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RESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES AND MIGRATION PROPENSITIES
OF RURAL YOUTH IN THE CENTRAL REGION
OF SAUDI ARABIA

presented by

Mohammed AlWahid

has been accepted towards fulfillment
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Harry K. Schwarzweller
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RESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES AND MIGRATION PROPENSITIES OF RURAL YOUTH IN THE CENTRAL REGION OF SAUDI ARABIA

By

Mohammed AlWahid

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ABSTRACT

RESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES AND MIGRATION PROPENSITIES OF RURAL YOUTH IN THE CENTRAL REGION OF SAUDI ARABIA

By

Mohammed AlWahid

This study explores the residential preferences and migration propensities of rural youth in the central region of Saudi Arabia. My aim is to specify some of the valuational and socioeconomic factors that have stimulated and continue to stimulate a massive flow of out-migration from rural areas and provincial cities to the growing urban metropolitan centers.

My thesis holds that residential preferences are related to migration propensity and are affected by various factors such as gender, family socioeconomic status (SES), family cultural background, and familism values. Indicators of these factors are introduced individually and jointly as predictors of residential preferences and migration propensity. Place of residence is taken into account. Residential preferences and migration propensity are the dependent variables. To explore gender variations and the effects of valuational and socioeconomic variables, percentage differences in contingency tables, mean variations, standardized regression coefficients, and rank-order of percentages are employed.

Data for the study were obtained through self-administered questionnaires given to 486 high school seniors in 17 high schools in three rural areas of the central

region of Saudi Arabia. The study population was drawn from all rural governorates in the central region that have high schools in the administrative center and in at least one hamlet.

The findings suggest that gender and family SES affect the degree of adherence to familism values, residential preferences, and migration propensity. Cultural background and place of residence have little effect on residential preferences or migration propensity. Family income and level of familism are the most important factors affecting residential preferences and migration propensity. Females prefer urban centers over rural life, and compared to males are more familistic and show lower migration propensity. Gender, family SES, and familism degree effects were noted in direct or through multiple control conditions upon residential preferences and migration propensities.

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DEDICATION

To the memory of three men who touched my life:

My late paternal grandfather, Abdullah Alsulaiman

My late maternal grandfather, Abdullah Abdullatief

My late father, Sulyman AlAbdullah

These three men accompanied my childhood education to knowledge maturity. Without their encouragement, guidance, and support I would not have come this far.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH PROBLEM

1.1 Introduction

This study explores the residential preferences and migration plans of rural youth in the central region of Saudi Arabia. My aim is to specify some of the factors --valuational as well as socioeconomic--that have stimulated and continue to stimulate a massive flow of outmigration from rural areas and provincial cities to the very rapidly growing urban metropolitan centers.

One of Saudi Arabia's most difficult development problems, as I will make clear, is this large-scale redistribution of its population. Many of its rural areas are losing population at an enormous rate and it is becoming ever more difficult to sustain basic services in these places. More seriously, many of the provincial centers and smaller cities established to serve the rural hinterland are also declining. The overwhelming flow of migration, particularly of young people, has been to Ar-Riyadh. In a very short time, Ar-Riyadh has become a sprawling metropolis. And, it seems, the peripheral status of rural areas by past development schemes, struggle to survive in the shadow of this booming urban giant, Ar-Riyadh.

As a child in my homeland of Saudi Arabia, we used to play with a magnetic bar to move iron filings around on a sheet of paper, with the magnet placed beneath

the paper. The filings could be spread-out, concentrated in a clump, or lined up--seemingly without visible cause. This is analogous to what in economics is known as "the invisible hand," an unseen force that moves prices up or down. Similarities between my childhood game and the pricing "hand" always come to mind when I review the demographic literature on population redistribution. People move from place to place, and from one social and economic circumstance to another. But what causes such movements, and where do such movements lead? People, of course, are not iron filings; nevertheless, it often seems as though an invisible hand is behind the scenes moving them around.

Scholars and planners have devoted much time to studying and predicting population redistributions. Explanatory models and models to suggest deviations from the norms have been established. Most of these approaches have been guided by economic, political, or cultural agendas to achieve certain pre-set macro- or micro-focal interests of policymakers (the invisible hand). Freely choosing where to live is still a dream of most people in deprived areas. Americans speak of "Home, Sweet Home"; Saudis say, "The love of one's homeland is part of one's religious beliefs"; and Egyptians say, "The one who leaves his own home will leave behind him his dignity and credibility." Planners seek national goals, but what national goal does not include the individual personal goals?

When social planners, particularly in Third World countries, claim that national interests must come above personal interests, they invariably mean that political and economic institutional interests should dominate and manipulate the general public interests, if not abuse them. During a revolution in the 1950s, political

institutions led people in Egypt to demonstrate against knowledge seekers, scholars, and researchers, and then gave two-thirds of the constitution-making committee to the farmers and factory workers [various articles in Arabic by Mustafa Ameen (1990) on the history of the 1952 Egyptian revolution; Ali Al-Tantawee (1986); and, in English, Turner's "Modernization of the Middle East"(1958)]. I want to argue that in policymaking processes the invisible hand plays a role in transforming political and economic interests into national goals. People are not openly forced to migrate from one area to another, but political and economic interests generally motivate them to do so, just as a pharmacist offers medicine for high prices and claims it is the patient's free choice to buy or not. In the arena of rural-urban relations, urban centers create the action and blame the actors or reactors.

In Saudi Arabia, rural decline has taken place steadily since the 1940s, when the political system, through the central government, applied a variety of social reform plans. All of these plans had some impact on population redistribution, concentration, and aggregation. One major action was the settlement of nomads (pastoral tribes), which took place during the late King Abdulaziz's reign. There were two main reasons for this action. First, as the King established his country's borders and exerted his authority over the territory, he believed that loose tribal movement might cause current and future political conflicts with his country's neighbors. Second, in a country whose borders the nomads frequently crossed, national affiliation required a full, clear citizenship--were the nomads Saudis or not? Keeping peace in the desert and stopping bedouin conflicts over water resources obliged the central government to enforce its presence by locating each tribe in a

certain zone. Individual movements were allowed to take place rather than tribal mobilization. That action helped to minimize anonymous crime, water, and grass misuse, and to increase the responsibility of tribal sheiks to control their people's behavior. Natural circumstances helped bring about these actions; drought made life harsh for the camel herders and bedouins. The offer to buy all the bedouins' livestock appeared an act of kindness to save the bedouins' dignity and lives. Bedouins became sedentary farmers. They traded some of their livestock for small farm equipment, seeds, and technical agricultural support. They may not have been good crop producers but at least they were busy coping with new lifestyles based on settlement.

The settlement of the bedouins, in effect, enlarged the rural population of Saudi Arabia. Established rural communities found competition in the newly settled bedouin groups. Social and cultural differences were more noticeable. Farming traditions passed down by old villagers were influenced by the newcomers. Thus, rural villages and towns became less hospitable to any additional populations. Furthermore, such villages and towns became centers for the exodus of both old and new inhabitants.

The discovery and production of oil brought about the growth of government agencies and firms affiliated with the oil industry. Employment in military services, police, and bureaucratic administration, became the dream of rural people who sought their future in more stable, modern, and rewarding posts. Pull-push factors functioned in an invisible pattern that in time sent a one-way stream of population from rural to urban centers. That stream became a component of the rural people's

cultural system: almost every boy and girl, at about age eighteen, moved from his/her current place to another more promising localities.

In the beginning, governmental plans contributed to the rural-urban migration. Later, the government stopped backing these efforts; it even attempted to stop the flow and reverse it, but the cultural build-up exerted a stronger pressure. New cultural beliefs are needed if Saudi Arabia is to seek an even balance of population over its large national lands. Social welfare, promising futures, and a healthier environment for generations to come all require action beyond internal and external security. The imbalance of population, growth, and growth centers must be studied, first to find out why what happened did happen, then why it is still happening, then how to adjust the balance in a way that will not lead to another extreme. Any adjustment proposed must treat the current decline of rural Saudi Arabia without causing a weakening of the urban context in Saudi Arabia. Such research might not provide definite answers to this problem, but in posing some tentative solutions or even putting the questions straight-forwardly could contribute to local and global efforts to make the lives of human beings everywhere less hard.

1.2 Urbanization in Saudi Arabia

Since 1960, Saudi Arabia has been implementing annual development plans related to its budget. When the first five-year development plan was proposed in 1970, it contained limited funds for social and economic programs. By 1974, the country's oil revenues had increased significantly because of a rise in oil prices.

Therefore, the second five-year development plan reflected a vast expansion in new, ambitious planning aimed at general development of the economy and society.

Economic programs assumed priority over other aspects of development because of a planning philosophy that reflects a deep need to establish services, education, and factories to advance the country's social development. Such programs were new to the country. Every location in Saudi Arabia was ripe for development because every place could make use of all possible efforts at material modernization. The larger and more concentrated centers of population were the first to have these programs implemented. The largest proportion of society would be served first, followed by the next largest center of population.

But things do not always go as planned. New waves of migrants headed toward the cities since they would enjoy the benefits of the new services, thus increasing the cities' population. The cities were able to deliver services to a smaller percentage of the population. Pressure on new services in large cities caused planners to expand the cities' programs. As a result, the expansion of services and programs for the rest of the country was constrained or delayed. Restoring existing programs in major cities stimulated more migration because of legitimate human ambitions to enjoy better health, education, transportation, housing, and communication. Also, these huge programs provided more opportunities for higher incomes and broader job selectivity. This vicious circle continued during the second five-year development plan (1975-1980).

The Third Development Plan (1980-1985) adopted a strategy of dual development: one for large cities and another for rural and bedouin areas. There

was a greater emphasis upon human resources in addition to economic development This strategic switch was needed to achieve equilibrium among the developmen centers and to contain out-of-control expansion in the major cities. Ar-Riyadh, fo example, from a size of 12 square kilometers and a population of 47,000 in the 1940s had expanded to an area of about 160 square kilometers and a population o 1,200,000 by 1972. The average annual growth rate in Ar-Riyadh from 1965 to 198(was about 9.8 percent. But during the 1980s, the rate approached 18.2 percent anc the population neared 1,500,000 (SCET, 1978). By 1990, the population reache about 2 million (Arab Institute for City Development, 1990). Ar-Riyadh became one of the most crowded cities in Saudi Arabia. Although a city with a population of 1.5 million is not large when compared, for example, to Cairo's 10 million inhabitants it is large given that the entire population of Saudi Arabia is only 10 to 12 million

The source of this growth in Ar-Riyadh is not only growth by natural increase but also a result of the strong pull of Ar-Riyadh from throughout the nation, anc especially from the central region, where internal migration was clearly prevalen during the late 1960s and mid-1970s (Al-Oteiby, 1988). The pull to Ar-Riyadh wa only half the problem. The other half lay in the hinterlands. Concentration o services, industries, businesses, and modern-life necessities in Ar-Riyadh reflected the limited feasibility of expanding such necessities outside the city, to the hinterlands Studies calculated limited profits for businesses if they moved out of Ar-Riyadh (government records of local bank funds, various sources).

Although most of the services, such as educational institutions and hospitals are generally governmental facilities available to the public free of charge, the studie

indicated that the quality and capacity of these services varied greatly between Ar-Riyadh and elsewhere. I believe this is reasonably explained by the Fourth Development Plan because variance is a natural result of stage development. A hospital in Ar-Riyadh established five years prior to a hospital in any village or small town has an accumulated capacity of operation and timely modifications. The Ar-Riyadh hospital appears to be several steps ahead of the recently established hospital in rural areas, which has yet to achieve its full operational capacity. Similar examples are found in other services. And disparity is also increased by the fact that the more qualified the worker, the more he/she finds cities a better place to live in because the cities have a more competitive work environment, a more promising future, and more rewarding jobs.

In the late 1970s, the Saudi government, the major employer in the country, offered a "distance allowance" to motivate people to accept jobs outside large cities, especially in remote areas. Calculation of these allowances was based on the distance between the remote area and the closest urban center. The move has had only limited success. The government lately announced that any applicant for a state position must be able to relocate outside of Ar-Riyadh, Jeddah, and Ad-Dammam, most likely in the rural areas throughout the country. While it is cheaper to live outside the major cities, and there are more opportunities to save money, a great many Saudis want to live in major cities even if life quality in the cities is at much lower levels than the standard of living they might enjoy in the countryside.

During the past twenty years, I have observed that some rural communities have experienced almost no economic growth. A limited number of new businesses

have been established, few new houses have been built, land prices have barely risen, and out-migration has been prevalent (especially of manual laborers). Only small return-migration has been observed and has never replaced out-migration in quantity or quality.

Some earlier studies conducted in this area have shown small growth in rural communities. At the national levels, such growth could be calculated as a decline, according to the national average of the well-being status.

> Between 1970 and 1980, the relative share of the large or 'metropolitan cities' in the total population increased from 20 percent to 42 percent (more than doubled), while cities of smaller size grew less rapidly and their relative share decreased noticeably from 20 to 12 percent (Al-Ibrahim, 1982:251).

I attribute this decline to the geographical proximity to a central dominant city that exerts its influence through a dependence on the facilities available in the center. The results of some studies of developmental projects in satellite communities and hamlets reflect a city attraction that pulls migrants out of their rural areas into the cities.

People in rural areas competed for opportunities to live in the cities because of better living standards and education facilities in the cities, especially institutions of higher education. The growth of cities affected the urban structure of the whole country; and towns in the central region, where Ar-Riyadh is located, sharply declined in population and in economic importance (Looney, 1990: 3, 48, 79, 86).

The importance of Ar-Riyadh was enhanced by oil production. Decisions on the pricing of oil and related economic and political decision-makers were all located in Ar-Riyadh (Sogreah Consulting Engineers, 1984:6).

With a population of 1.7 million in 1983, Ar-Riyadh became the largest city in Saudi Arabia, followed by Jeddah with 930,000, and Makkah with about 460,000 (World Almanac & Book of Facts, 1987). Ar-Riyadh's urban features are summarized in five areas: first, Ar-Riyadh swallowed up the investments from the internal and external economy; second, all of the work force was absorbed in Ar-Riyadh's labor market; third, Ar-Riyadh dominated the regional and national cultural pattern; fourth, Ar-Riyadh's development programs had a deleterious effect on the development of the other rural agglomeration centers in the country; and Ar-Riyadh's consumption greatly exceeded production (Rajab, 1981:325-326).

There are factors not discussed above that also contribute to urbanization in Saudi Arabia today--factors such as transportation, electricity, water from desalinization, industrialization, education, and municipal organizations. The dominance of the factors listed by Rajab make these other factors look less important, even though they cannot be ignored.

Rural out-migration and the relative decline of growth levels have left the aged (65 years or older) and the youth (15 years or younger) to continue living in rural communities because they cannot afford to accompany their family to the city. Furthermore, families who stayed in the hinterland have suffered not only from dispersion of its members but also from the effects of low growth in their homeland. Social, emotional, and economic problems may have strong effects on both the remaining family members and on the migrants.

Decline of a rural community may be related to close proximity to a primate city, and to dependency on a central place. In current community development plan

some measures are needed to avoid the immediate effects of urban centers on neighboring rural areas. Specialized projects might be directed at the rural areas to forestall their depopulation.

The impact of urban dominance reflects the strength exerted by urban centers upon rural areas, either to cause population movement in the hinterlands or to form a center of mediation. This theoretical perspective assures superiority of one or more large agglomerations of people against the surrounding hinterlands. The process of urbanization reflects superiority of the urban centers over the rural areas by supplying raw and manufactured materials, labor, and population independence of the hinterlands on the urban center. The cycle of capitalism strengthens the position of the urban centers by enhancing their status through uninterrupted growth. Such growth may partially handicap the growth of neighboring areas. Rural areas support urban growth by continuing to feed the city's unlimited appetite for more migrants, export materials, and consumption. Greater urban growth attracts larger numbers of migrants and these migrants in turn stimulate more growth, and so the process continues. Being the outlet for any type of export, such as knowledge, manufactured goods, crops, or even expatriates, puts the city in a good position to tailor changes in the hinterlands to fit its own needs.

1.3 Rural Decline

As a result of material development in Saudi Arabia during the last three decades, Saudi rural society has changed dramatically. Farming, for example, was once a principal enterprise in many rural areas, in both the traditional rural structure

and the settled livestock breeders who took up farming to replace their centuries-old pastoral activities. Both groups found that their traditional activities as farmers or livestock breeders were no longer as important for satisfying their economic needs. Youth, in particular, become more educated than their parents and more accustomed to new patterns of urban life.

Because of the growth imbalance, some areas of Saudi Arabia have become more modern than others. These areas, the major metropolitan centers, offer a range of services that entice rural people to move away from less developed and often economically depressed villages and small towns. Rural youth prefer to migrate to nearby urban centers close to their home village or town, despite their desire someday to reside in places that will fulfill their occupational, educational, and lifestyle aspirations. The motives of future generations of rural youth may be considered a hidden magnet that creates an action but does not explain it. A quick review of the position of rural areas within the socioeconomic and political structure of Saudi society may shed light on why such a large movement, and the concomitant intentions to migrate are so important in contemporary Saudi Arabia.

The initial conditions leading to the current situation might provide some indication of what rural Saudis are experiencing. Let us review conditions during the urban boom that began in Saudi Arabia in the early 1970s and is still continuing in direction and volume. Before 1970, there were 7,805 agricultural villages in the country, home to about 40 percent of the Saudi workforce. Fifty percent of the Saudis who lived in rural areas made their living through agricultural or related activities. By 1975, the number of such villages had declined to 3,084. On the other

hand, the number of Saudis engaged in rural economic activity declined from 40 percent before 1970 to 28 percent in 1975 and to 14 percent in 1990.

The average growth of the rural areas still lags behind the national average. Though the development plan set 4.6 percent as its target, growth in the rural areas was 1.6 percent. This lag is reflected in rural areas' share of the national gross domestic production (GDP). The average share in the GDP dropped from 12.1 percent before 1970 to only 2.4 percent in 1977. The reduction in production shares, employment in rural areas, and growth rate all indicate the continuous trend of rural economic decline. Decline is represented in the social, economic, and cultural life in rural Saudi Arabia under what Looney referred to as the low real income in rural areas and the increasing opportunities for well-paid employment in the industrial and urban areas in general (Looney, 1990:86-87).

Present economic conditions can be traced to their roots before and after the discovery of oil in the 1930s and the oil price boom of the 1970s. Before 1938, Saudi Arabia was a newly re-unified nation after a period of social and political unrest, especially after the fall of the second Saudi family governance and the regaining of power by the late King Abdulaziz during the early years of the twentieth century. After King Abdulaziz enforced his power over all of Saudi Arabia, the social and economic problems were the first to face the newborn central government. Financial resources were limited, and customs revenues, transit duties, pilgrimage entry fees, and Islamic zakah served as production taxes. Imports were limited, so customs taxes were minimal; transit duties were similarly limited. Pilgrimage entry fees were symbolic fees. Zakah income taxes were negligible because the nation was just

recovering from the tribal wars and production was not established. The situation worsened after the start of World War II, when Saudi Arabia was affected by higher prices for food, especially sugar and rice, and by a decline in transit and pilgrimage fees. Saudi Arabia was finally obliged to join the allied side because the Italian air force began bombarding oil exploration sites in eastern Saudi Arabia, which were operating under an American oil producers' consortium.

The country was composed of bedouin pastoralists and farmers, who represented about 80 percent of the country's population. The other 20 percent of the country's population resided in hamlets and villages where residents mainly worked in small trades, traditional crafts, and low productive activities (Al-Shamekh, 1975:35-38).

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the majority of the population of Saudi Arabia were nomads or seasonal nomads, with the rest living at small oases scattered over the Arabian desert or in a very few urban centers situated around religious sites at Makkah and Madinah on the west coast and at Al-Khobar on the east coast. Permanent settlement of the nomads was begun in the early twentieth century by King Abdulaziz.

Traditional farming villages and their surrounding areas were markedly affected by the settlement of bedouins in their environs. The settled rural population more than doubled. Rural land values increased and markets flourished. Tribal villages were created in which tribal sheiks kept their positions among their people and functioned as mediators between tribal members and the central government. This arrangement was partially a government plan to allow such sheiks to maintain

some power and to assure them that they would lose nothing in the sedentarization process. This strategy helped secure the traditional leaders' support for settlement programs.

No previous experience could serve as a model for the settlement programs. One result was that the distribution of settlements followed no plan that took into account the overall distribution of the nation's population. Another result was that rural settlements became points where a mixture of cultural backgrounds were brought together into a new formation of cultural characteristics. This increased variation led to increased social tensions. Bedouins held traditional villages in low esteem, while traditional villagers had little respect for nomads, characterizing them as backward and as constraints to development. While social homogeneity was emphasized in schools, social diversity was sustained in homes and familial relations (Bagader & Babaker, 1987).

After 1938, a major change in the economic structure of Saudi Arabia emerged. Nobody could predict what kind of major structural changes would result from the discovery of oil, or what oil production after World War II might do to the quiet, traditional Saudi Arabian society.

As mentioned above, the rural population was composed of bedouins, who accounted for about half of the total population, and sedentary farmers and villagers, who represented about a third of the nation's total population, which was roughly estimated to be between 3 and 5 million (Knauerhase, 1975:13; Nyrop et al., 1977: 63). After 1945, oil revenues poured into the country and new jobs were offered. Social status began to be a matter of ascription rather than inheritance, and

socioeconomic factors underwent a major shift. Settled bedouins and villagers only heard about the prosperity of the new wealthy because major spending was directed to the larger agglomerations of people in the four or five biggest cities. The major cities expanded and reflected some of their expansion in the neighboring villages. Other villages and small towns declined in population and economic importance.

The growth of urban centers continued throughout the 1940s and 1950s, but at acceptable levels of between 2 percent and 3 percent annually. The source of this growth was the rural areas. Rural communities stagnated. Limited numbers of new businesses were established, land prices changed only slightly, but out-migration of the rural population was prevalent. Compared to urban centers, rural areas were declining. The urban areas' share of Saudi Arabia's population grew from 20 percent to 42 percent, i.e. it more than doubled, while the share of small towns and rural villages decreased from 20 to 12 percent (Al-Ibrahim, 1982:251). If we review an earlier estimate of ratio distribution of Saudi population, we may note the amount and magnitude of changes (Table 1.1).

Among all these changes and their causes in rural Saudi Arabia, I was disturbed by the data (briefly reviewed here) and directed my research attention to development problems of rural areas and their career ambitions. Even though rural youth might prefer to make their future homes in places that will better fulfill their occupational and lifestyle aspirations, they tend to migrate to nearby urban centers not far from their home village or town. This may reflect the strength of family ties both among traditional villagers and among the newly settled bedouins. Such ties

Table 1.1 -- Rural and Urban Population Distribution in Saudi Arabia, 1950s and 1980s (percentage).

Population Sector	1950s	1980s
Rural (including bedouins)	78%	19%
Urban	22%	81%
Total	100% (4.89 million)*	100% (8.2 million)

Sources: Compiled from Sogreah Consulting Engineers, Socio-Economic Survey of Villages and Hijar in the Kingdom, Fourth Report, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 1984, pp. 26 and 28; 1950 total from O.F. Rajab, "Studies in the Geography of Saudi Arabia." Jeddah, DAR Al-Shrgo, 1981, p. 17, based on U.N. estimate.

still play a major role in the structure of Saudi society. The influence of familism on the occupational and migrational plans of rural youth, I believe, persists.

1.4 The Problem

The broad research question to be addressed is: to what extent are the residential preferences and migration propensities of young people influenced by their socioeconomic context and by values? I am especially concerned about the influence of family background and gender. My inquiry is guided by a number of specific, interrelated questions:

1 - What residential places do rural youth prefer? Do such residential preferences affect migration propensities?

2 - What is the relationship between current place of residence and preferred place of residence?

3 - What social situational background factors affect the preferences of rural youth about future place of residence and migration propensities?

4 - What valuational factors affect the preferences of rural youth about future place of residence and migration propensity?

5 - What role does gender play in determining residential preferences and migration propensities?

1.5 Relevance of the Problem

Saudi Arabia has witnessed a major shift in the distribution of its population. Migration from rural to urban centers has responded to both push and pull factors that collaborate to create a large-scale population movement.

This study is mainly concerned with the spatial restructuring of rural populations, uneven development, and the problem of rural decline in Saudi Arabia. It is also concerned with specifying the forces that determine the career choices of rural youth and shape their future plans. Regional variations in development programs, as well as variations within regions, are major considerations related to migration propensities.

Exploring the ideas of young people relative to what they want to do and where they want to live, will help us to better comprehend the changing sociocultural orientations of contemporary Saudi Arabia. This also would provide a useful frame of reference for understanding the character and bases for the massive population redistribution that has been occurring, and for answering the question of what can be done to stop rural decline. If ready answers are not forthcoming, then at least

posing this extremely important question will stimulate other researchers and future planners to further pursue the question of what should be done to slow the rural decline. Calling attention to this critical issue may be no less important than finding a proper solution.

Regional economists have tried to verify the most influential factor or group of factors contributing to urban drift and rural decline. Greenwood (1981) states:

> The forces that induced such moves consisted in large part of push of lack of employment opportunities and relatively low income and/or wage levels in agricultural sectors and of the pull of employment opportunities and relatively high income and/or wage levels in the nonagricultural sector. (p. 3)

The loser in this competition is the rural sector because there is no equal counter pressure to urban drift. It appears that people in Saudi Arabia tend to migrate to regions that are becoming more and more urbanized and have more services available.

The only official survey of internal migration in Saudi Arabia was conducted by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in 1973. This survey indicated that for internal migration, three of the five administrative regions gained population, while the other two lost population (Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 1973)(Table 1.2).

Saudi planners became aware of this critical problem and started to search for ways to stop the influx from the rural and less-developed areas to the urban and more-developed areas. Several plans and strategies have been adopted. For example, most services, such as educational institutions and hospitals, are government facilities available to the public free of charge. Still, feasibility studies indicate that

Table 1.2 -- Internal Migration by Region, 1972 (number of persons).

Region	In-Migration	Out-Migration	+/- Net
Eastern	4,864	328	+4,536
Western	8,162	2,517	+5,645
Central	5,019	2,528	+2,491
Southern	270	9,030	-8,760
Northern	907	1,146	-239

*Includes only Saudis working in non-governmental and non-military jobs

Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, "A Study of the Interior Emigration," Research and Statistical Department, Ar-Riyadh, 1973.

the quality and capacity of these services vary greatly between the big urban centers such as Ar-Riyadh and the areas outside (Looney, 1990:84).

The Fourth Development Plan explains such variance as a natural result of stage development. The rule can be applied to other things, including lifestyle. The more a person finds a big city a better place to live in--because of its better work environment, more promising future, and more rewarding jobs--the less desirable his/her birthplace becomes.

As mentioned earlier, the Saudi government offers a "distance allowance" to motivate people to accept jobs outside large cities, especially in remote areas, and has lately announced that any applicant for a state position must accept a location outside of Ar-Riyadh, Jeddah, and Ad-Dammam (Bureau of Civil Service, 1984). Such relocation is most likely to be to rural areas throughout the country. Although it is cheaper to live outside the major cities, the results of the government steps have

not been encouraging. In short, Saudi society is facing a critical problem of population redistribution, with an over-concentration in one urban center or another, especially Ar-Riyadh, Jeddah, or Ad-Dammam.

Clearly, Saudi planners need to assess the attitudes of people in the more remote, rural areas, particularly the youths who are likely to migrate. The research here is designed to provide such information. Further, it will contribute insights relevant to comprehending the changing structure of Saudi society and the extent to which Saudi society is becoming more individualistically oriented. Such information can be deduced from the attitudes of youths toward migration, leaving parental family behind, and building a satisfying work career. One of the supplementary objectives of this research is to contribute to and possibly elaborate on or modify the theory lines and perspectives that relate to the questions being posed.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL APPROACH

I will consider here some of the factors influencing population redistribution, as derived from the research literature. I am particularly concerned with disciplinary approaches to the study of residential preferences and migration propensities. My aim is to formulate a useful set of hypotheses to guide the research process.

2.1 Factors Influencing Population Redistribution

Residential preferences and migration propensities have received considerable theoretical attention from scholars interested in understanding why certain locations become centers of population aggregation while others lose people. Sometimes clearly observable advantages are present in migratory movements. In other cases, the causes are less obvious. In these latter situations, we are never really certain what factors shape the migration trends. For instance, population redistribution may be the direct result of cultural perceptions within groups, or may be the culmination of a long series of influences stimulated by hidden mechanisms felt only by the eventual migrants. Other inquiries explore migration at a societal level. Do these generalizations hold only in developed societies as well as in newly developing societies? Is mass rural-to-urban migration a phase that occurs only during a certain

period of a society's history? Or is it a continuous process for some segments of a society anywhere? Will this migrational attitude reach its peak and then begin to halt or reverse? Many questions raised in this regard are beyond the scope of the present research.

In Saudi Arabia, issues of population mobility and stability must be understood within the context of the changes--both planned and unplanned--that have affected the nation's growth and development since the mid-1940s. There are three major theoretical perspectives or study lines that attempt to account for the determinants of population redistribution: ecological, political, and economic. Yet none of these perspectives alone can satisfactorily elucidate the multiplicity of factors that affect the mobility of people in Saudi Arabia.

2.1.1 Ecological studies examine population distribution in relation to land and natural resources and to human-made sources of human need fulfillment. The movement of population follows the availability of such resources and the degree of competition for them. Such relocations occur under normal conditions of human life.

2.1.2 Political studies on the shape of population redistribution in Saudi Arabia draw attention to the changes instituted through planned actions by the state; e.g., the sedentarization of bedouins. In actuality, sedentarization was partially planned and partially undertaken voluntarily by bedouins themselves when they gave up pastoral life by group choice in order to acquire the benefits and facilities that had been offered to the settled populations. In his report on the sedentarization processes in Saudi Arabia, Khalid Al-Angari, previous Minister of Urban and Rural Affairs, states:

> The urban population in Saudi Arabia increased during the period between 1950 and 1985, from 10 percent to approximately 72 percent of total population. In the meantime, pastoral nomads percentages decreased from 60 percent to 13 percent of total population. (Al-Angari, 1990, pp. 158-181)

2.1.3 Economic studies of population redistribution are concerned with the proportions of a given society that engage in certain economic activities, such as agriculture, industry, mining, and fisheries. Whether the approach focusses on political or economic activities, each examines the dynamics that control such redistributions. When some segment gains, another loses, and the mechanisms behind these shifts receive attention from scholars, be they geographers, economists, politicians, or sociologists. All agree that change, in order to be understood, must be satisfactorily explained.

2.2 Literature Review

Some explanations of why people move emphasize natural factors, such as droughts or floods, while others posit political causes, such as planned sedentarization or threat of invasion. Still others refer to unequal economic development or unbalanced growth. To explain the relocation and redistribution of population, the fullest explanation, however, combines more than one cause, at the same time examining the gains and losses that accompany such population movements.

In this research, I adopt the unequal development or unbalanced growth perspective and will review some of the factors that produce direct or indirect influences upon the residential preferences and migration propensities of young people in rural Saudi Arabia. Five factors are considered: (1) push-pull factors; (2)

urbanization; (3) modernization; (4) family values; and (5) linkages of residential preferences to migration propensities.

2.2.1 Pull-Push Factors and Population Redistribution

People choose to migrate for personal or familial reasons. The "push" factors that induce movement can take the form of reactions to the surroundings, on one hand, like health and other individual needs, or external forces like economic conditions and political circumstances, on the other hand. Feelings of boredom and career frustrations in the home area may drive some people to seek better opportunities elsewhere. Such searching for more satisfactory conditions is voluntary migration. Involuntary migration occurs due to influences outside the control of the individual, influences that most often preclude individual choice of time and direction. External forces include events such as war or natural disasters like floods, droughts, volcanic eruptions, and epidemics.

Many researchers have included external forces such as war and natural disasters in their studies of internal migration and residential preferences. This is inappropriate. The inclusion of such factors may be acceptable if a study is mainly concerned with causes of migration. Since migration preferences are the researcher's concern, the inclusion of migration causes are outside our interest. "Preferences" implies the ranking of choices and desires, whether they have been carried out in action or are merely held in mind as future behavior. Some studies that combine forced migration and residential preferences include those of Al-Qutub (1986) and Lerner (1958). Most studies today distinguish between the various types of migration

and their causes (see Schwarzweller & Brown, 1962; Schwarzweller, 1968b, 1971; Zuiches & Fuguitt, 1974, 1975). However, when discussing the push factors in migration, studies of migration causes need not necessarily include residential preferences, and those concerned with residential preferences need not address involuntary migration. Preferences refers to choices and wishes but not to externally forced actions.

In the newly developed societies, push-pull factors play a significant role in redistributing population. Greenwood (1981), for example, states:

> The forces that induced such moves consisted in large part of the 'push' of lack of employment opportunities and relatively low income and/or wage levels in the agricultural sector, and of the 'pull' of employment opportunities and relatively high income and/or wage levels in the non-agricultural sector. (p. 3)

At both ends of the process, both push and pull, Greenwood has emphasized economic circumstances. However, push forces are not necessarily purely economic since educational aspiration, self-image, modernization, and peer-group pressures play a significant role in youths' choice of future residence (Schwarzweller, 1960a, 1968b, 1973; Sogreah Consulting Engineers, 1984; Sewell, Haller & Straus, 1957).

In Saudi Arabia, push-pull factors affect the processes of urbanization and development. The attraction of economic opportunities combine with enticing sociocultural factors to play significant roles in motivating people to migrate. For youth, other locations hold the promise of increased income and stature beyond that available at home. While the concern of this study is the formulation of rural youths' intentions about where they will live, the separation between rural youth and the rest of rural society is a theoretical distinction rather than a real one. Young people

absorb and adopt what their society values highly. Parents, relatives, and peer groups are transmitters of ideas that greatly influence what young men and women adopt as goals (Schwarzweller & Lyson, 1974; Sewell & Armor, 1966).

The component of forces that form pushing-out mechanisms vary by such factors as age, gender, educational level, socioeconomic status, and personal ambitions. Individual modernity and scholastic achievement could be included in the modernity of individuals and in collective household perceptions about life matters.

In rural areas of Saudi Arabia, strong push factors for migration include the low income levels and, where individual investments in land and commercial activities are concerned, low returns on investment or even assets lost over the course of time. Agriculture in Saudi Arabia depends upon small holdings. In the traditional villages, because of the insufficient water, the difficulties of organizing labor, and limited marketing opportunities for products, farmers are neither able nor willing to establish large land holdings. With the implementation of the sedentarization programs, the size of holdings is not important for the newly established bedouin farms, since the introduction of bedouins to fixed settlement areas is the goal, not the establishment of productive projects. However, the result is the same in both cases--the lack of large holdings provides low returns, which in turn creates dissatisfaction and hopelessness in rural youth, who see migration as the only avenue of promise.

McGregor (1972) describes the situation as follows:

> In Saudi Arabia, agriculture that depends on oasis water sources forms less than 0.2% of the land size of Saudi Arabia; beside that, government distribution for new reformed lands depends mainly on making small holdings per individual to break tribal ownership for unlimited areas. Furthermore, about 50% of holdings are only 0.6

> hectare, and 85% of the holdings are less than 1.6 hectare. (pp. 232-235).

This low-income situation in rural areas combined with prosperity in neighboring urban centers that offers a promising future, modern life, and the possibility of social mobility lead the youth of rural Saudi Arabia to prefer urban centers regardless of whether or not their future prosperity is likely to become a reality. In fact, in many cases that prosperity does not materialize. Some studies that review the quality of life of rural migrants after 5, 10, or 15 years in urban centers have found that:

> Rural migration to urban centers turned out to be a source of continuous headache for planners and social control institutions in the urban centers: crime rate, diseases, overcrowdedness in cities, failure of public services to meet the needs of incoming migrants, and, above all, the switch of migrants' goals themselves from temporary migration to complete migration. While students drop out of school for low-paying jobs, job seekers may switch to jobs that pay less due to necessity, and because they refuse to go back to the village under the fear of being labeled a failure. (Al-Qutub, 1968, pp. 42-45)

Thus, while migration might not be the best choice for youth, the lack of information about what may actually await them, combined with a youthful spirit to search after the unknown, may lead to decisions with irreversible results. Rural youth prefer to migrate to large cities that have more available jobs and services than do the small cities.

Zuiches and Fuguitt (1975) point out that younger people have a greater preference for a community closer to a central city but preference of a lesser degree for very large cities. This is especially true for students, whose main goal is an available school. In Saudi Arabia, all colleges and universities are located in large

urban centers. Ar-Riyadh is the city of the central region where students' educational and occupational needs might be fulfilled.

Consequently, I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis: Young people from more affluent and better educated families are more likely to move.

2.2.2 Urbanization

In the development process, the urban centers provide the major attraction or pull. Large cities represent the style of life that has replaced the drabness and unexciting character of the home village. Urban dominance is always characterized by abuse of rural area resources for the advantage of the urban centers. In Saudi Arabia,

> The government began to realise the danger of excessive urban growth: there was a serious risk that within twenty years, the "useful" Arabia would be reduced to the urban and industrialized strip. About two-thirds of Saudi Arabian nationals lived in an urban environment, with about 10% farmers and 9% stock breeders. (Sogreah Consulting Engineers, 1984:26)

Anderson and Collier (1956) examined urban dominance over rural areas, using distance from major city "to estimate the influence of the metrocity in relation to distance barriers. They found that the rural areas are spatially organized in terms of the urban world, at least with respect to level of living and size of farm . . . It appears to be generally true that rural level of living declines as distance from urban aggregations increases" (pp. 152-157). Although the authors found that farm size increased with distance from the nearest urban aggregation, not all characteristics could be explained by urban dominance over rural areas because the nature of the

land and the connections with other cities may give rise to some variations that cannot be explained solely by urban dominance.

Bogue (1949) explored the effects of the metropolis upon rural areas and found that in modern societies the metropolis has tended to control the conditions of life of the population in the areas surrounding it (p. 79). A similar conclusion was reached in other studies by Kish (1954), Keyfitz (1953), and Brunner and Kolb (1933), who found that the metropolis affects life quality in rural areas in different ways, such as family size, social trends, level of living, and so on.

In Saudi Arabia, "the rural and bedouin populations are attracted to urban centers by the thought of regular salaries, children's education, air conditioning, television, and all the usual household appliances" (Sogreah Consulting Engineers, 1984:28). Dominance of the urban center over rural areas may be accepted to a certain extent because the city is the source of growth, but if the price to be paid outweighs the advantages, then it may legitimately be questioned how far urban dominance may be embraced.

At this point I anticipate my theoretical review of familial relations and valuational changes in rural areas under urban dominance. Some social problems are caused by such dominance, so rural youth and the rural population will face critical and difficult choices beyond their anticipation. I agree with the assessment of Sogreah Consulting Engineers (1984):

> In Saudi Arabia, it is clear that when a Saudi farmer wishes to leave his home region, he has obviously weighed the "pros and cons" of all his vital problems: how much his land can produce, how much return he can make on his herds, but also with respect to his family, the future of his children, the health of the entire family, the fundamental

requirements of each member, his tastes in life, the social pressure of the local environment. The possibilities of richer returns in towns and their drawing power are such that he has thought about his farm, not only in economic terms but also in psychological and social terms:

- attachment to the birthplace, its climate, its landscapes, and the vegetation;
- desire not to leave the land of his ancestors;
- desire not to leave aged parents alone on the homelands that they do not wish to leave;
- fear that emigration may break family ties;
- knowledge of housing problems to be faced in the large towns, if the entire family, and especially the wife, are to be accommodated in decent conditions befitting the honour of the family;
- fear of the city, the continual movement, traffic, pollution, unknown neighbors, absence of social relations between people.

