THE CANADA - UNITED STATES PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY DAVID PIERCE BEATTY 1969 -



This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defense

presented by

David Pierce Beatty

has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in History

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Thesis for the Degree of Ph.D.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

DAVID PIERCE BEATTY

1969

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ABSTRACT

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By

David Pierce Beatty

World War II left the Canadian and American peoples with an alliance that had begun with the Ogdensburg Agreement of August 18, 1940. The principal agency of that alliance was the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD). During the war the Board had provided Canada and the United States not only with an agency for joint study of defense problems, but it furnished a symbol as well. By creating the PJBD, the two governments had recognized officially and for the first time the necessity for a joint approach to North American defense. Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had taken steps to form a "permanent" joint board which would meet the immediate wartime emergency, and would continue to function during peacetime. The Board served as a highly useful body for initiation of post-war defense planning, which began as soon as hostilities ended.

United States representatives initiated discussion of plans, through the Board in 1946, to guard against a surprise attack on North America. They particularly feared a Soviet assault over the Arctic frontier. Although Canadian government officials and, in turn, their representatives on the Board, were cautious about embarking on joint defense



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enterprises with the United States, they knew that the shortest route between the Soviet Union and the United States lay over Canada. The United States needed to gain access to Canadian territory and air space. Canada could hardly remain neutral when her location made her so important to United States defense. Geography linked Canadian and American interests inextricably together as the United States and the Soviet Union settled into polar positions of cold hostility.

The broad range of Canadian-American defense interests late in the 1940's and throughout the 1950's and early 1960's, increased opportunity for friction and misunderstanding between the two nations and evoked knotty problems which demanded repeated Board attention. Because many Canadians disliked the thought of stationing United States forces on Canadian soil, Americans had to put forth every effort to understand the Canadian viewpoint and respect Canadian sovereignty in proposing and establishing the many North American defense projects. Just as in World War II, the PJBD served in the post-war period as the primary agency for initiation and coordination of joint defense measures. Nearly every consideration of military matters affecting the two countries was considered by the Board and emerged under its auspices.

The PJBD dealt as a rule more with execution of defense plans than with planning. It recommended policy concerned with defense problems of a federal-provincial



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Frequently the Board considered the political nature. and economic implications of military plans and how such schemes would affect public opinion. Sometimes the Board provided an incidental means of collecting and exchanging information. Through the Board also, ideas were often exchanged and tested noncommitally. Most importantly, the PJBD furnished Canada with a significant alternative to the normal diplomatic channels to Washington. The Board offered Canada a ready agency through which it strove to maintain adequate recognition in Washington of its defense problems and preoccupations. Canada, notwithstanding all forecasts to the contrary, did not lose very much sovereignty to the United States. Although the United States, with Canadian permission and cooperation, built a most elaborate defense network on Canadian soil. Canada lost no territory. Canada's foreign policy maintained a freedom of action and independence which, under the geographic circumstances, appears most remarkable. The United States, in turn, valued the Canadian alliance epitomized in the PJBD. first because of the contribution Canada could render to United States security by granting the use of her territory. But the special Canadian-American relationship also proved valuable to the United States because of the diplomatic support which Canada lent to United States foreign policy when a community of interest made those Canadian and American policies similar. The PJBD furnished a useful forum, well adapted to deal with the problems that arose



in the Canadian-American military alliance - an alliance that was by no means a free and equal partnership.



THE CANADA-UNITED STATES PERMANENT

JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE

by

David Pierce Beatty

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1969

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to Mary Jean and Dave, Jr.

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I first acquired an interest in the work of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) while I was an undergraduate at Michigan State University in 1962. Dr. Alvin C. Gluek. Jr., while lecturing in Canadian History. discussed the activity of the PJBD and observed that Michigan State University's President, Dr. John Hannah, had served for many years as chairman of the American section of the Board. Dr. Gluek suggested that the subject of Canadian-American defense under the auspices of the PJBD warranted further historical investigation and would furnish an appropriate subject for a Ph.D. dissertation. I entered graduate school in the fall of 1962, and began a study of the post-World War II Canadian-American alliance and the principal agency of that alliance, the PJBD. I endeavored to evaluate the Board's impact and effectiveness in Canadian-American defensive relations during the post-war period.

It is with deep gratitude that I acknowledge my indebtedness to the many persons who aided me in this study. Dr. Alvin C. Gluek, Jr., Chairman of the Committee of Canadian-American Studies at Michigan State University, supervised the preparation of this dissertation and offered invaluable suggestions and encouragement throughout.

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CHAPTER I

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN UNDERSTANDING

While delivering a lecture at Columbia University in 1934, John W. Dafoe, Editor of the <u>Winniper Free Press</u>, discussed "the possibility of an understanding or even an alliance between the United States and Canada." "Something like this may indeed be necessary for the preservation of that North American civilization which is our joint possession," he asserted. Very few people in that year could have grasped the significance of Dafoe's words. He himself would have been surprised had he been informed of the intimacy that would ensue in Canadian-American relations, not only during World War II, but in the years of peacetime to follow.¹ He would have been amazed at the wartime alliance which continued into the post-war years, and at the principal forum in that alliance, the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJED).

Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt met at Ogdensburg, New York, on August 17 and 18, 1940, to discuss the threat posed

¹Tom Kent, "The Changing Place of Canada," <u>Foreign</u> <u>Affairs</u>, XXXV (July, 1957), 583. (He was Editor of the <u>Winnipeg Free Press</u>.)

to North America by the Axis after the collapse of western That meeting resulted in the Ogdensburg Agreement Europe. of August 18, and produced the PJBD. The PJBD provided Canada and the United States not only with an agency for joint study of defense problems, but furnished a symbol as well. The two governments, with the Board's creation, recognized officially and for the first time the necessity for a joint approach to North American defense. Roosevelt and King agreed that only through the closest cooperation could the defense of both countries be guaranteed. In case of hostile attack, Canada alone could not defend herself, and the United States could not be defended without also defending Canada. The two leaders took steps to form a "permanent" joint board which would meet the immediate wartime emergency, and would continue to function during peacetime. King and Roosevelt saw little prospect of the international situation ever returning to the isolationist inter-war period when defensive cooperation might be regarded as unnecessary or politically unwise.

By May, 1940, with the deepening military crisis in Europe, Canadian and American diplomatic and military contacts increased at a quickened pace. Relations between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King, well established by 1939,² would develop even more in the face of common danger.

²Canada, Parliamentary <u>Debates</u> (Commons), I (1940), 54-57; C.P. Stacey, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 1940-1945," <u>International Journal</u>, IX (1954), 108-109; F.H. Soward, <u>et al.</u>, <u>Canada in World Affairs:</u> <u>The</u>

After Germany invaded the Low Countries and the Allies suffered crushing defeats, the Canadian government War Committee decided that every available Royal Canadian Navy destroyer should be sent to defend Britain. (There were but four ready at the time.) The Prime Minister chose to inform Roosevelt that Canadian coastal waters had been stripped of naval defenses. The War Committee felt that Canada as a good neighbor should let the United States know of the destroyers' departure, for the United States would suffer if Canadian shores were wholly neglected. Canada, the War Committee agreed, should seek as much United States assistance as it could get.³

At the President's request, King sent a personal envoy, Hugh Keenleyside, First Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, to meet with Roosevelt and the Secretary of State.⁴ He visited Washington three times during May as King's personal messenger.⁵ Keenleyside's visits with Roosevelt

<u>Pre-War Years</u> (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 107; W.H. Shepardson, <u>et al.</u>, <u>The United States in World</u> <u>Affairs, 1938: An Account of American Foreign Policy Relations</u> (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940), pp. 195, 197, and 219; R.M. Dawson, <u>Canada In World Affairs: Two Years of</u> <u>War. 1939-1940</u> (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1943), pp. 239-240; and J.W. Pickersgill (ed.), <u>The Mackenzie King</u> <u>Record</u>, Vol. I, 1939-1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), pp. 106-108.

³<u>The Mackenzie King Record</u>, p. 116; and Stacey, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board," <u>International</u> <u>Journal</u>, 109.

> ⁴ <u>The Mackenzie King Record</u>, pp. 116-117.

⁵Stacey, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board," <u>International Journal</u>, 109; and <u>The Mackenzie King Record</u>, pp. 115, and 117-119.

afforded at least one future PJBD member a first hand acquaintance with the Chief Executive. Keenleyside served a few months later as the secretary of the Canadian section of the PJBD, and for a time, sat as acting chairman of that membership as well.

Jay Pierrepont Moffat, American Minister to Canada, provided another important contact between King and Roosevelt in the weeks just prior to the founding of the PJBD. Moffat. a career diplomat with several years of experience at diplomatic posts in Europe and in Washington, had a hand in the arrangements for confidential Canadian-American staff talks.⁶ After having newly assumed his post in Ottawa, Moffat met with King on June 14. 1940. In the course of this conversation, King discussed the war and Canada's part in it. He also referred to Keenleyside's talks with the President. The Prime Minister described how, in sending munitions, artillery, planes, and other military supplies abroad, Canada's defensive supplies had drained away. King referred to the fact that Canada also had troops in France. Since France, King emphasized, no longer counted as a military force, an attack upon Great Britain seemed all the more imminent. King explained to Moffat that if Britain were unable to withstand and repel an attack, the British Fleet would in whole, or in part, move

⁶Nancy H. Hooker (ed.), <u>Jay Pierrepont Moffat. The</u> <u>Moffat Papers: Selections From the Diplomatic Journals of</u> <u>Jay Pierrepont Moffat. 1919-1943</u> (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 310 and 336.

to Canada. This contingency would pose a multitude of problems that could not find solution without American assistance. At this point in the conversation, King asked if the time had not come for staff talks to commence anew. He recalled that informal talks had been held between staffs three years previous regarding the Pacific Coast. He asked Moffat to feel out the situation with the President and let him know if staff consultation between countries could begin once more.⁷

King suggested to Moffat, when he met with him in conference on June 29, that the latter meet with some Canadian government officials to ascertain exactly what they had in mind in suggesting Canadian-American staff talks. On this suggestion, Moffat met with the Minister of National Defense and Minister of National Defense for Air. Both ministers argued that high ranking officers in the two armies should meet to exchange impressions. It was well understood that no commitments on either side would be requested or given.⁸

By July 12, as a result of these preliminary activities, staff discussions proceeded in Washington between Canadian and American officers. These discussions proved inconclusive, however, and by the latter part of July they

⁷<u>Moffat Papers</u>, pp. 312-314.
 ⁸<u>Moffat Papers</u>, pp. 314-315.

reached an impasse.⁹ The breakdown in staff discussions proved to be fortunate for the future formation of a permanent joint defense board. Canada and the United States needed a permanent forum or agency that would provide the machinery for consultation and negotiation in addition to the normal diplomatic and military channels.

Throughout the forepart of 1940, other formal Canadian-American military contacts developed to supplement the staff conversations held in Washington. The first Canadian service attache, a Royal Canadian Air Force officer, had received an appointment to the Washington Legation in February. By late July, Canadian officials approved in principle the stationing of military and naval attaches in Washington, and the United States government endorsed this action. By August, Canadians had been appointed to fill these posts in Washington.¹⁰

In July, Roosevelt suggested further diplomatic contacts between heads of state. Loring Christie, Canadian Minister to the United States, advised King in Ottawa on July 13, that a close friend of Roosevelt's had approached him and suggested that King should visit Roosevelt at Hyde

⁹S.W. Dziuban, <u>Special Studies: Military Relations</u> <u>Between the United States and Canada. 1939-1945</u> ("United States Army in World War II;" Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), pp. 15-18.

¹⁰Stacey, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board," <u>International Journal</u>, 109.

Park to discuss a common plan for North American defense. This plan, to be forged between Canada and the United States, Christie stated, would include the Atlantic and might be flexible enough to bring the British government into it. That same day King received word from London that Washington wanted to secure air facilities in the British West Indies and in Newfoundland. London asked the Canadian government to comment on the American request, and King hastened to assure the British government that he favored extending such air facilities to the United States.¹¹

By mid-August, 1940, diplomatic and military contacts between Ottawa and Washington had improved considerably; yet joint staff conversations had not been very beneficial. No permanent forum or machinery existed for consultation on matters of defense. Public opinion in both Canada and the United States, aroused over the upset of the balance of power in Europe, grew fearful for the security of North America itself. Certainly time had arrived for closer Canadian-American military cooperation. Moffat reported to Washington in mid-August that even those groups in Canada which had opposed closer relations with the United States were now bringing pressure on the Frime Minister for more intimate relations below the border. King, who personally appeared to have been satisfied with the recent staff talks, thought that further measures would have to be pursued in

11 The Mackenzie King Record, p. 128.

defensive cooperation. King had suggested, said Moffat, that a personal interview with the President might prove fruitful.

Moffat's report appears to have reached Roosevelt on August 16.¹² In this report, and in correspondence with Roosevelt, Moffat suggested Ogdensburg, New York, as a meeting place for the President and Prime Minister. Inasmuch as Moffat had heard that Roosevelt planned a trip to New York State, he proposed to the President that he meet the Prime Minister somewhere along the border. Thus, the decision for the location of the conference at Ogdensburg came about somewhat by accident.¹³

In the meantime, Loring Christie, on August 13, had reported to the Acting Secretary of State, Summer Welles, that he had instructions from the Prime Minister to seek an interview with Roosevelt regarding Anglo-American destroyer negotiations. However, Welles, not Christie, delivered King's message to the President on August 14. When interviewed some years later in 1953, Welles stated that he believed King's message to Roosevelt included the suggested meeting, and that after he met with the President on August 14, 1940 he informed Christie of Roosevelt's willingness to meet the Prime Minister.¹⁴ Keenleyside also indicated that

¹³Interview, Leolyn Dana Wilgress, August 13, 1963.

¹⁴Dziuban, <u>Military Relations Between the U.S.</u> and Canada, p. 21.

¹²Stacey, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board," <u>International Journal</u>, 111.

King had suggested a meeting with Roosevelt.¹⁵ Christie himself met with Roosevelt on the afternoon of August 15 regarding the destroyers-for-bases issue,¹⁶ and may well have discussed the proposed meeting between the President and Prime Minister, if Welles's recollection regarding King's message to Roosevelt was correct. After the interview with Roosevelt, Christie observed that the President's mind appeared to have been made up regarding the destroyer problem and American defense.¹⁷

Roosevelt, with the Frime Minister's message and Moffat's report and suggestion of Ogdensburg as a meeting place confronting him, phoned King on the afternoon of August 16. Roosevelt spoke directly with King, addressing him as "Mackenzie." He said, "I am going tomorrow night in my train to Ogdensburg. If you are free, I would like to have you come and have dinner with me there." Roosevelt wanted to discuss the matter of destroyers and United States naval and air force use of British bases. He told King that he had given an interview to the press that morning, informing them that he was communicating with Great Britain over defenses in the Atlantic and that "I was taking up with you direct the matter of mutual defenses of our coasts on the

17 Eayrs, In Defense of Canada, p. 199.

^{15&}lt;sub>Hugh</sub> L. Keenleyside, "The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 1940-1945," <u>International</u> Journal, XVI (1960), 51.

¹⁶ James Eayrs, <u>In Defense of Canada: Appeasement</u> and <u>Rearmament</u> (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 199.

Atlantic." Roosevelt said he wished to keep the two matters separate, to which King agreed. Roosevelt continued by explaining to King that he had already informed the press that King and he would be meeting together. Thereupon he asked King: "Are you free tomorrow night?" King replied, "Yes." Roosevelt offered to have his car meet King at Ogdensburg or send it across the Thousand Islands Bridge for him, but King answered that he would have his own car and would go directly to Ogdensburg. Roosevelt concluded by asserting that "we can talk over the defense matters between Canada and the United States together." He asked King to stay the night with him in his railroad car, and attend a religious service with him on Sunday. King answered that he would be "very pleased to accept the invitation."¹⁸

Roosevelt had announced on August 14th that Washington had also been conferring with London regarding acquisition of naval and air bases for defense of the western hemisphere. He maintained that the negotiations with Canada continued independently of the British consultations.¹⁹ It appeared obvious, however, that geography triggered the Canadian-American discussions that were about to commence and the Anglo-American negotiations over Newfoundland, since Newfoundland comprised an integral part of Canada's defensive

19<u>New York Times</u>, August 17, and August 19, 1940.

¹⁸ The Mackenzie King Record, pp. 130-131; Stacey, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board," <u>International</u> Journal, 111.

perimeter. Lying as it did at the closest point to Europe of any of the coastal regions on the North American continent, Newfoundland suddenly assumed supreme military importance in Anglo-Canadian-American defense. It remained closely tied to Great Britain under colonial status.

Between spring and summer of 1940, the Canadian and American people slowly began to realize that their nations faced a threat, that the security of the western hemisphere The Germans successfully invaded Denmark lay imperiled. and Norway in April, and then, one by one, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France fell. Only England remained. During the week that preceded Ogdensburg, Nazi planes struck in waves across the English Channel. On Thursday, August 15, more than 1,000 planes raided England, and on the following day, 2,500 German planes rained bombs on London. On Saturday, the day the Prime Minister and President met in Ogdensburg, the Germans continued their raids.²⁰ How long could England stand? The Chief of the British Imperial General Staff had stated on July 26 that chances were 60 to 40 that Germany would try to invade Britain within the next six weeks, although both Roosevelt and King felt more optimistic about Britain's chances of holding out against Germany by the end of July.²¹

²⁰<u>New York Times</u>, August 16, 17, and 18, 1940.
²¹<u>The Mackenzie King Record</u>, p. 129.

A feeling of terrible uncertainty pervaded Ottawa and Washington. In this atmosphere, the Ogdensburg Agreement found its genesis, as Canadians and Americans turned to thoughts of joint hemispheric defense.

CHAPTER II

THE WASHINGTON-OTTAWA AXIS

Once Roosevelt had decided to meet King at Ogdensburg, Moffat proceeded with arrangements to have King driven down by car. All the preliminary preparations in Ottawa transpired with the strictest secrecy. Few men, even amongst those in the Department of External Affairs, knew of this planned conference, and those who did remained unaware of the agenda.¹ After having accepted Roosevelt's invitation, King, accompanied by Moffat, motored down from Ottawa the next day. At Prescott, Ontario, King and Moffat boarded a special ferry which carried them over the St. Lawrence to Ogdensburg. Motorcycles escorted them from there to the railroad yard where the President waited. King stepped aboard the President's private railway car at 7:00 p.m.

King and Moffat found Roosevelt relaxing in the observation room with his Secretary of War, Colonel Henry L. Stimson. The President greeted King with a smile and hearty handshake. "Hello Mackenzie," he said. "How do you do, Mr. President," replied King. Roosevelt and King, acquaintances since college days at Harvard, chatted over cool drinks as evening drew on. The train moved out of

¹Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963.

Ogdensburg to Heuvelton, New York, a quiet village nearby.²

When Moffat and King joined the President, he had just come in from inspecting troops in the field. Although physically tired, he was in an expansive mood. The President proceeded to discourse at random about a variety of issues. In particular, Roosevelt appeared amused at "stealing half the show" by his visit to Ogdensburg to see King. It happened that Roosevelt traveled to Ogdensburg on the same day that Wendell Willkie had given his acceptance speech for the Republican presidential nomination at Elwood, Indiana. About 8:00 o'clock that evening the initial conference broke up, and Roosevelt asked Stimson and King to join him for dinner at 8:30 p.m. They dined and deliberated until after 11:00 o'clock that evening.³

Roosevelt initiated the conversation by describing the destroyers-for-bases negotiations between the United States and Britain. He enumerated the several places within the British Empire where Americans would establish naval and air bases. Mentioning the matter of Canada, Roosevelt said that since Canada constituted a dominion, "negotiation must be with Canada." Then Roosevelt proposed the immediate

²<u>New York Times</u>, August 17, 18, 19, 1940; T<u>oronto</u> <u>Globe and Mail</u>, August 19, 1940; <u>Winnipeg Free Press</u>, August 24, 1940; <u>Montreal Gazette</u>, August 19, 1940; <u>Chicago Tribune</u>, August 18, 1940; <u>Time</u>, August 26, 1940, pp. 11-12; <u>The</u> <u>Mackenzie King Record</u>, p. 131; and <u>Moffat Papers</u>, pp. 324-326.

³Moffat Papers, pp. 324-326.

creation of a joint Canadian-American board, composed of military men, but led by two civilians who would be chosen from each country.⁴ There was an advantage, of course, in Roosevelt's thinking, in having a non-governmental civilian chairman in the early days when the United States was not a belligerent and Canada was. A former American Board member said he believed that it was the judgement from the American point of view that such an arrangement was politically necessary on our side.⁵

Roosevelt additionally proposed the establishment of a naval base and an air base somewhere in the St. Lawrence region or along the northeastern coast of Canada. Specifically he mentioned some place like Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, or an area further eastward along the coast of that province.⁶ King made it clear to Roosevelt that his government did not wish to sell or lease sites, but would willingly work out means by which the United States could use facilities on Canadian territory. Roosevelt said he wished to prepare

⁵Letter, J. Graham Parsons, October 15, 1963. Parsons was an American Board member November, 1945 to February, 1947, and served later as United States ambassador to Sweden.

⁴Stimson Diary, in Dziuban, <u>Military Relations</u> <u>Between the U.S. and Canada</u>, p. 23; Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, <u>The Western Hemisphere:</u> The Framework of <u>Hemisphere Defense</u> ("United States Army in World War II;" Vol. I; Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1960), p. 372.

⁶Stimson Diary, in Dziuban, <u>Military Relations</u> <u>Between the U.S. and Canada</u>, p. 23; and Conn and Fairchild, <u>The Framework of Hemisphere Defense</u>, p. 372.

for a situation in which, if Canada were invaded. United States troops could be brought into Canada quickly, or if the United States should be involved in conflict in the south or around the Panama Canal, Canadian troops could be moved down to Fortland, Maine, to the terminus of the Grand Trunk Hailway. He also thought that annual troop maneuvers on Canadian and American soil might be arranged.⁷ Use of Canadian bases would be granted to the United States by the Canadian government without submission to Parliament. The United States would be allowed a limited free port where it might bring in its supplies and equipment. It could install locks, dry docks and repair shops. The Americans would not object to Canadian artillery defense of these bases. Canadian participation in base defense might protect against charges that Americans had violated Canadian sovereignty.⁸

Roosevelt and King readily agreed in principle on the establishment of a joint board, which would consider the various problems presented by joint use of facilities, troop movements on each nation's soil of the other's armed forces, and the drafting of joint defense plans to meet the threat of attack. This agency, composed of an equal number of members from each nation, would study mutual defense problems and make recommendations to the two governments.⁹

⁷<u>The Mackenzie King Record</u>, p. 134.
⁸<u>Moffat Papers</u>, pp. 329-330.
⁹<u>The Mackenzie King Record</u>, pp. 131-132.

Before retiring on Saturday night, the two leaders decided to issue a joint statement to the press the following day. They discussed tentatively the wording of the press release. While they thought out loud on the phraseology of the joint announcement on the Board, the President mentioned something about the western hemisphere. However, Stimson used the words, "northern half of the western hemisphere." The scope of the Board would be confined to North America. Roosevelt commented to King that Newfoundland, because of its colonial status, constituted a phase of hemispheric defense on which the United States would of necessity have to negotiate directly with Churchill. King agreed, but interjected that inasmuch as Canada had undertaken the defense of Newfoundland, the British government would probably want Canada to cooperate in that negotiation.¹⁰

The President explained that the function of the newly devised committee or board should be to discuss plans for defense of the northern half of the western hemisphere, but with particular regard to possible attack from the northeast. It seemed vitally important, Roosevelt said, that there should be conferences, discussions and plans effected between the armed services of the two nations in case an attack should be launched up the St. Lawrence or along the northeastern coast of Canada, where he feared

> 10 <u>The Mackenzie King Record</u>, pp. 132-135.

a sudden attack seemed most apt to occur.¹¹ King was "perfectly delighted with the whole thing." Roosevelt's "courage and initiative," King asserted, "would be a most tremendous encouragement to the morale of Great Britain and Canada." He declared that "he would at once agree to the creation of such a Board and that it should be done immediately....¹²

On Sunday morning no further mention of the previous evening's conversations came up until Roosevelt and King returned to the train from attending troop maneuvers. While King and Stimson perused a list of questions that King had jotted down to discuss with the President, Roosevelt proceeded to draft the statement for the press, which they would issue jointly. King recalled that "he did this on a sheet of paper which he took from the basket." Roosevelt, with pencil in hand, read aloud the draft statement he had just written. Its wording, clear and concise, spoke of a permanent joint commission. King asked Roosevelt whether he thought the word "commission" was as good as "board" or "committee." The word "board," King pointed out, had been used the night before during conversation. Stimson agreed with King's suggestion that the word "board" might be

¹²<u>Stimson Diary</u>, quoted in Conn and Fairchild, <u>The</u> <u>Framework of Hemisphere Defense</u>, p. 372.

¹¹<u>Stimson Diary</u>, in W.L. Langer and S.E. Gleason, <u>The Challenge to Isolation: The World Crisis of 1937-1940</u> <u>and American Foreign Policy</u>, Vol. II (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 704; and Conn and Fairchild, <u>The</u> <u>Framework of Hemisphere Defense</u>, p. 372.

preferable, and Roosevelt concurred. King remarked that "commission" suggested the necessity of formal government appointments. "I then questioned him," King stated, "as to the significance of the use of the word "permanent."" Roosevelt answered immediately that he attached much importance to that word. "I was not questioning the wisdom of it but was anxious to get what he had in mind," said King. Roosevelt believed that the Board should not be created "to meet alone this particular situation but to help secure the continent for the future," and King concurred. They agreed on the title, the "Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defense."¹³

Roosevelt inserted the word "permanent" into the draft statement he composed. Yet, it is not clear whether King or Roosevelt first suggested that a permanent joint defense board be created. Dana Wilgress, Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union during World War II, and later chairman of the Canadian section of the PJBD, 1959-1967, maintained that King suggested the Board be a permanent one. In case the European situation brightened and Britain managed to stave off defeat, King did not want to see the Board dropped. King feared that as soon as the danger period passed, the United States would pull out of this Canadian-American agreement.¹⁴

> 13 <u>The Mackenzie King Record</u>, pp. 133-134. 14Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963.

John D. Hickerson, who served as State Department representative on the American section of the Board when it commenced in 1940, lent a different interpretation of Roosevelt's contribution to the Board's title. Roosevelt told Hickerson prior to the first PJBD meeting in 1940, that he had suggested the use of the word "permanent" in the Board's title. The President asserted in conversation with Hickerson, that the Prime Minister appeared pleased with this suggestion and readily concurred in it. "The President commented to me," Hickerson recalled, "that the defense of the United States and Canada was a permanent problem and that he did feel the Board ought to be a permanent body."¹⁵

Moffat, in his account of these conversations at Ogdensburg, related to him later by King, did not indicate that King had suggested the new Board be a permanent one. King just told Moffat that a "Permanent Joint Board on Defense" would be established.¹⁶ Whether or not King, during the conversations at Ogdensburg, actually proposed creation of a permanent joint defense body, certainly his fears as to the perpetuity of the American agreement to participate in a permanent board were not unfounded. Given

¹⁵Letter, John D. Hickerson, October 24, 1963. Stanley Dziuban, in <u>Military Relations Between the U.S.</u> and Canada, pp. 25-26, indicated that Roosevelt said King proposed that the joint board should be designated a permanent body. Dziuban based this contention on a letter written by John D. Hickerson, dated November 27, 1944 and found in the Department of State Dominion Affairs File.

16_{Moffat Papers}, p. 329.

the traditional American propensity for maintaining independence of action and avoiding entangling alliances, King's anxieties regarding the permanence of the Ogdensburg Agreement were understandable. (This is not to imply that Canadians generally had been any more ready to make foreign commitments than the United States.) The Frime Minister, furthermore, had participated in some of the very earliest proposals for a defense board. The actual idea for creation of a forum for Canadian-American joint defense had been discussed sometime prior to Ogdensburg within the Canadian government. Hugh Keenleyside maintained that Dr. O.D. Skelton, Canadian Under Secretary of State, originated the idea of a permanent joint board on defense.¹⁷

King most certainly contributed to the initial idea of establishing a joint Canadian-American board as a forum to discuss defense problems. He possessed great affection for the International Joint Commission (IJC),¹⁸ which had been created in 1909, with its six representatives, three from Canada and three from the United States. Granted, the IJC members sat primarily as a judicial body, unlike the PJBD, which would function much more as a deliberative forum. The Prime Minister may have desired to pattern the Board

¹⁸Interview, A.D.P. Heeney, June 9, 1967.

¹⁷Keenleyside, "The Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board," <u>International Journal</u>, 51.

after the IJC, because of the Commission's great success in boundary-water problems. King could have reasoned that the Board, like the IJC, would continue to work after the war as a permanent body. Although existing evidence indicates that Roosevelt penciled the word "permanent" into the Board's title at Ogdensburg, King may well have mentioned the word to Roosevelt at an earlier occasion during his conversations with him, or through personal messages sent by him to Roosevelt via Keenleyside or Christie. Dana Wilgress suggested, in fact, that the idea may have been broached to Roosevelt in this way.

Further explanations regarding the origin of a permanent joint defense board were offered by two former members. J. Graham Parsons suggested that the two national leaders' expectations in creating the PJBD comprised two parts: One, the recognition of an enduring geographic fact of life which was responsible for the addition of the word "permanent," a word normally too audacious for the uses of diplomacy; secondly, the short-term problem of how to provide a mechanism whereby two interdependent occupants of North America, one at peace for the time being, the other already a belligerent, would harmonize their activities without unacceptable political liabilities in either country. "Permanent" provided a useful word for avoidance of such liabilities of the moment. One must also recall, Parsons reminded, that a very great question mark existed at about this time as to whether the center of the British Commonwealth

could remain in London or might move to Ottawa. Happily, this factor, which loomed in the minds of the Board's founders when they created a "permanent" defensive body, never came about.¹⁹

R.M. MacDonnell, Canadian member from External Affairs, also maintained that the importance of a "permanent" joint board must be sought in the political climate in which the Board had its genesis. The lack of contact between the Canadian and American governments on defense questions before World War II remained almost complete, and to those who take post-war collaboration for granted, almost unbelievable. All that comes under the heading of isolationism characterized the defense policies of both the United States and Canada. Awareness both in Ottawa and Washington of the threat posed to North America by the Axis, particularly in the light of the over-running of western Europe, upset the comfortable cliches of isolationism, and produced the PJBD, not only as a mechanism, but as a symbol. A possible approach would have been a defense arrangement limited to an extraordinary situation which, it might be hoped, would go away. Instead. the two governments went out of their way to underline. by using the word "permanent," their belief that the threat to North America would be a lasting one.²⁰

19Letter, Parsons, October 15, 1963.

²⁰Letter, R.M. MacDonnell, September 3, 1963. He was Canadian member September, 1945 to February, 1947, and from October, 1955 to January, 1958.

Both Parsons's and MacDonnell's analysis of the creation of a permanent agency for hemispheric defense, sets the Ogdensburg Agreement in a very broad perspective. They attributed an extraordinary amount of realism and foresight to Roosevelt and King. However, given the international trauma of the Blitzkrieg in Europe, and then the air attacks on England raging in August, 1940, certainly these two leaders at Ogdensburg could easily perceive that the western hemisphere would no longer furnish an isolated continent of safety. Notwithstanding Roosevelt's idealism, his hope for world peace based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter to be drafted a year later, Roosevelt saw that the defense of the Americas would be a permanent, continuing problem. King's thinking paralleled that of Roosevelt's, and, consequently. the two leaders moved to meet the threat posed by the immediate conflict at hand. In so doing they laid the foundation for a permanent hemispheric defense understanding that would continue after the war had ended.

To return to the conversations at Ogdensburg, King and Roosevelt, after having agreed on a title for the Board, proceeded to the question of membership on the joint agency. Roosevelt suggested that there be four or five members, one of which would be a layman. When asked by King when and where the Board would meet, Roosevelt replied that he felt it should meet shortly. King believed the Board should meet that same week, and suggested that it might be well if they

met in Ottawa. The American members, he said, should become familiar with the problems which the Canadians already had been grappling with in Ottawa. Roosevelt thought King's suggestion an excellent one, and added that he would then like to see the Board go to Newfoundland or the Maritimes to view first hand the defense situation there. The President then read the statement a second time, and told King that he approved it in its entirety. Its wording likewise satisfied Stimson,²¹ who told others at the time, that he felt the Ogdensburg Agreement marked a major step, a turning point in American cooperation.²²

At noon, Sunday, August 18, King and Roosevelt parted, and the Prime Minister stepped out of the President's car. King's aide, who accompanied him, handed copies of a joint statement to several Canadian newspapermen who stood nearby. The statement read:

> The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual problems of defense in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States.

> It has been agreed that a permanent joint board on defense shall be set up at once by the two countries.

This permanent joint board on defense shall commence immediate studies relating to sea, land and air problems including personnel and material. It will consider in the broad sense the defense

of the north half of the western hemisphere.

²¹<u>The Mackenzie King Record</u>, p. 134.

²²<u>Saturday Night</u>, October 13, 1951, p. 1; Conn and Fairchild, <u>The Framework of Hemisphere Defense</u>, p. 372. The permanent joint board on defense will consist of four or five members from each country, most of them from the services. It will meet shortly.²³

The press release, which established the PJBD, variously referred to as the Ogdensburg Agreement, especially in Canada, and often called the Ogdensburg Declaration in the United States, was effected in Washington simply by publishing it, without title, in the Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>.²⁴ In Canada, the agreement, after having been approved by the War Committee of the Cabinet and by the Cabinet itself, received formal ratification and confirmation by a minute in council on August 21, 1940.²⁵ The Canadian government published it in the <u>Canada Treaty Series</u>, 1940, No. 14.

Moffat accompanied King back to Ottawa by car. During the drive, King related "at great length" his discussions with the President. The Board's first meeting, King said, would probably be held in Ottawa during the forthcoming week, but no final selections of personnel had been carried out in Ogdensburg. King predicted that the United States Under Secretary of the Navy would head the American section, while the remainder of the Board would

²⁴Dziuban, <u>Military Relations Between the U.S.</u> and Canada, pp. 27-29.

²⁵<u>Debates</u>, I (1940), 56.

²³<u>New York Times</u>, August 19, 1940; <u>Toronto Globe</u> <u>end Mail</u>, August 19, 1940; U.S., <u>Congressional Record</u>, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1940, LXXXVI, 12056; <u>Debates</u>, I (1940), 54; Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, III, No. 61 (1940), p. 154; and <u>Canada Treaty Series</u> (1940), No. 14.

be drawn from the heads of the services.²⁶ He outlined some of the problems which confronted the United States and Canada. Bases would have to be selected in Newfoundland and Canada. Supply and equipment decisions required urgent attention. Steps had to be carried out to make equipment interchangeable between nations. The question of how an American contingent of 300,000 troops could be sent to Nova Scotia as soon as possible remained pressing. Another consideration involved the course Canada would follow should an attack on Maine suddenly begin. Canadian railroads needed alterations, particularly with reference to reinforcing bridges and enlarging tunnels.²⁷ A good many of these problems fell within the frame of reference given the PJED for consideration and recommendation, and would soon pass before it for study.

Roosevelt's initial comment on the Ogdensburg Agreement, issued through his presidential secretary, announced that the Board would meet frequently and in varied locations. It would consider first the whole area of emergency organization for hemispheric defense, and function later as an advisory agency to maintain whatever defense operations might be effected. He did not disclose how much authority the American or Canadian governments might delegate to it, nor whether

27 Moffat Papers, pp. 329-339.

²⁶<u>Moffat Papers</u>, p. 329. James V. Forrestal was Under Secretary of the Navy and he never served on the Board.

it would extend to collaboration in economic areas.²⁸ The President deliberately interpreted the frame of reference given the Board in the broadest of terms, so as to leave the door open for further definition of the Board's responsibilities as the need arose. In establishing the PJBD, Boosevelt wanted the most freedom possible with regard to Congress. He did not consider it mandatory that the Senate pass judgement on the Ogdensburg Agreement. The acting Secretary of State, Welles, indicated Boosevelt's position on this matter at a press conference on August 19, when he announced that the agreement lay within the President's powers as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.²⁹

In the light of Roosevelt's forceful assertion of presidential prerogative, surprisingly little discussion ensued in Congress. For the most part, administration supporters and critics alike joined in approving Roosevelt's approach toward Canada. Many legislators who opposed American intervention in the war, supported Roosevelt in moving toward Canadian defense cooperation. Avid administration supporters unanimously approved the President's initiative. Alben Barkley, Senate Majority Leader, congratulated both Roosevelt and King and said the agreement evolved naturally out of a program planned to defend the United States and Canada against totalitarian aggression. One senator

²⁸New York Times, August 20, 1940.
²⁹New York Times, August 20, 1940.

interpreted it as an American pledge to enforce the Monroe Doctrine to the utmost.³⁰ A Democrat from Utah, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, spoke of Roosevelt's Board creation as a splendid and constructive piece of work. Sol Bloom, New York Democrat, and Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, expressed approval of the Board's establishment.

A West Virginia Democratic senator, previous critic of Roosevelt's foreign policy, welcomed the move to acquire defensive bases for the United States. He lauded the acquisition of naval or air bases on Newfoundland or Nova Scotia, and the possibility of the United States obtaining rights on Canadian territory on the Pacific coast between the United States mainland and Alaska. He said it "should have been the program long ago."³¹ After the agreement had been disclosed, this same senator stated that he was "glad to see our defenses being planned over here instead of over there." Closer Canadian-American military cooperation. he felt, was desirable, because any threat militarily to Canada naturally involved the United States. He warned, however, that if Canada wanted the United States to defend her, she should not transfer the British seat of government to this hemisphere.³²

³⁰<u>New York Times</u>, August 20, 1940.
³¹<u>New York Times</u>, August 17, 1940.
³²<u>New York Times</u>, August 19, 1940.

Senator Gerald Nye, maverick Republican from North Dakota, was unique in that he opposed the whole proposal. When Roosevelt announced his planned meeting with King. Nye bluntly stated, "I do not think we want any half interest with any foreign power in any part of the earth." He concluded with the kind of comment that has traditionally warmed Canadian affections toward their American friends, especially when that comment emanated from Congress. He said. "we certainly do not want to extend our frontiers any farther than they are now on a half or whole basis."33 Senator Nye's attitude, however, was not typical, for among congressional non-interventionists in the European war. little opposition arose to acquisition of naval and air bases in the western hemisphere. Along with Trinidad and Bermuda, Congress considered that Newfoundland's and Canada's security vitally affected the defense posture of the entire continent. Not only did Newfoundland serve as a strategic defensive outpost for Canada, its position had also assumed importance for the safety of the northeastern part of the United States. Most administration critics who opposed American intervention in the war thought the joint board plan an acceptable They visualized the Ogdensburg Agreement as part of one. hemispheric defense, a natural step in building a fortress America. Since it did not commit the United States beyond North America, it proved especially acceptable to those who did not wish to become involved in the war.

33_{New York Times}, August 17, 1940.

Democratic Senator Walter George, member of the Foreign Relations Committee from Georgia, who had frequently opposed Roosevelt on foreign policy issues, regarded the joint board's establishment advisable as a step in acquiring naval and air bases in the Atlantic. George asserted that the Board would serve merely as an advisory body and would not possess the power to bind the national government or make commitments. The Senate would have to ratify any formal agreements it might effect.³⁴

The brief consideration which the Senate gave the Board indicated that that body concurred in Senator George's assessment. On September 13, Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg from Michigan read a statement to the Senate from the Secretary of State. The document explained that the Ogdensburg Agreement and the PJBD created by it, did not constitute a treaty. The administration asserted that, because it appeared in form more like an executive agreement, the President had thought it unnecessary to formally submit it to the Senate. Vandenberg commented upon the administration's statement. His appraisal helps explain why the Senate approved the agreement with so little dissent. He said:

> If the arrangement is merely for the establishment of a joint board to study - again underlining the word "study" - problems of mutual defense between Canada and the United States, I can understand why the attitude would be taken which the Secretary defines. I personally am heartily in favor of a Canadian-American exploration of this character because it seems to me quite obvious that in the

³⁴<u>New York Times</u>, August 19, 1940.

event of untoward developments such a study might well be of desperately important consequences to our country. It is a wholly legitimate element of our nation's defenses.

He believed that since the Board would only "study," Congress need not be consulted. Vandenberg went on to emphasize that when the Board moved from study to "commitment," Congress should share in deciding the form that commitment might take. He requested that the text of the Ogdensburg Agreement be printed in the <u>Congressional Record</u>.³⁵ The Senate accepted Vandenberg's interpretation of the agreement with no further discussion of its implications. The Ogdensburg Agreement provided a means of protecting the western hemisphere and assisted particularly in strengthening the American fortress. On this basis it received passive support in Congress. Vandenberg's presentation was accepted without comment or debate, and printed in the <u>Record</u>.

At a press conference on August 20, King commented on the Ogdensburg Agreement. It would be the Board's duty, he said, to study the defensive situation and to make recommendations to the respective national governments. Neither government, he emphasized, would be bound in any way to execute these recommendations. This Canadian-American defense agreement, King carefully pointed out, did not commit either nation to definite action.³⁶ On Labor Day,

³⁵U.S., <u>Congressional Record</u>, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1940, LXXXVI, 12056.

^{36&}lt;u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u>, August 26, 1940; and <u>New York Times</u>, August 21, 1940.

King expanded further his interpretation of the agreement. In a coast to coast Canadian radio broadcast, King recalled Roosevelt's Kingston declaration in August 18, 1938, when Roosevelt had declared that "the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire." He recalled too his own reply to Roosevelt's declaration a few days later at Woodbridge, Ontario. when he had said that Canada had obligations as a good neighbor to see that "enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way across Canadian territory." King asserted that the Ogdensburg Agreement provided a natural conclusion to the two earlier declarations. He said the agreement, and the policy from which it sprang had increased, not decreased Canada's responsibilities. Canada and the United States, he said, had undertaken to share the burden of joint security. Neither nation had shifted the burden to the other. "We have recognized that our united strength will be something more than the strength of both acting separately," stated King. "Reciprocity in defense," he concluded, "involves reciprocal duties as well as reciprocal advantages. Canada gladly accepts both."37

King had met in Ottawa on August 20 with the Leader of the Conservative Opposition, Mr. R.B. Hanson. After this conference Hanson announced that he understood the "mutual" nature of the PJBD and that serving on it,

³⁷<u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u>, August 26, 1940; and <u>New York Times</u>, September 2, 1940. For the Kingston and Woodbridge pledges see <u>Debates</u>, III (1939), 2419; and I (1940), 57.

Canada would assume "equal responsibility."³⁸ Later. in Parliament, he referred to his August 20 meeting with the Prime Minister. Hanson stated that during his meeting with King. the latter had said President Roosevelt initiated the conversations at Ogdensburg. King had also assured him that Canada and the United States had made no commitments. On the basis of assurances King had given him in August. Hanson said he had not condemned the agreement. for he felt it might serve a good purpose. He did not feel the agreement served any great importance as long as Britain stood firm and the British Navy and Air Force held intact: yet. he thought it had positive worth as a means of increasing western hemispheric security. He admitted that if Britain should fall. the matter would become "a very live and important one."³⁹ When Parliament met on November 8. 1940, the agreement received support from Liberals and Conservatives alike. Only the Right Honorable Arthur Meighen attacked the Ogdensburg Agreement violently. His attack proved so violent in fact that the Toronto Globe and Mail refused to print the speech. 40

On November 12, King reported to Parliament on the meeting with Roosevelt. He noted that the War Committee of the Cabinet had been fully informed of the conversations

> ³⁸<u>New York Times</u>, August 21, 1940. ³⁹<u>Debates</u>, I (1940), 26.

⁴⁰George Ferguson, "Are the Yanks Invading Canada," <u>Macleans Magazine</u>, September 1, 1947, pp. 18 and 41.

he had held during the years leading up to Ogdensburg. He indicated that this agreement had not been due to "any sudden or precipitate action." To the contrary, he said. "it was the outcome of several conversations between the President and myself with respect to coastal defense on both the Atlantic and the Pacific, in which mutual interests of Canada and the United States were discussed." King denied. however, that the Ogdensburg Agreement had resulted wholly from conversations between Roosevelt and himself, or for that matter. from the reciprocal declarations issued by them in 1938. He said, "in a moment of crisis, personal friendship and mutual confidence, shared over many years between Mr. Roosevelt and myself, made it so easy for us to conclude the agreement reached at Ogdensburg." This new agreement, he asserted, was not to be of a temporary nature. "it is part of the enduring foundation of a new world order, based on friendship and good will." At the Prime Minister's request, a copy of the full text of the Ogdensburg Agreement was entered in Hansard.⁴¹

The Canadian government and opposition united in the opinion that Canada, with her vast continental expanse and limited defensive resources, possessed a common interest with the United States in mutual defense. They saw in the Ogdensburg Agreement a means of effecting a joint plan to insure Canadian and North American security. Prime Minister

⁴¹ <u>Debates</u>, I (1940), 53-60.

King had indicated his satisfaction in the Ogdensburg conference when he wrote to Roosevelt on September 7, 1940. He said he doubted that any conference between heads of state in neighboring countries could have been more in complete accord from start to finish, or more significant in its relation to international affairs.⁴²

Certainly King and other Canadian policy makers must have been encouraged by the suitable trend in American public opinion regarding Canada, both before and after Ogdensburg. Conceivably, the favorable evolution in American attitude during the months preceding the Ogdensburg Agreement may have spurred the Canadian government on in its contacts with Washington. Americans had indicated an increasing willingness to defend Canada with armed forces should Canada actually be threatened with armed invasion by a major foreign power. In January 1939, 71 per cent of the American voters favored defending Canada should the need arise, and 27 per cent said they opposed this action, or had no opinion on the matter. By January 1940, these Gallup Poll statistics showed that 74 per cent favored defense of Canada, 15 per cent opposed, and 11 per cent had no opinion. In August 1940, when the Ogdensburg Agreement was drawn, the per centage of those in favor of defending Canada had increased to 88, with only 12 per cent opposed or having no opinion. It is clear that interest and concern over defense of

⁴²Langer and Gleason, <u>The Challenge to Isolation</u>, p. 705.

Canada heightened before Ogdensburg. Results of a similar Gallup Poll conducted in May 1940, show that Republicans and Democrats were united in concern for Canadian defense. When asked if they thought the United States should use its army and navy to aid Canada, were Canada actually to be invaded by a European power, 87 per cent of Republicans and 86 per cent of Democrats sampled favored aiding Canada.⁴³

The Fortune polls conducted during the first year of war in Europe compare favorably with the evidence presented in the Gallup Poll for the same period. In January 1939, according to the Fortune data, 73.1 per cent of Americans indicated that they would be willing to see the United States assist Canada with armed forces if a major foreign power actually threatened to take Canada by armed invasion. A year later in January 1940, 74.2 per cent answered this question affirmatively. 44 These statistics show that the number of Americans sampled who would defend Canada, were it threatened, remained fairly constant between January 1939 and January 1940. Roughly three-quarters of those questioned would commit the United States to Canadian defense. From January 1940 on, the number of those ready to assist Canada grew in percentage.

A November 1940 public opinion poll demonstrated American approval of the PJBD. Of those questioned, 83.8

⁴³ H. Cantrill and M. Strunk, <u>Public Opinion 1935-</u> <u>1946</u> (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 772 and 781.

⁴⁴Fortune, January, 1940, p. 86, cited in F.H. Soward, et al., Canada in World Affairs, p. 111.

per cent approved creation of the Board, and only 5.2 per cent disapproved.⁴⁵ So Americans, during the spring and summer of 1940, not only manifested an increasing willingness to defend Canada, but also approved formation of a forum, the PJBD, through which Canada and the United States might cooperate in maintaining hemispheric security. The majority of Americans questioned understood that the United States could not defend itself should an enemy launch an attack through Canada. They realized that the United States would have to help defend Canada. To do this Americans would work jointly with Canadians through the agency of the PJBD.

In the weeks immediately preceding Ogdensburg, the press in Canada demanded that some form of joint defense understanding be forged between the two countries. Some of the principal newspapers in Canada, the <u>Montreal Gazette</u>, <u>Winnipeg Free Press</u>, <u>Vancouver Sun</u>, <u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u>, and periodicals like <u>Macleans</u> and <u>Saturdav Night</u> commited themselves to Canadian-American cooperation for defense.⁴⁶ Once the agreement had been disclosed, Canadian newspapers like the <u>Winnipeg Free Press</u>, the <u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u> and the <u>Montreal Gazette</u> reflected an attitude of general approval.

⁴⁵<u>Public Opinion Quarterly</u>, V (March, 1941), 164, cited in Dziuban, <u>Military Relations Between the U.S. and</u> <u>Canada</u>, p. 25.

⁴⁶Foreign Belations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1940, Vol. III (Washington, 1958), 144-145; <u>Winnipeg</u> Free Press, August 2, 6, and 17, 1940; <u>Toronto Globe and</u> <u>Mail</u>, August 2, 1940.

⁴⁷<u>Winnipeg Free Press</u>, August 19 and 22, 1940; <u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u>, August 19 and 26, 1940; <u>Montreal</u> <u>Gazette</u>, August 19 and 20, 1940.

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Frank H. Underhill commented upon the Ogdensburg Agreement in The Canadian Forum by noting that Canada had entered the war in September. 1939. and in so doing, reaffirmed her close ties with Great Britain. Within a year of the time Canada went to war, the Ogdensburg Agreement with the United States emerged, signifying a fundamental shift in Canadian foreign policy. Canadians recognized, Underhill asserted. that their primary interest suddenly had become North American defense and that they shared this interest in common with the United States. He observed that the Canadian government and press paid lip service to the "first front in Europe" slogan, but with the fundamental alteration in the old balance of power across the Atlantic and Pacific. Canada's immediate concern involved the defense of the northern half of the western hemisphere. 48 Underhill analyzed in the most discerning way the course of events that led the King government to Ogdensburg.

Newspapers and periodicals in the United States also supported a defensive understanding with Canada.⁴⁹ American newspapers in the Great Lakes area welcomed a mutual Canadian defense agreement to protect cities like Detroit and Buffalo. They feared for the security of the St. Lawrence River and Great Lakes region.⁵⁰ <u>Time</u> and <u>Life</u>,

⁴⁸"North American Front," <u>The Canadian Forum</u>, September, 1940, p. 166.

