A 7155:9815“!!! . s . r :q . Hrf...’ r. :9!!- i . .t ‘9 f..(u..\.28x..‘n§§ {III-Isl. i, 0: {3.};15. ‘i i. in!“ slit 0“, t . .t... 1!... CH IGAN STATE IIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII L» 3(XBH06034 IIIIIIII This is to certify that the dissertation entitled Art Criticism as Narrative: Diderot's Salon de 1762 presented by Julie Wegner Arnold has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. French degree in W§M4A Major r fessor I Datem IDI- 19% IVSU is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0- 12771 r LIBRARY Michigan State University K J PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE db“; 8 _, ~€6 P .dQ7QQA ' L :‘itiU V‘_ e 4‘. W06 I—‘I—I MSU to An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Inuitution cmms-od ART CRITICISM AS NARRATIVE: DIDEROT'S SALON DE 1767 By Julie Wegner Arnold A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Romance and Classical Languages 1993 ABSTRACT ART CRITICISM AS NARRATIVE: DIDEROT'S SALON DE 1767 BY Julie Wegner Arnold Scholars in recent years have explored how Denis Diderot showcases his thought process through the act of writing. I build on this foundation by investigating methods used by Diderot in the Salon de 1767 to represent art beyond the liminal moments portrayed and to reveal the vitality of his mind at work. Diderot inscribes himself fancifully within images and dramatizes or pantomimes them as an actor would a role. He represents his imaginary performances and the emotions they provoke, and he later relives these experiences while reading his text. My opening chapter locates Diderot's art criticism and the rationale for my study in the larger context of his work, specifically as concerns his acute interest in representing the pictorial, dialogical and theatrical nature of his intelligence. Chapter Two investigates narrative devices which convey the action of paintings transformed in Diderot's mind. His imaginary self-projection into historical and mythological subjects, family scenes, and paintings with moral overtones inspires him emotionally and energizes his prose. Chapter Three examines Diderot’s portraits and self- images. Successful artists convey Diderot’s apparent readiness to speak. This encourages Diderot as a beholder of his portraits to animate and "talk to himself," to engage in imaginary ventriloquy. His concept of selfhood as a dynamic process emerges as he interacts fancifully with others and narrates the experience. These others include portraits or sculptures of himself, portraits of others, and actual conversations or relationships retrieved from memory and embellished. Diderot imagines Vernet’s landscapes as natural sites. Chapter Four investigates these ”sites” as mental stages onto which Diderot projects himself and a fictitious guide created for the purpose of dialogue. The guide is a textual dramatization of Diderot's self-spectatorship, his critical intelligence attentive to the task of writing and to the differences between art and nature. Meanwhile, Diderot's imagination obfuscates the boundaries between art and nature and allows him to enter the landscapes psychologically or 'act' on stage. The interplay between rational beholding and imaginary acting structures his experience and narration. I conclude by showing the pertinence of my study to current Diderot studies. Copyright by JULIE WEGNER ARNOLD 1993 Dedicated to the memory of my grandparents ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It is difficult to express in a few words how much I appreciate the guidance, encouragement and friendship of Dr. Herbert Josephs, the major advisor of my dissertation committee. Dr. Josephs, your dedication as a teacher and expertise in Diderot studies have inspired and challenged me. I feel fortunate to have worked with you and I am grateful for your patient direction. To Dr. Laurence Porter and Dr. Eldon Van Liere, I thank you for your constructive suggestions, your moral support and faith in me. Special thanks are also extended to the faculty members of the Department of Romance and Classical Languages who have encouraged me during my studies at Michigan State University. I am deeply grateful to my parents and grandparents for a lifetime of love and an atmosphere conducive to learning. To my husband, John, I thank you for sharing the joy and anguish of this undertaking. Your love and support sustain my ambition, strength and happiness. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF FIGURES ........................................ viii CHAPTER I. Introduction ........................................ 1 II. Mental Images ...................................... 28 III. Diderot's Portraits ................................ 78 Diderot's Portrait by Michel Van Loo ............. 82 Diderot's Self-Portrait in Response to Van Loo...89 A Portrait by Garand ............................. 99 Busts of Diderot by Falconet and Mlle Collot....104 Diderot and Mme Therbouche ...................... 110 The Ventriloquist Once-Removed .................. 125 IV. Landscape: A Stage for Ventriloquy ................ 141 Setting the Stage ............................... 144 The First Site .................................. 147 The Second Site ................................. 153 Who's On Stage? ................................. 176 From Solitude to Companionship .................. 187 V. Conclusion ........................................ 201 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................ 218 FIGURES ................................................. 227 vii ‘6 KIU 1I\ 10. 11. 12. 