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A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF TV IN TAIWAN: RETHINKING THE CULTURE INDUSTRY AND IDEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Ву

Ming-Chu Chen

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Telecommunication

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From the cultural sociology view, the Taiwanese TV industry is investigated in relation to the Taiwanese political system, economic situation and cultural form. Through the investigation, the role of the culture industry and the ideological representations behind the culture industry are reconsidered.

In the 1960s, Taiwan's TV, as an Ideological State Apparatus, strengthened the ruling KMT's political status. The provincial government, the KMT and the military were major owners of the three networks. In the 1970s, TV contents presented the phenomenon of polarization: the serious state ideology and the light entertainment. Although there were a series of social reforms in the 1980s, TV in Taiwan still be manipulated by the soft authoritarianism.

Finally, there are three points to discuss the ideology in TV culture:

(1) The dominant classes are shaped by ideology more than they shape it.

The meanings of ideological representations on TV are not solely for the audiences. (2) Many media critics are too far outside the culture they examine. (3) Emancipatory TV culture can stimulate media civilization.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

TV, as a culture industry, produces cultural productions so that TV viewing becomes a cultural practice and TV functions as cultural forum of contemporary society (Newcomb and Hirsch, 1987; Fiske and Hartley, 1988; Lewis, 1991). The internal organization of TV as well as the content presented from TV attract many media researchers to discuss by either empricism or criticism. What's the matter with TV? This paper focuses on the TV industry per se and investigates the Taiwanese case within the historical context.

About the size of Massachusetts and Connecticut combined, Taiwan is located in the western Pacific Ocean, 100 miles off the coast of mainland China, 200 miles north of the Philippines and about 700 miles south of Japan. Rugged foothills and mountains cover two-thirds of the island, forming a backbone of the island. Forests stretch over half the island. Only a quarter of the land is arable. As of July 1989, Taiwan has a population of about 20 million, with a desity of 550 per square mile. Approximately 84 percent of the population are Taiwanese, 14 percent are mainland Chinese and 2 percent are aborigines. Over 60 percent of the

^{1.} Chinese immigration to Taiwan began as early as the T'ang dynasty (618-907). In 1628, the Dutch took control of the island. In 1683, the Manchus of mainland China conquered the island and made Taiwan a province of China. The island was ceded to Japan following the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 and was under Japanese control until 1945. In 1949, the advancing communist forces of Mao Tse-tung forced President Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist government and nearly two million soldiers to flee from the mainland to Taiwan. These two million soldiers are called "mainlanders" and the early immigrants are called "Taiwanese".

people live in urban areas.

Proposals for the establishment of TV stations in the Republic of China² were first heard as early as 1947. But it was not until May 16, 1957 that the first demonstration of TV broadcasting was held in Taipei. It took another four years before the first TV station, Taiwan TV Enterprise (TTV), was born. After TTV started on Oct. 10, 1962. China Television Company (CTV) went on the air on Oct. 31, 1969, and the Chinese TV Service (CTS) started operation on Oct. 31, 1971. These are the three commercial television networks in Taiwan.

TTV is a joint venture of the Taiwanese Provincial Government and private Taiwanese and Japanese interests. CTV is owned by the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party, private radio stations and other private investors. CTS stocks are owned by the Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Education and private investors. The government and the ruling party are major owners of the three networks, but they are run as commercial enterprises. The government ownership in the form of commercial system influences the future of the Taiwanese TV industry as a whole.

Like other mass media, TV technological innovation and usage involved the complicated history of social interest group's control. Mass media become significant tools of social control. These social tools are being used to transmit and maintain the dominant ideology with the assistance of those who control communications technologies and businesses.

^{2.} After the KMT moved to Taiwan in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government considered itself to be the legal government of all China. The Republic of China is the official name of the state and Taiwan is just one province in China.

In 1949, the KMT lost Mainland China and moved the seat to Taiwan. This party governed Taiwan under the dominated one-party system which was so called as "an authoritarianism party" (Winckler, 1984). After the destruction of World War II, Taiwan's social economy was totally out of order during the early 1950s. Taiwan was poor and underdeveloped. In this situation, the KMT brought the idea of TV development to Taiwan. There was little capital available with the society so the government became the major investor in TV development. But, instead of developing public TV system, the government ran TV as commercial system. A serious problem, cultural conflict between mainlanders and Taiwanese, arose in the 1950s; the most obvious demarcation line lay in linguistic differences. In order to consolidate the regime, the KMT cultivated the strong idea of anti-communism and mainland recovery into the Taiwanese minds. Under the manipulation of the KMT, TV became an efficient tool not only in language education but also in political propaganda.

In the terrible shadows of chaos and poverty in the 1950s, the government as well as the mass focused their attention on the Taiwanese socio-economic establishment and development. Through their endeavors, the Taiwanese created an extremely successful economy. Taiwan's per capita gross national product rose from US\$50 in 1952 to US\$6,400 in 1988. In 1987, trade reached US\$89 billion, with a surplus of US\$19 billion, and foreign exchange reserves reached US\$70 billion, one of largest levels of any country in the world (Wu, 1991).

The TV industry in Taiwan was established and developed as a part of the social formation. Although Taiwan has participated in the economic miracle of East Asian growth, it did not shake off its heritage of continental political ideals which was characterized by its mainland recovery. The program schedule revealed that in the 1970s, there were national broadcasting programs which the three commercial networks broadcasted simultaneously everyday during the prime time between 9:00pm and 9:30pm. In the 1980s, this period (9:00pm-9:30pm) was occupied by Public TV programs which did not carry any commercials. The mix of public programs and commercials programs in the same channels combined the characteristics of government ownership and commercial operation. In addition, the invasion of Public TV programs in prime time results in the abrupt decrease of rating after 9:00pm and influences the viewing habit of audiences.

According to the Taiwanese Broadcasting and Television Law, TV stations have the important missions of anti-communism, mainland recovery and Chinese cultural renaissance, and the number of Taiwanese programs must decrease gradually. The proportion of Taiwanese programs is even smaller than the proportion of American programs in Taiwan. Again, the TV industry plays a role as a political tool, yet, the three commercial TV stations are also completely profit—motivated. Their annual revenues have increased rapidly. Unfortunately, although the socioeconomic takeoff has brought about the continuous increases in revenues of the three commercial stations, many Taiwanese TV experts and scholars (Lee,1984; Wu,1986; Kuo, 1990; Huang,1990) agree that the quality of TV programs has not progressed at all.

Since the late 1980s, Taiwanese society has changed. The political atmosphere has loosened up and people no longer insist on Chinese recovery. The martial law, in force for 38 years, has been lifted and

opposition parties have been legalized. Travel to the People's Republic of China has been opened. Limitations on publication of new daily newspapers³ have been cancelled. Hair restrictions for high school students⁴ have been relaxed. The Taiwanese society was filled with the atmosphere of the system emancipation. In the TV industry, news programs with Taiwanese language emerged. Many TV programs, such as drama series and varieties, combined two languages (Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese) within the conversations. The public TV station is to be established on it own and its TV programs will be separated from the commercial system in the 1990s.

In an analysis of the development of the entire TV industry, the social context of the specific time period is a crucial factor. The research problems in this paper are:

why does the government possess the major ownership of the TV stations but run them commercially? In this situation, what ideology represents in the TV culture and how does it work? From a cultural viewpoint, what implications does the TV industry have?

Does the ruling class, the KMT, emancipate the Taiwanese TV following the social reforms? How does TV serve as a centralization tool for the KMT? What content and meanings does the TV industry present within the interaction between media and society? What TV culture is created through ideological representations in the social evolution?

^{3.} After 1949, the KMT regulated that only 35 newspapers could publish in Taiwan and no more added. In addition, each newpaper could not publish more than 3 sheets of paper.

^{4.} In the hair restrictions for high school students, boys' hair must be crew cuts and girls' hair could not be longer than the end of their ear lobes.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The bureaucratic-commercial alliance of the Taiwanese TV industry

The Taiwanese commercial TV system is built around an alliance of government bureaucracy and the ruling KMT with private commercial interests. In Lee's research (1980), he points out two implications of the TV culture in the disharmony between a political ideology and an economic reality.

First, the steady economic development has contributed tremendously to the establishment of a sophisticated and elaborate media infrastructure. Taiwan's small geographical coverage also makes it possible for television to reach a 100% penetration potential, with nearly 95% of the households equipped with television [in 1978]. Television, being a mass medium, has to weigh a Chinese cultural ideal against predominantly local Taiwanese customs and preferences — especially along liguistic lines.

Second, conversely, the Chinese political and cultural ideology dictates, in principle, that television should be used to promote the grand preconceived goal of a Chinese unity. The results are twofold. One is a conscious effort to resist the encroachment of foreign media influences, while the other is a suppression of cultural, or at least linguistic, localism. (Lee, 1980:147)

TV in Taiwan has been commercialized after the Amercian example. For the national policy, TV is responsible for the mission of anti-communism, Mainland recovery and Chinese cultural renaissance. Why was TV commercialized if the government was really determined to harness it to the goal of "Chinese cultural renaissance"? The poverty of national economy in the early 1960s made it difficult to bear the cost of a public

Social - Culture/political

TV without commercial subsidy. It was also possible that the government, although paying lip service to the cultural mission of mass media, did not appreciate the potential of the medium. In fact, the nation went without an integrated broadcasting policy for an extended period of time until the formal passage of the Broadcasting Television Act in 1976.

In Lee's study, he asserts that "media imperialism" does not fit Taiwan's experience very well, as it relates to the control of American multinational media conglomerates, in the production and dissemination of media products, and their cultural impacts. Taiwan is one of the most self-reliant nations in the media realm. Lee mentions: first, this low media dependence is a partial reflection of the Taiwan government's cultural pride. Second, the market mechanism and the government's cultural pride can be viewed as the structural constraints imposed upon the diffusion of innovations process. Third, Taiwan's low TV dependence appears to have been made possible by a flourishing movie industry before the rise of TV. Fourth, oligopolistic competition has reduced foreign imports and intensified indigenous entertainment efforts to cater to the mass market. Coversely, oligopolistic competition has contributed to a content homogeneity and has frustrated television's capacity to fulfill a cultural goal. Fifth, Taiwan has become an important regional media production "subcenter," exporting about 3340 hours of TV programs per year - mostly to the overseas Chinese population in the United States, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia. However, almost all the export programs are drama serials and variety shows which have little to do with the Chinese culture in any sense and little relevance to the society (Lee, 1980:159-60).

The role of government in the Taiwanese TV is not limited to its majority ownership. Government has great control over the industry's major appointments, finance, and content. There is a high overlap of political and media elites, or the bureaucratic-business complex, which serves as an expedient and powerful vehicle of state subordination. Those who get high positions in the TV stations have undergone a political socialization process so ingrained with the dominant value and ideology that they are unlikely to offend or worry the ruling regime. The futher investigation, as followings, comes out from Hsueh's research.

The KMT's hegemonic structure in the Taiwanese TV industry

Why cannot the Taiwanese TV run smoothly and why cannot the quality of the programs progress? Chau (1982) asserts that the most serious problem is the system and the policy run in the Taiwanese TV industry. Government owns TV but they don't know how to run it effectively. The high-ranking officials never seriously consider who are really qualified to be the directors in the TV industry. Because they are not professional, all the rules that they regulate are not pratical. Nobody cares how to run it successfully. To be a chairperson or a director in the Taiwanese TV must have rich experience of political work in the KMT. The problem is those chairpersons and directors never understand how to manage in this commercial TV system. What they really do is to be government officials, not managers.

In Hsueh's study (1988), he points out the KMT's hegemonic structure in the board of chairpersons and directors in the Taiwanese TV industry. He analyzes all the chairpersons' and directors' background as followings:

First, there are 10 persons who have served as chairpersons in the

three TV stations from 1962 to 1988. Of three chairpersons in TTV, two are Taiwanese and one is a mainlander; in CTV, all three are mainlanders; in CTS, two are Taiwanese and two are mainlanders. Of these ten chairpersons, four have had special training from the National Defense Graduate School where KMT cultivates high-ranking politicians, and two have worked in that graduate school. All chairpersons in the three TV stations are either politicians or businessmen linked to the KMT's elites.

Second, there were 13 directors and 16 vice directors in 1962–1988. But, in Hsueh's analysis, there are 10 vice directors who are not described in *The Contemporary Who's Who in the Republic of China*. Therefore, he only lists 19 personal files which include all directors' background. He finds that all these 19 persons are mainlanders. There are no Taiwanese in charge of director's position in the Taiwanese TV industry. Of 13 directors, six come from the Military Academy and four graduate from the colleges operated by the KMT. There are only 3 directors majoring in related communication subjects. Most directors are not trained professionally for their positions. The average of 16 vice directors' education level is higher than the average of 13 directors'. But, only two vice directors have gotten a promotion as directors. Most directors are not assigned from interior promotion of the TV stations but from outside organizations. The director's position is linked to the KMT's political system or propaganda system.

Third, according to Article 4. of the Rules for the Control of Broadcasting and Television Personnel (see Appendix I.), there are few chairmen and directors qualified. Those who are eligible come from the KMT's propaganda organizations such as the Cultural Committee. It is

more important and practical for the KMT to control all the high-ranking positions in the three TV stations than to establish a complete and detail rule or law. That is why government didn't promulgate the Broadcasting and Television Law until 1976 when TTV had started 14 years ago. The KMT actively controls the media for their propaganda of anti-communism and mainland recovery. It uses mass media to achieve its social intention – the consensus of Taiwanese.