⁴⁹<u>New York Herald Tribune</u>, August 1, 7, and 22, 1940; <u>Chicago Tribune</u>, August 20, 1940; <u>New York Times</u>, August 20, 1940; <u>Christian Science Monitor</u>, August 20, 1940.

⁵⁰Detroit Free Press, August 20, 1940; Detroit News, August 21, 1940.

Luce publications, supported the Ogdensburg Agreement, and <u>Newsweek</u> termed it, "the most momentous move toward bolstering our hemispheric defense...."⁵¹ The <u>Nation</u> said, "The President has already made it clear on several occasions that we will defend Canada: the creation of the joint defense board indicates that we mean business."⁵² <u>The New</u> <u>Republic</u> viewed the agreement as a part of the war effort in Europe, and considered the danger of actual invasion of North America to be a rather distant threat. Notwithstanding, it did think that the agreement made "good sense," for the United States in its own interest could not allow a foreign invasion of Canada.⁵³

A liberal Roman Catholic publication, <u>The Commonweal</u>, looked upon the agreement as a means of safeguarding American defense in the direction of Europe, and at the same time providing tremendous assistance to the United States in its defense of Alaska. <u>The Commonweal</u> observed that with this new Canadian agreement the United States could build interior communications to Alaska from the United States.⁵⁴

52"New Defense Frontiers," <u>Nation</u>, August 17, 1940, p. 143.

⁵¹"Canada: One Half of North America Joins the Other on Defense," <u>Life</u>, September 9, 1940, p. 103; <u>Time</u>, August 26, 1940, pp. 11-12; and <u>Newsweek</u>, August 26, 1940, p. 27.

⁵³"Alliance with Canada," <u>The New Republic</u>, August 26, 1940, p. 263.

⁵⁴"Geo-politics Invade Another Continent," <u>The</u> <u>Commonweal</u>, September 6, 1940, p. 397.

The Christian Century, a Protestant magazine, disliked the agreement. It asserted that the President had undertaken a military commitment in which the Congress and people had had no voice. The <u>Century</u> termed it a virtual military alliance, and accused the President of uniting with a nation already at war.⁵⁵ The western hemisphere looked perfectly secure to the <u>Century</u>, and in its view, the agreement was just another move made by the President to drag neutral America into war.

American business attitude, as reflected in periodicals, indicated a coolness toward the Ogdensburg Agreement. Yet the business community proved ready to make the most of it once it had been effected. The Commercial and Financial <u>Chronicle</u> accepted the fact that the agreement had been made, and then pointed out the possibility of economic cooperation with Canada via mutual defense arrangements.⁵⁶ On the other hand, <u>The Magazine of Wall Street and Business</u> <u>Analvst</u> failed to see the agreement as an opportunity to expand American business with Canada. It simply accepted the increasing involvement of the United States with the "affairs of the British Empire" and expected its entry into the war within a couple of years.⁵⁷ <u>Business Week</u> and

⁵⁵<u>The Christian Century</u>, September 4, 1940, p. 1067.

56"North American Defense," <u>The Commercial and</u> <u>Financial Chronicle</u>, August 24, 1940, pp. 1035-1036.

⁵⁷"Foreign Policy in the Making," <u>The Magazine</u> of Wall Street and Business Analyst, September 7, 1940, pp. 614-615.

<u>Barron's. The National Financial Weekly</u> tended to focus upon the brighter side of the agreement. They saw in it an opportunity for trade expansion and for forging business ties with Canada on a permanent basis. Because of the need for uniting against a common threat, said <u>Business</u> <u>Week</u>, "the hemisphere is knitting itself into a great new trading bloc, with Washington as its headquarters."⁵⁸

The governments and legislative bodies in both the United States and Canada, the press for the most part, and public opinion reflected therein, supported the Ogdensburg Agreement in August, 1940. By that date the threat from Europe in particular had forced Canada to reconsider its position vis-a-vis the United States diplomatically. Not in over a century had Canadians acquired so much concern for defense of their continent, and never had they been so concerned for defense of the northern half of the western In the United States the President, Congress, hemisphere. and the majority of the American people understood that American security rested upon fortification of the entire western hemisphere. Consequently, a genuine community of interest had evolved between the United States and Canada by the summer of 1940, resulting in the Ogdensburg Agreement. In view of the swiftly changed power configuration in the

^{58&}quot;Canada Takes the Lead," <u>Business Week</u>, August 31, 1940, p. 48; and "Our Defense Agreement With Canada," <u>Barron's. The National Financial Weekly</u>, September 9, 1940, p. 9.

world, it benefited both Canada and the United States to join in creating an agency specifically limited to discussion of problems of hemispheric defense. The agreement reflected a joint interest in self-preservation and mutual ideals, a belief in the freedom and rights of the individual and the democratic process.

But diplomatically, the Ogdensburg Agreement encompassed a broader application. John D. Hickerson recalled that Canada, at the time of the Ogdensburg Agreement, was at war with Germany and had an expeditionary force in England fighting the Germans on the European continent. The United States, at least formally, was a neutral. By the Ogdensburg Agreement the United States government in effect announced to Germany that "Canada is at war with you; Under the rules of war you are entitled to retaliate against them, but we are telling you that you must not retaliate against them in the homeland, which is North America."59 This was sound American policy. So, in addition to furnishing a solution to the urgent demands for cooperation in hemispheric defense for Ottawa and Washington, the Ogdensburg Agreement (like Lend-Lease and the Destroyers-for-Bases deal) constituted another form of American intervention in the European conflict. At the same time it gave Canadians further assurance that the United States would not stand idly by if Canada were attacked.

⁵⁹Letter, Hickerson, October 24, 1963.

CHAPTER III

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOARD

The organization of the Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defense consisted¹ of two administratively and physically separate national sections.² In 1963 each section contained a chairman, one member from each of the armed services of both nations, and one member each from the United States Department of State and Canadian Department of External Affairs.³ Since 1951, the representatives from External Affairs and the State Department served as Board members in addition to two secretaries furnished by

²General A.G.L. McNaughton, <u>Statements and Speeches</u>, No. 48/18 (Department of External Affairs). <u>Statements</u> <u>and Speeches</u> will hereafter be referred to as <u>S/S</u>.; and <u>Briefing Paper</u>. This is a copy of an unapproved paper which Lieutenant Colonel Gordon E. Jonas, United States Air Force, Secretary, Office of the Military Members, United States section, Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, the Pentagon, Washington 25, D.C., sent to me on July 9, 1963, and which he used as a briefing paper in American section sessions. Hereafter referred to as <u>Briefing Paper</u>. See Appendix A for a copy of this paper.

³<u>Briefing Paper</u>; <u>Dana Wilgress Memoirs</u> (Toronto: Byerson Press, 1967), pp. 183-184; and <u>A Brief History of</u> <u>the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defense</u> <u>1940-1960</u>, p. 5.

¹Although the past tense is used throughout, organization of the PJBD has not altered substantially since its establishment. <u>A Brief History of the Canada-United</u> <u>States Permanent Joint Board on Defense 1940-1960</u> (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960), p. 5.

those departments.⁴ Previous to 1951, members from the External Affairs and State Departments served both as members and as secretaries. For a complete list of membership, 1940-1963, see Appendix B. Inasmuch as the two secretaries and members from the External and State Departments. and the chairman of each section were civilians, a reasonable balance of civilian and military membership was maintained. To that combination, a former chairman of the Canadian section, Dana Wilgress, attributed the Board's success. "The Board," he said, "composed of both civilian and military representatives, was in a unique position to help reconcile the conflict between military necessity and political expediency."⁵ This mixture of civilian and military membership ensured that the PJBD functioned as something more than a body for joint staff consultations and that it remained informed on the broader aspects of government policy.⁶

The chairman of the United States section obtained his appointment from the President with the advice of the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State. Since the

<u>A Brief History of the Canada-United States Permanent</u> Joint Board on Defense 1940-1960, p. 6.

⁵<u>Wilgress Memoirs</u>, pp. 183-184. Wilgress served as chairman from August, 1959 to June, 1967.

⁶Overall representation underwent a slight change in 1965. With the introduction of armed forces unification in Canada, the service representation was reduced from three to one. <u>Wilgress Memoirs</u>, p. 184. However, during the period under examination in this study, Canada's military representation remained fixed at three.

American section of the Board served as a presidential agency, it reported through its chairman or secretary acting in his stead, directly to the President.⁷ See Figure 1 for a diagram of the Board's administrative place in the United States government. There is an evident difference in background of men who served as chairmen of the Board. Canadians in general were diplomats in government service, and Americans more political appointees. Certainly, former American chairmen such as F.H. LaGuardia, ex-mayor of New York City: former Secretary of State. Dean G. Acheson; and Dr. John A. Hannah are in this category. Apparently President John F. Kennedy considered the Canadian experience of appointing diplomats to Board chairmanships worth imitating. When Hannah retired as chairman in September, 1963, Kennedy appointed in his place Dr. H. Freeman Matthews, who had been American Ambassador to Stockholm, The Hague, and Vienna. Wilgress observed that "the State Department had used my record as a former diplomat as an argument for securing the appointment of Dr. Matthews rather than that of an active politician."8

One member, appointed by the Secretary of Defense, from each of the three services - Army, Navy and Air Force represented the military on the United States section. Members of the Board from the United States services were

Wilgress Memoirs, p. 185.

⁷<u>Briefing Paper</u>; and Interview, Dr. John A. Hannah, September 17, 1963. Hannah was American section chairman, April, 1954 to September, 1963.




Figure 1 -- Organizational Chart, United States Section, PJBD *This chart was attached to the <u>Briefing Paper</u>.

officers of major general or equivalent flag rank, and like the members from the State Department, were appointed for periods of time that assured continuity of policy.⁹ However, the turnover of military members proved to be much more frequent than that of members from the State Department. Although military members of the American section were not Vice-Chiefs of Staff, as their Canadian counterparts, the United States major generals and admirals were usually chosen because their present position or previous background gave them special expertise in the Board's area of reference. For example, the United States Navy member, in October, 1963, besides possessing experience in board activity (he was also a member of the Inter-American Defense Board), was an expert in anti-submarine warfare, a subject of particular interest to the Royal Canadian Navy. The United States Army member usually held the rank of an Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, a position which required him to be in close touch with North American military planning. The United States Air Force member, usually a Deputy Vice-Chief of Staff, as Director, Headquarters, United States Air Force in the Pentagon, headed the United States Air Force Command Post in Washington. One of his branch offices included the United States Air Force Central Coordinating Staff in Ottawa, an administrative division attuned to the many By such United States Air Force activities in Canada.

⁹Briefing Paper.

means, the American military members acquired personal knowledge of their respective services' joint actions and planning with their Canadian counterparts.¹⁰

One of the three military members acted as steering and coordinating member of the American military representation on the Board. He represented the American government in the absence of the chairman. The steering member had to insure that the Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military departments had been advised of decisions, made by the PJBD, that were of primary concern to the Department of Defense. He facilitated coordination between the United States services on matters within the purview of the Board. Lastly, he supervised the maintenance of the central office of record for the American section.

The United States government authorized the American section to employ a military secretary of the grade of lieutenant colonel. The military secretary, nominated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve under the steering and coordinating member, worked through the proper channels to assist Canadian-American liaison on matters within the FJED's purview. He rendered an appraisal to the chairman and members on the current state of Board affairs. Further, he was empowered to make recommendations on any action required, and provided the necessary administrative support to the chairman and members to effect that action. In addition, his responsibilities included facilitating

¹⁰Letter, Wharton D. Hubbard, October 15, 1963. Hubbard became United States section secretary in 1963.

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coordination between organizations within the Department of Defense itself regarding PJBD matters. He also maintained the central office of record for the PJBD.¹¹ Serving in these capacities demanded the military secretary's full time duty and usually carried with it a four-year stay on the Board.

Besides representing their respective military departments, the American military members, as a combined body, also represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Board. They obtained and coordinated their service positions on PJBD issues, and advised the chairman on matters concerning their service which had been referred to the Board. They insured that appropriate organizations of their military departments had knowledge of recommendations, made by the PJBD. which had been approved and resulted in commitments of interest to the Defense Department. Their duty also involved monitoring the status of major policies or actions resulting from United States commitments, made through the PJBD, that were of primary concern to their service. Each of the military members. with the approval of the American section chairman, could appoint an assistant member to advise and help him as required. Assistant military members usually held the grade of colonel or captain. Assistants, while not comprising a part of the formal organization of the Board, accompanied the military members to the Board meetings and occupied a recognized position in the Board's

11Briefing Paper.

structure. Assistant members could represent the military members in the latter's absence.

The Secretary of State appointed the one member from the State Department serving on the Board. This member paid particular attention to political problems associated with the work of the Board. He advised and assisted the Secretary of State in the development of Department of State positional stands on PJBD matters, and kept the American chairman informed on the views of his department regarding these matters. Furthermore, he insured that appropriate agencies of the Department of State acquired advice on recommendations, issued by the Board, which had been approved and resulted in commitments of consequence to the Department of State. Lastly, he conveyed information regarding the status of major actions resulting from American commitments, made through the Board, that involved the State Department.¹² Members of the Board from the State Department and External Affairs were often of high rank. For example, Dean Acheson, an under-secretary of state, served on the Board shortly before his appointment as Secretary of State. Dr. Matthews had a distinguished diplomatic career before becoming 13 The rank of the State Department American chairman. member, in his department, was similar to that of a two-star military general. Invariably, the Department of State member

12 Briefing Paper.

13Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

served as Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs. One of his principal responsibilities concerned American relations with Canada. He therefore was also usually well informed on Canadian-American matters which might have an effect on the business before the Board. Since it became progressively more difficult after 1945 to separate Canadian-American military matters from their side effects on political and economic issues, the importance of his position increased with time. The Board served for just that purpose - to see where military matters might have political and economic repercussions.¹⁴ Because of his position of overall responsibility within the American government, the Department of State member played a most significant role on the Board.

An assistant, appointed by the State Department member with the approval of the American section chairman, worked as an advisor and deputy to the State Department member, and served as secretary to the United States section of the Board. He maintained liaison with the secretary of the Canadian section and with the secretary of the American military representation on the Board.¹⁵ The secretary of the American section invariably served as the officer on the Canadian Desk in Washington, and occupied himself with Canadian political or political-economic problems. Therefore, at least in principle, he was well informed on the Board

¹⁴Letter, Hubbard, October 15, 1963.


15 Briefing Paper.

agenda at hand. Through his direct channel to the Canadian secretary, the United States secretary negotiated Board business or discussed the new agenda items for the next joint meeting of the Board.¹⁶

The Canadian section worked with less formality than its American counterpart. Nothing was set down in writing regarding the Canadian section's structure. No constitution, by-laws, informal working paper, or organizational chart of the Canadian section existed. Most of the activities of the Canadian section were integrated with the regular governmental machinery so closely that no necessity for a separate set of working rules or introductory briefing paper arose. The United States section, with a much more formal structure, required rules to brief its membership. A diagram of the Board's administrative position within the Canadian government appeared in the <u>Debates of the</u> <u>House of Commons</u> on June 24, 1948. See Figure 2.

Canadian members of the Board from External Affairs served by virtue of the particular position they held in the department. For example, in 1963, Mr. Arthur Menzies, employed as Defense Liaison between the Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of Defense, automatically assumed representation on the PJBD, because his position as Defense Liaison carried with it the responsibility of Board membership in addition to other duties. By the same token, Mr. James Nutt, working in 1963 as Deputy Assistant Defense

16Letter, Hubbard, October 15, 1963.



*Debates, VI (1948), 5780.

Liaison, dealt with Canadian-American relations in External Affairs. Nutt, while serving in this capacity, also assumed the secretaryship of the Canadian section. Members serving the Board from External Affairs reported to the Minister of External Affairs and remained responsible to him. For some years, representatives of the Canadian Departments of Transport and Defense Production attended Board meetings. When desirable, each section asked representatives of other government departments to participate in Board activity.¹⁷

Canadian Vice-Chiefs of Staff automatically took up membership on the Board as Vice-Chiefs and were responsible to the Chiefs of Staff. Because of the smaller Canadian military organization, military members of the Canadian section usually retained a higher flag rank than their American counterparts. The Canadian members frequently held ranks of major general, and had assistants who bore the rank of colonel. The Vice-Chiefs and External members each retained assistants, who sat on the Board and played a significant role in assisting with the Board's business. These assistants were drawn from their respective services and departments. However, no formal procedure for appointment applied within the Canadian section.¹⁸

With the exception of the United States military secretary, who was not a full member, membership on the

¹⁸Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963.

¹⁷Statement by Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, to the Special Parliamentary Committee on Defense, July 25, 1963, 10:30 a.m. For a copy of this see Appendix C.

Board generally served on a part-time basis. When not directly concerned with Board affairs, these men performed many other functions in differing capacities.¹⁹ The members served from their respective section offices in Ottawa and Washington when the Board was not in formal session. 20 The degree to which section members functioned as Board members between meetings varied within the two governments. Canadian membership worked much more as a part-time committee on Board affairs than did the American, which operated on a somewhat continuing basis. Within Canada, the Board's activity lay dormant for the most part between joint national sessions.²¹ Canadian members retreated into their respective services and departments more readily than their American counterparts. For example, no equivalent to the United States steering and coordinating member or military secretary existed in the Canadian section until mid-1967, at which

¹⁹Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963; and <u>Briefing</u> <u>Paper</u>.

²⁰Dziuban, <u>Military Relations Between the U.S. and</u> <u>Canada</u>, p. 33. PJBD offices were located at the following addresses: Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, United States Section, Office of the Military Members, The Pentagon, Washington, 25, D.C.; and Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, United States Section, Department of State (BNA), Washington 25, D.C.; and in Canada, Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States of America, Canadian Section, Office of the Chairman, East Block, Parliament Buildings, Ottawa; and Secretary, Canadian Section, Department of External Affairs, Room 278, East Block, Parliament Buildings, Ottawa.

²¹Interview, James Nutt, August 12, 1963.

time A.D.P. Heeney assumed Canadian chairmanship, and a Canadian military secretary was added. When letters concerning PJBD business arrived in External Affairs, the department used PJBD letterheads in answering Board correspondence, but beyond that, Canadian Board representatives served more in broader capacities as members of External Affairs between meetings, than they did as PJBD delegates specifically. When the secretary of the Canadian section, Nutt, returned from a PJBD session, he resumed his duties within the department as Deputy Assistant Defense Liaison, working closely with the Defense Liaison Officer. The Canadian sectional secretary worked more as a civil servant within the department. than as a member of the Board. Consequently, the Canadian membership functioned within a much less institutionalized structure than the American section.²²

The Board began its work in 1940 with senior officials from the State and External Affairs Departments acting as secretaries for the two sections.²³ In the American section, the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, J.D. Hickerson, served as secretary, and was also responsible for Canadian affairs in the Department of State.²⁴ External

²²Interview, Nutt, August 12, 1963; and Wilgress, August 13, 1963.

 ²³Letter, R.A. MacKay, July 31, 1963. MacKay was
 Canadian External Affairs member January, 1951 to October, 1955.
 ²⁴Letter, Hickerson, October 24, 1963.

Affairs, in selecting a secretary for the Canadian section, appointed Hugh Keenleyside, Counselor of the Department of External Affairs. He headed the American Division in External Affairs and seemed best qualified for the secretarial position.²⁵ At the first meeting of the Board in Ottawa during August, 1940, an informal agreement within the Board provided that the State and External Affairs Department representatives would sit as full voting members in addition to serving as secretaries.²⁶ LaGuardia, the American section chairman, however, never quite conceded to this informal understanding regarding full voting membership for the secretaries. Keenleyside often spoke out quite vocally on issues. as did Hickerson. LaGuardia once told Keenleyside that the latter. as secretary, did not enjoy full voting membership on the Board and was therefore not entitled to speak as such.²⁷ The status of the Board's secretaries was never a clearly defined one.

In the mid-1940's, when the Board's work slackened, the State and External Affairs Departments tended to be represented by secretaries from a lower department-grade level.²⁸ Not long after World War II, however, it became evident that, in addition to western Europe and the Far East,

²⁵Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963.
²⁶Letter, Hickerson, October 24, 1963.
²⁷Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963.
²⁸Letter, MacKay, July 31, 1963.

the North American continent furnished an area of prime military and diplomatic importance. North American military. economic, and political matters acquired increasing interrelatedness, and the two governments eventually thought it best to adjust the Board's representation accordingly. The introduction of full members from the Department of State and External Affairs in 1951 mirrored the further complexity of the Board's business.²⁹ As defense matters increased in urgency in the early 1950's, both departments reverted to appointing more senior diplomatic officials to the Board, while retaining as Board secretaries, the officials who had performed the clerical duties. An opinion prevailed in the External and State Departments that the Board secretaries did not have enough time, while serving as sectional secretaries, to fully represent their departments on the PJBD. The decision to have representatives from External Affairs and the State Department. in addition to the secretaries provided by those departments, was a step to ensure adequate representation for the two foreign Those representatives. freed from the burden of offices. secretarial duties, could now concentrate fully upon the interjection of their department's views into the Board's deliberations.³⁰ Consequently, after 1951, the Departments

²⁹Letter, Willis C. Armstrong, October 22, 1963. He was Department of State member during the concluding year of this study, 1963.

³⁰Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963; Letter, MacDonnell, September 3, 1963; Letter, A.R. Menzies, December 30, 1963; and Letter, Julian L. Nugent, July 31, 1963.

of State and External Affairs were represented on the Board by permanent, full-fledged members.

Ottawa appointed as diplomatic representative to the Board, a man closely allied with defensive matters, who held the position of full department head over the American section in External Affairs. This newly appointed member, the Defense Liaison, worked with the Chiefs of Staff, particularly with their chairman, and with the Minister of Defense. After 1951, the Defense Liaison served on the Board as the member from External Affairs, even though no policy directive ever provided for this in writing.³¹ The closeness with which this new Canadian diplomatic member was allied with defense problems is demonstrated when one examines the position of R.A. MacKay, Assistant Under Secretary in External and Defense Liaison. All defense matters within External Affairs passed over his desk. Furthermore, he represented the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs on the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and on the Committee on Economic Aspects of Defense. These two bodies, together with the Cabinet Defense Committee, on which he also served, constituted the effective inter-departmental committees concerned with hemispheric security.³² During the Liberal administrations of King and Louis St. Laurent, the Assistant Under Secretary for External Affairs and the Defense Liaison worked closely with the military departments in Ottawa.

> 31Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963. 32Letter, MacKay, July 31, 1963.

The Chiefs of Staff sent one of their members to sit with the Committee on Economic Matters of Defense, and a civilian member from this Economic Committee sat with the Staff Chiefs. Each of these committees sent a representative to the Cabinet Committee on Defense which included the Prime Minister, and the Ministers of Defense, External Affairs, and Finance and Trade.

The two secretaries from the political departments of each country served in a role inferior to the Board's diplomatic members. Dr. Hannah observed that he did not consider the secretaries from the External and State Departments as full voting members. The secretaries worked as assistants and scribes.³³ It appeared, however, that in Canada the secretary's position in Board affairs was a more weighty one than that of his American counterpart. Because the member held a departmental position one step higher than the secretary, a hierarchy did exist in Canadian Board membership, with the member carrying more responsibility than the secretary. Yet, Ottawa never considered the Canadian secretary as an assistant in the same light as the State Department looked upon its secretarial representative on the Board. As a secretary of the Canadian section. Nutt stated that he, for the most part, possessed a full voice and received recognition from the chairman,³⁴, but the American sectional secretary functioned merely as a recorder of Board proceedings.

> 33Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963. 34Interview, Nutt, August 12, 1963.

The appointment of full-fledged members from the External and State Departments proved significant in that it lent PJBD matters a higher priority in the activities of each nation's political departments. It allowed each department to exercise a greater voice in Board affairs. This new appointment increased the emphasis on political aspects of defense in PJBD proceedings. In a sense, the diplomatic end of the Board had not been completely represented by secretary-members alone, for a secretary found himself so busy taking notes that he really had little time to formulate thoughts or offer comments of his own.

A former American Board member, J. Nugent, cautioned that one should not attach too much importance to the secretarial change of 1951. In his view, the governments added secretaries primarily to relieve the State and External members from the burden of writing up the all-important minutes. which required approval prior to each Board adjournment. The secretaries, who prepared these minutes during the night and early morning, labored in a most time consuming task. Nugent did note that "their presence, plus that of the State and External members. was of considerable assistance in presenting civilian viewpoints." One "should not imagine, however," said Nugent, "that a struggle for power was being waged between military and civilian elements within the Board's confines. We had hot arguments from time to time, but they were caused primarily by differences in method and emphasis. Each member tended to think along

lines of his trade. The military thought primarily about defense objectives and technical problems related to those objectives. The civilian elements tended to stress political, economic, and diplomatic considerations." The appointment of members from State and External was not motivated by any attempt to subordinate service representatives to further supervision and control by the political and civilian departments of government. Mr. Nugent observed that often an examination of some military project among the military components of both sides would progress informally at certain stages, beyond the cognizance of civilian members. This was natural enough, he said, and although tempers sometimes strained, they rarely caused any problem. All those concerned, he noted, knew they had to "put their cards on the table" during Board meetings and during preparations prior to Board meetings. Nugent discounted heavily the suggestion that any necessity arose to subordinate the service members to further the balance of control by civilians on the Board in 1951. "Such language," he said, "would have given all the Board members a good laugh."35

Organizational changes in the political departments of both sections in 1951 were not related to elements of civilian control over military. In the post-World War II period, the field of policy making was left increasingly to the discretion of the military, a practice which was applicable to defense in general during that period and

³⁵Letter, Nugent, July 31, 1963.

not just to Canadian-American relations. The best explanation for the major additions in Board membership in the early 1950's rests upon the fact that the American government and military wanted a good deal from Canada by 1951. Against the background of a Russian nuclear explosion in 1949, the fall of the Nationalist Regime of Chiang Kai-shek on Mainland China, and the outbreak of the Korean War, Canadian-American defense assumed a new urgency. The United States government needed a full-time member from the State Department to carry forward the negotiation for a whole series of continental defense measures. On the Canadian side, the Liberal government desired a number of "guid-pro-guos" from the United States in return for concessions to the Americans, particularly to the United States Air Force, involving use of Canadian soil and airspace. A genuine mutuality of interest arose by 1951 between the United States and Canada. and both nations stood to benefit by expansion of the political arm of the PJBD. In appointing a full-time diplomatic member and secretary to each section, they freed these members from restrictive secretarial duties and left them at liberty to devote full time to political aspects of Canadian-American defense.

In the twenty-three years after the PJBD's creation, its organization remained essentially the same. There were two national sections, each with a civilian chairman, representatives from the army, navy and air force of each country, and representatives from the Departments of State and External

Affairs. During the years prior to 1951, the members from the External Affairs and State Departments functioned both as members and as secretaries. In 1951 each of those departments added to the Board assistants, who served as secretaries. The State and External Departments' representatives, freed from the responsibilities of secretarial duties, could more adequately represent the concerns of the two nations' foreign offices on the PJBD. The mixture of civilian and military membership on the Board helped ensure that the Board provided more than an agency for joint staff discussions, that its scope encompassed the political as well as military aspects of governmental policy.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF THE BOARD

On August 18, 1938 at the opening of the Thousand Islands Bridge, Prime Minister King stated that Canada and the United States had practiced "the art of international bridge-building" with two structures which stood out as "monuments of international cooperation and goodwill." One of these structures was the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817. and the other the International Joint Commission (IJC). In November, 1940, the Prime Minister compared the newly created PJBD to these two older Canadian-American structures. The Rush-Bagot Agreement had been a selfdenying ordinance of mutual disarmament, King asserted, and the International Joint Commission an instrument for peaceful adjustment of differences. King noted that the new agency, the PJBD, established a "mutual arrangement for common defense." Creation of all three structures. the Prime Minister said, had been dictated by "ordinary common sense."1 King and Roosevelt drew upon precedents found in the two older international agreements in considering the Board's establishment. The Rush-Bagot Agreement

¹<u>Debates</u>, I (1940), 53-60.

had been effected by an exchange of notes,² but the Ogdensburg Agreement consisted of only a simple press release, an even less formal agreement than that of 1817. The IJC, which had arisen out of a Canadian-American treaty of 1909, established a six man commission to sit in final authority on some boundary water problems and to study and report on boundary questions referred to it by either nation.³ It functioned largely in a judicial capacity, whereas the PJED formed more of a deliberative body. A Board chairman, unlike his counterpart on the IJC, often attended a joint meeting equipped with definite instructions from his government regarding proposals for joint defense.

Officially, the PJBD functioned as an advisory body. It took no executive action and did not possess authority to take implementing action on substantive matters.⁴ Its principal purpose, described in the Ogdensburg Agreement, consisted of advising or recommending to the two governments, defensive measures based on studies relating to the northern half of the western hemisphere. The Board did not constitute a combined staff, nor did its national sections provide

⁴Briefing Paper.

²J.M. Callahan, <u>The Neutrality of the American Lakes</u> and <u>Anglo-American Relations</u> (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins Press, 1898); and C.P. Stacey, <u>The Undefended Border: The</u> <u>Myth and the Reality</u> (Ottawa: The Canadian Historical Association Booklets, No. 1, 1955).

³C.J. Chacko, <u>The International Joint Commission</u> (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932); and A.G.L. McNaughton, "Organization and Responsibilities of the International Joint Commission," <u>Engineering Journal</u>, XXXIV (January, 1951), 2-4, and 12.

a rival in any way to the military or diplomatic staffs in Washington or Ottawa.

The Board, however, in the view of former Department of State member, J. Graham Parsons, operated from the early days as more than an advisory body. On some matters it provided a negotiating forum; on others, in fact nearly always, it operated as a highly flexible, consultative body, wherein discussions could go forward between individual members or between sections in their regular sessions, and wherein. at times. divisions could be on service or functional lines as much as on national lines. The dividing line between the role of members as members, and as executives in their respective services never appeared too distinct. By virtue of their positions and their consequent ability to influence and execute government actions and policies on both sides, members served in executive capacities. Sometimes subsequent advice by one or more members to his own government had an impact on the governmental process. Board members were frequently in a position to expedite government consideration of problems presented to the Board. Board members often enjoyed prestige and influence within their government because of the Board's good wartime reputation, and because of its status as a successful channel for bilateral arrangements. The status of a Board member probably carried more weight on the Canadian side, although several well known American military and political figures

also served on the Board during World War II.⁵ The Board itself, however, never functioned as an executive body, and never took to itself any such authority, even though its opinions carried weight. Certainly acquaintance between members helped greatly in speeding executive action. In part because of the unique mechanism of the Board, and in part because of the great pressure of dedication to the mutual war effort, personal friendships became close, and mutual confidence between and within sections developed easily.⁶

J. Nugent, in analyzing the Board's advisory functions, stated that most members of the Board worked in two or three capacities. In their regular government jobs, all members retained executive responsibilities which they were fulfilling daily. Whenever they met as a Board, they would assume Board responsibilities, but naturally enough, they were never far removed from executive thoughts and

⁶Letter, Parsons, October 15, 1963.

⁵During World War II, for example, Colonel Oliver Mowat Biggar, former Advocate General of the Canadian forces, and a man with a distinguished record as a lawyer and public servant, served as Canadian chairman. The United States chairman was Fiorello H. LaGuardia, mayor of New York City. John D. Hickerson of the State Department acted as member and secretary for the Americans, while Hugh L. Keenleyside of External Affairs was his counterpart. Canadian military membership consisted of Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Kenneth Stuart: Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General and Governor General of Canada) G.P. Vanier; Captain (later Vice-Admiral) H.E. Reid; and Air Vice-Marshal (later Air Marshal) W.A. Curtis. Distinguished American officers have included Commander (later Admiral and Chief of Naval Operations) F.P. Sherman; Lieutenant Colonel (later General) J.T. McNarney; and Lieutenant General S.D. Embick.

obligations. This condition represented one of the great virtues of the Board, as Board personnel could get together and discuss projects or proposals in relative calm. Once they had become convinced of the advisability of something, and had returned to their executive posts, they were in excellent positions to promote the matter they had deemed advisable.⁷

A former Canadian member, R.M. MacDonnell, maintained that from the first the Board provided a forum, not only for making joint recommendations, but for negotiating, exchanging views, testing ideas, and in some cases, for quietly rejecting impracticable solutions. It is wrong to think of the Board as a group of supra-national, and independent military and diplomatic advisers, tendering objective advice to governments hungering for objective appraisal. During the years of the Board's history, arguments were heard from time to time that such should be the Board's role, as it is the role of advisers to a national government, but such arguments fly in the face of political and constitutional realities. A service or diplomatic member on the Board put his views before his political chiefs; if accepted, they became the subject of international negotiation, but if rejected, they simply died. It would have posed an impossible situation if, for example, Canadian

⁷Letter, Nugent, July 31, 1963. Julian L. Nugent served as secretary from the Department of State, January, 1955-July, 1956, and member July, 1955-October, 1958.

service members had advocated policies in an international forum, only to have had the government of the day reject them. Instead, the Canadian members of the Board acted as spokesmen for government policy and avoided advocating recommendations which would later be disowned. They were, in short, negotiators whose positions were dictated by their instructions, broad or narrow, as the case might be. Under a system of ministerial responsibility for foreign and defense policy they could assume no greater latitude of discretion.⁸

Many other former Board members emphasized that the Board's strength lay in the fact that it had not been given formal executive responsibilities. It could render suggestions for action, but did not order execution of policy. The Board had to constantly review the defensive situation, and in case its suggestions were not carried out, its members could draw this to the President's or Prime Minister's attention. Members from both sections often influenced government policy. The PJBD furnished a channel of communication for expediting action on many projects of particular importance. It was, for example, the result of Board activity which drafted the plans for the North American air defense establishment in the 1950's.⁹

⁸Letter, MacDonnell, September 3, 1963.

⁹Letter, Air Marshal W.A. Curtis, July 11, 1963. Canadian member February, 1944-November, 1947; Letter, General Maurice Pope, July 6, 1963. Canadian member April,

Formal Board sessions provided the primary means through which the Board fulfilled its raison d'être. During formal meetings the two sections met with the single purpose of insuring that North American defense problems received a proper answer.¹⁰ The Board itself determined the frequency, date, and location of national joint sessions.¹¹ In the first three years, the Board met on an average of once a month, meeting alternately in the United States and Canada. Members discovered rather quickly that Washington and Ottawa did not provide good meeting places, for too often the telephone diverted them. Board representatives found that meeting several miles from their offices cut down on telephone interruptions. Something about the term "long distance telephone call" in the 1940's, as J.D. Hickerson noted. deterred persons who otherwise would have disrupted Board deliberations.¹² In the first years of the Board's existence it met frequently either at Montreal or New York. But even here too many distractions from the outside intervened to make these locations wholly desirable. Furthermore,

1941-November, 1945; Speech, General A.G.L. McNaughton, <u>S/S</u>, No. 48/18; and Letter, Armstrong, October 22, 1963.

10_{McNaughton}, <u>S/S</u>, No. 48/18.

11Briefing Paper.

¹²Letter, Hickerson, October 24, 1963.

the Board found it most advantageous to meet at defense installations, where they might review progress in a particular area on the spot. After 1946, meeting sites for the Board often rotated between service installations in the two countries, with the army, navy, and air force playing host at their respective defense establishments. The Board assigned the handling of publicity men and press to the particular host service. Free from publicity and public purview, such sites provided desirable locations for joint Board sessions. For the most part, Board members had no direct contact with the mass media during Board conferences. This proved advantageous for the Board's independence of action and helped insure security of defense activity as well.¹³

The Board met at such places as Mitchell Air Force Base, Long Island, New York; Fort Churchill, Manitoba; Fort Bliss, Texas; Camp Borden, Ontario; East Lansing, Michigan; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Camp Gagetown, New Brunswick; Goose Bay, Newfoundland; in the air over western Canada and Alaska, or on board ship at sea. From 1946, the number of annual meetings varied from three to five. For a complete list of Board meeting sites and dates from August 26, 1940 to June, 1963, see Appendix D. Beginning in the early 1950's Board meetings continued to alternate between the United States and Canada, with two meetings held in Canada, and

13Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963.

two in the United States. To make the most advantageous use of favorable weather conditions, the Board often met in Canada during the summer months and in the United States in winter.¹⁴ Provision existed, however, for calling emergency meetings of the Board. In an emergency the Board could be assembled just as in wartime.¹⁵

Before a joint Board meeting, considerable preparations took place in each country. If Canada acted as host, Wilgress, for example, as Canadian chairman, initiated preparations for the PJBD session. He, with the assistance of his section secretary, began gathering items for the agenda about six weeks in advance of the joint conference. Normally, Wilgress conversed by phone with the American chairman about six weeks to a month before a Board meeting. They discussed possible subjects for Board consideration.¹⁶ About two weeks in advance of a Board meeting, the Canadian section met for a preliminary briefing and discussion

¹⁴Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963.

¹⁵Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

16Since 1967, the Canadian military secretary assumed responsibility for arranging meeting sites when Canada was host, and assisted in gathering items for the agenda. Interview, A.D.P. Heeney, June 9, 1967. Arnold Danford Patrick Heeney became chairman of the Canadian section in 1967. He was Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet, 1940-1949 and Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1949-1952. He usually read the Journal of the Board and was well versed on Board affairs. Heeney served as ambassador and permanent representative of Canada to the North Atlantic Council and to the Organization for European Cooperation, 1952-1953. He was ambassador to the United States 1953-1957 and 1959-1962. period, and to plan for the official Board session. When the Board conference was held at a Canadian site, the Canadians attempted to call their preliminary meeting a little before the American section held a similar session. The principal business at this preliminary Canadian briefing session concerned drafting a list of items for discussion at the PJBD meeting. Figuring out an agenda proved difficult at times, as in 1958-1963 when so many problems developed in Canadian-American relations. Shortly after the Canadian section had met, the secretary or chairman contacted the American section, which usually had also held a preliminary session, to ascertain if the Americans had suggestions for the agenda. If so, the American proposals were invariably accepted.¹⁷

The Americans were just as willing to discuss any topic suggested by Canadians. "I suppose you can say," commented J.D. Hickerson, "that during the time I was on the Board we put on the agenda any topic that either side wished to discuss. I don't believe that either side ever objected to putting a topic on the agenda."¹⁸

The Canadians, as host, normally held another meeting of their section one week in advance of the PJBD session. At this point, items for the agenda had pretty well been accumulated. Discussion in detail of these items usually resulted in a Canadian position or view on each

¹⁷Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963.
¹⁸Letter, Hickerson, October 24, 1963.

of them, regardless of the source of the item. American or Canadian. After this meeting, the secretary, on the advice of the chairman, drew up the actual agenda for the forthcoming joint Board meeting.¹⁹ The final agenda normally was circulated among all Canadian and American members before the meeting of the Board. If an important item placed upon the agenda necessitated considerable research and investigation, it was the responsibility of the Canadian chairman to seek advice. He might go to External Affairs, the Department of Defense, the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff. or to other sources for information and advice. He might seek the advice of the Prime Minister himself if the Prime Minister proved accessible and interested. Sometimes lack of decision making handicapped the Canadian chairman. For example, when he first assumed the chairmanship of the Canadian section. Wilgress consulted with Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. The Prime Minister declined to act. He would not commit himself, and sent the chairman to the Minister of National Defense, and Minister of External Affairs, for advice. Wilgress never went to Prime Minister Diefenbaker again for counsel on Board affairs, but always sought out other ministers who could make at least some decisions and commitments. At times very few agenda items, or none, had been accumulated before the joint Board meeting. If such were the case, the Board met

19Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963.

regardless and let discussion evolve as the occasion suggested. Board procedure regarding an agenda remained informal throughout its history.²⁰

If the American section played host to the Board, preparations followed similar lines to those seen in Canada. With the exception of a period in the late 1950's and early 1960's, items were constantly accumulated for Board consideration within various departments between meetings. This tendency proved especially true during the early years that Hannah served as chairman of the Board. As already noted, the secretaries of the two sections usually gathered a list of topics for Board consideration. Items might emerge from any of the three armed services, the Department of State, the President, or from one of his executive agencies. A large share of the items originated from the armed services or from the Secretary of Defense, and were placed on the agenda at their request.²¹

Willis C. Armstrong, Department of State member, described the means by which an item reached the Board for consideration, once a department or service agency raised the issue. Agenda items were usually placed before the Board in two ways. In the first instance, if, for some unforeseen reason, a topic had created a problem, it might emerge as a proposal for Board deliberation. Secondly, if

²¹Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

²⁰Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963; and Interview, A.D.P. Heeney, June 9, 1967.

a particular service or department believed that a potential problem existed, it might suggest that that problem be submitted to the Board for examination. Armstrong explained that in either case, the Board served as a "fly-wheel" to the normal run of bilateral defense business between the two countries. To the extent that this "fly-wheel" operated correctly, items reaching the agenda were not too advanced to allow proper sorting out so that they could be acted upon expeditiously by higher authority. In short, such matters were usually rather fully thrashed out by services and departments and by the Board before being decided at an appropriate higher level. The Board saw to it that all aspects of a topic were discussed and understood by each side.²²

J. Graham Parsons recalled that, in his days on the Board, problems arrived on the Board's agenda in a variety of ways. Agenda items arose through correspondence or some other direct contact with Board members or the Board's secretaries. Often, interested government bodies, services, or departments would turn to Board members in the belief that their problem at the moment seemed appropriate for Board examination. He recalled that in his own case, as the Department of State's Canadian desk officer, he frequently had to decide whether a problem could better be handled through the Board, or as a government-to-government matter through regular diplomatic channels, or more rarely,

²²Letter, Armstrong, October 22, 1963.

by direct contact between Board members without ever achieving the status of a formal problem. In connection with the general subject of American post-war relationships and defense concepts for North America, he recalled that several early initiatives came to him from his superiors in the State Department for introduction in one case at least into a Board meeting.

Matters, usually not those involving major policy or principle, were often effectively worked out between the service members or others before being presented at a Board meeting for formal ratification and registering of a Board viewpoint, whether in formal recommendation or not. Also, as in all aspects of the conduct of foreign affairs, policy was constantly shaped and modified by actions and decisions which went into the making of a recommendation for eventual acceptance or rejection by the President. Recommendations were worked out with extreme care through the governmental and Board process, so that the record of acceptance was remarkable. 23 Former Canadian Board member, Woodbury Willoughby, also observed that, many times. considerable discussion of subjects transpired before they reached the Board. He noted that, "as the U.S. and Canada have a joint air defense, and numerous officers of each country are stationed in the other and participate actively in drawing up plans, it is inevitable, and helpful,

²³Letter, Parsons, October 15, 1963.

that there is much cross fertilization of ideas and give and take before matters requiring inter-governmental action reach the stage of submission to Board or other agencies." Willoughby emphasized that in recent years most problems were initiated by the agencies represented on the Board. Inasmuch as the subject matter concerned defense, the two Defense Departments initiated the majority of items.

American member, Nugent, cautioned that in any examination of how problems of hemispheric defense passed before the PJBD for deliberation. one must not forget that matters of continental defense reached a high degree of complexity after World War II. Several other groups tested proposals from a technical viewpoint long before they came within the Board's purview. One of these testing groups, for example, contained a high content of scientific personnel.²⁵ The Board members' philosophy embraced a belief that nothing would be gained by discussing a defense proposal which had not been thoroughly considered as to its feasibility. Most projects had been thoroughly examined regarding their practicality before they ever reached the The Board was well aware of such projects, for Board. some of its members or assistants sat on committees that considered those very projects in their early stages of Thus, practically all the items placed on formulation.

²⁴Letter, Willoughby, August 19, 1963.
 ²⁵The Canada-U.S. Scientific Advisory Team.

the Board's agenda were initiated by members of the Board, and one should always bear in mind the number of other positions held by various Board members. Subjects reaching the Board's jurisdiction should be thought of as having passed through an evolutionary process. When Nugent served as a member, Board consideration represented the stage prior to final formal agreement between the two governments at cabinet or congressional level.²⁶ Since the agenda included topics that did not come under the category of problems, the Board provided an excellent means by which to collect and exchange information on matters of mutual concern. Likewise, it served as a useful vehicle for informal discussion of possible future plans and programs.²⁷

The agenda was very much a collective affair. Representatives of the various services, in their capacity as representatives, not as members, proposed items for the next meeting of the Board. Many of these were routine, arising from the previous meetings. On occasion, specific proposals were made from higher authority, for example, from the Minister of Defense in Canada, or Secretary of State in the United States. But normally items were put forward by the services or the foreign offices. Each section notified the other in advance of what it wanted to discuss so that normally there was full agreement on the agenda before the Board met.

²⁶Letter, Nugent, July 31, 1963.

27Letter, Parsons, October 15, 1963; and Letter, Armstrong, October 22, 1963.

Once a list of discussion items had been gathered in Washington, the secretary drew up a list for the preliminary meeting of the American section. Hannah, when he was chairman, went over the proposed agenda in brief with the secretary before the preliminary meeting of the Americans. When the secretary received the chairman's approval of this agenda, he circulated it to the members of the Board in both countries previous to the American section meeting. If there were little on the suggested agenda that seemed new to him, and if it appeared that he need not be there in Washington, then Hannah would not attend the preliminary section meeting. Most of the preliminary activity transpired in Washington largely without the American chairman's actual presence. However, the secretary customarily conferred with him by phone both before and after the first sectional meeting. Frequently the American chairman continued consultation with Board officials in Ottawa as the agenda items accumulated.

When the American section acted as host, it convened as a section for a preliminary briefing to initiate the forthcoming agenda, just prior to the meeting of its counterpart in Ottawa. This preliminary meeting met about two weeks in advance of the regular joint Board session. Discussion of items for the agenda ensued at this briefing session, and new items could be added by the various agencies represented on that particular day in the section session.

If, when the American secretary contacted Ottawa before this meeting, the Canadians had asked to place items before the Board, then the American section added these suggestions and deliberated over them in this preliminary discussion. The American section always met again, after the initial preliminary council, to rediscuss the agenda and obtain an American view or position on each of the subjects under discussion. Thus, the United States members reached a degree of accord, and attempted to face the Canadian section in the joint Board meeting with a united bloc of opinion. This second preliminary meeting often convened just prior to the PJBD conference. Frequently, it met on the train or plane if the location of the joint session required the members to travel great distances.

If the American section acted as host, the American delegates tried to arrive at the meeting site shortly before the Canadians got there. The American secretary, if he had not done so already, circulated a copy of the proposed agenda to the Americans at the site. He also saw to it that the Canadian members all received a copy of this same list of discussion proposals. Usually, however, the Canadians had received a preliminary draft of the suggested agenda three or four days before the joint meeting. When the Canadian section was host to the Americans, the procedure for arrival first at the scene, and the responsibility for agenda circulation was reversed. Usually Board members planned to arrive at the conference location about mid-afternoon.

The members often passed this first afternoon or evening in an informal social atmosphere. Sometimes a movie of a defense project was shown or a special speaker called in to address the group. In one case, for example, George F. Kennan addressed the Board on the subject of Russian foreign policy.

As soon as members of the respective national sections had reached their destination at a military installation, hotel, or wherever the Board convened, the chairmen frequently met together in private to discuss the agenda. The diplomatic representatives and military members also conferred with their counterparts in preliminary sessions. Informal meetings of this kind allowed members to discuss items for the agenda between political and military branches previous to the full sitting of the Board. At times, after these initial get-togethers, a separate meeting of each section met to reaffirm a national policy for each half of the Board.

When the actual joint Board meeting commenced, the host section furnished the presiding chairman. This was true during Hannah's stay on the Board.²⁸ A similar policy regarding presiding chairman was followed during World War II as well. The two section chairmen sat together during the sessions,²⁹ and apparently during some of the early years of General McNaughton's membership, the two

²⁸Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

²⁹Dziuban, <u>Military Relations Between the U.S. and</u> <u>Canada</u>, p. 33.

chairmen presided jointly for a time.³⁰ During the ten years that Hannah presided as chairman of the American section. the joint Board never met without him. If a conflict arose over agreement on a date for the joint Board meeting. and it appeared that Hannah would be unable to attend, the date of the joint session was always changed for his convenience. He never missed a meeting during the years he served on the Board. So in that period at least, no instance developed whereby the steering and coordinating member had to take the American chairman's place.³¹ In Canada, the External Affairs member usually represented the Canadian chairman on the Board in case of the latter's absence. This custom, however, was not always followed. When Wilgress sat as Canadian chairman and had to miss a Board meeting, he designated one of several Canadian members to take his place. External Affairs and the Planning Department of each of the Canadian military services normally designated a substitute to attend Board meetings in cases where a regular member could not be present.³² A similar procedure regarding substitution operated within the United States military services and Department of State.³³

In proceeding with a Board meeting, the presiding chairman usually called upon the host country's secretary,

³⁰McNaughton, <u>S/S</u>, 48/18.
³¹Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.
³²Interview, J. Nutt, August 13, 1963.
³³Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

who served as the spokesman for the section he represented, to read the items as they appeared on the agenda, or as the chairman requested that they be discussed. Items were frequently discussed or called for in a different chronological order than they appeared on the agenda. For example, the chairman sometimes called for item four before he asked for item one. He might do this for the convenience of a witness or specialist who was waiting in the conference room to make a statement to the Board or to render some kind of a report to the members. A chairman always tried to conduct a Board meeting in such a way that people who had been called in to lecture or discuss items on the program might speak and then return to their duties without delay. Furthermore, the chairman could change the order of subjects for discussion if various members of the Board suggested that a particular item should be discussed before others were considered. Frequently, a member raised the point that outside testimony or specialists should be heard at some particular juncture in discussion, or that reports were ready that might bear upon some question on the agenda.

