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RECRUITMENT AND CAREER, 1949-1987

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THE CCP PROVINCIAL PARTY FIRST SECRETARY:
RECRUITMENT AND CAREER, 1949-1987

By

Chiahsiung Chiang

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ABSTRACT

THE CCP PROVINCIAL PARTY FIRST SECRETARY: RECRUITMENT AND CAREER, 1949-1987

By

CHIAHSIUNG CHIANG

Who gets ahead? how? and why? The study of these and other issues in Chinese politics generally follows the familiar factional theme. This dissertation looks into alternative conceptual frameworks and modes of analysis. It focuses on the roles of local ties, political generation, and career specialization in the recruitment of CCP provincial first secretaries (1949-1987). The results support our contention that political opportunities in the People's Republic of China (PRC) are highly structured, not randomly distributed. There are specific criteria governing the selection and placement of these officials and moreover, political recruitment in the PRC has become increasingly institutionalized and rationalized.

This study also examines two related issues. One is the civilian-military relationship and the extent of power concentration at the provincial level. The other is the standing of the office of provincial first secretary in the PRC's political hierarchy.

To My Wife, Suewen

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INTRODUCTION

The first secretary of the provincial party committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is an imposing political figure in the People's Republic of China (PRC). The provincial first secretary is not only the highest ranking official in the province but an influential member of the national elite as well. In addition, during the last four decades, the post of provincial first secretary has gradually emerged as a training ground for many of the top ranking leaders.

Who were the provincial first secretaries? Where did they come from? How and why were they chosen, according to what criteria and through what channels? By critically examining these issues, I hope to enhance our knowledge of PRC's policy on leadership recruitment as well as the nature of the Chinese political system.

THE PROVINCE AND THE PROVINCIAL FIRST SECRETARY

Except during two brief periods (1949-1954, 1961-1967) when another tier of administrative units--six Greater Administrative Regions--was created above the provinces, provinces have been the principal sub-national administrative units in the PRC.¹ At present, there are twenty-nine provincial-level administrative units in the PRC: twenty-one provinces, five autonomous regions, and three special

municipalities.² As the chief sub-national political-administrative division, the provinces have a rich tradition. Some provinces acquired their present identity in the thirteenth century when the Yuan dynasty first inaugurated eleven provinces as the main administrative units. With the expansion of the Chinese empire during the ensuing Ming and Qing dynasties, new provinces were added. By the end of the nineteenth century, all the current provinces except the three municipalities had obtained provincial-level status. Under Nationalist China (1911-1949), provincial units comprised thirty-five provinces, two territories, and twelve centrally-directed municipalities. After the founding of the PRC in October 1949, the number of provinces was reduced through a series of reorganizations. In 1967, the current number and division of provinces were established.³

Provinces are a very important part of the political landscape in China. The prevailing sentiment toward one's own province among the provincial natives in conjunction with striking differences between the provinces in many areas help foster a distinct individual provincial identity. By any measure, the PRC is a highly homogeneous nation. However, diversity and disparity do exist between the provinces. Provinces are not equal in terms of the size of population and territorial area. A discrepancy between the provinces in economic activity and living standard of the people also exists, particularly between coastal provinces and inland

provinces. Although non-Han ethnic minority nationalities constitute only a small portion of the population, they are highly concentrated in several border provinces. There are other areas of dissimilarity. Administrative boundaries of the provinces are parallel to those of the topographic divisions of the nation. Linguistically, major dialects in China are mostly provincially-based. Folkways such as cooking and operatic style also exhibit significant provincial flavor. Provincial stereotypes are evident in physical and non-physical features of the population.⁴ The diverse conditions of the provinces are a major variable and force in Chinese politics.

In each province, the CCP's provincial party committee is the supreme political body.⁵ The provincial party committee normally consists of a ranking secretary, several subordinate secretaries, and a number of standing committee members. The size of the provincial party committee as well as the titles of its members, has varied from province to province and from period to period. Prior to 1983, the ranking secretary in each province was called the provincial party first secretary. Since 1983, as a part of bureaucratic reform, the ranking secretary has been referred to as secretary, and subordinate secretaries as deputy secretary.⁶

The provincial first secretary is the dominant political figure in the province. As the ranking party official, he is responsible for political, economic, and social progress

within the province.⁷ Even though the province is not a self-governing unit by any means, the provincial first secretary does have some discretionary power in policy making and implementation over many issues concerning the province. Moreover, his power often extends beyond party affairs and political matters. The provincial first secretary frequently holds other important provincial posts such as governor or chairman of the provincial government, or first political commissar of the provincial military command.⁸

The provincial first secretary is a member of the national leadership and plays an active role in the national political arena. The incumbent provincial first secretaries are normally elected members of the Central Committee of the CCP, and often of the Politburo. Out of the total of 29 provincial first secretaries, 26, 22, 29, 22, and 29 were elected as full members of the Central Committee of the CCP in the Ninth (1969), the Tenth (1973), the Eleventh (1977), the Twelfth (1982), and the Thirteenth (1987) National Party Congress, respectively. During the 1960s, when the Central Work Conferences and the Enlarged Politburo Meetings emerged as informal decision-making arenas, provincial first secretaries were regular participants.⁹ Individually and collectively, provincial first secretaries can exert considerable influence in national politics.¹⁰

The dual role of the provincial first secretary--an agent of central authority and a representative of provincial

concerns--symbolizes his important role in PRC politics. The PRC's state-controlled economy and diverse conditions in individual provinces demand both central control and local flexibility. Local leaders are urged to do the best, according to local conditions, without deviating from the central directives. The provincial first secretary is entrusted with a delicate task of maintaining a proper balance between sometimes conflicting national and local interests.¹¹ As a "political middleman" in the central-local relationship, the provincial first secretary is instrumental in the success of any national policy or program in the province.¹²

The office of provincial first secretary also serves as a major stepping stone toward further career advancement in the PRC political hierarchy. The portfolio of many of the high ranking PRC officials contains provincial first secretary credentials. Four of the six Standing Committee members of the Politburo elected by the CCP's 12th Party Congress in 1982 were former provincial first secretaries: Hu Yaobang, Ye Jianying, Zhao Ziyang, and Li Xiannian.¹³ Many members of the Politburo had also served as provincial first secretary (see Table 1-1).

The provincial first secretary with a distinguished tenure is often rewarded with promotion to positions of greater power and national prominence. Three of the most celebrated cases involve the former and current head of the CCP. Hua Guofeng was appointed as Premier of the State

Council and later the Chairman of the CCP, after serving as provincial first secretary in Hunan province. Likewise, Zhao Ziyang was appointed as Premier and later the General Secretary of the CCP, following an outstanding career as the provincial first secretary of Sichuan province. Jiang Zeming, the ranking secretary of Shanghai, was appointed as the General Secretary of the CCP on June 24, 1989, at the aftermath of Tiananmen Square Incident. Jiang's sudden rise to fame is in part due to his prominent tenure in Shanghai.

Table 1-1 Full Members of the Politburo of the CCP:
Former or Current Provincial First Secretaries
(Elected at Congress Session)

Party Congress	Provincial First Secretaries	Total
8th CC (1956)	3 (17.6%)	17
9th CC (1969)	4 (19.0%)	21
10th CC (1973)	10 (47.6%)	21
11th CC (1977)	11 (47.8%)	23
12th CC (1982)	12 (50.0%)	24
13th CC (1987)	6 (35.3%)	17

In theory, provincial first secretary and other high ranking provincial party officials are elected by the provincial party congress. In reality, provincial first secretary is usually appointed by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CCP.¹⁴

Our knowledge of the actual decision-making process concerning the appointment of provincial first secretary is rather limited. The nucleus of our research is to analyze

recruitment patterns and to investigate the guiding principles and criteria underlying these appointment decisions. The premise is that such an approach may provide us with some insights into the 'structure of political mobility' (Schelsinger, 1966) or the 'ladder of success' (Oksenberg, 1970) in the PRC. In light of the increasingly important role played by the provincial first secretary in the provincial and national political arena since 1954, this study may also enrich our knowledge of PRC's emerging 'ruling class' (Mosca, 1939).

REVIEW OF PRC ELITE STUDIES

The tradition of elite studies is as old as that of the study of politics. Ever since the time of Plato and Aristotle, issues such as who should govern in numerous contexts and in various forms have attracted the attention of the students of politics. Works by modern political scientists such as Mosca (1939), Mills (1956), Michels (1958), Keller (1963), Pareto (1966) and others testify to the fact that there are continuing interests in the role of the elite in society.¹⁵ The basic perspective of elite studies can be summarized in the following sentences:

"In all societies.....two classes of people appear --a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first....." (Mosca, 1939:50).

Since the political elite is a group of people who hold power and make important decisions in a society, study of the political elite is vital to the understanding of any political system.¹⁶

The study of the political elite assumes a predominant role in the study of politics in communist states.¹⁷ To some extent, as Welsh (1973:320) has stated, "almost all analyses of communist politics have been 'elite studies'". This is particularly true in the study of PRC politics. In the past four decades, students of Chinese politics have employed a number of models to describe and analyze PRC politics. Most of these models depicted the political process in the PRC as interactions among political elites.¹⁸ The popularity of the elite approach to PRC politics is understandable. Political practices in the PRC are not institutionalized. The parameters and outcomes of the political process are largely defined by the political elite. As a result, changes in political leadership are often accompanied by political, social, and economic change in the society. Moreover, our knowledge about many aspects of the Chinese political process is still scanty. The lack of access to the society and the paucity of empirical data have further restricted the scope and methods of research on PRC politics. Because of the vital role of the elites in the PRC and the availability of adequate information on the background and career of the elites, the elite approach was regarded as an attractive alternative in

the study of Chinese politics. However, despite its popularity, elite studies generally have not produced significant progress toward our understanding of Chinese politics.

Although studies on PRC elites are abundant, only a few attempt to systematically examine provincial or sub-national elites.¹⁹ Among the notable exceptions are studies by Goodman (1980), Goodman (1981a), Scalapino (1975), Sung (1975a), Teiwes (1967), Teiwes (1971), and Teiwes (1974a). In spite of the increasingly important role of the provincial first secretary in PRC politics, only Goodman (1980) has devoted exclusive attention to the provincial first secretary.²⁰ Thus, studies on sub-national politics and the recruitment of provincial leadership can make a significant contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of PRC politics.

To put the current study into a better perspective, a brief review of the literature is imperative. Since Bennett (1972), Bullard (1979), Teiwes (1974b), Wilhem (1980), and Wong (1976) have already written extensive reviews on PRC elite studies, it is pertinent that we discuss some of the major characteristics and inherent problems in the existing literature, instead.

A major task confronting researchers in any elite study is the identification of elites. There is little consensus among social scientists over this issue.²¹ In PRC elite studies, neither the definition nor the identification of the

elite has been adequately addressed. Virtually all PRC elite studies have focused on a few supreme leaders and members of selected national political bodies. It is a convenient as well as a conscious choice. On the one hand, political power in China is highly centralized and is usually attached to membership in certain national political institutions. In addition, our knowledge about formal hierarchy and incumbents of major political offices in the PRC is superior to our knowledge of informal systems. On the other hand, the academic environment in the PRC for conducting the kind of research envisioned by the decision-making approach and reputation approach is not forthcoming. Access to political leaders and official archives has been and continues to be restricted and selective. Moreover, as far as available biographical data are concerned, those on national elites are of better quality and quantity than those on sub-national elites.²² Consequently, the overwhelming majority of PRC elite studies have been analyses of the composition of national party, state, and military institutions, such as the Central Committee, the Politburo, the State Council.²³

The study of PRC politics has been criticized for its area studies mentality and its lack of scientific and theoretical merit.²⁴ The perennial gap between the social sciences and PRC political studies is best exemplified in the areas of concept formation, theory construction, data and methodology. The retarded development of PRC political

studies in these areas is generally regarded as one reason why China scholarship failed to explain and predict political processes in the PRC.²⁵

First and foremost, the advancement of PRC elite studies is hampered by the lack of conceptual clarity. Many concepts have not been rigorously discussed either at a conceptual or an operational level. In some cases, conceptual ambiguity is caused by researchers' failure to define the terms explicitly. In other cases, the problem is exacerbated by indiscriminate use of certain concepts.

A common practice in the study of PRC politics is to perceive the political process in terms of group conflict, such as civilian versus military, conflict of generations, or factional struggle. However, key concepts are nonetheless poorly defined or even undefined. In the civilian-military or party-state-military typology, career attributes or other criteria as the base of such classification have rarely been explicitly spelled out. Judging from the close historical relationship between the CCP and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and the widespread practice of interlocking institutional memberships, the omission is very deleterious to the application of such a taxonomy.²⁶

'Generation' is also a typical denominator in the classification of PRC leaders. In some usages, the concept lacks a definitive quality. 'Generation' can be easily substituted by other terms (for example, 'group') without

affecting the nature of the investigation. In other cases, the empirical application of the concept of generation only grasps a narrow aspect of the definition. Such inconsistency has severely distorted the outcome of the analysis.

'Faction' is another concept which is widely employed in the analysis of PRC politics, but often left undefined or poorly defined by the researchers. The identification of factions and faction members are typically exercises of personal opinion rather than classifications based on objective, well-defined criteria. There is also a lack of conceptual distinction between 'faction' and other similar concepts such as 'clique', 'interest group', and 'patron-client network'.

The above three examples attest to the pervasiveness of conceptual problems in PRC elite studies. A poor conceptual framework has also weakened the very theoretical foundation of many PRC elite studies. In the field of PRC politics, there is no shortage of models, theories, approaches, or conceptual frameworks which focus on elites with the aim of describing and explaining the political process in the PRC.²⁷ Prior to the Cultural Revolution (CR), the prevailing perception of PRC politics was that of the totalitarian model which portrayed homogeneity and consensus among PRC elites. The students of PRC politics were generally concerned with ideology and organization of the CCP, and with the leadership and personality of Mao (Schurmann, 1968). The Cultural

Revolution not only had an enormous impact on the PRC political system, but also on the field of PRC political studies. Since then, various versions of the conflict model have replaced the totalitarian model as the basic analytic tool. The political process in the PRC is now viewed as competition among elites for the sake of power, policy, or ideology.²⁸

Among many models of PRC politics, the one with tremendous appeal to the students of PRC politics is the factional model.²⁹ There have been numerous elite studies which devote themselves to the examination of factional conflict in the PRC.³⁰ The contribution of these studies to the understanding of PRC politics has been marginal, however. Most factional analyses are speculative in nature, based on circumstantial evidence rather than on concrete data. Many proposed causal relationships between factional activity and policy outcome still remain to be verified. Then, there is the fundamental problem concerning whether the model can be effectively applied to PRC politics.³¹

Generally, studies on PRC elites are not guided by a well-conceived theoretical model. Key concepts are poorly defined or undefined. No testable hypothesis is formulated to link background and career of the elite with elite behavior or political process. Data are not collected to subject proposed hypotheses to empirical verification. As a result, elite studies remain "compilations of biographical

information, gathered and analyzed unsystematically" (Welsh, 1973:329).

The lack of information always poses a genuine problem in the study of any foreign society. The problem is particularly acute in the field of PRC politics. The concern with data frequently dictates researchers' interests. The scope and method of inquiry is also prescribed by the dearth of data of reasonable quality. Since the opening of the PRC to the outside world in the last decade, there has been steady improvement in the access to and availability of some data. Nonetheless, the prospect for the eradication of data problems is still not promising.³²

To a certain extent, the data problem in PRC political studies is beyond researchers' control.³³ The PRC is very sensitive with regard to the disclosure of personnel information. There is no official publication of biographic material on PRC leaders. There is no cumulative and complete listing of members of many institutions. The biographic information, when it is available, is sketchy and lacks specific details. The information released usually is selective and has strong political overtones.³⁴

The primary sources of biographical information on PRC leaders are to be found at places outside the PRC, such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, the U.S., and West Germany, collected through intelligence gathering.³⁵ Biographic data collected outside the PRC usually are not available in great

quantity. Instances of incomplete and contradictory information are not uncommon. Most biographic dictionaries and directories of officials are published irregularly, and hence are very time-specific. The amount of biographic material published is closely related to the political rank and fortune of the officials involved. There is more coverage on national leaders of higher status and visibility. Information on purged or inactive officials is often excluded in many publications. Among the provincial leadership, the provincial first secretary is the official for which a reasonable amount of data on social background and career experiences is available, permitting any kind of meaningful analysis.³⁶ Even so, as this study has found out, the quality of the data is far below what students of western democracies have been accustomed to.³⁷

If biographic data on the elite is to be desired, information on political attitudes, behaviors, and policy preferences of officials is very scant. Moreover, such information is normally derived from the reading and interpretation of official documents, radio broadcasts, and press reports. Because of the gap between mythical and operational aspects of PRC politics, its utility is doubtful (Johnson, 1982).

One area in PRC elite studies with great potential for improvement is data analysis. Most analyses of PRC elites can be characterized as descriptive, static, and intuitive.

A typical PRC elite study involves tabulating social background and career experiences of members of a selective institution on a specific date or time period, such as profiling the composition of a Central Committee of the CCP. Comparative studies which involve PRC elites and those of other nations are rare.³⁸ Neither has there been adequate scholarly attention to longitudinal change in social backgrounds, attitudes, and behaviors of the elites. If the dimension and pattern of elite change is not fully examined, and the linkage between such change and broader political process is not explored, then the utility of elite studies is very limited.

However, researchers often resort to intuition to analyze data. They are enticed to interpreting findings based on some untested but shaky assumptions. Social background characteristics are often unduly treated as if they were proven indicators for attitudes, behaviors, or policy orientations of the elite. Changes in the social makeup of the elite are often treated as the change of the system as a whole. Causal inferences such as these should be reserved for empirical validation.³⁹ Generally speaking, explanations advanced often are speculations, not substantiated by hard data.

From the above discussion, it is clear that there are some major problems in PRC elite studies. Seldom is research based on a well-conceived theoretical framework. Explicit

formulation and rigorous testing of hypotheses is rarely a part of the overall research enterprise. Furthermore, deficiencies in conceptualization and theory construction are compounded by the lack of quality data. Given the scarcity of information on system attributes and elite behavior, any explanation of PRC political processes based on social backgrounds and careers of the elite is rather tempting but precarious.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Political recruitment refers to the processes through which a political office is filled (Seligman, 1964). There are many methods of selection such as inheritance, lottery, examination, seniority, appointment, election. In different political systems and for different political offices, one or several of the methods may be employed. The methods of selection certainly affect the outcome of political recruitment. So too do the eligibility and qualifications required for each office. Some legal and ad hoc requisites such as age, ethnic origin, the possession of certain skills and expertise serve the function of a screen test. Whether a person is to be recruited into a specific office also depends on other factors. Personal attributes such as education, political ambition, past career experiences, affiliation with a certain formal organization and informal group are often the determinants of political recruitment.

The recruiter's assessment of an individual's fitness for the concerned political office, as well as the competition from other aspirants for the political office, also has a bearing on potential political mobility. Finally, political recruitment and the structure of political opportunity in general, are patterned and constrained by the nature and characteristics of the political regime. Depending upon theoretical evaluation and data restriction, researchers tend to focus on selected aspects of political recruitment.

The study of political recruitment involves the examination of issues such as how the participants got there, where they came from and by what path, what skills and contacts they acquired on the way (Marvick, 1976:30). Our inquiry into the recruitment and career of provincial first secretaries will focus on four major areas: channels, credentials, tenure, and patterns.⁴⁰ Through what career paths does an official reach the post of provincial first secretary? In what work locales and institutional settings did a provincial first secretary serve prior to the appointment? What are major criteria for being chosen as a provincial first secretary? Is recruitment based on social background, educational attainment, technical skills, party seniority, prior career experiences of the individual or other factors?⁴¹ What personal attributes are assets and what are liabilities? How stable is the tenure of the provincial first secretary? What is the rate of turnover? How pivotal is the

tenure of the provincial first secretary to an official's subsequent political career? Finally, what is the pattern of continuity and change with respect to the above-mentioned issues? Does the recruitment pattern exhibit any regional variation and temporal fluctuation? In the following, we are to evaluate the specific strategy and approach to be deployed in our investigation of these issues.

With respect to political recruitment and mobility in the PRC and other communist systems, there are two distinct models: the factional or patron-client model, and the rational-technical model.⁴² Each model adopts different assumptions regarding the nature of the political system, and recognizes different determinants of political recruitment. They are also offspring of different theories of the political system. The first one is derived from the conflict model. The other one is based on the literature of bureaucracy and modernization.

To proponents of the factional model, factional or clientelist ties are the major determinant of personnel assignment and political mobility in the PRC.⁴³ The role of informal groups such as factions, cliques and patron-client networks in the political process has been stressed by many students of PRC politics.⁴⁴ Factions are formed by their members for the purpose of "career security and the protection of power" (Pye, 1980:vi). Thus, major leaders of factions would garner important party, government and military posts

for their followers.

Factional analysis is a simple and appealing perspective on PRC politics. However, its utility is rather dubious. In addition to conceptual and theoretical deficiency, the application of the factional model has been severely hampered by the lack of directly observed data. The evidence on the existence of factions and factional conflict in the PRC is mostly circumstantial.⁴⁵ For the most part, the factional activities are secretive, and factional conflict is hidden. As in the study of other communist systems, factional analysis has "tended to be highly speculative based on esoteric sources of information" (Skilling, 1971:20).

China watchers, both scholars and journalists, commonly identify Chinese factions with certain leaders (e.g., Maoists, Liuists, or Dengists), or with various policy and ideological tendencies (e.g., moderates, radicals, pragmatists, ideologues), or with specific social groups or institutions (e.g., generational factions, civilian and military factions, or field army factions). These exercises are often impressionistic and conjectural.

The Chinese treasure various forms of special personal relationships such as coming from the same native place, going to the same school, belonging to the same generation, working for the same employer, engaging in the same profession, or having the same family name. Such personal ties (so-called "guangxi") have an important role in social and political life

among the Chinese.⁴⁶ Although common experiences and personal ties among the members, particularly between leaders and followers, are regarded as the prime basis of factions, there are other attributes of the faction such as exchange relationships, mutual interests, corporate loyalty, and collective behavior.⁴⁷ In identifying factions in the PRC, however, these attributes are mostly assumed rather than directly measured. In some cases, members of factions are identified solely by the affiliation with some formal institutions or informal systems.⁴⁸ In others, they are inferred from geographic and temporal proximity of past career assignments.⁴⁹ The inferential leap from affiliations to factions has gravely undermined many research efforts on factional conflict in the PRC. Mere shared experiences or personal ties may not be a sufficient condition for the formation of factions.

The identification of factions, their leaders and members remains problematic. As a result, the role of factions in PRC politics is yet to be determined. While advocating a factionalism model of CCP politics, Nathan (1973:36) also concedes that "the available data on CCP elite conflict will not be adequate to accept or reject the model decisively." Nathan (1973:53) acknowledges that "none of the evidence is conclusive, and it remains impossible to delineate with any confidence who the major factional leaders have been, much less the followers."

In contrast, the Rational-technical model depicts a more institutionalized political process as well as a more rational approach toward personnel policy. The criteria for political recruitment and mobility are personal merits instead of personal ties.

In the Weberian model of bureaucracy, recruitment, transfer, and promotion are based on achievement rather than ascription, universalistic rather than particularistic criteria (Weber, 1958; Downs, 1967; Huntington, 1968). Such is the case to be found in many modern industrial societies. However, neither the concept nor the practice of legal-rational bureaucracy is alien to the Chinese. In many respects, the civil service system in imperial China exhibited similar features. Under imperial rule, educational attainment was the major avenue of upward mobility. The educated were bestowed with the responsibility and power of governing. The normal path to officialdom was through the passing of rigorous examinations sponsored by the imperial court. There were formal and explicit rules administering the retention, transfer, and promotion of officials. Decisions were mostly based on competence and performance.

LaPalombara (1967:45) contends that "maximum achievement orientation in political recruitment may be critical for a society which deeply and directly involves the government in economic development." In the PRC, as in other communist systems, rapid economic development is usually placed at the

top of the national agenda. Economic programs such as the First Five Year Plan (1953-1957), the Great Leap Forward campaign of 1958, and the Four Modernizations of the 1980s all underscore such a commitment. It can be assumed that the mastery of technical skills in areas such as economic planning, industrial production and management is a deciding factor in recruitment of many officials.

The assessment of the relevancy of the factional and the rational-technical models in the recruitment of the provincial first secretaries is somewhat beyond the scope of our research. First of all, more detailed information on the careers of the officials is required to establish objective indicators for either clientelist ties or rational-technical criteria. Progress in developing a better theoretical framework, conceptual definition, and operational measurement is also critical. Otherwise, the investigation will remain exploratory and speculative.

Secondly, the two competing models are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In some cases, they may even be complementary. The legal-rational Weberian bureaucracy is an ideal type. Although the elevation of rational-technical criteria may have imposed bureaucratic constraints on political recruitment, it does not necessarily preclude factional or clientelist ties as a potent factor. In every political system, personnel decisions are affected by a particular combination of ascription and achievement,

particularistic and universalistic criteria.

Thirdly, the level of economic development in the PRC is still quite backward. Turmoil in the Cultural Revolution era thwarted not only normal political processes but economic activity as well. Since 1978, with the reorientation toward industrialization and the pledge to institutionalize political processes, there is also a more explicit personnel policy. Even with the four pronounced criteria (young, well educated, professionally competent, and revolutionary) for leadership recruitment, the emergence of a managerial revolution or technocracy in the PRC is still not a foregone conclusion.

An alternative conceptual framework is the structure of political opportunity (Schlesinger, 1966). Until recent years, career choices in the PRC has been very restricted. Job assignments have been tightly regulated by the CCP and the government. The appointment to the post of provincial first secretary is more the manifestation of official recruitment policy than the outcome of an individual's deliberate career decision. In short, the opportunities for political mobility are patterned rather than randomly distributed. Officials who come from certain social strata and have particular career experiences are more likely to be recruited than others. Our goal is to dissect the opportunity structure for the office of provincial first secretary by scrutinizing the social backgrounds and careers of office-holders.

DATA

Our analysis includes only those who served as provincial first secretary in the PRC's current twenty-nine provinces, from the establishment of the PRC in October 1949 to the convening of the Thirteenth CCP National Party Congress in October 1987. As to those who served in the provinces which had existed briefly between 1949 and 1954, they will not be included. Acting provincial first secretaries are also excluded from our analysis. Unless later officially appointed as the first secretary, the acting first secretary usually served for a short and nominal tenure.

To identify all those who had been appointed as provincial first secretary is by no means an easy task. There is no official comprehensive list of provincial first secretaries from the PRC. Several sources have provided a partial list of those who served in the capacity of provincial first secretary. After exhaustive examination, we have identified 213 terms of appointment served by 172 individuals (see Table 1-2).

The cutoff point in our study is the convening of the Thirteenth CCP National Party Congress in October 1987. This is more than an arbitrary choice. According to the CCP party constitutions, the CCP National Party Congress would be held regularly, presumably every five years. However, in reality, such a rule has never been seriously observed. Only the last two, the Twelfth and the Thirteenth CCP party congresses, had

been held at a five-year interval.

Table 1-2 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Appointments by Period

Period	Number of Appointments	Number of Individuals Served
1949-1956	58	54
1956-1969	24	22
1969-1973	34	33
1973-1977	27	25
1977-1982	31	28
1982-1987	39	38
1949-1987	213	172

The National Party Congress has often been employed as a political tool to legitimize the status quo. The convening of the Party Congress often symbolizes the end of a certain political crisis and the beginning of a new regime. For instance, the Ninth Party Congress (1969) put the Cultural Revolution on temporary halt, the Tenth Party Congress (1973) delivered the verdict on the Lin Biao Affair, the Eleventh Party Congress (1977) certified the departure of Chairman Mao as well as the Gang of Four from the PRC political arena, and the Twelfth Party Congress (1982) witnessed the near wholesale change of leadership from old revolutionary guards to their younger successors. Thus, the convening of the national party congress is a logical division for comparing recruitment practices in different periods. Our inquiry covers six distinct periods: October 1949 to September 1956, September 1956 to April 1969, April 1969 to August 1973, August 1973 to

August 1977, August 1977 to September 1982, and September 1982 to October 1987.

ORGANIZATION

In the following chapters, we are to investigate the recruitment practices involving provincial first secretaries. Due to the non-randomness of missing cases, a construction of multivariate analysis is unattainable. Instead, our inquiry will be conducted discretely on several issues related to the nature of the political process in the PRC.

Chapter Two will present a composite profile on social backgrounds and careers of provincial first secretaries. Has the principle of egalitarianism advocated in communist ideology been inscribed into the appointment decisions? Does the social makeup of provincial first secretaries mirror the general population? Are provincial first secretaries as a group distinct from the national elites in terms of social background and career pattern? Is there any temporal change in the demographic profile of provincial first secretaries?

Chapter Three will focus on the role of local ties in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. Localism has long been a fixture in Chinese political culture. Many types of special bonds are formed between an official and a province based on the convergence of an official's social background and career, and attributes of the province. These various types of local ties between an official and a province

are employed as a policy instrument for Chinese leaders to prevent local deviant behavior and to secure maximum compliance from local officials. How are some local ties considered to be assets, while others are liabilities in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries?

Chapter Four deals with the issue of generation in the PRC. Until the 1980s, aging leadership at all levels of the political hierarchy had been a lasting phenomenon in PRC politics. There was a lack of elite circulation in generational terms. In the post-Mao era, the path of generational change in leadership has been accelerated. What is the pattern of generational replacement in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries? Are different generations of leaders really different?

Chapter Five offers a preliminary assessment on the rational-technical model and interlocking directorship in the PRC. Have traditional, ascriptive criteria such as age and seniority been replaced by achievement criteria such as educational achievement, skill and performance in economic management and planning? Being the paramount leader in the province, the provincial first secretary often occupies other leading posts in provincial government and military establishments. What is the degree of functional specialization among the provincial leadership? How concentrated is the political power in the office of provincial first secretary? What is the nature of the

relationship between the civilian and the military? Does the Party always command the guns?

Chapter Six examines the last issue in our agenda, the political mobility of provincial first secretaries. The review of the tenure and turnover rate could shed some light on the stability of the office of the provincial first secretary. The analysis of the exit pattern of provincial first secretaries provides an evaluation concerning the post of provincial first secretary as a stepping stone in the advancement of political careers.

Finally, there will be a brief concluding chapter. A summary of findings, comments on the recruitment of provincial first secretaries, and prospects and directions for future research will be discussed.

1. In the 1961-1967 period, only regional party apparatus existed, incorporated as the regional bureaux of the Central Committee of the CCP. There was no parallel regional governmental structure. In the 1949-1954 period, Jiangxi was a part of the Central-south region, but in the 1961-1967 period it was a part of the East China region.

2. For convenience, provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities are all referred to as provinces in this study. Officially, the PRC includes Taiwan as the thirtieth province of the PRC. On September 5, 1987, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) recommended the elevation of Hainan, an island off the coast of Guangdong province, to provincial status. The plan was approved during the first session of the NPC on April 13, 1988.

3. In November 1952, North and South Anhui merged into Anhui, North and South Jiangsu became Jiangsu, North, South, East and West Sichuan combined into a single Sichuan. Tibet formally gained provincial status in September 1965. The provincial status for Ningxia (June 1954-July 1958) and for Tianjin (August 1958-September 1967) was briefly suspended. For a brief historical review on the evolution of provincial administration in China, see Whitney (1970), especially chapter five. For provincial attributes and administrative changes under the PRC see Shabad (1972) and Tregear (1980).

4. For stereotypes of provinces, see Eberhard (1965). For discussion of provinces and peoples of China, see Moser (1985).

5. During the heyday of the Cultural Revolution, provincial party organizations, along with party apparatus at various levels, ceased to function. For three years (1967-1970), the Provincial Revolutionary Committee replaced both party and state apparatuses as the sole governing body in the province. It was not until 1971, that the provincial party structure was reestablished throughout the PRC. Hunan was the first province to reinstate the provincial party apparatus on December 13, 1970. Ningxia was the last one to do so on August 25, 1971. See Goodman (1981) for the analysis of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee.

