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SUBJECTIVITY, OBJECTIVITY, AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

IN KANT'S

CEITIQUE_OF_PUBE_BEASON

by

Jorg Baumgartner

A Dissertation

submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

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Department of Philosophy 1985

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Abstract

SUBJECTIVITY, OBJECTIVITY, AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN KANT'S CBITIQUE_OF_PUBE_BEASON

by

Jorg Baumgartner

Chapter I contains an examination of the criticisms which some philosophers (Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty) have advanced against Kant concerning the problem of our knowledge of other thinking beings. In the course of this examination the nature and scope of Kant's inquiry is brought into focus: it is a transcendental inquiry which deals with the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience. This means two things: (1) The question whether there are other thinking beings besides myself is for Kant not a philosophical (transcendental), but an empirical question which can be answered only a posteriori, that is. by actual experience. (2) The a priori conditions must nevertheless be such that they do not preclude but leave room for the experience by which we find out whether there are other thinking beings besides ourselves. Chapter II develops the central thought of the Transcendental Deduction in order to deal with two complementary issues: with Kant's confusions with respect to the 'subjective', and with the notion of an 'object of representations'. It is argued that objectivity in the

Critical-transcendental sense ranges equally over the 'outer' and 'inner'. This means that inner experience is objective, i.e., can be expressed in judgments which possess objective validity and necessary universality for everybody. Chapter III deals with the Second Analogy. The main purpose here is to show what types of objects are constituted by means of the categories: the determination of a manifold of sensible intuition by means of the category of cause and effect is its determination as a happening or as an event. In chapter IV, finally, it is shown that and how a particular type of empirical objects, namely thinking beings, can be seen as falling under the objects which are constituted by the categories. DEDICATION

to

Inge and Nicholas

"Wem sonst, als Euch?"

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"The objects of transcendental philosophy are not objects of perception." (WW XXI, p. 92)

In Kant's <u>Anthropology</u> there is a section "On Egoism" in which he describes the behavior characteristic of, for example, the logical and the ethical egoist. Towards the end he remarks that egoism has as its opposite pluralism, "that is, the attitude of considering oneself not as if comprising the whole world in one's self, but only as a citizen of the world." This, Kant says, is how the science of anthropology states the difference between egoism and pluralism, and he concludes the section with the observation that they also form a topic in metaphysics--the topic of metaphysical egoism, or solipsism, which discusses the question "whether I, as a thinking being, have reason to assume, besides my own existence, also the existence of a totality of other beings that stand in community with me, i. e., the existence of what is called 'a world'."¹

The reader who with this question in mind turns to the Critique of Pure Reason will soon be convinced that nothing is further from Kant's mind than maintaining metaphysical solipsism, and that the latter is rather one of those philosophical "scandals" he mentions in the Introduction (B XL a; NKS 34).² For although the <u>Critique</u> is, in Bennett's words, "an intensely first-person singular work,"³ a considerable body of text is marked by what Strawson calls its "collective style."⁴ Indeed, the locutions in the first-person plural are numerous: Kant speaks, often emphatically, of "us," "our representations," "our sensibility," "our understanding," or of "our knowledge." And there is no question about the referent of these pronouns: it is the class of human beings.

Thus Kant says, for example, that "we cannot judge in regard to the intuition of other thinking beings, whether they are bound by the same conditions as those which limit our intuition and which for us are universally valid" (A 27 = B 43; NKS 72). These conditions are the conditions of our sensibility, and our sensibility is "peculiar to us, and not necessarily shared in by every being, though, certainly, by every human being" (A 42 = B 60; NKS 82).

According to the question in the <u>Anthropology</u>, however, the plurality of human beings cannot be simply presupposed as something obvious but demands a justification. Yet this does not mean <u>so ipso</u> that the <u>Gritique</u> has to give it. It has to do so only if the question "may reasonably be asked" and is not "absurd in itself and [calls] for an answer where none is required" (A 58 = B 82; NKS 97). But we can expect the question to be a reasonable one if the <u>Gritique</u> shares some basic features with that framework in which the question arises and from which it derives its sense. This framework is plainly

Cartesian: if not in wording, in essence the question is the one raised in the Third Meditation and in part answered. And there it is raised because it is held that a person is a thinking or immaterial substance which, as such, can know immediately or directly, although apodeictically so, only what is '<u>in</u>' it in the sense of being a modification of it. It can have no such indubitable knowledge of what, as matter of principle, cannot be a modification of it and in this sense is something '<u>outer</u>'--namely, all other substances, be they thinking or material.⁵

There is no question that Kant revises both the ontology and the epistemology of the Cartesian framework, and later I will examine both revisions in some detail. At the moment it is sufficient to say that if anything survives the ontological revision, it is the contrast of the internal and external which now recurs in the domain, no longer of substances, but of appearances. These divide into those of inner and outer sense. Yet the latter are 'inner' too: they are representations, and all representations belong, "whether they have as their objects outer things or not.... in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state" (A 34 = B 50; NKS 77). And this view is open, it seems. to the traditional objection that Kant formulates as follows: "I am immediately conscious only of that which is in me. that is, of my representations of outer things; and consequently ... it must still remain uncertain whether outside me there is anything corresponding to it, or not" (B

XLa; NKS 34).

For an answer to this objection, let us look briefly at Kant's epistemolological revision. The latter consists in the tenet that the Cartesian cogito implies. i. e., has as a necessary condition something other than itself. Thus in the Analytic of Concepts and in the Analytic of Principles there are arguments for the claim that for a manifold of representations given in intuition to be such that each of them belongs to one and the same consciousness, it is necessary that they be brought under concepts and so be representations of an object held to be, in some sense of the term. "distinct"⁷ from these representations themselves. And in the Refutation of Idealism Kant argues that the determination of my existence in time, that is, inner experience, is possible only on the assumption of outer experience: it requires, in other words, that some of my representations be representations of "actual things...outside me" (B 276; NKS 245).

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It appears that both these claims, if they can be substantiated, provide Kant with an answer to the question raised in the <u>Anthropology</u>. Thus he can say: I have reason to assume besides my own existence the existence of something else, because "the mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me" (B 275; NKS 245), or because the fact that I can be conscious of myself as the same subject of a diversity of representations shows that they are representations of objects. But Kant does not say, and hence answers the original question perhaps only partially, "whether I, as a thinking being, have reason to assume" that among the objects of my representations there are objects of a special type--thinking beings other than myself.

Kant's silence has not gone completely unnoticed in the literature, and in the following sections I will examine what some philosophers have to say about it. This will give me also the opportunity to bring to the fore a number of problems and themes that will occupy the center of my investigation.

(2)

In Husserl's interpretation, Kant's Copernican turn, his turn to 'transcendental subjectivity', consists in the insight that it is necessary to break with the traditional epistemological procedure that reconstructs experience by presupposing the following as given: that there exists, as a matter of course, a world, and that the cognitive subject, for example myself, occurs in it as a psychophysical thing among other things.⁸ This break is required, Husserl maintains, because what is given is neither the world nor myself simpliciter, but only the consciousness of 'the world' and of 'myself'.⁹ In other words: that there exists a world and that I find myself in it is an experience itself and hence cannot be presupposed in order to explain that

experience.

This experience belongs, according to Husserl, to a subject that on principle cannot occur in experience, but in terms of whose 'subjectivity', i. e., cognitive functions, experience, and there being a world in experience, is to be rendered intelligible. Hence when Kant expresses the subjective nature of space and of time by saying that they are "in us" and would vanish "if the subject ... be removed" (A 42 = B 59; NKS 82), he points to what in Husserl's view is "an irrefutable state of affairs."¹⁰ But this involves for Kant the problem of exploring how it is possible for a "cognitive...subjectivity" to arrive not only at a belief in, but "at a justified conviction about a real world which it can know."¹¹ And Kant. as Husserl points out. sees that in order to be known, a world has not only to be real, but also objective, and that it is objective if and only if it can be known by any subject. In other words: it is not sufficient that everybody be in a position to say: "I know a world in my experience as my world, ... and others know a world as their world."¹² What Kant, rather, sets himself as a task in the Critique is to discover the transcendental conditions of the possibility of a "single, individually and intersubjectively determinable world."13

According to Husserl, Kant's reconstruction of a "true objectivity within the transcendental subjectivity, "¹⁴ however admirable, has serious shortcomings nevertheless. Husserl bases his criticism on the claim that "in a

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transcendental philosophy everything without exception must be transcendental."¹⁵ Kant's failure to adhere to this norm is why his reconstruction is both incomplete and flawed by methodological mistakes. He commits such mistakes, for example, when he designs epistemological theories on the basis of empirical, psychological doctrines of association or of reproduction, whose legitimacy cannot be taken for granted in a transcendental inquiry but must first be established. And one respect in which the reconstruction is said to be incomplete concerns Kant's repeated and unjustified reference to "us human beings." Husserl argues that Kant fails to consider that in an inquiry like his own a plurality of subjects is given only in the form of human beings, and that therefore the "translation of their bodies, as the translation of all outer nature. into transcendental appearances"¹⁶ yields at first his own ego only, and that the transcendental possibility of positing other egos has still to be explored.

Husserl's criticism seems to come to this: The plurality of subjects to which Kant refers when mentioning 'us' or 'us human beings' is merely presupposed; it is not constituted in that "<u>single</u>, individually and intersubjectively determinable world" of which the <u>Critique</u> tries to establish the condition of the possibility. I will come back to this claim later, and at this point remark only that it is misleading. For we are left with the impression that Kant is completely unaware of the problem concerning

the 'translation' of human beings into appearances. That this is not so becomes clear once we realize that in a transcendental philosophy the plurality in question is not a plurality of other human beings only, but a plurality that also and equally includes myself. That the constitution of myself as appearance is at least attempted by Kant is shown by his all-important distinction between the transcendental unity of apperception and the empirical self, i. e., the self that is experienced.¹⁷ And it is my empirical self, according to Kant, that occurs, or is supposed to occur, in that intersubjective world we are talking about.

(3)

Whereas in Husserl's view Kant does not see and hence does not investigate the problem of the transcendental possibility of a plurality of subjects, we may, Sartre suggests, at first judge the situation differently and take Kant to be of the opinion that there is no such problem to be dealt with: the problem of Others does not fall in the domain of his inquiry, which is <u>a priori</u> and deals with "the universal laws of subjectivity," i. e., with laws "which are the same for all,"¹⁸ and with the conditions of the possibility "only for an object in general."¹⁹

Such a view, however, would be misleading. For in his transcendental inquiry Kant is engaged, according to Sartre, to determine not only the conditions of an object in general, but also of various types of objects--of the

physical object for example, or of the beautiful. Hence "if it is true," Sartre argues, "that the Other represents a particular type of object which is discovered to our experience, then it is necessary even within the perspective of a rigorous Kantianism to ask how the knowledge of others is possible."²⁰ And the other <u>is</u> a particular type of object: he is, to be sure, an object in my experience, but an object which, unlike all other objects, is also a subject of experience.

Sartre wants to argue for the conclusion that within the Kantian framework such an investigation comes to nothing: the concept of the Other, he maintains, is "neither...a constitutive concept nor...a regulative concept of my knowledge."²¹ For the issues to be raised, it is sufficient to examine Sartre's argument for the first claim only, which he also puts this way: The concept of the <u>Other</u> can not constitute our experience."²²

First let me point out here that in view of his actual argument Sartre's choice of the term 'constitutive' is misleading. For we cannot take him to use it in Kant's sense according to which the forms of intuition or the categories can be said to be constitutive in so far as they are <u>a priori</u> conditions of objects of experience. Nor can we take Sartre to employ the term in the sense in which he himself considers not the <u>concept</u> of the Other but the "<u>Other's look</u>"²³ to be constitutive, i. e., to be "the necessary condition of my objectivity."²⁴ In experiencing

myself as looked at, I experience myself as an object, which in turn is a requirement if I am to be able, upon reflection, "to conceive of...my properties in the objective mode"²⁵--to conceive of them, that is, as they present themselves to the point of view of the Other. What Sartre's argument amounts to, is simply the claim that if we presuppose Kant's account of experience, and if within this account we mean by 'the Other' not only an object but also a subject of experience, then the concept of the Other cannot be exemplified in our experience.

Now in a number of passages in Being and Nothingness Sartre critically discusses Kant's doctrine of freedom. in particular the notion of a "non-temporal spontaneity"26 and the notion of a choice on the part of the "intelligible character."²⁷ It is in the light of these passages that we have to see the preliminary step of Sartre's argument. which, however unhappily formulated, is a correct and important one: the problem of the Other does not concern his "noumenal" or "intelligible existence."²⁸ because such an existence can, not only in the Other's, but in my own case as well, "only be thought, not conceived."29 In correct Critical language Sartre should have said 'not known'. According to Kant we can think things in themselves, but we cannot know them. We have "no knowledge of any object as thing in itself, but only in so far as it is an object of sensible intuition, that is, an appearance" (B XXVI: NKS 27). The problem, then, of our knowledge of

the Other can concern the Other only as an appearance.

In my view Sartre's argument depends for its crucial steps on his interpretation of Kant's distinction between outer and inner experience. And it is in particular Kant's conception of inner experience that, Sartre says, is the reason why the knowledge of the Other becomes a problem that cannot be solved.

First, according to Sartre, inner experience consists in the knowledge of the appearances of my inner sense: "of my emotions or of my empirical thoughts."³⁰ To raise the question of the Other, then, is to ask whether within the Kantian framework I am justified in asribing to the other what I can know in my own case by means of inner experience. In Sartre's words: "What I aim at in the Other is nothing more than what I find in myself."³¹

Second, in outer experience I obtain knowledge of the Other "by the presence of organized forms such as gestures and expression, acts and conducts."³² But although I ordinarily take these to refer, for example, to the anger the Other feels towards me, in the Kantian framework I am prevented from doing so. For in it we are led to a gap between the Other's anger-behavior and his anger itself: while the former is public, the latter is private. For to talk in the Critical sense about the Other's anger is to talk about an appearance or series of appearances of "his inner sense...[that] is by nature refused to by apperception:"³³ they are "on principle

outside my experience and belong to a system which is inaccessible to me" 34 --to a system that, in short, "is not mine."

We might attempt now, Sartre suggests, to bridge the gap between the Other's anger and his anger-behavior by connecting them as cause and effect: to consider "the redness of Faul's face as the effect of his anger."³⁶ But the anger the Other feels and the anger-behavior I observe belong to two <u>different</u> experiences, and Kantian causality "only...links the phenomena of <u>one and the same</u> experience."³⁷ Causality for Kant, Sartre maintains, "is a unification of the moments of <u>my</u> time in the form if irreversibility,"³⁸ and there is no way for this causality to "unify my time with that of the Other."³⁹

If by the Other, therefore, we mean not only an object of experience, but an object of a particular kind--i. e., an object that is also a subject with experiences of its own--then the Other cannot be known in a Kantian framework. His experiences are out of my reach: they are "located outside of all experience which is possible to me."⁴⁰ Hence, "the subjective quality of the Other-as-object" turns out to be in Kant's philosophy a "closed box."⁴¹

In assessing this argument I am struck by the discrepancy between what Sartre promises to do and what he actually does. The promise is "to establish the conditions of the possibility of the experience of Others,"⁴² But to claim this, and to claim it "within the perspectives of a

rigorous Kantianism, "⁴³ is to claim that one is engaged in a transcendental inquiry. And such an inquiry is, in Kant's words, "occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible <u>a priori</u> (A 11 = B 25; NKS 59). The scope of a transcendental inquiry is thus defined not by any conditions, but by the <u>a priori</u> conditions of experience and objects of experience. It is within this scope, therefore, that the problem of our knowledge of the Other has to be dealt with.

We would, then, expect Sartre to tell us something about <u>a priori</u> conditions: about space, time, and the categories, and their function with respect to the constitution, for example, of "what I find in myself,"⁴⁴ of "the Other's anger in so far as it appears to his inner sense, "⁴⁵ i. e., of particular instances of inner experience. The latter according to Kant, cannot be simply taken for granted, but "has to be reckoned with the investigation of the possibility of any and every experience, which is certainly a transcendental enquiry" (A 343 = B 401; NKS 330).

But Sartre, instead of placing his argument on the transcendental-<u>a priori</u> level, places it plainly on the empirical-<u>a posteriori</u> level: for to talk about the Other's emotions and about his behavior means, for Kant, to talk empirically about empirical objects. And once we realize this, we realize also that the transcendental terminology

throughout his argument-- "apperception, " "synthesis," "synthetic unity"--is only ornamental. Without it, there is nothing specifically Kantian about the position under attack, and no reason why the argument could not be mounted against, for example, Locke or Hume. Against Kant, however it idles. And it does so, in my view, because Sartre completely ignores or fails to understand the "Critical problem."

In what follows, I will outline this problem and its solution so far as is necessary for my present purposes. In the Transcendental Deduction Kant introduces the problem with the question: what must we mean "by the expression 'an object of representations'" (A 104; NKS 134)? It is the problem, in other words, of how it is possible for our representations, which qua representations are "inner determinations of our mind, " to acquire, in addition to their "subjective reality" and "subjective meaning, " what Kant calls "relation to an object." "objective reality. " and "objective meaning" (A 197 = B 242; NKS 224). It is now of crucial importance to see that the expression 'relation to an object' does not mean 'relation to an external object': it concerns, rather, the objectivity of our representations. whether they are representations of inner or of outer intuition. And the solution of the problem of their objectivity is in both cases the same in principle: the representations must be united in the pure concepts of the understanding or categories. But the 'objects' thus

constituted are not particular empirical objects--such as a chair, for example, or Paul's anger--but objectivities, i. e., precisely those 'objects in general' that Sartre dismisses right at the outset of his discussion of the Critical philosophy. The problem, then, to which Sartre should have addressed himself and which he completely ignores, is a transcendental one and concerns the necessity of the categories and of the objects constituted by the categories, e. g. "a happening in general" (A 788 = B 816; NKS 624) or something permanent in general, for our knowledge of particular empirical objects which include 'my anger' and 'the Other's anger' as well.

(4)

In Husserl's opinion, as we have seen, Kant does not realize that even if he should have succeeded in establishing the transcendental conditions of a "<u>single</u>, individually and intersubjectively determinable world, "⁴⁶ he ist still faced with the problem "of the transcendental possibility of positing other egos."⁴⁷ Sartre, on the other hand, goes further: he believes to have shown that Kant cannot solve this problem. We turn now to Merleau-Ponty, who holds that the problem does not arise for Kant, but this only because Kant has an inadequate conception of philosophical reflection.

According to Merleau-Ponty, the very starting-point of the Critical philosophy is already "the spectacle of the

world, which is that of a nature open to a plurality of thinking subjects." 48 The task, then, which the Critical philosophy sets for itself is merely to discover "the conditions which make possible this unique world presented to a number of empirical selves."49 These conditions are found in a "transcendental ego" 50 or "universal constituting consciouness."⁵¹ And since the Kantian analysis "is located from the start outside me," that is, "has nothing to do but to determine the general conditions which make possible a world for an ego--myself or others equally -- ," the transcendental ego is "just as much other people's as mine."⁵² This, Merleau-Ponty maintains, is the reason why "the problem of the knowledge of other people is never posed in Kantian philosophy."⁵³ But if, on the other hand, philosophical reflection were "not carried outside itself."54 if. in other words. Kant had realized that "the thinking ego can never abolish its inherence in an individual subject, "55 he would have been able to achieve a more radical self-discovery and other people would have become a problem for him.

In my discussion of Merleau-Ponty I will take issue with his view of the method of argument which the Critical philosophy employs. It is an argument which consists in a <u>regress</u> on a <u>de facto</u> intersubjective world to the transcendental ego as the condition which renders such a world possible. The method, in other words, is the <u>analytic</u> one, which in "the preparatory exercises" of the <u>Prolegomena</u>

Kant says he used, as opposed to the $\underline{synthetic}$ method of the $\underline{Critique}$, 56

What I want to point out now is the asymmetry wich obtains between the regressive or analytic method which Merleau-Ponty ascribes to the "Critical philosophy," and the synthetic, i. e., deductive, and hence rigorous and scientific method of the <u>Critique</u>. For the argument of the <u>Critique</u> should have as its conclusion a world which is <u>de</u> <u>facto</u> intersubjective, i. e., the existence of a plurality of thinking beings or empirical selves. This conclusion, however, the argument does not have. The basic claim of the argument is only that its premise, namely the unity of consciousness, requires that it be consciousness of "objects in general," not however, of particular empirical objects, such as tables or human beings.

This becomes clear once we reflect upon the nature of Kant's inquiry. Its purpose is, at the most general level, to establish what Kant calls "<u>transcendental</u> knowledge" (A11 = B25; NKS 59): by it "we know that--and how--certain representations (intuitions or concepts)," although they are "not of empirical origin...can yet relate <u>a priori</u> to objects of experience" (A 56 = B 80f. NKS 96). And we can know this, Kant claims, because the arguments of the Transcendental Analytic show that only through these representations "is it possible to <u>know</u> anything <u>as an</u> <u>object</u>" (A 92 = B 125; NKS 126). In other words: a transcendental inquiry in Kant's sense concerns the a priori

conditions which are necessary if there is to be empirical knowledge. But these <u>a priori</u> conditions are all <u>formal</u> conditions, and it is precisely their formal character which sets a limit to what in a transcendental inquiry can be known.

Kant claims that the forms of sensibility. space and time, and the forms of the understanding, its pure concepts or the categories, make experience and objects of experience as regards their form possible (cf. A 128: NKS 149). But when he uses the term "form," Kant does not mean, as he points out in De Mundi Sensibilis. "the outline or some kind of shape of the object, "57 but, as he says in the Logic, "the manner in which we \underline{know} the object." $^{5\,8}$ In the terminology of the Critique we can say that these forms are the respective ways in which a sensible manifold of representations is intuited, thought, i. e., united in one consciousness, and thus known. This is the reason why in the Summary of the Transcendental Deduction Kant can say that "the complete unity" of such a manifold "in one and the same apperception ... constitutes the form of all knowledge of objects" (A 129; NKS 149; emph. added).

The sensible manifold itself, however, is outside the scope of Kant's transcendental inquiry: it denotes not the formal, but the <u>material</u> element of experience and is <u>a</u> <u>posteriori</u>. "In the field of appearance," Kant says, "in terms of which all objects are <u>fiven</u> us, there are two elements, the form of intuition (space and time), which can

be known and determined completely a priori, and the matter or content" (A 723 = B 751; NKS 583; emph. added). And this material element, which accounts for the content of our actual experience, can be given only empirically: "The matter of appearances, by which things are given us in space and time, can only be represented in perception, and therefore a_posteriori" (A 720 = B 748; NKS 581). What a transcendental inquiry, then, can be only concerned with, are the a priori conditions which a sensible manifold must fulfill if it is to be united in one consciousness and so constitute an object of knowledge: "In respect to this material element we have nothing a priori except indeterminate concepts of the synthesis of possible sensation. in so far as they belong, in a possible experience, to the unity of apperception" (A 723 = B 751; NKS 583).

We can express Kant's position differently as follows. We can know a_prigri that if a manifold of representations is to belong to one and the same consciousness, then it must be united by means of, for example, the pure concept of substance and accident. But we cannot know a_prigri what particular kinds of empirical objects will instantiate this concept: this we find out a pgsterigri, by means of experience. And the question as to what we empirically do find out is a question which is outside the scope of Kant's transcendental inquiry. "The objects of trancendental philosophy are not objects of

perception."⁵⁹ This, now, is the reason why, in Merleau-Ponty's words, "the problem of the knowledge of other people is never posed in Kantian philosophy."⁶⁰ The reason is not, as Merleau-Ponty claims, that the analysis "is from the start located outside me."⁶¹ This claim, too, has become untenable: the analysis concerns the unity of consciousness which is the premise of the Transcendental Deduction (cf. B 131f. NKS 152f.). And the consciousness whose unity we investigate is, of course, in each case "mine."

(5)

Kant claims that the unity of consciousness implies experience of objects, i. e., the unification or synthesis of a given manifold of sensible intuition by means of the categories. But Kant does not say that the unity of consciousness requires experience of objects <u>and</u> experience of objects of a special type, namely subjects of experience other than myself.

His position, thus, is at variance with the views, for example, of Husserl and Strawson. In his <u>Cartesian</u> <u>Meditations</u> Husserl wants to defeat the objection that his version of transcendental philosophy results in a transcendental solipsism by arguing that the experience of an objective world cannot be constituted by me alone, because objectivity, as actuality for everybody, already contains the sense 'other subjects'. "The sense of the

being of the world, and in particular of objective nature, obviously includes being-there-for-everybody, and this is always co-intended wherever we speak of objective actuality. "⁶² And among the results of his account of the experience of someone else, Husserl mentions the following: "Ky ego, which is apodeictically given to me...can <u>a priori</u> be a world-experiencing ego only by being in communion with others like himself: by being a member of...a community of monads."⁶³

And Strawson, in connection with the issue of a non-solipsistic consciousness, claims in <u>Individuals</u> that the idea of oneself as subject of experience requires not only experience of something other than oneself, i. e., of an objective domain, but also that one actually shares it with other such subjects. For according to Strawson "it is a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of consciousness, experiences to oneself, in the way one does, that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself."⁶⁴

It appears to me that Kant can answer Husserl and Strawson as follows. The <u>problem</u> of the unity of consciousness concerns the possibility as to how a manifold of representations "<u>can</u> stand together" (B 132; NKS 153) in one consciousness, or conversely how "it is possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations" (B 131; NKS 132). And the <u>solution</u> of the problem consists in what is necessary for this possibility to obtain: in what the unity

of consciousness, in other words, implies. Clearly, the inclusion, among my representations, of representations of other subjects of experience, cannot solve the problem but leaves it where it is. The solution, Kant maintains, is the synthesis of the representations by means of the categories, and it is these which are <u>a priori</u> necessary for the unity of consciousness. And if it is claimed that among the categories would have to be, let us say, the pure concept of a person, 65 then every object of experience would have to fall under this conept.

Whether or not there are other subjects besides myself is for Kant then a question of contingent fact which can be answered only <u>a posteriori</u>, that is, by experience. And this in my view also means that for Kant the question concerning the relation of those of our empirical judgments in which we ascribe states of consciousness to ourselves, and the judgments in which we ascribe states of consciousness to others, can be only an empirical, not a philosophical question.