The sociology of culture

Culture, as a central ideal, creates the idea of determination. It is "an idea that lurks behind every corner of social inquiry, an idea that despite its almost frightening simplicity, can adopt a baffling array of shapes and forms" (Lewis, 1991).

For Williams (1982), culture, as the active cultivation of the mind, can be distinguished two main kinds:

(i) an emphasis on the 'informing spirit' of a whole way of life, which is manifest over the whole range of social activities but is most evident in 'specifically cultural' activities - a language, styles of art, kinds of intellectual work; and (b) an emphasis on 'a whole social order' within which a specifiable cutture, in styles of art and kinds of intellectual work, is seen as the direct or indirect product of order primarily constituted by other social activities. (Williams, 1982: 9-10)

People distinguish a range of meanings from "(i) a developed state of mind - as in 'a person of culture', 'a cultural person' to (ii) the processes of this development - as in 'cultural interests', 'cultural activities' to (iii) the means of these processes - as in culture as 'the arts' and 'humane intellectual works'" (Williams, 1982:11). From the sociology of culture,

social meanings are created through cultural practices and cultural productions which are formed by cultural institutions and formations. Culture has been determined by differently designated social processes – particular kinds of political or economic order. Cultural sociology is concerned with the social processes of all cultural production, including those forms of production which can be designated as ideologies (Williams, 1982:30).

Williams identifies two traditions of analysis in the sociology of the culture: the tradition of observational analysis and the alternative tradition. The tradition of observational analysis is a developing interest in cultural institutions at that point when, through actual social developments in the modern mass media, there are major institutions and their products which can be studied by already generally available methods. Three useful kinds of study can be distinguished, of (i) the social and economic institutions of culture and, as alternative definetions of their products, of (ii) their content and (iii) their effects (Williams, 1982:17).

Outside observational sociology there is an early convergence between social theories of culture and what has been more specifically philosophical, historical and critical theories and studies of art. In this alternative tradition, Marxist tradition has been especially active and many studies combine with cultural history and analysis, and general art history and criticism. In modern studies, there are three broad emphases in this field: (i) the social conditions of art, (ii) social material in art works, and (iii) on social relations in art works (Williams, 1982: 20-21).

The culture industry

Adorno and Horkheimer (1986) in their *Dialectic of Enlightenmeni* assert that the culture industry enlightens people as mass deception. The culture industry perpetually cheats its consumers of what it perpetually promises. The truth that mass media "are just business is made into an ideology in order to justify the rubbish they deliberately produce". Mass media call themselves "industries" and claim that their standards are based in the first place on consumers' needs, and for that reason are accepted with so little resistance. The result is the circle of manipulation and retroactive need in which the unity of the system grows ever stronger. The need which might resist central control has already been suppressed by the control of the individual consciousness. The person with leisure has to accept what the culture manufacturers offer him. The whole world is made to pass through the filter of the culture industry.

In this concept, the culture industry robs the autonomous function of the individual thinking and no independent thinking must be expected from the audience. Adorno (1989) points out in his *The Culture Industry Reconsidered*:

Insofar as the culture industry arouses a feeling of well-being that the world is precisely in that order suggested by the culture industry, the substitute gratification which it prepares for human beings cheats them out of the same happiness which it deceitfully projects. The total effect of the culture industry is one of anti-enlightenment, in which, as Horkheimer and I have noted, enlightenment – that is, the progressive technical domination of nature – becomes mass deception and is turned into a means for fettering consciousness. It impedes the development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge

and decide consciously for themselves. (Adorno, 1989: 134-35)

The culture industry remains the entertainment business. Its influence over the consumers is established by entertainment. Business is their ideology. As Adorno and Horkheimer mention (1986), "the deception is not that the culture industry supplies amusement but that it ruins the fun by allowing business considerations to involve it in the ideological cliches of a culture in the process of self-liquidation" (p.142). The culture industry is corrupt. The original affinity of business and amusement is shown in the latter's specific significance: to defend society. However, "[a]musement itself becomes an ideal, taking the place of the higher things of which it completely deprives the masses by repeating them in a manner even more stereotyped than the slogans paid for by advertising interests"(p.144). The culture industry turns it into an open lie.

It is quite correct that the power of the culture industry resides in its identification with a manufactured need. The less the culture industry has to promise, the less it can offer a maningful explanation of life, and the emptier is the ideology it disseminates. Today, the culture industry has taken over the civilizing inheritance of the entrepreneurial and frontier democracy (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1986: 166).

Ideological analysis

What is ideology? As Eagleton (1991) says, nobody has yet come up with a single adequate definition of ideology. Ideologies, for Marx, are the false (upside down) ideas which the "material interaction" of people inspires in them, as an inevitable process (Boudon, 1989). Ideology is abstract and false thought, in a sense directly related to the original

conservative use but with the alternative - knowledge of real material conditions and relationships - differently stated. For the earlier sense, the ideological forms are expressions of (changes in) economic conditions of production. But, in the last century, the sense of ideology as the set of ideas which arise from a given set of material interests or, more broadly, from a definite class or group, has been at least as widely used as the sense of ideology as illusion (Williams, 1985: 155-56).

Within orthodox Marxism, ideology refers to ideas, values, and beleifs that may be carried by philosophy, literature, painting, or television programs. Television is a heavily capitalized and industrialized branch of the entertainment industry which would necessarily reflect the belief system, the ideology, of the dominant class. Viewers are then seen as buying into this belief system, no matter what their positions are within the economic system. From this perspective, a transformation of television's ideology would require a shift in the mode of production – a total reorganization of ownership and control of the medium (White, 1987: 137).

As a Marxist, Althusser argues that society is comprised of a variety of interrelated social and intellectual activities or practices, including the economic, the political, and the ideological (Althusser, 1971). Together these different practices comprise the social formation. A social formation is a "structure in dominance." It has certain distinct tendencies; it has a certain configuration; it has a definite struturation. It is a complex structure in which it is impossible to reduce one level of practice to another in some easy way (Hall, 1985a: 91). Complex social formations had to be analysed in terms of the economic, political and

ideological institutions and practices through which they were elaborated (Hall, 1985b: 83).

For Althusser, ideology is a system of representations (images, myths, ideas or concepts depending on the case) endowed with a historical existence and role within a given society (Althusser, 1977). He points out two main ideas: (1) ideology is a representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence; (2) ideology has a material existence. All ideology represents in its necessarily imaginary distortion not the existing relations of production, but above all the relationship of individuals to the relations of production and the relations that derive from them. An ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practices located within the rituals of specific apparatuses or social institutions and organizations. This existence is material (Althusser, 1971). Althusser's work will be described in the further literature review.

Ideological analysis, as White points out,

aims at an understanding of the ways in which meanings are produced by and for individuals within a social formation. Economic, political, and ideological practice are distinct but coexisting arenas of human activity. They exert mutual influence and pressure on one another, but also operate with relative autonomy. (White, 1987: 140)

Therefore, ideological analysis is based on the assumption that cultural artifacts-literature, film, television, and so forth - are produced in specific historical contexts by and for specific social groups.

Ideological State Apparatuses

In his "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" essay, Althusser

(1971) thinks the relationship between ideology and other social practices in terms of the concept of reproduction. The social relations of production are necessary to the material existence of any social formation or any mode of production. Althusser argues that, in capitalist social formations, labor is not reproduced inside the social relations of production themselves but outside of them. The cultural institutions, such as media, trade unions, political parties, etc., are not directly linked with production, but serve the crucial function of cultivating labor of a certain moral and cultural kind which the modern capitalist mode of production requires (Hall, 1985a). This cultivating task exercises through the various ideological apparatuses. It is clear that it is in the forms and under the forms of ideological subjection that provision is made for the reproduction of the skills of labour power (Althusser, 1971: 133).

For the Marxist tradition, the State is a machine of repression, which enables the ruling classes to ensure their domination over the working class, thus enabling the former to subject the latter to the process of surplus-value extortion. The State apparatus, which defines the State as a force of repressive execution and intervention in the interests of the ruling classes in the class struggle, is quite certainly defines the State's basic function. To summarize the Marxist theory of the State, Althusser states that the Marxist classics have always claimed that

⁽¹⁾ the State is the repressive State apparatus, (2) State power and State apparatus must be distinguished, (3) the objective of the class struggle concerns State power, and in consequence the use of the State apparatus by the classes (or alliance of classes or of fractions of classes) holding State power as a function of their class objectives, and (4) the proletariat must seize State

power in order to destroy the existing bourgeois State apparatus and , in a first phase, replace it with a quite different, proletarian, State apparatus, then in later phases set in motion a radical process, that of the destruction of the State (the end of State power, the end of every State apparatus). (Althusser, 1971: 141)

Althusser adds the concept of Ideological State Apparatuses to the Marxist theory. He mentions that no class can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State ideological Apparatuses. He makes the distinction between (Repressive) State Apparatuses (SA), like the police and the army, and Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA), like churches, trade unions and media which are not directly organized by the State. First, it is clear that while there is one SA, there is a plurality of ISAs. The unity that constitutes this plurality of ISAs as a body is not immediately visible. Second, it is clear that whereas the SA belongs entirely to the public domain, much the larger part of the ISAs are part of the private domain. The State, which is the State of the ruling class, is neither public nor private; on the contrary, it is the precondition for any distinction between public and private. Third, the SA functions by violence, whereas the ISAs function by ideology. The SA functions massively and predominantly by repression, while functioning secondarily by ideology. The ISAs function massively and predominantly by ideology, but they also function secondarily by repression (Althusser, 1971: 141-146).

Cultural hegemony

Gramsci's conception of cultural hegemony is a theory which interprets how social order is maintained and how it evolves. On the one

hand, he follows the Marxist tradition and concerns for the relationship between basestructures and superstructures. On the other hand, he revises the theory of the Marxist tradition (i.e. the mechanical relationship that basestructures determine supersturctures) and has stressed that culture and ideology are the dynamic of social transformation (Chang, 1990). Gramsci's theory is "the assertion of absolute historicism and humanism over economic determinism" (Salamini, 1974: 367).

Traditional Marxists believed that the growing numerical strength of the laboring classes would eventually result in automatic transition from capitalist to socialist structure. However, by the end of the last decade of the 19th century, industrialization and capitalist economic development had not polarized society into bourgeois and proletarian classes and revolutionary movemints had not occurred. In western capitalist society, the bourgeoisie was all powerful in so far as it had managed to secure and maintain the consent of the masses. Gramsci was convinced that "socialist revolution would not come mechanically from the breakdown of the capitalist economy but would have to be built, that is won through purposive human action within a wide range of historical settings" (Boggs, 1978: 16). The transition to socialism could not be expected to follow any unilinear pattern.

The Russian revolution for Lenin has demonstrated the capacity of politics to mobilize masses for the creation of a new socialist type of society. In asserting the primacy of politics, Lenin established a reciprocal dialectical relationship between economic base and the entire realm of the superstructure. Following Lenin's concept, Gramsci did not minimize the importance of the base, but he sought to establish "a just

equilibrium between the economic and political processes" (Salamini, 1974: 367).

In Gramsci's analysis, the failure of revolutionary process in the western countries results from the degree of development of the "civil society." He points out two major superstructural levels:

the one that can be called "civil society," that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called "private," and that of "political society" or "the Sate." These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of "hegemony" which the dominant group exercises through society and on the other hand to that of "direct dominant" or command exercised through the State and "juridical" government. (Gramsci, 1971: 12)

Civil society is understood by Gramsci as the complex of ideology superstructure and not as the ensemble of economic relations as in Marx.

Gramsci insists on the concept of ideological hegemony as distinct from that of political hegemony. For Gramsci, superstructural elements such as consciousness, ideology, and culture are determining factors of the nature, scope, and outcome of revolutions. Hegemony becomes "cultural and ideological direction." Gramsci conceives hegemony as an ideological phenomenon first, and only secondly as a political fact. "Ideological hegemony is a preliminary condition for the actual seizure of state power and the creation of a new state" (Salamini, 1974: 368).

In his *Television's Screens: Hegemony in Tranition* (1987), Gitlin points out that ideological domination requires an alliance between powerful economic and political groups on the one hand, and cultural elites on the other. In effect, alliances must be negotiated and, as social

conditions and elite dispositions shift, renegotiated. Gitlin explains,

Hegemony is a process of organization in which cutlural elites occupy top positions and supervise the work of subordinates in such a way as to draw their activity into a discourse that supports the dominant position of the elites; at the same time, hegemony cannot operate without the consent of those subordinates. (Gitlin, 1987a: 241)

In mass communications, the culture industry in capitalist society packages the representations. It relays and reproduces values and beliefs, distorting and adjusting elements of ideology that are constantly arising both from social elites and from social groups throughout the society including media practices and their social worlds (Gitlin, 1987a: 242-43). In the mass cultual system, "[h]igh-consumption corporate capitalism implies a certain sensitivity to audience taste, taste which is never manufacutred. Shows are made by guessing at audience desires and tolerance, and finding ways to speak to them that perpetuate the going system" (Gitlin, 1987b: 526).

Cultural hegemony, as Raymond Williams insists, "operates within a whole social life-pattern; the people who consume mass-mediated products are also the people who work, reside, compete, go to school, live in families". 5

^{5.} This quotes from Gitlin's "Prime Time Ideology" (1984: 510), based on Williams's "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory." New Left Review (1973) 82.