These are very deep-rooted reasons which, if a rural inhabitant were to migrate, would make him ill at ease, or feel without roots and not adapted to the new way of life. Much has been said in recent years concerning the delinquency that has developed in urban centers, the difficulty experienced by many Saudis in adapting to city life, the multiplication of psychological ills for an increasing number of city-dwellers. The excessively rapid rate of emigration to towns that has occurred in Saudi Arabia over the last twenty years is certainly one cause, among others, of these problems. (p. 27)

Hypothesis: Familism degrees affect geographic mobility via the migrational plans of young people.

2.2.3 Modernization of Rural Areas

Modernization, with accompanying urbanization and planned development, reaches beyond urban areas to affect life and livelihood in rural areas as well.

Modernization, as a concept, may be understood on two levels, the societal and the individual.

On the societal level, modernization refers to the process of transformation from a rural, peasant society to an urban, industrial one. As part of this transformation, social relationships and cultural perceptions and values are also altered. Active kinship relationships, for example, are narrowed down to the more immediate family and are less and less concerned with the extended family. The adherence of youth to parental desires and directives lessens, and young people make more decisions about their futures on their own. The development of media and marketing means that the spread of new products and information among the young leads them to consider their elders out of touch with the changing times. As a result, the young do not form as deep an emotional attachment to the past as their parents, and consequently fewer of them consider the family homestead as the most desirable place to live.

On the level of the individual, modernization refers to the psychological and cognitive reorientation that accompanies these changes in social structure and social relationships. Thus, modernization also refers to an individualistic orientation, with emphasis on personal achievement and a rationalist orientation toward the world.

In Saudi Arabia, the changes engendered by modernization have been comparable to those in other developing areas. Consumption habits, even in rural areas, have changed as incomes have risen. Social stratification is also undergoing change as persons with achieved status compete successfully for social resources with those of ascribed status. Individual modernity means that more people put more

emphasis on direct relationships with immediate family members than with extended family and tribal connections.

The modernization process also has direct bearing on the acceptance or rejection of particular areas as places of residence. Whether viewed as the developmental process of social change or as attitude formation in individuals, modernization directly affects evaluations of familial and social traditions by individuals and their consequent life-decisions. The accumulation of different experiences and beliefs by the young in rural areas has direct influence on their decisions about migration, residential preference, and plans (Inkeles, 1983:94-95; Schwarzweller, 1960a, 1960b; Zuiches & Carpenter, 1978; Al-Banyan, 1978a; Smith, 1970:18-20; Al-Qutub, 1986:24-28; Anderson & Collier, 1956:152-153; Goldscheider, 1971:182-218; Cole, 1981).

In the modernity of individuals, the differences between small family and class or tribal relations become clearer. Interests of the large group take a back seat to greater emphasis on direct relationships with immediate family members rather than extended family or tribal connections.

> Since the environment of the central area is identified by the bedouin tribal system with all its customs, traditions and regulations, King Abdulaziz concentrated most of his efforts on the propagation of culture among the bedouin tribes living in the Riyadh region. . . . All these factors led to the comprehensive development of the Riyadh emirate, making it the pinnacle for culture and ideology based on strong principles of Islamic regulations. . . . The rural population in the Province increased due to the large-scale settlement of nomads in the region. . . . In 1974 they represented more than 50% of the province's population. . . . [The rural population has declined because of] the fact that many people have been attracted to Riyadh City. (Sogreah Consulting Engineers, 1984:2-4)

After the boom in new rural settlements due to bedouin sedentarization, there was a decline in number of abandoned villages, from 7,805 in 1970 to 3,084 in 1975, a decline of more than 55 percent (Looney, 1990: 86). The developmental programs definitely contributed to rural modernization but also caused deep cultural changes. For example, nomads who were hardly persuaded in the past to give up pastoralism did so in order to settle in tribal villages under conditions enabling them to retain their hierarchical order and stratification. These nomads abandoned their villages and headed toward Ar-Riyadh. Furthermore:

> The tribal sheiks in particular are among the first to leave the village for the main emirate, where they exercise their administrative responsibilities while the other members of the family continue with trade activities. (Sogreah Consulting Engineers, 1984: 22-23)

Conlisk (1969) reported that school performance, which refers to whether a child is behind, even with, or ahead of his age group in school years completed, depends on early stages of the child's education for the child to be successful in high school. Conlisk found that students in the 14-15 year and 16-17 year age groups show greater differences in school achievement due to variation in living in rural areas with less educated parents and low income or living in urban areas with more educated parents and higher family incomes. The differences tend to be cumulative. A student who starts falling behind in school will tend to fall farther and farther behind and will drop out of school sooner (Conlisk, 1969:140-157).

Masters (1969) also studied the effect of family income on children's education and found that students whose parents were not educated and whose families had low incomes had higher probabilities of falling behind in school and

dropping out. In Masters's study, the income factor reflected that for children whose parents had a low income, the probability of dropping out of school or lagging behind other classmates was more than 20 times greater than for children from well-to-do families (Masters, 1969:158-175).

Thus, the integration of individual modernity (Inkeles, 1983) and modernization and development (Smith, 1970; Goldscheider, 1971; Al-Banyan, 1978a; Cole, 1981;) and family background and socioeconomic status (Cole, 1981; Al-Qutub, 1986; Masters, 1969; Lyson, 1976; Sewell, Haller & Straus, 1957; Schwarzweller, 1960a, 1973, 1974; Schwarzweller & Brown, 1962) clearly support each other in the forming of residential preferences and migration propensities as related to the ambitions of students in seeking jobs after high school or in pursuing higher education. The multifaceted effects are assumed to show some integration in rationalizing investigation into the connection between modernity on the levels of income and socioeconomic status of families, and the reflection upon student achievement.

Consequently, we hypothesize that modernity and socioeconomic status of families affect the achievements of students and together enhance or suppress student ambitions for changing residence or seeking better opportunities through education by intensifying current scholastic accomplishment.

> Hypothesis: Young people with more modern attitudes are more inclined to be geographically mobile. Individual modernity and migration propensity, therefore, are positively associated.

2.2.4 Family Values and Ties

Sociologists have long asserted that families are the basic units of social stratification because all family members share equal status in society's eyes (Parsons, 1949a; Barber, 1957; Turner, 1970; Nock & Rossi, 1978). This shared perception of family members relies on basic internal organization of family ties.

The family, as a type of social relationship, is a common feature of all societies, regardless of the empirical definition of its scale, longevity, and strength of relationship. As a social institution, the family has witnessed many changes in its conceptualization and importance. One major attribute of family relations is that they are not based on contractual, timed advantages. In the view of most sociologists, family obligation is not perceived equally by different members, but a minimum of such obligations to the family are necessary for everyone. Anthropologists have referred to the family as the first society in which individuals begin their steps outward to the open society.

The functions of the family used to be more comprehensive than in modern societies: educational, religious, fostering, defending, protecting, and securing material and emotional needs for children from the beginning of their lives to the end. Later, in modern societies, the family began to give up or lose some of its functions by handing them over to professional institutions. Education was turned over to schools, religion to religious institutions, security and defense to organizations of social control, and so forth. But the basic functions of the family are still the social identity source and emotional support during childhood and until the child attains relative independence.

The effect of family social standing is not limited even after independence. Adults obtain their status through a combination of achieved and ascribed characteristics. Although achieved characteristics are gaining in importance, ascription is still important even in developed societies like the United States. In America, it was found that social origin, parents' education and occupation, migration history, ethnicity, and other aspects of ascriptive status are still important (Blau & Duncan, 1967:52).

The less a society is exposed to modernization, the more likely it is that strong family ties will be highly significant. These ties vary from simple obligations such as occasional visits and sympathizing with a family member's ups and downs, to stronger obligations like financial help, defending family members, placing family priorities over personal ones, controlling individual selections about marriage or employment, bringing up children, sharing possessions, and so on. All those obligatory ties rely on the level of development of societies and common social perception to individual and familial exchanged obligations (Foster, 1973; Al-Messiri, 1977).

In Saudi Arabia, the family is undergoing dramatic changes in its size, level of obligations, roles, and importance. Social changes that have touched every aspect of life in Saudi Arabia have also affected familial ties. These changes have created some new roles for the family and have assigned some former family functions to other institutions such as schools, social control agencies, and government.

One issue that should be mentioned in this context is the difference between tribalism and nomadism. Many writings about Saudi society use "tribalism" and "nomadism" as if the terms were equivalent, but this is not strictly true. From my

own experience as a researcher in major national research studies in Saudi Arabia, and from the familial sociology courses I taught at King Saud University from 1980 to 1986, I found that not every nomadic group is a tribal group, and not all tribal people are nomads. This distinction is important because tribal values, sedentarization of nomads, and urban-rural social values are related to family ties. If this distinction is not made, the definition of cultural background will be less informative and may even be somewhat misleading.

Tribal affiliation does not mean the family is a pastoral, nomadic family; it could be a family that has been settled in a village for centuries but still carries tribal social evaluation to careers, marriage issues, and behavioral limitations. On the other hand, there could be pastoral nomads who have no tribal affiliation as a blood relationship and impose no restrictions upon its members' choices of career, marriage, or behavior. Tribal affiliation refers to blood relationship kept under strict laws not to mix with other different nontribal groups, regardless of whether they are pastoral or settled. Hence, the answer to the question, "Is your family tribal or not?" may differ from the answer to the question, "Is your family nomadic or not?"

Sedentarized tribes still carry their tribal laws even though sedentarization may have taken place several hundred years ago. Being urban or rural reflects a certain level of understanding and emphasis upon traditionality or modernity of commitment to familial rules and regulation, but there is a great deal of variation in commitment to tribal or nontribal cultural background. Neither of the questions, "Is your family of tribal roots?" or "Does your family object to different class marriages?" could be asked without hurting the respondent's feelings. One reason

is that both tribal and nontribal people try to avoid such distinctions. Also, it is contrary to religious and government laws to raise such issues. Islamic doctrine emphasizes equality regardless of roots, and government laws based on Islamic laws also prohibit such subjects from being raised for fear that it may deepen social classification and stratification (Cole, 1981, 1985; Al-Banyan, 1978a, 1978b; Al-Obodi, 1984).

Modernization and developmental programs have weakened these kinds of stratificational delineations. Still, such issues are unavoidable with regard to marriage and job aspirations. But rural modernization has suppressed many of these attributes, within certain limits. Goldsmithing, related to blacksmithing, became commonly accepted as a tribal career, although I recall some cases seen in courts of law, in which a separation was demanded because the husband had changed his career to goldsmithing.

Tribal people have an admiration for knights and guardians of the tribal possessions from the period prior to the sovereignty enforced by the central government. They admire careers that reflect such extensions of their historical careers. Today most tribal people seek jobs as guards, an extension of tribal "knights"; drivers, an extension of desert caravan leaders; or careers related to water drilling, which is highly important in the desert. Most tribal people joined oil company drilling teams thinking it would be a search for water; otherwise they would not have accepted working in a job associated with grease and crude oil smells (Al-Banyan, 1978a:32-40). Nowadays we note that a large proportion of oil workers in Saudi Arabia are bedouin tribal people who speak fluent English with a Texas

accent, although they cannot read or write Arabic or English (personal observation during visits to Aramco [Arabian American Oil Company] in Dhahran, most of whose employees are Americans from Texas).

Some family ties underwent alteration, transformation, or even cancellation during the past three decades. Modernization programs and facing reality made such changes less rejected. I wish I could translate into English some of the oral literature and poems that expressed sorrow and bitterness of tribal people, either pastoral or settled, villagers of traditional rural Saudi Arabia, and even urban families who gave up some of their traditions in favor of development and new life situations.

The relation between family ties and social valuational changes seems to be obvious. When a society grants a higher status to nonmaterial relations, the social scale of daily life requires or forces some changes demanded by new conditions, or faces isolation or dangers of being threatened with vanishing, effaced from social life, or even from life itself. Modification may be partial, limited to some minor aspects, and slowly extend to more major and fundamental life values. These changes may pass more easily to some groups than to others. Some groups more readily adjust and accept new changes; other groups may resist change and thus pay higher prices for their stands against social change. Strictness may, by itself, be an attribute of some groups' cultural components; flexibility may characterize others.

Cultural background, socioeconomic characteristics of the family (e.g., father's education, occupation, cultural background, and migration history) may play an important role in rejecting or adopting new values imposed by the necessity of social change (Al-Banyan, 1978b:34). Family ties are not exempt from social change.

Individualism against familism indicates weak family ties. Schwarzweller (1964) notes:

> An attempt was made to explore to what extent familism affected the decision to migrate. Migrants and nonmigrants did not differ in sociocultural background characteristics. A composite index of familistic orientation constructed from six attitudinal items revealed some differences between migrants and nonmigrants. Migrants on the whole tended to be less familistic. This difference may be explained, in part, by the influence of urban, industrial experiences in the areas of destination. (p. 11)

So familism is a "form of social organization in which the interests of the individual are subordinated to those of the family group" (Heller, 1970:73).

As can been seen from the definitions quoted above, social change and exposure to modernization may lead to changes in the interests of individuals even if a controlling variable of family background is neutralized. Still, variation in family ties is significant because of valuational change variation by social change, exposure to new types of social values related to strength of family ties.

If family background was not the same as different cultural backgrounds, and socioeconomic components were varied, then intensity of familism would show even more variation if level of modernization exposure is different, or if flexibility or strictness of sociocultural background exhibited variation in those two respects.

Hypothesis: Young women are less likely than young men to migrate away from the parental community.

2.2.5 Linkages of Residential Preferences to Migration Propensities

"Residential preferences" refers to people's choice of where they would like to live. Such preferences exert their influence upon the development of rural areas

through the population redistribution. One of the earliest studies of residential preferences in America was by Zuiches and Fuguitt (1975), who surveyed Wisconsin residents. They focused on preferences relating to city size and proximity to a metropolitan center among the adult population of the continental United States (p. 492). They found that 79 percent prefer to live in small towns and rural areas, but within 30 miles of a city of more than 50,000 people. The authors suggested that the realization of preferences could eventually result in a net movement out of central cities and nonmetropolitan areas into metropolitan rings.

The Gallup Poll has periodically asked Americans about what region, state, or city they would like to live in. The 1966 Gallup survey found that nearly half (49 percent) of the respondents favored small towns and rural areas. It also found that there is a correlation between jobs and economic opportunities in large cities and the preferences of individuals. The Gallup Poll found no difference by age and sex. Residing in a city and size of residence were positively associated with preference for an urban rather than a rural setting. On the other hand, blacks expressed a significant preference for cities or suburbs over small towns and farms (Zuiches & Fuguitt, 1975:622).

Hansen (1968) came up with a similar finding in his analysis of Gallup's data. He found that 59 percent of the respondents expressed a preference for rural areas or small towns. He theorized that one factor in this rise from the earlier survey might be "the increasing tensions of life in large urban centers" (Zuiches & Fuguitt, 1975:622).

There was an intensive effort by the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association to discover how the public perceives rural America. The result yielded some surprising facts. For example, most people believe that poverty and housing conditions are much worse in the city than in the country, whereas the actual situation is the opposite. This survey limited the choices to big cities, smaller towns, and rural areas. Only 15 percent of those interviewed chose large cities and only 27 percent of the large city residents said they live there by choice (Zuiches & Fuguitt, 1975:622).

Zuiches and Fuguitt (1975) found that stage in the family life cycle provides some indications of the characteristics of people and households expressing preferences for dissimilar metropolitan locations (p. 625). They pointed to the fact that their findings are similar to what one would expect on the basis of migration research. For nonmetropolitan residents, the higher the status, the greater the probability of a preference for metropolitan locations. Also, they found that younger families and single people had a greater preference for a community closer to a central city. Older married and unmarried people preferred distant rural areas slightly more than young families did. The Zuiches and Fuguitt (1975) research also found that professionals and those with at least some college are not as attracted to nonmetropolitan areas as others such as blue-collar respondents or those with less education.

High-income and low-income families differ in where they wish to live. In high-income families, nearly two out of three respondents already live in metropolitan areas. About three out of four would prefer to live within the

metropolitan complex. In low-income families, about 55 percent at present live in nonmetropolitan counties. They prefer to live in metropolitan counties and enjoy closer proximity to the central city (Zuiches & Fuguitt, 1975).

Zuiches and Fuguitt (1975) found a relationship between the size and location of birthplace. They also found movement from more remote areas to big cities and their peripheries over the last generation. However, there would be a reverse shift out of cities so that the proportion of residents in large cities and rural areas would be less than the proportion born there. Therefore, they argue that there is a considerable association of place of origin as well as current residence with the preferences given for each of the three general residence types (Zuiches & Fuguitt, 1975:497-498).

In Saudi Arabia, we need to consider two main factors concerning residential preferences:

1. Saudi Arabia by its geographical nature is formed of scattered settlements. Such settlements reflect the water-distribution system that affects most of the Arabian lands. Human settlements were founded near the oases or water sources throughout Arabian land (Rajab, 1981:52).
2. The urban boom of the last two decades is reflected in Saudi Arabia's population redistribution. About 70 percent of the Saudi population lives in urban centers, and rural depopulation became a mark of rural areas all over the country (Al-Ibrahim, 1982: 203).

So changes in residential preferences and migration propensities have been strongly boosted by the attraction of urban agglomerations and the push of rural

areas caused by the lack of services, including institutions of higher education. Such pull/push relations affect the social perceptions toward what a good place means and where one should locate a future home.

Hypothesis: Residential preferences and migration propensities are affected by differences in cultural background.

Hypothesis: Young people are more likely to migrate to urban centers located within their region or close to their home towns than to similar centers outside their regions.

2.3 Major Hypotheses (Summary)

From the previous theoretical arguments and empirical studies, we have developed the following major hypotheses for this study.

Hypothesis 1: Youngsters from more affluent and better educated families are more likely to move.

Hypothesis 2: Familism degrees affect geographic mobility via the migrational plans of young people.

Hypothesis 3: Young people with more modern attitudes are more inclined to be geographically mobile. Individual modernity and migration propensity are positively associated.

Hypothesis 4: Young women are less likely than young men to migrate away from the parental community.

Hypothesis 5: Residential preferences and migration propensities are affected by differences in cultural background.

Hypothesis 6: Young people are more likely to migrate to urban centers located within their region or close to their home towns than to similar centers outside their regions.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODS AND PROCEDURES

The central region is one of five major geocultural divisions of Saudi Arabia and includes Ar-Riyadh, the capital city. Jeddah, the second largest city, a seaport on the Red Sea, is in the western region, as are the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah (each with a population of under 500,000). The eastern region borders the Gulf coast and includes the oil-related urban triangle of Ad-Dammam-Dahrahn-Al-Khobar. The northern region includes the city of Tabuk, which serves as the regional governorate center. The northern region shares a long border with Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait, and is dominated by nomadic tribes as well as settled bedouins. The mountainous southwest region borders Yemen and the Red Sea. Abha is the regional governorate center; Jezan and Najran are the local governorate centers (Figure 3.1).

3.1 Study Setting

The study focuses on young people in two areas of the central region. The first is the Ar-Riyadh governorate, which includes most of the region, the capital city of Ar-Riyadh (the "main emirate"), and 24 other "branch emirate" subgovernorates that report to the Ar-Riyadh region governorate (see Figure 3.2). The second site



Figure 3.1--Map of the Central Region of Saudi Arabia (Source: Norconsult, "A.S. Socioeconomic Survey," 1983, p. 1; modified by the author).



Figure 3.2--Map of the Ar-Riyadh District of Saudi Arabia (Source: Sogreah Consulting Engineers, Socio-Economic Survey of Villages and Hijar in the Kingdom, Second Report, 1984, p. 91; modified by the author).

is the Al-Qasseem district (see Figure 3.3), consisting of 14 local governorates which are essentially rural in character.

Within Al-Qasseem, Al-Rass was selected because it is the only governorate with high schools for boys and girls in both the main center and in the satellite villages surrounding it. Within the Ar-Riyadh district, Ad-Duwadmi and Rumah were selected because they too are the only governorates that have high schools in both the central city and in the satellite villages (see Appendix A - Tables A1 and A2). There are no other areas in the central region that meet this basic requirement of having high schools in both the central city and in the satellite villages.

3.2 Study Sites Specified

The selected areas vary in distances from the city of Ar-Riyadh. Rumah governorate is closest to Ar-Riyadh, Ar-Rass is farthest, and Ad-Duwadmi is midway. The population of these areas reflects that of the central region and includes bedouins, farmers, and urban dwellers.

In each of these three areas, representative high schools were selected from the central town and two villages. The number of students interviewed by questionnaire reflects each area's twelfth-grade population, in both the boys' and girls' schools. The most populous area is Ad-Duwadmi (though population statistics are not definite and generally not available). I used estimates from various sources, such as educational authorities, health authorities, and governorate officials. Al-Rass is the second most populous area, and Rumah the least.



Figure 3.3--Map of the Al-Qasseem District of Saudi Arabia (Source: Sogreah Consulting Engineers, Socio-Economic Survey of Villages and Hijar in the Kingdom," Second Report, 1984, p. 82; modified by the author).

The lack of an accurate census is not important because my study aims do not depend on population number or density. The number of high schools and high school students is more important. I distributed questionnaires personally to pupils in the boys schools, and through a female social worker in the girls schools. In the latter cases, I communicated by telephone with the social worker, and explained the questionnaire and also answered inquiries that arose during the administration process. Further information about difficulties encountered in accessing these young people and getting permission to administer the questionnaires is discussed in a later section.

Within each region there are two administrative divisions: the major governorate center, which reports directly to the Ministry of Interior; and the local governorates, which report hierarchically to major governorates (and then to the Ministry of the Interior). In the study area there are two districts and the governor of each district reports to the Ministry of the Interior. The Al-Qasseem district has 14 local governorates, and they include many villages and small towns that report to the local governorate. Smaller hamlets report to the nearest town or village administrative office (amara). The situation in the Ar-Riyadh district is similar: 24 local governorates report to the Ar-Riyadh governor. Within the local governorates, there are many small towns and villages that report to the local governorate. Hamlets and nomadic satellites report administratively to the nearest town governor or amir. In the central region there are 34 local governorates, 24 of which are in the Ar-Riyadh district. These local governorates include 710 villages and hijar, i.e.,

bedouin settlements (see Table A3). The Al-Qasseem district includes 468 villages and hijar (see Table A4).

There are 1178 villages and nomadic settlements in the central region plus the major cities of Ar-Riyadh, Unayzah, and Buraydah, and 34 central towns of the local governorates. Reviewing lists obtained from the Ministry of Municipality and Rural Areas, I determined whether there are high schools in the villages and hamlets. Only three governorates have related villages with high schools for both boys and girls.

In the Rumah local governorate of Ar-Riyadh district, there are three high schools: one for boys and two for girls. All three are included in the study sample. In the Ad-Duwadmi local governorate, there are five high schools for boys and eight for girls. Only nine of these 13 high schools were selected, as it met the requirement of high school availability to the inclusion condition of a local governorate in the sample. (Only two high schools for boys and one for girls were required for an area to be included in the study.) In the Ar-Rass local governorate, there are five high schools in the governorate center and in the villages, and all schools are included in the sample. All twelfth-graders in both the boys and girls schools were included.

3.3 The Research Instrument

A self-administered questionnaire consisting of 58 questions, was used to collect information. An English translation is appended (Appendix B).

In addition to individual and family background characteristics, the questionnaire solicited the following kinds of information: familism orientation; modernity of respondents' residential preferences and migration propensities.

Residential images about cities, villages and bedouin areas were also covered by the questionnaire.

3.4 Field Situation and Procedures

Upon arriving in Ar-Riyadh, I contacted the necessary governmental agencies, beginning with the Sociology Department of King Saud University. There I obtained some supporting letters to facilitate cooperation with other agencies. I also obtained a car, maps, and letters of recommendation for the Girls Education Directorate and Ministry of Boys' Education to allow the questionnaire to be administered in their schools and to be tested for any final modifications if questions or information were found to be inappropriate. No major obstacles were encountered at this point, as the offices where I needed to obtain permissions were generally cooperative and encouraging.

The next step was to take letters to the local governorate directorate of education and get information about the schools, such as capacity, 12th graders in the 1990 class, and the official name of the school that I would use in correspondence. I then made a short visit to the areas where I located each school--not an easy task, given the approximate distances and descriptions I had. Later I prepared about 700 copies of the questionnaire.

3.5 Questionnaires Returned

When the questionnaires were distributed, there were about 650 students present (380 male and 270 female) in the twelfth-grade classes of the 17 high schools. A total of 553 questionnaires were returned from the 650 students; 97 were not

returned by the students or returned with only a cover letter. It was not possible immediately to determine which questionnaires were missing or incomplete. Only 45 minutes were allowed for the administration of the questionnaire in each classroom, and although an average of only 28 minutes had been needed to complete the pretest, some students in the actual administration took longer or kept the questionnaire. I had no direct access to the classrooms in the girls high schools; access was permitted only over the phone or through a doorkeeper. Almost half of the unreturned questionnaires were from the girls high schools. I was unable to identify which students returned questionnaires and which did not because of the strict conditions of anonymity agreed to with the educational authorities. Of the 553 questionnaires returned, 524 were considered valid and 29 were rejected because of a large proportion of unanswered questions.

Questionnaires were returned by 486 Saudis and 38 non-Saudis (Table 3.1). Questionnaires from the non-Saudis are not included in the present analysis because they are only temporary residents, mostly sons and daughters of guest workers. But I did explore the data from non-Saudis and I report this in Chapter IV. Distribution of the questionnaires could have been limited to Saudi students, but it was felt that the educational setting would be disturbed if some students were excluded. If the number of non-Saudi students had been greater, data from them could have been used in comparative analysis, especially with regard to family ties and image of residential areas. Because non-Saudis constitute less than seven percent of the sample (most concentrated in the Al-Duwadmi area), use of these data would not have produced statistically reliable results. Of these, 650 were distributed; 524 valid questionnaires were returned (see Table 3.1). This is a relatively high rate (81

Table 3.1--Survey Administrative Summary, by Survey Area.

Survey Area	Number of Schools (1)	Questionnaires distributed (2)	Completed and accepted (3)	Not returned (4)	Invalidated "refusals" (5)	Percent Valid
Ar-Rass						
Male	3	108	97	9	2	89.8
Female	2	80	68	8	4	85.0
Ad-Duwadmi						
Male	5	190	165	18	7	86.8
Female	4	100	73	22	5	73.0
Rumah						
Male	1	82	47	30	5	57.3
Female	2	90	74	10	6	82.2
Total Male	9	380	309	57	14	81.3
Total Female	8	270	215	40	15	79.6
Total	17	650	524*	97	29	80.6

(1) Number of schools differed from that obtained from 1988-89 educational statistics because of new schools being established in the last two years.

(2) Number of questionnaires distributed was determined by the schools' records of number of students who were enrolled and were going to enter final exams for the high school in 1990.

(3) Only returned and valid questionnaires were included (see * below).

(4) Number of unreturned caused by some of the students not returning questionnaires, which was not immediately discovered in the field.

(5) For a high number of unanswered questions or missing some pages, some questions, which was not immediately discovered in the field.

*This number includes Saudi and non-Saudi students. Only the Saudi sample, consisting of 486 students, will be used. The 38 non-Saudi students are excluded except for comparative purposes in the discussion about population and survey areas.

percent). From boys schools, the percentage of valid questionnaires returned was 81.3; from girls schools, 79.6 percent. I consider the returns of the girls schools to be better because though I was personally able to collect questionnaires in the boys schools only, the two return rates were nearly equal. I think that the girls were more cooperative in promptly completing and returning the questionnaires. For the boys, I did everything I could to spread the spirit of cooperation and tried to overcome any hesitation, even bringing extra pencils and extra forms to replace any misprinted or misstapled ones. With respect to the social workers and class teachers in the girls schools, I do not think their efforts can have been as great, because it was not their project. There might have been an even higher rate of return from the girls schools if I had been allowed personally to administer the questionnaires.

Generally the responses in the centers averaged 78 percent, and in the satellites, 80 percent. The numbers were 90 percent from Ar-Rass center and 87 percent from Ad-Duwadmi center, but 57 percent from Rumah center, which reduced the valid returns from centers to less than from the satellites. In general, the satellites had a lower percentage of return, but the average for the centers was pulled down by the low rate from Rumah.

The fewest questionnaires were unreturned from Ar-Rass; percentages not returned from Ad-Duwadmi and Rumah were equal. A point that supports my assertion about girls' cooperation is that the unreturned from all the boys schools accounted for nearly 70 percent of all unreturned, but the invalid rate was higher in the girls' schools. This means that cooperation of the girls was higher than the boys.

I began distributing the questionnaires just a month before final exams in the schools. Time pressures made me distribute questionnaires in the girls schools over the entire area first, then go back to the boys schools. I could follow up with the boys even during exams, if necessary. Fortunately, such follow-ups were not necessary. Only 45 minutes was given by the schools for administering the questionnaire. I used 5 minutes to introduce the project and discuss the goal of the research so that the students would not have to read the introductory letter. I asked them to answer all the questions and to ask me for explanations of questions they did not understand. I explained the questions with minimal wording to avoid variations in interpretation.

Some questions, such as one about obligation toward parents, triggered astonishment, especially among the female students. The female social worker noticed that the question about choice of location for settling was received with smiles and comments like, "Who says that girls choose where to live - it is either the father's or husband's choice."

3.6 Difficulties Encountered in the Field

Administration of the questionnaire was to be completed in a few weeks, but some unforeseen administrative problems delayed the process. The division of the local governorates does not reflect the division of educational directorates. For example, while the village of Kasser Bin Okayel follows the Ar-Rass educational directorate, and letters directed from Ar-Riyadh (Ministry of Boys' Education) were directed to the Ar-Rass educational directorate, the local amir governor of Kasser

Bin Okayel reports to the An-Nabhaniyah local governorate. While I had to meet the local amir governor, I needed a letter from a different governor (in this case, the Ar-Rass governor) to direct the board of education to permit data collection in an area outside his authority. So two permissions were needed to meet the requirements of both sides. This was also mentioned by Sogreah Consulting Engineers (1984):

> The Directory of Boys' education in Al-Qasseem does not have authority over the province as a whole. Currently, the sub-emirates (local governments) of Unayzah and Ar-Rass still depend directly on the Directorate of Boys' Education of Ar-Riyadh Province. This situation should not continue to exist, however, as it is planned that all the sub-emirates (local governments) in Al-Qasseem should be attached to the Province's own Directorate of Boys' Education in the coming years. (pp. 49-50)

Requiring double permissions took some time. In addition, the girls schools were restrictive about receiving the questionnaires from me directly. They preferred to have the questionnaires mailed in sealed envelopes directly from the girls education authorities and then to return them to the authorities with serial numbers and cover letters. These procedures did not prevent me from following the papers and contacting the social workers, but the formalities slowed the process.

The questionnaires were collected and reviewed at my place of residence in each area, then sorted according to boys and girls schools. There were only a few occasions when I had to ask for more questionnaires to be filled in. When I found that a class number had an absentee rate of more than 20 percent, I went back to ask the absent students to complete the questionnaire. This happened only once, when some students were absent to take medical tests required by the school and I

returned the next day to collect data from them. Otherwise, absenteeism was less than 2 percent, and follow-ups were unnecessary.

After collecting the information, I began coding and cleaning the data, and attempted to recover some missing information. Questionnaires with large numbers of missing responses or missing pages were considered invalid. There were 29 invalid questionnaires (4.4 percent) out of 650 distributed.

3.7 Research Variables and Their Measurement

My aim is to formulate a better understanding of the extent to which residential preferences and migration propensities are influenced by several factors detailed in pages to follow. For this purpose, I employed a set of dependent and independent variables.

3.8 Independent Variables

FAMILY CULTURAL BACKGROUND. In the central region of Saudi Arabia, as mentioned in my review of the survey area and population, there are three important cultural background types that need to be considered. They are:

Urban: An urban background is often characterized by modern attitudes, a cosmopolitan world-view, and behavior that is oriented toward consumption. Material amenities are important. Social and economic status enhancement and educational achievements are highly valued.

Rural Farmer: Young people from rural backgrounds tend to be especially concerned about communal relationships, and tend to be uncomfortable with individual diversity, alternative life styles and non-traditional social customs. There

is a concern for land ownership, which is often associated with the family's position in the communities. Rural young people place a high value on social relationships, as reflected in the terms "village-mates," "co-villagers," or "my townspeople." The rural perception is one that looks suspiciously at change and has a low opinion of urbanite attitudes and nomadic attributes.

Both rural and urban cultures value attachment to the land, although each from a different angle of valuation. The rural culture shows connections to certain land, with physical limits and location, whereas the urban culture's attachment is related to attributes of the land rather than its name or location.

Nomadic Pastoral Culture: This background is manifested by bedouins who are mostly tribal people related by blood or marriage. They carry a lineage relationship in place of villagership in rural areas or urban attributes in urban areas. Although many bedouins have given up nomadism and have settled in rural villages or small towns, they still exhibit the characteristics of nomadic life. They appreciate open doors and wide inner spaces in houses. They look down on villagers and city people and reject manual work regardless of income, preferring heroic jobs characterized by danger and unconfined spheres (i.e., they will do no office work); jobs such as those of night guards, military related services, or drivers (substituting for caravans of camels). Even settled bedouins place little value on land, at least not emotionally. They easily relocate, with no cultural constraints. (For a detailed description of these cultural background attributes, refer to the country overview and statement of the problem in Chapter I; also see Al-Ibrahim, 1982:6, 42, 61, 121, 128, 246-288; Al-Banyan, 1978a:32, 35, 48; 1978b:8-52; Looney, 1990:42, 81, 82;

Al-Hammad, 1986: 409-435; Schwarzweller, 1964:5-39; Cole, 1981: 169-210; Sogreah Consulting Engineers, 1984, Vol.II:5, 27, 29; Vol.IX:5-48; Shnore, 1966: 131-143.)

The survey instrument solicits the respondents' cultural background--urban, rural, or bedouin. Changes in family cultural background is determined, i.e., during the youth's life, his or her parents' life, or earlier during the paternal grandfather's life. The contrast of current family cultural classification with generational settlement and/or urbanization depends on the perception of families of themselves.

To assess the cultural background affiliation of respondents, one major question was employed:

Do you consider your family background to be

____ farmer family?
____ nomad family?
____ urban family?

Two other related questions were used to track family cultural background:

Where did your father live most of his life?
Name of place: (_____)
Is this: desert (____) rural (____) urban (____)

Where did your father's father live most of his life?
Name of place: (_____)
Is this: desert (____) rural (____) urban (____)

It is expected that migration propensities will be stronger among youths from bedouin families than from rural families. The literature review and previous studies have shown that those most attached to the land are the traditional villagers and the

urban youths who care for an area's attributes rather than locational names. The lack of services is assumed to boost the rural youths and urban youths response to push factors; hence, both will show preferences for other than their current residence, whereas bedouin youths will show migration propensities with less emphasis upon residential preference.

FAMILISM VALUES. Familism is often viewed as a form of social organization in which the interests of the individual are subordinated to those of the family group (Heller, 1970; Sorokin, Zimmerman & Galpin, 1930). Familism can also be conceptualized as an attitude or value.

To measure the degree of family ties, a scale was derived based mainly on earlier scales by Heller (1970) and Schwarzweller (1960a, 1964, 1971). The original scales were combined, then 20 statements or questions were adapted to fit the Saudi context. The main aspects or dimensions of familism intended to be reflected in this scale are: feelings about family; integration of activities; sharing property; concern about the family's perpetuation; and mutual aid.

I developed a new two-dimensional categorization scheme for the set of familism items. My first dimension deals with family ties, feelings, and emotions. My second dimension concerns the sharing of property, house, and the care for elderly or youth in physical and material ways.

My two dimension classifications are similar to those suggested by Harvey and Procos (1974: p. 244). In the Harvey and Procos study, family ties refers to a two-dimensional perspective. First, there is the mental conceptual frame for family which focuses on blood and marriage relationships and the concomitant socio-cultural

aspects. That perspective focuses on the unity of ancestors where the new generation is being raised to comprehend "my family" versus "other's family." In Saudi Arabia, family tree and family-root experts, especially among bedouins, are well known and common in each family that looks to its history to enhance its current solidarity. An older man (usually) is named as the "dean" of the family, especially among non-bedouins, and family members go to his place during national or religious festivals to express pride in and continuity of family ties.

The second dimension in the Harvey and Procos scheme is a behavioral dimension relative to the actions that reflect attitudinal or valuational aspects of family. Behavioral practices mainly appear as volunteering actions like frequent visits, phone calls, or letter writing, and in the official law of family responsibility toward family members, where obligations are enforced for the social security of family members. Spending money for children or parents, sisters, aunts, and so on are not merely charitable actions. Family members (by blood or marriage) are by Saudi law responsible for their relatives (see Appendix C, "Definition of Terms").

The scale of familism used in my research was composed of 20 statements with responses at five degree levels, ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." A value of "1" was assigned to "strongly agree" and a value of "5" was assigned to "strongly disagree." The value of "3" represents being unsure, but this does not mean an absence of feeling. "Unsure," as discussed in the literature (and I concur), often reflects a level of uncertainty in which there is conflict between personal needs and social values. The more a student is affected by the values of urban, modern life, the less he or she will agree with the various statements.

Schwarzweller (1964) commented about area isolation in the United States as a factor that "helped to preserve those cultural vestiges of a family-centered organization which were necessary, indeed crucial, for survival during the earlier frontier situation" (p. 5).

My set of 20 familism questions ask about abstract feelings and practical actions regarding family ties and family obligations. The set of items, as I have mentioned, is based upon earlier scales by Schwarzweller (1960a, 1964) and Heller (1970). The 20 questions were selected and modified from the aspects of familism that Heller used in developing his 37-item scale, which he later reduced to 15 items focused on five aspects of familism. Heller's familism scale (1970) also draws items from Schwarzweller's scale (1960, 1971). Other works provided a foundation for conceptualizing the relationships between family ties and migration (Parsons, 1949b; Brown, Schwarzweller & Mangalam, 1963), for comprehending familism as a form of social organization (Sorokin, Zimmerman & Galpin, 1931), and conceiving of familism as an attitude (Schwarzweller, 1964). The approach to the study of familism that guided Heller was an accumulation of such works, even if not cited. The five family dimensions Heller used are feeling of belonging, complete family integration, family properties, family perpetuation, and mutual aid. These five dimensions are found in the previously mentioned sources too. Although I used a version of Heller's scale of familism, I should credit those sociologists whose works contributed to the making of my scale. Procedures concerning validity and reliability and necessary modification to fit in the field of this study will be discussed in the section on Research Instrument Validity and Reliability later in this chapter.

MODERNITY VALUE. In Saudi society, as noted, there are three distinct cultural backgrounds (bedouins, farmers, and urban families). Dominant values and cultural heritage enhance the dignity of cultural background. Differences among these groups represent the way each group used to deal with the environment (i.e., for bedouins, the desert; for farmers, agricultural land; for urban people, the city). Changes during the last two decades have touched most components of the value system; some values have been altered, replaced, or even cancelled.

