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DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN BELIEF  
AND BEHAVIOR: IMPLICATIONS  
FOR ADULT EDUCATION

presented by

Robin Lee Burkhart

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DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN BELIEF AND BEHAVIOR:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR ADULT EDUCATION

By

Robin Lee Burkhart

A DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN BELIEF AND BEHAVIOR:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR ADULT EDUCATION

By

Robin Lee Burkhart

Previous research has demonstrated that overt behavior may not always be consistent with what is known, believed or valued. Many different approaches have been taken in an attempt to understand this phenomenon and discover conditions under which behavior can be predicted from espoused beliefs. This study was intended to contribute to an understanding of the adult's awareness of these discrepancies, the extent to which that awareness is motivational, the consequences of this awareness for adults, and the implications of discrepancy awareness for adult education. Additionally, the study sought to identify any differences that exist between those who claim a Christian and those who claim a non-religious belief base when dealing discrepancies.

Interviews were conducted with 35 adults who participated in adult education programs. Twenty subjects were drawn from religious adult education programs and claimed a Christian belief base. Fifteen



PLATE 1

subjects were drawn from non-religious adult education programs and claimed a non-religious belief base. In the interviews each subject was asked to: a) related and evaluate instances of belief/behavior discrepancies from their personal experience or from their observations of others; b) to select the most appropriate resolution strategy for 15 other belief/behavior discrepancy situations; c) to identify barriers individuals confront and resources individuals use when endeavoring to resolve belief/behavior discrepancies; and d) identify the process of discrepancy resolution.

The major findings of the study include: a) adults are aware of discrepancies in themselves and others; b) adults regard discrepancies as significant and negatively; c) adults evaluate the significance of discrepancies by "core values"; d) adults prefer to resolve discrepancies by changing behavior rather than by changing belief; e) under certain circumstances adult's will regard discrepancies as requiring no change; and f) adults identify other people as the most significant barrier to resolution and the most significant resource. The subjects also identified a four step discrepancy resolution process involving: a) awareness; b) deliberation; c) decision; and d) action. Finally, little or no difference was observed between the two groups of subjects.

subjects were drawn from non-religious adult education programs and  
included a non-religious belief base. In the intervention group subjects were  
asked to: a) reflect and evaluate instances of belief/behavior  
discrepancies from their personal experience or from their observations  
of others; b) to select the most appropriate resolution strategy for a  
given belief/behavior discrepancy; c) to identify barriers



TO LINDA

my wife, my friend



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Its traditional for recognition and gratitude to be expressed at the beginning of a dissertation. So, not wanting to break with tradition and sincerely wishing to thank some very important people, let me express my deep appreciation and heart felt thanks

- . . . to my Mom and Dad who taught me to dream;
- . . . to Grandma and Grandpa Still who showed me dreams take courage and hard work;
- . . . to the Pastors, Board and people of Bethany Assembly of God who believed in me and my dreams;
- . . . to my committee; Ted, Ken, Joe, Vince and Peggy who helped shape the dream;
- . . . to Emma, Jen, Pat, Ken, Richard, Ruth and Mom D' who helped give birth to the dream;
- . . . to my children, Erika, Paul and Mark and their dreams yet unlive;
- . . . to my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ who made it possible for me to dream;
- . . . and to Linda who has made my life a dream come true.





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
## Chapter 1: The Problem

"Surely the saddest thing that could be said of us in these later years of the Twentieth Century would be that we knew better, but could not bring ourselves to follow that better" (Peatling, p. 224).

### Introduction

Forming both belief systems and behavior patterns is an essential and normal part of adult life. In that process, and in the conduct of life, discrepancies between aspects of an individual's belief system and behavior occur. Many adults wish to live consistently with their beliefs and ideals but are frustrated in the attempt. The discrepancies they experience are a source of private consternation and, when such discrepancies have societal implication, a matter of public concern.

Much previous research (to be reviewed latter) has attempted to describe and explain the factors that contribute to belief/behavior discrepancies. This study, unlike much of the previous research, does not seek to focus on a given variable but, on the adults' awareness of belief/behavior discrepancies and the impact of that awareness. It is based on the assumption that adults reflect on their experiences, have insight that is valuable, and are willing and able to articulate those



insights if given the opportunity. Therefore, interviews were held with 35 adults involved in adult education programs. During the course of the interview the adults were given the opportunity to reflect on personally experienced belief/behavior discrepancies and discrepancies observed in others as well as share their insights.

Those involved in adult education programs were selected as the population for this because of their accessibility, curiosity about the relationship of education and belief/behavior discrepancies and the researcher's interest in education. The role of the adult's religious commitment, or lack of religious commitment, was also of interest. So, one group of subjects was comprised of 20 individuals who claimed a Christian belief base and participated in church based adult education programs. The other group of subjects was comprised on 15 individuals who claimed a non-religious belief base and participated in non-religious adult education programs.

#### Purpose Statement

It is the purpose of this study to contribute to an understanding of the adult's awareness of belief/behavior discrepancies, the extent to which that awareness is motivational, the consequences of that awareness for adults and the implications of awareness for adult education. In addition the impact of the subjects' belief base (Christian or non-religious) on these issues will be examined. The nature of the study is neither experimental nor evaluative. Rather, it is intended to identify and describe a phenomenon of adult life.

