wE3. " ignored. Another important point dealt with in some detail is the question of whether or not the naval treaties established a situation wherein the Navy was weaker than it would have been without the treaties. In view of Congressional refusal to allow the Navy to be expanded to treaty strength, the question is to an extent academic. On the other hand, the opposition of naval officers and big-navy Congressmen was based upon the premise that the treaties did weaken the Navy. In answer to the charge it should be pointed out that the attitude of Congress, the public and most of the Presidents made it unlikely that the Navy's 1916 program would ever have been completed. Even if it had Japanese naval building would probably have given Japan battleship strength well in ex- cess of the 5:3 ratio established by the Washington Treaty. As for fortifications, it is certain that the Navy's desires would not have been met by Congress had there been no restric- tions on base construction in the western Pacific. In the case of the London Treaty of 1930 the ratios established for the cruiser, destroyer and submarine categories--condemned by most naval officers as detrimental to American security-- actually gave the United States the opportunity to overcome previous neglect and eXpand its fleet considerably, while denying that right to Great Britain and Japan. It was an opportunity not graSped. Although this study sought mainly to show the influence of the disarmament treaties upon naval policy, it also brought out the effect of policy upon the treaties. Estimates of naval planners regarding the minimum strength necessary to execute policy were often accepted by the diplomats respon~ sible for concluding agreements. This was eSpecially true after 1931, when the deterioration of the international sit- uation made naval views more acceptable. The exceptions--at Washington in 1922 and at London in 1930--caused some anxiety among naval strategists, but they were able to adjust to the treaty limitations far more easily than they were able to abide Congressional neglect. Finally it may be said that the history of naval dis- armament indicates an inverse relationship between the exist- ence of fundamental antagonisms among nations and success at disarmament conferences--the more fundamental the tensions the less likely the probability of disarmament. As for the disarmament treaties themselves, it seems they were generally successful in promoting the security of the United States. UNITED STATES NAVAL POLICY IN THE DISARMAMENT ERA, 1921-1937. by Ernest Andrade, Jr. A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF HILOSOPHY Department of History 1966 PREFACE The serious student of American naval policy finds that only a few others have already trod the path he desires to follow. Studies of naval policy are for the most part of relatively recent origin and reflect to a large extent the growth of the Navy to the primary place in the armed services establishment--a develOpment essentially of this century. After World War 11 interest in the Navy blossomed, and a number of studies were published, most of them on the subject of the development of naval policy in the Pacific and the problem of Japan. This is understandable, since the manner of our entry into the war so dramatically focused attention upon Japan and since the military position of the two nations upon the outbreak of hostilities and during the course of the war was so largely determined by their relative naval strength. In addition to the problem of Japan, attention of scholars in naval history has been directed to the naval disarmament treaties, which had such profound effects upon the navies of all the powers in the interwar years. Recent scholars, while using much newly available original source material and pro- ducing some valuable work, have concentrated upon particular naval conferences or relatively short periodsoz emu .QQ .HWmH .mmdfim wflHU£wflb m 051% .wwumm .aa .moa>mz umruo one made ”mounwwu mNoH How mahDom “mouswaulbmnh How ouuaom on \ OH mm \ ea em \ oe m \ 0e 0 \ me meannesnsm on \ as ea \ Na Na \ oh m \ com o \ ewN muesouumem N \ 0a m \ e on \ ma oh \ as a \ ca enemasuo o \ o H \ o N \ H m \ m N \ H nuoauuso manuu museum modem caouanm uoouu monoum popes: , mass 0 \ mm H \ om ea \ mm o \ aw em \ mas mmsaumsnsm ea \ an H \ em. mm \ me e \ sea 0 \ sow mumsouumoe o \ Na 0 \ as e \ mm o \ Ne w \ as unmeasuo o \ o o \ o o \ o H \ e o \ H ruoauueo umeuuuaa wcaeaasm\uaasm wsaoaasm\uaasm wsaoaasm\uaasm wsaeaasm\uaasm msaoaasm\uaasm manna museum coach cdouaum awoke moumum omuwca l{l LI .mmmfi Qz< HNoH HNmH N MAmected the London Conference of producing more than was 21bid., pp. 108-109. 3 See statement of Sen. Henrik Shipstead (Minn.) in Sen. I§§g0§t no. 1080, pt. 1, 7lst Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 0 . 40P... LXXIII, p. 109. “ "H'r’z-r N LO \I actually made public. Members of the Senate had other misgivings about the treaty. Article XIX, which laid down rules for replacement of overage vessels, did not specify whether a light cruiser had to be replaced by a similar vessel, or whether it could be replaced by a heavy cruiser. Several admirals gave their Opinion that under the treaty overage light cruisers could be replaced by heavy cruisers,6 and the ambiguity was cleared up only when the governments of the United States, Great Britain and Japan completed an exchange of notes in which all agreed that the treaty intended ships to be replaced only within their own category or subcategory, so that a light cruiser could be replaced only by a light cruiser.7 A similar difficulty arose in connection with Article XXI, the escalator clause. If a nation desired to increase its cruiser category by building a certain tonnage of light cruisers, did the United States have the right to build a proportionate tonnage of heavy cruisers? Secretary of the .Navy Adams thought that the United States had the right, .Admiral Pratt and Senator Reed thought not.8 The question 5The vote on the London Treaty was 58 to 9. Ibid., p. 1378. The senators who cast negative votes were generally those who most favored naval expansion and had been leaders :tn the fight for larger naval appropriations. 61pm. , pp. 343 -344. 7FRUS., 1930, I, 126-127. 893., LXXIII, pp. 344-345. 238 was never settled, but in any event it did not become a matter of practical moment, since the escalator clause was never invoked. One other persistent question was asked by those Con- gressmen who, while not opposed to the treaty as such, were concerned over the impression that in agreeing to the London Treaty the United States was abandoning the principles es- tablished by the Washington Treaty and in subsequent naval policy. Senator Hale prOposed two reservations to the treaty. In the first, it was stated that the 10:7 ratio with Japan in auxiliary vessels was only a temporary eXpedient and was not to be regarded in any way as superseding the principle that the 10:6 ratio represented the true measure of equality between the two navies.9 The second reservation proposed to make it clear that the United States did not regard the division of cruisers into two categories as a permanent principle.10 In their opposition, some senators even tried to nullify the effect of certain parts of the London Treaty itself. IFOremost among these were the reservations offered by Johnson, 9Ibid., p. 330. Another expression of concern over the tidvantage supposedly given to Japan by the 10:7 ratio was \roiced in a reservation prOposed by George Moses of New Hamp- Shire, in which it was stated that the Senate understood that the granting of such a ratio in the London Treaty nullified the non-fortification agreement in the Washington Treaty. Ibid. , p. 374. lolbid., p. 330. 239 Moses and Bingham. Johnson submitted two reservations--one to the effect that the United States had the right to build heavy cruisers regardless of the provisions of article XV, and the other that the stipulation that three American heavy cruisers not be completed until 1937 should be disregarded. The Moses-Bingham reservation provided that under the escal- ator clause the United States would claim the right to make proportionate increases in any category it wished, rather than in the specific category in which the other parties to 12 Such reservations would the treaty made their increases. have invalidated the whole treaty, which was probably the intention of those who Sponsored them. One other aspect of the Senate debate on the treaty deserves mention. A few senators were concerned over the fact that if the treaty went into effect the United States would have to build substantial tonnage in order to gain parity with Great Britain and to maintain what practically all American naval officers believed was a disadvantageous ratio with Japan, yet the United States was nowhere committed to build the required tonnage. Fearing a repetition of the situation of the twenties, when Congress had refused to grant naval requests for a preconceived naval program, these sena- tors sought to provide a requirement to build as part of the .—k lllbid., pp. 374-375, 214. lzIbid., p. 330. treaty-—a kind of advance authorization. Thus David Walsh proposed a reservation providing that the United States in- tended to build all tonnage allowed it by 1936. This state- ment was notice in advance that the American program was not the signal for another round in the naval race but instead an attempt to carry out an implied stipulation of the treaty.1 Walsh pinpointed what turned out to be the main problem for the Navy in attempting to develop policy in terms of the London Treaty, for the next two years were to prove even more frustrating than the worst periods in the previous decade had been. Walsh's efforts in the Senate before the London Treaty was approved indicated that the Navy's supporters were anxious to prevent a repetition of the undesirable situation of the twenties, when Congressional opposition to a comprehensive annual program of construction brought about instead a con- centration of extensive authorizations at particular times, alarm over American intentions in other countries, and finally a resumption of naval competition. It was recognized that annual increases could be kept relatively small, thus avoid- ing giving other nations cause for alarm and at the same time minimizing the outcry from Congress and public alike 13Ibid., p. 368. The reservation was simply a restate- ‘ment of a resolution introduced by Walsh on July 19, and overwhelmingly defeated. Ibid., pp. 319-320, 322-323. 2411 over the high cost of a large program. The London Treaty broughttjmzproblem clearly into focus, for whereas previously the building of each category of the fleet to a particular strength had been a naval dream which Congress had refused to implement more than partially, now the treaty implied in legal form the obligation to build each category to a parti- cular level. Fully aware that the period following the ratification of the London Treaty was in that sense especially favorable, the Navy redoubled its efforts to persuade Con- gress to adopt a long range program which would have as its objective the replacement of all overage tonnage by the end of 1936 and the expansion of tonnage to the levels indicated by the treaty. The naval view of the London Treaty was well expressed by the General Board when it submitted its re- commendations for a construction program based upon that treaty on October 16. At that time the Board said: "This treaty aims at the maintenance of world peace by establishing a balance of world power. The balance fails unless each navy is actually composed Of the specified tonnages and Of vessels of comparable useful remaining life."14 The senatorial reaction to Walsh's reservation and the attitude of the Administration did not portend success in the Navy's attempts to secure an expanded fleet. Unfortunately 14Ser. 1473/G.B.420-2, 16 Get. 1930. for the plans of naval leaders, Hoover did not agree with the Navy's view of the treaty. The President considered the treaty as one of the many steps which would yet have to be taken along the road to complete disarmament and world peace, and he was concerned that the United States should not con- tribute in any way to a resumption of the international tensions which he believed the treaty had done much to re- duce. Probably no other President in the twentieth century was so thoroughly hostile to the concepts of the big—navy strategists, and his attitude proved a decisive factor in the Navy's failure in the years from 1930 to 1933 to begin much more than a token replacement of overage vessels--in authorizations to expand to treaty limits the Navy got no support at all. While naval officers themselves were not inclined to disagree openly with their commander-in-chief, the Navy League felt itself compelled to disagree emphatically with Hoover's policies. His administration was marked by in- creasing acrimony between Hoover and the supporters of naval expansion, even to the point where Hoover felt compelled to institute an investigation of Navy League charges of in- competence on his part. Feelings ran high during Hoover's tenure, and the higher the feeling, it seemed, the less likely became the chances of the kind of building policy the Navy desired. An investigating board, consisting of Hoover's friends or associates, deliberated four days, called no 243 witnesses and issued a report on November 6, 1931, terming the attacks on the President as being wholly unwarranted." Some newspapers called the investigation a "whitewash."15 Attempts by naval planners to begin a program of ex- pansion under the London Treaty started well before their recommendations in October, 1930. Even while the treaty was being debated in the régular Congressional session, Fred Britten introduced a bill in the House to provide for the building up of the Navy.to the tonnages Specified in the London Treaty. On May 9 he presented a bill calling for authorization to lay down, before 1936, 73,500 tons of light cruisers, 55,500 tons of destroyers, 42,100 tons of sub- marines, and 69,000 tons of aircraft carriers. These ton- nages, the cost of which would amount to more than $500,000, 000, would be necessary to bring the Navy to treaty strength by 1936.16 Somewhat later, the General Board stated that generally the bill represented what the Navy needed to carry out its goal of parity with Great Britain.17 This early effort to provide for the tonnages envisioned by the London Treaty was unsuccessful, for Congress took no action on the Britten bill. The Navy's supporters were not discouraged by their C’ 1"Rappaport, The Nayy Leagpe, pp. 142-150. 16g3., LXXII, 8707. 17Ser. 1498/G.B. 420-2, 12 Sept. 1930. 244 failure. During the interim between the second and third sessions of the Seventy-first Congress they marshalled their forces for a concerted campaign, whose opening move was the General Board's report on the building program for the fiscal year 1932. The report proposed that Congress adopt a pro- gram of orderly building to cover the years from 1931 to 1936, to include construction for both expansion and replacement. TABLE 6 GENERAL BOARD'S PROGRAM OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPLACEMENT, FISCAL YEARS 1932 TO 1936. **1 s;:: Ship categories 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 aircraft carriers 1 l 1 1 heavy cruisers 1 l 1 light cruisers 2 3 1 2 destroyer leaders 1 1 destroyers 10 4 10 12 submarines 4 7 4 4 5 Note: The two light cruisers for 1936 are replacements for Qgghg and.milwaukee. Destroyers and submarines are replace- ments for average tonnage. Other tonnage represents expan- sion. Source: Ser. 1473/G.B.420-2, 16 Oct. 1930. 245 As far as the Navy was concerned it was absolutely necessary to institute such a program.immediately, for it appeared that at no time since 1921 was the Navy in a weaker‘ position relative to the navies of Great Britain and Japan that it was in the fall of 1930. The scrapping of battle- ships, destroyers and submarines as required by the treaty, together with the changes in the American-Japanese ratios which it stipulated, made necessary a reexamination of War Plan Orange, the strategic.Army-Navy plan for a war with Japan. As has been seen, the Navy had assumed that in case of war with Japan the initial naval task would be the defense of the Philippines and Guam. As a result of the ratios es- tablished by the Washington Conference and the scrapping of the gigantic battleship construction program authorized in 1916, naval strategists had assumed that the defense of the Philippines would be extremely difficult and had provided contingency plans which assumed that the Japanese would capture the Philippines,in which case the primary naval task would not be the defense of the Philippines but their re- covery--a far more formidable task.18 The changes in relative naval strength brought about by the London Treaty caused the Navy to institute a re-evaluation of War Plan Orange. In a 18For a thorough study of the develOpment of war Plan Orange, see Louis Morton, "War Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy", world Politics, XI (Jan. 1959), pp. 221-250. .4”:— -V. 1" 246 report on October 23, 1930, the General Board indicated that one of the major reasons why a revision of the plan was necessary was the indecision of Congress regarding a program of augmentation of the fleet. The Board pointed out that the Army could not be counted upon to defend the Philippines since there were only 11,000 Army personnel there at that time.19 Nothing was done about revision, however, since it was haped that Congress would enact the legislation desired by the Navy within a year. The Navy and its supporters mis- judged Hoover's resolution and Congress's inertia. Although Congressional committees reported favorably a bill to author- ize the construction of an aircraft carrier, a light cruiser, a flying deck cruiser, and four submarines to cost a total of $90,635,00020-- in line with the General Board's request for fiscal 1932, minus the destroyer321--Congress failed to act before adjournment. Even this second failure did not halt the Navy's drive for more ships. If anything, each failure to gain new authorizations lent added strength to further efforts, since each ship not authorized at a given time would have to be 198er. 1502/G.B.425, 23 Oct. 1930. 20House Report no. 2291 and Senate Report no. 1322, 7lst Cong., 3rd sess. (Washington, 1931). 21Earlier Congressional reports stated that twelve des- troyers authorized in 1916 had never been appropriated for, and that authorization was sufficient to permit an appropri- ation. After some debate apprOpriations to begin work on eleven destroyers were voted. House Report no. 834 and Sen. 247 authorized later and simply swelled the total of later recommendations. In April, 1931, the General Board submitted its report on the 1933 building program.and urged that the ships of the 1932 program not authorized should be approved and laid down as soon as possible. In the event those auth- orizations were provided, the Board recommended that the program for fiscal 1933 should include apprOpriations for one heavy cruiser authorized by the Act of 1929, one carrier, two light cruisers, a destroyer leader and seven submarines. If the ships requested in the 1932 program were not author- ized, the Board said that these should be spread out and included in authorizations during the years 1933-1936, with one carrier, one flight deck cruiser and one light cruiser being added to the 1933 program.22 The Navy's persistence in the face of Hoover's op- position may seem to be remarkable, and.might be cynically explained as the result of wounded professional pride and reluctance to see the Navy's growth halted. While these considerations may well have played some part in naval per- sistence, the best explanation is probably found in refer- ence to the alarming developments on the international scene 'Report no. 988, 70th Cong., lst sess. (Washington, 1928); Senate Report no. 1673 and House Report no. 2899, 7lst Cong., 3rd sess. (Washington, 1931). CR., LXXIV, 4853-55, 1511; .11.; Statutes, XLVI, pt. 1, 1449'.- ZZSer. 1523/G.B.420-2, 20 Apr. 1931. 248 in 1931 and 1932. As has been noted, American naval officers were fearful that American naval strength under the London Treaty was insufficient to enable the Navy to carry out its mdssion in case of a war with Japan in the western Pacific, and they would have been concerned even if Congress had voted the funds to build the Navy to treaty strength in all cate- gories. But as long as relations with Japan continued to be amicable there was little likelihood that either Congress or the public could be aroused over a situation which seemed 23 Japanese-American relations had only a remote possibility. been especially good since 1925, and to many Americans, the Japanese approval of the London Treaty gave assurance that good relations would continue. Unfortunately, the treaty itself proved to be a major factor in tipping the scales in favor of the militaristic faction in its long-smoldering feud with the civilian authority and marked the beginning of the end of constitutional and civil party government in Japan. The end of effective civil control also meant the end of a moderate foreign policy not hostile to American interests in the Far East. 23Will R. WOOd, the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, had a talk with Hoover on September 12, 1931, and afterward told assembled newsmen that there was no need to build the Navy to treaty strength. "No wars are on now and no wars are in sight". The date of the statement is signifi- cant. New Ybrk Times, Sept. 13, 1931, as quoted in Rappaport, The Nagy League, p. 142. 249 The assassination of Hamaguchi marked the beginning of the assertion of power by the militaristic faction in Japan, and the coincident increase of hostility between the two countries. But the real nature of the Japanese re-orient- ation in foreign policy was more clearly revealed on the night of September 18, 1931, when the Japanese Army launched its attack in Manchuria as a means of further strengthening its position and undermining that of the civil authority in Japan. The move was considered both desirable and necessary --desirable because of the strength it would lend to support of the Army in Japanese public opinion, and necessary be- cause of Japan's economic distress which was made nearly unbearable by the worldwide depression, which reached enor- mous proportions by 1931. The Manchurian Incident and the indications it gave of the significant shift of Japan's attitude toward the United States caused alarm among naval circles in the United~States, while Congressional leaders and State Department officials showed concern over the possi- ble effects of the Japanese action on the entire structure of treaties built so painstakingly at Washington. In mid- February 1932, Senator Borah publicly inquired of Stimson whether the crisis in Manchuria made the Nine Power Treaty inapplicable. Stimson, in his reply on February 23, answer- ed that all the treaties of Washington were inter-related and that the violation of any one of them would jeopardize all the rest. In particular, he said, the effectiveness of 250 the naval disarmament treaty rested to a large extent upon the faithful observance of the other treaties,including the Nine Power Treaty.24 The meaning was clear. Japan's action struck directly at the main assumption upon which the naval treaties were built--the assumption of peace in the Far East. The American reaction was strong in moral indignation over Japan's flouting of solemn obligations but notably weak in attempts to coerce Japan by a show of force. This was understandable, since American naval power, the chief weapon of the United States in any attempt to intimidate Japan, was not much stronger, relative to Japan's power, than it had been in 1929 when it was perhaps at its weakest. A comparison of the two fleets shows this weakness clearly. TABLE 7 UNITED STATES AN JAPAN: UNDERAGE SHIPS IN COMMISSION AND BUILDING, FEBRUARY 1932. _2 seat 1_ categ°ries Eflifi3aiii§§§g Buili7giglding Aircraft Carriers 3/1 3/1 Tonnage 77,500/13,800 61,270/7,600 Heavy Cruisers 8/7 8/4 Tonnage 72,900/7o,000 68,400/40,000 24gg., Lxxv, 4584-85. 251 (table 7 continued) Categories gfiiIigBfizigiig ‘ Builifiggglding Light Cruisers 10/0 17/2 Tonnage 70,500/0 81,455/17,000 Destroyers 69/5 80/8 Tonnage 81,450/7,500 97,385/12,634 Submarines 65/3 67/5 Tonnage 58,220/3,800 70,973/9,oo9 Source: U. S. Senate, Naval Affairs Committee, Comparative Strength of Treaty Navies, Februar 1932, 72nd Cong., st sess. (Washington, 1932;, table no. 1. Referring to the situation, the General Board noted the 'necessity for a complete revision of War Plan Orange. Pre- vious assumptions, it said, were based on facts no longer obtaining. Japan had built up practically to treaty limits in underage vessels, and the changes in relative strength "furnish abundant reason for a revision of the estimate of the situation and for a probable rewriting of this plan."25 The lack of American determination to oppose Japan with more than protests was caused also by the economic depression in the United States. In view of the alarming decline in re- 25Ser. 1502/G.B.425, 4 May 1932. 252 venues and the parallel rise in federal expenditures, the problem for the Navy was not so much how to obtain more funds for expansion but rather how to prevent serious cutbacks in funds available for the Navy. As early as September 1931, Hoover announced that the building program for 1931-32 would be drastically slowed, and for 1932-33 it would be eliminated altogether.26 In the face of the determination of the Administration to reduce naval eXpenditures, naval spokesmen continued nevertheless to press for increased appropriations, either unwilling or unable to face the possibility of a shrinking of American naval power in the face of the growing menace from Japan. In early 1932 a new effort was mounted to obtain the funds necessary for at least a partial eXpansion of the fleet to treaty limits. The Secretary of the Navy told Congressmen that in order to reach treaty tonnages in under- age vessels by 1936 the Navy would need 55,200 tons of carriers, 73,000 tons of light cruisers, 133,500 tons of destroyers, and 25,630 tons of submarines.27 He attempted to sweeten the pill by pointing out that an expanded building program would provide relief to shipyards and would especially 27 Buildin _p of the g. S. Na to the Stren th Permitted Ext te WashIngton and London- Nav aI Treat Te es, 72n§ Cong.,'TSt sess. (Washington, 19325, p.T Zéflgfl 2235 Times, Sept. 28 1931, p. 1. U.S. Senate, Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings on 351 253 benefit the workers in the shipbuilding industry, since nearly 85 percent of the cost of a ship represented wages to labor.28 On January 4, 1932, Carl Vinson, the new chairman of the HOuse Naval Affairs Committee, introduced a bill pro- viding for construction by 1936 of all tonnage needed to reach treaty limits. His bill envisioned a total of 120 ships costing more than $616,000,000.29 At about the same time Frederick Hale introduced a bill in the Senate which authorized the building up of naval strength to the limits established by the London Treaty, but without asking for a specific number of ships. The bill was reported favorably by his committee on February 24; the report stressed the deteriorating world situation as the most compelling argu- ment in favor of the bill, saying "We believe that it is imperative that the United States authorize a building pro- gram at this time and thus give notice to the world that we intend to maintain the ratios established by the Washington and London Treaties."3O Although Vinson's bill was reported favorably by his committee, it was withheld from the floor because the economic situation did not permit its passage.31 281818., pp. 17-18, 34-35. 2993. , LXXV, 1275. 30Senate Report no. 280, 72nd Cong., lst sess. (Washing- ton, 1932). 3193., LXXV, 2663. 254 The Hale bill passed the Senate on May 6 by a vote of 44 to 21,32 but action upon the bill was not taken in the House. Thus all efforts failed. The idea that naval construct- ion could be a tool to relieve unemployment made no impression on Hoover, who, while not lacking in an understanding of the possibilities of public works expenditures in time of crisis, was not disposed to consider naval vessels as acceptable public works. The extension of the public works concept to naval construction therefore had to await the coming of another Chief Executive. As far as Hoover was concerned the Navy represented a prime target for drastic curtailment of expenses, and many congressmen agreed with him. By the fall of 1932 it was obvious that a stalemate had been reached. However, a large portion of Congress and public opinion were completely distracted by the enormous economic dislocation in which the nation found itself, and the Man- churian Incident, while deplorable, was not viewed as posing an immediate threat to the security of the United States. Naval officers, on the other hand, were so intent upon the weakness of the Navy in a period which seemed to them criti- cal, that they were oblivious to the condition of the country, which required the most careful attention. In its last building recommendation to the Hoover Administration, the 3293., Lxxv, 9711. 