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The Discourse of Chinese Marxism:
A Case Study 0F the Thought 0F
Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao beFore the Turn
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presented by 1

Alex Woshun Chan

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THE DISCOURSE OF CHINESE MARXISM:
A CASE STUDY OF THE THOUGHT OF
CHEN DUXIU AND LI DAZHAO BEFORE THE TURN OF 1920
by

Alex Woshun Chan

A THESIS

Submitted to

Michigan State University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

MASTER OF ART

Department of Sociology

 

 

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ABSTRACT
THE DISCOURSE OF CHINESE MARXISM:
A CASE STUDY OF THE THOUGHT OF
CHEN DUXIU AND LI DAZHAO BEFORE THE TURN OF 1920
By

Alex Woshun Chan

This thesis studies how Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao interpreted Marxism before
the tum of 1920. Data are collected through comparative textual analysis, with
particular attention to how specific words are used, and how arguments are arranged.
I argue that their interpretation was shaped by a particular discursive pattern called
moral discourse. This moral discourse was a product of complex interaction among
the voluntaristic language bequeathed by traditional Chinese culture, the structural
effects of a newly formed public sphere, and the historical conjunction of
deinstitutionalization of discourse. Theoretically, this thesis is intended as a critique
of the objective approach to sociology of knowledge. A discursive approach is
proposed, primarily treating knowledge as discourse. The purpose is to persuade

sociologists to take language into account seriously.

 

Copyright by
W0 SHUN CHAN
1991

 

Preface

By conventional rule, a preface is put before the content. But I guess most
authors write it at last of his drafting. In my case, I would like to take this
opportunity to remind the readers that this thesis is about Chinese Marxism as moral
discourse. Therefore, the focus is on moral discourse, not Marxism as such. As the
following content should lay bare, I take the interpretation of Marxism by Chen
Duxiu and Li Dazhao as one moment in the vicissitude of discourse in modern
Chinese history.

I would like to thank Professor Kevin Kelly, my Chair in the committee,
Professor Steve Averill and Professor Chris Vanderpool for their generous support
and precious criticism. In particular, Professor Averill pressed me most for a better
thesis which left me with indelible impression of his utmost seriousness in research.
This is what I really learnt from his good self. Thanks are also dedicated to Wang
Guanghua, Lu Yan, Lee Pak Chul, and Tu Su-hao for their helps in various ways.

Madison, February 10, 1991.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENT
PREFACE
CHAPTER
I. Introduction
H. Theory and Method
Objective Approach to Sociology of Knowledge
Critique of the Objective Approach to Sociology of Knowledge
The Discursive Approach
Method
III. Chinese Marxism as Moral Discourse
The Concept of Moral Discourse
The Handling of Truth — Logical Consistency
The Handling of Truth - Systematic Explanation
(1) Revolution
(2) Capitalism
(3) Socialism
The Handling of Rightness
Chinese Marxism, Voluntarism and Moral Discourse
IV. Public Sphere and Deinstitutionalization of Discourse
Voluntaristic Language as Chinese Culture
Moral Discourse and Public Sphere
Moral Discourse and Deinstitutionalization of Discourse
V. Concluding Remarks
APPENDIX
BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHAPTER I Introduction

This thesis is done with two purposes. Empirically, it is interested in how
Chinese intellectuals made sense of Marxism at the early days when it was received
into China. Chinese Marxism has long been characterized as a kind of voluntarism.
I would argue that this voluntarism emerged during the turn of the 1920 due to an
articulation of Marxism that was shaped by a moral discourse. This discursive pattern
was a product of complex interaction among structural, language and historical factors.
The second purpose is theoretical. It intends to demonstrate the inadequacy of an
objective approach which has played a central role in traditional sociology of
Imowledge. This thesis argues that in addition to structural factors, sociology of
knowledge has to take intersubjective factors, namely language, into account. A
complex explanation with an emphasis on the interplay between social structure and
language is proposed.

It has been generally admitted that the Chinese interpretation of Marxism is
highly voluntaristic (Gouldner 1980; Meisner 1967: 266; Goldman 1973: 246; Schram
1967: 266). Robert Jay Lifton once argued that Maoism
’assumes two things:...the human mind as infinitely malleable, capable Of being
reformed, transformed, and rectified without limit. The second is a related vision of
the will as all-powerful, even to the extent that The subjective creates the Objective.’
(Lifton 1970: 153)

In short, this voluntarism is summarized as an emphasis on the voluntaristic energy
of the self, as well as an optimistic belief in the potential of voluntaristic
transformation of the reality. This thesis argues that voluntaristic interpretation of
Marxism could be discerned even at the initial stage of its reception during the turn
of the 1920. Moreover, this voluntarism was characterized by a systematic neglect of

structural factors. Attention was consistently drifted to the moral force existing on the

l

2
individual level, while structural force on the supra—individual level like institution or
system was obscured. Comparing to the Marxist concepts of class and capitalism
which are structural, the Chinese voluntaristic reading was obvious.

So far, there has been two explanations of voluntarism in Chinese Marxism.
First, it is treated as a reflection of objective situation (Gouldner 1980; Meisner 1979:
101-16). This is also the domain assumption of the objective approach to sociology
of knowledge. Second, voluntarism is explained as a Chinese value deeply rooted into
the indigenous culture. Arguing against Weber’s judgment of Chinese culture as
stagnant, Metzger asserts that the voluntaristic impulse towards total societal
transformation can be found within Confucianism, especially the Mencian line (1977:
21 1—4).

This thesis will argue for a third explanation, that voluntarism in Chinese
Marxism is a product of a complex interaction between objective structural and
intersubjective language factors. More specifically, I will contend that the voluntarism
of Chinese Marxism could be discerned even at the beginning stage of its reception,
due to a moral discourse which was determined by both the formation of public
sphere and a corresponding voluntaristic language in a historically specific context of
deinstitutionalization of discourse. This moral discourse, as I conceive, corresponded
to an emerging public sphere in the culturally specific context of China in 1910s. In
short, this thesis proposes a new approach towards the explanation of voluntarism in
early Chinese Marxism. It was accounted as a moral discourse which was a product

of a complex interplay among structural, language and historical factors.

 

 

CHAPTER II Theory and Method
Objective Approach to Sociology of Knowledge

Karl Marx and Karl Mannheim remain the most familiar figures when one comes
to sociology of knowledge. Together their work indicated an objective approach to
sociology of knowledge. This chapter intends to give a critique to this approach. In
addition, a new framework is proposed which I shall call discursive. This discursive
approach will be the theoretical framework of our analysis of the emerging character
of Chinese Marxism at the turn of the 1920.

If there is one concept which can define the central focus of the objective
approach to sociology of knowledge, it is probably ideology. The point of departure
of this approach is the working assumption that knowledge is ideology. In addition,
ideology is essentially defined by its determinate relationship to objective factors. It
originates from an attempt to transcend the psychological and idealistic approach in
which production of knowledge is conceived as mysterious, intuitive, or visionary. The
revelation or prophetic model of knowledge with its origin in the religious tradition,
together with the claim in the philosophical tradition, which can be traced back to
Plato, of contemplation as the source of knowledge, are fundamentally challenged. In
contrast, the concept of ideology is objective, in the sense that it can be explained
adequately without reference to psychological elements. For the moment, we will stick
to this minimal definition of the objective approach to sociology of knowledge, in
which the attributed cause of production of knowledge is objective.

Ideology is not an empirical concept. No one can deny that the production of
knowledge involves an active process of analysis and imagination. Ideology is entirely

a methodological concept, based on the assumption that knowledge can be adequately

explained by objective factors. This group of objective factors is variously conceived
as base and capitalist mode of production in Marx’s analysis, and existence and
historical situation in Mannheirn’s work.

The notion of determination gives shape to the central problematic of this
objective approach to sociology of knowledge. The Marxian dictum that social being
determines social consciousness is perhaps the most condensed expression which
highlights the whole paradigm. However, the central problem of the objective
approach to sociology of knowledge also lies in the inherent ambiguity of this notion
of determination.

In the Marxian tradition, there has been two conceptions of determination.
Economism, which is connected to Stalinism and Marxism of the Second
International, contends that the determinate relationship between base and
superstructure is linear, unilateral and immediate. The superstructure is an
"epiphenomenon," a linear reflection of the base. Everything can be deduced from an
analysis of this base because the superstructure is unilaterally determined, and is a
function of it. Furthermore, the relationship is direct and immediate. The
superstructure is governed by the base through "objective" law rather than mediated
through "subjective" will. In short, it can be called a mechanical determination.

As demonstrated in subsequent history, economism was severely criticized as
untruthful to history, too mechanical in explaining human phenomena and too
dogmatic. Two amendments were subsequently made. First, the idea of linear
determination was replaced by the notion of "limitation of possibilities" (McMurtry
1978: 161-5). The base was conceived as determining the superstructure, not by
directly and mechanically fixing all the particularities, but by excluding certain

possibilities that were incongruent with it. Thus, determination referred to scope rather

5

than to content. Second, bilateral determination rather than unilateral was emphasized.
This was particularly emphasized in Althusser’s notion of overdetermination (1969:
111). Accordingly, the relationship between base and superstructure was never one of
essence and epiphenomenon. The non-economic, superstructural instances also had
their "specific effectivities" so that they were determining as well as being
determined. Economic structure was their conditions of existence, but they also
constituted the very existence of it. Determination was never simple but always
complex. Therefore, Althusser prefers the term overdetermination. We shall call it
dialectical determination in contrast to mechanical determination.

Therefore, to say that Marxism indicates an objective approach to sociology of
knowledge does not mean that it excludes subjective factors necessarily. But no matter
how sophisticated the concept of determination is understood, and how dialectical it
is interpreted, it remains asymmetrical as a kind of causal relationship. Marxists can
never go as far as Weberians do to argue that ideal factors also play an immediate
role in shaping history, as did the Protestant ethic in the emergence of capitalism,
without losing their identity as Marxists. Two prominent examples of the conception
of this asymmetrical relationship of determination are the thesis of determination-in-
the-last-instance in Althusser’s theory - in which the nature of the dominant sphere
in structure, even if non-economic, is determined in the last instance by economic
factors (Althusser 1969: 87—128), and causal primacy in Gerald Cohen’s defence of
historical materialism - in which productive force, even if not important in specific
historical moment, is accountable for overwhelmingly determining the general history
of human evolution (Cohen 1978: 134—72). Conceptually, determination must be
asymmetrical because it is a matter of definition. Mutual determination, strictly

speaking, is a logically contradictory term in Marxism.

6

In conclusion, Marxism has been criticized as committing the fallacy of
essentialism and reductionism because the framework cannot incorporate non-material
factors like language without shattering a whole set of assumptions in the original
texts of Karl Marx, for instance the idea of history as a totality (Jay 1984) and the
relationship between labor and historical materialism (Haberrnas 1979: 95-177). The
Marxist concept of determination is too narrow. The scope of causal attribution has
to be expanded.

In Mannheim’s work, ideology is no longer a particular phenomenon within a
general framework of historical evolution, but itself universal and ahistorical. He calls
this universal concept of ideology total ideology. As his theory of ideology is no
longer articulated, as Marx did, within a framework of historical materialism in which
the ideological is supposed to give way to the real eventually, the distinction between
the real and the ideological is excluded from his concern. The direct consequence is
that his concept of ideology is totalized. Every subjective phenomenon is ideology.
His intention is to describe objectively the determinate relationship between this total
ideology and the objective factors. Unfortunately, Mannheirn’s concept of total
ideology void of a framework of historical evolution leads directly to the ambiguity
of his concept of determination.

Let us go back to Marx for clarification. Marx maintains not only a determinate
relationship between ideology and objective historical situation, but that this
determination is conceptualized within a functional framework. As Giddens examines
thoroughly, functionalism is a vision originated from biology. It postulates a teleology
supplied by a general theory of evolution, namely that everything existing must be
functional in one way or another (Giddens 1977: chapter 2). With this teleological

concept of function, Marx argues that ideology exists in determinate relationship with

7
objective historical situation because it is functional to the existence (survival) of this
objective reality.