(6)

In my view, then, our 'knowledge of other minds' is for Kant not a philosophical problem, i. e., a problem to which a transcendental-<u>a priori</u> inquiry would have to provide the solution. In my opinion, Kant more so than any philosopher before him, is interested in the question as to what we can mean by the expression "a mind." We can read
the chapter on the Paralogisms as telling us what we must not mean by this expression, and the arguments of the Transcendental Analytic as an investigation into the necessary condition of "a mind" or, in Kant's words, of "a consciousness in general."⁶⁶ "Other minds," however, are for Kant just particular items in the class of empirical objects. And as there is, for instance, no special philosophical problem called "our knowledge of tables." so there is, correspondingly, for Kant no special philosophical problem about other minds. To be sure, Kant himself points out that "thinking beings, as such, can never be found by us among outer appearances, and that their thoughts, consciousness, desires, etc., cannot be outwardly intuited" (A 337; NKS 33f.). But we cannot, in the ordinary sense of the term, see electrons, for example, either: and this does not make the question whether or not there are electrons a philosophical question.

But here we must enter a caveat. We have to take Kant's claim that the unity of consciousness implies experience of objects as a formal-transcenental, not as a material-empirical claim. Nore explicitly, his thesis is that the unity of a manifold of sensible representations in "one and the same apperception" (A 129; NKS 149) is a synthetic unity which has as its necessary condition that these representations be united in "concepts of an object in general," that is, in the categories (B 128; NKS 128). And so united they obtain, in addition to their being mere

"modifications of our sensibility" (A 491 = B 519; NKS 439), relation to an object. Thus Kant can say that "it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, and therefore their objective validity and the fact that they are modes of knowledge" (B 137; NKS 156). It is for this reason that Kant calls the synthetic unity of consciousness "the form of all knowledge of objects" (A 129; NKS 149) which must "precede all experience" and which is "required for the very possibility in its formal aspect" (A 130; NKS 150). Kant wants to say, in other words, that there are certain invariant or formal elements which are necessarily involved in every instance of empirical knowledge, and that these elements can be known a priori, i. e., constitute the topic of a transcendental inquiry. Yet such an inquiry can say nothing about the actual empirical content of our knowledge. This content is due to the material element in experience. that is, to sensation. Of the latter Kant says that it is "the matter of perception," that it "can never be known a priori", and that it "therefore constitutes the distinctive difference between empirical and a priori knowledge" (A 167 = B 209; NKS 209).

But although it is a contingent matter of fact, i. e., to be found out "only...<u>a posteriori</u>, by means of experience" (A 721 = B 749; NKS 581) what particular kinds of empirical objects there are, their experience is itself "possible only in conformity" (A t21 + B 749; NKS 581) or in

"accordance with" (A 723 = B 751; NKS 583) the formal conditions of an experience in general. And this means for our problem that these conditions: the forms of intuition, space and time, the categories and the unity of apperception, must be such that, although they do not require, they nevertheless do not preclude, but leave room for that experience by which we find out whether there are other thinking beings besides ourselves. For if these transcendental conditions would not allow for such an experience, Kant would be in an awkward position: the g priori nature of his inquiry allows him, on the one hand, to dismiss the problem at hand as an empirical problem, whereas on the other hand, according to the very same inquiry, there can be no empirical solution of it.

And clearly, the transcendental conditions of an experience in general do rule out certain things as empirically impossible. On a priori grounds there can be no experience of, for example, miracles, if by a miracle we mean "an event the cause of which cannot be found in nature."⁶⁷ Nor can there be experience of the "power of spontaneously beginning a series of successive things or states" (A 448 = B 476; NKS 412), that is, of freedom. "The concept of freedom." Kant says, "is a pure concept of reason...for which there is no corresponding example in any possible experience, which therefore forms no object of any theoretical knowledge possible to us."⁶⁸ And let us mention finally that on a priori grounds there can be no

experience of our noumenal selves or of ourselves as psrsons, i. e., of "moral personality" which "is nothing but the freedom of a rational being under moral laws."⁶⁹ Hence it is only the experience of the "psychological self as empirical consciousness,"⁷⁰ that is, of the empirical self, for which Kant's transcendental inquiry must be shown to leave room.

In Chapter II, I will examine some of the arguments of the Transcendental Deduction in order to show that what Kant calls 'inner experience' is empirical knowledge in the strict sense of the term, i. e., consists in judgments which possess what for Kant are equivalent terms, namely objective validity and necessary universality (for everybody). In Chapter III, I will discuss the Second Analogy, that is, the Transcendental Deduction of the category of cause and effect: my aim is to show what kipgs of objects are constituted by the categories. And in Chapter IV, I will show that thinking beings other than ourselves can be known as objects of experience.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

¹Immanuel Kant, <u>Werke in sechs Baenden</u>, VI, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1966, p. 411. Hereafter quoted as <u>Werke</u>.

²Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trsl. Norman Kemp Smith, London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1956.

³Jonathan Bennett, <u>Kant's Dialectic</u>, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 69.

⁴ P. F. Strawson, <u>The Bounds of Sense</u>, London: Nethuen & Co. Ltd., 1966, p. 197. Hereafter quoted as <u>The</u> <u>Bounds of Sense</u>.

⁵Cf. <u>The Philosophical Works of Descartes</u>, I and II, trs. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969, pp. 157-61; p. 240. Hereafter quoted as Haldane.

⁶Cf. Jonathan Bennett, <u>Kant's Analytic</u>, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966, pp. 130-31; P. F. Strawson, <u>loc. cit.</u>, pp. 97-112.

⁷Cf. A 104, NKS 134; A 129, NKS 149; A 191 = B 236, NKS 220.

⁸Cf. Edmund Husserl, "Erste Philosophie," <u>Husserljana</u>, VII, Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956, p. 225. Hereafter guoted as Ha VII. My translation.

> ⁹Cf. Ha VII, pp. 277, 378. ¹⁰Ha VII, p. 226. ¹¹Ha VII, p. 225. ¹²Ha VII, p. 222. ¹³Ha VII, p. 222. ¹⁴Ha VII, p. 227. ¹⁵Ha VII, p. 373. ¹⁶Ha VII, pp. 369 f. ¹⁷Cf. B 157. NKS 168-9; B 406-7, NKS 368-9.

18 Jean-Paul Sartre, <u>Being and Nothingness</u>, trs. Hazel E. Barnes, New York: Philsophical Library, 1956, p. 225. Hereafter cited as Sartre. ¹⁹Sartre, p. 225. ²⁰Sartre, p. 225. ²¹Sartre, pp. 228-9. ²²Sartre, p. 227. ²³Sartre, p. 269. ²⁴Sartre, p. 269. ²⁵Sartre, p. 270. 26_{Sartre}, p. 148. ²⁷Sartre, p. 480. ²⁸Sartre, p. 225. ²⁹Sartre, p. 225. ³⁰Sartre, p. 225. ³¹Sartre, p. 226. ³²Sartre, p. 226. ³³Sartre, p. 226. ³⁴Sartre, p. 226. ³⁵Sartre, p. 227. ³⁶Sartre, p. 226. 37_{Sartre}, p. 226. ³⁸Sartre, p. 226. ³⁹Sartre, p. 226. ⁴⁰Sartre, p. 227-8. ⁴¹Sartre, p. 314. ⁴²Sartre, p. 225. ⁴³Sartre, p. 225.



⁴⁴Sartre, p. 226.
⁴⁵Sartre, p. 226.
⁴⁶Ha VII, p. 222.
⁴⁷Ha VII, p. 369.

⁴⁸M. Merleau-Ponty, <u>Phenomenology of Perception</u>, trsl. Colin Smith, New York: The Humanities Press, 1970, p. 62. Hereafter quoted as Nerleau-Ponty.

> ${}^{4.9}$ Merleau-Ponty, p. 62. 50 Merleau-Ponty, p. 62. 51 Merleau-Ponty, p. 62. 52 Merleau-Ponty, p. 62. 54 Merleau-Ponty, p. 62. 54 Merleau-Ponty, p. 61.

 $^{56}{\rm Immanuel}$ Kant, <u>Prolegomena to Any Future</u> <u>Metaphysics</u>, ed. Lewis White Beck, Indianapolis-New York: The Bobbs-Nerrill Co., Inc., 1950, pp. 21-2. Hereafter quoted as <u>Prol</u>. Nevertheless some interpreters have been of the opinion that the 'transcendental method' is analytic-regressive. This view springs from the belief that through Kant's interpolation of certain passages from the <u>Prolegomena</u> into the Introduction to the second edition of the <u>Critique</u> (B 14-24), the latter shifted towards the <u>Prolegomena</u> in the sense that its argument, unlike that of the first edition, has now to be understood as an analytic-regressive argument (cf. Vaihinger, <u>Commentar</u>, I, 414-15).

In Kant's own description the analytic-regressive method starts from a "fact" (<u>Prol.</u> 23) and then moves by an analytic exposition backwards to its conditions or grounds, which are held to explain how the given fact is possible. We begin with "something already known as trustworthy... and ascend to sources as yet unknown, the discovery of which will... explain to us what we knew" (<u>Prol.</u> 22). Thus the regressive argument of the <u>Prolegomena</u> proceeds from the fact that there actually are valid synthetic judgments <u>a</u> <u>priori</u> in pure mathematics, for example, and ascends to their conditions, namely that space and time are <u>a priori</u> forms of intuition (p. 31 #11-12). And these conditions are said to explain how this "uncontested synthetic jud knowledge a priori" is possible (Prol. 22).

Now in #117 of his Logik Kant says that the analytic-regressive method is more suited for popular than for scientific and systematic purposes. And this clearly because a regressive argument is inconclusive in a twofold sense: neither does the fact, on which the argument rests, guarantee the truth of the conditions to which it moves, nor do reversely these conditions, by themselves, constitute a proof of that fact (cf. Wolff, Kant's Theory, p. 46). The "Factum," therefore, "on which the Prolegomena are based, is not completely indubitable, but vigorously doubted by the sceptics" (Vaihinger, I, 413). But it is precisely scepticism that the Critical philosophy is supposed to defeat: "Criticism alone," Kant says, "can sever the root of... scepticism" (B XXXIV; NKS 32) and, "in the end, necessarily leads to scientific knowledge, in contrast to "unfounded assertions" (B 23: NKS 57).

So let us now turn to Kant's other, the synthetic-progressive method, which according to the Logik is scientific. This method is the method of deduction that "goes from the principles to the consequences" (Logik, #117): it is rigorous insofar as the truth of the premisses guarantees the truth of the conclusion. This method, in contrast to the analytic-regressive, "seeks, without resting on any fact. to unfold knowledge from its original germs (Prol., p. 22). In the synthetic procedure, Kant says, we do not start from facts: on the contrary, these "must strictly be derived in abstracto from concepts" (Prol. p. 26). Kant gives us a hint how both methods are related: "The Prolegomena... are intended to point out what we have to do in order to make a science actual, if it is possible" (Prol., p. 22). That is to say: whereas the Prolegomena move from the fact of the validity of synthetic judgments a priori in pure mathematics and pure science by an analytic regress to the conditions that explain how that validity is possible, it is the synthetic-progressive method of the Critique that at first proves these conditions and so proves the validity of these judgments to be actual. Vaihinger puts it this way: "In the Prolegomena Kant takes as a basis the validity of mathematics and pure science as incontestable, indubitable factum: Kant analyzes this fact in order to discover ... its conditions. These conditions are the grounds of explanation (principia assendi) of that in itself incomprehensible factum... Differently, and even in the opposite way, the Critique: it establishes first that there are such conditions ... which it finds quite independently, i. e., without taking that factum in its argumentation into consideration. Then it shows that the factum can not only be completely and uniquely explained in terms of these conditions, but that it is moreover necessarily contained in them and follows from them. In other words: those conditions are here both, grounds of explanation (principia essendi = explicatio) and grounds of

<u>proof</u> (<u>principia probandi</u>) for that <u>factum</u>"... Since it also "furnishes the <u>proof</u> of the <u>factum</u>," the "synthetic procedure is more complete and scientifically more satisfactory" (Vaihinger, I, 412-13).

But now it appears that this view becomes untenable as soon as we look at how in the Introduction to the second edition, Kant formulates the task of the Critique: for after asserting that the Critique has to answer the questions how pure mathematics and pure science of nature are possible, he continues in the manner of the Prolegomena: "Since these sciences actually exist, it is quite proper to ask how they are possible; for that they must be possible is proved by the fact that they exist" (B 20; NKS 56; cf. p. 22). But clearly, this way of stating the problem can lead us to the belief that the method of the Critique is, after all, the analytic-regressive method of the Prolegomena. And this means that at the very outset the Critique presupposes, or takes for granted, what it is supposed to prove -- that these sciences are actual. The argument of the Critique. therefore. can have only the strength of an exposition or explicatio, but not the apodeictic character of a proof (cf. Vaihinger, I. 412).

According to Vaihinger, however, the view that B underwent change to the analytic-regressive method of the Prolegomena is based on both "a factual and methodological error" (Vaihinger, I, 415). On a factual error because already in A the status of synthetic judgments a priori in pure mathematics and in pure science is by no means a problematic one in that at first Kant grants these judgments their claim to validity only in order subsequently to decide upon the legitimacy of this claim. On the contrary, if we believe Vaihinger, Kant never doubted the validity of such judgments in pure mathematics, and at least since 1770 entertained the possibility of their validity in pure science (Vaihinger, I, 388-89). And in the first edition of the Critique the validity of both types of judgments is presupposed as a fact. So Kant mentions, for example in A 4, the "established reliability" of mathematics and its "shining example of how far, independently of experience, we can progress in a priori knowledge." And in A 209 Kant says of the principle of causality that "direct inspection may show the principle to be actual and true" (my trans.) so that even "the question how it should be possible, may therefore be considered superfluous" (NKS 232). It is. Vaihinger maintains, the very presupposition of their validity that at first gives rise to the genuine Critical problem: why is it that I can form valid synthetic judgments a priori about objects? (Vaihinger, I, 395).

For this reason the fact that in the Introduction to B the validity of these judgments is much more pronounced than in A should not lead us to commit the <u>methodological</u> error of holding that in B Kant took a turn to the analytic-regressive method of the <u>Prolegomena</u> (Valinger, I, 415). In other words: that Kant formulates in B the Critical problem in <u>Prolegomens</u>-fashion, does not mean that he intends to solve it in the analytic-regressive way. On the contrary: if in the <u>Prolegomens</u> the validity of synthetic judgments <u>a priori</u> is <u>basis</u> and <u>means</u> of the argumentation, in the <u>Critique</u> it is neither. But it is, according to Vaihinger (I, 415), the <u>objective</u> of the argumentation, of an argumentation that Kant expressively calls synthetic, i. e., deductive. This should be taken seriously. That is to say: we have to look, for example in the Analytic, for a "principle" or a true premise of which valid synthetic <u>a priori</u> judgments "can strictly be derived" (<u>Prol</u>. 26).

⁵⁷<u>Werke</u>, III, p. 31. ⁵⁸<u>Werke</u>, III, p. 457.

59<u>Kant's Gesammelte Schriften</u>, Band XXI, herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin und Leipzig, 1936, p. 92. Hereafter quoted as WW.

> ⁶⁰Merleau-Ponty, p. 62. ⁶¹Merleau-Ponty, p. 62.

⁶²Edmund Husserl, "Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortraege," <u>Husserlians</u>, I, Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950, p. 124, my trs. Hereafter quoted as Ha I.

⁶³Ha I, p. 166.

⁶⁴_P. F. Strawson, <u>Individuals</u>, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1965, p. 166. Hereafter quoted as <u>Individuals</u>.

⁶⁵Cf. Strawson, <u>Individuals</u>, p. 101-02.

⁶⁶For this term see B 143 ("<u>sine Apperzeption</u> <u>ueberhaupt,</u>" <u>sin Bewusstssin ueberhaupt</u>") and <u>Prol</u>. 48 ("consciousness in general").

67 "Ueber Wunder, " WW 18, p. 320.

⁶⁸"Introduction to the Netaphysics of Morals," in <u>Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the</u> <u>Theory of Ethiss</u>, trs. T. K. Abbott, London-New York-Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., p. 277. Hereafter quoted as Abbott.

⁶⁹Abbott, p. 279.

70"Fortschritte," in Werke, III, p. 602.

CHAPTER II

SUBJECTIVITY [0]

"...a blind play of representations, less even than a dream." (A 112; NKS 129)

(1)

I will henceforth refer to the objectivity of an object in the Critical-transcendental sense as 'objectivity [ct]: it consists, as we have seen, in the necessary synthetic unity of a manifold of representations. This unity is not a function of intuition, by which the manifold is given, but of thought or of concepts. An object of outer intuition is thus objective [ct] not because it is represented in space, and there is no reason to suppose that something can not be objective [ct] on the ground that it is an object of inner intuition, an object, that is, which is represented only in time (cf. A 373; NKS 342). Synthetic unity, Kant maintains, is due to the categories: they "consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity" (A 79 = B 104; NKS 112).

We might now be tempted to form a corresponding notion of what is subjective or, as I shall call it, 'subjective [o],' namely a manifold which does not possess synthetic unity and the representation of which would lack what synthetic unity accounts for, i. e., "objective validity and necessary universality (for everybody)."¹ The representation would, instead, be valid only for the subject in which it is found, even if, of course, it would be a representation of an object in space.

In an early stage of the Transcendental Deduction in the first edition of the <u>Critique</u> Kant, indeed entertains the thought of a sensible manifold of intuition which does not possess necessary synthetic unity. In β 13 we find three versions of the same idea. (1) "Objects...may appear to us without their being under the necessity of being related to the functions of understanding" (A δ 9; NKS 123f.). (2) "Appearances can certainly be given in intuition independently of functions of the understanding" (A 90; NKS 124). (3) "Since intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of thought, appearances would none the less present objects to our intuition" (A 90; NKS 152).

It is obvious that if the Transcendental Deduction is to succeed, these claims must be false. For its very strategy consists in showing that consciousness could not have the formal unity it has, namely that "it must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations" (B 131; NKS 152), unless these representations were united by the functions of the understanding, i. e., by the categories. But such a stategy would be pointless if it were also maintained that we can be conscious of a manifold of intuition which does not possess such a unity. And indeed, at a later stage of the

Transcendental Deduction, Kant rejects the claim. A manifold "in a state of separation," he says, "and without belonging to consciousness of myself...is impossible" (A 122; NKS 145). He maintains that the categories "must be recognized as <u>a priori</u> conditions of the possibility of experience, whether of the <u>intuition</u> which is to be met with or of the thought" (A 94; NKS 126; emph. added). And finally he claims that "all sensible intuitions are subject to the categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one consciousness" (B 143; NKS 150).

(2)

Ny proposal has been to consider, as subjective [o], a manifold of representations which is given in intuition, but which does not possess necessary synthetic unity. In the passage last quoted, however, Kant claims, in effect, that necessary synthetic unity is the only condition under which a manifold of representations "can come together in one consciousness." What he rules out, in other words, is that there can be (one) consciousness of a manifold of representations which does not possess synthetic unity. This, he says in the Transcendental Deduction, "is impossible" (A 122; NKS 145).

It is in my view one of the basic tenets of the Transcendental Deduction that the formal property of all consciousness, namely its <u>unity</u>, is by no means something obvious, but something of which the transcendental

possibility has to be explained. And this for the following reasons.

It is held to be analytic, i. e., to be contained in its very concept. that a representation can exist or occur only if there is a subject which is conscious of it. Thus Descartes says in his Replies that "it is certain that no thought can exist apart from a thing that thinks; no activity, no accident can be without a substance in which to exist."2 Kant, too, subscribes to this view, without holding, however, that a 'subject' is a Cartesian thinking substance: "All representations have a necessary relation to a possible consciousness. For if they did not have this, and if it were altogether impossible to become conscious of them, this would practically amount to the admission of their non-existence" (A 118a; NKS 142). And what is true of the genus 'representation,' is true of every of its species: thus intuitions "are nothing to us, and do not in the least concern us, if they cannot be taken up into consciousness" (A 116; NKS 141).³

But while it is analytic that every representation has a necessary relation to some conscious subject or other, it is <u>not</u> analytic that each of a manifold of representations has such a relation to one and the same conscious subject. This, it appears to me, is the reason why the unity of consciousness must be accounted for. In the Paralogisms Kant himself points out that we can conceive of a plurality of representations, "for instance, the single

words of a verse." as being "distributed among different beings." But these representations would, Kant continues, "never make up a whole thought" (A 352; NKS 335). Our point here is that if we entertain the logical possibility of a plurality of consciousnesses of one representation each, we are talking only spuriously, and not in any cognitive relevant sense about both, consciousness and representations. "If each representation were completely foreign to every other, standing apart in isolation, no such thing as knowledge would ever arise. For knowledge is [essentially] a whole in which representations stand compared and connected" (A 97; NKS 130). Hence Kant wants to say not only, as I have repeatedly pointed out, that the unity of consciousness implies experience of objects, but also the reverse, namely that empirical knowledge has as its necessary condition the unity of consciousness.

In the Transcendental Deduction, then, Kant must address himself to three distinct but connected issues. (1) The possibility of a <u>manifold</u> of sensible representations to "stand together" (B 132; NKS 153) in <u>one</u> <u>consciousness</u>. (2) The possibility of <u>one</u> consciousness of such a manifold, or, as Kant puts it, of the "thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold which is given in intuition" (B 133; NKS 153). (3) The possibility of the representations to form a "connected whole." In the following we will try to reconstruct, in its <u>basic</u> features, Kant's solution of these three problems.

(1) A condition of this possibility would be, instead of each representations of the manifold having a necessary relation to some conciousness or other, that all representations of the manifold have such a relation to one and the same consciousness. It would, then, indeed be "possible for the 'I think' to accompany" (B 131; NKS 152) all the representations of the manifold; and the "necessary relation" which "all the manifold of intuition" is said to have "to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found" (B 132; NKS 153), could obtain.

(2) It can obtain, Kant claims, only by means of a synthesis, and his further claim is that this synthesis also secures the unity of consciousness. The relation of a manifold of representations to one and the same consciousness is not a matter of "the empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations" and which "is in itself diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject." This relation, rather, comes about "not simply through my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only in so far as I conjoin one representation with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in [i.e. throughout] these representations" (B 133; NKS 153).

(3) Now the unification of a manifold of sensible

representations, i. e., the constitution of its unity, can be according to Kant not a matter of intuition, in which the manifold is given, but only of concepts. Concepts are for Kant "functions of unity among our representations" (A 93 = B 93; NKS 105f). The concepts, however, in which the manifold is to be united, cannot be empirical concepts, for these are derived from experience which presupposes the unity of the manifold. They are the concepts, already referred to, which "consist solely in the representation of...necessary synthetic unity" (A 79 = B 104; NKS 112). i...e., the pure concepts of the understanding or categories. And a manifold of sensible representations which in these. and only in these concepts is united, is an object [ct]. A manifold which is united, for example, in the empirical concept of a tree, is in the strict sense of the term not an object [ct].

For our present purposes, then, we must note that a manifold of representations of sensible intuition can be accompanied by the 'I think' only if it possesses synthetic unity. Hence what we have called 'subjective [o],' namely a manifold of intuition which stands together in one consciousness, but which does not possess synthetic unity. is transcenentally impossible. And this is the reason why Kant must reject the thought entertained at the beginning of the Transcendental Deduction, i. e., that "appearances might very well be so constituted that the understanding should not find them in accordance with the conditions of its

unity" (A 90 = B 123; NKS 124). Now he says: "There might exist a multitude of perceptions, and indeed an entire sensibility, in which much empirical consciousness would arise, but in a state of separation, and without belonging to a consciousness of myself. This, however, is <u>impossible</u>. For it is only because I ascribe all perceptions to one consciousness (original apperception) that I can say of all perceptions that I am <u>conscious</u> of them" (A 122 = B 145; emph. added).

(3)

Although the notion of the subjective [o] is a notion of something which, as we have seen, cannot be constituted, I will not discard but retain it for heuristic purposes. For by examining what this notion implies, I intend not only to bring the epistemic function of the "pure," "original," and "transcendental" unity of apperception (B 132; NKS 153) into focus, but also to show the incoherence of any account of experience which is based on this notion.

At times Kant himself adopts such a strategy, i. e., assumes for the sake of argument of what is subjective [o]. Thus in a letter to Herz he assumes with respect to a manifold of representations that "I am...conscious of each individual representation, but not of their relation to the unity of representation of their object, by means of the synthetic unity of their apperception."⁴ On this

assumption, however, the representations would, Kant maintains, never "represent objects. They would not even reach that unity of consciousness which is necessary for knowledge of myself (as object of inner sense). I would not even be able to know that I have [them]; consequently for me, as a knowing being, they would be absolutely nothing. They could still carry on their play in an orderly fashion, as representations connected according to empirical laws of association, and thus even have an influence upon my feeling and desire, without my being aware of them...This might be so without my knowing the slightest thing thereby, not even what my own condition is." ⁵

Now in this passage Kant suspends, as it were, what in the opening sections of the Transcendental Deduction in B he establishes as "the principle of the original <u>synthetic</u> unity of apperception" (B 137; NKS 156). This principle says that "all <u>my</u> representations in any given must be subject to that condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as <u>my</u> representations, and so can comprehend them as synthetically combined in one apperception through the general expression ' I think'"(A B 138; NKS 157).

The condition, to which Kant here refers, is, as we have seen, the condition of their synthesis in a pure concept. It is in such a concept, Kant wants to say, that representations first of all can form "a whole" or "stand compared and connected," that is, be modes of knowledge or have relation to an object. "Knowledge," Kant says,

"consists in the determinate relation of given representations to an object; and an <u>object</u> is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is <u>united</u>" (B 137; NKS 156). To suspend the principle, then, means that our representations would fail to represent objects: they would, as Kant says in the same letter, "be nothing to us, that is, not objects of <u>knowledge</u> at all."⁶

But they would also have no "relation to the identity of the subject." For the latter requires according to the principle precisely their synthesis. "The thought that the representations given in intuition belong to me, is...equivalent to the thought that I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them; and although this thought is not itself the <u>synthesis</u> of representations, it presupposes the possibility of that synthesis. In other words, only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of the representations in one consciousness, do I call them one and all <u>mine</u>" Otherwise, Kant continues, "I should have as many-coloured and diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious to myself" (B 134; NKS 154). I could, as Kant puts it in his letter to Herz, not even know "what my own condition is."

