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7;? {EM}:
LITTLE EARS IN THE BIG WORLD

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TVRO IN TAIWAN

Jing-Erl Chen

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Telecommunication

1991

‘ r’~ i
_ c
‘ (
_ \i- v,
i

ABSTRACT

LITTLE EARS IN THE BIG WORLD
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TVRO IN TAIWAN

Global communications via satellite has taken hold of its
prosence today. It's application vary widely: from military intelligence,
to meteorological monitoring and to entertainment (i.e. DBS). These
applications (and many others) were initially afforded only by the
developed countries. But with technological progress leading to more
efficient and lower costs, satellite hardware, many deve10ping
countries were able to acquire this technology.

Taiwan is a case in point. Moreover, the Taiwanese case is quite a
unique one; H5 the sense that an external factor (the Japanese satellite
system) has created an impetus for Taiwan to consider having a D88
system to protect her TV industry and cultural sovereignty. The

\Japanese satellite system poses both a crisis as well as an opportunity
for the Taiwanese government and TV station--depending on how they
manage the situation.
E‘s This thesis traces the growth of TVROs in Taiwan which bore down
to poor quality TV programming, leading to poor viewerships which in
turn threatened the TV industry. With a significant Japanese
imperialistic influence in the past coupled with current availability of
Japanese programs (which is more populer), the cultural sovereignty
appears to be at stake. In the first instance, it seems that merely
improving the quality of TV programming would suffice. But upon
further deliberation having a DBS system is deemed necessary to
enhance the future prospect of the Taiwanese industry. E

The Taiwanese case thus reflects at least two critical issues: First,
technological advancement in satellite communication has made
hardware affordable to developing countries. Second, how cultural
sovereignty and a TV industry can be threatened by a more advanced

medium.

This thesis is dedicated to
my parents

C.C.H.

&
Y.H.L

iii.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special Thanks to Dr. Joseph Straubhaar and Dr. Charles Steinfleld

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES. . o ............ o .............. o ............ vii
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................... viii
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1
REFERENCES .......................................... 6
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ................................... 7
The Development of Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS). 7
General Background About Taiwan ..................... 15
The Development of Taiwan's Television Industry ..... 17
Cultural Imperialism ................................ 23
REFERENCES .......................................... 28
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ”LITTLE EARS” IN TAIWAN ........ .. 31
Current Television Media Aspects in Taiwan .......... 31
Factors Influencing the Growth of ”Little Bars”
in Taiwan...... ........... COCO-.0... OOOOOOOOOO O... 35
—-P°1itical Refor. ............ o. ..... cocoooooooooo 36
—_Econo.ic Growth 0 O O O O O O O ...... O O O O C O O O C O O C O O C O O O O 37
--The Past and Present Social and Cultural
Affiliation with Japanese ..................... 38
--Programming ..................................... 39
REFERENCES OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO C OOOOOOOOOOO C C C O O O C 43

Economic Impact on the Existing Television Industry. 46
Concerns Over Cultural Sovereignty.................. 48
Challenge to the Existing Media Regulation .......... 49

REFERENCE.’ OOOOOOOOOOOOO 0.... OOOOOOOOOO O ..... 0.0... 52

THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE TELEVISION ENTERPRISE

IN TAIWAN ................................. .. .....

To Develop Cable Television System .................

To Improve Television Programming ....... ...........
REFERENCES .........................................

VI. CONCLUSION.... ......... . ...........................
Summary and Conclusion .............................

The Prospects for Future Research.... ..............
Implication ........................................
REFERENCES .........................................
TABLES OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO O...
FIGURES .................................................

vi

53

53
57
60

66

67

67
7O
71

73

74
91

LIST OF TABLES

1. Statistic for Hardware................... ........... 74
2. Composition of TTV Programs (1962-1969)............. 75
3. The Data Compares the Penetration of Video Media

in Taiwan (January 1989) ..... .... ....... .......... 76
4. Viewing Habits of VCR Household by Day-part.... ..... 77

5. The Degree of the Audience’s Satisfaction with the
TV Programs (1984)................................ 78
6. The Degree of the Audience's Satisfaction with the
TV Programs (1989)............. ......... .......... 79
7. Survey of the Demand for ”Little Bars” in Taipei
Hetropolitan...................................... 80
(A) The Percentage of Household with ”Little Ears”.. 80
(B) The Possibility of Non-owner to install ”Little Ear”
in the Future.......................... ....... 81
(C) The Motive for Purchasing ”Little Ears”......... 82
(D) The Content Preferences of "Little Ears”
Programs.... ...... ............................ 83
8. The Public's Opinion About 'Japanization' of Young
People in Taiwan.................................. 84
9. Normal Weekday Program Schedules of TTV. CTV
and CTS........................................... 85
10. The Taiwanese Preference of the 1988 TV Broadcasting
Olympic Game Between Domestic TV Station and NHK.. 86
11. Weekly Average Time and Percentages Devoted to
Program Types Among TTV. CTV and CTS in 1987...... 87
12. Weekly Average Time and Percentages Devoted to
Program Types on NHK-ll and NHK-lS.......... ..... . 88
13. Normal Weekday Program Schedules of NHK-ll and

14. The Preferences of Viewing Times for ”Little Ears'.. 90

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

A Direct Broadcasting Satellite System (DBS) ........ 91
Average Annual Growth in Taiwan (%)

(A) Gross National Product....... .......... ......... 92
(B) Per Capita GNP.................................. 93
Improvement in Standard of Living in Taiwan

(A) Changes in Level of Consunption................. 94

(B) Consumption Pattern (%)................... ..... . 95

viii

I. INTRODUCTION

A Taiwan is an island-country in the Pacific Ocean located 120 miles
off the South-east coast of mainland China. This tropical island is
leaf-shaped stretching 365 kilometers from north to south and varies
between 100 to 145 from east to west. Although the land area is
3,600 square kilometers, 70% are rugged mountains making land a
scarce resource for economic developments and housing a growing
population. m 4 I

As of July 1989, Taiwan has a population of about 20 million with a
density of 550 per square kilometer. Of this 20 million, less than 5%
are Taiwanese natives and the rest are predominantly Chinese who
have contributed significantly to the economic growth and
development of Taiwan.

)5 The economy of Taiwan has been having a growth rate of about 9%

in Gross National Product (GNP) over the past 3 decades. During
these decades Taiwan has progressed from light and labour intensive
industries to heavy industries. Currently. the economy is geared
towards high-technology—base industries. A

5 5 Accompanying this industrial progress is affluence. The per capita
income of a Taiwanese has increased dramatically. For instance, in
1970 it was only about US $360. In 1985. it has increased to US
$3,142 and by 1989 it almost reached US $6,715. This rise in
affluence has increased the standard of living and more importantly.
demand for leisure and recreation. 4;

But in a land scarce island. space for recreation is fairly limited;
prime land for recreation are also prized land for economic
development and housing. Naturally, the population turned to public
broadcasting. In particular, the television.

The first TV program was aired in February 1962. By 1970. there
were three TV Stations. All of which are owned by various branches of
the government. They are :

(1) TM Television Entegprise, Ltg. ('I’I‘V)
'ITV was inaugurated on April 28. 1962. In 1987 the weekly

E

average telecast time was 80 hours 45 minutes.

1

2

(2) WW (CTV)
CTV was inaugurated on September 3, 1968. In 1987 the

weekly average telecast time was 8 1 hours 22 minutes.

(3) thneee Televteien Serviee (CTS)

CTS was inaugurated on October 31, 1971. In 1987 the weekly
average telecast time was 1 1 1 hours 49 minutes.

Prior to 1970. the TV industry in Taiwan although important
maintained a relatively low profile. The primary role then was to
deliver information and educational programs island-wide.
Entertainment was secondaryE/‘l‘hm was because the standard of living
was comparatively lower and there was little demand for mass-media
entertainment. However, after 1970 with growing affluence, the TV
industry took a turning point. There has been a growing demand for
quality entertainment programs.

Furthermore. with the introduction of the video cassette recorder
(379331131980, the industry face another competitor, i.e. pro-recorded
EQEQJBPCS° Currently. 70% of . the population own VCRs. Before
l984.---there ,was neither cable TV system or satellite transmitted
programs. produced domestically. The only sources of TV programs
are from the three TV stations or pre-recorded video tapes.

)As the VCR industry approaches the maturity stage of the product
cygle and competition seems to level off. the TV industry is
confronted with a "foreign competitor" forcing Taiwan to further
develop the TV industry and stay competitive. Lin .1984, Japan
launched the BS-2a—-the world's ,1 first Direct. Broadcast Satellite (DBS).
service receivable nationally.

VDBS is one of the most modern and advance technology for
transmitting broadcasting signals directly to individual television
households. Because the footprint from BS-Za covers the island of
Taiwan and the geography of Taiwan does not create any signal
reception problems, the people can receive the signals simply by
installing small satellite dishes. They call these funny looking dishes
that can bring alternative television programs transmitted through
Ku-band satellite frequencies "Little Ears" which resembles the "Big
Ears"--those big satellite dishes that receive C-band satellite signals.

3

But in 1984. because Taiwan was still under Martial Law it was
illegal for the public to set up "Little Ears" at home However, in 1987
the government in Taiwan has ended her forty-year Martial Law on the
island which henceforth, lifted the restriction on the establishment of
political organizations and new print media. Communicauon__channels
3111M: counterpart. People's Republic of China (PROC)1, are opened
up as well. In this climate of political reform and a healthy average

ual economic growth of 9% in recent years.2 people in Taiwan are
searching for a more diverse and richer media environment for their
leisure and recreation. This they found through "Little Ears".

Thus, it comes not as a surprise that within two months ever since
"Little Ears" are legalized, more than 100,000 units have been
lnstalledonlroof—topaall over Taiwan. E'The development of these
"Little Ears" in Taiwan. as in any new technological introductions, have
significant impacts on the Taiwanese society and the broadcasting
industry : the three TV stations have lost a significant fraction of their
viewers while the government is confronted by the so-called "DBS
spillover" problem. J

Naturally, several issues are worth to deliberate; the first one is:

"What factors influenced the growth of Little Bars in Taiwan? " The
factors that could have influenced the growth of "Little Ears" are
related to Taiwan's growing affluence which gives access to DB8
technology and dissatification with the current program standards.
Her past afl‘iliation with Japan recent political reformations do seem to
be contributing factors as well.
1;," Next, "What problems will be brought to Taiwan by the spillover
form Japan's DBS service? " this growth appears to threaten the
economics of the TV industry. There is also considerable concern
over the cultural sovereignity and whether the governing requlations
deserve certain changes to accomodate a new medium. And finally
from above "What are the prospects for the future development of TV
enterprise in Taiwan? " will be addressed.

The methodology of this research paper is qualitatively analytical.
The paper examines the existing empirical and research data
collected by various market research companies and some academic

Ii

4

literatures. Discussions are based on evaluating what has happened
and thence, predict what may happen in both positive and normative
approaches.

Since this paper concerns the development of Television Received
Only (TVRO) in Taiwan and with the fact that Direct Broadcast
Satellite (DBS) is a relatively new technology gaining consumer
acceptance only recently, together with Taiwan just gaining the
attention of alert international business conglomerates. a literature
review of DB8 and some information about Taiwan has to be in order.
Hence”? the author will begin this paper with a brief but yet concise
literatrire review of the development. of DBS. spanning from Arthur C.
Clarke's idea to present day satellite communications; general
background about Taiwan and the development of TV industry in the
past 26 years together with Taiwan's imperialistic cultural affiliation
with Japan will serve as the backdrops leading to the present day
situation.

Next, the author will trace the development of "Little Ears" in
TaIWan beginning with the current TV media aspects in Taiwan and
the factors influencing the growth of "Little Ears" : The political
reform, economic growth, the past and present social and cultural
affiliation with Japan, and the programming -constraintsfaced, by
Taiwanese TV stations. E} f .

Having "Little Ears" taken root in the households. the author then
discuss the impacts they have had in Taiwan. namely. the economic
impact on the existing TV industry, the threat to cultural sovereignty
and challenges confronting the present media regulations: With these
impacts in mind. the author next provides constructive! suggestions
that the Taiwanese TV industry can adopt in determining its future
prospects.\/(l‘hree distinct suggestions are specified although a
combination is not impossible : Establishing a set of DBS policy,
developing cable TV system(S) and improving TV programming?)

E. Finally. the author concludes that the reception by "Little Ears" via
the Japanese BS-2a is not a crisis unless the“ Taiwanese authority
continues with the current policy of "no policy".E Instead, the author

1
t
I

viewed these "crises" as challenges such that if they are well managed,

5

will launch Taiwan into a new era in Telecommunication.

REFERENCES
Chapter I

1. For example. people in Taiwan are now free to visit their
relatives in the Mainland China and Mainland Chinese who are not
members of the Communist Party are able to visit the island for
attending international conferences and activities. See United
Monthly, no. 73, August 1989, p. 25-29. For the history of modern
China and the historical relationship between Taiwan, Republic of
China (ROC). and PROC. see Colin Bown. mm
19114942. London, Heinemann Educational Books, 1974, and chiu

Hungdah. ed.. W. New York. Praeger. 1979.
2. The Free China Journal, 2 November 1989, p. 7.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Even with U.S., renowned for her advanced technology, Television
Receive Only Antennas (TVRO) are still new in the telecommunication
industry with only limited scholarly research on this subject. Since
this paper focusses on " The development of 'IVRO in Taiwan". the
relative literature will be summarized in five areas:

/ (1) Literature on the development of DES and TVRO in general.
1 (2) Literature on the General Background about Taiwan
E (3) Literature on the development of Taiwan's TV industry.
: (4) Literature on "culture imperialism"

E

(1) THE DEVELOPBIENT OF DIRECT BROADCAST
flTELLITE IN QENERAL

The Development of Satellite Communication Systems

"SPACE IS UPON US--THE AGE OF SPACE." David O. Woodbury
wrote in 1958. Making up words and getting pe0ple to use them is
harder than many people believe. Vastly more prescient than David O.
Woodbury was Arthur C. Clarke, the famous English science-fiction
writer.l In 1945. Arthur C. Clarke wrote in W. a proposal
for a global communications system utilizing manned space stations
orbiting the earth at the same rate as the earth's rotation:

"An 'artifictal satellite' at the correct distance from the Earth
would make one revolution every 24 hours. ie it would remain
stationary above the same spot and would be within optical range of
nearly half the Earth's surface. Three repeater stations. 120 degrees
apart in the correct orbit. could give television and microwave
coverage to the entire planet" .2

Clarke's proposal was prompted in part by the inability of television
signals to pass through the ground or bend around the earth. TV
stations perched their transmitting antennas on towers, mountains.

8

and skyscrapers in order to increase their broadcast area. but even
with such a boost their range seldom exceed fifty miles. One way to
overcome this limitation. Clarke wrote. would be to place TV antennas
in space. A satellite circling the earth a hundred miles above the
ground-~the lowest feasible orbit-~would have an enormous broadcast
range.

Once in orbit at this altitude, however. a satellite would take only
ninety minutes to circle the globe and that would greatly limit its
usefulness as a transmitting station. Television shows would fade in
and out as the satellite zoomed past and viewers would have to adjust
their receiving antennas constantly in order to keep them trained on
the drifting signal. Clarke pointed out that at a much higher
altitude—-22,300 miles--a satellite's orbital period would be
twenty-four hours, which is of course the same time that it takes the
earth to turn on its axis. A satellite orbiting at this height directly
above the equator would seem to hang motionless in the sky. Its signal
could be received with a fixed antenna.