However, Mannheim borrows the concept of ideology from Marx but takes it out
of the framework of human evolution. As a result, his concept of determination is
inherently unstable because it is void of a defining framework. Merton summarized
five possible conceptions within Mannheirn’s texts, namely direct causation,
gratification of interest, focus of attention, determination by social structure, and
emanation. However, they remained ultimately vague and fluctuating (Merton 1968:
543-62).

A critique of Mannheim sensitizes us to a broader definition of the objective
approach to sociology of knowledge. It refers to the nature of the relationship
between ideology and objective historical situation as objective. However, this
objective relationship in Mannheirn’s case is watered down into a general and not
very illuminating notion of correlation when it is taken out of a teleological
framework of human evolution. The decision of his quest for scientific objectivity
propels him incessantly away from a concrete concept of determination. With this
fundamental defect, Mannheim’s scientific project can only be incomplete. I
Critique of the Objective Approach to Sociology of Knowledge

The fundamental ambiguity of the concept of determination in the objective
approach to sociology of knowledge originates from a theoretical perspective in which
the determinate relationship between ideology and objective existence are
conceptualized as one between systems. David Lockwood proposed that there were
two kinds of theoretical relationship with radically different implications that
sociologists often confused. They were respectively system integration and social

integration.

 

 

8
’Whereas the problem of social integration focuses attention upon the orderly or
conflictual relationships between the actors, the problem of system integration focuses
on the orderly or conflictual relationships between the parts, of a social system.’
(Lockwood 1964: 245)

The crucial distinction between system integration and social integration is that
the former is about relationship between systems that is objective, with its law of
motion taking place independent of human will and over the head of men. For
example, the relationship between economic development and increasing demand for
democracy is one situating on the level of system integration. Another example is the
contradiction between the development of productive force and the institutionalization
of productive relations. This objective relationship can be formulated as scientific law
or regularity with no need to refer to human consciousness for explanation. Social
integration, on the contrary, refers to the relationship between social actors. This
relationship cannot be explained adequately without reference to the subjective
interpretation of the actors.

It is apparent that Mannheim shared with Marx an interest in objective
relationship of social life. Probably, both assumed that the explication of this objective
relationship was the sovereignty of science, and in order to be scientific, it was the
only legitimate realm of study. Therefore, ideology and objective existence were
juxtaposed as systemic parts in the hope that objective relationship in the form of
scientific law could be discovered. Moreover, as a rule of scientific study, reference
to subjective, ideal or psychological factors are systematically excluded. In short, both
Marx and Mannheim deal with ideology on the level of system integration.

However, social reality is not solely system integration. Gradually, sociologists
come to the conclusion that social reality involves the active interpretation of social
actors on the level of social integration (Weber 1949, Schutz 1967). Moreover, this

involvement is understood more and more as internal constitution rather than external

 

9
regulation, that is, reality is not regulated by social interpretation externally, but
constituted by it from within (Bernstein 1976: 61-2, 136-41).

Moreover, this question is also raised by Marxists. As Erik Olin Wright and
Andrew Levine argue, the transition from capitalism to socialism cannot be adequately
understood by reference to objective interests only because these interests may fail to
be translated into practical action (Wright and Levine 1980: 47-68). Therefore, a
further study of class formation among individuals is needed, and this brings us back
to the level of social integration.

Anthropologist Clifford Geertz also comes to a similar conclusion that leads us
back to the dimension of active interpretation of social actors. He criticizes that
theorists usually jump from assertion to observed consequence. What is missed in the
general theories of ideology in social sciences is a detailed analysis of the process of
mediation between objective historical situation and ideology. As a result, they
become merely juxtaposed to each other. He proposes that the concept of ideology
should be treated as a cultural system in which people make use of cultural symbols
to accomplish certain functions of an ideology. Ideology is not just an entity
automatically arising out of the objective need to satisfy certain functions, but a
cultural accomplishment (Geertz 1973: 193-233). With an emphasis on the
interpretation process, Geertz is bringing the analysis of ideology back to the level
of social integration. The concept of determination has to be supplemented by the
notion of interpretation.

Marx’s functional concept of determination has to be further criticized because
the functional postulate of teleology towards survival is mystifying. It also excludes
the possibility of integrating analyses on both levels of system integration and social

integration. Teleology on the system level is obviously incompatible with the active

 

 

10

interpretation of social actors on the level of social integration. There is nothing
wrong with functional explanation if it provides the mechanism through which this
"teleology" is realized. For instance, it is enlightening to argue as Poulantzas does that
capitalist state necessarily serves the interest of capitalism, regardless of who is
actually ruling in the state apparatus. The state "must" fulfill the function of capital
accumulation because a failure will hamper the condition of its own existence.
However, as long as one merely characterizes the general relationship between state
policies and the fulfillment of the function of capital accumulation as teleologically
"necessary," and fails to describe the mechanism through which these policies get
passed within the state apparatus, it is mysterious and not scientific at all.

The same spirit applies to sociology of knowledge. It may be true that there is
a determinate and "necessary" relationship between ideology and objective historical
situation. Nonetheless, without describing the mechanism of determination, the general
concept of determination remains vacuous. To wrap up our previous arguments, the
central concept of the objective approach to sociology of knowledge is ideology which
is defined by its determinate relationship with objective factors. However, the scope
as well as the nature of this determination are dubious. The central problems of this
approach are that knowledge is conceived as a systemic part, and efforts are made
systematically to avoid addressing knowledge on the level of social integration. As
a result, the problems of translation and mechanism are excluded.

The intellectual history of sociology indicates a riddle in theory. Many theorists
start off from an attempt to bridge the gap between system integration and social
integration, and finally slide back on either side. If previous approaches to sociology
of knowledge are too preoccupied with system integration, it does no good to slide

back to social integration. The objective approach to sociology of knowledge is surely

 

 

 

11

correct in emphasizing that men cannot produce knowledge in whatever way they
want, that the production of knowledge must be related to structural factors. However,
the concept of structure must be purged of its functionalistic implications when
applied to empirical studies. We do not want to shy away from addressing the
interpretation of social actors by brushing it under the carpet of a functional teleology.
The point is to link up structure and interpretation in approaching sociology of
knowledge.

The Discursive Approach

Probably, one of the causes of this sociological riddle can be traced back to the
assumptions in the tradition of Cartesian dualism. Accordingly, the reality is composed
of two discrete components, namely subject and object. System integration is assumed
as referring to the realm of object, while social integration is conceived as pointing
to the universe of subject. One may explain the objective by the subjective, vice
versa. But it is impossible to develop an explanation that can give space to both
subjective and objective factors without reducing one group to another.

However, it is questionable whether social integration can be understood correctly
as the universe of subjective phenomena. Let us illustrate this point by referring to
the concept of verstehen in Weber’s sociology. Working within the approach of
methodological individualism, Weber can be classified as the most representative
sociologist interested in social integration. He consistently steers his efforts to a
sociological analysis defined as attempting ’the interpretive understanding of social
action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects’
(Weber 1947: 88). Verstehen is the main working concept through which he gathers

data. Unfortunately, it has for i very long time been understood as a psychological

method of empathy, meaning that the researcher puts himself into the shoes of others

 

 

12
in order to acquire an immediate grasp of the inner meanings of a phenomenon within
the heads of men. As a result of this subjective understanding of verstehen, this
approach has been criticized as not amenable to the scientific principle of verification.

Until Alfred Schutz, he argues that verstehen as a general method of
interpretation is not subjective. Nor is social integration a subjective phenomenon. The
following paragraph is worth quotation in details because it beautifully summarizes
the major elements of an intersubjective understanding of social reality.

’By the term "social reality" I wish to be understood the sum total of objects and
occurrences within the social cultural world as experienced by the common-sense
thinking of men living their daily lives among their fellow-men, connected with them
in manifold relations of interaction. It is the world of cultural objects and social
institutions into which we are all born, within which we have to find our bearings,
and with which we have to come to terms. From the outset, we the actors on the
social scene, experience the world we live in as a world both of nature and of
culture, not as a private but an intersubjective one, that is, as a world common to all
of us, either actually given or potentially accessible to everyone; and this involves
intercommunication and language.’ (Schutz 1962: 53)

In brief, Schutz is saying that social reality is composed of meanings, not subjective
and accessible only to the subject who projects them, but intersubjective in nature and
shared among social actors. Social integration is possible because intersubjectively
shared meanings are rendered available for use by language and culture.

Therefore, social integration is not subjective in nature, but intersubjective.
Unlike system integration which is governed by systerrric regularities, social
integration is structured by definite configuration of meanings sedirnented over long
period of time as language and culture. These linguistically and culturally mediated
meanings are essentially intersubjective, and definite in form not amenable to
subjective will. On the contrary, subjectivity is constituted by these intersubjective
meanings.

With this new understanding of verstehen, of language and culture, and finally

of social integration, I am going to elaborate in the following paragraphs a different

 

 

13
approach which I hope can link up system integration and social integration, structure
and interpretation. I shall call it discursive approach.

First of all, this discursive approach to sociology of knowledge starts from a
working assumption that lmowledge is discourse rather than ideology. Here, discourse
is defined by its determinate relationship, not only to structure, or objective factors
as ideology does, but to language and culture as well.

Language is the essential element of culture. When we mention culture in the
following thesis, we refer to language in its full sense. What is language? Language
is the set of intersubjective rules that people intuitively practise in their everyday
lives. It does not mean narrowly the kind of language we learn in grammar school,
but the way we speak, talk, argue, persuade, all during our interactions with others.
In essence, language is practical rather than formal, intersubjective rather than
objective. This practical language includes all those rules that are inextricably linked
to, and defined by social situations rather than detachable from them. It cannot be
taught formally and systematically as language grammar. It can only be learnt through
practice in everyday life.

Language refers to linguistically mediated rules that appear to the Subject as
common sense knowledge. He intuitively knows them, and practices them everyday
but may not be able to articulate them. They are stored in what Anthony Giddens
calls practical consciousness (1979:57-8), or more literally subconsciousness. For
example, we know intuitively how to speak to people of different age, sex, status,
people with certain psychological characteristics and even in different appearances.
The rules are indeed complicated and sophisticated. We may not be able to articulate
them immediately without at least a moment of reflection. But we do know how to

follow these rules and practise them (Wittgenstein 1968; Giddens 1979: 67).

 

14

For the subject who follows these rules, language is a set of assumptions he uses
in the context of everyday life. These assumptions are not unique to himself, but
shared with other people in the society, and intersubjective in nature. They may not
be articulate in his consciousness. But he practices them everyday intuitively and
habitually. In short, these assumptions are practical rather than theoretical. They are
an integral part of interaction among actors on the level of social integration.

Now, we may assert that while structural factors determine system integration,
linguistic factors determine social integration. While structure is objective in the sense
it occurs through its own logic over the heads of men, language is intersubjective as
they function within the heads of men, but not reducible to personal psychological
characteristics. The intersection between system integration and social integration,
social structure and language, defines the concept of discourse.

Comparing to the notion of ideology, the salient strength of the concept of
discourse is that it straddles both system integration and social integration. As a
result, it conveys a sense that is more dynamic than the objective and somewhat
deterministic notion of ideology. Discourse can be conceived as a product of
institutionally-defmed language, or linguistically-defined institution. When we speak
the concept of discourse in this thesis, we are pointing not only to the objective
historical situation, but the intersubjective rules and assumptions unique to a language
as well. Moreover, we are referring to a complex process of interplay between them.

So far, my presentation has been directed at giving a justification for a shift of
attention from ideology to discourse by referring to the respective concerns with
system integration and social integration of society. In order to locate the concept of
discourse more systematically in sociology of knowledge, I would like to make a

preliminary comparison of three dimensions of human knowledge, namely thought,

 

15

ideology and discourse as follows: -

Thought Ideology Discourse
1. Defining Core idea interest validity claim
. what is the claim? . what interest does . how is the claim
the claim serve established as
valid?