Rising from the data, generated by the interviews, are several key issues that will be examined and described in order to fulfill the



purpose of this study. These issues include: a) the adults awareness of belief/behavior discrepancies; b) the relationship of these discrepancies to the individual; c) the perceived relationship between belief and behavior; d) the circumstances under which a discrepancy is regarded as not discrepant; e) the potential discrepancy resolution strategies, barriers, resources and process.

### Problem Statement

Belief and behavior interact in the lives of adults. Different ways to characterize this interaction have been advanced. For some, behavior is the result and indicator of what is truly believed but not necessarily espoused. For these discrepancies cannot exist at the most fundamental levels of life. Others contend that, while discrepancies exist, they are of little or no consequence. Emerson wrote that "With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do--He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall" (Edwards 1963, p. 107). However, there are others who assert that real discrepancies exist and are of great significance. The American cleric, John Jason Owen, a contemporary of Emerson, wrote "Without consistency there is no moral strength" (p. 107).

Most people assume that one who states a belief or feeling will behave consistently with those statements (Gross and Niman, p. 361). If this assumption is correct, why do reseachers report such a poor relationship between attitude and behavior? Underlying this study is the assumption that real discrepancies between belief and behavior exist and are significant. Individuals do act in ways that are contradictory to what they believe, are aware of these discrepancies, and are



purpose of this study. These issues include: (a) the extent to which the  
 belief/behavior discrepancy (b) the relationship of these  
 discrepancies to the individual (c) the perceived relationship between  
 belief and behavior (d) the circumstances under which a discrepancy is  
 regarded as not discrepant (e) the potential discrepancy resolution  
 strategies, barriers, resources and processes.

### Overview of the Study

The study was designed to explore the relationship between belief and behavior  
 and the extent to which a discrepancy is perceived as not discrepant.  
 The study was conducted in a laboratory setting and involved a sample of  
 college students.

concerned, at many different levels, about acting in ways that violate their value and belief systems. This awareness motivates individuals to resolve that conflict through coping mechanisms, change strategies and other means.

### Definitions

Awareness of discrepancies: A discrepancy is a variance, inconsistency or difference. Awareness is to be conscious or have knowledge of something. When an individual feels there is inconsistency or a lack of logic between belief and behavior, an awareness of discrepancy exists, for that individual. While others observing an individual's actions may judge them as inconsistent, only that person engaged in the behavior can know if a discrepancy exists.

Extent of motivation: To motivate is to provide a motive or reason for an action or attitude. In the broader sense, it is an incentive that prompts a person to act in a certain way. In the context of this study motivation is concerned with the nature, strength and direction of the prompting that results from an awareness of discrepancy between belief and behavior.

Consequences of awareness: A consequence is the effect of an earlier occurrence. Used here, it refers to what individuals do or experience, as an effect of an awareness of discrepancy between belief and behavior.

Belief system: Another key concept of this study that is difficult to define is the notion of belief system. The use of the term in the context of this study is intended to include other concepts: attitudes, value systems, religious beliefs as well as what one considers true or factual. The assumption is being made that, the adult weaves a system of beliefs about life and reality that grows out of his interaction with the world and his understanding and feelings about that interaction. As such each individual has a belief system but no two systems are exactly alike.

Behavior patterns: Behavior is the way an individual acts. An individual action may have any one of a number of causes or a combination of causes including; physical need, habit, emotions, or willful and conscious choice. Behavior patterns can be considered an aggregate of individual actions, a "lifestyle". The study is interested in both lifestyle and individual actions and their relationship to an individual's belief system.

Adult: There is no universally accepted definition of an adult. It is a complicated concept of age and maturity that varies with culture and time. For the purposes of this study, an adult is any individual 18 years or older who is regarded by others as having attained mental, emotional and behavioral maturity.

and, at many different levels, were acting in ways that violated  
values and belief systems. This awareness motivated individuals to  
act differently through negotiation, change strategies and

Christian moral value This refers to those individuals who would ground their belief system in the Christian tradition as opposed to other religious, philosophical, economic, political or personal systems.

### Key Concepts

Two concepts--belief and behavior--are central to the study. Both concepts require greater investigation than possible in the preceding brief definitions.

### Belief System

Jastrow pointed out that the human ". . . mind is a belief-seeking rather than a fact-seeking apparatus" (1927, p. 284). A belief is a simple proposition, conscious or unconscious, inferred from what a person says or does, capable of being preceded by the phrase "I believe that . . ." (Rokeach 1969, p. 113). Several different approaches have been taken to define the notion of "belief system."

Rokeach's view. Rokeach (1969) defined the belief system

. . . as having represented within it, in some psychological but not necessarily logical form, each and every one of a person's countless beliefs about physical and social reality. By definition we do not allow beliefs to exist outside the belief system for the same reason that the astronomer does not allow stars to remain outside the universe (p. 2).