Satellites in this 22.300-mile orbit (now called the Clarke Belt) are
often referred to as geosynchronous or geostationary. Clarke
suggested launching three of them such that they would be evenly
spaced above the equator. By using them to relay signals between
stations on the ground, he wrote. it would be possible to send
information almost instantaneously from almost anywhere to almost
anywhere else.3

In 1955. J. R. Pierce. the Scientific Director of the US Bell
Laboratories, expanded upon Clarke's theories. In particular. he
defined the parameters for the utilization of space satellite for
communications.4

The first communications satellites. launched more than a decade
later. were anything but geosynchronous. Echo, built by Bell
Telephone Laboratories and launched by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) into a low orbit in 1960. was just a big
metallic balloon that served as a mirror-off in which radio signals
could be bounced.

Telstar carried the world's first intercontinental television

9

broadcast--a shot of an American flag waving over the AT&T earth
station in Andover. Maine.5 This launched an explosion of activity that
molded what we now know as the "Information Age". D[fistar was an
active satellite because it contained a device called a "transponder" to
resell/e. 91281.99,an retransmit signals to earth. Although cosmic
radiation destroyed Telstar's electronics only 226 days after launching,
it paved the way for the whirlwind advance of domestic and
international satellite communications.6

During the 1970's important experiments were underway that
would provide information necessary for the development of an
advance and successful commercial satellite communication system.
One such experiment was the Communications Technology Satellite
(CTS) Program. which was a joint U.S.-Canadian venture. It utilized
the Canadian Anik series of vehicles. which were sent messages from
earth to be retransmitted to 36 remote receiving stations. This
ATS-65 satellite was used in experiments in both India and the Rocky
Mountains. These proved that a spot beam from outer space covering
170,000 square miles could be received using only $2.000 worth of
electronics. At least twenty of these powerful beams would have been
needed to service all of the continental United States.7

Today. the experiments and the ensuing progress continue. More
powerful and sophisticated satellites for broadcasting and for other
special uses are constantly being developed as the basic technology is
improved.

Direct Broadcasting System (DDS)

A communication satellite system is basically an electronic
communication package placed in orbit around the earth. It can take
on several different forms:

1. An uplink from a ground-based earth station to satellite. and a
downhnk from satellite back to ground.

2. A satellite -FF'OSSHDIS. between two satellite prior to a downltnk
transmission.

3. A satellite relay system involving earth stations, near-earth users.

 

1 0
(aircraft. ships. etc.) and satellite.8

The prime objective of the satellite is to aid communication
transmission from one point on or near Earth to another. In modern
systems this information most often corresponds to voice (telephone).
video (television). and digital data.9 Satellites used for video
transmission direct to receivers are referred to as Direct Broadcast

Satellite (DBS).

D35 is a special type of satellite communication system distributing
television signals by transmitting them directly from awh‘d‘ownlink
$95139 -19....the. home 313L§PR9£¥48111§692S=99L£791,913,?waxes. Basically
the system consists of a television repeater station in geostationary
orbit. a ground station (earth station) that transmits program signals
to the spacecraft. which is then received by the consumer terminals
that subsequently convert the signals to a format compatible with
existing television sets. (Figure 1 )10

These system components are derived from existing equipment
used for satellite distribution of television signals to homes. hotels.
cable systems. and network stations. The DBS systems in addition to
television. provides high-fidelity audio. teletext and other services as

well.

 

Frequency Bands

Satellite communications employ electromagnetic waves to carry
information between ground and space. The frequency of an
electromagnetic wave is the rate of reversal of its polarity in cycles per
second (now defined to be units of Hertz). Alternating current in a
copper wire also has this frequency property, and if the frequency is
sufficiently high. the wire will become an antenna radiating
electromagnetic energy at the same frequency.

A particular range of frequencies is called a frequency band. while
the full extent of all frequencies from zero to infinity is called the
spectrum. In particular. the radio frequency (RF) part of the
electromagnetic spectrum permits the efficient generation of signal

11

power. radiation into free space and reception at a distant point. The
most useful RF frequencies lie in the microwave bands (between
approximately 300 MHz and 300.000 MHz) although lower
frequencies (longer wavelengths) are attractive for certain
applications.

An RF signal on one frequency is called a carrier and the actual
information that it carries (voice. video. or data) is called modulation.
A carrier with modulation occupies a certain amount of RF bandwidth
within the frequency band of interest. If two carriers are either on the
same frequency or have overlapping bandwidths. then radio frequency
interference (RFI) may occur. To the user, RFI can look or sound like
background noise (which is neither intelligible nor particularly
distressful). or it could produce an annoying effect like herringbone
patterns on a 1" monitor. When the interfering carrier is comparable
in power level to the desired (wanted) carrier. the interference effect
would be classed as harmful. a condition similar to the radio jamming
encountered in the shortwave broadcast band.

A typical satellite band is divided into separate halves. one for
ground to space links (the uplink) and one for space to ground links
(the downlink). This separation is reflected in the design of the
satellite microwave repeater to minimize the chance of downlink
signals being re-received and thereby jamming the operation of the
satellite, but considerable care must be exercised in assigning
frequencies, since links can run in any direction between microwave
relay towers. 1 1

C-Band

The frequency band which is known as C-band was the first part of
the microwave spectrum to be used extensively for commercial
satellite commuication. Another common designation is 6/4 GHz
which identifies the nominal center of the uplink frequency band
(5.925 to 6.425 GHz) followed after the slash mark (I) is the nominal
center of the downlink frequency band (3.700 to 4.200 GHz). The
uplink-downlink convention is not an industry standard and others
have reversed the order to express the numbers in ascending order.

12

In the early years (1965 to 1970), C-band microwave hardware was
obtainable from other applications such as terrestrial microwave.
tropospheric scatter communication systems (which use high pciw'er
microwave beams to achieve over-the-horizon links) and radar. No
breakthrough in contemporary technology was necessary to take
advantage of the technical features of C-band.

C-band had. at the outset, a principal adventage over bands which
are either higher of lower in frequency. Hence. it represents an
optimum requiring less signal level to provide good quality
communications. Equipment technologi and availability were factors
in the favor of C-band. To this day. C-band remains the dominant
frequency band for commercial satellite communication, even as
higher bands (i.e., Ku) come into greater use. This is because the
equipment has been made very inexpensive (relatively speaking)
because of competition and high-volume production.

Kit-Band

The frequency band that has done more to interest new users of
satellite communication is Ku-band; it is a part of the spectrum lying
just above 10 GHz. Portions of Ku-band that are not shared with
terrestrial radio has some advantage over C-band. particularly for
direct services using earth stations with small diameter antennas. The
precise uplink and downlink frequency ranges allocated by the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) vary to some degree
with the region of the world.

There are effectively three sections of Ku-band which have been
allocated to different services on an international or domestic basis.
The most prevalent is the Fixed Satellite Service (FSS). which is the
service intended for one or two way communication between fixed
points on the ground. All of the C-band frequencies and the bulk of
Ku-band are allocated to the FSS for wide application in international
and domestic communication. However. the sharing of these
frequencies with terrestrial radio services is mandated by ITU
regulations. Consequently part of Ku-band is subject to the same
co-ordination and siting difficulties as C-band.

13

A portion of the Ku allocation for FSS which is not shared with
terrestrial services is refered to as 14/ 12 GHz (uplink range is 14.00
to 14.50 GHz and downlink range is 11.70 to 12.20 GHz). The
availability of 14/ 12 GHz is limited to Region 2 which is composed of
North and South America and can only be used for domestic
communication services. North America. in particular. has seen wide
introduction of 14/ 12 GHz while no such satellite are currently
serving South America. Power levels from these satellite are not
subject to the same restrictions as at C-band. although there is an
upper limit to minimize interference between satellites.

Ku-band satellite operations in the rest of the world (i.e., Regions 1
and 3) are restricted to the 14/11 GHz shared allocation. In some
instances. a Region 1 (Europe and Africa) or Region 3 (Asia) country
can make 14/11 GHz appear like 14/ 12 GHz simply by precluding
domestic terrestrial services from the band. However. terrestrial
radio services in adjacent countries are not under their countrol and
therefore. intemational coordination must still be dealt with in border
areas.

A third segment of Ku-band. referred to as 18/ 12 GHz. is allocated
strictly to the Broadcasting Satellite Service (BSS). As with the 14/ 12
FSS band in Region 2. the BSS band is not shared with terrestrial
servcies. Its intended purpose is to allow television and other
direct-to-home transmissions from the satellite. There are two
regulatory features of this band which make direct broadcasting to
small antennas feasible. The first is that. without sharing. the satellite
power level can be set at the highest possible level. Adjacent satellite
interference could be a problem in a common coverage area. but this
is precluded by the second feature: BSS satellites are to be spaced a
comfortable nine degrees apart. In comparison. while there is no
mandated separation between FSS satellite. a two-degree spacing has
become the standard in the crowded North American orbital arc.

The operational advantages of 14/ 12 and 18/12 GHz lie with the
simplicity of locating earth station sites (without regard to terrestrial
radio stations) and the higher satellite downlink power levels
permitted. The latter results in smaller ground antenna diameters

14

than C-band.13 So, besides the differences in power outputs between
C-band and Ku-band. passbands and transmitting wavelengths are
totally dissimilar. so are the radiators that deliver electromagnetic
energy either across the earth's surface or beyond the
stratosphere/ionosphere to the Clarke Belt which is 22,300 miles
above our planet.

Activity will continue. obviously. in the C-band to a large extent for
some time to come but the Ku-band has become a major attraction due
to the three times higher frequency transmit and receive lengths. less
expensive equipment and much-smaller-diameter radiators.14

TVRO
In recent years satellite antennas or "dishes" have become a

common sight. They are the "eyes" of the communication system that
now allow more than one hundred and twenty video channels to be
received by a television set anywhere on a continental land mass.
ese are part of the same revolutionary technology which makes it
possible for national and even global computer networks to exchange
information or for a small radio station to broadcast worldwide.

These earth receiving stations are the first highly visible sign that
many consumers have of the changes ahead. In the short life of the
satellite communication industry. costs of "earthstations" have ”been
gramatically, reduced. Less than 20 years ago purchasing a satellite
3 receivin station could require in excess of a million dollars. Now

l these "earth stations" are so inexpensive and simplified that even a
E competent "do-it-yourself' can receive signals in his backyard from
dozens of satellites orbiting more than 22,000 miles away in space.15

There are two types of Earth Station--tho that receive only and
those that can both receive and transmit. ceive-only stations are
used principally for the reception of television signals emitted by
satellites. They are usually known as Television Receive-Only (TVRO)
Stations. They are also used for receiving data and other forms of
information that can be displayed visually or in printed form. For
two-way links between users, such as telephony. video-conferencing
and computer tie-ups. the stations at each end of the links are

15

provided with both transmission and reception facilities. 16

TVRO stations detect the very weak signal received from space and
extract the original message much like uplinks working in reverse. \/A
TVRO must be of adequate size and quality to capture and sufficiently
concentrate the faint signal from a distant satellite and it must also be
accurately aimed toward these spacecraft so that other messages and
noise from unwanted terrestrial and satellite sources are barely
detected.l7

Arthur Clarke's idea of a satellite was materialized after fifteen years
through the launching of Echo k/ Ever since. the development of
satellite communication systems have been rapid. Developing in pace
with satellite communication system is DBS which makes use of
similar technology of satellite communication. More significant is the
fact the the DBS hardware (TVRO) are made affordable to

consumers--even in developing countries such as Taiwan.

(21W

1. The Land

Taiwan. a leaf -shaped island straddling the Tropic of Cancer is
about 200 kilometer (120 miles) off the eastern shores of the China
mainland. Strategically located in the East China Sea. midway between
Japan and Korea to the north and Hong Kong and the Philippines to
the south. with a land area of 36,000 square kilometers (13,900
square miles), Taiwan is about the size of Netherlands in Europe.

About two-thirds of the island is covered with lushly forested
mountains. Since most of the island is covered by mountains and hills.
there is little flat land for economic pruposes. Most of the flatlands is
along the west coast: a few limited flatlands exist along the east coast.
More than 80 percent of Taiwan's population. cities. farms and
industries are located in these flatlands.18

2. The People

16

The population of Taiwan stood at 20.0 million people in 1989.
Population growth has been at a rate of about 1% a year over the past 5
. years. The population density was 550 per square kilometer in 1989. ..
This gives Taiwan the second highest population density in the world.
‘Due to Taiwan's geography. more than 80 percent of the population is
distributed along the west coast. The Taipei area. which includes
Taipei municipality and Taipei county in the northern part of Taiwan.
has 5.3 million people and is the highest concentration of people. The
majority of Taiwan's Chinese populace traces there ancestry back to
Fukien province in mainland China.19

3. The History

Taiwan has a long and colorful history. First mentioned in Han
Dynasty chronicles over 2,000 years ago. Taiwan was later claimed in
the name of the Emperor of China by the seafaring eunuch and
magistrate Cheng H0 in 1430. During the 17th century. when the
Manchus invaded China and toppled the Ming Dynasty. Taiwan became
an island of refuge for patriotic Ming loyalists. led by the great Ming
hero Koxinga, who ousted the Dutch from their colonial settlement in
southern Taiwan and established the island's first Chinese
government. Koxinga's heirs resisted Manchu rule for half a century.
before the island was finally incorporated as a prefecture of the
Chinese empire in 1684. In fact. Peking never manage to establish
efiecfive control over the feisty. prosperous island.

In 1895. Taiwan was ceded to Japan as booty in the wake of the
Sino-Japanese War. For 50 years it remained under the yoke of
colonial Japanese rule. until the end of World War II. when Taiwan was
restored to Nationalist Chinese control in 1945. In 1949. when the
communists gained control over the Chinesex‘mainland. President
Chiang Kai-Shek led his divisions across the Taiwan Straits,
establishing the provisional capital of the Republic of China in Taipei.20 E

4. The Economy
Over the past three decades. Taiwan has changed from an
agricultural to an industrialized economy. Foreign investment, mostly

17

from overseas Chinese, the United States. Japan. and Western Europe,
helped introduce modern, labor-intensive technology to the island in
the 1960's. but now the emphasis is changing from production of
"light industry consumer goods for export to more sophisticated
capital and technology-intensive products.

( Today, Taiwan ranks among the top twelve trading countries in the
world and is America's fifth largest trading partner. Japan is her
largest supplier of imports and the second largest export market. It
ranks as the second wealthiest nation in all of Asia and enjoys one of
the highest living standards in the entire Far East.21

(3) 151; 0 Milo 'uLil 0' .. _: u in...

The Historical Development

Proposals for the establishment of television stations in the
Republic of China were first heard as early as 1947. But it was not
until May 6, 1957 that the first demonstration of television
broadcasting was held in Taipei. It took another four years before the
first television station was born. The pioneer in this new field was the
experimental National Education Television Station. which went on
the air on February 14. 1962.

As of the end of 1975 there were three commercial television
networks in the Republic of China. These are the Taiwan Television
Enterprise (T‘I'V) which inaugurated on October 10, 1962, China
Television Company (CTV) which went on the air on October 31,
1969, and the Chinese Television Service (CTS) which became
operational on October 31, 1971, when it took over the National
Education Television.

TI‘V is a joint venture of the Taiwan Provincial Government and
private Chinese and Japanese interests. China TV is owned by the
ruling Komintang. private radio stations and other private investors.
CTS stocks are owned by the Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of
Education and private investors. iAlthough the government and the
ruling party are major owners of the these networks, they are run
purely as commercial enterprises.