255 General Board conveyed forcefully the Navy's concern. The failure of the Congress to enact the programs recommended by the Board for the fiscal years 1932 and 1933 meant that more ships would have to be built in a shorter time in order to provide what were considered the Navy's needs under the naval treaties. Great Britain and Japan, the Board pointed out, would easily reach their treaty quotas by the end of 1936, while the United States would have to make great efforts in the brief time remaining. Altogether it considered "the period in the immediate future a critical one from the inter- national naval standpoint."33 MAKESHIFTS AND EXPEDIENTS: THE PROBLEM OF EFFICIENCY. Under the two fold impact of the limitations imposed by the London Treaty and the reduction of funds for new con- struction and for Operation imposed by the necessities of the times, the Navy had to labor even more manfully than before to keep the fleet at the highest efficiency possible. The Board had approved a plan to retain about 165,000 tons of the most serviceable destroyers, while keeping most of the remaining destroyer tonnage in decommissioned status, to be scrapped as replacements were completed.34 However, it 338er. 1578/G.B.420-2, 11 Sept. 1932. 34The tonnage figure included the 150,000 tons permiss- ible under the London Treaty, plus 15,000 tons transferred from the light cruiser category. Ser. 1511/G.B.420-9,l7Dec.1930. N U1 (in proved nearly impossible to keep all the active destroyer tonnage in service. Lack of operating funds and cuts in personnel forced naval planners to consider seriously re- ductions in the active strength of every category of warship. In September 1931, only a few days before the Manchurian crisis broke upon a startled world, the General Board esti- mated that the Navy lacked about 12,000 enlisted men simply to maintain the existing fleet.35 One proposal given consideration would have placed about a third of the vessels in each category in a reduced commission status or a reserve status. A reduced commission status would have kept the ships in the active fleet, but with complements only about forty percent of full strength, so that these vessels could not take part in the fleet exer- cises. In a reserve status the vessels would be practically decommissioned, with crews at only twenty percent of full strength. The idea was to save money and yet allow a cer- tain number of the vessels of the fleet to be maintained in full combat readiness. The reduced commission idea was favored, as it was believed to be "the best Operational arrangement and distribution that can be forecast at the 36 present time." While an acceptable solution from a financ- ial point of view, it was practically a catastrOphe from a 35Ser. 1552/G.B.420, 8 Sept. 1931. 36Ibid. ‘_§n~"‘- u.— .— a... strategic viewpoint. The London Treaty had given the Navy a strength which most naval officers had considered to be inadequate to deal effectively with a possible Japanese threat, and at the moment that threat materialized, cir- cumstances were forcing the Navy to consider reductions far below even the existing strengths, which in nearly every category were not sufficient even to sustain the ratios prescribed by the treaty. Naval officers were not prominent among those few advocates of a coercive policy against Japan. 'Even if there had been in the United States the will to oppose Japan's Manchurian adventure in 1931, there certainly was not the means-~either then or in the immediately fore- seeable future. The desire to promote efficiency at the lowest cost led to an unusual experiment which began shortly after the London Treaty went into effect and was a direct result of the treaty. Article III of the treaty had made clearer the definition of aircraft carriers and had specifically pro- vided for the construction or conversion of cruisers into a kind of hybrid carrier. At the time it seemed like an experiment worth conducting. If successful, the conversion of cruisers into a kind of carrier-~called flying deck cruis- ers in the United States Navy-~could be a relatively cheap way of augmenting the naval air power of the fleet. By 1930 the idea had a great appeal to American naval planners, since the threat of drastic reductions in funds Inade it less like- 1y that more carriers would be built. Furthermore, the general trend of naval thought regarding the most efficient size for carriers had been proceeding away from the large carrier, partly because the quantitative limitations of the Washington Treaty forced naval planners to try to provide for the largest number of carriers possible within tonnage quotas. Since the United States was granted 135,000 tons of carriers, and since 66,000 tons of that amount was al- ready taken by Saratoga and Lexin ton, American naval plan- ners felt themselves especially concerned with the necessity of developing an efficient carrier of minimum size.37 By 1927 the General Board had decided that the optimum dis- placement for a carrier Would be about 13,800 tons, and in its recommendations for new construction, the Board had annually requested a carrier of that size. By the time the London Treaty became effective the shortage of carriers was keenly felt by the Navy, and the opportunity presented by the treaty provisions regarding flight deck cruisers was eagerly seized by the naval planners. In a memorandum to the General Board dated 28 May, 1930, the chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics called the Board's at- 37Ser. 1362/G.B.420-5, 1 Nov. 1927. 38It will be recalled that the 1929 Authorization Act-- the 15 Cruiser Bill--provided for one such vessel. This ship, laid down in 1931 and completed in 1934, was named Ranger. 259 tention to the desperate need for aircraft carriers and urged the Board to consider the recommendation of as many as seven 10,000 ton flight deck cruisers.39 It pointed out that in many situations such a vessel would have great value. Not requiring the extra vessels needed by the large carrier for protection, the flight deck cruiser would still possess to a degree the advantages in scouting and striking power of naval aviation and would work eSpecially well on blockade 4O duty, convoy escort and general scouting. In a series of studies conducted at the request of the General Board, the Naval War College found that in weather conditions which permitted a flight deck cruiser to launch its aircraft it would invariably emerge the victor in a battle with a heavy cruiser. This result was obtained in spite of the fact that the effectiveness of dive bombing when opposed by anti- aircraft fire was not known with any degree of certainty.41 Utilizing this study, plus other information, the Board prompted work which resulted in a tentative design for an effective flight deck cruiser. According to the best naval thought at the time, such a vessel would diSplace 10,000 3gln war games between 1923 and 1927, the work of Lang- lgy--then our only carrier--demonstrated the value of air- craft carriers. In the maneuvers of 1929 and 1930, in which Sarato a and Lexington took part for the first time, the Iesson was even more clearly driven home. Turnbull and Lord, Histogy g£_Naval Aviation, pp. 214, 270-272. 4OEnclosure in Ser. 1492/G.B.420-2, 11 July 1930. 4lser. 1515/G.B.420-8, 20 Jan. 1931. ’ 260 tons and mount nine 6 inch guns forward to fulfill its cruiser capabilities. Most of he remaining length would be devoted to a 350 foot flight deck, together with hangar space for about 24 light aircraft. Bridge structure and smokestack would be mounted on the starboard side as in a regular carrier. TOp speed would be about 32 knots and maximum range at cruising Speed would be approximately 10,000 miles.42 As has been already stated, the Board had recom- mended in its 1932 program that a flight deck cruiser should be authorized, and the results of its studies led it to re- new emphatically its request in its recommendations for the 1933 program. Congress failed to act upon naval requests regarding flight deck cruisers, and during the period from 1932 to 1934 the enthusiasm of naval men for this type of vessel waned. In 1932 the Board did not request a flight deck cruiser in its recommendations for fiscal 1934,43 nor did it do so in the next two years. In the latter year, in answer to requests from several senators who wanted a flight deck cruiser included in the 1936 program, the Board stated that there was "a growing doubt as to the value of this type of vessel." It had been decided that the need for regular cruisers was such that no tonnage could be spared from that 42Blueprint and specifications appended to Ser. 1515/ G.B.420-8, 26 Jan. 1931.- 433er. 1568/G.B.420-2, 13 Apr. 1932. ‘v—T" .. 261 category to build flight deck cruisers; furthermore, regular carriers were being requested in the newer programs so that . . . l naval aViation would not be slighted.4+ It appeared that further reflection, after the burst of enthusiasm for the novel had subsided, indicated that such hybrid vessels would possess many of the disadvantages associated with double pur- pose ships. The flight deck would be restricted, and its 'vulnerability to shellfire would make it unwise to try to utilize fully the cruiser characteristics of this type of warship. Then too, further work with new types of aircraft indicated the need for larger rather than smaller carriers, and after 1932 the Roosevelt Administration and Congress were much more sympathetic toward the Navy's requests for new vessels. By the time the Board had given the above explan- ation, two new carriers had been laid down.45 With the develOpment of a much more favorable situation naval officers soon lost interest in what was admittedly an experimental expedient motivated by financial considerations which no long- er applied by 1934. THE NAVY'S DARKEST HOUR During the last months of the Hoover Administration the Navy's fortunes sank to their lowest point in this cen- 443er. 1642/G.B. 420-2, 20 Feb. 1934. 45These were Ybrktown and Entegprise, 20,000 tons and designed to carry upwards of eighty airplanes each. 262 tury. As the depression deepened, the second session of the Seventy-second Congress seriously considered measures which ‘would have reduced the Navy to impotence. In its deliber- ations the Congress was well aware that any reductions in naval strength would not be a matter of reducing a navy ‘whose power was on a par with those of the greatest naval powers. In his annual report for the fiscal year 1932, the Secretary of the Navy warned that existing building plans were not providing for a fleet even approaching the strength envisioned by the London Treaty. He pointed out that in strength of auXiliary vessels the Navy stood at the end of 1932 about as follows: the United States had in commission 8 heavy cruisers, compared with 21 British and 12 Japanese; 10 light cruisers, compared with 33 British and 20 Japanese; 101 destroyers to 137 for Great Britain and 104 for Japan; and 54 submarines to 52 for Great Britain and 62 for Japan.46 For all practical purposes, the Navy was already in a third place position in all categories except battleships and aircraft carriers. In Spite of these warnings many Congressmen went ahead with their plans to reduce eXpenditures. The depression was reaching its most serious proportions by early 1933, and the necessity for some kind of attack on the constantly growing problems was imperative. Following Hoover's lead, these 46Nagz Annual Re orts,‘1932, p. 7. 263 Congressmen thought of action primarily in terms of reducing all expenditures deemed unnecessary in order to provide as much as possible to combat the tide of business and bank failures and other manifestations of economic chaos. It was not coincidental that those Congressmen who stood in the forefront of the fight against naval eXpansion in the twen- ties also led the way in prOposing the most drastic reduct- ions of naval strength in the interests of economy--they were certain that a first-rank navy was unnecessary. Thus in December 1932, Representative McClintic introduced a bill which called for the decommissioning of all the battleships in the fleet, because those vessels used up the largest pro- portion of naval operating funds and naval personnel.47 The saving involved in such a move obviously would be large. McClintic's bill died in committee, but other measures con- stituted a more definite threat to the maintenance of Ameri- can naval strength at even its existing reduced level. The most dangerous of these was so-called Bratton-Costigan Amendment, an addition to the Treasury-Post Office ApprOpri- ation Bill passed by the Senate in early February 1933. The amendment required all heads of departments to reduce ex- penditures for the fiscal year 1934 to a figure 5 percent below the actual appropriations. The news caused constern- 47 911., LXXVI, 297. ation in the Navy Department, as well as in others. As various Congressmen began to realize the results which might follow from such a reduction, voices began to be raised against the amendment. Within a few days, Senator Bingham rose on the floor of the Senate to read a letter he had received from the Secretary of the Navy, warning of the dire consequences to be expected if the 5 percent reduction went into effect. The letter, dated February 10, stated that the proposed Navy'budget for fiscal 1934 was $308,689, 562. A 5 percent reduction would involve: the concentration of practically all of the fleet in the Pacific, with the consequent closing down of several East Coast navy yards; the slowing of work in progress on ships building or being modernized; the discharge of 4500 civilian workers and a cut in naval personnel of more than 10,000 men; and the placing out of commission of three battleships, two air- craft carriers, four heavy and two light cruisers, thirteen destroyers and six submarines. The strength left to the Navy would amount to 56 percent of Great Britain's and only 66 percent of Japan's. Arthur Robinson stated that the Bratton-Costigan Amendment, if passed, would reduce the United States Navy to a third rank status and would aggravate unemployment.48 When the House passed the Senate bill, it struck out the amendment, and in conference it was agreed 48Ibid., p. 3940. 265 that the amendment would be deleted.49 The incident of the Bratton-Costigan Amendment, to- gether with the other events told previously,produced the blackest depression among naval officers. They had already been forced to endure cuts in pay and allowances, while the reductions in operating funds for the ships of the fleet had forced the laying up of several of the smaller vessels, especially destroyers. Certain groups in Congress seemed willing to sacrifice the Navy entirely in the interests of economy, while public opinion generally seemed to agree. The demand for drastic cuts in naval expenditures was heard outside the halls of Congress as well. The prestige of the Navy reached its nadir. The eminent historian, Charles A. Beard, expressed the increased disdain in a book which ve- hemently attacked the Navy in general and naval officers in 51 Altogether the prospects for the future of particular. the Navy were not pleasant to contemplate. In retrOSpect, however, the dark period of early 1933 proved to be the prelude to a more favorable period which began to appear only a few months later. _._ 49House Report no. 2182, 72nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washing- ton, 1933), p. 15. 50Diary of Adm. William D. Leahy, 11, pp. 29 (16 July, 1932), 37 (20 Dec. 1932). 51Charles A. Beard, The Navy: Defense 25 Portent? (New York, 1932). CHAPTER VII THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1932: AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY. One important reason for Hoover's refusal to support the Navy's requests for funds to expand the fleet to treaty stren- gth was his hope that another disarmament conference sched- uled to meet in 1932 would lead to further reductions in the naval strength of the world powers. It will be recalled that the Preparatory Commission of the League of Nations had been holding sessions since 1926. After a long period of futile discussions the Commission was able to draw up a draft con-1 vention which could serve as a basis for discussion at the forthcoming disarmament conference to be held at Geneva in 1932. Partly because of the widely divergent views and the large number of delegations at the Commission and partly be- cause of the desire to include land and air as well as naval armaments as subjects for limitation, the draft convention contained only general statements for the most part. The specific points involved proposals to establish a permanent Disarmament Commission to supervise general disarmament, to establish a system of classification for naval categories and for aircraft, to limit both volunteer and conscript military levies, and to restrict military budgets.1 1The full text of the draft convention may be found in 266 267 There was nothing in the draft convention to encourage those who wished to see a meaningful agreement for the limi- tation and reduction of armaments emerge from the next con- ference. In fact, several heads of delegations at the Pre- paratory Commission so far abandoned the usual platitudes on adjournment day as to indicate their dissatisfaction with the results of the long years of endeavor by the Commission. In his closing Speech on December 4, the day on which the Commission officially ended its labors, Hugh Gibson stated that the completed draft convention fell short of American hopes. "What we have achieved," he said, "does not hold out the promise of bringing about that immediate reduction of armaments we would like to see." At best there was hope for a possible stabilization of armaments at existing levels. Later, in his report on the likely course of the conference, he traced the probable role and objectives of the United States. He believed "our role in coming to the Conference will be that of a Power limited in its one formidable arm, and with land and air armaments at such levels that they I Re art of £22 Prep. Comm. For a contemporary analysis of the araf? convention see Lord Cecil of Chelwood, "Facing the World Disarmament Conference," Foreign Affairs, X (Oct. 1931), pp. 18-19. 2Gibson to Stimson, Dec. 4 1930, FRUS. 1930, I, 202. 268 will not be affected."3 We might exercise a helpful in- fluence, but the role of the American delegation was not likely to be glorious or dominating, and whatever solutions were reached would probably affect the United States but little. PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS. Gibson's statements proved prOphetic. The United States did not play a dramatic part at the conference, except on one occasion. The really important factors governing the outcome of the conference grew out of the increasing hostil- ity among nations which was part of the general international climate of the early thirties or which had their origin earlier. Stimson, in a message to Dawes, accurately stated the main areas of difficulty: the Franco-Italian naval question, the Franco-German armaments question and the pro- blems of the relationship of the U.S.S.R. with the neighbor- countries of eastern EurOpe.4 These were difficult problems to solve. The Franco-Italian dispute, having its roots in the agreement on parity in capital ships at the Washington 3Gibson to Stimson, Dec. 6 1930, ibid., pp. 473-474. See also Elting E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition: A Stud 3: the Life and Times gf_§gg£z‘§. Stimson (Boston,-T960$, p. 455. astimson to Dawes, Feb. 28 1931, FRUS, 1931, 1, 491. 269 Conference and concerning primarily the Italian insistence on naval parity in all categories with France, has been mentioned previously. The Franco-German problem was of more recent origin and involved Germany's battleship replacement program under the Versailles Treaty. During the late 1920's the economic recovery of Germany had permitted that country to begin a building program to replace its obsolete and average cruiser and battleship tonnages. Article 190 of the treaty allowed the construction of a maximum of 60,000 tons of battleships and 36,000 tons of cruisers and limited their maximum.gun size to 11 inches and 6 inches respectively. When the Germans had decided to put half of their battleship tonnage allowance into a new type of ship superior to any "treaty cruiser", the French had been aroused to a feverish concern for the state of their naval power--a concern which, as had been seen, was a major cause of their incomplete support of the London Treaty. Ironically, the French had to some extent brought the problem upon themselves, for at Versailles they had been in the forefront of those who in- sisted that only old predreadnought battleshipsshould be retained by the postwar German Navy, thus insuring that Germany's main battle force would that much sooner reach an 5 age when it would have to be replaced with newer vessels. 5"Memorandum on the Question of Replacing Battleships," enclosure in Atherton to Stimson, Aug. 5 1931, ibid., pp. 518-519. But the Franco-German problem involved more than simply a question of replacement of German battleships. Also at stake was the fundamental question of French security, since the Germans, from their recently acquired position in the halls of the League of Nations, were demanding that the forth- coming disarmament conference consider the long deferred Allied promise to institute steps toward disarmament of land forces-~a step which the French were most reluctant to take. The problem of the U.S.S.R. in eastern Europe involved French security to an extent, since part of the Soviet objection to the existing situation concerned the French support of several eastern European nations, particularly Poland. The problem also was concerned with the reaction of these smaller countries to the U.S.S.R., and beyond this with the general distrust of the Soviets by the western world. The smaller countries represented at the Preparatory Commission had made it clear that any treaty to emerge from the conference must bind the U.S.S.R., otherwise it would not be possible to arrive at a meaningful limitation of land armaments.6 Many delegates suSpected that the Soviets, for their part, would attempt to disrupt the work of the conference and would try to use it to further their schemes of world re- volution. In the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission the Soviet delegate, Maxim Litvinov, had presented a Soviet 6Gibson to Stimson, Dec. 6 1930, ibid., p. 472. 271 proposal on February 15, 1928, calling for complete dis- abandment of all naval forces within one year, and land and air forces within four years.Spirited discussion of the scheme which occupied most of rest of the session.7 Later Litvinov proposed a system of partial disarmament which would eli- mate all "offensive" armaments--i.e., aircraft carriers, battleships, heavy artillery and aircraft. Strangely, his proposal did not contemplate the abolition of the submarine, which many other governments held to be the ultimate in offensive weapons.8 The refusal of the major countries to consider seriously the Soviet proposals reflected primarily their suSpicion of Soviet motives. The difficulties in the way of a successful conclusion of the 1932 Geneva Conference were so many that it seemed wise to hold exploratory conversations with a view to working out some basis upon which the major powers could agree as a preliminary to and insurance of the success of the conference itself. Exploratory talks had been successful in narrowing the areas of disagreement to manageable dimensions I prior to the London Conference, and the general view seemed 7League of Nations, Documents of the Preparatory Com- missiog,etc., Series VI, Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Preparatory CommiSsion (Geneva, 1528’, pp. 324- . 8League of Nations, Documents of the Preparatory Com- mission, etc., Series VIII~ Minutes of the Sixth Session (First Part) of the Preparato;prommission (Geneva, 1929), PP- 19' 21. to be that a similar procedure might enjoy a like success. The British took the initiative in suggesting that prelimin- ary discussions be held.9 They were eSpecially concerned with the Franco-Italian naval question, and had actually been holding discussions with the two governments on the matter since shortly after the adjournment of the London Conference. If the tension between the two countries should explode into a naval building competition, the British might find it necessary to invoke the escalator clause of the London Treaty with disastrous effects upon the whole delicate structure erected by that treaty. Such a develOpment was to be prevented at all costs, preferably by some kind of Franco-Italian accord. The closer approach of the Geneva Conference added another reason. If the French and Italians could not compromise their differences on the naval question, it could hardly be expected that the conference could develop a general disarmament agreement to which all the countries-- including France and Italy--could give their assent. The French-British-Italian talks were long and arduous, but by the end of the winter of 1931 a tentative agreement was in sight. On March 1, 1931, a series of prOposals, called the Bases of Agreement, were approved by the representatives 9Dawes to Stimson, Feb. 20 193i, FRUS., 1931, I, 490. of the three countries. The major provisions of the Bases of Agreement were: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) French and Italian battleship tonnages were to be increased from 175,000 tons to 181,000 tons. France and Italy could each complete 34,000 tons of aircraft carriers. Neither country would lay down any more heavy cruisers after completion of their 1930 programs. New light cruisers and destroyers would not exceed tonnages replaceable before December 31, 1936. Neither country would construct any more ships after completion of its 1930 program and replace- ment of vessels becoming overage after 1936. French submarine tonnage would not exceed 81,989 tons o 10 The British hOped that the Bases of Agreement would lead to a more definite accord which would bring to a final end the naval rivalry between France and Italy, but it was a prac- tically impossible hope. Even the Bases of Agreement did not mention the heart of the problem-~Italy's demand for parity in auxiliary vessels and France's refusal to concede it. With the growth of what the French considered a German threat they were even less likely to agree to parity with Italy. 10 By agreeing to accept something less than theoretical Enclosure in Atherton to Stimson, March 14 1931, ibid., pp 0 38-382 0 {\D \l 4) equality with the French fleet the Italians could have made some kind of understanding possible. However, this was not done. The French soon made it evident that the Bases of Agreement were not to be interpreted as Opening the way toward parity, for in later talks to secure more definite commitments they asked that both countries should build 25 percent less tonnage during the years 1931-36 than they built in the years 1922-30.11 The Italians quickly saw through the French proposal and pointed out that Italy had built much less tonnage than France had built during the years 1922-30; the French program had been especially large in the years 1922-24. What the Italians preferred was to take the years 1924-30 as the base, which would allow them nearly the same tonnage as the French.12 By the fall of 1931 the inability of these two countries to come to an agreement prior to the convening of the General Disarmament Conference was apparent. In the case of the other two areas of difficulty-~the Franco-German problem and the question of the U.S.S.R. ~- no progress toward solutions was made. The problem of Germany received some attention, but in this case there was 1Enclosure in Marriner (chargé Paris) to Cotton, Aug. 27 1931, ibid., pp. 424-428. 12Enclosure in Kirk (Ambassador in Rome) to Stimson, Aug. 31 1931, ibid., pp. 432-435. a general recognition that no agreement was possible until one country or the other drew back to some extent from its stated position. In Great Britain the general attitude was that Germany had a good case and that some way would have to be found to allay French fears over a revival of German militarism, perhaps by means of certain assurances from the British.13 It was believed that the conference would be the best possible place where Germany could voice her grievances and where the other nations could be made more fully aware of the French attitude. In the United States there was a belief that'the French were being unreasonable and that a solution of the problem might very well be tied to compromise on other questions, such as reparations and war debts. Hoover received one viewpoint early in June, when Walter Edge, the Ambassador to France, suggested that we could consider a reduction in France's war debts in re- turn for acceptance by that country of a plan of real dis- ‘ armament. A possible plan might consider several points: a one-year suspension of naval construction, a reduction of 25 percent or more in army and national defense budgets, and a moratorium on and possible revision of German reparations.14 All such statements were simply straws in the wind, however; 13femorandum of Conversation Between Stimson and Mac- Donald, Aug. 7 1931, ibid., pp. 515-517. 14Edge to Hoover, June 9 1931, ibid., pp. 501-505. 