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This is to certify that the
thesis entitled
ORGANIZATIONAL DISCORD:
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURSUIT ‘DRIVING
presented by

Marj ie T. Britz

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

MS (1981.99 in Criminal Justice

 

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PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record.
TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due.

 

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MSU Is An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution

cmmunS-DJ

 

ORGANIZATIONAL DISCORD:

POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURSUIT DRIVING

By
Marjie T. Britz

A THESIS

Submitted to the
College of Social Science
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
School of Criminal Justice

1992

 

 

 

ABSTRACT

ORGANIZATIONAL DISCORD:
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURSUIT DRIVING
By
Marjie T. Britz

Despite a seemingly abundance of literature involving the topic
of police pursuits, there have been few calm and dispassionate
inquiries into individual officers' opinions and attitudes regarding
their departmental pursuit policy. Rather, the vast majority of the
literature regarding pursuits is mostly emotional and polemic,
decrying the dangerousness of police pursuits.

This study was undertaken to measure the relationship which
exists between police job type and attitudes surrounding
departmental pursuit policies. The specific purpose was to provide
police managers with empirical data and conclusions, which may be
implemented in producing sound policies, realistic training
programs and appropriate supervision in the area of police pursuits
and emergency responses.

The research instrument was an attitudinal survey, distributed
to every officer in a state-wide agency. The basic hypothesis was
that attitudes regarding police pursuit policies within a department
would differ significantly depending on job description.

Significant differences were found in perceptions of pursuit
policies, administrative support, and adequateness of training. An
analysis of the data reveals that significant differences exist in

perceptions between different job types.

 

Copyright by
Marjie T. Britz
1992

 

Dedicated to my Family
Mom, Dad, Teddy, 8: Marianne Britz
and in loving memory of my Grandfather
Theodore C. Britz I

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My ability to undertake and complete this project may be
attributed to the guidance of one man. It was his library, his
criticism, his inspiration, and his general presence which enabled me
to continue working. My sincerest thanks and deepest gratitude to
my thesis advisor, Dr. Dennis M. Payne.

Additionally, I would like to thank the other two members of
my committee for their time and participation in this project, Dr.
Kenneth Christian, and Dr. David L. Carter. Thanks also to my
loving parents and family for their unfailing love and support.

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ..................................
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION ............................

Introduction ............................
Statement of the Problem .................
Nature and Scope of the Study ............
Hypotheses ........................ . .....
ose .................................
Definition of Terms .......................

11. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ...............

Introduction ...............................
Definitions ................................
Inherent Paradox in Policing .................
Legal Issues ................................
Litigation ..................................
Proximate Cause ...........................
Third Party Liability ........................
Negligence ................................
Liability to Suspect .........................
Emergency Situations ......................
Legal Aspects of Roadblocks ................
Inadequate Training .......................
Relevant Michigan Statutes ................
Previous Research on Police Pursuits .........
Summary of the literature ..................

iv

Page

v—l

\Dmhnkmud

 

III.METHODOLOGY ............................

Research Design ............................
Survey Design ..............................
Population .................................
Instrumentation .............................
Response Rate ...............................
Survey Instrument ............................
The Chi-Square Statistic ......................

IV. ANALYSIS OF DATA ...........................

Introduction ..................................
Policy Variables. .. .............................
Training Variables ............................
Supervisor Variables ..........................
Liability Variables ............................
Operational Variables ........................
Perceptual Variables ..........................
External Variables ............................

V. ANALYSIS OF COLLAPSED DATA ...............

Introduction ..................................
Policy Variables ...............................
Training Variables ............................
Supervisor Variables ..........................
Liability Variables ............................
Operational Variables ........................
Perceptual Variables ..........................
External Variables ...........................
Non-statistical results .......................
Policy Variables ..............................
Supervisor Variables .........................
Operational Variables .......................
Perceptual Variables .........................

46

46
47
48
49
50
51
51

52

52
53
57
60

62
66

69
72

74

74
75
76
78
80
81
82
84
85
85
87
88
88

 

VI. CONCLUSIONS .............................. 89

Introduction ................................ 89

Conclusions ................................. 89

Summary ................................... 92
Appendices ............................................. 94
Bibliography ............................................ 102

 

List of Tables

Policy variables / four job types ................
Proportion of policy variables ................
Training variables / four job types .............
Proportion of training variables ..............
Supervisor variables / four job types ...........
Proportion of supervisor variables ............
Liability variables / four job types ..............
Proportion of liability variables ...............
Operational variables / four job types ..........
Proportion of operational variables ...........
Perceptual variables/ four job types ............
Proportion of perceptual variables ............
External variables/ four job types .............
Proportion of external variables ..............
Policy variables/ collapsed job type ............
Proportion of collapsed policy variables .......
Training variables / collapsed job type .........
Proportion of collapsed training variables .....
Supervisor variables/ collapsed job type ........
Proportion / collapsed supervisor variables ......
Liability variables / collapsed job type ...........
Operational variables / collapsed job type .......
Proportion / collapsed operational variables .....
Perceptual variables/ collapsed job type .........
Proportion/ collapsed perceptual variables ......
External variables / collapsed job type ...........
Proportion/ collapsed external variables .........

Page

54
56
57
59
6O
62
63
65
66
68
69
71
72
73
75
76
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
82
84
84
85

 

CHAPTERI

INTRODUCTION

In existence since the introduction of motorized vehicles into
law enforcement agencies, police pursuits have long been a concern
of various interest groups. However, recent interest in police
pursuits has permeated every branch of the criminal justice system.
The legislatures have been besieged by constituents and public
interest groups to prohibit the practice of high speed pursuits. Law
enforcement administrators have been mandated to review and
revise their departmental policies. And the judiciary has been
flooded with a deluge of litigation involving civil action against
departments, in regards to pursuit matters. In each of these
branches, the prevailing concern appears to be this increase in
litigation. A litigious case involving pursuit can cost the department,
the city, and inadvertently, the public, millions of dollars in damages.
Thus, the question arises: Is pursuing a fleeing offender worth the
risks?

The advantages of a high speed pursuit are somewhat
obscured by the inevitable disadvantages. Some high speed pursuits
end in death, serious injury, and heavy property damage. Threats of
lawsuits, adverse publicity in the media, and negative public opinion
surface in the wake of a pursuit that results in an accident. The
media seldom report successful pursuits, and often leave the public
with an impression that all high speed pursuits end in tragedy. A by-
product of these negative connotations is the increasingly restrictive

departmental policies regarding pursuits. However, it is

 

hypothesized that major differences in perception exist within

departments regarding these policies which could render them
ineffective.

Arguments over the issue of pursuits can be divided into two
positions. Proponents of the first position view all high speed
pursuits as inherently dangerous, and opt for the abolishment of all
pursuits. The second sees the dangers which could result if pursuits
were abolished. The latter hold that the need to apprehend fleeing
offenders sometimes outweighs the possibility of later repercussions.
Those holding this position claim that to develop a policy in which
pursuits are not allowed would create an ineffectual, thereby
intolerable, system, which would severely handicap them as a police
agency. Furthermore, this viewpoint argues that the avoidance of
pursuits would constitute a failure by law enforcement personnel to
perform their public service functions. The avoidance of pursuits
would create an atmosphere which would allow not only traffic
violators, but felons to escape as long as they exceeded the speed
limit to do so. Such a position seems to be inconsistent with the' one
of the purposes of law enforcement and strikes at the basic mission of
police.

A consideration of both viewpoints would seem the logical
solution. Surely the public would not want to see its law
enforcement agency with a policy that restricted all pursuits. What if
the person being pursued was a crazed psychopath on his way to slay
innocent children? Would the public then agree to a policy of no
pursuits? On the other hand, what if the person being pursued was a

scared teenager out for a joy ride in his father's car, and flees out of

 

 

 

fear of his father's anger? Would it be acceptable to pursue this

offender at rates of speed in excess of 100 m.p.h.? Would the public
view this as necessary to preserve law and order? These are some of
the questions that are plaguing today's administrators in law
enforcement.

There is an inherent paradox in the issue of pursuit, as in many
other police duties. On the one hand, the police are sworn to protect
and serve their community. At the same time, they are responsible
for maintaining peace and order, and to do so without endangering
the public. To preserve law and order sometimes requires officers to
pursue offenders, while placing the public whom they are sworn to
protect at some risk. The balancing point rests in the scale of the
need to protect the public from an unreasonable risk of harm and the
need of the state to apprehend. Sound policy should be based on this
balancing point and empirical data. However, past studies have
reached contradictory conclusions regarding the dangerousness of
police pursuits. Thus, the need for empirical research in the area of

police pursuit is evident.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the relationship, if
any, which exists between police job description holders(i.e. road
patrol, investigative, first line supervisor and administrative) and
their agreement with and understanding of police pursuit policies.
This study is a preliminary phase of a broader one-year study,
currently being conducted, which examines environmental and other

variables present during actual pursuits. That broader study will

 

 

examine the variables present when pursuits are initiated and

discontinued. It will also examine several pursuit outcomes.
SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE STUDY
This study is an examination of the relationship of attitudes
and perceptions which exists between different job description
holders within a department regarding police pursuit policies. The
following goals exemplify this objective:

(1) To idenlfy’ and define a suitable theoretical premise for the
study of departmental perceptual differences. An attempt will be

 

made, through a review of the literature and by analysis of an
attitudinal survey distributed throughout a state-wide agency, to
determine a theoretical analysis of attitudes within a department.
This process lends itself to successful application to the
understanding of departmental differences in perceptions regarding
police pursuit policies.

(2) To develop an instrument and research method by which
departmental perceptions regarding pursuit policies may be
examined. This methodology would be grounded in the theoretical
foundation selected as propitious and based upon any influences
discovered which would affect the presence of attitudinal
discontinuity within a department. Such an effort would highlight
policy implications for administrators, enabling them to update their

polices based on empirical data.

HYPOTHESES
It is hypothesize that perceptual discord concerning pursuit

policy exists within police departments pursuant to specific job

 

description categorizations. The null hypothesis assumes that no

differences in perceptions exist. A further null hypothesis assumes
that no significant differences exist which would distinguish lower
classifications of job types (i.e. road patrol and investigative) from
higher classifications (i.e. supervisor and administrative).

It is also hypothesized that policy does make a difference in
- spite of perceptual differences which exist on pursuit policy. The
null hypothesis assumes that policy does not make a difference. A
further null hypothesis assumes that no significant differences exist
which would distinguish lower classifications of job types from
higher classifications.

It is further hypothesized that significant differences exist
between job types on perceptions on policy, supervisory support,
adequacy of training, liability issues, and discretionary issues
regarding police pursuit. The null hypotheses assume that no
significant differences exist between lower classifications of job types
and higher classifications of job types.

PURPOSE:

It is apparent that the topic of police pursuits is becoming a
popular concern among state legislators, courts, attorneys,
physicians and several citizen interest groups. The police who are
involved in these matters are no less interested. Due to the nature of
police discretion, the officer on patrol is the primary decision maker

in pursuit matters. Guided by their training and fortified with their

 

I IIIII

 

         
  

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departmental policies, officers must determine whether to initiate
the pursuit of a fleeing car, continue the pursuit, or terminate a
pursuit. They must also determine what pursuit tactics to initiate in
pursuit of those who choose to elude the police. It is unclear whether
consistency within the department is present, in regards to attitudes
concerning pursuit policies.

Lack of consistency in perceptions of the value of pursuit policy
elements within a department may be the turning point in a litigious
action. A lack of consistency may be attributed to the socialization of
police officers, attitudinal responses to current litigation against the
police, a desire to perform one's duty, general frustration over the
apparent lack of impact of the criminal justice system, or lack of
training or supervision. If that is indeed the case, this inconsistency
will be perpetuated. Administrators, however, may not recognize
this lack of cohesion in thinking among ranks in the development of
departmental policies. It is crucial for administrators to identify
possible disparities of thinking, and, if present, address them with
further training or increased supervision. The issues related to
pursuits and the possible detrimental outcomes must be
acknowledged by administrators, in order to clarify for their officers
different elements to be used in their critical decisions regarding
pursuits, to identify training needs, and to identify supervisory
concerns. Such information is also useful to reduce the flow of
litigious activity.

Empirical research has not been conducted to identify disparity
of thinking between administrators and line officers of police

departments regarding the efficacy of elements within agency policy.

 

   
  
 
   

  

 

 

 

If significant differences of perception exist between the officers and

their administrators on the content and relevance of pursuit policy,
this may indicate a need for further training and supervision to
ensure consistency. The fact that officers may feel quite differently
than their administrators does not mean that they will not adhere to
the policy, but it may indicate a strain in the agency that is not
healthy.

Over the past several years, studies have been conducted to
determine the dangerousness of pursuit. However, similar studies
have reached contradictory findings. Some experts report that no
pursuit is safe, and all pursuits should be prohibited. These experts
often compare high speed pursuit with deadly force issues, and
suggest that a patrol car is tantamount to holding a loaded gun.
Some argue that pursuits are necessary for the common good of the
public, and further argue that the dangerousness of pursuit has
become so sensationalized that the reality of the topic has become
obscure. Thus, two opposing viewpoints emerge. The law
enforcement viewpoint is that pursuits are necessary to preserve law
and order. While the viewpoint held by various other interest groups
is that pursuits have given rise to an unacceptable number of
casualties (Payne, 1991).

According to a study conducted by the Connecticut Safety
Commission (1978), the reason for the disparity apparent in pursuit
studies is the absence of a universal definition of "police pursuit."
They reported that some experts use the term pursuit only when

participants exceeded the legal speed limits, while others included

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

"high risk" pursuits, which included participants who exceeded safe

speeds in existing conditions.

It has certainly been established that pursuits sometimes end in
property damage, injury, or even death. These incidents have
resulted in an increase of litigation against the police in recent years.
Police policy, training and supervision are of utmost importance to
everyone, the general public, as well as the police officers involved.
However, the regulation of such polices varies from state to state,
department to department.

Police pursuit policies are purportedly regulated by state
statutes; however, many police administrators have supplemented
the legislative directives with deparmentally issued directives
addressing important policy issues inherent in high speed pursuits.
Additionally, it is unclear as to how much discretion an officer should
be granted in regard to pursuit decisions. Some administrators
creating policy do not address the question of discretion, and thus
leave the decision up to the officer. Furthermore, policies are
generally based on the most recent rulings by the court, not on
empirical data collected in the study of pursuits. This practice has led
to an increase of litigation against officers, executive officers and
jurisdictions.

To effectively pursue litigation against a department,
claimants must find fault with an officer's adherence to
departmental policies, his adherence to the letter of the law in the
state in which the pursuit takes place, the officer's training, the
supervision or lack thereof of the officer in question, and standards

set by court decisions. The issue of reasonableness versus negligence

 

 

is the key. Thus, it is essential that officers are not only properly

trained as to their departmental policy, but that they are instructed
as to the state law regarding pursuit, and the rationale behind such
legislation.

Despite the seeming abundance of literature on police pursuits,
most of the information gathered about their character and extent
has been somewhat impressionistic and sensationalized.
Additionally, these studies have analyzed the dangers of pursuits,
citing injury statistics, fatalities, and the like. There has been no
comprehensive study done to analyze the continuity in attitudes
regarding departmental pursuit policies, among different ranks,
within a department. For proper policy implementation to occur,
there should exist continuity of thinking among all members of the
department. In the absence of this, a strong adherence to policy
must occur through discipline.

The occurrence of perceptual differences regarding
departmental policies must be analyzed in search of an
understanding with practical implications for future departmental
regulations. In effect, it was felt necessary to explore departmental
perceptual discord in a selected state-wide agency with a View
toward developing an instrument by which police pursuit policies
might be studied elsewhere.

DEFINITION OF TERMS USED
The term "police pursuit" for all intents and purposes of this
study refers an event involving one or more law enforcement officers

attempting to apprehend a suspect in a motor vehicle, while the.

 

 

suspect is aware of the officer's attempt, yet tries to avoid capture

using high speed driving or other evasive tactics.

The terms "law enforcement officers", "police officers", and,
simply "officers", refers to sworn personnel in the state of Michigan
who have attended the Michigan State Police Academy, and who
further meet the qualifications set forth by the Michigan Law

Enforcement Officers Training Council.

 

 

 

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the issue of police pursuit is
the lack of sound empirical research. The preponderance of the
literature lacks impartiality and objectivity. Furthermore, research
which appears to contain these characteristics is flawed in a
methodological nature, rendering the conclusions almost useless.
The field, however, is not completely destitute, and few useful
studies do exist.