18

In reviewing the development of the television enterprise in
Taiwan, the following features need to be discerned:

Establishment of the Experimental Station
The National Education Television Experimental Station started

operation on February 14, 1962 when the Fourth National Education
Conference was being held in Taipei. The development may be
divided into two stages. The first stage covered the period from
February 14, 1962 to November 30, 1963. During this stage, pure
teaching programs accounted for only 30 percent of the air time while
the remaining 70 percent of the slots were devoted to
semi-entertainment programs. .5 The allocation of air time was
designed for a dual purpose: to experiment with television teaching on
the one hand and to cultivate public interest in TV on the other3 The
second stage began on December 1. 1963 after its experimental
period was over. From then on the air time was equally divided
between teaching programs and social education programs. They later
included language instruction, newscast, publicity of government

‘ wmeasures and public service.

~31" An important feature in the growth of Taiwan’s television

. ,5}. 1‘;
, .

enterprise is the gradual shift from international cooperation to
self-reliance. 7 The television enterprise in this country had to rely
heavily on the import of technology and know-how when it took its
first fumbling steps. Once the initial obstacles were overcome the
enterprise was able to make steady progress nationally.

In fact. the television enterprise in Taiwan stressed self-reliance
right from the beginngj For example, the original transmitter for the
National Education TV Sfation was manufactured by the professors and
students of the Institute of Electronics of National Chiaotung
University, while the station itself was jointly designed by the Institute
and the private 'IV Engineering Workshop. The transmitter had a
power output of 100 watts. In December 1963 the station acquired a
1 GOO-watt transmitter manufactured by the same Institute. It was not
until 1964 that the station procured a 2000-watt transmitter from the

United States.

19

This acquisition simply reflects the fact that the electronics
industry and relevant technology in Taiwan were still in the infant
stage when the island’s first television station went on the air and
although the young television enterprise desires self reliance (more
will be discussed later), there is a still a need to seek foreign
assistance.22 1

Inauguration of the Taiwan Television Enterprise

The Taiwan Provincial Government was the prime mover behind
the first commercial television network. 'ITV, in the country. A
preparatory committee was formed under the provincial
administration in February 1962. The committee decided the
following principles regarding the establishment of the yet-to-be-bom
television station:

'1.) Foreign investment should not exceed 49 percent of the total
capitalization, with the rest to come from domestic sources.

2.1?Foreign cooperation would be sought for the establishment of
plants to assemble receiving sets.

"3. The Taiwanese side would retain full control of program policy.

,4. Prospective foreign partners would be approached for technical
assistance and personnel training.

:5. The new company would be run as private business enterprise.

At its later meeting, the committee decided to seek foreign
cooperation in Japan Europe and the United States. Finally, after one
year's negotiation an agreement was reached with Fuji TV Company,
Hitachi. NEC and Tokyo Shibaura (Toshiba) of Japan} An agreement
was formally signed in Taipei and Tokyo in February 1962. Under the
agreement, the Taiwanese side would own 60 percent of the shares
and the four Japanese companies were to subscribe to the remaining
40 percent of the shares. Of the 60% Taiwanese investment, 49
percent would be put up by the Taiwan Provincial Government while
the remaining 1 1 percent were underwritten by private investors.

TTV was officially inaugurated on April 28, 1962. On October 3,
1962, 'ITV started a week-long trial run with two hours of telecasting
a day. On Oct. 10, the National Day of the Republic of China, 'I’I‘V

20

formally went on the air. The first commercial television station in
the country was thus born.

1 [Seven years after its inauguration, TI'V was rated as the top TV
station in the South-East Asia in terms of engineering, programming,
and experience of the working personnel even though it still had to
rely on imported transmitters and cameras.23

Inauguration of the China Television Company

Six years after the establishment of TTV, the Republic of China
acquired its second commercial network. the China Television

VZompany (CTV). The CTV came into being on September 3, 1968.
arlier there had been scores of applicgits seeking government
approval for a new commercial network. “The late president Chiang
Kai-Shek directed all the applicants including private radio stations
and private interests to pull their resources in organizing a new
television company with the BCC as the senior partner. After
negotiations, it was agreed that the BCC would put up 50 percent of
the capital. the private radio stations 28 percent, and the remaining
22 percent were to be raised by other applicants.

A preparatory committee was formed on October 17 , 1967. Eleven
months later, China TV was formally inaugurated on September 3,
1968. China TV‘s goal was to have an island wide broadcasting
network ready before it started operation. The company also decided
to introduce color telecasting and satellite relay. Consequently, the
company began soliciting capital and purchasing equipments in Japan.
Europe and the United. States.

China TV's relay stations in central and southern Taiwan were
completed in Feb. 1970. and its island wide hookup was thus
completed. A two way microwave transmission system comprising 9
microwave stations guaranteed stability of signals. The new five-studio
building was completed in Sep. 1970. By 1971, the new studios were
put to use one by one. All the facilities were manned by China TV's
own staff personnel. It is the second commercial network in Taiwan
established entirely with Taiwanese resources.24

21

Inauguration of the Chinese Television Service
V In December 1968. the Ministry of National Defense and the
Ministry of Education agreed to expand the National Education TV
Station so as to make adult education available to more servicemen and
the general public. In September 1970, the following principles were
agreed concerning the projected television station.

1. The new network was to be built by the two ministries on the
basis of the National Education TV Station to promote Chinese culture
and adult education for both servicemen and civilians. It was to be
operated as a business enterprise.

2. The network would be telecast in color.

. 3.}1‘he capital will be raised by the Ministry of National Defense and
the Ministry of Education will contribute the facilities of the National

Education TV Station as its share of investment.

The preparatory committee was officially inaugurated in August
1970. Following the advice of ’I'I‘V, China TV, as well as local TV
engineers, the new network decided to procure facilities from RCA
and Amplex in the United States and from NEC in Japan. Delivery “of
the equipment and facilities began in April. The station “was ready for
operation. A test run of the facilities was successfully conducted on
October 10 and the network was officially inaugurated on Dec. 31,
1971.25

In 1975. the three TV networks broadcast an average of 52 hours of
programs a week, of which more than 45 percent are consisted of
news. public service and educational and cultural programs. In other
words. popular entertainment programs occupied less than 45

percent of the total programs times.26

The Growth of Television Industry in the Past 26 Years
(1962-1988)

As we mentioned earlier. Taiwan established its first commercial
broadcast television station in 1962 under a cooperative venture with
some Japanese companies.27 With only about 4,000 television sets
then, Taiwan has come a long way. Presently 99% of the households
have television and more than half of them have“ at least two or more

22

1"

television sets at home“? There are three commercial television
stations in Taiwan which \‘are under a bureaucratic-commercial
infrastructure with various governmental branches as major
shareholders.29 Although with the public authorities as co-owners, the
three television stations: Taiwan Television Enterprise, Ltd. (TI'V),
China Television Company, Ltd. (CW). and Chinese Television Service
(CTS) are profit organizations depending on advertising revenues as
the only source of income 3 "W" "“'

In order to maintain fair and reasonable competition, all three
stations have joined the Radio and TV Enterprise Association of the
Republic of China. They cooperate with all radio stations in the
country with a common /endeavour to improve the management of
commercial programs. pin addition, all three commercial TV stations
are members of the Press Council of the Republic of China and accept
the Moral Code formulated by the council/They are also members of
the Television Academy of Arts and Science and abide by its
self-discipline covenant which provides guidelines to business
competition.

1 Progress comes from competition. As profit-seeking enterprises
depending on advertising revenue for support. these stations are
bound to compete with one another. EDuring these 26 (1962-1988)
years, the television enterprise in the Republic of China has registered
rapid progress both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Engineering and equipment:

The entire country is now within the effective range of the
transmission stations. Color telecasting has completely replaced
monochrome broadcasting to meet the taste of viewers and satellite
relays are being constantly used to provide fast and live coverage of
major events to meet their demand. Even udios are constantly
upgraded with new special effects available. In terms of engineering;
technology and facilities, the television industry in this country is now
the best in South-East Asia. (Fable 1)30

23

Programming

The progress in programming is particularly impressive. There is
much greater variety and sophistication in the production of programs.
A large pool of performing talent has been built up. The development
and rise of the drama serials are impressive if not phenomenal. Live
telecasting has become commoné’épver 80 percent of the total air
time is taken up by selffproduced programs, probably one of the
highest ratio in the world.3fi_’j.i

In the initial weeks of its inception, TI‘V stayed on the air for five
hours a day. Only two half-hour slots were assigned for entertainment
programs. The remaining four hours were solidly occupied by
educational and news programs. There was a modest increase of
entertainment programs at the end of 1962 where they accounted for
34.56 percent of the total program hours. The lopsided stress on
public service came to an end in 1969 when TI‘V encountered its first
local competitor. Competition from China TV, the second commercial
network in the country, forced 'ITV to beef up its entertainment
programsfven then, public service programs still accounted for 40
to 50 perc t ’of the total program hours. :(‘I‘able 2)32

(4) W

As we have mentioned in the foregoing literature reviews, Taiwan's
growth and development in the TV industry has been fostered initially
by Japanese and American media technology and support. Naturally,
the isEEEEf cultural imperialism or media imperialism arises. Next,
the author shall review some literatures on "Cultural Imperialism".

Vaguely defined by Schiller (1976), "Cultural Imperialism" is "the
sum of process by .which a society is brought into the modern world
system and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced
into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even to promote,
the values and structures of the dominant center of the system."33

The idea of cultural imperialism draws heavily on the theoretical
analogues of economic dependence. As such the theoretical
perspectives of cultural imperialism are similar to the perspectives of

24

"economic dependent" and economic imperialism. Essentially, there
are two perspectives : (l) Neo-Marxist perspectives (2) Non-Marxist
perspectives.“

- v f l r im rl

Nordenstrong and Varis (1973) argue that mass communication in
capitalist societies, serves three major functions”: (1) to conceal class
antagonism inside society and to compensate for the symptoms of
aberration; (2) to illegitimize the conerete social alternatives to the
existing order of society: and (3) to make profit as a branch of
commercial industry. Extending these ideas to the international
communication system, they maintain that the international streams of
communication are " a manifestation of the ruling interests of the
societies from which they originate and not a unanimous output of the
nations involved." With the West, especially the US, being a leader in
communication media products, Neo-Marxist theorists pointed
accusingly that the West offers to the Third World countries with
appealing western cultures and subsequently, dominating their
cultural-communication structures.

[ The Neo-Marxists prefer to deal with "cultural imperialism" instead
6f "media imperialism" .Li‘zThis preference is understood best in terms
of their theoretical andjidealogical orientations. Neo- Marxist have a
more holistic view of the role of the media and are primarily
concerned with the totality of dependence and dominance
relationships by which stronger and weaker nations, and classes
within nations, relate to each other. /

"Media imperialism" is too constricting for Neo-Marxists because
they regard it as? "part of cultural imperialism”. Boyd- “Barrett s (1977)
definition of "media imperialism" will serve t’o illuminate this point
better.36 He defined "media imperialism" as "the process whereby the
ownerships, structure, distribution or content of the media in any one
country are singly or together subject to substantial pressure from the
media interests of any other country or countries without
proportionate reciprocation of influence by the country so affected".

- v i riim

25

No one disagrees that media are important components of culture
but analysis that fails to differentiate the media, educational
institutions, family, and so on may obfuscate more than illuminates.
Hence, {1. on-Marxists seem to prefer to deal with "media imperialism"
rather than the all-encompassing "cultural imperialism": Non-Marxist
theorists also view that the American media conglomerates are
exploitative but they differ from the Neo-Marxist view in that the
Non—Marxist do emphasize the complex internal causes existing in
individual recipient nations.

The Non-Marxist analysts (A) do consider the economies of scale of
American media: (B) recognize the importance of national variance,
the varience in media dependence itself, and complex internal
dynamics variables; (C) maintain that each individual country is able to
defend or counteract foreign media influences in the process of
change; and (D) argue that international communication flow may
result in both good and bad cultural influences on participating
countries.”

CLW

1 To non-Marxist, the imbalanced communication flow is largely a
function of supply and forced pseudo-demand. From the supply or
seller side, large and powerful countries, for instance, the US are well
established in media industry and is in an advantageous position.
Further, TV programming is a cultural product following economies of
scale production methods and principles. This enabled US firms to
price lower than local producers.

Besides, the norms of broadcasting in most countries are non-stop
broadcasting. Thus, for smaller countries with lesser resources or
talents to air local productions (which, without economies of scales
are more expensive), they will turn to cheaper foreign imports to "fill
in the slots".38

‘ Non-Marxist are more wiling to assign more weight to internal
dynamics than Neo-Marxist, who insists on exploring the subject at a
world-system level without concern for variances in political and social
systems within and between recipient countries.

26

(Katz and Wedell (1977), and 'Dunstall (1977) trace the social causes
of television content homogeneity.39 Both studies have shown large
variations in kind and degree of media dependency as influenced by
the interaction of internal variables such as media infrastructure,
sociopolitical systems, cultural traditions, economic structure. and
external variables i.e.. those imposed influences by the "metropolitan"
nations. j
,1 (Q) Autonomoos Intorng Forces
'5 Non-Marxist writers are more willing to recognize the possibility of
{autonomous internal forces and their potential role in the process of
change“; This position is closely linked with the analyses of the
economies of scale and importance of internal dynamics variables on
media dependency. The diffusion of innovations is a random process
unless structural constraints are extemaily imposed upon it. (Rogers
and Shoemaker. 1970)40 The implication is that market forces would
normally work to the advantage of the communication-developed or
media-rich countries, if without interference.

#7" - But the fact is that the Third World nations may, and able to , take
actions against further foreign exploitation and accomodating the
media to local constraints and national needs. Katz and wedell (1977)
observe that many Third World nations have come to a "sense of
purpose" for TV in their countries around the early 1970's.

Non-Marxists have contended that international communication
flow may also bring about both positive and negative effects on
indigenous cultural growth. This position has two roots. One from the
anthropological theory of cultural diffusion which says that alien
cultures are absorbed by the natives to strengthen and rejuvenate the
tissue and fabric of existing cultural heritage. The other is "product
life cycle" which is a business model of multinational enterprise
expansion. This model maintains that interactions with foreign media
would make local learning of advanced technology possible so that
recipient nations are better equiped to harness media to indigenous
cultural developmentflr1

However, there should be serious concern that if the foreign

 

27

inflows of media products are allowed to take place with no hindrance,
they are likely to benefit the stronger parties more than the weaker
parties. Hence, the latter may suffer from negative consequences'
economically and culturally.

Conclusions

Media imperialism or, the broader perspective of cultural
imperialism are terms adopted by crich in the 1960s and 19705 in
analysing unequal media flows and structural differences of cultural
productions in the world. But they are overly simplisticm Nations are
now assymetrically interdependent. Meaning that countries now find
that their relationships with each other vary and are unequal but yet
possess variable degrees of power and initiative in politics, economics
and culture j Structural context, problems and constraints, and how
media are received by the audience in the context of existing cultures
and subcultures that resist change must be examined}:2 And having
done so. as Straubhaar did.“r3 we will note that cultural industries show
increasing aspects of independence and thatxaudiences choose to
receive international versus regional versusknational television
productions in an active way that tends towards the latter two when
they are available because of cultural relevance or proximityj‘ Also
media importation tends to be within the same region, language and
cultual frame of reference, when such programming is available.

 

REFERENCES
Chapter II

1. Owen David, "Satellite Television", Tho Atlantio Monthly, June

1985, p. 45.
2. Bleazard G. B., Introducing Satellite Communication, The

National Computing Centre Limited, 1985. p. 23.

3. Owen David, p. 46.

4. Bleazard G. B., p. 23.

5. Owen David. p. 46.

6. Baylin Frank and Gale Brent, Satellites loamy-Tho Gold: to
Sotollito Tolevision, Howard W. Sams & Co., 1986, 2nd. ed., p. 5.

7. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

8. Gagliardi Robert M.. W, Lifetime
Learning Publications, Belmont. California, 1984, p. 4.

9. Ibid., p. 7.

10. McGraw-Hill Inc., Encyclopedia of Science and Technology, Vol.

5,1987,p.323.

11. Elbert Bruce R. IniraduatisnLiLSatcllttLQammication.
Artech House, Inc., 1987, pp. 11-12.

12. Ibid., pp.13-15.

13. Ibid.. pp. 17-18.

14- Blonstein Larry. W
W. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1987b, p.
75.

15. Baylin Frank and Gale Brent, Ibid., p. 45.

16. Blonstein Larry, Ibid., p. 84.

17. Baylin Frank and Gale Brent, Ibid., pp. 47-48.

18. A Glance at Taiwan, R. O. 0., Tourism Bureau, Ministry of
Communications, R. O. 0., June 1989, p. 7.

19. Ibid., p. 8.

20. Ibid.. p. 9.
21. The Television Academy of Arts and Sciences of the Republic of

28

29

China, Iologision Xoarbook of tho Roooolio of China, 1962-1973,

Taipei, Taiwan, 1974, p. 63.

22. Ibid., p. 64.

23. Ibid., p. 65.

24. Ibid.. p. 66.

25. Ibid., p. 67.

26. Ibid., p. 69.

27. The Japanese Companies invested on the development of the
first television station in Taiwan, Taiwan Television Enterprise (’I'I‘V),
were Fuji TV Co., Hitachi, NEC, and Tokyo Shibaura (Toshiba), which
then owned about 40% of the TTV's share. See The Tolovioion
WWW. Taipei. Taiwan. 1974-

28. See Chia-Chin Pan, Shu-Fan Wang, and In-Tsun, "A Study of the
Communication Behavior of the People in Taiwan," Journalism
3mm, no. 38, 1988, p. 62-95, and The Council of Economic and
Development, Executive Yuan, Tho Coonoil of Eoonomio and
W. Taipei. Taiwan. May
1986, pp. 229-233.

29. On the history of television development in Taiwan, see
Thomas C. Lee, "Our Current Television Problems. Chapter 1: The
Development of Our Television, "WW, no. 34, 1984,
pp. 1-12.

30. 111: Dovolooroont of fl‘olovisioo Entomriso in m: Roooolio of
W5, Taipei, Taiwan, p. 74.

31. The Television Academy of Arts and Sciences of the Republic
of China, Tolevision Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1962-1973,
Taipei, Taiwan, 1974, p.67.

32. Ibid.. p. 75.

33. See Chin-Chuan Lee. W

W. Beverly Hills. Calif” Sage
Publication, 1980, p.41.

34. Ibid., pp.35-45.
35. Ibid., p.35.
36. Ibid., p.41.
37. Ibid., pp.42-43.

“Erma-11¢

“150'“

38.
39.
40.
41 .
42.
43.

30

Ibid., pp.43-44.
Ibid., p.44.

Ibid., pp.45-46.
Ibid., pp.46-47.
Ibic., pp.48-56.

See Joseph D. Straubhaar. "Media :
Assymetrical Interdependence and Cultural Proximity". Department of

From Imperialism to

Telecommunication, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI

48824.

twins...-
".

III THE DEVELOPMENT OF 'LITTLE EARS' IN TAIWAN

Although the growth and development of Taiwan's 'IV industry has
been impressive and dramatic for the past 26 years, however in the
last couple of years we saw a relative stagnation and even a decline in
the, industry's quest for upgrading their standards. {Because of this
stagnation together with competitive and technological factors, such

as VCR, channel 4 and "Little Ears", the television industry is currently
experiencing some critical problems; These will elaborated in this

chapter.

WW

According to a media viewing behavior study conducted in 1989 by
an advertising agency in Taiwanlz besides the three commercial
television channels people in Taiwan receive their television programs
from other sources such as prerecorded video cassettes, the fourth
Ehannel and television receive only stationsl'I‘VRO). (Table 3)

[This is not a surprise at all. These competitors are able to
penetrate into the market and gain significant market share because
the media consumers' wants are not satisfied by the three local
stations. .gl With respect to "Little Ears": the availability of technologr
enabled onsumers to receive foreign programs at an affordable cost.
Currently the television industry in Taiwan is faced with low
viewership. In fact, this was felt when the VCR was introduced and
become noticeable when the fourth channel and TVRO gained
momentum in their penetration.

The Penetration of Video Cassette Recorder (VCR).

Video cassette recorder (VCR) with its varied functions such as
time-shifting, viewing non-broadcast professional material and
producing home video. .etc., is becoming a very important source for
Taiwanese to use as a substitution for TV programs. It is not even
xjrv’vithin 10 years (1981-1989), Taiwan already has a roughly 79% VCR
i penetration rate and it is still growing. 2

31

‘P‘T‘H-R ‘fi‘u-‘I‘PIJ I

32

Q 0.

According to the survey by United Advertising Agency, VCR is the
major competitor of the existing broadcast television stations which
have lost a significant number of viewers to VCR use on some
important broadcast hours such as the weeknight 9:00 to 1 1:00 prime
hours and Saturday afternoon 2:00 to 4:00. (Table 4)3 Since VCRs in
Taiwan are mainly used for the viewing of prerecorded video tapes,
with the convenience of corner prerecorded tape rental stores, the
low rental charge caused by fierce competitions and the inexpensive
price of VCRs, the competitive force from the VCR sector is expected
to continue as a threat to the existing television industry in Taiwan.

The Fourth Television Channel

Another competitor, although illegal and with limited penetration,
is worth mentioning. It is similar to a miniature cable television
service that serves only a limited area and smaller community in each
system. People in Taiwan call it "The Fourth Station" service area
which is only limited to certain neighborhoods wired by the service
providers. With a one-time installation fee of around NT $5,000 (US
$200) and monthly payment for NT$ 1,000 (US $40),4 subscribers can
receive four channels which include two Japanese NI-IK channels
transmitted through the DBS named BS-2a, and the other two
channels with movies from Hong Kong and other Western countries.5

Under the current regulation, such cable system is illegal.
Nevertheless, 6.3% of ho seholds in the Taipei metropolitan area
subscribe to this channel.6 en with the understanding that it is illegal
, the audience in Taiwan is still willing to subscribe to the alternative
television service. This phenomenon certainly demonstrates the
consumers' [desire and need for more alternative television services in
Taiwan. ] With the realization of such problem, the Government
Information Office (GIO), a regulatory agency which carries similar
functions to those of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
in the U.S., has recently formed a task force to study and plan the
construction of an island-wide cable television system and its
technical, economic, and regulatory implications.7 jMore will be
discussed in later chapter.

M.‘

. .I T f.T.u"

 

 

33

I According to a survey conducted in 1984 (Table 5)3, only about
20% of the television riewers in Taiwan indicated that they were
satisfied with the programs provided by the three commercial
elevision stations. In a more recent survey, knowing that it is
ustomary for Chinese to stay home with their family during the New

ar vacations, a survey on the television programs was conducted in
1989. This survey revealed that only 9% of the viewers have positive

opinions on the content of the programs (Table 6)9

I; Yet in a 1989 island-wide survey on media consumption patterns, it
engaging in other activities.10 Clearly, the current programs supplied
by 'I'I'V, CTV and CTS are not at the stage to meet the consumers'

d (I.

Q j¥:e foregoing mentioned competitors to the TV industry have had
a successful entry into the media market because they provided better
quality programs than those aired by the local stations. Nevertheless
the thirst for world news and information on world sporting events
were not quenched. For this, the consumers turned to the "Little
Ears" that brought to their home what is beyond Taiwan--the Big

World. 1

"little Ears" in Taiwan
L Taiwan has approximately 4% penetration of Ku-band television
e

ceive-only earth stations in the Taipei metropolitan area.1 1 With the

galization statement made by the government in November 198812

d the decline in price of dish hardware, the trend of installing
" ttle Ears" for receiving alternative television programs from abroad
1 expected to continue. In contrast to "Li_t_t_l_e__l_§ars", " Ms" which
are still declared illegal under the current regulation have very
limited penetration (roughly 0.7% in the Taipei metropolitan area).13
They are mainly owned by luxurious hotels providing American
network programs and especially, international news and sports
programs to international business travellers and tourists. As "Big
Ears" are becoming widely known for their abundant channels and
varieties of Western programs, the general media consumers are

‘was found that 82% of the population watch television instead of .

. ‘ FW%:~F'Me-fi1rv

34

/ becoming more interested in purchasing this kind of earth station.
/ Egevertheless, the price of a "Big Ear" is still too costly for an average
; ousehold A "little Ear" package range from NT $18,000 (US $720)
(to NT $24,000 (US $960) while a "Big Ear" package costs almost
twenty times as much ranging from NT $350,000 (US $14,000) to NT
$400,000 (US $16,000).14
The satellite dish hardware service is now a very competitive
k“ business in Taiwan. Some companies even provide their customers
with free satellite television program guides.15 There are actually only
two channels available at this time--NHK-1 (channel 15) and NHK-2_
(channel 11). These two DBS channels are provided by the Japanese
NHK public television network containing mostly educational,
information/news, and sports programs that are broadcasted mainly in
Japanese.16
Thus, "Little Ear" owners in Taiwan are receiving foreign programs
solely from the Japanese public television system and the government
legalized such conduct. So far, both governments seem to agree that
the Little Ear situation is basically a satellite signal spill-over and not a
program pirating issue and thus allow it to continue. \/But legitimating
the use of "Little Ears" does not mean an establishment of policy.) The
government in Taiwan has opened up the market without actually
formulating any regulatory framework for the operation of the market.
The legal impact of such transborder television signals will be
discussed in details later.
In a survey which was conducted by Rain Maker Industrial Inc., a
media market research company carrying tasks similar to those of the
A.C. Nielsen Company in the U.S., close to 70% of the households in
the Taipei metropolitan area are familiar with "Little Ears" and 4% of
the households have "Little Ears". About 17% of this 4% household
have an annual income over US $46,000 which is the upper income
households in Taiwan (Table 7-A). And among the non-owners
interviewed, about half of them expressed the possibility for installing
"Little Ears" in the near future (Table 7-B). When asked for the
reasons for purchasing "Little Ears", about 44% of the "Little Ear’s "
owners indicated that the desire to watch something different from

i

35

other countries is the main motive. Eleven percent indicated that it is
useful for learning a language, and about 6% just being aware of other
programs from the three channels fl‘able 7-C).17
As stated earlier, Taiwan does not have its own DBS at this time.
vhlowever in 1985 a task force was mustered to study the feasibility of
having a DBS system.18 Last year, the govemment has given high
priority in the agenda on plans for Taiwan to develop her own space
satellites.19 It is still uncertain when media consumers in Taiwan be
ab to receive programs from their own DBS.
V' The cause of decline in viewership in local programs is
apparent--the media consumers' wants are not satisfied. Of the three
main alternatives, the one that is more complex and raises more
complicated issues, whose growth is most rapid and has the greatest
impact on the TV industry is the "Little Ears". In particular. there are
several factors that gave a strong impetue to the growth of "Little
Ears". This will be discussed next.

FA RS INFLUENCING THE GROWTH OF "LITTLE EARS"
W

Although it is prohibited to set up "Little Ears" at home prior to
1987 (because of the Martial Law), many Taiwanese still took the
risk-purely out of curiosity. There is an ancient saying which goes as
follows:

"Buddhist monks who come from afar are always better at reciting
sutras".

Synonymously, people who come from distant lands have better
talents to ofl'er than local talents. (In other words Taiwanese thirst for
new things and it is this curiousity for new things that is responsible
for the minuscular growth in this prohibition period.J

Furthermore, the flat roof-top of Taiwanese homes are often filled

mu

”3"?_: ?

 

36

with solar energr panels, water tanks, pigeon coops or storage sheds
which provide good hiding places for these 90-120cm wide receivers.

But after 1987 the growth of "Little Ears" was attributed by political
reform, ecnomic growth, social and cultural affiliation with the
Japanese in the past and present, and the Taiwanese TV programming

itself.

Political Reform

J When the Martial Law was lifted, the government after facing
several harsh criticisms from the opposition party decided to
liberalize several regulations and policies so as to maintain her
popularity with the people. One regulation which is significant to this
paper is the liberalization of the media environment as well as the
media content. 20

{Under this reformation, "Little Ears" is not prohibited but at the
same time it is not legalized. The new government actually made a
policy of "no policy"./{= Naturally demand for these small dishes
sky-rocketed. This demand is also fueled in part by the attraction of
the Olympic Games in Seoul. 21 Through the "Little Ears" a full and live
coverage of the Games could be received via the Japanese DBS system.
The three Taiwanese TV stations did not provide full coverage and
viewers had to be contented with the "excerpts". Thus with "Little
Ear" a viewer has more freedom and variety of programs to choose

fr m
(However, there are still limitations regarding how much control
over media contents should the government let go on the satellite dish
issue/,1 As mentioned before, under the current policy, the receiving of
C- band satellite signals is regarded as an unlawful conduct. It is
speculated that because of the availability of C-band television signals
from STW-l and STW-2 satellites which transmit programs from
northern China to central and southern China by Taiwan's counterpart,
PROC. the government in Taiwan is reluctant to open up the "Big Ears"
arket. In addition, since there are many more television signals
currently transmitted through the C-band frequencies, if the C-band
reception becomes legitimate domestically, without the initial

u.‘

37

U settlement on the allocation of royalties of the programs originally
K” intended for another country, it would certainly create a problem of
pirating over this form of intellectual property. And this is not what
the government would like to see.

Economic Growth
Taiwan is no longer considered a third world country but classified
as a Newly Industrialized Country (NIC)--one of the four "Little
Dragons" in Asia.” With a GNP growth rate averaging about 9%
annually over the paSt three decades (Figure 2), a trade surplus of US
$1.6 billion23 and a gradual transition from a labor-intensive industrial
economy to more sophisticated technology-intensive industrial
operations, people in Taiwan are experiencing a fast changing society
with rising income. higher standard of living, and more leisure time
for media consumption.24
The personal consumption pattern in Taiwan has been greatly
influenced by its macro-economic development. In 1968, 44.4% of
total spending by an average family was on food: by 1988 the figure had
dropped to 27.7%. As people spend relatively less on food, they are
devoting a larger proportion of their rising incomes to housing,
education and leisure-time activities (Figure 3). With the availability of
the hardware (DES and satellite dishes) and the software (television
programs from J apan), the desire to consume and the ability to pay for
t it, the television audience in Taiwan turns to this new medium.
Besides, based on the Rain Maker's survey, there was a very
interesting situation; when asked about the motive for purchasing
"Little Ears", about 11% of the respondents indicated "to “flaunt”
wedthqu‘able 7-C). Inevitably, Taiwan is experiencing the common
phenomenon of increasing materialism during its recent economic
growth.25 Having something others do not is synonymous with
prestige and prestige implies higher social status. The purchasing of
f "Little Ears" do not only provide an alternative media choice, but are

i
i, also symbol of social status and prestige.

38

The Past and Present Social and Cultural Affiliation with Japanese

In 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan as one of the spoils of the
Sino-Japanese War. For almost fifty years (until 1945), Taiwan
remained part of Japan.26 Taiwanese have mixed feelings over this
domination. According to a survey27 conducted by the Republic of
China Public Opinion Research Foundation in 1988, concerning the
good qualities of Japanese they include loyalty. cooperative,
hard-working, responsible, polite, law-abiding, trustworthy and
interms of business deals, reliable in keeping contracts and
maintaining quality products or design and excellent marketing skills.
Negative impressions are clearly rooted in historical experience with
descriptions like warlike, ambitious, and cruel.