Early in every Board meeting the six service members posted full reports of progress achieved in defense and military matters. These reports often related to previous Board recommendations or decisions. Such reports formed part of the official record, the <u>Journal of the Board</u>, or were appended to it. The Board usually studied the reports and deliberated upon them. These reports enabled the Board

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. . . to check the progress of earlier Board recommendations. Service reports furnished information and provided a basis for drafting new Board recommendations or suggestions. Data from the reports, consisting of the most detailed and technical kind of material, assisted each service, military and diplomatic, in their awareness of the other nation's defense activities, and provided another means of intersectional communication.³⁴

Former Canadian military members have described the Board's work regarding data exchange. General Pope asserted that during the Second World War, when he served on the Board, the PJBD provided an effective means of collecting and exchanging information between the two countries. He recalled that "while the U.S. service members played their military cards pretty close to their chests, we Canadians always played with our fifty-two cards face upwards on the table. On their part I think our U.S. colleagues told us pretty well all that they felt we needed to know " But he noted further that the United States was waging and directing war pretty well all over the world. and that Canada was merely contributing to the Allied war effort. "We always had full frank discussions with our counterparts in the United States." General Pope stated. "but the Pentagon had many irons in the fire that were not our direct concern."³⁵ Canadian Air Marshal, W.A. Curtis,

³⁴Interview, Heeney, June 9, 1967; Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963; and McNaughton, <u>S/S</u>, No. 48/18.

³⁵Letter, Pope, July 6, 1963.

who served on the Board from February, 1944 to November, 1947. generally concurred with Pope's assertion that the Board provided a means for exchanging information. He stated that Canadian service representatives had full and frank discussions with their American opposites. American defense planning which affected North America was always presented to Canadian planners. At no time during his years of Board service did the United States withhold defense information from Canadians.³⁶ Certainly, the military reports from American service representatives on the Board proved of invaluable use to Canada. Particularly in the area of classified security information or of military technology. the Board provided at least one alternative channel of exchange to the regular ones between the Departments of Defense.

Nonetheless, the securing of adequate American recognition of the junior partner's problems and interests proved to be a continuing problem for Canada. A lack of information on long-range United States intentions persisted in preoccupying Canadian ministers and officials. Proposals for joint action would come forward piecemeal from the Pentagon an installation here, a facility there - without any clear picture of what might follow, and consequently, Canadian ministers frequently found it difficult to make decisions.³⁷

36Letter, Curtis, July 11, 1963.

³⁷Letter, MacDonnell, September 3, 1963.

Without a doubt, the lack of information regarding American long-term planning hampered Ottawa. The Board, however, provided one medium through which Canada could and did acquire knowledge of American defense objectives in North America. Many major defense proposals for North America, initiated by the United States, including the principles for post-war cooperation in 1947, radar defenses in the far North, NORAD, aerial refueling, and BEMEWS, were presented to Canada via the PJBD. The Board performed its greatest service, in fact, by providing both countries with an agency wherein difficult proposals could be presented, studied, and discussed.

Joint Board meetings were always conducted informally. "The procedure is by way of discussion and agreement, never by vote," McNaughton noted in 1948.³⁸ Keenleyside, Hannah, Wilgress, Nutt, and many other former Board members agreed with McNaughton's assessment of the Board's procedure. Discussion on a matter usually proceeded until an agreement resulted. This did not mean that every Board member was satisfied with the decision reached, but it did mean that every member agreed that no other solution would obtain general acceptance.³⁹ Divisions of opinion during discussions

³⁸<u>s/s</u>, No. 48/18.

³⁹Keenleyside, "The Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board," <u>International Journal</u>, 54-55; and Maurice A. Pope, <u>Soldiers and Politicians. The Memoirs of Lieutenant General</u> <u>Maurice A. Pope</u> (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1962), pp. 163-166.

seldom occurred along national lines, although occasionally they did.⁴⁰ More frequently they developed along service lines (as often happened within the services of the United States and Canada). It was not unusual to find Canadian and American army members united in argument with naval members from the United States and Canada. Again, some or all of the service representatives opposed the civilian members in debate. Divisions of opinion along these lines at times assumed vigorous and heated proportions, but "the basic understanding, friendliness and good sense of all members of the Board soon restored a more judicial atmosphere."41 "As a general rule," wrote Pope, "our deliberations were carried out in an atmosphere of cordial understanding." When Canadians differed with their American opposites. they did so in complete frankness. "Canadians and Americans," he said. "have no difficulty in understanding each other even when they may not be in agreement." Personal relations between opposites in the two countries, Pope noted, could not have been more cordial.⁴² though that was not to say that our American friends "never put the heat on us."43

At joint meetings, the Board formulated and submitted to both governments, recommendations based on an analysis

⁴⁰ Pope, <u>Soldiers and Politicians</u> , pp. 163-166.
⁴¹ Keenleyside, "The Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint <u>International Journal</u> , 54-55.
42 Pope, <u>Soldiers and Politicians</u> , p. 166.
43 Letter, Pope, July 6, 1963.

of Canadian-American defensive requirements. 44 However. matters discussed by the Board were broader in scope than the formal recommendations, and the impact on the governmental process correspondingly greater. 45 In fact the Board discussed many issues without their giving rise to a formal Board recommendation. 46 The formal "Recommendation of the Board" represented a device which fell largely into disuse after World War II. The Board found that the recommendation procedure worked a little too ponderously. "Our system was to haggle over proposed defense projects, meeting after meeting, until we arrived at consensus," Nugent recalled. The consensus was always recorded in minutes that were written up and approved by the entire Board prior to any adjournment. Often, a minute would cause as much discussion after its writing as during the occasion reported by the minute. By having the minutes approved prior to any adjournment, no chance of misunderstanding existed. The Board traditionally never recorded a disagreement in the minutes. Whenever a disagreement occurred, the minutes would say something to the effect that it had been decided to discuss the subject further at a future meeting. The Board never formally voted on anything. "The Board tended to share a high feeling of cooperation. In order to have

⁴⁴Dziuban, <u>Military Relations Between the U.S.</u> and Canada, pp. 39-40; and Pope, <u>Soldiers and Politicians</u>, p. 162. ⁴⁵Letter, Willoughby, August 19, 1963. ⁴⁶Letter, Parsons, October 15, 1963. such a system work successfully, of course, you have to begin by having like-minded governments with like-minded individuals representing those governments, all faced by problems of mutual concern."⁴⁷

The formal recommendation did not always fit the problem at hand. One of the more useful contributions made by the Board was its capacity to act as a forum for testing and. at times. rejecting ideas. Relations between a great power and a smaller ally will seldom be automatic and easy, even when there exists the kind of goodwill that abounded between Canada and the United States. Both sides at times must exercise restraint: the great power refraining from pressing too hard for acceptance of its viewpoint when that viewpoint presents difficulties to its partner, and the partner realizing that it can not always have its own way, and careful not to use irresponsibly what is essentially a veto power. The work of the PJBD was influenced by these facts of political life. What may make military sense as seen in Washington, and even in Ottawa, may cause political difficulties for Canada, for example, the stationing of American forces in Canada, or the American right to use Canadian air space freely. In the Board it was possible to discuss proposals informally, and for one side or the other to point out difficulties. The result was that the Board dropped some proposals or reshaped them to make them In such cases, the Board made no official acceptable.

⁴⁷Letter, Nugent, July 31, 1963.

recommendation at all. One side simply undertook to consider and report back what the other had said.⁴⁸ During the late 1950's and early 1960's Canadians shied away from the informal variety of Board decisions. The Diefenbaker government demanded more formal agreements between the two nations in the form of an exchange of notes, which would set forth explicit terms based upon a formal Board recommendation of some description.⁴⁹

During the Board's sessions, responsibility rested upon the secretaries for recording the minutes of discussion and decisions, which provided the official record.⁵⁰ On the last evening of the joint meeting they often stayed up nearly all night to rewrite the minutes and jointly draft a <u>Journal</u>, which proved not only to possess accuracy, but reflected in suitable language a variety of viewpoints a time-consuming and demanding kind of diplomatic drafting. The two secretaries usually compared notes. Then, these notes, rewritten and incorporated into the <u>Journal of the</u> <u>Board</u>, were presented for final review and approval at the last joint session of the Board.⁵¹ After the joint meeting of the Board, the American section did not meet immediately again as a section. Members sometimes discussed again informally some of the items on the way home, but nothing

⁴⁸Letter, MacDonnell, September 3, 1963.
⁴⁹Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.
⁵⁰Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.
⁵¹Letter, MacDonnell, September 3, 1963.

official transpired. Neither the secretaries nor the individual sections could effect changes in the <u>Journal</u> once it had received joint Board approval and the Board meeting had adjourned.⁵²

The accumulation of files during the first five years of the Board's existence was very minimal. The complete file of the Board's records for the World War II period comprised less than a cubic foot. These records. drafted after each meeting, and labled the Journals of Discussion and Decisions. had attached to them the various progress reports given at each meeting.⁵³ During the Second World War, the senior United States Army member in the War Department kept the bulk of Board records. The American secretary from the State Department maintained an office of record, as did the United States Navy members, who kept a separate set of records relating to naval matters.⁵⁴ However, after the war, the military secretary kept a central office of record for the Board's documents, and in 1963 an air force officer served as military secretary. This appointment, no doubt, came as a result of the increased significance of air power in continental defense and in the Board's work. In Canada, the secretary from External

⁵²Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

⁵³Dziuban, <u>Military Relations Between the U.S.</u> and Canada, p. 44.

⁵⁴Dziuban, <u>Military Relations Between the U.S.</u> and Canada, p. 38. Affairs supervised the central office of official record for the Board <u>Journals</u>.⁵⁵ Some Board records were housed in the Privy Council Office and in the Department of National Defense.⁵⁶

When appropriate, verbal or written reports were delivered after joint Board meetings to officials who were not members of the Board.⁵⁷ After being printed, the <u>Journal</u> of the Board was circulated to each of the represented departments of the Board, to governmental agencies, and to the appropriate members of Congress. Because of their subject matter, these records are frequently classified very high.⁵⁸ Several copies of the <u>Index to the Journal</u> of the Board also existed. The <u>Index</u> contained a summary of agenda topics discussed by the Board from the years 1940 to 1960. Most of these did not involve a formal recommendation of the Board.⁵⁹

⁵⁵Interview, Nutt, August 12, 1963.

⁵⁶Stacey, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board," <u>International Journal</u>, 107. When A.D.P. Heeney assumed chairmanship of the Canadian members in 1967 and a military secretary was appointed, that secretary supervised the Board's records kept by the Department of National Defense. Interview, Heeney, June 9, 1967.

⁵⁷Letter, Willoughby, August 19, 1963.

⁵⁸Letter, Willoughby, August 19, 1963; and Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

⁵⁹The Board discussed a multitude of topics related to joint military operations: land, sea, and air; TACAN and LORAN stations; weather stations, point-to-point flying considerations; use of Arctic air strips; joint provisioning of weather stations; use of Canadian and American waters by each nation's navy; dominion and provincial tax exemption called for by the United States at radar installations; the

When the Board approved high-policy decisions, if accepted they were promulgated in the United States by executive order of the President, and in Canada by action of the Canadian Cabinet.⁶⁰ As of 1954 there had been fiftythree Board recommendations. When both governments approved. the recommendation became a directive to the particular department or agency involved. Sometimes, as already noted. adoption and implementation of Board decisions followed without a formal recommendation from the Board, or again, an item may have been discussed and then dropped by the governments after the Board had passed on it. On occasion, as in the late 1950's, one government approved a recommendation and the other government did not. The fact that the Board decided an issue meant only that the two governments would review that decision. Furthermore, in some cases, government approval of a Board decision was given and then the government concerned just never implemented the directive.⁶¹ In the first twenty-three years of its history, the Board examined nearly every consideration of military matters affecting the two countries. and in many cases submitted recommendations for action to

Churchill testing base; high altitude weather testing; building of air bases along the Alcan Highway; Haines Pipe Line and Road; St. Lawrence Seaway; RDX and screw thread agreements; and provisions for submarine sounding stations off the coasts of Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and British Columbia.

60 Briefing Paper.

⁶¹Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

the respective governments. Virtually every Board recommendation or suggestion was adopted by both countries up to 1958, after which date the Board submitted recommendations and offered suggestions which one by one fell dead when they reached the Diefenbaker government.⁶² Consequently, Board recommendations, for the most part, were not adopted from 1958 to early in 1963. The Board experienced a period during Diefenbaker's term of office, when many of its recommendations went unheeded.

Within sections a distinction existed between the Canadian and American sections that resulted in a different mode of processing Board recommendations and suggestions. The Canadian section utilized the regular channels of government and administrative machinery, especially the External Affairs Department, to effect Board actions and recommendations more than did the United States section with its formalized structure, its permanent military secretary, and its steering and coordinating member.⁶³ Canadians followed a definite procedure regarding implementation of Board suggestions. Before considering giving effect to a Board recommendation, the Canadian Cabinet Committee on Defense obtained a recommendation from the Canadian Chiefs of Staff.⁶⁴ In Ottawa more institutional coordination occurred between External Affairs and National

⁶²Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.
⁶³Interview, Nutt, August 12, 1963.

⁶⁴Pope, <u>Soldiers and Politicians</u>, p. 165; and Interview, MacKay, August 15, 1963.

Defense than was practiced in Washington. For example, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs or his representative attended the meetings of the Chiefs of Staff. and lower level subcommittees and special groups had similar membership. Further, at Cabinet Defense Committee meetings, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defense were usually accompanied by advisors from the Chiefs of Staff. In Canada, machinery was always at hand to coordinate the service and diplomatic viewpoints. In Washington, there appeared to be less regular, day-to-day machinery. Consequently, individual members of the American section of the Board probably contributed a good deal. more than their Canadian counterparts, to the process of securing agreement among their several superiors. One instance in particular in which this proved true involved the negotiation of the February, 1947 principles which would guide post-war defense collaboration.⁶⁵ So while the American section operated with a more institutionalized body on the one hand. this formalization was accompanied by irregular and loosely structured processing of Board recommendations on the other. This may have been more true during the immediate post-World War II period in Washington under the Democratic administration of Harry S. Truman.

While Hannah served on the Board under President Eisenhower, the United States section and the American government functioned in a formal, closely integrated way.

⁶⁵Letter, MacDonnell, September 3, 1963; and Interview MacKay, August 15, 1963.

Coordination between the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and the President remained close and effective; much better than in Canada, especially under the Diefenbaker government. That was one reason that Canada's defense difficulties were compounded after 1957. A lack of coordination between the military and External Affairs aggravated the Canadian government's difficulties with the United States regarding continental defense. This, in turn, inhibited the Board's effectiveness.⁶⁶ If the American section functioned in a more irregular fashion than the Canadian section in the 1940's and early 1950's, this did not mean that the American system worked any less expeditiously than the Canadian section did under the parliamentary system.

The United States chairman was directly responsible to the President and reported to him as necessary. For example, on several occasions when difficulties arose with American service personnel regarding Board business, or when government agencies and officials failed to carry out approved Board decisions already promulgated, LaGuardia flew to Washington to confer with President Roosevelt. LaGuardia's influence as United States section chairman, enhanced by his personal friendship with Roosevelt, was buttressed by his political power in New York State. He usually returned to the Board with the presidential directive to give life to Board decisions.⁶⁷ His contribution to

⁶⁶Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

⁶⁷Keenleyside, "The Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board," <u>International Journal</u>, 55.

the Board proved to be extremely important, not only for his wise counsel and unfailing interest, but because of his ready access to the President.⁶⁸ LaGuardia added to the Board's effectiveness, and furthered the interests of the American section and government in particular, because he "had the entreé into the White House."⁶⁹ As American chairman, LaGuardia's position often enabled him to expedite action in implementing Board decisions at the executive level.

Hannah, as spokesman for the government on the Board, regularly reported to Eisenhower four times yearly. He used these occasions to discuss Board business, very often at considerable length. Eisenhower's office usually scheduled fifteen-minute conferences for Hannah, though the latter often talked with Eisenhower for an hour and a half on problems of Canadian-American security. Furthermore, the close personal relationship between Eisenhower and Hannah worked on a first name basis. Eisenhower called Hannah "John," and Hannah addressed Eisenhower as "Ike." Eisenhower's interest in military affairs ran high, particularly regarding North American security and the PJED. This fact enhanced the Board's effectiveness by providing a ready channel to the Chief Executive from the Board chairman. Eisenhower's Cabinet was also very interested in the Board's work.

⁶⁸Letter, Parsons, October 15, 1963.
⁶⁹Letter, Pope, July 6, 1963.

With such an avenue to the decision-making process, proposals initiated via the Board had an excellent chance of becoming policy.

After 1960, and the election of John F. Kennedy, Washington's interest in Board affairs waned, and the American section's chairman no longer had ready access to the President to discuss North American defense problems. Not once, as of September, 1963, shortly before Kennedy's death and Hannah's resignation as chairman, did Kennedy invite Hannah to report on the activity of the PJBD. Communication between Hannah and Washington was largely limited to conversations or correspondence with various members of the American section. Hannah had no contact with the Secretary of Defense, Robert MacNamera, or any other United States Cabinet officials. As chairman, Hannah no longer possessed the line of communication with Kennedy that he had enjoyed with Eisenhower. On some occasions, during Hannah's conferences with Kennedy in connection with Hannah's chairmanship on the President's Civil Rights Commission, Hannah managed to infuse some topics regarding continental defense into the conversation, but these attempts proved to be of little value, for Kennedy appeared to lack interest in Canadian-American defense and Board affairs. Hannah attributed this lack of concern for PJBD problems to the vast differences in backgrounds and interests of Kennedy and Eisenhower.⁷⁰

⁷⁰Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

Hannah resigned from the Board on September 30, 1963 so he might devote more time to university problems.⁷¹ No doubt the lack of communication between Kennedy and Hannah influenced his decision to resign. The close personal political ties of the Eisenhower years no longer remained. Furthermore, given the Test Ban Treaty in the summer of 1963, Canadian-American defensive relations were perhaps overshadowed by events of greater priority. Then there was the fact that from 1957 to early 1963 the Board's work had been frustrated by problems related to the American request to store nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. By the summer of 1963, the nuclear issue had finally been resolved. Α major problem which had frustrated the Board's effectiveness had been laid to rest with the change of government in Ottawa. After ten years of service, the time probably seemed appropriate to Hannah to resign.

On the Canadian side, General McNaughton, a Liberal government appointee in 1945 and former Defense Minister in the Liberal government, possessed the strongest kind of backing from Ottawa during his long years of service as Canadian chairman. Under his leadership, Ottawa used the mechanism of the Board for gaining Canadian ends. His influence within and access to, the Cabinet and the Prime Minister remained effective up to 1958.⁷²

⁷¹<u>Michigan State News</u>, September 30, 1963.
⁷²Interview, MacKay, August 15, 1963.

Successive correspondence by letter or telephone between Board members in one country and their counterparts in the other, complemented the regular joint Board sessions. Through continuous consultation amongst members, the Board kept check on implementation of recommendations or decisions proceeding from its meetings, and laid the basis for initiation of new items for the Board agenda. Informal discussion and interchange between regular Board meetings, and in particular between secretaries, facilitated the Board's effectiveness as a Canadian-American forum for continental security.⁷³

In addition to periodic joint Board sessions and continuous correspondence between members, frequent informal meetings of American and Canadian opposite numbers presented an excellent alternative channel to the regular military and diplomatic ones, and an opportunity to discuss matters of common interest. J.D. Hickerson recalled that while he worked on the Board, his "opposite number" in Canada, Hugh Keenleyside, served as Head of the American Section of the Department of External Affairs. At that time Hickerson presided as Chief of the British Commonwealth Division of the Office of European Affairs in Washington. Hickerson noted that, "Dr. Keenleyside and I took advantage of many a luncheon or dinner hour to discuss scores of matters which we were dealing with, but which were not directly related

⁷³Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963; Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963; Letter, Norris S. Haselton, August 20, 1963. Haselton was Department of State member from May, 1951 to June, 1952.

to the work of the Board. I am sure the same could be said of all the other members of the Board. Indeed, U.S. members many times told me so."⁷⁴

Pope also recalled how he as a Canadian Army member used to meet Hickerson at noon on Saturdays. They would go "for spaghetti and a good talk at a little restaurant on lower 18th Street" in Washington, D.C. The best of friends, they greeted one another on a first name basis. Pope said he profited much from his close association with Hickerson, for he was always well informed on Canadian affairs.⁷⁵ Wilgress mentioned how he enjoyed the chats that he used to have with Dr. Matthews after Matthews assumed chairmanship of the United States section in 1963. Wilgress wrote, "we would discuss the policies of our respective governments in a frank and friendly manner." Wilgress noted that these conversations enabled him to gain a much firmer understanding of the purpose of American foreign policy.⁷⁶

The Board, together with its inter-sectional communication, whatever form that might have taken, provided an alternative, not a rival, means of contact between Canadian and American "opposites." It provided a means of collecting and exchanging information between countries. It facilitated

⁷⁴Letter, Hickerson, October 24, 1963.
⁷⁵Pope, <u>Soldiers and Politicians</u>, pp. 162-163.
⁷⁶<u>Wilgress Memoirs</u>, p. 185.

t . de De ur nç re 81 Ye Or the rej Dei app thr Con common business and mutual interest. At times ideas were tested out without commitment through individual contacts among Board members at meetings or at other times, or actually in the Board sessions. Its impact on the governmental process proved broad indeed, especially during the years 1940 to 1958.

The PJBD was designed to function as an advisory body not as an executive agency. From its beginning, however, the Board operated as more than an advisory body. After study of problems involving land, sea and air defense of the northern half of the western hemisphere. the Board was to make recommendations to the two governments on joint defense questions. It conducted its business informally. Defense problems were usually considered and deliberated until general agreement had been attained. The Board did not employ a voting procedure, but submitted suggestions. recommendations or advice only after unanimous acceptance among the Board members. Agenda items for Board discussion were initiated from several sources, from governmental agencies or departments, the armed services, and from the Board members themselves. Frequently, the Canadian and American governments referred problems to the Board through one of the Board's members. Once a Board suggestion or recommendation had been approved by both governments, that decision was effected through an executive directive from the government agency concerned.

CHAPTER V

FROM PARALLEL TO JOINT ACTION

During the Second World War the PJBD submitted thirty-three recommendations, and in nearly all instances governmental approval followed. The Board's work in the war period concerned defense of North American coastal areas, exchange of information, allocation and flow of materials, safety of navigation through the canals at Sault Ste. Marie, coordination in aviation and training; and following the war, the disposition of defense installations and facilities.¹

No announced plans for continued cooperation in military activity emerged from Ottawa or Washington in 1945. Since the PJBD had been designated as a permanent body at Ogdensburg, the two governments apparently considered that no further formal statement was required regarding purely military cooperation in continental defense. Joint military and military-economic relations declined rapidly, with many Canadian-American wartime agencies ceasing operation. Some

¹Stacey, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board," <u>International Journal</u>, 107-124; Keenleyside, "The Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board," <u>International Journal</u>, 52-75; Dziuban, <u>Military Relations Between the U.S.</u> and Canada, pp. 190-191, 215-216, 228-235, 317-334; and <u>A Brief History of the Canada-United States PJBD</u>, pp. 9-11.

consultation on economic matters continued following the war, and a limited exchange of technical information and military personnel extended on into peacetime. The PJBD now met only periodically² to consider problems of demobilization, and to evaluate the need for post-war military cooperation. Ottawa and Washington never evidenced a disposition to discontinue the Board's activities. Its functions lacked some of the urgency that had characterized its earlier work, but "the usefulness of the Board was still recognized and its continuation was never in doubt."³ When General Dwight D. Eisenhower, recently returned from Europe, declared at a press conference in Ottawa early in January, 1946 that he hoped the PJBD would operate permanently. Prime Minister King interrupted the general to interject that it had been intended that it should do such.⁴ Both Canadians and Americans obviously wanted to maintain the agreement forged in 1940, along with the principal instrument of that agree-This forum, resulting from the wartime ment, the PJBD. understanding, still remained. Although Canada, like her American counterpart, placed confidence and hope in the United Nations as an instrument of peace, and supported that organization politically and economically to enhance

⁵Keenleyside, "The Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board," <u>International Journal</u>, 74.

New York Times, January 11, 1946.

²W.R. Willoughby, "Canadian-American Defense Cooperation," <u>The Journal of Politics</u>, XIII (November, 1951), 675-676.

its effectiveness, she joined with the United States in forging a new bilateral defense agreement. This post-war understanding constituted a much closer and more binding agreement for both countries than the wartime partnership.

For Canadians especially the decision to continue joint defense cooperation on a more intimate basis with the United States proved to be a difficult one. As a result of the wartime experience, many Canadians disliked the thought of stationing United States forces on Canadian Some feared that Americans might jeopardize Canadian soil. sovereignty. During the war, United States military rule had sometimes been "more direct than diplomatic." Americans had penetrated deep into Canada's North until they outnumbered Canadians in the Arctic.⁵ Wartime incidents, and others that followed, caused many Canadians to admit very reluctantly to the necessity for further United States inroads into Canada for mutual hemispheric security. The Canadian government adopted the Canadian-American alliance as a fullfledged policy priority only after the United Nations had proved to be ineffective in maintaining stability, and the exigencies of the Cold War demanded it. As the recent wartime victors, the United States and the Soviet Union, moved from alliance to hostility, continental defense assumed

⁵Robert Arthur John Phillips, <u>Canada's North</u> (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967), pp. 108-109. He was secretary of the Canadian section of the PJBD, 1950-1952 and served in the Privy Council Office, 1952-1954. In 1954 he joined the Department of Northern Affairs and was Director of the Northern Administration Branch of that office 1964-1965.

new proportions. Canada, lying strategically as it did between the two hostile powers, occupied a potentially dangerous position. If the Soviets attacked the United States, theorists predicted that they would strike across Canadian territory. The security of North American cities, and industrial and military installations depended at least partially on defense of the Arctic frontier. Washington and Ottawa, faced with this new threat in continental defense, charged the PJBD with the task of studying and recommending policies regarding the nature and scope of Canadian-American defense for the post-war period.

After the war, the Liberal government entered into a much more active and positive role in world affairs in adapting to bi-polar international conditions. New figures emerged in Ottawa to give substance and shape to Canadian foreign policy. Mackenzie King had struggled for twenty-five years for full Canadian independence from external controls. Freedom of national decision had been his cardinal objective in external affairs. King's successors typified an evolution in Canadian external policy in the emerging Cold War conditions. Louis St. Laurent entered office in September. 1946 as Secretary of State for External Affairs at the time when Soviet aggressive and expansionist policies revealed that totalitarianism still threatened democratic freedom throughout the world. St. Laurent's response was based on the conviction that free nations must stand together to preserve their interests. He indicated his belief that

Canada, whose security lay in close alliance with the rest of the western democracies, must contribute, and even, if necessary, relinquish her unhampered freedom of national decision in the interest of the common cause.

St. Laurent's response to the fact of the Cold War developed into its mature form under Minister of External Affairs, Lester Bowles Pearson, the architect of Canada's post-war foreign policy. For him, the Cold War constituted the dominating external fact. Territorial conquests by communism, backed by massive Soviet military force, posed a threat which, left unchecked, would destroy the kind of world that Canada as a free democracy needed in order to survive and prosper. Canada willingly joined with others in a commitment to use force to contain Soviet aggression. Canadian foreign policy in the post-war era was based on the fact that in the nuclear age her immunity from direct attack had been wiped out. Her security lay bound up with the Free World. In 1945 and 1946 the King government grasped the necessity of maintaining an agency like the Board, first as a means of protecting Canadian interests against totalitarian expansion, and secondly, as a medium to conduct closer military relations with the United States, a nation many times more powerful than herself. The Board had provided an informal forum since 1940, and King desired to maintain

⁶Edgar McInnis, "A Middle Power in the Cold War," <u>The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs</u> (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1960), pp. 159-160.

this avenue of influence in Washington. The situation in 1945 proved propitious for continuation of the Board, both in Ottawa and Washington.

At its June, 1945 meeting the Board discussed the possibility of continuing joint military projects after the war.⁷ At that session General Guy Vernor Henry, the senior United States Army member on the PJBD (and later. in 1948, chairman of the American section) discussed defense requirements for the future. Since December, 1942. Henry had, in addition to his membership on the PJBD, also served as senior United States Army member on the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission. As senior army member he participated in conducting joint Mexican-United States staff conversations in Mexico City in 1945, seeking to unify the armed forces of those two countries.⁸ Canada. Henry thought, should join with the American military family of nations. Although he observed that Canadian public opinion might not be receptive to post-war activities moving toward standardization of Canadian and United States forces, and that Canada's commonwealth affiliation might present problems to such a move, he asserted that standardization seemed advantageous, and should bear Board exploration. He additionally wanted the Board to examine the value to

⁷Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

⁸Letter, Patricia Henry Williams, Wenatchee, Washington, October 25, 1968. Mrs. Williams is General G.V. Henry's daughter.

continental defense of facilities that had been developed in northwestern Canada during the war.⁹

With these weighty questions facing it, Ottawa proceeded to utilize the PJED to solve them. But Canada needed a strong Canadian negotiator on the Board to lead its section in deliberating the American proposals. In August, 1945, the Liberal government appointed Andrew George Latta McNaughton to the Board to replace Colonel Biggar. McNaughton, a most determined negotiator and Canadian nationalist, served as chairman of the Canadian section until 1959.¹⁰

⁹Dziuban, <u>Military Relations Between the U.S. and</u> <u>Canada</u>, pp. 334-335.

¹⁰McNaughton was born in 1887 at Moosomin, a tiny village in Saskatchewan. He was educated at McGill University in science. During the First World War he went overseas with the 2nd Brigade, Canadian Field Artillery. After a distinguished war record, he was promoted to brigadier general and assumed command of the Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery in the closing weeks of conflict. By 1929 he moved up to the rank of major general and became Chief of the Canadian General Staff. In 1935, he left that post to assume the presidency of the National Research Council. He returned to army duty in 1939, and went overseas as Commander of the First Canadian Division. By December, 1940 he had been promoted to Corp Commander, a post he retained until early in 1942, when he moved to the command of the First Canadian Army. McNaughton relinquished his position in a dispute with Ottawa in December, 1943, and returned to Canada in 1944. He retired from the army in September and entered the Cabinet as Minister of National Defense. McNaughton left the Cabinet in 1945, after twice failing to secure a seat in Parliament. The Liberal government appointed him to the PJBD, and also as chairman of the Canadian section of the International Joint Commission. In addition, he served as Canadian representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, and went as Canada's permanent delegate to the United Nations and representative on the Security Council in 1948 and 1949. "McNaughton, A.G.L.," Encyclopedia Canadiana, Vol. VI; New York Times, July 12, 1966.

He joined the Canadian members at their September, 1945 meeting, when a full discussion of General Henry's proposals ensued. The Canadians maintained that their participation in inter-American military cooperation appeared to be a political question. Secondly, Canada claimed that the value of the facilities in the northwest could only be determined when a military evaluation of the defensive posture of North America had been prepared.

Pope recalled that this September meeting furnished a fine example of how the Board could occasionally serve as a testing ground for ideas which one country might wish to try out on the other. "My last contribution to its proceedings," he said, "was gently to demur to General Henry's suggestion that the time was opportune for Canada to go American right down the line in the organization and equipment of its armed forces. The view we then took was that there was no real need for such a step, though as a matter of fact we had taken on some items of United States equipment which we had judged the better to meet our needs of the day. In our view it was more important for the United States and the United Kingdom to try to get together in these matters and that Canada would do all in its power to bring about this much desired end."11 The Canadian section quietly rejected the American proposal. McNaughton put forward the view of the Canadian section in concluding that a real case for standardization of material and organization

llLetter, Pope, July 6, 1963.

between the armed services of the two countries did not exist. The Canadians emphasized their country's dual, and at times divided, position as a North American state and as a member of the British Commonwealth.

The Board did agree on one basic decision - that Canadian-American military cooperation should continue within the terms of the Ogdensburg Agreement and that a fresh estimate of the joint defensive posture should be undertaken. Canadian members suggested that the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries meet to act on this recommendation. The Canadian section's response to the American members' proposals indicated that they wished to continue joint defense activities within the framework of the 1940 understanding, but that they were "cautious and deliberate" in their tone.¹² However, the Canadian members moved very quickly toward acceptance of some of General Henry's proposals. At a meeting early in the post-war period, the Board recognized the need for greater "interchange of officers and specialists, including those concerned with design of new weapons with a view to eventual standardization." They also saw the value of joint tests and for interchange of observers on exercises.¹³

The task of considering the areas in which defense cooperation should continue and of evaluating the existing

13<u>s/s</u>, No. 48/18.

¹²Dziuban, <u>Military Relations Between the U.S.</u> and <u>Canada</u>, pp. 334-335.

machinery available to carry it forth, resulted in a Board recommendation that a new body be created on the service level to supplement the Board's work of security reevaluation. The Chiefs of Staff of both countries concurred in this decision. The Board reasoned that the PJBD, responsible as it was to the President and Prime Minister, provided an adequate forum for policy debate, but that an agency more closely allied with the defense departments would now prove valuable. As a result, a Canadian-American Military Cooperation Committee, comprised of service representatives, but including officers from the State and External Affairs Departments, and the Secretary of the Canadian Cabinet Defense Committee. was formed in February, 1946. In March General Henry was appointed chairman of this Military Cooperation Committee. The two national sections of the committee were responsible for making recommendations to the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries for all matters pertaining to military collaboration between the Canadian and American armed forces. By May, 1946, the committee undertook the task of preparing, revising and recommending implementation of the basic security plan.¹⁴ The Military Cooperation Committee, created after a Board recommendation, took over the job of Canadian-American post-war strategic planning.

¹⁴Letter, Patricia Henry Williams, October 25, 1968; and Dziuban, <u>Military Relations Between the U.S. and</u> <u>Canada</u>, p. 336. Henry served on the Military Cooperation Committee until his retirement from the army, October 10, 1947.

Despite the fact that the alliance with the United States formed a "cornerstone of Canadian policy," it was not especially active in the immediate post-war period. The reason for this was that defense policy, in so far as it concerned security in Canada's North, involved a potential threat rather than an actual one. The most significant danger lay in long-range, nuclear-equipped bombers directed against the great North American cities or military and industrial complexes. This threat did not exist in 1945, but it was foreseen that it might develop very rapidly. A second threat concerned the possible invasion of the North by airborne troops transported over polar regions. It was vaguely plausible that air bases in the North might be seized, particularly in the era of short-range aircraft and few nuclear weapons, for the potential value of northern bases seemed considerable.¹⁵

Although the United States President's Air Policy Commission would, in early 1947, discount heavily the threat of supersonic transpolar or transoceanic piloted aircraft, or guided missiles to American air supremacy at home during the immediate future,¹⁶ American generals, especially Air Force officers, warned that immediate defensive preparations should be taken right after the war to protect the Arctic

¹⁵R.J. Sutherland, "The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic," <u>The Arctic Frontier</u>, ed. R.St. J. MacDonald (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), pp. 262-263. Sutherland is a member of Operational Research Establishment, Defense Research Board, Ottawa.

¹⁶W.E.C. Harrison, <u>Canada in World Affairs, 1949 to</u> <u>1950</u> (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 54-55.

frontier. Late in 1945 and throughout 1946, these experts theorized that an attack on America might strike from any one of a dozen launching points. The industrial heartland of North America, which lay between Winnipeg, Montreal, and Windsor in Canada, and between Duluth, New York, and Oak Ridge in the United States, would furnish the prime target. To obliterate these areas, they argued, the enemy could embark from one of the Arctic islands like the Spitzbergen or Jan Mayen, cross over northern Greenland, and down over Ungava and James Bay. Long before they were detected, the invaders would have flown deep into central Ontario and a few hundred miles from Fittsburgh.¹⁷ The FJBD turned its attention toward this potential threat.

General H.H. Arnold, Commander in Chief of the United States Army Air Forces, declared on December 5, 1945, that the North Pole would mark the strategic center of the next war.¹⁸ Other military experts like General L.H. Brereton, Commanding General of the First Air Force, voiced apprehension over threat of attack during the spring of 1946. Brereton's experience in World War II led him to emphasize preparation for any exigency, for he was the Air Force General whose planes had been caught by the Japanese at Clark Field in the Philippine Islands on December 8, 1941. He cautioned in April that "today it is entirely possible to launch

¹⁷Blair Fraser, "Watch on the Arctic," <u>Macleans</u> <u>Magazine</u>, December 1, 1946, pp. 7-8 and 69-71; and George A. Bevan, "Canada, A Power Vacuum of World Politics," <u>Dalhousie</u> <u>Review</u>, XXVII (July, 1947), 202-204.

¹⁸ New York Times, March 7, 1946.

attacks of such power, and without warning, from distant countries that our ability to create, organize, and train for defense might be completely paralyzed." Advocating an increased program for defensive preparedness, he stated further, "the speed and bomb carry capacity of the aircraft of the future, and the unknown power of the missiles that may be delivered are such that our former conception of defensive needs must be changed fundamentally."¹⁹ American senior military planners persisted in their contention that a world war would commence with a surprise attack by Soviet long-range air power upon North America. The Americans thought that by 1951 the Soviets would possess nuclear and bomber capability, or even some rocket capability to carry out a successful attack on North America.

Canadian military planners disagreed with the Americans as to the nature of the threat, and consequently, as to the method by which the threat should be met. Canadians viewed western Europe, not North America, as the prime Soviet target. They contended that if the Soviets attacked North America during the next five years, the attack would be on a small scale and diversionary in character. This fundamental disagreement over the nature of the threat pervaded the political as well as military levels in Ottawa and Washington. Canada and the United States failed to resolve this difference

19_{New York Times}, April 6, 1946.

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of opinion, and that helps explain why very little was done for joint continental defense until early in the 1950's.²⁰

Notwithstanding the basic difference of views in Ottawa and Washington regarding a possible Russian threat, Soviet aggressive action in Europe and the Middle East after the war²¹ furnished some reason for Canadian and American uncertainty over Russian intentions in the Arctic. If an outright Soviet attack over the Northland seemed unlikely immediately following the war, the possibility of Russian expansion further into Arctic regions had to be considered and met.²² The Russians, in fact, announced in March, 1946 that they were undertaking an air expedition into the central Arctic to establish a network of meteorological stations there over the next two years. They planned to use extensive airphoto surveys to help study the Arctic seas, particularly along the path the Northern Sea Route lay.²³

Adding to American uncertainty about the North was the fact that Canada had neglected its northern territories. Lack of information about the North abounded. Even good

23_{New York Times}, March 22, 1946.

²⁰James Eayrs, "Military Policy and Middle Power: The Canadian Experience," <u>Canada's Role as a Middle Power</u>, ed. J.K. Gordon (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966), p. 73.

²¹John W. Spanier, <u>American Foreign Policy Since World</u> <u>War II</u> (rev. ed.; New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 19-20; Norman Graebner, <u>Cold War Diplomacy: American Foreign Policy. 1945-</u> <u>1960</u> (Toronto: D. Van Nostrand Company, Ltd., 1962), p. 35; John Lukacs, <u>A History of the Cold War</u> (rev. ed.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1962), pp. 57-60.

²² This, of course, remains a continuing problem, especially under the Arctic Ocean floor and on the Arctic ice islands. Phillips, <u>Canada's North</u>, pp. 112-113.

maps were not available by 1947, nor was basic scientific data regarding topography, weather, magnetism, tides and ocean currents. Some justice lay in the claim that United States weather forecasting suffered in the past because of lack of Canadian weather data and an unwillingness in Ottawa to provide funds for weather stations and observers. The long-standing Canadian disinclination to explore the Arctic led the American authorities to volunteer to send out scientific parties to gather their own data. Lastly. no adequate Canadian administration functioned in the North and the Americans knew it, nor was there much in the way of traditional military defense there.²⁴ These conditions threats of attack or the possibility of Soviet expansion, a lack of earlier Canadian exploration and data on the North, and American willingness to undertake it unilaterally - led to an extensive Canadian-American program of exploration in the Arctic early in the spring of 1946.²⁵ Some of the first practical steps toward Arctic exploration and defense began with several expeditions by land and sea into the far North. These projects fitted in with the Board's observation, via McNaughton, that it valued joint activities in testing, and interchange of specialists and observers between the United States and Canada.

²⁴Trevor Lloyd, "Canada's Strategic North," <u>International Journal</u>, II (1947), 146.

²⁵<u>New York Times</u>, March 7, 1946; <u>Chicago Tribune</u>, February 13, 1947; <u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u>, February 13, 1946; and Wilfrid Eggleston, "Public Affairs: Strategy and Wealth in Northern Canada," <u>Queen's Quarterly</u>, LIV (1947), 238-244.

On December 14, 1945, Douglas Abbott, Minister of National Defense. announced in the House of Commons. plans for a Canadian Army expedition known as "Exercise Musk-Qx." This expedition was to cover an arc of 3.200 miles in the Canadian wilderness, starting from Churchill, Manitoba, on February 14, and proceeding via Baker Lake and Cambridge Bay, and finally, over the top of the divide and down by Norman Wells. From there, it would move to Nelson and end at Edmonton on May 5. The party would consist of forty-five men of all ranks. Twelve snowmobiles, developed from an American-style vehicle, would transport the men. In particular, military experts desired to learn how these snowmobiles would function under Arctic conditions of extreme winter and through the spring breakup. Abbott explained that the Royal Canadian Air Force would keep the party supplied with gasoline, food, and other items. Planes would drop all supplies from the air, for there would be no landing strips over most of the Arctic area covered. Technical and meteorological experts were also to accompany the party.²⁶ The Canadian Army requested that the United States Army Air Force cooperate with them in "Exercise Musk-Ox." The United States Air Force, keenly interested in extending its own knowledge of Arctic operations,

²⁶<u>Debates</u>, III (1945), 3552; and Soward, <u>Canada</u> <u>in World Affairs</u>, pp. 269-270.

had planned expansion of research in Alaska during 1946 and focused special attention on the cold weather experimental station at Ladd Field, Fairbanks, Alaska. The Americans joined with the Canadian expedition and furnished three C-47 cargo carriers to assist in "Musk-Ox." In addition they sent twenty-two men to operate the equipment and to work under the direction of the Royal Canadian Air Force. Five United States Army ground force observers accompanied the expedition, along with about twenty-five ground communications specialists.²⁷ Although Canadians emphasized that "Exercise Musk-Ox" would be a Canadian project, American military personnel participated in its operation and were interested in its results.

"Exercise Musk-Ox" traveled through a remote region. When the expedition reached its most northerly point, over 1,000 miles of large islands still stood between that point and the North Pole. These men penetrated over 300 miles inside the Arctic Circle, into almost completely unexplored territory. Canadians and Americans tested the suitability of the snowmobile as an Arctic invasion unit and surveyed unknown regions where the normal magnetic compass was useless. They experimented with Arctic clothing made from textiles in order to avoid the killing of caribou for fur garments, carried out extensive aerial photography, and experimented and trained in making bivouacs and cooking food under Arctic conditions.

27 New York Times, February 24, 1946, and March 7, 1946.

While cooperating in the Canadian overland exercise and taking measures to expand defense facilities in Alaska, the Americans sent the 45,000 ton supercarrier Midway to the Arctic in February and March. 1946 to test operations under polar conditions. The Midway moved into Davis Strait between Baffin Island and Greenland and operated in about a 500-mile diameter between Greenland, Labrador, and Hudson Strait. Rear Admiral John H. Cassady, former Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Air, led this expedition, which was called "Operation Frostbite." Naval experts desired to learn, in particular, how well carrier planes could operate in extremely cold regions. About 2,500 men and an air group of fifty-eight planes, including some newly designed FR-1 jet-propelled fighter bombers, went along.²⁸ As a result of "Operation Frostbite," the United States Navy, in the spring of 1946, expanded its plans for Arctic defense. Admiral Cassady announced that extensive naval operations similar to "Operation Frostbite" would get underway in 1947. Plans included operations in both Atlantic and Pacific waters and involved a much larger group of ships than those utilized in 1946. Cassady warned that the United States could not afford to permit an unfriendly power to set up Arctic beachheads from which guided missiles could be launched. "Operation Frostbite" had pointed to the need for more radio-positioning stations in the Far North, where the magnetic compass was useless and where

28_{New York Times}, February 22, 1946, and March 7, 1946.

ships could not depend upon celestial navigation. Radio stations were needed in order to send signals and assist ships in accurately fixing their positions.²⁹

Although the Canadian government initiated plans for military exploration of the Arctic, the Americans participated in some of these endeavors. Ottawa said it desired to cooperate with all the Arctic nations in exploring the Northland. Lester Pearson, Canadian Ambassador to the United States, stated in February, 1946 that Canada wished to cooperate particularly with the Soviet Union in Arctic development. Speaking partially for Soviet consumption, he noted that the Soviets had advanced far ahead of the rest of the world in Arctic exploration. Canadian cooperation with the Soviets would be to Canadian advantage, because they could learn from the Russians. Pearson said isolationism could have no place in Canadian foreign policy, for the Soviet Union joined Canada in a vast common boundary in the North.³⁰ Canadians wanted to allay, if possible, Russian fears arising from Canadian and especially from American military exploration in Canada's North. Moreover, Canadian-Russian cooperation conceivably would benefit Canadian efforts to develop Arctic resources and communications, for the Russians had already carried on northern experiments for many years.

The chances for peaceful Canadian-Russian cooperation in Arctic development seemed remote, for on March 5, 1946,

²⁹<u>New York Times</u>, April 6, 1946.
³⁰<u>New York Times</u>, February 8, 1946.

Sir Winston Churchill branded the Soviet Union an "expansionist state." Speaking in Fulton. Missouri, he said that "from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended." Churchill called upon the British Commonwealth and the United States to band together in opposition to Soviet expansionism. The challenge, he said. required a fraternal association of English-speaking It demanded intimate relationships between our peoples. military advisors, leading to a common study of potential dangers, the similarity of weapons and manuals of instruction, the interchange of officers and cadets at technical colleges. and joint use of all naval and air force bases in the possession of either country all over the world. Churchill did not believe the Russians wanted war. but he added. "I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for military weakness."³¹ Hopes for Big Three cooperation in the United Nations were failing. International organization was proving a poor substitute for a strong balance of power built on an alliance of English-speaking peoples. Churchill urged, only a few short months after the war had ended, that Canada and the United States proceed to forge closer defensive relations. In effect, he posed a challenge to the PJBD, the agency of the wartime alliance. to act.

³¹Winston Churchill, "Alliance of English Speaking People," <u>Vital Speeches of the Day</u>, XII (March 15, 1946), 329-332.

During World War II, the PJBD served as a significant mechanism for insuring effective cooperation in providing military protection for North America. It created an important channel for maintaining contact between civilian and military officials of the two countries, and provided a vital agency for educating members to military situations and to problems which might arise later. As the war in the Pacific ended, Washington and Ottawa charged the Board with the task of examining both the nature and scope of Canadian-American post-war collaboration. The Board, after having begun a reevaluation of post-war defense requirements, submitted recommendations to the two governments which resulted in creation of the Canadian-American Military Cooperation Committee and joint exploration by land, sea and air in the far North. These activities were in line with the Board's suggestions which urged that the two nations collaborate in testing, and interchange of specialists and observers for mutual defense purposes. In particular, the Board considered what defense precautions should be undertaken to protect the Arctic frontier.

CHAPTER VI

PRINCIPLES OF POST-WAR COOPERATION

The Board agreed in the fall of 1945 that military cooperation should continue within the terms of reference set forth at Ogdensburg in 1940. But the Americans proposed that even closer military ties should be forged in the post-war period. Since Canada now appeared potentially open to direct attack, the Canadian members considered it in their best interests to continue joint defense cooperation on a more intimate basis with the United States. So it was that the Board undertook to draft a set of principles to guide post-war joint defense.

Cause for distrust and uncertainty in Canada and the United States over Soviet aims grew early in 1946 when Prime Minister King revealed that the Soviets were operating an atomic espionage organization in Canada.¹ The potential threat to hemispheric security, posed by an increasing East-West enmity, led the United States government, particularly the War Department, to initiate proposals for increased Canadian-American defense cooperation through the PJBD.

¹Wilfrid Eggleston, "The Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage," <u>Queen's Quarterly</u>, LIII (1946-47), 372; <u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u>, February 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, March 5, 1946; <u>New York Times</u>, February 16, 17, 19, March 1, 5, 1946.

Thus, in the wake of Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" address, the PJBD acted. On April 29, 1946 it considered for the first time a recommendation concerning principles for continued Canadian-American defense.²

American planners, during the spring, when they awoke to the significance of the Arctic in North American defense, had decided to act quickly, for their last wartime budget expired June 30, 1946. Until that date, they had unlimited funds, but after July 1, defense appropriations might prove to be more limited. In a desire to make the best use of a wartime budget, some quickly drawn but farreaching plans had reached the PJBD.³ In light of the fact that the American public demanded disarmament and withdrawal from Europe during 1946, and would soon elect the Republicandominated Eightieth Congress in November. it is not difficult to understand why planners desired to make the most of a wartime budget. This new Congress would bring a successful drive to decrease government expenditures and cut taxes. Yet the haste with which the United States government acted in trying to push through an agreement with Canada impeded rather than furthered Canadian-American defensive relations.

The first substantial indication Canadians and Americans received that a closer North American defensive tie might emerge in peacetime appeared two months after

Debates,	III	(1951),	2550;	and I	D ziub an,	Military
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³Fraser, <u>Macleans Magazine</u>, December 1, 1946, pp. 7-8 and 69-71; and <u>New York Times</u>, February 13, 1947.

Churchill's speech. President Harry S. Truman submitted the "Inter-American Military Cooperation Act" to Congress on May 6. He requested authorization for a program of military collaboration with other American states. This bill included plans for cooperation with the armed forces of other countries in training, organization, and exchange of equipment. Although Truman requested passage of the Military Cooperation Act with Latin America in mind. he did not overlook Canada. "The collaboration authorized by the bill," he declared, "could be extended to Canada, whose cooperation with the United States in matters affecting their common defense is of particular importance."4 Truman's May 6 speech on joint defense with Latin America and Canada followed from the topic then under discussion by the PJBD. The Board's consideration of principles for military cooperation included plans for Canadian-American coordination in training, organization, and exchange of equipment.