Definition

Before analyzing the available studies, it might be helpful to
establish a working definition of "pursuit." Generally, the definition
of pursuit is somewhat consensual. For example, Scafe and Round
(1970) define high speed pursuit as:

 

An active attempt by a law enforcement officer operating
a motor vehicle and utilizing simultaneously all
emergency equipment to apprehend one or more
occupants of another moving vehicle, when the driver of
the fleeing vehicle is aware of that attempt and is
resisting apprehension by maintaining or increasing his
speed, ignoring the officer, or attempting to elude the
officer while driving at speeds in excess of the legal speed
limit.

 

 

l2

In a similar vein, the Michigan Pursuit Driving Research and

Training Manual (1986) defines pursuit as:

An event involving one or more peace officers attempting
to apprehend a suspect in a motor vehicle, while the
suspect is trying to avoid capture using high speed
driving or other evasive tactics such as driving off a
highway, making sudden or unexpected turning
movements, or maintaining a legal speed, but willquy
failing to yield to the officer's signal to stop.

Definitions such as these abound in available literature.
According to Payne (1991) "...pursuits by police are generally
considered to be runs at high speeds of motorists who are taking
some evasive action to evade capture." However, it is important to
note that the above definition is inclusive only of a typical pursuit.
There are other runs, "...often at higher than normal speeds or under
such adverse conditions, that could be considered in a broad
definition of pursuit." (Payne, 1991) There exists situations which
may possibly present more of a hazard than a typical pursuit. Payne
(1991) gives the example of a police officer attempting to stop a
motorist on a snow covered roadway at 50mph. This situation may
be equally as hazardous to those involved on the roadway as a car
with a speed of 90mph on a clear, dry four lane expressway.

Reasoning that high-speed pursuits are not atypical, Payne
(1991) suggests five typologies into which pursuits may be divided:
1.) Mug: offender was obviously attempting to elude the police by
increasing speed and/ or taking other evasive action. Those
circumstances that require emergency lights and sirens whether you

used them or not. 2.) Response to Alarm: nature of the alarm is such

 

 

 

 

that the officer considered it necessary to drive at speeds in excess of

the limit. An example might be responses to silent alarms; 3.)
Medical Emergengy: speeds driven in excess of the limit based on a
decision of the officer that the nature of call is such that he/ she feels
it is an emergency requiring speed, lights and siren. Examples
include: A serious injury accident, poisoning, attempted suicide,
heart attack, etc; 4.) Crime in Progress: those crimes or responses to
complaints in which officer obtained information leading to his/ her
conclusion, based on policy or training, that the circumstances
require an emergency response utilizing emergency equipment. This
category may also include silent-run situations for the latter part of
the run or officer in trouble calls; and, 5.) High Speed Driving: This
category is not a pursuit, but one in which an officer attempts to
overtake a vehicle that was observed at a speed in excess of the limit
or in a manner which requires police to drive at a speed in excess of
limit in order to take enforcement action. This may include pacing,
closing the gap, or overtaking a vehicle to take enforcement action,
but not using emergency equipment until the actual stop is made
(Payne, 1991). However, for the purposes of this study, pursuit is
defined as an attempt by a law enforcement officer while operating a
motor vehicle to apprehend one or more occupants of some other
moving vehicle when the operator of the fleeing vehicle is aware of
the attempt by the officer, and resists apprehension by maintaining
or increasing his speed in excess of the legal speed, ignoring the
officer, or attempting to elude the officer. This definition does not

include situations where an officer is driving in excess of the legal

 

 

limit in response to an emergency or in response to a crime in

progress.
Now that a working definition of pursuit has been established,

it might be helpful to distinguish the meaning of a "policy." A "policy"
is defined as a "course of action selected from among alternatives
and in light of given conditions to guide and usually to determine
present and future decisions" (Webster's, 1981).

According to the Connecticut Safety Commission (1978), there
are three categories of police pursuit policies. The first type of policy
is labeled an "officer judgment" policy. This is the most common type
of pursuit policy, which allows the individual officer the discretion to
begin a pursuit and what tactics to initiate. This type of policy, in
effect, makes the individual officer a policy maker. The second policy
also allows an individual officer discretion, however, it stipulates
what measures the officer may take. And finally, the third type of
policy is very restrictive, and generally discourages pursuits for
minor violations or when they are not deemed as absolutely
necessary (Connecticut Safety Commission, 1978:19).

Similarly, Payne (1991) defines three classifications of police
policies. The first type is a judgmental policy in which officers,
using discretionary powers, make all major decisions relating to
initiating, tactics and termination. This type of policy is only
effective when intensive training programs are established and
adequate supervisory practices are in place. The second type of
policy, the restrictive policy, provides guidance to terminate a
pursuit under certain conditions, thereby limiting an officer's

discretion. The last type of policy, the discouragement policy,

V

 

 

 

 

severely cautions against any pursuits, except under extreme

circumstances. The key element in any police pursuit policy should
be the balancing point between deterrence and citizen safety (Payne,
1991). It is the job of the police administrator to develop a policy
which reflects the philosophy of the department, and serves the

needs of the community.

Inherent Paradox in Policing

According to the California Highway Patrol "Pursuit Study"
(1983), there exists two opposing philosophies regarding pursuits:
pursuits are too dangerous and should be prohibited; and, pursuits
are necessary for preservation of law and order. These two
philosophies, however, are inherently paradoxical. It is the duty of
the police to preserve, protect and defend the public. On the one
hand, officers have the duty to support the constitution and to
protect the constitutional rights of the public. However, on the other
hand, in order to protect the public, police officers, on occasion, must
take actions, such as pursuits, that place persons at risk. "...The
balancing point in this paradox is the focal point of good police
policy" (Payne, 1991). Furthermore, an officer

must constantly weigh the hazard originally created by
the suspect against the future hazard that will be created
by a pursuit. The officer must also decide whether the
violator will continue to be a hazard if he or she does not
give chase." (Schultz, 1979: 3).

 

 

 

16

This pressure on the officer to make decisions on a case by case basis
is part of police discretion, and the focus of many lawsuits. The focal
point in many of these decisions relates to foreseeability.

Police administrators, then, develop policies which they feel
best protect the public's interest and safety. It is the same public,
however, who leans towards the prohibition of all pursuits. As is the
case in most incidents involving the police, cases which end tragically
are sure to appear in the local newspaper, the evening news, and any
other media available. On the other hand, cases which are successful
and result in the apprehension of a fugitive with no injuries, are
seldom mentioned. In fact, the issue of police pursuits has been so
sensationalized that it presents an inaccurate picture of the problem,
leading the public to fear and openly criticize police pursuits (Barth,
1981).

It is important to note that pursuits are mandated by policy. In
the ideal, policies are developed after close scrutiny of all relevant
literature on the subject. After reviewing the literature on police
pursuits, it is evident that the majority of policies are not based on
empirical data, but, rather, the most recent court cases.
Furthermore, a recent study reported that 20.6% of all police
agencies studied did not have "...any written guidelines governing
the activities of their personnel during pursuit driving operations"
(Auten, 1990: 53). Additionally, those departments which do have
written policies on pursuit "...have some serious gaps in their

existing policy statement" (Auten, 1990:54).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

l7

LEGAL ISSUES IN PURSUIT

Legally Justified Pursuits

Unlike various other topics, the bulk of literature involving
pursuits comes not from empirical research; but rather, the history
and theoretical concepts of pursuits can be found more implicitly in
court records.

Policies regarding pursuit vary among departments. These
policies are weighed by ascertaining whether the public is best served
and protected by continuing or terminating a pursuit. "It is
important that officers weigh the seriousness of the situation (injury,
offense, etc.), against the hazards to the health and welfare of other
citizens, generated by high speeds or maneuvers..." (Cincinnati,
DPS, 1980). A pursuit is justified "only when the necessity of
immediate apprehension outweighs the level of danger created by
the pursuit" (Round, 1979). Similarly, the courts have ruled that an
officer has a duty to balance the need to apprehend violators with
the due care to the general public's well being. Lee v. City of
Omaha . 302 NW. 2d 800 (1981). It is the officer's duty to the public
to effectively weigh the need for apprehension against the safety of

 

the public. The courts have recognized the necessity for pursuits,
however, sometimes this necessity is outweighed by the danger that

they create. When this occurs, a pursuit should be terminated.

Litigation
Litigation against the police has increased over the issue of

pursuit. To effectively pursue litigation against a department,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

claimants must find fault with an officer's adherence to

departmental policies, his adherence to the letter of the law in the
state in which the pursuit takes place, the officer's training, or the
supervision or lack thereof of the officer in question. Each of these
factors is closely examined in determining whether the officer
driving was the proximate cause of the resultant injury or death to
that person chased or to a third party (Payne, 1991).

The courts have ruled that officers have a certain duty to the
community which they are sworn to protect. However, this duty
does not prevent them from pursuing a criminal suspect when risk of
harm is misdemeanor. Thus, the courts have ruled that the police
are under no obligation to let suspects "leisurely escape." Smith v.
City of We_st Point, (Miss. 1985), 475 So 2d 818. However, the police
do have a duty of care with respect to the manner of pursuit. This
manner of pursuit is set forth in pursuit policies, statutes, and court
decisions, and can be found under reasonable care guidelines. In
summation, what these statutes provide is that drivers of emergency
vehicles have a statutory duty to drive with due care and regard for
the safety of others.

The Michigan Vehicle Code (275.632 section 632) states "Speed
limitations do not apply when due regard is exercised in responding
to emergency situations." However, this only applies when bell,
siren and lights are implemented. No exemption applies if officer is
operating vehicle recklessly. Earlier cases in the court system also
protected the agency involved under a blanket of sovereign
immunity. Mead v. State (1942), 5 NW. 2d 740, 303 Mich. 168.

Summarily, to exonerate an officer from negligence in proceeding

 

 

 

against a red light or a stop sign, the officer must be proceeding in

response to an emergency situation, he must slow down or stop to
the extent required for safe operation, and he must utilize at least an
audible signal sufficient to alert motorists of his approach. Cotton v.
Transamerica Insurance Co., (1968), La., 211 So. 2d 110.

Proximate Cause

Most litigation asks the central question of proximate cause.
The term "proximate cause" refers to the culpability of the actors
involved. In other words, was the resultant situation caused,
directly or indirectly, by the officers' actions. Certain contributing
factors in the proximate cause question include: training, emergency
equipment on or off, foreseeableness of accident, etc. Some courts,
however, do not make police officers "the insurers for the conduct of
the suspects they pursue." (Dent v. City of Dallas, 1986, 729 SW 2d
114). However, most courts have held that officers must drive with
due regard for the safety of others. Pomeroy v. Selman, (1970), 181
NW. 2d 72, 25 Mich. App. 128.

Liability to Third Parties

Early cases tended to place the liability factor not on the officer,
but rather on the fleeing suspect. Their rationale for not attaching
the liability on the officer was based on two themes:

1. the duty of the officer to apprehend those who are reckless
makes driving on the road safe if officers pursue those who make

driving reckless to innocent third parties; and,

 

O.

‘ ‘1“

20

 

2. the proximate cause of the accident is the reckless driving of
the pursued person not the officer, who has a duty to pursue these
people. Roll v. Tirnberrnan (N .Y. App. 1958). 229 A 2d 28.

The courts held a similar view in California when they stated

 

that "... not to pursue lawbreakers in order to provide that no harm
be done to a third party would in effect seriously restrict law
enforcement efforts." They further stated that the pursued may in
fact harm others if officers did not pursue. Reenders v. Ontario
(Cal. App. 1977), 137 Cal. Rptr. 736. However, the most current
trend is greater liability for departments where a third party injury is

 

present. This is partially due to the fact that, although the injured
plaintiff may have a better case against the fleeing suspect, he has
little chance of collecting against him. Therefore, he will attempt to
hold the police officer liable, as well as the city, under the vicarious
liability standard.

The oldest and most frequently cited case in this area is the case
of Draper v. City of Los Angeles, (Cal. App. 1949), 205 P. 2d 46.
Draper alleged that since the police car was not equipped with a
siren, that the police officers were negligent by failing to warn the
public of a high speed pursuit. However, the court ruled that the
officers, who stopped at the intersection which the suspect ran
through and crashed into Draper, were not negligent as they had
properly handled their vehicle. Furthermore, the court ruled that it
was the suspect's "reckless and Illegal conduct" which caused
Draper's injuries. D_ra_pgr; was affirmed in a similar case, Pagels v.

City and County of San Francisco, (Cal. App. 1955), 286 P. 2d 877.
The court ruled similarly in United States v. Hutchins (1959), 268

 

 

 

 

 

21

F.2d 69, 83 A.L.R. 3d 447, adding that the officers in this case would
have been "...derelict in their duty had they not pursued the escapee
in the reasonable manner in which they did pursue him."

Several more recent cases have upheld the Draper ruling. In
Lee v. City of Omaha, (Neb. 1981), 307 NW. 2d 800, the court ruled
that it was the duty of officers to balance the need to apprehend
violators of the law and the need to protect the general public. They
further ruled that each case should be judged on a case by case basis,
and that the balance should be determined by the trier of fact. In the
same year, a New York appellate court decided that "...since
motorists generally obey the directions of police officers...", the
officer was not negligent when the suspect exceeded speeds of 110
m.p.h. in an attempt to get away. Simmen v. State (N .Y. App. 1981),
442 N.Y.S. 2d 216. The courts added in 1952, that "Police cannot be
made insurers of the conduct of the culprits they chase." Chambers
v. Ideal Pure Milk Co. (Ky. 1952), 245 SW. 2d 589. Following this
trend, a New York court ruled that:

 

 

Police officers have a right to use whatever means
necessary to make an arrest and unless they exceed
proper and rational bounds, or act in a negligent, careless
or wanton manner, they are not liable for damages
sustained, even by innocent parties. McCormick v. State
(1964), 43 Misc.2d 777, 252 N.Y.S. 2d 199.

Similar rulings appeared in: Cairl v. St. Paul (Minn. 1978), 268 NW.
2d 908 Selkowitz v. State (N.Y. App. 1976), 389 N.Y.S. 2d 45; Ell—(E
v. City of Alexandria, (La. App. 1972), 261 So. 2d 92; Dunn v. State
(N .Y. App. 1971), 327 N.Y.S. 2d 622; Downs v. Camp, (111. App. 1969),
252 NE. 2d 46; and, Wrubel v. State, (N.Y. App. 1958), 174 N.Y.S. 2d

 

 

 

 

 

 

22

687. However, the most current trend is greater liability for
departments where a third party injury is present. This is partially
due to the fact that although the injured plaintiff may have a better
case against the fleeing suspect, he has little chance of collecting
against him. Therefore, he will attempt to hold the police officer
liable, as well as the city, under the vicarious liability standard.

In Thain v. New York (N.Y. 1971), 280 NE. 2d 892, the court
stated that although the officers could not be held liable on the basis
of the suspect's negligence, they could be held liable for their own.

 

They also cited the duty of the officers to balance the need to
apprehend the fugitive and due care for the public. The courts have
held that an officer's obligation to act with due care encompasses a
duty to third parties. They have a legal duty in pursuit in which no
person should be placed at risk. Duarte v. City of San lose, (Cal.
App. 1980),161 Cal. Reptr. 140. The courts have, in fact, completely
reversed the ruling in Draper and in numerous cases have held the
officer liable when the pursued vehicle collided with innocent third
parties. Wason v. City of Britton, (1975); loyner v. District of
Columbia (DC 1981), 28 CrL 2496; Sintros v. LaValle (Fla. App.
1981) 406 So. 2d 483; Gibson v. City of Pasadena, (Cal. App. 1978),
148 Cal. Rptr. 88; Boyer v. Indian River County Sheriff's
Department, (Fla. 1981) #77-458 Vero Beach Court: Alexander v.
New York (N.Y. App. 1976), 371 NE. 2d 534, 385 N.Y.S. 2d 788;
Schatz v. Cutler (D.C. Vt. 1975), 395 F. Supp. 271.

The turning point for Michigan appears to be the case of fie;
v. City of Ann Arbor (309 N .W. 2d 552; Mich App 1981). In ML the

court examined the issue of governmental immunity in conjunction

 

 

 

 

 

 

23

with the general standards of negligence and the statutory
exemptions applicable to the operation of emergency vehicles.

