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ABSTRACT

CHINA'S RESPONSE TO
THE OPEN DOOR, 1898-1906

By
Chung-tung Chang

The Chinese had never been able to form a consensus
in their attitude toward the United States. At the turn of
the century. their response to the U.S. policy of the open
door tended to be split. Some Chinese officials. like Li
Hung-Chang. were inclined to ignore the policy. Some others.
such as Liu K'un-i and Chang Chih—tung. would make use of it
so long as they thought it helpful in the preservation of
China's integrity. Fbr still others, the open door policy
and the American exclusion laws against the Chinese seemed
to be incompatible with each other. Besides. many reformers
and revolutionaries criticized John Hay's policy as hardly
better than the policy of partition.

One thing is sure. The open door policy was never
heartily welcome in China. This did not necessarily reflect
an anti-American attitude. In view of the fact that the
United States had never been so aggressive as the other

powers in dealing with China, the Chinese had no ground to

Chung-tung Chang
assume a more hostile attitude toward Americans. or toward
American policy. Nevertheless. the Chinese had other con-
siderations. They had to appraise the value of the open door
policy in their own terms.

Since China had been bitterly defeated in the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894 and had been victimized in the battle
of concessions thereafter, the most urgent problem for the
Chinese at the time was to save their country from complete
destruction. As a result. they sought changes in both
domestic and foreign affairs. On the domestic front. their
aspiration was reflected in the development of reform and
revolutionary movements.

In the field of foreign affairs. American Open door policy
appeared to provide for a way-out. China was threatened with
partition. Now the open door policy promised preservation
of China‘s territorial and administrative entity. Further-
more, the United States. unlike the other powers, had not
seized any of China's territory by force. Therefore. China
might rely on American help to save her from destruction.

So far as this purpose could be attained. the principle of
equal opportunity as a part of the open door policy was acceptable.

Nevertheless. the United States had neither the will
nor the power to defend China from further encroachments.
Those Chinese officials who tended to ignore the open door
policy could see this at very beginning. The others who

attempted to employ the policy to preserve China were

Chung-tung Chang
gradually disappointed. Consequently, many Chinese officials
became cool. or even intransigent. in their dealing with the
Americans. This can be traced in their reluctance to accept
the American demand for opening new treaty ports in
Manchuria and their insistance of cancelling the Canton-Hankow
railway concession.

From another point of view. the open door policy
could provide no basic change for China's foreign affairs at
all. China had for too long depended on using some
"barbarians" to manage other ”barbarians." To make use of
the Open door policy and to secure American help. even if
successful. was only a superficial change. It was still a
diplomacy of reliance on foreigners. China, according to
the advocates of a new and independent diplomacy, should no
longer rely on the foreign powers in handling her foreign
affairs. She could Open her door for foreign commerce on
the principle of equal opportunity. But this should be
done by herself according to the circumstances. not upon
demand by foreigners. She should preserve her territorial
and administrative entity. But this was also her own busi-
ness. no foreign power could do it instead. Thus. in the
name of self-reliance. the U.S. open door policy was criticized.

By 1906. the United States was about to expand the
Open door policy to include a demand for equal opportunity
for investment. as well as equal commercial opportunities.

The Chinese government. on its part, was adopting new

Chung-tung Chang
regulations regarding foreign economic interests. The
changes on both sides conflicted. Since China's sovereignty
over Manchuria was guaranteed after the Russo-Japanese War,
the old empire was released from the threat of partition.
the country was awakening, and the reformers and revolution-
aries were urging self-reliance and independent diplomacy.
the Ch'ing government became determined to regain economic
control. Therefore. the new regulations which the Ch'ing
government was introducing around 1906 were restrictive.
They were even detrimental to the old treaty privileges of
the United States. not to mention the new American demands

for investment opportunities.

CHINA'S RESPONSE TO
THE OPEN DOOR. 1898-1906

By
Chung-tung Chang

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1973

C] Copyright by
CHUNG-TUNG CHAN G

1973

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to
Dr. Warren I. Cohen, my major adviser, Dr. Madison Kuhn,
Dr. Paul a. Sweet, and Dr. Paul A. Varg, members of my
guidance committee. not only for their assistance and
suggestions in developing and completing this dissertation.
but also for their support and instructions throughout my
entire doctoral program.

I am also grateful to the U.S. Educational
Foundation in China. the American Council of Learned
Societies, the Asian Studies Center of Michigan State
University, and the National Science Council of Republic of
China. Without grants from any of these organizations. I
would not have been able to undertake and finish my graduate
study at Michigan State University.

Many other individuals, including my wife Jean,
contributed to the completion of this dissertation. I am

responsible for all shortcomings and errors in it.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . .
I. NO CONSENSUS . . . . . . . . .
II. CHINESE OPEN DOOR . . . . . .
III. AMERICAN CONCESSION LOST . . .
IV. A STUMBLING BLOCK . . . . . .

V. THE OPEN DOOR AS VIEWED IN AN
CHINA C O C C C O C U C O O O

EPILOGUE . C O O O O O 0 O O O
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . .

iii

AWAKENING

PAGE

17
#1

75
101

130

153
167

INTRODUCTION*

When E. H. Conger came to China in the Summer of 1898
to succeed Charles Denby as the American Minister in Peking.
China was on the verge of partition. Using the murder of
two missionaries as a pretext. Germany demanded and secured
the cession of the port of Kiaochow, thereby establishing its
control over the province of Shantung. Russia exacted lease-
holds at Port Arthur and Talienwan in consolidation of a grip
on Manchuria. Great Britain was further expanding its sphere
of influence throughout the Yangtze Valley and obtained a new
leasehold on the port of Weihaiwei. After seizing Kwangchow
Bay. France extended its interests in Kwangtung. Kwangsi. and
Yunnan. And. finally. Japan developed a sphere of influence
in the province of Fukien. Thus. China was crisscrossed by
agreements. leases. and other special concessions that tied
down portions of her territory to particular foreign powers.

*The story of the writing of the first Open Door notes
has been told many times. A summary of the story given here
has an introduction to the analysis of China' 3 response to
open door policy at the turn of the century is mainly based
upon the secondary works such as Charles S. Campbell. Jr..

S ecial Interests and the 0 en Door Polio (New Haven. Conn..

9 . A. W 1tney Criswo d. The ar Eastern Policy of the

United States (New York. 1938). Paul A. Varg. Open Door Diplomat.
The Life of w. W. Rockhill (Urbana. 111.. 1952) and The Maki_g

of a M tn.“Tfie United States and China 1802-1212 (East
Lansing. Mich.. 19585. and Marinn E. Young. The Rhetoric of

Empire: American China Poligyiyl895-1901 (Cambridge. Mass.. 1968).

2

These developments in China gained worldwide
attention and alarmed the Americans. The United States had
just extended her influence to the Philippines as a result
of the Spanish-American War. Conger suggested in late
August that the permanent ownership or possession of Manila
and vicinity would be most invaluable to the United States
in securing and holding her share of influence and trade
in China. In November. Conger had second thoughts. Manila
was not good enough. The situation in China was changing
rapidly. He urged that the United States put herself in a
position ”to own and control at least one good port (in
China) from which we can potently assert our rights and
effectively wield our influence.“ On March 1. 1899. in a
report on the Italian demand for a coaling station. Conger
argued once again that this was the moment for America to
choose and seize a base in China. He outlined the procedure
other powers had used to obtain their spheres of influence
and appealed for America to do the same.

American business groups had been interested in a
market in China. As China's door was being closed to them.
they were also concerned. A group of important cotton
textile exporters. railroad promoters. and mining entre-
preneurs who had organized the American Asiatic Association
forwarded a series of petitions to Washington urging
adoption of a more vigorous Far Eastern policy. The

National Association of Manufacturers in its annual meeting

3
of 1899 called for government support in expanding trade
throughout the Pacific. The New York Chamber of Commerce
complained in a memorial to President McKinley that the
Washington government seemed to be supine about the menace
to the important business interests of American citizens in
China.

By 1899. there were more than a thousand American
missionaries in China. Some of them. stirred by the anti-
missionary riots in China's interior in the late 1890's.
felt that if partition occurred the missionary movement
would benefit from the better government certain to be pro-
vided in areas run by Western powers. Many others. however.
thought in different terms. The well-known missionary
Gilbert Reid. for instance. published several articles in
the Spring of 1899 to stress the greatness of American
interests existing in China. He pointed out that the
United States had to deal with Russia. as well as China. in
Manchuria. with Germany in Shantung. with England in the
Yantze valley. and so on. and wondered why the Americans
were not more active in the old empire. Concluding one of
his articles. he urged the Washington government immediat-
ely to join Great Britain in support of the open door
policy.

The intellectual leaders in the United States also
turned to China. Brooks Adams saw the world polarized into
two opposing blocs-~Russia. and with her France and

Germany. against America and England. The battlefield for

L.

the inevitable struggle would be China. In a period of
increasing economic competition. "China is the only region
which now promises almost boundless possibilities of
absorption." If America would only ally herself with
Britain. the center of trade would remain safely in the
West. and human society "would be absolutely dominated by a
vast combination of peoples whose right wing would rest
upon the British Isles. whose left wing would overhang the
middle provinces of China. whose center would approach the
Pacific...." On the other hand. should France. Germany.
and Russia--the three land powers-~combine to occupy the
Chinese interior and then exclude American goods. the United
States would be forced to collectivize or die.

Charles Conant. a journalist. argued in a series of
articles between September 1898 and August 1900 that to find
investment fields abroad was essential to keep the economy
from stagnating. And the only significant field of
investment left in the world was China. He suggested that
the exclusive policy of France. Germany. and Russia. as
illustrated by their spheres of influence policy. must be
either stopped by force or imitated. In a country like
China. he stressed. investment opportunity depended on the
home government's vigor in pressing the claims of private
investers. This the United States must now do.

Similar arguments were provided by the others. In
1898 and 1899. journals and newspapers were full of dis-

cussions on China.

5

Incidentally. Great Britain was seeking help from
the United States. To maintain her advantageous position
in the Yangtze Valley and to guard against exclusion from
other parts of China. she attempted to interest the United
States in a cooperative effort to ensure equal trading
rights in leases or concessions acquired by other powers in
China. The British overture was turned down by President
McKinley on the ground that nothing in the situation in
China appeared to justify any departure from the United
States' well-founded policy of avoiding any ”interference
or connection with European complications. In the meantime.
Joseph Chamberlain made it clear that. while seeking an
Open door in China. Great Britain had no intention ”to give
anything like a guarantee of integrity and independence of
an empire which appeared to be decaying."

In late February 1899. Americans interested in
China welcomed Lord Charles Beresford as a spokesman for
the Open Door policy. Beresford was a representative of
the Associated Chambers of Commerce of England and had
recently made a tour in China and Japan. He criticized the
British policy and asked that America declare a new policy
for Asia that would go far beyond current British aims.
His program rested on two general proposals: that the
Spheres of influence pattern was strangling trade and must
be stopped and an Open Door policy substituted: that to
make the Open Door policy meaningful. China's integrity

must be preserved. For purpose of achieving the later.

6
Beresfbrd advanced. the United States must ally not only
with Britain. but with Germany and Japan. Americans
interested in China responded favorably to Beresford's pro-
gram. Nevertheless. as Beresford saw it. they hardly made
any practical effort beyond discussions.

The Washington government was still unwilling to
take action. John Hay had just assumed his post as
Secretary of State. While American Ambassador in London he
had favored a cordial response to British overtures for
cooperation. His attitude. however. was based on a desire
to strengthen Anglo-American relations rather than any great
interest in China. As a matter of fact. he had only a
superficial knowledge of conditions in the Far East. Not
until William W. Rockhill came back to the State Department
in May 1899 as his adviser on affairs in Eastern Asia. was
Hay ready to do something on China.

Rockhill was an old China hand. He had acquired
some knowledge of Chinese. Sanskrit. and Tibetan. In 188u.
he procured an appointment as Second Secretary of the
American Legation in Peking. The next year he was promoted
to First Secretary. After he resigned in 1888 because of
personal incompatibility with Minister Denby. he took two
famous journies of exploration through Mongolia and Tibet
respectively in 1888-1889 and 1891-1892. Then he came back
to work in the State Department as Chief Clerk. Assistant

Secretary. and Acting Secretary consecutively before he

7

was sent to Athens in 1897 as Minister to Greece. Roumania
and Servia. His wide experience in the Far East and in the
Department of State established his reputation as an expert
in China and earned him the friendship and admiration of
influential Republicans including Roosevelt. Hay andLodge.

Action was further hastened by the arrival of
Alfred H. Hippisley in Baltimore. Hippisley was a British
subject and a member of the Chinese Imperial Maritime
Customs Service since 1867. The Chinese customs service was
superintended by the British. a privilege ultimately
sanctioned by treaty of 1898 for as long as England's share
of China's foreign trade should exceed that of any other
nation. Nevertheless. it did not necessarily mean that the
individuals of the service always worked for the British
interest. Being involved in the service for decades. both
Hippisley and Sir Robert Hart. the Superintendent. prob-
ably were concerned about the impact of the scramble for
concessions on the operation of customs administration.

Hippisley's acquaintance with Rockhill dated from
the autumn of 1884 when the latter first joined the staff
of the American Legation in Peking. Their intimacy was
made the closer by Hippisley's marriage in the following
year with Miss Howard. a friend of long standing of Mrs.
Rockhill's. When Hippisley came to visit his wife's family
in Baltimore in June 1899. he was pleased to renew his

acquaintance with Rockhill. whom he had not seen for over

ten years.

Both friends had long experience in the Orient and
were deeply interested in the Far Eastern affairs. When
they could get together again. the topic of their con-
versations naturally fell on China. Since Hippisley came
fresh from the scene. Rockhill was anxious to have all the
data the Englishman could give him. Not long after their
reunion. Rockhill introduced Hippisley to Secretary Hay
and the latter was impressed with the views expressed by
both experts.

Then. at the beginning of August. when Hay left
Washington for vacation and Hippisley departed Baltimore on
a leisurely journey. Rockhill received a letter from his
British friend. It was Hippisley's opinion that spheres
of influence in China must be recognized as existing facts
and that the exclusive railroad and mining privileges of
the controlling powers must also be accepted. However. no
one of the powers had yet claimed the right to impose
differential tariffs on goods coming into its own sphere.
although such a claim might be only a matter of time.
Hippisley then ventured to suggest that the United States
lose no time in calling the attention of all the powers to
the changes now taking place in China and in expressing
"her determination not to sacrifice for her annually increas-
ing trade any of the rights or privileges she has secured

by treaty with China." To assure this end. Hippisley added.

9

the Washington government should obtain an assurance from
each European power that the Chinese treaty tariff should
without discrimination apply to all merchandise entering
its sphere of influence and that any treaty ports in them
should not be interfered with.

Rockhill went further in his reply to Hippisley.

He would like to see his government "make a declaration in
some form or other. which would be understood by China as

a pledge on our part to assist in maintaining the integrity
of the Empire.”

Nonetheless. Rockhill feared that home politics
and next year's election would interfere with the course
which he and Hippisley were conceiving. "for it might be
interpreted by a large part of the voting population of
the United States. especially the Irish and the German. as
an adoption of the policy advocated by England.” Hay had
similar worries. After reading Hippisley's recommendations
which Rockhill had passed to him. he wrote that "the
senseless prejudices in certain sections of the 'Senate
and people' compel us to move with great caution." Conse-
quently. the Washington government continued drifting along
for a while.

Hippisley did not give up hope. In the meantime.
two developments reinforced his analysis and led toward the
adoption of the policy he urged.

McKinley had appointed Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman.

President of Cornell University. to lead a commission to the

10
Philippines in a task to investigate and report on condi-
tions in the islands. Schurman had just returned to the
United States. In San Francisco he told the newsmen on
August 15 that the great question of the Orient was not
Formosa. nor the Philippines. but China. "Everywhere and
at all times...it was recognized that the future of China
was the one overshadowing question. China. it was agreed.
should maintain its independent position. but its doors
should be kept open. It means much to England and Japan
and not less to America.” McKinley had reposed great
trust in Schurman. Both Rockhill and Hippisley agreed
that Schurman's opinions would carry weight with the White
House.

On the same day that Schurman expressed his
opinions on China. the Czar issued an ukase declaring
Talienwan a free port. Hippisley wrote to Rockhill on
August 23: "This is most satisfactory. It gives a
natural opportunity for opening negotiations to settle
the conditions that are to hold in China for. at least.
the immediate future. and it seems to promise cooperation
on Russia's part in the direction we hope for. Let the
Admin. then act at once...." Accompanied with this letter.
there was a ”Memorandum on the 'Open Door' in China" drawn
up by Hippisley on August 17.

The Washington government was changing its position.
Rockhill wrote Hippisley on August 18 that he had received

”pretty clear assurances from the State Department that

11
it may take some action sooner than could be anticipated
from the position it held until within a few weeks...” On
August 2h. Rockhill received a letter from Hay-~then
escaping the Washington heat in New Hampshire. ”1 have
already received from the representatives of the powers
concerned.” Hay wrote ”assurances that the recent extension
of spheres of influence...wi11 not result in restricting
our commercial freedom in China. But I agree with you
that some more formal engagement of that sort would be
desirable. If you have time between now and next Wed. to
set down your views on this question in the form of a
draft instruction to Mr. Chalote. Mr. White. Mr. Tower and
Gen. Porter. I would be greatly obliged.” Rockhill was
elated. "My project of publishing our views on the policy
of the United States in China has been nipped in the bud.”
he wrote Hippisley on the twenty-eighth.

Rockhill's response to Hay's request. a memorandum
dated August 28. is the key document in the whole Open Door
exchange. On the basis of Hippisley's memorandum of
August 17. Rockhill suggested that the United States should
at once initiate negotiations to obtain from those powers
who had acquired spheres of influence in China formal
assurance on three points: (1) they would in no way inter-
fere with any treaty ports in such spheres or with the
interests in its (2) that all ports they might open in

their respective spheres should be either free ports. or

12
that the Chinese tariff at the time in force should apply
to all merchandise. and that the dues and duties provided
for by treaty should be collected by the Chinese government;
and (3) that they would levy no differential harbor dues on
vessels of other nationalities and that they would also
levy no discriminating railroad charges against citizens
of other nations. In short. the United States should in-
sist on absolute equality of treatment.

In addition. Rockhill's memorandum consisted of a
long critique of Beresford's recently published book.

The Break up of China. The American diplomat could not
agree to Beresford's low assessment of the strength and
efficiency of the Chinese government. He regarded the
Englishman's proposal to reform China's military by fereign
officers as the weakest part of his scheme.

Finally. Rockhill indicated that American interests
were not identical with those of Great Britain. It was
particularly important for obvious reasons of both domestic
and foreign policy. Rockhill stressed. that the United
States should take the initiative for negotiations. ”Such a
policy cannot be construed as favorable to any power in
particular. but is eminently useful and desirable for the
commerce of all nations. It furthermore has the advantage
of insuring to the United States the appreciation of
Chinese Government. who would see in it a strong desire to

arrest the disintegration of the Empire and would greatly

13
add to our prestige and influence in Peking."

Rockhill's memorandum received the approval of the
administration. and he was commissioned to draft the Open
Door notes. The notes were written from the memorandum on
September 5 and on the 6th dispatched to the American
representatives in England. Germany. and Russia. In
November. the identical ones were circulated to Japan,
Italy. and France.

For the time being. Rockhill put the question of
China's territorial integrity in the shadow. When he first
suggested this question in his letter to Hippisley at the
beginning of August. the Englishman made a reply that he
felt it too great an undertaking for so cautious an adminis-
tration as McKinley's. In late August. Hippisley wrote
that "steps taken to secure integrity of China are taken
not out of pure altruism but to maintain trade markets and
to avoid international conflicts." Yet unless China took a
determined stand on behalf of its own independence.
Hippisley did not believe many foreign powers would be will-
ing to bind themselves to the integrity idea. Rockhill
agreed that this aspect of the open door problem was too
large and complex to be dealt with at present. This ex-
plains why the question was referred to only ambiguously in
the note to London.

The replies to the open door notes were uniformly

evasive and noncommital. Great Britain agreed to the

1n

proposals only after the United States met her insistance
that Kowloon be excluded. Germany also agreed. but advised
that she did not think it would be wise to press the
powers for specific commitments. France accepted the
general proposal but carefully omitted any reference to
"spheres of influence." Italy and Japan made their
acceptance contingent upon the acceptance of all the
others. Russia finally accepted. but her reply was the
least satisfactory. From her declaration she specifically
excluded leased territories. stating that it was for China
to settle the question of custom duties in open ports and
that Russia would claim no special privileges for her own
subjects.

Both Hay and Rockhill were fairly satisfied with
what had been accomplished. On March 20. 1900. the
Secretary of State announced that he had received satis-
factory assurances from all the powers addressed. and that
he regarded each as ”final and definite." Rockhill wrote
Edwin Denby on January 13 that he convinced the acceptance
by the powers of the American proposals was due to America's
strong and central position in the Far East. "This country
holds the balance of power in China. I hope sincerely
that we may make good use of it. not only for our trade.
but for strengthening the Peking Government so that it can
find no means of escaping the performance of all its

obligations to the Treaty Powers. What we have obtained

15

will undoubtedly help to insure. for the time being. the
integrity of the Chinese Empire. but. on its side. China
can and must discharge its international obligations."

Some of American newspapers expressed their doubts.
The protectionist New York Press. for instance. feared the
consequences the open door note would have for the
Philippines. How could the United States now close the door
in the Philippines. which it should and must do. while demand-

ing that it remain open in China? The New Orleans Picayune

 

had similar worries with regard to Chinese immigration.
How could the United States. with any consistancy. shut the
door against unwanted Oriental migrants? The Springfield
Republican pointed to the vagueness of the replies America
had received: "The only assurance of an 'open door' still
rests upon our ability to keep it open by force."
Nevertheless. the favorable response was overwhelm-
ing. The New Xgrk Times enthusiastically declared that
Hay had succeeded "in repairing the huge blunder of his
predecessor" in rejecting the British open door overtures.
The Review of Reviews characterized his coup as "one of
the greatest achievements ever won by diplomacy." The
Philadelphia Press hailed the open door exchange as a
greater achievement than the Spanish-American War. The
Journal of Commerce called it "one of the most important

diplomatic negotiations of our time." The Independent

 

credited the administration with halting the partition of

China. The open door note had demonstrated. the editors

16
crowed. that the United States "had something to say as to
the future of Asia. and. if need comes. it will have some-
thing to do."
Then. what happened in China? What was China's

response to the open door policy? This will be the topic

of the following analysis.

CHAPTER I

NO CONSENSUS

For many years the Chinese have viewed the United
States with mixed feeling. This tradition was established
long before the end of the 19th century. For instance.
when Viceroy T'an T'ing—kéiang. of Chili was in charge of
negotiating treaty revisions with the powers in 1858. he
memorialized to the Emperor on one occasion that Americans.
"compared with the Russian barbarians. are trustworthy and
their speech rather reasonable but they are very suspicious
and obstinate." Two days later he changed his mind and
regarded the United States as in one category with England.

1 Some other

France and Russia in their insatiable greed.
Chinese officials. like Tseng Kuo-fang. had more illusions
about the United States. "Of all western barbarians....”
Tseng wrote in a memorial in 1861. "The Americans are of

pure-minded and honest disposition and long recognized as

 

l

T'an's memorials. Hsien-feng 8/h/l and 3 (May 13
and 15. 1858). Ch'ou Pan I Wu Shih M0 (The Management of
Barbarian Affairs of the Cfi'ing Dynasty from Beginning to
End. a collection of documents. cited hereafter as IWSM).
Hsien-feng (1851-1861) series. v. 22. pp. 1-2. 7. For an
English version. see Earl Swisher. China's Management of the
American Barbarians (New Haven. Conn.. 19537} pp. h5u:355.

1?

18
respectful and compliant toward China."2 There was no con-
sensus in China's attitude toward the United States. This
was exactly the case not only before but after Secretary
of State John Hay advocated an ”open door" policy due to
the explosive situations in China during the years of 1899
and 1900.

Not until the spring of 1900. did the United States
infbrm the Chinese government about the Open Door policy.
On March 22. though no power replied to the first open door
notes with a definite commitment. Hay instructed Conger to
impress upon the Tsungli Yamen at every opportunity that
the American government ”by the recent assurance which it
has obtained from the various great powers holding leased
territory or spheres of influence in China. concerning
freedom of trade in said spheres and the maintenance
therein of China's rights of sovereignty. has obtained
thereby renewed assurance of the policy of the Treaty Powers
not to interfere with the integrity of the Chinese Empire.”
On March 26. Hay enclosed in his instruction to Conger
duplicate copies of the correspondence which the American
government had with the governments of Great Britain.
France. Germany. Russia. Italy and Japan with respect to

the Open Door Notes.3 Conger in turn furnished the Chinese

 

2
Tseng's memorial. H10/11/25 (Jan. 1. 1861). IWSM.
Hsien—feng series. v.71. p.11; and Swisher. 22; cit.. p.691.

Hay to Conger. March 22 and March 26. 1900.
Instructions.

19

government one copy of the correspondence for its informa-
tion. But by May 21. Conger could only report to Hay that
the situation in China had become very serious because of
the Boxers and the Chinese government seemed to be too pre-
occupied to make any response to the correspondence.“

Though the government at Peking failed to make a
response to the first Open Door notes. the Chinese Minister
at Washington did not. As early as the first months of 1899.
a lot of people. both in the Great Britain and in the
United States. were already talking about the open door as
a panacea to the threatened partition of China.5 Probably
inspired by their discussions. the Chinese Minister Wu
T'ing-fang advised the annual meeting of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science on April 8. 1899
that "it has always been the policy of China to treat all
foreign nations alike. They are all most favored nations in
a literal sense. The maintenance of an 'Open Door' is
exactly in the line of her policy.” His topic for the
occasion was "China's Relation with the West." ”China." he
added. "welcomes to her shores the people of all nations.
Her ports are open to all. and she treats all alike without
distinction of race. nationality. or creed. Her people

trade with all foreigners."6 Time and again after Mr. Hay

 

l4

Conger to Hay. May 21. 1900.China Despatcheg.
5

Griswold. Op. cit.. p. #8: Young. op. cit.. pp. 109-110.
6

Wu T'ing-fang. "China's Relation with the West."