On May 17 Washington proposed a defense agreement to Canada in which the two countries would coordinate certain branches of their armed forces to protect North America, and especially the Arctic regions. If the Canadians accepted

⁴U.S., <u>Congressional Record</u>, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946, XCII, Part 4, 4518. This Inter-American measure was designed to effect the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance to be signed on September 2, 1947, at Rio, whereby the American republics agreed to launch joint defensive action in the event of an armed attack against any one of them.

the proposal, it might involve standardization of many forms of equipment between the two nation's armed services, coordination of training methods and military organization, and joint erection and staffing of defense and weather stations in the continental Arctic areas. In substance, this American proposal contained some of the same suggestions which General Henry had introduced to the Canadian members at the June, 1945 joint Board meeting and which had been discussed in detail at the next Board session in September. It developed out of recommendations which the FJED had, subsequent to these two meetings, submitted to the two governments early in 1946. The United States government apparently had approved these recommendations in principle and then had engaged in discussions on them with officials in Ottawa.⁵

In submitting the proposal to Ottawa, Washington officials emphasized that it would not constitute a military alliance, nor involve political commitments between the United States and Canada. Washington did not propose that the two countries agree to go to war if either nation were attacked. Neither would it disturb Canada's relations with the British Commonwealth. In an attempt to reassure Canadians on this point, Washington stated that it desired to strengthen, not weaken, the British Commonwealth. American foreign policy would not be coordinated with Ottawa's, nor would the United States obligate itself to fight Canada's or

⁵New York Times, May 18, 1946; and McNaughton, <u>S/S</u>, No. 48/18.

Britain's battles, any more than Canada would be obliged to fight for the United States. It would not supercede the two nations' responsibilities to the United Nations. On the contrary, the essential purpose of the proposed agreement was to strengthen North American continental They wished to reinforce the military structure defenses. of the United Nations through the kind of regional understanding which the United Nation's Charter specifically The American government pointed out that the authorized. two countries must accept the geographic fact that they shared the same continent, which now lay within range of long distance aircraft flying from any part of the globe. Washington suggested, in recognition of these facts, that they take joint steps in planning future defense operations. Specifically they desired establishment of bases to protect the continent from an invader. They suggested further that the armed services be jointly organized so that if the legislatures suddenly called on the military to go to war, they would be trained and equipped in much the same fashion. and could defend the continent more effectively.6

The American proposal to Canada implied a host of joint defense activities. To effect such a program, the PJBD's planning now would have to expand greatly beyond its wartime work. Joint weather and experimental bases might have to be built in the Arctic. Even though a start had

^{6&}lt;u>New York Times</u>, May 18, 1946.

been made in testing men and equipment in "Operation Musk-Ox," that expedition proved more than anything else that neither the United States nor Canada knew much about combat conditions in the Arctic. Experiment stations needed to be erected to study military problems under Arctic conditions. After a period of collaboration in experimentation had indicated what equipment seemed most appropriate in defending the Arctic roof, Canada and the United States might then jointly produce this equipment and standardize their weapons. They would conceivably coordinate their forces and build permanent bases across the Arctic to meet whatever demands arose.⁷

Concurrent with the presentation of this proposal to Canada, Washington chose to disclose publicly the Board's recommendations before Ottawa had agreed to the cooperative principles, a policy that caused some irritation in Ottawa. But the American government hoped to hasten the conclusion of a formal agreement on these principles. The United States, in announcing that the FJBD had recommended these proposals, thereby lent the Board's name and prestige to its request. That the Board had considered this issue and made suggestions for continental defense to the two governments might cause both the Canadian public and Ottawa to consider more carefully the State Department's request. Washington's strategy in convincing Canadians of the necessity for increased defense cooperation succeeded for the most part, as events during the following months proved.

7 New York Times, May 18, 1946.

Preliminary studies of the proposed joint continental defense plan indicated that it would involve an exceedingly expensive undertaking. Washington also understood that Arctic defense and the extensive experimentation which the situation demanded, could not be financed by Canada alone. As a result, if Ottawa agreed to the May 18 proposal for joint cooperation, Washington offered to assist in financing a hemispheric defense program. Some officials in Washington objected to submitting American taxpayers to the burden of defending Canadian territory. Canadians, they argued, should be obligated to protect their own country. But the State Department stated clearly that Canada's northern frontier vitally affected American national security and that the United States had an obligation to defend it from aggression and attack.⁸

Washington voiced the hope that the necessity for closer military ties would leave each country free to pursue its own independent foreign policy. The Canadian government was most hesitant to join in any further defense arrangement which would mar the outward impression of full Canadian independence and sovereignty. Yet, as defense costs mounted, Canadian foreign policy had to conform more and more to the American national interest. Canadian-American joint defense during the late 1940's, 1950's, and early 1960's proved to be most frustrating for Canadians as they tried to reconcile the need for defense of North America and the Western Atlantic

⁸<u>New York Times</u>, May 18, 1946.

Community, with minimum requirements of Canadian sovereignty. The Board's first post-war recommendations faced Ottawa squarely with this problem, which would go unresolved for two decades.

The Canadian government and its representatives on the FJBD recognized reluctantly that the United States wished to establish a joint defense plan in case the United Nations failed to insure world peace. A Canadian-American regional agreement would protect the western hemisphere. The American proposal, Canadians realized, aimed less at strengthening the United Nations' military structure, than at fortifying Canadian-American defenses if the United Nations proved useless. Serious reason existed already by the spring of 1946 to doubt the effectiveness of the United Nations as a world peace organ. The FJBD had recommended plans to insure continental defenses as hopes for collective security through the United Nations disintegrated.

While Washington waited for the Canadians to concur in their proposals, they applied particular pressure on Ottawa to obtain an agreement pertaining to joint study of weather reporting. One project which the Board considered and recommended called for creation of a million dollar weather station on Melville Island in the western Arctic to aid long-range weather forecasting. In the forepart of 1946, Congress, in implementing this recommendation of the PJBD, authorized the United States Weather Bureau to

draw up elaborate plans for weather stations, some with landing fields, to be erected on Canada's far northern islands, and in northern Greenland. But after the staffs of men had been recruited to work in the new weather stations and ships readied to sail to them, final authorization for the project failed to materialize in Ottawa.⁹ The Americans, it appeared in the summer of 1946, were about to proceed with building a chain of permanent weather stations across Canada's Arctic Archipelago before Canadian government permission had been granted.

The United States government tried to press ahead with the weather station program before reaching an agreement with Ottawa. When the United States service departments kept insisting that Ottawa accede immediately to several concessions for training and meteorological stations across Canada's North, Lester Pearson, the Canadian Ambassador, sent a formal statement from the Canadian government to the State Department. Pearson stated that Canada sympathized with the War Department's suggestions, but desired to move slowly because of the political situation both at home and abroad. The United States service departments continued their pressure on Canada, however, and finally Pearson urged the State Department not to allow the War Department

⁹Lloyd, "Canada's Strategic North," <u>International</u> <u>Journal</u>, 145; Soward, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, pp. 273-274; and Fraser, <u>Macleans Magazine</u>, December 1, 1946, pp. 7-8, 69-71.

to press Ottawa to the point where it had to refuse the United States demands.¹⁰

The United States had not given very much thought to the fact that the project would be built completely on Canadian territory. Canadians, not a little annoyed, began to worry over the urgency of American defensive preparations.¹¹ A former Canadian Board secretary, R.A.J. Fhillips, commented on the United States action with some exaggeration, saying that "with American thoroughness, close attention had been paid to every detail - except one: No one had thought of asking Canada's permission."¹² But the PJBD had at least considered the project and recommended it early in the year to both governments.

At the bottom of the weather station controversy lay a variance of opinion over the best means of Arctic defense. Some Washington officials desired to reinforce the weather stations by equipping them with radar. They wanted to initiate a five-year construction plan for weather facilities, estimated to cost 350 million dollars. Others went further and urged that Canadians and Americans lay down air strips adequate for B-29's and develop a chain of permanent, large scale, military bases of which the

10 New York Times, October 4, 1946.

¹¹Phillips, <u>Canada's North</u>, p. 110; Fraser, <u>Macleans</u> <u>Magazine</u>, December 1, 1946, p. 70; and George F.G. Stanley, <u>Canada's Soldiers: A Military History of a Non-Military</u> <u>People</u> (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada, 1954), pp. 367-368.

12 Canada's North, p. 110.

World War II Crimson Route installations at Frobisher Bay, Chimo, and Southampton Island would furnish a nucleus.¹³

This diversity of opinion over Arctic defense had flourished also within the PJBD. Air Force generals talked of the necessity for immediate Arctic frontier protection. Some very ambitious plans evolved for northern defense. Specifically, American PJBD representatives proposed building weather stations, observation, and radar outposts along the Arctic ring. Canadians countered with the argument that such posts would cost a great deal of money, and thus. seemed out of the question. But the Americans proposed that if Canada could not come up with the appropriations to finance the weather projects, then perhaps the United States could do it for them.¹⁴ Most Canadians, who considered Arctic defense, contended that a string of air strips and permanent radar stations would defeat their purpose. They argued that these facilities would easily fall to paratroop invaders who could convert them into bases for hostile attack. Canadians suggested, rather than permanent installations, a mobile system of radar that could be moved anywhere and the use of fighter planes that could land on ice. They labled this a "scorched ice policy." Make an attacker cross an empty waste with which he had no familiarity.

13 Fraser, <u>Macleans Magazine</u>, December 1, 1946, p. 70.

¹⁴<u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u>, February 13, 1947; and Brian Crane, <u>An Introduction to Canadian Defense Policy</u> (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1964), p. 28.

these planners suggested.¹⁵ At the bottom of this proposal lay the fact that many Canadians wished to discourage American plans for permanent bases or installations on Canadian northern territory.

Canadian officials withheld approval of weather stations and landing fields in Canada's North, and meanwhile the United States made arrangements with Denmark. A weather station at Thule did open in 1946, staffed by Americans and Danes.¹⁶ The United States also wanted bases in the North. The agreement with the Danes took the pressure off Ottawa for a while. The American post-war interest in Greenland. in fact, led to a great United States air base there, also located at Thule. This base's existence had an indirect impact upon the course of Canadian-American affairs. "If Thule had not been available to the United States the question of a major American base in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago would certainly have arisen."¹⁷ As it happened. the United States settled for something considerably less elaborate in Canada's North in 1946.

The United States haste in announcing plans for penetration of Canada's Arctic before permission had been obtained, pressed Ottawa into greater vigilance over its

¹⁵Fraser, <u>Macleans Magazine</u>, December 1, 1946, p. 70.
¹⁶Lloyd, "Canada's Strategic North," <u>International</u>
<u>Journal</u>, 145.

¹⁷Sutherland, "The Strategic Significance of the Arctic," p. 259; and Trevor Lloyd, "Open Skies in the Arctic?" <u>International Journal</u>, XIV (1958), 42-99.

sovereign rights in the North and into increased activity in Arctic development.¹⁸ The Canadians finally. in the summer of 1946, went along with an American proposal for joint study of weather reporting requirements. Out of this major Canadian decision, a far larger plan evolved for building several joint weather stations on condition that the commanding officer and half the staff be Canadians.¹⁹ So the Canadian government after some prolonged hesitation agreed to the PJBD proposals regarding weather stations. Before it agreed to the weather station plan. Ottawa had been careful to make sure that the United States had obtained no permanent rights or status on Canadian territory. The weather stations would be built without prejudice to Canadian sovereignty. Once the United States understood Canada's position regarding this, an agreement could emerge.

The Canadian government formulated plans for a network of weather observation stations to fill gaps across the Arctic. Canada operated twenty-eight northern weather stations in 1946 and planned on building eleven more. Two of these new stations were planned for the sub-Arctic north of Baker Lake, and nine more on the Arctic islands, with the farthest of these located near the North Pole. The United States offered to share much of the cost of these stations.²⁰

¹⁸Stanley, <u>Canada's Soldiers</u>, pp. 367-368.

¹⁹Phillips, <u>Canada's North</u>, p. 110.


²⁰ <u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u>, February 13, 1947; and Fraser, <u>Macleans Magazine</u>, December 1, 1946, pp. 7-8 and 69-71. Establishment of permanent Arctic weather stations would assist in opening up the Arctic, and in this way would serve an important defensive purpose. Furthermore, in another way, these weather stations held a special potential for defense. The two governments could convert them into early warning stations for detection of attacking aircraft over the Pole. Although these warning stations had not yet been planned in 1946, the idea had been conceived. Both governments agreed on the ultimate execution of this plan for establishing a complete system of weather stations in the Arctic.²¹ See Figure 3, page 141.²²

R.A.J. Fhillips noted that this project for building weather stations laid the political groundwork for several future joint defense projects. Creating adequate weather forecasting facilities in Canada's North taught Washington a lesson. Once the governments had reached a settlement, Americans grasped more fully the Canadian position toward sovereignty in the North, and for that matter, in other parts of Canada as well. American negotiations over weather stations, for example, provided useful precedents for both nations when Newfoundland joined Canada.²³

²¹Soward, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, p. 274. The idea of a northern radar chain was suggested to President Truman by the United States Air Force in 1946. Crane, <u>Canadian</u> <u>Defense Policy</u>, p. 28.

²²This map was taken from R.A.J. Phillips, "The Eastern Arctic Patrol," <u>Canadian Geographical Journal</u>, LIV (May, 1957), 194.

²³Phillips, <u>Canada's North</u>, p. 110.



As a result of the Canadian-American understanding on joint weather studies, Ottawa and Washington announced on June 29, 1946, that the United States Navy would send a small training cruise into northern waters to increase knowledge of Arctic navigational and weather conditions. The expedition would carry out the first phase of Arctic weather research. the announcement stated. and Canadian Navy, Army, and Air Force officers would participate.24 Accordingly, the joint expedition left Boston in July. They traveled to Greenland where the United States had established the weather station at Thule. Aircraft accompanying the contingent flew on reconnaissance and photographic flights far to the north of Greenland and to distant parts of Canada's Ellesmere Island. Led by a United States icebreaker, they moved westward from Greenland, to Dundas Harbor on Devon Island in Canada. They worked their way through a portion of the Northwest Passage to Winter Harbor, Melville Island, the site originally intended by Americans for early establishment of a large weather station.²⁵ The group returned home in October.²⁶ Canadians and Americans had surveyed and explored some of the area over which joint weather stations would be constructed during the next three years.

²⁴Soward, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, p. 274.
²⁵Lloyd, "Canada's Strategic North," <u>International</u>
Journal, 145.
²⁶Soward, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, p. 274.

In the midst of inter-government negotiation over Arctic defense, the United States Navy announced in June that four submarines from the Pacific Fleet would test the operation of American submarines in Arctic waters. They would enter the Chukchi Sea between Siberia and Alaska.²⁷ The expedition, labled "Operation Iceberg," cruised to Dutch Harbor, the Pribilof, St. Matthew and St. Lawrence Islands, turned through the Bering Straits, and went north as far as the seventieth parallel. It returned in August after a month-long cruise in the Arctic.²⁸ This exploratory cruise, like "Musk-Ox," and naval exploration west of Greenland, sought to investigate the impact of the Arctic on men and machine.

As Arctic exploration moved from planning to implementation, some Canadians worried about the precipitance of defensive cooperation with the United States. Much of the American May 17 proposal failed to receive immediate acceptance in Ottawa. Some Americans showed annoyance and hinted that Canadians, by inclination and financial necessity, might fail to take required steps for Arctic protection. The United States might, some suggested, do something unilaterally about far northern defense. In Canada, such hints coming from the south led to rumors of secret American military activity on Canadian territory. Frequent charges that the United States had demanded military air bases,

²⁷New York Times, June 25, 1946.

28 New York Times, August 24, 1946.

weather stations, and observation or radar posts in the far North, and that Ottawa had turned them down, brought questions in Parliament. Fresident Truman, upon hearing of these accusations, sent a letter to King discussing the problem.²⁹

On June 27, King answered to charges in Parliament brought in reference to an article which appeared in the conservative <u>Financial Post</u>. The <u>Post</u> stated that Canada had become "another Belgium" and that the United States demanded the building of an "atomic age Maginot Line." King labled the <u>Post</u>'s article "wholly misleading," and denied emphatically that the United States had dictated an ultimatum to Canada. He also denied the allegation that the United States had submitted a plan for establishing air bases in the Northland. He explained that:

> It is a fact, of course, that the Fermanent Joint Board is charged with studying the defenses of North America which includes our northern frontiers. The extent to which their vulnerability may or may not have been increased by reason of technological developments in recent years, and the measures which should be adopted for their protection are proper subjects of study by the Board. The Board is therefore examining them, and would be remiss in its duties if it did not.³⁰

King denied that the United States government had presented Canadians with a proposal for a new defense agreement

²⁹John C. Campbell, <u>The United States in World Affairs</u>, <u>1945-1947</u> (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 459-460; <u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u>, February 13, 1947; <u>New York Times</u>, October 13, 1946; and Eggleston, "Strategy and Wealth in Northern Canada," <u>Queen's Quarterly</u>, 238-244.

³⁰<u>Debates</u>, III (1946), 2987-2988.

backed by some kind of threat. Details of the American proposal of May 17 remained currently under study, he acknowledged, but Canadian sovereignty would be preserved. King tried to allay any apprehension in Parliament regarding threats to Canadian interests, by an aggressor on the one hand, or through encroachment on Canadian sovereignty by Americans pursuing hemispheric defense on the other. King assured Parliament that if the Arctic rim required further defenses, the PJBD would study the problem and act accordingly. In the meantime, King urged, wait for results of the Board's examination. "Let the Board decide," King admonished those who questioned the government's policy. The Board in this instance furnished Ottawa with an agency to which the government could refer an urgent issue. and defer a decision until a later date. Sometimes the Board would work to the same purpose and advantage for Washington as well. This pattern repeated itself several times throughout the Board's history.

Canada's Ambassador, Fearson, stated in July that Canada did not desire to cooperate exclusively with the United States in Arctic questions. Canadians wished to collaborate with Denmark, Norway, and the Soviet Union as well. He detected, he asserted, an increasingly unhealthy preoccupation with strategic aspects of the North, and the "staking of claims, the establishment of bases, the calculation of risks and all the rest." Canada, Pearson stated further, did not "relish the necessity of digging, or having dug for

her any Maginot line in her Arctic ice."³¹ Pearson's statement endeavored to accomplish the same ends for which the Prime Minister's speech had been intended. In each case, the Canadians had spoken for the Soviet ear. Both statements attempted to calm fears in and out of Parliament over American designs and activities in Canada's North.

As defense conversations between the Canadian and the American governments continued during the summer of 1946, Defense Minister Douglas C. Abbott announced in the House that the Permanent Joint Board on Defense would continue to function as a purely advisory body, as it had since August, 1940. It would have no policy making power. Part of Ottawa's future defense policy would, Abbott explained, include participation in the Board with the United States. In addition, he mentioned that Canada would maintain its Joint Staff Mission in Washington.³²

Ottawa waited almost a year after the war to announce its intention to continue with the PJBD. This announcement followed a decision to continue joint defense cooperation, concluded by the Board itself at its meeting in September, 1945. No doubt Ottawa had delayed a formal statement until

³¹Soward, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, p. 272.

³²<u>New York Times</u>, August 21, 1946; <u>Washington Post</u>, February 18, 1947; <u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u>, February 13, 1947; <u>Montreal Gazette</u>, February 13, 1947; Cyril Falls, "Aftermath of War: Canada, the United States and the Commonwealth," <u>Illustrated London News</u>, May 3, 1947, p. 458; Eggleston, "Strategy and Wealth in Northern Canada," <u>Queen's Quarterly</u>, 238-244; and <u>Debates</u>, V (1946), 5060.

a fuller assessment of the necessity for post-war continental defense had been undertaken. But the Prime Minister and others had, after all, on occasion, informally noted the permanent nature of the Board. It had been assumed in both nations that the Board would function beyond wartime. Abbot assured the public in mid-1946 that the Board would proceed with its work of study and recommendation. Agreement on maintenance of the Board would facilitate further deliberation of the proposals the United States had put forth in May. While an agreement on principles of cooperation and specific defense projects remained under consideration, the Canadian government could reassure the public that the Board, so highly regarded as a wartime defense body, now had proceeded to consider the demands of continental security.

As a consequence, in part, of PJBD deliberations,³³ the Canadian and United States governments agreed by an exchange of notes in September, 1946 to the mutual interchange of patent rights in connection with the explosive BDX and other similar materials.³⁴ The two governments had undertaken joint development during the war of various explosive compounds. Now each government granted to the other a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to have newly invented explosives manufactured by or for either the Canadian or American government. They agreed that the

³³Hannah, Interview, September 17, 1963.
³⁴<u>Canada Treaty Series</u> (1946), No. 51.

explosives covered in this agreement might be supplemented as further inventions evolved and were agreed upon by the two countries to constitute part of the joint explosives development program.

In September the PJBD submitted another recommendation suggesting that Churchill, Manitoba, serve as a joint military services experimental station for testing uniforms, equipment, and transportation facilities under Arctic conditions. Ottawa and Washington accepted this proposal. A United States agreement with Canada resulted, which provided that the United States might also send military personnel to Churchill to cooperate in testing materials, to conduct research, and to study weather forecasting problems. Churchill would serve first as a funnel through which all Canadian combat troops would pass while they received training in fighting under Arctic conditions. But Canadians extended Churchill's training and operational facilities to their American allies. so both nations' services would train there.³⁵ The base remained in Canadian hands and Canadian sovereignty continued inviolate. No American base had been established on Canadian territory. Churchill promised to provide a great research center for all the services to experiment under moderate summer heat and extreme winter cold. Canadians and Americans needed to search for metals and lubricants that would withstand

³⁵Soward, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, p. 274; <u>Winnipeg</u> <u>Free Fress</u>, February 22, 1947; Fraser, <u>Macleans Magazine</u>, December 1, 1946, p. 69.

temperatures of -50 degrees Fahrenheit. They had yet to discover what kind of clothing could best be worn in that temperature and what medical problems would arise while living there. An Arctic tractor superior to the ones employed in "Operation Musk-Ox" had yet to be developed, for those snow tractors used in the spring had not proven very successful. In fact, no alternative had been developed in the fall of 1946 to the dog team and airplane in solving Arctic transport difficulties. Churchill promised to provide some answers to these problems.³⁶

Canadians, during the fall and winter, contemplated sending 500 men to Churchill. They desired to establish a major military training base there for their peacetime army of 25,000 men, a skeleton garrison for the Arctic. At the same time, Washington requested permission to send 1,000 United States troops to Churchill to participate in training and defense research, and Canada agreed to the request. But, before the Americans could come, facilities had to be built to accomodate that many men. In November, the United States Army sent men to Hudson Bay to assist in building adequate housing. By the winter of 1946 they had erected sufficient installations to handle 315 Canadians and 110 Americans. Most of these military personnel specialized in some area of training or research.³⁷

³⁶ <u>Winnipeg Free Press</u>, February 22, 1947; Fraser, <u>Macleans Magazine</u>, December 1, 1946, p. 69; <u>New York Times</u>, October 13, 1946.

³⁷<u>New York Times</u>, October 13, and November 6, 1946; Soward, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, p. 276; and Fraser, <u>Macleans</u> <u>Magazine</u>, December 1, 1946, p. 69.

During October, while the PJBD recommendation for a base at Churchill moved from planning to implementation, an American B-29 flew from Hawaii to Egypt. From Honolulu, its flight carried it over Alaska, Greenland, Iceland, England, Italy, and to Cairo. It had flown the Great Circle Route, and with slight variation could have passed over any one of the capitols of Europe. The lesson was clear. Properly equipped aircraft could cross the Polar wastes and go over the top of the world. The flight of the B-29 had provided valuable information on navigation, engineering, communications, weather, fuel consumption, and physical endurance. Military experts looked upon it as final proof of their long-held contention that the United States was wide open to attack from polar skies.³⁸

General Carl A. Spaatz, head of the United States Air Force, warned the United States just prior to the flight, that America was open to assault. He stated that if general war should ever break out again, "there will be no islands of safety anywhere." The B-29's range had been only 7,000 miles, and it could just carry the weight of its gasoline on a flight from Hawaii to Egypt. But by October, 1946, the United States had the new B-36 bomber which could fly an 11,000 mile trip while carrying a bomb load.³⁹ After this epochal achievement in aeronautical history, General Spaatz

³⁸ <u>New York Times</u>, October 5, and October 7, 1946.
 ³⁹ <u>New York Times</u>, October 7, and October 13, 1946.

warned that there would be no time to prepare for the next war because of the new speed, range, and terrific power of weapons. He and other United States Air Force officials continued to demand increased air power to protect the Arctic, and United States acquisition of air bases in the far North to support air power there.⁴⁰

Canadian, as well as American military leaders warned of possible threats of war and pressed for further cooperation between the two countries. Soviet expansionism and aggression in Europe alarmed the armed services in both the United States and Canada. They cautioned against the threat to world peace and stability which the Soviets posed. Wartime Canadian naval minister, Angus L. MacDonald, stated in October that he looked forward to closer cooperation between Canadian and American navies. He suggested exchange of naval students in addition to cooperation in tactical matters. American naval personnel, he said, should visit Canadian naval installations and acquaint themselves further with Canadian naval problems. Officers from each navy should spend some time aboard a ship of the other flag, MacDonald added. If Canadian-American defense cooperation continued, as he urged, then joint naval studies by naval officers of each country seemed essential to him. General H.D.G. Crerar, Commander in Chief of the Canadian Army

> ⁴⁰<u>New York Times</u>, October 9, and November 23, 1946. ⁴¹<u>New York Times</u>, October 5, 1946.

during World War II, spoke early in February, 1947 of the urgency of military preparedness to meet the possibility of an international crisis. He questioned reliance on the United Nations to bring peace and security. Canadians, he asserted, faced with an ineffective collective security organization, must maintain adequate defensive forces.⁴² In the same vein, Field Marshal. Viscount Alexander, Governor General of Canada, during an address to the cadets at the United States Military Academy on February 10, stated that, "The best way to prevent war, is to be prepared for it."⁴³

In accordance with the urging of officials in both nations, Canadian-American cooperation in defense proceeded further by an exchange of notes in November and December of 1946. The two countries agreed that either nation might station naval vessels on the Great Lakes for training purposes. This agreement amended the old Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817. Canada or the United States, under this new understanding, might station armed vessels on the lakes provided that full information concerning the number, disposition, functions, and armament of the vessels had been disclosed in advance. The suggestion that the 130 year old agreement be modified evolved as a result of one of the FJBD's earliest post-war recommendations.⁴⁴ The significance of this agreement lay

42 New York Times, February 9, 1947.

43<u>New York Times</u>, February 11, 1947.

⁴⁴<u>Canada Treaty Series</u> (1946), No. 40; <u>New York Times</u>, December 14, 1946; Robert A. Spencer, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u> <u>from UN to NATO, 1946-1949</u> (Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 306.

more in the spirit of friendship and cooperation it signified between the two countries than in its strategic importance. The Rush-Bagot Agreement represented the kind of mutual trust in Canadian-American relations that extended back to 1939, if not before. Its amendment and reinterpretation augured well for "permanent" Canadian-American defense of the North American continent.

Canadians and Americans moved toward closer and more extensive defensive cooperation in late 1946 and early 1947. Soviets denounced this collaboration, particularly in the Northland. In January, 1947, Defense Minister Brooke Claxton emphatically denied statements issued in a Moscow broadcast asserting that Americans engaged in testing jet-propelled bombs in Canada, and that Churchill, Manitoba, functioned as a base for the United States Navy. Claxton asserted that Canadians tested new weapons in common with other nations, but experiments at Churchill included only small arms and artillery. He said of the 600 men at Churchill. only 100 were Americans, and they were engineers. 45 This Canadian statement did nothing to silence Russian condemnation. 46 At a period when the intensity of Soviet pressure reached toward a peak in the Middle East and Greece, the Soviets looked upon the Arctic as a sector of importance

⁴⁵<u>Winnipeg Free Press</u>, February 22, 1947; <u>New York</u> <u>Times</u>, January 28, 1947.

46_{New York Times}, February 2, 1947; and <u>Winniper</u> <u>Free Press</u>, February 8, 1947.

in world expansion. Through propaganda, the Soviets attempted to keep the United States out of the Arctic by branding her as imperialistic. But the United States and Canada soon agreed on a set of arrangements designed to contain Soviet expansion, primarily in North America, but elsewhere as well.

On November 20, 1946, the PJBD submitted a revised statement of principles in the form of a recommendation to the two governments. In negotiating a public statement of principles, the individual members of the United States section personally influenced and expedited the final process of securing agreement among their superiors. In the final stages, when a text that satisfied the State Department had been agreed upon in Ottawa, the secretary of the American section, with the assistance of the service members, went from office to office in the Pentagon until the required number of approvals had been obtained. This enabled a deadline to be met, for it had previously been agreed that it would be desirable, on a given day, for the President to issue a statement, and for the Prime Minister to make 47 a statement simultaneously to the Canadian House of Commons.

On February 12, 1947, in less than thirty days before President Truman pronounced his Containment Doctrine, Ottawa and Washington, by announcing a new agreement, indicated

⁴⁷Letter, MacDonnell, September 3, 1963.

their approval of the PJBD recommendation concerning principles for defense cooperation. The agreement stated that each government, in the interest of efficiency and economy, had decided "that its national defense establishment shall, to the extent authorized by law, continue to collaborate for peacetime joint security purposes." Collaboration would be confined to the following principles:

> 1. Interchange of selected individuals so as to increase the familiarity of each country's defense establishment with that of the other country.

2. General cooperation and exchange of observers in connection with exercises and with the development and tests of material of common interest.

3. Encouragement of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, organization, methods of training, and new development. As certain United Kingdom standards have long been in use in Canada, no radical change is contemplated or practicable and the application of this principle will be gradual.

4. Mutual and reciprocal availability of military, naval, and air facilities in each country; this principle to be applied as may be agreed in specific instances. Reciprocally each country will continue to provide with a minimum of formality for the transit through its territory and its territorial waters of military aircraft and public vessels of the other country.

5. As an underlying principle all cooperative arrangements will be without impairment of the control 48 of either country over all activities in its territory.

Although both governments had agreed upon the necessity for further defense cooperation, they had taken the decision to continue collaboration independently. The agreement did

⁴⁸ Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XIV, No. 355 (1946), p. 683; <u>Canada Treaty Series</u> (1947), No. 43; Canada, <u>Debates</u>, I (1947), 346-347.

not comprise a treaty, an executive agreement, or any form of a contractual obligation. Each country might determine the extent of practical cooperation in respect to any one or all of the announced principles, and might discontinue collaboration on any or all of them as it saw fit. Canada and the United States agreed that "neither country will take any action inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations." The Charter, they announced, "remains the cornerstone of the foreign policy of each." An important element in each government's decision to continue joint defense lay in the conviction that "in this way their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security could be fulfilled more effectively." Both Washington and Ottawa stated that they believed this agreement would contribute to world stability. It would, they said, establish through the United Nations an effective system of world-wide security. The two governments sent copies of this statement to the Secretary General of the United Nations for circulation to all its members. 49

Prime Minister King explained, in presenting the agreement to Parliament, that the statement of principles extended Canadian-American cooperation which had begun in August, 1940, with the founding of a PJBD. In discharging a responsibility for North American defense, "the Board's work had led to the building up of a pattern of close defense

⁴⁹Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XIV, No. 355 (1946), p. 683; <u>Debates</u>, I (1947), 346.

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cooperation." The principles announced in Ottawa and Washington were "in continuance of this cooperation," King asserted.⁵⁰ The two countries had, under the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940, studied problems relating to land, sea, and air. Now they formally agreed to continue that study particularly with regard to combat problems in the Arctic. By the agreement, effected simply through a joint statement, the United States and Canada reiterated their decision to maintain their close wartime activity indefinitely.

The two governments, in this declaration, outlined general principles for cooperation which included exchange of observers, and mutual availability of naval and air facilities. But the statement avoided any mention of specific provisions for weather stations, observation posts, or radar testing. When he announced the agreement, the Prime Minister emphasized, in fact, that the United States had not asked for bases.⁵¹ King did disclose, however, that the possibility of the United States building such bases and assisting in staffing them with a minority of Americans at each base had been very much under discussion during the past summer.⁵² Canadian sovereignty, he assured, would be maintained. The agreement had stated that as an underlying principle, defense cooperation would proceed without jeopardy to either nation's

⁵⁰<u>Debates</u>, I (1947), 346.

⁵¹<u>Debates</u>, I (1947), 346; <u>New York Times</u>, February 13, 1947.

⁵² <u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u>, February 13, 1947.

control over its own affairs. This provision had its source in the Board's November 20, 1946 recommendation which stated that "defense cooperation projects in either country should be agreed to by both governments, should confer no permanent rights or status upon either country, and should be without prejudice to the sovereignty of either country."⁵³

King pointed out to Parliament that the principles paralleled very closely the procedures which had long been employed between nations in the British Commonwealth.54 Canada, through her membership in both the British Empire and Commonwealth, had dealt before with multilateral defense Since the First Colonial Conference of 1887, she problems. had been familiar with projects relating to interchange of personnel, cooperative weapons procurement and development, mutual availability of bases, unity of command, and assigning of military functions to particular national contingents.⁵⁵ Canada already had experience in joint defense cooperation before Ogdensburg. King called attention to the fact that the new agreement with the United States was not unlike commitments which Canada had made in the Commonwealth. He attempted to disarm those who feared that the American agreement would harm Canadian freedom of action.

⁵³<u>Debates</u>, III (1951), 2250.

⁵⁴Toronto Globe and Mail, February 13, 1947; and <u>Debates</u>, I (1947), 346.

⁵⁵Theodore Ropp, "Politics, Strategy, and Commitments of a Middle Power," <u>Canada-United States Treaty Relations</u>, ed. D.R. Deener (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1963), pp. 82-83. Ropp is a professor at Duke University.

This "extremely cautious statement" of principles had "the mark of Mackenzie King upon it." Although King's opponents accused him of being unduly partial to the United States, on at least two occasions in wartime King "went on record in the Cabinet War Committee as apprehending, and proposing to guard against, American efforts to control post-war developments in Canada, and particularly in the North." Yet, in the final months of his administration, American activity increased in Canada's North.⁵⁶ Cold War demands led King to modify his stand on American penetration of Canada's Arctic. Under American persuasion, Canadian foreign policy moved into closer harmony with that of the United States.

The United States, for its part, faced a serious position internationally by 1947. The American wartime alliance with the Soviets had now disintegrated. It looked as if western Europe, on the verge as it was of economic collapse, would fall under the Soviet shadow as eastern Europe already had done. The Soviets doubted that the Americans possessed the leadership, political skill, material resources, and national self-discipline to bring western Europe material stability, confidence and hope for the future.⁵⁷

⁵⁶C.P. Stacey, "Twenty-one Years of Canadian-American Military Cooperation," <u>Canada-United States Treaty Relations</u>, ed., D.R. Deener (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1963), p. 113.

⁵⁷George F. Kennan, <u>Memoirs, 1925-1950</u> (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 350 and 330.

But the Truman administration undertook policies to meet the Soviet challenge. Canadians joined with Americans, significantly, in a renewed defensive agreement nine days before Great Britain admitted exhaustion in Europe. They moved to strengthen the military position of North America, and at the same time, to bolster the security of the Commonwealth and the Western Atlantic Community. They joined partially to fill a power vacuum left by an ebbing British influence.

United States foreign policy moved toward a new position with the Soviet Union in early 1947. American leaders throughout 1946 had followed a "policy of firmness and patience" in dealing with the Soviets. Americans had not accepted Winston Churchill's assertion that the Soviet government, ideologically hostile to the West, would continue to try to expand until capitalism ultimately disappeared. Not until the crisis in Greece reached the acute stage in February, 1947, did American officials recognize the revolutionary nature of the Soviet government.⁵⁸ George Kennan's philosophy of containment formed the basis of the new American foreign policy. Americans, according to this philosophy, in order to curb Soviet expansion and ideology would have to undertake a "long term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment." The State Department adopted this policy during the same interval that Great Britain acknowledged that it could no longer continue to support Greece and Turkey.

⁵⁸Lukacs, <u>A History of the Cold War</u>, pp. 59-60; and Spanier, <u>American Foreign Policy</u>, pp. 24-33.

Britain, exhausted from war, would prove unable to contribute significantly to preserving a balance of power in Europe. With British power withdrawn in Greece and the intensive Communist pressure on the Greek government, a Russian breakthrough appeared imminent. If Greece fell, Turkey and Iran might be outflanked, and could fall under Communist domination. President Truman met the eastern Mediterranean crisis on March 12, 1947, when he announced the Truman Doctrine to Congress.⁵⁹

The new Canadian-American defense agreement of February 12, appears most important when considered in the context of Truman's Containment Policy and the Marshall Plan. Canadians and Americans formulated an agreement to build a fortress North America against threat of attack, especially over the Northland. They also joined together to strengthen the power of the northern half of the western hemisphere, not only to contain potential Soviet infringements in the Arctic, but to build a stronger bloc of power for the West. Within a week after the United States and Canada announced that they would project their wartime military cooperation and exchange of information into the post-war period, the Inter-American Defense Board, composed of military representatives from the twenty-one Latin American nations, formally recommended that the republics consider plans for standardizing equipment, material and training for their land, sea, and

⁵⁹Spanier, <u>American Foreign Policy</u>, pp. 24-37.

air forces. The Inter-American Board recommended that the Latin American nations re-equip their armed forces along United States lines.⁶⁰ Thus, recommendations of the Latin American Board paralleled those that had been discussed and recommended within the Canadian-American PJBD. Both sets of recommendations aimed at strengthening and protecting the western hemisphere.

Some of the Canadian and American newspaper editorial opinions on the agreement bear out the assertion that an understanding between the two countries in February. 1947 aimed at Soviet containment and western Atlantic security. The <u>Washington Post</u> noted the preoccupation of military experts over Arctic defenses since V-J Day. It observed that the Russians had been actively developing weather and scientific stations in the far North since 1930 and that the Soviets possessed some 300 radio and weather stations in the Arctic. "There can be no doubt about it," the Post said, "the direct route from the foreign centers of population and industry linked to American centers lies across the Polar Cap." The agreement, the <u>Post</u> reasoned, should undoubtedly be considered as a step in the direction of defense across the heartland of Canada and the United States.⁶¹ The conservative Chicago Tribune bluntly stated that "those

⁶⁰<u>Washington Post</u>, February 16, 1947. The Inter-American Defense Board, created in 1942, had coordinated United States military activities and planning with the Latin American countries.

> 61. <u>Washington Post</u>, February 18, 1947.

familiar with the negotiations leading up to today's agreement conceded it was designed as a defense step against possible aggression from Russia across the Polar wastes." Noting that Prime Minister King emphatically denied that the United States had asked for bases in Canada when he presented the agreement to the House of Commons, February 12, the <u>Tribune</u> said, "We do not need such bases. What we need is radar stations strung across Alaska, Canada, and across Greenland." These pickets would detect assailants far enough away from Canadian and American population and industrial centers so that intercepting planes could rise to meet them from fields located on American territory.⁶²

The <u>Chicago Tribune</u> noted charges made in the House of Representatives that Alaskan and Canadian defenses had been neglected by American military experts - charges that they had been especially dilatory in selecting launching sites for guided missiles. The facts call for energetic action, the <u>Tribune</u> asserted. The Russians had familiarized themselves perfectly with Alaskan soil during World War II, the <u>Tribune</u> continued, yet, the United States knew nothing of Russian military activity in the Kuriles, Eastern Siberia, or Kamchatka. The <u>Tribune</u> stated that the agreement fell short of meeting defensive demands across the Arctic, and unless Canadians and Americans speedily implemented and expanded it to include listening posts, backed up by air

⁶²<u>Chicago Tribune</u>, February 13 and 16, 1947.

fields and planes, America would be vulnerable. American military efforts should cease to fritter away money in the budget for defense in Europe and concentrate on measures of instantaneous retaliation in our own hemisphere.⁶³ Before the Ogdensburg Agreement in 1940, the Chicago Tribune had urged formation of a PJBD and close cooperation with Canadians for insuring the security of the western hemisphere. At the same time it had warned against intervention in European affairs and the war taking place there. 64 The Tribune. in 1946, maintained the same position it had held in 1941. Traditionally isolationist in European affairs. it continued to advocate non-involvement in European defense. but sought Canadian-American cooperation for securing the homeland. Just as in 1941 it had called for an Alcan Highway to Alaska. in 1946 it demanded an early warning system across the Northland. Canadian-American cooperation seemed to propose the best method for containing Communist aggression in this hemisphere for the Tribune. but it desired to steer clear of any ties with western Atlantic powers outside the western hemisphere. A fortress America would secure the national interest of the United States.

In commenting on the agreement, the <u>Washington Post</u> stressed that Canadians and Americans had not formed a treaty. Thus, they had provided mutual protection for the two countries "without embarassing commitments."⁶⁵ The <u>New York Times</u>

⁶³<u>Chicago Tribune</u>, February 16, 1947.
⁶⁴<u>Chicago Tribune</u>, August 20, 1940.
⁶⁵<u>Washington Post</u>, February 18, 1947.

maintained that the agreement moved beyond a treaty or a military alliance inasmuch as "it practically abolished secrecy between the affected armed forces and provides for interchange of military experience and information... " The New York Times viewed the new agreement as a stronger pact than the Ogdensburg Agreement, for "it rests not on a merely temporary emergency, but on mutual convictions and interests, as well as on the new geographical and power factors in the world." In particular this paper paid deference to the agreement's permanence and to its significance during a shifting of the world balance of power. Not only would Canadian-American cooperation help fortify North America, it would, the New York Times asserted, help fill the power vacuum in western Europe and add security for the western Atlantic area.⁶⁶ Another newspaper. the Detroit Free Press. noted the potential threat of attack from abroad and observed that geography tied Canada and the United States in such a way that they would "stand or fall together." National self-interest and our vast wealth and industrial potential made it necessary to "do our share" to assist Canada in hemispheric defense, the Detroit paper stated.⁶⁷

In Canada, editorial reaction in the <u>Montreal Gazette</u> displayed some disappointment because the agreement failed, it asserted, to extend far enough in joint defense measures.

⁶⁶<u>New York Times</u>, February 14, 1947.
⁶⁷<u>Detroit Free Press</u>, February 14, 1947.

The agreement, it said, "is less inclusive and less rigid than might have been hoped." Yet, the <u>Gazette</u> commented that perhaps there need not have been a treaty or an alliance. for both countries recognized the necessity of "individual responsibility to assist jointly in the maintenance of international peace." Finally, the Gazette added that many doubts had existed over the Canadian government's willingness to defend the North or to enter into any kind of cooperative efforts for its defense. The agreement now dispelled any apprehension on this score, and assured Canadians that the government would share responsibility in exploring and defending the Arctic.⁶⁸ The more liberal <u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u> lauded the agreement. It would not be an overstatement. it said. to call it an alliance. However, it criticized the Canadian government for dragging its feet in defense. It said that the scanty forces which the government planned to recruit seemed inadequate to allow Canada to participate effectively with the United States in Arctic defense.⁶⁹ The government's defense plans for building a permanent service force, appeared to the <u>Globe</u> and <u>Mail</u> incommensurate for meeting the demands which the agreement would make on Canada.

Congressional comment on the agreement proved typically scant. Members of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees welcomed the Canadian-American statement. Senator Chan Gurney (Republican) of South Dakota, chairman of the

⁶⁸<u>Montreal Gazette</u>, February 13, 1947.

⁶⁹ Toronto Globe and Mail, February 14, 1947.

Senate group, stated that Canadian security interests "undoubtedly parallel our own." Another member of the Senate Committee said he hoped that the agreement would be submitted to Congress for approval.⁷⁰ Continuation of Canadian-American defense cooperation apparently had general congressional approval in February, 1947, but congressional reaction has to be measured more in favorable attitude which that body displayed regarding implementation of specific Canadian-American defensive measures later on in the 1940's and 1950's.

Canadians and Americans had begun to cooperate in exchange of observers during several military expeditions into the Arctic. They had undertaken to test and develop materials of common interest at Churchill and in Alaska. Interchange of personnel began early in 1946. They contemplated employing common industrial military designs as soon as experiments determined what models best suited the particular situation. Each country already had a precedent for mutual reciprocity in military, naval and air facilities. An attempt to maintain and guard Canadian sovereignty had been considered repeatedly before 1947. It had been announced publicly by Ottawa in August, 1946 that the PJBD would continue as an organ of defensive collaboration. In a practical way, many of the principles outlined in the 1947 agreement had already been effected at the time when the

70_{New York Herald Tribune}, February 13, 1947; and <u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u>, February 13, 1947.

governments issued the formal statement. Consequently, the timing of the statement leads one to conclude that the purpose of the joint statement lay more in the impact which the two governments hoped to make on world opinion to encourage the western Atlantic nations and deter Communist aggression.

The joint Canadian-American statement of unity for defense of the western hemisphere, emerging as it did on the eve of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, appears most important for its reaffirmation of Canadian-American solidarity. The specific principles of the text ranked in secondary importance to diplomatic design behind it. The first major crisis of the Cold War lurked ahead. Much of Europe lay in ruin and chaos. No one knew how Americans or Canadians would meet this challenge. Formal acceptance of the Board's recommendations in February, 1947 proclaimed to the Communists that hemispheric defensive cooperation would continue to stand firm against aggression as it had done with the Axis. The Canadian-American pact also gave the western European countries and England a ray of assurance.

<u>The Times</u> commented upon the Canadian-American agreement by stating that "the security of North America and of the western Atlantic is of the first importance to the Commonwealth and assuredly cannot be guaranteed with certainty from its own resources." The paper observed that once again Canada provided a link between the United States and the Commonwealth. Because of the scale of modern warfare,

it said, and the range of modern weapons, national defense no longer seemed practical. Present day security, <u>The Times</u> continued, demanded that defense transcend national frontiers. Defense must become an international collective security guarantee, and regional defensive arrangements provided the first step in that direction. The February agreement fulfilled this need in the western hemisphere, <u>The Times</u> asserted.⁷¹

After the Soviets employed the veto repeatedly in the Security Council, hopes for major and collective power unity in the United Nations lay shattered. Thus, a regional defense agreement, like the one formulated by Canadians and Americans, forged the first link in what would be, by 1949, a western defensive alliance against Communist expansion. The text of the agreement stated that Canadians and Americans endeavored to establish a world-wide security system through the United Nations, but Canadian-American joint defense continued because the United Nations had failed. (This is not to say that hopes for its success did not remain high in many minds yet in 1947.) The Canadian-American joint defense agreement provided a defensive arrangement outside the United Nations, just as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did later.

71 The Times, February 14, 1947.

CHAPTER VII

THE COLD WAR

The February, 1947 five-point statement (based on the FJBD's recommendations) proved to be most important, for it set forth the principles for extensive joint defense measures that followed. It defined the relationship of these defense activities to the two nations' obligations to the United Nations, and, in particular, it cast new light on the role of the FJBD. After the 1947 statement the Board found itself confronted increasingly with problems arising from the Cold War.

General McNaughton spoke of the 1947 principles during an address to a New York audience in April, 1948. He said that they included everything which was essential for the closest military cooperation. Through that agreement, he asserted, a comprehensive basis had been provided "on which either country may bring forward any defense matters which it may wish." McNaughton continued by noting that the agreement had allowed Canada to render a significant contribution to weapons development and research. The arrangements with the United States, he said, provided important "positive measures of association, collaboration and standardization" between the two nations' armed forces and for "the mutual and reciprocal availability of military,

naval and air facilities in each country" which now existed. These arrangements with the United States possessed an importance, he claimed, because they stated what was not intended. They made it clear to the world that Canada planned to continue, as always, to carry its full and proper responsibilities for the defense of its own territory, and that all defense activity within Canadian territory would remain under Canadian control.

Some justification had existed in February, 1947 for Canadians and Americans to state what their defensive collaboration did and did not include. The Soviets had leveled a series of charges in Izvestia, the government paper, and Communist Party paper, Pravda, at Canadian-American defense planners. Canadian-American collaboration for joint defense had aroused increasing Soviet hostility during 1946. The agreement of February, rather than allaying Soviet fears and apprehensions, seemed only to confirm them. Russian propaganda particularly singled out for attack the experimental base at Churchill, Manitoba, charging that it had been used for large military exercises and for experiments on big offensive weapons. These accusations led the Canadian government to refute the charge.³

¹McNaughton, S/S, No. 48/18.

²<u>New York Times</u>, February 2, 1947, February 19, 1947, and March 6, 1947; <u>New York Herald Tribune</u>, February 19, 1947; and <u>Winnipeg Free Press</u>, February 18, 1947.

⁹<u>New York Times</u>, February 19, 1947; and <u>Winnipeg Free</u> <u>Press</u>, February 18, 1947. and to invite a number of military attaches and press representatives, including visitors from the Soviet Union, to visit Churchill.⁴ The base at Churchill attracted public interest in the United States and Canada, when General McNaughton, accompanied by ex-mayor LaGuardia, disclosed from Winnipeg that the PJBD would visit it. The Board, they said, desired to tour Churchill, because experiments were underway there which concerned the entire North American continent.⁵

Before going to Churchill, the Board met in Winnipeg for a joint session.⁶ This meeting provided the public with some insights into the functions of the PJBD, for the press covered their session. Furthermore, when the Board returned from Churchill and concluded its discussions, the two chairmen agreed to answer questions from the press. This action, Saul Rae, the newly appointed Canadian secretary, labled as unprecedented.⁷ For the Board to answer questions

⁴<u>New York Times</u>, February 19, 1947.

⁵<u>New York Times</u>, February 19, 1947.

^OAmong the United States military members attending was a tank expert, General L.E. Oliver, who made his first appearance as a member. His appointment was significant because experiments in various types of armored vehicles, especially for transportation over ice and snow, were being carried out at Churchill. He would no doubt contribute to this research project. Other Americans attending were Colonel C.H. Deerwester; Captain G.W. Anderson; and retiring secretarymember from the United States State Department, J.G. Parsons, accompanied by Andrew B. Foster, who would soon succeed him on the Board. Canadian military members included Commodore F.L. Houghton, Royal Canadian Navy; Major General C.C. Mann; Air Vice Marshal, W.A. Curtis; R.M. MacDonnell, secretarymember from the External Affairs Department. He was accompanied by his successor to be, Saul Rae. <u>Winnipeg Free Press</u>, February 18, and 19, 1947.

