ABSTRACT

CHINA'S RESPONSE TO
THE OPEN DOOR, 1898-1906

By

Chung-tung Chang

The Chinese had never been able to form a consensus in their attitude toward the United States. At the turn of the century, their response to the U.S. policy of the open door tended to be split. Some Chinese officials, like Li Hung-chang, were inclined to ignore the policy. Some others, such as Liu K'un-i and Chang Chih-tung, would make use of it so long as they thought it helpful in the preservation of China's integrity. For still others, the open door policy and the American exclusion laws against the Chinese seemed to be incompatible with each other. Besides, many reformers and revolutionaries criticized John Hay's policy as hardly better than the policy of partition.

One thing is sure. The open door policy was never heartily welcome in China. This did not necessarily reflect an anti-American attitude. In view of the fact that the United States had never been so aggressive as the other powers in dealing with China, the Chinese had no ground to

assume a more hostile attitude toward Americans, or toward American policy. Nevertheless, the Chinese had other considerations. They had to appraise the value of the open door policy in their own terms.

Since China had been bitterly defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and had been victimized in the battle of concessions thereafter, the most urgent problem for the Chinese at the time was to save their country from complete destruction. As a result, they sought changes in both domestic and foreign affairs. On the domestic front, their aspiration was reflected in the development of reform and revolutionary movements.

In the field of foreign affairs, American open door policy appeared to provide for a way-out. China was threatened with partition. Now the open door policy promised preservation of China's territorial and administrative entity. Furthermore, the United States, unlike the other powers, had not seized any of China's territory by force. Therefore, China might rely on American help to save her from destruction. So far as this purpose could be attained, the principle of equal opportunity as a part of the open door policy was acceptable.

Nevertheless, the United States had neither the will nor the power to defend China from further encroachments. Those Chinese officials who tended to ignore the open door policy could see this at very beginning. The others who attempted to employ the policy to preserve China were

gradually disappointed. Consequently, many Chinese officials became cool, or even intransigent, in their dealing with the Americans. This can be traced in their reluctance to accept the American demand for opening new treaty ports in Manchuria and their insistance of cancelling the Canton-Hankow railway concession.

From another point of view, the open door policy could provide no basic change for China's foreign affairs at all. China had for too long depended on using some "barbarians" to manage other "barbarians." To make use of the open door policy and to secure American help, even if successful, was only a superficial change. It was still a diplomacy of reliance on foreigners. China, according to the advocates of a new and independent diplomacy, should no longer rely on the foreign powers in handling her foreign affairs. She could open her door for foreign commerce on the principle of equal opportunity. But this should be done by herself according to the circumstances, not upon demand by foreigners. She should preserve her territorial and administrative entity, But this was also her own business, no foreign power could do it instead. Thus, in the name of self-reliance, the U.S. open door policy was criticized.

By 1906, the United States was about to expand the open door policy to include a demand for equal opportunity for investment, as well as equal commercial opportunities. The Chinese government, on its part, was adopting new

regulations regarding foreign economic interests. The changes on both sides conflicted. Since China's sovereignty over Manchuria was guaranteed after the Russo-Japanese War, the old empire was released from the threat of partition, the country was awakening, and the reformers and revolutionaries were urging self-reliance and independent diplomacy, the Ch'ing government became determined to regain economic control. Therefore, the new regulations which the Ch'ing government was introducing around 1906 were restrictive. They were even detrimental to the old treaty privileges of the United States, not to mention the new American demands for investment opportunities.

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INTRODUCTION*

When E. H. Conger came to China in the Summer of 1898 to succeed Charles Denby as the American Minister in Peking, China was on the verge of partition. Using the murder of two missionaries as a pretext, Germany demanded and secured the cession of the port of Kiaochow, thereby establishing its control over the province of Shantung. Russia exacted leaseholds at Port Arthur and Talienwan in consolidation of a grip on Manchuria. Great Britain was further expanding its sphere of influence throughout the Yangtze Valley and obtained a new leasehold on the port of Weihaiwei. After seizing Kwangchow Bay, France extended its interests in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan. And, finally, Japan developed a sphere of influence in the province of Fukien. Thus, China was crisscrossed by agreements, leases, and other special concessions that tied down portions of her territory to particular foreign powers.

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*The story of the writing of the first Open Door notes has been told many times. A summary of the story given here has an introduction to the analysis of China's response to open door policy at the turn of the century is mainly based upon the secondary works such as Charles S. Campbell, Jr., Special Interests and the Open Door Policy (New Haven, Conn., 1951), A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), Paul A. Varg, Open Door Diplomat: The Life of W.W. Rockhill (Urbana, Ill., 1952) and The Making of a Myth: The United States and China, 1897-1912 (East Lansing, Mich., 1968), and Marilyn B. Young, The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy, 1895-1901 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968).

These developments in China gained worldwide attention and alarmed the Americans. The United States had just extended her influence to the Philippines as a result of the Spanish-American War. Conger suggested in late August that the permanent ownership or possession of Manila and vicinity would be most invaluable to the United States in securing and holding her share of influence and trade in China. In November, Conger had second thoughts. Manila was not good enough. The situation in China was changing rapidly. He urged that the United States put herself in a position "to own and control at least one good port (in China) from which we can potently assert our rights and effectively wield our influence." On March 1, 1899, in a report on the Italian demand for a coaling station, Conger argued once again that this was the moment for America to choose and seize a base in China. He outlined the procedure other powers had used to obtain their spheres of influence and appealed for America to do the same.

American business groups had been interested in a market in China. As China's door was being closed to them, they were also concerned. A group of important cotton textile exporters, railroad promoters, and mining entrepreneurs who had organized the American Asiatic Association forwarded a series of petitions to Washington urging adoption of a more vigorous Far Eastern policy. The National Association of Manufacturers in its annual meeting

of 1899 called for government support in expanding trade throughout the Pacific. The New York Chamber of Commerce complained in a memorial to President McKinley that the Washington government seemed to be supine about the menace to the important business interests of American citizens in China.

By 1899, there were more than a thousand American missionaries in China. Some of them, stirred by the anti-missionary riots in China's interior in the late 1890's, felt that if partition occurred the missionary movement would benefit from the better government certain to be provided in areas run by Western powers. Many others, however, thought in different terms. The well-known missionary Gilbert Reid, for instance, published several articles in the Spring of 1899 to stress the greatness of American interests existing in China. He pointed out that the United States had to deal with Russia, as well as China, in Manchuria, with Germany in Shantung, with England in the Yantze Valley, and so on, and wondered why the Americans were not more active in the old empire. Concluding one of his articles, he urged the Washington government immediately to join Great Britain in support of the open door policy.

The intellectual leaders in the United States also turned to China. Brooks Adams saw the world polarized into two opposing blocs--Russia, and with her France and Germany, against America and England. The battlefield for

the inevitable struggle would be China. In a period of increasing economic competition, "China is the only region which now promises almost boundless possibilities of absorption." If America would only ally herself with Britain, the center of trade would remain safely in the West, and human society "would be absolutely dominated by a vast combination of peoples whose right wing would rest upon the British Isles, whose left wing would overhang the middle provinces of China, whose center would approach the Pacific,..." On the other hand, should France, Germany, and Russia--the three land powers--combine to occupy the Chinese interior and then exclude American goods, the United States would be forced to collectivize or die.

Charles Conant, a journalist, argued in a series of articles between September 1898 and August 1900 that to find investment fields abroad was essential to keep the economy from stagnating. And the only significant field of investment left in the world was China. He suggested that the exclusive policy of France, Germany, and Russia, as illustrated by their spheres of influence policy, must be either stopped by force or imitated. In a country like China, he stressed, investment opportunity depended on the home government's vigor in pressing the claims of private investers. This the United States must now do.

Similar arguments were provided by the others. In 1898 and 1899, journals and newspapers were full of discussions on China.

Incidentally, Great Britain was seeking help from the United States. To maintain her advantageous position in the Yangtze Valley and to guard against exclusion from other parts of China, she attempted to interest the United States in a cooperative effort to ensure equal trading rights in leases or concessions acquired by other powers in China. The British overture was turned down by President McKinley on the ground that nothing in the situation in China appeared to justify any departure from the United States' well-founded policy of avoiding any "interference or connection with European complications. In the meantime, Joseph Chamberlain made it clear that, while seeking an open door in China, Great Britain had no intention "to give anything like a guarantee of integrity and independence of an empire which appeared to be decaying."

In late February 1899, Americans interested in China welcomed Lord Charles Beresford as a spokesman for the Open Door policy. Beresford was a representative of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of England and had recently made a tour in China and Japan. He criticized the British policy and asked that America declare a new policy for Asia that would go far beyond current British aims. His program rested on two general proposals: that the spheres of influence pattern was strangling trade and must be stopped and an Open Door policy substituted; that to make the Open Door policy meaningful, China's integrity must be preserved. For purpose of achieving the later,

Beresford advanced, the United States must ally not only with Britain, but with Germany and Japan. Americans interested in China responded favorably to Beresford's program. Nevertheless, as Beresford saw it, they hardly made any practical effort beyond discussions.

The Washington government was still unwilling to take action. John Hay had just assumed his post as Secretary of State. While American Ambassador in London he had favored a cordial response to British overtures for cooperation. His attitude, however, was based on a desire to strengthen Anglo-American relations rather than any great interest in China. As a matter of fact, he had only a superficial knowledge of conditions in the Far East. Not until William W. Rockhill came back to the State Department in May 1899 as his adviser on affairs in Eastern Asia, was Hay ready to do something on China.

Rockhill was an old China hand. He had acquired some knowledge of Chinese, Sanskrit, and Tibetan. In 1884, he procured an appointment as Second Secretary of the American Legation in Peking. The next year he was promoted to First Secretary. After he resigned in 1888 because of personal incompatibility with Minister Denby, he took two famous journies of exploration through Mongolia and Tibet respectively in 1888-1889 and 1891-1892. Then he came back to work in the State Department as Chief Clerk, Assistant Secretary, and Acting Secretary consecutively before he

was sent to Athens in 1897 as Minister to Greece, Roumania and Servia. His wide experience in the Far East and in the Department of State established his reputation as an expert in China and earned him the friendship and admiration of influential Republicans including Roosevelt, Hay and Lodge.

Action was further hastened by the arrival of Alfred H. Hippisley in Baltimore. Hippisley was a British subject and a member of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service since 1867. The Chinese customs service was superintended by the British, a privilege ultimately sanctioned by treaty of 1898 for as long as England's share of China's foreign trade should exceed that of any other nation. Nevertheless, it did not necessarily mean that the individuals of the service always worked for the British interest. Being involved in the service for decades, both Hippisley and Sir Robert Hart, the Superintendent, probably were concerned about the impact of the scramble for concessions on the operation of customs administration.

Hippisley's acquaintance with Rockhill dated from the autumn of 1884 when the latter first joined the staff of the American Legation in Peking. Their intimacy was made the closer by Hippisley's marriage in the following year with Miss Howard, a friend of long standing of Mrs. Rockhill's. When Hippisley came to visit his wife's family in Baltimore in June 1899, he was pleased to renew his acquaintance with Rockhill, whom he had not seen for over

ten years.

Both friends had long experience in the Orient and were deeply interested in the Far Eastern affairs. When they could get together again, the topic of their conversations naturally fell on China. Since Hippisley came fresh from the scene, Rockhill was anxious to have all the data the Englishman could give him. Not long after their reunion, Rockhill introduced Hippisley to Secretary Hay and the latter was impressed with the views expressed by both experts.

Then, at the beginning of August, when Hay left Washington for vacation and Hippisley departed Baltimore on a leisurely journey, Rockhill received a letter from his British friend. It was Hippisley's opinion that spheres of influence in China must be recognized as existing facts and that the exclusive railroad and mining privileges of the controlling powers must also be accepted. However, no one of the powers had yet claimed the right to impose differential tariffs on goods coming into its own sphere, although such a claim might be only a matter of time. Hippisley then ventured to suggest that the United States lose no time in calling the attention of all the powers to the changes now taking place in China and in expressing "her determination not to sacrifice for her annually increasing trade any of the rights or privileges she has secured by treaty with China." To assure this end, Hippisley added,

the Washington government should obtain an assurance from each European power that the Chinese treaty tariff should without discrimination apply to all merchandise entering its sphere of influence and that any treaty ports in them should not be interfered with.

Rockhill went further in his reply to Hippisley. He would like to see his government "make a declaration in some form or other, which would be understood by China as a pledge on our part to assist in maintaining the integrity of the Empire."

Nonetheless, Rockhill feared that home politics and next year's election would interfere with the course which he and Hippisley were conceiving, "for it might be interpreted by a large part of the voting population of the United States, especially the Irish and the German, as an adoption of the policy advocated by England." Hay had similar worries. After reading Hippisley's recommendations which Rockhill had passed to him, he wrote that "the senseless prejudices in certain sections of the 'Senate and people' compel us to move with great caution." Consequently, the Washington government continued drifting along for a while.

Hippisley did not give up hope. In the meantime, two developments reinforced his analysis and led toward the adoption of the policy he urged.

McKinley had appointed Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell University, to lead a commission to the

Philippines in a task to investigate and report on conditions in the islands. Schurman had just returned to the United States. In San Francisco he told the newsmen on August 15 that the great question of the Orient was not Formosa, nor the Philippines, but China. "Everywhere and at all times...it was recognized that the future of China was the one overshadowing question. China, it was agreed, should maintain its independent position, but its doors should be kept open. It means much to England and Japan and not less to America." McKinley had reposed great trust in Schurman. Both Rockhill and Hippisley agreed that Schurman's opinions would carry weight with the White House.

On the same day that Schurman expressed his opinions on China, the Czar issued an ukase declaring Talienwan a free port. Hippisley wrote to Rockhill on August 23: "This is most satisfactory. It gives a natural opportunity for opening negotiations to settle the conditions that are to hold in China for, at least, the immediate future, and it seems to promise cooperation on Russia's part in the direction we hope for. Let the Admin. then act at once,..." Accompanied with this letter, there was a "Memorandum on the 'Open Door' in China" drawn up by Hippisley on August 17.

The Washington government was changing its position. Rockhill wrote Hippisley on August 18 that he had received "pretty clear assurances from the State Department that

it may take some action sooner than could be anticipated from the position it held until within a few weeks..." On August 24, Rockhill received a letter from Hay--then escaping the Washington heat in New Hampshire. "I have already received from the representatives of the powers concerned," Hay wrote "assurances that the recent extension of spheres of influence...will not result in restricting our commercial freedom in China. But I agree with you that some more formal engagement of that sort would be desirable. If you have time between now and next Wed. to set down your views on this question in the form of a draft instruction to Mr. Chalote, Mr. White, Mr. Tower and Gen. Porter, I would be greatly obliged." Rockhill was elated. "My project of publishing our views on the policy of the United States in China has been nipped in the bud," he wrote Hippisley on the twenty-eighth.

Rockhill's response to Hay's request, a memorandum dated August 28, is the key document in the whole Open Door exchange. On the basis of Hippisley's memorandum of August 17, Rockhill suggested that the United States should at once initiate negotiations to obtain from those powers who had acquired spheres of influence in China formal assurance on three points: (1) they would in no way interfere with any treaty ports in such spheres or with the interests in it; (2) that all ports they might open in their respective spheres should be either free ports, or

that the Chinese tariff at the time in force should apply to all merchandise, and that the dues and duties provided for by treaty should be collected by the Chinese government; and (3) that they would levy no differential harbor dues on vessels of other nationalities and that they would also levy no discriminating railroad charges against citizens of other nations. In short, the United States should insist on absolute equality of treatment.

In addition, Rockhill's memorandum consisted of a long critique of Beresford's recently published book, The Break up of China. The American diplomat could not agree to Beresford's low assessment of the strength and efficiency of the Chinese government. He regarded the Englishman's proposal to reform China's military by foreign officers as the weakest part of his scheme.

Finally, Rockhill indicated that American interests were not identical with those of Great Britain. It was particularly important for obvious reasons of both domestic and foreign policy, Rockhill stressed, that the United States should take the initiative for negotiations. "Such a policy cannot be construed as favorable to any power in particular, but is eminently useful and desirable for the commerce of all nations. It furthermore has the advantage of insuring to the United States the appreciation of Chinese Government, who would see in it a strong desire to arrest the disintegration of the Empire and would greatly

add to our prestige and influence in Peking."

Rockhill's memorandum received the approval of the administration, and he was commissioned to draft the Open Door notes. The notes were written from the memorandum on September 5 and on the 6th dispatched to the American representatives in England, Germany, and Russia. In November, the identical ones were circulated to Japan, Italy, and France.

For the time being, Rockhill put the question of China's territorial integrity in the shadow. When he first suggested this question in his letter to Hippisley at the beginning of August, the Englishman made a reply that he felt it too great an undertaking for so cautious an administration as McKinley's. In late August, Hippisley wrote that "steps taken to secure integrity of China are taken not out of pure altruism but to maintain trade markets and to avoid international conflicts." Yet unless China took a determined stand on behalf of its own independence, Hippisley did not believe many foreign powers would be willing to bind themselves to the integrity idea. Rockhill agreed that this aspect of the open door problem was too large and complex to be dealt with at present. This explains why the question was referred to only ambiguously in the note to London.

The replies to the open door notes were uniformly evasive and noncommital. Great Britain agreed to the

proposals only after the United States met her insistance that Kowloon be excluded. Germany also agreed, but advised that she did not think it would be wise to press the powers for specific commitments. France accepted the general proposal but carefully omitted any reference to "spheres of influence." Italy and Japan made their acceptance contingent upon the acceptance of all the others. Russia finally accepted, but her reply was the least satisfactory. From her declaration she specifically excluded leased territories, stating that it was for China to settle the question of custom duties in open ports and that Russia would claim no special privileges for her own subjects.

Both Hay and Rockhill were fairly satisfied with what had been accomplished. On March 20, 1900, the Secretary of State announced that he had received satisfactory assurances from all the powers addressed, and that he regarded each as "final and definite." Rockhill wrote Edwin Denby on January 13 that he convinced the acceptance by the powers of the American proposals was due to America's strong and central position in the Far East. "This country holds the balance of power in China. I hope sincerely that we may make good use of it, not only for our trade, but for strengthening the Peking Government so that it can find no means of escaping the performance of all its obligations to the Treaty Powers. What we have obtained

will undoubtedly help to insure, for the time being, the integrity of the Chinese Empire, but, on its side, China can and must discharge its international obligations."

Some of American newspapers expressed their doubts. The protectionist New York Press, for instance, feared the consequences the open door note would have for the Philippines. How could the United States now close the door in the Philippines, which it should and must do, while demanding that it remain open in China? The New Orleans Picayune had similar worries with regard to Chinese immigration. How could the United States, with any consistancy, shut the door against unwanted Oriental migrants? The Springfield Republican pointed to the vagueness of the replies America had received: "The only assurance of an 'open door' still rests upon our ability to keep it open by force."

Nevertheless, the favorable response was overwhelming. The New York Times enthusiastically declared that Hay had succeeded "in repairing the huge blunder of his predecessor" in rejecting the British open door overtures. The Review of Reviews characterized his coup as "one of the greatest achievements ever won by diplomacy." The Philadelphia Press hailed the open door exchange as a greater achievement than the Spanish-American War. The Journal of Commerce called it "one of the most important diplomatic negotiations of our time." The Independent credited the administration with halting the partition of China. The open door note had demonstrated, the editors

crowed, that the United States "had something to say as to the future of Asia, and, if need comes, it will have something to do."

Then, what happened in China? What was China's response to the open door policy? This will be the topic of the following analysis.

CHAPTER I

NO CONSENSUS

For many years the Chinese have viewed the United States with mixed feeling. This tradition was established long before the end of the 19th century. For instance, when Viceroy T'an T'ing-kŝiang, of Chili was in charge of negotiating treaty revisions with the powers in 1858, he memorialized to the Emperor on one occasion that Americans, "compared with the Russian barbarians, are trustworthy and their speech rather reasonable but they are very suspicious and obstinate." Two days later he changed his mind and regarded the United States as in one category with England, France and Russia in their insatiable greed.[1] Some other Chinese officials, like Tseng Kuo-fang, had more illusions about the United States. "Of all western barbarians,..." Tseng wrote in a memorial in 1861, "The Americans are of pure-minded and honest disposition and long recognized as

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[1] T'an's memorials, Hsien-feng 8/4/1 and 3 (May 13 and 15, 1858), Ch'ou Pan I Wu Shih Mo (The Management of Barbarian Affairs of the Ch'ing Dynasty from Beginning to End, a collection of documents, cited hereafter as IWSM), Hsien-feng (1851-1861) series, v. 22, pp. 1-2, 7. For an English version, see Earl Swisher, China's Management of the American Barbarians (New Haven, Conn., 1953), pp. 454-455.

respectful and compliant toward China."[2] There was no consensus in China's attitude toward the United States. This was exactly the case not only before but after Secretary of State John Hay advocated an "open door" policy due to the explosive situations in China during the years of 1899 and 1900.

Not until the spring of 1900, did the United States inform the Chinese government about the Open Door policy. On March 22, though no power replied to the first open door notes with a definite commitment, Hay instructed Conger to impress upon the Tsungli Yamen at every opportunity that the American government "by the recent assurance which it has obtained from the various great powers holding leased territory or spheres of influence in China, concerning freedom of trade in said spheres and the maintenance therein of China's rights of sovereignty, has obtained thereby renewed assurance of the policy of the Treaty Powers not to interfere with the integrity of the Chinese Empire." On March 26, Hay enclosed in his instruction to Conger duplicate copies of the correspondence which the American government had with the governments of Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Italy and Japan with respect to the Open Door Notes.[3] Conger in turn furnished the Chinese

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[2] Tseng's memorial, H10/11/25 (Jan. 1, 1861), IWSM, Hsien-feng series, v.71, p.11; and Swisher, op. cit., p.691.

[3] Hay to Conger, March 22 and March 26, 1900, Instructions.

government one copy of the correspondence for its information. But by May 21, Conger could only report to Hay that the situation in China had become very serious because of the Boxers and the Chinese government seemed to be too preoccupied to make any response to the correspondence.[4]

Though the government at Peking failed to make a response to the first Open Door notes, the Chinese Minister at Washington did not. As early as the first months of 1899, a lot of people, both in the Great Britain and in the United States, were already talking about the open door as a panacea to the threatened partition of China.[5] Probably inspired by their discussions, the Chinese Minister Wu T'ing-fang advised the annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science on April 8, 1899 that "it has always been the policy of China to treat all foreign nations alike. They are all most favored nations in a literal sense. The maintenance of an 'Open Door' is exactly in the line of her policy." His topic for the occasion was "China's Relation with the West." "China," he added, "welcomes to her shores the people of all nations. Her ports are open to all, and she treats all alike without distinction of race, nationality, or creed. Her people trade with all foreigners."[6] Time and again after Mr. Hay

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[4] Conger to Hay, May 21, 1900, China Despatches.

[5] Griswold, op. cit., p. 48; Young, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

[6] Wu T'ing-fang, "China's Relation with the West,"

dispatched the first Open Door notes, Wu repeated this trend to his American audience and stressed the vast potentiality of China as a market for American goods, the great opportunity in China for American investments, and the possibility of a more friendly relationship between China and the United States. Also, though he did not mention the term "China's integrity," he suggested on one occasion that the United States might do something for it by extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Asia. The United States, he explained, had declared it would not allow the neighboring American continent to pass into the possession of any foreign power. Now, as she took new possessions at the Philippines, it was inadvisable for her to look with indifference upon any encroachment on the neighboring mainland of Asia, especially the eastern portion. Wu's remarks usually met with applause and Mr. George O. Meiklejohn, who was assisting Elihu Root in the conduct of the War Department, even naively indicated that the United States should support Wu as a candidate for the Chinese throne.[7]

"Supplement" to American Academy of Political and Social Science Annals, XIII (1899), pp. 168-170.

[7] After Hay dispatched the first Open Door notes, Wu was successively invited to address the meeting of the International Commercial Congress, the annual dinner of the American Asiatic Association, the Silk Association banquet, the dedication of the new law school of the University of Pennsylvania and the sessions of National Association of Manufacturers. See New York Times, Oct. 18, 1899, Jan. 26, Feb. 22, April 26, July 10, 1900. Also Wu T'ing-fang, "Mutual Helpfulness Between China and the United States," North American Review CLXXI (July, 1900), pp. 1-12.

