Agriculture, and Temporary Migration

Prior to the recent structural transformations of Saudi society, the migration strategies characteristic of people in Tamniah's peasant communities were quite different in type, duration and causes than they are now. Except for a handful of households, whose adult males used to specialize in trade, most Tamniah communities, particularly those of Shahran, had mainly used migration as a way to fulfill shortages in their household's subsistence and production needs. Aided by a dependable, traditional economy, co-operation in the use of labor, and mutual assistance among villagers, the community had managed to avoid the necessity of large-scale out-migration. Up until the 1950s, temporary labor migration was the norm. This was, more or less, a form of "target" migration, where the household, periodically, dispatched one or more of its adult male members to the Hijaz towns to seek 'gainful' employment and to bring back to the household various essentials for production and subsistence. No permanent migration of individuals or of whole families had occurred prior to 1950. Thus, a primary reason for the earlier pattern of migration was to reinforce subsistence agriculture. Migration was seldom used as a desirable strategy for survival.

As subsistence production began to lose its basis of continuity, so did temporary labor migration. Since the early 1960s, temporary labor migration began to decline markedly, giving way to new permanent and semi-permanent types of migration. This was probably due to a re-orientation of, and certainly associated with, the livelihood strategies among rural households in response to inducements emanating from the 'modern' sector. In this respect, the requisites of formal education and off-farm employment played a key role in the shifting of migration patterns. Both necessitated longer durations of being away and, eventually, led to the permanent residential relocation of migrating individuals and families.

Now, let me attempt to show how migration strategies shifted in the community of Shahran Bani Malik, and how individual migrants became totally oriented toward semi-permanent and permanent moves away from the community.

As indicated, my analysis utilizes data from seventy-five randomly selected households. The information includes migration experiences of household male members who currently reside in Tamniah. Their migration experiences were tabulated as instances of migration (table 6.1). Clearly, these instances are skewed toward over-representing the migration of older males (41 years and older). Older men; 1) have experienced a longer period of potential migration; 2) and, consequently, are more likely to have had multiple instances of migration (table 6.1). The data set, however, is useful for

the description and analysis of the shifts in migration pattern in terms of duration, destination, and reason for migration. The unit of observation, of course, is 'instance' of migration rather than the individual migrant. As such, all of the comparisons are centered on these instances across time.

TABLE 6.1
INSTANCES OF OUT-MIGRATION FROM TAMNIAH BY CURRENT HOUSEHOLD MALE MEMBERS BY YEAR OF MIGRATION AND PRESENT AGE

Present age of the male member	Year of migration instance			Total	(N)
	1973-85	1958-72	pre-1958		
16-20 years	33.3%	66.7%	0%	100.0%	(3)
21-40 years	71.4%	28.6%	0%	100.0%	(28)
41-60 years	3.2%	57.7%	39.1%	100.0%	(156)
≥ 61 years	2.9%	14.3%	82.9%	100.0%	(35)
Total	12.2%	47.3%	40.5%	100.0%	
(N=)	(27)	(105)	(90)	(222)	

As stated earlier, the older pattern of migration was characterized by short duration, where male migrants typically sought manual work in the Hijaz towns of Taif and Makkah. This pattern was the dominant type prior to 1958. As such, it accounts for more than ninety percent of migration instances during that time.

By the year 1958, however, temporary migration began to decline:

First, temporary migration of six months and less lost its dominance to a longer duration (six months to two years)

migration type. The general decline of subsistence production was behind this shift in migration duration. As a result of increased demands on cash, the continued declines of communal labor, and losses of a vital labor source due to schools, the majority of the community households were no longer able to meet their subsistence needs through domestic production. Subsequently, they were forced into a new migration type, where their migrant members had to anticipate a longer period of residence elsewhere, and the obligation to send back remittances for the household's basic needs. This was very typical of the 1960s before the community, eventually, was able to re-orient its livelihood strategies toward the 'modern' sectors of the economy (table 6.2).

TABLE 6.2
INSTANCES OF OUT-MIGRATION FROM TAMNIAH BY CURRENT HOUSEHOLD MALE MEMBERS BY YEAR OF MIGRATION AND DURATION OF MOVE

Duration of move	Year of migration instance			Total	(N)
	1973-85	1958-72	pre-1958		
< 6 months	0%	37.1%	51.1%	38.3%	(85)
6-23 months	22.2%	42.9%	40.0%	39.2%	(87)
2-6 years	59.3%	12.4%	5.6%	15.3%	(34)
> 6 years	18.5%	7.6%	3.3%	7.2%	(16)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	
(N=)	(27)	(105)	(90)	(222)	

Second, the year 1973 marked the end of the older migration pattern. No longer did the community members migrate temporarily (six months and less) and/or seek manual work. Since then, a longer duration of migration of two years or

more came to dominate. This type was associated with the pursuit of education and urban government jobs (table 6.3).

Third, the year 1961 marked the beginning of family out-migration. This was directly related to the continued declines of subsistence agriculture, and the presence of off-farm employment, and educational opportunities in the major urban centers of the country. While government jobs began to surface during mid-1950s, their real impacts on migration became profound from the mid-1960s and onward, when family migration started to become more common.

TABLE 6.3
INSTANCES OF OUT-MIGRATION FROM TAMNIAH BY CURRENT HOUSEHOLD MALE MEMBERS BY YEAR OF MIGRATION AND REASON FOR MIGRATION

Reason for migration	Year of migration instance			Total	(N)
	1973-85	1958-72	pre-1958		
Government job	33.3%	20.0%	4.4%	15.3%	(34)
Manual work	0%	69.5%	93.3%	70.7%	(157)
Studying	48.1%	8.6%	1.1%	10.4%	(23)
Accomp. Family	18.5%	1.9%	1.1%	3.6%	(8)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	
(N=)	(27)	(105)	(90)	(222)	

Fourth, as a consequence of family out-migration, females began to migrate for the first time to urban areas after 1958. Before that time females had not migrated outside Tamniah, except for a few whose families used to subsist on ruminant herding. The few reported instances of female migration show that females started to migrate only after 1958, and par-

ticularly after 1972. These few instances point to the fact that females move in company of their families. In few instances, young females, who had migrated to continue schooling, lived with close relatives (grand parents or a married brother).

In summary, the period between 1958 and 1972 witnessed a transitional phase between two migration patterns. The first, so characteristic of subsistence-geared communities, was dominated by temporary male labor migration. This was followed by a transitional phase, as the community began to adjust to the impulses of socioeconomic changes of the larger Saudi society. And as these wider socioeconomic changes took full force after 1972, Tamniah communities completed the transition from subsistence production to the 'modern' money economy. Consequently, migration strategies became channeled into long term and permanent types. And while some migrants do return now as in the past, returning to the village is predicated solely on realizing similar economic opportunities present in other parts of the country. In the following section, with the use of data from migrants, we will detail as best as possible the new migration pattern, and its impacts on the study area.

Recent Migration Trends

During the last thirty years, waves of long-term migration from Tamniah increased and led to the residential relocation of approximately half the population of the community of

Shahran Bani Malik. The new migration trend, in contrast to the older pattern of temporary male labor migration, is characterized by out-migration of families. As a result, more than 144 families of Shahran Bani Malik have moved to larger towns and cities in the span of thirty years. In congruity with the socioeconomic changes and the concomitant declines of subsistence production, waves of out-migration started during the late 1950s, and increased during the mid-70s and early 1980s.

Before proceeding with a discussion of this recent migration trend, it is pertinent that we take into account the source of information. This will enable us to note biases and deficiencies related to each data set and, more importantly, to guard against erroneous pooling of information from these different sources.

As mentioned earlier, information was obtained from three sources:

1- The first data set, which contains information on eighty-six migrants, was gathered from a randomly selected sample of seventy-five households in the community of Shahran Bani Malik. This group will be referred to as group one (male) and group two (females). Here, males out-number females by a two to one (table 6.4). The reasons for the huge differential are not so much the under-reporting of female migrants, but more as a result of: 1) a higher incidence of migration by single males, who account for twenty-

seven percent of migrant males of the group, compared to only 3.6 percent of single female migrants. This is consistent with the general pattern in Saudi Arabia, where single females seldom move out of the natal household, except under some circumstances, such as when parents get divorced and their children must move with other relatives, say, grand parents; 2) a higher percentage of adult daughters (23%) who are reported to be living outside these households are still living in Tamniah and its vicinity compared to zero percent of adult male children. For that reason, those females were not counted as migrants; and 3) in the community of Shahran Bani Malik, it was found that sons out-number daughters by about eight percent. The reason for this may be the effect of a higher rate of female infant mortality in the past due to the relative neglect of female children prior to the introduction of modern health utilities and the improvements in nutrition.

2- The second data set was assembled with the help of key community and migrant informants. This set contains information on the rest of the community's male migrants (N=111), who will be referred to as group three. Attempts to collect data on female migrants, was to no avail and not worthwhile. As such, informants were reluctant to talk about non-relative females, and when they were pressed to do so, they were not certain of most of the information. For this reason, no females were included in this data set.

A closer inspection of this data set reveals that informants only reported male migrants who are 21 years of age and older, and they also neglected to report single males living with their out-migrating families. As such, single male migrants account only for eight percent of the second group (table 6.4).

TABLE 6.4
MARITAL STATUS AND AGE, COMPARING THREE STUDY GROUPS OF MIGRANTS

Current age and marital status	Migrant study group			Total	(N)
	Group one (male)	Group two (female)	Group three (male)		
Single					
18-20 years	8.6%	3.6%	0%	3.0%	(6)
21-40 Years	19.0%	0%	8.1%	10.2%	(20)
Married					
18-20 years	1.7%	21.4%	0%	3.6%	(7)
21-40 years	39.7%	39.3%	44.1%	42.1%	(83)
41-60 years	25.9%	32.1%	33.3%	31.5%	(61)
Over 60 years	5.2%	0%	14.4%	9.6%	(19)
Widowed					
41-60 years	0%	3.6%	0%	.5%	(1)
Total (N=)	100% (58)	100% (28)	100% (111)	100% (197)	

3- The third data set was gathered through in-depth interviews conducted in the major destination towns. These interviews contain detailed information on fifty-one of the documented 169 male migrants. This data set is intended for in-depth analysis of migration in the following chapter.

In sum, the total count of community out-migrants is 197. Of those, males account for more than eighty-five percent. By no means is this an indication of the total number of the com-

munity's migrants since: 1) spouses of married male migrants, who are exclusively from the community of Shahran Bani Malik, are not included except for twenty-six female migrants; 2) all migrant children of the second group, who are under 20 years of age, are not included.

