THE INITIAL AMERICAN DENAZIFICATION PROGRAM IMPLEMENTED IN GERMANY AS REVIEWED IN THREE LEADING NEWSPAPERS

By
Debra Jean Allen

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ABSTRACT

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The initial phase of the American denazification program in Germany lasted from V-E Day until March 1946. While it is impossible to separate one aspect of the denazification program from another, the removal of Nazis from positions of authority is perhaps the clearest expression of the major aim of the program in general--security from future Nazi aggression.

The coverage of the program during these months accorded by the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, and the San Francisco Examiner varied, for the most part, according to the views and predilections of the editors or publishers. The Times covered the program most thoroughly, and generally lent its support to government policies concerning the occupation. The others showed less consistent interest and, for their own reasons, held to the view that the U.S. erred in its occupation policies for Germany.

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PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

Some of the individuals most closely connected with the denazification proceedings recorded the events which comprise the first part of this thesis. General Lucius D. Clay, military governor of the American zone, wrote of his four years in Germany in a monograph entitled Decision in Germany which was published in 1950. Those in authority over Clay such as Eisenhower and Truman made only passing reference to the denazification program, but Robert Murphy, who served as Political Adviser from the State Department, left his account of the activities in Diplomat Among Warriors which was published in 1964.

Finally, Harold Zink, who served as the first chief historian of the Historical Division of the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, used official documents and reports as well as notes, memos, and draft revisions in his two works on the occupation years--American Military Government in Germany (1947) and The United States in Germany 1944-1955 (1957). The other sources used were either dissertation studies of the era or document collections.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Although the Allies had done extensive planning for the occupation of Germany, when the surrender actually occurred, there was much confusion and bureaucratic overlap among the governing bodies. Early in 1944 the German Country Unit, comprised of American and British officers, was set up in England to handle affairs in the European Theater of Operations. One of the major difficulties for this unit was a lack of policy directives from both Washington and London. The unit did manage, however, to construct a series of plans and manuals for governing Germany before the Allied authorities decided in the summer of 1944 that military government should be handled on a national rather than an Allied basis, and consequently dissolved it. For the purposes of this study only the subsequent activities of the United States as they relate to occupied Germany will be reviewed.

The U.S. Group, Control Council for Germany, was established in August 1944, and continued much of the work of the German Country Unit. It was ultimately headquartered in Berlin and by June of 1945 consisted of 2,000 officers, 4,000 enlisted men, and many civilian employees. This Group had difficulty convincing the Joint Chiefs of Staff that any military government should be organized in such a

way that the eventual transfer of authority to the Germans could be relatively quick and simple. This problem was intensified by the lack of a single command center in Washington. The War Department was to handle the general operation while the State Department formulated the basic policies. This policy-planning and implementation responsibility was further divided between Washington officials and the commanding generals in the field, General George Patton Jr. of the Third Army and General A.M. Patch of the Seventh.

Another organization was developed in the summer of 1945 to handle military government affairs. This group, the G-5 division of the United States Forces, European Theater (USFET), came to consider itself the definitive authority for formulating directives, which view in turn resulted in a bureaucratic struggle with the U.S. Group Control Council for Germany. By the fall of 1945, however, the staffs of these groups were combined to form the Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone (OMGUS). OMGUS, with a staff of 12,000, was centered in Berlin and provided a staff for the American military governor and was the American representative on the Allied Control Council for Germany.

General Lucius D. Clay was appointed head of OMGUS as well as American Military Governor. In general, Clay wanted to ensure democratic growth in Germany by turning over administrative and legal matters to Germans as soon as

feasible in keeping with the outlines for the democratization and denazification of Germany.[1] Clay had earlier served as the director of the U.S. Group Control Council and therefore knew some of the difficulties he would have to face. As Military Governor he was aided by Robert Murphy who served as the Political Adviser from the State Department. Clay and Murphy reported to General Dwight Eisenhower and later to General Joseph McNarney. Fortunately for the success of the American denazification program, there were no major personality clashes among these men. Each admired certain traits and abilities of the other.[2] The problems they faced in reconstructing Germany were many and allowed for no petty quarrels. Aside from the typical bureaucratic infighting, there was a general vagueness and uncertainty regarding the correct channels of command for governing an occupied area. In addition to these problems was the added difficulty of finding capable German-speaking Americans to deal with administrative questions.[3] The largest problem which Clay and Murphy faced, however, was coping with the many sometimes conflicting documents and directives which they received from Washington; the three major ones being the Crimea Conference Communique, the Potsdam Protocol, and Joint Chiefs of Staff 1067 (JCS/1067).

At the Crimea Conference in February 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin had issued the following statement regarding the denazification of Germany:

> It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to . . . wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organizations, and institutions; remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public offices and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world.[4]

Later in the year the Potsdam Protocol was released to carry into effect the Crimea Declaration by destroying German militarism and Nazism, and thereby eliminating the threat that Germany posed to world peace. More specifically, Stalin, Truman, and Attlee agreed to be guided by the following principles concerning denazification:

> To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.
>
> To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propoganda.
>
> All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discrimination on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. . . .
>
> War criminals . . . shall be arrested . . . Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.
>
> All members of the Nazi party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public

> and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.[5]

In essence these two conferences reiterated the Allies' intent not to destroy Germany but rather to reconstruct it on a democratic basis. The methods taken for this reconstruction were spelled out in more detail in the directives emanating from Washington. One of the most important of these was labelled Joint Chiefs of Staff 1067 (JCS/1067). Although it was issued to the military government authorities in May 1945 and used in part for the Potsdam Protocol, it was not made public until October 1945. In general the directive was to serve as a guide for General Eisenhower and was not intended as the "ultimate statement of Policies."[6] It stated flatly that Germany was not to be occupied for the purpose of liberation, but rather to achieve certain Allied objectives--the primary ones being to prevent Germany from posing a threat to world peace through the elimination of Nazism and militarism, and the reconstruction of Germany on a democratic basis.[7] Regarding denazification JCS/1067 called for the following:

> --the dissolution of the Nazi Party and its affiliates;
> --the abrogation of laws and decrees establishing National Socialism and racism, and
> --the removal and exclusion from "positions of importance" of all Nazis who were more than "nominal participants" in civic organizations corporations, industry, education, or the press.[8]

Persons were described as more than "nominal participants" if they had held office or been active in the Party, authorized or participated in war crimes, been "avowed believers" in racist Nazi creeds, or "voluntarily given substantial moral or material support or political assistance" to Nazi leaders or officials. It was further declared that, "No such persons shall be retained in any of the categories of employment listed above because of administrative necessity, convenience or expediency."[9]

This non-discretionary clause caused special problems throughout the denazification proceedings because of the nature of the military government which allowed the different Army Groups to have a degree of autonomy in their proceedings. Thus a pattern, which had developed during the war, was continued through the early months of the occupation. This pattern involved the Army Groups which transmitted whatever parts of JCS/1067 they felt were sufficiently important, and then framed their own directives based on the main one from Washington. This resulted in delays and variations so that by the summer of 1945 the American Military Government was operating under at least four denazification policies.[10] Another problem which arose from this was the obligation JCS/1067 placed on the commander-in-chief to arrest or to have arrested certain Germans without regard to practical obstacles which could arise.[11]

This last point brings out an even more basic difficulty which resulted from JCS/1067. This was the criticism which it received from the military government

authorities who were charged with implementing it. General Eisenhower said it called for a "hard peace" and thus made it difficult to govern Germany effectively. He subsequently asked Washington for further instructions regarding the definition of a "nominal Nazi."[12] General Clay believed that JCS/1067 failed to take into account the reality of the conditions existing in Germany. He was concerned that Germany would starve and exist in a continual state of chaos as a result of the general provisions which limited the military government's freedom of action to improve the overall situation in Germany. He was generally circumspect in his public criticisms and saw some tempering effects resulting from Potsdam, but in his reminiscences of the occupation he wrote that, "Still, there was no doubt that JCS/1067 contemplated the Carthaginian peace which dominated our operations in Germany, . . ."[13]