Central to Rokeach's belief system concept are the notions of beliefs, attitudes and values. Beliefs are concerned with ". . . what is or is not true and beautiful and good about the physical and social world in which we live" (p. 1) and incorporate

. . . three basic types of beliefs: descriptive or existential beliefs, those capable of being true or false; evaluative beliefs, wherein the objective of belief is

judged to be good or bad; and prescriptive or proscriptive beliefs, wherein some means or end of action is judged to be desirable or undesirable (Rokeach 1973, p. 7).

Attitudes are the ". . . relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner" (Rokeach 1969, p. 112), ". . . a packaging of beliefs consisting of interconnected assertions to the effect that certain things about a specific object or situation are true or false and other things about it are desirable or undesirable" (p. 159). The multiplied thousands of individual beliefs are organized into thousands of attitudes. An attitude, then, is a set of interrelated predispositions to action (beliefs) organized around an object or situation (p. 113). Each belief, within an attitude, is conceived to have three components: a cognitive component representing a persons knowledge; an affective component because under suitable conditions the belief is capable of arousing affect of varying intensity centering around the object of the belief; and a behavioral component because the belief, being a response predisposition of varying threshold, must lead to some action when it is suitably activated (pp. 113-114).

Values are ". . . abstract ideals, positive or negative, not tied to any specific attitude object or situation . . ." (p. 124) and have to do with the ". . . enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternate modes of conduct or end-states of existence" (p. 160). He agrees with Allport that ". . . a value is a belief upon which a man acts by preference . . ." (Allport 1961, p. 454). A person is conceived to have thousands of attitudes but only a few dozen values (p. 453). It is his assumption that values are more fundamental components within a

judged to be good or bad, and consequently or possibly true  
beliefs, whereas some degree of action is judged to be  
desirable or undesirable (Roberts 1977, p. 17).

Attitudes are the "... relatively enduring organization of  
beliefs around an object or situation (encompassing one or several in  
one particular manner" (Roberts 1987, p. 113). "... a grouping of  
beliefs consisting of intercorrelated associations to the effect that

... on the one hand, ...  
...  
...

person's makeup than attitudes and, moreover, that values are determinates of attitudes as well as behavior (p. 453).

In Rokeach's scheme values differ from attitudes in several important respects. First, while an attitude represents several beliefs focused on a specific object or situation, a value is a single belief that transcendentally guides actions and judgments across specific objects and situations, and beyond immediate goals, to more ultimate end-states of existence. Next, a value, unlike an attitude, is an imperative to action, not only a belief about the preferable but a preference for the preferable. Finally a value, unlike an attitude, is a standard or yardstick to guide actions, attitudes, comparisons, evaluations and justifications of the self and others (Rokeach 1969, p. 160).

Rokeach (1973) divides his concept of values into "Instrumental" or mode of conduct values and "Terminal" or end-states of existence values (p.7). Two kinds of "Terminal" values can be thought of: personal and social (p. 7). Two kinds of "Instrumental" values can also be identified: moral and competence (p. 8). These two kinds of values can be organized into value systems that are hierarchical structures, suggesting a rank ordering of values along a continuum of importance (Rokeach 1969, p. 161). He suggests a hierarchically connected system of attitudes and values.

Let us suppose that the thousands of attitudes within a person's belief system are all in the service of, and cognitively connected with, a few dozen instrumental values and that the instrumental values are, in their turn, functionally and cognitively connected with an even fewer number of terminal values (p. 162).

Rokeach (1969) has also described five classes of beliefs within the

person's values and attitudes and, moreover, these values are  
determined by attitudes as well as behavior (p. 423).

In Rotter's scheme values differ from attitudes in several  
important respects. First, while an attitude represents several beliefs  
focused on a specific object or situation, a value is a single belief  
that transcendently guides actions and judgments across specific  
objects and situations, and beyond immediate goals, to more ultimate

ends. Thus, a value, which is a belief, is an  
end in itself, while an attitude is a means  
to an end. A value is a belief that is  
enduring and consistent, while an attitude  
is more changeable and specific.

Values are beliefs that are end in themselves, while attitudes are beliefs that are means to an end. Values are enduring and consistent, while attitudes are more changeable and specific. Values are beliefs that transcend specific objects and situations, while attitudes are beliefs that are focused on a specific object or situation. Values are beliefs that guide actions and judgments across specific objects and situations, while attitudes are beliefs that are focused on a specific object or situation. Values are beliefs that are end in themselves, while attitudes are beliefs that are means to an end. Values are enduring and consistent, while attitudes are more changeable and specific. Values are beliefs that transcend specific objects and situations, while attitudes are beliefs that are focused on a specific object or situation. Values are beliefs that guide actions and judgments across specific objects and situations, while attitudes are beliefs that are focused on a specific object or situation.



belief system universe. Type A, "Primitive Beliefs: (100% consensus)," constitute the most central type of beliefs and are reinforced unanimously by all of one's reference persons and groups (p. 6). Type B beliefs are also called "Primitive Beliefs" but have no consensus and do not depend on being shared with others. There are no reference persons or groups outside the self who could controvert such a belief (p. 8).