2. Nature of Core propositional functional pragmatic‘

3. Which level of individual system conjuncture of system
society is the and lifeworld
explanation
found?

What the concept of discourse implies, as distinguished from thought and
ideology, is a more dynamic approach to sociology of knowledge. Knowledge is no
longer staticly conceived as an entity of idea, but as discourse. Let us refer to
voluntarism, the subject matter of this thesis, for some illustrations. Voluntarism has
been conceived as an idea in the cultural approach, or as a cloaked interest in the
objective approach. However, voluntarism as discourse sensitizes us that it can be a
language practiced rather than a convicted idea. Besides its cognitive content, it has
a rhetorical dimension that needs to be analyzed. Moreover, the discursive approach
assumes that voluntarism as a convicted idea and a rhetorical language are not clearly
cut in empirical reality. One may genuinely believe that he is speaking the truth,
although he is also subconsciously aware that he is articulating the truth in a certain
way, all for the sake of persuasion.

The significance of the discursive approach is that we can distance the

 

‘ The pragmatic nature of discourse is different from the propositional nature of
thought. While the meaning of an idea of thought can be judged as true or false on
its own, the meaning of a discourse can only be understood in context. For instance,
one may try various way to argue that a specific idea is "true." Whether it is really
true is one thing, but the way to argue is another. It is in the latter case that all the
historical, sociological and situational factors come into play in shaping a discou.‘se.

 

16
explanation of voluntarism from human subjectivity (as the concept of thought
implies) without totally denying the level of communication among subjects (as the
concept of ideology does). In fact, we argue that it transcends the utility of the
concept of ideology positively by serving much better, in its analysis of human
knowledge, to link up system integration and social integration, structure and
interpretation.

In part, the concept of discourse is borrowed from Jurgen Habermas as it points
to the aspect of validity claims in knowledge. Habermas develops the concept of
discourse in his general theory of rationality. However, the two concepts remain
largely philosophical. This thesis intends to make empirical and historical use of the
Habennasian concept of discourse. Habermas uses the concept of discourse to
establish his normative conception of rationality (1974: 1—40; 1978: 1-68). In this
thesis, we are interested in the discourse of Li and Chen as effort to establish the
"rationality" of their arguments.

Taking a step further, the issue of validity of discourse points to the central
importance of the concept of audience. It is the audience who determines what type
of validity is relevant. When one is in the process of producing knowledge, the
audience that he is consciously addressing to determines what kind of discourse he
practices, and what kind of validity claim is more relevant. For example, in the
western academic sphere where discourse is highly institutionalized, the lmowledge
producer knows that his audience is the experts and scholars who are sitting in
university departments, the editorial boards of academic journals, and those figures
who are holding the power of funds allocation for research, rather than the general
public. This overwhelmingly shapes the pattern of his discourse.

Therefore, the relationship between audience and discourse is subject to an active

 

17
interpretation process. However, the audience is also a structural concept because it
is related to the degree of institutionalization of society and its specific sectors.
Although audience is incorporated into the active interpretation process of the subject,
it is also an objective fact existing outside his sphere of discourse, and not amenable
to his will. In short, the concept of audience locates the realm of interplay between
intersubjective interpretation and objective structure.

Summarizing all the elements previously described, we may now come to a
broader definition of discourse. It is defined as the action to establish the validity of
knowledge which is directly related to an audience whose characteristics are shaped
by a complex process of interplay between social structure and language. Language
serves as a mechanism through which the structural effects are translated into practical
action. As Western Marxists like Erik Olin Wright and Andrew Levine argue, the
base must be mediated by the superstructure (1980: 47-68). Therefore, superstructure
is critical in explanation of social reality. Weber describes concretely the dialectic
between structure and language.

’Interests, material as well as ideal, not ideas directly control action. But world
images, which are the product of ideas, have often served as the channels along
YgiCh action is moved by the dynamics of interests.’ (quoted from Schluchter 1979:

So far, the arguments above remain theoretical and abstract. Moreover, the
relationship between this interplay and the variables of audience and discourse is not
substantiated. We will leave them until we come to the specific history of the
reception of Marxism at the turn of 1920 for illustration. For the moment, let me
highlight the intention of the above discussion. This thesis proposes that voluntaristic
characteristic of Chinese Marxism during the turn of the 1920 can be understood as
a result of moral discourse which emerged due to an interplay between structural and

cultural factors. In short, we are proposing a discursive approach towards the

 

 

l8

understanding of voluntarism in Chinese Marxism.
Mc_thod

This thesis is an empirical study of how Chinese intellectuals made sense of
Marxism when it was received into China at the turn of 1920. In particular, we will
focus on the two most prominent Marxists, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. Chen was
the first secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) formed in September 1921
in Shanghai. He was generally agreed as most influential to the early Chinese
Marxists, including Mao Zedong. Li Dazhao was not as strategic a political figure in
the early formation of the CCP. However, he was generally regarded as the major
theoretician responsible for the characteristic interpretation of Marxism that emerged
in the subsequent period. It has been argued that the major elements of Maoism,
including his nationalism and voluntarism, can be identified in Li’s reading of
Marxism (Meisner 1967: xii).

The reason for choosing Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao is obvious because of their
prominent status in early history of Chinese Communism. However, the advantages
of studying two figures rather than one have to be stated more explicitly. A single
case study cannot control biographical factors. It is possible that a certain
interpretation of Marxism is related to the age and experience of the interpreter, rather
than any non-biographical reasons which are of more general significance. Chen was
some ten years older than Li. Moreover, the psychological impact of the failure of
the 1911 Revolution on them was different. As Chen Duxiu was more centrally
involved in the Revolution, the subsequent disillusionment was much greater.
Therefore, we can fairly conclude that there was probably a generational difference
in the reaction to the same historical situation by Chen and Li. However, as we will

demonstrate, in respect of discursive pattern, theirs both belong to moral discourse.

 

l9
Generational difference was not significant here. On the contrary, the parallel study
of the texts of both persons gives us a much stronger sense of how similar was their
response to the objective historical situation.

Our study of the interpretation of Marxism by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao is
empirical in the sense that it is primarily based on analysis of original texts. We will
derive their understandings of the concepts of socialism, capitalism, revolution, class
and other important concepts of Marxism from their own texts and within their own
con-texts. Moreover, we will pay close attention to the Chinese words as well as the
rhetorical skills they used in pursuing their arguments. This thesis aims to uncover
the cultural factors which are accountable for their readings. We assume that language
is the major vehicle through which cultural assumptions are conveyed through
generations. Culture has long been an elusive concept and is very difficult to be
operationalized. This thesis starts off from the methodological assumption that culture
is expressed through language, besides other ways. As Metzger asserts, cliches are not
arbitrary but ’the verbalized symbols of shared cultural orientations’ (Metzger 1977:
13). In addition, cultural assumptions can be detected in the rules that governs
communication. Through an empirical analysis of these cliches and rules, we can
uncover what are the age-old and taken for granted assumptions of Chinese culture.

This thesis is causal in nature because we aim to explain the moral discourse in
the reading of Marxism by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. Causation can be established
if we can demonstrate the correlation between cause and effect as well as their
temporal sequence. Control is exerted in several ways. First, as we have said, personal
and biographical factors are controlled by studying both Chen and Li. Second, the
time span of study will be held constant. We will study the texts of both persons

from the early 19103 to the early 1920s. Third, we will not pay as much attention to

 

 

20
their texts after 1921 when the organization of the Chinese Communist Party became
a material force with disciplinary power in determining discourse. The early CCP was
a loose group, gradually developing into a matured organization. Therefore, the further

away from 1921, the less likely we will take their texts into account.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER 111 Chinese Marxism as Moral Discourse

The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. Besides giving a definition of the
concept of moral discourse, I will gather together evidence to show that from the
early 1910s until 1921, the writings of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao on Marxism can
be characterized as moral discourse. Chinese Marxism has been identified as a kind
of voluntarism. I shall also argue that, from the discursive point of view, the
voluntaristic features of Chen and Li’s Marxist thought are better interpreted as moral
discourse. As regards the explanation of their Marxism as moral discourse, I shall
leave it to the next chapter.

The Concept of Moral Discourse

Habermas argues that every speech is constituted by an inherent claim to
validity. Every time one talks to another person, he means what he is saying. It is
true, right, understandable and sincere. If he does not mean that what he is saying is
for instance true, his words are meaningless, and he is not talking at all. Therefore,
validity claim is always-already a dimension of every speech.

Habermas asserts that every speech implicitly makes four types of claim to
validity, namely comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness and rightness. However, only the
claims of truth and rightness require systematic redemption. Comprehensibility needs
not be redeemed, one may say, because unless what one says is comprehensible,
communication cannot even start at all. Truthfulness is a psychological trait that is
not amenable to public examination. Whether one’s speech is sincere cannot be
examined through any other objective criterion except personal reflection and
subsequent check with his deeds. In contrast, truth and rightness can be examined

through discourse. Their respective criteria can also be discussed and redeemed

21

 

22
publicly and systematically (Habermas 1979: 1-68). In discourse, truth and righmess
as validity claims are consciously intended, questioned and defended.

Habermas intends through the above ideas to argue that rationality is
communication and discourse. This thesis is not interested in whether this normative
theory of rationality is convincing or not. On the other hand, we are concerned with
making empirical and historical use of his concept of discourse. In everyday life,
people speak something that make claims to truth and tightness simultaneously.
However, these claims are made subconsciously. In other words, communication is
discourse without being conscious of its implicit claims. As we are going to see, the
study of communication as discourse can reveal a lot about its structural and cultural
backgrounds. Specifically, we are interested in how truth and rightness are represented
and/or emphasized relatively, and why they are so.

For the moment, let me give a preliminary operational definition of truth and
rightness. By the concept of truth, I mean the concern with logical consistency of
arguments and the systematic form of its presentation. Rightness, on the other hand,
is the exclusive concern with spelling out the correct values or ideas explicitly that
is satisfactory to one’s moral concern. We have mentioned that from the discursive
point of view, the voluntarism of Chinese Marxism (revealed in the texts of Li
Dazhao and Chen Duxiu) was a moral discourse. What is moral discourse? It can be
defined as a discourse to establish validity of arguments during which rightness is at
the expense of truth’. Moral discourse is often illogical and unsystematic, but always

clear in its suggestion of what should be the case and what should be done.

 

2 My definition of moral discourse does not imply any position on the issue of
whether truth and rightness are logically incompatible. This is a complicated
philosophical issue that is not yet resolved, and perhaps will never be solved.

23
The Handling of Truth — Logical consistency

Let us focus on the handling of truth in Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu’s discourse
first. I shall argue that they did not take truth seriously as the basis of validity of
their arguments. First of all, logical consistency is almost excluded from their
discourse.

For example, determinism was one of the main topics that Li Dazhao was
concerned when he was seriously trying to understand Marxism. However,
deterministic arguments were heralded as scientific at one time and condemned as
paralyzing people’s voluntaristic impulse at the other time. For example, Li Dazhao
argued that the dissolution of the traditional Chinese institution of universal kingship
and the three ropes of social relationship prescribed by Confucianism3 were
determined (biran biange) by material and economic change. It was inevitable because
superstructure was, according to the Marxist principle, determined by material base
(Li: 260-73). Shortly later, Li repeated this argument and further argued that new
thoughts were determined to come. Li was satisfied with this law of evolution; he
claimed that the determination of mind by environment was materialistic (weiwude)
and scientific (December 1919).

If everything is determined, does it mean we should not do anything because
human intervention is futile? Does not fatalism the logical conclusion of determinism?
Curiously, Li Dazhao denied that the Marxist principle of base determining
superstructure was determinism. It was not a ism (lun) but an explanation (iieshi).
This Marxist principle was not a determinism because it determines everything except

the subjectivity of the present from its scope of explanation. Then, what is the subject

 

3 The three ropes of social relationship prescribed by Confucianism are
respectively between ruler and the ruled, father and son, husband and wife.

 

 

24

of the present? Practically, it means those who have discovered and learned the
principle. Therefore, Li believed that the scientific law of evolution did not apply to
his contemporary people. If they took the appropriate action, the law would be
breached. Having this insight, Li criticized the translation of the materialistic
conception of history as economic determinism because the wording was suspected
of the tendency towards fatalism (sumenglun). And fatalism was bad because it
implied a belief of the redundancy of human action (huodong). And he strongly
criticized it as totally wrong.