With a history of Japanese domination, not surprisingly, the
Japanese influence was quite extensive. This influence is reflected in
the present households.

From the point of view of economics, Chinese clearly feel Japanese
economic power. When asked whether Japan dominates the Taiwan
market, 46 percent answered "heavily dominates" and 31 percent
answered "dominates." The higher the education level, the more
strongly this feeling was held. on the other hand, 14 percent said
Japan "heavily obstructs" access to its own market for Taiwan
products, with 35 percent saying "obstructs."

Many factors influence this economic imbalance, but it is not
strange from the point of product use and quality evaluation. 82
percent of respondents had used a Japanese product, while 64
percent believe that Japanese manufactured products are of high
quality (with only 1.5 percent replying "poor quality"). However, 67
percent said they did not give preferential consideration to Japanese
products when choosing; this may reflect a certain bias against such
products.28

As for Sino-Japanese relations, the replies indicate that most
respondents have a good understanding of the historical relations
between the two countries. However, respondents took a positive
view of construction on Taiwan during the Japanese occupation
period, with 4 percent saying it was "very helpful" and 49 percent

rem /\/j

39

"helpful." As for whether or not young people are being "Japanized,"
about 42 percent expressed "concern" and 36.3 percent "no need for
concern", those were roughly even. (Table 8)

When asked, "How many Japanese speakers in Taiwan?" about
40% said that someone in their household could converse in
Japanese. This is because many of the older people who were
educated under the Japanese education system still speak Japanese
and are sentimental to Japanese culture. Due to such nostalgic
complexion, the Japanese programs provided by NHK are welcomed
by the old generation in Taiwan.29

In recent years there is yet another source of Japanese influence.
Since the beginning of 1980 Japanese fashion and popular music have
entered the Taiwanese market. These particularly attracted the
trendy younger generations. This phenomenon is evidenced by the
rapid rise in enrolment in the Japanese language, increase in demand
for Japanese publication and audio-video tapes.30 To stay trendy
requires latest update from Japan and this of course is met by the
"Little Ears"

Taiwan's TV Programming

As mentioned previously, the audience in Taiwan seem to be
unsatisfied with the current programs provided by the three
commercial television stations. Just what kind of television programs
are, available to the general public?

_’rA content analysis of the three television channels' weekday
program schedules show that variety shows, news, and soap operas are
the major types of ’ programs offered during the most-watched prime
hours (Table 9).30 - In fact, the audience does not really have many
choices over the "types" of programs but only different versions at
different scheduled times to choose from during this broadcast period.

1' Furthermore, the demand for international programs by Taiwanese
viewers are not met by the three TV stations» It is a legal constraint
inposed by the Taiwanese authority rather than a marketing
inadequacy. The regulatory agency of the industry, i.e., Government
Information Office (GIO), has specifically laid-the programming

40

‘guidelinesiunder four content ”classifications. The first classification
/ pertains to newcasts, and publicity of government policies and orders.
\ The second classification pertains to education and culture. The third
'1 classification concerns public service and the last one provides

\guidelines for entertainment.31

An examination on the weekly average time and percentage of these

program types during the year of 1987 was conducted (l‘able 11).32

The number of news and public information programs aired by CTS

and 'I’I‘V are about the same whereas CTV has less. For the education

and culture programs, TTV has about 27%, CTV has around 22% while

CTS has 31%. Furthermore, according to the public service programs,

the three stations has almost the same percentage.

, The entertainment programs is the heaviest type program for all;

'I'IV has about 40%. CTV has 46%, and CTS has around 35%. Even

with CTV's slight lead in entertainment programs and CTS's

educational and cultural programs the three stations basically provide
‘ similar proportions of types of programs. Such phenomenon is

probably due to the GIO's program control provisions which stipulate

that the percentages of time allocation to television newscasts and

public information programs will be no less than 20%, for education
. and culture programs no less than 20%, public service programs no
. less than 10%, and no more than 50% entertainment programs.33

\ The 1988 Seoul Opympic Game/s} is a case in point that the

Taiwanese viewers' demand for international programs are not

satisfied. In a survey conducted by the China Evening News

concerning the broadcasting of the 1988 Olympic Game between

Taiwan's three TV stations and Japan's NHK. About 58% of the

respondents preferred NHK, and only 8% of the respondents

answered domestic TV stations (Table 10). This preference is due to
the fact that NHK provided a full-live coverage of the international
event which none of the local stations did because of the legal
contraint imposed on the three stations.

1 Since the profit-making goal is fundamental for the current Taiwan
television infrastructure, \sfiuflcwhocontentp regulation seem to be
contradicting the established system.\ The market-driven commercial

/

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41

television system and the degree of control over media content
desirable by the government may be able to coexist, however, due to
the limitation of the available broadcasting frequencies in use, the
general media consumers may have to pay for the consequences of
such philosophical dispute. At this time, the price is the unsatisfied
television viewers who decided to turn to a basically foreign medium
_ rfor alternatives. . /
f j What do the alternative satellite channels offer then? J {A content
an ysis on the satellite television program guide indic ted that on

NHK-1‘ (channel 15), over 80% of the 24-hour air time is devoted to .
the news and sports programs and on NHK-2 (channel 1 1), over 40%
air time is devoted to education/ cultural programs and more than 20%
for entertainment programs (Table 12).34 2‘

In addition, a close examination on the individual programs
provided by the two NHK channels revealed that there are wide
coverage of world class sporting events, such as Tour of France.
Wimbledon Tennis and constant international news reports (NHK-1
even carries reports from CNN, BBC, and world known concerts, art
exhibitions, and so on. All these are rarely available on the three
Taiwanese television stations (Table 13). 35

Though there is a language difference on these programs, the
opportunities of receiving something "different" and "big" is still very
attractive. Furthermore, with sports events, language is not an
important factor in the understanding of the the programs, and for
international news, the gratification of getting instant information on
what's happening around the world offsets the inconvenience in
reasoning the news report. In essence, not entertainment, but the
w1335;“geporteofl'big«sportingevents and quality news/ informational
Wsmobflh- the major programming attraction driving the
purchaseof "Little Ears."36 .
3: In summ ,the develfi’pment and popularity of "Little Ears" in
T wan s a result of political reform which liberalized the media
environment. Aflluence through economic growth enabled the people
to acquire "Little Ears". Cultural and social affiliations in the past with
Japan also played a role. The rigid programming criteria led media

42

consumers to seek satisfaction by receiving the Japanese spilled-over
transmission. Although, "Little Ears" do benefit and satisfy the media
consumers’ wants, they do have some impact on Taiwan which the

author will disscuss next.

REFERENCES

Chapter III

1. Though there are discrepancies on the report of VCR
penetration rate from different research. See United advertising

Company. LWWMMEQM
Media (e; ggeggeaet Televieien, and the Bureau of
Telecommunications, Department of Transportation, The Report of
Wan. Taipei. Taiwan. 1988-

2. See United advertising company, Ibid.

3. Ibid. to face the problem, advertisers have started inserting
commercials in the video tapes.

4. New Taiwan (NT) dolloars' current exchange rate with the U.S.
dollars is about US$1 to NT$26.

5. China Time Express, 14 September 1988, p. 9.

6. See United Advertising Company, Ibid.

7. The government hasn't decided yet to open the whole system to
private investors, domestic and abroad, or with a limitation of certain
degree of public ownership. For more information, see Li-Lian Chiang,
"Analyzing the Concept of Developing Cable Television in Tiawan," 13

f R 1i f hi T , no. 43, October 1988, pp.29-72.

8. In Chan Lee, llelevieien, Yuan-Chen Cultural Publishing, Taipei,
Taiwan, 1984.

9. See Rain Maker Industrial Inc.'s research report on "Little Ears"
and Chinese New Year Media Viewing study.

10. gentrg Daily Newe, 6 November 1989.

1 1. According to an informal survey conducted by the United Daily
News research department in the Fall of 1988, the "Little Ear"
penetration of the whole island is about 9%. See United Dal}: News,
29 September, 1988, p. 3.

12. The government legalized the receiving of Ku-band satellite
signals but still restricts the reception of C-band signals. See Central

43

CCOI

201

A5 ‘5

85p

PA‘

Ll
.\h

197

Tel.

44

m 15 January, 1989.
13. See United advertising Company, Ibid.
14. W, Vol. 94, March 1989, pp. 38-43.
15. W, 14 March 1989, p. 10.

16. W. 24 September 1988-
17. see Rain Maker Industrial Inc.'s research report on the "Little

Ears" and Chinese New Year Media Viewing study.
18. Tsu-Long Jen, "Taiwan's Satellite Communication Policy

Research," Newepgper Reeeggeh, Vol. 7, no. 8, pp. 130-138.
19. W. 2 November 1989, p. 7.
20. See W, no. 73, August 1989, pp. 25-29.

21. Seem, no. 49 March 1986. pp. 66-75.
22. Along with South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong,

economists refer these four countries as Asia's four "Little Dragons.".
23. See Free China Review, Vol. 39, no. 8, August 1989, p. 27.

24. See W. 22 February 1988, p. 51 and
20 November 1989, p. 65.

25. See Wm, Vol. 39, no. 8, August 1989, p. 27.

26. For more information on the history of Taiwan in this period,
especially, the Japanese influence on the education system of Taiwan
during the period, see E. Patricia Tsurumi, Jananeseiglegial
W, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard UP.
1977.

27. Chen Jackie, "The Japanese in Chinese Eyes", W, Vol.
14, no.1, January 1989, p. 17.

28. Ibid. p. 15-16

29. Ibid. p. 18.

30. See W, TV guide, p. 28.

31. See The Television academy of Arts and Science of the
Republic of China, "The Enforcement Rules of the Broadcasting and

Television Law, Chapter 3--Program Control", WM

11 f 19 6-1 7. Taipei, Taiwan. 1988.
32. See "Television Programming", Ibid.

' 33. See "The Enforcement Rules of the Broadcasting. and
Television Law, Chapter3--Program Control, Article 18", Ibid.

45

34. The data are collected from the Orbiter program schedule,

W. 1-7 July 1989. pp-
54-57.
35. Ibid.

36. Some scholars in Taiwan have indicated that from their
observations, the influence of "Little Ears" on the news / informational
program on the three TV stations is more serious than the
entertainment programs. See gengal Daily News, 15 January 1989, p.
7.

1V MACTS OF "LITTLE EARS"

The broadcasting industry like any other technology--based
industry is highly afl'ected by technological progress especially in the
production process and transmission of signals. Furthermore, any
technologicy progress in one aspect seldom remain neutral in its
influence. It usually has an impact on the industry, related infustries
and the society in general. The TVRO is a cas in point. Although the
development of "Little Ears" in Taiwan is still in their initial growth
stage, they have already created some impacts on the Taiwanese 'IV
and related. industries, broadcasting regulations and cultural

sovereignty.

/Impact on the Existing Television and Related Industries

Even since the introduction of the "Little Ears" the three television
stations thg. In a survey (Table 14)1, "Little Ears"
owners indicated that they watch DBS programs most often during the
prime broadcasting hours, i.e. 7:00pm to 11:00pm. Possibly the
ratings will fall further when more "Little Ears" gradually increase.
The critical issue, of course, lies in the future of TV commercials or
advertisement.

Presently, NHK-1 and NHK-2 are non-commercial public television
services, there is no direct competition for television commercial
sales between the local stations and the Japanese channels except the
fact that the advertisers and the television companies have
experienced a slightly shrinking number of viewers. As the Taiwanese
living standard and purchasing power are on the rise, there is an
excessive demand from advertisers for television commercials in the
industry and such demand is expected to continue.

Currently the "Little Ear" medium does not seem to place any
31 cant threat to the advertising sector of the domestic stations.
The real problem, however, will come when people in Taiwan are able
to receive commercial television signals from Japan This will happen
in the near future. As it is one Japanese commercial television

46

47

company, JSB, is planning to participate in the upcoming DBS, BS-3,
for transmitting signals through out Japan under a service system
combining commercials and subscription charge.2 In this case, it
would be impossible for Government Information Office (GIO) to
execute its control over the amount and content of advertisements as
it has for the three television stations before.3 This will place the
three Taiwanese stations at a gross disadvantage. In fact the three
stations are expecting a shift in advertisements revenue from their
stations to the Japanese stations once the latter becomes operational.

With the requirement of subscription fees, the issue of whether
"Little Ears" owners in Taiwan also have to pay and how will they pay
for it will arise. Furthermore, confusion exists as to how will the
government, the satellite dish industry, and J SB (or other commercial
television companies transmitting signals through the Japanese DBS)
deal with the copyright issue, ie, how are they going to figure out the
allocation of royalties for use of the DBS programs that are originally
intended to be delivered only in Japan? x"

From the other point of view since Taiwan has a fairly high A VCR
penetration and the use of VCRs is recognized to have impacted the ‘
traditional broadcast television viewing, the influence of "Little Ears"
over VCRs will be discussed next.

TLIn order to attract advertisers to place advertisments with the
wanese stations, the stations first need to attract viewers. To do
so they need to upgrade their programs and all three stations are in
dire need for major upgrading.) Presently, the author observed that
there has not been any significant change in the programming of the
three stations. This foreign competition is definitely an impetus to
the Taiwanese TV industry to re-shape itself and perhaps for the
regulating agency (GIO) to reconsider her inflexible regulations.

’ Also, in the same survey it was found that the availability of "Little
Ears" did somehow contribute to the trend of improving picture
quality of video tapes in the VCR industry. (Furthermore, in the survey
"Young people and their orientation to the mass media : An
international study--Taiwan",4 the most popular prerecorded video
tapes in Taiwan today are those detective-action, kung-fu,

48

science-fiction, horror-films and romatic comedies. These types of
program are not offered in the NHK channels and thus the Japanese
DBS programs should not create any immediate competitive force to
the VCR industry. The largest prerecorded video tape duplicator in
Taiwan, Era Company, announced that due to the competition
generated from the high quality television pictures available on "Little
Ears", it is going to invest on new processing facilities for the
duplication of quality prerecorded video tapes.5

Beside the legal and technical impact on the TV industry, there is
the issue of cultural sovereignty that the authorities have to contend
with. Culture is not static. Culture changes over time. One culture
may influence another and at the same time may be influenced by
others. Acculturation is most effective through the mass media--in
particular the television. This explains why certain contries practices
strict censorships. But with the TVRO ability to receive foreign
transmissions, essenticlly what is or maybe regarded as undesirable by
the authority is not within the control of the government. So in
Taiwan today issues are raised over the cultural sovereignty.

Concerns over Cultural Sovereignty

Since Japan launched its BS-2 DBS in 1984, the island of Taiwan
has been facing an unintentional spillover problem which refers to an
accidental transmission of television signals between countries at
border areas.6 [Underlying the problem of spillover is that the form
and content of the broadcast system in a country is an aspect of
national sovereignty and an invasion to such informational sovereignty
creates a threat to the country's domestic television system as well as
the culture integrity. 2 In essence, the communication policy-makers
in Taiwan are facing a \dilemma of how to satisfy the public's demand
for television viewing alternatives without too many sacrifices in the
nation's cultural identity. The fear of such cultural dependency is even
intensified due to the historical influence Japan has had on the island. !
.. A close examination on the progam types provided by the J apanesej
NHK-1 and NHK-2 revealed that only very limited programs are
J apanese-cultured per se, most of the television programs are focused

Ca

49

/ on international and educational subjects. Though the situation may
change as soon as the Japanese commercial television system starts
; offering entertainment-oriented programs on BS-3 DBS, it is believed
'3‘ that at the present time the threat of cultural dependency is at its
\minimum..

