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A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF TV IN TAIWAN:

RETHINKING THE CULTURE INDUSTRY AND IDEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

BY

Ming-Chu Chen

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Telecommunication

I 992

A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF TV IN TAIWAN:

RETHINKING THE CULTURE INDUSTRY AND IDEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

BY

Ming-Chu Chen

AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Telecommunication

I 992

ABSTRACT

A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF TV IN TAIWAN:
RETHINKING THE CULTURE INDUSTRY AND IDEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

BY

Ming-Chu Chen

From the cultural sociology view, the Taiwanese TV industry is
investigated in relation to the Taiwanese political system, economic
situation and cultural form. Through the investigation, the role of the
culture industry and the ideological representations behind the culture
industry are reconsidered.

In the l9603, Taiwan's TV, as an ideological State Apparatus,
strengthened the ruling KMT‘s political status. The provincial government,
the KMT and the military were major owners of the three networks. In the
19705, TV contents presented the phenomenon of polarization: the serious
state ideology and the light entertainment. Although there were a series
of social reforms in the 19803, TV in Taiwan still be manipulated by the
soft authoritarianism.

finally, there are three points to discuss the ideology in TV cultures-“
(l) The dominant classes are shaped by ideology more than they shape it.

 

The meanings of ideological representations on TV are not solely for the

MM...

audiencesjfit'élwriany media critics are too far outside the culture they

“a.

examine. ISAI‘;_Emancipatory TV culture can stimulate media civilization. . .

\‘M-‘h-HJ’ "

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The bureaucratic-commercial alliance of the
Taiwanese TV industry

The KMT's hegemonic structure in the Taiwanese
TV industry

The sociology of culture
The culture industry
Ideological analysis
Ideological State Apparatuses
Cultural hegemony
METHODOLOGY
CHAPTER TWO: THE TAIWANESE TV IN THE l9605
TAIWAN IN THE l9605

THE ESTABLISI'NENT OF THE TAIWANESE TV IN THE IQGOS

lil'

vi

IO

12

I3

I5

I8

2I

23

24

PROGRAI‘NING
TV POLITICS IN THE I9GOS
CHAPTER THREE: THE TAIWANESE TV IN THE I97OS
TAIWAN IN THE I97OS
THE TV INDUSTRY IN TAIWAN IN THE I97OS
PROGRAI'NING
BROADCASTING AND TELEVISION LAW
THE POLARIZATION OF THE TV CULTURE IN THE I97OS
CHAPTER FOUR: THE TAIWANESE TV IN THE IQBOS
TAIWAN IN THE I9BOS
THE TAIWANESE TV INDUSTRY IN THE I9805
PROGRAMMING
THE SOFT AUTHORITARIANISM OF THE TAIWANESE TV IN THE I9BOS
CHAPTER FIVE: THE TAIWANESE TV IN THE I9905
TAIWAN IN THE EARLY I990$
TV IN TAIWAN IN THE EARLY I990$
CHAPTER SIX: RECONSIDERING IDEOLOGY IN TV CULTURE
IDEOLOGICAL REPRESENTATIONS IN TV CULTURE
CRITICS IN TV CULTURE

iv

28

31

33

34

36

42

44

47

50

55

SB

59

GI

63

EMANCIPATORY TV CULTURE 65

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

SUMMARY 67
PROBLEMS WITH THE STUDY 68
FURTHER PERSPECTIVES 69

APPENDIX I: Article 4. of the Rules of the Conrtrol of Broadcasting and
Television Personnel 70

APPENDIX II: The Composition of the GNP for Agriculture, Industry and

Service Industry 71
APPENDIX III: Annual Production and Sales of TV Set in Taiwan 73
APPENDIX IV: Annual Increase of TV Sets in Taiwan 74
APPENDIX V: The Statistic List of the Taiwanese TV AD 75

APPENDIX VI: Chapter III. Program Control of the Broadcasting and
Television Law 76

APPENDIX VII: Chapter III. Program Control of the Enforcement Rules of
the Broadcasting and Television Law 79

APPENDIX VIII: The Program Statistics in the International Commercial
TV Systems 85

BIBLIOGRAPHY 86

Table 2. I:
Table 2.2:

Table 3. I:

Table 3.2:

Table 3.3:

Table 4. I:

Table 4.2:

Table 4.3:

Table 4.4:

LIST OF TABLES

The Composition of the TTV‘s Programs in 1962- I969
The Language Used in the TTV's Programs in 1962-1969

The Taiwanese Audiences' Opinions for the TV Programs
in 1970 and 1978

The Language Used in the TTV's Programs in 1970-1979

The Export Program Hours of the Three Networks
(1971 - I 979)

The Weekly Average Telecast Time of the Three Networks
in the 19805

The Percentage of English Used in Each TV Station in
the 19805

The Percentage of the Domestic Programs and the Imports
in the Public TV (1984-1989)

The Exported Program Hours of the Three TV Stations in
the 19805

vi

29

3O

37

4O

42

49

52

S3

S4

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

T TATMN

TV, as a culture industry, produces cultural productions so that TV
viewing becomes a cultural practice and TV functions as cultural forum of
contemporary society (Newcomb and Hirsch, 1987,- F iske and Hartley,
1988; Lewis,1991). The internal organization of TV as well as the content
presented from TV attract many media researchers to discuss by either
empricism or criticism. What's the matter with TV? This paper focuses
on the TV industry per se and investigates the Taiwanese case within the
historical context.

About the si/ze of Massachusetts and Connecticut combined, Taiwan
is located in the western Pacific Ocean, 100 miles off the coast of
mainland China, 200 miles north of the Philippines and about 700 miles
south of Japan. Rugged foothills and mountains cover two-thirds of the
island, forming a backbone of the island. Forests stretch over half the
island. Only a quarter of the land is arable. As of July 1989, Taiwan has a
population of about 20 million, with a desity of 550 per square mile.
Approximately 84 percent of the population are Taiwanese, 14 percent are

mainland Chinese and 2 percent are aborigines.‘ Over 60 percent of the

 

1. Chinese immi ration to Taiwan began as early as the T'an

nasty (618-907). In 1 28, the Dutch took control of the island. In 168 ,
t e Manchus of mainland China conquered the island and made Taiwan a
province of China. The island was ceded to Japan following the Sim--
Japanese War of 1895 and was under Japanese control unti 1945. In
1949, the advancin communist forces of Mao Tse-tung forced President
Chiang Kai-Shek‘s ationalist government and nearly two million soldiers
to flee from the mainland to Taiwan. These two million soldiers are called
"mainlanders" and the early immigrants are called 'Taiwanese”.

I

people live in urban areas.

Proposals for the establishment of TV stations in the Republic of
China2 were first heard as early as 1947. But it was not until EL! 9,“
1957 that the first demonstration of TV broadcasting was held in Taipei.

 

It took another four years before the first TV station, Taiwan TV
Enterprise (TTV), was born. After TTV started on Oct. 10, 1962. China
Television Company (CTV) went on the air on Oct. 31, 1969, and the
Chinese TV Service (CTS) started operation on Oct. 31, 1971. These are
the three commercial television networks in Taiwan.

TTV is a joint venture of the Taiwanese Provincial Government and
private Taiwanese and Japanese interests. CTV is owned by the ruling
Kuomintang (KMT) party, private radio stations and other private investors.
CT 5 stocks are owned by the Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of
Education and private investors. The government and the ruling party are
major owners of the three networks, but they are run as commercial
enterprises. The government ownership in the form of commercial system
influences the future of the Taiwanese TV Industry as a whole.

Like other mass media, TV technological innovation and usage
involved the complicated history of social interest group’s control. Mass
media become signif 1cant tools of social control. These social tools are
being used to transmit and maintain the dominant ideology with the
assistance of those who control communications technologies and

businesses.

 

2. After the KMT moved to Taiwan in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek‘s
Nationalist government considered itself to be the le al government of all
China. The epublic of China is the official name of he state and Taiwan
is just one province in China.

3

In 1949, the KMT lost Mainland China and moved the seat to Taiwan.
This party governed Taiwan under the dominated one-party system which
was so called as “an authoritarianism party" (Winckler, 1984). After
the destruction of World War II, Taiwan's social economy was totally
out of order during the early 19505. Taiwan was poor and underdeveloped.
In this situation, the KMT brought the idea of TV development to Taiwan.
There was little capital available with the society so the government

became the major investor in TV development. But, instead of developing __

 

public TV system,gth_e government ran TV as commercial system. A

MR...

serious problem, cultural conflict between mainlanders and Taiwanese,

 

arose in the 19505; the most obvious demarcation line lay in linguistic
differences. In order to consolidate the regime, the KMT cultivated the
strong idea of anti-communism and mainland recovery into the Taiwanese
minds. @nder the manipulation of the KMT, TV became an efficient tool not
only in language education but also in political propaganda]

In the terrible shadows of chaos and poverty in the 19505, the
government as well as the mass focused their attention on the Taiwanese
socio-economic establishment and development. Through their endeavors,
the Taiwanese created an extremely successful economy. Taiwan's per
capita gross national product rose from US$50 in 1952 to US$6,400 in
1988. In 1987, trade reached US$89 billion, with a surplus of US$19
billion, and foreign exchange reserves reached US$70 billion, one of
largest levels of any country in the world (Wu, 1991).

The TV industry in Taiwan was established and developed as a part of
the social formation. Although Taiwan has participated in the economic
miracle of East Asian growth, it did not shake off its heritage of

4
continental political ideals which was characterized by its mainland
recovery. The program schedule revealed that in the 19705, there
were national broadcasting programs which the three commercial
networks broadcasted simultaneously everyday during the prime time
between 9:00pm and 9:30pm. In the 19805, this period (9:00pm-9:30pm)
was occupied by Public TV programs which did not carry any
commercials.iThe mix of public programs and commercials programs in
the same \channels combined the characteristics of government

I
I

ownership and commercial operationj In addition, the invasion of Public
TV programs in prime time results in the abrupt decrease of rating after
9:00pm and influences the viewing habit of audiences.

According to the Taiwanese Broadcasting and Television Law, TV
stations have HIS... important missions of . anti-communism, mainland
recovery and Chinese cultural renaissance, and the number of Taiwanese
programs must decrease gradually. [The proportion of Taiwanese programs
is even smaller than the proportion of American programs in Taiwan]

(Again, the TV industry plays a role as a political tool, yet, the three
commercial TV stations are also completely profit-motivated. I Their
annual revenues have increased rapidly. Unfortunately, although the socio-
economic takeoff has brought about the continuous increases in revenues
of the three commercial stations, many Taiwanese TV experts and
scholars ( Lee,l984; Wu,1986,- Kuo, 1990; Huang,1990) agree that the
quality of TV programs has not progressed at all.

Since the late 19805, Taiwanese society has changed. The political
atmosphere has loosened up and people no longer insist on Chinese

recovery. '3 The martial law, in force for 38 years, has been lifted and

5

opposition parties have been legalized; Travel to the People's Republic
of China has been opened. meimitatians on publication of new daily
newspapers3 have been cancelled.) Hair restrictions for high school
students4 have been relaxed. The Taiwanese society was filled with the
atmosphere of the system emancipation. In the TV industry, news
programs with Taiwanese language emerged. Many TV programs, such as
drama series and varieties, combined two languages (Mandarin Chinese
and Taiwanese) within the conversations. The public TV station is to be
established on it own and its TV programs will be separated from the
commercial system in the 19905.

~7l<wln an analysis of the development of the entire TV industry, the
social context of the specific time period is a crucial factor. The research
problems in this paper are:

Why does the government possess the major ownership of the TV
stations but run them commercially? In this situation, what ideology
represents in the TV culture and how does it work? From a cultural
vieWpoint, what implications does the TV industry have?

vii/Does the ruling class, the KMT, emancipate the Taiwanese TV
following the social reforms? How does TV serve as a centralization tool
for the KMT? What content and meanings does the TV industry present
within the interaction between media and society? What TV culture is

created through ideological representations in the social evolution?

 

3. After 1949, the KMT regulated that only 35 newspapers could
publish in Taiwan and no more added. In addition, each newpaper could not
publish more than 3 sheets of paper.

4. In the hair restrictions for high school students, boys' hair must
bebcrew cuts and girls' hair could not be longer than the end of their ear

0 es.

RVIW FTH TRATR
The bureaucratic-commercial alliance of the Taiwanese TV
industry

The Taiwanese commercial TV system is built aroundanalliance
of government bureaucracy and the ruling KMT with private
commercial interests. In Lee's research (1980), he points out two
implications of the TV culture in the disharmony between a political

ideology and an economic reality.

F irst‘), the steady economic development has contributed
tremendously to the establishment of a sophisticated and
elaborate media infrastructure. Taiwan‘s small geographical
coverage also makes it possible for television to reach a 100%
penetration potential, with nearly 95% of the households
equipped with television [in 1978]. Television, being amass
medium, has to weigh a Chinese cultural ideal against
predominantly local Taiwanese customs and preferences --
especially along liguistic lines.

Second; conversely, the Chinese political and cultural ideology
dictates, in principle, that television should be used to promote
the grand preconceived goal of a Chinese unity. The results are
twofold. One is a conscious effort to resist the encroachment
of foreign media influences, while the other is a suppression of
cultural, or at least linguistic, localism. (Lee,1980:147)

TV in Taiwan has been commercialized after the Amercian example.
For the national policy, TV is responsible for the mission of anti-
communism, Mainland recovery and Chinese cultural renaissance. Why was
TV commercialized if the government was really determined to harness it
to the goal of ”Chinese cultural renaissance"? The poverty of national

economy in the early 19605 made it difficult to bear the cost of a public

\
90::

r‘ .A't‘v 1'”
A “(14,- I‘Igl‘ V L/VQ (

2’

\I/

 

7
TV without commercial subsidy—:1 It was also possible that the government,
although paying lip service to the cultural mission of mass media, did not
appreciate the potential of the medium. 5 In fact, the nation went without
an integrated broadcasting policy for an extended period of time until the
formal passage of the Broadcasting Television Act in 1976.

In Lee's study, he asserts that 'media imperialism“ does not fit
Taiwan's experience very well, as it relates to the control of American
multinational media conglomerates, in the production and dissemination of
media products, and their cultural impacts. Taiwan is one of the most
self-reliant nations in the media realm. Lee mentions: first, this low
media dependence is a partial reflection of the Taiwan government's
cultural pride. Second, the market mechanism and the government's
cultural pride can be viewed as the structural constraints imposed upon
the diffusion of innovations process. Third, Taiwan's low TV dependence
appears to have been made possible by a flourishing movie industry before
the rise of TV. Fourth, oligopolistic competition has reduced foreign
imports and intensified indigenous entertainment efforts to cater to the
mass market. Coversely, oligopolistic competition has contributed to a
content homogeneity and has frustrated television's capacity to fulfill a
cultural goal. Fifth, Taiwan has become an important regional media
production 'subcenter,“ exporting about 3340 hours of TV programs per
year - mostly to the overseas Chinese population in the United States,
Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia. However, almost all the export programs
are drama serials and variety shows which have little to do with the
Chinese culture in any sense and little relevance to the society (Lee,

I980: I 59-60).