However, it is not clear on what basis Li could make such distinction between
ism and explanation. His arguments in summary seemed to be like this: For those he
found distasteful, they were determined to go. For those he found attractive, they were
not determined to come but contingent upon our efforts. Ultimately, the Marxist
principle of base determining superstructure was not determinism because he found
the ideal of communism appealing and needed the actions of everyone to fulfill it.
But what if one argues that something bad is determined to come?

It is not surprising that Li Dazhao categorized this type of argument as
explanation. In fact, this is rather predictable. Malthusian theory is an example. He
accused that Malthusian theory of population lent support to military invasion (Li:
83). Accordingly, Malthus contended that as resources grew in arithmetic rate, and
population grew exponentially, aggression and war were the only ways to reduce the
surplus population. Obviously, Li considered the Malthusian theory an explanation
because his criticism would be irrelevant if it were a determinism. But if our
understanding of Li’s judgment between explanation and ism is correct, he is blatantly
inconsistent.

In fact, Li Dazhao was also inconsistent about Confucianism. He argued that

 

 

25

Confucianism was essentially a teaching about self-respect (Li: 43). Later, he
condemned Confucianism as a symbol of autocracy (Li: 77). This judgment was
repeated rather consistently in later years throughout his text. Apparently, Li changed
his judgment about Confucianism in a rather abrupt way. With historical hindsight,
we know it was because he found confucianism more and more distasteful, when the
crisis of republicanism unfolded itself around January 1917 by turning Confucianism,
through the calculating efforts of Yuan Shikai and the help of Kang Youwei, into an
ideology supporting the restoration of monarchy. However, the fact that interests us
is that when Li Dazhao changed his judgment about Confucianism in such a drastic
and inconsistent manner, he did not feel being compelled to give justification. Logical
inconsistency did not hamper the persuasiveness of his rhetoric. It was just irrelevant.

By now, the inconsistency of Chen Duxiu’s text is quite well-known to the
students of his thought (Feigon 1983: 108; Lin 1979: 79; Schwartz 1951a: 63). For
instance, the concept of antagonism (dou) was applauded and attacked at different
time. During his pre-Marxist stage when he was still preoccupied with Darwinian
metaphors, he obviously had high regard of antagonism and resistance (kang). He
argued that the triumph of Western colonialism was due to the pervasiveness of
animalism (yeshou zhuyi). Japan could assumed the role of superpower in Asia also
because the Japanese retained this beastly nature (shouxin). He characterized this
beastly nature as the will to struggle and resistance (Chen: 25).

Later, he further elevated the concept of antagonism to the level of cosmological
principle. He appealed to his audience the "fact" that even planets resisted the
absorption by the sun (Chen: 27- 34). Apparently, this is a kind of animism which
is bewildering. However, in the context of traditional Chinese culture, this was self-

evident. After all, the Chinese even nowadays invoke the age-old assumption

 

26
sometimes that there is no ontological distinction between the cosmos and the society.
Cosmology is human relationship writ large, and human relationship is a miniature
reflection of cosmological phenomenon. If appropriately used, this rhetorical language
can be powerful.

Finally, Chen was led by his logic of antagonism into extreme that he publicly
advocated the value of conquest (zhengfu). Therefore, men zhengfu women; the white
zhengfu the yellow; the Mongols, the Japanese zhengfu the Chinese; even within
China, the northern people zhengfu the southern. Chen then came to the conclusion
that the youth should self-consciously and steadfastly behaved like the conqueror
(Chen: 44).

After the First World War, Chen’s belief in social Darwinism was shattered. The
dangerous and nihilistic logic of antagonism in Darwinism seemed to have played
itself out in the fm-de-siecle of European civilization. For the first time in "On Idols"
(August 1918), Chen came to condemn the value of antagonism. Aggressive
nationalism previously justified by the principle of antagonistic competition was now
wrong because it was solely an excuse for the monopoly of privileges by aristocracy
and the right of external aggression (Chen: 229). Again, Chen felt at ease with his
inconsistency about the value of antagonism. He was busy spelling out his latest truth.

Chen was converted into a Marxist after the May Fourth Movement in 1919.
However, this process was not without difficulty. As he was now so aversive to the
concept of antagonism (dou), he found himself difficult to accept the Marxian doctrine
of class struggle (jieji douzheng). He even condemned the antagonistic consciousness
- the value he advocated so feverishly just three years ago (Chen: 388—9). However,
he did not indicate he needed to give explanation for his shift of position. Apparently,

he was not troubled by his own logical inconsistency. The best evidence for his

 

 

27

easiness is that he made the decision to publish all these logically inconsistent
arguments, even in one book.

In "On Politics" (September 1920), he made his shift again, this time advocating
class war (jieji zhanzheng). Chen finally realized that without class struggle,
democracy as the absolute equality between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat would
never come‘. However, his advocation of antagonism was now based on a radically
different rationale. Antagonism was not good in itself, but useful. It must be used so
as to realize the higher value.

In sum, Chen Duxiu shifted his position twice as regards the desirability of
antagonism. However, he was not troubled by his logical inconsistency. As with Li
Dazhao, he articulated his thought in a moral discourse. As we have defined, the
characteristic of this discourse is that logical consistency is unimportant.

The Handling of Truth - Systematic Explanation

Moral discourse is not only characterized in its neglect of logical consistency,
but in its peculiarly unsystematic form of explanation as well. The explanation is
unsystematic because it explains but does not give the ground for its explanation.
Moreover, it raises different concepts without considering their mutual implications
to each other. Therefore, these concepts were unsystematically put together. In these
aspects, the arguments of Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu are largely identical in their
unsystematic forms.

(1) Revolution
Let us give some examples. The concept of revolution is central to the Marxist

imagination. In classical Marxism, revolution is articulated within the paradigrn of the

 

‘ On Chen Duxiu’s concept of democracy as absolute equality and its implicit
populist assumption, refer to Xin Gu 1989.

 

 

 

28

dialectic between subject and object. Therefore, revolution is both objective - referring
to the incessant growth of the forces of production beyond the fetters of relations of
production, and subjective - the gradual emergence of class consciousness, which is
the identity of class-for-itself.

However, for Li Dazhao, the concept of revolution was entirely idealistic. The
first time Li invoked this concept was May 1916, two years before he was eventually
drawn into an intensive reading of Marxism. Interestingly enough, the concept of
revolution belonged to Leon Tolstoy which meant awakening (juewu), the emergence
of the consciousness of moral rectification of the world and its realization. According
to Li’s quotation, Tolstoy asserted that there could be no other word that expressed
the meaning of revolution except repentance (chanhui) (Li: 56). Revolution is
repentance. But whose repentance? Whose awakening? Here, Li’s idea was vague. But
he implied that there was a mystic will behind history which was awakening. This
mystic will approximates Rousseau’s collective will and Hegel’s Geist. In plain
language, Li’s message seemed to be like this: Everyone is awakening now.
Revolution is coming now. He therefore urged his reader to be awakened (juewu).

After his increasing interest in Marxism, there was a shift of his conception of
revolution. It was now specified as both moral - which meant moral rectification of
mind, and social - which meant organizational renovation (Li: 175). Revolution is not
only repentance, but restructuring of society as well. Therefore, Li proposed the dual
renovation of objective and subjective reality (wuxin liangmiande gaizao). Although
the organizational concept was emerging in Li’s consciousness, it was merely (and
quite arbitrarily) added to his concept of revolution as awakening. Li seemed to argue
that people should now expand the scope of their awakening which included both the

moral and the organizational factors. However, there was no elaboration on the

 

 

29
systematic relationship on the two sides of revolution. He seemed to forget the
Marxist principle of base determining superstructure (Li: 195).

Chen Duxiu’s conception of revolution and its subsequent revision were almost
identical with Li Dazhao. It was initially entirely idealistic, referring to the moral will
of eliminating (qu) inequality, domination and renewing (xin), elimination of the old
and renewal (qujiubuxin), renewal (gengxin) and evolution (iinhua), eliminating (ge)
such ideologies as autocracy and invasionism (Chen 1: 14, 59, 135, 143; II: 29). After
his growing interest in Marxism during the early 1920 in Shanghai, he also identified
the institutional aspects like economy and organization of proletariat (Chen I: 563; II:
107). But as in the case of Li Dazhao, the influence of Marxism on Chen was merely
that the scope of revolutionary consciousness should be expanded. So long as
revolution was understood as a function of revolutionary consciousness, it was
fundamentally idealistic.

However, they never asked the question of whether revolution was possible at
all. One may concede that revolution requires increasing scope of consciousness, but
then come to the conclusion that it is impossible for people to come to their
revolutionary consciousness for the time being. Chen and Li seemed to get confused
that if they were now aware that revolution requires revolutionary consciousness, it
must be possible for everyone to acquire it. But this is not self-evident and necessary.
Even if one concedes further that everyone can freely acquire this consciousness
(juewu), is it powerful enough to burst asunder the existing order? If so, why? There
is no systematic explanation. It was simply assumed to be so.

This optimistic belief in the power of consciousness and the possibility to acquire
consciousness appears again in a different context. Both Chen and Li defined youth

as the capacity of being awakened (juewu, zijue) (Li: 70, 72; Chen I: 2, 43, 58-62).

 

 

30

The Chinese character zi, meaning self, was used extravagantly in their text in such
invoked ideas as self-respect (zizhong), self-determination (zizhu) and self-
consciousness (zijue) when they were appealing to their young readers. There was an
unmistakable focus on a god-like and omnipotent self in this age group. On the other
hand, while Chen and Li identified the power of zi in the youth, they never discussed
the possibility and constraints of the maturation of their self-consciousness. They
simply assumed that ruthless criticism of the moral impotence of the youth and the
deplorable historical situation was necessary and sufficient to incite revolutionary
action.’ But there was no systematic explanation of why it was so. If the mind was
determined by environment, as they learned from the Marxist principle of base
determining superstructure, how was it possible for the awakening of the youth to be
sufficient to rectify the reality?
(2) Capitalism

Chen used the concepts of capitalism and capitalist the first time in April 1920.
However, he identified capitalism as the practice of capitalist to concentrate capital.
As such, capitalism was completely a behavioral phenomenon. Li Dazhao talked about
capitalism and capitalist early after the message of the "victory of Bolshevism" was
spread to China (October 1918). However, his understanding was entirely atomistic.
Capitalism was understood as identical with capitalists rather than the capitalist mode
of production. It was criticized as a personality parallel to the kings, the nobles, the
bureaucrats and the warlords (Li: 109, 110, 114, 117, 120).

Again, after they read Marxism, capitalism was separated as a distinct concept

from capitalists, and identified as institution (zhidu) (Li: 199, 263). However, the

 

’ Interestingly enough, the young Marx also maintained that ruthless criticism of
the existing situation of Germany during the time was necessary and sufficient for
rational change of society and history.

 

 

31

institutional concept of capitalism was always used for condemnation rather than for
explanation. The discourse implied a moral need to reorganize the institution rather
than a call to understanding how this institution determines the society. Even after the
explanatory power of institutional factors was conceded, Chen and Li thought it was
valid only in the past. From now on, the subjects of the present could learn through
it. Practically, it mean the determining effects of institutional factors would be
suspended in the future. Rupture of history was self-evidently possible and needed no
explanation. What was assumed was an entirely autonomous realm of the subjectivity
of the present. It was self-evident and needed no explanation.

(3) Socialism

Similar orientation can also be identified in their concept of socialism. Li Dazhao
used the term socialism the first time in his "Comparison of the French and Russian
Revolution." It was characterized as a mystic will, a personality, reminiscent of
Hegel’s concept of the Geist (Li: 102).

Later, he alluded to socialism when he explained the First World War. This time,
he used another term laborism (lougong zhuyi), probably because he was still learning
to speak the Marxian tongue properly, and could not tell the precise difference
between different words. Here, the war was perceived as the melodramatic
culmination of the advance of moral reason over entrenched human vices. It was the
victory of laborism over capitalism. Again, socialism was characterized as a kind of
mystic will, historically embodied or incarnated in the "labor societies" of Germany
and Russia.‘5 However, there was no explanation of why socialism could come so

swiftly in Europe (Li: 110).

 

° I suspect the "labor societies" of Germany and Russia referred to the movement
led by German and Russian socialists, including the Bolsheviks.