7<u>Winnipeg Free Press</u>, February 18, 1947.

posed by reporters was very unusual. McNaughton, who answered most of the questions, discussed the Board's two-day inspection tour at Churchill. He said the complete harmony between the two nations and their services had brought valuable results in learning "how to live, move and work under Arctic conditions." He continued, with LaGuardia nodding approval, by noting that the military lessons learned there proved immense, but that civil byproducts of the Arctic effort might be of even more importance.

McNaughton commented on some of the testing taking place at Churchill. He described experiments in procuring water for a military contingent on the move. They discovered at Churchill, he explained, that "shaped charges" could cut a hole two inches in diameter through ice ten feet thick. He described advances in knowledge regarding garments for Arctic wear as revolutionary. Caribou skin, used by Eskimos, had once provided the best Arctic wear. Now, he said, experimenters had developed clothes of light weight, with decreased bulk and improved wind-break qualities. McNaushton told of the tremendous improvements in radar and harbor facilities at the Port of Churchill. He described the housing study underway there, and the significance of the base for weather forecasting on Hudson Bay. He asserted that those who visited Churchill expecting to view rockets capable of reaching the moon would find the trip a disappointment. Experiments there, he explained, provided a follow-up and continuation to those carried on in "Musk-Ox." In addition

to testing means of Arctic transport and movement, McNaughton said, the two governments desired to test a few ordinary weapons - artillery pieces, machine guns, and rifles - under northern conditions. He explained that one of his duties as Canadian Board chairman included maintaining liaison with the National Research Council. For this reason, the Director General of Research for the Department of National Defense, Dr. O.M. Solandt, had accompanied the PJBD to Churchill.⁸

LaGuardia said very little to newsmen other than to elaborate on the excellent physical condition of the troops at Churchill. He agreed strongly, he stated, with everything McNaughton had said, and concluded by asserting that the United States and Canada stood to benefit "scientifically, militarily, and socially from common endeavor." McNaughton concluded the Board's press conference by mentioning that press representatives would tour Churchill later in February and by noting that Soviet officials had accepted an invitation to view the base there also.⁹

The PJBD's meeting in Winnipeg further publicized the Board's activity regarding joint defense. McNaughton, in particular, had brought some of the Board's functions to public attention through the press. The unique mechanism which the Board provided for joint defense, and the close working relationship between the two countries' armed forces, which

⁹<u>Winnipeg Free Fress</u>, February 22, 1947.

⁸ Dr. O.M. Solandt was formerly a resident of Winnipeg before coming to Ottawa. He founded Canada's Defense Research Board. In 1968 he was Chairman of the Science Council of Canada and Chancellor of the University of Toronto.

it demonstrated, served to reassure those who feared that Ottawa and Washington moved too slowly in providing for Arctic defense. The press conference too had helped dispel rumors both within Canada and the United States, and abroad, that the two governments had initiated offensive or provocative projects on Canadian territory. A further step toward discouraging misinformation on joint defense followed the Board meeting, when press and military officials, including Soviet visitors, viewed the Churchill base firsthand.

That the Board's Winnipeg meeting had been publicized to dispel rumors and clear the air was borne out a short time External Affairs Minister, Louis S. St. Laurent, after later. the Board's visit at Churchill, denied that Canada intended to place responsibility for defense of its territory in United States military authorities' hands, and referred to speculation on Arctic developments as highly imaginative. He particularly criticized Soviet press insinuations that the February agreement amounted to a transformation of Canadian territory into an American base for imperialistic expansion.¹⁰ He asserted that the Prime Minister's recent declaration of Canadian-American cooperation had proven necessary both to set at rest fears that the government had overlooked obligatory action, and to discourage stories that more defense activity had commenced than had been contemplated by Ottawa.

¹⁰<u>Montreal Gazette</u>, February 27, 1947.

11 Toronto Globe and Mail, February 28, 1947; New York Times, February 28, 1947; and Winnipeg Free Press, February 27, 1947.

Notwithstanding action which the Board took at Winnipeg, or what Ottawa stated to demonstrate that Canada carried the primary responsibility for its own defense, the Soviets persisted in viewing with suspicion the Canadian-American joint defense agreement and the United States concern for the Arctic. Moscow saw Canadian-American defense principles as a cover for an Anglo-American alliance. The British. in fact, did cooperate with the United States and Canada in implementing mutual defense measures. Britain had been kept informed on the Canadian-American agreement but had not been directly consulted. Two months prior to the February agreement between the United States and Canada, the United States had been conducting informal discussions with both the United Kingdom and Canada regarding standardization of weapons among the three nations. By mid-February. 1947. London reported that it intended to 15 build its arms along lines employed by the United States. Although both United States and British officials denied the formation of any conclusive military or political alliance, a secret understanding did, however, evolve between Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States that remained undisclosed until 1960. The three nations established

¹³Toronto Globe and Mail, February 14, 1947.
¹⁴<u>New York Herald Tribune</u>, February 13, 1947.
¹⁵<u>Washington Post</u>, February 16, 1947.

¹²The Canadian-American agreement, the State Department had asserted, worked independently of any understanding at that time or pending between the United States and the United Kingdom. <u>Washington Post</u>, February 13, 1947.

tripartite arrangements for discussions on intelligence, strategy, research, and weapons development, and they mutually drew plans for confronting instances of major aggression.¹⁶

Although the February, 1947 agreement stopped short of any commitment to joint command, Canadian and United States Staff Chiefs had jointly approved defense plans in 1946. They broadly agreed that, in regard to territorial areas and coastal waters, each nation would establish its own defense arrangements, but even then a plan of mutual reinforcement had been included. In the field of air defense, they had employed an entirely different concept. "Air defense was to be a joint effort from the start." Canadians and Americans reached the decision for joint air defense in 1946, not in 1958 when NORAD was formed. A Military Cooperation Committee. responsible to the Chiefs of Staff, had been formed early in 1946 as a result of a PJBD recommendation. It had been charged 18 with the task of drafting a new basic security plan. After

¹⁷Foulkes, "Canadian Defense Policy in a Nuclear Age," pp. 2-3; and General Charles Foulkes, "The Complications of Continental Defense," <u>Neighbors Taken for Granted: Canada</u> and the United States, ed. Livingston T. Merchant (Toronto: Burns and MacEachern, 1966), pp. 111-112.

¹⁸See Chapter V, p. 115.

¹⁶General Charles Foulkes, "Canadian Defense Policy in a Nuclear Age," <u>Behind the Headlines</u>, XXI, No. 1 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1961), pp. 2-3. General Foulkes was appointed Chief of the Canadian General Staff shortly after World War II and served in that capacity until 1951, when he became Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, a position he held until retirement in 1960.

a re-evaluation of the Canadian-American defense position, a broad new scheme for continental defense resulted.

Prime Minister King had suggested in February, 1947 that Canadian-American cooperation and planning in northern development might increase. He stated that the United States as well as Canada realized the necessity for further familiarization with northern conditions and that Ottawa had arranged for American participation in Arctic projects. Joint Canadian-American experimental projects would serve to extend knowledge of the North. It would also make economic resources of that region more accessible, and at the same time provide valuable defense data.¹⁹

However, King's government continued in its cautious approach to American efforts toward northern defense endeavors. United States efforts were focused, for the most part, on establishment of weather stations as a joint Canadian-American undertaking.²⁰ The two governments, in accord with PJBD recommendations, worked out a joint program for erection of Arctic weather stations in 1947.²¹ An inter-departmental Canadian committee representing the Departments of National Defense, Transport, and Mines and Resources, had reviewed the problems of weather research and northern conditions. This committee worked closely with the United States Weather

¹⁹<u>Debates</u>, I (1947), 347-348.

²⁰Stacey, "Twenty-One Years of Canadian-American Military Cooperation," p. 113.

²¹External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, IV (August, 1952), pp. 280-282.

22 Bureau and the Arctic Institute of North America. The results of some of the inter-departmental committee's recommendations became public on March 4, 1947 when Minister of Reconstruction, Clarence Decator Howe, announced in the House that, within the next three years, nine new weather stations (later reduced to five) would be built for long-range forecasting above the Arctic Circle. Canadians would operate them, but the United States was to contribute to their original cost and to their maintenance. Winter Harbor, Melville Island, would furnish the main headquarters station and would be operating by August. Howe stated. The northernmost station. established at Eureka Sound. Ellesmere Island. Northwest Territories. lay about 600 miles from the North Pole.23 It was already 24 sending out weather reports by July of that year.

On July 3, Washington and Ottawa announced that a small mission of United States Navy and Coast Guard ships would provide the weather stations with food, fuel, and supplies,²⁵ for these stations initially depended, in part, upon United States ships and planes for sustenance.²⁶ At the

²⁶<u>Debates</u>, V (1947), 4113; and Phillips, <u>Canada's</u> <u>North</u>, p. 110.

²²The Institute was a private organization which had worked during the war on northern hemisphere defense studies. <u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u>, February 13, 1947.

^{23&}lt;u>Debates</u>, II (1947), 989-990; Eggleston, "Strategy and Wealth in Northern Canada," <u>Queen's Quarterly</u>, 238-244. 24 Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XVII, No. 419 (1947), p. 82. 25_{Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XVII, No. 419 (1947), p. 82.}

Eureka Sound Station, for example, Canada supplied the officer in charge, one half the personnel, and the food for these men. The United States weather bureau furnished the balance of the staff, their food, plus additional provisions and equipment.²⁷ The FJBD had discussed the issue of control, and considered a formula for staffing and provisioning these stations.²⁸ Some American military leaders disliked the restrictions Ottawa placed upon their activities in Canada, but the Canadian government held firmly to its maintenance of Canadian sovereignty. The Canadians refused to be stampeded into making broad concessions for stationing of United States personnel in Canada similar to those granted during the war.

Canada, however, found herself severely handicapped in asserting effective control over the joint weather stations. Not only did she lack the trained and experienced personnel to operate the posts, but she also was without adequate transportation facilities to and from the stations. St. Laurent observed in 1948 that "even though a station is under Canadian command, with most of the personnel Canadian, our control is far from satisfactory if no one can reach or leave the station except in United States planes and ships."²⁹ Ottawa adhered to the 1947 principles and held that they should constitute the American guideline for defense activity

²⁷<u>Debates</u>, V (1947), 4113.
²⁸Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.
²⁹Spencer, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, pp. 312-313.

in Canada. Before Canada approved of any United States activity, the Canadians requested that they participate substantially in the project also. Ottawa desired that all information obtained by the United States in Canada should be available to Canada. St. Laurent said Canada must, while recognizing the necessity of joint Canadian-American defense participation, be "alive to the dangers of close defense cooperation."³⁰ The United States government, he assured the House, seemed well aware of Canadian sensitivity over threats to Canada's sovereignty posed by Canadian-American collaboration, and respected Canadian feelings.³¹

Some Canadian critics agreed with St. Laurent and astutely observed that Canada's freedom of choice appeared very limited. Historian A.R.M. Lower, for example, claimed that with the construction of the joint Canadian-American weather stations, Canada had moved into the American defense system.³² In a discerning analysis, George Victor Ferguson, Editor in Chief of the <u>Montreal Star</u>, concluded that Canada could not afford to stand alone as Belgium had in 1939, but she must join with the Americans in a cooperative arrangement which would leave intact the essentials of Canadian sovereignty. Canada, he contended, in strengthening the

> ³⁰Spencer, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, p. 313. ³¹<u>S/S</u>, No. 48/23.

³²A.R.M. Lower, "Canada, Next Belgium," <u>Macleans</u> <u>Magazine</u>, December 15, 1947, pp. 9 and 51. Canadian defensive position by joining with the Americans, had not become an American colony.³³ The PJBD had to grapple with the issues which St. Laurent, Lower, and Ferguson discussed, problems of preserving Canadian security and sovereignty in considering the operation of Arctic weather stations. They had to recognize that from a defensive point of view, these stations furnished more accurate weather forecasting and would help determine the feasibility of air routes across the Arctic regions. They provided defensive assistance to the United States as well as Canada. The PJBD possessed a continuing interest, not only in the initial construction of these installations, but in their operation and maintenance as well.

The two governments followed the Board's recommendations urging construction of several weather stations. In addition to the station at Eureka Sound, posts sprang up at Resolute, Cornwallis Island; Mould Bay, Prince Patrick Island; Isachsen, Ellef Ringnes Island; and at Alert, at the northernmost tip of Ellesmere Island.³⁴ The first four of these were in operation by 1948 and the last one at Alert, by 1950.³⁵ With the assistance of Canadians, the United States Navy

³³George Victor Ferguson, "Are the Yanks Invading Canada," <u>Macleans Magazine</u>, September 1, 1947, pp. 18 and 41.

³⁴Sutherland, "The Strategic Significance of the Arctic," p. 263.

³⁵Spencer, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, p. 314; Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXII, No. 565 (1950), p. 695; and External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, IV (August, 1952), pp. 280-282.

and Coast Guard ships resupplied these stations annually.³⁶ This operation, established jointly by the Meteorological Division of the Canadian Department of Transport and the United States Weather Bureau, turned out most successfully. By 1951, the Department of Transport took over carriage of seaborne cargo to them, so that by the mid-1950's Canadian Arctic outposts no longer relied upon outside assistance to keep them in operation.³⁷

In conjunction with weather stations, the FJBD considered erection of a chain of "long range radar aid to navigation" (LORAN) stations in the North.³⁸ These installations utilized the principle of very short bursts of energy sent from three or more stations simultaneously. The pilot or receiver measured with close precision the differences in the interval required for the radar waves from the three or more sending stations to reach him. He could, in this way, figure quickly his exact position. St. Laurent announced a Canadian-American agreement to construct these radar aid posts on March 25, 1947. The Canadians planned to construct the first two in 1947, and possibly a third one in 1948. They would locate them at Port Brabant, an outport of the Mackenzie River system, and at Cambridge Bay on Victoria Island. These stations

³⁶Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXI, No. 524 (1948), p. 782; XIX, No. 484 (1948), p. 471; XXI, No. 524 (1949), p. 76; XXI, No. 533 (1949), p. 443; XXII, No. 565 (1950), p. 695; XXIII, No. 579 (1950), p. 550; XXIII, No. 587 (1950), p. 550.

³⁷Phillips, <u>Canada's North</u>, p. 110; Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXII, No. 565 (1950), p. 695; <u>Canada Treaty Series</u> (1952), No. 36.

³⁸Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

would function in conjunction with a station at Foint Barrow, Alaska. LORAN stations were considered particularly useful in the long starless twilight and in view of the distortion caused by the magnetic pole. Initially, the United States supplied the technical personnel to man these posts, while Canadians were training to replace them later. The Americans also furnished some of the technical equipment for LORAN.³⁹

In addition to Arctic defense, the Board considered problems related to defense facilities in western Canada in 1946 and 1947. As early as June, 1945, General Henry had suggested that the Board examine the value of defense facilities in northwest Canada with an eve to post-war continental defense. The Board agreed in 1945 that an estinate of their value could best be determined once a nilitary appraisal of the continental defense situation had The United States wanted, in particular, to been taken. utilize the telephone and telegraph facilities that followed along the Alaska Highway. However, not until March 31, 1948 did Canada and the United States enter into an agreement regarding the operation and maintenance of a land-line communication system between Edmonton, Alberta, and Fairbanks. Alaska.

Back in November, 1946, Canada and the United States had held discussions in Ottawa concerning the future operation and maintenance of the war-built communication system. At

³⁹Eggleston, "Strategy and Wealth in Northern Canada," <u>Queen's Quarterly</u>, 238-244; and Spencer, <u>Canada in World</u> <u>Affairs</u>, p. 314.

these meetings the two nations decided, subject to PJBD consideration and approval, that a number of facilities from Edmonton to the Alaskan border should be rented to the United States for \$271,000 yearly. The PJBD considered a report from these Ottawa meetings at its November 19-20, 1946 meeting, and lent its approval. Subsequently, in April, 1947 the Canadian Department of Transport made these facilities available to the United States. The Canadian National Telegraph, which was responsible for operation and maintenance of the system on Canadian territory, forwarded monthly accounts for the rental of the system to the commanding officer of the Alaska communications system in Seattle. Yet, the United States failed to pay its rent until formal authority for the lease had been arranged.

At its September 11-12, 1947 meeting the Board considered once again the communications circuits of the Alaska Highway. It formulated a recommendation noting that the United States forces needed the use of the voice and teletype circuits available. The Board acknowledged its approval of the arrangement and recommended that a contract be drawn up by Canadian officials covering the lease, so that the rent might be paid. This recommendation, effected by an exchange of notes, gave the United States the use of telephone and telegraph facilities running along the Alaska Highway from Edmonton to the border of the Territory of Alaska and Canada for the annual sum of \$271,000 (U.S.), commencing on April 1, 1947. The United States made up its

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back payment in a lump sum covering the period up to February 29, 1948, and thereafter it paid in monthly installments. The two governments agreed to continue the arrangement as long as it remained mutually acceptable.⁴⁰

The wartime makeup of the Board terminated with the death of LaGuardia late in 1947.⁴¹ Dean G. Acheson, an Under Secretary of State and a Washington lawyer, succeeded LaGuardia as United States section chairman in November, 1947. He served in that capacity until December, 1948. Acheson's brief tenure on the Board proved of special significance, for indirectly, through him, the PJBD contributed to the building of the NATO alliance in 1949.

Four years after he had left the Board, Acheson stated that he believed the habits of work which the Board developed contributed uniquely to containment of Communist aggression. Canadian and American PJBD colleagues, he explained, "work over a problem continuously and exhaustively until through pressure of good will and hard work, the solution is forced out." In his opinion, the Canadian-American experience with the Board had been helpful in developing the common defense task which the fourteen nations had been recently carrying out in NATO. The PJBD, Acheson observed, unlike NATO, did not rest on any treaty or legislative act, nor had it been devised to draft treaties or agreements.

> ⁴⁰U.S., <u>Statutes at Large</u>, LXII, 3883-3886.
> ⁴¹ New York Times, October 2, 1947.

The Board considered defense questions and issued joint recommendations, but it did not ask its governments for agreements or binding obligations of any sort. Yet, Acheson said, the interesting and significant fact was that in the Board's twelve year history, every recommendation either had been, or was then in the process of implementation as The United States and a voluntary act by the two nations. Canada had, he observed, been working closely together to help create a strong Atlantic community in order to deter Soviet aggression in Europe. "Many of the actions taken" in NATO, Acheson said, "lie in the field of coordination of effort rather than through binding agreements upon the nations concerned." As the Atlantic countries assume voluntary action to carry forward joint programs, as Canada and the United States had done, the difficulty and friction that so often develops in attempting to draft binding agreements can be avoided. 42

The Canadian-American FJBD offered the NATO community a functional model in 1949. In particular, the Board's operational habits, its traditional informality, and its emphasis on joint voluntary action without binding agreements, furnished precedents and lessons for operation of a more

⁴²"Chief Imperative Bearing Upon the Atlantic Coalition," Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXVII, No. 701 (1952), pp. 847-848; and Letter, Dean Acheson, July 16, 1963. The Board is unlike the NATO council in that the council is headed and represented by civilians only. There are no military members on the NATO council as there are on the FJBD.

institutionalized structure like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Acheson understood the Board's mode of operation and knew of its unique contribution to regional organization when he assumed the position of Secretary of State in April, 1949. He moved to a position in the United States Cabinet where he could apply the ideas and lessons he had acquired from his participation in the Board's operation.

Major General Guy Vernor Henry, Acheson's successor, served from December, 1948 to April, 1954. Henry had for many years worked as the senior United States service officer on the Board under LaGuardia, having been appointed to the Board in December, 1942, as United States Army member.⁴³ He had initiated the American members' proposals for future Canadian-American defense collaboration at the Board's June, 1945 meeting. He had urged that Canada join with the United States and South American nations in standardization of Canadian and American forces. After having also served as an American member of the Inter-American Defense Board, he possessed a great deal of experience in dealing with western hemispheric military affairs. Acheson, and then Henry, furnished strong personalities on the Board to further American initiatives for proposed defense projects with Canada.

⁴³Henry, born at Fort Robinson, Nebraska in 1875, was an old cavalry officer approaching the age of seventy when first appointed to the Board. During World War II he served as a member of the Secretary of War's Personnel Board, and was the United States chairman of the Canadian-United States Military Personnel Board, and the Inter-Allied Personnel Board. He died in November, 1967. Pope, <u>Soldiers and Politicians</u>, p. 218; <u>Official Army Register</u>, 1933 (Washington: United States Cavalry Personnel Office, 1933), p. 307; and Letter, Patricia Henry Williams, October 25, 1968.

The Board's post-war activity involving weather and LORAN stations and the northwestern communications system provided only a prologue to what followed. A proliferation of defense projects was spawned in the late 1940's and early 1950's. In January, 1948, Canadian Defense Minister Brooke Claxton, following a FJBD recommendation, initiated conversations with United States Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal regarding procurement of military equipment in Canada by the United States. 44 Claxton journied to Washington and met with President Truman. He toured the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, and the National War College in Washington, D.C. He met the United States Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, in addition to the four Chiefs of Staff; and while in Washington, he also met the United States section of the PJBD. During all these meetings Claxton exchanged information with United States agencies on defense organization and training.45

A return visit by the United States Secretary of Defense, Forrestal, took place the following August. On the anniversary of the Ogdensburg Agreement, August 17, Forrestal met with Claxton and military chiefs from both Canada and the United States at Ogdensburg, New York, to commemorate the founding of the FJBD. The ceremonies, at which a

> ⁴⁴<u>Debates</u>, III (1950), 2653. ⁴⁵<u>Debates</u>, II (1948), 2068.

commemorative plaque was unveiled, took place at the railway yard where Roosevelt and King had met eight years before. Forrestal attended ceremonial parties and dinners with Canadians. But his trip involved a more serious vein, for before coming to Ogdensburg he had met with Canadian officials in Ottawa on the 16th. Although Forrestal met with the Cabinet Defense Committee, nearly all the Canadian members of the Cabinet took part. Incoming Chief of State, St. Laurent, who would soon succeed Mackenzie King as Prime Minister, and the Under Secretary of State, Pearson, who was about to follow St. Laurent as head of the External Affairs Department attended. along with C.D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce, and The three Chiefs of Staff, and the Cabinet Secretary, Clarton. A.D.P. Heeney, together with the PJBD chairman, McNaughton, participated in the discussion with Forrestal. The conferences dealt mainly with joint action in any future emergency, with top priority given to three major projects: The first concerned the role of Canadian manufacturing plants and raw materials during a possible military emergency; the second, interchange of weapons and ammunition among armed forces of Canada, the United States and United Kingdom; and the third, standar-48 dization of United States and Canadian arms and ammunition.

> ⁴⁶<u>New York Times</u>, August 18, 1948. ⁴⁷<u>New York Times</u>, August 17, 1948.

⁴⁸<u>New York Times</u>, August 13, 18, 1948; Walter Millis and E.S. Duffield (eds.) <u>The Forrestal Diaries</u> (New York: Viking, 1951), pp. 473-474.

Forrestal recorded that the Canadians expected the Russians to continue their pressure, but that they did not believe the Soviets desired war. He also observed that the Cabinet was "giving a good deal of thought to a radar screen, although the very great costs involved make it a problem difficult of solution."⁴⁹ During an interview after the meetings, Forrestal said that he foresaw no difficulty in solving the problem of the bases in Newfoundland, which had been leased by the United States from the United Kingdom in 1940 for ninety-nine years. Noting that Newfoundland was now moving toward joining the Dominion of Canada, Forrestal said that it seemed too early to say what would be done. He assured Canadians that when the problem arose, a satisfactory solution for all parties could be attained. Problems posed by Newfoundland's changing constitutional status belonged in the common field of joint defense, he asserted. Claxton and Forrestal emphasized that problems of joint defense remained under continuous study.⁵⁰

The Claxton and Forrestal conferences, held as a result of the PJBD's suggestion, proved significant. Fractically every major issue which the Board would deliberate during the ensuing decade had been mentioned. The Board continued to study and recommend proposals encompassing virtually all aspects of hemispheric defense. Problems

49 Forrestal Diaries, pp. 473-474.

⁵⁰<u>New York Times</u>, August 17, 1948.

involved in ensuring adequate Canadian-American cooperation in air search and rescue operations along the boundary confronted the Board. It discussed this issue, and as a result of its recommendation, an Air Search and Rescue Agreement followed. The agreement, effected by an exchange of notes in January, 1949, provided for the elimination of immigration and customs formalities for Canadian or United States public aircraft engaged in search and rescue operations. By the terms of this agreement, the particular Rescue Coordination Center involved in a rescue operation (the center nearest the scene of rescue) assumed responsibility for informing the immigration authorities of the intended rescue and furnishing details on the purpose of the flight, including identification markings and number of crew members in each aircraft. Customs officials nearest the search area were to be appraised of similar details.⁵¹

As the Cold War intensified, the Board instituted further Canadian-American defensive cooperation in the industrial field. Froblems related to standardization of material and component specifications, weapons, and types of military equipment, comprised an issue of great economic significance, especially for Canada.⁵² Canada regarded the declaration of accord with respect to unification of screw

⁵¹U.S., <u>Statutes at Large</u>, LXIII, 2328.

⁵²Eric Harrison, "Strategy and Policy in the Defense of Canada," <u>International Journal</u>, IV (1949), 230-232. Harrison was professor of History at Queen's University. threads in 1948 as a major advance in the area of industrial standardization. This convention between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada had been a topic which the PJBD had discussed.⁵³ The three governments agreed in November, 1948 to specifications which provided for the general interchangeability of threaded products. They agreed also to maintain continuous cooperation in the further development and extension of screw threads standardization.⁵⁴

Since Canada and the United States constituted a single area of defense, it seemed necessary to the Board that, in the interest of preparedness, cooperation should proceed in the economic and industrial sectors as a part of joint defense. That the two countries' economies could work to mutual advantage had already been proven during wartime.⁵⁵ With the Cold War, new means of continuing coordination of defense purchasing needed to be found. Canadian defense requirements were usually too small to manufacture many kinds of equipment exclusively for its own use. Canada needed to produce items of defense specialization and then exchange their surplus for other items which could not be profitably manufactured in Canada. To meet this demand the Board formulated a recommendation calling for a system

> ⁵³Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963. ⁵⁴<u>Canada Treaty Series</u> (1948), No. 21.

⁵⁵The Hyde Park Declaration of April 21, 1941 had comprised an agreement whereby in mobilizing the resources of the continent each country was to provide the other with the defense articles which it was best able to produce, and production programs were coordinated to that end.

of reciprocal procurement for defense equipment. After the Board suggested this action, Defense Minister Claxton initiated a procurement plan with Secretary Forrestal, and concluded it with the latter's successor, Louis Johnson.⁵⁶

Further steps in carrying out the Board's reconmendation resulted in a meeting at washington in June, 1948 between representatives of the Canadian Industrial Defense Board, the United States National Security Resources Board, and the United States Munitions Board. They proposed that the two governments coordinate mobilization planning and that high level committees be established to effect this cooperation. Consequently, on April 12, 1949, a Joint Industrial Mobilization Flanning Committee was formed by an exchange of notes. Washington and Ottawa charged this committee with the task of exchanging information and formulating recommendations regarding industrial mobilization planning. They were to consider production, administration, and communications for a wartime emergency situation. The committee was also to cooperate with the PJBD in joint industrial planning.⁵⁷ The committee, created as it had been

⁵⁶<u>Debates</u>, III (1950), 2653.

⁵⁷"North American Defense Coordination in Canada and the U.S.A.," <u>The Round Table</u>, XL (June, 1950), 328-330; F. Winant, "United States Canadian Cooperation in Preparedness," <u>Public Affairs</u>, XIII (1951), 64-69; <u>New York Times</u>, April 13, 1949; Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XX, No. 512 (1949), p. 537; "Joint Canada-United States Industrial Mobilization Planning Committee," External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, III (January, 1951), pp. 21-22; and Michael Barkway, "Keying Washington to Ottawa," <u>Saturday Night</u>, March 21, 1950, p. 11. Michael Barkway is Editor and publisher of the <u>Financial Times of Canada</u>.

to complement the Board's work, met in June, 1949; but this session dealt primarily with discussion of the organizational pattern which the committee would follow.⁵⁸ For the most part the committee lay dormant during the next year after its first session. The Board's recommendations for reciprocal defense purchasing moved very slowly toward implementation.

Although Ottawa and Washington clearly decided to establish North America as a regional association for defense within NATO, arrangements for joint defense collaboration, especially in the economic sphere, were greatly impeded by a depression-fostered statute, the Buy American Act of 1934. This provision effectively blocked any reciprocal arms purchasing between the United States and Canada. In the post-war period Canadians faced the same problem which they had confronted in 1941 (and resolved for the duration of the war by the Hyde Park Declaration.) They used up scarce dollars to buy American parts and equipment; but the United States would not in turn, buy a significant amount of Canadian-made defense products. Against this one-sided affair, the PJBD recommended action.

In October, 1949, the Canadian Prime Minister called for a defense mobilization plan which would allow Canada to specialize in manufacturing a limited number of defense items and would provide for resumption of the reciprocal procurement

⁵⁸"Joint U.S.-Canada Industrial Mobilization Flanning Committee," External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, I (June, 1949), pp. 23-24; and Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XX, No. 518 (1949), p. 725.

which Canada and the United States had employed in wartime. 59 He suggested this plan again in February, 1950. 60 St. Laurent's statements in early 1950 came after many months of Canadian effort at every level of government, including the PJBD. to formulate a program of joint defense purchasing. Finally, just prior to the outbreak of war in Korea, the Canadians succeeded partially in their quest. The United States, confronted with the Communist Chinese takeover of mainland China and the threat of further Communist Chinese expansion, wished to reach an accord with Canada regarding defense purchasing. Board recommendations for reciprocal procurement resulted in a plan inaugurated in May, 1950 whereby the United States government informed Ottawa that it would spend from fifteen to twenty million dollars in defense purchases in Canada. However, with the outbreak of war, reciprocal purchasing moved upward rapidly from the twenty million to the one hundred million dollar mark.⁶¹ The United States Defense Department officials made use of a clause in the Buy American Act. which had been inactive. It allowed the head of a government department to authorize foreign purchases consistent with the national interest. 62

⁵⁹New York Times, October 15, 1949.

60"North American Defense Coordination in Canada and the U.S.A.," <u>The Round Table</u>, 328-330.

⁶¹Winant, "United States Canadian Cooperation," <u>Public Affairs</u>, 64-69.

⁶²Major General G.B. Howard, "United States Defense Procurement in Canada," <u>International Journal</u>, V (1950), 316-318; and Eric Harrison, "The Great Rearmament," <u>Queen's</u> <u>Quarterly</u>, LVII (1951), 548-549. Not until early in 1960 was

The defense build-up in NATO, coupled with the Korean War, brought new urgency and importance to planning for reciprocal defense procurement. As a consequence of a second meeting of the Industrial Mobilization Committee in August, 1950, a set of economic principles was recommended to the two governments. The committee proposed that the United States and Canada develop a coordinated program of requirements, production, and procurement; impose joint controls over the distribution of raw materials and supplies; exchange the technical knowledge and productive skills involved in production of essentials where feasible; remove border barriers which impede the inter-country flow of essential goods as far as possible; and consult when necessary on financial and foreign exchange matters.⁶³ Fresident Truman and the Canadian

the Defense Production Sharing program worked out whereby Canadian industries were allowed to bid for contracts in the United States on terms which did not discriminate against them. This program led to a waiver to Canada's advantage, of the Buy American legislation which would have imposed a handicap of from six to twelve per cent on Canadian bids for contracts with American industries. The program also exempted certain items from United States duty and produced security clearances which otherwise would have been difficult for Canadians to obtain. James Eayrs, "Sharing a Continent: The Hard Issues," The United States and Canada, ed. John Dickey (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 68-69; Jon B. McLin, "Defense Development and Froduction Sharing," Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 171-192; R.W. Reford, "Merchant of Death?" Behind the Headlines, XXVII, No. 4 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968).

⁶³Winant, "United States Canadian Cooperation," <u>Public Affairs</u>, 64-69. Cabinet approved this statement of economic principles through an exchange of notes on October 26, 1950.⁶⁴ Canada and the United States achieved a large measure of coordination in keeping with the purpose of these principles.⁶⁵ The committee's action in drafting a set of guide lines, and their implementation by both governments, reflected the determination on the part of Washington and Ottawa to follow the FJBD's suggestion to coordinate joint industrial planning, military procurement, economic controls and the use of raw materials, especially now that hostilities had begun in the Far East.

Frogress in defense procurement between the United States and Canada continued during the next two years. During 1951, defense orders placed by Canada in the United States were nearly two and a half times as large as corresponding United States orders placed in Canada. By 1952 the situation had altered radically. In December, 1952, the Canadian Minister of Defense Production stated that the total defense procurement for the two countries for 1951 and 1952 would be approximately in balance. Canada had been able to depend upon more of its own sources for supply, thus

⁶⁴ <u>United Nations Treaty Series</u>, CXXXII (1952), 247-253; "Canada-United States Economic Cooperation," External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, II (November, 1950), p. 414; and Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXIII, No. 592 (1950), p. 742-743.

 $^{^{65}}$ L.B. Pearson, "Canada and the United States - Our Area of Economic Cooperation," Address given at the University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, September 2, 1954, <u>S/S</u>, No. 54/40.

reducing to some extent the necessity of relying on the United States. But the United States had acquired a new awareness of Canadian facilities for production of defense equipment. Canada, by late 1952, demonstrated an important capacity for defense production and for supplying strategic goods. She made progress in defensive preparedness and effective rearmament, while at the same time strengthening her economy.⁶⁶ Canada achieved this progress, however, at the price of further involvement in the East-West conflict.

The United States and Canada established, by an exchange of notes on November 12, 1953, a Canadian-American Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. The committee, composed of officials from the Cabinet level, was to function as a consultative and advisory group. It would consider common economic problems and make recommendations to the two governments to improve economic relations between the two nations. It was to meet at least once a year, alternately in Washington and Ottawa.⁶⁷

Aircraft production provided a major example of integration in reciprocal procurement. Arrangements for production of the American F-86 E <u>Sabre</u> jet in Canada under a triangular scheme allowed the United States to supply the

⁶⁶C.D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce, and Defense Production, "Canada's Economy in 1952," <u>S/S</u>, No. 52/57.

⁶⁷It met for the first time in Washington in March, 1954. <u>Canada Treaty Series</u> (1953), No. 18; Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXIX, No. 735 (1953), pp. 739-740; and XXX, No. 771 (1954), p. 511.

engines and certain other parts for the aircraft. Canada then delivered the planes to the Royal Canadian Air Force, and under a mutual aid plan, to the Royal Air Force. The United States Air Force also was to purchase some of these aircraft produced in Canada.⁶⁸ Under the weapons program with the United States, Canada manufactured various Americantype equipment such as the 3.50 calibre naval gun. They planned on expansion of this kind of reciprocal defense production.⁶⁹ Canada contributed also in design, as applied to clothing, shoes, some vehicles and weapons, and particularly to equipment for use in the Arctic.⁷⁰ This was the kind of joint effort that the Board had urged in the February, 1947 agreement and during the years immediately following By placing defense orders in Canada, Mashington could it. help build greater Canadian industrial capacity and production, thereby improving continental defense. Furthermore, the United States could, in this way, help reduce Canada's adverse balance of payments with the United States. Canada would not find herself restricted by a shortage of American dollars for purchase of weapons and supplies which she could not economically produce.

⁶⁸L.B. Pearson, "Some Aspects of Canada-United States Relations," an address to the Canadian Society, New York City, March 7, 1952, External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, IV (April, 1952), pp. 139-141.

⁶⁹Brooke Claxton, Address, New York City on March 30, 1951, <u>3/3</u>, No. 51/15.

⁷⁰Harrison, "Strategy and Policy in the Defense of Canada," <u>International Journal</u>, 230-232.

The grim international atmosphere of 1949 and the early 1950's led to rapidly increasing defense cooperation between Canada and the United States in standardization of equipment and operational procedures, further conduct of joint military exercises, establishment of more joint defense installations, as well as industrial planning and procurement. In each of these areas the FJBD worked out the necessary arrangements for joint endeavors. It advanced the application of basic principles of cooperation in particular situations as they arose. In doing so, the FJBD built a most admirable record of service. Both the diplomatic and the defensive branches of government in the two countries held the Board in high regard.⁷¹

With the Board's backing, expansion of joint weather forecasting facilities to meet the emergency situation in the Far East moved forward rapidly.⁷² A system of weather stations in the Pacific Ocean was established between Canada and the United States, whereby a network of weather ships were strung out between the United States-Canada coast and Japan. The plan, effected by an exchange of notes, provided for seven weather stations to be located in the North Facific. The United States agreed to operate five; the Japanese, one (in the far western Facific); and Canada, the seventh. The Canadian government had been maintaining an Atlantic Ocean

⁷²Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

^{71&}quot;The Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States," External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, IV (November, 1952), pp. 372-374.

weather station off the Labrador coast with the United States on a joint basis previous to this 1950 Pacific agreement. Under this new agreement, the United States contracted to assume the complete operation of the Labrador coast station, thus allowing Canada to concentrate her full efforts on the Pacific installation. The agreement marked a significant step forward in providing better weather forecasting for both Canada and the United States as well as guarding the safety of trans-Pacific aviation and shipping.⁷³

By 1951, the two countries enjoyed closer arrangements for their common defense than the public generally appreciated. The general staffs of Canada and the United States employed complete agreements regarding doctrine, plans, and preparations for joint North American defense. Canada adopted much the same battle procedure and battle orders as the Americans. A system of interchange of officers for training, instruction, and liaison at many different levels had been worked out. In furthering this exchange, Canada had opened its National Defense College at Kingston in January, 1948, for studies in war, security, government, and policy. Senior officers of the forces and civil service had been brought together for work on the political, economic, and military aspects of defense. Canada maintained close cooperation in training and in exchange of staff and students with similar institutions

⁷³Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXIII, No. 579 (1950), p. 214; U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties and</u> <u>Other International Agreements</u>, I, 569; and II, 720.

in the United States (and in the Commonwealth). American officers attended every staff college and training school in Canada, while Canadian officers attended similar institutions in the United States. Canada and the United States constantly exchanged information on weapons and equipment, and combined their research activities so as to avoid duplication. Although a general standardization of weapons agreement had not been achieved by 1951, Canada had decided to accelerate standardization of her equipment along lines of United States patterns. Standardization of weapons was carried out directly between services of the two countries.

Satisfactory working arrangements for the reception of each nation's forces in the other country had been achieved. The United States, for example, had troops at Fort Churchill engaged in winter-testing and development, and in Newfoundland on air transport. Canada's 25th Brigade group, at that time (1951), was stationed at Fort Lewis, in the state of Washington, awaiting transport to Korea. Furthermore, Canadian officers worked at American headquarters in the Pentagon Building, and American officers were employed at Canadian headquarters in Ottawa. These men served, not as liaison officers, but in exactly the same way in the other country as if they actually were citizens of that nation.⁷⁴

⁷⁴Brooke Claxton, Address, Metropolitan Club, New York, March 30, 1951, <u>3/3</u>, No. 51/15; Claxton, Address, Canadian Women's Club, New York, October 15, 1949, <u>Saturday</u> <u>Night</u>, October 13, 1951, p. 28; Harrison, "Strategy and Policy in the Defense of Canada," <u>International Journal</u>, 230-232; and <u>New York Times</u>, April 5, 1949.

Canadians and Americans worked out arrangements for joint action in civil defense,⁷⁵ and continued to participate jointly in military exercises. One of the most important of these had been "Exercise Sweetbriar" in Alaska and in the Whitehorse area during February, 1950. Approximately 1,450 Canadian troops had engaged, with some 3,500 Americans, in exercises to test the defense of the northern approaches of the United States and Canada. The primary object of "Sweetbriar" had been to develop techniques for cold weather operations against an enemy landing in Alaska.⁷⁶ Canadians also had air and ground forces in Korea working closely with American services under actual combat conditions.

General McNaughton said in May, 1950 that Canada

and the United States must

work closely together in all defense matters from the elementary planning for civil defense through the development of weapons and resources; in standardization and manufacture of equipments; in organization and training on land, at sea and in the air; for intimate association in all these matters right up to and including the employment of our forces in war, if that unhappy eventuality should come.77

75U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and <u>Other International Agreements</u>, II, 717; and Claxton, <u>S/S</u>, No. 51/15.

76_{New York Times}, September 2, 1949; Claxton, <u>S/S</u>, No. 51/15; and <u>Debates</u>, I (1950), 853-855.

⁷⁷A speech to the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, Toronto, May 25, 1950, quoted in W.E.C. Harrison, "Canadian-American Defense," <u>International Journal</u>, V (1950), 200. McNaughton's years of experience as chairman of the Canadian section convinced him that Canada must make a total commitment to the Canadian-American alliance.⁷⁸

Without a doubt, no two sovereign nations in the world had closer arrangements for common defense than Canada and the United States. The demands of the Cold War and the Korean conflict stimulated an immense amount of continental defense activity. In that tense period the PJBD served a most useful purpose in promoting defense cooperation between the two nations. Its record had been impressive. With one exception, by the spring of 1951, every recommendation the Board had made to the two governments had been accepted. That one exception was the St. Lawrence Waterway.

CHAPTER VIII

GENERAL MCNAUGHTON AND THE NEWFOUNDLAND LEASED BASES AGREEMENT

A secondary set of problems which the Board considered soon after the February, 1947 statement of principles, involved the union of Newfoundland with Canada. The strategic importance of Newfoundland was demonstrated in World War II. Its integration into a general plan for North American seaboard defense, and Canadian responsibility for its military security, including administration of the airfield at Gander and construction of another at Goose Bay, Labrador, remain part of the history of the war. Lying as it did, one-third of the way across the Atlantic, Newfoundland's position continued to prove its value during the emerging Cold War years.¹

In an exchange of notes, September 2, 1940, the United States government signed a leased bases agreement with the United Kingdom, whereby the United States acquired territory for naval and air facilities in Newfoundland.² Great Britain leased these areas "freely and without consideration" for

²By this agreement, the United States also acquired similar facilities in Bermuda.

¹A.M. Fraser, "Newfoundland's Contribution to Canada," <u>International Journal</u>, IV (1949), 251, cited in Harrison, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, p. 50; and A.R.M. Lower, "Transition to Atlantic Bastion," <u>Newfoundland</u>, <u>Economic</u>, <u>Diplomatic</u>, <u>and</u> <u>Strategic Studies</u>, ed. R.A. MacKay (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 484-508.

a period of ninety-nine years.³ A second leased bases agreement, signed March 27, 1941, spelled out the details of the 1940 agreement.⁴ The Americans acquired and operated four bases in Newfoundland: Pepperrell Air Base near St. John's, Harmon Air Force Base near Stephenville, McAndrew Air Force Base, and the naval operating base at Argentia.⁵ See Figure 4.

The Newfoundland agreement of March, 1941 between the United Kingdom and the United States confronted the PJBD with a challenging set of problems. On April 1, 1949, Newfoundland joined Canada as its tenth province, and at once, Canada became a full party to the leased bases agreement.

³The bases acquired by the United States in the Caribbean and British Guiana were granted in exchange for fifty United States Navy destroyers. Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, III, No. 63 (1940), pp. 199-200; U.S., <u>Statutes</u> <u>at Large</u>, LV, 1572-1573.

⁴U.S., <u>Statutes at Large</u>, LV, 1560-1572, and 1574-1575. A protocol was attached to the 1941 bases agreement by which both the United Kingdom and the United States recognized Canada's defense interests in Newfoundland. The protocol stated that Newfoundland's defense comprised an integral part of Canada's defense, and that the Canadian government had already assumed certain responsibilities for the island's security. It stated also that in exercising its powers under the Newfoundland agreement, the United States would respect Canada's interests. In cases where the agreement required the United States government to consult the government of Newfoundland, the Canadian government as well as the government of Newfoundland had the right to participate. This was effective for the life of the main agreement - for 99 years. Lower, "Transition to Atlantic Bastion," pp. 506-507.

⁵Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXIV, No. 620 (1951), pp. 813-814.

⁶Interview, MacKay, August 15, 1963.




Figure 4 --Map, Newfoundland, Airfields and Defense Bases *External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, III (June, 1951), p. 212.

The St. Laurent government decided to place the issue before the PJBD for consideration and recommendation. United States Secretary of Defense. Forrestal.⁷ and Louis Johnson. his successor. 8 assured Canadians that the two nations could obtain a satisfactory solution to the continued presence of United States bases on Newfoundland's territory. Manv Canadians, however, especially those in the legal profession, and some of the leadership in the Liberal Party. remained uneasy over the status of United States authority in Newfoundland. According to them, some highly offensive provisions existed in the old 1941 agreement.⁹ Old provisions on customs and excise taxes, income tax arrangements, and military and postal facilities needed revising once Newfoundland joined Canada. But the worst situation which involved Canadian sovereignty arose from the article that created United States extraterritorial courts on the island. United States authorities possessed exclusive jurisdiction, both civil and military, over American persons, and a more limited jurisdiction over Newfoundlanders and foreign persons in the base areas. Under these provisions, Canadians could be prosecuted under American laws in American military courts.¹⁰

7<u>New York Times</u>, August 17, 1948.

⁸New York Times, August 12, 1949.

⁹Interview, MacKay, August 15, 1963.

¹⁰Interview, MacKay, August 15, 1963; U.S., <u>Statutes</u> <u>at Large</u>, LV, 1560-1571; and Fraser, "Newfoundland's Contribution," <u>International Journal</u>, 251.

The United States also possessed the right to take military action anywhere on the island in wartime or in an emergency, although Ottawa was to be consulted and its defensive interests recognized.¹¹

In operation as well as in theory the agreement proved disagreeable. On occasion the United States authorities brought Canadian citizens into American courts for offenses commited on the base or in the base area. Some Canadians objected strenuously to this state of affairs. St. Laurent's Liberal government feared the trouble that the Conservative opposition under George Drew would foment over these infringements on Canadian sovereignty. In themselves, the infringements were few in number and quite insignificant. But as former PJBD member, R.A. MacKay, later reminisced, "the political threat posed by the stink the Liberals feared the Conservatives would kick up, brought action."¹²

The question of the embarrassment which might result to Canadians from having Newfoundland join with Canada, in view of the 1941 Anglo-American agreement, had arisen in Parliament during the course of the debate on the union. In February, 1949, St. Laurent, in answer to this question, maintained that the provisions of the Anglo-American agreement must stand unless the United States government agreed

¹¹U.S., <u>Statutes at Large</u>, LV, 1561; and Fraser, "Newfoundland's Contribution," <u>International Journal</u>, 251.

¹²Interview, MacKay, August 15, 1963. MacKay served on the Board under McNaughton as the External Affairs member, January, 1951 to October, 1955.

voluntarily to some modification. He disclosed that negotiation with a view toward some variation in the leased bases provisions to bring them into accord with the Canadian-American declaration of February, 1947, had already commenced.¹³ The Liberals attempted to head off opposition criticism by bringing the issue before the Board. In the Board's hands, the problem could ride for a while, and meantime Ottawa could attempt to get the Americans to make some concessions. If the opposition knew the Board was considering new leased bases provisions for Newfoundland, they would not be so apt to attack the Liberals on the issue. This proved to be sound Liberal political strategy.

In the midst of the union debate in February, the Prime Minister met in Washington with President Truman. Among many issues, they discussed problems relating to NATO, the St. Lawrence Seaway, and Newfoundland. Truman seemed primarily interested in creating a military shield against the Soviet Communists that would extend from Alaska, over the Arctic, to Berlin. In that context, they discussed the United States bases in Newfoundland. St. Laurent assured Truman that the Anglo-American agreement authorizing the leased bases would not be challenged once Newfoundland joined Canada, and Truman replied by asserting that Canada's political independence remained in the interest of the United States as well as Canada.¹⁴ Truman seemed willing

¹³<u>Debates</u>, I (1949), 337-338.

14 Dale C. Thomson, <u>Louis St. Laurent: Canadian</u> (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967), p. 258.

to yield to the Canadian requests regarding Newfoundland in view of his broader aim of obtaining an Arctic shield. This knowledge spurred the Canadians on in negotiations.

St. Laurent assured Truman that Canada would not contest the validity of the bases agreement. The Canadian government, however, informed the United States government that it hoped they would consider relinquishing some of their extraterritorial rights in order to conform with the 1947 statement of principles. That statement referred to the "underlying principle" that "all cooperative arrangements will be without impairment of the control of either country over all activities in its territory." Ottawa also reminded Washington of the PJBD's recommendation of November 20, 1946 which stated that defense cooperation projects in the two countries should be agreed to by both governments, and should confer no permanent rights or status upon either nation. It should not, the recommendation read, prejudice in any way the sovereignty of either country. Ottawa pointed out to the United States that both governments had accepted the Board's suggestion.¹⁵ While the Board deliberated, Ottawa, recognizing that it had asked the United States to relinquish valid legal rights, appealed to the principles of cooperation already established to further its case for a new leased bases agreement. In this way the Canadian government backed the Canadian section of the PJBD.

15<u>Debates</u>, III (1951), 2550; and Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXIV, No. 620 (1951), pp. 813-814.

Under McNaughton's leadership, the Canadian section played an important role in achieving a modification of the 1941 agreement. McNaughton, always quick to seize any opportunity to ride hard on the Americans for benefit of Canadian nationalism, jumped at the chance to get this issue before the Board. Inasmuch as the Board was searching for agenda topics, and had little to deliberate early in 1949. the time proved opportune. McNaughton conversed with the Defense Minister and St. Laurent about Newfoundland. Several issues lay at stake. United States naval and military authorities liked the Anglo-American agreement regarding Newfoundland. The Americans wanted the continued use of Goose Bay, Labrador. In fact, they desired additional territory in Newfoundland to build a fighter base. Washington wished to obtain territory in Canada for radar lines. as well as other concessions. Backed firmly by the Liberal government, McNaughton warmed to the opportunity to apply pressure on the United States government through the medium of the Defense Department.