8

The role of government in the Taiwanese TV is not limited to its
majority ownership. Government has great control over the industry's
major appointments, finance, and content. IiThere is a high overlap of
political and media elites, or the bureaucratic-business complex, which
serves as an expedient and powerful vehicle of state subordination. Those
who get high positions in the TV stations have undergone a political
socialization process so ingrained with the dominant value and ideology
that they are unlikely to offend or worry the ruling regime. The futher
investigation, as followings, comes out from Hsueh‘s research.

The KMT's hegemonic structure in the Taiwanese TV industry

Why cannot the Taiwanese TV run smoothly and why cannot the
quality of the programs progress? Chau (1982) asserts that the most
serious problem is the system and the policy run in the Taiwanese TV
industry. Government owns TV but they don't know how to run it
effectively. The high-ranking officials never seriously consider who are
really qualified to be the directors in the TV industry. Because they are
not professional, all the rules that they regulate are not pratical. Nobody
cares how to run it successfully. To be a chairperson or a director in the
Taiwanese TV must have rich experience of political work in the KMT. The
problem is those chairpersons and directors never understand how to
manage in this commercial TV system. What they really do is to be
government officials, not managers.

In Hsueh's study (1988), he points out the KMT‘s hegemonic structure
in the board of chairpersons and directors in the Taiwanese TV industry.
He analyzes all the chairpersons‘ and directors' background as followings:

First, there are 10 persons who have served as chairpersons in the

9

three TV stations from 1962 to 1988. Of three chairpersons in TTV, two
are Taiwanese and one is a mainlander; in CTV, all three are mainlanders;
in CT 5, two are Taiwanese and two are mainlanders. Of these ten
chairpersons, four have had special training from the National Defense
Graduate School where KMT cultivates high-ranking politicians, and two
have worked in that graduate school. All chairpersons in the three TV
stations are either politicians or businessmen linked to the KMT's elites.

Second, there were 13 directors and 16 vice directors in 1962-1988.
But, in Hsueh's analysis, there are 10 vice directors who are not described
in The Contemporary Mia's M70 in the Republic of China Therefore, he
only lists 19 personal files which include all directors' background. He
finds that all these 19 persons are mainlanders. There are no Taiwanese
in charge of director‘s position in the Taiwanese TV industry. Of 13
directors, six come from the Military Academy and four graduate from the
colleges operated by the KMT. There are only 3 directors majoring in
related communication subjects. Most directors are not trained
professionally for their positions. The average of 16 vice directors“
education level is higher than the average of 13 directors'. But, only two
vice directors have gotten a promotion as directors. Most directors are
not assigned from interior promotion of the TV stations but from outside
organizations. The director's position is linked to the KMT's political
system or Dronaganda system.

Third, according to Article 4. of the Rules for the Control of
Broadcasting and Television Persnonel (see Appendix 1.), there are few
chairmen and directors qualified. Those who are eligible come from the
KMT's propaganda organizations such as the Cultural Committee. It is

10

more important and practical for the KMT to control all the high-ranking
positions in the three TV stations than to establish a complete and detail
rule or law. That is why government didn't promulgate the Broadcasting
and Television Law until 1976 when TTV had started 14 years ago. The
KMT actively controls the media for their propaganda of anti-communism
and mainland recovery. It uses mass media to achieve its social intention
- the consensus of Taiwanese.
The sociology of culture

Culture, as a central ideal, creates the idea of determination. It is
““an idea that lurks behind every corner of social inquiry, an idea that
despite its almost frightening simplicity, can adopt a baffling array of
shapes and forms" (Lewis, 1991).

For Williams (1982), culture, as the active cultivation of the mind,

can be distinguished two main kinds:

(1) an emphasis on the “informing spirit“ of a whole way of life,
which is manifest over the whole range of social activities but
is most evident in “specifically cultural“ activities - a language,
styles of art, kinds of intellectual work; and (b) an emphasis on
“a whole social order‘ within which a specifiable cutIure, in
styles of art and kinds of intellectual work, Is seen as the
direct or Indirect product of order primarily constituted by
other social activities. (Williams, 1982: 9-10)

People distinguish a range of meanings from ““( i) a developed state of
mind - as in “a person of culture“, “a cultural person“ to (11) the processes
of this development - as in “cultural interests', ‘cultural activities“ to
(iii) the means of these processes - as in culture as “the arts“ and “humane

intellectual works“ (Williams, 1982:11). From the sociology of culture,

l 1

social meanings are created through cultural practices and cultural
productions which are formed by cultural institutions and formations.
Culture has been determined by differently designated social processes -
particular kinds of political or economic order. Cultural sociology is
concerned with the social processes of all cultural production, including
those forms of production which can be designated as ideologies
(Williams, 1982:30).

Williams identifies two traditions of analysis in the sociology of the
culture: the tradition of observational analysis and the alternative
tradition. The tradition of observational analysis is a developing interest
in cultural institutions at that point when, through actual social
developments in the modern mass media, there are major institutions and
their products which can be studied by already generally available
methods. [Three useful kinds of study can be distinguished, of (i) the social
and economic institutions of culture and, as alternative definetions of
their products, of (ii) their content and (iii) their effects (Williams,
1982:17). ]

Outsibe observational sociology there is an early convergence
between social theories of culture and what has been more specifically
philosophical, historical and critical theories and studies of art. In this
alternative tradition, Marxist tradition has been especially active and
many studies combine with cultural history and analysis, and general art
history and criticism. I In modern studies, there are three broad emphases
in this field. (i)the social conditions of art, (ii) social material in art
works, and (iii) on social relations in art worksTJMilliams, 1982: 20-21 ).
The culture industry

12

Adorno and Horkheimer (1986) in their Dialectic of En/I'g‘itenmem
assert that the culture industry enlightens people as mass deception. The
culture industry perpetually cheats its consumers of what it perpetually
promises. The truth that mass media “are just business is made into an
ideology in order to justify the rubbish they deliberately produce“. Mass
media call themselves ”industries” and claim that their standards are
based in the first place on consumers“ needs, and for that reason are
accepted with so little resistance. The result is the circle of
manipulation and retroactive need in which the unity of the system
grows ever stronger. The need which might resist central control has
already been suppressed by the control of the individual consciousness.
The person with leisure has to accept what the culture manufacturers
offer him. The whole world is made to pass through the filter of the

culture industry.
Mn this concept, the culture industry robs the autonomous function of
the individual thinking and no independent thinking must be expected from
the audience. Adorno (1989) points out in his The Culture Ina/527}

Reconsio’ereo’:

Insofar as the culture industry arouses a feeling of well-being
that the world is precisely in that order suggested by the
culture industry, the substitute gratification which it prepares
for human beings cheats them out of the same happiness which
it deceitfully projects. The total effect of the culture industry
is one of anti-enlightenment, in which, as Horkheimer and I have
noted, enlightenment - that is, the progressive technical
domination of nature - becomes mass deception and is turned
into a means for fettering consciousness. It impedes the
development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge

I3

and decide consciously for themselves. (Adorno, 1989: 134-35)

The culture industry remains the entertainment business. Its
influence over the consumers is established by entertainment.“ Business is .
their IOBOIOQL‘AS Adorno and Horkheimer mention (1986), ”the deception
is not that the culture industry supplies amusement but that it ruins the
fun by allowing business considerations to involve it in the ideological
cliches of a culture in the process of self -liquidation” (p.142). The culture
industry is corrupt. The original affinity of business and amusement is
shown in the latter“s specific significance: to defend society. However,
“'[almusement itself becomes an ideal, takingthe place of the higher things
of which it completely deprives the masses by repeating them in a manner
even more stereotyped than the slogans paid for by advertising
interests'(p.144). The culture industry turns it into an open lie.

It is quite correct that the power of the culture industry resides in
its identification with a manufactured need. The less the culture industry
has to promise, the less it can offer a maningful explanation of Iif e, and
the emptier is the ideology it disseminates. Today, the culture industry
has taken over the civilizing inheritance of the entrepreneurial and
frontier democracy (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1986: 166).

Ideological analysis

What is ideology? As Eagleton (1991) says, nobody has yet come up
with a single adequate definition of ideology. Ideologies, for Marx, are the
false (upside down) ideas which the ”material interaction“ of people
inspires in them, as an inevitable process (Boudon, I989). Ideology is
abstract and false thought, in a sense directly related to the original

I4

conservative use but with the alternative - knowledge of real material
conditions and relationships - differently stated. For the earlier sense,
the ideological forms are expressions of (changes in) economic conditions
of production. But, in the last century, the sense of ideology as the set of
ideas which arise from a given set of material interests or, more broadly,
from a definite class or group, has been at least as widely used as the
sense of ideology as illusion (Williams,1985: 155-56).

Within orthodox Marxism, ideology refers to ideas, values, and
beleifs that may be carried by philosophy, literature, painting, or
television programslTelevision is a heavily capitalized and industrialized
branch of the entertainment industry which would necessarily reflect the
belief system, the ideology, of the dominant class. Viewers are then seen
as buying into this belief system, no matter what their positions are
within the economic system. From this perspective, a transformation of
television's ideology would require a shift in the mode of production - a
total reorganization of ownership and control of the medium (White, 1987:
137).

As a Marxist, Althusser argues that society is comprised of a variety
of interrelated social and intellectual activities or practices, including
the economic, the political, and the ideological (Althusser, 1971).
Together these different practices comprise the social formation. A
social formation isa ”structure in dominance.” It has certain distinct
tendencies; it has a certain configuration; it has a definite struturation.
It is a complex structure in which it is impossible to reduce one level of
practice to another in some easy way (Hall, 1985a: 91). Eomplex social

formations had to be analysed in terms of the econom ,political and

15
ideological institutions and practices through which they were elaborated
(Hall, 1985b: 83). "

For Althusser, ideology is a system of representations (images,
myths, ideas or concepts depending on the case) endowed with a historical
existence and role within a given society (Althusser, 1977). He points out
two main ideas: (1) ideology is a representation of the imaginary
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence; (2)
ideology has a material existence. All ideology represents in its
necessarily imaginary distortion not the existing relations of production,
but above all the relationship of individuals to the relations of production
and the relations that derive from them. An ideology always exists in an
apparatus, and its practices located within the rituals of specific
apparatuses or social institutions and organizations. This existence is
material (Althusser, 1971). Althusser“s work will be described in the
further literature review.

Ideological analysis, as White points out,

aims at an understanding of the ways in which meanings are
produced by and for individuals within a social formation.
Economic, political, and ideological practice are distinct but
coexisting arenas of human activity. They exert mutual
influence and pressure on one another, but also operate with
relative autonomy. (White, 1987: 140)

I Therefore, ideological analysis is based on the assumption that
cultural artifacts- literature, film, television, and so forth - are produced

in specific historical contexts by and for specific social groupsl

,J

Ideological State Apparatuses
In his “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses“ essay, Althusser

16

(1971) thinks the relationship between ideology and other social practices
in terms of the concept of reproduction. The social relations of production
are necessary to the material existence of any social formation or any
mode of production Althusser argues that, in capitalist social
formations, labor is not reproduced inside the social relations of
production themselves but outside of them. {The cultural institutions, such
as media, trade unions, political parties, etc, are not directly linked with
production, but serve the crucial function of cultivating labor of a certain
moral and cultural kind which the modern capitalist mode of production
requires (Hall, 1985a)? This cultivating task exercises through the various
ideological apparatuses. It is clear that it is in the forms and under the
forms of ideological subjection that provision is made for the
reproduction of the skills of labour power (Althusser, 1971: 133).

For the Marxist tradition, the State is a machine of repression, which
enables the ruling classes to ensure their domination over the working
class, thus enabling the former to subject the latter to the process of
surplus-value extortion. The State apparatus, which defines the State as a
force of repressive execution and intervention in the interests of the
ruling classes in the class struggle, is quite certainly defines the State's
basic function. To summarize the Marxist theory of the State, Althusser
states that the Marxist classics have always claimed that

\«(1) the State is the repressive State apparatus, (2) State power
and State apparatus must be distinguished, (3) the objective of
the class struggle concerns State power, and in consequence the
use of the State apparatus by the classes (or alliance of classes
or of fractions of classes) holding State power as a function of
their class objectives, and (4) the proletariat must seize State

I7

power in order to destroy the existing bourgeois State apparatus
and , in a first phase, replace it with a quite different,
proletarian, State apparatus, then in later phases set in motion
a radical process, that of the destruction of the State (the end
of State power, the end of every State apparatus).

(Althusser, I971: 141)

Althusser adds the concept of Ideological State Apparatuses to the
Mamistjheory. Ee mentions that no class can hold State power over a long
period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the
State ideological Apparatuses; He makes the distinction between
(Repressive) State Apparatuses” (SA), like the police and the army, and
Ideological State Apparatuses (LSA), like churches, trade unions‘and media
which are not directly organized by the State. First, it is clear that while
there is one SA, there is a plurality of ISAs. The unity that constitutes
this plurality of ISAs as a body is not immediately visible. Second,» it is
clear that whereas the SA belongs entirely to the public domain, much the
larger part of the ISAs are part of the private domain The State, which is
the State of the ruling class, is neither public nor private; on the contrary,
it is the precondition for any distinction between public and privat}. Third,
the SA functions by violence, whereas the ISAs function by ideology. The
SA functions massively and predominantly by repression, while
functioning secondarily by ideology. The ISAs function massively and
predominantly by ideology, but they also function secondarily by
repression (Althusser, 1 971: 1 41 - 146).

Cultural hegemony

Gramsci's conception of cultural hegemony is a theory which

interprets how social order is maintained and how it evolves. On the one

18

hand, he follows the Marxist tradition and concerns for the relationship

between basestructures and superstructures. 0n the other hand, he revises

the theory of the Marxist tradition (i.e. the mechanical relationship that

basestructures determine supersturctures) and has stressed that), culture

and ideology are the dynamic of social transformation] (Chang,1990).
[/ Gramsci“s theory is “the assertion of absolute historicism/and humanism
I over economic determinismikSalamini, 1974: 367).

Traditional Marxists believed that the growing numerical strength of
the laboring classes would eventually result in automatic transition from
capitalist to socialist structure. However, by the end of the last decade of
the 19th century, industrialization and capitalist economic development
had not polarized society into bourgeois and proletarian classes and
revolutionary movemints had not occurred. In western capitalist society,
the bourgeoisie was all powerful in so far as it had managed to secure and
maintain the consent of the masses. Gramsci was convinced that
”socialist revolution would not come mechanically from the breakdown of
the capitalist economy but would have to be built, that is won through
purposive human action within a wide range of historical settings“ (80995,
1978: 16). The transition to socialism could not be expected to follow any
unilinear pattern.