Type C beliefs are "Authority Beliefs". These non-primitive beliefs are based on the authorities, positive and negative, that are trusted or distrusted, looked to or not looked to, as the individual seeks information about his world (p. 10). Type D beliefs are "Derived Beliefs" and concern matters of fact that are held solely because the individual trusts an authoritative source (p. 10). Finally, type E beliefs are the "Inconsequential Beliefs" and are more or less arbitrary matters of taste (p. 11).

These beliefs are organized along a central-peripheral dimension in Rokeach's scheme. The more important the belief, the more central it is. The more central the belief, the more resistant it is to change. Finally, the more central the belief that is changed, the more widespread are the repercussions in the rest of the belief system (Rokeach 1969, p. 3). The most central beliefs in his scheme are the type "A" beliefs and the least central are type "E" (p. 12).

Rokeach also distinguishes between a number of other concepts within a person's belief system universe. These include a) ideology, the ". . . organization of beliefs and attitudes . . . that is more or less institutionalized or shared with others . . ." (p. 124); b) opinion, the ". . . verbal expression of some belief, attitude or value." (p. 125); c) faith, ". . . one or more beliefs a person accepts



as true, good, or desirable, regardless of social consensus or objective evidence, which are perceived as irrelevant . . ." (p. 125);

d) stereotype, ". . . a socially shared belief that describes an attitude object in an oversimplified or undifferentiated manner . . ." (p. 125); and e) sentiment which ". . . is more or less synonymous with attitude" (p. 126).

While Rokeach contends that belief is more basic than attitude, others argue that attitude, not belief, is the more fundamental. In this conceptualization, belief is a kind of attitude which contains a great deal of cognitive structuring (Cooper and McGaugh, p. 34). Lee (1985) states that ". . . operationally, then one has an attitude toward and a belief about or in a person object or situation . . ." (p. 220). Lee re-defines and adds concepts to the belief system universe. Unlike Rokeach, Lee sees opinion as ". . . a tentative viewpoint or judgment about a particular stimulus . . ." (p. 220). He adds the concepts of; a) preference, the ". . . predisposition to choose one stimulus over another . . ." (p. 220); b) prejudice, ". . . a warped or unfair attitude . . ." (p. 220); c) bias, ". . . a weak prejudice" (p. 220) and d) value which is ". . . primarily an affective content . . . a special kind of affective attachment for a . . . particular reality" (p. 227).

Fishbein (1967a) conceptualized a belief system as a habit-family-hierarchy of responses (p. 390). An individual associates many different concepts with any given attitude object, and the totality of an individual's beliefs about an object can be viewed as a belief system. It is thought of as a habit-family-hierarchy in that the higher the response in the hierarchy, the greater the probability that the

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response is associated with the stimulus, that is, the stronger is the belief (p. 390). In his approach attitudes toward an object are viewed as "... learned, mediating evaluative responses ..." which, along with beliefs about an object, can be viewed in terms of the strength of the stimulus-response association.

Religion is a significant area in which the concept of belief is important. James Fowler (1981) makes a distinction between belief and faith.

Belief . . . (is) "the holding of certain ideas." Belief, in religious contexts at least, arises out of the effort to translate experiences of and relation to transcendence into concepts or propositions. Belief may be one of the ways faith expresses itself. But one does not have faith in proposition or concept. Faith, rather, is the relation of trust in and loyalty to the transcendent about which concepts or propositions--beliefs--are fashioned (p. 11).

Though there are many different concepts within these views of the belief system, much research has focused on the concept of attitude. "The attitude concept seems to reflect quite faithfully the primary form in which past experience is summed, stored and organized in the individual as he approaches a new situation" (Newcomb, Turner and Converse 1965, pp. 41-42). The concept of attitude and how it is understood, particularly with respect to its impact on behavior, is a key to dealing with the whole notion of belief/behavior discrepancies.

Stimulus-response view of attitude. Early and formative ideas are reflected by Doob who defined attitude as

. . . (1) an implicit response (2) which is both (a) anticipatory and (b) mediating in reference to patterns of overt responses, (3) which is evoked (a) by a variety of stimulus patterns (b) as a result of previous learning or of gradients of generalization and discrimination, (4) which is itself a cue-and drive producing, (5) and which is



considered socially significant by the individual's society (Doob 1967, p. 43).

Using this definition Doob contends an ". . . ideally thorough analysis of an attitude requires knowledge (quantitative if possible) of the following factors . . ." (p. 50) if the attitude's behavior and role in determining overt behavior in various situations are to be understood.

1. Goal Response: the response pattern or patterns which the attitude anticipates and mediates and which determine its reinforcement or extinction.
2. Perception: the drive orienting the individual to pay attention to the stimulus pattern evoking the attitude.
3. Afferent-habit Strength: the strength of the bond between the attitude and the evolving stimulus patterns, including the gradients of generalization and discrimination.
4. Efferent-habit Strength: the strength of the bond between the attitude and the evoked responses, including overt ones.
5. Drive Strength: the drive strength of the stimuli produced by the attitude.
6. Interaction: the strength of the other attitudes, drives etc. with which the attitude interacts to evoke overt behavior.
7. Social Significance: the evaluation in the society of the attitude and its direction . . ." (Doob 1967, p. 50).

In short, Doob sees attitude as a stimulus-response bond by which overt behavior can be predicted, if the elements in the formula are only carefully and quantitatively measured.