But, considering the homogeneous television culture in the world
media development today,7 with the already existing social and
cultural affiliation with Japan, an extensive fear on the issue of cultural
invasion or media imperialism 3931's to be the main threat from.
media technology. For instance, in recent years, several phenomena
have created a strong feeling for Japanese culture, the boom in
Japanese language schools, the success of the bookstores is evidence
of the rapid rise in Japanese publications, demand for Japanese video
tapes sky-rocketed, and the younger generation is now heavily
criticized for being affected by the new Japanese youth culture and
even its social values. With such popularity of the Japanese publication,
the influx of Japanese television programming through VCR rental
stores, and the number of "Tokyo kids". running around Hsimenting,
the fear that this later generation will be more likely "Japanalized".8
Either from the historical review or from the examination of the
current cultural flow, the cultural affiliation between the Japanese
media contents, which, are accessible through the installation of
"Little Ears".

/

LChallenge to the Existing Media Regulation
Since 1976 the operation of broadcasting industry in Taiwan is

governed by the Broadcasting and Television Law (BTL) and the
Enforcement Rules Formulated in accordance with the BTL. Pertinent
to our discussion are Articles 18, 19, 21 and 28 of Chapter 3. Under
Chapter 3, Article 18 of the Enforcement Rules, the government laid
out the minimum and maximum percentages of the four program
Vfategories permissible during the broadcast hours.

In Article 21, the government indicated that except newscast all
the TV programs are required to be examined by the GIO before they
can be broadcasted. And finally, Article 19 and 28 of the BTL spelled

DEC

WEI

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can

Thi
Bro

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P3.

WEI
prc
cre
sul.

50

out the limitation of a maximum of 30% imported programs among all
television programs aired and the requirement of GIO's authorization
for the importation of any foreign program. 9

{The reception of television signals from NHK-1 and NHK- 2 has
certainly posed challenges to these regulations. 1! In formulating
policies to regulate this new medium the governmenx has to consider
how the DBS signals are going to be classified. {1; For example, are the
DBS signals to be classified as the common” carrier or within the
traditional broadcasting regulatory framework?

Sometimes, it is. inevitable to have contradictory policies when a
new technoloy is developed. However, without building a regulatory
framework to compromise the old and the new technolog, as the new
one develops and the old matures, the challenge is going to be more
overwhelming in the future.

Presently, with the government adopting , a policy of "no policy", it
is actually a situation of the government losing control and creating
contradictions to the existing communication laws.

The other related issue concerns international copy-right laws.
This issue will definitely be raised once the Japanese Satellite
Broadcast (J SB a commercial satellite television company), W.
WhBS, B823. For example, JSB may demand that
aiwan be responsible for part of the royalties for their broadcast.lo
ithout an initial settlement on the allocation of royalties of the
programs originally intended for another country, it would certainly
(treate a problem of pirating. At the same time they may demand

subscription fees from the Taiwanese consumers.

From the Taiwanese government point of view, the content of the
Japanese broadcast may not be desirable and one that she does not
have control over. To the extreme the Taiwanese government may
regard the Japanese broadcast as an invasion of Taiwan's sovereignty.

From this discussion, it is clearly seen that the present policy of
"no policy" adopted by the Taiwanese government is not an end but a
very temporary one. From the author's point of view, the Taiwanese
government have to have at least a skeletal framework of regulations
implemented before J SB operationalize the BS-3 satellite. This will

 

51

give the Taiwanese government an upper hand in a forthcoming

complicated problem.
‘\ ’Ifi'summary then, "Little Ears" exist in Taiwan because they receive

them-75a signals from the Japanese BS—2a which stemmed from
., technological advancement in TV signal transmission. The growth and
popularity of "Little Ears" led to significant loss in local programs
f viewing which in turn affect the flflimgngCm-miflf the TV
stations. Another negative impact concerns cultural sovereignty.“ The
. "over-identification" of the younger generationwith the Japanese
’1 threatens the nation's cultural identity. Moreover, a challenge is a
posed to the existing media regulation which indeed needed major
,1 re-evaluation because of changes in technology and consumers' wants.
. Without doubt, the Taiwanese TV industry is presently plunging
: into a crsis. But the situation is not altogether hopeless. The future
' prospects of the industry depends on the concerted effort of all the
., various bodies in the industry in upgrading their standard and making
new changes so as to compete aggressively with their present and
w future competitors. '

IO

REFERENCES
Chpater IV

1. Since the result is generated from a very small sample size of
"Little Ear" owners, it is not suggested to generalize such
programming preference findings to the general "Little Ears" owners
in Taiwan. See Rain Maker Industrial Inc.'s research report on "Little
Ears".

2. See Independent Meming News, 5 June 1989.

3. See "The Enforcement Rules of The Broadcasting and
Television, Chapter 4: Control of Advertisements," Televieien Yearbopk
pf the Reppplie pf China 1986-1987, Taipei, Taiwan, 1988.

4. Bradley S. Greenberg, Linlin Ku, "Young people and their
orientation to the mass media : An international study--Taiwan", June,

1989.
5. See Economic Daily, 12 January 1989, p. 12.

6. See Hamid Mowlana, lepal Infermatipn and wprld
W, New York: Longman, 1986, p. 76.

7. See Chin-Chuan Lee, Media Imperialism Reconsidered: The
flemegepieipg pf Televisipn Qpltpre, Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage

Publication, 1980.
8. Jackie Chen, "Understanding Japanese", Sm, Vol. 13, no.

12. pp. 4-14.
9. See "Acts Governing TV Affairs", Ielevieien Yearpeek ef the

Republie pf China 1986-1987, Taipei, Taiwan, 1988.
10. " NHK v.s. JS ". MW Vol. 1, no. 6, June
1989, pp.5-8.

52

V. THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE TELEVISION ENTERPRISE
IN TAIWAN

As indicated before, the quality of the current TV programs in
Taiwan is generally recognized to be unsatisfactory. This has led to
the initial growth and demand for "Little Ears" in Taiwan. It is
estimated that there are more than 200,000 households in Taiwan
who own "Little Ears" today. The figure is expected to increase more
gpidly when J SB operationalizes BS-3.

Even the "Big Ears" which can receive programs from other parts of
the world including U.S., European countries and Russia, although
handicapped by its higher price, are gaining more acceptance. Also, on
W ”63914-19993 fiHong Kong has launched her own
3%I9,111.t,e.1-:AsiaSat I-ewhose northern footprint covers China, Taiwan,

- Korea-"Nepal and Western J apan.“;This new satellite opens another set
of channels for "Big Ears" owners. 0 Furthermore, with the anticipation
that the price for "Big Ears" would gradually decrease once this
product matures, demand for "Big Ears" will increase as well. i

The popularity and growth in demand for these receivers, together
with a lack of sound regulations from the authorities certainly pose a
great danger to Taiwan's media environment. The existing and
potential problem caused by the growth and development of the DBS
medium has to be resolved before the situation eventually becomes a
crisis. The author has a few suggestions:

:3 LEstablishaDBSSystemandaSetofPolicies

Since Taiwan has become an important member of the
international economic community, she needs a telecommunication
facility with a global orientation. It is essential for Taiwan to develop
an integrated international information system that is speedy and
accurate.

Since the establishment of such system is largely dependent on a
country's own information network infrastructure, the author suggests

53

54

that the dejelopmehtfilaiwan'sown DBS system is the most direct
a,_.t_1_g_i_*_hefifeetive,~ avenue for building its prosperity in. the future global
communication society. .At the same time, with such DBS television
programming transmission capacity, better signal reception as well as
more programming opportunities are possible for the television
audience in Taiwan.

Furthermore, almost every developed countries are heading in the
direction of DBS system, so Taiwan with its economic ability, should
. be following the trend and develope her own DBS system and policies
suitable for its unique social and economic environment.

PYom the author's view point, at least there are three advantages for

Taiwan to develope her DBS television programming services:

0)wa The reason why Japan

launched the DBS service is to improve its reception problem for
some 620,000 television households located on remote islands and
other rural areas.2 With Taiwan's geography, a DBS system would
substantially improve the signal reception. Furthermore, there are
additional functions which can be served by such DBS system. For
instance in : '

v‘l‘ele-education. The education quality has been evaluated to be
lower in the eastern mountainous areas and the island
communities outside of the main island of Taiwan due to the lack
of facilities and teachers.3 By utilizing the DBS system, it is possible
for these communities to share the instructors, teaching material
and curriculum planning resources with the schools in the main
islands. Another area is in:

‘VTele-medicine. Small community clinics, remote island, and
mountainous community hospitals may benefit from a medicine
network transmitter by the DBS system to assist in emergency
situations as well as training and on-job education provided by big
and more resourceful hospitals on the main island of Taiwan.4

55

 

Prior to 197 5 most Chinese television programs in South-East asia
were produced in Taiwan. However, after 1975 and especially in the '
mid 1980's. wesee a drastic shift towards Hong Kong-produced TV
programs and video tapes because by--using technically advanced
ngCia-l ”effects and equipments, r’Hong Kong has produced better
quality programs. Not suprising she has carved out a large market
share in Asia and has been maintaining this position up till today.

Besides, Hong Kong has launched "AsiaSat 1". She has been hailed
as having a technological superiority irf broadcasting over Taiwan and
is moving towards a new regional market--the DBS market in the
South-East Asia.5

Taiwan needs to establish a DBS broadcasting service to promote
her image in broadcasting and to compete efl'ectively with Hong Kong.
As it is, Taiwan is already late in the competition even though her
conception of a DBS system was earlier, but then there is still another
reason that warrants Taiwan to have a DBS system which sill be
discussed next.

 

Also, to deal with the fear of cultural invasion generated from
imported media programming services, establishing Taiwan's own DBS
broadcasting services may provide an effective cultural invasion
counter solution. . . . (

There are tremendous cOntroversies surrounding the issue of
launchingfil‘aiwan' s own communication Satellitesw' Those who oppose
the idea say that Taiwan with a small land mass, has a low frequency of
satellite utilization, and since her needs for channels can be
adequately handled by international satellite organizations, it is not
economical or feasible to spend so much money on developing a
satellite of her own. ’ It was estimated that to launch a DBS would cost I
Taiwan about NT $10 billion (approximately $400 million in the U.S.
dollars). This point is propounded by by Wang Chi, dean of the

grad
poin

requ

ten
the
Ion;
Chi
Wox

52116
Con

laux
Lee

56

graduate school of journalism at National Chengchi University. He
pointed out that from the standpoint of telecommunications
requirements, Taiwan indeed does not need to spend such a large
sum on developing her own satellite.6 Hsiung James C., professor of
the department of mass communication at TamKang University, has
suggested that a cooperative developing scheme with other countries
is more appropriate.7

Despite the opposition from the academic field, National Science
Council member Teng Chi-Fu believes that the value of commercial __
applications is certainly one factor to consider. He contended that " in '1
\quy private companies--especially multinational
corporations-- are going to use satellites to set up their own
telecommunications networks and it is a market with a lot of
potential."

From a technological stand point, "the ultimate goal of developing a
satellite is] to drive related industries and spur technological
upgrading," said Tseng Fan-Teng, vice-director of the
Telecommunications Training Institute in the Ministry of
Communications, who first advocated developing a satellite as early as
ten years ago in Taiwan.8

There is also the possibility of a cooperative venture between Hong

ng and Taiwan. Technically and economically it is a feasible idea but
this idea did not evolue (in fact was not even discussed) because both
countries have been competitors from the beginning. J {There is also
the political issue to contend with . By 1997, Hong Kong will be no
longer under the British sovereignty but become part of Mainland
China which is the political foe of Taiwan since the end of the Second
World War.

Based on these arguments the generally accepted notion is for a
satellite system. As a result, the chairman of the ational Science
Council. Hsia Han-Min. revealed in early July, 1989 that Taiwan will
launch its first low-orbit satellite in three to five years. And premier
Lee Huan made a clear promise on the undertaking in his final report

en
ob
dc

COI
pr

ttl-
at'

57

to overseas scholars at the 1989 National Development Seminar that
the DBS launching project will be executed.

A suggestion for the DBS system

The development of a DBS system can be divided into the
construction of the DBS software and hardware. The regulation of the
hardware facility, the DBS transmission and receiving equipments
should fall into the jurisdiction of the Telecommunications Bureau,
while the software of the system including the programming
production and planning would be under the television stations' and
the Information Bureau's responsibility. Both tasks are expected to
encounter difficulties judged by the current status of the television
industry in Taiwan.

Pertaining to the hardware development, the GIO would possibly
encounter economic, technological, and frequency appropriation
obstacles in its effort to establish the facility and obtain internationally
designated frequencies. It is anticipated that renting” transponders
and cooperate “with other neighboring countries in developing
cooperative regional DBS systems would be more feasible for Taiwan
patiently.

As for the development of DBS software programming, the three
television stations should form a consensus in exploiting quality and
attractive programs to compete with imported programs under the
Edgy; and supports from the GIO.

. In summary, the three bodies of the media environment, ie, the
. GIO, the Telecommunications Bureau and television stations need to
coordinate in the planning process as their functions are closely
linked together and the success of a DBS system is essentially
depending on the overall planning, administering and implementation
3 carried out by the three parties.

j 2.DevelopACableTelevisionSystem

i
1

As indicated before, with the already widespread of "Little Ears" in

in
PM

elul

[0

he;
to 1
cor

58

Taiwan, it is difficult to prohibit the use of satellite dish equipments
either technically or politically. Some researchers sauch as Tung-Tai
Lin,9 James C. Hsiung, and Kuo-Chou La11° have suggested to develop a
cable television system on the island to counter the undesirable
medium system already existing. __T_hi__s_ is a lesson learned from the

Memmerience.
/ In 1980's European countries also had a similar problem when the 5 ' I
! Russian DBS programming spill-over and was received by some ‘
European people unintentionally. It was also difficult for the
government authorities to stop the undesirable reception of these
Russian programs at that time. {The European communities finally
counter the problem by aggressively developing their own DBS system

as well as establishing or improving existing cable television services ,

to counter the foreign signalsfl. By utilizing the cable television g

i headend system as a gatekeeper, these European countries were able I”

, .
I

- -.*' .r
' s

I
.l

\\ to deliver the television signals, foreign or domestic, through a certain
content control process.1 1 \ {/0

These researchers who are in favour ‘ of a cable system have
gsuggested the authority in Taiwan to review the European experience
in solving the "Little Ears" dilemma. ,it is anticipated that besides
(legalizing the "Little Ears" mediumf the authority should also
aggessively develop its own DBS broadcasting service, and at the same
Jamehstart planning an island-wide cable television system which may
selectively -.deliver television. programs from recorded available foreign.
QBSmgrammming- (after the negotiation on the copyright issue),
domestic DBS programming, as well as cable-specific and existing
brpadcasting programming to the subscribers.

} Under such system infrastructure. the audience would be offered
“Am more programming choice in comparsion to the traditional
broadcasting system which is limited by the available frequency
spectrum. In addition, the development of cable television services
would provide a\ harrowcastingpprogramming" opportunity for the
minority taste audience vihgaare left unserved under the traditional

59

broadcasting system which limits its production goal to produce the
most common denominator programming. 5

)With the implementation of a cable television system in Taiwan it
create opportunities for more independent producers with the
availability of multiple channels and subsequently, stimulate
competition, variety and improvement in the quality of television
programs. Thus, viewers would be divested to local channels and the
threat of a cultural invasion generated from extensive viewing of
foreign programming would be drastically reduced.