One of the major valuational aspects of social behavior and beliefs is the rank order of priorities for individual versus family interests. Social values are one of the many aspects of Saudi society that have changed. The settlement of bedouins brought some contradictions in their values. Bedouins used to maintain a loyalty to clan and tribal customs without being tied to the land as an arena for social practices. Bedouins have to face the fact that travelling across Arabia is not as easy as it once was. The central government has its political borders with other neighboring political entities, and crossing borders can cause political crises.

Nomadism has also become a difficult way of life because the political system encourages settlement and provides services for those who settle. One natural dimension enhancing the settlement of tribes is the severe drought experienced by camel and sheep herders, whereby grazing lands have become scarce and gave rise to fighting between tribes over water resources and grassland. All factors worked to make the country witness a boom in bedouin settlements from the 1940s to the late 1960s. A new rural tribal society emerged by then, where bedouin economies based on livestock trading changed into farming and livestock breeding (details are

reviewed in the part about Saudi rural system and in the Statement of the Problem) (see Al-Banyan, 1978a, 1978b; Al-Shamekh, 1975; Rajab, 1985).

The old rural areas are no exception to this rule. Changes touched the economic system and put farming in competition with new income sources. Traditional farming systems and small crafts faced the mechanization and modernization methods that challenged and replaced the traditional methods of surviving. The system of self-sufficiency and content changed to one of competition and accumulation of wealth. Cooperation in communities vanished with the rise of individualism, personalism, and social envy. For a long time, rural people looked economically alike; but with such new changes the rural value system was affected by the decline of cooperation and the rise of individualism. These changes expanded on different levels, first on the level of Saudi society in general and on particular parts of the national level (i.e., governmental structure), and then on the local levels--rural, bedouin, and urban areas. A third level is within the family itself.

The development and modernization of rural people (traditional villagers and newly settled bedouins) made the countryside recognize a new valuational system with different accessories. The transitional period was not long, and change was not everywhere equal. As Philipp (1984) has noted, "Perhaps the majority of non-Saudis (and possibly even the Saudi Arabs themselves) still have an either vague or mistaken conception of the present state of affairs" (p. xxix). Sudden changes touched all aspects of life, mostly in urban areas, but not much less so in rural areas. Value changes made rural areas look far different from what they had been a few decades ago. People reacted to changes in rural areas in numerous ways, and family

cultural background played a major role in that reaction formation. Family ties affected individualism, and rural areas began to adopt urban ways of life. Not everyone welcomed the changes, but everyone had to deal with them.

In regard to personal and familial adoption of modern values, two questions were used to detect such changes indirectly. The questions concerned the type of news--local, national, or international--that attracted the respondent, and his or her personal beliefs about qualifications required for high position occupations--being socially popular, being conservative, or being professional. The three indicators reflect how the youth would evaluate the world around him or her, in direct relation to his or her being affected by new social values. The questions were adopted and modified from Inkeles (1983), "Exploring Individual Modernity" (CI-13 and EF-11, 12; p. 94). They are:

What should most qualify a man to hold high office?

____ Devotion to the old and (revered) time-honored ways
____ Being the most popular among the people
____ Higher education and special knowledge

Which one of these kinds of news stories interests you the most?

____ World events, such as happenings in other countries
____ The nation (Saudi Arabia)
____ Your home town or village

Students responding in a conservative, traditional way of evaluating matters are classified as holding conservative values and are less exposed to changes taking place. The modern response is taken to be liberated from traditional ways of thinking, and

selects educated professionals for jobs rather than relatives of the conservatives. Since breadth of vision and interests are not attributes of traditional rural life, students who were most attracted to world events in the news exhibited more modernity than those who cared only about local village happenings. By weighting the responses, we can calculate the value changes from traditional to modern. Modernism or conservatism are also detected through the familism scale, where less attachment to family represents a level of modernization not common in rural areas, and high familism represents conservatism and retention of rural values.

GENDER. There are two reasons why it is important to consider gender as an indicator of variation in migration propensity and residential preferences, especially in Saudi Arabia. First, the culture dictates that single women are to be accompanied by a male family member who is ineligible to be their spouse, such as their father, son, or brother. Second, residential preferences are related to migration propensities because both require decision-making if action is to be carried out. Hence, females might be seen as having residential preference in the form of wishful thinking, and migration propensity may be seen as limited social permission for women to be on their own independently. Familism is expected to vary less according to gender, although women might react to some empirical familial obligations that they might not be allowed to put into practice.

Although many studies have shown that females are similar to males in their residential preferences, migration propensities, and familism, it is expected that this variable would show some variance due to the uniqueness of the status of females in Saudi Arabia.

FAMILY SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND. The survey instrument assessed socioeconomic status using three questions. A question about father's education contains seven status categories. In constructing this variable the levels were collapsed into four categories (no education; below average, less than 12th grade; average, high school; and above average, above high school). In other parts of this research, the seven levels were retained because of the significance shown in the primary test of relations between each level of education and other variables.

A second question was about father's occupation. The four status categories were public service, military, business owner, and business employee.

A third question about family income was categorized by Saudi sources as average income (see, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 1979; Al-Ibrahim, 1982; and Table 3.2 about average income for Saudis in urban, rural, and nomadic areas). Information for this variable was categorized into six levels, but for computational purposes the data were collapsed into four categories: below 11,000 SR; 11,000 to less than 30,000 SR; 30,000 to less than 80,000 SR; and 80,000 SR or more).

The following questions were asked:

What is your father's formal education?

____ No education at all
____ Less than 6th grade
____ More than 6th grade but less than 12th grade
____ College or university -- 4 years
____ Vocational or military college
____ Master's degree or Ph.D.
____ Other--please specify

What kind of work does your father do? If retired, what did he do before?

(_____)

Table 3.2--Average Household Income, by Residence Location (in Saudi Riyals).*

Residence Location	Head of Household Income	Household income
Bedouin	11,200	14,200
Rural	16,200	20,700
Urban		
Small towns	35,300	43,600
Large cities	33,400	44,900
Very large cities	58,000	80,400

*1 US dollar equals 3.75 Saudi Riyals

Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Department of Labor, "Occupation, Wages and Labor Hours in the Private Sector" (in Arabic), 1979.

What is your father's (or head of household's) yearly income?

____ below 11,000 SR
____ 11,000 - 13,999 SR
____ 14,000 - 19,999 SR
____ 20,000 - 29,999 SR
____ 30,000 - 79,999 SR
____ 80,000 SR and above

The socioeconomic level of a family, it was reasoned, has considerable influence upon children's ambitions, exposure to modern ideas, level of knowledge and breadth of experience, and liberalism or conservatism. All of these aspects will affect variations in residential preferences and migration propensities. Family cultural origins will contribute to this effect by suppressing, marginalizing, or enhancing youths' attitudes to current residence and propensity to migrate.

3.9 Dependent Variables

The dependent variables, the main problematics of this study, are residential preferences and migration propensities of rural youth.

RESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES. Attributes of preferred places of residence will be used to determine the residential preferences of young people. A scale adopted from Martin (1953) and modified to fit our research setting is used for this purpose. This scale is composed of a set of seven questions each of which has five possible responses varying from 1 to 5. The total score of from 7 to 35 is used as a continuous measurement for residential preferences. High scores indicate that the respondent is urban oriented, while low scores reflect preference for rural places, and consequently low migration propensity. A high score, which indicates an urban connotation, can be assumed to suggest a strong propensity to migrate from current place to an urban center, e.g., Ar-Riyadh, and a low score reflects a strong propensity to stay in the present place.

The original scale contained 10 items, but for this study I decided that only seven could be used to detect Saudi rural youth attitudes toward conditions of rural life, conditions of urban life, and social stereotyping in rural-urban relations. The seven items were worded in different directions of measurement, so that "strongly agree" to one statement meant the respondent was in favor of urban areas, but "strongly agree" to another statement meant the respondent was in favor of rural areas. Later the measurements were reordered to be in the same direction and the scale was weighted so that the highest scores indicated a preference for urban areas and the lowest scores indicated a preference for rural areas.

The residential preferences scale is composed of questions that depict negative or positive attitudes and beliefs about rural, urban, and bedouin areas. The questions require answers varying from strongly agree to strongly disagree. After the

required adjustment for reversed questions, the answers are summed. Detailed information about the rural and urban residential preferences will be given in the section about validity and reliability of the study instrument.

The residential preferences scale items are:

a) Isolation from social activities

Some people complain that living in rural areas and small towns outside large cities means being cut off from social activities. Do you agree?

____ strongly agree
____ agree somewhat
____ undecided
____ disagree somewhat
____ strongly disagree

b) Child-rearing preference

It is sometimes said that rural or provincial areas are far better than large cities for rearing children. Do you agree?

c) House ownership preference

Some people say that, all things considered, a person gets more for his money buying a house in Ar-Riyadh than he does buying a house in a rural area. Do you agree?

d) Metro cities leisure life preference

Some say that people living in large cities get a lot more fun out of life than those living in rural villages or provincial towns. Do you agree?

e) Metro cities deficiencies

Some say that compared with village or small town dwellers, people living in cities miss out on many of the worthwhile things in life. Do you agree?

f) Metro cities admiration

Some say that there is not a single advantage to be gained by living outside the city of Ar-Riyadh. Do you agree?

g) Rural areas admiration

Some say that most families living in Ar-Riyadh would be better off if they moved out into the rural villages or small towns. Do you agree?

MIGRATION PROPENSITY. As mentioned in the literature review, there are strong relations between residential preferences, migration propensity, and socioeconomic attributes of the current place of residence. To detect propensity to migrate, a direct question was used:

How likely is it that you will move from your home (village or town) soon after graduation?

___ very likely
___ likely
___ somewhat likely
___ not very likely

Residential preferences and migration propensity are closely linked. Not favoring the current residential place enhances migration propensity and favoring the current residential place reduces or suppresses migration propensity. It is also important to note that family ties affect residential preferences and, so too, migration propensity.

3.10 Validity and Reliability of the Research Instrument

Validity tests are used to insure that the instrument used is valid for collecting the information it was designed to collect, and reliability tests are used to check dependability, that is, whether the instrument can be used over and over and give the same level of measurability (Miller, 1991).

3.10.1 Validity

The questionnaire was constructed in the United States in collaboration with my dissertation research advisor. It was translated into Arabic and back into English to verify identical meanings and to avoid questions that might hinder cooperation in the field. Before leaving Ar-Riyadh, I had the questionnaire typed in Arabic, with bold type for headings and sections. I prepared an introductory letter summarizing the research and asking for the cooperation of respondents.

A pre-test of the Arabic version was done in suburban Ar-Riyadh high schools. Although minor adjustments were made, no major changes were required. The pre-test included 28 male students and 8 female students. The number of female students was small because of difficulty in getting cooperation from female schools. This was because the questionnaire was not administered by a female researcher, but by a class teacher who was not trained for this purpose, and the only communication with me was by written notes delivered by the doorkeeper.

I developed a summated scale (described in part six of the questionnaire review following). For each residential type, I put ten attributes, mostly given by the students during the pre-test, then asked each student to check only one attribute that he or she thought appropriately described that residential type. I had intended separate versions for males and females because of gender-dependent spellings (as in French) in Arabic but I could not prepare separate forms because of time and financial constraints. The differences did not affect the meaning of the questions. I added a note of apology to the female respondents for the shortcomings of the language, but none commented upon this.

Because the aim of validity testing is to verify that the instrument is measuring what it was designed to measure, the following steps were undertaken. When the questionnaire was constructed, it was divided into six sections:

1 - General information about the respondents: These questions were pre-tested by Saudi students (native Arabic speakers) in the United States and by subjects in Saudi Arabia who spoke only Arabic. There were 16 students in the United States pre-test and 38 students in the Saudi Arabia pre-test. The information sought in this section was such that the questions could be completely answered with no ambiguity or sensitivity.

2 - Intentions of students after graduation from high school: There was very little ambiguity in understanding this question. Only for the United States pre-test sample was there some uncertainty about what the respondents wanted to do after graduation since they were children of temporary residents and related their answer to their parents' future location. No such uncertainty was noticed in the Saudi Arabia pre-test sample.

3 - Residential preferences scale: These questions were drawn from Martin's (1953) "Rural-Urban Fringes and Residential Preferences." Validity of the contents was carefully checked to meet the Saudi environment. The pre-test of both samples showed no misunderstanding or ambiguity. Some sensitivity occurred in the female pre-test group in Saudi Arabia. They reacted strongly when asked about where they will be after graduation and what area they will chose to live in because the answers related to cultural limits upon women's independence. Reactions were moderate, such as, "When we have choices, we'll tell you." No modification was made because

the question did not insult anyone in the field. I noticed the reactions about this point were later very limited. Some members of the Saudi pre-test group were in the city of Ar-Riyadh, and the urbanite mode played a role in raising this cultural limit; the rural pre-test group in Al-Hayer did not react so strongly. In the United States, the female pre-test group (4 students) did not feel that limitation of choices, perhaps because they were out of the cultural frame of Saudi society.

4 - Familism scale: A scale of 20 items was developed and modified to fit the Saudi context. Instead of the five dimensions used by Heller, I used only two: emotional level (abstract perception) and empirical level (practical action). This scale of 20 items was weighted in one direction, where "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" formed the options for the respondents to choose to express their agreement or disagreement with the statements. Point values were assigned to the responses: "strongly agree" = 1; "agree" = 2; "unsure" = 3; "disagree" = 4; and "strongly disagree" = 5. A maximum of 100 points reflected weak family ties; the minimum of 20 points reflected strongest family ties. On the basis of a test of reliability no question was deleted due to low correlation with other items.

In later stages of the research, the scale was divided into three levels of family attachment ("trichotomized"), ranging from strong to medium to low family ties. The scale was generally used as it was designed except for being reduced to three categories. Since there was an absence of negative correlation with other variables, all questions were given the same value for each response. There was no need to reverse the weighting measures for compatibility of unidirectional weighting.

The validity of the questions was assessed during the pre-test. Special consideration was given to the clarity of the items, especially in the Arabic version, so that intended meanings were communicated to the Arabic language readers. No comments or questions about the familism part were received during the pre-test, so it was considered valid.

5 - Modernity of individuals: The two questions were assessed in the pre-test. For both the United States and Saudi Arabia pre-test samples, no confusion or misunderstanding was noted. Hence I consider them valid for measuring individual modernity, especially since variation was noticed in responses without any signs of misunderstanding or sensitivity by any of the pre-test groups in either country.

6 - Residential images: This part of the questionnaire was developed in the pre-test period, where I asked the pre-test group in Saudi Arabia to write down the first thing they thought of when I mentioned certain names. I mentioned "big city like Ar-Riyadh," then asked each student to write down what came to mind as an association of or description of that place. I used the same procedure with the phrases "rural small town or village" and "nomadic settlement." Names used as examples were checked for familiarity with the pre-test group in Al-Hayer (a rural area close to Ar-Riyadh). Similar procedures were used with the female pre-test group. The responses of all 38 male and female students in the pre-test group were taken into consideration and clustered into three groups (large cities images, small towns or villages images, and nomadic settlement images), then clustered into ten descriptions for each type of settlement, using as much as possible the similarity of description for certain areas as group agreement to that description. Frequency of

occurrence of a description was used as an indicator for social labelling of that area. Finally I selected ten images for each area, modified the language slightly to fit into the set of instrument questions, then pre-tested them alone to check validity of the question and its comprehensive coverage of all possible images. No new suggestions or ambiguities about the area images three questions were mentioned, so these questions were considered valid for inspecting rural youths' images of residential areas. Questions 56, 57, and 58 were added to the questionnaire and considered a part of the instrument.

The entire questionnaire was given to some sociology professors at King Saud University for their opinions about its final contents. No major changes were asked for, and they generally praised the clarity and comprehensiveness of the instrument.

3.10.2 Reliability

Tests of reliability were done alongside the validity tests. The same questions used in Saudi Arabia in the field were given to 16 Saudi students in the United States and 38 students in Saudi Arabia as a pre-test. The accuracy of each answer for each student in the pre-test groups reflected a re-use of the measurement over and over. Checking the information collected, I found that the questions from each student provided the same information about age, sex, family background, and so on. So I considered the instrument to be reliable for all such questions.

Familism Scale: The test of reliability for the familism scale was an internal consistency test, using Cronbach's alpha. The correlation values (see Appendix D) show a significant level of reliability, which indicates homogeneity among items. The

overall alpha value was 0.7731, which indicated the scale was reliable (see Appendix D). According to Nunnally (1978), an alpha value of 0.7731 is good; it was not necessary to delete any item due to low correlation. The standardized alpha value is .8034. (For a summary of the statistical values, see Appendix D.)

Listing of Familism Items: The following question items were included in the 20-item familism scale:

1 SHARING HOUSE WITH IN-LAWS

A married person should be willing to share his home with brothers and sisters of his husband or wife? Do you agree? (This item was deleted afterwards for low correlation with other items.)

2 LIVING CLOSE TO PARENTS

Married children should live close to their parents so that they can help each other. Do you agree?

3 DEFENDING FAMILY INTEGRITY

If a member of the family is insulted or injured, you should feel more strongly about it than if the injured person is not a member of your family. Do you agree?

4 BE WITH ILL PARENTS

It is the responsibility of married children to be with their parents in time of serious illness even if the children have moved some distance away from the parents. Do you agree?

5 FAMILY INTERESTS BEFORE PERSONAL

Children owe it to their parents to put family interests above their own personal interests. Do you agree?

6 HOLDING TO FAMILY VALUES

If a family group has strong common moral views, a member should not let himself be influenced by outsiders to change these views. Do you agree?

7 SHARING ACTIVITIES WITH PARENTS

As many activities as possible should be shared by married children and their parents. Do you agree?

8 FAMILY VALUES OVER CAREER

If a person finds that his job runs so much against the family values that severe conflict develops, he should find a new job. Do you agree?

9 MAKING DECISIONS WITH FAMILY

Whenever possible to do so, a person should talk over his important decisions (such as marriage, employment, and residence) with family members before taking action. Do you agree?

10 MARRIAGE IS TO MAINTAIN FAMILY

Marriage should be viewed as keeping families going rather than creating new families. Do you agree?

11 PERPETUATE THE FAMILY NAME

It is important that the family name be carried on. Do you agree?

12 OBLIGATION TO ELDERLY PARENTS

Children of elderly parents have as much responsibility for the welfare of their parents as they have for the welfare of their own children. Do you agree?

13 MARRIAGE IS TO HAVE CHILDREN

Keeping the family going is a very important reason why sons and daughters should expect to marry and have children. Do you agree?

14 PARTICIPATION AS FAMILY GROUP

At a community social affair, a family should participate pretty much as a group rather than as individuals. Do you agree?

15 PAY MEDICAL CARE OF ILL PARENTS

If a person's father has a medical bill of SR 10,000 which he cannot pay, the son is morally obligated to pay the debt. Do you agree?

16 SOLIDARITY OF THE FAMILY GROUP

There should be a feeling on the part of all members of a family that they belong permanently to the family group and that all other persons are outsiders. Do you agree?

17 INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITIES FOR FAMILY GROUP

Within a family, there should be complete integration of individual activities for the achievement of family objectives. Do you agree?

18 MATERIAL POSSESSIONS SHARED BY ALL

An individual should assume that his land, money, and other material goods are family property, and that he has an obligation to support individual members and give them assistance when they are in need. Do you agree?

19 FAMILY SUPPORT FOR INDIVIDUALS

There should be concern for the perpetuation of the family by helping an adult child in beginning and continuing an economic activity in line with the family expectations, and in setting up a new household. Do you agree?

20 MUTUAL AID WITHIN FAMILY GROUP

There should be mutual aid within a family, consisting of friendly exchange relationships between parents and their married children, and married children and their married siblings. Do you agree?

Residential Preference Scale: A similar test of reliability was used for the residential preference scale in order to determine homogeneity and internal consistency. The scale has three questions negatively ordered, so a procedure was done to reverse the code order for these three items. The reliability test was then conducted to determine internal homogeneity (consistency) between the scale's items. (See Appendix D for the correlation matrix and reliability analysis statistics.)

In the residential preference scale of seven items, the reliability test alpha was .3272, which is not high but, according to Nunnally (1978, p. 226), is acceptable for

small numbers. We need to be cautious in interpreting results of the use of this scale. I used the scale only to indicate favoring or not favoring urban areas rather than to indicate levels. The scale measured residential preferences but not degree of liking or disliking. Loss of some information was acceptable, in that the degree of preference was less important than the direction of preference itself. If the degree of preference could be obtained, it might add further information to the study results.

The residential preference scale in its original form was developed by Martin (1953) and consisted of 10 items, with an alpha level of .92. Point values for this scale were assigned to responses: "strongly agree" = 5 points; "agree" = 4 points; "undecided" = 3 points; "disagree" = 2 points; and "strongly disagree" = 1 point. The code was reversed for the three negatively ordered items. The higher the score, the less favorable the attitude expressed by the person toward rural areas, and vice versa. The highest possible score (adding the items and dividing by their number) was 5, and the lowest score was 1. The average percentage of total scores for all respondents (minimum = 7, maximum = 35) was used to determine the level of below-average = in favor of rural areas; average and above-average = in favor of urban areas. This scale was supported by the other variable (Q23) about migration propensity. The residential preference scale correlates with migration propensity at a significant level (.85), and that supports the interpretation of the residential preferences and migration propensities more dependably.

In the residential preference scale, most of the items were considered moderately or highly reliable. The composite reliability of items was low to

moderate with an alpha value of .33, which indicates reliability of the scale and homogeneity among items.

3.11 Limitations of the Study

This study is limited to the central region of Saudi Arabia. Within this region, the study is concerned with only three districts consisting of 24 emirates (local governorates) in the Ar-Riyadh district, and 14 emirates in the Al-Qasseem district. The homogeneity of the regional population does not mean that other factors may not influence a similar study carried out elsewhere in the future. The study sites were not randomly selected; there were criteria for the inclusion of each area in the research sample. Differences in published descriptions of an area and actual field characteristics caused me to go over the detailed area books' descriptions and compare them to the field.

Most variations could be ignored, but some forced me to shift from one area to another because of administrative reorganizations. Condition and location requirements for an "area governorate" to be selected for sample inclusion was having a high school in the governorate center and at least two villages belonging administratively to that area governorate. During the preparation of the proposal, the only three governorates that satisfied this condition were Rumah, Ad-Duwadmi in the Ar-Riyadh district, and An-Nabhaniyah in the Al-Qasseem district. In the first field survey, I found that the two village high schools had previously been administratively attached to An-Nabhaniyah but now belonged to the Ar-Rass area governorate. This meant that An-Nabhaniyah did not meet the requirements because

there were no substitute village high schools there. Hence An-Nabhaniyah lost its qualification in favor of Ar-Rass. Other less important changes occurred, such as having new schools or expanded classes in the same area, that required no change in the sample.

A further limitation of the study has to do with school dropouts, which has not been reviewed as it relates to employment opportunities. Nor have such dropouts before the 12th grade been examined for any relation to local ambitions in rural areas or to familial circumstances. The generalizability of this study over Saudi Arabia should be carefully dealt with, as other regions have different social cultural components. Though the differences from the people of the central region may be slight, the border towns may be affected by the neighboring countries' media and even social connections. Another limitation is that most of the documents used are from two sources: governmental or independent researchers' sources, in which some variations or even contradictions are apparent. Field trips were highly beneficial especially in comparing area descriptions with actual observed characteristics.

3.12 Data Analysis

After data collection was complete, the questionnaires were reviewed in the field to make sure no pages were missing, all questions were answered, and serial numbers assigned for each male or female group in each survey area. In the United States, the questionnaires were again reviewed and assigned codes. Data were entered on a personal computer, using Statistical Package for Social Sciences

software. The first outputs were used to clean and finally check the data, then the other procedures were used to form the basis of the final analysis.

Examining the reliability of the scales and the reliabilities and validities of the questions, we can assume overall goodness-of-fit measures and fair estimates of key parameters. The following statistical techniques are used to achieve the objectives and test the study hypotheses:

1 - Simple descriptive statistics such as frequencies, percentages, and mean variation are used to compare variations and to set magnitude of residential preferences and migration propensities as related to areas, gender, and intentions after graduation from high school.

2 - Analysis of variance, correlation, and regression are used to determine variation in residential preference and migration propensities (the dependent variables) in relation to family cultural background, gender, familism, and socioeconomic background. Correlations are used to determine the statistical significance of relationships among dependent and independent variables.

CHAPTER IV

STUDY POPULATION: CONTEXT AND CHARACTERISTICS

Information for this study was obtained by survey from young people in the Ar-Riyadh and Al-Qasseem districts of the central region of Saudi Arabia. In this chapter I will briefly review certain basic characteristics of the survey sites and the study population. These comparative descriptions will help set the stage for further analysis of residential preferences and migration propensities.

4.1 Survey Sites

Ar-Rass

The local governorate of Ar-Rass consists of the small town of Ar-Rass and 46 other satellite villages interconnected with the town. This area is socially organized around various farm groups called "The Kassers" ("The Forts"), and each Kasser group bears the name of a family that has long dominated the area. These Kasser-farms are located throughout the Al-Qasseem district.

Oasis land is perhaps the best description of the Al-Qasseem district. "Ar-Rass" means "the water well dug in sandy land and covered on the inside by stone bricks." Under the reign of King Abdulaziz, nomads were encouraged to settle

in oasis lands, close to water resources, to avoid the harsh way of life they had endured for centuries.

The population of the Ar-Rass governorate is about 15,000 or 20,000. There are five high schools and one teacher's college for males and another for females. Ar-Rass high schools are directed by local educational offices: one for girls' education, the other for boys'. Of the study areas, Ar-Rass is the farthest from Ar-Riyadh. (For a descriptive overview of the three areas see Table 4.1).

Ad-Duwadmi

Ad-Duwadmi is the study area second farthest from Ar-Riyadh. It has 13 high schools (five for girls and eight for boys). There were no colleges or institutions of post-secondary education in the governorate when this study was conducted. Ad-Duwadmi is located midway between Ar-Riyadh, in the center of Saudi Arabia, and Jeddah on the west coast of Saudi Arabia. The choice of moving out of Ad-Duwadmi to either of the two cities, either to seek a job or further education, is assumed to be open. But because the people of Ad-Duwadmi are culturally closer to those of Ar-Riyadh, Ar-Riyadh may be the preferred move. Furthermore, Ar-Riyadh is located within the central region and Jeddah is not. Ad-Duwadmi is surrounded by hundreds of satellite villages and bedouin hamlets. Only a few villages have high schools. This situation has caused the town of Ad-Duwadmi to have heavy traffic when school is in session, especially high school. About 50,000 people from 150 villages have to do such travelling daily. Ad-Duwadmi itself has

Table 4.1--Descriptive Characteristics of the Survey Areas.

	Ar-Rass	Ad-Duwadmi	Rumah
Infrastructure			
Villages (number)	46	150	11
Hamlets (number)	0	213	0
Survey area population	15,510	64,811	6,208
Asphalt roads (number)	2	53	4
Paved roads (number)	9	78	7
Electric power (# villages)	15	52	8
Sewer network	NA	NA	0*
Water network (# villages)	4	37	6
Waste collection (# villages)	8	36	5
Public services			
Post offices (# villages)	4	58	2
Telephones in (# villages)	3	12	2
Petrol stations (# villages)	9	56	9
Public markets (# villages)	6	29	2
Educational services			
Elementary schools for boys	19	89	9
Elementary schools for girls	9	80	6
Intermediate schools for boys	5	28	4
Intermediate schools for girls	4	14	3
High schools for boys	3	8	2
High schools for girls	2	5	2

NA = not available
0* = network available but not operated

Data compiled by the author from various sources (Sogreah Consulting Engineering, 1983; Norconsult, 1984) as well as information collected in the field during 1990 and 1991.

long been a historical water well, lately treated to insure that the water is safe for human consumption.

Among the villages in the area, there are 65 short paved roads, 52 villages are powered by electricity, 37 villages have water networks, 36 villages have waste-collection services, 58 villages have post offices, and 12 villages have phone systems and many other services (Table 4.1).

Rumah

Of the study areas, Rumah is closest to Ar-Riyadh (about 90 miles away). There are 6,000 to 14,000 people scattered among Rumah's small villages and its central town. The people are mainly of settled nomadic families of tribal background and some families who work mainly at small-scale farming. The proximity of Rumah to Ar-Riyadh has caused life in Rumah to have many of the characteristics of life in a large city, especially in marketing techniques, real estate prices, and housing designs. Only recently were two high schools for boys and two for girls established because of the growing demand for them. They were established when the educational authorities determined that many Rumah students were commuting daily to high schools in Ar-Riyadh.

A large number of teachers still commute daily from Ar-Riyadh to Rumah, preferring the 100-mile trip to settling in Rumah. Some teachers explain that Rumah is not far from Ar-Riyadh. At the same time, moving to Rumah is not rewarding enough to encourage them to sacrifice their established homes and the social relationships they have established in Ar-Riyadh.

4.2 School Population Overview (Saudi--Non-Saudi)

The majority of respondents (73.9 percent) were drawn from schools in the central town of the governorates; 26.1 percent were from surrounding villages (Table 4.2). These percentages refer to school location, not the respondent's area of residence. Some students commute to the central town, either because their parents are commuting to jobs in town, or because the capacities of schools in the town are much larger than the high schools in the villages. Table 4.3 shows that 63.0 percent live in urban places (main centers), whereas 73.9 percent go to schools that are located in urban areas. Further, 37.0 percent live in rural or bedouin areas, while 26.1 percent go to schools in satellite villages. We can assume then that about 11 percent commute to the central town from villages but reside in villages or bedouin settlements. Some commuting can also be inferred since not all villages have high schools. Commuting to the main center may be easier than commuting to another village.

Non-Saudi students constitute only 7 percent of the total of 524 respondents (Table 4.2), a relatively low level of representation. These students do not represent a single culture but are of various backgrounds--Arab-Muslims, non-Muslims, non-Arabs, and so on--and are from a wide range of economic levels and social positions.

I will briefly discuss the study population attributes, keeping separate the non-Saudi and Saudi students. Summary tables will overview demographic characteristics, personal information, family background, and standard of living. Only information relevant to the focus of this study will be discussed in detail.

Table 4.2--Distribution of the Surveyed Population by Area, Gender, and Nationality (All Students, Saudi and Non-Saudi).

Area	Total	Saudi		Non-Saudi	
		Male	Female	Male	Female
	%	%	%	%	%
Ar-Rass	31.5	28.8	33.2	60.0	7.7
Ad-Duwadmi	45.4	56.0	32.2	24.0	61.6
Rumah	23.1	15.2	34.6	16.0	30.7
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	524	284	202	25	13

Table 4.3--Origin Characteristics of All Students Surveyed (Saudis and Non-Saudis).

	Ar-Rass		Ad-Duwadmi		Rumah		Total Male and Female (%)
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
School location							
Main Center	61.9	63.2	74.6	74.0	85.1	90.5	73.9
Satellites	38.1	36.8	25.4	26.0	14.9	9.5	26.1
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(97)	(68)	(165)	(73)	(47)	(74)	(524)
Birthplace							
Urban	66.0	69.1	54.6	65.8	48.9	83.8	63.7
Rural	21.6	20.6	24.2	21.9	31.9	9.5	21.6
Bedouin	12.4	10.3	21.2	12.3	19.1	6.7	14.7
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(97)	(68)	(165)	(73)	(47)	(74)	(524)
Home location							
Urban	55.7	52.9	66.1	72.6	66.0	63.5	63.0
Rural	28.9	29.4	21.2	13.7	25.5	28.4	24.0
Bedouin	15.4	17.6	12.7	13.7	8.5	8.1	13.0
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(97)	(68)	(165)	(73)	(47)	(74)	(524)

4.3 Non-Saudi Students

Non-Saudi students are almost without exception temporary residents because they are the sons or daughters of guest workers who will leave the country when their contracts expire. These guest workers are either very well-educated people, such as physicians or pharmacists, or unskilled workers in low-income jobs like farm employment or small-business sales.

Origin Characteristics. Most of the non-Saudi students go to school in the main centers of the governorate (60.5 percent), but only 36.8 percent reside in the urban centers. One can assume then that about half of the non-Saudi students commute to the central town and about half live in the villages (see Appendix E - Table E1). Most of the non-Saudis are likely to be from urban areas in their home countries, as most of them were born outside Saudi Arabia and their parents were generally well-educated. None of the non-Saudi students go to schools in bedouin areas, but 13.2 percent of them live in bedouin areas. The relations between school location, birthplace, and home location for non-Saudi students reflects their parents' work conditions and the contractual arrangements with employers. Guest workers are usually permitted only one term of contract (four years); few can renew their contracts beyond the four years.

Personal Information. Non-Saudi students, of course, are mostly born outside Saudi Arabia. Their early schooling experiences were in different systems of education and this may affect their school achievement in Saudi Arabia. We see that 11.8 percent were ahead of the average for their age-group (i.e., less than 17 years old), 36.8 percent were average, 36.8 percent were slightly behind the age-group, and

only one student was considerably behind the age-group (i.e., older than 22) (see Appendix E - Table E2).

Most of the non-Saudi students (47.4 percent) ranked in the middle among their siblings, 34.2 percent were the eldest, and only 18.4 percent were the youngest. Thus, parents having children older than 19 years of age are the majority. These data also suggest that the parents have been married at least 20 years, and are probably over 40 years of age.

Most of the non-Saudi students attend the closest available high school. Most guest workers are contracted to work in rural or bedouin areas; urban Saudis rarely accept jobs in rural or bedouin areas unless it is their ancestral home. Non-Saudi guest workers also like rural areas because of low expenses such as rents. They appreciate their temporary residence in remote areas as a way to gain maximum savings and high social status. The expenses are more and the status less in large or medium-sized urban centers, and in these larger centers they would become part of a larger pool of more qualified workers and not be able to save as much money. Most guest workers are motivated to take jobs outside their home country in order to save money and to prepare for a more secure future when they return to their homeland.

Most (76.3 percent) of the non-Saudi students are in the science section. It is typical for non-Saudi students in Saudi Arabia to choose this section because it gives them wider options in selecting college specialization and because they can avoid the extensive Arabic grammar and religious studies, almost twice that of the literature section. Their previous foundation in those subjects in their homeland

does not match the Saudi students' previous study of those subjects; they would encounter difficulties (see Appendix E - Table E2). A small proportion, 5.3 percent, are in the "others" section. These students entered high school as part of a preparative program for further studies. The program is considered part of the literature section but provides a specialized diploma rather than a general high school diploma.

Most of the non-Saudi students manifest an individualistic orientation; 55.3 percent are in this category, while 44.7 percent are in the group-oriented category. Females are more group oriented than males by a ratio of 2 to 1 (Appendix E, Table E2).

Family Characteristics. Of the non-Saudis, 78.9 percent are from urban families, 7.9 percent are from rural families, and 13.2 percent are from bedouin-rooted families (see Appendix E - Table E3). Among the fathers of the non-Saudi students, 15.8 percent are illiterate, 7.9 percent had done graduate study, 15.8 percent had special education, and the remainder are between being illiterate and having a higher education. This reflects the education required for employment in the rural areas, where only one or two people in each education category meet the need for that level of education in an area. Having special education reflects also that some guest workers have special qualifications that cannot be fulfilled by the local labor market (Appendix E - Table E3).

Father's occupation also reflects the variations in education levels. Public services account for half of the guest workers, followed by private business owners (47.4 percent) and military-related jobs (2.6 percent). As is the case for education

and father's occupation, family income ranges from very low (28.9 percent) to very high (5.3 percent), with the majority between 30,000 SR and 79,000 SR, where medium towners category is for the Saudi population. This income level shows that guest workers, it seems, have higher incomes than rural Saudi people in general.

Family Standard of Living. The education, occupation, and income of households are reflected in the appliances acquired by the families (see Appendix E - Table E4). Only 18.4 percent of the families lack a television set; none of these families are from the Ad-Duwadmi area. Those lacking telephone service are 23.7 percent, none of whom are from the Ad-Duwadmi area. And only 10.5 percent of the families lack radios, none of whom are from the Ar-Rass area. On the other hand, most of those lacking television sets or telephones are from the Ar-Rass area. In general, guest worker families have appliances and services in higher proportion than the local rural people, an indication of their generally higher financial status.

4.4 Saudi Students

Saudi respondents account for 486 of the 524 respondents in the sample.

Place of Birth - Some noteworthy variations among respondents are observed (Table 4.4). While most Saudi students are from rural families, 64 percent were born in urban centers; only 36 percent were born in rural or bedouin areas. I asked some students whether they had lived in urban areas such as Ar-Riyadh. They replied negatively, indicating they had been born in an urban center because of a lack of hospital facilities in rural areas. Their mothers moved to a hospital in an urban center several weeks before their expected delivery date and remained there until the

delivery. Some students said their parents had to stay at a relative's house in the city or had to rent a house on a monthly basis. Other students noted that their mother was rushed to a hospital in the nearest urban center at the onset of labor. So they have a birth certificate from a city hospital but have actually always lived in a rural area. When deliveries are done at home, parents' records show that the offspring was born and raised in the rural or bedouin area.

I have sometimes used the term "urban center" as villagers do because they call the governorate a center even if it is just a big village. They still think of it as an urban center for at least it is the main administrative and governing location.

Most of those born in the governorate center refer to their birthplace as an urban center, which is acceptable even on the administrative level, as any area populated with more than 2,500 inhabitants may be classified as an urban center even if sociologically it still has the features of primary relations, simple structures, and low share in the economy of the country.

Home Location and School Location - Most Saudi students in the sample live in urban places (here the main center of the governorate). I observed that 65 percent live in the main centers, whereas 22.4 and 12.6 percent, respectively, live in rural and bedouin areas. Although 86.4 percent go to schools in urban areas, only 65 percent reside in urban areas, which again shows the commuting pattern. Those who live in bedouin areas (12.6 percent) are more likely to commute to town; those who live in villages are less likely to commute. Only 9.8 percent commute to the main center of the governorate from among those (22.4 percent) who live in villages. But 11.6 percent of those who live in bedouin areas (12.6 percent) commute.

Table 4.4--Origin Characteristics of Saudi Respondents by Gender and Area of Residence (percentage).

	Ar-Rass		Ad-Duwadmi		Rumah		Total
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	(%)
School location							
Main center	67.9	64.2	73.6	70.8	88.4	92.9	74.9
Satellites	32.1	35.8	26.4	29.2	11.6	7.1	25.1
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)
Birthplace							
Urban	69.5	70.1	54.7	61.5	51.2	82.9	64.0
Rural	15.9	20.9	23.3	19.8	27.9	10.0	20.4
Bedouin	14.6	9.0	22.0	18.7	20.9	7.1	15.6
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)
Home location							
Urban	64.6	53.7	66.7	69.2	72.1	64.3	65.0
Rural	17.1	29.9	22.0	15.4	20.9	30.0	22.4
Bedouin	18.3	16.4	11.3	15.4	7.0	5.7	12.6
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)
Type of high school location							
Urban	81.7	83.6	87.4	90.8	86.0	88.6	86.4
Rural	15.9	16.4	12.6	9.2	9.3	10.0	12.6
Bedouin	2.4	-	-	-	4.7	1.4	1.0
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)
Intermediate school location							
Urban	78.0	94.0	73.0	84.6	55.8	55.7	74.3
Rural	22.0	6.0	27.0	15.4	44.2	44.3	25.7
Bedouin	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)

A negligible number of respondents go to high schools in the bedouin areas, but 9.8 percent of the villagers do. Of the Saudi students who live in bedouin areas, 99 percent make trips to the central town to go to high school; 50 percent of the village students commute to town to go to high school.