Long before Doob expressed his view, LaPiere accused those who measure attitude by the questionnaire method of assuming ". . . that there is a mechanical relationship between symbolic and non-symbolic behavior . . ." (LaPiere 1967, p. 27). Chein challenged Doob's definition by presenting an alternative definition of attitude that he believed was a ". . . recognizable version of the common useage of the term . . . and defined attitude as ". . . a disposition to evaluate

considered equally significant by the individual's society  
(Bach 1987, p. 43).

Using this definition Bach contends that "... ideally through analysis  
of an attitude negative knowledge (negative II possible) or the  
following factors: - - -" (p. 43) if the attitude's behavior and role in  
determining overt behavior in various situations are to be understood.

I. Goal Statement: The purpose of this study is to determine which are  
the most important factors and which role factors are

most important.

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factors and which role factors are most important.



certain objects, actions and situations in certain ways . . ." (p. 52). Despite the differences, Chein asserts that the two definitions agree at several points including: 1) a person is not born with his attitudes; 2) the learning process plays a major role in the development of attitudes; 3) attitudes involve problems of perceptions and motivation; 4) as a result of a particular attitude a person may be more likely to perceive certain objects than others; 5) some attitudes affect perception after arousal even though they may not have oriented the person originally in the direction of the perceived objects; 6) specific behavior cannot safely be predicted from a knowledge of attitude alone; and 7) people may act contrary to their attitudes (p. 52).

Attitude as an organization of belief. For Rokeach (1969) an attitude is: 1) relatively enduring; 2) an organization of beliefs (p. 112); 3) organized around an object or situation (p. 118); 4) a set of interrelated predispositions to respond (p. 119); and 5) leads to preferential response (p. 121).

Unlike Rokeach's definition of attitude, which focused on a packaging of beliefs, Lee (1985) views attitude as ". . . an affective, acquired, and relatively permanent disposition or personality-set to respond in a consistent manner toward some physical or mental stimulus . . ." (p. 217; 1973, p. 106). He contends that his definition includes the six major characteristics most social scientists agree are basic to the attitude construct (1985, p. 217). These six state that an attitude: 1) is learned from experience and teaching; 2) is comparatively stable; 3) reflects a disposition toward an activity rather than either a verbalization or it or the activity itself; 4) is a

certain algebraic relations and identities in certain ways. . . . (p. 32).

regards the distinction. This means that the two definitions agree as

several points including: 1) a person is not born with the attitudes;

2) the learning process plays a major role in the development of

attitudes; 3) attitudes involve problems of perception and motivation;

4) as a result of a particular attitude a person may be more likely to

engage in certain types of behavior; 5) some attitudes direct

the individual toward certain types of behavior; 6) they are not identical with

values; 7) they are learned; 8) they are not identical with

values; 9) they are learned; 10) they are not identical with

values; 11) they are learned; 12) they are not identical with

values; 13) they are learned; 14) they are not identical with

values; 15) they are learned; 16) they are not identical with

values; 17) they are learned; 18) they are not identical with

values; 19) they are learned; 20) they are not identical with

values; 21) they are learned; 22) they are not identical with

values; 23) they are learned; 24) they are not identical with

more-or-less coherent way in which data or experiences are ordered; 5) is selective; and 6) is an orientation toward others, toward objects and toward situations (1985, p. 217).

Evaluation view of attitudes. Insko and Schopler (1967) provide a somewhat different look at this significant area. They approach attitude as ". . . evaluative feelings of pro or con, favorable or unfavorable, with regard to particular objects . . . (which) are considered to be either concrete representations of things or actions or abstract concepts" (pp. 361-362). They see cognitions as ". . . beliefs about, or perceptions of, the relationship between two objects of affective significance" (p. 362). Behavior is regarded as ". . . goal-directed activity or striving . . . typically evaluated . . . as either plus or minus" (p. 364). In their usage, the term behavior means ". . . the actual occurrence of motor activity not the simple concept of some motor activity" (p. 364).

Probability and habit process view of attitudes. Gross and Niman (1975), following DeFleur and Westie, suggest that there are two general conceptions of attitude in the current literature: probability conceptions and latent process conceptions (p. 359). The primary inference of probability conceptions is that attitudinal responses are more or less consistent: a series of responses toward a given attitudinal stimulus is likely to show some degree of organization, structure or predictability. Stated another way, an attitude is equated with the probability of recurrence of behavior forms of a given type and direction (p. 360). Conceptualized in this way, an attitude is inferred

more-or-less abstract way in which data or experience are organized.  
 (2) is subjective, and (3) is an organization toward which various objects  
 and toward situations (1963, p. 117).

Two other views of perception. In the first (1961) Piaget and  
 Inhelder present a somewhat different look at this significant area. They suggest  
 that perception is not a passive reception of data from the outside or  
 from the inside, but rather an active construction of the world.

... the child's perception of the world is not a passive reception of data from the outside or from the inside, but rather an active construction of the world. The child's perception of the world is not a passive reception of data from the outside or from the inside, but rather an active construction of the world.

by consistency of response. In the latent process view, the attitude is not the manifest responses themselves but an intervening variable that operates between stimulus and response, and is inferred from the overt behavior (p. 360).