276 nothing concrete was settled upon prior to the conference. In purely naval matters relating to possible alteration of the status quo established at Washington and London there was considerable discussion prior to the conference. The assumption among American naval officers was that those previous conferences had produced about as much reduction and limitation of navies as was practicable or desirable, and that the Geneva Conference would be concerned more with land and air armaments and with questions pertaining to EurOpean rivalries of which the United States could not be considered a part. It was also assumed that the British and the Japanese thought the same. The Americans were astonished, therefore, to learn that the British had secured, as a supplement to the Bases of Agreement of March 1, 1931, a statement from the French and Italians supporting a British proposal which pledged the three countries not to build in the future any battleships larger than 23,000 tons or carrying guns heavier than 12 inches. Recognizing the possi- bility that the British might seek at Geneva to extend the restriction to the American and Japanese navies--indeed, it was not possible for the British to actually execute the idea unless American and Japanese battleships were likewise restricted--Stimson actually encouraged the Navy League and other pro-Navy groups to arouse public opinion against the British proposal.15 ‘Apprized of the situation, the General 5Rappaport, The Navy League, pp. 138-140. I! 277 Board restated the Navy's view that the Battleship was the foundation of naval power and that large battleships were necessary to meet American naval needs. "Under no con- sideration," it said, "should we permit our national security to be threatened by a whittling away of our battleship strength unless and until it becomes evident that the battle- ship has ceased to be the backbone of our naval power." In a discussion of the battleship question shortly afterward, Admiral Pratt, now Chief of Naval Operations, and Navy Secretary Adams both thought that naval Opinion would insist that present limitations on battleship size should not be reduced. They themselves had no objections to battleships of smaller size, if all the other powers were similarly restricted. They also believed that if the British could be persuaded to allow modernization of the three American battleships armed with 16 inch guns, the Americans could favorably entertain proposals to lengthen the life of battle- ships to 30 years.17 While the British were persuaded to drop their proposal temporarily, it was evident that at the conference they might seek to reOpen the question. It was also evident there was some division of opinion within Ameri- can naval circles regarding the minimum size battleship 16Ser. 1527/G.B.438-2, 6 May 1931. 17Memorandum of Discussion between Naval and State Department Representatives, May 25 1931, FRUS, 1931, I, 496-498. acceptable for the Navy.18 In the fall of 1931 an event occurred which held naval armaments in a static position pending the outcome of the Geneva Conference. On September 8, the Italian Foreign Minister, Dino Grandi, proposed in a Speech to the League Assembly that the naval Powers agree not to construct any armaments while the conference met. Later he amplified his suggestion by prOposing that no new naval vessels should be laid down for one year, and that for a similar time there should be no increases in expenditures or budgets for land forces, and no new aircraft should be built.19 Reaction in the United States was mixed. There was some disposition to regard the proposed truce as being to some extent detrimental to the United States. A truce could halt construction of several destroyers--the first destroyer construction since 1922--and would further delay the laying down of several heavy cruisers which were felt to be sorely needed.20 The General Board indicated that the Navy could both gain and lose by an arms truce. The British and Japanese, it pointed 181t should be pointed out however, that men like Pratt and Yarnell were not representative Of a large body Of naval Opinion. The division was extremely one-sided. 19Hugh Wilson (Ambassador in Bern) to Stimson, Sept. 8 1931, Sept. 16 1931, FRUS., 1931, I, 440-445. 20Stimson to Wilson, Sept. 18 1931, Sept. 20 1931, ibid., Pp o 446‘4-5 1 . 279 out, had appropriated for larger tonnages than had the Americans, and this wouldfnot be laid down if a truce were approved. On the other hand, all navies would age even further during the truce period, and a higher proportion of American vessels would be overage at its end--Japan would actually have more underage tonnage than the United States at the end of the truce.21 The political gain seemed well worth any risk, and Stimson decided to approve the Grandi proposal. Before a final form for a truce could be worked out, however, French objections had to be met. The French were suspicious of the proposal, especially since the Italians had first voiced it and the Germans were supporting it.22 The French were particularly concerned over the proposal to limit military budgets and insisted as a condition of their approval of the truce that that part Of the Grandi prOposal relating to military budgets be eliminated. An amended text to this effect was adopted by the League on September 30. After further talks in which the United States govern- ment stipulated that it would begin work on the destroyers for which contracts had already been let, Stimson agreed to the terms of the truce, which went into effect on November 213er. 1580/G.B. 438, 19 Oct. 1931. 22Edge to Stimson, Sept. 11 1931, FRUS., 1931, I, 443. 1.23 The truce, which brought to a halt practically all naval construction in the United States, went into effect precisely at the time when the Manchurian Crisis was reaching serious proportions and caused further anxiety among naval officers. It was but one Of many problems with which naval planners had to contend. The truce caused anxiety in other quarters as well. Both the British and the Japanese felt too much restricted by the truce, and when in August Of 1932 it was proposed that the truce be extended for another four months they stated that acceptance on their part was conditional upon the understanding that ships already apprOpriated for could be laid down. Since most of the tonnage necessary to bring the navies of these countries to treaty strength had been appropriated for, the truce extension under the conditions insisted upon would have had no practical effect upon any major navy. The General Board warned that the United States should not agree to an extension of the truce without insisting upon the same conditions expressed by the British and the Japanese.24 Eventually the extension was agreed upon, but it was for such a short time as to have no real effect upon naval develOpments in any of the countries 23Stimson to Greene (Charge Bern), Oct. 29 1931, ibid., p. 470. 24 Ser. 1580/G.B.438, 16 Aug. 1932. 281 concerned.25 As the time for the Opening of the Geneva conference drew nearer, efforts were continued to arrive at preliminary understandings. The British were especially perturbed that the conference, unlike the previous one at London, would be started without any real understanding of any nation's position by any Of the others. In fact there did not yet appear to be any general agreement as to what particular problems would be discussed at Geneva. Late in 1931 the British, in an attempt to clear away the fog, gave their Opinion as to what matters the Conference should not discuss. They indicated it did not seem wise to attempt to conclude any agreements at Geneva which did not conform to previous 26 Later, they indicated that Part III of the treaties. London Treaty should be maintained, and that if the Big Three Naval Powers could come to a preliminary agreement "they will be in a strong position to influence the other 27 Powers to reduce their armaments in turn." In view of Japanese dissatisfaction with the terms of Part III of the London Treaty it is difficult to see how the British hoped for even as much unanimity of opinion as they did. 2SStimson, in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy on October 19, noted that the extension would delay the laying of the keels Of two heavy cruisers by only two months, which was not "of much consequence," Annex to ibid. 26British Embassy to State Dept., Dec. 5 1931, FRUS., 1931’ 1, 532-5330 27Memorandum, enclosure in Lindsay (British Ambassador) to Stimson, Jan. 22 1932, ibid., pp. 15-16. 232 Naval officers were not at all reluctant to voice their views as to what naval prOposals the United States delegation should oppose or Sponsor at the conference. Their general Opinion in regard to the forces likely to dominate the conference was summarized by the General Board, which com- mented upon the necessity for building up American naval strength to treaty limits by referring to a Naval War College statement that the surest way to bring about further re- ductions at Geneva of a kind desired by the United States was to secure authorizations from Congress for a major building program and go to the conference in a position to demand reduction lest we build to the full strength author- 28 As to Specific attitudes, the ized, or even beyond. Board strongly asserted its opposition to any further re- duction in the total aircraft carrier tonnage allowed the United States under the treaties. At least six carriers were necessary for the fleet, it said, and Saratoga_and Lexington together took up nearly half the allowable tonnage.29 The Board also recommended that the United States support possible British prOposals for the abolition of submarines. 28Naval War College Study XTYG (1931-107), 23 Oct. 1931, Annex to 6.3.438-2, 8 Oct. 1931. 29Ser. 1521-J/G.B.438-2, 11 Jan. 1932. All material relating to serial 1521 is conveniently bound in a volume entitled "Secretary of the Navy, Disarmament Conference 1932, General Board Report," Series XI, Gen. Bd. Disarmament Records. Ser. 1521 contains all the General Board studies pertaining to the 1932 Conference. 283 This startling reversal of attitude was based partly upon further eXperience with large fleet submarines which in- dicated that the submarine's value as a fleet adjunct was relatively slight, but the main consideration was financial. Since submarines were by far the most eXpensive vessels to build, ton for ton, relatively the most expensive to maintain and wore out more quickly in actual service, it seemed their abolition would help bring about a more than proportionate re- duction in eXpenditures, especially since their abolition would mean that each navy might be able to reduce its destroyer 3O forces considerably. Should it not be possible to abolish submarines, destroyer tonnages could not be substantially re- duced below existing levels.31 Finally, the Board was willing to consider reductions of maximum gun size on battleships from 16 to 14 inches. If this concession seems even more remark- able than the one on submarines, it should be noted that no change was contemplated in battleship size. Also, the con- cession was hedged about with conditions which would almost certainly be unacceptable to the other treaty powers, for the Board insisted that as conditions of American acceptance of the 14 inch gun the United States would have to be allowed to fortify the Philippines, the French and British would have to demilitarize their naval bases in the western At- lantic, and nations of "potential 303er. 1521-L/G.B. 438-2, 23 Jan. 1932. 313er. 1521-L:2/G.B. 438-2, 2 Feb. 1932. greatness"-—reference to Germany and the U.S.S.R.--would have to agree to be so bound in their battleship construction.32 'Commenting upon the Board's battleship proposal, Admiral Pratt noted, "This is an interesting study, but too highly the- oretical to be of practical value."33 Altogether it appeared the Navy did not consider it practicable to secure much more limitation than had already been achieved. Public comment, as reflected in the press of the various countries, tended to sustain a general belief that the con- ference was not likely to accomplish much. In the United States there was nowhere near the editorial comment which had been aroused by previous disarmament conferences. In- formed opinion stressed the idea that the American delegation should seek to maintain the status quo.34 In France, where the most volatile opinion about the chances of the conference was generated, the overwhelming majority of French newspapers condemned the Grandi Arms Truce as useless and pointed to the attitude of Germany in support of their view that the time for further arms limitation was inopportune.35 In Great Britain most opinion held to a moderate optimism. It 328er. 1521-L:1/G.B.438-2, 28 Jan. 1932. 33 34Allen W. Dulles, "The Disarmament Puzzle", Foreign 'Affairs, IX (July, 1931), pp. 605-616. Pratt to Adams, 3 Feb. 1932, annex to ibid. 35Edge to Stimson, Sept. 18 1931, SDSOO.A15A4 Press/14. 285 was widely believed that whatever hostilities might be generated at the conference would not be because of Anglo- American differences, which were felt to be nearly non- existent.36 The Italians said little. In Japan there was practically no newspaper comment in the month preceding the conference. One Japanese periodical, the §2£§2,li22a voiced what may well have been the best description of the chances of success of the forthcoming conference when it said that the conference was "like an attempt to sail a frail boat on a turblent sea against contrary winds."37 THE GENEVA CONFERENCE: FIRST PHASE There has been no extensive study of the 1932 General Disarmament Conference at Geneva. It is possible but un- likely that scholars have simply overlooked it. There have been few international conferences which have produced as large a collection of documents, minutes, reports, corres- pondence and resolutions as did this one, and to less pur- pose. The repetition, the timeworn arguments, the irrelevant and trivial speeches practically benumb the researcher--what effect they must have had upon the participants may well be 36Atherton to Stimson, Feb. 10 1932, SD500,A15A4 Press/14. 37Forbes (charge Tokyo) to Stimson, Jan. 30 1932, SD500.A15A4 Press/44. 286 imagined. Add to this the complicated interplay of forces, as great and small nations alike advanced their positions with regard to air, land and sea armaments, together with the inescapable fact that all the Speechmaking, discussing and negotiating were barren of any practical result, and it is understandable that there has been no thorough investi- gation of the subject. Actually, the general outlines of the conference are not difficult to trace, and if reference is made primarily to the naval questions which arose rather than to the whole broad subject of armaments as it was dis- cussed at the conference, the task becomes even simpler. The Conference opened on February 2, 1932. It was a bad time for a disarmament conference. The great crisis of the day was of course the Japanese march into Manchuria, which had been nearly completed by the time the conference convened. Then there was Shanghai, where another Japanese attack had begun only a few days before and was then raging in unimaginable fury, with air and naval bombardment laying waste large sections of the teeming port as the Chinese defenders doggedly contested every foot of ground. On the .opening'day of the conference there was a brief adjournment so that the League Council could consider this latest threat to the peace of nations. In addition to the Far East, other areas were stirring uneasily, as the ground shakes underfoot before an eruption. In France, an election campaign was under way which indicated that yet another brief French 287 government would be toppled. In Germany an election had recently taken place in which the Nazi Party of Adolf Hitler had made impressive gains. Yet with a seeming refusal to recognize realities which was to become a marked characteris- tic of the deliberations, the opening speeches consumed practically the entire time from opening day until February 25, and more time afterward was spent in setting up committees. By March 19, when a recess was declared for the Easter holiJ day, no substantive work had been done.38 The American delegation acquitted itself well during this opening phase of discussions. On February 9, Gibson, as chief of the delegation, presented a series of American proposals which, he said, represented the position of the American government. Stating that it must be assumed each nation would have to maintain sufficient increments of military strength to insure internal order and defend against aggression, he asserted: "Beyond this reasonable supplement to the police force we have taken an implicit obligation to restrict ourselves."39 Meaningful agreements would have to involve restrictions, and the American proposals would in- volve such restrictions. The proposals consisted of nine major points: 3 8Denna F. Fleming, The United States and World Organ- izatign, 19251—1933 (New YES'E'E: "19335, 'p'.“3'76. 39Gibson to Stimson, Feb. 9 1932, FRUS., 1932, I, 28. 283 1. The Preparatory Commission's draft convention was a convenient basis for discussion, but further pro- posals should be considered. 2. The Washington and London treaties could be pro- longed and France and Italy persuaded to subscribe to them. 3. The figures of total tonnages in the naval treaties might well be lowered by further negotiation. 4. Submarines should be abolished. 5. Rules should be formulated to protect civilians against aerial bombardment. 6. The use of gas and bacteriological warfare should be abolished. 7. Reserves should be counted in the determination of military strength. 8. Tanks and heavy artillery should be especially re- stricted, because of their "peculiarly offensive character." 9. Limitation of expenditures should be considered as a supplement to direct limitation of armed forces.40 The far-ranging scope of the Gibson prOposals well 'illustrates the complexity of the problem with which the general conference was attempting to deal. Any one of the proposals would have been sufficient problem for an arms 401bid., pp. 29-30. "Q CD \0 limitation conference to try to solve, yet at Geneva it was proposed to try to solve all at once. While remembering that all these subjects were discussed at the same time by various committees of the conference, it would be well at this point to restrict further attention mainly to the prob- lems which bore on the limitation of naval armaments. AS far as the Gibson proposals were concerned, those calling for the abolition of the submarine, revision of the Washing- ton and London Treaties, and the limitation of expenditures bore directly upon naval limitation. The reactidn to the Gibson prOposals was generally favorable. While not all the proposals could be accepted, the important point was that Specific proposals were offered at a relatively early stage of the proceedings. Other coun- tries were led by the American example to offer counter prOposalS of their own, which tended to clarify the attitudes of at least those countries. Grandi voiced his government's desire to reach an understanding which would allow Italy to subscribe to the London Treaty. He stated his government was willing Specifically to approve the abolition of capital ships, aircraft carriers and submarines, the abolition of tanks and heavy artillery, the abolition of bombing aircraft, and the abolition of gas and bacteriological warfare.41 Matsudaira said his government favored restrictions on bomb- ——— _ __ 41Gibson to Stimson, Feb. 10 1932, ibid., p. 31. 42 ing Operations and the abolition of aircraft carriers. Several other countries introduced proposals which generally stood somewhere between the two extremes of the Italian and Japanese positions. If each prOposal had been considered on its own merits and had been free of objectionable assumptions some measure of agreement might have been reached. Unfortunately the entire question of armaments limitation was complicated by the introduction of an issue upon which it proved impossible to reach any agreement-~the question of "offensive" versus "defensive" instruments of warfare. The idea that certain weapons are essentially offensive in nature while others are essentially defensive has an intrinsic appeal, since it seemingly offers a Solution to the problem of limitation by lessening anxiety over the consequences of really substantial limitation measures. By singling out certain weapons as "offensive" and therefore bad, measures of drastic limitation or even abolition can be directed against them, while "de- fensive"--i.e., desirable-~armaments would be permitted. Thus the drastic cutting of armaments and the enhancing of national security can both be achieved at the same time. Each country could rest secure in the feeling that it had retained armaments which adequately provided for its security, and the destruction of offensive weapons would promote se- Ibid., p. 32. 291 curity by relieving the anxiety over the possibility of attack. Such a concept, appealing though it may be, had certain flaws. Aside from the logical fallacy which is at once apparent, it is evident that the concept is politically rather than militarily motivated and sustained. When the concept was first formally prOposed in 1929 it was obvious to military experts that it had little merit. weapons could not generally be classified into offensive and defensive categories. To use a naval example, the battleship was seized upon at Geneva as an outstanding offensive weapon, and, as will be seen, several efforts were made further to limit their size or to abolish them entirely. Yet from a military point of view there was no reason for assuming battleships to be offensive weapons. A battleship was just as effective in defending a coastline or an island possess- ion as it was in assaulting the same, or an opposing fleet. Similar considerations applied to any other category of warship, except possibly the submarine. Much the same reasoning applied to instruments of land warfare. The tank was looked upon at Geneva as "peculiarly offensive"--witness Gibson's proposal number eight--yet in practice it was to prove as effective a weapon of defense as of attack. Since it was impossible to differentiate between offensive and defensive weapons in any meaningful military sense, the differentiation was actually made on a political basis. The representatives of each nation conceived of the 292 weapons they most feared as offensive, while those weapons which were best suited to their own needs were considered to be defensive. Thus the French were willing to abolish battle- ships as offensive but clung to submarines as defensive. To the British the submarine was an offensive weapon, while cruisers were defensive, and so on. It was obvious that deadlock would develop over the question, and since so many of the proposals advanced at Geneva were based upon the con- cept it was certain that they would therefore fail. The credit--if it may be called such--of formally in- troducing the concept of "offensive" weapons as prime sub- jects for limitation on a large scale belongs to the U.S.S.R. As pointed out earlier, the Soviet delegation at the sixth session of the Preparatory Commission in 1929 announced a proposal for partial disarmament which involved particularly drastic limitations on weapons which they considered to be offensive--long range warships, artillery and aircraft. Their proposals viewed aircraft carriers as fit subjects for abolition and ships larger than 10,000 tons as essentially offensive. The Soviets did not propose to abolish the sub- marine.43 Earlier, at Geneva in 1927, the Japanese had sought to exempt from restriction submarines displacing less than 600 tons on the ground that they were defensive weapons 43fligg£g§ of the Sixsh Session 2: the Preparatory 99mmissign, SeriES VIII, pp. 19-21. 293 suited only to coastal protection, but this prOposal was limited compared to the Soviet view. These were but pre- liminaries to the wide range of preposals offered at Geneva and designed to limit or abolish offensive weapons. The American proposals contained the offensive weapons concept to some extent; those of the Italians involved the idea even more. Perhaps the ultimate proposal along these lines was reached when the Soviets suggested that tanks, heavy artillery, dirigibles, bombing aircraft, aircraft carriers, all naval guns above 12 inches and all naval vessels displacing more than 10,000 tons be abolished.44 Whether the Soviets were sincere or were Simply seeking a deeper obfuscation of the issues can only be surmised. Once the various prOposals had been made the different committees of the conference settled themselves into the task of separating, clarifying, summarizing and modifying them so as to produce a basis for final agreement, while delegations hastened to seek instruction from their govern- ments as to which prOposalS should be supported and which rejected. General Simonds and Admiral Hepburn, the chief American Army and Navy advisers at the conference, requested studies by the War and Navy Departments concerning the effect upon national defense of the abolition of bombers and pro- L 44Gibson to Stimson, Feb. 11 1932, FRUS., 1932, 1, 32-33. A good study of the offensive—defensive weapons pro- blem is Marion W. Boggs, Attempts £3 Define and Limit "Aoress- $22 Armament ig_9iplomagy and Strategy (Columbia, Mo., . 294 hibition of bombing. The Navy Department replied abolition of bombers was impracticable because of the difficulty of definition--practically any military airplane could carry bombs. Prohibition of bombing "would be detrimental to national defense."45 It should be pointed out that the American delegation was not dominated by the Admirals. Gibson, as chairman of the delegation, was in close touch with the State Department at all stages of the proceedings. Few decisions were reached without direct approval from Washington. Even in the Naval Commission, where technical details were discussed, Admiral Hepburn, who represented the Navy's interests directly, was subjected to civilian control in the person of Senator Claude Swanson, who was chairman of the delegation to the Commission. Naval members agreed that Swanson, while keenly aware of the Navy's desires, also knew what the Senate would approve and was by no means dominated by the admirals.46 If there was substantial agreement between the civilian and naval groups at Geneva, it was not because the admirals dominated the discussions but because increasing international tensions made the Navy's contentions more likely to be heard. 'If there was any anxiety among military and naval circles 4SGibson to Stimson, Feb. 16 1932; Stimson to Gibson, March 11 1932, ibid., pp. 40, 52. 46Capt. A.H. VanKeuren'S statement to General Board, 18 July 1932, folder, misc. letters 1932, Series XI, Gen. Bd. Disarmament Records. in the United States that the Geneva Conference might arrive at agreements which would dangerously limit any particular weapon believed to be especially suited to the requirements of American strategy, it was soon dispelled by the activities of the Naval Commission, which had no more success in over- coming mutual national hostilities and translating the many conflicting attitudes and prOposals into workable agreements than did any of the other commissions. In spite of the fact that the existing naval agreements provided a basis upon which a more wide-ranging accord might have been constructed, the Commission Spent a fruitless period in arguing every conceivable proposal without arriving at any conclusions. One reason for the futility was provided by the form the conference possessed. As in 1927, the structure of a conference where several countries discussed a wide range of prOpositions on disarmament created a Situation in which the proceedings were fragmented and permeated with such ir- relevancy that the achievement of any degree of success would be nearly a miracle. In the fourth meeting of the Naval Commission on March 15, the disruptive effects of the situ- ation were noticeable and serve as an example of the kind of discussion which characterized most of the conference, In discussing the definitions of different kinds of warships in the draft convention, each delegation felt free to ad- vance ideas which had the effect of completely nullifying what agreements had been arranged with such difficulty by .-fl"—“ 7..., 296 the Preparatory Commission. he Germans, for example, in- troduced a resolution which defined cruisers as vessels dis- placing from 800 to 6,000 tons with guns no larger than 4.1 47--a definition which had no relevance whatever to inches views prevailing for decades and which would have required the re-definition of practically every kind of warship than in existence. In argument over rules for replacement, a- mendments were offered by no fewer than fifteen countries to one paragraph establishing the effective life of certain 40 The likelihood of success under such conditions vessels. was remote indeed. Negotiations dragged on in this fashion for several months. PrOposals were offered so extreme that it was un- likely that any major country would accept them, and their introduction seems to have been mainly for propaganda effect. Several countries proposed battleships should be abolished. These were nations having little strength in battleships or which, like Germany, had a particularly strong interest in limiting the strength of likely enemies. The Germans were quite candid in showing their motivation when the German delegate stated that the basis for Germany's proposal was 47League of Nations,.Records of the Conference for the Reduction.ggg Limitation of Armaméfifsj‘fleneva, I932. Series Q, vol. III: Minutes of the Naval Commission, February 27- JuI§_30,-T§32 (Geneva,-T9377, pp. 1T;12._Hereafter cited as Minutes 2: the Naval Commission, 1932 Conference. 48 Ibid., pp. 14-17. 