Further inspection of the first and second data sets also reveals the following:

1- Of all married male and female migrants, 96.4 percent had migrated with their spouses and children.

2- Of all male migrants who were reported by non-relative informants, only twenty-six percent still have close relatives (spouse, children, parents, and siblings) in the village (table 6.5). This further strengthens our assertion that today's migration trend is typified by family out-migration.

TABLE 6.5
MIGRANT'S CLOSEST RELATIVES IN VILLAGE, COMPARING THREE STUDY GROUPS

Closest relatives of migrant in Village	Migrant study group			Total
	Group one (male)	Group two (female)	Group three (male)	
Spouse/children	6.9%	0%	2.7%	3.6%
Parents/siblings	48.3%	75.0%	7.2%	28.9%
Siblings	25.9%	25.0%	16.2%	20.3%
Others	19.0%	0%	65.8%	42.6%
Unknown	0%	0%	8.1%	4.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N=)	(58)	(28)	(111)	(197)

Destination of Migration

As a consequence of the socioeconomic changes and the concomitant declines of subsistence production, waves of out-migration from the community of study started during the 1950s and accelerated after 1971. As such, more than seventy-three percent of the documented community migrants reportedly out-migrated after 1971.

Four factors were (and continue to be) the main determinants of a migrant's choice of destination. These are: proximity to the village; past community knowledge; availability of education and job opportunities; and presence of relatives and fellow villagers. As we can see from the following table, regional towns of the Southwest have attracted more than sixty-five percent of the documented migrants, followed by the Hijaz region, and finally the Central region. Four towns in particular account for ninety percent of the community migrants. The nearby regional towns of Abha and Khamis Mushait account for about sixty percent of the reported migrants. Riyadh, being the capital, and with better education and job opportunities, continues to receive migrants from Tamniah at a steady rate of about sixteen percent. And Taif, the traditional destination of southwest migrant labor, was the main destination of early out-migrants (table 6.6). In the following chapter, we will elaborate more on the migrant's choice of destination.

TABLE 6.6
MIGRATION DESTINATION BY YEAR OF OUT-MIGRATION

Migrant's destination by region	Year migrant left village			Total	(N)
	Pre-1970	1971-82	post-82		
Southwest					
Abha	30.2%	39.4%	36.0%	36.0%	(71)
Al-khamis	18.9%	24.5%	28.0%	23.9%	(47)
Dhran aljanoob	0%	1.1%	4.0%	1.5%	(3)
Al-areen	0%	0%	2.0%	.5%	(1)
Jizan	1.9%	2.1%	0%	1.5%	(3)
Bilad Shomran	0%	1.1%	0%	.5%	(1)
Hijaz					
Taif	28.3%	10.6%	8.0%	14.7%	(29)
Makkah	1.9%	2.1%	0%	1.5%	(3)
Jeddah	1.9%	2.1%	4.0%	2.5%	(5)
Central					
Riyadh	17.0%	16.0%	14.0%	15.7%	(31)
Eastern					
Alhafoof	0%	1.1%	2.0%	1.0%	(2)
Others					
U.S.A.	0%	0%	2.0%	.5%	(1)
Total (N=)	100.0% (53)	100.0% (94)	100.0% (50)	100.0% (197)	

As is the case with Tamniah non-migrants, government jobs have attracted more than ninety-five percent of male migrant workers. In a marked difference from the income-earners in Tamniah, the migrants hold better jobs. Looking at table 6.7, it is obvious that high percentage (35%) of male non-migrants hold low-paying service non-skill jobs. Beyond an age criterion, these jobs require minimum qualifications. While the percentage of service job holders among migrants is also high, migrants holding high-ranking jobs in the civil and military sectors is noticeably higher than that of non-migrants.

TABLE 6.7
WORK STATUS OF ADULT MALE MIGRANTS AND NON-MIGRANTS OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK

Work status	Migrants	Non-migrant
Retired	1.9	1.1
Self-employed		
Farmer	0	12.4
Business	4.5	3.2
Government jobs		
Servant (manual)	22.3	35.1
Military/police	12.7	9.2
High rank mili/police	7.6	1.6
Government clerk	26.1	17.8
High admin. Official	10.2	4.3
Teacher	14.6	14.6
Technician	0	0.5
Total	100.0%	100.0%
(N=)	(157)	(185)

Undoubtedly, education is the key qualifying factor for the type and quality of government jobs. As tables 6.8-9 illustrate, there is a congruity of distribution of educational attainments and the type and quality of employment. For example, percentages of illiterates of both migrants and non-migrants consistently correspond to their respective percentages of manual government jobs. Also, the distribution of higher educational categories approximates those of higher quality jobs. At any rate, more migrants seem to have attained more education, especially post-secondary.

TABLE 6.8
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENTS OF ADULT MALE MIGRANTS AND NON-MIGRANTS OF SHAHRAN BANI MALIK

Education	Migrants	Non-migrant
Illiterate	20.4	35.7
Read & write	5.7	17.8
Elementary	19.7	12.4
Intermediate	13.4	8.6
Secondary	17.8	15.1
Post secondary	21.1	9.7
Unknown	1.9	0
Total	100.0%	100.0%
(N=)	(157)	(185)

The full ramification of government jobs and education for out-migration is not totally clear and our findings may prove to be inconclusive. On one hand, those who migrated have better educational credentials and hold better jobs. On the other hand, job markets are not equally distributed among regions or towns. As a result of centralization and the urban orientation of the government's development schemes, allocations of government jobs (in terms of quality and number) are usually in favor of the major urban centers. As a consequence, those possessing more education and who are qualified for certain positions in the civil and military sectors are always more restricted in their choices of destination than others of lesser qualifications, such as the illiterates.

The distribution of migrants as state's workers among government branches is also interesting.

First, migrants are attracted to jobs in five Ministries; Defense, Interior, Health, and the two Ministries of Public

Education. These five have been the primary targets for rural migrants and nomads seeking state employment. All five were vital in the state's centralization and bureaucratization schemes and they facilitate a wide range of job opportunities that suit practically every job-seeker, regardless of qualifications.

Second, in each of the four main destinations, migrants are clustered in certain Ministries. For example, migrants to Riyadh work mainly in the Ministry of Interior and the two Education Ministries; Taif migrants found state employment in the Ministry of Defense due to the presence of a military base, and also in the Education Ministries. The General Presidency of Girls' Education, in particular, had attracted older (especially earlier) Taif migrants of both genders for janitorial and doorman's jobs (table 6.9).

This also points to the importance of contacts among migrants. As such, earlier migrants always present recent migrants with information, as well as with the necessary aid to obtain a job in their respective place of work.

TABLE 6.9
BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT MIGRANT WORKS IN, BY DESTINATION

Branch of government migrant works in	Migrant's place of residence					Total	(N)
	Abha	Khamis Mushat	Taif	Riyadh	Other Towns		
Education	34.6	32.4	40.0	26.1	21.4	32.5	(49)
Interior	9.6	8.1	8.0	47.8	7.1	14.6	(22)
Defense	3.8	21.6	32.0	8.7	14.3	14.6	(22)
Health	19.2	18.9	8.0	4.3	14.3	14.6	(22)
Other govt	32.7	16.2	12.0	8.7	42.9	22.5	(34)
Priv. Sector	0	2.7	0	4.3	0	1.3	(2)
Total (N=)	100% (52)	100% (37)	100% (25)	100% (23)	100% (14)	100% (151)	

Migration, Family Ties, and Remittances

As indicated earlier, recent migration is typified by family migration. More than 140 of the documented male migrants of Shahran Bani Malik moved along with their immediate families. This has many implications for the migrant family, the rural household, and the area of origin.

Prior to the recent socioeconomic changes of the last three decades, migration from this rural community was of the temporary type where a household member migrated for a short duration and returned back with the funds for the household's consumption and production essentials. This type of migration, in effect, used to be geared toward the on-going household's maintenance and reproduction strategies, and did not affect the household's morphology or the membership status of the migrant. Furthermore, this older migration pattern functioned in the past to preserve the subsistence orientation and cohesiveness of the community. As such, it used to complement

subsistence production, relieve the community during economic crises, and never led to permanent out-migration of its members.

Today, the situation has changed. The sudden openings of long-term urban jobs necessitated permanent and semi-permanent moves of job-seekers and their immediate families. The instant effect of this recent migration trend is the breaking up of the traditional pattern of extended rural households.

Generally speaking, long distance married male migrants who moved with their wives and children tend to ease away from feeling integrally tied to their parental households. They organize their incomes, consumption habits, and future priorities independent of the parental households. This applies, in particular, to earlier migrants to Taif and Riyadh. Recent short distance migrants, however, are somewhat different. Many young migrants in Abha and Khamis Mushait, when they moved, took their aging parents along and continued to live in large extended households. But other recent migrants, who moved with only their wives and children to Abha and Khamis Mushait, still have not completely broken economic ties with their parents. As such, they often shoulder economic responsibilities for their parents, usually in the form of monthly remittances and shared investments.

Non-migrant sons, on the side of the dependency continuum, all still live and manage their income and consumption jointly with parents and even after they are married. This

is also the case for several non-migrant married brothers, who still live together in large joint households.

While the immediate effect of long-term migration has been the breaking up of some rural households, kinship ties never are broken. Family ties between migrants and their families in the rural community are still strong and take the form of frequent contacts and visits, and, to a lesser degree, remittances. The frequency of a migrant's visits to the village depends on the presence of close relatives in the village and, of course, to distance of destination from Tamniah. From the following three tables one can see that:

1- Migrants living in close proximity to Tamniah frequently visit the village, except for those with only distant relatives in the village; the latter tend to visit less frequently. The majority of the close-by migrants reside in Abha and Khamis Mushait, about 55 KM from village (table 6.10).

TABLE 6.10
FREQUENCY OF VISITS TO TAMNIAH BY MIGRANTS LIVING LESS THAN 300 KM FROM VILLAGE, BY CLOSEST KIN IN VILLAGE

Frequency of visits to Tamniah	Closest relatives in Village				Total	(N)
	Spouse/ Child	Parents/ siblings	Siblings only	Other kin		
Weekly	66.7	15.6	22.6	19.7	20.5	(26)
Monthly	33.3	62.5	54.8	41.0	49.6	(63)
Once /3-months	0	15.6	3.2	3.3	6.3	(8)
Twice a year	0	0	3.2	6.6	3.9	(5)
Once a year	0	6.3	16.1	29.5	19.7	(25)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
(N=)	(3)	(32)	(31)	(61)	(127)	

2- Most migrants now residing further away in the Hijaz region visit their home village once a year; those with parents back in the village, however, tend to visit twice a year. The majority of the Hijaz migrants are earlier migrants and reside in Taif, which is about 550 Km from Tamniah. Table 6.11 shows that most of these farther-distance migrants have only distant relatives in Tamniah.