In this case, police officers were involved in a high speed
pursuit of a traffic violator within the city limits of Ann Arbor. The
pursuit commenced after the officers involved observed the fugitive,
M. Lehman, fail to stop for a flashing red signal. Initial attempts to
stop the vehicle were unsuccessful, and a pursuit ensued. The pursuit
progressed through residential and business areas, and reached
speeds of over 100 m.p.h. Lehman disregarded traffic signals, and
after losing control of his car, struck the police car and stopped. As
one of the officers approached his car, Lehman sped away, nearly
striking the officer. The officer, who had remained in the patrol car,
re-initiated the pursuit, and followed the fugitive the wrong way
down a one-way street. The officer, however, soon lost contact with
the suspect vehicle. Another officer, spotting the fugitive, proceeded
to take up the chase with sirens and lights activated. This last phase
of the chase lasted almost six blocks at speeds in excess of 50 m.p.h.
in a 25 m.p.h. zone. The pursuing officer observed Lehman attempt
to brake at an intersection, before speeding through. The plaintiff's
car was broadsided by the suspect's vehicle, and the plaintiff
sustained serious injuries. The facts of this case brought up two legal
questions:

I. Did the defense of "governmental immunity" apply to

the officers and the City of Ann Arbor in this case?
11. If "governmental immunity" did not apply, did the
action of the officers constitute negligence? m

v. City of Ann Arbor (309 NW. 2d 552; Mich App
1981).

 

 

 

 

24

The original ruling by the trial court granted the officers
"governmental immunity", and ruled for the City. The Court of
Appeals upheld this decision. However, the Michigan Supreme
Court, citing MCLA 691.1405, reversed the decision and ruled that
police officers were not automatically immune from civil liability for
personal injuries or property damage sustained as the result of high
speed chases. MCLA 691.1405 creates an exception to the
government immunity doctrine for situations where any injury or
other damage is caused by the negligent operation of a government
owned motor vehicle while under the operation of a government
employee. (Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor, 309 NW. 2d 552: Mich App
1981).

According to Koonz and Regan (1981), total abrogation of

 

governmental immunity is on its way. They assert that courts now
start from the premise that "...liability is the rule and immunity is the
exception" (Koonz and Regan, 1981:65). More and more, courts are
holding individual officers, their departments, and municipal
governments liable for the actions not only of themselves, but of the

fugitives they pursue as well.

Negligence

In litigation matters the primary focus is on the failure of an
officer to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. The
courts have ruled that officers have a duty to balance the state's need
for apprehension against the police duty to protect the public from
undue risk of harm. If an officer is unsuccessful in balancing the

scale, his/ her actions may be regarded as negligent. Negligence is

 

 

 

:10

25

 

determined by the trier of fact, using the "reasonable man" theory.
That isvthe question presented to the jury would be to ascertain what
any "reasonable, prudent emergency driver would do under all the
circumstances, including that of the emergency." Rutherford v.
State, (Alaska. 1979), 605 P. 2d 16. To determine reasonableness,
factors such as speed through intersection, view of intersection
cross-traffic, road and weather conditions, need for emergency
response, and other drivers' negligence should all be considered
(Rutherford, 1979). In a similar ruling, the court ruled against an
officer who proceeded through a red light resulting in the death of
the operator. They stated:
"To have entered such a crowded intersection at any
speed without the vehicle being in sufficient control to
permit an abrupt stop, particularly with so many
obstacles present preventing a clear view of the dangers
which might lie ahead, belies all representations of
caution and is certainly inconsistent with safe operation"

Mayfield v. City of Springfield, (Ill. 1981), NE. 2d
#17096.

The courts have stated once reasonableness is determined,
proof of negligence consists of evidence showing a duty to the
injured party, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately

resulting from that breach. Furthermore, such injury must be so

 

related as to be the proximate cause thereof. (Brooks v. Lundeen
(1981), 364 NE 2nd 423).

However, the court decided in Kuzmics v. Santiago, Pa Super
389 A2nd 587. that vehicle code exemptions have been designed to
require plaintiff seeking recovery for any damaged caused by an

emergency vehicle to provide recklessness rather than ordinary

 

 

 

26

negligence. Conduct is considered to be reckless when the officer
intentionally disregards the safety of another by failing to perform
an act that the public is entitled to or performing an act which
endangers the public. If the officer knows in his mind that his actions
could reasonably cause proximate harm to others or to himself, the
recklessness would be warranted. (Reilly v. Philadelphia, 328 PA
563).

The court's decision of proximate cause has been based on the
evidence in each case as it relates to due care. The court has held
that "...officers engaged in high speed pursuit of traffic violators are
protected by statute where they observed basic standards of reason
and due care." Marion v. City of Flint, (1976), 71 Mich App 447;
Mayfield v. City of Springfield, (Ill. 1981), NE. 2d #17096. Powell v.
Allstate Insurance Co. (La. App. 1970), 233 So. 2d 38; Hammon V.
Pedigo, (Neb. 1962), 115 NW. 2d 222. The court, ruling similarly in
Stanton v. New York (1967) 285 NY Supp 2d 964, further stated that

"...the statutes require vehicles to operate with proper emergency

 

 

sound and light equipment...the statutes further require due care for
life and property and freedom from reckless disregard of the safety
of others." (Stanton, 1967). The court also provided for negligence
to be determined by the jury, even if all statutory requirements were
met by the officer. Winston v. Davis (Neb. 1971), 192 N. W. 2d 413.

The duty of an officer to drive with due regard for all persons

 

requires the officer to weigh the protection of life and property by
capturing a fleeing offender, who by not stopping his vehicle
wantonly endangers the public's safety, against the possibility of

endangering life and property by continuing the pursuit. This duty to

 

 

\
\

II

 

27

drive with due regard for all persons must be measured in terms of
due care under the unique circumstances present at the time of the
pursuit decision. Clark v. Sterrett (1966), 141 Ind. App. 384, 386, 220
NE. 2d 779, 781.

Pursuits in which visible and audible emergency equipment was
not implemented and which have resulted in an accident involving
the fugitive and a third party have not been looked upon favorably by
the courts. The court ruled that failure to use a siren during pursuit
constituted negligence on the part of the officer. Alexander v. New
X21134 (N.Y. App. 1976), 371 NE. 2d 534, 385 N.Y.S. 2d 788. In the
event that a siren was not implemented, negligence could be based
on a "failure to warn". Reed v. Winter Park (Fla. App. 1971), 253 So.
2d 475; M11 v. City and County of Denver (Colo. 1980), #C61525.

The court has also ruled on cases in which the plaintiff was
"contributory negligent." In lackson v. Rauch, (Mich. App. 1969), 171
NW. 2d 551, the court, under the doctrines of "discovered peril,"

 

 

"last clear chance , discovered negligence , reckless negligence" or
"gross negligence" and "humanitarian rule", found that the
contributorily negligent plaintiff was entitled to recover if
defendant's negligence was proximate cause of injury. The court
ruled that even though the plaintiff's failure to yield at an
intersection constituted "contributory negligence", the officer should
have realized that the plaintiff was not going to yield, and was thus
showed no due regard for the safety of the plaintiff. However, in
1979, the court replaced the "contributory negligence" with a
"comparative negligence" standard. This standard allows the jury to

determine who was more at fault the plaintiff or the officer. The

 

 

 

28

courts held that the standard of care to which the driver with the
right of way must adhere was a standard of reasonable or due care
under the circumstances. Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, (Mich.
1979), 275 NW. 2d 511.

The courts have also held the officer liable in similar cases
where an intersection was present, stating that:

The driver traveling on a through street, as against an

emergency vehicle, has a right to cross the intersection

unless, by the reasonable exercise of the senses of sights

and hearing, he or she should have noticed or heard

warning to the contrary. City of Lansing v. Hathaway,
280 Mich. 87, 273 NW. 403 (1937).

Thus, the plaintiff's obligation is to be "fairly alert to potential
dangers that may be readily seen or heard" Holser v. City of
Midland 330 Mich. 581, 584, 48 NW. 2d 208 (1951). Furthermore,
they ruled that the right of way is not an "assurance of safety", and

 

does not grant absolute right of way in any given circumstance. The
driver is still required to operate his vehicle with due car in View of
the situation at the time. In other words, the driver on a through
highway man not "proceed blindly." Holser supra, 330 Mich. 584, 48
NW. 2d 211. However, the jury must decide whether or not a

 

reasonable person would have seen or heard the oncoming
emergency vehicle. Keevis v. Tookey, 42 Mich. App. 283, 287, 201
NW. 2d 661 (1972).

The court has also ruled that driving the wrong way on a one
way street could be considered negligence, as could driving on the

sidewalk. (Catpenter v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., (La.
App. 1976), 333 So. 2d 296; and, Baselski v. City of Chicago, (Ill. App.

 

 

 

29

1972), 292 NE. 2d 475. Rulings for the police officer were found in
lones V. Ray, (Ga. App. 1981), 285 SE. 2d 42 and Sholar v. US. Fire
Insurance Co., (La. App. 1972), 261 So. 2d 327. In each of these cases,
the plaintiff's negligence was said to be the causal factor in the
accident.

Accidents resulting from the officer's failure to utilize visual
and audible signals are not usually looked upon by the court in the
officer's favor. The court held that emergency vehicles are only
exempt "from the rules governing other vehicles," if the officer
utilizes audible and visible signals. Mayor and Alderman of Town of
Morristown v. Inman (Tenn. 1960), 342 SW. 2d 71. Similar rulings

appeared in Moore v. Travelers Indemnity Co., (La, App. 1977), 352
So. 2d 270; Cotton v. Transamerica Insurance Co. (La. App. 1968),

 

 

211 So. 2d 110; Herron v. Silbaugh, (Pa. 1970), 260 A. 2d 755;
Cornwall v. Larsen (Utah 1977), 571 P. 2d 925; Kirshenbaum v.
Chicago, (Ill. 1976), 357 NE. 2d 571; Scottsdale v. Kokaska (Ariz.
App. 1972), 495 P. 2d 1327; and, Franklin v. Dade County, (Fla. App.
1970), 230 So. 2d 730.

Situations in which an officer must respond in a "silent

 

 

emergency response", such as a robbery or burglary in progress, have
been looked upon differently by various courts. The court ruled in
Stephen v. City of Lincoln, (Neb. 1981), 311 NW. 2d 889, that the
officer was not negligent if the circumstances demanded a silent
response, if he properly used his lights as a warning. However, an
Arkansas court ruled that a silent response, in and of itself, could be
considered negligence on the part of the police officer. (Wht'stle-Vess
BottlingCo. v. OWEfi, (Ark. 1970), 459 SW. 2d 562. Other courts

 

 

 

30

have ruled that the silent response, in and of itself, could not be
construed as negligence; however, the officer must still practice due
regard for the safety of others. Brummgtt V. County of Sacramento,
(Cal. 1978), 582 P. 2d 952; Rutherford v. State (Alaska, 1979), 605 P.
2d 16; Dillenbeck v. Cig; of Los AngelesL (Cal. 1968), 446 P. 2d 129.

According to Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated (M.C.L.A.)
691.1405:

 

Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury
and property damage resulting from the negligent
operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the
governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the
governmental agency is owner, as defined in Act N o. 300
of the Public Acts of 1949, as amended, being sections
257.1 to 257.923 of the Compiled Laws of 1948.

Liability To Fleeing Suspects

Although the courts have held much sympathy for third party
injuries resulting from pursuits, the liability to the fleeing suspect is
somewhat diminished. For example, the court held that the fleeing
driver was negligent as a matter of law. They stated "..if the
plaintiff negligently and is the proximate cause of his own injuries,
he is barred from recovery." (Silva v. City of Alburquggg, NM App
610-P2d 219). The courts have further held that if the officer
practiced due care, was not the proximate cause of the accident, and
was not shown to be negligent in his duties, no legal grounds exist
for litigation. The court further stated that "...police cannot be made
insurers of the culprits that they chase." Furthermore, the court

stated that actionable negligence "may only be maintained by

 

 

31

shoveling of a duty, a breach thereof, and an injury as proximate
result of the breach." Baile v. L. W. Edison Charitable Foundation
334,N.E. 2nd 141).

 

Emergency Situations

The courts have ruled that in order for statutory exemptions to
be in force, police must be involved in emergency situations. The
courts have held that certain situations were indeed emergency
situations. However, no universal definition of an emergency
situation has been established; rather, each situation is judged case
by case. In Hamilton v. Town of Palo (244 NW 2d 329), the court
found that an emergency call does indeed exist when, upon receipt of
message, an officer truly believes an emergency exists and has
reasonable grounds to believe same. Furthermore, in Simkins v.
Barcus [(1951) 77A 2d 717}, the court ruled that even if the situation

was not in fact an emergency, the police were not liable if the officer

 

involved honestly believed it to be. Whether or not a call may be
considered an emergency depends upon the nature of the call and the
situation presented to the officer. (Lakoduk v. Gruger, (1956) 296 P
2d 690.

The courts have also found certain situations where they can be
considered emergency situations on their face. In Rankin v. Sander
(121 NE 2d 91) and Agpew v. Porter (247 NE 2d 487), the courts found
that a call for "help" by a fellow officer, could be considered an
emergency on its face. Other situations which the courts have held
to constitute emergencies are: investigation of an accident, (Rowe v.
Kansas City Public Service Co., 248 SW. 2d 454 (1942); and, an

 

 

 

32

mqesfigation of death, (Spencer v. Heise, 158 NE. 2d 570, (1958).
However, the courts have also ruled that certain situations are not
emergencies, and should not be construed as such. For example, an
officer in pursuit of a stolen car is not protected under statute Q1211
Arx V. 'Burlingame, 1936, 60P Zn 304). Likewise, officers who are
investigating criminal offenses are also exempt from statute
protection. (Brazonia v. Radtke, 1978. 566 NW 2d 326).

Legal Aspects of Roadblocks

In some instances, law enforcement agencies may find it
necessary to block traffic in order to apprehend a fleeing suspect. A
roadblock is a structure, device, or other means used by duly-
authorized law enforcement officers for the purpose of controlling
all traffic through a point on the highway, whereby all vehicles may
be slowed or stopped. Although roadblocks are implemented for a
variety of reasons, for the purposes of this study, only roadblocks
which are implemented to apprehend fleeing violators are
considered. The provision for roadblocks is mandatory in an
effective pursuit policy. The same standards of care which apply in
other pursuit situations, also apply in situations in which a roadblock

is necessary.

Inadequate Training
42 U.S.C. 1983 provides for the liability of any municipality for
constitutional deprivations made under color of state law if the

alleged wrongdoing of the municipality is the inadequate training of

 

 

33

an eflployee. Additionally, the plaintiff must show that the alleged
wrongdoing constitutes a municipal custom or policy. It states:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured

in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. { 1983 (1976).

It is apparent that the attitudes and subsequent rulings of the
courts are constantly changing. Thus, it is extremely hard for police
administrators to keep pace of current opinions. However,
administrators, aided by social scientists and armed with existing

statutes, may develop adequate policies (Galligher, 1985).

Relevant Michigan Statutes

Although much litigation regarding pursuits by the police has
taken place in Michigan, and court views are constantly changing,
the Michigan Vehicle Code which mandates high speed driving by
the police remains somewhat constant. Outlined below are the
excerpts which deal with police pursuits.

MCLA 257.603(b) provides for the "standard of care" doctrine.
It allows the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle when
responding to an emergency call, but not while returning from an
emergency call, to exercise the privileges set forth in this section,

subject to the conditions of this section.

 

(c)

(d)

(e)

34

The driver of an emergency vehicle may:

1. Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this
act.

2. Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but
only after slowing down as may be necessary for
safe operation. '

3. Exceed the prima facie speed limits so long as he
does not endanger life or property.

4. Disregard regulations governing direction of
movement or turning in a specified direction.

The exemptions granted in this section to an authorized
emergency vehicle shall apply only when the driver of the
vehicle while in motion sounds an audible signal by bell,
siren, air horn, or exhaust whistle as may be reasonably
necessary except as provided in subsection (3), and when
the vehicle is equipped with at least one lighted lamp
displaying a flashing, oscillating, or rotating red or blue
light.

A police vehicle shall retain the exemptions granted in
this section to an authorized emergency vehicle without
sounding an audible signal if the police vehicle is engaged
in an emergency run where silence is required.

However, the exception to the requirement that an emergency
vehicle must activate its siren in order to fall within these
statutory exemptions is very limited. One such exemption
would be in response to silent alarms. However, in order to
operate as an emergency vehicle the lights would still have to
be activated.

(1’)

The exemptions provided for by this section shall apply
to persons, teams, motor vehicles, and other equipment
while actually engaged in work upon the surface of a

 

35

highway, but shall not apply to those persons and
vehicles when traveling to or from work.

The concept of due regard may be found in MCLA 257.632.

The speed limitations set forth in this chapter shall not
apply to vehicles when operated with due regard for for safety
under the direction of the police when traveling in emergencies
or in the chase or apprehension of violators of the law or of
persons charges with or suspected of a violation...This
exception shall apply only when the driver of the vehicle while
in motion sounds an audible signal by bell, siren or exhaust
whistle as may be reasonably necessary or when the vehicle is
equipped with at least one lighted lamp displaying a flashing,
oscillating or rotating red or blue light visible under normal
atmospheric conditions from a distance of 500 feet to the front
of such vehicles, unless the nature of the mission requires that a
law enforcement officer travel without giving warning to
suspected law violators. This exemption shall not however
protect the driver of the vehicle from the consequences of a
reckless disregard of the safety of others.