6. Since the title of the first secretary was adopted for the longest period of time, the ranking provincial secretary will be addressed as the provincial first secretary in this study. Such a title also unequivocally conveys the supremacy of the position in the province.

7. Only one woman has ever been appointed the provincial first secretary. For simplicity, provincial first secretary is designated as masculine gender throughout this study.

8. There is one military district for each of the twenty-six corresponding provinces and autonomous regions, one military garrison command for each of the three corresponding special municipalities. There are also seven military regions, down from ten of the pre-1985 period. Each military region has jurisdiction over several provinces, autonomous regions and special municipalities. Military district, military garrison command, and military region will be referred to as provincial military command throughout this study.

9. See Chang (1970), Lieberthal (1978), and Lieberthal and Dickson (1989).

10. For discussion concerning provincial first secretaries as a political group in national politics see Goodman (1984).

11. From time to time, provincial leaders were charged with localism--catering to local interests and nonconformity to national concerns--and some of them were dismissed from office as a result. See Teiwes (1966) and Teiwes (1979) for provincial purges on the ground of localism and local nationalism.

12. For central-local relationship and the dual role of the provincial first secretary, see Goodman (1986) and Solinger (1977).

13. Hu Yaobang served briefly as acting first secretary of Shaanxi province in 1965.

14. For discussion on China's Nomenklatura system, regulations concerning the appointment, promotion, transfer, and removal of party and state officials in the 1980s, see Burns (1987), Burns (1989), and Manion (1985).

15. For theories of elites and review of elite studies, see Bill and Hardgrave (1973), Parry (1969), and Putnam (1976).

16. For a critique of elite studies, see Rustow (1966).

17. For some of the early PRC elite studies, see Lewis (1963), Lewis (1970), North (1952), and Scalapino (1972a).

18. For example, Wei (1974) identified five models of political change in the PRC: the "red versus expert" model, the "palace coup" model, the "regional versus central" model, the "military-party-bureaucratic struggle" model, and the "political personality" model. Also see Harding (1984a), Oksenberg (1974), Pye (1980), Starr (1976), Wei (1985), and Whitson (1973) for detailed discussion of various models of PRC politics, especially Harding (1984a) and Pye (1980).

19. In contrast, there are numerous studies on Obkom first secretary and Obkom elite in the Soviet Union such as Armstrong (1959), Blackwell (1972a), Blackwell (1972b), Blackwell (1973), Blackwell and Hulbary (1973), Clark (1989), Frank (1971), Hodnett (1965), Hodnett (1978), Hough (1969), McAuley (1974), Miller (1977), Moses (1974), Moses (1983), Rigby (1978), Stewart (1968), Stewart et al. (1972).

20. Goodman (1980) presents a profile of all the provincial first secretaries who were appointed between 1949 and 1978. However, his study also includes acting provincial first secretaries, provincial first secretaries of those provinces which existed briefly before 1954, and chairmen of the Provincial Revolutionary Committees of the 1967-1971 period when the provincial party committees were not in existence. None of these three groups is included in our study.

21. There are three commonly employed methods: position approach, decision-making approach, and reputation approach. For discussion of techniques of elite identification, see Bill and Hardgrave (1973:165-7) and Putnam (1976:15-9).

22. Purged, dismissed, inactive, and deceased leaders are usually excluded in some of these biographical publications.

23. Among these political institutions, the membership of the Central Committee has attracted the most scholarly interest. For example, Bartke and Wolfgang (1985) on the 12th Central Committee (CC), Chao (1959) on the 8th CC, Dittmer (1983) on the 12th CC, Domes (1973) on the 9th CC, Domes (1977) on the 9th and 10th CC, Donaldson and Waller (1970) on the 8th CC, Houn (1957) on the 8th CC, Klein (1962) on the 7th and 8th CC, Klein and Hager (1971) on the 9th CC, Lee (1983) on the 12th CC, Li and White (1988) on the 13th CC, Scalapino (1972b) on the 9th CC, Waller (1972) on the 8th CC, Waller and Donaldson (1973) on the 9th CC.

24. Almost all articles on PRC politics appear in the interdisciplinary, area studies journals such as China Quarterly, Asian Survey, Studies in Comparative Communism. The most recent article on PRC politics appeared in American Political Science Review is in September, 1983 issue, and it is the only one in the decade of 1980s. For critique of area studies, see Johnson (1974).

25. For critical reviews of PRC political studies on this issue, see Boorman (1960), Domes (1983), Goodman (1985), Harding (1982), Harding (1984b), Johnson (1965), Johnson (1982), Myers and Metzger (1980), and Wilson (1971).

26. Because of the lack of conceptual clarity, it is often very difficult to compare the findings of different studies.

27. For theories or models of PRC politics see Harding (1984a), Oksenberg (1974), Pye (1980), Starr (1976), Wei (1985), Whitson (1973). However, most of the models or theories of PRC politics are to be regarded as approaches instead, for they failed to meet common conceptions of theory in the social sciences.

28. For review of the field of PRC political studies, see Lindbeck (1971), Harding (1984a), Kuo and Myers (1986).

29. For a comprehensive analysis of the faction model in Chinese politics, see Nathan (1973) and Pye (1980).

30. For example, see Bridgham (1970), Chang (1976), Parrish (1974), Solinger (1982), Whitson and Huang (1973).

31. Nathan (1973) has developed probably the most elaborated factional model, or any model, of PRC politics. However, there are two basic problems with the model. For one, as Tsou (1976) argued, the model lacks empirical referents. Then, there is the issue of circular reasoning of his model.

32. Some data problems may never be solved because of poor record-keeping and statistics collection. Since 1978, foreign scholars were allowed to conduct field study in the PRC and to gain access to certain official archives. However, political scientists have not benefited as much as their colleagues in other disciplines such as history, anthropology, or sociology. Presumably, it has to do with the nature of subject matter.

33. For a general discussion of data and statistics problems, see Klein (1970b), Oksenberg (1969), Orleans (1974), Travers (1982), and Whyte (1977).

34. In recent years, the CCP appointed many middle-aged cadres to leadership positions at various levels. Youth and technical background were often stressed in the officially released biographic information.

35. For the biographical sources of this study, see Appendix A. For discussion of major sources of biographical material on PRC elites, though somewhat outdated, see Klein (1970b).

36. The criteria for the inclusion of officials or office-holders in a biographical publication are rarely explicit. Wolfgang (1981) and Wolfgang (1987) are among the few exceptions. Provincial officials included in these two

biographic dictionaries are secretary, deputy secretaries, governor, and vice governors. No other sub-national civilian official is included.

37. We are unable to collect information on date of birth, provincial origin (native province) for all the provincial first secretaries included in this study, for example. The information on education and other career experiences is even less complete.

38. Donaldson and Waller (1970), Waller and Donaldson (1973) have done a comparative study on the CCP Central Committee and the CPSU Central Committee.

39. These intuitive explanations are more like speculations or hypotheses. At present, there is no sufficient data to verify them. However, Edinger and Searing (1967) have already demonstrated that the inference of elite behavior from social background of elite is fragile.

40. For general discussion of elite recruitment and some of the key issues, see Czudnowski (1975), Czudnowski (1983), Marvick (1976), Putnam (1976:46-70), and Seligman (1964).

41. Two major variables--informal network, and ideological proclivity--will not be examined in this study. Both are of considerable importance in political recruitment.

42. For the role of patronage or clientelist ties in Soviet politics, see Armstrong (1959), Brzezinski and Huntington (1965), and Stewart (1968). For the factional model of PRC politics, see Whitson (1969), Whitson and Huang (1973), Nathan (1973), and Pye (1980). For the rational-technical model in Soviet type systems, see Moore (1954) and Hough (1969).

43. Research on factionalism in the PRC is largely concerned with factionalism in the PLA, especially the field-army based factions. For full discussions and findings, see Ting (1975), Ting (1979), Whitson (1973), and Whitson (1974). For a case study on the importance of patron-client ties to political mobility, see chapter two of Lampton (1986) on the career of Ji Dengkui.

44. There has been no deliberate effort to distinguish these terms conceptually or empirically by students of Chinese politics. Researchers often use them interchangeably. However, 'faction' is generally preferred. For simplicity, 'faction' is employed in our discussion.

45. To a large extent, the interest in factional politics in the PRC was fueled by Red Guard publications during the Cultural Revolution.

46. For the role of particularistic ties in Chinese politics, see Chi (1976), Jacobs (1979), Jacobs (1982), and Nathan (1976).

47. For discussion on the concepts of clientelism and factionalism, see Hall (1974), Nicholson (1972), Nicholas (1965), Nathan (1973), and Scott (1977).

48. For example, Whitson (1973) identified four types of factions in the PRC: field-army factions, military-regional factions, generational factions, and functional (civil-military, commander-commissar) factions. With the exception of the field army system, there has been no systematic research on the existence of these factions. Pye (1980:6) argued that "factions in the CCP rarely, if ever, represent clearly defined institutional, geographical, or generational interests."

49. Proximity in geographic and temporal terms is treated as an indicator of clientelist ties between the patron and client in Stewart et al., (1972) and Willerton (1979).

The Provincial First Secretary: A Profile

Who had been appointed as provincial first secretary of the twenty-nine provincial-level party committees? Where did they come from? The answers to these questions may provide some clues as to why they were chosen. The initial investigation into the recruitment of provincial first secretaries thus warrants an analysis of the social backgrounds and careers of provincial first secretaries.

With rare exceptions, the biographic approach to PRC elite studies usually falls into two extremes: descriptive or speculative. Either nothing was said regarding the variables or too much was made out of scanty information. To ascertain the utility and validity of biographic analysis, two questions ought to be addressed. What is the rationale for analyzing a specific social background or career indicator? Why and how can the selective indicators be incorporated into a theoretical framework?

The goal of the analysis of the profile of provincial first secretaries is to transform social background and career attributes into the determinants of the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. Our inquiry will focus on three issues: the theoretical relevance and political implications of selective social background and career indicators, a preliminary interpretation of the findings in light of Chinese political tradition and changing PRC political environment,

and a preview of the determinants of recruitment to be examined in the following chapters.

Our task is to sketch a profile of provincial first secretaries according to several demographic and career variables as well as to outline the evolution of such a profile as transpired between the CCP Party Congresses. In addition, a comparison of this profile with that of the population and with that of the members of the 13th Central Committee of the CCP will be undertaken.¹

Terms of office rather than individuals will be the principal unit of analysis since our concern is with the recruitment (i.e., the staffing) process. Between October 1949 and October 1987, there are a total of 213 provincial first secretary appointments involving 172 individuals. Of the total 172 persons who had received provincial first secretary appointments, 81 percent (140) had a one-term appointment and only 19 percent (32) served multiple terms (see Table 2-1).²

Table 2-1 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Number of Appointments

Appointments	Individuals
One Term	140 (81.4%)
Two Terms	25 (14.5%)
Three Terms	6 (3.5%)
Four Terms	0 (0%)
Five Terms	1 (0.6%)
Total	172 (100%)

Two groups of variables are called upon to construct a profile of provincial first secretaries.³ All of them are common recourse for researchers who have vested interests in the elite studies. The variables in the first group pertain to an individual's social background characteristics such as gender, nationality, provincial origin, year of birth (age), and educational attainment. The other group consists of career attributes prior to the appointment as provincial first secretary, such as year joined the CCP, apparatus affiliation, career specialization, and work locale.

SOCIAL BACKGROUND

The social background of the elites is often awarded an exceptional status in elite studies. The assumption is that political attitudes, behavior, and even policy preferences of the elites can be deduced from their social background. Even though such an assertion has not been substantiated, it has rarely been challenged by the students of PRC politics. Alternatively, social background characteristics can be perceived as an integral part of the structure of political opportunity. The likelihood of being appointed as provincial first secretary hinges on an individual's social denominations. In other words, provincial first secretary appointments are determined by demographic variables such as gender, nationality, native province, year of birth (age), and educational attainment.

GENDER

Many students of PRC politics have observed and praised efforts by the PRC in eliminating inequality in various areas. The liberation of women from traditional bondage and the expansion of women's participation in economic production and the political process were singled out by many as major achievements under the rule of the CCP. However, in the political arena, progress toward sexual equality is still rather limited.

In the PRC, politics remains a career domain exclusively for men. Very few women have reached the top level of leadership in the party or in the government. No woman was ever elected to the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CCP. Until 1987, only five women had ever been appointed members of the Politburo: three were full members and two were alternate members.⁴

There have been several highly visible female political figures in the history of the PRC. Many of them are wives of high ranking officials: Jiang Qing (Mao's), Wang Guangmei (Liu Shaoqi's), Ye Qun (Lin Biao's), and Deng Yinchao (Zhou Enlai's).⁵ The political status and influence of these women is usually the residual or extension of the husbands' political fortune.

Women are not well-represented among the PRC's political leadership (see Table 2-2). Although women make up about 49 percent of the total population, less than 6 percent of the

full members of the 13th Central Committee are female.⁶ At the provincial level, provincial leadership is also dominated by men. In 1983, Gu Xiulian of Jiangsu province became the first and only woman governor in PRC's history. While in 1985, Wan Shaofen was appointed as the ranking secretary in her native province, Jiangxi. Wan is the first and the only woman who has ever been appointed provincial first secretary.⁷

Table 2-2 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Gender

Gender	Provincial First Secretaries	Full Members, 13th Central Committee, 1987	The Population, 1982 census
Male	212 (99.5%)	165 (94.3%)	51.5%
Female	1 (.5%)	10 (5.7%)	48.5%
Total	213 (100%)	175 (100%)	100.0%

The lack of representation by women among the national and provincial leadership is not difficult to comprehend. Historically, the role of Chinese women is known to be limited to family and domestic matters only, and very few Chinese women had been active in politics or any social movement. Under the CCP, the overall status of women has been improved immensely. However, women have not yet been adequately represented in the political hierarchy. One major reason may be the lack of qualified women officials. Women still make up only a fraction of the CCP membership.⁸ Since few women had joined the CCP before 1949, most of the female party

members do not have lengthy party seniority. Moreover, the opportunity of upward political mobility for women is restricted because most of them are not as well-educated or technically competent as men are.

NATIONALITY

The PRC is a highly homogeneous nation in terms of ethnic composition and cultural heritage. The Han comprise 93 percent of the population, while the non-Han minority nationalities account for 7 percent.⁹ However, the sheer size and distribution of the non-Han population creates a sensitive political issue. According to the 1982 Chinese census, the total population of non-Han nationalities is 67 million. Fifteen of the fifty-five officially recognized non-Han nationalities have over one million population. The area populated by non-Han nationalities equals more than half of the PRC territory. However, non-Han nationalities are highly concentrated in several provinces along the northwest and southwest borders. In Tibet, more than 95 percent of the population are Tibetans. In Xinjiang, Uygurs and other non-Han nationalities have the numerical majority. In Qinghai, Guangxi, Ningxia, and Yunnan provinces, one-third of the population are non-Han. There is also a sizable non-Han population in Guizhou and Neimonggol (Inner Mongolia). Thus, it is conceivable that national integration and security concern is a compelling factor in the recruitment of

provincial first secretaries in those provinces. Not only will members of non-Han nationalities be well represented among provincial first secretaries, but also they will be purposely appointed to the provinces with a large non-Han population in order to heed the interests and concerns of those minorities.

As of 1987, nine members of non-Han nationalities had been appointed to eleven terms of provincial first secretaryship.¹⁰ In general, non-Han nationalities had been fairly represented in provincial first secretary appointments. However, the share is below their representation in the total population and in the Central Committee of the CCP (see Table 2-3).

Table 2-3 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Nationality

Nationality	Provincial First Secretaries	Full Members, 13th Central Committee, 1987	1982 Population Census
Han	202 (94.8%)	159 (90.9%)	93.3%
Non-Han	11 (5.2%)	16 (9.1%)	6.7%
Total	213 (100%)	175 (100%)	100%

Seven of the eleven minority provincial first secretary appointments occurred in the five minority nationality autonomous regions. The other four were in other provinces. The nationality background was definitely a factor in the placement of provincial first secretaries. Of the 32

provincial first secretaries appointed in the five minority nationality autonomous regions, 22 percent were non-Han nationalities. On the other hand, of the total 181 provincial first secretary appointments in the other twenty-four provinces, only 2 percent involved the non-Han.

The recruitment of provincial first secretaries of non-Han nationalities has been quite steady in all but one period (see Table 2-4). Between 1975 and 1983, no member of minority nationalities was appointed to the post of provincial first secretary. And from 1978 to 1983, no member of non-Han nationalities served in that capacity.

Table 2-4: Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Appointments of Non-Han Nationalities

Period	Non-Han Nationalities
1949-1956	2 (3.4%)
1956-1969	3 (12.5%)
1969-1973	2 (5.9%)
1973-1977	2 (7.4%)
1977-1982	0 (0%)
1982-1987	2 (5.1%)
1949-1987	11 (5.2%)

To some extent, the share of non-Han recruitment has actually been decreasing.¹¹ There are two possible explanations for such a development. One is that the success of national integration has taken its toll on political opportunity for prospective provincial first secretaries of non-Han nationality origin. Once the CCP has consolidated its

control, the appointment of a member of non-Han nationalities to head the provincial party committee is no longer imperative. The other is that the pool of qualified minority party members is rather small and it had been depleted in the past forty years.¹² Since there was little or no CCP activity in the provinces with a large congregation of minority nationalities, very few minority people had joined the CCP prior to 1949.

The recruitment of non-Han nationality members to the ranking provincial party post may also be an integral part of CCP's cadre policy.¹³ In general, the share of the non-Han nationalities among the leadership in other provincial political institutions is considerably larger. For example, at the eve of the Thirteenth CCP Party Congress (1987), two ranking provincial secretaries were of minority nationality origin while nine governors were non-Han.

NATIVE PROVINCE

Geographically, political opportunities are often unevenly distributed. Individuals from certain locales tend to have advantages over those from other areas with respect to political mobility. For natives of different provinces, the chance to be appointed as provincial first secretary is not equal.

The spatial dimension of the structure of political opportunity in the PRC is accentuated by geographically based

sub-national loyalty. One major source of such loyalty is native province. Traditionally, the Chinese always have strong emotional attachment to their native place.¹⁴ The native place often delimits the scope of social interaction and political association. The formation of political factions or patron-client relationships may be deliberately configured according to common provincial origin.

It is evident that provincial origin is not a neutral factor in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. The representativeness index measures the difference between the population ratio and that of provincial first secretary appointments for a province (see Table 2-5). Few provinces were over-represented, while most provinces were under-represented in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. The reasons for the discrepancy in the likelihood of appointments for the natives of different provinces are manifold. One of them is that provinces are not created equal. Provinces differ in population, geographic size, natural resources, economic activity, political tradition, and other respects. These provincial attributes are often decoded into either political assets or liabilities for natives.

Table 2-5: Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Native Province

Native Province	Appointments	Population (1982 census)	Representativeness Index
Anhui	5 (2.7%)	4.9%	- 2.2%
Beijing	1 (.5%)	.9%	- .4%
Fujian	10 (5.3%)	2.6%	2.7%
Gansu	1 (.5%)	1.9%	- 1.4%
Guangdong	3 (1.6%)	5.9%	- 4.3%
Guangxi	6 (3.2%)	3.6%	- .4%
Guizhou	2 (1.1%)	2.8%	- 1.7%
Hebei	13 (7.0%)	5.3%	1.7%
Heilongjiang	0 (0%)	3.3%	- 3.3%
Henan	8 (4.3%)	7.4%	- 3.1%
Hubei	12 (6.4%)	4.8%	1.6%
Hunan	24 (12.8%)	5.4%	7.4%
Jiangsu	5 (2.7%)	6.0%	- 3.3%
Jiangxi	18 (9.6%)	3.3%	6.3%
Jilin	2 (1.1%)	2.2%	- 1.1%
Liaoning	6 (3.2%)	3.6%	- .4%
Neimonggol	2 (1.1%)	1.9%	- .8%
Ningxia	1 (.5%)	.4%	.1%
Qinghai	1 (.5%)	.4%	.1%
Shaanxi	22 (11.8%)	2.9%	8.9%
Shandong	13 (7.0%)	7.4%	- .4%
Shanghai	2 (1.1%)	1.2%	- .1%
Shanxi	14 (7.5%)	2.6%	4.9%
Sichuan	11 (5.9%)	9.9%	- 4.0%
Tianjin	1 (.5%)	.8%	- .3%
Tibet	0 (0%)	.2%	- .2%
Xinjiang	1 (.5%)	1.3%	- .8%
Yunnan	1 (.5%)	3.2%	- 2.7%
Zhejiang	2 (1.1%)	3.9%	- 2.8%
Total	187 (100%)	100%	
Unknown	26		

However, there is one overriding ingredient. Elite recruitment in the PRC was closely associated with revolutionary activities of the CCP in the early years (see Table 2-6).

Table 2-6 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Appointment of Natives of Selective Provinces

Native Province	1949-1987	1949-1969	1969-1987	1982 population
Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi	28.9%	34.6%	24.8%	13.5%
Shaanxi, Shanxi	19.3%	24.4%	15.6%	5.5%
Heilongjiang, Tibet	0%	0%	0%	3.5%
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Jilin, Yunnan	3.2%	1.3%	4.6%	8.3%
Other Provinces	48.6%	39.7%	55.0%	69.2%
Total	187	78	109	100%
Unknown	26	4	22	

On the one hand, a disproportionate number of provincial first secretary appointments went to the natives of provinces which hosted CCP political and military activities between 1927 and 1945. The CCP was then operated in some restricted areas: from 1927 to 1935, in Jiangxi, Hunan, and Hubei provinces of central-south China; and from 1936 to 1945, in Shaanxi and Shanxi provinces of north-west China. As a consequence, in early years, the CCP party members were overwhelmingly drawn from the natives of these provinces. Over the years, cadres from those provinces of former CCP

political bases had accumulated lengthy seniority and political skill. They held major political posts at all levels of political and military hierarchy.

On the other hand, provinces from which natives had been under-recruited are the ones least penetrated by the CCP revolutionary movement during the pre-1945 period. In 1927, the united front between the CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT) collapsed and the CCP was eradicated from its strongholds in urban and industrial centers such as Shanghai, Tianjin, and Beijing. Jilin, Heilongjiang and Liaoning provinces of northeast China were first governed by warlords and were later under Japanese occupation. Yunnan was also under a warlord's rule. Tibet was in semi-independent status until retaken by the PLA in 1950. Consequently, relatively few natives of these provinces had joined the CCP between 1927 and 1945. This probably contributes to the lack of representation by the natives of these provinces in provincial first secretary appointments.

The domination of natives of the provinces which formed the CCP power bases of the pre-1945 years has been lessened in the last twenty years, however. The share of the natives of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi provinces in provincial first secretary appointments dropped from 35 percent before the Cultural revolution to 25 percent of the post-Cultural Revolution years.¹⁵ Such a development is partly due to natural attrition and partly due to the changing criteria of

recruitment. With the passage of aged revolutionary veterans and criteria other than party seniority being factored into personnel decisions, the gap between the provinces in terms of political opportunity for provincial natives is gradually narrowing.

AGE AT APPOINTMENT

In traditional Chinese society, the aged are venerated. The elderly often command social status as well as political authority. For years, the CCP has attempted to reform numerous traditional institutions and values. Nonetheless, the more things changed, the more they stayed the same. Despite political rhetoric such as "three-in-one alliance" in the 1960s (sharing of political power among the elderly, the middle-aged, and the young), the truth of the matter is age in both chronological and political terms is, as always, a major determinant of political opportunity in the PRC. Provincial first secretary appointments have been dominated by certain age cohorts (see Table 2-7).

**Table 2-7 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Year of Birth**

Year of Birth	Period of Appointment						
	1949-1987	1949-1956	1956-1969	1969-1973	1973-1977	1977-1982	1982-1987
1890-1899	2.5%	7.4%	4.5%	0%	0%	0%	0%
1900-1909	33.3%	70.4%	59.1%	20.7%	25.0%	6.7%	2.6%
1910-1919	43.4%	22.2%	36.4%	75.9%	70.8%	80.0%	7.7%
1920-1929	12.6%	0%	0%	3.4%	4.2%	13.3%	48.7%
1930-1939	7.6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	38.5%
1940-1949	.5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2.6%
Total	198	54	22	29	24	30	39
Unknown	15						

**Table 2-8 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Age at Appointment**

Age at Appointment	Period of Appointment						
	1949-1987	1949-1956	1956-1969	1969-1973	1973-1977	1977-1982	1982-1987
Average Age	55	45	53	58	62	65	57
Lowest Age	37	37	42	49	48	57	42
Highest Age	74	57	70	65	69	72	74

In spite of personnel turnover, provincial first secretaries apparently had common adulthood experiences. About 80 percent of provincial first secretaries were born before 1919. In fact, of a total of 159 provincial first secretaries appointed before 1982, only 6 were born after 1919. The corollary of the above phenomenon is the inevitable trend of aging in provincial first secretary appointments. The average age of provincial first secretaries at appointment rose steadily, from 45 years old in the 1949-56 period to 65 years old in the 1977-1982 period (see Table 2-8).

The advancing age of provincial first secretaries was not a unique or isolated incident. A similar pattern has also been observed among leadership throughout the party and government. For instance, the average age of full members of the Central Committee from the 8th to the 12th Party Congress is 54 (1956), 61 (1969), 62 (1973), 65 (1977), 64 (1982) respectively (Domes, 1985:53).

The ratio of provincial first secretaries over 60 years old had been rising continuously between 1949 and 1982 (see Table 2-9). In the 1949-1956 period, none of the fifty-four provincial first secretaries was over 60 years old at the time of appointment. However, the percentage of provincial first secretaries who were over 60 years old, escalated during the next four periods: 9, 41, 79, and 87 percent respectively. In the 1982-1987 period, with the infusion of young blood, those of 60 years and older accounted for only 28 percent of

the appointments.¹⁶

Up to 1982, gerontocracy had been the norm of Chinese political life. Since 1982, there has occurred a massive retreat of aging leaders from active service at every level of the political hierarchy. At the same time, a policy of promoting a new wave of younger, better educated, professionally competent officials was put into practice. During the period of 1982-1987, the aging trend was reversed, a partial testimony to that policy initiative. The ratio of provincial first secretaries born before 1919 fell from 100 percent of the 1949-1956 period to 10 percent. The average age at appointment for provincial first secretaries was dropped to 57 years old.

Table 2-9 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Age at Appointment by Period

Age	Period of Appointment						
	1949- 1987	1949- 1956	1956- 1969	1969- 1973	1973- 1977	1977- 1982	1982- 1987
30-39	2.5%	9.3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
40-49	25.8%	72.2%	27.3%	3.4%	4.2%	0%	10.3%
50-59	36.4%	18.5%	63.6%	55.2%	16.7%	13.3%	61.5%
60-69	32.8%	0%	4.5%	41.4%	79.2%	76.7%	25.6%
70-	2.5%	0%	4.5%	0%	0%	10.0%	2.6%
Total	198	54	22	29	24	30	39
Unknown	15						

However, many old revolutionary guards still wield enormous power either on the spot or behind the scene. The political role of these aging leaders more than elucidates two

latent political problems. For one, leadership succession has thus far been postponed. It is not certain when and how the leadership will be completely passed on to the "next generation". Moreover, the gap between the political leadership and the general populace will not be easy to bridge. The 1982 Chinese census shows that the average age of the population is only twenty-four years. Eighty-five percent of the Chinese are under 50 years old and only 5 percent are over 65 years old. Age wise, neither provincial first secretaries nor other leadership mirror the population. Will the differences in age pattern between the leadership and the population be translated into differences in political outlook, ideological commitment, economic concern, and eventually induce political crisis? Will political ambitions of aspiring young newcomers be adequately fulfilled?

EDUCATION

One of the definitive characteristics of modern bureaucracy is that personnel placement and promotion are based on achievement criteria such as skill and competence. Since educational attainment represents training and skill, it serves as a barometer for one's ability and expertise. In many modern, industrialized societies, a common trait of public officials and civil servants is their high level of educational attainment. As the PRC gradually moved toward industrialization, there would be also an increasing demand

for the participation of professional technocrats in the governing of the nation. The ongoing political reform, calling for granting better educated and professionally competent cadres in leadership positions, undoubtedly echoes such sentiments.

According to the 1982 Chinese census, among the population twelve-years old and over, 23.5 percent were illiterate or semi-literate, 35.4 percent had a primary school, and 24.4 percent had a middle school education. Only less than one percent of its population had a college education.¹⁷ The educational attainment of provincial first secretaries may not be comparable to that of government and party officials in either western democracies or other communist systems. Nonetheless, provincial first secretaries were much better educated than the rest of the population (see Table 2-10).¹⁸

Over all, thirty-six percent of all provincial first secretaries had received a college education. During the periods when economic development is given a high priority, educational attainment is a much more important factor in personnel decisions. Since 1978, the PRC has engaged in a concerted effort toward industrialization. The provincial first secretary appointments of the last ten years clearly underscore such an effort. Forty-three percent of the provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1977-1982 period are college educated. In the 1982-1987 period, the ratio of

college-educated provincial first secretaries has risen to as high as 76 percent.

Table 2-10 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Education¹⁹

Education	1949- 1987	1949- 1956	1956- 1969	1969- 1973	1973- 1977	1977- 1982	1982- 1987
Primary School	7.1%	3.8%	11.1%	15.8%	7.1%	12.5%	0%
Middle School	31.2%	32.1%	44.4%	26.3%	28.6%	31.3%	23.8%
Party School	18.4%	22.6%	5.6%	42.1%	28.6%	6.3%	0%
Military Academy	7.1%	17.0%	0%	0%	0%	6.3%	0%
College	26.2%	11.3%	27.8%	10.5%	28.6%	43.8%	61.9%
Foreign	9.9%	13.2%	11.1%	5.3%	7.1%	0%	14.3%
Total	141	53	18	19	14	16	21
Unknown	72						

One particular omission among the social background characteristics discussed above is social class origin. Class struggle is an icon of the Chinese political process. The ultimate goal of communist ideology is to create a classless egalitarian society. Thus, the analysis of social-economic status of political leadership would provide some indications on the fulfillment of this particular goal. The reason that class origin of provincial first secretaries was not included is such information usually is either unavailable or distorted (Klien, 1971).

CAREER PATTERN

The career prior to the appointment as provincial first secretary manifests the skill and expertise as well as personal and institutional ties a person has acquired throughout the years. Most PRC elite studies stress formal and informal career links among individuals as the sources of political alignment. Individuals with overlapping or common careers in certain institutional settings are grouped together as a faction. We have reservations about such a conception since it relies more on circumstantial evidence than on exhibited concrete behavior. In this study, the focus is on prior career as an indicator of skill and qualifications, and as a part of the structure of political opportunity. In other words, prior career is treated as a major determinant of the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. Four career variables are to be examined: year joined the CCP, apparatus affiliation, career specialization, and work locale.

YEAR JOINED THE CCP

The date of joining the CCP marks a person's initiation into politics. It regulates one's status within the party and has considerable impact on one's subsequent political career. First of all, an individual's revolutionary experiences are very likely to be correlated with the date he joined the party. Early entry to the party means a greater opportunity of participation in the revolutionary movements

of the early years such as Jiangxi Soviet, Long March, Yenan Soviet, anti-Japanese war, and civil war with the Nationalists. The PRC has adopted a personnel classification system based on the participation in major revolutionary events. Under the system, rank, salary and benefit are determined by an individual's revolutionary credentials (Vogel, 1967).

Secondly, the date of joining the CCP determines one's party seniority. High seniority, representing political longevity and loyalty, is usually a vital qualification for career promotion at any level of the political hierarchy.

Thirdly, the date of joining the CCP defines the political socialization process one has experienced. One's political outlook and association are likely to be structured by the date of joining the CCP. Whitson (1973), and Pye (1980) among others have argued that generational factions may be formed by individuals who joined the CCP during the same period when the party was confronted with a certain political crisis.