Nevertheless, Wu appeared to be less enthusiastic than his American audience. The Chinese had long been unhappy with American restrictions on Chinese immigrants. The Boxer uprising against foreigners was brewing. With all this in mind, whenever Wu welcomed American friends for China with open arms, he asked the United States to open reciprocally her own door. When he talked about the extension of the Monroe Doctrine, he discounted the necessity of American help by saying that he did not apprehend any encroachment on China.[8]

Unfortunately, the Boxer uprising once again brought in foreign attacks. The Boxers stirred up an armed rebellion against foreigners in May, 1900. After tearing down portions of the Tientsin-Peking railway, they entered the capital, cut off telegraphic communication, murdered the secretary of the Japanese legation and the German minister, and besieged the foreign legations in the city. For the purpose of lifting the siege, the foreign forces bombarded the Taku forts on June 17, took Tientsin on July 13, and reached Peking on August 14. Now, as the Chinese government definitely needed help from the powers to restore peace, how much did she count on the United States?

At first, when conflict broke out and the Court was in the hands of reactionaries who stood behind the

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8 Ibid.

Boxers, the more liberal provincial authorities in the South resolutely kept disorder and war out of their jurisdiction. These people, Viceroy Chang Chih-tung at Wuchang, Viceroy Liu K'un-i at Nanking and Director of Railways and Telegraphs Sheng Hsuan-huai at Shanghai especially, had long demanded suppresion of the Boxers.[9] After Taku was bombarded and the Court issued an edict on June 21 to declare war against the foreigners, Chang and Liu agreed immediately that the declaration of war should be ignored. Viceroy Li Hung-chang at Canton and Governor Yuan Shih-k'ai of Shantung joined in. Li even regarded the war edict as being issued without proper authorization from the Throne.[10] On the other hand, these viceroys ordered the local officials in all of the cities and villages under their control to post proclamations commanding peace and asking Chinese people to acknowledge the foreign rights and to protect lives and property of foreigners. This precaution against trouble was so effective that John F. Goodnow, American Consul-General in Shanghai, could wire to the

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9 Chang to Tsungli Yamen and Jung Lu, K (Kuang-hsu) 26/5/4 (May 31, 1900), and to Liu K'un-i, K26/5/18, Chang Chih-tung, Chang Wen Hsiang Kung Ch'uan Chi (Complete Works of Chang Chih-tung), v. 160, p.2; Sheng to Tsungli Yamen, K26/5/9, Sheng Hsuan-huai, Yu Chai Ts'un Kao (Collected Papers of Sheng Hsuan-huai), v. 21, p. 19; and Liu to Tsungli Yamen, K26/5/19, Liu K'un-i, Liu Chung Ch'eng Kung I Chi (Works of Late Liu K'un-i), "Tien Tsou," (Telegraphic Memorials), v.2, p. 1.

10 Liu to Chang, K26/5/28 (June 24, 1900) and K26/6/1, Chang to Liu, K26/5/29, Chang, op. cit., v. 160, pp. 38-39;

Department of State that his reports from the missionaries in the Yangtze valley were of "the most encouraging character."[11]

In the meantime, the provincial authorities in the South were making efforts to reach an understanding with all the powers concerned. As early as June 18, the day after the bombardment of Taku, Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i assured Lord Salisbury through the Chinese minister in London that they were able to maintain order and to protect foreigners within their territories. They asked Great Britain not to send any naval forces into the Yangtze River. Otherwise, they warned, other powers would follow suit and the Chinese people in the Yangtze valley would be highly disturbed. Three days later, the two viceroys made an appeal to the United States for the same purpose. But, in addition to what they had urged upon Great Britain, they even asked for American help in their negotiations with all the other powers to reach a similar mutual understanding. In view of the fact that the United States just stood by and did not fire a single shot during the bombardment of Taku,

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Li to Sheng, K26/5/29, Sheng to Li, K26/5/30, Li Hung-chang, Li Wen Chung Kung Ch'uan Chi (Complete Works of Li Hung-chang), "Tien Kao," (Telegrams), v.22, p. 40.

[11] Goodnow to Cridler, June 29, 1900, FRUS, 1900, pp. 249-251.

they believed she would surely do China some further favor.[12]

In response to the requests of Yangtze viceroys, Mr. Hay offered a seemingly encouraging assurance. As long as the Yangtze Valley could be maintained in peace, he told the Chinese minister at Washington, the United States would send no military forces to the area. Besides, the American government would communicate the correspondence in this regard to her representatives at London, Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Tokyo.[13] This assurance came at the time the Southern authorities were being forced to look for a general and more definite agreement with the powers.

Such an agreement was necessary for several reasons. First of all, the court had issued an edict on June 20, ordering all provincial authorities to protect their territories, and the southern viceroys had made use of it as a pretext to reach mutual understanding with the powers in keeping south China out of war.[14] Now, if the viceroys could not keep foreign forces from coming, or could not prevent foreigners from taking obtrusive actions in their

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12 Chang to Lo Feng-luh, K26/5/22 (June 18, 1900), Chang to Liu, K26/5/22, Liu to Chang, K26/5/23, and Chang to Wu T'ing-fang, K26/5/25, Chang, op. cit., v. 160, pp. 15-17, 22.

13 Hay's memorandum, June 22, Hay to Wu, June 22, and Wu to Hay, June 23, 1900, FRUS, 1900, pp. 273-274.

14 See note 12.

provinces, they might be in trouble with the court. Also, they had to watch out for the reactionaries. Though the viceroys spared no effort to ask the local inhabitants to respect foreign rights, there were reactionary elements who were always restless, or even reckless, within their jurisdiction. The Imperial Inspector Li Ping-heng of the Yangtze Naval Forces, for instance, had already left for the Kiangyin fort near Shanghai and declared that foreign warships would be fired upon if they closed in. In addition, he planned to mine the mouth of the Yangtze River. Both Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i were greatly disturbed and made all the efforts to persuade him not to take impetuous actions.[15] On the other hand, some powers, Great Britain especially, consistently threatened to take military action along the Yangtze. Rumors were always present of British war vessels moving along the River despite the appeal made to Lord Salisbury not to dispatch naval forces. In Shanghai, the British consul once offered help in a joint protection of the manufacturing factory and arsenal. This offer was turned down by Viceroy Liu, because he hated to see important military installations falling into foreigner's hands. Then, with the fighting in the north escalating, it was reported that the British troops had suffered heavy

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[15] Sheng to Liu and Chang, K26/5/26 (June 22, 1900), Liu to Sheng, K26/5/27, Sheng, op. cit., v. 36, pp. 3-4; Liu to Chang, K26/5/28, Chang to Li Ping-heng, K26/5/29, Chang, op. cit., v. 160, p. 39.

casualties near Tientsin and the British commander had asked all powers to send reinforcements.[16] Under all these pressures, the southern authorities learned of Mr. Hay's assurances. Most probably, this indication of American good will reinforced their decision to negotiate with all the foreign consuls in Shanghai for a general agreement.

On June 26, Sheng Hsüan-huai and Shanghai Taotai Yu Lien-yuan met with the foreign consuls, including American consul Goodnow, and presented to them a draft agreement which had been formulated with instructions from Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i. The draft agreement consisted of nine articles. Except for the ones concerning the assurance which had been given by Chang and Liu to maintain order and to protect foreigners in their provinces, most of them were designed to restrain the foreigners. The foreign settlements at Shanghai should be jointly protected by the powers. The measure for the joint protection should be carried out in a quiet and discreet way. Foreign ships of war now at the different ports along the Yangtze could remain as heretofore, but they were not to land marines or sailors. Should any foreign power without the consent of the viceroys despatch more ships of war up the Yangtze and

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16 Liu to Chang and others, K26/5/23 (June 19, 1900), Liu to Chang, K26/5/24, and Liu to Yu Lien-yuan, K26/5/28, Liu, op. cit., "Tien Hsin," (Telegrams), v. 1, pp. 16-17, 19-20; Liu to Chang, K26/5/23, Chang to Liu, K26/5/28, Chang, op. cit., v.160, pp. 18, 33-34; and Sheng to Li, Liu and Chang, K26/5/28, Sheng, op. cit., v. 36, p. 5.

thus rouse the suspicion of the natives and create a disturbance, resulting in the loss of lives and property of foreign merchants and missionaries, China would not be liable. Foreign ships of war should not approach, anchor, or carry on drills near the forts at Wusung and on the Yangtze, so as to prevent misunderstanding or accident. Foreign powers were asked not to allow their ships of war to patrol the waters in the vicinity of the Shanghai Arsenal, or to anchor near thereto, or to send troops or police to that place. Missionaries and foreigners should not venture into places in the interior, where means of protection were not established, thus exposing them to possible dangers.[17] It is clear that the southern authorities needed more definite assurance from the powers to relieve them from all of the worries.

Nevertheless, the foreign consuls could not accept this draft agreement. They raised objection especially to the article which spared the viceroys the responsibility for the disturbances which might be occasioned by the entrance of foreign warships into the Yangtze. As a result of the meeting, these consuls sent back next day a joint memorandum which declared the limited purpose of the powers to fight only against the Boxers and those who strove to prevent rescue of foreigners in danger in the north. As

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[17] Ibid.; and Sheng to Chang, K26/6/1, Chang, op. cit., v. 161, pp. 1-3. For English version of the draft agreement, see Chester C. Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe (New York, 1955), p. 81.

far as the Yangtze valley was concerned, it affirmed that the powers had no intention to take any action or to land the force so long as the viceroys were able to maintain the treaty rights of foreigners.[18] There was no definite assurance. Nothing was specifically mentioned in the joint memorandum about the foreign warships along the Yangtze which so haunted the southern authorities.

Immediately after Sheng and Taotai Yu presented to the foreign consuls a draft agreement and the consulate group sent in return the joint memorandum of June 27, it became known that German minister Baron von Ketteler had been murdered in Peking. The southern viceroys were greatly upset by the report. In addition to promising to protect foreigners and to maintain order in their provinces, these viceroys had agreed that the Chinese ministers abroad should stay at their posts as long as possible and the foreign ministers at Peking should be free from assault. Then, they believed, China could still maintain diplomatic relations with the powers and negotiation could be arranged in the future to settle the problems left by the Boxer uprising.[19] With the murder of German minister, the whole project to keep the door for peace open was being broken

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[18] Goodnow to Cridler, June 29, 1900, FRUS, 1900, pp. 249-250.

[19] Liu to Chang, K26/6/2 (June 28, 1900), Chang to Liu, Sheng, and Yu, K26/6/2, and Chang to Chinese ministers abroad, K26/6/4, Chang, op. cit., v. 161, p. 4; Sheng to Li, K26/6/3 and K26/6/4, Li to Sheng, K26/6/4, Li, op. cit., "Tien Kao," v. 23, pp. 4-6.

down. In order to save the situation, Liu K'un-i wired Princes Ch'ing and Tuan at Peking urging them to do all possible to protect the ministers. Chang suggested they send consolatory letters to all foreign consuls at Shanghai, with emphasis on a decree of June 25 in which the court had guaranteed the protection of Peking legations. Then the two viceroys jointly instructed Chinese ministers abroad, Wu at Washington included, to reassure the powers that regardless of what might happen in the north, they would continue to give all protection to the lives and property of foreigners. In return, the powers were asked to keep their promise not to send forces to the Yangtze. Desperately, Viceroy Liu even urged President McKinley to take a leading part in pushing aside selfish schemes.[20]

Secretary Hay learned of the murder of Ketteler on July 1.[21] Faced with this explosive report, the unknown fate of the rest of the ministers in Peking, and the appeals from the southern Chinese viceroys, he decided to dispatch no additional troops to China. With the approval of McKinley, he sent another circular to the powers on

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[20] Liu to Princes Ch'ing and Tuan, K26/6/3 (June 29, 1900), Liu, op. cit., "Tien Hsin," v. 1, p. 23; Chang to Liu, Sheng and Yii, K26/6/6, Chang, op. cit., v. 161, pp. 9-10; Wu to Hay, July 3, 1900, FRUS, 1900, pp. 276-277; and Goodnow to Hay, July 1 and July 3, 1900, Consular Dispatches, Shanghai.

[21] Goodnow to Hay, July 1, 1900, ibid.

July 3 to define American policy. This second Open Door note set forth the purpose of the United States "to act concurrently with the other powers" in restoring order and protecting American lives, American property and all legitimate American interests in China. In its concluding sentence, it stressed that "the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."[22] Compared with the first Open Door note, this second circular contained more emphasis on China's integrity. It did not include reference to "the spheres of influence." Apparently, nothing could have been more desirable for all Chinese at that particular time than this American policy. But how much the policy would be realized and how much it would be favored in China, remained to be seen.

The value, or lack of value, of American policy for China's diplomacy during the Boxer catastrophe should be more closely examined in China's efforts to restore peace for the whole country. On the day following the Taku incident, Li Hung-Chang, the leading statesman of China

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22 FRUS, 1901, app. I, p. 12.

for thirty years and the incumbent viceroy at Canton, was summoned by the Imperial Court to go up the north to save the whole situation. Then, suggestions were made from all sides to look for a proper nation as the prime mediator. Chang Chih-tung had wired Chinese minister Li Sheng-toh at Tokyo to explore the possibility of Japan's mediation. Japan, Chang hypothesized,should be unhappy to see China destroyed by the European powers because of her close relations with the old Empire in terms of race and geography. Besides, Japan had sent more troops than any of the other powers to attack Taku. If she was willing to stop fighting, the other powers would come along. Similar suggestions were made to Li by many other officials. Next to Japan, Great Britain was also taken into account. Russia was the most crafty, Viceroy Hsu Ying-kuei of Fukien explained, only Great Britain could manage her. If the London government promised to mediate, at least Japan and the United States would give in. Having had a conference with Count Witte, Russia's Minister of Finance, Chinese minister Yang Ju in St. Petersburg thought in a quite different way. He reported to Li that the Russian statesman was very friendly to China and had a great respect for Li. The Russians, Young argued, suffered heavy casualties at the Taku forts. If they agreed to negotiate, the other powers should have no objection. In concluding his telegram, Yang even stressed that, for the time being,

there was no better way for settlement than cooperating with Russia.[23] So, as in days of old, all the barbarian experts were talking about making use of one power to manage the other powers. More significantly, the United States, like France and Germany, was not highly regarded by Chinese officials as a possible mediator at this stage.

Li Hung-chang himself took a little more ambiguous position at first on what role the United States might play. When he was planning to go to the north as the court ordered, the Japanese government for an unknown reason made a suggestion that he should take the trip "in a foreign man-of-war, not in a Russian, British, or Japanese ship, but in a German ship." Nevertheless, he told Commander T.C. McLean of the U.S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station that he could not trust any other but preferred an American man-of-war. Shortly after, he changed his mind and cancelled the arrangement to go north in The Brooklyn, the flagship of Rear-Admiral George C. Remey, by reason of a new edict from the Emperor commanding him to remain in Canton and to maintain order there.[24] As a matter of fact, there was no such edict and the Emperor would constantly order him to repair to Peking as soon as possible. Later when he decided

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[23] Chang to Li Sheng-toh, K26/5/23 (June 19, 1900), Chang, op. cit., v. 160, p. 19; Hsii to Li, K26/5/26 and Yang to Li, K26/5/28, Li, op. cit., "Tien Kao," v. 22, pp. 32, 38.

[24] Remey to Long, June 26, Li to Remey, June 28,

to leave for the north in mid-July, against the American consul's advice to stay in order to preserve peace and protect foreigners, he sailed on a Chinese steamship instead of any foreign man-of-war.[25]

Several reasons may be provided for explaining why Li changed his mind abruptly. He might have lost his confidence, if any, in the United States. He might have found it stupid to agitate the other powers by sailing on an American warship. It may also be justifiable to say that he decided not to go in an American ship not because he changed his attitude toward the United States, but because he was not sure how much he could do in view of the bad situation in the north.[26] Nonetheless, while exploring the prospects for success of his mission and the willingness of the powers for peace negotiation, Li showed more ambiguity. On June 21, July 12 and July 16, three times, Li sent telegrams to instruct Chinese ministers abroad to find out the positions which the powers were taking. It should be noted that Minister Wu at Washington was not even once on the list of the receivers.[27] But in a separate instruction despatched

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McLean to Hay, June 28, 1900, McKinley Papers.

[25] McWade to Hill, July 17 and 18, 1900, McKinley Papers.

[26] Indeed, Li made such an expression to Commander McLean. McLean to Hay, June 28, 1900, McKinley Papers.

[27] Li to Chinese ministers abroad, K26/5/25 (June 21, 1900), K26/6/16 and K26/6/20, Li, op. cit., "Tien Kao," v. 22, p. 28, v. 23, pp. 30, 43.

at the time when he left Canton for Shanghai, Li asked Wu to consult the American government "as to the possibility of obtaining from the treaty powers either a guaranty of the territorial integrity of China or a self-denying ordinance in any action circumstances may call on them to take in the present disturbed state of the country."[28] Thus, Li appeared to ignore the United States on the one hand. On the other hand, he seemed to hope that something valuable for China could be produced from Mr. Hay's second Open Door note.

Among all of the Chinese officials who had a voice in diplomacy at that time, Viceroy Liu K'un-i counted more definitely on the United States. In spite of the recent American acquisition of the Philippines, he esteemed the United States as the only nation whose history indicated that it could be depended upon not to grab territory. No matter what had really happened or how the powers had responded to Hay's circular notes, he believed that the United States had led them to an agreement to keep the door to China open for equal trade. Finally, he was heartened as the American government asked the powers to agree to preserving the integrity of China.[29] It has been noticed that he had worked with other southern authorities to seek

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[28] Wu to Hay and Hay to Wu, July 18, 1900, FRUS, 1900, p. 279.

[29] Goodnow to Hay, July 8, 1900, and Goodnow to Gridler, July 21, 1900, Consular Despatches, Shanghai.

American help in their efforts to keep the south out of war. In June and July, 1900, as many people ignored the United States in their suggestions of possible mediators and Li Hung-chang took an ambiguous view of American role, Viceroy Liu was making close contacts with American consul Goodnow in Shanghai and sparing no effort to look for American mediation.[30]

On the same day, incidentally, when John Hay asked the powers to respect and preserve China's integrity, the Chinese Emperor adopted some suggestions and sent letters to the Imperial Courts of Great Britain, Russia and Japan for the purpose of seeking their mediation. With no encouraging response from any of these powers and the fall of Tientsin on July 13, Liu and Chang Chih-tung urged in a joint memorial that the court should treat the United States, as well as Germany and France, on a basis of equality with the other three powers. As a result, the Emperor wrote President McKinley a letter on July 19, 1900 to place special reliance on the United States for settling the difficulty. He asked the President to devise the measures and to take the initiative in bringing about a concert of the powers for restoration of order and peace in China.[31] After Li Hung-chang arrived at Shanghai on July 21, Liu

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[30] Ibid.

[31] FRUS, 1900, pp. 293-294.

cabled him twice on the necessity and possibility of American mediation. The American government, Liu explained on a new ground, was very happy to learn about the safety of the American minister in the besieged Peking. Responding to the request of the Chinese Emperor, the American President made a reply which was the modest in tone in comparison with the others. Therefore, it was reasonable to assume that the United States would do no more harm to China and she could be counted on to mediate for a peace settlement.[32]

As Liu pushed Li, the allied forces were proceeding to Peking. Under the circumstances, Li did try to obtain special help from the United States. On July 24, when Goodnow came to call on him under Hay's instruction to ascertain his purpose, he told the American consul that the Boxers and rebellious troops could be stopped by the Chinese government, that the foreign ministers were safe, and that he was attempting to persuade throne to send them from Peking to Tientsin. He asked Goodnow: if the ministers were escorted to Tientsin safely, was it possible that the military action of the powers could be suspended and then negotiations could be arranged? A week later, Li dictated the following question to Goodnow: "If free

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[32] Liu to Li, K26/6/26 (July 22, 1900), and Liu to Li and others, K26/7/1, Li, op. cit., "Tien Kao," v. 24, pp. 50-51, v. 24, p. 2.

communication is established between ministers and their Governments, will America arrange that allies will not advance on Peking pending negotiations?" In addition, Li said that he would have nothing more to say if the answer was unfavorable.[33]

From Li's instructions to Minister Wu, the Emperor's letter to McKinley and Li's conversations with Goodnow at Shanghai, it is clear that China at this time wanted an American initiative which would lead to an international agreement helpful for her to get rid of the disaster caused by the Boxer uprising. Nevertheless, the replies made by the United States were hardly encouraging. The American government confirmed that she favored the territorial and administrative integrity of China, and she believed all other powers entertained similar views. But this confirmation was scarcely an indication that the powers had agreed to the American position. President McKinley wrote the Emperor that the American government would place its good offices, "with the assent of the other powers," at his disposition for an amicable settlement of all the questions arising out of the recent troubles. In other words, without the assent of the other powers, American good

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[33] Hay to Goodnow, July 23; Goodnow to Hay, July 24; Hay to Goodnow, August 1; and Goodnow to Cridler, August 2, 1900, FRUS, 1900, pp. 260-263.

offices would be in question. In response to Li's proposition to accept some conditions by China in exchange for an American initiative to arrange a truce, Mr. Hay insisted that free communication with foreign ministers besieged at Peking was not a negotiable condition. It was demanded rather as a matter of absolute right. The American government would not enter into any arrangement with the other powers until it materialized.[34] In short, explicitly or implicitly, these American replies contained nothing definite for American initiation of the peace settlement which China was so anxiously seeking. By the end of July, Li concluded that American mediation had been empty talk, not yet put into action. When Goodnow gave him Hay's message refusing his conditions, Li gave no further indication of his intentions.[35]

Thereafter, as urged by Li and other provincial authorities, the court allowed all the foreign ministers free communication with their respective governments in cipher and Mr. Conger consequently had no trouble reporting his situation back to Washington. Also, the court would have appointed high officials together with reliable troops

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[34] Hay to Wu, July 18; Hay to Wu, July 23; Hay to Goodnow, July 30; and Goodnow to Cridler, Aug. 2, 1900, FRUS, 1900, pp. 260-263, 279, 294.

[35] Li to Cho, K26/7/5 (July 30, 1900), Li, op. cit., "Tien Kao," 24/11; and Goodnow to Cridler, Aug. 2, 1900, FRUS, 1900, p. 263.

to escort the ministers from Peking to Tientsin, if it had been asked.[36] However, Li Hung-chang did not ask for American mediation in return. On August 14, Peking fell with the Emperor and the Empress Dowager fleeing to the West. On August 25, Russia proposed in a circular note general military withdrawal from Peking on the grounds that the basic aim of the allied expedition to lift the siege had been achieved and the continuous foreign occupation of Peking would do nothing more useful but delay the return of the Chinese government and thus obstruct an early peace negotiation.[37] This Russian proposal became known to Li at the end of August and he saw in it a turning point of the Boxer crisis. Therefore, he turned more away from the United States. When W. W. Rockhill arrived at Shanghai in early September and came to call on him, he only asked the newly appointed American commissioner if the United States would do likewise if the other powers follow the example of the Russians and withdrew their forces to Tientsin. Even worse, he appeared so rough and impolite that Rockhill had to stop the conversation in the second interview.[38]

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[36] Wu to Hay, Aug. 1 and 3, Wu's memorandums, Aug. 4 and 8, Adee to Wu, Aug. 8, 1900, FRUS, 1900, pp. 282-284.

[37] Li to Liu and Chang, K26/8/6 (Aug. 30, 1900), Li, op. cit., "Tien Kao," 25/15.

[38] Rockhill to Hay, Sept. 6, 1900, Hay Papers.

So ended a major attempt by China to make use of the United States to manage the other powers. For a time, as China was encroached upon once again by the foreigners as a result of the Boxer uprising and as the United States expounded a policy to keep equal trade in China and to preserve the China's integrity, these two countries might have established closer relations with each other.

But the chance was not great. The American minister was besieged with other foreign ministers in Peking. The American troops were fighting along with those of other powers in order to secure their safety. So long as this goal could not be reached, the Washington government would not extend the help which China needed, an initiation of a peace settlement.

On the other hand, the Chinese were split among themselves in their attitudes toward the United States. Some officials, such as Liu K'un-i, had confidence in the United States open door policy, and were enthusiastic in seeking for American help. The others, however, were different. For instance, Li Hung-chang never relied much on the United States. He made most of his efforts to look for help from other powers. After he learned that Russia had proposed general military withdrawal from Peking, he even became harsh in his dealing with the newly arrived American commissioner.