The Russian revolution for Lenin has demonstrated the capacity of
politics to mobilize masses for the creation of a new socialist type of
society. In asserting the primacy of politics, Lenin established a
reciprocal dialectical relationship between economic base and the entire
realm of the superstructure. Following Lenin's concept, Gramsci did not

minimize the importance of the base, but he sought to establish ““a just

19
equilibrium between the economic and political processes“ (Salamini,
1974:367).
{In Gramscis analysis, the failure of revolutionary process in the

wes ern\ countries results from the degree of developmetn of the ”civil“

\‘M

I

society:(/ He points out two major superstructural levels:

the one that can be called “civil society,” that is the ensemble
of organisms commonly called "private,” and that of ”political
society“ or “the Sate.“ These two levels correspond on the one
hand to the function of ”hegemony” which the dominant group
exercises through society and on the other hand to that of
"direct dominant” or command exercised through the State and
”juridical” government. (Gramsci, 1971: 12)

Civil society is understood by Gramsci as the complex of ideology
superstructure and not as the ensemble of economic relations as in Marx.

Gramsci insists on the concept of ideological hegemony as distinct
from that of political hegemony. For Gramsci, superstructural elements
such as consciousness, ideology, and culture are determining factors of
the nature, scope, and outcome of revolutions. Hegemony becomes
“cultural and ideological direction." Gramsci conceives hegemony as an
ideological phenomenon first, and only secondly as a political fact.
“Ideological hegemony is a preliminary condition for the actual seizure of
state ower and the creation of a new state" (Salamini, 1974: 368).

In his fe/ew'sionis Screens: Hegemony in Tran/Non (1987), Gitlin
point out that ideological domination requires an alliance between
powerful economic and political groups on the one hand, and cultural elites

on the other?) In effect, alliances must be negotiated and, as social

1

20
conditions and elite dispositions shift, renegotiated. Gitlin explains,
Hegemony is a process of organization in which cutlural elites
occupy top positions and supervise the work of subordinates in \
such a way as to draw their activity into a discourse that 1
§ supports the dominant position of the elites; at the same time, /

hegemony cannot operate without the consent of those '
subordinates. (Gitlin, 1987a: 241 )

f In mass communications, the culture industry in capitalist society
packages the representations. 1t relays and reproduces values and beliefs,
distorting and adjusting elements of ideology that are constantly arising
both from social elites and from social groups throughout the society
including media practices and their social worlds; Gitlin, 1987a: 242-43).
In the mass cultual system, '[hligh-consumptioéi corporate capitalism
implies a certain sensitivity to audience taste, taste which is never
manufacutred. Shows are made by guessing at audience desires and
tolerance, and finding ways to speak to them that perpetuate the going
system“ (Gitlin, 1987b: 526).

Cultural hegemony, as Raymond Williams insists, “operates within a
whole social life-pattern; the people who consume mass-mediated
products are also the people who work, reside, compete, go to school, live
in families".5

 

5. This quotes from Gitlin“s ”Prime Time Ideol ““ (1984: 510),
based on W1111ams's “Base and Superstructure in Marxist ultural Theory.”
New Left Review (1973) 82.

21

.IJEIBQDQLQQL

From the sociology of culture, there is a convergence of two clear
tendencies in the research: one within general social thought and then
specifically sociology and the other within cultural history and analysis.
Sociological explanation incorporates historical explanation, and social
institutions cannot be examined in isolation from economic or political
ones: This paper focuses on the Taiwanese TV industry in relation to the
Taiwanese political system, economic environment and cutlural form: In
addition to the discussion of TV development within the Taiwanese
historical context, this paper uses the concept of the culture industry to
analyze the role of the TV industry corresponding with Taiwanese social
formation during defferent decades. By reconsidering the relationship
between the culture industry and ideoldgical practice, hegemony, ideology
and power will be re-examined in the case of the Taiwanese TV industry. 1

This paper investigates the entire TV industry throuth critical and

theoretical analysis. This is a qualitative research. {By reviewing the \. ,

relevant theories, this paper uses contextual analysis which examines the ..

TV industry with the external factors (political, economic, social and
cultural factors) and the internal factors (ovnership, organization,
programmin, and policy) within the historical context (the 605, the 705,
the 805 and the 905). The roles of commercial TV, public TV and
educational TV in Taiwan will be discussed. J

This paper dialectically discusses fact (the case of the Taiwanese
TV) and the relevant theories by logical thinking. The evidences will be
found from (I) the relevant periodicals and literatures, (2) the official

meterials, and (3) the talks with the senior administers in the three TV

22
stations, to describe and argue the relationship between the social
formation andthe TV culture in Taiwan during different decades. Not
only the role of the culture industry but also the ideological
representations behind the culture industry will be reconsidered within

the entire investigation.

CHAPTER TWO: THE TAIWANESE TV IN THE 19608

TAIWAN IN LH_E1_9_6_O_S

When the seat of the ROC government was moved to Taiwan, a heavy
burden was thrust upon the island's economy, and it was hard to see how
the latter could have sustained this burden for very long. For the outbreak
of the Korean War in 1950, the political tension of the Pacific Ocean area
increased so the US. economic aid program came to east Asia and gave a
new hope to Taiwan. However, due to the struggle between the
mainlanders and Taiwanese, the society was in a mess. The KMT governed
Taiwan by terror and eliminated the Taiwanese opposite organizations
(Peng, 1991). The Taiwanese literature was repressed and the anti-
communist literature was promoted by the KMT.

In the 19605, Taiwan from the government to the people began to
shake off the experience of chaos, upheavals and famine. People seriously
and unitedly reconstructed the social order. The economic structure
trans- formed to emphasize industrialization and improve the plurality of
agriculture for extension of product exportation. The US. aid to Taiwan
stopped in 1965. In 1952, the composition of the GNP was 35.9% for
agriculture output, 18% for industrial production and 46.1% for the service
industries. In 1969, the composition shifted to 18.8% for agriculture,
34.6% for industry and 46.6% for the service sector (see Appendix 11). The
first year that proportion of industry was higher than that of agriculture

was 1963. In other words, the Taiwanese economy became more industry-

23

24
oriented. And the Taiwanese TV industry was established in this steady

social situation.

a 2.3. II kl 0 n T. In L n '00

The initial emphasis is placed on education. The experimental
National Education Television Station started operation on Feb. 14, 1962.
The station had only a 100W transmitter and it had an effective range of
only about ten kilometers. The development of the National Education
Television Station (ETS) may be divided into two stages. The first stage
covered the period from Feb. 14, 1962 to Nov. 30,1963. During this stage,
the pure teaching programs accounted for only 30 percent and the
remaining 70 percent was devoted to semi-entertainment programs. The
teaching programs included language instructoins, geography, history and
civics. The remaining programs included newscast, educational films,
entertainment and public service. The programs was designed for a dual
purpose: ”to experiment with TV teaching on the one hand and to cultivate
public Interest in TV on the other“ (Taiwan, Television Academy, 1976).
The second stage of ETS began on Dec. 1, 1963 after its experimental
period was over. From then on the air time was equally divided between
teaching programs and social education programs The latter included
language instruction, newscast, publicity of government measures and
public service. (ETS was incorporated into CTS on Oct. 31, 1971.)

For the TV industry, the electronics industry and relevant technology
in Taiwan were still in the infant stage during the early 19605. It was a
matter of necessity form the young TV enterprise to seek foreign
assitstance. That explains why TTV, the first commercial network in

25
Taiwan, had to solicit international cooperation in the beginning. The
Taiwanese Provincial Government was the prime mover behind the first
commercial TV network. A preparatory committee decided the following
principles:
, 1. Foreign investment should not exceed 49 percent of the
total captial.
2. Foreign participation would be sought for the
establishment of plants to assemble receiving sets.
3. The Taiwanese side would retain full control of
programming policy.
4. Foreign partners would be approached for technical
assistance and help in personnel trainning.

5. The new company would be run as a private enterprise.
(Taiwan, Television Academy, 1976: 15)

Under the agreement, the Taiwanese side owned 60 percent of the
shares, and the four Japanese companies, Fuji Television Co., Hitachi, NEC
and Tokyo Shibaura, subscribed to the remaining 40 percent of the shares.
Of the Taiwanese investment 49 percent was put up by the Taiwanese
Provincial Government and the remaining 11 percent owed by private
investors. (However, some private investors were controlled by the
government or the KMT. For example, Central Daily News and China Radio
Broadcasting Co. were operated by the KMT. After 1982, Japanese shares
had reduced to 20 percent. The remaining 20 percent turned to "private
investors“) In fact, the committee first expected foreign investment
from the US, but both sides didn‘t get a negotiation within the two
meetings. The Japanese companies agreed with the committee because
they wanted to sell their obsolescent TV sets in Taiwan (Hsueh, 1988).

TTV completed all the island‘s transmission in 1975. Taiwan lies

26

between 120 and 122 degrees East Longitude, 22 and 25 degrees North
Latitude. The Central Mountain divides Taiwan into two distinct portions.
The eastern part of the island is largerly mountainous, while the western
side boasts some of the most fertile plains along the coast. The
population of Taiwan concentrates on the western side. TTV had only one
transmission station in northern Taiwan at the time of its founding in
1962. It built its western coast microwave system with relay stations in
1965. But the eastern transmission stations were not established until
1974-1975.

TTV started assembling black and white sets in 1962. Only 4,400
sets were assembled in that year. In 1964, the number of TV sets
manufactured locally rose to 31,055 after several more plants joined
production. Beginning from 1967, American electronic companies started
erecting TV plants in Taiwan. Production shot up to l 1 1,722 in that year.
Export of TV plants began at the same time. In 1968, the number of locally
manufactured sets quintupled, reaching 650,205 (see Appendix III).

The number of TV sets in use in Taiwan includes domestic sales by
local plants, import volume and the number of sets bought in by travelers.
Assuming that each set lasts seven years, the number of black and white
sets in use rose to 360,000 in 1968 (see Appendix IV), seven years after
the advent of the TV era in Taiwan. After 1968, the annual increase has
been kept at a steady pace, averaging around 300,000 sets a year.

For TV advertising (see Appendix V), the years from 1962 to 1964
may be described as a period of painful start. Although TTV was the only
commercial network in the country in those days, there were relatively

few receiving sets as most of the consumers could“t afford them.

27
Consequently, advertising through this new medium was not very
effective. With few advertisers willing to make use of this new channel,
TV advertising management in this period was most difficult.

The period of vigorous growth came between 1964 and 1969. The
price of the receiving sets dropped markedly with the establishment of
assembling plants in Taiwan. With increasing affluence the public started
to buy TV sets in large numbers. TV programming also witnessed a drastic
improvement. As a result, the volume of TV advertising increased in
proportion with the increase of viewers. The fact that there was only one
TV network contributed to the rise of demand. In 1969, the birth of CTV
marked the beginning of the color TV era and the era of sharp competition.
In 1969, the net profit of TTV rose by US$ 3 million, and growth ratio
increased 120 percent (Lee, 1987).

CT V started in 1969 and was owned by the KMT (50% of the shares),
private radio stations and other private investors (50% of the shares). The
ownership has shifted to 63 percent owned by the KMT and the remaining
37 percent owned by private radio stations in 1991.5 The CTV“s
transmission stations in all the island were completed in 1975. In 1969,
CTV only covered northern Taiwan. When the central transmission station
and southern transmission station were established in 1970, the CTV“5
signal covered all the western coast. But the three estem transmission
stations were established in 1974-1975.

 

5. Source comes from Wu, Tung-Chuan, one of the senior managers in
CT V, who talked to the author in August, 1991.

28
W

When TTV started in late 1962, a great deal of things prepared for
the advent of the new age were lacking. For example, there was no
pertinent law for the TV industry to follow. Nor was there a TV code for
its guidance. There were few educational institutes that offered TV
courses or had the facilities to conduct TV personnel training. There was
a woeful lack of performing talents. TTV had to recruit them from the
show biz and military troupes. Eqally in short supply were program
producers and technicians. TTV worked out its first program schedule in
which a great deal of emphasis was placed on educational programs, news
programs and cultural programs.

En the initial weeks, TTV stayed on the air for five hours a day. Only
two alf-hour slots were assigned for entertainment programs. The
remaining four hours were solidly occupied by educational and news
programs?I There was a modest increase of entertainment programs at the
end of 1 2 when they accounted for 34.56 percent of the total program
hours.

If The lopsided stress on non-entertainment programs came to an end in
1969 when TTV encountered its first local competitor. The competition
with CTV, the second commercial network in Taiwan, forced TTV to
increase its entertainment programs. j Even then, non-entertainment
programs still accounted for 40 to 50 percent of the total program hours
(see Table 2.1).

Table2.1
“ Pr 1 1 -1

29

Air Time (Min_s/_P_e_r;c_ent)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Average Culture &

Minutes News- Educa- Public Entertain- Comm-
Y_e.a1: M cast. L n 52111.92 tau—.11 m 11
1962 2,275 611/ 613/ 241/ 786/ 24/

26.86 26.94 1&9 34.56 L05
1963 2,560 362/ 556/ 295/ 1,205/ 142/
14.14 21.72 1 1.52 47.07 5.55
1964 2,740 365/ 452/ 367/ 1,298/ 258/
13.32 16.50 13.39 43.37 9.42
1965 3,050 365/ 462/ 383/ 1,520/ 320/
11.97 15.15 12.55 39.83 10.50
1966 3,210 390/ 420/ 385/ 1,605/ 410/
12.15 13.08 12 50 12.77
1967 3,350 430/ 385/ 380/ 1,650/ 505/
12.84 11.49 1 1.34 49.25 I 5.08
1968 3,724 434/ 430/ 410/ 1,850/ 600/
11.65 J1.55 11.01 49.68 16.11
1969 4,180 485/ 470/ 445/ 2,250/ 530/
1 1 .60 1 1.24 10.65 53.85 12.68

 

Source: Television Yearbook of the Republic of China 1961-1975

Because there was no broadcasting law in Taiwan in the 19605, TTV
formulated a TV Code for their program production (TTV, 1983). The Code
indicates that the language used in news, weather reports, and education
programs must be Camila/rm 9:93.59; JDepending on the needs of the plots,
dramas can use Taiwanese but cannot cause the audiences to misun-
derstand the stories. Those programs which use Taiwanese must be
entertainments, and they must be explained in Chinese. The imported
programs must be dubbed in Chinese or use Chinese caption. The language
used in the TTV“s programs in 1962-1969 shows very low percentage

In Taiwanese (see Table 2.2). Especially, the percentage of the Taiwanese

I

I
.'