What we can mean, then, by the notion of the subjective [0], is a manifold of diconnected representations, standing apart in isolation, each of which is accompanied by a different empirical consciousness. But with this, Kant wants to say, we can in the <u>copnitive</u> sense

mean nothing at all. For such a manifold has no cognitive function: on the basis of the subjective [o] "we should have," as Kant writes to Herz, "knowledge neither of ourselves nor of other things." 7

(4)

We have seen that in an early stage of the Transcendental Deduction in A Kant maintains that the notion of what I call 'subjective [c]' has a legitimate constitutive employment. This claim, however, he later dismisses: what the notion of the subjective [c] purports to refer to, is, as he says, "impossible." And in the meantime we have seen, too, that these two claims cannot be made compatible. But it is nevertheless instructive to understand why Kant gets entangled in this contradiction, a contradiction of which he apparantly is never completely aware: for although we find only a few traces of it in the revised edition of the <u>Gritiquy</u> (cf. B 141-42; NKS 158-59), the contradiction reappears, as we shall see, at the basis of an untenable doctrine in the <u>Projegompna</u>.

It appears that the reason for Kant's quandry is to be found in the peculiar method which he employs in the Critique and elsewhere. The <u>Gritique</u>, De Vleeschauwer writes, "is based on the method of isolating the factors that occur in knowledge."⁸ Similarly Vaihinger talks about Kant's "decomposing method which consists in considering each of the cognitive faculties at first by itself."⁹ Thus

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Kant says, for example, that "in the transcendental aesthetic we shall <u>isolate</u> sensibility, by taking away from it everything which the understanding thinks through its concepts"(A 22 = B 36; NKS 67), and that in "a transcendental logic we isolate the understanding...[by] separating out from our knowledge that part of thought which has its origin solely in the understanding" (A 62 = B 87; NKS 100).

Kant owes the use of this procedure not merely to considerations of exposition. but rather to a philosophical reason which in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method he sets forth as follows: "It is of utmost importance to isolate the various modes of knowledge according as they differ in king and in origin, and to secure that they not be confounded owing to the fact that usually, in our employment of them, they are combined. What the chemist does in the analysis of substances... is in still greater degree incumbent upon the philosopher" (A 842 = B 870; NKS 660; emph. added). Kant's method of isolation, in other words, is based on the idea that although our knowledge is, or "usually" is, knowledge only as "conjunction" (A 271 = B 327; NKS 283) of elements, it is a conjunction of elements none of which is reducible to the other. Thus he says at the beginning of the Transcendental Logic that "intuition and concepts constitute ... the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can

yield knowledge" (A 50 B 74; NKS 92). And he adds that although it is only through their "union" that knowledge can arise, these elements "cannot exchange their functions" and that it is therefore necessary to "carefully separate and distinguish the one from the other" (A 51-2 = B 75-6; NKS 93). Kant's admonition is well founded. For he asserts here one of the basic tenets of the Critical philosophy, namely, in Strawson's words, the "original duality of intuition and concept."¹⁰ And he asserts it against his predecessors, against Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza, against Locke, Berkeley and Hume, all of whom in his view in one way or another "confounded" intuition and concept or assimilated the one to the other. "Leibniz <u>intellsctualised</u> appearances, just as Locke <u>sensualised</u> all concepts of the understanding" (A 271 = B 327; NKS 283).

Kant's method, however, is subject to a misunderstanding which is due to the ambiguity of terms such as "isolation" or "separation." Given his fondness to compare his own procedure with that of the chemist,¹¹ we might be led to believe that an element of knowledge can <u>occur</u> in separation. Kant, it appears, is aware of this danger. Here is a remark from his Reply to Eberhard which, although it concerns the topic of abstraction, in my view nevertheless pertains to the problem at hand: "One does not abstract a <u>concept</u> as a common predicate, but one abstracts in the <u>use</u> of a concept from the diversity which falls under it. The chemists alone are in a position to abstract

something, when they extract a liquid from other materials in order to have it separately; the philosopher abstracts from what in a certain use of a concept he does not want to consider."¹²

Hence to "isolate" an element of knowledge. for instance intuition. should not be taken to mean that we come in possession of it. as does the chemist of an element. namely as something which can exist independently of the other element. that is, of concept. In other words: Kant's method of isolation is supposed to result not in real. but in transcendental distinctions. These must be drawn, as we have seen. in order not to confound the specific epistemic contributions of each of the elements or sources of knowledge. It is in this respect, indeed, that "intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of thought" (A 90-1 = B 123; NKS 124). But it is only in this respect. We are not permitted, in other words, to do what Kant apparantly does against his own warning, namely to confuse the transcendental independence of intuition with its real independence. And it is this mistake that, in my view, is responsible for the uncritical claim according to which, as we have seen. "objects ... may appear to us without their being under the necessity of being related to the functions of understanding." for the claim, that is, that the notion of what is subjective [o] does have a legitimate constitutive employment.

It is this same mistake to which, I think, we must ultimately trace Kant's notorious distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience that he develops in the #18-20 of the Prolegomens, to which he refers obliquely in #19 of the Transcendental Deduction, and that he states summarily in #40 of the Logic. Although this distinction cannot be maintained as it stands, it can nevertheless be reconstructed along Critical lines, as can the equally untenable notion of subjective validity which according to Kant belongs to a judgment of peception.

Both types of judgments are empirical in the sense that they have their ground in "what is given to sensuous intuition. " that is, "in immediate sense-perception. "13 judgment of experience, however, in contradistinction to a judgment of perception, is not only empirical in this sense. but expresses experience in the Critical sense of the term. that is. "empirical knowledge" (B 165: NKS 173). And this is because in such a judgment the perceptions are subsumed under a pure concept of the understanding and thus possess necessary synthetic unity. In a judgment of experience, Kant wants to say, the perceptions are not represented as they contingently happen to belong to each other in a subject's perceptual state. "in my state or in several states of mine, or in the perceptual state of others. "14 but as they are necessarily related among themselves. It is this "necessary connection"¹⁵ among the given perceptions

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(5)

themselves that, according to Kant, constitutes their "reference to an object, " 16

This gives us the opportunity to render the notion of an object [ct] more precise. Such an object is the representation, in a pure concept or category, of the synthetic unity of the given perceptions, that is, of their necessary relation among themselves. It is, therefore, an objective representation, a "mode of knowledge, " or a cognition. And this representation is not only numerically. but also in kind. "distinct" from any one of the given perceptions, or a collection or association thereof. The given perceptions are sensible representations, their object, however, consists in their representation in a pure concept. It is this state of affairs to which, in my view, Kant refers when in the Transcendental Deduction he says of perceptions that are represented as they necessarily belong to one another. that "they are combined in the object. no matter what the state of the subject may be" (B 142: NKS 159). And now we can see, too, why for Kant an objective representation is also a universal representation. i. e., why what he considers in the Prolegomena as the defining mark of a judgment of experience, namely "objective validity" and "necessary universality (for everybody), " are "equivalent terms."17

One of Kant's examples of a judgment of experience is "The sun warms the stone." Its empirical ground are the perceptions of the sun and of the warmth of the stone as

they succeed one another "in my subject."¹⁸ But it is only by the synthesis of these perceptions in a pure concept, i. e., in the pure concept of cause and effect, that they are determined as they are necessarily connected among themselves, and thus, in Kant's words, "changed"¹⁹ or "converted into experience."²⁰ It is for this reason that the judgment is not only empirical, but expresses empirical knowledge, and is hence, not only valid for "my subject,"²¹ but for all subjects: it "hold[s] good for us and in the same way for everybody else."²²

In my view the most useful and least ambiguous definition of a judgment of perception is to be found in Kant's Logic, where he savs that such a judgment is about our "perceptions qua perceptions."23 A judgment of experience, we have said, consists in the representation of their object, i. e., in the representation of their necessary synthetic unity. A judgment of perception. Kant wants to claim, consists in something else, and this precisely because of what it is a judgment about. "The consciousness of perceptions." Kant says in the Reflexionen. "relates all representations only to ourselves as modifications of our state: they are thus, unconnected among themselves.... constitute no knowledge, and have no relation to an object."²⁴ And this view, it appears, is reflected here in the Prolegomena where Kant says that a judgment of perception requires "no pure concept of the understanding." but only "the logical connection of perceptions in a

thinking subject." ²⁵ Thus in the judgment 'The room is warm' I "merely compare perceptions and connect them in a consciousness of my state."²⁶ Such a judgment is, therefore, only "subjectively valid,"²⁷ i. e., its validity is "limited to the subject" who makes it, and "to its state at a particular time."²⁶ A judgment of experience, by contrast, is valid, as we have seen, "no matter what the state of the subject may be."

It has often been remarked and hardly needs to be repeated that Kant's doctrine of judgments of perception in the Prolegomena is incompatible with his account of judgment which he gives in the Critique. There he says that a judgment "is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception" (B 141; NKS 159). Clearly, if this is correct, then a judgment of perception is not a judgment. More important for our purposes, however, is to see that the doctrine is in violation with an already familiar claim of Kant. namely the claim which in the revised version of the Transcendental Deduction he puts as follows: "All sensible intuitions are subject to the categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one consciousness" (B 143; NKS 160). And this means that a judgment of perception is but an instance of what we have called 'subjective [o]', something, that is, which cannot be constituted: a manifold of sensible intuition which stands together in one consciousness, but which does not possess

synthetic unity.

(6)

It is the notion of the subjective [o], then, which provides us with the clue for the Critical reconstruction of a judgment of perception: the reconstruction must be based on the realization that the unity of consciousness, and whatever is necessary for this unity, cannot be circumvented.

The central thesis, as we have seen, of the Transcendental Deduction is that the unity of consciousness implies a synthesis of representations. But this means that the order of constitution which we find in the Prolegomena is invalid. For there Kant claims not only that there are these two kinds of judgments, but moreover that "all our judgments are at first merely judgments of perception. " and that "we do not til afterwards give [some of] them a new reference (to an object)."29 and so convert them into judgments of experience. According to the thesis of the Transcendental Deduction, however, we must say: unless a manifold of perceptions possesses synthetic unity, there can be no "unity of consciousness... in the manifold of perceptions" (A 112; NKS 139). They could not even "enter the mind or be apprehended" (A 122; NKS 145) and hence would be "nothing at all" (A 120; NKS 144). Without synthetic unity, therefore, they would not only fail to refer to an object, but would not even qua perceptions be available as

the topics of a judgment of perception.

But this means that as a matter of transcendental necessity also a judgment which is about perceptions <u>qua</u> perceptions only, must be a judgment in the strict Critical sense of the term (B 141; NKS 159), i. e., a judgment in which the perceptions are subsumed under a pure concept. It means, to put it differenty, that also the "consciousness of perceptions" which, as we have seen, "relates all representations only to ourselves as modifications of our state," must be understood in the strict Critical sense: as a consciousness which requires the pure concepts as the conditions of what for Kant is the form of all consciousness, namely its unity.

In order to see what this involves we shall look at a letter of Kant's to Beck. The problem under consideration is "the relating of a representation, qug determination of the subject, to an object distinguished from it, by which means it becomes a cognition and is not merely a feeling. "³⁰ Under discussion, in other words, is the claim that if a representation "is to be a cognition, a <u>reletion</u> to something else (something other than the subject in which the representation inheres) <u>befits</u> the representation, wherey it becomes <u>computicable</u> to other people; for otherwise it would belong merely to feeling... which in itself is not communicable. "³¹ With the basic feature of Kant's answer we are already familiar: the relating of representations to an object consists, he says, in "the

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grasping (<u>apprshepsip</u>) of the given manifold,... its reception in the unity of consciousness" by means of a synthesis, and thus in the "representation of a composite."³²

I now want to point out the following. If an object's being "distinguished" from the subject would consist in its being an <u>object in space</u>, or if, in other words, the relation of a representation to "something other than the subject" would have to be construed as a relation to such an object, then there could be no cognition of representations taken <u>qua</u> determinations of the subject only, and they would therefore not be "communicable."

We have seen, however, that for Kant the relation of a manifold of representations to an object consists solely in the representation of their necessary synthetic unity in a pure comept. And it is the representation of this unity, i. e., of the object [ct], which is, as I have said, "distinct" from the representations themselves. It is this representation, therefore, and not an object in space, which constitutes what here in his letter Kant calls the "something_other than the subject." But this means that even representations taken que determinations of the subject only, can have a relation "to an object distinguished from [them]:" they can be united in a pure concept and thus be represented as "contained in_s_single_representations" (A 99; NKS 132). And this representation is not only numerically, but also in kind distinct from the representations que
determinations: it is the representation of an object [ct], that is, a cognition and hence communicable. TANK A DESCRIPTION

But the notion of an object [ct] does not only <u>allow</u> for representations <u>qua</u> determinations to be "connected in the object:" they must be connected. Kant stresses this point in the letter to Herz which we have already mentioned. Representations, he says, without the functions of the understanding, would be "nothing to us, that is, not objects of <u>knowledge</u> at all; we should have knowledge neither of ourselves nor of other things."³³ He stresses, in particular, that the representations "would not even reach that unity of consciousness that is necessary for knowledge of mysself (as object of inner sense)."³⁴ And knowledge of my representations <u>qua</u> determinations is, of course, but a special type of knowledge of myself.

Kant distinguishes here two kinds of empirical objects: "myself (as object of inner sense)" and "other things." To the former Kant refers also, e. g., as the "object of inner perception," or the "object of inner empirical intuition."³⁵ We are dealing here, in other words, with what in the Palalogisms Kant calls an empirically "ipper object," i. e., an object which "is represented only ip_its_time_relations" (A 373; NKS 348). Correspondingly, we can take "other things" to fall under what Kant calls an empirically "external object," that is, an object which also is "represented in space" (A 373; NKS 348).

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It appears that we can now say the following: the notion of an object [ct] is <u>pytral</u> with respect to, or ranges over <u>byth</u>, empirically external <u>app</u> empirically inner objects. The objectivity [ct] of an object, thus, consists not in its being represented in space, and the fact that an object is represented in time only and hence inner, does not amount to its being 'subjective'.

To the neutrality of the notion of an object [ct] there corresponds the neutrality of the principle of the unity of apperception itself: it ranges over any given intuition. "All my representations in any given intuition must be subject to that condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as my representations" (B 135: NKS 155). The same point is made in #24 of the Transcendental Deduction where Kant says that "apperception and its synthetic unity is ... far from being identical with inner sense. The former, as source of all combination. applies to the manifold of intuition in general, and in the guise of the categories. prior to all sesnsible intuition. to objects in general" (B 154; NKS 166). What the principle stipulates, in other words, is that a manifold of both. outer and inner intuition, must satisfy the condition under which alone there can be consciousness of it, namely the condition of synthetic unity in a pure concept. Otherwise. the manifold of either type would be "merely a blind play of representations, less even than a dream, " that is, "without an object" (A 112; NKS 139) and hence incommunicable in

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principle.

Conversely, however, we can say: if consciousness in the Critical-transcendental sense, i. e., a consciousness whose fundamental property, or form, is its unity "in" or "throughout" a manifold of representations, requires their unity in an object [ct], then whatever I can be said to be conscious of, is communicable in principle. And this in particular if what I am conscious of, is a manifold of inner intuition only, e. g., representations taken qug determination of the subject only.

(7)

Throughout these sections of the <u>Prolegoggggg</u> the scope of the <u>Principls</u>, i. e., that it ranges over "the manifold of intuitions in general," is obscured by Kant's equivocation on the term 'object'. There is, in my view, no doubt that when he claims that the given perceptions acquire, by their subsumption under a pure concept, "reference to an object, "³⁶ he uses the term 'object' not only in the sense of an object [ct], that is, as denoting a manifold of any description which has the formal property of possessing synthetic unity, but also in the sense of an empirical object which is represented in space.³⁷

This ambiguity reveals itself not only in the way in which Kant contrasts the expressions 'object' or 'objective' on the one hand with such phrases as, for example, "my present state of perception, " 36 "a connection of

perceptions in my mental state, 39 and a consciousness of mv particular state" 40 on the other hand: these states are all 'inner' states. The ambiguity is also contained in what Kant says about a certain class of judgments of perception, i. e., a class whose members cannot be converted into judgments of experience: e.g. "The room is warm, sugar sweet. and wormwood bitter."⁴¹ And they cannot be converted even though a concept of the understanding were superadded. "because they refer merely to feeling which everybody knows to be merely subjective and which of course can never be attributed to the object and consequently never become objective."42 Clearly, Kant is here talking about an external object. And what he is saving derives from one⁴³ of his views about sensible qualities that in the Aesthetic we find in The Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space, and according to which these qualities cannot be regarded as "objective determinations" or "properties of things, but only as changes in the subject" (A 29 = B 45; NKS 73). On this view sensible qualities are to be treated not as determinations of 'objects.' but of the 'subject, ' and the sentence. 'The room is warm. ' can be rendered epistemologicaly more persopicuous with the sentence. 'I have a sensation of warmth in this room.'

Now, given the expository character of the <u>Projesomena</u> and their conception as "a sketch and textbook," ⁴⁴ it suggests itself to <u>illustrate</u> the objective validity and necessary universality (for everyone) of a judgment of

experience by a judgment which is, as for example, "The sun warms the stone," about empirically external objects, i. e., about objects which are "represented in <u>space</u>" (A 373; NKS 348). In contrast to what Kant calls an empirically "<u>ipper</u> object," the sun and the stone are, as it were, there for everyone to see.

But such an illustration obscures not only, as I have pointed out, the scope of the <u>Principls</u>, i. e., its range over "the manifold of intuition in general," but also, and more importantly so, the precise character of the <u>unity</u> of the manifold which the <u>Principls</u> requires and hence <u>upy</u> the Principle can have the range it does: It is a unity in a pure category or concept, that is to say, a unity which consists entirely in its being <u>thought</u>. This is one of the fundamental claims of the <u>Gritique</u>, and we have to be clear about what it entails.

To say of a manifold of representations that it possesses synthetic unity or that it is "combined in the object" (B 130; NKS 151) is to say that its being so combined is pot a matter of <u>sensibility</u>, but of the <u>upderstanding</u>: "The combination (<u>sensibility</u>) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the <u>senses</u>" (B 129; NKS 151). On the contrary: "All combination...be it a combination of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts, is an act of the understanding. To this act the general title 'synthesis' may be assigned" (B 130; NKS 151). Thinking, for Kant then,

is <u>combination</u>. And combination itself is defined as "the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold" (B 131; NKS 152), that is, as a <u>judgmont</u>. In the <u>Prologomona</u> Kant says: "The business of the senses is to intuit, that of the understanding to think. But thinking is uniting representations in one consciousness... The unity of representations in one consciousness is judgment. Thinkng, therefore, is the same as judging or referring representations to judgments in general."⁴⁵

But if the unity of a manifold in general is synthetic, i. e., is something which is, qua unity, due not to sensibility but to an act of the understanding and thus is something which is thought or judged, then it belongs to the very essence of this unity that there can be no intuition whatsoever of it. "By means of outer sense, a property of our mind, " Kant says in Transcendental Aesthetic, "we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all without exception in space." By means of "inner sense ... the mind intuits itself or its inner state. " and time is the "form in which the intuition of inner states is possible" (A 22 f.= B 37 f.: NKS 67; emph. added). But as something which is essentially thought, synthetic unity precisely does not admit of this: to be represented. by means of outer sense, in space, and by means of inner sense. in time. What only can be so represented is the manifold in so far as it is given in intuition: not, however, its unity. Kant thus can talk about "outer intuition" and "inner

intuition" (A 33 f.= B 50 f.; NKS 77)--but it would be senseless, that is, strictly absurd, to talk about an outer or inner synthetic unity.⁴⁶ In other words: the distinction between the "inner" and the "outer," and thus between inner and outer objects of knowledge depends entirely on the <u>type</u> of the manifold of intuition that is either temporal or spatial, or both: but it does <u>not</u> depend on the <u>ypity</u> of the manifold.

Hence, although the judgment "The sun warms the stone" is about empirically external objects, i. e., about a manifold of representations which are, qug "determinations of the mind" in time and which "have for their objects" things in space (A 34 = B 50; NKS 77), the synthetic unity or objectivity [ct] of these representations, i. e., the cognition expressed in the judgment, is nothing in space and time at all.⁴⁷ It is nothing 'outer' and it is, in particular, nothing 'inner.' And the same holds, <u>mutating</u> <u>mutand</u>;, for what Kant calls 'judgments of perception:' for those judgments which according to him are about representations, qug determinations of the mind, i. e., about representations, which are in time only. Their synthetic unity is nothing in time either: the cognition, therefore, of our inner states is not itself an inner state.

Thus it is for the objectivity [ct] of a manifold of sensible intuition and therefore for the objective validity and universality (for everybody) of spy empirical judgment strictly_impaterial whether the representations united are

in time only or whether they have, in addition, for their objects things in space. We can make an even stronger claim: if we grant Kant that the two "fundamental sources of the mind" (A 50 = B 74; NKS 92), namely, sensibility and understanding, "cannot exchange their functions," if, in oher ords, "the senses can think nothing" (A 51 = B 75; NKS 93), and if the synthetic unity of a manifold is a unity that is <u>thought</u>, then it is <u>ipgoposivable</u> that a manifold's being a manifold of either outer or inner sensible intuition should in any way respectively either strengthen or weaken the objectivity [ct] of the judgment.

The fact that the synthetic unity of a manifold, the bearer of objectivity [ct], is a unity in a pure concept, that is. a function not of sensibility, but of the understanding, explains not only why it is that the Principle can range over the manifold of outer and inner intuition. It is also the reason why, furthermore. objectivity in the Critical sense cuts across those contrasts that are associated with the 'inner' and 'outer': the contrasts, for example, between the mental and the physical, between the private and public. In each of these cases the objective [ct] is neither. Thus it is misleading to assimilate or to identify the objective [ct] with the public. And this not only because the objective [ct] is nothing spatial or physical, but because we would be at a loss if within Kant's transcendental inquiry we were to form the contrasting notion of what is private. What objectivity

[ct] alone can be contrasted with is subjectivity [o]. But this is a purely heuristic notion which signifies something whose constitution is transcendentally impossible: namely, a unitary consciousness of a manifold of representations which does <u>pop</u> possess synthetic unity. Such a manifold would only be <u>sepsed</u> and not <u>thought</u> and could, therefore, not be <u>known</u>. "I would not even be able to know that I have [it]."⁴⁸ That is to say, we are talking about representations which are not even private in the sense that in principle only I and nobody else could know them.

(8)

Kant says that in a judgment of perception "I connect (perceptions) in one consciousness of my state. "⁴⁹ We know that he is talking about "perceptions quy perceptions"⁵⁰ or about perceptions qua "modifications of our state, "⁵¹ that is to say, about a sensible manifold of ippgr intuition only. On our reconstruction we know furthermore: it is required by the 'I think' or the Pripgipls that the connection of this manifold be synthetic, which is to say, be thought in a pure concept or "brought to the objective unity of apperception" and thus judged (B 141; NKS 159). And we know finally, as a consequence of this, that the manifold in question gs thought or gs judged, i. e., its gegnition, is objective [ct], that is, constitutes an objective [ct] representation which is not identical with, but distinct from, the perceptions themselves: it is

not something 'inner.'⁵² And this, as we have seen, because the objectivity [ct] of the representation, i. e., its content as that which is <u>thought</u> in it, is a function of the <u>upderstanding</u> and <u>pg</u> of sensibility, and thus incapable of being represented in time at all. Hence, objectivity [ct] and distinctness [ct] or, in Kant's repeated phrase, the notion of "an object distinct from our representations" is neither precluded by their being representations of <u>ipper</u> nor does it require that they be representations of <u>gytsr</u> sensible intuition.⁵³

Ultimately, then, it is the satisfaction of the transcendental condition of the unity of consciousness as spelled out in the Pringipls, i. e., the synthetic unity of a manifold of any description, which accounts for the fact that the empirical "consciousness of my state"⁵⁴ is a cognition or knowledge in the strict Critical sense of the term. It is, to be sure, knowledge of an inner manifold, but is, <u>qus_kpowlsdgs</u>, precisely <u>pot</u> inner, but objective [ct] and thus in principle communicable to others. And this is the reason why any empirical judgment in which such a cognition is expressed, must have "objective validity" and its equivalent, "necessary universality (for everybody)."⁵⁵ "The synthetic unity of consciousness," Kant says, "is...an objective condition of all knowledge" (B 138; NKS 156) and hence, also of the knowledge of our inner states (Gemueth).

At times Kant refers to an unsynthesized manifold of inner sensible intuition as being merely "a feeling which

everybody knows to be merely subjective ... and which of course can...never become objective, "⁵⁶ i. e., as something which has no cognitive worth: which is, as he says in the Critique of Judgment "available for no cognition whatever. not even for that by which the subject <u>cognizes</u> itself."⁵⁷ This, however, is false. Any manifold, we have shown, which does not possess synthetic unity, is subjective [o], i. e., something of which there can be no consciousness of. But what can Kant mean by a feeling of which I cannot be conscious and of which, therefore, I cannot "even know that I have it?" It is precisely this question which is glossed over in the letter to Beck where in a curious turn of the phrase Kant says that an unsynthesized manifold of inner sensible intuition is a "feeling (of pleasure or displeasure), which in itself [an_sich] cannot be communicated." But within Kant's transcendental inquiry there is no warrant to talk about 'a feeling in itself.' He can. to be sure, talk about what is a priori and constitutive, and about what is empirically constituted. He can. furthermore, talk about what as a matter of principle cannot be constituted: the subjective [o] which "would be nothing to me" and whose decisive importance for the argument of the Transcendental Deduction lies in the fact that it is the only alternative to the unity of consciousness. But the legitimate discourse about what cannot be constituted does not allow us the inference that there is something unconstituted. What I have already

pointed out and what I call the '<u>Critigal_disjunction</u>' says the following: a manifold of any description either possesses synthetic unity and is constituted, or it is "nothing at all" (A 120; NKS 144). There is thus, no "feeling in itself." It is either "nothing at all" or I can be conscious of it. And if I am conscious of it, then the transcendental condition of the unity of consciousness must be fulfilled. But then a feeling js "available... for cognition, " that is, for the empirical knowledge of myself. And this knowledge cannot fail to be objective [ct]: it "is valid (<u>communicable</u>) for everyone."⁵⁸

(9)

We are now finally in a position to say in which sense judgments of perception are 'subjective.' Kant claims, as we have seen, that they are "merely subjectively valid, " that their "validity is... limited to the subject" and "to its state at a particular time:" they "hold good only for us (that is, our subject)." What Kant, according to our reconstruction, should have said is the following: a judgment of perception is called 'subjective' for the sole reason that it is about the sensory state of <u>ibs_subject</u> who makes it, in contradistinction to a judgment in which a subject judges something <u>object</u> than its state. This sense of 'subjective' we shall henceforth call 'subjective [s].' But otherwise such a judgment is a judgment [ct] and hence

has objective validity and necessary universality for everybody.

