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HE cmL WAR CAREER or JAcola’opLsoupox

. , Thesis for the"'pegree'*of Ph.’D.A__' f . -

‘ . . MICHIGANSTATEUNIVERSITY
‘ ,JERRYLEEBDWER,  

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled _
The Civil War Career of Jacob Dolson Cox
presented by
Jerry L. Bower
has been accepted towards fulfillment

of the requirements for

Ph . D. degree in History

 

Major professor

Date NOV. 5, 1970

 

0-7639

 

 

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ABSTRACT

THE CIVIL WAR CAREER OF
JACOB DOLSON COX

By

Jerry Lee Bower

Jacob Dolson Cox (1828-1900) began his Civil War
career as an Ohio Brigadier General. Despite his lack of
previous military experience and his youthfulness, he devel-
oped into an outstanding officer and earned respect and
praise from his superiors.

Cox saw his first action in western Virginia where
he worked with Generals George B. McClellan, William S.
Rosecrans, and John C. Fremont to secure the area for the
Union. In the fall of 1862 Cox's Kanawha Brigade partici-
pated in the Antietam Campaign. During the Battle of
Antietam Cox directed the successful assault on Burnside's
Bridge. In November, 1862, he was appointed District
Commander in West Virginia, but he desired a transfer to a
more active field of operations. He believed that the
geography of western Virginia precluded a decisive military
victory.

Cox next served (April 14 to December 2, 1863) as

 

the Commander of the District of Ohio. In this capacity he

.helped thwart John H. Morgan's famous raid. In December he

 

 

Jerry Lee Bower

was ordered to the front in East Tennessee. After the Union
army was reorganized in March, 1864, he commanded the Third
Division of the Army of the Ohio, under General John M.
Schofield. Subsequently his division participated in the
Atlanta and Nashville Campaigns. On November 29, 1864, Cox
reached the pinnacle of his military career when he directed
the Federal troops in the bloody Battle of Franklin,
Tennessee. In December, 1864, he was promoted to Major
General upon the recommendations of Generals Schofield,
William T. Sherman, and George H. Thomas.

After the Battle of Nashville, the Army of the Ohio
was transferred to North Carolina. Here Cox assumed command
of the Twenty-third Corps and directed a successful assault
against Goldsboro to prepare a base for Sherman's army. The
reunion was made on March 23, 1865, but the war ended before
further serious contact was made with the Confederates. Cox
resigned his commission in the fall to campaign successfully
for Ohio's governorship on the Union ticket.

Throughout the great conflict Cox placed the Union
cause above personal aspirations. He was a critic of the
army structure and made several recommendations for improv-
ing its efficiency, but his ideas were never tested. Cox's
own promotion to Major General, first considered in 1862,
was delayed for two years by some of the very problems he
underscored. He retained a life-long interest in the Civil

war and wrote several books dealing with the great conflict.

 

 

 

He

1:2: [rd

 

 

Jerry Lee Bower

He also served as a reviewer of military monographs for Th3
Nation for many years.

The major sources used were the Cox Papers, located
at Oberlin College in Ohio; The E§£_g£_£hg_Rebellionz A
Compilation gf'thg_0fficial Records gf EEE.HE$22.§EQ
Confederate Armies, 70 volumes in 128 (washington: General
Printing Office, 1880-1901); and the James A. Garfield
Papers and the John M. Schofield Papers, both in the
Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. Cox's own

books--Military Reminiscences g£_the Civil War, 2 volumes

 

(1900), Atlanta (1882), The March Eg_the Sea: Franklin and

 

————————-————————-——-

November gg, 1§§§_(1897), all published by Charles
Scribner's Sons of New York-~were used extensively. Other
manuscript collections and many secondary works were con-
sulted. A bibliographical essay is included.

This work is divided into eight chapters; six of
these describe Cox's military career. The first chapter
traces Cox's pre-war experiences and the final chapter is a

brief account of his varied post-war activities.

 

 

 

THE CIVIL WAR CAREER 0F
JACOB DOLSON COX

By

Jerry Lee Bower

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of History

1970

 

/l , 7:)
:ré {XL/g I

 

 

@Copyright by
JERRY LEE BOWER
1971

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have received assistance from many people in
preparing this thesis. To all who have given generously of
their time, I extend my heart-felt thanks.

A few people deserve special mention. Miss Lelia F.
Holloway of the Oberlin College Library assisted with the
Cox Papers and helped to locate other collections of Cox
items. Professor Frederick D. Williams served as the
director of my doctoral committee. His patient guidance and
constructive criticisms were very much appreciated. I thank
especially my wife, Donna, for many hours of proofreading
and typing, preparation of maps, and much moral support

throughout this lengthy task.

ii

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF MAPS. .

Chapter
I. EARLY LIFE . . . . . . . .
II. WESTERN VIRGINIA .
III. THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN.
IV. RETURN TO FAMILIAR GROUND: WEST VIRGINIA
ANDO OHIO . . . . . . . .
V. THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN . . .
VI. FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE .
VII. WAR'S END: THE NORTH CAROLINA CAMPAIGN
AND THE OHIO GOVERNORSHIP.
VIII. EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . .

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY .

iii

 

iv

30
7O

98
123
155

188
219
242

 

 

LIST OF MAPS
WEST VIRGINIA AND EASTERN VIRGINIA . . . . . . . . . . . 36
THE KANAWHA VALLEY, 1861 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
ATLANTA CAMPAIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
BATTLE OF NASHVILLE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
FORT FISHER TO WILMINGTON. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

iv

 

 

CHAPTER I
EARLY LIFE

The American Civil War, a cataclysmic event, drove
division and hatred deep into the heart of American society.
The war forced men to make choices they preferred to avoid:
should one take up arms, even if it meant fighting relatives
and friends? The states, as collective bodies of citizens
who held diverse opinions on the issues involved, also faced
a similar, difficult decision. In 1860, as the secession
movement unfolded and war became more and more likely, there
was no such thing as a purely ”Northern" or "Southern" state.

Each state contained some people who would not support the

 

majority decision. Thus men and states alike had to look
hard at their own peculiar circumstances to determine what
stand they should take. Each hoped that he would make the
right choice.

Among the men deeply troubled by the ominous devel-
opments of 1860 was Jacob Dolson Cox, a freshman in the Ohio
Senate from Warren, in Trumbull County. Cox had always
Opposed the spread of slavery. As a student of the ministry
he had decided that the institution was morally wrong; as a
lawyer, practicing on Ohio’s anti-slavery Western Reserve,

he was convinced that slavery's extension was illegal; and

 

as a politician he had continually supported those views

and parties which opposed the extension of slavery. But did
his attitude toward slavery justify the use of force against
the South? Like so many others, Cox, in 1860, reviewed his
personal situation, his family obligations, and his duties
as a citizen in hopes of finding the basis for making a wise
decision.

Jacob Dolson Cox (named after his father) was born
in Montreal, Canada, on October 27, l828. His parents'
usual residence was New York City, but his father's occupa—
tion had brought the family to Canada in the summer of 1828.
The elder Cox was an accomplished building engineer who had
demonstrated great ability in roofing large areas without
the use of internal supports. This skill convinced the
leaders of the Church of Notre Dame in Montreal to employ
him to supervise the roofing of their new church. In 1830,
after the contract was fulfilled, the Cox's returned to New

York City.1

1Unless otherwise indicated, the information in this

Chapter is based upon: William C. Cochran, "The Early Life
and Military Services of General Jacob Dolson Cox, " MSS.
copy in the Cox Papers located in the Oberlin College Library
at Oberlin, Ohio. This source will hereafter be cited as.
Cochran, ELMS. Cochran was Cox' 3 stepson, his mother was
Helen (Finney) Cochran, she married Jacob Cox in l849.A11
subsequent manuscript material cited herein is from the Cox
Papers Oberlin, unless otherwise indicated. Brief sketches
of Cox's life can be found in Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone,
(eds ), The Dictionar of American Bio ra h (20 vols. ; New
York. Charles Scribner? s ons, 305, IV, £76 M78 Ezra J.
Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Un1ver51ty Press,
97-98; and Whitelaw Reid, Ohio in the war: Her Generals and
Soldiers (2 vols. ; Cincinnati: 'Mbore, 'WIlstEEE'E BSIdwin,

, , 770. Hereafter cited as Reid, Ohio in the War.

 

———_— »;_;.,, '

3

Following their return, the Cox family prospered for
several years. Cox found fairly steady employment in the
rapidly developing city, and he was able to provide for the
education of his children. Then the Panic of 1837 struck,
throwing the economy into turmoil and forcing businessmen to
reassess their plans. Among the first cut-backs made, as
businessmen struggled to stabilize their finances, were
those in the building trades. Cox could not find steady
employment, so the family had to cut expenses even to dis-
continuing the formal education of the children.

At the time Jacob was only nine and was probably
unaware of the impact these financial reverses would have
upon him. Until 1837 he had attended a private academy
operated by Rufus Lockwood. There he received a basic edu-

cation in the Classics, the core of almost every curriculum

 

in the Nineteenth Century. _In 1838 his parents, unable to
continue tuition payments, arranged for him to study for a
year under the tutelage of a Congregational minister.
Thereafter, Jacob turned to "private study” partially
directed by graduate students from Columbia University. Cox
later said this period of his education was haphazard and
relatively incomplete.2 He skimmed the surface of many
areas, but really did not concentrate upon preparing himself

for a particular occupation. Nevertheless, he acquired a

 

love for books which continued throughout his life, and a

questioning mind which compelled him to investigate those

 

 

2Cochran, ELMS., 5.

 

 

4

areas of learning where he felt particularly weak.

From his parents Jacob acquired a valuable education
in meeting the demands of everyday living and an ability to
separate the important from the unimportant. His father,
having come to America from Germany, deeply loved this
country for the opportunities it provided. He gave to his
son a professional pride and a spirit of scientific inquiry.
The elder Cox's talent was revealed in Jacob who became,
after the Civil War, a recognized authority on the architec—
tural styles of European churches.3 Jacob's mother, Thedia
Kenyon Cox, was a deeply religious woman, who ably trans-
mitted her feelings to her family. From her, Cox gained
sufficient interest in religion to lead him to study for the
ministry.

In 1842, at age fourteen, Cox began to train for a
profession. He chose law, a selection that was undoubtedly
influenced by the prestigious role lawyers played in
American society. He worked as a clerk in a New York law
office where his main duties were to file papers and to
verify legal points in the law library. In 1845, his plans
went awry when the partners fell to squabbling among them-
selves, eventually dissolving the firm. These developments
abruptly ended Cox's legal studies. Needing employment, he
went to work for Anthony Lane, a stock broker. In Lane's
office Cox learned to keep books and obtained a rudimentary

knowledge of business practices. Even though he quickly

 

 

3Dictionary pf American Biography, IV, 477.

 

 

 

 

 

5

mastered his duties and drew praise from his employer, Cox
was unhappy and frustrated.4

During the winter of 1845-46 Cox finally settled
upon a plan for his immediate future which appeared to
promise more permanence than anything he had previously
attempted. From the autumn of 1842, when he had attended
several revival meetings conducted in New York City by
Charles G. Finney, he had been drawn toward the ministry.
About a year later he had joined the Congregational Church
of Samuel D. Cochran, a graduate of Oberlin College, who
urged him to enroll in that Ohio school. After giving the
matter careful consideration he reached a decision, influ-
enced no doubt by his mother's attitude (she was delighted
at the prospect of her son becoming a minister), and by the
fact that Finney was President of the College. He deter-
mined to study at Oberlin.

In the spring Cox and a younger brother, Kenyon, set

out for Oberlin. They travelled to Buffalo on a freight

 

4Shortly after leaving Lane's employ Cox made
another ill-fated attempt to find a suitable occupation. As
a lad Cox had fallen in love with the majestic sailing ves-
sels which constantly moved in and out of New York harbor.
Like many others he yearned to see the world as a crew
member aboard a fast-sailing packet ship. But his mother
refused to give her permission--surely sailors were not good
Christians! After many tearful family discussions, however,
consent was given and all the arrangements were made. Cox
purchased a sea-chest, stocked it with sailor's clothing and
other equipment, and placed it on board. Before departing
he decided to pay one last visit to the family, for he
expected to be away at least a year. When he returned to
the dock at the appointed hour, he discovered the captain,
taking advantage of favorable tides and currents, had
already put out to sea. Cox was utterly dejected, but his
mother was elated with the turn of events.

 

 

barge via the Erie Canal. The accommodations were poor and
the pace terribly slow. The barges were designed for
freight rather than people; the passengers often slept on
top of boxes on the deck rather than in the stifling
quarters where the bunks were so closely spaced that one had
to get out of bed to change position. At Buffalo the
brothers transferred to a steamer for the trip across Lake
Erie to Cleveland. But the most grueling travel was between
Cleveland and Oberlin; the only conveyance was a hard-spring
stagecoach which physically tormented the passengers as it
bounced from rut to rut. After a week, excluding Sunday
when Oberlin students were not allowed to travel, the Cox's
reached their destination.5

Following a brief rest, the brothers met with
President Finney and discussed their academic plans. Jacob
discovered that before he could enter the Theological
Department he had to earn a Bachelor of Arts degree. Finney,
who was cordial and encouraging, arranged for them to take
a series of entrance examinations. Both passed and were
enrolled as freshmen.

As Cox settled into the college routine, he was
struck by the sharp contrast between Oberlin and New York

City. In 1846 Oberlin was a pioneer village of about 1,700

 

 

5Although Cox did not leave a record of how he and
Kenyon travelled to Oberlin, the college did keep records
ghich reveal that most Eastern Etugenis EOIIIWEd ghis route.
0 ert S. Fletcher, A Histor o 0 er in Co e e rom Its
Foundation Throu h the CiViI W5? 12 VOIS.; OEerIin, Ohid?
er in o Iege, [9537, II, 537338. Hereafter cited as
Fletcher, History g§_0berlin College.

 

 

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIr_____________IEa_-____________________-_“‘-_'"”

7
residents, including the college students. Most of the
people depended upon agriculture for their livelihood,
although a demand for goods and services had attracted mer-
chants, blacksmiths, carpenters, an inn-keeper, and a
variety of other tradesmen. Oberlin had been founded in
1833 by Easterners, mostly from New York, under the
Presbyterian-Congregational Plan of Union which hoped to
promote Christian principles on the frontier by making reli-
gion the rallying point for new settlements. Oberlin had
only four streets when Cox arrived-—two running east and
west, and two laid out north and south, thus forming a large
square. The college was the focal point of the square. The
streets were unpaved; rain turned them into quagmires,
threatening wagons and pedestrians with a sticky fate should
they wander innocently from the safe track. Some boardwalks
had been built, but they were often in bad repair and pre-
sented their own hazards. Village women and college girls
often complained that their long skirts were torn by loose
boards and nails. Another common sight greeting Oberlinites
on their daily routine was stray animals--cows, hogs, sheep--
pursuing their quest for grass on the village lawns. Vil-
lage ordinances, of course, required the penning of all
animals but enforcement of the law was lax. Occasionally a
stray wandered into Tappen Hall, the main college building,
and upset the classes. In retaliation the college men would
round up all the strays, pen them on the square, and threaten

to hold an auction unless the owners claimed their livestock

 

 

 

 

 

 

posthaste.6

Because religion had been the driving force in the
founding of the village, community life centered around the
Oberlin Congregational Church and the college it had organ-
ized in 1833. Despite the residents' common background in
religion, they soon deviated from the original Presbyterian-
Congregational Plan to establish an independent church
organization. In 1835, at a meeting of the Western Reserve
Congregational churches, the Oberlin representatives led the
way in forming the "General Association of the Western
Reserve." The issue was organizational. The Congregational-
Presbyterian plan established a board of elders to oversee
the operation of several churches. But the General
Association decided in favor of a purely congregational
structure which allowed each church to determine independ-
ently its policies. This action stamped Oberlin as a radi-
cal community, a reputation which earned more merit as time
passed, not only in religion, but also on the issues of
slavery, Negro rights, and co-educational colleges.7

The Oberlin Collegiate Institute had opened its
doors in 1833 as a "manual training school.” The college
promised to provide, in addition to its academic program,
sufficient employment to enable students to finance their
education; but the college often failed to make good this

promise, and many students had to seek employment outside

 

 

61bid., 1, 102-116; 11, 552, 555-57, 560-61.
71bid., 1, 184-85, 219-21, 236-56.

 

 

 

 

9
the school. In 1835 the Board of Trustees created the
School of Theology to complement the undergraduate program,
and Reverend Finney was employed as the first Professor of
Theology. Finney's reputation as a religious leader was

well-established, and he drew many students to Oberlin.8

 

These facts help explain why Cox came to Oberlin; he
expected to earn money for his college expenses and he had
been inspired by Finney to train for the ministry.

The college offered two terms of study per academic
year; the Fall term ran from mid-August until December, and
the Spring term from March until June. The course of study
was rigorous, centering, even in the undergraduate program,
upon subjects closely related to religion. Every Oberlin

student studied Hebrew and was required not only to read the

 

New Testament in that language, but to give recitations in
Hebrew during the senior year. When Cox arrived the curric-
ulum was undergoing change, moving from the traditional
Greek and Roman classics tOWard more "Christian" literature,
such as Hebrew poetry and the poems of various English
authors. The science courses, psychology, anatomy, and
physiology, were all directed toward demonstrating the
proper way for a Christian to use his mind and body for the
advancement of God's Kingdom. This brief list does not
begin to include all the required subjects and, considering
the other demands on the students' time, one wonders how

they managed. Besides going to classes, each day they had

__

81bid., 1, 117-41, 167-78, 180-81; 11, 509-10.

 

 

10

to attend two chapel services, participate in formal evening
religious discussions, work several hours and, somehow,
devote a few hours to study in their rooms.9
A major problem for Cox and most Oberlin students
was earning enough money to remain in school. In 1846, the
"official costs" for the academic year were seventy-five
dollars: tuition, fifteen dollars; board, forty dollars;
room, four to six dollars; and incidentals, fourteen to six-
teen dollars. Cox accepted a number of different jobs as he
attempted to meet his expenses; during one term he baked all
the bread consumed in the college dining hall, a task which
demanded much work in the early morning hours before most
students arose. In 1851, as a graduate student, Cox received
18-3/4 cents per hour for teaching algebra to undergraduates.
During the long winter vacations, from December to March, he
sought employment which would enable him to save a few
dollars. A teaching position was the best way to achieve
the objective. Teaching was especially desirable because it
kept one indoors and somewhat protected from the elements,
but it was a demanding occupation. Cox reported that he had
to instruct forty to fifty pupils, with varying abilities,
in geography, grammar, and spelling. Moreover the advanced
pupils were to receive instruction in Latin, Greek, chemis-
try and rhetoric. Such a task, Cox admitted, demanded broad

knowledge, patience, and strict discipline; for which he

 

 

91bid., I, 207-13, 366-68.

 

 

11

might earn from sixteen to twenty dollars per month.10

Late in 1847 Cox met and began to court Helen Finney
Cochran, the recently widowed daughter of Reverend Finney.
Helen had married William Cochran, an Oberlin theological
student, in 1846. Soon thereafter the couple moved to New
York City where William assumed the pastorate of his
brother's Congregational church. Not long after they were
settled, William contracted a respiratory ailment which grew
steadily worse until it claimed his life. Thus it was a
distraught Helen who, with her infant son, returned home to
Oberlin.

Hoping to relieve her distress, the Finney's held a
reception in Helen's honor for the college faculty and stu-
dents. At this event Cox met his future wife for the first
time. Helen was beautiful. Long dark hair framed her
lovely face and sparkling eyes. But she was obviously sad-
dened by the death of her husband; Cox hated to see someone
so young carry such a heavy burden. He decided to cheer her
up. He called upon Helen and took her to chapel services
and to the evening discussions. Cox was fascinated with the
baby and spent many hours entertaining the infant. He had
always loved children, and his own sons remembered him as a
kindly, yet strict father. Although Cox soon knew he loved
Helen, he believed that he could not take on the added
responsibilities of husband and father until he had com-

pleted his education. In November, 1848, he went to say

_

101bid., 11, 589, 615-22, 629; Cochran, 121.113., 9-10,

 

 

 

 

 

 

12

goodbye to Helen before beginning teaching duties during the
winter vacation. As they talked Cox realized that he could
not bear the thought of the long separation without some
permanent plan to Spur him on. Their engagement was
announced that evening. One year later, on Thanksgiving
Day, they were married by Reverend Finney with almost the
entire community in attendance. Shortly thereafter Cox
adopted Helen's son and the little family settled down.

In view of his new obligations Cox decided to
accelerate his studies. Shortly after the wedding he and
Helen moved in with the Finney's, thereby reducing expenses
and freeing Cox to spend more time with his books. In 1850
he received his baccalaureate degree and plunged directly
into his graduate program. During his study of ”systematic
theology" and of the Greek and Hebrew Exegesis, Cox encoun-
tered religious questions which nagged at his mind. The
most distressing question concerned free will. Did God
intend that a Christian should exercise free will, or was
everything foreordained? Cox wrote long letters to Oberlin
theology graduates seeking their advice on this important
issue. Of course he received conflicting answers to his
queries, and it became clear that he had to make up his own
mind.11

Cox was not alone in raising questions regarding

11Cox's most consistent correspondents on these
topics were Thomas H. Robinson, John A. R. Rogers, and John
W. Ellis, all Oberlin graduates who were now serving

Congregational churches. Copies of Cox's letters may be
found in Letter Book 1.

 

 

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII::_____________________1Iiillliiifi‘“_—_________““ ”m' ”flr*

13
Oberlin's particular interpretation of Christian free will.
In fact, Oberlin's attitude toward this subject caused great
controversy among the Presbyterian and Congregational
churches in the North during the 1840's. Critics openly
berated Oberlin's "peculiar heresy.” What Finney and the
Theological Department had done was reject John Calvin's
doctrine of election and accept in its place a "belief in
human ability" or free will. The Oberlin doctrine taught
that sinners were responsible for their transgressions and
their atonement, and were free to accept or reject salvation.
This View hit directly at Calvin's belief that God chose,
God acted, and no individual could change God's decision.
The Oberlinites argued that a Christian could perfect him-
self by leading a life acceptable to Christ, and in this
fashion the sinner could achieve sanctification, or accept-
ance in the eyes of God. They did not contend that sancti-
fication, once achieved, ruled out the commission of all sin
by the sanctified person; but it did provide the sinner with
a better opportunity to perceive his own errors and to make
a new peace with God. Many Northern churches, particularly
the Presbyterians, rejected this "peculiar heresy" as con-

trary to the Scriptures and they refused to permit Oberlin

 

graduates to occupy their pulpits or to allow members of
Oberlinite churches to transfer their membership unless they
Specifically renounced this doctrine.12

Cox's letters on this issue reveal that he never

”Fletcher, Histogy g Oberlin College, 1, 223-28.

 

L—r p-42... -. ,- m, ”K11. g, "

14

clearly decided one way or the other; he wanted to accept
the Oberlin doctrine but his studies of the original Hebrew
and Greek Scriptures raised substantial doubts. In 1851 he
began to argue with his father-in-law over the free will
issue. Reverend Finney had recently returned from a disap-
pointing revival tour in England and was deeply concerned
about the poor condition of the Christian faith. Naturally
he did not expect to have to defend his views in his own
household and hot words were exchanged with Cox. During
one of their stormy arguments Finney exclaimed, ”Dolson, you
are not honest. You do not want to see the truth."13 That
remark settled it. Cox could not continue study at Oberlin
if he, as a theological student, was not allowed to arrive
at the truth by questioning basic doctrines. Although this
decision ended Cox's formal academic career, it marked the
beginning of the intellectual independence which typified
the remainder of his life. He was unwilling to accept ideas
just because they were popular or promoted by someone with
authority; instead he preferred to interpret facts independ-
ently and draw his own conclusions.

Shortly after abandoning plans for the ministry, Cox

discovered that warren, Ohio, was seeking a Superintendent

 

of Schools. He applied for the position and was accepted.
Helen packed their meager possessions and the family moved
to Warren, where Cox began his duties in the fall of 1851.

Warren, located on Ohio's Western Reserve, was, like

13Cochran, ELMS., 13.

 

 

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII7________________________—____—"t‘__________________

15
Oberlin, a small community dependent mainly upon agriculture
for its economic livelihood. But the town had a woolen
cloth manufacturing firm, several small furniture factories,
a machine works, and the Western Reserve Bank. Two news-

papers served Warren--the Western figserve Chronicle, a free-

 

soil Whig publication, and the NgwgfLetter, begun by
Jacksonian Democrats in the 1830's as a rebuttal to the
Chronicle. The presence of these newspapers attested to
Warren's importance in the political affairs of the Western
Reserve.14
Warren's schools had expanded considerably in the
1840's; three frame ”district” schoolhouses had been built
in 1844-45 to meet the needs of elementary education. In
1849, under a new state law which facilitated the operation
of local school districts, a high school was added to the
district and M. D. Leggett became Warren's first Superin-
tendent at an annual salary of $700. Leggett's resignation
created the vacancy which Cox filled in 1851 at a stipend of
$600. No doubt Cox's youthfulness and lack of experience
explain the lower salary, and he served in this capacity for

three years without receiving more money. The Superin-

 

tendent's duties were vast; he had to coordinate the curric-
ulum, hire and discipline the teachers, and urge the tax-
payers to give adequate monetary support to the schools.

The last task was the most difficult, as school taxes were

 

 

14History of Trumbull and whonin Counties, with
Illustrations and Bio ra hical Sketches ZévoIs Cleveland:
1 1ams and rot er, 825, I, 240- 45, 250- 59, 268- 72.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII7_________________________________I’“‘__—_______________"w ' ~:11-"

l6

levied and collected separately from the town taxes; some-

times the school district had to sue reluctant taxpayers.15

In Warren the Cox's resided in a rented house on
Elm Street, near the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Elm

ll

Street, one of the town's newer "developments, was little

 

more than a trail through a dense stand of trees. At night,
even during a full moon, so little light penetrated the
thicket that Cox had to feel his way along a rail fence to
get home. The residents of Warren later recalled that the
Superintendent did not even own an overcoat, and in the
coldest weather he was seen hurrying down the street with
only a cape draped over his shoulders.16 Perhaps this
explains Cox's reputation for having a quick stride and long
gait when walking--with such light attire he had to hurry
from place to place to avoid freezing!

Although official duties were time consuming, Cox
began immediately to renew his law studies. He arranged to
study with M. D. Leggett, his predecessor as Superintendent.
At the time it was relatively simple for a man to become a
lawyer; Ohio required two year's study under a licensed

lawyer or a certificate from the Cincinnati Law School. Cox

 

followed the former course, was admitted to the Ohio bar in

March, 1853, and began a brief partnership with Leggett.

 

 

15Harriet Taylor Upton, A Twentieth Century History
Of Trumbull County, Ohio. A Narrative Account 0 ts

His toricaI Pro ress, Its Peo 1e and Its Princi IE'l.nterests
§§9v8I3.; Chicago. The Lewis PuhIIshin ng Co. , I909], I,
- 3

 

161bid., 1, 293.

 

 

 

 

17
The legal profession, the most highly esteemed occupation in
Ohio in the 1850's, often served as a stepping-stone into
politics.17

The first three years of practice were the most
difficult for the neophyte lawyer. Cox complained bitterly
that he could not establish a rewarding business until he
had proven his ability, yet he needed clients to establish
his reputation. By 1856, however, his practice had so
improved that he could revamp his finances and arrange to
purchase the house he had occupied since arriving in warren.
That same year he entered into a new partnership with John
Hutchins, another warren lawyer.

Despite the many demands on his time, Cox became
involved in community affairs which brought him popular
recognition and eventually, it appears, helped to involve
him in Ohio politics. Warren did not have a Congregational
church, but the local Presbyterian church operated on the
congregational form of government and its membership was
composed of both Presbyterians and Congregationalists. He
and his family attended services at this church, and he
directed the choir. He further displayed his musical tal-

ents by playing violin in a trio which often entertained at

community affairs. In 1854 Cox organized a small "Home

 

 

l7Eu ene H. Roseboom, The Histor of the State of
Ohio: The Civil war Era, 1850- 3 lCqumhfisT—_Ohio StEEe
KrchaeoIhgicaI and-HigfhricaI Society, 1944), 205-206.
Hereafter cited as Roseboom, Ohio: Civil war Era. Roseboom
lists Salmon P. Chase, John Sherman, Rutheffhrd—F. Hayes,
James A. Garfield and Cox as examples of Ohio lawyers who
achieved prominence in politics.

 

 

 

 

 

18

Literary Union." It met periodically to discuss world lit-
erature and to comment upon the members' literary efforts.
Whenever a member's article or poem was published by a local
newspaper, a celebration was held in the author's honor.
Cox also served as a speaker for a variety of occasions. In
1853, for example, he discussed ”Music” at a band convention,
talked about "Fairs" before the Trumbull County Agricultural
Society, and described the “Emancipation of Science" before
the Salem (Ohio) Teachers Association.18

Cox's interest in public affairs gradually drew him
into politics. He began his political career as an anti-
slavery Whig and, as might be expected, later transferred
his allegiance to the Republican party. Undoubtedly Cox's
environment shaped his opinion on slavery. Oberlin College
strongly opposed human bondage and was one of the first
Northern schools to allow colored students to enroll (as
early as 1835). Cox saw fellow students, in spite of open
hostility, found and operate elementary schools for free and
fugitive Negroes; Reverend Finney often struck out against
slavery as an inhuman and un-Christian institution. More-
over the Oberlin Congregational church demanded, as its
membership certificate clearly stated, an anti-slave "con-
fession" as a requirement for joining.19 His move from

Oberlin to warren did nothing to change his mind. 0n the

 

 

18Cochran, ELMS., 16A-16B.

386 19Fletcher, Histogy of Oberlin College, 1, 254-56,
-400. “'

 

 

 

l9
contrary, Cox's views were strengthened because the entire
Western Reserve was violently anti-slave. Warren, itself,
contained many people from the South who had fled a society
that condoned human bondage. To put it bluntly, Warren was
no place for anyone who did not oppose slavery.20 Thus when
Cox began to participate actively in politics, his views
meshed admirably with the prevailing sentiments.

Before we go further in tracing Cox's political
activities, it would be well to comment generally upon the
structure of Ohio politics. As of 1848, when slavery emerged
as the paramount issue, the state contained three distinct
party organizations--Whig, Democrat, and Free-Soil. All
were essentially opposed to the extension of slavery and had
supported the Northern efforts to apply the Wilmot Proviso
to the territories acquired from Mexico in 1848. In terms
of power the Whigs had dominated Ohio since 1844 and had
managed a succession of victories in the state elections.

By 1850, however, forces were at work which would shatter
Whig unity and create conditions favorable to the formation
of a new party unquestionably committed to an anti-slavery
platform.21

The issue which threw Ohio Whiggery into turmoil was

2OGcorge H. Porter, Ohio Politics Durin the Civil
war, Columbia University StuHIEE’Ih‘HIEEEryj-EhhnhfiicE—Ehd
u ic Law, Number 105 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1911), 15-16.

21For the general discussion of Ohio politics I have

relied upon Roseboom, Ohio: Civil War Era, Chapters IX-XII;
see also Porter, Ohio PoIitics Daring the Civil War, 20-75,

 

 

1, , . , z ., :11. j,

20
California's request, in 1850, for admission to the Union as
a free state. Naturally the Ohio Whigs supported this
request and were gratified when President Zachary Taylor,
also a Whig, agreed to support the request. But the sena-
tors and representatives from the Southern states reacted
violently to the proposal because the future of slavery was,
as they saw it, at stake. To admit California as a free
state would destroy the tenuous balance that had been main-
tained in the Senate between free and slave states; and
there was no other territory which would, in the foreseeable
future, become a slave state to restore the parity. Thus
threatened, the Southerners forced a broad discussion of the

slaver issue and the federal government's res onsibilit
Y P Y

 

for protecting the institution. President Taylor, however,
refused to budge; he wanted California admitted solely on
the merits of her request and would not allow the broader
slavery issue to interfere. But before the problem was
resolved, President Taylor died (July, 1850) and Millard
Fillmore succeeded him.

Northern Whigs waited, with foreboding, to learn
Fillmore's position on California. Finally he accepted
Henry Clay's compromise measures. Clay's major recommenda-
tions were that California be admitted as a free state, that
the New Mexico and Utah territories be organized without
restrictions on slavery, and that a stronger federal fugi-
tive slave law be enacted. These proposals offered some-

thing to each section, but their impact in Ohio was a

 

 

21

bombshell. The Whigs were caught in a dilemma; on a state
level they believed they should take an anti-slavery stance
and oppose the compromise, but to do so would mean repudia-
tion of the national Whig policy and a concurrent loss in
federal patronage. Eventually the Ohio Whigs supported the
Compromise of 1850 as a means of preserving the Union but
they tried desperately to tone down the emphasis on slavery.
The evasive policy, however, did not work; the party lost
members to both the Democrats and the Free-Soilers.

While tension mounted the Ohio Democracy pursued a
policy of watching and waiting. But once Clay's compromise
measures were passed, they moved rapidly to exploit the
Whig's embarrassment. The Democrats denounced the decision
to allow slavery to expand into the New Mexico and Utah
territories and bitterly assailed the new federal fugitive
slave law. By these tactics the Ohio Democrats assumed a
hard anti-slavery position and gained enough votes to elect
Judge Reuben Wood governor in November, 1850.

The Free-Soil party never had a large following, but
for several years its few members in the Ohio legislature
held the balance of power between the Democrats and Whigs.
0n slavery, the Free-Soilers were the most outspoken and
their radicalism undoubtedly explains their failure to
develop greater strength. Like the Democrats, they exper-
ienced an increased popularity after 1850. In 1851, these
two parties united to elect Benjamin F. Wade, from the

western Reserve, a United States Senator. Wade's well

 

 

—————_flflm 2-- W P

22
publicized anti-slave views provided the basis for the inter-
party cooperation, and his election reflected the majority
sentiment in Ohio.

Until 1854 the Democrats enjoyed almost complete
control over state offices; then they ran afoul of the same
issue which had crippled the Whigs. In January, 1854,
Senator Stephen A. Douglas, a Democrat from Illinois, intro-
duced into Congress the Kansas~Nebraska Act which would
organize the two territories and allow the residents to
decide about slavery through the use of popular sovereignty.
The real problem was that the bill, in its final form,
specifically repealed that part of the Missouri Compromise

which prohibited slavery north of 36° 30'. Thus an area the

 

North had long considered free territory was suddenly thrown
open to slavery, at least until an election was held. The
impact of this measure in Ohio shattered traditional polit-
ical alliances and created fertile ground for the formation
of an anti-Nebraska coalition.

Anti-Nebraska protest meetings began in February,
1854, and increased in intensity when it became apparent
that the Douglas proposal would receive congressional
approval. These rallies were sponsored and attended by Free-
Soilers, "Free Democrats," "Independent Democrats," and out-
right abolitionists. The largest gathering met in the state
capital, Columbus, in February and adopted a resolution
calling for a state convention of all dissidents. The con-

vention, held in Columbus on March 22, failed to agree upon

 

 

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII:_______________________________—________—“"“___________IA‘I ’W"F'

23

the formation of an anti-Nebraska party. But after the
Douglas bill was approved in May, the call for a "fusion
ticket" was renewed. A second state convention met in
Columbus on July 13, 1854. This time a slate of anti-
Nebraska candidates was nominated for federal and state
offices. Although a party name was not formally adopted,
the fusion newspapers began to refer to their candidates as
"Republican nominees." In November each of the anti—
Nebraska candidates won by a sizeable margin; the success
convinced the fusionists to establish a permanent party
organization.

In 1855 the anti-slavery groups officially organized

the Republican Party. At this point Cox's participation in

 

politics can be documented. He had been active in the anti-
Nebraska movement on the Reserve, because some of the best
attended meetings were held in Warren. Cox's participation
led to his selection as Warren's delegate to the state con-
vention held in Columbus on July 13, 1855.22 At this con-
vention the Republican name was officially adopted, an anti-
slave platform was written, and Salmon P. Chase was chosen
to lead a slate of candidates for state offices. In addi-
tion, the Ohio party called for a national Republican conven-
tion to select a presidential candidate.

The Chase-led ticket swept Ohio in 1855 and the

Republicans gained a majority in the state legislature. In

22Histor of Trumbull and Mahoning Counties I 194
286-87; Cochran, EffiS., I3. ’ ,

 

 

 

24

the following year the state's Republicans supported the
nomination of John C. Fremont. And in the presidential cam-
paign following his nomination, Cox stumped Ohio's Western
Reserve for Fremont. These efforts increased Cox's stature
within the party and enhanced his reputation with the voters
on the Reserve. In 1857 and 1858 he campaigned for
Republican nominees for state and federal offices. As a
result of all this, Cox emerged as a potential candidate
for the state senatorship from the Trumbull and Mahoning
district in 1859. Although he specifically requested that
he not be nominated, when the Republican senatorial conven-
tion met in Niles on August 22, 1859, a delegate from warren
placed Cox's name in contention. Cox rapidly gained
strength over his six opponents and was nominated on the
third ballot. Cox did not attend the convention and the
first inkling he had of what occurred was when a Warren
delegate knocked on his door and asked him to go to Niles.
During the hectic five mile ride, Cox was informed of the
Convention's decision and, upon arrival, presented a brief
acceptance speech. He campaigned actively during the next
two months and was elected by a comfortable margin as the
REPUblicans continued their mastery of the state offices.23
Cox assumed his seat in the Ohio Senate in January,

1860, and remained there until the Civil War erupted. Here
______________7

23William C. Cochran, "The Western Reserve and the
Fugitive Slave Law," Western Reserve Historical Soc1ety

Collections, Publication—fififiber IOI (Cleveland: n.p-,
19205, 2077208.

 

 

 

25

he formed friendships with leading Ohioans, who later helped
promote his military career. In Columbus, Cox roomed with
James A. Garfield, another freshman senator. The two men
became close friends and they generally agreed on political
issues, but Garfield did say he wished that Cox would be
more emphatic in presenting his ideas. Cox also made
acquaintances with Governor Salmon P. Chase, who served from
1856-60, and William Dennison, who succeeded Chase as gover-
nor in 1860.

Cox's senatorial career was relatively brief, so
his opinions on many issues never clearly emerged. But he
did express himself on slavery and secession, which became
critical issues after Lincoln's election in November, 1860.
Cox was recognized as a member of the ”Radical Triumvirate"
in the senate, which also included Garfield and Senator
James Monroe of Oberlin.24 These three men were steady in
their denunciation of slavery and its evils. Actually Cox's
raputation as a radical is overemphasized for it appears
that he was simply reflecting the views of the Western
Reserve and of a majority of Republicans in Ohio. He was,
it is true, opposed to the spread of slavery, but not a
shred of evidence exists to suggest that he was an aboli-
Zionist. Cox did not even favor equality for Negroes. When
Ln 1865 he was a candidate for Ohio's governorship, he
Bfused to support a demand for amending Ohio's constitution

D allow Negroes to vote.
\

24Cochran, ELMS., l8.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

26

Cox's attitude toward secession, in contrast to his

unwavering opposition to slavery, changed as the events

unfolded. In November, 1860, shortly after Lincoln's elec-

tion, Cox predicted it would be only a few months before

the worst of the Southern "fire-eaters" left the Union. At

the time he was so exasperated with their conduct that he

would little lament their departure because their constant

a itation made them an "unmiti ated nuisance." Cox thou ht,
8 8 g

however, that only South Carolina and Georgia would actually

take the fateful step of secession.25 If his predictions

had proven correct, Cox would have let the rebels go in

peace because he thought they would soon see the disadvan-

tage of their position and seek contrite readmission. It

was, Cox believed, an opportunity to teach the radical fire-

eaters a valuable lesson. But when the secession movement

expanded to include several Southern states, Cox's opinion

shifted. If secession meant disruption of the Union and

armed resistance to federal authority, he was ready to

fight. When that issue arose, he was among those Ohioans

who urged the state to fight for the preservation of the

Union.
Nevertheless, despite his own convictions, Cox
realized that his responsibility was more than just per-

sonal. Since he was a state senator, the broad impact of

the developing crisis upon the state must be considered.

 

 

25Cox to J. A. R. Rogers, November 29, 1860, Letter
Book 1.

 

 

27

Geographically Ohio was a northern state, but her develop-

ment had brought within her borders all shades of opinion

on slavery and secession. North of the old National Road an

anti-slavery sentiment prevailed because most of the set-

tlers had arrived from Northern states. Moreover the eco-

nomic connections of this area were with the North and

farmers regularly shipped their produce east via railroads

or the Erie Canal for sale in the urban areas. Ohio was

beginning to develop some industry--for example coal and
iron deposits in Cox's Trumbull and Mahoning district were

just beginning to be exploited--and these developments were

strengthening the ties with the North. But southern Ohio

presented a different picture. This area contained mostly

Southerners and although they, too, opposed the institution

of slavery, they were not convinced that the use of force

against the South was justified. In addition, businessmen

operating in the southern portion of the state, especially

 
    
   
  
  

Cincinnati, had extensive economic connections with the

lave states located below the Ohio River. Thus Ohio, Cox

believed, would face a difficult decision if she had to

choose sides in a civil conflict. Most of the evidence

Jointed toward support for the North, but such a decision
vould not be unanimous, and the dissidents, if they so

lecided, could cause serious trouble.26

By 1860 Cox had achieved a large measure of success.

 

26Porter, Ohio Politics During the Civil War, 13-14;
oseboom, Ohio: CiViI ar ra, , , 17-13, 7 '79:
02-103, lO7-I13.

 

 

28

ad established a law practice in Warren and he was a
er of the Ohio Senate. But he had done little that pre—
d him for the military career which he followed for the
four years. In the spring of 1860 Governor Dennison
appointed Cox 3 Brigadier General of the Ohio militia.
the state forces had been inactive since the Mexican
so this position gave Cox no opportunity to develop
tary skills or leadership ability. In fact Cox's
nds in warren thought the appointment a great oppor-
ty to tease the "General.” They purchased several old
tary books and presented them to Cox in a hilarious
nony during one of his visits at home. Curious, Cox
the books and, his interest aroused, purchased more to
V. This was the sum total of his preparation for Civil
Leadership; he had read a few books dealing with mili-
operations.27 But Cox's lack of military experience
ot unique. Allan Nevins has noted that the very size
e Civil War, and the dearth of trained leaders, caused

  
  
  
  

civilians to rise to high position during the conflict.

27Cochran, ELMS., 20-21. Cochran also listed some
books which Cox read, among them were: Muller's
Forbe's Manual, Carlyle's Cromwell,
Tactics, and Jomini7§_——__'
and Nagoleon. Cox

y te wor s on military
8 and strategy were in French, a language he had not

d. He bought himself a dictionary and learned enough
to read it rather well. But his Paris-trained son,

, said that Cox could not converse in French. None-

8, by his efforts Cox read some books which even grad-
of West Point had only heard about in their studies.
necdote is based on a letter: Allyn Cox to the author,

4, 1967.