297 that the Versailles Treaty had prohibited that country from ' possessing battleships, so that German aggression would be made impossible in the future. The entire German attitude toward the naval aSpect of armaments limitation at the con- ference was overtly one of seeking to reduce the naval strength of the great powers to a level approaching Germany's,although their real desire may have been to gain acceptance of the idea that the Versailles Treaty should be revised so as to allow Germany to expand her naval power. The Germans also pointed out that the Versailles Treaty's prohibition of cer- tain kinds of weapons implied that those weapons were offen- sive and therefore more dangerous than others.49 There was little question that the French-German problem was at the heart of much of the difficulty in which the conference found itself. A solution which secured the objectives of both sides would have gone a long way toward insuring a good chance that some concrete agreements could be reached which would allow the conference to be considered a success, but unfort- unately the positions of the two countries did not appear to admit of any compromise. The Germans flatly insisted on "equality of treatment," by which they particularly meant a re-negotiation of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty and a reduction of the overwhelming land power of the French; the French would not consider granting the German 4911m... p. 25. demand unless a security arrangement could be worked out which would relieve French anxiety by giving them solid guarantees of aid, particularly from Great Britain and the United States. The British, who held the key, compounded the difficulty by showing more sympathy to the German position than to the French, thus rendering the French more intractable than ever. The French-German problem did not pose any direct threat to the settlement of naval questions at the conference, since a possible revival of German naval power was more a matter of concern for the British than for the French; however, the French did evince considerable concern over the new German long range armored cruisers, which were well advanced in construction by 1932 and which were clearly intended as commerce raiders. In line with the general attempt to class- ify weapons as offensive or defensive, which occupied so large a proportion of the attention of the conference, the French tried to persuade the delegates that the German raid- ers were offensive vessels, while the Germans vigorously dissented, contending that~the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty were reSponsible for the characteristics of the vessels. 50The German defense, while essentially correct, was not able effectively to answer the French claim that several char- acteristics of the ships which made them especially suitable for commerce raiding--an extremely long range capability in particular--were not required under the treaty. If there was any naval vessel which might have been considered to be an almost purely offensive weapon, it was probably the German pocket battleship. Minutes 2: the Navgl Commission, 1932 anference, pp. 35-4 . 299 The Americans were not directly concerned with the French-German problem and saw the American role--and that of the British as well --as being mainly that of a mediator. Gibson believed it would be best if the two countries stood in the position of "being present in a friendly capacity and facilitating the approach to these difficult problems, . . T51 The problems were not to be solved. The French remained im- movable, determined to accept no limitations on their armed forces unless their demands for security were met; yet they feared that the conference would end in failure, for which they might receive a large share of the blame.52 The Germans, on their part, insisted that the immense continental super- iority of France be reduced or the Reichswehr be increased, or both. It was, they said, a matter of simple justice and in the interest of peace.53 The impasse was complete. Gibson reported "that the atmosPhere of the¢:onference at the pre- sent moment is very pessimistic. There is a definite feeling of discouragement and confusion." Discussions concerning naval limitations did not meet SlGibson to Castle, May 10 1932. FRUS, 1932, I, 119-120. 52Gibson to Castle, Apr. 25 1932, ibid., p. 108. 53Memorandum of Conversation Among Members of United Statesi British and German Delegations, undated, ibid., pp. 09-1 . 54Gibson to Castle, Apr. 21 1932, ibid., p. 106. 300 with as much success as those concerning land and air arma- ments. The main reason was that the great naval powers had already substantially limited their fleets by 1932, while nothing had been done in the matter of limitation of land and air forces. In other words, the naval powers had already advanced a way along the road to disarmament, while the land powers had not. The Americans in particular thought it un- fair to ask the naval powers for further sacrifices until the land powers showed themselves willing to make similar sacri- fices.55 The United States Government reflected the Navy's view when it said that the Geneva Conference was primarily to be viewed as a conference to limit land and air armaments. In spite of the American wish to prevent discussion of naval questions, further limitations on naval power were much discussed at the conference, and even the Americans felt it necessary to offer proposals of their own. Three major pro- posals on naval limitation were offered to the conference during 1932-~one each by the United States, Great Britain and Japan. The first of these was a British plan, suggested by Stanley Baldwin, the substance of which was given to the Americans in private discussion on May 13. The Baldwin Plan involved proposals relating to land and air as well as naval armaments, and consisted of four main points: (1) Total abolition of military aircraft and aircraft 55Gibson to Castle, Apr. 9 1932, Castle to Gibson, Apr. 11 1932, ibid., pp. 75-760 carriers. (2) Abolition of battleships. (3) Drastic reduction of army effectives (standing forces and reserves). (4) Abolition of certain offensive weapons, such as tanks and heavy mobile artillery.56 The American reaction to the plan was Spirited. Upon being informed of the British proposals, Stimson consulted the Navy Department, and upon its advice he sent an unequivocal re- jection. The American fleet, he said, was already greatly weakened by limitations, and the British plan, particularly in regard to battleships, was "an.immossible one."57 In connection with the rejection, however, Stimson did offer Gibson some ideas as to what proposals regarding naval limi- tation would be acceptable. These primarily involved re- ductions in overall tonnage of the various categories on a percentage basis. Battleship tonnages, he suggested, might be reduced about one-third, giving the United States and Great Britain ten vessels to six for Japan. Under no con- ditions could we consider the abolition of aircraft carriers, but we would accept reductions in total tonnage of 20 percent. Light cruiser and destroyer tonnages might be cut 20 percent 56Gibson to Castle, May 13 1932, FRUS., 1932, 1, 124. 57Stimson to Gibson, June 7 1932, ibid., p. 154. to C) Ix.) below the limits set in the London Treaty, but no reductions could be considered on heavy cruisers. Submarine tonnages might be reduced one-third below London levels. 'He reiterated strongly American objections to further limitations upon the naval powers without a corresponding sacrifice by the land powers.S8 Alarmed at the adverse American reaction, the Brit- ish hastened to assure the Americans that Baldwin had been speaking privately and that there had been no intention of putting forward the abolition of battleships as an official 59 The British did not prOposal by the British government. formulate any new naval proposals until the following year. The American prOposals on naval limitation, like those of the British, were coupled with proposed restrictions on land and air forces, but were placed directly before the con- ference in as dramatic a manner-as possible. The idea seems to have originated with Hoover himself, who was extremely disappointed by the lack of progress of the conference. In a Cabinet meeting on May 24, he stated his concern over the high cost of armaments while national economies were collap- sing. He Specifically voiced his anxiety over the fact that ultimately the United States would have to construct a billion dollars worth of naval vessels in order to reach treaty strength. If armaments were reduced, he said, this vast 58Ibid., pp. 156-158. 59Mellon (Ambassador in London) to Stimson, June 8 1932, ibid., p. 159. Lo 0 to construction program would be unnecessary. He then laid before the Cabinet some specific proposals which he thought the United States should offer at the conference. He suggest- ed that: 1. Battleship strength should be reduced one-third. 2. Aircraft carriers should be abolished. 3. Cruiser and destroyer stength of the London Treaty Powers should be cut one-third, with France and Italy to build no more. 4. Submarines, military aircraft other than scouting craft, mobile guns of a caliber greater than 6 inches, tanks and gas should all be abolished. 5. Army effective strengths should be reduced one- third.60 Stimson immediately noted that Hoover's plan went well beyond the reductions which the Navy Department considered acceptable. Stimson was eSpecially concerned over the preposal to abolish aircraft carriers, in which American potential superiority was greatest and in which the Navy placed increasing confid- ence.61 He succeeded in persuading Hoover to modify his plan to the extent that carriers Should be cut 25 percent rather than abolished, that cruisers and destroyers should be re— 60Memorandum of Statement to Cabinet, May 24 1932, en- closure in Hoover to Stimson, May 24 1932, ibid., pp. 180-182. 61Memorandum by Stimson, May 25 1932, ibid., p. 184. 304 duced 25 percent rather than one-third, and that submarines should be reduced one-third rather than abolished, with no nation to retain more than 35,000 tons of submarines.62 The Hoover Plan, as it came to be called, was offered to the conference on June 22. Reaction was immediate, most of it highly favorable. Even the French did not directly oppose it, while the Germans asserted that the plan, if a- dOpted, would go a long way toward satisfying Germany's de- mand for equality. The Italians accepted the plan absolutely and without reservation.63 Later, however, as emotions cool- ed, more guarded comments began to appear. Herriot, the new French Premier, announced that certain parts of the Hoover Plan might not be applicable in the existing world situation, and he restated the French view that disarmament was not possible without adequate guarantees of security for France.64 The British seemed reluctant to discuss the plan, and there were indications they were exploring with the Japanese the possibility of blocking the naval proposals.65 By the begin- ning of July strong efforts were being made to sidetrack the fi— 62Stimson to Gibson, June 20, June 21 1932, ibid., pp. 195, 213-214. 63Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, June 22 1932, , ibid., pp. 215-216. S4Armour (charge Paris) to Stimson, June 25 1932, ibid., p. 22 . 65Gibson to Stimson, July 1 1932, ibid., p. 252. 305 plan in the various technical committees.66 Eventually the Hoover Plan suffered the same fate as all the other proposals presented at the conference-~oblivion. The Geneva Conference reached a climactic point and then adjourned abruptly shortly after the presentation of the Hoover Plan. The Technical commissions had been meeting periodically since March, and to judge by the discussions in the Naval Commission, none of these meetings would bear much fruit. After several months of argument, the Naval Commission sub- mitted a report on May 28 which shamaithe wide divergence of Opinion on practically every aspect of naval limitation.67 The question of just which weapons were offensive and which defensive was eSpecially vexing and, judging by the report, insoluble. The United States, Great Britain and Japan agreed that battleships were not offensive weapons, while the French, Germans and Soviets insisted they were.68 The Italians, Ger- mans and Soviets, who did not possess aircraft carriers, con- sidered them to be offensive weapons, while the French, Americans and British, who did have carriers, believed that they were not.69 Neither could agreements be reached on 66Gibson to Stimson, July 2 1932, ibid., pp. 253-254. 67The report is in Minutes 9; the Naval Commission, 1932 Conference, pp. 126-137. 68Ibid., pp. 128-129. 691bid., pp. 129-131. questions of qualitative limitation. The British and the Japanese, who seemed most interested in securing limitations on battleships, offered a number of proposals pertaining to increasing the effective age of battleships or reducing their 70 tonnage. Referred to Washington for decision, the pro- posals were invariably rejected, except those which allowed age limits to be increased to 26‘years.71 Obviously, it would be impossible to secure agreements of any kind on naval limitations. The work of the technical commissions on land and air forces was more fruitful, and produced various agreements, their efforts and those of the Naval Commission being summar- ized in a resolution adopted by the conference on July 23.72 While the resolution represented the only solid achievement of the conference, it was also the occasion for the with- drawal of the Germans. They, along with the Soviets, voted against the adoption of the resolution, denouncing it as containing no guarantee of changes corresponding to German desires for equality. From then until the end of the year, the conference was adjourned, as the British, French and 70Adm. Hepburn to Navy Dept., Apr. 23, June 9 1932, SD500.A15A4 Naval Arm./31, 89. 713er. 1521-P&Q/G.B.438-2, 3 May 1932; Ser. 1521-v/ G.B.438-2, 16 June 1932. 72The full text of the July 23 resolution is in FRUS., 1932, I, 318-322. 307 Americans took the lead in attempts to persuade the Germans to return. During this interval, the Japanese offered for consider- ation the third major proposal regarding naval limitations. In late October, Matsudaira informed Davis that the Japanese had a comprehensive naval plan to offer, which he had just received. He intimated that the plan was something of a compromise combining the most acceptable features of the earlier American and British proposals.73 The Japanese plan was not officially presented for another month, but when it was, it was clear that it stood even less chance of accept- ance then the others. it provided for limitation of vessels of "great offensive power"--classified according to Japanese standards. It urged qualitative limitations as follows: reduction of battleship unit tonnages to 25,000 tons and reduction of maximum gun size to 14 inches; for heavy cruis- ers, reduction of tonnage to 8,000 tons; for light cruisers, establishment of a maximum unit tonnage of 6,000 tons. De- stroyers and submarines were to remain the same as under the London Treaty. The plan also proposed quantitative limi- tations to reduce total tonnages well below the London Treaty stipulations. 73Davis to Stimson, Oct. 28 1932, SD500.A15A4 Naval Arm./153. 308 .maq .mmmfl ..Wmmm .mmmH w .009 .GomEHum ou ma>wa ca madmoauam ”mousom ooo.ma ooo.ma ooo.ma ooo.ma ooo.ma mooauasoam ooo.oma ooo.oms ooo.oma ooo.oma ooo.oms auosoouaoo .ooo.oma ooo.oma ooo.oma ooo.oma ooo.oma mooaaouo pawns Amoaoo av Aooaaa av noaaaa oav “manna NHV Aaoaao Nae ooo.on ooo.om ooo.om ooo.oo coo.oa muoaaouo s>oom Aooaaa we Amado” any Aoaaaa any ooo.oms ooo.oma ooo.oo~ ooo.m- ooo.m~WL moaaaoauuom hawuH museum smash :Houaum ”mono moumum woman: .Nmaa .m mumzmuma .zamao we ammoaoem ma mmamoemeao mo mmuazzoe m mqm<fi 309 Three features of the Japanese proposal are readily apparent. First, the tonnages for battleships and heavy cruisers gave the Japanese much better than a 10:7 ratio, which had earlier been considered satisfactory for Japan's needs.74 Second, the reductions in unit tonnages proposed by the Japanese would have required the scrapping within a relatively short time of every battleship and heavy cruiser in existence and their replacement at enormous cost. Finally, under the proposals the Japanese would have parity with the United States in light cruisers and destroyers as well as submarines. The plan was obviously unacceptable. The General Board commented: "By presenting these proposals Japan really pro- poses world approval of Japanese naval supremacy in the Western Pacific. As far as the United States is concerned the proposals are wholly unacceptable."75 As far as public opinion was concerned, there seemed to be a general feeling that Japan's attitude at the conference was arrogant and that the Japanese were not really interested in limitation. Yet there was no strong belief that the United States should build its Navy to treaty strength; many felt that existing 74The Japanese Naval Staff, in developing its plans for possible war with the United States, considered Japan's chances for victory excellent with the ratios established under the naval treaties, provided the war was fought in the western Pacific. Thaddeus V. Tuleja, Statesmen and Admirals: Qpest for a 8Far Eastern Naval Policy, I§3I:T§41. New Ybrk, ), p. . 758er. 1521-AA(1584)/G.B.438-2, 18 Jan. 1933. '310 naval strength was adequate. With the rejection of the Japanese plan no further naval proposals of significance were offered by any major power until March, 1933. he main diplomatic effort was directed toward attempts to find a French-German agreement in prin- ciple sufficient to persuade the Germans to return to the Conference. Talks were held during the fall of 1932, with delegates of the United States, Great Britain and Italy diligently seeking a formula acceptable to all. Actually, the problem was not simply a French-German question. What- ever solution might be reached between those countries would inevitably involve Italy and Great Britain directly and the United States indirectly. Davis thought that an Anglo-Ameri- can understanding was a necessary first step toward agree- 77 ment among all the countries involved. It was clear how- ever, that France's attitude lay at the heart of much of the difficulty. In an attempt to reach agreement, the French presented on November 15 a comprehensive proposal which called for the security guarantees long demanded by the French. It prOposed that whenever aggression or a threat of aggression took form, the powers signatory to the Kellogg-Briand Pact "shall concert together as promptly as possible with a view 76Tupper and McReynolds, Japan i9 American Public 0 inion, pp. 266-267. 77Davis to Stimson, Oct. 19 1932, SD500.A15A4 Naval Arm./144. 311 to appealing to public Opinion and agreeing upon the steps to be taken."78 In addition, the French urged a series of reductions or prohibitions of certain land weapons, none of these being much different from points already raised at Geneva. The Germans found nothing in the French plan to satisfy their aspirations,79 so the matter was quietly drOp- ped. Ultimately, after a series of conversations among the five powers at Geneva during the period between December 2 and 12, the French agreed to accept equality of rights for Germany as a principle, with the conference itself to decide how the principle was to be practically applied. Thereupon the Germans agreed to return to the conference. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE: SECOND PHASE. The first phase of the Geneva Conference was now over, and preparations were made to convene once more early in 1933. The Germans' decision to resume their places at the conference table made a continuation of discussions possible, but the agreement which had prompted their decision actually ___ u u __._ 78Enclosure in Wilson to Stimson, Nov. 15 1932, FRUS., 1932, I, 380. ’ 79Gordon (Charge Berlin) to Stimson, Nov. 18 1932, ibid., 397-398. . 80Memorandum of Five-Power Conversations at Geneva, Dec. 2-12, 1932, ibid., pp. 489-528. 312 did nothing more than return the situation to what it had been before. French acceptance of equality of rights for Germany as a principle was a slight advance but had little practical significance, since the conference might well argue fruitlessly over how the principle was to be applied. In fact this is what happened. Hitler's accession to power at the end of January and his subsequent actions during the rest of the year did nothing to allay French suspicions of German intentions, and by the fall of 1933, when Hitler took Germany out of both the conference and the League, no way had been found to give practical eXpression to the principle of equality in such a way as to satisfy both German claims and French insistence on security. Attitudes on all sides were hardening. Each nation seemed convinced that others were bent upon securing agree- *ments to their own advantage alone. The General Board in its report on the 1932 phase of the conference realistically summed up the situation: At Geneva in 1932, Soviet Russia stood for complete disarmament, which would enhance her hepes of world revolution. Germany proposed sweeping re- ductions in armaments to bring other powers down to her own status under the Versailles Treaty. France, supported by Poland and other interested powers, stood for consolidation of the status quo, . . .which would tend to maintain France's hegemony over the Continent. Italy's proposals and her support of measures of re- duction of armaments were in accord with her policy of 'armaments equality with the strongest armed nation on the continent' . . .to be attained by the scaling down of French armaments and not at disastrous cost to herself. Japan indicated her dissatisfaction with the present naval ratios and favored only such re- ductions as would enhance her strong position in the Far East. She rejected all proposals that were not in harmony with this policy. . . Generally speaking, the large number of small powers represented at the Conference favored limitation of armaments to low levels, causing reductions not directly affecting them but indirectly increasing their relative strength. The Hoover proposals were criticized on the ground that they permitted the United States to attain re— lative treaty strength without the expense of build- ing, while Great Britagp and Japan would have to scrap existing ships." The Board did not say it, but it was clear that the various national views were incompatible. The inescapable conclusion was that the Geneva Conference was doomed to failure, no matter how long it might continue its deliberations. Under the circumstances, it seemed to the naval officers that the Americans need not make any further concessions, since there was nothing they could do, short of abject surrender to every demand made upon them, to pull the floundering confer- ence out of the mire into which it had fallen. The general feeling, outside naval circles as well as within, was that the problems of the conference were essentially EurOpean problems, to be solved by the Europeans. As if to assume that no further progress could be hoped for from the present conference, the Board asserted that at future conferences the United States should insist upon: (1) agreements based upon simple and direct means of limitation; (2) maintenance of the 5:5:3 ratio and the present characteristics of vessels, "both of which are vitally important to the interests of this 813er. 1521-AA(1584)/G.B. 438-2, 18 Jan. 1933. f 3 14 Q) agreements in which our prOper position is country"; assured at the beginning of the term of agreement, rather "Present preparedness must not be sacrificed than at its end. 82 to an illusory future readiness." The second phase of the conference began whenthe General Commission convened on January 16, with the Germans once When the more taking their places at the conference table. conference had first met in February, 1932, many officials had not considered the prospects hOpeful, but by 1933 there The was an even more widespread conviction of pessimism. international situation was no better-~perhaps even worse-- than it had been in 1932. In the Far East another crisis was breaking, this time in connection with Japanese inroads In into Jehol, the Chinese province bordering Manchuria. EuroPe Hitler's accession to power had been followed by a revival in Germany of an intense nationalistic spirit, and the possibility of drastic attempts by that country to escape the restrictions of Versailles was rapidly turning Under the circumstances, it was apparent into probability. that there would be a hardening of attitude and consequently less likelihood that any of the major powers would approve a disarmament plan which would really disarm. Only the British seemed optimistic. After some pre- liminary discussion, MacDonald introduced a draft treaty of 821bid. 315 l disarmament, the most comprehensive proposal made at the Divided into five parts, the MacDonald plan conference. provided mainly for security, in the form of a consultative pact among the Kellogg-Briand Pact signatories, and limitation of land, naval and air armaments. The limitations would in- volve tanks, heavy mobile artillery and aircraft, and an attempt to limit the French and Italian building programs and to postpone the replacement of battleships until after Decem- ber, 1936.83 The entire plan represented an attempt to in- corporate some of the features of previous proposalswhich As far as the naval had received a large degree of support. provisions were concerned, the plan tried to provide for stabilization of the French and Italian fleets while the g provisions of the London and Washington treaties were essenti- While making several comments regarding the ally maintained. land and air provisions, Gibson refrained from taking any position on the naval provisions and referred them to Washing- 84 ton. not meet with the Navy's approval, since, unlike the Japanese they did not attempt to alter the ratios established General Board voiced its There was nothing in the naval proposals which could plan, by the naval treaties; and the 83The text of the MacDonald treaty plan is in Gibson to Hull, March 17 1933, FRUS., 1933, I, 43-54. 84Gibson to Hull, March 17 1933, ibid., pp. 56-57. ar- 03 O Q I O . approval of the plan. The main prOVlSlOI‘lS with which he Americans could find fault were those of Part 1 providing for consultation in case of aggression.86 Unfortunately, the same feature of the naval proposals which made them acceptable to the Americans made them un- acceptable to the Japanese, who were by now intent upon re- vision of the naval treaty ratios.87 The whole Japanese position toward disarmament had stiffened noticeably since they had quit the League in February, and although they remained in the conference it was evident they were interest- ed in disarmament only to the extent that others disarmed. Their determination to keep the mandated islands was further evidence of their desire to strengthen their position in the Far East;88 under such conditions Japanese support for a real disarmament plan was not likely. The MacDonald Plan was the main subject of discussion at the general session and in the technical commissions dur- 353er. 1521-II/G.B.438-2, 21:.zaroa 1933; Ser. 1521- per/6.3. 438-2, 22 June 1933. C2 femorandum of a conversation between Roosevelt and MacDonald, April 23 1933, FRUS, 1933, I, 102-105, 106-107. Both the Navy and Army also were concerned over the aerial provision limiting the total number of aircraft possessed by any nation to 500 planes. The Navy said the number was too small, and the principle of parity in aircraft for all nations was not: acceptable. Hull to Gibson, March 23 1933, FRUS., 1933, I, 74. 87Grew (Ambassador in Tokyo) to Hull, March 22 1933, ibid. , p. 68. 88 Grew to Hull, Feb. 10 1933. FRUS., 1933, 111, 749-750. ing most of the rest of the.year, but there was little question that it stood no more chance of general acceptance than had the plans offered earlier. Besides the Japanese hostility, the steadily worsening French-German relationship made agreement impossible. By May, the Germans, who had been unable to obtain American support for a re-negotiation of the armaments restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, were showing increasing signs of hostility, raising the question of whether they might not once again walk out of the conference. Anxiety increased when it was learned that Hitler would deliver a major speech before the Reichstag on May 17, and Roosevelt decided to make a public appeal for a continuation of the conference. Addressed to all the chiefs of state but directed particularly to Hitler, his appeal was given on May 16. He stated that national governments could best allay people's fears by taking concrete steps toward disarmament. Specifically, he proposed that the nations agree to the MacDonald Plan, that they not increase their armaments as long as the conference met, and that they enter 90 The Germans gener- into a mutual pledge of non-aggression. ally approved of the statement and Hitler's speech to the Reichstag was surprisingly mild, one observer characterizing 89Hull to Gibson, May 8 1933, anus, 1933, 1, 130-131. 901bid., pp. 143-145. ”I o v pr 318 it as "entirely different in tone from all others I. have 91 The Japanese were all smiles, heard the Chancellor deliver. " but were not sure that the Roosevelt Speech was directed to In any case, they said, there conditions in the Far East. would be a delay in the giving of an official answer since, "in vie-7 of the situation in China, there would be some em- . O O I 92 barrassment in answering the Pre51dent's communication." Only the French voiced misgivings, and reiterated their position that security for France must precede disarmament.93 In Spite of the generally favorable reaction to the President's appeal, it soon became evident that the Germans In further and the Japanese had not changed their positions. discussions of the naval provisions of the MacDonald Plan the Japanese attempted to delay and to confuse further pro- gress by making their agreement to prohibit bombing condition- al Upon the abolition of aircraft carriers, a situation which, Davis believed, "would prejudice the entire procedure to which we are committed inasmuch as it would Open an endless debate on the naval chapter; . . ."94 The General Board agreed that 91Gordon to Hull, May 17 1933, ibid., p. 150. 