CHAPTER II

CHINESE OPEN DOOR

In Peking in the fall of 1900 as the envoys of the powers negotiated the final peace settlement after the Boxer uprising, Russia began to make her attempt at closing Manchuria by separate arrangement with China. A crisis thus followed and could not be concluded until the Russo-Japanese war. The history of this crisis reveals that the Chinese would accept the open door policy only as they thought it helpful in retaining China's control over Manchuria.

Russia had dispatched troops to occupy the whole territories of Manchuria under pretext of protecting her railroads attacked by the Boxers. Now she indicated that she was willing to return the area to China, but it was necessary for her to leave part of the troops for protection of the railways.[1] In November, 1900, the Russian General

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[1] Yang to Li, K26/9/1 (Oct. 23, 1900), Yang Ju, ed., Chung O Hui Shang Chiao Shou Tung San Sheng Tien Pao Hui Chao (A Collection of Telegrams concerning the Sino-Russian Negotiations on the Restoration of the Three Eastern Provinces, reprint, Peking, 1935), pp. 1-2.

Governor Admiral Alexeieff coerced Tartar General Tseng-chi to sign an agreement with regard to the Russian evacuation of Fengtien, the southernmost of the three provinces in Manchuria. The Tseng-Alexeieff Agreement, if ratified, would have resulted in Chinese demobilization in the province, temporary protection of the railways by Russian troops, and the appointment of a Russian Resident in Mukden, the provincial capital, to oversee all the important measures adopted by the Tartar General.[2] China's administrative integrity in the province thus would have been destroyed with her own consent.

On the Chinese side, Li Hung-chang played a major role in the Manchurian crisis. He and Prince Ch'ing had been appointed as the plenipotentiaries in charge of the joint peace negotiations. Nevertheless, he apparently preferred to reach secret agreement with Russia first. The Russian initiative to withdraw her troops from Peking to Tientsin was a bait. Li was led not only to give up his efforts in seeking for American mediation, but to conclude that all of the other powers were unreliable.[3] Besides, the Russian government offered protection for

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2 Wang Yen-wei and Wang Liang, eds., Ch'ing Chi Wai Chiao Shih Liao (Historical Materials on Foreign Relations in the Latter Part of the Ch'ing Dynasty, reprint, Taipei, 1964, hereafter cited as WCSL), Vol. 144, pp. 16-18.

3 Memorial, K26/8/9 (Sept. 2, 1900), Li Hung-chang, Li Wen Chung Kung Ch'uan Chi (Complete Works of Li Hung-chang, reprint, Tapei, 1962), "Tien Kao" (Telegrams), v.25, p. 27.

Li's trip from Shanghai to Tientsin. The Russian minister in Peking, in Li's words, was doing his best to reduce the demands on China after the diplomatic corps began to prepare the protocol for final settlement.[4] Anyhow, Li believed in the professed goodwill of Russia and was anxious to sign a separate agreement with Russia before the conclusion of the joint peace treaty.[5]

Li learned of the existence of the Tseng-Alexeieff Agreement before it became known to the outside world at the beginning of January, 1901. For unknown reasons, Li did not report it to the court until January 15, the day when he signed the protocol presented by the foreign envoys.[6] The court was furious for being kept ignorant beforehand and rejected the agreement. It would have severely punished Tseng if Russia had not interferred. In the meantime, Li accepted the Russian proposal which

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4 Li to Yang, K26/7/18 (Aug. 12, 1900), Sheng Hsüan-huai, Yü Chai Ts'un Kao (Collected Papers of Sheng Hsüan-huai, reprint, Taipei, 1963), v. 39, p. 5; the Russian Charge d'Affaires to the Acting Secretary of State, Aug.17, 1900, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United State (Cited hereafter as FRUS), 1901, app. I, p. 17; and Rockhill to Hay, Nov. 20, 1900, Hay Papers. As a matter of fact, Li kept close contacts with two Russian officials, Michael de Giers, the Russian minister in Peking, and Prince Uktomshi, personal friend of the Tsar and Director of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Their close contacts were often mentioned in Li's telegrams.

5 Li's preference to sign a separate agreement with Russia first was exemplified later by his telegrams to Chinese ministers abroad, K27/1/10 (Feb. 28, 1901) and to Grand Council, K27/1/10, Li, op. cit., v.32, pp. 22-23.

6 Chou Mein to Li, K26/9/20 (Nov. 11, 1900), and Li's

requested that the Chinese government give the broadest power to Yang Ju, the Chinese minister at St. Petersburg, for negotiations on the restoration of Manchuria.[7]

The court appointed Yang as Chinese plenipotentiary to negotiate with the Russian government and ordered him to consult Li and Prince Ch'ing according to circumstances.[8] The first phase of the negotiations resulted in a Russian proposal of twelve articles presented on February 16. In return for the Russian promise to restore China's sovereignty over Manchuria, according to the text of the proposal, China should agree to the stationing of a body of Russian troops along the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) until order was to be reestablished, and to the right of the CER to build a railroad to the Great Wall in the direction of Peking. China could maintain troops in Manchuria only after the completion of the railroad and the number of the troops should be determined after consultation with Russia. Outside the railway district, China could dispatch police guards to maintain order, but again, the number of the guards should be decided with Russia's consent. In addition, China could not grant to any other power without

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memorial, K26/11/25, Li, op. cit., "Tien Kao," v. 28, p. 37, and v. 30, pp. 32-33; Chester C. Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe (New York, 1955), pp. 166-168.

7 Ibid., pp. 168-171.

8 Sheng to Yang, K26/11/14 (Jan. 4, 1901), Yang, op. cit., p. 10.

Russia's agreement, any privileges with regard to mines, railroads, or any industrial enterprises in Manchuria and other regions in the proximity of Russia, such as Mongolia and Sinkiang. Even China herself could not build railroads in these territories without Russian concurrence. These demands, unquestionably, constituted an attempt to legitimate the Russian violation of the open door principles of both equal commercial opportunity and China's integrity. Because of Chinese resistance, the Russian government made only a slight revision and, on March 13, asked Yang to sign them within two weeks.[9]

The revised Russian demands were acceptable for Li Hung-chang. Against the protests made by both the powers and the Chinese officials, especially the Yangtze viceroys, Li could see no evil consequences of the demands and urged the court to give orders promptly for Yang to sign.[10]

Nevertheless, the protests against any separate arrangement between China and Russia were too heavy to be ignored. The foreign protests had been made since the revelation of the Tseng-Alexeieff Agreement. Among them

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9 Yang to Prince Ching ad Li, K26/12/30 (Feb. 18, 1901) and K27/1/23, to Li, K27/1/25, Yang, op. cit., pp. 27-30, 50-53, 55-56.

10 Li to Yang, K27/1/26 (Mar. 16, 1901), Li to Grand Council, K27/1/27 and 28, Li, op. cit., "Tien Kao," v.33, pp. 20, 22-23, 26.

the American complaint was comparatively moderate. On February 19, 1901, Secretary Hay pointed out to the Chinese minister at Washington "the extreme danger in the interests of China of considering any private territorial or financial arrangements, at least without full knowledge and approval of all the powers now engaged in negotiation." Referring specifically to the circular of July, 1900, he stated that this warning was based on the preservation of the territorial integrity of China, a principle which had been recognized by all the powers then engaged in the joint negotiations in Peking. Rockhill, who represented the United States in the joint negotiations while Conger was granted a short leave, instructed the American consuls in Nanking and Hankow to confer at once with Liu K'un-i and Chang Chih-tung for the purpose of urging the two Yangtze viceroys to send memorials to the court against any private Sino-Russian deal which would seriously injure China.[11]

Even this mild American protest was undermined by the compromising American attitude toward Russia. In early February, John Hay made, in response to an inquiry from Japan, a statement that the United States "is not at present prepared to attempt singly or in concert with other powers to uphold China's integrity by a demonstration which could present a character of hostility to any power."

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[11] Rockhill to Hay and enclosures, March 4, 1901, China Dispatches.

Later in March, he indicated that he was prepared to accept the Russian action in Manchuria, "insofar as it could be acknowledged necessary for her interests and projects," provided American trade was protected.[12] This American position was perceived by the Chinese minister Wu T'ing-fang. The United States, Wu reported, would not take any strong action and could not help China. Her government talked about the preservation of China's territorial integrity and the inexpediency of any secret Sino-Russian agreement, but all in elusive terms.[13]

Not the American but rather the Japanese and British protests should be credited for the Yangtze viceroys' objections and for the court's cautious decisions. Without full knowledge of what Russia really demanded, the Japanese government warned the Chinese minister in Tokyo that if China acquiesced in the Russian demands to surrender special interests or to cede territories the other powers would surely follow the Russian precedent. If any power asked China for too much, Japan suggested, China had better

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12 Hay to Foreign Office, Tokyo, memorandum, Feb. 1, 1901 and Conversation of Hay with Cassini, March 28, 1901, cited in Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East, 1895-1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), pp. 69, 71.

13 Wu to Yang, K27/1/23 (March 13, 1901), Yang, op. cit., p. 54; Li to Grand Council, K27/1/27 and Wu's memorial, K27/2/7, transmitted by Sheng and Li, Li, op. cit., "Tien Kao," v. 33, p. 22 and v. 34, pp. 18-19.

end her separate negotiations with it and put all the troubles on the joint peace table in Peking.[14] Not satisfied with her warning through the Chinese minister, the Japanese government instructed her consul Odagiri at Shanghai to visit the Yangtze viceroys at Nanking and Hankow. In his interviews with the two viceroys, Liu K'un-i and Chang Chih-tung, Odagiri once more warned that any agreement between China and any power with regard to the cession of territories or station of foreign troops would definitely lead to the similar demands from all of the other powers.[15] In the meantime, Great Britain and Germany, the two powers which had only recently signed an agreement to commit themselves to the open door, lodged their protests in the same manner against any separate arrangements between China and Russia.[16] In short, all these powers, except Germany which promptly declared that

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14 Li Sheng-toh to Grand Council, received K26/12/27 (Feb. 15, 1901), Ch'ing Kuang Hsü Ch'ao Chung Jih Chiao She Shih Liao (Historical Material on Sino-Japanese Relations in the Kuang Hsu Reign, thereafter cited as CISL, reprint, Taipei, 1963), v. 60, p. 15.

15 Chang to Odagiri, K27/1/8 (Feb. 26, 1901), Chang Chih-tung, Chang Wen Hsiang Kung Ch'üan Chi (Complete Works of Chang Chih-tung, reprint, Taipei, 1963), v. 171, p. 2; Liu to Grand Council, K27/1/9, Liu K'un-i, Liu Chung Ch'eng Kung I Chi (Works of the Late Liu K'un-i, reprint, Taipei, 1967), "Tien Hsin" (Telegrams), v. 1, pp. 57-58.

16 Li to Grand Council, K26/12/29 (Feb. 17, 1901), Li, op. cit., "Tien Kao," v. 31, pp. 47-48; Chang to Grand Council, K27/1/14 and 18, Chang, op. cit., v. 171, pp. 4-5, and Liu to Grand Council, K27/1/14, Liu, op. cit., "Tien Hsin," v. 1, pp. 58-59.

her agreement with Great Britain did not apply to Manchuria, were threatening to follow suit in the event of China's acceptance of the Russian demands.

The threat of following suit meant much for Liu K'un-i and Chang Chih-tung. The Yangtze valley under the control of these two viceroys had been recognized as the British sphere of influence, like Manchuria was recognized as the Russian one. If the Russians succeeded in their demands on Manchuria, Great Britain would be justified to ask for more privileges in the Yangtze. Likewise, Governor Yuan Shih-k'ai of Shangtung and Governor Hsü Ying-k'uei of Fukien had to worry about the threat, since their provinces were respectively the German and Japanese spheres. Another Chinese official who should be disturbed by the threat of following suit was Sheng Hsüan-huai. Sheng had long been in charge of the Chinese telegrams and railways. If Russia obtained special rights with regard to the railways in Manchuria and the other powers asked for the same privileges in the other parts of the empire, his control of the Chinese railways would be surely hampered. Thus, concerned about their own responsibilities, these officials were really unhappy about the Russian demands on Manchuria. If the Russians got their demands accepted, they argued in similar telegrams to the court at Sian, to Li at Peking, and to Yang at St. Petersburg, the other powers would surely follow suit and the Chinese empire would be

partitioned. If China dare not reject the Russian demands, they asked, how could she reject the demands of all the powers?[17] This sort of objection was so frequent that the court grew tired of hearing the terms of "following suit" and "partition."[18]

Nevertheless, the protests from both the foreign powers and the Chinese officials had their effect on the court. At first, the court faltered for about a month. In one decree it accepted the argument that the Russian demands, if signed and ratified, would lead to the similar demands from Great Britain, Germany and Japan, and would thus bring about evil consequences beyond what one could imagine. It ordered Li Hung-chang and Prince Ch'ing to reckon up all the accounts and to dissolve all the discrepancies between Russia and the other powers. In another decree, it permitted Li to conclude separate agreement with Russia on condition that Li was sure of no evil consequences to follow.[19] Finally, on March 23, a decree was issued

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17 CJSL, v. 60, 61 and 62, passim; Li, op. cit., "Tien Kao," v. 32, 33 and 34, passim; and Yang, op. cit., pp. 56-68.

18 Grand Council to Chang and Liu, K26/8/12 (Sept. 24, 1901), Chang, op. cit., v. 83, p. 11.

19 Decrees, K27/1/6 (Feb. 24, 1901) and K27/2/1, Ta Ch'ing Te Tsung Ching Huang Ti Shih Lu (Records of the Ch'ing Dynasty, Reign of Kuang Hsü, reprint, Taipei, 196?, hereafter cited as CHTSL), v. 478, pp. 6-7, and v. 480, p. 1.

ordering Yang Ju at St. Petersburg not to sign the Manchurian agreement.[20]

On the other hand, faced with the unequivocal opposition from Japan and Great Britain, Russia was also obliged to back down herself and announced on April 4 her intention not to proceed further with the Manchurian agreement, but to wait for the development of events.[21] The Manchurian crisis abated for a while, but it was by no means settled. The Russian troops remained in the area. When it was opportune the Russian government would press China once again to grant her privileges and the crisis would recur in the same pattern as before. Nevertheless, Russia was fighting a losing battle. Japan, for her own interests, was determined to forestall any further extension of the Russian influence in Manchuria. Her position was reinforced by the alliance with Great Britain in 1902. Thereafter, the Manchurian crisis was to be resolved not by any Sino-Russian agreement, but by the Russo-Japanese War.

No matter how the Manchurian crisis would come to an end, China had to look for measures to extricate herself from it. The efforts in this regard had been made even before the court decided not to sign the Manchuria agreement.

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[20] Decree, K27/2/4 (March 23, 1901), Ibid., v.480, p. 4.

[21] Tan, op. cit., pp. 210-213.

Japan and Great Britain might be most helpful. Therefore, Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i once proposed to engage Japanese and British officers to train Chinese military forces in the province of Fengtien as a counterbalance against the Russian demand when she learned of China's intention to adopt such a measure; if not, then the modern-trained Chinese forces in Fengtien could serve as a bulwark against Russia. This proposal was sent to the court.[22] But, probably because it was too provocative, the court did not take any action on it.

A second measure possibly helpful for China was the submission of the Manchurian problem to the foreign envoys representing their governments in the joint peace negotiations in Peking -- as suggested to the Chinese government by Japan. After the court decided not to sign the Manchuria agreement, all the important provincial authorities, including Liu, Chang, Governor Yüan Shih-k'ai in Shantung and Viceroy T'ao Mo at Canton, considered it as the only alternative and urged the court to adopt it. In the meantime, they proposed to communicate to the powers the texts of the draft agreement.[23] The court accepted the suggestion essentially and ordered Li Hung-chang to notify the foreign envoys for their

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22 Chang to Liu, Sheng and Yüan, K27/1/29 (March 19, 1901), Liu to Chang, Yüan and Sheng, K27/2/2, Chang, op. cit., v. 171, pp. 11-14.

23 Liu, Chang, T'ao, Yüan and Wang to Grand Council, received K27/2/7 (March 26, 1901), CJSL, v. 61, pp.33-34.

common deliberation of those provisions of the draft agreement which could affect China's sovereignty and the treaty rights of the powers.[24] Nevertheless, Li failed to take any action in accordance with the decree without Russian permission. As long as neither China nor Russia submitted the Manchuria problem for joint deliberation, the other powers could do nothing.

Finally, the Yangtze viceroys attempted to extricate China from her trouble with Russia by means of an open door in Manchuria. The measure originated from one of Chang Chih-tung's conversations with the British consul at Hankow and was then designed as a price for an effort on the part of the powers to gain for China an extension of the time limit for signing the Manchurian agreement. Upon receiving a joint proposal of the measure from Chang, Liu K'un-i and Sheng Hsüan-huai, the court issued a decree on March 21 to the Chinese ministers abroad ordering them to consult with the Japanese, British, American, and German governments. According to the decree, the ministers were to inform the various foreign offices secretly that if they could help work out satisfactory arrangements with regard to Manchuria, the Chinese government would open the area and grant the

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24 Grand Council to Prince Ch'ing and Li, K27/2/7, and Prince Ch'ing and Li to Grand Council, K27/2/9, Ibid., v. 61, pp. 35-37.

powers equal rights there in mining, railroads and industrial enterprises. The court stressed, however, that the opening of Manchuria could be realized only after Russia evacuated her troops and China could restore her full sovereignty over the provinces.[25]

In the long run, the opening of Manchuria was regarded as the best policy to counteract Russian encroachment. As Chang Chih-tung saw it, Manchuria was vast and very rich in resources. If China did not invite foreigners to develop the territory, she could not develop it herself because of limited capital and technicians. On the other hand, China could tax all of the powers if she opened the area to all foreigners to undertake commercial and industrial activities. Then, China would stand richly and powerfully in Manchuria and Russia would no longer be able to encroach upon the territory. "China," Chang put it more straightforwardly, "could not maintain Manchuria by her own military force. She could do it only by employing the commercial force of the powers."[26] In such a manner, Chang developed the open door into a Chinese policy to employ the other powers to check Russia.

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25 Chang to Grand Council, K27/1/29 (March 19, 1901), Chang, op. cit., v. 171, pp. 10-11; Chang, Liu and Sheng to Grand Council, received K27/2/2, Grand Council to the Chinese ministers abroad, K27/2/2, CJSL, v. 61, pp. 17, 20-21.

26 Chang to Grand Council, received K27/2/2, ibid., v. 61, pp. 17-19; Chang to Fan, K27/2/1, Chang, op. cit., v. 171, pp. 15-16.

In addition, the Chinese open door was significant in two more respects. As Chang emphasized in his appeal to the court, first, the opening of Manchuria was not forced upon China by the powers, it was rather a policy adopted by China herself. Secondly, the open door, designed for settling the Manchurian crisis only, would be under no circumstances extended in its application beyond the boundaries of the provinces to China proper.[27]

While John Hay's Open Door notes at least drew evasive responses from the powers, the Chinese open door met with a complete failure at the very onset. The decree of March 1 ordering the Chinese ministers abroad to consult with the powers promised to open Manchuria in return for the Japanese, British, German, and American good offices. But the court could receive no response from its diplomatic representatives. Even so, the positions taken by the powers were not hard to perceive. Japan expressed through her consul at Shanghai her opposition to the Manchurian agreement, but she indicated that she had no interest in contending with Russia for privileges and had no intention to do anything in return for the opening of Manchuria.[28] Great Britain made no comment on the opening of Manchuria,

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[27] Ibid.

[28] Liu to Chang, received K27/2/5 (March 24, 1901), Chang, op. cit., v. 171, pp. 21-22; Sheng to Grand Council, K27/2/5, Sheng, op. cit., v. 53, p. 13.

but claimed that she would do nothing for China more than barring the secret Russo-Chinese arrangement.[29] Germany had signed with Britain an agreement to endorse the principle of the open door. Nevertheless, only one week before the court issued the decree of March 21, the German Chancellor declared in the Reichstag that the Anglo-German Agreement was "in no sense concerned with Manchuria," that "there were no German interests of importance in Manchuria," and that "the fate of that province was a matter of absolute indifference to Germany."[30] Finally, in the United States although John Hay was concerned about American trade in Manchuria and would like to have had an assurance that the Manchurian door would remain open, he had no thought of interferring with the Russian occupation of the provinces.[31] Plainly enough, none of the four powers was ready at this time to accept the Chinese request for good offices in exchange for the opening of Manchuria. None of them was willing to be employed to serve the interests of China.

Faced with this first failure, the Yangtze viceroys were hardly daunted. On the contrary, they tried again and again throughout the year of 1901 to realize the opening of Manchuria as the best measure to counterbalance Russia.

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29 Ibid.

30 Quoted in Tan, op. cit., pp. 209-210.

31 See note 12.

Up to the time when Russia decided not to proceed further with the Manchurian demands and not to evacuate her troops either, a rumor was in circulation that Russia was going to use privileges in Manchuria to lure Japan into dropping her opposition to the Russo-Chinese arrangement.[32] Liu was really alarmed by this rumor and worried that China might lose the Japanese and even British support which had been effective in barring the Manchurian agreement. As a result, he saw it beneficial to China to open Manchuria herself without any delay and sounded out Japan, Britain and the United States once again. For unexplained reasons, the Japanese Foreign Minister Kato expressed this time his endorsement of Liu's suggestion. The London government continued to be lukewarm. It indicated that it was sufficient to maintain the opening of Manchuria if the Treaty of Tientsin of 1858 was respected. It was not necessary for China to make a new declaration, to bring the opening into effect. The least acceptable response came from the United States. As the Chinese designed to limit the open door within the boundaries of Manchuria, the Washington government demanded an opening of all China. Because of the differences among the powers, the Japanese government

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[32] Li Sheng-toh to Grand Council, received K27/2/11 (March 30, 1901), CJSL, v. 62, pp. 3-4; Sheng to Grand Council, Liu, Chang and Yüan, K27/2/11, Sheng, op. cit., v. 53, p. 27.

through her consul at Shanghai finally advised China to drop the idea of opening Manchuria for the time being.[33]

Nonetheless, the Yangtze viceroys made at least three new efforts to open Manchuria. The first of these efforts made in June originated from a proposal drafted by Count Atsumaro Konoe, the Japanese speaker of the House of Peers. Chang had asked for Count Konoe's advice during his last contacts with the Japanese consul at Shanghai. Finally, Count Konoe sent to Chang and Liu in mid-June a proposal which would have required China to undertake extensive reforms in Manchuria for purpose of opening the area. Although Chang saw it applicable, Liu regarded the reform programs as too sweeping to be accepted by the court. Therefore, the opening of Manchuria fell through once again.[34]

The subsequent efforts made by the Yangtze viceroys underlined their great anxiety over the Manchurian situation. Both Chang and Liu had counted on the joint

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[33] Liu to Chang, K27/2/12, to Odagiri, K27/2/22, to Chang, K27/2/27, to Lo, K27/3/10 (April 28, 1901), and to Odagiri, K27/3/22, Liu, op. cit., "Tien Hsin," v. 1, pp. 66, 71-72, and v. 2, pp. 1-2, 4; Chang to Odagiri, K27/3/17, and Odagiri to Chang, K27/3/25, Chang, op. cit., v. 172, pp. 21-22.

[34] Chang to Liu, K27/4/28 (June 14, 1901), and Liu to Chang, received K27/4/29, Chang, op. cit., v.173, pp. 20-22.

deliberation by the powers attending the peace negotiations in Peking as an alternative to settle the Manchuria problem. Nevertheless, Li Hung-chang and Prince Ch'ing failed to take any action along this line while they were negotiating with the foreign plenipotentiaries. The joint negotiations came to their closing phases in July and the peace treaty was finally signed in September. With the chance for joint deliberation lost, Chang and Liu now considered the opening of Manchuria as the only way left for China to get herself out of her plight. They explained so in their memorials to the court. The court, however, insisted that the opening of Manchuria should remain an unpublished promise until Russia evacuated her troops. Otherwise, the court warned, the measure would surely irritate Russia and result in more troubles instead of benefits.[35] Consequently, no more discussion was made on the question until the spring of 1903 when China was negotiating with the powers for the revision of commercial treaties in accordance with the joint peace treaty.