 

 

32

The moral conception of socialism continued afterward (Li: 113, 137) until May
1919 when Li added a new element to his discourse of socialism, namely the
renovation of organization (zuzhi gaizao) (Li: 174). Again, this was probably due to
the influence of his study of Marxism during the end of 1918. However, as in the
case of the concepts of revolution and capitalism, the articulation of the organizational
aspect was simply added to the predominantly idealistic concept of socialism. There
was no further elaboration, for instance, of the dialectic between morality and
organization, between subject and object.

Interestingly enough, after his conversion to Marxism, he continued to articulate
an idealistic concept of socialism, maintaining that its germination, in whatever form,
was purely ethical (Li: 222). Even in the debate of the materialist basis of the
socialist revolution, he asserted that China must have been ready for socialism
because the misery (kutong) of Chinese people was already very great, even greater
than the proletariat in other capitalist countries. In other words, socialism was
essentially a subjective phenomenon. The more the misery, the greater was the moral
anger, thus the revolutionary consciousness and the capacity for socialism7 (Li: 356).

The idealistic concept of socialism was repeated in Chen Duxiu’s arguments. It
meant the value of social democracy in distinction from political democracy, the
socialization and concentration of capital, the benevolence of the majority and was
associated with the idea of historical evolution (Chen 1: 375, 447 553, 559). Nowhere
did Chen mention the scientific concept of socialism which was conceived by Engels
as the potential determined to be realized within capitalism.

To sum up our discussion of the concepts of revolution, youth, capitalism and

 

7 This line of reasoning was succeeded by Mao who maintained that it was good
for China to be poor and bleak (yiqiong erbai) because she would then be more apt
for revolution.

33

socialism in the texts of Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu, it was a form of explanation
that was asymmetrically biased toward the explanatory power of idealistic and
subjective factors. Structural factors were nowhere mentioned. Even upon the influence
of Marxism, they merely added the institutional factors into their idealistic framework.
However, this group of factors only played two roles: first, as an element in the
expanded scope of awakening as in the articulation of the concepts of revolution and
socialism; second, to explain phenomena in the past, as in the case of capitalism.
However, the power of the subjectivity of the present was never hampered or strained.
Practical action was assumed to be an entirely autonomous realm empirically. If
action determines history, history can never detemrine action.

What then is the nature of the subjectivity of the present? Why can it be so
recalcitrant to the objective environment? If the past history was determined, why can
we be so optimistic of the genuine rupture of history in the present? If the various
idealistic and subjective elements that we have identified in the thought of Li Dazhao
and Chen Duxiu can be described as voluntaristic, it is a voluntarism that surely lacks
systematic explanation. To this extent, it is a voluntaristic language rather than a
system of thought that can be labelled as voluntarism. It is merely used conveniently.

Anyway, the consequence was that structural factors which might determine the
subjectivity of the present were consistently excluded. The form of explanation was
biased towards the idealistic and subjective realm, as was indicated in such concepts
like awakening, youth, misery, the spirit of socialism, and the like. All in all, given
the unsystematic form of explanation, and the neglect of logical consistency in their
discourse, we conclude that the concept of truth as the basis of validity claim was

only precarious. And it is necessarily so in moral discourse.

34
The Handling of Rightness

Moral discourse, as we have defined, is a discourse in which rightness is at the
expense of truth. It is often illogical and unsystematic, as we have just demonstrated.
However, its very identity is that it is preoccupied with its moral suggestion as to
what should be the case and what should be done. In this discursive pattern, what is
valid is predominantly what is right. Whether Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao intentionally
neglect the truth value of their arguments is an issue beyond the scope of this thesis
to speculate. Nevertheless, I do argue that their preoccupation with rightness constitute
a certain constraint for the full articulation of truth. This is obvious in their
interpretations of historical phenomena.

For instance, we have mentioned that Li Dazhao portrayed the Russian
Revolution and the First World War as pointing to a melodramatic culmination of the
advance of moral reason. In fact, within that article, Li never explained what he
called the victory of Bolshevism. The historical event was turned into an object to be
learnt rather than to be explained. What should be learned take precedence of what
actually was happening and why.

’the spirit [Bolshevism] embodied can be regarded as that of a common awakening
in the heart of each individual among mankind of the twentieth century. The victory
of Bolshevism, therefore, is the victory of the spirit of common awakening (juewu)
in the heart of each individual among mankind in the twentieth century.’ ("The
Victory of Bolshevism"; Li: 118)

Li also described the global socialist movement as a tide (chaoliu) (Li: 117). Li
probably took the idea of revolutionary tide literally, because he did not explain the
movement. He might well believe that a natural phenomenon did not require further
explanation. To call it natural was already to explain. On the other hand, the moral
suggestion was clear enough. It is rational to follow what is natural. If the

revolutionary movement was a natural phenomenon, everyone should go revolutionary.

35

The preoccupation with action at the expense of explanation repeated in another
context. Li argued that Marxism proved everything, including morality, to be
transitory because it was determined by the change of the base. However, he seemed
to be satisfied with using the theory practically for advocating change - as he did
untiringly during the time, that he did not even try to explain change. It is a
phenomenon to be learned rather than to be explained (Li: 256-273).

Again and again, there was a burning moral impulse that drove his attention
away from theoretical explanation. Even when he came close to explanation, the need
for moral condemnation and exhortation deflected the direction of his discourse. When
he came to explain the traditional Chinese extended family as a superstructural
phenomenon determined by the functional need of agrarian economy, his discourse
was truncated in a rather abrupt and unnatural manner:

’The Chinese institution of extended family was an agrarian economic organization,
as well as the social formation of Chinese society of the last two thousand years.
All politics, law, ethics, morality, intellectual development, thought, customs and
habits were epiphenomena formed on the basis of this institution of extended family.
Look at the Confucian ethics which dominated the Chinese spirit for the last two
thousand years! Wasn’t every mean used to subjugate the lower to the higher? Wasn’t
it used to sacrifice the personality of the subordinate for the will of the superordinate?
Wasn’t everything based on the relationship between father and son in the extended
family?’ ("An Economic Explanation of the Causes of the Changes in Modern
Chinese Thought")

The first two sentences were explanatory. However, the followings sentences were
unnaturally pedagogical. The flow of the discourse was truncated compulsively by a
moral impulse to condemn. Explanation was consequently traded off by the spelling
out of what was right.

In the text of Chen Duxiu, such preoccupation with moral suggestion at the
expense of explanation can also be found. For instance, during the second half of the

19103, the concept of struggle was successively heralded, condemned, and finally

instrumentally advocated. However, he never explained it.

 

 

36

All in all, both Li and Chen enthusiastically appropriate from Marxism moral
implications for voluntaristic action. But they did not explain anything in a detailed
manner. Even when they came close to an explanation, it was then truncated by a
moral impulse to condemn or appraise. Moreover, the moral appropriation of the
Marxist doctrines seemed only to reaffirm their pre-Marxist moral judgments. Marxism
was only a new vocabulary used to speak an old language.

The moral discourse of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao was even more clear in their
interpretation of theories, all in the form of simple approval or rejection. Therefore,
Marxism was correct because it demonstrated that the realization of socialism could
not be accomplished without the participation of people (renmin) (Li: 191). The
deterministic interpretation of Marxism was incorrect because it denied the activities
(huodong) (Li: 191, 339). The materialist explanation of history was judged by its
influence upon the human spirit (yu renleijingshen de yingxiang) and was good
because it proved that men make their own history, and these men are common
people (renmin). Idealistic explanation of history was bad because it paralyzed the
moral effort (Li: 337). Whether they were or were not the cases did not bother Li.

The same moral preoccupation in the interpretation of theories repeats in Chen’s
text. Therefore, the idea of human right alerted everyone not to be slave. Darwinism
alerted everyone to be self-determined because it proved that there is no God to rely
on. Thanks to atheistic Darwinism, we could now strive towards infinite progress.
Socialism was correct because it proclaimed to eliminate inequality and oppression
(Chen 1; 12-4). Malthusianism was incorrect because it discriminated against workers
and poor people (Chen 1: 442). What lurks behind all these interpretations of theories

is the intuitive eye of a transcendental moral subject beyond human history, almost

 

 

37
god-like, judging every deviations of the corrupted world.8 This was the self-
understanding of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. Righmess was their primary and the
ultimate concern.

From this perspective, we may also understand why both Li Dazhao and Chen
Duxiu emphasized so much on subjective factors. After all, action rather than structure
was immediate to morality. The primary concern with correct values led the attention
of Chen and Li rather naturally to the realm of action and subjectivity. This is the
Chinese origin of voluntaristic interpretation of Marxism. This voluntarism was based
on a Chinese concept of self/subjectivity that was god-like and virtually onmipotent.

To summarize the above analysis, both Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao interpreted
Marxism within a moral discourse. This discourse emphasized overwhelmingly moral
suggestion instead of explanation. It stressed as its conscious goal the spelling out of
correct values, but took the truth of analysis lightly. What was valid was essentially
the right argument, not necessarily the true one.

Chinese Marxism Voluntarism and Moral Discourse

 

Chinese Marxism has commonly been described as a kind of voluntarism which
is radically different from mechanical or structural Marxism. However, it would be
misleading to imply that Chinese Marxism has a theoretical position systematic
enough to be comparable to its assumed opponent. Stuart Schram once raised the
question whether Maoism was a system on its own or a variant of Leninism (1969:

136-8). I would argue that if the identity of Maoism is voluntarism, then Maoism is

 

' Merle Goldman argues that the traditional self-irnage of Chinese intellectuals
is a moral subject unbound by history but judging every single deviation of history
from prescribed values. They internalize Confucian values and take it as their holy
responsibhity to denounce any political corruption committed by the monarchy. The
implicit assumption is that the moral rectification of human society is necessary and
sufficient for restoration of the goodness of humanity. In this regard, the self-
understanding of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao was typically traditional.

38
surely not a system because his articulation of voluntaristic arguments is not
systematic enough.’ In contrast, Stalinism is a system because his mechanical
interpretation of Marxism is systematic. Therefore, the juxtaposition between Stalinism
and Maoism as determinism versus voluntarism is questionable at least in the aspect
of its systematic form. The voluntarism of Chinese Marxism is not a system.

Why is it so? One may argue that Maoism is necessarily unsystematic because
during the days of waging a Communist revolution, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) must try to guarantee the availability of diplomatic, political and military
resources from Moscow. Therefore, its voluntaristic orientation must not be systematic
to be discemable as challenging the official interpretation of Marxism by the
Russians. In other words, the Chinese Communists must try to claim the legitimacy
of being "the Marxist-Leninist" party so as to ask for money. Therefore, the
unsystematic character of the voluntarism in Maoism was instrumental in purpose.

However, the history of Chinese Marxism suggested a different answer. The
non-systematic features of the voluntaristic interpretation of Chinese Marxism appeared
even in the early day when Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu were still not the members
of the Chinese Communist Party, and their thoughts were not constrained by" political
consideration. Their insistence on the identification of correct values, and the neglect
of logical consistency and systematic form of presentation indicated that their prime
concerns were values. Moreover, they also assumed voluntaristically that the

realization of these values within objective constraints must be possible. Their beliefs

 

9 The non-systematic character of Maoism was noted by Schurmann as practical
ideology (1966: 17-57). The practical character of Maoism was also pointed out by
Brantly Womack to justify his own approach to Mao Zedong’s thought (1982: xi-
xviii). Concerning the superficiality of the reception of Marxism, read Arif Dirlik
1989: 43; Xin Gu 1989: 215-40), Zehou Li 1987: 7-49, and Maurice Meisner 1967:
56).

 

39
can be summarized in essence in Mao’s words: the subjective creates the objective.
However, their neglect of logical consistency resulted in a prominently unsystematic
presentation. Voluntarism had not been spelled out of its logical implications
systematically. Obviously, this unsystematic character of its voluntarism must be
explained by something other than political factors.