921vfemorandum by Undersecretary of State Phillips, May 16 1933, ibid., p. 147. Marriner (charge Paris) to Hull, May 17 1933, ibid., 93 147-148. pp- 94Davis to Full, May 30 1933, SD500.A15A4 Naval Arm./l75. acceptance of the Japanese~prooosal would vastly complicate the proceedings and restated the Navy's view that while a reduction in the treaty tonnages for carriers was acceptable, their total abolition was not. Since the Navy lacked bases in the western Pacific it needed carriers.95 By the end of the summer the conference had once again entered a situation of stagnation. Finally, on October 14, after several last-minute attempts to work out compromises, the German Foreign Minister, von Neurath, stated the confer- ence could not achieve its purpose--a general disarmament treaty--solely because of "the unwillingness on the part of the highly armed states to carry out their contractual obligation to disarm." Hence, Neurath announced, Germany was withdrawing from the conference.96 While the German withdrawal did relate to the stagnation of the conference and to the belief in official circles in Germany that direct negotiations with France might result in greater success, other reasons for their action had to do with internal poli- tical considerations and perhaps with Hitler's emotional reaction to what he considered slighting remarks by Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, in a conversation with GoebbeLs . 97 953er. 1521-LL:3/G.B. 438-2. 20 July 1933. 96Davis to Hull, Oct. 14 1933, raus., 1933, 1, 265. 97Dodd (Ambassador in Berlin) to Hull, Oct. 17, Oct. 18, Oct. 20 1933, FRUS., 1933, I, 235-289, 291-292. Also lv'Zesser- smith (Consul general Berlin) to Hull, Nov. 3 1933, ibid., 320 In Spite of the German action, the general feeling in the conference was that negotiations should continue.93 It was wishful thinking, for after October 14 he conference was practically at an end, although some discussions continued for a time thereafter. It would be easy to place the blame for the collapse of the conference on Germany's withdrawal, but in fact it is not possible to assign resoonsibility to any one nation. French insistence upon a strong preponderance of armed might over Germany had much to do with the failure to achieve limitations upon land armaments, while Japan's attitude did much to prevent the adeption of the naval pro- posal of the MacDonald Plan. In fact, the failure of the conference is primarily attributable to the developments in the general international situation after 1931--a situation wherein it was becoming increasingly evident that relations among nations were not improving, that for the most part the deterioration was not caused by the existence of an arms race, and that the world was moving in the direction of war rather than away from it. 98Davis to Hull, Oct. 19 1933, ibid., pp. 289-290. CHAPTER VIII THE REVIVAL OF NAVAL EXPANSION. The coming of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the White House proved to be the turning point for the fortunes of the Navy. Nowhere in the history of presidential administrations was there so complete a reversal of attitude toward the Navy and its problems than now took place. As has been seen, Hoover enjoyed the worst possible relationship with the Navy, but in Roosevelt's case the relationship was smoother and much.more fruitful from the Navy's vieWpoint. It was ex- pected that Roosevelt would be more sympathetic toward the Navy's problems than Hoover had been, since Roosevelt's ten- ure as Assistant Secretary of the Navy during World War I had brought him into close contact with naval problems in general and with the naval officer's outlook in particular. As Assistant Secretary he had indicated his belief that the United States Navy should ultimately be equal to the largest navy in the world,1 and nothing in his subsequent career had indicated that the ideal had been abandoned. 0n the other hand, his later career had not been connected with naval matters but had dealt more with matters of practical bread-and-butter politics arising out of the coming of the 1Davis, A Nagy Second £2 None, p. 357. 321 (.0 N to Great Depression. Thus as Roosevelt entered office on March 4, 1933, it was not certainly known whether his earlier sympathy toward the Navy would assert itself or whether he would see the economic disaster into which the nation had fallen as had his predecessor and would continue attempts to bring about recovery by measures of economy at the Navy's expense. It was generally assumed that Roosevelt would not attempt to emulate Hoover's policies, since these seemed to have done no good and since the often-voiced promise of a "New Deal" implied a new line of attack on the problems of the depress- ion. Yet Roosevelt's initial statements and actions were strangely disquieting to naval men and their supporters, as they seemed to indicate a preoccupation with.measures which sought to reduce expenses and to balance the budget--measures for which the Hoover administration had become notorious, and which had brought the Navy to the brink of complete dis- organization. WARSHIPS AS PUBLIC WORKS: THE NAVY AND THE NEW DEAL. As it turned out, however, Roosevelt's concern with cost cutting and budget balancing was only temporary. Far less committed to budgetary conservatism as a principle than his predecessor, Roosevelt was soon persuaded of the necessity )1) LI [ill .11..qu x ,‘ . .14“ 323 for large scale programs of unemployment relief, public works and aid to business, which required deficit spending. Public works programs, which had been used to an extent by Hoover, were particularly favored as the best means of direct spend- ing by governments to promote recovery, since they provided both unemployment relief and the construction of needed buildings, parks, roads and other benefits to the public at large. Public works spending also avoided the criticism of "subsidizing idleness", which was so much directed at programs for direct relief. An important question, from the Navy's point of view, was: what constituted public works? That roads, playgrounds, courthouses and the like were public works had long been accepted. But why could not warship construction be so con- sidered? To some there was not and could not be any connect- ion between a destroyer and a municipal building, but to others there was no great difference. If the construction of a new city hall during a time of depression was valuable primarily as a means of putting money into the hands of con- tractors and construction workers, and secondarily as a sound means of increasing the efficiency of city government, then a new destroyer could be viewed as being valuable pri- :marily as a means of aiding the shipbuilding industry and shipyard workers and secondarily as an addition to the Navy's Ineans of protecting national security--which was after all an important public function. K4 324 As has been stated earlier, the Secretary of the Navy used the argument that warships were good public works in his testimony to the Senate Naval Affairs Committee on the occa- sion of their discussion of the 1932 bills for the increase of the Navy. At that time the idea had been brushed aside, but now with a Chief Executive dedicated to finding novel ways to stimulate employment the concept took root. The principle was first established in section 202 of the Nation- al Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933. By the terms of that law the Federal Emergency Administrator of Public Works was required to submit to the President a program of public works projects, including the construction of naval vessels and naval aircraft.2 That same day President Roose- velt, in Executive Order 6174, authorized the Federal Emer- gency Administrator to allot $238,000,000 "to the Department of the Navy for the construction of certain vessels," . . .3 Later additional funds were granted for the construction of aircraft and for public works projects at several naval bases, 4 air stations and other shore facilities. After recovering from.their surprise at this complete 2Q5§.s;atuces, XLVIII, pt. 1, p. 201. 3Federal Emergency Administration of Public WOrks, Prin- cipal Acts and Executive Orders Pertaining to Public Works Kamifiistration (Washington, 1938), p. 63. 4g.§.§tatutes, XLVIII, pt. 1, p. 1055. 325 reversal of the Navy's fortunes, the naval planners lost no time in developing a program. Earlier the General Board had recommended that Congress should immediately enact legis- lation to authorize the construction of 2 aircraft carriers, 7 light cruisers, 47 destroyers and 18 submarines.5 With the funds provided by the NRA program, both carriers, three of the cruisers, twenty destroyers and four submarines were promptly contracted for and most of them laid down by the end of the year. In addition, one of the heavy cruisers previously authorized was commenced with NRA funds. Naval leaders were elated. There is no question that the NRA shipbuilding program marks the turning point in the Navy's fortunes and the end of the long period of general decline following the signing of the Washington Treaty. After mid-1933 the direction of naval building was toward an ever-greater eXpansion. The combination of the growing xnilitancy of Japan in the Far East, the mounting suspicions about Hitler in EurOpe, the fruitless negotiations of the disarmament conferenCe at Geneva, the acceptance of the idea that warship construction was an important part of economic .recovery, and above all the accession of a chief executive ‘who was interested in naval eXpansion, produced a remarkable .naval renaissance which moved at such a pace as to make the 5Ser. 1619/G.B. 420-2, 10 May 1933. ' U) [\3 O\ "unreasonable" demands of big Navy advocates in 1931 look picayune ten years later. The immediate results of the NRA program were dramatic. Less than a year after the allocation of funds by Roosevelt's A order the General Board submitted recommendations for the 1936 building program which by comparison with the general pessimistic tone of previous recommendations positively glowed with enthusiasm. The NRA program, it said, was of inestimable value in strengthening the Navy. As a result of it "a material change in the naval situation. . .has been made and a substantial beginning of the attainment of treaty strength has been accomplished."6 The NRA program mightily influenced naval eXpansion for approximately four years, during which time it provided a large portion of the funds which were expended upon ship construction and upon improve- ment of shore facilities, actually fendering unnecessary in- creases of regular appropriations, which might have been much more difficult to push through successive Congresses. Not only was the program a success from the point of view of strengthening American naval power, it was also a success as a public works concept to alleviate unemployment. The House Committee on Appropriations reported that the funds allocated during the first six months of the program totalled $274,765,900, of which $238,000,000 was for ship construction 68er. 1659/G.B. 429-2, 9 May 1934. and the rest for procuring aircraft and improving shore fa- cilities. This large sum, it stated, had had many bene- ficial effects on employment, since nearly ninety percent of the sum represented wages to labor. In fact, "it is questionable if any better way existed for complying with the spirit of the National Industrial Recovery Act of getting money into the hands of wage earners in return for valuable useful services rendered". .7 No longer would Congress as a whole question the allegation that the Navy needed to be eXpanded, or that funds expended on warships was money wasted. It was a remarkable transformation. The only dissonant notes came from abroad. In January, 1933, the Japanese had announced a new naval replenishment law to provide their fleet with an aircraft carrier, a light cruiser, seven destroyers and six submarines. As of that time there was every likelihood that the Japanese would enter the conference scheduled to be held in 1935 under the terms of the London and Washington treaties with substantial parity with the United States in underage tonnage in every category except battleships. In that case their position would be very strong, for eXperience in naval conferences indicated that tonnage in being was likely to be the basis of any agreements reached, and thus the Japanese might be able 7House Report no. 335, 73rd. Cong., 2nd sess. (Washing- ton, 1934) pp. 4-5. 328 successfully to advance a claim for equality in ratios. Un- fortunately for them, the NRA program seriously endangered their hOpes. Spurred by the expansion of American building, the Japanese hastened to augment their naval construction with another program announced in July, 1933, which authorized the laying down of another carrier, another light cruiser, and seven destroyers.8 It was evident that Japanese-American naval relations were about to enter a critical phase. The Ambassador in Tokyo reported that it was futile to try to negotiate with the Japanese. "The necessity of self-defense, the conviction of the legitimacy of their action on the con- tinent, the sting of naval inferiority, the determination to brook no interference in Asiatic affairs, are not susceptible to logical treatment nor to adjustment over conference tables."9 It was a prophetic remark. The British were also concerned over the new American building program; however, they viewed it not so much a direct threat to them as a portent of a new naval armaments race. They warned the Americans that the situation could easily lead to another naval competition, this time in a new type of naval vessel--the 10,000 ton light cruiser. The Brit- ish pointed out that they had no ships of this type and would be forced to build them if the United States persisted in its 8Grew to Hull, July 26 1933, FRUS,1933, 1, 380-382. 91pm. , p. 382. . a'w"' M": 329 course of action. They urged the Americans to suSpend their cruiser program if the Japanese would agree to do the same. The American government replied that the Navy was simply try- ing to build to treaty strength in a type of ship which was better suited to American needs than was a smaller vessel. Furthermore, it was pointed out, the London treaty was not being violated in any way, and the British were reminded that the United States had never questioned the right of the Brit- ish to build as they chose within treaty restrictions. The Americans went ahead with their program; eventually nine 10,000 ton heavily armed light cruisers were built by 1940.12 Their construction did provide an added impetus to the ex- pansion programs of most of the naval powers after 1933. It is significant that the Japanese light cruisers laid down after that year were of the large type, while the British, as they had feared, felt themselves required to build a sub- stantial portion of their cruiser tonnage between 1934 and 1939 in vessels which approached 10,000 tons diSplacement. 10Aide-memoire of British Embassy to Department of State, 14 1933, ibid., pp. 382-383. 11Memorandum of Department of State to British Embassy, Sept. 22 1933, ibid., pp. 386-388. It is ironic that it was primarily the British insistence at London that the United States agree to subdivide the cruiser category into two types which was the cause of the creation of the new "heavy" light Sept. cruisers. 12Brooklyn and St. Louis classes, mounting fifteen 6 inch guns and capable of 32 knots. 330 TOWARD A TREATY NAVY: THE VINSON-TRAMMELL ACT OF 1934. The NRA program, important though it was as evidence of a new resurgence of naval expansion, was but the beginning of a series of laws to build the Navy up to--and after 1937, well beyond-~the limits stipulated by the naval treaties. Under NRA the public works aspect of naval construction had been emphasized; mow the big navy men believed that the time had come to develop a building program explicitly directed toward the objective of reaching treaty tonnage quotas. The impetus provided to ship construction by the NRA fund allocations was never lost. In March, 1934, the regular Naval ApprOpriations Act provided $27,342,000 to commence the construction of a heavy cruiser and three light cruisers previously authorized by the 1929 Act.13 The Navy's recommendations for the 1936 program had already been presented to Congress in the form of Senate bill 81154, but when a number of the vessels re- quested were laid down under the NRA program, the revision of the recommendations made a new bill necessary. The new bill, $2493, authorized the construction of all remaining tonnage necessary to reach treaty strength in underage vessels by 1937--one carrier of 15,000 tons, 99,200 tons of destroyers, and 35,530 tons of submarines, this entire tonnage being for replacements. In addition, the bill provided for the increase of naval aviation to 2184 aircraft, more than doubling its 13H.§.Statutes, XLVIII, pt. 1, 421. 331 existing strength.14 Senate bill 82493 was not passed, however. 'On January 9, 1934, a practically identical bill had been introduced in the House by Carl Vinson, chairman of the House Naval 15 Affairs Committee. His previous attempts to persuade Con- gress to authorize a treaty navy had not been successful, but that had been two years before. Now the time seemed pro- pitious and Vinson made the most of the Opportunity. The bill was reported favorably on January 24 by his committee. The report stated it was time for a definite long range build- ing policy to be inaugurated. The adoption of a definite naval policy will permit an orderly building program in the future. Such a building program will not only be more eco- nomical but it will also contribute to better de- signs, better workmanship, less disruption of in- dustry, and will keep the national defense on a higher level than is possible under the old waste- ful methods of building a navy by alternate Spasms of intense activity and practically complete idle- ness. The cost of the contemplated program was estimated at $380,- 1 329,000, beginning in fiscal 1935. 7 The report eXpressed q 14U.S.Senate Naval Affairs Committee, Hearing pp 32493: Construction 2; Certain Naval Vessels 2E the Limits Prescribed gy the Treaties Signed at Washington and Lgpdon, 73rd Cong., nd sess. (Washington, T9347, p. I. Hereafter cited as Hear- ing 23 32493. 1595, LXXVIII, 295. 16House Report 338, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1934), p. 2. - \ 17H.L. Roosevelt (Asst. Sec. of Navy) to Vinson, Jan. 20 1934, Annex to ibid. . (.0 LO f0 perfectly the arguments which the General Board had been advancing for years. It was assumed that the bill, although it did not prescribe any schedule for the laying of keels, would establish a program which could be substantially com- pleted by 1942.18 The Vinson bill set off long and intense debate in the House. The supporters of the bill emphasized the threatening world situation and the relatively weak position of the United States Navy compared to the Japanese Navy, which was practi- cally at treaty strength in underage vessels. Vinson himself argued persuasively of the necessity for building to treaty strength and of the importance of an orderly program.19 Others pointed to what they considered the failure of the naval trea- ties to limit armaments,20 and to the fact that the bill did not appropriate a penny of funds, but merely authorized build- ing.21 Several dissenters put up a spirited battle, stating that the Navy as then constituted was adequate for defense and that many of the vessels, though average, would actually 22 be effective for several more years. Others expressed con- 18Vinson's statement in 93, LXXVIII, 1622. 191bid., pp. 1597-98. 20Drewry (Va.), ibid., pp. 1601-02. ZlBritten (111.), ibid., p. 1591. 1 22Frear (Wis.), Collins (Miss.), ibid., pp. 1606-07, 16 6. 333 cern that the United States Spent more money on its Navy than any other country did, and they claimed large naval expendi- tures were quite wrong when so many in the country cried for relief.23 One attempt by Hastings of Oklahoma to establish a limit for future Spending under the bill was voted down.24 One ingenious argument expressed was that a large building program would be disadvantageous to us at the next naval con- ference, since we might then be required to scrap large amounts of tonnage as we did after the Washington Conference.25 The opposition Spoke in vain. A large majority was determined upon naval expansion at that time, and on January 30 the bill was passed by voice vote.26 In the House, although the opposition had been vocal, there had been little question that the bill would be passed, but in the Senate the situation was somewhat different. Though a large majority of senators favored the bill--or per- haps because of it--attempts were set afoot to prevent the Vinson bill from coming to~a vote. For nearly a month efforts of Trammell, the chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, to bring the measure to the floor were unsuccessful, although his committee reported the bill favorably with some amend- 23Biermann (Iowa), Shoemaker (Minn.), Sisson (N.Y.), ibid., pp. 1602-03, 1623’ 16210 241bid., pp. 1593-94, 1626-27, 25Ayres (Kan.), ibid., p. 1618. 26Ibid., p. 1630. 334 ments.27 Trammell feared a possible filibuster, but finally succeeded in getting the bill to the floor on March 5.28 Frazier and Nye of North Dakota, and King of Utah led the opposition. All the old arguments heard in the House were heard again in the halls of the Senate,29 and a few new ones were presented as well. Nye and Borah introduced the theme of the greedy munitions makers, claiming that passage of the bill would start another naval race which could only benefit the arms manufacturers.30 Walsh of Massachusetts took the lead in defending the bill, pointing out that it was designed to remedy a bad situation. He noted that as of December 31, 1936, when the Washington and London treaties would expire, the United States would be 102 ships short of treaty strength in underage tonnage, Great Britain would be short but 64 ships, while Japan would be up to full treaty strength. The Vinson bill would authorize the 102 ship deficit to be built.31 27Ibid., pp. 2248, 2391, 2582, 2728, 2867; Senate Report 248, 73rd Cong. 2nd sess. (Washington, 1934). 2895, LXXVIII, 3409-3491. 291bid., pp. 3494-95, 3681, 3682, 3686-87. 301bid., pp. 3689-90, 3783-85. 31Ibid., p. 3807. An interesting point was made by Ship- stead of Minnesota, who asserted that consistency would re- quire those senators who voted for the London Treaty to vote also for the Vinson bill, since the latter was designed to carry out the terms of the former. .Shipstead, at least, was consistent. His voice was against both treaty and bill. Ibid. p. 3808. L 1.} b) U1 The next day, the Senate passed the Vinson bill by a vote of 65-18.32 With the passage of Vinson's measure, Trammell's original bill, S2493, was shelved. Since the Senate had amended the Vinson measure, a con- ference of members of the two houses had to work out a com- promise. The disagreements did not concern the basic prin- ciple of the bill--the authorization of tonnage necessary to reach treaty strength--but the questions of what proportion of the tonnage should be built in private shipyards and what measures should be taken to insure that private yards did not extract undue profits from their contracts. In the Senate hearing on Trammell's original bill, these questions had re- ceived far more attention than had the more fundamental question of the sanction of large scale naval expansion; only three witnesses, members of the National Council for the Prevention of War, had voiced concern over the big Navy im- 33 After considerable discussion a plications of the bill. compromise bill was agreed upon by both houses34 and was signed into law by President Roosevelt on March 27, 1934. q 32Ibid., pp. 3813-14. The opposition was concentrated among senators from the Plains and Mountain States. Both Senators from North Dakota, Idaho, Utah, and Iowa voted against the bi. 1]. 0 33These were Frederick J. Libby, executive secretary of the organization, Jeanette Rankin, associate secretary and Laura P. Morgan, a prominent member. Hearings pp 82493, assim. 34$enate Doc. 157, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1934); QR, LXXVIII, 5116, 5174. 336 As finally passed, the Vinson-Trammell Act consisted of several parts. Its main provision authorized the President to begin construction of one aircraft carrier of 15,000 tons to replace the obsolete Langley, and an additional 99,200 tons of destroyers and 35,500 tons of submarines. It also gave the President authority to replace overage tonnage in all categories and to build all aircraft necessary for the expanded fleet. Other provisions included: a requirement that the first ship and every succeeding alternate vessel in each category--except the carrier--was to be built in a government shipyard; another requirement that private ship- yards accepting contracts under the Act should allow their books to be inSpected periodically and that their profit should not exceed 10 percent; and a final provision that in the event of an agreement to limit armaments, the President could suSpend further construction, provided that ships laid down before the passage of the act could be completed.35 The Vinson-Trammell Act was a momentous event in the history of American naval policy. Its main provision would, if fully carried out in construction, add 102 warships to the fleet, mostly replacement destroyers and submarines. The provision allowing the President to build replacement tonnage in all categories cleared the way for the replacement of all ten Omahas and all the battleships as soon as they became 3511-3 flaunt-es. an, pt. 1. 503-504. (.0 L0 N overage beginning in 1935. But most important of all, for the first time Congress had approved the Navy's desire to build to treaty limits within a relatively short time, if not by the end of 1936, and had served notice to the other naval powers that the United States was committed to naval expansion as long as other nations were so committed and as long as no further effective limitation of naval armaments was agreed upon. The General Board was enthusiastic. The Vinson-Trammell Act, together with the funds provided by the NRA program and the Naval Appropriations Act of March 15, 1934, dramatically solved practically all the problems in develOping an effect- ive building program which naval planners had been struggling to overcome for a decade. The Board announced triumphantly that under such conditions "it therefore appears that the construction of a treaty Navy, including replacements for ships becoming overage, is fully authorized."36 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VINSON-TRANMELL ACT. The new act had immediate effects. For one thing, the rapid expansion in numbers of ships and aircraft which the act portended meant that shortages of personnel, especially officer personnel, would soon appear unless dealt with prompt- ly. Aviation officers, in chronically short supply, caused 36Ser. 1659/G.B. 420-2, 9 May 1934. D.) (a) C 3 the most immediate concern. A special board of the Bureau of Navigation investigated the situation and reported that some kind of organization supplementing the Naval Academ would probably be necessary in order to provide enough flying 37 personnel. Eventually a naval aviation cadet corps was established, whose members were university graduates who went directly into a one-year program of flight training, followed by three years active duty. Upon completion of his tour of duty, each cadet was eligible for a lieutenant's commission in the Naval Reserve.33 It was a stopgap, but an effective one.39 Taking full advantage of its new-found initiative, the Navy forged ahead. For fiscal 1936 the General Board re- commended that funds to begin the construction of two cruisers authorized in 1929 should be apprOpriated, as well as funds for a carrier, fifteen destroyers and six submarines under the Vinson-Trammell Act.4O Their'recommendation was enacted into law in the Naval Appropriation Act of June 24, 1935, which also provided $94,310,000 for the continuation of work on fourteen destroyers and six submarines begun a year 37 p. 291. 381bid., pp. 293-295. Turnbull and Lord, Histogy g§,g.§. Naval Aviation, 39"Hearings of the General Board", 1937, II, pp. 315-313- 405er. 1659/G.B. 420-2, 9 May 1934. (.10 {-0 \D earlier.41 From the Navy's point of view the situation was now well in hand. With no pressing needs for new warships to construct, the members of the General Board felt that the time was Opportune to present Congress with a long deferred program to construct a number of naval auxiliaries. No minesweepers, oilers, storeships or transports had been added to the fleet for over a decade, and the shortage in vital service ships such as these was beginning to be felt keenly, especially since the number of warships in the fleet was rapidly increasing. In its recommendations for the 1937 building program the Board noted that if the bill then before Congress42 were passed, the Navy would be able to achieve treaty tonnages in underage aircraft carriers and cruisers, but needed more destroyers and submarines to replace overage tonnage. It also pointed out that the expiration of the naval treaties would soon allow replacement battleships to be built. Accordingly it recommended that a 35,000 ton battleship, twelve destroyers, six submarines, three mine- sweepers and a seaplane tender be authorized for fiscal 1937.43 Actually, it was not until after the expiration of the trea- ties that the Board recommended a really extensive program ' 44 of construction of naval auxiliaries, but by 1935 the naval 41 42 above. Q.