On the other hand, there are intermediate schools (grades 7-9) only in villages and urban areas; no Saudi student indicated that his or her previous intermediate school was in a bedouin area. I checked this point personally in the field and found that intermediate schools in bedouin areas may have been opened after the 12th grade students in the Saudi sample had moved or had attended intermediate schools in villages or schools in the main town. Some bedouin areas have no schools of any kind, and their students commute to the nearest school in the villages or to bedouin settlements. It is not surprising to find some bedouin students, though a negligible percentage, who go to high schools in bedouin areas because there are no intermediate schools in their areas (Table 4.4).

Since 1980, there has been a huge expansion of education in Saudi Arabia's regions and districts. While this study was being conducted, eight new high schools for boys and girls had been established in the research area and were soon to be in operation. When I returned to the United States, I learned from some local Saudi journals that these new schools had become operative and were calling for students in the area to apply. Generally, the variations between survey area, birthplace, home location, and school location reflects having to move to find a place in a suitable high school within range of home. Bedouins, generally, are more likely to move before and during high school. Villagers also move, but less frequently. Females generally

do more commuting to high school than do males, because of the lack of girls schools in villages and bedouin areas. This can be explained by the relatively new pattern of making education available to girls. The first governmental girls schools were established in the central region during the mid-1960s, whereas boys schools were established 20 years earlier.

Age - In Table 4.5 we note that the Saudi respondents are divided into four age categories: under 17 years of age; from 17 years to less than 19; from 19 years to less than 22; and 22 years or older. The minimum age at which Saudi schools admit children to elementary classes is six, so 12th-grade students who have made normal progress would be 17 to 19 years old. Younger students can be regarded as ahead of the class group, older students behind. The category of 22 years or more is used to provide some flexibility, because some families keep girls at home longer than boys before sending them to elementary school. Also, girls education does not have an upper age limit for beginning first grade; boys over 10 years of age are prohibited from entering first grade because of the social and psychological difficulties that may result.

In our Saudi sample, only 6.8 percent are ahead of their age-class group, and 38.3 percent are in the expected age-class group. Because of the late establishment of schools in rural and bedouin areas, the next age group constitutes the normative group for age-class achievement. There we find most of the Saudi sample (49.4 percent). Only 5.5 percent of the Saudi sample is in the slower age-class group of 22 years or older; 60 percent of these are females. The female majority is accounted for by the late establishment of girls schools in rural areas, more difficulty for girls

Table 4.5--Personal Characteristics of Saudi Respondents, by Gender and Area of Residence.

	Ar-Rass		Ad-Duwadmi		Rumah		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Total(%)
Age							
Less than 17	14.6	6.0	4.4	-	14.0	5.7	6.8
17 to less than 19	24.4	58.2	31.4	40.0	34.9	51.4	38.3
19 to less than 22	53.7	28.3	62.3	52.3	46.5	34.3	49.4
22 and older	7.3	7.5	1.9	7.7	4.6	8.6	5.5
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)
Sibling rank							
Oldest	12.2	22.4	11.9	3.1	16.3	10.0	24.7
Youngest	4.9	7.5	5.7	3.1	4.7	7.1	4.2
Middle	82.9	70.1	82.4	93.8	79.0	82.9	82.1
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)

than for boys to commute, and the traditional viewpoint that educating females is less important than educating males.

Rank Among Siblings - Rank in the family gives an indication of parents' ages, size of the family, and position of a student as a leader or follower of his brothers and sisters. Of the Saudi students in the sample, 24.7 percent are the eldest or only child, and 4.1 percent are the youngest child in the family. If the youngest child in a family is 19 to 22 years old, the parents are probably somewhat older and may be more conservative in their values and attitudes. This might affect what students intend to do after graduation. It might also affect familial obligations toward elder parents. The majority of the sample (82.1 percent) are in the middle range, meaning they have brothers or sisters who are younger and older than 19-22 years. Being in

the middle group is also expected to affect one's orientation towards group life, as in rural areas, or individualistic life, as in urban areas. For the 82.1 percent of the sample in the middle group, the parents are likely to be at least in their mid-40s and are not likely to be seeking further education or different jobs, or seeing major changes in their income.

Study Section - High schools in Saudi Arabia are divided into science and literature sections. Only students with 80 percent of the total marks can go on to the science section; those with lower scores can go to the literature section. High level of attainment may be inferred from this choice, as well as ambition and the propensity to migrate.

In the Saudi sample, 26.1 percent are in the science section (Table 4.6). Of those in the science section, 38 percent are female and 62 percent are male. The majority (71.8 percent) of students in the sample are in the literature section. Of those in the literature section, 42 percent are female and 58 percent are males.

Table 4.6 also shows 10 Saudi students (2.1 percent) in the study section category of "other." These cases are part of a teacher-education program considered part of the literature section, so they inflate the numbers in this section even though their diploma is to be a teaching diploma.

Hobbies - The purpose of this item was to detect two dimensions: exposure to urban life patterns of individualism, and variation among child-rearing by cultural restrictions on females through gender/role expectations. Most conservative Saudi families will keep their children oriented toward group life, while modern families will allow children freedom to develop their own life preferences.

Table 4.6--Interests of Saudi Respondents, by Gender and Area of Residence.

	Ar-Rass		Ad-Duwadmi		Rumah		Total
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	(%)
Study section							
Science	52.4	19.4	13.2	21.5	20.9	38.6	26.1
Literature	37.8	80.6	86.8	78.5	79.1	58.5	71.8
Other	9.8	-	-	-	-	2.9	2.1
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)
Hobbies							
Group oriented	34.1	58.2	43.4	72.3	30.2	35.7	45.5
Individualistic	65.9	41.8	56.6	27.7	69.8	64.3	54.5
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)

In the sample, 45.5 percent are group-oriented and 54.5 percent are individualistic. Males predominate in the individualistic group, and females predominate among the group-oriented. This is not unexpected because cultural pressures push females to chose group life whereas most males have greater freedom to chose either orientation. Males more commonly choose individualism, perhaps because males in rural areas are brought up to depend on themselves or because males, more than females, are exposed to urban ways of life that might facilitate developing individualism. Table 4.6 shows that male students are dominant in the "ahead of age-class group" category and in being the eldest in the family. Females are equal with males in study section selection and were more group-oriented than males.

Family Cultural Affiliation - We observe that 15.8 percent of the Saudi students classified their families as urban, 29.8 percent as bedouin, and 54.4 percent as villager families (Table 4.7). Among those from an urban background, 58 percent are males and 42 percent are females. Among those from bedouin backgrounds, 65 percent are males and 35 percent are females. Among those from villager backgrounds, 58 percent are males and 42 percent are females. These ratios and the total representation of Saudi family affiliations is expected; the majority come from villager-rural non-bedouin families (54.3 percent) because the study areas are not urban centers and rural life is predominant even before the bedouin settlement programs. Bedouin-rooted families are second to villager families in the study population, and this is consistent with the assumption that settled bedouin tribes were in or close to old villages rather than in the suburbs of urban centers. The small number of urban families is also not unexpected because urban families rarely move to rural areas in Saudi Arabia. Such families might be ones that moved to urban areas and then returned to their homestead (Table 4.7).

Ad-Duwadmi is known as the most attractive area for nomads in which to settle. Bedouin families from Ad-Duwadmi contribute 58 percent of the total bedouin-rooted families in the study population, primarily because the Otaiba tribe is predominant in the Ad-Duwadmi bedouin settlements. There is a similar situation in Rumah, which accounts for 32 percent of the bedouin families, and where the Subay tribe is predominant. The Ar-Rass area sample accounts for the fewest families (8 percent), as older families of villagers dominated the area before the bedouin settlement programs.

Table 4.7--Family Characteristics of Saudi Respondents, by Gender and Area of Residence.

	Ar-Rass		Ad-Duwadmi		Rumah		Total N
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	(%)
Family Cultural Affiliation							
Urban	19.5	11.9	15.7	16.9	14.0	15.7	15.8
Rural	73.2	77.6	42.8	64.6	39.5	35.7	54.4
Bedouin	7.3	10.5	41.5	18.5	46.5	48.6	29.8
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)
Father's Background							
Urban	58.5	58.2	35.2	61.5	25.6	62.9	49.0
Rural	30.5	34.3	49.1	29.2	41.9	4.3	34.2
Bedouin	11.0	7.5	15.7	9.3	32.5	32.8	16.8
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)
Grandfather's Background							
Urban	20.7	11.9	18.2	10.8	32.6	58.5	23.9
Rural	36.6	41.8	56.6	43.1	48.8	12.9	42.4
Bedouin	42.7	46.3	25.2	46.1	18.6	28.6	33.7
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(488)
Father's Education							
Illiterate	41.5	31.3	37.1	16.9	46.5	45.7	36.4
Less than elementary	29.3	28.4	30.8	38.5	23.3	30.0	30.4
Elementary	9.8	29.8	19.5	33.8	14.0	8.6	19.1
Secondary	8.5	3.0	5.0	6.2	4.6	8.6	6.0
4 yrs college	6.0	3.0	2.6	-	4.6	4.3	3.3
Military/ vocational	-	-	4.4	-	4.7	1.4	2.1
Graduate study	1.2	-	-	1.5	-	-	0.4
Other	3.7	4.5	0.6	3.1	2.3	1.4	2.3
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)

Table 4.7, continued

	Ar-Rass		Ad-Duwadmi		Rumah		Total N
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	(%)
Father's Occupation							
Public service	51.2	59.7	27.7	36.9	32.6	30.0	38.1
Military	7.3	9.0	27.7	10.8	25.6	44.3	21.4
Business owner	41.5	31.3	44.6	52.3	41.8	20.0	39.5
Business employee	-	-	-	-	-	5.7	-
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)
Family Income							
Less than 11,000 SR	18.3	31.3	22.6	13.8	23.1	22.9	22.0
11,000-13,000	14.6	6.0	6.9	7.7	14.0	27.1	11.7
14,000-19,999	12.2	4.5	20.8	7.6	14.0	11.4	13.4
20,000-29,999	15.9	14.9	18.9	6.2	23.3	8.6	15.0
30,000-79,999	20.7	19.4	13.2	38.5	16.3	21.4	20.2
80,000 or more	18.3	23.9	17.6	26.2	9.3	8.6	17.7
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)

A second point to take into account is that culture plays a role in male/female educational ambitions, and certain normative restrictions on girls education go along with the importance of male dominance. Saudi bedouin families have the lowest proportion of females in school, where males represent 64 percent and females only 36 percent of the bedouin families. A higher female representation is found among families of urban cultural affiliation--40 percent are females and 60 percent are males. Cultural restrictions in villager families are usually less than in bedouin families, but villager families are also less flexible than urban families living in rural areas. This is not reflected by the proportion of girls in high schools since boys represent 58 percent and girls represent 42 percent from all rural villagers.

Culturally-urban families in rural areas have an equal proportion of females and males in school. In summary, Saudi families of culturally-urban and old-rural families appear to give females more freedom to attend high school. Bedouin-rooted families, though equal to urban and rural villagers in encouraging boys, are less encouraging of girls' education.

Father's and Paternal Grandfather's Cultural Affiliation - These items are used to follow change of residence among ancestors. Table 4.7 indicates that 16.9 percent of the fathers and 33.7 percent of the grandfathers lived most of their lives in bedouin areas. But 34.2 percent of the fathers, compared with 42.4 percent of the grandfathers, lived in rural areas. Saudi history is reflected in these data. This proportional change suggests that many bedouin grandfathers settled in rural areas (a difference of 7 percent from one generation to the next). Urban residents also witnessed changes, as grandfathers who lived in urban areas most of their lives were more numerous than fathers. Considering this change in the field, I found that many grandfathers had to live with King Abdulaziz's armies during his unification of Saudi Arabia, so they were close to government posts, either in public armies [Akhwan Forces] or they took simple government jobs as an income source for their families left behind in villages or desert areas.

Father's Education and Occupation - The educational levels among Saudi fathers in their mid-fifties tells us much about the country's previous generation. That generation was witness to the great educational development plans that were introduced at a point in their lives when it was too late to take advantage of these new opportunities. Most of the fathers either tried to catch up later or relied on

self-education by seeking diplomas in a system similar to the American GED program. This program is no longer available because most Saudi students now are enrolled in formal education. Uneducated adults seeking formal education can enroll in evening courses or take high school exams with regular students.

It is not surprising to find that 36.4 percent of the respondents' fathers are illiterate, with the rates about equal in each of the three areas. Degrees of education gradually accumulate in a decreasing ratio for each higher level of education.

We also observe that 30.4 percent of the respondents' fathers have less than an elementary education, 19.1 percent have an elementary or less than secondary education, 6 percent have high school diplomas, 3.3 percent are 4-year college graduates, and 2.1 percent have attended military or vocational colleges. Although the percentages for the latter two categories are very close, military or vocational school graduates have better chances of getting stable jobs than regular college graduates. Only 0.4 percent of the fathers had done graduate work but two fathers are judges. The "other" category includes religious schools that are accepted as high schools but are not academically equivalent, so its graduates are not qualified to pursue further formal studies.

For father's occupation, the "public service" category is a broad one that encompasses employees who range from illiterate to having a college degree. The category includes not only drivers, porters, and doorkeepers, but also school directors, mayors, and so on. No additional information about the category could be obtained since the job classification data from the Ministry of Labor applies the same description to all public service employees. We find (Appendix B - Table B5) that

38.1 percent of the respondents' fathers are public service employees, almost equally distributed among survey areas. Military personnel account for 21.6 percent of the fathers, which includes police officers, soldiers, and national guard personnel. Bedouin-dominated areas show the largest share of military careers. Of the 105 military personnel, 51 were from the bedouin area of Ad-Duwadmi, 42 were from Rumah, and only 12 were from Ar-Rass.

The largest proportion of fathers are business owners (39.5 percent), followed by public service employees (38.1 percent), military personnel (21.6 percent), and business employees (0.8 percent). The relation between education and occupation is not clear. Public service jobs and business ownerships are open to everyone regardless of education. Income may shed some light by significantly relating to occupation, although it has a low correlation with education (see Table 4.7).

Annual Family Income - The distribution of family income among the sample categories shows that the high income group (80,000 SR* or more) accounts for only 17.7 percent whereas the lowest income group (below 11,000 SR) accounts for the largest proportion of respondents (22 percent). The proportion in the low-income groups declines as income increases through the next two levels (11.7 and 13.4 percent, respectively). The next income group (20,000 to 29,999 SR) has 15.0 percent, and the 30,000 to 79,999 SR income group has 20.2 percent. The wide range at this level increased the ratio but that was the division of categories supplied by the Ministry of Labor.

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*In 1991, $1 U.S. = 3.75 SR

Table 4.7 also indicates that Rumah has the lowest share of the high-income level of 80,000 SR, and Ad-Duwadmi had the highest share. This may be because military personnel are the best paid of the occupational groups. In Ar-Rass, 45 percent of the family incomes are in the low-income groups, compared to 30 and 25 percent for Ad-Duwadmi and Rumah, respectively. For the high-income groups, Ad-Duwadmi has 52 percent, Ar-Rass 36 percent, and Rumah 11 percent. Occupation is found to be highly correlated (.3065, significant at the .001 level) with income, whereas income is negatively correlated (-.2452, significant at the .001 level) with education. As education increases, income decreases.

Family Standard of Living. In relation to family cultural affiliation to father's cultural affiliation, education, occupation, income, household appliances such as modern facilities for communications, cooking, and electrical equipment are significantly correlated. I considered the presence or absence of three basic appliances or services in each household, after ensuring that all three were available in the given area. Having these facilities, which are common in urban homes, reflects two dimensions: (1) the socioeconomic ability of the family to acquire these items; and (2) views about modern and conservative media such as radio and television. Families with very low incomes might not buy TV sets for economic reasons, but very conservative families might also avoid buying TV sets, even when doing so is within their purchasing power.

Table 4.8 shows the distribution of radios, television sets, and telephones in the students' homes. In the Saudi sample, 9.5 percent reported not having TV sets in their homes. Of the 9.5 percent who do not have TVs, most live in the old

Table 4.8--Family Standard of Living of Saudi Respondents, by Gender and Area of Residence (percentage).

	Ar-Rass		Ad-Duwadmi		Rumah		Total N
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	(%)
No television in home	14.6	11.9	3.1	7.7	11.6	15.7	9.5
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)
No telephone in home	29.3	22.4	6.3	6.2	25.0	-	14.0
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)
No radio in home	7.3	0.0	1.9	1.5	9.3	1.4	3.1
N =	(82)	(67)	(159)	(65)	(43)	(70)	(486)

traditional villages in the Ar-Rass area (50 percent); 32 percent live in Rumah; and only 10.8 percent live in Ad-Duwadmi. The reasons for absence of TV sets may be cultural rather than economic.

The absence of a telephone in a home could be due to a shortage of service lines, the costs of the service, or cultural rejection related to the perception that boys and girls misuse it. Of those without telephones, 57 percent are from Ar-Rass, 24.6 percent from Rumah, and 18.4 percent from Ad-Duwadmi. Greater percentages of the families of male students have no phone (59.7 percent compared to 40.3 percent of the families of female students).

Overall, 86 percent of the respondents have telephones at home and 14 percent do not; 89.5 percent have TV sets, and 9.5 percent do not; 96.9 percent have radios, and 3.1 percent do not.

4.5 Overview

The study population exhibits the following general characteristics:

1. A majority of the Saudi students are from rural backgrounds, while non-Saudi students tend to be from urban backgrounds.

2. A majority of the Saudi students' fathers and paternal grandfathers also lived most of their lives in rural areas, while non-Saudis have transitional affiliations from rural to urban.

3. Most of the respondents' fathers had no education, while only 15.8 percent of the non-Saudi respondents' fathers are illiterate.

4. Most of the Saudi respondents' fathers work in the private sector.

5. Most of the Saudi respondents' families have low incomes; non-Saudi families have higher incomes.

6. The majority of Saudi students are in the 19-22 year old group, which is the lower age-class group. The non-Saudi students are equally divided between lower age-class and normal age-class group.

7. The majority of Saudi students are in the literature section in high school, and most of them are individualistic in their life perception. The majority of non-Saudi students are in the scientific section but are also individualistic.

8. Most of the respondents go to school in the central town of the governorate. Some students commute to schools in the central town from surrounding villages. This is true of both Saudi and non-Saudi students.

9. Bedouin students commute most frequently, and females commute more often than males. But bedouin non-Saudi students comprise a lower proportion (13

percent) than do Saudis (30 percent). Female students of Saudi and non-Saudi nationality commute equally.

10. The majority of non-Saudi students live in rural areas and study in high schools in the central town, which means that their home is not where the school is, whereas Saudi students mostly live in the central towns.

11. Young males are more likely to be ahead of their age-class group than are females. There is a higher proportion of older students in the female sample, both Saudi and non-Saudi.

12. Most houses have radios and TV sets, but telephones are less common. Saudi families lack facilities more often than do non-Saudi families.

Taking these attributes into account, I will next consider the variabilities in residential preferences and migration propensity by area of residence and gender.

CHAPTER V

RESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES AND MIGRATION PROPENSITY: THE GENDER FACTOR

5.1 Introduction

Developmental change in Third World countries generally results in a rush toward urbanization. In this process, the old social, valuational, and economic structures are affected and people begin to adopt new ways of life which tend to be characterized by impersonal, contractual, and temporary relations. Traditional structures usually emphasize the opposite features: personal identification, small-group relations, long-term relations, and economies geared to survival needs rather than the accumulation of wealth. Urbanization is invariably a by-product of development; a fully urbanized society is usually not the target for any development plan. But urbanization facilitates the introduction of social changes, especially in nonmaterial aspects such as ideas, customs, norms, and social stratification. Many kinds of social changes are encouraged because of the association between development goals and industrialization.

A study done by the United Nations measured "the pace of urbanization in individual countries as the difference between the growth rate of the urban population and that of the rural population." This study estimated that "the

differential rate for Saudi Arabia for the period 1950-1970 at 4.43 percent" (United Nations, 1974:22). The annual growth of urban areas during 1970-1980 was estimated at 6.5 percent (Al-Ibrahim, 1982:250).

These changes accompanying urbanization have impacted upon various social values basic to Saudi society. They range from minor valuational concepts, such as the regular exchange of visits among rural community members, to major or basic values, such as familism, feelings of loyalty toward one's community of residence, fundamental religious beliefs, conceptions of the sacred, and "a whole range of social values and practices" (Halpern, 1967:37).

Valuational changes in Saudi society could be the basis for many studies. My research, reported here, deals with only one aspect of this complex issue. The focal point of the present study is to assess the changing patterns of rural/urban residential preferences and migration propensity. Changing residential preferences, I believe, reflect some of the more fundamental valuational changes.

Differences between the rural social structure in Saudi Arabia before and after major development programs were introduced by the government have probably affected qualitative and quantitative shifts in the material and nonmaterial components of Saudi society. Rural areas have experienced their share of modernization through the funding allocations that governmental development programs have provided. But, being responsive to development activities is nevertheless one of the major factors causing rural areas to lag behind in the accelerated pace of Saudi development. Rural people have found it necessary to adjust to new demands to avoid being alienated from the social body of Saudi

society. Cities are the terminals for such adaptation, for it is in the cities that rural people are taught the attributes of urban life. The adoption of these attributes has spread the damaging aspects of modernization to rural areas through the groups most exposed to urban life. Younger people and males in the rural areas have been the prime candidates for this transformation.

Through our study population, we can observe how gender and variations in family background are associated with valuational variations related to residential preferences and migration propensity. Thereby I'll attempt to infer, insofar as possible, some of the major valuational changes coming about in Saudi society relative especially to population redistribution.

5.2 Preferences for Urban Life, by Gender

Rural youth and youths from settled bedouin backgrounds, we generally assume, like the areas where they live and where they were brought up. Rural values, as an element of conservative social values, are assumed to enhance an individual's loyalty to his/her current area of residence and at the same time to reinforce normative roles. Urbanization that expands in connection with development plans affects rural areas in various ways. In particular, one can anticipate major changes in gender-role expectations.

To ascertain the residential preferences of rural youth, I used a scale that is especially sensitive to new development processes. I will first review the seven items in that scale relative to gender variations. Table 5.1 shows residential preferences by gender.

Table 5.1--Residential Preferences Scale Items, by Gender (Mean, Standard Deviation, F Ratio).

Item*	Attitude	Gender	N	Mean	Std Dev	F Ratio	F Prob
1	City life less worthwhile	Male	284	2.3204	1.4090	.0117	.9138
		Female	202	2.3069	1.2715		
		Total	486	2.2148	1.3522		
2	City life more fun	Male	284	2.4754	1.4152	.3468	.5562
		Female	202	2.5545	1.5192		
		Total	486	2.5082	1.4583		
3	City homes better investments	Male	284	2.6056	1.5107	.3562	.5509
		Female	202	2.6881	1.4885		
		Total	486	2.6399	1.5005		
4	Rural areas better for children	Male	284	2.4225	1.4888	4.2107	.0407
		Female	202	2.7079	1.5417		
		Total	486	2.5412	1.5160		
5	City families better off in villages	Male	284	2.8415	1.2570	3.4973	.0621
		Female	202	3.0594	1.2284		
		Total	486	2.9342	1.2484		
6	Ar-Riyadh is best	Male	284	3.1338	1.3357	16.016	.0001
		Female	202	3.6238	1.3222		
		Total	486	3.3374	1.3506		
7	City more socially active	Male	284	3.1197	1.6473	.0095	.9223
		Female	202	3.1337	1.4061		
		Total	486	3.1255	1.5501		

*Scale items order presented in the questionnaire in the following order: 7, 4, 3, 2, 1, 6, and 5 (see Appendix A).

The scale was adapted and modified from Martin's (1953) "The Rural-Urban Fringe," where he used ten statements to explore the reasons why people choose certain areas of residence. Martin found that the choice of an area was controlled by two factors: desires of the respondents and availability of resources. The respondents' desires included the preferences of places over other choices. Availability reflected the ability of the respondents to act without constraints to move to his or her desired place. Martin's scale consisted of ten statements, each with five possible responses that ranged from completely agree to completely disagree. "The

standard of accuracy in reproducing item responses from the total score was 90 percent . . . It is felt that reproducibility is sufficiently high to place individuals in rank order positions with a degree of accuracy satisfactory for this study" (Martin, 1953, pp. 90-91).

From that scale, I selected seven items and modified them slightly to fit the study society in Saudi Arabia. These items have five possible responses that range from strongly agree to strongly agree. A value of 1 to 5 was assigned to each response level. Agreement with some statements reflected more urban preference, whereas disagreement with some other statements meant more urban preferences. The higher the score for the statement (item) and the total scores for the scale mean more preference for urban areas; lower scores mean less urban orientation and greater preference for rural areas. The maximum total score for an item is 35 points and the minimum total score is seven points.

In the scale reliability test (reported in Chapter III), I found that the reliability test alpha was .3518, which is not high, but, according to Nunnally (1978, p. 226), is an alpha level acceptable for small numbers. This alpha score does not invalidate the scale usability, but reduces its accuracy in placing individuals in rank order positions with a high degree of accuracy. It is still usable to determine magnitude and volume of attitudes of the study population toward residential preferences.

The following is a review of the scale items as responded to by males and females. Mean and standard deviation indicate the variation among genders regarding the scale statements. Further discussion will be offered for the variation exemplify the preference for urban life through an item-by-item response review.

Variation in item responses by males and females indicates the internal variation of the more or less attitudinal direction that cumulatively adds up to make the urban life more or less preferences.

From my review of attitudinal statements regarding residential preferences, I observe that males generally show less preference for urban areas. Females are more likely to prefer urban life and the characteristics of urban areas. I believe that in spite of the nature of females' conservatism concerning change, level of familism, and valuational conformity, they respond with less preference to rural areas generally, though they still believe that urban areas are not the best alternative for rural areas life. Male attitudes toward change, familism, and level of conformity with social values also affect their attitudes but with less tendency toward urban areas.

The following is an item-by-item review of scale statements combined with mean test and standard deviation between genders regarding residential preference for urban areas.

City life less worthwhile

"Some say that compared with village/small town dwellers, people in cities miss out on many of the worthwhile things in life." Disagreement with this item suggests a more favorable orientation toward urban life. We find:

	Percentage		
Respondent Gender	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Total
Males =	7.9	9.8	17.7
Females =	8.4	13.6	22.0

Females tend to be oriented more favorably toward urban life than males. Table 5.1 shows slight variations in the scores, reflecting that directional attitude but the disagreement response levels indicate that females are more than males in their urban attitudinal preferences.

Mean scores - No significant variation is observed between male and female attitudes toward city life being less worthwhile (Table 5.1, Item 1). Both sexes recognize deficiencies of cities as a major attribute they both agreed upon.

City life more fun

"Some say that people living in large cities get a lot more fun out of life than those living in rural villages or provincial town areas." Agreement with this item suggests a more favorable orientation toward urban life. We find:

Respondent Gender	Percentage		
	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Total
Males =	34.9	26.5	61.4
Females =	30.1	34.3	64.4

Our data here reveal a slight difference in urban/rural orientation between males and females.

Mean scores - No significant variation is observed between males and females regarding the desirability of life in cities (Table 5.1, Item 2). Males show slightly more enthusiasm for urban leisure facilities, but both sexes highly welcome that dimension of urbanization (in Table 5.1 the mean for males is 2.32 and the mean for females is 2.30).

City homes better investment

"Some say that, taking everything into consideration, a person gets more for his money buying a house in Ar-Riyadh than he does buying a house in some smaller city." Agreement with this item indicates a more favorable orientation toward urban life.

Respondent Gender	Percentage		
	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Total
Males =	33.5	16.3	49.8
Females =	32.4	27.8	60.2

We find that females are more inclined to urban life than males by agreement with the statement that homes in cities are a better investment than homes in rural areas. I believe that using "home" for preferences reflects even deeper preferences and inclination to permanently settle in an urban area. This preference is stronger among females than males.

Mean scores - Both sexes agree on the importance of having a house in a city, but females are more attracted to the idea than males (Table 5.1, Item 3). Of the females, 60.2 percent support this idea while only 49.8 percent of the males support this idea.

Rural areas are better for children

"It is sometimes said that rural/provincial areas are far better than large cities for rearing children." Disagreement with this statement suggests a more favorable orientation toward urban areas.

Respondent Gender	Percentage		
	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Total
Males =	13.9	12.9	26.8
Females =	19.1	17.7	36.8

We find that females are more oriented to favor urban areas than males, but express low propensity to migrate. For males, however, the levels of preference for urban areas and propensity to migrate are more closely matched.

Mean scores - Significant gender variation is observed regarding preference for rural areas for child rearing. Females are less likely than males to believe that rural areas are suitable for children. I think this is because males are less attached to the household than females, and so they do not understand how children's needs are not adequately met in rural areas. Females also spend more time at home and are more in touch with what children need, such as health care, recreation facilities, and educational systems compared to advanced facilities in the cities (Table 5.1, item 4).

City families better off in villages

"Some say that most families living in Ar-Riyadh would be better off if they moved out into the rural villages or small towns." Disagreement with this statement suggests that the respondent have a more favorable orientation toward urban areas. We find that slight variation among males and females in level of agreement with this statement. Females show slightly higher orientation of favoring urban areas than females show.

Respondent Gender	Percentage		
	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Total
Males =	22.0	12.0	34.0
Females =	22.9	13.5	36.4

Mean scores - The variation between males and females in preference for urban areas is not significant. Though both genders show admiration for urban areas, females tend to show more admiration for urban areas (Table 5.1). In general, 36.4 percent of the females admire urban areas, while males prefer urban areas at a somewhat lower level of 34.8 percent (Table 5.1, item 5; females mean 3.06, males mean 2.84).

Ar-Riyadh is best

"Some say that there is not single advantage to be gained by living outside the City of Ar-Riyadh." Agreement with this statement suggests that the respondent prefers urban areas. We find that females are more in favor of urban areas by indicating that Ar-Riyadh is best for their residential preference requirements.

Respondent Gender	Percentage		
	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Total
Males =	11.2	9.3	20.5
Females =	15.2	20.7	35.9

Mean score - The variation between males and females in admiring urban centers, especially big cities (i.e., Ar-Riyadh), is significant. Females tend to be

highly fond of large cities more than males. Although both males and females think big cities are good (Table 5.1, Item 6; mean for females = 3.6238, mean for males = 3.1338, F significant at .0001), it is clear that females are more inclined to idea that big cities are very admirable places.

City more socially active

"Some people complain that living in rural areas and small towns outside large cities means being cut off from social activities." Agreement with this statement reflects higher urban preferences.

Respondent Gender	Percentage		
	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Total
Males =	14.0	29.3	43.3
Females =	27.5	19.1	46.6

We find that both males and females are more inclined to prefer urban areas with little more female percentage (male 43.3 percent, female 46.6 percent).

Mean score - No significant variation is observed between males and females about feeling of nonactive life in rural areas. Females agree with this item by 46.6 percent. Males agree with this item by 43.3 percent. Males tend to lead more open lives but not much than females. This may be due to males having greater freedom to develop social contacts (Table 5.1, Item 7; female mean = 3.13, male mean = 3.12).

5.3 Residential Preference Scores, by Gender

According to the literature on residential preferences, an individual's gender is not supposed to play an important role in regard to preference of residential places in general. In the case of Saudi Arabia, however, we observe some gender variation.

The role of gender in variation of residential preferences indicates that the scale of residential preference reflects a variation between genders regarding attitudes toward urban areas. Females showed a higher mean than males (female mean = 20.0743, male mean = 18.9225), indicating that such variation is significant by F-test at .005 (Table 5.2; also Figure 5.1).

Table 5.2--Residential Preference (Distributed Data), by Gender (Mean, Standard Deviation).*

Gender	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	F Ratio	F Prob.
Male	284	18.9225	4.5014	7.9973	.005
Female	202	20.0743	4.3147		
Total	486	19.4012	4.4566		

*28 point residential preference scale index with score ranging from 7 through 35

X^2 = 47.15 DF = 25 Sig. = .005

For further inspection of gender variation in regard to degree of urban preference, I used quartile distribution to cluster the levels of variation by four levels of scoring about urban residential preferences (Table 5.3).

It is clear from this four-level table that females' attitudes are more prevalent in expressing urban orientation. At the same time, male attitudes show a clustering toward a low to medium urban preference. Males' low preferences for urban centers



Figure 5.1--Distribution of Male and Female Residential Preferences.

Table 5.3--Residential Preference (Quartile Levels), by Gender.

Degree of urban preference	Gender		Total (%)
	Male (%)	Female (%)	
7-15 low	24.3	14.3	20.2
16-19 medium	29.9	23.8	27.3
20-22 moderate	24.3	32.7	27.8
23-35 high	21.5	29.2	24.7
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(284)	(202)	(486)

X^2 = 13.26 DF = 3 Sig. = .004

is indicated by 24.3 percent versus females' low level of preferences of 14.3 percent. On the other hand, females occupy the highest level of urban preferences by 29.2 percent versus 21.5 percent for males with high preference for urban areas. Dichotomization of Table 5.3 will help make the picture clearer by combining the low and medium (7-19) into low preference of urban centers, and the other two levels moderate to high (20-35) into high preference of urban centers. Then we can see that female respondents preferred urban centers by 61.9 percent and males by 45.8 percent.

High preference for urban centers implies that the respondents have low preference for rural areas as the counter choice depicted by the residential preferences scale. The opposite is also true. In Table 5.3, only two levels of preference are presented: a high level, indicating a greater leaning toward urban life versus rural life; and low urban preference, which means a higher preference of rural

over urban life. For the following discussion only, those two levels of residential preference will be used to indicate urban or rural preferences whenever discussed in regard to migration propensity, and also for sociocultural relations to residential preferences.

Females' comfort in rural areas may be less than males, so the preference for urban areas is reflected clearly and significantly on the females' responses: almost two-thirds of females prefer residing in an urban areas while less than half of the males share the same preference (Table 5.4). Although the majority of the males and females in the sample preferred urban areas, females expressed the strongest preference for urban areas. The X^2 significance level shows that gender plays a role in such urban preferences (at sig. = .001). Although males more readily seek jobs or pursue education in urban centers, the relative freedom they enjoy in their homesteads makes them less eager to move to urban centers. In addition, female preferences might be due to push factors associated with strict rural social norms rather than economic needs. It may be economic/educational needs that females lack. Males should be under the same influences if not under greater pressure for their socially framed male role; rural families depend on males in rural areas as family leaders (Table 5.4). The factor of place of residence does not contribute any variation among sexes in different areas: female preferences and male preferences do not differ from one place of residence to another (Table 5.5).

As discussed in Chapter IV, area of residence reflects some variations of dominant cultural background of families. We knew that the Ar-Rass area is dominated by farmers who are not of bedouin or urban background. Ar-Rass

Table 5.4--Residential Preference (Dichotomized), by Gender.

Degree of urban preference	Gender		Total (%)
	Male (%)	Female (%)	
High (urban oriented)	45.8	61.9	52.5
Low (rural oriented)	54.2	38.1	47.5
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(284)	(202)	(486)

X^2 = 12.28 DF = 1 Sig. = .001

Table 5.5--Residential Preference (Dichotomized), by Area of Residence and Gender.

Gender	Male			Female			
Survey Area	Ar-Rass	Ad-Duwadmi	Rumah	Ar-Rass	Ad-Duwadmi	Rumah	Total
Urban Preference	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
High	50.0	43.4	46.5	65.7	53.8	65.7	52.5
Low	50.0	56.6	53.5	34.3	46.2	34.3	47.5
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(159)	(43)	(67)	(65)	(70)	(486)

X^2 = .10 DF = 2 Sig. = NS X^2 = 2.63 DF = 2 Sig. = NS

villagers inherit their farm lands and have been farmers for generations. So the farmers' seasonal activities, attachments to the land, and related sociocultural values are common to the Ar-Rass society. On the other hand, people in Ad-Duwadmi mainly come from bedouin tribal settlers who recently chose the settled life rather than their historical tradition of circling the Arabian desert for grazing and herding livestock; for them, attachment to land has not yet become a value ancestors pass on to the future. Rumah people stand in-between the traditional farmers of Ad-Rass and newly settled bedouins of Ad-Duwadmi. Recent bedouin settlements, as in Rumah, and the old farmers society sharing the area, where both traditional farmers values go side-by-side with those of newly settled bedouins. The neighboring proximity of these two sociocultural values is reflected in the variation among the same gender due to family cultural background that is still carried by both society's cultural components.

5.4 Migration Propensity

In order to inspect the rural youth migration propensity a question was used as follows:

> "How likely is it that you will move from your current home (village or town) soon after graduation?"

The possible answers were:

(___ very likely)
(___ likely)
(___ somewhat likely)
(___ not very likely)

In order to present the information obtained by this question, I trichotomized the responses into high migration propensity = "very likely" and "likely"; moderate migration propensity = "somewhat likely"; and low migration propensity = "not very likely." This distribution reduced the levels of data presentation which keeps the direction and quantitative variation observable.

5.5 Migration Propensities and Population Redistribution

Reviewing the variations between males and females regarding attitudes toward residential preferences, I assume that variations with high statistical significance reflect two major points:

First, males and females in rural areas show different attitudinal responses regarding rural residential preferences.

Second, circumstances and male role expectations provide a larger margin of choices for males than for females. Rural culture tends to place the main family burdens upon males. Hence, females are less sympathetic to keep rural valuational dimensions and are not inclined to follow tradition. Females have not been untouched by the spread of urbanization, so they showed less preference for rural areas. The challenges facing the old rural traditions, customs, and norms have provided the strength to enable females to adapt to the waves of social change that are sweeping rural Saudi Arabia. The placement of males in the cultural context of traditional value systems enforces them to stick to the valuational perceptions that are not necessarily exerted on rural females.

From the previous discussion, we note that females showed less preference for rural areas as a residential place (Table 5.4), but with regard to the second dimension of such preference, migration propensity, females do not reflect consistent attitudes (Table 5.6). Females showed less migrational attitudes from rural areas to urban areas as one might related to on the previous discussion of residential preferences. In this point we note that the social values that let preferences free of bonds to be expressed do not let actions of females pursue freely as choice to migrate bonded by the actual capabilities of fulfilling personal preferences by manifesting actual actions; by developing migrational attitudes. Such attitudes require a minimum level of logical means, which means that women in rural areas lack the free choice to move to urban centers by themselves. So developing attitudes is related to take an action toward moving to urban centers is paralyzed by the fact that women need a family male companionship to carry the dream into reality. Hence, developing migrational attitude shows that females are less likely than males to show a propensity to migrate. In Table 5.6, it is shown that males exhibit a quite consistent ratio of migrational propensity to their residential preference levels, but for females, on the other hand, 61.9 percent prefer urban areas for residence (Table 5.4) and only 27.7 percent expressed high migrational propensity to urban areas. For males, 54.2 percent prefer rural areas (Table 5.4) and 55.6 percent show lower migration propensity; 38.1 percent of females showed rural preferences, but 72.3 percent expressed lower migrational propensity.

The differences noted here refer to the fact that preference of urban areas requires the ability to move independently to the preferred area. This contradiction

Table 5.6--Migration Propensity, by Gender.

Migration Propensity	Gender		Total (%)
	Male (%)	Female (%)	
High	44.4	27.7	37.5
Moderate	21.1	31.7	25.5
Low	34.5	40.6	37.0
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(284)	(202)	(486)

X^2 = 15.10 DF = 2 Sig. = .001

was reflected by so many comments written by females regarding migrational propensity. I noticed that frequent side comments in the questionnaire by females reflected a level of frustration in comments such as, "Only if we have the choice," or "Ask yourself as a male," and similar comments that express the distance between dreams and reality in the women's world. Generally, males prefer rural areas more than females but migration propensity positively goes with association of being male to develop higher migration propensity (Table 5.6).