Munro once suggested that a cultural factor might be possible. He argued that
’[t]raditionally, theories and philosophical claims have been accepted or rejected in
China less because of logically or empirically convincing demonstrations of their truth
than because of their behavioral implications’ (197721). However, even if intellectual
primacy was given to behavioral implications (rightness?) than to truth, it does not
necessarily mean that rightness should be at the expense of truth. On the other hand,
given that Confucianism governed China for a long time, it is difficult to see how it
could be sustained against the challenge of Buddhism and Taoism without being
systematically articulated. For instance, neo-Confucianism was a systematic school of
thought. Even the Mencian elaboration of Confucius’ doctrine of humanity (ren), the
arguments of the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean were systematic, no
matter how primitive they were in form. The topics that they covered were not just
something to be learned, but to be explained as well. Moral discourse had been a rare
phenomenon among intellectuals.

To argue that the arguments are not articulated systematically does not
necessarily mean that its arguments cannot be understood systematically. The
non-systematic articulation of voluntarism in Chinese Marxism, in the last instance,
was intended for persuasion and validity claim. And in order to persuade, one must
ensure that his audience understood his arguments systematically so that the validity

of arguments could be established. If the articulation was not systematic, it must be

 

40
the case that the audience must have already understood the arguments systematically,
so that to invoke them was sufficient for persuasion and validity claim even if the
articulation was unsystematic. How was it possible? How was it possible that the
simple invocation of tightness was enough for validity claim? If moral discourse was
a rare phenomenon, why did it happen during the second half of the 19103? We will
attempt an answer in the next chapter.

In short, we argue the voluntaristic interpretation of Chinese Marxism during that
period of time was conducted within a moral discourse. Chinese Marxism was not
systematically articulated even as early as in the days of Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu.
It was voluntaristic not because it could be claimed as a systematic thought (called
voluntarism), but because its discursive pattern was moral. It was voluntaristic because
of its discourse of the moral suggestion of what should be done, and its optimistic

belief of the possibility of voluntaristic action.

 

 

CHAPTER IV Public Sphere and Deinstitutionalization of Discourse
Voluntaristic Langpage as Chinese Culture

In last chapter, I have argued that voluntarism as the identity of Chinese
Marxism does not have a systematic character. I have also suggested that when they
made such voluntaristic explanations, their audience must have already understood
them systematically. How could this be possible? It is my argument that it was the
case because they spoke a voluntaristic language that belongs to traditional Chinese
culture. In fact, their voluntaristic arguments were not theoretical arguments at all, but
in essence a kind of practical language. To put my point more precisely, they were
rhetoric for the sake of persuasion. What they expressed were practical rules and
assumptions that had been embedded within Chinese language. They were stored in
the practical consciousness of ordinary Chinese people. As Anthony Giddens’ concept
of practical consciousness suggests, when people communicate, they intuitively know
the way to speak although they often cannot articulate them systematically. For the
purpose of rhetoric which is to incite rather than to inspire, it does not matter whether
the content of the language is systematic or not because the audience have already
understood it systematically.

Therefore, the concepts of awakening (juewu), activity (huodong), spirit
(jingshen), renewal (xin) and change (bian) were most natural to an audience who had
been accustomed to the voluntaristic language of how to attain moral success in one’s

life.10 We have demonstrated that the concepts of revolution, capitalism and socialism

 

‘° Metzger mentioned that moral success has long been the central concern of
Chinese (1977: 208). Chang Hao also described the confucian conception of life as
moral drama of struggle for success (1988: 183-4). This idea was also revealed in the
texts of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao as guiding their orientation to everything
including interpretation of Marxism.

41

42

as revealed in the texts of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao were emphatically subjective.
No doubt, they were palatable to the pragmatic concern of this audience. After all,
an overly structural emphasis was likely to be suspicious of being deterministic,
fatalistic (sumenglun). Moreover, the Chinese tradition had celebrated the Confucian
doctrine of self-cultivation (xiushen) for at least hundreds of years. It goes without
saying that a discourse of self-cultivation can only be possible if one accepts the
assumption that the human self is autonomous. Otherwise, self-cultivation is fruitless
and irrelevant. If we understand this point, we should not be surprised that the
assumption of the omnipotence and moral spontaneity of self (zi) occupied such a
central place in their discourse. What Chen and Li spoke was in fact a kind of
voluntaristic language that their audience found self-evident.

Can we conclude that Chinese Marxism as interpreted by Li and Chen was more
Chinese than Marxist? In a sense, it is true if we focus on the historical origin of the
content of discourse. But if we are aware of the complexity and heterogeneity of
Chinese culture, it is clear that their discourse was a certain appropriation and
particular expression of the tradition. It would be misleading to say that Chinese
culture, or Confucianism, is a kind of voluntarism if we take into account the
Confucian conception of self (zi) as a center of objective social relationship. Is not
the assumption of hierarchy and submission as revealed in such concept of
sangangwuchang“ also part of Confucianism? How can we attribute the cause of the
extremely voluntaristic, oftentimes iconoclastic discourse of Li and Chen to the
tradition when it was once so conservative? Last but not least, did not Chen and Li

accuse their cultural heritage most furiously as regards its suppressive quality?

 

“ Sangangwuchang literally means the three cardinal social relationship between
ruler and the ruled, father and son, husband and wife, and the five elements in natural
order, namely the heaven, the earth, the ruler, the parent, the teacher.

43

Therefore, in order to demonstrate the particularity of moral discourse in the
context of Chinese tradition, I would like to analyze two litres of thought in historical
Confucianism which had been dialectically combined.” I do not claim that they
exhaust our understanding of Confucianism, nor the Chinese tradition. So long as my
analysis can demonstrate that moral discourse is a particular phenomenon, and this
particularity makes sense in historical context, I regard them as useful and adequate
for our purpose. These two lines of thought prescribe different factor as what is
essential to social order. The first is called tianren xiangying (the correspondence
between the heaven and man). It emphasizes the primacy of social relationship over
self consciousness. Social order can be maintained or restored if one knows the
correct social relationship. Therefore, man is defined as the bearer of natural and
objective social roles or the center of various social relationship. The essence of man
is entirely relational. The cardinal value is rite (1i), which in actuality means the
institutions of universal kingship and three ropes. One can be truly human if he
succeeds to adjust, or "correspond" to the rite and role expectation.

The second line of thought is called tianren heyi (the union of the heaven and
man). It emphasizes the primacy of self consciousness over social relationship. Social
order is possible if everyone is moral. Therefore, man is defined as the bearer of
moral consciousness. He is conceived essentially rather than relationally. The central
value is humanity (ren). One can be truly human if he succeeds to realize this value
of humanity within his inner nature rather than fulfill the external rite, or role
expectation. If he succeeds, he enjoys the "union" with the heaven.

In history, these two lines of thought in historical Confucianism were

 

‘2 The distinction between these lines of thought is borrowed from Chang Hao
(1989).

44

dialectically combined. One can conceptually distinguish them, but in practice, they
appeared more as different emphases.” On the other hand, their implications are
radically different. If carried to logical extremes, the tianren xiangying line of thought
will become extremely conservative. Man will be a slave of social order and social
expectation. The tianren heyi line of thought will in contrast become extremely
voluntaristic, with radical implication even to the extremes of iconoclasm and
revolutionary action. Social order becomes the uninterrupted expression of moral
consciousness. Anyone who successfully persuade others of his superior moral
consciousness can rightquy shatter the whole society to rebuild his abstract utopia,
if he wants. Historically, these two emphases had been mixed in Confucianism
without discrimination. They had been maintained in its subtle balance between
extreme conservatism and extreme voluntarism.

Upon the western intrusion in the nineteenth century, the concepts of universal
kingship and three ropes were destroyed by the increasing awareness of their
particularities and comparative deficiency in the light of alternative social order in the
West.“ As a result, 1i (rite), or pejoratively lijiao, became increasingly meaningless
and obsolete, and reactive, while moral consciousness was magnificently inflated
subsequently as the remaining basis of building social order. Behavior could now be

considered moral even if it was dubious in the light of role expectation defined by

 

‘3 Despite that, there were different historical periods when one aspect was
emphasized clearly at the expense of another. Chang Hao suggested that the Han
interpretation of Confucianism by Dong Zhongshu can be cited as example of the
tianren xiangying line of thought. The Neo-Confucianism of Sung is an example of
the tianren heyi line of thought.

1‘ Concerning the literature on the idea of universal kingship and its decline, Yu-
sheng Lin (1979)and Hao Chang (1987: 5-8) are relevant reference. Lin and Chang
call the collapse of the belief in universal kingship the crisis of Chinese
consciousness, and the crisis of orientational order respectively.

45

traditional institutions. The dissociation of moral consciousness fiom the constraint of
pre-established social expectations and norms had its historical origin in Wang
Yangming’s theory of innate moral knowledge (liangzhi) in the Ming dynasty, and
was radicalized by Huang Zongxi.” Chang called this line of intellectual development
the left-wing Wang Yangming Confucianism (zuopai wangxue).16

Now, I shall argue that Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao’s moral discourse in their
interpretation of Marxism can be understood as originating from this leftist
interpretation of Confucianism. The assumptions of an omnipotent subjectivity of the
present totally unbound by the past history, the implicit optimism in the genuine
rupture of history and complete moral rectification of the corrupted reality, the
persistent condemnation of existing social institution, all reflected the leftist orientation
vividly. What was in focus was a leftist concept of social order which was grounded
solely in moral consciousness, uncompromisingly radical and anti-establishment. In
fact, the early Li Dazhao before 1918 was even more explicit in his commitment to
this line of reasoning borrowed from the Confucian tradition. The best evidence is his
long essay "People’s Nature and Politics" written in 1913, which looked very much
like a manifesto of his left-wing Wang Yangming Confucian belief. The characteristic

emphasis on hierarchy in orthodox Confucianism was unequivocally condemned as

 

’5 The radicalism of Huang Zongxi’s interpretation of Confucianism was revealed
in his book "Propositions for a More Propitious Age" (Minyi Daifanglu) when he
denigrated the institution of monarchy (Grieder 1981: 34-7). this was perhaps the
germination of the attack on the universal kingship. It is now clear to the students of
Chinese history that Huang exerted significant influence on the thought of Liang
Qichao who then shaped the minds of Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and Mao Zedong.

“ The title of zuopai wangxue should not be mistaken as a formalized school
of thought. Rather, it is used to label an element within a broader intellectual tradition
of Confucianism, namely its unprecedentedly inflated concept of moral consciousness
that carried the radical implication of criticizing the institutional elements of
Confucianism. In different occasions, Chang Hao called the same element the monistic
pathos (1971) and universalism (1987).

46
autocracy (zhuanzhi) and replaced by a new moral conscience (minyi). However, this
new moral consciousness was obviously borrowed from the Confucian tradition.I7

So far, I hope I have accomplished the task of demonstrating the indigenous
origin of the voluntaristic language of Chen and Li, without hypostatizing Chinese
culture as a homogenous entity. However, a genetic approach cannot replace the
causal explanation of why this left-wing Wang Yangming Confucianism was
succeeded and eventually emerged in the thoughts of Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu. To
say where it comes from does not answer the question why it comes.

Moreover, the left-wing Wang Yangming Confucianism was not a moral
discourse. The systematic character of the thoughts of Wang Yangming and Huang
Zongxi was undeniable. Even if it was voluntaristic, the discourse was not only moral.
As I have mentioned, moral discourse had been a rare phenomenon in the intellectual
history of China. Even until the generation of Kang Youwei in the 18903, moral
discourse was not obvious. For instance, Kang’s arguments about institutional reform
and the three-stage theory of historical evolution were intended to be an articulation
of truth rather than a rhetorical language, and rightness was established only on the
basis of the truth value of these arguments. Why was the arguments of Chen and Li
in the 1910s degenerated into moral discourse? Why was voluntarism transformed into
a moral discourse? Even the texts of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao did not show a
uniform style of moral discourse. For instance, Li’s long essay "People’s Nature and
Politics" which looked very much like a manifesto his left-wing Wang Yangming
Confucian assumptions, and Chen’s polemical reply to Kang Youwei against the

movement intended to establish Confucianism as state religion both emphasized more

 

'7 In fact, Li Dazhao did invoked Wang Yangming’s concept of liangzhi
elsewhere (Li: 17, 31), but rarely concepts from other traditions. This is an additional
proof that he was influenced more by the tradition of Wang Yangming’s thought.