30

I programs in the first two years presents lower than 10 percent. But,

\. approximately 84 percent of the audiences speak Taiwanese.

\

Table 2.2
' 11 TV' Pr in
N A T P NTA

1931: W EDQLLI h M
I962 I ,430/62.86 7 I 5/3 I .43 I 30/5.7 I

I 963 I ,645/ 64.26 745/ 29. I 0 I 70/ 6.64

I 964 I ,570/ 57.30 835/ 30.47 335/ 12.23
I965 I,595/ 52.29 1,100/ 36.07 355/ I 1.64
I966 I,7IS/53.43 I,080/33.64 415/I2.93
I967 I,760/52.54 I,I 15)/33.28 475/ I 4. I 8
I 968 2, I 34/ 57.30 I, 120/3008 470/ I 2.62
I 969 2,425/ 58.00 I ,2 I 5/ 30.00 540/ I 2.00

Source: Television Yearbook of the Republic of China 1961-1975

In terms of the shortage of programs, the schedule was filled with
lots of films (around 30% to 40%). Film programs may be classified into
three categories: borrowed films, self -produced films and leased foreign
films. The borrowed films were supplied by the Taipei USIS and the the
Education Data Center of the National Taiwan Normal University. Most of
them were educational programs. The domestically produced films were
documentaries and feature films. All leased films were cartoons, series,
and features from the US. The US. series such as ““1 Love Lucy“ (30 mins,
170 installments), “Lassie” (30 mins, 154 installments), ““77 Sunset Strip“
(60 mins, 205 installments), “Combat” (60 mins,152 installments), “The
Wagon Train” (60 mins, 158 installments), “Leave It to Beaver” (30 mins,
225 installments), and “Bewitched” (30 mins, 262 installments) were
popular in the 19605 (Television Academy, 1976).

31
For the competition wiht TTV, which had established seven years
ago, CTV started its operation with a series of six programs of a serial
nature in 1969. The very first of these was the Mandarin drama serial
WID:,_$20 mins, 102 installments), which set a trend in TV
programming which is still going strong today. This also brought about the
competition of the drama serials in the 19705.
3.5:} T1 1 T 1
I The reasons that the KMT government established the TV industry in

”M

the 19605 are manifest First, the society was gradually in a well
sitUzlthhm Second, in far east and northeast Asia, many countries such as
Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Thailand, India, Indonesia, and
even PRC had established TV stations (United Daily News, 1962). 72
countries in the world had TV before 1962. For the international
reputation and the competition with PRC in development sector, Taiwan
was urgently developing its TV industry. Therefore, in terms of the
(”Wient nattonal capitals Taiwan accepted foreign investment Third, /'
certainly, the government did it as a gamble - it expected that TV would
make money in the future,J_ heref ore, TV was run commercially in Taiwan.“
[The state as a coercive mechanism in the early 19505 gradually
changed. The state named ”the Republic of China" was really a political
entity in Taiwan and substantially manipulated the national ideology. The
ideology from this regime influenced the development of mass media
(Peng, 1987))
Since 963, the KMT had actively held many news meetings and
invited many chairpersons and directors, who served in mass media, to

emphasize the propaganda of anti-communism and Chinese recovery. In

32
1966, the KMT strongly promoted the movement of Chinese Culture
Renaissance. There were 15 main points in this movement: 5 against
communist culture, 9 for traditional Chinese cultural renaissance, and 1
for maintance of the historical cultural products. [Only the last one was in

~ , \
relation to the Taiwanese culture.) I’Mass media in Taiwan in the 19605

J

served as a political tool for the KMT]Wei, 1991 ; Hsueh, 1988).

In the 19605, the KMT government cooperated with the private
commercial organizations and permeated the power into the society. In
the TV ownership structure, there was a solid superstructure formed by
political society and civil society: the government shares as political
society and the private shares as civil society. gAnd many so-called
”private" investors were also owned by the government or the KMU The
combination of political society and civil society made the state more
stable and consolidated the political power.

[Although the TV penetration rate was not so high in the 19605, TTV
as an Ideological State Apparatus focused on news and education programs
to promote the concept of anti-communism and the renaissance of Chinese
culture under a seven-year non-competitive situation. 3 The contents
presented “President Chiang and Taiwan,“ “China and Its Cultural Heritage,“
and a series of documentaries showing President Chiang Kai-shek,
delievering messages about anti-communism and Chinese recovery
(Television Academy, 1976). In fact, documentaries could be an important
tool of political education. [In other words, those programs strengthened

the KMT's political status and its one-party authoritarianism.

CHAPTER THREE: THE TAIWANESE TV IN THE 19705

TAIWAN INTHE 19705
In 1971 the UN. General Assembly voted by 75 to 36 to expel Taiwan
and seat the People's Republic of China, Taiwan's archenemy. In 1972,
Japan formally admitted the regime of PRC. Then in 1979, came the U.S.“s
abrupt but inevitable recognition of Communist China and severance of
ties with Taiwan. IHowever, diplomatic setbacks have not deterred the
ruling KMT from the hope of recovering the Chinese mainland and from
claiming to represent the sole legitimate government of China (Lee, 1980).;
Iln the early 19705, Taiwan's political development has shown clear
trends Taiwanization.) In 1972, when Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang
Kai-shek, became Premier, he initiated the appointments of native
Taiwanese as provincial governor of Taiwan and as vice-premier; he also
tripled the number of Taiwanese cabinet members. Following his
succession of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975 as president, Chiang Ching-kuo
steered Taiwan's political development steadily toward a reformist
direction.
j/xFrom 1952 through 1977 Taiwan experiecned a phenomenal growth of
815 percent in GNP, senod only to Japan. From 1970 to 1976 Taiwan's
annual growth in GNP was 12.8 percent - higher than Japan. In 1979, GNP
had reached NT$1,164.5 billion (NT$40 was approximately equivalent to
US$1), an increase of 20.3 percent over 1978. From 1953 to 1977,

agriculture productivity rose at an annual rate of 4.4 percent. Taiwan is

33

34

about 90 percent self-sufficient in food prodution. In industrialization
sector, the government encouraged and assisted export industries, and tied
the nation‘s economy to increases in world trade. At the same time there
was a transition from small industry to heavy industry, and from
labor-intensive to capital-intensive, to production.(: Therefore, Taiwan
successfully weathered the oil crisis of 1973-1974, and continued
impressive economic growth during the global recession of the early
19805 (Chiu, 1979; Copper, 1988). 5
mg I! INDUSTRY IN TAIWAN IN THE) 19795

Because the financial viability of TTV and CTV bounced back quickly
due to a continuing economic boom, ETS was expanded and renamed the
Chinese Television Service (CTS) in 1971, of which the Ministry of
Education owned 49 percent and the Ministry of National Defense 51
percent. With the establishment of transimission stations in the various
parts of Taiwan, an island-wide TV broadcasting network has been
completed in 1975.

he proclaimed aim of CTS was to promote social and military

education. But, a commerical TV station would be run on a self-sufficient
basis. “The education and cultural objective appeared to have been used
for legitimizing the genesis of a third station and for placating whatever
doubts there remained about the wisdom of it" (Lee, 1980:150). In fact,
the cultural and educational objectives were reduced to a secondary
priority, with some instructional courses being aired in the early morning
(5:30-8:00) or late evening (1 1:00-12:00). ]

CTS“ commercialization immediately made its finacial impact felt
among two other outlets. TTV had a deficit of US$ 3 million in 1972, CTV

35
continued to operate at a loss of US$ 5 million, and the newest CTS lost
US$ 2 million during the first month of operation. The financial outlook
further deteriorated for the next few years during the oil crisis. At
present Taiwan has revived its economic viability and trade capabilities,
and the three TV stations garnered a total profit of US$ 5 million in 1977
(Lee,_,1 980).

1 TV receiver sets in this decade showed over 80 percent ”in a
saturation rate - among the most popular of electric appliances] (Tn the
average, 94.3 of every 100 households owns a television in 1977.;Black-
white TV sets in use dropped from a distribution percentage 6f 67.6
percent in 1975 to 65.8 percent in 1977, 48.2 percent in 1979. However,
the distribution offieolorTV setsover the same period was rising: from
15.3 percent in 1975 to 26.1 percent in 1977, 48.7 percent in 1979
(Television Academy, 1984). These figures demonstrate clearly the
market takeover by color TV sets at the expense of black-and-white, and
the fact that most TV viewing has been in color for years.

TTV enjoyed a monopoly situation from 1962 through 1969. But this
hegemony was shattered with the birth of CTV in 1970 and of CTS in 1971
(see Appendix IV). TUnfortunately, advertising volume was not growing fast
enough to suddenly triple and meet the new demand, and sharp competition
inevitably ensued. /‘This fratricidal situation endured until 1973, when the
three networks worked out a business cooperation to reduce its impact.
From then on the advertising revenue increased steadily. jTotal TV
advertising purchased in 1978 reached NT $2.13 billion, up 25.3 percent
from 1977. The 1979 figure was NT$2.56 billion, up another 19 percent
(Television Academy, 1984).

36
W

TAfter CTV competed with TTV in 1970, the contents of the TV
programs became a hot issue?E Official Chou in the Legislative Yuan
asserted that the commericaI TV programs gave the TV stations
substantial profit, but their contents negatively influenced Taiwanese
adolescents. She thought that ll) the Taiwanese programs hindered the
national policy - Chinese language movement; (2) the lewd public songs
and violence series corrupted people; (3)-there were so many commercials
and bad taste programs. She also pointed out that some programs such as
night club live shows obviously disregarded the national policy (Lee,
1984).

Lan (1970) criticized the TV programs in China Times (June 12th,
1970). He argued that the TV programs lacked the long-term plan and
many programs presented homogeneously. ”Many singers are shouting and
screaming. The singers and the exciting fans embrace and kiss. In
Chinese culture, those pictures are just like monsters and would
negatively influence the youth. In addition, many foreign series have kiss
and murder exposures. Those exposures destroy the traditional Chinese
culture.”

Many critics criticized the drama serials. "The nurses in the serials
wear white miniskirt uniforms and many kinds of fancy hair styles. Those
pictures are different from the real nurses in the society“ (Central Daily
News, May 14th, 1970). ”There are many divorces in the series. It would be

bad influence for the society” (United Daily News, I 970).
g-
I

\
Taiwanese TV audiences in 1970 and 1978. He found the satisfied

In Lee‘s study (1984), he investigated the satisfaction degree of the

37
audiences showed 31.30 percent in 1970 and dropped to 20.36 percent in
1978. The unsatisfied audiences showed 44.24 percent in 1970 and

\

increased up to 59.67 percent in 1978 (see Table 3.1). 1

 

Table 3.1
h-T.i . .- ,- “O-o'nin firthTV mm in 19 9.. :197
omens We) W
very satisfied 0.00 1.08
satisfied 31.30 19.28
unsatisfied 39.93 53.00
very unsatisfied 4.31 6.73
Mnion 24.46 I 9.9 1
Total 100.00 1 00.00

Source: Lee, Chan ( 1984: 124) Television. Taipei: Yun-Chen Publisher.

X/

T In the early 19705, the popular drama serials attracted the audiences
to watch them in the prime time. But the plots of the series repeated and

time. hose serials were such as “Judge Pad“ (60 mins, 350 installments),

repefied without change so that the serials could drag on and on for a long
““The'Escorts' (60- 100 mins, 250 installments), “Seven Swordsmen of H51-
lou' (45 mins, 221 installments), ”The Samartians' (60 mins,186 install-
ments), ““The SIow-witted Son-in-law' (30 mins, 240 installment).
(Television Academy, 1976)

Because the drama serials dragged on and on without endings, the
regulatory agency, the Government Information Office (610), took it upon
itself to force each TV station to reduce the number of serials to one

one-hour Mandarin episode and two half -hour Taiwan episodes per evening.

38
And the outline of each serials had to obtain a three-week advance
approval of the 610. The 610 further decided in 1977 that each serial
should consist of no more than 60 episodes. The number of episodes
allowed for each serial was further cut down to 30 in 1978 (Wu,1986;
Lee,11980).

T In this decade, because Taiwan confronted many difficulties in the
international diplomacy, the three networks presented special programs
for propogating the national mission - anti-communism. {After President
Chiang died in 1975, the three commercial TV stations broadcasted special
programs simultaneously during the golden prime time of 9:00-9:30 pm
from 1976. From then on, the golden prime time was cut by these special
programs. The first three series for this period (9:00-9230pm) were: The
Cold Spell (73 episodes,- three times rerun: twice dubbed in Chinese and
once dubbed in Taiwnese), Confidence Born of Storms (60 episodes), and
The Dawning Land (55 episodes). The stories were described as followings
(Television Academy, 1978):

“'The Cold Spell” is an outright expose of the totalitarian rule of the
Chinese communist regime, covering two phases: pre-1949 and post-1949.
The story epitomizes the solidarity of the Chinese people and government
in the face of the ruthlessly adverse international trend - composure and
confidence maintained under the judicious leadership of the government of
the Republic of China, with its provisional capital at Taipei, Taiwan.

The story of ”Confidence Born of Storms" goes back to 1938 when the
communists set up a branch headquarters in Taiwan in an attempt to
create turmoil. The infamous organization was finally dissloved by united

efforts in a massive crackdown. The Taiwanese victory made more mean-

39
ingless that Chinese communist threat to “liberal Taiwan.“

The theme of "The Dawning Land“ was to extol humanity and morality
and expose the Chinese communist scheme of infiltration, subversion, and
conspiracy. It boosted the people's faith and determination to overthrow
the mainland. The story dates from 1948, when the communist rose in
armed rebellion, to the growth of this island as anti-communist bastion -
firm and strong, stable and prosperous.

After these three series, the programs in this period included news,
documentaries and report programs such as “Great Construction,“ “Great
Events of Our Time,“ "The Road,“ “Stories of Great Times,“ and “Road to
Prosperity.“ Those themes presented either the history of the national
revolution against the communists or the government's contribution to the
national development.

As CT 5 started in 1971, there were armed forces shows on the air
everyday. Those shows were produced by the various military troupes
under the sponsorship of the Ministry of National Defense. Those shows
presented a 30-minute program at 1:00pm from Monday to Saturday.
Certainly, the theme of those programs focused on the concept of
anti-communism and mainland recovery.