With these criticisms taken into account other directives were issued to fill in the loopholes left by the major governing documents. For the purposes of this study only those dealing with the removal of Nazis from office will be considered. Thus on 7 July 1945 a directive entitled "Removal of Nazis and Militarists" was issued to deal predominantly with Nazis in government offices. It listed 136 mandatory removal and exclusion categories for those who joined the Party before May 1937 since it was then that Party membership became a prerequisite for holding a civil service position.[14] It further interpreted an active Nazi as anyone who had held office or been

active in the Party or its organizations, sanctioned or participated in Nazi crimes and persecutions, been avowed believers in Nazi racism and militarism, or voluntarily given moral or material support or political assistance to the Party or its officials.[15]

The 15 August 1945 directive expanded upon the preceeding one by including persons in private business, professions, and those of "'wealth and importance' who were unemployed."[16] Law Number Eight, entitled "Prohibition of Employment of Members of Nazi Party in Positions in Business Other Than Ordinary Labor and for Other Purposes," was issued on 26 September 1945. It called for the extension of denazification over the entire economy (except agriculture) by making it a criminal offense for anyone to employ a person who had been more than a nominal Nazi for anything other than common labor, except those expressly authorized by the Military Government. It allowed for appeals to be heard by local German Review Boards composed of reputable non-Nazis, with final decisions resting with the Military Government authorities. This directive thus placed part of the burden for denazification on the Germans themselves by making them liable for the removal of Nazis. In January 1946 a quadripartite directive was issued which contained the same provisions as the American directive and thus allowed for uniformity. This reduced the chances of a person who had been removed from an office or a position in a business being rehired in another zone.

A study of the progress of the denazification program was then undertaken by the Denazification Policy Board which had been established by OMGUS and headed by Charles Fahy, a former Solicitor General of the United States.[17] This report was submitted in January 1946 and stated that the existant program had five major flaws: it sometimes resulted in arbitrary decisions, it failed to reach certain active Nazis, it lacked German participation, it lacked long-range projection, and finally it lacked integration with other OMGUS programs.[18] In an attempt to correct this situation a law was issued in March 1946 which transferred complete responsibility for the administration of the denazification program to German hands with the supervision of the American Military Government. This "Law for the Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism" set up five clearly defined categories under which the German tribunals were to classify those who were screened. The categories were: (1) major offenders who could receive a maximum of ten years imprisonment, confiscation of property, and personal exclusion from public office; (2) offenders who were subject to the same punishments as above, but were eligible for probation; (3) nominal Nazis who were subject to a fine but could exercise the rights of citizenship; (4) those exonerated as a result of the investigation; and (5) followers of Nazism who received the same punishment as nominal Nazis.[19]

Initially then, the program established in the American zone required all persons in public or semi-

public office to complete a questionnaire or Fragebogen. It listed 133 questions intended to reveal an individual's personal history, employment and military record, membership in the Nazi Party or its organizations, income, travel abroad, and other such information. The individual had to sign and certify that the answers were true and that he or she understood that there was a severe penalty for falsifying answers. Those Germans with enough cash on hand could avoid answering the Fragebogen simply by remaining unemployed. Law Number Eight reduced this possibility somewhat by making it illegal for private businesses to be run or owned by anyone who had not passed the requirements of the Fragebogen.

The forms were then screened or "vetted" by the Special Branch of the Military Government. Answers were checked against employment records and other available documents. The Military Government was aided in this by the Nazi Party membership records which had been confiscated at a Munich paper mill in October 1945. These records made it almost impossible to falsify a questionnaire, but the screening process had to be completed nevertheless. When the number of applicants to be "vetted" became too much for the small staff of the Public Safety Division to handle, the whole process was turned over to the Germans under the Law for the Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism as described above. General Clay admitted that this was a controversial decision to make, but was justifiable as being within the confines of the Washington

directives because he pointed out that unless the Germans played a greater role in judging those who were suspected of Nazi activities, there was the danger that martyrs to National Socialism would be made out of those who were condemned by an occupying army.[20] Whether such a danger would have actually materialized is hard to say. What was apparent, however, was the gradual change in attitude and actions among the American Military Government. Part Two of this thesis reviews some of these attitudes and the American public's response to them as they were recorded in three leading newspapers of the time.

PART TWO

INTRODUCTION

Gauging public opinion is always a questionalbe undertaking. The validity of the data collected and the usefulness of the resulting analysis are often suspect. The power of the press in controlling or forming public opinion is also debatable. Nevertheless, certain attitudes and predispositions about events and activities of the time are revealed in public opinion polls and newspaper articles and editorials. Sometimes the fact that events are not reported in the media reveals some biases or short-sightedness on the part of those responsible for publication.

The denazification program discussed in the first part of this thesis was a newsworthy and sometimes controversial activity. Yet the coverage accorded it by the printed media differed in scope and intensity as shown in the three newspapers examined here; the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, and the San Francisco Examiner.

In 1945 the Times was published by Arthur H. Sulzberger and had Charles Merz as editor-in-chief. Sulzberger was the son-in-law of Adolph Ochs, the founder of the modern New York Times, whose credo was: "To Give the News Impartially, Without Fear or Favor." As publisher, Sulzberger attempted to adhere to his father-in-law's motto. During World War II he increased the size of the staff in order to cover the expanding role which the

United States was playing in international affairs. His basic premise of news reporting was, "For our part, we solicit the patronage of intelligent Americans who desire information rather than entertainment, who want the facts unadorned and who, in this critical period of our history place first their country and the freedom which it guarantees.[21]

The Tribune was the mouthpiece of Colonel Robert McCormick. The Colonel was a staunch Republican and an ardent conservative. Lloyd Wendt, one of McCormick's biographers, stated that the Colonel considered himself one of the country's "toughest fighting" editors and publishers, and one of the last "effective practitioner[s] of personal journalism in America."[22] His early opposition to the war arose from his anti-Democratic biases, his disillusionment with the results of World War I, and his distrust of the Soviet Union. Although considerable newsspace was given to the military aspects of the war, the editorials which appeared never lost their pro-isolationist and anti-administration tone.

The San Francisco Examiner was one of the first newspapers of the Hearst empire. John Winkle, a Hearst biographer, claimed that Hearst kept a close watch on the contents of the editorial page, especially those dealing with international events, even after he transferred control of the paper to his sons. Although he initially opposed U.S. intervention in the war, after Pearl Harbor he became a supporter of an "all out" war against Germany and Japan.