TABLE 6.11
FREQUENCY OF VISIT TO TAMNIAH BY MIGRANTS LIVING 300-700 KM FROM VILLAGE, BY CLOSEST KIN IN VILLAGE

Frequency of visits to Tamniah	Closest relatives in Village				Total	(N)
	Adult child	Parents/ siblings	siblings only	Other kin		
Twice a year	0	71.4	33.3	8.7	22.9	(8)
Once a year	100%	28.6	66.7	91.3	77.1	(27)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
(N=)	(2)	(7)	(3)	(23)	(35)	

3- Long distant migrants, living mainly in Riyadh, manifest a different visiting pattern. While the majority visit once or twice a year, many, usually those with parents and immediate family in Tamniah, tend to visit the area at least four times a year (table 6.12).

TABLE 6.12
FREQUENCY OF VISIT TO TAMNIAH BY MIGRANTS LIVING MORE THAN 700 KM FROM VILLAGE, BY CLOSEST KIN IN VILLAGE

Frequency of visits to Tamniah	Closest relatives in Village				Total	(N)
	Spouse/ child	Parents/ siblings	Siblings only	Other kin		
Monthly	0	5.6	0	11.1	5.7	(2)
Once /3-months	100%	22.2	0	11.1	20.0	(7)
Twice a year	0	38.9	33.3	11.1	28.6	(10)
Once a year	0	33.3	66.7	66.7	45.7	(16)
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
(N=)	(2)	(18)	(6)	(9)	(35)	

In sum, the presence of close kin in Tamniah influences frequency of visits to Tamniah. Later, with the use of information gathered from interviews with migrants, we will explicate more the degree of contacts between the migrant and his relatives back in the village.

While family ties between the migrants and their rural household still persist in the form of reciprocal contacts and visits, remittances by the migrant perform a less important role in the maintenance and reproduction of the rural household. Generally speaking, there are five qualitatively different types of remittances by migrants to their relatives in the village:

1- Single sons generally provide remittances to their parents on a monthly basis. The parents, for their part, save some of this money to build a house and to pay dowry and wedding expenses for their sons' marriages.

2- Married sons remit regularly to help their aging and needy parents. This is especially the case among Abha and Khamis Mushait migrants.

3- Some migrant sons and/or brothers still pool part of their income with respective relatives for the purpose of building a new house back in the village or to invest in a business project in an urban area.

4- Some migrants, less frequently though, send monetary help to their female relatives, such as mothers, aunts, and widowed or divorced sisters.

5- The weakest type of remittances take the form of gifts or money given by migrants to aging and needy relatives when they visit the village during holidays.

In sum, remittances, while still very vital for some rural households, are no longer the driving force behind recent migration, and are not expected as obligations by the majority of rural households. Of eighty-six migrants in the seventy-five surveyed households, only nineteen migrants send remittances to their relatives back in the village, and only five migrants pool their income with their village relatives. Undoubtedly, the provision of social security by the government to non-working elder persons and females with dependents

has relieved other able relatives from having to provide for these needy kin. Thus, one may conclude that remittances by long-term migrants, in the main, are sent to their relatives as an expression of kinship loyalty and solidarity rather than as a matter of economic necessity or obligation.

Conclusions and Implications

I have attempted to characterize and compare two distinct migration patterns of Shahran Bani Malik. Moreover, I have tried to show how migration represents a response to the wider socioeconomic changes within the Saudi society.

The available data reveal two distinct migration patterns, each formed under different socioeconomic parameters affecting both local communities and the larger society. Earlier, until approximately the early 1960s, temporary male labor migration was dominant. This functioned primarily to complement a household's subsistence production. Migrants' remittance, thus, was the driving force behind this migration type. The recent long-term migration pattern, a response to the new socioeconomic changes within Saudi society, began during the late 1950s, but accelerated after 1970. This migration trend is, also, more often characterized by moves of entire families. Under this migration pattern, remittance occupies a less important role. Even though many migrants, especially the young, still remit frequently, remittance is no longer the driving force behind recent migration.

Rural people of Shahran Bani Malik shifted their migration strategies in response to the deteriorating subsistence agriculture, emergent needs of cash income, and the improving prospects of economic opportunities in urban areas. The pursuit of education and government jobs hastened the transition from temporary migration to the recent long-term migration.

The urban orientation of the state's development schemes, thus far, continues to encourage rural depopulation and an irreversible migration stream. Even though many long-term migrants have returned to Tamniah, they did so only after securing government employment in the area or in nearby regional towns. The incidence of long-term migration, however, has not slowed. Since 1971, more than 100 families have left Tamniah, but invariably after the male head found a job in the government sector. An inspection of types of works obtained by migrants shows that more than ninety percent are working in the government sector. This further attests to the important role of the state in creating the conditions for a massive long-term rural to urban migration.

Migrants of Shahran Bani Malik have generally chosen four towns; Taif of the Hijaz region was the destination of early uneducated migrants who usually settled for low ladder (manual) government jobs; Riyadh, which continues to receive about sixteen percent of the community migrants, mainly because of the availability of more government jobs

opportunities, and diverse education and training programs; the regional towns of Abha and Khamis Mushait, which flourished during the 1970s and 1980s as a result of expansions of the regional government and allocations of funds to regional development schemes, have received thus far more than sixty percent of the community migrants.

Migrant's ties to his family and the village are still strong and take the forms of frequent visits to village and, to a lesser extent, remittance to parents and needy relatives, especially females. As I will show in the following chapter, long-term migration has paid for the migrant and his immediate family, and as well for the rural household in Tamniah.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE PROCESS OF MIGRATION: A CLOSER LOOK

In the preceding chapter, I attempted to provide a general picture of migration, both in the past and today, and I drew inferences from available migration information on what transpired in Tamniah. This information, to a large extent, was provided by family members and village informants rather than from the migrants themselves. It deals with the socio-demographic characteristics of migrants, as well as with date, duration, and destination of migration. While such an approach may be sufficient for the general picture, nonetheless it stops short of fully describing and analyzing what really happened. For that reason, it was incumbent that I should follow-up at least some of the migrants and gather first hand accounts on the initial stages of migration.

My main purpose here is to uncover some of the more subtle intricacies of migration in terms of how and why a particular person decides to move and, subsequently, what the consequences are for that migrant and his family. What was the migrant's situation before out-migrating, what is he doing now, how is he adjusting at the place of destination? Since the Saudi society emphasizes family, it is important to note how migrants keep in touch with relatives in Tamniah.

Furthermore, through case studies, I will look at variations pertaining to year of out-migration, age at out-migration, and reason for out-migration in order to explore the underlying bases for migration.

My information derives from in-depth interviews with fifty-one of the documented 169 community male migrants. Initially, I tried for a random sample, but that proved to be enormously time consuming, impractical, and frankly impossible. There was also no attempt by me to gather information on female migrants, mainly because: 1) it was impossible for me to interview female migrants; and 2) females in Saudi Arabia do not make migration decisions separate from their male relatives. In effect, this was a 'convenience sample', and was not representative of the entire migrant population.

My "sample" consists of forty-six married and five single males. Except for four migrants, all are living now in Abha, Khamis Mushait, Taif, and Riyadh. As table 7.1 shows, about seventy-five percent are between 21 and 60 years of age.

TABLE 7.1
MARITAL STATUS AND AGE OF MIGRANT, BY CURRENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS)

Age and marital status	Migrant place of residence						Total	(N)
	Abha	Khamis Mushat	Taif	Jeddah	Riyadh	Dhran Aljonb		
Single								
18-20	0%	0%	0%	67%	33%	0%	100%	(3)
21-40	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	(2)
Married								
18-20	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	100%	(1)
21-40	30%	39%	4%	4%	22%	0%	100%	(23)
41-60	33%	20%	20%	0%	27%	0%	100%	(15)
≥ 61	29%	29%	43%	0%	0%	0%	100%	(7)
Total (N=)	27% (14)	27% (14)	14% (7)	6% (3)	24% (12)	2% (1)	100% (51)	

In the following, I will focus attention on: 1) background of the migrant and his first migration experience; 2) experience in the current destination (last migration); and 3) ties and contacts with his rural kin and the rural community in general.

Migrant's Background

As was observed generally, about thirty-three percent of the selected group out-migrated prior to 1971 (table 7.2). At the time of out-migration, more than sixty percent were less than 21 years of age. Not surprisingly then, about half had been attending school and had attained at least six or more years of schooling prior to out-migration. Only thirty-five percent were farmers with minimal or no education.

TABLE 7.2
WORK STATUS AND AGE OF MIGRANT PRIOR TO INITIAL MIGRATION FROM VILLAGE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS)

Work status before out-migration	Age at out migration				Total
	< 21	21-40	41-60	> 60	
Unemployed	6.5%	6.7%	0%	0%	5.9%
Farmer	19.4%	46.7%	75.0%	0%	31.4%
Sheep herder	3.2%	6.7%	0%	0%	3.9%
Student	67.7%	6.7%	0%	0%	43.1%
Govt job-holder	3.2%	33.3%	25.0%	100%	15.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N =)	(31)	(15)	(4)	(1)	(51)

Since the mid-1950s, subsistence farming began to deteriorate and life opportunities in Tamniah dwindled, especially for young adults and teenagers. Youths, continuously exposed to new ideas through urban-oriented formal education, soon realized that the pursuit of higher levels of 'schooling' and government jobs was the only way to better oneself and to help the family. As evidenced in table 7.3, more than 65 percent migrated out of the area in search of work or education.

TABLE 7.3
REASON FOR MIGRATION BY AGE OF MIGRANT AT TIME OF INITIAL OUT-MIGRATION FROM VILLAGE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS)

Reason for out-migration	Age at out-migration				Total
	< 21	21-40	41-60	> 61	
Pursue education	35.5%	20.0%	0%	0%	27.5%
Job requirement	6.5%	33.3%	50.0%	0%	17.6%
Search for work	41.9%	46.7%	25.0%	0%	41.2%
Move with parents	16.1%	0%	0%	0%	9.8%
Move w/ adult child	0%	0%	25.0%	100%	3.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N=)	(31)	(15)	(4)	(1)	(51)

The decision to migrate reflects an initial stage in the break-up of the traditional rural household. Even though approximately forty percent of the migrants that I interviewed indicated that they reached the decision to migrate in collaboration with their relatives, an equal percent said that they made this decision on their own. This was the case for both the younger and older migrants, and clearly a deviation from the earlier migration pattern under subsistence production, where the decision to migrate was a household matter.