Also including due regard provisions is MCLA 257.653, which

states:

(a) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized
emergency vehicle...

1. The driver of every other vehicle shall yield the
right of way.

(b) This section shall not operate to relieve the driver of
an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive
with due regard for the safety of all persons using the
highway.

Previous Research on Police Pursuit

Although the field is somewhat barren, there does exist certain

studies, which may provide insight into the issue of pursuit. The

 

"I

K
I

g0

.10

36

 

9mm research in this area are the studies conducted by the
California Highway Patrol (1983), Physicians for Automotive Safety
(1968), National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (1970), and
Beckman (1987). These studies are somewhat contradictory, and the
authors concur on very few points. It is important to remember that
some of these studies were conducted in certain geographical areas,
using data obtained from select law enforcement agencies, while
others, like Beckman (1987) were more broad in nature.

To date there has been no nationwide study that provides an
accurate estimation of how many pursuits take place yearly. One
study estimated that somewhere between 50,000 and 500,000 pursuits
take place in any given year (Fennessy, 1970).

Studies similarly differ on the estimates on injuries and
fatalities experienced due to pursuits. In a study conducted by the
Physicians for Automotive Safety (1968), relying solely on newspaper
clippings, they estimated that one (1) out of five (5), or twenty
percent (20%) end in death, while seven (7) out of ten (10), or seventy
percent (70%) end in» accidents. This was contradicted by the
California Highway Patrol's study which found that one percent
(1%) of all pursuits end in death, and only thirty percent (30%) end in
accidents (California Highway Patrol, 1983). Beckman's study (1983)
found that 17-45% of all pursuits ended in property damage; 14-23%
ended in injury; and, up to 3% ended in fatalities. A study conducted
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (1970), found
that there are approximately 250,000 police chases each year, 8,000
of which end in accidents. That is only equal to 3.2%, contrary to the
higher findings of 30-70%.

 

 

9.

11¢

37

 

To date there has been numerous studies on police pursuits.
However, almost invariably these studies were somewhat flawed in
their methodologies, making their findings invalid and unreliable.
These studies are summarized below.

A Study of the Problem of Hot Pursuit by the Police (1970) was
conducted in 1970, in conjunction with the United States Department
of Transportation (DOT) National Highway Safety Bureau,
concluded that police pursuits end in an unacceptable number of
accidents, injuries, fatalities and the like. However, the best
estimation that they could reach on the number of pursuits which
occur yearly was somewhere between 50,000 and 500,000. Other
findings included:

1) 6,000 to 8,000 of the pursuits result in accidents;

2) 300 to 400 pursuit-related fatalities occur every
year;

3) 2,500 to 5,000 pursuit-related injuries occur every
year.

4) Less than 5% of all law enforcement agencies keep
an accurate count of the pursuits with which they
are involved (Fennessey, 1970).

Although sponsored by the United States Department of
Transportation, this study, in keeping with the other available
studies on pursuit, is somewhat flawed in its methodology.
According to Beckman (1983), this study was based on (1) a review of
prior research, (2) a one-month field study in four police agencies,
and (3) available police data. The one-month field study of 46 police
pursuits and "available police data" were so limiting that the study

38

itself labeled them as unworkable. As a result, the findings presented
were based on an extremely small sample, "unreliable historical
information, and unworkable police data" (California Highway
Patrol, ~1983z7).

Interestingly enough, this study, unlike prior ones, found that,
on the average, individuals that attempted to flee from the police
had "significantly different characteristics than normal drivers."
Additionally, these drivers were "involved in a significantly higher
number of accidents," and had a "statistically significant number of
convictions for moving violations"(Fennessey, 1970:6).

In 1968, the Physicians for Automotive Safety released a study
that concluded that all pursuits must be prohibited due to the dangers
inherent in high speed pursuits. They based this conclusion on data
which showed that:

1) One out of five (20%) of all pursuits end in death;

2) Five out of ten (50%) of all pursuits result in
serious injury;

3) Seven out of ten (70%) of all pursuits are
culminated in an accident;

4.) One out of twenty-five fatalities in pursuits is a law
enforcement officer;

5) More than 500 persons die each year as a result of
high speed pursuits initiated by law enforcement

personnel.
Unfortunately, much publicity was gained from this report, and

public concern over the issue of police pursuit was intensified. What

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

39

was not publicized was the way in which the authors reached their
conclusions.

The researchers of the PAS study based their conclusions solely
on the basis of newspaper clippings depicting police pursuit
incidents. Furthermore, the PAS research team failed to consult with
any law enforcement agency, further invalidating their findings.

In keeping with the previous research on the topic of police
pursuit, Beckman (1983) concluded that no matter how fast or how
far a police pursuit lasts, pursuits are not "particularly safe"
(Beckman, 1983: 46). Beckman's study involved 424 pursuits among
75 law enforcement agencies in nine states and two territories, and
at its publishing was considered to be the most comprehensive study
to date.

Beckman found that suspects are most likely to sustain injuries
or fatalities, other motorists placed second, while law enforcement
personnel were third. He reported that property damage occurred in
one out of five (20%) pursuits, injuries in one in seven, and deaths in
one in thirty five.

Other relevant findings included:

1) Factors such as distance, time of pursuit, type of .
roadway, locale, environmental conditions, pohce and

suspect's speed did not affect the likelihood of
apprehension of the suspect.

2) Shorter pursuits usually resulted in property felony
charges, while longer pursuits tended to result in vrolent

felony charges.

 

 

 

 

3)

4)

6)

8)

9)

10)

11)

12)

40

The typical driver who attempts to elude the police is not
a dangerous felon, but has various other reasons for
fleeing.

The event preceding the pursuit is unrelated to the
safety of its outcome.

Generally, the officer's perception of the event
immediately preceding the pursuit is confirmed by the
booking charges.

In pursuits in which only one officer is involved, the
suspect has a greater chance of escaping.

The typical pursuit is usually terminated when the
offender voluntarily stops his vehicle and surrenders, or
when the offender is involved in an accident.

Offenders who were forcibly stopped by law enforcement
personnel were usually charged with a violent felony,
reckless driving or driving under the influence of alcohol.

Ninety-six percent of the suspects were male 67% were
white, 16% were black; 45% of suspects were in the 21-30
years age group, 37% were between the ages of 11-20.

Police injuries occurred in police speeds ranging from 41
to 140 miles per hour.

Pursuits with high speeds, long distance and intoxicated
drivers occurred primarily at night.

Suspects between the ages of 21-40 were usually booked
on felony and driving-related charges, while those under
21 and over 40 were usually book on driving-related
charges only.

 

41

Surprisingly enough, Beckman (1983) reported that the use of
roadblocks and ramming actually decreased the overall injury rate,
while increasing the rate of apprehension from 77% to 96%.

Although each of these studies reported statistical findings,
each of the studies were methodologically or theoretically flawed to
such an extent that their findings must be considered suspect at best.
However, there does exist three more recent empirical studies which
offer some very different conclusions.

Unlike the previous studies on police pursuits, the California
Highway Patrol (1983) developed a sound methodology which was
consistent with social science research. The California Highway
Patrol (CHP) study was conducted over an eighteen month period in
which all California Highway Patrol pursuits and all pursuits of ten
cooperating law enforcement agencies were documented on survey
forms prepared by the researchers. Data was collected on a total of
683 pursuits, 480 for the California Highway Patrol and 203 from ten
cooperating agencies. Consequently, the methodology implemented
by the California Highway Patrol resulted in findings contradictory
to all of the previous studies.

The researchers of the California Highway Patrol (1983),
reasoning that apprehension of minor traffic violations preserves
order on the highway, concluded that pursuit is worth the risk. They
found that the typical law enforcement pursuit did not end in death
or injury to innocent persons; rather, injury to non-pursuit involved
parties was quite rare. Furthermore, they reported that simply
following a fleeing offender was a very effective method in

apprehending violators, due to the fact that 54.6% of the time, the

 

42

offender either voluntarily stopped and surrendered, or the offender

was involved in an accident and surrendered (CHP, 1983).

The California Highway Patrol study listed a typology of a

typical pursuit:

1)

2).

3)

4)

6)

7)

8)

9)

10)

the typical pursuit will be initiated after an officer
witnesses a violation of the Vehicle Code;

the pursuit will occur towards the end of the week
between 1500 and 0300 hours;

the pursuit will travel 1 mile and last one to two
minutes;

two ground units will be involved in the pursuit
with no air support;

the pursuit will take place in an urban area;

the pursuit will terminate because the pursued
driver voluntarily stops or crashes and surrenders;
or because the pursued vehicle outruns the police
vehicle;

the driver of the pursued vehicle will be arrested
and booked;

no firearms or forcible stops will be used during the
pursuit;

the pursued driver will be a male, 20 years of age;
high speed driving will be the method used by the

pursued driver while trying to evade arrest
(California Highway Patrol, 1983: 20).

Additionally, they found that the time of day, the vicinity of

pursuit, and the violator's age had no effect on the apprehension

 

 

43

rate, accident rate, or severity of accidents. Further findings
indicated that the apprehension rate of pursuit suspects was
seventy-seven percent (77%). The typical pursuit lasted less than ten
(10) minutes, and covered ten (10) miles or less (California Highway
Patrol, 1983). Like Beckman (1983) they concluded that the length or
duration of pursuit did not affect the outcome.

The researchers also found that less than 3 in 10 (29%)
involved actual collisions, contradicting the 1968 study conducted by
the North Carolina Highway Patrol, which reported that 7 out of 10
(70%) of pursuits ended in accidents. They further found that only 1
(one) percent of pursuits ended in death, not the 20 percent which
were claimed in other studies. And, finally, they found that only 11
percent of all pursuits end in injury, contradicting earlier studies
which found a 50 percent injury ending rate.

Furthermore, approximately 70% of all pursuit related injuries
and fatalities will occur to the occupants of the pursued vehicle;
approximately 14% to law enforcement personnel; and
approximately 15% to uninvolved parties. Approximately 28% of all
fatalities can be expected to be uninvolved parties, and law
enforcement fatalities are extremely unlikely (CHP, 1983).

The California Highway Patrol (1983) also reported that 77%
of all pursuits end with the apprehension of an offender; and that,
most pursuits are ten miles or less in length, and last ten minutes or
less.

Although methodologically sound, the study conducted by the
California Highway Patrol was limited to a specific geographical

location which may or may not limit the generalizability of the

 

44

findings. The majority of pursuits contained in the study involved
the California Highway Patrol. In other words, 95% of the studied
incidents were initiated on freeways. This may limit the study's
external validity.

Until recently, this study was the only empirical research in the
area of police pursuit. However, a study conducted by Alpert and
Dunham (1989) was also empirically sound. Implementing
discriminant analysis, Alpert and Dunham (1989) attempted to
predict outcomes of pursuits based on characteristics of pursuits and
individual officers. Their findings indicated that:

1) Older officers are the least likely to be involved in
accidents;

2) Pursuits initiated for traffic violations were more
likely to result in accidents;

3) Pursuits involving wet roadways had a greater
probability of resulting in an accident;

4) Pursuits in which multiple police agencies are involved
are more likely to result in personal injury;

5) Pursuits lasting ten minutes or more are least likely to
result in personal injury;

6) Pursuits initiated by males are 50% more likely to result
in personal injury;

7) Pursuits which involve speeds in excess of 40 miles per
hour are more likely to end in the escape of the offender;

 

45

8) Pursuits involving motorcycles are 50% more likely to
terminate in the escape of the perpetrator when
compared to pursuits involving automobiles or trucks.
(Alpert and Dunham, 1989)

Although the research tends to support the law enforcement
view that police pursuits are safe, the researchers stress the need for
strong policies regarding police pursuit. They point out that pursuit
driving is sixty-five times more likely to result in an accident that any

other type of police driving.

Summary of the literature

Although much has been written on police pursuits in the past
several years, the literature is still ambiguous and contradictory.
Some authors maintain that police pursuits are too dangerous and
should be abolished, while others argue that to do so would be
tantamount to regulating chaos. The majority of the literature is
based strictly on speculation and moral indignation. The presence of
empirical research on the topic of police pursuit policy is still
somewhat sparse.

The only centralizing theme to the literature which exists
appears to be the importance of a sufficient policy which controls
officers' discretion. It is for this reason that administrators must
grapple with monumental decisions in development of an effective
policy. However, even the most circumspect policy may be rendered
inoperable if perceptions within ranks do not concur. There has

been no empirical study to date which has ascertained if this occurs.

 

 

46

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Research Design

This thesis details the introductory phase of a two part study.
The second part of the study is currently underway, and should
provide insight into environmental, demographic, and judgmental
conditions that exist at the time pursuit decisions are made.
Furthermore, the results of the study should proVide police
managers with empirical data and conclusions which can be used to
produce sound policy, realistic training, and appropriate supervision
in matters relating to police emergency responses with a particular
emphasis on pursuits.

The first phase was the development, design, distribution and
analysis of an attitudinal survey. The survey was designed as a self-
administered General Opinion Questionnaire. This attitudinal
survey was distributed to all sworn members of the State Police who
were presently assigned, or had performed, general road duties .
Each of the 2,220 enlisted personnel were asked to describe their job
from one of four categories. Those categories were 1) Road Patrol;
2) First Line Supervisor; 3) Investigative; and, 4) Administrative.

The survey instrument was designed to determine the opinions

of officers who are making or who have made decisions while

 

 

 

47

performing actual pursuits. The conceptual basis for this decision
was that philosophical agreement must exist within a department if
the policy, as determined by administrators, was to be of any value to
those doing the pursuing and those supervising them. Divergent
views on the matter could be identified by conducting an attitudinal
survey to pinpoint inconsistencies in thinking among the
respondents. Such information could then be used for training and

supervisory interventions.

Survey Design

This survey design may be conceptualized as a perceptual study
of police officers. The instrument was constructed after an analysis
of previous research findings, a review of previous pursuit accidents,
and a general review of the literature. In support of this activity, the
State Police provided a committee of police experts from several
areas of the department and an additional researcher for support
and input from Ferris State University. Several of the questions
were included as a result of an analysis of hundreds of cases brought
against the police nationwide.

The opinion questionnaire consisted of 64 questions and was
limited to the subject of pursuits as defined by departmental policy.
The job type was used as the independent variable. In an attempt to
maximize the internal validity of the study, the survey was designed
to be anonymous. This practice was implemented in an attempt to
obliterate biased responses from individuals apprehensive of

possible repercussions from their superior officers.

 

 

 

48

To maintain the anonymity of respondents, each enlisted
member of the department was mailed a survey instrument for
completion. A cover letter with an explanation of the purpose of the
study accompanied the instrument (see Appendix A). Each
completed survey was deposited into a central mailing container at
each work station and mailed directly to the researcher by a
designated supervisor. Removing the process from the normal chain
of command provided an atmosphere for confidentiality and
anonymity.

In order to achieve the highest possible response rate, several
meetings were held with post commanders, district commanders,
and union representatives prior to distribution of the survey
instrument. The director of the department provided each member
of the department with a general overview, and requested their
cooperation in this research endeavor. After two weeks, a follow up
letter was sent by the researcher through departmental mail as a
reminder for all officers to complete the survey instrument.
Responses were scaled on a Likert type scale with four possible
categories: 1) Strongly agree; 2) Agree; 3) Disagree; and, 4) Strongly

disagree. No neutral option was available.

Population

The population consisted of all Michigan State Police officers
who are presently or have been assigned general police duties on
road patrol. These respondents are located at one of 68 state police
posts spread over 83 counties. In order to obtain the widest possible

variations of disparity among ranks and to gather as much

 

 

 

49

information as possible about the state agency, it was decided to
utilize the entire population of sworn Michigan State Police officers.
Samples were not drawn from this population, rather the entire

population was used.

Instrumentation

This research is descriptive and exploratory in nature, it is
designed to discover training, supervisory an policy implications.
The questionnaire was designed to determine the opinions of
enforcement members when making decisions on the job regarding
police pursuits. It 'was also designed to see if there exists
significantly different opinions or attitudes among the various ranks
of the department.

In addition to the anonymity of the study, the Nominal Group
Process (NGP) was implemented in the development of the
questionnaire to maximize the validity of the study. The
questionnaire was constructed by a fifteen-member committee,
consisting of consultants, union representatives, and various ranks
in the department, after analysis previous research findings, a
review of previous pursuit accidents, and a review of the literature.