 
 
 
 
  

on

     
   
 
  
    

 

29

”Nobody could say in after years that John A. Logan, Jacob

D. Cox, Carl Schurz, Lew wallace, Joshua Chamberlain and

James A. Garfield were not capable generals."28

 

 

28Allan Nevins, The War for the union: The
m rovised war (New York. —Cfia rles Scribner 3 Sons, 1959),

 

7"

 

 

CHAPTER II
WESTERN VIRGINIA

Abraham Lincoln's victory in the 1860 presidential
election plunged the nation into a crisis. The South had
warned that the election of a Republican would be consid-
ered just cause for secession; on December 20, 1860, South
Carolina left the Union. By February six other states had
followed her ominous example and they formed the Confederate
States of America. Thus, when Lincoln was inaugurated he
assumed a heavy burden. He tried conciliation, but the
‘Confederates refused to discuss anything short of an abso-
lute guarantee for slavery. That Lincoln would not grant,
or even consider.

By April the crisis was coming to a head. All fed-
eral property in the lower South had been seized except for
Fort Pickens at Pensacola and three forts, including Sumter,
in Charleston Harbor. Florida officials did allow the fed-

ral government to land provisions at Pickens, but South
arolina refused to make a similar arrangement. Instead
he demanded an immediate evacuation of the federal troops.
incoln must act soon to replenish the supplies at Fort
umter or the garrison would be forced to surrender.

In Ohio the Senate attempted to operate as usual.

30

_a —p

31
But the Senators, preoccupied with the national crisis,
found it difficult to concentrate on routine business. On
April 12 an excited Senator burst into the chamber and
announced: "The Secessionists are bombarding Fort Sumter.”1
The American Civil war had begun. Amidst great confusion
the Senate immediately adjourned. The men gathered in small
groups and excitedly discussed how the war might affect
their careers.

During the tense days after the fall of Sumter, Cox
pondered his personal response to the war. He was convinced
that the Union must be restored. But he also knew many
problems stood in the way of volunteering his services.

His large family,2 sizable debts, and questionable health
all gave him pause. Although only thirty-two, his pale com-
plexion and slight build made Cox appear almost sickly to
nmny of his associates. Garfield, especially, urged him not
to volunteer, saying: "I am big and strong, . . . I shall

have no excuse for not enlisting; but you are slender and

 

. . 1Jacob Dolson Cox, Military 33miniscences of the
Civ11 War (2 vols.; New York: Charles’SCriEfier‘s Sons,
[5557, , 2. Hereafter cited as Cox, Reminiscences.

2m: this time Cox had six children: William
ochran, Helen Finney, Jacob Dolson III, Kenyon, Charles
orton, and Brewster, who was born in January, 1861 and died
he following December. Two other children, Dennison (who

lso died in infancy) and Charlotte Hope were born after the
ar.

 

 

 

 

32
will break down."3 After hours of discussion, however, both
men offered to raise companies and to serve as their com-
manders. But Cox was chosen for a larger role when, on
April 23, he was appointed an Ohio Brigadier General by

4

Governor Dennison. Cox accepted and arranged to have

 

friends in Warren look after his family.

Cox’s first duty, in cooperation with Major General
George B. McClellan, was to inspect Ohio's arsenal and mili-
tary installations to determine what must be done to put the
state on an adequate military footing. The inspection did
not take long, for at the arsenal only a few rusty muskets
and worn-out batteries were found. The state militia

existed in name only, the long period of peace having caused

 

the public to lose interest in keeping the units fit for
combat. McClellan and Cox reported that everything was
needed, and immediately! Surely this was an inauspicious
beginning. They drew up requisitions for supplies to equip

ten thousand men and laid plans to begin training the first

 

3Frederick D. Williams, editor, The Wild Life of the
Army: The Civil War Letters 9f_James A;fGErfieId lEast"-_
ansing: Michigan-State UniverSity Press, I955}, 5-6.
Hereafter cited as Williams, Wild Life of the Arm ; Cochran,
ELMS., 21. It is interesting to note tHEtIGEr 1e d's health
broke down early in the war and forced his retirement from
the military, while Cox's health was improved by the rigors
of army life: Cox, Reminiscences, I,

 

 

4Cox, Reminiscences, I, 6-7; Williams, Wild Life of
the Army, 10. At the same time Newton Schleich and . .__
Eafes were also appointed Ohio Brigadiers, but only Cox
remained in the service after the ninety-day enlistments
exPired: Reid, Ohio i§_§hg_flag, I, 34.

 

33
5
volunteers.
After completing this work, Cox assumed command of
Camp Jackson at Columbus, where he organized and prepared
recruits for combat. Camp Jackson soon proved inadequate

and Camp Dennison was hastily erected near Cincinnati to

 

accommodate the increasing number of volunteers. Cox moved
to the new facility and, in fact, supervised much of its
construction. Because the demand for troops was immediate,
the first Ohio regiments merely paused at the camp before
they were sent forward. The state volunteers enlisted only
for three months, barely sufficient time to train them, let

alone get them into combat before their enlistments expired.

 

Thus, unfortunately, the training period was cut short and
the first units went to war with scanty military knowledge
and inferior equipment. Lincoln took steps to correct the
problem in May when he asked men to volunteer for the fed-
eral army for a three year period. Many of those already in
the state service responded to the President's request, as
did Cox who on June 22, 1861, received a commission as a
Brigadier General, United States Volunteers.6 Within two
weeks he was enroute to the Kanawha Valley in western
Virginia in answer to a personal request made to the War
5Cox, Reminiscences, I, 9—11; Reid, 9232.3E.EEE.EEE»

I, 771

cences, I, 9-11 38; Salmon P. Chase,
former Governor o lo, and Lincoln 5 Secretary of the
Treasury, strongly supported Cox sapponmtmenti1 Chase to
Cox, June l8, l8 1. Governor Dennison wrote t at.t e
aPpOintment was a "deserved tribute to Cox 8 merit as a man
and soldier. Dennison to Cox, June 24, 1861.

6Cox, Reminis

34

Department by General McClellan.7

Although often overlooked, western Virginia was an
important part of the Eastern theater during the Civil War.8
Both combatants had substantial reasons for desiring to con-
trol the region. From the Southern viewpoint, the area had
political value. Some anti-slave, pro-Union sentiment
existed in western Virginia, particularly in the foothills
of the Allegheny Mountains where geography had prevented
the profitable use of the plantation system. The South
wanted to stop the further development of the pro-Union
movement. If the Confederacy retained possession, she would
demonstrate solidarity as a nation and maintain the Ohio
River as the traditional dividing line between North and
South.

Strategically, western Virginia was also important
to Southern aspirations. Geographically, the region was a
"panhandle" that nestled between the borders of Pennsylvania
and Ohio. A vital railroad, the Baltimore and Ohio, ran
through north-western Virginia, crossing the Ohio River at
Parkersburg. If the South held even a portion of these
tracks, commerce and troop movements from Ohio to the east

ould be interrupted, forcing the Union to use less conven-

 

'ent railroads much farther north. Finally, western

 

7For McClellan's role in bringing Cox to western
irginia, see Cox, Reminiscences, I, 59-62.

8West Vir inia was not admitted to the Union until
une 20 1863. Ugtil that time the area was called either
he Department of Western Virginia or the Mountain Depart-
ent.

 

 

 

 

 

35

Virginia might serve as a base for an invasion of Ohio or
Pennsylvania, thus bringing the war to the heart of the
North.9

Identical objectives persuaded the North to fight
hard for western Virginia. If the Unionists could be per-
suaded to separate from Virginia, the Southern "nation"
would be weakened.10 By providing military support the
North might hasten the decision and, hopefully, shorten the
war. After Virginia seceded a convention did meet in
Wheeling to discuss the course to be followed by the anti-
slave people. Governor Dennison promised to send troops if
the delegates requested aid. Anticipating a favorable
response, he ordered General McClellan to prepare for an
invasion of western Virginia. But President Lincoln showed
no great interest in these developments, probably because
he was busy trying to promote similar Union movements in
Kentucky and Missouri.11 Thus when the Wheeling group
requested troops, Ohio responded.

The North, too, saw considerable military value and

potential in western Virginia. Protection of the Baltimore

9Thomas Harry Williams, Hae es of the Twent -third;
the Civil War Volunteer Officer Efk: Knopf, 1965),
6:: ereaft ter Cited as W1 IIiams, Hayes 2f_the Twenty-
t ird.

101bid., 68.

11William B. Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War
Governors (New York: hopf,l W4 85, III-13—_'HE§sEIEine says
1nco n merely "tolerated' Francis H. Pierpont' s Unionist
government in western Virginia.

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37

and Ohio Railroad was a necessity.12 Using the area as a
staging base, the Northern forces could exercise several
options: 1) turn the Rebel position at Harpers Ferry;
2) move from Grafton southeastward to Staunton in the upper
Shenandoah Valley, thereby threatening the flank of the
Army of Northern Virginia; or 3) advance south from the
Kanawha Valley to strike the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad
and interrupt communications between Virginia and the states
to the west.13 Despite the obvious importance of western
Virginia to each side, neither committed adequate forces to
secure fully its objectives.

The Rebels initiated hostile action in western
Virginia on May 26, 1861, when they attacked the lightly

guarded Baltimore and Ohio Railroad near Grafton. Striking

   
  
   
  
 
   

swiftly, the Confederates burned bridges over the
Mbnongahela River, where the two western branches of the
railroad met the main line running to Baltimore. McClellan,
who remained in Ohio, sent several regiments to Grafton,
which was quickly recaptured and the damage repaired.14

After this raid the Confederates expanded and

 

12Thomas Weber, The Northern Railroads in the Civil
, 1861-1865 (New York: King's Crown Press of_C6IEm5ia
nlversityj—I§32), 75-76. Festus P. Summers, Th; Baltimore
nd Ohio in the Civil War (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
95, I7:IB:-63-39, 223:24, also discusses the importance
f the B & O to the Union war effort.

13Williams Ha es of the Twent -third, 68-69.
illiams suggests in a fooffibte, 69-70, that the failure of

he North to commit large enough forces to western Virginia
0 achieve its objectives was a mistake.

14Cox, Reminiscences, I, 40-44.

 

 

 

 

38

intensified their efforts. General Robert E. Lee, serving
in the Shenandoah Valley, dispatched two additional columns.
One column, under General Robert S. Garnett, advanced along
the Parkersburg Turnpike to renew the pressure on the rail-
road. The other, led by General Henry A. Wise, entered the
Kanawha valley to protect Charleston and to strengthen the
garrison at Gauley Bridge.15

Apprized of the increased enemy activity, McClellan
decided that Garnett's force presented the greatest danger.
On June 21, 1861, he assumed personal command of the Union
troops in western Virginia. McClellan's scouts found the
Confederates entrenched on Laurel and Rich Mountains, near
Beverly, where they obstructed traffic on the Staunton and
Parkersburg Turnpike. They intended to make Beverly a
staging area for thrusts toward the railroad. McClellan
determined to destroy or drive out the enemy. After pulling
together his scattered forces, he advanced slowly toward the
Confederates. As he approached Rich Mountain, he split his
troops, sending General William S. Rosecrans to circle the
mountain and threaten Garnett's flank. On July 11, Rosecrans
hit the enemy flank and the surprised Confederates beat a
hasty retreat. McClellan’s victories during this brief
campaign brought him much recognition and led directly to
his appointment as the commander of the Army of the

Potomac.16

 

 

15Ibid., 46-47.
16Ibid., 49-58.

 

 

 

 

 

 

39

Meanwhile, on July 2, Cox received orders from
McClellan to bring an additional brigade to western
Virginia. The orders explained Cox's duties in detail. His
destination was the Kanawha Valley, where he was to attack
General Wise and attempt to capture Charleston. Cox was
warned to be extremely cautious and to avoid sharp engage-
ments. Confident that he would defeat Garnett, McClellan
planned a cross-country march from Beverly to get behind
Wise and force his surrender.17 Acting as decoys, Cox's
men were to keep Wise busy until MCClellan delivered the
smashing blow.

Cox organized his command and requested necessary
supplies. He then went to Gallipolis, Ohio, to await the
arrival of his troops. On July 9, the Eleventh, Twelfth,
and Twenty-third Ohio, and the First and Second Kentucky
regiments rendezvoused at Gallipolis and were carried by
steamer across the Ohio River to enter the theater of war.
In addition to the infantry, Cox had been promised a company
of cavalry and a half-dozen artillery pieces to support his
operations. But he started without them. Eventually the
cavalrymen caught up with the column, but they were so
miserably trained that Cox used them only as messengers for

several weeks. Moreover, because of the shortage of

 

 

17U. S. Government, The war of the Rebellion: A
Com ilation §f_the Official Re eco rds 2§_the Union and —
Confederate rmies I70 voIs nI23; as Hington: cavernment
Printing Office, I880- 1901), Series I, II, 197, 200. Here-
after c1ted as O.R., all references are to Series I unless
otherwise indicated.

 

 

 

40

artillery, he received only two smooth-bore six-pounders.
When the campaign began Cox estimated his total strength at
about 3,000; General Wise reportedly had 4,000 men.18

Two days later, Cox's command, using steamboats for
transports, started pushing slowly up the Kanawha River.
The steamers also served as floating supply depots because
the wagons Cox ordered had not been delivered. Until the
wagons arrived, Cox limited his activities to within a few
miles of the river. For several days the small flotilla
proceeded calmly upstream, pausing occasionally to check
out wildly exaggerated rumors of enemy movements along the
river.19

Entering the Kanawha valley, the Federals were awed
by the topography. Mbuntains appeared everywhere, they
rolled toward the men like waves on the ocean until they

elt insignificant. The mountains were divided by deep

 
   
  
   
  
  
    

alleys and rocky gorges leading away from the river. Dense
hickets of trees and brush grew on the mountains, except

or the highest peaks. Great beauty hit the eye everywhere.
ut beauty masked the difficulties and dangers confronting
he troops. Every valley provided the Rebels with an oppor-
unity for flank attack. Each gorge had to be carefully
couted to assure safety to the main column. Cox often left

ehind small detachments to guard against surprises and to

 

18Ibid., II, 197, LI, pt. 1, 416-18; Cox,
miniscences, I, 59-63.

, 190.R., LI, pt. 1, 418-21; Cox, Reminiscences, I,
+~69.

 

 

 

 

41
protect the supply line. This reduced the strength of his
assault force and made large-scale engagements impractical.
The geography of western Virginia largely determined the
nature of military operations there throughout the war.

On July 17, Cox received the first reliable report
of Rebel troops operating along the river. A scouting
party discovered about 500 Confederates camped on the bank
of Scary Creek, where it enters the Kanawha River. Basing
his decision solely upon their report, Cox resolved to trap
the enemy. He sent the Twelfth Ohio across the Kanawha,
ordering it to move up Scary Creek, cross over to the
Confederate side and then drive the enemy toward the main
column. The first messages indicated that the maneuver had
succeeded. By evening, however, it became apparent that
the regiment had been repulsed and was retreating in dis-
order. The Rebel force had been much larger than estimated
and had given the Twelfth a "warm welcome" when it attempted
to cross the creek. During the confusion, three of Cox's
colonels had been enticed across the river by a small
Confederate band and taken prisoner. The colonels had mis-
taken the enemy for Union troops because the standard blue
and gray uniforms were not yet common, and the variety of
dress worn by both sides made positive identification almost
impossible. The captured officers, however, had failed to
exercise a proper degree of caution and paid for their folly

by spending several months in Libby Prison.20

 

 

2OCox, Reminiscences, I, 69-71.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

42

Although greatly embarrassed by his failure to rout
the enemy, Cox faithfully reported the full details of the
incident. McClellan exploded! Complaining to the War
Department, rather than directly to Cox, McClellan said he
feared his subordinates were so "green” and uneducated in
military affairs that he must stand beside them constantly
to assure proper execution of orders. In addition, he
stated that Cox would be ordered to stay put until a relief
column could cut across country and get in behind Wise's
force.21 Either Cox never received the "stay put" direc-
tive or it was never sent, because a few days later he
resumed his advance.

While resting in camp, Cox gathered more information "
about the enemy. His scouts located Wise's main camp on

Tyler Mountain, near Charleston. Because his supply wagons

 

had finally arrived, Cox decided to take Wise from the rear.
The movement began at dawn on July 24, following a circui-
tous route over rough mountain roads. At sundown the
Federals reached the Confederate camp. Cox sent the men
forward. Surprised, the Rebels fired a few shots and
rapidly retreated. Wise paused only briefly in Charleston

to burn a few bridges and then continued his withdrawal
toward Gauley Bridge. The next day Cox accepted the surren-
der of Charleston and established a garrison.22 His second

skirmish had been a great success.

 

 

211151.; O.R., 11, 288, 746.

22Cox, Reminiscences, I, 71-74.

 

 

 

 

43

Charleston, with a population of only 1,500 people,
was the largest settlement in the Kanawha Valley. Near the
city were excellent saline wells which the Confederacy had
used to produce salt. Besides flavoring food, salt pre-
served meat, served as a packing medium for eggs (it kept
air from the product and retarded spoilage), and was regu-
larly mixed with fodder to keep livestock healthy. Before
the war the demand for salt had been largely met by imports.
But now the South, cut off from foreign trade by the Union
blockade, was compelled to fill her own needs. This prob-
lem became more serious when the Federals captured
Charleston.23

While in Charleston Cox learned that McClellan had
been called to Washington; General William S. Rosecrans now
cammanded the Union troops in western Virginia. These
changes resulted from a reorganization in the command of
the Army of the Potomac, triggered by the Union defeat at
First Bull Run on July 21, 1861. Rosecrans ordered Cox to
organize his men into a brigade—~soon to be commonly known
as the Kanawha Brigade--and outlined his immediate plans.
Cox was to advance to Gauley Bridge, fortify it, and place
troops in front of Gauley to detect Rebel movements. At
the same time Rosecrans would fall back to Weston, on the
Parkersburg Turnpike, sending some of his units southward

to tie in with Cox's line. If successful, this deployment

 

 

 

23Ella Lonn, Salt as a Factor in the Confederacy
(New York: Walter Nea Ie, I933), I3- I8.

 

 

44

would effectively screen the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
from Confederate attacks and give the Federals control of
the Kanawha Valley.24

Leaving a small garrison to protect Charleston, Cox
marched rapidly to Gauley Bridge, taking possession on July
29. Enroute the men picked up equipment thrown away by
the Rebels in their hasty retreat. The enemy also left
behind 1,500 small arms and much ammunition at Gauley. Cox
could not understand Wise's failure to put up any real
resistance. The country between Charleston and Gauley was

even more rugged than that encountered in the lower valley.

Wise could have at least slowed Cox considerably by making

 

use of the excellent positions for the placement of artil-
lery. The neutralization of such batteries, covering narrow
defiles, would have required a tedious flanking movement.
But Wise, perhaps completely rattled by the surprise
received at Tyler Mountain, ran swiftly and did not halt
until a safe distance beyond Gauley.25
The first night out of Charleston Cox had encoun-
tered a potential mutiny. After supper three regimental
commanders came to Cox's tent. The spokesman announced
that, in view of the narrow gorges ahead, they would not
lead their regiments any farther. Cox inquired whether he
understood what his remarks implied. Taken aback, the

spokesman protested that none of them meant any disrespect,

 

 

240.R., 11, 762, 767.

ZSCOX, Reminiscences, I, 78-79.

 

 

 

45

but as their military experience equalled Cox's they should
be consulted before any movement was made. Cox replied
that only their unfamiliarity with proper military procedure
restrained him for placing them under arrest. Furthermore,
command decisions were his to make and he would not call a
council of war until he felt incompetent. He dismissed
them with the admonition that if they apologized and did
not repeat their indiscretion, the matter would be forgotten.
As Cox looked back upon the incident he became convinced
that his calm approach had served better than "the regula-
tion amount of cursing” in putting the officers in their
place. Cox never swore at his troops, even in the heat of
battle, and found that quiet orders were obeyed just as
quickly as those accompanied by profanity.26

On the same march Cox had an unpleasant brush with
two reporters representing influential Eastern newspapers.
The men joined the column at Charleston and asked on what
terms they could accompany the troops. Cox told them that
the quartermaster would supply a tent and transportation
and that their letters must be submitted to his staff for
review to prevent publication of vital facts. The report-
ers, however, intimated that they expected to join Cox's
mess and to be announced as volunteer aides. Patiently Cox
explained that he could not confer military rank upon them
and suggested that it would be better if they remained

independent, for then they would feel no need to flatter

 

 

26Ibid., 74-76.

 

 

 

 

46
anyone in their reporting. Near Gauley they tried to reopen
the discussion but Cox's adjutant-general reaffirmed the
original decision. The reporters replied, "‘Very Well;
General Cox thinks he can get along without us, and we will

show him. We will write him down.'"

That very evening
they left camp and wrote reports "'describing the army as
demoralized, drunken, and without discipline, in a state of
insubordination, and the commander as totally incompetent.'"
Luckily the impact of these statements was slight because,
at the same time, reports were published about Cox's occu-
pation of Gauley Bridge and the Rebels' retreat out of the
Kanawha Valley. Throughout the war Cox never deviated in
his treatment of correspondents, although some officers
acted scandalously in currying their support for personal
ambitions.27
Gauley Bridge, a tiny community tucked away in the
mountains, became, during the Civil War, one of the most
sought after villages in western Virginia. It consisted of
three homes, a tavern, a country store, and a church; the
latter served surrounding farms and passing travellers.
The buildings perched precariously on a narrow ledge between
Gauley Mount and the waters of the Gauley River. At several
points near the settlement the ledge was barely wide enough
to carry one good-sized wagon, but the bridge provided the

Only convenient crossing for heavy freight for almost one

 

 

271bid., 76-78.

 

 

 

 

47
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THE KANAWHA VALLEY, 1861
Adapted from Williams, Hayes g the Twenty-third, 79.

 

 

 

 

48

hundred miles in either direction.28 Nearby was a saw mill,
operated by a water wheel which turned furiously in the
raging waters below Kanawha Falls. Cox used the mill to
produce heavy timbers and other wooden materials needed to
transform Gauley Bridge from a quiet, sleepy village into a
fortified military camp.

Colonel Christopher G. Tampkins, recently in the
United States army, but now fighting for the Rebel cause,
owned an estate located atop Gauley Mount. The Tompkins'
house, situated on a knoll with a commanding view in three
directions, became a vital link in Cox's surveillance net-
work. Colonel Tompkins had left a letter with his wife
requesting that she and the family be treated with courtesy
by the Federals. Cox agreed to honor the request as long
as it did not interfere with his military obligations, and
he did his best to prevent his soldiers from making life
uncomfortable for the Tompkins' household. That he suc-
ceeded cannot be doubted. Mrs. Tompkins' letters described
Cox as an "elegant, refined, handsome gentleman.”29 Some of
the soldiers, however, resented his kind treatment of the
Confederate "sympathizers” and were convinced that signals

were sent to Rebel forces from the house.30 Overall, Cox's

 

28Ibid., 83-84.

29Ellen B. Tompkins, "The Colonel's Lady," Virginia
Magazine 2: History and Biography, vol. 69, 390-93.

30Williams Ha es of the Twent ~Third 92. Colonel
Hayes was one of those who-disapproved of Cox's lenient
attitude toward Mrs. Tompkins and of the use of Union tr00ps
to protect Confederate property.

 

 

 

 

49

conduct paid off handsomely. Even General Lee admitted that
Cox "made himself very acceptable to the inhabitants of the
Kanawha Valley by his considerate conduct."31 Cox clearly
understood the value of having the civilians on his side,
rather than incurring their hatred, and possibly their
retaliation, by needlessly interferring with their daily
lives.

From a military viewpoint, Gauley Bridge was the
key to the southwestern end of the Kanawha valley. Here the
James River Turnpike, the most practical route into the
valley from eastern Virginia, crossed the Gauley River. If
the Federals controlled the bridge, they could prevent
Rebels from menacing the Kanawha Valley unless the enemy
chose to enter via miserable mountain trails. To prevent
surprises, Cox posted several companies in front of Gauley,
fanned out on either side of the turnpike, to give advance
notice of any unusual activity. From Gauley Bridge a moun-
tain road followed the northern bank of the river for
several miles in a northeasterly direction and then turned
left toward Weston. This road, the only direct link between
Cox and Rosecrans, served as the line of deployment for
their troops.32

The inhospitable environment threw many obstacles

in the way of vigorous military operations. Cox's supply

 

310.R., LI, pt. 2, 220.

32Ibid.; Cox, Reminiscences, I, 80-89; Williams,

Hayes gf the Twenty-thlr , '

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

50

line extended eighty miles down the Kanawha River to the
Ohio. During high water, steamers came to the headwaters
of the Kanawha, then wagons carried the supplies the last
few miles to camp. Because the Rebels could easily inter-
rupt traffic on the river or on the narrow road, many men
had to be posted along the route to keep it open. Although
little trouble arose over getting adequate supplies and
ammunition, Cox remained close to Gauley Bridge. The barren
countryside failed to provide even fodder for the mule
teams. Thus plans for any extensive movement had to
include means for providing both men and animals with sus-
tenance. Moreover the roads, except for the turnpike, were
so bad that everyone tired quickly and could travel only a
few miles each day. Consequently Cox decided that the only
practical operations were those for which the men could pre-
cook several days' rations before leaving Gauley.33 He
probably found some consolation in the fact that the
Confederates faced identical problems.

Until August 10 the enemy remained quiet. Then
Cox's advance units detected suspicious Confederate move-
ments. As further information arrived, it became clear that
two columns commanded by Wise and General John B. Floyd
planned to drive a wedge between Cox and Rosecrans. Another
Rebel unit menaced the supply line. Cox turned his atten-
tion to insuring the safety of the line connecting his

command with Rosecrans. Because of the thirty to forty foot

 

 

33Cox, Reminiscences, I, 80-85.

 

 

 

 

51

banks along the Gauley River, the enemy could cross in large
numbers at very few points. Cox reinforced the garrisons
guarding these fords. Simultaneously Rosecrans, alerted to
the danger, began shifting more men toward Cox to strengthen
the threatened line.34

During the redeployment a mix-up occurred which
caused a temporary disaster and which stressed the impor—
tance of having reliable subordinates in the field, beyond
the direct control of the commanding general. On August 13,
Rosecrans sent Colonel E. B. Tyler and the Seventh Ohio to
Cross Lanes, a little village situated on one of the fords.
Now closer to Gauley, Tyler received his orders from Cox.
But Tyler disliked (or misunderstood) the arrangement and
wasted little time in showing his displeasure. On the
twenty-first Cox sent Tyler to investigate a rumored Rebel
movement below Cross Lanes. Tyler found nothing. Cox,
fearing a ruse, ordered him to rush back to the village.
But Tyler procrastinated and did not get back until dusk on
the twenty-fifth. Worn out by what he considered to be
futile marches, the Colonel failed to post proper pickets
for the night. General Floyd, who had crossed the river
during the Seventh's absence, took good advantage of Tyler's
neglect and routed the Federals at dawn. The men scattered
in every direction--some, including Colonel Tyler, straggled
into Gauley Bridge, others fled toward Weston and a few

eventually turned up in Charleston. The Cox-Rosecrans line

 

 

34Ibid., 90-93.

 

 

 

 

52

had been breached.35

The situation was not as serious as it appeared, but
neither Cox nor Rosecrans knew the true circumstances. The
Confederate plan depended entirely upon concentrating the
forces under Wise and Floyd to exploit the foothold gained
at Cross Lanes. The two generals, however, were busy giving
each other more trouble than they gave the Federals. Floyd,
who outranked Wise on the basis of seniority, had been put
in command of all Rebel troops in western Virginia. But
both men were former Virginia governors and Wise resented
having to take orders from Floyd. Mostly he ignored them.
Now, with the need for cooperation most pressing, Floyd
failed to direct Wise to join him. Even if he had, it is
questionable whether the latter would have obeyed.36

Rosecrans, informed of the break in the line, swung
into action. He took personal command of several regiments
and raced toward Cross Lanes to close the gap. Floyd, mean-

37

while, moved to Carnifix Ferry, a few miles from Cross

 

351bid., 94-96; O.R., LI, pt. 1, 458-60, LI, pt. 2,
223-26. “"- "‘“

36Cox, Reminiscences, I, 97—98. Cox wrote, "If he
[Wise] had been haIf as troublesome to me as he was to
Floyd, I should indeed have had a hot time of it. But he
did me royal service by preventing anything approaching to
cooperation between the two Confederate columns." Williams,
Hayes gf_£hg Twenty-third, 78-79, agrees with these senti-
ments.

37Most contemporary sources use Carnifix Ferry as
the preper spelling for this little town, but Cox used
garnifex in his Reminiscences and some sources even use
arnifax. According to WiIIiams, Ha es of the Twenty-third
f. n. 5, 80-81, the modern version is Carnifex. '9

 

 

53

Lanes, and dug in. But he had failed to take enough men
with him and did not really have sufficient strength to hold
his position against the aroused Federals. On September 10,
Rosecrans practically stumbled over the entrenched enemy.
Recovering quickly, the Union commander put his men into an
assault formation and attacked. Five separate rushes failed
to crack the Confederate line. As darkness fell, Rosecrans
pulled back to await daybreak and the renewal of battle.
During the night, however, Floyd withdrew across the Gauley
River, burned the ferries, and joined Wise.38 Naturally,
Rosecrans claimed a "victory" for his command and proceeded
to re-establish contact with Cox.39

The battle at Carnifix Ferry was the last sharp
engagement of 1861 in western Virginia. Floyd and Wise
pulled back and established fortified camps near Big Sewell
Mountain, approximately fifteen miles from Carnifix Ferry,
and about the same distance from Gauley Bridge. Rosecrans
therefore decided to use a pincers movement to dislodge the
Rebels. In accordance with these plans Cox pushed forward
to establish Camp Lookout on a small mountain about five
miles from the Confederate position. Meanwhile Rosecrans
experienced great difficulty getting under way because Floyd
had destroyed all the transports at Carnifix Ferry. While

Cox advanced slowly toward the Rebels, General Lee arrived

 

 

3800x, Reminiscences, I, 106-107; Williams, Hayes of
them Wenty-thir, .—

39Williams, Hayes 2f the Twenty-third, 89-90; O.R.,
IL, pt. 1, 515.

 

 

 

54

in western Virginia to visit the Confederate troops and to
see if he could cool off the feud between Wise and Floyd.
He failed to settle the difference between the rival gener-
als and eventually had Wise transferred out of the area,
leaving Floyd in sole command.40

While waiting at Camp Lookout for further orders,
Cox's command experienced an incident which highlighted the
difficulty of fighting in the mountainous terrain. One
afternoon a wagonmaster, who had been out searching for
forage, rushed into camp and excitedly related to Cox that
he had stumbled upon a Rebel camp about five miles behind
Camp Lookout. Cox, skeptical of the report, decided to
verify the story. He sent out Lieutenant Bontecou of the
Second Kentucky, an experienced woodsman and scout, with a
small party to reconnoiter the suspected enemy encampment.
About nightfall Bontecou returned and reported that the
camp did indeed exist; he had crawled close enough to count
the tents and had been challenged by the enemy sentries.
Bontecou had escaped only by running away pell-mell through
the dense woods. At daybreak Cox sent Colonel Robert
McCook's brigade to circle behind the Rebels and drive them
toward Camp Lookout. McCook's men followed their guides
over twisting mountain trails and eventually reached the
rear of the camp. But McCook's suspicions were aroused.
He crawled forward to get a better look at the situation and

to his great surprise found himself overlooking the rear of

40Cox, Reminiscences, I, 113-15.

 

—: 7

 

55
Camp Lookout! The indignation at being fooled quickly
passed, and the officers and men joined in hearty laughter,

dubbing the entire episode ”The Battle of Bontecou,’ much

to the chagrin of that unfortunate scout.41
After failing to hear from Rosecrans for several
days, Cox resolved to push ahead and feel out the enemy.
His scouts verified that the Rebels were on Sewall Mountain
but had neglected to occupy the highest ridge. If Cox
could sneak his men onto the ridge, his artillery could
shell the enemy's forward line and enfilade the only decent
road in the area. After much hard work Cox's well-placed
guns began firing. The astonished Confederates, who had
failed to detect the movement, hastily withdrew to a safer
location. When he first learned of this movement, Rosecrans
was critical, for he feared that Cox would be cut off and
destroyed. But when the commander viewed the position, he
agreed that it was well-chosen and could not be outflanked.‘42
On September 26, Rosecrans‘ units finally arrived to
reinforce Cox. Now the Federals were strong enough to seek
a general engagement with the enemy. But before they got
underway nature intervened and made further operations
impossible. The skies opened up and poured down rain for
days. Little mountain streams became raging torrents, pre-
senting formidable barriers to troop movements. Roads

turned into quagmires and supply wagons could barely move

 

4llhid., 115-16.
420.R., LI, pt. 1, 486-88.

fi'

 

 

 

 

56

with half-loads, not enough to sustain 5,000 men located
several miles from their base camp. Therefore, during the
first two weeks of October, the Federals withdrew slowly to
Gauley Bridge to await drier weather.43

October passed quietly, with only occasional skir-
mishes breaking the interlude. Then, on November first, the
enemy suddenly opened up with artillery on Gauley Bridge.
Undetected, Floyd had maneuvered behind the Federal camp
and placed his men and batteries upon Cotton Mountain, which
overlooked the camp and the only road leading to it. For-
tunately the threat was more irritating than serious.
Rosecrans and Cox hastily ordered the supplies moved to a
safe location below the cliffs, where Rebel shells could
not destroy them.44

After recovering from the initial shock of being
exposed to Rebel artillery fire, Rosecrans conceived a plan
for trapping Floyd's command. Cox was to make a frontal
assault on Cotton Mountain and keep the enemy occupied,
while General Henry Benham led another contingent around the
mountain to block the major withdrawal route. Other small
detachments were posted elsewhere to seal the trap in case
Floyd should avoid Benham's force. Cox's men stormed up

the face of the mountain and chased the Rebels toward

 

43Cox, Reminiscences, I, 120-28.

441bid., 129-35; Cox to Garfield, November 8, 1861,
James A. Garfield Papers, V, pt. 2, MSS. Division, Library
of Congress. Hereafter cited as Garfield Papers.

 

IIIIIIIIIIIllEIII:—__________________________________————‘flx"_____________“-‘-

57

Benham's supposed position, but the latter was not yet in
place and Floyd escaped unscathed. Cox, greatly aggravated
at the failure to trap the Rebels, put the blame squarely
on Benham, who, he said, spent more time complaining about
the difficult terrain than in carrying out his orders.45

With the Cotton Mountain fiasco behind, Rosecrans
laid plans to move into winter quarters. The weather was
getting worse and would soon make impossible any further
large-scale movements. Garrisons would remain at Gauley
Bridge, Cheat Mountain and Romney over the winter.
Rosecrans established his departmental headquarters at
Wheeling, placing Cox in command of the Kanawha District.
At the end of November Cox prepared to move most of his
brigade to Charleston, leaving behind a small force to hold

46 Because the Confederates were making similar

Gauley.
arrangements, no one expected to see any real action until
the next spring.

Before leaving Gauley, Cox received exciting orders
from army headquarters in washington. He was directed to
take three Ohio Regiments and report to General Don Carlos
Buell in Kentucky. Cox was overjoyed. He had been com-
plaining for several months about remaining in western

Virginia and had requested a transfer to an area where more

decisive action could be assured. Cox enthusiastically

45Cox, Reminiscences, I, 139—45; O.R., V, 255,
261-65, 266-68, 669; Cox to Garfield, Novemher 8, 1861,
Garfield Papers, V, pt. 2.

46O.R., IL, pt. 1, 508; Cox, Reminiscences, 1,146-41

 

 

 

 

58

reported to Rosecrans that he was prepared to go to Kentucky
immediately; but, to his dismay, discovered that Rosecrans
had not received copies of the orders. Rosecrans, angered
over Washington's failure to consult with him, protested
strongly and won his case. The regiments would go to
Kentucky, but Cox would remain in command at Charleston.
Although Rosecrans' reasons for keeping him in western
Virginia were personally flattering, Cox was most disap-
pointed to see this opportunity escape.47

Cox now assumed command of the Kanawha District and
moved to Charleston, resolving to use the quiet winter
months to improve the discipline of his troops. He held
daily drills for all men and officers, conducted separate
classes for the officers, and continually urged everyone to
work as if their lives depended upon a rapid, unhesitating
execution of their duties. The necessity for additional
instruction arose from two factors: first, the inadequate
training before the regiments were sent forward and, second,
the transfer of Cox's best-trained units to Kentucky.
Naturally the men and officers grumbled about the stress on
drills when there was no enemy within many miles, but Cox's
serious attitude convinced them of his determination to make

his men the best soldiers in the entire armyf"8 As a result

 

47o v, 259, 657; Cox to Garfield, November 8,

R',

1861,Garf1eId Papers, V, pt. 2; Cox, Reminiscences, I, 147.

480 R., LI, pt. 1, 515, Cox, Reminiscences, I, 146
148-49, 165- 70; Cox to Garfield, Decemher 22,186], Garfield
Papers, V, pt. 2.

 

59
special ties developed between the General and "his regi-
ments" and the men put their hearts into perfecting the com-
plex maneuvers. Their efforts were rewarded in 1862, dur-
ing the Antietam Campaign, when Cox's Kanawha Brigade was
recognized as one of the best-disciplined in the entire
Army of the Potomac.

Just as the garrison was established for the winter
at Charleston, a military court sentenced a private from the
First Kentucky to death for desertion and mutiny. Some camp
demagogues, trying to stir up trouble, claimed the sentence
was unwarranted. Cox feared trouble because military custom
required that the firing squad be drawn from the offender's
regiment. Knowing that he must not appear timid, he
ordered a detail selected from the First Kentucky to per-
form the execution. At the appointed hour, with all the
troops present, Cox rode slowly down the lines; his eyes, as
they met those of each man in First Kentucky, transmitted
his feeling that this was an unwelcome, but inevitable duty.
Afterwards Cox felt a deep sense of relief that the painful
task was over, and was gratified that strict discipline
had prevailed to the end. He could only hope that everyone

understood the need for such punishment and that its

 

intended purpose was to make the entire army more efficient
by removing those who might endanger their comrades in time
of battlef'9

During the winter months, when many regiments

49Cox, Reminiscences, I, 149-52.

 

 

60

received long furloughs, Cox limited leaves of absence so
that his troops could receive intensive training. He set a
personal example by remaining on duty, although he strongly
desired to visit his family. Instead he arranged to have
Helen, his wife, come to Charleston. Her visit gave Cox an
opportunity to entertain some of the local residents and to
improve the army's relationship with them. Cox discovered
that most citizens were sympathetic to the Confederate
cause but, because of his even-handed treatment, they were
not openly hostile.50

Winter quarters also allowed Cox to catch up on his
letter writing. His favorite correspondent was Garfield
(now a colonel commanding a brigade in Kentucky). A con-
sistent complaint runs throughout these letters. Cox was
bitterly disappointed at remaining in western Virginia and

he thought his career was surely doomed unless he could

somehow get out. ”The command of the District here is a
humbug," he wrote, " . . . it don‘t seem possible that I
"51

shall be left at a trifling post like this. But it was
possible and, in January, Cox lost his most experienced
regiments for the second time and had to begin anew with
meager replacements. The result was a reduction in his

command to the point where it was barely sufficient for

garrison duty, and wholly inadequate for active

 

 

501bid., 152-53.

V 51Cox to Garfield, January 9, 1862, Garfield Papers,
, pt. 2

 

 

61

operations.52

Resigned to remaining in western Virginia, Cox
looked ahead to the arrival of spring and the renewal of
the war. He wanted to take part in developing plans that
would give him more action. Near the end of February, he
travelled to Wheeling to discuss with Rosecrans the coming
spring campaign. Cox went with great expectations, but
came away thoroughly disgusted. Rosecrans offered no firm
plans and refused to consider seriously those presented by
others. Cox had suggested that he operate along a line
which would allow him to link-up with Garfield's troops in
East Tennessee, near the north end of the Cumberland
Mountains. Rosecrans rejected the proposal.53 In any case,
the plan undoubtedly would have failed because it involved
a long march through enemy territory. Somehow Cox, desper-
ate for active fighting, forgot to consider how geography
might preclude the successful execution of this movement.
But, since no alternative was offered, his anger is under-
standable.

Shortly after his return from Wheeling, Cox dis-
covered why his commander had been reluctant to make a

definite commitment to a particular campaign. In March

 

 

52Same to same, January 17, 1862; W. T. Bascom to
Garfield, January 30, 1862, Garfield Papers, V, pt. 2

53Cox to Garfield, February 6, 8, and 26, 1862,
Garfield Papers, V, pt. 2. In the first two letters Cox
explained his proposal to Garfield; in the last he reported
its rejection and expressed a lack of confidence in
Rosecrans' leadership ability.

 

—7——*"

62

Rosecrans was called to washington for reassignment and John
C. Fremont took over in western Virginia. At the same time
Fremont's command was renamed the Mbuntain Department, which
covered a broad area between McClellan's Army of the Potomac
and General Henry W. Halleck's command to the west.
McClellan's projected Peninsula Campaign so preoccupied him
that the protection of western Virginia and the Shenandoah
valley was left to others. In the West, Halleck controlled
operations west of a line drawn north and south through
Knoxville, Tennessee. The new department was aptly titled,
for it contained mostly mountains and served as the organi-
zational bridge between the powerful Union armies on either
side. Fremont's primary duty would be to protect the flanks
of McClellan and Halleck.54

Cox, elated by Fremont's appointment, predicted a
stepped-up tempo. He believed Fremont's ”destiny" demanded
a vigorous campaign because the ”Pathfinder" had not yet
impressed Lincoln with his military ability. Furthermore,
Cox assumed he would have increased influence with the new
commander because Fremont would need advice from someone
who had served in the area. Cox volunteered his services.55

Fremont outlined the spring campaign. He divided

his troops into two columns: the first would push along the

 

Parkersburg Turnpike from Monterey to Staunton; the second,

 

54Cox, Reminiscences, 1, 194-95.

55cOx to Garfield, March 17, 1862, Garfield Papers,
V, pt. 2; O.R., XII, pt. 1, 4

 

 

li———ri; ""”“””“ "

 

63
with Cox in command, would advance from Gauley Bridge to
Princeton. If the initial movement succeeded, Fremont
planned to unite the two forces and send them into either
Virginia or Tennessee. The major defect in the plan was
that the two contingents would be widely separated and
operating at the end of long, exposed supply lines. In
opposition the Rebels could maneuver on interior lines,
employing the Virginia and East Tennessee Railroad to bring

together rapidly their men against either column.56

Only by
striking quickly and decisively could the Union troops hope
to achieve success. Otherwise they were in danger of being
defeated in detail.

Throughout March, Cox kept up a hectic pace getting
everything ready for the campaign. He tried to obtain
enough weapons of a single caliber to arm his entire bri-
gade. The variety of rifles created headaches for the
Quartermasters Corps because many different types of ammuni-
tion had to be stocked. But Cox's requests were not filled;
the weapons went to more important columns elsewhere.
Another annoyance involved the large tents issued in 1861;
they had proved too cumbersome to carry and erect in the
mountains. Cox attempted to replace them with smaller

"French tents," but he received only one-third the required

 

 

56O.R., XII, pt. 1, 7; Jacob Dolson Cox, ”West
Virginia Operations Under Fremont,” Battles aflg_Leaders of
the Civil War, eds. C. C. Buel and R. U. Johnson vo ST?

ew York: -Tfie Century C0,, 1887-88), II, pt. 1, 278. Here-
after cited as Battles and_Leaders.