METHODOLOGY

From the sociology of culture, there is a convergence of two clear tendencies in the research: one within general social thought and then specifically sociology and the other within cultural history and analysis. Sociological explanation incorporates historical explanation, and social institutions cannot be examined in isolation from economic or political ones. This paper focuses on the Taiwanese TV industry in relation to the Taiwanese political system, economic environment and cutlural form. In addition to the discussion of TV development within the Taiwanese historical context, this paper uses the concept of the culture industry to analyze the role of the TV industry corresponding with Taiwanese social formation during defferent decades. By reconsidering the relationship between the culture industry and ideological practice, hegemony, ideology and power will be re-examined in the case of the Taiwanese TV industry.

This paper investigates the entire TV industry throuth critical and theoretical analysis. This is a qualitative research. By reviewing the relevant theories, this paper uses contextual analysis which examines the TV industry with the external factors (political, economic, social and cultural factors) and the internal factors (ownership, organization, programmin, and policy) within the historical context (the 60s, the 70s, the 80s and the 90s). The roles of commercial TV, public TV and educational TV in Taiwan will be discussed.

This paper dialectically discusses fact (the case of the Taiwanese TV) and the relevant theories by logical thinking. The evidences will be found from (1) the relevant periodicals and literatures, (2) the official meterials, and (3) the talks with the senior administers in the three TV

stations, to describe and argue the relationship between the social formation and the TV culture in Taiwan during different decades. Not only the role of the culture industry but also the ideological representations behind the culture industry will be reconsidered within the entire investigation.

TAIWAN IN THE 1960S

When the seat of the ROC government was moved to Taiwan, a heavy burden was thrust upon the island's economy, and it was hard to see how the latter could have sustained this burden for very long. For the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the political tension of the Pacific Ocean area increased so the U.S. economic aid program came to east Asia and gave a new hope to Taiwan. However, due to the struggle between the mainlanders and Taiwanese, the society was in a mess. The KMT governed Taiwan by terror and eliminated the Taiwanese opposite organizations (Peng, 1991). The Taiwanese literature was repressed and the anticommunist literature was promoted by the KMT.

In the 1960s, Taiwan from the government to the people began to shake off the experience of chaos, upheavals and famine. People seriously and unitedly reconstructed the social order. The economic structure trans- formed to emphasize industrialization and improve the plurality of agriculture for extension of product exportation. The U.S. aid to Taiwan stopped in 1965. In 1952, the composition of the GNP was 35.9% for agriculture output, 18% for industrial production and 46.1% for the service industries. In 1969, the composition shifted to 18.8% for agriculture, 34.6% for industry and 46.6% for the service sector (see Appendix II). The first year that proportion of industry was higher than that of agriculture was 1963. In other words, the Taiwanese economy became more industry-

oriented. And the Taiwanese TV industry was established in this steady social situation.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TAIWANESE TV IN THE 1960S

The initial emphasis is placed on education. The experimental National Education Television Station started operation on Feb. 14, 1962. The station had only a 100W transmitter and it had an effective range of only about ten kilometers. The development of the National Education Television Station (ETS) may be divided into two stages. The first stage covered the period from Feb. 14, 1962 to Nov. 30,1963. During this stage, the pure teaching programs accounted for only 30 percent and the remaining 70 percent was devoted to semi-entertainment programs. The teaching programs included language instructoins, geography, history and civics. The remaining programs included newscast, educational films, entertainment and public service. The programs was designed for a dual purpose: "to experiment with TV teaching on the one hand and to cultivate public interest in TV on the other" (Taiwan, Television Academy, 1976). The second stage of ETS began on Dec. 1, 1963 after its experimental period was over. From then on the air time was equally divided between teaching programs and social education programs. The latter included language instruction, newscast, publicity of government measures and public service. (ETS was incorporated into CTS on Oct. 31, 1971.)

For the TV industry, the electronics industry and relevant technology in Taiwan were still in the infant stage during the early 1960s. It was a matter of necessity form the young TV enterprise to seek foreign assitstance. That explains why TTV, the first commercial network in

Taiwan, had to solicit international cooperation in the beginning. The Taiwanese Provincial Government was the prime mover behind the first commercial TV network. A preparatory committee decided the following principles:

- 1. Foreign investment should not exceed 49 percent of the total captial.
- 2. Foreign participation would be sought for the establishment of plants to assemble receiving sets.
- 3. The Taiwanese side would retain full control of programming policy.
- 4. Foreign partners would be approached for technical assistance and help in personnel training.
- 5. The new company would be run as a private enterprise. (Taiwan, Television Academy, 1976: 15)

Under the agreement, the Taiwanese side owned 60 percent of the shares, and the four Japanese companies, Fuji Television Co., Hitachi, NEC and Tokyo Shibaura, subscribed to the remaining 40 percent of the shares. Of the Taiwanese investment 49 percent was put up by the Taiwanese Provincial Government and the remaining 11 percent owed by private investors. (However, some private investors were controlled by the government or the KMT. For example, Central Daily News and China Radio Broadcasting Co. were operated by the KMT. After 1982, Japanese shares had reduced to 20 percent. The remaining 20 percent turned to "private investors.") In fact, the committee first expected foreign investment from the U.S., but both sides didn't get a negotiation within the two meetings. The Japanese companies agreed with the committee because they wanted to sell their obsolescent TV sets in Taiwan (Hsueh, 1988).

TTV completed all the island's transmission in 1975. Taiwan lies

between 120 and 122 degrees East Longitude, 22 and 25 degrees North Latitude. The Central Mountain divides Taiwan into two distinct portions. The eastern part of the island is largerly mountainous, while the western side boasts some of the most fertile plains along the coast. The population of Taiwan concentrates on the western side. TTV had only one transmission station in northern Taiwan at the time of its founding in 1962. It built its western coast microwave system with relay stations in 1965. But the eastern transmission stations were not established until 1974–1975.

TTV started assembling black and white sets in 1962. Only 4,400 sets were assembled in that year. In 1964, the number of TV sets manufactured locally rose to 31,055 after several more plants joined production. Beginning from 1967, American electronic companies started erecting TV plants in Taiwan. Production shot up to 111,722 in that year. Export of TV plants began at the same time. In 1968, the number of locally manufactured sets quintupled, reaching 650,205 (see Appendix III).

The number of TV sets in use in Taiwan includes domestic sales by local plants, import volume and the number of sets bought in by travelers. Assuming that each set lasts seven years, the number of black and white sets in use rose to 360,000 in 1968 (see Appendix IV), seven years after the advent of the TV era in Taiwan. After 1968, the annual increase has been kept at a steady pace, averaging around 300,000 sets a year.

For TV advertising (see Appendix V), the years from 1962 to 1964 may be described as a period of painful start. Although TTV was the only commercial network in the country in those days, there were relatively few receiving sets as most of the consumers could't afford them.

Consequently, advertising through this new medium was not very effective. With few advertisers willing to make use of this new channel, TV advertising management in this period was most difficult.

The period of vigorous growth came between 1964 and 1969. The price of the receiving sets dropped markedly with the establishment of assembling plants in Taiwan. With increasing affluence the public started to buy TV sets in large numbers. TV programming also witnessed a drastic improvement. As a result, the volume of TV advertising increased in proportion with the increase of viewers. The fact that there was only one TV network contributed to the rise of demand. In 1969, the birth of CTV marked the beginning of the color TV era and the era of sharp competition. In 1969, the net profit of TTV rose by US\$ 3 million, and growth ratio increased 120 percent (Lee, 1987).

CTV started in 1969 and was owned by the KMT (50% of the shares), private radio stations and other private investors (50% of the shares). The ownership has shifted to 63 percent owned by the KMT and the remaining 37 percent owned by private radio stations in 1991. The CTV's transmission stations in all the island were completed in 1975. In 1969, CTV only covered northern Taiwan. When the central transmission station and southern transmission station were established in 1970, the CTV's signal covered all the western coast. But the three estern transmission stations were established in 1974–1975.

^{5.} Source comes from Wu, Tung-Chuan, one of the senior managers in CTV, who talked to the author in August, 1991.

PROGRAMMING

When TTV started in late 1962, a great deal of things prepared for the advent of the new age were lacking. For example, there was no pertinent law for the TV industry to follow. Nor was there a TV code for its guidance. There were few educational institutes that offered TV courses or had the facilities to conduct TV personnel training. There was a woeful lack of performing talents. TTV had to recruit them from the show biz and military troupes. Eqally in short supply were program producers and technicians. TTV worked out its first program schedule in which a great deal of emphasis was placed on educational programs, news programs and cultural programs.

In the initial weeks, TTV stayed on the air for five hours a day. Only two half-hour slots were assigned for entertainment programs. The remaining four hours were solidly occupied by educational and news programs. There was a modest increase of entertainment programs at the end of 1962 when they accounted for 34.56 percent of the total program hours.

The lopsided stress on non-entertainment programs came to an end in 1969 when TTV encountered its first local competitor. The competition with CTV, the second commercial network in Taiwan, forced TTV to increase its entertainment programs. Even then, non-entertainment programs still accounted for 40 to 50 percent of the total program hours (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1

The Composition of the TTV's Programs in 1962-1969

		Air Time (Mins/ Percent)				
	Average				Culture &	
	Minutes	News-	Educa-	Public	Entertain-	Comm-
<u>Year</u>	Per Week	<u>cast</u>	<u>tion</u>	<u>Service</u>	ment	ercial
1962	2,275	611/	613/	241/	786/	24/
		26.86	26.94	10.59	34.56	1.05
1963	2,560	362/	556/	295/	1,205/	142/
		14.14	21.72	11.52	47.07	5.55
1964	2,740	365/	452/	367/	1,298/	258/
		13.32	16.50	13.39	47.37	9.42
1965	3,050	365/	462/	383/	1,520/	320/
		11.97	15.15	12.55	39.83	10.50
1966	3,210	390/	420/	385/	1,605/	410/
		12.15	13.08	12	50	12.77
1967	3,350	430/	385/	380/	1,650/	505/
		12.84	11.49	11.34	49.25	15.08
1968	3,724	434/	430/	410/	1,850/	600/
		11.65	11.55	11.01	49.68	16.11
1969	4,180	485/	470/	445/	2,250/	530/
		11.60	11.24	10.65	53.85	12.68

Source: Television Yearbook of the Republic of China 1961-1975

Because there was no broadcasting law in Taiwan in the 1960s, TTV formulated a TV Code for their program production (TTV, 1983). The Code indicates that the language used in news, weather reports, and education programs must be Mandarin Chinese. Depending on the needs of the plots, dramas can use Taiwanese but cannot cause the audiences to misunderstand the stories. Those programs which use Taiwanese must be entertainments, and they must be explained in Chinese. The imported programs must be dubbed in Chinese or use Chinese caption. The language used in the TTV's programs in 1962–1969 shows very low percentage in Taiwanese (see Table 2.2). Especially, the percentage of the Taiwanese

programs in the first two years presents lower than 10 percent. But, approximately 84 percent of the audiences speak Taiwanese.

Table 2.2

The Language Used in the TTV's Programs in 1962-1969

	LANGUAGE USED (MUNITES PER WEEK/PERCENTAGE)			
<u>Year</u>	Mandarin Chinese	English	<u>Taiwanese</u>	
1962	1,430/62.86	715/31.43	130/5.71	
1963	1,645/64.26	745/29.10	170/6.64	
1964	1,570/57.30	835/30.47	335/12.23	
1965	1,595/52.29	1,100/36.07	355/11.64	
1966	1,715/53.43	1,080/33.64	415/12.93	
1967	1,760/52.54	1,115/33.28	475/14.18	
1968	2,134/57.30	1,120/30.08	470/12.62	
1969	2,425/58.00	1,215/30.00	540/12.00	

Source: Television Yearbook of the Republic of China 1961-1975

In terms of the shortage of programs, the schedule was filled with lots of films (around 30% to 40%). Film programs may be classified into three categories: borrowed films, self-produced films and leased foreign films. The borrowed films were supplied by the Taipei USIS and the the Education Data Center of the National Taiwan Normal University. Most of them were educational programs. The domestically produced films were documentaries and feature films. All leased films were cartoons, series, and features from the U.S.. The U.S. series such as "I Love Lucy" (30 mins, 170 installments), "Lassie" (30 mins, 154 installments), "77 Sunset Strip" (60 mins, 205 installments), "Combat" (60 mins, 152 installments), "The Wagon Train" (60 mins, 158 installments), "Leave It to Beaver" (30 mins, 225 installments), and "Bewitched" (30 mins, 262 installments) were popular in the 1960s (Television Academy, 1976).

For the competition with TTV, which had established seven years ago, CTV started its operation with a series of six programs of a serial nature in 1969. The very first of these was the Mandarin drama serial "Chin Chin" (20 mins, 102 installments), which set a trend in TV programming which is still going strong today. This also brought about the competition of the drama serials in the 1970s.

TV POLITICS IN THE 1960S

The reasons that the KMT government established the TV industry in the 1960s are manifest. First, the society was gradually in a well situation. Second, in far east and northeast Asia, many countries such as Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Thailand, India, Indonesia, and even PRC had established TV stations (United Daily News, 1962). 72 countries in the world had TV before 1962. For the international reputation and the competition with PRC in development sector, Taiwan was urgently developing its TV industry. Therefore, in terms of the insufficient national capitals, Taiwan accepted foreign investment. Third, certainly, the government did it as a gamble – it expected that TV would make money in the future. Therefore, TV was run commercially in Taiwan.

The state as a coercive mechanism in the early 1950s gradually changed. The state named "the Republic of China" was really a political entity in Taiwan and substantially manipulated the national ideology. The ideology from this regime influenced the development of mass media (Peng, 1987).