Throughout the war and subsequent occupation, Hearst editorials reflected his virulent anti-communism with continual warnings against "Excessive Russianism."[23]

These three newspapers represent some of the different views taken in regard to certain aspects of the American occupation of Germany from V-E Day to the adoption of the Law for the Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism. The interest taken in the denazification program varied from paper to paper and also within each paper depending on the news stories which came from Germany. The opinions about the occupation expressed in each of the three newspapers reflected to a small degree the parochial interests of certain groups within those cities. For the most part, though, the opinions expressed reflected the special interests and ideologies of the editors and/or publishers of each paper.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

The New York Times covered the denazification program rather thoroughly during the months encompassed by this study. The editor periodically ran feature articles and editorials about the program or about Germany in general. The words used to describe National Socialism reveal a belief that Nazism was a deeply-rooted and pervasive evil. In an editorial of 12 May 1945 the writer, in discussing the extent of the occupation, called for a denazification program that would clean out Nazis as efficiently as an "exterminator cleans a pest-ridden house."[24] Reporters covering the program in Germany wrote of "purging agencies"[25] of the "Nazi aftermath,"[26] and of the "cancer of Nazism."[27] The American officials in Germany used the same kind of nomenclature when discussing Nazism. Eisenhower spoke of the necessity of "uprooting nazism"[28] while Major Keith Wilson of the Public Safety Division of the U.S. Group Control Council for Germany called for a program "done with a surgeon's knife if it is to be done at all. . ."[29]

Public opinion polls also reflected a basic belief that Nazism constituted more than just another type of government. When asked if they thought that there was a "real danger" of Fascism springing up again unless steps were taken by the Allies to prevent it, 58% of those questioned in April 1945 agreed, while only 23% believed

that the ideas would die.[30]

An analysis of the words and ideas expressed in the Times and polls revealed something about the perceived requirements of the denazification program. The belief that Nazism was an evil meant that it had to be expelled and destroyed rather than simply displaced. To do this every Nazi who had held a position of significant authority had to be removed and replaced by someone who met the criteria established by the military government. It further showed that the American public and the Times' reporters who carefully examined these policies, realized that the initial denazification program had to be "tough," "ruthless," and "inflexible."[31] Such determinations also implied the belief that the denazification program could succeed and that it was possible for the German people to become democratic citizens once again if all vestiges of National Socialism were removed. Indeed, one of the Times' readers considered the removal of the Nazis one of the "most humane things" the Allies could do since the Nazis were seen as "offenders against society."[32]

Initially the soldiers stationed in Germany feared that the American public would be too soft on the peace terms. In a series of letters which the Times reviewed, soldiers wrote about Germans as the "carriers of the virus of Nazism."[33] It is interesting and perhaps understandable to note, though, that the farther the troops were removed from the fighting, the more tolerant they became of the Germans.[34]

This became a real problem later in the occupation (considering the non-fraternization rules) when redeployment resulted in the combat troops being sent home and being replaced by rookies who had never experienced the intensity of the battle against the Germans. This growing feeling of leniency was seen in two different ways by the reporters dealing with Germany. Drew Middleton saw it as a possible sign that the denazification program was proceeding as planned so that the military government authorities had less cause to be alarmed since the Nazi officials were being successfully removed from office.[35] On the other hand, Raymond Daniell and Hanson Baldwin on separate occasions feared that the lackadasical attitude on the part of many American officers and enlisted men was resulting in a loss of prestige for the military government since some Nazis who had been removed from their jobs were being re-established in their occupations by other American officers who would simply change the job title.[36]

The American occupation of Germany was also affected by the dawning realization that in spite of their general docility and cooperation, the majority of Germans felt no guilt at all for the atrocities of the Nazis. The questions of war guilt and justifications go beyond the scope of this thesis, but the news reports, letters to the editor, and the public opinion polls reveal a general indignation at the absence of any German contrition for the war. General Eisenhower stated his belief that the punishment

of the Nazis was necessary because he saw no evidence of the acknowledgement of war guilt; "'I am quite sure they have no consciousness about it.'"[37] In a feature article which appeared in May, Curt Riess, who had travelled extensively in Germany, facetiously noted that it was amazing that the Nazis had stayed in power as long as they had considering the number of people who boasted that they had opposed or disapproved of Hitler. Riess noted that, "Needless to say, we don't believe . . . most of them. . . . They are still Nazis. . . . as arrogant as ever . . ."[38] Riess did not go so far as to state that the Germans could not be re-educated, but he did caution that it would be very time consuming if it was to be done thoroughly. He also displayed his disagreement with those who believed that the Germans could re-educate themselves. He stated, "The world has taken too many chances in believing in the 'better Germans.'"[39]

Even as late as November 1945 a letter to the editor of the Times cautioned about too much "maudlin sentimentality" for the Germans considering their arrogance during the war and the recorded fact that most Germans hated Hitler not because of his vile crimes, but because he had lost the war.[40] Alfred Hetkin, the author of this letter, warned the Times' readers not to forget the victims of German aggression who had suffered a worse fate than the Germans after the war. He wanted the press to concentrate on American policies in Germany in order to keep the public informed. These articles show the concern of many Americans

that the Germans not only be punished, but also that Germany be in a position from which it would not be able to put such Nazi creeds into practice.

An opinion poll taken periodically by OMGUS of the German people in the American zone served to show that the Americans' view of an unrepentant Germany was not far from the truth. When asked if they thought National Socialism was a bad idea or a good idea poorly carried out, 43% of the Germans polled believed it was bad and 44% good on 5 November 1945; 39% said it was bad and 51% good on 27 December 1945; and 38% bad and 54% good on 29 March 1946--even after the Law for the Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism had been issued.[41]

Although not directly related to the denazification program, the Nuremberg war crimes trials of the leading Nazis served to show further that the German masses refused to accept responsiblitiy for the activities of the Nazis. The Times covered the proceedings of the trial thoroughly and editorials appeared which were favorable to the aims of the trial--condemnation of aggressive war and the establishment of standards of conduct for all nations.[42] Reporters also canvassed the German population and discovered a general feeling of apathy regarding the Nuremberg trials. Raymond Daniell stated that the Germans suffered from an "ethical lacuna" which made it possible for them to accept the proof of certain acts without recognizing the evil concepts on which these acts were based.[43] In his evaluation

of this German apathy he determined that perhaps the Allies had based the trial on the wrong premise. Instead of proving that the Nazis had committed the atrocities of which they were accused, the prosecution should have started its case by pointing out that such actions were immoral and inhumane. Daniell believed that the Germans in this case were incapable of accepting responsibility because of the nature of Nazism which established criteria for a master race which had to be met at all costs.[44] In two separate editorials the writers pointed out that what little interest the Germans showed in the Nuremberg trials resulted in a feeling that collective responsibility for the war had shifted to the defendants.[45]

What this meant for the success of the denazification program was that the Americans would have to do more than simply remove the Nazis from office. As stated earlier, it was necessary to institute a plan through which democratic ideas could gain a foothold among the Germans. The possibility for the success of this plan as seen by the Times will be discussed in the conclusion. It is necessary to point out here, however, that both the Nuremberg trials and the denazification program attempted to curb human aggression and were therefore experiments with few if any legal precedents.

The views that Americans held about Germans were further complicated by problems with the occupation. One major one was the failure of the Army to convince the troops of the necessity for the occupation. In September 1945

Gladwin Hill reported that both enlisted men and officers were expressing discontent, with the result that "gold-bricking" was generally the rule rather than the exception.[46] He regretted that the Information and Education Division was developing programs dealing with Shakespearian literature and poultry raising instead of trying to instill some sort of purpose into the soldiers.[47]

Added to the feeling of apathy among the soldiers and partially in response to it were the difficulties arising from the rapid redeployment of the European forces. The Times did not make a major issue out of redeployment except to note how it adversely affected the denazification program.[48] In October 1945 Raymond Daniell warned that the American Military Government was relying increasingly on German civilians, especially if they were "good looking and speak English."[49] He further noted that the newly arrived troops were especially open to blandishments. Daniell did not hesitate to criticize such military practices, or to state his belief that the Germans still thought in terms of "goosestepping" and could not yet be trusted to administer Germany without supervision.[50]

Such reports of inefficiency resulting from the redeployment were denied by military leaders such as General Joseph McNarney, Secretary of War Robert Patterson, and General John Hildring of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, but the Times quoted "a number of officials at the War Department" and "reports from

non-military observers" who claimed that redeployment was greatly reducing the number of soldiers capable of handling the denazification procedures properly.[51]