47
on the establishment of the truth value of their arguments rather than the rightness
of their positions. Moral discourse came under a very specific historical situation.
Moral Discourse and Public Sphere

It is the argument of this thesis that moral discourse emerged during the turn of
the 19208 because of various effects associated with the emergence of public sphere.
Public sphere is defined as a sphere in society where there is exchange of ideas,
discussion of issues that everyone is concerned, and the formation of opinions. The
activities of public sphere is distinguished by the fact that it needs no conscious
coordination. It is public because it is open to everyone who is interested. Every piece
of information in public sphere is by definition accessible to everyone who is willing
to find it out. The opinions in public sphere may be deliberately and predominately
shaped by certain interest groups. But no one can coordinate the overall activities of
this sphere. This fact remains the very identity of public sphere. It is also the
structural consequence of this fact which interests us in the explanation of moral
discourse.

The public sphere began to emerge in Chinese society several centuries ago.
Since the late Qing period, there had been restructuring of state-societal relationship,
with a new sphere of civil activities growing at increasing rate and continually
separate from the monarchy. This was due to several socio-economic reasons: First,
demographic growth, especially that of the gentry class. As a result of over-supply,
the state-sponsored civil service examination failed in its function to coopt them
adequately. A significant portion of the elites remained outside the imperial
bureaucracy, thus adding to the self-ruling ability of the society. Second, increasing
commercialization of economy and the subsequent urbanization. As a consequence,

the gentry class was given an alternative means in their pursuit of wealth and power.

 

48
They could become rich and influential, not by serving the monarchy, but by doing
business. As a result, the gentry class was becoming more and more separated. This
relative separation of the gentry class from the monarchy was shown in the gradual
expansion of elite public managerial activities (Rankin 1986: Introduction), and the
gradual devolution of state power into some local gentry which was expedited after
the Taiping Rebellion (Kuhn 1970: 211-25). Third, with the intrusion of western
imperialism, the imposed entrepot trade increased. This further shook up the monopoly
power of the monarchy in distributing wealth, and strengthened the separation of the
society from the monarchy meanwhile. In short, increasing population, escalating
commercialization and decreasing state power rendered the emergence of public sphere
structurally possible (Rowe 1990: 314—29).

However, public sphere was a relatively young phenomenon in China." It came
only after 1895 (Li & Nathan 1985: 361; Nathan 1985: x). Accordingly, there were
three reasons. First, the defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 sent shock
waves through the whole country. After almost thirty years of import of western
technology and armament, China crumbled totally in the war with Japan. The
humiliation was aggravated by the fact that Japan was an enemy which China had
been looked down on for centuries. This made people fanatic with the root causes of
the defeat, and consequently motivated the formation of a politically conscious public
sphere. Second, the technological advancement rendered the press available as a new
medium of public discussion. Together with urbanization and the weakening of state

power, increasing number of urban cities organized sphere of public discussion.

 

” William Rowe recently published a review article, linking Habermas’ concept
of public sphere to the recent historiography of China (1990: 309-29). He implied that
public sphere had a long history in China. However, as a sphere of public exchange
of ideas, public sphere is still a relatively new phenomenon in modern Chinese
history.

49

As a consequence, a new form of communication called press or journalism
appeared. Unlike the academies (shuyuan) in the past, it was for the first time
generally accessible to the non-gentry class. The readership included the gentry as
well as merchants, even students, youth and women. The impersonal pattern of
communication ensured that discussion could be more lively, more direct, and less
scrupulous in the consideration of status and face. Moreover, unlike the academics
which was small in scale, enjoyed more personal familiarity and intimacy among
students and teachers, and more homogenous in the cultural background of these
people who came from the gentry class overwhelmingly, now the anonymity and
heterogeneity of audience in the public sphere rendered it more crucial for the men
of letters to choose an appropriate discourse. If they failed to attract their audience
or convince them in this new cultural setting, they were bound to fail in this
battlefield of arguments. It was in this structural context that moral discourse could
become so prominent.

Many studies have been done on the thoughts of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao.
But scholars rarely paid attention to one single fact: that their thoughts, including the
interpretation of Marxism, was developed wholly within this new settings called public
sphere. Unlike Kang Youwei, Zhang Zhidong, or the generation in the 1890s, their
ideas were presented in short articles in journals and newspapers rather than in books.
Li Dazhao never published a book; for Chen Duxiu, the only book that he published
was his autobiography during his later years. If their intellectual labor was framed by
this new pattern of argumentation, what was the effect? It should be clear by now
that the effect was shown in the moral discourse of their ideas. Moreover, it was this
moral discourse which shaped their interpretation of Marxism.

The immediate consequence of the coming of age of public sphere was the

50

socio-structural transformation of the empirical concept of audience. Between the two
generations of 1890s and 19105, there was a rupture in the intellectual history of
China in that the reproduction of knowledge was no longer monopolized by the gentry
class. No matter how dominant they were, the gentry had to consider for the first
time other people, including students, youth and women who had all been traditionally
defined as inferior, both morally and intellectually. This change also gained impetus
and justification in Liang Qichao’s theory of solidarity (qun) together with its
implication for the reconstruction of the traditional concept of authority (Chang 1971:
73-120). If ordinary people had to be mobilized for the political sake of the wealth
and strength (fuqiang) of China, there would be no reason to forbid them to assume
the role of audience in intellectual discussion. In fact, Liang Qichao was the first who
published newspapers, developed the new and much easier style of writings, and
asserted that the non-gentry class had to be called upon by all means to take part in
the salvation of the nation and its modernization (Nathan 1985: 132-55).

The characteristicsof this new group of audience was that they were huge in
number, totally anonymous, and heterogeneous in respect of subcultures. Karl
Mannheim once argued that competition among free-flown intellectuals in the public
sphere explained the diversity and heterogeneity of intellectual development of the
west (1985: 12, 269). Stanley Milgram also asserted that heterogeneity of social life
led to tolerance, while anonymity provided space for eccentricity (1970: 1461-8).
However, this was apparently not the case in China. The effects of these structural
variables of size, social anonymity and cultural heterogeneity were not immediate and
uniform. They were subject to cultural interpretation.

The result of this cultural interpretation was that the structural effects of the

public sphere and audience were translated into moral discourse. First of all, with the

51

traditional assumption that valid knowledge came from moral sagehood rather than
from scientific spirit, validity was associated with moral virtues. As the new audience
was anonymous, the only way to appeal to them of the validity of one’s argument
was to prove his moral superiority rather than to invoke the criterion of truth.
Therefore, a moral impulse to exhort or condemn was not an aberration from the
effort to establish validity of arguments, but rather one of its integral effort. Truth
may not equal morality. But without morality, one is surely not eligible for the truth
claim.

Secondly, as the new public sphere were no longer monopolized by the gentry
class and consequently heterogeneous in subcultures, there was no common language
to resolve intellectual disputes. Methods as practiced by the empirically oriented Han
Learning in the mid-Qing Dynasty were no longer available as the traditional
institutionalization of discourse in academia was disrupted. Nor was there any
consistent framework like the Sung Learning that could be used to establish or refute
a claim. In the age of cultural iconoclasm, only moral discourse of awakening,
self-respect, unselfishness and moral action was capable of establishing consensus
because these moral values were the only things they all shared.

Therefore, it was no surprise that when Li Dazhao was accused by Hu Shi of
not studying concrete problems, but wasting time talking abstractly about Marxism,
he replied that ’therefore, we must be dare enough to practise our ideals rather than
merely to theorize.’ However, the debate was not between theory and practice, but
about what should be practiced. While he advocated radical and revolutionary practice,
Hu suggested moderate and piecemeal action (Li: 228—35). Amazingly, Li resolved the
dispute by emphasizing practice as a value. He tried to convince Hu and his readers

through moral discourse.

52

In his comment of Liang Ji’s suicide, Chen Duxiu also approved his "unselfish"
act of suicide (Chen 1: 369-72). However, he brushed aside the key issue in this
incident, namely that Liang J i’s death was intended as a remonstration against cultural
iconoclasm that Chen Duxiu was practicing. With historical hindsight, we know that
Liang Ji failed. The path of modern Chinese history was inexorably moving away
from his moral utopia - a perfect moral community defined by Confucianism.
However, he succeeded in putting his opponents back within the constraint of moral
discourse. Unselfishness was still the universal value that no one can disagree. Now,
Chen felt more pressed to announce his "unselfish" motivation which became almost
the sole basis of validity of his arguments. Rightness, not truth, was the primary
emphasis, into which were inserted every other piece of argument. In effect, Chen
was locked within a moral discourse.

Thirdly, given the unprecedented proximity between intellectuals and society
provided by the public sphere, the cultural image of intellectuals as responsible for
providing moral leadership became more likely to be realized. As a result, the public
sphere turned their attention to' the invocation of values rather than the tedious
analyses of facts and information. With the anticipation that their influence was now
more accessible to millions of people, moral exhortation and condemnation were
rather unconsciously and compulsively channelled into their discourse. The central
point of this argument is that the turn to moral discourse was not accidental, but
predetermined.

Finally, the cross-class nature of discourse also meant that the audience included
younger generation of students, youth and even women. This cross-generational feature
also added to the moral burden of Chen Dixiu and Li Dazhao. Therefore, truth must

give way to rightness and specification of practical actions. After all, the distinction

53
between the morally respected (iunzi) and the ordinary people (xiaoren) had been
sedimented through thousands of years that it was difficult for Chen and Li to
eliminate this consciousness when they were addressing to the younger generation.
The unequal status in discussion also created a moral impulse to teach rather than to
discuss, to give instruction (jianghua) rather than to have dialogue (duihua).

To summarize, for determinate cultural reasons, the public sphere was perceived
by Chinese intellectuals as technical means to achieve moral rectification of the world.
It was used as a tool of moral control rather than a realm of free exchange of ideas.
In the last instance, it was a manifestation of power and domination, even though in
the name of rightness. As a result, discussions in public sphere were motivated by an
interest in control which was uncongenial to intellectual diversity and tolerance. They
became propaganda (Nathan 1985: 133-51)."

It must be emphasized that there is no necessary connection between public
sphere and moral discourse. We have mentioned Mannheim’s explanation of the
historical origin of free—flown intellectuals and Milgram’s prediction of increasing
tolerance and eccentricity in public sphere. In fact, they can be cited as counterfactual
arguments in support of the explanation in this thesis, that the structural effects of the
public sphere on communication in a different cultural context would be totally
different. Moral discourse was a product of a complex interaction between objective
structural and intersubjective cultural factors.

To summarize the above analysis, the emergence of public sphere, together with

a new composition of audience, introduces new variables into discourse, including

 

‘9 The moral character of press and journalism as noted by Andrew Nathan
(1985: 133-51) echoes Metzger’s argument that the Chinese concept of modernization
as pingtianxia (moral rectification of the world) which was essentially moral (Metzger
1980: 282-5).

54

anonymity, cultural heterogeneity, structural proximity among classes, and generation.
However, their effects on discourse are not immediate, as what Mannheim and
Milgrarn predicted. Rather, they are mediated through cultural assumptions that are
stored in the practical consciousness of people in the same cultural tradition. These
practical assumptions serve to translate the effects of these variables of the public
sphere into moral discourse. The moral discourse of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao
cannot be explained by structural factor alone.

Moral Discourse and Deinstitutionalization of Discourse

Now, I would like to complicate the above arguments by introducing one more
factor, namely the deinstitutionalization of discourse. To anticipate the following
arguments, I would argue that the structural effects of the public sphere are specific
not only in a particular cultural context, but in a particular historical context as well.
Cultural context specifies where the effects take place, and the historical context
specifies when they take place. Moral discourse emerged in a generation of Chinese
people when public discourse was deinstitutionalized. Before we go on, let us
elaborate the concept of deinstitutionalization first.