13. LIST OF FIGURES Vien, ”Saint Denis préchant la foi en France," Paris, église Saint-Roch (from Diderot, Salons III, fig. 12). Doyen, 'Le Miracle des ardents,’ Paris, église Saint— Roch (from Diderot, Salons III, fig. 13). Vien, ”Mars et Vénus,‘ Leningrad, Hermitage (from Diderot, Salons III, fig. 19). Greuze, 'Le Mauvais fils puni,‘ sketch, 1765, Lille, Musée des Beaux-Arts (from Munhall, Soan;SaoLlsoo Greuzel_1125;lafli. fig. 49). Baudouin, 'Le Coucher de la mariée,‘ Gravure by Moreau 1e Jeune (from Diderot, Salons III, fig. 42). Tintoretto, "Susanna and the Elders," Munich, former collection Marzell von Nemes ?? (from Bercken, Dis Gemalde_des_lasene_1intetette. fig. 165). Michel Van Loo, 'Diderot," Paris, Louvre (from Diderot. Salons III, fig. 5). Garand, ”Diderot," drawing, private collection (from Diderot. Salons III, fig. 7). Mademoiselle Collot, ”Diderot," terra-cotta, former collection Jacques Doucet (from Diderot, Salons III, fig. 8). Madame Therbouche, ”Diderot," engraving by Bertonnier (from Diderot, Salons III, fig. 9). Vernet, 'La Source abondante,’ engraving by Le Bas (from Diderot, Salons III, fig. 23). Vernet, ”Marine," Collection P. Cailloux (from Diderot. Salons III, fig. 21). Vernet, ”Les Occupations du rivage,‘ (from Diderot, Salons 111. fig. 22). viii CHAPTER I WHY ART CRITICISM? Between 1759 and 1781, Denis Diderot reviewed nine Salon art exhibitions as a favor to his friend, Friedrich Melchior Grimm, who published them in the fortnightly newspaper called La Correspondance Littéraire (1753+). But the eighteenth-century French philosophe did not merely write the Salons as a favor to his friend Grimm. A careful examination of the Salons reveals that art criticism was a challenge to Diderot, not only because La Correspondance Littéraire was intended for a small, widely dispersed group of readers, many of whom could not attend the Salons and who relied solely on Diderot's written representations, but also because Diderot's examination of art and subsequent writing of the Salons provide him with the opportunity to examine and expose his self-conscious narration of his own artistic experience. The perspective Diderot brings to representation, to art and fiction is grounded in Enlightenment epistemology. The seventeenth-century philosopher and mathematician, René Descartes, had proposed a model of human understanding which the following generation challenged. In his Discours de la méthode... (1637), Descartes dismisses sensory information as unreliable and imperfect and establishes the principle that being is predicated solely upon thought (_L r 'e ‘1‘ J (I (cogito ergo sum). He accepts as true only those ideas or premises which are clear and distinct in his mind, and he maintains that certain innate ideas are placed in his consciousness by a perfect, divine being. He begins, as Ernst Cassirer explains, with ”certain principles, certain general concepts and axioms, in order, by virtue of abstract inferences, to pave the way to knowledge of the particular, the 'factual" (7). Like Descartes, eighteenth-century thinkers investigate human understanding and knowledge, but they reject Descartes' assumption that such investigations must begin with absolute principles to be 'proven' by a consistent method. In his research on planetary bodies, Newton did not begin with a priori assumptions or principles but rather collected data by experience in order to derive principles (Cassirer 7). Newton’s establishment of the physical laws of gravity and of moving bodies was the goal of his inquiry, not the starting point. Many Enlightenment theoreticians adopt this premise that knowledge and understanding can be gained only by experience and by reflection upon experience. In his Essay concerning Haman understanding (1689), John Locke was one of the first to dismiss Descartes' 'innate ideas" and restore the role of the body in the pursuit of knowledge. As Paul Hazard points out, Locke asserts that the source of all knowledge is rooted in sense perception and reflection (Crise 2: 20). Going beyond the teachings of Locke, George Berkeley argued that matter does not exist apart from its being perceived. Paul Hazard sums up Berkeley’s philosophy this way: 'Etre, c'est percevoir et étre percu; rien de plus" (Pensée 2: 20). Likewise influenced by Locke, Etienne Condillac maintains a doctrine of sensationalism based on the principle that observations made by sense perception are the basis for human thought. But he also maintains that the constitutive elements of psychological experience can be analyzed and broken into their constituent parts (Cassirer 24). Hazard suggests that theoreticians generally proposed four stages of cognition. Sense perception is followed by deduction which differentiates between sense data (Pensée 1: 35). Condillac calls this attention, or the isolation of a single sense experience from the total psychological process according to the immediate needs and desires of the individual (Cassirer 102). The mind is aware of itself perceiving. It then actively works on the sense data. weighing, sifting and comparing it before finally delivering or representing a verdict (Pensée 1: 36). Hazard points out, however, that theoreticians did not dwell on these successive stages but were more interested in watching the mind at work (Pensée 1: 36). Gottfried Leibniz also criticizes Descartes' philosophy, claiming it is too mechanistic and static. From Leibniz’s perspective, since clear ideas and principles are Descartes' starting point, being is presumed in advance. Leibniz's philosophy, expressed in such works as.MOnadology (1714) and Principles of Nature and Grace (1714). rests on the conception of being as made up of an infinite number of units of spiritual force or matter, which he called monads. There is a hierarchy of monads rising up to God, and each monad reflects a dynamic universe because each is a whole which is not the sum of its parts, but which constantly unfolds into multiple aspects. The individuality of the monad manifests itself in these progressive acts of individuation... (Cassirer 31) Leibniz’s concept of an individual entity therefore focuses on the act of becoming, not on being. Cassirer summarizes: The monad is not an aggregate but a dynamic which can only manifest itself in a profusion, in an infinity, of different effects. In this...infinity it preserves its identity as the same living center of force. (32) Hazard points out that Leibniz’s followers 'spiritualized matter' by extending his theories to include "quelque principe d'intelligence, quelque chose de semblable a ce que nous appelons désir, aversion, mémoire..." (Pensée 2: 43). In other words, Leibniz's theories were adopted as a model for human thought. Clear and distinct ideas have no meaning under Leibniz's concept -—n.p_‘ _".