Whether it was denied or accepted, it is only logical that as more and more American troops were sent home or to the Asian theater, the work load of those remaining would have to increase, or the efficiency of the "vetting" process would suffer. In June 1945 there was approximately one investigator for every 6,000 Germans. One Army Corps transferred 600 artillerymen and gave them a "rudimentary course in pigeonholing Germans," but the number of screeners was still too low.[52] By July 1945 there were more than 700,000 putative Nazis held in jails or detention camps in the U.S. Zone. By January 1946 forty-nine percent of those held were released after an investigation revealed that they had no pro-Nazi activity record. Considering the fact that only one percent of those detained could produce evidence of having actively worked against the Nazis, the number of those released seems excessive.[53]

One result of this loss of interest or effectiveness in denazification was an increase in the reported instances of Nazis retaining their authority in some sphere of government or business. In the early months of the occupation some Nazis had been retained to "'get the electricity on'" as General Clay phrased it.[54] As the months dragged on, however, Raymond Daniell and others who were covering the occupation warned against placing

too much emphasis on expediency rather than on the long-term policy of eliminating Nazism in Germany.[55] They feared that the progress that had been made in the denazification program thus far would suffer at the hands of those Nazis who had been retained or returned to positions of authority. At a conference of the American Military Government leaders held in Frankfort am Main in August 1945 the conferees cautioned that any failure to remove Nazis from power would be seen as a sign of American unwillingness to accomplish the major war aims.[56]

This increased concern over the retention of Nazis resulted in an investigation and subsequent purge of the Bavarian officials who had been appointed to office after the establishment of the American Military Government. In September 1945 a special investigation by Major Howard Ordeway resulted in the dismissal of several officials who were accused of falsifying their Fragebogen. Many of these people had been sponsored by the Minister President Schaeffer who then resigned in protest.[57]

This incident in Bavaria was directly related to the transfer of General George Patton as head of the Military Government in Bavaria to Fifteenth Army headquarters where he was to prepare materials necessary for writing the official history of the war. In September 1945 the general held a press conference in which he expressed doubts about the importance that was being placed on the denazification program--especially the removal of competent

Germans who were helping the occupation authorities. He stated his belief that too much fuss was being made over the program in general since such a vast number of Germans had been dragooned into joining the Nazi party. He wisely asked not to be quoted on his estimation that 99% of the Nazis were simply joiners of the party in power, and not true believers. He thought that the best hope was in "'showing the German people what grand fellows we are.'"[58] Patton wanted to get German industry operating efficiently so that it would no longer be a burden on the American taxpayer. His remarks were duly recorded in the Times, but the statement that most caught the attention of the American public was quoted as, "'. . . the Nazi thing is just like a Democrat or Republican election fight.'"[59] In saying this Patton seemed to be minimizing the importance of the atrocities committed in the name of Nazism, and thereby making the whole occupation superfluous.

An editorial which appeared in the New York Times on 24 September 1945 praised General Patton's military ability, but stated that as head of the Bavarian Military Government, his remarks showed a disregard for the ultimate aims of the war--the elimination of Nazism and militarism. The editor did not believe that, " . . . his remarks should go unchallenged, either by his commanding officer, General Eisenhower, or by his superiors in Washington."[60]

Patton later attempted to explain that his major fear was that communists would try to take advantage of the chaos

to further their own ends. This explanation was not sufficient for General Eisenhower, however. He subsequently sent Patton a letter stating unequivocally that the discussion stage of denazification had long passed, and that the Potsdam Protocol must be carried out. After a meeting with his commander, Patton held a second news conference in which he stated that his use of the analogy of Republicans and Democrats had been an unfortunate choice, but he reiterated his belief that it might prove necessary to put up with some Nazis in order to survive the harsh winter.[61] As noted earlier General Patton was reprimanded and removed from his position in Bavaria.

His was not the only voice of criticism of the American denazification program, however. In October 1945 Raymond Daniell reported that Patton had only helped to dramatize the issue by voicing the doubts and reservations of many American officers in the military government. Daniell praised Patton for bringing on a showdown over the denazification orders that were being overridden in the name of expediency. He expressed fear, however, that the general's removal would be seen as a healing of the breach in policy rather than as the disciplinary action it was. In the same report Daniell interviewed Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, who stated his belief that the real danger arising out of the Patton episode was not that Patton failed to carry out orders, but that the junior officers would misconstrue his remarks about the real reasons

for the American occupation.[62]

Other reports of the lackadaisical attitude that existed among American Military Government officials regarding enforcement of the provisions of denazification confirmed General Smith's fears. "General opposition" was expressed; one officer was even quoted as saying that the whole thing was just a political matter and when he came across a directive which he disagreed with, he simply ignored it because the worst that could happen would be his transfer to the United States which was what he wanted to happen anyway.[63] When General Eisenhower learned of this attitude, he warned of dire consequences to any officer who did not take the program seriously. In October 1945 he publicly defended the role of the military government in carrying out the provisions of the Potsdam Protocol. He went on to admit that although mistakes (which he did not specify) had been made in governing Germany, he did not believe that the success or failure of the program could be determined after only five months of occupation rule.[64]

In December a column by Anne O'Hare McCormick appeared in which she reported that after spending a month in Germany she did not believe that things were going well. She wrote that it looked too much like an experiment with no definite ends in sight. She admitted that a purge of the Nazis had occurred, but stated that, "A purge is not a policy. It only clears the ground for policy."[65] As has already been noted, this lack of a positive program to supplement the negative aspects of JCS/1067 was one of the

major criticisms of this policy when it was revealed to the public. On at least two separate occasions Raymond Daniell expressed his belief that this reluctance to remove all Nazis from authoritative positions resulted in the non- and anti-Nazis becoming "disillusioned, disheatened, and afraid to cooperate" out of fear of retaliation from a possible Nazi revival.[66]

Another issue which was taken up by many of the critics was that of increasing the food allotment for the Europeans. On this matter the critics had the support of the American public, or at least that portion that was polled by the American Institute of Public Opinion in June 1945. When asked if they believed that Europeans would starve unless the U.S. sent food 70% said yes and 23% said no.[67] When they were then asked if they would be willing to continue putting up with shortages of butter, sugar, meat, and other rationed foods in order to send goods to Europe 85% said yes and only 12% said no.[68] A poll taken in January 1946 concerning the area of occupation revealed that almost half of the general public questioned believed that the United States should ship more food there; thirty-five percent said no, and 17% had no opinion on the matter.[69] Partially in response to this concern about a food shortage, President Truman sent Byron Price as a special envoy to Europe to review the situation. The New York Times reported on this fact-finding trip. Price, former Associated Press executive and wartime Director of Censorship, confirmed the necessity of increasing food shipments, and warned that rioting and

epidemics might occur if something was not done. He was careful to phrase his suggestion so that he did not appear to be "soft" on the Germans. He pointed out that by increasing the food allotment and thereby preventing starvation, the U.S. would be helping to prevent disease among the troops, and helping to promote decency among the Allies.[70] There were no editorials in the Times regarding Price's recommendation, but from the general tone of the news reports and editorials concerning the occupation, it is fairly safe to say that the Times would have supported increased food shipments as long as they did not hamper the success of the denazification program.