As one can see, the United States, if her commercial interests were guaranteed, was not interested in Chinese

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[35] Chang to Grand Council, K27/6/11 (July 28, 1901), Grand Council to Chang and Liu, K27/6/15, Chang to Liu, K27/8/2 (Sept. 14, 1901), and Liu to Chang, K27/8/7, Chang, op. cit., v. 83, pp. 10-14, and v. 174, pp. 19-20; Decree, K27/8/21, CHTSL, v. 486, pp. 16-17.

territorial integrity and offered little help while China was attempting to open Manchuria to counter Russian encroachment. Gradually, the Washington government would take a position probably even stronger than the Japanese one with regard to the opening of new treaty ports in Manchuria.

Henry B. Miller was the first American diplomat in China who argued that American commercial interests were in no way to be guaranteed if Washington ignored the Russian occupation of Manchuria. Miller was ordered in May, 1901 to reopen the American consulate in Newchwang which was the only treaty port in Manchuria by that time and had for years been in charge of a merchant vice-consul. He saw a bright future for American trade in Manchuria. According to his account, American goods, cotton, kerosene and flour in the main, constituted over one-third of the imports into Manchuria, far exceeding those of any other country. They were valued well over five million gold dollars for 1899 and would be surely increased many more times "if China retains Manchuria". Nevertheless, Miller warned, the Russian officials throughout Manchuria unreservedly announced that it was the purpose of Russia to govern the area and make it a part of their great empire. Americans and British who had had business relations with the Russians were unanimous in their belief in the total unreliability of both the official and mercantile classes. "Russian methods are so varied, devious and uncertain,

that I have absolutely no faith in our being able to maintain an open door in Manchuria by any agreement with Russia. . . . If the political domination of Manchuria falls into the hands of Russia, American interests will be shortlived." He believed, therefore, it was of the utmost importance to stop the domination of Russia over Manchuria and by the most active measures to insist upon the full and absolute return of the whole area to the Chinese government. "Our efforts should be to have Manchuria thrown open to the world for trade, commerce and development, and in that case, I have not the least doubt that we would lead all nations."[36] In such a manner, Miller intended to change the Washington policy into one which would keep Manchuria open for the growth of American trade through insistence on China's integrity.

On the basis of Miller's reports, Minister Conger also complained to Secretary Hay of Russian aggression in Manchuria. He summarized in one of his reports the details of the Russian occupation of Manchuria since the signing of the Tseng-Alexeieff Agreement and indicated the possibility of renewed negotiations between Russia and China, toward which the attitude of the powers was incalculable.

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[36] Miller to Squiers, June 27 and July 19, to Conger, Sept. 21, 1901, enclosed in the despatches of American Legation, Peking, China Despatches.

If Russia was not checked in her activities, Conger stressed, she would ultimately acquire sovereign control over Manchuria, an unpleasant prospect for the United States to contemplate.[37]

Upon the receipt of Conger's despatches, John Hay finally was in doubt that American commercial interests could be ensured as long as Russia continued her encroachments in Manchuria. He instructed Conger to send back more facts and note especially any damage to American trade. By the end of 1901, as renewed negotiations between Russia and China were in progress, John Hay once again picked up the principle of China's integrity and warned the Peking government not to make with any power an agreement which "will permanently impair the territorial integrity of China or impair the ability of China to meet her international obligations."[38]

Nevertheless, not until the Spring of 1903 did the Washington government, under pressure, adopt more determined steps in order to check the Russian encroachments and make sure that Manchuria would remain open for American trade. The year of 1902 found a prospect of eventual evacuation of Russian troops from Manchuria. On January 30,

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37 Conger to Hay, Aug. 26, Sept. 7 and 28, 1901, China Despatches.

38 Hay to Conger, Aug. 29 and Dec. 6, 1901, China Despatches.

Japan and Great Britain signed an alliance directed at Russia. Faced with this united front, Russia decided to drop her immediate demands for privileges through an arrangement between the Chinese government and the Russo-Chinese Bank,[39] and signed with China a convention on April 8. By this convention, Russia recognized Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria and agreed to evacuate the area within eighteen months. In October, Russia was able to observe her words and began to carry out the first stage of the evacuation. These happenings seemed to be fortunate, for the United States. At any rate, John Hay was still indicating that the United States would recognize Russia's exceptional position in Manchuria if only the freedom of American trade would be guaranteed.[40]

Then, the reports from China in the Spring of 1903 revealed that Russia continued to make inroads and threaten all the foreign interests in Manchuria, including the

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39 The Russo-Chinese negotiations were renewed in July, 1901. Being unable to make an arrangement because of Li Hung-chang's death in November, the Russian representatives continued to work on Prince Ch'ing. In late January, 1902 a compromise was reached in Peking by which China, in exchange for the return of Manchuria, was to sign an agreement with the Russo-Chinese Bank giving assurance that she would not award railway and other concessions to any foreign power except Russia.

40 Hay to Roosevelt, May 1, 1902, quoted in Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War (New York, 1925), pp. 135-136; Cassini to Lamsdorf, Aug. 12, 1902, cited in Zabriskie, op. cit., p. 85.

American ones. According to the reports, Russia had established an ostensible diplomatic representative at Mukden whose real duties were to advise the tartar General at the city and give orders to Chinese officials. The Chinese Eastern Railway controlled by Russia had purchased all the land along the Sungari River and held it so as to preclude the leasing or ownership of land to anybody but Chinese and Russians. The second stage of the Russian evacuation, scheduled for April 8, 1903, had not taken place. In addition, the Russian government had made the withdrawal of their troops from Manchuria contingent upon certain concessions from China which included: no treaty ports or foreign consuls to be allowed in Manchuria; no foreigners except Russians to be employed in the public service of North China; the status of the administration of Mongolia to remain as before; Newchwang customs receipts to be deposited in the Russo-Chinese Bank; the sanitary commission at Newchwang to be under Russian control; the Port Arthur-Newchwang-Mukden telegraph line to be dominated by Russia; and no territory in Manchuria to be alienated to any power.[41]

John Hay was somewhat perplexed by the developments and especially unhappy with some of the Russian demands

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[41] Miller to Conger, March 5, 17 and 21, 1903, Conger to Hay, April 18, 1903, China Despatches. Conger to Hay, April 23, 1903, and "The substance of the Russian demands as reported by the Japanese Minister at Peking," enclosed in Hay to Roosevelt, April 28, 1903, Hay Papers.

which he regarded as injurious to the United States. Consequently he instructed American ministers in both St. Petersburg and Peking to insist on the American request for treaty ports and consulates in Manchuria and make known American objectives to the Russian demand regarding foreign employers in Chinese service.[42] Later on, as Russia denied making demands of China but in fact was doing so, Theodore Roosevelt became more irritated. The President wrote in one of his personal letters to Hay: "I have not the slightest objection to the Russians knowing that I feel thoroughly aroused and irritated at their conduct in Manchuria; that I don't intend to give way and that I am year by year growing more confident that this country would back me in going to an extreme in the matter."[43]

But the United States could not go to extremes. As John Hay realized, the United States could not fight over Manchuria. Public opinion in the country would not support the Washington government in any scheme of concerted action with England and Japan which would seem openly hostile to Russia. After learning at the beginning of May that China had refused to accept the Russian demands, Hay decided, as

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[42] Hay to Roosevelt, April 25; to McCormick, April 25; to Conger, April 25, 1903. Hay Papers.

[43] Roosevelt to Hay, July 18, 1903. Roosevelt Papers.

"a last resort" to prevent Russia from shutting doors of Manchuria for American interests, to insist in getting a written assurance from the Peking government that China would grant open ports and consulates as soon as the necessities of trade and commerce required them.[44]

Negotiations had been underway between China and the United States for a new commercial treaty. According to John Hay, the essential object of these negotiations was to favor Chinese financial stability and promote China's ability to buy in any market and to exchange native products wherever produced on equal terms with all nations. Also, an agreement should be reached to abolish Likin, the internal tax, and at the same time to raise duties so as to add to China's revenue.[45] All of these were close to settlement in terms similar to the Chinese commercial treaties with Britain and Japan. A Sino-American treaty might have been signed at an earlier time if the problem of opening ports in Manchuria had not evolved.

The American request for the opening of new ports was referred at the end of April, 1903 to the Chinese commissioners Lü Hai-huan and Wu T'ing-fang, who were

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[44] Hay to Roosevelt, April 25 and 28, May 4, 1903. Hay Papers.

[45] Hay to Rockhill, April 11, 1901, and Hay to Conger, Jan. 21, 1903, cited in Paul A. Varg, The Making of Myth: The United States and China, 1897-1912 (E. Lansing, Mich., 1968), p. 81.

undertaking treaty negotiations at Shanghai. After the Washington government decided to obtain assurance on the opening of Manchuria, Lü and Wu were willing to acquiesce and looking forward to getting in return American support of China's territorial integrity in Manchuria. Some other Chinese officials also saw the benefits of opening new ports. In his answer to Lü and Wu, the chief commissioner Sheng Hsüan-huai, then at Peking, indicated the difficulty of accepting the American request. But he regarded it as worthwhile to make use of the request as a pretext to demand Russia's return of Manchuria. Wei Kuang-t'ao, who took over the viceroyalty of Nanking after Liu K'un-i died in October, 1902, even suggested opening more new ports in Manchuria, if the Russian encroachments could thus be countervailed.[46]

Beside possible advantages, however, there were disadvantages. The Russian troops were still occupying Manchuria. In spite of American protests and Chinese rejection, the Russian minister at Peking was still forcing upon China the demands not to open treaty ports or to grant other powers any privilege in Manchuria. In addition, Japan was also demanding the opening of new ports.

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[46] Lü and Wu to Wai Wu Pu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) K29/4/3 (April 29, 1903) and K29/4/14, WCSI, v. 170, p. 17 and v. 171, p. 9; Sheng to Lü and Wu, K29/4/3 and Wei to Sheng, K29/4/12, Sheng, op. cit., v. 60, pp. 18, 26.

Under the circumstances, if China accepted the American request, she would irritate Russia on the one hand, and encourage Japan and even other powers to follow suit on the other. These were exactly the worries which Yüan Shih-k'ai expressed in his telegram to the Wai Wu Pu. Yüan, who had become the Viceroy of Chihli after Li Hung-chang's death and made great effort to have the Russian demands rejected more recently, considered it not helpful to open new ports in Manchuria in exchange for American support.[47]

Throughout 1901 Chang Chih-tang had advocated the immediate opening of Manchuria. Now in 1903, he became more cautious. He could see no possibility of accepting the American request and declaring publicly the opening of new ports before the complete withdrawal of Russian troops. Nonetheless he believed the United States, Britain, and Japan as well, would never permit Russia to control Manchuria exclusively. Therefore, China should be more persistent not to accept the Russian demands and should take the opportunity to ask the three powers to intervene in China's behalf. If the three powers could help China to recover Manchuria, Chang indicated, then China would be able to consider opening new ports, by herself, according to the circumstances.[48] After receiving Chang's telegram,

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[47] Yüan to Wai Wu Pu, K29/4/4 (April 30, 1903) and K29/4/14, WCSL, v. 170, p. 19 and v. 171, pp. 9-10.

[48] Chang to Wai Wu Pu, Yüan, Lü, Wu and Sheng, K29/4/7, Chang, op. cit., v. 187, pp. 6-7.

Yüan thought it feasible for China herself to declare by an edict the opening of new ports in Manchuria, but insisted that the court should take such an action only after the evacuation of Russia and with no Russian objection.[49]

The decision on opening new ports in Manchuria was hard to make. The problem was thus detached from the other issues involved in the treaty negotiations at Shanghai and picked up by Prince Ch'ing and Conger at Peking for high-level bargaining. Prince Ch'ing at first expressed China's difficulty in accepting the American request. As he made clear in a note to Conger, Russia had warned China not to open any new ports for trade in Manchuria, nor permit the establishment of foreign consulates at any new port without notifying the St. Petersburg government. In response, China had refused to discuss the matter and told Russia that "should it become necessary at any future time to open ports for international trade in Manchuria it would rest with China, as circumstance might require, to investigate conditions and herself open them." Therefore, the Peking government felt it very inconvenient now to mention the opening of new ports in the Sino-American commercial treaty. Two days later, Prince Ch'ing's principal secretary reiterated that China would herself open the Manchurian ports.

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[49] Yüan to Wai Wu Pu, K29/4/14 (May 10, 1903), WCSL, v. 171, pp. 9-10.

He begged the United States to be satisfied with this verbal promise, not to insist upon China putting it too plainly in writing.[50]

The United States was not satisfied with the verbal promise. She continued to fight on two diplomatic fronts. Fully convinced of the Russian objection as the basic cause of China's refusal to accept the American request, the Washington government made constant efforts through the contacts between Hay and Russian Ambassador Cassini at Washington, between American Ambassador McCormick and Russian Foreign Minister Lamsdorff at St. Petersburg, and between Conger and Russian Minister Lessar at Peking, to ask Russia to withdraw her opposition to the opening of treaty ports in Manchuria.[51]

In addition, Minister Conger, under Hay's instructions, insisted in Peking that a provision with regard to the opening should be inserted in the treaty. The diplomatic tangle resulted in an American victory at least on the surface. In the middle of July, Russia assured the United States that she would not oppose the opening of Manchuria. One month later, Conger could obtain a written statement from Prince Ch'ing that China promised to insert

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50 Conger to Hay, May 28 and 19, 1903, and enclosures, FRUS, 1903, pp. 60-62.

51 For a full account of the Washington-St. Petersburg-Peking skein, see Zabriskie, op. cit., pp. 89-94.

in the treaty a provision for the opening of two ports. But this diplomatic success on the part of the United States produced problems for China. As Prince Ch'ing put it, China was faced with unsurmountable difficulties. In spite of the assurance the St. Petersburg government made to the United States, Russia had not notified China of her withdrawal of the objection to the opening of new ports. In addition, if new ports were opened by treaty with the United States, the other countries would each demand the opening of other ports in their treaties. China could not understand, Prince Ch'ing continued, "how the government of the United States, which had proved such a great friend to China, should now insist upon her doing something so harmful to her best interests, ..."[52]

China had accepted the American request. As the situation required, she was going to seek American help in return. In September, 1903, it was learned that Russia had made new demands upon China, which included an extension of the time of evacuation, no Manchurian territory to be alienated under any circumstances to any foreign power, and all the wharves and telegraphs along the Sungari River and the highway from Tsitsihar to Blagovyestchensk to be controlled by Russia. Being certain that Russia would not evacuate on October 8 in accordance with her own

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[52] Conger to Hay, Aug. 14, 1903, FRUS, 1903, pp. 71-73.

promise in the Russo-Chinese convention of April 8, 1902, Prince Ch'ing once asked Conger if in that case the United States would, at the request of the Chinese government, use its good offices at St. Petersburg to effect some satisfactory settlement. Conger gave no assurance, but promised to transfer the request of China to Washington if necessary.[53] On October 8, in spite of Russia's failure to evacuate from Manchuria, China went ahead, as she had agreed in the written statement of August, to sign with the United States the commercial treaty which included a provision for the opening of Antung and Mukden to foreign trade. In late October, China finally sent a request to the Washington government for American good offices to effect a Russian evacuation of Manchuria. Whatever happened in Manchuria, Prince Ch'ing stressed in his note presenting the request, the interests of the United States would be surely involved because the new ports provided in the recently concluded Sino-American treaty, Antung and Mukden, were in the area.[54]

Nevertheless, China failed once again to obtain American support in her struggle for recovering territorial integrity in Manchuria. Japan and Russia were drifting into war because of the Manchurian situation. In such an

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[53] Conger to Hay, Sept. 9 and 23, 1903, China Despatches.

[54] Conger to Hay, Sept. 9 and 23, Oct. 25 and 29, 1903, China Despatches.

emergency, even President Roosevelt, who had become very irritated at Russian conduct, was at a loss to see in what way his good offices could practically be made available. In his reply to the Chinese minister, Secretary Hay could only explain that in the absence of any intimation from Russia of willingness to accept good offices, it did not seem advisable to tender them.[55]

By all accounts, there are many differences between Chinese and United States views of the open door throughout the Manchurian crisis. The United States had little interest in China's integrity if her commercial interests in Manchuria could be assured. After she found her trade in Newchwang to be threatened by continuous Russian inroads, she insisted that more treaty ports should be opened. Nonetheless, she still felt herself in no position to help China in her struggle to recover Manchuria from the Russian occupation. On the other hand, the main concern for China was her territorial integrity. The Russian encroachments should be opposed not because they endangered the commercial interests of other powers, but because they would possibly lead to the partition of China. In the same manner, the opening of Manchuria was by no means intended to serve the foreign interests. It was, as one historian has pointed out, rather a means to the end to preserve

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[55] Hay to Conger, Oct. 28 and Nov. 2, 1903, China Despatches.

China's integrity in the area.[56] This concern becomes more meaningful if two things are added to one's consideration. First, when Chinese talked about the opening of Manchuria, they usually stressed that under no circumstances would such an opening be extended its application to the other parts of China. Secondly, in spite of her failure, China had insisted that such an opening should be a measure adopted by herself, not forced upon her by the powers. Apparently, as her attitudes toward the open door during the Manchurian crisis revealed, China was on her way toward a national awakening.

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[56] Masataka Kosaka, "Chinese Policy in Manchuria, 1900-1903", Ch'ing Documents Seminar Paper (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), pp. 126-153.

CHAPTER III

AMERICAN CONCESSION LOST

By the time John Hay dispatched the Open Door notes, Americans had acquired a concession from China to build the Canton-Hankow railway. In the Spring of 1904, however, Chinese officials and gentry in the provinces concerned began to insist on cancelling the concession and regaining the railway rights. A survey of the changing attitudes of the Chinese toward the concession shows that one of their main concerns was to prevent any particular power from monopolizing China's railroad construction.

China had undertaken some railway enterprises before the Sino-Japanese war of 1894. But the defeat she suffered in the war caused her to look to railway construction as one of the ways to achieve a great power status. When the court accepted the proposal to construct a railway between Peking and Hankow in 1896, many Chinese officials, including Chang Chih-tung and Sheng Hsüan-huai, pointed out the benefits of constructing at the same time a railway between Hankow and Canton.[1] At the beginning of 1897, the

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[1] Chang to Wang, K22/8/10 (Sept. 16, 1896), Chang

Chinese Railway Company was established at Shanghai with Sheng being appointed as the Director General. Before long, Sheng was negotiating with foreign interests for capital to finance railway construction.

American interests had actively sought railway concessions from China and had secured support from the American minister at Peking. As early as 1895, Charles Denby, the minister, advised the Peking government that railways had been helpful to the strength and unity of the United States. China, he contended could have the same advantages without efforts of her own and without fear of foreign political complications "if she would entrust her railway development to experienced American engineers and capitalists." In January of 1897, he reminded the Chinese once again that Americans were conceded to be more competent in railway construction than any other nationality and that the United States, unlike the European powers, had no designs on Asiatic territory.[2] This American persuasion

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Chih-tung, Chang Wen Hsiang Kung Chüan Chi (Complete Works of Chang Chih-tung, reprint, Taipei, 1963), v. 151, pp. 31-32; Sheng to Prince Ching, K22/8/16, Wang Yen-wei and Wang Liang, eds., Ching Chi Wai Chiao Shih Liao (Historical Materials on Foreign Relations in the Later Part of the Ching Dynasty, reprint, Taipei, 1964, hereafter cited as WCSL) v. 123, pp. 10-11.

2 Denby to Tsungli Yamen, Aug. 24, 1895 and Jan. 10, 1897, cited in William W. Braisted, "The United States and the American China Development Company." Far Eastern Quarterly, XI (1951-52), pp. 147-165.

found an echo in one of Sheng Hsüan-huai's memorials concerning railway construction. "Americans," Sheng said in justifying his advice to seek American money and technical assistance, "have shown no covetous spirit toward China and in railroad building they are exceedingly skillful."[3]

But the Chinese preference for American assistance was not just the result of American persuasion. Almost all of the leading powers were interested in investing their capital in China's railway enterprises. Their agents were no less active than the Americans in appealing to the Peking government.[4] Surrounded by these foreign interests, China had to make a cautious choice. In 1895, Chang Chih-tung had already expressed his preference for obtaining loans from smaller and distant powers for the construction of railways. Those strong powers such as Great Britain and France, he explained, would put China in a more difficult position when the latter was to regain her railway rights in the future.[5] From 1895 to 1897, China was forced to make concessions to Russia in Manchuria, Great Britain in the

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[3] Sheng to Tsungli Yamen, enclosed in Denby to Olney, Jan. 29, 1897, China Despatches.

[4] Li Kuo-chi, Chung Kuo Tsao Chi Te Tieh Lu Ching Ying (The Initial Development of Railroads in China, Taipei, 1961), pp. 148-174.

[5] Chang's memorial, K21/intercalary 5/27 (July 19, 1895), Chang, op. cit., v. 37, p. 26.

Yangtze Valley, France in Kwangsi and Yunnan, and Germany in Shantung. This new situation made China more reluctant to offer any further special interest to any of these leading powers, since such an offer might not only irritate the other powers, but would put China more firmly in the grasp of that particular power. Therefore, when Sheng Hsüan-huai suggested seeking American help in railway enterprises, he stressed that "if we borrow money in America and employ American constructors the jealousy of other powers will be to a great degree avoided."[6]

In the meantime, Chang Chih-tung opposed stubbornly throughout the year of 1897 any loan from Great Britain for the construction of the Canton-Hankow railway. Such a loan, he explained, in addition to the special interests which Great Britain had already obtained along the Yangtze Valley, would definitely lead to a complete British control of China's heartland.[7] By the Spring of 1898, as a decision had been made to arrange a loan from Belgium to construct the Peking-Hankow railway, Chang agreed with Sheng that it was "the most proper" to borrow money from an American interest to build the Hankow-Canton railway.[8] It becomes

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6 See note 3.

7 Chang to Wang, K23/3/17 (April 18, 1897), to Tsungli Yamen, K23/12/24, and to Chen, K24/1/2, Chang, op. cit., v. 153, p. 3, v. 79, pp. 23-25, and v. 154, pp. 21-22.

8 Sheng to Chang, K23/12/24 (Jan. 6, 1898), Sheng

clear that when China decided to make concessions respecting the Canton-Hankow railway to the United States, her main concern was to prevent any particular power from monopolizing her economic interests.

The negotiations for an American loan to construct the Canton-Hankow railway were finally undertaken by Sheng Hsüan-huai at Shanghai and by Wu T'ing-fang at Washington with the representatives of American China Development Company. The American firm had long been seeking a concession from China. Its list of stockholders included such prominent American business names as E. H. Harriman, Jacob H. Schiff of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, former Vice President Levi P. Morton, Charles Coster of J. P. Morgan and Company, the Carnegie Steel Company, and the presidents of the National City Bank of New York and the Chase National Bank.[9] As a result of the negotiations, a contract was signed on April 18, 1898. According to the contract, China authorized the Development Company to market bonds amounting to 4,000,000 to supervise construction of the railway, and to operate it during the fifty year period of the loan.

Hsüan-huai, Sheng Hsüan-huai Wei K'an Hsin Kao (Formerly unpublished letters of Sheng Hsüan-huai, reprint, Peking, 1960), pp. 56-57; Sheng to Wang and Chang, K24/2/25 (March 17, 1898), and Chang to Sheng, K24/2/27, Sheng hsüan-huai, Yü Chai Ts'un Kao (Collected Papers of Sheng Hsüan-huai, reprint, Taipei, 1963, hereafter cited as Sheng, YCTK), v. 31, pp. 16-17.

9 William R. Braisted, "The United States and the American China Development Company," Far Eastern Quarterly, XI (1951-52), pp. 147-165.