§.Statutes, XLIX, pt. 1, 417. The Appropriation Act of June 24 1935, referred to 43Ser. 1686/G.B. 420-2, 24 May 1935. 44See below, p. 340 planners could at least feel free to consider the possibili— ties. Feeling themselves in a considerably strong er position, both in a military sense and in a political sense, naval officers began to recommend a stronger international stance. Not as fearful of Japanese reaction as they had been in 1932 and early 1933, when the main battle fleet had been removed from the Pacific in order to calm Japan and to avoid a possi- ble collision for which the Navy did not feel itself ready, naval strategists determined on a bold show for Japan's benefit. The fleet had returned to the Pacific in late 1933, and in early 1935 the Navy announced that the yearly fleet exercises, which had usually been held in the waters im- mediately around Hawaii or off the West Coast, would be held that year in the waters north and west of Hawaii and off the Aleutians.45 An attacking fleet coming from the north and west would attempt to occupy the outlying islands of the Hawaiian chain as bases for a direct attack upon Pearl Harbor. The maneuvers would test the defenses of Pearl Harbor and the ability of the fleet to take the strategic offensive, as wellas to provide training in joint landing Operations.46 The 4SJniji Kasai, The United States and Japan in the Pacific: American Naval Maneuvers and Ja anTs PaelficP Policy (Tokyo, , pp. 14-15. This work reflected the growing Japanese concern over the revival of United States naval power in the Pacific. 46 No. A16-3/FPXVl/5179, Commander in Chief File, p9. 3-4. Japanese could not fail to be thoroughly alarmed over these maneuvers, which in their final phase in mid-May ranged in the waters around Midway right up to the International Date Line. In addition, the Navy showed evidence of wishing to construct facilities at Midway, for President Roosevelt announced that several islands between Midway and Guam were being transferred from the jurisdiction of the Interior 47 and bills were introduced Department to that of the Navy, in Congress to appropriate funds for the construction of harbor facilities at Wake and Midway.48 Japanese protests availed them nothing, however, and eventually they had to content themselves with staging their own maneuvers in the fall of 1935 much farther eastward than was customary. The firm stand of the Navy with regard to Japan was not necessarily to be taken as evidence that a strong Far Eastern naval policy had been decided upon. On the contrary, 1935 was a year of indecision regarding the Philippines. The passage of the Tydings-MacDuffie Act pledging independence for the Philippines within ten years forced a re-examination of the problem of Philippines defense, eSpecially after independence was granted. The General Board believed that the United States should maintain bases in the Philippines whether the islands became independent or not, for the up- 47 48 New Ybrk Times, Jan. 20 1935, p. 2. pg, LXXIX, 3777. 342 holding of American rights in the Far East depended upon an American military presence there. Without Philippines bases our whole Far Eastern policy would collapse.49 Another question related to the location of the bases. If the Filipinos would not allow bases in the Manila Bay area to be retained, as seemed likely, others would have to be provided. The Board recommended investigation and reservation of several likely areas in the central and southern Philip- pines,50 in addition to development of others at Kiska, Samoa, and Guam.51 Later it appeared that Roosevelt, while approving of the inclusion in the Philippines Independence Act of provisions guaranteeing American base rights, was not at all certain of their value. Replying to the Navy's re- quest to reserve base areas as desired by the General Board, Roosevelt stated that if Philippine independence were granted it would not be possible to maintain bases there. "From the point of view of naval strategy alone, I would consider such a base in an independent territory a military-naval liability instead of an asset."52 A War Plans Division study indicated that Roosevelt's fears were well founded. A naval base in an independent 493er. 1683/G.B. 404, 16 Apr. 1935. 501b1d. , SlSer. 1683-1/G.B. 404, 22 Apr. 1935. 52Memorandum, Roosevelt to Swanson, May 3 1935, ercL.in Ser. 1688/G.B. 404, 3 June 1935. 343 Philippines would force us to maintain a large fleet and army there at enormous cost and would be liable to capture soon after the outbreak of a war with Japan. It would be better to abandon the Philippines and develop the line Alaska-Oahu-Panama as our strategic peacetime frontier in the Pacific.53 What such a move would mean in terms of American Far Eastern policy was not indicated. The General Board remained steadfast however, and the division within the Navy and in other branches of the government over the problem of the Philippines continued for some time thereafter. The time was approaching when the conference to revise or to extend the London and Washington agreements was supposed to meet. It was evident that the Americans, not being in a position of Superiority, as at Washington, nor in a substan- tially inferior position, as at London, would approach the forthcoming conference with a sizeable fleet under construct- ion, most of it laid down in the years since 1932. In just slightly more than two years, between February 1932 and March 1934, the number of carriers under construction had risen from one to three, cruisers from seven to nine, destroyers . 54 from five to thirty-two, and submarines from three to five. SBSecret study dated 2 Dec. 1935 with two appendices, incl. in Ser. 1688/G.B. 404, 3 June 1935. 54Tables in U. S. Senate, Naval Affairs Committee, gam- arative Stren th of Treaty Navies, 72nd Cong., lst sess. EWasEington, ); and same title, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1934). 344 The Americans it seemed, would not be intimidated and would not be persuaded to recede from principles which American naval experts, who were more likely to be heeded now than formerly, considered to be vital to the interests of the United States. CHAPTER IX THE FINAL EFFORT AT LIMITATION: THE SECOND LONDON CONFERENCE. History may not repeat itself but sometimes gives the appearance of doing so. In 1926 the obvious inability of the Preparatory Commission to prepare a basis for an inter- national conference on naval armaments limitation had led to an attempt by the naval powers to come to agreement in negotiations strictly among themselves outside the auSpices of the League of Nations. Although the Geneva Conference of 1927 had been barren of concrete results, its failure had been primarily because of the lack of preliminary agreement to serve as a basis for negotiation. The London Conference of 1930 had shown the value of such preliminary discussion as a means of helping to insure the success of netotiations at a regular conference. By 1933 the failure of the General Disarmament Conference at Geneva was manifest to all but confirmed Optimists. Accordingly the naval powers began to plan for another conference to try to solve purely naval problems, and as a means of facilitating agreement they held a number of exploratory discussions--a situation which looks remarkably similar to that in the period preceding the Naval Conference at London in 1930. Appearances are often de- ceiving, however, and particularly so in this case. It must be remembered that whereas the 1926 sessions of the Prepara- 345 tory Commission were a direct cause of the 1927 Geneva Conference, the 1935 conference held at London was not direct- ly the result of the failure at the 1932 Geneva Conference. The second London Conference would have been held in any case, since it was specifically related to the Washington and London treaties; those treaties would expire in 1936, and the London Treaty had provided that a conference to consider revision or extension of the treaties should be convened not later than one year previous to the expiration date. There was another noticeable difference between the conditions leading to the Naval Conference<1f 1935 and those preceding the 1927 and 1930 conferences. In the latter cases relationships among the nations, while lacerated by occasional outbursts of annoyance and expressions of suSpicion, were not fundamentally hostile. Unfortunately, such was not the case in 1935. The fundamental problem by that time was the marked deterioration of relations between Japan on one hand, and Great Britain and the United States on the other. The in- fluence of the military groups in the Japanese government had grown to an alraming extent after September, 1931, as first the Army and later the Navy had come increasingly to favor an aggressive policy on the mainland of Asia. As early as mid-September 1931, even before the outbreak of trouble in Manchuria, there were signs that the Japanese would in- sist upon a favorable revision of the naval ratios and might even advance a claim for absolute equality with the American 347 and British fleets.1 At the Geneva Conference the Japanese did not claim equality but did advance a demand for ratios approaching equality in their proposals in November, 1932. By the fall of 1933, after Germany's withdrawal from a con- ference already doomed, the indications were that the Japanese government would oppose vehemently any concessions unaccept- able to the Japanese Navy and that their delegation at the forthcoming conference would yield very little.2 Within the Navy itself, opinion against the maintenance of the treaty ratios was practically unanimous, since the officers who had approved of the London Treaty had been eased out of important positions or had resigned by 1934.3 The official Japanese attitude appeared not to consider that the conference would have much chance of success unless the naval ratios were altered in Japan's favor or eliminated completely. Foreign Minister Hirota's statement to the Diet at the end of Janu- ary, 1934, indicated as much when he stated: "It is also very doubtful whether a disarmament agreement based on ratios will contribute to world peace."4 Japanese naval officers 1Grew’to Stimson, Sept. 15 1931, SDSOO.A15 A5/7. 2Grew to Hull, Oct. 30 1933, SD500.A15A5/11. 3Grew to Hull, Jan. 22 1934, {BUS , 1223, I, 218-219. 4As quoted in Grew to Hull, Feb. 1 1934, SD500.A15A5/21. - Uri-c.“ 348 Spoke more bluntly. One of them, Vice Admiral Takahashi, told the assistant naval attache in Tokyo, "We are going to the 1935 conference with a demand for parity. If our demand is rejected, we shall return home." THE DECISION TO HOLD PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS. In the face of Japan's increasing militancy and un- willingness any longer to tolerate restrictions which left the Japanese Navy in what it considered to be an inferior position, the Americans and the British found themselves drawing closer together and minimizing their differences in order to present a common front against Japanese demands. As soon as the Japanese attitude became generally known, both governments began to speak seriously of cooperation. As early as December 1933, American and British officials recognized the necessity of c00peration in the sense of resolving the differences over naval disarmament separating the two countries.6 By March, 1934, the British had taken the initiative in proposing that secret talks should be held. It was vitally important, MacDonald said, that Japan not be 5Grew to Hull, Jan. 22, 1934, FRUS., 1934, I, 219. _ 6Memorandumby Moffatt (Asst. Sec. for European Affairs), Dec.115 1933; Atherton to Hull, Jan. 29 1934, SD500.A15A5/ 6, 9. 349 allowed parity with the British and American navies. A spirit of c00peration had to be fostered between the Americans and the British, and this could best be done by the recon- ciliation of points of difference. As far as MacDonald was concerned, the most important difference was that involving the size and gun power of battleships.7 Believing that American refusal to hold exploratory talks with the British might lead to an Anglo-Japanese rapprgchement, Hull approved the idea that preliminary talks should be held first with the British, after which the Japanese could be brought into the discussions.8 Others within the State Department thought the opportunity for U. S.- British cooperation particularly good at that time, and that the British were not at all likely to seek an understanding with the Japanese. Stanley K. HOrnbeck, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, believed that the time for concessions to Japan was past, and the only chance for American policy in the Far East lay in a strong policy, backed by an extensive program of naval construction. He stated: The maximum of insurance which we can take out against injury to ourselves by and from Japan lies along the line of naval construction. . .The soundest course for us to take lies on the line of possessing naval strength such that Japan will not A— w w—r 7Davis to F. D. Roosevelt, March 6 1934, FRUS, 1934, I, 226-229. _8Hull to Davis, May 24 1934, SD500.A15A5/59. dars to take the risk of resort to force against us. Since our naval strength was not yet strong enough to enable us to defy Japan, cooperation with the British was a necessity. We must refuse Japan's demand for parity, even if it means no conference. In fact, "we should welcome non-convening of the conference. We should welcome lapsing of the existing agreements."10 Hornbeck's view was not the official attitude of the State Department, but it did indicate the growing be- lief in American official circles outside the Navy that Japan was an increasing threat which could best be countered by a bold naval policy. On the same day Hornbeck wrote his memorandum, President Roosevelt was developing the basic principles which should be advanced by the American delegation at the preliminary discussions. He thought that simplicity was the key to success; rather than bogging down in the technicalities of qualitative limitation, it would be best to concentrate on quantitative limitations. He suggested reductions of 25 per- cent from existing tonnages, or if that was not acceptable then perhaps an extension of existing tonnages should be proposed.11 9Memorandum by Hornbeck, May 24 1934, SD500.A15A5/159. lolbid. 11Memorandum by Phillips, May 24 1934, FRUS., 1934, I, 237‘238 o 351 Once it had been decided to hold preliminary conver- sations, a problem immediately arose. How could the British and Americans hold bilateral talks in such a way as to avoid arousing Japanese suSpicions of a secret understanding? If they kept the talks secret, as the British originally de- sired, they could hardly avoid an affront to Japan. On the other hand, too much publicity would make it more difficult for an Anglo-American understanding to be reached. Some officials on both sides of the Atlantic probably considered the promise of cooperation to be worth the risk of Japanese displeasure, but Hull was not so inclined. He questioned the advisability of secret talks and persuaded the British to go along with a strategy in which the talks would be announced as dealing with procedural matters; once under way they would not be kept secret, but neither would they be unduly publicized.12 When the Japanese were asked to approve the holding of bilateral talks between the Americans and the British they replied that the procedure was acceptable as long as only procedural matters were discussed.13 The Japan- ese would not be in a position to discuss technical questions until their naval delegates arrived in London, which would not be possible before July.14 The Japanese press was in- 12Hull to Bingham (Ambassador in London), May 24 1934, SDSOO.A15A5/61/ 13Grew to Hull, May 31 1934, FRUS., 1934,1, 242-243. 14Bingham to Hull, June 8 1934, ibid., pp. 246- 247. Ac- tually, the Japanese did not arrive until October. 352 clined to suspect British and American motives, but among many Japanese it did not really make much difference whether the western powers adOpted a common front against Japan or not. Japan would not be overawed. The QEEEE.&§2§1 of May 26 said: "There was once a time when Japan bowed before force, but the United States and other Powers are grossly mistaken if they think Japan can still be intimidated."15 Meanwhile, it was evident that officials in Great Britain were divided over the question of the advisability of bilateral talks. While MacDonald eXpressed the official vieWpoint, a number of important personages in government, headed by Neville Chamberlain, believed that a show of solidarity by the British and Americans would simply antago- nize the Japanese and jeopardize the chances of success of the conference. They did not believe that the Japanese would press their claim for naval equality when they realized the enormous cost of the construction program necessary to achieve parity.16 At the preliminary discussions, however, the reins were in MacDonald's hands, and British policy became even more clearly directed toward a closer Anglo-American tie by the removal of as many points of difference as possible. lsGrew to Hull, June 12 1934, SDSOO.A15A5/146. 16Bingham to Hull, May 2 1934, FRUS., 193$, I, 232-233. ANGLO-AMERICAN PRELIMINARY CONVERSATIONS. The Anglo-American preliminary conversations began on June 18, 1934, in London. MacDonald led the British dele- gation, whose other important membersvnnmaSir Bolton Eyres- Monsell, First Lord of the Admiralty, Vice Admiral C. J. C. Little, the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, and R. L. Craigie, Counsellor of the Foreign Office. The American delegation was headed by Norman Davis--by now an old hand at naval disarmament talks--supported by Robert Bingham, the American Ambassador, Rear Admiral R. H. Leigh, the Chairman of the General Board, and Raymond Atherton, Secretary of the Ameri- can Embassy. The first meeting succeeded in establishing a basis of understanding between the delegations. It was agreed that both nations stood for the maintenance of the principles of the Washington Treaty, that neither nation believed Japan should be granted an increase in ratios be- yond present limits, and that conversations would be kept secret from all other nations save Japan. Information given Japan would first be agreed upon by both governments. At the second meeting on June 20, the delegates came to grips with the real problem. An Anglo-American understanding depended upon settling outstanding naval differences between “—— “‘7 17"Corrected Minutes of Naval Conversations", June 18 1934, SD500.A15A5/145. Hereafter cited as "Corr. Min." with . date. the two countries, chief among which was the disagreement over the permissible maximum size and gun power of battle- ships. The American position ever since 1922 had been that the probable wartime role of the Navy in the Pacific required large battleships of maximum power, and that the Washington limitations on the size of battleships represented the mini- mum to which they could agree. The British had favored smaller battleships with guns as small in size as 12 inches. At the meeting on June 20 the issue was faced squarely when the British presented their general proposals which they wished to see considered at the conference. First, they said they wished to see the tonnage and maximum size of main battery guns of battleships reduced. Second, they proposed that no more heavy cruisers should be built; and third, they suggested that the total number of 10,000 ton light cruisers should not exceed ten each for the United States and Great Britain and six for Japan, with smaller cruisers limited to a maximum displacement of 7,000 tons and no nation's total cruiser tonnage exceeding 491,800 tons.18 To follow up their general proposals, a meeting of naval delegates was held the next day, at which time the British elaborated and eXpanded their proposals, as follows: W- Maximum tonnage should be 25,000, with guns no larger than 12 inches. 18"Corr. Min.", June 20 1934. 355 Aircraft Carriers. A total tonnage limit of 110,000 tons, 25,000 tons less than prescribed under the Washington Treaty. No carrier would exceed 22,000 tons or mount guns larger than 4.7 inches. Cruisers. British needs called for more cruisers than the Royal Navy presently possessed. Rather than build more new tonnage, the British proposed that ten cruisers which would reach retirement age by 1937 should be retained rather than scrapped. Destroyers. If submarines were abolished, total destroyer tonnage for Britain and the United States would be reduced to 100,000 tons-~65,000 tons less than the London Treaty-~with proportionate reductions for Japan. If submarines were not abolished but could be held to a maximum for any one country of 40,000 tons, destroyer tonnages could be reduced by 15,000 tons. If no further total tonnage limi- tations on submarines were adopted, destroyer ton- nage should be raised to 200,000 tons. Qualitative limitations on destroyers would remain the same. Submarines. I Abolition or reduction of total tonnage to 40,000 tons was desirable. Maximum size of submarines 356 should be 250 tons surface diSplacement. The British proposals, while comprehensive, offered little that stood much chance of acceptance at the future conference. The battleship proposals could not be accepted by the United States, and in view of the continuing demon- stration of the value of the aircraft carrier, it was not likely that the Americans would accept further reduction of the total tonnage for carriers. In fact, the Americans al- ready had more than 110,000 tons of carriers built or build- ing. Neither the Japanese nor the French were likely to accept further quantitative or qualitative limitations on submarines, and further restrictions on destroyers depended upon reduction of submarine tonnage. In some respects the British preposals involved increases rather than reductions in tonnage, especially in cruisers and destroyers. The Americans questioned the British at some length on this point. Admiral Little significantly replied that the world situation was not primarily responsible for the British desire for more cruisers and destroyers, but rather that naval Opinion in Britain had always considered large numbers of these vessels to be necessary, but had been overridden in 1930 by political considerations. Craigie pointed out that tonnages of individual cruisers and destroyers were increasing, thus making necessary larger total tonnages for the same number k *— 19Ibid., June 21 1934. of vessels in a given category.20 The American reaction to the British proposals of June 21 was one of astonishment. Davis indicated he thought the proposals completely unacceptable. The British, he said, seemed to be intent upon doing away with the London Treaty restrictions.21 Hull agreed with Davis. The proposals, he asserted, were unacceptable "even as a basis for discussion." He repeated that the Americans favored only one of two possi- ble solutions--proportionate reduction of tonnages in all categories, or extension of the existing ratios.22 President Roosevelt himself sent a message to MacDonald, reminding him that the purpose of the coming conference was to reduce naval armaments, not increase them. He suggested that the treaties should be extended for ten years, with a 20 percent reduction in all categories to be achieved by the end of that time.23 In reply MacDonald hastened to point out that if all the British proposals were adopted there would be an excess of reductions over increases in tonnage.24 In a detailed memo- zolbid. 73 21Davis to Hull, June 25 1934, §§g§., 1934, 1, 272- 2 . ,____ 22Hull to Davis, June 26 1934, ibid., pp. 276-277. 23Roosevelt to Davis, June 26 19343 ibid., pp. 277-278. 24Bingham to Hull, June 26 1934, SD 500.A15A5/120. 358 randum the British explained that abolition of submarines and cuts in destroyer tonnages and sizes of battleships, carriers and cruisers would result in substantial overall reductions, even though cruiser total tonnages were increased. The British needed more cruisers, mainly because the world situation had changed considerably since 1930.25 The British proposals and their hostile reception by the Americans certainly retarded the growth of the spirit of c00peration which had earlier been stated as a major goal of the preliminary discussions, and the situation remained tense for some time afterward. By early July Hull noted despondently that there had not been much progress.26 What conciliation there was was attempted by the naval delegates. The Americans, anxious to try to work out a compromise at least on battleships, were able to admit reductions in battle- ship size below their minimum 35,000 tons. In a conversation with Admiral Little, Admiral Leigh showed an American design for a battleship of 32,500 tons, which he said was the ab- solute minimum displacement to allow for the degree of gun power, Speed and protection considered necessary by the Navy. Little, for his part, candidly admitted that the British did not eXpect agreement on the British battleship prOposals, w— j *— 25Craigie to Atherton, July 26 1834, FRUS., 1934, I ’ 299-303 0 26Hull to Crew, July 2 1934, SD500.A15A5/127a. 359 but that perhaps a compromise figure of around 30,000 tons might be agreed upon.27 That conversation represented prac- tically the extent of efforts to reconcile Opposing points of view, and the Anglo-American conversations ended on July '19, with only one agreement-~the British, after desiring to issue a joint public statement about the conversations, were persuaded by the Americans that to do so would give an un- desirable impression.28 CONVERSATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE. It was fortunate that no public statement was issued about the progress of Anglo-American talks. If it had been, the Japanese would have beEn presented with a diplomatic opportunity almost too good to be missed. As it was, the British and Americans managed to conceal their profound dis- agreement from the Japanese, thus keeping the latter from attempts to drive the wedge deeper by making concessions to one side or the other. The British in particular might have been amenable to some kind of understanding with the Japanese in return for Japanese support of the British naval proposals ———f 27"Admiral Leigh's Report on London Conversations, June 18-July 19, 1934", entry of July 13, 1934, Series XIII, "Gen. Bd. Disarmament Records." 28Davis to Hull, July 17, 1934, Hull to Davis, July 17, 1934, Davis to Hull, July 19, 1934, FRUS, 1934, I, 295-296, 296-297, 298. 360 of June 21. Had the Japanese been willing to negotiate on the basis of the principles to which they had subscribed at the 1930 London Conference, they would have been able to accept most of the British proposals and would have been in a position to ask for substantial concessions from the Brit- ish in return. However, such Speculation serves no practical purpose, for the Japanese were not in a mood to negotiate, but were bent single-mindedly upon securing the principle of parity with the greatest naval powers. It was a good illus- tration of how adherence to a principle at all costs could lose everything, for the Japanese stand served only to unify the British and Americans in their opposition to the Japanese demands while gaining the Japanese nothing. Of course, given the trend of Japanese foreign policy and the state of public agitation over the ratio system as applied to navies, there was little likelihood that the Japanese retained enough flex- ibility to use the opportunity presented by the Anglo-Ameri- can discord even if they had been aware of it. By the time Anglo-American conversations were drawing to a close it was more evident than ever that the Japanese would come to the preliminary conversations determined upon one principle only. There was some anxiety that the Japanese might even go so far as to abrogate the naval treaties and to refuse to attend the 1935 conference if their parity demand was not met.29 They might not in fact build their naval strength 29erew to Hull, July 2, 1934, SDSOO.A15A5/163. 361 to parity--partly because of the high cost involved--but there was little question that they would insist upon the elimina- tion of the assumption of inferiority inherent in the present naval ratios.30 Shortly before the Japanese delegates left T0kyo for London, the American Embassy reported that Japanese policy had been officially decided upon and approved by the Cabinet. The Japanese, it stated, would advance four ideas at the preliminary conversations: 1. The present naval ratios must be abolished. 2. The Washington Naval Treaty will be abrogated. 3. Japan is willing to negotiate a new naval treaty which establishes the principle of equality of armaments. 4. Japan favors the global tonnage system of limi- tation and will insist upon its adoption.31 The final twist was added when the Embassy reported that while the Japanese would discuss the question of abrogation of the Washington Treaty, they would probably take abrogation action regardless of the outcome of the talks. The fourth point in the Japanese policy--demanding the 30Naval AttachE’Report no. 161, July 3, 1934, SD500.- A15A5/163. . 31Naval Attache Report no. 219, Sept. 7, 1934, FRUS, 1934, I, 303. The few moderates left in high positions in the Japan- ese Navy and those moderates who were in the Foreign Office did not agree with such harsh demands, but there was little that they could do. Grew to Hull, Sept. 11, 1934, SDSOO.- A15A5/184. 