When the formal diplomatic relations were severed between the US.
and Taiwan, TV news in Taiwan became magnets during the 1978-79
period and the three commercial TV stations took turns in rerunning a
dozen anti-communist films. Lee described the TV contents during that

time:

I The variety shows all at once acquired an utterly new format

4o

fand content - no more glamour decorations, no more
I extravagant clothing, and no more “unhealthy“ songs. The
homogeneity of content pushed to an all-time high, as the
“patriotic songs“ - of anti-Communist pitch - dominated the
variety shows, accounting for two-thirds of the content, and
i this figure is not counting the heavy spot announcements of
slogans. When the public mood somewhat cooled down, the
‘2 audiences lost no time in writing to complain of the
exhausting bombardment of these slogans and high-pitched
songs that took a huge toll on their psyche. (Lee, 1980)

I

I

1

competition, the three commercial TV stations reduced imported programs
and increased domestic programs}; ““The birth of CTV forced TTV to drop
the proportion of foreign import; from 33 percent to 22 percent during
1970-1971; CTS“ appearance further reduced the imports of two other

In this decade, according to Lee (1980), in terms of oligopolistic

stations to about 17 percent" (Lee, 1980: 160). (see Table 3.2)

Table 3.2
We Used in the TTV“s Programs in 1970-1979

£9.41:
1 970

1 971
1 972
1 973
1 974
1 975
I 976
I 977
1 978
1 979

A
Mandarin Chinese

2,239/ 48.33
3,451 / 62.53
3,272/ 65. 10
3,207/ 73.35
2,423/71 .3 l
2,293/66.83
2,552/ 72.4

2,609/7S.78
2,645/77.29
2,532/7187

TPR

ED911511

I,525/32.9
1,228/2225
1,055/21. 10

745/ 17.05
648/ 19.04
691/2014
603/ I 7. 1 I
470/ 13.65
442/ 12.92
542/ 15.38

K/P R

Tai QDQSQ
870/ I 8.77
840/ 1 5.22
692/ I 3.8
420/ 9.60
327/ 9.62
447/ 1 3.03
370/ I 0.49
364/ I 0.57
335/ 9.79
449/ 1 2.75

41
Source: Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1961-1975,
1976-1977, 1978-1983.

CTV, in the beginning, had self -produced programs about 65 percent
of the total air time, with the remaining 35 percent assigned to imported
films. The ratio changed to 72.65 percent for self-made programs and
27.35 percent for imported programs in 1970. In 1971, self-made
programs had increased to 85 percent, while imported programs dropped to
a mere 15 percent. Self -produced programs accounted for 87.88 percent of
the total air time in CTS during its first two years,1971-1972.I:1n 1975,
CTS“5 self-made programs still kept up to 88.57 percent (Television
Academy, 1976).

The popular imports were “Wonderful World of Color“ (30 mins, 316
installments), “The FBI“ (60 mins, 237 installments), “Peyton Place“ (30
mins, 514 installments), “Hawaii Five-0'“ (60 mins, 186 installments) and

T

so on. Some import programs, such as “Kung F u,“ were dubbed in Chinese,
but the audiences“ responses were not so good for dubbing. Therefore,
dubbing was not popular in Taiwan in the 19705 (Wu, 1986).

[ The program exports started from 1971. Hong Kong, was the first
customer:~ The major markets included Hong Kong, the US, Canada, the
Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore. The US. market was largely
concentrated in New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Honolulu, where
there were fairly large Chinese communitie5I The audiences in most of the
markets are in great, part of Chinese origin. 2 In terms of the big overseas
Chinese markets, the number of programs exported by the three TV
networks has skyrbcketed in the 19705 and those exports focused on

42
drama serials and varieties. There were up to 3426.25 hours exported in
1976, and 3652.85 hours exported in 1977 (see Table 3.3). The export
policy was under the negotiation of the three cmmercial TV stations and

under government supervision (Television Academy, 1978).

Table 3.3

1‘ .01 .“elll9 o 1‘1“r.0. ‘ “'
YEAR 11! {Hours} CTV (Hggrsz 9T5 (Hours) IQ! AL
1971 24.5 -- -- 24.5
1972 106 -- -- 106
1973 239.5 71 243.6 554. 1
1974 304.2 249.5 258.4 812. 1
1 975 787.6 626.75 1 I 64.6 2578.95
1 976 690 491 .25 2245 3426.25
1977 804 l 1 19.85 1 758.5 3652.85
1978 180 l I 30.5 962 2272.5
1979 304.5 793.25 I 266 2363.75

Source: Calculated from Television Yearbook of The Republic of China
1961-1975, 1976-1977, 1978-1983.

AWN

I After the Taiwanese TV industry started operation 14 years ago,
Broadcasting and Television Law was finally ratified by the Legislative
Yuan in 1976. E This law entrusted the 610 with a wide range of
administrative duties in implementing the regulation of broadcasting
technicalities, especially in program control and censorship. It did not
give the 610 any mandate to formulate a clear and integrated policy that
would render TV to the service of national development and cultural
renaissance (Lee, 1980; Lee,1984). In its chapter 111. Program Control (see

43

Appendix VI.), programs are classified into four categories: (1) newscast
and publicity of government policies and orders, (2) education and culture,
(3) public service, and (4) entertainment. The time of the (1), (2) and (3)
programs should not be less 50 percent of the total weekly TV time. And
self-produced programs shall not be less than 70 percent of the TV
programs. The domestic programs shall mainly use Mandarin Chinese and
the dialect (Taiwanese) shall decrease gradually. In the Enforcement
Rules of the Broadcasting and Television Law (see Appendix VII), the
percentages of the domestic programs using Mandarin Chinese shall be no
less than 70 percent. -

Because the definitions of the program categories are not clear and
the percentages of the entertainments shall be no more than 50 percent,
many programs with entertainment characters are classified in education
and culture category by the three commercial TV staions. For example,
“Law Theatre“ was a crime series. It was classified in education and
culture because CTV argued that the show had educational function. In
addition, some varieties, quiz shows, and game shows were also
classified in education and culture (Lee, 1984). The confusion of the
program categories makes the program statistics of Television Yearbook
unreliable. 6 TV being a “commercial“ system, the percentage of
enterainments seems difficult to keep less than 50 percent in the total
programs. 3. In the international commercial TV systems, even in the
British IBA, there are 65 percent of entertainments . In many countries,
the entertainment programs have more than 70 percent in their total
programs (see Appendix VIII).

In language usage, for the national policy - Chinese language

44
- promotion, the percentage of the domestic TV programs using Chinese
shall be more than 70 percent. Language promotion is not a bad thing. The
bad thing is promoting one language to repress the usage of another
language on purpose. Language has cultual significance. It can be used to
promote a particular cultural-racial view of one's own group. Moreover,
language, as an ideological apparatus, can be used as part of the
mechanism of getting and maintaining power over others, or of resisting
such power- taking (Joseph and Taylor, 199024). The “national language,“
asameans, can create unity for the society. However, local dialects
which represent local culture are worth respecting. TV, as a cultural
window, presents the national needs but disregards the local cultural in
the Taiwanese case.

7 TH P ARI ATION or TAIWAN TV cu T R IN TH 19705

The Taiwanese TV culture in the 19705 presented the phenomenon of
polarization - seriousness and lightness. It could be so serious to take
responsibility for the national mission. It could be too light to give the
audiences a good taste.

The special joint programs in 9:00-9z30pm period represented the
serious state policy. Why did the TV stations choose 9:00-9z30pm to
broadcast those programs? Obviously, this period was in the golden prime
time. People used to watch TV during this period. The three “commercial“
TV stations could sacrifice their advertising revenues for the “sacred“
mission because they were owned by government (the provicial
government, the ruling KMT, and the military) and all their chairpersons
- and directors were politicians. In this situation, what the supervisors in

the three networks concerned was how to promote the state propaganda,

45
not how to improve the quality of the TV programs. In the beginning, the
special joint programs were catching people. However, that period
gradually became the time to take a rest, take a shower, take a walk, etc.
Moreover, the audiences even turned off the TV during this period.

In addition, when the “patriotic songs“ repeated and repeated
during 1978-79, the audiences were getting bored. TV, as an Ideological
State Apparatus, may disseminate the state idea to the people.
However, ideological representations may confront the struggle and
conflict in which the structure may be compromised and reformed.

The lightness of the Taiwanese TV programs in the 19705 seemed to
be an opposite role aggainst the serious system. The light entertain-
ments evaded the serious themes. The drama serials dragged on and on.
The plots repeated and repeated. The shouting singers in strange dresses
were crazy with their fans. The quality of TV programs may be not good.
However, people still watched it and liked to talk about it. “The first
thing that high school students come in the class everyday is to talk about
the yesterday‘s plot of “The Escort“ [which dragged up to 250 episodes];
the advertisements of some restaurants shows: we have a TV so that you
would not miss any episode of “Judge Pao' [which had 350 episodes] when
you have dinner in our restaurant“ (Yang, 1987). (Tiany critics argued that
TV programs were in bad taste and disregarded “the traditional Chinese
culture“ and even “the national policy“. They criticized TV programs with
a high culture view. They did not acknowledge that TV was a mass medium
which represented popular culture. Those critics took mass culture too
seriously. Fl

1

CHAPTER FOUR: THE TAIWANESE TV IN THE 19805

4,! TAIWAN IN THE 19505

I From the process of political Taiwanization in the 19705, several
political policies reformed. The opposition forces aggainst the KMT
legally formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. In the
parliamentary reforms, the KMT has adopted a formula to retire the aging
members of the three national representative bodies - the Natoinal
Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan - who were elected or
were candidates for the elections in the mainland during 1947-1948. In
1987, martial law ended in Taiwan after thirty-eight years. The
government announced that citizens of the Republic of China could travel
to the People‘s Republic of China; that they could buy and sell Communist
publications; and that they could compete in sports events. These
represented an official action to legalize direct contacts between Taiwan
and the mainland. In 1988, the government also lifted the previous
restrictjons on publication of new daily newspaper (Tien, 1988; Copper,
1988). TAfter Chiang Ching-kou died in 1988, Taiwan's new president, Lee
Teng-hui who came from the reformist wing of the ruling KMT, faced a

series of challenge in the social reforms. J
In the 19805, the Taiwanese political participation increased.
Competitive elections were held; new political parties formed; the press
became independent. Students and various other groups including veterans,

professional organizations, and labor began to seek political influence.

46

47

The polity was in transition to a democracy.
In its economic development, Taiwan was called “the greedy island“
during the 19805. In Taiwan, an average of nearly US$fi3'billionworth of I
shares has changed hands each 3-hour trading day in 1989. This figure is
US$ 1 billion a day more than in London. In August 1989, the Taipei market
reached a record US$ 7.6 billion of deals. The world's largest stock
market, Tokyo, traded a mere US$ 4.2 billion worth of shares on the same
day. The Taiwan Stock Exchange Weighted Stock Index has barely broken
1,000 at the beginning of 1987. It created an illogical rise of 276% in the
first 215 trading days of 1988. In September 1989, it hit a record
10,172.49 (Economist, 1989; Friedland and Moore, 1988).

} Taiwan has had a decade of 9% annual growth and held the world's
2nd-liighest foreign exchange reserves of US$ 71 billion in 1988. In 1989,
the foreign exchange reserves reached US$ 75 billion, and money supply
grew at up to 50% a year. {The Taiwanese have private savings of some US$
46 billion in 1989. From the lifting of foreign-exchange controls in 1988,
the government has allowed residents to remit overseas up to US$ 5
million annually (Economist, 1989; Friedland, 1988; Shim, 1988; Moore,
1988).

W

When ETS“ instruction programs joined CTS, the so-called “studio
classroom“ was started the day after CTS“ establishment. But, because
broadcast times for studio classroom were before 8:00 am and after
11:00pm, students complained. To address this defect and to enlarge the
scope of air education, CTS expanded the UHF system on the basis of

existing equipment. In 1983, the construction of the enlarged system was

43
completed and broadcasting officially began on September Ist, 1983. The
half of the courses began telecasting mainly between 7:00 and 10:00 pm
over the new UHF channel and the other half was remained in the VHF
channel. The “National Stedio University“ began with total 42 hours
weekly (Televison Academy, 1984). . I-

f In 1984, 610 eventually screened the first pulbic TV program in
Taiwaé-T he three TV networks were obligated to allocate time slots for
public TV programs free of charge. No commercials were permitted in
public TV time slots. 1n the initial stages, the 610 public TV Programming
Group provided just two TV programs for the daily 9:00-9:30 pm pulbic TV
time slot, Mondays through Saturdays, so that two of the three networks
weere forced to screen the same program simultaniously. (The special
joint programs in this period from 1976 eventually stopped when the
public TV programs started operation.) Later, additional time slots were
allocated to the three networks : (1) 5:30-6:00 pm Mondays through
Fridays, (2) 11:00-11:3O pm Mondays through Fridays, (3) 11:00 pm-l:00
am Saturdays, and 10:30-11:00 am Sundays. In 1985, the public TV
program hours were increased to 15 hours per week over three commercial
TV channels.

According to internal reference statistics of the Taiwan Power
Company in 1985, there are over 5,000,028 TV receivers in Taiwan, for the
highest percentage of households (93.1%), next only to electric fans
(94.1%), of all domestic electric appliances. The 1985 edition of the
World's Broadcasting and Television Manual counts 413 TV sets per
thousandfpeople in Taiwan; in other words, one TV set for every 2.6

l . .
persons. ; Among the various mass commumcation media, TV has the most

49
contact with the people in Taiwan: in 1985, 64.8% of all people watch TV
everyday; each person watches TV an average of two hours and forty
minutes per day - twice the time they devote to reading newspaper and
listening radio. The number of TV receivers increased up to over 6 million
in 1989 (Television Academy,1986, 1990).

I In 1985, due to the economic depression, the advertising revenue of
the three networks presented the first time negaitive growth (-1.48%).
However, the advertising volumes of Taiwan increased rapidly in terms of
the economic growth and a large quantity of import production in the late
19805. TAlthough the three commercial TV stations faced the competition
from many new media such as dishes, VCR, and illegal,_cable_._TV, the
advertising revenue of the three networks still increased. In 1989, the
advertising net nevenues of each TV station were: NT $2.7 billion (TTV),
NT$2.1 billion (CTV), and NT$2.6 billion (CTS). (NT$26 was equal to US$1.)
Due to the needs of the large advertising market, the weekly average
telecast time of the three networks increased from 174 hours in the early

19805 up to 318.3 hours in 1989 (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1
W kl Av r eT l c Timeof theT reeNetw rksinth 19 05

Year U_V_(tI.Q.tI£2 CTV (Hour) £35ngng Igtal (Hour)
1 980 57.8 57.4 59.6 1 74.8
1981 57.2 56 58.3 171.5

1 982 58. 1 58.3 58.3 174.7

1 983 58.3 58.4 57.3 174

1984 60.7 60. 1 64.3 185. 1
1985 74 73. 1 76.3 223.4

1 986 76 76 79 23 1

50

1987 80.8 81.4 88.8 251
1988 88.7 83.6 1 10.3 282.6
1989 103.8 96.2 1 18.3 318.3

* The hours of CTS exclude the air hours of the studio classroom.