 

 

 

64

number before his troops went into action.57 Mbst of the
men, therefore, slept in the open and prayed for dry
weather. When it did rain, a piece of canvas, some small
poles and ingenuity provided those lacking tents with ade-
quate shelter. To reduce weight, Cox Substituted "mountain
wagons" for the heavy army-issue wagons. With the lighter
conveyance, four mules hauled almost as many supplies as
could six pulling the heavier vehicle. Additional mules,
requested because of the eighty-mile supply line to
Princeton, arrived unbroken and many hours of hard work
were required before the surly beasts accepted their har-
nesses. As the departure date approached, Cox, not entirely
pleased with his equipment, recalled that his men had never
gone hungry. Even with below-average material, the Kanawha
Brigade could accomplish much on full stomachs.58

In mid-April the Federals swung into action. Cox
got away from Gauley without a hitch; but the other column,
under General Robert Milroy, soon ran into trouble.
Milroy's objective was McDowell's, a tiny village on the
Parkersburg Turnpike between the Allegheny and Shenandoah
Mountains, where he intended to meet General Robert
Schenck's brigade. Before the rendezvous was made Rebels
from Stonewall Jackson's Valley command hit Milroy (May 8).
Schenck appeared in time to prevent a complete rout, but the

Federals fell back rapidly to Franklin. Stonewall Jackson,

 

 

57o.R., x11, pt. 3, 45-48.

58Cox, Reminiscences, I, 196-98.

 

 

 

 

65

sensing victory, came over from the Shenandoah valley and
joined the pursuit. After reaching Franklin, however,
Jackson turned his back on the entrenched Union soldiers and
started on his Shenandoah Valley Campaign by attacking the
force under N. P. Banks. Although Banks also escaped
destruction, Jackson's attacks were successful enough to
throw Union plans into disarray. The authorities in
Washington, dismayed over the failures to stop Jackson,
directed Fremont to order Banks, Milroy and Schenck back
toward the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, where they could be
quickly transferred to the capital if the Rebels threatened
Washington.59

Moanwhile, after receiving Fremont's orders, Cox
put his troops into motion. From Gauley he sent out regi-
ments in fan-like fashion across a broad front to clear the
area toward Princeton. For these Operations Cox divided
his troops into two small brigades and placed in command
Colonels E. P. Scammon and George Crook. Scammon pressed
directly toward Flat Top Mountain, above Princeton, to
establish a base camp; Crook worked toward Lewisburg to
protect Scammon's left flank. After the men left, Cox
hurried to Charleston to keep in touch with his field com-
manders via telegraph.60

Evidently the size of the movement surprised the

 

59Ibid., 200-202; Cox, "West Virginia Operations
Under Fremont," Battles and Leaders, II, pt. 1, 279-80.

600.11., x11, pt. 3, 84-85, 89-90, 93, 100-101,
110-11, 1131?, 120.

 

 

 

66

Rebels because they offered little resistance, and then only
by small bands of guerillas who burned supplies and bridges
as they retreated. Scammon reached Flat Top Mountain on
May 1, and established a fortified camp. On May 9 Cox left
Charleston to join the brigade and direct the assault on
Princeton. Poised for action, Cox now received word of
Milroy's setback at McDowell's. This completely altered
the picture. Fremont did not order Cox to retreat, but
warned that he was vulnerable to flank attacks. Cox faced
a hard decision. Should he gamble that the Confederates
would continue to harass Milroy and proceed with his attack,
knowing that if the Rebels turned on him he would be in deep
trouble?61

After reviewing the situation, Cox resolved to
remain at Flat Top and await further developments. His
scouts reported that three Rebel units under Generals
Humphrey Marshall, Henry Heth and John S. Williams were
nearby with a total strength of about 12,000.62 Cox had,
counting both brigades, only 8,500 men; but if the Confed-
' erate Generals did not cooperate closely the Federals still
might be able to take Princeton. Moving cautiously, Cox
occupied the town on the night of May 13th, after driving

out a few skirmishers from Marshall's command. The next day

 

 

 

611bid., 157-58, 188, 200-203, x11, pt. 1, 503-505;
for a general discussion of the Princeton operation, see
Cox, "West Virginia Operations Under Fremont," Battles and
Leaders, II, pt. 1, 280-81. "“

62O.R., x11, pt. 1, 504-505.

 

67
Marshall brought up his main column and menaced Cox with
superior numbers from hills north of town. Desperately Cox
tried to gather enough men to hold his position, but to no
avail; his troops were too scattered to achieve a rapid con-
centration. Now Cox realized that he had erred in moving
into Princeton before Crook had secured Lewisburg. Crook
had been delayed by orders from Fremont directing him to put
an end to guerilla activity in several counties north of
Lewisburg. Thus, when Cox attempted to concentrate his
troops, Crook could not reach Princeton in time to help.63
On the 18th Marshall finally forced the issue and Cox with-
drew in orderly fashion to Camp Flat Top.64 Five days later
Crook defeated Heth and took Lewisburg, but his success came
too late to alter events at Princeton.

Fremont, trying to help Cox, requested more troops
from Secretary of War Stanton. Stanton replied that no
reinforcements were available. Fremont relayed the bad news
to Cox and told him that he must determine whether he could
hold his exposed position. When Marshall failed to press
him, Cox decided to stay put. His location allowed him to
scan the countryside for thirty miles in three directions
and, at the same time, it screened him from Rebel view. On

May 29, Fremont suggested that Cox strike the Virginia and

 

63lbid., pt. 3, 188, 200-203, 209.

64Ibid., pt. 1, 505; Marshall's report of the action
513-17, states that the Federals were "routed” so quickly
that lights were left burning in the tents. The evidence
does not support Marshall's version of the withdrawal.

3

 

 

 

68

East Tennessee Railroad and throw Confederate communications
into turmoil. Cox declined because such a raid would expose
him to much danger with little chance for decisive success.65

At this point, with summer approaching, Cox had
reason to be discouraged. The same old story had repeated
itself; great plans were laid, men were committed to action,
a little fighting occurred, but nothing significant had been
accomplished. Cox's disgust at continuing to serve in this
theater grew stronger. He wanted an assignment elsewhere.

By the end of May the Mountain Department was a
shambles. Jackson's bold action in the Shenandoah Valley so
bothered Washington officials that they pulled troops from
Fremont to aid Banks. Milroy and Schenck, joined by another
small force, moved across the Shenandoah Mountains to
Harrisonburg. Meanwhile Banks, with headquarters at
Strasburg, suffered constant harrassment. On May 28 the
Rebels occupied Halltown, only three miles from Harpers
Ferry. But Jackson did not attack because he had learned
of Fremont's movement into the Valley and he feared he would
be trapped. At the same time additional troops drawn from
General Irwin McDowell at Fredericksburg also moved into
action against Jackson. To avoid the converging forces,
Jackson retraced his route back up the Valley and rejoined
Lee before Richmond. The withdrawal was handsomely accom-

plished; several days elapsed before the Federals knew for

651bid., pt. 3, 203, 206, 209, 217-18, 288.

 

 

 

69
certain that Jackson was gone.66
These developments shifted the center of action out
of western Virginia and left Cox isolated. His forces at
Flat Top and Lewisburg were too small to take the offensive
without reinforcements. Cox, therefore, assumed a defensive
posture, holding the two positions and protecting his supply
line. The Rebels, despite their numerical advantage, did
not attempt to attack because the Federal camps were well
located and could be easily defended. The stalemate con-
tinued until early August, when Cox received orders to pull
back to Gauley, establish an adequate garrison to hold the
Kanawha Valley, and send the remainder of his troops to the
Shenandoah Valley.67 With high spirits Cox acted quickly to
carry out his orders; he assumed he would accompany the men
going east, putting an end to his discouraging service in

western Virginia.

k

66Ibid. 264, pt. 1, 642, Sanford c. Kellogg, The
Shenandoah Va Ile , 1861 to 1865, A War Stud (New York. The
ea e u is ing Co. I9 903), 50- 70'; Franc1s W. Palfrey, The

Aggietamw and FrederiCkaur (New York: Charles Scribners

67
0.R. . . .
224_25_ —___n XII, Pt. 3, 567, 570, Cox, Reminiscences, I,

 

 

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER III
THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN

Washington was tense. Rumors spread through the
city. Some said that Stonewall Jackson's "foot cavalry"
was advancing through the Shenandoah Valley to attack the
capital. President Lincoln, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton,
and Henry Halleck, now General-in-Chief of the armies, acted
quickly to insure the defense of the city.1 But the best
troops--the Army of the Potomac under McClellan--were in
Virginia engaged in McClellan's Peninsula Campaign. And
they could not be withdrawn rapidly enough, or without dan-
ger of an attack by General Robert E. Lee during a with-
drawal, to insure the safety of Washington. The defenders
must be drawn from other areas.

Thus, Lincoln created the Army of Virginia by com-
bining troops under Generals Nathaniel P. Banks, Irvin
McDowell, and John C. Fremont, and placed in command General
John Pope. Pope's duties were to (1) protect Washington,
(2) control the Rebels in the Shenandoah Valley, and (3)

draw Confederate forces away from Richmond to reduce

K;
General Halleck had been called to washington in

1
fiuly, 1862. When Grant became the supreme commander in
sii§¥’ 1864, Halleck's role was reduced to that of Chief of

70

 

 

 

71

resistance to McClellan's advance.2 Pope's immediate need
was for reliable reinforcements, but he also worried about
the poor morale in the units he already commanded.3

During the first few days of August, 1862, Cox com-
municated with Pope about moving part of his command from
the Kanawha Valley to the Shenandoah, where they could help
check Jackson's advance. Pope proposed that the junction be
made at Staunton by a march through the mountains from
western Virginia into the Shenandoah Valley.4 Cox protested.
The route, he said, was fraught with danger; it would
require a seventeen day march through enemy territory put-
ting him in constant danger of flank attacks or a sudden
frontal assault by a superior Rebel force. The supply prob-
lem, alone, was sufficient to warrant reconsideration of the
proposed route. After some discussion Cox suggested a water
and rail route which would pass behind Pope's primary lines
and bring his men to the Shenandoah in seven days.5
General-in-Chief Halleck, who read Cox's correspondence with
Pope, also believed the water-rail route was safer, but left

the final decision to Pope.6

 

2Edward James Stackpole, From Cedar Mbuntain to
Antietam: Cedar Mountain, Second Manassas, anti y:—
Ha er's Ferr , South Mountain, Antietam (Harrisburg, Pa.:
The Stackpo e Co., 1959), 9. Hereafter cited as Stackpole,
From Cedar Mountain £9_Antietam.

 

 

3%, x11, pt. 3, 295-97.
412151., 551, 553.

531333., 555.

6&3}, 540, 543.

 

 

72

On August 11, Cox received orders to send all but
5,000 men to Pope via the water-rail route. But he was not
elated because he was to remain in western Virginia with the
remnants of his original force.7 Naturally Cox had expected
that he would be allowed to accompany his men; after all,
that had been his intention in July when he had argued for
a transfer by extolling the discipline and morale of his
troops. Moreover, as he had pointed out, he had erected
strong fortifications in the Kanawha Valley which would

enable a small force to hold off the Rebels.8

Now his plans
seemed to have miscarried; his best men would join Pope
while he garrisoned the Valley. Surely he deserved some-
thing better!

As he prepared to ship his troops east, Cox,
unhappy about staying behind, asked Pope to reconsider his
decision. His long service in western Virginia, he felt,
had earned him the right to a more important assignment.9
The next day, August 13, 1862, good news came; Cox could
go east.10

The original plan called for Cox's Kanawha division

 

71119, 560-61; xxx, pt. 1, 1069.
81123., x11, pt. 3, 451, 457.
913351., 567.

10M» 570.

 

73
to join the Army of Virginia by way of Warrenton Junction.11
But delays in securing railroad transportation altered this
plan. Instead Cox and most of his men went directly to
Washington, where they were ordered to Upton's Hill, a key
point in the Capital's outer defenses, near Alexandria,
Virginia.12
On August 29-30, Pope fought the Second Battle of
Bull Run. It ended disastrously for the Army of Virginia
and greatly increased the danger of an attack on Washington.
During the battle Cox reported no enemy activity in the
vicinity of Fairfax Courthouse, directly in front of Upton's
Hill. He did report, however, that he could clearly hear
heavy cannonading at the front.13 After Pope's rout, Cox's
men were busy several days covering the Federals' hasty

14 Soon

retreat into the fortifications around Washington.
the Rebels appeared in ever-increasing numbers near Fairfax
Courthouse.15

Pope's report of the engagement placed some of the

blame for his defeat on Cox and other commanders, whOm he

 

llIbid., x11, pt. 2, 57-59; x11, pt. 3, 623, 625,
630 641. The title, Kanawha division, remained attached to
Cox s unit throughout the Antietam Campaign; it was never
given the usual numeral designation.

12lbid., x11, pt. 3, 630.
13lbid., 748, 789, 801, 802.

14Ibid., 805; Stackpole, From Cedar Mountain to
Antietam, 259.

15945;, x1x, pt. 2, 170, 176.

 

 

 

74

had ordered to secure Warrenton Junction.16 He contended
that their absence allowed Jackson to turn his flank. But
Pope knew three days before the battle that Cox definitely
would not be coming because Halleck and McClellan, who had
just returned from the Peninsula, had decided to keep the
Kanawha division near Washington.17

Shortly after the Second Battle of Bull Run,
McClellan was reinstated as the commander of the Army of the
Potomac. On September 5, he ordered Cox to report for duty
to General Ambrose E. Burnside, the commander of the right-
wing of his army. A few days later Burnside assigned the
Kanawha division to General Jesse Reno's Ninth Army Corps.
For several days Cox's men participated in routine recon-
naissance patrols while McClellan attempted to determine
Lee's location and strength.18 But this changed radically
on September 14, when Cox supported General Albert
Pleasonton's cavalry in a movement toward South Mountain.

Before joining the Eastern troops Cox had worried
that his rough Westerners would compare unfavorably with
McClellan's well—disciplined troops. Upon comparison, how-
ever, the Kanawha division rated very highly, and Cox was

especially proud that there was less straggling among his

 

 

 

16Ibid., x11, pt. 2, 33-34; see also John Codman
Ropes, The Arm Under Pope (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons , 7131-4522—-

170.R., x11, pt. 3, 680, 712-13, 726; Ropes, Egg
Army Under Pope, 161-63.

18Jacob Dolson Cox, "Forcing Fox's Gap and Turner's
Gap," Battles and Leaders, II, pt. 2, 583

 

 

75

men. Cox attributed this to the long, swinging stride his
men had developed in the mountains of western Virginia, a
stride that carried them with ease over the relatively
smooth terrain of northern Virginia and southern Maryland.19
Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes of the Twenty-third Ohio, a
future President, believed that Cox's six regiments were
the "best” in the East,20 and James A. Garfield described
the Kanawha division as the ”. . . finest Corps in the
whole Capitoline Army. . . ."21

Lee's famous ”Lost Order,” which accidentally fell
into McClellan's hands on September 13, placed half of the
Confederate army at Boonesboro and the other half at
Harpers Farry. If McClellan moved rapidly, Lee's Army
could be cut in two. Resolving to hit the Rebels at
Boonesboro first, McClellan ordered the left-wing to advance
through Crampton's Gap to Rohrsville while the center and
right-wing were taking Hagerstown via Turner's Gap. But
McClellan was unaware that Lee had already changed his
plans, moving both Longstreet and D. H. Hill to Hagerstown

where they cOuld defend Turner's Gap. Furthermore, the

 

19Cox, Reminiscences, I, 268.

 

20Hayes to Lucy, his wife, August 30, 1862; Hayes to
his mother, September 1, 1862; in Charles Richard Williams,
editor, The Diar and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes,
Nineteenth Pres1 ehf—bf the Unifed States (5 vols.;
Columhus, Ohio: The Ohih_State Archaeological and
Historical Society, 1926), II, 333, 338.

 

 

21Gar£ie1d to Burke [Hinsdalel September 12, 1862,
Williams, The Wild Life _o_f_ the Armz, 1 .

 

76

Union commander simply moved too slowly to take full advan-
tage of a rare opportunity to divide the enemy and defeat
him in detail.22

The terrain surrounding Turner's Gap reminded Cox
of western Virginia, although the mountain slopes were not
as steep. The National Road ran along the bottom of
Turner's Gap rising to 1,100 feet between South Mountain
and Catoctin Mountain. On the slopes south of the National
Road cleared fields were visible to the advancing Federals,
but many of the taller hills were covered with dense
thickets. How many Rebels these might conceal, no one

could guess.23

In any event little resistance was antic-
ipated because the ”Lost Order” assured McClellan that the
main Confederate force was at Boonesboro.

At 6 A.M. on September 14, after an early breakfast,
the First Brigade of the Kanawha division, led by Colonel
Scammon, accompanied General Pleasonton's cavalry on its

reconnaissance toward Turner's Gap. Cox rode forward with

the men for a short distance, then stopped on a hilltop to

 

 

22Daniel H. Hill, ”The Battle of South Mountain or
Boonesboro,” Battles and Leaders, II, pt. 2, 570, describes
the impact of the LOSE—Order from the Confederate viewpoint.
Cox, "Forcing Fox's Gap and Turner's Gap,” ibid., 585,
agrees that McClellan did not anticipate reaI resistance at
South Mountain because the Lost Order placed the Rebels'
main force elsewhere. Stackpole, From Cedar Mountain to
Antietam, 313-17, analyzes McClellan's opportunity and——
a1 ure in some detail. Williams, Ha es of the Twenty-
third, 136, also states that McClelIan cofiId—hhve carried
the mountain passes on September 13 if he had moved with
rapidity.

 

23Cox, "Forcing Fox's Gap and Turner's Gap,"
Battles and Leaders, II, pt. 2, 585.

77

 

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THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN

Adapted from: Fletcher Pratt, A Short Histor of the
Civil War (Cardinal Edition, New Yofk: PocEet h‘o'okh': Inc.
I956; I54.

9

)

 

 

 

 

78
watch the column's progress. As the blue-jacketed soldiers
approached the foot of South Mountain, white puffs of smoke
appeared in the trees south of the National Road. The
advancing regiments fled for cover wherever it could be
found.24

Immediately Cox galloped back to camp and ordered up
Colonel Crook's Second Brigade. As it hurried toward the
rapidly developing battle, General Reno, commander of the
Ninth Corps, arrived and told Cox to press the attack.
Reno promised to send up more men to help clear the Rebels
from their position atop the ridges.

At the front, Cox ordered an advance along an
extended line, with Scammon's brigade forming the left and
Crook's the right. They began immediately to move up the
treacherous slopes, but expertly placed Confederate bat-
teries raked the easiest avenues of advance with deadly
fire. As Federal skirmishers closed on the Rebel infantry
they discovered the wily enemy using every fence, stone-
pile, and wood-lot to conceal his position. The advance
against combined artillery and musket fire demanded great
courage and discipline; the Kanawha division, suffering

many casualties, pushed slowly but relentlessly forward.

 

24Unless otherwise indicated the description of the
action by the Kanawha division and the Ninth Corps at South
Mountain is based upon Cox's report, O.R., XIX, pt. 1,
458-61. McClellan's two reports, ibid., 27, 48-50, and
Burnside's report, ibid., 416-18, thIbw Cox's report in
detail; evidently both relied heavily upon his report in
writing their own accounts of this phase of the battle at
South Mountain. ‘

 

 

 

 

 

79

Early in the engagement the Rebel right cracked
under an assault led by Colonel Hayes's Twenty-third Ohio.
Screened by trees and intervening hills, Hayes's regiment
moved undetected to the crest of a ridge beyond the enemy's
flank. The Twenty-third quickly swung around and charged
headlong into the surprised Rebels. An entire Confederate
brigade was shattered and its commander, General Samuel
Garland, Jr., lost his life trying to rally his men. As
the Twenty-third's success spread confusion down the entire
Confederate line, the rest of Cox's division rushed forward
to drive the Rebels from their position. Enemy counter-
attacks failed to dislodge the determined Federals. About
noon there was a lull in the fighting, during which the
opposing commanders worked to prepare their men for new
efforts.

Cox urged Generals Burnside and Reno to send up
reinforcements, but Burnside, the ranking officer, delayed
the reserves until General Joe Hooker's First Corps had
begun its supporting attack north of the National Road.
Burnside's decision probably saved D. H. Hill from total

defeat.25

At the same time the Rebel commander shifted his
line to the left so that it slightly overlapped Cox's right.
When additional union troops arrived, Cox used most of them
to protect his exposed flank.

At 2 P.M. the fighting began anew. Cox's right

faced two dangers: a flanking movement, and an enfilading

 

 

 

25Stackpole, From Cedar Mpuntain £2_Antietam, 228-29.

 

 

|_———'i7 1-1, ~-----~'

80
artillery fire from Rebel batteries across the Hagerstown
road. Since the road ran through a deep gorge it was
impossible to attack these batteries directly, and they
were not silenced until late afternoon. About 4 o'clock,
four divisions of the Ninth Corps joined Cox's weary men.
Subsequently General Reno, after consultation with McClellan
and Burnside, ordered his commanders to sweep the enemy
from their front and to silence the Confederate artillery.
After a brief, but fierce, contest the Ninth Corps control-
led South Mountain.

As night fell the Rebels made a last, desperate
effort to regain their former position. Once again they
keyed upon the right of the Federal line, placing great
pressure upon General Samuel Sturgis' division and upon
several of Cox's regiments. Having no success, the enemy
ceased attacking after an hour. During the night the
Confederates withdrew in the direction of Sharpsburg and
the following day the Federals moved unimpeded through
Turner's and Fox's Gaps toward Antietam Creek.

Many men had fallen at South Mountain. About sun-
set General Reno suffered a fatal wound. As the ranking
Brigadier in the Ninth Corps, Cox assumed temporary command
of the unit. The Kanawha division received 356 casualties,
among them Colonel Hayes who, though wounded, had contin-
ued to fight until he collapsed from loss of blood. Overall

the Ninth suffered 1,813 casualties in this action.26

 

 

260.11., XIX, pt. 1, 461.

 

 

81
Many years after the Battle of South Mountain a con-
troversy erupted over exactly what had occurred. Hooker
stated that Cox was retreating at 1 P.M. when he arrived

upon the scene,27 a statement that Cox did not see until

 

the Official Records were published. In his Reminiscences,

28 Moreover, Burnside, who saw

he vehemently refuted it-
Hooker's statement, refuted it in his own report on the
action. In addition to defending Cox, Burnside castigated
Hooker's conduct, saying that he ordered the First Corps

29 This much

to attack four times before Hooker responded.
is clear: Cox's men did not retreat at any time during the
contest for control of South Mountain.
Two interesting and different viewpoints appear in

Battles §n§_Leaders where both Cox and his opponent, Daniel
H. Hill, stated that they were outnumbered at Fox's Gap.
Hill insisted that the entire Rebel force was only 9,000,
whereas the Federals committed 30,000 to the battle.30 How-

ever, Hill's figure represented the total force engaged at

South Mountain, which Cox believed was misleading and

 

unfair. As his division was the only Union command engaged

 

until 2 P.M., Cox contended that his men ousted a

 

 

27_I_b_id_., 214.

28Cox, Reminiscences, I, 291-92.

29%, XIX, pt. 1, 422-23.

30D. H. Hill, ”The Battle of South Mountain,"
Battles and Leaders, II, pt. 2, 580. Hill's official

report, OTR., XIX, pt. 1, 1019-22, puts the strength of his
own divihihh at 5,000.

 

 

82

numerically superior foe from a defensible position.31
Actually each was correct. Cox had the smaller force until
the early afternoon, when the arrival of reinforcements
gave the Federals numerical superiority.

After the battle at South Mountain the Ninth Corps
spent half a day burying its dead and reorganizing its
forces. Then Cox moved the Corps through Fox's Gap along
the Boonesboro and Sharpsburg Pikes toward Antietam Creek.
Riding to the rear of the army, Cox found McClellan,
Burnside, and other officers discussing the placement of
the troops.32 After the conference was over, Cox, aided by
Burnside's staff, moved the Ninth into position on the
extreme left of the Army of the Potomac.

The village of Sharpsburg, where Lee intended to
reunite his separated forces, is situated on high ground
overlooking Antietam Creek. To reach Sharpsburg, the
Federals had to cross the winding creek and advance over
hilly country. Three bridges spanned the stream, which
could also be crossed at several suitable fords. The

bridges and the fords became major targets for both armies}3

 

 

31Cox, ”Forcing Fox's Gap and Turner's Gap,” Battles
and Leaders, II, pt. 2, 587-89. Cox insists the ‘_'“—“
Chhfederates' method of computing ”present for duty"
strength differed from the Union 5 so that Hill actually had
6,000 present, instead of 5,000. Williams, Hayes of the
Twenty-third, 137, says the murderous terrain greaEIy_—‘
strengthened the Rebel position.

32Cox, ”The Battle of Antietam," Battles and Leaders,
II, pt. 2, 630-32. ‘

33For a description of the battlefield see ibid.,
630-31.

 

 

 

83
The Ninth's objective was the southern-most bridge, soon to
be known as the Burnside Bridge.

Cox's troops camped behind the ridge of hills just
east of the stream, which protected them from Rebel artil-
lery and sharpshooters. The Corps was divided along the
Sharpsburg road: a battery with twenty-pound rifled Parrott
guns cemmanded the center of Cox's line, Crook's brigade of
the Kanawha division and Sturgis' division were stationed
to the right, while General Isaac P. Rodman's division and
Colonel Hugh Ewing's brigade from western Virginia fanned
out to form the left.34 The next day passed without inci-
dent, but McClellan and Burnside visited Cox late in the
afternoon and ordered him to be prepared for action in the
morning. The Generals also changed Cox's line so that
Sturgis was keyed on the bridge, leaving only Crook's bri-
gade to the right of the Sharpsburg road.35

Even before the battle began Cox was unhappy with
his personal situation. After Reno's death at South
Mountain, Cox had taken command of the Corps. He assumed
this was only a temporary arrangement and that Burnside
would personally lead the Ninth at Antietam. But when he
raised the issue he discovered that a dispute was in prog-

ress between Burnside and Hooker. Burnside was miffed

 

 

34O.R., XIX, pt. 1, 423-24. Colonel Scammon, who
normally commanded a brigade, was now commander of the
Kanawha division.

35Cox ”The Battle of Antietam,” Battles and Leaders
11, pt. 2, 632. "“—“"“““-’

 

 

 

 

84

because his command was separated with Hooker's First Corps
on the extreme right and the Ninth on the extreme left of
the line of operations. Moreover, Hooker had arranged to
receive his orders directly from McClellan, thereby effec-
tively cutting his nominal commander out of the picture.36
Consequently, Burnside flatly refused to reduce further his
role by accepting the command of only the Ninth. Cox then
pointed out that his small staff was unable to handle an
entire corps. But Burnside remained adamant; Cox would
command the Ninth and Burnside's own staff would lend a
hand. Therefore Cox found himself in an uncomfortable
situation-~technically he commanded the Ninth, but with his
immediate superior ever present during the battle he hesi-
tated to make independent decisions.37

McClellan's battle plan called for simultaneous
attacks on both of Lee's flanks, saving the center of his

38

army for action at the decisive moment. The plan followed

the theories of military tactics because it was simple and

 

36The difficulties between Burnside and Hooker were
not new. It has already been noted that Hooker's report of
the Battle of South Mountain contained inaccuracies which
Burnside refuted in his report. See above, 81. Evidently
Hooker was maneuvering in hopes of obtaining a more impor-
tant command.

37There are several sources which comment upon the
command situation. For example, see O.R., XIX, pt. 1, 177;
Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksbur , 116-17; Stackpole,
From Cedaf—Mbuntain to—Khtietam, 408; and Cox, "The Battle
of Kntletam," BEttIe§_§g§ headers, II, pt. 2, 631-32.

38McClellan presents his plan in two separate
reports of the campaign: O.R., XIX, pt. 1, 30-55.

 

 

 

85
implied use of all available troops. It was unfortunate
that McClellan failed to follow his own blueprint. Had he
done so, the Battle of Antietam might have ended in a disas-
trous defeat for Lee.

At 7 A.M. on September 17, Burnside, relaying orders
from McClellan, directed Cox to prepare to attack. After
completing his preparations, Cox joined Burnside to await
further orders. From their vantage point on a high knoll
behind their line, they saw waves of men moving across the
fields to the north near the Dunker Church. They fully
expected any moment to receive word to attack, but it was
nearly 10 o'clock before McClellan sent orders to take the
bridge.39

Immediately Cox put the men into motion. The left--
Rodman's division and Ewing's brigade--went downstream one-
half mile to cross at a ford and flank the enemy. Crook's
brigade approached the target from the right and Sturgis'
division hit it with frontal assaults. General Orlando
Willcox's division remained under cover as a reserve.

In the contest for Burnside's Bridge the Rebels
held an advantageous position. From the steep right bank of
the Antietam, the enemy, hidden behind breastworks and a
stone wall, poured a terrific fire into the attacking col-
umns. In addition, that bank of the stream curved in such

a way as to enable Confederate artillery to enfilade the

 

39Unless otherwise indicated the description of the
Ninth's role at Antietam is based upon Cox's report, O.R.,
XIX, pt. 1, 423-27. _“

 

 

86
approaches to the bridge. Since the bridge itself was so
narrow that it could carry only three men running abreast,
the Rebels concentrated their firepower upon a compact
target.40

During Crook's slow and confused advance toward the
bridge, Sturgis tried a direct assault which was easily
repulsed. Then Crook's men appeared and the Rebels zeroed
in on them, compelling Crook to halt his brigade and return
the devastating volleys. It soon became clear that a new
approach was required to dislodge the entrenched enemy.
And, so far, no word from Rodman and Ewing.

Cox and Sturgis sent forward two regiments in
single-file columns. They fanned out in a skirmish line on
the Union side of the creek and effectively pinned down the
Confederates, who were now unable to sustain their previous
rate of fire. Meanwhile Crook, under galling conditions,
managed to place two mountain howitzers in a position from
which they could cover the opposite end of Burnside's
Bridge. Crook's gunners, using double-shotted canister,
began to rake the Rebels, who dived for more cover.

With the preparations completed, Sturgis chose the
Fifty-first New York and the Fifty-first Pennsylvania to
attempt a crossing of the bridge. This time the men rushed
forward, wavered momentarily at the approach to the struc-

ture, and then dashed across. Other regiments, following

 

 

40Cox, "The Battle of Antietam,” Battles and Leaders,
11, pt. 2, 649-50.

 

 

 

 

87
hard on their heels, clambered up the steep bank and drove
the Confederates from their position above the bridge.
Shortly Rodman and Ewing, who had carried out their assign-
ment, arrived and formed on the left of Cox's line. After
three hours of vicious, costly fighting the Union flag was
at last raised on the Sharpsburg side of Burnside's
Bridge.41

To his dismay Cox discovered that he could advance
no further until reinforcements and ammunition arrived.
Everyone was exhausted. Willcox's reserves would have to
lead the next phase of the attack, but three precious hours
passed before the drive toward Sharpsburg began.

At first the renewed advance moved steadily forward,
but then Cox noticed a gap developing in the center of the
line. The right, spearheaded by Willcox's fresh division,
was advancing more rapidly than Rodman's division on the
left, which had run into stiff resistance and could not
keep up.42 Unless both moved at the same pace, Cox's Corps
faced the danger of being divided and beaten in detail.

At this point new troops came running across the
fields toward Cox's left. Although they wore blue uniforms,

they carried Confederate flags and were firing upon the

41Ibid. 641-53. Cox's article describes the storm-
ing of Burnside 5 Bridge in greater detail than his official
report.

42Lieutenant General James Longstreet, C.S.A.,
reports Rodman's flank was hit by General Robert Toomb's
division: O.R., XIX, pt. 1, 840-41.

 

_fi,,, , , , a «_f

88
Federals as they advanced. They belonged to Major General
Ambrose P. Hill's small Confederate division which had just
come from Harpe1:s Ferry. Their timely arrival sealed the
fate of Cox's assault on Sharpsburg.43 Despite Willcox's
penetration of the outskirts of the village, a retreat had
to be ordered to save Rodman. The Federals fell back in
orderly fashion to the banks of the Antietam, where they
dug in to hold their position. By now the battle was almost
over, the exhausted Rebels could not mount an attack to
dislodge the Ninth. That night both armies slept on their

weapons, fully expecting a renewal of the struggle at dawn.

 

But it was not to be. McClellan, convinced that Lee
outnumbered him, allowed the Confederates to slip away
unmolested. Revealing great audacity and considerable
understanding of the Union commander, Lee remained in a
battle-ready position for another day before beginning his
retreat into Virginia. McClellan did not even harass the
Rebels' withdrawal. If McClellan had vigorously renewed
his attack against Lee on the 18th, he probably could have
destroyed him and greatly shortened the war. But the Army
of the Potomac rested and lost a great opportunity. Several
weeks after Antietam, Lincoln, displeased by McClellan's

failure, removed him and gave the command to Burnside.44

 

43See ibid., 980, for Hill's description of his
arrival at Antietam. His men had taken the Union uniforms
from a government warehouse at Harpe1:s Ferry.

44Stephen E. Ambrose, Halleck: Lincoln's Chief of
Staff (Baton Rouge: Louisiana-State University Press, _—
, 86-87, 92-93.

 

 

89

Although Antietam lacked military decisiveness, it
had tremendous political importance because Lincoln used
this Northern ”victory" as the basis for issuing his prelim-
inary Emancipation Proclamation. This not only added
strength to the Union cause in the North, but it also
reduced the possibility of British intervention in behalf
of the South. Now the Civil War had a dual purpose; it was
a struggle to preserve the Union and a moral crusade to
free the slaves behind enemy lines.45

During the days following the battle Cox had several
conversations with McClellan. On one occasion McClellan
asked Cox, Burnside, and General John Cochrane of New York
what they thought of Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation.
When McClellan mentioned that some people had urged him to
oppose Openly the proclamation, Cox replied that such an
action would surely destroy McClellan's career. He also
pointed out that the military was subordinate to the civil
authority and that if McClellan challenged that power "not
a corporal's guard would stand by his side.” Cox suspected
that McClellan purposely broached the subject to them
because all three opposed slavery and strongly supported
Lincoln's administration. The very raising of this question,
Cox wrote, revealed a weakness in McClellan; a stronger-

willed commander would have summarily thrown the

 

45James Ford Rhodes Histor of the Civil war (New
York: The Macmillan Co. , 19177—76747”

 

 

 

 

90
anti-administration schemers out of camp.46
In his Reminiscences Cox devoted considerable space
to analyzing McClellan's defects as a commander. He con-
cluded the greatest problem was that McClellan had convinced
himself and his army that they were greatly outnumbered by
Lee's forces. Thus McClellan's failure to act vigorously
was not interpreted by his men as a lack of courage, but
rather as a wise decision that saved them from certain dis-
aster. As proof of this Cox admitted that while he served
in the Army of the Potomac he, too, believed McClellan's
statements about Lee's superiority. But in retrospect Cox
agreed that the Union had to go on the offensive to win;
McClellan was not the man to be entrusted with such a
responsibility and had to be removed.47
McClellan's leadership at Antietam was faulty. To
be successful his plan required simultaneous attacks by
both wings of the army, with the center being thrown into
the contest at an opportune moment. The assaults, however,
were uncoordinated from the outset. The fighting on the
right, where Hooker's corps bore the brunt of the battle,
was almost over before Burnside received orders to begin his

attack.48

 

46Cox, Reminiscences, I, 359-61.
47Ibid., 1, 365-75.

48Cox, "The Battle of Antietam,” Battles and Leaders
11, pt. 2, 635, puts particular stress upon the ldEE'SI'—__‘J
coordination, as does Stackpole, From Cedar Mountain to
Antietam, 413-14. _—

 

 

 

 

91
Any attempt to determine the responsibility of
Burnside and Cox for the failures at Antietam hinges on the
question of time. Did either or both of these generals
fail to carry out Quickly the orders received? McClellan's
report (October 15, 1862) stated that Burnside had received
directions to take the bridge at 10 A.M., which agreed with

49 But in a later report (August

the latter's own account.
4, 1863) McClellan changed the time to 8 A.M. making it
appear that Burnside, or his subordinates, wasted two hours
before attacking.50 A copy of the original orders, however,
is clearly marked 9:10 A.M.; Burnside could not have
received them over an hour before they were issued.51
Depending on his sense of urgency, a messenger could have
consumed fifty minutes covering the two miles from army
headquarters to the Ninth's position.

Mere important is the three-hour delay between the
successful assault on the bridge and the attempt to take
Sharpsburg. If the final attack had commenced sooner, Lee
could have still been defeated.52 In his Reminiscences,

Cox explained that the delay was caused by the necessity of

moving all the fresh troops and ammunition over Burnside's

49o.R., XIX, pt. 1, 31, 419.
501bid., 63.
511bid , LI, pt. 1, 844.

52Bruce Catton, The Arm 9: the Potomac: Mr.
Lincoln's Army (Garden City, N.¥ Doubleday and C31, Inc

'2

-1

 

 

 

 

92
Bridge.53 But Cox erred in his handling of these maneuvers.
On either side of the bridge the Antietam could have been
waded. Had Willcox's division been ordered to wade across,
the bridge would have been clear for transporting the ammu-
nition and valuable time saved.54 Once the bottleneck
appeared Cox or Burnside should have sought a means to speed
up operations. But they did not and precious hours slipped
away, allowing A. P. Hill's men to arrive just in time to
repel the Federals.

The failure on the left, however, rested mainly upon
McClellan, who did not commit any of his reinforcements to
the battle. Cox believed that McClellan expected defeat,
not victory, and withheld his fresh troops to cover an
anticipated retreat.55 If McClellan had used his reserves,
A. P. Hill's 1,800 men probably could not have stopped the
Ninth's advance on Sharpsburg.56

A final point of interest involves the curious
language Cox used in his report of the battle. Near the
end, where he summarized the Ninth's efforts, he said the
attack "had the effect of a most powerful diversion in favor

of the center and right of the army, which by this means had

 

53Cox, Reminiscences, I, 345.

 

54Garrom, 1:13. Lincoln's Army, 301-302.

5500x, "The Battle of Antietam," Battles and Leaders,
11, Pt. 2, 656-58.

56For example, Fitz-John Porter's Fifth Corps
remained inactive throughout the battle.

 

93
been able to make decided and successful advances. ."57
When he wrote these words Cox surely knew the battle on the
left had been much more than a diversion. In fact, it had
been the major action of the afternoon. Did he use this
language to excuse or minimize the failure of his men to
crush completely Lee's right? Or did he firmly believe that
a diversion was all that McClellan had intended for the
Ninth? The latter seems more plausible because Cox contin-
ually referred to the "diversion” created by his men at
Antietam in his article in Battles §E§_Leaders, and in his
Reminiscences.58 Possibly he heard the term used by
Burnside and others in the conference he attended upon his
arrival at Antietam and, therefore, he used it to describe
the Ninth's role in the battle.59
Just when Cox was looking forward to continued
service in the East, he received orders to return to western
Virginia.6O Affairs there had rapidly deteriorated. The

Rebels, aware that Cox and his Kanawha division had left,

decided to drive out or destroy the Federals still in the

 

570.R., XIX, pt. 1, 426.

5800x, "The Battle of Antietam," Battles and Leaders,
II, pt. 2, 633-34; Reminiscences, I, 307.

59Cox, Reminiscences, I, 307.

609.31,, XIX, pt. 2, 380, 393.

 

 

 

94

area.61 To thwart their plans, the War Department selected
Cox to command the District of Western Virginia. Although
his previous experience made him the best qualified com-
mander available for the job, Cox was not happy with his
new assignment.62

On October 6, 1862, Cox reported to General-in-Chief
Halleck for instructions before returning to western
Virginia, and was informed that he had been promoted to
Major General.63 The promotion had impressive support;
McClellan, Burnside, Salmon P. Chase, and Garfield had all

recommended Cox's advancement.64 With this backing,

 

61Cox, Reminiscences, I, 391-99; copies of Confed-
erate correspon ence, .R., XII, pt. 3, 940, 946, reveal
that they knew Cox and the Kanawha division had gone to
Washington. Both Lee and Secretary of War George Randolph
were urging General William W. Loring to seize control of
the Kanawha Valley and to disrupt the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad.

62Cox to Major General George Thomas, November 4,
1862. Cox was disgruntled because he still believed the
mountainous terrain would prevent achievement of any lasting
success against the Rebels. James A. Garfield, who visited
with Cox just before he returned to western Virginia, also
reported that he was unhappy with the assignment: Garfield
to Crete Elucretia, his wiféj, October 7, 1862, in Williams,
Wild Life 9f_£he Army, 155.

63Cox, Reminiscences, I, 400. He related that
Secretary of War Stanton personally handed him the notice of
his appointment.

64O.R., XIX, pt. 2, 383-84. This is McClellan's
recommendation and he stated that Burnside concurred in
urging the promotion. No record of Burnside's personal
recommendation appears in the Official Records. Salmon P.
Chase, Inside Lincoln's Cabinet: The Civil War Diaries of
Salmon P. Chase, ed. David Donald (new York:-—Ibngmans, _—
Green, l9545, I61, entry for September 27, 1862; Garfield
to Crete, September 27 and October 7, 1862, in Williams,
Wild Life 9f.Ehg_Army, 145, 155.

 

 

 

95

confirmation by the Senate appeared to be a mere formality.

In July, 1862, Congress had voted to limit the
number of additional Major Generals to forty. But the
administration had ignored the measure.65 When Congress
convened in December, the War Department recommended forty-
three men for promotion. Several Senators and Representa-
tives challenged the list and said it must be reduced.
Stanton defended the request as necessary to provide for
the proper staffing of the army and asked that the entire
issue be reviewed.66 ‘During the subsequent debate, the
House approved a bill authorizing forty more major general-
cys, for a total of eighty. Assuming that the Senate would
concur, the administration, negotiating with Congressmen,
added twenty-seven men to the group. At the last minute,
however, the Senate rejected the House measure; finally,
both houses agreed to approve appointments for seventy major
generals. With only a few days remaining before adjournment,
the War Department worked quickly to remove six names:
Napoleon B. Buford, George W. Morell, William F. Smith,
Horatio G. Wright, John M. Schofield, and Cox. Therefore,
in March, 1863, Cox was notified that his "temporary promo-
tion” had expired. Naturally he was dismayed.

65The Con ressional Globe (46 vols.; Washington:
Congress-lem modem—1833:1873), 32, Appendix, 386. The
limit had been attached as a "rider” to an appropriations
bill and Lincoln doubted its constitutionality.