20
dispatched the first Open Door notes. Wu repeated this
trend to his American audience and stressed the vast
potentiality of China as a market for American goods. the
great opportunity in China for American investments. and the
possibility of a more friendly relationship between China
and the United States. Also. though he did not mention the
term ”China's integrity.” he suggested on one occasion
that the United States might do something for it by ex-
tension of the Monroe Doctrine to Asia. The United States.
he explained. had declared it would not allow the neighbor-
ing American continent to pass into the possession of any
foreign power. Now. as she took new possessions at the
Philippines. it was inadvisable for her to look with in-
difference upon any encroachment on the neighboring main-
land of Asia. especially the eastern portion. Wu's remarks
usually met with applause and Mr. George 0. Meiklejohn. who
was assisting Elihu Root in the conduct of the War Depart-
ment. even naively indicated that the United States should

support Wu as a candidate for the Chinese throne.7

 

— __ —_.

"Supplement” to American Academy of Political and Social
Science Annals. XIII—(189§). pp. l68¥l70.

7

After Hay dispatched the first Open Door notes. Wu
was successively invited to address the meeting of the In-
ternational Commercial Congress. the annual dinner of the
American Asiatic Association. the Silk Association banquet.
the dedication of the new law school of the University of
Pennsylvania and the sessions of National Association of
Manufacturers. See New York Times. Oct. 18. 1899. Jan. 26.
Feb. 22. April 26. July 10. 1900. Also Wu T'ing-fang.
"Mutual Helpfulness Between China and the United States.”
North American Review CLXXI (July. 1900). pp. 1-12-

21

Nevertheless. Wu appeared to be less enthusiastic
than his American audience. The Chinese had long been un-
happy with American restrictions on Chinese immigrants.
The Boxer uprising against foreigners was brewing. With
all this in mind. whenever Wu welcomed American friends
for China with open arms. he asked the United States tocmen
reciprocally her own door. When he talked about the ex-
tension of the Monroe Doctrine. he discounted the necessity
of American help by saying that he did not apprehend any
encroachment on China.8

Unfortunately. the Boxer uprising once again brought
in foreign attacks. The Boxers stirred up an armed
rebellion against foreigners in May. 1900. After tearing
down portions of the Tientsin-Peking railway. they entered
the capital. cut off telegraphic communication. murdered
the secretary of the Japanese legation and the German
minister. and besieged the foreign legations in the city.
For the purpose of lifting the siege. the foreign forces
bombarded the Taku forts on June 17. took Tientsin on July
13. and reached Peking on August 1h. Now. as the Chinese
government definitely needed help from the powers to restore
peace. how much did she count on the United States?

At first. when conflict broke out and the Court

was in the hands of reactionaries who stood behind the

22
Boxers. the more liberal provincial authorities in the
South resolutely kept disorder and war out of their juris-
diction. These people. Viceroy Chang Chih-tung at Wuchang.
Viceroy Liu K’un—i at Nanking and Director of Railways and
Telegraphs Sheng Hsuan-huai at Shanghai especially. had
9

long demanded suppresion of the Boxers. After Taku was
bombarded and the Court issued an edict on June 21 to
declare war against the foreigners. Chang and Liu agreed
immediately that the declaration of war should be ignored.
Viceroy Li Hung-Chang at Canton and Governor Yuan Shih-k'ai
of Shantung joined in. Li even regarded the war edict as
being issued without proper authorization from the Throne.10
0n the other hand. these viceroys ordered the local
officials in all of the cities and villages under their
control to post proclamations commanding peace and asking
Chinese people to acknowledge the foreign rights and to
protect lives and property of foreigners. This precaution

against trouble was so effective that John F. Goodnow.

American Consul-General in Shanghai. could wire to the

 

Chang to Tsungli Yamen and Jung Lu. K (Kuang-hsu)
26/5/u (May 31. 1900). and to Liu K'un—i. K26/5/18. Chang
Chih-tung. Chan Wen Hsian Kun Ch'uan Chi (Complete Works
of Chang Ch h-tung . v. 160. p.23 Sheng to Tsungli Yamen.
K26/5/9. Sheng Hsuan-huai. Yu Chai Ts'un Kao (Collected
Papers of Sheng Hsuan—huai). v. 21. p. 19; and Liu to Tsungli

Yamen. x26/5/19. Liu K'un-i. Liu Chun Ch'en Kun I Chi
(Works of Late Liu K'un-i). ”Tien Tsou." (Telegraphic

Memorials). v.2. p. 1.

10
Liu to Chang. K26/5/28 (June 2h. 1900) and K26/6/l.
Chang to Liu. K26/5/29. Chang. 22;,git.. v. 160. pp. 38-39:

23

Department of State that his reports from the missionaries
in the Yangtze valley were of "the most encouraging
character."11

In the meantime. the provincial authorities in the
South were making efforts to reach an understanding with
all the powers concerned. As early as June 18. the day
after the bombardment of Taku. Chang Chih-tung and Liu
K'un-i assured Lord Salisbury through the Chinese minister
in London that they were able to maintain order and to pro-
tect foreigners within their territories. They asked Great
Britain not to send any naval forces into the Yangtze River.
Otherwise. they warned. other powers would follow suit and
the Chinese people in the Yangtze valley would be highly
disturbed. Three days later. the two viceroys made an
appeal to the United States fbr the same purpose. But. in
addition to what they had urged upon Great Britain. they
even asked for American help in their negotiations with all
the other powers to reach a similar mutual understanding.
In view of the fact that the United States just stood by and
did not fire asingle shot during the bombardment of Taku.

Li to Sheng. K26/5/29. Sheng to Li. K26/5/30. Li Hung-Chang.
Li Wen Chung Hung Ch'uan Chi (Complete Works of Li Hung-
chang). ”Tien Kao.” (Telegrams). v.22. p. #0.

ll
Goodnow to Cridler. June 29. 1900. PRUS. 1900.
pp. 2h9-251.

2%

they believed she would surely do China some further favor.

In response to the requests of Yangtze viceroys.
Mr. Hay offered a seemingly encouraging assurance. As
long as the Yangtze Valley could be maintained in peace. he
told the Chinese minister at Washington. the United States
would send no military forces to the area. Besides. the
American government would communicate the correspondence in
this regard to her representatives at London. Paris. Berlin.
St. Petersburg. and Tokyo.13 This assurance came at the
time the Southern authorities were being forced to look for
a general and more definite agreement with the powers.

Such an agreement was necessary for several reasons.
First of all. the court had issued an edict on June 20.
ordering all provincial authorities to protect their
territories. and the southern viceroys had made use of it
as a pretext to reach mutual understanding with the powers
in keeping south China out of war.lu Now. if the viceroys
could not keep foreign forces from coming. or could not

prevent foreigners from taking obtrusive actions in their

12
Chang to Lo Feng—luh. K26/5/22 (June 18. 1900).
Chang to Liu. x26/5/22. Liu to Chang. K26/5/23. and Chang
to Wu T'ing-fang. K26/5/25. Chang. op. cit.. v. 160. pp. 15-
17. 22.

13
Hay's memorandum. June 22. Hay to Wu. June 22.
and Wu to Hay. June 23. 1900. FRUS. 1900. pp. 273-27U.

in
See note 12.

12

25
provinces. they might be in trouble with the court. Also.
they had to watch out for the reactionaries. Though the
viceroys spared no effort to ask the local inhabitants to
respect foreign rights. there were reactionary elements who
were always restless. or even reckless. within their juris-
diction. The Imperial Inspector Li Ping—heng of the Yangtze
Naval Forces. for instance. had already left for the
Kiangyin fort near Shanghai and declared that foreign
warships would be fired upon if they closed in. In addition.
he planned to mine the mouth of the Yangtze River. Both
Chang Chih—tung and Liu K'un-i were greatly disturbed and
made all the efforts to persuade him not to take impetuous
actions.15 On the other hand. some powers. Great Britain
especially. consistently threatened to take military action
along the Yangtze. Rumors were always present of British
war vessels moving along the River despite the appeal made
to Lord Salisbury not to dispatch naval forces. In Shanghai.
the British consul once offered help in a joint protection
of the manufacturing factory and arsenal. This offer was
turned down by Viceroy Liu. because he hated to see import-
ant military installations falling into foreigner's hands.
Then. with the fighting in the north escalating. it was

reported that the British troops had suffered heavy

 

15
Sheng to Liu and Chang. x26/5/26 (June 22. 1900).
Liu to Sheng. K26/5/27. Sheng. o . 235.. v. 36. pp. 3-h: Liu
to Chang. K26/5/28. Chang to Li P ng-heng. K26/5/29. Chang.
pp;_plp.. v. 160. p. 39.

26
casualties near Tientsin and the British commander had

16 Under all these

asked all powers to send reinforcements.
pressures. the southern authorities learned of Mr. Hay's
assurances. Most probably. this indication of American
good will reinforcedtheir decision to negotiate with all
the foreign consuls in Shanghai for a general agreement.

On June 26. Sheng Hsflan-huai and Shanghai Taotai Yu
Lien-yuan met with the foreign consuls. including American
consul Goodnow. and presented to them a draft agreement
which had been formulated with instructions from Chang
Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i. The draft agreement consisted
of nine articles. Except for the ones concerning the
assurance which had been given by Chang and Liu to maintain
order and to protect foreigners in their provinces. most
of them were designed to restrain the foreigners. The
foreign settlements at Shanghai should be jointly protected
by the powers. The measure for the joint protection should
be carried out in a quiet and discreet way. Foreign ships
of war now at the different ports along the Yangtze could
remain as heretofore. but they were not to land marines or

sailors. Should any foreign power without the consent of

the viceroys despatch more ships of war up the Yangtze and

16
Liu to Chang and others. K26/5/23 (June 19. 1900).
Liu to Chang. K26/S/24. and Liu to Yu Lien-yuan. K26/5/28.
Liu. pp; 213.. "Tien Hsin." (Telegrams). v. 1. pp. 16-17.
19-20: Liu to Chang. K26/5/23. Chang to Liu. K26/5/28.
Chang. pp; cit.. v.160. pp. 18. 33-3h; and Sheng to Li. Liu
and Chang. i26/5/28. Sheng. pp; 213.. v. 36. p. 5.

27
thus rouse the suspicion of the natives and create a dis-
turbance. resulting in the loss of lives and property of
foreign merchants and missionaries. China would not be
liable. Foreign ships of war should not approach. anchor.
or carry on drills near the forts at Wusung and on the
Yangtze. so as to prevent misunderstanding or accident.
Foreign powers were asked not to allow their ships of war
to patrol the waters in the vicinity of the Shanghai
Arsenal. or to anchor near thereto. or to send troops or
police to that place. Missionaries and foreigners should
not venture into places in the interior. where means of
protection were not established. thus exposing them to

17 It is clear that the southern author-

possible dangers.
ities needed more definite assurance from the powers to
relieve them from all of the worries.
Nevertheless. the foreign consuls could not accept
this draft agreement. They raised objection especially to
the article which spared the viceroys the responsibility
for the disturbances which might be occasioned by the
entrance of foreign warships into the Yangtze. As a result
of the meeting. these consuls sent back next day a joint
memorandum which declared the limited purpose of the powers

to fight only against the Boxers and those who strove to

prevent rescue of foreigners in danger in the north. As

17
Ibid.: and Sheng to Chang. K26/6/l. Chang. op;
cit.. v. 161. pp. 1-3. For English version of the draft
agreement. see Chester C. Tan. The Boxer Catastrophe
(New York. 1955). p. 81. ——

28
far as the Yangtze valley was concerned. it affirmed that
the powers had no intention to take any action or to land
the force so long as the viceroys were able to maintain the
treaty rights of foreigners.18 There was no definite
assurance. Nothing was specifically mentioned in the joint
memorandum about the foreign warships along the Yangtze
which so haunted the southern authorities.

Immediately after Sheng and Taotai Yu presented to
the foreign consuls a draft agreement and the consulate
group sent in return the joint memorandum of June 27. it
became known that German minister Baron von Ketteler had
been murdered in Peking. The southern viceroys were
greatly upset by the report. In addition to promising to
protect foreigners and to maintain order in their provinces.
these viceroys had agreed that the Chinese ministers abroad
should stay at their posts as long as possible and the
foreign ministers at Peking should be free from assault.
Then. they believed. China could still maintain diplomatic
relations with the powers and negotiation could be arranged
in the future to settle the problems left by the Boxer up-
rising.19 With the murder of German minister. the whole

project to keep the door for peace open was being broken

 

18
Goodnow to Cridler. June 29. 1900. FRUS. 1900.
pp 0 249-250 0

19
Liu to Chang. K26/6/2 (June 28. 1900). Chang to
Liu. Sheng. and Yu. K26/6/2. and Chang to Chinese ministers
abroad. K26/6/h. Chang. 22; 215.. v. 161. p. a. Sheng to Li.
K26/6/3 and K26/6/h. Li to Sheng. K26/6/h. Li. 22; gi5..
"Tien Kao.” v. 23. pp. #-6.

29

down. In order to save the situation. Liu K'un-i wired
Princes Ch'ing and Tuan at Peking urging them to do all
possible to protect the ministers. Chang suggested they
send consolatory letters to all foreign consuls at Shanghai.
with emphasis on a decree of June 25 in which the court had
guaranteed the protection of Peking legations. Then the
two viceroys jointly instructed Chinese ministers abroad.
Wu at Washington included. to reassure the powers that
regardless of what might happen in the north. they would
continue to give all protection to the lives and property
of foreigners. In return. the powers were asked to keep
their promise not to send forces to the Yangtze. Des-
perately. Viceroy Liu even urged President McKinley to take
a leading part in pushing aside selfish schemes.2o

Secretary Hay learned of the murder of Ketteler on
July 1.21 Faced with this explosive report. the unknown
fate of the rest of the ministers in Peking. and the
appeals from the southern Chinese viceroys. he decided to
dispatch no additional troops to China. With the approval

of McKinley. he sent another circular to the powers on

20
Liu to Princes Ch'ing and Tuan. K26/6/3 (June 29.
1900). Liu. 0 . cit.. "Tien Hsin." v. 1. p. 23: Chang to Liu.
Sheng and Yi . K5676/6. Chang. 22;,git.. v. 161. pp. 9-10:
Wu to Hay. July 3. 1900. FRUS. 1900, pp. 276-277: and Goodnow
to Hay. July 1 and July 3. 1900. Consular Dispatches. Shanghai.

21
Goodnow to Hay. July 1. 1900. ibid.

30

July 3 to define American policy. This second Open Door
note set forth the purpose of the United States "to act
concurrently with the other powers" in restoring order and
protecting American lives. American property and all
legitimate American interests in China. In its concluding
sentence. it stressed that "the policy of the Government
of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring
about permanent safety and peace to China. preserve Chinese
territorial and administrative entity. protect all rights
guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international
law. and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and
impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."22
Compared with the first Open Door note. this second cir-
cular contained more emphasis on China's integrity. It
did not include reference to "the spheres of influence.”
Apparently. nothing could have been more desirable for all
Chinese at that particular time than this American policy.
But how much the policy would be realized and how much it
would be favored in China. remained to be seen.

The value. or lack of value. of American policy for
China's diplomacy during the Boxer catastrophe should be
more closely examined in China's efforts to restore peace
for the whole country. On the day following the Taku
incident. Li Hung-Chang. the leading statesman of China

22
FRUS. 1901. app. I. p. 120

31
for thirty years and the incumbent Viceroy at Canton. was
summoned by the Imperial Court to go up the north to save
the whole situation. Then. suggestions were made from all
sides to look for a proper nation as the prime mediator.
Chang Chih—tung had wired Chinese minister Li Sheng-toh at
Tokyo to explore the possibility of Japan's mediation.
Japan. Chang hypothesized.shou1d be unhappy to see China
destroyed by the European powers because of her close
relations with the old Empire in terms of race and geo-
graphy. Besides. Japan had sent more troops than any of
the other powers to attack Taku. If she was willing to
stop fighting. the other powers would come along. Similar
suggestions were made to Li by many other officials. Next
to Japan. Great Britain was also taken into account.
Russia was the most crafty. Viceroy Hsu Ying-kuei of
Fukien explained. only Great Britain could manage her. If
the London government promised to mediate. at least Japan
and the United States would give in. Having had a confer-
ence with Count Witte. Russia's Minister of Finance.
Chinese minister Yang Ju in St. Petersburg thought in a
quite different way. He reported to Li that the Russian
statesman was very friendly to China and had a great res-
pect for Li. The Russians. Young argued. suffered heavy
casualties at the Taku forts. If they agreed to negotiate.
the other powers should have no objection. In concluding

his telegram. Yang even stressed that. for the time being.

32
there was no better way for settlement than cooperating
with Russia.23 So. as in days of old. all the barbarian
experts were talking about making use of one power to
manage the other powers. More significantly. the United
States. like France and Germany. was not highly regarded by
Chinese officials as a possible mediator at this stage.

Li Hung-chang himself took a little more ambiguous
position at first on what role the United States might play.
When he was planning to go to the north as the court
ordered. the Japanese government fOr an unknown reason made
a suggestion that he should take the trip ”in a foreign
man-of-war. not in a Russian. British. or Japanese ship.
but in a German ship.“ Nevertheless. he told Commander
T.C. McLean of the U.S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station that
he could not trust any other but preferred an American man-
of-war. Shortly after. he changed his mind and cancelled
the arrangement to go north in The Brooklyn. the flagship
of Rear-Admiral George C. Remey. by reason of a new edict
from the Emperor commanding him to remain in Canton and to

24

maintain order there. As a matter of fact. there was no

such edict and the Emperor would constantly order him to

repair to Pekirg as soon as possible. Later when he decided

23
Chang to Li Sheng-toh. K26/5/23 (June 19. 1900).
Chang.‘gpi cit.. v. 160. p. 19: Hsii to Li. k26/5/26 and
Yang to Lh.—K§6/5/28. Li.‘22;,git.. "Tien Kao." v. 22.
PP- 320 3 o

24
Remey to Long. June 26. Li to Remey. June 28.

33

to leave for the north in mid-July. against the American
consul's advice to stay in order to preserve peace and pro-
tect foreigners. he sailed on a Chinese steamship instead
of any foreign man-of-war.25

Several reasons may be provided for explaining why
Li changed his mind abruptly. He might have lost his con-
fidence. if any. in the United States. He might have found
it stupid to agitate the other powers by sailing on an
American warship. It may also be justifiable to say that
he decided not to go in an American ship not because he
changed his attitude toward the United States. but because
he was not sure how much he could do in view of the bad
situation in the north.26 Nonetheless. while exploring the
prospects for success of his mission and the willingness of
the powers for peace negotiation. Li showed more ambiguity.
On June 21. July 12 and July 16. three times. Li sent tele-
grams to instruct Chinese ministers abroad to find out the
positions which the powers were taking. It should be noted
that Minister Wu at Washington was not even once on the list

of the receivers.27 But in a separate instruction despatched

 

McLean to Hay. June 28. 1900. McKinley Papers.

25
McWade to Hill. July 17 and 18. 1900. McKinley

Papers.

26
Indeed. Li made such an expression to Commander
McLean. McLean to Hay. June 28. 1900. McKinley Papers.

27
Li to Chinese ministers abroad. K26/5/25 (June
21. 1900). K26/6/l6 and K26/6/20. Li. gpg‘g;§.. ”Tien Kao.”
V. 22, p0 28. Va 23. pp. 30. 430

34
at the time when he left Canton for Shanghai. Li asked Wu
to consult the American government "as to the possibility
of obtaining from the treaty powers either a guaranty of
the territorial integrity of China or a self-denying
ordinance in any action circumstances may call on them to
take in the present disturbed state of the country.”
Thus. Li appeared to ignore the United States on the one
hand. On the other hand. he seemed to hope that something
valuable for China could be produced from Mr. Hay's second
Open Door note.

Among all of the Chinese officials who had a voice
in diplomacy at that time. Viceroy Liu K'un-i counted more
definitely on the United States. In spite of the recent
American acquisition of the Philippines. he esteemed the
United States as the only nation whose history indicated
that it could be depended upon not to grab territory. No
matter what had really happened or how the powers had
responded to Kay's circular notes. he believed that the
United States had led them to an agreement to keep the door
to China open for equal trade. Finally. he was heartened
as the American government asked the powers to agree to
preserving the integrity of China.29 It has been noticed

that he had worked with other southern authorities to seek

 

28
Wu to Hay and Hay to Wu. July 18. 1900. FRUS.
1900. p0 2790

29
Goodnow to Hay. July 8. 1900. and Goodnow to
Cridler. July 21. 1900. Consular Despatches. Shanghai.

35

American help in their efforts to keep the south out of war.
In June and July. 1900. as many people ignored the United
States in their suggestions of possible mediators and Li
Hung-Chang took an ambiguous view of American role. Viceroy
Liu was making close contacts with American consul Goodnow
in Shanghai and sparing no effort to look for American
mediation.30

On the same day. incidentally. when John Hay asked
the powers to respect and preserve China's integrity. the
Chinese Emperor adopted some suggestions and sent letters to
the Imperial Courts of Great Britain. Russia and Japan for
the purpose of seeking their mediation. With no encouraging
response from any of these powers and the fall of Tientsin
on July 13. Liu and Chang Chih-tung urged in a joint memorial
that the court should treat the United States. as well as
Germany and France. on a basis of equality with the other
three powers. As a result. the Emperor wrote President
McKinley a letter on July 19. 1900 to place special reliance
on the United States for settling the difficulty. He asked
the President to devise the measures and to take the in-
itiative in bringing about a concert of the powers for

l

restoration of order and peace in China.3 After Li

Hung-Chang arrived at Shanghai on July 21. Liu

 

Ibid.

31
FRUS. 1900. pp. 293-294.

 

36

cabled him twice on the necessity and possibility of
American mediation. The American government. Liu explained
on a new ground. was very happy to learn about the safety
of the American minister in the besieged Peking. Respond-
ing to the request of the Chinese Emperor. the American
President made a reply which was the modest in tone in com-
parison with the others. Therefore. it was reasonable to
assume that the United States would do no more harm to
China and she could be counted on to mediate for a peace
settlement.32

As Liu pushed Li. the allied forces were proceeding
to Peking. Under the circumstances. Li did try to obtain
special help from the United States. On July 2“. when
Goodnow came to call on him under Hayfs instruction to
ascertain his purpose. he told the American consul that
the Boxers and rebellious troops could be stopped by the
Chinese government. that the fereign ministers were safe.
and that he was attempting to persuade throne to send them
from Peking to Tientsin. He asked Goodnow: if the
ministers were escorted to Tientsin safely. was it possible
that the military action of the powers could be suspended
and then negotiations could be arranged? A week later. Li

dictated the following question to Goodnow: "If free

32
Liu to Li. K26/6/26 (July 22. 1900). and Liu to
Li and others. K26/7/l. Li. gp;,gi§.. ”Tien Kao." v. 2“.
pp. 50’519 V. 2“. p. 20

37

communication is established between ministers and their
Governments. will America arrange that allies will not ad-
vance on Peking pending negotiations?" In addition. Li said
that he would have nothing more to say if the answer was un-
favorable.33

From Li's instructions to Ninister Wu. the Emperor's
letter to McKinley and Li's conversations with Goodnow at
Shanghai. it is clear that China at this time wanted an
American initiative which would lead to an international
agreement helpful for her to get rid of the disaster caused
by the Boxer uprising. Nevertheless. the replies made by
the United States were hardly encouraging. The American
government confirmed that she favored the territorial and ad-
ministrative integrity of China. and she believed all other
powers entertained similar views. But this confirmation was
scarcely an indication that the powers had agreed to the
American position. President McKinley wrote the Emperor
that the American government would place its good offices.
"with the assent of the other powers." at his disposition for
an amicable settlement of all the questions arising out of
the recent troubles. In other words. without the

assent of the other powers. American good

 

33
Hay to Goodnow. July 23: Goodnow to Hay. July 2h:
Hay to Goodnow. August 1: and Goodnow to Cridler. August 2.
1900. FRUS. 1900. pp. 260-263.

38

offices would be in question. In response to Li's proposi-
tion to accept some conditions by China in exchange for an
American initiative to arrange a truce. Mr. Hay insisted
that free communication with foreign ministers besieged at
Peking was not a negotiable condition. It was demanded
rather as a matter of absolute right. The American govern-
ment would not enter into any arrangement with the other
powers until it materialized.3h In short. explicitly or
implicitly. these American replies contained nothing
definite for American initiation of the peace settlement
which China was so anxiously seeking. By the end of July.
Li concluded that American mediation had been empty talk.
not yet put into action. When Goodnow gave him Hay's
message refusing his conditions. Li gave no further indica-
tion of his intentions.35

Thereafter. as urged by Li and other provincial
authorities. the court allowed all the foreign ministers
free communication with their respective governments in
cipher and Mr. Conger consequently had no trouble reporting
his situation back to Washington. Also. the court would

have appointed high officials together with reliable troops

3h
Hay to Wu. July 18; Hay to Wu. July 23: Hay to
Goodnow. July 30: and Goodnow to Cridler. Aug. 2. 1900.
FRUS' 1900, pp. 260-263. 279. 2914’.

35
Li to Cho. x26/7/5 (July 30. 1900). Li. 92; £13..

”Tien Kao.” Zh/llx and Goodnow to Cridler. Aug. 2. 1900
FRUS. 1900. p. 263.

39

to escort the ministers from Peking to Tientsin. if it had
been asked.36 However. Li Hung-Chang did not ask for
American mediation in return. On August lb. Peking fell
with the Emperor and the Empress Dowager fleeing to the
West. On August 25. Russia proposed in a circular note
general military withdrawal from Peking on the grounds

that the basic aim of the allied expedition to lift the
siege had been achieved and the continuous foreign occupa-
tion of Peking would do nothing more useful but delay the
return of the Chinese government and thus obstruct an

early peace negotiation.37 This Russian proposal became
known to Li at the end of August and he saw in it a turning
point of the Boxer crisis. Therefore. he turned more away
from the United States. When W. W. Rockhill arrived at
Shanghai in early September and came to call on him. he
only asked the newly appointed American commissioner if the
United States would do likewise if the other powers follow
the example of the Russians and withdrew their forces to
Tientsin. Even worse. he appeared so rough and impolite
that Rockhill had to stop the conversation in the second

interview.38

 

36
Wu to Hay. Aug. 1 and 3. Wu's memorandums. Aug. u
and 8. Adee to Wu. Aug. 8. 1900. FRUS. 1900. pp. 282-28“.

37
Li to Liu and Chang. K26/8/6 (Aug. 30. 1900). Li.
23; 23120. ”Tien K30.” 25/150

38
Rockhill to Hay. Sept. 6. 1900. Hay Papers.

40

So ended a major attempt by China to make use of the
United States to manage the other powers. For a time. as
China was encroached upon once again by the foreigners as a
result of the Boxer uprising and as the United States ex-
pounded a policy to keep equal trade in China and to pre-
serve the China's integrity. these two countries might have
established closer relations with each other.