During the process of initial migration, more than fifty percent moved in company with their families or close relatives. Most of the young migrants, however, out-migrated alone (table 7.4). At that time, most of the young migrants were single and moved in pursuit of education or a job. Eventually, many young migrants went back to the village, got married, and remigrated along with their spouses.

TABLE 7.4
WHO ACCOMPANIED MIGRANT BY AGE AT INITIAL OUT-MIGRATION FROM VILLAGE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS)

Migrant was accompanied by:	Age at out-migration				Total
	< 21	21--40	41--60	> 60	
No one--alone	48.4%	33.3%	25.0%	0%	41.2%
Wife & children	6.5%	33.3%	75.0%	100%	21.6%
Parents & siblings	22.6%	20.0%	0%	0%	19.6%
Brothers	12.9%	6.7%	0%	0%	9.8%
Uncles	3.2%	0%	0%	0%	2.0%
Fellow villagers	6.5%	6.7%	0%	0%	5.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N =)	(31)	(15)	(4)	(1)	(51)

Migrant's Experience in Destination

A high percent of long-term migrants from the community of Shahran Bani Malik chose to remain resident at the initial place of destination. Once the migrant finds a job in an urban area, he rarely moves elsewhere unless it is required for a better job. This is especially true of those who migrated after 1971 (table 7.5). Students, however, are an exception to this trend. Once they graduate, they may go back to the village if an appropriate job is available, or may move to another town as dictated by job location.

TABLE 7.5
YEAR OF MOVE TO CURRENT DESTINATION BY YEAR OF INITIAL OUT-MIGRATION FROM VILLAGE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS)

Year of move to current destination	Year of migration					Total	(N)
	Pre-1965	65-70	71-76	77-82	Post 1982		
Pre-1965	38.5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	9.8%	(5)
1965-70	15.4%	75%	0%	0%	0%	9.8%	(5)
1971-76	23.1%	25%	46.2%	0%	0%	19.6%	(10)
1977-82	15.4%	0%	23.1%	80%	0%	33.3%	(17)
Post 1982	7.7%	0%	30.8%	20%	100%	27.5%	(14)
Total (N =)	100% (13)	100% (4)	100% (13)	100% (15)	100% (6)	100% (51)	

The propensity to stay in one town for a long time is primarily due to the migrant's satisfaction with the situation at the place of destination. Job security, the availability of education and other social amenities, and the presence of relatives and fellow villagers conceivably make urban residence a pleasant experience for most of the migrants.

When I asked migrants to appraise their situation now, more than seventy-five percent indicated they were much better off now than before migration. Generally, earlier migrants to Taif and Riyadh perceive their situation now more positively than before migration; they migrated under difficult situations, and things are markedly improved. Older migrants, recently moving to Abha and Khamis Mushait, contrary to earlier migrants, perceive their situations less positively than when they were in Tamniah. While noting improvements in their livelihoods, they generally missed the village life. Generally, most migrants are still emotionally tied to Tamniah. When asked about a preferred place of residence, only eight percent mentioned their current place of residence; more than fifty-five percent prefer to live in Tamniah under comparable life chances, i.e. if they could earn the same income they currently enjoy. Younger migrants, however, prefer to live in urban areas (table 7.6).

TABLE 7.6
PREFERRED PLACE OF RESIDENCE OF MIGRANT BY CURRENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS)

Preferred residence place:	Current place of residence						Total
	Abha	Khamis Mushat	Taif	Jeddah	Riyadh	Dhran. Aljnob	
Current Town	0%	7.1%	14.3%	0%	16.7%	0%	7.8%
Tamniah	57.1%	42.9%	71.4%	33.3%	66.7%	0%	54.9%
Abha	28.6%	0%	14.3%	0%	0%	100%	11.8%
Al-khamis	0%	42.9%	0%	33.3%	0%	0%	13.7%
Makkah	7.1%	7.1%	0%	0%	8.3%	0%	5.9%
Jeddah	7.1%	0%	0%	33.3%	8.3%	0%	5.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N=)	(14)	(14)	(7)	(3)	(12)	(1)	(51)

Choosing Destination

As we noted earlier, the search for long-term employment and the pursuit of education have motivated the recent rural-urban migration in Saudi Arabia. Since the early 1960s, when family agriculture became less viable, many individuals, as well as families, were compelled to migrate in search of better life opportunities in urban areas.

The choice of destination also is determined mainly by job and educational opportunities. For example, while some migrants cite different reasons, more than seventy percent of the migrants that I interviewed chose a particular place of destination because of job and educational opportunities.

Generally, job opportunities and education inspired long distance migration to the Hijaz towns and Riyadh, whereas migrants to the regional towns of Abha and Khamis Mushait focused on other reasons besides job and education. About thirty percent who migrated to the two regional towns said that it was the presence of relatives that motivated them to move there.

This, however, is not to suggest that Taif and Riyadh migrants are isolated from their relatives. As a matter of fact, more than two-thirds of those who migrated to Taif and Riyadh indicated they had relatives there prior to their own arrival. So, while they may have been inspired by job or educational opportunities, undoubtedly the presence of relatives added an incentive for long-distance migration.

The presence of relatives and fellow villagers at place of destination was and still is a very important factor for channeling the flow of migration. Since the beginning of the 1970s, earlier migrants acted as a source of help, information, and sanctuary for in-migrants; 1) they provided board and food until the latter were able to be on their own; 2) they gave financial help when needed; 3) they provided emotional support during the process of adjustment to urban life and the new cultural setting; and 4) most importantly, earlier migrants used their knowledge, connections, and influence to help recent migrants find work with the government (table 7.7). This is supported by the fact that in each of the four major places to which migrants tend to move, the migrants from Tamniah tend to be employed in one or two Ministries.

Migrants in each of the four major places of destination also live in close proximity to one another. Many of them, especially in Abha and Khamis Mushait, bought or were awarded a residential plot of land by the government where they eventually built their own houses through a housing loan.

The residential concentration of migrants in certain neighborhoods continues to keep them in close contact with each other and with their rural communities. The Taif and Riyadh migrants, in particular, are closer to each other than those within Abha and Khamis Mushait. Certainly the close proximity of the latter to Tamniah, where they can visit more

frequently, helps ease feelings of separation from rural community and relatives.

TABLE 7.7
TYPES OF HELP OFFERED BY MIGRANT TO RECENT FELLOW MIGRANTS (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS)

Type of help offered	Year when migrant moved to this town			Total
	Pre-1971	1971-82	post 1982	
None	0%	14.8%	50.0%	21.6%
Ride to town	0%	7.4%	0%	3.9%
Temporary housing	50.0%	37.0%	28.6%	37.3%
Financial assistance	10.0%	14.8%	0%	9.8%
Help finding a job	40.0%	25.9%	21.4%	27.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N=)	(10)	(27)	(14)	(51)

Generally, Tamniah migrants in both Riyadh and Taif get together during holidays, social gatherings such as weddings, and during visits by villagers. They also organize periodic gatherings to converse about happenings where they reside, and about village events. Sometimes this may require them to take initiatives, such as helping a fellow migrant or sending monetary help to needy or disaster stricken families back in the village.

Migrant's ties with their respective village communities are still strong. Each adult male migrant is required to send annually an amount of 100 SR to the 'tribe fund'. Usually, the special fund is used to help needy and disaster stricken members, or during special events, such as a visit by an important government official to the area. In sum, the

migrants' spatial detachment from the village is generally not matched by a sense of disavowal of Tamniah and the Shahran tribe.

Migrant and Family Ties

Recent socioeconomic changes in Saudi society have profoundly affected the morphology and composition of the household. In the past, an extended household was the predominant type, where livelihood strategies of both the household and that of the individual were, to a large extent, inseparable. Even though individuals within a household may independently choose a livelihood strategy such as off-farm employment or temporary migration, their choices were, usually, bounded by the overall household's strategies and needs. Undoubtedly, the dominance of subsistence agriculture and the importance of land in the past bonded households' individuals regardless of age and marital status.

As rural communities were lured into off-farm employment and the 'money' economy, both agriculture and the land lost their importance in the overall livelihood strategies of the rural household. Consequently, the encompassing logic of the extended household was dealt a strong blow. While kinship ties remain strong, individuals no longer feel the need to link their future with that of the larger household or, for that matter, to the land.

Undoubtedly, long-term migration contributed to the declining importance of extended family households. Soon after married male migrants and their spouses move out of the village, they tend to break away from full membership in their parental households. As we can see in table 7.8: 1) single migrants continue to remit to their natal households; 2) the majority of Abha and Khamis Mushait migrants, who are mostly recent migrants, still hold strong economic ties with their parents and siblings; 3) the majority of Hijaz and Riyadh married migrants, living with their immediate families, maintain a weaker form of economic linkages with parents and siblings.

Even though the group of migrants I interviewed is not totally representative of Tamniah migrants, I feel fairly confidant in generalizing, as follows:

First, those having full economic ties with family usually pool about twenty-five percent of their monthly income with their parents and siblings. The pooled income, in turn, is used to invest in urban real estate or businesses, to build a new house in the village, and/or to pay dowry for spouses of younger brothers.

Second, after they obtain a job and buy an automobile, single migrants usually send between fifteen to fifty percent of their salaries to their parents. While most of this is used by the family, single migrants expect, in return, full financial support during marriage.

Third, married migrants who send monthly help usually send it to an aging parent with dependents and a limited income source, such as social security payments. Many of these migrants send between 400 and 700 SR monthly. Other migrants, especially in Abha and Khamis Mushait, instead of giving money, bring food and other essentials when they visit needy parents or a widowed female relative with dependents.

TABLE 7.8
ECONOMIC TIES OF MIGRANT WITH PARENTAL FAMILY BY REGION OF RESIDENCE (SELECTED 51 MALE MIGRANTS)

Economic ties with natal family and marital status	Current residence			Total
	Southwest	Hijaz	Central	
single				
Complete close ties	0%	20.0%	8.3%	5.9%
Monthly remittances	0%	0%	8.3%	2.0%
Occasional help only	0%	0%	8.3%	2.0%
Married				
Complete close ties	37.9%	0%	0%	21.6%
Monthly remittances	13.8%	20.0%	33.3%	19.6%
Occasional help only	13.7%	0%	25.0%	13.7%
No economic ties	34.5%	60.0%	16.7%	35.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N=)	(29)	(10)	(12)	(51)

Causes and Consequences of Migration: Case Studies

As indicated, each migrant cited a reason for out-migration. While the majority specify the pursuit of education and job as the two primary reasons, there were those who migrated as dependents. But to judge a migrant's success (or

failure) on the bases of his stated reason or, for that matter, the outcome of his migration is far short of examining the underlying causes of migration. For us to gain a clearer picture of migration and to be able to discuss the migrants' experiences in destination, we must highlight the situation prior to migration in terms of a migrant's age and socioeconomic status and year of migration.