This last point reflects the overall support which the New York Times accorded the policies of the American Military Government in Germany. That is not to say that criticisms did not appear in the paper. It simply means that when comments or criticisms were made, they were generally based on substantiated facts and intelligent supposition. The Times' correspondents assigned to Germany often pointed out the failings of the military government. Such articles, however, adhered to the Times' "internationalist" philosophy--that as a new world power, the United States should play a more important part in world affairs. In this case that involved having a central role in the denazification of its former enemy. Ideas and opinions expressed in the Times varied slightly from column to column, but in general the Times displayed an optimistic attitude that with enough

properly trained men and women, and given enough time the American denazification program could prove to be a success.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

In contrast to the New York Times the Chicago Tribune did not emphasize the denazification proceedings in its coverage of the occupation. There was some summary acknowledgement of the establishment of the military government and its activities and problems in Germany. The Potsdam Conference received a large portion of editorial comment, but the Patton incident was recorded without any type of commentary. Throughout the war the major focus of the Tribune had been on Japan,[71] and after the war in the Far East had ended, the attention of the Tribune shifted to the popular cause of bringing the American troops home from Germany. In the Tribune's coverage of these events in Germany, the concerns and biases of Colonel Robert McCormick, the editor/publisher were plainly revealed.

The narrow outlook of the Tribune was shown in its support of the issue of demobilization. Rather than point out the importance of keeping a military presence in Germany in order to carry out the aim of eliminating Nazism, the Tribune warned against the army of occupation becoming an army of oppression. In the same column the editor enigmatically stated that the United States would have neither a greater nor lesser role in world affairs whether it withdrew or retained its troops.[72] He later praised the announcement by Eisenhower in September 1945 of the reduction in number of the occupation army, but still claimed that

any such army of occupation was "stupid," "cruel," and "venal."[73] The author of these columns does not consider the importance either of the acceptance of responsibility by a world power or the perceptions of U.S. power by other nations. It is unrealistic to think that the United States, as the most powerful nation emerging from the war, could simply pull out its troops and let the western Allies handle the occupation because of their proximity to the defeated nation. Nevertheless, that is what the Tribune proposed on at least two separate occasions. Such an insular policy may have reduced the number of administrative headaches with which the United States was plagued during the occupation, but it would not have met the realities of the situation.

This short-sightedness and longing for the "good ol' days" was also shown in its editorial opposition to the Nuremberg trials. The news articles by Hal Foust, who covered the proceedings for the Tribune, were remarkably straight-forward and unprejudiced. An editorial which appeared on 21 November 1945 was not. The editor objected to the trials, not because of any doubts about the guilt of the defendants--which was accepted as a fact, but because the author of the column believed that the Nazis had committed the conspiracy to murder, and could therefore have been tried in the traditional courts against well-established criminal codes. The editor goes on to say that he or she doubted that the "kangaroo court" would be remembered for its established purpose of dramatizing the determination

of the world to punish peace breakers. Instead, "The trial is much more likely to be remembered as a supreme example of self-righteous hypocrisy."[74] The discrepancy between the opening and closing statements was obvious: how could the trials be both a simple procedure against a murder conspiracy and a world-wide determination to punish war-time aggressors? The editorial itself serves to show how the Tribune often presented arguments that were based on existing biases, rather than on a critical analysis of the facts.

The Tribune did express admiration for General Eisenhower and faithfully recorded his announcements and warnings while he was military commander in Germany. In October 1945 he reported that military rule had progressed so far that U.S. detachments might be withdrawn from county and city governments by November 15 and from provincial governments a month later.[75] No editorials appeared (as they had in the New York Times) which questioned the reasons behind this transfer of authority back to the Germans at that specific time. There was no hint of doubt about the motives of the administration because in this case the government authorities were operating in tandem with the wishes of the Tribune editors. Indeed, further praise of Eisenhower was reported in October 1945 when Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy stated that he was pleasantly amazed at what the general had done considering the situation in Germamy, and also that he did not believe that

the American press was revealing the full picture of Eisenhower's successes.[76]

Warnings about the inadequacy of food supplies in Germany were also taken up by the Tribune. In July and December 1945 editorials the author[s] realistically tied in the state of the United States' economy to that of Germany. But then in a simplistic attempt to find a single cause for the desperate situation, other editorials laid the entire blame for the conditions on President Truman and his administration for their role at Potsdam. The editor condemned the guidelines established at Potsdam as calling for a deliberate starvation policy for Germany. He saw this as a new policy in U.S. foreign relations which resulted from America's association with western Europe.[77] The editor even went so far as to compare the members of the Truman administration to the war criminals in Germany because of their anti-humanitarian policies.[78] These views on Potsdam clearly reflect a combination of the Tribune's pro-isolation and anti-Democrat biases.

This generally negative view of the occupation was reflected in the Tribune's coverage of the criticism which the denazification program received. On several separate occasions someone, usually connected with the army of occupation, spoke in favor of treating the Germans kindly or of revising the harsh peace terms that had been established. In May 1945 the Tribune reprinted a letter which had appeared in Stars & Stripes. The writer of the letter, Samuel Freiberg, an army engineer, called for a

helping hand to be given to the Germans as children of God. It was unclear whether the Tribune reprinted this letter because of its display of humanitarianism or because it displayed disaffection with administrative policies. What was evident was that the reasoning behind Freiberg's call for aid showed just how far the military government authorities had to go in educating the troops on the necessity for the occupation. Contrary to the declarations of the Potsdam Protocol and JCS/1067, Freiberg stated that, "'We have forgotten that we have come here as liberators! To liberate Germany from the Nazis, just as we liberated France and the Low Countries. . . . Instead we have conquered and condemned a nation. . . . Are we behaving any better than that Fascist clique. . . ?'"[79]

Later in the year another surprising article appeared in the Tribune in which Alexander B. Maley, a lieutenant commander who had served in Army Intelligence and the OSS, criticized the basis of the denazification program by stating that the U.S. must realize that 80% of the Germans had been betrayed by 5%.[80] He then went on to point out that the U.S. had to develop a more constructive program to replace the generally negative aspects of JCS/1067 and the other Washington directives. He concluded by stating that, "'The American people are big enough to retract and start over.'"[81] Those Americans who knew or cared anything about JCS/1067 might have wanted a more positive program implemented in Germany, but it is extremely doubtful that Americans in general were willing to follow the "forgive and forget"

type of policy that Maley and Freiberg advocated. On the contrary, a public opinion poll concerning the treatment of the Germans by the U.S. which was conducted in October 1945 revealed that 50% of those polled believed it was "not tough enough;" 37% believed it "about right;" and only 2% thought it was "too tough."[82]

Others who disagreed with the harshness of American occupation policies also had their protests recorded in the Tribune. A "high ranking officer" in Berlin criticized the theory that since Germany had started the war, Germans should not be allowed a higher standard of living than their hardest hit neighbor. He stated his belief that American soldiers could not long watch freezing and starving German women and children without taking some action. He warned that this policy would only create hatred and prejudice, and called instead for Americans to teach the Germans what real freedom and democracy were by not perpetuating a regime of force.[83] Such generalities were very appealing to the American public, but unfortunately this "high ranking American officer" gave no specifics about how such freedom and democracy should be generated.

In October 1945 Larry Rue, a Tribune correspondent, wrote a column condemning the use of German manpower to maintain the occupation forces as nothing more than slave labor which strained the economy and slowed recovery.[84]

A few months later another movement emerged among American scholars who encouraged the U.S. government to stop the drain of German scientific talent to the Russian

zone by making it more appealing for them in the American sector.[85] A "highly placed American source" said that because of the indiscriminate application of the mandatory arrest directives, some famous non-Nazi scientists were being held in jail.[86] Dr. Roger Adams of the University of Illinois Chemistry Department claimed, after a four month tour of Germany, that the denazification program in the U.S. zone had gone beyond that of the other Allies and that the U.S. was therefore wasting potential scientific talent.[87]

Unfortunately again, such articles were not extensive enough to ascertain whether these appeals on behalf of certain sections of the German population arose from humanitarian reasons or from other more selfish motives. What was clear was that many of these articles agreed in principle with the concerns of the Tribune, i.e., criticism of the administration and condemnation of the occupation of Germany.