66U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Executive Documents,
$34929, 37th Congress, 3d Sess. (danuary 30, [863), Serial

 

 

 

96

Cox noted wryly that none of those eliminated,
except for Schofield, had been among the twenty-seven
recommended by Congressmen. It appeared that ”political
pull” was more important in winning advancement than proven
service on the battlefield.67 If such was the case, Cox
admitted that he stood little chance of success. He was
only slightly acquainted with Ohio Senator Benjamin wade and
had campaigned against John Sherman in 1860. Neither could
be expected to promote vigorously his claim. As Cox
described it, the contest among Ohioans narrowed down to a
choice between himself and Robert G. Schenck. DeSpite Cox's
more important commands, he lacked Schenck's political
influence. Cox was virtually unknown outside of Ohio,
whereas Schenck had already served several terms in the
House of Representatives. Therefore Schenck received the
promotion.68

In November, 1861, Cox had said he fought for the
Union cause, not glory. If his ”utter Disgrace" w0u1d serve
the cause he could accept even that. He believed this atti-
tude separated the regular army and civilian volunteer
officers. The former sought fame and glory on the battle-

field to advance their careers, while a civilian regarded

 

67Cox, Reminiscences, 1, 431-34. Retirements and
resignations ha e 1m1nate four other men. It is inter-
esting to note that the law permitting the appointment of
the new officers also required "that the president appoint
no one except for gallant and meritorious service."
Concressional Globe, 33, 1309.

68Cox, Reminiscences, I, 433-35.

 

 

97
the war as a temporary interruption of his normal life.69
The rejection of his promotion was not ”utter disgrace" but

it must have shaken Cox's philosophy that personal advance-

ment was unimportant.

 

69Cox to Garfield, November 8, 1861, Garfield
Papers, v, pt. 2

 

 

 

CHAPTER IV
RETURN TO FAMILIAR GROUND: WEST VIRGINIA AND OHIO

During August and September, 1862, the Union armies
suffered a series of setbacks. The Army of the Potomac had
been forced on the defensive by Lee's invasion of Maryland;
and although McClellan turned it back at Antietam, Lee's
army escaped destruction. In the West Rebel General Braxton
Bragg carried the war into central Kentucky, compelling the
Federals to give up Nashville, Tennessee. After a hectic
pursuit, Bragg was repulsed at Perryville, Kentucky. But
the results were inconclusive. Despite much hard fighting
the Federals had little to show for their efforts and faced
the unhappy task of regaining ground taken earlier from the
enemy.

Union reversals on the battlefield extended into
West Virginia.1 There the Confederates successfully wrested
the Kanawha Valley from the grip of the federal government

and temporarily interrupted the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

 

1On April 3, 1862, the citizens in fifty western
Vir inia counties approved a state constitution (18,862 to
514% for West Virginia. Although the state's request for
admission to the Union was still under consideration by the
federal government when Cox returned in October, 1862, the
region was commonly referred to as West Virginia. James G.
Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction
2d ed.; Boston: D. C. Heafh & Co.,-IgbITT - .

98

 

 

99
The Rebel's campaign had been triggered by Jackson's capture
of Pope's headquarters at Second Bull Run. Among the items
seized by the Confederates were letter-books which contained
accurate information about the strength and location of
Union forces in West Virginia. After studying these records
Lee sent General William A. Loring into the Kanawha Valley.
Loring was to sweep down the valley to the Ohio River, then
turn eastward to link up with other Rebel units operating
near Harpers Ferry.

When Cox went east, he had left Colonel Joseph A. J.
Lightburn in command of 5,000 men in the Kanawha Valley.
Lightburn's job was to dig in and hold Gauley Bridge. Cox
believed that the fortifications were strong enough to step
an attack by an enemy force outnumbering the defenders
three or four to one. Lightburn, unfortunately, did not
share Cox's confidence in the strength of his position. As
Loring advanced, Lightburn called his scattered units into
the breastworks to make a stand. Then he panicked. With
Loring closing in from two sides, Lightburn feared he could
not hold out, put the torch to the vast amount of supplies
stored at Gauley, and retreated toward Charleston. In the
hasty withdrawal the Federals became separated and some had
to cut through rugged mOuntains to avoid capture. Pausing
at Charleston only long enough to burn more supplies,
Lightburn continued his withdrawal to Point Pleasant on the
Ohio River. Almost withOut effort, the Confederates chased

the Federals from the Kanawha Valley. Thus, when Cox

 

 

100
returned to West Virginia he faced a situation strikingly
similar to that encountered in 1861.2

The Rebels learned of Cox's reassignment to West
Virginia almost as soon as the orders were issued. Lee, and
other Confederate officials, alerted Loring and implored
him to make every effort to retain control of the valley.
Lee expressed special concern for maintaining possession of
the highly productive salt wells near Charleston.3 When
Loring failed to prepare vigorously for the approaching con-
test, he was replaced by General John C. Echols.

On October 4, 1862, Cox assumed his new duties as
commander of the newly-created District of West Virginia,4
which included most of the present state of West Virginia
and several Ohio counties bordering on the Ohio River.5
Cox set up headquarters at Gallipolis, Ohio. He commanded
directly the Kanawha Division under Crook (6,000 men),
Lightburn's Division (7,200 men), and the Railroad Division
headed by General Benjamin F. Kelley (8,600 men).6 In addi-
tion, if he needed help, Cox had authorization to bring in
George W. Morgan's Division from Tennessee. Since Kelley's

troops were committed to keeping open the Baltimore and Ohio

 

2Cox, Reminiscences, I, 391-99.
39.33;, xxx, pt. 2, 666.
4313313., 421.

53339, L, pt. 1, 289.

6933., xxx, pt. 2, 522-23.

 

 

101

tracks, only Crook's and Lightburn's units were available
for offensive operations.

General Horatio G. Wright, whose Department of the
Ohio included the West Virginia District, urged Cox to move
quickly. Wright wanted the Confederates driven out before
fall rains turned the roads into seas of mud. He suggested
an advance by two columns-~one to move up the Kanawha Valley
from Point Pleasant, and the other to proceed southward from
Clarksburg. It was hoped that the columns could converge on
the Rebels and destroy them.7 Cox disliked the plan because
he had experienced too many failures by the use of widely
separated forces in the mountainous terrain. But since
speed was essential, he decided to go ahead rather than
argue.

~Before sending his troops into action, Cox tried to
replace the equipment destroyed during the recent retreat.
The most essential items-~weapons, ammunition and food--
were easily obtained, but wagons and mules were in short
Supply.8 Now even the Kanawha River failed to cooperate;
indeed, the water level was so low that steamboats could not
navigate beyond Charleston. Despite the difficulty, Cox
pushed ahead, hopeful that he could gather enough wagons by
the time he reached Charleston to continue the march to

Gauley. He worried needlessly. Just as the operation

71bid., XVI, pt. 2, 402, 579.
81bid., xxx, pt. 2, 474-76, 535-37.

 

 

 

102

began, an extended rain raised the river and provided the
steamers with adequate clearance to the headwaters of the
Kanawha.9

Cox's column left Point Pleasant on October 15; it
proceeded cautiously, expecting a stiff fight above
Charleston. The Rebels were dug in on Laurel MOuntain,
using the camp established the previous year by Wise. Cox
had sufficient manpower to dislodge the enemy by driving
directly toward their position, but such a tactic might
result in high casualties. He, therefore, decided to use a
flanking movement, combining speed and surprise in an effort
to trap the Confederates. The main force marched down the
left bank of the Kanawha, crossed the river several miles
below Charleston, and proceeded toward the rear of Laurel
Mountain. They were too late. Echols had already pulled
out and was moving toward Gauley. Cox ordered a vigorous
pursuit, but the Rebels crossed Gauley Bridge to make good
their escape. The Federals reclaimed their former camp on
October 31.10 Halleck instructed Cox to station a large
garrison at Gauley and to post detachments where they could
watch the enemy.

Guerrillas who had refused to leave with Echols
remained in the valley. Cox had little use for these

"irregulars," as he called them, because their conduct

 

 

91bid., 456, 459.

10lbid., 448-49, 456, 474, 481-82, 515, 520-21. The
Clarksburg cqumn, delayed by a host of problems, did not
even get started before Cox claimed his victory.

 

.. 1---- , ,_111

103
violated prescribed military procedures. He branded them
armed outlaws, and commanded his men to remove them com-
pletely.11 With their identities disclosed by citizens who
had suffered harassment at their hands, the guerrillas were
soon captured and sent North to prison.

Cox personally stationed the troops at Gauley, and
then returned to his headquarters at Gallipolis. On
November 13, he received an urgent request from General
Kelley (Railroad Division) for reinforcements. Kelley
feared that Stonewall Jackson, who had returned to the
Shenandoah Valley, meant to attack the railroad junction at

Grafton.12

At the same time Kelley had alerted the War
Department and Halleck recommended that Cox send troops from
Charleston to Grafton. Cox demurred, explaining that it
would be unwise to reduce the garrison in the Kanawha Valley
just when the situation was returning to normal. Such a
step might undermine the recent victories and trigger
renewed resistance. But more importantly, Cox thought that
Kelley exaggerated the danger.13
Kelley insistently repeated his request for help.
Halleck, more impressed by Kelley's reports than by Cox's

reasoning, pressured Cox to send at least Crook's brigade

 

to Point Pleasant, where it could be moved quickly by rail

 

llIbid., 529-31.
121bid., 570, 586-87; XXI, 759.

131b bid., XXI, 763, Cox to Aaron F. Perry, November
17,1862,Eettter Book 1.

 

 

 

104

to Grafton. But Halleck left the final decision up to Cox.
Cox remained calm and carefully analyzed the situation.
His scouts reported no unusual activity. Surely if Jackson
planned a determined attack on the railroad he would have
either ordered a diversion toward Cox to keep him busy, or
pulled the Confederates out of Cox's area to assist his
column. Thus Cox decided to hold his troops until a clear
danger emerged. He was right. Jackson took a quick run at
the Baltimore and Ohio, then moved eastward to join Lee near
Fredericksburg.14

During December Cox's troops moved into winter
quarters, garrisoning Charleston and Gauley, and setting up
a few advanced posts in front of the latter. During the
winter Cox's command steadily diminished. The War Depart-
ment decided that fewer men could hold the Kanawha Valley,
so several regiments were transferred to Rosecrans in
Tennessee.15 The Rebels, confused by these movements,
thought that Cox personally accompanied the units. But they
were wrong.16 Although Cox certainly would have preferred
to go along, he remained in command in West Virginia. The
only excitement during the winter occurred near the end of

March, 1863, when about 400 Rebel raiders hit Point Pleasant

 

 

140.R., XXI, 768, 775, 778-79, 786-87.
lSIbId., XX, pt. 2, 260; XXI, 855, 896, 899, 944.

l6lbid., XXIII, pt. 2, 646, 647, 685; XXV, pt. 2,
679. GeneraI Braxton Bragg, the Confederate commander in
Tennessee, was the source of the inaccurate information
about Cox.

 

_7—_———___’ ' 7' ”' ' ‘*‘“‘"’

 

105

on the Ohio River and briefly severed communications between
Cox's headquarters at Gallipolis and Charleston. More
embarrassed than hurt, Cox scrounged up some Ohio militia
units and quickly regained the village.17

In February, 1863, Cox made a personal request for
a leave of absence and a transfer to a more active theatre.
Earlier, in November, 1862, Cox had intimated that he
desired to return to civilian life-~to his quiet home, his
books and his profession. But, at the same time, he
admitted that he had scant reason to resign because his
health was admirable despite much exposure to the elements.

In fact, he had gained weight.18

Probably he was bored and
disgusted with his routine duties when he made these
comments. He was serious, however, about the transfer.

His command had been sharply decreased by the shifting of
troops to Rosecrans, and the Rebels were quiet in the
district. His subordinates, Crook and Scammon, were com-
petent officers and he thought either of them could easily
replace him. Moreover, Cox had made many recommendations
for increasing the efficiency of the army, and he wanted an
Opportunity to put his ideas into practice. He would even
accept a less important position in preference to his

19

present inactivity. The leave was speedily granted. But

 

17Ibid., XXV, pt. 1, 75-77; pt. 2, 171-73, 175, 177.

186 18Cox to Major General George Thomas, November 4,
2.

186 19Cox to Adjutant General of the Army, February 2,
3.

 

 

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII7_________________________—____—__fii ’ "7

106
ten months elapsed before Cox obtained a battlefield command.
During the quiet winter months Cox worked on his
long neglected correspondence. In these letters he thor-
oughly reviewed the political and military situations, and

presented his personal opinions. He expressed alarm over

 

the gains made by the "peace party” in the 1862 congres-
sional elections. As a result the Union Party's majority in
the House had been sharply decreased.20 (The Union Party
consisted of Republicans, "War Democrats" and Unionists,

who supported the military effort against the South.)
Reports indicated that the anti-war representatives and sen-
ators intended to propose a compromise to the South in an
effort to halt the war. Cox feared the compromise might go
so far as to propose recognition of slavery everywhere,

although this would undoubtedly convince New York and New

 

England to leave the Union. Such an offer must never be
made. Reviewing the circumstances, Cox thought there were
two ways to defeat the peace party delegates. First, and
clearly more desirable, would be a complete military victory

by the North. But Cox doubted whether such a victory was

 

20Randall and Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction,
458, give the following figures for EEE'HBGse o epresent-
atives. The Thirty-seventh Congress, 1861-1863 (after the
withdrawal of Southern delegates), contained 106 Republicans,
42 Democrats and 28 Unionists. The Thirty-eighth Congress,
1863-1865, had 102 "Republicans and Unconditional Unionists"
and 75 Democrats, resulting in a sharply diminished
Republican and Unionist majority. The Democrats had majOr-
ities from five states which had voted Republican in 1860--
New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois.
Wisconsin's congressional delegation was evenly split between
the two parties.

 

 

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII:7____________________________""W’'7‘II-____________________”'——_w

107
imminent. On the other hand, the anti-war Democrats might
defeat themselves through internal dissensions. They had
won the elections by stressing local issues and by running
candidates who appealed to strong local passions. Cox

suspected that these men, holding many divergent opinions,

 

would not be able to agree upon a unified course of action.
Even if they agreed on a compromise and presented it to the
Confederacy, Cox thought the Southern leaders, interpreting
the negotiations as a sign of weakness, would hold out for
complete political independence.21 All things considered,
Cox knew a very serious danger existed. The North must win
both the political and military struggles.

Cox recognized that the Union's political problems

were closely related to military events. Success on the

 

battlefield would end most of the current dissension. But
he believed that the military structure lacked proper organ-
ization and utility to bring about a quick, sure conclusion
to the war. He disliked the "Anaconda Plan” because the
Union lines were too extended. The Confederates had con-
sistently used inner lines to thwart uncoordinated Federal
attacks. At best, the Anaconda policy had only a slight

chance of succeeding because it required a long war of

 

21Cox to Aaron F. Perry, November 7, 1862, in
William C. Cochran (ed.), "The Political Correspondence of
Major General Jacob D. Cox” (2 vols.; unpublished typewritten
manuscript), I, 1—4. Hereafter cited as Cochran, ”Political
Correspondence." There are copies of this manuscript in the
Oberlin College Library, the University of Cincinnati
Library, the Ohio State Historical Library at Columbus and
the Library of Congress.

 

 

 

108
attrition against the South.22 But time, itself,worked
against the North. Somehow new vigor must be injected into
the army to bring a quick end to the hostilities.

Dismissing the current policy as futile, Cox out-
lined his own formula for success. He would bring the half-
dozen small Federal armies into one large, well-organized,
well-supplied unit. This huge army (400,000 to 500,000
troops) would operate against a single target--the
Confederate right in Virginia, or the center in Tennessee
and Kentucky, or the left along the Mississippi River. Only
small units would be left elsewhere for defensive purposes.
Cox believed such a concentration of troops would force the
Confederates to follow suit. But Cox suspected his plan
would never be adopted. Northern politicians, especially
governors, seeing their states left relatively unprotected
would put pressure on Lincoln to detach troops for garrison
duty. Such action would defeat Cox's proposal before it
received a fair trial. Concentration of troops had been
Napoleon's key to success, it could win for the Union, but
circumstances in the North worked against its pr0per appli-
cation.23

Cox recommended, in addition to his overall strategy,
that changes be made in the army's structure to increase its
efficiency. He expressed dismay at the distinction made

between "veteran" and newly-recruited regiments. At first,

 

 

22Same to same, November 17, 1862, Letter Book 1.
23Ibid.

 

 

 

 

109

the competition between the units served to increase their
morale, but this no longer was true. Many of the veteran
regiments, decimated in battle, were mere organizational
skeletons. Unfortunately the War Department, rather than
using new recruits to restore the under-manned regiments to
full strength, accepted entirely new regiments into the
service. These new tr00ps, because they lacked proper
training or had inferior officers, frequently collapsed
under fire. It would be better, Cox thought, to integrate
veteran and novice. At full strength the veteran regiments'
zeal would return; and the recruits, learning by example,
would more rapidly become well-disciplined soldiers.24

Debilitating conditions also existed among the
officers. Cox believed the government had made poor use of
the regular army officers. Rather than spreading these
better trained men throughOut the army, where they could
have helped train the multitude of civilian officers, the
War Department assigned several to commands in a single
brigade or corps. This left inexperienced civilian officers
in complete charge of other units, a situation often result-
ing in disaster. Moreover, regular army officers received
preferential treatment when promotions were granted. This
practice diminished the civilian officer's desire to excel.
The army failed, many times, to remove incompetent officers

and even if the poor officers were forced out, they

 

 

24Cox to Aaron F. Perry, December 18, 1862.

 

 

 

 

llO
frequently returned to the field with higher ranks than when
dismissed. Cox had a personal acquaintance with the latter
problem.
I have known a lieutenant to be forced by his

captain (a splendid soldier) to resign on account

of his general inefficiency. I have seen that same

lieutenant take the field a few months later as a

lieutenant-colonel of a new regiment, whilst the

captain still stood at the head of his fraction of

a company in the line. This is not a singular

instance, but an example of cases occurring liter-

ally by the thousand in our vast army during the

year past 25
Cox proposed a complete review of the officer corps and the
diSpersal of the regulars throughout the army, with all
assignments based solely on merit. Thereafter open compe-
tition should determine who received promotions. This
system would, Cox thought, reward proven ability, rather
than ”pull." Consequently all officers would be encouraged
to produce their best, incompetents could be removed, and
the increased efficiency of the officers would benefit the
entire army.26

Cox even suggested increased use of Negro troops.

In this scheme Cox sought to solve two problems, one mili-
tary and the other social. Negro volunteers would be prom-

ised a separate "colony," to be established by the federal

government at the end of the war. (Cox thought part of

 

25Cox to Salmon P. Chase, January 1, 1863.

26Ibid.; Cox to Major General Ethan Allan Hitchcock,
January 2, I863. These letters are undoubtedly more impor-
tant than those to Aaron F. Perry because they were directed
to men in important positions. Chase was Lincoln's
Secretary of the Treasury and Hitchcock was on the War
Department staff in washington.

 

 

 

-11“-

111
Texas could be set aside for a colored settlement.) In the
meantime, the military training and discipline would help
prepare the Negro to accept the responsibilities of freedom.
Cox based his proposal on Jomini's Guerres dg_lg Revolution,

which described France's use of Negro soldiers in Santo

 

Domingo and Guadaloupe. These Blacks, when led by white
officers, had proved to be excellent fighters. Besides
these advantages, the call for Negro recruits would further
drain labor from the South and hamper the Confederate econ-
omy.27 If this war was aimed at ending slavery, the Negro
should be given an opportunity to fight for his own libera-
tion.

In 1862 the federal government appointed a commis-

sion, headed by Major-General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, to

 

revise the army regulations. Cox, responding to a general
request by the commission, sent many of his recommendations
to Hitchcock. Cox pointed out that the United States was
following the military practices established by the first
French Republic, including even the procedures that had
proved defective. He hoped that the government would learn
from history and remove the most flagrant abuses. But time
and politics prevailed and no substantial changes were ever
made. It is to the credit of the Union soldiers and offi-

cers that they overcame such handicaps and fought through to

 

27Cox to Aaron F. Perry, February 9, 1863, Cochran,
"Political Correspondence," 1, 9'11

 

 

 

112

eventual victory.28

As the spring campaigns approached, Washington
reorganized the Departments of Ohio and Maryland, completely
reshuffling the command structure. West Virginia would now
report to General Schenck at Baltimore, rather than to
Cincinnati. Since West Virginia relied on the latter for
most of its supplies, Cox thought the shift was a drastic
error. But even more distressing, General Robert H. Milroy
became Cox's immediate superior, a man he considered unqual—
ified for the position. Now Cox worked feverishly for a
transfer. Fortunately for him he had a good relationship
with General Schenck, who helped convince Washington offi-
cials that his request should be granted.29

After some deliberation, the War Department assigned
Cox to the military post at Columbus, Ohio. This pleased
him immensely because General Burnside had just been
appointed commander of the Ohio Department. Cox had served
under Burnside at South Mountain and Antietam, had estab-
lished a warm relationship with him, and now hoped he could
convince Burnside to give him a battlefield command. In the
meantime, however, his orders directed him to assist in

enrolling eligible Ohio males for the draft under the

 

281m his analysis of the army's problems, Cox
stressed weaknesses long recognized as important by students
of the Civil War. For example see: Randall and Donald,
Civil War and Reconstruction, 325-33; T. Harry Williams,
e *IItary Leadership of North and South,” Wh the North
Won the Civil War, ed. David Donald (New York: oIIIef-—_'

WWW,- 3'3'354

29Cox, Reminiscences, I, 444-45.

 

 

 

 

113
federal Enrollment Act of March 3, 1863. All men between
twenty and forty-five had to register and the list of regis-
trants would be used to draft men if state quotas were not
filled by volunteers. As events turned out, very few men
were drafted in Ohio, or elsewhere, because the state,
counties and municipalities offered handsome bonuses to
volunteers.30 The Civil War draft served more as a "club"
to spur enlistments than as an effective means of bringing
men into the army.

When he arrived at Columbus, Cox found Burnside
engaged in reorganizing the department to increase its effi-
ciency. After discussing the matter with Governor David
Tod, Burnside announced the establishment of the Military
District of Ohio, and put Cox in charge. Consequently Cox
moved to Cincinnati, setting up his office a few blocks
away from Departmental Headquarters. His major duty was to
prevent civilians from interfering with the smooth operation
of the military. Normally this would be an easy task; but
the presence of Southern sympathizers in Ohio, who were not
above inciting riots, created a situation requiring a firm,
but delicate, touch. The District contained 2,500 regular
troops; if conditions deteriorated beyond their control Cox
had authority to call out the state militia to assist in

restoring peace.31

 

 

301bid., 446-47.

310.R., XXV, pt. 2, 299; Cox, Reminiscences, 1,
450-72, paSSIm.

 

 

 

 

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIlIIIIIIT_________________________________I_'IE_II-_-__________-_____‘______'“W’—'

114

Cox spent most of his time in administrative work--
filling out numerous reports, writing letters, and issuing
orders. In addition to his own district, he often aided
Burnside's staff with departmental paperwork. Under these
circumstances he had an opportunity to renew and expand his
acquaintance with Burnside. Burnside, he found, was averse
to the official routine required for the smooth operation of
the department, often leaving to subordinates tasks which
needed his personal attention. Even under this loose
arrangement many reports languished on Burnside's desk
awaiting his signature. Frequently Burnside tackled these
during the early morning hours when his staff was abed;
Cox became accustomed to being roused at 1 or 2 a.m. by an
orderly, who requested that he come to the office to help
with some pressing matter. Cox liked and respected Burnside,
but thought a closer attention to detail would have spared
the commander much unnecessary embarrassment.32

At the beginning of the war some cities and counties
spurred volunteering by paying cash bounties to enlistees.
In July, 1861, the federal government further encouraged
the practice by authorizing an additional federal premium of
$100 per man. In 1862 and 1863 national conscription laws
were passed. The states, attempting to avoid resorting to

a draft, added even more money to the system. As a result

 

bounty jumping-~a man would enlist, collect his money, then

 

 

32Cox, Reminiscences, I, 451-53; 11, 54-55.

 

 

 

 

115

desert to repeat the practice in another area under an
assumed name--became a problem. The most flagrant instance
involved a man, from New York, who confessed to jumping
bounty thirty-two times.33

The violators fell into two classes. The first,
and most despised, were the "professionals” who made a regu-
lar practice of abusing the system. If caught, they were
charged with desertion and were judged by a military court.
Harsh sentences usually resulted from the tria1--a long
prison term or, in extreme cases, death before a firing
squad. The other class consisted of the supposedly innocent
offenders. They were underage, but mature-appearing lads
who enlisted to collect the bounty. Later their parents
would appear with proof of the boy's age and demand his
release from the service. The military officials could
never be certain whether to believe the parents' assertion
that their son had enlisted without their knowledge. The
army, however, seldom pressed such a case, preferring to
release the boy after arrangements had been made for the
repayment of the money. In the course of his duties, Cox
frequently dealt with bounty jumpers. Most cases were
rather routine, but in one instance Cox found himself in a
touchy situation.

A man named Hicks, arrested in Cincinnati as a

deserter and bounty jumper, was being held for military

 

33Randall and Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction,
312-15, 328—29.

 

 

 

1. .- _

116
trial in barracks under Cox's direct command. Friends of
Hicks persuaded the county Probate Judge to issue a writ of
habeas corpus demanding that the prisoner be turned over to
the civilian court. The judge, a well-known Copperhead,
ordered the county sheriff to serve the writ and return with
the prisoner. The sheriff, recognizing an explosive situa-
tion, met with Cox, who explained that Hicks was held under
federal law and that he could not be released to the civil
authorities. The sheriff reported this to the court, but
the judge was adament, "Raise a posse if necessary but get
the prisoner!" The distraught sheriff returned to Cox to
ask how he would react if a posse tried to enforce the court
order. Cox replied calmly that he would instruct his men to

resist; they would have orders to fire at the leaders first.

 

Cox's determination convinced the sheriff that a collision
between the civil and military authorities must be avoided.
But, since both he and the judge were up for re-election,
the sheriff did not want to hurt his political career by
backing down alone. Thereupon Cox suggested a clever solu-
tion: return to the judge, explain the entire situation,
and if he insists on pursuing the matter, tell him he will
be deputized to lead the posse. The judge quietly withdrew

the writ and the affair blew over without further trouble.34

 

During the summer of 1863 great political tension

gripped Ohio. State elections, scheduled for October, would

 

 

34Cox, Reminiscences, II, 48-51.

 

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIlllllll::::—————---—————————————__________1 ,, 111.- ”n,”

117
reveal much about the public attitude toward the war.
Clement Vallandigham, an anti-war Democrat and leading
Copperhead, opposed John Brough, the Union Party's nominee,
for the governorship.35 In May, Vallandigham had been
arrested by Burnside after delivering an anti-war speech at
Mount Vernon, Ohio. Subsequently a military court found
Vallandigham guilty of "declaring sympathies for the enemy"
and sentenced him to imprisonment for the duration of the
war. But, because Vallandigham had not urged the use of
force against the federal government, a huge public outcry
followed his conviction. Embarrassed, President Lincoln
commuted the sentence to banishment within the Confederate
lines. Vallandigham fared no better in the South; he became

embroiled in arguments with Jefferson Davis over the conduct

 

of the war and was ordered out of the Confederacy. After
successfully running the Union blockade, the Ohio Copperhead
took up residence in Canada. While in Windsor, Ontario, he
was nominated for Ohio's governorship by the Democrats.
Lincoln's commutation, however, included a promise of renewed
imprisonment should Vallandigham return to the North.36 Cox
issued a general order stressing that military officials in

Ohio would indeed perform their duties if Vallandigham

 

 

 

35The Union Party replaced the Republican Party in
the North after the outbreak of hostilities. The name
stressed the fact that the party was not partisan, it sup-
ported the Union and the federal government. Rallied under
its banner were Republicans, War Democrats and others who
supported the war against the South.

36Randall and Donald, Civil War £29 Reconstruction,
302-303.

 

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIT_____________________—_I__————fi7 '_ ‘

 

118
reappeared.37 Everyone wondered whether he would force a
showdown. Fortunately he decided not to return, thereby
defusing the situation. Further relief was provided in
October when Brough and the Union Party won a smashing
victory.38

The political campaign had scarcely begun when John
H. Morgan's "Raid" pushed politics from the headlines.
Morgan, an outstanding but unpredictable cavalry officer
attached to Bragg's command in Tennessee, had instructions
to attack Rosecrans' supply line. The raid on the
Louisville and Nashville railroad utterly failed due to the
stiff resistance put up by Federal garrisons. Morgan kept
moving north and exceeded his orders by crossing the Ohio
River into Indiana on July 8, 1863. Cox, in his account of
the raid, suggests Morgan took this action to "save face."39
Whatever the reason, what followed was one of the most
bizarre episodes of the Civil War.

Morgan burned his hijacked ferry to delay his pur-
suers. The Indiana militia reacted quickly and held the
raiders to within forty miles of the river, driving them
eastward toward Ohio. The responsibility for stopping

Morgan fell upon Burnside, who had recently sent most of his

 

51 4 37O.R., XXX, pt. 3, 522; Cox, Reminiscences, II,
-5 . “‘*‘ ""““"“"

38For a more complete description of the election
:32 Vallandigham's role See Roseboom, Ohio: Civil War Era,
~423.

39Cox, Reminiscences, 1, 497-98.

119
troops into East Tennessee. He quickly recalled the cavalry,
put General Edward Hobson in charge, and sent them after the
Rebels.40 With Burnside's attention directed toward super-
vising the general pursuit, the responsibility for arranging
the finer details in Ohio fell upon Cox.

Because Mbrgan followed an erratic course through
Indiana, it was difficult to determine where he would enter
Ohio. Cox assumed the Confederates must have a particular
target in mind, probably the railroads. His first efforts
were directed toward providing protection for them. Cox
used a proclamation, issued by Governor Tod, to mobilize
every able-bodied man between twenty and forty-five to meet
the emergency. This provided adequate manpower, but the
men were untrained and ill-equipped. Thus Cox limited his
orders to defensive measures: throwing up breastworks at
vital points along Morgan's suspected route, felling trees
across roads and tearing up planks from bridges to delay the
raiders. As the Rebels approached Cincinnati during the
early morning hours on July 14th, a show of force by the
hastily gathered militia deflected Morgan toward Camp
Dennison. Morgan refused a confrontation with the camp gar-
risen and continued to wind his way across southern Ohio.41

By now his objective was to escape. But Burnside's regulars

 

 

401bid., 499-500.

41Ibid. 501-509. For the official correspondence
relating to Cox 5 efforts to delay or capture Morgan, see
O.R., XXIII, pt. 1, 743, 748, 755, 756, 768, 773, 786-87,
789, 790, 795.

 

120

held the Ohio River crossings, supported by steamers carry-
ing rifled artillery. Meanwhile Hobson's men narrowed the
gap between hunter and quarry to just ten miles. On the
18th the Confederates made a desperate effort to recross
the Ohio at Buffington Island, but troops called from West
Virginia easily thwarted the attempt. For eight more days
Morgan eluded the Federals, losing hundreds of men through
capture and sheer exhaustion. On July 26, the leader and
his 400 remaining men were brought to bay at New Lisbon,
Ohio. Lincoln ordered that Morgan be held in the federal
penitentiary at Columbus in retaliation for reported Rebel
abuse of captured Union officers. Although Morgan later
carried off a spectacular escape and returned to the South,
his career was ruined. He never again received an inde-
pendent command.

In retrospect, Morgan's Raid must be written off as
a spectacular, but entirely futile, operation.42 Although
the Confederacy lost 3,000 men, the raiders failed to delay
Rosecrans' drive toward Chattanooga. North of the Ohio, the
hard-pressed Rebels had been unable to burn supply depots or
damage the railroads. The suppression of the raid, includ-
ing payment of damage claims to citizens, cost Ohio a little
more than one million dollars. The money, however, was well
Spent because it proved that the militia could react reason-

ably well under pressure to protect the state. It is

 

 

 

42Cox, Reminiscences, I, 508-509.

121

interesting to note that Southern sympathizers were not a
problem throughout the entire episode.43

With Morgan behind bars, quiet returned to Ohio.
Nothing important interrupted the routine until November 9,
when Cox received an alarming message from Detroit. (Before
Burnside went to East Tennessee, he added the Military
District of Michigan to Cox's command.) The telegram said
that some of Morgan's men, who had escaped to Canada,
planned to launch an amphibious attack on the Federal mili-
tary prison on Johnson's Island in Sandusky Bay.44 It con-
tained captured Confederate officers and their release would
be a worthy objective. At first Cox was inclined to ignore
the report, especially after he wired the United States
Consul-General at Montreal, who replied that the entire
thing was a fabrication. On the 12th, however, Secretary of
war Stanton telegraphed that the British Minister in
Washington had confirmed the rumor and directed Cox to take
steps to defend the prison. Cox went quickly by rail to
Sandusky and inspected the defenses on Johnson's Island.
Because an attack had been considered so improbable, the
prison was virtually undefended. Cox, aboard a yacht loaned
by a citizen, scouted Sandusky Bay and decided the best plan
would be to prevent a hostile craft from ever entering the

harbor. At the mouth of the bay, where sandbars forced

43Roseboom, Ohio: Civil War Era, 424-25.

440.R., Series III, III, 1012-13, 1015, 1043.

 

122

vessels into a narrow channel, Cox placed artillery so that
the gunners could fire broadside at any unwelcome ship.
Then, just in case the raiders managed to get past the
shore batteries, Cox positioned more artillery on the island
and strengthened the garrison with militia. By now the
Confederates knew their security had been breached. They
dropped their plans.45 Cox had done his work well, the
prison could be easily defended in the future.

While still at Sandusky Cox received long-awaited
orders. He was directed to report for active duty to

General Burnside in East Tennessee.46

With high spirits,
Cox quickly wrapped up his affairs at Cincinnati and left

for the field.

45Cox, Reminiscences, II, 58-63.

460.12., XXXI, pt. 3, 314.

 

 

CHAPTER V
THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN

Cox left Cincinnati on December 9, 1863, for
Knoxville, Tennessee, where he would report to General
Burnside. He travelled by train to Lexington, Kentucky,
where he requisitioned horses and wagons for the remainder
of the journey. On the 11th the entourage left Lexington
to wend its way across the mountains. The terrain reminded
Cox very much of his travels in West Virginia; the roads
were narrow and often so steep that double teams were
required. Rain fell intermittently, adding to the discom-
fort of the travellers. At night they sought shelter with
local residents, but sometimes were forced to camp out.

One evening the wet, exhausted group found shelter
with a widow and her children. The large log cabin was
divided into two parts, the family lived in the front half
and the rear portion was unfinished except for a large fire-
place and a bed in a small, partitioned chamber. The men
dried their clothes before a roaring fire as they ate sup-
per. Shortly they all laid down and dropped off to sleep
quickly. But a short while later one man, in deep sleep,
began to rattle the windows with his "nasal trumpeting,"

each measure ending with a high whistle. As Cox listened to

123

 

124

this racket, he debated whether to plug his ears or get up
and rouse the offender. By this time everyone was awake.
Just then the snorer ended a long passage with a loud snort,
followed by complete silence. From the corner a drawling
voice said, "Thank God hgl§_dead." Gales of laughter swept
through the room. Cox long wondered whether their enter-
tainer slept another wink that night for fear that he might
repeat his exhibition.l

While enroute Cox met Burnside, who had been
relieved of his command and was returning to Ohio. Cox had
anticipated continued service under Burnside and had
expected an important assignment.2 Now, with his friend
being replaced by General John G. Foster, Cox was troubled.
Before they parted, Burnside assured Cox that he had given
a strong recommendation to Foster and said he believed Cox
would receive a battlefield command. Hearing this cheerful
news, Cox hurried to reach Knoxville before any decision was
made. Leaving the wagons behind, he and a small escort
reached their destination on December 18.3

When Cox met with General Foster the following day,

he was informed that orders had been issued placing him in

 

lCox, Reminiscences, II, 73-74.

2Cox to Garfield, December 6, 1863, Garfield Papers,
VI, pt. 1. In this letter Cox stated that he was on his way
to the front to assume command of the Twenty-third Corps.
Evidently Burnside had promised the position to Cox during
the thme they worked together in Cincinnati.

3Cox, Reminiscences, II, 75-83.

 

 

125

command of the DiStrict of Kentucky.4 Cox was dismayed by
the appointment, which meant more of the inactivity he had
disliked so intensely in Ohio. He prevailed upon Foster to
reconsider, citing his long-standing request for active
duty and his understanding with Burnside. Foster reviewed
the situation and, after reading Burnside's notes, assigned
Cox to the TWenty-third Corps, Army of the Ohio. As he was
the senior brigadier serving with the corps, Cox became its
commander.5

Cox moved to Blain's Crossroads, where the Twenty-
third Corps was bivouacked, and set up headquarters in four
tents. He believed that constant exposure to the elements,
rather than continually transferring back and forth between
a comfortable office and temporary field quarters, made him
less susceptible to illness. Cox also thought his relation-
ship with the men in the ranks improved when his living con-
ditions closely resembled theirs. Within a few days Cox had
appointed his staff officers and had reviewed the troops.6

The condition of the Union troops in and around
Knoxville was desperate. Bragg's two-month siege of
Chattanooga, following the Confederate victory at Chickamauga
(September 19-20, 1863), had drastically reduced the flow of
supplies. The Federals tried to open up a supply route,

using wagons, from Lexington; but the miserable roads and

 

40.R., XXXI, pt. 1, 283; pt. 3, 407.
51bid., pt. 3, 457, 468.
6Ibid., 463; Cox, Reminiscences, II, 87-89.

 

 

126

poor weather kept the flow of provisions to a mere trickle.
The men needed to be completely reoutfitted before they
could return to the field. Their uniforms were tattered;
many men lacked a complete set of clothing. The appearance
of bloody footprints in the snow attested to the shortage of
shoes. The men had been on half-rations for several weeks
because the mainstay of the army's diet--meat and bread--
could not be secured in adequate amounts. There were cattle
at Lexington, but they could not even be driven forward due
to the lack of fodder along the route. Small rations, such
as coffee, sugar, and salt, had long since disappeared from
the camp mess. The solution to the problem, of course, was
to reopen the railroad to Chattanooga, where a huge supply
depot was located. But the tracks needed to be completely
rebuilt. Meanwhile, the men struggled along with what they
had.7

Knoxville, nestled in the Holston River Valley
between the Cumberland and Great Smoky Mountains, served as
the forward base for the Union forces operating in East
Tennessee. Cumberland Gap, sixty miles to the northeast,
was also held by the Federals. With a firm grip on these
two positions, the Federals prevented the Confederates from
moving into southern Kentucky or upon Chattanooga. By
securing Knoxville, the Federals also denied the Rebels use

of the most direct rail connection between Virginia and

 

7Cox, Reminiscences, II, 89-91.

 

 

8

Georgia.

The Confederates in the Holston Valley, led by
General James Longstreet, desired to drive the Federals out
of Knoxville. This would clear the way for an advance upon
Chattanooga, catching Rosecrans in a vise between Longstreet
and Bragg. But such a maneuver was not anticipated before
spring because the Rebels, too, lacked supplies. Yet for
all their deficiencies, both armies sparred continually
seeking a weak point in the opponent's line.

On Christmas Eve Cox received orders to move his men
to Strawberry Plains where they would reinforce the garrison
and assist in rebuilding the long railroad trestle over the
Holston River.9 Cox immediately sent up two divisions and
on the 27th he brought forward the remaining division.
Strawberry Plains had been used continually as a base by
either the Federals or Confederates. It was a shambles.
The constant tramping of men and animals had stripped the
ground bare and, with a thaw in progress, mud dominated the
scene. Being late arrivals, the corps did not have much
choice in selecting a camp and considered it a rare stroke
of luck when they located a grassy knoll nearby. They soon
discovered why this particular ground had remained

unoccupied; the raw winds swept over and around the bill so

 

 

8The railroad was known as the Virginia and East
Tennessee north of Knoxville, and as the Tennessee and
Georgia below the town.

9o.R., XXXI, pt. 3, 482-83, 490, 519-20, 537-38.

 

 

 

128

that its chilling currents could not be escaped. On New
Year's Day, about 10 P.M., a cold wave and snow moved in
with a vengeance. A gale wind threatened to tear the tent
stakes from the soft ground and sent burning embers rolling
across the camp. Fortunately the tents, still wet from
earlier rains, did not catch fire. After seeing to his own
tent and staff, Cox spent the rest of the night going
through the camp to look after his men and to chat with them
as they sat huddled about their fires. It was too cold to
sleep. The men, having received no soap for two months,
were covered with grime from the smoke, appearing not unlike
chimney-sweeps. Despite all the discomfort, Cox heard no
complaints and his heart swelled with pride, with men like
these he need not worry about their performance in battle.10
General Ulysses S. Grant, the supreme military com-
mander in the West, stopped at Strawberry Plains on January
3, 1864, during a general inspection tour. Grant's report
to Washington stressed the problems confronting the troops
in East Tennessee and urged that every effort be made to
repair quickly the railroad from Chattanooga to Knoxville.ll
Cox was not impressed with the man destined to lead
the Union armies to victory. He found Grant shy and
reticent; Grant spoke only when asking or answering a ques-

tion. Even when the officers gathered informally after the

 

10Cox, Reminiscences, II, 94-100.

110.R., XXXI, pt. 2, 43.

 

 

 

129

tour, he did not take an active part in the conversation.
Cox was especially disappointed that Grant said little about
military affairs or his previous experiences. After the
war, however, Cox commented that Grant's genius lay in his
quick grasp of details and in his decisive orders. These
qualities had not been revealed during Grant's brief visit
to Strawberry Plains.12

Three brigades of the Twenty-third went, on January
13, to Dandridge to support a reconnaisance mission.13 At
Dandridge Cox's units linked up with tWO divisions from the
Fourth Corps and several companies of cavalry. General Phil
Sheridan, of the Fourth Corps, commanded the entire opera-

tion.14

On the 16th Longstreet's cavalry unexpectedly
engaged the advance units. Cox feared that the cavalry,
with its greater mobility, might block their escape route to
Strawberry Plains. The following day Rebel infantry skir-
mished with Sheridan's troops and the dismounted cavalrymen,
but Cox's men did not get into the fight.15 A council of
officers agreed that Dandridge could not be held and a
couple of regiments were put to work building a narrow

bridge across the French River to facilitate the withdrawal.

Sheridan planned to march several miles on the night of the

 

12Cox, Reminiscences, II, 101-104.
13%, XXXII, pt. 2, 82.
141313., 102.

1513351., 116.

 

 

 

 

 

.9403“ ..

 

 

130

17th, but the movement got fouled up. The bridge led only
to an island and another channel separated the men from
shore! Someone had neglected to make certain that the
entire stream had been spanned. Working quickly,some tempo-
rary barges were constructed and most of the Federals were
brought across by daybreak, but they were still vulnerable
should Longstreet press them.16 Luckily the Rebels did not
give hot pursuit and the column returned safely to Strawberry
Plains. As a scouting operation the affair had been futile.