It is, thus, useful to classify the sample according to year of migration, age at migration, reason for migration, and whether the migrant was a family provider, a dependent, or just taking care of himself when he migrated. Following the classification, I will overview some representative cases in order to gain a better understanding of what really happened both in terms of causes and consequences. Each migrant to be used for case studies will be given a name different than his in order to protect the migrant's identity.

The sample consists of two groups based on the date of migration:

1- Early Migrants

During the 1950s and the 1960s, Tamniah began to experience dramatic changes as it began to articulate its institutions more strongly with that of the larger Saudi society.

First, with the introduction of formal education, young males were re-oriented toward off-farm employment and urban life in general.

Second, as urbanization began to spread across the country, the prospect for better economic opportunities in urban areas began to attract rural people. As a result, temporary migration became more viable and long-term migration surfaced for the first time in Tamniah. Since younger migrants represent the more able-bodied labor force, both temporary and long-term migration led to a deterioration of subsistence agriculture, communal labor, and the community's cooperation projects.

While most of the community's households were able to combine both temporary migration and agriculture during the period 1950-71, many were not as fortunate. Those who lacked sufficient labor and land began to think urban and began careers outside agriculture. In this respect, young as well as older males, and individuals as well as families, started to migrate in search of better life opportunities.

Of the sampled migrants, seventeen (33.3%) migrated prior to 1971. Nine were 19 years of age or older. Before out-migration, none of the older group had secured an off-farm job; all were farmers. Generally, the older cohort that migrated before 1971 had to settle for low status government service jobs requiring only minimal credentials. Among the older migrants, two moved with their immediate families; both were in their early thirties.

The first of the older migrants moved to Abha in 1962 with his wife. Prior to migration, Ibraheem (pseudonym) was

a farmer, and also took advantage of both the traditional and the newly established elementary school to learn reading and writing. Since he had no labor power but himself, agriculture became an unrealistic source of subsistence, especially when the prospects of off-farm employment were strong.

Soon after migrating, Ibraheem got a job with the Commission of Guidance, which demands less of its officials, requires only basic reading, writing, and a good knowledge of religious teachings, all of which he had prior to migration. Thus, he was able to continue education until graduating from high school. He moved alone to Riyadh in 1971, where he took a second wife, and finished college while still keeping his job.

Though he declares Riyadh as his place of residence, his older wife and her children still live in Abah. Now he is 58 years old, has two households, and manages eighteen children who are between 25 and 3 years of age. Two of his daughters moved back to Tamniah after they got married. He still visits the village monthly, and commutes back and forth between Riyadh and Abha. He makes around (5,000) SR monthly from his job, but also owns real estate which grants him some annual return.

Another married migrant to move with his wife and children was an illiterate, 34 year-old farmer we will call Mosa. After he visited Taif and Makkah for short time periods, and worked during the pilgrimage season during 1966 and 1967,

Mosa decided to move out along with his wife and son to Taif in 1968. Even though Mosa had sufficient agricultural lands, he was unable to eke out his family subsistence from the land due to shortages of family labor, especially when communal labor declined rapidly in the 1960s.

Soon after moving to Taif, both Mosa and his wife obtained low status government service jobs as a doorman/-doorwoman at a female elementary school. He remained a resident of Taif ever since. Now he is about 55 years old and both he and his wife still hold the same jobs at the school. He also took advantage of a government housing loan and built a small house. In his spare time, Mosa drives and rents-out a small truck, a 'Suzuki'. Both husband and wife make about (4,300) SR monthly which, along with his part-time work, is sufficient for a decent living. He has four children between the ages of 35 and 8 years. The eldest son moved back to Tamniah after finishing nine years of schooling, got married, and now holds a clerical job with the government at the Post Office of Al-Masqi. Aside from occasional visits by the parental family, there are no other ties between the father and his eldest son.

A second group of early migrants consists of six teenage males between 10-18 years of age. Two moved with their parents, enrolled in school and were able to finish post-secondary education. Today, both are high school teachers and leading a good life. In a manner of speaking, they had a

relatively easy situation since they were not burdened with family responsibility. The situation, however, was not as easy for the other younger early migrants. Even though their migration was economically advantageous, they experienced many hardships from the time of moving until they reached adulthood. Two cases, in particular, provide some insight of the pressures of having to migrate young with little or no support either in the village or at the place of destination.

The first is the case of two teenage orphan brothers. Prior to initial migration, Khalil and Saleem lived with their aunt and subsisted on community help. Even though they had five pieces of inherited farm land, they were unable to farm it or rent it out due to common labor shortages in Tamniah. In 1950, they moved along with temporary labor migrants to Makkah. For four years they engaged in manual labor for self-subsistence, while pursuing education at a night school. They returned to Tamniah in 1955, and stayed for one year, subsisting on what they had saved. In 1956, both again migrated back to Makkah and worked four more years in construction while still continuing night school. In 1961, and after acquiring some savings, they went back to Tamniah and worked the land for two years. In 1963, with the intention to save for marriage, they moved to the town of Unaiza in the central region. There, they worked with a construction company for one year, after which they went back to Tamniah and got married. For the next six years, with the use of hired labor, they

engaged in farming, concentrating mainly on vegetable production for sale. At the same time both continued night school until they graduated. In 1969, they migrated to Riyadh to pursue college educations, while leaving their families back in Tamniah. During their stay in Riyadh, Khalil and Saleem subsisted on the government students' allowance, sending part of it to their families. Also, they rented out part of their farm, which helped them get through college. After graduating from college, they got assigned as intermediate school teachers. The eldest was sent to Abha, while the younger brother was sent to the Tamniah intermediate school, where he is still teaching today.

After getting teaching jobs, both settled in their respective places of residence. Each makes around 120,000 SR, and owns a house in Abha, which was built through the government's housing program. While they still visit each other weekly, they no longer pool their income, but always help each other during times of need.

The second case of an early young migrant is that of a ten year old boy who had to go it alone. Prior to initial migration, Jabir lived with his mother and his older teenage brother. The family is from the village of A~l Yanfa'. Due to shortages both in land and labor, the family subsisted on community help and from remuneration for herding done by the eldest son.

Jabir attended school when it was first opened and finished four years of elementary schooling before he migrated. Even though Jabir insists that he migrated to continue schooling, there is little doubt that he actually migrated in search of better life chances. His first move was to Abha in 1954, where he stayed for a month waiting for transportation to go to Taif. Jabir got ten Saudi Riyals from his mother to help him on his way.

After moving to Taif, he worked for one year as a grocer helper, staying in a rented place set up by the village for temporary labor migrants. By year end, he moved temporarily to Makkah and stayed with an older migrant from the village. Two months later, he moved to Riyadh in company of other village migrants. During his stay in Riyadh, Jabir got admitted into a government charity school, and lived there for the next five years. After finishing the equivalent of a high school degree, he applied for a government clerical job at the Ministry of Health.

With the help of friends, he got the job and was assigned to the Ministry chapter in Abha. After moving to Abha, Jabir brought along his mother and brother, where they lived together for the next two years. By 1963, Jabir got married and moved with his wife to Riyadh due to job requirements. His brother migrated to Makkah, and worked there for the next twenty years as a state guard. Their mother moved back to

Tamniah, living alone, but supported by her sons until she died in 1971.

Jabir lived in Riyadh for four years, until his job was transferred to Taif. For the next sixteen years, he stayed in Taif until he built a house in the village with the help and supervision of a cousin. In 1983, he asked his superiors in the Ministry of health to be transferred to Abha, and was granted his wish. For the next three years, Jabir lived in Tamniah, commuting daily to Abha. In 1987, he became eligible for a promotion, but had to move to Riyadh in order to realize it. Leaving his wife and eight children back in Tamniah, Jabir moved alone to Riyadh. He is still waiting for a chance to get transferred back to Abha. Even though Jabir makes around 100,000 SR, he barely can cover the cost of living for himself and his family. To help the family, his eldest son quit high school in 1987 and enrolled in a military school in Taif.

Judging from the experience of the four cases discussed above, earlier migrants, while improving their situations considerably, had to go a long way and to do many things before realizing the full benefits of migration. In general, earlier migrants who chose to stay for longer durations in urban areas did so because village life had little to offer at that time. In marked difference, temporary migrants of the 1950s and 1960s only went for special 'targets', such as to complement subsistence production, improve production tools, and to help younger siblings and children get an education.

2- Recent Migrants

While many Tamniah people were driven out of their home village by the impacts of socioeconomic changes of the 1950s and 1960s, the majority endured these changes and elected to stay. By combining incomes from agriculture, remittances from family members who had temporarily migrated, government jobs, and agricultural and social security subsidies, they were able to make it through the 1960s. Some invested in education for their children.

Earlier long-term migrants, so to speak, were driven out of Tamniah when things no longer seemed to work for them there. Also, when they migrated they were not sure of the prospects, and none of them secured off-farm employment prior to migration. Most had to settle for low-ladder service and clerical government jobs.

In marked contrast, both young and older migrants of the 1970s and 1980s migrated under better circumstances.

First, most of the recent migrants who moved out for employment did so only when they secured or were assured by friends and relatives of off-farm employment.

Second, younger migrants of the 1970s and 1980s had better success than their earlier cohort in realizing what they had migrated for. For example, students migrating to continue college, to get special training, or to enroll in a military school always were assured of a monthly student

allowance and board, and always secured a job soon after graduation. Also, other young migrants who elected to go for a job after finishing elementary schooling always found an opening in the suddenly expanding military and civil sectors. Furthermore, the presence of earlier migrants in places such as Taif and Riyadh helped recent migrants to more easily achieve what they migrated for.

Third, recent migrants did not migrate far from Tamniah. Since 1971, sixty-three percent of all documented migrants moved to Abha and Khamis Mushait. The age factor, also, is very important in the propensity to migrate farther from the village. While younger recent migrants tended to migrate longer distances in pursuit of education and employment, the majority of older migrants did not move far. This is especially the case for those 40 years old and above; more than 86 percent of them moved only as far as Abha and Khamis Mushait.

Undoubtedly, the wealth of the 1970s, as a result of oil price hikes, gave the state an opportunity to expand its regional development plans, creating more programs and jobs for all regions. Suddenly, government jobs in Abha and Khamis Mushait became available for the young and the old, the qualified and the not so qualified. Expansion of the educational system, both in scope and size, also played a key role in deterring families from long distance migration. Not only can their children get higher-level education in nearby

destinations, but many of the less educated elders of both genders were able to find openings for jobs as janitors, guards, and door-persons.