But the chance was not great. The American minister
was besieged with other foreign ministers in Peking. The
American troops were fighting along with those of other
powers in order to secure their safety. 80 long as this
goal could not be reached. the Washington government would
not extend the help which China needed. an initiation of a
peace settlement.

On the other hand. the Chinese were split among them-
selves in their attitudes toward the United States. Some
officials. such as Liu K'un—i. had confidence in the United
States open door policy. and were enthusiastic in seeking
for American help. The others. however. were different.

For instance. Li Hung-Chang never relied much on the United
States. He made most of his efforts to look for help from
other powers. After he learned that Russia had proposed
general military withdrawal from Peking. he even became
harsh in his dealing with the newly arrived American com-

missioner.

CHAPTER II
CHINESE OPEN DOOR

In Peking in the fall of 1900 as the envoys of the
powers negotiated the final peace settlement after the
Boxer uprising. Russia began to make her attempt at closing
Manchuria by separate arrangement with China. A crisis thus
followed and could not be concluded until the Russo~
Japanese war. The history of this crisis reveals that the
Chinese would accept the open door policy only as they
thought it helpful in retaining China's control over
Manchuria.

Russia had dispatched troops to occupy the whole
territories of Manchuria under pretext of protecting her
railroads attacked by the Boxers. Now she indicated that
she was willing to return the area to China. but it was
necessary for her to leave part of the troops for protection

of the railways.1 In November. 1900. the Russian General

 

l

Yang to Li. K26/9/1 (Oct. 23, 1900), Yang.Ju. ed..
Chung_0figui Shang Chiao Shou Tung San Shepngien Pao Hui Chao
(A Collection of Telegrams concerning the Sino-Russian
Negotiations on the Restoration of the Three Eastern Provinces.
reprint. Peking. 1935). pp. 1-2.

#1

#2
Governor Admiral Alexeieff coerced Tartar General Tseng-chi
to sign an agreement with regard to the Russian evacuation
of Fengtien. the southernmost of the three provinces in
Manchuria. The Tseng-Alexeieff Agreement. if ratified.
would have resulted in Chinese demobilization in the
province. temporary protection of the railways by Russian
troops. and the appointment of a Russian Resident in
Mukden. the provincial capital. to oversee all the import-
ant measures adopted by the Tartar General.2 China's
administrative integrity in the province thus would have
been destroyed with her own consent.

On the Chinese side. Li Hung-Chang played a major
role in the Manchurian crisis. He and Prince Ch'ing had
been appointed as the plenipotentiaries in charge of the
joint peace negotiations. Nevertheless. he apparently
preferred to reach secret agreement with Russia first.

The Russian initiative to withdraw her troops from Peking
to Tientsin was a bait. Li was led not only to give up
his efforts in seeking for American mediation, but to
conclude that all of the other powers were unreliable.3

Besides. the Russian government offered protection for

 

2

Wang Yen-wei and Wang Liang. eds.. Ch'ing Chi Wai
Chiao Shih Liao (Historical Materials on Foreign Relations
in the Latter Part of the Ch'ing Dynas . reprint. Taipei.
1964. hereafter cited as WCSL). Vol. 1h . pp. 16-18.

3

Memorial. K26/8/9 (Sept. 2. 1900). Li Hung-Chang.
Li Wen Chung7Kun Ch'uan Chi (Complete Works of Li Hung-
chang. reprint. Tapei. l9 2 . "Tien Kao" (Telegrams). v.25.
p. 27.

43

Li's trip from Shanghai to Tientsin. The Russian minister
in Peking. in Li's words. was doing his best to reduce the
demands on China after the diplomatic corps began to pre-
pare the protocol for final settlement.“ Anyhow. Li be-
lieved in the professed goodwill of Russia and was anxious
to sign a separate agreement with Russia before the con-
clusion of the joint peace treaty.5

Li learned of the existence of the Tseng-
Alexeieff Agreement before it became known to the outside
world at the beginning of January. 1901. For unknown
reasons. Li did not report it to the court until January

15. the day when he signed the protocol presented by the
6

foreign envoys. The court was furious for being kept

ignorant beforehand and rejected the agreement. It would
have severely punished Tseng if Russia had not interferred.

In the meantime. Li accepted the Russian proposal which

R

Li to Yang. K26/7/18 (Aug. 12. 1900). Sheng Hsuan-
huai. Yu Chai Ts'un Kao (Collected Papers of Sheng Hsfian-
huai. reprint. Taipei. 1963). v. 39. p. 5: the Russian
Charge d'Affaires to the Acting Secretary of State. Aug.17.
1900. Papers Relating to the Fbrei Relations of thg
United State (Cited hereafter as FRUS). 1901. app. I.
p. 17: and Rockhill to Hay. Nov. 20. 1900. Ha Pa ers. As
a matter of fact. Li kept close contacts with two Russian
officials. Michael de Giers. the Russian minister in Peking.
and Prince Uktomshi. personal friend of the Tsar and
Director of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Their close con-
tacts were often mentioned in Li's telegrams.

5

Li‘s preference to sign a separate agreement with
Russia first was exemplified later by his telegrams to
Chinese ministers abroad. K27/l/10 (Feb. 28. 1901) and to
Grand Council. K27/l/10. Li. 22; 333.. v.32. pp. 22-23.

6
Chou Mein to Li. K26/9/20 (Nov. 11. 1900), and Li's

#4

requested that the Chinese government give the broadest
power to Yang Ju. the Chinese minister at St. Petersburg.
for negotiations on the restoration of Manchuria.7

The court appointed Yang as Chinese plenipotentiary
to negotiate with the Russian government and ordered him
to consult Li and Prince Ch‘ing according to circumstances.8
The first phase of the negotiations resulted in a Russian
proposal of twelve articles presented on February 16. In
return for the Russian promise to restore China's sovereign-
ty over Manchuria. according to the text of the proposal.
China should agree to the stationing of a body of Russian
troops along the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) until order
was to be reestablished. and to the right of the CER to
build a railroad to the Great Wall in the direction of
Peking. China could maintain troops in Manchuria only
after the completion of the railroad and the number of the
troops should be determined after consultation with Russia.
Outside the railway district. China could dispatch
police guards to maintain order. but again. the number of

the guards should be decided with Russia's consent. In

addition. China could not grant to any other power without

 

memorial. K26/11/25. Li. 22; cit.. "Tien Kao." v. 28.
p. 37. and v. 30. pp. 32-338 ChEster C. Tan. The Boxer
Catastrophg(New York. 1955). pp. 166-168.

7
Ibido. pp. 168-1710

8
Sheng to Yang. K26/11/1h (Jan. a. 1901). Yang.
22; Cite, p. 10.

45

Russia's agreement. any privileges with regard to mines.
railroads. or any industrial enterprises in Manchuria and
other regions in the proximity of Russia. such as Mongolia
and Sinkiang. Even China herself could not build railroads
in these territories without Russian concurrence. These
demands. unquestionably. constituted an attempt to legitimate
the Russian violation of the open door principles of both
equal commercial opportunity and China's integrity. Be-
cause of Chinese resistance. the Russian government made
only a slight revision and. on March 13. asked Yang to
sign them within two weeks.9

The revised Russian demands were acceptable for Li
Hung-chang. Against the protests made by both the powers
and the Chinese officials. especially the Yangtze viceroys.
Li could see no evil consequences of the demands and urged
the court to give orders promptly for Yang to sign.10

Nevertheless. the protests against any separate
arrangement between China and Russia were too heavy to be
ignored. The foreign protests had been made since the
revelation of the Tseng-Alexeieff Agreement. Among them

9

Yang to Prince Ching ad Li. K26/12/30 (Feb. 18.
1901) and K27/l/23. to Li. x27/1/25. Yang. 9p; 3;}... pp. 27-
30. 50-53. 55-56.

10
Li to Yang. K27/l/26 (Mar. 16. 1901). Li to Grand
Council. K27/1/27 and 28. Id. 92; £13.. ”Tien Kao." v.33.
pp. 20. 22-23, 260

#6

the American complaint was comparatively moderate. On
February 19. 1901. Secretary Hay pointed out to the Chinese
minister at Washington ”the extreme danger in the interests
of China of considering any private territorial or finan-
cial arrangements. at least without full knowledge and
approval of all the powers now engaged in negotiation.”
Referring specifically to the circular of July. 1900. he
stated that this warning was based on the preservation of
the territorial integrity of China. a principle which had
been recognized by all the powers then engaged in the joint
negotiations in Peking. Rockhill. who represented the
United States in the joint negotiations while Conger was
granted a short leave. instructed the American consuls in
Nanking and Hankow to confer at once with Liu K'un-i and
Chang Chih-tung for the purpose of urging the two Yangtze
viceroys to send memorials to the court against any private
Sino-Russian deal which would seriously injure China.11

Even this mild American protest was undermined by
the compromising American attitude toward Russia. In early
February. John Hay made. in response to an inquiry from
Japan. a statement that the United States "is not at
present prepared to attempt singly or in concert with other
powers to uphold China's integrity by a demonstration which

could present a character of hostility to any power."

 

ll
Rockhill to Hay and enclosures. March h. 1901._

China Dispatches.

1+7

Later in March. he indicated that he was prepared to accept
the Russian action in Manchuria. "insofar as it could be
acknowledged necessary for her interests and projects.” pro-

vided American trade was protected.12

This American posi-
tion was perceived by the Chinese minister Wu T‘ing-fang.
The United States. Wu reported. would not take any strong
action and could not help China. Her government talked
about the preservation of China's territorial integrity
and the inexpediency of any secret Sino-Russian agreement.
but all in elusive terms.13
Not the American but rather the Japanese and
British protests should be credited for the Yangtze
viceroys' objections and for the court‘s cautious decisions.
Without full knowledge of what Russia really demanded. the
Japanese government warned the Chinese minister in Tokyo
that if China acquiesced in the Russian demands to surrender
special interests or to cede territories the other powers

would surely follow the Russian precedent. If any power

asked China for too much. Japan suggested. China had better

 

12
Hay to Foreign Office. Tokyo. memorandum. Feb. 1.
1901 and Conversation of Hay with Cassini. March 28. 1901.
cited in Edward H. Zabriskie. American-Russian Rivalry_in
the Far East. l895-l9lfl_ (Philadelphia. 1936). pp. 69. 71.

13
Wu to Yang. K27/l/23 (March 13. 1901). Yang. 92;
93.. p. 52;. L1 to Grand Council. K27/1/27 and wu's
memorial. K27/2/7. transmitted by Sheng and Li. Li. 22; gi3..
”Tien Kao." v. 33. p. 22 and v. 34. pp. 18-19.

#8

end her separate negotiations with it and put all the

1b Not satis-

troubles on the joint peace table in Peking.
fied with her warning through the Chinese minister. the
Japanese government instructed her consul Odagiri at
Shanghai to visit the Yangtze viceroys at Nanking and
Hankow. In his interviews with the two viceroys. Liu
K'un—i and Chang Chih-tung. Odagiri once more warned that
any agreement between China and any power with regard to
the cession of territories or station of foreign troops
would definitely lead to the similar demands from all of
the other powers.15 In the meantime. Great Britain and
Germany. the two powers which had only recently signed an
agreement to commit themselves to the open door. lodged
their protests in the same manner against any separate

l6

arrangements between China and Russia. In short. all

these powers. except Germany which promptly declared that

 

1a
Li Sheng-toh to Grand Council. received K26/12/27
(Feb. 15. 1901). Ch'in Kuan Hsu Ch'ao Chung Jig_Chiao She
Shih Liao (Historical Material on Sino-Japanese Relations
in the Kuang Hsu Reign. thereafter cited as CISLI reprint.
Taipei. 1963). v. 60. p. 15.

15
Chang to Odagiri. K27/l/8 (Feb. 26, 1901). Chang
Chih-tung. Chan Wen Hsian Kun Ch'uan Chi (Complete Works
of Chang Ch h-tung. repr nt. Taipei. l9 3 . v. 171. p. 2:
Liu to Grand Council. K27/l/9. Liu K'un—i. Liu Chun Ch'en
Kun I Chi (Works of the Late Liu K'un-i. reprint. Taipei.
l9 7 . ”Tien Hsin” (Telegrams). v. 1. pp. 57-58.

16
Li to Grand Council. x26/12/29 (Feb. 17. 1901).
Li. 0 . £33.. "Tien Kao." v. 31. pp. h7-u8: Chang to Grand
Council. K27/l/14 and 18. Chang. 0 . 213.. v. 171. pp. n-5,
and Liu to Grand Council. K27/l/l . Liu. 22; 313.. "Tien
HSinn" V0 19 Pp. 58-59-

 

1+9

her agreement with Great Britain did not apply to Manchuria.
were threatening to follow suit in the event of China's
acceptance of the Russian demands.

The threat of following suit meant much for Liu
K'un-i and Chang Chih—tung. The Yangtze valley under the
control of these two viceroys had been recognized as the
British sphere of influence. like Manchuria was recognized
as the Russian one. If the Russians succeeded in their
demands on Manchuria. Great Britain would be justified to
ask for more privileges in the Yangtze. Likewise. Governor
Yuan Shih-k'ai of Shangtung and Governor Hsu Ying-k'uei
of Fukien had to worry about the threat. since their
provinces were respectively the German and Japanese spheres.
Another Chinese official who should be disturbed by the
threat of following suit was Sheng Hsuan-huai. Sheng had
long been in charge of the Chinese telegrams and railways.
If Russia obtained special rights with regard to the rail-
ways in Manchuria and the other powers asked for the same
privileges in the other parts of the empire. his control
of the Chinese railways would be surely hampered. Thus.
concerned about their own responsibilities. these officials
were really unhappy about the Russian demands on Manchuria.
If the Russians got their demands accepted. they argued
in similar telegrams to the court at Sian. to Li at Peking.
and to Yang at St. Petersburg. the other powers would

surely follow suit and the Chinese empire would be

50

partitioned. If China dare not reject the Russian demands.
they asked. how could she reject the demands of all the
powers?17 This sort of objection was so frequent that the
court grew tired of hearing the terms of "following suit“
and "partition."18
Nevertheless. the protests from both the foreign
powers and the Chinese officials had their effect on the
court. At first. the court faltered for about a month.
In one decree it accepted the argument that the Russian
demands. if signed and ratified. would lead to the similar
demands from Great Britain. Germany and Japan. and would
thus bring about evil consequences beyond what one could
imagine. It ordered Li Hung-Chang and Prince Ch'ing to
reckon up all the accounts and to dissolve all the dis-
crepancies between Russia and the other powers. In another
decree. it permitted Li to conclude separate agreement with
Russia on condition that Li was sure of no evil consequences

to follow.19 Finally. on March 23. a decree was issued

 

17
CJSL. v. 60. 61 and 62. passim: Li op. cit.
"Tie26K23.“ v. 32. 33 and 3h. pass1m; and Yang. op. cit..
PP- - .

18
Grand Council to Chang and Liu. K26/8/12 (Sept.
24. 1901). Chang. 02. Cit.. V. 83. p. 11.

19
Decrees. K27/l/6 (Feb. 20. 1901) and K27/2/1. 33
Ch'in Te Tsun Chin Huan Ti Shih Lu (Records of the
ing Dynas y. Re gn o uang Hs . reprint. Taipei. 196?.
heriafter cited as CHTSL). v. #78. pp. 6-7. and v. #80.
p. .

51

ordering Yang Ju at St. Petersburg not to sign the
Manchurian agreement.20

0n the other hand. faced with the unequivocal
opposition from Japan and Great Britain. Russia was also
obliged to back down herself and announced on April u
her intention not to proceed further with the Manchurian
agreement. but to wait for the development of events.21
The Manchurian crisis abated for a while. but it was by no
means settled. The Russian troops remained in the area.
When it was opportune the Russian government would press
China once again to grant her privileges and the crisis
would recur in the same pattern as before. Nevertheless.
Russia was fighting a losing battle. Japan. for her own
interests. was determined to forestall any further extension
of the Russian influence in Manchuria. Her position was
reinforced by the alliance with Great Britain in 1902.
Thereafter. the Manchurian crisis was to be resolved not by
any Sino-Russian agreement. but by the Russo-Japanese War.

No matter how the Manchurian crisis would come to
an end. China had to look for measures to extricate herself
from it. The efforts in this regard had been made even be-
fore the court decided not to sign the Manchuria agreement.

L

20

p a Decree. K27/2/u (March 23. 1901). Ibid.. muso.

21
Tan. op. cit.. pp. 210-213.

52
Japan and Great Britain might be most helpful. Therefore.
Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i once proposed to engage
Japanese and British officers to train Chinese military
forces in the province of Fengtien as a counterbalance
against the Russian demand when she learned of China's inten-
tion to adopt such a measure: if not. then the modern-
trained Chinese forces in Fengtien could serve as a bulwark
against Russia. This proposal was sent to the court.22 But.
probably because it was too provocative. the court did not
take any action on it.

A second measure possibly helpful for China was the
submission of the Manchurian problem to the foreign envoys
representing their governments in the joint peace negotiations
in Peking -- as suggested to the Chinese government by Japan.
After the court decided not to sign the Manchuria agreement.
all the important provincial authorities. including Liu.
Chang. Governor YUan Shih-k'ai in Shantung and Viceroy T'ao
Mo at Canton. considered it as the only alternative and
urged the court to adopt it. In the meantime. they proposed
to communicate to the powers the texts of the draft agree-
ment.23 The court accepted the suggestion essentially and

ordered Li Hung—Chang to notify the foreign envoys for their

22
Chang to Liu. Sheng and YUan. K27 1/29 (March 19.
1901). Liu to Chang. YUan and Sheng. K27/2 2. Chang. op.
Cite. V0 171. pp. 11-1”.

23
Liu. Chang. T'ao. YUan and Wang to Grand Council.
received K27/2/7 (March 26. 1901). CJSL. v. 61. pp.33~3’+.

53

common deliberation of those provisions of the draft agree-
ment which could affect China's sovereignty and the treaty

rights of the powers.2u

Nevertheless. Li failed to take
any action in accordance with the decree without Russian
permission. As long as neither China nor Russia submitted
the Manchuria problem for joint deliberation. the other
powers could do nothing.

Finally. the Yangtze viceroys attempted to extricate
China from her trouble with Russia by means of an open door
in Manchuria. The measure originated from one of Chang
Chih-tung's conversations with the British consul at Hankow
and was then designed as a price for an effort on the part
of the powers to gain for China an extension of the time
limit for signing the Manchurian agreement. Upon receiving
a joint proposal of the measure from Chang. Liu K'un-i and
Sheng Hsuan-huai. the court issued a decree on March 21 to
the Chinese ministers abroad ordering them to consult with
the Japanese. British. American. and German governments.
According to the decree. the ministers were to inform the
various foreign offices secretly that if they could help work

out satisfactory arrangements with regard to Nanchuria. the

Chinese government would open the area and grant the

 

24
Grand Council to Prince Ch'ing and li. K27/2/7.
and Prince Ch'ing and Li to Grand Council. K27/2/9. Ibid..
V. 61' pp. 35‘370

5h

powers equal rights there in mining. railroads and indus-
trial enterprises. The court stressed. however. that the
opening of Manchuria could be realized only after Russia
evacuated her troops and China could restore her full
sovereignty over the provinces.25

In the long run. the opening of Manchuria was
regarded as the best policy to counteract Russian encroach-
ment. As Chang Chih-tung saw it. Manchuria was vast and
very rich in resources. If China did not invite foreigners
to develop the territory. she could not develop it herself
because of limited capital and technicians. 0n the other
hand. China could tax all of the powers if she opened the
area to all foreigners to undertake commercial and indus-
trial activities. Then. China would stand richly and power-
fully in Manchuria and Russia would no longer be able to
encroach upon the territory. "China." Chang put it more
straightforwardly. "could not maintain Manchuria by her own
military force. She could do it only by employing the
commercial force of the powers."26 In such a manner. Chang
developed the open door into a Chinese policy to employ the

other powers to check Russia.

 

25
Chang to Grand Council. K27/1/29 (March 19. 1901).
Chang. 22; cit.. v. 171. pp. 10-11; Chang. Liu and Sheng to
Grand Council: received K27/2/2. Grand Council to the
Chinese ministers abroad. K27/2/2. CJSL. v. 61. pp. 17. 20-21.

26
Chang to Grand Council. received K27/2/2. ibid..

v. 61. pp. 17-19; Chang to Fan. K27/2/1. Chang. op. ETTZ.
V. 171’ pp. 15-16.

55

In addition. the Chinese open door was significant
in two more respects. As Chang emphasized in his appeal
to the court. first. the opening of Manchuria was not forced
upon China by the powers. it was rather a policy adopted
by China herself. Secondly. the open door. designed for
settling the Manchurian crisis only. would be under no
circumstances extended in its application beyond the bound-
aries of the provinces to China proper.27

While John Hay's Open Door notes at least drew
evasive responses from the powers. the Chinese open door
met with a complete failure at the very onset. The decree
of'March l ordering the Chinese ministers abroad to consult
with the powers promised to open Manchuria in return for
the Japanese. British. German. and American good offices.
But the court could receive no response from its diplomatic
representatives. Even so. the positions taken by the
powers were not hard to perceive. Japan expressed through
her consul at Shanghai her opposition to the Manchurian
agreement. but she indicated that she had no interest in
contending with Russia for privileges and had no intention
to do anything in return for the opening of Manchuria.28

Great Britain made no comment on the opening of Manchuria.

Ibid.

28
Liu to Chang. received K27/2/5 (March 2a. 1901).
Chang. op. cit.. v. 171. pp. 21-22: Sheng to Grand Council.
K27/2/5. Shmeng. op. cit.. v. 53. p. 13.

56
but claimed that she would do nothing for China more than
barring the secret Russo-Chinese arrangement.29 Germany
had signed with Britain an agreement to endorse the prin-
ciple of the open door. Nevertheless. only one week before
the court issued the decree of March 21. the German
Chancellor declared in the Reichstag that the Anglo-German
Agreement was “in no sense concerned with Manchuria."
that "there were no German interests of importance in
Manchuria." and that "the fate of that province was a
matter of absolute indifference to Germany."30 Finally. in
the United States although John Hay was concerned about
American trade in Manchuria and would like to have had an
assurance that the Manchurian door would remain Open. he
had no thought of interferring with the Russian occupation

31

of the provinces. Plainly enough. none of the four
powers was ready at this time to accept the Chinese request
for good offices in exchange for the opening of Manchuria.
None of them was willing to be employed to serve the
interests of China.

Faced with this first failure. the Yangtze viceroys
were hardly daunted. 0n the contrary. they tried again and

again throughout the year of 1901 to realize the opening of

Manchuria as the best measure to counterbalance Russia.

 

29

Ibid.
30

Quoted in Tan. op. cit.. pp. 209-210.
31

See note 12.

57
Up to the time when Russia decided not to proceed further
with the Manchurian demands and not to evacuate her troops
either. a rumor was in circulation that Russia was going to
use privileges in Manchuria to lure Japan into dropping her

'5
3‘ Liu was

opposition to the Russo-Chinese arrangement.
really alarmed by this rumor and worried that China might
lose the Japanese and even British support which had been
effective in barring the Manchurian agreement. As a

result. he saw it beneficial to China to open Manchuria her-
self without any delay and sounded out Japan. Britain and
the United States once again. For unexplained reasons.

the Japanese Foreign Minister Kato expressed this time his
endorsement of Liu's suggestion. The London government
continued to be lukewarm. It indicated that it was suffi-
cient to maintain the opening of Manchuria if the Treaty of
Tientsin of 1858 was respected. It was not necessary for
China to make a new declaration. to bring the opening into
effect. The least acceptable response came from the

United States. As the Chinese designed to limit the open
door within the boundaries of Manchuria. the Washington

government demanded an opening of all China. Because of

the differences among the powers. the Japanese government

32
Li Sheng-toh to Grand Council. received K27/2/11
(March 30. 1901). CJSL. v. 62. pp. 3-4: Sheng to Grand
Council. Liu. Chang and Ydan. K27/2/ll. Sheng. op. cit..
v. 53. p. 27.

58

through her consul at Shanghai finally advised China to
drop the idea of opening Manchuria for the time being.33

Nonetheless. the Yangtze viceroys made at least
three new efforts to open Manchuria. The first of these
efforts made in June originated from a proposal drafted by
Count Atsumaro Konoe. the Japanese speaker of the House of
Peers. Chang had asked for Count Konoe's advice during
his last contacts with the Japanese consul at Shanghai.
Finally. Count Konoe sent to Chang and Liu in mid-June a
proposal which would have required China to undertake ex-
tensive reforms in Manchuria for purpose of opening the
area. Although Chang saw it applicable. Liu regarded the
reform programs as too sweeping to be accepted by the court.
Therefore. the opening of Manchuria fell through once
again.3l+

The subsequent efforts made by the Yangtze viceroys

underlined their great anxiety over the Manchurian situ-

ation. Both Chang and Liu had counted on the joint

 

33
Liu to Chang. K27/2/12. to Odagiri. K27/2/22. to
Chang. K27/2/27. to L0. K27/3/10 (April 28. 1901). and to
Odagiri. K27/3/22. Liu. 22fi 213.. ”Tien Hsin." v. 1. pp. 66.
71-72. and v. 2. pp. 1-2. 3 Chang to Odagiri. K27/3/l7.
and ggagiri to Chang. x27/3/25. Chang. pp; 213.. v. 172.
pp. -22.

3“ .
Chang to Liu. K27/fi/28 (June 14. 1901). and Liu
to Chang. received K27/h/29. Chang. op. cit.. v.173. pp. 20-22.