The events in Bavaria--the arrests, investigation, and resignation of Schaeffer--were reported in the Tribune as they had been in the New York Times, although no editorials appeared either to praise or condemn the arrests of more than one hundred German businessmen and financiers, or the arrest of a German adviser to the American Military Government who was convicted of falsifying a questionnaire and possessing contraband.[88] The Tribune recorded American Military Government progress reports in July and September 1945 which announced the arrests of tens of thousands of

Nazis and the removal from office of tens of thousands more.[89] There was also a report that General Clay was satisfied with the progress being made in the denazification program and with the target dates for the transfer of authority to the Germans, but this was all recorded without editorial opinion.

Even the removal of General Patton was not deemed important enough to warrant editorial comment. His actions and statements were duly noted. The Tribune recorded his general objection to the denazification program in September 1945 when he stated that the prime objective of his Third Army would be to restore normal communications and prevent suffering rather than to rout out every suspected Nazi.[90] He gave his opinion that it was more dangerous to allow an "anarchistic situation" to develop by not restoring normal communications and law and order than to have some Nazis working for the U.S.[91] Even after his transfer to the 15th Army Headquarters, he stood by his belief that he would have been un-American if he had not done his utmost to prevent starvation. The Tribune also noted in this article that the general was pleasant and smiling during his press conference, but he appeared to weigh every word so as not to "get into more hot water."[92]

An article appeared about a week later which stated that "many military government officials" agreed with Patton, and complained that there was no distinction between the genuine Nazis and those forced to join the Party in order to carry on their professions.[93] As in the New York Times

the Tribune did not include specific names of those "many military government officials" or report that any of them offered any suggestions about how to correct the situation. It is perhaps humorous to note here also that while the generals may have agreed en masse with Patton, they were not prepared to follow his vociferous lead. When they learned in late September 1945 that General Eisenhower had condemned six or seven members of the Nazi party to hard labor for their crimes, the Tribune reported that there was a sudden firing of the generals' "pet barbers, chefs, pretty secretaries, chambermaids, and waitresses."[94]

The Tribune did not often publish such lighthearted reports about the occupation. The editorials written during the initial months of the occupation expressed general dissatisfaction and disgust at the situation in Germany. One of the most vituperative compared the policies governing the occupation to those of Hitlerism which bred racism, slavery, and indifference.[95] Another compared the mismanagement and suppression of civil liberties in occupied Germany to the situation in the U.S. under the New Deal.[96]

It is difficult to say for sure whether the Tribune's support for an easing of the harsh measures vis-a-vis Germany arose from a feeling of sympathetic concern for the Germans, or from a generally obstructionist policy towards the Administration's actions. It is easy to note, however, that the Tribune did attach itself to popular issues such as redeployment and the activities of General Eisenhower.

The condemnation of Potsdam and Allied cooperation showed the depth of the Colonel's belief that America would only be corrupted by being involved in such international affairs. Clearly the Tribune did not strive for the "internationalist" outlook which the New York Times attempted to maintain. Instead, the Tribune reflected for the most part the ideological views of its editor/publisher, and perhaps to a lesser extent the interests of Chicago's large ethnic German population.

SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER

The San Francisco Examiner, like the Chicago Tribune, made the war in the Far East and the subsequent occupation of Japan its major point of focus during the months encompassed in this study.[97] Only certain apects of the German denazification program were covered. Aside from a very basic coverage of the progress of the American Military Government in restoring the German government, the Examiner also focused on the speeches and reports of Eisenhower and Clay, the dissatisfaction of the occupation troops, and gave a large amount of newsprint to the Patton incident. The Examiner gave an emphasis to these activities which was very different from either the Tribune or the New York Times. The reason that lay behind these and other post-war events, according to the Examiner, was that the Western Allies were continually appeasing Soviet demands to the extent that Soviet communism was succeeding in its attempt to fill the vacuum left by National Socialism in Germany.

The initial months of the occupation were only intermittently recorded in the Examiner's coverage of the events. The Nuremberg trials did initially receive some mention. Reports from INS correspondent Pierre J. Huss and others who covered the trials for the Examiner were very candid and factual. Surprisingly few if any editorials concerning the trials were written, and gradually even the reports from Nuremberg became back-page news and received

only a small amount of newsspace.

Reports about the occupation in general noted a stern application of the Washington directives and non-fraternization rules. General Clay was reported as being a "hard boiled commander" who said that the Germans would know for sure that they were being governed by military rule, and that the German war-making potential would definitely be smashed.[98] The wording of this article was interesting in that it declared that a program of "sweat and discipline" would be necessary "to get Germany back into the community of nations."[99] Since this article appeared in May 1945 it was too early to tell if the Examiner actually was advocating the implementation of the denazification program for the good of Germany as the phrase seemed to suggest. Subsequent editorials showed that this was not the case, and that the Examiner's paramount concern was that the Soviets would somehow use the program to advance their own cause.

Nevertheless, General Eisenhower's stern demands that the denazification policies be carried out were recorded in the Examiner. He stated that although it might take fifty years or more it was necessary because, "'A Nazi is a Nazi until he proves himself otherwise, . . .'"[100] He also noted that the all-important task of this "direct purging of German life" would be supervised by him and General Clay.[101]

The Office of War Information called the denazification program a "big demolition project" because it was necessary to destroy the myth of an innocent and misunderstood Germany that had been set upon by its inferior neighbors.[102]

This office further clarified the guidelines of the program by stating that there would be no attempt to "woo" the Germans to the American viewpoint; it would simply be a policy of "take it or leave it."[103] The Army also initially warned its occupation troops that no matter how friendly, sorry, or anti-Nazi the German people appeared, the soldiers must always be on their guard because Nazi treachery and lust for conquest still existed. The report also noted that although the non-fraternization rules were "tough" for Americans to accept, they were necessary because the Germans "cannot come back into the civilized fold just by sticking out their hand and saying I'm sorry."[104]

Eventually, however, the Examiner reported Eisenhower's announcements of the target dates for the transfer of state and local administrative machinery to the Germans.[105] Eisenhower also urged the United States to take steps (within the confines of the Potsdam Protocol) which would check starvation and disease in Germany. Without denying complete German responsibility for the situation, Eisenhower nevertheless advocated sending increased food shipments out of humanitarian considerations.[106]

A correspondent for the Examiner, Karl H. Von Wiegand, suggested another possible reason for this change in attitude about the Germans controlling their own government, however. In November 1945 Von Wiegand reported "intense dissatisfaction" among the troops regarding American policies in Germany which they perceived as "kicking a man when he's down."[107] He further reported that according to a private letter from

a "high ranking American staff officer" unless there was a change in policy to ease the situation in Germany, "sensational developments" would occur. Unfortunately Von Wiegand did not tell where he got this letter from, or whether other military government officials confirmed its contents.[108]

As it turned out some "sensational developments" were reported in the Examiner in January 1946. These developments proved to be protests and demonstrations among the occupation troops in Germany. There was no evidence indicating dissatisfaction with the stern application of denazification measures as the cause of these protests, however. Instead, these soldiers were demonstrating against delays in redeployment. General McNarney received complaints from "thousands of irate G.I.'s and WAC's" who wanted to return home since in their opinion the enemy had definitely been defeated.[109]