Since 1963, the KMT had actively held many news meetings and invited many chairpersons and directors, who served in mass media, to emphasize the propaganda of anti-communism and Chinese recovery. In

1966, the KMT strongly promoted the movement of Chinese Culture Renaissance. There were 15 main points in this movement: 5 against communist culture, 9 for traditional Chinese cultural renaissance, and 1 for maintance of the historical cultural products. Only the last one was in relation to the Taiwanese culture. Mass media in Taiwan in the 1960s served as a political tool for the KMT (Wei, 1991; Hsueh, 1988).

In the 1960s, the KMT government cooperated with the private commercial organizations and permeated the power into the society. In the TV ownership structure, there was a solid superstructure formed by political society and civil society: the government shares as political society and the private shares as civil society. And many so-called "private" investors were also owned by the government or the KMT. The combination of political society and civil society made the state more stable and consolidated the political power.

Although the TV penetration rate was not so high in the 1960s, TTV as an Ideological State Apparatus focused on news and education programs to promote the concept of anti-communism and the renaissance of Chinese culture under a seven-year non-competitive situation. The contents presented "President Chiang and Taiwan," "China and Its Cultural Heritage," and a series of documentaries showing President Chiang Kai-shek, delievering messages about anti-communism and Chinese recovery (Television Academy, 1976). In fact, documentaries could be an important tool of political education. (In other words, those programs strengthened the KMT's political status and its one-party authoritarianism.

CHAPTER THREE: THE TAIWANESE TV IN THE 1970S

TAIWAN IN THE 1970S

In 1971 the U.N. General Assembly voted by 75 to 36 to expel Taiwan and seat the People's Republic of China, Taiwan's archenemy. In 1972, Japan formally admitted the regime of PRC. Then in 1979, came the U.S.'s abrupt but inevitable recognition of Communist China and severance of ties with Taiwan. However, diplomatic setbacks have not deterred the ruling KMT from the hope of recovering the Chinese mainland and from claiming to represent the sole legitimate government of China (Lee, 1980).

In the early 1970s, Taiwan's political development has shown clear trends Taiwanization. In 1972, when Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, became Premier, he initiated the appointments of native Taiwanese as provincial governor of Taiwan and as vice-premier; he also tripled the number of Taiwanese cabinet members. Following his succession of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975 as president, Chiang Ching-kuo steered Taiwan's political development steadily toward a reformist direction.

From 1952 through 1977 Taiwan experienced a phenomenal growth of 815 percent in GNP, senod only to Japan. From 1970 to 1976 Taiwan's annual growth in GNP was 12.8 percent - higher than Japan. In 1979, GNP had reached NT\$1,164.5 billion (NT\$40 was approximately equivalent to US\$1), an increase of 20.3 percent over 1978. From 1953 to 1977, agriculture productivity rose at an annual rate of 4.4 percent. Taiwan is

about 90 percent self-sufficient in food prodution. In industrialization sector, the government encouraged and assisted export industries, and tied the nation's economy to increases in world trade. At the same time there was a transition from small industry to heavy industry, and from labor-intensive to capital-intensive, to production. Therefore, Taiwan successfully weathered the oil crisis of 1973-1974, and continued impressive economic growth during the global recession of the early 1980s (Chiu, 1979; Copper, 1988).

THE TV INDUSTRY IN TAIWAN IN THE 1970S

Because the financial viability of TTV and CTV bounced back quickly due to a continuing economic boom, ETS was expanded and renamed the Chinese Television Service (CTS) in 1971, of which the Ministry of Education owned 49 percent and the Ministry of National Defense 51 percent. With the establishment of transimission stations in the various parts of Taiwan, an island-wide TV broadcasting network has been completed in 1975.

The proclaimed aim of CTS was to promote social and military education. But, a commercial TV station would be run on a self-sufficient basis. "The education and cultural objective appeared to have been used for legitimizing the genesis of a third station and for placating whatever doubts there remained about the wisdom of it" (Lee, 1980:150). In fact, the cultural and educational objectives were reduced to a secondary priority, with some instructional courses being aired in the early morning (5:30-8:00) or late evening (11:00-12:00).

CTS' commercialization immediately made its finacial impact felt among two other outlets. TTV had a deficit of US\$ 3 million in 1972, CTV

continued to operate at a loss of US\$ 5 million, and the newest CTS lost US\$ 2 million during the first month of operation. The financial outlook further deteriorated for the next few years during the oil crisis. At present Taiwan has revived its economic viability and trade capabilities, and the three TV stations garnered a total profit of US\$ 5 million in 1977 (Lee, 1980).

TV receiver sets in this decade showed over 80 percent in a saturation rate – among the most popular of electric appliances. On the average, 94.3 of every 100 households owns a television in 1977. Black-white TV sets in use dropped from a distribution percentage of 67.6 percent in 1975 to 65.8 percent in 1977, 48.2 percent in 1979. However, the distribution of color TV sets over the same period was rising: from 15.3 percent in 1975 to 26.1 percent in 1977, 48.7 percent in 1979 (Television Academy, 1984). These figures demonstrate clearly the market takeover by color TV sets at the expense of black-and-white, and the fact that most TV viewing has been in color for years.

hegemony was shattered with the birth of CTV in 1970 and of CTS in 1971 (see Appendix IV). Unfortunately, advertising volume was not growing fast enough to suddenly triple and meet the new demand, and sharp competition inevitably ensued. This fratricidal situation endured until 1973, when the three networks worked out a business cooperation to reduce its impact. From then on the advertising revenue increased steadily. Total TV advertising purchased in 1978 reached NT\$2.13 billion, up 25.3 percent from 1977. The 1979 figure was NT\$2.56 billion, up another 19 percent (Television Academy, 1984).

PROGRAMMING

After CTV competed with TTV in 1970, the contents of the TV programs became a hot issue. Official Chou in the Legislative Yuan asserted that the commerical TV programs gave the TV stations substantial profit, but their contents negatively influenced Taiwanese adolescents. She thought that (1) the Taiwanese programs hindered the national policy - Chinese language movement; (2) the lewd public songs and violence series corrupted people; (3) there were so many commercials and bad taste programs. She also pointed out that some programs such as night club live shows obviously disregarded the national policy (Lee, 1984).

Lan (1970) criticized the TV programs in China Times (June 12th, 1970). He argued that the TV programs lacked the long-term plan and many programs presented homogeneously. "Many singers are shouting and screaming. The singers and the exciting fans embrace and kiss. In Chinese culture, those pictures are just like monsters and would negatively influence the youth. In addition, many foreign series have kiss and murder exposures. Those exposures destroy the traditional Chinese culture."

Many critics criticized the drama serials. "The nurses in the serials wear white miniskirt uniforms and many kinds of fancy hair styles. Those pictures are different from the real nurses in the society" (Central Daily News, May 14th, 1970). "There are many divorces in the series. It would be bad influence for the society" (United Daily News, 1970).

In Lee's study (1984), he investigated the satisfaction degree of the Taiwanese TV audiences in 1970 and 1978. He found the satisfied

audiences showed 31.30 percent in 1970 and dropped to 20.36 percent in 1978. The unsatisfied audiences showed 44.24 percent in 1970 and increased up to 59.67 percent in 1978 (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1

The Taiwanese Audiences' Opinions for the TV Programs in 1970 and 1978

<u>OPINIONS</u>	1970 (Percentage)	1978 (Percentage)
very satisfied	0.00	1.08
satisfied	31.30	19.28
unsatisfied	39.93	53.00
very unsatisfied	4.31	6.73
non-opinion	24.46	19.91
Total	100.00	100.00

Source: Lee, Chan (1984: 124) <u>Television</u>. Taipei: Yun-Chen Publisher.

In the early 1970s, the popular drama serials attracted the audiences to watch them in the prime time. But the plots of the series repeated and repeated without change so that the serials could drag on and on for a long time. Those serials were such as "Judge Pao" (60 mins, 350 installments), "The Escorts" (60-100 mins, 250 installments), "Seven Swordsmen of Hsilou" (45 mins, 221 installments), "The Samartians" (60 mins, 186 installments), "The Slow-witted Son-in-law" (30 mins, 240 installment). (Television Academy, 1976)

Because the drama serials dragged on and on without endings, the regulatory agency, the Government Information Office (GIO), took it upon itself to force each TV station to reduce the number of serials to one one-hour Mandarin episode and two half-hour Taiwan episodes per evening.

And the outline of each serials had to obtain a three-week advance approval of the GIO. The GIO further decided in 1977 that each serial should consist of no more than 60 episodes. The number of episodes allowed for each serial was further cut down to 30 in 1978 (Wu,1986; Lee,1980).

In this decade, because Taiwan confronted many difficulties in the international diplomacy, the three networks presented special programs for propogating the national mission – anti-communism. After President Chiang died in 1975, the three commercial TV stations broadcasted special programs simultaneously during the golden prime time of 9:00-9:30 pm from 1976. From then on, the golden prime time was cut by these special programs. The first three series for this period (9:00-9:30pm) were: The Cold Spell (73 episodes; three times rerun: twice dubbed in Chinese and once dubbed in Taiwnese), Confidence Born of Storms (60 episodes), and The Dawning Land (55 episodes). The stories were described as followings (Television Academy, 1978):

"The Cold Spell" is an outright expose of the totalitarian rule of the Chinese communist regime, covering two phases: pre-1949 and post-1949. The story epitomizes the solidarity of the Chinese people and government in the face of the ruthlessly adverse international trend - composure and confidence maintained under the judicious leadership of the government of the Republic of China, with its provisional capital at Taipei, Taiwan.

The story of "Confidence Born of Storms" goes back to 1938 when the communists set up a branch headquarters in Taiwan in an attempt to create turmoil. The infamous organization was finally dissloved by united efforts in a massive crackdown. The Taiwanese victory made more mean-

ingless that Chinese communist threat to "liberal Taiwan."

The theme of "The Dawning Land" was to extol humanity and morality and expose the Chinese communist scheme of infiltration, subversion, and conspiracy. It boosted the people's faith and determination to overthrow the mainland. The story dates from 1948, when the communist rose in armed rebellion, to the growth of this island as anti-communist bastion – firm and strong, stable and prosperous.

After these three series, the programs in this period included news, documentaries and report programs such as "Great Construction," "Great Events of Our Time," "The Road," "Stories of Great Times," and "Road to Prosperity." Those themes presented either the history of the national revolution against the communists or the government's contribution to the national development.

As CTS started in 1971, there were armed forces shows on the air everyday. Those shows were produced by the various military troupes under the sponsorship of the Ministry of National Defense. Those shows presented a 30-minute program at 1:00pm from Monday to Saturday. Certainly, the theme of those programs focused on the concept of anti-communism and mainland recovery.

When the formal diplomatic relations were severed between the U.S. and Taiwan, TV news in Taiwan became magnets during the 1978-79 period and the three commercial TV stations took turns in rerunning a dozen anti-communist films. Lee described the TV contents during that time:

The variety shows all at once acquired an utterly new format

and content - no more glamour decorations, no more extravagant clothing, and no more "unhealthy" songs. The homogeneity of content pushed to an all-time high, as the "patriotic songs" - of anti-Communist pitch - dominated the variety shows, accounting for two-thirds of the content, and this figure is not counting the heavy spot announcements of slogans. When the public mood somewhat cooled down, the audiences lost no time in writing to complain of the exhausting bombardment of these slogans and high-pitched songs that took a huge toll on their psyche. (Lee, 1980)

In this decade, according to Lee (1980), in terms of oligopolistic competition, the three commercial TV stations reduced imported programs and increased domestic programs. "The birth of CTV forced TTV to drop the proportion of foreign imports from 33 percent to 22 percent during 1970–1971; CTS' appearance further reduced the imports of two other stations to about 17 percent" (Lee, 1980:160). (see Table 3.2)

Table 3.2

The Language Used in the TTV's Programs in 1970-1979

LANGUAGE USED (MUNITES PER WEEK/PERCENTAGE)				
Mandarin Chinese	<u>English</u>	<u>Taiwanese</u>		
2,239/48.33	1,525/32.9	870/18.77		
3,451/62.53	1,228/22.25	840/15.22		
3,272/65.10	1,055/21.10	692/13.8		
3,207/73.35	745/17.05	420/9.60		
2,423/71.31	648/19.04	327/9.62		
2,293/66.83	691/20.14	447/13.03		
2,552/72.4	603/17.11	370/10.49		
2,609/75.78	470/13.65	364/10.57		
2,645/77.29	442/12.92	335/9.79		
2,532/71.87	542/15.38	449/12.75		
	Mandarin Chinese 2,239/48.33 3,451/62.53 3,272/65.10 3,207/73.35 2,423/71.31 2,293/66.83 2,552/72.4 2,609/75.78 2,645/77.29	Mandarin ChineseEnglish2,239/48.331,525/32.93,451/62.531,228/22.253,272/65.101,055/21.103,207/73.35745/17.052,423/71.31648/19.042,293/66.83691/20.142,552/72.4603/17.112,609/75.78470/13.652,645/77.29442/12.92		

Source: Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1961-1975, 1976-1977, 1978-1983.

CTV, in the beginning, had self-produced programs about 65 percent of the total air time, with the remaining 35 percent assigned to imported films. The ratio changed to 72.65 percent for self-made programs and 27.35 percent for imported programs in 1970. In 1971, self-made programs had increased to 85 percent, while imported programs dropped to a mere 15 percent. Self-produced programs accounted for 87.88 percent of the total air time in CTS during its first two years,1971-1972. In 1975, CTS's self-made programs still kept up to 88.57 percent (Television Academy, 1976).