Moral judgment view of attitude. Kohlberg views this arena from the perspective of the development of cognitive structures. These structures constitute an invariant sequence of six stages of thinking (1970, p. 70). Moral judgment has a "cognitive-structural core" and the stages of moral thinking "... represent the interaction between ... structuring tendencies and the structural reality of the environment" (1980a, pp. 45-46). He rejects both the "bag of virtue" approach to moral thinking (1970, p. 68-69) and the notion that emotional and social forces associated with belief determine moral action (Kohlberg 1971, p. 231). The key element is the stage of moral judgment: the cognitive structure.

While there is much discussion about the exact nature and organization of belief system and varying lists of components, there is almost universal agreement that belief systems exist and encompass the range of belief concepts. A person's belief system has pervasive effects on different spheres of activity--ideological, conceptual, perceptual and esthetic (Rokeach 1960, p. 288). For the purpose of this study the term "belief" will be used in the broadest sense of the belief system universe and is intended to incorporate the many different belief concepts that have been identified and defined.

This overview reveals the complexity of the concept, identified here by a single term, belief. Different approaches to the concept are

by consistency of responses. In the label process view, the attitude is not the subject responses themselves but an intervening variable that operates between stimulus and response, and is inferred from the overt behavior (p. 360).

Label Judgment view of attitude. Kendor view this as an

and projection of the development of a relative structure. These  
and the other two views of attitude are of a similar nature.  
The label judgment view of attitude is a relative structure.  
The label judgment view of attitude is a relative structure.  
The label judgment view of attitude is a relative structure.

taken. The approach taken in this study is neither philosophical or technical. Rather, belief will be defined from the perspective of the individual and his relationship to the beliefs. From this "inside-out" perspective, an individual relates to his beliefs in three different levels. At the first level (level 1) are those things that he "knows". The facts, the bits of information that the individual believes to be true but to which he feels no connection. Belief at this level is the recognition that, while some bit of information is true, it has little or no relation to the individual.

At the second level (level 2) are those beliefs that the individual believes to be true and sees as having an impact on his/her life. The individual feels that there is a connection between the belief and himself. The difference between these first two levels is the difference between an individual's knowledge that cigarette smoking can contribute to health problems (level 1) and believing that cigarette smoking is contributing to that individual's health problems (level 2). From this research, and from the work of others, it can be asserted that individuals can know (level 1) without seeing any connection (level 2) to themselves.

At the third level (level 3) are those beliefs that are so connected with the individual that they form his/her self image. These are the "I am" beliefs that shape one's self perception. These level 3, "core values" shape one's perception of reality. While the function of these "core value" will be discussed at length later, it should be noted that these beliefs are the primary vehicle by which individuals perceive and evaluate beliefs at the other levels. For instance, a person who knows (level 1) and believes (level 2) that cigarette smoking is

taken. The approach taken in this study is neither philosophical or technical. Rather, belief will be defined from the perspective of the individual and his relationship to the belief. From this "inside-out" perspective, an individual relates to his beliefs in three different levels. At the first level (level I) are those things that he "knows". The facts, the bits of information that the individual believes to be

will be to add a final conclusion. Belief at this level is the

two levels. The first level is the level of the individual's



damaging their health may or may not quit smoking. His or her reaction will depend largely on the way that information is manipulated by the "core values." Indeed, these level 3 "core values" largely determine at what level information is perceived. The level of relationship one perceives between the self and a given belief will greatly affect one's behavior.

This conceptualization has much in common with the one advanced by Marcel (1960) who made the distinction between "believing that" and "believing in" (pg. 77). Belief "in" differs from belief "that" in the way in which the entire self is involved (Trueblood, pg. 22). Marcel writes

If I believe in something it means that I place myself at the disposal of something, or again that I pledge myself fundamentally, and with this pledge affects not only what I have but what I am (p. 77).

To believe "in" is to commit the total self to act upon the conviction (Trueblood, p. 22).

### Behavior

Human behavior is a broad term signifying anything which the individual does, including overt physical action, internal physiological and emotional processes, and implicit mental activity (Good 1959, p. 55). Behavior may be classified as inner or overt. "Overt behavior is that kind of human activity which can be directly observed by another individual or by some sort of measuring instrument . . ." while inner behavior is that ". . . which cannot be directly observed by another individual or by some sort of measuring device" (Lee 1971, p. 55). This study is primarily concerned with overt rather than inner behavior.

A concept closely allied to the notion of overt behavior is "lifestyle".

Lifestyle content refers to the overall pattern of a person's activities. Put somewhat personalistically, lifestyle content consists of the way in which a person organizes his self-system and lives out his life. Lifestyle, then, is the all-inclusive shape and operational flow of the totality of a persons behavior. By virtue of its complete inclusivity, lifestyle delineates, demarcates, orients, pervades and colors all of an individual's general activities, as well as all of his specific behaviors. Thus, in a real sense, all human functioning, more or less, represents or embodies a person's own individual lifestyle. This holds true for the most global compartments through various levels of general activities right down to highly specific behaviors.