It is clear that cable television services can be a’ strong competitor
to DBS services when one examines. the history, of the American
multichannel media industries. The United States‘fis one of the most
advanced countries in developing DBS systems but cable television
services have had a much higher penetration and gained much more
popularity in compahson to its DBS counterpart. As the American
'EaBie-M industry entered the new decade, it has reached a threshold
penetration of 50%. In comparison, the DBS service which was
started in 1981 when the FCC which had required a license to install a
TVRO lifted that requirement.12 has not really taken off after a decade
of evolution.

Although the media environment in Taiwan is obvisouly different
from the American market-driven system, the establishment of an
island-wide cable television system would ely provide an attractive
and feasible alternative television programming delivering system for
the audience in Taiwan. Furthermore. these muti-channel alternatives
have a competitive edge--it is broadcasted in mandarin uner the DBS
foreign programs which are mostly broadcasted in foreign languages.
Even though the cost of implementing such a system is expected to be
colossal, but considering the economic, social and technological
infrastructure implications, for the future information society, such a
cable system development.

As a matter of fact, there is a task force established by the GIO for
studying the possibility of implementing a cable television systems in

60

Taiwan. But, no substantial suggestions have been reported so far from
the task force.

In essence, DBS and cable television systems have their own
disadvantages as well as advantages. Awell planned infrastructure
which incorporates the two into a complementary telecommunication
system should be the best proposal for Taiwan today.

3 To Improve Television Programming

As mentioned briefly earlier, the lack of quality programming and
variety of programming is one of the main reasons for the people in
Taiwan to purchase "Little Ears". Thus, one area that the TV industry
must pay particular attention to is to improve both quality and quantity
of television programming in Taiwan.

In discussing the programming issue. the author would approach
the problems from three different perspectives:

r/(I) W. The first president of the
BBC network, Lord Reith, once pointed out that television is a cultural
business which should keep a balance in providing information,
education, and entertainment programs to the public. Most of the
democratic developed countries in the world also use such
information-education-entertainment balancing standard in planning
their public television system. Nevertheless, the
commercial ”television system in_ Taiwan has been predominated by
{eveauengven entertainment program for years. git was not until
1984, a public television station was establishe to provide the
audience in Taiwan with more cultural programming alternative.)~ In
general, even including the educational and cultural programming
furnished by the public television station, the entertainment
programming type is still prevailing the overall offering of the
television programs in Taiwan today. e balance of programming
types needs to be readdressed‘ in planning the new
telecommunications system on the island. ) In particular, more

i

.r'

61

international news and information coverage is needed.

1.12) 111W It is understandable for
entertainment programming type to predominate the television
content in a commercial broadcasting system as is the case in Taiwan.
However, entertainment programming does not mean low quality
programming. Unfortunately, the two are almost synonymous in the
Taiwanese media today. The current major content approaches of
entertainment programming include: (a) variety shows (b) game
shows (c) Kung-Fu drama or Chinese puppet show. All these
programs seem to aim at attracting the largest possible number of
audience. The game shows produced are one of very low quality: the
variety shows are filled with low taste comedian jokes: violent acts
dominated Kung-Fu movie with very simple plots. Lately, even puppet
shows are filled with violence. According to the 1989 Chinese New
Year television viewers' behavior conducted by Rain Maker Company
(Table 6), only 9% of the interviewees were satisfied with the
entertainment programs provided by the three commercial stations
during the new year period. Over 20% of the audience criticized that
the available entertainment programsare boring, repetitive and of very
low quality. Some audience even suggested that the television stations
should import more foreign television programs to replace these
distasteful shows.

(13%.th There are four major

kinds of program sources in Taiwan: (a) self-produced programs
which are produced by and broadcasted by the individual television
stations (b) simulcasting programs--produced by other stations but are
universally broadcasted in all stations (c) imported porgrams
including cartoons, drama series, and theatrical or made-for-TV
movies (d) independently produced programs including
semi-independent and totally independent programs.

A self-produced program is proposed, developed, and produced by

62

a television station's own production division. On the other hand, a
semi-independent program is produced by a station's contracted
independent producers, while a totally independent program is
developed and produced by independent production houses,
independent producers, advertising agencies or even a certain
advertisers' account executive. Since these television programs are
produced outside of the stations and have no direct production
connection or supervision from any television stations' programming
development divisions, they are called independently produced
programs.

The creation of such independent programs, especially the
advertiser-supported independent programs, is evolved from the
following forces:

(1) Station advertising competition: In competing for advertising
dollars, the three commercial stations are facing pressures from big
account advertisers and allowing such advertiser-produced programs
is a good business practice to build good station-client relationships.

(2) Conflict between marketing and production: Station producers
often have different program production ideology with the station
marketing department and its advertising clients. As a result, the
advertisers are unsatisfied and looked for alternatives to their own
production units. ‘

(3) Advertising agency interference: Advertising agencies are
becoming more familiar with telecasting and thus desiring to be more
involved with the production process. When there is a conflict of
interest, they first interfere with the station production, then they may
boycott the program, or finally decide to produce their own programs
to best coordinate with their overall promotion plans.

(4) Budget cutting: The three commercial stations are all facing
budget cutting due to losses in the recent years. Independently
produced programs. either semi-or totally independent, can help to
reduce the programming production cost. Furthermore, by

63

broadcasting the advertiser-supported productions.the stations can
generate broadcasting time as well as commercialspots revenues and
even sell more block commercial spots to the advertisers. Such
business practices are welcomed during this period of station financial
difficulties

In general, it is expected that the programming content of those
advertiser-related programs would not only be easily influenced by the
involved advertisers (or agencies), but are actually directly controlled
by these advertisers (or agencies). Furthermore, since the three
commercial stations merely execute the actual "broadcasting" process
of these programs and collect the broadcasting fees and commercial
spots charges for the broadcasting of these programs, they are not
participating in any script writing, editing, or production process of
the indepedently produced programs. Thus, the stations do not have
the mafibility nor the authority to control the quality of these
programs.

Nevertheless, according to the survey done by James Lee, among
the three commercial stations in Taiwan, the Taiwan Television
Station has devoted approximately 52% of its programming time to
the independently produced programs and only 23.7%. of its programs
is self-produced in the station. The China Television Station has a
slightly own independent program percentage. Independently
produced programs account for 40% while self-produced programs
account for 33%. Finally, the Chinese Television Station has
approximately 52% of its programming independently produced
while only 22.6% is produced in the station. )’With such overwhelming
percentages of programming which is develciped outside the stations
and very often under the influence of advertisers, how can the three
stations control and further improve the quality of their
programming? It is understandable that the general audience prefers
the imported television programs which are free of such production
pitfalls.)I

/"

64

The author has three suggestions concerning the issue of

programming quality:

(la/the three television stations should reduce the amount of
broadcasting time of the advertiser-supported independently
produced programs either through self-regulation or governmental

'_.__._--.k.__-

m...’_.

system should be activated for both programs produced inside and
outside of the stations.

In particular, for the self-produced programs, a detailed production
quality control system should by established for every stage of the
production process. And for those independently produced programs.
an evaluation system with specific guidelines should be developed to
screen out the programs which are of unacceptable quality or cOntent.
The British Independent Broadcast' 5 evaluation system is a very good
example for such screening procedure. With 100% independently
produced programs, the IBA established a very good program
screening process to select programs (except news programs) to be
broadcasted in the network under some predetermined picture,
script. and overall content standards.13 Such critical quality control
system has resulted in the acquisition of consistently well produced
programs for the British network.

(2)" A better programming balance of the informative (news),
education and entertainment programming types should be
readdressed to all the stations.

(3)/To improve the news and cultural programming in both quality
and quantity aspects so as to fulfil the goal of television as a cultural
business.

The latter two suggestions implies that GIO has to review her

65

current policies and regulation. For example, the GIO has to relax the
30% maxium air-time for foreign movies. This relaxation is necessary
so th t the three stations can air more foreign programs and remain
cpm etitive.

om the above discussions, we can see that the future prospects of
the Taiwan TV industry depends on the functions of the three key
bodies. The LO which screen and recommend domestically
produce movies and foreign movies to be broadcasted. The

mm!”-

Telecommunication Bureau should be held responsible for the DBS .
£51168} and transmISSion and co-ordination with other countries for
DBS relays. As for the DBS software programming, they come under
the/purview of the three stations» Besides, these defined
responsibilities there is a need for close co- -ordination and mutual
support among these three bodies. This is particularly important for

an inexperience country that is dealing with a modern technology.

 

REFERENCES
Chapter V

l. "Launching of AsiaSat I Sending Colony Into Execusive New
Orbit", 13W, July 30, 1990.

AsiaSat I, can't be received on a ku-band dish ("Little Ear" which
is only between 0.75m to 1.2m wide), a 2.5m to 3m wide C-band dish
is required.

2. Gi Wu, "To Discuss Japanese DES and Relative Problems".
fldipzTV, no.49, March 1986, p.66.

3. Chang, Chih-Weng, "Satellite communication in Taiwan", Pao
Hsueh, June, 1987, pp.130-l38.

4. Margaret Scott, "Dishing the Rules", r mi
Barley, June 14, 1990, pp.34-39.

5. Ibid.
6. Jen Liou Lih, W, Vol. 14, no. 9, September 1989, p. 88.
7. Jen Liou Lih, Ibid. p. 99.
8. Jen Liou Lih, Ibid. p. 100.

9. The chairperson of Mass communication Department in
Tamkang University, Taipei, Taiwan.

10. Assistant professor of the Jounalism Department in the
University of Cheng-Chih, Taipei, Taiwan.

1 1. Chen-Gei Chang, "Satellite Communication and Cultural
Evasion", W, Ibid. pp. 71-74.

12. Ebel, A. James, TV/Radio Age, 1987, March 16, 1987, p. 100.

13. Burton Paulu, "The Independent Broadcasting Authority",

Television ad Radio in the United Kingdpn, 1981, pp.57-82.

66

4‘

VI CONCLUSION

Summary and Conclusion

In the early 1960's, space fiction Arthur Clarke said, "What we are
building now is the nervous system of mankind. The communications
network, in which the satelites will be modal points, will enable
people to flicker like lightning back and forth across the face of this
planet. They will be able to go anywhere and meet anyone, at any
time, without stirring from their homes....all the museums and
libraries of the world will be extensions of this new rooms."1

This quotation reflects two key points. First, the domination of
satellite communication in the future (which we are experiencing
now). Second, the inqusitive nature of human beings to know about
the world and people around us.

Pertaining to the first issue--the domination of satellite
communication--it is particularly important to modern and developing
countries. In this "Global village" era, information and the speed of
obtainning these information are critical. The transfer of such
information is only possible. through satellite communication
presently.

I Taiwan is a developing country and has been seeking technological

f advancement for more than three decades. This is reflected in her
; industrialized program. In this decade she is facing a new challenge
' in one area that she has never experienced before--that of satellite
communication.

When Authur Clarke made that speech in the early 1960's, Taiwan

has just started her first TV station. From a humble beginning with

the emphasis of TV as a medium for education and government

information, Taiwan's TV industry has shifted towards information and
entertainment. This shift resulted from higher literacy levels

‘ developing more informational programs and affluence information
lead to more leisure time: thus, demanding more entertainment

67

68

programs.

Because of the G10 rulings and organization of the three stations
together with the subsidiary production units-the deImanding viewers
are not satisfied. This explains why when VCRs and pre-recorded
video cassettes were introduced in the early 80's, their demand
mushroomed. because they have provided another alternative for
E11113- Because of the eminence of pre-recorded video tapes, they
provided an impetus for upgrading (although minimal) to the three
TV stations.

By the end of 1984, just as the VCR approached maturity and
competition seems to level off, the TV industry faced another
competitor MCI! is more (dynamic and technologically
advanced -TVRO-I-more widely known in Taiwan a.{"Little Ears")

The "Little Ears" in essence, captures the spill-over signals from
the Japanese satellite BS-2a. The popularity and growth of "Little
\ Ears" in Taiwan reflects the second key point in Authur Clarke's
quotation ie., the inquisitive nature of human beings to know more
about the world and people around us. This is because program from
JNHK -1 and NHK- 2 via the DBS are mainly international
news-information and sports. It is mainly the curiosity to know what
is beyond Taiwan that lead to illegal installations even during the
Martial Law years.

Not surprising with fthelifting of Martial Law in 1987 (a critical
political reform) and the adoption of "laissez-faire" by the reformed
government together with 'a distinguishing economic growth of Taiwan
during this period and accompanying affluence. the demand and
popularity of "Little Ears" blossomed.
geside this political reform and economic well being, the cultural

tion with Japan in the past also has a significant influence? This
cultural affiliation in the past has a significant impact especially/2m the
older generation who had undergone Japanese education system and
culture and therefore, welcome Japanese programs. With a taste of
better programs via the "Little Ears", the already poorly rated

69

Taiwanese programs received harsher criticisms. This caused even
greater diversions form locally produced programs to foreign
channels.

Naturally then, this diversion will have a negative impact on the

advertisement revenues of the TV industry which is the critical -
97661-633? rewind? for the TV stations. Presently, the three stations
have felt a decline in advertisement revenue and this decline is
expected to plunge further once JSB participates in the upcoming
BS-3. In fact, the "Little Ears" has given an opportunity and a
extremely valid reason for the TV stations to upgrade their needs to
improve programs and for the GIO to seriously consider her inflexible
regulations. ‘ Another negative impact of "Little Ears" is that of
acculturation. As it is Taiwan has a history of Japanese amliation. With
the availability of DBS hardware -- to receive Japanese programs, the
cultural sovereignty of Taiwan is at stake.

The first challenge faced by the Taiwanese authority is the
establishment of a DBS system. It is feasible for Taiwan to have a DBS
system considering that she has become an important member of the
international economic community. Taiwan need a telecommunication
facility with a global orientation.

A system is not complete without a set of operating policies and
regulations. The current policy of "no policy" is not a solution whether
short or longnterm. There is an urgent need for the Taiwanese
government to draft out a practical set of policies and accompanying
regulations before the Japanese launch the BS-3 satellite with JSB
participating in it. -- -

Another prospect or challenge is for Taiwan to develope a? cable

--._ __--—-¢r
_ ,~-.»
7“.-. ._.----'

television system. Taiwan can learn from the European experience in
Whereby‘the cabIe TV services is used as a complementary
systM combat undesirable reception of the Russian TV systems.
/\The cable system also provides opportunities for independent
:producer, stimulates competition and creates variety in TV programs.

“~ ; Last but not least. the TV industry need to improve both the quality

70

and quantity of television program in Taiwan.) Presently, low quality
entertainment programs dominate Taiwanese} programs. There is a
lack of international information or news and other quality programs
that the Taiwanese viewers thirst for. In addidtion, local TV stations
and producers need to upgrade their programs and productions as
well.

_~ At first sight, it seems that since the launching of DBS-2a Taiwan is

I faced with an informidable crisis. But, as the old Chinese saying goes,
"Crisis comes with opportunities as well" the situation in Taiwan is not
hopeless. Instead it‘ poses challenges to the future prospects of the
TV industry in Taiwan and if these challenges are well managed they
will launch Taiwan into a new era in Telecommunication in line with
the developed countries and reap the benefits of this modern

technology.

The Prospects for Future Research

This study traces the factors contributing to the growth of TVRO in
Taiwan and its impacts. However, there are certain observations and
areas in which the study has revealed and worthy of further research
but are beyond the scope of this study.

The first observation, as noted in the last section, is that the
Japanese programs via themNBm BS-2a, not only appealed to the older
generations (who were under the Japanese imperialistic rule) but also
the younger generations. In fact, the latter is influenced more than
the former. A research on the impact of the TVRO on the social strata
is definitely challenging.