59

deliberation by the powers attending the peace negotiations
in Peking as an alternative to settle the Manchuria prob-
lem. Nevertheless. Li Hung-Chang and Prince Ch'ing failed
to take any action along this line while they were negoti-
ating with the foreign plenipotentiaries. The joint
negotiations came to their closing phases in July and the
peace treaty was finally signed in September. With the
chance for joint deliberation lost. Chang and Liu now con-
sidered the opening of Manchuria as the only way left for
China to get herself out of her plight. They explained so
in their memorials to the court. The court. however. in-
sisted that the opening of Manchuria should remain an un-
published promise until Russia evacuated her troops.
Otherwise. the court warned. the measure would surely
irritate Russia and result in more troubles instead of
benefits.35 Consequently. no more discussion was made on
the question until the spring of 1903 when China was
negotiating with the powers for the revision of commercial
treaties in accordance with the joint peace treaty.

As one can see. the United States. if her commercial

interests were guaranteed. was not interested in Chinese

 

35
Chang to Grand Council. K27/6/ll (July 28. 1901).
Grand Council to Chang and Liu. K27/6/15. Chang to Liu.
K27/8/2 (Sept. 1a, 1901). and Liu to Chang. K27/8/7. Chang.
pp; cit.. v. 83. pp. lO-lh. and v. 174. pp. 19-203 Decree.
K27/8; 21. CHTSL. V. “86. pp. 16-17.

60

territorial integrity and offered little help while China
was attempting to open Manchuria to counter Russian en-
croachment. Gradually. the Washington government would
take a position probably even stronger than the Japanese
one with regard to the opening of new treaty ports in
Manchuria.

Henry B. Miller was the first American diplomat in
China who argued that American commercial interests were
in no way to be guaranteed if Washington ignored the
Russian occupation of Manchuria. Miller was ordered in
May. 1901 to reopen the American consulate in Newchwang
which was the only treaty port in Manchuria by that time
and had for years been in charge of a merchant vice-consul.
He saw a bright future for American trade in Manchuria.
According to his account. American goods. cotton. kerosene
and flour in the main. constituted over one-third of the
imports into Manchuria. far exceeding those of any other
country. They were valued well over five million gold
dollars for 1899 and would be surely increased many more
times "if China retains Manchuria". Nevertheless. Miller
warned. the Russian officials throughout Manchuria un-
reservedly announced that it was the purpose of Russia to
govern the area and make it a part of their great empire.
Americans and British who had had business relations with
the Russians were unanimous in their belief in the total
unreliability of both the official and mercantile classes.

"Russian methods are so varied. devious and uncertain.

61
that I have absolutely no faith in our being able to main-

tain an open door in Manchuria by any agreement with
Russia. . . . If the political domination of Manchuria
falls into the hands of Russia. American interests will be
shortlived.” He believed. therefore. it was of the ut-
most importance to stop the domination of Russia over
Manchuria and by the most active measures to insist upon
the full and absolute return of the whole area to the
Chinese government. "Our efforts should be to have Manchuria
thrown open to the world for trade. commerce and development.
and in that case. I have not the least doubt that we would
lead all nations.”3 In such a manner. Miller intended to
change the Washington policy into one which would keep
Manchuria open for the growth of American trade through
insistence on China's integrity.

0n the basis of Miller's reports. Minister Conger
also complained to Secretary Hay of Russian aggression in
Manchuria. He summarized in one of his reports the details
of the Russian occupation of‘Manchuria since the signing
of the'Tseng-Alexeieff Agreement and indicated the poss-
ibility of renewed negotiations between Russia and China.

toward which the attitude of the powers was incalculable.

 

36
Miller to Squiers. June 27 and July 19. to Conger.
Sept. 21. 1901. enclosed in the despatches of American
Legation. Peking. China Despatches.

62

If Russia was not checked in her activities. Conger
stressed. she would ultimately acquire sovereign control
over Manchuria. an unpleasant prospect for the United
States to contemplate.37

Upon the receipt of Conger's despatches. John Ray
finally was in doubt that American commercial interests
could be ensured as long as Russia continued her encroach-
ments in Manchuria. He instructed Conger to send back
more facts and note especially any damage to American trade.
By the end of 1901. as renewed negotiations between Russia
and China were in progress. John Hay once again picked up
the principle of China's integrity and warned the Peking
government not to make with any power an agreement which
"will permanently impair the territorial integrity of China
or impair the ability of China to meet her international
obligations."38

Nevertheless. not until the Spring of 1903 did the
Washington government. under pressure. adopt more deter-
mined steps in order to check the Russian encroachments
and make sure that Manchuria would remain open for American
trade. The year of 1902 found a prospect of eventual

evacuation of Russian troops from Manchuria. On January 30.

 

37
Conger to Hay. Aug. 26. Sept. 7 and 28. 1901.
China Despatches.

38 -
Hay to Conger. Aug. 29 and Dec. 6. 1901. China
Despatches.

63

Japan and Great Britain signed an alliance directed at
Russia. Faced with this united front. Russia decided to
drop her immediate demands for privileges through an
arrangement between the Chinese government and the Russo-
Chinese Bank.39 and signed with China a convention on
April 8. By this convention. Russia recognized Chinese
sovereignty over Manchuria and agreed to evacuate the area
within eighteen months. In October. Russia was able to
observe her words and began to carry out the first stage of
the evacuation. These happenings seemed to be fortunate.
for the United States. At any rate. John Hay was still
indicating that the United States would recognize Russia's
exceptional position in Manchuria if only the freedom of
American trade would be guaranteed.“0

Then. the reports from China in the Spring of 1903

revealed that Russia continued to make inroads and threaten

all the foreign interests in Manchuria. including the

 

39

The Russo-Chinese negotiations were renewed in
July. 1901. Being unable to make an arrangement because of
Li Hung-Chang's death in November. the Russian representatives
continued to work on Prince Ch‘ing. In late January. 1902
a compromise was reached in Peking by which China. in ex-
change for the return of Manchuria. was to sign an agreement
with the Russo-Chinese Bank giving assurance that she would
not award railway and other concessions to any foreign power
except Russia.

no
Hay to Roosevelt. May 1. 1902. quoted in Tyler
Bennett. Roosevelt and the Russo-Ja anese War (New York.
1925). pp. 133-1358 Cass n to Lamsdor . Aug. 12. 1902. cited
in Zabriskie. 22; 233.. p. 85.

69

American ones. According to the reports. Russia had estab-
lished an ostensible diplomatic representative at Mukden
whose real duties were to advise the tartar General at the
city and give orders to Chinese officials. The Chinese
Eastern Railway controlled by Russia had purchased all the
land along the Sungari River and held it so as to preclude
the leasing or ownership of land to anybody but Chinese and
Russians. The second stage of the Russian evacuation.
scheduled for April 8. 1903. had not taken place. In
addition. the Russian government had made the withdrawal of
their troops from Manchuria contingent upon certain con-
cessions from China which included: no treaty ports or
foreign consuls to be allowed in Manchuria; no foreigners
except Russians to be employed in the public service of
North China; the status of the administration of Mongolia
to remain as before; Newchwang customs receipts to be
deposited in the Russo-Chinese Bank; the sanitary commission
at Newchwang to be under Russian control; the Port Arthur-
Newchwang-Mukden telegraph line to be dominated by Russia:
and no territory in Manchuria to be alienated to any power.“1

John Hay was somewhat perplexed by the developments

and especially unhappy with some of the Russian demands

 

#1
Miller to Conger. March 5. l7 and 21. 1903. Conger
to Hay. April 18. 1903. China Despatches. Conger to Hay.
April 23. 1903. and "The substance of the Russian demands as
reported by the Japanese Minister at Peking.” enclosed in
Hay to Roosevelt. April 28. 1903. Hay Papers.

 

65

which he regarded as injurious to the United States. Con-
sequently he instructed American ministers in both St.
Petersburg and Peking to insist on the American request for
treaty ports and consulates in Manchuria and make known
American objectives to the Russian demand regarding foreign
employers in Chinese service.”2 Later on. as Russia denied
making demands of China but in fact was doing so. Theodore
Roosevelt became more irritated. The President wrote in
one of his personal letters to Hay: ”I have not the
slightest objection to the Russians knowing that I feel
thoroughly aroused and irritated at their conduct in
Manchuria; that I don't intend to give way and that I am
year by year growing more confident that this country would
back me in going to an extreme in the matter.”3

But the United States could not go to extremes. As
John Hay realized. the United States could not fight over
Manchuria. Public opinion in the country would not support
the Washington government in any scheme of concerted action
with England and Japan which would seem openly hostile to
Russia. After learning at the beginning of May that China

had refused to accept the Russian demands. Hay decided. as

 

#2
Hay to Roosevelt. April 25; to McCormick. April
253 to Conger. April 25. 1903. Hay Papers.

43
Roosevelt to Hay. July 18. 1903. Roosevelt

 

Papers.

66

"a last resort" to prevent Russia from shutting doors of
Manchuria for American interests. to insist in getting a
written assurance from the Peking government that China
would grant open ports and consulates as soon as the
necessities of trade and commerce required them.uu

Negotiations had been underway between China and
the United States for a new commercial treaty. According
to John Hay. the essential object of these negotiations
was to favor Chinese financial stability and promote
China's ability to buy in any market and to exchange native
products wherever produced on equal terms with all nations.
Also. an agreement should be reached to abolish Iikig.
the internal tax. and at the same time to raise duties so
as to add to China's revenue.’+5 All of these were close to
settlement in terms similar to the Chinese commercial
treaties with Britain and Japan. A Sino-American treaty
might have been signed at an earlier time if the problem of
opening ports in Manchuria had not evolved.

The American request for the opening of new ports

was referred at the end of April. 1903 to the Chinese.

commissioners Lu Hai-huan and Wu T'ing-fang. who were

 

an
Hay to Roosevelt. April 25 and 28. May h, 1903.
Hay Papers.

45
Hay to Rockhill. April 11. 1901. and Hay to
Conger. Jan. 21. 1903. cited in Paul A. Varg. The Making of
Myth: The United States and China. 1897-1912 (E. Lansing.
Mich.. 1968). p. 81.

6?

undertaking treaty negotiations at Shanghai. After the
Washington government decided to obtain assurance on the
opening of Manchuria. Lu and Wu were willing to acquiesce
and looking forward to getting in return American support of
China's territorial integrity in Manchuria. Some other
Chinese officials also saw the benefits of opening new
ports. In his answer to L0 and Wu. the chief commissioner
Sheng HsUan-huai. then at Peking. indicated the difficulty
of accepting the American request. But he regarded it as
worthwhile to make use of the request as a pretext to demand
Russia's return of Manchuria. Wei Kuang-t'ao. who took over
the viceroyalty of Nanking after Liu K'un-i died in October.
1902. even suggested opening more new ports in Manchuria. if
the Russian encroachments could thus be countervailed.“6

Beside possible advantages. however. there were dis-
advantages. The Russian troops were still occupying
Manchuria. In spite of American protests and Chinese rejec-
tion. the Russian minister at Peking was still forcing upon
China the demands not to open treaty ports or to grant other
powers any privilege in Manchuria. In addition. Japan was

also demanding the opening of new ports.

#6
Lu and Wu to Wai Wu Pu (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs) K29/u/3 (April 29. 1903) and K29/u/1u, WCSL. v. 170.
p. 17 and v. 171. p. 9: Sheng to LU and Wu. K29/E73 and Wei
to Sheng. K29/b/12. Sheng. 22; 213.. v. 60. pp. 18, 26.

68

Under the circumstances. if China accepted the American
request. she would irritate Russia on the one hand. and
encourage Japan and even other powers to follow suit on the
other. These were exactly the worries which YUan Shih-k'ai
expressed in his telegram to the Wai Wu Pu. YUan. who had
become the Viceroy of Chihli after Li Hung-Chang's death
and made great effort to have the Russian demands rejected
more recently. considered it not helpful to open new ports
in Manchuria in exchange for American support.u7

Throughout 1901 Chang Chih-tang had advocated the
immediate opening of Manchuria. Now in 1903. he became
more cautious. He could see no possibility of accepting
the American request and declaring publicly the opening of
new ports before the complete withdrawal of Russian troops.
Nonetheless he believed the United States. Britain. and
Japan as well. would never permit Russia to control
Manchuria exclusively. Therefore. China should be more
persistent not to accept the Russian demands and should
take the opportunity to ask the three powers to intervene
in China's behalf. If the three powers could help China to
recover Manchuria. Chang indicated. then China would be
able to consider opening new ports. by herself. according

to the circumstances.“8 After receiving Chang's telegram.

 

4?
YUan to Wai Wu Pu. K29/h/h (April 30. 1903) and
K29/h/lu. WCSL. v. 170. p. 19 and v. 171. pp. 9-10.

48
Chang to Wai Wu Pu. YUan. Ln. Wu and Sheng.
K29/h/7. Chang. op. cit.. v. 187. pp. 6-7.

69

YUan thought it feasible for China herself to declare by an
edict the opening of new ports in Manchuria. but insisted
that the court should take such an action only after the
evacuation of Russia and with no Russian objection.“9

The decision on opening new ports in Manchuria was
hard to make. The problem was thus detached from the other
issues involved in the treaty negotiations at Shanghai and
picked up by Prince Ch'ing and Conger at Peking for high-
level bargaining. Prince Ch'ing at first expressed China's
difficulty in accepting the American request. As he made
clear in a note to Conger. Russia had warned China not to
open any new ports for trade in Manchuria. nor permit the
establishment of foreign consulates at any new port without
notifying the St. Petersburg government. In response. China
had refused to discuss the matter and told Russia that
"should it become necessary at any future time to open
ports for international trade in Manchuria it would rest
with China. as circumstance might require. to investigate
conditions and herself open them." Therefore. the Peking
government felt it very inconvenient now to mention the
opening of new ports in the Sino-American commercial treaty.
Two days later. Prince Ch'ing's principal secretary re-

iterated that China would herself open the Manchurian ports.

“9
Yuan to Wai Wu Pu. K29/u/1u (May 10. 1903), WCSL.
v. 171. pp. 9-10.

70

He begged the United States to be satisfied with this
verbal promise. not to insist upon China putting it too
plainly in writing.50

The United States was not satisfied with the verbal
promise. She continued to fight on two diplomatic fronts.
Fully convinced of the Russian objection as the basic cause
of China's refusal to accept the American request. the
Washington government made constant efforts through the
contacts between Hay and Russian Ambassador Cassini at
Washington. between American Ambassador McCormick and
Russian Foreign Minister Lamsdorff at St. Petersburg. and
between Conger and Russian Minister Lessar at Peking. to
ask Russia to withdraw her opposition to the opening of
treaty ports in Manchuria.51

In addition. Minister Conger. under Hay's instruc-
tions. insisted in Peking that a provision with regard to
the opening should be inserted in the treaty. The diplo-
matic tangle resulted in an American victory at least on
the surface. In the middle of July. Russia assured the
United States that she would not oppose the opening of
Manchuria. One month later. Conger could obtain a written

statement from Prince Ch'ing that China promised to insert

50
Conger to Hay. May 28 and 19. 1903. and enclosures.
FRUS. 1903. pp. 60-62.

51
For a full account of the Washington-St. Petersburg-
Peking skein. see Zabriskie. op. cit.. pp. 89-9“.

71

in the treaty a provision for the opening of two ports.
But this diplomatic success on the part of the United
States produced problems for China. As Prince Ch'ing put
it. China was faced with unsurmountable difficulties. In
spite of the assurance the St. Petersburg government made
to the United States. Russia had not notified China of her
withdrawal of the objection to the opening of new ports.
In addition. if new ports were opened by treaty with the
United States. the other countries would each demand the
opening of other ports in their treaties. China could not
understand. Prince Ch'ing continued. ”how the government
of the United States. which had proved such a great friend
to China. should now insist upon her doing something so
harmful to her best interests. ...."52

China had accepted the American request. As the
situation required. she was going to seek American help in
return. In September. 1903. it was learned that Russia
had made new demands upon China. which included an ex-
tension of the time of evacuation. no Manchurian territory
to be alienated under any circumstances to any foreign
power. and all the wharves and telegraphs along the Sungari
River and the highway from Tsitsihar to Blagovyestchensk to
be controlled by Russia. Being certain that Russia would

not evacuate on October 8 in accordance with her own

52
7 Conger to Hay. Aug. 1h. 1903. FRUS. 1903. pp. 71-
3.

72

promise in the Russo-Chinese convention of April 8. 1902.
Prince Ch'ing once asked Conger if in that case the United
States would. at the request of the Chinese government. use
its good offices at St. Petersburg to effect some satis-
factory settlement. Conger gave no assurance. but promised
to transfer the request of China to Washington if necessary.53
On October 8. in spite of Russia's failure to evacuate from
Manchuria. China went ahead. as she had agreed in the written
statement of August. to sign with the United States the
commercial treaty which included a provision for the open-
ing of Antung and Mukden to foreign trade. In late
October. China finally sent a request to the Washington
government for American good offices to effect a Russian
evacuation of Manchuria. Whatever happened in Manchuria.
Prince Ch'ing stressed in his note presenting the request.
the interests of the United States would be surely in-
volved because the new ports provided in the recently con-
cluded Sino-American treaty. Antung and Mukden. were in the
area.54

Nevertheless. China failed once again to obtain
American support in her struggle for recovering territorial

integrity in Manchuria. Japan and Russia were drifting

into war because of the Manchurian situation. In such an

53
Conger to Hay. Sept. 9 and 23. 1903. China
Despatches.

5h
Conger to Hay. Sept. 9 and 23. Oct. 25 and 29.
1903. China Despatches.

73

emergency. even President Roosevelt. who had become very
irritated at Russian conduct. was at a loss to see in what
way his good offices could practically be made available.
In his reply to the Chinese minister. Secretary Hay could
only explain that in the absence of any intimation from
Russia of willingness to accept good offices. it did not
seem advisable to tender them.55

By all accounts. there are many differences between
Chinese and United States views of the open door throughout
the Manchurian crisis. The United States had little in-
terest in China's integrity if her commercial interests in
Manchuria could be assured. After she found her trade in
Newchwang to be threatened by continuous Russian inroads.
she insisted that more treaty ports should be opened.
Nonetheless. she still felt herself in no position to help
China in her struggle to recover Manchuria from the Russian
occupation. On the other hand. the main concern for China
was her territorial integrity. The Russian encroachments
should be opposed not because they endangered the commer-
cial interests of other powers. but because they would
possibly lead to the partition of China. In the same
manner. the opening of Manchuria was by no means intended
to serve the foreign interests. It was. as one historian

has pointed out. rather a means to the end to preserve

55
Hay to Conger. Oct. 28 and Nov. 2. 1903. China
‘Qespatchegp

7h
China's integrity in the area.56 This concern becomes more
meaningful if two things are added to one's consideration.
First. when Chinese talked about the opening of Manchuria.
they usually stressed that under no circumstances would such
an opening be extended its application to the other parts
of China. Secondly. in spite of her failure. China had
insisted that such an opening should be a measure adopted
by herself. not forced upon her by the powers. Apparently.
as her attitudes toward the open door during the Manchurian
crisis revealed. China was on her way toward a national

awakening.

56
Masataka Kosaka. "Chinese Policy in Manchuria.
1900-1903”. Ch'in Documents Seminar Pa er (Cambridge. Mass..
1961). pp. 12 -153.

CHAPTER III
AMERICAN CONCESSION LOST

By the time John Hay dispatched the Open Door notes.
Americans had acquired a concession from China to build the
Canton-Hankow railway. In the Spring of 190M, however.
Chinese officials and gentry in the provinces concerned
began to insist on cancelling the concession and regaining
the railway rights. A survey of the changing attitudes of
the Chinese toward the concession shows that one of their
main concerns was to prevent any particular power from
monopolizing China's railroad construction.

China had undertaken some railway enterprises before
the Sino-Japanese war of 1894. But the defeat she suffered
in the war caused her to look to railway construction as
one of the ways to achieve a great power status. When the
court accepted the proposal to construct a railway between
Peking and Hankow in 1896. many Chinese officials. includ-
ing Chang Chih—tung and Sheng HsUan-huai. pointed out the
benefits of constructing at the same time a railway between

1

Hankow and Canton. At the beginning of 1897, the

1
Chang to Wang. K22/8/10 (Sept. 16. 1896). Chang

75

76
Chinese Railway Company was established at Shanghai with
Sheng being appointed as the Director General. Before
long. Sheng was negotiating with foreign interests for
capital to finance railway construction.

American interests had actively sought railway con-
cessions from China and had secured support from the
American minister at Peking. As early as 1895. Charles
Denby. the minister. advised the Peking government that
railways had been helpful to the strength and unity of the
United States. China. he contended could have the same
advantages without efforts of her own and without fear of
foreign political complications "if she would entrust her
railway development to eXperienced American engineers and
capitalists.” In January of 1897. he reminded the Chinese
once again that Americans were conceded to be more competent
in railway construction than any other nationality and that
the United States. unlike the European powers. had no

designs on Asiatic territory.2 This American persuasion

 

Chih—tung. Chan Wen Hsian Kun Chflan Chi (Complete Works
of Chang Ch h-tung. reprint. Ta pe . 19 3 . v. 151. pp. 31-
32: Sheng to Prince Ching. K22/8/16. Wang Yen-wei and Wang
Liang. eds.. Chin Chi Wai Chiao Shih Liao (Historical
Materials on Foreign Re at ons n the Later Part of the Ching
Dynasty. reprint. Taipei. 1964. hereafter cited as WCSL)

v. 123. pp. 10-11.

2

Denby to Tsungli Yamen. Aug. 24. 1895 and Jan. 10.
1897. cited in William W. Braisted. "The United States and
the American China Development Company." Far Eastern

Quarterly. XI (1951-52). pp. 1147-1650

77

found an echo in one of Sheng Hsdan-huai's memorials con—
cerning railway construction. "Americans." Sheng said in
justifying his advice to seek American money and technical
assistance. "have shown no covetous spirit toward China and
in railroad building they are exceedingly skillful."3

But the Chinese preference for American assistance
was not just the result of American persuasion. Almost all
of the leading powers were interested in investing their
capital in China's railway enterprises. Their agents were
no less active than the Americans in appealing to the Peking
government.“ Surrounded by these foreign interests. China
had to make a cautious choice. In 1895. Chang Chih—tung
had already expressed his preference for obtaining loans
from smaller and distant powers for the construction of
railways. Those strong powers such as Great Britain and
France. he explained. would put China in a more difficult
position when the latter was to regain her railway rights
in the future.5 From 1895 to 1897. China was Forced to make

concessions to Russia in Manchuria. Great Britain in the

3

Sheng to Tsungli Yamen. enclosed in Denby to Olney.
Jan. 29. 1897. Qpina Despatches.

4

Li Kuo-chi. Chung Kuo Tsap_th_Te Tieh Iu Ching_Ying
(The Initial Development of Railroads—in China. Taipei. 1961).
pp. 148-174.

5
A Chang's memorial. K21/intercalary 5/27 (July 19.
1695). Chang. on. cit.. v. 37. p. 26.

 

78

Yangtze Valley. France in Kwangsi and Yunnan, and Germany
in Shantung. This new situation made China more reluctant
to offer any further special interest to any of these lead-
ing powers. since such an offer might not only irritate the
other powers. but would put China more firmly in the grasp
of that particular power. Therefore. when Sheng Hsuan-huai
suggested seeking American help in railway enterprises, he
stressed that "if we borrow money in America and employ
American constructors the jealousy of other powers will be
to a great degree avoided."6

In the meantime. Chang Chih-tung opposed stubbornly
throughout the year of 1897 any loan from Great Britain for
the construction of the Canton-Hankow railway. Such a loan.
he explained. in addition to the special interests which
Great Britain had already obtained along the Yangtze Valley.
would definitely lead to a complete British control of

7

China's heartland. By the Spring of 1898. as a decision

had been made to arrange a loan from Belgium to construct
the Peking-Hankow railway. Chang agreed with Sheng that it

was "the most proper" to borrow money from an American

8

interest to build the Hankow-Canton railway. It becomes

6

See note 3.

7 _

Chang to Wang. K23/3/17 (April 18, 1897), to Tsungli
Yamen. K23/12/2Lt. and to Chen. Kzu/l/z. Chang, op. cit..
v. 153. p. 3. v. 79. pp. 23-25. and v. 15”, pp. 21-22.

8
Sheng to Chang. K23/12/2u (Jan. 6. 1898). Sheng

79
clear that when China decided to make concessions respect-
ing the Canton-Hankow railway to the United States. her
main concern was to prevent any particular power from
monopolizing her economic interests.

The negotiations for an American loan to construct
the Canton-Hankow railway were finally undertaken by Sheng
Hsuan-huai at Shanghai and by Wu T'ing-fang at Washington
with the representatives of American China Development
Company. The American firm had long been seeking a con-
cession from China. Its list of stockholders included such
prominent American business names as E. H. Harriman. Jacob
H. Schiff of Kuhn. Loeb and Company. former Vice President
Levi P. Morton. Charles Coster of J. P. Morgan and Company.
the Carnegie Steel Company. and the presidents of the
National City Bank of New York and the Chase National Bank.9
As a result of the negotiations. a contract was signed on
April 18. 1898. According to the contract. China authorized
the Development Company to market bonds amounting to

h.000.000 to supervise construction of the railway. and to

Operate it during the fifty year period of the loan.

Hsflan-huai. Sheng Hsfian-huai Wei K'an Hsin Kao (Formerly un-
published letters of Sheng Hsflan-huai. reprint. Peking. 1960).
pp. 56-57: Sheng to Wan and Chang. K24/2/25 (March 17. 1898).
and Chang to Sheng. th 2/27. Sheng hsuan-huai. Yu~Chai Ts'un
Kao (Collected Papers of Sheng Hsuan-huai. reprint. Taipei.
I563. hereafter cited as Sheng. YCTK). v. 31, pp. 16-17.

William R. Braisted. ”The United States and the
American China Development Company.” Far Eastern Quarterly.
x1 (1951-52). pp. 1u7-165.