The foregoing brief explanation reveals that lifestyle has a least two fundamental and interrelated characteristic, namely totality and integrativeness (Lee 1985, p. 608).

Moral action is another important concept. Moral action has been defined as

. . . interventions through the exercise of some form of power in accord with intentions, rules and ends which are subject to qualitative judgments of good or bad . . . one acts for the sake of altering the state of affairs in such a way that there is a preservation of or increment in what is morally valued by the person or by the community (Gustafson 1970, p. 14).

Gustafson further lists six salient aspects of the person engaged in moral acts.

1. . . . unconscious motivation; that is, those presumably "real" determinants of behavior which underlie and often are different from the reasons we give for our actions.
2. One's beliefs or convictions about certain moral values, about what is morally right and good, what is to be preferred, condition the sort of person one becomes.
3. Character, habits, dispositions and attitudes all suggest persistent "traits" of persons.
4. Affective and emotive aspects of persons are important, for example, indignation with injustice.
5. Motives and intentions have always been deemed to be important.



6. The capacity to make judgments is obviously involved. That men make moral judgments is a fact; how they make their judgments differs (pp. 15-18).

For many, moral action is understandable only in terms of social action. Loubser writes,

. . . social moral action requires the capacity and disposition to accept the discipline or moral duties and obligations, and to associate with others for purposes of expressing and implementing moral values . . . Acceptance of moral discipline or moral commitments . . . implies the flow of affect or motivation in the direction of moral action regarding any situation in which the actor finds himself. the opposite is withdrawal . . . apathy and alienation, or escape . . . " (p. 163).

For Kohlberg there is no such thing as moral judgment that is not invariably linked to moral action. But, moral judgment is the only distinctly moral factor in such behavior (Coursen 1976, p. 20). Kohlberg argues that moral judgment dispositions influence action through being stable cognitive dispositions not through the affective changes with which they are associated (Kohlberg 1971, p. 230). He writes,

There simply is no valid psychological definition of moral behavior, in the sense that no observation and categorization of behavior "from the outside," or "behavioristically," can define its moral status in any psychologically valid sense. But, while there is no such thing as moral behavior as such, there is such a thing as behavior which is consistent with an individual's moral principles, or which springs from moral decision. Before we can know anything about such behavior, however, we must first know what a man's moral judgments or principles are (p. 228).

#### Rationale and Problem Background

The problem this study proposes to explore has many dimensions. It is an ancient question and one that confronts those concerned with values education, adult development, adult education, society and the



individual. Evidence of the dilemma presented by an awareness of discrepancies can be seen in at least four areas. It can be seen in religious and philosophical literature, values education, and in religious education.

### Ancient Concerns

There are many examples of the dilemma created by belief/behavior discrepancies found in ancient literature. The nature of the dilemma makes it of particular concern to the religious who confronts an external belief system and pressure to conform his behavior to that belief system. Therefore, it is not surprising that, many references to the problem can be found in religious literature. Perhaps one of the most eloquent is found in the New Testament. The apostle Paul wrote

For the good that I would I do not; but the evil which I would not that I do. Now if I do that I would not . . . I find then a law, that, when I would do good evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man; But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. O wretched man that I am who shall deliver me from the body of death? (Romans 7:19-24, KJV)

In another passage the apostle James addresses the issue of inconsistency between belief and behavior. He wrote

What doth it profit my brethren, though a man say he hath faith and have not works? . . . If a brother or sister be naked and destitute of daily food and one of you say unto them, "Depart in peace be ye warmed and filled"; notwithstanding ye give them not those things which are needful to the body; what doth it profit? Even so faith, if it hath no works, is dead, being alone. Yea, a man may say, "Thou hast faith, and I have works": show me thy faith without thy works and I will show thee my faith by my works. (James 2:14-18, KJV)

These New Testament passages depict behavior that is inconsistent with religious belief while Isaiah describes those whose proper

is presented by an instance of  
the following form. It can be seen that

religious behavior is inconsistent with their attitude.

. . . For as much as this people draw near to me with their mouth and with their lips do honor me but have removed their heart far from me and their fear toward me is taught by the precept of men . . . (Isaiah 29:13 KJV)

### Religious and Philosophical Concerns

Such expressions are not confined to scripture. Many religious writers, in different times and in different ways, have expressed their concern with consistency between belief and behavior. The monk Thomas 'A Kempis described the dilemma when he wrote, "You can give good counsel also, and can strengthen others with your words, but when sudden tribulation comes to your door, you fail in counsel and in strength" ('A Kempis, p. 65). John Bunyan's classic, Pilgrim's Progress, deals extensively with the struggle of an individual to bring consistency between his lifestyle and his beliefs. Francis of Assisi put the issue of consistency between belief and behavior this way: "A person has as much knowledge as he lives out" (Lee 1985, p. 613).

Nor are these statements limited to Christian scripture or Christian writers. Seneca, the Roman stoic philosopher wrote, "We are always complaining that our days are few and acting as though there would be no end to them" (Edwards 1963, 107). Aristotle wrote

. . . virtue is of two kinds, intellectual and moral. While intellectual virtue owes its birth and growth to teaching, moral virtue comes about as a result of habit. The moral virtues we get by first exercising them; we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts and brave by doing brave acts (Munsey 1980, p. 77).