The chi-square for gender relation to migration propensity indicates a value that is significant at the (.001) level, indicating the effect of gender on the variation in migration propensity level.

Though area of residences carried some familial cultural variation, both sexes do not differ due to place of residence in their migrational propensity. Males and females in all three areas carry a similar previous attitude about migration propensity levels. Statistical tests reflect this level of indifference of migration propensity within each gender in different areas of residence.

Chi-square reflects no significant variation by adding the area of residence for further inspection. In Table 5.7, area of residence is used to explore if the place of residence makes any difference among genders by place of residence but I found that no effects upon the volume and magnitude of preferences and migration propensity as they are still the same as for total population, indicating that males and females in all three areas do not differ in their residential preferences or migration propensities regardless of where they currently live.

Table 5.7--Migration Propensity, by Area of Residence and Gender.

Gender	Male			Female			
Survey Area	Ar-Rass	Ad-Duwadmi	Rumah	Ar-Rass	Ad-Duwadmi	Rumah	Total
Migration Propensity	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
High	39.0	45.9	48.8	31.4	23.1	28.6	37.5
Moderate	26.9	16.4	27.9	23.9	32.3	38.5	25.5
Low	34.1	37.7	23.3	44.8	44.6	32.9	37.0
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(82)	(159)	(43)	(67)	(65)	(70)	(486)

X^2 = 6.82 DF = 4 Sig. = NS X^2 = 4.80 DF = 4 Sig. = NS

Residential Preference and Migration Propensity

The level of acceptance of current living place related to the intentions of students to continue their residence in the area of moving somewhere else. Psychological satisfaction with the area of residence is not the only determinant that invites the idea of migration to the rural youths' future plans. The socioeconomic circumstances and personal ambitions are further influential factors that could be

added to the migrational attitudes' formation. The ability to migrate is also a third factor. Some people cannot dream or plan for migration simply because they cannot afford it, either financially, like members of limited-income families, or emotionally, like those who have strong attachments to their families that do not have other children to take care of parents and younger siblings. Other constraints for developing migration attitude even if not satisfied current residential area are gender, where females in Saudi Arabia need to have one male family member to accompany them to the sought residential area. Table 5.8 may reflect all those factors where the pure relation between migration propensity and residential preferences reflects a high correlation level (.85). On the level of individual cases we note that males who prefer rural area more than urban area are showing more propensity to migrate more than females who showed high urban preferences.

Table 5.8--Residential Preference and Migration Propensity, by Gender.

Gender	Male			Female			
Migration Propensity	High	Moderate	Low	High	Moderate	Low	Total
Residential Preference	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Urban	41.3	61.7	41.8	48.2	56.3	75.6	52.5
Rural	58.7	38.3	58.2	51.8	43.7	24.4	47.5
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(126)	(60)	(98)	(56)	(64)	(82)	(486)

X^2 = 7.75 DF = 2 Sig. = .02 X^2 = 11.90 DF = 2 Sig. = .003

The statistical tests reflect general significance for migration propensity and residential preferences. Chi-square values for males and females reflect such

residential preference/migration propensity relations to be significant, at .02 for males and .003 for females. Significance of the relation reflects the variation in one variable and its relation to the other variable values. The consistency of directions is negatively significant, where the least preference of urban areas related to the most migration propensity out of rural areas in the case of males. For females the situation is reversed, indicating that females who prefer urban centers revealed low migrational attitude, a case clearly related to the gender-role expectations.

5.6 Concluding Remarks

Based on the above discussion about scale of residential preferences items and the general discussion of residential preferences and migration propensity by gender and area of residence, I derive some general remarks. The judgment about the typical responses of males and females to the residential preferences and migration propensities of rural youth is based on the genders' frame of roles. I derive the following concluding remarks:

1 - Males and females showed significant variations with regard to certain items of the residential preference scale, especially preferring cities over rural areas where females are more enthusiastic about urban life.

2 - Males showed a slight tendency to be tradition-breakers. No explanation could be offered for this finding except that role expectations made some familial norms be embraced less by males, who are supposed to lead the familial adjustment processes to urbanization by showing less consideration for some traditionally preset social norms, especially that males strongly relate residential preference to

migrational attitudes while females do not show such relation between residential preferences and migration propensities.

3 - Because males have been more exposed to urban effects, they are expected to use migration tendencies as a major, or perhaps the only, option for satisfying familial and personal ambitions, even if they are less fond of urban life.

4 - No significant variations in residential preferences were found when area of residence was considered, meaning that current place of residence did not affect rural youths' attitudes.

5 - Urbanization's spread to rural and bedouin areas, accompanied by industrial zoning, formed a preset future plan for rural youths. The population redistribution band to the role of a pull-in forces to join the urban-industrial demographic movement. Reshaping the population concentration around that urban-industrial zoning stripline, the overcrowding of urban centers accompanied by the formation of low-density areas north and south the industrial line from east to west (Figure 5.2).

6 - Males highly relate family needs to residential preferences. Where they conjunct preferences to ability to migrate to satisfy their preferences of places.

7 - Females prefer urban life due to strict rural life rules about the expected behavior of females, but inability to act on their wishes results in a contradiction between their migrational attitudes and their residential preferences.

8 - Areas of residence do not contribute further explanation to the gender's variation regarding residential preferences or migrational attitudes. Inclusion of area of residence reflects no significant effects upon volume or direction of attitudes



Figure 5.2--Saudi Major Urban Industrial Line.

(Source: A.A. Al-Ibrahim, "Regional and Urban Development in Saudi Arabia." Doctoral Dissertation, University of Colorado, Boulder, 1982)

toward the preferred place of residence or the propensity to migrate from current place of residence. Though of this result area of residence will be included in discussions about sociocultural factor, and value orientation factors in the following chapter, as it may be useful to inspect the role of area of residence may contribute further explanation for respondents reactions toward residential preferences and migration propensity.

CHAPTER VI

RESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES AND MIGRATION PROPENSITY: SOCIOCULTURAL FACTORS

6.1 Introduction

In the previous two chapters, we reviewed the attributes of the study population, emphasizing cultural variations of families, socioeconomic levels, and residential preferences and migration propensity according to gender. Differences in residential preferences between the sexes suggests the effects of urbanization upon the social values of rural youth with respect to liking or disliking a place of residence. Migration propensity, to some extent, reflects the social role of rural women.

This chapter explores the effects of sociocultural background factors on the residential preferences and migration propensities of rural youth. It is divided into two parts. The first part examines the relationship between residential preferences and family cultural background, and family socioeconomic status. The second part assesses how family cultural background and socioeconomic status affects the formation of migrational attitudes. To begin with, however, the linkages between residential preferences and migration propensities must be considered.

6.2 Residential Preferences and Migration Propensity

Urbanization is invariably associated with socioeconomic development, and together they are bringing about changes in the sociocultural structure of Saudi society. These changes are especially prevalent in rural areas, where people mostly express reactions to social elements rather than create actions by themselves. But, development has progressed at a very fast rate in Saudi society and rural areas have not been able to keep up. Lagging at least economically, rural areas have suffered from economic and social marginalization. Rural areas as a source of food, manpower, and local small handicrafts--all were swept away by the rise of urbanization and the ebb of rural cultural power.

The new economic power in Saudi rural society is not simply an outcome of newly applied developmental plans. Before that, oil revenues had forced the government to employ expatriates with different capabilities and qualifications than those of the local people, in order to manage its basic structures. New people were brought into the central government offices, bringing new ways of life and forming agglomerations in the growing urban centers.

Development plans concentrated on urban centers in the first stages of programs that began in the 1950s. Local people, especially rural people and bedouins, found fewer opportunities. Only small, unskilled jobs were available for them. Education became the new class emblem: rural people had no education, and no suitable farms that could produce the fruits and vegetables demanded by the new urban centers. Imported food and products left rural people with only one choice:

"If you can't beat 'em, join 'em." Hence, rural people, especially in the 1950s generation, joined the process in the urban centers.

Those who remained in rural areas inherited small farms that produced barely enough wheat for self-support. Income and socioeconomic status in rural areas remained as they had been in the pre-oil state. The gulf between rural and urban life widened. Sociocultural structures in rural life began to crack under the pressure of urbanization's dominance over all aspects of life. Hence acceptance of urban conditions were accepted in favor of the newly emerging roles. Abdication of rural values was manifest in less attachment to rural life's customs, norms, and inherited social values. The embrace of urban roles pervaded all small towns, villages, and new bedouin settlements. The role of push factors in physical and valuational rural society and the pull of the urban combined to change the rural Saudi scene.

Residential preferences, as we have noted in Chapter V, varies by gender. Preferences for urban areas and for urban sociocultural relations are, I believe, external indicators of deeper cultural alterations. Both males and females prefer urban areas and the urban way of life. Females are more inclined to favor urban life. Nevertheless, even those males who express less fondness for urban areas still lean toward favoring urban areas and urban lifestyles.

6.3 Residential Preferences and Cultural Background

The influence of family cultural background upon residential preferences reflects the familial inherited customs that affect the youths' attitudes toward place of residence. Also, family cultural background is associated with various

socioeconomic factors influencing the youths' ambitions, familial relations, and problem-solving styles.

We observe, however, that family cultural background does not affect directly the youths' residential preferences (Table 6.1). Students from urban family backgrounds generally prefer residence in a rural area (58.4 percent), while those from rural family backgrounds prefer urban centers (52.7 percent). Bedouin students most prefer urban areas (57.9 percent). But no significant variation is observed in the effect of family cultural background on choosing urban or rural areas as a preferred residential place.

Table 6.1--Residential Preferences, by Family Cultural Background.

Family Background	Urban	Bedouin	Rural	Total
Residential Preferences	%	%	%	%
Urban oriented	41.6	57.9	52.7	52.5
Rural oriented	58.4	42.1	47.3	47.5
% =	100	100	100	100
N =	(77)	(145)	(264)	(486)

X^2 Value = 5.41 DF = 2 Sig. = NS

Controlling on gender makes no significant difference in relationship of residential preferences to family cultural background (Table 6.2). Females generally, as we have noted, are more in favor of urban life than are males. Bedouin and rural females are more urban oriented than those from an urban background. Females, we observe, tend to vary more than males, by background. Bedouins especially, of both genders, are the most pro-urban (Table 6.2).

Table 6.2--Residential Preference and Family Cultural Background, by Gender.

Gender	Male			Female			
Family Background	Urban	Bedouin	Rural	Urban	Bedouin	Rural	Total
Residential Preference	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Urban	40.4	53.3	42.8	43.3	66.0	64.7	52.5
Rural	59.6	46.7	57.2	56.7	34.0	35.3	47.5
% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	(47)	(92)	(145)	(30)	(53)	(119)	(486)

X^2 = 3.15 DF = 2 Sig. = NS X^2 = 5.17 DF = 2 Sig. = NS

Variation by Family Cultural Background and Gender

We have found that each survey area has some culturally dominant features. Some families have been deeply rooted for generations in village life, as is the case for Ar-Rass. Other areas are dominated by tribal culture, as in Ad-Duwadmi, where the Otaiba tribe dominates even though not all residents are newly settled bedouins. The high profile of bedouin settlements in Ad-Duwadmi means that the bedouin culture expresses itself in various aspects of life, such as housing distribution, word pronunciations, and clothing. Although such changes do not stand as points distinguishing Ad-Duwadmi from the rest of Saudi Arabia's central region, they are still an internal modification within the general frame of Saudi society, especially in the central region. The same applies to Rumah, where the Subay tribe dominates culturally, but not enough to create a society radically different from the rest of Saudi Arabia or even from the central region. I assume that bedouin cultures in Ad-Duwadmi and Rumah resemble each other more than they resemble the Ar-Rass

culture, though areas and subareas do not represent pure culture alone: there are bedouins in Ar-Rass just as there are farmers and traditional villagers in Ad-Duwadmi and Rumah.

Variation in residential preferences by family cultural background is shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. We will now take into account the place of residence of respondent (Table 6.3).

Table 6.3--Residential Preference and Family Cultural Background, by Gender and Area of Residence.

Gender		Male			Female			Total
Family Cultural Background		Urban	Bedouin	Rural	Urban	Bedouin	Rural	
Area	Residential Preference	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Ar-Rass	Urban	56.3	50.0	48.3	62.5	71.4	65.4	57.0
	Rural	43.7	50.0	51.7	37.5	28.6	34.6	43.0
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(16)	(6)	(60)	(8)	(7)	(52)	(149)
Ad-Duwadmi	Urban	32.0	51.5	39.7	18.2	50.0	64.3	46.4
	Rural	68.0	48.5	60.3	81.8	50.0	35.7	53.6
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(25)	(66)	(68)	(11)	(12)	(42)	(224)
Rumah	Urban	33.3	60.0	35.3	54.5	70.6	64.0	58.4
	Rural	66.7	40.0	64.7	45.5	29.4	36.0	41.6
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(6)	(20)	(17)	(11)	(34)	(25)	(113)

Residential preferences in Ar-Rass vary by gender and family background, as can be seen in Table 6.3. In Ar-Rass (mostly a farming community), urban families are represented by 16 male and 8 female students; rural families are represented by

60 male and 52 female students. The minority culture in this area is bedouin, with 6 male and 7 female students.

We also notice that 56.3 percent, 50.0 percent, and 48.3 percent of the Ar-Rass males from urban, rural, and bedouin families, respectively, tend to prefer urban areas to rural areas. Urban students show the highest preference for urban areas, followed by bedouin students. Females generally favor urban areas over rural areas. Family cultural background plays a significant role in this regard, as females from bedouin areas are most likely to favor urban residence (71.4 percent), followed by rural females (65.4 percent), and lastly by urban (62.5 percent). While male students from urban families are most likely to favor urban areas, it is bedouin females who are the most likely to favor urban areas. Rural females are more attracted to urban centers than are rural males. Urban females are also more attracted to urban centers than are urban males. So females are generally more attracted to urban life than males.

It may be that the lives of females in rural areas is more boring than the lives of rural males, though both sexes prefer urban areas. Stress upon females in rural areas may make them especially pro-urban. Bedouin females without doubt experience the worst situation, so they are highly expressive of their preference for urban areas even if it sounds like an action that does not conform to their expected role in a strict bedouin context.

In Ad-Duwadmi, where the bedouin culture is dominant, 51.5 percent of the male students and 50 percent of the female students are from bedouin families. We notice that bedouin males are the most urban oriented. Other groups are similarly

urban oriented, but at a lower level. Urban students in Ad-Duwadmi also prefer urban life, but the percentage for males is 32 percent, and for females 18.2 percent. This is quite inconsistent with my expectation that offspring of urban families are more inclined to favor urban centers than offspring from any other group. The observation here is that students from bedouin families, and students from rural families, especially females, show a greater desire for urban centers (Table 6.3).

Rumah is the most influenced by urbanization because of its proximity to the city of Ar-Riyadh, less than 100 miles away. The lure of the urban is exerted through frequent trips to Ar-Riyadh. Students from urban families show the lowest attraction to urban centers: 33.3 percent of the males and 54.5 percent of the females favor urban locations. Of the bedouin students, 60 percent of males and 70.6 percent of the females prefer the urban. Rural students prefer the urban too, with 35.3 percent for males and 64 percent for females.

In general, Ar-Rass students and Rumah students are the more oriented to urban life. Ad-Duwadmi students are less likely to favor urban life.

6.4 Residential Preferences and Family SES

I shall now explore preference for rural or urban residence according to family socioeconomic level.

Table 3.2 shows how income levels vary according to sociocultural background and residential area. Bedouin families have the lowest incomes, followed by people living in villages, then by residents of small towns, and finally--with the highest incomes--residents of larger urban centers. On the other hand, Table 3.2 also shows

that cultural affiliation (bedouin, village, urban) is related to the ladder of income that ranges from low to high. We can relate socioeconomic status to two factors: cultural affiliation and current place of residence. Cultural background (affiliation) further reflects dimensions whereby educational qualification and access to educational institutions play a role in family income levels.

In addition, cultural background plays another role in enhancing or suppressing the importance of education as a means of self-development. Cultural affiliation may limit individual choice of jobs: rural and bedouin people reject certain jobs regardless of their incomes (e.g., bedouins will never work as butchers, bakers, or hairstylists; villagers never accept leather-related jobs, carpentry, or blacksmithing). Only a few people specialize in such jobs and do so by inheritance.

Income is generally related to career status and education, but in these traditional social groups I have noticed that income is not strongly correlated with educational level, because income depends on the ownership of land or livestock. Family socioeconomic status, as explained in Chapter III, is composed of family income, father's education, and father's occupation. A three-component scale was developed to reflect a low, medium, or high socioeconomic level.

In Table 6.4, we observe a significant association between family socioeconomic level (SES) and residential preferences. However, it is not a straight-line relationship. Students from medium-level families are least likely to favor urban areas (38.6 percent), while students from families with a high level of SES are the most eager for urban life (63.4 percent). Low SES families are in the middle (58.4 percent), above the medium but less than high SES families. My

Table 6.4--Residential Preferences, by Family SES Level.

Family SES Level	Low	Medium	High	Total
Residential Preferences	%	%	%	%
Urban	58.4	38.6	63.4	52.5
Rural	41.6	61.4	36.6	47.5
% =	100	100	100	100
N =	(238)	(166)	(82)	(486)

X^2 Value = 20.19 DF = 2 Sig. = .01

interpretation is that high SES families have been brought up to appreciate city life and therefore have few worries that their preferences will disturb their families. Money is no problem for them, and they enjoy strong parental support.

Students from low SES families, on the other hand, are the opposite. Their current situation is no better than what they might face in urban areas; they will probably do well in urban areas, and they probably could do no worse.

Youths from middle-level SES families find their current places relatively secure. They do not have the luxury of an affluent family and, at the same time, they are free from the financial disparities that both youths from low SES families.

Gender variation (Table 6.5) reflects the same magnitude of preferences but shows that the females from high SES families have a stronger urban preference than the males from high SES families. I believe that rural life (current residence) plays a role in why the females prefer urban life more than their male counterparts. The same holds true for females from low SES families, as they are more urban-oriented than males (Table 6.5).

Table 6.5--Residential Preference and Family SES Level, by Gender.

Gender	Male			Female			
Family SES Level	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Total
Residential Preference	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Urban	53.9	34.7	54.2	62.6	48.9	76.5	52.5
Rural	46.1	65.3	45.8	37.4	51.1	23.5	47.5
% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	(115)	(121)	(48)	(123)	(45)	(34)	(486)

$X^2 = 10.4$ DF = 2 Sig. = .01 $X^2 = 6.32$ DF = 2 Sig. = .04

Females from medium SES families also are more urban oriented than males of the same SES level. There is greater variation among males from different SES levels than among females.

Residential Preference and Area of Residence

Residential preferences are influenced by family SES and cultural background. I will now explore more directly the effects of area of residence on residential preferences.

In Table 6.6 we observe that family SES is related to residential preference. We note that the majority of the survey population lean toward a preference for urban centers (52.5 percent) than for rural areas (47.5 percent). For all SES levels, females were more eager to reside in urban areas than males.

Among the three areas, Ad-Duwadmi has the lowest percentage preferring urban centers and Rumah, the highest. Gender plays a more significant role in differences in residential preference than socioeconomic status of family. In all

Table 6.6--Residential Preference and Family SES Level, by Gender and Area of Residence.

Gender		Male			Female			Total
Family SES Level		Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	
Area	Residential Preference	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Ar-Rass	Urban	45.8	56.0	55.6	66.7	60.9	80.0	57.0
	Rural	54.2	44.0	44.4	33.3	39.1	20.0	43.0
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(48)	(25)	(9)	(39)	(23)	(5)	(149)
Ad-Duwadmi	Urban	60.7	26.9	56.0	60.0	31.6	83.3	46.4
	Rural	39.3	73.1	44.0	40.0	68.4	16.7	53.6
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(56)	(78)	(25)	(40)	(19)	(6)	(224)
Rumah	Urban	54.5	38.9	50.0	61.4	66.7	73.9	58.4
	Rural	45.5	61.1	50.0	38.6	33.3	26.1	41.6
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(11)	(18)	(14)	(44)	(3)	(23)	(113)

areas, and across all family status levels, gender appears to be a source of variation regardless of SES, with males showing less preference than females for the urban. Women's margin of freedom in rural areas appears to play a major role in this preference rather than family status, which seems to disappear, crossing all variations of family, social, and economic status (Table 6.6).

6.5 Migration Propensity and Cultural Background

It is reasonable to expect that level of preference for rural or urban residence is associated with propensity to migrate. Because this survey was carried out in rural areas, where even the small towns cannot be considered urban centers, we anticipate that those who prefer an urban way of life will want to migrate from their current

residential area to preferred urban centers. Family cultural background and family socioeconomic status may affect variations in pattern. Gender may be an important source of variation in similar social circumstances, because role-expectations for males and females may enhance or suppress migration propensity even if other factors are equal. Area of residence, as mentioned previously, must be considered here because of the dominant culture that imprints the area. Ar-Rass is a traditional farming area; Ad-Duwadmi is dominated by a bedouin majority; and Rumah is a mixture of both cultures and close to Ar-Riyadh, where urban dominance might be more apparent than in areas farther away, such as Ar-Rass and Ad-Duwadmi.

Migration propensity is divided into three response categories: high propensity, moderate propensity, and low propensity. Respondents were asked:

> "How likely is it that you will move from your current home (village or town) soon after graduation?"

The possible answers were:

(___ very likely)
(___ likely)
(___ somewhat likely)
(___ not very likely)

In Table 6.7 the relation between family cultural background and migration propensity is shown to be significant and quite strong. The highest level of migration propensity is expressed by youths from urban cultural backgrounds, while rural young people show a lower propensity to migrate. Such a relation is surprising because rural people culturally are expected to reflect the most attachment to land and homesteads. Students from bedouin cultural backgrounds also have lower migration

Table 6.7--Migration Propensity, by Family Cultural Background.

Family Background	Urban	Bedouin	Rural	Total
Migration Propensity	%	%	%	%
High	59.7	39.3	29.9	37.5
Moderate	13.0	26.2	28.8	25.5
Low	27.3	34.5	41.3	37.0
% =	100	100	100	100
N =	(77)	(145)	(264)	(486)

X^2 Value = 23.74 DF = 4 Sig. = .01

propensity; although they expect to be less attached to any fixed residence place, they also by culture reject urban lifestyles so they are not eager to migrate out of rural areas (Table 6.7).

In Table 6.8 gender influence is noticeable in affecting propensity to migrate and its relation to family cultural background. Male/female preset role expectations in rural areas exceed the inherited cultural roots to the "here and now" determinants in rural areas. Variations among males are less sharp than those among females; family cultural background strongly affects the residential preference of females. Urban females are the group most eager to migrate; rural females are the group least eager to migrate. Urban males too, like urban females, show a higher propensity to migrate. It was previously noted that rural females are more likely than rural males to prefer urban areas. In terms of migration propensity, females also appear far more likely to want to migrate.

Table 6.8--Migration Propensity and Family Background, by Gender.

Gender	Male			Female			
Family Background	Urban	Bedouin	Rural	Urban	Bedouin	Rural	Total
Migration Propensity	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
High	57.4	40.2	42.8	63.3	37.7	14.3	37.5
Moderate	8.5	19.6	26.2	20.0	37.7	31.9	25.5
Low	34.1	40.2	31.0	16.7	24.6	53.8	37.0
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(47)	(92)	(145)	(30)	(53)	(119)	(486)

X^2 = 9.1 DF = 4 Sig. = .05 X^2 = 38.0 DF = 4 Sig. = .001

The migration propensity for young people from urban cultural backgrounds is greater than for average in Ar-Rass (43.8 percent); it is 60 percent in Ad-Duwadmi; and it is 83.3 percent in Rumah. The general average for low migration propensity is 37 percent; in Ar-Rass it is 38.8 percent, in Ad-Duwadmi 39.7 percent, and in Rumah 29.2 percent. It is clear from Table 6.9 that students from Rumah have the least propensity to migrate while those in Ar-Rass and Ad-Duwadmi have the greatest propensity. The variation here could be explained in that Rumah residents do not feel the need to move to a city because the largest city in the central region is Ar-Riyadh, which is less than a hundred miles away. They can enjoy the benefits of the city without losing the attributes of their community.

In all three areas of study, young people from urban backgrounds (both males and females) are highly inclined to migrate (Table 6.9). Rural females show a propensity to migrate less than that of rural males.

Table 6.9--Migration Propensity and Family Background, by Gender and Area of Residence.

Gender		Male			Female			
Family Cultural Background		Urban	Bedouin	Rural	Urban	Bedouin	Rural	Total
Area	Migration Propensity	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Ar-Rass	High	43.8	33.3	38.3	75.0	85.7	17.3	35.6
	Moderate	6.2	33.3	31.7	12.5	14.3	26.9	25.6
	Low	50.0	33.4	30.0	12.5	0.0	55.8	38.8
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(16)	(6)	(60)	(8)	(7)	(52)	(149)
Ad-Duwadmi	High	60.0	39.4	47.1	54.5	33.3	11.9	39.3
	Moderate	8.0	16.7	19.1	9.1	41.7	35.7	21.0
	Low	32.0	43.9	33.8	36.4	25.0	52.4	39.7
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(25)	(66)	(68)	(11)	(12)	(42)	(224)
Rumah	High	83.3	45.0	41.2	63.6	29.4	12.0	36.3
	Moderate	16.7	25.0	35.3	36.4	41.2	36.0	34.5
	Low	0.0	30.0	23.5	0.0	29.4	52.0	29.2
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(6)	(20)	(17)	(11)	(34)	(25)	(113)

For bedouin females the propensity to migrate is also less than for bedouin males. In Rumah both sexes show strong eagerness to migrate as those in the other areas, in general.

6.6 Migration Propensity and Family SES

Migration propensity was theoretically proposed as a feature of medium SES families, where ambitions more than qualifications, looking for better chances, become essential even if social norms and values (familism, residential preferences, land abandonment) constrain such ambitions. A nonconformative generation takes

risks to fulfill these ambitions even if the price is socially high. The findings from this study substantiates this theory posted for medium SES families. Upon further inspection, though, we find that the medium SES students are very similar to the upper and lower SES students in terms of migration propensity. The association between family SES and migration propensity is low (gamma = -.05), which indicates no fixed pattern. Chi-square also indicates no significant level for relation between family SES and migration propensity (Table 6.10). There are concentrations of high and low migration propensity but the total average (37.5 percent and 37.0 percent showed high than low migration propensity respectively (Table 6.10).

Table 6.10--Migration Propensity, by Family SES Level.

Family SES Level	Low (%)	Medium (%)	High (%)	Total (%)
Migration Propensity	%	%	%	%
High	34.5	41.5	37.8	37.5
Moderate	28.6	18.7	30.5	25.2
Low	37.0	39.8	31.7	37.0
% =	100	100	100	100
N =	(238)	(166)	(82)	(486)

X^2 Value = 7.0 DF = 4 Sig. = NS
Gamma = -.05

The gender factor (Table 6.11) does not disturb the conclusions from Table 6.10 with regard to propensity to migrate. However, we observe that females from medium SES families are less inclined to migrate than females, a rule that is true for all SES levels and students, where females less than their counterpart males of the same class in respect to migration propensity. Low SES and high SES females are in the opposite situation to males of the same SES. Medium SES magnitude of

Table 6.11--Migration Propensity and Family SES Level, by Gender.

Gender	Male			Female			
Family SES Level	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Total
Migration Propensity	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
High	47.0	43.0	41.7	22.8	37.8	32.4	37.5
Moderate	21.7	15.7	33.3	35.0	26.7	26.5	25.5
Low	31.3	41.3	25.0	42.3	35.6	41.2	37.0
% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	(115)	(121)	(48)	(123)	(45)	(34)	(486)

X^2 = 8.62 DF = 4 Sig. = NS X^2 = 4.43 DF = 4 Sig. = NS

migration propensity for females contrasts with that of males in the same SES class group (Table 6.11).

Migration propensity by SES and gender reveal an important variation explained by gender role expectations. This expectation formulated and encouraged males' consistency of residential preference and attitudes to seek such preferences fulfillments through migration. Affluent families and poor families have similar migration propensity levels where security in taking actions relates to not being afraid of losing anything.

Gender roles cannot overcome social norms where females respond differently in terms of migration propensity even if conditions about wealth or poverty are still similar for females as well as males. The strength of social norms and customs is worth special consideration as it clearly marginalizes the SES effects' upon migration propensity, at least for females (Table 6.11).

In Table 6.12, area of residence slightly affects the volume but not direction of attitudes toward migration propensity levels. Rural young people from low SES families in Ar-Rass are the least likely to migrate (for both genders). In Ad-Duwadmi, low SES males are more likely than females to migrate, while high SES males show above average leanings to migrate.

Table 6.12--Migration Propensity and Family SES Level, by Gender and Area of Residence.

Gender		Male			Female			Total
Family SES Level		Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	
Area	Migration Propensity	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Ar-Rass	High	39.6	36.0	44.4	38.5	21.7	20.0	31.3
	Moderate	27.1	24.0	33.3	20.5	30.4	20.0	23.9
	Low	33.3	40.0	22.3	41.0	47.9	20.0	44.8
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(48)	(25)	(9)	(39)	(23)	(6)	(149)
Ad-Duwadmi	High	50.0	44.9	40.0	33.3	66.7	0.0	45.9
	Moderate	16.1	11.5	32.0	32.5	21.1	66.7	16.5
	Low	33.9	43.6	28.0	55.2	26.3	33.3	44.6
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(56)	(78)	(25)	(40)	(19)	(6)	(224)
Rumah	High	63.6	44.4	42.9	18.2	66.7	43.5	28.6
	Moderate	27.3	22.2	35.7	50.0	33.3	17.4	38.6
	Low	9.1	33.4	21.4	31.8	0.0	39.1	32.8
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(11)	(18)	(14)	(44)	(3)	(23)	(113)

Again, social norms through all classes and cultural backgrounds greatly influence the shaping of students' responses to their gender role expectations (Table 6.12).

High SES families seem to encourage migration in males for different reasons. They are not constrained from developing attitudes for migrating. Low SES families have weak familial support and cannot afford such social sacrifices.

In Table 6.12, the relation between migration propensity and family SES shows some of my argument to be true--i.e., low SES families have a higher propensity to migrate than the total survey average. Also, high SES families do not encourage the migration of their members or at least leave the choice open for children to choose different places (cities) to live. High SES families have higher ambitions and can financially help children relocate. In low SES families, young people may be discouraged from leaving and show low migration propensity because of lack of family financial support for children to relocate and find their way in the new urban spheres, even if the children accept the risk of relocation.

Females from high SES families in Ar-Rass show a lower level of migration propensity than their male counterparts. But among the other SES levels, males are more likely to wish to migrate than females. This point could be explained as the high SES level families' discourage females from migrating for educational or career opportunities, though these families exert fewer limits on females' ambitions (i.e., residential preferences). In families from lower SES levels, females' migration ambitions are closer to males' despite the stricter sex-role behavior exerted in that lower-class families.

6.7 Concluding Remarks

Residential preferences and migration propensity are intertwined: the former can be conceptualized as a stimulus, the latter as a response. I have observed the following:

1 -Residential preferences and migration propensity are affected by family cultural background, especially with regard to sex-role expectations, where females are free to express preferences regardless of the cultural frame of the family. Choosing urban centers is clearly preferred but having thoughts of migration are suppressed by strict rural values. In traditional societies, self-reliance and traveling independently for a career make males show a stronger propensity to migrate and consequently lean towards the urban, though females show more preference for urban areas.

2 - Residential preferences and migration propensity are also related to family socioeconomic level. Both high and low status families are less encouraging of their children in seeking new places for residence and in thinking of migration as a requirement for the fulfillment of ambition. High-level SES families impose fewer restrictions on female choices than on males. Females show almost twice the degree of urban residential preferences but lower migration propensities. Low SES families members, even if need changes in life conditions more than others do, but the lack of financial support by family makes family members think twice before deciding to change current place of residence.

3 - Social norms and values overcome the financial capabilities (high SES) or financial constraints (low SES) for females, where such social values affect the stream

of residential preferences to urban areas to be linked to low migration attitudes which is not true in the case of males. I recall again the often-stated comments by females about migration propensity: "Only if we can act independently, we can tell you about our attitude to migrate."

CHAPTER VII

RESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES AND MIGRATION PROPENSITY: VALUE ORIENTATIONAL FACTORS

The part played by value factors in the formation of residential preferences and in the development of a young person's propensity to migrate is an important consideration for better understanding the phenomenon of population redistribution in Saudi Arabia. Among these value factors, level of attachment to family is integral to an individual's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with his/her place of residence. Sacrificing personal ambitions in favor of being with the family is one dimension of familism, while familism attitudes, on the other hand, influence another aspect, namely, migration propensity. Familism may enhance or suppress migrational attitudes. A second factor related to residential preferences and migration propensity is the level of individual modernity. Social and personal values influence the attitudes of individuals toward family relations, attitudes toward the place of residence, and migrational attitudes.

In this chapter, I will review the influence of familism on residential preferences and migrational propensity. Social attributes, such as family background and socioeconomic factors (i.e., family income and family socioeconomic levels in

general) will be taken into account. The degree of familism and modernity level will also be discussed in relation to residential preferences and migration propensity.

7.1 Familism Attitudes

A familism scale was adapted for use in this survey. Variations between males and females and between expected and observed attitudes suggest some of the valuational changes coming about in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi educational system is structured mainly by urbanites and male-only committees. Consequently, females may suffer from conflicting attitudes between what home commands and educational system explains. Rural males are also expected to show such misalignment between internal values and new societal requirements. Males and females in rural areas probably show more variations in practical than in abstract dimensions of familism.

I shall first provide a general review of the ranking of statements by amount of agreement. Then I will examine variations in individual statements according to gender, using mean, standard deviation, and statistical significance. This will help to detect the influence of gender upon value variation through familial attitude differences. Comparison between males and females will illustrate variations and relevance to male and female social roles.

(1) Be with Ill Parents

As shown in Table 7.1, the familial aspect with the highest ranking is "Be with ill parents." Respondents were asked:

Table 7.1--Familism Attitudes, by Gender (Percentage and Rank).

Attitude	Male (N=284)		Female (N=204)	
	Percent	Rank*	Percent	Rank*
1 - Be with ill parents	95.4	(1)	98.5	(1)
2 - Sharing activities with parents	95.4	(1 tie)	97.0	(2)
3 - Material possessions shared by all	92.3	(3)	88.1	(10)
4 - Pay medical care of ill parents	90.5	(4)	89.6	(7)
5 - Making decisions with family	88.7	(5)	88.6	(9)
6 - Mutual aid within family group	85.6	(6)	93.1	(3)
7 - Family support for individuals	84.9	(7)	91.6	(6)
8 - Participation as family group	84.9	(7 tie)	92.1	(5)
9 - Family interests before personal	83.8	(9)	93.1	(3 tie)
10 - Holding to family values	81.7	(10)	89.1	(8)
11 - Marriage is to have children	81.7	(10 tie)	74.8	(17)
12 - Perpetuation of family name	81.3	(12)	87.6	(12)
13 - Marriage is to maintain family	79.9	(13)	58.9	(19)
14 - Individual activities for family group	77.8	(14)	83.2	(14)
15 - Obligation to elderly parents	77.1	(15)	82.2	(15)
16 - Living close to parents	75.0	(16)	84.7	(13)
17 - Defending family integrity	73.2	(17)	79.2	(16)
18 - Family values over career	69.7	(18)	88.1	(9 tie)
19 - Solidarity of the family group	66.5	(19)	69.8	(18)
20 - Sharing house with in-laws	44.4	(20)	45.0	(20)

*Ranking level reflects percentage of those who "strongly agree" and "agree" with the statement of each gender group.

> It is the responsibility of married children to be with their parents in time of serious illness even if the children have moved some distance away from the parents. Do you agree?

We find that 95.4 percent of the males and 98.5 percent of the females agree to this statement.

The gender factor shows significant variations regarding obligation to ill parents (Table 7.2) in terms of average score on the five-point Likert scale for this item. Females are more inclined to agree, on average, than males. Hence, females in this specific respect are somewhat more familistic than males. (Note: the lower the mean score the higher the familism level).)

(2) Sharing Activities with Parents

The second highest ranked item (Table 7.1) was "Sharing activities with parents." The respondents were asked:

> As many activities as possible should be shared by married children and their parents. Do you agree?

Both males and females rank this aspect very high. Males rank it in a tie for highest, and females rank it second after "Be with ill parents."

Both males and females, on average, show high valuation for sharing activities with parents in social life (Table 7.2). Females are more inclined to support this type of sharing than are males. Females, more strongly than males, hold that such sharing of activities is an important feature of family relations.

Table 7.2--Familism Scale Items, by Gender (Mean, Standard Deviation, F-Ratio).

Item #	Attitude	Gender	N	Mean*	Std Dev	F Ratio	F Prob
1	Be with ill parents	Male	284	1.2465	.8464	5.7717	.0167*
		Female	202	1.0891	.4593		
		Total	486	1.1811	.7152		
2	Sharing activities with parents	Male	284	1.2932	.7813	4.6048	.0324*
		Female	202	1.1535	.5741		
		Total	486	1.2346	.7053		
3	Material possessions shared by all	Male	284	1.5282	.9673	.0971	.7555
		Female	202	1.5545	.8402		
		Total	486	1.5391	.9158		
4	Pay medical care of ill parents	Male	284	1.4437	1.0332	.7946	.3732
		Female	202	1.3614	.9584		
		Total	486	1.4095	1.0026		
5	Making decisions with family	Male	284	1.5493	.9881	.5310	.4666
		Female	202	1.4851	.9100		
		Total	486	1.5226	.9560		
6	Mutual aid within family group	Male	284	1.5810	1.1390	16.1797	.0001*
		Female	202	1.2277	.6048		
		Total	486	1.4342	.9690		
7	Family support for individuals	Male	284	1.7817	1.1001	7.8439	.0053*
		Female	202	1.5248	.8297		
		Total	486	1.6749	1.0037		
8	Participation as family group	Male	284	1.6444	1.2082	7.3181	.0071*
		Female	202	1.3812	.7969		
		Total	486	1.5350	1.0638		
9	Family interests before personal	Male	284	1.7289	1.3347	8.1834	.0044*
		Female	202	1.4257	.8267		
		Total	486	1.6029	1.1598		
10	Holding to family values	Male	284	1.7958	1.2329	6.0270	.0144*
		Female	202	1.5446	.9145		
		Total	486	1.6914	1.1175		
11	Marriage is to have children	Male	284	1.6725	1.1443	5.9728	.0149*
		Female	202	1.9455	1.3052		
		Total	486	1.7860	1.2199		

Table 7.2--Continued

Item #	Attitude	Gender	N	Mean*	Std Dev	F Ratio	F Prob
12	Perpetuation of the family name	Male	284	1.7500	1.3202	6.0776	.0140*
		Female	202	1.4752	1.0375		
		Total	486	1.6358	1.2172		
13	Marriage is to maintain family	Male	284	1.8873	1.2013	20.5530	.0000*
		Female	202	2.4703	1.6335		
		Total	486	2.1296	1.4250		
14	Individual activities for family group	Male	284	1.8873	1.2503	4.6935	.0308*
		Female	202	1.6584	.9860		
		Total	486	1.7922	1.1523		
15	Obligation to elderly parents	Male	284	1.8556	1.3980	.4539	.5008
		Female	202	1.7723	1.2648		
		Total	486	1.8210	1.3435		
16	Living close to parents	Male	284	2.0599	1.4414	11.7599	.0007*
		Female	202	1.6485	1.0791		
		Total	486	1.8889	1.3176		
17	Defending family integrity	Male	284	1.9542	1.3895	.4381	.5084
		Female	202	1.8713	1.3208		
		Total	486	1.9198	1.3606		
18	Family values over career	Male	284	2.3662	1.5794	38.3841	.0000*
		Female	202	1.5891	.9796		
		Total	486	2.0432	1.4143		
19	Solidarity of family group	Male	284	2.2183	1.4518	.1853	.6686
		Female	202	2.1634	1.3075		
		Total	486	2.1955	1.3925		
20	Sharing house with in-laws	Male	284	2.9965	1.6138	1.5615	.2121
		Female	202	3.1832	1.6364		
		Total	486	3.0741	1.6241		

(3) Material Possessions Shared by All

The item, "Material possessions shared by all" is ranked third by males and tenth by females. The question was:

> An individual should assume that his land, money, and other material goods are family property, and that he has an obligation to support individual members and give them assistance when they are in need. Do you agree?