McNaughton's strategy involved the use of the concessions which the United States Air Force in particular wished to gain for radar installations and further bases in Canada. In conferring with Canadian officials, McNaughton suggested that these concessions might serve as a lever to obtain quick political action in Congress for revamping the leased bases agreement. He also observed that the Board might function as a significant forum in this negotiation. His plan was followed and a modification emerged. Because of the Board mechanism and the personal influence of McNaughton, it arrived sooner than otherwise might have been possible. MacKay observed that McNaughton "had tremendous influence over the American military members on the Board in particular, and on American military thinking in Washington in general." He used his own prestige and influence to obtain a revision of the agreement, for the American military and the United States Air Force desired many concessions from Canada in 1950-1951. "It did not constitute a complete <u>guid pro guo</u>," MacKay said, "but nearly so."¹⁶

In 1949 and 1950, during discussion of the Newfoundland issue, the military and State Department members on the United States section of the Board opposed any revision in the leased bases agreement. Any changes made in that agreement possessed international implications, for the United States had leased bases all over the world. Those bases in North Africa, around the Mediterranean Sea, and in the Middle East provided touchy subjects for debate when McNaughton brought up the matter of Newfoundland. In 1950, Washington especially valued these bases in the era of the manned bomber. To the Americans, these bases appeared particularly vulnerable; and they feared that any change in the Newfoundland agreement would cause repercussions elsewhere. Also to be considered were the other bases originally leased from Great Britain in 1940. The American

> 16 Interview, MacKay, August 15, 1963.

section maintained for some time that the Canadian request would provoke demands for revising leased bases agreements around the world. It might "snowball," they feared. This threat erupted with McNaughton's proposals, right at the time when the Korean War kept the United States occupied as well.¹⁷

McNaughton remained undaunted by American arguments. Canadian sovereignty lay at stake! He seized the initiative to place this item on the Board agenda, and utilized a Canadian diplomatic advantage to secure the provisions for a revised agreement for Newfoundland. For him, the Board furnished a means to apply diplomatic pressure at the right time and place to help secure a Canadian success. The Canadian section bargained with the Americans, knowing that the President himself wanted to initiate a greatly expanded program for continental air defense on Canadian territory. This knowledge gave Canada a stronger hand in obtaining some concessions. McNaughton did not win a joint recommendation on Newfoundland overnight, however. Not until March, 1950 did the Board formulate a recommendation.¹⁸

Well over a year passed after the Board had submitted its recommendation regarding Newfoundland before the governments acted. On May 1, 1951, Washington and Ottawa announced that agreement had been achieved in principle and that certain modifications in the Anglo-American agreement had been reached.

17 Interview, MacKay, August 15, 1963.

¹⁸<u>Debates</u>, III (1951), 2250.

The slowness with which an accord was reached was due to the difficult position which the United States government considered itself in regarding the Newfoundland leased bases agreement. The joint May announcement disclosed the contents of the PJBD's recommendations and stated that its proposals had been officially approved in both capitols. Washington and Ottawa suggested that an exchange of notes would constitute a formal agreement on the Board's recommendation.¹⁹

Washington simply printed the May 1st announcement in the Department of State Bulletin on May 21, 1951, under the title, "U.S.-Canada agree on U.S. Leased Bases in Newfoundland." The article stated that Ottawa would disclose the text of the Board's recommendation. It asserted that the proposed arrangements provided "an equitable and practicable solution to the points at issue." Settlement of this problem, the article concluded, bore further testimony to the fact that Canada and the United States could arrive at satisfactory solutions for their common benefit.²⁰ The United States government, officially at least, appeared satisfied with the arrangement, as well it might have been. It remained firmly entrenched in this forward bastion along the Atlantic coast and in a position to expand American air installations there in a few months hence.

¹⁹<u>Debates</u>, III (1951), 2250; and Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXIV, No. 620 (1951), pp. 813-814.

20 Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXIV, No. 620 (1951), pp. 813-814.

In Canada, St. Laurent presented the Board's proposals to Parliament on May 1. He stated that the two governments had decided earlier to ask the PJBD to examine and report on Canada's request for modification in the leased bases agreement. The Board, he said, had undertaken an exhaustive study. The United States section members cooperated on behalf of the United States government "in a spirit of friendship in search for a solution."²¹ St. Laurent's statement, correct as far as it went, had not, of course, disclosed the extent to which McNaughton. as bargainer, had facilitated agreement. The Liberal tactic of delegating the leased bases issue to the Board, proved successful in keeping the opposition pacified regarding American infringements upon Canadian sovereignty. During the several months of negotiations between Washington and Ottawa, the opposition had been willing to leave this problem in the hands of a respected agency like the Board.

St. Laurent asked that the text of the Board's recommendations be printed in <u>Hansard</u>. (For the PJBD's leased bases recommendation, see Appendix E.) He explained to Parliament that the first part of the recommendation would place income tax exemptions of United States personnel in Newfoundland on the same ground as in the rest of Canada. He said that on June 12, 1950, a new double taxation convention between the United States and Canada had been signed. Parliament had approved it, but it awaited ratification in

²¹<u>Debates</u>, III (1951), 2550.

the United States. When it came into force, it would replace certain exemption provisions from which Americans had benefited in the 1941 agreement. In addition, the Board had recommended that the United States waive the exemptions given by the bases agreement on contractor's profits, on United States civilian employees of these contractors, and on the families of these employees. Secondly, the United States agreed to waive duty and tax exemptions enjoyed under the bases agreement on contractor-owned equipment, on personal belongings and household items owned by contractors and their United States employees (other than on first arrival in the country), and on individual purchases by United States personnel made in Canada, thus submitting these items to Canadian customs charges. Customs and excise exemptions for post exchanges and service clubs would continue unchanged. United States authorities agreed, however, to attempt to increase purchases for these institutions within Canada and to take special steps to prohibit abuse of the priviliges continued under the new agreement. In the third recommendation, St. Laurent said Canada had sought to replace the United States military postal facilities with Canadian post offices. The United States authorities had not been ready to accede to this request. Accordingly, the Board's recommendation stated that the United States would not establish normal civilian post offices, and would limit the use of their army post office system strictly to mail bound to United States territory or to other United States Army post offices. Fourthly, the recommendation

regarding jurisdiction of the courts covered four matters, the Prime Minister said. The United States waived all rights of jurisdiction, enjoyed under the bases agreement, over British subjects and over aliens other than citizens of the United States. The Americans also suspended for five years the rights of jurisdiction over United States civilian personnel. This last provision remained subject to revival on notice, after five years, or in the event of war or an emergency.²² St. Laurent explained that the Board's recommendation meant that members of United States forces in Newfoundland would generally be dealt with by United States service courts, which he considered a "reasonable and sensible arrangement in the circumstances." St. Laurent assured Parliament that Canadian forces stationed in the United States received corresponding treatment.

The Board's recommendations, St. Laurent stated, would remove the most objectionable feature of the bases agreement, namely, the right of jurisdiction by United States courts over Canadian citizens, and the tax concessions enjoyed by Americans in Newfoundland. The recommendation as a whole met most of the specific requests which the Canadian government had put forward to the Americans. Obviously, he

²²Ottawa, by these proposals, agreed to seek legislation to amend the Visiting Forces United States of America Act, to permit the compulsory attendance of witnesses at United States courtmartial proceedings. According to the Board's recommendations, Canadians also were to effect legislation to protect United States forces' security interests, as had been required under the old bases agreement.

said, negotiation of the kind conducted by the Board required a willingness to give and take on both sides. The government believed that all things considered, the Board's recommended solution constituted "a reasonable compromise in an admittedly unprecedented situation." St. Laurent stated in conclusion that the government would soon make five legislative proposals, flowing in whole or part from the Board's recommendations.²³

An exchange of notes, February 13, and March 19, 1952, confirmed the PJBD's recommendations of March, 1950. They effected modification of the wartime leased bases agreement.²⁴ Both Ottawa and Washington followed the Board's recommendations for revision of the leased bases agreement, and in so doing, compromised to the mutual advantage of both nations.

R.A.J. Fhillips, who served on the Board as secretary from External Affairs, January to August, 1951, evaluated the Canadian position by asserting that the FJBD's new terms for Newfoundland, to the layman at least, might not seem terribly different from the old ones. But the fact that the United States did renegotiate, indicated that Ottawa's attitude regarding Canadian sovereignty had assumed a new firmness. As in the episode over erection of joint weather stations, the Newfoundland agreement underscored once more Canada's desire to maintain stronger control over events on its own territory. The State Department, Fhillips said,

> ²³<u>Debates</u>, III (1951), 2549-2551, and 2601. ²⁴<u>Debates</u>, II (1952), 1806.



now seemed most circumspect in seeking Canadian permission for United States military projects in Canada's North.²⁵

The PJBD furnished the primary agency through which the Canadian government, represented by McNaughton, forged this new agreement. By means of the forum which the Board provided, the Canadians successfully changed some offensive provisions. Given the tense Korean War atmosphere of 1950-1951. the Canadian section accomplished considerable diplomatic Most importantly, the Board furnished a medium success. whereby the Canadian soldier-diplomat, McNaughton, exercised personal influence upon American service representatives, and indirectly upon the United States government itself to Canada's advantage. The United States government learned that it would have to exercise continued diligence in respecting Canadian sovereignty. It would have to consider carefully each new joint Canadian-American defense project in the light of Canadian domestic politics as well. Increasingly. the Board furnished a means for educating Americans, civilian and military alike, on this aspect of continental defense.

The new agreement left Washington in a strong position in Newfoundland. Certainly Washington's initial fear that any changes in the Newfoundland leased bases agreement might have dangerous international repercussions leading to demands for revision of other leased bases agreements around the world proved exaggerated. Less than a decade later, long-range

²⁵Phillips, <u>Canada's North</u>, pp. 110-111.



guided missiles assumed a larger place in the United States defense system, and diminished the need for some of the American bases in the Middle East and North Africa. In Newfoundland, the United States reaped considerable benefits from its conciliatory attitude toward Canada. The Americans had been very popular with the new Canadians, the Newfoundlanders, during World War II. From an economic standpoint, Newfoundlanders desired to see the ninety-nine year leased bases agreement confirmed and the American presence continued. The Canadian government would probably have been willing to assume the United States commitments in Newfoundland. but the United States naval and military establishment seemed contented with the American position there. "Thus, on the critical approaches of the Atlantic," as one Canadian caustically put it, "a foreign power sits firmly in possession of air bases that could deny to Canada communication with the European world."²⁶ Revision of some of the provisions of the leased bases agreement was as far as United States military leaders wished to go.

The United States authorities desired to obtain an even firmer military position on Newfoundland's territory than they had enjoyed under the 1941 Anglo-American agreement. They were already using Goose Bay Airport. The PJED discussed a United States proposal to lease seven thousand acres,

²⁶B.S. Keirstead, <u>Canada in World Affairs. September</u> <u>1951 to October 1953</u> (Toronto: Oxford University Fress, 1956), pp. 174-175. Keirstead is an economist at the University of Toronto.



situated within the Royal Canadian Air Force Station Goose Bay (referred to hereafter as Goose Bay), for construction of a fighter base. The leased base, designed to protect Canada as well as the United States, would remain in American hands for twenty years without charge. The United States might, at the end of that period, request an extension of the lease. "Under persuasion," Ottawa acceded to the American request. On December 5, 1952, an exchange of notes formalized the agreement.²⁷

The Americans, the agreement stated, "without prejudice to the sovereignty of Canada, shall have quiet enjoyment of the leased areas," subject to the right of free access by the Canadian Commanding Officer of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Goose Bay. Subject to his approval, the United States could construct and operate communication facilities and navigational aids, including meteorological systems, radio and radar installations and electronic devices. The United States obtained the use, not only of a new airfield at Goose Bay, but also of roadways outside the base, petroleum pipe line facilities, and dockage areas. In view of the recently renegotiated Anglo-American leased base treaty of 1941, the last clause in the 1952 agreement appeared most interesting. It read as follows: "In order to avoid doubt," the Canadian government "intends that the laws of Canada

²⁷Keirstead, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, p. 175; and U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties and Other</u> <u>International Agreements</u>, III, 5295.



shall continue to apply throughout Goose Bay, including the leased areas." 28

This fighter base, established for the joint defense of the United States and Canada, was not strategically well situated for fighter aircraft to defend the Atlantic coast of either the United States or Canada. Goose Bay had not been designed merely to serve as a defensive fighter base. The "runways and general establishment were such" as to make it difficult to believe that its purpose was wholly defensive. In fact, Goose Bay's location provided the United States with "a strong potentially offensive weapon against Europe." If the United States, at some future time, engaged in war with a European power, while Canada wished to remain neutral, Canada's freedom of choice would indeed be limited with this American installation commanding Canada's eastern approaches. This 1952 Canadian-American agreement denied Canada absolute control and free use of these approaches.²⁹ Certainly it was possible to argue, quite validly, that Canada's freedom of action, potentially at least, had been severely limited by this agreement. It would be easy to contend that McNaughton lost far more in terms of control over Canadian sovereignty in 1952, than he gained in the renegotiation of the leased bases agreement in 1951.

²⁹Keirstead, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, pp. 175-176.

²⁸U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and Other International Agreements, III, 5295.



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²⁹Keirstead, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, pp. 175-176.

²⁸U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and Other International Agreements, III, 5295.



In Newfoundland, Canadian members on the Board faced just one more instance of perplexity in a continuing dilemma. They confronted the problem of attempting to reconcile Canadian security needs with the minimum demands of Canadian sovereignty. Yet the international political situation in the fall and winter of 1952 did not infuse optimism in those who held responsibility for North American security. FJBD members, whether Canadian or American, in the context of the unstable world political scene in 1951 and 1952, could hardly have conceived of a military situation arising in which Canada and the United States would not face a common enemy. Given this situation, together with their responsibility of study and recommendation for joint defense, the Board's recommendations for establishment of a major air base at Goose Bay comprised a sound policy.

McNaughton had obtained a compromise compatible with the 1947 principles of military cooperation, not only in the old leased bases agreement of 1941, but in the 1952 Goose Bay agreement as well. Canadian law extended throughout Newfoundland. The worst abuses of the older agreement had disappeared. Canadian sovereignty, in the narrow sense, had been maintained. The United States, a traditionally friendly power, continued to help guarantee Canadian sovereignty against hostile attack from Europe. She lay entrenched, as a result of the Anglo-American agreement of 1941 and the two agreements over Newfoundland in the early 1950's, in a



shield position on the Atlantic coast. For this, the Canadian delegation on the Board bore some responsibility. There remained also the possibility that the United States might, in some future contingency, use these Canadian bases to carry nuclear weapons in an offensive strike against an enemy. American policy in Newfoundland might conceivably limit Canadian freedom of action during the years ahead; but, that chance, Canadians like General McNaughton, MacKay and others on the Board and in Ottawa felt obliged to risk.



CHAPTER IX

THE CLIMACTIC YEARS, 1953-1958

During the tense international atmosphere of the 1950's, when the security of both the United States and Canada appeared threatened repeatedly by the Soviets, the PJBD focused upon several areas of concern in continental defense. It studied and recommended action regarding the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, the Haines-Fairbanks Pipe Line, and the Distant Early Warning, Mid-Canada, and Pinetree Lines. The Board supported plans for further cooperation in military training and maneuvers, and integration of operational control for continental air defense. The volume of the Board's work expanded appreciably in this period because the nature of the threat and techniques of war underwent revolutionary change.

The functions of the Board evolved rapidly during these years. The Board allowed the Canadian military members to exert greater influence on Canadian policy making than would have been possible had there been no channels of communication other than the normal diplomatic ones. Without the Board, the Canadian government would never have allowed the Canadian military so much voice in decisions. The Canadian armed services establishment obtained assistance in gaining its defense objectives through its close connection



with the United States military on the PJBD. Because of their affiliation with the more powerful American associates, the Canadians acquired more prestige and voice in policy in Canada. On the other hand, the Board helped modify, to some degree, the demands of the American military. It helped Ottawa exercise a degree of political influence on the United States government and make Washington pay more respect to Canadian public opinion than otherwise would have been the case without the PJBD's existence.

The Board served especially well in aiding the American military planners, and to a lesser degree their Canadian counterparts, to be cognizant of just how far they could go with their military decisions and plans without raising Canadian public opinion against them. The Board served a political purpose for both Ottawa and Washington by laying down guide lines for the military to follow. During the 1950's it continued to provide an agency where the political and military minds met. These men worked out compromises as they had, for example, in the latter half of the 1940's regarding weather stations, and as a result. each national group and the service and political representatives, knew where they stood on a particular issue. A good deal of the credit for the Board's success in defense cooperation rested upon the PJBD chairmen, McNaughton, Henry, and Hannah. McNaughton saw the Board as a mechanism for gaining Canadian ends and interests, but the Americans used the Board to similar advantage in gaining concessions

from Canada. Particularly as the Russians displayed thermonuclear weapons capability and the long-range bombers to deliver them, the Americans asked for a great deal from Canada. The United States needed Canadian territory and air space for an accelerated program of air defense. These demands would repeatedly confront Canadian Board members and, in turn, Ottawa, with the problem of maintaining Canadian sovereignty as well as security. The fact that the Board functioned so effectively until the late 1950's also bore testimony to the kind of confidence that the two governments placed in one another, a confidence based on several years of experience in working together in many spheres of continental defense endeavor.

The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project provided General McNaughton with another opportunity, similar to the Newfoundland leased bases matter, to place a knotty affair on the Board agenda. He pressed the Seaway issue before the Board and obtained its support and recommendation. Again he employed the mechanism furnished by the Board to apply diplomatic pressure upon the United States government, and in so doing, assisted in bringing the Seaway project to ultimate completion. The actual execution of the FJBD's recommendation was a long time in coming, however. In the course of the Board's history most FJBD suggestions had been implemented by both governments, with one single exception, the recommendation favoring immediate development of the

St. Lawrence waterways.¹ In May, 1947, for the first time a major Board recommendation lay unheeded, when Congress failed to carry out the Board's recommendations for joint construction of the St. Lawrence waterway. The Board recommended repeatedly in the late 1940's and early 1950's that the St. Lawrence Waterways and Power Project should proceed along the lines of agreement already worked out by the governments of the United States and Canada. But that recommendation remained unimplemented as the Korean War dragged on during the first years of the 1950's.

In 1941 during the darkest period of the Second World War, King and Roosevelt drafted an agreement for joint construction of the St. Lawrence waterway project. They had advocated the project to serve not only as a potential contribution to trade but also as a line of communications for continental defense.² The two nations, however, preoccupied with the war, delayed implementation of this agreement. Following the war, active discussion of the St. Lawrence project revived in the United States and Canada,³ but Congress did not proceed with the venture.

¹Address, Brooke Claxton, New York, March 30, 1951, <u>S/S</u>, No. 51/15.

³<u>New York Times</u>, April 27, 1947; and Harrison, "Canadian-American Defense," <u>International Journal</u>, 200.

²Address, Brooke Claxton, Sault Ste. Marie, January 11, 1948, External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, I (February, 1949), pp. 10-11.

Several American departments and agencies, including the PJBD, and the President, submitted recommendations and reports to Congress advocating the Seaway on the grounds that it would advance American and Canadian security. On January 28, 1952, President Truman urged Congress to enact legislation to carry out the 1941 St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, "first because it is important to our national security." The Secretary of Defense, the Director of Defense Mobilization. the Joint Chiefs of Staff. the National Security Resources Board, and the PJBD all recommended congressional action on the Seaway. Exhaustive congressional hearings considered the 1941 Seaway Agreement after 1945. The project's value to continental defense received repeated recognition in several congressional resolutions.⁴ The PJBD constituted only one of several agencies that discussed the Seaway project and urged Congress to implement its construction. Yet the Board's make-up of civilian and military representatives enabled it to play an important role in bringing to congressional attention a convincing argument for construction of the waterway.

Following the war, the Canadian government attempted, by working through the PJBD as well as through more direct

⁴These included the Barkley Resolution offered in the Seventy-Ninth Congress; the Vandenberg Resolution in the Eightieth Congress; and the Senate and House resolutions introduced during the first session of the Eighty-Second Congress. Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXVI, No. 659 (1952), pp. 232-234; and XXII, No. 567 (1950), p. 767.



means, to win United States approval for the Seaway. On numerous occasions Ottawa underlined the importance of the Seaway to continental defense. Canadian officials lent strong support to the PJBD, especially to McNaughton and the Canadian section in its recommendations for building a joint St. Lawrence project. In January, 1948, Brooke Claxton urged, in the "interest of national defense and international security," the waterway should be constructed and pressed to completion as an "urgent priority."⁵ Speaking in March, 1951 to a New York audience, Claxton said the St. Lawrence Waterway should proceed as an "urgently needed defense measure." He said that in the Canadian government's view, in the view of all political parties and from all parts of Canada, the PJBD's recommendations appeared correct. The St. Lawrence development should be undertaken along lines already worked out by the two nations. Development of the waterways, he deemed necessary in the interest of Canadian-American defense.⁶ Minister of External Affairs, Lester Pearson, commented in Parliament in November, 1949, that development of the Seaway might get underway once Congress lent its legislative approval. Because of the project's vast defensive and strategic implications, he hoped Congress would take immediate action.⁷ Prime Minister St. Laurent

⁵External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, I (February, 1949), pp. 10-11.

⁶<u>S/S</u>, No. 51/15. ⁷Harrison, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, pp. 161-162.



met with President Truman in Washington during February, 1949 and again in September, 1951, to urge that the United States take action on the Seaway.⁸

On the advice of their civilian and military agencies, departments, and advisors, the Canadian and United States governments sought authority to construct the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, not only in the interests of peacetime prosperity, but to insure the security of North America. The PJED considered the Seaway several times between 1947 and 1951. McNaughton saw to it that this issue repeatedly arose for review by the Board. He kept placing it before the American military members. He utilized every opportunity afforded him by contacts on the Board to persuade the United States armed service members of the military necessity for constructing a Seaway and Power Project; and in the end, he got them to support it as a defense necessity.⁹

The Board reviewed the Seaway project after the war, and issued its first recommendation advocating joint construction in May, 1947. Because of the public interest in the Seaway, General George Marshall placed the Board's May, 1947 recommendation in evidence at a congressional

⁸Harrison, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, pp. 161-162.

⁹Interview, MacKay, August 15, 1963; William R. Willoughby, <u>The St. Lawrence Waterway: A Study of Politics</u> and <u>Diplomacy</u> (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), pp. 228 and 284-285.



hearing concerning the waterway.¹⁰ The Truman administration attempted to further its case by introducing the Board's advice to Congress. Marshall hoped to strengthen the Seaway proposal by recommending it as a defense measure. In December, 1948, the Board again considered the Seaway and submitted a second recommendation suggesting that the two governments initiate the project.¹¹ Then again, for the third time, at a meeting on January 29 to February 2, 1951. the Board deliberated the Seaway and Power Project in the light of the serious international situation and continental defense needs. They reaffirmed the value of the Seaway in peacetime and discussed anew its immediate significance in terms of contemporary defense of the northern half of the continent.

The Board noted that since 1948 the international situation had deteriorated considerably. Both Canada and the United States had been engaged in armed conflict in the Far East. It appeared, the Board observed, that the free nations might be entering a time of extended crisis during which it would be continually necessary to increase Canadian-American military strength. With these ominous circumstances in view, the Board felt that it again had the duty to recommend early construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway and

¹¹Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXIV, No. 610 (1951), p. 434.


¹⁰External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, I (February, 1949), pp. 10-11. General George Marshall was Secretary of State, 1947 to 1949.



ਤੇ ਦਾ ਹੈ. ਹੋ Power Project. It noted that the project would yield additional supplies of hydro-electric power which were already required in the northeastern United States and eastern Canada, and which the Board said would later become vital to the expansion of mutual military strength. Furthermore, the Board noted that the Seaway would be a relatively safe inland waterway from enemy attack. Canada and the United States would be able to move war materials at less cost in money and resources via the Seaway than by any other means. The Seaway, moreover, would allow for a vastly expanded shipbuilding and ship repair program in the comparatively well protected Great Lakes shipyards.

The PJBD cited another area of urgency in its recommendation in 1951. The iron ore supplies of the Mesabi Range had diminished, but coupled with the depletion of the Mesabi reserves had been the discovery and development of large new deposits of high grade ore in Labrador. See Figure 5. Depletion of the Mesabi reserves and the Labrador discovery, the Board stated, constituted additional cause for immediate undertaking of the work on the Seaway. Inasmuch as Labrador ore could be transported to the large steel producing centers in the Great Lakes most economically by ship, the wealth of the Labrador mines, which provided such a vital link in the defense industry, could only be completely exploited by construction of the Seaway. The Board concluded that "the addition which the project would make to our military potential would far outweigh the initial expenditure in

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manpower, money and critical materials." They went on to emphasize that many of these materials would be needed in any event, because if the combined project for navigation and power failed to materialize, alternative sources of power would have to be devised.

The Board recognized the risk of enemy attack upon the St. Lawrence Seaway project. It was of the opinion, however, that this risk would be no greater than similar danger to other installations of comparable defensive importance already in existence. Inasmuch as the area involved in the project already held a high defense priority, the Board believed that adequate protective measures could be maintained on a reasonably economical basis. With these considerations in mind, and also reaffirming its previous recommendations, the Board recommended "that the two Governments take immediate action to implement the 1941 St. Lawrence Agreement as a vital measure for their common defense."¹²

The extent to which the Board's recommendations affected the final outcome of the Seaway and Power Project is difficult to measure. Significantly, however, the Truman administration urged Congress to consider the Board's judgment and report favorably. The administration, in presenting the project to Congress, emphasized the alliance of Canada

¹²The Board's argument and recommendation are contained in the minutes of the Board, which met January 20-February 2, 1951, printed in the Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXIV, No. 610 (1951), p. 434.

and the United States in economic, political and military Defense of the United States, the administration affairs. asserted. could not be conducted independently of Canada. That fact had been recognized in 1940 when Canada and the United States established the PJBD to consider fuller cooperation for mutual security; and the Truman government "This Board functions today with increasing claimed: effectiveness." The administration urged that congressional approval of the 1941 agreement for joint Seaway development would provide a further important contribution to cooperation with Canada for mutual security.¹³ President Eisenhower's administration used arguments similar to those employed by President Truman in urging congressional support for the In May, 1953, the National Security Council advised Seaway. the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to initiate the Seaway immediately in the interest of national security.¹⁴ Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, advised a Senate Subcommittee on May 8, 1953, that the Seaway's power seemed essential from the standpoint of Canadian and American industrial and military strength.¹⁵

^{13&}lt;sub>Department of State Bulletin</sub>, XXIV, No. 610 (1951), pp. 433-434.

¹⁴Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXVIII, No. 724 (1953), pp. 698-699. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman was Alexander Wiley.

^{15&}lt;sub>Department of State Bulletin</sub>, XXVII, No. 728 (1953), p. 826.

In May, 1953, St. Laurent visited President Eisenhower, who had spoken in favor of the Seaway while campaigning for the presidency. Eisenhower returned St. Laurent's visit in November, 1953. On both occasions the two men discussed the Seaway.¹⁶ While in Ottawa Eisenhower addressed a joint session of the Canadian Parliament. He said that the National Security Council and the United States Cabinet favored the St. Lawrence waterway on security as well as economic grounds. The Seaway, Eisenhower said, now awaited senatorial approval. Canada and the United States must be prepared to meet a present threat. "The measures of defense have been thoroughly studied by official bodies of both countries," he noted. "The Permanent Joint Board on Defense has worked assiduously and effectively on mutual problems. Now is the time for action on all agreed measures."¹⁷ Eisenhower urged completion of the Seaway as one step in insuring continental defense. The PJBD had studied and recommended construction of the St. Lawrence Waterway and Power Project as a defense measure to meet a present security threat, and Eisenhower used the Board's name and prestige to support his recommendations to the Senate.

By an exchange of notes on November 12, 1953, the United States and Canada established the St. Lawrence River

¹⁶Thomson, Louis St. Laurent, pp. 346-348 and 358.

¹⁷Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953. Containing the Public Messages. Speeches. and Statements of the President. January 20 to December 31. 1953 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 772.

Joint Board of Engineers. This four-man board was to review, coordinate, and approve the plans and construction program for power in the International Rapids section of the St. Lawrence River.¹⁸ Plans for the power project rapidly moved forward with the creation of this board. On May 13, 1954, the President signed the St. Lawrence Seaway Bill providing for creation of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation to construct part of the Seaway in United States territory in the interest of national security.¹⁹ Then Congress acted, not by following the principles embodied in the Canadian-American treaty of 1941 which had provided for development of the Seaway in a genuine partnership, but rather by deciding to build the two required canals unilaterally on the United States side of the international section of the St. Lawrence.²⁰

McNaughton had employed his personal prestige to gain the ear of the American military members and to obtain their backing for the Seaway project. He now used the Board as an agency through which to exert Canadian influence upon the American government, especially the Senate; and in so doing he, and in turn the PJBD itself, contributed to

18_{Department of State Bulletin}, XXIX, No. 753, (1953), p. 739.

¹⁹Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXX, No. 778 (1954), p. 197.

²⁰L.B. Pearson, Address, the University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, September 2, 1954, <u>S/S</u>, No. 54/40; and Donald C. Masters, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, 1953-1955 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 51-60. For a comprehensive analysis of the St. Lawrence River development see Willoughby, <u>The St. Lawrence Waterway</u>.

the final success of the Seaway's construction. Once again the Board furthered Canadian-American cooperation in North American defense.

Throughout the late 1940's and the 1950's the PJBD repeatedly considered problems relating to radar warning lines and an interceptor system. Canadian defense planners in 1947 seriously deliberated constructing an Arctic warning line but concluded that it would cost more than it was worth. Increased threat of air attack and the expanding North American budgets which accompanied the Korean conflict changed Ottawa's attitude toward Arctic warning schemes.²¹

When St. Laurent visited Truman and Secretary of State, Acheson, in Washington in February, 1949, they discussed the possibility of building a radar and interceptor network for North America.²² While in Washington St. Laurent denied reports that high level talks had previously been conducted on a proposal to ring the North American continent with a radar screen capable of detecting hostile aircraft from 150 to 300 miles away. He said there had been studies of such a radar line by Canadian and American defense strategists and military planners, but he asserted that the cost of the scheme would be prohibitive for Canada. The United States House Armed Services Subcommittee had, at the time of

²¹Sutherland, "The Strategic Significance of the Arctic," p. 268.

²²<u>New York Times</u>, February 13 and 14, 1949; and Thomson, <u>Louis St. Laurent</u>, pp. 258-259.

St. Laurent's visit, just authorized the Air Force to spend \$161,000,000 as its share of a radar network, and Canada, under the House Committee's proposed plan, would pay its full share to construct and operate a radar chain. St. Laurent emphasized his concern over costs of the projected radar plan before he met with the President and Secretary of State.²³

The Air Force Air Defense Command conceived the plan which involved assigning 8,300 airmen to a widespread system of radar detection devices covering the continental United States and Alaska. Another 13,000 men would back them up in event of an emergency. The system would apply only against piloted planes and those powered by conventional jet motors, not against missiles, for they would surpass the range at which radar could detect them. The amount of protection for specific areas of the country would depend upon their strategic value, their vulnerability, and the likelihood of their being attacked. Industrial areas and important coastal regions would receive heavy radar protection. Although the proposed system was designed to screen only the United States and Alaska, air force officials stated that the Canadian and American Air Defense commands possessed complete information on each other's plans, and that a combined radar defense network would ultimately serve the entire North American continent. Air force defense authorities asserted that aircraft warning for the United States

23_{New York Times}, February 14, 1949.

remained wholly inadequate. They recommended a program to strengthen air defense, particularly in areas where fighter plane forces could intercept enemy craft picked up by radar screens. The Air Force hoped to extend the range of detection as far as possible in order to enable fighter planes to reach the point of interception far from protected areas.²⁴

Notwithstanding the reluctance of the Liberal government to shoulder the economic burden of a costly radar program, the discussions between Truman and St. Laurent apparently persuaded Ottawa to move forward with a radar defense plan. The Canadian government disclosed in mid-1949 that development of a warning system to cover certain vital approaches had commenced. Progress was underway in a plan whereby a certain amount of construction of radar sites and equipment could be constructed annually.²⁵ The Defense Minister told the House of Commons in November, 1949 that radar equipment and a communications system backed up by interceptor planes and a mobile brigade group constituted the first essentials for defense, and, next in importance. were anti-submarine and mine vessels. Washington and Ottawa initiated plans in 1950 for establishment in both countries of a radar screen network for detection of a possible aggressive air attack. They constructed installations

²⁴<u>New York Times</u>, February 10, 1949.
 ²⁵Harrison, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, pp. 334-335.
 ²⁶<u>New York Times</u>, November 12, 1949.

for interceptor aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. At all stages of this high priority construction program the two governments engaged in joint planning. Constant consultations and cooperation at all levels marked the four-year construction plan for this radar line, known as the Pinetree Chain.²⁷

The PJBD repeatedly considered problems related to providing radar protection for Canada and the United States.²⁸ It had worked out the plan for extension and coordination of the so-called Pinetree Line within Canada.²⁹ By an exchange of notes on August 1, 1951, the two governments publicly announced their agreement to construct the Pinetree system along a line following northeast from Vancouver Island to the Peace Eiver area of Alberta. Then it dipped down through the northern American plains and came back up again through Ontario and Quebec, ending at Newfoundland's Atlantic coast. The Pinetree Line, unlike the two radar networks which followed, had some of its installations located in the United States. See Figure 6. Every station possessed equipment for detecting approaching aircraft and for directing interception by fighter planes.³⁰ The costs

²⁷Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, Statement of April 8, 1954, Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXX, No. 774 (1954), pp. 639-640.

²⁸Interview, John G. Diefenbaker, June 8, 1967; Wilgress, August 13, 1963; and Douglas Harkness, June 9, 1967. Harkness was Defense Minister 1960 to 1963.

²⁹Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963.

³⁰James Eayrs, <u>Canada in World Affairs. October 1955</u> to June 1957 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 141;




Figure 6 -- Map, Systems of Radar Defense of North America

*<u>The Illustrated London News</u>, September 20, 1958, p. 470.

of construction, equipment, and operation (\$450,000,000) were to be shared on the basis of approximately two-thirds by the United States and one-third by Canada. They agreed to employ Canadian labor and contractors as far as practical in building the stations and to use equipment manufactured in Canada. Canada would retain title to all sites required in Canada for the extension. but Ottawa assured the United States of rights of access. use and occupancy of the stations allocated to the United States and Canada. Both countries assumed financial responsibility for construction, equipping and operation of stations specifically allocated to each of them by a separate agreement between their two governments. Of the thirty-three stations, the United States built and manned twenty-two. They agreed generally that all property brought into Canada or purchased there by the United States, other than permanent structures, should remain under American ownership. The stations were to be manned initially by Canada and the United States respectively, but Canada might eventually take over the manning of stations that had in the first instance been staffed by Americans. Within the sites made available to the United States, the American personnel remained under the command and control of the United States military authorities. Neither government. according to this pact, might discontinue operation of

U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties and Other</u> <u>International Agreements</u>, V, 1721; <u>Canada Treaty Series</u> (1951), No. 31; and Address, R. Campney, Seattle, Washington, January 4, 1957, <u>S/S</u>, No. 57/3.

any station or any part of the extension without prior agreement of the other government. They also agreed that the extension's capabilities would undergo constant review in the light of current developments.³¹ The PJBD drew up this proposed arrangement which the two governments implemented at once.

On June 7, 1952, the Royal Canadian Air Force announced that United States Air Force personnel would soon arrive in Canada to man a number of radar stations then being constructed as part of the North American radar system. The statement went on to say that these stations were intended primarily for defense of localities in the United States and that the project was part of a long-range plan for joint Canadian-American aerial defense. The Royal Canadian Air Force, in effect, had already dedicated itself to a form of military integration which would later be formalized in NORAD.³²

Long before the Pinetree Line approached completion and became operational in 1954, military planners in Canada and the United States were engaged in intense studies to consider what further steps seemed necessary to improve the early warning system. Late in 1951 President Truman

³¹U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and Other International Agreements, V, 1721; <u>Canada Treaty</u> <u>Series</u> (1951), No. 31; and Michael Barkway, "Canada's Changing Role in NATO Defense," <u>International Journal</u>, XIV (1959), 102.

³²Barkway, "Canada's Changing Role in NATO Defense," <u>International Journal</u>, 102.

signed an executive order instructing that a Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line) be built either "at or near the Arctic coast."³³ During the early months of 1952, the United States Air Force went to Barter Island on the north coast of Alaska and experimented with several kinds of building facilities which would prove suitable in the far North. They built tunnel or tram-type structures that allowed men to move from one building to another without exposure to the weather. The Air Force contracted with the Western Electric Company to determine the feasibility of constructing a DEW Line. Barter Island served as a pilot station for this project in conjunction with which the Air Force carried out long distance photographic and survey flights over the Arctic.³⁴

A Canadian-American Military Study Group, set up under the sponsorship of the PJBD, carried on joint studies and discussions regarding further early warning. This group was, in turn, served by a subordinate body, the Canada-United States Scientific Advisory Team, which worked on joint systems studies and evaluations.³⁵ In October, 1953, a team of military and scientific advisors representing both the United States and Canada recommended that additional early warning should be provided through establishment of

³³Barkway, "Canada's Changing Role in NATO Defense," <u>International Journal</u>, 102.

³⁴Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

³⁵Sutherland, "The Strategic Significance of the Arctic," p. 269.

a radar system lying generally to the north of settled areas in Canada. The Chiefs of Staff of each country studied this report. In November, at a meeting between Canadian and American authorities in Washington, the Canadians announced that they would allow the necessary surveys and siting for the proposed new early warning radar system, the DEW Line, to begin work immediately. By April, 1954 this survey task had already advanced considerably.³⁶

As surveying for the DEW Line proceeded, Washington and Ottawa, following PJBD deliberations,³⁷ announced on April 8, 1954, plans for establishment of further radar installations, the Mid-Canada Line, or McGill Fence. Ottawa subsequently undertook, as its contribution to common hemispheric defense, responsibility for financing, constructing and operating this system. The Mid-Canada Line, developed by Canadian scientists under the Defense Research Board's sponsorship, followed the 55th parallel several hundred miles north of the Pinetree, forming an arc along the points Prince Rupert, Flin Flon, Upper James Bay, and Northern Labrador. Unlike the Pinetree, the Mid-Canada Line, reported to have cost \$170,000,000, consisted of a radar fence only. It could warn of approaching aircraft, but was incapable of determining the craft's speed or direction.³⁸

³⁶Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXX, No. 774 (1954), pp. 639-640.

³⁷Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963; Harkness, June 9, 1967; and Hannah, September 17, 1963.

³⁸Eayrs, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, p. 141; Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXI, No. 798 (1954), p. 539; <u>Debates</u>, VI

A new American PJBD chairman, Dr. John Alfred Hannah, had assumed the task of leading the American section of the Board in April, 1954. Shortly thereafter, on May Day, the Russians displayed the first <u>Badgers</u>, planes comparable to the United States B-47. These huge bombers were capable of scaling intercontinental distances and of mounting long-range thermonuclear bombing attacks. Although the Americans knew since August of the previous year that the Soviets possessed thermonuclear weapons, they did not know that they had bombers such as the <u>Badger</u>.³⁹ Suddenly military planners saw the need for more effort in the creation of a Distant Early Warning system.

Hannah, appointed to the Board by President Eisenhower, played a primary role during the next few years in the buildup of continental defense, especially the air defense system. President Truman had appointed him to the International Development Advisory Board, which laid down policies for the Point Four Program designed to assist underdeveloped countries. Under President Eisenhower, he served as Assistant

(1956), 6251; Barkway, "Canada's Changing Role in NATO Defense," <u>International Journal</u>, 102-103; and Address, R.A. Campney, Toronto, April 12, 1956, <u>S/S</u>, 56/11. In April, 1965 the Liberal government scrapped the Mid-Canada warning line. The western half of the line was shut down in January, 1964. The eastern half from Hudson Bay to Labrador ceased operation in March, 1965. The closing resulted after the Canadian and American governments had reexamined the resources committed to anti-bomber defenses. Additional improvements in the Pinetree radar system made the Mid-Canada network obsolete. <u>New York Times</u>, April 3, 1965.

³⁹They did know that they had the TU-4, comparable to the American B-29 since May of 1948 and nuclear weapons since September, 1949.

Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel from February. 1953 to July, 1954, and then in 1954 became PJBD chairman. 40 By early 1954, after extensive surveying, the Eisenhower administration decided that it could undertake the DEW Line. The Soviet show of force in May added to the urgency of the program. When Hannah assumed chairmanship of the PJBD, he discussed with Eisenhower the prospects of constructing the DEW Line. Particularly, they talked about the problems of Canadian sovereignty involved in this momentous undertaking. Eisenhower charged Hannah with the task of negotiating the provisions of a formal agreement for an integrated continental radar defense system. He said to Hannah, "John, go up and see what you can do to work this out." Eisenhower displayed a keen interest in Arctic defense and a determination to move forward rapidly with this warning line.⁴¹ Washington was willing to force the pace of Arctic defense and assume

⁴¹Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

⁴⁰Born in Grand Rapids, Michigan, in 1902, Hannah had been surrounded by his family interests in horticulture, floriculture, and poultry business. He received a B.S. degree in agriculture in 1923 from Michigan State College, where he was appointed as a poultry extension specialist. After having served as a National Recovery Act code official in the first years of Franklin Recovery Act code official in the first years of Franklin Recovery Lot code official in the first years of Agriculture and in 1941, President of the State Board of Agriculture and in 1941, President of Michigan State College. In addition to college duties, he held positions on boards of the Michigan Bell Telephone Company and the Detroit Branch of the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank. Madison Kuhn, <u>Michigan State: The First Hundred</u> <u>Years, 1855-1955</u> (East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1955), pp. 347-348 and 400-405; and <u>Current Biography:</u> <u>Who's News and Why, 1952</u>, ed. A. Rothe, <u>et al.</u> (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1953), pp. 241-243; and <u>New York Times</u>, July 27, 1954, and July 30, 1954.

whatever commitments were involved regardless of cost.⁴² The United States continental defense system depended upon Canada. American security required an elaborate series of warning systems backed by interceptors. The Strategic Air Command needed to be able to deliver retaliatory blows against an enemy, and effective retaliatory power depended upon the installation of American airfields in widely scattered areas.⁴³

Discussions between the two governments concerning the Distant Early Warning Line continued following a recommendation made by the Military Study Group in June, 1954 that Canada and the United States agree in principle upon the necessity for the DEW Line, and that further action to determine the military characteristics and construction plans for the line commence.⁴⁴ Ottawa as well as Washington requested the PJBD's consideration and advice on radar defense. The Board participated in the Canadian-American negotiations and helped solve certain points of difficulty involved in arriving at a working agreement for this line.⁴⁵ It afforded a ready agency to study and recommend solutions.

⁴²"Trends in External Policy," <u>The Bound Table</u>, XLV (March, 1955), 185; and Melvin Conant, "Canada and Continental Defense: An American View," <u>International</u> <u>Journal</u>, XV (1960), 221-223.

43 Address, John Foster Dulles, Chicago, Illinois, November 29, 1954, Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXXI, No. 807 (1954), pp. 891-894.

⁴⁴Sutherland, "The Strategic Significance of the Arctic," p. 269.

⁴⁵<u>Debates</u>, VI (1956), 6251.

Ottawa somewhat reluctantly approved the DEW Line "in principle." The Canadians insisted that both oceans also receive radar coverage by aircraft and ships.⁴⁶ By September 27, 1954, Ottawa and Washington announced agreement on the necessity for constructing a distant early warning line across the far northern areas of North America. The two governments directed that detailed planning for this line get underway immediately. In addition the United States stated that it might extend portions of the continental warning and control system seaward on both flanks of North America.⁴⁷

In support of the Military Study Group's recommendations, and of the two governments' agreement in principle regarding the DEW Line, the PJBD proposed the joint establishment of a comprehensive warning and control system against air attack. The Board suggested that the construction of the Distant Early Warning element of the overall joint Canada-United States warning system remain a United States government responsibility. On November 16, 1954 the Canadian government approved the Board's recommendations. Ottawa indicated that it intended to participate by lending assistance to the United States authorities in organizing and employing Canadian resources for the project. Canada would make available the necessary Canadian armed forces

⁴⁷Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXXI, No. 805 (1954), p. 813.

⁴⁶Barkway, "Canada's Changing Bole in NATO Defense," <u>International Journal</u>, 103.

facilities and appropriate government agencies. The Canadian government intended to participate actively in the operation and maintenance phase of the DEW Line operation. Ottawa concurred with the FJED's proposals, subject to conclusion as soon as possible of an agreement which would govern the work on the early radar defense line. The Canadian government proposed a set of conditions that would govern the American establishment of an early warning system, and the American government accepted these on May 5, 1955.⁴⁸

The Distant Early Warning Line, begun in 1955, consisted of fifty-eight stations that extended along the 70th parallel of latitude from Alaska, across the Canadian Arctic to Baffin Island, and on to Greenland. Experts considered it to be capable of detecting and tracking aircraft flying at altitudes up to 60,000 feet. The DEW Line, constructed at a cost of nearly a half billion dollars, was paid for by the American government. The Americans undertook the responsibility for its erection and operation.⁴⁹ The PJBD played a paramount role in working out a construction and maintenance formula for the DEW project.⁵⁰ Hannah and

⁴⁸U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and <u>Other International Agreements</u>, VI, 763-765; Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXXI, No. 798 (1954), p. 813; XXXI, No. 834 (1955), p. 1020; and Eayrs, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, pp. 148-152.

⁴⁹Eayrs, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, p. 142; Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXXVIII, No. 974 (1958), pp. 296-297; Address, R. Campney, Toronto, April 12, 1956, <u>S/S</u>, No. 56/11.

⁵⁰Interview, Harkness, June 9, 1967; Wilgress, August 13, 1963; and Diefenbaker, June 8, 1967. McNaughton visited the DEW installations in Alaska in September, 1955 to obtain a first hand account of the progress in construction.⁵¹ Both men contributed appreciably to drafting the terms and conditions of the distant early warning network. Furthermore, the Board's recommended guidelines governing the DEW Line agreement proved valuable as precedents in drafting similar agreements throughout the following decade. Later agreements followed a more or less standard form, similar to the terms set down in the DEW agreement.

The agreement under which the United States acquired authorization to build the DEW Line was drawn up by the Board with the intent of preserving the principles set forth between Canada and the United States in the joint declaration of February 12, 1947 regarding defense cooperation. The DEW project left unimpaired (as far as was possible in an undertaking of this magnitude) the control of either country over activities in its own territory. In the exchange of notes covering the agreement, the United States promised to carry out construction through a management contractor appointed by the United States government, but Canadian contractors received equal consideration with American contractors in the awarding of contracts. As far as possible they agreed to use Canadian manufactured electronic equipment. Canadian labor received preference on

⁵¹Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXXIII, No. 848 (1955), p. 495.

the project. (By June, 1957, 80 per cent of the personnel at the DEW Line were Canadians.)⁵² Nothing at the line was to derogate from the application of Canadian law in Canada. The location and size of all airstrips and location of all sites required were worked out mutually by the two govern-Plans were submitted for Canadian approval, and ments. Canadians retained the right of inspection during construction. Scientific data obtained during construction was given to Ottawa. The Americans assumed obligations regarding the Canadian Eskimos, telecommunications, transportation, and taxes. Canada reserved the right to take over the operation and manning of any or all of the DEW installations after a reasonable notice. They agreed that the DEW Line should continue in operation for ten years or for a shorter period as should be agreed upon by both nations in the light of the demands of mutual defense. If either government should. after ten years, conclude that any or all the installations were not needed, and the other government failed to agree, the question of continuing need was to be referred to the PJBD. Following Board consideration, either government

⁵²The diplomatic notes establishing both the Pinetree and DEW Line contained clauses which provided that as far as practicable, Canadian agencies and contractors with Canadian labor and materials would be employed. This same principle was applied to electronic equipment, and thus, established a precedent for defense production sharing. Although Canadian subcontracts for the DEW Line only amounted to \$8,000,000 worth of electrical equipment, the principle that Canada had a share in production of defense equipment was accepted by the United States. Reford, "Merchant of Death?," <u>Behind</u> the Headlines, p. 8.

might then decide that the installations should be closed.⁵³

The agreement for construction of the DEW Line also stated that the extent of Canadian participation in the initial operation and manning of the system would be considered later by Canada in consultation with the United States. An agreement on March 20, 1956 between the United States and Canada, covering the first three years of operation, applied the same general terms and conditions in manning and operation which had been agreed upon for construction of the line. These provisions once again safeguarded Canadian rights and laws. The United States government selected an American firm to manage the manning and operation phase, but Canadian personnel and facilities were to be employed as far as possible.⁵⁴

As in the Newfoundland leased bases agreement of 1951 and 1952, the Canadian members of the PJBD frequently had to consider the consequence of defense projects for Canadian sovereignty. American construction and operation

⁵³U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and Other International Agreements, VI, 763-765; Eayrs, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, pp. 148-150; and External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, VIII (May, 1956), pp. 123-128.

⁵⁴The presence of a supervisory Canadian administration was reflected in the notes. Dealings with local inhabitants were to be handled through the Canadian Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources. Even though United States money financed the line, as it turned out, the Canadian section was constructed and operated primarily by Canadians. External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, VIII (May, 1956), pp. 123-128; and Phillips, <u>Canada's North</u>, p. 111.

of the Pinetree and DEW radar lines would bring an influx of American personnel to the Northland. The Canadians had to weigh carefully the political consequences of this occupation. Yet the threat of attack by long-range aircraft equipped with hydrogen bombs spurred the Canadian PJBD members to concur in the American proposals for the multitude of defense projects that came in the 1950's. In the greater interest, not only of guaranteeing security from hostile attack, but of maintaining a strong Canadian diplomatic voice in Washington, the Canadian Board members proceeded with defense undertakings that brought American participation and occupation on Canadian soil. They offered Canadian territory to the Americans as the costs of hemispheric defense increased. Whatever the risks might be of American infringements to Canadian sovereignty, the Canadian PJBD members assumed them and joined with their American counterparts in recommending the most intimate kinds of defense cooperation.