The popular imports were "Wonderful World of Color" (30 mins, 316 installments), "The FBI" (60 mins, 237 installments), "Peyton Place" (30 mins, 514 installments), "Hawaii Five-O" (60 mins, 186 installments) and so on. Some import programs, such as "Kung Fu," were dubbed in Chinese, but the audiences' responses were not so good for dubbing. Therefore, dubbing was not popular in Taiwan in the 1970s (Wu, 1986).

The program exports started from 1971. Hong Kong was the first customer. The major markets included Hong Kong, the U.S., Canada, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore. The U.S. market was largely concentrated in New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Honolulu, where there were fairly large Chinese communities. The audiences in most of the markets are in great part of Chinese origin. In terms of the big overseas Chinese markets, the number of programs exported by the three TV networks has skyrocketed in the 1970s and those exports focused on

drama serials and varieties. There were up to 3426.25 hours exported in 1976, and 3652.85 hours exported in 1977 (see Table 3.3). The export policy was under the negotiation of the three cmmercial TV stations and under government supervision (Television Academy, 1978).

Table 3.3

The Export Program Hours of the Three Networks (1971-1979)

YEAR	TTV (Hours)	CTV (Hours)	CTS (Hours)	TOTAL
1971	24.5			24.5
1972	106			106
1973	239.5	71	243.6	554.1
1974	304.2	249.5	258.4	812.1
1975	787.6	626.75	1164.6	2578.95
1976	690	491.25	2245	3426.25
1977	804	1119.85	1758.5	3652.85
1978	180	1130.5	962	2272.5
1979	304.5	793.25	1266	2363.75

Source: Calculated from Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1961-1975, 1976-1977, 1978-1983.

BROADCASTING AND TELEVISION LAW

After the Taiwanese TV industry started operation 14 years ago, Broadcasting and Television Law was finally ratified by the Legislative Yuan in 1976. This law entrusted the GIO with a wide range of administrative duties in implementing the regulation of broadcasting technicalities, especially in program control and censorship. It did not give the GIO any mandate to formulate a clear and integrated policy that would render TV to the service of national development and cultural renaissance (Lee, 1980; Lee, 1984). In its chapter III. Program Control (see

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Appendix VI.), programs are classified into four categories: (1) newscast and publicity of government policies and orders, (2) education and culture, (3) public service, and (4) entertainment. The time of the (1), (2) and (3) programs should not be less 50 percent of the total weekly TV time. And self-produced programs shall not be less than 70 percent of the TV programs. The domestic programs shall mainly use Mandarin Chinese and the dialect (Taiwanese) shall decrease gradually. In the Enforcement Rules of the Broadcasting and Television Law (see Appendix VII), the percentages of the domestic programs using Mandarin Chinese shall be no less than 70 percent.

Because the definitions of the program categories are not clear and the percentages of the entertainments shall be no more than 50 percent, many programs with entertainment characters are classified in education and culture category by the three commercial TV staions. For example, "Law Theatre" was a crime series. It was classified in education and culture because CTV argued that the show had educational function. In addition. some varieties, quiz shows, and game shows were also classified in education and culture (Lee, 1984). The confusion of the program categories makes the program statistics of Television Yearbook TV being a "commercial" system, the percentage of unreliable. enterainments seems difficult to keep less than 50 percent in the total programs. In the international commercial TV systems, even in the British IBA, there are 65 percent of entertainments. In many countries, the entertainment programs have more than 70 percent in their total programs (see Appendix VIII).

In language usage, for the national policy - Chinese language

promotion, the percentage of the domestic TV programs using Chinese shall be more than 70 percent. Language promotion is not a bad thing. The bad thing is promoting one language to repress the usage of another language on purpose. Language has cultual significance. It can be used to promote a particular cultural-racial view of one's own group. Moreover, language, as an ideological apparatus, can be used as part of the mechanism of getting and maintaining power over others, or of resisting such power-taking (Joseph and Taylor, 1990:4). The "national language," as a means, can create unity for the society. However, local dialects which represent local culture are worth respecting. TV, as a cultural window, presents the national needs but disregards the local cultural in the Taiwanese case.

THE POLARIZATION OF TAIWANESE TV CULTURE IN THE 1970S

The Taiwanese TV culture in the 1970s presented the phenomenon of polarization – seriousness and lightness. It could be so serious to take responsibility for the national mission. It could be too light to give the audiences a good taste.

The special joint programs in 9:00-9:30pm period represented the serious state policy. Why did the TV stations choose 9:00-9:30pm to broadcast those programs? Obviously, this period was in the golden prime time. People used to watch TV during this period. The three "commercial" TV stations could sacrifice their advertising revenues for the "sacred" mission because they were owned by government (the provicial government, the ruling KMT, and the military) and all their chairpersons and directors were politicians. In this situation, what the supervisors in the three networks concerned was how to promote the state propaganda,

not how to improve the quality of the TV programs. In the beginning, the special joint programs were catching people. However, that period gradually became the time to take a rest, take a shower, take a walk, etc. Moreover, the audiences even turned off the TV during this period.

In addition, when the "patriotic songs" repeated and repeated during 1978-79, the audiences were getting bored. TV, as an Ideological State Apparatus, may disseminate the state idea to the people. However, ideological representations may confront the struggle and conflict in which the structure may be compromised and reformed.

The lightness of the Taiwanese TV programs in the 1970s seemed to be an opposite role aggainst the serious system. The light entertainments evaded the serious themes. The drama serials dragged on and on. The plots repeated and repeated. The shouting singers in strange dresses were crazy with their fans. The quality of TV programs may be not good. However, people still watched it and liked to talk about it. "The first thing that high school students come in the class everyday is to talk about the yesterday's plot of 'The Escort' [which dragged up to 250 episodes]; the advertisements of some restaurants shows: we have a TV so that you would not miss any episode of 'Judge Pao' [which had 350 episodes] when you have dinner in our restaurant" (Yang, 1987). Many critics argued that TV programs were in bad taste and disregarded "the traditional Chinese culture" and even "the national policy". They criticized TV programs with a high culture view. They did not acknowledge that TV was a mass medium which represented popular culture. Those critics took mass culture too seriously.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE TAIWANESE TV IN THE 1980S

TAIWAN IN THE 1980S

From the process of political Taiwanization in the 1970s, several political policies reformed. The opposition forces aggainst the KMT legally formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. In the parliamentary reforms, the KMT has adopted a formula to retire the aging members of the three national representative bodies - the Natoinal Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan - who were elected or were candidates for the elections in the mainland during 1947-1948. In 1987, martial law ended in Taiwan after thirty-eight years. The government announced that citizens of the Republic of China could travel to the People's Republic of China; that they could buy and sell Communist publications; and that they could compete in sports events. represented an official action to legalize direct contacts between Taiwan and the mainland. In 1988, the government also lifted the previous restrictions on publication of new daily newspaper (Tien, 1988; Copper, 1988). After Chiang Ching-kou died in 1988, Taiwan's new president, Lee Teng-hui who came from the reformist wing of the ruling KMT, faced a series of challenge in the social reforms.

In the 1980s, the Taiwanese political participation increased. Competitive elections were held; new political parties formed; the press became independent. Students and various other groups including veterans, professional organizations, and labor began to seek political influence.

The polity was in transition to a democracy.

In its economic development, Taiwan was called "the greedy island" during the 1980s. In Taiwan, an average of nearly US\$ 3 billion worth of shares has changed hands each 3-hour trading day in 1989. This figure is US\$ 1 billion a day more than in London. In August 1989, the Taipei market reached a record US\$ 7.6 billion of deals. The world's largest stock market, Tokyo, traded a mere US\$ 4.2 billion worth of shares on the same day. The Taiwan Stock Exchange Weighted Stock Index has barely broken 1,000 at the beginning of 1987. It created an illogical rise of 276% in the first 215 trading days of 1988. In September 1989, it hit a record 10,172.49 (Economist, 1989; Friedland and Moore, 1988).

Taiwan has had a decade of 9% annual growth and held the world's 2nd-highest foreign exchange reserves of US\$ 71 billion in 1988. In 1989, the foreign exchange reserves reached US\$ 75 billion, and money supply grew at up to 50% a year. The Taiwanese have private savings of some US\$ 46 billion in 1989. From the lifting of foreign-exchange controls in 1988, the government has allowed residents to remit overseas up to US\$ 5 million annually (Economist, 1989; Friedland, 1988; Shim, 1988; Moore, 1988).

THE TAIWANESE TV INDUSTRY IN THE 1980S

When ETS' instruction programs joined CTS, the so-called "studio classroom" was started the day after CTS' establishment. But, because broadcast times for studio classroom were before 8:00 am and after 11:00pm, students complained. To address this defect and to enlarge the scope of air education, CTS expanded the UHF system on the basis of existing equipment. In 1983, the construction of the enlarged system was

completed and broadcasting officially began on September 1st, 1983. The half of the courses began telecasting mainly between 7:00 and 10:00 pm over the new UHF channel and the other half was remained in the VHF channel. The "National Studio University" began with total 42 hours weekly (Televison Academy, 1984).

In 1984, GIO eventually screened the first pulbic TV program in Taiwan. The three TV networks were obligated to allocate time slots for public TV programs free of charge. No commercials were permitted in public TV time slots. In the initial stages, the GIO public TV Programming Group provided just two TV programs for the daily 9:00–9:30 pm pulbic TV time slot, Mondays through Saturdays, so that two of the three networks weere forced to screen the same program simultaniously. (The special joint programs in this period from 1976 eventually stopped when the public TV programs started operation.) Later, additional time slots were allocated to the three networks: (1) 5:30–6:00 pm Mondays through Fridays, (2) 11:00–11:30 pm Mondays through Fridays, (3) 11:00 pm–1:00 am Saturdays, and 10:30–11:00 am Sundays. In 1985, the public TV program hours were increased to 15 hours per week over three commercial TV channels.

According to internal reference statistics of the Taiwan Power Company in 1985, there are over 5,000,028 TV receivers in Taiwan, for the highest percentage of households (93.1%), next only to electric fans (94.1%), of all domestic electric appliances. The 1985 edition of the World's Broadcasting and Television Manual counts 413 TV sets per thousand people in Taiwan; in other words, one TV set for every 2.6 persons. Among the various mass communication media, TV has the most

contact with the people in Taiwan: in 1985, 64.8% of all people watch TV everyday; each person watches TV an average of two hours and forty minutes per day - twice the time they devote to reading newspaper and listening radio. The number of TV receivers increased up to over 6 million in 1989 (Television Academy, 1986, 1990).

In 1985, due to the economic depression, the advertising revenue of the three networks presented the first time negative growth (-1.48%). However, the advertising volumes of Taiwan increased rapidly in terms of the economic growth and a large quantity of import production in the late 1980s. Although the three commercial TV stations faced the competition from many new media such as dishes, VCR, and illegal cable TV, the advertising revenue of the three networks still increased. In 1989, the advertising net nevenues of each TV station were: NT\$2.7 billion (TTV), NT\$2.1 billion (CTV), and NT\$2.6 billion (CTS). (NT\$26 was equal to US\$1.) Due to the needs of the large advertising market, the weekly average telecast time of the three networks increased from 174 hours in the early 1980s up to 318.3 hours in 1989 (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1

The Weekly Average Telecast Time of the Three Networks in the 1980s

Year	TTV (Hour)	CTV (Hour)	CTS(Hour)	Total (Hour)
1980	57.8	57.4	59.6	174.8
1981	57.2	56	58.3	171.5
1982	58.1	58.3	58.3	174.7
1983	58.3	58.4	57.3	174
1984	60.7	60.1	64.3	185.1
1985	74	73.1	76.3	223.4
1986	76	76	79	231

1987	80.8	81.4	88.8	251
1988	88.7	83.6	110.3	282.6
1989	103.8	96.2	118.3	318.3

^{*} The hours of CTS exclude the air hours of the studio classroom.

Source: Calculated from Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1978-1983, 1984-1985, 1986-1987, 1988-1989.

PROGRAMMING

In the early 1980s, the Hong Kong drama series gave Taiwan a big surprise. In 1982, CTV added Hong Kong drama series to its programming in the prime time on the weekend: "Chor Lau Heung", the first such series to be telecasted in Taiwan, created a sensation throughout the island. It was a costume kung fu drama; the story talked about a hero, Chor Lau-Heung, who was enthusiastic to help poor people and had a very good skill to steal things from the bad peolpe. Although it was an entertainment, TV station still considered the political situation. Because some directors and actors in this drama had gone to the mainland China, CTV cut the names of those people on the screen (Wu, 1986).

According to Television Academy (1984), this Hong Kong drama created 70% rating in Taiwan. "Chor Lau Heung" increased much CTV's advertising revenue.) The other two networks protested this situation because nobody watched their programs during that period. Therefore, the GIO regulated that the three networks took turns to broadcast the Hong Kong drama series and there were only 17 episodes on the air in each turn. From then on, wherever "Chor Lau Heung" went, the commercials would follow. After "Chor Lau Heung," there were many Hong Kong drama series

imported continuously such as "Semi-Gods and Semi-Devils," "The Hawk," "Legend of the Unknown," "The Green Dragon," "The Reincarnated" (Television Academy, 1984). Those drama series drew the spotlight of audience attention. Not only the series but also the Hong Kong actors became popular in Tiawan. Therefore, many Hong Kong actors came to Taiwan for the entertainment business (Wu, 1986; Chou, 1982).