The provincial first secretary appointments were dominated by the so-called "thirty-eight cadres" (san ba ganbu), who joined the CCP movement prior to 1938. Overall, 80 percent of provincial first secretaries were recruited from the thirty-eight cadres. Only 7 percent of the provincial first secretaries had no role in the CCP's pre-1949 revolutionary struggle. Of those who joined the CCP after

1950, all except one were appointed in the 1982-1987 period (see Table 2-11).

Table 2-11 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Year Joined the CCP

Year Joined the CCP	Period of Appointment						
	1949- 1987	1949- 1956	1956- 1969	1969- 1973	1973- 1977	1977- 1982	1982- 1987
1921-27	25.7%	55.6%	38.1%	9.1%	0%	9.5%	0%
1928-37	55.1%	44.4%	57.1%	78.8%	70.0%	76.2%	0%
1938-45	7.8%	0%	4.8%	9.1%	20.0%	14.3%	11.1%
1946-49	4.2%	0%	0%	0%	10.0%	0%	27.8%
1950-	7.2%	0%	0%	3.0%	0%	0%	61.1%
Total	167	54	21	33	20	21	18
Unknown	46						

The majority of the "thirty-eight cadres" were the veterans of the epic Long March. They had fought the anti-Japanese war and the civil war with the Nationalists. By the time they were appointed to the post of provincial first secretary and other leadership positions, most of them had lengthy party seniority and distinguished careers, and most important of all, proven revolutionary credentials. During the Cultural Revolution, some of these old revolutionary guards were purged and were deprived of political power. However, after 1969, the majority of them had made a comeback. They continued to be the nucleus of political leadership in the PRC.

Since 1982, most of the "thirty-eight cadres" were relieved from the day-to-day activity of governing the nation.

None of the provincial first secretaries appointed during the 1982-1987 period is from the group. For the first time in the PRC history, officials who had joined the CCP after 1937 had amassed not only the majority of, but all, the provincial first secretary appointments.²⁰ The most striking development is the emergence of officials who joined the CCP after the birth of the PRC in 1949. Eleven of the eighteen provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1982-1987 period joined the party after 1950.²¹

More than 95 percent of provincial first secretaries had been party members for over 20 years when they took office. In light of the domination of the "thirty-eight cadres" in the provincial first secretary appointments, it is not surprising that until 1982 party seniority of provincial first secretaries at appointment had been increasing continuously (see Table 2-12).

Table 2-12 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Party Seniority at Appointment

Party Seniority (Years)	Period of Appointment						
	1949- 1987	1949- 1956	1956- 1969	1969- 1973	1973- 1977	1977- 1982	1982- 1987
1-10	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
11-20	3.9%	11.6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
21-30	40.2%	86.0%	44.4%	5.0%	0%	0%	38.5%
31-40	30.7%	2.3%	55.6%	60.0%	46.7%	11.1%	53.8%
41-50	25.2%	0%	0%	35.0%	53.3%	88.9%	7.7%
Total	127	43	18	20	15	18	13
Unknown	86						

The party seniority at appointment for provincial first secretaries ranged from 15 years to 53 years, with an average being 33 years. The average party seniority for the six periods is: 23, 30, 38, 41, 45, and 33 years respectively. Until 1982, the advancement in age and party seniority among provincial first secretaries denotes the continuing domination of aging revolutionary leaders as well as the lack of generational mobility in Chinese political system. The issue of political succession--when and how the governing duty in the PRC is to be transferred to a younger generation with different social and political experiences--has not been dealt with until recent years.

APPARATUS AFFILIATION

Apparatus affiliation refers to the institutional setting of an individual's past career.²² Since career specialization and political outlook are constrained by one's apparatus association, apparatus affiliation is germane to the structure of political mobility. Moreover, political barriers such as the principle of the party commanding the guns, often discourage lateral entry from military to civilian institutions. Under normal circumstances, the post of provincial first secretary would be staffed by civilian personnel. It is evident that civilian personnel had not been able to monopolize the recruitment of provincial first secretaries (see Table 2-13).

While more than seven out of ten provincial first secretaries were civilian officials, the other three appointees were from the military apparatus. Military men had been highly visible in the periods of 1949-1956, 1956-1969 and 1969-1973. Especially, between the Ninth Party Congress (1969) and the Tenth Party Congress (1973), the military accounted for 73.5 percent of appointments.

Table 2-13 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Apparatus Affiliation

Apparatus	Period of Appointment						
	1949- 1987	1949- 1956	1956- 1969	1969- 1973	1973- 1977	1977- 1982	1982- 1987
Military	28.6%	31.0%	16.7%	73.5%	37.0%	9.7%	2.6%
Civilian	71.4%	69.0%	83.3%	26.5%	63.0%	90.3%	97.4%
Total	213	58	24	34	27	31	39

The apparatus affiliation of provincial first secretaries highlights the pattern of military involvement in Chinese politics. Before 1949, institutional and personnel distinction between the military and the party was nominal. Officials often held positions in both civilian and military hierarchies. In the early years of the PRC, the nation was divided into six Greater Administrative Regions, and six corresponding greater military regions. The majority of positions in party, government, and military hierarchies, both at regional and provincial levels, were staffed by commanding officers and political commissars from the Five Field Armies.

After the Gao-Rao incident of 1954, administrative reform was under way to eliminate the tendency toward localism in the regions.²³ Greater Administrative Regions and Field Armies were abolished, and greater military regions were replaced by military regions of smaller jurisdiction. Moreover, some of high ranking officials in the regions were transferred back to Beijing. Military involvement in provincial politics subsided.

In January 1967, the military was ordered to intervene in the Cultural Revolution. With the dismantling of provincial party and government structures and the purge of provincial leaders, the military not only was in charge of maintaining law and order, but also provided the only legitimate leadership in the provinces. Consequently, the military was heavily represented in the provincial revolutionary committees, and later the reestablished provincial party committees, and the Central Committee of the CCP (Godwin, 1976). The military domination in PRC politics and particularly in provincial politics was curtailed after the Lin Biao incident in 1971. In late 1973, during a large scale inter-region transfer involving commanders and political commissars of military regions, military leaders in provinces were discharged from their civilian duty. Since then, the role of the military in politics was reduced to a minimum level. From 1977 to 1987, only four of the seventy provincial first secretaries were career military men.

CAREER SPECIALIZATION

The functional system is a subdivision and grouping of various organizational units according to certain distinct characteristics: line of duty, organizational structure, channels of communication (Barnett, 1967). Since the mid-1950s, it has been an established procedure for personnel classification in the PRC. However, the exact number and classification of functional systems is not clearly delineated.²⁴

The analytical utility of the functional system affiliation is two fold. First of all, functional system affiliation symbolizes one's career specialization. Therefore, as in the case of educational achievement, it is a good denominator for one's ability and expertise. As the regime commits itself to economic development, a rational-technical bureaucracy should emerge. Officials with higher education and expertise in the area of economic management are likely to be appointed to important party and government posts. Secondly, functional system affiliation circumscribes not only one's formal and informal political associations but political outlook as well. Institutional interest groups are likely to consist of individuals with the same functional system affiliation to safeguard their own interests and compete with other groups for a larger share of power. In either case, the functional system affiliation is perceived as an important variable in personnel decisions.

As an alternative to the functional system affiliation, career specialization will be adopted as the tool of analysis. Such usage is more in line with the concept of the structure of opportunity and with less built-in speculative connotation. The designation of areas of specialization for provincial first secretaries is based on the type of educational training received as well as job assignments prior to their appointments.

Table 2-14 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Career Specialization

Career Specialization	Period of Appointment						
	1949- 1987	1949- 1956	1956- 1969	1969- 1973	1973- 1977	1977- 1982	1982- 1987
Organization	18.3%	1.7%	12.5%	38.2%	29.6%	9.7%	5.1%
Propaganda	8.9%	13.8%	16.7%	2.9%	0%	6.5%	10.3%
Economic Management	16.0%	0%	12.5%	2.9%	14.8%	38.7%	35.9%
Military Affairs	12.2%	15.5%	4.2%	41.2%	7.4%	0%	0%
Administrator- Secretary	44.6%	53.4%	54.2%	14.7%	48.1%	45.2%	48.7%
Total	213	58	24	34	27	31	39

The major area of career specialization for provincial first secretaries had been administrator-secretary affairs (see Table 2-14). Individuals with administrator-secretary careers accounted for 45 percent of the total appointments. With the exception of the 1969-1973 period, they were the largest of the five groups. There are two explanations for

this phenomenon. On the one hand, career mobility usually occurred within the same functional system rather than otherwise (Barnett, 1967). So provincial first secretaries are likely to be recruited from those who had been party secretaries or government administrators. On the other hand, the duties performed by provincial first secretaries are non-technical in nature. They may not require and hence do not bestow any advantage to persons with specialist careers.

The recruitment of provincial first secretaries with a certain type of specialization is dictated by the political process in the PRC. One major development during the Cultural Revolution was military intervention in the normal political process. As a result, individuals with military careers accounted for 41 percent of the appointments in the period of 1969-1973. After the death of Chairman Mao and the fall of the Gang of the Four in 1976, the political process in the PRC has been back to normalcy. Economic modernization has since then replaced ideological indoctrination as the top priority in the national agenda. The recruitment pattern of provincial first secretaries during the periods of 1977-1982 and 1982-1987 confirms such a policy change. On the one hand, none of the provincial first secretaries had come from a military background. On the other hand, the appointment of officials with experiences and expertise in the area of economic management (i.e. finance and trade, industry and communication, agriculture and forestry) has seen a

significant increase, up to 39 percent and 36 percent for the two periods.

WORK LOCALE

Work locale refers to the level and location of job assignment. Whether the predominant work place of the past assignments was at the center or local level, in the capital or the provinces, can affect subsequent career advancement. The impact of work locale on the recruitment of provincial first secretaries is usually transmitted through three channels. First of all, a lengthy tenure in a locale can generate familiarity with the people and problems in that particular locale. Because of certain variations among the provinces such as social and economic conditions, ethnic makeup, dialect, such expertise on the locale, thus, can be a valuable asset. So the extent of previous career ties with a locale may be a deciding factor for the appointment as provincial first secretary. Secondly, work locale also dictates one's informal political ties. A close working relationship with a higher official in the same locale may foster a patron-client tie or what the Chinese called "Guangxi"--to be in good terms with important people. Such a special relationship can be a contributing or negating factor to career advancement.²⁵ Finally, a lengthy career assignment in a particular locale may incite localism sentiment and behavior on the part of the officials. In such

a case, a close identification with a particular locale could actually be detrimental to career mobility.

Provincial first secretaries were most likely recruited from local cadres (see Table 2-15). On average, provincial first secretaries had spent about 88 percent of their pre-appointment career at the local level and 12 percent at the center.²⁶

Table 2-15 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Work Locale

Work	Period of Appointment						
	1949- 1987	1949- 1956	1956- 1969	1969- 1973	1973- 1977	1977- 1982	1982- 1987
Center	11.8%	.4%	19.3%	6.2%	10.3%	28.4%	10.0%
Local	88.2%	99.6%	80.7%	93.8%	89.7%	71.6%	90.0%

Of the six periods, provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1977-1982 period had spent a relatively larger portion (28 percent) of their prior careers in Beijing. Some of the provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1977-1982 period were purged during the Cultural Revolution. In general, these reinstated officials had more extensive experiences working in the national party and government hierarchies.

Apparently, knowledge and experiences with provincial affairs were valued. Seventy-two percent of the provincial first secretaries had spent all of their past careers at the

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local level. Only less than 12 percent of the provincial first secretaries did not spend the major proportion of their past assignments at the local level (see Table 2-16).

Table 2-16 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Prior Career in the Center

Prior Career in the Center	Period of Appointment						
	1949- 1987	1949- 1956	1956- 1969	1969- 1973	1973- 1977	1977- 1982	1982- 1987
0%	72.0%	97.1%	58.3%	76.5%	66.7%	45.2%	78.9%
1-25%	10.6%	2.9%	12.5%	8.8%	18.5%	16.1%	7.9%
26-50%	5.8%	0%	8.3%	11.8%	7.4%	6.5%	2.6%
51-75%	6.9%	0%	12.5%	2.9%	3.7%	19.4%	5.3%
76-99%	4.2%	0%	8.3%	0%	3.7%	12.9%	2.6%
100%	.5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2.6%
Total	189	35	24	34	27	31	38
Unknown	24						

During the 1977-1982 period, there was a significant development in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries with respect to the location of past assignments. More than half of the provincial first secretaries had previous career experiences in Beijing, and about 32 percent of them had spent the majority of their past assignments at the center. As mentioned earlier, some of the provincial first secretaries appointed in this period had extensive careers at the national level. The higher priority for economic modernization led to the recruitment of officials with technical skill and rich working experiences in the center. Expertise in economic management and planning are most likely to be developed

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through working at functional departments of the Central Committee or ministries of the State Council where the main responsibility for economic management lies.

CONCLUSION

Some conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis of the profile of provincial first secretaries. First of all, as a group, provincial first secretaries were not socially representative. All except one were men. A majority of them were recruited from the natives of a few provinces which had been CCP's political bases of early years. On average, provincial first Secretaries were older and better educated than the rest of population. On the other hand, in terms of social background, they were not different from members of the Central Committee, of which most of them are also members.

Secondly, provincial first secretaries had much in common in terms of career development. Most of them had joined the CCP before 1937 and participated in the major party activities that occurred prior to 1949. By the time of appointment as provincial first secretary, they had accumulated long party seniority and had spent most of their past careers at the local level. Most of the provincial first secretaries were civilian officials and had worked primarily in the capacity of administrator-secretary.

Finally, elite recruitment is affected by the structure and process of the political system. To some extent, the

evolution of the profile can be attributed to major changes of and within the system. The Cultural Revolution had paved the way for military intrusion into the normal political process and a large contingency of military personnel in the national and provincial leadership. The transformation of political leadership in the post-Mao era, especially since 1982, is in part due to the stepping-down of the senile "thirty-eight cadres" and in part, the outcome of the regime's commitment to political and economic reform. The profile of provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1982-1987 period extends a subtle endorsement to the coming of rational-technocracy in the PRC.

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1. Since 1961, there has been little published information on social composition of the CCP membership. Due to the lack of data, a comparison with the membership of the CCP will be limited.

2. The most distinctive case is the career of Tan Qilong. He had received a total of five appointments: in Zhejiang (1952-1955) and Shandong (1961-1967) before the Cultural Revolution, and in Zhejiang (1973-1977), Qinghai (1977-1979) and Sichuan (1980-1983) after the Cultural Revolution.

3. The biographic and career data needed for performing all the analyses in this and the following chapters are collected from various biographic sources listed in General References (Data Sources).

4. Jiang Qing (1969-1976), Ye Qun (1969-1971), and Deng Yingchao (1978-1982) were full members of the Politburo. Wu Guixian (1973-1977) and Chen Muhua (1977-1987) were alternate members.

5. Madame Song Qingling, widow of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, is another prominent example.

6. The number of female full members in the previous Central Committees are: four (4%), thirteen (7.6%), twenty (10.2%), fourteen (6.9%), and eleven (5.2%) for the 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Party Congress respectively.

7. Wan's tenure ended in April 1988. Later, she was appointed as deputy director of the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee. In 1989, Gu left Jiangsu and became the Minister of Chemical Industry of the State Council.

8. Women constituted about 10 percent of the CCP membership in 1961. (People's Daily, July 1 and November 17, 1961, as cited in Domes, 1985:69)

9. The Chinese define minority nationality in both ethnic and cultural terms.

10. They are Wei Guoqing and Qiao Xiaoguang of Zhuang nationality, Yang Jinren of Hui nationality, Seypidin of Uygur nationality, Ulanfu and Yang Zhilin of Mongolian nationality, Jiang Hua of Yao nationality, Guang Guanfu of Yi nationality, and Wu Jinghua of Manchu nationality. With the exception of Wei Guoqing who had served three times, twice in his native Guangxi autonomous region and once in Guangdong province, each of them served only one term. Ulanfu probably had the most distinctive career. His seventeen-year tenure in Neimonggol

marked one of the longest among all provincial first secretary appointments. In fact, until the Cultural Revolution, Ulanfu was the only person who had ever served as provincial first secretary in Neimonggol.

11. The rate of population growth is higher for non-Han minorities. Between 1964 and 1982, the Han population increased by 43.8 percent, but the non-Han population was up 68.4 percent (Yin, 1984:16). Among the provincial first secretaries appointed before 1969, 6.1 percent (5) are of non-Han nationalities. For those appointed between 1969 and 1987, 4.6 percent (6) are non-Han.

12. In 1961, about one percent of the CCP members were minority nationalities. (Domes, 1985:69)

13. A cadre is a person who holds a formal leadership position at any level in any hierarchy. A cadre may or may not be a CCP party member. For the definition and classification of cadres see Barnett (1967:38-47) and Vogel (1967).

14. The official policy of the past and current regimes in China on the acquisition of citizenship clearly reflects such sentiment. To distinguish the Chinese from non-Chinese, the Chinese opt for the principle of *jus sanguinis* rather than the principle of *jus soli*. Thus, unlike most of PRC elite studies, native province, not the place of birth, is treated as provincial origin.

15. A similar development also occurred in the Central Committee of the CCP. The ratio of the natives of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi in the full membership of the Central Committee are 41.8% (8th), 45.0% (9th), 34.3% (10th), 38.1% (11th), and 30.5% (12th). (Domes, 1985:54)

16. A similar pattern was also detected in the membership of the Central Committee. The percentage of these 60 years and older among the full members are 14.5% (8th), 59.3% (9th), 75.8% (10th), 83.9% (11th), and 77.8% (12th). (Domes, 1985:53)

17. It is estimated that in 1982 about 6 million Chinese had a college-level education, or six-tenths of one percent of the total population. The number includes college graduates, persons who had attended college but did not graduate, and college students.

18. It is highly plausible that those provincial first secretaries whose level of educational attainment is unknown, are less educated. In releasing statistical information of any kind, the CCP usually accentuates the positive and

overlooks the negative. Since 72 out of the 213 cases have missing information, a certain downward adjustment of our findings may be inevitable.

19. For educational attainment, ideally, we would like to identify both the level and type of education an individual had achieved. However, the paucity of information pertinent to the type of education inhibits such a conception. Educational attainment is divided into six levels: elementary school, middle school, party school, military academy, college, and foreign education. Middle school includes junior high, senior high, and normal schools. Party school loosely refers to those educational institutions sponsored by the CCP in the pre-1949 period. It includes Ruijing Red Army school, Yenan Anti-Japanese Military and Political Academy, and other general and specialized cadre training schools as discussed in Price (1976). Military academy includes those sponsored by the CCP and its predecessors, those in China as well as abroad. Foreign education refers exclusively to college and post-graduate work. Due to the irregularity of the educational system in modern China, it is also difficult to compare educational attainment below the college level.

20. The ratio of Central Committee full members who joined the CCP before 1935 (the Long March) are 99.0% (8th), 80.4% (9th), 63.2% (10th), 67.2% (11th), and 49.2% (12th). (Domes, 1985:56)

21. Prior to 1982, the only such appointment is Seypidin. Seypidin who had been a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) before he joined the CCP in 1950.

22. In PRC elite studies, elites are often classified as either military or civilian men. However, the explicit criteria for the division is often absent or ambiguous. In this study, individuals with any of the following career features are identified as professional military men or more precisely with military apparatus affiliation: 1. full time military personnel who held rank before the rank system was abolished in 1965; 2. full time military personnel after 1965; 3. full time political work cadre in the PLA; 4. members of institutions which are in charge of national defense, military affairs, defense industry. All the others will be regarded as civilian. The military rank was reinstated on October 1, 1988.

23. Gao Gang was CCP's regional first secretary and chairman of regional administration in Northeast Administrative Region (1949-1954). Rao Shushi held the same posts in East China Region. Gao and Rao were alleged to have formed an anti-party

alliance and to have established an independent kingdom based in Northeast and East China. However, their main crime may have been their aspiration for higher offices in the party and the government and policy disputes with Mao and other leaders over economic and regional issues. They were first removed from their respective regional posts and transferred to Beijing. Gao became chairman of the State Planning Commission; Rao, director of the Organization Department of the Central Committee. Later, both were purged and expelled from the CCP.

24. Nine functional systems are identified: political and legal affairs, culture and education, finance and trade, industry and communications, agriculture and forestry, party-mass work, organization and personnel, military affairs, and administrator-secretary. The first six are officially accepted divisions.

25. See Jacobs (1979) and Jacobs (1982) for a discussion on the role of Guangxi in Chinese political alliances.

26. The term 'Center' refers to assignments in the national institutions, most of them are located in Beijing. The term 'local' applies to assignments at the sub-national level--province, military district, military region. The calculation of work locale is based on the post-1949 career assignments. The career prior to 1949 was not included. For the first appointee in many provinces, the work locale is treated as a missing case.

LOCAL TIES

The profile of provincial first secretaries indicates that provincial origin and work locale, among others, are factors in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. The appointments of provincial first secretaries have been unevenly distributed among the natives of China's twenty-nine provinces. On the one hand, natives of a majority of the provinces were under-represented and two provinces had no native who had ever been appointed as provincial first secretary. On the other hand, natives of five provinces (Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, and Shanxi) had taken up almost half of the total appointments. The locale of past job assignments had an even more conspicuous role in the recruitment process. On average, local job assignments account for 88 percent of the career prior to the provincial first secretary appointment. Seventy-two percent of provincial first secretaries had spent their entire careers prior to the appointment at the local level.

The focus of inquiry in this chapter is to assess the role of various forms of local ties in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. Specifically, we will examine how and why the presence of a specific tie between an official and a province will enhance or diminish his chance of serving as provincial first secretary in that province.

The People's Republic of China is the world's third

largest nation in land-area, behind the Soviet Union and Canada. Other than variations in climate and topography and the number of sub-provincial administrative units, provinces also differ in size, population, level of economic development, and ethnic makeup (see Appendix). Aside from three municipalities, the size of provinces ranges from 1,600,000 sq. km. (Xinjiang), 1,200,000 sq. km. (Neimonggol and Tibet) to 100,000 sq. km. (Jiangsu and Zhejiang). The population of provinces varies from 100 million in Sichuan to 2 million in Tibet and 4 million in Ningxia and Qinghai.

With regard to economic performance, coastal provinces have fared much better than those in inland and border areas. Ethnic composition adds another dimension to inter-provincial diversity. In most provinces, the Han nationality accounts for more than 95 percent of the population. However, minority nationalities are highly concentrated in some provinces. In Tibet and Xinjiang, the non-Han minority nationalities actually have a numerical majority. In Qinghai, Guangxi, Ningxia, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Neimonggol, there are significant concentrations of minority population. Depending on the degree of Sinification, there are substantial differences in life style, religion, language, and folklore between Han and non-Han nationalities. Given the size and diversity of China's provinces, some political and administrative problems are certain to arise.

For centuries, the province had been not only a political

and administrative unit, but also an economic and military unit. The distinct provincial identity was augmented by language barriers and backward communications and transportation networks. Moreover, provincial natives have long exhibited strong provincial loyalty and distrust for outsiders. Localism--affection for a locale and the tendency to place local interests above national ones--has been a major political concern in China for over two millennia and a major obstacle to political integration in modern China.

The provincial first secretary and other local officials have the responsibility of implementing policies and programs drafted by the central authorities. They are to faithfully implement central directives and at the same time to take due account of local conditions to flexibly apply policies without distorting their intent or content. Provincial first secretaries, thus, need to command a good knowledge of local problems and the trust and support of local people and cadres. On the other hand, such qualities are also likely to cause deviant behavior, championing for local interests and causes, in defiance of national authority and measures. The recruitment of provincial first secretaries is likely to take these two opposite tendencies into consideration.

In summary, the diversity of China's provinces, the presence of localist sentiment, and the role of the provincial first secretary all mandate a proper relationship between the provincial first secretary and the province. There are

several channels through which an official can establish substantive ties with a province. The most common and direct ones are through nativity, residence, working experiences, and educational training. There are some other indirect and less explicit means, such as patronage and marriage, through which provincial ties can also be inherited. The different forms of provincial ties can create a varying degree of emotional attachment to the province. Moreover, various provincial ties may also define the scope of an individual's social relations and political associations.

How and why a certain type of provincial tie will affect the recruitment of provincial first secretaries is the subject of our intensive examination in the following sections. Five major types of provincial ties--linkages between an individual's social background and career characteristics and the attributes of the province--as stated in the following, are to be examined in order.¹

1. The appointment of the provincial first secretary to his native province.
2. The appointment of the provincial first secretary to a province with which he had lengthy career ties.
3. The appointment of the provincial first secretary of minority nationality origin to a minority nationality autonomous region.
4. The appointment of the provincial first secretary of military background to a province vital to national security.
5. The appointment of the provincial first secretary affiliated with a particular field army system to the province which is considered as a power base of that field army system.

NATIVE RECRUITMENT

To effectively administer an empire of enormous size and diversity, the Chinese had established one of the most sophisticated bureaucracies in human history. The political power was relatively decentralized. Governors and viceroys had been given immense power and latitude in governing the provinces. On the other hand, to combat localism, to secure maximum compliance from local officials and to ensure uniform political practice across the Middle Kingdom, the emperors had resorted to a series of elaborate rules for personnel appointment.

Since the Han dynasty, the entry into officialdom had depended on the successful completion of state-sponsored imperial examinations at various levels of administrative hierarchy.² All officials were subjected to triennial imperial assessment at the conclusion of a three-year term. The subsequent promotion, demotion, transfer, and dismissal of the officials was to be based on such an evaluation. Thus, the appointment of officials both at the national and local levels was based on objective criteria--educational achievement and job performance.

Moreover, in order to exert utmost control over local officials and to curtail the tendency of localism among local officials, the Chinese emperors had ordained a series of measures. The term of office was limited to three years, six years at most. Limited term and fixed length of tenure, as

well as frequent transfer, was aimed at preventing local officials from taking local roots and from forming vertical and horizontal cliques.

However, the most elaborate and effective measure is the Law of Avoidance (Guang-Yuan-Hui-Bi), a set of restrictions on the locality of appointment for all principal officials at the local level, officials who are the heads of various administrative units and functional branches.³ The Law of Avoidance was first introduced during the Han dynasty. It was then not a written law, but nonetheless a well-established bureaucratic practice. Its codification took place under the Tang dynasty. During the Qing dynasty, the Law of Avoidance became very comprehensive. Among various categories of restrictions incorporated in the Law of Avoidance, the most prominent one is the avoidance of natives. During the Han dynasty, with rare exceptions, a principal official was forbidden to serve in his native prefecture. Such a restriction on native appointment was rigorously observed (Yen, 1961). The thesis is that family ties and local loyalty might weaken an official's devotion to the emperor and his impartiality toward the subjects under his jurisdiction. Under the Qing administration, officials were prohibited to hold office in their native province or in the neighboring provinces within 500 li distance of their native place.⁴

The history of modern China is that of disunity, characterized by local autonomy and warlord politics. In

1949, forty years of internal political infighting in China ended. For the first time in modern China, the CCP was able to exert control over all parts of China with the exception of Taiwan. The people and officials of the PRC were compelled to subjugate ethnic and regional loyalty to the supreme goal of building socialism. However, localism remained a major problem in the central-provincial relationship. The prevalence of such problems was supported by frequent charges against local officials reported in the Chinese press. During the 1957-1958 anti-rightist campaign, localism and local nationalism were the major issues behind a series of sweeping purges of provincial leadership.⁵ At least in eight provinces (Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi, Liaoning, Shandong, Xinjiang, Yunnan, and Zhejiang), many high-ranking provincial party and government officials, including the governor of Shandong, Zhao Jianming and governor of Zhejiang, Sha Wenhan, were dismissed, demoted, or transferred on such grounds.

In light of the imperial practice of prohibiting native appointment and the deep-rooted localism in Chinese political culture, the CCP's approach toward appointment of native local officials might not deviate significantly from that of its predecessors. In other words, provincial first secretaries would be less likely to be appointed to their native province.

Among the 187 provincial first secretaries whose provincial origin are known, 25 percent (47) served in their native province and another 24 percent (44) were appointed to

neighboring provinces (see Table 3-1). However, if those provinces of CCP's former revolutionary bases are excluded, the ratio of native provincial first secretaries was even smaller, down to 29 out of the 155 appointments or 19 percent. Only in seven provinces had natives of the province claimed the majority of the appointments in the province.⁶

Table 3-1 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Native Appointment

Provincial Origin	Period of Appointment						
	1949- 1987	1949- 1956	1956- 1969	1969- 1973	1973- 1977	1977- 1982	1982- 1987
Same Province	25.1%	35.7%	27.3%	9.7%	16.0%	14.3%	40.0%
Neighboring Province	23.5%	21.4%	27.3%	32.3%	16.0%	28.6%	16.0%
Other Province	51.3%	42.9%	45.5%	58.1%	68.0%	57.1%	44.0%
Total	187	56	22	31	25	28	25
Unknown	26						

The pattern of native recruitment of provincial first secretaries shows continuity as well as a breach from what was prescribed in the Law of Avoidance. First of all, while the natives were excluded from holding office within the province under the Law of Avoidance, the restriction was applied only to principal officials. The secondary officials were almost exclusively recruited locally. This arrangement is aimed not only to ensure checks and balances between native

and non-native officials, but also to improve bureaucratic performance. The knowledge and expertise on local affairs, dialect, and folklore on the part of native secondary officials makes up for the deficiency on the part of non-native principal officials. There is evidence suggesting that a similar policy was adopted by the CCP. The ratio of native appointment among provincial leadership as a whole is much higher than 25 percent observed in the recruitment of native provincial first secretaries. Other provincial leaders such as governor, vice-governors, deputy secretaries are more likely to be natives of the province they served (Teiwes, 1967; Teiwes, 1974a).

Secondly, while during the imperial dynasties no local official was allowed to serve in the native province or in the provinces within 500 li of distance, such a prohibition has never been officially acknowledged by the PRC. On the contrary, in the early years, native recruitment was actually encouraged. During the early 1950s, the CCP adopted the so-called 'localization of cadres' policy. One aspect of this policy was to appoint officials who are natives of the locale, especially in the areas where the CCP had no or little activity in the years before 1949. During the 1949-1956 period, more than one-third of provincial first secretaries were appointed to their native province. The appointment of natives was a common practice until the localization of cadres policy was suspended in the midst of the provincial purge in

1957-1958. In the period of 1982-1987, there was a resurgence of native appointments. Forty percent of provincial first secretaries were appointed to their native province.

The case against native recruitment of provincial first secretaries is centered on concern with the central-provincial relationship in general and with localism in particular. A native provincial first secretary is likely to possess a better understanding of local problems. He is also likely to command cooperation and support from local cadres and people. Thus, a native provincial first secretary may have better success in implementing those policies and programs that were originated outside the province. On the other hand, a native provincial first secretary may prove to be politically vulnerable to localism. He is likely to fall a prey to local interests and engage in activities contradictory to the wishes of the central authorities. The dismissed governor of Shandong, Zhao Jianming, reportedly made the remark that "I am a native of Shandong, I am for the people of Shandong and cadres of Shandong."⁷

Overall, provincial first secretaries appointed to their native province had much more extensive prior career links with the province of appointment (see Table 3-2). On average, native provincial first secretaries had spent a larger portion of prior career in the province than non-native provincial first secretaries did (69 percent versus 37 percent). The ratio of provincial first secretaries who had served

exclusively in the province of appointment is higher among native provincial first secretaries (55 percent versus 24 percent). More native provincial first secretaries were already working in the province for more than a year when they took office (81 percent versus 54 percent). Finally, native provincial first secretaries had a longer tenure (65 months versus 55 months). If ever localist behavior on the part of native provincial first secretaries was suspected, then the observed provincial careers for the native provincial first secretaries may not have occurred at all.