Yet both the Canadian and American public often questioned the soundness of strategy in building the radar lines, while Canadians worried about how the new American occupation and control might infringe on their sovereignty. The DEW Line provided only a three-hour warning interval. Furthermore, in a mass attack some hostile aircraft would be very apt to penetrate the radar lines before interception so the argument ran.⁵⁵ These criticisms regarding strategy

⁵⁵Eayrs, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, pp. 142-148; and Barkway, "Canada's Changing Role in NATO Defense," <u>International</u> <u>Journal</u>, 101-108.

were no doubt sound, but the Canadian section of the PJBD obtained some substantial guarantees for Canadian sovereignty in the DEW and similar agreements. The Americans on the Board, in acquiring Canadian territory for defense of the continental United States and the Strategic Air Command. yielded to Canadian demands which guaranteed Canadian control over its territory to the utmost degree, given the requirements of mutual security. In the DEW agreement, Canada secured from the United States an explicit recognition of Canadian claims to exercise sovereignty in the far North. The Americans had previously attempted to avoid such clearcut recognition.⁵⁶ Se the PJBD negotiations over the terms of the DEW agreement contributed a good deal to furthering mutual respect at the national level. at least between the Liberal government in Ottawa and the Republican one in Washington. It also diminished the possibility of hostile air attack over the far North, although it by no means provided a solid guarantee that such an attack might be successfully turned back.

In addition to the DEW Line agreement and the May, 1951 leased bases agreement at Goose Bay, Canada and the United States had several defense agreements in 1956 under which United States authorities might let contracts in Canada. However, in each case a stipulation provided that

⁵⁶Sutherland, "The Strategic Significance of the Arctic," pp. 270-271.

Canadian contractors were to receive equal consideration with their American counterparts.⁵⁷ Although the terms of these agreements varied somewhat, many of them effected at the time of the DEW Line negotiations possessed terms similar to those in the distant radar pact. In each case, with the exception of the 1951 leased bases agreement (the renegotiated Anglo-American agreement of 1941), it was expressly stated that Canadian law should apply.⁵⁸

There were many useful precedents for the Board to draw upon in drafting the DEW agreement. Many of the earlier defense understandings contained provisions which the Board employed in formulating the 1955 early warning agreement. For example, the global communications agreement, effected by an exchange of notes in November, 1952, provided for improved facilities to serve communications needs important to Canada, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The United States Air Force undertook to modernize communication installations

⁵⁷Some of these included: the Pinetree radar agreement of August, 1951 (already discussed); a global communication agreement effected in November, 1952; the Goose Bay fighter base lease, December, 1952; the Haines-Fairbanks Pipe Line agreement, June, 1953; a LORAN Station agreement at Cape Christian, Baffin Island, May, 1954; an agreement providing for extension of radar stations from the Pinetree Line in February, 1956; and another agreement providing for a "gap-filler" radar station in the Pinetree Line, February, 1956; the Pepperrell Pipe Line agreement, September, 1955; and an agreement establishing an oceanographic research station at Shelburne, Nova Scotia, operated jointly by the Royal Canadian Navy and the United States Navy under Canadian command.

⁵⁸ External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, VIII (May, 1956), pp. 123-128.

which were essential to the operation of the Newfoundland bases and to American air and other operations in northeastern Canada and the North Atlantic area. Their construction required use of Canadian lands near Stephenville, Newfoundland. Accordingly, the United States Air Force bore the capital investment required for construction and the cost of operating them and the Canadian government furnished the land without charge. If either government should discontinue the agreement - the notes stated - the PJED would consider the question of continuing need. Should either government, following a Board consideration, decide that the communication facilities no longer served a useful purpose, the land and any permanent installations would revert back to the Canadian government.⁵⁹

Another Canadian-American defense agreement involving Canadian territory and American defense projects concerned an oil line in the Northwest. On August 12, 1953, Ottawa and Washington announced the existence of the United States-Canada Haines-Fairbanks Pipe Line agreement. Negotiations had been underway during the previous year in the FJED, and then between representatives of the two governments, concerning construction by the United States Army Corps of Engineers of an eight-inch petroleum pipe line from Haines, near Skagway, Alaska, through northwestern British Columbia and Yukon Territory to Fairbanks. The pipe line plan figured

⁵⁹U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and Other International Agreements, III, 3741.

to play an important part in providing an assured supply of petroleum products to meet the military requirements of Alaskan-based forces. It also would serve Canadian military requirements in the Northwest. Civilian petroleum needs would be satisfied when the line was not required for military purposes.⁶⁰ Canada and the United States agreed that in the interests of mutual defense, the pipe line would be continued for a minimum period of twenty years. They agreed that if, at the expiration date, either government wished to discontinue the agreement, the question of its continuing need would be turned over to the PJED for deliberation. The Board would consider the relationship of the pipe line to defense installations in Alaska. Following the Board's consideration, though either government

⁶⁰The total cost of the project was estimated at about \$40,000,000. Of this, \$12,000,000 would be spent on the Canadian section. It would cross Canadian territory for 284 miles following the Haines Cut-Off, the military road which ran from Haines to Haines Junction, a point on the Alaska Highway. From this point it would follow the Alaska Highway to Fairbanks. The American government would construct, own, and operate the pipe line. Title to the right of ways, however, remained with the Province of British Columbia and Canada. Canadian contractors were to receive equal consideration with United States contractors in the awarding of contracts and in procurement of materials. equipment and supplies in either country. Qualified Canadian labor would receive preference over American for construction work in Canada. On the Canadian portion the agreement called for the use of Canadian materials where possible, and Canadian tax laws, labor laws, minimum rates of pay, workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance would apply. Canada would provide the necessary arrangements to allow United States citizens into Canada for employment on construction and maintenance of the pipe line, but Canadian civilian labor was to be used as much as possible in maintaining the Canadian sector.

might terminate the agreement, due consideration would be given to the other's defense needs in any subsequent pipe line operation.⁶¹

The Haines-Fairbanks Pipe Line was completed in 1955.⁶² During the ensuing decade, the Board dealt with constant problems connected with this line. By an agreement worked out in January, 1957, based on Board discussions, a plan was effected regarding winter maintenance of the section of the pipe line from the British Columbia-Alaska border to Haines Junction, Yukon Territory. This sector ran parallel to the Haines Cut-Off Road. The United States Army gained permission to use this stretch of road once a month for maintenance purposes and bore the expense of keeping it open. Each time the Haines Cut-Off Road was opened to the American pipe line inspection teams, permission had to be requested in advance by the United States Army Command, Alaska, from the Canadian Commander, Northwest Highway System.⁶³

61 Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXIX, No. 741 (1953), pp. 320-321; and U.S., Department of State, <u>United States</u> <u>Treaties and Other International Agreements</u>, IV, 2224.

⁶²By 1962, additional requirements for petroleum in Alaska led the Americans to increase the capacity of the pipe line by building six new pumping stations, three of them on Canadian soil. An agreement effected between Canada and the United States on April 19, 1962 provided for this project. U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and Other International Agreements, XIII, 982. The pipe line, originally built to fulfill military demands in Alaska, eventually acquired significant commercial value for the Yukon Territory as well. Phillips, <u>Canada's North</u>, p. 188.

⁶³U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and <u>Other International Agreements</u>, VIII, 23; and Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXXVI, No. 920 (1957), p. 242.

The PJBD provided for protection of Canadian interests and sovereignty in this understanding.

The Board repeatedly dealt with renewal of this agreement. ⁶⁴ It was renewed in August, 1959,⁶⁵ and again in 1962, when it was extended until July 1. 1963.⁶⁶ By these agreements the United States government hired the Canadian Northwest Highway System to carry out any snowremoval operations along the Haines Cut-Off Road that might be necessary. Yet this had not been a vary satisfactory solution to snow clearance. Snow removal remained a constant problem for the Board. By 1966 the PJBD proposed that the government of British Columbia assume responsibility for clearing the road on the Canadian side and that the United States government get the Alaskan government to do the same in Alaska. British Columbia accepted the Board's proposal on the condition that Washington persuade the Alaskans to keep their sector of the road open. An understanding followed between Washington and Ottawa on this problem of snow clearance. 67 The PJBD obtained a solution to a small problem which had plagued the pipe line agreement for several years.

⁶⁴Interview, Heeney, June 9, 1967.

⁶⁵Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XLI, No. 1059 (1959), p. 526.

⁶⁶Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XLVI, No. 1192, (1962), p. 741; U.S., Department of State, <u>United States</u> <u>Treaties and Other International Agreements</u>, XIII, 339-340. ⁶⁷Interview, Heeney, June 9, 1967.

During September, 1953, the Canadian government Department of Transport assumed responsibility for operation of the LORAN stations in Newfoundland at Port aux Basques, Battle Harbor, and Bonavista, which had been operated by the United States Coast Guard. All the fixed station equipment was transferred to Canada free of charge. The land involved reverted to Canada as well. If the Canadian government decided to discontinue any or all of these stations, Ottawa agreed to consult with Washington first. In case the American government did not concur, the matter was to go before the PJBD for study and reporting. Ottawa agreed to postpone any decision until the Board reported such a contingency, and to consider the Board's views in its final decision.⁶⁸ In this agreement, the Board assumed the position, as it did frequently in so many Canadian-American understandings, of a clearing house in case of disagreement between nations over the exigencies of a particular defense project.

Another Canadian-American agreement in May, 1954 involved construction and operation of a LORAN station at Cape Christian, Baffin Island. Canada authorized the United States Coast Guard to erect and operate the station. Ottawa retained title to all land required and the permanent facilities. Ownership of moveable property brought in remained with the Americans. The Canadians reserved the right to

⁶⁸U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and Other International Agreements, IV, 2174; and VI, 6045.

take over operation and manning of the station on a year's notice. Canada and the United States agreed to operate the station as long as mutual defense interests dictated. Again, if either government desired to discontinue the station, the question of continuing need would be referred to the PJBD for consideration and recommendation.⁶⁹

An exchange of notes providing for extension of radar stations from the Pinetree Line in June, 1955 stated that the United States should construct and operate new radar stations in British Columbia, Ontario, Nova Scotia, and the Newfoundland-Labrador area. This agreement was modeled along the lines of the DEW Line provisions regarding contractors, labor, and title to land. In case either government should decide to abandon these installations and the other government disagreed, the PJBD was to consider the question in the light of mutual defense interests. After the Board had considered the issue, either government might close the station or stations if it desired. Canada reserved the right to take over any or all of the stations upon reasonable notice and operate them in association with similar United States facilities.⁷⁰

In an exchange of notes in September, 1955, the United States government built an oil pipe line between

⁶⁹U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and Other International Agreements, V, 1459.

⁷⁰U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and <u>Other International Agreements</u>, VI, 6051; and <u>Department</u> of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXXIV, No. 863 (1955), p. 74.

the United States Air Force dock at St. John's and Pepperrell Air Force Base in Newfoundland (which is just outside St. John's). The United States Air Force hoped, by constructing this pipe line. to avoid some inconvenience and possible danger created by trucks carrying oil moving through the city of St. John's. This agreement, again fashioned after the DEW Line and Haines-Fairbanks agreements, allowed the United States to operate the pipe line for twenty years. Should either government wish to discontinue the arrangement after that time, the question of continuing the facility would go to the PJBD for recommendation. After Board consideration. either government might terminate the arrangement upon one year's notice.⁷¹ The Board functioned as an agency where final consideration and recommendation might be rendered before a government discontinued a joint defensive project. In many Canadian-American defense agreements the Board played a significant role, not only in formulating the terms of the understanding but also in furnishing a kind of final board of review to consider at some time in the future the continuing necessity of a particular defense project. The Board itself, in effect, guaranteed its own permanence as a joint defensive agency.

In April, 1956, Canada and the United States entered into an agreement, based on a PJBD recommendation,⁷² whereby

⁷²Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

⁷¹U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and <u>Other International Agreements</u>, VI, 3899; and Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXXIII, No. 851 (1955), p. 623.

the Canadian Unemployment Act extended to Canadian employees of the United States armed services in Canada. American compliance with the Unemployment Insurance Act enabled local employees of the American armed services to enjoy the same conditions of employment and work as those available to other employees in Canada. The United States Department of Defense agreed that the American armed services should participate in the Canadian unemployment insurance scheme. The American armed services began participating in the Canadian unemployment program on behalf of their Canadian employees in Canada on July 1, 1956.⁷³

Since it appeared just as important to establish early warning devices to warn of aircraft approaching target areas of North America from across the sea as it did from Canada's North, the American government extended its early warning lines across the northeastern and northwestern seaward approaches to North America. Deep sea sounding stations were built along the Nova Scotian coast. By 1954 the Alaska radar system had been fully coordinated with the network in Canada and the United States. In addition. development of airborne radar had advanced appreciably. United States and Canadian air defense commanders worked closely to improve air defense installations in the areas nearest to major targets for enemy attack. Naval operations were integrated with Canada in sounding and in extending

⁷³U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and Other International Agreements, VIII, 3933. shipborne radar from the Aleutians to Midway and beyond, and from Greenland to Iceland and eastward toward Europe.⁷⁴ In all of these projects the PJED participated and worked out the details to effect the operation.⁷⁵

Canadian-American cooperative arrangements for North American defense were tied in closely with the defense of Europe. The North American defense system comprised one region in the North Atlantic Treaty defense scheme. After Canada and the United States joined the NATO alliance, arrangements for North American defense continued to function under a Canada-United States Regional Planning Group. (This remained so even after the NATO Council decided that regional planning groups were to be superceded by a system of integrated commands under one supreme commander in 1952.) Although the Canadian-United States Group comprised one of NATO's regional groupings, it did not have a direct relationship to NATO, for it was not under NATO's European direction or command. The Canadian-United States Group existed as a part of NATO on paper but bore no organizational ties with its infrastructure in Europe. It was not responsible to the NATO Council in the same way as Allied

⁷⁴Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>. XXX, No. 774 (1954), pp. 639-640; John Gellner, "Problems of Canadian Defense," <u>Behind the Headlines</u>, XVII, No. 5 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, December 1958), pp. 1-6; and Melvin Conant, <u>The Long Polar Watch:</u> <u>Canada and the Defense</u> <u>of North America</u> (New York: Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1962), pp. 37 and 39. John Gellner retired in 1958 from the Royal Canadian Air Force with the rank of Wing Commander.

⁷⁵Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963; and Wilgress, August 13, 1963.

Command Europe or Allied Command Atlantic was.⁷⁶ Initially, the formation of the NATO alliance actually posed a threat to the life and usefulness of the PJBD.

In a joint meeting during January, 1950, the Canadian and American Chiefs of Staff had considered the question of associating defense measures already in operation under the PJBD's auspices with the NATO organs. They debated the feasibility of transferring all the Canadian-American defense planning measures then under the PJBD's purview to the NATO organization and of bringing the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group under similar control with other regional groups already organized in Europe. The United States Chiefs emphasized, in opposing this move, that defense planning under the PJBD was of a permanent character. They argued that the lasting characteristic of defense planning was not envisaged under the NATO agreement, for it was a treaty of twenty years duration, and it might not even continue that long. Furthermore, it was pointed out that while the NATO treaty included the Atlantic Ocean, it did not apply to the Pacific. But Pacific security was included in Canadian-American defense provisions under the PJBD. The United States also proved hesitant in allowing their European

⁷⁶Charles E. Wilson, Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXX, No. 774 (1954), pp. 639-640; <u>Debates</u>, II (1957-1958), 1059-1061; Address, George R. Pearkes, Seattle, Washington, October 12, 1959, <u>S/S</u>, No. 59/35; and Foulkes, "The Complications of Continental Defense," p. 117.

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treaty allies the same access which Canada then enjoyed to intelligence, research, and development information. Both Canadian and American Chiefs of Staff agreed that territorial and coastal defenses should, because they were national considerations, be left outside the NATO organization. Canadians thought, however, that air defense might be considered as a possible NATO activity in the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group inasmuch as it was a joint matter. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that if air defense merged in NATO, and the magnitude of the facilities alloted to continental defense were revealed to the European partners, then the Europeans might pressure to fortify European defenses at the expense of North American security. The Americans, objecting further, argued that air defenses were closely associated with protection of the Strategic Air Command and any multilateral control for the Strategic Air Command protection might lead to attempts to control this force. The United States Chiefs remained solid in opposition on this point. They would, under no circumstances, consider any form of multilateral control or veto regarding use of the Strategic Air Command. Although the Canadian Chiefs of Staff were under some political pressure to bring North American defense into the NATO organization, they decided that for practical and strategic reasons, it was better to go along with the United States' view. The result of this review and another similar one which followed in 1952, was that North American defense

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planning continued under PJBD supervision. The NATO Council and Military Committee was kept informed of North American defense activity by periodic reports, briefings, and European visits to joint defense establishments in North America.77 Many Canadians, understandably, preferred to join in a multilateral alliance like NATO, rather than continue in an increasingly more entangling bilateral alliance with the United States. They favored allowing the defense arrangements.which had been worked out under the recommendations of the PJBD, to merge with the NATO organization. The United States successfully withstood this Canadian initiative. however, and thereby kept North American defense activity and planning within the purview of the PJBD. Not only did the United States maintain the PJBD as the main agency in the Canadian-American alliance. but the continued Soviet threat to the western hemisphere spurred the Eisenhower administration into pursuing, through the Board, further expansion of continental air defense facilities and warning systems in the mid and late 1950's.

The Eisenhower government moved toward increasing the effectiveness of North American defense by integrating continental air defense under one command. Proof of how effective North American defense cooperation had become came to light during the Suez crisis in the fall of 1956. A

⁷⁷Foulkes, "The Complications of Continental Defense," pp. 117-119.

highly placed American source stated (to me) that Washington gave Ottawa about three hours' notice that the United States would be opposing Britain and France in that outbreak of hostilities, and that "the United States might be at war with England by morning." The Canadians promptly joined the United States in its position. Had it not been for the FJBD and the close cooperation it engendered, this source claimed, the Canadians would never have moved alongside the Americans in opposing the British and French action at Suez. Canada joined the United States by stating that it must help defend the North American continent.

From the time of the Board's establishment, one of the most difficult problems Canada and the United States confronted involved the matter of command over North American defense forces.⁷⁸ This issue assumed new proportions in mid-1950, when, as in World War II, the Board considered the problem of unified command. The PJBD,⁷⁹ and the Canada-United States Military Study Group⁸⁰ studied and recommended integration of operational control in Canadian and United States air defenses. The Board's action resulted in the scheme which created the North American Air Defense

⁷⁸Conant, <u>The Long Polar Watch</u>, p. 78; and Foulkes, "The Complications of Continental Defense," pp. 107-112.

⁷⁹Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963; Diefenbaker, June 8, 1967; Harkness, June 9, 1967; and Letter, Air Marshal W.A. Curtis, July 11, 1963.

⁸⁰U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and <u>Other International Agreements</u>, IX, 538; and Foulkes, "The Complications of Continental Defense." pp. 113-116.

establishment.⁸¹ Canada and the United States jointly announced on August 1, 1957 that the two governments had agreed to a system of joint control for air defenses in the United States. Canada and Alaska under an integrated operational command responsible to the Chiefs of Staff of both nations. Following this announcement the two governments established on an interim basis a joint headquarters, the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), at Colorado Springs, Colorado.⁸² Eleven years prior to the establishment of NORAD, it had been recognized that Canadian-American air defense posed a single problem.⁸³ Arrangements which existed between Canada and the United States prior to 1957 had provided only for the coordination of separate national defense plans, but failed to create an authoritative control over all air defense weapons which would be used on a potential enemy.

The advent of nuclear weapons, the rapidly increased means of delivering them, and the requirements of air defense control systems called for rapid decisions to keep up with technological developments. The two governments deemed it essential, on the basis of the Board's⁸⁴ and the Military

⁸¹Letter, Curtis, July 11, 1963.

⁸²<u>New York Times</u>, August 2, 1957; Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXXVII, No. 947 (1957), p. 306; and Conant, "Canada and Continental Defense: An American View," <u>International</u> <u>Journal</u>, 223-225.

⁸³See Chapter 7, p. 177.

⁸⁴Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963; and Diefenbaker, June 8, 1967.

Study Group's recommendations to create a peacetime organization, including weapons, facilities, and command structure, which could function with a single air defense plan, approved in advance by the governments. The old system of coordinated national planning requiring consultation between commanders before action could commence was considered inadequate in the event of sudden attack with virtually no warning. As frequently happened, proposals were broached very informally in meetings or outside before they were put on the Board's agenda. As early as 1951, Canadian and American air force PJBD representatives had discussed informally the desirability of an integrated air defense command.⁸⁵ Discussions and studies carried on by the two governments' representatives, beginning May 14, 1956, had led to the realization that national air defense of the two nations could best be accomplished by delegating to an integrated headquarters the responsibility for implementing operational control over combat units from the air defense forces of the two countries. As a consequence of these recommendations and of the experience gained in operation of NORAD on an interim basis, the two governments entered into a formal agreement on May 12, 1958, establishing the North American Air Defense Command and creating a commander in chief of NORAD. The commander in chief would be an American, with a Canadian serving as deputy commander. NORAD would remain in operation for ten years or a shorter period if both

⁸⁵Letter, MacKay, July 31, 1963.

governments approved.⁸⁶ The Board played a contributory role throughout the entire period of negotiations for the NORAD agreement.

The Board functioned in no sense as an executive body, but after a decision had been taken, executive action sometimes was speeded up by reason of personal contacts on the Board. Negotiations leading to the North American air defense agreement ranked in that category. Granted, both countries utilized the service representation in each other's capitol and communications were always open for direct contacts between service chiefs. In the NOEAD agreement, however, contacts between PJED opposites provided not only an instrument through which joint air defense was instigated, but facilitated the final adoption of an integrated air command establishment.

In June, 1958, following the NORAD agreement, Canada and the United States entered into another understanding

⁸⁶Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXXVIII, No. 989 (1958), pp. 979-981; <u>Debates</u>, II (1958), 993-994 and 1424; <u>Debates</u>, II (1957-1958), 1059-1060; U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties and Other International Agreements</u>, IX, 538; Trevor Lloyd, <u>Canada in World Affairs. 1957-1959</u> (Toronto: Oxford University Fress, 1968), pp. 25-39; and Jon B. McLin, "The North American Air Defense Command," <u>Canada's Changing Defense Folicy, 1957-1953; The Froblems of a Middle Power in Alliance</u> (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins Fress, 1967), pp. 37-59; P.C. Newman, <u>Renegade in Fower</u>: <u>The Diefenbaker Years</u> (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), pp. 346-347; and <u>New York Times</u>, June 20, 1958. NORAD was renewed in March. 1968.

based on PJBD discussions and recommendations regarding the establishment, maintenance, and operation by the United States government of aerial refueling facilities in Canadian territory.⁸⁷ The United States Air Force and the Royal Canadian Air Force jointly conducted investigations of Canadian airfields to determine their suitability for aerial refueling. The Americans desired to establish facilities at four bases in Canada. Again the text of this agreement remained similar to the DEW Line agreement regarding construction of airfields, Canadian law, and operation of facilities.⁸⁸

The Americans on the PJBD pressed further for permission to use Canadian air space and territory.⁸⁹ By general agreement, Canada allowed Strategic Air Command bombers to fly over Canadian territory on the condition that they clear each flight in advance with Canadian officials. Americans, under the leased bases arrangements of 1941 regarding Newfoundland, used refueling facilities for their aircraft at Goose Bay, Labrador, and Harmon Air Field, Newfoundland.⁹⁰

After Canada had joined NORAD, the Canadians, in September 1958, adopted the United States Air Force plan

⁸⁷Interview, Harkness, June 9, 1967.

⁸⁸U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and <u>Other International Agreements</u>, IX, 903; and Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXXIX, No. 994 (1958), p. 87.

⁸⁹Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.


90 Debates, I (1958), 781; and McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, pp. 128-129. for integrating the Canadian defense system into its new Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system and equipped the one Canadian SAGE sector between the Great Lakes and Quebec City with ground-to-air guided missiles.91 The missiles, the Bomarc -B, symbolized a new defense era, and provided an American substitute for the Arrow, a Canadian manned interceptor. Two Bomarc bases, manned by Canadian personnel. were established near North Bay in eastern Ontario, and Mont Laurier in western Quebec. Throughout the rest of Canada the Pinetree radar installations were connected with United States Air Force SAGE sectors controlled from below the border in the United States. See Figure 7. SAGE substituted a computor for the hand and mind of the ground-controller personnel. It collected information from search radars within its sector, plotted each aircraft, and predicted its course. This information was shown to the human controller. If he decided to launch his interceptors, SAGE assumed the complete operation and assigned an individual missile to each attacking object. SAGE would then guide the missile to an interception point. The SAGE defense network was to be completed by mid-1961.

The SAGE-Bomarc project depended upon a two-to-one cost sharing formula, one that had been used in earlier

⁹¹A Canadian ground environment system (CAGE) being developed by the Canadian Defense Research Board as a more inexpensive alternative to SAGE was abandoned in March, 1958. McLin, <u>Canada's Changing Defense Policy</u>, p. 86.



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defense agreements like the Pinetree Line, where the United States financed and manned two-thirds of the stations. The two-to-one split for SAGE-Bomarc was different from the Pinetree agreement in that the American two-thirds represented costs for all the technical equipment, while Canada's contribution consisted of construction costs. The SAGE-Bomarc project raised a multitude of problems regarding Canadian participation in continental defense and provoked a controversy over nuclear weapons in Canada.⁹²

The PJBD's impact on government decision-making was appreciable during the years, 1953-1958. Nearly every consideration involving military matters affecting the two countries had been discussed at sometime by the Board. In many cases the Board submitted recommendations or, at least, suggestions to the two governments. Nearly every Board recommendation or suggestion was adopted by Ottawa and Washington up to 1958. After that date the Board issued recommendations which one by one fell dead when they reached the Diefenbaker government. The most important recommendation which Ottawa disregarded concerned the arming of Bomarc -B

^{92&}quot;Canada's Defense Perplexities," The Economist. March 28, 1959, pp. 1186-1197; Barkway, "Canada's Changing Bole in NATO Defense," <u>International Journal</u>, 101-108; "Canadian Defense Policy in Trouble," <u>The Economist</u>, April 2, 1960, pp. 63-64; McLin, <u>Canada's Changing Defense Policy</u>, pp. 84-88; <u>SAGE Goes Underground: Information Booklet</u>, Headquarters NORAD Region, RCAF Station, North Bay, Ontario (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964); and Conant, "Canada and Continental Defense: An American View," <u>International</u> Journal, 225.

missiles with nuclear warheads and the storing of nuclear weapons at American bases within Canadian territory. The nuclear weapons controversy brought the PJBD activity into an eclipse which would not end for half a decade.

CHAPTER X

IMPASSE AND INDECISION, 1958-1963

The Board's role decreased significantly after 1958 because of problems involving nuclear weapons and Canadian sovereignty. Board deliberations shifted to longrange topics regarding projected defense needs for the years of the 1960's and early 1970's. It functioned more as a forum for general discussion concerning future defense plans, rather than one dealing with specific problems involving study and recommendation, although it still considered some of these. By 1963, with the break of the deadlock over nuclear weapons, the Board's usefulness gained a new momentum.

On two occasions abolition of the PJBD came under serious consideration. Diefenbaker wanted to dissolve the Board when the Americans urged that nuclear weapons should be stored on Canadian territory. His desire to end the Board received further impetus as a result of the lack of coordination between the Department of External Affairs and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff in the Conservative administration. Diefenbaker had extremely poor relations with the armed services in his government. He distrusted them. His attitude toward the armed services only added to his antipathy for the PJBD.

American requests to place nuclear warheads on missiles in Canada first arose as a problem for PJBD consideration early in 1957.¹ The Board discussed American proposed plans for storing nuclear warheads for air-to-air missiles at Goose Bay, Labrador, and Harmon Field, Newfoundland, and for arming Bomarc -B squadrons with nuclear warheads in the Canadian SAGE-Bomarc sector. The Bomarc -B without nuclear warheads was worthless. The Board also considered American suggestions for arming the Royal Canadian Air Force jet interceptors with nuclear air defense warheads. After exhaustive study and deliberation. the Board submitted recommendations to the Canadian government suggesting that the United States request be granted in order to make the most effective use of the jet interceptor squadrons and the Bomarcs.²

In September, 1958 the Canadian government decided to adopt the Bomarc weapons system. As a result, two Bomarc -B squadrons were placed in Canada, where they served

²Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

¹Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963. The United States had initiated conversations directed towards obtaining Canadian permission regarding nuclear weapons as early as 1951. American authorities worked out an agreement with Ottawa allowing the United States Air Force to intercept and engage hostile aircraft over Canadian territory. This agreement exempted American interceptor squadrons from the provisions governing Strategic Air Command flights over Canadian air space, even if they were armed with nuclear weapons. These flights apparently did not require Canadian approval in advance, but such planes could not operate from Canadian air fields. <u>Debates</u>, II (1958), 1424; and McLin, <u>Canada's Changing Defense Policy</u>, pp. 129-130.

to protect Montreal and Toronto, and at the same time to shield the American deterrent force.³ By 1962 installation of two Bomarc -B batteries without nuclear warheads had been completed. However, the matter of making nuclear warheads available for the Bomarc -B and other weapons with nuclear capability acquired by Canada, including the Royal Canadian Air Force's supersonic jet interceptors, remained the subject of protracted and inclusive discussions between Canada and the United States until early 1963.⁴

Canadian military authorities, backed by the Canadian Defense Minister, wanted nuclear warheads and weapons placed

³The United States planned to erect some thirty Bomarc bases along its northern boundary. If an atomic attack came, it was conceivable that a major air battle might take place over Toronto or Montreal. The Canadian Defense Minister, desiring that the Bomarc system be situated far enough north to protect Toronto and Montreal, requested that a few of the Bomarcs be placed in Canada. Some United States civilian officials, wishing to avoid similar problems to those which had been raised by American bases in Newfoundland and from United States personnel stationed on radar networks in Canada, opposed constructing Bomarc bases in Canada. However, military planners in both nations supported the proposal. Accordingly, two squadrons of Bomarcs, originally planned for installation in upper Michigan and northern New York State, were placed in Canada. The United States agreed to pay for the missiles, which reduced Canada's costs in the Bomarc system to \$14,000,000. Newman, Renegade in Power, pp. 348-349; and McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, pp. 86-87.

⁴U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> <u>and Other International Agreements</u>, XII, 1375; Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XLVI, No. 1186 (1962), p. 457; and XLVIII, No. 1234 (1963), pp. 235 and 243-244. For further description and analysis of this problem see McLin, "The Problem of Nuclear Weapons," <u>Canada's Changing Defense Policy</u>, pp. 123-167; and Peyton V. Lyon, "Defense: To Be or Not To Be Nuclear?" <u>Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963</u> (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 76-222; Newman, <u>Renegade</u> <u>in Power</u>, pp. 348-352, and 366-368; and Foulkes, "The Complications of Continental Defense," pp. 102-106. on Canadian soil. They recommended them for protection of North America, as did the American military. Members of the PJBD remained of one mind on this issue. But the Diefenbaker government would do nothing to implement the Board's suggestions.⁵ Not only did Diefenbaker not trust his military advisors, but even Canadian civilian experts who called for these military measures remained suspect in his eyes. Consequently, the Board's recommendations lay unadopted. From 1958 until the spring of 1963, the Board experienced a period when its major recommendations were not heeded in Ottawa. Of course the United States government and military stood solidly behind the Board, and remained unified in their decision to implement its recommendations. As opposed to Ottawa, unity in Washington between the government and its military advisors was very close. Diefenbaker's distrust of the military only deepened at the PJBD's recommendations and at the American initiative, which had been carried forward through the Board. His dislike for the Board prompted Diefenbaker to pursue a course to do away with the eighteen-year-old permanent defense agency. However, after protracted consideration and deliberation, the Conservative government reversed itself. Diefenbaker decided to continue to support and maintain the PJBD.⁷ He desired to abandon it, but the Board proved

⁵Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963; and Wilgress, August 13, 1963. ⁶Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963. ⁷Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

difficult to drop, even if the Canadian government wanted to get rid of it. People in both Canada and the United States thought of the PJBD as <u>the</u> permanent joint American-Canadian defense body. Consequently it was politically dangerous for either government to try to abolish it.

During 1958, the Conservative government worked to create two new organizations, which, although it denied that such was the design.⁸ conceivably might have taken over much of the Board's responsibilities. One of these organizations, the Joint Ministerial Committee on Defense, so called because it was comprised of higher heads of governments than the PJBD, could have superseded to a large extent the work of the Board. This committee's creation provided for periodic review, at the ministerial level, of defensive Perhaps in an attempt to relieve some of the relations. Canadian resentment and frustration regarding defense,⁹ the United States agreed with the Canadian government's suggestion that the importance and complexity of defense relations made it necessary to supplement existing Canadian-American channels, like the PJBD, for consultation between The committee would consider political and governments. economic, as well as military questions of joint defense. it was thought. It was to serve as an adjunct to the PJBD, and was not to supplant it. On the American side it consisted

⁸Address, J.G. Diefenbaker, New York City, October 28, 1958, <u>S/S</u>, No. 58/43.

⁹"Cooperation with Canada," <u>The Economist</u>, July 12, 1958, p. 126.

of the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury; and on the Canadian side, the Ministers of External Affairs, National Defense, and Finance.¹⁰

The second occasion on which the Board's continued existence was called to question came in 1958, when Hannah suggested to President Eisenhower that the PJBD be abandoned, because he felt its usefulness had ended with the formation of the Joint Ministerial Committee on Defense. He believed. at that time. that the new committee would take the Board's Eisenhower ordered a study and comprehensive review place. of the PJBD's activities. After the results of this governmental review of the Board had been collected and considered, the Eisenhower administration decided that the Board still served a useful purpose, and concluded that the PJBD should continue as a permanent agency.¹¹ No doubt Eisenhower kept the Board for some of the same reasons that Diefenbaker did, because it would have been a political liability to abolish it. However, the PJBD had served the United States well throughout nearly two decades in furthering American security interests, and Eisenhower was not eager to drop it.

The decision to continue the Board proved to be a sound one, for the Joint Ministerial Committee on Defense

¹¹Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

¹⁰Statement, Martin, July 25, 1963; U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties and Other International</u> <u>Agreements</u>, IX, 1159; External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, X (August, 1958), pp. 172-173; (October, 1958), p. 239; and Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XXXIX, No. 1006 (1958), p. 555.

did not replace the PJBD. It met for three years, the last in 1960, and that ended its conferences for four years. 12 During the Diefenbaker period the committee contributed little to joint defense. Conservative Canadian cabinet ministers, having newly assumed their offices in 1957. were largely unaware of Canadian commitments regarding continental defense. They remained completely lost on issues of western hemispheric defense during the Conservative government's term in office. The Canadian ministers would make commitments and statements to their American counterparts and then regret that they had made them. They got in trouble with the Prime Minister every time they attempted to discuss Canadian-American defense issues at the ministerial level after 1958. So the Ministerial Committee did not work as a planning committee, especially for the Canadians. After 1960 the committee lay dead during the Conservative administration's stay in power and the Americans hoped that it would not be revived.13

¹²Statement, Martin, July 25, 1963; External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, XII (August, 1960), pp. 736-737; Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XLIII, No. 1100 (1960), p. 139; L, No. 1302 (1964), p. 45. The Ministerial Committee on Defense met in 1958 in Paris; in 1959 in the United States; in Canada in 1960; and in the United States in 1964.

¹³Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963. It was revived in May, 1963, when the new Liberal Prime Minister, Pearson, and President Kennedy met at Hyannisport, Massachusetts, and announced that a meeting of the Ministerial Committee would be held in the latter part of that year, perhaps in October. Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XLVII, No. 1248 (1963), pp. 815-817; and Statement, Martin, July 25, 1963. Perhaps because of the President's death, the meeting was deferred until 1964.

The Joint Ministerial Committee on Defense would have failed to affect the Board very much even if there had been no deadlock over nuclear weapons between Washington and Ottawa. Unlike the Committee, the Board's value lay in the fact that in working out political details of joint projects between countries. Board members were representatives of their governments from lower levels rather than principals. The Ministerial Committee found itself hindered in its effectiveness partially because its members were principals. The PJBD and the Ministerial Committee were entirely different organs. The Ministerial Committee usually met when some major defense policy was under review by either one country or the other. The PJBD met regularly and brought continuity to defense deliberations of the two countries. It acted as a clearing house to assure that defense relations were orderly and did not get out of control. If the Ministerial Committee were meeting, the results of the Board's deliberations were on occasion brought to its attention for policy review purposes. Likewise, the PJBD made recommendations with regard to the Ministerial Committee's agenda, but essentially the two performed quite different functions. So the Ministerial Defense Committee did not impinge upon the PJBD's work very much in actual practice.

The same evaluation applied to the other creation of the Diefenbaker government in 1958, the Canada-United

States Interparliamentary Group.¹⁴ It proved of even less significance in so far as the PJBD was concerned. The group served as an educational body and helped parliamentary and congressional members gain an idea of the workings and problems within one another's country, but did not take over any of the PJBD's advisory responsibilities. Before it came into office in 1957, the Diefenbaker government had, to some limited extent when in Opposition, stressed the importance of maintaining Canadian independence of the United States. However, within a few months they had agreed to NORAD and, as a result, the government came under considerable criticism.¹⁵ Diefenbaker may well have pressed for the Ministerial Committee and the Interparliamentary Group to prove that his government was protecting Canadian interests. Yet it would appear that the existing machinery for inter-country communication was guite adequate at the time.

McNaughton resigned from the PJBD in mid-summer, 1959 to turn his full attention to chairmanship of the International Joint Commission. Although traditionally the Canadian chairman had been appointed by the Prime Minister,

¹⁴External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, XI (August, 1959), pp. 209-213; XII (July, 1960), pp. 700-701; XII (August, 1960), p. 745; XIII (1961), pp. 169-171; XIV (April, 1962), pp. 142-144. By March 4, 1962 it had met six times alternately in Canada and the United States.

15_{Robert A.} Spencer, "Canadian Foreign Policy -Conservative Style," <u>Behind the Headlines</u>, XVIII, No. 3 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1958), pp. 6-7.

Leolyn Dana Wilgress was appointed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. He followed McNaughton as Canadian chairman of the Board in August, 1959. Diefenbaker. because of his alienation from the Board, evidently deferred the appointing of the new chairman to his cabinet minister. Wilgress, born October 20, 1892, in Vancouver, British Columbia, had served as a career diplomat with over forty years of service in Canada's Department of Trade and Commerce and in the Department of External Affairs.¹⁷ When he assumed the Canadian chairmanship on the Board, very little existed for the Board to consider. This situation prevailed owing to the strained nature of Canadian-American relations. Any difficulty between the American and Canadian governments adversely affected the Board, and especially hampered the Canadian chairman in promoting and furthering joint defense. In part, confusion prevailed due to Diefenbaker's tendency to be indecisive. He just would not make decisions, particularly regarding Board recommendations for arming Bomarc -B missiles and jet interceptors with nuclear warheads,

¹⁶Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963; and <u>New York</u> <u>Times</u>, April 21, 1959.

¹⁷He was Canada's first minister to the Soviet Union in 1942 and ambassador there from 1944 to 1947. He was Minister at Berne, Switzerland from 1947 to 1949; and High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom from 1949 to 1952. He served for a year, starting in June, 1952, as Under Secretary of State for External Affairs. Then in June, 1953, he was named Canada's permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council and to the Office of European Cooperation. <u>Current Biography. Who's News and Why. 1954</u>, ed. M.D. Candee (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1954), pp. 646-647; and <u>Wilgress Memoirs</u>.

and the storing of nuclear weapons at American bases within Canadian territory. At Wilgress's first meeting, for example, the members "really had to scratch to find enough to talk about."¹⁸

Notwithstanding the impasse over nuclear weapons. some problems did arise on which the Board studied and made recommendations in the years that followed up to 1963. Once the Russians launched Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's). the question of the military effectiveness of the network of radar lines came up. The radar lines could detect manned airplanes and give three hours' warning, but they were worthless in defense against rockets. Furthermore, the NORAD agreement had been designed as an anti-aircraft plan and not to deal with missiles. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), provided the answer, as far as one could be found, to this threat. Radar stations which could "see" around the earth's curvature were constructed in Alaska. Great Britain. and Greenland. This system reached far enough out into space so that the need no longer existed for radar bases on Canadian soil. It also held out a long run solution to the problem of American infringements to Canadian sovereignty.¹⁹ In the mutual defense interests of both the United States and Canada, the Board discussed and recommended the establishment of the Ballistic Missile

¹⁸Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963.
 ¹⁹Lloyd, <u>Canada in World Affairs</u>, pp. 39-40.

Early Warning System. It recognized the necessity of developing an integrated communications system in connection with EMEWS to provide information to NOHAD. This integrated communications system involved the use of existing facilities in Canada, as well as construction of some new installations on Canadian soil. The United States intended to employ Canadian government as well as commercial communications networks in Canada to the maximum extent possible to obtain the necessary service. The United States government selected a contractor to work closely with the two governments in this project, which was effected by an exchange of notes in July, 1959.²⁰ The BMEWS network was the most important enterprise to which the Board contributed during the period of impasse over nuclear weapons.

Canada and the United States undertook a program to provide for ballistic missile defense, but at the same time acknowledged that the manned bomber would still pose a threat for several years to come.²¹ Accordingly, the PJBD recommended augmentation of communications facilities at Cape Dyer, Baffin Island, to support the Greenland extension of the DEW Line (DEW East). By an exchange of notes in April, 1959, Canada and the United States agreed to establish and operate these facilities under the same

²⁰U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and <u>Other International Agreements</u>, X, 1260; Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XLI, No. 1050 (1959), p. 222; and Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

²¹Sutherland, "The Strategic Significance of the Arctic," pp. 271-272.

conditions which had governed the distant early warning system on Canadian territory. This agreement went into effect retroactively on January 15, 1959.²²

Provisions for creation of short-range Tactical Air Navigational (TACAN) facilities came up for Board study and recommendation.²³ The United States Air Force had carried out surveys with the view to possible installation of TACAN facilities in Canada as a part of a world-wide system of air navigational aid, after an agreement drafted to permit these surveys had been effected in 1955. In May, 1959, Canada authorized the United States to proceed with the establishment, maintenance, and operation of these TACAN facilities.²⁴ In order to obtain further information

²²U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and <u>Other International Agreements</u>, X, 739; and Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XL, No. 1037 (1959), p. 690.

²³Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963. Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) is a military system of air navigation which is used primarily for training purposes on flights within the continental United States, but is also adaptable to combat conditions. It operates in the ultrahigh frequency (UHF) radio band. TACAN is made up of two units. On the ground a UHF transmitter sends out radio signals in every direction. A pilot, after tuning to the ground station's frequency, takes a hearing which indicates to him his directional angle to the station. He can measure his distance to and from the station by means of radio impulses sent from his plane to the ground station, where they are picked up and returned by ground equipment. Through precise electronic measurement of the time that the impulses require to reach the ground station and return, the distance between the airplane and the station can be determined. "Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN)," Encyclopedia International, 1st ed., Vol. XVII.

²⁴U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and Other International Agreements, X, 790; and Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XL, No. 1039 (1959), p. 769. for aircraft traversing the DEW Line, the United States, in September, 1961, obtained Canadian permission to establish an additional TACAN site at Cape Dyer.²⁵

Although the major preoccupation of the Board throughout the late 1950's and early 1960's appears to have been air defense, the seas also posed an increasing threat, especially from submarines equipped with nuclear weapons. During July, 1960, the United States, after PJBD consideration,²⁶ entered into an agreement with Canada, whereby Canada acquired a submarine on loan from the Americans for purposes of anti-submarine training.²⁷

After 1958 the Board helped formulate a number of agreements which contributed to satellite and outer space programs. In June, 1960, Canada and the United States, upon a PJBD recommendation, agreed to continue using the existing upper atmosphere research facilities at Fort Churchill, Manitoba.²⁸ These installations had been developed and initially used for American rocket research activities during the International Geophysical Year (mid-1957 to the end of 1958). Canadian agencies had assisted the American rocket team at Churchill. Board discussions suggested that

²⁵U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and Other International Agreements, XII, 1357.

²⁶Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

²⁷U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and <u>Other International Agreements</u>, XI, 2214; and Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XLIII, No. 1115 (1960), p. 734.

²⁸Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

mutual Canadian-American interests would be advanced by the continued availability of the facilities for conduct of joint upper atmosphere research activities and cold weather testing for army support equipment.²⁹ To assist in tracking high altitude rockets, like those fired at Churchill, and satellites, a powerful radar station had already been installed at Prince Albert, Saskatchewan. This radar laboratory, opened in June, 1959, was jointly sponsored by the Defense Research Board of Canada and the United States Air Force. It provided facilities for continued joint activities in Canadian-American continental ballistic missile defense and for investigation of factors which influenced radar detection of aircraft and missiles entering the Auroral zone.³⁰

During August the two governments followed PJBD suggestions³¹ regarding the establishment and operation of a Minitrack station in the vicinity of St. John's, Newfoundland. The United States and Canada joined in a cooperative effort for tracking and receiving radio signals from space vehicles. The United States undertook to finance the construction costs of the station, and Canada furnished the land for

³⁰Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XL, No. 1043 (1959), p. 911-912.

³¹Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

²⁹U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and Other International Agreements, XI, 1801; Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XLIII, No. 1101 (1960), p. 192; "The International Geophysical Year," External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, II (September, 1959), p. 268; Speech, J.G. Diefenbaker, Kingston, Ontario, May 15, 1959, <u>S/S</u>, No. 59/19; Statement to the General Assembly, C.S.A. Ritchie, Canadian permanent representative to the United Nations, November 18, 1958, <u>S/S</u>, No. 58/58.

the site. Following construction of the installation, Canada would assume the cost of operation and maintenance. Canadian personnel would man the station.³²

As a result of discussions held in the PJED,³³ Canada and the United States agreed in June, 1961 that the government of Canada should assume responsibility for manning, operation and maintenance of fifteen Pinetree radar stations previously operated by the United States government in Canada. Further provisions were worked out regarding the Canadian-American production sharing program. By this agreement, Canada acquired sixty-six F-101B aircraft from the United States for operation in Canada in conjunction with NORAD. The two countries also agreed to a program of procurement in Canada by the United States of the F-104G aircraft to help meet Canadian mutual aid contributions to NATO and United States Military Assistance Program requirements.³⁴

In December, 1962 the two countries decided, after PJBD discussions, to cooperate in an operational meteorological satellite system. Canada allowed the joint establishment and operation of a command and data acquisition station on Canadian territory. This station constituted

³³Interview, Hannah, September 17, 1963.

³⁴U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and <u>Other International Agreements</u>, XII, 723; and Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XLV, No. 1150 (1961), p. 92.

³²U.S., Department of State, <u>United States Treaties</u> and <u>Other International Agreements</u>, XI, 2084; Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XLIII, No. 1109 (1960), p. 501.

one element in an integrated command and data acquisition network. The system, established by the United States, was designed to provide eventually for continuous meteorological observation on a global basis. It was to be constructed either in the Maritime provinces of Canada, or in Newfoundland. Staffing of the installation remained a Canadian responsibility, although American personnel might be located at the station for assistance, training, and liaison purposes.³⁵

The amount of business which the Board handled and its effectiveness in transacting it depended heavily upon the state of Canadian-American relations at the time. The Board furnished a useful instrument in the hands of the two governments when they wished to work closely together in defense matters. When that desire did not exist, or existed in a modified manner as in the 1958-1963 period, the Board's contribution was not as great, for the nuclear impasse hampered the Board's activity. Not infrequently during these years the Board met, but found that it had little of significance to discuss. However, the Board still served a useful function. Even former Prime Minister Diefenbaker recalled that during these difficult years Hannah did much to "keep problems of Canadian-American defense in a position of open and frank discussion." Diefenbaker assessed Hannah's

³⁵U.S., Department of State, <u>Treaties and Other</u> <u>International Acts Series</u>, I, 5260.

role by asserting that "Hannah's contribution to Canadian-American defensive relations was momentous."³⁶ Wilgress spoke of Hannah in much the same vein when he observed that "he made an excellent chairman, being broad minded and greatly interested in adequate defense against any potential military threat."³⁷ At least the Board furnished a forum for dialogue while the nuclear issue remained unsettled, and despite the problems involving nuclear defense, the Board submitted recommendations regarding ballistic missile defense, increased radar protection against the manned bomber, sea defenses, outer space and defense production sharing.

By June, 1963, at its session in British Columbia, the Board's work began to increase. It had so many items to consider that it barely finished within its alloted meeting time. At that meeting they deliberated some fifteen agenda items plus many reports by various members.³⁸ The new Liberal government under Prime Minister Lester Pearson had begun to make decisions regarding the placing

³⁷<u>Wilgress Memoirs</u>, p. 184.

³⁸Interview, Wilgress, August 13, 1963; and Hannah, September 17, 1963.

³⁶Interview, Diefenbaker, June 8, 1967. Diefenbaker spoke of Hannah in warm terms, conveying his high regard for the American section chairman. He noted that Michigan State University had given him an honorary degree on June 7, 1959 and that Hannah's hospitality had been unbounded. He said he had conversed with him directly and by phone regarding defense issues, and enjoyed a cordial personal relationship with him.

of nuclear weapons on Canadian territory.³⁹ With a lot of new business related to North American defense for the Board to discuss, and a change of government and policy in Ottawa, the PJED entered what promised to be a new phase of usefulness.

Canada had, for many years, accepted the fact that it was a military ally of the United States and was committed not only to defense of North America, but to that of western Europe as well. Canada based its policy on a nuclear deterrent - a nuclear alliance really. This caused some unrest in Canada and, in turn, led to indecision in the Diefenbaker government. Ultimately Ottawa had to accept the Board's recommendations regarding nuclear weapons, or disassociate itself from the alliance. which was not a practical possibility. The forward defenses of the alliance were in Canada and these had to be nuclear to be effective. Canada considered how it might best participate in this nuclear alliance and looked for acceptable consultation arrangements. By mid-1963 Canada and the United States did agree in principle to emplacement of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. The weapons would be retained under United States control but could be employed only after

³⁹Statement, Martin, July 25, 1963; McLin, <u>Canada's</u> <u>Changing Defense Policy</u>, pp. 166-167; Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, XLVIII, No. 1248 (1963), pp. 815-817; Speech, Mr. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, New York City, May 28, 1963, <u>S/S</u>. No. 63/10; and Foulkes, "The Complications of Continental Defense," pp. 103 and 106-107.

joint consultation between Washington and Ottawa. Canada could refuse to allow the United States to use these nuclear weapons, but Canada could not employ them unless the United States concurred. So the United States made the Weapons available to Canada, but held the right of veto over their Although they reached agreement in principle concerning use. stationing of nuclear weapons in Canada, no set agreement was worked out to establish a regular procedure for actual employment of nuclear weapons from Canadian soil. This was true in spite of the fact that various procedures had been discussed for several years. The United States Secretary of Defense felt that a lack of established procedure between the United States and Canada posed a very dangerous situation and pressed Canada for action in this regard. Without a doubt the Board once again, in 1963, considered this procedural issue and recommended various schemes to remedy it.40

⁴⁰A highly placed Canadian source told me as late as 1966 that Canada and the United States had reached no set agreement regarding procedure for employment of nuclear Weapons from Canadian territory.