The bonds were to carry five percent interest. The company was assured as compensation the profits secured from sale of the bonds, five percent of the cost of construction, and twenty percent of the net profits. In addition to the main line, the company was promised the right to build an extension to the sea and branch lines necessary for traffic connections. By appended notes, China promised to authorize the American company to operate coal mines adjacent to its concession and to provide funds for the Peking-Hankow railway if Belgium gave up her concession to construct it.[10]

During the Winter of 1898-99, the Development Company sent William Barclay Parsons to China to survey the proposed route of the Canton-Hankow railway. The American engineer closely studied the resources and population along the route which ran through the provinces of Hupeh, Hunan and Kwangtung. Parsons came to the conclusion that the construction of the Canton-Hankow railway would be of great value for both the development of the area and the profits of the American company. Nevertheless, he discovered that the cost of the construction, put at 4,000,000 in the contract, had been extremely underestimated to the extent of nearly 100 percent. Consequently, he suggested

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10 W. W. Rockhill, Treaties and Conventions with and Concerning China (Washington, 1904), pp. 252-258; Wu to Sheng, K24/3/5 (March 26, 1898), Sheng's memorials, K24/3/7 and 29, Sheng, YCTK, v. 31, p. 19 and v. 21, pp. 10-11.

modification of certain terms in the contract.[11]

The Development Company endorsed the Parsons report and sent Clarence Cary to China to negotiate a supplementary agreement. Cary put before Sheng Hsüan-huai at Shanghai some sweeping demands for lengthy additional lines and extensive mining rights.[12] However, it was not opportune for China to accept the new American demands at a time when the anti-foreign rebellion of the Boxers was already brewing. As a matter of fact, Chang Chih-tung had always been cautious in handling the Canton-Hankow railway affairs. When he learned that the Hankow-Canton railway was to be operated by the Americans under the stipulations of the first contract, he promptly asked Sheng Hsüan-huai to make some revisions so as to reserve the rights for China to fire any unqualified American operators and to prohibit any transportation of foreign troops on the railway.[13] When Parsons came to undertake the survey of the route for the proposed Canton-Hankow railway, Chang at first opposed the Parsons party plan to travel through Hunan because the

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11 W. Barclay Parsons, An American Engineer in China (New York, 1900), pp. 44-126; Percy Horace Kent, Railway Enterprise in China (London, 1907), pp. 112-114.

12 Sheng to Tsungli-Yamen, K25/2/13 (March 24, 1899) and K25/4/23, Sheng, YCTK, v. 34, pp. 6-7, 18.

13 Chang to Sheng, K24/3/8 and 10 (March 29 and 31, 1898), Chang, op. cit., v. 155, pp. 6-7.

province was particularly anti-foreign at that time. Instead, he urged Parsons to make the survey through the province of Kiangsi. It was only at Parsons insistance that an effort was made to get an edict issued by the court to the Governor of Hunan to allow the surveying party to enter the province under his protection.[14]

In the same manner, Chang firmly opposed new concessions to the Development Company, especially in respect to mining. In November, 1899, he told the American minister Conger, who came from Peking to Hankow to visit him, that China was anxious to have the Canton-Hankow railway built by Americans. However, he stressed, the Chinese government could not grant any concessions concerning mining such as Cary demanded, because the people in Hunan were so opposed to foreigners and determined to develop the mines themselves.[15] Therefore, some of Cary's sweeping demands were brushed aside.

Finally, a supplementary agreement was signed in July, 1900. With no mention of mining, the chief provisions in this new contract were the extension of the time for completion of the line from three to five years and the increase in the amount of the loan from 4,000,000 to

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[14] Kent, op. cit., pp. 111-112.

[15] Conger to Hay, Dec. 31, 1899, China Despatches.

40,000,000. Above all, article 17 provided that the Americans could not transfer their rights "to other nations or people of other nationality."[16] This restriction, which later provided the issue in a dispute leading to the cancellation of the American concession, underlined the Chinese preference for American help in the construction of the Canton-Hankow railway.

The supplementary agreement was ratified by the Peking Government in July, 1902.[17] In the autumn of the same year the extension from Canton, by way of Fatshan, to Samshui was commenced, and the second survey over the main line for construction purposes was put in hand. Towards the end of 1903 the Canton-Fatshan section was opened to traffic and in September of the following year Samshui was reached, the whole length of the extension (thirty-two miles) being opened to the public.[18]

Before the Peking government took action on ratification, however, a dispute over article 17 of the supplementary

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16 Rockhill, op. cit., pp. 259-77.

17 Sheng's memorial, K28/5/10 (June 28, 1902) and Wai Wu Pu to Sheng, K28/6/8, Sheng, op. cit., v. 7, pp. 17-20, and v. 58, p. 11; Conger to Hay, July 14, 1902, China Despatches.

18 Kent, op. cit., p. 117.

agreement had already evolved between China and the Development Company as a result of the encroachment of the Belgians upon the American interest. As early as the beginning of 1901, Sheng Hsüan-huai learned that the Development Company was selling its stock to the Belgian interests. He instructed the Chinese minister at Washington, Wu T'ing-fang to prevent the company from doing so. Following Sheng's instructions, Wu made use of his reply to a letter from F.W. Whitridge, an American director of the Development Company, to ask a series of questions about the shareholders of the company. Whitridge conceded that there had been a good many changes in the ownership of the stock of the company as a consequence of the Boxer rebellion. But he denied that the company had sold out to a Belgian syndicate, or any other syndicate, and affirmed that a majority of the shares of the company were still held by Americans.[19] This explanation did not convince Sheng Hsüan-huai. In March of 1901, the American chargé at Peking indicated that Sheng was disposed to repudiate the Hankow-Canton railway contract. In June, it was learned that Sheng had wired Wu T'ing-fang to cancel the contract on the ground that the provisions of article 17 of the

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[19] Sheng to Wu, K26/11/15 (Jan. 5, 1901), Sheng, YCTK, v. 48, p. 35; F.W. Whitridge to Wu, Jan. 10, 1901, Wu to Whitridge, Jan. 12, 1901, and Whitridge to Wu, Jan. 14, 1901, Hay Papers.

supplementary agreement had been violated by a sale of 4,400 shares out of the Development Company's 6,000 shares to other nationalities.[20]

Sheng had some worries at that particular time. As has been stressed, the Canton-Hankow railway concession was granted to an American company for purposes of preventing any of other leading powers from exclusive control of China through further encroachment. As a consequence of the Boxer rebellion, however, Russia was threatening in the beginning of 1901 as she put before the Chinese government her most aggressive demands on Manchuria.[21] Under the circumstances, Sheng had to be concerned. The Belgian interests had long been identified with both French and Russian interests. A transfer of the shares of the Development Company from American holders to Belgian holders might result in a turnover of the Canton-Hankow railway rights not only to Belgium, but to Russia, and thus put Russia in control of a great part of China. In one of his dispatches, the American chargé at Peking indicated that Sheng did have such fears.[22] Later on, some other Chinese officials would also argue for cancellation of the

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20 Squiers to Hay, March 26 and June 13, 1901, China Despatches.

21 See Chap. II.

22 Squiers to Hay, March 26, 1901, China Despatches.

Canton-Hankow railway contract on the same ground.

Temporarily, Sheng's worries were dispelled and the director-general of Chinese railways decided to get the Hankow-Canton railway agreement ratified by the Peking government. This change was attributed to the following events. At first, Sheng learned that the Development Company had already raised $3,000,000 in cash and was ready to begin construction. Secondly, he was assured by both the Chinese minister at Washington and the American minister at Peking that the management of the Development Company remained in American hands and the firm was "a bona fide American company." Thirdly, he was negotiating at that time with a British interest for the Shanghai-Nanking Railway loan agreement. An unnecessary trouble over the Canton-Hankow railway contract, he thought, might result in disadvantageous terms for the loan.[23]

Once again, the Belgian encroachment of the Development Company became so evident at the beginning of 1904 that the Chinese government had to take issue with the United States. It was widely reported that Belgians not only had bought a great portion of shares of the Development Company but were pressing for a division of the Canton-Hankow railway in which they would be given sole control of

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[23] Sheng to Tao, K27/11/5 (Dec. 15, 1901), Wu to Sheng, K27/12/2 and Sheng to Chang, K28/1/5, Sheng, YCTK, v. 56, p. 34, and v. 57, p. 4, 9-10; Braisted, op. cit., and E-tu Zen Sun, Chinese Railways and British Interests, 1898-1911 (New York, 1954), pp. 74-75.

the northern section. In the meantime, General Whittier, the agent of the Belgian Syndicate in New York, superceded Mr. William Barclay Parsons, the American engineer who had undertaken the survey of the Hankow-Canton route and who had succeeded Calvin Briceto manage the Development Company, to become the President of the American firm. The American manager of the company's Shanghai office was recalled, the same fate overtaking the engineers, who were replaced by Belgians. Besides, Sheng Hsüan-huai was especially surprised at the accounts of the Development Company which covered a lot of expenses not in the United States, not in China, but at Brussels.[24] The situation was too apparent. Sheng could not but warn that the Chinese government would cancel the Hankow-Canton concession according to article 17 of the supplementary agreement if the Washington government took no action. In one of his instructions to Chinese minister Liang Ch'en at Washington, Sheng stressed that the Chinese government could recognize the Development Company only as long as it was controlled by Americans. In March, he sent his American secretary John C. Ferguson to the United States to arrange a settlement.[25]

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[24] London Times, Dec. 25, 1903, cited in Braisted, op. cit., p. 155; Kent, op. cit., p. 117, Sheng to Liang, K29/11/17 (Jan. 4, 1904), Sheng, YCTK, v. 62, p. 12.

[25] Sheng to Liang, K29/11/17 and 28, Sheng, YCTK, v. 62, pp. 12, 20; Sheng to Goodnow, enclosed in Goodnow to Hay, March 23, 1904, Consular Despatches, Shanghai.

Now, the American government was involved. American minister at Peking, Conger, had done all he could for the Development Company. After he learned of the Belgian involvement and received a protest from Sheng Hsüan-huai, he believed the company had violated its contract with the Chinese government. He explained in his report to Hay, it was difficult for the Chinese to separate the United States government from the enterprises of American citizens, hence any failure of the latter to keep their promises would discredit the American government as well, and the action of the Development Company would make it very hard in the future for all Americans seeking concessions to receive consideration from the Chinese government. Therefore, he advised the State Department to cease supporting the company if Sheng's allegation were found to be true.[26] After Ferguson arrived at Washington with Sheng's instructions, Chinese minister Liang sent to the State Department a note in which he asked three questions. First, did the American government regard the Development Company as a bona fide American company? Secondly, would the American government claim sole right to deal with all diplomatic problems affecting the company? Thirdly, would the American government make public its attitude, especially its

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[26] Conger to Hay, Jan. 21 and 22, 1904, China Despatches.

willingness to use its good offices on behalf of the company? Nevertheless, the Washington government could not be moved by either Conger's advice or Liang's note. To Liang's questions, the State Department made all positive answers with only a reservation to indicate that the American government would withdraw its support should the Development Company change its conduct or organization in future.[27]

For a time both Sheng and Liang seemed to be convinced by the State Department and regarded it as difficult for China to cancel the Canton-Hankow contract unilaterally after the American government officially expressed its willingness to support the Development Company.[28] Nonetheless, the provincial interests along the Canton-Hankow line had been infuriated by the news about the Belgian involvement. They bombarded the director-general of Chinese railways with telegrams which insisted on annulment of the contract. As Governor Chao of Hunan Province put it, the Belgian involvement of the Development Company was "a matter of the greatest moment," and the people of Hunan,

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27 Ferguson to Sheng, K30/3/27 (May 12, 1904), Sheng, YCTK, v. 64, pp. 9-10.

28 Sheng to Hunan gentry, to Wang, and to Chang, Tuan and Chao, K30/4/1 (May 15, 1904), to Wai Wu Pu, K30/4/3, to Wu, K30/4/3, and Liang to Sheng, K30/4/9, Sheng, YCTK, v. 64, pp. 13-21.

who would be the first to suffer from the evil consequences, would on no account recognize the contract. For the gentry in Hunan, it was of no use to consult with the American government. In their words, the railway contract was not made with the Washington government, and consequently it could not legally interfere; nor was it made through the American minister, so that he also was not concerned. The only proper step for Sheng to take was immediately to annul the contract, holding the Americans strictly to account for their violation of article 17. The gentry of Hupeh province expressed their opinions in similar terms. They advised Sheng not to settle the matter with the American government in a compromising way. On the top of these provincial gentry, there was Viceroy Chang Chih-tung at Hankow. In one of his telegrams to Sheng, he earnestly hoped that Sheng would make strong representation to Minister Liang and at the same time instruct Mr. Ferguson to vigorously protest and not to cease his efforts until the cancellation of the contract was secured. In threatening terms, he even asked Sheng: "Should there be the slightest display of incautiousness in the handling of the present case without having succeeded in taking action in accordance with article 17 in the agreement, who would then, in the event of interference of other powers, take upon himself the responsibility for the mistake?"[29] This new

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[29] Hunan gentry to Sheng, Wang to Sheng, and Chang to

position of Viceroy Chang presented a striking contrast to that he had taken while preferring American assistance.

These provincial interests insisted on the cancellation of the Canton-Hankow railway contract on several grounds. They were unhappy with the violation of article 17 on the part of Americans. They complained that the construction of the line was too slow, without a single inch of work being started in Hunan Province after four years had elapsed. They declared that they wanted to build the railway by themselves.[30] Above all, these people had just the same worries that Sheng had expressed in 1901. As they saw it, the Belgian interests represented those of France and Russia. The Belgian encroachment on the Development Company meant a final control of the company by the governments at Paris and St. Petersburg. France, the argument continued, had her sphere of influence in Southern China. Russia had obtained special interests in Manchuria. If these two powers controlled the Development Company through their Belgian agents and grabbed the rights to construct the Canton-Hankow line which ran into the heartland of China, how dangerous it would be for the old empire was beyond

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Sheng, K30/3/28 (May 13, 1904), Chang and Tuan to Sheng, K30/3/29, Chang, Tuan and Chao to Sheng, K30/4/2, and Hupeh gentry to Sheng, K30/4/7, Sheng, YCTK, v. 64, pp. 5-21; Goodnow to Pierce, June 22, 1904, Consular Despatches, Shanghai.

30 Ibid.

imagination.[31] Strikingly enough, while China had preferred to grant Americans the Canton-Hankow railway concession for purpose of saving herself from being exclusively dominated by any particular power, she decided a few years later to cancel the concession on almost the same ground.

The Chinese government, however, did not officially notify the United States about its determination to cancel the Canton-Hankow railway contract until the end of 1904. Before that time, the Development Company made several efforts to convince the outside world that a majority of its shares had been bought back from Belgians and their company was under the management of Americans. Nevertheless, Chinese officials could hardly believe it. As late as October, 1904, Sheng Hsüan-huai still could cite new cases of Belgian interference and mismanagement.[32] Meanwhile, Sheng failed to realize his plan to save the American concession. The so-called "American replacement" plan was designed for regranting the Canton-Hankow railway rights to a new

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[31] Tsen to Sheng, K30/1/21 (March 7, 1904), Chang to Sheng, K30/3/2, and Hunan gentry to Sheng, K30/3/28, Sheng, YCTK, v. 63, pp. 6, 22-23, v. 64, p. 10; and Chang to Wai Wu Pu, K30/4/2, Chang, op. cit., v. 189, pp. 28-29.

[32] Loomis to Moncheur, July 21, 1904, Moncheur to Loomis, July 30, 1904, Moncheur to Hay, Aug. 13, 1904, Whittier to Hay, Sept. 21, 1904,and Cary to Rockhill, Oct. 14, 1904, cited in Braisted, op. cit., p. 157.

American syndicate represented in China by A. W. Bash. But the fact that Bash had signed the original Canton-Hankow agreement in behalf of the Development Company in 1898 deepened suspicion of some Chinese, especially Chang Chih-tung. Finally, Sheng's plan was turned down.[33] Thus, the cancellation of the Canton-Hankow concession became the only step left for China to take. In December, the court ordered Minister Liang to notify the Washington government that China had decided to annul the concession granted to the Development Company. Since Chang Chih-tung was the most outspoken leader for annulment, he was authorized to assume the responsibility, with Liang's assistance, for negotiating with the American company to end its contract with the Chinese government. In his telegrams to transfer the court's order to Liang, Sheng explained again why China insisted on cancellation. China, Sheng stressed, worried about the possibility for Russia and France, through their Belgian agents in the American company, to grab the Canton-Hankow railway rights. As a power which had several times advocated protecting China's integrity, the United States should not be willing to see Chinese rights violated by other powers.[34]

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[33] Sheng to Wai Wu Pu, K30/8/27 (Oct. 6, 1904), Sheng, YCTK, v. 66, pp. 12-14; Chang to Sheng, K30/10/12, Chang, op. cit., v. 191, p. 3.

[34] Chang to Sheng, K30/11/8 (Dec. 14, 1904), Sheng to Chang, K30/11/10, and Sheng to Liang, K30/11/13, Sheng, YCTK, v. 66, pp. 31-32, v. 67, p. 1.

Negotiations started in January of 1905 at Washington with Liang and John W. Foster as representatives on the Chinese side, and Elihu Root and G. W. Ingraham speaking for the Development Company. It took about half a year for both parties to reach an agreement by which China would pay $6,750,000 in compensation covering the railway properties and the bonds sold by the company, with the bond holders being given the option of retaining their securities either wholly or in part.[35] The compensation was exceptionally high in view of the fact that the American company had constructed for China only a short line from Canton to Sanshui (thirty-two miles). President Theodore Roosevelt was told by Americans that it had been suggested by the Chinese Minister himself. As W. W. Rockhill learned from William Barclay Parsons, this large sum of compensation had been fixed upon to "gauge the opposition of the Chinese" to the Development Company.[36] In fact, the company originally presented claims even much larger, totalling $18,100,000.[37]

The Washington government stood opposed to the settlement from very beginning. Immediately after Liang

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[35] J.V.H. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, I (New York, 1921), pp. 519-521.

[36] Roosevelt to Rockhill, Aug. 8, 1905, enclosed in Rockhill to State Department, Aug. 9, 1905, and Rockhill to State Department, Aug. 17, 1905, China Despatches.

[37] Ingraham to Foster, May 29, 1905, cited in Braisted, op. cit., p. 159.

notified John Hay of China's determination to revoke the Canton-Hankow concession, the Secretary of State was assured that the Americans had just regained a clear majority of the stock of the Development Company as J.P. Morgan had bought back 1,200 shares from the Belgian interests.[38] Therefore, he hastened to apprise Liang and the American legation in Peking that he still regarded the enterprise to be American. He directed John Gardner Coolidge, the American Chargé in Peking, to urge the Chinese to postpone cancellation until the parties interested in the Canton-Hankow concession were heard from. With no satisfactory assurances coming from the Chinese, he once again telegraphed Coolidge on January 26, 1905 to protest "with energy" against cancellation. "The American proprietors have made great sacrifices in regaining absolute control of the enterprise," Hay added, "this government cannot tolerate such an act of spoilation as the forfeiture of the concession would be."[39]

President Theodore Roosevelt was much more stirred. He wrote Hay on January 26, "I should be very sorry to abandon the project of building that road."[40] After John Hay died, the President took over all dealings with China.

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[38] Diary of John Hay and Morgan to Hay, Jan. 5, 1905, cited in Braisted, op. cit., p. 158.

[39] Coolidge to Hay, Jan. 18 and 25, Hay to Coolidge, Jan. 26, 1905, confirmed in Coolidge to Hay, Feb. 9, 1905, China Despatches.

[40] Cited in Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and

He worked on two fronts. On the one hand, he directed W.W. Rockhill, the new American Minister to China, to put pressure on the Peking government. If China desired the Americans to construct the Canton-Hankow railway, the President instructed Rockhill to tell the Chinese government, the Development Company under the control of Americans would proceed at once with building and the company was willing to meet any reasonable request of the Chinese government as to modification of concession. "The American government," Roosevelt added in strong terms, "cannot acquiesce in sharp practice by the Chinese government to the detriment of interests of entire American business community in the Orient."[41] On the other hand, the President appealed to J. P. Morgan, now a big shareholder of the Development Company, not to sell the Canton-Hankow railway rights back to China. He promised the well-known banker that the American government would support the company in every honorable way to prevent it from being wronged by China or by any other country.[42]

Nevertheless, Roosevelt failed in his efforts. After faltering for a while, Prince Ch'ing eventually

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the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, Md., 1956), p. 183.

[41] Roosevelt to Rockhill, Aug. 8, 1905, confirmed in Brookhill to Secretary of State, Aug. 9, 1905, China Despatches.

[42] Roosevelt to Morgan, July 18, 1905, cited in Braisted, op. cit., p. 161.

informed Rockhill on August 15, 1905 that the Chinese government had approved the indemnity agreement reached in June.[43] Morgan expressed his unwillingness to keep the company any longer when Roosevelt made a final appeal to him on August 27.[44] Two days later, the indemnity agreement was officially signed in Washington and the Americans lost the Canton-Hankow railway concession forever. The President could do nothing more but blamed himself for having left the earlier negotiations to Hay and the State Department. "If I had been in closer touch with the workings of the State Department I should have taken drastic action long ago, both against the members of this corporation who had sold out to the Belgians, and against the Chinese government. . . I am sure I could have put the thing through."[45]

Rockhill assumed his new post as American Minister to China in June, 1905. He also saw that the cancellation of the Canton-Hankow concession would "gravely and permanently" injure American interests in China. But he put more blame on the Development Company. After he learned that the company would sell back the concession to China at

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[43] Rockhill to Secretary of State, Aug. 17, 1905, China Despatches.

[44] Beale, op. cit., p. 189.

[45] Ibid., p. 190.

$6,750,000, a sum vastly in excess of the outlay of the company, he thought the price would be looked upon by all as excessively sharp practice of the shareholders. "It is a blow to all our interests in China," he wrote in regret. "It places our government, which helped to secure the concession, in a false position. It serves to intensify anti-American feeling and aids our competitors in these markets. It has shaken belief in our business integrity, if consummated, Americans will get no new concessions for years to come." Then, he urged making arrangements with the Chinese promptly for saving the concession.[46]

Nevertheless, the Chinese were determined. Chang Chih-tung and the provincial interests were willing to pay such a high price to buy back the railway rights, and they were making all efforts to raise the needed funds.[47] In Peking, Rockhill's protests against the cancellation of the Canton-Hankow concession received no definite and satisfactory response.[48] The Russo-Japanese War had recently come to an end. With Russia defeated in the battlefield, China no longer had to worry about the possibility that the

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[46] Rockhill to State Department, June 2 and Aug. 9, 1905, China Despatches.

[47] Sun, op. cit., pp. 76-82.

[48] Rockhill to State Department and enclosures, Aug. 17 and 22, 1905, China Despatches.

Belgian involvement of the Development Company would lead to French and Russian control of the Canton-Hankow railway. Thus, one of the main reasons for cancelling the Canton-Hankow concessions seemed to have disappeared. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the Japanese victory over the White race helped the national awakening of China. The Chinese, racially identical with the victor, began to lose their patience to submit to foreign pressures. Under the circumstances, boycotts broke out in many large cities of China against America's exclusion of Chinese laborers.[49] And, as Rockhill reported, there was a strong feeling in the whole of China in favor of the Chinese regaining possession at the earliest possible dates of railway building, and a determination not to make concessions of any kind to foreign countries.[50] This explains why China stood firm at the final stage of negotiations to annul the Development Company contracts.

How the Canton-Hankow railway would be finally constructed is another story. In what has been discussed, it is clear that when China was under the pressure to make railway concessions, she would open her door for all of the powers, not for any particular power. In the case of Canton-Hankow railway concession, the Chinese officials

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[49] See Chap. IV.

[50] Rockhill to State Department, Aug. 17, and 19, 1905, China Despatches.

were especially interested in employing an American interest to counter the interests of other great powers. Consequently, a contract was signed with the American China Development Company to construct the railway.

Nevertheless, the American company violated the contract and sold some of its shares to the Belgian interests. This violation alarmed the Chinese officials. They believed that the French and Russian interests were behind the Belgian ones. The Belgian encroachment on the American company would result in a French or Russian control of the Canton-Hankow railway. If that happened, their original purpose to employ an American interest to counter those of other powers would fall apart. Therefore, they determined to cancel the Canton-Hankow railway concession. Their effort was finally supported by two forces. First, the provincial interests in Hunan and Hupeh wanted to build railways in their area by themselves. Secondly, there appeared after the Russo-Japanese War a strong feeling among Chinese people in favor of recovering the rights which had been conceded to foreigners.

CHAPTER IV

A STUMBLING BLOCK

During a time when China was threatened with partition as a result of the scramble for concessions and the Boxer rebellion, the open door policy expounded by the Washington government seemed to be helpful for China and the Chinese did try to make use of it to serve the interests of their country. Nevertheless, China could never establish more friendly relations with the United States. For many Chinese, the United States was even as perfidious as those powers which had encroached upon China's territories. There are plenty of explanations. Except for those discussed in the last three chapters, the American exclusion laws and the Chinese resentment against them always constituted a stumbling block in the contacts between the two nations.