On the day Cox's men returned, a dispatch arrived
from Grant directing General Foster to concentrate his
troops in Knoxville.17 This precaution was taken because
reports arriving in the Capital asserted that Longstreet had
been reinforced and would soon attack. When the authorities
learned about the engagement at Dandridge, they interpreted
it as the beginning of Longstreet's advance. Cox discounted
the "rumors," however, and complained bitterly (and pri-
vately!) about officials in Washington who moved troops from
place to place althOugh they were hundreds of miles from the
action. He believed the officers in the field were better
judges of the situation.18 Although the reconnaisance to
Dandridge had not been particularly fruitful, there had been

no evidence that Longstreet was reinforced or that he planned

 

1600x, Reminiscences, II, 116.
170.R., XXXII, pt. 2, 162.

18Cox, Reminiscences, II, 122-24.

 

 

 

 

 

_.-,

131
a major operation. But orders were orders; the men broke up
camp and returned to Knoxville.

When the enemy failed to appear, the troops were
sent into winter quarters. Although no one expected an
attack, the three corps were posted so that Knoxville could
be defended: the Twenty-third was assigned to quarters
within the city, the Fourth and Ninth were stationed nearby.
In the following weeks the supply problem eased due to the
reopening of the railroad to Chattanooga on a limited basis
and the reduction of the number of men in camp.19

Excitement of a different nature pulsed through the
army camps during these quiet months. A bill promoting

Grant to Lieutenant-General and giving him command of the

 

Union armies was before Congress. A contest was on to
determine who would receive the many promotions that would
be opened up by Grant's elevation. The army's entire
command structure buzzed with rumors, and intrigues were
soon underway in Washington to push for the advancement of
particular men. The uncertainty in Knoxville was compounded
by General Foster's request to be relieved of duty. In
January Foster's horse had fallen on him, reopening an old
leg wound. With the passage of time the wound became
infected and forced Foster to retire. After several weeks
the War Department announced the new commanders for the

Western theater. Sherman became the commander of the

 

19Ibid., 128-29; O.R., XXXII, pt. 2, 173, 176-77.

 

 

132

Military Division of the Mississippi, with control over the
Armies of the Cumberland, the Ohio and the Tennessee.
General George Thomas was tapped to lead the Army of the
Cumberland; Rosecrans was transferred to Missouri. Serving
as the top officer in the Department of the Ohio and as the
active leader of its army was John C. Schofield. James
McPherson became the leader of the Army of the Tennessee.
Cox's old friend, Burnside, finally got his wish when Grant
transferred him and the Ninth Corps to North Carolina.
Cox's future was left up in the air by these arrangements.
With Schofield moving in to take over the Army of the Ohio
(the Twenty-third Corps), he was out of a job.20

Schofield arrived in Knoxville on February 9 and
invited Cox to become his Chief of Staff. Since an inde-
pendent command was unavailable at the time, Cox accepted.
The Chief of Staff serves as the eyes, ears, and legs of
the commanding officer. It is his responsibility to convey
orders to the field officers and to relay back information
received from the front. When delay could result in
disaster, the Chief makes important decisions.21 Although
Cox did not underestimate the importance of his position,
he requested an assignment to active duty at the earliest

opportunity.22

 

20Cox, Reminiscences, II, 132-34, 137-40.
21Ibid., 145-46, 157-59.
22O.R., LII, pt. 1, 521.

 

 

 

133

While Schofield remained in Knoxville organizing
Departmental affairs, Cox directed a reconnaissance up the
Holston Valley to New Market. Longstreet did not offer
serious resistance and the advance was completed with little
difficulty. From New Market Cox sent forward a cavalry
column to keep an eye on the enemy. This was Secessionist
country and many residents had fled with Longstreet; those
who remained were sullen and uncooperative. Late one night
a pro-Union citizen came to headquarters and warned that an
attack on the advanced cavalry camp was scheduled at dawn.
Two hours before dawn Cox set out, accompanied by an orderly,
for the front. It was raining again. The murky darkness
prevented them from seeing the road and Cox allowed his
horse to pick the trail. At last they reached a few tents;
Cox asked to be shown to the Captain's quarters. In a few
minutes their Irish guide had dressed and, taking the lead,
moved away from the firelight into the still, deep darkness.
The guide warned that they must follow him closely "for
there's pits every little way where thim ribils dug founda-

tions for their chimbleys.’ Then "Paddy” disappeared; Cox
jerked his reins so hard that his horse sat back on its
haunches--their guide had found a chimney pit the hard way.
Hardly a rod farther Paddy exclaimed, "Be jabers, I've
found another.” After an understandably slow trip through
the area, Cox met the captain and ordered out extra patrols

to insure that an attack would not catch them asleep.

Retracing his steps, Cox arrived back at headquarters before

 

 

 

134
his staff had arisen. This sort of night duty occurred
often.23 Despite a deep conviction that the alarm was
merely a rumor or ruse, he felt obligated to make sure that
his men were not surprised and routed because their com-
mander had failed to exercise proper caution.

After he became General-in-Chief, Grant met with
his subordinates in Washington to discuss strategy. Grant
recommended that the Federals concentrate most of their
manpower in two huge armies-~the Army of the Potomac in the
East and a conglomerate of the three armies in the West
under Sherman.24 The plan was accepted.

During April the Twenty-third Corps finished its
work in the Holston Valley so that it could join Sherman
near Chattanooga by May lst. The objective was to drive
out the Rebels, then quickly withdraw, ripping up the rail-
road and burning bridges to make impractical further enemy
operations in the Valley.25 Before these activities began,
Cox was placed in command of the Third Division of the
Corps.26

The Twenty-third pushed Longstreet steadily until
he left the Valley via Bulls Gap. He aided the Federals
during his retreat when he burned bridges and wrecked parts

of the railroad, thereby allowing the Union soldiers to

 

23Cox, Reminiscences, 11, 148-50.
240.11., XXXII, pt. 3, 245-46.
2500x, Reminiscences, II, 157.

260.R., XXXII, pt. 3, 245.

 

 

 

135
conceal their plan to do the same thing. Cox's Division
completed the destruction of the railroad as it withdrew.
Cox had mixed emotions when his men put the torch to the
trestle at Strawberry Plains, which they had earlier helped
rebuild; but he knew it must be done to prevent the Rebels
from quickly returning to the area. On May 3 the Corps
reached Cleveland, Tennessee, and the following day moved
forward to Red Clay, Georgia, on the extreme left of
Sherman's huge army.27

The long planning sessions now bore fruit as the
three Western armies moved into position for the Atlanta
Campaign. Sherman placed Thomas' Army of the Cumberland,
60,000 strong, in the center. The Army of the Tennessee
(MCPherson) with 35,000 men formed the right wing, and
Schofield's smaller Army of the Ohio (17,600) fell in on
the left. This gave Sherman 112,000 men, including approx-
imately 15,000 cavalry.28 To maintain this army Sherman
estimated that 150 carloads of supplies would be consumed
daily. In view of this requirement the railroad was of
vital importance. As he advanced, Sherman planned to con-
struct blockhouses at strategic points along the railroad
to insure its uninterrupted operation.29

The Rebel army encamped near Dalton, Georgia, also

 

27Ibid., pt. 1, 53; pt. 3, 477, 492-93, 500-501, 512.
281bid., pt. 3, 468-69.
29Cox, Reminiscences, II, 176-78. Chattanooga

served as the storage depot for the supplies until they were
shipped forward.

 

 

prepared for the inevitable collision. Joseph E. Johnston
had been placed in command in December, 1863, after General
Bragg asked to be relieved. Through the subsequent months
Johnston had labored to develop a strategy for preventing
a Union victory in the West. Since his army (about 75,000)
was smaller than Sherman's, he concluded to operate on the
defensive, to avoid a pitched battle and to exploit every
opportunity to Whittle away at Sherman's flanks and supply
lines. As a result the Atlanta Campaign developed into a
long exercise in tactical maneuvering as Sherman attempted
to drive the Confederates into the open and Johnston worked
desperately to avoid a direct confrontation.30
The push toward Dalton began on May 7, 1864, timed
to coincide with the start of operations by the Army of the
Potomac in Virginia. By sending two huge armies into action
simultaneously, Grant believed the Federals could prevent
the Confederates from transferring their troops from theater
to theater. Sherman's tactics before Dalton set a pattern
that was used, with minor variations, throughout the cam-
paign. He sent forward Schofield and Thomas to engage the
Rebels, and ordered McPherson to move around the enemy's
left flank. MbPherson was to block Johnston's escape route
by seizing Resaca, located fifteen miles below Dalton, thus
forcing the Rebels to fight. But delays prevented McPherson

from reaching Resaca before the Confederates covered their

391616., 182-95.

 

 

 

137

flank. With McPherson bogged down, Sherman ordered
Schofield to transfer his men from the left wing of the army
to the right. Sherman thought this maneuver would force
the Confederates to stretch their line so thin that the
Federals could break through.31

Cox's Third Division, which formed the extreme left
of Sherman's line, began to move around the rear of the army
on May 10. The maneuver was fraught with danger; a division
cannot turn its back on the enemy and march away without
inviting disaster. To provide protection, Cox devised a
highly successful scheme. He stationed his troops in two
lines about one hundred yards apart. The second line was
ordered to lie down and be prepared to give cover to the
first line during the withdrawal. After the first line
passed through it went a short distance, laid down and
covered its comrades. In this fashion half of the men
always faced the Rebels and kept them at a safe distance.
With Cox's Division leading the way, the entire Army of the
Ohio circled behind Thomas and McPherson to extend the
right wing of Sherman's army.32

The Federals got into position by May 12th and pre-
pared to drive toward Resaca. But that same evening

Johnston, who had learned of the Federal's effort to get

 

 

311bid., zoo-213.

320.R., XXXVIII, pt. 2, 674-79, this is Cox's report
of operations from May 7-16, 1864, covering action around
Dalton and Resaca. Unless otherwise indicated the descrip-
tion of this part of the campaign is based on his report.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  
  
    
  
 
 
  

138
Chaflqnoogv ’8.
/ ”($0. Tenn.
I e? "
I (:30 H 7 1864 60'
\fi’ 01y ' - Union

:3 Coated er ale

 
 

May '8, IBUI

Cussvifle
\

Kenesow Ml:
June 27, 186*)

Bangles around Aflon‘fo."
JuIy 7.0- 28, “36‘!

 

 

 

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN
Adapted from Boatner, Civil War Dictionary, 31

 

 

 

w -,

139
behind him, pulled out of Dalton and dug in around Resaca.
Sherman's excellent plan had been thwarted by its slow
execution.

The action around Resaca involved constant skir-
mishing as the Union troops pressed in upon the Rebel
fortifications. Sherman, keeping his army in constant
motion, continued the wheeling movement so that eventually
Cox's division once again formed the left of the Union line,
with the Army of the Cumberland returning to the center and
the Army of the Tennessee to the right. On May 14 MCPherson
slipped across the Oostanaula River, southwest of Resaca,
and threatened the railroad to Atlanta. Johnston, reacting
to the danger, pulled out of Resaca the following day and
retreated southward to keep his army between Sherman and
Atlanta.

Cox's men fought well at Resaca. They attacked the
enemy lines, carried the Rebels' advanced rifle-pits, and
forced them to retire to their stronger secondary line.

This was perilous work. The soldiers were exposed to con-
stant rifle and artillery fire. When they reached the rifle-
pits, the men dug in quickly to protect themselves from the
worst of the barrage. Cox personally directed these opera-
tions, riding continually up and down the line to urge his
troops forward.33

33Oliver Otis Howard, Autobio ra h of Oliver Otis
Howard (2 vols. ; New York. ThE—Bakéfg§fi§"¥abef_CBT_'I907)

. Howard describes Cox as a "handsome, gallant young
officer and able man."

 

 

 

 

 

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII7______________________________——*—77

140

After pulling out of Resaca, the Rebels concentrated
at Cassville, just north of the Etowah River. Sherman made
a vigorous effort to bring the enemy to bay. The terrain
in front of and around Cassville was relatively level and
cleared, in stark contrast to the sharp ridges and tangled
forests at Dalton and Resaca. To exploit the favorable
ground and to prevent delays, Sherman spread out his army
along an eight mile front and assigned to each corps a
specific line of march. Unfortunately, when General Hooker's
scouts reported that the ford assigned to him was impassable,
he shifted his corps several miles to the east and preempted
the route reserved for the Army of the Ohio. Thus, when Cox
reached the stream he found Hooker's men starting across.
Cox complained bitterly about Hooker's unwise action because
it delayed several thousand men for twenty-four hours just
when Speed was essential.34

It appeared for a time that the Confederates would
make a determined stand at Cassville. But Johnston's corps
commanders, John B. Hood and Leonidas Polk, counseled
against offering battle. They feared Sherman could outflank
their army and destroy it. Consequently the Confederates
evacuated Cassville, pulled across the Etowah River, and
fortified a new position at Allatoona.

During the brief stay near Cassville the Federal

army was reinforced by the return of several veteran

2 67 34Cox, Reminiscences, II, 225-28; O.R., XXXVIII, pt.
3 90

 

 

 

 

11. ,,, . , I

141

regiments from furlough. Cox's division received nine regi-
ments, more than enough to replace losses incurred in pre-
vious action.35 The Union's manpower advantage began to
take effect; Johnston could not get replacements for his
casualties and the odds grew greater in favor of the
invaders. Moreover, the flow of supplies to the front con-
tinued unchecked despite interference by Confederate cav-
alry. Sherman's blockhouse plan worked admirably and pre-
vented the raiders from seriously damaging the railroad.
Increased in size and fully-equipped, the Union army pre-
pared to cross the Etowah River to make Johnston fight.

Since the Rebels had avoided every effort to trap
them, Sherman decided to employ a new tactic. The Federals
had been following the Confederates' movements along the
railroad connecting Chattanooga and Atlanta. This had been
the most practical route because they could readily get
supplies by rebuilding the tracks as they advanced. On May
20th Sherman issued orders for all units to prepare for
twenty days separation from the railroad. He planned to
move west and south of Allatoona and place his army between

Johnston and Atlanta.36

To screen the movement of his main
column, Sherman ordered several units to press directly

toward the Etowah River bridges. Among these units was

 

35Cox, Reminiscences, II, 237.

36O.R., XXXVIII, pt. 2, 679-85, Cox's report for
gperations from May 16 to July 8, 1864; Cox, Reminiscences,
I, 231-32.

 

 

 

 

 

142

Cox's division, which pushed through Cartersville and struck
the Rebel rear-guard covering the railroad bridge. After
several hours of sharp skirmishing the enemy withdrew across
the river, putting the torch to the trestle as they
retreated. In the meantime Cox sent a detachment upstream
to burn flour mills and to destroy the Etowah Iron Works.
Cox reported that the riverbanks were very steep, enabling
a handful of Confederates to stop a much larger force. In
View of this, Sherman's determination to move south of the
river by an indirect route gained more support as the wisest
plan.37

The immensity of the operation precluded keeping it
secret. On May 23rd the Federals began crossing the Etowah;
seven days elapsed before the one-hundred thousand blue-
coated soldiers had tramped over the temporary bridges. As
Sherman approached Allatoona, Johnston's scouts penetrated
the screen and reported the location of the main column to
their commander. On June 4 the Rebels once again eluded
Sherman; they withdrew southward to Marietta, anchoring
their line on Brush and Lost Mbuntains. There, facing
northwest, the Confederates prepared to contest Sherman's
advance.

During June, 1864, the question of Cox's promotion
arose once again. As seen earlier, Cox's advancement to

Major General had not been ratified by Congress in 1862

 

 

 

370.11., XXXVIII, pt. 2, 680-81, pt. 4, 286, 298.

 

—. 7

143
despite support from Burnside and McClellan.38 Now Sherman
and Schofield renewed the issue with their personal recom-
mendations. They supported the promotion because it would
reward Cox for his excellent service and would allow him to

command the Twenty-third Corps in Schofield's absence. Cox

 

was convinced that nothing would happen; he was, however,
pleased to receive renewed assurance that he was performing
his duties well.39

At about this same time General Alvin Hovey, com-
mander of the First Division, Twenty-third Corps, resigned
his post. Sherman tried to dissuade Hovey, pointing out

that quitting in the face of the enemy would be considered

cowardice. But Hovey persisted and was relieved. This had

 

hardly transpired when word came that Hovey had been made a
Brevet Major-General."0 What an uproar! Why should an
undeserving man, who resigned his battlefield commission in
the midst of a crucial campaign, be promoted, while Cox,
better qualified, remained at the front with a lower rank?

Sherman protested vehemently that no promotions should be

 

38See above 94-97.

39Cox to Garfield, June 5, 1864, Garfield Papers,
VI, pt. 1; Cox to Aaron F. Perry, June 9, 1864, Letter Book
2. To Garfield, Cox wrote, "I shall look on with quite as
much amusement as interest, to see how far the administra-
tion will carry the game of snubbing its friends.”

4OTechnically a "Brevet” rank was purely honorary
and did not give to its holder the authority delegated to a
man with full rank. During the war, however, the distinc-
tion was blurred and in many instances the owner of a brevet
rank could act as though he held a regular appointment.
Boatner, Civil WQE'Dictionagy, 84.

 

 

144

made among his officers without his personal recommendation.
The complaint, however, did not alter the outcome of the
incident. Hovey's troops were divided between Cox and
General Milo Hascall's Second Division.41

As the Federals pressed toward the Confederates
near Marietta, the weather turned nasty. Almost three weeks
of continuous rain hampered their movements and made miser-
able the task of carrying the fight to the enemy. Sherman
steadily broadened his flanks, trying to force the enemy to
overextend his line. But Johnston thwarted the plan by
shortening and curving his line to avoid being outflanked.
On June 25th, Sherman reluctantly changed his tactics and
issued orders for a general assault for the 27th.42

Sherman's plan called upon Schofield's army to
create a diversion on the right before McPherson and Thomas
rushed against the Rebel lines on Kenesaw Mountain. Sherman
hoped Johnston would transfer men to stop Schofield, thereby

weakening the Confederate line where the major attack would

 

41Cox, "Diary," June 9, 1864; Cox, Reminiscences,
II, 249-53. Brigadier General Peter J. Osterhaus was aIso
promoted at this time, largely for political reasons.
Sherman's indignation was great: "I wish to put on record
this, my emphatic opinion, that it is an act of injustice to
officers who stand by their posts in the day of danger to
neglect them and advance such as Hovey and Osterhaus, who
left us in the midst of bullets to go to the rear in search
of personal advancement. If the rear be the post of honor,
then we had better all change front on Washington." O.R.,
XXXVIII, pt. V, 247.

42Cox, Reminiscences, II, 259-60. Sherman's reluc-
tance to attack arose from the strength of the outlying
works captured from the Confederates; their main line would
be even stronger and many Federals would fall in the assault.

 

 

145
strike. Cox pushed his men forward on the 26th to get in a
position for the demonstration, and, despite exposure to
constant fire, established a beachhead across Olleys Creek.
In front of and above the beachhead lay the main Rebel

43 At 4 A.M. on the 27th Cox sent his First Brigade

works.
into action; the other two brigades followed at half-hour
intervals. As Cox's men fought their way up the ridge, the
rest of the Army of the Ohio swung into action to support
the movement. By early afternoon Cox had captured a portion
of the breastworks overlooking the Rebel supply line, and if
the advantage could be followed up rapidly the Confederates

d.44 Setbacks suffered elsewhere, however,

might be trappe
ruled out such a thrust, and the overall assault failed.
Nevertheless, both Sherman and Schofield commended Cox for
the brilliant handling of his division.45
McPherson's and Thomas' assault on Kenesaw Mbuntain
quickly bogged down. The rough ground and tangled forest
compelled the attackers to move forward in narrow columns,
rather than on a broad front, enabling the Confederates to
concentrate their rifle and artillery fire on compact tar-
gets. Union casualties were heavy. After penetrating the

enemy's outlying works, the Federals ceased their attack.

The ferocity of the action and the impenetrable nature of

 

 

430.11., XXXVIII, pt. 4, 597-600.
441616., 619-21.

45Ibid., 621-22; John M. Schofield, Fort -six Years
;§_the Army (New York: The Century Co., 18975, I44.

 

146
the Rebel works was reflected in the casualty figures for
the day: Sherman lost 2,500, Johnston only 500.46

Although Johnston succeeded in repulsing Sherman, he
withdrew cautiously toward Atlanta. At first he intended to
make a stand north of the Chattahoochee River, but a vigor-
ous pursuit by McPherson and Thomas compelled him to retreat
across the stream. He destroyed all bridges and ferries and
the Federals were delayed several days until they found a
safe crossing.

With careful planning and a bit of luck, Cox's
Division was the first to cross the river. For several days
many Federal units had hammered unsuccessfully at the Rebels
on the opposite shore. Since brute force had failed, Cox
resolved to use trickery. Scouting the area, he discovered
a narrow creek flowing into the Chattahoochee where small
boats could be hidden for a surprise movement. At 3:30 A.M.
on July 8th, Cox sent a regiment upstream to a fishdam to
pretend that it was forcing its way over the dam. Half an
hour later about 100 seasoned sharpshooters rowed out of the
creek and headed for the opposite bank. The plan worked
beautifully. The Rebels, distracted by the diversion, had
left only a few men at the point where the sharpshooters
landed. The Federals quickly cleared the area and secured an
excellent position on the high bank without losing even one

man. Cox rushed across more men and a couple of batteries to

 

46Jacob Dolson Cox, Atlanta (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1882), 127-29.

 

 

 

 

____________________—-:-—-—-

147
enlarge the beachhead."7 During the next few days Sherman's
entire army crossed without further incident. Now the route
to Atlanta was open; there were no more rivers to cross.

On July 17, the Confederate army defending Atlanta
got a new commander. For several weeks President Davis had
expressed displeasure with General Johnston because he had
not acted offensively to halt the Federal's advance. The
Confederate President could not understand why Johnston con-
tinually retreated southward, surely he must fight some-
where! Johnston had operated on the defensive to avoid com-
plete destruction, but had failed to report fully the com-
pelling reasons for his decisions. Consequently Davis dis-

patched General Bragg to inspect the army and to determine

 

whether Johnston had any solid proposal for stopping Sherman.
Johnston remained tight-lipped and Bragg recommended his

1.48 Davis acted, replacing him with General Hood, a

remove
move destined to have a decisive impact on the outcome of
the campaign.

Sherman and his officers were elated by the news.
They knew Hood was a fighter; now the Rebels would try to

smash their lines.49 Quietly Sherman passed the word, "Be

prepared for attack at all times."

 

 

47O.R., XXXVIII, pt. 5, 85-86, 89-90; Record Group
393 - Twenty-third Army Corps, Letter Book 19, 87-91,
National Archives,Washington, D.C.

48Cox, Reminiscences, II, 270-74.

49Ibid., 277.

 

 

 

148

Sherman's plan for taking Atlanta followed the pat-
tern used so successfully throughout the campaign. His
army first extended its line to the east cutting the Georgia
Railroad; then it wheeled to the west circling the city and
tearing up the Atlanta and West Point Railroad. This action
effectively isolated Hood, making it almost impossible for
him to receive reinforcement or supplies. Throughout the
operation Sherman used Thomas' large Army of the Cumberland
as the mainstay of his line, swinging McPherson's and
Schofield's smaller armies to the left or right as condi-
tions dictated.50

On July 18, Schofield and McPherson moved toward
. Decatur, through which ran the Georgia Railroad. By the 20th
both forces had reached their objective and delivered
destructive blows to the tracks. During the movement Cox's
Division led the advance of the Twenty-third Corps. Despite
steady resistance from skirmishers, they pushed the Rebels
back with resolute efforts. On every ridge they constructed
light fortifications just in case the Confederates should
launch a heavy counter-attack.

Meanwhile Thomas' army pushed across Peachtree Creek.
During these movements, at a point where the terrain was

marshy, a gap Opened up between Thomas and the other two

 

 

50For the description of the final action around
Atlanta I have relied upon a variety of sources: Cox's
report of Operations, July 9- September 8, 1864, O.R.,
XXXVIII, pt. 2, 688-692; Cox, Atlanta, Chapters XII:XV; Cox,
Reminiscences, II, Chapters XXXIX3XE? and Schofield, Forty-
§$§_ ears $2_th§_Army, Chapter IX.

 

 

 

149
armies. Hood learned of the gap and resolved (July 20) to
attack Thomas' flank, hoping to divide the Federals and
defeat them in detail. But he had considerable difficulty
getting his men into proper position, and his attack did not
begin until 3 P.M., two hours behind schedule. The delay
aided the Federals immeasurably because, during those two
hours, Thomas brought over many regiments and Schofield
extended his line to the right, nearly closing the gap
between them. Despite the rapidly changing scene Hood
stubbornly proceeded with the assault. After minor, initial
success the Rebels suffered severely as Thomas and Sherman
brought forward reinforcements and used massed artillery to
turn them back. Again and again the valiant Confederates
charged, but each desperate effort was repulsed. Both sides
took heavy casualties during the engagement; Hood lost 6,000
and Thomas 2,000.

Hood, having failed to neutralize Thomas or to
separate the Federal armies, now turned his attention to
McPherson's army approaching Atlanta from the east. He
struck savagely on July 22, triggering a battle which even-
tually extended along a five-mile front. Despite repeated
attacks, the Rebels could not breach the Union line and were
thrown back with losses amounting to approximately 10,000
before the day's action came to an end. By contrast the
Federals suffered only 3,500 casualties, although the death
of General McPherson, during the opening minutes of the

engagement, added greatly to their sorrow. To replace

 

150

McPherson, Sherman chose General 0. 0. Howard.

Sherman now executed the second phase of his plan,
a swing westward above Atlanta. Using Thomas' army as a
pivot, Schofield and Howard marched their men from the left
wing to the right wing of the Federal line. Then the entire
army moved southward toward its target, the Atlanta and West
Point Railroad. Although they met constant resistance, the
Federals moved according to schedule until July 28th. On
that day Hood's men delivered, at Ezra Church, a third
desperate attack. The Army of the Tennessee, on the extreme
right, again received the brunt of the assault. The results
were the same as earlier: the Confederates expended 5,000
troops, while Howard's men took only 600 casualties. This
brought an end to sharp fighting around Atlanta; in eight
days Hood had lost 21,000 irreplaceable soldiers. The
morale in the Rebel ranks sank so low that some Confederate
units would not obey orders to attack. At the same time
confidence within the Federal forces reached a new peak;
they were convinced that they could achieve their objective.

For another tedious month Sherman edged southward.
On August 29, 1864, the Federals finally crossed the West
Point Railroad and began to drive east around the city. Two
days later, Cox's Division took Rough and Ready Station
below Atlanta, and pressed on to join Howard at Jonesboro,

where Hood was expected to make a final resistance.51 Hood,

 

510.R., XXXVIII, pt. 5, 732-35.

 

 

151

however, did not offer battle; he withdrew rapidly to the
north, leaving Atlanta open to Federal occupation. On
September 1, Thomas' men entered the city, bringing the
Atlanta Campaign to a close.

The capture of Atlanta set off rejoicing in the
North. A mortal blow had been struck against the
Confederacy; the eastern Confederacy had been deeply pene-
trated and Hood's army was now in terrible condition.
Sherman's success, coupled with Grant's continued pressure
on Lee, brought for the first time some assurance that the
Union would emerge victorious. Even high-ranking Confederate
officials admitted privately that the South probably could
not recover from the disaster.52

The Federals spent nearly a month encamped around
Atlanta, enjoying a much needed rest and replenishing their
supplies. The Army of the Ohio was posted near Decatur.
On September 16, Schofield left to visit Knoxville and
Louisville on departmental business, neglected since May.
During his absence, Cox commanded the Twenty-third Corps,
holding that position until Schofield returned towards the
end of October.53

Sherman and Schofield both urged again that Cox be
promoted to Major-General in recognition of his service.

Schofield's recommendation was especially strong and

 

 

52Cox, Reminiscences, II, 291.

53%;, xxxxx, pt. 2, 377, 379.

 

 

 

 

152

complimentary:
I have no hesitation in saying that I have never seen
a more able and efficient division commander. General
Cox is possessed of a very high order of talent and
superior education. As a commander he is discreet,
energetic and brave. As a just reward for long,
faithful and efficient services and as an act of jus-
tice to the army and the country, I earnestly recom-
mend that Brig. Gen. J D. Cox be appointed Major-
General of volunteers.54
Sherman seconded these sentiments and personally assured
Cox, before he left on the March to the Sea, that he believed
the promotion would finally be granted.55
When he had met with Grant in March, Sherman had
indicated that Atlanta would be only his first objective.
From there he proposed to advance eastward to Savannah or
Augusta. At that time, Grant had directed that a second
Federal column should move toward Atlanta from Mobile,
Alabama, but Rebel resistance around Mbbile had prevented
the execution of the plan. If the line to Mobile had been
secured, Sherman could have obtained his supplies for
renewed action from that base. Instead his provisions and
equipment had to be brought to Atlanta from Chattanooga via
the railroad, a distance of 140 miles. In order to Speed
up his preparations, Sherman ordered all civilians out of
Atlanta and turned the city into a vast supply depot. Simul-

taneously he put several regiments to work constructing

fortifications which would allow a small garrison to hold

 

 

54Ibid., 366.
55Ibid., pt. 3, 413; Cox, ”Diary," October 30, 1864.

 

 

 

153

the city after he departed.56

Meanwhile Hood mapped out his next move. From
Sherman's preparations he judged that an inactive winter in
camp was not in the offering. He accurately surmised that
the Federals would go east, hoping to force him to resist
the advance and draw his army away from its base. To
thwart such an effort, Hood resolved to strike at Sherman's
line of communications and keep him tied down in Georgia or
Tennessee. Consequently, Hood sent his cavalry north to
harass the railroad, while he started with his infantry
toward Allatoona.57

Sherman alerted Thomas, who was at Chattanooga, and
prepared to follow Hood north. Sherman decided to delay
his move until Hood committed his troops at Allatoona,
thinking that the Rebels could be trapped between his own
and Thomas' armies. In accordance with the plan, Cox's
command left Decatur on October 10 enroute to Rome, Georgia.
Although Hood did attack Allatoona he remained wary enough
to avoid being caught. From Allatoona the Rebels moved
further north to threaten Resaca and Dalton, but did not
attack in force. As a result the Federals retraced the
route they had travelled during the Atlanta campaign. On

October 28, Sherman issued his last orders before returning

 

56Cox, Reminiscences, 11, 293-94, 303-306, 318-32;
Jacob Dolson Cox, e rC‘ to the §E§F Franklin and
Nashville (New YorkT— Charles—Scribner's Sons, [8377,
Chapter I.

57Cox, Reminiscences, II, 310-12.

 

 

 

154

to Atlanta to begin the March to the Sea. Sherman sent some
units back to Atlanta to bring his column up to 50,000 men;
the rest, including Cox, were ordered to Chattanooga. Cox's
men arrived by rail on November 7, and came under the com-
mand of Thomas, to whom Sherman had given command of all
operations in Tennessee.58

During the march toward Dalton, Schofield, bringing
additional troops from Chattanooga, rejoined the main
column. Sherman, Schofield and Cox met to discuss the
future role of the Twenty-third Corps. Earlier Sherman had
intimated that he would take the Corps, with Cox in command,
along on his march, while Schofield remained behind as
departmental commander. When Schofield learned of the pro-
posal, he demurred, saying he preferred to retain personal
control over troops in the field. Sherman allowed Schofield
and Cox to decide among themselves. Schofield urged that
they both remain behind, pointing out that Hood's present
course would soon carry the war into central Tennessee.
Any hard fighting would be done by the troops under Thomas
and they could see plenty of action. The logic of the
argument and his high regard for Schofield's friendship con-
vinced Cox that he should stay with the Twenty-third

59

Corps. He and Schofield bade farewell to Sherman and

turned north to help Thomas deal with Hood's army.

 

 

58O.R., XxXIx, pt. 2, 540, 789-95.

59Cox, Reminiscences, II, 315-16.

 

 

. 4F?

 

 

 

—, _-.._

CHAPTER VI
FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE

After the train carrying the Twenty-third Corps
steamed into Chattanooga on November 8, 1864, Cox set up
polls in a box car to allow the soldiers to vote in the
presidential election. A carnival atmosphere prevailed as
the men cast their ballots solidly for Abraham Lincoln.
The military victories of previous months had removed many
doubts about the ability of Lincoln and the Union Party to
lead the North to eventual victory. The Federal troops in
Tennessee had also gained new confidence, and they looked
forward with relish to the approaching confrontation with
Hood.

0n the following day the Twenty-third completed its
journey to Nashville. Cox reported immediately to Schofield.
He learned that Thomas had ordered the Twenty-third and
Fourth Corps to Pulaski, eighty miles below Nashville, to
contest Hood's advance. Previously, Thomas had planned to
concentrate all of his troops in Nashville before confront-
ing the Rebels, but Cox's arrival changed his mind. Thomas

remained in Nashville and gave Schofield command of the

155

 

 

 

 

 

 

156
three corps (two infantry and one cavalry) in the field.1

The Twenty-third left for Pulaski on November 10.
Despite the short distance and a direct rail connection, the
men spent five tedious days reaching their destination. The
delays arose from running trains in two directions on a
single track. Several times Cox, disgusted with the snail-
paced progress, marched his men around obstructions to take
another train. When it finally reached Pulaski, the Twenty-
third set up camp and remained relatively inactive for
nearly a week.2

Meanwhile Hood had been busy. On November 15 his
army, covered by Forrest's cavalry, crossed the Tennessee
River at Florence, Alabama. Hood's objective was to reach
the railroad at Columbia before the Federals could organize
their resistance. But the weather delayed his movements.
Intermittent rains and frost created seas of mud, frozen
only on the surface. The supply wagons easily broke through
the thin crust and bogged down. Thus the Federals were

ready when Hood's army came forward in force.3

 

10.R., XXXIX, pt. 3, 638, 685. Thomas, by desig-
nating Schofield as the field commander, went beyond normal
procedure. Thomas should have executed these duties person-
ally, but he felt compelled to remain in Nashville to
receive the reinforcements promised to him and to look after
other details. The War Department eventually approved
Thomas' action.

2Cox, "Diary," November 13-22, 1864; O.R., XLV, t.
1, 76, lists briefly Cox's location from November 1, 1862,
to January 31, 1865.

3Cox, Franklin and Nashville, 63-64.

 

 

 

. 157

Instead of advancing through Pulaski, the
Confederates bypassed the village to the west and pushed
toward Columbia. On November 21 Cox's division moved to
interpose itself between the Rebels and Columbia. Hood,
however, continued to evade the Federals and swept beyond
Cox's position on the following day. Schofield ordered the
infantry toward Columbia, while his cavalry fought desper-
ately to delay the Confederate advance. Despite these
efforts Forrest's cavalry relentlessly pushed the Federal
horsemen to within a few miles of Columbia. When darkness
fell on the 23rd, only the cavalry stood between the
Confederate column and its objective. If Hood reached
Columbia first, Schofield would be in serious trouble.4

Schofield ordered Cox to bring his division to
Columbia without delay. Cox's men set out at 4 A.M. After
three hours of forced marching, just as the town came into
view, Cox heard rapid firing off to the west. It sounded
serious. Moving along country lanes, he hurried his divi-

sion toward the sound. They arrived in the nick of time

 

40.R R., XLV, pt. 1, 399- 405, this is Cox's report of
operations fr rom November 22-29,1864. Unless otherwise
indicated the description of the Federals' movements during
this interval is based on this report. See also Cox,
Franklin and Nashville, Chapter IV; and Schofield, Forty-six

ears ;§_EHE'Armv, Chapters X-XI. John B. Hood, Advance 5‘7I
Retreat: ‘PErsondl Experiences in the United States an
Confederate States Armies (New C—leans: published by

auregard for the Hood Orphan Memorial Fund, 1880),
Chapter XVI, presents the Rebel commander's account of the
action prior to the battle of Franklin. Hood's narrative is
very one- sided, designed evidently to explain why he failed
to trap the Federals--he placed the blame upon his corps
commanders, especially B. F. Cheatham. Hereafter cited as:
Hood, Advance and Retreat.

 

 

 

 

 

 

158

and helped the cavalry stop Forrest in front of Bigby Creek,
only 2 miles from Columbia.5 Despite a sharp skirmish,
which continued throughout the morning, Cox's troops threw
up light breastworks to give them more cover. About 10 A.M.
the first units of the Fourth Corps appeared and took posi-
tions on either end of Cox's line. By sheer good fortune
Hood's plan to grab Columbia had been thwarted.

Schofield wrestled with a difficult problem. The
Union line on the 24th, in front of Columbia and south of
the Duck River, was temporarily safe because the rampaging
stream was unfordable. But the rains had stopped and it
would soon recede enabling the Rebels to cross beyond the
Federal flank. Because Hood's army outnumbered Schofield's
by about 10,000, the Confederates had sufficient manpower
to execute just such a movement. Schofield searched for a
more defensible position. The most logical decision, from
a tactical viewpoint, would be to give up Columbia and
entrench on the north bank of the Duck River, thereby using
the stream to offset Hood's numerical superiority. But the
north bank could be commanded from the higher ground on the
southern shore. After carefully weighing the alternatives,
Schofield resolved to cross the river.6

0n the evening of November 25, Schofield pulled his

troops over to their new position. Cox's division covered

 

50.11., XLV, pt. 1, 1017.

6Cox, Franklin and Nashville, 66-67; Schofield,
Forty-six Years in the Army, I68.

 

 

 

 

159
the operation, and he remained with one brigade before
Columbia to keep the Rebels at bay while Schofield con—
structed breastworks. After a tense one-day vigil, these
men gladly ferried the river, under cover of darkness, to
join their comrades.

Cox's division manned breastworks at the most
advanced point in the Union line, a tongue of low-lying land
created by the meandering of the river as it flowed past
Columbia. Rifle pits were dug at the edge of the river,
with stronger barricades upon small knolls where they could
rake the Opposite shore. The Fourth Corps reinforced the
Twenty-third from a second line of carefully constructed
barricades. General James H. Wilson's cavalry division
patrolled for several miles on both flanks to sound the
alarm if Hood slipped over the river.

Hood finally moved a strong force into Columbia on
the 28th, touching off a day-long skirmish. This ruse
covered important Rebel Operations at Huey's mill, about
eight miles to the east. At 1 A.M. (November 29) Forrest's
cavalry, supported by several infantry brigades, forced its
way over the Duck River. Outmanned, Wilson could only delay
the Rebels for a short time. The Confederates circled
behind Schofield's line toward Spring Hill, where they
intended to block the turnpike to Franklin. Wilson sent a
warning to Schofield, but the courier travelled a devious

route to evade the enemy and did not reach headquarters

 

 

 

 

 

160
until daybreak.7 Schofield immediately sent the Fourth
Corps to Spring Hill to help the cavalry keep the road open.
Hood left two divisions of infantry, and all of his
artillery, at Columbia with orders to move over the river
and push the Federals toward Spring Hill. In Hood's mind

his troops at Columbia were a hammer, those at Spring Hill

 

an anvil--he would crush Schofield between them. But
Schofield anticipated the plan. Cox remained at the Duck
River with the Twenty-third Corps to stall the Rebels. A
steady rattling fire continued throughout the day, punctu-
ated occasionally by loud bursts from the artillery. The
Federal batteries, consisting of rifled pieces, easily out-
distanced the enemy's smooth-bores and prevented the Rebels
from bringing their pontoons down to the river until late
afternoon. Then they ferried across about two hundred men.
Cox's soldiers, however, kept the Confederates pinned down
with accurate fire whenever they tried to clamber up the
bank. The wet, hapless Rebels were trapped; they could go
neither forward nor backward.

General Wilson was fooled by Forrest's early morning
dash toward Murfreesboro; he sent his men galloping to reach
the town before the raiders. After going only a short dis-
tance, however, Forrest backtracked and interposed his men
between the Federal cavalry and Spring Hill. Consequently

Schofield lost his best reconnaisance for twenty-four hours

 

7Cox, Franklin and Nashville, 69-70.

 

161

and had to rely upon less mobile infantry scouts to track
Hood's movements.

The Fourth Corps reached Spring Hill at noon, just
in time to stop enemy skirmishers approaching the village.
During the afternoon the Fourth Corps established a curved
line, almost entirely encircling the town, to cover the
railroad and the Franklin Turnpike.8 Hood came up person-
ally, in the early afternoon, to direct the fight at Spring
Hill. Fortunately for the Union he misjudged the situation.
Hearing the steady firing at the Duck River, the Confederate
commander assumed that Schofield wanted him to cut across
the Franklin Pike so that the Federals could crush him
between two forces. Hood evidently feared that he might be
victimized with a version of his own plan and, therefore,
did not push vigorously to gain control of the turnpike.
Instead he placed his troops parallel to the road.9 If
Hood had pressed the contest for the turnpike, he could have
at least cut off Cox's division from the rest of Schofield's
command.

At dusk (November 29) Cox received orders to move
the Twenty-third Corps to Spring Hill. To cover the with-
drawal, Schofield left a small skirmish line in the trenches
on the Duck River until midnight. Darkness had fallen

before the first units moved out on the Franklin turnpike at

 

8Ibid., 71—73.
91bid., 74—75.

 

 

162

7 P.M. Enroute they met a few of Wilson's cavalry, who
warned them that they would pass directly in front of Hood's
line below the village. All metal utensils were wrapped to
avoid making any sound. The Federals marched along the road
with the Confederates' campfires in full View; some of the
men remarked that they could have lit their pipes with the
embers. Receiving a report of the movement, Hood directed
Benjamin F. Cheatham's Corps to check it out. But the dark-
ness and unfamiliarity with the terrain prevented Cheatham
from interfering with the withdrawal. Only a few inaccurate
shots were exchanged. After midnight, Cox pulled out with

the skirmishers and reached Spring Hill at 2 A.M. Cox met

 

briefly with Schofield, who ordered him to move north to
Franklin. Without resting the Twenty-third pushed on,
reaching their objective an hour before daybreak (November
30, 1864). Cox was greatly pleased with the performance of
his troops; there had been little straggling during the
twenty-two mile forced march from Columbia and the roll-call
at Franklin revealed that only eleven men were missing.10
Schofield did not plan to remain in Franklin; he
intended to cross the Harpeth River there and continue on to

Nashville. Schofield had telegraphed headquarters several

 

10O.R., XLV, pt. 1, 404-405; Hood considered the
failure to stop the Federals from reuniting their forces at
Spring Hill the crucial point in the campaign. He was so
incensed with Cheatman's lack of vigor that he withdrew his
recommendation that Cheatham be promoted to Lieutenant
General. As he later admitted, however, Hood should have
seen to it personally that his orders were carried out.
Hood, Advance and Retreat, 288-91.