Since the aim of establishing a DBS system, from the point of view
of the Taiwanese government is to counter Japanese media influences
while at the same time, reap the benefits from the DBS and enhance
her cultural presence in South-East Asia via TV transmissions, a
research must be conducted to detemmine if the DBS system above is
sufficient for the detemence. As mentioned in the study, a
combination of cable TV and DBS may be the optional means to do so.

71

Next, a research is necessary as (firtain the competitive effects of
Hong Kong's DBS on Taiwan and South-East Asia. As noted in this
study, culturally Hong Kong and Taiwan are similar and both countries
are aggressive rivals in seeking to dominate the South-East Asian
market with their TV productions. Each country hass considered
using DBS as a medium. The primary issue, hence, concerns
first-mover advantage, ceteris paribus. It seems that Hong Kong has a
headstart in developing a DBS system. Thus, a research on
competitvie strategies is required before embarking on this colossal

project.

Implications

From the study that the author have conducted, the growth of
’II‘VRO's has been contributed to primarily by the poor quality in TV
programs and MUN Iquantity of imported programs. It is of these

two qualitative and quantitative aspects that drive viewers to turn to
the more appealing Japanese DBS which provides both quality and
more foreign programs. Furthermore, because Taiwan is experencing
the common phenomenon of increasing materialism during its recent
economic growth, the purchasing of "Little Ears" do not only provide
an alternative media choice, but are also symbol of social status and
. prestige. ’
“W‘erespect to the quantity of imported programs, the TV stations
I have been coatrainted by GIO regulations that specifically set the
3 programming guidelines under four content classifications. For the
entertainment classification we find that for the three TV stations the
percentages range from thirty-five to forty-six percent only. Another
I) constraint involves limiting the number of imported TV programs.
E Hence, viewers are to be contented with what is being aired by the
\ three stations and in terms of production quality, there is not much
forei pur competition and upgrading.
With the launching of the BS-2a by NHK, within a short period of

me, the marks of the footprint of the BS-2a became noticeable.

 

72

Satellite dishes sprung up like mushrooms on roof-tops, local stations
lost viewership and advertising revenues and , perhap most dreadful of
all, cultural declination. ‘

To dismiss the issue of ’I cultural imperialism on the premise that
Taiwan is not an under-developed country and hence will not be
subjected to it is a fallacy. Taiwan is a unique case. Japan and the U.S-
have made significant technological contributions in the formative
years of the TV industry. There is a technological biase in adaptation.
Furthermore, Taiwan has been dominated historically by J apan, and
until today a tint of Japanese influence still persist.

The Author is convinced that ever since the growth of "Little Ears",
"Japanization" of the younger generation is strong and distinct. (The
interesting point to note is that these younger generations-youth and
teenagers are not the ones who were under the political domination
which their grandparents received.) This tendency raised concerns
over the dilution of their native culture by the Japanese "pop" culture.

REFERENCES

Chapter VI

1. Bhattacharya, Vivek Ranjan, Qemmpmeadpn m A Glepal Village,
Chetana Publications, New Delhi, 1976, p.98.

73

TABLES

74

 

Table 1 : The Growth of TV Hardware

 

 

 

Year 1962 1978 1987 1988
Station 2 3 3 3
Investment
(0551.000) 750 14.175 29.675 78.850
Transmission
tower 2 24 38 38
Output power 5.1 128.8 284.8 336.8
of transmitter

kw kw kw kw
Studio 2 17 20 23
Camera 4 64 123 N
TV Program B/W color color color
ReCeive North- Taiwan & national- national
frame Taiwan remote- wide wide
r .

islands

 

 

 

 

 

 

**Source :
1. Television Yearbook of the Reppblic of China
1962-1975. Taipei. Taiwan. 1976.
2. Television Yearbook of the Republic of China
1986-1987. Taipei. Taiwan. 1988.

3. Collected from three TV stations by the Author.

75

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 2 : Composition of TTV Prograns (1962-1969)
mn/% news edu. pub. ent. con. ave.

& a per
year inf. cul. ser. week
1962 26.86% 26.94% 10.59% 34.56% 1.05% 2.275mn
1963 14.14% 21.72% 11.52"6 47.07% 5.55% 2.560Inn
1964 13.32% 16.50% 13.39% 47.37% 9.42% 2,740mn
1965 11.97% 15.15% 12.55% 49.83% 10.5096 3,050mn
1966 12.15% 13.08% 12.00% 50.00% 12.77% 3.210mn
1967 12.84% 11.49% 11.34% 49.25% 15.08% 3,35omn
1968 11.65% 11.55% 11.01% 49.68% 16.11% 3,720mn
1969 11.60% 11.24% 10.65% 53.83% 12.68% 4.180mn

**Source : Television Yearbook of the Republic of China

 

1962-1975.

**mn=minute

inf.=information

edu.=education

cul.=culture

pub.=public

ser.=service

ent.=entertainment

com.=commercials

Taipei.

Taiwan.

1976.

 

76

 

Table 3 : The Following Data Compare the Penetration of

Video Media in Taiwan : (January 1989)

 

TV 99.2%
VCR 79.0%
The Fourth Channel 6.3%
TVRO -- Little Ear (Ku-band) 4.0%

-- Big Ear (C-band) 0.7%

 

 

 

 

*N=649
**Source : United Advertising Company. A Report on the
Audience Viewing Behavior of Alternative

Media for Broadcast: Television. Taipei.
Taiwan. 1989.

77

 

 

 

 

 

Table 4 : Viewing Habits of VCR Household by Day-part

Weekdays Saturday 1 Sunday

% % %

morning 2.3 1.8 36.3
afternoon 16.6 49.7 46.7
evening
19:00-- 20.0 14.5 12.6
21:00-- 45.1 24.2 14.1 .
23:00-- 20.0 15.2 . 8.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

 

 

 

 

 

*sample size : 649
515 household with VCR
**Source : United Advertising Company. A Report on the
Agdience Viewing Behavior of Alternative Media

for Broadcast: Television. Taipei. Taiwan. 1989.

78

 

Table 5 : The Degree of the Audience's Satisfaction
with the TV Programs (1984)

 

 

 

very satisfied 1.08%
satisfied 19.28%
unsatisfied 53.00%
very unsatisfied 6.73%
no comment 19.91%
Total 100.00%

 

 

 

79

 

Table 6

The Degree of the Audience's Satisfaction

with the TV Programs (1989)

 

 

 

F

satisfied 9.0%
unsatisfied 28.0%
no comment 63.0%
Total 100.0%

 

 

 

80

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inc.. Taipei.

2. Data :

3. sample size

4. To use 900 as
”Little Ears”
To use 612 as

"Little Ears”

Table 7 : Survey of the Demand for I'Little Bars" in
Taipei Metropolitan Area*

household have not TVRO have TVRO
annual income % %
US$15.000 26.0 2.0
US$15 I 000--

23.000 19.6 0.3
US$23.000--

30.000 15.1 0.7
US$30.000--

46.000 9.3 1.8
*USS46.000 2.5 0.8
Rejected answer 21.6 0.3
TOTAL 94.1 5.9 ’
*1. This survey was conducted by Rain Maker Industrial

Taiwan.

02/09/89-02/10/89

900
612 respondents. about 68% are familiar
with ”Little Bars”. 36% of the respondents

has "Little Ears" at home.
base--the percentage of household with
is 36/900=4.0%

base--the percentage of household with

is 36/612=5.9%

81

 

(B) The Possibility of Non-owner to Install "Little Bar”

in the Future

 

 

 

BB annual yes not sure no
income % % %
US$15.000-- 5.2 8.3 14.0

US$15.000-

23.000 4.7 6.8 9.3
US$23.000-- 3.1 5.2 7.8

30.000
US$30.000-

46.000 1.7 2.4 5.7
US$46.000+ 0.9 0.7 1.0
Rejected answer 6.1 6.1 11.0

.TOTAL % 21.7 29.5 48.8

 

 

 

 

 

 

82

 

(C) The Motive for Purchasing ”Little Ears"

 

 

 

 

Reason number %
To watch something difference

from other countries 16 44.4
Apartment owned 5 13.9
To flaunt wealth 4 11.1
To learn language 4 11.1
To attract more customers

(business needed) 3 8.3
To be aware of the programs from

the three stations 2 5.6
More diversities 2 5.6

Total 36 100.0

 

 

 

 

83

 

Table 8 : What is your opinion about 'Japanization' of

young people in Taiwan?.

 

 

 

worried 42.0%
unnecessary to worry 36.3%
no opinion 12.5%
don't know 9.2%
Total 100.0%

 

 

 

*Source : SinoramaI Taipei. Taiwan. Dec. 1988/Jan. 1989.

p. 19

84

 

 

 

 

Table 9 : Normal Weekday Program Schedules of TTV. CTV
and CTS
TTV CTV CTS
6:20 Cartoon 12:00 Midday 5:00 Educational
’:30 Special Report news programs
on Current Affairs 12:30 Puppet 11:40 Midday News
----------------------- Show 12:30 Government
11:35 Agricultural News 1:00 Drama series Program
12:00 Variety Show 2:00 Woman's 1:00 Educational
12:30 Midday News Program programs
1:00 Educational 4:40 News 4:00 Sports
Programs Reports
2:30 TTV News Report 5:00 Cartoons 5:30 Children's
3:00 Variety Show 6:00 Children's Programs
3:30 Chinese Opera Programs 6:30 Soap Opera
5:00 Cultural Program 7:00 Chian Review 7:00 variety
5:30 Children Programs (introduction Show
and Cartoons of Mainland
6:30 Game Show China) 7:30 Evening
7:00 Variety Show 7:30 Evening News News
7:30 Evening News 8:00 Soap Opera 8:00 Soap Opera
8:00 Soap Opera 9:00 Nature Films 9:00 Educational
9:00 News Magazine 9:30 News Magazinei Drama
Program Program 9:30 Variety
9:30 Variety Show Show
10:30 TTV World Report 11:00 Cultural 11:00 Imported
11:00 Variety Show Program Program
11:30 Latenight
News
12:00

 

Imported Program
P

--Dynasty

 

 

 

85

 

Table 10 : The Taiwanese Preference of the 1988 TV

Broadcasting Olympic Game between Domestic
TV Station and NHK

 

 

 

 

Preference Percentage
Domestic Stations 8%
NHK 58%
Not sure 16%
No comment 18%
Total 100%

 

 

 

86

 

Table 11 : Weekly Average Time and Percentages Devoted
to Program Types Among TTV. CTV and CTS in 1987

 

 

 

Types of TTV CTV CTS
Programs % % %
News & Public 22.70 19.91 22.57
Information

Education & 26.79 21.98 31.04
Culture

Public Service 10.97 12.08 11.75
Entertainment 39.54 46.03 34.64
Total minute (100%) 4.845 4.882 6.709

 

 

 

 

 

87

 

Table 12 : Weekly Time and Percentages Devoted to Program
Type on NHK Channel 11 and 15

 

 

 

 

Types of NHK-1 Channel 15 NHK-2 Channel 11
Programs % %

News & Public 44.79 18.85
Information

Education & 4.29 41.78
Culture

Public Service 3.07 8.81
Entertainment 0.00 23.47
Sport 47.85 7.09
Total minute (100%) 9.780 10.160

 

 

 

 

88

 

 

 

 

Table 13 : Normal Weekday Program Schedules of NHK-1
and NHK-2 '
NHK-1 (Channel 15) NHK-2 (Channel 11)
04:00 World News or Special 04:00 Goodmornign Satellite
Sports Event 04:30 Senior Citizen Program*
06:00 World News (U.S.A.) 05:00 English Conversation
07:00 World News 06:00 NHK Morning News and
(Europe and U.S.A.) Weather
10:00 Tokyo Stock Market 07:15 Family Programs
7 Financial News Report 08:40 Cooking Programs
10:50 World News 09:05 Family. Woman Program
12:00 Japanese Wresting 10:55 News and Weather
contest 12:00 Music
14:00 Tokyo Stock Market 12:05 Soap Opera
Financial News Report 14:00 Japanese Wresting
14:45 World Weather Report
15:00 A Tour of Japanese 16:00 HDTV Experiment
Cultural and Social 17:00 Children Program
Introduction of Japan 18:00 News and Weather
16:00 The Tour of France 18:30 orchestra Performance
Bicycling Event 21:00 French Art--
17:00 Beat '89--movie. music Painting
17:30 World News speical-- 23:00 Beat '89
CNN. A-2. ABC. ZDF. BBC 23:30 Music
19:00 American Professional 00:30 Documentaries or
20:45 Today's Japan Travelogs
21:00 Sports (1989 Wimbledon 01:45 Educational Program
Tennis) 02:30 Music
02:00 World News 03:00 Educational Program

 

 

 

89

 

Table 14 : The Preferences of Viewing Time for

”Little Ears" (N=36.

Multiple choices)

 

 

 

 

 

Time period number %
8:00 - 9:00 pm 25/36 69.4
9:00 -10:00 pm 17/36 47.2
10:00 -11:00 pm 10/36 27.8
7:00 - 8:00 pm 7/36 19.4
11:00 -12:OOpm 4/36 11.1
1:00 - 2:00 pm 3/36 8.3
2:00 — 3:00 pm 3/36 8.3
3:00 > 4:00 pm 2/36 5.6

 

 

90

 

 

 

 

 

Table 15 : The Content Preferences of ”Little Ears”
Programs : (N=36)

Type of programs number %
Variety shows 14 39.0
News 9 25.0
Series 7 19.4
Sightseeing of the Mainland China 4 11.1
Travelling 2 5.5
TOTAL 36 100.0

 

 

 

 

*Source : Rain Maker Industrial Inc.. Taipei. Taiwan. 1989

FIGURES

91

FIGURE 1 : A DIRECT BROADCASTING SATELLITE
SYSTEH

 

  
 
   
   
  

satellite signals

.....
ccccc

......
......

......
nnnnnn
nnnnnnn
oooooooo
uuuuuuuuuu

  
 

uuuuuuuuuu
.........
.....

satellite signals

receiving
antenna
indoor electronics

p-
(descrambler and
channel selector)
‘5-

 

 

L-KIEJ

 

 

standard optional connection
TV 59‘ to stereo unit

92

FIGURE 2: AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH IN TAIWAN (S)

(A) Gross National Product

 

19508 8.2

 

 

 

 

19608 g.

 

 

 

 

19708 10.2

 

 

 

 

 

1986 11.7

 

 

 

1987 1L9

 

 

 

 

 

1988 7,3

 

 

W8 MW! W77

(ZASUVIBZZZ/QZAC’
l/9.7

 

93

FIGURE 2: AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH IN TAIWAN (3)
(5) Per Capito GNP

 

19503 4_3

 

 

 

 

19608 6.2

 

 

 

 

19705 8.1

 

 

 

 

'955 10.4

 

 

 

 

1987

 

 

 

 

1988 6.2

 

 

 

PE? @AIPWFA WP

(05:? J
5, 05.7

 

94

FIGURE 3: II‘IPROVEI‘IENT IN STANDARD OF LIVING IN TAIWAN

(A) Changes in Level of Consumption

 

1968

(BASE YEAR) '00

 

 

1978
185

 

 

 

 

1988 320

 

 

 

Average annual growth (3)

 

1969-78

1979-88

 

95
(8) Consumption Pattern (z)
B 6. T —- Beverages and Tobacco

c -- Clothing

E “ Education and Recreation
F -- Food
H -— Housing

T -- Transportation

 

1968

 

1978

 

 

** SourcezTaiwan ROC. Economic Development Council for
Economic Planning and Development, i989