The urban orientation of the state regional development schemes, which led to the concentration of government establishments in Abha and Khamis Mushait, also encouraged regional migration. With provisions assured for education, health and other social amenities, the pace of urbanization in both towns became astounding during the late 1970s and the 1980s. Both towns grew in population by more than fifty percent. The establishment of the housing-loan program in 1973-74 was particularly instrumental in concentrating population in regional towns. Not only did the government offer people large interest-free loans for housing, but vast tracts of lands were bought-off by the government and were redistributed to families free of charge. With all that going on, investments in property, real estate, and construction occupied the minds of Saudis all over the country. Price hikes in real property literally made millionaires out of simple people who happened to own a piece of land or had been able to invest in one.

In the study area, many households of both migrants and non-migrants were able to take advantage of at least one housing loan and a free piece of property. The younger educated adults, in particular, were fast to take advantage of the situation. Since they were more eligible for a free

plot of land, they applied for it, and soon applied also for the free loan, both of which they got promptly, and in no time they were constructing their modern houses in Abha and Khamis Mushait. Later on, they got into investments, both in real estate and land speculation.

In terms of real estate investments, those who stayed in close proximity to the village or migrated to Abha and Khamis Mushait had a relative advantage over earlier long distance migrants. As it turned out, property during the mid-1970s was much cheaper in the two regional towns than in the larger urban areas of Hijaz and the capitol city of Riyadh. With minimum savings and income pooling, most families could afford to buy a piece of property and negotiate a housing loan.

In the following, I will use some case studies to highlight characteristics of recent migrants, such as socio-economic backgrounds, past migration experiences, reasons for recent out-migration, and their overall situation in their destination. Due to the concentration of recent migrants in Abha and Khamis Mushait, my case studies will be from these two towns.

The first case is an illiterate man. Ahmed, now is 67 years old, has eight children between the ages of 40 and 12 years of age. He is from the leading tribal kinship group, and a close relative of the 'Sheikh'. He was, as a matter of fact, offered the head of tribe position when the former 'Sheikh' died, but he turned it down. His last migration came in 1979,

when he permanently moved to Abha. This was, however, not his first migration experience.

Even though the 'Sheikh' kinship group was traditionally better off than the rest, it resorted to temporary migration just like all families did, especially during times of economic hardships. In 1937, when Ahmed was 18 years old, he migrated to Taif and worked for the next six years in the military. During that period, he used to send money to his family regularly, while visiting Tamniah once a year.

By the end of 1942, he quit the army and went back to Tamniah and worked in farming for the next few years. His family by then owned more than ten pieces of agricultural lands, most of which were irrigated. The family subsistence, generally, was never in jeopardy, but Ahmid nevertheless migrated temporarily for manual work. In a sense, temporary migration, traditionally, was socially compulsory for young adult males regardless of the urgency of needs. During the period between 1944-47, he migrated three times to Riyadh and worked in construction.

By the year 1948, he settled in Tamniah, got married, and worked in farming. In the beginning of 1962, when the regional markets of Abha and Khamis Mushait began to expand, the family started to orient part of its agricultural production towards vegetable production, using Yemenite migrants (both share-cropper and hired). Here, it is important to note that, while the prospect of production for the market was good in the

1960s, few families were able to take advantage of this. For one thing, not many could devote enough land to vegetables, while keeping family subsistence requirements intact. Moreover, production for the market needs investments in hired labor and transportation which not everybody could afford.

The engagement in vegetable production took pressure off family labor and enabled Ahmid's family to invest in education for its children. Ahmid's eldest son represents many young people who relied on family support until adulthood. After finishing elementary school, Abdullah was sent to Abha, where he lived with fellow students from the village until graduating from high school. In 1969, he migrated to Riyadh to pursue a college education. Both family help and the government's student allowance got him through college. After graduating from college in 1975, Abdullah went back to Tamniah, got married, and migrated again with his wife back to Riyadh to finish a post college diploma in public administration. In 1977, and after he finished the diploma, Abdullah got a prestigious administrative job with the Emirate of Asir in Abha.

In 1979, the parents and the rest of the family migrated to Abha to live with their eldest son. The move came after the family built a modern 22-room house in Abha. The move also helped the family's two younger sons to enroll in high school, which was not available in the area. Both sons graduated from high school and took administrative jobs in the government.

After moving to Abha, Ahmid's family took the farm out of production. The three sons who support the family make around 18,000 SR a month. The family visits the village once a month and still keeps a residence for vacation. Two of the daughters are married. The eldest daughter still lives in Tamniah, while the youngest lives in the United States with her husband who is pursuing higher education.

The last case study is an illiterate 64 year old man. Moshabab was the eldest of two sons. His parents owned six pieces of farmlands. Early in 1940s, he began to migrate temporarily to Taif and Makkah, working in construction and water delivery to urban residents, and sending the money back to his family. After Moshabab got married in 1953, he discontinued temporary migration and worked the farm along with his brother and wife.

In 1960, Moshabab got a doorman job in Tamniah elementary school, which he kept until he retired and moved with his wife and six children to Khamis Mushait in 1984. The family chose to move there, because the two eldest sons got government jobs in the town. Both sons continued schooling while still living in Tamniah by commuting daily to Abha. The eldest son qualified for teaching in elementary school after he graduated from junior college, whereas the younger son holds a technical job at the military base. Both are married and live with their parents and younger siblings in a newly constructed 24-room house. The father practices trades in the traditional

market of Khamis Mushait as a hobby. Their annual income is around 150,000 SR, most of which is earned from the government jobs of the two sons.

Moshabab visits Tamniah twice a month. His brother Saeed still lives there and works as a custodian in Tamniah's intermediate school, but also still does some farming in his part time. Saeed usually works two pieces of the family farm for tomatoes and wheat production with the help of hired labor on a daily basis. In 1986, Saeed accrued around 6,000 SR from sales of the tomatoe crop. The wheat is always consumed domestically. The two brothers no longer share economic responsibilities towards each other, but yet split the farm.

Conclusions And Implications

In this chapter, I tried to look closer into the intricacies of the process of migration; when and how it happened, why it happened, and what was the outcome for the migrant and his family. I also used case studies to examine variations pertaining to year of out-migration, age at out-migration, and reason for out-migration.

According to the sample selected for in-depth information, one generally can distinguish between two groups based on year of out-migration:

1- Earlier migrants who moved prior to 1971. They, generally, moved when family agriculture became less viable as a result of the emerging needs of cash income, deterioration

of communal labor, and shortages of family labor. After migrating, this group were pressed into low-ladder service and clerical government jobs. Eventually, the situation of most of them, especially the younger migrants, has improved as they were able to pursue education which qualified them for better government jobs. Earlier migrants, generally, had chosen long-distance destinations, such as Taif and Riyadh.

2- Recent migrants of the 1970s and 1980s migrated under better circumstance. As such, most of them, when migrating for employment, did so only when they secured or were certain of an off-farm employment. The majority of recent migrants have chosen to migrate to Abha and Khamis Mushait, when the two flourished in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of expansions in the government job markets, and provisions of education, health, and other social amenities.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study explored the migration strategies of individuals and households in the community of Shahran Bani Malik, Tamniah in the Asir Sarat region of Saudi Arabia. It is a region that has been experiencing very rapid socio-economic changes. The aim was to comprehend how migration patterns and the structural dynamics of residential relocation of rural populations are initiated and develop as integral aspects of the adaptive strategies of rural households. I applied a broad theoretical approach; explanations of migration are sought at all levels of social structure --individual, household, local community, region, and national.

My approach necessitated a methodology that takes into account various determinants of migration at different levels:

First, past migration strategies of the community were examined in terms of economic activities, socio-political organization, and modes of cooperation and assistance. Most of this information was gathered by interviews with community elders and other knowledgeable informants in the community.

Second, to comprehend the structural (macro) effects of migration, I tried, with the aid of government statistics and

reports and writings on Saudi Arabia, to characterize the recent critical stage of socio-economic development of Saudi society. I wanted to bring to focus: 1) efforts by the Saudi state in the process of development, centralization, and societal integration; 2) how these development schemes impacted different segments of the society, and especially rural communities; and 3) how rural-urban migration patterns were affected.

Third, in light of the structural transformations of Saudi society, I examined present socio-economic aspects of Shahran Bani Malik as the community began to fully articulate with and became integrated into the larger society. In particular, I elaborated on: 1) the impacts of formal education and off-farm employment opportunities; 2) how the community has responded; and 3) what the outcome was at the household and community levels.

For these purposes I utilized: 1) a survey of all households the community, obtaining basic socio-demographic information for each household; and 2) focused interviews of household heads in 75 randomly selected households to explore variations in economic activities, migration strategies, and basic resources.

Fourth, in light of recent socio-economic changes of the local community and the larger society, I examined recent migration patterns of Shahran Bani Malik: 1) how they differ from the older patterns; 2) how they developed as an integral

part of recent individual and household livelihood strategies; and 3) the outcome of these recent migration patterns.

For these purposes I gathered information on: 1) past instances of migration by household members in the 75 randomly selected households relative to those who currently reside in the village (informing us of the date, duration, destination, and reason for each migration instance as well as the age and sex of each migrant); 2) migrant family members in these households (including socio-demographic information as well as the dates, destinations, length of out-migrations, and reasons for migration of each individual migrant); 3) the rest of the community migrants, with the aid of key community and migrant informants; and 4) a sample of 51 male migrants drawn from the documented male migrants who were interviewed in their current destination. These interviews helped me get a first hand account from migrants on their decision to migrate, why they migrated, and what the consequences of migration have been for the individual migrant and his family.

Prior to 1950, Shahran Bani Malik was a relatively self-sufficient peasant community that subsisted on family farming, complemented by ruminant herding and periodic male labor migration to the Hijaz urban centers. Moreover it was a community with strong cohesive bonds visible in various forms of communal assistance, cooperation, and adherence to a set of socio-political rules and cultural mores.

Migration in association with subsistence production was of the temporary male-labor-migration type. Except for a few households whose adult males used to specialize in trade, the rest of the community had mainly used migration as a way to overcome shortages in their household's subsistence and production needs. Aided by a dependable subsistence economy, co-operation in the use of labor, and mutual assistance among villagers, the community had managed to avoid the necessity of permanent large-scale out-migration. Up until the 1950s, Shahran Bani Malik selectively used "target" migration, where the household periodically dispatched one or more of its adult male members to the Hijaz towns to seek gainful employment and to bring back to the household various essentials for production and subsistence. No permanent migration of individuals or of whole families had occurred prior to 1950. Thus, a primary reason for the earlier pattern of migration was to reinforce what was essentially subsistence agricultural economy; migration was seldom used as an ultimate strategy for survival.