- h‘ of dynamic individuation, because each individual object. concept or phenomenon, though whole unto itself, is constantly evolving and transformed by the perceiver's emotions and by his memory. Each monad or individual unit of being tends towards a different state of being. This means that any distinct idea of an object or phenomenon including identity can be nothing more than a temporary picture in the mind. From different perspectives, these writers all investigate the process of human understanding or how we know. When Newton and Leibniz propose the dynamic nature of the physical and spiritual world, the implications for human thought are immediately apparent. If we conceive of the mind as a unit of being within the natural world, then the mind is necessarily a dynamic entity. Thought and understanding evolve constantly. Knowledge is a process: it is something we are always in the act of acquiring and is not lodged innately within us. Any method of inquiry must therefore take into consideration the dynamic nature of the human mind itself. Diderot's early works demonstrate that he is a strong participant in the epistemological changes of his century. Like his contemporaries, he is interested in the natural and therefore liberated ordering and development of ideas in his mind. In De l'Interprétation de la nature (1754), Diderot directs his reader's attention to the fact that he will not impose a structure on the narration of his thoughts but will allow them to develop freely: C'est de la nature que je vais écrire. Je laisserai les pensées se succéder sous ma plume, dans l'ordre meme selon lequel les objets se sont offerts a ma réflexion; parce qu'elles n'en représenteront que mieux les mouvements et la marche de mon esprit. (De l'Interprétation 9) De l’Interprétation de la nature offers a demonstration of Diderot's philosophical inquiry, a mental process which he calls ”experimental philosophy”. Diderot declares he is going to write about nature and then points specifically to the internal workings of his mind and his representation of those workings. As with Leigniz's monads, Diderot’s mind is a dynamic whole which conforms to and mimics the “multitude infinie des phénoménes de la nature“ always in flux (De l'Interprétation 12). The goal of his experimental philosophy is "l'exécution d'un ouvrage qui ne peut jamais étre fait...“ (13). In other words, Diderot intends to reveal and demonstrate the exécution or free development of his thought process. Since nature's phenomena are transient and ever-evolving, so must his mind which perceives and experiences them also move freely without hindrance. This is an important insight with regard to Diderot's art criticism, because his interest will lie not in what objects including art work appear to be (for example, a painting of Joan of Arc) but in his experience of them and 7 the process by which they are tranformed and represented in his mind. Diderot describes this process as ”cet esprit de divination par lequel on subordore pour ainsi dire, des procédés inconnus, des experiences nouvelles, des résultats ignores“ (24). The experimental philosopher takes interest in objects, in natural phenomena, and in visual stimuli not for what they are, but for the way in which he experiences them and how they are creatively transformed and modified. Diderot is interested in the way his own sensory apparatus first absorbs information from outside, recognizes it, and then begins to transform it with ideas and analogies retrieved from memory. This transformation serait une histoire fidele de toutes les extravagances apparentes qui lui ont passe par la téte. Je dis extravagances; car quel autre nom donner a cet enchainement de conjectures fondées sur des oppositions ou des ressemblances si éloignées, si imperceptibles, que les réves d'un malade ne paraissent ni plus bizarres, ni plus décousus? (De l’Interprétation 24—25) Rather than focus upon objective, quantitative aspects of objects or phenomena as an inherent aspect of inquiry, Diderot stresses the process of cognition which culminates in the almost hallucinatory role of his liberated imagination. In the above quotation, the nouns infinité de faits (events) or chain of conjectures stress the dynamic transformation of objects and phenomena and depict the unrestricted, unpredictable emergence of ideas and associations. His point of departure is not that he can know objects and phenomena in a definitive way but can narrate their development in his mind. Likewise, Diderot's approach to Salon art will be to represent the ‘extravagances apparentes qui lui ont passé par la téte' as he absorbs the visual images of Salon art and watches how his imagination alters them. Diderot's representation of mental images and the insights he derives from a (disorderly) development of ideas are also investigated in his 1751 essay entitled Lettre sur les sourds et muets. He sets up an experiment whereby he engages ”celui que la nature a privé de la