The subjective [s], thus, is objective [ct]. In other words: within the domain of all judgments [ct] the differentia specifica of a reconstructed judgment of perception does not consist in its cognitive status or value, in its being, as Kant says. "merely subjectively valid. " but exclusively in its matter. It is a member of that class of judgments in which a manifold of inner intuition only is brought to the objective unity of apperception. This is the kind of manifold we are dealing with whenever we talk about the subjective [s]. But as being brought to the unity of apperception, i. e., judged. such a manifold is, as I have shown, no longer inner but objective [ct]. And I want to maintain that the subjective [s] is one of two senses in which within the scope of Kant's Critical inquiry anything can be legitimately called 'subjective.' It denotes the subjective insofar as it can be constituted. The only other legitimate sense is the one in which space, time, and the categories are respectively said to be the "subjective conditions of all our intuitions" (A 49 = B 66; NKS 86) and the "subjective conditions of thought" (A 89 = B 122; NKS 124). What is subjective in this sense is so because it has its ground or "its seat in the subject only, as the formal character of the subject" (B 41: NKS 70): it is a priori. But it is at the same time transcendental, that is, the necessary and universal

condition of objectivity [ct].

(10)

I conclude this chapter with a remark on the unreconstructed subjectivity which, as Kant says in the **Prolegomena**, belongs to a judgment of perception. Under discussion, in other words, is the correct philosophic 'location,' if any, of the indisputable state of affairs that the judgment 'I have a feeling of warmth in this room,' for example, does not mean that "I or any other person shall always find it as I do now."⁵⁹

The decisive point to remember is that a subjective [s] judgment is, as is any judgment [ct], objective [ct]: it cannot be made unless the manifold of inner intutition "is brought to the objective unity of apperception" (B 141; NKS 159). But then it is "valid" or "communicable" as is a judgment whose matter consists in a sensible manifold of inner and outer intuition. Only if, therefore, the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience are fulfilled. are we in a position to discover and to assess by experience, i. e., a posteriori, the empirical subjectivity or objectivity of our empirical judgments. That the room feels warm to me is an empirical fact, and that not everybody "shall always find it as I do now," is likewise an empirical fact. Facts like these can be found out "only... a posteriori, by means of experience" (A 721 = B 749; NKS 581). This, however, is possible only "in accordance with"



the <u>a_priori</u> conditions of the possibility of experience (A 723 = B 751; NKS 583). But it is with these <u>a_priori</u> conditions that philosophy proper, according to Kant, is concerned: it is <u>transcendental</u> (A 56 = B 80 f.; NKS 96). We will adopt a term from the section on the <u>Amphiboly</u> and say that the subjective and objective validity of which Kant talks in the <u>Prolegomena</u>, have no "<u>transcendental</u>" but only an <u>empirical</u> "location" (A 268 = B 324; NKS 281) and are therfore, strictly speaking, of no philosophical interest at all.

In analogy to a distinction which Kant makes in the Introduction to the second edition of the <u>Gritique</u>, we can talk of the <u>"gomparative</u>" (B 3; NKS 44) or relative empirical objectivity or subjectivity of an empirical judgment. From this we distinguish its Critical-transcendental objectivity and intersubjectivity which are <u>"strict</u>" (jbjd.): the Critical disjunction says that a manifold of intuition either possesses synthetic unity or is nothing at all. By contrast all empirical judgments can be graded or ranked according to their relative empirical subjectivity and objectivity. The paradigmatic case of the latter would be an empirically universal judgment about objects in space, that of the former a judgment of perception, i. e., a judgment which is about myself and my state at a particular time.

But even within the domain of the empirical subjective is room for differentiations. "The taste of

wine" (A 29 = B 45; NKS 73) may be "different for different men" (A 29 = B 45; NKS 73) and may "appear differently to every observer" (A 30; NKS 73) and thus be subjective. But it may also not vary and hence be objective if, let us say, the community of observers is one of vintners. On the other hand, the description, in terms of colors, of a landscape by an acyanobleptic would, according to Kant, be subjective twice over: because it is a function, as is any such description, of "the particular constitution of the sense-organs" (A 29; NKS 74), and because in this case we are dealing with a defect in this constitution. But nevertheless: the description could not be made and could not be found out to be subjective [s] unless it were objective [ct].

Considerations such as these, however, have only an empirical, but no "transcendental location" and should, therefore, not occur on the arguments of the <u>Transcendental</u> <u>Aesthetic</u> and of the <u>Transcendental_Logic</u>. Their proper location is Kant's own empirical <u>Apthropology</u> where, it appears, he carefully distinguishes empirical-anthropological questions from transcendental

ones. Thus what would be illegitimate in transcendental inquiry, is perfectly legitimate in an anthropological one: to rank, for example, the five bodily senses according to their relative subjectivity and objectivity. Three of these senses, i. e., the senses of touch, sight, and hearing "are more objective than subjective, that is, as empirical

<u>intuition</u> they contribute more to the knowledge of the external object than they animate the consciousness of the affected organ. "⁶⁰ The other two, the senses of taste and smell, "are more subjective than objective, i. e., what we represent by means of them is suited more for the enjoyment of the external object than for its cognition. This is the reason why with regard to the former it is easy to communicate with others. With respect to the latter, however, although the external empirical intuition is the same... the manner in which the subject is affected by it, can be quite different. "⁶¹ NOTES TO CHAPTER II

¹<u>Prol</u>. p. 46. ²Haldane, II, p. 64.

 3 Cf. A 104, NKS 134; A 491 = B 519, NKS 439; A 492 = B 520, NKS 440.

⁴Arnulf Zweig, ed. and trs., <u>Kant Philosophical</u> <u>Correspondence 1759-99</u>, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967, p. 154. Hereafter quoted as Zweig.

> ⁵Zwei₆, 153-54. ⁶Zweig, p. 153. ⁷Zweig, p. 153.

⁶H. J. De Vleeschauwer, <u>La Deduction</u> <u>Transcencentale dans l'Oeuyre de Kant</u>, II, Antwerpen-Paris. 'S Gravenhage, 1937, p. 178, my trs. Hereafter quoted as De Vleeschauwer.

⁹H. Vaihinger, <u>Commentar zu Kant's Kritik der</u> <u>Reinen Vernunft</u>, II, Stuttgart-Berlin-Leipzig: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1692, p. 120. Eereafter quoted as Vaihinger.

> ¹⁰<u>Bounds of Sense</u>, p. 97. ¹¹Cf. BXXa, NKS 24; <u>Prol.</u>, 115; Abbott, 262. ¹²<u>Werke</u>, III, p. 311. ¹³<u>Prol</u>., p. 45. ¹⁴<u>Prol</u>., p. 49. ¹⁵<u>Prol</u>., p. 46. ¹⁶<u>Prol</u>., p. 46. ¹⁷<u>Prol</u>., p. 46. ¹⁸<u>Prol</u>., p. 49. ¹⁹<u>Prol</u>., p. 49. ¹⁹<u>Prol</u>., p. 49.

²¹ Prol., p. 46. ²²Prol., p. 46. ²³Werke, III, p. 544. ²⁴WW. XVIII, p. 386. ²⁵Prol., p. 45. ²⁶Prol., p. 48. 27_{Prol.}, p. 45. 28_{Prol., p. 47}. 29 Prol., p. 46. ³⁰Zweig, p. 216. 31_{Z.weig.} p. 216. ³²Zweig, p. 216. ³³Zweig, p. 153. ³⁴Zweig, p. 153. ³⁵Werke, VI, p. 430; my trs. 36 Prol. p. 46.

 $37_{\rm In}$ other words: Kant uses the term 'object' (a) in the constitutive sense and (b) as referring to something constituted, and so blurs the distinction between transcendental and empirical discourse.

38<u>prol</u>., p. 47. 39<u>prol</u>., p. 48. 40<u>prol</u>., p. 48. 41<u>prol</u>., p. 47. 42<u>prol</u>., p. 47 note, emph. addec.

⁴³ The competing view is to be found in the second edition of the <u>Critique</u> where Kant says that "the predicates of appearance can be ascribed to the object itself, in relation to our sense, for instance, the red color of the secent to the rose" (B 70a; NKS 89). Or in the <u>Lorie</u> where it is asserted that "'The stone [is] warm' is a judgment of experience" (Logic, #40). And a mixed view is set forth in the <u>Critique of judgment</u> where Kant distinguishes between objective and subjective sensation. "The green color of the meadows belongs to <u>objective</u> sensation, as a perception of an object of sense." A <u>subjective</u> sensation, by contrast, is a feeling, that is, a representation which is "referred" not to the object, but "simply to the subjecti" it "must always remain merely subjective and can constitute absolutely no representation of an object," and "is available for no cognition whatever, not even for that by which the subject <u>cognises</u> itself" (C.J. ed. Bernard, 49). I will show that his latter claim is blatantly false.

⁴Prol., p. 130.

45 Prol., p. 52.

⁴⁶It is therefore perhaps misleading to say that "the content of inner experience" must, in order to be "knowledge of the self (expressible in judgments)...be <u>categorized</u> without being <u>objectified</u> in the normal sense (viz., ascribed by outer sense to a spatial object" (Beck, Essays on Kant and Hume, 48).

⁴⁷ This is the reason why for Kant the objectivity [ct] of the judgment 'The body is heavy' can <u>never</u> result from the fact that "the two representations have <u>sluwys</u> been conjoined in my perception, <u>however</u> often that perception be repeated" (B 142; NKS 159 emph. added). The very same point is made by Heidegger: "The perceptual judgment (<u>Wahrnehungswise</u>]) 'every time when...then', does not gradually change over after a sufficient number of observations, into the experiental judgment (<u>Erfshrungswise</u>]) 'if...then'"... "The experiential judgment demands in itself a new step, another way of representing the given, that is, in the concert," which is an "essentially different representation." (<u>What is a</u> Thing?, 139).

> ⁴⁸Zweig, p. 153. ⁴⁹<u>Prol</u>., p. 48. ⁵⁰<u>Werke</u>, III, p. 344. ⁵¹WW, XVIII, p. 386.

⁵²Hence Kant's attempt to a Critical Revision, in the <u>Paralogisms</u>, of the traditional, broadly Cartesian notion of <u>'lnner perception</u>' which is notoriously ambiguous. For our purposes here, we can single out two complementary claims of Kant's. The <u>first</u> is that "inner experience in general.. or (inner) perception in general.. is not to be regarded as empirical knowledge, but as knowledge of the empirical in general" (A 343 = B 401; NKS 330), that is, of a given manifold of sensible intuition. Hence 'inner experience' qua knowledge consists in the synthetic unity. by means of a pure concept, of a manifold of inner intuition in one consciousness. But this knowledge is precisely not inner. but objective [ct] and therefore communicable. For Descartes, on the other hand, it is inner and hence incommunicable: because what inner perception in the broadest sense is claimed to be the perception of, namely all the "modes of thought" which "reside (and are met with) in me" (Med. III, HR I, 157), is a manifold which does not possess synthetic unity. Kant's other claim is that inner perception "in the narrowest sense of that term" (A 367: NKS 345), the "perception of the self" which is expressed in the proposition 'I think' (A 342 = B 400; NKS 329) is nothing inner either. For the 'I think' is the "mere apperception" which is "transcendental" and which "serves only to introduce all our thought, as belonging to consciousness" (A 341 = B 399 f.; NKS 329).

⁵³This is the reason why the <u>Refutation of Idealism</u> <u>cannot</u> occur in the Transcendental Deduction and why the latter is in no need of a supplementation by it. Authors who think that it needs this supplementation, e.g. Strawson and Beck, have, in my view, a wrong conception of objectivity [c] and in particular of distinctness [ct]: in one way or another they conceive of them in <u>spatial</u> terms.

> ⁵⁴<u>Prol</u>., p. 48. ⁵⁵<u>Prol</u>., p. 46. ⁵⁶<u>Prol</u>., p. 47 note. ⁵⁷J. H. Bernard, ed., <u>Kant's Critique of Judgment</u>,

London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1914, p. 49.

⁵⁸Zweig, p. 216. ⁵⁹<u>Prol</u>., p. 47. ⁶⁰<u>Werke</u>, VI, p. 446. ⁶¹<u>Werke</u>, VI, p. 446. Chapter III OBJECTS [ct] "That something happens..." (A 191 = B 236; NKS 220)

(1)

My discussion in the last chapter of the Principle resulted in a number of claims the most important of which can be summed up as follows. I have shown that unity of consciousness requires objectivity [ct], namely, a given manifold of intuition of any description which possesses synthetic unity. The latter, I have said, consists in the fact that the manifold is united or thought in a pure concept of the understanding. This accounts not only for its objectivity [ct], but also for what is equivalent. namely its intersubjectivity in priciple. Thus I could claim. consciousness is always consciousness of objects [ct] which are communicable or intersubjective, and this even if the manifold should be a manifold of inner intuition only. The principle of the unity of apperception. I have pointed out, ranges equally over the manifold of outer and inner intuition: its scope is the manifold of intuition in general. And I have claimed that the strength of the principle derives from the fact that the only alternative to the unity of consciousness is subjectivity [o], i. e., a manifold which does not possess synthetic unity. The

constitution of such a manifold I have shown to be transcendentally impossible. My judgments, in other words, about what Kant calls empirically "inner objects," are as objective [ct] and intersubjective as are our judgments about objects in space. An unsynthesized manifold would, as Kant says, be "nothing at all" (A 120; NKS 144) or "nothing to me" (B 132; NKS 153). This led me to formulate the Critical disjunction according to which a manifold of intuition either possesses synthetic unity or is nothing at all.

(2)

But how much of all of this has Kant really established? Let us look at #17 of the Transcendental Deduction in B where Kant makes the following two claims. He maintains, first, that "insofar as the manifold representations of intuition are <u>Liven</u> to us, they are subject to the... supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in its relation to sensibility." This principle says that "all the manifold of intuition should be subject to the formal conditions of space and time" (E 136, NKS 155). Secondly, Kant maintains that insofar as the representations "must allow of being <u>combined</u> in one consciousness, they are subject to... the supreme principle of the same possibility, in its relation to understancing" according to which "all the manifold of intuition should be subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of



apperception" (B 136; NKS 155). For this claim, I have argued at length in the preceding chapter. But it says no more than that the unity of consciousness in a manifold of representations requires their synthetic unity and that the latter is the result of an act of combination which "is an affair of the understanding alone, which itself is nothing but the faculty of combining <u>a priori</u>, and therefore of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception" (B 134 f.; NKS 154).

To these two claims we must now add a third one which we find in the short section 20 and to which Kant himself refers as "the transcendental deductions" (B 159; NKS 170): namely, the claim that the categories whose table he has established in the Metaphysical Deduction (A 70-83 = B 95 = 109) in fact are the conditions of synthetic unity, i. e., "the conditions under which alone" the manifold of all sensible intuitions "can come together in one consciousness" (B 143; NKS 166). They are, it is claimed, "concepts of combination" (B 131; NKS 152), and precisely for that combination which the Principle requires, and "without which nothing can be thought or known, since the given representations would not have in common the act of the apperception 'I think.' and so could not be apprehended together in one self-consciousness" (E 137; NKS 156). But this claim. it appears, is established by Kant neither in the Transcendental Leduction of the first nor in the Transcendental Deduction of the second edition of the

Critique.

In A the claim is simply a consequence of what Kemp Smith in his Commentary calls the "identification of apperception with understanding."¹ "The unity of <u>apperception</u>," Kant says, "in relation to the synthesis of <u>imagination is the understanding</u>... In the understanding there are then pure <u>a priori</u> modes of knowledge which contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of imagination in respect to all possible appearances. These are the <u>categories</u>, that is, the pure concepts of understanding" (A 119; NKS 143).

Now Adickes says that in #20 in B we find the simplest and clearest expression of the deduction which Kant could achieve.² And De Vleeschauwer maintains that here Kant succeeds in demonstrating for the first time "the objectivity of the categories."³ The deduction in #20 "distinguishes itself from the deduction of the first edition insofar as there the categories are deduced neither as synthetic forms of apperception (objective deduction) nor as <u>a priori</u> forms of objects (subjective deduction). It is governed by the notion of judgment and by the idea of the identity of the categorical and the judgmental act. Thus the metaphysical and the transcendental deduction are now tightly joined to each other. In 1781 their connection was quite weak."⁴

With this assessment, Wolff partially agrees. In his discussion of #19 and of #20 he says that "Kant

introduces the categories by way of a doctrine of judgment. As judgment is the assertion of a unity of representations by means of the copula 'is', the functions of unity expounded in the Table of Judgments will yield the modes of combination in general (#19). When applied to a manifold of sensible intuition, they give the modes of synthesis or Table of Categories (#20). This way of leading into the categories after a discussion of the unity of apperception is much superior to the original discussion in the Metaphysical Deduction.⁹⁵ But Wolff disagrees, and in my view, rightly so, with both Aidckes and De Vleeschauwer: "It is still the case, however, that the Tables of Judgments and Categories are ad_hoc at this point in the argument. Rather. Kant should modify his exposition slightly so that he claims here merely the existence of such tables, and not yet their possession. In practice, he does just this, for the second edition Deduction makes no more detailed reference to particular categories than did the first edition."⁰ That is to say: "the objectivity of the particular categories" is precisely <u>not</u> demonstrated. And Kemp-Smith says that "the Analytic of Concepts supplies no proof of the validity of particular categories, but only a quite general demonstration that forms of unity, such as are involved in all judgment, are demanded for the possibility of apperception. The proofs of the indispensableness of specific categories are first given in the Analytic of Principles."⁷ I will now turn to a discussion of the

"Principle of Succession in Time, in accordance with the Law of Causality" (E 231; NKS 218).

(3)

It is worth our while to begin the discussion of Kant's Second Analogy with a remark concerning its place in the main argument of the Analytic. In The Discipline of Pure Reason, Kant characterizes the way we prove transcendental synthetic propositions, that is, the principles of the pure understanding, to the effect that "our guide is the possibility of experience" (A 783 = 8811; NKS 621). In particular, Kant says with respect to the Second Analogy, according to which "all alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect" (B 232; NKS 218), that its "proof proceeds by showing that experience itself, and therefore the object of experience, would be impossible without a connection of this kind" (A 783 = B 811; NKS 621). Whatever ramifications Kant's proof of the Second Analogy has for the "General Problem of Pure Reason" (B 19; NKS 55), its significance for his strict epistemological-transcendental inquiry consists in the assertion that the law of the connection of cause and effect is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience.

Now this claim is but a specification of "the general principle of the analogies" which in its revised version says that "experience is possible only through the

representation of a necessary connection of perceptions" (B 218; NKS 208). This tenet, however, is but a reformulation of the conclusion of the Transcendental Deduction. "Experience," Kant maintains, "is knowledge by means of connected perceptions" (B 161; NKS 171), or "the thoroughgoing synthetic unity of perceptions is... the form of experience" (A 110; NKS 138). And this conclusion, it will be remembered, is held to follow from the 'I think,' that is, from the necessary unity of consciousness. The same point is made by Kant himself at the beginning of the Analogies: he ties what he is about to say to the main thread of his argument: "The general principle of the Analogies, " he says, "rests on the necessary unity of apperception" (B 220; NKS 209). That it so "rests" means that it, and the three Analogies themselves, are implied by, and hence necessary for, the unity of apperception.

It is the first-edition version of the Principle of the Analogy which tells us in some detail in which sense the Analogies go beyond and deepen, the result of the Transcendental Deduction: "All appearances are, as regards their existence, subject <u>a_priori</u> to rules determining their relation to one another in <u>one_time</u>" (A 177; NKS 208). That is to say: the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions, of which the revised version of the Principle talks, is a representation, by means of <u>a_priori</u> rules, of a necessary <u>temporal</u> connection among perceptions; of a manifold of perceptions "as it exists objectively in time"

(B 219; NKS 209). And it is precisely this representation, we ought to note, in terms of which Kant finally gives the most explicit answer to the question which he first asks in his letter to Herz^{δ} and which keeps recurring in the Analytic, namely, what "we mean by the expression 'an object of representations'" (A 104, NKS 134; A 129, NKS 149; A 155 = B 194, NKS 192; A 197 = B 242, NKS 224). And the answer is that to confer "<u>relation to an object</u> upon our representations" consists in "subjecting the representations to a rule, and so in necessitating us to connect them in some specific manner... as regards their <u>time-relations</u>" (A 197 = B 242 f.; NKS 224; emph. mine).

And again it is of importance for Kant that we see how the temporal character of synthetic unity, or of necessary connection, which here in the Analogies comes to the fore, is related to the Transcendental Deduction and its central thought, that is, the necessary unity of apperception. All the manifold of intuition, he says here, "must, as regards its time-relations, be united in the original apperception." This, he continues, "is demanded by the <u>a priori</u> transcendental unity of apperception, to which everything that is to belong to my knowledge (that is, to my unified knowledge), and so can be an object for me, has to conform" (A 177 = B 220; NKS 209 f.). Now with this claim we are already acquainted: in the opening sections of the Transcendental Deduction in B, Kant argues that "the synthetic unity of consciousness... is a condition under
which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me" (B 136; NKS 156). And this tenet Kant makes immediately explicit as the Principle of Apperception, which is "the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge" (B 135; NKS 154), and which says that "all my representations in any given intuition must be subject to that condition under which I can ascribe them to the identical self as my representations, and so can comprehend them as synthetically combined in one apperception through the general expression, '<u>I think</u>'" (B 136; NKS 157).

The "condition" which the Principle of Apperception in general terms refers to, is "synthesis," that is, the synthesis of representations in "a concept" (B 137; NKS 156), in a category (B 143; NKS 160), or in a concept of an object in General (A 93 = B 126; NKS 126). And to establish in this way synthetic unity of a manifold of representations is to unite them in one consciousness. Here in the Analogies of Experience, synthetic unity becomes specified as the "synthetic unity in the time-relations of all perceptions," and the individual Analogies are said to be rules of synthesis by which this unity is brought about, i. e., "rules of universal time-determination" (A 177 f. = B 220; NKS 210). Hence the cate ory for example, that is under discussion in the Second Analogy is but a particular instance of that general condition of synthesis of which the Principle of Apperception talks. Therefore, to prove the Second Analogy, is not only to prove that the category of

cause and effect is required for the possibility of experience: that it is, in other words, one of the indispensable and "fundamental concepts by which we think objects in general for appearances" (A 111; NKS 138), but <u>also</u> to prove that this category is, ultimately, a necessary condition of the unity of consciousness itself.

(4)

The initial and perhpas central difficulty of the Analogies consists in Kant's notion of the time-order of representations in apprehension which is "always successive" (A 198 = B 243; NKS 224), "accidental" (B 219; NKS 209), "arbitrary" (A 193 = B 238; NKS 222), "undetermined" (A 193 = B 238; NKS 221) and "<u>subjective</u>" (A 193 = B 238; NKS 221), but which is <u>objectified</u> or rendered "<u>objective</u>... by reference to a <u>rule</u>" (A 195 = B 240; NKS 223; emph. added) or category such that the "time-order" of the representations is now a "<u>necessary</u> order" (A 206 = B 245; NKS 226; A 194 = B 239 f.; NKS 222, emph. added).

The <u>terminus a quo</u> of objectivation, however, the notion of a subjective time-order of representations, is dubious: it is inconsistent with the result of the Transcendental Deduction. Thus Kant asserts in A that "according to [the principle of the unity of apperception] all appearances, without exception, must so enter the mind or be apprehended, that they conform to the unity of apperception. Without synthetic unity in their connection,

this would be impossible" (A 122; NKS 145). And the corresponding claim in B is that "all sensible intuitions are subject to the categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one consciousness" (B 143; NKS 160). But given this tenet, Kant is faced with the following dilemma:

(1) If the representations <u>do</u> conform to the unity of apperception, i. e., possess synthetic unity and are subject to the categories, then their order in consiousness can be no other than an <u>objective</u> [ct], that is, <u>necessary</u> [ct] order.

(2) If they do <u>not</u> conform to the unity of apperception and do not possess synthetic unity, then they cannot be "apprehended," "enter," or "come together in" one consciousness, and <u>no time-order</u> whatsoever can be assigned to them.

I have shown that a manifold of representations which stands together in one consciousness but that does not possess synthetic unity is <u>subjective</u> [o], that is, something whose constitution is transcendentally impossible. And Kant's notion of a subjective time-order of representations <u>is</u>, it appears, subjective [o]: it is an order in consciousness, but not a necessary order. But to give up necessity, that is, synthetic unity, is to give up everything. The result is <u>not</u> one consciousness of a multiplicity of representations whose time-order would be subjective instead of objective [c1]. The result, rather,

is a multiplicity of consciousnesses of one representation each (cf. B 134; NKS 154; cf. A 352; NKS 335): and in this case the very notion of a temporal <u>order</u> of representations no longer applies.

Accordingly, Kant's doctrine of a subjective time-order of representations in apprehension has to be abandoned. At first sight this seems to be fatal: it has been suggested, for example by Wolff, that "the central insight of the Secona Analogy is the distinction between subjective and objective time-order."⁹ and that "the proof of the Analogy ... demands two contrasting orders, both of them conscious."¹⁰ Similarly Strawson argues that it is essential for Kant to distinguish "two sets of relations: (1) the time-relations between the objects which the perceptions are to be taken as perceptions of; (2) the time-relations between the members of the (subjective) series of perceptions themselves."¹¹ Without this distinction, Strawson claims, Kant could not distinguish between "objects and perceptions of objects" and "all attendant notions would collapse too: i. e., the notion of a subjective or experiential route through an objective world, the possibility of empirical self-consciousness, the necessary self-reflexiveness of experience, hence the very notion of experience itself."¹²

(5)

One way out of the dilemma, and one which Eant

himself takes, consists in the introduction of an additional synthesis which accounts for the subjective time-order of representations in consciousness. Thus Kant talks about, for example, the "apprehension" of representations as "their reception in the synthesis of imagination" (A 190 = B 235; NKS 219). He mentions a "synthesis of apprehension" (A 192 = B 237; NKS 221) and "a subjective synthesis of apprehension" (A 195 = B 240; NKS 223). And he refers to the "synthetic faculty of imagination" (B 233; NKS 218) or to the "synthesis of the manifold by the imagination" (A 201 = 246; NKS 226). But there are two considerations which count strongly against Kant's assumption of a second synthesis.