The six step process was initiated at a preliminary meeting.
This meeting resulted in the documentation of concerns individual
concerns and questions about departmental pursuit policies. The
committee then convened on three separate occasions to discuss and
prioritize items. After three meetings, a discussion of the vote took
place. And, finally, a silent vote was taken, including a re-ranking of

priorities.

 

 

 

 

50

This approach was selected due to its inherent nature of
interaction among experts. This amalgamation resulted in the most
equitable solution for those involved.

The questionnaire was developed with the assistance of a fifteen
member committee, consisting of various ranks in the department,

consultants and union representatives.

Response Rate

The authorized strength of sworn members of the department
was 2,220. Twelve hundred and eighteen useable surveys were
received. Table 3.1 illustrates the distribution of the responses. The
resultant response rate was 55%. While this was considerably lower
than expected, it is still considered a good response rate for social
science research. The survey instrument was distributed at the apex
of an election year, and economic factors and subsequent disruptions
and anxieties may have contributed to the lower than expected
response rate. The variances in numbers of respondents from
questions to question was due to the fact that some respondents

omitted answering certain questions.

Table 3.1 Distribution of Responses

 

 

Job Type N

Road Patrol 674
Investigative 202
First Line Supervisor 173

Administrative 169

 

 

 

 

51

Survey Instrument

The survey instrument implemented in this study was a self-
report questionnaire. The questionnaire was composed of sixty-
three perceptual questions with responses on a scale from Strongly
Agree to Strongly Disagree. There was no neutral response
provided on the questionnaire in an attempt to obtain the most
accurate data. The independent variable was job type of the
respondent with four categories possible: 1) road patrol; 2)
investigative; 3) first line supervisor; and, 4) administrative.

The questionnaire was designed to ascertain perceptions on
various issues relating to pursuit among four broad job categories
within a department. Of the 63 elements contained in the
questionnaire, seven classifications of variables emerged. These
variables were categorized for clarification in reporting results.
These categories included: 1) policy; 2) training; 3) supervisory; 4)
liability; 5) operational; 6) perceptual; and, 6) external. Due to the
categorical nature of the data collected, the x2 statistic was used.

The Chi-Square Statistic

The Chi-Square test was selected due to its ability to test the
independence of the relationship between categorical variables.
The Chi-Square, based on a distribution of frequencies, ascertains
whether the two variables are independent, exhibit no relationship
or an association due to chance, or are dependent where the

relationship is real and would seldom occur due to chance alone.

 

 

 

 

52

CHAPTERIV

ANALYSIS OF DATA

Introduction

The data will be presented in three sections. The first section is
the percentages section. The proportion of respondents in each job
type category responding to each individual question. The results
will be used to assist the administration of the State Police to
determine policy, training, and supervisory implications based on
empirical data.

The second and third part of the analysis will involve
crosstabulation of the independent variable, job type, against the
dependent variables. The independent variables, job type, contained
four classifications: 1) road patrol - typical line officers whose duties
primarily involve patrol duties; 2) investigative - officers whose
primary duties are of an investigative nature and who do not fall
into the final two categories; 3) supervisory - first line supervisors,
section heads and unit leaders; and, 4) administrative - upper
management ranked higher than a lieutenant and executive officers,
such as Colonel, Lt. Colonel, Major, Captain, and division heads.

The dependent variables were categorized into six areas. The
first category is composed of policy variables. The second category
is composed of training variables. The third category is composed of
supervisory variables. The fourth category is composed of liability

variables. The fifth category is composed of operational variables.

 

53

And the final category is composed of perceptual variables. Only
those variables that were statistically significant appear in the tables
of this section. The analysis of this data is used to make
determinations of whether or not differences in perception exist
between line officers, investigative officers, first line supervisors and
administrators, and if so, to what degree. The data are analyzed to
either confirm or refute the presence of perceptual discord. The
independent variable is the job type of the respondents.

The third section of the analysis involved collapsing the
independent variable into two categories. The process used to
collapse these variables involved the grouping of road patrol and
investigative, as one group - patrol; and first line supervisor and
administrative, as the second group - administrative. This was done
in an attempt to further ascertain the level of organizational discord
which exists between administrators and officers whose primary
responsibilities are street duties, but not necessarily on patrol, such
as line detectives.

The sixty-three elements (questions) were collapsed into two
categories. The process used to collapse the responses involved
combining responses of strongly agree with agree into one category.
Likewise, responses of strongly disagree and disagree were
combined. The differences between strongly agree and disagree are
difficult to define, and for purposes of acceptance or rejection, this
collapsed process was deemed sufficient.

Policy variables
Nine variables were categorized into the policy section of the

analysis. Variables were classified as policy based on their relevance

 

 

 

 

54

to policy issues. This included questions which directly referred to
policy, and other questions which indirectly dealt with policy-related
issues. Variables, in this section, also involved situations in which
noncompliance to policy restrictions were ascertained, as well as

questions relating to discipline.

Table 4.1 - Policy Variables - Indep. Var. = Job Type

 

Dependent
Variables X2 sig R Lambda V

 

Pursued where dispatcher or

 

supervisor uninformed. (03) 15.378 .002 .1059 .000 .1129
Policy is too restrictive.

(Q7) 26.065 .000 -.1419 .000 .1481
Involved in unreported pur-

suits. (QQ) 12.058 .007 .0902 .000 .1008
Policy discourages pursuits.

(013) 22.811 .000 -.1200 .000 .1393
df=3

 

The data in Table 4.1 reveal that of the nine variables in this
category, road patrol officers, investigators, first line supervisors
and administrators are more likely to disagree with line officers and
investigators in four of the nine variables. The job type of the
respondents accounts for the level of significance. Significant
differences exist in perceptions of policy and subsequent actions
taken by officers between respondent types. The null hypothesis
was rejected for four of the nine variables relating directly to policy

issues. Of the four variables that showed statistical significance,

 

 

 

55

two 0f the variables exhibit negative relationships, while the
remaining variables exhibited positive relationships.

The data indicated that significant differences exist between
job types and their perceptions of policy restrictions and guidelines.
As shown in Table 4.1(b) (% table), road patrol officers are more
likely to view departmental policy as restrictive. They are also more
likely to agree that the policy discourages pursuits. Administrators,
on the other hand, are the least likely to view the policy as overly
restrictive. This may be attributed to the fact that they are the same
ones who developed and implemented the policy. Thus, they are the
least likely to identify possible flaws. However, these same
administrators should be concerned that the officers to whom the
policy is directed are unsatisfied.

The data also indicate that the same administrators who view
the policy as adequate were the most likely to engage in practices
inconsistent with policy regulations. In fact, the data indicate that
49% of all administrators involved in the study had engaged in
pursuits without informing a dispatcher or a supervisor.
Furthermore, 46% of all administrators were involved in pursuits
without ever reporting them. This demonstrates a definite lack of
adherence to written policy as it is today. It was not just the
administrators, however, who were involved in these practices. On
the average, 36% of sworn departmental personnel had either
pursued without ever writing a written report or were involved in
pursuits in which a supervisor or a dispatcher was not informed. In
summary, it should be noted that over one/ third of the department is

not in compliance with policy restrictions.

 

 

 

It should be noted that historical policies were less restrictive.
This may account for the degree of variance between line officers,
with more updated / restrictive policies, and supervisors, with
traditional/ more discretionary policies.
Table 4.1(b) - Policy Variables

56

 

 

Patrol Invest. Super. Admin.
D A D A D A D

Pursued where dispatcher
or supervisor uninlorrned.
(03) .32 .68 .37 .63 .37 .63 .49 .51 .36 .64
Policy is clearly written.
(05) .75 .25 .23 .77 .32 .68 .75 .25 .74 .26
Policy provides guidance.
(06) .75 .27 .72 .28 .70 .30 .79 .21 .73 .27
Policy is too restrictive.
(Q7) .27 .73 .18 .82 .18 .82 .11 .89 .22 .78
involved in unreported
pursuits. (09) .32 .68 .35 .65 .36 .64 .46 .54 .35 .65
Policy discourages pursuits.
(Q13) .42 .58 .39 .615 .35 .65 .22 .78 .38 .62
Knows pursuit policy.
(038) .80 .20 .75 .25 .80 .20 .79 .21 .79 .21
Seldom report
successful pursuits
((2150) .20 .80 .18 .82 .27 .73 .26 .74 .23 .77
Disciplined resulting from
pursuit.(060) .08 .92 .08 .92 .09 .91 .04 .96 .07 .93

 

 

57

Training Variables

Training variables

Nine variables were identified as training variables for the
purposes of simplification of analysis of the data. Variables in this
section related to issues of academy training, and variables
regarding training in areas such as high speed driving and
departmental pursuit policy. Additionally, variables including
practices which are traditionally taught both at the academy and on
the job were included.

Table 4.2 - Training Variables

 

Dependent
Variables X2 sig R Lambda V

 

Trained in high speed
driving techniques. (014) 30.494 .000 -.1228 .089 .1610

Trained in pursuit
policy. (015) 17.116 .000 -.0581 .071 .1212

Post-academy testing
on pursuit (016) 12.994 .000 -.1002 .000 .1055

Failure in discontinuing
pursuit. (029) 12.827 .000 .0501 .080 .1031

Can't pursue people sup-
pose to apprehend (057) 16.581 .001 -0823 .000 .1174

Balance need to apprehend
and public safety (058) 8.110 .044 .0817 .000 .0821

 

df-3

 

 

58

The data in Table 4.2 reveal that of the nine variables in this
category, road patrol officers, investigators, first line supervisors
and administrators are more likely to disagree with line officers and
investigators in six of the nine variables. Analysis of the data
indicate that job type of the respondent attributes to the variance of
these dependent variables. The null hypothesis was rejected for six
of the nine variables in this category.

As this data show, discord exists within the department over
factors relating to training. For example, patrol officers were the
most likely to agree that they had been adequately trained in high
speed driving techniques, while the supervisors and administrators
were less confident. However, administrators felt more strongly
about other areas of departmental training programs.

As Table 4.2 indicates, administrators were the most likely to
agree that they had been tested on pursuit policy after graduation
from the academy. However, road patrol officers, who are much
more likely to be exposed to a pursuit, were the least likely to agree
that they had been tested post-academy. Although patrol officers
were the most likely to agree that their training in pursuit policy had
been adequate, only 56% answered in the affirmative. Furthermore,
48% of the entire department did not feel as if they had been
adequately instructed in pursuit policy.

Also shown in Table 4.2(b) , supervisors were the most likely to
be confused by existing pursuit policies while administrators were
the least likely to find the policy ambiguous. This demonstrates a
definite lack of communication between the administration and their

supervisors. Additionally, the data indicates that administrators

 

59

were the most likely to feel a sense of failure if a pursuit was

terminated. This may be an artifact of their history, which may not

have included extensive training or policy regulations at the time of

their employment.

Table 4.2(b) - Training Variables

 

 

Patrol Invest Super. Admin. All

A D - A D A D A D A D
Trained in high speed
driving techniques
(014) .61 .39 .55 .45 .43 .57 .43 .57 .55 .45
Trained in pursuit
policy. (015) .56 .44 .49 .51 .39 .61 .51 .49 .52 .48
Post-academy testing
onpursuit (016) .81 .19 .87 .13 .89 .11 .90 .10 .85 .16
Failure in discontinuing
pursuit. (029) .46 .54 .505 .495 .39 .61 .53 .47 .50 .50
Training affects outcome
of pursuit (031) .95 .05 .96 .04 .95 .05 .98 .02 .96 .04
Reasonable and unreason-
able driving (040) .975 .025 .985 .015 .965 .035 .99 .01 .98 .02
Can't pursue people sup~
pose to apprehend
(057) .41 .59 .37 .63 .49 .51 .28 .72 .395 .605
Balance need to apprehend
and public safety
(058) .67 .33 .74 .26 .70 .30 .76 .24 .70 .30
Cornering and
handling (063) .65 .35 .61 .39 .61 .39 .56 .44 .62 .39

 

df-3

 

 

 

60

Supervisor Variables

Supervisor variables

Eight of the sixty-three variables in the study involved issues
relating both directly and indirectly to perceptions of departmental
supervisors. Four of these dealt directly with the perceived support
received from supervisors. Additionally, general questions

regarding supervision were included in this section.

Table 4.3 - Supervisor variables

 

 

 

Dependent

Variables X2 sig R Lambda V
Instructed by sup. on policy (017) 8.637 .032 -.0407 .000 .0865
Policy applied equally(018) 18.859 .000 .0608 .000 .1258
Written policy (019) 12.890 .000 -.0552 .000 .1040
Gen. support officers (020) 16.727 .001 .0517 .000 .1181
Support rezinjuries (042) 59.296 .000 .1927 .000 .2231
Support/not at fault (045) 46.457 .000 .1720 .000 .1967
Support/follow policy (047) 24.384 .000 .1418 .000 .1424
df =- 3

 

The data in Table 4.3 reveal that of the eight variables in this
section, road patrol officers, investigators, first-line supervisors and
administrators are more likely to disagree on seven of the eight

variables. Job type of the respondents does account for the level of

 

61

3'1 . ‘ Canoe. It may be stated, then, that significant differences in
perceptions of supervisors and their role in the department do exist
among job types. Of the eight variables in this section, the null
hypothesis was rejected for seven.

As Table 4.3(b) indicates patrol officers were the most likely to
agree that they had been instructed on pursuit policy by their
supervisors; however, those same supervisors were the least likely to
agree. Additionally, only 30% of the patrol officers stated that they
had been instructed by their supervisors. Additionally, supervisors
were the least likely to agree that they always followed written
policy. This may raise implications of inadequate training of
supervisors.

As Tables 4.2 and 4.3 indicate, significant differences in
perception existed within the department in regards to the role and
support of supervisors in a pursuit situation. For example, 47% of
all supervisors stated that they generally supported officers in
pursuit situations. However, these officers, road patrol and
investigative, were the least likely to believe that their supervisors
supported them. Even when officers were not at fault in an accident
relating to a pursuit or when they adhered to policy restrictions, road
patrol officers were still the least likely to agree that their

supervisors would support them.

 

 

 

62

Table 4.3(b) - Supervisor variables

 

 

 

 

Patrol Invest. Super. Admin. All

A D A D A D A D A D
Support policy
(012) .86 .14 .88 .12 .85 .15 .91 .09 .87 .13
Instructed policy
(017) .30 .70 .23 .77 .20 .80 .28 .72 .27 .73
Policy applied equally
(018) .67 .33 .61 .39 .71 .29 .81 .19 .68 .32
Written policy
(019) .38 .62 .26 .74 .30 .70 .37 .63 .35 .65
Gen. support officers
(020) .33 .67 .31 .69 .47 .53 .43 .57 .36 .64
Support re:
injuries (Q42) .50 .50 .58 .42 .69 .31 .80 .20 .58 .42
Support/not at
fault (045) .72 .28 .80 .20 .87 .13 .93 .07 .78 .22
Support/follow policy
(047) .84 .16 .91 .09 .89 .11 .97 .03 .875 .125

LIABILITYVARIABLES

Liability Variables

Seven of the variables dealt with the issue of liability, and its
effect on individual officers and their decisions. Variables were
categorized into this section on the basis of their references to

litigious characteristics and discipline factors.

 

63

“are 4.4 - Liability Variables

 

 

 

f

Dependent

Variables X2 sig R Lambda V
More detail reported (04) 8.745 .033 -.0251 .000 .0853
Decisions affected (026) 12.891 .005 -.0635 .000 .1033
Fear of discipline (033) 9.403 .024 -.0808 .036 .0883
Pursued less/lawsuits (044) 8.566 .086 .0389 .055 .0844
df - 3

 

The data in Table 4.4 reveal that of the seven perceptual
variables concerning liability, job types were more likely to disagree
on four of these variables. The level of significance is attributed to
the job type of the respondents. In regards to perceptions of liability
issues, the null hypothesis was rejected for four of the seven
variables.

The data indicate (see Table 4.4a) that of the four job types,
investigators are the least likely to View detailed reports as
important. This may be attributed to the fact that investigators, on
the average, are not involved in pursuits as often as their road patrol
counterparts. Additionally, unlike supervisors who are involved
either directly or indirectly in pursuits on a regular basis,
investigators seldom experience the subject of pursuit.
Administrators, on the other hand, are the most likely to agree that
the more detail contained in a report, the better the report. This
suggests that administrators may be more aware of the value of

detailed reports in litigious suits against the department.

 

mnmflu

 

64

pmd‘Ermore, it suggests that administrators, who are the least likely
to be involved in an actual pursuit, may remove themselves from the
tedious nature officers often attribute to paperwork demands.