 

163

days previous to order bridging materials because the
bridges at Franklin had been burned. The river was too high
to permit use of the ford. When he came up to direct the
crossing of the supply wagons, however, Schofield discovered
that the pontoons and planks had not been delivered.11
While he personally supervised the construction of a tempo-
rary bridge, Cox's men threw up breastworks to cover the
delay. Schofield also instructed Cox to station the troops
of the Fourth Corps in these fortifications as they arrived
from Spring Hill. ‘

Cox anchored the right wing of the line on the river
and the left on a deep railroad out, which ran parallel to
the stream. Since Fort Granger's batteries covered the
railroad from the north bank, Cox refused his left at the
edge of the cut. To secure timbers for their breastwork,
the soldiers tore down an abandoned cotton gin and ware-
house. They cut brush from a thorny Osage Orange hedge to
create a formidable abatis in front of a portion of the
line. A frontal assault on this position required a thick
hide! The Franklin Turnpike, passing through the center of
the line, presente<i a problem. Cox could not completely
obstruct the road because this would delay the rearguard in
getting to safety. He left a gap, constructed another short
breastwork about 100 yards to the rear, and placed behind it

several artillery pieces aimed directly down the turnpike.

 

, 110.11., XLV, pt. 1, 1107-8, 1138; Schofield, Forty-
s1x Years Ififfhe Army, 175-76.

 

 

 

 

164

Cox hoped these batteries, supported by infantry, could pre-
vent the Confederates from rushing through the gap before it
could be closed.12 Working steadily, the men completed
their task at mid-day and then laid down in the trenches for
a quick nap, their first sleep in over thirty-six hours.

Cox filled approximately two-thirds of the entrench-
ments with the Twenty-third Corps. The Second Division
manned the breastworks between the Carter's Creek and
Franklin Turnpikes, while the Third Division occupied the
works running from the Franklin Pike to the railroad cut.
When Nathan Kimball's First Division, Fourth Corps, arrived
from Spring Hill about 1 P.M., Cox placed it on the right to
cover the remainder of the breastworks. T. J. Wood's Third
Division, Fourth Corps, came up a short time later and was
posted on the north bank of the river as a reserve. By 2:30
P.M. only George Wagner's Second Division of the Fourth
Corps had not reached Franklin. Wagner's three brigades—-
commanded by Colonels Emerson Opdycke, Joseph Conrad, and
John Lane--fought as the rear-guard during the march from
Spring Hill. At 3 P.M. these units appeared over the rise

of hills about two miles south of Franklin; the Rebels were

 

120.11., XLV, pt. 1, 348-49.

 

 

 

165

 

 

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BATTLE OF FRANKLIN

Adapted from Boatner, The Civil War

Dictionary , 304 .

 

 

 

 

166
in hot pursuit.13 Within a short time, General wagner
accompanied Opdycke's brigade into the Federal line.
Schofield sent word to Wagner to order in immediately his
other two brigades.

The men behind the breastworks watched in awe as the
action unfolded before them. Rebel batteries raced toward
Conrad's and Lane's brigades, unlimbered, and fired a few
hasty shots at the retiring men. Then, when the Federals
moved out of range, the horses were rehitched and the proc-
ess repeated a few hundred yards down the road. Within
minutes Hood's entire army hove into view, strung out in
battle formation. Cheatham's Corps formed the left of the
advancing line, Alexander P. Stewart's the right, and
Lieutenant-General Samuel D. Lee's Corps followed in reserve.
The Confederates had approached so rapidly that, although
Schofield had moved his wagons across the river, the

Federals could not avoid a battle.14

 

13There are numerous reports describing the Battle
of Franklin. I have relied most heavily upon Cox's two re-
ports: "Preliminary Report," December 2, 1864, in ibid.,
and his "Official Report," January 10, 1865, in ibid.,
349-56. Cox described the battle in some detail in his
Franklin and Nashville, Chapter V. In 1897 Cox published
The Battle—3f Franinn, Tennessee, November 89, 1864 (New
York: CharIEs Scrihner's Sons), devoting Chapters II-XIV to

a minute description of the engagement.

14Schofield's original plan had been to withdraw his
infantry at 6 P.M. if the Rebels did not offer to fight.
Cox, Franklin and Nashville, 87. Schofield's engineers had
laid pIanEs on-fhe ralIroad trestle to provide a temporary
bridge. They also discovered that the pilings on the burned-
out wagon bridge were sound near the water line; they sawed
these off and constructed another narrow bridge. The wagons
were brought to safety just as Hood's army came into view.

 

 

 

167

Cox stationed Opdycke's brigade directly behind the
men covering the Franklin Turnpike, to act as a reserve if
the Confederates broke through. Cox assumed that the other
two brigades would retire in time to allow the breastwork to
be closed across the road. Imagine his amazement, then,
when he saw Conrad's and Lane's brigades halt about one-half
mile from Franklin and deploy in a skirmish line. Surely
they did not mean to fight Hood's entire army! Before he
could react, Cox saw smoke rising from the Federal's thin
line and heard the report of their muskets. Just as quickly
Cheatham and Stewart's men were upon the brigades, out-
flanking them on both sides. The overwhelmed units turned
tail and raced pell-mell down the turnpike for the safety of
the breastworks. But it was too late. The slower running
soldiers were captured with flying tackles by their pursuers.
There was no space between onrushing Confederates and
Federals; the Twenty—third Corps had to hold its fire for
fear of hitting their comrades. Like a tidal wave the mixed
mass of humanity hit the Union line. Rebels swept through
the opening for the turnpike, over the parapets on either
side, and charged into the confusion. What followed was
sheer mayhem; rifles were swung as clubs in hand-to-hand
combat and many enemy soldiers were wrestled physically to
the ground and disarmed. Cox sent word to Opdycke's bri-
gade to charge into the gap; but that valiant Colonel, exer-
cising his own judgment, had put his men into motion before

the message arrived. Opdycke's action saved the day. After

 

 

168

thirty minutes of bitter fighting the line was repaired,
although curved back about a hundred yards where the Rebels
had broken through.

The battle raged until 9 P.M. For five hours the
rattle of muskets and boom of artillery pounded the sol-
diers' ears into deafness. The Twenty-third Corps bore the
brunt of Cheatham's and Stewart's repeated assaults.
Kimball's division, on the right, was also engaged, but not
as heavily. Cox rallied some of Conrad's and Lane's men
and rushed them to the most threatened portions of the line,
but others from these units did not stop until they had
crossed the river. The heavy atmosphere held down the
clouds of black powder until it appeared that darkness had
fallen. The men could not see more than a few yards, and
each unit fought its own private war, hoping the line did
not break elsewhere and leave them isolated.

Cox rode back and forth behind the line encouraging
the men to deliver their best. General Stanley, cowmandant
of the Fourth Corps, came forward just as the battle began,
but within minutes he received a painful neck wound and had
to seek medical attention. Throughout the engagement
Schofield remained on the north bank of the river, where he
could view the entire action. Except for Stanley's brief
appearance, Cox was the senior officer on the line.

Although Cox was confident that the Federals could

hold their position, at 11 P.M. Schofield ordered the troops

 

 

 

 

169

across the river.15 During the evening Thomas had counter-
manded his original instructions to hold at Franklin and
directed Schofield to fall back to Brentwood, where he
would be reinforced by troops from Nashville. The with-
drawal almost miscarried when a fire broke out in Franklin;
the flames spread rapidly and clearly outlined the Union
soldiers. The Confederates, however, made no effort to
interfere with the movement. During the night, Thomas
further altered his plans and instructed Schofield to bring
his men into Nashville.16
The Battle of Franklin was the fiercest one-day
engagement in the Western theater during the Civil War.
The Federals committed 27,939 men to the action; they suf-
fered 1,222 casualties and listed 1,104 as missing (mostly
from Conrad's and Lane's brigades). Hood's army numbered
26,897, making the engagement an almost even match. The
Rebel losses were severe. Hood reported 6,252 casualties,
of which only 702 were missing and presumed captured. The
battle decimated the Confederate officer corps; five Rebel
generals fell at Franklin and in many units captains were

forced to assume duties usually borne by colonels or

 

15Cox, The Battle pf Franklin, 169.

l6Cox believed that if they had been allowed to
remain at Franklin, Hood's army would have been destroyed
there and the Battle of Nashville would never have occurred.
Ibid., 169-70.

 

 

 

 

 

 

majors.17 Hood's forces were so mauled at Franklin that the
army he led against Nashville in early December was but a
battered remnant of his original command.

Many years after the war, a controversy arose over
two questions related to the Battle of Franklin. Briefly
stated these were: (1) who failed to issue orders to Conrad
and Lane to bring their men immediately into the breast-
works? (2) was Cox ”the commandant upon the line” through-
out the engagement? Cox had a great personal interest in
answering these questions with factual information. At
stake was his reputation, not only as a soldier, but also as
a military historian. In his Franklin gnd_Nashville he made
statements bearing on these issues which triggered irate
responses from readers who had participated in the battle.18

In the book just cited Cox wrote as follows:

Wagner placed the rest of his division (Lane's

and Conrad s brlgades) astrlde the Columbia Turn-
pike, about half a mile in front of the rincipal
line. The commandant upon the line [Cox was noti-
fied by Gener5I_Schofield’th§t Wagner's orders EBId
him to remain in Observation only till Hood should’

show a disposition to advance in forcg, and then to
retire to deycke‘s position and act as a general

 

 

 

 

 

 

l7The Generals were John Adams, Patrick Cleburne,
S. R. (States Rights) Gist, Hiram Granbury and Otto F.
Strahl. The latter was killed along with so many men from
his division that his body was found in an upright position,
held there by the bodies of his fallen soldiers. Boatner,

Civil War Dictionary, 305.

18This book was part of the series published by
Charles Scribner's Sons entitled "Campaigns of the Civil
War." In addition to the volume mentioned, Cox also wrote
Atlanta for the series. Both were published in 1882.

 

171

reserve. Wagner, on being shown the note copgeying
this notice, said that such were his orders.

At 3 P.M. Cox repeated the directions to Wagner and then
went to a knoll to get a better view of the field.20 In
summing up his description of the battle Cox lays the blame
for the near disaster squarely upon Wagner. ”General
Wagner's place of duty was with the two brigades of his div-
ision which were exposed in front, and the order to bring
them in without fighting had been sent through the Fourth
Corps headquarters, and had been received by him.” Instead
of complying with the instructions, "he sent back a command
to fight.”21 By these statements Cox clearly faulted Wagner
for failing to get the two brigades into the lines before
they were so hotly engaged that they could not withdraw
safely.

At the time he wrote his official reports, however,
Cox did not censure Wagner's conduct and one must inquire
why. Cox related that Wagner visited him shortly after
they reached Nashville and offered an explanation for his
apparent neglect of duty. Wagner said the proper orders had
been sent out but that they did not reach Colonels Lane and
Conrad in time. Cox, always willing to give someone the

benefit of the doubt, assured Wagner that he bore him no

 

19Cox, Franklin and Nashville, 86-87. Underline
added for emph331s.

20Ibid., 87, evidently this message was carried to
Wagner by one of Cox's aides.

lebid., 97.

 

172

grudge. On December 3, 1864, Cox sent a letter to Wagner in
which he said, "Indeed an excess of bravery kept the two
brigades a little too long in front, so that the troops at
the main line could not get to firing upon the advancing
enemy till they were uncomfortably near." He sent along
with the letter a copy of his preliminary report to General
Thomas which stated: "In the early part of the engagement
a portion of the Second Division, Twenty-third Corps, was
somewhat disordered by misunderstanding the purpose of
retiring through the lines of the two brigades of wagner's
division which had been engaged in advance."22

Cox was kind toward Wagner, others were not.
Wagner's brigade commanders, Conrad and Lane, censured their
superior in their reports, stating that instead of being
ordered to retire they were directed to stand and fight

where they were.23

The hard feelings thus aroused convinced
Thomas to relieve Wagner of his divisional duties on
December 3, 1864, demoting him to command of the second bri—
gade. Six days later, Wagner, at his own request, was

relieved of all further duty with the Army of the Cumberland

 

220.11., XLV, pt. 1, 348-49.

23Ibid., 256. Lane stated that he received his last
orders from Wagner at 2 P.M.; Wagner told him to give battle
as long as possible. Lane did not mention receiving specific
directions to retire. Conrad, in ibid., 270, said that he
sent an aide to Wagner seeking orders; just then a staff
officer arrived and "gave me orders to hold the line as long
* as possible, and to have the sergeants to fix their bayonets
and to keep the men to their places.” General David S.
Stanley, who commanded the entire Fourth Corps, also
reported that the men were told to fight: ibid., 115.

 

 

173

and went to Indianapolis to receive a new assignment.24
The second controversy grew out of a letter written

by General Stanley in February, 1889. Stanley contradicted

the statement that Cox was "commandant upon the line” during

the Battle of Franklin.25 Stanley insisted that he shared

with Cox the responsibility for directing the fight. After

a thorough review of the orders issued by General Schofield,

on November 30, 1864, and of the reports written by other

participants in the battle, Cox maintained that he correctly

described his role at Franklin. Schofield, in his own book

of recollections, stated that he indicated to Cox "the line

upon which the troops were to be formed; and intrusted to

him the formation, as the several divisions of 22£2.22£E§

should arrive, General Stanley being in the rear directing

the operations of the rear-guard."26 This clearly put Cox

in charge of directing the construction of the breastworks

and placement of the troops, whether from the Twenty-third

or Fourth Corps, in those fortifications. Schofield's offi-

cial report affirmed the substance of this statement

although he does limit Cox's responsibility to ”the greater

 

24Cox, The Battle of Franklin, Chapter XVII, deals
entirely with thi? lssue. -I EEVe relied heavily upon Cox' 3
narrative to reconstruct the argument and must say that Cox
did his homework as a historian. He presented both sides of
the question and drew sound conclusions.

25Centur azine, February, 1889; Cox's statement
appears in his FranEIin and Nashville, 86.

26Schofield, Hertz -six Years in theA my, 175,
underline added.

 

 

174
portion of the line” without telling who commanded the

27 If anyone else did share the

remainder of the troops.
duty, it would have been General Stanley. But, as noted
earlier, Stanley appeared on the battle-line only a few
minutes before being wounded. He then returned to the north
side of the river to obtain medical attention and remained
there until the troops were withdrawn. Surely Stanley

could not have believed he had commanded the line! But in
his official report he implied that he did so, and he "gra-
ciously" thanked Cox for his assistance during the confron-

28

tation. In View of the evidence one must agree that Cox

acted as the "commandant upon the line" during the Battle of

 

27O.R., XLV, pt. 1, 343.

28Ibid., 118. "Although Brigadier-General J. D. Cox
was not in my command, he was my close neighbor in the
battle of Franklin, and I take this opportunity to express
to him my thanks for his gallant help at that time.”
Stanley did mention receiving a wound but said it did not
prevent him from remaining on the field. This is in direct
contradiction with testimony from Cox's aides who saw
Stanley with Schofield on the north side of the river when
they made reports to headquarters: Colonel L. T. Schofield,
The Retreat from Pulaski to Nashville,” Sketches of War
H1stor (5 vols.; Cincinnati: Ohio Commandary of tab—rayal
Eeglon, 1888-1903), II, 137; and Theodore F. Cox to Cox,
June 16, 1881. Colonel Emerson Opdycke's report also omitted
any mention of his having received any orders from Stanley
during the battle: O.R., XLV, pt. 1, 240-41, and since his
brigade arrived just Before the fighting began this omission
suggests that Stanley did very little active commanding dur-
ing or after the engagement. Opdycke stated his brigade was
also withdrawn upon Cox's orders.

 

 

 

" vrr‘y
igrwa
. .

 

 

 

Franklin.29

Thomas received a telegram from Grant, on December
2, ordering an immediate attack at Nashville. But Thomas
waited a few days to allow his cavalry to replace the mounts
they had lost during the fall campaign. He scheduled the
attack for December 8, but nature intervened. A freezing
rain covered the entire area with a sheet of ice; an assault
over such treacherous ground was out of the question. More
urgent messages arrived instructing Thomas to attack or turn
over the command to Schofield. Thomas called a council of
the officers to discuss the situation. Schofield supported
a further postponement; the others concurred. Thomas sent
this information to Grant and explained the reason for the
delay. Despite the explanation, officials in the War
Department concluded that Thomas had lost his nerve; on
December 13 they sent General John A. Logan to Nashville to
take over. Logan, however, did not arrive until the early
hours of the 15th, only a short time before the Federal
assault would begin. Under the circumstances, he decided

not to execute his orders and allowed Thomas to remain in

 

29For a much more detailed discussion of the entire
issue, see Cox, Battle of Franklin, Chapters XX-XXI. In
the Cox Papers at UBerlifi'tEere are several dozen letters
written by Cox or to him during the years 1887-1889, dealing
with a variety of questions related to the Battle of
Franklin. The overwhelming majority support Cox's descrip-
tion of the battle in his Franklin and Nashville and were
used by him to prove his case in the Battle gf_Franklin.

 

 

 

command.30

During the 1u11 at Nashville, Cox inquired into what
action the government had taken upon Sherman's and
Schofield's recommendations that he be promoted to Major-
General. Shedding his usual restraint, he wrote to Garfield
(who was now in the House of Representatives) and asked him
to check into the matter.31 A few days later Garfield
replied that he had gone personally to the War Department
and had seen Stanton place Cox's name on the promotion list
to be sent to the Senate for approval.32 General Schofield
also renewed his recommendation in a letter to Halleck, in
which he used even stronger language than earlier in urging
that Cox be rewarded for his service in the army. Schofield
said that Cox had merited promotion several times because
he often exercised duties which were above those of a
brigadier—general. Schofield described Cox as the best
division commander he had ever seen, yet others, with less
experience and carrying less responsibility, had already
been promoted. Such an oversight, Schofield believed, would
soon cause Cox to resign in disgust. Schofield concluded by

writing: "Excuse, General, the earnestness with which I

 

30O.R., XLV, pt. 2, 104-106; Thomas B. Van Horne,
Histor of_EEE'Arm of the Cumberland (2 vols.; Cincinnati:
0 ert Clark—5h 0.7—1873), 11, 225-26. Hereafter cited
as: Van Horne, Army gf_thg_Cumberland.

31Cox to Garfield, December 6, 1864, Garfield
Papers, VI, pt. 1.

32Garfield to Cox, December 14, 1864.

 

 

 

refer to this matter. I do not exaggerate the merits of the

case. On the contrary, I do not half state them."33 Thomas
forwarded the statement to Washington, adding his own
endorsement that Cox deserved recognition for his work
during the Atlanta Campaign and for his especially distin-
guished service at Franklin.34 Actually all this was
unnecessary, the promotion was approved on December 7, 1864,
but the notification did not reach Cox until January 15,
1865.35 At long last justice had been done.

Although the Confederate and Union armies had been
evenly matched at Franklin, the odds weighed heavily in
favor of the Union at Nashville because reinforcements had
gradually swelled the size of Thomas' command. During the
last days of November, General A. J. Smith arrived with
9,200 men from the District of Tennessee and General James
B. Steedman added 5,200 from the Chattanooga garrison. The

arrival of Schofield's army pushed the aggregate to about

 

 

33O.R., XLV, pt. 2, 273. I cannot determine whether
Cox asked Schofield to write this letter, probably it was
unsolicited. Cox abhorred others who pushed their own
careers and it is doubtful whether he went further in his
own case beyond asking Garfield to check out the facts.

34Ibid., 274.

351bid., pt. 1, 364; Record Group 94, Army Register
for 1865, SE, 95, National Archives.

 

 

 

 

 

178

55,000.36

Much confusion exists regarding the strength of
Hood's army at Nashville. Hood claimed that he had just
slightly more than 23,000 on December 10, but other sources
give a much larger total.37 Regardless of the figures used,
one must inquire why Hood led his smaller army against
Thomas at Nashville. Hood says he expected momentarily to
be reinforced by soldiers from Texas, and that he hoped to
secure more men by active recruiting in Tennessee.38 The
Texans, however, never appeared and his recruiters enlisted
very few volunteers.

In an effort to even the odds a little, Hood
attempted to draw some of the Federals away from Nashville
by sending Forrest's cavalry, and three infantry brigades,
toward Murfreesboro. But the strong garrison stationed

there turned back the Rebels in a sharp clash on December
7.39

 

36Colonel Henry Stone, "Repelling Hood's Invasion of
Tennessee,” Battles and Leaders, IV, 473, reproduces an
official report using the figure 55,000 as the "available
forces" in and around Nashville, but the report also states
that only 43,260 were "actually engaged” on December 15.
Cox, Franklin and Nashville, 219, presents another report
indicating that Thomas had about 70,000 under his command,
but this figure included several thousand troops posted in
garrisons outside of Nashville.

 

37Hood, Advance 229 Retreat, 298. Stone, "Repelling
Hood's Invasion of Tennessee,” Battles and Leaders, IV, 474,
places Hood's total at 39,000. Cox, Franklin and Nashville,
222, using Hood's official return for December-TU: I864, '
puts the Confederate strength at 36,440.

38Hood, Advance and Retreat, 299.

39Cox, Franklin and Nashville, 103-104.

\\

 

 

179

 

In the meantime, Thomas had developed an excellent
plan for engaging Hood's army.

Thomas' tactical plan was masterly: it was a
coordinated attack; his main effort-~Smith and Wood--
was weighted to assure combat superiority at this
point [Hood's left], his secondary attack (Steedman)
was planned so as to give maximum assistance to the
main effort; he had provided for an adequate,
properly located reserve (Schofield); and he used
his mobile troops (cavalry) to screen his flank and
extend the envelopment of the enemy left.

Hood's disposition of his troops, on the other hand, played
right into the Federals' plans. The Rebel line was
over-extended and it formed a concave curve, thereby deny-
ing Hood use of interior lines. Moreover Hood lacked an
adequate reserve, if the line weakened at any point he
would have to pull men off the breastworks to strengthen
the threatened portion of his fortifications.

On December 15 a heavy fog enshrouded the area and
the Federals were in battle formation before Hood detected
any activity. At 8 A.M. Steedman struck the Confederate
right, intending only to make a convincing demonstration,
but the fighting soon developed into a sharp engagement.
This action continued for several hours and Hood, convinced
that this was the major assault, pulled men from the left of
the Confederate line. Meanwhile Smith's and Wood's artil-
lery softened up the Rebels in front of them. At 1 P.M. the

two Corps rushed forward, overwhelming the outnumbered

Rebels so rapidly that they captured 1,200 prisoners and

 

AOBoatner, The Civil war Dictionary, 579.

 

 

 
   

 

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.v. .
A

 

 

 

 

 

w:irif .. 11 1 11 11.1.- E .

 

181

sixteen batteries. To support the main attack Schofield
swung the Twenty-third Corps around Smith and hit the
Confederates' extreme left flank. This finished the
destruction of Hood's line; the Rebels were driven two
miles before darkness halted the pursuit.41

, Naturally the Federals expected that the routed
enemy would continue their withdrawal during the night.
But once again General Hood defied reason and remained on
the field. His soldiers worked feverishly throughout the
night to construct a new line of breastworks, running from
Shy's Hill42 on the left to the Overton Hills on the right,
a distance of about two miles. Hood refused both flanks
by bending them sharply southward. The weakest point was
on Shy's Hill, where the bend created a salient.

The Federals reopened the contest with artillery at

5 A.M. on December 16. Their rifled batteries easily out-
distanced the Confederate smooth-bores and forced them to
withdraw. Smith's and Schofield's gunners bombarded the
salient on Shy's Hill with a terrific crossfire, knocking
holes in the Rebel breastworks. During this barrage, Union

skirmishers crept to within a few hundred yards of the

 

41O.R., XLV, pt. 1, 405-406. For general descrip-
tions of the-Battle of Nashville see Van Horne, Arm of the
Cumberland, II, 229-43, and Cox, Franklin and NasEv1lIE,
107TI237'—' '——__—""—"’—-—_"“

42This hill did not have a special name before the
battle began; it Was named by the Confederates in honor of
Colonel T. M. Shy, who fell there on December 16. Cox,
Franklin §§d_Nashville, 113.

 

 

 

 

 

182

Confederate works. At 4 P.M. Schofield and Smith ordered a
general assault. Their men rushed forward, jumped over the
works and drove the Confederates from Shy's Hill. Cox's
division came on so rapidly that the Rebels fired only one
volley before they fled. The entire Confederate left
collapsed. Smith's and Schofield's men raced forward and
met at the Granny White Turnpike, where they halted to
avoid firing at one another in the confusion.43 Wood's
Corps, unsuccessful in an earlier attempt, renewed its
assault on the enemy's right and swept away the remaining
resistance.

The Federals strained every muscle to finish off
Hood's battered army. The Union cavalry dashed after the
rapidly retreating enemy_but darkness, a drizzling rain,
and Forrest's excellent horsemen made them keep their dis-
tance. The following day (December 17), Thomas' infantry
joined the pursuit. The roads soon deteriorated into strips
of mud, sometimes reaching forty or fifty feet in width,
broadened by thousands of feet trying to avoid the deep
holes. Ten days later the ragged Confederates reached the
Tennessee River, the last obstacle to be surmounted before
reaching safety. But their scouts could not find a bridge,
all had been destroyed in previous actions, and the water
was too high to permit fording. Suddenly several Federal

pontoons came floating downstream; these were quickly

 

430.12., XLV, pt. 1, 406-407.

 

 

 

 

183
rescued and used to build a narrow bridge.44 The last
Confederate reached the opposite shore just a few minutes
before a Union gunboat appeared and blasted the structure.
At this point Thomas gave up the chase and ordered his
troops into winter quarters. But the War Department over-
ruled his decision. Although Hood's army no longer con-
stituted a real threat to the Union, Grant wanted it watched
carefully. Thomas, therefore, sent several divisions after
the Confederates; those units not involved in this task
settled down to await their next assignment.

The Franklin-Nashville Campaign virtually shattered
the Confederate resistance in the Western theater. Although
the figures are discrepant, it appears that Hood's army
suffered losses approaching fifty per-cent. The Union
reports estimated Hood's strength above 36,000 and listed
20,752 Confederate prisoners and casualties!"5 Hood placed
his strength at around 23,000, his losses at 10,000.46 The
results were so discouraging that Hood asked to be relieved

of his command, a request honored by the Confederate

 

4406x, Franklin and Nashville, 125.

45O.R., XLV, pt. 1, 46, 664. Thomas listed these
enemy losses: 13,000 prisoners, 6,252 casualties at
Franklin and 1,500 casualties at Nashville.

46Ibid., 656. In his Reminiscences, II, 285-89,
Cox took issue with Hood's report 0 so ew casualties and
defended the accuracy of the Federal reports. The Union
and Confederate armies did not use the same method for
reporting their effective strengths. For example, if his
command actually suffered 2,000 casualties and received
1,000 reinforcements, Hood would admit a loss of only 1,000,

 

 

 

 

184
government on January 10, 1865.

By contrast, the Federal forces operating in
Tennessee gained strength throughout the campaign. The
additional troops brought into Nashville during November
and December more than offset the Union losses of 5,383
incurred during the two major battles.47 Thomas' great
victory completely reversed the attitude of his superiors;
Lincoln, Grant, and Stanton vied with one another in heaping
praise upon the "Rock of Chickamauga."

The end of the campaign found Schofield's Corps

 

encamped at Columbia, Tennessee. Schofield did not relish
the prospect of a long period of inactivity. He, therefore,
wrote to Grant suggesting that the Twenty-third assist the
Army of the Potomac in Virginia, or that it could go to
North Carolina to prepare a base for Sherman when his column

came up from the south. These recommendations meshed per-

 

fectly with a plan Grant had already forwarded to Sherman.

On January 7, 1865, Schofield received orders to bring his

men to Washington, from there the navy would transport them
to North Carolina.48

During the encampment at Columbia, Cox fought a

 

mild case of malaria. Many men had been stricken and the
doctors traced the outbreak to contaminated water used by

the soldiers during their bivouac on December 16 at

 

47Casualties at Franklin were 2,326; at Nashville,
3,057. Boatner, The Civil war Dictionary, 305, 582.

 

48Cox, Reminiscences, II, 375-76.

 

 

 

185

Nashville. Cox had unwisely assumed he could fight off the
disease without special attention and he led his division
until they reached Columbia. Here he found quarters in a
farmhouse, rested in bed and took medicine prescribed by
the corps' medical director. Although he was back on his
feet by January 2, he did not regain full strength for
another month.49

On December 29, after learning that the corps would
be going into winter quarters, Cox requested a thirty-day
leave so he could visit his family and recover his health.
The request was speedily granted and Cox prepared orders
turning command of the division over to Colonel Charles C.
Doolittle, the senior brigade officer. Before the order
was executed, however, Cox heard about the transfer to
North Carolina; without hesitation he rescinded the direc-
tions and remained with his troops.50

The Twenty-third Corps left Columbia on January 2
and marched west to Clifton on the Tennessee River, reaching
there on the eighth. The march took the men through deso-
late country. They crossed the Buffalo River several times
as it twisted and turned through the countryside. After
each crossing the men built huge fires with wooden rails
stripped from nearby fences so that they could dry their
clothing to reduce the danger of sickness. After they

reached Clifton the supply problem became critical; Smith's

 

491616., 376-77.
5°o.R., XLV, pt. 1, 426, 474, 475, 486.

 

 

 

186

Sixteenth Corps, who preceded them, had stripped the area.
Boats and barges carrying supplies passed Clifton, but did
not step. Angered, Schofield finally ordered a battery to
fire in front of the next boat to force it to shore so he
could send a message to Thomas at Nashville requesting
transportation for his men.51

While at Clifton Cox described his wretched condi-
tion. ”I am," he wrote, "getting ragged and barefoot. My
boots are worn out, my coat is worn out, my waistcoats are
worn out, my hat is worn out, and I am only whole and
respectable when I am in my shirt and drawers. If I ever
get near civilization again, I shall be obliged to lie abed
somewhere till I can get some clothes made."52 On January
14, the day after Cox wrote this letter, General Thomas
arrived with a fleet of transports. As the word spread
through the camp, distress changed to enthusiasm. Although
the troops were about to embark on a two thousand mile jour-
ney by water, rail and foot, they looked forward to the
trip in preference to remaining in Tennessee to shiver in
the winter snow and rain.53

After placing his division aboard the transports,
Cox left the entourage to spend a few days with his family

at Warren, Ohio. Cox had not been home for two years.

 

51Cox, Reminiscences, II, 380-85.
521bid., 385.
53Ibid., 386.

 

 

 

 

187
Jacob, Jr. recalled his father's arrival.

. . one winter's night, when we were getting
ready to go to bed, the smaller children having
already been tucked in, the door bell rang. As
mother was busy, she sent me to the door to see
who was there. On opening it, I was very much
surprised to see a very tall man with big bushy
heard in a soldier's uniform. He stepped in and
asked if Mrs. Cox was home, and I flew off to the
nursery to tell mother that there was a big sol-
dier in the front room wanting to see her.
Imagine the surprise of the children when the big
soldier soon came back into the nursery and
routed us all out of bed. It proved to be father
home on a furlough.

Although Cox had planned to get plenty of rest, he hardly
slept at all. Somehow, during these few whirlwind days, he
also acquired sparkling new uniforms to replace the miser-
able outfits he had described so graphically. Despite their
condition, his son related: "It is interesting to remember
that during the war years my best Sunday clothes were made
out of father's discarded uniforms.”55 On January 26, 1865,
a tired, but spiritually refreshed General Cox set out for
Washington.56 He looked forward to a speedy termination of

the war and a permanent reunion with his loved ones.

 

54Jacob Dolson Cox, Buildin An American Industr.
The Stor of the Cleveland Tw1st r1 7Com an and Its
thn er CIEvEIEnd: The Cleve an mst r1 C3—,‘—1951),
e author is General Cox's eldest son; he was twelve
years old at the time of the incident related here. Here-
after cited as: Cox, Building A§_American Industry.

551616.
56O.R., XLVII, pt. 2, 131.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER VII

WAR'S END: THE NORTH CAROLINA CAMPAIGN
AND THE OHIO GOVERNORSHIP

Consultations between Grant and the principal offi-
cers of the Federal army had brought forth a detailed plan
for operations in North Carolina. The first objective was
Fort Fisher, an elaborate fortification guarding the mouth
of the Cape Fear River. By controlling the fort, the
Confederates were able to sneak blockade running vessels to
safety upstream. This brought in only a mere trickle of
supplies, but it helped the Rebels to keep fighting. The
Union resolved to seal this loophole, but the initial
attempt to do so was a complete failure (December, 1864).
Early in 1865 more men and new leaders were assigned to the
undertaking.1

Once Fort Fisher had been taken, the city of
Wilmington, which the fort guarded, would become a primary
target. New Bern, fifty miles farther north, was also
desired for a second supply depot. From these two bases,

the Union troops would execute a double envelopment of

Goldsboro, where they would meet Sherman's rugged veterans.

 

1Harry Hansen, The Civil War (New York: Duell,
Sloan and Pearce, 1962), 62I-22, describes briefly Butler's
futile assault.

188

 

 

189

Then, if necessary, the entire column could march into
Virginia to assist Grant.

In the attack on Fort Fisher, General Alfred H.
Terry's Tenth Corps directed maneuvers on land, supported
closely by a large fleet under Admiral David D. Porter.
The assault was difficult because of the location of the
fort, which lay on the southern tip of a peninsula of sand,
with the Atlantic Ocean on the eastern side and the Cape
Fear River on the western side. Smaller forts on the oppo-
site shore of the river covered approaches to Fort Fisher
and prevented Federal ships from running upstream to out-
flank it. Operations against the fort began by landing
troops on the Atlantic beach, where the pounding surf
threatened to capsize the landing craft. Despite the diffi-
culties Terry's men were put safely ashore on January 13.
They spent two days reconnoitering the fort and deciding
where to make their attack. Meanwhile Porter's fleet kept
up a steady barrage with its long-range guns in an effort
to silence as many Rebel batteries as possible. But they
knocked only a few small holes in the stockade which was
constructed of sodded sand banks. On January 15, Terry
threw his men against the structure, attacking a wall
extending toward the Cape Fear River. Despite steady artil-
lery barrages from Porter's ships, the Rebels poured a
withering fire into the advancing Federal column. Between
rushes, the men dug shallow trenches in the sandy soil to

gain some cover. After three hours the Tenth Corps finally

 

190

forced its way over the outer wall and into the fort. Once
inside, however, they discovered that the battle had just
begun. The Rebels had constructed a series of "bombproof"
shelters within the wall and each of these had to be taken
before the Union flag could be raised. By nightfall the
work was completed; Fort Fisher was in Union hands.2

After the Rebels were driven from Fort Fisher, they
retired up the Cape Fear River several miles to Fort
Anderson. Situated on the west bank of the river, the fort
commanded a line running from the stream westward to Orton
Pond, a large lake several miles in length. On the east
bank of the river, the Confederates also established forti-
fications which ran to Myrtle Sound, another large body of
water. Their position appeared secure because both flanks
were protected by water and were covered by artillery to
prevent an amphibious assault. Only a few causeways ran
through the bogs and the Confederates naturally secured
these with batteries and infantry. In some respects Fort
Anderson would be harder to take than Fort Fisher, espe-
cially since there seemed to be no safe place to land troops
near the structure.

The Twenty-third Corps rendezvoused in Washington,
where Cox joined them on January 28. They intended to
leave on February 1 via naval transports, but their depar-

ture was delayed for three days by large ice floes in the

 

2Cox, Franklin and Nashville, 138-145.

 

 

191

Potomac. The trip along the Atlantic coast was rough and
the soldiers,unaccustomed to the pitching and rolling of
the ships, suffered greatly from seasickness. To make
matters worse, the surf was so heavy when they arrived off
Fort Fisher that they spent two more miserable days aboard
ship before being put safely ashore on February 9.3

Upon his arrival, Schofield assumed command of the
newly created Department of North Carolina and personally
directed the operations against Fort Anderson. At first
Schofield employed both the Twenty-third and Tenth Corps in
a united effort against the Rebel line on the eastern bank
of the river. Since the terrain and fortifications ruled
out a direct assault, the decision was made to cross Myrtle
Sound and attack the Confederates from the rear. During the
night of February 12 the infantry marched north from Fort
Fisher along the beach to a point where a naval fleet was
to put ashore the pontoons. But a heavy surf prevented the
navy from landing the pontoons and the dejected soldiers,
wet and cold, returned before daybreak to the fort. Two
nights later a second attempt was made. This time the pon-
toons arrived on time, but the soft sand proved too great an
obstacle; the horses could not move the boats to the sound
rapidly enough. About 2 A.M. the moon broke through the

clouds, exposing the Federals to enemy view. The Rebels

 

3O.R., XLVII, pt. 1, 958-64. This is Cox's report
for operations from February 8—22, 1865. I have used this
reporg for the general description of movements during this
perio .

 

 

 

 

192

 

 

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Cox, Reminiscences, II, 406.

 

 

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193

opened up with artillery across the sound, putting an end
to another futile effort.4

Now Schofield changed his tactics. He ordered Cox
and the Twenty-third Corps across the Cape Fear River to
threaten directly Fort Anderson, keeping General Terry and
the Tenth Corps on the east bank to engage the Rebel line
between the stream and Myrtle Sound.5 On February 17, Cox's
men left Smithville, where they had landed the previous day,
and pushed toward Fort Anderson.6 They encountered enemy
cavalry about three miles from the village, but easily
forced them back into the fortifications.7 After personally
scouting the Rebel entrenchments, Cox saw that a frontal
assault would be foolhardy. During the night of the seven-
teenth Cox led half of his troops westward along the shore
of Orton Pond, leaving behind two brigades to distract the
Confederates. About midnight the small force reached the

head of the pond, where a causeway ran through a swamp to

 

dry ground on the opposite shore. The causeway was well

 

4Cox, Nashville and Franklin, 147-154, presents a
brief description of the struggIe for Fort Anderson and the
subsequent capture of Wilmington.

5The disposition of the troops was such that Cox
acted as the commander of the Twenty-third Corps throughout
the North Carolina campaign. Schofield found that he could
not personally lead the corps and serve as the District
Commander. Schofield set up headquarters aboard a steamer
in the river and allowed Cox and Terry to direct the sol-
diers in the field.

60.R., XLVII, pt. 2, 470.

7Record Group 393, Twenty-third Army Corps, Letter
Book 6, number 229.

 

194

guarded, but Cox's men waded through waist-deep water to
outflank the defenders and sent them scurrying for a safer
position. Cox's elation over having his plan work so
smoothly evaporated when he discovered Terrapin Pond, not
on his maps, blocking the route to Fort Anderson. It
appeared that several more hours of tiresome slogging would
be required to reach the objective. The Federal's native
scout, however, pointed out a little used trail between the
two ponds, leading directly to the rear of the Rebel line.
Despite the possibility of being trapped if the Rebels
detected his route, Cox decided to use the path. At day-
break the brigades emerged from the swamp, ready to attack.
They were greeted by silence. The Confederates surprised
on the causeway had given the alarm and the enemy pulled
out in time to avoid Cox's trap.8 Cox's success also com-
pelled the Rebel commander, General Robert Hoke, to pull
back his men in front of the Tenth Corps because Federal
batteries in Fort Anderson could now enfilade his line.

Although forced to give ground, the Confederates did
not retreat far. They moved behind Town Creek, tore up the
bridges, and dug in. Schofield ordered Cox to send one
division across to help General Terry, because it appeared
that the main enemy force was on the opposite side of the
Cape Fear River. With the remaining four brigades Cox

pushed toward Town Creek. Again the swampy ground limited

 

3Ibid., numbers 234, 235.

 

 

 

 

195
his maneuvers. Luck, however, continued to ride with the
Federals. Cox's scouts found an abandoned flatboat in the
creek about two miles above the main Rebel line. Cox put
a guard over it and had repairs made.9 On February 20, Cox
left one brigade to keep up a demonstration on the causeway
leading to the Town Creek bridge, while he personally led
the other three units upstream to the flatboat. The
rickety craft could carry only fifty men at a time, but by
3 P.M. the transfer was completed. No resistance had been
encountered, evidently the enemy believed the ground was
too swampy to allow a vigorous movement. Cox led the men
through two miles of murky bogs until they struck the Old
Town Creek road, leading toward the enemy's rear. He took
two brigades down the road, and sent the third to barricade
another farm lane, which the Confederates might use during
a retreat. Without warning Cox's men crashed in upon the
Rebels and blasted them from their trenches, capturing 375
prisoners and several cannon. Despite the surprise several
hundred Rebels evaded the attackers and escaped before Cox's
reserve brigade reached the farm lane. (The reserve had been
delayed by treacherous swamps and managed to fire only a
few shots at the fleeing Rebels.) This time, however, Cox's
success did not help Terry's operations, General Hoke held
stubbornly to his position across the river.

At dawn the Federals struck out rapidly toward

 

9O.R., XLVII, pt. 2, 495; Record Group 393,
Department of North Carolina, Letter Book 40, number 59.

 

196
Wilmington. They reached the Brunswick ferry before the
enemy had completely destroyed the bridges. Although the
planking was ablaze, Cox's men saved about half of the pon-
toons and used them to construct quickly a narrow span to
Eagle Island. Several regiments went over immediately to
dislodge the Confederate rear-guard. Later the artillery
were brought across and the gunners lobbed shells into
Wilmington.

During the late afternoon, in the midst of the move-
ment to Eagle Island, Cox received orders from Schofield to
disengage and bring his entire command downstream.
Schofield wanted the Twenty-third ferried across the river
to help General Terry dislodge the Confederates in front of
Wilmington. Cox was convinced, however, that Schofield's
plan was unnecessary. He could see the Rebels setting fire
to their warehouses; this did not suggest that General Hoke
planned to make a staunch effort to defend the city. None-
theless Cox did send one brigade to the rendezvous, and a
message to Schofield explaining the situation. Hours passed

without a word, then a second message, more urgent than the

 

first, reinforced the original directions. Still Cox
delayed. At last, about midnight, Cox got another communi-
cation from headquarters cancelling the operation.

Schofield explained that Cox's messenger had gotten lost and

had not reported until after dark.10 The next day Cox's

 

10See ibid., 521-23, for the messages exchanged
between Cox and-Shhofield.

 

197
assessment proved correct; the Rebels evacuated Wilmington
and General Terry's Tenth Corps entered the city unopposed.
The bridge to Eagle Island was quickly rebuilt and Cox's
men rejoined the main column for a victory celebration.
Now, if the Federals failed to secure Goldsboro, Sherman
could come to Wilmington to replenish his supplies.

After the capture of Wilmington, Federal strategy
dictated that Schofield's command be divided to bring
Goldsboro under greater pressure. Schofield remained at
Wilmington with the Tenth Corps; Cox and the Twenty-third
were sent north to Newberne. When prepared, both columns
would move forward simultaneously.

The Twenty-third reached Newberne on the last day
of February. Cox assumed command of the District of
Beaufort, replacing General I. N. Palmer, who had failed to
execute vigorously his orders. Grant expected Cox to
reorganize the troops and end their lethargic inactivity.
Schofield recommended, in view of his separation from the
Twenty-third, that Cox also be given permanent command of
the corps. Grant concurred and the necessary orders were
issued on March 27, 1865.11

Cox wasted no time. The next day he moved forward
with two divisions to find the Rebels. He proceeded slowly
along the railroad, providing protection for the engineers
who rebuilt the tracks. These repairs were vitally impor-

tant to assure that Sherman's army could be reoutfitted at

 

lllbid , 579-80; pt. 3, 34, 195.