 

80

The bonds were to carry five percent interest. The com-
pany was assured as compensation the profits secured from
sale of the bonds. five percent of the cost of construction.
and twenty percent of the net profits. In addition to the
main line. the company was promised the right to build an
extension to the sea and branch lines necessary for traffic
Connections. By appended notes. China promised to authorize
the American company to operate coal mines adjacent to its
concession and to provide funds for the Peking-Hankow
railway if Belgium gave up her concession to construct it.10

During the Winter of 1898-99. the Development
Company sent William Barclay Parsons to China to survey the
proposed route of the Canton-Hankow railway. The American
engineer closely studied the resources and population
along the route which ran through the provinces of Hupeh.
Hunan and Kwangtung. Parsons came to the conclusion that
the construction of the Canton-Hankow railway would be of
great value for both the development of the area and the
profits of the American company. Nevertheless. he discovered
that the cost of the construction. put at h.000.000 in
the contract. had been extremely underestimated to the ex-
tent of nearly 100 percent. Consequently. he suggested

10
W. W. Rockhill. Treaties and Conventions with and
Qoncerninghina (Washington. 190“}. pp. 252-2537 Wu to
Sheng. KZH/B/E-(March 26. 1898). Sheng's memorials. KZu/3/7
and 29. Sheng. YCTK. v. 31. p. 19 and v. 21. pp. 10-11.

81

modification of certain terms in the contract.11
The Development Company endorsed the Parsons report

and sent Clarence Cary to China to negotiate a supplementary

agreement. Cary put before Sheng Hsuan-huai at Shanghai

some sweeping demands for lengthy additional lines and

extensive mining rights.12 However. it was not opportune

for China to accept the new American demands at a time when

the anti-foreign rebellion of the Boxers was already brewing.

As a matter of fact. Chang Chih-tung had always been

cautious in handling the Canton-Hankow railway affairs.

When he learned that the Hankow-Canton railway was to be

operated by the Americans under the stipulations of the

first contract. he promptly asked Sheng Hshan-huai to make

some revisions so as to reserve the rights for China to

fire any unqualified American operators and to prohibit any

transportation of foreign troops on the railway.13 When

Parsons came to undertake the survey of the route for the

proposed Canton-Hankow railway. Chang at first opposed the

Parsons party plan to travel through Hunan because the

 

11
W. Barclay Parsons. AggAmericanEngineer in China
(New York. 1900). pp. uh-126; Percy Horace Kent. Railway
Entegpgise in China (London. 1907). pp. 112-11“.

12
Sheng to Tsungli-Yamen. K25/2/13 (March 2“. 1899)
and x25/A/23. Sheng. YCTK. v. 31;. pp. 6-7. 18.

13
Chang to Sheng. K2b/3/8 and 10 (March 29 and 31.
1898), Chang. OE. Cite. V0 155' pp. 6-70

 

.—

 

82

province was particularly anti-foreign at that time. Instead.
he urged Parsons to make the survey through the province of
Kiangsi. It was only at Parsons insistance that an effort
was made to get an edict issued by the court to the Governor
of Hunan to allow the surveying party to enter the province
under his protection.“L

In the same manner. Chang firmly opposed new con-
cessions to the Development Company. especially in respect
to mining. In November. 1899. he told the American minister
Conger. who came from Peking to Hankow to visit him. that
China was anxious to have the Canton-Hankow railway built by
Americans. However. he stressed. the Chinese government
could not grant any concessions concerning mining such as
Cary demanded. because the people in Hunan were so opposed
to foreigners and determined to develop the mines them-
selves.15 Therefore. some of Cary's sweeping demands were
brushed aside.

Finally. a supplementary agreement was signed in
July. 1900. With no mention of mining. the chief provisions
in this new contract were the extension of the time for
Completion of the line from three to five years and the

increase in the amount of the loan from h.OO0.000 to

‘r

111
Kent. op. cit.. pp. 111-112.

15
Conger to Hay. Dec. 31. 1899. China Degpatches.

83
“0.000.000. Above all. article 17 provided that the
Americans could not transfer their rights "to other nations

or PGOple of other nationality."16

This restriction. which
later provided the issue in a dispute leading to the can-
cellation of the American concession. underlined the
Chinese preference for American help in the construction of
the Canton-Hankow railway.

The supplementary agreement was ratified by the
Peking Government in July. 1902.17 In the autumn of the
same year the extension from Canton. by way of Fatshan. to
Samshui was commenced. and the second survey over the main
line for construction purposes was put in hand. Towards the
end of 1903 the Canton-Fatshan section was opened to
traffic and in September of the fo1lowing year Samshui was
reached. the whole length of the extension (thirty-two miles)
being opened to the public.18

Before the Peking government took action on ratifi-

cation. however. a dispute over article 17 of the supplementary

 

16
Rockhill. op. cit.. pp. 259-77.

17
Sheng's memorial. K28/5/10 (June 28. 1902) and Wai
Wu Pu to Sheng. K28/6/8. Sheng. 9p; 213.. v. 7. pp. 17-20.
and v. 58. p. 11; Conger to Hay. July 1h. 190?. China
Despatches.

18
Kent. 02. Cite, p0 1170

8h
agreement had already evolved between China and the Develop-
ment Company as a result of the encroachment of the
Belgians upon the American interest. As early as the
beginning of 1901. Sheng Hsuan-huai learned that the
Development Company was selling its stock to the Belgian
interests. He instructed the Chinese minister at
Washington. Wu T'ing-fang to prevent the company from do-
ing so. Following Sheng's instructions. Wu made use of his
reply to a letter from F.W. Whitridge. an American director
of the Development Company. to ask a series of questions
about the shareholders of the company. Whitridge conceded
that there had been a good many changes in the ownership
of the stock of the company as a consequence of the Boxer
rebellion. But he denied that the company had sold out to
a Belgian syndicate. or any other syndicate. and affirmed
that a majority of the shares of the company were still
held by Americans.19 This explanation did not convince
Sheng Hsdan-huai. In March of 1901. the American charge
at Peking indicated that Sheng was disposed to repudiate
the Hankow-Canton railway contract. In June. it was learned
that Sheng had wired Wu T'ing-fang to cancel the contract

on the ground that the provisions of article 17 of the

 

19
Sheng to Wu. x26/11/15 (Jan. 5. 1901). Sheng.
YCTK. v. #8. p. 35; F.W. Whitridge to Wu. Jan. 10. 1901. Wu
to Whitridge. Jan. 12. 1901. and Whitridge to Wu. Jan. In.
1901. Hay Papers.

85

supplementary agreement had been violated by a sale of
4,400 shares out of the Development Company's 6.000 shares
to other nationalities.20

Sheng had some worries at that particular time.
As has been stressed. the Canton-Hankow railway concession
was granted to an American company for purposes of pre-
venting any of other leading powers from exclusive control
of China through further encroachment. As a consequence of
the Boxer rebellion. however. Russia was threatening in the
beginning of 1901 as she put before the Chinese government

her most aggressive demands on Manchuria.21

Under the cir-
cumstances. Sheng had to be concerned. The Belgian
interests had long been identified with both French and
Russian interests. A transfer of the shares of the
Development Company from American holders to Belgian
holders might result in a turnover of the Canton-Hankow
railway rights not only to Belgium. but to Russia. and thus
put Russia in control of a great part of China. In one of
his dispatches. the American chargé'at Peking indicated

2

that Sheng did have such fears. 2 Later on. some other

Chinese officials would also argue for cancellation of the

20

Squiers to Hay. March 26 and June 13. 1901.
China Deepatches.

21
See Chap. II.

22
Squiers to Hay. March 26. 1901. China Despatches.

 

86

Canton-Hankow railway contract on the same ground.

Temporarily. Sheng's worries were dispelled and the
director-general of Chinese railways decided to get the
Hankow-Canton railway agreement ratified by the Peking
government. This change was attributed to the following
events. At first. Sheng learned that the Development Com~
pany had already raised $3,000,000 in cash and was ready to
begin construction. Secondly. he was assured by both the
Chinese minister at Washington and the American minister
at Peking that the management of the Development Company
remained in American hands and the firm was ”a bona fide
American company." Thirdly. he was negotiating at that
time with a British interest for the Shanghai-Nanking Rail-
way loan agreement. An unnecessary trouble over the
Canton-Hankow railway contract. he thought. might result in
disadvantageous terms for the loan.23

Once again. the Belgian encroachment of the
Development Company became so evident at the beginning of
190“ that the Chinese government had to take issue with the
United States. It was widely reported that Belgians not
only had bought a great portion of shares of the Development
Company but were pressing for a division of the Canton-

Hankow railway in which they would be given sole control of

 

23
Sheng to Tao. K27/ll/5 (Dec. 15. 1901), Wu to
Sheng. x27/12/2 and Sheng to Chang. K28/1/5. Sheng. YCTK.
v. 56. p. 34, and v. 57. p. h. 9-10; Braisted. pp; 213..
and E-tu Zen Sun. Chinese Railwa s and British Interests.
1898-1911 (New York. l95h). pp.'7E-73?

87
the northern section. In the meantime. General Whittier.
the agent of the Belgian Syndicate in New York. superceded
Mr. William Barclay Parsons. the American engineer who had
undertaken the survey of the Hankow-Canton route and who
had succeeded Calvin Briceto manage the Development Company.
to become the President of the American firm. The American
manager of the company's Shanghai office was recalled. the
same fate overtaking the engineers. who were replaced by
Belgians. Besides. Sheng Hsuan-huai was especially sur-
prised at the accounts of the Development Company which
covered a lot of expenses not in the United States. not in
China. but at Brussels.2u The situation was too apparent.
Sheng could not but warn that the Chinese government would
cancel the Hankow-Canton concession according to article 17
of the supplementary agreement if the Washington government
took no action. In one of his instructions to Chinese
minister Liang Ch'en at Washington. Sheng stressed that the
Chinese government could recognize the Development Company
only as long as it was controlled by Americans. In March.
he sent his American secretary John C. Ferguson to the

United States to arrange a settlement.25

 

2h
London Times. Dec. 25. 1903. cited in Braisted.
op. cit.. p. 135: Kent. op. cit.. p. 11?. Sheng to Liana.
K29/11717 (Jan. a. 190“). Sheng. YCTK. v. 62. p. 12.

25
Sheng to Liang. K29/ll/17 and 28. Sheng. YCTK.
v. 62. pp. 12. 20: Sheng to Goodnow. enclosed in Goodnow to
Hay. March 23. 1904. Consular Despatches._§hanghai.

88

Now. the American government was involved. American
minister at Peking. Conger. had done all he could for the
Development Company. After he learned of the Belgian in-
volvement and received a protest from Sheng Hsfian-huai. he
believed the company had violated its contract with the
Chinese government. He explained in his report to Hay. it
was difficult for the Chinese to separate the United States
government from the enterprises of American citizens. hence
any failure of the latter to keep their promises would dis-
credit the American government as well. and the action of
the Development Company would make it very hard in the
future for all Americans seeking concessions to receive
consideration from the Chinese government. Therefore. he
advised the State Department to cease supporting the company

if Sheng's allegation were found to be true.26

After
Ferguson arrived at Washington with Sheng's instructions.
Chinese minister Liang sent to the State Department a note
in which he asked three questions. First. did the American
government regard the Development Company as a bona fide
American company? Secondly. would the American government
claim sole right to deal with all diplomatic problems

affecting the company? Thirdly. would the American

government make public its attitude. especially its

26

Conger to Hay. Jan. 21 and 22. 190h, China
Despatchgg.

89

willingness to use its good offices on behalf of the
company? Nevertheless. the Washington government could not
be moved by either Conger‘s advice or Liang's note. To
Liang's questions. the State Department made all positive
answers with only a reservation to indicate that the
American government would withdraw its support should the
Development Company change its conduct or organization in
future.27

For a time both Sheng and Liang seemed to be con-
vinced by the State Department and regarded it as difficult
for China to cancel the Canton-Hankow contract unilaterally
after the American government officially expressed its

28 Nonethe-

willingness to support the Development Company.
less. the provincial interests along the Canton-Hankow line
had been infuriated by the news about the Belgian involve-
ment. They bombarded the director-general of Chinese rail-
ways with telegrams which insisted on annulment of the con-
tract. As Governor Chao of Hunan Province put it. the

Belgian involvement of the Development Company was “a

matter of the greatest moment." and the people of Hunan.

27
Ferguson to Sheng. K30/3/27 (May 12. 190b). Sheng.
YCTK. VI 6“" pp. 9-100

28
Sheng to Human gentry. to Wang. and to Chang.
Tuan and Chao. KBO/h/l (May 15. 190a). to Wai Wu Pu. K30/u/3.
to Wu. x3o/u/3. and Liang to Sheng. Kao/u/g, Sheng. YCTK.
V. 6"". pp. 13-21.

90
who would be the first to suffer from the evil consequences.
would on no account recognize the contract. For the gentry
in Hunan. it was of no use to consult with the American
government. In their words. the railway contract was not
made with the Washington government. and consequently it
could not legally interfere; nor was it made through the
American minister. so that he also was not concerned. The
only proper step for Sheng to take was immediately to annul
the contract. holding the Americans strictly to account for
their violation of article 17. The gentry of Hupeh
province expressed their opinions in similar terms. They
advised Sheng not to settle the matter with the American
government in a compromising way. On the top of these
provincial gentry. there was Viceroy Chang Chih-tung at
Hankow. In one of his telegrams to Sheng. he earnestly
hoped that Sheng would make strong representation to
Minister Liang and at the same time instruct Mr. Ferguson
to vigorously protest and not to cease his efforts until
the cancellation of the contract was secured. In threaten-
ing terms. he even asked Sheng: "Should there be the
slightest display of incautiousness in the handling of the
present case without having succeeded in taking action in
accordance with article 17 in the agreement. who would then.
in the event of interference of other powers. take upon

_himself the responsibility for the mistake?"29 This new

29
Hunan gentry to Sheng. Wang to Sheng. and Chang to

91

position of Viceroy Chang presented a striking contrast to
that he had taken while preferring American assistance.

These provincial interests insisted on the cancel-
lation of the Canton-Hankow railway contract on several
grounds. They were unhappy with the violation of article
17 on the part of Americans. They complained that the con-
struction of the line was too slow. without a single inch
of work being started in Hunan Province after four years
had elapsed. They declared that they wanted to build the
railway by themselves.30 Above all. these people had just
the same worries that Sheng had expressed in 1901. As they
saw it. the Belgian interests represented those of France
and Russia. The Belgian encroachment on the Development
Company meant a final control of the company by the govern-
ments at Paris and St. Petersburg. France. the argument
continued. had her sphere of influence in Southern China.
Russia had obtained special interests in Manchuria. If
these two powers controlled the Development Company through
their Belgian agents and grabbed the rights to construct the
Canton-Hankow line which ran into the heartland of China.

how dangerous it would be for the old empire was beyond

 

Sheng. K30/3/28 (May 13. 190h). Chang and Tuan to Sheng.
K30/3/29. Chang. Tuan and Chao to Sheng. K3o/u/2. and Hupeh
gentry to Sheng. Kao/u/7. Sheng. YCTK. v. 6n, pp. 5-21:
Goodnow to Pierce. June 22. l90h. Consularfiggspatches.

S hanghil o —

Ibid.

92
imagination.31 Strikingly enough. while China had preferred
to grant Americans the Canton-Hankow railway concession for
purpose of saving herself from being exclusively dominated
by any particular power. she decided a few years later to
cancel the concession on almost the same ground.

The Chinese government. however. did not officially
notify the United States about its determination to cancel
the Canton~Hankow railway contract until the end of lQOU.
Before that time. the Development Company made several
efforts to convince the outside world that a majority of its
shares had been bought back from Belgians and their company
was under the management of Americans. Nevertheless.
Chinese officials could hardly believe it. As late as
October. 1904. Sheng Hsuan-huai still could cite new cases

32

of Belgian interference and mismanagement. Meanwhile.

Sheng failed to realize his plan to save the American con-
cession. The so-called "American replacement" plan was

designed for regranting the Canton-Hankow railway rights to a new

31
Tsen to Sheng. K30/l/21 (March 7, 190a), Chang to
Sheng. K30/3/2. and Hunan gentry to Sheng. K30/3/28. Sheng.
YC‘I‘Kl v. 63. pp. 6. 22-23. V. 6a. p. 10; and Chang to Wai
Wu Pu. K3o/u/2. Chang. op. cit.. v. 189. pp. 28-29.

32
Loomis to Moncheur. July 21. 190b, Moncheur to
Loomis. July 30. 190a, Moncheur to Hay. Aug. 13. 190b,
Whittier to Hay. Sept. 21. 190U.and Cary to Rockhill. Oct.
14. 190a, cited in Braisted. pp; 233.. p. 157.

93
American syndicate represented in China by A. W. Bash. But
the fact that Bash had signed the original Canton-Hankow
agreement in behalf of the Development Company in 1898
deepened suspicion of some Chinese. especially Chang Chih-
tung. Finally. Sheng's plan was turned down.33 Thus. the
cancellation of the Canton-Hankow concession became the
only step left for China to take. In December. the court
ordered Minister Liang to notify the Washington government
that China had decided to annul the concession granted to
the Development Company. Since Chang Chih-tung was the
most outspoken leader for annulment. he was authorized to
assume the responsibility. with Liang's assistance. for
negotiating with the American company to end its contract
with the Chinese government. (In his telegrams to transfer
the court's order to Liang. Sheng explained again why China
insisted on cancellation. China. Sheng stressed. worried
about the possibility for Russia and France. through their
Belgian agents in the American company. to grab the Canton-
Hankow railway rights. As a power which had several times
advocated protecting China's integrity. the United States
Should not be willing to see Chinese rights violated by

3“

other powers.

3

Sheng to Wai Wu Pu. K30/8/27 (Oct. 5. 190”): Sheng.
YCTK. v. 66. pp. lZ-lh; Chang to Sheng. K30/lO/12. Chang.
02. Cite. V. 191’ p. 30

34
Chang to Sheng. K30/ll/8 (Dec. 1“. 1904). Sheng
to Chang. K30/ll/10. and Sheng to Liang. K30/ll/13. Sheng.
m. v. 66. pp. 31-32. v. 67. p. l.

94
Negotiations started in January of 1905 at

Washington with Liang and John W. Foster as representatives
on the Chinese side. and Elihu Root and G. W. Ingraham
Speaking for the Development Company. It took about half a
year for both parties to reach an agreement by which China
would pay $6,750,000 in compensation covering the railway
properties and the bonds sold by the company. with the bond
holders being given the option of retaining their securities
either wholly or in part.35 The compensation was exception-
ally high in view of the fact that the American company had
constructed for China only a short line from Canton to
Sanshui (thirty-two miles). President Theodore Roosevelt
was told by Americans that it had been suggested by the
Chinese Minister himself. As W. W. Rockhill learned from
William Barclay Parsons. this large sum of compensation had
been fixed upon to "gauge the opposition of the Chinese" to
the Development Company.36 In fact. the company originally
presented claims even much larger. totalling $18,100,000.37
The Washington government stood opposed to the

settlement from very beginning. Immediately after Liang

35

J.V.H. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and
C<>ncerning Ching; I (New York, 1921). pp. 519-521.

36
Roosevelt to Rockhill, Aug. 8, 1905, enclosed in
fybckhill to State Department. Aug. 9. 1905, and Rockhill to
-$tate Department. Aug. 17. 1905, China Despgtches.

37
Ingraham to Foster. May 29. 1905. cited in Braisted.

2&0. Eli-v Po 1590

95

notified John Hay of China's determination to revoke the
Canton—Hankow concession. the Secretary of State was assured
that the Americans had just regained a clear majority of the
stock of the Development Company as J.P. Morgan had bought
back 1.200 shares from the Belgian interests.38 Therefore.
he hastened to apprise Liang and the American legation in
Peking that he still regarded the enterprise to be American.
He directed John Gardner Coolidge. the American Charge in
Peking. to urge the Chinese to postpone cancellation until
the parties interested in the Canton-Hankow concession were
heard from. With no satisfactory assurances coming from
the Chinese. he once again telegraphed Coolidge on January
26. 1905 to protest "with energy” against cancellation.
"The American proprietors have made great sacrifices in re-
gaining absolute control of the enterprise." Hay added.
“this government cannot tolerate such an act of spoilation
as the forfeiture of the concession would be."39

President Theodore Roosevelt was much more stirred.
He wrote Hay on January 26. "I should be very sorry to

40

abandon the project of building that road." After John Hay

died. the President took over all dealings with China.

 

38
Diary of John Hay and Morgan to Hay. Jan. 5. 1905.
cited in Braisted. op. cit.. p. 158.

39
Coolidge to Hay. Jan. 18 and 25. Hay to Coolidge.
Jan. 26. 1905. confirmed in Coolidge to Hay. Feb. 9. 1905.
China Despatches.

40
Cited in Howard K. Beale. Theodore Roggevelt and

96
He worked on two fronts. 0n the one hand, he directed W.W.
Rockhill. the new American Minister to China. to put pres-
sure on the Peking government. If China desired the
Americans to construct the Canton-Hankow railway. the
President instructed Rockhill to tell the Chinese government.
the Development Company under the control of Americans
would proceed at once with building and the company was
willing to meet any reasonable request of the Chinese
government as to modification of concession. "The American
government." Roosevelt added in strong terms. "cannot
acquiesce in sharp practice by the Chinese government to
the detriment of interests of entire American business com-
munity in the Orient."ul 0n the other hand. the President
appealed to J. P. Morgan. now a big shareholder of the
Development Company. not to sell the Canton-Hankow railway
rights back to China. He promised the well-known banker
that the American government would support the company in
every honorable way to prevent it from being wronged by
China or by any other country.“2

Nevertheless. Roosevelt failed in his efforts.

After faltering for a while. Prince Ch'ing eventually

 

the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore. Md.. 1956),
p. 183.

#1

. Roosevelt to Rockhill. Aug. 8. 1905, confirmed
in Brookhill to Secretary of State. Aug. 9. 1905. China
Despatches.

42
Roosevelt to Morgan. July 18, 1905. cited in
Braisted. op. cit.. p. 161.

97
informed Rockhill on August 15. 1905 that the Chinese

government had approved the indemnity agreement reached in
June.’+3 Morgan expressed his unwillingness to keep the
company any longer when Roosevelt made a final appeal to
him on August 27 an Two days later. the indemnity agree-
ment was officially signed in Washington and the Americans
lost the Canton-Hankow railway concession forever. The
President could do nothing more but blamed himself for
having left the earlier negotiations to Hay and the State
Department. "If I had been in closer touch with the work-
ings of the State Department I should have taken drastic
action long ago. both against the members of this corp-
oration who had sold out to the Belgians. and against the
Chinese government. . . I am sure I could have put the thing
through.”45

Rockhill assumed his new post as American Minister
to China in June. 1905. He also saw that the cancellation
of the Canton-Hankow concession would "gravely and
permanently" injure American interests in China. But he
put more blame on the Development Company. After he learned

that the company would sell back the concession to China at

“3
Rockhill to Secretary of State, Aug. 17. 1905.

China Despatches.

44
Beale. op. 313.. p. 189.

45
Ibid.. p. 190.

98

$6,750,000. a sum vastly in excess of the outlay of the com-
pany, he thought the price would be looked upon by all as
excessively sharp practice of the shareholders. "It is a
blow to all our interests in China," he wrote in regret.
"It places our government, which helped to secure the con-
cession, in a false position. It serves to intensify anti-
American feeling and aids our competitors in these markets.
It has shaken belief in our business integrity, if con-
summated. Americans will get no new concessions for years
to come." Then. he urged making arrangements with the
Chinese promptly for saving the concessionf‘L6

Nevertheless, the Chinese were determined. Chang
Chih-tung and the provincial interests were willing to pay
such a high price to buy back the railway rights, and they
were making all efforts to raise the needed funds.u7 In
Peking, Rockhill's protests against the cancellation of the
Canton-Hankow concession received no definite and satis-
factory response.“8 The Russo—Japanese War had recently

come to an end. With Russia defeated in the battlefield.

China no longer had to worry about the possibility that the

#6
Rockhill to State Department, June 2 and Aug. 9.
1905. China Despatches.

47
Sun. op. cit.. pp. 76-82.

#8
Rockhill to State Department and enclosures, Aug.
17 and 22. 1905. China Despatches.

99

Belgian involvement of the Development Company would lead

to French and Russian control of the Canton-Hankow railway.
Thus. one of the main reasons for cancelling the Canton-
Hankow concessions seemed to have disappeared. Nevertheless.
on the other hand. the Japanese victory over the White race
helped the national awakening of China. The Chinese,
racially identical with the victor. began to lose their
patience to submit to foreign pressures. Under the circum-
stances. boycotts broke out in many large cities of China
against America's exclusion of Chinese laborers.”9 And, as
Rockhill reported. there was a strong feeling in the whole
of China in favor of the Chinese regaining possession at

the earliest possible dates of railway building. and a
determination not to make concessions of any kind to foreign
countries.50 This explains why China stood firm at the
final stage of negotiations to annul the Development Company
contracts.

How the Canton-Hankow railway would be finally con-
structed is another story. In what has been discussed. it
is clear that when China was under the pressure to make
railway concessions. she would open her door for all of the
powers. not for any particular power. In the case of

Canton-Hankow railway concession, the Chinese officials

 

#9
See Chap. IV.

50
Rockhill to State Department, Aug. 17, and 19.
1905, China Despatches.

100
were especially interested in employing an American interest
to counter the interests of other great powers. Consequent-
ly, a contract was signed with the American China Develop-
ment Company to construct the railway.

Nevertheless. the American company violated the
contract and sold some of its shares to the Belgian
interests. This violation alarmed the Chinese officials.
They believed that the French and Russian interests were
behind the Belgian ones. The Belgian encroachment on the
American company would result in a French or Russian con-
trol of the Canton-Hankow railway. If that happened, their
original purpose to employ an American interest to counter
those of other powers would fall apart. Therefore. they
determined to cancel the Canton-Hankow railway concession.
Their effort was finally supported by two forces. First,
the provincial interests in Hunan and Hupeh wanted to build
railways in their area by themselves. Secondly. there
appeared after the Russo-Japanese War a strong feeling
among Chinese people in favor of recovering the rights

Which had been conceded to foreigners.

CHAPTER IV
A STUMBLING BLOCK

During a time when China was threatened with parti-
tion as a result of the scramble for concessions and the
Boxer rebellion, the open door policy expounded by the
Washington government seemed to be helpful for China and
the Chinese did try to make use of it to serve the in-
terests of their country. Nevertheless. China could never
establish more friendly relations with the United States.
For many Chinese. the United States was even as perfidious
as those powers which had encroached upon China‘s territories.
There are plenty of explanations. Except for those dis-
cussed in the last three chapters. the American exclusion
laws and the Chinese resentment against them always con-
stituted a stumbling block in the contacts between the two
nations.