Males rank this aspect of familism higher than do females (Table 7.1, item 3). Females may pay less attention to the materialistic side of familism attachment and put spiritual and emotional relations before material considerations.

No significant variation is observed, on average, between males and females with regard to sharing material possessions by the family (Table 7.2). The typical rural attitude is that every member is expected to share with the family his or her material possessions. So both genders consider such property sharing significant, with no variation by gender.

(4) Pay Medical Care of Ill Parents

Being responsible for financial obligation toward the family is one dimension that females find themselves unable to contribute to, because Saudi females are rarely responsible for the financial affairs of the family. This item and the previous item (no. 3) both reflect less attention given by females to financial matters. The question for "Pay medical care of ill parents" was asked as the following:

> If a person's father has a medical bill of SR 10,000 which he cannot pay, the daughters or sons are morally obligated to pay the debt. Do you agree?

We find that the ranking of this item is higher among males than among females; it is ranked fourth and seventh respectively by the two genders (Table 7.1).

Males and females, on the average, do not vary much on the question of providing care for ill parents (Table 7.2, Item 4). Males attached slightly more importance to it than did females.

(5) Making Decisions with Family

When making decisions about one's life, sharing family in that process is important for familial relation. The "Making decisions with family" aspect is detected by the following question:

> Whenever possible to do so, a person should talk over his important decisions (such as marriage, employment, and residence) with family members before taking action. Do you agree?

Making decisions with family is ranked fifth by males and ninth by females, although the percentage of agreement is nearly the same. Females generally appear more familistic than males.

Males and females, on average, show similar attitudes toward making decisions with family (Table 7.2, Item 5). No significant variation is observed in this aspect due to gender differences.

(6) Mutual Aid Within Family Group

"Mutual aid within Family Group" is an indication of the nature of giving and taking in the family life. Respondents were asked:

> There should be mutual aid within a family, consisting of friendly exchange relationships between parents and their married children, and married children and their married siblings. Do you agree?

We find that males rank "Mutual aid within the family" sixth and females rank it third in a tie with "Family interest before individuals." Female agreement is higher

than males and is also higher in rank order. Males agree by 85.6 percent and females agree by 93.1 percent, another indication of females' higher familistic orientation.

A significant variation, on average, is found for this item (Table 7.2). Females rely highly on mutual aid within the family, whereas males attach less importance to it. Such variation may be explained in the light of value changes of groupness in rural life on the male side while females still preserve such rural spirit.

(7) Family Support for Individuals

Supporting individuals to establish their own households reflects horizontal expansion of family connections. The respondents were asked:

> There should be concern for the perpetuation of the family by helping an adult child in beginning and continuing an economic activity in line with family expectations, and in setting up a new household. Do you agree?

We find that expanding family size by supporting its members ranks seventh for males and sixth for females. It seems that females are more interested in having large families. Males agree with this item by 84.9 percent and females agree with this item at 91.6 percent (Table 7.1).

Variation among males and females, on average, is very significant here. Females, as in Table 7.1, show an intention of and consideration for having large families, with extra household establishing in connection with the original family. Independence attitude by males reflects importance for family size but less so than females (Table 7.2).

(8) Participation as Family Group

With regard to considering the family as a basic unit, the item "Participation as a family group" is used. Respondents were asked the following question:

> At a community social affair, a family should participate pretty much as a group rather than individuals. Do you agree?

We find that males rank togetherness of family seventh whereas females rank it higher. Both genders agree that participation as a family group is important. Males agree by 84.9 percent and females agree by 92.1 percent. It is clear that females lean to the social life of the family more so than males.

Females considered family more important than individuals in the family activities, on average (Table 7.2). Males attach less importance to the group and more importance to the notion of "each one for himself first." The effect of urbanization is prevalent here more clearly in male than in female responses.

(9) Family Interests Before Personal

Putting family interests before individual interests carries the meaning of supremacy of the organization (family) to its members (individuals). I asked the respondents the following question:

> Children owe it to their parents to put family interests above their own personal interests. Do you agree?

We find that females carry more typical attitude for rural people more than males. Females rank this item third (tied) and males rank it ninth. Females agree by 93.1 percent and males agree by 83.8 percent. Males are more concerned about individualism, which is an urban attribute of life not common in rural areas.

Variation in putting interests of the individual versus family interests is significant, on average (Table 7.2). Females are more inclined to sacrifice personal interests in favor of family. The self-centrism of male interests reflects erosion of the rural norm of giving priority to the family. Males show a more urbanite perception of personal advantage.

(10) Holding to Family Values

Considering family values not less than family existence is another dimension of familism. Respondents were asked:

> If a family group has strong common moral views, a member should not let himself be influenced by outsiders to change these views. Do you agree?

Holding to family values is ranked tenth by males with an agreement of 81.7 percent and is ranked eighth by females with an agreement of 89.1 percent. Both genders believe that values are important, but males are less worried than females about values (Table 7.1).

This item also reflects a variation in the attitude toward traditional family values, on average (Table 7.2). Males are less enthusiastic about preserving such values. Females retain this norm as one of the rural life attributes in which family values play a significant role in directing behavior of the new generation.

(11) Marriage is to Have Children

In order to detect how the respondents related their own lives to their original families, marriage as a means for extending the family is one aspect to be considered. The respondents were asked:

Keeping the family going is a very important reason why sons and daughters should expect to marry and have children. Do you agree?

We find that males rely on marriage to have children to keep the family going. Of the males, 81.7 percent agree with this item and rank it tenth. Females rank this item 17th, agreeing by 74.8 percent. The variation observed here is placing importance on children as a family means for continuity can be explained by the fact that the children of the son are carrying his parental family name and identification, while the girls' children carrying their father's family name and belonging to some other families, where in rural and bedouin Saudi areas blood relations count for family identification.

Significant variations are found between males and females, on average, regarding the importance of marriage as a means of family preservation by having children (Table 7.2). Males see that marriage is more significant in keeping the family than females do. Through marriage, females share in preserving families other than their parental families, so it is not surprising that they consider having children to preserve the original family less important.

(12) Perpetuation of the Family Name

Carrying on the family name reflects a familial relationship that emphasizes the family as a source of pride. The respondents were asked:

It is important that the family name be carried on. Do you agree?

We find that both males and females rank this aspect 12th. The level of agreement for males is 81.3 percent and for females is 87.6 percent. Female children will not carry their mother's family name, but their father's. Females want that dimension

of familism carried on because they really need a reference support from their pre-marriage status. Such support in Saudi Arabia gives some security to the women in case of a failed marriage or in the case of a dispute with their husband, or even for the social pride that her family is not a small family but a well-known family in the area.

There are significant variations, on average, in the viewpoints of males and females toward perpetuation of the family name (Table 7.2). The females' view may derive from the same causes as their view of preserving the family by marriage. Although males rank this aspect at the same level as females, females agree more on the importance of preserving family name because rural females have conservative attitudes that encourage such name preservation of families rather than urban people who care of individualism more than traditional reference group.

(13) Marriage is to Maintain Family

Maintaining family existence as a social figure is important in revealing familial attachment attitude. The respondents were asked:

> Marriage should be viewed as keeping families going rather than creating new families. Do you agree?

The attitude of preserving the family as an existing body is ranked 13th and agreed upon by 79.9 percent of the males. Females rank it very low in their evaluation for means of family preservation and continuity. They feel it is less important to think that marriage is a family support for durability. Females rank this item 19th out of the 20 items that comprise the scale. The level of agreement with this item is only 58.9 percent for females. Again I think females assume their husbands extend their

families by having children after their family names. Females in this equation do not rely on marriage as a means for keeping the original family going.

There are significant variations, on average, between males and females for this item: females consider marriage less significant for maintaining their original families (Table 7.2). Males highly value this item because their wives will have their family names as well as the children.

(14) Individual Activities for Family Group

Merging the self into the family group identity in terms of activities reflects a strong familial attitude toward one's family. Respondents were asked:

> Within the family, there should be complete integration of individual activities for the achievement of family objectives. Do you agree?

We find that both males and females agree with this dimension and both genders rank it 14th. The percentage of agreement is higher for females than males, with 83.2 and 77.8 percent respectively. Attachment is higher in general to families by females than for males.

Males and females agree, on average, that family activities should be integrative (Table 7.2). Females support this idea more than males. Although the rank order is the same for males and females, a higher percentage of females agree with this item.

(15) Obligation to Elderly Parents

Feeling an obligation to elderly parents touches deeply the familism level. Respondents were asked:

> Children of elderly parents have as much responsibility for the welfare of their parents as they have for the welfare of their own children. Do you agree?

We find that both males and females rank this item 15th in the order of items of familism priority consideration. Females agree by 82.2 percent and males agree slightly less with 77.1 percent. Rank and agreement with the items reflects high consideration for elderly parents by both genders.

No significant variations, on average, are seen for males and females regarding obligation to elderly parents (Table 7.2). Females and males give the same ranking to this obligation, but females generally show higher agreement that it is important to be committed to parents.

(16) Living Close to Parents

Physical attachment to the family reflects stronger familial attitude. Respondents were asked:

> Married children should live close to their parents so that they can help each other. Do you agree?

Males rank this item 16th with a level of agreement of 75 percent. Females rank it 13th with a level of agreement of 84.7 percent. Proximity to the parents' homestead reflects further dimensions about possibility of leaving the area to other preferred places to reside.

There are significant variations, on average, between males and females about living close to parents' homestead (Table 7.2). Females support preserving this rural norm and males do not. Females show less migration propensity by their level of

familism, while males for this item of familism will not change their plans of leaving the area even if they have to be far from their homestead.

(17) Defending Family Integrity

A feeling of family alliance reflects the familial attachment level to family. Respondents were asked:

> If a member of the family is insulted or injured, you should feel more strongly about it than if the injured person is not a member of your family. Do you agree?

Both males and females feel it is important to defend family integrity. Males agree on this by 73.2 percent and rank it 17th among the familial priorities. Females feel stronger about this dimension, ranking it 16th with an agreement level of 79.2 percent. Females' feelings about defending family may be reduced because their role in rural areas is limited to feelings, not actions. Also, females depend on family support and defense because they may be victims of unjust treatment by others.

Defending family has the same importance, on average, for males and females (Table 7.2). No significant variation according to gender is observed. Although females tend to be more supportive of this familial dimension, women's limited role in Saudi society reduces this action to sound as equal to that of males (compare to Item 17 in Table 7.1).

(18) Family Value over Career

Sacrificing one's career for family values indicates high level of familism attitude. Respondents were asked:

> If a person finds that his job runs so much against the family values that severe conflict develops, he should find a new job. Do you agree?

We find that males and females vary significantly on this issue. The situation of each gender in the society imposes some differences in the way of looking at things. Males feel responsible for the family, besides they who have chances of facing such job values conflict. Females area of job selectivity is limited and highly controlled by family. Males agree by 69.7 percent for finding a new job that coincides with family values, ranking this item 18th. Females are free of such situation stress, so they rank it ninth (tied), with an agreement level of 88.1 percent.

A significant variation between males and females, on average, is observed for this norm of rural societies (Table 7.2). Males are less attracted to the idea of conformity to family values when these values contradict their career choice. Females show highly supportive attitude toward giving up a career opportunity if it conflicts with family values. The most significant variation that appears to distinguish males from females familial attitude is this issue.

(19) Solidarity of the Family Group

Feeling of "we" versus "them" in familial relations reflects a level of strong solidarity among family members. Respondents were asked:

> There should be a feeling on the part of all members of a family that they belong permanently to the family group and that all other persons are outsiders. Do you agree?

We find that both males and females agree on this aspect. Both rank it in less priority among other items of familism dimensions. Males rank it 19th with a level of agreement of 66.5 percent. Females rank it 18th with a level of agreement of 69.8

percent. The "we" dimension is not observable highly in rural areas and bedouin settlements as the villagers and tribal people still feel community relationship more than urban people.

No significant variations by gender are observed, on average, concerning solidarity of the family group (Table 7.2). Females show a slight leaning toward the preservation of family relations through time, while males think less of it. Longevity of family relations is a basic norm of family ties in rural areas, where people keep face-to-face relations and father-to-child relations both in vertical and horizontal directions. Females showed slightly more commitment than males in this regard.

(20) Sharing a House with In-Laws

A traditional norm of rural people is to share their house with relatives (in-laws) as an expression of family relations. Respondents were asked:

> A married person should be willing to share his home with brothers and sisters of his husband or wife. Do you agree?

We find that this item ranks lowest as a familial sign of relations. Males and females both rank it 20th. Males agree by 44.4 percent and females agree by 45 percent. Females' responses to the questionnaire were very clear that no relatives (in-laws) are welcome in the house, adding that "in-laws are only welcome as visitors." Rural typical norms of large cooperative families is not supported by this finding about hosting in-laws.

No significant variation, on average, by gender is found for the idea of in-laws sharing a house (Table 7.2). Females are slightly more likely to reject this idea than

males, but both genders thought family own house for new couples is solely for the couples with less acceptance for in-laws sharing the house with them.

7.2 Foci of Familism and Gender

Several points can be made about variations by gender in means, as reported in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. Both males and females agree that the most important familial obligation is to "care for parents." Parents are the main focal point for family relations of both sexes. But when the dimension of interest goes beyond parental relations to the whole family, females show less interest than males (e.g., males rank "sharing decisions with family" fifth but females rank it ninth). Such variations in ranking of dimensions reflects priorities of attitudes rather than rejection of ideas by respondents.

The F-tests (Table 7.2) reflect some variation in the mean and standard deviation from that mean regarding every item responded to by each gender. The F-tests (Table 7.2) reflect the significance of variations between genders in responding to certain statements. Some item variations are at a high level, such as for item 6, "sharing decisions with family." Males believe it is very important but many females feel that "all family" are not equally as important to be "shared in decision making." That attitude of females is either based on a greater tendency for females to be independent of the family than males, or their feelings that making decisions for them initially is done by the family, so the "sharing/not sharing" is not within their control. For some other items, the male/female pattern is very similar.

With item 3, for instance, the F-probability is close to .76, meaning that this attitude shows only a slight variation by gender.

7.3 Familism Summated Scale

As mentioned in Section 7.1, a scale of familism was employed to detect the level of familism of the study population. To measure the degree of family ties, I used a scale based on previous scales by Heller (1970) and Schwarzweller (1960a, 1964, 1971). The original scales were combined, then 20 statements were adapted to fit the Saudi context. The main aspects or dimensions of familism intended to be reflected in this scale are: feelings about family; integration of activities; sharing property; concern about the family's perpetuation; and mutual aid.

In my analysis for familism levels, I concentrate on two dimensions. The first dimension is the mental conceptual frame for family. The second dimension is relative to the actions that reflect valuational aspects of family.

The scale of familism used in this study was composed of 20 items with responses at five degree levels, ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." A value of "1" was assigned to "strongly agree" and a value of "5" was assigned to "strongly disagree." The value of "3" represents being "unsure," but this does not mean an absence of feeling. "Unsure" often reflects a level of uncertainty in which there is conflict between personal needs and social values. A minimum of 20 points indicates the highest level of familism, and 100 points is the lowest level of familism. Any point value between the maximum and minimum levels corresponds to the

accumulation of points that place the respondents on a continuum of familism based on his/her answers cumulative points. By subtracting 20 from 100 we find the range should be any number on the 80 point scale. The test of internal consistency using Cronbach's alpha showed a significance level of reliability equal to .81 percent accuracy of measurement for familism levels by the used scale (see appended scale reliability tests). We are confident that this scale provides an accurate report about student's familism more that 80 percent every time the test is administered. Gender is used in connection with area of residence to explore the level of familism and any variation among genders by controlling for area of residence.

In Table 7.3, the whole sample mean average test for degree of familism by gender is displayed. The mean average of familism for males is 36.24 with a standard deviation of 10.85. The mean average for females is 33.52 with a standard deviation of 9.05. The F-ratio for mean variation by gender is 8.46 with a probability $P = .0038$. Noticing that the mean score of females is lower than of males indicates that females are more familistic than males (see Table 7.3, and Figures 7.1-7.2).

For further inspection of variations among gender, I used the mean test for familism degree for each area. This area inspection will shed light on two dimensions: first, the area population's cultural attributes implication upon children familial attitudes; second, pointing out on an area level the extremes of attitudes toward families either by more or less familistic orientations.

In Table 7.4, the Ar-Rass population is mostly traditional farmers with very limited number of bedouin settlers, dominated by typical rural customs and values,

Table 7.3--Familism Degree (Distributed Data), by Gender (Mean, Standard Deviation).*

Gender	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	F Ratio	F Prob.
Male	284	36.2394	10.8520	8.4582	.0038
Female	202	33.5248	9.0467		
Total	486	35.1111	10.1414		

*80-point familism index with score ranging from 20 through 100.
**lower points means higher familism degree

where land, family, local community, and co-villagers notion represent Ar-Rass society's cultural backbone. In this area we notice the reversed direction of the general sample attitude about familism. In Ar-Rass, males show a mean score of 33.18 whereas females show a mean score of 34.72, indicating that males in Ar-Rass are more familistic oriented than females in the same area. The difference in the mean score is small to a degree that it certainly affects the total population mean test significance but does not reverse the magnitude of familism as it is still higher among females than among males in general. Males in Ar-Rass are more familistic than females because traditional villagers of Saudi Arabia impose familism by cultural means (i.e., ways of upbringing, social labelling). Males are strongly seen as the major actor whose faults are strictly counted, and his future in the society is mainly formulated by living up to his ancestors' way of life. For all these reasons, I believe that males of Ar-Rass reflect a high level of familism, and slightly higher than females of Ar-Rass. Females of Ar-Rass are not less familistic than other females, in fact, but their level of familism is concealed by the high level of familism shown by males.



Figure 7.1--Familism Levels, by Gender.



Figure 7.2--Combined Familism Attitude for Males and Females.



Figure 7.3--Level of Familism for Males.



Figure 7.4--Level of Familism for Females.

Table 7.4--Ar-Rass: Familism Degree, by Gender, Controlling on Survey Area (Mean, Standard Deviation).*

Survey Area	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	F Ratio	F Prob.
Ar-Rass					
Male	82	33.1829	7.8018	1.3715	.2435
Female	67	34.7164	8.1311		
Total	149	33.8725	7.9613		

*80-point familism index with score ranging from 20 through 100.
**lower points means higher familism degree

In Table 7.5 we explore the familism degree by gender in Ad-Duwadmi. The people in Ad-Duwadmi are mostly of bedouin origin. They settled in three waves of settling stages which occurred between the 1940s, 1960s, and 1980s to the present. The nature of people pulled to the area is that they all belong to the same "Otaiba" tribe. Newcomers are more strict or fundamental in their beliefs toward the clan's role in unifying people. The continuous settling waves during various periods of time affected the demolishing process of tribal values and replacing it with settled rural values. Because of the continuous bumping of historical heritage with each group joining the settled parts of the tribe, change of values become a major issue due to the preservative role that newcomers add to the society with each new wave. Bedouin social values always degrade attachment to land, women's role in tribal issues, and males' expression of dependency upon family (Al-Banyan, 1978b; see also Figures 7.3-7.4).

Table 7.5--Ad-Duwadmi: Familism Degree, by Gender, Controlling on Survey Area (Mean, Standard Deviation).*

Survey Area	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	F Ratio	F Prob.
Ad-Duwadmi					
Male	159	38.1321	12.5774	4.0864	.0444
Female	65	34.4923	11.3277		
Total	224	37.0759	12.2303		

*80-point familism index with score ranging from 20 through 100.
**lower points means higher familism degree

In Ad-Duwadmi, the mean for males' familism is 38.13 and for females is 34.49. These values indicate that males are less familistic (recalling that higher mean value indicate lower familism level), the variation here is significant for F-test at p. = .04.

In Rumah (Table 7.6), males also reflect lower familism than females (males' mean = 35.07; females' mean = 31.49; variation significant level is P. = .009). Rumah is composed of a mixture of settled bedouins and old-time village farmers. It is noticeable that Rumah females represent the highest familism across all the survey population. Rumah is the area closest to Ar-Riyadh among the areas of this study. Males of Rumah come second to Ad-Duwadmi males in regard to level of familism where Ad-Duwadmi males showed the lowest familistic attitude across the whole study population.

Considering level of familism across all three areas, we find that the highest familism level is for Rumah females, the second highest level is for Ar-Rass males,

Table 7.6--Rumah: Familism Degree, by Gender, Controlling on Survey Area (Mean, Standard Deviation).*

Survey Area	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	F Ratio	F Prob.
Rumah					
Male	43	35.0698	6.9158	6.9865	.0094
Female	70	31.4857	7.0480		
Total	113	32.8496	6.9986		

*80-point familism index with score ranging from 20 through 100.
**lower points means higher familism degree

and the third highest is for Ad-Duwadmi females. Ar-Rass females rank fourth, Rumah males rank fifth, and the lowest familism level is for Ad-Duwadmi males.

Females generally are more familistic than males. The exception is for Ar-Rass males, where males are more familistic than females. We can interpret this as that males of bedouin roots are less familistic possibly due to the bedouin cultural component of bedouin societies that stresses male independence and considers familism attitudes as a feminine attribute. This interpretation is supported by other phenomena, that bedouin males join careers that permit low communication with families, such as solders in the armed forces, where military camp life permits the lowest level of communication with families and homesteads, while the case is not so with typical rural males. Many other attributes of culture encourage bedouin males to join the Armed Forces, but certainly low familistic attitudes are facilitating if not directing such a career choice.

7.4 The SES Factor

Family income is considered here. In Table 3.4 we noted that the lowest income group is the bedouin with less than $3500 per year family income (14,200 Saudi riyals). Females in farmer societies or in bedouin settlements are not required to contribute to family income, or even to be responsible for their own expenses, regardless of their age or level of wealth (Islamic and State Laws). The males' role in generating family income may serve to explain low familism levels among bedouin males. The high familism levels among rural males, as shown in the case of Ar-Rass, may be attributed to two social factors: first, that rural families in typical villages are more affluent than bedouin families (rural and small towner's incomes range from $5,000 to $11,000, or 20,000 to 43,600 Saudi riyals)(Ministry of Labor, 1979, Table 4.3). Such relative affluence of farmers explains why young male members depend on family support and feel even more attached to family life. A second factor is the nature of economic activities in the rural traditional villages (not bedouin settlements). Such economic activity of an agricultural nature absorbs any male available support and reflects higher income levels of families. In the bedouin settlements, economic activities are still cattle herding which only requires one person to take the livestock to graze in the nearby grassy areas, while the rest of the males hang around with limited economic activities available. Then males of bedouin families seek jobs where their capabilities support them. Herding livestock is not so rewarding as what farmers gain from established crop production.

Family SES is a broad concept, not only limited to the family income level but also including father's education and occupation (Chapter III, 3.8 Socioeconomic

Background). A generalized SES variable was used throughout this study. It is composed of the three components: income, father's education, and father's occupation. For purposes here, to focus more directly on values and their effect on residential preferences, I have elected to consider in particular the family income factor. This permits me to employ a regression test which takes into account the interrelationships between SES, familism, and residential preferences/migration propensity. The following section presents variation in familism, family income and its relation to residential preferences and migration propensity.

7.5 Familism Attitude Variation: Regression Analysis

The correlation between familism and family income (for total study population, comprising males and females) is significant, as determined by a multiple regression analysis (multiple R = .101, T = 2.30, and level of significance = .03). The correlation between familism and residential preferences is not significant (multiple R = .007, T = -.15, level of significance = .89), indicating that familism does not affect residential preferences. Family income is modestly related to residential preferences, with multiple R = .10, T = -1.83, and level of significance = .07. Family income affects familism and residential preferences but no direct relation between familism and residential preferences is observed. I assume that such an effect would be direct and strong. This unexpected absence of relation between familism and residential preferences may result from the fact that residential preferences as expressed by both genders are in favor of urban centers versus rural areas, but those students live in rural areas with their families, so if they carry their

preferences to action by moving to their preferred places of residence, they will migrate to urban centers. If family income is high, the student will migrate with no financial or emotional obstacles because migration to urban centers is related to family income. In this case, the family does not need his or her presence. Furthermore, the family will support him/her to move financially and emotionally with peace of mind that the student's migration and residential choice would not negatively affect the family back home. For those students preferring an urban area and who are not from a rich family, propensity to migrate will help the family back home by exploring new horizons of income sources and social affiliations, and by easing the burdens upon their families. The level of familism would not be under the threat that urban residential preferences means low familial attachments. Most of the respondents (77.8 percent) show high to medium familism levels (Table 7.13, Familism Trichotomized). Females and males show variations in familism levels but females cannot fulfill residential preferences independently (without a male family member), so their migrational attitudes have been suppressed by such limitation.

Let us take a closer look at the results of my regression analysis. Interaction effects between familism and family income, family income and residential preferences, familism and residential preferences, migration propensity, and migration propensity and residential preferences, and as well as family income, should take gender variation into account.

In Table 7.7 we observe the interaction effect between familism and family income. We note that familism attitude levels for males correlate with family income levels (R = .20, beta .21, T-value 3.40, Sig. T = .00), indicating that a one-unit

Table 7.7--Regression Analysis Results for the Interaction Effect between Familism and Family Income.**

Gender	Multiple R	Standardized Regression Coeff. (beta)	T-Statistic	Sig-T*
Males	.20	.21	3.40	.00
Females	.03	-.03	-.41	.70
Total Population	.10	.10	2.30	.03

*significant at $\leq$ 0.05 level
**numbers rounded to two decimals

increase in family income has a corresponding increase of .21 units in the male familism level score. For females, familism attitude is not associated with differences in scores of family income levels (R = .03, beta -.03, T-value -.41, Sig T = .70), indicating no significant interactional effect of family income on familism attitude. Further, for females there is a slight negative relation between income level and familism attitude but it is very minor in degree and importance.

Table 7.8 shows the interactions between family income and residential preferences. There is a slight significant variation by results of regression analysis for interaction effects derived from changes in family income and corresponding changes in residential preferences (high = urban preference, low = rural preference).

Males show a non-significant effect by income level changes on their residential preferences (R = .03, beta = -.03, T-value = -.44, Sig T = .66), indicating low correlation between income and residential preferences. There is also a negative relation direction (-.03) for beta, which means that for each unit increase in income, preference for urban area decreases by .03 unit. The minor correlation reflects a low

Table 7.8--Regression Analysis Results for the Interaction Effect between Family Income and Residential Preferences.**

Gender	Multiple R	Standardized Regression Coeff. (beta)	T-Statistic	Sig-T*
Males	.03	-.03	-.44	.66
Females	.17	-.17	-2.50	.01
Total Population	.08	-.08	-1.83	.07

*significant at $\leq$ 0.05 level
**numbers rounded to two decimals

significance level in relating income to residential preferences for males (Sig. T = .66).

For females, there is a stronger correlation between income level changes and preference for urban areas. The multiple R value of .17 indicates some significant relation between changes in the two variables, but the relation is in a negative direction. For each unit increase in family income, there is a decrease of .17 units in urban preference. This relation is significant (Sig T = .01). We conclude that females are less attracted to urban life as their family income level increases. This is similar in direction for males, but the correlation is very low.

The interaction effects between familism and residential preferences are shown in Table 7.9. For males, the regression analysis indicates that familism level correlates slightly with residential preferences in terms of strength (R = .08, beta = -.08, T-value = -1.33, Sig T = .18) and in a negative direction, meaning that an increase in familism decreases urban preference very marginally (-.08). For females, an increase in familism correlates positively with preference for urban areas. Each

Table 7.9--Regression Analysis Results for the Interaction Effect between Familism and Residential Preferences.**

Gender	Multiple R	Standardized Regression Coeff. (beta)	T-Statistic	Sig-T*
Males	.08	-.08	-1.33	.18
Females	.17	.17	2.40	.02
Total Population	.01	-.01	-.15	.89

*significant at $\leq$ 0.05 level
**numbers rounded to two decimals

unit increase in familism increases preference for urban center by .17 units. This relation for females is significant (T-value 2.40, Sig T = .02). We conclude that males do not shift much of their residential preferences in corresponding to their familism level. Further, it seems that familism levels have almost no impact upon males' attitudes toward rural or urban areas. This not the case for females, as the higher their familism level, the more they lean to urban areas as the preferred residential place.

The interaction effects between familism and migration propensity, as shown in Table 7.10, are very low. Males' attitudes to migrate out of rural areas decreases by .08 unit for each unit increase in familism level. The low significance relation for male attitudes about migration propensity whenever familism level changes clearly indicates very minor effects of familism levels on male attitudes to migrate. For females, an even weaker relation is observed between impact of familism level changes on migration propensity (R = .02, beta .02, T-value .28, Sig T = .78). From

Table 7.10--Regression Analysis Results for the Interaction Effect between Familism and Migration Propensity.**

Gender	Multiple R	Standardized Regression Coeff. (beta)	T-Statistic	Sig-T*
Males	.08	-.08	-1.40	.16
Females	.02	.02	.28	.78
Total Population	.06	-.06	-1.39	.17

*significant at $\leq$ 0.05 level
**numbers rounded to two decimals

these findings we conclude that familism degree has little or no effect on migration propensity to urban areas for rural youth of either gender.

Table 7.11 shows the regression analysis results for interaction between migration propensity and residential preferences. Males show a low relation level between migration propensity levels and attitudes toward urban or rural areas as preferred residential place (R = .04, beta = .04, T-value = .61, Sig T = .54), indicating that very small changes in residential preferences are correlated to changes in migration propensity levels. The direction of change is positive but the level of significance is low. For females, the relation is significant (R = .19, beta = .19, T-value = 2.78, Sig T = .01), indicating a positive significant relation between changes in migration propensity levels and corresponding changes in residential preferences attitude. For each unit increase of migration propensity (high to low) there is a corresponding increase of .19 unit in residential preference for urban areas. This relation indicates effects reflected by migration propensity level changes on residential preferences. This result supports our findings in the mean test

Table 7.11--Regression Analysis Results for the Interaction Effect between Migration Propensity and Residential Preferences.**

Gender	Multiple R	Standardized Regression Coeff. (beta)	T-Statistic	Sig-T*
Males	.04	.04	.61	.54
Females	.19	.19	2.78	.01
Total Population	.11	.11	2.51	.01

*significant at $\leq$ 0.05 level
**numbers rounded to two decimals

regarding female attitudes toward preference for urban areas, which is higher than males, and should be higher if migration propensity is not constrained by the fact that women cannot migrate independently in Saudi society. Hence, we conclude that males' migrational capability does not affect their choices of residential preference, whereas females are highly affected in their residential choices because they cannot make migration choices independently.

Table 7.12 presents the regression analysis results for interaction effects between changes in family income and migration propensity. Both male and female responses show a very limited relation between the two variables of income and migration propensity. Further, an increase in family income results in a decrease in migration propensity, but the volume of the decrease is not significant for either males (R = .04, beta = -.04, T-value = -.69, Sig T = .50) or females (R = .08, beta = -.08, T-value = -1.18, Sig T = .24). We conclude there is a weak and negative relation between changes in family income and migration propensity for both genders.

Table 7.12--Regression Analysis Results for the Interaction Effect between Family Income and Migration Propensity.**

Gender	Multiple R	Standardized Regression Coeff. (beta)	T-Statistic	Sig-T*
Males	.04	-.04	-.69	.50
Females	.08	-.08	-1.18	.24
Total Population	.05	-.05	-1.16	.25

*significant at $\leq$ 0.05 level
**numbers rounded to two decimals

Summary of Regression Analysis

From the regression analysis results, we find that the degree of familism is highly affected, in a positive direction, by family income level for males, while for females this relation is very minor and negatively directed. Also, family income affects residential preferences. For females a strong and negative direction relation is observed, meaning that the increase of income stimulates a decrease in preference for urban areas. Males show a weak relation between income level and urban preferences but the magnitude is similar to females in its negative correlation direction. Changes in familism levels have a small negative relation to residential preferences of males. For females, familism and family income both have weak relations to migration propensity levels (Tables 7.10 and 7.12). Migration propensity level is positively related to residential preferences (urban preference) for females. The relationship is weak for males.

7.6 Familism Trichotomized

In order to reduce the range of familism degrees and also to eliminate the effects of extreme positions, I trichotomized the scale scores. I took into consideration that familism should be dealt with as a continuous variable from high through low. Trichotomization serves two purposes: to compress the few extreme values into a grouping system; second, to enable the researcher to develop more comparisons with variables that have only three or two dimensions by cross-tabulation procedures. Furthermore, trichotomization of familism will enable the reader to observe the whole picture of magnitudes and volumes of familism distribution without being overwhelmed by information. Generally, we noticed in Table 7.3 that the general mean familism score for the survey population (N = 486) is 35.11, which indicates that high familism levels are expressed by the students (100.0 indicates low familism and 20.0 indicates high familism; 40.0 is the theoretical mean (scale score mean), 100-20 = 80 / 2 = 40). Being lower than the theoretical mean, the actual mean (field calculated) indicates a high level of familism for all the population in general. Variations within these levels reflects variations within the population about who is more familistic, what attributes relate to higher familism, and how that affects residential preferences and migration propensity.

The cumulative percentage of familism frequency distribution is divided into three levels. First, the higher quartile ranging from 20-28 degrees of familism. Second, the middle half, ranging from 29 to 40 familism degrees. Finally, the lower quartile, ranging from 41 to 100 familism scores.

The first level indicates a high level of familism, the second a medium level, and the third a low familism level. In Table 7.13, the trichotomized familism levels are shown along with corresponding frequency and percentages.

Table 7.13--Familism Frequency Distribution (Trichotomized) and Percentages.

Familism degrees	Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
High (20-28 scores)	125	25.7	25.7
Medium (29-40 scores)	253	52.1	77.8
Low (41-100 scores)	108	22.2	100.0
Valid cases	486	100.0	

After trichotomization of the summated scale, the variations previously noticed by gender became less evident. I believe that the extreme values ("out-lyers") are incorporated into the high or low familism degrees, which consequently dampens their influence. But the direction and levels of familism are still observed with no effects on the magnitude or volume of familism by gender. Familism's relation to residential preferences and migration propensity will be examined using both information obtained from the summated scale and the trichotomized distribution.

Table 7.14 shows the familism degrees by gender after converting the scale into three levels (high, medium, and low). The mean for males is higher than the mean for females, indicating that males are expressing less familism attitude than females (higher score indicates lower familism). Mean score variation here is smaller than that of the distributed data (Table 7.3). This variation reduction refers to the small range of three levels of familism being presented here. Variations between

Table 7.14--Familism Degree (Trichotomized), by Gender (Mean, Standard Deviation).*

Gender	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	F Ratio	F Prob.
Male	284	1.9965	.6804	1.4123	.2353
Female	202	1.9208	.7079		
Total	486	1.9650	.6922		

*Three levels of familism: high, medium, and low, with score ranging from 1 through 3.

gender are less significant because trimming extreme values makes the familism level variations smaller.

7.7 Familism Attitude and Sociocultural Factors: Cross-Tabulation Analysis

I will review the relationship between familism attitude and family background and family SES. Then I will consider the effect of familism in enhancing or suppressing attitudes toward residential preferences and migration propensities.

Familism and Family Cultural Background

In the previous discussion about family cultural background (Chapters V and VI), we related family cultural roots (traditional villagers and farmers, settled bedouins, and urban migrants in rural areas) to child-rearing. Those cultural backgrounds represent variations from each other and even within the same cultural traditions there are what might be termed conservatives and liberals. Conservatism and liberalism will be the subject of discussion in the second part of this chapter on value orientations relative to the modernity factor.

The relation between level of familism and family cultural background is not significant (Table 7.15). Interestingly, students from urban cultural backgrounds reflect more extreme positions.

Table 7.15--Familism Degree, by Family Cultural Background.

Family Cultural Background	Urban	Bedouin	Rural	Total
Familism degree	%	%	%	%
High	29.8	24.1	25.4	25.7
Medium	44.2	51.7	54.5	52.1
Low	26.0	24.2	20.1	22.2
% =	100	100	100	100
N =	(77)	(145)	(264)	(486)

X^2 Value = 3.20 DF = 4 Sig. = NS

Controlling on gender, Table 7.16 shows that the variation in familism degree by cultural background is not significant for either males or females. Gender does not add much explanation to the variation in familism degrees.

By taking into account area of residence as well as gender, I assume that cultural dominance in the area of residence may provide a further explanation (see Table 7.17). In Ar-Rass, urban males are far more familistic than rural or bedouin males. Urban females also tend to be more familistic.

In Ad-Duwadmi, urban males are far less familistic than rural or bedouin males. But there is very little variation among females.

Table 7.16--Familism Degree (Trichotomized) and Family Cultural Background, by Gender.

Gender	Male			Female			
Family Cultural Background	Urban	Bedouin	Rural	Urban	Bedouin	Rural	Total
Familism Degree	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
High	21.3	23.9	23.4	43.3	24.5	27.7	25.7
Medium	42.6	56.5	55.9	46.7	43.4	52.9	52.1
Low	36.1	19.6	20.7	10.0	32.1	19.4	22.2
% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	(47)	(92)	(145)	(30)	(53)	(119)	(486)

$X^2 = 5.81$ DF = 4 Sig. = NS $X^2 = 8.20$ DF = 4 Sig. = NS

Table 7.17--Familism Degree and Family Cultural Background, by Gender and Area of Residence.

Gender		Male			Female			
Family Cultural Background		Urban	Bedouin	Rural	Urban	Bedouin	Rural	Total
Area of Residence	Familism Degree	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Ar-Rass	High	43.8	16.7	28.3	37.5	0.0	28.8	28.9
	Medium	43.8	50.0	55.0	50.0	0.0	50.0	49.0
	Low	12.4	33.3	16.7	12.5	100.0	21.2	22.1
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(16)	(6)	(60)	(8)	(7)	(52)	(149)
Ad-Duwadmi	High	8.0	27.3	19.1	36.4	25.0	19.0	21.4
	Medium	40.0	54.5	55.9	45.5	58.3	64.3	54.9
	Low	52.0	18.2	25.0	18.1	16.7	16.7	23.7
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(25)	(66)	(68)	(11)	(12)	(42)	(224)
Rumah	High	16.7	15.0	23.5	54.5	29.4	40.0	30.1
	Medium	50.0	65.0	58.8	45.5	47.1	40.0	50.4
	Low	33.3	20.0	17.7	0.0	23.5	20.0	19.5
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(6)	(20)	(17)	(11)	(34)	(25)	(113)

	Males:	Females:
Ar-Rass:	$X^2 = 2.83$ DF = 4 Sig. = .6	$X^2 = 20.12$ DF = 4 Sig. = .00
Ad-Duwadmi:	$X^2 = 12.28$ DF = 4 Sig. = .02	$X^2 = 1.70$ DF = 4 Sig. = .80
Rumah:	$X^2 = 1.11$ DF = 4 Sig. = .91	$X^2 = 4.21$ DF = 4 Sig. = .40

In Rumah, urban males tend to be slightly less familistic than rural and bedouin males. Urban females, on the other hand and rather surprisingly, tend to be more familistic.