 

 

 

 

 

198

Goldsboro.12 The column advanced steadily until it encoun—
tered enemy breastworks near the Southwest River. Cox
deployed the men in front of the Confederate trenches;
Palmer's division anchored on the railroad and Carter's
division covered roads on the left. When Ruger's division
came up, Cox stationed it near the center as a reserve.13

From March 8-10, 1865, Cox's men fought three
desperate engagements (referred to as the Battle of Kinston).
The Rebels seized the initiative because time was against
them; they had to destroy Cox before Sherman got closer.
Early on the eighth, the Confederates struck Cox's left
(Carter's division), sweeping away the advance guard and
taking 900 prisoners. But the main line fought valiantly
and Cox brought up part of Ruger's reserves to reinforce
the weak points. The Rebels slashed repeatedly at the
Federal line, but could not break through before nightfall

14 attempted the

ended the action. The following day Bragg
same thing on the right, battering Palmer's division and
trying desperately to turn that flank. The Confederates
bent the line a bit before Ruger's division again saved the

day. On the tenth, the enemy made one last vigorous

assault. They hit Carter, near the center of the line.

 

12Record Group 393, Department of North Carolina,
Letter Book 150, 201-204.

130.R., XLVII, pt. 1, 973-80.

14General Braxton Bragg had recently arrived from
Tennessee to help defend Goldsboro.

 

 

 

 

199
The Federals were prepared. Field artillery, loaded with
death-dealing canister, were fired repeatedly into the
attacking waves. Accurate musket fire dealt with those who

escaped the artillery barrages. During the night the enemy
15

 

evacuated their lines and pulled back to Goldsboro.

Although Cox expected continued fighting, his column
entered Kinston unopposed. More surprisingly, they encoun-
tered no further resistance during the march to Goldsboro.
General Joseph E. Johnston, the over-all Confederate com-
mander in North Carolina, had quietly evacuated the city and
had concentrated all available troops for a last desperate
effort to stop Sherman's advance.

After failing to halt Cox outside Kinston, Johnston
had ordered all available units to rendezvous south of
Goldsboro. The results were meager; despite an all-out
effort the Confederates could not muster more than 22,500
men. Johnston hurled them against Sherman at Averasboro
(March 16), and at Bentonsville (March 19). The Rebel's
best opportunity came at Bentonsville because Sherman,
laboring over miserable roads, had divided his army into

three separate columns. The Confederates hit General Henry

 

Slocum's Twentieth Corps near Bentonsville, h0ping to crush

Sherman in detail. Although hard pressed, Slocum's soldiers

 

150.R.,XLv11, pt. 2, 734, 749- 51, 789; Cox,
"Diary, ” Mh_Eh'8 and 10, 1865; Cox, Franklin and Nashville,
158- 62 The bridge over the Neuse River [ead1ng into
Kinston became known as "Cox's Bridge" in subsequent corres-
pondence between Sherman and Schofield. 0. R. XLVII, pt. 2,
910; pt. 3, 913.

 

 

 

200

held their ground and, in fact, had stopped the Rebels
before reinforcements came on the field. This shattered
Johnston's hope of preventing the link-up at Goldsboro,
which Sherman reached on March 23. The carnival atmosphere
triggered by the reunion of long separated comrades beggars
description; even usually strict officers looked on indul-
gently or openly participated in the jubilant celebration.
Now the Union's combined army of 80,000 cast an engulfing
shadow over the small Confederate force gathering at
Raleigh.16

With the original plans fulfilled, Sherman, Grant
and Lincoln met at City Point, Virginia, to discuss future
strategy. Sherman was instructed to press toward Raleigh,
remaining ready, however, to send some troops north to
Virginia in case Lee did something unexpected. The brief
respite at Goldsboro sufficed to allow Sherman's ragged men
to receive new uniforms and replace equipment. On April 5,
Sherman issued confidential orders for an advance to begin

17 They were about half-way to Raleigh

within five days.
when, on the eleventh, news arrived of Lee's surrender at
Appomattox. The shouts of joy travelled faster than the
messenger who carried the official announcement. Hats were

flung into the air, everyone hugged someone as a carefree

 

16Cox, Franklin and Nashville, Chapter XI.
170.R., XLVII, pt. 2, 969.

 

 

201
celebration broke out. The Confederacy had been crushed.18
Sherman's army bivouacked around Raleigh on April
13. The following day an informal armistice was arranged
and Sherman began negotiations with Johnston for the surren-
der of his tr00ps. Johnston, who had recently consulted
with Jefferson Davis and several members of the Confederate
cabinet, however, offered to surrender all the remaining
Rebel armies if the proper guarantees were made. Sherman,
recalling Lincoln's conciliatory attitude during the meet-
ing at City Point, agreed to consider terms going beyond a
simple military capinflation. But Sherman cautioned that
the document must be approved by the President and his cab-
inet before becoming official. Working as amicably as pos-
sible under the circumstances, the two men hammered out an
agreement by April 18th. The military terms were simple.
The Confederate soldiers were to return to their state cap-
itals, deposit their arms with federal authorities and Sign
a declaration to abide by state and federal laws. The other
items dealt with political affairs, stipulating recognition
of existing Southern state governments after their members
executed a loyalty oath, promising protection for personal
property and personal political rights, and stating that no

one would be prosecuted for their part in the war.

 

AlthOugh the news of Lincoln's death, on April 15,

SPread rapidly throughout the North, it did not reach

 

 

18Cox, ”Diary,” April 6-12, 1865.

 

 

202
Sherman's camp until the seventeenth. Sherman swore his
staff to secrecy and directed Cox quietly to strengthen the
guard around Raleigh. All troops not on duty were sent to
their quarters. After Cox completed the arrangements,
Sherman sadly went from camp to camp to read the tragic
announcement and to caution the men against any rash action.
The news stunned the soldiers; but there were no incidents
and Cox reported that his guards encountered less trouble
than usual.

The Sherman-Johnston agreement reached Washington
after Lincoln's death, when the entire government was reel-
ing from shock. President Andrew Johnson, General Halleck
and Secretary of War Stanton reacted violently to the len-
iency concerning civil affairs. They voted to reject the
document and, what is worse, sent Grant to secure a new
agreement under conditions which appeared to express a lack
of faith in Sherman's patriotism. Grant arrived in Raleigh
on April 24, and diplomatically instructed Sherman to reopen
the negotiations with Johnston. Johnston had no alternative
but to accept a new statement which excluded recognition of
state governments, personal rights and immunity for acts
committed during the war. The revised agreement was sent to

Washington on April 26 and it received speedy ratification.19

 

19This affair'caused a complete rupture between
Sherman and Halleck and Stanton. Unfortunately Sherman's
agreement was printed in Northern newspapers, without proper
explanation, making it appear his inclusion of political
terms bordered on treason. Sherman felt then, and through-
out the rest of his life, that he had not exceeded the

1”&Q‘_’—9? 7:9: ' ,'

 

 

203

The responsibility for administering the paroles to
the defeated Rebels fell upon Cox and Schofield. They went
by train from Raleigh to Greensboro on May 1, accompanied
during the last half of the trip by Confederate General
William Hardee, whose book on Tactics Cox had used through-
out the war. Cox brought along only a couple of regiments,
enough to complete the task but not so many as to arouse
hatred. At Greensboro they met briefly with Johnston, who
assured them that his only desire was to have the men
returned home before they broke up into outlaw bands.20
Within three days the paperwork was completed and the
paroled soldiers, accompanied by General Johnston, set out
for their respective states. Schofield had underscored
the Union's desire for a speedy reunification by arranging
for the Confederates to receive rations during their journey

home.

 

instructions received from Lincoln in March. He could not
know, due to slow communications, that recognition of the
Virginia state government had been withdrawn before he
reached an accord with Johnston; he assumed he was applying
an approved principle to the other state governments.
Sherman's bitterness over this treatment caused him to
reject Halleck's invitation to meet in Washington in May,
and to refuse to shake Stanton's hand when they reviewed
Sherman's army in the capital on May 24, 1865. Hansen, The
Civil War, Chapter 44, presents a brief account. Cox, 1h"—

15 efiihiscences, II, Chapters XLIX-L, analyzed the dispute
in detaiI and approved Sherman's actions. Joseph E.
Johnston, Narrative of Militagy Operations Directed During
the Late war Between-The States (Bloomington: Ifidiana
Uhiver51ty—Press, I95 , - 5, discusses the affair from
his viewpoint and suggests that Sherman agreed to include
political terms because he believed the war had been a fight
to restore the Union.

20Cox, "Diary," May 1, 1865.

 

204

Subsequently Cox was put in charge of the western
part of the state to supervise the return of authority to
civilian officials.21 Many citizens feared that they would
be punished for having supported the Confederacy. Cox
accepted numerous speaking engagements for the sole purpose
of explaining the federal government's intention. Cox
stressed that no one need fear reprisals for past activi-
ties, but he also bore hard upon the abolition of slavery
and urged Blacks and Whites to work diligently in adjusting
to their new relationship. To this end, Cox recommended
that work agreements be drawn up defining the obligations
of each party. The Negroes constituted the greatest prob-
lem; many assumed that wealth would automatically follow
emancipation and they lolled about awaiting the division of
the plantations into small farms, which they expected to
receive free and clear. Cox frequently and strenuously
discouraged such notions, but with little effect.

During May, Garfield wrote that many men within
Ohio's Union Party wanted to present Cox's name to the state
convention for the nomination for governor. Although Cox
did not encourage the move, he believed that the governor-
ship might serve as a transition back to civilian life and
that it would give him time to renew business contacts.22

After being nominated Cox requested a transfer to Ohio,

 

21O.R., XLVII, pt. 3, 396, 407.

22Cox to Garfield, June 1, 1865, Garfield Papers,
VI, pt. 2.

 

 

 

 

205

ostensibly to supervise the mustering out of Ohio troops,
but actually to bring himself on the scene for some quiet
campaigning. The request was approved and at the end of
July, Cox returned to Ohio.23

As Cox travelled toward home his thoughts went,
naturally, back over the four years he had spent in the
army. He entered the service as a novice, but had proven
his ability through unstinting dedication to duty. Some
said he was not ”popular" with the men because he was too
aloof to develop warm personal relationships, but the offi-
cers of the Sixteenth Kentucky thought otherwise; they had
presented Cox with a horse and a testimonial citing their
thanks for his uniform kindness and courteous handling of
the troops.24 Mbreover Cox had developed warm friendships
with other officers, particularly Schofield and Sherman;
both held high estimates of his value as a Volunteer officer
and wished him every success in the gubernatorial campaign.
Sherman even made personal endorsements of Cox's candidacy
in Ohio during the canvass. If any single trait dominated
Cox's military career, it was his devotion to the Union. He
felt deeply the refusal of the Senate to ratify his promo-
tion in 1862. Even more galling was the subsequent promo-
tion of other men, when Cox had served longer and in more

important capacities. But he could not justify resigning

_‘¥

230.R., LXVII, pt. 3, 679.

24Officers of the Sixteenth Kentucky to Cox, March
13, 1865.

 

 

206
for personal reasons. In a very great measure Cox accepted
the nomination for Ohio's governorship as a recognition of
his service and as a reward for his unrelenting efforts to
see the Union restored. Although thankful that the war was
over at last, he knew he would miss the close comradship
experienced in camp and field, where men had drawn together

for a common purpose.

The Union Party of Ohio held its convention in
Columbus on June 21, 1865. Among the delegates were one
hundred fortyofive uniformed men representing Ohio's sol-
diers. Governor Brough, a nominal Democrat elected under
the Unionist banner in 1863, had withdrawn his name from
contention on June 16. This left Generals Cox, Schenck and
John B. Steedman (a former Democrat) and one civilian,
Samuel Galloway, in the race. By the time nominations were
made the contest had narrowed to Cox and Galloway. At the
last minute Galloway withdrew and the delegates unanimously
endorsed Cox on the first ballot.25

National issues rather than state questions domin-
ated the platform. The document praised, in a Subdued tone,
President Johnson's determination to carry out Lincoln's
reconstruction plans; but warned that the federal government

must insure the security of ”loyal'l Southern Whites, the

 

25The general description of Ohio's political pic-
ture, Cox's election and his administration is based upon
Roseboom, Ohio: Civil War Egg, Chapter XV, and Porter, Ohio
Politics During £fig_C1viI Egg, Chapter IV.

 

 

207

peace and prosperity of the Union, and-the abolition of
slavery. On the particularly thorny issue of Negro suf-
frage, the platform remained silent. The radical delegates,
especially those from the Western Reserve, had demanded a
plank approving the extension of political rights to Blacks
in Ohio and throughout the South. The conservative major-
ity, however, beat back all attempts to include such a
statement. Cox heartily approved of this decision. In
fact, he had instructed his friend, Aaron F. Perry of
Cincinnati, to withdraw his name if the party decided to
push forward on the issue.26

Despite the spirited debate in the convention, Cox
wanted to avoid taking a stand on Negro suffrage. But
pressure from many sources increased and Cox finally
resolved to make his position clear. He did so with a pri-
vate reply to a letter from an Oberlin Committee, knowing
that the response would receive wide publicity. The Commit-
tee's letter raised two major questions: did Cox support
changing Ohio's Constitution to allow Negroes to vote; and
did he favor extending the same right to Blacks throughout

the nation?27 In his reply, known throughout the state as

 

26Cox to Perry, May 25, 1865, Cochran, "Political
Correspondence,” I, 26-27.

27Oberlin Committee to Cox, July 24, 1865, ibid.,
57-60. The Oberlin Letter is usually represented as the
work of a committee of Negroes. See, for example, Porter,
Ohio Politics Durin the Civil war, 210, and Eugene Roseboom
and Franc1s P. Weisenhhfger, A Hihtory of Ohio (Columbus:
Ohio State Archaeological and-HistoricaI—Society, 1954),
294. William C. Cochran, Cox's stepson, pointed out,

 

 

 

 

208
the "Oberlin Letter,” Cox devoted most of his attention to

the second query.28

He thought that Negroes would be more
hindered than helped if they received the franchise. He
based his opinion upon four years of close observation of
Southern racial conditions; he believed that mutual dis-
trust, and sometimes hatred, dominated the relationship
between the races. Cox suspected that granting the suffrage
to Negroes would only make the situation worse because they
were generally uneducated, often outnumbered, and could not
be expected to use the ballot intelligently. Cox predicted
a violent reaction from Whites if their former slaves sud-
denly became their equals in the polling booth. Instead of
equal rights, Cox proposed ”a peaceful separation of the
races on the soil where they now are.” A "Negro Territory"
could be created by the federal government within each
Southern state, preferably where the Blacks already consti-
tuted a majority of the population. Within these enclaves
the qualified Negroes would receive full voting rights and
could operate their own separate government. Writing

bluntly, Cox feared that the American ideal of a homogeneous

 

however, that at least two of the signatories were white.
Samuel Plumb was Oberlin's mayor and banker; E. H. Fairchild
held the position of Chairman of the Preparatory Department
at Oberlin College. Cochran contends that these two men
were the ”true committee" and that the Negroes' signatures
were merely window-dressing. Cochran cited several letters
from Oberlinites which suggest strongly that this was the
actual circumstance. Cochran, ”Political Correspondence,”
footnote, I, 57-58.

28COX to the Oberlin Committee, July 25, 1865.

 

 

 

209
population could never be achieved between Blacks and
Whites; color would always keep them apart.

Cox opposed amending Ohio's constitution before the
suffrage issue had been debated and determined at the
national level. It would do little good for Ohio to act
alone. Even more importantly, Cox failed to see any meas-
ureable benefits for Ohio's Negroes if voting rights were
granted because they were a minority and could not signifi-
cantly influence the outcome of state elections. Encour-
aging more Blacks to move into Ohio in quest of broader
rights would merely compound the existing problems.

In closing, Cox castigated the Committee for its not
so subtle threat that he would lose votes if he refused to
answer their questions. He lectured them on party unity,
stating that they had no right to demand opinions from him
on issues not included in the party platform. But it was
too late for lectures. If Cox had really wanted to avoid
controversy he should have remained silent. In answering
the Committee Cox took a calculated risk, but at least he
would know for certain how much support he had from within
the party ranks. Moreover, the public debate over his views
would indicate the reaction of many voters.

Cox's forthright statement reflected the View of a
majority of Ohio's returning soldiers, and it received

strong support in the southern part of the state, where most

 

 

210
of Ohio's Negroes resided.29 But it aroused the ire of the
radical Unionists, who attacked the statement on suffrage as
too conservative and the proposal for the separation of the
races as impractical. Judge William M. Dickson of
Cincinnati emerged as a radical spokesman by quickly prepar-
ing a rebuttal which was widely publicized. After rejecting
Cox's idea that a deeply rooted antagonism prevailed between
the races which might compel their separation, he devoted
most of the reply to discussing party unity. Dickson, who
had served as Chairman of the Committee on Resolutions
(platform) during the convention, said that a majority of
the delegates favored Negro suffrage, but had refrained from
pressing the issue in the interest of harmony. Now Cox had
endangered that principle. Dickson recommended that
Unionists and voters View Cox's statement as a purely per-
sonal pronouncement, not as a commonly held party belief.
The Western Reserve press echoed Dickson's sentiments, but
the conservative newspapers came to Cox's rescue.30 Out of
the controversy one thing became clear, Negro suffrage would

be a key issue in the campaign despite all efforts to avoid it.

 

29William T. Sherman to John Sherman, August 3,
1865, in Rachel Sherman Thorndike (ed. ), The Sherman Letters:
Correspondence between General and Senator Shem man from I837
to 1891 (New’York: Chaers Scrihher's Sons, '
Chchran, "Political Correspondence, '1, 77- 112, reproduced
dozens of letters Cox received supporting the Oberlin Letter.

30Porter, Ohio Politics Durin the Civil War,
211-13; Roseboom, Oh1o:1v1 ar Era, 0; Ehil1us 0.
Randall and Daniel 3. Ryan H1 stor _hf Ohio. The Rise and
Pro ress of an American State vo s. wN YofET The
Century HIEthfy Co. , I91 , , 294-97.

 

211

The Union party campaign opened with a rally in
Warren, Cox's home town, on August 15. Heading the list of
speakers were Cox, Garfield, and former governor David Tod.
Speaking first, Cox placed special emphasis on party har-
mony, saying that the Unionists must remain united to pre-
vent Northern Copperheads and Southern Whites from control-
ling reconstruction. He talked very briefly about Negro
suffrage, repeating the substance of the Oberlin Letter.
Garfield agreed on every point except Negro voting rights;
he favored giving the franchise to Blacks in Ohio and in
the South without further delay. Tod supported Cox and
warned that if Ohio changed her constitution a large number
of Negroes would move into the state. Six days later,
speaking at Oberlin, Cox further clarified his position on
Negro suffrage. He said he would support an amendment to
the state constitution if each state had to decide for
itself, but he preferred that the issue be resolved by the
federal government to provide a uniform policy for the
entire nation.31

On August 23, in an unusually late convention, the

Democrats nominated General John H. Morgan for the

 

31Porter, Ohio Politics During the Civil War,
216-17; Roseboom, 1o: 1V1 ar ra, .

 

 

 

212

governorship.32 Morgan had served in the Mexican War and
during the first three years of the Civil War; he had also
been minister to Portugal during the Buchanan administra-
tion. In view of the division within the Union Party, the
Democrats came out flatly against Negro suffrage. They
represented their party as the true defender of White
supremacy in Ohio. They appealed to the soldier and labor
vote by warning that Whites‘ social status and wages would
be drastically affected if large numbers of Blacks flooded
into the state. When Morgan began his active campaigning
in mid-September, he attacked Cox's separation scheme as
impractical and costly. It would be better, Morgan thought,
to protect Negroes where they now resided, but without
extending them voting rights.33

In October Ohio voters returned their verdict. Cox
won over Morgan by a majority of about 30,000, although the
Union party drew 65,000 fewer votes than in 1863. The sharp
reduction in Unionist support was attributed to thousands
of men who refused to vote, rather than to defections to
the Democrats. Almost one-third of the decrease occurred

in the Reserve, where the suffrage issue was esPecially

 

32One week earlier, August 17, a small group of
extreme states-rights Democrats had held a convention which
nominated Alexander Long for governor and adopted a platform
embodying the doctrine of state nullification of federal
laws. Long received only 360 votes in the election.
Porter, Ohio Politics During Ehg Civil War, 214, 219.

33Ibid., 214-16, 217-18.

 

 

213

volatile. The Union party retained control of the state
legislature by a 70 to 35 margin in the House and by 25 to
12 in the Senate.34

Although Cox had clearly indicated his Opposition to
extending the franchise, the radicals in the state legisla-
ture refused to let the issue rest. The 1866 legislative
session was barely underway when a resolution was introduced
to strike the word "white” from Ohio's voting qualifica-
tions. The conservatives prevented a stampede by sharply
pointing out that the resolution would amend the constitu-
tion and must, therefore, be approved by the voters in a
referendum. The measure eventually passed and appeared
upon the state ballot in 1867.35 Throughout the protracted
debate, Governor Cox maintained a resolute silence which
undoubtedly increased the radical's resentment toward him.

During the first few months of 1866 Cox labored to
conciliate differences within his party arising over
national reconstruction. In response to a suggestion by
William Dennison, former Ohio governor and currently Post-
master General, Cox asked the state legislature to adopt a

resolution approving the President's program.36 But,

 

34Porter, Ohio Politics During the Civil War, 219,

 

35Ibid., 219-20, 235-38. For a summary of the votes

on the resqution in its various stages see Ohio Senate
Journal, 1866, 8, 498; Ohio Senate Journal, , 210, 273,

, O, ZII; Ohio House JournaI, I367, Z90, 350, 552, 561,
570, 573, 579, MERE—533. ~

36William Dennison to Cox, January 3, 1866.

 

 

 

 

214

because the rift between Congress and the President was
widening, the request was tabled. Later, after Johnson had
vetoed the Freedman's Bureau Bill, the Ohio Unionists
coalesced into pro-Johnson and pro-Radical factions. Deeply
concerned, Cox journeyed to Washington to see the President
and determine first—hand if the controversy could be
resolved. As his train rumbled eastward, the dispute was
intensified. Johnson, on February 22, delivered a speech
lashing the Radicals for their opposition. By the time Cox
arrived in the capital, the Ohio congressional delegation
was furious and several members advised him to cancel the
appointment with the President. In spite of the warnings
that he might seriously harm his political future, Cox went
ahead.

The interview (February 24) ran smoothly. Cox
sounded out Johnson on reconstruction policies, and espe-
cially on Negro suffrage. He came away convinced that both
factions within the Union Party desired the same objectives;
the major difference lay in whether the program should be
carried out by executive or congressional action. Cox
issued a public statement on the meeting and concluded it
by observing that, ”. . . although he may not receive per-
sonal assault with the forebearance Mr. Lincoln used to
show, there is no need to fear that Andrew Johnson is not
sincere in his adhesion to the principles upon which he was

elected."37 He urged the Ohio Unionists to support the

 

 

37Cincinnati Commercial, February 27, 1866.

 

 

215

Chief Executive and pleaded for everyone to remain temperate
until a common agreement could be reached. Cox observed,
privately, that hot tempers were the most serious problem.38
DesPite these earnest efforts Cox failed to reunite his
party and, as a result, his effectiveness as a party leader
steadily diminished.39

As preparations were made for the congressional cam-
paign of 1866, the animosity of the Union party leadership
toward Cox emerged. The party's central committee had
originally invited Cox and Dennison to open the contest,
but abruptly reversed itself at the last minute and gave
the honor to Senator John Sherman and Representative Robert
Schenck.4O The deliberate slight took place although Cox,
by mid-summer, had sharply reduced his support of President
Johnson.41 In the few speeches he presented during the can-
vass, Cox continually stressed the need for party unity on
the basis of a just reconstruction program. He urged rati-
fication of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment as the best
way to guarantee the Negroes' rights. The election returns

revealed that the Union Party in Ohio had done well; it lost

 

38Cox to Aaron F. Perry, March 10, 1866, Cochran,
"Political Correspondence," I, 183-87.

39For a description of Cox's conciliatory efforts
see Porter, Ohio Politics During_ the Civil War, 220- 23.

40Cox to William Dennison, August 3, 1866, Cochran,
"Political Correspondence," I, 242-

4100x to Charles Anderson, August 7, 1866, and Cox
to Willard Warner, August 27,1866, ibid. , 243-44, 250-52.
Cox to James Mbnroe, November 21,1866.

 

 

 

216
only one seat by a narrow margin to the Democrats.42

Despite the emphasis on national issues and the
struggle to maintain party harmony, Cox's administration
managed to complete or initiate action on several state
programs. The state tax laws were thoroughly studied and
remedial legislation was adopted to provide for a statewide
reassessment. In 1867, at Cox's urging, a study group was
formed which recommended the construction of a new Girls
Reform School. In March, 1867, the state legislature
empowered first-class cities to establish Boards of Health
to enforce local health regulations. The final important
action, in April, 1867, created a State Board of Charities
to assist the legislature in operating the various public
assistance agencies. All of these marked Cox's term as one
beneficial to the state.43

Even the radicals agreed that Cox had served well,
but they had serious doubts about his loyalty to their
44

cause. They disliked his independent attitude. Cox
sensed their uneasiness and early in 1867 made his decision
regarding his political future. He believed he could be
renominated if willing to fight, but what would he gain?

Even if victorious, he could not count upon enough support

 

3 4 42Porter, Ohio Politics During the Civil War,
2 2-3 .

43James R. Ewing, "The Public Services of J. D.
Cox,” Ph. D. Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1899,
17-18; Randall and Ryan, History gf_0hio, IV, 299-300.

 

 

44Roseboom, Ohio: Civil War Era, 458.

 

217

in the legislature to carry out his policies.45 After
weighing the alternatives, Cox wrote the Central Committee
on January 25, 1867, withdrawing from any consideration
for a second term."6 As time passed many people urged him
to run, but Cox remained steadfast in his resolution to
return to private life.47
The Union Republican Party, as it now called itself,
met in Columbus on June 19. After Cox's announcement, the
radicals had openly supported Rutherford B. Hayes, a man of
greater party regularity. Samuel Galloway again provided
the strongest opposition, but Hayes easily won the nomina-
tion on the second ballot. The Democrats countered with
Allen G. Thurman. The campaign was highly emotional because
the proposed amendment to the state constitution providing
for Negro suffrage was on the ballot. Hayes supported the
measure, while Thurman vigorously upheld the principle of
White supremacy. Hayes won by a narrow 2,983 votes, but the

constitutional amendment was defeated by 38,000.48 Cox

 

45Cox to Aaron F. Perry, January 14 and 17,1867,
Cochran, "Political Correspondence, ” 273- 76, 280- 81.

46Cox to General B. R. Cowan, Chairman of the State
Central Committee, January 25,1867, ibid., 283.

47Cox to Aaron F. Perry, June 3,1867, ibid.
316- 18; John W. Andrews to Cox, January 27, 1867; Frederick
ngsaurek to Cox, May 6, 1867; S. D. Harris to Cox, June 6,
7

48Porter, Ohio Politics Durin the Civil War,
241—48; Roseboom, 10: 1V1 Jar Era, -62

 

 

 

 

 

 

218

considered the referendum results as a vindication of the

position he had sternly upheld through two stormy years.49

 

 

49Cox to Charles F. Cox, October 16, 1867, and Cox
to Garfield, November 22, 1867, Cochran, "Political
Correspondence," 330, 341-46.

all 1110(239 .T-

   
 

13': _

 

 

CHAPTER VIII
EPILOGUE

In the spring of 1868 Cox moved his family to
Cincinnati, where he had arranged a law partnership with
General Henry L. Burnett. He purchased a large two-story
house on Dayton Street. The spacious lot soon contained a
wide variety of flowers planted and tended by Mrs. Cox and
the children.

The Cox home was a constant beehive of activity; old
army comrades and political associates frequently lodged
there during visits to the Queen City. Although many of the
visits were social, some were made by friends seeking help
in their business ventures. Sometimes former army acquaint-
ances, down on their luck, sought Cox's assistance in find-
ing them employment. He usually succeeded. On one occasion
Colonel E. A. Tracy, a former member of Cox's staff, arrived
with his family. Tracy was in such poor health that he had
to be carried into the house. The front parlor was turned
into a bedroom and Mrs. Cox struggled to make him comfort-
able.1

It was during this trying time that one of Cox's

 

 

lCox, Building A§_American Industry, 42.

219

 

 

 

 

220

sons, Kenyon, had a brush with death. Kenyon, a sickly lad
since birth, had developed a tumor on his face. Doctors had
treated it for more than a year with external applications
of iodine, which they hoped would be absorbed and arrest the
spread of the tumor. But the treatment failed and the
growth enlarged until it was the size of a man's fist. One
day as the children played in an upstairs bedroom, Ken sud-
denly collapsed and began bleeding profusely from the mouth.
Thereafter the tumor hemorrhaged often, causing Ken to lose
much blood and reducing his weight drastically. Finally, as
a last resort, an operation was performed by Doctor Mussy of
Cincinnati in February, 1869. The danger was great and the
family steeled itself for the possibility of Ken's death.
Happily, the operation was a success and, although periodic
surgery was required thereafter, Ken recovered fully from
the ordeal.2

After Grant's smashing victory in the election of
1868, politicians speculated over the make-up of his cabinet.
Many believed that an Ohioan would be included in the select
group due to that state's continued support of the

Republican party. Ex-governor Jacob Cox and Senator

 

2Ibid., 43—44; Cox to Rutherford B. Hayes, September

16, 1869, Cox Papers, The Rutherford B. Hayes Memorial
Library, Fremont, Ohio. Hereafter cited as: Cox Papers,
Hayes Library.

 

 

221

3 Cox

Benjamin Wade were frequently mentioned as choices.
reacted without enthusiasm to rumors of his appointment.
He had privately written off his chances as rather slim and

intimated that he preferred to remain in Cincinnati because

4

". .to go would be an onerous though honorable duty."

Grant withheld announcement of his decision until
shortly before the inauguration, much to the exasperation of
the press. In keeping with the uncertainty of the entire
episode, Cox read in a newspaper that he would fill the post
of Secretary of Interior.5 After several long frustrating
days, in the midst of teaching a class at the Cincinnati Law
School, Cox finally received a telegram from Grant bearing
the official notification of his appointment.

Grant's administration faced a number of turbulent
issues. Reconstruction of the South remained incomplete.

Wealthy holders of greenbacks and federal bonds demanded

 

3William Dennison to Cox, March 7, 1869. Former
Governor Dennison was in contact with Grant regarding the
selection of an Ohioan. But Dennison got the impression
that Wade, whom he disliked, had the best chance, so he
backed off and did not press vigorously in favor of Ohio.
After the appointment, Dennison apologized for not making a
more determined effort in Cox's behalf.

4Cox to Theodore Cox, January 27, 1869, and to
Charles F. Cox, March 3, 1869, Cochran, "Political
Correspondence," 1, 403-404.

5This was somewhat of a surprise because the rumor-
mills had connected Cox with the War Department. This prob-
ably occurred because both Grant and Sherman had urged
President Johnson to appoint Cox as Secretary of War in the
midst of the battle over Stanton's dismissal, early in 1868.
See Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton: The

Life and Times of Lincoln‘s Secretar of war (New York:
KIffed-KI Kfiopft_1§62$, 568-69. _-

 

 

222

payment in gold. Men-on-the-make, a numerous species during
those years, approached the government seeking assistance
with their schemes. Some people sought political reforms,
including the establishment of a civil service system, in
the hope that the government might become more efficient.
It was a time that required a strong leader at the head of
the government to check the malevolent impulses. Grant
never provided strong presidential leadership, but at the
outset few suspected serious wrongdoing in the administra-
tion. Three of the cabinet members--Cox, E. Rockwood Hoar,
and Hamilton Fish--were all hailed as "reformers." Yet some
skeptics intimated that these men might not find the polit-
ical climate in the capital amenable to their ideas. Time
would tell.6

One of Cox's first official acts established a new
method for selecting employees in the Patent Office and
Census Bureau.7 Using the Civil Service Law of 1853 as the

basis for his decision, Cox ruled that prospective employees

 

6Allan Nevins, Hamilton Fish: The Inner Histor of
the Grant Administration {New YorE: Dodd, Mead & 0., 936),

7Cox to Charles Cox, March 14, 1869, Cochran,
"Political Correspondence," I, 412; U.S. Congress, House,
Re ort of the Secretar 9f the Interior for 1870, House
Executive Document 0. , 41E? Cong., 3rd‘Séss., v-vi.
Hereafter cited as Report for 1870. In the report Cox said
he would apply the new method to other offices in his
department if this trial proved successful.

 

223

had to submit to an oral and written examination.8 This
procedure, Cox believed, would increase the quality of per-
sonnel in those two offices and reduce the number of office-
seekers who beseiged the cabinet members, often hindering
the proper execution of their duties.9 The initial reaction
to Cox's policy was favorable, and the test results proved
that a screening process was necessary and desirable.10 But
some complaints were registered. For example, one woman
became furious when informed that a written test was required
to become a copyist in the Patent Bureau. After some ques-
tioning she admitted her inability to read or write, yet
maintained that she could copy with the best!11

During 1870 Cox initiated two additional policies to
increase further the morale and efficiency of his employees.
First, he prohibited Republican fund raisers from using

coercion in collecting political assessments. Cox announced

 

8U.S. Statutes §£_Lar e, X, 211. The act left the
implimentation of the law to the discretion of the secre-
taries of the departments. Cox was the only secretary to
use the law during Grant's administrations.

9U.S. Congress, House, Report of the Secretar 2:
the Interior for 1869, House Executive-Document o. , part
, 4Ist Cong., 2d Sess., xxiv-xxvi. Hereafter cited as

Report f2; 1869.

10New York Tribune, September 17, 1869 l; washington

Chronicle, December , , 2; Jacob D. Cox, 'Civil Service
e orm, orth American Review, Vol. 112, No. 230 (January,
1871), 102-I04. Cox's articIe gave the most complete statis-
tics. He reported that 621 applicants were tested, only 54%
(338) received a qualifying score of 400 points out of a
total of 1,000 points. Mbreover only 17% (107) earned over
600 points.

11Washington Chronicle, June 22, 1869, 1.

 

224
that political contributions were voluntary and promised
that no disciplinary action would be taken against anyone
who refused payment.12 This policy reversed traditional
practices; each federal employee had been compelled to con-
tribute a percentage of his salary if he wanted to retain
his job. By opposing these collections, Cox raised the
hackles of the Republican leadership and made some powerful
enemies.

Cox's second decision also abolished a traditional
practice. During elections federal employees were given a
leave of absence, with pay, while they returned to their
home states to vote. Cox informed his staff that, hence-
forth, they would have to forfeit their pay for the days
absent or they could deduct the time from their vacation.
This announcement triggered a storm of protest. President
Grant did not overrule Cox, but he did ask that the Interior
Department follow the procedure used by a majority of the

13 Cox held his ground and never reversed his

departments.
decision.

Revealing his broad interest in civil service

 

12New York Tribune, October 31, 1870, 5. The
Tribune reprinted three Ietters exchanged between Cox and
the Republican Executive Committee of Ohio in which Cox
flatly refused to require his clerks to contribute to the
party finances. One of these letters, R. D. Harrison (Chair-
man, Ohio State Union Executive Committee), to Cox, May 14,
1870, hit the nail squarely. Harrison asked Cox's coopera-
tion so "our assessments may be made at once, and that each
and every rec1p1ent of federal patronage be afforded the
opportunity to contribute.” (Underline added.)

13Washington Chronicle, October 5, 1870, 1.

 

 

225

reform, Cox urged passage of the Jenckes bill. The measure
would require a competitive examination for all civil serv-
ants.14 Instead of a single Civil Service Commission, how-
ever, Cox favored a separate commission for each department
to prevent a few men from controlling the entire program.

Cox worked earnestly to improve the operation of the
Office of Indian Affairs. His recommendations, made with
the President's approval, laid the basis for "Grant's Peace
Policy."15 Acting on a suggestion made originally by the
Society of Friends, Cox had representatives of religious
denominations appointed as Indian agents. In 1869 Quakers
were given control over Indian affairs in Kansas and Nebraska
and they served with distinction. After their initial
success, several other churches accepted invitations to
participate.16 These churchmen, who struggled to improve
the welfare of their charges, earned the respect of the

17

Indians. In those areas where the program was established

14Ari Hoogenboom mtlawing the S oils: (A History
of the Civil Service Refdrm ovement, IBEE- I883 Ur ana:
Uhiver31ty of IIIinois Press, I96I5,1n5 The sponsor of

the measure was Representative Thomas A. Jenckes of Rhode
Island.

 

15Jacob D. Cox, "The Indian Question," International

Review, Vol. VI (1879), 617- 634, Henry E. Fritz, The Mbvement

or ndian Assimilation, 1860- 1890 (Philadelphia: I-Uhiversity
5f_PennsyIVania Press, 19635, Chapter III

 

16Re ort for 1869, x—xi; Fritz, The Movement for
Indian AssimiIation, 7I-75.

17Re ort for 1869, x-xi; William B. Hesseltine,
Ul sses S. rant, Politician (New York. Dodd, Mead and Co.
I9§55,160Mew York Tr1bune, September 23, 1869, 1.

 

226

it brought about generally a less hostile relationship
between the federal government and the Indians. Cox also
arranged for between sixty and seventy unassigned army
officers to serve as Indian agents. This resulted in a con-
siderable monetary savings because these men were already
drawing a regular salary. Moreover the officers remained
under military discipline and faithfully executed the orders
of the Indian Commissioner. These innovations improved the
quality of the field personnel in the Indian Bureau and Cox
reported a marked increase in efficiency.18 Despite the
success of these programs, however, the "spoilsmen" within
the Republican party bitterly criticized Cox. They had
planned to reward some of their supporters with an Indian
agency, and became angry when Cox filled many of the posi-
tions with men selected on merit rather than on political
loyalty.19

During his term in office, Cox struggled to unravel
the "McGarrahan Claim." The claim, located in Fresno
County, California, contained quicksilver deposits valued at
$5,000,000. The dispute revolved around William

McGarrahan's efforts to secure a clear title to the tract

 

18Re ort for 1869, x; New York Tribune, April 29,
1869, 1, an y 8, 1859, 1.

19One complaint was registered by Senator Zachariah
Chandler of Michigan in September, 1870. Chandler was
incensed because a New Jersey man had been appointed an
Indian Agent in Michigan in preference to Chandler's favor-
ite, the Reverend W. H. Brockway. Zachariah Chandler: An
Outline Sketch of His Life and Pub11c Service (Detro1t: '__

The Post and Tribune Co. ,1880), 307.

 

 

 

227
from the General Land Office. The original grant had been
made by the Mexican government to Vincente P. Gomez in 1844,
but the records had been destroyed when the Monterrey
archives burned during the American attack on that city in
1846. Gomez, working under the Treaty of Guadaloupe
Hidalgo and several American land laws, supposedly had
secured a clear title from the California Federal District
Court in June, 1857. Shortly thereafter McGarrahan pur-
chased the claim from Gomez and had it recognized by the
court in February, 1858. Subsequently, in 1862, he had
applied for a patent (title) to the General Land Office.
But for some unexplained reason the claim had not been
registered and when found in the files it lacked President
Lincoln's signature and the official government seal.20 In
1869 McGarrahan appealed to Cox to complete the transaction
and officially record his claim. Cox's duty appeared clear,
but as a precaution he ordered the Land Office to make an

. . . . 21
exten51ve 1nvest1gat10n.

 

20There are several government documents which pre-
sent a detailed review of the McGarrahan Claim. I have used
extensively: U.S. Con ress, House, "Report on the Memorial
of William McGarrahan, House Re orts, No. 24 (February,
1871), 4lst Cong., 3d Sess., 8 pp. Also helpful was a
lengthy editorial in the Washington Chronicle, April 5,
1869. The Chronicle favored McGarrahan's cIaim and fre-
quently criticized Cox's refusal to issue the patent.

21The Land Office investigation revealed that
McGarrahan's claim had been turned down by the United States
Supreme Court on appeal by the Justice Department in 1865;
the verdict was based partly upon the fact that fraudulent
practices had been associated with the suit from the very
outset. Excerpts from the Supreme Court's decision may be
found in: U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Miscellaneous

 

 

 

228

Before the investigation was completed, the New
Idria Mining Company filed a counter-claim to 486 acres
within the McGarrahan tract. Now Cox found himself caught
between two contending parties and he turned to Attorney
General E. Rockwood Hoar for advice. Hoar's opinion
(December 17, 1869) stated that Cox must issue a patent to
the claimant that had most clearly complied with the law.
Hoar also said that it appeared the New Idria Company's
case was more valid than McGarrahan's.22

After several more months of complicated legal
maneuvering, Cox decided, in August, 1870, to complete the
New Idria claim. But Grant intervened and ordered him not
to issue a patent to anyone unless specifically directed

23 In his reply to Grant's letter, Cox protested

to do so.
vigorously McGarrahan's interference and asked the President

to put an end to it. He closed by saying that he could not

 

Documents, No. 85 (1878), 45th Cong., 2d Sess., 231. In

epresentative George S. Boutwell had charged that
Gomez and his principal witness, Jose Albrigo, had both
been convicted of perjury in a similar case. Boutwell also
asserted that a U.S. District Attorney had been bribed to
support the claim in 1858. See Boutwell's speech in the
Con ressional Globe (46 vols., Washington, D.C.: F. and J.
Elves and George K. Bailey, 1833-73), vol. 39, 2471-75.
Hubert Howe Bancroft, The Histor 2: California (7 vols.;
The History Company, 1 - , stated that tHe entire
glaim was based upon a "pretended Spanish grant" in VII,

57, f. n. 21.

22Senate Misc. Doc., No. 85, 871-72.

23Evidently McGarrahan's efforts to have some of his
friends speak to Grant had borne fruit. McGarrahan to
Frederick Franck, December 17, 1869 and January 10, 1870, in
”Report on the Claim of William McGarrahan,” House Re orts,
No. 951 (June 13, 1878), 45th Cong., 2d Sess., 359-50.

 

 

 

229
deviate from his chosen course; if Grant failed to back him,

he would feel compelled to resign.24

Grant did not respond,
forcing Cox to conclude that the President would not support
his position.

At the end of September the Coxes went to Staten
Island for a brief vacation. After spending many hours in
deep thought Cox wrote a long letter to Grant. He reviewed
his operation of the Interior Department and placed special
emphasis upon the civil service reforms which had triggered
so much protest. Cox reasoned that his policies might have
embarrassed Grant by going farther than the President
desired. Therefore, he wrote, ”I deem it my duty to place

in your hands my resignation. ."25

Two days later,
before he had received a reply, Cox read in the newspapers
that Grant had accepted his resignation. In his acceptance
letter Grant thanked Cox for his work and asked him to
remain at his post until the department's Annual Report had
been completed. Cox agreed and left office on November 1,
1870.

Cox returned to Cincinnati and his legal practice in

an effort to recoup his finances, which had been impaired by

fifteen years of almost constant public service. He hoped

 

24Washington Chronicle, November 10,1870,l. Both
Grant's and Cox's letters were printed after Cox had left
the cabinet At first Grant had refused to make the corre-
spondence public: Chronicle, October 19, 1870, 1.