32Grew to Hull, Sept. 18 1934, SDSOO.A15A5/19l. 362 adoption of the global system of tonnage--was directed par- ticularly toward securing a sympathetic response from the French, who were known to be dissatisfied with the battleship ratios of the Washington Treaty. Although they hastened to deny reports that they desired to serve notice of abrogation of the treaty by the end of the year, there was little question that the French would not be unhappy should the treaty be 33 Later the Japanese did make an overt allowed to expire. attempt to secure French support for abrogation by asking the French and also the Italians to join Japan in supporting pro- posals at the next conference for an equitable treaty based on a single or global tonnage for defensive purposes. Both the French and Italians declined the suggestion,34 although numerous elements of the French press expressed sympathy with the idea of negotiating a new accord based upon equality of armaments.35 In late September, the General Board drew up an estimate of the situation and stated the position which they believed would be the best for the American delegation to take, both in the discussions with the Japanese and at the Conference. A— W 33Atherton to Hull, Aug. 7 1934, SD500.A15A5/166. 34Grew to Hull, Dec. 3 1934, Moffatt to Hull, Dec. 3 1934, Grew to Hull, Dec. 5 1934, FRUS , 1934, I, 406-407, 407-408. 35Straus to Hull, Dec. 4 1934, SDSOO.A15A5/331. 363 The Board pointed out first of all that Japan would probably Oppose an extension of the naval treaties, both because of her publicly stated position and because of the fact that the Japanese Navy, since it was already nearly at treaty strength, would be unable to build any more ships if the treaties were simply extended, while the British and particularly the Ameri- cans could still build substantially. Reduction of existing fleets would probably be accepted by all the delegations at the conference except the Japanese. The British would un- doubtedly prOpose a larger cruiser tonnage for themselves and a reduction in the size of battleships; the French and Italians would want a better ratio in battleships. The French and Japanese would oppose the abolition of submarines. "All nations will favor agreement on a naval limitation treaty in a form acceptable to themselves, reSpectively. . . . No single item upon which general agreement will be readily forthcoming can confidently be predicted."3'5 It was a pessimis- tic estimate, but under the existing conditions a clearly realistic one as well. As to the American position, the Board considered that there were some principles on which the United States should make no concession whatever. The size of battleships must not be reduced, cruiser diSplacements in either category must not be reduced below the present 2,000 tons. The probable 368er. 1640/G.B. 438-1, 10ct. 1934. Lo 0‘ ‘5 Japanese prOposal to abolish battleships, carriers and heavy cruisers must not be accepted, and above all the Japanese de- mand for parity in naval strength must be resisted. In the interests of securing agreement, however, the Americans would be willing to lower the maximum size of the battleship gun from 16 inches to 14 inches. Aircraft carrier displacement might be reduced to 22,000 tons, flight deck cruisers may be abolished, the prOportion of larger destroyers in the total destroyer tonnage may be increased somewhat, and total ton- nage of submarines may be reduced. Finally, the American delegation might agree that no more than half of the total light cruiser tonnage would consist of vessels diSplacing more than 7,000 tons, and submarines might be abolished.37 With the exception of the concession on the reduction of battleship guns and that committing the United States to accept a certain number of 7,000 ton cruisers, there was nothing in the Board's list of possible concessions which represented anything which had not already been prOposed by the Americans or which was of vital importance to the Navy. The Board predicted with remarkable accuracy the position which would be taken by the Japanese and the general attitude which would be shown by the British, especially in reaction to the Japanese demands. With the arrival of the Japanese naval delegation in 37Ibid. w London in the middle of October the talks entered the second stage. The first conversations were held between the Ameri- can delegation and the Japanese delegation on October 24, 29, and 31. Matsudaira came squarely to the point at the first discussion. He said that while Japan desired limitation of armaments she did not believe the existing ratios could pro- perly accomplish this objective. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto,38 the chief Japanese naval delegate, then presented Japan's prOposals: first, a "common upper limit" of total tonnage, within which each nation may build as it sees fit; second, this limit should be fixed as low as possible; and finally, offensive arms should be strictly limited or abolished.39 In answer to American questions, Yamamoto said the common upper limit meant parity in tonnage for all nations, and that offensive naval weapons included mainly aircraft carriers, battleships and heavy cruisers--the very weapons, it may be noted, in which the Japanese inferiority or potential in- feriority was greatest. Yamamoto repeated Japan's absolute Opposition to the present ratio system which he said was "causing a certain country to look upon Japan with more or 40 less of contempt." He stated Japan's reasons for insisting 38The same Yamamoto who later achieved notoriety in World War 11. 39"Copies of Conversations", entry 0f OCt- 24 1934’ SDSOO' A15A5/257. Hereafter cited as "Conversations" with date. 4O"Conversations", Oct. 24 1934. In later conversations, it was clear that the "certain country" was not China. ibid., Oct. 29 1934. ‘*“ 366 upon a common upper limit were based upon the fact that naval technology had so changed since 1922 that Japan could no long- er feel secure with anything less than equality in fleet tonnages, or at least the right to build to equality.41 The Japanese attitude at that first meeting was unbending and indicated little chance for agreement. It had only one beneficial effect, from the American point of view--it at least showed both the British and the Americans that previous reports as to Japanese policy were correct, and that an Anglo- American understanding was more imperative than ever. A common front presented to the Japanese offered the only chance of persuading them to modify their position.42 Davis quickly indicated to Craigie that if the two countries could agree on a common position in regard to Japan's claims the Americans would be willing to consider the approval Of increases in cruiser tonnage, provided that there were prOportionate de- creases in other categories.43 0n the other hand, the Ameri- can attitude at the meeting seems to have been instrumental in convincing the Japanese that there was no hope that their demands would be met;44 accordingly, they definitely decided 41Phillips to Grew, Oct. 25 I934, FRUS , 1934, I, 314-315. 42Phillips to Davis, Oct. 26 1934, ibid., p. 315. 43Davis to Hull, Oct. 27 1934, ibid., p. 317. 44Captain Shimomura, chief of the American Section Of the Japanese Naval Staff, told the American naval attache as much. Grew to Hull, Nov. 1 1934, ibid., p. 322. 367 to give notice of the abrogation of the Washington Treaty. Their decision became known in Washington and London by October 29.45 From that time on the Americans and British.moved stead- ily from talking about cooperation to actually achieving it. Cooperation did not manifest itself in the achievement of agreement over such details as the tonnages of destroyers or the size of battleships but rather in the common rejection of the Japanese demands. The Americans held further talks with the Japanese, end- ing finally in a dramatic meeting on October 31 in which the Americans rejected the reasoning behind the Japanese proposals. There was some discussion about the problem of distinguishing offensive from defensive weapons, which ended as usual in stalemate, but most of the discussion revolved around the claim for parity. Davis pointed out to the Japanese that there was no reason for them to feel inferior to the United States just because the American Navy was larger. It was just as illogical, he said, for Americans to feel inferior to the Japanese because Japan's Army was far larger.46 His Argument may have been sensible from a Western point of view, but may have seemed condescending to the Oriental mind. Most 45Davis to Hull, Oct. 29 1934, ibid., pp. 317-318. 46Davls to Hull, Nov. 1 1934, ibid., pp. 323-324. 368 of the rest of the discussion was taken up by Yamamoto and Admiral William F. Standley,47 who argued the Japanese con- tention that the develOpment of naval technology made the ratio system untenable. Standley said that naval develOpments favored the defense as much or more than the offense, and that the Japanese had been just as alive to new develOpments as had the Americans. Their navy contained a larger prOportion of modern vessels than did the American fleet.48 The Japanese arguments were thoroughly demolished by the Americans. It was readily apparent to any careful observer of naval develop- ments that the Japanese argument was at best tenuous, yet the Japanese continued to cling to it.49 In fact, the Japanese Navy had long been quick to utilize the latest develOpments in naval technology. Japan was the first country to place the main battery guns on destroyers in enclosed twin mounts, and Japanese torpedoes were far superior in design and per- formance to American torpedoes. Before the advent of radar, Japanese develOpment of the use of superior starshell and 47Standley replaced Leigh as chief naval delegate upon the latter's retirement from the General Board. 48"Conversations", Oct. 31 1934. Standley and Yamamoto later held a conversation during which Standley reportedly said: "If you were to take the American fleet and give me the Japanese fleet you would have a difficult time getting across the Pacific." Davis to Hull, Nov. 3 1934, SD500.A15 A5/235. 49See statements of Adm. Kichisaburo Nomura in his "Japan's Demand for Naval Equality", Foreign Affairs, XIII (Jan. 1935), p. 203. parachute flares gave their fleet a great advantage in night action.SO At the end of the discussion the Japanese indicated they did not wish to pursue the subject and that there was no point in holding further discussions. Shortly thereafter the Japanese delegates left London for Tokyo. Japanese par- ticipation in the preliminary conversations was at an end. PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE. The period from early November, 1934 to early December, 1935, was taken up by lengthy preparations for the conference. During that time three major develOpments occurred. First, on December 24, 1934, the Japanese gave the required two years notice of the abrogation of the Washington Treaty, leaving her legally free after December 31, 1936, to pursue a naval building program without restrictions. Second, the British offered a "middle course" proposal in a final effort to overcome Japanese intransigence; and third the British signed an agreement with the Germans which in effect re- pudiated the naval restrictions of the Versailles Treaty and gave the Germans authorization to create a new navy. The Japanese abrogation announcement came as no surprise, as has been stated. Having been anticipated for some time and 50Samuel Eliot Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April, 1942, vol. III of History of United States Naval Operations i3 World War II, (Boston, 19485, pp. 21-23. 370 taken into account in the plans of both the Americans and the British, the Japanese action caused but little comment and forced no shifts in policy. It simply provided one more in- dication that the coming conference was not likely to prove successful in limiting armaments on the Old basis Of ratios. The British "middle course" proposals came out of the preliminary discussions with Japan in late October, 1934. When, at a meeting between the British and Americans on October 29, Davis made clear the American attitude toward the problem of cruiser tonnage, he stated that American willing- ness to reach agreement with the British proposals of July 21 depended primarily upon whether an understanding with Japan could be formulated.51 MacDonald realized that if Japan were free to build without restrictions the British might have to consider a two fleet policy--one fleet for the Pacific and one for the Mediterranean and home waters. Yet there was no question that Japan's.demand for parity could not be met, for to do so would create a precedent to grant equality to Germany and Soviet Russia, in which case "there would be no end to the difficulties which would arise."52 On November 14, at another meeting after the departure of the Japanese from London, both Davis and MacDonald dis- cussed the situation frankly. The British for the first time 51"Conversations", Oct. 29 1934. 52Ibid. 371 indicated they saw little hOpe for quantitative limitations; therefore they thought the conference might better concentrate upon qualitative limitations. The British were anxious that there should be some agreement to limit the size of ships in each category. Otherwise, they said, the Japanese might seek to overcome their inferiority in certain categories by building a new type which would render obsolete other ships in its category. They cited the case of their own Dreadnought in 1906 and the more recent case of the German pocket battleships.53 They then advanced a set of prOposals which they said was a "middle course." If no other agreement were possible, perhaps there could at least be an understand- ing at the conference on building programs, an extension of the non-fortification provisions of the Washington Treaty, an accord on qualitative limitations, and an agreement on mutual notification of the laying down of new ships.54 The American reaction was not favorable. Further talks with the Japanese prior to the conference would be new talks on a new basis, in view of Japan's denunciation action, and could easily give the impression that the British and Americans had conceded the abolition of the ratio principle.55 The British 53Minutes of Meeting Between the British and American Delegations, Nov. 14 1934, FRUS , 1934, I, 342-343. 54lbld., pp. 348-349. 55Hull to Davis, Nov. 22, 1934, ibid., pp. 364:365. ‘1‘; M_m- .u 372 then decided to postpone the delivery of their proposals until some opportune time during the conference itself. It should also be noted that since the "middle course" proposals con- tained no endorsement of parity for Japan, the Japanese would not have accepted it. While the governments concerned continued their attempts to smooth the pathway to the conference, newSpapers and peri— odicals discussed the problems of naval disarmament. The advocates of disarmament on a large scale were having a more difficult time than formerly in securing widespread support for their views; the general attitude appeared to be one of disbelief that the concept of naval limitations could enjoy any more success. In Great Britain opinion among many naval officers was summarized in an editorial which appeared in the British naval journal Egg Ngygl‘ggg‘Militagy Record 35g 5923; Dockyard Gazette. Entitled "The Next Naval Conference," it pointed out that Japan had clearly entered upon a new phase of naval expansion which was not to be halted. The prelimi- nary discussions had shown that the conference was destined to fail. "The realities today are that Japan is going her own way and the United States means to follow her; that France and Italy have been going their own ways throughout the term of the London Treaty, and that we alone are standing on a patch Of 'cleared ground' . . ."56 In the United States, the 56Enclosure in Standley to Hull, Apr. 27 1935, SDSOO. A15A5/402. Eyres-Monsell, the First Lord, had stated to Par- liament that the preliminary discussions had cleared the ground for the conference. 373 periodical Foreigp Affaigg devoted the lead Space in several issues to a discussion of the naval problems facing the con- ference, presented by spokesmen from the major countries in- volved. For Great Britain, Admiral Sir Herbert W. Richmond presented a statement which, though ingenious, Offered little contribution to what had already been said by the British many times before. Smaller battleships and cruisers, he claimed, were practical and should be agreed to at the conference. American naval Opinion which held that large battleships and heavy guns were essential to victory in sea actions was exact- ly contrary to the truth; in fact, tactics at sea historically have been accommodated to the weapons available. The weapons in turn were decided upon at the naval conferences and could be altered.57 Speaking for the Americans, Admiral Pratt maintained that Japan's denunciation of the Washington treaty made a conference more rather than less necessary. The ratio concept, he held, should be the proper basis for future naval limitations. As for qualitative limitation, he contended the Americans could not abandon their insistence on large vessels, especially battleships.58 Admiral Nomura presented the Japanese view, arguing that while Japan looked favorably upon the non- fortification provisions of the Washington treaty, the ratio 57"Naval Problems of 1935: A British View", Foreign Affairs, XIII, (Oct. 1934), pp. 45-54. 58"Pending Naval Questions", ibid., XIII (Apr. 1935): pp. 409-419.1 374 principle, which the Japanese people considered a mark of inferiority, could not any longer be accepted. Having once gained a position of legal equality, he intimated, Japan might be content with "the minimum of armaments adequate to guarantee her national security in the light of domestic and external circumstances."59 While the views expressed by these naval officers were not officially sponsored, they neverthe- less represented the official views of the naval agencies concerned, and there was no indication in the articles that any important change in the respective positions had taken place. The Japanese found it difficult to develop a real inter- est in the forthcoming conference. Shortly after the end of the preliminary conversations Hirota told Grew an early con- ference was desirable. Further develOpments at home and in China might make the success of a conference more remote the longer it was postponed.60 Later, it appeared that Japanese naval officers were pressing for a postponement of the con- ference to late 1935 or even late 1936. Both moderates and radicals in the Navy Department favored postponement, but for different reasons. The moderates--also the liberals in the Foreign Office--hoped that postponement would give time to 59"Japan's Demand for Naval Equality," ibid. XIII (Jan. 1935), 196-203. Nomura's view is significant, since he was looked upon by American naval officers as a leader of the moderate group within the Japanese Navy. 6Osrew to Hull, March 27 1935, FRUS , 1935, 1, 69. 375 allow a more sober understanding of the cost of abandoning the treaties, while the radicals believed that delay would further strengthen their hand and discredit the United States.61 In attempts to strengthen their position further the Japanese sought to gain support from Germany by indicating support for Germany's demand for freedom from the armaments restrictions 62 but for the time being the Nazi of the Versailles Treaty, racial attitude and discriminatory legislation made sympathy between the two nations most difficult. The Japanese found cause for considerable protest against Nazi racial policies, while several German officials recognized the unfortunate effects of those policies on Japanese-German relations.63 The superstructure of relationships involving several countries with Nazi Germany was dealt a severe blow by the conclusion of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, which also had significant effects upon the major naval powers and their attitude toward the coming conference. The agreement had its basic cause in German determination to be rid of the naval restrictions under which the German Navy was no more than a coastal defense force. As early as February 1933, Hitler reportedly told Admiral Erich Raeder, the German naval commander, that he would seek a naval agreement with 61Grew to Hull, June 27 1935, SD500.A15A5/440. 62Dodd to Hull, March 22, 1935, SD500.A15A5/394. 63Memorandum by Foreign Office, Aug. 29 1934, U. S. State Department, Documents on German Forei n Polic , 1918- 1945, Series C, 111 (Washington, ), 357-369. Hereafter“ cited as German Documents, with series letter and volume number. g.- 376 ‘3‘“. Great Britain at an Opportune time.64 Later Hitler told Raeder he desired an agreement with Great Britain fixing the strength of the German Navy at somewhere near one-third that of the Royal Navy.65 0n the other side, the British reached the conclusion by early 1935 that a definite agreement with Germany would be a move in the direction of stability in naval armaments. The British seem to have been motivated primarily by fear that the Germans might simply declare they would no longer obey the naval restrictions of Versailles, as they were already doing with regard to the air and land armaments restrictions. The British may also have been seeking to prevent an armaments race brought about by the creation of new types of vessels. It is significant that the British, who by early 1935 realized there was little hope of reaching agreement at the conference on quantitative limi- tations, were at first primarily interested in developing an understanding with the Germans on qualitative limitations, and it was only after the unequivocal insistence of the Germans upon a 35 percent ratio for Germany that the negoti- ations resulted in an agreement concerning both qualitative 64D.C. Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment", Journal_gf Modern Higgggy, XXVIII (June, 1956), 160. Hereafter cited as Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement." This is perhaps the most thorough study of the agreement made to date, but it leaves many important questions unanswered, particularly in regard to the sources of the British initiative. 65Memorandum of the Naval Command, Nov. 5 1934, German Documents, C, III, 573. ~377 and quantitative limitations.66 A final motivation may have been the desire of the National Government of MacDonald to strengthen its weakened political position at home.67 The details of the motivations behind the negotiations and the course of the negotiations themselves need not con- cern us here, since they did not directly affect Americans or American naval policy. It is sufficient to state briefly the results of these negotiations. The Germans were able to extract from the British all the concessions they demanded, while giving none of vital concern to themselves. The final agreement, negotiated in London by the newly appointed Nazi Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, stated that in each category of surface warship the Germans were to have the right to build up to 35 percent of the actual strength of the navies of the British Commonwealth, or to their strength as determined by treaty. The ratio would not be affected by the naval construction of other powers--i.e., there was no escape clause. While the Germans agreed to build no more than 35 percent of the British submarine strength, they were given the right to build 45 percent, and under critical con- ditions--as determined by the Germans themselves--they could 66Watt, "The AngloeGerman Naval Agreement", pp. 165-168. 67Ibid., pp. 162-163. build to equality with the British submarine force.68 These provisions involved quantitative restrictions. In return for these concessions the German5~agreed to observe the qualitative limitations already in effect under the naval treaties and to subscribe to the submarine warfare provisions of Part IV of the London Treaty. The Germans stated their navy was expected to reach the strength stipulated in the Agreement by the end of 1942.69 The British may have viewed the Agreement as beneficial in that it set limits upon Ger- many's naval construction, but the fact is the main result was to give Germany full authorization to build as rapidly as possible a Navy which would be four times larger by 1942. From the German point of view this was hardly limitation. The effect upon the French of the news of the Anglo- German Naval agreement was easily predictable. They were astounded by what they considered to be a British-sponsored move to upset the balance of naval power in European waters. The French Navy hastened to secure authorization for building two 35,000 ton battleships, and Anglo-French relations sank correSpondingly. When the British approached the French with 68The Germans never seriously considered the 35 percent limitation in submarines. The German Navy's estimate of the construction program necessary to implement the agreement pro- vided for a submarine tonnage equivalent to 45 percent of Great Britain's. Vice-Admiral Friedrich Ruse, Sea Warfare, 1939-1945: A German Viewpoint (trans. M. G. SauEHErs, London, 1957), p. 2?.‘_ ‘— 69The full text of the Agreement is in German Documents, C, IV, 323-325. 379 a request for their approval of a British suggestion that the conference concern itself mainly with qualitative limitations which should be fixed at 25,000 tons for battleships, 10,000 tons for heavy cruisers, 22,000 tons for aircraft carriers, 7,600 tons for cruisers and destroyers and 2,000 tons for submarines,7O the French replied that while they agreed the main purpose of the conference should be to establish quali- tative limitations they were not yet ready to make commit- ments on definite figures until the nature of the German building program was more fully known.71 In the last months before the convening of the second London Conference final positions were stated by several governments. The Japanese, in their reply to the same Brit- ish statement which was so summarily rejected by the French, said that they could not agree that the conference should deal only with qualitative limitations. It should also con- sider quantitative limitations which would be fair to all 72 nations. The French stated that under no circumstances would they agree to any proposal to abolish submarines. In Great Britain the new Baldwin Government emphasized its 70Atherton to Hull, Aug. 9 1935, FRUS , 1935, I, 87-90. 71French Memorandum dated Aug. 14 1935, enclosed in Marriner to Hull, Aug. 20 1935, ibid., pp. 95-96. - 72Aide-Mémoire (undated), ibid., p. 102. 73Atherton to Hull, Sept. 30 1935, SD500.A15A5/509. 380 attitude toward the Japanese demands was not different from that of the MacDonald Government; it had become more important than ever that Great Britain not admit Japan's claim to parity in any form.74 The British "middle course" proposal had al- ready indicated the British would press mainly for qualitative limitations, and private statements subsequently showed that they had abandoned their quest for quantitative limitations.75 The American official position remained unchanged also. In early October the General Board submitted a final report on the naval situation for the benefit of the American delega- tion. It stated that the Japanese attitude was not likely to be modified by any developments which might take place at the conference, and since the American position was not likely to change there seemed little chance of any agreement at all on quantitative limitations. While not certain the British would continue unequivocal support of the American stand against Japan, the Board thought it likely. The French opposition would also make the securing of an accord on quantitative limi- tations practically impossible. "As matters stand, there is no basis for belief that a conference in 1935 will accept a treaty along the broad lines of the Washington and London 74 British Embassy to Phillips, Nov. 7 1935, SDSOO.A15A5 /539. 75Cmdr. R.E. Schuirmann Memorandum to ONO, 30 Apr. 1935, "Miscellaneous CorreSpondence Relating to Naval Limitation and Naval Conversations, 1934-1935", Ser. XIII, "General Board Materials Relating to Disarmament, 1921-1936." Commander chuirmann was one of the American naval delegates at the preliminary discussions. 38] Treaties."76 If one thing about the conference was certain, it was that the path to agreement would be long and difficult, with perhaps nothing at the end of the road but disappointment of hapes for further limitation. THE FIRST PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE. The second London Naval Conference convened on December 7, 1935. Since the fundamental positions of the powers con- cerned had already been worked out during the preliminary con- versations a year previously or had been develOped in the months following those talks, the conference itself was some- thing of an anticlimax, at least in its early stages. The outcome of this conference was much easier to predict than was the case with the previous naval conferences. Anyone offering to bet that the Japanese would leave the conference and that the four powers remaining would work out an agreement based on qualitative limitations, but containing enough escape clauses to render the whole agreement meaningless, would have had few takers. The proceedings of the conference divide themselves neat- ly into two phases. During the first phase stalemate was the rule, as the Japanese delegation single-mindedly advanced their proposals for parity, while the Americans and British just as 76Ser. 1696/G.B. 438-1, 4 Oct. 1935. stubbornly stood their ground and refused to admit any of Japan's claims. The result was a foregone conclusion--the Japanese walked out of the conference a little more than a month later. The second phase of the conference was more fruitful as well as more amicable, and resulted in an agree- ment on qualitative limitations which represented perhaps the most that could be eXpected from a disarmament conference during those troubled times. The Japanese wasted no time in presenting their pro- posals. At the first plenary meeting on December 9, Admiral Osami Nagano, the chief Japanese naval delegate, stated that his government desired a treaty which should be based upon the fundamental idea of setting up a common limit of naval armaments to be fixed as low as possible, which they shall not be allowed to exceed; simultaneous- ly, offensive forces must be drastically re- duced and ample defensive forces provided, so as to bring about a substantial measure of dis- armament, thus securing a state of non-menace and non-agression among the Powers. 