faculté d'entendre et de parler, pour en obtenir les véritables notions de la formation du langage“ (142). In other words, he turns to a deaf mute who communicates by gestures, because he assumes that this is how human beings first communicated with one another. Diderot hopes to discover 'l'ordre d'idées qui aurait paru le meilleur aux premiers hommes pour se communiquer leurs pensées par gestes, et quel est celui dans lequel ils auraient pu inventer les signes oratoires“ (138). Diderot's 'sourd et muet de naissance“ believes that a machine designed to transform musical sonatas into colors is a way of communicating, a means of representing thought. Deprived of hearing and therefore of language, the deaf mute interprets color as gesture (146). He transforms £1; . ‘ i‘: concrete signs (colors) sent by an ”interlocutor' (the machine) into a dynamic mode of expression. Diderot explains: 'S'il ne rencontra pas exactement ce que c'était, il rencontra presque ce que ce devrait étre" (147). This episode from the Lettre reveals Diderot's early conviction that sense perception (or the lack thereof) is vital to the way we understand objects and events. Furthermore, it demonstrates how our interpretation of an object's dynamic qualities (its 'gestures') also influences our understanding. Diderot's experiment with the deaf mute convinces him that “les gestes annoncent l'ordre naturel du langage' (149), and that the order usually proceeds from a concrete image (signaled by one interlocutor) to an abstract interpretation of that image (150) in the mind of a beholder or a second interlocutor. Diderot's acute awareness of visual stimuli and his inquiry into the role of gesture in the communicative act will later influence his representation of Salon art. When Diderot directs his energies to art criticism eight Years after publishing the Lettre sur les sourds et muets, he will approach art like a deaf mute who interprets and transforms visual signs into dynamic gesture. Images will acquire new shape and dimension in his imagination as he narrates his experience of them. But we know that his interest in art long preceded the ”v n. “VA, P‘V| 10 writing of the Salons. He draws our attention to what happens when he looks at paintings: Cette sagacité vous surprendra moins peut-étre, si vous considérez que celui qui se promene dans une galerie de peintures fait, sans y penser, le role d'un sourd qui s'amuserait a examiner des muets qui s'entretiennent sur des sujets qui lui sont connus. Ce point de vue est un de ceux sous lesquels j'ai toujours regardé les tableaux qui m'ont été présentés; et j'ai trouvé que c'était un moyen sfir d'en connaitre les actions amphibologiques et les mouvements équivoques; d'étre promptement affecté de la froideur ou du tumulte d'un fait mal ordonné ou d'une conversation mal instituée.... (Sourds 147-148) When Diderot looks at paintings, he reacts like a deaf man who re-presents the figures on canvas and dramatizes them. He looks at their facial features, at their actions frozen in pigment and envisions them springing into movement. He provides the script for their communication by gesture. Until Diderot imagines a dialogue according to 'les sujets qui lui sont connus' and informs the actions he sees with associations retrieved from memory, static actions are only potential gestures, potential purveyors of meaning. As outward manifestations of ideas, emotions or thoughts, the actions of painted figures must be perceived as gesture and decoded by an active imagination in order for their meaning to be communicated. Communication between the artist and the spectator requires the active participation of the latter. e I . I Vol '7' Au . (f) *IJ. .1\ v. ‘1 5o; . 1r) ”.7 R I & I I“ 5‘“ 11 When we speak of Diderot's transformation of visual signs into dynamic gesture, we are talking about mental drama. And indeed, Diderot is interested in theatre as a metaphor for the human mind. When familiar with the text of a play being performed, he sometimes plugs his ears: 'Je n'écoutais que quand j'étais dérouté par les gestes, ou que je croyais l'étre' (Sourds 148). He plugs his ears in order to decipher the actions he sees without recourse to language. He is convinced of the power of gesture to signal emotions and thoughts independently of (and more efficiently than) language because the spectator absorbs the visual stimuli of the actors' gestures, dramatizes them further on the stage of his imagination and in this way interprets thoughts and emotions signaled by those gestures. The spectator who plugs his ears becomes an active participant in the communicative process, just as the beholder of a painting takes an active role in bringing static figures to life. Diderot's concern for including the beholder in the creative act prompts his criticism of classical theatre because it is word—bound and action-less. In his opinion, stage performances would communicate ideas and emotions more effectively if the operative means of representing them were more pictorial than verbal. He dreams of theatrical plays in which gestures would dominate the scene, resulting in performances which would resemble a SE gt“. \ g') F01 . 