First: whatever these syntheses elsewhere in the <u>Gritique</u> are supposed to accomplish, they are definitely <u>not</u> claimed to generate a <u>subjective</u> time-order of representations. On the contrary, in the Subjective Deduction in A they form essential moments of the Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept. In other words: they are required for the synthetic unity of a manifold of intuition in a pure concept. Thus Kant says, for instance, that a manifold of intuition, if "unity of intuition" is to arise out of it, "must first be run through, and held together." This "act" he calls the "<u>synthesis of apprehension</u>," and this synthesis is necessary for a manifold to "be represented as a manifold, and as contained <u>in a single</u> representation" (A 99; NKS 131 f.). And the latter notion

is, ironically, precisely the one which in the Second Analogy Kant needs in order to distinguish between a succession of representations in apprehension and the representation of an objective succession.

Second: it is the very point of the Transcendental Deduction that for a manifold of representations "to come together in one consciousness" not <u>any</u> synthesis is required, but their synthesis by means of the categories "alone" (B 143; NKS 160). In no other way is the unity of consciousness possible. Of any other synthesis, therefore, the following can be said: if it is thought to take place prior to the synhesis by the understanding, we are asked to entertain the meaningless notion of a time-order of representations which is not in consciousness. And if it is thought to take place after the synthesis by the understanding, then the time-order of the representations will already be a necessary orcer. In othe words: any other synthesis, in addition to the synthesis in a pure concept, is either no solution of the problem at all, or else there is no problem for it to solve.

(6)

The other way out of the quandry derives from a distinction which Kant draws at the beginning of the Second Analogy. The distinction concerns the notion of a representation and is crucial: kant makes it in order to answer, finally, the question as to what, in the

Critical-transcendental sense, has to be understood by "an oject of representations" (A 104; NKS 134).

The distinction under consideration is the one first formulted by Descartes, who in his Third Meditation distinguishes between ideas taken "only in themselves."¹³ as "certain modes of my thoughts, "14 and as unrelated "to anything beyond. "¹⁵ and ideas 'properly so called' which are, "so to speak, images of the things"¹⁶ and which are. therefore, related to something "else beyond themselves."17 The very same distinction underlies, for example, Kant's claim in the Transcendental Aesthetic according to which "all representations, whether they have for their objects outer things or not, belong, in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state" (A 34 = B 50: NKS 77). It is to be found in the body of the Second Analogy where Kant talks about representations qua "modifications" (A 197 = B 242: NKS 224) or "inner determinations of the mind" (A 197 = B 242; NKS 224) in contradistinction to "an object for these representations (A 197 = B 242; NKS 224). And finally we have the distinction at the beginning of the Second Analogy where Kant refers to representations qua "objects of consciousness" and representations qua_representations, that is, "viewed... in so far as they stand for an object" (A 190 = B 235; NKS 219).

Of decisive importance now is the interpretation of Kant's further claim, namely that representations qua

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objects of consciousness "are not in any way distinct from their apprehension" (A 190 = B 235; NKS 219). It appears that Paton, for example, and in particular Wolff, are correct when they take Kant to mean here that representations qug objects of consciousness do not differ from their apprehension with respect to their <u>jime_order</u>. That is to say: the time-order of representations in apprehension is their time-order <u>qug</u> objects of consciousness. Wolff calls this their "<u>subjective</u> <u>jime_order</u>."¹⁸ And from it we can now distinguish their opjective_time_order which, according to Wolff, is "their order <u>qug</u> representations, which is to say, the order in objective time of the states or events of which they are representations."¹⁹ It is the time order in which they are "connected in the object" (A 190 = B 235; NKS 220).

Thus, when Kant says in the proof of the Principle of the Analogies, for instance, that in apprehension representations "come together only in accidental order," that is, "without necessity determining their connection," he is talking about representations qua objects of consciousness and their subjective time-order. But when he continues to say that in experience [ct] "the manifold (of representations) has to be represented... as it exists objectively in time" (B 219; NKS 209), he refers to representations qua representations and their objective time-order. The whole point, of course, for Kant's quandry is the fact that both orders can, in Wolff's words, "exist

in consciousness. "²⁰ Representations, he says, have a "double nature." As objects of consciousness "they are apprehended in a subjective time-order. But as representations, they form the content of empirical judgments which assign them to an objective time-order."²¹

In my opinion, however, this solution does not survive scrutiny. To be sure, we can talk about the "double nature" of representations and there is, as we shall see, a legitimate use for this notion. What is questionable, however, is the inference to the further claim that they have this double nature also "in consciousness," a claim from which, if correct, the doctrine of the two time-orders "in consciousness" would immediately follow. But the inference, in my view, is fallacious: it rests on an unresolved ambiguity of the expression 'in consciousness,' an ambiguity of which, it appears, not only Wolff is the victim, but in the first place, Kant himself.

In keeping with a considerable number of seventeenth and eighteenth-century theories, I interpret the expression first in the <u>optological/metaphysical</u> sense. A representation, viewed not in its representational function, but in respect of its existence or the kind of entity it is, is 'in consciousness' or 'in the mind' because there can be no representation unless there is a mind which is conscious of it. "No thought," Descartes says, "can exist apart from a thing that thinks."²² "Ideas," according to Locke, "are nothing but perceptions of the mind."²³ And Berkeley

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states that the "existence of an idea consists in its being perceived," which is to say that ideas "cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them."²⁴

Without a doubt, we must understand Kant's claim in the same sense, that "in itself" a representation has "no objective reality," but "exists only in being known" and is "otherwise nothing at all" (A 120; NKS 144); or his assertion that "if it were altogether impossible to become conscious of [representations], this would practically amount to the admission of their non-existence" (A 10&a; NKS 142); and finally, all those passages in which he states the doctrine of Transcendental Idealism and maintains that representations "have...no independent existence outside our thought" (A 491 = B 519; NKS 433) or that they "cannot exist outside our mind" (A 492= B 520; NKS 440), but only "in us" (A 372, NKS 347; A 42 = B59; NKS 440).

It seems that Kant here is firmly committee to the traditional ontological/metaphysical conception of a representation being 'in consciousness' or 'in the mind.' In what follows, however, I shall show that this sense is at variance, if not incompatible, with the transcendental nature of his argument. He may, <u>perhaps</u>, be allowed to make use of this sense simply for reasons of exposition, that is, for an intelligible formulation of the problem of objectivity [ct]. But where ne sets forth the solution in the Transcendental Deduction and in the Analogies, it can no longer be taken for granted. In particular the

ontological/metaphysical sense of 'in consciousness' cannot be used to procure representations and their subjective time-order a 'subrepetitious entry' as it were, into consciousness, that is, an entry without their conforming to the condition of its unity.

We find now in the Transcendental Deduction and in the Analogies a number of passages in which the discussed sense of 'in consciousness' has not been set completely aside and still holds its sway. Kant says, for example, that representations "enter the mind" (A 122, NKS 145), "stand" (B 132, NKS 153) or "come together in one consciousness" (E 143; NKS 160), that they are "generated in the mind successively" (A 190 = E 235; NKS 220) or simply "in us"(A 197 = E 242; NKS 224). These claims, one might say, are couched in a more or less metaphorical language and doubtlessly can be phrased in a less offending way. But one can also say that here the language betrays a defect in the substance, that is, in the argumentation, and therefore has to be looked at without charity.

What is at issue in these passages are not only the conditions, in Critical-transcendental terms, of experience or of empirical knowledge, but also of a mind or of consciousness itself. The transcendental possibility of both is inextricably linked by the very structure of the argument: the categories, it is claimed, precisely in so far as they unite a manifold of representations in an object [ct], render also the unity of consciousness in these

representations first of all possible. And this unity is, according to Kant, the form of consciousness in general, i. e., of any consciousness whatever.

But if the transcendental constitution of consciousness itself is here indeed the issue, then Kant cannot legitimately at the same time presuppose 'consciousness' or 'mind' in the ontological/metaphysical sense, and make use of it as something which, for example, representations "enter" or "in" which they already "are." On the contrary: we must say that nothing can be said to be "in consciousness" prior to its constitution, that is, unless the conditions of its unity are fulfilled. And it is in the light of these strictures that we should look at the passages at hand.

Thus Kant says that representations cannot "enter the mind" unless "they conform to the unity of apperception" (A 122; NKS 145). The latter clause, clearly, belongs to the transcendental discourse proper of the Deduction. The former clause, however, which derives from the ontological/metaphysical sense of 'in consciousness,' is illegitimate in the present context, which purports to be transcendental. In fact, the damage in this particular passage is negligible precisely because of the <u>transcendental</u> condition which Kant places on the onological/metaphysical notion of representations entering the mind. As a consequence this notion dissolves or cancels itself: what Kant is claiming here is simply that there can

be no consciousness unless the condition of its <u>unity</u> is satisfied. The damage is severe, however, when Kant says in the Second Analogy with respect to the subjective time-order of representations that they "are generated in the mind successively" (A 190 = B 235; NKS 220). For Kant has no right to refer to anything being generated "in the mind" if the argument concerns the transcendental possibility of a mind, that is, of its unity, in the first place.

The same objection applies, in my view, to the introductory passage (A 197 = B 242; NKS 224) to the fourth proof of the Second Analogy where Kant now <u>explicitely</u> accounts for the subjective time-order in terms of the ontological/metaphysical sense of representations being 'in consciousness.' "We have representations in us," he says, "and we can become conscious of them. But how far this consciousness may extend...they still remain mere representations, that is inner determinations of our mind in this or that relation of time" (emph. added). Clearly, the subjective time-order of representations in consciousness is here a corollary of the <u>ontolorical/metaphysical</u> sense of 'in consciousness'. Kant then shifts ground and turns to the epistemological/transcendental question, namely, as to how it "comes about that we posit an oject for these representations, and so, in addition to their subjective reality, as modifications, ascribe to them some mysterious kind of objective reality." The question is, in other words, how it is possible for a representation to acquire

"objective meaning in addition to its subjective meaning which belongs to it as determination of the mental state." And Kant's answer, which no longer will do, is that the representations, which are "in us" and which as modifications of the mind stand "in this or that relation of time," must be subjected to a rule such that they are "necessitated in a certain order as regards their time-relations," which is to say, possess an objective [ct] time-order.

(7)

Although the passage under consideration (A 197 = B 242; NKS 224) is a failure in the sense that Kant does not succeed to account legitimately for the subjective time-order of representations 'in consciousness,' the passage is nevertheless of interest precisely because of the admixture of ontological/metaphysical and epistemological/transcendental considerations that it contains. Let us, therefore, examine it further.

I begin by exploring a different and uncritical answer to the question concerning the "object for these representations," that is, the answer given by Transcendental Realism as Kant refers to the netaphysical doctrine which ne claims to be inherent in Descartes's Empirical Idealism. For the transcendental realist, the objects corresponding to our representations, Kant says, "in the manner in which they are represented, as extended beings

or as alterations," <u>Go have</u> an "independent existence outside our thoughts," that is, they are not "mere modifications of our sensibility," but "self-subsisting things" or "things-in-themselves" (A 491 = B 519; NKS 439; of. A 369 f.; NKS 346 f.). And furthermore, according to Kant's account, it is precisely because they "exist independently of us" and have "an existence by themselves," that the <u>objects</u> of our representations are said to be "outside us" or "external" (A 369; NKS 346). The <u>representations</u>, on the other hand, have no independent existence; their "reality... depends on immediate consciousness" and are therefore "never to be met with save in us" (A 372; NKS 348) and said to "exist only in us" (A 42 = B 59; NKS 82).

According to this view we can now distinguish two different time-orders. The first is the time-order of the independently existing <u>objects</u> of our representations: it is a time-order "apart from" or "outside us" (A 373; NKS 346). The other is the time-order "in us" or "in the mind." And if we now say that for the transcendental realist the domain of the 'objective' is the domain of the independently real and external, and by contrast the domain of the merely 'subjective' the domain of the only dependently real or inner, then the first time-order will be an objective, and the second will be a subjective time-order. This, then, is the historical setting, in outline at least, of kant's claim in the passage under discussion, namely that our

representations stand <u>qua</u> "inner determinations of our mind in this or that relation of time:" the setting is an ontological/metaphysical one, and so is the claim itself.

It is not necessary to rehearse here the various arguments, both metaphysical and epistemological, that have been advanced to the effect that within this framework the expression 'an object corresponding to our representations' is ultimately incoherent or internally inconsistent; why on this view the "objective reality" of our representations, namely that they represent something other than themselves, is, as Kant himself says, "mysterious," and consequently, the notion of a representation itself. Of importance here is only that for Kant an 'object of representations is not an independently real object, and that it is not the latter "which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard and arbitrary" (A 104; NKS 134) and so makes them knowledge, which is to say, objective [ct]. Objectivity [ct], for Kant, is not grounded in the independently real, but in necessity. An object [ct], he claims here in the Second Analogy, consists in the representation, by means of a rule or category, of the necessary temporal relation among representations themselves. And the necessity of this relation is, as is "all necessity, without exception, ... grounded in a transcendental condition" (A 106; NKS 135), namely in the transcendental unity of apperception.

We see now quite clearly that in the passage under consideration, Kant is confused about what can be

legitimately contrasted with what. The contrast of objectivity [ct]: of the "objective reality," the "objective meaning," and the necessary and therefore objective time-order of our representations is <u>not</u> their merely "subjective reality" or "subjective meaning," or their subjective time-order, i. e., their standing <u>qua</u> "inner determinations of the mind in this or that relation of time." Objectivity [ct] is a Critical-transcendental notion and can only be contrasted, as I have shown, with subjectivity [o]. The subjectivity here, however, which Kant ascribes to the "reality" and the "meaning" of our representations is an <u>ontological/metaphysical</u> notion: it derives solely from the fact that a representation depends, for its existence or its reality, on a mind or a <u>subject</u> that is conscious of it.

What is at issue here, however, is not only kant's confusion of contrasts. It appears that I can go one step further and say that in his Critical-transcendental inquiry there is no room for this type of subjectivity, because there is no room for the notion of a representation <u>qua</u> modification or determination. And if this notion has to be given up, then we will have to give up the doctrine of the double nature of representations itself.

To say, in the ontological/metaphysical scheme under consideration, that representations are, in the existential sense, modifications or determinations, is to say that they necessarily belong to, or inhere in, a <u>substance</u>. By the

latter we understand, if we abstract from the concurrence of God, a thing which, in Descartes's words, for example, "so exists that it needs no other thing to exist,"²⁵ but on which for their existence the representations depend: "it is certain that no thought can exist apart from a thing that thinks;... no accident without a substance in which to exist."²⁶

The point here is that on this view, and if we take the notion of a representation <u>qua</u> modification seriously, the <u>unity</u> of consciousness turns out to be analytic: it is the consequence of the concept of a thinking substance and of a representation <u>qua</u> modification of such a substance. Representations are 'in the mind' because of their nature <u>qua</u> modifications, and to say that a plurality of representations is in one mind is to say that there exists, as Kant himself characterizes the view, an "I" in which, as their "common subject" they "inhere" (A 350; NKS 334).

But then the objection will be: if representations <u>qua</u> modifications, <u>qua</u> "inner determinations of our mind" are indeed indispensable for Kant, then his dentral, and anti-Cartesian claim according to which the unity of consciousness is synthetic, is unintelligible, and the principle of the synthetic unity of consciousness superfluous: "All <u>my</u> representations in any given intuition must be subject to that condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as <u>my</u> representations, and so can comprehend them as synthetically contined in one

apperception through the general expression, 'I think'" (B 136; NKS 157). But if, on the other hand, we take the principle seriously, as we certainly must, then we ought to eliminate from Kant's transcendental argument, as an extraneous element, the notion of a representation <u>qua</u> modification and everything that this notion entails: that our representations, as we have seen, are 'inner' and 'subjective,' and that they have an 'inner' and 'subjective' time-order that subsequently becomes objectified (A 197 = B 242; NKS 224).

Now it goes almost without saying that in the Paralogism Kant denies what the notion of a representation qua modification implies, namely the view that in his own words, "everyone must...necessarily regard himself as substance, and thought as [consisting] only [in] accidents of his being, determinations of his state" (A 549; NKS 333). This is not the place to examine in detail Kant's discussion of the First Paralogism. The suggestion is only that his attack of the claim that "I, as thinking being (soul), am substance" (A 34 δ ; NKS 333) could have included, and quite obviously so, an attack of the notion of a representation qua modification. For clearly, this notion makes sense only in conjunction with this, as Kant calls it, <u>dogmatic</u> view. That is to say: we can apply the notion of a modification when we talk, dogmatically, for example, about "the real subject in which thought inheres" (A 350; NRS 334), "the subject in itself" (A 350; NKS 334) or about the "I" as

"self-<u>subsisting</u> being" or "<u>substance</u>" (E 407; NKS 369). But we can no longer apply it when we talk in Critically correct language, that is, talk for instance about "the constant logical subject of thought" (A 350; NKS 334), "consciousness... as the transcendental subject" (A 350; NKS 334), the "I of apperception" (E 407; NKS 369), or about the "I in every act of thought" (B 407; NKS 369).

(8)

I have said above that the initial difficulty of the Analogies consists in Kant's notion of a <u>subjective</u> time-order of representations, which is claimed to be in consciousness and to serve as the basis of objectivation [ct]. This notion, I have pointed out, is incompatible with the principle of the synthetic unity of apperception, which allows only of one, that is, <u>objective</u> [ct] time-order of representations in consciousness. And the notion, as we have shown, can be saved neither by the introduction of an additional synthesis, nor by invoking the traditional doctrine of the double nature of representations.

In my view, the difficulties in the Transcendental Deduction and here in the Analogies that surround some of Kant's uses of the terms 'subjective,' 'objective,' and their cognates, result from the fact that the notion of objectivity [ct] is a <u>constitutive</u> notion and as such has as its proper contrast the notion of subjectivity [o] which signifies something which as a matter of principle <u>cannot</u> be constituted. Thus, being constitutive of experience, objectivity [ct] can be exemplified in experience, that is, is exemplified in any empirical judgment. For given the identity of the categories and the logical functions of judgment in so far as the latter "are employed in the determination of the manifold of a given intuition" (B 143; NKS 160), an act of judgment is an act of objectivation [ct]: it is "nothing but the manner" in which such a manifold is "brought to the objective unity of apperception" (B 141; NKS 159) and thus determined. But there can be no judgments which would exemplify the 'undetermined' or subjectivity [o]: in which, let us say, a manifold of sensible intuition would be brought to the 'subjective unity of apperception.' In the transcendental discourse at hand, this term is meaningless: it involves, to be sure, not only a logical, but an epistemic contradiction. Yet Kant nevertheless uses the term (cf. B 139; NKS 157), and uses it in contradistinction to the objective unity or apperception, as he correspondingly distinguishes "the objective unity of representations from the subjective" (E 142; NKS 159). This, it seems, is not a matter of careless terminology on kant's part, but is due, rather, to the difficulties which the exposition of the notion of objectivity [ct] is faced with, and this precisely because the notion requires that its only legitimate contrast, namely subjectivity [o], cannot be constituted: it is not in the domain of discourse possible to us.

We can, to be sure, characterize the subjective [o] from the 'outside,' as it were. Kant does so himself: he describes it, in opposition to the "unitary experience" (A 123; NKS 146) in "which representations stand compared and connected" (A 97; NKS 130), as "a turmoil" of representations (A 111; NKS 138, my trans.) which fail to "constitute... knowledge... and consequently would be for us as good as nothing" (A 111; NKS 138). It is this state of absolute cognitive blindness to which Kant refers when he talks about "a blind play of representations, less even than a dream" (A 112; NKS 139). And we can go further and say that lack of synthetic unity among the representations implies the 'fragmentation' 27 of the "numerical unity of... apperception" `A 107; NKS 136) and therefore the impossibility of self-consciousness. Not only, thus, would my representations fail to "represent objects" other than myself or to yield "knowledge of myself (as object of inner sense)," but I would "not even be able to know that I have" representations.²⁸ But we cannot tell a story from the '<u>inside</u>' or give a description of what subjectivity [o], i. e., a 'turmoil' or 'a blind play of representations' would be like. For any such description presupposes at least a unitary consciousness: but if we grant this, then we must also grant the rest that is necessary for such a consciousness, that is, the synthetic unity of the representations.

In other words: if according to #19 of the

Transcendental Deduction objectivity [ct] is of necessity the defining mark of our discourse, that is, of our <u>theoretical</u> language, then subjectivity [o] cannot be expressed in this language. It is this impossibility which is the reason for the systematic inadequacy and for the final failure of all our attempts to say anything about, or to illustrate, the subjective [o]: we cannot, as it were, step outside the domain of objectivity [ct].

(9)

We have come across this state of affairs already in the previous chapter where I discussed Kant's doctrine of judgments of perception. Such a judgment is supposed to serve as a contrast to objectivity [ct] in the sense that it expresses an unsynthesized manifold of sensible intuition in one consciousness. But a manifold of this description is not subjective, but subjective [o], and, therefore, strictly ineffable. This is of course the reason why from the very beginning Kant has to admit that the doctrine is self-defeating: he calls, what by hypothesis is not brought to the unity of apperception and hence is not a judgment, e. g.. the expression 'The room feels warm to me,' by its correct name, namely a judgment. Our reconstruction of a judgment of perception, if we recall, consisted in showing that it is necessarily objective in the Critical-transcendental, but subjective in the empirical sense or subjective [s]: that the room feels warm to me does

not mean that, in Kant's words, everybody else in the room should "find it as I do now." 29

The suggestion now is that we have here an example of a possible procedure to deal with an item which Kant considers to be subjective, but wich upon examination turns out to be subjective [o]: namely to try to relocate it in the domain of the constituted, that is, of experience [ct]. As such it will have satisfied the transcendental conditions of the possibility of experience, and therefore be, first of all, objective [ct]. It remains to be seen, then, in which <u>empirical</u> sense of the term the item in question is <u>also</u> subjective: but the point is that in whichever sense it will turn out to be so, it cannot of course be contrasted with objectivity [ct], because it is itself objective [ct].

Let us now turn to the <u>subjective</u> time-order of representations "in apprehension" (A 192 = B 237; NKS 237) which according to Kant is "always successive" (A 189 = B 235; NKS 219; cf. B 225, NKS 213; A 190 = B 235; NKS 220; A 198 = B 243, NKS 224): be it "the apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house" (A 190 = B 235; NKS 220) or that of a ship moving down stream (A 192 = B 237; NKS 221). The subjective time-order or "<u>subjective</u> <u>succession</u>" is, therefore, "entirely undetermined, and does not distinguish one appearance from another," i. e., "it does not prove anything as to the manner in which the manifold is connected <u>in the object</u>" (A 193 = B 236; NKS 221 f.; cf. B 233, NKS 219; A 190 = B 235, NKS 220; emph.

added). In other words: "the subjective succession <u>by</u> <u>itself</u>" (A 193 = B 238, NKS 221; emph. added) does not tell me whether the manifld "in the object" is successive or coexistent: whether I am presented by an empirical object, let us say, of the type 'event' or of the type 'thing,' In order to know this, the manifold of apprehension must be "represented as an object:" it must be brought "under a rule which distinguishes it from every other apprehension and necessitates some one particular mode of connection in the manifold" (A 191 = B 236; NKS 220).

Now, for the sake of the argument, we can grant Kant the claim that the time-order of a manifold of representations in apprehension is always successive, yet must ask why and in which sense this order should also be <u>subjective</u>. If by the latter we mean 'not objective [ct],' then the manifold turns out to be subjective [o]: of such a manifold, however, no consciousness is possible as a matter of principle. But then I cannot even know that the time-order of the manifold is one of succession.

Let us, therefore, discuss the grounds for the other claim, namely that the manifold is <u>successive</u>. In order to know this, I must be able to become conscious of it <u>as</u> successive. This point, it appears, is admitted by Kant, inadvertently though, when he says that "I am conscious only that my imagination sets one state before and the other after, not that one state precedes the other in the object" (B 233; N&S 219). Such a consciousness, however, requires,

as does on Critical-transcendental principles <u>all</u> consciousness in the strict sense of the term, for its very possibility the synthesis of the manifold by means of the categories.

The claim that "it must be possible for the 'I think" to accompany all my representations" (B 131; NKS 152) implies that all my representations must allow of being objectified [ct]. The claim does not mean, however, that all of them must allow of being objectified [ct] in space, i. e., be representations of an emprically external object. But it does mean, in conjunction with the further claim, namely that "all representations, whether they have as their objects outer things or not, belong, in themselves... to our inner state" (A 34 = B 50; NKS 77), that all my representations must allow to be synthesized or connected, as Kant puts it in the Prolesomena, in "a consciousness of my particular state."³⁰ And it is such a consciousness which is required if I am to find out or to know empirically, as in the case at hand, anything about my representations "in themselves" as opposed to the objects of which they are sometimes the representations.

At this point it is of crucial importance to make <u>explicit</u> the correct transcendental/epistemological grammar involved in the expression 'a consciousness of my state.' What is brought to the objective unity of apperception and, therefore, determined and <u>known</u>, is my empirical self in the sense that it is predicated and claimed to be true of it, that it apprehends representations successively. This, of course, is an <u>a posteriori</u> claim: what I know <u>a priori</u> is that representations "are in time, and necessarily stand in time-relations" (A 34 = B 51; NKS 77). That the latter in apprehension are always relations of succession, is known by experience, that is, by inner experience. The claim, therefore, is a contingent claim. Its proper domain is, as Kant argues in the <u>Parglogismo</u>, "empirical psychology" (A 343 = B 401; NKS 330), and it is, as some commentators maintain, as a matter of fact <u>false</u>.

But in my view the point is that the expression 'subjective succession' has to be reconstructed as 'the succession of representations in subjects.' The phrase "subjective succession in apprehension" (A 193 = B 238) is, in other words, an empirical claim to the effect that representations in me or in any subject are apprehended successively. And this order can be contrasted only with the temporal order of what is not in me. which here can mean only the temporal order of the empirically external objects of which these representations are the representations of. But to maintain that the time-order of representations is successive in subjects does not mean that it is therefore 'subjective' in an epistemological sense, i. e., subjective as opposed to objective [ct]. To draw this conclusion would mean that, correspondingly, we would have to ground the 'objective' in the object, that is, ground it ontologically. In this case, however, we would have abandoned the Critical

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stance.