Since 1950, Shahran Bani Malik, as is the case with most Saudi rural communities, began to experience wide socio-economic changes as a result of an accelerated pace of articulation with the larger society. The articulation process was largely due to state actions. The state began to centralize its authorities, integrate rural communities into the

"concept" of Saudi Arabia, and push for a "modernized" economy.

The primary mechanisms through which the state advanced its development schemes have been formal education, provisions for off-farm employment opportunities in the government sectors, and the continuous expansion of transportation, communication, and health infrastructures and facilities. Furthermore, the state continued to implement extensive subsidy programs and largess such as social security, price supports, free loans and other income supplements schemes.

The introduction of mass formal education, and the sudden expansion of off-farm government jobs, hastened the transition from subsistence agriculture to a modern money economy. The main points relative to that transition are:

First, with the introduction of formal education, young males were drawn out of family agriculture and pastoralism, and were re-oriented toward off-farm employment. Depending on a particular household's stock of labor and land, and its commitments to education, the decline of young male participation in home production necessitated instant changes in the sustenance strategies of the majority of the community households. In this respect, those who had traditionally integrated child labor into their household's productive activities suffered the most. As such, they were forced to minimize the loss of young male labor by abandoning part of their productive activities, such as herding. Others were

forced into more frequent temporary migration by household heads and other adult males.

Second, the state efforts to build its governmental apparatus, especially the bureaucracy and the military forces, began to attract young adult males from rural areas since the early 1960s. This attraction to better economic opportunities, forged by education credentials, quickly became the deciding force for the transition from subsistence agriculture to non-agricultural off-farm employment. Not only does off-farm state employment demand less of its employees, but it also offers better economic returns than subsistence farming. In addition, this shift to off-farm employment was further fueled by the emergence of cash needs to meet the demands of the 'modernizing' economy. Under the new circumstances, rural households felt the need for a stable monetary income.

While off-farm employment opportunities opened up during the late 1950s, its full impacts were greatly felt after 1973, when oil revenues suddenly burgeoned, enabling the government to pursue a full range of economic growth, both at the national and regional levels.

The ramifications of these shifts to off-farm employment are great, both at the household and the community levels, and also relative to domestic production and migration. Since 1973, Shahran Bani Malik became totally oriented toward off-farm employment and a cash economy. While not abandoning farming altogether, subsistence agriculture ceased to exist

as a necessary element in the household's sustenance strategies. In testimony to the declining importance of agriculture, only 4 percent of Shahran Bani Malik people now engage in farming activities. Of those, only 17 percent are below the age of 61 years. Furthermore, every household in the community today benefits directly or indirectly from government jobs, and/or assistance.

The changes in a typical household's modes of sustenance induced many other changes. As a result of declines in subsistence production, the household lost its dominance as the basic unit of production. Consequently, the encompassing logic of the traditional household structure was undermined and household morphology began to change. The earlier pattern of multi-generational (extended) households lost ground to the nuclear family household.

At the community level, the acquisition of off-farm employment and the concomitant deterioration of small scale subsistence agricultural production have resulted in the disappearance of communal labor, and declines in co-operation and assistance. Subsequently, the community no longer functions as an independent unit politically, socially, and economically. Besides general socioeconomic changes, deliberate actions of the state undoubtedly have contributed greatly to the new situation. As the government began to provide free services on a wide scale, and to establish its socio-political

institutions in rural areas, local units lost many of their reasons for being.

Another salient aspect of the new socio-economic changes at the community level is the redefining of the bases of social class. In this respect, gender, patriarchy, and tribal affiliation, which for long have constituted the foundations of stratification in the once segmented Saudi society, are being undermined, and increasingly share relevance with education, occupation and income.

Certainly, migration an integral social organizational aspect of contemporary rural communities, was greatly impacted by the socio-economic changes. The urban-orientation of Saudi Arabian development programs, which resulted in urban-biased formal education, an occupational structure dominated by civil service jobs, extremely rapid urban growth, and a general neglect of the rural sector, gave birth to a new pattern of movement out of the countryside, replacing the older pattern of seasonal labor migration.

In the case of Shahran Bani Malik, the community's migratory behavior began to change since the late-1950s. I observed the following:

First, since 1958, the temporary male labor migration so characteristic of subsistence communities, gave way to a longer-duration rural-urban migration. The general decline of subsistence production induced this shift. As a result of increased demands for cash, continued declines of communal

labor, and losses of a vital labor source due to schools, a majority of community households were no longer able to meet their subsistence needs through domestic production. Subsequently, they were forced into a new form of migration, where members of their family had to endure long periods of urban residence, and to send back remittances for the household's basic needs.

Second, since 1972, Shahran Bani Malik completely abandoned temporary labor migration in favor of longer-term and semi-permanent migration. This was associated with the pursuit of education and urban government jobs. Long-term migration also created the conditions for a rural exodus of entire family households. While some families of Shahran Bani Malik migrated out of Tamniah during the 1960s, this process intensified after 1972. More than 100 families from Shahran Bani Malik moved to major urban centers and regional towns in the southwest.

The majority of long-term migrants of Shahran Bani Malik have generally chosen four destinations; 1) Taif, the traditional destination of southwest labor migrants, was the destination of early out-migrants; 2) Riyadh, the capital city, and with better education and job opportunities, continues to receive migrants from Tamniah at a steady rate of about 16 percent; and 3) the nearby regional towns of Abha and Khamis Mushait, which flourished during the 1970s and the 1980s as a result of expansions of the regional government

and allocations of funds to regional development programs, have received more than 60 percent of the migrants.

The impacts of recent long-term migration patterns have been profound at the level of larger society, local rural communities, and the household. At the national level, recent rural-urban migration eventuated in: 1) population concentration in urban centers and regional towns; and 2) heavy intersectoral redistribution of labor from traditional agriculture and pastoralism into government sectors, including the military.

Recent urban migration fostered many changes at the rural community level: 1) an accelerated pace of rural depopulation, where in most instances Saudi rural communities have lost a majority of their native population; 2) in combination with the state's provisions for off-farm employment in rural areas, it drew the most able-bodied labor force away from agriculture and, thus, agriculture was relegated to a minor household activity; and, 3) as rural communities abandoned their traditional base of subsistence, they ceased to function as cohesive and independent units socially, economically, and politically.

Recent long-term migration, which differs functionally from older migration patterns, resulted in many changes at the household level. The earlier temporary migration, geared toward the on-going household's maintenance and reproduction strategies, did not affect the household's morphology or the

membership status of the migrant. Remittances from temporary seasonal migrants occupied an important role under the traditional subsistence economy. To this end, temporary migration was a household-planned strategy.

In marked contrast, the recent long-term migration trend affected the migrants' membership status in their natal extended rural households. Generally speaking, married male migrants who move with their wives and children tend to ease away from feeling integrally tied to their parental households. They organize their incomes, consumption habits, and future priorities independent of the parental households. Furthermore, remittances are no longer the driving force behind recent migration, and are not expected as obligations by the majority of rural households.

Most importantly, recent long-term migrations are initiated as individual rather than household strategies. As a result of recent socio-economic changes, which undermined traditional extended households, younger adult males began to organize their livelihood strategies independent from their parental households.

Even though long-term migration affects the membership status of migrants in their respective rural households, kinship ties never are broken. Family ties between migrants and their families in the rural community are still strong and take the form of frequent contacts and visits and, to a lesser degree, remittances. All Shahran Bani Malik migrants still

visit the village. The frequency of a migrant's visits, generally, depends on the presence of close relatives in the village and, of course, on distance of destination from Tamniah.

Theoretical and Methodological Implications of the Study

From the beginning I viewed the existing migration research with an open mind, attempting to reconcile and make use of its divergent approaches, and to explore the possibility of developing an integrated approach to the study of migration. As seen by many, the general problem in migration research is the imposition of a false dichotomy between the particular and the universal or, to be more clear, "the individual, his family and the local community on the one hand and the larger political economy on the other" (Swidell, 1979:255). As a result, mobility research generally became channeled into one of two contending approaches. The first is the partial theories of migration which focus on the characteristics and migration decisions of individuals as the latter try to improve their welfare. This approach is often faulted for being based on an implicit notion of voluntarism where the society is assumed to be the sum product of intentional actions of individuals. By contrast, the second approach concentrates on the conditions under which people make their decisions, thus tying explanations of migration into the underlying structural-historical forces that create these

conditions. This perspective has been flawed for assuming, more often than not, that society is external to the individual and exerts substantial constraints upon their behavior (Forbes, 1984; Oberai and Bilsborrow, 1984).

An alternative theoretical framework to bridge the gap between the micro and macro approaches is to consider and analyze relationships between individual and society as a two-way "dialectical" relationship. As such, we start with the theoretical assumption that relationships between individual and society are complex, and that both individual and society impact upon and transform one another. Clearly, this is pertinent as it establishes the bases for developing an integrated theory of migration, where both individual and societal levels of analysis are relevant and important. My approach was guided by this theoretical assumption, as follows:

First, I attempted to integrate both the micro and macro approaches by studying socio-economic changes and migration at various levels-- individual, family, local community, and society. In this respect, I show how the community of Shahran Bani Malik has shifted from a subsistence mode of production to a money economy in response to events at the national level.

Second, I emphasized the relevance of history by examining past economic and socio-political aspects of the community as well as characterizing the past migration patterns of the

community. Further, I related migration to the process of socio-economic development in Saudi Arabia, showing how the migration patterns of Shahran Bani Malik have shifted in response to the path of economic development being pursued by the Saudi state.

Third, I emphasized the interrelationship between migration strategies and livelihood strategies. As such, I viewed and analyzed migration as an integral part of "sustenance strategies" of individuals and households, and not as a discrete phenomenon subject to separate investigation.

Fourth, I attempted to conceptualize individual migratory behavior as an outcome of a set of relationship between the individual, the economy and society. To further elaborate, I focused on the individual's trajectory through space and time, showing how social and economic as well as time and space constraints have shaped migratory behavior of the people of Shahran Bani Malik. The value of this approach, which is being used by human geographers, lies in the utility of developing a methodology for the collection of longitudinal micro-level data on human behavior over time and space (Forbes, 1984:159).