Table 3-2 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Provincial Career Ties, Native versus Non-native

Provincial Career Ties	Native First Secretaries	Non-native First Secretaries
Average Prior Career in the Province	69.0%	36.5%
Average Prior Career in the Region	80.7%	59.6%
Spent Entire Prior Career in the Province	55.3%	23.8%
Spent Entire Prior Career in the Region	65.8%	44.4%
Serving in the Province at the Time of Appointment	83.8%	59.3%
Served at least One Year in the Province immediately before the Appointment	81.1%	53.7%
Tenure (Months)	65	55

The career characteristics of native provincial first secretaries suggest that factors other than being a provincial

native may have a more important role in the recruitment of native provincial first secretaries (see Table 3-3). Specifically, the recruitment of native provincial first secretaries may have been determined by educational attainment rather than by nativity considerations. On average, native provincial first secretaries were better educated. Fifty-four percent of the native provincial first secretaries as compared to 29 percent of the non-native provincial first secretaries had a college education. Native provincial secretaries were also more likely to have administrative experience. Fifty-seven percent of the native provincial first secretaries, as opposed to 37 percent for the non-native provincial first secretaries, came from administrator-secretary backgrounds.

While native provincial first secretaries were slightly more likely to have expertise in economic management, military men were significantly less likely to be appointed to their native province. Nineteen percent of the native provincial first secretaries were military officers as compared to 34 percent for the non-native provincial first secretaries. On average, native provincial first secretaries were younger (52-years-old versus 56-years-old), and had less party seniority (29 years versus 34 years) at the time of appointment. More native provincial first secretaries had not joined the CCP by 1937. Fewer native provincial first secretaries were already members of the Central Committee at the time of appointment.⁸

Table 3-3 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Career Characteristics, Native versus Non-native

Career Characteristics	Native First Secretaries	Non-native First Secretaries
College Education	54.3%	29.4%
Administrator- Secretary Career	57.4%	37.1%
Economic Management Career	17.0%	14.3%
Military Apparatus	19.1%	34.3%
1938 Cadres	71.8%	84.6%
Full Members, CCP Central Committee	27.7%	48.6%
Average Age at Appointment	52 years	56 years
Average Party Seniority at Appointment	29 years	34 years

Our findings show that the CCP were more lenient toward the native recruitment of provincial first secretaries than its imperial predecessors. While there had been no deliberate effort to exclude natives from serving as provincial first secretary, the concern with localism and bureaucratic control lingers on. Only 47 out of the total 187 provincial first secretaries whose provincial origins are known are natives of the provinces they have served. And as we have pointed out earlier, the extent of native appointment is less than the number has implied.

The concern with native appointment for fear of localist behavior had been mitigated by several factors. First of all, as discussed in Chapter Two, the differences between

provincial first secretaries and national leaders in terms of social background is marginal. The overwhelming majority of both native provincial first secretaries and non-native provincial first secretaries had joined the CCP by 1937. Prior to 1949, they and other high-ranking national leaders had participated in the same revolutionary activities. Moreover, except for some isolated underground movements, the CCP's pre-1949 revolutionary activities were concentrated in some guerrilla bases, first in Jiangxi area and later in Yenan area. Hence, most party leaders had spent a substantial part of their pre-1949 career in areas outside their native province. Such an experience had not only cemented a close working relationship among PRC leaders, but may have subdued any parochial sentiment toward their native province as well.

Secondly, provincial first secretaries are not only the supreme provincial leaders, but also are members of national leadership. Some of them, 28 percent of native provincial first secretaries and 49 percent of non-native provincial first secretaries, were already full members of the Central Committee at the time of appointment. Some of them were elected to the Central Committee during the tenure of provincial first secretary. Moreover, since provincial first secretaries were regularly involved in the national decision-making process, they had rich working experiences with the national leadership on issues of national scope. These experiences as well as the prospect for further career

advancement would encourage them to place national interests above provincial interests and to work for the common good of the nation. The truth of the matter is that purge of provincial leadership on the ground of promoting localism was not very common, and cases involving provincial first secretaries were rare.⁹

INSIDER RECRUITMENT

In general, provincial first secretaries had spent a substantial part of their careers in the province prior to the appointment as provincial first secretary (see Table 3-4). On average, provincial first secretaries had spent 46 percent of their prior careers working in the province of which they were later appointed as provincial first secretary. One out of three provincial first secretaries had spent their prior careers exclusively in the province of the appointment. About two out of three provincial first secretaries were already serving in the province at the time of appointment.

Among the six periods, 1977-1982 is the period in which provincial first secretaries had the least past career experience in the province. This is due to a significant number of provincial first secretary appointments involving rehabilitated cadres who were purged during the Cultural Revolution. Prior to the appointment, many of these officials had an established career and working experiences in the national political hierarchies. Moreover, most of them had

spent their careers before the Cultural Revolution in provinces other than where they were reinstated.

Provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1977-1982 period had spent only 11 percent of their previous careers in the province. None of the thirty-one provincial first secretaries appointed during the period had spent the entire post-1949 career in the province. By and large, provincial first secretaries appointed during the periods of 1949-1956 and 1982-1987 had much more lengthy provincial career ties.

Table 3-4 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Provincial Career Ties by Period

Provincial Career Ties	Period of Appointment						
	1949- 1987	1949- 1956	1956- 1969	1969- 1973	1973- 1977	1977- 1982	1982- 1987
Average Prior Career in Province	45.5%	70.5%	32.1%	48.8%	39.9%	11.4%	60.5%
Average Prior Career in Region	64.7%	96.2%	60.2%	63.2%	59.1%	27.3%	74.2%
Spent Entire Career in Province	33.9%	68.6%	16.7%	29.4%	18.5%	0%	55.3%
Spent Entire Career in Region	50.3%	94.3%	41.7%	41.2%	33.3%	9.7%	68.4%
Working in Province at Time of Appointment	67.4%	74.2%	43.5%	91.2%	55.6%	61.3%	68.4%
Served over One Year before the Appointment	61.4%	71.0%	34.8%	91.2%	55.6%	35.5%	68.4%

To what extent, does substantial past career experience in the province affect the recruitment of provincial first secretaries? As in the case of native recruitment, provincial career ties had not been singled out as a criterion for exclusion in the appointment of provincial first secretaries. One of the most explicit policies on the appointment of local officials is the 'localization of cadres' policy of the early 1950s. One aspect of the policy dealt with native appointment which we have discussed earlier. The other aspect is the encouragement of officials recruited from outside the locale to learn the local dialect and customs, and to integrate with the local population. The consequence is that many cadres built up substantial career experience in the province.

An insider is an official who has spent a significant amount of career in a locale. As the result of long-time service in the locale, he has gained a deep understanding of local problems and familiarity with local dialect and folklore. He also may have established a close relationships with local cadres and the support and trust of local people. To local cadres and people, he is known as "we" rather than "they".

Provincial first secretaries with either one of the following career characteristics are identified as insiders: had served continuously for more than three years in the province immediately preceding his appointment as provincial first secretary, or had spent more than 75 percent of the past

career in the province. The minimum three years' continuous service in the province is based on both theoretical and pragmatic considerations.¹⁰ In Imperial China, the tenure for local officials was three years. The rationale is that three years are long enough for local officials to establish certain ties which may put their loyalty to the emperor in jeopardy. In addition, the provincial party committee is elected to a three-year term. Thus, cadres with three-year service in the province, going through two consecutive provincial party congresses, are to be regarded as members of the provincial party establishment.¹¹ The second criterion is intended to be supplementary for officials who had served in the province for a long period of time except the last three years immediately before his appointment as provincial first secretary.¹²

In terms of provincial career ties, the majority of provincial first secretaries were insiders (see Table 3-5). The extent of insider recruitment was most striking during the 1969-1973 period, when 29 out of the 34 provincial first secretaries (85.3 percent) were insiders to the province they served, as opposed to only 3 out of 31 (9.7 percent) were natives. During the Cultural Revolution, the Provincial Revolutionary Committee was the sole power-wielding organ in the province. When the provincial party committee was reestablished between December 1970 and August 1971 throughout China's 29 provinces, its members were transplanted from the Provincial Revolutionary Committee. Almost all the chairmen

of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee were appointed as provincial first secretaries concurrently. As a result, most of the provincial first secretaries appointed during the 1969-1973 period had been serving more than three years in the province when they took office.

Moreover, the biggest winner of the Cultural Revolution was the PLA, especially regional and provincial military commanders. During the 1969-1973 period, 25 of the 34 provincial first secretaries (73.5 percent) were professional military men. Since there had been little re-deployment of PLA main forces or large-scale shuffling of local military commands before the Cultural Revolution, most provincial and regional military commanders had been in the same locale for a very long period of time.

Table 3-5 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Insider Recruitment

	1949- 1987	1949- 1956	1956- 1969	1969- 1973	1973- 1977	1977- 1982	1982- 1987
Insider	54.3%	71.0%	34.8%	85.3%	51.9%	12.9%	60.5%
Outsider	45.7%	29.0%	65.2%	14.7%	48.1%	87.1%	39.5%
Total	184	31	23	34	27	31	38
nknown	29						

Insider recruitment, in contrast to native recruitment, of provincial first secretaries is a common phenomenon. However, to what extent lengthy provincial career ties represent a recruitment criterion needs further elaboration.

Overall, the career pattern of insiders is almost identical to that of outsiders (see Table 3-6).

Table 3-6 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Career Characteristics, Insider versus Outsider

Career Characteristics	Insider	Outsider
College Education	39.1%	40.8%
Administrative-Secretary Career	44.0%	44.0%
Economic Management Specialization	12.0%	26.2%
Military Men	36.0%	16.7%
1938 Cadres	76.0%	79.7%
Full Members, CCP Central Committee at Appointment	45.0%	42.9%
Average Age at Appointment	55 years	59 years
Average Party Seniority at Appointment	34 years	37 years
Average Tenure	57 months	50 months

In comparison with outsiders, insiders were younger (55-years-old versus 59-years-old) and had less party seniority (34 years versus 37 years) at the time they assumed the office. Insiders also held the office longer (57 months versus 50 months). The differences are negligible, however. The ratio of the "thirty-eight cadres" and the Central Committee membership is also comparable for insiders and outsiders. The percentage of insider provincial first secretaries with college education is as high as that of

outsiders (39.1 percent versus 40.8 percent). The same ratio (44 percent) of insiders and outsiders had come from administrative backgrounds.

The careers of insiders differ from those of outsiders in two areas. Insiders were more likely to be military men (36.0 percent versus 16.7 percent), but less likely to have a career in economic management (12.0 percent versus 26.2 percent). These contrasts are partially due to the lack of geographic mobility and the lack of economic expertise inherent in the military career.

Nativity and lengthy career in the province are two avenues to establish close provincial ties. Both provincial natives and provincial insiders are equipped with knowledge of provincial conditions and problems. Both are likely to gain support among local cadres and people. However, insider recruitment is much more prevalent than native recruitment. This has probably occurred more by design than by accident. All things considered, compared to natives, insiders may be more immune to localism.

Nonetheless, native provincial first secretaries had spent a larger portion of their careers in the province than non-native provincial first secretaries did. This seems to be inconsistent with the precaution against the tendency toward localism among local officials. However, both native recruitment and insider recruitment are dictated by the political climate and personnel policy of the period. In

addition, the mechanism of safe guard against localist behavior is likely to be furnished by an individual's other attributes such as education and career specialization.¹³

The appointment to a province of which one is both a native and an insider, may be conditioned on educational attainment (see Table 3-7). For provincial first secretaries without college education, there is a moderate relationship between being a provincial native and insider appointment, $\Phi = .167$. For those with college education, the association between the two types of provincial ties is strong, $\Phi = .428$.¹⁴ In such cases, the apprehension regarding potential localist behavior may have been reduced by the qualifications of provincial first secretaries.¹⁵

Table 3-7: Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Insider Recruitment by Provincial Native,
Controlling for Education

	No College		College Education	
	Native	Non-native	Native	Non-native
Insider	77.8%	53.4%	81.3%	37.0%
Outsider	22.2%	46.6%	18.8%	63.0%
Total	9	58	16	27
	$\Phi = .167$		$\Phi = .428$	

MINORITY NATIONALITY RECRUITMENT

There were 67 million people of minority nationality in the PRC in 1982. Although the non-Han constituted about 7 percent of the Chinese population, they dwelt in 60 percent

of the total land area of China. Most of the PRC's fifty-five minority nationalities still maintain their own spoken and written language, religion, and life style. For political and administrative purposes, the PRC had established autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures, and autonomous counties in the areas with significant concentrations of non-Han nationalities. There are five autonomous regions with provincial status: Guangxi, Neimonggol, Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Each autonomous region is named after the dominant minority nationality in the region, Zhuangs, Mongols, Huis, Tibetans, and Uygurs respectively.

Because of the presence of the large number of non-Han inhabitants, social and cultural differences between the Han and non-Han, and the historical resentment toward Han chauvinism, the regions had not been well integrated with the rest of China.¹⁶ Even though the Han are a minority only in two of the five autonomous regions, Tibet and Xinjiang, the administration of these five region poses a special challenge to the CCP.

A large area of the five autonomous regions is sparsely populated. For the most part, desert and rugged mountain dissuade the Han settlers.¹⁷ However, the five autonomous regions are vital to the PRC's national security and economy. All five autonomous regions are located in the border area. In many cases, brethren of the minority nationalities reside across the border. Local rebellions under the aegis of

separatists and independence movements have continued even under the rein of the CCP. The worsening relationship between the PRC and some neighboring nations such as the Soviet Union (USSR), India, and Vietnam in the last two decades has further underscored the strategic importance of the regions to China's national security.

Economically, the five autonomous regions are underdeveloped. However, the areas are rich in natural resources. There is a large deposit of coal, iron, and many non-ferrous metals as well as grasslands and forests in the regions. The majority of animal husbandry, and the wool and woolen textiles industry in the PRC are also located in the areas (Sun, 1988).

To address the special concerns in the autonomous regions and areas populated by the non-Han minority nationalities, the CCP evidently adopted a distinctive personnel policy. To secure the cooperation and loyalty of the non-Han population, indigenous minorities are heavily represented among the non-party leadership--the regional government and the regional People's Congress. However, the regional party committee is staffed primarily by the Han.

Between 1949 and 1987, 62 percent of chairmen (governors) of the regional government compared to only twenty-two percent of provincial first secretaries are from minority nationalities. In four autonomous regions, non-Han nationalities account for the majority of appointments of chairmen of the regional government. But in none of the five

regions, do the non-Han collect the majority of provincial first secretary appointments (see Table 3-8).¹⁸

Table 3-8 Minority Nationality Recruitment, 1949-1987:
Provincial First Secretaries and Governors

Minority Nationality Autonomous Region	Provincial First Secretaries		Governors (Chairmen)	
	Total Appointments	Number of Minority	Total Appointments	Number of Minority
Guangxi	8	3	7	5
Neimonggol	5	1	5	3
Ningxia	8	1	9	4
Tibet	4	1	6	4
Xinjiang	7	1	7	5
Total	32	7	34	21

The eleven provincial first secretary appointments of minority nationality origin involved nine persons from seven different non-Han nationalities. Seven such appointments were in the autonomous regions.¹⁹ In four other cases, a minority nationality provincial first secretary was appointed in the provinces other than autonomous regions.²⁰

The brief discussion in the above points out some important aspects of the CCP's policy on the recruitment of non-Han nationality leaders. First of all, there is the pattern of "divide and rule", reminiscent of a similar policy of the imperial past.²¹ The establishment of autonomous regions and the appointment of native minority cadres to the various leadership posts in the region is a political gesture of equal partnership between the Han and minority

nationalities. However, rarely had party leaders of minority origin been assigned to the predominantly Han areas or areas of other minority nationalities.

Secondly, the ultimate political power in the minority areas is still in the hands of Han party leaders. Cadres of minority origin were usually appointed to head the regional government or regional People's Congress.²² But with few exceptions, a Han official was appointed as the ranking party secretary. At the eve of the Thirteenth CCP National Party Congress (1987), all five chairmen of the autonomous regional government were non-Han, but only one of the five ranking regional secretaries was.

Thirdly, the recruitment of provincial first secretaries takes into consideration the relationship between the Han and the non-Han in the autonomous regions. The presence of local nationalism and ethnic tension is a major variable in the appointment of non-Han provincial first secretaries. In Guangxi, the three appointments of Zhuang nationality are attributed to the fact that the Zhuangs are highly Sinicized and to the lack of ethnic conflict in the region. On the other hand, there had been strong ethnic identity among minority members and frequent occurrences of anti-Han uprisings in other autonomous regions. In particular, there had been major rebellions with an emphatic nationalist tone in Tibet (1959 and 1989) and Xinjiang (1962 and 1990). Not surprisingly, three of the four regional first secretary

appointments in Tibet and five of the seven appointments in Xinjiang went to career military officers.

MILITARY RECRUITMENT

The PRC has a land boundary of more than 20,000 kilometers, and borders a total of twelve countries: North Korea, the USSR, Mongolian People's Republic, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Burma, Laos, Vietnam. Nine of the PRC's twenty-nine provinces are located in border areas: Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Neimonggol, Gansu, Xinjiang, Tibet, Yunnan, and Guangxi. These provinces, along with Fujian province which is at the opposite side of rival Nationalist government in Taiwan, are considered as critical to national defense.

Historically, China's border provinces had always been of vital security concern for Chinese emperors and their mandarins. The border provinces were heavily fortified and stationed with a large number of troops. Moreover, provincial administration in the border provinces was often headed by a military man.

Today, the security concern underlying various imperial measures is still very much alive. First of all, China's borders with some of the neighboring nations are not defined, hence, a matter of perennial dispute. Border dispute was one of the major reasons behind the PRC's armed conflict with its neighbors, India (1962), the Soviet Union (1969), Vietnam

(1979).

Secondly, on top of the border disputes, PRC's relations with its major neighbors were anything but cordial. Specially, the relationship with the USSR had been deteriorating since the late 1950s. Both nations had stationed millions of conventional and nuclear forces along the Sino-Soviet border and the Sino-Mongolian border. In addition, the Russians had entered into alliance with two of China's major neighbors, India and Vietnam. The tension with these neighboring nations added another dimension of political complexity in China's border provinces.

Thirdly, the border provinces are vital to the PRC's economy. The northeast provinces are a major industrial center in China. Other border provinces, though economically less developed, have rich deposits of mineral resources and industrial raw materials. Moreover, many border provinces are sparsely populated. Although the border provinces account for more than 60 percent of the land area in China, they are inhabited by about one-fifth of the population.

Fourthly, most of China's minority nationality population reside in the border provinces. Some of these minority nationalities also have a substantial number of members who reside on the other side of the border. The insurgence by local independence movements and the instigation from hostile neighboring nations further complicated the political situation in the border provinces.

Because of the over-arching concern for national security, the recruitment of provincial first secretaries in the border provinces exhibited a somewhat distinct pattern. Among the total of 68 appointments of provincial first secretaries in the 10 national defense provinces, 37 percent (25) are military men and 63 percent (43) are civilian. The recruitment of military men is more prevalent in the national defense provinces (37 percent) than in the non-national defense provinces (25 percent).

The recruitment of provincial first secretaries is likely to take into consideration the career backgrounds of the officials. We would expect that military officers are more likely to be assigned to provinces vital to national security. Of a total of 61 appointments of military men, 41 percent (25) are appointed to national defense provinces and 59 percent (36) to other provinces. The association between being a military man and province of assignment for military officers is weak, $\Phi = .123$ (see Table 3-9).

Table 3-9 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Military Recruitment

Province	Military	Civilian
National Defense Provinces	25 (41.0%)	43 (28.3%)
Other Provinces	36 (59.0%)	109 (71.7%)
Total	61 (100%)	152 (100%)
$\Phi = .123$		

There is no confirmation for the expected relationship

between the provincial first secretary appointment in the national defense provinces and having a military career background. The assertion that being a career military officer is a prerequisite in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries in national defense provinces needs to be modified. First of all, the internal political situation in the provinces is an important factor. In provinces such as Tibet and Xinjiang where minority nationalities make up the majority of the population, and have a notorious record of local unrest, then it is more likely that military men will be appointed.²³

Secondly, the relationship between the PRC and its major neighbors was not hostile during the entire history of the PRC. The break-up with the USSR and India occurred in the 1960s. The relationship with Vietnam had not worsened until the 1970s. Moreover, the intensity of external threat is not equally felt in all border provinces. Provinces bordering the USSR (Heilongjiang and Xinjiang) and Vietnam (Yunnan and Guangxi) are probably of a higher priority in national defense.²⁴

The greater share of military men in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries in the above-mentioned provinces clearly demonstrates these two concerns are legitimate and vital. Of the total 35 provincial first secretary appointments in these five provinces, 49 percent (17) involved cadres with military careers.²⁵

On the other hand, of a total of 33 provincial first secretary appointments in the other five national defense provinces, only 24 percent (8) went to career military officers.

Finally, the pattern of military recruitment is affected by the overall military-civilian relationship in PRC politics. The appointment of professional military men as provincial first secretaries does not necessarily reflect a preoccupation with national security. When and if consensus among the higher leadership breaks down and the military interfere with the normal political process, there is bound to be a strong military presence at all levels of political hierarchies. Such was the case during and immediately after the Cultural Revolution.²⁶

FIELD ARMY SYSTEM RECRUITMENT

Since 1930, the Chinese Red Army (renamed the People's Liberation Army in 1948) had been largely an assembly of regional armies which were regrouped into five field armies in February 1949. Each field army system had its distinct leadership and command bases throughout the guerrilla years. In 1949, after the CCP's victory over the Nationalists, the PRC was divided into six Great Administrative Regions. Each region was occupied and administered by one of the five field armies: the First Field Army under marshall Peng Dehuai in the Northwest, the Second Field Army under marshall Liu Bocheng

in the Southwest, the Third Field Army under marshall Chen Yi in East China, the Fourth Field Army under Lin Biao in the Central-South and in the Northeast, the Fifth Field Army under marshall Nie Rongzhen in North China. Each Field Army thus had a region or regions where it and its descendants dominate.

At the conclusion of the Korean War, most of the PLA units sent to the front were brought back to the regions where they were originally stationed. In 1954, the paramilitary control of the PRC was terminated. The great administrative regions were abolished and the five Field Armies were replaced by military regions with smaller geographic domains. Many high-ranking regional military and civilian leaders were transferred back to Beijing. However, the Field Army units continued to be stationed in the same areas.

Whitson (1973) and other students of the Chinese military have long advocated that the field army system is a major source of factionalism among PRC elites. Loyalty to a specific Field Army was derived from the lengthy career associations and intimate personal relationships among members of the same Field Army. The political allegiance of the members to their field army system was reinforced by the lack of inter-Field Army transfer. The advocates of this thesis perceived PRC politics as a competition among members of various Field Armies for representation within their own region and for a greater share of political power at the national level. According to this line of reasoning, the

field army system is a determinant for personnel appointments, especially for military personnel. The leaders in Beijing are said to favor their proteges from the former field army system in those decisions.²⁷

The field army system affiliation proves to be a good predictor for the recruitment of provincial first secretaries (see Table 3-10). Military officers and civilian officials from a specific field army system have dominated the provincial first secretary appointments in the power bases of that Field Army.²⁸ The association between a cadre's field army system affiliation and his appointment to the power bases for that Field Army is particularly strong for the First Field Army, the Second Field Army, and the Third Field Army, and for the years before the Cultural Revolution.

Table 3-10 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Field Army System Affiliation

Ratio of Provincial First Secretaries with
Same Field Army System Affiliation

Province	1949-1987	Pre-CR	Post-CR
First FA Power Bases	79.2% (19)	100.0% (14)	50.0% (5)
Second FA Power Bases	69.0% (20)	80.0% (12)	57.1% (8)
Third FA Power Bases	68.8% (22)	80.0% (12)	58.8% (10)
Fourth FA Power Bases	38.5% (10)	46.7% (7)	27.7% (3)
Fifth FA Power Bases	21.7% (5)	27.3% (3)	16.7% (2)
Cramer's V=	.480	.620	.361

The above result gives some support to the existence of field army system loyalty and its role in personnel appointments. However, the function of the field army system in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries apparently dwindled in the last two decades. The weakening of the domination of a field army in its own power bases is largely attributed to the re-deployment of military units and re-shuffling of commanding officers during and after the Cultural Revolution.

CONCLUSION

An official's social background and past career epitomize his ability in dealing with the distinctive problems of the concerned province. Within certain guidelines, the CCP had attempted to appoint cadres whose social origin and career pattern match the specific conditions of the provinces.

First of all, there is the continuing practice of a personnel policy reminiscent of the old tradition. The limited scale of native recruitment and minority nationality recruitment may be partly due to the concern with localism and local nationalism. The appointment of military officers as provincial first secretary in Tibet and Xinjiang undoubtedly underscores the strategic importance of these two provinces as well as prevalent ethnic problems in the regions.

Secondly, the recruitment of provincial first secretaries is also influenced by the CCP's past revolutionary activities

and by the political process in the PRC. The domination of military men in the provincial first secretary appointments during the period of 1969-1973 is an example. The command of a field army system over the provincial first secretary appointments in its own power bases, especially in the years before the Cultural Revolution, is another example.

Thirdly, the role of local ties in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries during the 1982-1987 period attests to the CCP's recent effort to institutionalize the political process. The ratio of native and insider appointments in the 1982-1987 period is higher than any other period since the Cultural Revolution. It symbolizes the impartiality toward provincial natives and local officials concerning local job assignments. The view toward the non-Han nationalities is less parochial. Two non-Han provincial first secretaries were appointed in this period. However, one was assigned to a predominantly Han province and the other to an autonomous region dominated by a non-Han nationality of which he is not a member.

The institutionalization of the political process took place during the 1982-1987 period is only one aspect of the ongoing political reform in the PRC. The other aspect deals with the issue of political succession. The transfer of the responsibility and power from one group to another group of leaders was proceeded in terms of generational change. To this topic, we shall address ourselves next.

1. The relationship between economic performance of the provinces and career specialization of provincial first secretaries will be discussed in Chapter Five.

2. The examination system as the method for bureaucratic recruitment was institutionalized during the Tang dynasty in the Seventh century. See Twitchchett (1976) and Lo (1987) for examinations and the civil service of the Tang and Sung dynasties.

3. For more on the Law of Avoidance see Chi (1973), Chien (1950), Chu (1962:21-22), Hsieh (1966:128-129), Wou (1979), Wright (1966:90-91), and Yen (1961:345-383).

4. One Chinese li is about one-third of a mile.

5. For purge of the provincial leadership in 1957-1958, see Teiwes (1966) and Teiwes (1979).

6. These provinces are: Fujian (66.6%), Guangxi (62.5%), Hunan (66.6%), Neimonggol (50%), Jiangxi (50%), Shaanxi (66.6%), and Shanxi (50%).

7. See Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1924, as quoted in Teiwes (1966:23).

8. However, this does not necessarily imply that native first secretaries were lesser known nationally. Thirty of the total forty-seven native appointments were in the periods of 1949-1956 and 1982-1987. During the period of 1949-1956, the Central Committee membership was much smaller than that of later years. None of the provincial first secretaries appointed between 1982 and 1987 joined the party before 1937.

9. The only notable case is Chen Manyuan of Guangxi in 1957. He was a native of Guangxi and had worked exclusively in the province in the post-1949 years. His dismissal was sparked by the famine in Guangxi for which he was held responsible. For the purge of provincial leadership on the ground of localism see Teiwes (1966) and Teiwes (1979).

10. In their analysis of PRC's provincial and regional leadership, Bennett (1973), Sung (1975a), and Teiwes (1974a), have examined the appointment of insiders to various provincial and regional positions. An insider refers to an official with a substantial career in the province or in the military region. However, the degree of insider appointment is treated as an indicator for localism or regionalism. Bennett (1973) focuses on the reestablished provincial party committees in 1971. If a secretary's province of assignment and that of his last assignment prior to the Cultural Revolution are the same one, then he is considered an insider.

Sung (1975a) divides CCP history into several cycles of political crisis. An insider is a person who served in the same military region during the entire cycle of crisis. Teiwes (1974a) uses the service in the same province at two different time points and continuous presence during the period as the criteria for insider.

11. In retrospect, the three-year service criterion is arbitrary, to say the least. The provincial party congress and the National Party Congress had been convened irregularly. In the CCP party constitution of 1982, the provincial party congress is stipulated to be held every five years, and the provincial party committee is elected to a five-year term.

12. And for those who were appointed during the first three years of the CCP regime.

13. Both the period of appointment and career specialization are strongly related to insider recruitment. There is also a moderate association between apparatus background and insider recruitment, as well as between education, generation, period of appointment, career specialization and native recruitment. Below is a list of Cramer's V or Phi:

	Native Recruitment	Insider Recruitment

Independent Variables:		
Education	.226	.018
Generation	.238	.076
Period of appointment	.264	.479
Career specialization	.215	.300
Military/civilian	.143	.216

14. Cramer's V (or Phi) will be used to evaluate the association between two variables. If the value of Cramer's V is greater than or equal to .3, it is considered that there exists a strong association. If the value is less than .15, the association between the two variables is weak. If the value is equal to or greater than .15, but less than .3, then the association is moderate. See Blalock (1979) and Buchanan (1974) for the calculation and interpretation of the statistics.

15. Due to the unusually large number of missing cases, this is a very tenuous conclusion. However, this piece of evidence does raise questions on the use of lengthy career as an index for localism, as practiced by many students of PRC politics.

16. For the CCP's policy toward minority nationalities see Dreyer (1976).

17. The population density in the minority regions is much lower than that in the other parts of the PRC. The two regions with the Han as minority also have the largest area and lowest population density among the twenty-nine provinces: Xinjiang, 8 persons per square kilometer; Tibet, 2 per square kilometer.

18. It should be noted that 21.8 percent of minority recruitment is comparable to 25.1 percent for native recruitment in all twenty-nine provinces.

19. With the exception of the appointment of Wu Jinghua of Yi nationality to Tibet, a native was appointed as the provincial first secretary: Wei Guoqing (twice) and Qiao Xiaoguang of Zhuang in Guangxi, Ulanfu of Mongolian in Neimonggol, Yang Jingzen of Hui in Ningxia, and Seypdin of Uygur in Xinjiang.

20. They are Wei Guoqing of Zhuang to Guangdong, a neighboring province of Guangxi, Yang Zhilin of mongolian to Qinghai, Jiang Hua of Yao to Zhejiang, Guan Guangfu of Manchu to Hunan. Only in Qinghai is there a large number of non-Han population (39.4%).

21. Such a policy is generally characterized as "Let Hans govern Hans, let barbarians govern barbarians" (yi han zhi han, yi yi zhi yi).

22. The 1982 PRC State Constitution stipulated that the chairmanship of the regional government is reserved for the minority nationality exercising autonomy in the region (Article 114), and in each region at least one of the chairman and vice-chairmen should be of minority origin (Article 113).

23. There were major revolts against the CCP in Tibet (1959), and in Xinjiang (1962). Most of the one-hundred thousand or so Han population in Tibet are PLA soldiers.

24. In the 1960s and the 1970s, the PRC and North Vietnam were allies. Yunnan and Guangxi were vital to PRC's national defense because of the American involvement in the Vietnam War.

25. They are: 3 of 9 in Heilongjiang, 5 of 7 in Xinjiang, 3 of 4 in Tibet, 3 of 7 in Yunnan, and 3 of 8 in Guangxi. No military men has been appointed in these five provinces since 1982, however.

26. For the role of the military in provincial politics, see Bennett (1973), Godwin (1976), Nelson (1972).

27. For the discussion on the role of field army system in the PLA politics see Nelson (1972), Ting (1975), Ting (1979), Whitson (1969), Whitson (1974), and Whitson and Huang (1973).

28. The field army system affiliation is determined by the career association with a particular Field Army. If the exclusive or predominant career tie with a certain Field Army can be identified, then a person is regarded as affiliated with that field army system. If no such pattern exists, then the affiliation with one of the five Field Armies during the period of 1945-1949 will be chosen. For the classification of Field Army power bases, i.e., military regions (provinces) where a field army system had the dominant forces, see Whitson (1973).