I am now in a position to state less ambiguously one of the theses which Kant advances in the Analogies. The thesis can not be that there is a subjective time-order which is "rendered objective by reference to a rule" (A 195 = B 240; NKS 223). Given Kant's central claim, that all consciousness is necessarily consciousness of the objective [ct], such a time-order is systematically elusive. Rather we can take Kant to assert the following. We know from outer experience that the time-order of the objects of our representations is sometimes one of coexistence, and at other times one of succession. From inner experience, however, we know that the time-order of the representations "in themselves," i. e., the order of their apprehension in a subject, is always successive. This orcer, hence, is "entirely undetermined," that is, "<u>by itself</u>... does not prove anything as to the order in which the manifold is connected in the object" (A 193 = B 238; NKS 221 r.; eLph. added). If experience, therefore, were to be construed entirely in terms of a succession of representations, there would be no way in which we could make intelligible to ourselves two types of representations which as a matter of fact we do have: namely the representation of a succession and of a co-existence of representations.

Thus, Kant's disagreement with Hume concerns not the <u>truth</u> of the tenet according to which we find in us nothing "but different perceptions, which succeed each other... and

which are in a perpetual flux and movement."⁵¹ Of this, Kant himself says, "I am conscious" (E 233, NKS 219). The disagreement, rather, is that for experience "successive perceptions"³² are <u>not sufficient</u>. "Experience," Kant says in the Principle of the Analogies, "is possible only through the representation of a <u>necessary connection</u> of perceptions" (A 176 = B 218; NKS 208; emph. added).

(10)

There remains, however, still one sense of 'subjective,' which according to some of Kant's commentators applies precisely to my reconstructed notion of a succession of representations in a subject. According to this view, which derives from the second argument for the Second Analogy (A 189-94 = B 234-39; NKS 219-22), a succession of representations is subjective in the sense that the subject can determine the order in which the representations succeed one another. Thus the manifold of the appearance of a house, for instance, can be represented "either from right to left or from left to right" (A 192 = B 238; NKS 221), either from top to bottom or from bottom to top. "In the series of these perceptions," Kant says, there is "no determinate order specifying at what point I must begin to connect the manifold" (A 193 = B 238; NKS 221). The order, in other words, in this series is "entirely undetermined" (A 193 = B 238; KKS 221), "altogether arbitrary" (ibia.), and reversible (cf. A 193 f. = B 239; NKS 222).

Let us now consider "an appearance which contains a happening" (A 192 = B 237; NKS 221), e. g., a ship moving down stream. In this case, Kant claims, "my perception of its lower position follows upon the perception of its position higher up in the stream, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship should first be perceived lower down in the stream and afterwards higher up (A 192 = B 237; NKS 221). If, in other words, we are dealing with an appearance which contains an objective succession such that A precedes B, then A and D \underline{must} be represented in this order. The representation of B must follow the representation of A, and the representation of A cannot follow upon the representation of 5, but can only precede it. "The order in which the perceptions succeed one another in apprehension is in this instance determined, and to this order apprehension is bound down" (<u>ibid</u>.): it is an irreversible and a "necessary order" (A 193 = E 238; NKS 221).

In my view, it is unjustified to take Kant to assert in this passage that the respective properties of the two orders make the first a <u>subjective</u> and the second an <u>objective</u> [ct] order. This view is expressed by Gram most emphatically. "The distinction," he says, which "Kant makes between a subjective and objective time order comes to this. The time order in which a manifold is presented is subjective if I can vary it at will. This is illustrated by the example of our apprehension of a nouse... There are



other sequences, like that of a ship's movement downstream, which we can allegedly not vary. And the order in which such a manifold is presented is for Kant objective." 33

There is, first of all, no textual evidence for such a suggestion. Kant says, to be sure, that when we perceive an event, "we must derive the subjective succession of apprehension from the objective succession of appearances" (A 193 = B 238; NKS 221). But this does not mean that when we perceive what is not an event, e. E., a house, where no such 'derivation' is possible, the order in the succession is subjective. For neither is Kant's claim here out of the ordinary, nor is it a particularly Critical claim. All he is saying, according to my previous reconstruction, is that when we experience an event, the order in which the perceptions follow one another in the subject is determined by the order in which the appearances follow one another in the object. And this state of affairs does not render the order in the subject objective [ct]. Haa Kant thought it were so, the existence of the Second Analogy would be unintelligible; he would be committed to the view that for our knowledge of an objective succession, as opposed to our knowledge of an cojective coexistence, apprenension is sufficient: for in this case the latter "is bound down" (A 192 = B 237; NKS 221), and its order is an irreversible order.

That an irreversible order is not an objective [ct] order becomes clear once we examine parts of the present

argument itself, and in particular if we look at it as Kant's answer to Hume. There is no doubt that both must be taken to agree that we know that a certain event AB occurs: "I see a ship move down stream." Both differ, of course, in their account of this knowledge. But even here we find at least partial agreement: they concur in the view that "nothing is really given us save perception(s)" (A 493 = B 521; NKS 441) "...in this or that relation of time" (A 197 = B 242; NKS 224). And it seems that Hume would furthermore not guarrel with Kant's other claim, namely that in the experience of an event the orger in the succession of our perceptions is an irreversible order. A crucial step in Kant's argument, however, consists in the tenet that "the objective relation of appearances... is not determined through mere perception" (B 234; NKS 219). Ano this means that a succession of perceptions, even if the order in which they occur is an irreversible order, is not sufficient for our knowledge of the event AB. And to say this is to say that an irreversible order is <u>not</u> an objective [ct] order.

It is for my purposes instructive to look at this matter from a different angle. It appears that in the case of an event the property Kant assigns to the succession of perceptions, brings with it, as it were, an <u>illusion</u> of objectivity [ct]: its order is determined, necessary, and irreversible. But we must not overlook the fact that this order belongs to the succession <u>only</u> within the framework of empirical realism in whose language a considerable part of


the argument is stated.³⁴ The succession of perceptions in the subject, Kant says, that is, in me, is derived from or determined by, the succession of appearances in the object, i. e., in the course of the ship down stream. This, of course, is an empirical and hence <u>a posteriori</u> claim, and it is based on both, outer and inner experience. Thus it presupposes the <u>a priori</u> conditions of the possibility of experience as already fulfilled. In other words: the order in question is an experienced or constituted order, and therefore cannot be said to be constitutive of experience itself.

And indeed, as soon as we enter the domain of Kant's Critical-transcendental inquiry proper and investigate the a priori conditions of the possibility of our knowledge of an "objective succession of appearances" (A 193 = E 238; NKS 221), nothing any longer can be said to be "derived." The transcendental turn in the present argument occurs, in my view, with the "otherwise," which introduces the claim that "by itself," or in the transcendental sense, the succession in the subject is "entirely undetermined" and "altogether arbitrary" and "does not prove anything as to the manner in which the manifold is connected in the object" (A 193 = B 238; NKS 221). In the transcendental sense the succession is <u>radically undetermined</u>: it is a given manifold of intuition which does not possess synthetic unity, and Kant correctly denies it all reference to an object. But he still calls it a "subjective succession," that is, a

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succession in a <u>subject</u>. All reference to a subject, however, ought equally to be dropped, since otherwise the succession as a manifold which does not possess synthetic unity, according to the argument of the Transcendental Deduction, turns out to be subjective [o].

(11)

We concluded our discussion of the last of various senses of 'subjective' with the remark that what gives rise to the problem of the Second Analogy is the radical indeterminateness of what Kant calls in contradistinction to "the <u>objective succession</u> of appearances," "the <u>subjective</u> <u>succession</u> (of representations) in apprehension" (A 193 = B 238; NKS 221), and which on our reconstruction became a succession of representations in a 'a subject.' This manifold is held by Eant to be "arbitrary" or "undetermined" in the sense that "by itself" it "does not distinguish one appearance from another," or "does not prove anything as to the manner in which the manifold (of appearance) is connected in the object" (A 193 = E 238; NKS 221).

For the intelligibility of the problem, however, it is not required that the manifold of representation is in <u>succession</u>. The impression to the contrary derives from Kant's repeated insistence that the apprehension of a manifold is "always successive" (cf. A 198 = E 243; NKS 224). It is sufficient to recognize that the temporal order which obtains in a manifold of representations, be it one of

succession or of simultaneity, is not necessarily the same as the temporal order which "belongs to the manifold in the appearnces themselves" (A 190 = B 235; NKS 220). Thus we might be inclined to think for instance that the successiveness of a manifold of representations "proves" that the represented manifold of appearance is in succession and so constitutes a happening or an event. But mere successiveness is inconclusive: for if I scan, for example, "the manifold in the appearance of a house which stands before me," my representations will succeed one another. Yet this does not mean "what no one will grant," namely, that "the manifold (in the appearance) of the house," e. g., its roof and its basement, is "also in itself successive" (A 190 = B 235; NKS 220), that is, an event.

We can render the indeterminateness under discussion more precisely in the following manner. A manifold of representations is "entirely undetermined" (A 193 = B 238; NKS 221) in the sense that "this or that relation of time" (A 197 = B 242; NKS 224) which in it obtains, "by itself" or "alone" (B 225; NKS 213) affords no evidence whatsoever as to whether the manifold of appearance, which the representations are the representations of, is in itself or "as object of experience... <u>coexistent or in succession</u>" (E 225; NKS 213). It is the neutrality with respect to this alternative, an alternative, that is, between two different basic <u>types</u> of objects, to which Kant refers when he says of the successiveness of our representations that it does "not

distinguish one appearance from another, " or "does not prove anything as to the manner in which the manifold (of appearance) is connected in the object" (A 199 = B 238; NKS 238).

The epistemological problem, then, to which the Second Analogy addresses itself, is how, in general terms, an "entirely undetermined" manifold of representations becomes <u>determined</u>. Specifically, it is the problem on which grounds it is to be decided that it represents a manifold of appearance which is successive, i. e., an "appearance which contains a happening" (A 192 = B 237; NKS 221) or an event, namely "that something, or some state which did not previously exist, comes to be" (A 191 = B 236; NKS 220 f.). Let us, with respect to its solution, first look at the short summary Kant gives of it towards the end of the <u>Critique</u> and where in my view he expresses the basic idea of his argument much more concisely than anywhere in the Analogy itself. He says: "In the Transcendental Analytic... we derived the principle that everything which happens has a cause, from the condition under which alone a concept of a happening in general is objectively possible -- namely, by showing that the determination of an event in time, and therefore the event as belonging to experience, would be impossible save as standing under such a dynamical rule" (A 78δ = B 816; NKS 624). Kant claims here, in other words, the fact that our concept of a happening in general is "objectively possible," that is, in

the terminology of the Postulates, has "objective reality" and hence refers to a possible object of experience and not to "mere fancies" (cf. A 222 = B 269; NKS 241), is subject to a transcendental condition: namely, as he says in the same paragraph, to "the synthetic condition of the possibility of the object in accordance with this concept" (A 781 = B 815; NKS 624). This condition is the "dynamical rule" to which Kant alludes, i. e., the principle of causality. And it renders the object of the concept possible in so far as it makes the "determination of an event in time," which is to say, "the experience... of anything as <u>happening</u>" (A 195 = B 240; NKS 223) first of all possible.

(12)

Our reconstruction of Kant's argument for this claim is based mainly on the first three proofs of the Analogy.³⁵ I begin by recalling what Kant considers to have demonstratea "by reference to the appearance" of a ship which moves down stream (A 192 = E 237; NKS 221), and of a "house which stands before me" (A 192 = B 235; NKS 220). With respect to the former Kant says that "the order in which the perceptions succeed one another in apprehension is in this instance determined" (A 192 = E 237; NKS 221), namely by the order of the events of which they are the perceptions. And with respect to the example of the house, Kant maintains that in this case there is, by contrast, "in

the series of perceptions... no determinate order specifying at what point I must begin in order to connect the manifold" (A 193 = B 238; NKS 221).

Commentators have pointed out, however, that these two claims are only contingent claims. That is to say: "the physical and physiological setting of a perceptual situation" 36 can be imagined to be such that the order in the succession of a manifold of representations is not determined by, or "bound down" (A 192 = B 237; NKS 221) to, the order of the "appearances in their succession" (A 195 = B 240; NKS 223), i. e., of the events. Or the perceptual situation can be conceived to be such that the order in the manifold of representations is determined, although what is represented are appearances which coexist. That a manifold of representations be order-actermined or order-indifferent is, therefore, not a necessary condition for its representing, respectively, an objective succession or an objective coexistence. Nor is it, as I have already shown, a sufficient condition: "it does not prove anything as to the manner in which the manifold (of appearance) is connected in the object" (A 193 = 5 238; NKS 222).

Let us see now how this state of affairs affects Kant's argument. Its purpose, I have said, is to show under which condition an "entirely undeterminea" (A 193 = B 236; NKS 221) manifold of representations can be said to represent an objective succession, i. e., constitute the experience of an event.

(1) Although an objective succession does not imply an order-determined manifold of representations, the latter nevertheless, <u>if</u> it is to represent an objective succession, according to Kant, must at least be <u>assumed</u> or taken to be order-determined: "For <u>mere</u> succession in my apprehension, if there be no rule determining the succession in relation to something that precedes," that is, if the succession is believed to be order-indifferent, "does not justify me in assuming any <u>succession</u> in the object" (A 195 = B 240; NKS 223; emph. added).

(2) Let us suppose that the manifold <u>is</u> order-indifferent and let the representations Ra and Rb represent, respectively, the appearances A and B. Then A can be represented either before or after B. To be sure, this is "by itself" (A 193 = E 238; ;NKS 221) not conclusive proof, i. e., sufficient for the coexistence of A and B, in which case we would contradict our assumption of "a succession in the object" (A 195 = B 240; NKS 223). But this assumption is nevertheless unjustified if the manifold is supposed to be order-indifferent: for there is no basis for assuming of either appearance. A or E, that it must occur after, and cannot be coexistent with, the other, that is, "that it <u>follows</u>" (A 195 = B 240; EKS 223; emph. acued). However, if we take, as Kant says we must, the manifold to be order-determined, then what is represented by Ra, namely the appearance A, must precede what is represented by Ro. the appearance B, which is to say that D must follow upon A.

(3) Now, to say that B must follow upon and cannot precede A implies the "recognition" (A 196 = B 241; NKS 224) of a condition under which alone this temporal relation between A and B is possible, namely that they stand to each other in "the relation of cause and effect" (A 202 = B 247; NKS 227). In order that "the objective relation" (B 234; NKS 219), Kant says, between the appearances A and B "be known as determined, the relation between the two... must be so thought that it is thereby determined as necessary which of them must be placed before, and which of them after, and that they cannot be placed in the reverse relation... The concept which carries with it a necessity of synthetic unity... (is) in this case the concept of the rglation_of gause_and_effect, the former of which determines the latter in time as its consequence" (B 234; NKS 219).

(4) I have said earlier that the epistemological problem to which the Second Analogy addresses itself, results from the indeterminateness of a manifold of representations: its being "entirely undetermined" (A 193 = B 238; NKS 221) with respect to an object of either two basic types, i. e., an object of the type 'coexistence' or of the type 'succession.' I can now say: to claim of a manifold of representations, Rm and Rn, that Rn represents, not an appearance which coexists with what is represented by Rm, but an "appearance which contains a happening" (A 192 = B 237; NKS 221), that is, an <u>eyept</u>, implies the assumption that what Rn represents, namely the event En, follows upon

and cannot precede the event Em which is represented by Rm. But to say that the temporal relation between Em and En is determined and cannot "be placed in the reverse" (B 234; EKS 219), i. e., that En always or "invariably" (A 193 = B 239; NKS 222 / A 198 = B 243; NKS 225) follows upon Em, is to say that En "follows according to a rule" (A 195 = B 240; NKS 222; A 198 = B 253; NKS 225). This rule is "that the condition under which" En "invariably and necessarily follows is to be found in what precedes" it, that is, in Em (A 220 = B 201; NKS 226). Invariable and necessary succession in time, however, is the schema of causality (cf. A $144 = B \ 183$; NKS 185). Therefore: a representation can be said to be a representation "of an event (i. e., of anythint, as <u>happening</u>)...only on (the) assumption" that "appearances in their succession, that is, as they nappen, are determined by the preceding state" (A 195 = B 240; NKS 222).

(5) From here let us now look at Kant's answer to Hume. "The accepted view," Kant says with respect to Hume, "Is that only through perception and comparison of events repeatedly following in a uniform manner upon preceding appearances are we able to discover a rule according to which certain events always follow upon certain appearances, and that this is the way in which we are first led to construct for ourselves the concept of cause" (A 195 = E 240; NKS 223). There is no doubt that Hant agrees with the first part of this statement which concerns, we can say, the empirical procedures by which we discover particular causes

for particular events. "To obtain any knowledge whatsoever... of special laws concerning those appearances which are empirically determined,... we must resort to experience" (E 165; NKS 173). Kant's disagreement is with the second clause wich is a claim about the formation of the concept of cause. He argues, as we have seen, for the following: that a representation Kn of a manifold represents an event or has "relation to an object" (A 197 = B 242; NKS 224) of the type succession, is <u>decidable</u> only if it stands under the Rule of the Second Analogy according to which "I must refer" Rn "necessarily to something else which precedes it." i. e., to Rm, "and upon which it follows in conformity with a rule, that is, of necessity" (A 194 = B 239; NKS 222). It is precisely this procedure, namely the application of the category of cause and effect to RM and Rn. by which an object of the type 'succession,' that is, an event, is first of all constituted.

This, however, means two things. It means, first, that the rule of cause and effect, or the concept of cause, cannot in the proposed manner be derived from experience. On the contrary: the implicit "recognition of the rule, as condition of the synthetic unity of appearances in time, has been the ground of experience itself, and has therefore preceded it <u>a priori</u>" (A 196 = E 242; KKS 224). And it means, second, that a Eumean manifold of impressions, since it does not stand under this rule, is <u>underigable</u>: "by itself," i. e., without the rule, "it does not prove

anything as to the manner in which the manifold is connected in the object" (A 193 = B 238; NKS 222), namely whether any one impression is an impression of an gygnt in the first place. Thus the fact that one impression follows "repeatedly... in a uniform manner upon" (A 196 = B 240; NKS 223) some other impression does not preclude the possibility that the sequence of events which they purport to be the impressions of, is "a sequence that occur(s) solely in the imagination" (B 234; NKS 219), and that in fact they are the impressions of an object of the type 'coexistence.' "Mere succession in my apprehension," Kant says, "if there be no rule determining the succession in relation to something that precedes, does not justify me in assuming any succession in the object" (A 195 = B 240; NKS 223).

(13)

I have already indicated that Kant places the Analogies of Experience in the context of the main argument of the Analytic by claiming that their "general principle... rests on the necessary unity of apperception" (B 220; NKS 209). We can now go further and say of one of the three special principles, namely of the principle of causality or of "the law of the connection of cause and effect" (B 232; NKS 218) that it likewise so "rests," i. e., is implied by, and hence a necessary condition of, the unity of consciousness.

This claim, however, brings us back to the

Transcendental Deduction itself. The central idea of the latter, as expressed in #16, is that the 'I think' or the unity of consciousness requires "a synthesis of representations" (B 133; NKS 153). In #20, Kant arrives at the conclusion that the categories are the conditions of this synthesis: "All sensible intuitions are subject to the categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one consciousness" (E 143; NKS 160). Now synthetic unity of a manifold of representations of any description is Kant's most general definition of an object [ct], i. e., of an object of knowledge. The categories, therefore, are conditions of knowledge and of objects of knowledge. Specifically, they are conditions of experience and of objects of experience, if we are dealing with a manifold of perceptions. "Experience," Kant says in #26 whose title is 'Transcendental Deduction,' "is knowledge by means of connected perceptions" (B 161; NKS 171). This tenet, however, stands at the beginning of the Analogies as their principle: "The principle of the analogies is: Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions" (D 218; NKS 208). The version in A is more detailed in the sense that it specifies this necessary connection as a connection in time: for experience to be possible it is required that "all appearances are, as regards their existence, subject a priori to rules determining their relation to one another in one time" (A 177; NKS 20 δ). The principle of causality,

Kant claims, <u>is</u> such a rule, and what the Second Analogy proves is that this rule is an <u>a priori</u> condition of the possibility of experience. We may recall Kant's answer to Hume: "Recognition of the rule, as a condition of the synthetic unity of appearances in time, has been the ground of experience itself, and has therefore preceded it <u>a</u> <u>priori</u>" (A 197 = E 242; NKS 224). It is with the proof of this claim, then, and not sooner, that the Transcendental Deduction of a particular category, i. e., of the category of cause and effect, finally comes to its conclusion.

¹Norman Kemp Smith, <u>A Commentary to Kant's</u> 'Critique of Pure Reason', New York: The Humanities Press, 1962. p. 258. Hereafter guoted as NKSC. ²Erich Adickes, <u>Immanuel Kants Kritik der reinen</u> <u>Vernunft</u>, Berlin: Mayer & Nueller, 1889, p. 149. ³De Vleeschauwer, III, p. 150, my trs. ⁴De Vleeschauwer, III, p. 151. ⁵Robert Paul Wolff, <u>Kant's Theory of Hental</u> <u>Activity</u>, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, p. 186. Hereafter quoted as Wolff. ⁶Wolff, p. 168. 7_{NKSC.} p. 343. ⁸Zweig, p. 712. ⁹Wolff, p. 275. ¹⁰Wolff, p. 279. ¹¹Strawson, <u>Bounds of Sense</u>, p. 124. ¹²Strawson, <u>Bounds of Sense</u>, p. 124. ¹³Haldane, I, p. 159. ¹⁴Haldane, 1, p. 160. ¹⁵Ealdane, I, p. 159. ¹⁶ Haloane, I. p. 159. ¹⁷ Halaane, I, pp. 159-60. 18_{Wolff, p. 242.} ¹⁹Volff, pp. 243-44. ²⁰Wolff, p. 280. ²¹Wolff, p. 280. ²²Haldane, II, p. 64.

23 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1969, p. 16. 24 <u>Berkeley's Philosophical Writings</u>, ed. David M. Armstrong, London: Collier-Nacmillan, Ltd., p. 62. 25 Haldane, I, p. 239. 26 Haldane, II, p. 64. 27 I owe this term to Rhoda H. Kotzin. 28 Zweig, p. 135. 29 <u>Prol.</u>, p. 46. 30 <u>Prol.</u>, p. 46. 30 <u>Prol.</u>, p. 48. Cf. "Did the Sage of Koenigsberg Have No Dreams?" in Lewis White Beck, <u>Essays on Kant and</u> <u>Hume</u>, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976, pp. 47 f.

³¹David Hume, <u>A Treatise on Human Kature</u>, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1960, p. 233. Hereafter quoted as <u>Treatise</u>.

³²<u>Treatise</u>, p. 253.

³³Koltke S. Gram, <u>Kant, Ontoloky, and the A Priori</u>, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968, p. 142.

³⁴Cf. Lewis White Beck, "Six Short Pieces on the Second Analogy," <u>Essays on Fune and Kant</u>," New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978, p. 141. Hereafter quoted as Beck.

 35 E 232-34. A 189-95 = B 234-39. A 194-95 = B 239-40. I am indebted, in part, to Lewis White Beck, "Once hore unto the Breach: Kant's Answer to Hume," in Beck, pp. 130-35.

³⁶Wolff, p. 268; cf. Beck, pp. 147-50.

Chapter IV

ONE WORLD

"The Other's anger is "outside my experience and belong[s] to a system which is inaccessible to me. Sartre, 226 "There is one single experience." (A 110; NKS 138)

At the beginning of the present inquiry I quoted a passage from Kant's Anthropology in which he considers it to be a "metaphysical" problem "whether I, as a thinking being, have grounds to assume, besides my own existence, the existence of a totality of other beings that stand in community with me, i. e., the existence of what is called 'a world'." To call this a metaphysical problem is, for Kant, to say that it is a problem that falls in the comain of the theoretical or "speculative...employment of pure reason" (A $841 = B \ 869$; hES 659) which answers the question "What can I know?" (A 805 = 833; NES 635). It is, thus, a problem to which the <u>Critique</u> is supposed to provide the answer. Let us now conclude this inquiry by asking how some or its results pertain to the question at hand. In order to do so I shall consider two interpretations. A and B, of the question: the first is Cartesian, the other Critical-transcendental.

(1)

I will, first, interpret it in its original, Cartesian sense according to which, as we have seen, it refers to a thinking substance in which all "activites...falling under the description of thought, perception or the mind" reside as its "accidents" 2 or modifications. Of these, and only of these, such a substance or subject is said to be immediately conscious. According to Descartes some of these immediate objects of awareness are, "so to speak, images of the things." He calls them 'ideas' and gives as examples "my thought of a man or of a chimera, of heaven, of an angel, or (even) or God." Ideas, in other words, besides being mere modifications, have a representational function: they purport to Perer to something "beyond themselves", ⁵ to objects", that is, which "exist outside me,"⁴ or which exist 'independently'.

The problem with this view consists, it is argued, in the fact that it can give us only insufficient grounds for knowing that our ideas indeed refer to something other than themselves. East puts this traditional objection as follows: "I am immediately conscious only of what is in me, that is, of my <u>representation</u> of outer unings: and consequently...it must still remain uncertain whether outside me there is something corresponding to it, or not."

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Hence the "existence of things outside us...must be accepted on mere faith" (B XL; NKS 34). And even the causal argument that infers the existence of external thinks from "inner perception, taking the inner perception as the effect of which something external is the proximate cause" (A 368; NKS 345) is not satisfactory proof. It does not stand up against the objection that it is "far from certain that, if the perception exists, there exists also the object corresponding to it" (A 371; NKS 347). And this is because "the inference from a given effect to a determinate cause is always uncertain since the effect may be due to more than. one cause. Accordingly, as regards the relation of the perception to its cause, it always remains coubtful whether the cause be internal or external; whether, that is to say, all the so-called outer perceptions are not a mere play of our inner sense, or whether they stand in relation to actual external objects as their cause" (A 368; NRS 345).

Under the Cartesian interpretation, then, of the expression 'a thinking being', it is only the existence of myself <u>qua</u> thinking substance that is apodeictically certain. The existence of "a totality of other beings that stand in community with me," i. e., of a world," is, however, in principle open to doubt. "I myself with all my representations," Kant says, am on the Cartesian view something that is "immediately perceived" and whose existence "does not allow of being doubted." Eut with representations to which these representations purport to

refer, we must conclude with the Fourth Paralogism "that we can never, by way of any possible experience, be completely certain as to their reality" (A 369, NKS 345; A 367, NKS 344).