25Cox to Grant, October 3, 1870, Cochran, ”Political
Correspondence," II, 50-51.

 

 

 

 

 

230
to remain aloof from politics, but his reputation prevented
him from realizing this objective. Friends and politicians
continually sought out his advice or his cooperation on a

26

variety of issues. In 1871 Cox began corresponding with

Carl Schurz and other leaders of a movement for monetary,

27 These men feared that

tariff, and civil service reform.
no satisfaction on these points could be obtained from the
Grant administration. Thus they decided to oust Grant by
either taking control of the Republican party or by forming
a third party. At first Cox rejected the third party idea
but he gradually accepted it as the only practical course.
By the time the Liberal Republican Convention opened
in Cincinnati on May 1, 1872, the delegates had generally
coalesced behind two candidates--Horace Greeley and Charles
Francis Adams. Cox strongly favored the latter and had
warned Schurz about the danger of compromising with the

28

Greeley faction. Although Adams led on the first ballot,

Greeley slowly gained strength and secured the nomination on

 

26In 1871 a group of maverick Republicans joined
hands with the Democrats in the state legislature in an
attempt to defeat Senator John Sherman' 3 bid for re- -election.
They wanted to use Cox as their candidate, but he flatly
rejected the overtures. Cochran, ”Political Correspondence,"
II, 270- 350 assim, contains many letters urging Cox to run.
Roseboom, Oh1o: Civil War Era, 478- 80, gives a brief
description of the ep13533._

27Schurz to Cox, February 3, October 14 and 22,
1871. Cox to David A. Wells, July 22, 1871, Cochran,
"Political Correspondence, ” II, 274-78

28Cox to Carl Schurz, April 5, 1872, Cochran,
”Political Correspondence," II, 407- 410.

 

 

231
the sixth ballot. Greeley's avowed support for the protec-
tive tariff and his shallow interest in the other reforms
persuaded Cox, and many others, to withdraw from active
participation in the party. As Cox put it, "Greeley will
get no help from us."29 Greeley later received an endorse-
ment from the Democrats, but his candidacy was doomed. In
November Grant and the Republicans swept to a smashing vic-
tory. During the next four years Cox avoided an active role
in public affairs, limiting his participation to occasional
letters.

Among Cox's legal clients were a group of New York
investors whose financial misfortunes during the Panic of
1873 unexpectedly provided him with a new position. The
New Yorkers owned a large block of stock in the Toledo,
Wabash, and Western Railroad, with headquarters in Toledo,
Ohio. When the company's books were closed for 1873 these
men held enough votes to control the annual meeting, but
subsequent monetary reverses compelled them to sell many
shares. Now a question arose: were the New Yorkers enti-
tled to vote the recorded shares or only the current shares?
With control over the railroad at stake, they engaged Cox to
represent their interests. In his brief Cox argued that the
record book was official; what had transpired since the clos-

ing date should be ignored.30 Many Ohio investors, however,

 

29Cox to Allyn Cox, May 6, 1872, ibid., 428-32.

30Ewing, "Public Services of J. D. Cox," 28.

 

 

 

232
refused to accept his opinion and declared their willing-
ness to fight out the issue in the annual meeting. At this
point a compromise emerged. J. S. Casement, who had served
under Cox throughout the war, recommended that Cox accept
the presidency of the corporation because all parties

trusted him.31

He agreed and moved to Toledo. During his
tenure, December, 1873 until March, 1877, he successfully
guided the company through bankruptcy proceedings, during
which he acted as the court-appointed referee.32
While in Toledo Cox developed an interest in micro-
scopic research and especially in photomicrography (taking
photographs through a microscope). With characteristic
zeal he plunged into a study of the entire field. Within a
few years he became an expert in microphotography and in
1881 he was elected to membership in the Royal [Dutch]
Microscopical Society and the American Association for the
Advancement of Science. In 1884 and in 1892, Cox served as
president of the Royal Society. He wrote several articles
for scientific periodicals explaining the techniques he used

to produce superior quality photos. Cox crowned his

endeavors in 1891 by earning a gold medal with his

 

31J. S. Casement to Cox, September 26, 1873.

32Shortly after Cox resigned, the corporation was
reorganized on a sound financial basis. Clark waggoner
ed. Histor of theC of Toledo and Lucas County, Ohio
(Toledo: MhnseII'and ot , I888), 4I4_

 

233

photomicrography display at the Antwerp Exposition.33
By 1876 Cox had drifted back into the Republican

Party. The miserable failure of the third party effort in

1872 had convinced him that if reform would ever triumph

it had to occur through regular political channels. Even

though he worked with the local Republican committee on

several occasions, he expressed no desire to become involved

as a candidate. Despite this reticence, however, he was

nominated for the House of Representatives by the Sixth

34 After a dull

District convention in the summer of 1876.
and unexciting campaign, he was elected by a majority of
1,915.35

Throughout the presidential campaign, Cox corre-
sponded with Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican nominee
and a fellow Ohioan. Their friendship dated back to the
Civil War when Hayes had served under Cox in West Virginia.
Cox pleaded that Hayes base his campaign on reform,

36

especially in the area of civil service. Hayes did not

respond warmly to Cox's ideas but agreed to "hint at least

 

33Cox, Reminiscences, II, 550, note by William
Cochran; The Governors of Ufiio (Columbus: Ohio Historical
Society, , . are 13 a bibliography of the scien-
tific articles in the Cox Papers.

34Cox to James Monroe, August 14, 1876, Cox Papers,
Hayes Library.

35Joseph P. Smith Histor of the Re ublican Part
§§ Ohio (2 vols.; Chicago: Eew1s Publishing Co., 13985, E,
5.

3600x to Hayes, June 20, 1876, Cox Papers, Hayes
Library.

 

 

 

234

37 The deals the

in the direction you [Cox] suggest.”
Republicans made to secure victory restricted Hayes' free-
dom of action as chief executive. Thus Cox saw another
effort at reform swept aside. In the House he discovered
that the traditional forces still predominated and he
suffered his final political disillusionment. He served
out his term without distinction; the party apparently
recognized his lack of enthusiasm and did not renominate
him.38 In March, 1879, Cox returned once again to
Cincinnati and briefly revived his law practice.

Two years later, Cox accepted an appointment as
Dean of the Cincinnati Law School.39 The school, estab-
lished in 1833, was the oldest legal training institution
west of the Appalachians. Only Harvard (1817), Yale (1824)
and Virginia (1826) antedated it. Prospective lawyers
transferred to the school for their junior and senior years.
The school, during Cox's tenure (1881-97), enrolled from

100 to 200 students annually.40 A degree from the

 

37Hayes to Cox, June 23, 1876, ibid.

38Dictionar of American Bio ra h , IV, 477; The
Governors of Ohio, g2?_WiII1am A. Taylor, Ohio in the_
Con ress from ISUB- 1901, with Notes and Sketches of-Senators
and c_UReEresentatlves (Co 1m Bus The XX—Century Pthish1ng

 

39Alex H. McGubby to Cox, June 22,1881, relays news
that Cox was selected unanimously by the Board of Trustees.

40John B. Shotwell, A Histor of the Schools of
Cincinnati (Cincinnati: The _SchooI hi e o. , 230-61;
Henry A. and Mrs. Kate B. Ford, compilers, History of
Bio ra

Cincinnati, Ohio, with Illustrations and 1051
Sketches (CleveIand: W. W. W1II11ams hhd'Co. ,IEEIF, 323-24.

 

 

institution entitled graduates to join the Cincinnati bar
without further examination.

In addition to his administrative duties, Cox
taught courses in Constitutional Law, Civil Procedure, Real

41 To avoid a conflict of

Property and Elementary Law.
interest, the Board of Trustees required that Cox give up
personal court appearances and limit himself to a "chamber
practice.”42 Cox remained at the head of the school until
1897. During four of these years (April, 1885 to June,
1889) he also served as the President of the University of
Cincinnati. In 1896 the University created its own legal
department and the following year merged with the Cincinnati
Law School. Cox did not approve of the merger which he said
had been engineered by the "[University of] Cincinnati

crow Therefore, he selected this as an opportune time

to retire. He announced that he would go to Oberlin and
devote his time to writing.44
Shortly before his retirement, President McKinley

had offered Cox an appointment as ambassador to Spain. Even

then tensions were high between the United States and Spain

 

 

41History of Cincinnati and Hamilton Count , Ohio:
Their Past and Present (Cincinnati: . . eIson and Co.,

42Ewing, "Public Services of J. D. Cox,” 28-29.

43Cox to James Ford Rhodes, July 19, 1897, Cox
Papers, MSS. Division, Library of Congress.

44"Action of the Board of Trustees in Relation to
the Retirement from the Faculty of the Honorable Jacob D.
Cox," June 23, 1897.

236

due to the Cuban revolt and the methods used by Spanish
authorities to quell the uprising. Cox politely declined,
giving several reasons for his decision.45 First, his
health had deteriorated during the past few years; he had a
bad heart which doctors warned could fail if overtaxed.
Second, the salary for the post was not large enough to
cover the "social obligations" required of an American
ambassador. Although Cox had adequate resources for the
foreseeable future, he did not think his money could be
stretched to cover a large expenditure. Third, and most
important, Cox declined because he could not speak the
language. For a man who had frequently criticized the dip-
lomatic corps for the inability to speak the native tongue
of their assigned station, accepting the proffered position
would be the height of inconsistency. Cox recognized that
with "burning questions at stake" the ability to converse in
Spanish would be even more important and necessary than
usual.46

During the years in Cincinnati, Cox had devoted
much of his spare time to writing. Atlanta and Ih§_§§£gh
£2_£hg_§ga: Franklin ang_Nashville were published by

Scribner's in 1882 as part of their "Campaigns of the Civil

 

45Charles G. Dawes, who had read law under Cox,
relayed the refusal to President McKinley. Dawes reported
the President to be "much disappointed." Dawes to Cox,
June 22, 1897.

46Cox to James Ford Rhodes, July 19, 1897, Cox
Papers, Library of Congress.

 

 

 

War series. Although Cox wrote mainly for ”the surviving

officers and men who served in the late war," he hoped that
general readers would also find the works valuable.47 He
meticuously documented his narratives, using the then
unpublished records in the office of the War Department.

Cox added to his raw materials by writing to those who had
taken part in a particular engagement and soliciting their
recollections.48 He frequently sent out portions of his
manuscript to these same people for review before submitting
it to the publisher. Despite his direct connection with the
events described, Cox displayed an even impartiality
throughout these books; this especially impressed one

reviewer who commended the .fairness of tone and gen-

eral accuracy of statement [which] characterize this valu-

able contribution to the history of the war. The favor-

able reception given these monographs helped establish Cox's
reputation as one of the leading authorities on the Civil

War.50

 

47Cox, Franklin and Nashville, "Preface."

48There are many letters in the Cox Papers dealing
with questions which arose while he was preparing a manu-
script; the majority, however, were written or received in
1880- 81.

49Unsigned review in The Nation, XXXV, No. 905
(November 2, 1882), 385- 86.

50That same year, however, Cox deviated from the
sound historical methodology demonstrated in these two books.
The Second Battle of Bull- Run, as Connected with the Fitz-
thn Porter Case triggered some-harsh comments. 553*
reviewer hit the nail squarely when he stated that Cox had
.approached his task more in the spirit of an advocate

 

51

In 1897 Thg_Battle 9: Franklin appeared. Cox
listed two reasons for writing this monograph: first, to
demonstrate the importance of the battle in the overall
perspective of Sherman's plans to cripple the Confederacy,
and second, to fulfill a promise to comrades who felt that
their role had not received proper emphasis. Although he
and several other authors had already described the battle
generally, Cox justified his work by observing that ”. . .we
can hardly place a limit to the desirability of detailed
knowledge. Everything which helps to a complete under-
standing is then made welcome. Even those things which at
first blush may seem trivial are not so if they aid us in
comprehending how men live, and act, and think, and fight,
and die, on such a stubbornly contested field.”52 Cox
contended that this battle smashed Hood's army and rendered
it incapable of achieving success against Thomas' combined
forces at Nashville.53 The action at Franklin was Cox's
most outstanding battle but his role does not dominate the

narrative. He placed the discussion of the controversy

 

than_of a judge." (The Nation, XXXIV, No. 880 LMay ll,
l882j, 404-405). The-same analyst pointed out that Cox had
used very shaky testimony to prove his contention that
General Porter deserved the punishment dealt out by the
army for failing to act vigorously at Second Bull Run on
August 29, 1862. Fortunately this work did not permanently
damage Cox's reputation as a military historian.

51(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897).
521bid., 1-2.
53Ibid., 194-97.

239

over his personal contribution at Franklin in separate
chapters; even in these, he used accepted methods of his-
torical inquiry to test and prove the soundness of his con-
clusions.54

Cox spent the last three years of his life writing
Military_§§miniscences gf_th§_§ixil_flgg, He promised to
donate his collection of books to Oberlin College in
exchange for a work room in their library. Here Cox
gathered his personal papers, the Official Records and many
reference works. In contrast to many memoirs that had
appeared without a single footnote, Cox constantly verified
his recollection of events with supporting evidence. These
two volumes recounted much more than just his career; Cox
wove his narrative into the broader picture of overall
strategy and events. The completed manuscript went to the
publishers only a few weeks before his death. William C.
Cochran, his stepson, reviewed the press proofs and pre-
pared a detailed index. The Reminiscences highlighted the
smooth and scholarly style that Cox had used throughout his
productive and successful literary career.55

In addition to the works cited Cox contributed 168
items to Thg_Nation. The vast majority were book reviews;

the remainder were obituaries of leading Civil War figures

 

54Ibid., Chapters XX-XXI.

55American Historical Review, VI (1901), 602-606,
contains a review of these volumes.

 

 

 

 

 

240
such as Grant, Sherman and Schofield.56 In an editorial,
published after his death, The Nation recalled its relation-
ship with Cox:

For a generation we have enjoyed him with an inti-
macy characterized by utter frankness and mutual
esteem through all vicissitudes of opinion; enlivened
by constant intercourse by letter, in connection with
that attached and cordial collaboration which has

lent so much weight to the reviews of this jour-
nal . . .
The editor also praised Cox's style and his impartiality:

He wrote with great fluency, seldom amending his
proofs, and maintained to the end the vigor of
thought and expression which marked his prime. His
fairness was remarkable for a nature so hearty as to
be almost fervid. If his judgement of Fitz-John
Porter seems unwarranted, or at least not that which
will finally prevail, his admiration for Grant was
unimpaired by his experience with him as a politician-
ridden President. 7

When one considers Cox's other duties during the period
encompassing his literary career, one cannot help but won-
der how he managed. The only answer can be his intense
intellectual curiosity, great industry, and a compelling
desire to lay his ideas before the reading public.

During the summer of 1900 Cox and his wife went East
to Magnolia, Massachusetts, to spend the hottest months at
the seashore. This was an annual trip, looked forward to
with anticipation because most of the family managed at

least a brief visit. They enjoyed sailing and Cox, despite

 

56These were unsigned reviews; thus it is fortunate
that the Cox Papers contain a bibliography of Cox's contri-
butions.

57The Nation, LXXI, No. 1832 (August 9, 1900), 108.

 

 

 

241
his advanced years, insisted on taking his turn as crewman.
On July 30, an especially warm, sultry day, the sea breezes

seemed more welcome than ever and the hours passed quickly

as the craft swept along. That evening Cox was exhausted

and he excused himself to rest. Checking a little later his

son, Jacob, discovered that he was unconscious. He had

suffered a massive heart attack. The end came quietly on

August 4, 1900.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Manuscript Collections

The largest collection of Jacob Dolson Cox Papers
is in the Oberlin College Library at Oberlin, Ohio. The
holding is made up of a wide variety of items: six boxes
of letters sent and received, two large letterbooks con-
taining copies of letters sent from 1852 to 1879, a "Civil
War Diary" dated April, 1864 to May, 1865, reprints of
several speeches, and newspaper clippings concerning Cox's
postwar political activities. Unfortunately the clippings
are neither identified nor dated. One box of letters is
devoted solely to Cox's correspondence relating to the
Battle of Franklin. The collection has not been indexed,
but it has been generally arranged in chronological order.
Oberlin College has attempted to complete its holding by
obtaining photo-copies of Cox letters in other manuscript
collections, most notably the Rutherford B. Hayes Papers.

The most striking and disappointing gap in the Cox
Papers is the absence of Civil War letters from Cox to his
family. This is explained by Allyn Cox, Cox's grandson, in
a letter to the author (April 4, 1967) stating that after

Cox's death, "Mrs. Jacob D. Cox cut up my grandfather‘s

242

 

 

 

 

 

243

letters, and distributed the fragments among all her chil-

V

dren.‘ Thus, the only references to these letters are

those included by Cox in his Military Reminiscences of the

 

The Cox Papers at Oberlin include a typewritten
manuscript, "The Political Correspondence of Major-General
Jacob D. Cox," edited by Cox‘s stepson, William C. Cochran.
These two volumes contain approximately 800 letters; the
editorial notations are particularly helpful in identifying
the correspondents and in placing the letters in their
historical context. There are also copies of this manu-
script at the Rutherford B. Hayes Memorial Library (Fremont,
Ohio), The Cincinnati Historical Society, The Ohio State
Library (Columbus), The Western Reserve Historical Society
(Cleveland), The Wisconsin Historical Society (Madison),
The University of North Carolina Library (Chapel Hillx and
the Library of Congress.

A short manuscript by Cochran, "Early Life and
Military Services of General Jacob Dolson Cox, A Patriotic
Address Delivered at Oberlin, Ohio, February 22, 1901,"
provides information about Cox's pre-Civil War career that
cannot be found elsewhere.

Other libraries have smaller collections of J. D.
Cox Papers. The Cincinnati Historical Society has eight
letters (all post-war) and twenty-two copies of speeches
and articles. Almost all of the speeches and articles can

also be found at Oberlin or in the periodicals in which

244
they were published originally. The West Virginia
University Library at Morgantown has thirty telegrams Cox
sent to Governor Francis H. Pierpont during his tour of
duty in West Virginia from 1861 to 1863. They are located
in the F. H. Pierpont Letters and Papers and deal with
routine military matters in the recruitment of soldiers and
the suppression of guerilla activities. The Cox Papers
in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, consist of
only sixteen items; thirteen of these are letters exchanged
between Cox and James Ford Rhodes in the 1890's discussing
military law and its application during the Civil War and
during Reconstruction.

The Kenyon Cox Papers at the Avery Library of
Columbia University contain about one hundred letters
exchanged between Cox and his son. But these were all
written after the war and, except for a few, do not deal
with either Cox's military or political career. The few
letters which do comment on political issues were included
by Cochran in his manuscript, "Political Correspondence.”

The James A. Garfield Papers, located in the Library
of Congress, contain numerous Cox letters. Most of these
were included in the manuscript by William Cochran cited
above. Cochran, however, had deleted portions of some
letters from the Civil War years; a comparison with the
originals revealed that he had removed all discussion of
military matters. Tbs Qi§£y_gf_g§mg§ A, Garfield, l§é§7l§li

(East Lansing: Michigan State University Pressz published

 

 

 

in 1967 by Professors Harry Brown and Frederick D. Williams
contains important references to Cox.

The Cox letters in the John M. Schofield Papers in
the Library of Congress have been placed in the Special
Correspondence Series, Box 39. Also of special interest is
Box 74 which contains Schofield's correspondence on the
Franklin and Nashville campaigns.

The Ulysses S. Grant and Andrew Johnson Papers in
the Library of Congress have very few items pertaining to
Cox. Those in the Grant collection are of a routine nature
dealing with Cox's brief service as Secretary of the
Interior. The items in the A. Johnson Papers are concerned
with Cox's views on Reconstruction and his interview with
the President on February 24, 1866.

The War Department's collection of reports, orders,
telegrams, field dispatches and correspondence from the
Civil war, located in the National Archives in Washington,
D.C., was used as the resource pool for the Official
Records. "Record Group 94: General Reports, 1861-1865,"
is divided into three categories: (1) ”Union Battle
Reports, 1861-1865,” (2) "Selections from the Records of
the 25 [Union] Army Corps," and (3) "Selections from the

Original Records of Geographical Military Commands, 1861-65.

It was used to determine that Cox's most important reports
and dispatches had been included in the Official Records.
Slight use was made of "Record Group 393, Department of

North Carolina." Fortunately there are numerous indexes to

 

ll

 

246

these documents.

Public Documents

An invaluable source for any student of the Civil
Official Rggords g£_thg_Union EEQ Confederate Armies, 70
volumes in 128 (washington: General Printing Office, 1880-
1901). In his Reminiscences Cox states that certain letters
and telegrams written during his tour of duty in West
Virginia had been omitted. A comparison of Cox's original
papers (which are located in the National Archives) with
the Official Records revealed, however, that the printed
source was not misleading. It appears that Cox was piqued
because not every document he considered relevant had been
included. There is an excellent general index to the
Official Records and each volume has its own index.

The Congressional 912292 46 volumes (Washington:
Congressional Globe Printing Company, 1833-1873) is the
official record of the United States Congress for the forty-
year period. It was used to trace the debate on the mili-
tary promotion controversy in 1862-1863, and to determine
congressional action on the McGarrahan Claim. While the
filgbg provided some insight on both subjects, the author
fOund that the special reports of both houses contained
better coverage.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Executive Documents,

 

247

No. 29, 37th Cong., 3d. Sess. (January 30, 1863), Serial
1149, included, in addition to committee decisions,
Stanton's correspondence with Congress on the military pro-
motion issue. For the MtGarrahan Claim the following were
used extensively: Senate Miscellaneous Documents, No. 85
(1878), 45th. Cong., 2d. Sess., Serial 1786; ng§g_Reports,
No. 24 (February, 1871), 4lst. Cong., 3d. Sess., Serial
1388; and H23§g_Reports, No. 951 (June, 1878), 45th Cong.,

2d. Sess., Serial 1826. Senate Miscellaneou§_Document No.

 

85 is particularly helpful because it contains much of
McGarrahan's correspondence pertaining to the claim over a
twenty year period. Most of these letters do not relate
directly to Cox's role in the case, but they reveal
McGarrahan's willingness to use almost any method to win a
favorable decision.

Cox's Reports 22.222 Secretary gf'thg_lnterior for
1869 and 1870 appear, respectively, in: Egggg Executive
Document, No. 1, pt. 3, 4lst. Cong., 2d. Sess., Serial
1414, and Hgg§§_Executive Document, No. 1, pt. 4, 4lst.

Cong., 3d. Sess., Serial 1449. These consist of brief

 

statements about the Interior Department's yearly activities

with emphasis on those programs Cox considered of special
significance. If one wishes more information on a partic-
ular office or bureau, it is a simple matter to refer to
the detailed report of the chief of that division.

The thg_Senate Journal for 1866 and 1867, and the

Ohio House Journal for 1867, were used to establish the

 

 

 

248
dates for legislative consideration of the Negro voting

rights issue during Cox's term as governor.

Monographs and Special Studies

George H. Porter, Oh 2 Politics During thg_£izil
W§£_Period, Columbia University Studies in History,
Economics and Public Law, Number 105 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1911), is an excellent study. It provides
a general background on Ohio's development before the Civil
War, as well as an inQdepth analysis of political issues.
Porter carries his narrative up to 1870 and his work on the
Negro suffrage question during Cox's governorship proved
very helpful.

Robert S. Fletcher, A_History,gf Oberlin College
Eggm_15§_Foundation Through thg_giyil_fla£, 2 volumes
(Oberlin: Oberlin College, 1943), is a definitive study.
Fletcher ably works Oberlin College into the broad back-
ground of Ohio's development in the three decades before
1860. His description of the community, as well as the
college, provides a good picture of the environment in which
Cox studied and shaped many of his pre-war opinions. John
B. Shotwell, A_History g§_£hg Schools gf_Cincinnati
(Cincinnati: The School Life Company, 1902), is a less
scholarly work, but his sketch of the Cincinnati Law School
is helpful in tracing the school's history.

William C. Cochran, "The Western Reserve and the

 

 

249

Fugitive Slave Law," Western Reserve Historical Socigty
Collections (Publication no. 101; Cleveland, 1920), was
used to determine the reaction of the Reserve to the
Fugitive Slave Law in the 1850's. The period encompassed
by this article included the years Cox spent at warren,
Ohio.

Two other politically oriented works--Joseph P.
Smith, History 91_Ehg Republican nggy_1g_gh1g, 2 volumes
(Chicago: Lewis Publishing Company, 1898), and William

Sketches g1 Senators and Representatives (Columbus: The XX

 

Century Publishing Co., l900)--have limited value. Each,
however, contains a few bits of information not uncovered
in other sources. ”Grant or Greeley? The Abolitionist

Dilemma in the Election of 1872,” American Historical

 

Review, LXXI, No. 1 (October, 1965), 43-61, by James M.
McPherson explains why Horace Greeley was an unacceptable
candidate to Cox and many other Liberal Republicans.

Thomas Weber, The Northern Railroads 1n_the Civil

 

Egg, 1861;1§§§_(New York: King's Crown Press--Columbia
University, 1952), and Festus P. Summers, 1hg_Baltimore EEQ
Ohio 1E_Eh§_§1y11_W§1_(New York. G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1939), stress the importance of railroads as a factor in
the Union's eventual victory. They both conclude that
Federal control over West Virginia reduced Rebel interfer-

ence with the vital Baltimore and Ohio.

Ella Lonn, Salt as a Factor in the Confederacy (New

 

 

 

York: walter Neale, 1933), to judge by its title, appears
to be a peripheral monograph. But such a conclusion is far
from true. Miss Lonn stresses that the shortage of common
salt made life increasingly miserable in the South. The
high quality salt wells located near Charleston, West
Virginia, gave added importance to the Kanawha Valley.

Jacob Dolson Cox wrote several books and articles on
the Civil War. His Military Reminiscences 21 1§£ §1311_@3£,
2 volumes (1900), Atlanta (1882), and Ehg_Maggh_£g_Ehg_§ggz
Franklin an§_Nashville (1882), and IE5 Battle 21 Franklin,

Tennessee, November 29, 1864 (1897), were used extensively

 

to trace his military career. All were published by Charles
Scribner's Sons of New York. These books are briefly
reviewed in Chapter VIII of the present work. There is, of
course, some danger in using a man's own writings while
evaluating his career; but if one is careful to check out
controversial points, the hazards can be minimized.
Actually Cox's description of his role is so muted that one
hardly would suspect that the General Cox referred to in
the text is also the author. The continued use of Cox's
books by modern authors also indicates that his general
description of military events is accurate.

Wag, edited by C. C. Buel and R. U. Johnson, 4 volumes (New
York: The Century Co., 1887-88), deal with the first two
years of the war. "War Preparations in the North," (1, pt.

1, 84-98), describes the utter lack of advance planning for

 

251
the conflict and the many make-shift arrangements used dur—
ing the first months of the war. "McClellan in West
Virginia," (1, pt. 1, 126-48), and "West Virginia Operations
under Fremont," (II, pt. 1, 278-81), provide a good descrip-
tion of the difficulties encountered in conducting military
Operations in the mountainous terrain. Cox also explained
the Antietam Campaign from the Union viewpoint in two
articles: "Forcing Fox's Gap and Turner‘s Gap," (II, pt.
2, 583-90), and "The Battle of Antietam," (11, pt. 2, 630-
80). These articles contain some very good comments on
McClellan's failure to achieve success against Lee.

Several studies were utilized to test the accuracy
and validity of Cox's writings and his conclusions. Thomas
Harry Williams, Hayg§_g£'gh§_Twenty-1h11g5 IEE.EEXE$.K§£
Volunteer Officer (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), con-.
tains only a few direct references to Cox. It is, nonethe-
less, an illuminating book. Williams' portrayal of the
difficulties encountered by the soldiers in West Virginia
reinforaa;Cox's complaints about the futility of military
operations in the region; but Williams reveals the real
importance of West Virginia to the Union, a fact which never
lodged firmly in Cox‘s mind.

Additional background material on the first two
years of the war was gathered from: Sanford G. Kellogg,
Egg Shenandoah Valley, 1821f1§§23 A_W§E_§Eudy_(New York:
Neale Publishing Co., 1903); Edward J. Stackpole, F122

Cedar Mbuntain 19_Antietam, August-September, 1862: Cedar

252
Mpuntain, Second Manassas, Chantilly, Harper's Ferry, South

 

Mountain, Antietam (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Co.,
1959); John Codman Ropes, IEE.é£EX.EE§E£.§QRE (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1881); and Francis W. Palfrey,
1hg_Antietam and Fredericksburg (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1882). The latter two are part of
Scribner's excellent series--Campaigns of the Civil War-~to
which Cox contributed two volumes.

Daniel H. Hill, who directed the Confederate
resistance at South Mountain (Fox's and Turner's Gaps),
wrote "The Battle of South Mountain," Battles and Leaders,
11, pt. 2, 559-81. Hill's account differs sharply from
Cox's on the question of which side held the advantage dur-
ing the engagement.

"The Colonel's Lady: Some Letters of Ellen Wilkins
Tompkins, July-December, 1861,” edited by Ellen Watkins
T0mpkins, 1h§_Virginia Magazine 91 History and Biography,
69 (October, 1961), 387—419, presents some interesting
impressions of Cox's treatment of ”hostile” civilians in
West Virginia. Mrs. Tompkins' husband, Colonel Christopher
G. Tompkins, was in the Confederate service but his family
and estate near Gauley Bridge came under Cox's control.
Mrs. Tompkins requested and received protection for her
family and property and she made her appreciation of Cox's
kind treatment very clear in these letters.

Also helpful was Ehg_W11g_L1fg_g£_£hg Aggy: Q1y11

War Letters 91_James A, Garfield, edited by Frederick D.

 

 

 

I

 

r—flfifli

253

Williams (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press,
1964). These letters span the period from the beginning of
the war to December, 1863. Some of them were to Cox and a
few to other correspondents contain comments on Cox. John
M. Schofield, F211y;§1§_1231§_12_1hg_égmy_(New York: The
Century Company, 1897), is a handy reference because Cox
and Schofield served together from February, 1864, to the
end of the war. Schofield's high regard for Cox as an
officer is readily apparent. Oliver Otis Howard,
Autobiography 21_Oliver 911g Howard, 2 volumes (New York:
The Baker and Taylor Co., 1907), and Inside Lincoln's
by David Donald (New York: Longmans, Green, 1954), include
some favorable, but brief, comments on Cox.

Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative 91_Military Operations
(Bloomington: Indiana State University Press, 1959), and
John Bell Hood, Advance ang_§etreat; Personal Experiences

13 the United States and Confederate States Armies

 

 

(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959), provide
valuable insights. Johnston's monograph explains why he
refused to meet Sherman in open battle during the Atlanta
Campaign, and poignantly reveals his desperate, but futile,
efforts to prevent the reunion between Sherman's and
Schofield's armies in North Carolina. Hood's book presents
his reasons for advancing upon Nashville, even after the

severe repulse at Franklin. But his account should be used

 

 

 

254
with caution because he blamed others for many of his own
shortcomings.

George B. McClellan, My_gwg_§12£y_(New York, 1886);
Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, edited by E. B. Long
(New York: Grossett and Dunlap, 1962); and William T.
University of Indiana Press, 1957), were useful in deter-
mining the reasons for decisions made by these important
generals. McClellan's defense of his inactivity after the
Battle of Antietam is brilliant, but many others have
rejected his conclusions, as did Lincoln by removing him
from command. General George 9122k, H1§ Autobiography,
edited by Martin F. Schmitt (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1946), only briefly mentions Cox, despite the fact
that Crook served under Cox in West Virginia until February,
1863.

Several special studies and monographs help to
sketch Cox's post-war activities. Jacob Dolson Coxl:111],
Building §2_American Industry: Ehg_§£21y_91_1hg Cleveland
Iw1§1_21111_Company §E§.£E§ Founder (Cleveland: Cleveland
Twist Drill Co., 1951), is the autobiography of Cox's son.
The first two chapters present a brief glimpse of family
life, hOuses, and the hustle and bustle connected with Cox's
various public offices and legal occupation.

James Rees Ewing, "Public Services of Jacob Dolson
Cox, Governor of Ohio and Secretary of the Interior,"

(Ph.D. Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1899), is a

 

 

very brief survey (31 pp.). It offers, however, informa-
tion on how Cox became president of the Toledo Railroad in
1873; none of Cox's own papers give any clue to the reasons
for his selection.

-Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing 1hg_Spoils: é_History 21
Egg Reform Mbvement, 1§géf1§§§_(Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1961), and Henry Adams, "The Civil Service
Reform," N211h_American Review, vol. 109, no. 225 (October,
1869), 443-75, discuss Cox's efforts toward civil service
reform. Both studies clearly indicate the frustrations
encountered by those interested in increasing the efficiency
of federal employees. Henry E. Fritz, Thg_Movement 123
Indian Assimilation, 1§égr1§gg_(Philadelphiaz University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), devotes one chapter to
"Grant's Peace Policy.” Fritz points out the desirability
of removing the office of Indian Agent from the sphere of
political patronage, but notes that such attempts greatly
angered the politicians. Each of these three sources helps
to explain why Cox got into hot water as Secretary of the
Interior.

Also useful were three articles by Cox dealing with
his brief stint as Secretary of the Interior. Although
these were written after he left office, Cox did not make
any startling revelations. "The Civil Service Reform,"
Ihg_N211h American Review, vol. 112, no. 230 (January, 1871L
81-113, deals with Cox's attempt to establish a limited

civil service program in the Interior Department and his

 

 

 

 

opposition to political assessments. The article, however,
cannot be labeled as a defensive presentation, rather it

was aimed at marshalling public support for the establish-
ment of personnel screening practices throughout the entire
federal government. In "The Indian Question," International
Review, VI (1879), 617-34, Cox defends Grant's efforts to
overhaul the Bureau of Indian Affairs. On the other hand,
Cox criticizes President Grant--"How Judge Hoar Ceased to
be Attorney-General,” 1hg_Atlantic Monthly, vol. 76, no. 454
(August, 1895), 162~73-—for his handling of the Santo
D0mingo annexation issue in 1870. Cox indicates that Hoar
was forced to resign because he opposed Grant's scheme, as
did Cox. But there is no evidence in this article, or
elsewhere, that Cox considered his opposition on this issue
a factor in his own departure from the cabinet.

James Ford Rhodes, Historical Essays (New York:

 

The Macmillan Co., 1909), 185-88, contains an essay summar~
izing Cox's post-war career, with special emphasis on his

efforts at political reform and his stature as an author.

General Works

(Columbus: Ohio State Archaeological and Historical
Society, 1944), is the best general history of Ohio for the
Civil War period. Roseboom's conclusions on political

events do not differ materially from those found in George

 

 

 

257
Porter's, 921p_Politics, cited in the previous section.
Some information was gleaned from Eugene RosebOOm and
Francis P. Weisenberger, A_History 91_Qp1pg revised edition
(Columbus: Ohio State Archaeological and Historical
Society, 1954); Emilius O. Randall and Daniel J. Ryan,
History g§_g§123 Tpg_g1§g.§pd_Progress pf_§p_American
SEEEEJ 4 volumes (New York: The Century History Company,
1912); and Charles B. Galbreath, History 9§_Qh1g, 5 volumes
(New York: The American Historical Society, Inc., 1925).
Several Ohio county and municipal histories were

also useful. Harriet Upton Taylor, é Twentieth Century

 

History 91_Trumbull County, Ohio: §_Narrative Account p1_

 

 

Its Historical Progress, Its People and Its Principle
Interests, 2 volumes (Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Co.,
1909); and History 91_Trumbu11 and Mahoning Counties, with

Illustrations and Biographical Sketches (Cleveland:

 

 

H. Z. Williams and Brother, 1882), provide facts about
Warren, Ohio, and the surrounding area. é_History 91.
Cincinnati, 9212) w1£§ Illustrations pad Biographical
Sketches, compiled by Henry A. and Mrs. Kate B. Ford
(Cleveland: W. W. Williams and Co., 1881); History 21
Cincinnati gpd_Hamilton County, 92125 IEEEE.E§§E.§E§ Present
(Cincinnati: 8. B. Nelson and Co., 1894); and History of
the §11y_pf_Toledo §p§_1223§ County, QE1p_(Toledo: Munsell
and Co., 1888), present information about Cox's post-war

cities of residence.

Charles H. Ambler, West Virginia: The Mountain

 

 

258
Spgpg_(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958), serves as a
general source on the development of the pro-Union movement
in western Virginia. Ambler's treatment of the military
aspect is very brief. W§§£_Virginia 1p_§§g_§1y11_ng
(Charleston: Education Foundation, Inc., 1963) is a collec-
tion of Civil war illustrations and photographs, accompanied
by brief historical descriptions. One section, "Preparing
for Battle on the Kanawha, June-July, 1861,” contains
illustrations of the Kanawha Valley, Charleston and Gauley
Bridge at the time of Cox's penetration into the area. Roy
Curry Watson, "The Newspaper Press and the Civil War in
West Virginia," (M.A. Thesis; Morgantown: West Virginia
University, 1940), deals with press coverage of military
and political events, and the relationship between corre-
spondents and the army. Clarice Lorene Bailes, "Jacob
Dolson Cox in West Virginia,” (M.A. Thesis; Morgantown:
West Virginia University, 1944), is rather disappointing.
Bailes did not carry her research beyond the Official
Records and Cox's Reminiscences, except for a few manuscript
items held by the West Virginia University Library. Both
theses have been published in ngp Virginia History, 6,
225-64, and 5-58, respectively.

Brief outlines of Cox's military career can be found
in Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, editors, Egg Dictionary
pf_American Biography, 20 volumes (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1930), IV, 476-78; Whitelaw Reid, 9212.12

the War: Her Generals and Soldiers, 2 volumes (Cincinnati:

 

 

 

259

Moore, Wilstach and Baldwin, 1868), I, 770; and Ezra J.
Warner, Generals 1p_§1pg; 11yg§_p£_ppg_gp1pp_Commanders
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964),
97-98. All of these indicate that Cox received his promo~
tion to Major General in 1862, overlooking the fact that
this was withdrawn and not officially confirmed until
December, 1864.
§1y11_W§19 edited by R. U. Johnson and C. C. Buel, 4 volumes
(New York: The Century Co., 1887-88). This is a collection
of articles, written by participants in the war, which were
published originally in the Century Magazine. They cover
virtually every aspect of the war; the editors underscore
controversial points and guide the reader to other appro-
priate articles. There is an index in the last volume.

Two works by James Ford Rhodes, History 21 1pg_g1y11
Wag (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1917), and Histopy pf_£§g

(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1900-1928), provide useful
information. Although some of the interpretations are out-
dated, Rhodes' scholarship is meticulous and his books often
contain data that cannot be found in briefer treatments.
Harry Hansen, 1hg_§1y11_W§1_(New York: Duell, Sloan and
Pearce, 1962),and Bruce Catton, EEE.é£EX“2£ £h§_Potomac:
M11_Lincoln's Aggy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co.,

Inc., l962),are useful as general sources. Both books

 

 

 

260
contain solid facts on military events and the authors'
analysis of leading personalities is especially helpful.
A more scholarly approach to military developments is used
by Allan Nevins in Egg Improvised WEE, l§§lfl§§29 and E13
Becomes Revolution, 1§§gf1§§§ (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1959, 1960). Mark Mayo Boatner III, 1pg_§1y11_flap
Dictionary (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1959),is a
handy reference for identifying officers, checking dates
and for brief descriptions of military battles and cam-
paigns.

Thomas B. Van Horne, History 2£.EEE.éEEZ.2§.EEE
Cumberland, 2 volumes (Cincinnati: Robert Clark and Co.,
1875), provides supplementary material on the Atlanta
Campaign and the Battles at Franklin and Nashville. Van
Horne defends Thomas' decision to delay his attack at
Nashville and gives major credit for the victory to the
Army of the Cumberland, slighting, in Cox's estimation, the
role played by the Army of the Ohio.

Lincoln gpd_ppg_W§£ Governors (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1948), by William B. Hesseltine, considers the impact
of Lincoln's relationship with Union governors on the war.
This monograph was used to ascertain Lincoln's attitude
toward the pro-Union movement in western Virginia.

Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton:

The Life and Times g1_Lincoln's Secretary p1_War (New York:

 

Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), provides insight into the operation

of the War Department and a description of Stanton's feud

 

 

261

with President Andrew Johnson. Stephen E. Ambrose, Halleck:
Lincoln's Qp1§1_91_§£§££ (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1962), has useful information on Halleck
and the command structure. ypy_ppg Npppp W p phg_§1y11_Wg£,
edited by David Donald (New York: Collier Books, 1966), a
collection of essays, contains one by T. Harry Williams,
"The Military Leadership of North and South,” 33-54, which
underscores the validity of Cox's criticisms of the command
structure.

A general work on the post-war period is Ellis
Paxson Oberholtzer, A History pf_ppg_United States since phg
§1y11_W§1, 5 volumes (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922).
Like the multi-volume Rhodes' work cited above, the inter-
pretations drawn from some of the events have been reversed
or tempered by more recent scholarship. William A. Dunning,

Reconstruction, Political and Economical, 1865-1877 (New

 

York: Harper and Row, 1907), devotes one chapter (12) to
the "Liberal Republican Movement, 1870-72.” Dunning agrees
that Greeley's nomination took the steam out of the attempt
at reform. James G. Randall and David Donald, 232.9121;
W§1_apd_Reconstruction (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1961),
is a widely-used textbook. The scholarship is excellent and
the book has an extensive bibliography which was used as a
general reference.

Assistance in analyzing briefly Cox's service as
Secretary of the Interior came from Allan Nevins, Hamilton

Fish: The Inner History pf the Grant Administration (New

 

York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1936), and William B. Hesseltine,
Ulysses S, §1§p£J Politician (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co.,
1935). These authors come to opposite conclusions about
Cox's resignation; Hesseltine says that Cox was in error
when he believed Grant was obstructing civil service reform
in the Interior Department, while Nevins states that the
attacks upon the Indian Bureau personnel policies were not

imagined. Reverend W. H. Brockway, Zachariah Chandler:

 

————-—————————_—_——

The Post and Tribune Co., 1880), reinforces Nevin's conclu-
sion by revealing Chandler's anger when Cox passed over
Chandler's choice for an Indian Agency in Michigan. ngpy
Letters, compiled by Harold Dean Cater (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1947), contains one letter to Cox. This letter
reveals that Adams considered Cox's efforts at civil service
reform in his department very important.

Three newspapers--the New York 21233: the New York
Tribune, and the washington Chronicle--were consulted to
determine the press's reaction to Cox as Secretary of the
Interior. The Chronicle has the most extensive coverage,
probably because it was published in the capital and was
directed at an audience whose interests were tied closely
to the operation of the government. The Chronicle, after
praising Cox at the outset, became increasingly critical,
especially with regard to the McGarrahan Claim. In contrast

the Times and Tribune are much more restrained in their

 

 

263
comments upon Cox's role in the case. It should be noted
that the New York Times Index is invaluable in helping to

locate specific articles.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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