Political Generation

In essence, local ties are the spatial dimension of the structure of political opportunity, while generation or age is the temporal facet. Each implants a person into the political process through the convergence of geographic and historical locations. Both can have notable impact on a person's political career as well. In this chapter, we will discuss the role of generation in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries and the application of a generational approach to the study of Chinese politics. Four issues will be addressed. The first issue deals with the definition of generation, or more precisely elite generation, and the identification of generation in the PRC. The second issue concerns the pattern of generational stratification and mobility in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. The third one regards the profile of provincial first secretaries from the generational perspective. Finally, there will be an evaluation of two competing conceptualizations of elite generations in the PRC.

The concept of generation can be instrumental in the study of politics, particularly on political attitudes and behavior. Generation is often regarded as an agent or catalyst of social change. Differences in attitudes, values and behavior have often been attributed, sometimes unduly, to generational differences. However, due to the confusion over

the exact meaning of the concept of generation, many political scientists have been reluctant to employ the concept in their research.

The concept of generation has many different meanings. There are at least five different definitions of generation.¹ For different interpretations of generation, there are different underlying assumptions and thus different dimensions of analysis. First, generation is treated as a time span. In the beginning, a generation refers to the average time span between the birth of parents and that of their offspring. A generation is about thirty years. Mannheim (1952) discovered that significant historical events and social change often took place every thirty years. Generation was then transformed "from a primitive means of accounting into one of the tools for decoding reality" (Kriegel, 1978:23). In the twentieth century, the pace of social change has been accelerated, so the length of generation has been shrinking to twenty years, a decade, or even a few years.

Secondly, generation is also applied to the ranked descent within the family system. Parents are one generation. Sons and daughters are another generation. This lineage concept of generation is commonly used by demographers and anthropologists. Political scientists have also opted for this concept in the study of political socialization, especially the transmission of political values from parents to their children.²

Thirdly, generation is sometimes equated with developmental stage. The developmental stage is viewed not only as a biological fact but also a social and psychological phenomenon. There is one generation for each stage of the life cycle such as childhood, adolescence, adulthood, middle-age, and old age. For each and every stage, there are certain definitive characteristics.

The fourth definition of generation is that of cohort. A cohort is "the aggregate of individuals who experienced the same event within the same interval" (Ryder, 1965:845). There is no assumption about the distinctiveness of cohorts. Cohorts are identified by the joint occurrence of any specific event during an individual's lifetime. Thus, cohorts may be defined in terms of the year or time period in which they were born, graduated from high school, joined the military service, entered the labor force, got married, and so forth. In most of the cohort studies, age cohort is selected and treated as synonymous with cohort.

Finally, generation may be defined in terms of zeitgeist (spirit of the age). Mannheim (1952:292) argues that "the social phenomenon of 'generation' represents nothing more than a particular kind of location, embracing related 'age groups' embedded in a historical-social process." A generation is an age cohort earmarked with common historical experiences. These shared experiences that occurred during the most formative period of life have a lasting and decisive impact

on an individual's values, attitudes and behavior, and separate one generation from another generation.³

Different concepts of generation have incorporated different assumptions regarding the formation of political attitudes, addressed different research questions, and often arrived at different conclusions. Nevertheless, the thrust of generational analysis is to explicate the differences in attitudes, values, and behavior among the generations. The multiple meanings of generation also propagate several theories on generation and age-related differences in attitudes and behavior.⁴ The differences in attitudes and behavior among the generations can be attributed to life cycle (or aging) effect, cohort (or generation) effect, or historical (or period) effect.⁵

POLITICAL GENERATION IN THE PRC

In the study of PRC politics and other communist systems, generational analysis usually assumes a different direction. On the one hand, due to the difficulty in employing survey methods to collect data, the examination of generational effect on attitudes and behavior has not been feasible. On the other hand, the totalitarian nature of the political system in which the elite usually monopolizes the political power warrants a shift of focus. Instead, generational research on communist political systems has been concerned with the issues of elite circulation and political succession.

Different generations of political leaders may exhibit different leadership styles, political attitudes, and policy orientations. As such, generational change of the leadership may denote the change of the system as a whole.

The Chinese do not use the term 'generation' per se in their political discourse.⁶ However, the reference to generation has been common in Chinese politics. One example is the so-called revolutionary age. Revolutionary age refers to the length of time since a person joined the CCP or the communist revolution. It is the basis for the common designation of cadres such as Long March Cadres, Yenan Cadres, Thirty-eight Cadres, Anti-Japanese War Cadres, Liberation War Cadres, Uprising Cadres. Revolutionary age not only reflects the extent of a person's participation in the major revolutionary activities, but also constitutes seniority within the political hierarchy. It serves as a good indicator of a person's political virtue, ideological purity, and political loyalty to the CCP. Revolutionary age has been officially employed as a criterion for rank, status, and salary classification in the PRC's personnel administration (Barnett, 1967; Pye, 1977; Vogel, 1967).

As in many traditional societies, age is a determinant of social stratification in China. The Chinese acknowledge there are different psychological attributes and behavior patterns associated with different biological ages. The Chinese also uphold the role of age in personal relationships

and the social pyramids. The elders are venerated and usually command respect and authority. In the political arena, age often enters into many personnel decisions. Since the accumulation of experiences, wisdom, and seniority are normally associated with the progression of a person's age, age serves as an objective and agreeable criterion for career advancement.

The application of revolutionary age and chronological age in personnel management has contributed to orderly and steady bureaucratic operation in the PRC. However, it does inevitably lead to gerontocracy and the lack of generational mobility. The potent issue of generational conflict in PRC politics first surfaced during the Cultural Revolution. To a certain extent, the Cultural Revolution can be perceived as a political conflict between the old and the young, between the revolutionary generation and post-revolutionary generation, and between the establishment and the up-and-comers. To bridge the generation gap, the so-called "old-middle-aged-youth three-in-one alliance" (lao zong qing san jie he) had been instituted to provide the sharing of power by the three generations.

Since 1978, the generation issue again has taken a prominent role in Chinese politics. With the aging of the leadership and the drive toward economic modernization, the issue of political succession is at the center stage of political reform. Generation has been touted as the major

factor for leadership selection. Officially, the Chinese divide their leadership into three echelons or three generations.⁷ The CCP has pushed for the retirement of the first echelon and the gradual transfer of the baton from the second echelon to the third echelon. The requirements for the third generation successors are to be revolutionary, young, well-educated, and professionally competent.

Few attempts have been made to apply the concept of generation to the analysis of PRC politics.⁸ Most China scholars treat generation as a social background attribute and conjecture on the implications of generational background. The analysis is limited to the classification of leadership based on certain vague notions. Others such as Whitson (1973) and Pye (1980) speculate on the phenomenon of generational factions.

The main purpose of this chapter is to explore the role of political generation in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries, and in the PRC political process in general. A political generation is commonly defined as a group of persons who have undergone the same basic historical experiences during their formative years (Herble, 1951; Mannheim, 1952; Rintala, 1963). Common historical experiences or generational events shape the attitudes and values of a specific generation and distinguish them from other contemporaries within the society. The size of a generation is determined by the temporal and spatial limits of given historical experiences.

In identifying political generation in the PRC, the age cohort approach has its limitations. First of all, it is difficult to define what constitutes formative years for the Chinese. Most scholars define the period as 17 to 25 years old and such definition has been corroborated by some empirical studies. However, formative years are certain to vary from society to society and from culture to culture. There has not yet been any empirical evidence suggesting one way or the other what are the formative years for the Chinese. Secondly, this usage also obscures the differences between age cohort and political generation. As Mannheim (1952) pointed out a distinction must be made between generation as potentiality and generation as actuality. In a highly integrated society with advanced communications and transportation networks, this distinction may be trivial. However, it is a truly legitimate concern when one deals with politically fragmented China of pre-1949 period. It is precarious to consider two youth grown up contemporarily, however, one in the communist guerrilla bases and one in Nationalist government controlled territory, as members of the same generation. The mere sharing of common historical location does not create a generation out of an age group. It requires the active participation in the historical events by the generational members.⁹

Since this study examines a much smaller segment of the population, the CCP elite, the above problem is less acute.¹⁰

For the elite generation, chronological age may be highly correlated with the revolutionary experiences. Nonetheless, in light of the political reality and societal development in contemporary China, an alternative definition without reference to age cohort is preferred.

Rather than accepting 17 to 25 years or any age stratum as the formative period, we elect to identify the points in a person's political life which constitute key formative experiences. As in the case of the contemporary Soviet elite, three points are of considerable importance in influencing an official's political attitudes, behavior, and career development. They are: the entry into the communist party; the recruitment into a party, government or military apparatus; and the appointment to a leadership position (Bialer, 1980). Among the three, entry to the CCP is probably the most critical point with regard to formative experiences. The joining of the CCP as the referent for elite generation seems to be a logical and practical choice. First of all, most CCP members joined the CCP when they were between 17 and 25 years old, which scholars consider the formative period. Secondly, this conception is congruent with the established CCP practice, the use of the revolutionary age in personnel administration. Thirdly, without doubt, there is much more information available on the date a cadre joined the CCP than that on the other two events.

A generation is thus defined as a group of men and women

who, regardless of age, joined the CCP at the same time and shared politically relevant historical experiences during the given period. In short, a generation is a party cohort which shares common formative experiences.¹¹ The next question is to identify those distinctive periods of CCP history which differ significantly from each other with respect to certain political and military incidents to provide a basis for distinct formative experiences and diverse elite generations. The cadres who joined the CCP during the same historical period, arguably, will endure common formative experiences which may have impact, among other factors, on their political attitudes and behavior.

Even though scholars may not be in agreement as to the significance and the impact of many political events in the CCP history, there are several events which clearly have helped shape the CCP history. These major events marked five distinct periods in the CCP history: July 1921 to April 1927, April 1927 to July 1937, July 1937 to August 1945, August 1945 to October 1949, and post-1949.¹² The first period is from the establishment of the CCP to the break-up of the first alliance between the CCP and the KMT. During this period, the activities of the CCP were urban centered and worker-oriented. Its leadership was predominantly intellectuals, some of them returned students from the USSR with strong ties to the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU). During the second period, the CCP went through a major transformation, in terms

of leadership, power bases, and revolutionary strategy. The CCP had survived the Long March, moved its headquarters from Jiangxi to Yenan, and Mao Zedong emerged as the supreme leader of the party. At the end of this period, the CCP was converted into guerilla forces, operated in the rural areas, with the peasants as the main supporters, and was led by cadres with strong local roots. During the third period, the anti-Japanese war years or the Yenan years, the CCP had grown into a formidable political and military force and was ready to take the final assault on the KMT. The fourth period, the civil war years, marked the CCP's eventual victory over its arch rival and the establishment of the PRC. The final period covers the years since the PRC was inaugurated in 1949.

The identification of generational membership for provincial first secretaries proves not to be an easy task, even though we have identified periods and events which create distinct political generations. We do not have detailed information on the circumstance surrounding their joining the CCP and whether they had participated in the major political events of the period. The specific date of entry into the CCP or the revolutionary movement is often unknown. In most cases, only the year or the approximate period is available.

According to the period when they joined the party, the CCP leadership can be divided into three generations: the thirty-eight generation, the forty-nine generation, and the post-1949 generation.¹³ The members of the thirty-eight

generation entered into the party during the 1921-1937 period, before the outbreak of the anti-Japanese War. The forty-nine generation includes those who became CCP members during the 1938-1949 period. These two generations had participated in the communist revolution. Together, they are often referred to as the revolutionary generation. The post-1949 generation or the post-revolutionary generation consists of those who entered the party after 1949 and had not taken part in the communist revolutionary struggle.

GENERATIONAL MOBILITY

In the PRC, political mobility is in large part hinged on a person's generational membership. In the recruitment of provincial first secretaries, generation is clearly a major determinant (see Table 4-1). There are two distinctive features in the provincial first secretary appointments: the domination of the thirty-eight generation, and the lack of generational mobility.

Until 1982, provincial first secretaries were almost exclusively recruited from the thirty-eight generation. Two factors probably contribute to the above phenomenon. First of all, as mentioned earlier, is the pivotal role of revolutionary age in the PRC personnel administration. Because of their early entry into the party, the members of the thirty-eight generation have higher seniority within the political ladder. Although the thirty-eight generation may

not be highly educated or possess relevant professional skills, they are endowed with political virtue. Their proven revolutionary credential suggests that they are loyal to the party, faithful to the ideology, supportive to the leadership. Secondly, gerontocracy did not become a political issue until the 1970s. A cadre who joined the CCP in 1928 at the age of twenty-one, for example, would be only forty-two years-old when the party took over the reign in 1949. He would still be in his prime in the next two decades.

Table 4-1: Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Generation

Generation	Period of Appointment					
	1949- 1956	1956- 1969	1969- 1973	1973- 1977	1977- 1982	1982- 1987
Thirty-eight	100%	95.2%	87.9%	70.0%	85.7%	0%
Forty-nine	0%	4.8%	9.1%	30.0%	14.3%	38.9%
Post-1949	0%	0%	3.0%	0%	0%	61.7%
Total	54	21	33	20	21	18

The aging of leadership at all levels of the political hierarchy began to emerge in the 1970s. The issue of political succession in the PRC then took on a new dimension, that of generation. The changing of the guard was no longer confined to within the same generation, but between the generations. Another development in the late 1970s, the drive toward economic modernization, further accentuated the need for generational change of leadership. As discussed in the

next section, members of the thirty-eight generation and the forty-nine generation are not as educated and professionally competent as their counterparts of the post-revolutionary generation. They are not quite up to the task of managing a modernizing Chinese economy.

In 1981, among the twenty million cadres in the PRC, 99 percent of them had been recruited after 1949. Only about ten thousand of them can be classified as members of the thirty-eight generation.¹⁴ However, major party and government posts at both the national and the provincial level were still occupied by the thirty-eight generation. It took a grand strategy in the name of political reform to accelerate the pace of generational transfer of power.¹⁵ Since 1982, along with the massive retirement and semi-retirement of the aging revolutionaries, many forty-nine generation and post-forty-nine generation cadres were placed in leadership positions at various levels of the political hierarchy. In the 1982-1987 period, no one from the thirty-eight generation had been appointed as provincial first secretary. At their expense, more than 60 percent of provincial first secretaries were from the post-revolutionary generation.¹⁶ Moreover, the generational change of the leadership is from the 1938 generation to the post-1949 generation, and more or less bypasses the 1949 generation.

GENERATION PROFILE

The rise of the post-revolutionary generations is an integral part of Chinese political and economic reform in the last decade. Whether the generational change of the political leadership in the PRC will produce any permanent and meaningful change of the PRC political system is uncertain. Whether the leadership of the post-revolutionary generation will be different from their predecessors in terms of leadership styles, political agenda, and policy preferences is equally unclear. While scholars generally agree that generational differences in formative experiences may contribute in shaping the attitudes and behavior of the elites, how and how much it does is an empirical question which is very difficult to answer.

As an analytical concept, generation is both interesting and appealing. As an explanatory variable of Chinese politics, its value is very difficult to determine. For one thing, in terms of its impact on elite attitudes and behavior, generation probably may not be as critical as other background and structural variables. In many aspects, the role of generation is similar to that of social class, it is a unifying force, reinforcing the existing differences between the groups. Only when generational differences overlap or coincide with political, economic, and social divisions within the society, does the generation become a potent political force. For another, our knowledge on the attitudes and policy

preferences of the Chinese leadership is very limited. It is very difficult to identify any kind of connection between specific generations and particular ideological tendencies or policy goals among the PRC leadership (Pye, 1980).

Nonetheless, there are significant differences among the provincial first secretaries of three elite generations on the selective social background and career indicators. Such differences not only highlight the distinctiveness of the three elite generations, but also exemplify the evolution of recruitment practices in the PRC.

On average, the members of the post-revolutionary generation joined the CCP at the age of twenty-six and were appointed as provincial first secretary at the age of fifty-one, with twenty-seven years party seniority. Compared with the other two generations, the post-revolutionary generation joined the CCP later, received the appointment at a younger age and with less party seniority. While the differences between the thirty-eight generation and the forty-nine generation are marginal, the differences between the forty-nine generation and the post-1949 generation are substantial (see Table 4-2).

Although these numbers are not fully comparable, due to the small number of cases on the forty-nine and post-1949 generations and the fact that the PRC was not in existence until 1949, they do at least expose one important feature of the career of the post-revolutionary generation. That is the

relatively rapid ascendancy of the post-1949 generation to the post of provincial first secretary. All but one provincial first secretaries of the post-1949 generation were appointed in the 1982-1987 period. Many of this third generation leadership are the newcomers on the PRC political scene. Unlike their predecessors, they are unknown to the outside world and even to the general Chinese public. Only one member of the post-1949 generation appointed as provincial first secretary during the 1982-1987 period was elected to the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in 1977.

Table 4-2: Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Age Profile of the Three Generations

Age	Thirty-eight Generation	Forty-nine Generation	Post-1949 Generation
Average Age When Joined the CCP	21	20	26
Average Age at Appointment	54	58	51
Mean Party Seniority at Appointment	33	37	27

With respect to career pattern, there are also significant variations among the three generations (see Table 4-3). It is evident that elite recruitment had been closely associated with the evolution of the CCP. Prior to the outbreak of the civil war, the CCP mainly operated in Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, and Shanxi provinces. Natives of these provinces were among the first to be recruited into the

CCP. Eighty-one of the eighty-three natives of these provinces who had been appointed as provincial first secretary were members of the thirty-eight generation. While natives of these provinces account for more than 61 percent of the thirty-eight generation provincial first secretaries, only two provincial first secretaries from the forty-nine generation and none from the post-1949 generation were natives of these provinces.

Table 4-3: Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Career Attributes of the Three Generations

Career Attributes	Thirty-eight Generation	Forty-nine Generation	Post-1949 Generation
Natives of Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Shanxi Provinces	61.4% (81)	10.5% (2)	0% (0)
Military Men	40.0% (54)	5.0% (1)	8.3% (1)
College Education	27.8% (30)	45.5% (5)	90.9% (10)
Economic Management Specialty	8.9% (12)	25.0% (5)	58.3% (7)
Mean Ratio of Prior Career in the Province	39.6%	55.9%	57.5%
Mean Ratio of Prior Career in the Region	63.0%	66.9%	71.4%
Mean Ratio of Prior Career in the Capital	12.3%	10.3%	3.3%
Native Recruitment	21.2% (28)	31.6% (6)	45.9% (5)
Insider Recruitment	52.8% (57)	55.0% (11)	63.6% (7)
Tenure (Months)	58	37	36

The military nature of the CCP activity in the early years was also reflected in the significant presence of career

military men among the first generation. Forty percent of the members of the thirty-eight generation are professional military men, but only one each from the forty-nine generation and post-1949 generation are.

The recruitment of the post-revolutionary generation during the 1982-1987 period is largely attributed to the policy proclaimed in 1982 to promote younger, better educated, and professionally competent cadres to major leadership posts. Among the three generations, the thirty-eight generation is least likely and the post-1949 generation most likely to have college education or skills in the areas of economic production and management.¹⁷ More than 90 percent of the post-1949 generation are college educated and almost 60 percent of them are specialists in economic management.

Although the differences are not substantial, members of the forty-nine and post-1949 generations had spent a larger portion of their previous career at the local level and in the province where they received the appointment as provincial first secretary. Only three members of the post-revolutionary generation had spent some time working in the capital. While in terms of insider recruitment, the variations among the three generations are small, there are larger differences with respect to native recruitment.¹⁸ The members of the post-revolutionary generation are more likely to be appointed to their native province and to the province with which they have very close career ties. Almost half of them were appointed

to their native province and more than 60 percent were appointed to the province where they had lengthy past career service. However, among the three generations, the members of the thirty-eight generation had longer tenure.

The above discussion shows that the three elite generations differ significantly from each other in some aspects of social background and career characteristics. One important development in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries during the 1982-1987 period is not manifested in the statistics, however. In addition to the technocrat background, the provincial first secretaries of the post-revolutionary generation also exhibit the cooptation career pattern. The concept of cooptation refers to a specific career pattern of party officials who begin party careers in relatively high positions after spending lengthy careers outside the party, particularly in management and technology fields.¹⁹ In essence, cooptation is a lateral career transfer which is highly unusual in Chinese politics.

The normal channel of career advancement within the CCP is for a cadre to start his party career at a relatively low position and to gradually move up the political ladder. The provincial first secretaries of the thirty-eight and forty-nine generations are either career politicians or professional military men. They had been full-time party officials in their entire career prior to their appointment as provincial first secretaries. In contrast, many provincial first

secretaries of the post-revolutionary generation had not held important posts in the party or the government prior to 1982. Before then, they had been engineers and specialists in the state industrial enterprises. After being recruited into provincial leadership and serving two or three years in the capacity of governor, vice governor, or deputy secretary, they then assumed the post of provincial first secretary. Among the eleven provincial first secretaries of the post-revolutionary generation appointed during the 1982-1987 period, seven fit into the cooptation pattern.²⁰

The cooptation pattern is an important career attribute of the provincial first secretaries of the post-revolutionary generation. Since many of them had been appointed to their native province or province which they had worked for a considerable length of time prior to the appointment, the cooptation career pattern may reduce the concern with the problem of localism in the appointment of the members of the Post-revolutionary generation. Because most of them were not active in provincial politics prior to 1982, they were less likely to be identified with localism sentiment, despite their close provincial ties.²¹

PARTY COHORT AND AGE COHORT

Many scholars have defined generation as an age-homogeneous group who shared certain historical experiences during their formative years. Despite the apparent

shortcomings in applying this definition to the study of generations in the PRC, the age cohort approach merits some consideration. First of all, members of the same age cohort are likely to have common life experiences during different points of their life. They would be aging together and would experience many major life events such as schooling, joining the labor force, marriage, and so forth contemporaneously. People who were born during approximately the same time period would be exposed to the same historical events. These predispositions are likely to distinguish one age group from other age groups. Secondly, it is easier to identify a person's date of birth than to ascertain other major life and political experiences in a person's life. In this study, of the total 213 cases, in 46 cases the information on the year (period) a cadre joined the CCP is missing, while in only 15 cases is the year of birth for an official not identified. Because of the common traits shared by an age cohort and the problem of direct verification of formative experiences, age cohort is a convenient, if not completely convincing, surrogate for generation.

Matching the temporal locations of formative years with the three distinctive periods in the history of the CCP, provincial first secretaries can be grouped into four generations.²² The first generation includes those who were born before 1899 and were over 21 years old when the CCP was established in 1921. The second generation consists of those

who were born between 1900 and 1916. They became 21 years old during the 1921-1937 period. These two generations are parallel to the thirty-eight generation. The third generation is made up of those who were born between 1917 and 1928. The members of this group reached the age of twenty-one during the 1938-1949 period. This group coincides with the forty-nine generation. The fourth generation comprises those who were born after 1929. They were twenty-one years old only after the PRC was established in 1949. This group of cadres are counterparts of post-revolutionary generations. The generational membership of the provincial first secretaries is correlated with the period when they reached their formative years. There is a strong association between party cohort and age cohort, Cramer's $V=.654$ (see Table 4-4).

Table 4-4: Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Party Cohort and Age Cohort

Party Cohort (Generation)	Age Cohort (Year of Birth)			
	Pre- 1899	1900- 1916	1917- 1928	Post- 1929
Thirty-eight Generation	100%	92.7%	50.0%	0%
Forty-nine Generation	0%	6.5%	50.0%	26.7%
Post-1949 Generation	0%	0.8%	0%	73.3%
Total	5	123	16	15

The lack of an even stronger relationship between the two is in part due to the discrepancy in available information.

More important, the disparity between the two alternative measurements of elite generation illustrates the deficiency of the age group as the referent for political generation. First of all, age is not a perfect indicator for a person's political experiences. The formative experiences such as joining the CCP in this case, may not have occurred during the prescribed formative period. Many provincial first secretaries joined the CCP in their teens and some became party members after they had passed the formative period. Secondly, generation is a discrete concept, involving discontinuities, while age is more a continuous phenomenon. An age difference of a few years can be consequential, if it occurs at generational border, the breaking-off point between two political generations.

The lack of age mobility in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries is also apparent in the age cohort analysis. Prior to 1982, the provincial first secretary appointments were dominated by persons who were born before 1916.²³ In general, the differences among the generations as defined in terms of age cohort are consistent with the findings while the party cohort approach is employed (see Table 4-5).²⁴

Table 4-5: Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Career Attributes of Age Cohorts

Career Attributes	Age Cohort (Year of Birth)			
	Pre- 1899	1900- 1916	1917- 1928	Post- 1929
Natives of Hubei, Hunan Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Shanxi Provinces	0% (0)	57.9% (77)	34.6% (9)	11.8% (2)
Military Men	40.0% (2)	35.3% (48)	13.5% (5)	0% (0)
College Education	40.0% (2)	28.6% (30)	28.6% (4)	86.7% (13)
Economic Management Specialty	0% (0)	11.8% (16)	13.5% (5)	55.0% (11)
Mean Ratio of Prior Career in the Province	0%	40.8%	47.1%	64.8%
Mean Ratio of Prior Career in the Region	100%	64.0%	53.9%	83.4%
Mean Ratio of Prior Career in the Capital	0%	12.2%	18.6%	1.9%
Native Recruitment	60.0% (3)	21.1% (28)	19.2% (5)	52.9% (9)
Insider Recruitment	0% (0)	50.4% (57)	51.4% (19)	68.4% (13)
Tenure (Months)	53	58	53	22

As in the case of the thirty-eight generation, the natives of Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, and Shanxi provinces constitute the majority among the 1900-1916 cohort. Of the 88 provincial first secretaries who were the natives of Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, and Shanxi provinces, 77 (87.5 percent) were born before 1916. Among the 1900-1916 age group, there is also a large contingency of military officers.

Moreover, the emergence of technocrats in the recruitment during the 1982-1987 period is also evident in the age cohort analysis. The career pattern that characterized the post-revolutionary generation also applied to those who were born after 1929. Nineteen of the twenty provincial first secretaries from the post-1929 cohort were appointed during the 1982-1987 period. Among the provincial first secretaries who were born after 1929, 87 percent had a college education, 55 percent had expertise in areas of economic management. None of them was a professional military man. Only two of them were natives of Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, or Shanxi provinces. Finally, the majority (53 percent) of the post-1929 cohort had been appointed to their native province. Sixty-eight percent of their appointments can be classified as insider recruitment.

CONCLUSION

The utility of the concept of generation is very dubious. In part, it is due to the confusion over the precise meaning

of the concept. In part, it is due to the problems involved in the operationalization of the concept and its application in empirical research.

Several conclusions can be made concerning the role of generation in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. First of all, between the two alternative methods for identifying elite generations in the PRC, the party cohort approach proves to be a better choice than that of age cohort. However, the two are correlated and the findings are quite similar. According to the period in which they joined the CCP, the Chinese leaders can be divided into three generations. Cadres who joined the CCP in the same historical period are identified as belonging to the same elite generation. This definition provides a more direct and concrete measurement of formative experiences and is more in line with the Chinese view on the generation issue.

Secondly, there is a lack of generational mobility as well as age mobility in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. The thirty-eight generation had dominated the appointments until 1982. Generation, in the disguise of seniority and political virtue, was a critical determinant of political mobility. After 1982, generational membership is still a major qualification, only in the reverse direction.

Thirdly, with respect to several social background and career attributes, the three generations are distinctive from each other, especially between the thirty-eight generation and

the post-1949 generation. The post-revolutionary generation has departed significantly from its predecessors in technical competence and the cooptation career pattern. For the post-revolutionary generation, the channels and criteria of recruitment are different from those applied to the previous generations.

Generational change of political leadership in the PRC has been evolving in the last decade. While it is still ongoing, the change is more substantive than cosmetic. In many respects, the provincial first secretaries of the post-revolutionary generation appointed in the 1982-1987 period are a new breed of elites. However, whether generational differences in certain social and career attributes are indicative of differences in ideological orientations or policy preferences among the generations remains to be seen. When and if the generational transfer of power will result in the fundamental change of the political system is a question begging for answer.

Generational change of political leadership is only one aspect of the PRC political reform in the post-Mao era. The change is in part due to the emphasis on educational attainment and technical skill as the criteria for the leadership recruitment. In the next chapter, we will examine the role of rational-technical criteria in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. In addition, there will be inquiry into the functional division of power at the

provincial level, namely the relationship between the civilian and military leadership, and between the state and the party.

1. For the definitions of generation see Abramson (1980), Bengtson and Cutler (1976), Berger (1960), Herble (1951), Huntington (1977), Kertzer (1983), Mannheim (1952), Rintala (1963), Rintala (1968), Rintala (1979), Ryder (1965), and Troll (1970).
2. This conceptualization of generation is of limited utility in the study of social change. Because of the wide range of possible age differences between the parents, among the siblings, and between the parents and children, there are many different factors that have contributed to the differences in attitudes and behavior between the generations.
3. There is circular reasoning in the generational approach to politics. Mannheim (1952) argues that the formation of generation depends on the rate of social change. The generations, in turn, are to explain social change.
4. For the discussions on theories of generation see Adler (1983), Bialer (1981), Huntington (1977), Jennings and Niemi (1981), and Pye (1980).
5. For discussion of these different determinants of generation or age-related differences in attitudes and behavior see Bengtson and Cutler (1976), Braungart and Braungart (1985), and Spitzer (1973).
6. The Chinese speak freely of generation and generational differences. However, they mainly speak of them in the context of familial succession.
7. There have been no precise definitions for the three generations offered by the CCP. The two common criteria are the period when one becomes a CCP member and the age or the year of birth. For the discussion on the prerequisites and background of the third generation successors see Ting (1985).
8. For the generational approach to PRC politics see Klein (1962), Mills (1983), Pye (1977), Pye (1980), Whitson (1968), and Yahuda (1979).
9. In addition to generation as potentiality and generation as actuality, Mannheim (1952) also mentions a third meaning of generation, generation unit. Within the same actual generation, there may exist intra-generation differences. Members may participate in the same historical event but with different responses. Thus, there are differences in attitudes, values, and behavior among members of the same generation.

10. Thus, in the ensuing discussions, generation and elite generation will be used interchangeably.

11. This definition provides a more direct and concrete measurement of formative experiences than the age cohort approach does. It is also easier to operationalize for empirical analysis. Furthermore, this definition is generally in line with the Chinese perception of generation. Song (1973), Whitson (1968), Whitson (1973), and Wong (1976) have adopted similar definitions.

12. As Whitson (1969:922) puts it, "the notion of political crisis becomes the sine qua non of meaningful periodization." Students of CCP politics may disagree on precisely when each key period in the CCP history begins and ends, and hence an elite generation begins and ends. They nevertheless are in agreement on the overall historical divisions. In addition, since we do not have information on the specific date and location a cadre joined the CCP, this may not be a major problem in the identification of generations. As for the post-1949 years, the CCP history can be further divided into several periods, each of them marked by certain historical events such as the Cultural Revolution. However, for this study, it is not critical since all provincial first secretaries had joined the CCP by 1960.

13. These three generations roughly correspond to the current Chinese jargon of the first, the second, and the third generation.

14. The figures are reported on Beijing Review, August 3, 1981, page 3 (As cited in Burns, 1983:698).

15. For political reform and leadership change at the provincial level see Mills (1985).

16. The only member of the post-1949 generation appointed as the provincial first secretary prior to 1982 is Seypidin. He was a CPSU member before joining the CCP in 1950.

17. Prior career specialization in the fields of finance and trade, industry and communication, and agriculture and forestry is treated as the indicator for skill in economic management.

18. For the discussion of native recruitment and insider recruitment see Chapter Three.

19. The concept of cooptation was first introduced by Fleron (1970) in his study of Soviet political elites.

20. They are Chen Guangyi, Chen Huiguang, Hu Jingtao, Li Guixian, Song Hanliang, Yin Kesheng, and Zhang Boxing. (Li Guixian had received two appointments). Two, Ni Zhifu and Li Ruihuang, had worked extensively in trade unions. The careers of the other two, Huang Huang and Zhang Shuguang are unknown. Some of the provincial first secretaries appointed during the 1982-1987 period, whose generational affiliation is unknown, were also engineers or specialists by training and by occupation, and had a cooptation career pattern.