77 During the next several days the Japanese delegation was kept busy answering questions about the meaning of their prOposal, particularly in regard to the term "common upper limit." At the first meeting of the First Committee on December 10, Davis, 77U. S. State Department, The London Naval Conference, 1935. Report of the Delegates of the United States of Ameri- gg, _Text pf the London Naval Treaty of I935 and Other Docu- ments, Conf. series no. 735 (Washington, 19365T—p. 53. Here- after cited as ggnference, 1935. 383 the chief American delegate,78 asked the Japanese to indicate to which nations the common‘upper limit would apply.79 In his reply Nagano stated that the three leading naval powers, be- cause of their "specially intimate relationship", should have a common limit.80 Later, in reply to questions as to what was specifically meant by a common upper limit, Nagano said that it did not necessarily mean absolutely equal tonnages, but that they should be nearly equal enough so that attack would be made difficult and defense easier. Adjustments could be made to allow for differences in vulnerability. Davis in- dicated that this could be taken to imply some kind of ratio, but Nagano believed that it really meant "parity plus alpha"-- a kind of supplement over and above parity.81 What the Japan- ese meant by this statement was never made clear, for later 78The other important American delegates were William Phillips, Under Secretary of State, and Admiral William H. Standley, Chief of Naval Operations. The most important ad- visers were: for the State Department, Ray Atherton of the Embassy in London and Eugene Dooman of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs; for the Navy, Captains Walter S. Anderson, Royal E. Ingersoll, and Julius A. Furer, and Commander R.E. Schuirmann. For the complete list of delegates, see Con- ference, 1935, p. 23. 79Ibid., p. 100. 801bid., p. 107. 81Great Britain, Foreign Office,WQj_§h§_W Naval Conference, 1935 (London, 1936), pp. 395-399. Hereafter EIEEH as Documents, I935. This British record of the confer- ence, while not as complete as the American record cited above, does contain some minutes of meetingsnot included in the Amer- ican record of the proceedings. The two should be consulted together. 384 they returned to their insistence upon mathematical parity. It is conceivable that in their own way they were attempting to jockey the other delegations into an acceptance of the parity principle. Discussions over the Japanese proposals continued for several days. Both the British and the Americans repeated their belief that because of geographical and other factors absolute equality in tonnages was not a true measure of equality at all, but that the ratios established under the naval treaties were better. Because of her position as a power with interests both in Europe and the Pacific, Great Britain needed a larger fleet than Japan.82 It was impossible for Britain to muster in Far Eastern waters a fleet even equal to Japan's let alone superior enough to insure victory in a naval engagement. Davis asserted that under the existing ratio system there was no chance whatever that the fleet of any one of the three great powers could make a successful attack upon any other.83 The discussions became highly technical, as fruitless arguments developed over questions extremely difficult to answer with any degree of certainty-- as for example the question of how large a superiority of one fleet over another was needed to ensure victory in a naval engagement.84 Nothing positive emerged from these discussions. 82Conference, 1935, pp. 126-127, 140. 83Ibid., pp. 139-140. 841b1d., pp. 164-163. On December 17, at a private meeting between the American and Japanese delegates, the Americans indicated that the ratios could not be abandoned and hinted that if no agreement were reached a naval race would ensue in which Japan would be outbuilt. The Japanese replied that they could accept no agreement which did not provide for parity.85 As the discussions dragged on with no hint of an eventual break in the deadlock of ideas, several delegates began to submit compromise proposals in the hope something might be advanced which would enable progress to be made. On December 17 the British offered a plan they claimed would allow for quantitative limitation and at the same time avoid the ratio system to which Japan was so hostile. It would involve the voluntary limitation of naval construction over a period of years so as to maintain each nation’s naval strength at a level "required for the national security of the respective Powers, and these limits necessarily vary according to cir- cumstances."86 Such a vague prOposal would have involved no limitations at all, particularly if each nation was allowed to determine what it needed for its own security, and it came as no surprise that in discussions of the proposal on the 19th and 20th of December each of the other delegations voiced practical objections to the proposal, with the French and the Japanese eXpressing the most criticism. The American 85Davis to Hull, Dec. 17 1935, SD500A15A5/588. 86Conference, 1935, p. 148. 386 delegation, probably perceiving that the British plan stood no chance of acceptance, took little part in the discussions beyond indicating that the plan was acceptable as a basis for discussion.87 Finally it was decided to shelve the British proposal in favor of other plans which were submitted on January 6, 1936, when deliberations resumed after the Christ- mas recess. On JanuaryIS discussions were held concerning French, Italian and British proposals, which sought to secure limitations by requiring advance notice of laying of keels and of the characteristics of vessels laid down.88 The Japan- ese, sensing that the conference could easily become bogged down in endless discussion or, worse still, might sidetrack the Japanese proposal for parity with other agreements, ob- Jected to discussion of the three plans before questions in- 89 Accord- volving quantitative limitations had been settled. ingly, it was decided to reintroduce and discuss the Japanese proposal for a common upper limit. A dramatic high point of the conference occurred on January 15, when the Japanese proposal once more was intro- duced for discussion. Nagano presented a long plea for acceptance of the common upper limit, and afterwards each §7Ibid., pp. 151, 160. 88The text of the British, Italian and French proposals may be found in ibid., pp. 432, 433-434, 435-436 respectively. Bglhlg-a PP. 200, 207-208. 387 delegation voiced its reaction. Not one of the delegations voiced sympathy with the plan. This was predictable, because of the Anglo-American agreement much earlier and because the French and the Italians had been persuaded to oppose the 90 Japanese plan. Davis summarized the objections of all when he said: The principle of the common upper limit rests in fact on the assumption, which it has not been possible to substantiate, that equality of secur- ity. . .could be achieved by equality of naval armament. We believe it has been sufficiently shown in the course of our discussions that equal- ity of naval armaments not only is not the same as equality of security, but that the two are in- compatible and contradictogy. Equal armaments do not ensure equal security. Eyres-Monsell, the chairman, then closed further discussion of the Japanese proposal and adjourned the meeting with the announcement that the British, French and Italian proposals would again be considered. That evening Nagano notified Eyres-Monsell that since there was no chance the conference would further consider the Japanese proposal, "our Delegation have now come to the conclusion that we can no longer usefully continue our participation in the deliberations of the present Conference."92 Leaving a team of observers behind, the Japan- ese delegation thereupon left for Tokyo. The Japanese withdrawal caused little excitement since 90Davis to Hull, Jan. 10 1936, FRUS , 1936, 1, 23. 91Conference, 1935, p. 223. 92Ibid., p. 437. 338 it had been so long expected. At the meeting of the First Committee on January 16 the Japanese statement was read, a resolution of regret was passed, and the discussion proceeded immediately to the consideration of the French, British and Italian proposals. There was little comment from abroad. In the United States there was some realization that the Japanese action made a positive limitations agreement more difficult to achieve. The Washington Star commented that "all concerned are conscious that for practical purposes naval limitation is at an end." The New York Sun stated: "A naval agreement to which Japan is not a party being obviously of little value, the withdrawal of the Japanese delegation from the London Naval Conference makes the subsequent history of this gather- ing of slight interest."93 Although not so pessimistic, Hull noted that the interest of the United States in the Conference was much lessened now that Japan was no longer involved, and that the main interests would henceforth be EurOpean.94 THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE The Japanese withdrawal from the conference both com- plicated and simplified the subsequent proceedings. They were 93Enclosures in Hull to Davis, Jan. 17 1936, SD500.A14A5/ 621. '94Hull to Davis, Jan. 18 1936, FRUS , 1936, I, 38. 389 complicated in that the delegates realized that no accord could be reached which did not take into account the fact Japan would be completely free of any restrictions on her fleet beginning in 1937; therefore, any agreement reached could not be unduly restrictive of the navies of the signa- tory powers, lest Japan gain an advantage. On the other hand the removal of the Japanese delegation made it less likely the conference would bog down without reaching some kind of an agreement. Yet it must be admitted that the Japanese action in effect marked the end of the era of naval limi- tations, even though a treaty did result from the labors of the second London Conference; for under the circumstances whatever limitations were adapted could be only qualitative, and even these would be endangered unless Japan continued to build only the types of ships already established by the naval treaties. Thus the shadow of future Japanese naval programs clouded the further deliberations of the conference. It was indeed remarkable that the conference was con- tinued at all after mid-January, but the determination of the British to effect some kind of naval limitations agreement met all objections and carried all before it. While the with- drawal of the Japanese did simplify matters, it also brought out into the open problems which hitherto had been submerged by the need to present a common front to the Japanese threat. Chief among these were the Anglo-American disagreement over battleships and 10,000 ton cruisers, the question of Germany's 390 participation in the conference, and the Italo-Ethiopian war. The first of these problems had occupied some of the time of the Anglo-American preliminary discussions and now took up much of the remaining time of the conference. In the course of negotiations over this question, the Americans found them- selves to some extent supplanting the Japanese in the role of dissenters, for the British position favoring smaller battle- ships and cruisers had been generally supported by the French and the Italians. The first serious discussion at the confer- ence on the question of battleship and cruiser limitations came shortly after mid-January, when the Japanese withdrawal cleared the way for discussion of qualitative limitations. On January 23 the chief American and British Naval delegates, Admiral Standley and Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, the First Sea Lord, met to discuss a British proposal which called for a reduction of the size of.the main battery guns on battle- ships from 16 inches to 14 inches; a building holiday, during which no 6 inch gun cruisers diSplacing more than 8,000 tons or 8 inch guncruisers would be built for a period of six years; and the establishment of a new category of "light sur- face vessels" to take the place of the former cruiser (b) and 95 destroyer categories. The Americans were reluctant to a- dopt any of the proposals without'considerable modification, 95Davis to Hull, Jan. 24 1936, ibid., pp. 46-47. 391 but subsequent conversations showed that there was no Ameri- can objection in principle to any of the ideas. In the matter of cruisers the primary American objection was that a building holiday would amount to a quantitative limitation which would apply to a type particularly important to the American Navy while not applying to other categories. The General Board commented; "The definite restriction of 10,000-ton 8-inch and 6-inch types seems inconsistent in a treaty in which all other types will be unrestricted."96 However, Standley's view was that the number of 10,000 ton cruisers already built or on the stocks was large enough to provide for the Navy's needs and would allow the United States to accept such a holiday in the interests of true limitation.97 After some deliberation his view was accepted, along with his contention that the proposal should include an escape clause to allow further construction if Japan built beyond her pre- sent strength in those categories. In explaining the State and Navy Departments' approval of the British cruiser pro- posal to Roosevelt, Phillips emphasized the importance of agreement on this point by quoting Davis' comment made earlier: "The question at issue is whether or not a treaty for quali- tative limitation is of sufficient value to the United States for it to accept a building holiday in category A and 10,000 96General Board memorandum, enclosure in Hull to Davis, Jan. 31 1936, ibid., p. 53. 97Davis to Hull, Jan. 26 1936, ibid., p. 48. . "p wuflh—mfi ton category B cruisers for a period of years."98 After further clarification of'the light surface vessels category so as not to exclude 10,000 ton light cruisers the British proposals were given final approval on February 6, even though by so doing we were committing ourselves to build cruisers of no more than 8,000 tons for the next six years.99 Since the British had long sought some kind of limitation on the heavier cruisers and would not be likely to approve any treaty which did not provide for such limitation, it was left to the Ameri- cans to make the concession necessary to reach an accord. In the case of battleships the discussions revolved pri- marily around the question of whether the treaty should pro- vide for a limitation of gun size to 14 inches with the pro- vision that they could be restored to 16 inches if Japan did not agree to so limit her battleship construction, or whether the gun size should remain at 16 inches with the stipulation that it could be lowered to 14 inches if Japan so agreed. TheBritish favored the former position and the United States the latter, primarily because it was unlikely that Japan would agree in either case, and it would be a weak psychologi- cal move to reduce the size and then be forced to restore it 98Phillips to Roosevelt, Feb. 5 1936, SD500.A15A5/659a. 99Hu11 to Davis, Feb. 6 1936, FRUS , 1936, 1, 57-58. 393 later.100 The naval delegates, while officially committed to the 14 inches limitation, believed that it should not be permitted unless Japan accepted it. Accordingly, they fought hard for their view. Ingersoll and Schuirmann, the naval spokesmen for this part of the negotiations, argued both with the British and with Davis,101 while in the meetings of the technical committee which was set up to discuss qualitative limitations Standley stood his ground against a Franco-Brit- ish attempt to lower the gun size to 12 inches and the unit tonnage to 25,000 tons.102 The pressure for the 14 inch limitation was such that the Americans found it embarrassing to hold out against it, and agreed that with suitable safe- guards it could be adopted. With this second American concession the work of formu- lating a treaty for qualitative limitation was practically completed. The only major question remaining was whether Germany should be invited to join the conference and to sign the completed treaty. As might have been expected, the French were at first most reluctant to admit Germany, primarily be- cause they believed that it would mark approval by the powers at the conference of Germany‘s violation of the armaments W...” F. 100This was the official view as stated by Hull. Hull to Davis, Jan. 29 1936, ibid., pp. 49-50. Davis preferred the British view, since it ifiVUIyed reduction of armaments in treaty form. Davis to Hull, Jan. 24 1936, SD500.A15A5/636. 1Ingersoll to Hustveldt, 21 Jan. 1936, "Miscellaneous Correspondence Relating to the London Naval Conference of 1935", Series XIV, Gen. Bd. Disarmament Records. IOZConferencg, 1935, pp. 322-323, 339. 394 restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. The French would consider German participation only on condition that the Germans simultaneously enter into discussions of limitation of land and air armaments--an unlikely prOSpect.103 Somewhat 'later the French suggested that after the treaty was concluded the British.might secure German adherence to its provisions through bilateral negotiations.104 Further attempts along these lines were abruptly ended, however, when on March 7 Hitler sent his troops into the Rhineland. The final problem for the conference manifested itself late in February, although it had been recognized from the time the conference began. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the reaction in the League of Nations culminating in the voting of sanctions against Italy--a develOpment in which Great Britain had played a leading role--had created an embarrassing situation. Mussolini's annoyance at the League and at Great Britain in particular resulted in the Italian delegation's announcement that Italy would not agree to the naval treaty at that time.105 Thus, although the Italians had played an active role in the negotiations up to that 103Davis to Hull, Jan. 23 1936, Egg , 322$, I, pp. 40-41. 104Davis to Hull, Feb. 25 1936, ibid., p. 73. 105Hu11 to Davis, Feb. 28 1936, gpgg., p. 78. 395 point and continued to do so thereafter and approved of the treaty as finally formulated, they did not participate in the signing of the completed treaty on March 25, 1936. There- fore the treaty was a three-power document. THE TREATY! PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS The London Naval Treaty of 1936 was designed to take effect on January 1, 1937, promptly upon the expiration of the Washington and London treaties, and to remain in force until December 31, 1942. It consisted of four main parts: definitions, qualitative limitations, exchange of building information, and safeguarding clauses.106 The first part defined the various warship categories. In general the definitions did not depart from those establish- ed in previous naval treaties, except in one reSpect. The former heavy cruiser, light cruiser and destroyer categories were set aside and replaced by a new category called light surface vessels, including surface craft ranging from 100 to 10,000 tons. This category was divided into three subcate- gories which were similar to the cruiser and destroyer cate- gories except that the lowest subcategory--corresponding to destroyers--included warships between 100 tons and 3,000 tons. This definition,which altered considerably the definition of 106The full text of the treaty is in Conference, 1935, pp. 27-43. the destroyer category as developed in the Geneva discussions in 1927 and established in the London Treaty of 1930, was made necessary by the French desire for very large destroyers. The French already had several destroyers exceeding 2,200 tons, and they later built destroyers (contretorpilleurs) approaching 3,000 tons displacement. The second part of the treaty was the most important. It provided for limitations on the size of battleships, carr- iers and submarines, and on the construction of light surface vessels. Capital ships could not exceed 35,000 tons nor carry guns larger than 14 inches. If Japan or Italy failed to ad- here to the treaty by April 1, 1937, the maximum size of gun could be raised to 16 inches. Aircraft carriers could not exceed 23,000 tons nor carry guns larger than 6.1 inches. Submarines could not exceed 2,000 tons surface displacement nor carry a gun larger than 5.1 inches. Light surface vessels displacing between 8,000 and 10,000 tons (i.e., cruisers) could not be constructed or acquired for six years; if, how- ever, a power not party to :he treaty built enough vessels of this category to constitute a menace to one of the signa- tory powers, the latter would be free to build such vessels upon notifying the other signatories. The third part of the treaty stated that each signatory power would provide the others with advance information con- cerning building programs. The information would include dates of laying of keels, launching and commissioning of vessels, 397 and specifications such as tonnage, main and secondary battery characteristics and designed Speed. The fourth part of the treaty established safeguards in addition to those already provided in the limitation clauses of Part II. The most important of these safeguards were: Article 24, which stated if any nation not party to the treaty built a warship exceeding the limitations Specified in the treaty for that type of ship a signatory power could, up- on prior notification, similarly disregard the treaty limi- tation in its own construction; and article 26, which pro- vided that upon prior notification a signatory power could increase its previously announced annual program of naval construction if it deemed such increase necessary. Examination of the treaty in the context of the times reveals that while it seemed to offer a large measure of limitation, in reality its success depended primarily upon the whim of one nation--Japan. Furthermore, the anxiety over Japan's probable reaction was evident in the numerous safe- guarding clauses attached to the treaty. If Japan should choose to ignoreall the qualitative limitations stipulated in the treaty, each signatory power would then be freed from the treaty's restrictions, thus nullifying all its major pro- visions and rendering it in effect a dead letter. In short, if the Japanese did not act as though they had signed the treaty--and there was no reason to suppose that they would-- the conference at London might as well not have been held. CHAPTER X THE END OF LIMITATIONS: RESUMPTION OF NAVAL COMPETITION. The London Naval Treaty of 1936 was concluded during a time when the prOSpects for limitation of armaments were ex- tremely poor. The attack on Ethiopia by Italy, Hitler's dis- regard of the armaments restrictions of the Versailles Treaty and his march into the Rhineland, and Japan's clearly men- acing attitude all foreshadowed war in the not-distant future. Under the circumstances reaction to the new treaty was not generally enthusiastic. In the United States the Senate held but one hearing on the treaty prior to approving it, during which Davis was the chief witness to appear. He was careful to stress the factors which.might lead the Japanese to sign the treaty,sndhesthe lack of quantitative limitations which would allow them to build a fleet as large as they might choose, and that the notification provisions would give them valuable information on other navies which they might not otherwise be able to obtain.1 The Senators however, seemed more concerned with satisfying themselves that the safeguards in the treaty were ample enough to prevent the United States from being trapped. In debate on the floor of the Senate 1U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearino on the London Naval Treat , 1936, 74th Cong., 2nd sess. (Wash- ington, 1936;, pp. 3 - , 38-39. 398 more concern was shown over the possibility that other coun- tries might cheat on the notification clauses and that the treaty did not provide for real reduction of armaments, but there was remarkably little argument over its main provisions. On May 18, 1936, the Senate approved the treaty without bothering to take a roll call vote.2 Only the French seemed pleased. The removal of the restrictions of the Washington Treaty were considered a positive advantage. The new treaty had no discriminating clauses, and the safeguards left the French free to counter the possibility of a threat by Germany.3 The immediately important question, however, concerned the reaction to the treaty in Japan. Would the Japanese see enough advantage in it to persuade them to join in its pro- visions--either officially or in effect by limiting their building programs--or would they defy it? For the time being, the Japanese seemed unwilling to face the consequences of a large scale naval armaments competition. Grew reported some Japanese officials had said they favored another conference as soon as possible, while others had expressed fear that the United States would begin the development of extensive forti- fications in the Philippines as soon as the Washington Treaty 2CR. , 7437. For the Senate debates see pp. 6425- 7433, 72:37-74. 3French Embassy to Hull, Apr. 15 1936, SD500.A15A5/782. 400 expired.4 In the State Department Hornbeck saw these state- ments as evidence that the American building program was beginning to overawe the Japanese and that perhaps another conference might have better results.5 Yet the British re- ported that the Japanese had definitely stated they would not accede to the new naval treaty.6 As it was, the only significant attempt after the 1935 conference to re-negotiate any part of the expiring treaties occurred when the British, responding to unofficial Japanese statements favoring the extension of the non-fortification agreements, indicated to the Americans that it might be well to approach Japan favor- ably upon the subject.7 The subject was referred to the General Board, which promptly rejected the whole idea. In view of the unsettled situation in the Far East and of "the inability of the United States Government clearly to define its futurepolicy in regard thereto". such negotiations should not be initiated.8 THE ACCELERATION OF NAVAL CONSTRUCTION. 4 5 Grew to Hull, May 15 1936, SD500.A15A5/783. Hornbeck to Hull, May 16 1936, SD500.A15A5/788%. 6Welles to Standley, July 30 1936, SD500.A15A5/809. 7"Memorandum of conversation between the British charge and the assistant chief of the Division of Western EurOpean affairs", Sept. 11 1936, enclosure in Ser. 1730/G.B. 438-1, 17 Oct. 1936. 8Ser. 1730/G.B. 438-1, 17 Oct. 1936. 401 While hOpeful that Japan might not upset the delicate balance in the naval situation, the powers concerned were not willing to trust the future. In May the British un- officially requested the American government to approve the retention by the Royal Navy of 40,000 tons of overage des- troyers, even though under the London Treaty this tonnage was supposed to be scrapped by the end of the year.9 The General Board, while willing to acquiesce, took the opportun- ity to demand that the United States Navy should be allowed to retain an equal amount of tonnage as allowed by a safe- guarding clause in the treaty.10 The Japanese, unable to retain a proportionate tonnage because they did not possess enough overage destroyers, announced they would keep 15,598 tons of old submarines.11 Thereupon the United States an- nounced it would retain an equal amount of submarine tonnage. The barriers were already collapsing. Since the 1936 London Treaty did not provide for quanti- tative limitations, it had no effect whatever upon the Ameri- can naval construction program. The qualitative limitations 98ingham to Hull, July 15 1935, FRUS, 1936, 1, 135. 103er. 1719/G.B. 438-1, 25 May, 1936. 11Saito (Ambassador in‘Washington) to Hull, Dec. 28 1936, FRUS , 1936, I, 156. 12Moore (Acting Sec. of State) to Grew, Dec. 30 1936, ibid., p. 158. 12 402 of the London Treaty, which governed the design of the newer vessels, were similar to those established by the new treaty which in any case did not come into force until 1937. Under the authorization provided by the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934, the shipbuilding program progressed favorably. In June, 1936, the Naval Appropriation Act provided $115,300,000 to continue work on the ships begun under the NRA program, to complete two submarines authorized previously, and to lay down under the authority of the Vinson-Trammell Act 12 destroyers, 6 submarines and 2 battleships as replacements for the aging Arkansas and 33533, the oldest battleships in the fleet.13 A month later the General Board submitted its recommendations for the 1938 program. Increasingly confident of favorable Congressional action on its proposals, the board stated that all tonnage necessary to reach treaty limits should be laid down before the end of the year. It recommended the appro- priation of funds to commence the construction of 2 battle- ships, 1 experimental destroyer of 3,000 tons, 10 destroyers of 1,500 tons, and 4 submarines. In addition, funds should be voted to lay down a number of sorely needed naval auxiliar- ies.14 Altogether the situation was much improved. 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