The Sino-American dispute over the immigration problem had a long history. More recently, the Chinese government yielded to the wishes of the United States in 1894 and concluded the Yang-Gresham treaty which gave Congress additional power of legislation respecting Chinese laborers. By Article I of this treaty it was agreed that for a term of ten years the coming of Chinese laborers to

the United States should be absolutely prohibited. Article III provided that "the provisions of this convention shall not affect the right at present enjoyed of Chinese subjects, being officials, teachers, students, merchants, or travellers for curiosity or pleasure, but not laborers, of coming to the United States and residing therein." Article IV stipulated that Chinese, either permanently or temporarily residing in the United States, "shall have for the protection of their persons and property all rights that are given by the laws of the United States to citizens of the most favored nation, excepting the right to become naturalized citizens."[1] For a few years this treaty seemed to be respected and there was no serious contention over its practice. Around the turn of the century, however, the United States government began to change its policy and violations of either the spirit or the letter of the treaty were common.

In 1898, 1900 and 1902 respectively, the United States extended the exclusion laws based on the treaty of 1894 to the newly annexed Hawaii and the Philippines. By that time there had been residing in the Hawaiian Islands approximately 20,000 Chinese. Among them a large number had been born in the islands and a considerable number had become lawfully naturalized citizens of Hawaii. The

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[1] J. V. A. MacMurray. Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, I (New York), pp. 9-11.

official statistics show that many of these Chinese had become holders of real estate, that they outnumbered all other nationalities as merchants and traders, and that in three of the branches of trade, as shown by the official licenses issued, they also exceeded all other nationalities. To a far larger extent are these statements true of conditions in the Philippines. For centuries very intimate and important relations had existed between the archipelago and China owing to their continguity and the favorable trade and industrial conditions. The commercial intercourse between these islands and the cities of Southern China had been and was very extensive, and the Chinese population there was very large, engaged in almost every walk of life. Many of these Chinese were native born, of which a considerable portion were the offspring of marriage with the Philippine races.[2] Given such close relations, the extension of the exclusion laws into Hawaii and the Philippines stirred up the Chinese government. It worried that the exclusion laws would do great injury and injustice to the Chinese in those islands. It also hated to see the continuance of close relations between China and those islands thus threatened. Naturally, the Chinese government protested.

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[2] Wu to Hay, Dec. 12, 1898, Feb. 3, 1899, and Dec. 10, 1901, FRUS, 1899, pp. 202-204, 207-208, and 1901, pp. 91-95; and Chester Holcombe, "Chinese Exclusion and the Boycott," Outlook, LXXXI (1905), 1066-1072.

In its protests one point was often stressed. The treaty of 1894 was concluded before the annexation of Hawaii and the Philippines. Therefore, the exclusion legislation based on it should not be applied to the islands.[3]

Next, there was a change of American policy regarding Chinese in transit. The right of transit had been equally enjoyed by all Chinese persons. By the treaty of 1894, though Chinese laborers were prohibited from coming to the United States, the right of transit was reserved for them with all other Chinese classes. Up to 1901 about 37,000 Chinese in transit had passed through the United States to Mexico or somewhere else with no one being denied. In the latter half of 1901, however, out of 1,000 transits 200 were suddenly denied landing. Thereafter, the transit regulations were tightened. By 1905, the old rule requiring the Chinese laborers in transit to have a through ticket across the whole territory and a bond of five hundred dollars had been elaborated to apply to Chinese "persons", apparently including the exempt classes provided in the Article III of the Yang-Gresham Treaty. In the meantime, the immigration officials were authorized to demand any proof he chose to ask that if the transit was in good faith and if the traveler was not of the exempt

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[3] A typical protest is found in Wu to Hay, Dec. 10, 1901, FRUS, 1901, pp. 75-97, in which Wu made a long review of Chinese immigration problems.

class.[4]

More intolerably, the rights of the exempt classes were not properly respected in accordance with the principle of the most favored nation. This kind of mistreatment was exemplified by many cases. On October 11, 1902, a number of United States immigration officials and a force of local police made a sudden and unexpected descent upon the Chinese quarter of Boston. In the raid no mercy was shown by the officials. They treated all Chinese alike, no matter whether they were laborers or the persons of the exempt classes. Finally, about 250 Chinese were arrested and carried off to the Federal Building. There they were crowded into two small rooms where only standing space could be had, all through the night, and many of them till late in the afternoon of the next day. After the event, an official report revealed that among the arrested only five proved to be illegal residents.[5]

In 1903, a Chinese military attache was mistreated in San Francisco. The attache, named Tom Kim Yung, was returning to his lodgings at the Chinese Consulate General one evening when he was accosted by a policeman in most indecent language and struck with gross indignity. This resulted in an encounter participated in by another policeman.

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[4] Mary Roberts Coolidge, Chinese Immigration (New York, 1909), pp. 287-289.

[5] John W. Foster, "The Chinese Boycott," Atlantic Monthly, XCVII (1906), 118-127.

Yung was beaten and severely bruised, and finally handcuffed and tied by his queue to a fence until the arrival of a patrol wagon, into which he was forced and taken to the police station. There he was kept some time, until released on bail given by a Chinese merchant, about half past one o'clock at night. After that, he was held for trial on a charge of assaulting a police officer, and when his diplomatic character was brought to the attention of the chief of police by the consul general, that officer refused to dismiss the charge.[6]

Then Chinese officials and merchants who were invited to attend the Louisiana Purchase Exhibition at St. Louis in 1904 were also harshly treated. The American government had sent the Hon. John Barrett to China requesting that each province send an exhibit. Since it was China's first official representation at an affair of this kind, liberal appropriation was made, a commission was organized, and a Prince was appointed to participate in the opening ceremony of the fair. Merchants all over China became enthusiastic likewise, and preparations were going on on a large scale. Nevertheless, there came, months after the invitation had been extended, the rulings of the Treasury Department that Chinese to take part in the fair had to be photographed, had to comply with discriminating conditions not made applicable to any other nationals, and had to give a bond

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6 Ibid.

of five hundred dollars to guarantee that they would leave the country after the closing of the fair. The publication of these rulings in the Chinese press led to indignation and many Chinese merchants decided to give up their contemplated exhibitions. When the others finally came to the United States and arrived in San Francisco, they were more mistreated and certain of them were detained in the shed,"a cheap, two-story, wooden building, at the end of the wharf, built out over the water where the odors of sewage and bilge are most offensive; unclean, at times overrun with vermine, and often inadequate to the numbers to be detained."[7]

Naturally, the mistreatments and other violations against the treaty of 1894 brought in protests from the Chinese ministers at Washington.[8] The Chinese ministers to the United States had been assigned the protection of Chinese immigrants as their main duty. After Wu T'ing-fang assumed the post in 1898 he became more active than his predecessors in censuring the American exclusion laws. Besides filing the necessary diplomatic protests, he made use of many occasions to admonish the American public. As

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7 Wong Kai Kah, "A Menace to America's Oriental Trade," North American Review, CLXXVIII (1904), 414-424; Colidge, op. cit., pp. 291-301.

8 A plenty of these diplomatic arguments which Chinese ministers presented against the American exclusion laws can be found in the volumes of FRUS.

he argued, the treaty of 1894 prohibited only the Chinese laborers, there should be no law or regulation against any of other Chinese classes. Furthermore, he believed it basically unjust to single out Chinese for exclusion. "Justice would seem to demand equal consideration for the Chinese on the part of the United States," he wrote once. "China does not ask for special favors. All she wants is enjoyment of the same privileges accorded other nationalities. Instead, she is singled out for discrimination and made the subject of hostile legislation. Her door is wide open to the people of the United States, but their door is slammed in the face of her people." He told Americans that China had long ago adopted the open door policy in her foreign intercourse. She had relations with all the European powers, together with the United States and others. All these were equally "favored nations" in every sense of the term. All foreigners, Americans included, enjoyed the same rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions with respect to commerce, navigation, travel, and residence throughout China. In reciprocity, he reaffirmed, the United States should deal with the question of Chinese immigration in a spirit of fairness and equity and accord Chinese subjects who came to the United States for legitimate purposes the same treatment as was accorded to the people of other countries.[9] Thus, Wu criticized the

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[9] New York Times, April 9 and Oct. 18, 1899, Jan. 26

American exclusion laws in rhetoric of the open door and fair play.

After Wu left office, Liang Cheng came to the United States in the Spring of 1903 to take over the job as the Chinese minister. When he disembarked at San Francisco, Liang told the newsmen explicitly that he would do what he could to induce a modification of the exclusion laws.[10] By the beginning of 1904, he became more impatient. As he saw it, the American exclusion laws were too harsh and annoying. For the purpose of getting rid of them, the Chinese government had better reach an agreement with the United States not to renew the treaty of 1894 when it was going to expire in December of 1904. If impossible, Liang added in his telegram to the Wai Wu Pu in Peking, a sweeping revision of the treaty had to be insisted upon at least.[11] Incidentally, only one day before Liang sent this telegram to express his hatred of American exclusion laws, the Russo-Japanese War had been declared and the State Department had dispatched identical notes to China and the two belligerents to assert once more in terms

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and Feb. 9, 1900, and March 28, 1902; Wu T'ing-fang, "China and the United States," Independence, LII (1900), 752-55; also Wu, "Mutual Helpfulness between China and the United States," North American Review, CLXXI (1900), 1-12.

10 New York Times, March 27, 1903.

11 Liang to Wai Wu Pu, K29/12/26 (Feb. 11, 1904), Ch'ing Archives.

of the Open Door, that the neutrality of China and her administrative entity had to be respected in all practical ways.[12]

Obviously, the resentment of the Overseas Chinese who had suffered one way or another under the American exclusion laws was even greater. As a result, they sent letters and telegrams back to China to describe vividly the misfortunes which they had experienced and to urge an annulment of the treaty of 1894. Among these complaints, one came from the Overseas Chinese in Latin America who had passed through the United States as transits. Another one was sent in the name of about 56,000 Overseas Chinese in the United States. A third one was a resolution adopted by the Overseas Chinese merchants who had held a meeting convened by the Chinese Benevolent Association at San Francisco, one of the largest and most influential Overseas Chinese organizations.[13] In short, they represented a wide indignation over the American exclusion policy.

More significantly, the harsh enforcement of American exclusion laws had its effects inside China. Among the victims of the Boston raid of 1902, a man named Feng Hsia-wei wrote a book on his unhappy experiences after he returned to China. Being so distressed, he finally committed

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12 FRUS, 1904, pp. 2-3.

13 The three complaints mentioned here were sent to Wai Wu Pu respectively in 1901 and 1903. They are cited in Chang Tsun-Wu, Chung Mei Kong Yueh Fang Chao (Agitation over

suicide near the American Consulate in Shanghai. His book and his martyrdom made a profound impression in China. In many cities of South China, several thousand Chinese joined demonstrations in his memory. Several eulogies were written to praise him and to denounce American brutality against Chinese nationals. Tom Kim Yung, the Chinese attache who was maltreated in San Francisco in 1903, also felt that he had "lost face" with his countrymen and committed suicide. When the funeral service was held, he was followed to the grave by thousands of his countrymen who regarded themselves as personally outraged. The Chinese merchants who attended the Louisiana Purchase Exposition returned to China with some bitterness. They complained that Americans were "a race of pigs" and spread word of the insulting discrimination which they had suffered throughout their respective provinces.[14] Anyhow, the Chinese were so agitated that they were ready to take steps of economic boycott as the diplomatic negotiations were being undertaken because of the expiration of the treaty of 1894.

In 1903, some Overseas Chinese in the United States were already fomenting a boycott against American goods.

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the Sino-American Exclusion Treaty, Taipei, 1965), pp. 11-14.

[14] A Yin, ed., Fang Mei Hua Kung Chin Yueh Wen Hsueh Chi (An Anti-American Literary Collection on the Exclusion of Chinese Laborers, Shanghai, 1960), pp. 696-699; Foster, op. cit.; and Lu Fang-shih, Hsin Tsuan Yueh Chang Ta Chuan (A New Compilation of Treaties, Shanghai, 1908), v. 12, pp. 415-416.

In order to carry out the movement, they suggested raising funds in the United States and organizing working committees in the big cities in China. In the beginning of 1904, a Chinese vice-commissioner to the Louisiana Purchase Exposition forecast in an article written for the North American Review an anti-American boycott unless the exclusion regulations against Chinese were altered.[15] But not until the late Spring of 1905, when the Sino-American negotiations on a new immigration treaty came to a deadlock, was the boycott realized.

The treaty of 1894 was due to expire on December 7, 1904. The Chinese Foreign Ministry, after consulting by telegrams with Minister Liang Cheng in Washington, informed the American Minister in Peking on January 24, 1904 that China decided to terminate the treaty after its expiration.[16] Thus the two sides started a series of negotiations. Since it immediately occurred to the Chinese government that it was a Presidential election year in the United States and the termination of the immigration treaty might be embarrassing to the Washington government, the Foreign Ministry once suggested putting off the discussion

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15 A Yin, op. cit., pp. 588-597, 612; and Wong Kai Kah, op. cit.

16 Wai Wu Pu to Liang, K29/9/30 (Nov. 18, 1903) and Liang to Wai Wu Pu, K29/10/1, Ch'ing Archives; and Prince Ch'ing to Conger, Jan. 24, 1904, enclosed in Conger to Hay, FRUS, 1904, p. 117.

of the immigration treaty until next year, without withdrawing its former notice of termination.

Nevertheless, the State Department insisted on the renewal of the treaty for another term of ten years. Through Minister Conger in Peking, it argued that it was impossible to extend the immigration treaty one year since the treaty provided for succession periods of ten years. On the other hand, the argument continued, it was difficult to terminate the treaty after its expiration and to negotiate a new one, since any such action would be surely brought before the Senate and the Senators could hardly pass it. Consequently, the two countries might be without an immigration treaty and some inconvenience might be followed. Therefore, the only way left for the present was to withdraw the discussion of termination and to extend the treaty of 1894 for another period of ten years.[17]

The Peking government was unwilling to acquiesce. In March, it learned that the Chinese exhibitors at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition would meet troubles with their passports.[18] In April, it made a reply to the United States government in stiff terms. The immigration treaty had to be modified, Prince Ch'ing asserted in his

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17 Hay to Conger, Feb. 11, 1904, confirmed in Conger to Hay, March 1, 1904; also Conger to Hay, April 4 and 20, 1904, China Despatches.

18 Prince Ch'ing to Conger, March 12, 1904, enclosed in Conger to Hay, March 15, 1904, China Despatches.

note to Conger; if not, "the harsh regulations of your Government will daily give more annoyance and the Chinese in the United States cannot endure the oppression. Several tens of thousands of them have repeatedly called to us for help, and how can my Board treat their cries with indifference! As to withdrawing the announcement that the Treaty is to be terminated, this will be very difficult to do. Your Excellency fears that if there be no Treaty there may result some inconvenience, but the oppression now endured by the Chinese in the United States is already extreme, and it would seem that their condition could not be made worse than at present, and this makes it very difficult for us to consent to extend the Treaty for another period of ten years."[19]

Being so determined not to renew the treaty of 1894 the Foreign Ministry and Minister Liang at Washington went on to work for a new immigration treaty. In August, 1904 and January, 1905 respectively, Liang sent to the State Department two drafts which demanded that only Chinese laborers should be excluded; that the rights of Chinese laborers in transit should be respected; that no exclusion regulation should be applied to Hawaii and the Philippines; and that the so-called exempt classes should not include only officials, teachers, students, merchants

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[19] Prince Ch'ing to Conger, April 19, 1904, enclosed in Conger to Hay, April 20, 1904, China Despatches.

and travellers as the Article III of the treaty of 1894 appeared to provide, but should be broadly interpreted as to include all Chinese who were not laborers.[20] These demands, especially the last two, were hardly acceptable. After reading one of the drafts, John Hay in the privacy of his diary called it "a very strong paper; one which I could not conscientiously handle...." The new Secretary of Commerce, Victor Metcalf from California where Chinese were extremely discriminated against opposed any revision of the treaty. Even when Rockhill was sent to persuade him, he remained obdurate.[21] Therefore, the negotiations in Washington for a new immigration treaty came to a complete deadlock by the Spring of 1905.

It is not easy to guage the exact connection between the failure of negotiations in Washington and the final outbreak of boycott in China. But some clues can be traced. As the treaty of 1894 expired in December, 1904 and there was no headway in the negotiations for a new treaty, Minister Liang Cheng in Washington began to suggest by letters to Wai Wu Pu that the Chinese government had better drop the efforts to obtain a revision of the treaty

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20 Draft of proposed Treaty between China and the United States relating to the exclusion of laborers, enclosed in Liang to Hay, Aug. 12, 1904, and Second Draft, enclosed in Liang to Hay, Jan. 7, 1905, Notes from Chinese Legation.

21 Howard K. Beale. Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, Md., 1956), pp. 193-94.

and leave in the hands of the United States government the sole responsibility for the question of Chinese immigrants. If in that case the United States government continued the exclusion laws against the Chinese with no basis of a treaty, Liang argued, then the Chinese government could retaliate with laws of the same nature against the Americans. In addition, if the Chinese people chose to boycott American goods as many Overseas Chinese had proposed, it might also be helpful to force the Washington government into modifying the exclusion laws.[22] Then, on May 10, 1905 when Rockhill was coming to China to continue the treaty negotiations and when the Overseas Chinese in the United States were sending scores of telegrams to Peking urging that the new American minister not be received,[23] the Shanghai merchants met and adopted a resolution to oppose the treaty negotiations and call a nationwide boycott against American goods.

During June support for the boycott spread throughout China. On July 20 the boycott was definitely declared to be in effect. From then on it grew in intensity throughout the month of August and the center of agitation shifted

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22 Liang to Wai Wu Pu, received K31/1/13 (Feb. 16, 1905), K31/4/5 and K31/4/23, Ch'ing Archives.

23 As found in Ch'ing Archives, at least twenty-one telegrams from the Overseas Chinese in the United States were received in the five days' period between May 9 and May 13, 1905.

from Shanghai to Canton where the anti-American feeling was strongest due to the fact that most of the emigration to America had been from that region. And as the boycott agitation grew, more and more Chinese groups participated in it. Except for the merchants in Shanghai, there were several nationally influential guilds in the treaty ports, like the silk guild, the Chinese native banking guild, the hempsack guild, the rice guild, the bean guild and others. A number of famous doctors in Shanghai, Canton, Hankow and other cities refused to purchase American medicine. The Chinese cigarette smokers in Canton started buying Chinese manufactured cigarettes instead of American brands. The boatmen of Canton resolved not to ferry American goods across the Pearl River. The Chinese women in the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi decided, for the traditional Chinese moon festival, to make rice cakes in place of the usual moon cake, which required American flour.[24]

More significantly, as happened later in the patriotic May Fourth movement of 1919, the students and intellectuals played an important role in the boycott. In early 1905, a popular Chinese writer named Chi You-tse wrote a long story, "Bitter Student," which vividly reported the ill-treatment the Chinese students received in the United States

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[24] Shih-shan Henry Tsai, Reaction to Exclusion: Ch'ing Attitudes toward Overseas Chinese in the United States (Dissertation, 1970), pp. 306-307; and Margaret Field, "The Chinese Boycott of 1905," Papers on China, II

and effectively stimulated resentment against American discrimination.[25] As the boycott agitation spread out, the students and intellectuals were highly involved. On May 27, 1905, the Shanghai Educational Association, representing twenty-four Shanghai colleges and high schools, approved the boycott solution. The student demonstration at Soochow was described as "a unaminity of purpose most unique and never yet heard of in the history of this ancient Empire." Scholars from all the different schools in Foochow and Nantai met together to consider what steps to take to resist the immigration treaty with the United States. This meeting was reported as "perhaps the first meeting of the large student body of Foochow upon a common platform. A few years ago it would have been impossible." In Canton, it was reported, "societies of students...have banded themselves together, and have sworn an oath not to use any commodity of American manufacture nor let anything which has come from America pass their lips." In addition, several thousand students met in Honan to honor three men arrested for boycott agitation.[26] By these activities, the literate class helped to keep the boycott alive, exerted pressure on reluctant merchants who found the boycott

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(Harvard University, 1957), 63-98.

[25] A Yin, op. cit., pp. 273-309.

[26] Tsai, op. cit., pp. 309-310; and Field, op. cit.

detrimental to their economic interests, and even assumed leadership as merchant support declined.

It may be wondered why the Chinese, because of hatred for the American exclusion policy, became so fervent in the boycott movement with very little regard to the American government's stand for the preservation of China's integrity -- while most of the world was planning the partition of the old empire, -- and to the many other acts of constant friendship that the United States had shown to China.[27] As the boycott grew, however, the Chinese found grounds beyond the evils of the American exclusion laws to support their movement. At one mass meeting attended by nearly 1500 persons in Shanghai on July 20, for example, the speakers exhorted everyone present to maintain a firm front to show to the world that there was a united China. "For", said one gentleman, "some Americans have sneered at us saying that there is nothing to fear because we Chinese never can unite. Even the previous United States minister in a recent speech made the same sneering allusion. We will show by precept and example how fallacious an idea this is on the part of such Americans." Other speakers showed how little Japan by her unity and determination had beaten her huge opponent Russia, showing the world what

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27 North China Daily News, Aug. 17, 1905, enclosed in Rockhill to the Secretary of State, Aug. 18, 1905, pp. 219-220.

Asiatics were able to do when thoroughly aroused. "Can not China easily do the same?" They asked. "Can not China by a united front and firm determination obtain her desire, also, by the repeal of the Chinese exclusion treaty?"[28]

Except for the appeal for national unity, the rhetoric of the open door was also employed. The faculty and students of the Anglo-Chinese college at Foochow once asked the United States in their petition to the Washington government: "Why...do you oppress the Chinese by introducing the Exclusion Acts with which no country has ever oppressed Chinese in like manner as you, and no country has ever received such ill-treatment from you as has China?" "The maintenance of peace in the East by your honorable country, regardless of pains," they continued, "is to keep the 'Open Door' policy which is the essential of commerce... if you unduly restrict Chinese industry or labor in your country, you narrow your commerce in China because when the Chinese are excluded, in self-defense, they might, with all their efforts, try to boycott American goods." In conclusion, they asserted that when the Americans excluded Chinese from their country, it meant no less that they excluded their commerce from China.[29] Obviously, since the United States did not treat Chinese as equally as she

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[28] North China Daily News, July 21, 1905, enclosed in Rockhill to the Secretary of State, July 26, 1905, FRUS, 1905, p. 211.

[29] Rockhill to State Department, July 26, 1905, and enclosures, China Despatches.

treated other foreigners, many Chinese believed that China had the right not to provide equal opportunity for American commerce as the open door policy required.

The Chinese officials, no matter what their motives, expressed their sympathy for the boycott in different degrees. As the agitation penetrated from Shanghai to the regions South of the Yangtze, the positions which the provincial authorities at Nanking and Canton adopted were especially important because their districts were the most infected.

The Viceroy Chou Fu at Nanking (Shanghai was under his jurisdiction) appeared to be non-commital from the beginning. Asked by the American vice consul in charge, he replied that he had been in ignorance of the situation and the seriousness of the matter. As a matter of fact, he had been repeatedly advised from Peking and Shanghai and he had no intention of suppressing the boycott movement. Later he even made it clear in his note to the American Consulate that the Chinese people had the right to determine whether they would buy American goods. If the United States government would correct the abuses of the exclusion policy, there would be an end to the trouble.[30]

Viceroy Tsen Chung-hsuan at Canton expressed his sympathy more explicitly and constantly. "Relating to the

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[30] Rodgers to Loomis, Aug. 12, 15 and 24, 1905, Consular Despatches, Shanghai; Chou to Wai Wu Pu, received K31/8/2 (Aug. 31, 1905), and enclosures, Ch'ing Archives.

matter of a merchant who wishes to trade with another or a person who wishes to buy something from a merchant," he wrote in his correspondence with the American Consul-General, "they have perfect right to trade or buy as they please. If a merchant or person does not want to use American goods, he should not be compelled to use them, just as if he wants to buy American goods, there is no law that may compel him to buy the same." Besides, he defended the right of the Chinese people to hold boycott meetings despite American protests.[31] After the court issued an edict on August 31 to order the provincial officials to stop the anti-American agitation, he took action against the boycott meetings and the circulation of anti-American literature. But he insisted for the rest of the year, when the boycott movement was declining in other areas, that the Chinese people had full freedom to decide whether they wanted to buy American goods.[32]

For a while, the Foreign Ministry in Peking was no less sympathetic. American Minister Rockhill had notified the ministry that the Chinese would be held responsible for any loss sustained by American trade on account of any failure on the part of China to stop the boycott. Also, he demanded the punishment of Tseng Shao-Ch'ing, the prime

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[31] Lay to Loomis, Aug. 9, 1905, and enclosures, Consular Despatches, Canton.