4‘ H M “.1- I L s T’ 12 series of paintings (Discours sur la poésie dramatique 497). In Entretiens sur le,Eils_natnzal, Diderot's fictitious author of the play, Dorval, asserts that “si un ouvrage dramatique était bien fait et bien représenté, la scene offrirait au spectateur autant de tableaux reels qu'il y aurait dans l'action de moments favorables au peintre' (38). The beholder of a painting takes the static actions and gestures he sees and attempts to understand them by setting them in motion. His thought process dramatizes the scene. On stage, a tableau is a moment during which actors pantomime heightened emotions associated with the virtuous or vile actions of the characters they portray. Their gesture is the key to moving and involving the spectators. The spectator represents the actor's gestures, interprets their significance for himself, and becomes emotionally involved. As Dorval suggests in Entretiens..., the emotive power of performed tableaux is not due to the verbal articulation of feelings, but in the gestures with which they are delivered (49). The beholder is not just a passive listener who hears an actor proclaim his joy, fear, or distress. The beholder participates imaginatively in the scene. How does this apply to Diderot as a narrator of fiction in general and as a narrator of Salon art in ;particular? The beholder's active participation is vital ".4...‘ 4 a- __,_._.__. 13 not just because the beholder dramatizes figures on the stage of his imagination, but because Diderot's awareness of himself as a spectator during the act of writing is in fact what makes his narration effective. The act of writing requires not only that Diderot behold Salon art projected in his mind, but that he watch himself set that drama in motion. We spot the importance of self-spectatorship throughout his work. Le.Neveu de Rameau (begun in 1762) is a dialogue between two interloctors, Lui (an eccentric mime) and Moi, whose opinions are conservative and whose writing is uninspired. Lui and Moi represent two dialoguing sides of Diderot's intellect; they are fictitious projections whose dialogue exists within Diderot's mind alone. As Lui performs and Moi watches, Moi does not merely describe what the eccentric mime is doing. Moi's narration of this (mental) performance becomes energized as he 'watches' the pantomime with his inner eye. As Moi observes and then narrates Lui's pantomime, his own prose becomes enlivened, poetic, fluid. Another way to say this is that in Diderot's imagination, Moi the beholder steps metaphorically into Lui the performer, and the resulting narrative becomes an equivalent of the gestures which Moi has imaginatively taken over. The written representation of this dynamic, imaginary performance is enlivened because Moi the spectator watches himself perform 14 ”on stage”. He is an active participant in the scene. Beholder becomes actor, and the spectatorship of his own acting affects his narration, his ”performance." The structure of the Entretiens sur Lo_£ils_naonzol (1757) also illustrates the importance of the spectator in the creative act. Diderot projects his voice into the protagonist of his own creation, Dorval, and uses Dorval as an authorial persona to articulate the theatrical reforms he tried to implement in Le Fils naturel. Figuratively, Diderot the author becomes Dorval the actor, and vice versa. Meanwhile, Diderot introduces himself as a spectator of the play (Moi), but he is spectator simultaneously of his own thoughts articulated by Dorval. Therefore in the act of writing the Entretiens, Diderot narrates from the perspectives of author, actor, and spectator. All three perspectives influence his writing. And if the importance and inclusion of self-spectatorship were not immediately apparent, at the close of the Entretiens Dorval includes Moi as a member of the performing familial group. Dorval officially adds Moi as a character on stage, as Moi explains: ...je reconnus toujours 1e caractere que Dorval avait donné a chacun de ses personnages. Il avait le ton de la mélancolie; Constance, 1e ton de la raison; Rosalie, celui de l'ingénuité; Clairville, celui de la passion; moi, celui de la bonhomie. (Entretiens 116; emphasis added) This underscores Diderot’s inclusion of the spectator in 15 the creative act. Just as the psychological distinction between Moi and Lui narrows during the great pantomime of Le Neveu de Rameau, resulting in an energetic, dramatic prose description of Lui's performance, the distance between Moi and Dorval or between the spectatorship and acting (a working metaphor for Diderot's mind) narrows as well. In Jacques le fataliste, Diderot reduces the gap between beholding and acting in much less subtle ways. At times his narrator addresses the reader (a beholder) directly, demanding that the latter narrate a sequence of events as he sees fit. Narrative voice is dispersed and undermined consistently in Jacques. By calling explicit attention to the self—conscious act of narration and by destroying the illusion of reality on purpose, Diderot points emphatically to self-spectatorship as an essential ingredient of the creative act. The structures of these works and Diderot's description of the creative act which accompanies his spectatorship of paintings in a museum suggest that we can expect his duality of mind (beholding-acting) to influence his narration of Salon art. In fact, Diderot admits in the Salon de 1767 that he is a self-conscious spectator every minute of the day and that this indeed affects his writing: Cela vient apparemment de ce que mon imagination s'est assujetie de longue main aux véritables regles de l'art, a force d'en regarder les productions; (I) C) n r I ’ —J A4 (3 E o, (.1) L1; 16 que j'ai pris l'habitude d'arranger mes figures dans ma téte comme si elles étoient sur la toile; que peut-étre je les y transporte, et que c'est sur un grand mur que je regarde, quand j'écris; qu'il y a longtems que pour juger si une femme qui passe est bien ou mal ajustée, je l'imagine peinte.... (Salon de 1767 110)1 This is perhaps one of Diderot's most significant statements concerning his experience and representation of reality. He thinks pictorially when he writes and, as he claims, has done so for a long time. Habitually, he focuses objects and events on his inner canvas and compares them to the standards of his artistic inner ”eye”. When Diderot claims that his imagination is subject to the rules of art, he refers to the critical, self—beholding side of his intelligence which gives form to his imagination. His frequent attendance at plays over the years has sharpened his sensitivity to what constitutes effective representation and has disciplined his arrangement of figures as he writes. As a spectator, he knows what moves him. As a writer, he understands the ”rules of art,” the necessary techniques for creating an illusion of reality for himself as a different kind of spectator: a reader. Diderot admires the English writer, Richardson, because the novelist inspires his active, emotional involvement as a reader. 