Hong Kong drama series struck the Taiwanese TV with a big blow. Lots of articles blamed the bad quality of the domestic programs which could never compete with Hong Kong drama series. Hong Kong used to be one of the big customers which imported the Taiwanese TV programs in the 1970s, but its drama series heavily hit the Taiwanese TV in the early 1980s. It seemed a shame on the Taiwanese TV industry. In the late 1983, for protecting the domestic programs, the three networks decided that they would never broadcast the Hong Kong drama series regardless of the audiences' response and the highest ratings. However, the Hong Kong drama series rapidly became one of the favorite videoes in the Taiwanese video market (Wu, 1986).

The other influence of the "Chor Lau Heung" was that dubbing became popular in Taiwan. The language of the original Hong Kong drama series used Cantonese. As a result, those series were dubbed in Mandarin Chinese. The response of the audiences were very well so that dubbing became a new popular occuption in Taiwan. Not only the Hong Kong series but also Amercian series were dubbed in Chinese. Some of Amercian series such as "The-A-Team" (1985), "Knight Rider" (1986), and "MacGyver" (1986) were dubbed in Chinese and really got a good rating around 35 - 40 percent. In the late 1980s, almost Amercian situation

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comedies such as "The Cosby Show," "The Golden Girls," "Family Ties," and "Who's the boss?" were dubbed in Chinese and became the popular shows. In 1986, according to Jun-Li Market Survey Company, the percentage of the Taiwanese audiences who liked the dubbed programs was 49%; those who disliked, 43.5%; and no answer, 7.5%. Those who liked the dubbed programs asserted that the dubbed programs were easy to understand for kids, and people didn't need to read the Chinese caption. But, some people argued that the effect of the dubbed series was not so good as the effect of the original series. They asserted that some colloquialisms, slang and terms especially in the situation comedies missed the original meanings when those words were dubbed in Chinese. However, it was salient that the percentages of English used in each TV station decreased in terms of dubbing in Mandarin (see Table 4.2). In TTV, the percentage of English laguage used in the total programs was dropped from 12.87% in 1980 to 2.27% in 1988.

Table 4.2

The Percentage of English Used in Each TV Station in the 1980s

<u>Year</u>	<u>TTV (%)</u>	<u>CTV (%)</u>	CTS (%)
1980	12.87	15.05	11.75
1981	9.15	10.46	9.29
1982	9.40	9.23	6.86
1983	4.23	9.45	6.83
1984	3.65	5.47	6.18
1985	8.15	13.59	8.79
1986	4.98	13.36	10.30
1987	4.10	9.25	13.61
1988	2.27	6.40	11.17
1989	5.26	7.99	12.15

Source: Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1978-1983, 1984-1985, 1986-1987, 1988-1989.

The percentage of the imports was still lower than 20% in Taiwan in the 1980s. The public TV program had higher proportion of the imports as the beginning development of the three networks (see Table 4.3). But, the imports of the public TV decreased gradually. Unlike the three commercial TV stations, the imports of the public TV came from not only from the U.S. but also the European countries.

Table 4.3

The Percentage of the Domestic Programs and the Imports in the Public TV (1984-1989)

<u>Year</u>	Domestic (%)	<pre>Imported(%)</pre>	<u>Total</u>
1984-1985	59.6	40.4	100
1986	61.2	38.8	100
1987	64.4	35.6	100
1988	67.7	32.3	100
1989	74.9	25.1	100

Source: Calculated from Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1984-1985, 1986-1987, 1988-1989.

The annual exported program hours were totally around 3000 to 4000 in the 1980s (see Table 4.4). In terms of the large overseas Chinese market, the exports could keep a certain volume. The U.S. was still the big market for Taiwan's TV programs. Besides the U.S., the major markets were Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. In Hong Kong, the Taiwanese exported programs decreaed from 695.75 hours in 1975 to 155.5 hours in 1988. (Calculated from Television Yearbook of the Republic

of China, 1961-1975, 1988-1989.)

Table 4.4

The Exported Program Hours of the Three TV Stations in the 1980s

<u>Year</u>	TTV (Hours)	CTV (Hours)	CTS (Hours)	<u>Total</u>
1980	636	1322.2	1188.8	3147
1981	591.3	1163	1196.3	2950.6
1982	1094.3	1068.5	957.8	3120.6
1983	1262.5	1278	952	3492.5
1984	1564.5	1462	1150	4176.5
1985	818.1	1519.6	918	3255.7
1986	1321.5	1583.5	1085.2	3990.2
1987	1239	791.3	931.7	2962
1988	1074.5	1752.5	1085	3912
1989	1587.4	1581	N/A	N/A

Source: Calculated from Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1978-1983, 1984-1985, 1986-1987, 1988-1989.

In the late 1980s, many political and economic policies reformed. The Taiwanese News reports appeared in the three networks. Besides, the third dialect, Hakka, also presented in the news reports and commercials. When the stock market peaked as a casino, the news programs in the three networks provided the analysis of the stocks' trend. In 1989, a popular variety show, "Lien Huan Pao", created a puppet show which performed as government officials with an ironical way. However, the government high-ranking officials were too sensitive to accept this humor. Therefore, CTS cut this puppet show in 1990.

Many communication scholars came to discuss the problems of the Taiwanese TV. Those scholars' arguements assumed that TV was so powerful and could manipulate people's minds.

Chen (1990) asserted that a good cultural production could express the entire social formation. In a realistic modernism view, there was a represent relationship between cultural production and real world. For example, "Lien Huan Pao" represented the social problems within its comedic format. However, the Taiwanese TV didn't reflect, express, and represent the real society but edited, constructed, and knited a "reality effect" which was just belonged to the TV world. People living in a new TV realistic world, the real world didn't mean anything at all.

Kuo (1990) argued that the Taiwanese TV was manipulated for a long time. The three networks occupied the public resource (public media) but disregared the cutural responsibility. The way what they did was truely commercial. The quality of the programs was really bad. All they provided were entertainments. They produced stimuli to please the audiences. The audiences repeated the reaction of stimuli. In this stimuli-reaction mode, in fact, the audiences did not participate in and just accepted the TV contents. In this situation, the audiences totally lost their autonomies and their thinking capabilities. Those entertainments lacked the meanings of creativity and enlightenment. People imitated the poses, the terms, the values, the ideologies, the living styles and the thinking ways from TV.

The Soft Authoritarianism in the Taiwanese TV in the 1980s

By the mid 1980s, the KMT became so successful at winning elections under the the ground rules it has imposed that the regime can envisage progressively shifting the legal basis of its legitimacy from past elections on the mainland to future elections on Taiwan. As Winckler points out, Taiwan begins a systemic transition from "hard" to "soft" authoritarianism. "Hard" authoritarianism on Taiwan has meant

mainlander-technocratic rule under one-man dictatorship. "Soft" authoritarianism would imply joint mainlander-Taiwanese technocratic rule under collective party leadership. The dominance of the "ruling party" would still be guaranteed (Winckler, 1984).

The KMT brought the joint mainlander-Taiwanese technocratic rule in the Taiwanese TV industry. Instead of presenting the propaganda of anti-communism and Chinese recovery in the 1960s, TV contents shifted to be more pluralistic. News could be reported in Taiwanese. The third dialect appeared in the TV programs. Talents could discuss the government and the parties in their performance. No more drama like "The Cold Spell" in 1970s rerun in the 1980s. But, unlike the emancipation of the new daily newspaper, Broadcasting and Television Law still limited the TV contents. Many sensitive political topics such as Taiwan Independency were still baned.

In terms of its authoritarianism, the Taiwanese TV banned the popular Hong Kong drama series on the screens under a protectionism of the domestic programs. But in the soft reform, it invited many producers and talents from Hong Kong to progress the domestic programs. The drama productions with Hong Kong style such as "Return Ming-Chu," "The Peach Blossom in August," and "Spring Returns," got a big hand from the audiences. The inter-production between Hong Kong and Taiwan was based on a high degree of cultural proximity. As the Brazilian case in Straubhaar's study (1991), there were regional similarities beyond Language when Hong Kong dramas were dubbed in Chinese.

Following the socio-economic growth, the annual revenues of the Taiwanese TV industry increased rapidly in the late 1980s. Although there

were a series of social reforms, TV in Taiwan did not change so much, especially in its political situation. In terms of the KMT's hegemonic structure in the owenership, TV culture in Taiwan seemed difficult to be emancipated. As White (1987) points out, a transformation of TV's ideology would require a shift in the mode of production – a total reorganization of ownership and control of the medium.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE TAIWANESE TV IN THE 1990S

TAIWAN IN THE EARLY 1990S

Taiwan is still not a democracy. It is more democratic than authoritarian regimes, and it will be more democratic still by the mid-1990s. But, as Winckler (1988) asserts, its democratic practices will remain subordinate to a party-state apparatus that reserves to itself the choice of highest leaders and basic policies and defines the limits of political competition.

By the 1990s, increased unofficial contact with the mainland will have reaffirmed a public consensus that nobody wants to rejoin the mainland but that formally declaring Taiwan independent would be foolbardy (Winckler, 1988: 235).

Taiwan, Asia's most dynamic economy of the 1980s, is slowing down. The economy is growing at its slowest pace in 5 years. In 1990, Taiwan's gross national product (GNP) had been expected to grow by around 7%, but with the stock market slide, and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, real GNP will grow by 5.42% or less (Economist, 1990).

The crash of Taiwan's stock market in 1990 brings the likelihood that the stock market has peaked as a casino. However, Taiwan has recovered quickly from the 80% drop in the stock market in 1990. People are returning to productive employment now that the stock market casino has lost its appeal. Companies are being encouraged by government incentives to improve training and invest in research and development.

Economic growth, liquidity, and corporate earnings are all back on course. The Peoples' Republic of China is quickly becoming an export processing center for Taiwanese manufacturers. Taiwanese exports have been growing at an annualized rate of more than 50% in 1991 (Economist, 1990, 1991; Kurz and Wannamethee, 1991).

TV IN TAIWAN IN THE EARLY 1990S

The programs of the public TV are planning to broadcast over the UHF system as ETS in the mid 1990s. The period (9:00-9:30pm) in the prime time which has been occupied by non-commercial programs since 1976 will return to the three commercial TV stations.

In 1991, many TV programs especially drama series and varieties used two languages in their dialogue. For example, a series named "Between sister-in-laws and mother-in-laws" portrayed the relationship between a mainlander family and a Taiwanese family. The talents used both languages in the stories.

The political campaigns on TV were open in the December 1991 election. But all the political campaigns were required to be examined by the Central Election Committee which was organized by the government.

The KMT focused on a topic of "Your Old Friend." The slogan was "Sharing both the sweet and the bitter 40 years, we are always here. Your old friend - KMT". This campaign emphasized the contribution of the government and the harmony of mainlander and Taiwanese. There were four stages showed in this campaign: (1) Taiwanese could not communicate with mainlanders because of the different languages in the 1950s; (2) the living standard progressed in the 1960s; (3) the generational change and intermarriage bridged the ethnic gap between Taiwanese and mainlanders

in the 1970s; (4) the economic growth made all the people in Taiwan rich in the 1980s (United Daily News, 1991).

The campaign of the opposition party, DPP, focused on the political reforms. Their slogan was "Let's establish an independent Taiwanese republic country." They asserted to initiate a new constitution and insisted on direct election of president and anti-Chinese recovery. However, by examination, the word "Taiwanese" in the slogan was cut by the Central Election Committee (United Daily News, 1991; Lin, 1991).

Those campaigns were broadcasted only in 9:00-9:30 pm. The rating decreased from 23% to 19% during 9 days. Huang, a chief manager in an advertising company, said that it was hard to expect voters to watch TV during that period. There was always low rating in that time slot from the mid 1970s so far. The Central Election Committee didn't consider the viewing habit of the audiences (Huang, 1991).

In the 1991 election, the KMT held its majority (over 70%). This might be an indication that the "crisis of confidence" of the KMT was not so bad as had been thought.

In fact, when the limitations of the media such as newspaper have been lifted, TV in Taiwan still plays the most conservative one. The political Taiwanization from the 1970s doesn't influence the personnel structure of the three networks. In terms of the KMT's hegemonic structure, the highest leaders and basic policy of the Taiwanese TV will be still manipulated by the one-party authoritarianism.

CHAPTER SIX: RECONSIDERING IDEOLOGY IN TV CULTURE

From the Taiwanese case, there are three points to discuss the ideology in TV culture:

- (1) The dominant classes are shaped by ideology more than they shape it. The meanings of ideological representations on TV are not solely for the audiences.
 - (2) Many media critics are too far outside the culture they examine.
 - (3) Emancipatory TV culture can stimulate media civilization.

IDEOLOGICAL REPRESENTATIONS IN TV CULTURE

In the Taiwanese case, TV is actually manipulated by one party. Although the emphasis of TV messages changes from the concept of anti-communism and Chinese recovery in the 1960s to the social reforms in the 1980s, TV still serves for one party and represents the dominant ideology. On the one hand, it is more democratic that the opposition party can show on TV. On the other hand, it is pseudo-democratic that the speech freedom of the opposition party is limited by the government examination. However, the practice of ideological representations is not an unilinear process for the various groups of the audiences.