21. Moreover, the state enterprises where they were employed are under the direct supervision of the concerned ministry in the State Council.

22. The formative period is generally regarded as seventeen to twenty-five years old. The middle point, twenty-one years old is adopted for the following analysis.

23. Their share for the five periods are: 90.7%, 86.4%, 82.%, 75.0%, and 76.7%. In the period of 1982-1987, only three (7.7%) of the total thirty-nine provincial first secretaries were born before 1916.

24. A word of caution on the statistics regarding the pre-1899 age cohort. There are only five valid cases in this age group. Some statistics such as mean ratio of prior career in the province, in the region, in the capital, and insider recruitment are calculated on one case only. Below is a comparison of some of the Cramer's V:

Dependent Variables	Generation	
	Party Cohort	Age Cohort
Education	.374	.377
Career Specialization	.310	.256
Military/Civilian	.282	.281
Native Recruitment	.156	.257
Insider Recruitment	.059	.138
Period of Appointment	.610	.469

Rational-technical Bureaucracy

Political generation has been a critical factor in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. Until 1982, provincial first secretaries, like most of the leadership at the national and the local level, were recruited from cadres of the thirty-eight generation, those who had joined the CCP prior to 1938.

In the 1970s, the longevity and dominance of the thirty-eight cadres in PRC politics evolved into the phenomenon of gerontocracy. There was a lack of political mobility among the leadership ranks in terms of generational turnover. Moreover, there was an added concern regarding the overall quality of the leadership. Not only are thirty-eight cadres aging, but they also lack the necessary technical skill to manage an increasingly complex economy.

The PRC began to engage in a concerted effort to modernize its economy in 1978. A decade of economic reform produced impressive economic growth and marked improvement in the livelihood of the Chinese populace. At the same time, there is a gradual realization among many PRC leaders that for economic reform to succeed, political reform is imperative.¹ One important aspect of political reform is leadership reform. For one reason, the old revolutionary guards are to be replaced by their younger counterparts of the post-revolutionary generation, and the successors are to be better

educated and professionally competent. For another, certain structural and organizational reforms of political power are instituted to improve bureaucratic efficiency.

The goal of this chapter is to examine these two central elements of the post-Mao leadership reform: the role of rational-technical criteria in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries, and the pattern of interlocking office-holding by provincial first secretaries within the province.

RATIONAL-TECHNICAL BUREAUCRACY

In the literature of political development, modernization is defined by many as the transition from one type of elite rule to another type of elite rule; that is, from traditional to charismatic then to legal-rational leadership. As Beck (1967:270) put it, "the establishment of a legal-rational system is the end product of the process of modernization." In the classic Weberian rational bureaucracy, political roles are functionally differentiated and specialized. Personnel recruitment is based on objective criteria such as educational achievement and technical skill. Promotion, transfer, retention, and dismissal of personnel are based on job performance.

Kautsky (1967) has commented that the tasks of revolution and modernization are not compatible, hence requiring different types of political leadership. As in other communist systems, industrialization has always been one of

PRC's major national goals. This commitment has been more pronounced since the PRC launched the Four Modernizations in 1978.² If, as Beck (1967:270) contended, "industrialization demands the establishment of a legal-rational authority", then the transition of political leadership from the revolutionaries to the managers in the PRC is inevitable.

In the following paragraph, Moore (1954) has given a vivid description of the development of a rational-technical bureaucracy in the USSR.

The end result can be imagined as a technocracy--the rule of the technically competent. By definition, such a development would imply a heavy reduction of emphasis on the power of the dictator and its replacement by technical and rational criteria of behavior and organization. The share in power and prestige held by the instruments of violence and persuasion, the secret police and the party, would decline. That of industrial manager, the engineer, and the technical administrator would rise.... Promotion in the bureaucratic hierarchy would be according to demonstrated merit.... (Moore, 1954:189)

In a rational-technical society, professional competence and technical skill are the determinants of political recruitment. Specifically, political leadership is likely to be dominated by officials with skill in economic management. No one will proclaim that at present there exists such a rational-technical bureaucracy in the PRC. However, in the following, we will see that a move toward the rational-technocracy has occurred in the PRC in the last decade.

Information on technical skill or career specialization of many PRC officials is generally not available. However,

the kind of positions held during the course of their career may be indicative of officials' technical skill and functional specialization. As we have mentioned earlier, the functional system is an important part of personnel management in the PRC.³ Each functional system is characterized by specific institutions and personnel, a distinct functional responsibility, and a structured chain of command. The career of officials is often developed within a specific functional system and lateral transfer from one system to another system is rare. Lengthy and repeated assignment in a specific line of work are likely to breed knowledge and expertise in that field.

Hence, job assignments prior to the provincial first secretary appointment are a satisfactory proxy for the expertise and skill provincial first secretaries may possess, in the absence of any concrete data. The exclusive or predominant past job assignments in one of the major functional areas constitutes the career type for provincial first secretaries.⁴

Five distinct career types are identified among the provincial first secretaries: cadre specialists, ideological specialists, economic specialists, military specialists, and generalists.⁵ Each career type represents specialization in selective functional areas. Cadre specialists are experts in either personnel and organization matters, or political and legal affairs. For some, the main responsibility had been

recruitment, supervision, and discipline of personnel. For others, the chief concerns were with public security and criminal justice. Ideological specialists are masters of ideological indoctrination and propaganda.⁶ Some of them directed the mass media such as newspapers, magazines, television, radio, and movies toward the general public. Others had persuasion targeted toward specific segments of the population such as ethnic or religious minorities, women, youth, trade unions, or even the overseas Chinese. Economic specialists are economists, engineers, scientists, or technicians who excel in the planning, production, and management of the economy, with career domains in fields such as finance and trade, industry and communications, agriculture and forestry.⁷ Military specialists include career officers in the armed forces and professionals in the defense industry, and have national security as their trade. Generalists are administrators who do not profess any specific area of specialization. They are political managers and jacks-of-all-trades.

The generalists have dominated the appointments of provincial first secretaries. Among the 213 provincial first secretaries appointed between 1949 and 1987, 45 percent are generalists. Cadre specialists, economic specialists, and military specialists account for 18 percent, 16 percent, and 12 percent of the provincial first secretary appointments respectively. Ideological specialists garner the remaining

9 percent of appointments (see Table 5-1). In all but the 1969-1973 periods, the generalists are the largest career group in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries.⁸ In the 1969-1973 period, the heyday of the Cultural Revolution, generalists only account for 15 percent of provincial first secretary appointments. At their expense, military specialists and cadre specialists amount to 41 percent and 38 percent respectively.

Table 5-1 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Career Type

Career Type	Period of Appointment						
	1949-1987	1949-1956	1956-1969	1969-1973	1973-1977	1977-1982	1982-1987
Cadre	18% (39)	17% (10)	12% (3)	38% (13)	30% (8)	10% (3)	5% (2)
Ideological	9% (19)	14% (8)	17% (4)	3% (1)	0% (0)	6% (2)	10% (4)
Economic	16% (34)	0% (0)	12% (3)	3% (1)	15% (4)	39% (12)	36% (14)
Military	12% (26)	16% (9)	4% (1)	41% (14)	7% (2)	0% (0)	0% (0)
Generalist	45% (95)	53% (31)	54% (13)	15% (5)	48% (13)	45% (14)	49% (19)
Total	213	58	24	34	27	31	39

The generalists, cadres with no specialization in any field of party or government work, dominated the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. Moreover, altogether, cadres who specialize in the instruments of violence and persuasion, namely cadre, ideological, and military specialists account for 39 percent of appointments. Only 16 percent of the

provincial first secretaries can be regarded as economic specialists or technocrats. Such a pattern of career specialization for provincial first secretaries is in sharp contrast with that of Obkom first secretaries in the USSR. For instance, among the 125 Obkom first secretaries appointed in the 1953-1979 period, economic specialists are the largest group, receiving 54 percent of appointments. Mixed-generalists account for 38 percent, while cadre specialists and ideological specialists only tally 6 percent and 2 percent respectively.⁹

According to Moore (1954), economic specialists are expected to be heavily represented in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries, while the share of cadre specialists, ideological specialists, and military specialists who are the masters of instruments of state power is doomed to be reduced. Undoubtedly, the recruitment practice involving PRC's provincial first secretaries does not conform to that of Moore's rational-technical bureaucracy. There are four reasons for the modest role of rational technical criteria in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries.

The first one pertains to the nature of the post of provincial first secretary. As the party chief and the supreme political leader in the province, provincial first secretary is more likely to be concerned with policy initiatives than to be burdened with the actual implementation of policy. He is more likely to oversee the general

performance of the provincial political machinery than to personally administer its day-to-day operation.¹⁰ The post may not require as much technical skill in any special functional area as competence in general political management.

The second factor is Mao's attitude toward bureaucracy and political leadership.¹¹ Cadres are supposed to be both 'red' and 'expert'. However, because of Mao's general distrust of intellectuals and specialists, 'redness' rather than 'expertness' have often been accentuated in cadre recruitment. Political loyalty, revolutionary fervor, and class background often outweigh or displace educational attainment, technical skill, and professional competence in personnel decisions.

Thirdly, cadre recruitment in the PRC is impeded by the low level of educational attainment among most of the CCP membership and the population. As of 1982, less than one percent of the Chinese population has college or equivalent education. It is also commonly acknowledged that there is a shortage of professionally competent technical personnel in the PRC. Moreover, prior to 1977, provincial first secretaries, and leadership at all levels of the political hierarchy in general, were predominantly recruited from the cadres who had joined the CCP before 1949, especially from the thirty-eight cadres. Most of these old revolutionary guards are neither well-educated nor endowed with necessary technical skill.

The fourth explanation is related to the level of economic development in the PRC. The PRC is essentially an agrarian economy. It is not mandatory for provincial first secretaries and most of the provincial officials to be as technically competent in some specific functional areas as their colleagues in a modern, urban, industrial economy. At least during the earlier part of PRC's history, the assertion that revolutionary mobilizers rather than industrial managers were in need for the running of the country may indeed have its merit.

There are two factors affecting the application of rational-technical criteria in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. One is regime type, namely the general characteristics of the regime such as the political leadership and cadre policy of the specific periods. The other is the nature of the provincial economy.

The nucleus of PRC's cadre policy has always been the axiom of 'red and expert'. The precise meaning and property of redness or expertness are open to interpretation. In general, the red criteria concern political loyalty and ideological purity, while the expert criteria refer to professional competence and technical skill. Even though the PRC leadership often addresses the two criteria in contradictory terms, 'red versus expert', the two are not necessarily contradictory or mutually exclusive. The key is rather how to achieve a proper blend of these two qualities

in a cadre.

In Mao's era, political purity rather than technical competence usually received extra consideration in leadership selection. As a result, generalists are much more likely to be recruited to the post of provincial first secretary. Another confounding factor in leadership recruitment in Mao's era is the epic event of the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution provided an expedient access to leadership ranks for certain cadres with military and public security career background.

The deviation of the cadre policy under the post-Mao leadership from that of Mao's is both substantive and substantial. In his speech to an enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the CCP on August 18, 1980, Deng Xiaoping affirmed that leadership succession was to be an integral part of socialist modernization and political democratization and the recruitment of new leadership was essential for the realization of these two reforms.¹² Cadre selection should take into consideration both political integrity and ability; i.e., red and expert. The qualifications of the cadres he outlined were to be younger, better educated, and professionally competent, and revolutionary. Technical specialists are definitely the favorites in the leadership recruitment under the new regime.

Three distinct regimes in PRC's history are thus identified: the 1949-1969 period, the 1969-1977 period, the

1977-1987 period. Political leadership and cadre policy of each period determined the types of cadres were to be recruited to the post of provincial first secretary. Evidently, the regime type had a distinct impact on the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. The association between the career types of provincial first secretaries and the regime types is strong, Cramer's $V=.414$ (see Table 5-2).

Table 5-2 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Career Type by Regime Type

Career Type	Regime Type		
	1949- 1969	1969- 1977	1977- 1987
Cadre	16%	34%	7%
Ideological	15%	2%	9%
Economic	4%	8%	37%
Military	12%	26%	0%
Generalist	54%	30%	47%
Total	82	61	70
Cramer's $V=.414$			

The recruitment of provincial first secretaries in the 1949-1969 period adhered closely to Mao's perspective on bureaucracy. Generalists were not only the largest career group among the provincial first secretaries appointed before 1969, they received the majority of the appointments. Economic specialists represented only 4 percent of the provincial first secretary appointments. Moreover, the difference in the share of the appointments between generalists and economic specialists in this period is 50

percent, the largest of the three periods.

Thanks to the Cultural Revolution, the 1969-1977 period witnesses the unprecedented involvement of the military in the political process in PRC history. At the provincial level, the military intervention into civilian politics had an enormous impact on the makeup of the provincial leadership. The career types of the provincial first secretaries appointed during the period exemplifies such a tour de force. Cadres in charge of the instruments of violence and persuasion--military specialists and cadre specialists--account for 26 percent and 34 percent of the provincial first secretaries, primarily at the expense of generalists. On the other hand, only 2 percent are ideological specialists, 8 percent are economic specialists, and 30 percent are generalists.¹³

The recruitment of provincial first secretaries in the 1977-1987 period exhibited a significant departure from past practices. The proportion of cadres identified as economic specialists rose to 37 percent, compared to 4 percent and 8 percent for the two earlier periods. Moreover, the increased representation of the technocrats is largely at the expense of those cadres who are the masters of instruments of terror and persuasion. None of the provincial first secretaries appointed is a military specialist. The combined share of cadre specialists and military specialists also dropped drastically from 28 percent and 60 percent in the two earlier periods to a meager 7 percent for the 1977-1987 period.

The recruitment of provincial first secretaries in the 1977-1987 period, displays a sign of increasing rationalization. In contrast to that in Mao's era, the expert criteria apparently have gained ascendance over red criteria in personnel management. The shift of priority can be attributed to the new cadre policy of "the four transformations of cadres"--promoting the younger, better-educated, technically competent, and revolutionary cadres to leadership positions, under Deng Xiaoping.¹⁴ Moreover, the increased representation of the technocrats in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries is not an isolated or accidental phenomenon. During the same periods, institutions such as the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council among others also register a similar trend.¹⁵

Another variable affecting the role of rational-technical criteria in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries is the attributes of the provinces, especially those pertaining to provincial economy. The nature of the provincial economy will require provincial first secretaries to be skillful and competent in certain functional areas. Specifically, in economically more advanced provinces provincial first secretaries are more likely to be economic specialists.¹⁶

Because of the lack of statistics available on the economic development of the PRC provinces, we employ two convenient measures for the performance of the provincial

economy. The first one is derived from the historical perspective of the Chinese economy. According to the geographical locations and the level of economic development, Chinese provinces can be divided into three regions: coastal, inland, and border regions.¹⁷ There are notable differences in economic activity among these three regions. The coastal provinces are the economically most advanced regions, the border provinces are the least developed regions, and the inland provinces fall in between these two, both in geographical and in economic terms.

The second measure of the economic development of the province is the Gross Output Value of Agriculture and Industry (GOVAI) per capita.¹⁸ The GOVAI is the total value of all the goods produced in a specific year. It is the Chinese rendition of a more common economic indicator, Gross National Product (GNP). The GOVAI per capita is thus considered an equivalent of income per capita.¹⁹

The association between the career type of the provincial first secretaries and the type of economic regions they served is moderate, Cramer's $V=.191$ (see Table 5-3). The percentage of the provincial first secretaries identified as economic specialists is higher in the coastal provinces (21 percent) than in the inland provinces (13 percent) or in the border provinces (13 percent). The recruitment of generalists is much higher in the inland provinces (55 percent) than that in the coastal provinces (35 percent) and in the border provinces

(39 percent).

Table 5-3 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Career Type by Region of Appointment

Career Type	Region		
	Coastal	Inland	Border
Cadre	20% (16)	17% (16)	18% (7)
Ideological	12% (10)	2% (2)	18% (7)
Economic	21% (17)	14% (13)	10% (4)
Military	12% (10)	11% (10)	15% (6)
Generalist	35% (29)	55% (51)	39% (15)
Total	82	92	39

Cramer's V= .196

The association between the career type of the provincial first secretaries and economic region has fluctuated according to the regime type (see Table 5-4). While in the 1969-1977 period, the relationship between the two is relatively weaker, it is relatively stronger in the 1949-1969 period and in the 1977-1987 period. The Cramer's V are .183, .256, and .270 respectively.

In the 1977-1987 period, economic attributes of the region seem to be very important in the recruitment of rational-technocrats. In the economically more developed east coastal provinces, 50 percent of the provincial first secretaries appointed during the period were economic specialists. In the less-developed central inland provinces

Career Type						
Province	Cadre	Ideological	Economic	Military	Generalist	Total
Regime Type						
Region	1949-1969					
Coastal	24%	21%	3%	14%	38%	29
Inland	13%	5%	5%	10%	67%	39
Border	7%	29%	0%	14%	50%	14
Region	1969-1977					
Coastal	32%	4%	8%	24%	32%	25
Inland	35%	0%	8%	23%	35%	26
Border	40%	0%	10%	40%	10%	10
Region	1977-1987					
Coastal	4%	11%	50%	0%	36%	28
Inland	7%	0%	33%	0%	59%	27
Border	13%	20%	20%	0%	47%	15
Cramer's V=	1949-1969	1969-1977		1977-1987		
	.256	.183		.270		

According to the level of the GOVAI per capita, the PRC's twenty-nine provinces are divided into three groups: high GOVAI per capita, median GOVAI per capita, low GOVAI per capita.²⁰ We have found a moderate association between the career type of the provincial first secretaries and the level

of the GOVAI per capita of the province, Cramer's $V=.220$ (see Table 5-5).

Table 5-5 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Career Type by GOVAI Per Capita of the Province

Career Type	GOVAI Per Capita		
	High	Median	Low
Cadre	6% (2)	25% (15)	18% (22)
Ideological	23% (7)	7% (4)	6% (8)
Economic	32% (10)	10% (6)	15% (18)
Military	10% (3)	14% (8)	12% (15)
Generalist	29% (9)	44% (26)	49% (60)
Total	31	59	123
Cramer's $V= .220$			

In the high GOVAI per capita provinces, 32 percent of the provincial first secretaries are economic specialists, compared to 10 percent for median GOVAI per capita provinces and 15 percent for low GOVAI per capita provinces. Moreover, in high GOVAI per capita provinces, economic specialists are the largest among the five career groups. The 32 percent share of the provincial first secretary appointments by economic specialists is higher than that of 29 percent by the generalists.

As in the case of the relationship between economic region and the career type of the provincial first secretaries, the relationship between GOVAI per capita of the

province and the career type of the provincial first secretaries varies by regime type (see Table 5-6).

In all three periods, the proportion of economic specialists in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries is higher in the high GOVAI per capita provinces than in the medium and low GOVAI provinces. In the 1977-1987 period, 57 percent of the provincial first secretaries appointed in the high GOVAI per capita provinces are economic specialists as compared to 28 percent and 34 percent in the medium and low GOVAI provinces.

Table 5-6 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Career Type by GOVAI Per Capita of the Province,
Controlling for Regime Type

Career Type						

Province	Cadre	Ideo- logical	Economic	Military	General- ist	Total

Regime Type						

GOVAI	1949-1969					
Per Capita						
High	0%	50%	10%	10%	30%	10
Medium	27%	9%	0%	14%	50%	22
Low	14%	10%	4%	12%	60%	50
GOVAI	1969-1977					
Per Capita						
High	29%	14%	14%	29%	14%	7
Medium	42%	0%	5%	26%	26%	19
Low	14%	10%	4%	12%	60%	35
GOVAI	1977-1987					
PER CAPITA						
High	0%	7%	57%	0%	36%	14
Medium	6%	11%	28%	0%	56%	18
Low	10%	8%	34%	0%	47%	38

	1949-1969	1969-1977	1977-1987			
Cramer's V=	.319	.281	.180			

It is evident that rational-technocracy is still a remote reality in the PRC political scene. However, there has been a great movement toward that direction. In the last decade (1977-1987), there has been a significant increase of technocrats in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. A similar advancement toward the recruitment of cadres of technocrat background transpired in the Central Committee, the State Council, and other provincial leadership. However, at present, there are still some obstacles to the development of a rational-technocracy in the PRC. One of them is the limited supply of cadres with professional skills. To some extent, the older and less skilled, but more experienced cadres are retained because of the lack of replacement of younger technocrats. As Saich (1987) has rightly pointed out, the key of any further cadre reform is the educational system.

We have employed career type as a surrogate for the skill and expertise that a cadre may possess. It provides us with some insight into the role of rational-technocrat criteria in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries, hence the state of rational-technocracy in the PRC. However, some scholars have employed career type as the foundation of the group approach to PRC politics.²¹ Interest groups are to be formed by cadres with similar career backgrounds. Politics is perceived as various groups competing for resources such as power and offices. Members of the same career type or functional group are presumed to possess similar political

attitudes and outlooks and will exhibit similar behavior due to their similarity in career background.

Several features distinguish the career of the economic specialists among the five career types (see Table 5-7). First of all, economic specialists are relatively late starters in their political careers. On average, economic specialists joined the CCP at the age of 22, compared to 20 or 21 for other career types. However, they were appointed to the post of provincial first secretary at an older age (59-years-old) and with longer party seniority (38 years). This is partly because economic specialists tend to start the career with a non-political job assignment. The average tenure as provincial first secretary for economic specialists is 38 months, the shortest among the five career types.

Secondly, of the five career types, economic specialists exhibit the weakest career ties with the province and the strongest ties with the center. On average, economic specialists have spent the least amount of previous career in the province (33 percent) or in the region (43 percent) where the appointment is granted. However, of the five career types, economic specialists have the longest career in the center. On average, economic specialists have spent 34 percent of their prior career in Beijing.

Table 5-7: Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Career Attributes of Career Types

Career Attributes	Career Type				
	Cadre	Ideological	Economic	Military	Generalist
Age Joined the CCP	20	20	22	21	21
Age at Appointment	56	52	59	54	55
Seniority at Appointment	34	31	38	33	31
Tenure (Months)	57	82	38	52	54
Prior Career in Province	50%	33%	33%	57%	48%
Prior Career in Region	72%	60%	43%	72%	70%
Prior Career in Center	6%	27%	34%	3%	4%
College Education	9%	56%	87%	10%	31%
Thirty-eight Cadre	94%	76%	50%	96%	80%
Military	90%	0%	0%	100%	0%
Native Recruitment	14%	10%	29%	21%	34%
Insider Recruitment	71%	31%	35%	79%	54%

Thirdly, economic specialists are the most educated among the five career types. Almost nine out of ten economic specialists have a college education. Cadres specialists with 9 percent and military specialists with 10 percent are the least educated. The higher percentage of the college-educated among economic specialists and ideological specialists (56 percent), is partly due to the technical nature of the job they perform. The acquisition of skill in economic production and administration, and in propaganda and indoctrination tends to require substantially more schooling.

Fourthly, in terms of generational affiliation, economic specialists also differ significantly from the other four groups. Only half of the economic specialists belong to the so-called thirty-eight cadres. On the other hand, 96 percent of military specialists, 94 percent of cadre specialists, 80 percent of generalists, and 76 percent of ideological specialists had joined the CCP by 1938.

There is notable but narrow variation among the five career types with regard to native recruitment, appointment as provincial first secretary in one's native province. While only 10 percent of ideological specialists and 14 percent of cadre specialists are provincial natives, native recruitment only accounts for 34 percent among the generalists. As to the extent of insider recruitment, there is a greater variation among five career types. While 79 percent of military

specialists and 71 percent of cadre specialists are considered as insider recruitment, only 35 percent of economic specialists and 31 percent of ideological specialists fit into such a description.

The above discussions reveal that in many aspects the careers of economic specialists deviate from those of the other four career groups. Moreover, there are strong resemblances between the careers of cadre specialists and the careers of military specialists. In areas such as local career ties, educational attainment, generational affiliation, insider recruitment, cadre specialists and military specialists are much alike. Such similarities can be attributed to the common background and line of responsibility of these two career groups. All economic specialists, as well as ideological specialists and generalists, are civilian. However, nine out of ten cadre specialists are military men. Both cadre specialists and military specialists are in charge of the forces of coercion, albeit under the pretext of public security and national defense.

CONCENTRATION OF POWER

The discussion on cadre problems in the PRC has usually centered on bad work style, breakdown of party norms or the existence of a feudal mentality. However, in his August 18, 1980 speech to the enlarged meeting of the politburo of the CCP Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping pointed to structural

and organizational aspects. Specifically, in addition to the practices of bureaucratism and paternalism, privileges of every kind, Deng mentioned leadership holding lifelong posts, over-concentration of political power, and the ambiguous relationship between the party and the government as the major defects in the leadership and cadre system of the party and state. Criticizing the fact that all authorities were inappropriately and indiscriminately concentrated in party committees, Deng (1984:311) condemned practices in which "the power of the party committees themselves is often in the hands of a few secretaries, especially the first secretaries, who direct and decide everything".

The pattern of concurrent office-holding by the provincial first secretaries connotes the degree of concentration of political power at the provincial level, especially in the hands of provincial first secretary. Moreover, It also manifests the relationship between the party and the government as well as that between the party and the military at the provincial level.²²

The supremacy of the post of provincial first secretary within the province is indisputable. There are three other leading posts in the province, namely governor, chairman or mayor of the provincial government, first political commissar, and commander of the provincial military district.²³ When and if provincial first secretary holds additional posts in other provincial political and military institutions, he will do so

by occupying one or more of these top posts. He will not be outranked in other provincial political bodies.²⁴ Moreover, if provincial governor is not concurrently provincial first secretary, he is normally a provincial secretary. This bureaucratic practice is intended to preserve the supremacy and leadership of the party but also to assure a unified provincial leadership.

Holding of other top provincial military and government posts by provincial first secretary has been very common in the PRC (see table 5-8). Overall, only 10 percent of the provincial first secretaries had not held any other provincial posts concurrently.²⁵ The post that provincial first secretaries were most likely to occupy is that of the first political commissar of the military district or military region.²⁶ Seventy-eight percent of the provincial first secretaries had been the first political commissar simultaneously. Next, thirty-three percent of provincial first secretaries held the governorship, chairmanship, or mayorship concurrently. Lastly, the commanders of the military district or military region had collected nine percent of the provincial first secretary appointments.

The principle guiding the relationship between the CCP and the PLA is that of the party commanding the guns. It means that the military should uphold the supremacy of party leadership and the party exerts direct and complete control of the military. At the provincial level, the post of first

political commissar of the provincial military district is the post through which such a principle is to be observed. On the one hand, provincial first secretary as the provincial party chief should serve as first or ranking political commissar of the provincial military command. On the other hand, the military professional, either military commander or political commissar of military district, should not be appointed as provincial first secretary.

Table 5-8 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Concurrent Provincial Posts

Concurrent Provincial Positions	Period of Appointment						
	1949- 1987	1949- 1956	1956- 1969	1969- 1973	1973- 1977	1977- 1982	1982- 1987
None	10%	17%	38%	0%	4%	3%	3%
First Political Commissar	78%	72%	54%	65%	85%	87%	97%
Governor	33%	31%	17%	100%	70%	19%	3%
Commander	9%	14%	4%	32%	0%	0%	0%

With the exception of the 1969-1973 period, the party commands the guns typifies the party-military relationship at the provincial level. The 1969-1973 period saw the greatest involvement of the military in civilian politics in PRC history. Career military officers had assumed a large number of civilian posts and duties at all levels of party and government hierarchies. Of the total of 34 provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1969-1973 period, 25 were

military officers and 9 were civilian officials. Among the 22 provincial first secretaries who served as the first political commissar concurrently, 13 were military men. Eleven provincial first secretaries were recruited from the rank of commanders of military districts or military regions.

The supremacy of the party over the military was restored after 1973. Since then, none of the provincial first secretaries were recruited from commanders of the military district or military region. On the other hand, almost all provincial first secretaries were appointed as first political commissar of the provincial military command.

Another prominent feature of the pattern of multiple office-holding in the 1969-1973 period is the lack of distinction between the party and the government both in terms of personnel and function. In most provinces, the membership of the provincial party committee and that of the provincial revolutionary committee overlapped. During this period, every provincial first secretary was concurrently the chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee. In the following 1973-1977 period, the dual appointment of provincial party first secretary and chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee was still prevalent, though the number had declined to 70 percent.

During the decade of 1977-1987, the separation of party and government at provincial level was re-established as well. Only one of the 34 provincial first secretaries appointed in

the 1982-1987 period, Li Ruihuan of Tianjin, assumed the governorship concurrently.

Although the practice of multiple office-holding by provincial first secretaries is common, the danger of the concentration of political power in the hands of provincial first secretaries has been overstated. Of all the 213 provincial first secretaries, 10 percent had no other concurrent appointments, 56 percent had one additional post, 32 percent had two more appointments, and only 2 percent had monopolized all the top party, government and military posts in the province (see Table 5-9). All four provincial first secretaries who were concurrently occupants of all other leading provincial posts, were appointed in the 1949-1956 period when the PRC was under some form of military rule.

The most common type of the interlocking directorship was the dual provincial first secretary-first political commissar appointments. It accounts for 49 percent of all provincial first secretary appointments. Next is the triple appointment of provincial first secretary-first political commissar-governor appointment with 25 percent.

The 1969-1973 period witnesses the highest concentration of political power in the hands of provincial first secretaries. Every provincial first secretary appointed in this period also served in the capacity of chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee. All except one were either first political commissar or commander of the

provincial military command concurrently.

Table 5-9 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Concentration of Power in the Province

Concurrent Provincial Positions	Period of Appointment						
	1949- 1987	1949- 1956	1956- 1969	1969- 1973	1973- 1977	1977- 1982	1982- 1987
None	10%	17%	38%	0%	4%	3%	3%
First Political Commissar	49%	47%	42%	0%	26%	77%	95%
Governor	6%	9%	4%	3%	11%	10%	0%
Commander	1%	0%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%
First PC, Governor	25%	14%	12%	65%	59%	10%	3%
First PC, Commander	1%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Governor, Commander	6%	2%	0%	32%	0%	0%	0%
First PC, Governor, Commander	2%	7%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Total	213	58	24	34	27	31	39

The concentration of political power in the post of provincial first secretary was curtailed during the following periods. In the 1973-1977 period, 59 percent of provincial first secretaries concurrently held both posts of first political commissar and chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee. In the 1982-1987 period, the problem of over-concentration of power at the provincial level was almost non-existent. Only one of the thirty-nine provincial first secretaries had gained multiple posts, governor and

first political commissar of the provincial military command. Ninety-five percent of the provincial first secretaries served in only one additional capacity, that of first political commissar of the military district.

CONCLUSION

Many students of PRC politics have observed the change of PRC political leadership in the past decades, such as from revolutionary to semi-bureaucrats (Vogel, 1967), from bureaucrats to managerial modernizers (Saich, 1986), and from mobilizers to managers (Li and Whyte, 1988). By examining the career type of provincial first secretaries, we comprehend the role of rational-technical criteria in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. By examining the extent of concurrent holding of other leading provincial posts by provincial first secretaries, we gain insight into the concentration of political power, the relationship between the party and government, and the relationship between the party and the military at the provincial level.

Thanks to the political reform of the last decade, the political process in the PRC has been increasingly rationalized and institutionalized. Cadres with technical skills are featured prominently in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries and leadership at various levels of political hierarchy in general. However, the further progression toward the development of a rational-technical

bureaucracy depends on, among others, both the supply of professionally competent technocrats and the continuing growth of the economy.

The concern with over-concentration of political power in the province, a common phenomenon during the Cultural Revolution era, is greatly reduced by eliminating the practice of concurrent appointments. The posts of provincial first secretary and governor are no longer to be held by one person simultaneously. There is a finer distinction between the party and the government both in terms of personnel and functional duties.

The disengagement of military officers from civilian provincial posts paved the way for the restoration of party leadership. Furthermore, the concurrent appointment of the civilian provincial first secretary as the first political commissar of the military district is firmly established to ensure the control of the party over the military at the provincial level.