1Unless clearly specified otherwise in this and the following chapters, all subsequent quotations indicated solely by a page number in parentheses will be from the Salon de 1767. PAH, 17 Richardson draws him into the scene and makes him feel as though he has inscribed his mind and body within the situations portrayed: ”on s'unit a son rOle, s'il est vertueux; on s'en écarte avec indignation, s'il est injuste et vicieux” (Eloge de Richardon 30). Diderot beholds not only objects projected in his mind and not only himself as he writes but also images conveyed by the text and re— experienced each time he reads. He knows that his most effective writing and most intense experiences occur when he is both attentive to the mechanics of writing and yet involved in the creative animation of images projected on his mental canvas. This ability to combine an awareness of process with creative abandonment is the most important skill Diderot brings to the narration of Salon art. John Locke and other eighteenth-century theoreticians investigate the process of human understanding and ask how we come to know and experience the world around us. While a thesis on the Salons could target Diderot's theories concerning the art of painting, composition, color, and lighting, I focus on Diderot's experience and understanding of art through his narration. The subject of a painting (the ”what”) is less important than how he perceives and transforms it, narrates his experience of this activity, and reads what he has written. He watches his own artistry unfold. He observes himself narrowing the psychological distance between himself and the image. He watches his 18 perspective shift from that of a mere spectator who admires an image to that of a spectator who identifies with the image and who becomes an imaginary actor in the scene. I am interested in Diderot's art criticism as it relates to. and is shaped by, his awareness of the creative thought process. Given the dual nature of Diderot's mind as it affects his writing, to what degree does Diderot's self- spectatorship dominate his imagination, and vice versa? Is this an important consideration for an inquiry into art criticism as narrative? Diderot's Paradoxe sur le comédien contrasts two very distinct types of actor who approach the dramatization of their roles in different ways. Might they provide insight into these questions? Especially in light of the fact that when Diderot dramatizes painted images, he mentally ”acts them out” and figuratively becomes an actor? The first type of actor, represented by Le Premier in the Paradoxe..., projects an image of the character (role) he is to play and maintains constant vigil or spectatorship over his acting. He is a cool imitator of emotions and does not allow his own to influence his representation of a character. In contrast, the second type of actor identifies so strongly with his role that he loses touch with himself and fails to watch over his acting. Whereas the first actor is completely self-conscious and in control of his performance, the second actor loses control and forgets the .. MI .1. ey‘II “t“ 19 difference between himself and the role he plays. But Diderot seems to prefer neither the clear—headed, rational actor nor the actor who becomes creatively and emotionally involved in his portrayal of a role. His real interest lies in what happens between these extreme, hypothetical mental poles, perhaps because the dynamic shift between beholding and creative abandonment describes more accurately how the mind really works. The dynamic oscillation between his rational spectatorship and his imaginary participation inside mental images affects his experience and narration of art. This oscillation is highlighted in the Salon de 1767 in a dialogue between himself and an imaginary abbot. As a spectator of a play, the abbot articulates his insight into the psychological shift between his creative intelligence (which allows him to act or imagine himself in the place of figures he sees on stage) and his rational awareness of representation (his spectatorship). This imaginary dialogue points to Diderot's interest in how his mind functions: Ah, j'entends a présent.--Quoi, l'abbé?--Je fais deux rales, je suis double; je suis Le Couvreur, et je reste moi. C'est le moi Le Couvreur qui frémit et qui souffre, et c'est 1e moi tout court qui a du plaisir.