My methodology, devised to take into account the different determinants of migration, proved to be fairly adequate for the purpose at hand, but with some obvious shortcomings. The shortcomings are related to: 1) inadequacies as well as inaccuracies of published national and regional data and information, since they are controlled and produced by

government agencies; 2) lack of migration data at both national and regional levels, constricting the generalizability of the study since no comparisons between the community of study and other levels of the society (regional and/or national) were made explicit; 3) the inability to build a robust socio-economic status scale has impeded the recognition of clear boundaries between social strata at the community level.

Thus I have learned that in order to advance the development of an integrated approach to the study of migration it is contingent upon us to realize the following:

1- The need to incorporate the concept of household, both as an organizing concept and unit of analysis since households are "the primary arena for the expression of age and sex roles, kinship, socialization, and economic cooperation where the very stuff of culture is mediated and transformed in action" (Netting, et al., 1984, p. xxii). But to utilize the concept in a meaningful way, we must worry a lot about formulating a useful perspective of household. A good definition not be derived merely from an income pooling criterion, but, instead, should incorporate both the unit morphology (age-sex composition and inter-generational configuration) and, more importantly, the way the unit organizes its production, maintenance, consumption, and reproduction activities (functions).

2- Data gathered at one level of analysis are not sufficient to capture complexities of the migration process in terms of causes, consequences, and the decision to migrate. For instance, the analysis of data at the aggregate or macro-level leads to generalities, and only indirectly helps in understanding the decisions of individual/household to migrate. By the same token, analysis at the micro-level (individual/household) does not allow consideration of the context in which the household decisions are made (Oberai and Bilsborrow, 1984).

3- Inferences from data at one level of analysis to investigate relationships between social and economic variables at other levels are risky and more often than not lead to fallacies. For instance, the inference about individual behavior from aggregate or macro-level data leads to the "ecological fallacy" (Robinson, 1950), and the inference from observations made at the micro-level (individual/household) about the conditions or behavior of higher level units leads to "individualistic fallacy" (Scheuch, 1974:-138). It is, thus, pertinent that data be gathered at intermediate levels (community and region) besides the micro and macro levels, in order to safeguard against inference fallacies. Community and regional factors are of particular importance for migration study since areal characteristics or what is called "opportunity structures" are recognized as major determinants of migration flows

(Ritchey, 1976). Information on community or areal characteristics must be extensive to include all aspects of the community. As charted by Bilsborrow (1984), these include employment opportunities, wage levels, land-tenure system, kinship ties, degree of cohesion and social integration, inheritance systems, transportation and communication linkages, access to health and eduction facilities, politico-economic power structure, climatic factors, and government investment programmes (ibid. p. 413).

4- The need to integrate the role of the state and society into the analyses of migration and the broad socio-economic changes which characterize the specific epoch. As is the case of most third world countries, the state becomes a "central figure" in the process of development; it controls and implements development plans, sets scales of income distribution, and mediates between national and international forces. For us to comprehend the process of mobility patterns, we must, also, look into the process of socio-economic development in terms of how it came about, who are the beneficiary groups or classes, and what are the beneficiary regions. This, undoubtedly, will help explain the emergence of particular mobility patterns at both regional and national levels.

Relevance of the Study to Saudi Arabia

Today, a great challenge facing developing nations is to control the flow of migration rural communities to urban centers in order to maintain a balanced economic growth. It is pertinent therefore that we monitor and study the great socio-economic changes taking place in the rural countryside. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the government is making special efforts to curb the rates of rural-urban population drift. This makes the comprehension of how and why rural people pursue particular livelihood and/or migration strategies very essential if development schemes are to prove beneficial rather than detrimental to the well-being of people in the society.

Recent rural-urban migration in Saudi Arabia presents a unique case that is, in many ways, different from the experiences of most contemporary developing nations. It is a phenomenon that must be understood in the context of a traditional tribal society which, in the span of a few decades, have been under the impress of intense socio-economic forces not necessarily of its own making. Let me try to explain:

First, this migration pattern is an outcome of the state's socio-political and economic planning, which stresses the need for societal integration, centralization, and 'modernization'. Unfortunately this has resulted in an urban-oriented development process that created a strong pulling

force for the rural population, and eventually leading to high rates of rural-urban migration and the abandonment of the traditional sector. By contrast, the recent migration experiences of most Third World countries coincided with high population growth in rural areas, mechanization of agriculture, urbanization, industrialization and the incorporation of rural economies into the world economy (Binsbergen and Meilink, 1978; Forbes, 1984; Oberai, 1981).

Second, unlike in most other developing countries, rural to urban migrants in Saudi Arabia are not channeled into skilled technical and needed manual activities. Instead, the government by virtue of its labor policies, which relies upon the use of expatriate labor, has accommodated the rural and nomadic migrants by expanding its bureaucracy, creating abundant jobs for unskilled Bedouins and rural migrants, and generally shielding the indigenous labor force from the market forces.

Third, Saudi rural-urban migration of the last two decades is characterized by long-term moves of entire families. Certainly, this is different from other developing nations where temporary migration and labor circulation still constitute the norm (Chapman and Prothero, 1982). This type of migration has many ramification for the migrant family and the Saudi society as a whole: 1) contrary to temporary labor migration, where the family of the migrant stays back in the village and continues working the land, the move of the entire

family out of the village eventuates in the abandonment of the land and the continued deterioration of small family agriculture; 2) movement of the entire family to urban areas, which more often than not leads to a permanent residency in urban areas, generally is an irreversible process; and, 3) more importantly, the bringing up of children and young adults in urban setting cuts them of their rural roots, and limits the possibilities of them going back to the village.

My study offers some timely insights into the agrarian transition in Saudi Arabia as rural population shifted its livelihood strategies from subsistence agriculture to a money economy. In particular, it shows that: 1) the patterns of rural-urban migration were greatly affected by the structural transformation of the Saudi economy; 2) the spread of formal education and the creation of off-farm employment opportunities by the state have led to the deterioration of traditional agriculture; and 3) despite the massive build-up in rural infrastructures, creation of government jobs in rural areas, and the institution of numerous incentives to revive traditional agriculture, the rural-urban drift has accelerated, especially after 1971.

Here, we must bring back into question the very nature of government development plans. Undeniably some of the government's programs have delayed potential massive rural drifts to urban centers from the relatively heavily populated rural areas, especially of the south and southwest regions.

These programs, however, did so only through injection of capital, which is electively used by recipients as an income source. Furthermore, the urban orientation of government development schemes, which includes the encouragement of formal education, an occupational structure dominated by civil service jobs, and the general neglect of self-sustaining programs in the rural areas, continues to promote an irreversible rural-urban population drift.

To this end, one may conclude that the Saudi Arabian government's programs in rural areas have not accomplished their main stated goals of raising rural productivity and releasing excess labor to the rural industries that are being planned, and other productive sectors of the economy. To the contrary, they have had the twin impact of enticing rural families out of traditional agriculture while maintaining a largely service oriented, bureaucratic labor force in rural areas.

The implication of these schemes to rural-urban migration is far reaching. The retention of the rural population in the countryside thus far is only made possible through the use of oil revenues in the forms of subsidies, income supplements, and less productive off-farm employment. These while generally have raised the welfare of rural people can only continue so far as there is enough revenues to spend. And as Arafat (1985) points out "Any reduction in spending on the rural people will

erode sense of satisfaction and may gradually lead to a new wave of internal migration" (p. 392).

Another critical implication of this path to socio-economic development is that the Saudi society during the last two decades have, practically, relied upon oil revenues to finance all development projects and maintain a high standard of living especially in urban areas, while abandoning its traditional way of living. The future of this path of development, however, is uncertain. Since 1984, when oil prices plummeted in the international markets, the government began a process of recalculation: 1) it began to cut down on its subsidy and price support programs; 2) its schemes for employment of Saudis were reshaped to the degree that some high school and college graduates are unemployed today; 3) it began to limit the number of admissions to colleges; and 4) it raised payments on various government's services, adding burdens on the unemployed labor force.

One cannot help but to wonder what the Saudi situation will be when the oil sector ceases to deliver; how the millions of young people, who had been brought up in affluence and with little or no productive skills, will survive the struggle for existence under a cruel environment and uncertain geo-political picture; and how can a city like Riyadh, in the middle of a desert, with no raison d'etre but administration, and with over one million people, endure the harsh reality of

resource scarcity when the international prices of oil further fall.

Recommendations for Future Research

The recent socio-economic changes in Saudi Arabia have reshaped the lives of all Saudi people, affecting even the basic values and social organizational aspects of society, such as the concept of the work ethic itself, consumption habits, kinship ties, and the likes. Findings from my study, which focused mainly on rural-urban migration, suggests some relational patterns and social phenomena that I believe merit further research.

I have observed that the very dramatic socio-economic changes in Saudi Arabian society during the past two decades and the concomitant shift to a pattern of long-term permanent-type rural-urban migration have impacted in profound ways on the interpersonal relationships that define rural households and family life in Saudi Arabia. In contemporary Saudi Arabia we are witnessing the emergence of some very important questions relative to the changing pattern of rural-urban migration and the changing structure of the Saudi Arabian family. These may be posed as follows:

1- How has the traditional patriarchic family in Saudi Arabia interacted with and been affected by this new form of rural-urban migration? We need to comprehend the part played by family and kin in channeling and facilitating

rural to urban migration, and at the same time to assess the degree to which the recent geographic redistribution and dispersion of members of the rural family have impacted the structure and the internal dynamics of family life in terms of household roles, norms of reciprocity, patterns of mutual aid, kinship obligations, and decision-making processes relative to work, child-rearing, and community responsibilities.

2- How have governmental programs of human services, such as social welfare, impacted upon the family and upon the individual's feelings of responsibility and loyalty to the family group. Certainly many of these programs have facilitated the free flow of labor from rural to urban areas.

My study, also, revealed that more than ninety percent of the male labor force, both migrants and non-migrants from the village, are presently employed in the government sector; less than five percent are engaged in skilled or semi-skilled jobs. Clearly, this points to a serious question about the country's manpower situation: the heavy reliance on foreign labor at the lower echelons of the occupational structure. This, to many scholars, seems to pose a threat to the sustainability of the Saudi economic system. Is it a situation that is irreversible? Would it not be in the interests of the Saudi state and its people, both now and in the future, to have Saudi citizens occupying all ranks of the occupational structure, including

the lower technical and manual labor positions? Surely the occupational situation in rural villages throughout Saudi Arabia merits special attention.

Questions such as these, which in one way or the other involve the interrelationships between rural migration and societal development, pose enormous challenges to future researchers. Saudi society is experiencing some very basic changes, many of which have been stimulated by governmental programs to build a 'modern' nation. But we need to monitor these changes very carefully, and we need to be especially sensitive to their deeper meanings, if Saudi Arabia is to maximize its human resources and to realize its ultimate potential as a nation.

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