Cultural hegemonic process can be explained by three dimensions or levels. "First, there is 'effective' dominant culture. Second, there is 'residual' culture containing historical meanings and proctices which may eventually become incorporated as part of dominant culture. Finally, there is 'emergent' culture of new ideas, meanings, experiences, styles which

eventually become incorporated in some form, even though initially they may constitute an oppositional or counter culture" (Billington, 1991:27). In other words, the hegemonic ideology changes in order to remain hegemonic.

Both Gramsci and Althusser emphasize the role of the state which represents the dominant ideology through the social institutions. If everything is under the supervision of the state, it is quite easy to see why the only ideology that gets reproduced is the dominant one. But, the question is how a society allows the relative freedom of civil institutions to operate in the ideological field, day after day, without direction or compulsion by the state. If hegemony explains everything in the sphere of culture, it explains nothing. The cultural hegemony system is not a closed system. It leaks and it remains to some extent competitive (Hall, 1985; Gitlin, 1987).

In fact, dominant classes are shaped by ideology more than they shape it. They are involved in an ideological mechanism more than the people whom they want to influence are. To extend that they engage in active deception, they disseminate propaganda, not ideology. "It is lived experience that produces ideology, not the other way around. Ideology is rooted in and expresses the activities out of which it emerges" (Burawoy, 1979:18).

Although TV represents the dominant culture, TV contents are polysemic for the different social groups which can find in TV different meanings that correspond to their differing social relations. The dominant ideology is structured into the text as into the social system, but the structure of both text and society allows space for resistance and

negotiation. Because the TV text is more polysemic and more open, the message is not solely in the text, but can be changed or worked on by the audiences as they make their own interpretation of a program (Fiske, 1986, 1987). Therefore, the meanings produced by ideological representations on TV are not as monolithic as have been thought.

CRITICTS IN TV CULTURE

TV, as a member of the family, takes place in domestic surroundings, and is usually viewed in normal light conditions. The regime of viewing TV is very different from cinema. TV doesn't encourage people to concentrate on viewing it. Watching TV is not the only activity going on in front of the TV set. It seems unusual to pay attention to viewing TV. People watch TV and also do something (conversation, eating, sleeping, tending children, reading, doing homework, etc). As Williams (1986) asserts, TV creates a popular memory and it serves important human interests not longer engaged by most serious art.

The Frankfurt school analysis of the culture industries as mass deception has strongly influenced left views of popular culture. The theorists like Adorno and Horkheimer assumed the power of mass culture "to be monolithic and so pervasive that it virtually eradicated any revolutionary potential in the masses" (Modleski, 1986). In this perspective, many critics argue that TV is now dominated by various forms of capitalist ideology. They see the cultural industries as dominated by "mind managers" who served as instruments of corporate-capitalist rule (Kellner, 1987). They emphasize that mass culture manipulates its consumers.

Popular culture can be seen as a very active world of everyday

conversation and exchange. Jokes, idioms, characteristic forms not just everyday dress but occasional dress, people consciously having a party, making a do, marking an occasion. There is a sense in which everyday gossip passes straight into a certain kind of serial (Heath and Skirrow, 1986). TV may be articulating those things. But, the question is whether the audiences totally lose their autonomies and their thinking capabilities and directly imitate the poses, the terms, the values, the ideologies, the living styles and the thinking ways from TV.

In Hall's (1980) study, there are three forms in the audiences' responses: dominant, negotiated, and oppositional. According to Hall, the dominant reading of a text accepts the text's messages at face value; the negotiated response might dispute a particular claim while accepting the overall system; and an oppositional response rejects the system in the interests of the subordinate culture. Therefore, the way of reading a message depends on the audience's political beliefs and general social experience.

This study may explains that the audiences are not completely manipulated. It would seem mass culture is no longer a problem for the work of the Frankfurt school. But, critics seem to have the opposite problem: "immersed in their culture, half in love with their subject, they sometimes seem unable to achieve the proper critical distance from it" (Modleski, 1986). In mass culture studies, as Williams (1986) points out, "there is also the danger of narrowing our notion of text too much, of analyzing 'the discrete single work,' and by doing so of missing the normal or characteristic experience of mass culture."

EMANCIPATORY TV CULTURE

Today, electronically transmitted culture in the broadcast media occupies so much of people's leisure time. It seems that most people get much of their information and view of the world from the electronic media. Therefore, many communication scholars make a serious commitments to these media. However, when media culture is manipulated by a dominant culture and the structure of the media can not be changed, media civilization may be more important than the arguement of the cultural dominance.

By media civilization, people understand how the media produce the meanings everyday. They rethink the messages transmitted by the media. They may doubt the reliability of the messages. They receive the information by the media but they judge things by themselves. But how can a society reach the ideal of media civilization under a hegemonic culture?

Although hegemonic ideology tends to legitimate dominant institutions, values, and ways of life, it is not monolithic. Hegemonic ideology is saturated with contradictions. Like "Lien Huan Poa" in Taiwan, comedy and satire have often been effective means of the social criticism and enlightenment. In Taiwan, there are more and more comedic varieties in the 1990s but not many varieties present emancipatory nature. The audiences rethink the governmental policies through satiric performace in the comedies. This may be a good way to speake out for the different voices from the dominant classes'.

Emancipatory comedy provides insights into the nature of the society that break through ideological conceptions. Emancipatory laughter suspends the logic of everyday reality; it is surreal and helps one to rise

above ideological preconceptions in order to recognize the workings of everyday life. It could foster critical awareness by enabling one to laugh at a miserable – and to see that life could be different (Kellner, 1987).

Emancipatory TV culture stimulates media civilization. It increases the opposite conscious which attacks the authority of the established society.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

From the cultural sociology view, the Taiwanese TV industry is investigated in relation to the Taiwanese political system, economic situation and cultural form. Through the investigation, the role of the culture industry and the ideological representations behind the culture industry are reconsidered.

TTV was started operation in 1962; CTV went on the air in 1969. In the 1960s, Taiwan's TV, as an Ideological State Apparatus, delivered messages about anti-communism and Chinese recovery and strengthened the ruling KMT's political status and its one-party authoritarianism.

In the 1970s, the third commercial network, CTS, was established. In the TV ownership structure, there was a solid supersturcture formed by political society (the government shares) and civil society (the private shares). The provincial government, the KMT and the military were major owners of the three networks. The special joint TV programs in 9:00-9:30 pm have represented the state policy since 1976. Broadcasting and Television Law was finally ratified after the Taiwanese TV started 14 years ago. TV contents presented the phenomenon of polarization: the serious state ideology and the light entertainment.

In the early 1980s, the Hong Kong drama series got a 70% rating in Taiwan in terms of regional cultural proximity but banned by the three networks in 1984 for protecting the domestic programs. Following the

socio-economic growth, the annual revenues of the Taiwanese TV industry increased rapidly in the late 1980s. Although there were a series of social reforms, TV in Taiwan still be manipulated by the soft authoritarianism.

The political campaigns on TV were open in 1991 but they were required to be examined by the government. In fact, when the limitations of the media such as newspaper have been lifted, TV in Taiwan still plays the most conservative one.

From the Taiwanese case, there are three points to discuss the ideology in TV culture: (1) The dominant classes are shaped by ideology more than they shape it. The meanings of ideological representations on TV are not solely for the audiences. (2) Many media critics are too far outside the culture they examine. (3) Emancipatory TV culture can stimulate media civilization.

PROBLEMS WITH THE STUDY

There are two problems in this study. First, many sources come from the newspaper, magazines, and books which describe the situation at the different time period. It must be careful to collect the evidences and judge the reliability of the resources. For example, the Television Yearbooks emphasize the progress of the TV industry. There are no critical descriptions in those yearbooks. Therefore, it is dangerous to believe everything that the yearbooks decribe.

Second, for ideological analysis, the researcher had better watch the TV texts to analyze the meanings of texts. But in this research, all the descriptions of the TV programs come from the literature of the resources. It is hard to study in depth without examining the image

representations.


FURTHER PERSPECTIVES

Today people live in the age of the electronic media. New media such as cable TV, satellite become popular. The messages are received not only by the domestic transmissions but also by the international distributions. The sources of information become pluralization. The ideological representations of the new information industry become more complex. Not only the domestic dimension but the international dimension would be considered. The cross-culture issue would be involved.

For the further research, as Luke (1989) points out,

the substance and form of television and radio broadcasting, audio and videocassetes, computer hardware and software – as key commodities in this growing web of global exchange – should be reevaluated in this sort of ideology critique to explore some of the new forms of power and ideology binding together these new transnational human communities. (Luke, 1989:4)

In the process of informationalization, the new modes of domination and the forms of resistance to the social, political, economic, and cultural transformations are likely examined.



APPENDIX I

Article 4. of the Rules of the Control of Broadcasting and Television Personnel

APPENDIX I

Article 4. of the Rules of the Control of Broadcasting and Television Personnel (Approved as per Executive Yuan Letter Tai (66) Wen No. 6386, Dated July 30,1977) (Promulgated as per Government Information Office Letter (66) Te Po No. 08737, Dated August 6, 1977)

- <u>Article 4</u>. With the exception of chairmen and members of boards of directors of private stations who do not execute operations directly, the responsible personnel of broadcasting and TV enterprises shall have one of the following qualifications:
- (1) Having been responsible personnel of broadcasting and/or TV enterprises or publisher of journals.
- (2) Having been chiefs of departments of broadcasting and/or TV enterprises of journals for three years or more.
- (3) Having been public functionaries of Recommended Appointment rank or equivalent rank or higher rank for seven years or more.
- (4) Possessing professorships approved by the Ministry of Education and having been professors teaching related subjects.
- (5) Graduates of domestic or foreign universities, colleges or junior colleges recognized by the Ministry of Education, majoring in related subjects, who have had work experience in broadcasting and/or television for ten years or more.

Source: Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1976-1977

APPENDIX II				
The Composition of the GNP for Agriculture, Industry and Service Industry				

APPENDIX II

The Composition of the GNP for Agriculture, Industry and Service Industry

Year	Agriculture (%)	Industry (%)	Service(%)	A/I (Times)
1952	35.9	18.0	46.1	1.99
1953	38.3	17.7	44.0	2.16
1954	31.7	22.2	46.1	1.43
1955	32.9	21.1	46.0	1.56
1956	31.6	22.4	46.0	1.41
1957	31.7	23.9	44.4	1.33
1958	31.0	23.9	45.1	1.30
1959	30.4	25.7	44.9	1.18
1960	32.8	24.9	43.3	1.32
1961	31.4	25.0	43.6	1.26
1962	29.2	25.7	45.1	1.14
1963	26.7	28.2	45.1	0.94
1964	28.2	28.9	42.9	0.98
1965	27.3	28.6	43.1	0.95
1966	26.2	28.8	45.0	0.91
1967	23.8	30.8	45.4	0.77
1968	22.0	32.5	45.5	0.68
1969	18.8	34.6	46.6	0.45
1970	17.9	3 4.7	47.4	0.52
1971	14.9	36.9	48.2	0.40
1972	14.1	40.4	45.5	0.35
1973	14.1	43.8	42.1	0.32
1974	14.5	41.2	44.3	0.35
1975	14.9	39 .2	45.9	0.38
1976	13.4	42.7	43.9	0.31
1977	12.5	43.7	43.8	0.29
1978	11.3	45.5	43.2	0.25
1979	10.4	45.7	43.1	0.23

1980	9.3	45.3	45.4	0.21
1981	8.7	45.2	46.1	0.19
1982	8.7	43.9	47.4	0.20

^{*} A/I = Agriculture / Industry

Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, 1983

APPENDIX III

Annual Production and Sales of TV Set in Taiwan

APPENDIX III

Annual Production and Sales of TV Set in Taiwan

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>OUTPUT</u>	DOMESTIC SALES	OVERSEAS SALES
1962	4,400		
1963	7,600		
1964	31,055		
1965	49,540		
1966	66,260	65,105	
1967	111,711	24,2 80	65,964
1968	650,205	182,000	56,121
1969	947,539	247,413	340,271
1970	1,254,125	378,000	705,465
1971	1,891,846	381,300	1,602,001
1972	3,590,752	336,000	3,175,807
1973	4,541,955	386,332	4,107,233
1974	4,036,204	410,644	3,764,623
1975	2,934,971	396,515	2,592,381
1976	3,850,046	414,760	3,642,214
1977	4,926,000	474, 000	4,454,000
1978	7,096,000	593,0 00	6,159,000
1979	6,698,000	711,000	5,955,000
1980	4,041,000	655,000	6,517,000
1981	6,924,000	544,0 00	6,333,000
1982	4,724,000	497, 000	4,352,000
1983	5,152,000	417,000	4,752,000

Note: Domestic sales include both locally manufactured and imported sets.

After 1977, the number below one thousand doesn't count.

Source: Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1961-1975, 1976-1977, 1978-1983.

APPENDIX IV Annual Increase of TV Sets in Taiwan

APPENDIX IV

Annual Increase of TV Sets in Taiwan

YEAR	B/W SETS	COLOR SETS	TOTAL
1962	4,400		4,400
1963	12,000		12,000
1964	43,035		43,035
1965	92,595		92,595
1966	157,700		157,700
1967	181,980		181,980
1968	363,980		363,980
1969	606,880	113	606,993
1970	971,580	5,813	977,393
1971	1,290,525	37,113	1,327,628
1972	1,516,985	97,113	1,614,098
1973	1,774,739	160,588	1,935,327
1974	2,028,436	293,255	2,321,691
1975	2,053,750	482,456	2,179,346
1976	1,963,772	744,181	2,346,693
1977	1,765,000	1,076,000	2,841,000
1978	1,493,000	1,523,000	3,016,000
1979	1,322,000	1,914,000	3,236,000
1980	1,171,000	2,526,000	3,697,000
1981	1,087,000	3,157,000	4,244,000
1982	919,000	3,788,000	4,70 7,000
1983	787,000	4,448,000	5,235,000

Note: After 1977, the number below one thousand doesn't count.