CHAPTER XI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The history of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense was marked by successive stages of evolution. A mechanism like the PJBD could not be excessively rigid in usage if it were to accomplish the changing objectives of Canadian-American defensive cooperation which challenged it. When the Board was first established in 1940, its task involved planning for North American defense at a moment when Canada was already a participant in World War II and the United States a neutral. The Board's role, therefore, was of a planning nature clearly separate (officially at least) from Canada's commitment to Europe. For example, it drew up plans in case Newfoundland or the North American continent should be attacked. Approximately a year later, however, the United States became a belligerent and the roles of the two Board sections paralleled one another. After the United States entered the war, much of the planning phase was taken over by military bodies. The Board concerned itself with political and economic implications of problems involved in the execution of defense plans. It served as a significant mechanism for ensuring effective military cooperation for North American security during World War II, slight as the need may have been.

World War II left the Canadian and American peoples with an alliance that had begun with the Ogdensburg Agreement. The PJBD furnished the principal agency of that alliance. The success of the Board's work during the war fully justified its continuation as an instrument in maintenance of mutual security. At the war's end it provided a highly useful body for liquidation of wartime enterprises which had been established on Canadian soil. and for the initiation of post-war defense planning which began very promptly as hostilities subsided. During the war period, the United States section habitually took a much darker view of the military situation and of the requirements for continental defense than did those who sat on the Canadian side of the The United States section continued to maintain. table. in the post-war years, this more pessimistic position regarding the threat of hostile attack on North America. The Americans, quite justifiably, after having experienced the trauma of the Pearl Harbor disaster, were unwilling to be caught unprepared again. So in 1946 the United States government initiated discussion of plans, through the Board, to guard against a surprise attack upon North America. They particularly feared a Soviet assault over the Arctic frontier.

The Canadian Board members and the Canadian government remained much more optimistic than the Americans in their appraisal of the danger of a Soviet attack on North America after the war. Ottawa was cautious in embarking

on joint defense enterprises which would involve the United States use of Canadian territory and air space. The distinctive character of Canadian-American relations which the Canadians faced, however, involved the presence of a country with a small population contiguous to a country with a large population and whose territory was important to the defense of the larger country. Recognition of this reality helped shape decisions in Ottawa. Canadian government officials. and in turn their representatives on the Board, considered the fact that the shortest route between the Soviet Union and the United States lav over Canada. United States foreign policy aimed at securing Canadian cooperation through the PJBD in defending the North American continent. The American government needed to gain access to Canadian territory and air space to maintain their own and Canada's security. Geography linked Canadian and American political and defensive interests inextricably together as the United States and the Soviet Union settled into polar positions of cold hostility. Canada could hardly be neutral when her location made her so important to United States defense. While joint defense demanded the closest of cooperation between Washington and Ottawa, many Canadians disliked the thought of stationing United States forces on Canadian soil. Given this attitude in Canadian public opinion the United States had to put forth every effort to understand Canadian viewpoints and sensibilities and respect Canadian sovereignty in its many projects for North American protection.

The Board's immediate post-war role underwent further change during the Korean War, and then entered a new dimension with the advent of the manned bomber threat which presaged the very extensive air defense system created in Canada and the United States. The joint Canadian and American response included the Pinetree Line, the Mid-Canada Line, the Distant Early Warning Line, and in 1957, the North American Air Defense Command. These systems of air defense raised many political and economic problems as well as military ones, and thereby enlarged the scope and type of matters considered by the Board. The United States government stationed substantial numbers of American armed forces personnel on Canadian territory, especially at bases in Newfoundland and in areas connected with the radar warning lines. Through the PJBD the Americans proposed a multitude of defense projects which, by the mid-1950's, led to United States defense expenditures totaling over half a billion dollars annually in Canada. Defense endeavors of this magnitude evoked knotty problems involving customs duties, labor laws, personnel, employees, dependents, transportation, communication, and construction materials which demanded continued attention from the PJBD.

The Board as a rule dealt more with execution of defense plans than with planning. Numerous secret military bodies and technical committees were created in the post-World War II period to take over joint strategic planning, leaving the Board to serve other functions. The Board

helped work out details of defense plans as they were implemented and to smooth out complications arising from them, especially those involving the presence of Americans stationed on Canadian territory. It studied and recommended policy concerned with defense problems of a federal-provincial nature - as in the revision of the 1941 leased bases agreement in Newfoundland or the Haines-Fairbanks Road and Pipe Line. Most importantly, the Board was concerned with the political and economic implications of military plans. It considered how such plans would affect public opinion, an area to which the military members of both sections paid less attention than their civilian counterparts on the Board. The military members (perhaps understandably because of their preoccupation with security) when left to themselves often failed to view the diplomatic as well as the military side of a problem. The Board's mode of procedure was a useful one, for in working out mutual defense problems, there were definite advantages in combining the civilian or diplomatic and military representatives into one informal body. Prior to the creation of the Board in 1940, there had never been a mechanism that drew together the military and diplomatic branches of government. The relationship between them had traditionally never been close. They had really not had much occasion to get together, so the PJBD provided a unique means of temporarily combining these two rather divergent departments into one governmental body both within nations and between them. Here especially the

Board performed a significant service. The concept that no major problem is wholly political or diplomatic, and no defense problem is wholly devoid of political, economic or diplomatic content has gained wide recognition since the early years of the 1940's, when it was implicit in the Board's structure and functioning.

The Board provided an incidental means of collecting and exchanging information, and thereby facilitated common business and mutual interest. At times, ideas were exchanged and tested, without commitment, through individual contacts among Board members, at meetings, at other times, or actually in formal sessions. It was a body through which all views of each country, department and service, could be considered.

The Board was established to function primarily as an advisory rather than as an executive body. From the beginning, however, the FJBD operated as more than an advisory agency. The dividing line between the role of members as members and as executives in their respective services was never very clear. By reason of their positions and their consequent ability to influence and execute government policies on both sides, members served in executive capacities. Board members were frequently in a position to expedite governmental consideration of problems presented to the Board.

There were also political implications in the Canadian-American alliance forged at Ogdensburg and perpetuated in the post-war years. Canadians could conceivably have left the problem of Canadian defense and security in the hands of the United States government. The Americans, in providing adequate defenses for maintenance of its own security in North America. effectively guaranteed Canadian security as well. If Canadian security had been her only aim. Canada need not have participated in North American defense organizations like the PJBD as she did. Certainly a foremost Canadian objective, however, in dealing with the United States was to maintain access to the decision-making process in Washington. The PJBD provided Canada with an important alternative to the normal diplomatic channels to Washington. It offered Canada a ready forum through which it strove to maintain adequate recognition in Washington of its defense problems and preoccupations. Canada, notwithstanding all forecasts to the contrary, lost very little sovereignty to the United States. Although the United States, with Canadian permission and cooperation, built a most elaborate defense network on Canadian soil. Canada lost no territory. Canadian foreign policy maintained a freedom of action and independence, which under the geographic circumstances appears most remarkable.

Through participation on the Board, Canada could more easily project its point of view in Washington, with a hope that the United States government might consider it. The Board contacts also enabled Canada to lend support on occasion to American foreign policy, when a community of

Canadian and American interests existed, as they did frequently in the western Atlantic region. That is not to imply that Canada could exert a decisive influence through the Board or by other means on American policy-making when Canadian and American interests diverged, as in some areas of the Far East or in Latin America. Yet Canada benefited more by her connection on the Board and from North American defense schemes than if she had abandoned her membership in the American alliance. Canadian membership on the PJBD and cooperation in North American defense, which that membership implied, helped serve Canadian diplomatic ends as much or more than it served to increase Canadian national security per se. In other words, Canadian association on the Board worked to bolster Canadian diplomacy with Washington. It availed Ottawa with important diplomatic backing in its relations with other nations as well. This is not to deny that on occasion the close Canadian identification with the United States may have posed a political liability for Canada, particularly with some of the developing nations who viewed the United States as an imperialistic power. Yet, on balance, Canada benefited from diplomacy which gave priority to policies that helped maintain the influence of the United States in the bi-polar post-war world.

Canadian participation in a military alliance with the United States served a very important political purpose as well as a vital military one for Washington. The United States needed access to Canadian territory, water, and air

space to protect the continental United States. Americans valued the Canadian alliance first because of the contribution Canada could make to United States military security by granting the use of her territory. But the special relationship between Canada and the United States proved particularly valuable to the United States because of the diplomatic support which Canada could lend to Washington's foreign policies, when a mutuality of interests made those Canadian and American policies similar. Washington sought Canadian diplomatic backing along with other western nations in facing the Communist world in the first eighteen years after World War II. Canadian support through the PJBD, NATO, NORAD, and the other manifestations of the Canadian-American alliance, assisted Washington in attempting to meet the Communist bloc with a united coalition of Western allies. Canada assisted the United States in maintenance of international stability and a favorable balance of power.

The PJBD furnished a useful forum, well adapted to deal with the problems that arose in the Canadian-American military alliance - an alliance that was by no means a free and equal partnership. It provided an effective instrument in the hands of the two governments when they wished to, and did, work closely together in defense matters. It was true that during periods when this desire did not exist, or perhaps existed in a modified manner, as in the late 1950's and early 1960's, the Board proved to be of less significance.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Board had a lot of business to consider after the break of the nuclear impasse in the early 1960's. it may well play a decreasing role in the future defense of North America. By 1963. many highly integrated programs and a multitude of military agreements existed between Canada and the United States. The development of a joint North American air defense and the continual, intimate contact between the two nations' military establishments at all levels led to a great deal of informal agreement and action outside the Board that could not have been foreseen in 1945. A good many major plans and issues were ironed out by the Board over the years. especially difficult ones like those involving radar warning lines. NORAD and BMEWS. Not only were big schemes like NORAD agreed upon, but many smaller ones such as those providing for deep sea sounding along the Nova Scotian coast, standardization of weapons and equipment, and production sharing programs were functioning or stood in readiness for joint operation in an emergency. Thus, there was much less for the Board to do. The extent of joint development in North American defense has, to at least a certain degree, done away with some of the need for a Board to work out defense problems between the two countries.

However, if a war should come or an international emergency arise, the PJBD would be needed. The Board should be maintained, for there is a continuing need for joint

collaboration between Canada and the United States. It is well to have the FJED machinery in case of an emergency and to have an agency other than the normal diplomatic one to provide Canada with a voice in Washington. Canadians and Americans will have a community of interest in their continental defense partnership in the future as they have had in the past. Canada will have to continue to make the United States aware that their alliance implies equality even though the partners may be of unequal strength. Canadian participation on the FJED should serve to assist Ottawa in attaining this end. Perpetuation of the Board will enable the United States to continue to formulate continental defense policy in close consultation with Canada.

For more than twenty years Canadian and American senior military and civilian officials have consulted regularly on the FJED. The Board has remained a flexible instrument capable of bringing together in one unpublicized forum all aspects of problems attendant on mutual security. Because of its adaptability to changing conditions, the Board has served significantly in furthering Canadian and American military and political interests. Since the realities of present-day weaponry cause a rapidly evolving reconfiguration of the North American systems of defense, the nature of the Board's work will continue to change accordingly and it is quite proper that it should do so.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The first published account of the wartime activities of the PJBD based upon official Canadian records was Professor C.P. Stacey's, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 1940-1945," International Journal, IX (1954), 107-124. In this article the former Director of the Historical Section, Canadian Army Headquarters, Department of Defense, summarized and discussed the PJBD's World War II recommendations. A similar account by Hugh L. Keenleyside described the Board's wartime record of accomplishment in "The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 1940-1945," International Journal, XVI (1960), 50-77. Keenleyside's observations and reflections are particularly noteworthy since he served on the Board during the war. For the occasion of the Board's twentieth anniversary meeting in August, 1960, C.P. Stacey prepared a booklet, <u>A Brief History of the Canada-United States</u> Permanent Joint Board on Defense. 1940 to 1960 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960), for the Canadian Army Headquarters. This sixteen page booklet surveyed the Board's origin and wartime initiatives. It was most valuable in that it listed the Board's membership from 1940 to 1960.

The Canada in World Affairs volumes proved very useful in this study. F.H. Soward, et al., Canada in World Affairs: The Pre-War Years (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1941); and R.M. Dawson, Canada in World Affairs: Two Years of War, 1939-1940 (Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1943), were helpful in supplying factual material for background to the Ogdensburg Agreement. The best source relating to the meeting at Ogdensburg was J.W. Pickersgill (ed.), The Mackenzie King Record, Vol. I, 1939-1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960). King's record of the events which surrounded the Ogdensburg Agreement was most illuminating. King's address to the House, found in Canada, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), I (1940), not only shed light on the Ogdensburg meeting but described the contacts between King and Roosevelt which had taken place during the three previous years. Nancy H. Hooker (ed.), Jay Pierrepont Moffat, the Moffat Papers: Selections from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, 1919-1943 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956), contained an account of King's conversations with Roosevelt which were related to Moffat by the Prime Minister immediately after the Ogdensburg conference. It also included other material surrounding creation of the PJBD.

Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, accompanied King and Roosevelt during the discussions at Ogdensburg and recorded a first hand report of this event in his diary. Stimson's observations concerning Ogdensburg were found in

two volumes of the "United States Army in World War II" The most complete study of the PJBD's wartime series. undertakings was S.W. Dziuban, Special Studies: Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945 ("United States Army in World War II." Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History. Department of the Army, 1959). It was based primarily upon official papers of the PJBD. These papers included not only the official records of the Board itself, but correspondence exchanged between members of the Canadian and American sections, and between the members of the United States section and agencies of the State, War, and Navy Departments. Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, in The Western Hemisphere: The Framework Of Hemisphere Defense ("United States Army in World War II." Vol. I; Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1960), pp. 364-409, devoted two chapters to the Canadian-American wartime alliance and the PJBD's work. United States Army and official PJBD records were employed in this study also.

The official papers of the PJBD and correspondence between its members were not available for the period 1946-1963.* The Department of State's files for the post-1941

I wrote to the following places requesting information regarding the Board's post-war activities: the Reference Department, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; the Diplomatic, Legal and Fiscal Branch, General Services Administration, National Archives and Records Service; the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State; the Historical Services Division, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History; the United States Air Force, Historical Division,

period, for example, were not open for research on the PJBD. The Board has attempted to avoid publicity and this has contributed to the scarcity of material relating to it. There is a security factor involved as well. Some of the Board's official files in Washington and Ottawa for the postwar years are classified very high. Consequently, this thesis is based upon available printed sources, and a number of interviews with and letters from various people who were affiliated with the PJBD.

One of the most valuable of these interviews was with Dr. John Hannah at Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, on September 17, 1963, a few days before his resignation from the Board became effective. His comments proved most helpful in understanding the functions of the American section's chairman and the general procedure which the Board followed. He surveyed at considerable length the nature of the issues which the Board had considered over the years. In addition to the interview I was able to examine at Dr. Hannah's office the <u>Index to the Journal</u> of the Board containing items of the agenda which the Board had discussed from 1940 to 1960. Without his interview and the opportunity of examining the <u>Index</u>, this study would have been less feasible.

Liaison Office, Department of the Air Force, Headquarters, United States Air Force; the National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, in Washington, D.C.; and in Canada, to the Department of External Affairs; Department of National Defense Library, National Defense Headquarters, Ottawa; Fort Frontenac Library, National Defense College, Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Ontario; and the National Archives and Library in Ottawa.

The Canadian section chairman and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, L. Dana Wilgress, shed considerable light on the duties of the Canadian chairman and the functions of the Canadian section during an interview in Ottawa on August 13, 1963. He touched upon a multitude of issues which the Board had studied over the years. His comments upon the Board's difficulties during the Diefenbaker government's period in office were very helpful. Mr. James Nutt, Canadian section secretary, had explained the Canadian section's mode of operation and offered many useful comments on its history and significance during an interview the day before. Mr. Nutt accompanied Mr. Wilgress during the meeting on August 13, and rendered further comment on the Board at that time.

On August 15, 1963, I met with Professor R.A. MacKay. He was Chief of Defense Liaison Division, External Affairs, 1948-1952; Assistant Under Secretary of State, 1952-1954; and Deputy Under Secretary, 1954-1955. He discussed the Board's history in detail. His comments regarding the Board's role in the St. Lawrence Waterway negotiations and the Newfoundland leased bases problems were most helpful. In particular he outlined the part which General A.G.L. McNaughton played in promoting Canadian interests through the Board in the late 1940's and 1950's. Former Ambassador to the United States, A.D.P. Heeney, set forth his views regarding the PJBD during an Ottawa interview on June 9, 1967. Mr. Heeney was then chairman of the Canadian section.

He talked of the Board's history, especially with regard to defense problems in the Canadian Northwest and Alaska. He surveyed some of the areas where the Board had studied and made recommendations. Finally, he philosophized concerning the Board's historical significance and its role in the future.


Douglas Harkness, former Defense Minister, 1960 to 1963, evaluated the Board's contribution to North American defense over the years during an interview in Ottawa, June 9, 1967. His comments on the Board were helpful in understanding the Board's role after 1958, when it was primarily concerned with long-range planning for the late 1960's and 1970's. Opposition Leader, John G. Diefenbaker, during an Ottawa interview on June 8, 1967, discussed the Board's history in general terms and mentioned areas such as radar defense and the aerial refueling agreement in which the Board had contributed significantly. He spoke at length on the contribution which Dr. John Hannah had made to hemispheric defense through his open and frank discussion with Canadians of American defense and security preoccupations.

Dana Wilgress (July 31, 1963), and R.A. MacKay (July 31, 1963), wrote letters concerning the PJBD in addition to the interviews. Other Canadians such as Air Marshal W.A. Curtis (July 11, 1963); General A.G.L. McNaughton (August 3, 1963); Lieutenant-General Maurice Pope (July 6, 1963); former Deputy Under Secretary of State, 1955-1957 and 1958-1959, R.M. MacDonnell (September 3, 1963); former Head, Defense Liaison Division, 1962-1965, A.R. Menzies (December 30, 1963); former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, 1962-1966, Paul Tremblay (August 1, 1963); Christopher C. Eberts (December 13, 1963); W.H. Barton (November 29, 1963); James Nutt (July 25, 1963) of the Department of External Affairs; and the diplomat, historian and Chairman of the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, Hugh Keenleyside (July 5, 1963), answered questions by letter concerning the PJBD.

Several Americans contributed to this study through letters. These included the following from the Department of State: former Ambassador to the Phillipines. John D. Hickerson (October 24, 1963); former Counselor of Embassy, Asuncion, Paraguay, Julian L. Nugent (July 31, 1963); Norris S. Haselton (August 20, 1963); former Ambassador to Sweden, J. Graham Parsons (October 15, 1963); Woodbury Willoughby (August 19, 1963); Wharton D. Hubbard (October 15, 1963); Dean G. Acheson (July 16, 1963); and Willis C. Armstrong (October 22, 1963). I also received a most informative letter from Patricia Henry Williams, Wenatchie, Washington, on October 25, 1968 regarding her father, General Guy V. Henry's family background and military career. These letters were invaluable not only for the factual material they contained but for the insight which they provided. They were useful also in understanding the structure and functions

of the PJBD. The <u>Briefing Paper</u> and diagram of the Board's administrative position within the United States government which Lieutenant Colonel Gordon E. Jonas of the United States Air Force, Office of the Military Members, United States Section, Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. sent to me July 9, 1963, proved very helpful in gaining a knowledge of the organizational framework operative within the American section.

In Maurice A. Pope, Soldiers and Politicians. The Memoirs of Lieutenant General Maurice A. Pope (Toronto: the University of Toronto Press, 1962), pp. 163-166, a former Canadian Board member lent some insight into the nature of the Board's operation, as did Dana Wilgress in the Dana Wilgress Memoirs (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1967), pp. 182-185. A published list of the Board's post-war recommendations was not available to me. One would have to have had access to the PJBD's own records for a definitive picture of Board recommendations which failed to be The use of interviews and letters from various adopted. former Board members somewhat remedied the lack of access to official records. Such recommendations as were adopted and implemented were for the most part recorded in formal agreements between Canada and the United States. These were contained in the Canada Treaty Series, published by the Queen's Printer for the Department of External Affairs. The Canada Treaty Series is arranged by year, and within



each year, by a numerical series. An Index to the Canada Treaty Series is published each year for that particular By going through the Canada Treaty Series from 1945 year. to 1963 using the Indexes, one could compile a list of actions resulting from PJBD negotiations. This was the most valuable primary source which provided insight into the nature of the problems the Board considered. One could employ a similar technique of research with the U.S.. Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements or the U.S., Statutes at Large. The texts of many of the Canadian-American agreements upon which the PJBD made recommendations were found in these treaty series. The text usually stated the considerations which governed the establishment of a particular agreement. The agreements often consisted of an exchange of notes between the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and the American ambassador in Ottawa, or the United States Secretary of State and the Canadian ambassador in Washington. By such an agreement, each government bound itself to take or not to take a particular action.


The External Affairs <u>Bulletin</u>, a monthly publication, provided many articles related to the Board's work.

In this form of international arrangement, classified in the United States as an Executive Agreement, the Executive acts without the advice and consent of the Senate. His action may be based upon the President's constitutional authority, legislation enacted by Congress, the provisions of a treaty approved by the Senate, or a combination of two or more such bases. See L.F. Schmeckebier <u>et al.</u>, <u>Government</u> <u>Publications and Their Use</u> (ed. rev.; Washington, D.C.: the Brookings Institution, 1961), pp. 340-341.

<u>Statements and Speeches</u>, obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, contained data pertaining to the Board. <u>Statements and Speeches</u> are listed by title and number in the annual <u>Queen's Printer's Catalogue</u> <u>of Government Publications</u>. The Public Archives of Canada and the Parliamentary Library in Ottawa maintain a complete collection of these publications. Another source, the Canada, <u>Parliamentary Debates</u> (Commons) yielded data concerning PJBD recommendations and functions. The American Department of State <u>Bulletin</u>, published weekly, also provided much useful information for this study.

A few Canadian and American newspapers produced information on PJBD recommendations and activities. The <u>New York Times</u> proved to be the most valuable, while the <u>Toronto Globe and Mail</u>, and on occasion the <u>Winniper Free</u> <u>Press</u> carried news items and editorials touching upon Board concerns.

Scholarly secondary works which examine Canadian-American military cooperation after World War II are not very numerous. Fewer still are those which bear directly upon the activities of the PJBD. Melvin Conant's, <u>The</u> <u>Long Polar Watch: Canada and the Defense of North America</u> (New York: Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1962), provides the most comprehensive account of Canadian-American post-war defense policy. He traced the evolution of NORAD and analyzed Canadian views on foreign policy, noting how they differed from those in the United States.



Conant, who lectured at the National War College in Washington, D.C. during the early 1960's, asserted that Canada must be prepared to accept defensive nuclear weapons if it intended to continue to play an influential role in the Atlantic alliance. C.P. Stacey, in "Twenty-One Years of Canadian-American Military Cooperation," Canada-United States Treaty Relations, ed. D.R. Deener (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1963), pp. 102-122, reviewed the years of defense collaboration during the decades after the Ogdensburg Agreement, and concluded that the alliance with the United States tended to restrict Canadian foreign policy at a time when Canada was increasingly in a more independent national mood. R.J. Sutherland analyzed Canadian-American defense activity in "The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic," The Arctic Frontier, ed. R.St. J. MacDonald (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), pp. 256-278. He suggested that the growing threat from over the Arctic had helped to make Canadians more aware of Canada's international responsibilities. His authoritative description of Arctic defense proved most valuable for this study. Sutherland served in 1966 with the Defense Research Board.

Brian A. Crane, lawyer and Chairman of the Ottawa Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in 1964, wrote an informative survey of Canadian defense policy during and after World War II in <u>An Introduction to Canadian Defense Policy</u> (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1964). In this booklet he included a select bibliography on Canadian defense problems. General

Charles F. Foulkes summarized Canadian defense activity from 1946 to 1961 in "Canadian Defense Policy in a Nuclear Age," <u>Behind the Headlines</u>, XXI, No. 1 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1961), and concluded that Canada should continue to offer her facilities to assist the American deterrent forces, even if it meant some sacrifice of Canadian sovereignty. His article was valuable for the authoritative disclosures he made regarding Canadian-American military planning for defense of North America in 1946, particularly in the area of air defense.

The Cold War historiography employed in this dissertation is based on George F. Kennan's thesis set forth in his <u>Memoirs</u>, 1925-1950 (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 330 and 350.^{*} Kennan argued that World War II dictated the shape of post-war politics. He noted that the Western democracies were forced to unite with the Russians to defeat Germany. With Germany's collapse, the Soviets were left militarily dominant in eastern Europe. They occupied a stronger position there relative to the West than they had prior to the war. Consequently, the United States had little opportunity to influence events in the Soviet sphere of control. Inasmuch as the Russians were determined to expand their area of domination, even at the expense of breaking the Yalta Agreement on Foland, they thereby precipitated events which resulted in the Cold

[#]See also his <u>American Diplomacy, 1900-1950</u> (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1951).

War. Other interpretations of the Cold War period used in this study are historian Norman Graebner's <u>Cold War</u> <u>Diplomacy: American Foreign Policy. 1945-1960</u> (Toronto: D. Van Nostrand Company, Ltd., 1962); political scientist John W. Spanier's <u>American Foreign Policy Since World War</u> <u>II</u> (rev. ed.; New York: Praeger, 1962); and historian John Lukacs' <u>A History of the Cold War</u> (rev. ed.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1962). They, like Kennan, viewed containment as a necessary response to Soviet expansion and to the breakdown of Western power and influence in eastern Europe. Like Kennan, they were critical, however, of the legalistic-moralistic tradition which kept United States policy makers from viewing foreign relations in the light of balance of power considerations.^{*}

Robert A. Spencer, <u>Canada in World Affairs from</u> <u>UN to NATO. 1946-1949</u> (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959); and W.E.C. Harrison, <u>Canada in World Affairs. 1949</u> <u>to 1950</u> (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), supplied a factual background on hemispheric defense for the early post-war period. Canadian historian and former president of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1952

[&]quot;A professor of history at Northwestern University, Christopher Lasch, discussed recent revisionist interpretations of the Cold War in "The Cold War, Revisited and Revisioned," <u>The New York Times Magazine</u>, January 14, 1968, pp. 26-27, and 44, 46, 48, 51, 54, and 59. A.M. Schlessinger, Jr. took exception to Cold War revisionist views in "The Russian Revolution - Fifty Years After: Origins of the Cold War," <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, XLVI (1967), 22-52. The Canadian Institute of International Affairs devoted its summer, 1968 quarterly issue of the <u>International Journal</u>, XXIII, to the topic of "The Cold War and Beyond."

to 1960, Edgar McInnis, described in "A Middle Power in the Cold War," The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1960), pp. 142-163, the way in which the Canadian government entered into a more active and positive role in world affairs in adapting to bi-polar international conditions. He illustrated how Canada sought collective action whenever possible as the most effective means of implementing her own foreign policies. Eric Harrison, Queen's University history professor. discussed the expanding activities of the PJBD immediately following World War II in "Strategy and Policy in the Defense of Canada," International Journal, IV (1949), 216-220 and 230-232. He asserted that the permanence of the PJBD was sustained after the war by the demands of space and circumstance. Geographer and historian, Trevor Lloyd, presented some helpful facts on the status of defense preparedness in Canada's North in "Canada's Strategic North," International Journal, II (1947), 144-149. He summarized the strategic situation in the Arctic regions in the context of Prime Minister King's February, 1947 statement to the House regarding Canadian-American defense. George A. Bevin of McMaster University in 1947, sketched out the defense network in northeastern and northwestern Canada in "Canada, A Power Vacuum of World Politics." Dalhousie Review, XXVII (July, 1947), 197-205. He concluded that these two areas of Canada were fairly adequately defended, but that no concrete defense measures protected Canada's North. This

northern security problem, he observed, confronted the PJBD with a challenge in 1947.

Wilfrid Eggleston, in "Public Affairs: Strategy and Wealth in Northern Canada," Queen's Quarterly, LIV (1947), 238-244, commented favorably upon the 1947 statement of principles and related some of the events that followed it involving weather forecasting and LORAN stations. He asserted that the new agreement assured that Canadian security and sovereignty would be maintained. However, R.A.J. Phillips, Canada's North (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967), pp. 99-113, demonstrated how slender Canada's claim has been at times to its northern lands. Phillips. a former PJBD member and director of the Northern Administration Branch of the Department of Northern Affairs. noted that many Canadians feared Americans might jeopardize Canadian sovereignty with their northern defense projects following World War II.

General A.G.L. McNaughton's address to the Council of Foreign Relations in New York on April 12, 1948, contained in the Department of External Affairs, <u>Statements</u> <u>and Speeches</u>, No. 48/18, provided an important commentary by the Canadian Board chairman on the 1947 agreement of defense principles. In this address, McNaughton also described the Board's structure and mode of operation. Another authoritative analysis of Canadian-American defense cooperation, by Frederick Winant, appeared in "United States Canadian Cooperation in Preparedness," <u>Public Affairs</u>,

XIII (1951), 64-69. Winant, who occupied a post in the Foreign Coordination Section of the Defense Production Administration in Washington during 1951, enumerated the events that led to the establishment of post-war defense production sharing between the two nations and joint civil defense activities. His article proved especially valuable in its portrayal of the PJBD's role in initiating a system of reciprocal procurement of defense equipment between Canada and the United States. General G.B. Howard, Vice President and General Manager of the Canadian Industrial Preparedness Association, in "United States Defense Procurement in Canada," International Journal, V (1950). 316-318, touched upon the main obstacle to reciprocal defense procurement, the "Buy American Act," and described how the United States government planned to get around that act in order to place defense contracts in Canada. Eric Harrison commented upon Canadian-American defense preparedness in "The Great Rearmament." Queen's Quarterly. LVII (1950), 548-549. He discussed the possibility of increased reciprocal defense procurement, and standardization of defense equipment between the United States and Canada. William R. Willoughby, professor of political science at the University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, reviewed post-war military collaboration to 1951 in "Canadian-American Defense Cooperation," Journal of Politics, XIII (1951), 675-695. This well documented article included a list of the February, 1947 statement of defense

principles and an account of their reception in Parliament, facts regarding Canada's commitment to the Korean conflict, and a sketch of the two countries' efforts toward economic cooperation for common defense.

General Charles F. Foulkes analyzed the question of associating the defense measures, which had been made between the United States and Canada under the PJBD's auspices, with the organs of NATO in 1950 in "The Complications of Continental Defense," <u>Neighbors Taken for Granted: Canada and the United States</u>, ed. Livingston T. Merchant (Toronto: Burns and MacEachern, 1966), pp. 101-133. Foulke's comments on NATO and the FJBD were valuable, but he devoted some attention to the NOEAD agreement as well. He concluded that Canada, because of her continuing requirement for missile early warning and fallout information, and for assistance in protecting its cities against missile attack, has a vital interest in continued participation in NOEAD, even though joint control of the collecting and disseminating agencies are not vital to American defense.

Historian A.R.M. Lower examined the strategic importance of Newfoundland during World War II in "Transition to Atlantic Bastion," <u>Newfoundland Economic. Diplomatic</u> <u>and Strategic Studies</u>, ed. R.A. MacKay (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 484-508. His description of the development of defense installations on the island and in the region around it were very informative. In 1949, Professor A.M. Fraser of Memorial University College,

St. John's, Newfoundland, an authority on Newfoundland, summed up the economic and strategic value of Newfoundland and Labrador to Canada in "Newfoundland's Contribution to Canada." International Journal. IV (1949), 250-260. He commented briefly upon the part Newfoundland played in winning the Second World War and concluded that the tenth province would help strengthen Canada's contribution to NATO. University of Toronto economist, B.S. Keirstead's Canada in World Affairs. September 1951 to October 1953 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 174-175 offered useful factual material on Canadian-American defense. In particular it shed some light on the Newfoundlander's attitude toward the leased bases agreement and toward the Americans in Newfoundland. Dale C. Thomson, University of Montreal political scientist, in Louis St. Laurent: Canadian (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967), touched upon the Newfoundland leased bases agreement problems, negotiations for the St. Lawrence Seaway, discussions regarding Arctic defense, and described St. Laurent's part in dealing with these issues. Historian Donald C. Masters, Canada in World Affairs, 1953-1955 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1951), furnished some information regarding the St. Lawrence Waterway also. The most definitive study, however, of the diplomatic and political maneuvering that preceded construction of the Seaway is William B. Willoughby, The St. Lawrence Waterway: A Study of Politics and Diplomacy (Madison: The University

of Wisconsin Press, 1961). Willoughby noted that when Congress finally passed the Seaway bill in 1954, it was due not only to the fact that national security demanded importation of iron ore from Labrador, but also that several legislators were adverse to seeing Canada build an all Canadian waterway.

James Eayrs, political economist at the University of Toronto, in Canada in World Affairs. October 1955 to June 1957 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), supplied some helpful material relating to the radar warning agreements, particularly the DEW Line. He also contributed evidence to demonstrate that some sectors of both Canadian and American public opinion questioned the soundness of strategy in building the radar lines, and that some Canadians feared an American occupation might threaten Canadian sovereignty. Michael Barkway argued, in "Canada's Changing Role in NATO Defense." International Journal. XIV (1959). 101-108, that as Canada became increasingly preoccupied with North American defense in the 1950's. she discovered that NATO did not save Canadians from an exclusive and unequal partnership with the United States. He reviewed the several schemes of aerial defense and concluded that the Canadian SAGE sector between Montreal and North Bay furnished protection primarily for strategic sites in the United States rather than for Canadian cities. Melvin Conant, in "Canada and Continental Defense: An American View," International Journal, XV (1960), 219-228, observed

that the Canadian-American military relationship was more nearly co-equal in terms of participation and control during the immediate post-war period. By the 1960's, however, Conant noted that developments in military technology and costs of defense were such that Canada could no longer play a meaningful role in continental defense.

Trevor Lloyd, in Canada in World Affairs, 1957-1959 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 25-63, supplied a factual background to Canadian defense policy in the late 1950's. His survey of the events surrounding the creation of NORAD were especially helpful. Canadian journalist, Peter Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), pp. 346-352, touched upon some of the controversies involved in the breakdown of Canadian-American defense relations between 1957 and 1963. He described, often in unsympathetic terms, the Diefenbaker government's policies involving the formation of NORAD, cancellation of the CF-105 Arrow, the establishment of Bomarc bases in Canada, and the defense debate and election of Prime Minister Pearson in 1963. Jon B. McLin, political scientist at the University of Alabama, in Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance (Baltimore: The John's Hopkins Press, 1967), examined the choice Canada faced of accepting a reduced role in continental defense, or of making the enlarged contribution that was required to retain the same influential role. Using published

material, McLin analyzed the Canadian commitments to NORAD and NATO which led to the problems faced by the Conservative government in the early 1960's. He described the events which finally led to Canadian acquisition of nuclear weapons. McLin also included a consideration of developments which led to a satisfactory program of defense production sharing between the United States and Canada. Another helpful source to this study was Carleton University political scientist, Peyton V. Lyon's, Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968). In his chapter. "Defense: To Be or Not to Be Nuclear?" pp. 76-222, Lyon reviewed the history of the nuclear dispute and concluded that as of 1967 there was no evidence to suggest that Canada's acceptance in 1963-1964 of nuclear arms under joint control significantly weakened its role in the United Nations or disarmament talks in Geneva. He contended, on the contrary, that it appeared to have strengthened Canada's diplomacy, for it helped to restore Canadian influence with the NATO allies and its reputation for common sense. Never in Canadian history, Lyon asserted, has there been such a heated argument to so little purpose.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

BRIEFING PAPER


Authority, Organization, Composition, and Functions of the U.S. Section, Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States (PJBD)

1. <u>Authority</u>

a. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States was established by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada in accordance with the Ogdensburg Agreement of 17 August 1940 for the purpose of carrying out studies relating to sea, land and air problems including personnel and material, and to consider, in the broad sense, the defense of the northern half of the Western Hemisphere.

b. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense is an advisory body and takes no executive actions. It does not have the authority to enforce decisions or to take implementing action on substantive matters.

c. High Policy Decisions of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, when approved, are promulgated in the United States by Executive Order of the President and in Canada by action of the Canadian Cabinet.



2. <u>Organization</u>

a. The PJBD is organized into two similar country sections which represent their respective governments.

b. The U.S. Section of the Board is a Presidential agency, and, through the Chairman, it shall report directly to the President.

c. The Chairman of the U.S. Section shall be appointed by the President, with the advice of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. The military members of the U.S. Section shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The State Department member shall be appointed by the Secretary of State.

d. Representatives of other U.S. Governmental agencies may attend the Board meetings at the request of the Chairman of the U.S. Section.

e. The frequency, date and place of the joint sessions of the Board shall be determined by the Board.

f. The present organizational chart of the PJBD is attached as Inclosure 1. (See Figure 1, p. 47.)

3. <u>Composition</u>

a. The membership of the United States Section shall consist of:

(1) A chairman, who will be appointed by, and report to, the President.

(2) Four members

(a) Three military members, one from each of the three services - Army, Navy and Air Force - who

shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense. They shall be officers of major general or equivalent flag rank and should be appointed for periods of time that will assure continuity of policy. One of the three military members will execute the functions of, and act as, Steering and Coordinating Member of the U.S. Military Representation. The military members are each authorized an assistant member. The assistant members shall be in the grade of colonel or captain, and they should be appointed for periods of time that assure continuity of policy. The assistant military members shall be designated by the respective military members and approved by the Chairman. While not a part of the formal organization of the Board, these assistant members will accompany the military members to Board meetings, and they will occupy a recognized position in its structure. The assistant members may represent the military members in their absence.

(b) One member from the Department of State, who shall be appointed by the Secretary of State. The State Department member shall be authorized an assistant. The assistant shall be appointed by the principal and approved by the Chairman. The assistant should be appointed for periods of time that will assure continuity of policy. He shall also act as Secretary to the United States Section.

b. The U.S. Section PJBD is authorized a military secretary. The military secretary shall be in the grade of lieutenant colonel and should be appointed for periods

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of time that assure continuity of policy. The military secretary shall be nominated to the Steering and Coordinating Member by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The military secretary will be full time duty and he will maintain a permanent central office of record for the U.S. Section of the PJBD.

c. The Chairman and members may call upon advisors to accompany them to Board meetings. The advisors may be military or civilian depending on the subject matter to be considered.

d. The membership of the PJBD shall function as a part time committee.

4. <u>Functions</u>

a. The Chairman

The Chairman, U.S. Section, PJBD, is a presidential appointee. In general, his duties consist of the following:

(1) Advise the President on matters pertaining to those Canada-United States defense problems which have been referred to the Board.

(2) Represent the United States Government at combined meetings of the Board.

(3) Determine the United States position on Canada-United States defense matters referred to the Board.

(4) Preside at meetings of the Board when meetings are in the United States.

(5) Conduct meetings of the United States Section of the Board, including the determination of the agenda and the frequency of the meetings.

b. The Steering and Coordinating Member

The Steering and Coordinating Member is a Secretary of Defense appointee. In general his duties consist of the following:

(1) Represent the United States Government in the absence of the Chairman.

(2) Obtain and coordinate the views of the appropriate organizations of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and military departments on matters of concern to the PJBD.

(3) Advise the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military departments, as appropriate, on matters of concern to the PJBD.

(4) Insure that appropriate organizations of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and military departments are advised of recommendations made by the PJBD which have been approved and result in commitments affecting the Department of Defense.

(5) Monitor the status of major actions resulting from United States commitments made through the PJBD that are of primary concern to the Department of Defense.

(6) Facilitate coordination between the U.S. Services on matters within the purview of the PJBD.

(7) Supervise the maintenance of a central office of record for the U.S. Section, PJBD.

c. The Military Members

The military members shall be Secretary of Defense appointees. In general their duties will consist of the following: (1) Represent their respective military departments on the U.S. Section, PJBD.

(2) As a combined body represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the PJBD.

(3) Obtain and coordinate their service positions on PJBD matters.

(4) Advise the Chairman on matters concerning their service which have been referred to the PJBD.

(5) Insure that appropriate organizations of their military departments are advised of recommendations made by the PJBD which have been approved and result in commitments affecting the Department of Defense.

(6) Monitor the status of major actions resulting from United States commitments made through the PJBD that are of a primary concern to their service.

d. The State Department Member

The State Department member shall:

(1) Advise and assist the Secretary of State in the development of positions for the Department of State on PJBD matters. Particular reference will be devoted to the political problems associated with the work of the PJBD.

(2) Obtain and coordinate the views of the Department of State on matters of concern to the PJBD.

(3) Advise the Chairman on matters concerning the Department of State which have been referred to the PJBD. (4) Insure that appropriate agencies of the Department of State are advised of recommendations made by the PJBD which have been approved and result in commitments affecting the Department of State.

(5) Monitor the status of major actions resulting from United States commitments made through the PJBD that are of a primary concern to the Department of State.

e. The Assistant members

(1) The Assistant State Department member shall:

(a) Advise and assist the State Department member as required.

(b) Serve as Secretary to the U.S. Section, PJBD.

(c) Maintain liaison with the Secretary, Canadian Section and Secretary, U.S. Military Representation.

(2) The Assistant military members shall:

(a) Advise and assist the military members as required.


f. The military secretary shall:

(1) Maintain a central office of record for the U.S. Section, PJBD.

(2) Work through proper channels to facilitate Canadian-United States liaison on matters within the PJBD.

(3) Facilitate coordination between the organizations of the Department of Defense.

(4) Advise the Chairman and members as to the status of matters of concern to the PJBD and make recommendations as to action required.



(5) Provide the necessary administrative support to the Chairman and members.

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
MEMBERS OF THE CANADA-UNITED STATES PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE, 1940-1963

CANADIAN SECTION

UNITED STATES SECTION

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UNITED STATES SECTION

UNITED STATES NAVY

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CANADIAN SECTION

UNITED STATES SECTION

UNITED STATES NAVY (AIR) Cont'd

Capt GW Anderson, JR.	R/ADM Marshall Greer	Capt Felix L Baker
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, Cont'd


Mr WH Barton (Member Jan 60-Sep 61 Mr F Tovell (Secretary) Jan 60-May 62 Mr LAD Stephens (Member) Sep 61-Apr 62 Mr AR Menzies (Member) Apr 62-Mr JS Nutt (Secretary) May 62-

UNITED STATES SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Cont. d

Mr Mr Mr Mr Mr Mr Mr Mr WD Hubbard (Secretary) Willis Armstrong JP Parker (Secretary) JL Nugent **RJ Barrett** W Willoughby (Member) H Burgess (Secretary) RG Miner (Member) (Member) (Member) (Secretary)Oct 63-Apr Jul Oct Apr 55-Jul 56-Apr 60-I **Oct** 63 0 8 0 0 8 0

sent to me from the Department of External Affairs. Permanent Joint Board on Defense. This list of members was taken from <u>A Brief History of the Canada-United States</u> Joint Board on Defense, 1940-1960, pp. 15 and 16; and from information and 16; and from information



APPENDIX C

EXCERPT, STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, PAUL MARTIN, TO THE SPECIAL PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE, JULY 25, 1963 10:30 a.m.

Canada-United States Defence

Canadian co-operation with the United States in the defence of North America has acquired added significance because of Canada's unique geographic position, placing on us a responsibility to help to protect the U.S. nuclear deterrent forces which are the final guarantor of the security of the Western Alliance. As the House has been informed, we are negotiating an agreement with the United States to make available nuclear warheads to make effective the weapons systems already acquired by the Canadian armed forces. The Department of External Affairs has primary responsibility for negotiating such an agreement, although naturally we rely for expert advice on the Department of National Defence. In the negotiation of defence agreements and where consultation on the implementation of agreements on policy questions arise, the normal diplomatic channels between the Department of External Affairs and the Embassy in Washington or between the Department and the U.S. Embassy here are available and are often heavily engaged in such matters.

In addition, the Department of External Affairs is represented on those intergovernmental bodies on defence which deal with more than the purely military aspects of defence questions. One such body is the Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence. In 1958 the United States and Canada agreed that the importance and complexity of interdependent defence relations made it essential to supplement existing channels for consultation and to provide for a periodic review at the Ministerial level. It was envisaged that this review would include not only military questions but also the political and economic aspects of joint defence problems. The Committee consists on the U.S. side of the Secretaries of State, Defence and the Treasury and, on the Canadian side, of the Ministers of External Affairs, National Defence and Finance. The last meeting of this Committee was held in 1960 but, as the Prime Minister and President Kennedy announced at Hyannis Port, a meeting will be held in the latter part of this year probably in October but the date has not been fixed.

Supplementing the Ministerial Committee is the Permanent Joint Board on Defence which has been in existence since the Ogdensburg Declaration of August 1940. The Board comprises both civilian and military representatives and thus permits open and frank presentation on a thrice yearly basis of the civilian and military viewpoints of both countries on current defence questions. The Board comprises a Canadian and a U.S. Section. The Chairman of

the Canadian Section is Mr. Dana L. Wilgress [Sic]. a distinguished Canadian public servant who, before he retired from the Department of External Affairs, was Canada's Permanent Representative to NATO. In addition, the Vice-Chiefs of Staff of the three services are members and there is also a member and secretary provided by the Department of External Affairs. For some years representatives of the Departments of Transport and Defence Production have attended Board meetings. Where it is desirable, each Section may have in attendance for particular meetings representatives of other government departments. Over its 23 years in existence, practically all of the important joint defence measures taken since 1940 were originally discussed in the Board and many of them resulted from the Board's recommendations. The Board is a wholly advisory body. and does not have the authority to enforce decisions or to take implementing action on substantive matters."

"The Department of External Affairs sent this excerpt to me in August, 1963.

APPENDIX D

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE, CANADA-UNITED STATES MEETINGS, DATES AND LOCATIONS 1940-1963

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This list was obtained from a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Gordon E. Jonas, USAF, Secretary, Office of the Military Members, United States Section, Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, the Pentagon, Washington 25, D.C., on July 9, 1963.

APPENDIX E

LEASED BASES AGREEMENT

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE -RECOMMENDATION OF MARCH 28-30, 1950

The board decided to make the following recommendation:

Taxation

(a) That there be included in the proposed revised United States-Canadian double taxation convention, on a reciprocal basis, the exemption from Canadian income taxation (on income derived from outside Canada) of:

(1) U.S. service personnel serving in Canada,

(2) U.S. civilians employed by the U.S. government in Canada,

(3) The wives and minor children of (1) and (2).

(b) That, by an exchange of diplomatic notes, the provisions of article XVII of the leased bases agreement conferring the exemptions described in (a) above be cancelled as of the date of the coming into force of the proposed revised double taxation convention in a form justifying such cancellation.

(c) That the exemption from Canadian income taxation, under article XVII of the leased bases agreement, of the following categories be discontinued by an exchange of notes:



(1) U.S. contractors, or contractors ordinarily resident in the United States, in respect of their profits arising from work at the leased bases,

(2) U.S. civilians employed by contractors at the leased bases,

(3) The wives and minor children of (2).

(d) That the foregoing be without prejudice to the remaining taxation exemptions conferred by article XVII of the agreement.

Customs and Excise Exemptions

(a) That the customs and excise exemptions accorded to contractor-owned equipment under the terms of article
 XIV (1) (a) of the leased bases agreement be suspended by an exchange of notes;

(b) That it be agreed by exchange of notes that article XIV (1) (d) does not accord customs and/or excise exemptions in personal belongings and household effects of contractors and their U.S. employees (after first arrival) or customs and/or excise exemption on purchases in Canada, outside the leased areas, by U.S. military or civilian personnel, or their families;

(c) That the U.S. authorities continue to exercise every precaution to prevent abuse of the customs and exise privileges enjoyed under the leased bases agreement.

Post Offices

That it be agreed by exchange of notes that the



U.S. military postal system in operation at the Newfoundland bases conform to the following stipulations:

(a) That they provide military postal services only for U.S. military agencies, U.S. military personnel, authorized U.S. civilians, and their dependents.

(b) That they dispatch mail only to the United States, its possessions and territories and its military postal installations,

(c) That geographical locations be not indicated by date stamp or cancellation stamp.

Jurisdiction

(a) That the government of the United States, through an exchange of diplomatic notes, agree to waive its rights of jurisdiction under the leased bases agreement over Canadian citizens, other British subjects, and alien civilians other than those subject to U.S. military law by reason of their accompanying or serving with the U.S. forces.

(b) (1) That the governments of the United States and of Canada, through an exchange of diplomatic notes, agree to suspend the exercise of their rights of jurisdiction under article IV of the leased bases agreement other than those waived by the U.S. government under (a) above, for a period of five years, and thereafter subject to six months' notification of termination, except that in the event of war or other emergency the suspension shall, on notification given by either government, cease to operate;



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(2) That the Canadian government, as a condition precedent to the waiver and suspension of the exercise of rights under article IV and to the extension to Newfoundland of an amended Visiting Forces (United States of America) Act, give satisfactory assurances that the U.S. officials in Newfoundland will have a degree of jurisdiction comparable to that which they now in fact exercise. In this connection, the U.S. section would regard the proposed letter from the government of Canada to the government of Newfoundland, with a reply from the Newfoundland government that jurisdictional conditions would remain substantially as now exercised, as the basis for satisfactory assurances to be given by the Canadian government.

(c) That the Canadian government undertake to seek legislation to protect U.S. interests in security offences as envisaged by article V of the leased bases agreement.

(d) That the Canadian government seek amendment to the Visiting Forces (United States of America) Act to provide for the compulsory attendance of witnesses required by U.S. service courts.

(e) That either government should be free to raise through appropriate channels the matter of any difficulties arising out of the working of the foregoing jurisdictional arrangements.*

*This recommendation was found in <u>Debates</u>, III (1951), 2601.

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