At the same time as these protests were occurring Merrill Meigs, Vice-President of the Hearst Corporation, completed a tour of Germany at the request of Secretary of War Robert Patterson. He reported in the Examiner that he believed Germany was an "utterly defeated nation," and one could almost feel pity for the Germans. He also stated that although the military government officials were doing an "intelligent and constructive" job, he had repeatedly heard complaints that demobilization was crippling U.S. governing functions.[110]

In spite of this report, the editor of the Examiner sided with the protesting soldiers and stated that they had

a right to ask why they were not going home. This editorial further stated that Washington, and not the G.I.'s was to be blamed for any loss of prestige which may have occurred because of this incident.[111] The reasons given for the condemnation of American policy in this case point out the "red baiting" nature of this Hearst publication. This editorial claimed that U.S. "subservience to Soviet Policy" at Moscow, Yalta, and Potsdam had resulted in a loss of faith among the western Allies in American intentions. It further stated that the United States had compromised on every principle of human rights at these conferences.[112]

Another editorial concerning Potsdam stated that the conference proved to be nothing more than the official confirmation of Soviet policies in Europe. The writer of this column vividly declared that the "carcass of defeated Germany" would be further "picked over" by the Soviet Union, Poland, and the Baltic States.[113] Without stating what actions gave support to such a remark, the editor further noted that the American people were more convinced than ever that the President should stay within the borders of the United States and attend to the main concern--the war in the Pacific.[114]

The Allied Conferences were not the only activities to come under the wrath of the editor of the Examiner, however. The particulars of the Patton incident have already been related in articles from the Times and the Tribune, and they were also closely reported in the Examiner. His conferences with General Eisenhower increased speculation

by Examiner correspondents that he would again be "muzzled" because of his remarks about policy,[115] although Eisenhower initially claimed such reports were just "'gossipmongering.'"[116]

Patton's explanation for his actions was also recorded in the Examiner. He stated that although he had made an unfortunate choice of analogies in comparing "so vile a thing as Nazism with the political parties," he still believed that he was obeying General Eisenhower's orders in carrying out denazification.[117] He further remarked that he thought the brouhaha was simply a case of the "'outs'" in Germany complaining as usual about the "'ins'" by calling them Nazis.[118]

The Examiner stood by Patton throughout this ordeal, and even after his transfer refused to find any cause for complaint with his actions. On the contrary, an editorial stated that his removal was a "Communist smear" that had occurred because of Patton's adamant anti-communist beliefs.[119] The editor saw the whole incident as a "disturbing thing" and claimed that there was jubilation in Moscow and Russian Berlin over Patton's transfer, not because he refused to put Nazis out, but because he was unwilling to allow the communists in.[120]

A few days later another editorial appeared which was titled, "Vindication for Patton." According to this view Eisenhower in his second monthly report as military governor, unintentionally vindicated Patton when he reported that denazification was virtually complete and included a list of the number of Nazis who had been removed from certain

professions. The editor then concluded that since Bavaria comprised a large section of the American zone, it was obvious that there had been no lag in the denazification process and thus, "General Patton was 'disciplined' not because he was opposed to 'de-Nazification'--for plainly he was not--but because he would not help the Reds to Communize Bavaria."[121] The author of this column, however, did not elaborate on this communist conspiracy or take into account the fact that in spite of his statements to the contrary, Patton had directly disobeyed the orders of his superiors by not ousting all known Nazis from office whenever it was required.

General Patton was only one of many victims of the communist advance, according to the Examiner. Wilhelm Hoegner, the Minister President of Bavaria who was appointed after Schaeffer's resignation, stated that his Social Democrat government would probably include communists who could "put teeth" into the denazification program because he preferred a small number of decent people to a "well greased (Nazi) machine."[122] The editor of the Examiner was apoplectic upon learning of these remarks. He (or she) claimed that such remarks were "pure Communist bunk," and proved that the Russians were making further ideological advances in Germany.[123]

As if to substantiate its remarks, the Examiner published reports of individual members of Congress who also warned of communist aggression. With various titles such as "Save Germany from Red Grip, Senator Urges,"[124] or

"Red Trend in Europe Told"[125] these articles quoted Senator James Eastland of Mississippi, who warned that the Soviets were capitalizing on the desperate and chaotic situation in Germany by wooing hungry and homeless Germans into their sector.

These articles simply reflect the general disfavor of the Examiner for American policies and actions in Germany. Certainly the Soviets were active in their zone pursuing their own ends, but for the Examiner to see every action or event in Europe in such an anti-communist light, unprofessional and biased journalism was certainly evident. The denazification program was undertaken to remove Nazis from power and replace them with democratic Germans who were acceptable to the American Military Government. Its main purpose was not to advance the cause of the communists, as the Examiner's articles and editorials would want its readers to believe. Even considering the fact of the American public's growing distrust for its former wartime ally, the anti-Soviet campaign of the Examiner seemed to blow out of proportion the issues that existed in Germany during the immediate post-war months. Reports of some Germans' unrepentant attitude for the war were recorded in the Examiner without editorial comment.[126] Even a report released by the Army stating that a portion of the occupation troops had fallen for Goebbels' propoganda and could find justification for German aggression was duly recorded and forgotten.[127] While it is, of course, impossible for a newspaper to comment on every article or report which

it receives, the Examiner in this case could definitely have notified its public that the aims for which it had fought the war in Europe were in danger of being forgotten after only eight months of peace. Instead, the publisher chose to use the newspaper as a "soapbox" for his own cause.

PART THREE

CONCLUSION

When criticizing any type of literary endeavor, it is usually easier to comment on the outlandish or the absurd than on the ordinary and everyday. Seen in this light, then, the New York Times took on the role of the solid, news-disseminating medium which was difficult to distrust, but also difficult to critique. The San Francisco Examiner and the Chicago Tribune, on the other hand, provided much more opportunity for critical analysis because of the predilections of the editors/publishers, but for the same reason were difficult to accept without question unless the reader happened to share the same opinions as the writers.

As stated earlier, the Times' coverage of the denazification program was relatively extensive and unbiased. Times' correspondents closely followed the activities of the military government, and oftentimes analyzed the policies emanating from Washington. When Raymond Daniell, a Times' correspondent in Germany, heard the announcements about the reduction of occupation troops and the projected dates for the transfer of governmental authority back to the Germans, he did not hesitate to conjecture that these two activities were related. He even went so far as to state his belief that it was too early for the Germans to regain the authority of their government, because he feared the Nazi underground.[128]

As it turned out, the Nazi underground proved to be weaker than anticipated, and Daniell's fears came to nothing. This article served to show, however, that editorializing did occur in the Times in places other than on the editorial page, but only after a thorough review of the situation.

Other events of the occupation such as the Patton incident and the criticisms of the military government officials were recorded and analyzed in light of their overall affect on the success of the denazification program or the prestige accorded the United States by other nations.

Although the editors of the Times did not tie in the Nuremberg trials to the denazification program, the aims which they hoped would accrue from both events were similar. The trials were conducted in order to punish the Nazis and make sure they could not instigate another aggressive war. In doing so, the Allies were assured that their cause had been just. Times' editorials repeatedly stated the same reasonings for the denazification policies. The program itself was a continuation of the major war aims--to destroy Nazi power and thereby curtail their war-making potential. The editors of the Times noted this, and as was their practice, looked beyond the immediate event to discuss the possible long-range benefits or disadvantages to the U.S.