The Sino-American dispute over the immigration
problem had a long history. More recently, the Chinese
government yielded to the wishes of the United States in
1894 and concluded the Yang-Gresham treaty which gave Con-
gress additional power of legislation respecting Chinese
laborers. By Article I of this treaty it was agreed that

for a term of ten years the coming of Chinese laborers to

101

102

the United States should be absolutely prohibited. Article
III provided that "the provisions of this convention shall
not affect the right at present enjoyed of Chinese subjects,
being officials. teachers, students. merchants. or
travellers for curiosity or pleasure. but not laborers. of
coming to the United States and residing therein."
Article IV stipulated that Chinese, either permanently or
temporarily residing in the United States. "shall have for
the protection of their persons and property all rights
that are given by the laws of the United States to citizens
of the most favored nation, excepting the right to become
naturalized citizens."1 For a few years this treaty seemed
to be respected and there was no serious contention over
its practice. Around the turn of the century. however.
the United States government began to change its policy
and violations of either the spirit or the letter of the
treaty were common.

In 1898, 1900 and 1902 respectively, the United
States extended the exclusion laws based on the treaty of
1894 to the newly annexed Hawaii and the Philippines. By
that time there had been residing in the Hawaiian Islands
approximately 20,000 Chinese. Among them a large number
had been born in the islands and a considerable number had
become lawfully naturalized citizens of Hawaii. The

l

.J. V. A. MacMurray. Treaties and Agreements with
and Concerning China, I (New York). pp. 9-11.

 

103
official statistics show that many of these Chinese had be-
come holders of real estate. that they outnumbered all
other nationalities as merchants and traders. and that in
three of the branches of trade, as shown by the official
licenses issued, they also exceeded all other nationalities.
To a far larger extent are these statements true of con-
ditions in the Philippines. For centuries very intimate
and important relations had existed between the archipelago
and China owing to their continguity and the favorable
trade and industrial conditions. The commercial intercourse
between these islands and the cities of Southern China had
been and was very extensive, and the Chinese population
there was very large. engaged in almost every walk of life.
Many of these Chinese were native born, of which a consider-
able portion were the offspring of marriage with the

Philippine races.2

Given such close relations. the exten-
sion of the exclusion laws into Hawaii and the Philippines
stirred up the Chinese government. It worried that the ex-
Clusion laws would do great injury and injustice to the

Chinese in those islands. It also hated to see the contin-

uance of close relations between China and those islands

thus threatened. Naturally, the Chinese government protested.

 

2

Wu to Hay. Dec. 12, 1898, Feb. 3, 1899, and Dec.
10. 1901. FRUS, 1899, pp. 202-204. 207-208, and 1901, pp.
91-95; and Chester Holcombe. "Chinese Exclusion and the Boy-
cott." Outlook, LXXXI (1905), 1066-1072.

104

In its protests one point was often stressed. The treaty
of 1894 was concluded before the annexation of Hawaii and
the Philippines. Therefore. the exclusion legislation
based on it should not be applied to the islands.3

Next, there was a change of American policy regard-
ing Chinese in transit. The right of transit had been
equally enjoyed by all Chinese persons. By the treaty of
1894. though Chinese laborers were prohibited from coming
to the United States. the right of transit was reserved for
them with all other Chinese classes. Up to 1901 about
37,000 Chinese in transit had passed through the United
States to Mexico or somewhere else with no one being denied.
In the latter half of 1901, however. out of 1,000 transits
200 were suddenly denied landing. Thereafter. the transit
regulations were tightened. By 1905. the old rule
requiring the Chinese laborers in transit to have a
through ticket across the whole territory and a bond of
five hundred dollars had been elaborated to apply to
Chinese "persons". apparently including the exempt classes
Provided in the Article III of the Yang-Gresham Treaty.
In the meantime, the immigration officials were authorized
to demand any proof he chose to ask that if the transit was

in good faith and if the traveler was not of the exempt

 

A typical protest is found in Wu to Hay, Dec. 10,
1901. FRUS. 1901. pp. 75-97. in which Wu made a long review
of Chinese immigration problems.

105
class.“

More intolerably. the rights of the exempt classes
were not properly respected in accordance with the principle
of the most favored nation. This kind of mistreatment was
exemplified by many cases. On October 11. 1902, a number
of United States immigration officials and a force of
local police made a sudden and unexpected descent upon the
Chinese quarter of Boston. In the raid no mercy was shown
by the officials. They treated all Chinese alike. no matter
whether they were laborers or the persons of the exempt
classes. Finally, about 250 Chinese were arrested and
carried off to the Federal Building. There they were
crowded into two small rooms where only standing space could
be had. all through the night. and many of them till late
in the afternoon of the next day. After the event. an
official report revealed that among the arrested only five
Proved to be illegal residents.5

In 1903, a Chinese military attache was mistreated
in San Francisco. The attache. named Tom Kim Yung, was
returning to his lodgings at the Chinese Consulate General
one evening when he was accosted by a policeman in most in-
decent language and struck with gross indignity. This

resulted in an encounter participated in by another policeman.

1..

Mary Roberts Coolidge. Chinese Immigpation (New
York, 1909). pp. 287-2890

5
John W. Foster. "The Chinese Boycott." Atlantic
Monthly; XCVII (1906), 118-127.

106
Yung was beaten and severely bruised. and finally handcuffed
and tied by his queue to a fence until the arrival of a
patrol wagon. into which he was forced and taken to the
police station. There he was kept some time. until released
on bail given by a Chinese merchant, about half past one
o'clock at night. After that. he was held for trial on a
charge of assaulting a police officer. and when his diplo-
matic character was brought to the attention of the chief
of police by the consul general. that officer refused to
dismiss the charge.

Then Chinese officials and merchants who were invited
to attend the Louisiana Purchase Exhibition at St. Louis in
1904 were also harshly treated. The American government had
sent the Hon. John Barrett to China requesting that each
province send an exhibit. Since it was China's first
official representation at an affair of this kind. liberal
appropriation was made. a commission was organized. and a
Prince was appointed to participate in the opening ceremony
of the fair. Merchants all over China became enthusiastic
likewise. and preparations were going on on a large scale.
Nevertheless. there came. months after the invitation had
been extended. the rulings of the Treasury Department that
Chinese to take part in the fair had to be photographed,
had to comply with discriminating conditions not made

applicable to any other nationals, and had to give a bond

107

of five hundred dollars to guarantee that they would leave
the country after the closing of the fair. The publica-
tion of these rulings in the Chinese press led to indigna-
tion and many Chinese merchants decided to give up their
contemplated exhibitions. When the others finally came to
the United States and arrived in San Francisco. they were
more mistreated and certain of them were detained in the
shed.”a cheap. two-story. wooden building. at the end of
the wharf. built out over the water where the odors of sew-
age and bilge are most offensive: unclean. at times over-
run with vermine, and often inadequate to the numbers to be
detained."7

Naturally. the mistreatments and other violations
against the treaty of 1894 brought in protests from the
Chinese ministers at Washington.8 The Chinese ministers
to the United States had been assigned the protection of
Chinese immigrants as their main duty. After Wu T'ing-fang
assumed the post in 1898 he became more active than his
predecessors in censuring the American exclusion laws.
Besides filing the necessary diplomatic protests. he made

use of many occasions to admonish the American public. As

7

Wong Kai Kah. "A Menace to America's Oriental Trade."
North American Review, CLXXVIII (1904). 414-424: Colidfie.

op. cit.. pp. 291-301:

8

A plenty of these diplomatic arguments which
Chinese ministers presented against the American exclusion
laws can be found in the volumes of FRUS.

108

he argued. the treaty of 1894 prohibited only the Chinese
laborers. there should be no law or regulation against any
of other Chinese classes. Furthermore. he believed it
basically unjust to single out Chinese for exclusion.
"Justice would seem to demand equal consideration for the
Chinese on the part of the United States.“ he wrote once.
"China does not ask for special favors. All she wants is
enjoyment of the same privileges accorded other national-
ities. Instead. she is singled out for discrimination and
made the subject of hostile legislation. Her door is wide
open to the people of the United States. but their door is
slammed in the face of her people." He told Americans

that China had long ago adopted the open door policy in
I her foreign intercourse. She had relations with all the
European powers. together with the United States and
others. All these were equally "favored nations" in every
sense of the term. All foreigners. Americans included.
enjoyed the same rights. privileges. immunities and exempt-
ions with respect to commerce. navigation. travel. and
residence throughout China. In reciprocity. he reaffirmed,
the United States should deal with the question of Chinese
immigration in a spirit of fairness and equity and accord
Chinese subjects who came to the United States for
legitimate purposes the same treatment as was accorded to

the people of other countries.9 Thus. Wu criticized the

 

9
New York Times. April 9 and Oct. 18. 1899. Jan. 26

109

American exclusion laws in rhetoric of the open door and
fair play.

After Wu left office. Liang Cheng came to the
United States in the Spring of 1903 to take over the job
as the Chinese minister. When he disembarked at San
Francisco. Liang told the newsmen explicitly that he would
do what he could to induce a modification of the exclusion

10

laws. By the beginning of 1904, he became more im-

patient. As he saw it. the American exclusion laws were
too harsh and annoying. For the purpose of getting rid of
them. the Chinese government had better reach an agreement
with the United States not to renew the treaty of 189u

when it was going to eXpire in December of 190“. If
impossible. Liang added in his telegram to the Wai Wu Pu in
Peking. a sweeping revision of the treaty had to be in-

11

sisted upon at least. Incidentally. only one day before

Liang sent this telegram to express his hatred of American
exclusion laws. the Russo-Japanese War had been declared
and the State Department had dispatched identical notes to

China and the two belligerents to assert once more in terms

_¥

and Feb. 9, 1900. and March 28. 1902: Wu T'ing-fang.
"China and the United States." Independence. LII (1900).
752-558 also Wu. "Mutual Helpfulness between China and the
United States." North American Reviewl CLXXI (1900). 1-12.

10
New York TimesI March 27. 1903.

11
Liang to Wai Wu Pu. K29/12/26 ( Feb. 11. 19ou),
Ch'ing Arghives.

———-J--

 

110
of the Open Door. that the neutrality of China and her
administrative entity had to be respected in all practical
ways .

Obviously. the resentment of the Overseas Chinese
who had suffered one way or another under the American ex-
clusion laws was even greater. As a result. they sent
letters and telegrams back to China to describe vividly
the misfortunes which they had experienced and to urge an
annulment of the treaty of 1894. Among these complaints.
one came from the Overseas Chinese in Latin America who
had passed through the United States as transits. Another
one was sent in the name of about 56.000 Overseas Chinese
in the United States. A third one was a resolution adopted
by the Overseas Chinese merchants who had held a meeting
convened by the Chinese Benevolent Association at San
Francisco. one of the largest and most influential Overseas
Chinese organizations.13 In short. they represented a wide
indignation over the American exclusion policy.

More significantly. the harsh enforcement of Ameri-
can exclusion 1aws had its effects inside China. Among the
victims of the Boston raid of 1902. a man named Feng Hsia-
wei wrote a book on his unhappy experiences after he

returned to China. Being so distressed. he finally committed

12
w: 190“. pp. 2-3.

13
The three complaints mentioned here were sent to
Wai Wu Pu respectively in 1901 and 1903. They are cited in
Chang Tsun-Wu. Chung Mei Kong Yueh Fang Cha9_(Agitation over

111
suicide near the American Consulate in Shanghai. His book
and his martyrdom made a profound impression in China. In
many cities of South China. several thousand Chinese joined
demonstrations in his memory. Several eulogies were written
to praise him and to denounce American brutality against
Chinese nationals. Tom Kim Yung. the Chinese attache who
was maltreated in San Francisco in 1903. also felt that he
had ”lost face" with his countrymen and committed suicide.
When the funeral service was held. he was followed to the
grave by thousands of his countrymen who regarded themselves
as personally outraged. The Chinese merchants who attended
the Louisiana Purchase Exposition returned to China with
some bitterness. They complained that Americans were ”a
race of pigs” and spread word of the insulting discrimina-
tion which they had suffered throughout their respective

14

provinces. Anyhow. the Chinese were so agitated that they

were ready to take steps of economic boycott as the diplo-
matic negotiations were being undertaken because of the
expiration of the treaty of 189M.

In 1903. some Overseas Chinese in the United States

were already fomenting a boycott against American goods.

—
‘—

tfie Sino-American Exclusion Treaty. Taipei. 1965). pp. 11-
1 .

1h
A Yin. ed.. Fang7Mei Hua Kung Chin Yueh Wen Hsueh Chi
(An Anti-American Literary Collection on the Exclusion of
Chinese Laborers. Shanghai. 1960). pp. 696-699: Foster. 92; cit.:
and Lu Fang-Shih. Hsin Tsuan Yueh Chagnga Chuan (A New Compila-
tion of Treaties. Shanghai. 19087. v. 12. pp. 315-416.

112

In order to carry out the movement. they suggested raising
funds in the United States and organizing working committees
in the big cities in China. In the beginning of 190k. a
Chinese vice-commissioner to the Louisiana Purchase Ex-
position forecast in an article written for the Nppth
American Review an anti-American boycott unless the ex-
clusion regulations against Chinese were altered.15 But
not until the late Spring of 1905. when the Sino-American
negotiations on a new immigration treaty came to a deadlock.
was the boycott realized. I

The treaty of 1894 was due to expire on December 7.
1904. The Chinese Foreign Ministry. after consulting by
telegrams with Minister Liang Cheng in Washington, in-
formed the American Minister in Peking on January 2h. 1904
that China decided to terminate the treaty after its ex-

16

piration. Thus the two sides started a series of negoti-

ations. Since it immediately occurred to the Chinese
government that it was a Presidential election year in the
United States and the termination of the immigration treaty
might be embarrassing to the Washington government. the

Foreign Ministry once suggested putting off the discussion

15
A Yin. op. cit.. pp. 588-597, 612; and Wong Kai
Kah. op. cit.

l6
Wai Wu Pu to Liang. K29/9/30 (Nov. 18. 1903) and
Liang to Wai Wu Pu. K29/10/l. Ch'ingArchivegi and Prince
Ch'ing to Conger. Jan. 24, 190E. enclosed'in Conger to Hay.
FRUS. 1904, p. 117.

113
of the immigration treaty until next year, without with-
drawing its former notice of termination.

Nevertheless. the State Department insisted on the
renewal of the treaty for another term of ten years.
Through Minister Conger in Peking. it argued that it was
impossible to extend the immigration treaty one year since
the treaty provided for succession periods of ten years.

On the other hand. the argument continued, it was difficult
to terminate the treaty after its expiration and to
negotiate a new one. since any such action would be surely
brought before the Senate and the Senators could hardly
pass it. Consequently. the two countries might be without
an immigration treaty and some inconvenience might be
followed. Therefore. the only way left for the present was
to withdraw the discussion of termination and to extend the
treaty of 189u for another period of ten years.17

The Peking government was unwilling to acquiesce.
In March. it learned that the Chinese exhibitors at the
Louisiana Purchase Exposition would meet troubles with
their passports.18 In April. it made a reply to the
United States government in stiff terms. The immigration

treaty had to be modified. Prince Ch'ing asserted in his

 

1?
Hay to Conger. Feb. 11. 190h, confirmed in Conger
to Hay. March 1. 1900; also Conger to Hay. April h and 20.
1904. China Despatches.

18
Prince Ch'ing to Conger. March 12. 190h, enclosed
in Conger to Hay. March 15. 190“, China Despatches.

114

note to Conger; if not. "the harsh regulations of your
Government will daily give more annoyance and the Chinese
in the United States cannot endure the oppression.
Several tens of thousands of them have repeatedly called to
us for help. and how can my Board treat their cries with in-
difference! As to withdrawing the announcement that the
Treaty is to be terminated. this will be very difficult to
do. Your Excellency fears that if there be no Treaty there
may result some inconvenience. but the oppression now en-
dured by the Chinese in the United States is already ex-
treme. and it would seem that their condition could not be
made worse than at present. and this makes it very difficult
for us to consent to extend the Treaty for another period
of ten years."19

Being so determined not to renew the treaty of
1894 the Foreign Ministry and Minister Liang at Washington
went on to work for a new immigration treaty. In August.
l90h and January. 1905 respectively. Liang sent to the
State Department two drafts which demanded that only
Chinese laborers should be excluded; that the rights of
Chinese laborers in transit should be respected; that no
exclusion regulation should be applied to Hawaii and the
Philippines: and that the so-called exempt classes should

not include only officials. teachers. students. merchants

19
Prince Ch'ing to Conger. April 19. 1904, en-
closed in Conger to Hay. April 20. l90h. China Despatches.

 

115
and travellers as the Article III of the treaty of 189M
appeared to provide. but should be broadly interpreted as
to include all Chinese who were not laborers.20 These
demands. especially the last two. were hardly acceptable.
After reading one of the drafts. John Hay in the privacy of
his diary called it "a very strong paper; one which I could
not conscientiously handle...." The new Secretary of
Commerce. Victor Metcalf from California where Chinese
were extremely discriminated against opposed any revision
of the treaty. Even when Rockhill was sent to persuade
him. he remained obdurate.21 Therefore. the negotiations
in Washington for a new immigration treaty came to a com-
plete deadlock by the Spring of 1905.

It is not easy to guage the exact connection be-
tween the failure of negotiations in Washington and the
final outbreak of boycott in China. But some clues can be
traced. As the treaty of 189u expired in December. 190a
and there was no headway in the negotiations for a new
treaty. Minister Liang Cheng in Washington began to suggest
by letters to Wai Wu Pu that the Chinese government had

better drop the efforts to obtain a revision of the treaty

 

20
Draft of proposed Treaty between China and the
United States relating to the exclusion of laborers. enclosed
in Liang to Hay. Aug. 12. 190U. and Second Draft. enclosed
in Liang to Hay. Jan. 7. 1905. Notes from Chinese Legation.

21

Howard K. Beale. Theodpre Roosevelt and the Rise
of America to World Power (Baltimore, Md.. 19567, pp. 193—9U.

116

and leave in the hands of the United States government the
Sole responsibility for the question of Chinese immigrants.

f in that case the United States government continued the
exclusion laws against the Chinese with no basis of a
treaty. Liang argued. then the Chinese government could
retaliate with laws of the same nature against the Americans.
In addition. if the Chinese people chose to boycott
American goods as many Overseas Chinese had proposed, it
might also be helpful to force the Washington government
into modifying the exclusion laws.22 Then. on May 10. 1905
when Rockhill was coming to China to continue the treaty
negotiations and when the Overseas Chinese in the United
States were sending scores of telegrams to Peking urging
that the new American minister not be received.23 the
Shanghai merchants met and adopted a resolution to oppose
the treaty negotiations and call a nationwide boycott
against American goods.

During June support for the boycott spread through-

out China. On July 20 the boycott was definitely declared
to be in effect. From then on it grew in intensity through-

out the month of August and the center of agitation shifted

 

22
Liang to Wai Wu Pu. received K31/l/13 (Feb. 16,
1905). K31/Q/5 and KBl/h/ZB. Ch'ing Archives.

23
As feund in Ch'in Archives at least twenty-one
telegrams from the Overseas Chinese in the United States
were received in the five days' period between May 9 and
May 13. 1905.

117

from Shanghai to Canton where the anti-American feeling was
strongest due to the fact that most of the emigration to
America had been from that region. And as the boycott
agitation grew. more and more Chinese groups participated
in it. Except for the merchants in Shanghai. there were
several nationally influential guilds in the treaty ports.
like the silk guild. the Chinese native banking guild.
the hempsack guild. the rice guild. the bean guild and
others. A number of famous doctors in Shanghai. Canton.
Hankow and other cities refused to purchase American
medicine. The Chinese cigarette smokers in Canton started
buying Chinese manufactured cigarettes instead of American
brands. The boatmen of Canton resolved not to ferry
American goods across the Pearl River. The Chinese women
in the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi decided. for the
traditional Chinese moon festival. to make rice cakes in
place of the usual moon cake. which required American
flour.2u

More significantly. as happened later in the patriot-
ic May Fourth movement of 1919. the students and intellectuals
played an important role in the boycott. In early 1905.
a popular Chinese writer named Chi You-tse wrote a long
story. "Bitter Student." which vividly reported the ill-

treatment the Chinese students received in the United States

 

2h
Shih-shan Henry Tsai. Reaction to Exclusion:
Ch'ing Attitudes toward Overseas Chinese in the United
States (Dissertation. 1970). pp. 306:307: and Margaret—
Field. "The Chinese Boycott of 1905." Papers on China. II

 

118
and effectively stimulated resentment against American dis-
crimination.25 As the boycott agitation spread out. the
students and intellectuals were highly involved. On May
27. 1905. the Shanghai Educational Association. representing
twenty-four Shanghai colleges and high schools. approved
the boycott solution. The student demonstration at
Soochow was described as "a unaminity of purpose most
unique and never yet heard of in the history of this
ancient Empire." Scholars from all the different schools
in Foochow and Nantai met together to consider what steps
to take to resist the immigration treaty with the United
States. This meeting was reported as "perhaps the first
meeting of the large student body of Foochow upon a common
platform. A few years ago it would have been impossible."
In Canton. it was reported. "societies of students...have
banded themselves together. and have sworn an oath not to
use any commodity of American manufacture nor let anything
which has come from America pass their lips." In addition.
several thousand students met in Honan to honor three men

arrested for boycott agitation.26

By these activities. the
literate class helped to keep the boycott alive, exerted

pressure on reluctant merchants who found the boycott

 

(Harvard University. 1957). 63-98.

25
A Yin. 92; 233.. pp. 273—309.

26
Tsai. on. cit.. pp. 309-310; and Field. op. cit.

119
detrimental to their economic interests. and even assumed
leadership as merchant support declined.

It may be wondered why the Chinese. because of
hatred for the American exclusion policy. became so fervent
in the boycott movement with very little regard to the
American government's stand for the preservation of China's
integrity -- while most of the world was planning the
partition of the old empire. -- and to the many other acts
of constant friendship that the United States had shown to
China.27 As the boycott grew. however. the Chinese found
grounds beyond the evils of the American exclusion laws to
support their movement. At one mass meeting attended by
nearly 1500 persons in Shanghai on July 20. for example.
the speakers exhorted everyone present to maintain a firm
front to show to the world that there was a united China.
"For". said one gentleman. "some Americans have sneered at
us saying that there is nothing to fear because we Chinese
never can unite. Even the previous United States minister
in a recent speech made the same sneering allusion. We
will show by precept and example how fallacious an idea
this is on the part of such Americans." Other speakers
showed how little Japan by her unity and determination had

beaten her huge opponent Russia. showing the world what

27
North China Daily News. Aug. 17. 1905. enclosed
in Rockhill to the Secretary of State. Aug. 18, 1905.
pp. 219-220.

120

Asiatics were able to do when thoroughly aroused. "Can not
China easily do the same?“ They asked. "Can not China by
a united front and firm determination obtain her desire.
also. by the repeal of the Chinese exclusion treaty?"28

Except for the appeal for national unity, the
rhetoric of the open door was also employed. The faculty
and students of the Anglo—Chinese college at Foochow once
asked the United States in their petition to the Washington
government: "Why...do you oppress the Chinese by introduc-
ing the Exclusion Acts with which no country has ever
oppressed Chinese in like manner as you. and no country has
ever received such ill-treatment from you as has China?"
"The maintenance of peace in the East by your honorable
country. regardless of pains." they continued. ”is to keep
the 'Open Door' policy which is the essential of commerce...
if you unduly restrict Chinese industry or labor in your
country. you narrow your commerce in China because when the
Chinese are excluded. in self-defense. they might. with all
their efforts. try to boycott American goods." In con-
clusion, they asserted that when the Americans excluded
Chinese from their country. it meant no less that they
excluded their commerce from China.29 Obviously. since the

United States did not treat Chinese as equally as she

 

28

North China Daily News. July 21. 1905, enclosed
in Rockhill to the Secretary of State. July 26, 1905. FRUS.
1905! p0 2110

29 _
Rockhill to State Department. July 26. 1905. and
enclosures. China Despatches.

121
treated other foreigners. many Chinese believed that China
had the right not to provide equal opportunity for American
commerce as the open door policy required.

The Chinese officials. no matter what their motives.
expressed their sympathy for the boycott in different
degrees. As the agitation penetrated from Shanghai to the
regions South of the Yangtze. the positions which the pro-
vincial authorities at Nanking and Canton adopted were
especially important because their districts were the most
infected.

The Viceroy Chou Fu at Nanking (Shanghai was under
his jurisdiction) appeared to be non-commital from the be-
ginning. Asked by the American vice consul in charge. he
replied that he had been in ignorance of the situation and
the seriousness of the matter. As a matter of fact. he
had been repeatedly advised from Peking and Shanghai and he
had no intention of suppressing the boycott movement.

Later he even made it clear in his note to the American
Consulate that the Chinese people had the right to determine
whether they would buy American goods. If the United States
government would correct the abuses of the exclusion policy.
there would be an end to the trouble.30

Viceroy Tsen Chung-hsuan at Canton expressed his

sympathy more explicitly and constantly. "Relating to the

30
Rodgers to Loomis. Aug. 12. 15 and 2h, 1905.
Consular Despatches. Shanghai; Chou to Wai Wu Pu. received
K31/8/2 (Aug. 31. 1905). and enclosures. QhLing Archives.

122
matter of a merchant who wishes to trade with another or a
person who wishes to buy something from a merchant," he
wrote in his correspondence with the American Consul-General.
"they have perfect right to trade or buy as they please.
If a merchant or person does not want to use American goods.
he should not be compelled to use them. just as if he wants
to buy American goods. there is no law that may compel him
to buy the same." Besides. he defended the right of the
Chinese people to hold boycott meetings despite American
protests.31 After the court issued an edict on August 31
to order the provincial officials to stop the anti-
American agitation. he took action against the boycott
meetings and the circulation of anti-American literature.
But he insisted for the rest of the year. when the boycott
movement was declining in other areas. that the Chinese
people had full freedom to decide whether they wanted to
buy American goods.