Habermas makes a distinction between theoretical discourse and practical
discourse. While the truth as a validity claim is singled out and examined in
theoretical discourse, practical discourse is concerned with the vindication of the claim
of tightness. However, it is impossible to examine both truth and righmess at the
same time. Only one validity claim can be examined at one time, while other claims
must be held constant. Now, the moral discourse of Chen and Li was obviously
practical because of their emphasis on tightness. Moreover, their practical discourse
presupposed a common definition of truth, so that any people who wanted to

participate in the discussion of righmess could share the same concepts and theoretical

55
framework the common rules of measurement, and common logic of verification
and/or falsification. They might or might not be available, depending on what
Habermas calls the institutionalization of discourse (Habermas 1974: 16-9).

However, in the moral discourse of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, righmess was
at the expense of truth. This is a phenomenon that needs to be explained. Chen and
Li probably believed that their discourse of tightness was true. However, their
discourse, as we have demonstrated, was in fact illogical and unsystematic. One
possible reason was that they were not careful enough, or not intelligent enough. But
given that they both successfully mastered the devotion of hundreds of thousands of
intellectuals of the age, this explanation is most unlikely.

I would suggest that a more plausible explanation has to be sought in the
deinstitutionalization of discourse. In traditional Chinese society, there was
institutionalization of discourse within the gentry class. Academia (shuyuan) which
was once prosperous was a clear example. This institution was important because it
provided a common "definition" of truth. In the first place, this was possible because
the gentry class shared a common cultural identity called Confucianism. However, as
is now well-lmown to the students of Chinese history, this gentry class began to
disorganize during the 1890s. This fragmentation gained momentum after the failure
of the Hundred Days Reform in 1898.20

As a result, there was destitutionalization of discourse. The common "definition"

of truth became ambivalent. When the public sphere swiftly emerged as the

 

2° Reference to the fragmentation of the gentry class can be found in Maurice
Meisner, Mao’s China and After. For a local but more detailed description of the
process, read Joseph Esherick, Reform and Revolution in China: the 1911 Revolution
in Hunan and Hubei, chapter 1. Indirect reference of the fragmentation of the gentry
class can also be found in the topic of the emergence of modern Chinese
intelligentsia. Read Hao Chang, 1980: 373; Jerome Grieder, 1981: 240.

56

predominant institution of discourse, there was constant pressure to prove the validity
of one’s arguments by emphasizing the rightness of the claims, but not enough time
and patience for careful examination of arguments and re-establishment of the
"definition" of truth. What remained was a more generalized yet more imprecise
moral discourse that the people could appeal to for validity claims. In fact, it was
bound to come due to the emergence of public sphere and the deinstitutionalization
of discourse. Eventually, moral discourse emerged.

If this argument makes sense, it also answers why Li’s long essay "People’s
Nature and Politics" and Chen’s polemical reply to Kang Youwei against the
movement intended to establish Confucianism as state religion emphasized more on
the establishment of the truth value of their arguments rather than the righmess of
their positions. Concerning historical Confucianism which both protagonists and
antagonists were familiar, a common framework was more immediately available so
that Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao’s discourse could appeal to truth. But when they
moved to new topics like democracy and science, discourse of truth became extremely
difficult. In the age of deinstitutionalization of discourse, moral discourse became
almost inevitable. The gradual transition of their arguments into moral discourse, when
the topics shifted from the more familiar to the less, gives our arguments more
credibility.

Concluding the explanations given in this chapter, let me summarize them as
follows: all in all, the moral discourse of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao was a
consequence of complex interaction among cultural factors (the voluntaristic language),
structural factors (the public sphere) and historical factors (the deinstitutionalization

of discourse).

CHAPTER V Conclusion

The final chapter of a thesis is usually its conclusion. But what should be added
to our previous discussion of the moral discourse of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao
about Marxism? It is my belief that besides the evidence and logical consistency of
the arguments, a thesis should also be understood and criticized in respect of its
implications. I have mentioned that the purposes of this thesis are both empirical and
theoretical. In the following paragraphs, let me discuss the empirical and theoretical
implications that I have in my mind right at the beginning of the drafting of this
thesis.

During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), different political factions were

involved in fierce political struggle. All claimed to be "proletarian, revolutionary"
and "red." Every minute deviation from ritualistic political behavior was treated as
evidence of the "counterrevolutionary" and purged. Of course, no political group could
stand long in struggle. In principle, there was just no clear definition of what was
meant by revolutionary. ’The moral drama continues, and while it is still discussed
in terms of the Marxist rhetoric of class struggle, it is no longer entirely clear which
segments of society are the social bearers of human evil and which segments are the
bearers of virtue. People of wrong class background are still subject to discrimination,
but the right background is no guarantee of virtue. The bourgeois disposition of soul
can find its lodgement in any established organization including the Communist party
itself. Indeed, one can only be sure of the leader himself.’ (Schwartz 1968: 377).
Political struggle is also a form of communication, if we do not suppose that

communication must be peaceful. After all, it is also a process of exchange of

arguments, threats and, in the last resort, weaponry. What is peculiar is that during

57'

58
the turbulent days of the Cultural Revolution, the communication was so dramatically
moral. Political struggle was a struggle for the claim of moral superiority, and what
was moral was defined by the great teacher and leader Chairman Mao Zedong.

In a sense, the Cultural Revolution resembled the moral discourse of Chinese
Marxism by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao in the accentuation of righmess. The
difference was the scale. It is not my argument that there was a causal relationship
between the two events which are separated from each other for almost half a
century. That is just beyond the scope of this thesis. But it is my intention to draw
the attention of researchers who are interested in the historical change of Chinese
society in the twentieth century to this peculiar aspect, namely the accentuation on
righmess in discourse and communication, including even political struggle. Moreover,
if the moral discourse of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao could be explained by the
emergence of public sphere and deinstitutionalization of discourse, could they be
related in any way to the explanation of the Cultural Revolution? Furthermore, one
must not forget the various debates in the 19308 (about the difference between science
and religion, between the Eastern culture and the Western culture, and the nature of
traditional Chinese society), and the wide-scale discussions among the intellectuals in
the 19508 (about the political nature of literature, and other topics)? It would surely
be intriguing if research can be done on the interconnection among these various
incidents. If we relate the phenomenon that we have discussed to the broader context
of Chinese history in the twentieth century, it seems to me that discourse is an
unexplored theme that requires further investigation. This is the hidden ambition of
this thesis.

It should also be clear by now that the focus of this thesis is not Marxism, nor

the voluntarism of Chinese Marxism. It is the change of discursive pattern in modern

59

Chinese history which is the concern of this thesis. We are not interested in whether
Chinese Marxism is proper Marxism or not, nor whether the voluntaristic element is
derived and faithful to the original spirit of Marx. That kind of task should be left
to intellectual historians and those who believe that they know the "true" Marxism.
We study Chinese Marxism insofar as it is taken as moral discourse. We investigate
the moral discourse of Chinese Marxism insofar as it represents a moment in the
broader pattern of historical change.

In respect of the theoretical part, this thesis is intended to emphasize language
as an important factor in sociological explanation. For a long time, sociologists
assume that social world is objective. Apparently, they need the assumption because
this is the reason why social science is possible. After all, is not science objective?
If the social world can be studied scientifically, it must be objective. However, what
does it mean that the social world is objective? There are two radically different
answers. The first is metaphysical. It argues that the social world is objective, just
like the natural world. Therefore, if we can rightly say that there is a gravitational
law in the natural world, there must be some laws of equal status in the social world.
Since gravitational law is universal and ahistorical, and social laws must be 80,
history must be excluded from the social world. Note that the argument is
metaphysical. It does not argue that there are some ahistorical dimensions in the
social world. It asserts that the social world has no history.

The second answer is less extreme. It avoids metaphysical assumption. The social
world is objective only in methodological sense. As science is an objective method,
it can only abstract from the infinite social reality and study the objective aspects.
The spirit of this answer is that the social world may or may not be different from

the physical world, but the method of social science must be the same as that of

60
natural science. Methodologically, there is only one logic of science.

Obviously, the first answer is ridiculous. We will just leave aside. For the second
answer, it is appealing intuitively. There should be only one scientific method. After
all, physics does not recognize social boundary. To say that there is a difference
between bourgeois and proletarian physics, or between Chinese physics and American
physics is ludicrous. By the same token, there should be no distinction between
Chinese and American statistics.

But what about Chinese and American sociology? Now, I believe one should be
more cautious to reject this distinction as well. After all, it is reasonable to argue
that Chinese and American sociology are answers that have been sought for different
questions. If the questions are particular, the answers are bound to be particular.
While the questions for statistics and physics are more technical, and more amenable
to universal definition, the questions that sociologists try to answer are more rooted
in concrete history. Unlike physics and statistics, sociology is inherently value-laden
and political. There can be universal and value-free perspective in physics and
statistics because physicists deal with the physical world, and statisticians deal with
data. But sociologists deal with the social world. The physical world and data are not
inherently meaningful; there is no laughter or tear in the world of objects or data. But
the social world is inherently meaningful; and there is human suffering or happiness
in the social world. It is not because, or not only because(?) I am particularly tender-
minded that I observe this fact; it is the implacable logic that draws me to the
conclusion. One can surely abstract away from laughter and tears when he studies the
social world. But he should be aware of the cost. He is no longer studying the social
world as such, but the abstract model as the social world.

I must declare that I am not challenging the use of model in social scientific

61

research. I am challenging the use of abstract model as if it were the social world.
The precise difference between the conscious and unconscious use of abstract model
is that in the latter, the problem of definition is excluded. Those unconscious
researchers are only interested in the relationship among concepts. But they do not
know that concepts need to be defined before they can be investigated in respect of
their interrelationship. And worst of all, they do not know that definition involves
hermeneutics. There is no herrneneutical problem in natural science before it deals
with object. An atom is an atom; it cannot be otherwise. The point here is that the
definition of an object is more or less unproblematic. But the modern society is not
an industrial society. Nor is it a capitalist society. It can be defined so by bourgeois
and Marxist sociologists respectively. Inequality can also be defined as stratification
or exploitation. But what goes into the respective definitions are commitments to what
is meaningful, which rightly belongs to the realm of hermeneutics. When one is
studying the social world, one cannot avoid making judgment of what is meaningful
and defining his topic well before he can deploy the scientific method. These steps
which precede the use of scientific method are herrneneutical operations. I hope the
reader will be clear by now that I am not challenging the use of scientific method.
I gladly appreciate all the technical achievements in social science, including research
methods, statistics and model-building. But I insist that what is unique to social
science is that it must be preceded and constituted by hermeneutics (Habermas 1989).

I go into details to establish this point - that social science is constituted by
hermeneutics - because it is of crucial importance to my argument that language is
integral to sociological explanation. If one admits that the social world is meaningful,
and different societies have different meaning systems, it is a matter of principle that

objective factors may produce different effects, depending on the cultural specificity

62

of the context.21 Therefore, I deem it is of paramount importance to integrate language
as a variable into sociological explanation. As I have asserted, the drawbacks of the
objective approach to sociology of knowledge is that in order to be scientific and
objective, it excludes all non—objective factors from its framework. The consequence
is that the specificity of determination is obscured. I have also asserted that the
effects of public sphere and deinstitutionalization of discourse would very likely be
different if they take place in a different cultural context. In a sense, moral discourse
was a Chinese product shaped by the voluntaristic language bequeathed by left-wing
Wang Yangming Confucianism. It was this language which translated the structural
effects of the public sphere and the deinstitutionalization of discourse into moral
discourse. Without this factor, the explanation must suffer in respect of its specificity.

The arguments of this thesis may be wrong or insufficient in the light of new
evidence. Or it may not stand the careful reading in its logical consistency. The hope
of a dedicated researcher is not to prove that he is always correct, though I hope my
arguments are not seriously wrong. It is his aim to point out new facts, new factors
that have been ignored, and stimulate reflection of the present through increasing
understanding of history.

-—THE END —-

 

21I only assert that it may be so because a stronger assertion risks the danger of
falling prey to cultural idealism. It would be idealistic to maintain that cultural
configuration is the necessary and sufficient factor in sociological explanation. After
all, there are some objective interests like food, sex and understanding that are not
culture-bound and have their own specific effectivities. To deny material factors and
admit solely cultural factors is idealistic. But it is equally idealistic to admit that
material factors can explain everything. This admittance is possible only if one
maintains an "ideal" image of man, say man is instrumentally rational.

APPENDIX:

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