(2)

This "scandal to philosophy" (EXL; NKS 34) is, according to Kant, due to a metaphysical doctrine which he calls Transcendental Realism, "which regards time and space as something given in themselves, independently of our sensibility" (A 369; RKS 346). Rence "outer appearances" or "the objects of outer sense" (A 371; NKS 347) are likewise interpreted as "things-in-themselves, which exist independently of us and of our sensibility" and in this sense are said to be "outide us" (A 369; NKS 346. Cf. A 371; NKS 347). The expressions 'external' and 'outside us' refer on the view under consideration to "what as thing in itself" exists apart from us" (A 373; NKS 346). And it is precisely this, according to kant, that is the source of the epistemological difficulties into which this metaphysical doctrine "inevitably falls." For: since "what is without is not in me, I cannot encounter it in my apperception, nor therefore in any perception." The latter is, "properly regarded...merely the determination of apperception". In the strict sense of the term, "I um not, therefore, in a position to perceive external chings" (A 360, NRS 345).

(3)

These difficulties can be avoided, Kant claims, if we adopt the doctrine of Transcendental Idealism for which he has argued "from the start" (A 370; NKS 346), that is, already in the Transcendental Aesthetic. This doctrine is that "appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, and not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects viewed as things in themselves" (A 369; NKS 345. Cf. B).

On this view, Kant Laintains, the "existence or matter," or of objects that, in Descartes's formulation, "exist outside me," can be accepted "on the unaided testimony of our mere self-consciousness," (A 370; NKS 346), i. c., without the nerp of a causal inference. "There can be no question, the argument loes, "that I am conscious or my representations, these representations and I myself, who have the representations, therefore exist. External objects (bodies), however, are here appearnces, and are therefore nothing but a species of my representations, the objects of which are something only through these representations. Apart from them they are nothing. Thus external things exist as well as I myself, and both, indeed, upon the immediate witness of my self-consciousness" (A 370-71; NKS 346-47). Hence the difference is no longer that it is only myself that I can be said to be 'immediately' conscious or.

This term is now pointless: "the only difference is that the representation of myself, as the thinking subject, belongs to inner sense only, while the representations which mark extended beings belong also to outer sense" (A 370-71; NKS 346-47). This difference, since time and space are, respectively, the forms of inner and of outer sense, can also be expressed as follows: the representation of myself is an empirically 'inner' object in so far as it is "represented only in its <u>time_relations</u>," whereas the representation of an extended being constitutes an empirically 'external' object, i. e., an object that is also "represented <u>jp_space</u>." But both, time and space, are transcendentally ideal: they are not "to be found save <u>jp</u> us" (A 373; NKS 348).

I will not discuss here the various reasons why Kant's argument fails to refute the Cartesian position: why, for example, "it refutes," in Kemp Smith's words, "Descartes only by virtually accepting the still more extreme position of Berkeley."⁵ Kant himself came to realize this: we have the Refutation of the Second Edition and the note pertaining to it in the Introduction which make pronounced use of the results of the Analytic, in particular of the Analogies. But is appears to me, nevertheless, that the doctrine of Transcendental Idealism is at least sufficient to expose some of the mistakes involved in the Fourth Paralogism: I hope that their removal will help us see our original question in the proper, that is to say, in the

Critical-transcendental perspective.

(4)

Let us, then, examine one claim about "the topic of the rational doctrine of the soul" (A 344 = 8402; NKS 330), the claim that underlies the Fourth Paralogism as an unquestioned presupposition and according to which "'I' as thinking being" or "the soul" am said to be "in relation to <u>possible</u> objects in space" (A 344 = 8402, EKS 330-31).

If we interpret, first, the expression 'objects in space' in the transcendental-realistic sense and mean by 'objects' things-in-themselves, and by 'space' a determination that exists by itself or that "attaches to the objects them-selves" (A 26 = E 42; hmS 71): if, in other words, we take the expression to refer to "what <u>as thing in</u> <u>itself</u> exists apart from us" (A 373; HLS 348), then the claim under discussion turns out to be a dogmatic assertion. "No one," Kant says, "is in a position to cecide what an unknown object may or may not be able to do" (A 392; hMS 359).

But if we give, instead, the expression 'objects in space' a transcendental-idealistic interpretation, then the claim of the rational psychologist no longer makes sense. For we cannot say that the cognitive subject "is in relation to possible objects in space," if under this interpretation these objects are more representations and hence 'in us', and the <u>a priori</u> representations of space and the "awell in

us as forms of our sensible intuition" (A 373; NKS 348). "No one," Kant argues, "could dream of holding that what he has come to recognize as mere representation, is an outer cause" (A 390; NKS 358). The only relations conceivable are those that obtain <u>amone</u> the items which are 'in us', i.e., which appear to a subject. These fall for Kant, as we have seen, under the notion of the "empirical object, which is called an external object if it is represented in space, and an inner object if it is represented only in its time-relations" (A 373; NKS 348). Thus Kant says that "in the connection of experience matter, as substance in the (field of) appearance, is really given to outer sense, just as the thinking 'I', also as substance in the (field of) appearance, is given to inner sense. Further, appearances in both fields must be connected with each other according to the rules which this category introduces into that connection of our outer as well as of our inner perceptions whereby they constitute one experience" (A 379; KkS 351-52).

(5)

We are now in a position to expose the basis of the Fourth Paralogism: the causal relation observed to obtain among what Kant calls "empirically external objects" (A 372, NKS 348) is taken to obtain <u>also</u> between the thinking subject and 'objects in space'. That is to say: the latter are taken to be the cause of the representations that the subject is said to have <u>of</u> them. This, of course, implies

the hypostatization of these objects: they are treated as things in themselves. Kant is very clear about this particular point: "we hypostatise outer appearances and come to regard them not as representations but as things existing by themselves outside us, with the same quality as that with which they exist in us, and <u>as bringing to bear upon our</u> thinking subject the activities which they exhibit as appearances in relation to each other" (A 386; NKS 356; emphasis added.)

What Kant maintains here, in other words, is that the philosophical account of our consciousness of empirical objects is not to be construct in terms of the causal relation we observe to obtain between these objects. East himself as we know, is not immune from violating his own stricture: we find, for instance, at the very beginning of the Transcendental Aesthtic the claim that "the effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by it, is <u>sensetion</u>" (A 19 - B 34; NKS 65). It is not necessary to discuss the implications of this tenet here: but it is reasonable to expect that some of them will be the same as some of the positions that are under attack in the chapter on the Faralogism.

В

If we now consider the question Kant raises in the <u>Anthropology</u> in the Critical-transcendental sense, we ought, first of all, to icking ourselves of the purpose and the

limits of a transcendental inquiry.

(6)

Such an inquiry is <u>a priori</u>. Transcendental philosophy, Kant says in <u>Fortschritte</u>, is "the doctrine of the possibility of all <u>a priori</u> knowledge in general, which doctrine is the Critique of Pure Reason".⁶ And according to the <u>Critique</u> itself transcendental knowledge is defined as being "occupied... with the mode of our knowledge of object in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible <u>a priori</u>" (B 25; NKS 59). Leaving the Transcendental Aesthetic aside, it is occupied, in other words, "with our <u>e</u> <u>priori</u> concepts of objects in general."⁷

(7)

These concepts are not concepts by which we distinguish, for example, between chairs and tables. This we do by the respective empirical concepts that are derived from experience, i. e., are <u>a posteriori</u>. An <u>a priori</u> concept of an object in general is basic: it is required to confer upon a manifold of sensible intuition those invariant determinations we think belong to an object as such. And there are essentially two. One is that the manifold has a relation to an object in the sense of something "distinguished from the subject," or of "something other than the subject in which the representation inheres." The other characteristic is that an object in this sense is also

objective or intersubjective, i. e., "valid (communicable) for everyone."⁸ The Critical-transcendental notion of an object does justice to both these features: and object [ct] consists, we have shown, in the representation of the necessary synthetic unity of a manifold of sensible intuition. And it is the categories that impart this unity. They are, thus, "functions of unity among our representations" (A 59 = B 93; NKS 105-6), or concepts "which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity" (A $79 = B \ 104$; NKS 112). And in so far as the different categories are representations of different modes of unity, they can be said to be constitutive of the different modes in which a manifold of sensible intuition can become objective [ct] at all. The categories of relation, for instance, represent synthetic unity as necessary connection: here we have, as Kant says, a "synthesis of the manifold so far as its constituents necessarily_belong_to_one_another, as, for example, the accident to some substance, or the effect to the cause" (B 201; NKS 198, note).

(8)

A transcendental inquiry, thus, is not concerned with how we arrive empirically at a certain piece of empirical knowledge that we express in a synthetic <u>a</u> <u>posteriori</u> judgment such as, for instance, "The body is heavy," or "The sun warms the stone." Such judgments are of

interest only in so far as they raise the question, not of the empirical but or the <u>a priori</u> conditions of their possibility. Among these concitions are the <u>a priori</u> concepts of objects in general in which, Kant claims, a manifold of sensible intuition is united--i.e. thought--and hence known <u>a priori</u>. If, therefore, a manifold is thought in the category of substance and accident, for example, the cognition consists not in our ascription, let us say, of the predicate 'heavy' to a particular body. What is represented a priori and thus comes to be known is that the sensible representations are representations of something permanent or abiding in general. And similarly, if we represent a manifold of sensible intuition in the category of cause and effect, we do <u>not</u> assign, for instance, causal efficacy to the sun in relation to the warmth of the stone. The <u>a</u> priori cognition is that the representations are representations of succession, i. e., of something happening or of an eyent.

(9)

We are now in a position to give at least part of our original question a Critical-transcendental interpretation. In part the question concerns, "the existence of a totality of other beings which stand in community with me." Clearly, if by 'beings' (<u>Wesen</u>, we mean such things as tables, electrons, or flashes of lightning, then the question, lies outside the scope of g

transcendental inquiry and cannot be answered by it: it is an <u>a priori</u> inquiry. Whether there are tables or lightning is a question of fact that can be answered only a posteriori, that is, by experience. But it can be answered only "in accordance with" (A 723 = B 751; NKS 583) the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience. And this means tht we cannot have empirical knowledge of a table or of a flash of lightning unless we know a priori, -- i.e. by the application of a category to manifold of sensible representations -- that the latter are representations of something permanent or of something that happens. For in respect to this alternative a manifold of sensible intuition by itself is, as we have seen in the discussion of the Second Analogy, completely inceterminate or indifferent. The question, therefore, as to the existence of a totality of other beings can in a Critical-transcendental inquiry mean only the question whether the categories que a priori concepts of objects in general indeed do effect a differentiation in the described sense of the given manifold of sensible intuition: a differentiation, that is, into modes in which it can become objective or an object for us.

In the <u>Critique</u> this question is the question of the objective validity of the categories. For it is one thing to say that these concepts are "represented in the mind completely <u>a priori</u>" (A 156 = 5 195; NKS 193). It is quite another thing, however, to show that they are not "a mere play of imagination or of uncerstanding" (A 239 - E 298; NKS

259), but "relate to an object" and so have "meaning and significance in respect to it" (A 155 B 194; NKS 192). And to show this, i. e., the objective validity of the categories, means proving "their necessary application to the objects of experience" (A 156 = 195; NKS 193). And this proof is all that talk about grounds for assuming the existence of a totality of other beings -- i.e., of a world--in a Critical-transcendental induiry comes to. This inquiry is a priori and as such concerns not the existence of world, but the universal and necessary conditions for the constitution of a world in its "formal aspect"⁹ in the first place. And also in the domain of transcendental constitution in this sense belones the question not of what exists but of what we must mean by the notion of existence, and what we mean by it, will be a <u>formal</u> feature of the world. In other words: that the sun warms the stone, for instance, is <u>not</u> such a reature. But what Kant calls a principle, i. e., a synthetic <u>e priori</u> principle of pure understanding, namely that "everything, that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule" (A 189; MKS 218) does express such a feature. Similarly, it is not a formal determination of the world that there are tables. The Principle, however, which says that "that which is bound up with the Laterial conditions of experience, that is, with sensation, is actual" (A 218 = E 266; KKS 239) does state a formal determination of the world. 10

(10)

In the last section I have shown that part of Kant's question in the <u>Anthropology</u> becomes in his Critical-transcendental inquiry the question of the objective validity of the categories. The other part of the question, which I have so far neglected, concerns the expression 'I as thinking being'. In what follows I shall show that it is the very structure of the proof of the objective validity of the categories, that allows me to give the expression 'I as a thinking being' a Critical-transcendental interpretation.

Earlier in my investigation I have said that this proof, which comprises the arguments of the Transcendental Deduction and of the Principles chapter, has as its core the claim that the necessary unity of any finite consciousness in a manifold of representations of sensible intuition implies the synthetic unity of these representations by means of the categories. The central tenet, in other words, is that the unity of consciousness requires as a matter of transcendental necessity that the manifold be constituted as an object [ct]: as something that possesses "objective validity and necessary universality (for everybecy)."¹¹

I have argued above that the proof of the objective validity of the categories issues in the Principles, i. e., in the Synthetic Principles of Pure Understanding that concern the formal determinations of the world. I can now

say, correspondingly, that Kant's claim that the necessary unity of consciousness implies a synthesis of representations (Cf. B 133; NKS 153) and is, therefore, synthetic, denotes an equally formal, <u>a priori</u> and hence universal and necessary determination of any consciousness of such a world. And it is this determination that in my view forms <u>ope</u>, and the fundamental one, of two interpretations to which the expression 'I as a thinking being' in Kant's Critical-transcendental inquiry is susceptible.

Kant's claim of the necessary synthetic unity of consciousness has likewise, as I have already pointed out, the status of a principle: it is the "Principle of the necessary unity of apperception" and is indeed "the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge" (B 135; NKS 154). And the closest tie between it and the principles of pure understanding is that at least some of the latter are claimed to be derived from the former: "the general principle of the three analogies, " Kant says, "rests on the necessary unity of apperception" (B 220; NKS 209). It is, in other words, the very form of consciousness as such, i. e., its necessary synthetic unity, which requires that it be consciousness of an objective [ct] domain, that is, of a world tha formal features of which are described by the principles of pure understanding: of objects which possess extensive and intensive quantity, which are substances that have changing accidents and that stand in causal interaction with other substances. 12

This thesis does not amount to a straightforward. affirmative answer to the question Kant raises in the Anthropology--namely, whether "I as thinking being, have grounds to assume, besides my own existence, the existence of a totality of other beings that stand in community with me, i. e., the existence of what is called 'a world'." Kant's thesis, rather, undercuts the question by maintaining that its first term, 'I as thinking being', cannot be taken for granted, but already presupposes, as the condition of its very possibility, what the question is a question about--that is, a 'world'. For what Kant's thesis says is that as matter of transcendental necessity there can be, in the terminology of the question, no 'I' unless there is a 'world'. In Critical-transcendental terms we find this dependency expressed at the very beginning of the Transcendental Deduction: the "thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of manifold which is given in intuituion contains, " Lant says, "a synthesis of representations" (B 135; NKS 153). And this claim, which we have examined in detail earlier, is really Eant's thesis in its most rucimentary form. The fact, however, that the identity of apperception stands under a condition has to be kept in Lind when in the course of the Analytic the notion of a synthesis of representations is developed. Thus when Hant determines nature in its formal unity as "the synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances according to rules" (A 127; NLS 148)

we have to note that these rules, i. e., the categories, precisely in so far as they are constitutive of a nature or of a 'world', are also constitutive of the identity of apperception itself.

(11)

Let us now modify the original question of the <u>Anthropology</u> and take the 'totality of other beings" to include beings of a particular kind--houses, for example, or thinking beings, or electrons. And let us now investigate what, it will mean, in light of the answer Kant has already given, to ask whether we have "grounds to assume the existence" of any such particular being.

Kant's answer, remember, in brief, was the thesis that the unity of apperception implies an objective [ct] domain. If explicated, the thesis will "instruct us... as to what it is that can be known as an object of experience" (B 165; NKS 173), namely a manifold of sensible intuition which possesses synthetic unity by means of the categories. The thesis does not instruct us, however, in regard to the particular instances of an object of experience: they cannot "be derived from the categories" (B 165; NKS 173). With these we "become acquainted" (my trans.) only <u>a posteriori</u>, that is, "we must resort to experience" (B165; NKS 173).

Here Kant is saying that the categories are necessary but not sufficient conditions for actual experience. They are not sufficient: the categories are
only "indeterminate concepts of the synthesis of possible sensations" (A 723 = B 751; NKS 583). Actual experience requires, in addition, sensation as the material element of experience. But they are necessary: actual experience itself is possible only "in accordance with these concepts as rules of an empirical synthesis" (A 723 = B 751; NKS 583). And this means two things. (1) We can show, on \underline{a} priori transcendental grounds, that something can not be known as an object of experience and hence can not be a member of the objective [ct] domain, by demonstrating that its concept is not in conformity with the Principle of Pure Understanding. Thus the referents of what Kant calls 'ideas of reason' cannot occur in the objective [ct] domain: God, for example, is according to the First Postulate not empirically possible. Similarly, according to the Second Analogy there is no room for miracles in the objective domain. if by a miracle we mean "an event whose cause cannot be found in nature. 13 (2) We cannot prove, of course, on a priori transcendental grounds, what will be known as an object of experience: the Principles, Kant says, cannot "exhibit a priori any one of their concepts." i. e., the categories, "in a specific instance; they can only do this a posteriori, by means of experience" (A 721 = B 749; NKS 581). But if a specific instance is experienced, then it must be experienced "in accordance with" the categories "as rules of an empirical synthesis" (A 723 = B 751; NKS 583). And this we must in principle be able to show of every

specific instance, and to do so amounts to what in Kant's Critical-transcendental inquiry we have to mean by 'to have grounds for' or by 'to give an account of' the instance in question.

Thus we can say that my seeing a house that stands before me--i. e., something that is relatively enduring or permanent--requires, according to the First Analogy, the category of substance and accident. And the reason for this is what I have called the indeterminateness of a manifold of sensible representations: I have said that it is, with respect to any one representation as given, undecidable whether it is the representation of something that is permanent or of something that happens. It is the differentiation of the indifferent given manifold for example into a "happening in general" (A 788 = B 16; NKS 624) or into something permanent in general that, according to Kant, is effected by categories. These are <u>a priori</u> and transcendental differentiations that make our empirical distinctions first of all possible: without them. Kant wants to say, we could not, empirically, distinguish between the ship that moves downstream and the house that stands next to the stream. Hence it is such a priori differentiations that a transcendental account of a specific empirical instance must be concerned with. And it need be concerned with nothing more. Thus, for example, what in the case of the ship comes to be known [ct] is a <u>happening</u> or an alteration that, according to the Second Analogy, demands the category

of cause and effect. Moving ships, in other words, can be known as objects of experience and therefore are members of the objective [ct] domain.

(12)

Before we examine the membership of thinking beings, let us pause briefly and put the problem in context with the main tenets of the Transcendental Deduction.

There is only <u>one</u> objective [ct] domain. "There is one single experience," Kant says, "in which all perceptions are represented as in thoroughgoing and orderly connection...When we speak of different experiences, we can refer only to the various perceptions, all of which, as such, belong to one and the same general experience" (A 110; NKS 138). And there can be only one experience because according to the Principle of the Unity of Apperception, "all appearances, <u>without_exception</u>, must so enter the mind or be apprehended, that they conform to the unity of apperception. Without synthetic unity in their connection, this would be impossible," i. e., I could not say "that I am conscious of them" (A 122; NKS 145, emphasis added).

This tenet entails that for every putative empirical concept we must be able to show that the experience from which it is derived is possible in accordance with the categories. We might <u>not</u> be able to do so because the concept in question upon closer examination turns out to be "fictitious" (A 222 = B 269; NKS 241). Or

the concept might upon inspection turn out to be not empirical at all, but a transcendental idea of which the purported reference to an empirical object rests on a "dialectical illusion" (A 63 = B 88; NKS 100). The same holds for thinking beings: they either belong to the objective domain, or else are 'nothing at all'. What we are not permitted to do is to widen the scope of the objective domain by adding another "original and primitive concept" (A $82 = B \ 108$), i. e., a category to the list we already have. Such a move is forbidden primarily not because Kant claims that the list is complete and exhaustive (A 79 = B 105, NKS 113), but because the objection will be that the experience in question is the exception which the principle of the unity of apperception rules out: that appearances can, therefore, enter the mind without being subject to the categories. All we can do is supplement, adjust or refine some of the membership-criteria for the objective [ct] domain that we already have. And we can see Kant himself doing so: suppose it is argued that electrons can not be known to exsist because the notion of an electron is inconsistent with the Second Postulate according to which "that which is bound up with the material conditions of experience, that is, with sensation, is <u>actual</u> (A 218 = B 266; NKS 239). Here is Kant's refinement: "The postulate bearing on the knowledge of things as <u>actual</u> does not, indeed, demand immediate perception (and, therefore, sensation of which we are conscious) of the object whose

existence is to be known. What we do, however, require is the connection of the object with some actual perception, in accordance with the analogies of experience, which define all real connection in an experience in general" (A 225 = B 272; NKS 242-43).

(13)

I have argued above that Kant's reconstruction of a Cartesian 'thinking being' results, in part, in the notion of the transcendental unity of apperception. If I now show that thinking beings can occur in the objective [ct] domain, I can of course not try to show this for the transcendental unity of apperception itself. The latter can, to be sure, be legitimately investigated in a transcendental inquiry, but cannot itself be an object of what this inquiry tries to establish the <u>a_priori</u> conditions of--that is, empirical knowledge. To call this unity 'transcendental' is to say that it is <u>a_priori</u> necessary for the possibility of experience: it cannot, therefore, itself be experienced.¹⁴

In objective [ct] domain, then, we must take the expression 'a thinking being' to refer to a particular type of empirical object among other such objects. And this is, besides the sense 'transcendental unity of apperception', within the confines of the Critique of Pure Theoretical Reason, all we can mean by the expression. Following Kant, we now understand by a thinking being in this, <u>empirical</u> sense, (1) a being that has 'thoughts, consciousness,

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desires etc., " all of which "belong to inner sense" (A 357; NKS 338-40), and (2) a being that "as man" is also "an object of the outer senses" (B 415; NKS 373).

In what follows I shall establish the membership in the objective [ct] domain first of myself as such a being, and subsequently of other such beings: I will show, in other words, how I myself and Others "can be known as ab object of experience" (B 165; NKS 173). Such a procedure I have called a 'transcendental account'. It is to be expected that the transcendental account' of myself as "an object of the outer senses" (B 415; NKS 373) will follow the general lines which I have indicated above. But so will the account of myself as an object of inner sense. For inner experience or empirical knowledge of myself has the same requirements as experience in general--namely, unity of apperception, the categories, and a given manifold of sensible intuition: "in order to know ourselves, there is required in addition to the act of thought, which brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception. a determinate mode of intuition, whereby this manifold is given" (B 157; NKS 168). The "limiting condition" (B 159; NKS 169), i. e., the fact that in this case the manifold can be represented only in time as the form of inner sense, may complicate the account, but will not affect its nature. Thus the transcendental account, for example of a change of our mood, will not differ in principle from the account of the changing positions of the ship. That is to say: in this

case, too, we are not concerned with <u>empirical</u> distinctions the account of which, according to Kant, belongs to empirical psychology and to anthropology. We are concerned not with what Kant calls the "specific instance" (A 721 = B 749; NKS 581), which is <u>a posteriori</u>, but with what is <u>a</u> **priori** necessary for it, i. e., with transcendental differentiations of a sensible manifold of intuition, which is in this case a manifold of inner intuition only.

To give a transcendental account of Others qua "object[s] of the outer senses" (B 415; NKS 373) should likewise pose no particular problem. But the difficulties appear to be formidable if we attempt to do so with Others taken as beings that have "thoughts, consciousness, desires, etc." (A 357; NKS 338-39). Here is the apparent obstacle: "In the Transcendental Aesthetic we have proved, beyond all question, that bodies are mere appearances of our outer sense and not things in themselves. We are therefore justified in saying that our thinking subject is not corporeal; in other words, that, inasmuch as is it represented by us as object of inner sense, it cannot, in so far as it thinks, be an object of outer sense, that is, an appearance in space. This is equivalent to saying that thinking beings, as such, can never be found by us among outer appearances, and that their thoughts, consciousness, desires, etc., cannot be outwardly intuited. All these belong to inner sense" (A 357; NKS 338-39). Part of this passage is, according to Kant, fallacious and the source of

a paralogism: of the inference, namely, that we must regard "souls as quite different entities from their bodies" (A 358; NKS 339). I have chosen this passage because what it says "seems to be so natural" (A 357; NKS 339) as to give rise to an argument equally fallacious and for the same reasons: I cannot, it is said, have grounds to believe that there are beings other than myself that have "thoughts, feeling, desire, or resolution," for these are "never...objects of outer intuition" (A 358; NKS 339).

(14)

Nothing prevents our giving one and the same transcendental account of both: of Others as objects of the outer senses and of myself as such an object (cf. B 415; NKS 373). "If I want to determine my location in the world as a human being," Kant says, I must "view my body in relation to other bodies outside me."¹⁵ My body, as well as the body of Others, must be considered as what Kant calls "empirically external objects," or as things which are to be found in space" (A 372; NKS 348).

Since the focus of much of the subsequent discussion will be on the categories of relation, I will deal with the problem at hand in terms of the category of magnitude (A 142 = B 181; NKS 183), which I have so far neglected. In particular, I have not examined the proof of its objective validity that results in the Principle of the Axioms of Intuition. This Principle says, as stated in A, that "all

appearances are, in their intuition, extensive magnitudes" (A 162; NKS 197), and in B. that "all intuitions are extensive magnitudes" (B 202; NKS 197). In what follows I will not enter into a detailed evaluation of this proof, but restrict myself to conveying its main idea, and only so far as it pertains to the problem under investigation.

Kant begins the proof with a reference to the Transcendental Aesthetic: "Appearances, in their formal aspect, contain an intuition in space and time, which conditions them, one and all, <u>a_priori</u>" (B 202; NKS 197-98). I will return subsequently to the problem as to the relationship between Kant's doctrine in the Aesthetic and his doctrine here in the Analytic. But it seems that Kant here refers to the claim that space and time are <u>a_priori</u> representations that as such necessarily underlie, repectively, all outer appearances, and all appearances as their <u>form</u> (cf. A 23-24 = B 38-39; NKS 68; A 30-31 = B 46; NKS 74).