[32] Tsen to Wai Wu Pu, received K31/11/4 (Nov. 30, 1905), Ch'ing Archives.

mover in the movement. To all those pressures, Prince Ch'ing, the head of the Foreign Ministry, made a reply on August 26. As he put it, the idea of a boycott against American goods came directly from the trade people. It did not come from the Chinese government by any means, and the Chinese government certainly could not assume the responsibility. As to Tseng Shao-ch'ing, Prince Ch'ing refused to enlarge upon his offense and deal severely with him.[33] Rockhill had complained that the boycott agitation had gone on openly under the guidance and active participation of high officials. After reading Prince Ch'ing's reply, he was constrained once again to believe that the movement had a certain amount of sympathy from the Chinese government.[34]

While Chinese officials expressed sympathy for the boycott, however, they were surrounded with forces from different sides.

At first, some American officials recognized the causes for the Chinese complaints. Roosevelt wrote to Rockhill that he was trying in every way to make things easy for the Chinese in the United States. Secretary of War Taft likewise expressed sympathy with the Chinese while

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[33] Rockhill to the Secretary of State, Aug. 5, 12, 17 and 29, and enclosures, FRUS, 1905, pp. 212-213, 222-224.

[34] Rockhill to Prince Ch'ing, Aug. 7 and 27, 1905, FRUS, 1905, pp. 213-214, 223-224.

speaking before the graduating class at Miami University in Ohio. Rockhill advised that the United States must be patient and refrain from threats of force. He understood that to force the Peking government to take hasty measures might easily result in revolution and even greater losses to American merchants.[35]

Therefore, the Washington government attempted to induce the Chinese government to suppress the boycott by acknowledging and remedying the injustices resulted from the exclusion policy. For this purpose, President Roosevelt sent instructions through the Secretary of State to all the diplomats and consular representatives in China to remind them that his government intended to extend the heartiest courtesy toward all Chinese classes besides the laborers. He informed them that the immigration officers had been instructed that the exclusion laws must be enforced without harshness or unnecessary inconvenience and that any discourtesy shown to Chinese persons by any American official would be cause for immediate removal from the service.[36]

Since China continued to be intransigent, Roosevelt became very impatient and wrote Rockhill in late August

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[35] Roosevelt to Rockhill, May 18, 1905; The Nation, June 22, 1905, p. 491; and Rockhill to Hay, June 17, 1905. Cited in Paul A. Varg, Open Door Diplomat: the Life of W.W. Rockhill (Urbana, Ill., 1952), pp. 61-63.

[36] Circular to the Diplomatic and Consular Officers of the United States in China, June 26, 1905, Diplomatic Instructions, China.

that "it is absolutely necessary for you to take a stiff tone with the Chinese where they are clearly doing wrong." "Unless I misread them entirely," the President added, the Chinese "despise weakness even more than they prize justice, and we must make it evident both that we intend to do what is right and that we do not intend for a moment to suffer what is wrong."[37] Rockhill, in his turn, stressed in his reply to Prince Ch'ing's note of August 26 that the United States government was emphatically of the opinion "that it has been and still is the duty of the Imperial Government to completely put a stop to this movement." He described the boycott as "an unwarranted attempt of the ignorant people to assume the functions of government and to meddle with international relations."[38]

Many Chinese, including those who were sympathetic with the boycott, were worried that the movement might be turned into a general uprising like either the Taiping Revolution or the Boxer Rebellion. As a matter of fact, when Chou Fu, Tsen Chun-hsuan and Prince Ch'ing refused American demands for taking steps to stop the agitation, they usually explained that if too much pressure were used

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[37] Roosevelt to Rockhill, Aug. 22, 1905, in Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. IV (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), p. 1310.

[38] Rockhill to Prince Ch'ing, Aug. 27, 1905, FRUS, 1905, p. 223.

to suppress the boycotters, the feeling of the people would become more excited and more trouble and disorder would be followed.[39]

Viceroy Yuan Shih-kai at Tientsin, who had high-handedly suppressed the Boxers in his territory of Shantung Province several years before, obviously had the same fear in mind and consistently adopted measures to stop the boycott agitation. On June 20, 1905, he summoned the local prefects and leaders of the Tientsin Chamber of Commerce and ordered them to stop boycotting American goods. He also forced the Tientsin Chamber of Commerce to print counter-boycott propaganda sheets for distribution throughout Tientsin. This propaganda proclaimed, "The Boxer Rebellion hurt Tientsin badly... Our commerce had just started recovering recently. But America's exclusion policy again aroused the agitation and caused our commodities to stagnate in the market.... We, the Tientsin merchants, after considering the big loss we previously suffered, realize that it would be again a great trouble to stir up an anti-foreign agitation.... Please maintain our regular activities."[40] Clearly enough, a sense of the danger of a

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39 Tsen to Lay, enclosed in Lay to Loomis, Aug. 19, 1905, Consular Despatch, Canton, Prince Ch'ing to Rockhill, Aug. 26, 1905, FRUS, 1905, pp. 222-223; and Chou Fu to Wai Wu Pu, received K31/8/9 (Sept. 7, 1905), Ch'ing Archives.

40 Hsin Wen Pao (The News), Shanghai, June 28, 1905, cited in Chang, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

new anti-foreign uprising can be found in this counter-boycott literature. Thereafter, Yuan advised the Foreign Ministry in Peking on June 21 to order all the provincial governments on the East Coast and along the Yangtze to forbid the merchants to boycott American goods. In mid-August he made a proclamation to forbid the public to read the Ta Kung Pao, alias "L'Impatial," because the newspaper published reports and articles which favored the boycott and "rendered harm to peace." As a result, the newspaper was forced to close. On August 22, in response to the request from the Shanghai piece-goods dealers who felt the economic losses because of the boycott, Yuan again gave orders to prevent the spreading of the agitation to his province and to encourage the free circulation of trade.[41] Thus, Yuan became the most representative of the Manchu ruling officials who were hostile and opposed to the boycott.

Exactly how much the fear of a general uprising and Yuan Shih-k'ai's attitude influenced the policy of the Peking government is not known. Taking into account of the importance of Yuan's position as the viceroy at Tientsin, in the immediate vicinity of Peking, one must conclude that Yuan did have a voice in making a policy which gradually yielded to the American demand for stopping the boycott.

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[41] Yuan to Wai Wu Pu, received K31/5/19 (June 21, 1905), Ch'ing Archives; Rockhill to State Department, Aug. 24 and 25, 1905, China Despatches.

More meaningfully, while the people like the students of Anglo-Chinese College at Foochow employed the rhetoric of open door to justify the boycott movement, Yuan also talked in terms of the open door. As Yuan stressed in his telegram advising the Foreign Ministry to stop the boycott agitation, the United States had long been friendly to China and had urged the powers to respect the neutrality of China since the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. In addition, it had been because of the American policy that China's territorial integrity could be preserved. Now, Yuan concluded, as China needed more help from the United States while a peace conference was being arranged after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, the anti-American boycott was improper in the sense of timing and it would highly impede the friendly relations between the two countries.[42] To be sure, Yuan differed from the boycotters. While the later hinged more on the principle of equal opportunity for commerce, the viceroy rested his argument more on the principle of preserving China's territorial integrity. This marks a pivotal point in the disputes among Chinese over the open door policy.

Finally, the court issued an edict on August 31 to forbid the anti-American boycott.[43] Thereafter, the boycott

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[42] Yuan to Wai Wu Pu, received K31/5/19, Ch'ing Archives.

[43] Imperial Edict of Aug. 31, 1905, FRUS, 1905, p. 225.

declined and died out at last at the beginning of 1906 in Canton. The American exclusion policy, however, remained a stumbling block in the Sino-American relations. After the failure of the boycott, the United States government extended and re-enacted all the anti-Chinese exclusion laws.

CHAPTER V

THE OPEN DOOR AS VIEWED IN AN AWAKENING CHINA

A survey of American newspapers and periodicals of 1906 shows that the word "awakening" was usually used as a catchword to describe the current Chinese situation, such as a beginning of national unity, of national independence, or of patriotism. When Dr. W.A.P. Martin, formerly President of the Chinese Imperial University, wrote a book in 1907 about the progress which he witnessed in China, he adopted The Awakening of China as its title. Indeed, China was undergoing a change at the turn of the century. Mainly because of this awakening change, she could do now what she had not been able to do before. As her recent relations with the United States revealed, for instance, she could insist on the cancellation of Canton-Hankow railway concession and could also stage an anti-American boycott.

In order to understand more about China's response to the open door policy, one should know two phenomena in the awakening China. In the first place, despite the fact that the conservatives in the Ch'ing court staged a successful coup d'etat in 1898 against the Emperor Kuang-hsü and his reform followers,[1] the reform trend did not decline,

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[1] For the events of the coup d'etat, see Liang Chi-chao,

but swelled. After the Boxer Rebellion, the Empress Dowager Ts'u-hsi initiated a series of reforms. By her orders, some old offices were abolished and new ones created. The civil service examination system, which had lasted for centuries and required the students to learn only the classics and the writing of long essays, was abrogated. Instead, modern schools were established for students to study mathematics, the natural sciences, foreign languages, law, and other Western knowledge. In the summer of 1905, the Empress decided to send five senior officials abroad to study foreign constitutions in preparation for a representative system. But a September departure of these officials was forestalled by a revolutionary's attack on them at the railroad station in Peking.[2] These reform measures have been usually interpreted as being insincere and an attempt to disguise the mistakes which the Empress committed in the Boxer catastrophe. But they made concrete improvements especially in the educational institution.

Wu Hsu Cheng Pien Chi (An Account of the 1898 Coup, Taipei, 1959); Hu Pin, Wu Hsu Pien Fa (The Reform of 1898, Shanghai, 1956); and Liu Feng-han, Yüan Shih-k'ai Yu Wu Hsu Cheng Pien (Yüan Shih-k'ai and the Coup D'etat of 1898 (Taipei, 1964).

2 Meribeth E. Cameron. The Reform Movement in China, 1898-1912 (Stanford, 1931), Chap. III; and Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China, 1840-1928 (trans. and ed. by Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls, Stanford, 1956), pp. 194-196.

On the other hand, some reform leaders of 1898, among whom K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao were the most prominent, managed to escape from arrest during the coup d'etat. In exile in Japan, Liang continued to speak for the reform movement and expound his concept of constitutional monarchy in his journals, Ch'ing I Pao (The Public Opinion, 1898-1902) and Hsin Min Ts'ung Pao (New People's Miscellany, 1902-1907).[3] His influence was great. Dr. Hu Shih, who was studying in Shanghai and later became a well-known scholar, regarded the years 1902-1903 as Liang's most effective.[4]

Besides, the revolutionary movement led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen was burgeoning. Many reformers, disappointed with their failure in 1898, swung toward revolution.[5] The Revolutionaries organized associations and published periodicals to advocate the overthrow of the despotic Manchu dynasty. Finally, they founded a united revolutionary

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[3] For a more recent account of Liang's activities in exile, see Hao Chang, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907 (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), Chaps. V and VI.

[4] Hu Shih, Ssu Shih Tzu Shu (Autobiography at the Age of Forty, Shanghai, 1935), p. 93.

[5] Even Liang Ch'i-ch'ao swung toward revolution for a while. See Michael Gasster, Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911 (Seattle, Washington, 1969), Chap. II; and P'eng-yüan Chang, Liang Ch'i ch'ao Yu Ch'ing Chi Ko Ming (Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Late Ch'ing Revolution, Taipei, 1964), Chaps. IV and V.

organization, the T'ung Meng Hui (Revolutionary Alliance), in Tokyo, in August 1905.[6]

A parallel phenomenon to the swelling of the reform and revolutionary trends was a full blossoming of the public press. According to one report, the only paper published in Peking in 1900 was The Peking Gazette containing little more than the decrees and doings of the court. Five years later, there were ten daily papers published in the capital, among them one of the few women's dailies in the world. In 1900, a man seen reading a newspaper was ridiculed as a follower of the foreign devils. Five years later, the general newspapers were read by many more than ever before.[7]

Outside Peking, the growth of the newspapers and periodicals published by both the reformers and the revolutionaries during the same period was significant. Among the reform publications, the most prominent were Ch'ing I Pao and Hsin Min T'sung Pao in Japan, and Wai Chiao Pao (Diplomatic News) and Tung Fang Tsa Chih (The Eastern Miscellany) in Shanghai. Take Hs'in Min T'sung Pao for illustration. It was a fortnightly and ran to ninety-six issues, each issue consisting of criticism on current events,

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6 Li, op. cit., pp. 200-202.

7 Joseph Franklin Griggs. "China Awakened," Century Magazine, LXXII (July, 1906), 392-396. See also Archibald R. Colquhoun, "The Chinese Press of Today." North American Review, CLXXXII (1906), 97-104.

introduction of Western knowledge, dissertations, short stories and poems. Its circulation was increased from 2,000 at the beginning to 10,000 a year later. Though it was published in Yokohama, Japan, it had ninety-seven branches for circulation spreading out to most of the eighteen Chinese provinces and some foreign cities, including Honolulu and San Francisco.[8] Thus, it commanded a wide influence among the Chinese speaking public, both in China and abroad.

The revolutionary press was no less popular. Daily newspapers like Chung Kuo Jih Pao (China Daily) in Hong Kong, and Su Pao (Kiangsu Journal) and Kuo Min Jih Pao (National Daily News) in Shanghai; and miscellanies like Chekiang Ch'ao (Tide of Chekiang), Hupeh Hsüeh Sheng Chieh (Hupeh Students' Circle), Yu Hsüeh I Pien (Overseas Students Translation), and Erh Shih Shih Chi Chih Chih Na (Twentieth Century China), all in Japan, were all influential at the turn of the century. In 1905, after founding of the united revolutionary organization T'ung Meng Hui, a monthly named Min Pao (People's Tribune) was published in Tokyo as its organ. This new journal had on its editorial board many outstanding revolutionaries, such as Wang Ching-wei, Hu Han-min and Chang Ping-lin. After only four issues

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[8] P'eng-yüan Chang, op. cit., pp. 287-299.

came out, it entered into a great debate on China's future with Liang Ch'i ch'ao's Hsin Min T'sung Pao in the Spring of 1906. It's circulation quickly reached 10,000.[9]

These two phenomena, the swelling of reform or even revolutionary trends and the rise of a public press, revealed that the anti-government forces, though most of them were in exile, were as vigorous as the Ch'ing court in the political arena. In view of this, one can not ignore in his dealing with late Ch'ing foreign relations the positions which the reformers and the revolutionaries took.

As reflected in their publications, both the reformers and the revolutionaries were interested not only in domestic issues, but in foreign affairs. And, very strikingly, their discussions of foreign affairs at the turn of the century were usually made against the open door, as well against the sphere of influence. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, the spokesman for the reformers, once described the United States sentimentally as the most benevolent among the powers and regarded American policy in pursuing an open door in China and in preserving China's territorial integrity as the best to save the old empire from partition.[10]

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9 Lin Yu-t'ang, A History of the Press and Public Opinion in China (Chicago, 1936), p. 102; and P.K. Yu, et al. (eds.), The Revolutionary Movement During the Late Ch'ing: A Guide to Chinese Periodicals (Washington, D.C., 1970), pp. ix-xvi.

10 Ch'ing I Pao. No. 55 (Aug. 25, 1900), p. 4.

Nevertheless, this was by no means a predominant opinion. It represented only a shortlived hope during the crisis when the foreign troops occupied Peking as a result of the Boxer rebellion.

The reformers criticized the open door on several accounts. First of all, they could see that the United States was mainly motivated by her own economic interests. In an article on the conflict between the United States and the rebelling Filipinos following the Spanish-American War, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao warned that the United States would use the Philippine Islands as a foothold to promote her economic interests in China. After John Hay dispatched the open door notes, another article appeared in Liang's Ch'ing I Pao stressing the economic motivation behind the American policy. The United States advocated an open door in China because she had no sphere of influence in the old empire, the author of the article explained. She suggested preserving China's integrity because she hated to see chaos unfavorable to American commerce following a break-up of China. In any sense, the open door was a self-interested policy. It contained nothing good for China.[11]

Even so, Liang did hope that the open door policy could save China from a possible partition during the Boxer

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[11] Ch'ing I Pao, no. 32 (Dec. 13, 1899), p. 2; and no. 53 (Aug. 5, 1900), p. 2.

catastrophe. As a partisan of the Emperor Kuang-hsü, he believed that since the Empress Dowager was corrupt and had supported the anti-foreign Boxers, the foreign powers should never compromise with her. Instead, if the powers were sincerely interested in preserving China, they should recognize the Emperor, who had been under detention since the coup d'etat of 1898, and supported his restoration.[12] But, as the peace negotiations following the catastrophe revealed, the powers failed to punish the Empress and did nothing for a restoration of the Emperor. Being so disappointed, Liang found new ground to describe the open door policy as hypocritical. As he put it, the powers had scrambled the spheres of influence and threatened to dismember China. Now, as they defeated the Boxers and occupied Peking, they should have gone ahead to pick the golden apple. Nevertheless, they became interested in preserving China to the contrary and talked no longer about partition. This change of policy on the part of the powers, Liang stressed, displayed no goodwill. In view of the Boxer rebellion, the foreign powers were too afraid of an extention of the anti-foreign feeling of the Chinese people to push for the partition of the old empire. To adopt a policy of preservation instead, these powers believed that they could thus tranquilize the Chinese people and keep what

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[12] Ch'ing I Pao. No. 55, p. 4; and No. 89 (Aug. 24, 1901), p. 1.

they had obtained from China. This was, in Liang's words, a policy of "giving less in exchange for taking more," or a policy of "preservation in name and partition in reality."[13]

In an attempt to prove the validity of his argument, Liang explained further that since the powers agreed to preserve China's territorial and administrative entity, China would be required to open all her territories for foreign economic interests in return. This shows that he misunderstood John Hay's policy. Nonetheless, following his misapprehension, Liang carried on his argument. All the treaty ports, he asserted, had become the foreign settlements and the practice of extraterritoriality had stripped China of her sovereignty over those cities. If China opened all her territories for foreign economic interests, she would definitely sink into foreign colonies. Thus, Liang called the open door policy "Mieh Kuo Hsin Fa," a new way to destroy a country.[14]

In an article on the international economic competition, another reformer under the pen-name of Yu Ch'ien-tsi thought the open door policy not only new, but more harmful to China. He regarded the scramble for the spheres of influence, or a policy of partition, as a political aggression, in which the powers came into conflict with

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., p. 3.

each other. On the other hand, he pointed out, the policy of preserving China's integrity but opening China's door for all foreign commerce was an economic aggression. It was executed cooperatively by the powers.[15] Yu failed to carry his discussion far enough. Apparently, he believed that the cooperative nature of this form of exploitation was more dangerous. He probably also thought that economic aggression was less overt than political aggression. The Chinese people could not easily discover it, and thus they would not resist it until it became too late.

The revolutionaries did not become so involved in the public press until the end of 1902. Nevertheless, they were no less outspoken than the reformers once they launched their criticism of the open door policy. They could see that the open door policy was designed to extend American economic interests in China, especially into the spheres of influence which the other powers had obtained from China. Also, they believed that the powers approved the open door policy in order to hamper the growth of Chinese patriotism which was aroused by the scramble for concessions and was recently revealed in the anti-foreign Boxer rebellion. The aim of the powers remained the same,

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[15] Hsin Min T'sung Pao, No. 14 (Aug. 18, 1902, p. 47.

they argued. Only the means had been changed. Now the powers were carrying on a "civilized" aggression, instead of the old, "barbarous" one. While the scramble for the spheres of influence was a "visible" policy of dismembering China, they continued, now the open door policy was an "invisible" one which would destroy "the 400 million Chinese people."[16]

In pursuit of their goal of overthrowing Manchu rule, the revolutionaries went on to slash the principle of preserving China's territorial and administrative integrity. According to them, the Manchu dynasty did not represent China. Under the existing situation, the practice of the policy to preserve China might be helpful only in consolidating the Manchu rule over the Chinese people. It was not necessarily good for the whole country. On the contrary, China might become another Egypt or India. With the rulers above being the puppets of the foreigners, the people below might be easily subjected to foreign exploitation.[17] Thus, a question like "which China" was raised.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the revolutionaries, presented the question in a more clear way. He divided China into "two Chinas", a China illustrated by the "kuo

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16 Hupeh Hsüeh Sheng Chieh, no. 1 (Feb. 1903), p. 82; and no. 3 (April, 1903), pp. 2-3.

17 Yang Tu, "Yu Hsüeh I Pien Hsü (Preface to Overseas Students Translation)," Yu Hsüeh I Pien, no. 1 (Nov. 1902), pp. 1-19.

shih" (political situation) and a China represented by the "ming ch'ing" (popular sentiment). According to the popular sentiments, he contended, China had become more unified and self-reliant. If the powers attempted to dismember the old empire, the Chinese people would be no less hostile than the Filipinos and the Boers, and they would resist the foreigners much more firmly and forcefully than their Boxers predecessors. On the other hand, he continued, the political situation in China was too bad to be preserved. The Manchu rulers had made concessions to foreign powers. They could not stop doing so, in spite of the policy of preservation, until the whole country fell into dissolution. Therefore, the policy of preservation was by no means more practicable than the one of dismemberment.[18] In a similar presentation, Dr. Sun likened the Manchu dynasty to a collapsing building, which could not be upheld by any effort.[19]

Basically, both the reformers and the revolutionaries began to believe that it was China's own business either to open her door for foreign commerce or to preserve

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18 Sun Yat-sen. "Chih Na Pao Chüan Fen Ko Ho Lun (On the Preservation or Dismemberment of China)," Chiangsu, no. 6 (Sept. 1903), reprinted in Kuomintang Historical Commission (ed.), Kuo Fu Chüan Chi (Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen, Taipei, 1965), vol. VII, pp. 29-33.

19 Sun Yat-sen, "Chih Na Wen T'i Chih Chen Chieh Chüeh, (The True Solution of the Chinese Question), originally published in 1904, reprinted in Kuo Fu Chüan Chi, vol. VII, pp. 37-41.

her territorial and administrative integrity. The followers in the both groups were tired of the arbitrary manner with which the foreign powers decided China's future among themselves with little regard to China's aspirations. Now they told the foreigners that the open door should not be imposed upon China and that China needed no foreign powers to preserve her integrity. As to the responsibility of China herself, they asserted that no Chinese government should rely any longer on foreign help. In the meantime, they warned the Chinese people against feeling happy with the news of preservation while worrying about the possible dismemberment. The only thing which the Chinese people could do, they concluded, was to save their country from being destroyed by themselves.[20] Thus, the reformers and the revolutionaries were advancing a new concept of independent diplomacy in contrast with the traditional method of "employing barbarians to manage barbarians."

The revolutionaries, however, appeared to modify their position after they entered into heated debates on China's future with the reformers. Following the coup d'etat of 1898, the reformers and the revolutionaries came

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[20] Ch'ing I Pao, no. 34 (Jan. 31, 1900), p. 4; no. 53 (Aug. 5, 1900), pp. 1-3; and no. 58 (Aug. 25, 1900), pp. 3-6. Hsin Ming T'sung Pao, no. 2 (Feb. 23, 1902), p. 75. See also Hupeh Hsüeh Sheng Chieh, no. 1 (Feb. 1903), p. 55; and no. 3 (April, 1903), pp. 11-12.

closer to each other for a while. In 1903, nonetheless, these two groups split away once more partly because they had entered into a struggle over their respective influences among the overseas Chinese, and partly because K'ang Yu-wei took a firm position against any idea of revolution and his disciple Liang Ch'i-ch'ao could do little but obey him.[21] Thereafter, the two groups launched a paper war with each other which came to a climax in 1906. In one of their debates the reformers argued that revolution would bring civil war, destruction and chaos, that the foreign powers might intervene, and that such action might lead to the partition of China.[22] This reformer attack sounded justifiable. The revolutionaries had to convince both the Chinese and the foreigners that there would be no ground for such happenings in the event of revolution.

In denying the possible evils of revolution, the revolutionaries leader Dr. Sun Yat-sen stressed once again that the Manchu rulers had ceded territories and made economic concessions to the foreign powers. The final partition of China could not be avoided so long as the Manchu dynasty existed. Therefore, things could never be

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21 Yen-p'ing Hao, "The Abortive Cooperation between Reformers, and Revolutionaries," Papers on China, XV (Dec. 1961), pp. 91-114; and P'eng-yuan Chang, op. cit., pp. 119-136.