-—Fort bien, l'abbé; et voila la limite de l'imitateur de Nature. Si je m'oublie trop et trop longtemps, 1a terreur est trop forte; si je ne m'oublie point du tout, si je reste toujours un, elle est trop faible. C'est ce juste 20 tempérament qui fait verser des larmes délicieuses...Nous aimons le plaisir en personne, et la douleur en peinture. (144) “Doubling oneself“ refers to the oscillation between rational awareness and creative abandon, between the pleasure of beholding and the pain of make—believe. The perspective shifts constantly to accommodate both. Between these two psychological positions exists an imaginary space where fear and pain are pleasurable because the beholder imagines himself ”acting” or suffering in place of a character on stage but is also aware of the representational status of his acting. Pain is gratifying when a beholder represents it in his mind and watches himself "feeling” it, because he identifies with an image of himself worthy of empathy. Diderot explains in the Salon de 1767: Nous allons au theatre chercher de nous-memes une estime que nous ne méritons pas, prendre bonne opinion de nous, partager l'orgueil des grandes actions que nous ne ferons jamais.... (143) As Diderot slips imaginatively into painted landscapes and human figures and brings them fancifully to life, the dédoublement or oscillation between self-awareness and creative abandon enhances his experience and narration of re-projected images. It is the structuring principle of his narration. Diderot's Salons are not only about his creative transformation of art into mental images but about nib. I-v‘” 55 I .u‘. h e... h.— H... t *h. u.‘. (D '..o at: 5“ \ ~V-s 21 his written representation of them and his awareness of the process. The two are indelibly linked: Pour moi, je ne concois pas comment le poete peut commencer une scene, s'il n'imagine pas l’action et le mouvement du personnage qu'il introduit; si sa démarche et son masque ne lui sont pas présents. C'est ce simulacre qui inspire le premier mot; et le premier mot donne 1e reste. (Discours sur la poésie 470). By imagining the movement of characters as he creates them, the playwright invests his creative energies in the shaping of roles. He moves an actor on his inner stage as if the latter were a puppet. He embodies fancifully the character he projects, narrowing the psychological distance between himself and character. Meanwhile, Diderot is aware that this mental drama must accompany the act of writing. He declares: ”La pantomime est le tableau qui existait dans l'imagination du poete. lorsqu'il écrivait; et qu'il voudrait que la scene montrat a chaque instant, lorsqu'on 1e joue' (Discours 499). These passages are revealing and important because they point to Diderot's interest in the process of his own thinking. A mental drama must take place in the writer’s mind before he even writes the first word. Words follow imaginary actions. They emerge as an effect of mental pantomime and action. This is relevant for Diderot as a narrator of Salon art, for he, too, dramatizes scenes (pictures) on his .A?’ 'e- 3.-.: a '4 r“ in ‘1. AR" vv'c1. “7"- - O. _ ...~ 1 ‘LM‘J v u I,“ - e ”a . e. A e h v \ p‘ 'e,~‘ Va ’A sth, e‘. s s "' I 22 mental stage and conveys the action linguistically to a reader. In the Lettre sur le sourds et muets, however, Diderot discerned that ideas and emotions are best communicated pictorially, not linguistically. This is because language is often a mechanical reflex divorced from the images which make it resonate with meaning. 'L'imagination,“ says Diderot in his Discours sur la poésie dramatique (1758), “est la faculté de se rappeler des images (440)...sans laquelle le discours se réduit a l'habitude mécanique d'appliquer des sons combines“ (442). Words render neither the fullness nor the simultaneity of our feelings and ideas: Autre chose est l'état de notre ame; autre chose 1e compte que nous en rendons soit a nous—memes, soit aux autres: autre chose la sensation que nous sommes forcés d'y donner pour l'analyser, la manifester et nous faire entendre. Notre ame est un tableau mouvant d'apres lequel nous peignons sans cesse: nous employons bien du temps a le rendre avec fidélité; mais i1 existe en entier et tout a la fois: l'esprit ne va pas a pas comptés comme l'expression. Le pinceau n'exécute qu'a la longue ce que l'oeil du peintre embrasse tout d'un coup. La formation des langues exigeait la decomposition; mais voir un objet, 1e juger beau, éprouver une sensation agréable, désirer la possession, c'est l'état de l'ame dans un meme instant..." (Sourds 161-162). Given the disparity between thought, feelings and the representation of them, how does the creative genius communicate, especially when several ideas are compared Irv“ 50¢ I ~IA a... ’ r .‘-‘ “e 23 simultaneously? (162). More specifically, how does a writer convey the immediate intensity of what he sees and feels when the tedious medium of his craft can't keep pace with the sprinting of thought? How can he narrate his experience effectively? This enigma haunts Diderot and is a frequent source of frustration when he writes. He complains in the Salon de 1767: "A tout moment je donne dans l'erreur, parce que la langue ne me fournit pas a propos l'expression de la vérité. J'abandonne une these, faute de mots qui rendissent bien mes raisons; j'ai au fond de mon coeur une chose, et j'en dis une autre" (190). The answer is to ”descendre des mots aux images,” he tells us in the Discours sur la poésie dramatique (440). Like the painter whose human figures should display actions which trigger imaginary conversations in the beholder's mind (Sourds 147-148), or like the actor whose gestures so clearly complement his discourse that the latter becomes unnecessary (Sourds 148), the writer or poet must strive to break down encumbrances in the linguistic medium by energizing language with gestural equivalents. On the one hand, this means making language as pictorial as possible. Diderot explains the creative operation responsible for such language: Il passe alors dans le discours du poete un esprit qui en meut et vivifie toutes les syllabes. Qu'est-ce que cet esprit? j'en ai quelquefois senti la w u a: .n A V. m .3 Ab» nhv ! u. .0 “U. A: r». A.» Ac be an AV C» Yd ha :5 .fld flu» .v. .n« W). L. I c‘ u .. I 2.. V e -.FI... LI» AN» bl u L H 1.