The findings also indicates that administrators are the least
likely to be affected by their fear of discipline in pursuit decisions.
This may be attributed to two factors: 1) Administrators are the least
likely to be involved in an actual pursuit; and, 2) Administrators are
the least likely to be disciplined within the department.

As indicated by Table 4.4(b), 58% of supervisors stated that they
have pursued less since becoming aware of law suits. Road patrol
officers, who are the most likely to become involved in a pursuit
directly, were the least likely to state that law suits have affected
their decisions to pursue. - However, road patrol officers, along with
supervisors, were the most likely to state that their decision to
pursue is affected by liability issues. Approximately 75% of road
patrol officers stated that liability concerns impacted on their pursuit

decisions.

 

131312 4.4(b) - Liability Variables

7

65

 

Patrol Invest. Super. Admin. All

A D A D A D A D A D
More detail
reported (04) 83 .17 74 .26 .80 .20 .85 .15 .80 .20
Decisions affected
(026) .75 .25 .75 .25 .72 .28 .61 .39 .75 .25
Fear of discipline
(033) .52 .48 .48 .52 .49 .51 .30 .70 .49 .51
Risk to third parties
(043) .975 .025 .965 .035 .96 .04 .97 .03 .97 .03
Pursued less
(044) .46 .54 .52 .48 .58 .42 .49 .51 .49 .51
Involved in litigation -
(061) .06 .94 .04 .96 .10 .90 .07 .93 .06 .94
Know officers in
litigation (062) .45 .55 .495 .505 .51 .49 .51 .49 .48 .52

 

 

 

 

66

OPERATIONAL VARIABLES

Operational variables

This category was the broadest in scope, and involved
variables which existed in individual officers daily activities on the
job. Variables were classified as operational if they involved self-
reported activities which occur or had occurred in the individual
officers job experience. Other variables included in this section
dealt with subjects' perceptions of important factors in the

continuance or termination of a pursuit.

Table 4.5 - Operational Variables

 

 

Dependent

Variables X2 sig R Lambda V
Should have pursued but

did not (011) 11.536 .009 -.0599 .000 .0988
Vehicle maintenance

assures safety (021) 18.421 .000 .1150 .000 .1235
Check emergency

equipment (022) 9.298 .026 -.0750 .000 .0878
Experienced intentional

collisions (036) 9.402 .024 .0253 .000 .0937
Support roadblocks (051) 38.918 .000 -.1610 .000 .1795

 

As the data in Table 4.5 indicates, respondents were more likely
to exhibit significant differences in four of the fourteen operational
variables. The level of significance may be attributed to the job type

of the respondents. The data indicates that there exists certain

 

 

 

67

s-(gnificant differences between actions taken by personnel in the day-
to—day operations of the department. When job type of the
respondent was used as the independent variable, the null hypothesis
was rejected on four of the fourteen variables.

Table 4.5(b) indicates that patrol officers are the least likely to
be satisfied by the maintenance on departmental vehicles. Almost
one/ half (46%) indicate that they are not assured a safe vehicle,
while 71% of administrators felt that the maintenance provided by
the department ensured safety. This may be attributed to the fact
that most administrators do not come into contact with police
cruisers regularly. Additionally, cars assigned to administrators are
typically newer and driven less than the average police cruiser.
Furthermore, patrol officers daily put their cars to the test when
responding to emergencies, ticketing speed violators, and the like.

The data also indicates that 46% of all supervisors, and 36% of
the department as a whole, had been involved in intentional
collisions in their day-to-day operations. This indicates a large
amount of noncompliance with official policy restrictions.
Furthermore, patrol officers were more likely to support the use of
roadblocks as a pursuit tactic. Administrators, on the other hand,
were the least likely to support this practice. This may be attributed
to the fact that administrators are more aware of litigious suits

involving departmental implementation of roadblocks.

 

 

68

Table 4.5(b) - Operational Variables

 

’

 

Patrol Invest. Super. Admin. All

A D A A D A D A D
Reporting details helps
officer (02) .86 14 .83 .17 .80 .20 .81 .19 .84 .16
Paper work discourages
pursuits (08) .24 .76 .25 .75 .24 .76 .25 .75 .24 .76
Should have pursued but
did not (011) .39 .61 .35 .65 .53 .47 .30 .70 .31 .69
Vehicle maintenance
assures safety
(021) .54 .46 .61 .39 .64 .36 .71 .29 .59 .41
Check emergency
equipment (022) .88 12 .84 .16 .81 .19 .81 .19 .85 .15
Check tires and
brakes (023) .61 .39 .63 .37 .53 .47 .56 .44 .59 .41
Rammed vehicles to
stop them (025) .25 .75 .25 .75 .28 .72 .28 .72 .26 .74
More serious incident,
more risks (027) .80 .20 .86 .14 .85 .15 .84 .16 .82 .18
Pursued after told to
discontinue (028) .06 .94 .04 .96 .08 .92 .04 .96 .06 .94
Intentional collisions
(036) .66 .325 .675 .46 .54 .39 .61 .36 .64
Non-intentional collision
(037) .58 .45 .55 .53 .47 .44 .56 .44 .56
Support roadblock
(051) .16 .77 .23 .72 .28 .64 .36 .74 .26
Boxing-in as a tactic
(052) .88 .12 .90 10 .865 .135 .84 .16 .88 .12
Continue because suspect
serious crime
(054) .73 .27 .76 .24 .73 .27 .71 .29 .73 .27

 

 

 

69

PERCEPTUAL VARIABLES

Perceptual variables

Variables in this section addressed the opinions of individual
officers on various topics. Issues regarding discretion were included
in this section, as were contributory factors in pursuit related

accidents.

Table 4.6 - Perceptual Variables

 

Dependent
Variables X2 sig R Lambda V

 

More discretion in

 

pursuit decisions (010) 77.722 .000 -.2405 .060 .2555
Discretion in ramming

a car (024) 53.094 .000 -.1966 .000 .0937
Personal problems may

cause accidents (032) 19.537 .000 .1252 .091 .1284
Older pursue more than

younger (035) 10.488 .015 -.0885 .000 .0937
Support greater discretion

with firearms (053) 73.553 .000 -.2269 .150 .2465
df = 3

 

As the data in Table 4.6 indicates significant differences were
displayed in five of the eleven variables dealing with officers'
perceptions on various issues. Of the three variables regarding
greater discretion for the individual officer, negative relationships

existed. That is, as the level of job increased the level of discretion

 

70

whiCh they would tolerate decreased. The level of significance in
these five variables was the job type of the respondent. The null
hypothesis could be rejected for five of the eleven perceptual
variables in this section.

In this section officers' perceptions of various topics were
tested against their job type. As Table 4.6(b) indicates,
administrators were the most likely to believe that personal
problems attributed to accidents. While road patrol officers and
first-line supervisors were the most likely to agree that younger
officers pursued more than older officers. In questions regarding
discretion, however, the differences were more distinct.

Of the five perceptual variables which were statistically
significant in this section, three of them dealt with the topic of
discretion. The data indicates that patrol officers are the most likely
to support greater discretion in pursuit decisions and ramming cars.
lnversely, administrators were the least likely to support greater
discretion in these areas. Furthermore, patrol officers were two and
one/ half times more likely to support greater discretion in the use of

firearms to stop fleeing vehicles, than were administrators.

 

 

71

Table 4.6(b)- Perceptual Variables

 

 

 

Patrol Invest. Super. Admin. All

D A D A D A D A D
Reporting details to
dispatcher (or) .945 .055 .94 .06 .92 .08 .95 .05 .94 .06
More discretion in
pursuit decisions
(010) .765 .235 .64 .36 .61 .39 .42 .58 .68 .32
Discretion in ramming
acar (024) .78 .22 .68 .32 66 .34 .51 .49 .71 .29
Physical condition
affects outcome (030).83 .17 .87 .13 .87 .13 .86 .14 .85 .15
Personal problems may
cause accidents
(032) .44 .56 .53 .47 .49 .51 .63 .37 .49 .51
Confident driving at
high speeds (034) .94 .06 .93 .07 .93 .07 .94 .06 .94 .06
Older pursue more
than younger
(Q35) .09 .91 .04 .96 .09 ..91 .02 .98 .07 .93
Support greater
discretion with
firearms(053) .56 .27 .43 .57 .36 .64 .22 .78 .39 .61
Overconiidence causes
accidents (055) .56 .43 .58 .42 .55 .45 .59 .41 .57 .43
Experience is a primary
factor (056) .89 .11 .92 .08 .92 .08 .91 .09 .90 .10
Personal safety is a
primary factor
(059) .84 .16 .78 .22 .80 .20 .79 .21 .815 .185

 

 

 

72

EXTERNAL FACTORS

External factors

This section included factors outside of the department.
Variables categorized into this section addressed the influences from
factors such as the court system, legislative system and the public.
These variables attempted to ascertain individual officers'
perceptions of the outside environment and their affect on his

personal decisions.

Table 4.7 - External Factors

 

 

Dependent

Variables X2 sig R Lambda V
Courts support pursuit (046) 9.942 .019 .0647 .000 .0914
Public supports pursuit (049). 14.927 .002 .0816 .000 .1113

 

As the data in 4.7 indicates, significant differences were shown
in two of the five dependent variables dealing with external
influences. Job type of the respondents does account for the level of
significance. Of the five variables in this section, respondents were
more likely to disagree on two of the variables. The null hypothesis
could be rejected for two of these variables.

As Table 4.7(b) indicates, administrators were the most likely to

agree that the judicial system supported the police in pursuit matters.

 

73

Administrators were also the most likely to agree that the legislature

supports police pursuits.

Table 4.7(b) - External Factors

 

 

Patrol Invest. Super. Admin. All

A D A A D A A D
Watch TV pursuits
(039) .47 .50 .50 .57 .43 .49 .51 .53 .47
TV pursuits realistic
(041) .98 .02 .98 .04 .96 .12 .88 .02 .98
Courts support pursuit
(046) .29 .71 .28 .72 .33 .67 .41 .59 .31 .69
Legis. support pursuit
048) .24 .76 .21 .79 .23 .77 .30 .70 .24 .76
Public supports pursuit
(049) .33 .67 .36 .64 .45 .55 .45 .55 .37 .63

 

 

 

74

CHAPTERV

COLLAPSED DATA

Introduction

For the purpose of further analysis and to further identify
perceptual discord within the department, the categories of road
patrol and investigative were collapsed into one category; and the
categories of first line supervisor and administrative were collapsed
into one category. This was done due to the similarity between
them. For example, road patrol officers and investigative officers
were basically assigned general police duties. First line supervisors
and administrators, on the other hand, were responsible for the
supervision of others and the maintaining of appropriate
paperwork.

For analysis purposes, in this section, the two categories will be
referred to as 1) line officers - containing officers who classified their
job type as road patrol or investigative officers; and 2) supervisors -
containing officers who classified their job type as first-line
supervisor or administrative. These labels shall be used generically
throughout this section and this section only. All other sections shall
keep the four categories classified as: 1) road patrol; 2) investigative;

3) first-line supervisor; and 4) administrative.

 

 

75

Table 4.8 - Policy Variables - Indep. Var. = Job Type

 

Dependent
Variables X2 sig R Lambda V

 

Policy is too restrictive
(07) 16.7972 .000 -.1189 .000 .1191

Policy discourages pursuits
(013) 16.1950 .000 -.1174 .000 .1174

 

The data in Table 4.8 reveal that of the nine variables relating
to policy issues, the collapsed subgroups of line officers and
supervisors are more likely to disagree on two of the nine variables.
Of the nine policy variables in the study, two of them proved to be
statistically significant after the four categories were collapsed.
The job type of the respondents does account for the level of
significance. There are significant differences in perceptions of
policy adherence and limitations. The null hypothesis was rejected
for two of the nine variables.

Table 4.8(b) indicates that of all respondents, approximately
75% of them do not find the policy too restrictive. This correlation
exists in each job type category. However, respondents whose job
type is investigative or contains general road patrol duties are more
likely to agree that existing policies discourage officers from
engaging in pursuits, than are those officers engaged in supervisory

positions or administrative duties.

 

 

76

Table 4.8(b) - Policy Variables Proportion

 

r

 

 

Line Officers Supervisors
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree
Policy is too restrictive (Q7) .25 .75 .25 .75
Discourages pursuits (Q13) .41 .59 .29 .71
Training Variables

Table 4.9 - Training Variables

 

Dependent
Variables X2 sig R Lambda V

 

Trained in high speed
driving techniques (014) 28.0963 .0000 -.1545 .0892 .1545

Trained in pursuit
policy (015) 9.5656 .0020 -.0906 .0624 .0906

Post-academy testing
on pursuit (016) 5.0077 .0252 -.0655 .0000 .0655

Failure in discontinuing
pursuit (029) 10.0134 .0016 .0911 .0797 .0911

 

The data in Table 4.9 indicate that of the nine variables
associated with training, four of them proved to be statistically
significant after the collapsing of job type categories. As indicated in
Table 4.9 supervisors are more likely to disagree that officers have
been adequately trained in high speed driving techniques.
Additionally, supervisors are more likely to reject the claim that

training in pursuit policy has been adequate. This may indicate the

 

 

77

need for further training in the areas of pursuit policy and pursuit
driving techniques Furthermore, although the general consensus
exists throughout the department regardless of job type, there does
exist a significant difference which indicates that supervisors feel the
need for testing periodically post-graduation from the academy.

The data also indicate that supervisors and administrators are
more likely than line officers to feel a sense a failure when
discontinuance of a pursuit is necessary. As noted previously before
the categories were collapsed, a significant difference exists between
administrators' viewpoint on the clarity of the departmental policy.
The data indicate that administrators are the least likely to be
confused by the policy. However, departments may feel
uncomfortable with the relatively high number of personnel who do

find the policy ambiguous.

Table 4.9(b) - Training Variables

 

Line Officers Supervisors
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree

 

Trained in high speed driving

techniques (Q14) .58 .42 .43 .57
Trained in pursuit policy (Q15) .53 .47 .45 .55
Post-academy testing (Q16) .30 .70 .11 .89

Failure in pursuit
termination(Q29) .48 .52 .57 .43

 

 

 

78

Supervisor Variables

Table 4.10 - Supervisor variables

 

Dependent
Variables X2 sig R Lambda V

 

Policy applied equally
(Q18) 12.2003 .0005 .1012 .0000 .1012
Gen. support officers

(Q20) 15.9816 .0000 .1155 .0000 .1155

Support re:injuries
(Q42) 50.6005 .0000 .2061 .0000 .2061

Support/ not at fault
(Q45) 39.019 .0000 .1803 .0000 .1803

Support/ follow policy
(Q47) 11.2774 .0008 .0969 .0000 .0969

 

As the data in Table 4.10 indicate, five of the eight variables
dealing with perceptions of supervisors were shown to be
statistically significant after the categories were collapsed. The data
indicate that line officers and supervisors are more likely to disagree
when their perceptions of supervisory support are measured. The
are significant differences in perception of supervisory roles and
support for line officers. The null was rejected for five of the eight
supervisory variables.

Table 4.10(b) indicates that supervisors are more likely to
believe that the departmental policy on pursuit is applied equally,

regardless of job type. However, 36% of the line officers do not see

 

79

(he POIicy as being equally applied to all members of the department.
It was also found that 45% of all supervisors and administrators
thought that generally, officers were supported by supervisors.
Only 32% of line officers felt that this support existed.
Furthermore, 90% of supervisors and administrators felt that line
officers received support from supervisors in the event of an accident
in which the officer was not at fault, while only 76% of line officers
acknowledged that their supervisors supported them. First-line
supervisors and administrators were also more likely to report that
officers were supported by their supervisors in the event of injuries,
than were line officers. And, finally, line officers were less likely to
feel that they would receive support from their supervisors in a
pursuit matter as long as they followed written policy, than were

administrators or supervisors.

Table 4.10(b) - Supervisory Variables

 

 

Line Officers Supervisors
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree
Policy applied equally (Q18) .64 .36 .75 .25
Generally, sup. support
officers (Q20) .32 .68 .45 .55
Support re:injuries (Q42) .54 .46 .75 .25
Support/ not at fault (Q45) .76 .24 .90 .10

Support/ follow policy (Q47) .88 .12 .93 .07

 

 

 

80

Liability Variables

r able 4.11 - Liability Variables

 

 

/
Dependent
variables X2 sig R Lambda V
Decisions affected (Q26) 18.2378 .0041 -.0826 .0000 .0826
Fear of discipline (Q3) 4.6546 .0310 -.0621 .0221 .0621

 

As indicated in Table 4.11, the collapsed categories of road
patrol and investigative officers, and first-line supervisors and
administrators were more likely to disagree on two of the seven
variables identified in this category. Both variables exhibited
negative relationships with the independent variable. The level of
significance was attributed to the job type of the respondent. The
null hypothesis was rejected for two of the seven variables dealing
with liability issues.