1. For post-Mao political reform, see Barnett and Clough (1986), Benewick and Wingrove (1988), Chang (1988), Harding (1986), Harding (1987), Ogden (1989), and Stavits (1988).
2. The term 'Four Modernizations' first appeared in Zhou Enlai's speech to the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975. The goal of Four Modernizations--industry, agriculture, national defense, and science and technology--was to transform China into a powerful, modern socialist country by the end of the century. For a brief period in the early 1980s, Four Modernizations was the symbol of PRC's economic modernization campaign.
3. For detailed discussions on the functional system and its role in PRC's personnel management, see Barnett (1967).
4. This is complemented by any published material on the career and expertise of provincial first secretaries.
5. Each career type corresponds to certain functional systems. Cadre specialists are usually affiliated with personnel and organization, or political and legal affairs functional systems. Ideological specialists spend their careers in culture and education, or party-mass work functional systems. Economic specialists work in the functional systems such as finance and trade, industry and communications, or agriculture and forestry which are closely involved with economic management. Military specialists are tied to the People's Liberation Army or the defense industry. Generalists have mixed careers and do not profess any exclusive or predominant affiliation with any functional system.
6. Armstrong (1959) refers to this type of specialists as indoctrination specialists.
7. Economic specialists will also be referred to as technocrats or rational-technocrats in this study.
8. The term career group will be used purely for descriptive purposes. A career group refers to individuals with the same career type or career specialization.
9. See Moses (1983:33). Among the fifty-four percent of economic specialists, 28 percent are industrial specialists and 26 percent are agricultural specialists. The most striking difference between the two communist countries is that no military specialists was identified among the Obkom first secretaries.
10. Due to the extent of multiple office-holding, to be examined in the second part of this chapter, provincial first

secretary is often preoccupied with policy implementation and daily functioning of the government.

11. For the analysis of the Maoist conception of bureaucracy, see Harding (1981) and Whyte (1973).

12. Deng's speech titled "On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership" is the definitive document on political reform in the PRC. The text was not officially released until 1983. For the text, see Deng (1984).

13. The effect of the military intervention into civilian politics on the recruitment of provincial first secretaries was particularly striking between 1969 and 1973. The total representation of military specialists and cadre specialists among provincial first secretaryship appointments was 79 percent, 41 percent for the former and 38 percent for the later. Even in the 1949-1956 period, when PRC was under some kind of paramilitary rule, the combined share of military specialists and cadre specialists was only 33 percent.

14. The order of these four criteria underscores the de-emphasis of the red criteria--being revolutionary--in the cadre recruitment. The quality of being revolutionary is rather ambiguous. It generally refers to supporting the party line.

15. For technocrats in the Central Committee see Li and Whyte (1989).

16. In Chapter Three, we have examined the association between one provincial attribute and careers of provincial first secretaries, the recruitment of military personnel as the provincial first secretaries in the national defense areas.

17. There are eleven provinces in the coastal (eastern) region, twelve provinces in the inland (central) region, and six provinces in the border (western) region. For the provinces in each of these three economic regions, see Appendix. For different classifications of regions and the issue of regional development, see Goodman (1989b).

18. The Gross output value of agriculture and industry (GOVAI) is the total value of agricultural and industrial output. This indicator closely resembles the gross national product (GNP) which has not been embraced by the Chinese. The GOVAI per capita thus is equivalent to income per capita.

19. The third measure is the ratio of the Gross Output Value of Industry (GOVI) to GOVAI. It represents the level of the industrialization of the provincial economy. Because

industrial specialists and agricultural specialists are lumped together as economic specialists in this study and because the employment of this indicator produced very similar findings to those based on GOVAI per capita, no detailed analysis is to be presented in our discussions. Two additional measures, literacy rate and ratio of urban residency, are excluded for different reasons. The statistics for the provinces on these two measures show very narrow variation. Moreover, they are incongruous with the two measures we employed.

20. There are four provinces in the high GOVAI per capita group, eight provinces in the medium GOVAI per capita group, and 17 provinces in the low GOVAI per capita group. The GOVAI and population figures are of 1987, from China Official Annual Report 1987, p.756. The figures for GOVAI per capita are calculated by the author.

21. For the group approach to the study of PRC politics, see Dome (1984) and Goodman.

22. For the relationship between the military and the party, see Bullard (1985).

23. The chairman of the provincial people's congress is another leading post in the province. The provincial people's congress was created in 1979 as a provincial legislative body, however only with nominal authority.

24. In a similar vein, the provincial first secretary was rarely outranked by other provincial officials in terms of membership standing in the Central Committee of the CCP, and its Politburo.

25. The meaning of 'concurrently' was given a loose interpretation. It means that the holding of other provincial posts occurred during the major portion of the tenure of the provincial first secretaryship. It does not mean the holding of those posts started or ended with the tenure of the provincial first secretary at the same time.

26. Military district is coterminous with the province. While military region has a jurisdiction over several provinces. Both will be referred to as provincial military command in this study.

Political Mobility

In the study of the recruitment and career of provincial first secretaries, questions such as "where they came from", "how they got here", and "where they go" are as vital as the question "why were they here". These questions concerning political mobility of provincial first secretaries will be addressed in this chapter.¹ Our inquiry will focus on four selected aspects of political mobility.

The first one is the role of provincial first secretaries in PRC politics--their status in the Chinese political hierarchy and the impact of the tenure of the provincial first secretaryship on their political standing in the CCP.

The second aspect of political mobility is the channels of recruitment--the setting and type of institutional positions which constitute the reservoir for prospective provincial first secretaries.

The third question concerns the post-provincial first secretaryship career mobility--how provincial first secretaries depart from office and for what destination, or what Oksenberg (1976) referred to as the exit pattern.

The fourth issue is the tenure and turnover of provincial first secretaries--how long do provincial first secretaries stay in office? how often do they leave? and how stable is their tenure?

POLITICAL STANDING

The Central Committee (CC) of the CCP is a major political body in the PRC. It is to be the central collegiate decision-making body during the interim of the CCP's National Party Congresses which are to meet every five years. The full (voting) members and alternate (non-voting) members of the Central Committee are elected by the CCP's National Party Congress for a concurrent five-year term.²

However, because of its large size and infrequent meetings, the Central committee has not been an effective decision-making body.³ The Central Committee is in fact mainly an instrument for the ratification of major decisions reached by the Politburo and the Standing Committee (SC) of the Politburo. Another important function of the Central Committee is to elect the members of the Politburo and its Standing Committee and other leadership.⁴

By itself, the membership in the Central Committee does not confer upon the holder any authority or responsibility. However, the Central Committee is an ensemble of political elites of the PRC. In particular, full members of the Central Committee hold various important positions in the party, the government, and the military at the national and local level. Moreover, only full members of the Central Committee can elect and be elected members of the Politburo.

The apex of political power in the PRC is the Politburo of the Central Committee and its Standing Committee. The

Politburo exercises all the power of the Central Committee when the latter is not in session. Its twenty or so members include the top national party, government, and military leaders. With small size and frequent meetings, the Politburo has been the chief decision-making body of the CCP. The Standing Committee of the Politburo is the inner circle of political power in the PRC. Its members are made up of a few supreme political leaders and have wielded enormous political power since its creation in 1956.

Officials are mostly likely to derive their political power from formal institutional posts they hold in various hierarchies. Nonetheless, membership in the Central Committee, the Politburo and its Standing Committee does serve as a credible yardstick as to the standing of individuals and offices in the national political hierarchy.⁵ The change with respect to the membership in these three bodies is in essence a manifestation of political mobility. Comparison of the membership status of provincial first secretaries in the Central Committee at the beginning of appointment with that at the end of their tenure can be very revealing as to the extent of political mobility induced by the provincial first secretary appointment. At the beginning of the appointment, 42 percent (89) of all provincial first secretaries were full members of the Central Committee. At the end of appointment, 66 percent (139) were full members of the Central Committee. At the beginning of appointment, 8 provincial first

secretaries had full membership in the Politburo. At the end of tenure, 20 provincial first secretaries were full members of the Politburo. In aggregate terms, the tenure of provincial first secretaryship definitely enhances many officials' status in the Central Committee. For the freshmen provincial first secretaries, the tenure is equally beneficial. At the beginning of first-time appointment, 65 of the total 172 provincial first secretaries (38 percent) were full members of the Central Committee. In comparison, at the end of the first tour of duty, 110 (64 percent) were full member of the Central Committee.

Individually, the political standing of many provincial first secretaries has been enhanced thanks to their tenure in the provincial first secretaryship. Seventy-nine provincial first secretaries (37 percent) have had their membership status in the Central Committee enhanced as a result of their tenure. The membership status of 131 provincial first secretaries (62 percent) in the Central Committee has not been affected by the tenure of the provincial first secretaryship. Only three of the total 213 provincial first secretaries have their standing in the Central Committee weakened (see Table 6-1).⁶

Of the 79 provincial first secretaries whose status in the Central Committee improved, 49 were awarded full membership in the Central Committee, 34 were non-members and 15 were alternate members previously. Thirteen provincial

first secretaries had become new members of the Politburo during their tenure. Three provincial first secretaries had further enhanced their standing in the Politburo. The remaining fourteen provincial first secretaries had entered the Central committee as alternate members.

Table 6-1 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Membership Status in the CCP Central Committee

At the End of the Term	At the Beginning of the Term				
	None	Alternate Member	Full Member	Alternate Politburo	Full Member Politburo
None	34	0	3	0	0
Alternate CC	14	23	0	0	0
Full Member CC	34	15	67	0	0
Alternate Politburo	0	1	2	0	0
Full Member Politburo	3	0	6	1	7
Standing C'tee Politburo	0	0	1	1	1
Total	85	39	79	2	8

The provincial first secretaries appointed after 1969 are more likely to be members of the Central Committee both at the beginning and at the end of their tenure than their counterparts appointed in the earlier years. In the pre-1969 period, only 12 of the total 82 provincial first secretaries (14 percent) were full members of the Central Committee at the beginning of the tenure. At the end of tenure, 23 provincial first secretaries (28 percent) were full members of the

Central Committee. On the other hand, in the post-1969 period, 77 of the total 131 provincial first secretaries (59 percent) were full members of the Central Committee at the beginning of the tenure. At the end of the tenure, 116 provincial first secretaries (89 percent) were full members of the Central Committee. For provincial first secretaries appointed prior to 1969, only two were full members of the Politburo at the beginning of the tenure and five were at the end of the tenure. In contrast, among the provincial first secretaries appointed after 1969, six were full members of the Politburo at the beginning of their tenure. At the conclusion of tenure, fifteen were full members of the Politburo and three of them were Standing Committee members of the Politburo.

There is also a greater degree of political upward mobility in the post-1969 years than in the pre-1969 years as reflected in the Central Committee membership held by provincial first secretaries. More provincial first secretaries have their standing in the Central Committee improved during the tenure in the post-1969 years than those in the pre-1969 years. Of the eighty-two provincial first secretaries appointed before the Cultural Revolution, 70 percent (57) did not have their membership status in the Central Committee altered as a result of the tenure. Only 30 percent (25) have bettered their standing in the Central Committee. Of these 25 provincial first secretaries, 13

became alternate members; 7, full members of the Central Committee. The remaining five were promoted to either alternate or full members of the Politburo.⁷

On the other hand, of the 131 provincial first secretaries appointed after the Cultural Revolution, 41 percent (55) have had their political fortunes enriched as a result of the appointment of provincial first secretaries. Forty-two of these fifty-four provincial first secretaries were promoted to full members of the Central Committee during the tenure of the provincial first secretaryship. One provincial first secretary became an alternate member of the Central Committee. For the other eleven provincial first secretaries, advancement in membership status involves Politburo membership.

The advancement of the membership standing of many provincial first secretaries in the Central Committee can be attributed to the elevation of the political role of provincial first secretaries in PRC politics. Since 1954, provincial first secretaries have gradually become political figures of national stature and with a greater voice in the national political forum. In the 1950s and 1960s, non-member provincial first secretaries were regular participants in the enlarged Central Committee and Politburo meetings. In the post-1969 period, incumbent provincial first secretaries were almost guaranteed full membership when the CCP's National Party Congress elected a new Central Committee. Moreover, the

post of provincial first secretary has emerged as a pivotal step in the PRC's political ladder. The political careers of Hua Guofeng, Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin clearly accentuate such a development.

However, the magnitude of the change of membership status during the tenure of provincial first secretaryship is circumscribed by the frequency of the sessions of the national party congress of the CCP and hence the frequency of the election of the Central Committee, and the size of the membership of the Central Committee. The members of the Central Committee are elected by the CCP's national party congress. Only during the sessions of the national party congress were members of the Central Committee elected. From 1949 to 1969, only the Eighth CCP national party congress (1956) was held.⁸ On the other hand, the Ninth (1969), the Tenth (1973), the Eleventh (1977), the Twelfth (1982) and the Thirteenth (1987) party congress had been held between 1969 and 1987.

Not only did the CCP's National Party Congress meet more frequently between 1969 and 1987, but the size of the five Central Committees elected is considerably larger than that of their predecessors (see Table 6-2). As a result, provincial first secretaries appointed in the post-1969 period have more opportunity to be admitted to the full membership of the Central Committee during their tenure.

Table 6-2: Size of the Central Committee of the CCP

Central Committee	Full Member	Alternate Member
7th (1945)	44	33
8th (1956)	97	73
9th (1969)	170	109
10th (1973)	195	124
11th (1977)	201	132
12th (1982)	210	138
13th (1987)	175	110

These two factors--the frequency of Central Committee election, and the size of the membership of the Central Committee, undoubtedly affect the change of membership status of provincial first secretaries in the Central Committee (see Table 6-3). For provincial first secretaries whose tenure was between two consecutive national party congresses, the tenure of provincial first secretaryship had almost no impact on their membership standing in the Central Committee. However, for provincial first secretaries whose tenure overlapped with the convening of the CCP's National Party Congress, the rise of membership standing in the Central Committee is common. Especially since 1969, provincial first secretaries were almost certain to be re-elected or elected full members of the Central Committee.

Table 6-3 Provincial First Secretaries: 1949-1987:
Membership Change in the CCP Central Committee

----- 1949-1969 -----				
Membership Status	Tenure Began and Ended in the Same Period		Tenure Began and Ended in Different Period	
	Beginning of Tenure	End of Tenure	Beginning of Tenure	End of Tenure
None	26	25	25	3
Alternate CC	18	19	1	12
Full Member CC	10	9	0	7
Alternate Politburo	0	1	0	1
Full Member Politburo	1	1	1	4
	-----	-----	-----	-----
Total	55	55	27	27
----- 1969-1987 -----				
Membership Status	Tenure Began and Ended in the Same Period		Tenure Began and Ended in Different Period	
	Beginning of Tenure	End of Tenure	Beginning of Tenure	End of Tenure
None	6	2	28	7
Alternate CC	3	3	17	3
Full Member CC	24	28	45	72
Alternate Politburo	0	0	2	1
Full Member Politburo	2	2	4	10
Standing C'tee Politburo	0	0	0	3
	-----	-----	-----	-----
Total	35	35	96	96

Other than the entitlement of Central Committee full membership, the prospect of Politburo status is linked to the tenure of provincial first secretaryship. Politburo membership is much more prestigious and powerful. From 1949 to 1987, 23 provincial first secretaries from 13 provinces had been granted membership in the Politburo (see Table 6-4). One of the underlying criteria for awarding Politburo membership to provincial first secretaries is the importance of the province.⁹

Table 6-4 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Politburo Members (At the End of Tenure)

Province of Appointment	1949-1969		1969-1987		Total
	Alternate Member	Full Member	Alternate Member	Full Member	
Beijing	1	1	0	3	5
Shanghai	0	1	0	3	4
Sichuan	0	1	0	2	3
Guangdong	0	1	0	1	2
Tianjin	0	0	0	1	1
Shangdong	0	1	0	0	1
Liaoning	0	0	0	1	1
Jiangsu	0	0	0	1	1
Anhui	0	0	0	1	1
Hunan	0	0	0	1	1
Guangxi	0	0	0	1	1
Neimonggol	1	0	0	0	1
Xinjiang	0	0	1	0	1
Total	2	5	1	15	23

All provinces are not equal. Some provinces are regarded as more important than others because of political, economic, strategic or other reasons. There are a number of indexes

such as the area, the size of its population, the performance of its economy, according to which the intrinsic importance of a province may be rated. In Table 6-5, PRC's 29 provinces are ranked in terms of area, population size, GOVAI, GOVAI per capital, GOVI to GOVAI ratio, and provincial finance.¹⁰ It is fair to say that provinces such as Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Sichuan, and Guangdong are important or key provinces in the PRC.

Provincial first secretaries of key provinces are more likely to be elected as Politburo members. Seventeen of the twenty-three provincial first secretaries who had been Politburo members served in those key provinces. Nine of the thirteen provincial first secretaries who were newly elected Politburo members during the tenure of provincial first secretaryship were from Beijing, Shanghai, Sichuan, Guangdong, and Tianjin.¹¹

Table 6-5: Provincial Ranking

PROVINCE	AREA	POPUL- ATION	GOVAI TOTAL	GOVAI PER CAPITA	GOVI/ GOVAI	FISCAL BALANCE
Shanghai	29	24	4	1	1	1
Tianjin	28	26	16	2	3	5
Beijing	27	25	14	3	2	4
Liaoning	21	12	3	4	4	2
Jiangsu	24	5	1	5	6	3
Zhejiang	25	10	7	6	7	7
Heilongjiang	6	16	11	7	8	26
Jilin	14	20	15	8	10	21
Guangdong	10	4	5	9	15	9
Hubei	14	9	8	10	13	6
Shandong	20	3	2	11	14	12
Hebei	13	7	10	12	9	8
Shanxi	19	19	18	13	5	15
Xinjiang	1	23	26	14	25	27
Fujian	23	18	19	15	18	19
Anhui	22	8	13	16	26	14
Hunan	11	6	12	17	19	10
Neimonggol	3	22	23	18	23	28
Shaanxi	12	15	20	19	12	18
Ningxia	26	27	27	20	16	20
Qinghai	4	28	28	21	17	22
Gansu	7	21	24	22	11	16
Jiangxi	18	13	17	23	22	17
Henan	17	2	9	24	20	11
Sichuan	5	1	6	25	21	13
Guangxi	9	11	21	26	27	21
Yunnan	8	14	22	27	24	24
Guizhou	16	17	25	28	28	23
Tibet	2	29	29	29	29	NA

NOTE: The data on AREA, POPULATION, GOVAI TOTAL, GOVAI PER CAPITA, GOVI/GOVAI are for 1986. The ranking for FISCAL BALANCE is for 1983.

SOURCES: Calculations are done by the author, base on information from The China Official Annual Report 1987 (for AREA, POPULATION, GOVAI TOTAL, GOVAI PER CAPITA, GOVI/GOVAI) and The Encyclopedic Almanac of China 1984 (for FISCAL BALANCE).

The Politburo is a collection of important positions and powerful individuals. At the time of appointment, eight provincial first secretaries were already full members and two were alternate members of the Politburo. Five of them were appointed to Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong.¹² Most of them also held other important positions at the national and regional level concurrently. Zhang Chunqiao was Vice Premier and Director of the General Political Department of the PLA. Xie Fuzhi was Vice Premier and Minister of Public Security. For military commanders such as Chen Xilian, Xu Siyou, Li Desheng, and Wei Guoqing who along with Zhang and Xie entered the Politburo during the Cultural Revolution, their membership was probably more a manifestation of the military intervention into civilian politics than of the status of the provinces they served.¹³

Finally, though not as many and as conspicuous as the cases involving Central Committee membership, Politburo membership was sometimes awarded on the ground of representativeness. Despite serving in two of the least developed provinces, Ulanfu, provincial first secretary of Neimonggol, and Sypidin, provincial first secretary of Xinjiang, became alternate members of the Politburo during their tenure.

CHANNELS OF RECRUITMENT

Political opportunity is structured. There are specific routes leading to a political office. In other words, political mobility is indexed by both the office held and geographic location of that office. The likelihood to become a provincial first secretary thus is significantly higher for cadres in certain institutional posts and at certain locales.

The provincial first secretaries are almost exclusively recruited from local officials (see Table 6-6). At the time of appointment, 90 percent of the provincial first secretaries were working at the local level and 67 percent of them were already serving in the province of which they were to be the provincial first secretary.¹⁴ Only 8 percent of the provincial first secretaries were working in the center when the appointment was made.¹⁵ However, in the 1977-1987 period, the proportion of the provincial first secretaries recruited from cadres holding national offices was increased to 13 percent from 5 percent and 3 percent in the earlier periods.

As we discussed in Chapter Three, provincial first secretaries generally had lengthy careers in the provinces prior to the tenure of the provincial first secretaryship. It is not surprising that local officials, and specially officials who ere already working inside the province had been the prime candidates for the post of provincial first secretary. Not only are services at the local level prized, but the appointment is often seen as a natural extension and

deserved reward for such services as well.

Table 6-6 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Locale of Last Assignment

Locale of Last Assignment	Period of Appointment			
	1949- 1987	1949- 1969	1969- 1977	1977- 1987
Same Province	124 (67%)	34 (61%)	45 (74%)	45 (65%)
Same Region	24 (13%)	15 (27%)	5 (8%)	4 (6%)
Other Region	20 (11%)	4 (7%)	5 (8%)	11 (16%)
Center	14 (8%)	3 (5%)	2 (3%)	9 (13%)
Purge	4 (2%)	0 (0%)	4 (6%)	0 (0%)
Total	186	56	61	69
Unknown	27	26	0	1

The concept of power is very difficult to define, not to mention to measure and compare objectively. Like in any political system, political power in the PRC is not entirely based on or derived from political offices in an institutional setting. Nonetheless, institutional positions do suffice as a legitimate measure for political power in the absence of any viable alternative. One aspect of political mobility, thus, involves the movement between numerous institutional positions.¹⁶

Prior to the appointment, provincial first secretaries held diverse positions in different political institutions, at various locales (see Table 6-7). Only thirteen provincial first secretaries had come directly from the central party or

government bureaucracy, such as Central Committee departments or ministries of the State Council. Moreover, nine of these thirteen provincial first secretaries were appointed in the 1977-1987 period.

In getting a provincial first secretary appointment, provincial officials certainly had enjoyed enormous advantage. Overall, the most common stepping stone to the post of provincial first secretary is the provincial secretaryship. At the time of appointment, about 43 percent of the provincial first secretaries were provincial secretaries or worked in other lower party posts. The other two common posts held by provincial first secretaries immediately preceding the appointment are provincial governorship and vice-governorship, 12.8 percent and 7.0 percent respectively. The appointment of these officials as provincial first secretary, the highest ranking official in the province definitely constitutes a promotion.

Table 6-7 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Position of Last Assignment

Position of Last Assignment	Period of Appointment			
	1949- 1987	1949- 1969	1969- 1977	1977- 1987
Provincial Secretary or Lower Post	80 (42.8%)	32 (56.1%)	15 (24.6%)	33 (47.8%)
Provincial First Secretary	19 (10.2%)	10 (17.5%)	4 (6.6%)	5 (7.2%)
Regional Secretary	2 (1.1%)	2 (3.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Central Committee	3	2	0	1
Department Director or Deputy Director	(1.6%)	(3.5%)	(0%)	(1.4%)
Provincial Vice-governor or Lower Post	13 (7.0%)	3 (5.3%)	2 (3.3%)	8 (11.6%)
Provincial Governor	24 (12.8%)	3 (5.3%)	8 (13.1%)	13 (18.8%)
Vice Minister	3 (1.6%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.6%)	2 (2.9%)
Minister	7 (3.7%)	1 (1.8%)	0 (0%)	6 (8.7%)
Deputy Commander (MD) or Lower Commander (MD)	1 (.5%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.6%)	0 (0%)
Deputy Commander (MR)	14 (7.5%)	2 (3.5%)	11 (18.0%)	1 (1.4%)
Commander (MR)	3 (1.6%)	0 (0%)	3 (4.9%)	0 (0%)
Commander (MR)	13 (7.0%)	2 (3.5%)	11 (18.0%)	0 (0%)
PLA Department Chief or Service Commander	1 (.5%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.6%)	0 (0%)
Purge	4 (2.1%)	0 (0%)	4 (6.6%)	0 (0%)
Total	187	57	61	69
Unknown	26	25	0	1

One distinct path in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries involves the lateral transfers of PLA officers. Thirty-two provincial first secretaries were recruited from the commanders or political commissars of the PLA. All but one were officers from military districts and military regions. This method of entry to the office of provincial first secretary has occurred frequently. However, it is not a regular or formal route of political mobility. Twenty-seven of the thirty-two cases occurred during the 1969-1977 period. In the 1969-1977 period, this avenue of recruitment accounts for 44 percent of provincial first secretary appointments. But in the 1977-1987 period, only one provincial first secretary was recruited from the rank of military district commander.¹⁷

The recruitment of military officers differs from that of civilian officials in two important regards. First of all, the lateral transfers of military officers were usually restricted to the same province or region. And while taking over civilian assignments, these military officers seldom relinquished their military command posts. Secondly, the lateral transfer of military personnel was transient. After a brief stint as provincial first secretary, officers went back to the barracks to resume their military careers. Of the thirty-two military officers who took up the post of provincial first secretary, three died while in office, one retired, nine were purged. Of the remaining nineteen,

seventeen forsook their civilian posts and resumed their military careers after the completion of the tenure. Only two continued to hold civilian offices.¹⁸

EXIT PATTERN

For provincial first secretaries, their political careers immediately following their tenure is rather uncertain.¹⁹ On the one hand, since the post of provincial first secretary is among the highest officials outside the capital, any further career advancement at the local level is finite. The opportunity of political mobility, if any exists, lies in the national party and government establishments. On the other hand, as the ranking provincial official and a member of national elite, a provincial first secretary is under constant scrutiny. The tenure of the provincial first secretaryship commands tremendous opportunity as well as peril with respect to career advancement.

Of the total 185 provincial first secretaries whose immediate whereabouts after the conclusion of the tenure are known, 102 were still active in some official capacities. Local offices make up the majority of post-provincial first secretaryship assignments. While 24 percent of the provincial first secretaries moved on to the center, 31 percent of them continued to serve at the local level--4 percent stayed in the province, 12 percent remained in the same region, and 15 percent were transferred outside the region (see Table 6-8).

Table 6-8 Provincial First Secretaries: 1949-1987:
Locale of Next Assignment

Locale of Next Assignment	Period of Appointment			
	1949- 1987	1949- 1969	1969- 1977	1977- 1987
Same Province	7 (4%)	6 (8%)	0 (0%)	1 (2%)
Same Region	23 (12%)	14 (18%)	7 (12%)	2 (4%)
Other Region	28 (15%)	6 (8%)	17 (28%)	5 (11%)
Center	44 (24%)	20 (25%)	10 (17%)	14 (30%)
Purge	43 (23%)	29 (37%)	14 (23%)	0 (0%)
Retirement	31 (17%)	1 (1%)	6 (10%)	24 (52%)
Death	9 (5%)	3 (4%)	6 (10%)	0 (0%)
Total	185	79	60	46
Unknown	28	3	1	24

Prior to 1977, career opportunity for provincial first secretaries following their tenure was primarily at the local level. However, among the provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1977-1987 period, those who assumed national political offices outnumber those who continued to garner local assignments, 30 percent versus 17 percent.

The changing pattern of the work locale for provincial first secretaries after leaving office can be attributed to two factors. One is the rising standing of provincial first secretaries in the PRC political hierarchy. In addition, opportunity for upward mobility was propagated by the retirement of many veteran officials. Increasingly,

provincial first secretaries and other provincial officials are expected to continue their careers in Beijing. The other explanation is the end of military intervention in civilian politics, and hence the cessation of the appointment of provincial and regional military officers to the post of provincial first secretary. By and large, military officers were recruited locally and were more likely to continue their career in the province. In the 1977-1987 period, only one provincial first secretary appointment involves lateral transfer of military officers.

Of the 83 provincial first secretaries who did not hold any posts after leaving the office, 43 were purged, 31 retired, and 9 died while still in office.²⁰ The major course of retreating from politics for provincial first secretaries appointed in the two early periods is political purge. Twenty-nine provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1949-1969 period and fourteen provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1969-1977 period had endured such a fate. Another conspicuous way of departing from the office is death. Three provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1949-1969 period and six appointed in the 1969-1977 period had ended their career in such a fashion.

For the provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1977-1987 period, their mode of exiting from politics is in stark contrast to their counterparts appointed in the early periods. None of the provincial first secretaries appointed

in the 1977-1987 period were either purged or died while still in office. Instead, another avenue of exit from the post of provincial first secretary emerged in the 1977-1987 period. Among those provincial first secretaries appointed in the period and who had left the office by 1987, 52 percent (24) retired at the conclusion of their tenure. In contrast, only a nominal number of provincial first secretaries appointed in the early periods ended their tenure in retirement.

The replacement of purge, and death to some extent, with retirement as the major method of resigning from the office and politics exemplifies the political progress in post-Mao China.²¹ More than the abolition of the life-time tenure system, separation of party and state, and rejuvenation of leadership, the resort to peaceful means of leadership displacement is a manifestation of the institutionalization of the political process in the PRC.

Among those provincial first secretaries who had not departed from the political scene after the conclusion of their tenure, the positions they took vary from period to period (see Table 6-9). Of those 35 appointed during the 1969-1977 period, 16 had resumed regional military command career, 9 continued their civilian career at the provincial level. The remaining nine moved to Beijing and assumed various positions including the Premiership in the national government.

Table 6-9 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Position of Next Assignment

Position of Next Assignment	Period of Appointment			
	1949- 1987	1949- 1969	1969- 1977	1977- 1987
Provincial Secretary or Lower	11 (5.9%)	7 (8.9%)	3 (4.9%)	1 (2.2%)
Provincial First Secretary	19 (10.2%)	8 (10.1%)	6 (9.8%)	5 (10.7%)
Regional Secretary	6 (3.2%)	6 (7.6%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Central Committee	6	2	0	4
Department Head or Deputy Head	(3.2%)	(2.5%)	(0%)	(8.7%)
Provincial Vice-governor or Lower	2 (1.1%)	1 (1.3%)	0 (0%)	1 (2.2%)
Provincial Governor	5 (2.7%)	3 (3.8%)	1 (1.6%)	1 (2.2%)
Vice Minister	9 (4.8%)	5 (6.3%)	4 (6.5%)	0 (0%)
Minister	13 (7.0%)	5 (6.3%)	1 (1.6%)	7 (15.2%)
Vice Premier	7 (3.8%)	2 (2.5%)	3 (4.9%)	2 (4.3%)
Premier	1 (.5%)	0 (0%)	1 (1.6%)	0 (0%)
Commander (MD)	1 (.5%)	1 (1.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Deputy Commander (MR)	6 (3.2%)	0 (0%)	6 (9.8%)	0 (0%)
Commander (MR)	10 (5.4%)	1 (1.3%)	9 (14.8%)	0 (0%)
PLA Department Chief or Service Commander	5 (2.7%)	3 (3.8%)	1 (1.6%)	1 (2.2%)
CC Military Commission	2 (1.1%)	2 (2.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Purge	43 (23.1%)	29 (36.7%)	14 (23.0%)	0 (0%)
Retirement	31 (16.7%)	1 (1.3%)	6 (9.8%)	24 (52.2%)
Death	9 (4.8%)	3 (3.8%)	6 (9.8%)	0 (0%)
Total	186	79	61	46
Unknown	27	3	0	24

On the other hand, a majority of the provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1977-1987 period, 13 out of 22, took over posts such as director of the Central Committee Departments, Minister, and Vice Premier of the State Council.

In any event, other than political purge, provincial first secretaries rarely encountered demotion; that is, were reassigned to a post lower than either provincial first secretaryship or governorship.²² All together, only 13 out of the total 186 provincial first secretaries had been demoted.

TENURE AND TURNOVER

The length of tenure as provincial first secretary affects subsequent political mobility. The longer a person stays in the same office, the less politically mobile he becomes--especially since other than being purged, provincial first secretaries had rarely been demoted.