For a while. the Foreign Ministry in Peking was no
less sympathetic. American Minister Rockhill had notified
the ministry that the Chinese would be held responsible for
any loss sustained by American trade on account of any
failure on the part of China to stop the boycott. Also.

he demanded the punishment of Tseng Shao-Ch'ing. the prime

 

31
Lay to Loomis. Aug. 9. 1905, and enclosures.
Consular Dggpatchesi Canton.

32
Tsen to Wai Wu Pu. received K31/11/u ( Nov. 30.
1905). Ch'ing Archives.

123
mover in the movement. To all those pressures. Prince
Ch'ing. the head of the Foreign Ministry. made a reply on
August 26. As he put it. the idea of a boycott against
American goods came directly from the trade people. It did
not come from the Chinese government by any means. and the
Chinese government certainly could not assume the res-
ponsibility. As to Tseng Shao-ch'ing. Prince Ch'ing
refused to enlarge upon his offense and deal severely with
him.33 Rockhill had complained that the boycott agitation
had gone on openly under the guidance and active participa-
tion of high officials. After reading Prince Ch'ing's
reply. he was constrained once again to believe that the
movement had a certain amount of sympathy from the Chinese
government?+

While Chinese officials expressed sympathy for the
boycott. however. they were surrounded with forces from
different sides.

At first. some American officials recognized the
causes for the Chinese complaints. Roosevelt wrote to
Rockhill that he was trying in every way to make things
easy for the Chinese in the United States. Secretary of

War Taft likewise expressed sympathy with the Chinese while

 

Rockhill to the Secretary of State. Aug. 5. 12.
17 and 29. and enclosures. FRUS. 1905. pp. 212-213. 222-22u.

3h
Rockhill to Prince Ch'ing. Aug. 7 and 27. 1905.
FRUS, 1905' pp. 213-2114, 223-2214.

124

speaking before the graduating class at Miami University in
Ohio. Rockhill advised that the United States must be
patient and refrain from threats of force. He understood
that to force the Peking government to take hasty measures
might easily result in revolution and even greater losses
to American merchants.35

Therefore. the Washington government attempted to
induce the Chinese government to suppress the boycott by
acknowledging and remedying the injustices resulted from
the exclusion policy. For this purpose. President Roosevelt
sent instructions through the Secretary of State to all the
diplomats and consular representatives in China to remind
them that his government intended to extend the heartiest
courtesy toward all Chinese classes besides the laborers.
He informed them that the immigration officers had been in-
structed that the exclusion laws must be enforced without
harshness or unnecessary inconvenience and that any dis-
courtesy shown to Chinese persons by any American official
would be cause for immediate removal from the service.36

Since China continued to be intransigent. Roosevelt

became very impatient and wrote Rockhill in late August

35
Roosevelt to Rockhill. May 18. 1905: The Nation,
June 22. 1905. p. #91: and Rockhill to Hay. Juneil7.“1905.
Cited in Paul A. Varg. Qpen Door Diplomat: the Life of W.W.
Rockhill (Urbana. 111.. 1952). pp. 61-63.

36
Circular to the Diplomatic and Consular Officers

Of the United States in China. June 26. 1905. Diplomatic
Instructions. China.

 

 

 

125

that "it is absolutely necessary for you to take a stiff
tone with the Chinese where they are clearly doing wrong."
”Unless I misread them entirely," the President added. the
Chinese "despise weakness even more than they prize justice,
and we must make it evident both that we intend to do what
is right and that we do not intend for a moment to suffer
what is wrong."37 Rockhill. in his turn, stressed in his
reply to Prince Ch'ing's note of August 26 that the United
States government was emphatically of the opinion "that it
has been and still is the duty of the Imperial Government
to completely put a stop to this movement." He described
the boycott as "an unwarranted attempt of the ignorant
people to assume the functions of government and to meddle
With international relations."38

Many Chinese, including those who were sympathetic
with the boycott. were worried that the movement might be
turned into a general uprising like either the Taiping
Revolution or the Boxer Rebellion. As a matter of fact.
when Chou Fu. Tsen Chun-hsuan and Prince Ch'ing refused
American demands for taking steps to stop the agitation,

they usually explained that if too much pressure were used

 

37
Roosevelt to Rockhill, Aug. 22, 1905, in Elting E.
Morison. ed.. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt. Vol. IV
(Cambridge. Mass.. 19517: p. 1310.

38
Rockhill to Prince Ch'ing, Aug. 27, 1905, FRUS.
19059 p. 223-

126

to suppress the boycotters. the feeling of the people would
become more excited and more trouble and disorder would be
followed.39

Viceroy Yuan Shih-kai at Tientsin, who had high-
handedly suppressed the Boxers in his territory of Shantung
Province several years before. obviously had the same fear
in mind and consistently adopted measures to stop the boy-
cott agitation. On June 20, 1905, he summoned the local
prefects and leaders of the Tientsin Chamber of Commerce
and ordered them to stop boycotting American goods. He a1-
so forced the Tientsin Chamber of Commerce to print
counter-boycott propaganda sheets for distribution through-
out Tientsin. This propaganda proclaimed. "The Boxer
Rebellion hurt Tientsin badly... Our commerce had just
started recovering recently. But America's exclusion policy
again aroused the agitation and caused our commodities to
stagnate in the market.... We. the Tientsin merchants,
after considering the big loss we previously suffered.
realize that it would be again a great trouble to stir up

an anti-foreign agitation.... Please maintain our regular

, . . . u
act1v1t1es." 0 Clearly enough, sense of the danger of a

39
Tsen to Lay, enclosed in Lay to Loomis. Aug. 19.
1905. Consular Despatch, Canton, Prince Ch'ing to Rockhill,
Aug. 25, 1905. FRUS. 1905. pp. 222-223; and Chou Fu to Wai
Wu Pu. received K31/8/9 (Sept. 7. 1905), Ch'ing Archives.

no
Hsin Wen Pao (The News), Shanghai, June 28, 1905,
cited in Chang. op. cit.. pp. 67-68.

127

new anti-foreign uprising can be found in this counter-
boycott literature. Thereafter, Yuan advised the Foreign
Ministry in Peking on June 21 to order all the provincial
governments on the East Coast and along the Yangtze to for-
bid the merchants to boycott American goods. In mid-August
he made a proclamation to forbid the public to read the

Ta KunggPao, alias ”L'Impatial,“ because the newspaper pub-
lished reports and articles which favored the boycott and
"rendered harm to peace." As a result, the newspaper was
forced to close. On August 22. in response to the request
from the Shanghai piece-goods dealers who felt the economic
losses because of the boycott. Yuan again gave orders to
prevent the spreading of the agitation to his province and

u
to encourage the free circulation of trade. 1

Thus, Yuan
became the most representative of the Manchu ruling
officials who were hostile and opposed to the boycott.
Exactly how much the fear of a general uprising and
Yuan Shih-k'ai's attitude influenced the policy of the
Peking government is not known. Taking into account of the
importance of Yuan's position as the Viceroy at Tientsin,
in the immediate vicinity of Peking, one must conclude that

Yuan did have a voice in making a policy which gradually

yielded to the American demand for stopping the boycott.

 

#1
Yuan to Wai Wu Pu, received K31/5/19 (June 21.
1905), Ch'ing Archives: Rockhill to State Department, Aug.
Zn and 25. 1905, China Despatches.

 

 

t .5
PM

Ci

 

 

 

128

More meaningfully. while the people like the stu-
dents of Anglo-Chinese College at Foochow employed the
rhetoric of Open door to justify the boycott movement. Yuan
also talked in terms of the open door. As Yuan stressed in
his telegram advising the Foreign Ministry to stop the boy-
cott agitation, the United States had long been friendly to
China and had urged the powers to respect the neutrality of
China since the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. In
addition. it had been because of the American policy that
China's territorial integrity could be preserved. Now,

Yuan concluded. as China needed more help from the United
States while a peace conference was being arranged after the
end of the Russo-Japanese War, the anti-American boycott

was improper in the sense of timing and it would highly
impede the friendly relations between the two countries.“2
To be sure, Yuan differed from the boycotters. While the
later hinged more on the principle of equal opportunity for
commerce, the Viceroy rested his argument more on the prin-
ciple of preserving China's territorial integrity. This
marks a pivotal point in the disputes among Chinese over
the open door policy.

Finally. the court issued an edict on August 31 to

forbid the anti-American boycott.u3 Thereafter, the boycott

#2
Yuan to Wai Wu Pu. received K31/5/l9. Ch'ing Archives.

”3
Imperial Edict of Aug. 31. 1905. FRUS. 1905, p. 725.

129
declined and died out at last at the beginning of 1906 in
Canton. The American exclusion policy, however. remained
a stumbling block in the Sino-American relations. After
the failure of the boycott, the United States government

extended and re-enacted all the anti-Chinese exclusion laws.

CHAPTER V
THE OPEN DOOR AS VIEWED IN AN AWAKENING CHINA

A survey of American neWSpapers and periodicals of
1906 shows that the word "awakening" was usually used as a
catchword to describe the current Chinese situation. such
as a beginning of national unity. of national independence.
or of patriotism. When Dr. W.A.P. Nartin, formerly
President of the Chinese Imperial University. wrote a book
in 1907 about the progress which he witnessed in China, he
adopted The Awakening of China as its title. Indeed. China
was undergoing a change at the turn of the century. Mainly
because of this awakening change. she could do now what she
had not been able to do before. As her recent relations
With the United States revealed. for instance. she could
insist on the cancellation of Canton-Hankow railway con-
cession and could also stage an anti-American boycott.

In order to understand more about China's response
to the open door policy. one should know two phenomena in
the awakening China. In the first place. despite the fact
that the conservatives in the Ch'ing court staged a
successful coup d'etat in 1898 against the Emperor Kuang-hsu

and his reform followers.1 the reform trend did not decline,

 

1
For the events of the coup d'etat. see Liane Chi-Chao.

130

131
but swelled. After the Boxer Rebellion. the Empress
Dowager Ts'u-hsi initiated a series of reforms. By her
orders. some old offices were abolished and new ones
created. The civil service examination system. which had
lasted for centuries and required the students to learn
only the classics and the writing of lone essays, was
abrogated. Instead. modern schools were established for
students to study mathematics. the natural sciences. foreign
languages. law. and other Western knowledge. In the summer
of 1905, the Empress decided to send five senior officials
abroad to study foreign constitutions in preparation for a
representative system. But a September departure of these
officials was forestalled by a revolutionary's attack on

2 These reform

them at the railroad station in Peking.
measures have been usually interpreted as being insincere
and an attempt to disguise the mistakes which the Empress
committed in the Boxer catastrophe. But they made concrete

improvements especially in the educational institution.

 

Wu Hsu Cheng Pien Chi (An Account of the 1898 Coup. Taipei.
1959): Hu Pin, Wu Hsu Pien Fa (The Reform of 1898, Shanghai,
1956); and Liu Feng-han. Ydan Shih-k'ai Yu Wu_fisu Cheng

Pien (YHan Shih-k'ai and the Coup D'etat of—I898 (Taipei. 196“).

 

2

Meribeth E. Cameron. ThetBeform Movement in China,
18 8-1912 (Stanford. 1931). Chap. III: and Li Chien-nung,
The_§oIitical History of China. l8bO-l928 (trans. and ed. by
Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls. Stanford. 1956), pp. l9H-l96.

 

l32
On the other hand. some reform leaders of 1898.
among whom K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao were the most
prominent. managed to escape from arrest during the coup
d'etat. In exile in Japan. Liang continued to speak for
the reform movement and expound his concept of constitution-

al monarchy in his journals. Ch'ing I Pao (The Public

 

Opinion. 1898-1902) and Hsfin Min Ts'ung Pao (New People's

 

Miscellany. 1902-1907).3 His influence was great. Dr. Hu
Shih. who was studying in Shanghai and later became a well-

known scholar. regarded the years 1902-1903 as Liang's

most effective.“

Besides. the revolutionary movement led by Dr. Sun
Yat-sen was burgeoning. Many reformers. disappointed with
their failure in 1898. swung toward revolution.5 The
Revolutionaries organized associations and published
periodicals to advocate the overthrow of the despotic Manchu

dynasty. Finally. they founded a united revolutionary

3

For a more recent account of Liang's activities
in exile. see Hao Chang. Lian Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual
Transition infighina._l§90-IQQZ (Cambridge. Mass.. 197i).
Chaps. V and VI. 1—

L;
Hu Shih. Ssu Shih Tzu Shu (Autobiography at the
Age of Forty. Shanghai. 19337. p. 93.

5

Even Liang Ch'i-ch'ao swung toward revolution for
a while. See Michael Gasster. Chinese Intellgptuals and
the Revolution of 1911 (Seattle. Washington. 196§77 Chap.
II: and P'eng-yuan Chang. Liang Ch'i ch'ao Yu Ch'ing Chi
Ko Ming (Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Late Ch'ing Revolution.
Taipei. l96u). Chaps. IV and V.

 

133

organization. the T'ung Meng Hui (Revolutionary Alliance).
in Tokyo. in August 1905.6

A parallel phenomenon to the swelling of the reform
and revolutionary trends was a full blossoming of the
public press. According to one report. the only paper
published in Peking in 1900 was The Peking Gazette contain-
ing little more than the decrees and doings of the court.
Five years later. there were ten daily papers published in
the capital. among them one of the few women's dailies in
the world. In 1900. a man seen reading a newspaper was
ridiculed as a follower of the foreign devils. Five years
later. the general newspapers were read by many more than
ever before.7

Outside Peking. the growth of the newspapers and
periodicals published by both the reformers and the revolu-
tionaries during the same period was significant. Among
the reform publications. the most prominent were Ch'ing I 1
£32 and Hsin Min T'sggg_Pao in Japan. and Wai Chiao Pao
(Diplomatic News) and Tung FangTsa_Chih (The Eastern
Miscellany) in Shanghai. Take Hs'in Min T‘sung Pao for
illustration. It was a fortnightly and ran to ninety-six

issues. each issue consisting of criticism on current events.

6
Lip 02. Cite, pp. 200-2020

7

Joseph Franklin Griggs. "China Awakened."
Century Magazine. LXXII (July. 1906). 392-396. See also
Archibald R. Colquhoun. "The Chinese Press of Today."
North American heviegi CLXXXII (1906). 97-104.

134
introduction of Western knowledge. dissertations. short
stories and poems. Its circulation was increased from 2.000
at the beginning to 10,000 a year later. Though it was
published in Yokohama. Japan. it had ninety-seven branches
for circulation spreading out to most of the eighteen
Chinese provinces and some foreign cities. including

Honolulu and San Francisco.8

Thus. it commanded a wide
influence among the Chinese speaking public. both in China
and abroad.

The revolutionary press was no less popular. Daily
newspapers like Chung Kuo Jih Pao (China Daily) in Hong
Kong. and Su Pao (Kiangsu Journal) and Kug Min Jih Pao
(National Daily News) in Shanghai; and miscellanies like
ChekiangChLao (Tide of Chekiang). Hupgh Hsfieh Sheng Chieh
(Hupeh Students' Circle). Yu Hsfieh I Pien (Overseas
Students Translation). and Erh Shih Shih Chi Chih Chih Na
(Twentieth Century China). all in Japan. were all influential
at the turn of the century. In 1905. after founding of the
united revolutionary organization T'ung Meng Hui. a monthly
named Min Pao (People's Tribune) was published in Tokyo as
its organ. This new journal had on its editorial board
many outstanding revolutionaries. such as Wang Ching-wei.

Hu Han-min and Chang Ping-lin. After only four issues

8
P'eng—ydan Chang. op. cit.. pp. 287-299.

135
came out. it entered into a great debate on China's future
with Liang Ch'i ch'ao's Hsin Min T'sungiPao in the Spring
of 1906. It's circulation quickly reached 10.000.9

These two phenomena. the swelling of reform or
even revolutionary trends and the rise of a public press.
revealed that the anti-government forces. though most of
them were in exile. were as vigorous as the Ch'ing court
in the political arena. In view of this. one can not
ignore in his dealing with late Ch'ing foreign relations
the positions which the reformers and the revolutionaries
took.

As reflected in their publications. both the
reformers and the revolutionaries were interested not only
in domestic issues. but in foreign affairs. And. very
strikingly. their discussions of foreign affairs at the
turn of the century were usually made against the open door.
as well against the sphere of influence. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao.
the spokesman for the reformers. once described the United
States sentimentally as the most benevolent among the powers
and regarded American policy in pursuing an open door in
China and in preserving China's territorial integrity as

the best to save the old empire from partition.lo

 

9
Lin Yu-t'ang. A History of the Press and Public
0 inion in China (Chicago. 1936). p. 102: and P.K. Yu. g1 g1.
(eds.). The Revolutiona Movement Durin- the Late Ch'in :
A Guide to Chinese Periodicals (Washington. D.C.. 1975).

pp 0 lx-XVi o

10
Ch'ing_;_£ao. No. 55 (Aug. 25. 1900). p. u.

136
Nevertheless. this was by no means a predominant opinion.
It represented only a shortlived hope during the crisis
when the foreign troops occupied Peking as a result of the
Boxer rebellion.

The reformers criticized the open door on several
accounts. First of all. they could see that the United
States was mainly motivated by her own economic interests.
In an article on the conflict between the United States
and the rebelling Filipinos following the Spanish-American
War. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao warned that the United States would
use the Philippine Islands as a foothold to promote her
economic interests in China. After John Hay dispatched the
open door notes. another article appeared in Liang's
Ch'ing ;_Pao stressing the economic motivation behind the
American policy. The United States advocated an open door
in China because she had no sphere of influence in the old
empire. the author of the article explained. She suggested
preserving China's integrity because she hated to see chaos
unfavorable to American commerce following a break-up of
China. In any sense. the open door was a self-interested
policy. It contained nothing good for China.

Even so. Liang did hope that the open door policy

could save China from a possible partition during the Boxer

 

11
Ch'ing I Pao. no. 32 (Dec. 13. 1899). p. 2: and
no. 53 (Aug. 5. 19007_. p. 20

137
catastrophe. As a partisan of the Emperor Kuang-hsu. he
believed that since the Empress Dowager was corrupt and
had supported the anti-foreign Boxers. the foreign powers
should never compromise with her. Instead. if the powers
were sincerely interested in preserving China. they should
recognize the Emperor. who had been under detention since
the coup d'etat of 1898. and supported his restoration.12
But. as the peace negotiations following the catastrophe
revealed. the powers failed to punish the Empress and did
nothing for a restoration of the Emperor. Being so dis-
appointed. Liang found new ground to describe the open door
policy as hypocritical. As he put it. the powers had
scrambled the spheres of influence and threatened to dis-
member China. Now. as they defeated the Boxers and occupied
Peking. they should have gone ahead to pick the golden
apple. Nevertheless. they became interested in preserving
China to the contrary and talked no longer about partition.
This change of policy on the part of the powers. Liang
stressed. displayed no goodwill. In view of the Boxer
rebellion. the foreign powers were too afraid of an exten-
tion of the anti-foreign feeling of the Chinese people to
push for the partition of the old empire. To adopt a policy

of preservation instead. these powers believed that they

could thus tranquilize the Chinese people and keep what

12
Ch'ing_I Pao. No. 55. p. 4; and No. 89 (Aug. 2“.
1901). p. l.

138
they had obtained from China. This was. in Liang's words.
a policy of ”giving less in exchange for taking more." or a
policy of “preservation in name and partition in reality."13

In an attempt to prove the validity of his argument.
Liang explained further that since the powers agreed to
preserve China's territorial and administrative entity.
China would be required to open all her territories for
foreign economic interests in return. This shows that he
misunderstood John Hay's policy. Nonetheless. following
his misapprehension. Liang carried on his argument. All
the treaty ports. he asserted. had become the foreign
settlements and the practice of extraterritoriality had
stripped China of her sovereignty over those cities. If
China opened all her territories for foreign economic
interests. she would definitely sink into foreign colonies.
Thus. Liang called the open door policy 'Mieh Kuo Hsin Fa.“
a new way to destroy a country.1“

In an article on the international economic compe—
tition. another reformer under the pen-name of Yu Ch'ien-tsi
thought the open door policy not only new. but more harm-
ful to China. He regarded the scramble for the spheres of
influence. or a policy of partition. as a political

aggression. in which the powers came into conflict with

 

 

 

139
each other. On the other hand. he pointed out. the policy
of preserving China's integrity but opening China's door
for all foreign commerce was an economic aggression. It
was executed cooperatively by the powers.15 Yu failed to
carry his discussion far enough. Apparently. he believed
that the cooperative nature of this form of exploitation
was more dangerous. He probably also thought that economic
aggression was less overt than political aggression. The
Chinese people could not easily discover it. and thus they
would not resist it until it became too late.

The revolutionaries did not become so involved in
the public press until the end of 1902. Nevertheless. they
were no less outspoken than the reformers once they
launched their criticism of the open door policy. They
could see that the open door policy was designed to extend
American economic interests in China. especially into the
spheres of influence which the other powers had obtained
from China. Also. they believed that the powers approved
the open door policy in order to hamper the growth of
Chinese patriotism which was aroused by the scramble for
concessions and was recently revealed in the anti-foreign

Boxer rebellion. The aim of the powers remained the same.

 

15
4 Hsin Min T'sung Paoi No. 14 (Aug. 18. 1902.
p. 7.

luo

they argued. Only the means had been changed. Now the
powers were carrying on a "civilized" aggression. instead
of the old. "barbarous" one. While the scramble for the
spheres of influence was a "visible" policy of dismembering
China. they continued. now the open door policy was an
"invisible" one which would destroy "the uoo million
Chinese people."16

In pursuit of their goal of overthrowing Manchu
rule. the revolutionaries went on to slash the principle of
preserving China's territorial and administrative integrity.
According to them. the Manchu dynasty did not represent
China. Under the existing situation. the practice of the
policy to preserve China might be helpful only in consoli-
dating the Manchu rule over the Chinese people. It was not
necessarily good for the whole country. On the contrary.
China might become another Egypt or India. With the rulers
above being the puppets of the foreigners. the people below
might be easily subjected to foreign exploitation.17 Thus.
a question like "which China" was raised.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen. the leader of the revolutionaries.
presented the question in a more clear way. He divided

China into "two Chinas". a China illustrated by the "kuo

 

16
Hu eh Hsueh Shen Chieh. no. 1 (Feb. 1903).
p. 82; and no. 3 (April. 19035. pp. 2-3.

17 *
Yang Tu. "Yu Hsueh I Pien Hsu (Preface to Over-
seas Students Translation)." Yu Hsdgh I Pien; no. 1 (Nov.

1902) p pp. 1-190

141

shih" (political situation) and a China represented by the
"ming ch'ing" (popular sentiment). According to the popu-
lar sentiments. he contended. China had become more unified
and self-reliant. If the powers attempted to dismember the
old empire. the Chinese people would be no less hostile
than the Filipinos and the Boers. and they would resist the
foreigners much more firmly and forcefully than their
Boxers predecessors. 0n the other hand. he continued. the
political situation in China was too bad to be preserved.
The Manchu rulers had made concessions to foreign powers.
They could not stop doing so. in spite of the policy of
preservation. until the whole country fell into dissolution.
Therefore. the policy of preservation was by no means more
practicable than the one of dismemberment.18 In a similar
presentation. Dr. Sun likened the Manchu dynasty to a
collapsing building. which could not be upheld by any
effort.19

Basically. both the reformers and the revolution-
aries began to believe that it was China's own business

either to open her door for foreign commerce or to preserve

18
Sun Yat-sen. "Chih Na Pao Chdan Fen Ko Ho Lun
(0n the Preservation or Dismemberment of China)." Chiangsu.
no. 6 (Sept. 1903). reprinted in Kuomintang Historical
Commission (ed.). Kuo Fu Chuan Chi (Complete Works of Sun
Yat-sen. Taipei. 1963). vol. VII. pp. 29-33.

19

Sun Yat-sen. "Chih Na Wen T'i Chih Chen Chieh
Chdeh. (The True Solution of the Chinese Question). origin-
ally published in 190a. reprinted in Kuo Fu Chuan Chi. vol.
VII. pp- 37-u,1, —

 

1&2
her territorial and administrative integrity. The followers
in the both groups were tired of the arbitrary manner with
which the foreign powers decided China's future among them-
selves with little regard to China's aspirations. Now they
told the foreigners that the open door should not be
imposed upon China and that China needed no foreign powers
to preserve her integrity. As to the responsibility of
China herself. they asserted that no Chinese government
should rely any longer on foreign help. In the meantime.
they warned the Chinese people against feeling happy with
the news of preservation while worrying about the possible
dismemberment. The only thing which the Chinese people
could do. they concluded. was to save their country from

20 Thus. the reformers and

being destroyed by themselves.
the revolutionaries were advancing a new concept of in-
dependent diplomacy in contrast with the traditional method
of “employing barbarians to manage barbarians."

The revolutionaries. however. appeared to modify
their position after they entered into heated debates on

China's future with the reformers. Following the coup

d'etat of 1898. the reformers and the revolutionaries came

 

20
Ch'in I Pao. no. 3“ (Jan. 31. 1900). p. u; no.
53 (Aug. 5. 900 . pp. 1-3: and no. 58 (Aug. 25. 1900).
pp. 3- . Hsin Ming T'sung Pao. no. 2 (Feb. 23. 1902).
p. 75. See also Hupeh Hsueh Sheng Chieh. no. 1 (Feb. 1903).
p. 55: and no. 3 (April. 19037. pp. 11-12.

1h3
closer to each other for a while. In 1903. nonetheless.
these two groups split away once more partly because they
had entered into a struggle over their respective influences
among the overseas Chinese. and partly because K'ang Yu-wei
took a firm position against any idea of revolution and
his disciple Liang Ch'i-ch'ao could do little but obey him.21
Thereafter. the two groups launched a paper war with each
other which came to a climax in 1906. In one of their
debates the reformers argued that revolution would bring
civil war. destruction and chaos. that the foreign powers
might intervene. and that such action might lead to the

partition of China.22

This reformer attack sounded justi-
fiable. The revolutionaries had to convince both the
Chinese and the foreigners that there would be no ground
for such happenings in the event of revolution.