The data indicate that line officers are much more likely to
restrict their actions out of fear of discipline, than are the
supervisors. As Table 4.11(b) indicates, 50% of road patrol and
investigative officers fear discipline. This may be attributed to the
fact that road patrol officers are more likely to be disciplined by the
department, than are administrators. Additionally, three/ fourth of
the line officers state that their decisions are affected by liability

issues, while only 67% of the supervisors are affected.

 

 

81

Operational Variables

Table 4-12 - Operational Variables

 

 

/
Dependent
Variables X2 sig R Lambda V
Vehicle maintenance
assures safety (Q21) 13.0636 .0003 .1040 .0000 .1040
Check emergency
equipment (Q22) 7.2142 .0071 -.0773 .0000 .0773
Support roadblocks
(Q51) 31.3399 .0003 -.1611 .0000 .1611

 

As the data in Table 4.12 indicate, three of the fourteen
variables dealing with operational perceptions were shown to be
statistically significant after the categories were collapsed. The data
indicate that line officers and supervisors are more likely to disagree
when their perceptions of vehicle safety are measured. The null
was rejected for three of the fourteen operational variables.

Table 4.12(b) indicates that line officers are more likely to be
dissatisfied by the maintenance on departmental vehicles. Only 57%
of line officers indicate that maintenance provided by the department
on service vehicles, while 67% of the supervisors were satisfied with
departmental maintenance. This may be attributed to the fact that
road patrol and investigative officers spend the a great portion of
their time in police vehicles, while supervisors are more often at the

station or other locations. Additionally, patrol officers are often

 

/

 

Table 4.12(b) - Operational variables

82

' Jdved in situations where their cars must be operated at high
eds an . . .
5?6 d in bad condltlons.

 

Line Officers

Supervisors

 

 

 

 

Agree Disagree Agree Disagree
Vehicle maintenance
safety (Q21) .58 .42 .68 .32
Check emergency equipment
(022) .86 .14 .81 .19
Support roadblocks (Q51) .81 .19 .68 .32
Perceptual Variables
Table 4.13 - Perceptual Variables
Dependent
Vana' bles X2 sig R Lambda V
More discretion in
pursuit decisions (Q10) 52.0755 .0000 -.2091 .0000 .2091
Discretion in ramming
a car (Q24) 36.8729 .0000 -.1747 .0000 .1747
Personal problems may
cause accidents (Q32) 8.9018 .0029 .0867 .0672 .1867
More discretion with
firearms. (Q53) 35.5534 .0000 -.2142 .1009 .2142

 

 

83

As the data in Table 4.13 indicate, after the independent

gafiable was collapsed, significant differences were displayed in four

of the eleven variables dealing with individual officers' perceptions
of various pursuit related issues. Of the three variables regarding

greater discretion for the individual officer, line officers were
consistently more likely to support greater discretion. The level of
significance in these four variables was the job type of the
respondent. The null hypothesis could be rejected for four of the
eleven perceptual variables in this section.

Of the four perceptual variables found to be statistically
significant, three directly involved the issue of discretion. As Table
4.13(b) indicates that line officers are more likely to support various
forms of discretion. Of the line officers involved in the study, 71% of
them supported the idea of greater discretion for the individual
officer in pursuit decisions, while only 52% of the supervisors were
supportive of this idea. Likewise, 73% of all line officers supported
more discretion in ramming cars in order to stop them, while only
59% of the supervisors answered affirmatively.

Greater discretion in the use of firearms to stop fleeing
vehicles was favored by one-half of all line officers. However, only
29% of supervisors were in favor of such an act. This may be
attributed to the fact that supervisors and administrators are more
aware of and concerned with liability issues. Additionally, line
officers are much more likely to be involved in pursuit situations than
their administrative counterparts. Thus, they are more likely to feel
that certain situations require more immediate action than a pursuit

which may last several miles and reach extremely high speeds.

 

 

84

191913 4513(1)) - Perceptual Variables
/\ Line Officers SUPervisors

Agree Disagree Agree Disagree

 

 

 

‘Dfaet‘ron in pursuit (010) .70 .30 .52 .48
Discretion / ramming cars (Q24) .74 .24 .59 .41
Personal problems / accidents(Q32) .49 .51 .56 .44
Older pursue more younger (Q35) .07 .93 .06 .94
Greater discretion in firearms(Q53) .50 .50 .29 .71

External Variables

Table 4.14 - External Factors

 

 

Dependent

Variables X2 sig R Lambda V
Public supports

pursuit (Q4) 14.2838 .0002 .1089 .0000 .1089

 

Of the five variables involving perceptions of external
influences included in the study, only one was shown to be
statistically significant This variable was the job type of the
respondent.

Perceptions of support from factions outside of the department
were included in this section. The data indicated that supervisors
were more likely to believe that the public supported the issue of

pursuit. It was found that only 35% of line officers surveyed believed

 

 

85

?t the PUblic supported their pursuit endeavors, while 45% of the

sofemsors answered affirrnatively. It is important to note that

over 60% of the entire department felt that the public was not in

gavor of pursuit.

Table 4.14(b) - External Variables

 

Line Officers Supervisors
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree

 

Public supports pursuit (Q49) .35 .65 .45 .55

 

NON-STATISTICAL RESULTS

In the pursuit of empirical research, findings are based purely
on statistically significant results. Often times in policy research
such as this, however, non-significant findings may still be indicative
of policy oriented problems, and helpful for police administrators.

The research design resulted in the classification of variables
into eight categories, as mentioned previously. Of these eight
categories, seven of them posed serious questions for police
administrators. These questions posed to administrators were not
shown to be statistically significant; however, they may have serious
implications for policy-makers. For reporting purposes and
increased clarity, the results not proven to be statistically significant

are reported below in these categories.

POLICY VARIABLES
Of the nine variables identified as policy variables, only four

were found to be statistically significant. However, the proportion

 

 

86

f officers who were unfamiliar with existing policies or exhibited

diéregal‘d for these policies may be unacceptable for police

2“gin'lIVlStrators. As was discussed previously, litigious suits against
Aepartments are often based upon lack of adherence to existing

departmental pursuit policies. Thus, understanding of and
adherence to departmental policy is crucial for a department wishing
to minimize litigation regarding pursuit.

The variables classified into the policy section of the
questionnaire attempted to ascertain respondent knowledge of
departmental pursuit policy (see Table 4.1b). Although not
statistically significant, administrators may not wish to accept that
over 20% of departmental personnel do not know the pursuit policy
of their department. Furthermore, an additional 25% of
departmental personnel find the language of the policy ambiguous
and difficult to understand. This may be attributed to the reactive
nature of departmental pursuit policy, which change regularly with
the current trend of the judicial system. Thus, a definite need exists
for more extensive training not only in the academy, but also
periodically in keeping with the latest litigious developments.

An additional concern for police administrators may be the fact
that 27% of the department disagreed with the statement that
departmental policy provided guidance for sound decision-making.
The design of pursuit policy, as well as other policies, is designed to
provide a reference for officers involved in discretionary situations.
However, the data indicates that over 25% of the department does
not view existing policies as guiding in nature. This is also

indicative of the need for further training in pursuit policy.

 

 

resp

 

87

finally, the data indicated that 23% of the department seldom
{ted Successful pursuits. Although differences among
or‘dents did not prove to be statistically significant,
adu‘hfifal‘i‘ators may feel uncomfortable with the fact that over one-
fifth of the department engaged in behavior inconsistent with
departmental policy. Additional supervision may appear to be a
logical solution. However, the data indicated that supervisors and
administrators, respectively, were the most likely to be engaged in
this type of activity. Although this type of behavior may not appear
to be inherently detrimental to the department, it may be indicative
of more serious deviations from policy. Thus, policy makers must

develop strategies for reducing this unacceptable type of behavior.

SUPERVISORY VARIABLES

Of the eight supervisory variables identified in the study, seven
of them were shown to be statistically significant and were discussed
in an earlier chapter. The one variable which did not prove to be
statistically significant may indicate supervisory problems. The
data indicates (see Table 4.3b) that 87% of all personnel believe that
supervisors generally support the agency's policy; however, the
remaining 13% indicate that supervisors do not support
departmental policy. Administrators, then, must determine whether
the department can afford deviation from pursuit policy from over
10% of their supervisors. Administrators may wish to consider

further training for supervisors.

 

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oYERATIONAL VARIABLES
The data indicates that almost 25% of officers agree that paper
work discourages pursuits. Administrators may wish to educate
officers on the necessity of detailed reporting of pursuits.

Certain operational variables which did not prove to be
statistically significant still produced results which administrators
may wish to evaluate (see Table 4.5b). For example, supervisors '
were the most likely to report that they had been involved pursuits in
which they were instructed to discontinue, and they did not. Once
again, implications for further training for supervisors exist and
must be considered by police administrators. Furthermore, 26% of
the department indicated that they had rammed vehicles in order to
stop them. The policy on ramming vehicles is very strict, and
provides for the ramming of a car only in the event of a known felon.
Administrators may find this indicative of other instances where

policy was not followed.

PERCEPTUAL VARIABLES

Of the eleven perceptual variables identified, five were shown
to be statistically significant. However, it should be noted that only
57% of the department agreed with the statement that
overconfidence causes accidents (see Table 4.6b). It would appear to
a casual observer that overconfidence in any endeavor often causes
the actor to be more careless in his / her endeavors. Thus, the high
proportion of the department which did not View overconfidence as

contributory in nature may be a concern for policy-makers.

 

89

CHAPTERVI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

This research consisted of the administration of a self-report
questionnaire to the entire sworn population of the Michigan
Department of State Police. The analysis of the generated data was
used to ascertain whether there existed discontinuity in attitudes
regarding pursuit issues consistent with job classification, as was
hypothesized.

Certain training and supervisory implications for police
administrators and policy makers were found. These implications
for further training and increased supervision must be considered by
police administrators and policy makers if an effort is to be made to
reduce the likelihood of pursuits ending tragically and subsequent
litigious activity against the department.

Conclusions .

Collectively, there exists certain inconsistencies of perceptions
among job types. Using the respondent job type as the independent
variable, it was learned that road patrol officers, investigators, first-
line supervisors and administrators exhibit significant differences on
issues regarding perceptions of policy, supervisory support,
adequacy of training, liability issues and discretionary issues

regarding police pursuit.

  
  
 
 

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90

Of the sixty-three dependant variables contained in the

study, thirty-three were found to be statistically significant. Of the
nine variables identified as policy related, four were found to be
significant which may suggest the need for reevaluation or further
training. It was found that line officers feel that departmental
policies discouraged pursuits and were too restrictive.
Administrators, on the other hand, did not View written policies as
overly restrictive. Police administrators may wish to further
educate officers on the need for written policies. Furthermore, these
administrators may also wish to re-evaluate departmental policies
more objectively.

It was also found that almost one-half of the administrators,
who viewed the policy as adequate, reported engaging in pursuits
inconsistent with policy restrictions. Additionally, a large portion of
the department reported practices in violation of current policies.
This may be attributed to the 45% of the department who reported
that they were unfamiliar with written policy or felt the policy was
ambiguous. Furthermore, supervisors were most likely to find the
policy ambiguous. Administrators, on the other hand, were the
lease likely. This indicates a definite lack of communication
between administrators, the ones formulating policies for the troops,
and supervisors, the ones responsible for instructing and supervising
the troops. _ Thus, a meeting between administrators and
supervisors is essential if clarification is to occur.

It was also found that administrators were the most likely to
report that they had been tested on departmental pursuit policy after

graduation from the academy. However, line officers, the

  
 
   
    

    

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91

mdiViduals most likely to be involved in an actual pursuit, reported
that they were not tested post-academy. Furthermore, 44% of road
patrol and 48% of the entire department did not feel adequately
trained in pursuit policy. This may indicate a strong need for more
extensive training in departmental policies at the academy, and
periodic post-academy training sessions.

Various other training variables displayed discrepancies
between supervisors and line officers. The data indicated that line
officers are more likely to feel adequately trained in high speed
driving techniques, while supervisors were less confident of their
abilities. Administrators may feel uncomfortable with this
discrepancy, and implement defensive driving sessions for road
patrol officers and their supervisors. This would enable supervisors
to evaluate the skills and capabilities of individual officers.

More extensive training for line officers is essential if
perceptual equilibrium is desired. However, the findings indicate
that supervisors are also deficient in training. For example, it was
found that supervisors were the least likely to follow the written
policy, yet were responsible for instructing subordinates on proper
procedures and policies. Administrators may not be satisfied that
line officers are receiving proper instruction from their supervisors.
Thus, they may wish to consider implementation of periodic
management seminars and random testing of supervisors on
departmental policies.

Lack of communication between supervisors and line officers
also needs to be addressed by administrators. Typically, supervisors

reported supporting their officers. However, line officers did not

         

fl

It?

92

 

feel that supervisors supported them in pursuit decisions. This
skewed relationship must be reconstructed into a more realistic
picture. Administrators may wish to consider implementation of
fifteen minute workshops, where supervisors would meet for fifteen
minutes each day with rotating members of their shifts.

Perceptions of maintenance on departmental vehicles
displayed discontinuity between administrators, supervisors and line
officers. Line officers were the least confident in departmental
maintenance of police vehicles, while administrators were more so.
Officers also reported that the safety of their vehicle was a primary
factor in their pursuit decisions. Administrators must realize that
perceptions of safety among officers affects their behavior. They
may wish to re-evaluate their vehicle maintenance program.

Finally, it is apparent that line officers favor greater discretion
in the pursuit decisions, ramming cars and use of firearms.
Generally speaking, however, officers are following policy. It must
be concluded, then, that policy does make a difference, and is
essential for maintaining socially acceptable police practices. The

strengths and weaknesses of existing policies must be reviewed.

SUMMARY
Reporting of empirical findings is essential for the furtherance
of knowledge. Empirical results are ones in which statistical
significance has been shown to be present. From these empirical
results, program implementation and training implications may be
. formulated. However, in policy oriented research, data which has

not been shown to exhibit statistical significance must not be

 

L

   

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93

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discarded. Rather, administrators may be provided with useful
msight into differences of perception, which although not empirically
significant - may display some practical significance.

The study reported both empirical results and practical
implications. Academians may consider the statistical analysis more
beneficial. However, police administrators and policy-makers must
carefully examine all findings, and ascertain the areas of training
and supervision which need to be addressed.

This study illumined many target areas for police
administrators. However, administrators should keep in mind that
although officers desire greater latitude in decision-making, i.e. i I
ramming, use of firearms, etc., there is no evidence that they exercise
such discretion. Therefore, administrators, working within this
framework, should concentrate on further training of policy, periodic
evaluation and revision of policy, and greater communication and

supervisory instruction of policy, as it does make a difference.

l
l
l
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APPENDICES

 

 

‘ \ MICHIGAN EMERGENCY RESPONSE STUDY
I GENRAL OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE

The questions that follow were designed to determine the opinions of officers when making
decisions relative to police pursuits . The data obtained may be used to l) assist police agcn cics
in the development of training. 2) the developmentor refinement of current policies. and 3) to
provide feedback to officers to assist them in their decision making on such matters There are
no right or wrong answers. only your opinions. Though you may not be assigned to patrol
functions at this time. your past experience and opinions based on that experience are of

interest in determining organizational attitudes and perceptions on this subject.

Your responses are W Results of this survey will be reported in the aggregate and a
final report will be given to the department. An executive summary will be made available to

all respondents.

Please express your honest fcelin gs about each statement by indicating whether you Strongly
Agree (SA). Agree (A), Disagree (D). or Strongly Disagree (SD). Circle the appropriate answer.
Please choose only one answer- per question. Feel free to use pencil or pen.

 

l. Reporting details of pursuit to a dispatcher provides support
for the officer.

2. Reporting details to dispatcher puts officer in a favorable
position should an accident result

3. l have been involved in pursuits in the past in which the
dispatcher or supervisor was not informed.

1. Because of potential in suits-the more detail reported
the better.

5. My agency policy is clearly written.

6.Deparunent policy provides guidance to are for making
sound decisions.

7. My agency policy is too restrictive.

3. Paper work following pursuit: discourages off iccrs
to report pursuits.

9. l have been involved in pursuits which were not reported.
l0. Officer: should have more discretion in pursuit decisions.

1 LThcrc have been occasions when I felt i should have pursued
and did not.

12. Supervisors generally support my agency 3 pursuit policy.
Next Page Please

SA

A

2

I.)

to

D.
3

SD;
4

 

96

Page Two

\5- Existing policies on emergency response and pursuits
discourage officers from initiating or continuing pursuits.