We not only intuit appearances, however, in space and time, or in time only, but we represent them as occupying a particular space or time. And it is this, i. e., the constitution of our "representations of a determinate space or time" (B 202; NKS 198) that Kant is concerned with here in the Analytic. At issue, in other words, is the possibility of those of our empirical judgments in which we talk, for example, of a thing's size, of its distance to something else, or of the length of a

happening and the frequency in which it occurs. Also at issue, hence, is the possibility of such judgments in which, in some fashion or other, we predicate determinate spaces or times of our <u>bodies</u>. Thus we say: "The cut in his finger was deep, and the wound took a week to heal." Or: "I am 20 inches taller than my son," which for Kant is an empirical judgment about myself and my son qua "objects for the outer senses" (B 415; NKS 373)--that is, about our bodies.

Kant is now saying, on the grounds of the results of the Transcendental Deduction, that the representation of an appearance as occupying a determinate space or time requires a synthesis. The appearance "cannot be apprehended, that is, taken up into empirical consciousness, save through that synthesis of the manifold whereby the representations of a determinate space or time are generated" (B 202; NKS 298). This synthesis, too, is successive: it is one of "part to part," and as such it involves the repeated position, i. e., the addition of parts of space or of time (A 163 = B 203-04; NKS 198-99; cf. Rfl. 5726; AA 18, 337). The synthesis consists, in other words, in the "combination of the <u>homogespeous</u> manifold and consciousness of its synthetic unity " (B 202-03; NKS 198; emph. added).

According to the Transcendental Deduction, however, every synthetic unity requires a pure concept or category in which a manifold first of all becomes united and hence representable as an object. And here this means: "Consciousness of the synthetic unity of the

manifold...homogeneous in intuition in general, in so far as the representation of an object first becomes possible by means of it, is, however, the concept of a magnitude" (B 203; NKS 198). Every category is, for Kant, a concept of a unity, i. e., a concept that serves as a rule for, and hence governs, a particular combination of the manifold. And so does, Kant maintains, the category of magnitude: the particular type of synthesis of which it is the rule and which it governs is "the successive synthesis of part to part" (A 163 = B 204; NKS 199), the repeated positing of the same, that is, of the manifold in so far as it is homogeneous. It is, in other words, the "concept of a magnitude" in which "the unity of the combination of the manifold (and) homogeneous is thought" (B 203; NKS 198).

All appearances, Kant has claimed, are intuited as occupying a determinate space or time. The representation, however, of a determinate space or time consists in the representation of the manifold homogeneous in the category of magnitude. Hence objects, as appearances, "are all without exception <u>magnitudes</u>, indeed, <u>extensive</u> magnitudes" (B 203; NKS 198), i. e., magnitudes that are generated by the successive addition of their parts.

Let us pause here and compare this principle of the pure understanding with Kant's doctrine in the Transcendental Aesthetic. There he argues not only for the claim that space and time are the <u>a_priori</u> forms of intuition, but also that they are intuitions themselves.

What Kant wants to point out, it appears, is that the representation of space, for example, is not "a general representation (representatio per notas communes)" or a concept, but a "singular representation (representation singularis)" or an intuition: ¹⁶ a representation, in other words, "which can be given only through a single object" (A 32 = B 47; NKS 75). And the reason why the representation of space "is not a discursive or...general concept..., but a pure intuition" (A 24-25 = B 39; NKS 69), is that "space is essentially one" (A 25 = B 39; NKS 69). For we can, Kant says, "in the first place...represent to ourselves only one space; and if we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space. Secondly, these parts cannot precede the one all-embracing space, as being, as it were, constituents out of which it can be composed; on the contrary, they can be thought only as in it" (A 25 = B 39; NKS 69).

Commentators have of course observed that it is difficult to reconcile such a claim with the doctrine of the Axioms of Intuition. For their principle says that "all intuitions are extensive magnitudes" (B 202; NKS 197), and of the notion of an extensive magnitude Kant gives the following definition: "I entitle a magnitude extensive when the representation of the parts makes possible, and therefore necessarily precedes, the representation of the whole" (A 162 = B 203; NKS 198). And commentators have said, too, that this discrepancy can be explained by the

fact that for expository reasons in the Transcendental Aesthetic the emphasis must be on the contributions of sensibility, whereas those of the understanding are neglected. This is, to be sure, correct, but we must nevertheless locate the precise problem.

Kant cannot say of the representation of a particular empirical object, e.g., of a table, that it is an intuition: if it were, we could be said to know the object independently of the categories and the unity of apperceptiohn. What he is saying, of course, is that such a representation involves both, intuition and concept: it requires, that is, a sensible manifold of intuition, the forms of intuition, and the categories. All of these we can now call (adopting Kant's own terminology) '<u>elements</u>' in empirical knowledge or in the knowledge of an empirical object. And let us note further, as we have seen, that the general procedure by which Kant arrives at these elements is one of isolation (cf. A 11 = B 36; NKS 67), and that the purpose of this procedure is to isolate the elements as they differ with respect to their origin, their cognitive nature and function. Thus when here in the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant calls the representation of space "a necessary <u>a priori</u> representation" (A 24 = B 38; NKS 68) and, as we have seen, a (pure) intuition, part of what he means is this: that this representation is subjective in the sense that it is due to the cognitive subject, that it is an "objective" representation (cf. A 28 = B 39; NKS 69) insofar

as it is constitutive of an object [ct]--and that in contradistinction to other, equally constitutive representations--it is not a concept, but an <u>intuition</u>. What I suggest here is that it is both necessary and legitimate to treat, for example, of the representation of space 'in isolation': provided, that is, we keep in mind that the claim according to which this representation is an intuition can then be only a claim about an <u>element</u> in our knowledge of an object [ct]. On Critical grounds it cannot be a claim to the effect that we know space by intuition alone.

It appears that on the whole Kant is in the Transcendental Analytic more aware of the crucial difference between an element that is constitutive of empirical knowledge, and such knowledge itself, than he is in the Transcendental Aesthetic. For this difference can be seen to be expressed in all those numerous passages in which it is argued that the categories <u>by_themselves</u> or in 'isolation' "are nothing but <u>forms_of_thought</u>" (A 248 = B 305; NKS 266), or that pure categories, i. e., "the categories, apart from the condition of sensible intuition, of which they contain the synthesis, have no relation to any determinate object" (A 246; NKS 264). In the Transcendental Aesthetic, by contrast, the corresponding emphasis with respect to the forms of intuition appears to be lacking.

And Kant's claim that the representation of space is an intutition <u>is</u> ambiguous. If it is, as I have indicated,

a claim about the epistemic nature of an element in empirical knowledge, then Kant is undoubtedly entitled to If, however, it is a claim to the effect that our it. knowledge of space consists in an intuition. then we are entertaining a view as uncritical as the view that the representation of a table is an intuition. And this second interpretation suggests itself by the fact that space is said to be represented as "one" or as "unique" (A 25 = B 39; NKS 69). According to the Transcendental Deduction, however, the unity of space is not given in intuition, but thought in the pure concepts of the understanding. And Kant does correct himself: "Space represented as object...contains more than mere form of intuition; it also contains <u>combination</u> of the manifold, given according to the form of sensibility, in an intuitive representation" (B 160n; NKS 170; Kant's emph.) Clearly, here in the Transcendental Deduction Kant wants to stress two things: (1) that the representation of space as an object requires, as does the representation of any object [ct]. the necessary synthetic unity of a manifold by means of a pure concept; and (2) that the representation of space, taken in isolation or as element only, is not a conceptual but an intuitive representation.

We must side, then, with Kant's view in the Analytic, and in particular adopt his view expressed in the Axioms. There he has argued, as we have seen, that the representation of a determinate space is not a matter of

intuition alone: he has argued, in other words, that the sensible manifold as given in intuition is <u>undetermined</u> with respect to extensive magnitude. Getting back to the original problem in this section, I can now conclude the following. The judgment 'I am 20 inches taller than my son' is an empirical judgment about myself and my son <u>qua</u> "objects of the outer senses" (B 415; NKS 373), that is, about our bodies. This <u>empirical</u> judgment requires, according to the Principle of the Axioms of Intuition, the category of magnitude: and what in terms of the latter first of all comes to be determined and hence known [ct] are extensive magnitudes. My body, therefore, and my son's body, can be known as objects of experience and hence are members of the objective [ct] domain.

(15)

In the chapter on Subjectivity I have shown that inner experience, too, is subject to the principle of the necessary synthetic unity of apperception; the latter ranges not only over the manifold of outer intuition, but over "representations in any given intuition" (B 138; NKS 157; emph. added). Thus inner experience consists, as does outer experience, in the representation of an object [ct]: it is expressed, in other words, in a judgment in the strict sense of the term (cf. B 141 f.; NKS 159), in a judgment, therefore, that possesses "objective validity and necessary universality (for everybody)".¹⁷ And this means that my

judgments about myself as a being that has "thoughts, consciousness, desires, etc., " all of which "belong to inner sense" (A 357; NKS 338 f.), are made in accordance with the categories. I can know myself, therefore, as an object of inner experience, and as such an object I am a member of the objective [ct] domain.

The fact that the principle of apperception, the "highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge" (B 135; NKS 154), applies to both outer and inner intuition means that the particular principles govern equally both outer and inner experience. I have argued in the last section that the judgment "The cut in my finger was deep, and the wound took a week to heal, " requires, according to the Principle of the Axioms of Intuition, the category of quantity. And the same holds for the judgment "The pain in my finger lasted one hour, " which is about an empirically inner object and expresses the consciousness of my particular state: what by means of the category is here first of all represented and hence known [ct] is a "determinate time-magnitude" (A 153 = B 203; NKS 198). Similarly Kant claims that the category of cause and effect unites not only a manifold of outer but also of inner intuition: what in our awareness of a change in our mood, for example, comes to be known [ct] is an inner happening or an "inner alteration," i. e., "the successive existence of ourselves in different states" (B 292; NKS 255). Such a succession, too, is an objective [ct'] that is, a causal

succession. Inner alterations, in other words, must be seen as falling under the principle according to which "all alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect" (B 232; NKS 218).

My emphasis on the fact that the particular Principles apply to both outer and inner experience suggests concluding this section with two observations. The first is about Kant's view of the status of empirical psychology, the other will be a comparison of Strawson and Kant.

(1) It appears that the "System of the Principles of the Pure Understanding" (A 150 = B 189; NKS 189) must be taken to be coextensive with what in the Introduction to the Critique and in the Prolegomena Kant calls "the pure part of natural science" (B 18; NKS 54) or the "pure" and "universal science of nature" (B 20; NKS 56).¹⁸ This science is said to be pure in the sense that the Principles are synthetic a priori, and strictly universal in the sense that it "must bring nature in general, whether it regards the object of the outer or that of the inner sense (the object of physics as well as psychology)" under these principles.¹⁹ On this view, then, empirical psychology is on par with physics: it too is, and for the very same reasons, a genuine natural science. Here is what Kant says at the beginning of the Paralogisms: "If our knowledge of thinking beings in general... were based on more than the <u>cogito</u>, if we likewise made use of observations concerning the play of our thoughts and the natural laws of the thinking self to be

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derived from these thoughts, there would arise an empirical psychology, which would be a kind of physiology of inner sense, capable perhps of explaining the appearances of inner sense" (A 347 = B 405; NKS 332). This passage has a cautionary note that I think reflects Kant's other view of empirical psychology: the view that he expresses in the Anfangsgruende and according to which empirical psychology can never attain the status of a genuine natural science, because mathematics is not applicable to the appearances of inner sense.²⁰ This position, however, is at variance with Kant's doctrine in the <u>Critique</u>. For he claims not only, as he does in the General Note on the System of the Princples, that the category of quantity "can...be applied...to inner sense, " although, to be sure, "only through the mediation of outer intuition" (B 239; NKS 256). In the Axioms, moreover, Kant claims that "all appearances are...intuited as aggragates." And the fact that they are so intuited, i. e., "as complexes of previously given parts" (A 163 = B 204; NKS 199) is said to be the very reason why they allow of mathematical treatment. 21

(2) In the chapter 'Persons' of his book, <u>Individuals</u>, Strawson discusses the problem of how one can ascribe states of consciousness to others. Referring to the historical origin of the problem itself, Strawson says: "if the things one ascribes states of consciousness to, are thought of as a set of Cartesian egos to which only private experiences can, in correct logical grammar, be ascribed,

then this question is unanswerable and this problem insoluble. $"^{22}$

It appears that Kant would agree with part of what Strawson here claims. We can say that to the "private experiences" there corresponds what in all those passages in which Kant poses the Critical problem of an "object of representations. " he calls (in contradistinction to such an object) representations in the sense of "modifications" or "inner determinations of the mind" (cf. A 197 = B 242; NKS 224). These by themselves indeed would not be "communicable."²³ But we have already seen earlier that Kant wants to go further: he is saying that a mind or a subject could not even know that it has representations in this sense. And this is because they do not "reach [the] unity of consciousness. n^{24} because, that is, they are not "synthetically combined in one apperception" (B 138; NKS 157). This, however, would mean that the very notion of a subject, and the connected notion of the ascription of representations to it, could no longer be entertained. But then the problem at hand would not only be "insoluble" but could not even be stated.

Strawson himself does not want to give us a solution of the "problem of other minds," but argues instead for a position according to which the problem does not arise.²⁵ Central to his position are two tenets. Strawson claims, first, that the concept of a person is "the concept of a type of entity such that <u>both</u> predicates ascribing states of

consciousness <u>and</u> predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situtation etc. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type. "²⁶ He calls predicates of the first kind, e.g. "is in pain," P-predicates, and those of the second kind, e.g. "is in the drawing room, " M-predicates, predicates, that is, "which are also properly applied to material bodies."²⁷ Secondly, Strawson maintains that "one ascribes P-predicates to others on the strength of observation of their behaviour; and that the behaviour-criteria one goes on are not just signs of the presence of what is meant by the P-predicate, but are criteria of a logically adequate kind for the ascription of the P-predicate."²⁸

Now an obvious difference between Strawson and Kant is that for Kant there is no single type of entity to which both M-predicates and P-predicates are applicable. These we employ, Kant maintains, in our judgments, respectively, about empirically external objects, including our bodies, and about empirically inner objects, such as our inner states and episodes. In contrast to Strawson, then, Kant holds that a 'person,' i.e. the empirical self, is something 'jpper': it is an object not of outer, but of inner sense, and in so far as time is the form of inner sense, it is time, and not space, which is the "mode of representation of myself as object" (B 4; NKS 79).

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I share this particular view with Bird whose own comparison between Strawson and Kant is based mainly on the Refutation of Idealism. But Kant's argument there shows only, according to Bird, that inner discriminations presuppose the discrimination of "outer, spatial objects, "²⁹ not, however, that "the concept 'person' has the meaning that Strawson, but not Kant, ascribes to it." For the latter, Bird maintains, empirical "persons are essentially possessors of consciousness."³⁰ And although Kant rejects, as does Strawson, Descartes' account of persons, he still holds "that a person is essentially that to which inner characteristics belong."³¹

And this brings us to the central difference, in my view, between Kant and Strawson. I have said that Strawson wants to argue for a position in which the sceptical problem with respect to other minds does not arise. His remarks, therefore, Strawson assures us, should not be understood as a "solution" of this "problem," or as a "general philosophical 'justification'" of our beliefs about others.³² Such "justifications" are bound up with a set of connected distinctions which his own concept of a person, as we have seen, is supposed to undercut: the distinctions, that is, between mind and body, the mental and the physical, the inner and outer, the subjective and objective.

Now we have seen that Kant, too, at times talks in a Cartesian fashion about representations <u>qua</u> "inner determinations of our mind" that have only "subjective meaning" (A 197 = B 242; NKS 224). This way of talking allows Kant to state the Critical problem in terms of the "relation to an object" of these inner determinations, and of their acquiring "objective meaning" and "objective reality" (A 197 = B 242; NKS 224). One result of my discussion of the Second Analogy, however, has been that at the center of the Critical problem is not the 'inner', but how, on the presupposition that nothing is given to us save representations (cf. A 483 = B 521; NKS 441), there can be, not knowledge of outer objects, but objects of knowledge at all. And this is because of what I have called the undeterminateness of a manifold of representations as given in sensible intuition. If the sensible manifold is undetermined, i. e., not thought in the category of cause and effect, there is no question of our having knowledge of particular empirical happenings or events, be they represented in space or in time only--that is, be they empirically jnner objects. The central problem, therefore, is for Kant not the ascription of M-predicates and P-predicates, but the <u>a_priori</u> possibility of ascribing predicates to anything at all: the possibility, in other words, of "the unity among our representations," i. e., of judgdments (A 69 = B 93; NKS 105-06). The actual ascription of predicates is a posteriori, i.e., discovered and learned by experience and empirical procedures, and hence for Kant outside the scope of a philosophical inquiry which for him is <u>a priori</u>.

(16)

I will finally answer the question how, according to Kant, we "ascribe," as Strawson puts it, "states of consciousness... to others.³³ It is the question which, as we have seen, in Husserl's view Kant failed to explore: the question concerning the transcendental possibility of positing other egos. And according to Sartre it is the problem which Kant cannot solve: "the subjective quality of the Other-as-object," he claims, turns in the Critical philosophy out to be "a closed box."³⁴

For this investigation it is the problem of showing how thinking beings can be known as objects of experience and hence be members of the objective [ct] domain. The apparent obstacle, I have pointed out, is that "thinking beings, <u>as_such</u>, can never be found among outer appearances, and that their thoughts, consciousness, desires, etc., cannot be outwardly intuited. All these belong to inner sense: (A 357; NKS 338). Kant, however, says also that although "we cannot intuit" the thoughts of thinking beings, we can "indeed intuit their signs [in the field] of appearance" (A 359; NKS 340). And the second part of his <u>Aptpropology</u>, as the title page instructs us, deals with "the ways of knowing the inner of human beings by means of the outer."³⁵

Such knowledge, however, is according to Sartre, precisely for what the Critical philosophy leaves no room.

If we talk, for instance, about Paul's anger, we are talking about a series of appearances of "his inner sense" which "on principle are outside my experience and belong to a system which is inaccessible to me."³⁶ And we are not allowed to consider Paul's behavior as the effect of his anger because the behavior which I observe and the anger which Paul feels belong to two <u>different</u> experiences: and Kantian causality, he says, "only... links the phenomena of <u>one_and_the_same</u> experience."³⁷

We have seen that knowledge of the existence of things in general requires the satisfaction of the Second Postulate according to which "that which is bound up with the material conditions of experience, that is, with sensation, is actual (A 218 = B 266; NKS 239). Clearly, the Postulate as it stands is of no help for the problem at hand: I cannot have, Sartre will say, sensations of the appearances of Paul's inner sense. Let us then look again at Kant's refined version of the Postulate: "The postulate bearing on the knowledge of things as actual does not, indeed, demand immediate <u>perception</u> (and, therefore, sensation of which we are conscious) of the object whose existence is to be known. What we do require, however, is the connection of the object with some actual perception, in accordance with the analogies of experience, which define all real connection in an experience in general" (A 225 = B 272; NKS 242-43).

Indeed it appears that this refined version of the

Second Postulate allows us to infer the existence of Paul's anger from the perception of his behavior. Here is Kant's example: "Thus from the perception of the attracted iron filings we know of the existence of a magnetic matter pervading all bodies, although the constitution of our organs cuts us off from all immediate perception of this medium. For in accordance with the laws of sensibility and the context of our perceptions, we should, were our senses more refined, come also in an experience upon the immediate empirical intuition of it. The grossness of our senses does not in any way decide the form of possible experience in general" (A 226 = B 273; NKS 243). The objection, of course, will now be that what makes the problem under consideration a problem is not "the grossness of our sesnes," but the fact that, as Kant puts it, our thoughts and our feelings "can never [be] objects of outer intuition" (A 358; NKS 339). But this fact does not decide the form of a possible experience in general either. For this form consists, as we have seen, in the synthetic unity, by means of the categories, of a manifold of sensible intuition in a consciousness in general. It consists, in the two cases at hand, in a manifold's of outer intuition being united, i. e., thought in the pure concept of cause and effect. It would be absurd and the existence of the Second Analogy a puzzle, were we to think that this unification to be a unification of particular empirical objects of which some belong to "outer sense" but due to the "grossness of our

senses" <u>cappot</u> be seen, and of which some cannot on principle be <u>seen</u>, because they belong to "inner sense." What Kant has argued for is that the representation of the given manifold of intuition in the category of cause and effect makes "the experience of an event [i. e., of anything as <u>happepipg</u>]" (A 195 = B 240; NKS 223) first of all possible. This means that only if, as Kant puts it very carefully, "the manifold in the appearance" (A 190 = B 235; NKS 220) of the iron filings or of Paul is experienced as a <u>happepipg</u>, is it possible to look for and to discover <u>a</u> <u>posteriori</u>, i. e., by experience and by <u>whatever_empirical</u> procedures the respective causes, be they emprically inner or outer.

Because the experience of "anything as <u>happening</u>" requires <u>a_priori</u> application of the category of cause and effect, the <u>a_posteriori</u> judgment 'Paul is angry' is made "<u>in_accordance_with</u>" the principle of the Second Analogy. It is for <u>this</u> reason alone that it expresses empirical <u>knowledge</u>, or possesses what for Kant is equivalent, namely objective validity and necessary universality (for everybody). "The relation of cause and effect is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments, in respect of the series of perception, and so of their empirical truth" (A 202 = B 247; NKS 227).

I have shown in the chapter on subjectivity [o] that objective validity and necessary validity (for everybody) belong also, and for the same reason, to the judgment 'I am

angry'. Hence my judgment 'Paul is angry' and Paul's judgment 'I am angry' express the <u>same_empirical_cognition</u>. Thus the fact that my judgment is one of outer experience and that Paul's judgment is one of inner experience does also not decide "the form of a possible experience in general." This form is, as we have said, necessary synthetic unity, and it is the latter which gives us objectivity and universality: "There would be not reason for the judgments of other people agreeing with mine if it were not the unity of the object to which they all refer and with which they all agree; hence they must all agree with one another" (Prol. 46). Now the categories, we have seen, are not only the forms of the unity of the object, i. e., of a manifold's being "combined in the object, no matter what the state of the subject may be" (B 142; NKS 159), but also the conditions of the form of consciousness in general, i. e., of its necessary unity. And it is this state of affairs which necessarily ties a plurality of empirical subjects into a common world, i. e., into a world which is <u>manifold</u> as to its <u>matter</u>, but <u>one</u> as to its <u>form</u>. It is this state of affairs, too, which is the reason why there is only "one single experience, " and why when we speak "of different experiences, " e. g., Paul's and mine, "we can refer only to the various perceptions, all of which, as such, belong to one and the same general experience" (A 110; NKS 138), whose sameness consists in its "form," i. e., in the "synthetic unity of appearances according to concepts" (A 110; NKS

138). Paul's anger, thus, does <u>not</u> in Sartre's words, "belong to a system which is inaccessible to me:" we both inhabit one and the same. And in order to do so, it is not necessary, as Sartre thinks it is, that I unite my representations with Paul's. What is necessary, and also sufficient, is that Paul and I bring, in a judgment, our representations "to the object unity of apperception" (B 141; NKS 159). NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

¹<u>Nerke</u>, VI, p. 411. ²Halaane, II, p. 64. ³Haldane, I, p. 159. ⁴ Haldane, I, p. 179. ⁵NKSC. p. 304-05. ⁶<u>Werke</u>, III, p. 604, my trs. ⁷WW, IV, p. 23 (A 12). ⁸Zweig, p. 216.

⁹In the <u>Frolebomena</u> Kant says that the "formal aspect of nature... is... the conformity to law of all objects of experience and, so far as is known, a priori, their <u>necessary</u> conformity" (44). To establish the latter is to establish the necessary application of the categories to all objects of experience. And in the <u>Critique</u> he claims that "nature, considered merely as nature in general, is dependent upon these categories as the original ground of its necessary conformity to law (natura formaliter <u>spectata</u>)" (E 165; NRS 173).

10 Kant's more explicit formulation of the Second Postulate is: an object exists or is, actual "if it stands in connection with perception, that is, with sensation as material supplied by the senses, and through perception is determined by means of the understanding" (A 234 = B 266; NKS 252) 11 <u>Prol</u>., p. 46.

¹²Cr. H. J. Paton, <u>kant's hetaphysics of Experience</u>, II, London: Georg Allen & Union Ltd; New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1970, p. 336. Herafter quoted as Paton.

¹³WW, XVIII, p. 320.

 14 It is this idea, I think, that lies at the basis of Kant's arguments in the Paralogism Chapter and links then to the Transcendental Deduction. Thus he says: "I cannot know as an object that which I must presuppose in order to know any object" (A 402; NKS 365). Or he maintains that "the unity of consciousness, which underlies the categories," that is, "the subject of the categories,"
cannot be known. "The subject of the categories cannot by thinking the categories acquire a concept of itself as an object of the categories. For in order to think them, its pure self-consciousness, which is what is to be explained, must itself be presupposed" (E 421-22; NKS 377). This is what Kant means when in the Transcendental Deduction he calls the 'I think', which must be capable of accompanying all other representations," also "<u>original apperception</u>:" it is "that self-consciousness which... cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation" (E 231; NKS 153). If it were so accompanied, it could be <u>known</u> and hence occur in the objective domain. But then it would also no longer be <u>original</u>.

> ¹⁵<u>Werke</u>, V1, p. 259. ¹⁶<u>Werke</u>, III, p. 521. ¹⁷<u>Prol</u>., p. 46. ¹⁸<u>Prol</u>., p. 43. ¹⁹<u>Prol</u>., p. 43. ²⁰<u>Werke</u>, V, p. 16.

²¹W. H. Walsh, <u>Kant's Criticism of Netaphysics</u>, Edinburgh: At the University Press, 1975, p. 112.

> ²²Individuals, p. 100. ²³Zweis, p. 216. ²⁴Zweis, p. 153. ²⁵Individuals, p. 112. ²⁶Individuals, p. 101-02. ²⁷Individuals, p. 104. ²⁸Individuals, p. 106.

²⁹Graham Bird, <u>Kant's Theory of Knowledge</u>, New York: The Eumanities Press, 1962, p. 182. Hereafter quoted as Eird.

³⁰Bird, p. 186.
³¹Bird, p. 181.
³²Individuals, p. 32.

³³Ingiviouals, p. 100. ³⁴Sartre, p. 314. ³⁵Werke, VI, p. 621. ³⁶Sartre, p. 226. ³⁷Sartre, p. 226.

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