Source: Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1961-1975, 1976-1977, 1978-1983.

APPENDIX V

The Statistic List of the Taiwanese TV AD

APPENDIX V

The Statistic List of the Taiwanese TV AD (Unit: NT\$10,000)

		Rate in All AD	
<u>Year</u>	Worth of TV AD	Total Amount (%)	Rate of Growth(%)
1962	136	0.50	
1963	706	2.30	419.12
1964	2,400	6.00	239.94
1965	4,200	9.30	75 .00
1966	7,430	13.50	76.90
1967	11,200	16.50	50.74
1968	14,000	16.20	25.00
1969	20,500	18.69	46.43
1970	42,600	29.40	107.80
1971	44,210	29.50	3.78
1972	54,5 00	32.40	23.28
1973	72,450	31.41	32.94
1974	90,600	31.37	25.05
1975	100,700	30.11	11.15
1976	132,000	31.49	31.08
1977	159,500	31.35	20.83
1978	203,000	31.81	27.27
1979	248,850	30.87	22.59
1980	295,380	28.66	18.70
1981	340,300	29.92	15.21
1982	347,400	29.20	2.09
1983	456,000	31.75	31.26

Source: Taipei Advertising Agencies Association.

APPENDIX VI Chapter III. Program Control of the Broadcasting and Television Law

APPENDIX VI

Chapter III. Program Control of the Broadcasting and Television Law (Promulgated by the President on January 8, 1976. Amendment of this Law promulgated on June, 7, 1982.)

Chapter III. PROGRAM CONTROL

Article 16.

Broadcasting and television programs are classified into the following categories:

- (1) Newscast and publicity of government policies and orders.
- (2) Education and culture.
- (3) Public service.
- (4) Entertainment.

Article 17.

The time of the (1), (2) and (3) programs of the foregoing Article shall not be less than 45 per cent of the total weekly broadcasting time in broadcasting stations and 50 per cent of the total weekly television time in TV stations.

Entertainment programs shall be aimed at promoting Chinese culture as well as ethics, democracy and science and shall be educational.

The standards of contents and the distribution of time of these programs shall be stipulated by the GIO (the Government Information Office of the Executive Yuan).

Article 18.

The distribution of programs for specialized stations and those with special missions shall be made by the GIO in conjunction with other government agencies concerned.

Article 19.

Self-produced programs shall not be less than 70 per cent of all broadcasting and television programs.

Foreign-language programs shall be presented with Chinese subtitles or with Mandarin narration. If necessary, GIO may ask to dub the programs in Chinese.

Article 20.

The stations shall mainly use Mandarin in domestic broadcasts and shall decrease gradually the use of dialects. The proportion between the Mandarin and the dialects shall be decided by the GIO according to actual requirements.

Article 21.

No contents of Broadcasting and television programs shall be allowed to:

- (1) Be detrimental to national interests or national dignity.
- (2) Contravene the national policy of anti-Communism and mainland recovery and the Government's laws and regulations.
 - (3) Instigate people to commit crimes or disobey laws and orders.
 - (4) Be detrimental to the mental and physical health of children.
 - (5) Impair public order and customs.
 - (6) Spread rumors and heresies and mislead the people.

Article 22.

No program shall be allowed to comment on legal actions under investigation or trial, on judicial personnel handling the cases or on the parties involved. No program shall report the devate of lawsuits wherein publicity is prohibited.

Article 23.

The stations shall make corrections of errors in the same program or at the same time of the original program within seven days upon receipt of requests from the interested parties, and the correction must be made within 15 days from the day of broadcast. Otherwise, the stations shall reply in writing informing the complainants of their justifications of the reports in question.

If the mistaken reports have caused damages to the rights and interests of the parties concerned, the stations, their responsible officials and employees concerned shall be liable civilly or criminally.

Article 24.

If broadcasting and television commentaries involve other people or agencies or organizations and are detrimental to their rights and interests, the stations concerned shall not refuse any request from the parties mentioned for an equal chance of defense.

Article 25.

All programs other than news shall be subject to review by the GIO. The procedure of such review shall be established by the GIO.

Article 26.

The GIO may designate all public and private stations to jointly or separately broadcast such programs as news and publicity of governmental orders and policies.

Article 27.

The stations shall submit to the GIO beforehand the timetables of programs for knowledge. This shall apply to changes of programs.

Article 28.

The import or export of any kind of broadcasting and television programs shall be authorized by the GIO.

Article 29.

Broadcasting of any foreign program through the relaying facilities of international telecommunications or relaying of domestic programs for foreign use shall be authorized by the GIO.

Article 29-1.

The establishment of broadcasting television program supply enterprises shall have the approval of the GIO. Article 21, Article 25, Article 28 and Article 34 shall be applied to the program contents and related management matters of the enterprises.

Source: Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1978-1983

APPENDIX VII

Chapter III. Program Control of the Enforcement Rules of the Broadcasting and Television Law

APPENDIX VII

Chapter III. Program Control of the Enforcement Rules of the Broadcasting and Television Law

Chapter III. PROGRAM CONTROL

Article 13.

The news programs referred to in paragraph one of Article 16 of this Law include news reports, analyses and live telecast or live radio broadcast; publicizing of government policies and orders refers to introduction to government measures and achievements.

Article 14.

The education and culture programs referred to in paragraph two of Article 16 shall be aimed at furthering the Chinese culture, promoting social education, supplementing school education, and developing children's intelligence and ability. The standards are as follows:

- (1) To increase the citizens' knowledge in keeping with the needs of society.
 - (2) To expound scientific technology and various vocational skills.
- (3) To introduce refinement in life, public morality, physical culture, hygiene and ethical eduation.
- (4) To augment public knowledge of history and geography, expound traditional culture, and inspire national spirit and consciousness.
- (5) To introduce or commetn on literature, music, fine art, drama and dance to enable better appreciation.
 - (6) To offer air-school and supplementary education programs.

Article 15.

The public service programs referred to in paragraph three of Article 16 of this Law are the weather reports, time reports, urgent announcements, public safety and other related social service items. The standards are as follows:

(1) The broadcast, in principle, shall be propagated free of charge, and when a major problem related to the public interest is referred to, a

satisfactory response shall be made.

- (2) During the hours of broadcasting, a weather report and a time report shall be made at least once every four hours. In the case of a television broadcast, a time report must be made on the hour. All such reports must be based on information supplied by competent agencies.
- (3) In cases of natural calamities and emergencies, reports shall be inserted from time to time and measure for dealing with the crisis shall be included

Article 16.

The entertainment programs mentioned in paragraph four of Article 16 refer to programs not included in paragraphs one to three, including singing, music, dramas, novels, stories, jokes, riddle solution, dancing, acrobatic performance, vaudeville and other entertainment programs.

Article 17.

In addition to observing the provisions of Article 21, radio and television broadcasting programs shall be produced in keeping with the principles.

Article 18.

The percentages of time allocation in radio and television broadcasting stated in paragraph three of Article 17 of this Law are prescribed as follows:

- (1) Newscasts and programs relation to government policies and orders: No less than 15 percent of the weekly total broadcasting time for a radio broadcasting station and no less than 20 percentof the weekly total time for a television broadcasting station.
- (2) Education and culture programs: No less than 20 percent of the weekly total broadcasting time for both radio and television broadcasting stations.
- (3) Public service programs: No less than 10 percent of the weekly total broadcasting time for both radio adn television broadcasting stations.
- (4) Entertainment programs: No more than 55 percent of the weekly total broadcasting time for a radio station and no more than 50 percent of the weekly total broadcasting time for a television station.

Additional broadcasting time required in the execution of a government assignment shall not be subject to the restrictions set forth in the foregoing paragraphs.

Article 19.

The percentages of domestic broadcasts using Mandarin shall be no less than 55 percent in the case of an AM radio broadcasting station and no less than 70 percent in the case of an FM radio broadcasting station or a television broadcasting station. The use of dialects shall be reduced gradually and the percentage shall be reviewed and regulated by the GIO in accordance with practical considerations.

Article 20.

A professional station or a station with a specific mission shall devote at least 60 percent of its total broadcasting time to the broadcast of professional and specific programs. The time allocated to other programs and the proportion between the use of Mandarin and dialects shall reported with their detailed justifications and the duration of implementation to the GIO for approval.

Article 21.

Except for newscasts, the programs and scripts that are required to be examined by the GIO in compliance with Article 25 of this Law shall be submitted to the GIO for examining in accordance with the following procedure:

- (1) An application form together with the sound tape, video tape or film concerned shall be submitted within severn days before broadcasting. No broadcasting or screenign shall be made before a certificate of GIO authorization has been granted.
- (2) An application form together with the script of a drama program and/or skits inserted for review. No broadcasting or screening shall be made without GIO approval.

In case of disagreement with the GIO decision, the concerned station may file a written application within 14 days after receiving the notice requesting another review, after which period the application will not be accepted. If necessary, scholars and experts may be invited to participate in the second review.

For programs not requiring GIO examination, the stations shall be responsible for reviewing them before broadcasting. The sound tape, video tape, film, manuscript and other materials related to the program shall be kept for 15 days for reference.

Article 22.

A station shall submit the timetable of its programs to the GIO for approval ten days before broadcasting. Upon approval, the timetable shall not be changed except under the following conditions:

- (1) The changed timetable of programs is submitted for approval two days before broadcasting.
- (2) A last-minute change is warranted for a special reason and an inserted announcement or immediate explanation of the change is made.

In case of a change of timetable necessitated by paragraph two, reasons for the change and contents of the changed program shall be reported to the GIO for reference within 24 hours after broadcasting.

Article 23.

Procedures for importing foreign radio and/or television programs by a station shall be as follows:

- (1) Application for a certificate of delivery from the GIO shall be made with a Bill of Lading , and customs clearance shall be completed with the GIO certificate.
- (2) An imported program shall be coupled with a broadcasting authorization certificate and it shall not be broadcast until a broadcasting certificate is obtained. If the program is in the form of a film or a video tape, the applicant shall pay the examining fees.
- (3) If broadcasting of the imported program is prohibited, it shall be returned to the sender immediately.

Article 24.

Procedures for exporting a radio or television broadcasting program shall be as follows:

- (1) An application form shall be filled out and filed with the GIO for an export certificate. If the program is a film or video tape, the applicant shall pay the examining fee.
- (2) The applicant shall complete customs clearance with an export certificate.

(3) When an imported foreign program is to be sent abroad, an export certificate is required.

Article 25.

With GIO approval, a radio and television program supplier is entitled to submit scripts an programs to the GIO for examination and to import and export radio and television programs. In such case, the provisions of paragraphs one and two fo Article 21, Article 23 and Article 24 of this Law are applicable mutatis mutandis.

Article 26.

Procedures for applying for the use of international telecommunications facilities for relaying radio or television broadcasting programs in accordance with Article 29 of this Law shall be as follows:

- (1) An applicationshall be filed with the GIO.
- (2) With a GIO certificate, the applicant may file an application with the International Telecommunications Administration of the Ministry of Communications for lease of a channel.
- (3) An applications shall be filed with the GIO for examining all domestic programs which are to be relayed abroad, except for newscasts, which shall be dealt with in accordance with other relevant rules. If the program to be relayed is a film or a video tape, the applicant shall pay the examining fee.

If a foreign program is to be relayed to the Republic of China, the station concerned is required to make an audio or video recording for examination, when necessary, before it is broadcast.

Article 27.

If a foreign performer is invited to take part in a domestic television program, the station shall act in accordance with the regulations concerned, report in detail on the contents fo the performance and submit a biographical sketch and a photo of the performer to the GIO for approval.

Article 28.

A broadcasting station shall keep a daily log containing such entries as the titles of all programs, languages used, names of the anchor persons, producing units and a brief description of the contents of the programs and advertisements.

THe form of the log may be determined by the station itself, but the log shall be kept for two years for reference.

Article 29.

A radio broadcasting station shall announce the name of the statoin, call letters and frequency at the start, the end and during a change of program. A brief announcement of the station's name shall be made once every half hour, depending on circumstances, to facilitate identification.

Television and radio stations with special missions are to operate with reference to the foregoing provisions.

Source: Television Yearbook of The Republic of China 1978-1983



APPENDIX VIII

The Program Statistics in the International Commercial TV Systems

			Entertain-	Public
Country	<u>News (%)</u>	Education (%)	ment (%)	Service (%)
British IBA	17.0	18.0	65.0	0
U.S.A.	13.5	2.5	80.0	4.0
Canada	13.0	15.0	70.0	2.0
Australia	11.0	4.0	84.0	1.0
Philippine	15.3	1.0	77.4	6.3
Japan	11.0	8.0	71.0	10.0
Guam	5.6	1.0	82.4	11.0
Hong Kong	8.5	12.5	75.0	4.0
Lebanon	13.0	11.0	73.0	3.0
Nicaragua	2.0	8.0	90.0	0
Argentina	13.6	9.3	71.4	5.7
Paraguay	12.0	12.0	73.0	3.0
Trinidad	12.3	10.8	70.1	6.8
Guatemala	8.3	2.4	87.9	2.4
Ecuador	13.6	5.2	72.5	8.7

Source: Lee (1984: 21-22); based on World Radio and TV Handbook, 1982



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