H. l have been adequately trained in high speed driving
techniques.

15. l have been adequately trained in pursuit policy.

16. Since graduation from the academy l have been tested
on pursuit policy.

I7. My supervisors have instructed me on pursuit policy.

IS. The policy of my agency is applied to all officers equally.
l9. Supervisors always follow the written policy.

20. Supervisors generally support officers-regardless of policy.
2f. Our vehicle maintenance program assures me a safe vehicle.
22. i check my emergency equipment prior to going on patrol.

23. i make a physical check of my tires and brakes prior
to going on patrol.

21.Deciding to ram a car should be an option of the officer.

25. l have rammed vehicles in order to stop them .

26. My decision to pursue is affected by liability issues.

27. The more serious the incident the more risks I will take.

28. l have pursued vehicles after being instructed to discontinue.
29. i feel like i failed when l discontinue a pursuit.

30. An officer's physical condition affects the success of pursuit.
31. Training affects the success of a pursuit.

32.0fficers with personal problems are more apt to have
accidents when pursuing.

53. Fear of discipline affects my decision to pursue.

31. Generally. I am confident when driving at high speeds.

Next Page Please

1

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97

in.“ Three

35. Older officers pursue much more than younger officers.
36. l have experienced intentional collisions in pursuits.

37. I have experienced non-intentional collisions in pursuits.
35. I know the pursuit policy of my department.

39. l frequently watch T.V. police shows depicting pursuits.

«o. I understand reasonable and unreasonable driving
behavior.

1!. Pursuits depicted on T.V. are realistic.

42. Generally, supervision will support me when there are
injuries resulting from pursuits.

as The risk of iniury to other people is a primary factor
in my decision to discontinue a pursuit.

4H. l have pursued less since becoming aware of law suits.

1'5. Supervisors in my department will back me up if I am not
at fault.

96. The courts generally support the police in pursuit matters.

17 As a general rule: My agency supports officers who follow
policy in pursuit matters.

as. The State Legislature has given adequate support to police
in pursuit matters.

49. Generally,the public supports police pursuits.
50. I seldom report successful pursuits.

5|. l support the use of a road block as a tactic.
52. I support the use of boxing-in as a tactic.

53. I support greater officer discretion in the use of
firearm to stop fleeing vehicles.

54. I continue pursuits because i suspect a serious crime.

55. Over confidence is a primary cause in emergency
response accidents.

Next Page Please

09

I.)

V

 

Pigs Pour 5A A I! SQ

56. Experience is a primary factor in avoiding emergency

response accidents. l 2 3 4
57. i am sometimes confused: 'l feel I can't pursue the people

l am supposed to apprehend.‘ l 2 3 4
58. It is difficult to balance a police need to apprehend violators

against a demand for public safety. I 2 3 4
59. My personal safety is a primary factor in my decision

to initiate or terminate a pursuit. l 2 3 4
60. I have been disciplined as a result of pursuing. l 2 3 4
6|. l have been involved in litigation as a result of a pursuit. l 2 3 4

62. I personally know officers who have been involved in
litigation as a result of a pursuit. l 2 3 4

63. Patrol car 'cornering and handling' characteristics is a
primary factor in my decision to initiate or terminate a
pursuit. I

I0
9|
J

64. My iob can best be described as:

Road Patrol l
First Line Supervision 2
investigative 3
Administrative 4

PLEASE RETURN COMPLETED SURVEY
NO LATER THAN HARE}! 15. I991

PER INSTRUCTIONS '
PLEASE PLACE YOUR SURVEY IN THE ENVELOP PROVIDED
AND DEPOSIT IT IN THE COLLECTION CONTAINER PROVIDED
AT YOUR WORK STATION

THANK YOU TOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY

If you have any questions regarding this survey
feel free to call:
Dennis M. Payne (5)7) 353-5182 or Terry M. Nerbonne (6l6) 592-2636

 

99

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

 

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE ' SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL jL'STICE EAST LANSING ' MICHIGAN ' duzd-llll
BAKER HALL

February 27, 1991

TO: Enforcement Personnel, Michigan Department of State Police

FROM: , Dennis M. Payne, Ph.D.. School of Criminal Justice
Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan

SUBJECT: Michigan Emergency Response Study, General Opinion Questionnaire

Enclosed is a questionnaire dealing with the topic of police pursuits. You
are being asked to complete this questionnaire at your earliest convenience in
the next two weeks. This questionnaire is the first phase of the Michigan
Emergency Response study which was recently outlined in a joint letter from
Colonel R. T. Davis and MSPTA President Richard Darling.

Work station supervisors were asked to provide collection boxes for the
completed questionnaires. After you have finished the questionnaire. please
put the completed forms in a plain envelope and place it in the work station
collection receptacle. Because the answers will be coded onto computer forms
prior to data entry, you may use a pencil or pen to circle your responses.
The survey instrument should take no more than 10 minutes to complete.

The overall response rate on this survey is important; therefore. your
cooperation in completing the survey is critical to the overall success of the

study. Do not sign the form or identify your specific work station, as this
study is designed to be anonymous.

Enclosure

"51,"! ll A/Ivmlis'e Anson /£qsaml Opporlsuulfr Imrlslulaoss

 

 

100

FILE: 14 (2) 1991

u°“0(2l10l
MEMORANDUM

STATE OF MICHIGAN
1) IE I’AA.II'JTINIIE 11']? (3 I? ES'ITIL'ITIE I='() 1; 13¢: 13
DATE: January 18, 1991

T0 : Departmental Work Units

FROM : Col. R. T. Davis, Director” S;
Sgt. Richard J. Darling, President, MSPTA W/J '
SUBJECT: Michigan Emergency Response Study

The department, with the active participation of the Michigan State
Police Troopers Association, will be conducting an emergency response
driving study. This comprehensive research project was initiated by the
department and is a cooperative effort between the Michigan State Police,
Michigan State University, and Ferris State University. We are jointly
requesting and soliciting your cooperation and support in this important
endeavor.

Emergency response and pursuit driving by police officers have generated
much concern in recent years. They have all too often resulted in mis-
haps causing property damage, injury, and even death. Enforcement
members, guided by their training and departmental policy, must mak
critical decisions pertaining to initiating, continuing, and terminating
a pursuit and what tactics are most appropriate under the circumstances
presented to them by those who elude enforcement members. The balancing
point for an officer‘s decision is the most reasonable point between the
government's need to apprehend and the public interest to be protected
from unreasonable risk of harm. Police attempt to preserve, protect,
and defend the public. This action includes apprehending violators or
quick response to an emergency. The manner in which an officer
apprehends or responds to an emergency often places others at risk.

The balancing point in this paradox is the test of reasonableness. It
is the policy and training provided to the officer, supported by the
officer's experience and judgement, that leads to the decision of what
is reasonable at the time.

The department has an obligation to provide its enforcement members
with sound, rational policy and informed training in such matters.
Policy and training are best when based upon empirical data. This
valuable data is currently unavailable. Past research has failed to
provide a comprehensive look into this area. We believe this study
will provide this much needed data.

This project is a study of police driving behavior with motor vehicles
which reflect a correlation between accidents and/or injury and various
forms of police response. The data collected should provide insight
into environmental, demographic, and judgmental conditions that exist
at the time pursuit decisions are made. The results of the study
should provide police managers with empirical data and conclusions,

A PROUD tradition of SERVICE through EXCELLENCE, INTEGRITY, and COURTESY

A PWOUD tradition of SERVICE through EXCELLENCE, INTEGRITY, and COURTESY

 

101

lJased on analysis of that data, which can be used‘to produce sound
policy, realistic training, and appropriate supervision in matters
relating to police emergency responses with a particular emphasis on
pursuits.

 

This study is designed to be implemented in two phases. The first
phase is the distribution and completion of a General Opinion Question-
naire to be completed by all enforcement members of the department
(includes all ranks/levels). This questionnaire is designed to deter-
mine the opinions of enforcement members when making decisions while
at.work performing police pursuits. It is also designed to see if
there are significantly different opinions or attitudes among the
various ranks of the department. The questionnaire was constructed
after careful analysis of previous research findings, 8 review of
previous pursuit accidents, and a review of the literature. The effort
has been supported by input and counsel from a resource committee of
departmental members. The results of the first phase will be analyzed
and reported in a final report. The questionnaire is anonymous.

The second phase involves the distribution and administration of a
survey instrument to be completed anonymously by all enforcement
members shortly after each pursuit, medical emergency response,
response to a crime in progress, alarm response, and incidents of
high-speed driving. Each enforcement member on patrol will be provided
with a supply of survey instruments for his/her use, instructions for
completion, and collection envelopes for return to the researchers.
Both short and long forms will be provided along with instructions for
completion. The survey instruments will be used by each enforcement
member for a specific period (actual dates will be determined).
However, actual pursuits, as specifically defined by the research
instrument, will cause a survey instrument to be completed as soon as
possible following the pursuit. All enforcement members will complete
a survey form for all actual pursuits of this nature each time they
‘occur over the entire one (1) year period of the research project.

After the researchers receive the survey instruments, the data will be
analyzed in the aggregate and published in a final report. A pilot
test of the survey will soon be conducted at three posts. Following
this pilot test, further specific information and direction will be
disseminated to actually implement this research process.

We strongly solicit the support and cooperation of all enforcement
members in this exciting research project.

Although this project is being coordinated by the Executive Division,
any specific questions or concerns regarding the survey instrument or
other related research matter: should be directed to either of the
following researchers at their respective university:

Dennis M. Payne, Ph.D. Terry Nerbornne, Ph.D.
School of Criminal Justice Director, Law Enforcement
Baker Hall, Room 504 Programs

Michigan State University Ferris State University
East Lansing, MI 48823-1118 Big Rapids, MI 49307
(517) 355-2197 (616) 592-2836

 

 

9v '

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. ,
,T.

’Q

[a5
s,

I)”

102

 

WORKS CITED

Alpert, Geoffrey P. (1991). Law enforcement establishing
roadblocks to control the drunk driver - Michigan
Department of State: Police 0. Sitz.. Criminal Law Bulletin
27:1.

 

Alpert, Geoffrey P. and Dunham, Roger G. (1990). Police Pursuit

Driving: Controlling Responses to Emergengg Situations.
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Alpert, Geoffrey, (1989). Policing hot pursuits: The discovery of
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Alpert, Geoffrey and Anderson, Patrick R. (1986). The most deadly
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Auten, James (1990). "An analysis of police pursuit policy." Law and
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Barth, Louis H., (1981). Police pursuit: A panoply of problems. m
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Beckman, Erik (1983). "High Speed Chases: In pursuit of a
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California Highway Patrol, (1983). California Highway Patrol
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Connecticut Safety Commission, (1978). A report to Governor
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Fennessy, ER (1970). A study of the problem of hot pursuit by thg
police. The Center for the Environment and Man, Inc.:
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103

Gamgher, GP. (1985). "Lethal Force on Wheels: What Can
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Hagan, Frank E. (1989). Research Methods in Criminal lustice
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York.

Kappeler, Victor E. and del Carmen, Rolando V. (1990). Legal
issues in police negligent operation of emergency vehicles.

lournal of Police Science and Administration, 17:3.

Koonz, Jr., Joseph H. and Regan, Patrick M., (1985). Hot pursuit:
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Payne, Dennis M. (1991). Characteristics of PursuitszMichigan State
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Physicians for Automotive Safety (1968). Rapid Pursuit by the Police

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Round, John E. and Scafe, Myron E. (1979), "High-speed pursuits",
TheChief December, 1979.

 

Schubert, Frank A. (1988). State Police Vehicular Pursuit Policies: A
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of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, San Fransisco,
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Schultz, Donald 0. (1983). "High Speed Chases: Vehicle Pursuit
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104

Territo, Leonard, (1982). "Citizen Safety: Key Elements in
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42 U.S.C. { 1983 (1976),
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Cincinnati Department of Safety, Division of Police, (1980). Section
B]. "Emergency Operation of Police Vehicles."

 

 

105

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Aggew v. Porter, (1969). 247 NE 2d 487.

Alexander v. New York, (N.Y. App. 1976). 371 NE. 2d 534,
385 N.Y.S. 2d 788.

Bailey v. L. W. Eidson Charitable Foundation, (1978). 284 NE. 2d
141.

Baselski v. City of Chicago, (Ill. App. 1972). 292 NE. 2d 475.

Boyer v. Indi_an Rivgr County Sheriff's Department, (Fla. 1981).
#77-458 Vero Beach Court.

Brazonia v. Radtke (1978). 566 NW 2d 326.

 

Brooks v. Lundeen (1981). 364 NE 2nd 423.

 

Brummptt v. County of Sacramento (Cal. 1978). 582 P. 2d 952.

 

Cairl v. St. Paul (Minn. 1978). 268 N.W. 2d 908.

 

Cagpenter v. Hartford Accident and Indpmnity Co., (La. App. 1976)
333 So. 2d 296.

Chambers v. Id_e_a_l Pure Milk CL. (Ky. 1958). 245 SW. 2d 589.

City of Lansing v. Hathaway, (Mich. 1937) 280 Mich. 87, 273 N.W.
403.

Clark v. Sterrett (Ind. App. 1966), 141 Ind.App. 384,386, 220 NE. 2d
779, 781.

Cornwall v. Larsen (Utah 1977). 571 P. 2d 925.

 

Cotton v. Transamerica Insurance Co., (La. App. 1968). 211 So. 2d
110.

 

 

 

l 0 6
Dent v. City of Dallas, (Texas App.1986). 729 SW 2d 114.

Dillenbeck v. Cigg of Los Angeles, (Cal. 1968). 446 P. 2d 129.

Downs v. Camp, (Ill. App. 1969). 252 N .E. 2d 46.

Duarte v. City of San lose, (Cal. App. 1980). 161 Cal. Reptr. 140.
Dunn v. State (N.Y. App. 1971). 327 N.Y.S. 2d 622.

 

Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor, (Mich. App. 1981). 309 N.W. 2d 552.
Franklin v. Dick County, (Fla. App. 1970). 230 So. 2d 730.

Goddard v. Williams 251 NC 128, 110 SE 2nd 820.

 

Hamilton v. Town of Palo (1976). 244 NW 2d 329.

 

Hammon V. Pedigo, (Neb. 1962). 115 N.W. 2d 222.
Herron v. Silbaugh, (Pa. 1970). 260 A. 2d 755.

Holser v. City of Midland, (Mich. 1951). 330 Mich. 581, 584, 48 N.W.
2d 208.

Iackson V. Rauch, (Mich. App. 1969). 171 N.W. 2d 551.
lones v. Ray, (Ga. App. 1981). 285 SE. 2d 42.

onger v. District of Columbia, (DC. 1981). 28 Cr.L 2496.

Keevis v. Tookey, (Mich. App.1972). 42 Mich. App. 283, 287, 201 N.W.
2d 661.

Kirshenbaum v. Chicago, (Ill. 1976). 357 NE. 2d 571.
Kuzmics v. Santiago, (Pa. App. 1978). 389 A2nd 587.
Lakoduk v. Cruger, (1956). 296 P 2nd 690.

 

 

h
.0

I!”

l O 7
Lee v. Ci of Omaha (1981). 307 N.W. 2d 800.

 

 

Marion v. City of Flint, ( Mich.1976). 71 Mich App 447.
Mason v. City of Britton, (Wash. 1975). 534 P. 2d 1360
Mayfield v. City of Springfield, (Ill. 1981). #17096 NE. 2d.

Mayor and Alderman of Town of Morristown v. Inmfl, (Tenn.
1960). 342 SW. 2d 71.

McCormick v. State (1964), 43 Misc. 2d 777, 252 N.Y.S. 2d 199.
McKay v. Hargis, 351 Mich 409, 88 NWan 456.

Mcmarter v. City of Atlanta, (Ga. 1983), 572 F. Supp. 1401, 1419.
Mead v. State (1942), 5 N.W.2d 740, 303 Mich. 168.

Mobell v. City and County of Denver, (Colo. 1980), #C61525.
Moore v. Travelers Indemnity Co., (La. App. 1977). 352 So. 2d 270.

 

Pagels v. Cityatnd County of San Franci_sg, (Cal. App. 1955). 286
P. 2d 877.

Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, (Mich. 1979). 275 N.W. 2d 511.
Pomeroy v. Selman, (1970). 181 n.W. 2d 72, 25 Mich. App. 128.

Powell v. Allstate Insurance Co. (La. App. 1970). 233 So. 2d 38.

 

Rankin v. Sander (1953). 121 NE 2d 91.

 

Reenders v. Ontario (Cal. App. 1977). 137 Cal. Rptr. 736.

 

Reilly v. Philadelphia, (Pa. 1978). 328 PA 563.

Roll v. Timberman (NY App 1958). 229 A 2d 28.