22 Wang and Chang, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 693-694; and Hsin Ming T'sung Pao, no. 76 (March, 1906), pp. 27-39.

made worse. On the other hand, Sun continued to convince his compatriots, revolution would topple down the feeble Manchu government and bring for the Chinese people a new and energetic one that would earn foreign respect instead of foreign aggression.[23]

In his attempt to convince the foreigners, Dr. Sun wrote an article on the true resolution of the Chinese question in English while he was taking a trip in the United States in 1904. As he put it, the corruption and backwardness of the Manchus constituted a threat to world peace and the balance of power. For instance, if the Ch'ing government had been able to play a more positive role in world affairs, the Russo-Japanese War would not have occurred. Turning to revolution, Dr. Sun argued that it would be anti-Manchu, not anti-foreign. It would result in the establishment of "a civilized government" which would benefit not only China but the whole world. After revolution, Sun added, the new government would open all of China to foreign trade, railroads would traverse the length and breadth of the country, the production of raw materials would increase steadily, foreign goods would be sold in China in ever-increasing amounts, and China's international trade would be far greater than ever before.[24]

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[23] Sun Yat-sen. "Po Pao Huang Pao (Refuting the Emperor-protection Newspaper)," in Kuomintang Historical Commission, op. cit. Vol. VII, pp. 33-36.

[24] See note 21.

So, while the revolutionaries appeared as hostile as the reformers against the foreign interests in their criticism of the open door policy, Dr. Sun now became less intransigent.

After the T'ung Meng Hui (Revolutionary Alliance) established its organ Min Pao at Tokyo at the end of 1905, many other revolutionaries such as Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min wrote articles for the monthly in supporting Dr. Sun's thesis. These followers of Sun even regarded the open door policy as sufficient to safeguard China from dismemberment according to circumstances. According to them, the powers agreed to the open door policy for two reasons. First, they were aware of the possibility that the policy of partition would spur the Chinese people to anti-foreign movement. Secondly, they considered that the open door policy was helpful in preventing themselves from fighting each other and in maintaining a balance of power in the Far East. Consequently, the revolutionaries believed that so long as a revolution could remain an internal affair, not anti-foreign, and not threatening to the international order, the foreign powers would themselves insist on the open door policy and the partition of China could never happen.[25]

Nevertheless, the revolutionaries reiterated that even if the powers agreed to the open door policy, they

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[25] Hu Han-min. "Min Pao Chih Liu Ta Chu I (The Six Great Principles of the Min Pao), "Min Pao, no. 3 (April,

could still reverse their position because of the mistakes made by the feeble Manchu government. Taking the Russo-Japanese War for instance once again, these revolutionaries pointed out that since the Ch'ing government failed to resist efficiently the Russian demands on Manchuria following the Boxer disaster, the interests of other powers, especially Japan, and the balance of power in the area were thus threatened. Under the circumstances, the powers renewed their scrambling game and Japan finally entered the war with Russia in Manchuria without regard to China's sovereignty over the territory. Therefore, the revolutionaries concluded, the open door policy was still far from being reliable. The foreign powers should not be expected never to change their policy. The Chinese people had to keep their country from dismemberment by themselves. For such a purpose, they should overthrow the weak Ch'ing government and establish instead a new and strong government which would be able to resist the foreign aggression and to decide China's future by itself.[26]

Thus, one after another, the revolutionaries presented in their debates with the reformers the limited value

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1906) pp. 1-22; and Wang Ching-wei, "Po Ke Ming K'e I Chao Kua Fen Shuo (Refuting the View That Revolution May Invite Partition)," Min Pao (July, 1906), pp. 17-39.

[26] Ibid.

to China of the open door policy and the necessity for China to decide her future by independent diplomacy. As a matter of fact, nothing counted as much as self-reliance during an era of national awakening. Here was the basic criterion according to which both the reformers and the revolutionaries formed their opinions on China's foreign relations.

One more question left is what the relationship was between the reformer and revolutionary opinions on the one hand, and the Ch'ing government policy on the other. One historian has pointed out that the Ch'ing government was beginning in the 1900's to give weight to public opinion and Chinese public opinion had developed in response to imperialist diplomacy.[27] It needs to be noted here that, first, the Ch'ing government worried very much about the reformer and revolutionary publications; and, secondly, the reformer and revolutionary opinions on some specific issues regarding to Sino-American relations coincided in some degree with those of officials in power.

The Ch'ing government was alarmed by the reform and revolutionary press. The court issued successive edicts ordering the arrest of reform leaders K'ang Yu-wei

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27 Akira Iriye, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: the Case of Late Ch'ing China," in Albert Feuerwerker, et al. (eds.), Approaches to Modern China History (Berkeley, Calif., 1967), pp. 216-238.

and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. "Such rebellious activities" of K'ang and Liang to publish journals and incite the people with their eloquence, one of such edicts read, "make one's hair stand on end." The court then ordered the provincial governors to enforce the punishment of anyone who bought and read their papers, and to burn all the rebellious books published by them.[28] The revolutionaries could not escape from suppression. When one of their most inflamatory pamphlets, Ke Ming Chün (Revolutionary Army), came out in print in the summer of 1903, the Ch'ing government immediately closed down the sponsor newspaper, Su Pao, and put both the writer of the pamphlet and the editor of the newspaper in jail.[29] This high-handed policy was revealing. Sometimes reformers and not revolutionaries were suppressed, but sometimes their views were absorbed by the government.

On the other hand, the reformers and revolutionaries did not ignore the issues over which the Ch'ing government was in trouble with the United States. For instance, when the American minister in Peking insisted that the opening of new ports in Manchuria should be written into the Sino-American commercial treaty in negotiation, the editor of the reform journal Hsin Ming T'sung Pao at once pointed out that American request was not much different

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[28] Lin, op. cit., p. 98.

[29] Ibid., pp. 102-103.

from the Russian demand for exclusive rights. In essence, both represented a disregard of China's sovereignty over Manchuria. The editor stressed furthermore that the opening, or not opening, of new ports in Manchuria was China's business and the Ch'ing government should make decision by itself. It should not let the Washington government consult with the St. Petersburg government. Neither should the two foreign governments make between themselves any agreement on this matter.[30] Prince Ch'ing did insist in his negotiations with Conger that China would open new ports in Manchuria by herself. He took this position, as had been pointed out, mainly because of his worry about Russia. He may also, now one may conclude, have had in mind the reformers' appeal for self-assertion.

When the Canton-Hankow railway affair came forth, there appeared in the reform and revolutionary press some detailed discussions. Among these the points made by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao were the most conspicuous. The reform leader believed that China needed capitals and technical assistance from foreigners in railroad construction. But the Ch'ing government had conceded too many rights in obtaining American help to build the Canton-Hankow railway. The contract with American China Development Company had to be cancelled. Thereafter, he suggested, in order to

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30 Hsin Ming T'sung Pao, no. 29 (April 2, 1903), p. 71; and no. 33, June 9, 1903), pp. 52-53.

prevent any particular country from monopolizing the construction of an important railway in China, it would be better to obtain the needed capital and technical assistance separately from different countries. Besides, he pointed out that since the American company had sold some of its shares to the Belgian interests and the Belgian interests in their turn had connections with French and Russian interests, the Canton-Hankow concession was no longer a matter involving only foreign investment. It had become a political conspiracy initiated by France and Russia.[31]

To compare Liang's opinion and Chang Chih-tung's position, one finds there was some gap between them. When Chang insisted to cancel the Canton-Hankow railway contract, he was pushed by the provincial interests who wanted to build the railways within their region by themselves. Nonetheless, both Chang and provincial gentries believed that Russia and France were behind the Canton-Hankow railway affair, and that these two powers were attempting to control China through monopolizing China's railroad construction. This argument which they spoke out too often came close to Liang's theory of political conspiracy.

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[31] Hsin Ming T'sung Pao, no. 40 (Aug. 25, 1904); and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "Wai Tsu Shu Ju Wen T'i" (The Problem of the Inflow of Foreign Investment), in Chang Nan and Wang Jen-chih (eds.), Hsin Hai Ke Ming Ch'ien Shih Nien Chien Shih Lun Hsuan Chi (Collected Essays Published during the Ten Years before the Revolution, Hong Kong, 1962), v. I, pp. 813-832.

Then, the reformers and revolutionaries usually criticized the American exclusion policy against the Chinese immigrants and worked very hard to promote the Anti-American boycott movement in 1905. The reform newspaper Hsin Chung Kuo Pao (New China Daily) in Honolulu, as a matter of fact, had first advocated the boycott of American goods as early as 1903. The revolutionary leaders, among them Lin Sun who would become the Chairman of the Kuomintang government in the 1930's, were always active in giving speeches and raising funds when the boycott broke out in Shanghai.[32] Though the reform and revolutionary involvement into the anti-American boycott was conspicuous, some officials in power, like Viceroy Tsen at Canton, never hesitated to express their strong sympathy with the movement.

It is clear that the reform and revolutionary opinions on some specific issues coincided with those of the officials in power. This coincidence was suggestive. The rebellious groups had some influence on the government policy. To take this into consideration, one may conclude that the reform and revolutionary criticism of the open door policy and their appeal for self-reliance and independent diplomacy pointed to a stronger position which the

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[32] Hsin Ming T'sung Pao, no. 38 (Oct. 4, 1903), pp. 141-150; and Chang Tsun-wu, Chung Mei Kong Yueh Fang Chao (Agitation over the Sino American Exclusion Treaty, Taipei, 1965), pp. 104-105.

Ch'ing government would adopt in its dealing with the foreign powers, including the United States.

EPILOGUE

The Chinese had never been able to form a consensus in their attitude toward the United States. At the turn of the century, their response to the U.S. policy of the open door tended to be split. Some Chinese officials, like Li Hung-chang, were inclined to ignore it. Some others, such as Liu K'un-i and Chang Chih-tung, would make use of the policy so long as they thought it helpful in the preservation of China's integrity. For still others, the policy seemed to be incompatible with the American exclusion laws against the Chinese. Besides, many reformers and revolutionaries criticized John Hay's policy as nothing better than the policy of partition.

One thing is sure. The open door policy was never heartily welcome in China. This did not necessarily reflect an extensive anti-American feeling. In view of the fact that the United States had never been so aggressive as the other powers in dealing with China, the Chinese had no ground to assume a more hostile attitude toward Americans, or an American policy. Nevertheless, the Chinese had other considerations. They had to appraise the value of the open door policy in their own terms.

Since China had been bitterly defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and had been victimized in the scramble for concessions thereafter, the most urgent problem for the Chinese at the time was how to save their country from complete destruction. As a result, they sought for changes in both domestic and foreign affairs. In domestic front, their aspiration was reflected in the development of reform and revolutionary movements.

In the field of foreign affairs, the U.S. policy of the open door appeared to provide a way out. China was threatened with partition. Now the open door promised preservation of China's territorial and administrative entity. Furthermore, the United States, unlike the other powers, had indeed not grabbed a single piece of China's territory by force. Therefore, China might rely on American help to save her from break-up. So far as this purpose could be attained, the principle of equal treatment as a part of the open door policy was acceptable.

Nevertheless, the United States had neither the will nor the power to defend China from further encroachments. Those Chinese officials who tended to ignore the open door policy could see this at very beginning. The others who attempted to employ the policy to preserve China were gradually disappointed. Consequently, many Chinese officials turned to be lukewarm, or even intransigent, in their dealing with Americans. This can be traced in their reluctance to accept the American demand for opening new

treaty ports in Manchuria and their insistence of cancelling the Canton-Hankow railway concession.

From another point of view, the open door policy could provide no basic change for China's foreign affairs at all. China had for too long depended on some "barbarians" to manage other "barbarians." To make use of the open door policy and to secure American help, even if successful, was only a superficial change. It was still a diplomacy of reliance on foreigners. China, according to the advocates of a new and independent diplomacy, should no longer rely on the foreign powers in handling her foreign affairs. She could open her door for foreign commerce on the principle of equal opportunity. But this should be done by China according to the circumstances, not upon demand by foreigners. She should preserve her territorial and administrative entity. But this was also her own business, no foreign power could do it instead. Thus, in the name of self-reliance, the U.S. policy open door was criticized.

By 1906, the whole situation in China was changing. If the Chinese had been preoccupied by the possible dismemberment of their country as a result of the scramble for concessions, the Boxer rebellion, and the Russian occupation of Manchuria, now all these crises were over. After the Russo-Japanese War the Manchurian problem was finally settled on the conference table at Portsmouth. Both Russia

and Japan, after delimiting their respective rights and interests in Manchuria, agreed to withdraw their troops and to restore the territory to Chinese sovereignty. Thus released from worries over the territorial integrity of their country, the Chinese began to reassess the ways to open their door for foreign commerce.

The Peking government decided to take action in developing the Manchurian provinces in September 1905. The court stressed in an edict to the effect that it was urgently necessary to "open more ports of international trade, and develop international commerce, in the hope that all those nations with which we have treaties may share in the benefits to be derived."[1] Throughout the year of 1906, many more ports in China were opened for foreign commerce. Among them Antung and Mukden in Manchuria were opened especially to fulfill Article VII of the Sino-American commercial treaty of 1903.

In the course of opening new ports, the Chinese government was also introducing new regulations regarding foreign commerce. The new regulations, however, were restrictive. They revealed that the Chinese were recovering some rights which they had conceded to the foreigners. In some cases they were detrimental to the privileges which Americans had obtained under treaties.

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[1] Imperial edict of September 15, 1905, FRUS, 1905, p. 164.

First of all, there were new regulations for the opening of new ports. Since the British treaty of Nanking and the treaty of Wanghsia with the United States, the Chinese government had allowed foreign merchants the privilege of residing for purposes of trade at treaty ports. There had been no provision for foreign settlements. In opening Soochow and Hangchow in 1896, the Chinese government began to take a new course. Selected locations were thus fixed upon for foreign settlements. The Chinese authorities themselves bought up the land in the settlements and leased it in lots to the foreigners for a period of thirty years, with leases being subject to renewal for additional periods of thirty years for ever. These settlements were put under Chinese police control, and road construction and all other public improvements were undertaken by the Chinese authorities.[2]

When the Chinese government announced the opening of Chinan in Shantung in January 1906, it adopted more restrictive regulations. According to them, foreigners were permitted to reside and trade only in the international settlement. All other places inside or outside the city of Chinan, including those close to the settlement, were under the inland regulations, foreign residence and trade in them were prohibited. All public services in the settlement

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[2] E. T. Williams' memorandum, FRUS, 1906, pp. 290-293.

had to be established by the Chinese. In addition, provisions were made for the establishment in the settlement of a Chinese municipal government and a Chinese police administration. The extraterritorial powers of foreign consuls were recognized. In important cases, however, the police could enter any house in search of criminals, even without a warrant. All land in the settlement was bought by the Chinese government and leased at a fixed annual rental and an annual tax. The lease period was set for thirty years, at renewal the rental could be increased according to circumstances. Besides, the Chinese government reserved the right to take over the property at the expiration of sixty years at a valuation to be determined by arbitrators.[3] It is clear that the Chinese government was trying to strengthen its control over foreigners in the newly opened ports.

Similar regulations were applied to the opening of Antung and Mukden. When the American minister, Rockhill, was informed about them, he thought them absolutely unacceptable. In a reply to Prince Ch'ing, he at once pointed out that the commercial treaty of 1903 required beforehand consultation with the powers concerned on the preparation of regulations. It meant that the Chinese had

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[3] Regulations concerning the leasing land the building of houses at the national settlement of Chinan and police regulations for the port of Chinan, enclosed in Rockhill to Root, Jan. 17, 1906, FRUS, 1906, pp. 163-170.

no right to prepare them unilaterally. As to the contents of the regulations, Rockhill thought there were provisions in open violation of American rights acquired by treaties and the most-favored-nation clause. He referred particularly to (1) the limiting of the period of land lease to thirty years, (2) the question of taxation, (3) the status of the Chinese municipal government, and (4) the adjustment of judicial cases, by which all minor cases of foreigners were to be brought before a Chinese court room established by the bureau of police. He told T'ang Shao-i, Chinese assistant minister of foreign affairs, that these provisions restricted the rights which Americans were enjoying in other treaty ports.[4]

More irksome for the American diplomats in China was the failure of the Chinese government to establish regular customs houses at the newly opened ports in Manchuria. The Chinese government met with trouble in this business. It had to reach some agreements with both Japan and Russia, the two countries still in control of the areas where the newly opened ports located. More complicated, an agreement with Japan on the establishment of customs houses in southern Manchuria depended on what course Russia pursued in the north. On the other hand, Russia wanted to know what was to take place in the south.

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[4] Rockhill to Root, Aug. 15, 1906, cited in Paul A. Varg, The Making of a Myth: The United States and China, 1897-1912 (East Lansing, Mich., 1968), pp. 144-145.

The Chinese were equally concerned about the right to collect the customs dues. They deeply resented the fact that Director of Imperial Maritime Customs Service, Sir Robert Hart, had failed to appoint a single Chinese to any of the higher posts. Now they insisted that customs houses in Manchuria should be "purely Chinese without even a foreign commissioner."[5]

Whatever the reasons behind the Chinese failure to establish customs houses, this failure, from the American point of view, constituted the greatest obstacle to effective equality of commercial opportunity in Manchuria. The situation was clear. With no customs house established at the newly opened ports in Manchuria, Russia and Japan were passing through them their goods from nearby areas under their respective control without paying any import tax. The American businessmen, nonetheless, had to pay treaty tariff as usual since their goods generally went into Manchuria through Newchwang where duties were levied.

To save this situation, the United States government at first asked China to establish customs houses at Antung and a place near to Dalny, where Japanese goods generally entered. It also demanded the establishment of a third customs house on the Russian frontier of Manchuria.

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[5] Sammons to Rockhill, July 12, 1906, and Rockhill to Root, Aug. 15, 1906, cited in Varg, op. cit., pp. 144-145.

Failing to evoke a satisfactory response from the Chinese government, the American minister in Peking then addressed the Wai Wu Pu, requesting that Newchwang be declared a free port until customs houses were established at all localities in Manchuria.[6]

Besides, the Chinese government adopted new mining regulations in November 1905. To prevent the mining rights from falling into the hands of foreigners, Rule VII of the regulations prohibited the people from effecting private sales. It provided that property belonging to the people was only allowed to be sold to "a native of the same district in the presence of the officials and witness," and the transfer was allowed only after satisfactory investigation. If any improper sales happened, the local officials would be held responsible.[7]

Rockhill found the said rule to be in direct conflict with Article VII of the Sino-American commercial treaty of 1903, which permitted Americans to carry on in Chinese territory mining operations and other related business. He pointed out in a protest to the Chinese foreign office that the rule would prevent the investment of American capital in Chinese mining lands. Upon receiving

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6 Rockhill to Root, July 16 and Sept. 3, 1906, FRUS, 1906, pp. 202-203, and 221.

7 Mining Regulations establishing provincial bureaus of inspection, Nov. 27, 1905, FRUS, 1905, pp. 236-238.

a complaint from an American businessman, the Acting Secretary of State Robert Bacon instructed Rockhill to bring the matter to the attention of the Chinese government and request that the mining regulations be amended in accord with the treaty.[8]

The Chinese government made replies to the American complaints. With regard to the regulations for the settlements in the newly opened ports, the Chinese officials asserted that Antung and Mukden were self-opened ports, subjected to no restriction by treaty.[9] This was similar to the argument which the Chinese representatives had presented in their negotiations with the Americans for the commercial treaty of 1903. After consultations with Rockhill, the Chinese government finally agreed that foreigners, while still restricted to residence in the settlements, would be permitted to enter into the cities for purpose of trade.[10]

The later regulations for the settlements remained almost the same as those promulgated in 1906. As the regulations for the international settlement at Wuhu revealed, there were provisions for limiting lease period,

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8 Rockhill to Root and Rockhill to Prince Ch'ing, Dec. 23, 1905, FRUS, 1905, pp. 235-236, 238; Bacon to Rockhill, Dec. 9, 1905, FRUS, 1906, p. 261.

9 Sammons to Rockhill, July 12, 1906, cited in Varg, op. cit., p. 143.

10 Prince Ch'ing to Rockhill, Jan. 30, 1907, FRUS, 1907, pp. 221-222.

for paying tax, for the establishment of Chinese police administration, and for the Chinese to undertake public services. The only conspicuous change, except for the permission allowed foreigners to enter into the city for purpose of trade, was that "all" foreigners of bad character "shall be dealt with by their consul at the request of the taotai." By this, the extraterritorial powers were fully restored to foreign consuls.[11]

As to the question of the customs houses in Manchuria, the Chinese government firmly rejected the American suggestion to make Newchwang a free port on the ground that the Newchwang customs had been pledged to the powers for the Boxer indemnity.[12] The American demand to open customs houses at new ports was accepted. But the Chinese government took a whole year to settle the question. Then, it was able to inform American minister of the opening of the customs houses at Antung and Dalny on July 1, 1907, and the other two at Manchuli and Shuifenho in northern Manchuria on July 8, 1907.[13]

Finally, the Chinese response to the American complaint against the mining regulations was far from being acceptable to the American charge in Peking. At first,

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[11] Regulations for general foreign settlement at Wuhu, FRUS, 1908, pp. 125-126.

[12] Rockhill to Root, Sept. 3, 1906, FRUS, 1906, p. 221.

[13] Prince Ch'ing to Rockhill, June 18 and July 10,

Prince Ch'ing explained that the regulations about which the Americans complained were for temporary and experimental use. Chang Chih-tung had just completed the compilation of the general mining regulations. After they were approved by the court, all mining affairs would be dealt with according to them.[14] In October 1907, the new set of mining regulations was promulgated. The subjects of treaty powers were permitted to cooperate with Chinese in the opening of mines. Nevertheless, there were many qualifications. For instance, missionaries, foreigners who worked for their governments, foreigners whose country had no treaty relations with China, or foreigners whose government did not grant Chinese similar privilege, were not admitted into mining enterprise. Foreigners were not entitled to own mine land in China, and in case of foreign and Chinese cooperation in a mining venture the interest of the foreigner should cease with the mining operations. Probably the worst of all, all foreigners in cooperation with Chinese in mining enterprise must be termed "mining merchants," and they would thus be put under strict control of Chinese law. This meant that they must give up their right under extraterritoriality. These regulations, American charge Henry P. Fletcher pointed out, "are not framed in a liberal spirit and will, if put into operation

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1907, FRUS, 1907, pp. 136, 241.

[14] Prince Ch'ing to Rockhill, April 24, 1906, FRUS, 1906, p. 271.

in their present form, handicap, if not entirely prevent, the employment of foreign capital and foreign participation in the development of Chinese mineral resources." In addition, he thought the provisions of the Sino-American commercial treaty of 1903 "do not seem to have been borne in mind in the preparation of the regulations."[15]

The United States had been seeking for equal opportunity for commerce while the other powers had been extending their special interests in China. Very recently, Secretary of State Elihu Root expressed his interest not only in retaining commercial opportunity, but in seeking for mining opportunity in Manchuria.[16] The newly appointed consul general at Mukden, Willard Straight, was thinking of the introduction of American capital to offset Japanese predominant position in the three northeastern provinces following the Russo-Japanese War.[17] The United States was thus about to expand the open door policy to include equality of opportunity for capitalistic investment.

Now the Chinese attitude toward foreign economic interests was changing around 1906. The change, as has been pointed out, was even detrimental to the treaty

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15 Fletcher to Root, Nov. 29, 1907, and inclosures, FRUS, 1908, pp. 152-173.

16 Root to Wilson, March 30, 1906, FRUS, 1906, p. 177.

17 Charles Vevier, The United States and China, 1906-1913 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1955), pp. 45-53; and Raymond Estnus, "Changing Concepts of the Open Door, 1899-1910," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLVI (1959), 435-454.

privileges which the United States had obtained. This seems to be unfair if one takes account of the fact that the Washington government expounded the preservation of China's territorial and administrative entity when the old empire was threatened with partition. Nonetheless, China had never enthusiastically welcomed the U.S. policy of open door. In addition, the country was awakening after the Russo-Japanese war. The reformers and revolutionaries were condemning the old policy of using "barbarians" to counter "barbarians," and urging self-reliance and independent diplomacy. Under the circumstances, it was not unnatural if the United States found it more difficult to deal with China.

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