In denying the possible evils of revolution. the
revolutionaries leader Dr. Sun Yat-sen stressed once again
that the Manchu rulers had ceded territories and made
economic concessions to the foreign powers. The final

partition of China could not be avoided so long as the

Manchu dynasty existed. Therefore. things could never be

 

21
Yen-p'ing Hao. "The Abortive Cooperation between
Reformers. and Revolutionaries." ngers on Ching. XV
(Dec. 1961). pp. 91-11“: and P'eng-yuan Chang. 22; £15..
pp. 119-136.

22
Wang and Chang. op. cit.. Vol. I. pp. 693-69“:
and Hsin Ming T'sung Pao. no. 76 (March. 1906). pp. 27-39.

 

1&4

made worse. On the other hand. Sun continued to convince
his compatriots. revolution would topple down the feeble
Manchu government and bring for the Chinese people a new
and energetic one that would earn foreign respect instead
of foreign aggression.23

In his attempt to convince the foreigners. Dr. Sun
wrote an article on the true resolution of the Chinese
question in English while he was taking a trip in the
United States in 190M. As he put it. the corruption and
backwardness of the Manchus constituted a threat to
world peace and the balance of power. For instance. if the
Ch'ing government had been able to play a more positive
role in world affairs. the Russo-Japanese War would not
have occurred. Turning to revolution. Dr. Sun argued that
it would be anti-Manchu. not anti-foreign. It would
result in the establishment of "a civilized government”
which would benefit not only China but the whole world.
After revolution. Sun added. the new government would open
all of China to foreign trade. railroads would traverse the
length and breadth of the country. the production of raw
materials would increase steadily. foreign goods would be
sold in China in ever-increasing amounts. and China's

international trade would be far greater than ever before.2u

23
Sun Yat-sen. "Po Pao Huang Pao (Refuting the
Emperor-protection Newspaper)." in Kuomintang Historical
Commission. op. cit. Vol. VII. PP- 33-36.

2h
See note 21.

145
So. while the revolutionaries appeared as hostile as the
reformers against the foreign interests in their criticism
of the open door policy. Dr. Sun now became less intransigent.
After the T'ung Meng Hui (Revolutionary Alliance)
established its organ Min Pao at Tokyo at the end of 1905.
many other revolutionaries such as Wang Ching-wei and Hu
Han-min wrote articles for the monthly in supporting Dr.
Sun's thesis. These followers of Sun even regarded the
open door policy as sufficient to safeguard China from
dismemberment according to circumstances. According to
them. the powers agreed to the open door policy for two
reasons. First. they were aware of the possibility that
the policy of partition would spur the Chinese people to
anti-foreign movement. Secondly. they considered that the
open door policy was helpful in preventing themselves from
fighting each other and in maintaining a balance of power
in the Far East. Consequently. the revolutionaries be-
lieved that so long as a revolution could remain an internal
affair. not anti-foreign. and not threatening to the
international order. the foreign powers would themselves
insist on the open door policy and the partition of China
could never happen.25
Nevertheless. the revolutionaries reiterated that

even if the powers agreed to the open door policy. they

25
Hu Han-min. "Min Pao Chih Liu Ta Chu I (The Six
Great Principles of the Min Pao). "Min Pao. no. 3 (April.

146
could still reverse their position because of the mistakes
made by the feeble Manchu government. Taking the Russo-
Japanese War for instance once again. these revolutionaries
pointed out that since the Ch'ing government failed to
resist efficiently the Russian demands on Manchuria
following the Boxer disaster. the interests of other powers.
especially Japan. and the balance of power in the area were :3
thus threatened. Under the circumstances. the powers re-
newed their scrambling game and Japan finally entered the
war with Russia in Manchuria without regard to China's
sovereignty over the territory. Therefore. the revolution-
aries concluded. the open door policy was still far from
being reliable. The foreign powers should not be expected
never to change their policy. The Chinese people had to
keep their country from dismemberment by themselves. For
such a purpose. they should overthrow the weak Ch'ing
government and establish instead a new and strong government
which would be able to resist the foreign aggression and to
decide China's future by itself.26

Thus. one after another. the revolutionaries pre-

sented in their debates with the reformers the limited value

1906) pp. 1-22: and Wang Ching—wei. "Po Ke Ming K'e I Chao
Kua Fen Shuo (Refuting the View That Revolution May Invite
Partition)." Min Pao (July. 1906). pp. 17-39.

Ibid.

lb?

to China of the open door policy and the necessity for China
to decide her future by independent diplomacy. As a matter
of fact. nothing counted as much as self-reliance during an
era of national awakening. Here was the basic criterion
according to which both the reformers and the revolution-
aries formed their opinions on China's foreign relations.

One more question left is what the relationship was r"
between the reformer and revolutionary opinions on the one 9
hand. and the Ch'ing government policy on the other. One
historian has pointed out that the Ch'ing government was
beginning in the 1900's to give weight to public opinion
and Chinese public opinion had developed in response to
imperialist diplomacy.27 It needs to be noted here that.
first. the Ch'ing government worried very much about the
reformer and revolutionary publications; and. secondly.
the reformer and revolutionary opinions on some specific
issues regarding to Sino-American relations coincided in
some degree with those of officials in power.

The Ch'ing government was alarmed by the reform and
revolutionary press. The court issued successive edicts

ordering the arrest of reform leaders K'ang Yu-wei

 

27
Akira Iriye. "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy:
the Case of Late Ch'ing China.” in Albert Feuerwerker. gt El-
(eds.). Approaches to Modern China History (Berkeley. Calif..
1967). pp. 216¥§38.

148
and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. "Such rebellious activities" of
K'ang and Liang to publish journals and incite the people
with their eloquence. one of such edicts read. "make one's
hair stand on end." The court then ordered the provincial
governors to enforce the punishment of anyone who bought
and read their papers. and to burn all the rebellious books

published by them.28

The revolutionaries could not escape
from suppression. When one of their most inflamatory
pamphlets. Ke Ming Chan (Revolutionary Army). came out in
print in the summer of 1903. the Ch'ing government
immediately closed down the sponsor newspaper. Su Pao. and
put both the writer of the pamphlet and the editor of the
29

newspaper in jail. This high-handed policy was revealing.
Sometimes reformers and not revolutionaries were suppressed.
but sometimes their views were absorbed by the government.

On the other hand. the reformers and revolution-
aries did not ignore the issues over which the Ch'ing
government was in trouble with the United States. For in-
stance. when the American minister in Peking insisted that
the opening of new ports in Manchuria should be written into
the Sino-American commercial treaty in negotiation. the

editor of the reform journal Hsin Ming T'sung Pao at once

pointed out that American request was not much different

28
Lin. Op. Cito. p. 98.

Ibid.. pp. 102-103.

 

149
from the Russian demand for exclusive rights. In essence.
both represented a disregard of China's sovereignty over
Manchuria. The editor stressed furthermore that the open-
ing. or not opening. of new ports in Manchuria was China's
business and the Ch'ing government should make decision by
itself. It should not let the Washington government con-
sult with the St. Petersburg government. Neither should the
two foreign governments make between themselves any agree-
ment on this matter.30 Prince Ch'ing did insist in his
negotiations with Conger that China would open new ports in
Manchuria by herself. He took this position. as had been
pointed out. mainly because of his worry about Russia. He
may also. now one may conclude. have had in mind the
reformers' appeal for self-assertion.

When the Canton-Hankow railway affair came forth.
there appeared in the reform and revolutionary press some
detailed discussions. Among these the points made by
Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao were the most conspicuous. The reform
leader believed that China needed capitals and technical
assistance from foreigners in railroad construction. But
the Ch'ing government had conceded too many rights in
obtaining American help to build the Canton-Hankow railway.
The contract with American China Development Company had to

be cancelled. Thereafter. he suggested. in order to

—_ ‘—
——

30
Hsin Ming T'sung_Pao. no. 29 (April 2. 1903).
p. 71; and no. 33. June 9. 1903). pp. 52-53-

150

prevent any particular country from monopolizing the con-
struction of an important railway in China. it would be
better to obtain the needed capital and technical assist-
ance separately from different countries. Besides. he
pointed out that since the American company had sold some
of its shares to the Belgian interests and the Belgian
interests in their turn had connections with French and
Russian interests. the Canton-Hankow concession was no
longer a matter involving only foreign investment. It had
become a political conspiracy initiated by France and
Rus sia.31

To compare Liang's opinion and Chang Chih-tung's
position. one finds there was some gap between them. When
Chang insisted to cancel the Canton-Hankow railway contract.
he was pushed by the provincial interests who wanted to
build the railways within their region by themselves.
Nonetheless. both Chang and provincial gentries believed
that Russia and France were behind the Canton-Hankow rail-
way affair. and that these two powers were attempting to
control China through monopolizing China's railroad con—
struction. This argument which they spoke out too often

came close to Liang's theory of political conspiracy.

 

31
Hsin Min T'sun. Pao no. MD (Aug. 25. 190k); and
Liang Ch' i-chfao. "Wai Tsu Shu Ju Wen T'i " (The Problem of
the Inflow of Foreign Investment). in Chang Nan and Wang
Jen-Chih (eds. ). Hsin Hai Ke Ming Ch'ien Shih Nien Chien
Shih Lun Hsuan Chi (collected Essays Published dur1ng the

Ten Years before the Revolution. Hong Kong. 1962). v. I.
Pp. 813-832.

 

151

Then. the reformers and revolutionaries usually
criticized the American exclusion policy against the
Chinese immigrants and worked very hard to promote the
Anti-American boycott movement in 1905. The reform news-
paper Hsin Chung Kuo Pao (New China Daily) in Honolulu. as
a matter of fact. had first advocated the boycott of
American goods as early as 1903. The revolutionary leaders.
among them Lin Sun who would become the Chairman of the
Kuomintang government in the 1930's. were always active in
giving speeches and raising funds when the boycott broke

32

out in Shanghai. Though the reform and revolutionary
involvement into the anti-American boycott was conspicuous.
some officials in power. like Viceroy Tsen at Canton. never
hesitated to express their strong sympathy with the move-
ment.

It is clear that the reform and revolutionary
opinions on some specific issues coincided with those of
the officials in power. This coincidence was suggestive.
The rebellious groups had some influence on the government
policy. To take this into consideration. one may conclude
that the reform and revolutionary criticism of the open

door policy and their appeal for self-reliance and independ-

ent diplomacy pointed to a stronger position which the

 

32
Hsin Min T'sun- Pao no. 38 (Oct. n.1903),
pp. 141-15, and hang Tsun-wu. ChungiMei Kong Yueh Fang
Chao (Agitation over the Sino American Exclusion Treaty.
Taipei. 1965). pp. 104-105.

152
Ch'ing government would adopt in its dealing with the

foreign powers. including the United States.

EPILOGUE

The Chinese had never been able to form a consensus
in their attitude toward the United States. At the turn
of the century. their response to the U.S. policy of the
open door tended to be split. Some Chinese officials. like
Li Hung-Chang. were inclined to ignore it. Some others.
such as Liu K'un-i and Chang Chih-tung. would make use of
the policy so long as they thought it helpful in the pre-
servation of China‘s integrity. For still others. the
policy seemed to be incompatible with the American exclusion
laws against the Chinese. Besides. many reformers and
revolutionaries criticized John Hay's policy as nothing
better than the policy of partition.

One thing is sure. The open door policy was never
heartily welcome in China. This did not necessarily reflect
an extensive anti-American feeling. In view of the factl
that the United States had never been so aggressive as the
other powers in dealing with China. the Chinese had no
ground to assume a more hostile attitude toward Americans.
or an American policy. Nevertheless. the Chinese had other
considerations. They had to appraise the value of the

open door policy in their own terms.

153

J

154

Since China had been bitterly defeated in the Sino-
Japanese War of 189“ and had been victimized in the
scramble for concessions thereafter. the most urgent prob—
lem for the Chinese at the time was how to save their
country from complete destruction. As a result. they
sought for changes in both domestic and foreign affairs.

In domestic front. their aspiration was reflected in the
development of reform and revolutionary movements.

In the field of foreign affairs. the U.S. policy
of the open door appeared to provide a way out. China was
threatened with partition. Now the open door promised
preservation of China's territorial and administrative
entity. Furthermore. the United States. unlike the other
powers. had indeed not grabbed a single piece of China's
territory by force. Therefore. China might rely on
American help to save her from break-up. So far as this
purpose could be attained. the principle of equal treatment
as a part of the open door policy was acceptable.

Nevertheless. the United States had neither the
will nor the power to defend China from further encroach-
ments. Those Chinese officials who tended to ignore the
Open door policy could see this at very beginning. The
others who attempted to employ the policy to preserve China
were gradually disappointed. Consequently. many Chinese
officials turned to be lukewarm. or even intransigent. in
their dealing with Americans. This can be traced in their

reluctance to accept the American demand for opening new

155
treaty ports in Manchuria and their insistence of cancell-
ing the Canton-Hankow railway concession.

From another point of view. the open door policy
could provide no basic change for China's foreign affairs
at all. China had for too long depended on some
"barbarians" to manage other "barbarians." To make use of
the open door policy and to secure American help. even if
successful. was only a superficial change. It was still a
diplomacy of reliance on foreigners. China. according to
the advocates of a new and independent diplomacy. should no
longer rely on the foreign powers in handling her foreign
affairs. She could Open her door for foreign commerce on
the principle of equal opportunity. But this should be
done by China according to the circumstances. not upon
demand by foreigners. She should preserve her territorial
and administrative entity. But this was also her own busi-
ness. no foreign power could do it instead. Thus. in the
name of self-reliance. the U.S. policy open door was
criticized.

By 1906. the whole situation in China was changing.
If the Chinese had been preoccupied by the possible dis-
memberment of their country as a result of the scramble for
concessions. the Boxer rebellion. and the Russian occupa-
tion of Manchuria. now all these crises were over. After
the Russo-Japanese War the Manchurian problem was finally

settled on the conference table at Portsmouth. Both Russia

156
and Japan. after delimiting their respective rights and
interests in Manchuria. agreed to withdraw their troops
and to restore the territory to Chinese sovereignty. Thus
released from worries over the territorial integrity of
their country. the Chinese began to reassess the ways to
Open their door for foreign commerce.

The Peking government decided to take action in
developing the Manchurian provinces in September 1905. The
court stressed in an edict to the effect that it was
urgently necessary to ”open more ports of international
trade. and develop international commerce. in the hope that
all those nations with which we have treaties may share in
the benefits to be derived."1 Throughout the year of 1906.
many more ports in China were opened for foreign commerce.
Among them Antung and Mukden in Manchuria were opened
especially to fulfill Article VII of the Sino-American
commercial treaty of 1903.

In the course of Opening new ports. the Chinese
government was also introducing new regulations regarding
foreign commerce. The new regulations. however. were
restrictive. They revealed that the Chinese were recovering
some rights which they had conceded to the foreigners. In
some cases they were detrimental to the privileges which

Americans had Obtained under treaties.

 

1

6b Imperial edict of September 15, 1905, FRUS. 1905.
p. l .

157

First of all. there were new regulations for the
Opening of new ports. Since the British treaty of Nanking
and the treaty of Wanghsia with the United States. the
Chinese government had allowed foreign merchants the
privilege of residing for purposes of trade at treaty ports.
There had been no provision for foreign settlements. In
opening Soochow and Hangchow in 1896. the Chinese government
began to take a new course. Selected locations were thus
fixed upon for foreign settlements. The Chinese authorities
themselves bought up the land in the settlements and leased
it in lots to the foreigners for a period of thirty years.
with leases being subject to renewal for additional periods
of thirty years for ever. These settlements were put under
Chinese police control. and road construction and all
other public improvements were undertaken by the Chinese
authorities.2

When the Chinese government announced the opening
of Chinan in Shantung in January 1906. it adopted more
restrictive regulations. According to them. foreigners
were permitted to reside and trade only in the international
settlement. All other places inside or outside the city of
Chinan. including those close to the settlement. were under
the inland regulations. foreign residence and trade in them

were prohibited. All public services in the settlement

 

2
E. T. Williams' memorandum. FRUS. 1906. pp. 290-
293.

158

had to be established by the Chinese. In addition, pro-
Visions were made for the establishment in the settlement
of a Chinese municipal government and a Chinese police
administration. The extraterritorial powers of foreign
consuls were recognized. In important cases. however. the
police could enter any house in search of criminals. even
without a warrant. All land in the settlement was bought
by the Chinese government and leased at a fixed annual
rental and an annual tax. The lease period was set for
thirty years. at renewal the rental could be increased
according to circumstances. Besides. the Chinese govern-
ment reserved the right to take over the property at the
expiration of sixty years at a valuation to be determined
by arbitrators.3 It is clear that the Chinese government
was trying to strengthen its control over foreigners in the
newly opened ports.

Similar regulations were applied to the opening of
Antung and Mukden. When the American minister. Rockhill.
was informed about them. he thought them absolutely un-
acceptable. In a reply to Prince Ch'ing, he at once
pointed out that the commercial treaty of 1903 required
beforehand consultation with the powers concerned on the

preparation of regulations. It meant that the Chinese had

Regulations concerning the leasing land the build-
ing of houses at the national settlement of Chinan and
police regulations for the port of Chinan. enclosed in
Rockhill to Root. Jan. 1?. 1906. FRUS. 1906. pp. 163-170.

«a. ‘1"...1... 1.0.!

159

no right to prepare them unilaterally. As to the contents
of the regulations. Rockhill thought there were provisions
in open violation of American rights acquired by treaties
and the most-favored-nation clause. He referred parti-
cularly to (l) the limiting of the period of land lease to
thirty years. (2) the question of taxation. (3) the status
Of the Chinese municipal government. and (u) the adjustment
of judicial cases. by which all minor cases of foreigners
were to be brought before a Chinese court room established
by the bureau Of police. He told T'ang Shao-i. Chinese
assistant minister of foreign affairs. that these provisions
restricted the rights which Americans were enjoying in other
treaty ports.“

More irksome for the American diplomats in China
was the failure of the Chinese government to establish
regular customs houses at the newly opened ports in
Manchuria. The Chinese government met with trouble in this
business. It had to reach some agreements with both Japan
and Russia. the two countries still in control of the areas
where the newly opened ports located. More complicated.
an agreement with Japan on the establishment of customs
houses in southern Manchuria depended on what course Russia
pursued in the north. On the other hand, Russia wanted to

know what was to take place in the south.

Lg,

Rockhill to Root. Aug. 15. 1906. cited in Paul A.
Varg. The Making of a Myth: The United States and China:i
1897-1212 (East Lansing. Mich.. 19687} pp. lhE-IES.

160

The Chinese were equally concerned about the right
to collect the customs dues. They deeply resented the fact
that Director of Imperial Maritime Customs Service. Sir
Robert Hart. had failed to appoint a single Chinese to any
of the higher posts. Now they insisted that customs houses
in Manchuria should be ”purely Chinese without even a
foreign commissioner."5

Whatever the reasons behind the Chinese failure to
establish customs houses. this failure. from the American
point of view. constituted the greatest obstacle to effec-
tive equality of commercial opportunity in Manchuria. The
situation was clear. With no customs house established at
the newly opened ports in Manchuria. Russia and Japan were
passing through them their goods from nearby areas under
their respective control without paying any import tax.

The American businessmen. nonetheless. had to pay treaty
tariff as usual since their goods generally went into
Manchuria through Newchwang where duties were levied.

To save this situation. the United States govern-
ment at first asked China to establish customs houses at
Antung and a place near to Dalny. where Japanese goods
generally entered. It also demanded the establishment of a

third customs house on the Russian frontier of Manchuria.

5
Sammons to Rockhill. July 12. 1906. and Rockhill
t3 Root. Aug. 15. 1906, cited in Varg. op. cit.. pp. inn-
1 5.

161

Failing to evoke a satisfactory response from the Chinese
government. the American minister in Peking then addressed
the Wai Wu Pu. requesting that Newchwang be declared a
free port until customs houses were established at all
localities in Manchuria.6

Besides. the Chinese government adopted new mining
regulations in November 1905. To prevent the mining rights F
from falling into the hands of foreigners. Rule VII of the
regulations prohibited the people from effecting private
sales. It provided that property belonging to the people
was only allowed to be sold to "a native of the same dis-
trict in the presence Of the Officials and witness." and
the transfer was allowed only after satisfactory investiga-
tion. If any improper sales happened. the local officials
would be held responsible.7

Rockhill found the said rule to be in direct con-
flict with Article VII of the Sino-American commercial
treaty of 1903. which permitted Americans to carry on in
Chinese territory mining operations and other related
business. He pointed out in a protest to the Chinese
foreign office that the rule would prevent the investment

of American capital in Chinese mining lands. Upon receiving

 

‘—

6
Rockhill to Root. July 16 and Sept. 3. 1906. FRUS.
1906. pp. 202-203. and 221.

7
Mining Regulations establishing provincial bureaus

of inspection. Nov. 27. 1905. FRUS. 1905. pp. 236-238.

162

a complaint from an American businessman. the Acting
Secretary of State Robert Bacon instructed Rockhill to
bring the matter to the attention of the Chinese government
and request that the mining regulations be amended in
accord with the treaty.8

The Chinese government made replies to the American
complaints. With regard to the regulations for the
settlements in the newly opened ports. the Chinese
officials asserted that Antung and Mukden were self-
opened ports. subjected to no restriction by treaty.9 This
was similar to the argument which the Chinese representa-
tives had presented in their negotiations with the Americans
for the commercial treaty of 1903. After consultations
with Rockhill. the Chinese government finally agreed that
foreigners. while still restricted to residence in the
settlements. would be permitted to enter into the cities
for purpose of trade.10

The later regulations for the settlements remained
almost the same as those promulgated in 1906. As the
regulations for the international settlement at Wuhu

revealed. there were provisions for limiting lease period.

 

8

Rockhill to Root and Rockhill to Prince Ch'ing.
Dec. 23. 1905. FRUS. 1905. pp. 235-236. 2383 Bacon to
Rockhill. Dec. 9. 1905. FRUS. 1906. p. 261.

9
Sammons to Rockhill. July 12. 1906. cited in Varg.

22:. 9.1.:- p- 1&3-

10
Prince Ch'ing to Rockhill. Jan. 30. 1907. FRUS.
1907. pp. 221-222.

163

for paying tax. for the establishment of Chinese police
administration. and for the Chinese to undertake public
services. The only conspicuous change. except for the
permission allowed foreigners to enter into the city for
purpose of trade. was that "all" foreigners of bad charac-
ter "shall be dealt with by their consul at the request of
the taotai." By this. the extraterritorial powers were
fully restored to foreign consuls.ll

As to the question of the customs houses in
Manchuria. the Chinese government firmly rejected the
American suggestion to make Newchwang a free port on the
ground that the Newchwang customs had been pledged to the
powers for the Boxer indemnity.12 The American demand to
open customs houses at new ports was accepted. But the
Chinese government took a whole year to settle the question.
Then. it was able to inform American minister of the open-
ing of the customs houses at Antung and Dalny on July 1.
1907. and the other two at Manchuli and Shuifenho in
northern Manchuria on July 8. 1907.13

Finally. the Chinese response to the American com-
plaint against the mining regulations was far from being

acceptable to the American charge in Peking. At first.

11
Regulations for general foreign settlement at

12
Rockhill to Root. Sept. 3. 1906. FRUS. 1906. p. 221.

13
Prince Ch'ing to Rockhill. June 18 and July 10.

164
Prince Ch'ing explained that the regulations about which
the Americans complained were for temporary and experi-
mental use. Chang Chih-tung had just completed the com-
pilation of the general mining regulations. After they
were approved by the court. all mining affairs would be

dealt with according to them.lu

In October 1907. the new
set of mining regulations was promulgated. The subjects of
treaty powers were permitted to cooperate with Chinese in
the opening of mines. Nevertheless. there were many quali-
fications. For instance. missionaries. foreigners who
worked for their governments. foreigners whose country had
no treaty relations with China. or foreigners whose govern-
ment did not grant Chinese similar privilege. were not
admitted into mining enterprise. Foreigners were not en-
titled to own mine land in China. and in case of foreign
and Chinese c00peration in a mining venture the interest of
the foreigner should cease with the mining operations.
Probably the worst of all. all foreigners in cooperation
With Chinese in mining enterprise must be termed "mining
merchants." and they would thus be put under strict control
of Chinese law. This meant that they must give up their
right under extraterritoriality. These regulations.
American charge Henry P. Fletcher pointed out. "are not

framed in a liberal spirit and will. if put into operation

1907. FRUS. 1907. pp. 136. 241.

14
Prince Ch'ing to ROCkhlll. April 24, 1906. FRUS.
1906. p0 2710

 

165

in their present form. handicap. if not entirely prevent.
the employment of foreign capital and foreign participation
in the development of Chinese mineral resources." In
addition. he thought the provisions of the Sino-American
commercial treaty of 1903 "do not seem to have been borne
in mind in the preparation of the regulations."15

The United States had been seeking for equal oppor-
tunity for commerce while the other powers had been extend-
ing their special interests in China. Very recently.
Secretary of State Elihu Root expressed his interest not
only in retaining commercial opportunity. but in seeking

for mining opportunity in Manchuria.16

The newly appointed
Consul general at Mukden. Willard Straight. was thinking
of the introduction of American capital to offset Japanese
predominant position in the three northeastern provinces
following the Russo-Japanese War.17 The United States was
thus about to expand the open door policy to include equal-
ity of opportunity for capitalistic investment.

Now the Chinese attitude toward foreign economic

interests was changing around 1906. The change. as has

been pointed out. was even detrimental to the treaty

15
Fletcher to Root. Nov. 29. 1907. and inclosures.
FRUS. 1908' pp. 152-1730

16
Root to Wilson. March 30. 1906. FRUS. 1906. p. 177.

17
Charles Vevier. The United States and China. 1906-
1913 (New Brunswick. N.J.. 1955). pp. 5-53; and Raymond
Bstnus. "Changing Concepts of the Open Door. 1899-1910."
Mississippi Valley Historical Review. XLVI (1959). 435—45“-

166
privileges which the United States had obtained. This
seems to be unfair if one takes account of the fact that
the Washington government expounded the preservation of
China's territorial and administrative entity when the old
empire was threatened with partition. Nonetheless. China
had never enthusiastically welcomed the U.S. policy of open
door. In addition. the country was awakening after the
Russo-Japanese war. The reformers and revolutionaries were
condemning the old policy of using "barbarians" to counter
"barbarians." and urging self—reliance and independent
diplomacy. Under the circumstances. it was not unnatural

if the United States found it more difficult to deal with

China.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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