Source: Calculated from Television Yearbook of The Republic of China
1978-1983, 1984-1985, 1986-1987, 1988-1989.

R 1N

1n the early 19805, Ithe Hong Kong drama series /::gave Taiwan a big
surprise. In 1982, CTV added Hong Kong drama series to its programming
in the prime time on the weekend: “Chor Lau Heung" , the first such series
to be telecasted in Taiwan, created a sensation throughout the island. it
was a costume kung fu drama; the story talked about a hero, Chor
Lau-Heung, who was enthusiastic to help poor people and had a very good
skill to steal things from the bad peolpe. Although it was an
entertainment, TV station still considered the political situation. Because
some directors and actors in this drama had gone to the mainland China ,
CTV cut the names of those people on the screen (Wu, 1986).

I According to Television Academy (1984), this Hong Kong drama
created 70% rating in Taiwan. "Chor Lau Heung“ increased much CTV's
advertising revenue.) The other two networks protested this situation
because nobody watched their programs during that period. I'Theref ore, the
610 regulated that the three networks took turns to broadcast the Hong
Kong drama series and there were only 17 episodes on the air in each turn. I
From then on, wherever 'Chor Lau Heung" went, the commercials would

follow. After 'Chor Lau Heung,” there were many Hong Kong drama series

51
imported continuously such as “Semi-Gods and Semi-Devils,” “The Hawk,”
“Legend of the Unknown,“ "The Green Dragon," "The Reincarnated"
(Television Academy, 1984). Those drama series drew the spotlight of
audience attention. Not only the series but also the Hong Kong actors
became popular in Tiawan. Therefore, many Hong Kong actors came to
Taiwan for the entertainment business (Wu, 1986; Chou, 1982).

Il-long Kong drama series struck the Taiwanese TV with a big blow.
Lots of articles blamed the bad quality of the domestic programs which
could never compete with Hong Kong drama series/I Hong Kong used to be
one of the big customers which imported the Taiwanese TV programs in
the 19705, but its drama series heavily hit the Taiwnese TV in the early
19805. It seemed a shame on the Taiwanese TV industry. In the late 1983,
for protecting the domestic programs, {the three networks decided that
they would never broadcast the Hong Kong drama series regardless of the
audiences' response and the highest ratings. However, the Hong Kong
drama series rapidly became one of the favorite videoes in the Taiwanese
video [market (Wu, 1986).

I The other influence of the “Chor Lau Heung" was that dubbing became
1

1

popuklar in Taiwang The language of the original Hong Kong drama series
used Cantonese. /As a result, those series were dubbed in Mandarin
Chinese. The response of the audiences were very well so that dubbing
became a new popular occuption in Taiwan.I /Not only the Hong Kong series
but also Amercian series were dubbed in Chinese. )I Some of Amercian
series such as "The-A-Team" (1985), “Knight Rider” (1986), and
'MacGyver" (1986) were dubbed in Chinese and really got a good rating

around 35- 40 percent. in the late 19805, almost Amercian situation

52

comedies such as ”The Cosby Show,“ "The Golden Girls," "Family Ties,” and
”Who‘s the boss?‘ were dubbed in Chinese and became the popular shows.
(In 1986, according to Jun-Li Market Survey Company, the percentage of
the Taiwanese audiences who liked the dubbed programs was 49%; those
who disliked, 43.5%,- and no answer, 7.5%. Ifhose who liked the dubbed
programs asserted that the dubbed programs were easy to understand for
kids, and people didn't need to read the Chinese caption. But, some people
argued that the effect of the dubbed series was not so good as the effect
of the original series. They asserted that some colloquialisms, slang and
terms especially in the situation comedies missed the original meanings
when those words were dubbed in Chinese. However, it was salient that y
the percentages of English used in each TV station decreased in terms of‘JI
dubbing in Mandarin (see Table 4.2). In TTV, the percentage of English
laguage used in the total programs was dropped from 12.87% in 1980 to
2.27% in 1988.

Table 4.2
P f 11 h i chTV tion in h 1 8 5

leg: [IV 1%) CIV (2o) 915172)
1980 12.87 15.05 1 1.75
1981 9.15 10.46 9.29

1 982 9.40 9.23 6.86

1 983 4.23 9.45 6.83
1984 3.65 5.47 6. 18
1985 8. 15 1 3.59 8.79
1986 4.98 13.36 10.30
1987 4.10 9.25 13.61
1988 2.27 6.40 1 1.17
1989 5.26 7.99 1 2. 15

53

Source: Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1978-1983, 1984-
1985, 1986-1987, 1988-1989.

,,

IThe percentage of the imports was still lower than 20% in Taiwan in
the 1980s The public TV program had higher proportion of the imports as
the beginning development of the three networks (see Table 4.3). But, the
imports of the public TV decreased gradually. Unlike the three commercial
TV stations, the imports of the public TV came from not only from the US.

but also the European countries.

 

Table 4.3
1 -': _-n u: . an - ti 'rnr.m .._ th lmrts in he ' ol' TV
11284-1989)
m: Domestic 1%) Imported1%) Total
1984- 1985 59.6 40.4 100
1986 61.2 38.8 100
1 987 64.4 35.6 1 00
1988 67.7 32.3 100
1989 74.9 25. 1 1 00

Source: Calculated from Television Yearbook of The Republic of China
1984-1985, 1986- 1987, 1988-1989.

The annual exported program hours were totally around 3000 to 4000
in the 19805 (see Table 4.4). In terms of the/large overseas Chinese
market, the exports could keep a certain volume. Ifhe US. was still the big
market for Taiwan's TV programs. Besides theIU..,S the major markets
were Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. I In Hong Kong, the
Taiwanese exported programs decreaed from 695.75 hours in 1975 to
155.5 hours in 1988. (Calculated from Television Yearbook of the Republic

54
of China, 1961-1975, 1988-1989.)

Table 4.4

x Pr H ur f Thr TV ati n i h 198
Year 11V 11_-_lour§) CTV1Hours) §T§1ngr§) Iota)
1980 636 1322.2 1 188.8 3147
1981 591.3 1 163 1 196.3 2950.6
1 982 1094.3 1 068.5 957.8 3 1 20.6
1 983 1262.5 1 278 952 3492.5
1984 1564.5 1462 1 150 4176.5
1985 818.1 1519.6 918 3255.7
1986 1321.5 1583.5 1085.2 3990.2
1987 1239 791.3 931.7 2962
1988 1074.5 1752.5 1085 3912
1989 1587.4 1581 N/ A MA

Source: Calculated from Television Yearbook of The Republic of China
1978-1983, 1984-1985, 1986-1987, 1988-1989.

./

I
1
‘4

\

In the late 19803, many political and economic policies reformed.
The Taiwanese News reports appeared in the three networks. I 8esides, the
third dialect, Hakka, also presented in the news reports and commercials.
When the stock market peaked as a casino, the news programs in the three
networks provided the analysis of the stocks' trend. In 1989, a popular
variety show, ”Lien Huan Pao", created a puppet show which performed as
government officials with an ironical way. However, the government
high-ranking officials were too sensitive to accept this humor. Therefore,
CT 5 cut this puppet show in 1990.

Many communication scholars came to discuss the problems of the
Taiwanese TV. Those scholars“ arguements assumed that TV was so

powerful and could manipulate people's minds.

55

Chen ( 1990) asserted that a good cultural production could express
the entire social formation. In a realistic modernism view, there wasa
represent relationship between cultural production and real world. For
example, "Lien Huan Pao" represented the social problems within its
comedic format. However, the Taiwanese 'TV didn‘t reflect, express, and
represent the real society but edited, constructed, and knited a ”reality
effect” which was just belonged to the TV world. People living in a new
TV realistic world, the real world didn't mean anything at all. “I

Kuo (1990) argued that the Taiwanese TV was manipulated for a long
time. The three networks occupied the public resource (public media) but
disregared the cutural responsibility. The way what they did was truely
commercial. The quality of the programs was really bad. All they provided
were entertainments. They produced stimuli to please the audiences. The
audiences repeated the reaction of stimuli. In this stimuli-reaction mode,
in fact, the audiences did not participate in and just accepted the TV
contents. In this situation, the audiences totally lost their autonomies
and their thinking capabilities. Those entertainments lacked the meanings
of creativity and enlightenment. People imitated the poses, the terms, the
values, the ideologies, the living styles and the thinking ways from WI

1‘ o A .1'11'111 1' (tel" V't h1‘-0 '

IrBy the mid 19803, the KMT became so successful at winning
elections under the the ground rules it has imposed that the regime can
envisage progressively shifting the legal basis of its legitimacy from past
elections on the mainland to future elections on Taiwan. As Winckler
points out, Taiwan begins a systemic transition from “hard" to 'soft'

authoritarianism. "Hard' authoritarianism on Taiwan has meant

Wé,

 

56
mainlander-technocratic rule under one-man dictatorship. “Soft" authori-
tarianism would imply joint mainlander-Taiwanese technocratic rule
under collective party leadership. The dominance of the "ruling party“
would still be guaranteed (Winckler, 1984).

I I, The KMT brought the joint mainlander-Taiwanese technocratic rule in
the Taiwanese TV industry. Instead of presenting the propaganda of anti-
communism and Chinese recovery in the 19603, TV contents shifted to be
more pluralisticf'INews could be reported in Taiwanese. The third dialect
appeared in the TV programs. Talents could discuss the government and
the parties in their performance. No more drama like “The Cold Spell” in
19703 rerun in the 19803.,IBut, unlike the emancipation of the new daily
newspaper, Broadcastingé'and Television Law still limited the TV contents.
Many sensitive political topics such as Taiwan lndependency were still
banedi}

I In terms of its authoritarianism, the Taiwanese TV banned the
popular Hong Kong drama series on the screens under a protectionism of
the domestic programs. But in the soft reform, it invited many producers
and talents from Hong Kong to progress the domestic programs. 'The drama
productions with Hong Kong style such as "Return Ming-Chu,‘ "The Peach
Blossom in (August; and ”Spring Returns," got a big hand from the
audiences. The inter-production between Honngong and Taiwan was based
on a high degree of cultural proximity. .As the Brazilian case in
Straubhaar's study (1991), there were regional similarities beyond
Language when Hong Kong dramas were dubbed in Chinese. '

I Following the socio-economic growth, the annual revenues of the

Taiwanese TV industry increased rapidly in the late 19803. Although there

57
werea series of social reforms, TV in Taiwan did not change so much,
especially in its political situationI In terms of the KMT‘s hegemonic
structure in the owenership, TV culture in Taiwan seemed difficult to be
emancipated. A3 White (1987) points out, a transformation of TV‘s
ideology would require a shift in the mode of production - a total

reorganization of ownership and control of the medium. I

CHAPTER F IVE: THE TAIWANESE TV IN THE 19905

IAIWAN IN THE EARLY 19905

Taiwan is still not a democracy. It is more democratic than authori-
tarian regimes, and it will be more democratic still by the mid-19903.
But, as Winckler (1988) asserts, its democratic practices will remain
subordinate to a party-state apparatus that reserves to itself the choice
of highest leaders and basic policies and defines the limits of political
competition.

‘ By the 19903, increased unofficial contact with the mainland will
have reaffirmed a public consensus that nobody wants to rejoin the
mainland but that formally declaring Taiwan independent would be
foglhardy (Winckler, 1988: 235). .
Taiwan, Asia's most dynamic economy of the 19803, is slowing down.
The economy is growing at its slowest pace in 5 years. In 1990, Taiwan's ’
gross national product (GNP) had been expected to grow by around 7%, but
with the stock market slide, and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, real GNP will
grow by 5.42% or less (Economist, 1990).

The crash of Taiwan‘s stock market in 1990 brings the likelihood
that the stock market has peaked as a casino. However, Taiwan has
recovered quickly from the 80% drop in the stock market in 1990. People
are returning to productive employment now that the stock market casino
has lost its appeal. Companies are being encouraged by government

incentives to improve training and invest in research and development.

58

59

{Economic growth, liquidity, and corporate earnings are all back on course.
IThe Peoples' Republic of China is quickly becoming an export processing
center for Taiwanese manufacturers. 1 Taiwanese exports have been
growing at an annualized rate of more than 50% in 1991 (Economist, 1990,
1991; Kurz and Wannamethee, 1991).
IV IN TAIWAN IN TW

The programs of the public TV are planning to broadcast over the UHF
system as ETS in the mid 19903. The period (9:00-9z30pm) in the prime
time which has been occupied by non-commercial programs since 1976
will return to the three commercial TV stations. I

I’m 1991, many TV programs especially drama series and varieties
used two languages in their dialogueI For example, a series named
“Between sister-in-laws and mother-inilaws" portrayed the relationship
between a mainlander family and a Taiwanese family. The talents used
both languages in the stories.

The political campaigns on TV were open in the December 1991

\

electionIBut all the political campaigns were required to be examined by
the Central Election Committee which was organized by the government.
The KMT focused on a topic of ”Your Old Friend“ The slogan was
'Sharing both the sweet and the bitter 40 years, we are always here. Your
old friend - KMT". This campaign emphasized the contribution of the
government and the harmony of mainlander and Taiwanese. There were
four stages showed in this campaign: (l)\T’aiwanese could not communicate
with mainlanders because of the different languages in the 19503; (Zflhe
living standard progressed in the 19603; (3) the generational change and

intermarriage bridged the ethnic gap between Taiwanese and mainlanders

60
in the 19703; (4)/the economic growth made all the people in Taiwan rich
in the 19803 (United Daily News, 1991).

The campaign of the opposition party, DPP,__focused on the political
reforms. Their slogan was “Let's establisflhwan independent Taiwanese
republic country.“ They asserted to initiate a new constitution and
insisted on direct election of president and anti-Chinese recovery.
However, by examination, the word "Taiwanese" in the slogan was cut by
the Central Election Committee (United Daily News, 1991; Lin, 1991).

Those campaigns were broadcasted only in 9:00-9:30 pm. The rating
decreased from 23% to 19% during 9 days. Huang, a chief manager in an
advertising company, said that it was hard to expect voters to watch TV
during that period. There was always low rating in that time slot from the
mid 19703 so far. The Central Election Committee didn‘t consider the
viewing habit of the audiences (Huang, 1991).

In the 1991 election, the KMT held its majority (over 70%). This
might be an indication that the ”crisis of confidence' of the KMT was not
so bad as had been thought.

In fact, when the limitations of the media such as newspaper have
been lifted, TV in Taiwan still plays the most conservative oneiIThe
political Taiwanization from the 19703 doesn't influence the personnel
structure of the three networks. In terms of the KMT's hegemonic
structure, the highest leaders and basic policy of the Taiwanese TV will

be still manipulated by the one-party authoritarianism.