‘ I ..A A: : e We Cs An I! re at C» ”A ‘5'“D gust? 24 presence; mais tout ce que j'en sais. c'est que c'est lui qui fait que les choses sont dites et représentées tout a la fois; que dans le meme temps que l'entendement les saisit, l'ame en est émue, l'imagination les voit. et l'oreille les entend; et que le discours...c'est encore un tissu d'hiéroglyphes entassés les uns sur les autres qui la [la pensée] peignent. Je pourrais dire en ce sens que toute poésie est emblématique. (Sourds 169; emphasis added) The hieroglyph is discourse turned into images. The reader sees written images so clearly and so instantaneously in his mind that he is not aware of their horizontal appearance on the page. It is as though time stops, or as Jay Caplan describes it, "narrative action comes to a halt“ (Framed 16). According to Norman Bryson, the hieroglyph is Diderot's solution to discourse which has “lost touch with the sensations and the images which are the natural stuff of the mind's tableau vivant' (Bryson 180). Diderot's written hieroglyph restores pictures to words for the reader's benefit and inspiration. Secondly, the reader will respond not only to the images themselves, but also to the poetic effects of language which can also be considered gesture, as Herbert Josephs explains: The language of poetry...became gesture when the various properties at the poet's disposal--meaning and metaphor, sound and rhythm—-were combined in such a way that language broke through its limits. (Diderot's Dialogue...75) The reader forgets the presence of words as words, just as , . nav‘fi ytehd‘ “nipt ' V 4 ‘oeevO‘ 2' ‘RRI' ‘ a .‘ I ‘ _ .u-.:J _ .1‘ A?! I he: .--u 94rd )- A-‘Ae'u’ 5. V pp ’8“ any V“ .. “‘ ' "LvA ;-‘ ‘.‘boi. V . .fifi “VA bees. r . V Sup-w; v&.___‘ a. . ‘1: Ave” ~“ “.5 T. I -Ifl F.» ‘ “a“ 5,]. 0 ‘Q. a. Q \ A, V: A ‘V‘Ja ' r. c . ..I‘sgcf‘ 7V fut 4"- eI'IOK “L I “A. ,. \ 25 a beholder of a painting will forget ideally that a painting is paint. Diderot is aware of the use of language, the mechanics of writing which dynamically convey an illusion of reality. Diderot's inquiry into the development of ideas in the mind, his intuition of the multiple sensations housed by the soul in a given moment, his disappointment with the diachrony of words, and most importantly his interest in the process of writing itself foster exploration into the effective narration of Salon art. In the first three Salons (1759, 1761, 1763), Diderot is insecure about his abilities as an art critic. Coached by his artist friends, he spends many hours learning about the technical aspects of painting in order to judge works of art, but he does not often transform paintings or dramatize them. The Salon de 1765 has more discourse, narration, melodrama, digressions and philosophical speculation than any of the earlier salons. But in my opinion, the Salon de 1767 is the richest representation of Diderot's combined imagination and objective scrutiny with regard to art criticism. After the Salon de 1767, Diderot does not bring the same energetic creativity to the task. With the exception of one painting from the Salon de .1765, the ensuing chapters examine Diderot's narration of Sealected paintings from the Salon de 1767. I have chosen to limit my study in order to focus directly on the rich ' n- ' PI“ \; peed V“ P‘r'; Lee. I: ccrx-ze 3: 5:5 1 Izages e “‘V‘lFVIy- W‘Ov yes}. I'I Ac w v-n 5......“3 V ‘*:+ viii- art '9’?" “VAR hvv.y‘ VI“ h"‘ ‘ , “.5 aft; 26 and diverse narrative strategies exploited by Diderot in this Salon especially. Chapter Two explores literary devices used by Diderot to convey the dramatic and emotive energy of images altered on his inner screen. We witness how the dramatization of images encourages him to become an emotionally involved participant in the scenes. He suspends his disbelief by closing the psychological gap between images and himself. Chapter Three studies Diderot's portraits. He asserts that artists who portray him successfully enter into a reciprocal relationship with their mental images of him. The artist becomes Diderot's ”ventriloquist,” animating and speaking for him fancifully as if Diderot were a puppet. At the same time, when the artist's image of Diderot ”speaks,” it engages the artist and inspires him to paint. Therefore, the image animates the artist as much as the artist animates the image. When this fanciful dialogue takes place in the artist's mind, evidence of the exchange is locked forever into Diderot's painted features which seem to invite new spectators to ”converse” with him just as the artist did. The chapter's final pages probe Diderot’s tactic for assuring that he is not the only one to represent a morally problematic painting. The dispersion of his voice into other imaginary beholders Ireduces the image's negative emotional charge and permits lDiderot to recognize his own ideas. a!“ a «M. 5.6 s u c BL. ~\.~ 27 Chapter Four explores the metaphor of ventriloquy as it applies to Diderot's critical and creative faculties. Rather than represent Vernet's landscapes as Salon art, Diderot narrates his visit to four natural ”sites”. He dialogues with an imaginary guide, the abbot, who often voices a more objective approach to the experience of nature in contrast to Diderot's creative enthusiasm. This interaction with the abbot is a textual dramatization of Diderot's dialogue with himself, the ventriloquy and puppetry between two aspects of his genius which must be active for effective representation of the ”sites” to occur. Like other leading Enlightenment theoreticians, Diderot is fascinated by the operations of his mind. The following chapters explore how Diderot alters concrete images provided by artists, interacts with these images, invests them with subjective analogies and emotions, and conveys or mirrors his excitement through the use of pictorial language. We will watch his self-conscious spectatorship unite with his imaginary acting so that the vitality and emotional charge of Salon art can be conveyed. rgrr bvrb Alw- Vac. I or. V u Vee-‘ P _