The relation of familism degree and family background according to area of residence reveals that males from Ad-Duwadmi and females from Ar-Rass show a significant relation between family cultural background and familism level (X^2 for Ad-Duwadmi males = 12.28, sig. at .02; for Ar-Rass females, X^2 = 20.12, sig. at .00). Other areas by gender show a low relation between familism level and family cultural background.

Out of all three areas, we find that urban males are less familistic than others except in Ar-Rass, where bedouins are the least familistic-oriented. But in general, rural students are most familistic, followed by bedouins, and the least are males from urban cultural roots. This result is expected in that the more urbanized the individual the more individualistic-oriented he will be, and vice-versa.

Familism and Family Socioeconomic Level

The relation between familism and family SES for the combined study population, as seen in Table 7.18, indicates that familism is associated with family SES level. The higher the SES the higher the familism orientation. The chi-square value is significant at the .001 level and is supported by a modest gamma association.

When gender is taken into account (Table 7.19) we observe that the significance of the relation between familism and family SES holds for girls but not for boys. The higher the family SES, the higher the familism level for females.

Table 7.18--Familism Degree, by Family Socioeconomic Level.

Family SES Level	Low	Medium	High	Total
Familism Degree	%	%	%	%
High	23.5	22.3	39.0	25.7
Medium	50.4	60.2	40.2	52.1
Low	26.1	17.5	20.8	22.2
% =	100	100	100	100
N =	(238)	(166)	(82)	(486)

X^2 Value = 14.64 DF = 4 Sig. = .001
Gamma = -.15

Table 7.19--Familism Degree (Trichotomized) and Family SES Level, by Gender.

Gender	Male			Female			
Family SES Level	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Total
Familism Degree	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
High	22.6	18.2	37.5	24.4	33.3	41.2	25.7
Medium	52.2	60.3	41.7	48.8	60.0	38.2	52.1
Low	25.2	21.5	20.8	26.8	6.1	20.6	22.2
% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	(115)	(121)	(48)	(123)	(45)	(34)	(486)

X^2 = 8.34 DF = 4 Sig. = NS X^2 = 11.1 DF = 4 Sig. = .03
Gamma = .11 Gamma = -.27

Gender here shows the effect of family status upon female attachment to the family, but not for males. I believe this is because males are more inclined to be independent than are females and because females are more influenced by society's perception about the family. Males feel the responsibility for family SES elevation

and so they feel more familistic when the family SES is low, or the family needs support of their male members (Table 7.19).

Area of residence does not add much to an explanation of the relationship of familism to family SES (Table 7.20). Ar-Rass students show that the direction of high familism correlates with an increase in family SES for females, and the opposite for males. The opposite is true for Rumah students. Females in Ad-Duwadmi have a pattern similar to Ar-Rass female students, but Ad-Duwadmi males show low correlation between familism level and family SES. On the other hand, for females in Ad-Duwadmi, family SES correlates highly to familism degree.

Table 7.20--Familism Degree and Family SES Level, by Gender and Area of Residence.

Gender		Male			Female			
Family SES Level		Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Total
Area of Residence	Familism Degree	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Ar-Rass	High	25.0	32.0	55.6	30.8	21.7	20.0	28.9
	Medium	54.2	56.0	33.3	28.2	69.6	60.0	49.0
	Low	20.8	12.0	11.1	41.0	8.7	20.0	22.1
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(48)	(25)	(9)	(39)	(23)	(5)	(149)
Ad-Duwadmi	High	25.0	14.1	32.0	10.0	42.1	50.0	21.4
	Medium	50.0	59.0	40.0	65.0	57.9	33.3	54.9
	Low	25.0	26.9	28.0	25.0	0.0	16.7	23.7
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(56)	(78)	(25)	(40)	(19)	(6)	(224)
Rumah	High	0.0	16.7	35.7	31.8	66.7	43.5	30.1
	Medium	54.5	72.2	50.0	52.3	0.0	34.8	50.4
	Low	45.5	11.1	14.3	15.9	33.3	21.7	19.5
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(111)	(18)	(14)	(44)	(3)	(23)	(113)

	Males:	Females:
Ar-Rass:	X^2 = 4.02 DF = 4 Sig. = .40	X^2 = 11.82 DF = 4 Sig. = .02
Ad-Duwadmi:	X^2 = 5.17 DF = 4 Sig. = .27	X^2 = 13.51 DF = 4 Sig. = .01
Rumah:	X^2 = 9.31 DF = 4 Sig. = .05	X^2 = 4.36 DF = 4 Sig. = .36

7.8 Familism and Residential Preferences

Level of familism is generally assumed to have been affected by the spread of urbanization and social development as related to socioeconomic plans implemented during the past two decades. Social values regarding family relations are changing, especially those values that relate family members to family homesteads. The strongest familial attitudes are assumed to associate with the lowest level of preference for the urban residence, as personal feelings and emotions may alter or redirect feelings towards current place of residence. This generalization cannot be applied as a one-way explanation because sometimes preferences for the urban life may be an expression of high familial attachment if looked to as helping the family by seeking chances for elevating the circumstances of family life in a rural area. Hence, strong familial attitude holders may temporarily be sacrificing attachment to family homestead in order to secure future stability and well-being for all family members.

Table 7.21 shows that degree of familism is not related to residential preferences. We know that female students tend to prefer urban areas and the majority of male students tend to prefer rural areas (Chapter V). The relation between familism levels and residential preferences suggests that choosing an urban or rural area does not simply reflect high or low familism. Residential preferences are affected by many factors, including the search for better chances for the family in an urban area or by financial constraints. In the case of females, urban residential preferences do not mean high migration propensity, which means that familism levels of females is not related to their choice of residence.

Table 7.21--Familism and Residential Preferences (Dichotomized), by Gender.

Gender	Male		Female		
Residential Preferences	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Total
Familism Degree	%	%	%	%	%
High	20.8	25.3	27.2	32.5	25.7
Medium	60.0	48.7	50.4	48.0	52.1
Low	19.2	26.0	22.4	19.5	22.2
% =	100	100	100	100	100
N =	(130)	(154)	(125)	(77)	(486)

X^2 = 3.70 DF = 2 Sig. = NS X^2 = 0.70 DF = 2 Sig. = NS

In Table 7.21 we note that there is no relationship between level of familism and residential preferences in either the case of males or of females. The results about familism level and residential preferences do not match the relations observed about familism and family SES discussed earlier, where we found that familism level increases by the increase in family SES in the case of females. With regard to the moving out of rural areas to urban places, we notice that high SES males prefer their own homesteads even if in poor areas. Even for a relatively affluent person, staying in the village is more rewarding than moving to the city (Table 7.19). This perception may explain why high familism people in the village prefer rural areas while medium familism people prefer city life. Low familism male students in the villages prefer rural life (Tables 7.19-21).

In Ar-Rass (Table 7.22), the relation between familism level and residential preference reflects that those with high familism (both genders) share less preference for urban centers. Students with medium familism most prefer urban centers. Males

Table 7.22--Familism Degree and Residential Preferences, by Gender and Area of Residence.

Gender		Male		Female		
Residential Preferences		Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Total
Area	Familism Degree	%	%	%	%	%
Ar-Rass	High	19.5	41.5	20.5	39.1	28.9
	Medium	61.0	43.9	50.0	34.8	49.0
	Low	19.5	14.6	29.5	26.1	22.1
	% =	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(41)	(41)	(44)	(23)	(149)
Ad-Duwadmi	High	23.2	18.9	25.7	20.0	21.4
	Medium	56.5	50.0	48.6	73.3	54.9
	Low	20.3	31.1	25.7	6.7	23.7
	% =	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(69)	(90)	(35)	(30)	(224)
Rumah	High	15.0	21.7	34.8	41.7	30.1
	Medium	70.0	52.2	52.2	29.2	50.4
	Low	15.0	26.1	13.0	29.1	19.5
	% =	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(20)	(23)	(46)	(24)	(113)

	Males:	Females:
Ar-Rass:	$X^2 = 4.67$ DF = 2 Sig. = .09	$X^2 = 2.81$ DF = 2 Sig. = .25
Ad-Duwadmi:	$X^2 = 2.31$ DF = 2 Sig. = .30	$X^2 = 5.34$ DF = 2 Sig. = .07
Rumah:	$X^2 = 1.45$ DF = 2 Sig. = .48	$X^2 = 4.29$ DF = 2 Sig. = .12

and females with medium familism are more eager to move to urban areas, reflecting a modification of beliefs with regard to family relations. This means that familial relations are being dealt with in further dimensions than just extremes of levels of familism. We note that those of medium familism in Ar-Rass are also those who most prefer urban centers. High familism students in Ar-Rass are less fond of urban areas. Furthermore, we note that in Ar-Rass the lower the familism, the higher the urban preferences (see Table 7.22; also the next part of this chapter, "Familism and Migration Propensity").

In Rumah, students with medium familism also showed higher preference for the urban centers.

In Ad-Duwadmi, females with medium familism were less enthusiastic about the urban than those with high or low familism. The variation here may be due to the cultural dominance of bedouin families over the area. The level of familism does not reflect attitudes toward urban centers because bedouin people are rarely attached to land and do not correlate place of settlement to familial attitudes (Table 7.22).

In general, across all levels of familism, more than half of the total survey population preferred urban centers. Medium familism was more strongly related to preference for urban centers in Ar-Rass. Rumah as a bedouin-dominated area and Ad-Duwadmi, too, familism shows no correlation with preference for urban residence.

7.9 Familism and Migration Propensity

As discussed in the section on residential preferences and familism, migration propensity is probably related to familism as a logical connection: being dissatisfied with current residence leads to thinking about moving to a more comfortable area. A relation between familism and residential preference is expected also in the relation between familism and migration propensity.

There is an observed relationship between familism level and migration propensity, as indicated by a chi-square significance of .05. Familism is correlated with migration propensity to a modest degree (Table 7.23).

Table 7.23--Familism Degree (Trichotomized), by Migration Propensity.

Familism Degree	High	Medium	Low	Total
Migration Propensity	%	%	%	%
High	40.0	31.6	48.1	37.4
Moderate	24.8	28.1	20.4	25.5
Low	35.2	40.3	31.5	37.1
% =	100	100	100	100
N =	(125)	(253)	(108)	(486)

X^2 Value = 9.41 DF = 4 Sig. = .05

Table 7.24 reports a weak relationship between familism degree and migration propensity, by gender. Further, the relationship is skewed in both the case of males and of females. Males with the lowest familism attitudes are lowest in migration propensity, while males with high familistic attitudes are highest in migration propensity. For females, lower migration propensities are shown by students with medium familism levels, while the lowest migration propensities percentages are shown by females with high familism levels. This finding shows the opposite direction for genders with regard to migration propensity and familism level. But generally the relation between familism and migration propensity shows low correlation regardless of gender.

In Table 7.25, it is seen that level of familism does not reflect a direct relation to migration propensity: low familism means high migration propensity in females of Ar-Rass, but high familism is related to low migration propensity in males of Ar-Rass. Gender affects migration propensity within the same level of familism but not on the level of study areas.

Table 7.24--Familism Degree (Trichotomized) and Migration Propensity, by Gender.

Gender	Male			Female			Total
Familism Degree	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low	
Migration Propensity	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
High	50.0	37.7	55.4	28.8	23.0	37.2	37.5
Moderate	15.2	26.1	15.4	35.6	31.0	27.9	25.5
Low	34.8	36.2	29.2	35.6	46.0	34.9	37.0
% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	(66)	(153)	(65)	(59)	(100)	(43)	(486)

$X^2 = 8.66$ DF = 4 Sig. = NS $X^2 = 4.14$ DF = 4 Sig. = NS

Table 7.25--Familism Degree (Trichotomized) and Migration Propensity, by Gender and Area of Residence.

Gender		Male			Female			Total
Familism Degree		High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low	
Area of Residence	Migration Propensity	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Ar-Rass	High	24.0	48.8	35.7	27.8	23.3	47.4	35.6
	Moderate	24.0	23.3	42.9	22.2	26.7	21.1	25.6
	Low	52.0	27.9	21.4	50.0	50.0	31.5	38.8
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(25)	(43)	(14)	(18)	(30)	(19)	(149)
Ad-Duwadmi	High	66.7	28.6	64.2	20.0	28.2	9.1	39.3
	Moderate	6.1	26.2	4.8	40.0	38.8	27.3	21.0
	Low	27.2	45.2	31.0	40.0	41.0	63.6	39.7
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(33)	(84)	(42)	(15)	(39)	(11)	(224)
Rumah	High	62.5	46.2	44.4	34.6	16.1	46.2	36.3
	Moderate	25.0	30.8	22.2	42.3	35.5	38.5	34.5
	Low	12.5	23.1	33.4	23.1	48.4	15.3	29.2
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(8)	(26)	(9)	(26)	(31)	(13)	(113)

In Ar-Rass also, males of high familism showed low propensity to migrate in reverse to other males of the same level of familism in the other survey areas (Table 7.25).

Bedouin males in Ad-Duwadmi and Rumah of higher familism show high migration compared to females of the same level of familism. Both males and females of medium level of familism show two directions of migration opposing each other, as in the females' case the percentage of migration propensity show least migration propensity, while males show the highest migration propensity. This shows that females of medium familial attitude to increase in number by the decrease of migration propensity. For males the situation is the opposite except in Ad-Duwadmi, where males' attitudes to migrate is least in the medium level of familism.

On the opposite direction of residential preferences, females who show high preference ratio for urban centers show here less opt for migration out of their rural areas. Familism does not change this attitude and variation still as is regardless of level of familism, which means steady direction of less migrational attitude by females than by males. Such magnitude stayed the same also in all the study areas of Ar-Rass, Ad-Duwadmi, and Rumah (Table 7.25).

Concerning familism, residential preference, and migration propensity, familism degrees do not relate to the area of residence and gender. Family SES correlates with familism degrees where females' familism increases with an increase of family SES degrees, males' familism decreases generally with an the increase of family SES degrees.

Residential preferences for urban areas, as discussed in Chapters V and VI, show that females prefer urban areas more than males do, but migration propensity is higher among males than females in all areas. Familism levels seem to show some correlation with migration propensity and family income combined (see Table 7.26).

Table 7.26--Migration Propensity by Familism, Controlling for Family Income, by Gender.

Gender		Male			Female			
Familism		High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low	Total
Family Income	Migration Propensity	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Low	High	47.8	30.8	48.7	21.7	16.3	50.0	32.8
	Moderate	15.2	25.6	40.0	34.8	26.5	33.3	26.2
	Low	37.0	43.6	13.3	43.5	57.2	16.7	41.0
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(46)	(78)	(15)	(23)	(49)	(18)	(229)
Medium	High	71.4	51.1	61.5	40.0	32.4	28.6	48.0
	Moderate	21.4	13.3	10.3	36.0	38.2	42.9	24.0
	Low	7.23	35.6	28.2	24.0	29.4	28.5	28.0
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(14)	(45)	(39)	(25)	(34)	(14)	(171)
High	High	16.7	33.3	45.5	18.2	23.5	27.3	29.1
	Moderate	0.0	46.7	0.0	36.4	29.4	0.0	26.7
	Low	83.3	20.0	54.5	45.4	47.1	72.7	44.2
	% =	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(6)	(30)	(11)	(11)	(17)	(11)	(86)

Relation of migration propensity to familism, by family income level

	Males:	Females:
Low income :	X^2 = 8.80 DF = 4 Sig. = .07	X^2 = 11.40 DF = 4 Sig. = .02
Moderate income:	X^2 = 4.91 DF = 4 Sig. = .30	X^2 = 0.71 DF = 4 Sig. = .95
High:	X^2 = 15.81 DF = 4 Sig. = .01	X^2 = 4.91 DF = 4 Sig. = .30

In Table 7.26, migration propensity varies by the variation in family income. In the high familistic-oriented group of students, middle (medium) income students are the most eager to migrate, while high and low income students are less eager to

migrate. In the medium familistic-oriented students, those from middle income families are highly eager to migrate. For the low and high income females, eagerness to migrate is very low. High income males are moderate in migration propensity.

In the low familial-oriented, female students with high income are less eager to migrate, medium income are moderate in migration propensity, and low income females are highest in migration propensity. Males with higher income show lower migration propensity.

We conclude from Table 7.26 that migration propensity is affected by familial attachment and income level. The option to migrate reflects three observations: The first observation is that the higher the income, the lower the propensity to migrate regardless of familism level. The second observation is that low income males show a higher propensity to migrate. The third observation is that female students in general show low migrational attitude regardless of familism level.

In the regression analysis, income (part of SES) explains variation in familism. Income also explains variance in residential preferences but no direct explanation of variance could be observed between familism and residential preference for male students (see Table 7.9). Also no variance was explained by male familism and migration propensity (see Table 7.12). The missing link here I can refer to is that the strength of social values marginalizes the importance of residential preference choices and migration propensities in a way that makes these interrelated factors lose connection between them. Although income and SES of family prevailed to be the denominator for residential preference and migration propensity, the power of social values undermines the outcome of such indirect financial effects.

7.10 Modernity Attitude Variation

In the previous section we discussed the influence of familism on residential preferences and migrational propensity. In this section we will consider the influence of modernity or traditionality on residential preferences and migrational propensities.

Modernity can be studied at the level of groups or societies, where the values of modern life replace the traditional values, particularly among rural (farmer, bedouin) populations.

On the individual level, modernization refers to the psychological and cognitive orientation that accompanies the changes in social structure and social relationships. It also refers to an individualistic orientation with emphasis on personal achievement and a rationalist orientation toward the world. Modern individuals are assumed to go beyond their societal circumstances with its value system components and norms to create a personal evaluation of the outer world using their own perceptions (Inkeles, 1983, p. 94).

The study population here consists of rural residents from various family cultural backgrounds, different family SES levels, and different places of residence, where each place carries attributes of a dominant cultural background. Hence, I assume that homogeneity in public places such as schools is obvious, but heterogeneity in personal perceptions is not. Modernity of individuals could be measured in various ways (Chapter II), but in this study I divide the population into modern and traditional based on questions designed to detect two dimensions of personal attitudes: individual outer world connections, and personal evaluation of

certain subjects (e.g., qualification for high positions), whether based on traditional or modern social roles.

Modernity and traditionality are assumed to enhance or suppress residential preferences and migration propensity. From the theory of individual modernization, I assume that modern students will prefer urban areas and will be more inclined to migrate from rural areas. Traditionality is assumed to associate with conservatism, preference of rural areas, and natural avoidance of out-migration from rural areas.

Modernity and Residential Preferences

In Table 7.27, we observe that the relationship between modernity and residential preferences does not obtain significance (chi-square = 1.13, not significant).

Table 7.27--Modernity, by Residential Preferences.

	Traditional	Modern	Total
Residential Preferences	%	%	%
Urban	55.0	50.2	52.5
Rural	45.0	49.8	47.5
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(229)	(257)	(486)

X^2 = 1.13 DF = 1 Sig. = NS

Urban preference, I assume, overcomes the personal values of traditionality or modernity to become the dominant attitude regardless of personal attributes (Table 7.27).

In Table 7.28, controlling for gender, we again observe no significant relationship between modernity value and residential preferences the case of males or of females. Males' attitudes tend to reflect that modern individuals show less preference for urban centers but the relationship is not of a significant magnitude.

Table 7.28--Modernity and Residential Preferences, by Gender.

Gender	Male		Female		
Modernity	Traditional	Modern	Traditional	Modern	Total
Residential Preferences	%	%	%	%	%
Urban	50.7	40.4	63.0	61.2	52.5
Rural	49.3	59.6	37.0	38.8	47.5
% =	100	100	100	100	100
N =	(148)	(136)	(81)	(121)	(486)

X^2 = 3.0 DF = 1 Sig. = NS X^2 = .07 DF = 1 Sig. = NS

Controlling on area of residence (Table 7.29), we find that only in the case of Ad-Duwadmi males is there a relationship between modernity values and residential preferences; however, it is an inverse relationship--the greater the modernity value, the more rural the residential preferences. In general, then, I conclude the modernity values have no effect on residential preferences (Table 7.29).

Modernity and Migration Propensity

Individual modernity also does not affect migrational propensities. The magnitude of migration propensity related to individual modernity is negligible. Generally, traditional individuals are more likely to declare low propensity to

Table 7.29--Modernity and Residential Preferences, by Gender and Area of Residence.

Gender		Male		Female		
Modernity		Traditional	Modern	Traditional	Modern	Total
Area of Residence	Residential Preference	%	%	%	%	%
Ar-Rass	Urban	50.0	50.0	67.9	64.1	57.0
	Rural	50.0	50.0	32.1	35.9	43.0
	% =	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(36)	(46)	(28)	(39)	(149)
Ad-Duwadmi	Urban	51.6	32.4	51.6	55.9	46.4
	Rural	48.4	67.6	48.4	44.1	53.6
	% =	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(91)	(68)	(31)	(34)	(224)
Rumah	Urban	47.6	45.5	72.7	62.5	58.4
	Rural	52.4	54.5	27.3	37.5	41.6
	% =	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(21)	(22)	(22)	(48)	(113)

Modernity and residential preferences by gender (chi-square)

	Males:	Females:
Ar-Rass:	$X^2 = 0.00$ DF = 1 Sig. = 1.00	$X^2 = 0.10$ DF = 1 Sig. = .75
Ad-Duwadmi:	$X^2 = 5.91$ DF = 1 Sig. = .02	$X^2 = 0.12$ DF = 1 Sig. = .73
Rumah:	$X^2 = 0.02$ DF = 1 Sig. = .89	$X^2 = 0.70$ DF = 1 Sig. = .40

migrate, while modern individuals are more inclined to migrate out of their current place of residence to urban areas. But the tendency is very weak and not significant (Table 7.30).

Considering gender we again note that modernity does not affect migration propensity in either the case of males or of females (Table 7.31).

Controlling on area of residence in Table 7.32, we see that migration propensity is related to individual modernity in a moderate way by including area of residence (area factor represents also family cultural background). In Ar-Rass,

Table 7.30--Migration Propensity, by Modernity.

Modernity	Traditional	Modern	Total
Migration Propensity	%	%	%
High	37.1	37.7	37.4
Moderate	23.6	27.3	25.6
Low	39.3	35.0	37.0
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(229)	(257)	(486)

X^2 = 1.3 DF = 2 Sig. = .54 (NS)

Table 7.31--Modernity and Migration Propensity, by Gender.

Gender	Male		Female		Total
Modernity	Traditional	Modern	Traditional	Modern	
Migration Propensity	%	%	%	%	%
High	40.5	48.5	30.9	25.6	37.4
Moderate	20.3	22.1	29.6	33.1	25.6
Low	39.2	29.4	39.5	41.3	37.0
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(148)	(136)	(81)	(121)	(486)

X^2 = 3.1 DF = 2 Sig. = .21 (NS) X^2 = .70 DF = 2 Sig. = .71 (NS)

Table 7.32--Modernity and Migration Propensity, by Gender and Area of Residence.

Gender		Male		Female		
Modernity		Traditional	Modern	Traditional	Modern	Total
Area of Residence	Migration Propensity	%	%	%	%	%
Ar-Rass	High	44.4	34.8	28.6	33.3	35.6
	Moderate	27.8	26.1	28.6	20.5	25.5
	Low	27.8	39.1	42.8	46.2	38.9
	% =	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(36)	(46)	(28)	(39)	(149)
Ad-Duwadmi	High	40.7	52.9	29.0	17.6	39.3
	Moderate	16.5	16.2	32.3	32.4	21.0
	Low	42.8	30.9	38.7	50.0	39.7
	% =	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(91)	(68)	(31)	(34)	(224)
Rumah	High	33.3	63.6	36.4	25.0	36.3
	Moderate	23.8	31.8	27.3	43.8	34.5
	Low	42.9	4.6	36.3	31.2	29.2
	% =	100	100	100	100	100
	N =	(21)	(22)	(22)	(48)	(113)

Modernity of migration propensity relation (chi-square)

	Males:	Females:
Ar-Rass:	$X^2 = 1.27$ DF = 2 Sig. = .53	$X^2 = 0.60$ DF = 2 Sig. = .74
Ad-Duwadmi:	$X^2 = 2.76$ DF = 2 Sig. = .25	$X^2 = 1.37$ DF = 2 Sig. = .50
Rumah:	$X^2 = 9.10$ DF = 2 Sig. = .01	$X^2 = 1.86$ DF = 2 Sig. = .39

females are less inclined to migrate regardless of modernity or traditionality personal characteristics. This finding supports previous findings that farmer-rooted females especially are less likely to migrate than other settled bedouin females. Ar-Rass males show a high migration propensity by traditional more than modern-oriented students. In Ad-Duwadmi, traditional males are less enthusiastic than modern male students about migration. In Rumah, females with traditional characteristics are

more inclined to migrate out of the homestead, while males are the opposite: modern males prefer to migrate, traditional students show less migrational attitudes.

Modernity and migrational attitudes affected by cultural attributes of the area more than gender of the respondents or level of modernity. Hence I believe that individual modernity contributes less information to migrational attitudes than do gender, cultural background, family SES, and familism.

7.11 Concluding Remarks

Value orientational factors appear to affect residential preferences and migration propensity to some degree. Some of my major findings can be summarized as follows.

(1) Females show more familistic orientations than males. Students of rural villager background are more familistic than students of settled bedouin or urban background.

(2) For both genders, parents are the main focal point for family relations. Females show less interest than males in any relations beyond parental.

(3) Variation by gender in ranking familism items reflects a priority of this dimension rather than acceptance or rejection of familial attitude because both males and females expressed high familism levels throughout the scale of familism scores.

(4) Variation in familism attitude generally revealed effects of family income upon familism levels.

(5) Familism levels do not correlate highly with selection of urban or rural place of residence.

(6) Females' attitudes toward family (familism level) is not affected by family income and family socioeconomic status, while males show a high correlation between family income and familism level (Table 7.7).

(7) Family income affects residential preferences for females to choose urban areas whenever their family income increases.

(8) Family income level does not affect the migration propensity of either gender.

(9) Modernity values do not affect personal preferences for urban or rural residence.

(10) Students of medium familism level, especially male students, tend to migrate out of their homesteads.

(11) Most females have a high preference for urban areas but low migration propensity due to social limitations on their independence.

(12) Migration propensity and residential preferences correlate negatively females. For males, changes in migration propensity do not affect residential preferences.

(13) Traditional students have a greater preference for urban centers compared to modern individuals or urban-rooted students in rural areas.

(14) Males of bedouin origin who express high familial attitudes are not affected in their preference for urban areas.

(15) Students of low and high socioeconomic status are less eager to migrate out of their home area than are students of medium socioeconomic status.

(16) Only males of the Ad-Duwadmi area show a significant relation between familism levels and migration propensity.

(17) Familism degrees are higher among rural students than among students of bedouin origin.

(18) Familism degree on distributed data shows variation between males and females while such variation becomes less prevalent when extreme values are excluded in categorizing familism.

(19) Most of the study population are characterized by high familism levels, urban preferences, and modern attitudes.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Study Approach

This study explored the residential preferences and migration propensities of rural youth in Saudi Arabia. The influence of various factors assumed to contribute to the formation of youth's attitudes toward place of residence and to the shaping of their migration plans were considered. Several relevant questions guided my inquiries. Relevant hypotheses were derived from previous studies and literature about residential preferences and migration propensity.

The Problem

The sociological problem addressed in this study was to examine to what extent the residential preferences and migration propensities of rural youth are influenced by their socioeconomic context and values. The relationships of residential preferences and migration propensities to the influence of gender, family cultural background, family socioeconomic status, and socio-valuational orientations that include familism and individual modernity, were the focus of this sociological inquiry.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to investigate the current situations that affect residential preferences and migration propensities, directions, and the various variables that lead to rural decline in rural Saudi Arabia. The relation between residential preferences and migrational propensities was found by various studies to be interrelated (Rowe & Wardwell, 1988, p. 207; Schwarzweller, 1964, p. 33; Heller, 1970, pp. 73-75). Hence this research aimed to explore the effects of the previously mentioned variables and the variation of such effects with regard to differences in gender and place of residence.

Methodology

Population and Sampling: Three rural areas in the central region of Saudi Arabia were selected because they were the only areas with high schools in the area center and peripheral villages. Seventeen high schools for boys and girls from the three rural areas of Ar-Rass, Ad-Duwadmi, and Rumah were included in the study. All twelfth-grade students enrolled at these high schools during the 1990 school year were included. Of 524 students interviewed, there were 486 Saudi students and 38 non-Saudi students. Only the responses of Saudi students were used in the analysis of the research problem.

Research Instrument: The study depended on a self-administered questionnaire distributed to the male students by the researcher and to female students by a female social worker trained by phone to administer the questionnaire. Categorization of information requested was identical for both male and female students.

The questionnaire consisted of five main sections. The first section collected personal and demographic information such as the student's age, nationality, family cultural background, family income, and father's occupation and level of education. This information assisted in testing the study hypotheses. The second section consisted of 21 questions which obtained information about the students' migration propensity and a scale of residential preferences. The third section consisted of 20 questions which inspected the level of familial attitudes of the students (familism scale). In sections two and three, the students were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert scale whether they strongly agreed, agreed, were uncertain, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with each item in the residential preferences scale and familism scale. The fourth section consisted of two questions which explored the respondents' modernity. Finally, section five consisted of three questions about the respondents' image of residential places (city, village, and bedouin settlements).

The questionnaire was distributed during the second term of the 1990 school year and gathered in the field within seven weeks. It took seven months to prepare and review the final drafts of the questionnaire and obtain letters of permission for field distribution from the appropriate local and educational authorities.

A pilot study was conducted among Saudi high school students accompanying their families in the United States before the researcher left the United States and arrived in Saudi Arabia. Another pretest was carried out in Saudi Arabia to determine students' reactions and to ascertain whether there was any confusion about questionnaire items.

Measurement

The independent variables (family cultural background, the value orientational factors of familism and modernity, socioeconomic status) were measured according to various methods designed to test each variable. Family cultural background was mainly measured by the respondents' personal classification of his/her family identification as rural villagers, bedouins, or urban-rooted. Additional questions were used to inspect the consistency of given information by asking where the respondent's father and paternal grandfather spent most of their life (urban, rural, or bedouin area). A scale of family socioeconomic status was developed by combining family income and father's occupation and level of education and standardizing the information into high, medium, and low family SES levels. Familism and individual modernity were measured by a familism scale that consisted of 20 statements and a maximum cumulative value of 100 points and minimum cumulative value of 20 points. For this scale, a lower point value indicated higher familism level. Modernity was measured by a short scale developed by Inkeles, with responses ranging between two and six points; a low point value indicates a more traditional-oriented individual and a high point value indicates greater modernity.

The dependent variables were residential preferences and migration propensities. These variables were measured according to two scales. One scale was the residential preferences scale developed by Martin (1953), consisting of seven questions. This scale was used with its modified measurements that consisted of the possible responses of strongly agree, agree, unsure, disagree, and strongly disagree. Point values were assigned to the responses based on a range of 5 = "strongly agree"

to 1 = "strongly disagree." The higher the points, the more the students leaned to urban areas; the lower the points, the more the students leaned to rural areas. The second scale related to migration propensity, which was measured by one question asking whether the possibility of the respondent's moving away from his/her homestead was very likely, likely, somewhat likely, or not likely. These responses were categorized into high, moderate, and low migration propensities. The nature of the interrelationship between residential preferences and migration propensities made these intertwined variables to be dealt with in integrational interpretation for the information obtained by and tested in relation to the independent variables.

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were formulated for this study:

Hypotheses were constructed to relate the literature of residential preferences and migration propensity to the current study within the socio-cultural context of rural Saudi Arabian society. These exploratory hypotheses also served as focal points for the main issues relevant to determining the relationship between residential preferences and migration propensities. Pull and push factors are viewed by the literature as the most influential forces directing population movement and residential preferences. These two factors include, in fact, the socio-cultural and economic variables that play a dual role at both the origin and destination areas. I hypothesized that:

1 - Youngsters from more affluent and better educated families are more inclined to move to urban areas.

2 - Young people with more modern attitudes are more inclined to be geographically mobile. Individual modernity and migration propensity are positively associated.

3 - Young women are less likely than young men to migrate away from their parental community.

4 - Residential preferences and migration propensities are affected by differences in cultural background.

5 - Young people are more likely to migrate to urban centers located within their region or close to their hometowns than to similar centers outside their regions.

An additional hypothesis was eliminated due to some difficulties related to obtaining information about females in Saudi Arabia. I had assumed that data about scholastic achievement could be obtained from the school records. This was possible for males, but I could not obtain such information for female students because the school staff strictly enforce the anonymity of female students. So the relation between scholastic achievement and geographical mobility via the educational plans of young people could not, in practice, be examined because of lack of required information.

The relationship between current place of residence and preferred place of residence was limited to the rural versus urban residential places, with less emphasis on characteristics of the preferred place. This dimension placed limitations on this hypothesis utilization with regard to distance between current place of residence and preferred place of residence.

8.2 Summary of the Findings

Viewing the relation between residential preferences and migration propensity as intertwined variables, where residential preferences can be conceptualized as a stimulus and migration propensity as a response, I have generally observed the following:

There are significant differences between males and females with regard to preferring cities over rural areas. Females are more enthusiastic about urban life. This finding was not expected, for I hypothesized that females would express low propensity to migrate. The latter finding supports our hypothesis as females show high preference for cities but low migration propensity due to social circumstances that prevent Saudi women from travelling independently without a male family member. Males show less preference for urban areas than females but they have a level of migration propensity equal to their level of urban preference. The attitude of females toward urban areas is not supported by an equal propensity to migrate, which reflects their personal comprehension regarding the social circumstances dictating gender role expectations.

Males seemed less conforming in familial aspects than females due to familial customs that place more responsibility on males which, in turn, gave males the power to alter some familial norms with less social criticism. This finding explains why males are less fond of city life: they are less stressed by strict rural social customs and norms. The relative freedom enjoyed by males in their homesteads enables them to take a leading role in social reforms and to be in contact with urban norms and the values of urban society. Although this relative freedom exposes them to

developmental aspects such as urbanization, males are generally more traditionally oriented than females.

We also found that there are no significant variations in residential preferences due to area of residence. Males prefer rural areas and females prefer urban areas regardless of their current area of residence.

Sex-role expectations affect residential preferences and migration propensity. Self-reliance and the ability to travel independently for a career makes males show a stronger propensity to migrate. Although females show a stronger preference for city life, their migration propensities are suppressed by cultural background based values.

Another finding was that family socioeconomic status plays a significant role in residential attitude and migration propensity. Students of high and low SES families are more conservative in their preferences for urban life and migrational attitudes than students from medium SES families. This findings leads us to reject our hypothesis that youths from more affluent families would have a higher propensity for geographical movement.

Social norms and values overcome the economic capabilities, such as financial resources, could not change conservative attitudes of rural males to be more inclined to migrate. With regard to the value orientational factors of familism and modernity we found that females are more familistic than males and rural villagers are more familistic than settled bedouin students. Parents are the focal point for family relations and males and females are equally less oriented toward family members beyond the parents.

Familism level is generally affected by family income in a positive direction. Increased family income is associated with an increased level of familism. The familism level of females is less affected by family income level than the familism level of male students. Residential preferences are affected by family income level for females, but no such effect is observed for males.

Migration propensity is not affected by family income level for either gender, nor was level of modernity significantly related to migration propensity or residential preferences.

A medium level of familism is associated with higher migration propensities in parallel with family income level for medium SES families.

In general, the study population is characterized by a high familism level, preference for urban centers, and modern attitudes. The findings indicate a high preference for urban centers, accompanied by low migrational attitudes, for females. Place of residence is not a significant predictor of residential preferences or migrational attitudes for either gender. Strict social values affect females' migrational attitudes but not their residential preferences, whereas males feel less constrained in their residential preferences or capability for geographical movement. Gender is useful in detecting variations driven by social values exerted upon youth, as females are more targeted and highly affected by these rules.

The major findings can be summarized in the following groups:

Group One: Residential preference variations are observed according to gender. Females mainly prefer urban areas and males prefer rural areas. Males also show less conformity to social values regarding extended family, or to changing a job

if it conflicted with family values. Males relate residential preferences to migration propensity whereas females do not show a strong relation between their preferences for urban centers and their propensity to migrate from rural areas. Further, males' tendency to migrate is not associated with preference for another residential area different from their homestead. Hence, male migrational attitudes can be seen as necessity for family cause rather than personal preference for urban areas. Males also relate family needs to migration attitudes and residential preferences whereas females, who carry less of the burden of family affairs, are more free to express personal rather than familial attitudes toward urban centers as preferred areas.

Group Two: Residential preferences and migrational attitudes are affected by family cultural background, especially with sex role expectations for males and females in a traditional society. Residential preferences and migration propensities are related to family SES: both high and low SES status families are less encouraging of their children to migrate, high SES families because of the need for family cohesiveness and low SES families because of the inability to facilitate such migrational ambitions. Medium SES families are most likely to prefer urban areas and the highest in migration propensity expressed by males especially.

Group Three: Females show more familistic orientation than males. Rural villagers are also more familistic than bedouin or urban students. For both genders, parents are the most important part of the family, but females are less concerned than males about other family members or relatives such as in-laws. A high familism level is generally observed by both genders. Although females are more familistic oriented, males also generally express a high familistic level.

Family income level is observed to be associated with familism level, especially for male students. Female students express greater preference for urban areas as family income increases. While family income level has less impact on migrational attitudes of either gender as residential preferences affected by income level of the family, migrational attitudes are influenced more by family ambitions to encourage and support their youth to migrate, which is clearly observed in the medium SES families more than high or low income families.

Modernity values do not affect residential preferences in general, but traditional students tend to prefer urban areas more than modern individuals in rural areas.

Familial attitudes are generally low among bedouin students, but those of bedouin families and show higher familial attitudes than the rest of the bedouin students also low correlation between familism level and residential preference, indicating that urban preferences, migration propensity are not an indicator of low familial attitudes. Rural students scored highest in familism level. Even rural males (from the Ar-Rass area) show higher familism than bedouin and urban females, knowing that females are generally higher in familism attitudes than males.

8.3 Relationship of the Findings to Previous Research

The findings of the present study revealed many distinct patterns, as reviewed in Section 8.2 above. This section is a summary of these findings as related to the findings of other studies the area of residential preferences and migration

propensities in Saudi Arabia, in Arab and Third World countries, and at the international level.

One of the most significant findings of this study is that gender is a significant source of variation in residential preferences and migration propensities. The role of females is not given enough consideration by many Saudi scholars who have studied rural-urban migration. Many studies and government reports acknowledge the substantial flow of migrants to urban areas but concentrate on the role of males in making the decision to migrate from rural or bedouin areas to urban centers. This is because men are the breadwinners in Saudi society, and women's decisions to migrate are totally related to male family members' decisions. From this limited perception, the role of women is marginalized or totally ignored.