The average tenure for provincial first secretaries who had already concluded their duty is 55 months, which is slightly less than the stipulated five-year term. The provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1949-1956 period had the longest tenure, averaging about 79 months. The average tenure for provincial first secretaries appointed in the next four periods falls between 42 months and 53 months.²³

The longest tenure for provincial first secretaries appointed prior to 1956 is over seventeen years. On the other

hand, only one of the provincial first secretaries appointed thereafter had been in office longer than ten years (see Table 6-10).²⁴

Table 6-10 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Tenure and Turnover

Tenure and Turnover	Period of Appointment						
	1949- 1987	1949- 1956	1956- 1969	1969- 1973	1973- 1977	1977- 1982	1982- 1987
Average Tenure (months)	55	79	42	53	51	43	31
Longest Tenure (months)	211	211	104	105	130	100	49
Turnover Rate	22%	15%	29%	23%	24%	28%	39%
Purge Rate	26%	32%	52%	37%	14%	0%	0%

The stability of the tenure of provincial first secretaries is expressed in two indicators: turnover rate, and purge rate. Turnover rate measures the frequency with which the post of provincial first secretary is vacant. In general, low turnover rate means a high degree of stability of the office. The turnover rate for all provincial first secretaries is 22 percent. In other words, on average, almost one out of four provincial first secretaries left the office every year. The provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1949-1956 period had the longest average tenure and hence the lowest turnover rate (15 percent). Turnover rate for the subsequent periods is in the range of 23 to 29 percent.²⁵

The purge rate calculates the percentage of the provincial first secretaries who ended their tenure in purge. Since purge causes a violent and abrupt ending of one's political career, a low purge rate suggests high stability of the office. The tenure of 26 percent of provincial first secretaries had been interrupted because of political purge. Mostly due to the volatile events surrounding the Cultural Revolution, the purge rates for provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1949-1956, 1956-1969, and 1969-1973 periods are exceptionally high. The purge rates for these three periods are 32 percent, 52 percent, and 37 percent respectively. On the other hand, none of the provincial first secretaries appointed during the 1977-1982 period and the 1982-1987 period was purged.

There exists a moderate relationship between the period of appointment and length of tenure, Cramer's $V=.265$ (see Table 6-11).²⁶ Twenty-nine of the fifty-seven provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1949-1956 period had a tenure of more than five years, while only 36 of the 135 provincial first secretaries appointed between 1956 and 1987 had a similar accomplishment. Nineteen provincial first secretaries had a tenure of ten years or longer. All except one were appointed prior to 1956. More important, the tenure of 13 of these 18 provincial first secretaries was interrupted only by the Cultural Revolution. If not for the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, the tenure of provincial first

secretaries in the 1949-1956 period is definitely the most stable one.

Table 6-11 Provincial First Secretaries, 1949-1987:
Tenure by Period of Appointment

Tenure	Period of Appointment						
	1949- 1987	1949- 1956	1956- 1969	1969- 1973	1973- 1977	1977- 1982	1982- 1987
less than 1 year	15	3	4	3	1	2	2
1-3 years	68	15	8	11	11	12	11
3-5 years	44	10	4	6	6	12	6
5-8 years	40	11	7	12	6	4	0
8-10 years	6	0	1	2	2	1	0
more than 10 years	19	18	0	0	1	0	0
Total	192	57	24	34	27	31	19

CONCLUSION

Several conclusions can be drawn on the nature and pattern of political mobility concerning provincial first secretaries. First of all, in most cases, the provincial first secretary appointment and the subsequent appointment are judged as promotions. These appointments are often accompanied by promotion with respect to membership status in the Central Committee membership and the advancement of institutional position in the political hierarchy.

Secondly, there is more evidence suggesting that the political process in the PRC of the post-Mao era has been

increasingly institutionalized and rationalized. In addition to the inclusion of rational-technical factors as recruitment criteria, both the termination of lateral transfer of military officers and the displacement of purge with retirement as the major avenue for exiting from the political arena attest to such development.

Thirdly, the argument that provincial first secretaries of key provinces are more likely to be elected as Politburo members is convincing. The connection between Politburo status and selective indices for key provinces is strong enough to suggest that such is the case. In the pursuit of the elusive relationship between political mobility and other factors such as job performance, it is reassuring to know that opportunity for political mobility is indeed patterned, not randomly distributed.

1. For studies on political mobility in traditional China, see Eberhard (1962), Fried (1953), Ho (1962), Hsu (1967), and Wou (1979); and in the PRC, see Lampton (1986), Oksenberg (1965), Oksenberg (1970), and Wong (1976).

2. In the pre-1969 period, the National Party Congress of the CCP had not been held at regular five-year intervals. Hence, the tenure of Central Committee members had not been concurrent with the stipulated five-year term. The Seventh CCP National Party Congress was held in 1945. The Eighth National Party Congress was held in 1956 and the Ninth was held in 1969.

3. In theory, plenary sessions or plenums of the CCP are to be held twice a year. In practice, they have been held sparingly and irregularly. In thirty-eight years, from the establishment of the PRC in October 1949 to the eve of the thirteenth CCP National Party Congress in October 1987, only thirty-six Central Committee plenums had been held, less than once per year. The number of plenums for each Central Committee are as following: seven for the Seventh Central Committee, twelve for the Eighth Central Committee, three for the Ninth Central Committee, three for the Tenth Central Committee, seven for the Eleventh Central Committee, and six for the Twelfth Central Committee. Two of the seven plenums of the Seventh Central Committee were held prior to October 1949.

4. Since 1982, the Central Committee also elects the members of the Secretariat, the Central Advisory Commission (CAC), and the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC).

5. Plenty of cases can be made against this assertion, however. Although none of them is in the Central Committee or has held any prominent post since 1985, Deng Xiaoping and other retired officials such as Peng Zhen, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, Deng Liqun, Hu Qiaomu, Song Renqiong, Wang Zhen and others (so-called octogenarian Old Guard) still wield tremendous power behind the scene. In many instances, political power in China is derived more from informal stature, than from official position. For the analysis of formal power and informal power in China, see Dittmer (1978).

6. At the Twelfth National Party Congress of the CCP (1982), three provincial first secretaries, Bai Rubing, Duan Junyi, and Hou Shilian were not re-elected full members of the Central Committee. Instead, they were elected to the newly established Central Advisory Commission which mainly consists of retired officials with at least 40 years of party seniority.

7. Three provincial first secretaries were promoted from non-members of the Central Committee to full members of the Politburo. They are Ke Qingshi of Shanghai, Li Jinqian of Sichuan, and Tao Zhu of Guangdong. Incidentally, all three left the office in 1965, after more than ten years of tenure. Ke died while still in office. Li was purged when the Cultural Revolution broke out. Tao was transferred to Beijing to take over the powerful post of the director of the organization department of the Central committee. Shortly afterward, Tao also became a victim of the Cultural Revolution.

8. The Eighth National Party Congress also held an unprecedented second session in May 1958.

9. For studies on the relationship between CPSU Central Committee membership and ranking of RSFSR obkoms, see Frank (1974) and McAuley (1974).

10. The rank of provinces is relative and for a specific year only. The absolute differences between some provinces on certain indicators are smaller than what rank-ordering has otherwise inferred. Fiscal balance denotes the state of financial surplus or deficit of a province. The surplus from some affluent provinces is a major contributor to the revenue of the central government. On the other hand, subsidies from the central government are a major source of revenue for some impoverished provinces. For PRC's fiscal policy, see Hsiao (1987).

11. They are Li Xuefeng, Wu De, and Li Ximing of Beijing, Li Jinqian, Zhao Ziyang, and Yang Rudai of Sichuan, Ke Qingshi of Shanghai, Tao Zhu of Guangdong, and Li Ruihuan of Tianjin. All except Li Xuefeng were elected full members of the Politburo. In addition, Su Zhenhua was promoted from alternate to full member of the Politburo during his tenure in Shanghai.

12. They are Peng Zheng and Xie Fuzhi of Beijing, Zhang Chunqiao and Peng Chong of Shanghai, and Wei Guoqing of Guangdong.

13. Chen Xilian was commander of Senyang military region. Xu Siyou was commander of Nanjing military region. Li Desheng was commander of Anhui military district. Wei Guoqing was first political commissar of Guangzhou military region.

14. Since the provincial first secretary is the highest ranking official in the province, appointment of provincial officials is in essence promotion.

15. As a designation of locale, center is a residual term. It is synonymous with capital, national level, or Beijing. The center is mostly applied to posts affiliated with national party, government, and military institutions.

16. In some cases, rather than to list them individually, certain institutional positions are assigned to that of comparable rank. For example, first political commissar of the provincial military district is grouped with commander of military district.

17. Yin Fatang was the provincial first secretary of Tibet autonomous region from 1981 to 1985.

18. The two men are Chen Yi and Wang Enmao. After his tenure as the provincial first secretary of Shanghai (1952-1955), Chen went on to become PRC's Minister of Foreign Affairs. Wang Enmao moved from the deputy commander of Nanjing military region to the provincial first secretary of Jilin province (1977-1981). Then he was transferred to Xinjiang province (1981-1985) to serve in the same capacity before he retired in 1985. Wang was also the provincial first secretary of Xinjiang from 1952 to 1967.

19. On average, provincial first secretaries who ended the tenure in retirement were older at the time of leaving the office, while those who were purged had the longest tenure.

Locale of Next Assignment	Average Age at Dismissal	Average Tenure (Months)
Local	58	46
Center	57	44
Purge	58	79
Death	62	59
Retirement	70	56

20. In the PRC, the tenure system and retirement for public officials has yet to be institutionalized. The current usage of retirement carries a different connotation. Retirement, or more appropriately semi-retirement, refers to the state of officials who either hold nominal or no political office in a political institution. At present, retirement for high-level officials usually means resigning from active duty and a membership in institutions such as the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) or the Central Advisory Commission (CAC). The CDIC was in existence between 1956 and 1966, and reestablished in 1978. The CAC was installed in 1982, specifically for the accommodation of retiring

officials. Similar institutions also exist for local officials at the local level.

21. For purge and political succession, see Sandschneider (1985), and Robinson (1974).

22. Due to the extent of multiple concurrent office-holding as discussed in the last chapter, promotion and demotion is rarely a clear-cut issue in most cases of personnel change.

23. The calculation of tenure statistics in this section includes provincial first secretaries who died while still in office. There is only a marginal variation in statistics when those who died in office are excluded. Since only 11 of the 39 provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1977-1987 period had completed their term by October 1987, caution is warranted in interpreting the statistics for this period.

24. Three of the longest serving provincial first secretaries are Lin Tie of Zhejiang (211 months), Ulanfu of Neimonggol (210 months), and Peng Zheng of Beijing (204 months). Literally, they were the only persons who had been the provincial first secretary in their respective provinces prior to the Cultural Revolution. In the post-Cultural Revolution era, Mao Ziyong of Hunan (1977-1988) had the longest tenure of 130 months.

25. The reported turnover rate for provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1982-1987 period is 39 percent. This figure is only suggestive. As of September 1989, twenty of the thirty-nine provincial first secretaries appointed in this period are still in office. Turnover rate in this period is calculated for the 19 provincial first secretaries who had completed their service by that time.

26. If the 1982-1987 period is excluded, the association between the period and the length of tenure is marginally higher, Cramer's $V=.273$.

CONCLUSIONS

Our study of the recruitment and career of the provincial first secretary will conclude with the discussion of four issues. The first one is the review of major findings in terms of the 'structure of political opportunity'. The second one concerns two determinants of the opportunity structure and the turnover of provincial leadership: regime type or party line, and localism. The third issue relates to the confirmation of the two major models of cadre recruitment: rational-technical model and patron-client model. Lastly, we shall address the implications of this research for the study of Chinese politics, and identify courses of future research.

THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY

The opportunity for political mobility in the PRC is patterned rather than randomly distributed. With respect to the post of provincial first secretary, the opportunity structure confers advantages upon cadres with certain social and career characteristics and disadvantages upon others.

Gender, provincial origin, nationality, age, and party seniority are important factors in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. Almost all provincial first secretaries are men. Only one of the 213 provincial first secretaries is a woman. The natives of the five provinces which are the CCP revolutionary bases of the pre-1949 period

garnered a lion's share of provincial first secretary appointments (48 percent). About 95 percent of the provincial first secretaries are Han. The provincial first secretary appointments were unevenly distributed to the cadres of different age cohorts and of different generations. Seventy-seven percent of the provincial first secretaries were born between 1900 and 1919. Eighty-one percent of the provincial first secretaries are the so-called 'thirty-eight cadres'--those who joined the CCP before 1938. Thirty-six percent of the provincial first secretaries are college-educated. Forty-five percent of them are political generalists. Seventy-one percent of them are civilian.

Our analysis has confirmed that there exists an opportunity structure, and there are indeed certain rules and criteria governing the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. These rules and criteria are of varying degrees of relevance. Some are legacies of the old tradition. Others are explicit policy pronouncements. Some are by-products of socioeconomic and political development in China. Others are intended responses to special circumstances.

The recruitment of provincial first secretaries had been molded by several imperial bureaucratic rules. Under the Law of Avoidance of the imperial dynasties, officials were prohibited from serving as the principal official in their native place. To some extent, the CCP had adhered to this tradition. Only 25 percent of the provincial first

secretaries were appointed to their native provinces. The CCP had followed the imperial "divide and rule" policy concerning the appointments of officials of minority nationalities as well. Non-Han provincial first secretaries were appointed to minority nationality autonomous regions, and mostly to the region dominated by the nationality of which they were members. The CCP also observed the traditional role of seniority in personnel management. Until 1982, leadership recruitment in China had been based primarily on party seniority. Cadres from the revolutionary generation, and the thirty-eight generation in particular, had dominated provincial first secretary appointments.

The recruitment of provincial first secretaries had also been dictated by two of the CCP's most articulated policies on cadre recruitment: the 'localization of cadres' policy of the 1950s and the 'four transformations of cadres' policy of the 1980s. Under the former, native officials were appointed to areas where the CCP had not been active during the revolutionary years. Under the latter, young technocrats were promoted to leadership posts at various levels of party and government hierarchies.

The philosophy behind the CCP's cadre recruitment is that cadres ought to be both 'red' and 'expert'. Throughout PRC history, there had been different interpretations and emphases regarding the quality of redness and of expertness. Under different regimes, the priority had been given to one or the

other. In Mao's era, political criteria reigned supreme and generalists were chosen. In the post-Mao era, technical criteria were featured prominently and technocrats were favored in personnel decisions.

Major political developments in the history of the CCP had an impact on the structure of political opportunity. Two important facets of the CCP revolution of the pre-1949 period were inscribed into the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. One is that during the revolutionary years, CCP political and military bases were limited to certain provinces. The CCP members were then mostly recruited from natives of provinces such as Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Shanxi, and Shaanxi. It resulted in the 'anti-Northerners bias' among PRC leadership. During the first two decades of the PRC, natives of these provinces had dominated provincial first secretary appointments and the CCP leadership in general.

The other is the military nature of the CCP activities during the pre-1949 period. Many of the CCP leaders served in both civilian and military capacities. This had in part contributed to a strong presence of career military men among the leadership at both the national and the local level during the early years of the PRC. In addition, there was the institution of the field army system. The field army system has been considered by many as a major source of factionalism in the PRC. There is evidence indicating it is a factor in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. A provincial

first secretary was often assigned to a province regarded as the power base for a particular field army with which he had close affiliation.

The most monumental event in the post-1949 CCP politics is the Cultural Revolution. In the provinces, the Cultural Revolution led to military intervention into civilian politics. For several years, many provincial and regional military commanders had taken up civilian posts and assumed civilian duties. The lack of distinction between provincial party and government institutions is another outcome of the Cultural Revolution. For an even longer period, the party and government duplicated each other in personnel and functions. Many cadres had held both party and government posts with jurisdiction over the same policy areas.

In light of the existence of diverse and unique conditions in the provinces, there had been regional variations in recruitment patterns for provincial first secretaries. Specific and exceptional personnel decisions were made to address overriding provincial concerns. There were appointments of non-Han cadres to minority nationality autonomous regions. There were appointments of military officers to border provinces which faced both external threats and internal ethnic problems. And somewhat less easy to discern, there were appointments of technocrats to economically advanced provinces. Finally, an ex officio provincial first secretary in the so-called 'key provinces'

is presumed to be on the fast track of career advancement. Most of the former and incumbent province first secretaries with Politburo membership were from the key provinces: Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Sichuan, and Guangdong.

REGIME TYPE

The recruitment of provincial first secretaries is related to the change of party line or regime type. In the decade of 1977-1987, the PRC moved steadily toward economic modernization and political reform. There are three significant developments in the recruitment of provincial first secretaries. First of all, there is the generational change of political leadership. The entrenchment of the thirty-eight generation in the provincial leadership was uprooted. Since 1982, no member of the thirty-eight generation has been appointed. The governing of the provinces has been transferred to the post-revolutionary generation.

Secondly, there is the development of a rational-technical bureaucracy in the PRC. The leadership succession in the last decade has been proceeded simultaneously on two courses--changing of the guard from the revolutionary generation to the post-revolutionary generation, and the ascendance of technical (expert) criteria over political (red) criteria in cadre recruitment.

Thirdly, there is the institutionalization of the political process. The military interference in civilian

politics was terminated and the supremacy of the party over the military was resumed. There is the separation of party and government both in terms of leadership and responsibilities. Then, there is the regularization of bureaucratic practices such as fixed tenure, limited term of office, and the retirement system.¹

LOCALISM

Despite his dual role--representative of the province and agent of the center--provincial first secretary is definitely a local official. Most provincial first secretaries had a very limited career experience in Beijing. On average, provincial first secretaries had spent 88 percent of their careers prior to the appointment at the local level. Seventy-two percent of the provincial first secretaries had no prior career experience in the center. At the time of appointment, 92 percent of the provincial first secretaries were serving at the sub-national level.

However, provincial first secretary's ties to the province of appointment are not very substantial. On average, provincial first secretaries had spent 46 percent of their prior careers in the province where they were appointed as provincial first secretary. Fifty-five percent of the provincial first secretaries were identified as provincial insiders.

The local career experience for the republic first

secretaries and obkom first secretaries in the USSR is very similar to that of CCP provincial first secretaries.² One striking difference in the recruitment of sub-national leaders in the two communist nations is the extent of native recruitment and minority nationality recruitment. Only 25 percent of the CCP provincial first secretaries were appointed to their native province. A same percentage of provincial first secretary appointments in the five minority nationality autonomous regions went to non-Han. In contrast, 85 percent of the republic first secretaries of the 14 national republics appointed in the 1955-1968 period were natives. In 11 of these 14 national republics, all republic first secretaries had been natives (Hodnett, 1978:90). Apparently, the concern with localism and local nationalism is a major factor in the recruitment of the CCP provincial first secretaries.

Both republic first secretaries and obkom first secretaries in the USSR enjoyed more stable tenures than the CCP provincial first secretaries did. From 1949 to 1987, The average tenure for provincial first secretaries was 4.6 years and the annual rate of turnover was 22 percent. In the 1956-1969 period, the average tenure was 3.5 years and average rate of turnover was 29 percent. On the other hand, in the 1955-1968 period, republic first secretaries of the 14 non-Russian republics held office for an average of 7.8 years and the average yearly turnover rate was only 10.7 percent (Hodnett, 1978:63).

RATIONAL-TECHNICAL BUREAUCRACY

Our study rendered some support to the rational-technocratic model of leadership recruitment.³ The recruitment of technocrats to the post of provincial first secretary is determined by regime policy and the level of economic development of the provinces. In the 1977-1987 period, the PRC committed itself to economic modernization and there was a significant increase of the recruitment of economic specialists to the post of provincial first secretary. In the 1977-1987 period, 37 percent of provincial first secretary appointments went to technocrats as compared to 4 percent and 8 percent in the two earlier periods. Moreover, the representation of technocrats among the provincial first secretaries in the economically more advanced provinces is higher than in other provinces.

The CCP provincial first secretaries were not as educated or technically specialized as the sub-national leaders in the USSR. Only 36 percent of the provincial first secretaries are college educated and only 16 percent of the provincial first secretaries are technocrats. However, republic first secretaries and obkom first secretaries in the USSR are normally college graduates. The majority of CPSU obkom first secretaries are either industrial specialists or agricultural specialists. The state of rational-technocracy in the two communist nations also confirmed the rational-technocrat model of leadership recruitment.

In the PRC it is not a simple question to determine whether there is a pronounced policy to recruit technocrats into leadership positions or whether such a policy is indeed implemented. The emergence of a technocracy in the PRC has been stalled by the limited supply of well-educated and skilled cadres. Not only is the Chinese economy still quite backward, but the education system has yet to produce a large number of well-educated and skilled leaders.

FUTURE RESEARCH

This study on the recruitment of provincial first secretaries has several implications for the study of Chinese politics. First of all, politics in the PRC should be perceived not only in terms of power and policy, but as a process as well (Goodman, 1989a). In addition to personality, organization, and ideology, research should be directed toward political change and the dimensions and explanations of political change. The current study has demonstrated that the recruitment of provincial first secretaries ought to be examined in terms of the process of rationalization and institutionalization. Secondly, there are alternatives to the totalitarian perspective and factional analysis of PRC politics. Moreover, description, explanation, and even prediction of PRC political phenomena should not be purely an exercise of conjecture and intuition. Even with data limitations and conceptual deficiencies, the application of

research methodology and theoretical propositions commonly observed in the social sciences to the study of the PRC political process is both feasible and rewarding. This empirical study of political recruitment has demonstrated that research with a strong conceptual and factual foundation can enrich our understanding of Chinese politics.

Thirdly, it is evident that continuing refinement in the areas of data analysis, concept formation, and theory construction is vital to future progress in the study of Chinese politics. Political change in the PRC in the last decade has a tremendous impact on the field of PRC political studies. More than ever, information from China is available in larger quantity and in better quality. There has been a greater access to information and opportunity for academic research inside China. For the students of Chinese politics, the improvement of the data problem and the research environment poses both an opportunity and a challenge.⁴

As to the study of the recruitment of the Chinese provincial leadership, there are two potential courses of research. One is to enlarge the scope of investigation to include other high-ranking provincial civilian leaders such as governor, provincial secretaries, and vice-governors. As we discussed earlier, in some areas such as appointment of provincial natives and non-Han cadres, there existed different patterns of recruitment for provincial first secretaries and for other provincial leaders. The investigation of other

recruitment criteria will provide more insight into the recruitment of provincial leadership.

Moreover, the separation of party and government at the provincial level in terms of leadership and functional duties was reestablished in the 1980s. The provincial first secretary oversees personnel and organization, political campaigns and mobilization, and rural policy. The governor is normally in charge of economic and education matters. The number of vice-governors and secretaries in each province was reduced to two to seven, down from tens and twenties of the earlier years. Each provincial secretary and vice-governor has responsibility in specific functional areas. Conceivably, role-matching would be critical in the recruitment of these provincial leaders. Occupants of different offices are likely to exhibit different social background and career characteristics.

Thirdly, the posts of provincial governors, vice-governors, and provincial secretaries are the main feeders for the provincial first secretaryship. Between 1949 and 1987, excluding military officers and purged officials, 78 percent (117) of the 151 provincial first secretaries were recruited among provincial secretaries, governors, and vice-governors. Why did some provincial officials succeed to the office of provincial first secretary while others did not? Comprehension of political recruitment and mobility thus mandates examination of the whole provincial leadership.

Especially, though somewhat less abundant, the data on social backgrounds and careers for other provincial leaders are available.

The second avenue of future research is to continue to explore other major determinants of recruitment. Because of the methodological and data problems discussed in Chapter One, it is rather difficult to relate an individual's political fortune to factional ties or patronage. However, there is one alternative--the concept of 'guangxi'--which is of both theoretical and practical relevance in the recruitment of Chinese leadership.

The concept of 'guangxi' (connections) refers to various forms of particularistic personal ties. It is a very important element of Chinese social fabric and political life.⁵ Guangxi can be either cultivated or inherited. There are many types or bases of guangxi such as kinship (lineage and in-law), teacher-student, sworn brotherhood, classmate, locality, surname, and co-worker. Not only are these particularistic ties easier to identify, but in many instances they are the basis of clientelist relationships or factions. The evaluation of the role of guangxi in the recruitment of PRC political leaders thus can be the first step toward the assessment of the role of factional ties or patron-client ties.

There are indications that particularistic connections may have a conspicuous role in provincial first secretary

appointments. Among the rehabilitated cadres appointed as provincial first secretaries in the 1977-1982 period, some of them had served in the State Council before the Cultural Revolution under the leadership of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. Some of the provincial first secretaries appointed in the 1982-1987 period when Hu Yaobang was the General Secretary of the CCP had been formal officials in the Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL).⁶

In his study of political mobility of local officials during the Qing dynasty, Wou (1979) has demonstrated that the extended family and kinship unit rather than the individual ought to be the focus of analysis. There is also evidence suggesting that family ties may be important to the political fortunes of some provincial leaders and national officials.⁷

The children and relatives of high ranking senior officials benefit most under the current leader reform. Many of them were born in the 1930s and are now in their fifties. They had attended college and gone to the USSR and Eastern Europe for advanced degrees in the 1950s. Since then, many of them had been engineers, scientists, managers in state enterprises and research institutes. Moreover, because of their family background, they are generally considered as revolutionary and hence politically reliable.

Not only are these children of high ranking officials qualified, they have political clout and connections. In the first place, it is their parents who selected the third

echelon leaders. Such advantages are also reinforced by intermarriage among the children of many high ranking officials.⁸ Moreover, veteran high ranking officials are not hesitant to use extensive personal networks (guangxi) and their own retirement as the leverage to gain political appointments and material benefits for their children.

We have maintained that there is no inherent contradiction between the role of rational-technocratic criteria and patron-client ties in the recruitment of PRC leaders. To the contrary, the CCP's present 'four transformations of cadres' policy to promote young, well-educated, technocrats to the leadership positions is tailor-made for those with 'guangxi'.

1. For reform of the Chinese civil service system, see Burns (1987) and Burns (1989). An infallible sign of increasing bureaucratic regularity is the convening of both the Twelfth CCP Party Congress (1982) and the Thirteenth CCP Party Congress (1987) in accordance with the stipulated five-year interim.
2. For local careers of obkom first secretaries and republic first secretaries, see Clark (1989), Hodnett (1978), and Rigby (1978).
3. We did not offer any specific confirmation or refutation of the factional or patron-client model, for the reasons we mentioned in chapter one.
4. How the Tiananmen Incident of June, 1989, will affect such progress is still unknown.
5. For discussion on guangxi and its role in factional formation, see Chi (1976), Jacob (1979), Jacob (1982), and Nathan (1976).
6. Hu Yaobang was the First Secretary of the CYL (1957-1964) before the Cultural Revolution. Two of the more prominent formal CYL officials are Liang Buting and Hu Jintao. Hu Jintao was the First Secretary of the CYL (1984-1985) before becoming the provincial first secretary of Guizhou (1985-1988) and of Tibet (1988-).
7. Some provincial governors and Ministers are sons or son-in-laws of veteran CCP officials. Ye Xuanping, governor of Guangdong (1985-) is the son of deceased Marshall Ye Jianying. Buhe, governor of Neimonggol (1983-), is the son of Ulanfu. Chen Haosu, vice-mayor of Beijing (1984-), is the son of late Marshall Chen Yi. Chen Yuan, vice-president of the People's Bank of China (1988-), is the son of Chen Yun. Li Tieying, State Councilor and Politburo member (1988), is the son of late Li Weihan. Xu Huizi, Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA (1985-), is the son of Marshall Xu Xianqian. Zou Jiahua, State Councilor and Minister of Machine Building and Electronics (1988-), is the son-in-law of Ye Jianying. Ding Henggao, Minister of National Defense, Science, Technology, and Industry Commission (1985-), is the son-in-law of Marshall Nie Rongzhen. Yang Baibing, Director of the General Political Department of the PLA (1987-), is the younger brother of Yang Shangkun, President of the PRC (1988-).
8. Among the intermarriages of the children of high ranking officials are those of He Long and Liao Chengzhi, Peng Zhen and Geng Biao, Yu Qiuli and Xu Shiyu. For political networks in Chinese politics , see Lewis (1986).

APPENDIX

APPENDIX: Socio-economic Characteristics of the Provinces

PROVINCE	AREA <10,000> SQ. KM	POPULATION <10,000>	GOVAI <1,000,000> YUAN	PER CAPITA YUAN	GOVAI#	MINORITY\$ILLITERACY\$ <1,000,000> YUAN	MINORITY\$ILLITERACY\$ <1,000,000> YUAN	URBAN\$ RESIDENCE <1,000,000> YUAN	REGION* GOVI/GOVAI# <1,000,000> YUAN
ANHUI	13.94	5,217	54,626	1,047	0.5	33.7	14.2	2	59.4
BEIJING	1.68	975	39,990	4,102	3.5	12.5	64.7	1	93.0
FUJIAN	12.12	2,749	31,156	1,133	1.0	26.5	21.2	1	65.6
GANSU	45.40	2,071	20,040	968	7.9	35.0	15.3	2	71.9
GUANGDONG	21.20	6,346	96,363	1,518	1.8	16.8	18.6	1	67.3
GUANGXI	23.63	3,946	28,347	718	38.3	17.6	11.8	3	58.1
GUIZHOU	17.64	3,008	18,731	623	26.0	32.3	18.9	3	57.7
HEBEI	18.77	5,617	68,057	1,212	1.6	22.5	13.7	1	74.4
HEILONGJIANG	46.90	3,332	60,574	1,818	4.9	16.2	40.1	2	77.4
HENAN	16.70	7,808	73,760	945	1.1	27.1	14.5	2	64.8
HUBEI	18.74	4,989	75,503	1,513	3.7	23.5	17.3	2	71.0
HUNAN	21.00	5,696	59,156	1,039	4.1	17.8	14.2	2	65.4
NEIMONGOL	118.30	2,029	20,555	1,013	15.5	22.5	28.9	3	61.4
JIANGSU	10.20	6,270	156,789	2,501	0.2	27.3	15.8	1	78.8
JIANGXI	16.66	3,509	33,854	965	0.1	22.2	19.4	2	63.1
JILIN	18.74	2,315	38,091	1,645	8.1	16.3	39.6	2	74.2
LIAONING	14.57	3,726	101,450	2,723	8.1	13.0	42.4	1	86.0
NINGXIA	6.64	424	4,253	1,003	31.9	29.0	22.4	2	66.7
QINGHAI	72.15	412	4,091	993	39.4	32.0	20.5	3	65.5
SHANXI	20.56	3,043	30,646	1,007	0.5	24.8	19.0	2	71.5
SHANGDONG	15.33	7,776	114,299	1,470	0.6	28.1	19.1	1	68.4
SHANGHAI	0.62	1,232	98,597	8,003	0.4	14.4	58.8	1	96.6
SHANXI	15.63	2,655	32,061	1,208	0.3	18.1	21.0	2	81.7
SICHUAN	56.70	10,320	93,759	909	3.7	23.7	14.3	2	63.8
TIANJIN	1.13	819	37,805	4,616	2.1	14.0	68.7	1	92.9
TIBET	122.84	203	1,162	572	95.2	51.8	9.5	3	14.6
XINJIANG	160.00	1,384	16,323	1,179	59.6	21.1	28.4	3	59.9
YUNAN	39.40	3,456	24,325	704	31.7	33.9	13.0	3	60.5
ZHEJIANG	10.18	4,070	86,565	2,127	0.4	24.3	25.7	1	77.8
TOTAL	957.37	105,397	1,520,928	1,443	6.7	20.5			

SOURCES: e from The China Official Annual Report 1987, p. 756.

GOVAI (gross value of agriculture and industry) is the value of all the products produced in 1985 constant price.

* calculated by the author.

\$ from 1982 census, urban residence refers to residence in city or town

illiteracy includes semi-literacy and illiteracy.

* 1: coastal, 2: inland, 3: border.

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