_/

Hm .. . . "9.0!

CHAPTER SIX: RECONSIDERING IDEOLOGY IN TV CULTURE

From the Taiwanese case, there are three points to discuss the
ideology in TV culture:

I/( 1) The dominant classes are shaped by ideology more than they
shape it. The meanings of ideological representations on TV are not solely
for the audiences.

“(2) Many media critics are too far outside the culture they examine.
,(3) Emancipatory TV culture can stimulate media civilization.
IDEOLOGICAL REPRESENTATIONS 1N TV CULTURE

I'm the Taiwanese case, TV is actually manipulated by one party.

Although the emphasis of TV messages changes from the concept of
anti-communism and Chinese recovery in the 19603 to the social reforms
in the 19803, TV still serves for one party and represents the dominant
ideology. 0n the one hand, it is more democratic that the opposition party
can show on TV. On the other hand, it is pseudo-democratic that the
speech freedom of the opposition party is limited by the government
examination. However, the practice of ideological representations is not
an unilinear process for the various groups of the audiences.

Ix Cultural hegemonic process can be explained by three dimensions or
levels. ”First, there is 'effective' dominant culture. Second, there is
'residual‘ culture containing historical meanings and proctices which may
eventually become incorporated as part of dominant culture. Finally, there

is 'emergent' culture of new ideas, meanings, experiences, styles which

61

62
eventually become incorporated in some form, even though initially they
may constitute an oppositional or counter culture" (Billington, 1991227).

”In other. words, the hegemonic ideology changes in order to remain

We'd“
_ aw

Both Gramsci and Althusser emphasize the role of the state which
represents the dominant ideology through the social institutions. ' If
everything is under the supervision of the state, it is quite easy to see
why the only ideology that gets reproduced is the dominant one. But, the
question is how a society allows the relative freedom of civil institutions
to operate in the ideological field, day after day, without direction or
compulsion by the state. If hegemony explains everything in the sphere of
culture, it explains nothing. The cultural hegemony system is not a closed
system. It leaks and it remains to some extent competitive (Hall, 1985;
Gitlin, 1987).

In fact, dominant classes are shaped by ideology more than they
shape it. They are involved in an ideological mechanism more than the
people whom they want to influence are. To extend that they engage in
active deception, they disseminate propaganda, not ideology]1 “It is lived
experience that produces ideology, not the other way around? Ideology is
rooted in and expresses the activities out of which it emerges” (Burawoy,
1979:18).

Although TV represents the dominant culture, TV contents are
polysemic for the different social groups which can find in TV different
meanings that correspond to their differing social relations. I/The dominant
ideology is structured into the text as into the social system, but the

structure of both text and society allows space for resistance and

63
negotiationiI Because the TV text is more polysemic and more open, the
message is not solely in the text, but can be changed or worked on by the
audiences as they make their own interpretation of a program (Fiske,
1986, 1987). (Therefore, the meanings produced by ideological represen-
tations on TV are not as monolithic as have been thoughtI
R l T51 TV T R

TV, as a member of the family, takes place in domestic surroundings,
and is usually viewed in normal light conditions. The regime of viewing
TV is very different from cinema. TV doesn't encourage people to
concentrate on viewing it. Watching TV is not the only activity going on in
front of the TV set. It seems unusual to pay attention to viewing TV.
People watch TV and also do something (conversation, eating, sleeping,
tending children, reading, doing homework, etc). As Williams (1986)
asserts, TV creates a popular memory and it serves important human
interests not longer engaged by most serious art.

The Frankfurt school analysis of the culture industries as mass
deception has strongly influenced left views of popular culture. The
theorists like Adorno and Horkheimer assumed the power of mass culture
"to be monolithic and so pervasive that it virtually eradicated any
revolutionary potential in the masses“ (Modleski, 1986). f In this
perspective, many critics argue that TV is now dominated by various
forms of capitalist ideology. They see the cultural industries as
dominated by ”mind managers'iwho served as instruments of corporate-
capitalist rule (Kellner, 19871. I They emphasize that mass culture
manipulates its consumers. 7

Popular culture can be seen as a very active world of everyday

64

conversation and exchange. Jokes, idioms, characteristic forms not just
everyday dress but occasional dress, people consciously having a party,
making a do, marking an occasion. There is a sense in which everyday
gossip passes straight into a certain kind of serial (Heath and Skirrow,
1986). TV may be articulating those thingsI‘ But, the question is whether
the audiences totally lose their autonomies and their thinking capabilities
and directly imitate the poses, the terms, the values, the ideologies, the
living styles and the thinking ways from TV.

1n Hall‘s (1980) study, there are three forms in the audiences'
responses: dominant, negotiated, and oppositional.) According to Hall, the
dominant reading of a text accepts the text‘s messages at face value; the
negotiated response might dispute a particular claim while accepting the
overall system; and an oppositional response rejects the system in the
interests of the subordinate culture. Therefore, the way of reading a
message depends on the audience's political beliefs and general social
experience.

{1‘ This study may explains that the audiences are not completely
manipulated. Ilt would seem mass culture is no longer a problem for the
work of the 'Frankfurt school. But, critics seem to have the opposite
problem: “immersed in their culture, half in love with their subject, they
sometimes seem unable to achieve the proper critical distance from it”
(Modleski, 1986). In mass culture studies, as Williams (1986) points out,
“there is also the danger of narrowing our notion of text too much, of
analyzing 'the discrete single work,‘ and by doing so of missing the normal

or characteristic experience of mass culture."

W

[mom

65

Today, electronically transmitted culture in the broadcast media
occupies so much of pe0ple's leisure time. It seems that most people get
much of their information and view of the world from the electronic
media. Therefore, many communication scholars make a serious commit-
ments to these media. However, when media culture is manipulated by a
dominant culture and the structure of the media can not be changed , media
civilization may be more important than the arguement of the cultural
dominance. I

By T3... 1?..-91Y11123U00» people understand how the media produce the
meanings everyday. They rethink the messages transmitted by the media.
They may doubt the reliability of the messages. They receive the
information by the media but they judge things by themselves. But how
can a society reach the ideal of media civilization under a hegemonic
culture? 7

Although hegemonic ideology tends to legitimate dominant
institutions, values, and ways of life, it is not monolithic. Hegemonic
ideoogy is saturated with contradictions/Like "Lien Huan Poa' in Taiwan,
comedy and satire have often been effective means of the social criticism
and enlightenment. In Taiwan, there are more and more comedic varieties
In the 19903 but not many varieties present emancipatory nature. The
audiences rethink the govermental policies through satiric performace in
the comedies. This may be a good way to speake out for the different
voices from the dominant classes'. I

Emancipatory comedy provides/insights into the nature of the society
that break through ideological conceptions. Emancipatory laughter

suspends the logic of everyday reality; it is surreal and helps one to rise

66
above ideological preconceptions in order to recognize the workings of
everyday life. It could foster critical awareness by enabling one to laugh
at a miserable - and to see that life could be different (Kellner, l987).
Emancipatory TV culture stimulates media civilization. It increases
the opposite conscious which attacks the authority of the established

society.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

MARX

{From the cultural sociology view, the Taiwanese TV industry is
investigated in relation to the Taiwanese political system, economic
situation and cultural form! Through the investigation, the role of the
culture industry and the ideological representations behind the culture
industry are reconsidered.

TTV was started operation in I962; CTV went on the air in I969. In
the \l960s, Taiwan's TV, as an Ideological State Apparatus, delivered
messages 360111 anti-communism and Chinese recovery and strengthened
the ruling KMT‘s political status and its one-party authoritarianism.

In the I97OS, the third commercial network, CTS, was established.
In the TV ownership structure, there was a solid supersturcture formed by
political society (the government shares) and civil society (the private
shares). The provincial government, the KMT and the military were major
owners of the three networks. The special joint TV programs in 9:00-9:30
pm have represented the state policy since I976. Broadcasting and
Television Law was finally ratified after the Taiwanese TV started 14
years ago. TV contents presented the phenomenon of polarization: the
serious state ideology and the light entertainment.

In the early 19805, the Hong Kong drama series got a 70% rating in
Taiwan in terms of regional cultural proximity but banned by the three

networks in I984 for protecting the domestic programs. Following the

67

68
socio-economic growth, the annual revenues of the Taiwanese TV industry
increased rapidly in the late I980s Although there were a series of
social reforms, TV in Taiwan still be manipulated by the soft authoritari-
anism.

The political campaigns on TV were open in I99l but they were
required to be examined by the government. In fact, when the limitations
of the media such as newspaper have been lifted, TV in Taiwan still plays
the most conservative one.

From the Taiwanese case, there are three points to discuss the
ideology in TV culture: (I) The dominant classes are shaped by ideology
more than they shape it. The meanings of ideological representations on
TV are not solely for the audiences. (2) Many media critics are too far
outside the culture they examine. (3) Emancipatory TV culture can
stimulate media civilization.

PR M WITH TH STUDY

There are two problems in this study. First, many sources come from
the newspaper, magazines, and books which describe the situation at the
different time period. It must be careful to collect the evidences and
judge the reliability of the resources. For example, the Television
Yearbooks emphasize the progress of the TV industry. There are no
critical descriptions in those yearbooks. Therefore, it is dangerous to
believe everything that the yearbooks decribe.

Second, for ideological analysis, the researcher had better watch the
TV texts to analyze the meanings of texts. But in this research, all the
descriptions of the TV programs come from the literature of the

resources. It is hard to study in depth without examining the image

69

representations.

"»..{4=ggTH§R PERSPECTIVES

i
a
i
1

Today people live in the age of the electronic media. New media such
as cable TV, satellite become popular. The messages are received not only
by the domestic transmissions but also by the international distributions.
The sources of information become pluralization. The ideological repre-
sentations of the new information industry become more complex. Not
only the domestic dimension but the international dimension would be
considered. The cross-culture issue would be involved.

For the further research, as Luke (I989) points out,

the substance and form of television and radio broadcasting,
audio and videocassetes, computer hardware and software - as
key commodities in this growing web of global exchange -
should be reevaluated in this sort of ideology critique to
explore some of the new forms of power and ideology binding
together these new transnational human communities.

(Luke, I989z4)

In the process of informationalization, the new modes of domination and

the forms of resistance to the social, political, economic, and cultural

5
I
l

\-

transformations are likely examined.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX l

Article 4. of the Rules of the Control of Broadcasting and Television
Personnel

APPENDIX |

Article 4. of the Rules of the Control of Broadcasting and Television
Personnel (Approved as per Executive Yuan Letter Tai (66) Wen No. 6386,
Dated July 30,1977) (Promulgated as per Government Information
Office Letter (66) Te Po No. 08737, Dated August 6, I977)

ALtJ'flLA With the exception of chairmen and members of boards of
directors of private stations who do not execute operations directly, the
responsible personnel of broadcasting and TV enterprises shall have one of
the following qualifications:

(I) Having been responsible personnel of broadcasting and/or TV
enterprises or publisher of journals.

(2) Having been chiefs of departments of broadcasting and/or TV
enterprises of r journals for three years or more.

(3) Having been public functionaries of Recommended Appointment
rank or equivalent rank or higher rank for seven years or more.

(4) Possessing professorships approved by the Ministry of Education
and having been professors teaching related subjects.

(5) Graduates of domestic or foreign universities, colleges or junior
colleges recognized by the Ministry of Education, majoring in related

subjects, who have had work ecperience in broadcasting and/or television
for ten years or more.

Source: Television Yearbook of The Republic of China i976- l 977

70

APPENDIX II

The Composition of the GNP for Agriculture, Industry and Service Industry

APPENDIX 11

The Composition of the GNP for Agriculture, Industry and Service Industry

 

 

 

 

Yea; Agrigglture 1%) industry 1%) Service(%) A/ I (Times)
1952 35.9 18.0 46.1 1.99
1953 38.3 17.7 44.0 2. I 6
1954 31.7 22.2 46.1 1.43
1955 32.9 21.1 46.0 1.56
1956 31.6 22.4 46.0 1.41
1957 31.7 23.9 44.4 1.33
1958 31.0 23.9 45.1 1.30
1959 30.4 25.7 44.9 1.18
1960 32.8 24.9 43.3 1.32
1961 31.4 25.0 43.6 1.26
1962 29.2 25.7 45. 1 1.14
1963 26.7 28.2 45. 1 0.94
1 964 28.2 28.9 42.9 0.98
1965 27.3 28.6 43. 1 0.95
l 966 26.2 28.8 45.0 0.91
1967 23.8 30.8 45.4 0.77
1968 22.0 32.5 45.5 0.68
1969 18.8 34.6 46.6 0.45
1970 1 7.9 34.7 47.4 0.52
1971 14.9 36.9 48.2 0.40
1972 1 4. 1 40.4 45.5 0.35
1973 14.1 43.8 42.1 0.32
1974 14.5 41.2 44.3 0.35
1975 14.9 39.2 45.9 0.38
1976 13.4 42.7 43.9 0.31
1977 12.5 43.7 43.8 0.29
1978 1 1.3 45.5 43.2 0.25
1979 1 0.4 45.7 43. 1 0.23

 

71

72

1 980 9.3 45.3 45.4
198 1 8.7 45.2 46. 1
1982 8.7 43.9 47.4

* A/I - Agriculture / Industry

0.21
0.19
0.20

Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, Council for Economic Planning

and Development, Executive Yuan, 1983

APPENDIX 111

Annual Production and Sales of TV Set in Taiwan

[EAR QUTPUT QOME§TI§ 5ALE§ QVER§EA§ 5ALE§
1962 4,400

1963 7,600

1964 31,055

1965 49,540

1966 66,260 65, 105

1967 1 1 1,71 1 24,280 65,964
1968 650,205 182,000 56,121
1969 947,539 247,413 340,271
1970 1,254, 125 378,000 705,465
1971 1,891,846 381,300 1,602,001
1972 3,590,752 336,000 3,175,807
1973 4,541,955 386,332 4,107,233
1974 4,036,204 410,644 3,764,623
1975 2,934,971 396,515 2,592,381
1976 3,850,046 414,760 3,642,214
1977 4,926,000 474,000 4,454,000
1978 7,096,000 593,000 6,159,000
1979 6,698,000 71 1,000 5,955,000
1980 4,041,000 655,000 6,517,000
1981 6,924,000 544,000 6,333,000
1982 4,724,000 497,000 4,352,000
1983 5, 152,000 417,000 4,752,000

Annual Production and Sales of TV Set in Taiwan

APPENDIX 111

Note: Domestic sales include both locally manufactured and imported sets.
After 1977, the number below one thousand doesn't count.

Source: Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1961-1975,
1976-1977, 1978-1983.