For example, Al-Oteiby's (1988:50-56) study concentrated on males' history of migration to Ar-Riyadh and the reasons for such migration from their (male) viewpoints. He found these viewpoints are highly related to the economic opportunities available in urban centers relative to those available in rural areas. Al-Otaiby (1989:20, 62), in his study of migration and socioeconomic development of a rural community in southwestern Saudi Arabia, focused on family members who left the rural community and went to urban centers, from the families' view of their migrant members. He found that job-seeking is the dominant cause for such migration, and that women have no role except to accompany male relatives who are migrating. In another study, Asseri (1991) stated, "Females are less exposed to outside effects such as migration, working outside the village . . . and so on" (p. 94).

He believes such gender variation results from a lack of female experience rather than from the fact that women might be more willing to migrate.

Additionally, the report by Sogreah Consulting Engineers (1984, Fourth Report) concentrated on the male side of migration effects upon rural areas. The role of women is limited to feelings about being left behind while men pursue their financial goals in the cities. For example, the report states,

> The old production units, which have almost always been run by a family (father and married sons), have been broken down structurally by emigration. The attraction of towns has drawn away most able men for productive jobs . . . [later] they bring their families as well. (p. 29)

Thus women's migrational attitudes and their propensity to migrate are almost totally ignored.

Saudi Arabia's Third Development Plan (1980-85) stated, "In the last ten years there have been significant changes of population with a high rate of urban drift and consequent rural depopulation" (Ministry of Planning, 1979:56). The Plan also indicates that "the continued exodus of labor made the labor input expensive and in short supply" (p. 149).

Such studies and government reports have made women's role in migration, or at least their attitudes toward migration, appear to be less significant and, indeed, virtually unimportant in shaping outmigration from rural areas.

My study argues that the findings from the earlier researches assume that social customs account for women's role in migration attitude formation and in selecting preferred areas of residence. These perceptions, I submit, are myopic.

They recognize pull-push factors but they focus only on the male's role as primary bread-winner. Women's role in migration propensity formation is overlooked.

In the Arab world generally, migration studies also reflect perceptions similar to the Saudi studies, i.e,. that being male and seeking employment (or a better job) are the obvious explanations for migration from rural to urban areas. Female migrational situations and attitudes are not considered as possible explanations for such migration. Al-Qutub (1976) stated that, "Social disintegration in rural areas became an obvious phenomena as a result of the separation between the migrant (the father) from the family (wife and children) being left behind, a case that led to many social problems" (p. 45).

We find that most Arabic studies focus on one or the other of four major reasons for migration from rural to urban areas in the Arab world:

1 - Demographic causes exemplified by population growth imbalance, where the rural areas lack the resources capable of containing rural population growth, which consequently led to an exodus of people from rural to urban centers;

2 - Economic causes related to low job opportunities in rural areas, which direct the surplus of laborers to seek jobs in urban areas;

3 - Social causes related to social pressure upon individuals to look for further and better chances of life for their families; and

4 - Political causes, such as maldistribution of health care and other services, which lead to migration from rural areas to more fortunate urban centers that host the social elite who direct policymaking and can channel resources to serve these urban areas (see Ibraheem, 1986:51-61; Al-Qutub, 1986:5-49; Al-Farra, 1986:167-174;

Al-Abbadi, 1986:119-137; AbuAyash, 1986:243-284; Al-Kurdi, 1986:197-209; and Al-Sa'ady, 1986:161-166).

At the international level, the role of females in migration also is not considered a major factor. We find that many studies about migration from rural to urban centers concentrate on young men leaving farms to live in the outskirts of cities (rural-urban fringe). Martin (1953), for example, found that migration from current place of residence to another preferred one "is not related to sex, . . . age, occupation of head of the house, income of the family, and not even related to social status, social participation, type of current resident or home situation" (pp. 22-23). Schwarzweller's (1973) study of the educational plans of rural youth in Norway, Germany, and the United States emphasized that:

> The three societies under consideration are structurally similar in many respects. They share certain broad, political, ideological and cultural traditions. They are "Westernized," "modernized," "bureaucratized," "democratically governed," "industrialized," and, as nations, caught up in the frantic tempo of competing in world markets. (p. 141)

Schwarzweller's generalizations about his study field lead us again to the previously mentioned assumption that gender is of less importance in Western countries because male/female roles and chances show less variation, if any, especially with regard to migration plans. Schwarzweller (1973) later recognized some gender-related variation in school plans among European and United States samples, although gender variation in the United States was less observable than in Germany or Norway (which he termed, "sex biasing")(p. 150). The relation between educational plans and migration is more prevalent in Saudi Arabia, where attendance at colleges, universities, and, to some extent, high schools, requires migration to an urban area.

Gender and migration plans are the outstanding factors in most non-Western societies.

Another significant finding of the present study is that socioeconomic status (especially family income) plays a significant role in residential preference, in combination with the gender factor. We found that the higher the family income, the lower the propensity to migrate. This is true for both males and females, although for different reasons. Males prefer to stay with the family because it requires less income and helps the family in the rural area manage its wealth and enhance its status. Females of wealthier families prefer different residential areas "highly urban oriented" but cannot transform their wishes into reality because of their inability to migrate independently. Even females from less affluent families share the inability to migrate to urban areas (see Chapter VII, "Concluding Remarks," especially Nos. 5-8 and 11).

Most of the studies done in Saudi Arabia did not deal with female attitudes, so the socioeconomic factor was not explored. In the studies done by Al-Otaiby (1988), Al-Oteiby (1989), and Asseri (1991), males migrated from rural areas as a result of poverty and concentrated in needy families, which supports the present study's findings about low-SES family members being more likely to migrate to urban area due to their financial situation. The present study also found that youth from medium-SES families are the group most likely to show migrational attitudes. The categorization of SES into high, medium, and low enabled me to observe that high-SES members do not need to migrate, that low-SES members cannot afford to migrate, but that medium-SES families have enough resources to support their

children's efforts in migrating to seek a better income and, hence, increase the family's SES level (see Chapter VII, "Concluding Remarks," No. 10).

In Arab countries, many studies considered migration to urban centers as a desire of all rural people. The assumption is that all rural people have low incomes and are eager to migrate to the cities, where life appears to be more appealing. This assumption may be justified by the financial situation of rural people across the Arab world being far behind that of urban dwellers. But this is not the case for Saudi Arabia, which is more affluent than most countries of the Arab world.

On the international level, the United Nations Conference on Problems of Human Settlement (United Nations, 1976) summarizes the world situation by stressing the need of rural people for migration due to their desperate economic situations. Such findings are in line with other studies on the Arab world in general, but not completely congruent with the economic situation of Saudi Arabia's rural population.

The third major finding of this study observes that there is an inherent tension in females' high aspirations and lower migration propensity. The case of Saudi Arabia is still unique among Arab and international societies, because women in Saudi Arabia are prevented from travelling independently by religious and state laws and social custom. Saudi women prefer urban centers because of the better educational opportunities and higher standards of living. Their absence from the family will usually not affect the family financially or in terms of social prestige because women do not have a prominent role in social life. Hence, the family is less affected by females' preference for urban areas than by males. But this raises the

dilemma of females migrating to the city by themselves. The resulting frustration was expressed by females in the study sample, as was their great desire for urban life. But they also exhibit low migrational propensity because they know that moving to a city requires male companionship (father, brother, or husband). To my knowledge, this contradictory situation has not been touched upon by other Saudi researchers, and does not exist in the rest of the Arab world or on a global level.

8.4 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research

Some of the study's limitations, as noted in Chapter III, relate to the field, time situations, and data collection procedures. Additional limitations are mentioned here so that future research on residential preferences and migration propensities will be strengthened.

A major shortcoming is that cultural constraints should have been given more consideration in planning the field work. I underestimated the importance of male/female separation in the school system and found myself facing rules and regulations I was unprepared for. These norms are especially strong in rural areas. Most severe is the insistence upon a total anonymity of female respondents' personalities; social customs take precedence over scientific requirements. I could not obtain grade reports for female students since that might have compromised their anonymity.

Another limitation is that I cannot generalize for all of Saudi Arabia. Even though Saudi Arabian society is composed of Muslim Arabs, there are regional differences in social values and customs that cannot be dismissed.

Another limitation is that I cannot generalize for all of Saudi Arabia. Even though Saudi Arabian society is composed of Muslim Arabs, there are regional differences in social values and customs that cannot be dismissed.

Also, statistical books and local maps were not always useful. I found some schools were much larger than indicated by records of the Ministry of Education, and some schools had been transferred to another directorate board belonging to another governorate. Some schools were very formal in their procedures for allowing the research to be conducted while others were more flexible and less demanding of verification documents.

For future studies, I highly recommend, depending on the field context, that the researcher personally visit the proposed area before deciding to include that area in his or her proposed field survey study. Statistical books and records of education and village facilities are not always accurate and can mislead the researcher into overestimating or underestimating the field situation.

Trained assistants, especially females where the society has rules of sex separation, are a necessity for saving time and not making unnecessary efforts.

Characteristics of the areas of residence were not given much consideration in this study. I suggest that future researchers pay more attention to distances between cities, villages, and hamlets, as well as to means of transportation and socio-cultural attributes of the communities.

Results from the residential preferences scale must be interpreted with caution due to its limited number of questions and, consequently, its reliability in measuring accurately what it is designed to measure.

Finally, cross-regional research would be beneficial and would enable further inspection of social variations within a society with diversified cultural components.

8.5 Conclusion and Recommendations

The major conclusion of this study is that residential preferences and migration propensities are strongly interrelated and are affected more by socioeconomic variables than by other variables such as cultural background or current place of residence. Familism is more strongly associated with financial situation and gender than with the relative modernity of the individual. Similarly, familism affects residential preferences and migrational attitudes. Social values and sex-role expectations conceal further findings, but multiple means of information gathering and possibly longitudinal studies might reveal further correlations between the study variables and may lead to other aspects not included as major variables in short-term studies. The time variable is also significant in following up the widening gulf between urban and rural societies within the same nation or on the level of cross-national studies.

I strongly recommend that residential preferences and migrational attitudes be seriously considered by social and economic planners in order to avoid facing large urban centers with high crime rates, mental and social disorders, and critical and uncontrollable overcrowding and poverty that could be avoided by reducing the pull of large urban centers and by enhancing the future economic and social flourishing of rural areas. In the case of Saudi Arabia, three major urban agglomerations are the fastest growing giants. At the present time the situation is

manageable because of large expenditures by the state. But in the case of low national income or regional unrest, such urban agglomerations could become an unbearable burden on economic and political institutions. In Saudi Arabia, the central region's major urban centers are the capital city of Ar-Riyadh and the west coast urban triangle of Jeddah, Makkah, and Madinah (religious cities). There are few things that can be done because the political and religious functions cannot be transferred to other areas because they have symbolic attributes highly related to the social components of Saudi society. The outstanding hope relies on the economic function of oil sites in the eastern region. where industries and related economic activities can be distributed to the rest of the country, which might reduce the push factors out of declining rural areas.

The importance of gender showed higher influence in residential preferences and migrational attitudes, so I believe that more industrial and economic activities for females will enhance the rural power and reduce rural marginalization that has continued to grow in the last two decades.

Sociological perspectives tend to deal with gender as a vanishing source of variations. This might be true in the western hemisphere (Europe and the United States), where women have nearly similar attitudes toward life matters as men. But in other regions of the world, gender is still a source of variation that planners and sociology researchers should give more attention to its influence, especially in rural and bedouin settlements where traditional values are still prominent.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

SURVEY AREA TABLES

SURVEY AREA TABLES

Table A1--Survey Area from the Ar-Riyadh District, Ad-Duwadmi and Rumah Areas.

Governorate	Distance Range	No. of Villages	No. of High Schools	Village 1 Name	Village 1 Population	Village 2 Name	Village 2 Population
Al-Kharj	1	37	0				
Rumah	1	11	2	Ar-Rumhea	350	Rumah	6208
Al-Hawtah	2	13	0				
Al-Hariq	2	3	0				
As-Sulayyil	4	10	0				
Wadi Ad-Dawasir	4	11	0				
Al-Aflaj	2	35	1				
Huraymila	1	8	0				
Duruma	1	6	0				
Al-Muzahimiyah	1	10	0				
Ad-Diriyah	1	4	0				
Thadiq	1	10	0				
Al-Majma'ah	1	43	0				
Az-Zulfi	1	17	0				
Al-Ghat	2	1	0				
Ad-Duwadmi	2	150	8	Musedah	2412	Arja	490
Shaqra'	2	12	1				
Marat	2	6	0				
Al-Quwayiyah	2	230	1				
Al-Hayer	1	2	1				
Al-Uyaynah	1	1	0				
Al-Khasirah	3	14	0				
Afif	4	74	0				

Distance Range: 1 = < 150 km, 2 = 150-250 km, 3 = 250-350 km, 4 > 350 km

Source: Sogreah Consulting Engineers, 1984, p. 2b; distances calculated by the researcher.

Table A2 -- Survey Area from the Al-Qasseem District, Ar-Rass Area.

Governorate	Distance Range	No. of Villages	No. of High Schools	Village 1 Name	Village 1 Population	Village 2 Name	Village 2 Population
Buraydah	3	62	0				
Unayzah	3	12	0				
Ar-Rass	3	46	1	Kassar Ben Okayel	2040	Dokhna	1424
Dariyah	3	47	1				
Markaz Abanat	3	57	0				
Ash-Shamasiyah	3	12	1				
Al-Midhneb	3	54	0				
Uqlat Al-Suqur	3	33	0				
Al-Quwarah	3	17	0				
An-Nabhaniyah	3	41	2	Subayh	247	Az-Zyabiyah	1115*
Al-Butaynh	3	28	0				
Uyun Al-Jawa	3	28	0				
Al-Bukayriyah	3	14	1				
Al-Assiyah	3	14	1				

Distance Range: 1 = < 150 km, 2 = 150-250 km, 3 = 250-350 km, 4 > 350 km

*Replaced by the Ar-Rass area with two villages (see discussion on substitution due to administrative reasons)

Source: Sogreah Consulting Engineers, 1984, p. 2b; distances calculated by the researcher.

Table A3--Distribution of Villages and Bedouin Settlements by Size in the 24 Local Governorates of the Ar-Riyadh District, Central Region, Saudi Arabia.

Local Governorate	Small (fewer than 60 houses)	Medium (60-200 houses)	Large (more than 200 houses)	Total villages & settlements	Total Population
Al-Kharj	14	9	14	37	40,333
Rumah	6	4	1	11	6,208
Al-Hawtah	7	3	3	13	16,120
Al-Hariq	1	1	1	3	2,258
As-Sulayyil	8	0	2	10	7,146
Wadi Ad-Dawasir	8	3	0	11	3,716
Al-Aflaj	15	12	8	35	33,577
Huraymila	4	3	1	8	3,137
Duruma	5	0	1	6	5,982
Al-Muzahimiyah	6	3	1	10	4,048
Ar-Riyadh	1	0	1	2	2,292
Ad-Diriyah	3	1	0	4	6,230
Thadiq	4	5	1	10	6,048
Al-Majma'ah	35	6	2	43	17,905
Az-Zulfi	14	3	0	17	3,402
Al-Ghat	0	0	1	1	1,970
Ad-Duwadmi	122	16	12	150	64,811
Shaqra'	5	3	4	12	13,442
Marat	4	1	1	6	7,371
Al-Quwayiyah	204	19	7	230	51,199
Al-Hayer	0	1	1	2	3,005
Al-Uyaynah	1	0	0	14	3,238
Al-Khasirah	13	1	0	14	3,238
Afif	69	5	0	74	11,766
Ar-Riyadh District Total	549	99	62	710	309,906

Source: Sogreah Consulting Engineers, Second Report, Ar-Riyadh/Al-Qasseem Districts, 1984, p. 32.

Table A4--Distribution of Villages and Bedouin Settlements by Size in the 14 Local Governorates of the Al-Qasseem District, Central Region, Saudi Arabia.

Local Governorate	Small (fewer than 60 houses	Medium (60-200 houses)	Large (more than 200 houses)	Total villages & settlements	Total Population
Buraydah	56	4	24	62	15,928
Unayzah	12	0	0	12	1,844
Ar-Rass	40	3	3	46	15,510
Dariyah	44	2	1	47	7,375
Markaz Abanat	55	2	0	57	6,062
Ash-Shamasiyah	8	1	3	12	7,145
Al-Midhneb	48	42	2	54	9,444
Uqlat Al-Suqur	29	3	1	33	8,059
Al-Quwarah	10	7	0	17	5,509
An-Nabhaniyah	31	9	1	41	10,535
Al-Butayn	25	1	2	28	5,177
Uyun Al-Jawa	12	4	1	17	5,215
Al-Bukayriyah	10	4	0	14	3,378
Al-Assiyah	18	5	5	28	15,646
Al-Qasseem District Total	398	49	21	468	116,827

Source: Sogreah Consulting Engineers, Second Report, Ar-Riyadh/Al-Qasseem Districts, 1984, p. 27.

APPENDIX B

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

(ENGLISH TRANSLATION)

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

(ENGLISH TRANSLATION)

SURVEY OF FUTURE PLANS OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT

Part 1 - About Yourself and Your Family

First, we would like you to tell us about yourself and your family. Please answer in the spaces provided. (x)

1. Your age (___ years)

2. Your sex (___ male) (___ female)

3. Are you: (Saudi ___) (Non-Saudi ___)

4. Birthplace:

   Name of Place (_____)
   Is this a: (City ___) (Town ___) (Village ___)

5. Where is your current home located:

   Name of Place (_____)
   Is this a: (City ___) (Town ___) (Village ___)

6. What is the size of your family of origin?

   Total Persons (___)
   Number of Brothers (___)
   Number of Sisters (___)
   Your Rank Among Brothers and Sisters (___)

7. Where did your father live most of his life?

   Name of place (_____)
   Is this: (desert ___) (rural ___) (urban ___)

8. Where did your father's father live most of his life?

Name of place (_____)
Is this: (desert ___) (rural ___) (urban ___)

9. Do you consider your family background to be? (check one item)

(___ Farmer family)
(___ Nomad family)
(___ Urban family)

10. What is your father's formal education:

(___ No education at all)
(___ Less than 6th grade)
(___ More than 6th grade but less than 12th grade)
(___ College or university -- 4 years)
(___ Vocational or military college)
(___ Master's degree or Ph.D.)
(___ Other, please specify)

11. What kind of work does your father do? If retired, what did he do before?

(_____)

12. What is your father's (or head of household's) yearly income?

(___ Below 11,000 SR)
(___ 11,000 - 13,999 SR)
(___ 14,000 - 19,999 SR)
(___ 20,000 - 29,999 SR)
(___ 30,000 - 79,999 SR)
(___ 80,000 SR and above)

13. Where is your high school located? (Name of city or village)
(_____)

14. Where is your previous intermediate school located? (Name of city or village
(_____)

15. In what section are you now in school?

(___ Applied science)
(___ Literature)

16. Do you have a TV set at home?

(___ Yes)
(___ No)

17. Do you have a phone at home?

(___ Yes)
(___ No)

18. Do you have a radio set?

(___ Yes)
(___ No)

19. Which of the following do you prefer? Rank from 1 (favorite) to 7 (least favorite).

(___ Read)
(___ Play Group Games)
(___ Visit Friends or Relatives)
(___ Sit with Family)
(___ Watch TV)
(___ Go Outdoors/Shopping)
(___ Talk on the Phone)

Part 2 - Your Future Plans

20. When you graduate, what do you expect to do?

(___ work at what) (where?_____)
(___ study at what) (where?_____)
(___ other) (specify:_____)

21. Someday, after you have a permanent job and have a family, where would you most like to live if you could choose freely? (_____ name of place)

22. Someday, when you have established a more or less permanent work career, what kind of work would you most like to be doing?

(_____)
Describe: (_____
_____)

23. How likely is it that you will move from your home (village or town) soon after graduation?

(___ very likely)
(___ likely)
(___ somewhat likely)
(___ not very likely)

24. Some people complain that living in rural areas and small towns outside large cities means being cut off from social activities. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

25. It is sometimes said that rural/provincial areas are far better than large cities for rearing children. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

26. Some people say that, taking everything into consideration, a person gets more for his money buying a house in Ar-Riyadh than he does buying a house in some smaller city. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

27. Some say that people living in large cities get a lot more fun out of life than those living in rural village or provincial town areas. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

28. Some say that compared with village/small town dwellers, people living in cities miss out on many of the worthwhile things in life. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

29. Some say that there is not a single advantage to be gained by living outside the city of Ar-Riyadh. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

30. Some say that most families living in Ar-Riyadh would be better off if they moved out into the rural villages or small towns. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

31. If you found you needed to move and there were houses and jobs easily available throughout the Central Region area, would you most rather move into Ar-Riyadh or remain where you live now?

(___ move into Ar-Riyadh)
(___ undecided)
(___ remain where you live now)

32. Some people living outside of Ar-Riyadh say they envy Ar-Riyadh dwellers. Others say they feel sorry for Ar-Riyadh dwellers. Would you say that you feel sorry for Ar-Riyadh dwellers, envy them, or haven't ever thought about it?

(___ envy them)
(___ have not thought about it)
(___ feel sorry for them)

33. How much do you like the kind of life that is found in rural/small town areas as a place to live?

(___ very much)
(___ all right, passable)
(___ not at all)

Part 3 - Your Opinions About Family Obligations

34. A married person should be willing to share his home with brothers and sisters of his husband or wife. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

35. Married children should live close to their parents so that they can help each other. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

36. If a member of the family is insulted or injured, you should feel more strongly about it than if the injured person is not a member of your family. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

37. It is the responsibility of married children to be with their parents in time of serious illness even if the children have moved some distance away from the parents. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

38. Children owe it to their parents to put family interests above their own personal interests. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

39. If a family group has strong common moral views, a member should not let himself be influenced by outsiders to change these views. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

40. As many activities as possible should be shared by married children and their parents. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

41. If a person finds that his job runs so much against the family values that severe conflict develops, he should find a new job. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

42. Whenever possible to do so, a person should talk over his important decisions (such as marriage, employment, and residence) with family members before taking action. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

43. Marriage should be viewed as keeping families going rather than creating new families. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

44. It is important that the family name be carried on. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

45. Children of elderly parents have as much responsibility for the welfare of their parents as they have for the welfare of their own children. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

46. Keeping the family going is a very important reason why sons and daughters should expect to marry and have children. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

47. At a community social affair, a family should participate pretty much as a group rather than individuals. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

48. If a person's father has a medical bill of SR 10,000 which he cannot pay, the daughters or sons are morally obligated to pay the debt. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

49. There should be a feeling on the part of all members of a family that they belong permanently to the family group and that all other persons are outsiders. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

50. Within a family, there should be complete integration of individual activities for the achievement of family objectives. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

51. An individual should assume that his land, money, and other material goods are family property, and that he has an obligation to support individual members and give them assistance when they are in need. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

52. There should be concern for the perpetuation of the family by helping an adult child in beginning and continuing an economic activity in line with family expectations, and in setting up a new household.

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

53. There should be mutual aid within a family, consisting of friendly exchange relationships between parents and their married children, and married children and their married siblings. Do you agree?

(___ strongly agree)
(___ agree somewhat)
(___ undecided)
(___ disagree somewhat)
(___ strongly disagree)

54. What should most qualify a man to hold high office?

(___ Devotion to the old and (revered) time-honored ways)
(___ Being the most popular among the people)
(___ High education and special knowledge)

55. Which one of these (following) kinds of news interests you most?
(___ World events, such as happenings in other countries)
(___ The nation Saudi Arabia)
(___ Your home town or village)

Part 4 - Residential Image

56. Choose one of the following statements that you think best describes a large city such as Ar-Riyadh.

(___ A big jungle)
(___ Modernistic)
(___ Difficulty of Transportation)
(___ Loneliness and selfish)
(___ High social status)
(___ Familial distinction)
(___ Open windows to the world)
(___ Good place for youth)
(___ Pollution)
(___ Rapid Social Change)

57. Choose one of the following statements that you think best describes a mid-sized town, such as Ad-Duwadmi, Rumah.

(___ Same as big cities)
(___ Better than big cities)
(___ Better than small villages)
(___ Mixture of big city and small village)
(___ Social customs control)
(___ Rigid social control)
(___ Good for various ages)
(___ Good for easy goals/achievements)
(___ Limited ambitions)
(___ Just a big village)

58. Choose one of the following statements that you think best describes a small bedouin settlement, such as Nifi, Ar-Rumheah.

(___ Equal to any city)
(___ Good family life)
(___ Fresh air)
(___ Limited job choices)
(___ Social backwardness)
(___ Difficult to attain technology)
(___ Jealousy and social blabbing)
(___ Moderate social change)
(___ Easy to reach places)
(___ Big family)

APPENDIX C

DEFINITION OF TERMS

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Region - A socially homogeneous entity that is viewed as a unique causal universe in which sets of variables may assume different patterns of interrelationships and form unique structural configurations (Lyson, 1976:20). In the context of this research, the central region has been chosen because of the natural physical attributes that demarcate it from other regions in Saudi Arabia. This also corresponds to the governmental planning division of regions in Saudi Arabia.

Growth - Accumulation of economic indicators and population numbers both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Urban dominance - A situation in which one city grows in such a way that it dominates other urban centers and doubles population size over the next-ranked city. Urban primacy is accompanied by further indicators such as influence over hinterlands and represents the attributes of the primate center as explained below.

Provincial town - A provincial or regional small city with a population of over 2,000, playing the roles of supplier of services and goods, and serving as a social model for surrounding villages or hamlets.

Village/hamlet - Centers of less than 2,000 persons. Hamlets lack the minimum services available in a village, so that daily trips to the nearest village or central city are required to meet daily needs.

Hinterlands - Settlements and surrounding areas connected commercially to a large city either at regional or national levels. The closeness to that center makes hinterlands belong to that center.

Rural youth - High school students (boys/girls) in rural areas.

Town youth - High school students (boys/girls) in provincial city high schools in local governorates.

Modernization - This term is employed on two levels. First, it is used to mean a change in rural society from peasantry to urbanization and industrialization, especially in terms of cultural accompanionship among rurality and urban perceptions of various social aspects like family ties and orientation of collective actions (Smith, 1970:4). Second, it is used to mean individual modernity by attitudinal modernity, as personal interests of national versus local matters sources of information, evaluation of personal needed qualification for public service departing from small scale of interests to rational causations for evaluating external matters (Inkeles, 1983:94-95).

Other infrequently used terms will be defined as they are used.

APPENDIX D

TESTS OF RELIABILITY

Table D1--Correlation Matrix of Familism Items.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1	1.000 ( )																			
2	-.07 (.066)	1.000 ( )																		
3	-.09 (.029)	.12 (.003)	1.000 ( )																	
4	-.05 (.141)	.25 (.000)	.17 (.000)	1.000 ( )																
5	-.14 (.001)	.33 (.000)	.13 (.002)	.34 (.000)	1.000 ( )															
6	-.13 (.003)	.09 (.029)	.19 (.000)	.25 (.000)	.24 (.000)	1.000 ( )														
7	-.03 (.233)	.23 (.000)	.11 (.006)	.39 (.000)	.10 (.011)	.32 (.000)	1.000 ( )													
8	.04 (.201)	.13 (.003)	.13 (.002)	.25 (.000)	.20 (.000)	.14 (.001)	.28 (.000)	1.000 ( )												
9	.12 (.009)	.12 (.005)	.03 (.250)	.19 (.000)	.07 (.051)	.21 (.000)	.29 (.000)	.38 (.000)	1.000 ( )											
10	.15 (.000)	.05 (.155)	-.06 (.084)	.10 (0.13)	.08 (.047)	.02 (.362)	.17 (.000)	.07 (.065)	.17 (.000)	1.000 ( )										
11	-.20 (.000)	.40 (.000)	.14 (.001)	.27 (.000)	.44 (.000)	.26 (.000)	.28 (.000)	.26 (.000)	.22 (.000)	.10 (.012)	1.000 ( )									
12	.04 (.212)	.02 (.301)	.08 (.048)	.18 (.000)	.08 (.032)	.26 (.000)	.16 (.000)	.08 (.048)	.14 (.001)	.18 (.000)	.16 (.000)	1.000 ( )								
13	.03 (.241)	.19 (.000)	.10 (.011)	.17 (.000)	.12 (.004)	.18 (.000)	.22 (.000)	.11 (.007)	.11 (.007)	.36 (.000)	.13 (.003)	.25 (.000)	1.000 ( )							
14	-.10 (.014)	.34 (.000)	.23 (.000)	.30 (.000)	.40 (.000)	.21 (.000)	.31 (.000)	.25 (.000)	.09 (.030)	.06 (.097)	.51 (.000)	-.01 (.431)	.13 (.002)	1.000 ( )						
15	-.19 (.000)	.27 (.000)	.13 (.002)	.26 (.000)	.26 (.000)	.14 (.001)	.30 (.000)	.14 (.001)	.22 (.000)	.00 (.485)	.40 (.000)	.14 (.001)	.10 (.015)	.23 (.000)	1.000 ( )					
16	.11 (.010)	-.06 (0.93)	.22 (.000)	.15 (.001)	.01 (.392)	.17 (.000)	.17 (.000)	.29 (.000)	.20 (.000)	.16 (.000)	.02 (.309)	.24 (.000)	.29 (.000)	-.05 (.157)	-.03 (.280)	1.000 ( )				
17	-.21 (.000)	.33 (.000)	.10 (.017)	.24 (.000)	.43 (.000)	.37 (.000)	.25 (.000)	.29 (.000)	.10 (.013)	.05 (.146)	.59 (.000)	.16 (.000)	.11 (.007)	.54 (.000)	.17 (.000)	-.01 (.419)	1.000 ( )			
18	-.05 (.140)	.12 (.004)	.03 (.292)	.30 (.000)	.32 (.000)	.27 (.000)	.32 (.000)	.21 (.000)	.12 (.003)	.15 (.000)	.24 (.000)	.14 (.001)	.16 (.000)	.24 (.000)	.20 (.000)	.12 (.003)	.40 (.000)	1.000 ( )		
19	.07 (.075)	.08 (.042)	-.01 (.399)	.20 (.000)	.15 (.000)	.22 (.000)	.17 (.000)	.20 (.000)	.12 (.004)	.16 (.000)	.13 (.003)	.07 (.050)	.17 (.000)	.19 (.000)	.00 (.488)	.15 (.001)	.20 (.000)	.35 (.000)	1.000 ( )	
20	-.25 (.000)	.26 (.000)	.09 (.027)	.34 (.000)	.47 (.000)	.23 (.000)	.27 (.000)	.22 (.000)	.11 (.008)	.01 (.414)	.56 (.000)	.16 (.000)	.01 (.392)	.47 (.000)	.40 (.000)	-.02 (.328)	.48 (.000)	.32 (.000)	.14 (.001)	1.000 ( )

Numbers refer to Familism Scale Items, Table D2 ( ) = p significance level

Table D2--Item Reliabilities for Familism Scale Items.

Item No.	Item Label	Item - Total Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
1	Sharing House with In-Laws	-.0934	.8030
2	Living Close to Parents	.3463	.7631
3	Defending Family Integrity	.2027	.7743
4	Be with Ill Parents	.4837	.7596
5	Family Interests Before Personal	.4482	.7562
6	Holding to Family Values	.3967	.7599
7	Sharing Activities with Parents	.4855	.7597
8	Family Values Over Career	.4119	.7580
9	Making Decisions with Family	.3493	.7635
10	Marriage is to Maintain Family	.2272	.7731
11	Perpetuate the Family Name	.5494	.7485
12	Obligation to Elderly Parents	.2892	.7676
13	Marriage is to Have Children	.3519	.7626
14	Participation as Family Group	.4824	.7548
15	Pay Medical Care of Ill Parents	.3306	.7644
16	Solidarity of the Family Group	.2581	.7703
17	Individual Activities for Family Group	.5098	.7520
18	Material Possessions Shared by All	.4372	.7590
19	Family Support for Individuals	.3084	.7656
20	Mutual Aid Within Family Group	.4578	.7573

Note: Reliability coefficients 20 items
Alpha = .7731 Standardized Alpha = .8034

APPENDIX E

TABLES FOR NON-SAUDIS

Table D3--Familism Scale Reliability Statistics.

# of Cases = 486						
Statistics for Scale	Mean 35.1111	Variance 104.4289	Std. Dev. 10.2190	# of Variables 20		
Item Means	Mean 1.7556	Min. 1.1811	Max 3.0741	Range 1.8930	Max/Min 2.6028	Var. 1699
Item Variances	Mean 1.3868	Min .4974	Max 2.6378	Range 2.1404	Max/Min 5.3027	Var. .3081
Inter-Item Correlations	Mean .1697	Min -.2497	Max .5913	Range .8410	Max/Min -2.3675	Var. .0210

Table D4--Familism Scale Analysis of Variance.

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	Q	Prob.
Between	2532.4000	485	5.2214		
Within	12488.0000	9234	1.3525	1160.151	.000
Between Measures	1569.0807	19	82.5832		
Residual	10919.7193	9215	1.1850		
Total	15021.2000	9719	1.5455		
Grand Mean =	1.7556				
Reliability Coefficients	20 items				
Alpha = .7731		Standardized Item Alpha = .8034			

Table D5--Correlation Matrix for Residential Preference Scale.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	-						
2	-.22**	-					
3	.19**	.05	-				
4	.23**	-.12*	.32**	-			
5	-.17**	.34**	.04	-.07	-		
6	.17**	-.01	.18**	.25**	-.11*	-	
7	.12*	.16**	-.02	-.11*	.10	.05	-

No of Cases = 486
*1-tailed significance = .01
**1-tailed significance = .001

Table D6--Item Reliabilities for Residential Preference Scale Items.

Item No.	Item Label	Item - Total Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted
1	City more socially active	.1070	.3154
2	Rural areas better for children	.0478	.3518
3	City homes better investments	.2899	.1910
4	City life more fun	.1921	.2599
5	City life less worthwhile	.0436	.3474
6	Riyadh is best	.1989	.2588
7	City families better off in villages	.1038	.3131

Note: Reliability Coefficients (7 items) Alpha = .3272

Table E1--Origin Characteristics of Respondents, by Gender and Area of Residence (percentage).

	Ar-Rass		Ad-Duwadmi		Rumah		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Total (%)
School location							
Main center	33.3	-	100.0	100.0	50.0	50.0	60.5
Satellites	66.7	100.0	-	-	50.0	50.0	39.5
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(15)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(38)
Birthplace							
Urban	46.7	-	50.0	100.0	25.0	100.0	60.6
Rural	53.3	-	50.0	-	75.0	-	36.8
Bedouin	-	100.0	-	-	-	-	2.6
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(15)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(38)
Home location							
Urban	6.7	-	50.0	100.0	-	50.0	36.8
Rural	93.3	-	-	-	75.0	50.0	50.0
Bedouin	-	100.0	50.0	-	25.0	-	13.2
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(15)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(38)
Type of high school location							
Urban	60.0	100.0	50.0	100.0	50.0	50.0	36.8
Rural	40.0	-	50.0	-	50.0	50.0	34.2
Bedouin	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(15)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(38)
Intermediate school location							
Urban	60.0	100.0	50.0	75.0	50.0	25.0	57.9
Rural	40.0	-	50.0	25.0	50.0	75.0	42.1
Bedouin	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(15)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(38)

Table E2--Personal Characteristics of Non-Saudi Respondents, by Gender and Area of Residence.

	Ar-Rass		Ad-Duwadmi		Rumah		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Total (%)
Age							
Less than 17	33.3	-	-	-	25.0	75.0	23.8
17 to less than 19	-	100.0	83.3	75.0	25.0	25.0	36.8
19 to less than 22	66.7	-	16.7	12.5	50.0	-	36.8
22 and older	-	-	-	12.5	-	-	2.6
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(15)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(38)
Sibling rank							
Oldest	33.3	-	33.3	50.0	25.0	25.0	34.2
Youngest	6.7	-	66.7	-	25.0	25.0	18.4
Middle	60.0	100.0	-	50.0	50.0	50.0	47.4
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(5)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(38)

Table E3--Personal Interests of Non-Saudi Respondents by Gender and Area of Residence.

	Ar-Rass		Ad-Duwadmi		Rumah		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Total (%)
Study section							
Science	100.0	-	83.3	62.5	100.0	-	76.3
Literature	-	100.0	16.7	37.5	-	50.0	18.4
Other	-	-	-	-	-	50.0	5.3
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(15)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(38)
Hobbies							
Group oriented	40.0	100.0	50.0	75.0	25.0	-	44.7
Individualistic	60.0	-	50.0	25.0	75.0	100.0	55.3
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(15)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(38)

Table E4--Family Characteristics of Non-Saudi Respondents, by Gender and Area of Residence.

	Ar-Rass		Ad-Duwadmi		Rumah		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Total (%)
Family Cultural Affiliation							
Urban	100.0	100.0	100.0	62.5	100.0	100.0	92.1
Rural	-	-	-	37.5	-	-	7.9
Bedouin	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(15)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(38)
Father's Background							
Urban	66.7	-	50.0	12.5	75.0	25.0	47.4
Rural	26.7	100.0	50.0	12.5	25.0	-	26.3
Bedouin	6.6	-	-	75.0	-	75.0	26.3
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(5)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(38)
Grandfather's Background							
Urban	66.7	-	-	-	50.0	-	31.6
Rural	26.7	100.0	66.7	62.5	50.0	50.0	47.4
Bedouin	6.6	-	33.3	37.5	-	50.0	21.0
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(15)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(38)
Father's Education							
Illiterate	33.3	-	-	-	25.0	-	15.8
Less than elementary	40.0	100.0	-	-	25.0	-	21.0
Elementary	-	-	50.0	12.5	25.0	50.0	18.4
Secondary	-	-	16.7	12.5	-	-	5.3
4 yrs college	-	-	16.7	37.5	-	25.0	13.2
Military/ vocational	-	-	-	-	-	25.0	2.6
Graduate study	-	-	16.6	25.0	-	-	7.9
Other	26.7	-	-	12.5	25.0	-	15.8
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(15)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(38)

Table E4, continued

	Ar-Rass		Ad-Duwadmi		Rumah		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Total (%)
Father's Occupation							
Public service	33.3	100.0	50.0	75.0	25.0	75.0	50.0
Military	-	-	-	-	-	25.0	2.6
Business owner	66.7	-	50.0	25.0	75.0	-	47.4
Business employee	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(15)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(38)
Family Income							
Less than 11,000 SR	33.3	-	50.0	12.5	50.0	-	28.9
11,000-13,000	33.3	-	-	-	25.0	25.0	18.4
14,000-19,999	-	-	-	12.5	-	-	2.6
20,000-29,999	-	-	16.7	-	-	-	2.6
30,000-79,999	33.4	-	33.3	62.5	25.0	75.0	42.2
80,000 or more	-	100.0	-	12.5	-	-	5.3
% =	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =	(15)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(38)

Table E5--Possession of Level of Living Items, Non-Saudi Respondents, by Gender and Area of Residence (percentage).

	Ar-Rass		Ad-Duwadmi		Rumah		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Total(%)
No television in home	33.3	100.0	-	-	25.0	-	18.4
N =	(15)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	100.0 (38)
No telephone in home	33.3	-	-	-	25.0	75.0	23.7
N =	(15)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	100.0 (38)
No radio in home	-	-	50.0	-	25.0	-	10.5
N =	(15)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	100.0 (38)

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