The same could not be said of the Tribune which oftentimes supported the popular issues without giving much consideration to their possible effects in the future. Such a policy was definitely in the best interests of the Tribune, which in 1945 had a daily circulation of more

than nine hundred-sixty thousand.[129] Colonel McCormick once stated that during the war he strove to relate events from the average midwestern soldier's point of view.[130] He must have continued this policy into the occupation since he, along with the thousands of soldiers involved, supported the rapid redeployment of the European forces. McCormick, whom one critic claimed was the "finest mind of the fourteenth century,"[131] did not choose to point out the risks involved if the occupation troops were pulled out too early. Considering the attitude which the Germans expressed in the OMGUS polls, and the fact that slightly more than 60% of the Americans polled in July 1945 believed that Germany would again try to conquer the world if the possibility arose, it was evident that Nazism and Americans' fear of it did not simply disappear on V-E Day.[132]

The same accusations of short-sightedness could be applied to the Tribune's condemnation of Nuremberg and Potsdam on the grounds that they forced U.S. involvement in world affairs. Contrary to McCormick's hopes, it was impossible for Americans to return from Europe and pick up where they had left off. The status and power which the United States had achieved, as well as the respectability which the Soviet Union had acquired through the war, meant that adjustments to a new world order would have to be made.[133]

The Examiner also displayed a lack of broadmindedness, although for different reasons than the Tribune. The Examiner saw almost every incident in Germany--from the protests of the occupation troops to the Potsdam conference--

as being somehow related to a communist advance. Patton was seen as the embodiment of freedom and the last bulwark against communism. The Examiner closely followed the general's triumphant tour through western Europe after his dismissal, and effusively eulogized him after his untimely death. Such hero-worship may have been popular among the Examiner's two hundred thousand or so readers, but it certainly gave only a one-sided account of the story. This was often the case with this newspaper, though. Perhaps a quotation from a letter by William Randolph Hearst to his son George (whom he was grooming to take over control of the Examiner) will help to explain the Examiner's news and editorial style. He wrote:

> These usual editorials are based on heavy topics and interest only the writer and editor. You can go to 100 dinners or any kind of collection of human beings of ordinary intelligence and never hear one of the subjects discussed that are discussed laboriously in the editorial columns. . . . . an editorial writer firmly believes in his heart that the first essential of his business is to be dull, . . . and that generally means to impose on somebody . . . a lot of dreary stuff that is supposed to be high-brow and that does not interest the average reader in the least. . . .
>
> Now the fault is not with the readers. . . . It is our business to give the readers what the readers will read. . . .
>
> Stop writing about politics and economics, and write about subjects that human beings are interested in. . . .[134]

Such an irresponsible outlook was apparent in much of the Examiner's coverage of the events in Germany.

Although none of the three newspapers reviewed overtly declared the denazification program a total success or complete failure, the readers could get a sense of where they stood on that issue from the articles and editorials

about the occupation in general. The New York Times supported it with some reservations, and believed that it would eventually prove successful if handled properly. The Chicago Tribune believed the whole occupation was a mistake and that the United States should simply "bring the boys home." The San Francisco Examiner viewed it as a failure because it saw communists replacing Nazis.

These newspapers were basing their judgments on the day to day events in Germany as their correspondents reported them. Such coverage may have been timely, but it did not allow for a thorough analysis of the overall situation. Before deciding whether the newspapers' criticisms were justified, it may be helpful to review various opinions of people who were involved in the occupation, but whose careers did not depend on the successful purge of Nazis from positions of authority.

Donald Robinson, who served as chief historian for the U.S. Military Government in Germany, used official documents to analyze the progress of the denazification program for American Mercury. In an article which appeared in May 1946 he claimed that denazification was failing for two main reasons, both of which rested with the military government officials. The first was that these officials simply did not want to get rid of the Nazis because the efficiency rating of their area would then suffer, and they would be made to look incompetent. The second reason given was the rather cynical notion that these officials were luxury-loving sycophants who could delude themselves

into believing that most of the Germans had secretly opposed Nazism.[135] Robinson observed that, "It is only a year since V-E Day. But the memory of the corpses at Buchenwald has been dissipated by too much German brandy and double talk.[136]

Other critics agreed that failings of the program rested in the hands of the military government officials, although for different reasons than Robinson presented. In an article which appeared in Harper's Magazine in December 1945, William Hale, who had served as Policy Adviser to the Information Control Division of the U.S. Occupation Forces in Germany, condemned the "half-hearted" efforts of these officials who were more interested in returning home than in purging Nazis. Hale believed that the problem went deeper than that, however. He brought up the point that has been raised before--that Washington failed to "indoctrinate" the occupation forces with the reasons for the necessity of the occupation. Although not justifying the action, he stated that it was partially understandable. "First we had been faced with a military necessity and in order to cope with it had to deal with anyone who could be of help--even if he smelled to high heaven. Then the immediate necessity passed. But the need was still felt for some efficient Germans as helpers, . . ."[137] Hale expressed the hope that the American officers and technicians would gain the political wisdom necessary to understand the importance of removing all the Nazis from power.[138]

Saul Padover, historian and political scientist who worked for the Army's Psychological Warfare Division, expressed dismay over the pride which the military government officials took in their apolitical attitude. He believed that this only showed their political ignorance since it often led to the practice of retaining Nazis for the sake of efficiency.[139] Padover and Hale also stated, however, that such an attitude was perhaps understandable considering the fact that most of these men as civilians had been trained as administrators or technicians who needed to get a job done rather than consider the political climate that surrounded them.[140] Padover claimed that, "What Military Government needs is fewer plumbers and more men with political wisdom and training, fewer officers who want to keep the street cars running and more who are concerned with how to eradicate Nazism."[141]

Other critics pointed out that the setbacks in denazification were not always the fault of the military government. The Germans themselves had to learn to oversome the political "inertia" with which they lived and which engendered the attitude that Saul Padover heard expressed that, "'Wir muessen den richtigen Mann finden.'"[142] A letter which the military government officials allegedly received attached to a Fragebogen was reprinted by the Examiner. Although possibly written in jest, this letter best expressed the American view of the post-war Nazi mentality with which the occupation forces had to deal. The author of the letter attempted to explain his involvement in Nazi activities:

> I have never been an active National Socialist. In spite of the strongest pressure I was able to stay out of the party until 1931. . . . No one was able to talk me into taking on any functions except that of blockwart (leader of a group or bloc of houses). . . . I joined the SA in 1933 only because of my love for exercise. . . . It was my love of nature, especially my affection for animals, that induced me to join the SA Reitercorps in 1934. . . . When I joined the NS-Kolonialbund in 1937, I did this only to express my feeling for the exotic, . . . I was only a paying member of the SS and paid very small dues. . . . In order to keep up my 4-F classification I had to help out the Gestapo once in a while . . . I ask you kindly to reconsider my case and permit me to continue my wholesale grocery business. . .[143]

Perhaps it was Washington's fault for failing to make clear to a war-weary American public that it was necessary for future peace to keep the occupation troops in Germany in order to carry out the denazification program. If that was the case, though, why could a reporter for the Times like Raymond Daniell figure out the problem, while the editors of the Tribune and Examiner could not? Rather than try to understand the Washington viewpoint, they shaped and molded the news stories to fit their outlook of the world. Neither newspaper took into account that denazification was a new procedure for the United States, and as with all new programs, mistakes would be made that necessitated correction.

Of the three newspapers reviewed, then, the New York Times had the best analysis of the situation in Germany. The Tribune and Examiner chose to use the issue of the German occupation as the springboard for their own personal projects and grievances. Times' editors, on the other hand,

realized the limitations of a program which was imposed on the German people who had been imbued with the Nazi ideology for twelve years, by a group of soldiers and civilians who for the most part wished to be elsewhere. William Jordy, writing in The Commonweal, best analyzed these limitations when he wrote that, "The presence of totalitarian ideologies masking under a legitimate political party exemplify just how much easier it is to criticize Military Government for its paper denazification than it is to devise the infallible divining rod that will separate the pure from the wicked."[144]

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