73

APPENDIX 1V

Annual Increase of TV Sets in Taiwan

Annual Increase of TV Sets in Taiwan

APPENDIX IV

_Y_EA_B BZW §ET§ COLOR §ET§ TOTAL
1 962 4, 400 4,400
1963 12,000 12,000
1964 43,035 43,035
1965 92,595 92,595
1966 157,700 157,700
1967 181,980 181,980
1968 363,980 363,980
1969 606,880 1 13 606,993
1970 971,580 5,813 977,393
1971 1,290,525 37,1 13 1,327,628
1972 1,516,985 97,1 13 1,614,098
1973 1,774,739 160,588 1,935,327
1974 2,028,436 293,255 2,321,691
1975 2,053,750 482,456 2,179,346
1976 1,963,772 744,181 2,346,693
1977 1,765,000 1,076,000 2,841,000
1978 1,493,000 1,523,000 3,016,000
1979 1,322,000 1,914,000 3,236,000
1980 1,171,000 2,526,000 3,697,000
1981 1,087,000 3,157,000 4,244,000
1982 919,000 3,788,000 4,707,000
1983 787,000 4,448,000 5,235,000

Note: After 1977, the number below one thousand doesn't count.

Source: Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1961-1975,
1976-1977, 1978-1983.

74

APPENDIX V

The Statistic List of the Taiwanese TV AD

APPENDIX V

The Statistic List of the Taiwanese TV AD (Unit: NT$10,000)

 

 

 

Rate in A11 A0

Yea; Worth of TV AD Total Amou_nt (28) Rate of Growth(%)
1962 136 0.50

1963 706 2.30 419. 1 2
l 964 2,400 6.00 239.94
1965 4,200 9.30 75.00
1966 7,430 13.50 76.90
1967 1 1,200 16.50 50.74
1968 14,000 I 16.20 25.00
1 969 20,500 1 8.69 46.43
1970 42,600 29.40 107.80
1971 44,210 29.50 3.78
1972 54,500 32.40 23.28
1973 72,450 31.41 32.94
1974 90,600 3 1.37 25.05
1975 100,700 30.1 1 1 1.15
1976 132,000 31.49 31.08
1977 159,500 31.35 20.83
1978 203,000 31.81 27.27
1979 248,850 30.87 22.59
1980 295,380 28.66 1 8.70
1981 340,300 29.92 15.21
1 982 347,400 29.20 2.09
1983 456,000 31.75 31.26

Source: Taipei Advertising Agencies Association.

75

APPENDIX V1

Chapter III. Program Control of the Broadcasting and Television Law

APPENDIX V1

Chapter 111. Program Control of the Broadcasting and Television Law
(Promulgated by the President on January 8, 1976. Amendment of this
Law promulgated on June, 7, 1982.)

Chapter 111. PROGRAM CONTROL

Article 16.

Broadcasting and television programs are classified into the
following categories:

(1) Newscast and publicity of government policies and orders.

(2) Education and culture.

(3) Public service.

(4) Entertainment.

Article 17.

The time of the (1), (2) and (3) programs of the foregoing Article
shall not be less than 45 per cent of the total weekly broadcasting time in
broadcasting stations and 50 per cent of the total weekly television time
in TV stations.

Entertainment programs shall be aimed at promoting Chinese culture
as well as ethics, democracy and science and shall be educational.

The standards of contents and the distribution of time of these
programs shall be stipulated by the 610 (the Government Information
Office of the Executive Yuan).

Ari 1 1 .

The distribution of programs for specialized stations and those with
special missions shall be made by the G10 in conjunction with other
government agencies concerned.

Afljglg 19.

Self-produced programs shall not be less than 70 per cent of all
broadcasting and television programs.
76

77
F oreign-language programs shall be presented with Chinese subtitles
or with Mandarin narration. If necessary, G10 may ask to dub the programs
in Chinese.

Article 20,

The stations shall mainly use Mandarin in domestic broadcasts and
shall decrease gradually the use of dialects. The proportion between the
Mandarin and the dialects shall be decided by the 610 according to actual
requirements.

A i l 1.

No contents of Broadcasting and television programs shall be allowed
to :

(I) Be detrimental to national interests or national dignity.

(2) Contravene the national policy of anti-Communism and mainland
recovery and the Government's laws and regulations.

(3) Instigate people to commit crimes or disobey laws and orders.

(4) Be detrimental to the mental and physical health of children.

(5) Impair public order and customs.

(6) Spread rumors and heresies and mislead the people.

Article 22.

No program shall be allowed to comment on legal actions under
investigation or trial, on judicial personnel handling the cases or on the
parties involved. No program shall report the devate of lawsuits wherein
publicity is prohibited.

Ari 1 3.

The stations shall make corrections of errors in the same program or
at the same time of the original program within seven days upon receipt of
requests from the interested parties, and the correction must be made
within 15 days from the day of broadcast. Otherwise, the stations shall
reply in writing informing the complainants of their justifications of the
reports in question.

If the mistaken reports have caused damages to the rights and
interests of the parties concerned, the stations, their responsible
officials and employees concerned shall be liable civilly or criminally.

78
Article 24.

If broadcasting and television commentaries involve other people or
agencies or organizations and are detrimental to their rights and
interests, the stations concerned shall not refuse any request from the
parties mentioned for an equal chance of defense.

Article 25.
All programs other than news shall be subject to review by the 610.
The procedure of such review shall be established by the 610.

Article 26.
The 610 may designate all public and private stations to jointly or

separately broadcast such programs as news and publicity of governmental
orders and policies.

531919.221
The stations shall submit to the G10 beforehand the timetables of
programs for knowledge. This shall apply to changes of programs.

Article 28.
The import or export of any kind of broadcasting and television

programs shall be authorized by the 610.

Article 29.
Broadcasting of any foreign program through the relaying facilities of

international telecommunications or relaying of domestic programs for
foreign use shall be authorized by the 610.

W

The establishment of broadcasting television program supply
enterprises shall have the approval of the 610. Article 21, Article 25,
Article 28 and Article 34 shall be applied to the program contents and

related management matters of the enterprises.

Source: Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1978-1983

APPENDIX V|1

Chapter III. Program Control of the Enforcement Rules of the Broadcasting
and Television Law

APPENDIX V11

Chapter III. Program Control of the Enforcement Rules of the Broadcasting
and Television Law

Chapter 111. PROGRAM CONTROL

Acticle 13.

The news programs referred to in paragraph one of Article 16 of this
Law include news reports, analyses and live telecast or live radio
broadcast; publicizing of government policies and orders refers to
introduction to government measures and achievements.

Article 14

The education and culture programs referred to in paragraph two of
Article 16 shall be aimed at furthering the Chinese culture, promoting
social education, supplementing school education, and developing
children's intelligence and ability. The standards are as follows:

(1) To increase the citizens' knowledge in keeping with the needs of
society.

(2) To expound scientific technology and various vocational skills.

(3) To introduce refinement in life, public morality, physical culture,
hygiene and ethical eduation.

(4) To augment public knowledge of history and geography, expound
traditional culture, and inspire national spirit and consciousness.

(5) To introduce or commetn on literature, music, fine art, drama and
dance to enable better appreciation.

(6) To offer air-school and supplementary education programs.

Ar ' l 1

The public service programs referred to in paragraph three of Article
16 of this Law are the weather reports, time reports, urgent
announcements, public safety and other related social service items. The
standards are as follows:

(1) The broadcast, in principle, shall be propagated free of charge,
and when a major problem related to the public interest is referred to, a

79

80
satisfactory response shall be made.

(2) During the hours of broadcasting, a weather report and a time
report shall be made at least once every four hours. In the case of a
television broadcast, a time report must be made on the hour. All such
reports must be based on information supplied by competent agencies.

(3) In cases of natural calamities and emergencies, reports shall be
inserted from time to time and measure for dealing with the crisis shall
be included.

Artigle 16.

The entertainment programs mentioned in paragraph four of Article
16 refer to programs not included in paragraphs one to three, including
singing, music, dramas, novels, stories, jokes, riddle solution, dancing,
acrobatic performance, vaudeville and other entertainment programs.

Article 17.
In addition to observing the provisions of Article 21, radio and
television broadcasting programs shall be produced in keeping with the

principles.

mm

The percentages of time allocation in radio and television
broadcasting stated in paragraph three of Article 17 of this Law are
prescribed as follows:

(1) Newscasts and programs relatign to government policies and
orders: No less than 15 percent of the weekly total broadcasting time for a
radio broadcasting station and no less than 20 percentof the weekly total
time for a television broadcasting station.

(2) Educaiton and culture programs: No less than 20 percent of the
weekly total broadcasting time for both radio and television broadcasting
stations.

(3) Public service programs: No less than 10 percent of the weekly
total broadcasting time for both radio adn television broadcasting
stations.

(4) Entertainment programs: No more than 55 percent of the weekly
total broadcasting time for a radio station and no more than 50 percent of
the weekly total broadcasting time for a television station.

81
Additional broadcasting time required in the execution of a
government assignment shall not be subject to the restrictions set forth
in the foregoing paragraphs.

Article 19.

The percentages of domestic broadcasts using Mandarin shall be no
less than 55 percent in the case of an AM radio broadcasting station and no
less than 70 percent in the case of an FM radio broadcasting station or a
television broadcasting station. The use of dialects shall be reduced
gradually and the percentage shall be reviewed and regulated by the 610 in
accordance with practical considerations.

Article 20.

A professional station or a station with a specific mission shall
devote at least 60 percent of its total broadcasting time to the broadcast
of professional and specific programs. The time allocated to other
programs and the proportion between the use of Mandarin and dialects
shall reported with their detailed justifications and the duration of
implementation to the 610 for approval.

Ar i l 1

Except for newscasts, the programs and scripts that are required to
be examined by the G10 in compliance with Article 25 of this Law shall be
submitted to the 610 for examining in accordance with the following
procedure:

(I) An application form together with the sound tape, video tape or
film concerned shall be submitted within severn days before broadcasting.
No broadcasting or screenign shall be made before a certificate of G10
authorization has been granted.

(2) An application form together with the script of a drama program
and/or skits inserted for review. No broadcasting or screening shall be
made without GIO approval.

In case of disagreement with the 610 decision, the concerned station
may file a written application within 14 days after receiving the notice
requesting another review, after which period the application will not be
accepted. If necessary, scholars and experts may be invited to participate
in the second review.

82
For programs not requiring GIO examination, the stations shall be
responsible for reviewing them before broadcasting. The sound tape, video
tape, film, manuscript and other materials relatedto the program shall be
kept for 15 days for reference.

Article 22.
A station shall submit the timetable of its programs to the 610 for

approval ten days before broadcasting. Upon approval, the timetable shall
not be changed except under the following conditions:

(1) The changed timetable of programs is submitted for approval two
days before broadcasting.

(2) A last-minute change is warranted for a special reason and an
inserted announcement or immediate explanation of the change is made.

In case of a change of timetable necessitated by paragraph two,
reasons for the change and contents of the changed program shall be
reported to the G10 for reference within 24 hours after broadcasting.

Article 23.

Procedures for importing foreign radio and/or television programs by
a station shall be as follows:

(1) Application for a certificate of delivery from the 610 shall be
made with a Bill of Lading , and customs clearance shall be completed
with the 610 certificate.

(2) An imported program shall be coupled with a broadcasting
authorization certificate and it shall not be broadcast until a broadcasting
certificate is obtained. If the program is in the form of a film or a video
tape, the applicant shall pay the examining fees.

(3) If broadcasting of the imported program is prohibited, it shall be
returned to the sender immediately.

Actjclg 24.

Procedures for exporting a radio or television broadcasting program
shall be as f ollows:

(1) An application form shall be filled out and filed with the 610 for
an export certificate. If the program is a film or video tape, the applicant
shall pay the examining fee.

(2) The applicant shall complete customs clearance with an export
certificate.

83
(3) When an imported foreign program is to be sent abroad, an export
certificate is required.

Articlc 25,

With 610 approval, a radio and television program supplier is entitled
to submit scripts an programs to the 610 for examination and to import
and export radio and television programs. In such case, the provisions of
paragraphs one and two fo Article 21, Article 23 and Article 24 of this
Law are applicable mutatis mutandis.

Article 26.

Procedures for applying for the use of international telecommuni-
cations facilities for relaying radio or television broadcasting programs in
accordance with Article 29 of this Law shall be as follows:

(I) An applicationshall be filed with the 610.

(2) With 3 G10 certificate, the applicant may file an application with
the International Telecommunications Administration of the Ministry of
Communications for lease of a channel.

(3) An applications shall be filed with the 610 for examining all
domestic programs which are to be relayed abroad, except for newscasts,
which shall be dealt with in accordance with other relevant rules. If the
program to be relayed is a film or a video tape, the applicant shall pay the
examining fee.

If a foreign program is to be relayed to the Republic of China, the
station concerned is required to make an audio or video recording for
examination, when necessary, before it is broadcast.

Article 27.

If a foreign performer is invited to take part in a domestic television
program, the station shall act in accordance with the regulations
concerned, report in detail on the contents f o the performance and submit
a biographical sketch and a photo of the performer to the G10 for approval.

Article 28.

A broadcasting station shall keep a daily log containing such entries
as the titles of all programs, languages used, names of the anchor persons,
producing units and a brief description of the contents of the programs and
advertisements.

84
THe form of the log may be determined by the station itself, but the
log shall be kept for two years for reference.

Article 29.

A radio broadcasting station shall announce the name of the statoin,
call letters and frequency at the start, the end and during a change of
program. A brief announcement of the station's name shall be made once
every half hour, depending on circumstances, to facilitate identification.

Television and radio stations with special missions are to operate
with reference to the foregoing provisions.

Source: Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1978-1983

APPENDIX VIII

The Program Statistics in the International Commercial TV Systems

APPENDIX VIII

The Program Statistics in the International Commercial TV Systems

Entertain- Public
Ccuntcy Ncws 1%: Education 1%) meat 1%) Scrvicc 1%)
British 18A 17.0 18.0 65.0 0
USA. 13.5 2.5 80.0 4.0
Canada 1 3.0 15.0 70.0 2.0
Australia 1 1.0 4.0 84.0 1.0
Philippine 15.3 1.0 77.4 6.3
Japan 1 1.0 8.0 71.0 10.0
Guam 5.6 1.0 82.4 1 1.0
Hong Kong 8.5 12.5 75.0 4.0
Lebanon 13.0 1 1.0 73.0 3.0
Nicaragua 2.0 8.0 90.0 0
Argentina 13.6 9.3 71.4 5.7
Paraguay 1 2.0 12.0 73.0 3.0
Trinidad 12.3 10.8 70.1 6.8
Guatemala 8.3 2.4 87.9 2.4
Ecuador 1 3.6 5.2 72.5 8.7

Source: Lee (1984: 21 -22); based on World Radio and TV Handbook,

1 982

85

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