Plato distinguishes between knowledge of the good that does not necessarily lead to moral action and true virtue which entails action (p.77).





These kinds of discrepancies have been noted in many areas of life. It is seen in religion where ". . . brotherhood and bigotry are intertwined . . . plenty of pious people are saturated with racial, ethnic and class prejudice . . . at the same time many of the most ardent advocates of racial justice are religiously motivated" (Allport 1959, p. 1). Rokeach (1968) sees these contradictions as a function of the conflict between the ideological content and the ideological structure: the "what" and the "how" ( p. 194). He contends that

. . . a particular religious institution must not only disseminate a particular religious ideology; it must perpetuate itself and defend against outside attack . . . this dual purpose . . . leads to the contradiction between the "what" and the "how" (p. 194).

#### Values and Religious Education

A concern for discrepancies between belief and behavior can be seen in values educational literature. Despite wide disparity in approach to values education, the concern for consistency shows up. Those who approach values education from the social learning model emphasize content and see the process as instilling or enabling students to acquire certain desired societal values. In this approach consistency between an individual's behavior and belief is essential and values are taught to mold a student to a certain ideal (Coursen 1976, p. 17).

Those in the values clarification school view acting consistently with values and repeating that behavior as an essential part of a values clarification exercise. Action is the last step of the three step process of choosing, prizing and acting. Those who follow Kohlberg and the developmentalist use the term "disequilibrium" to describe those who face inconsistency. In this approach the educator's task is to explore

These kinds of characteristics have been noted in many areas of life.

It is seen in religious spheres . . . , in education and industry are intertwined . . . , in many of these people are saturated with racial, ethnic and class prejudices . . . at the same time many of the most ardent advocates of racial justice are religiously motivated" (Wilbert 1923, p. 1). Roberts (1955) sees these contradictions as a function of the conflict between the ideological content and the ideological

content of the religious faith. He concludes that

the religious faith is a double-edged sword. It is a sword that cuts both ways. It is a sword that cuts the religious faith from within and the religious faith from without.

disequilibrium with the disequibrated in those whose moral judgment is developing normally, and to challenge inconsistency and induce disequilibrium for those whose development is stalemated (Ward, 1976). Kohlberg states that moral maturity in judgment and in action are closely related. However, knowledge of the good in terms of opinion or conventional belief will not lead to moral action. True knowledge of the principle of justice does entail virtuous action (Munsey 1980, p. 77).

The concern is no less significant in the arena of religious education. Christian education is viewed as aiming ". . . at facilitating Christian living in the learner's total behavior pattern" (Lee 1971, p. 10). Richards wrote that the truth (belief system) should be put to use in the life of the learner, that is to get it into the experience, into the life of the learner (Richards 1970, p. 116). Still others have emphasized the fact that, in Christian education, one must be equally concerned with both Bible knowledge and Christian living. These have warned against an educational approach in which the learner only learns the concepts or has an emotional catharsis (Edge 1956, pp. 16-17). Others emphasize the fact that cognitive concerns have far outweighed the affective and behavioral side of religious education. They point out that orthopraxis (doing what is right) must not be separated from orthodoxy (thinking right) (McKenzie 1982, p. 39).

From this quick and cursory review, it is clear that consistency between belief and behavior is a longstanding and vital human concern. It can be found in a number of different areas and appears in the writings of people with different perspectives of life and who lived at different times.

### Research Questions

#### A. What are the contexts in which adults become aware of discrepancies between belief and behavior?

Assuming that adults become aware of discrepancies, it is important to understand under what conditions, in what circumstances and by what processes awareness occurs.

- a. What role do educational experiences play, if any?
- b. What role if any do others play?
- c. Is awareness related to adult development? moral development? life experience?
- d. Is awareness a process? a sudden event?
- e. What role do external or internal forces play?
- f. Are there predictable barriers to awareness?

#### B. By what criteria does an adult evaluate the importance of a given area of discrepancy between belief and behavior of which he is aware?

Assuming that all discrepancies are not given identical treatment by adults, it is important to understand the basis of evaluation, the internal and external factors that contribute to the evaluation and the process itself.

- a. Is every instance of discrepancy given the same importance, acted upon with the same intensity or given the same care?
- b. Does the area of life in which they occur an important factor?
- c. What role do values play?
- d. How significant is the relationship of the discrepancy to felt need?
- e. Do the consequences of dealing with an area or failing to deal

# CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

1. The first and foremost principle is that of the separation of powers.

between the legislative, executive and judicial.

Knowing that while these powers are of themselves, it is important

to understand under what conditions, in what circumstances and by what

processes they are carried out.

2. The second principle is that of the separation of powers.

3. The third principle is that of the separation of powers.

4. The fourth principle is that of the separation of powers.

with an area make a difference?

f. Can a profile of criteria be developed?

g. Are criteria common among adults or completely individual?

C. Toward what end does an awareness of discrepancy between belief and behavior motivate the adult?

Assuming that once aware of a discrepancy the adult will desire to deal with it in some way and achieve some end, it is important to understand the direction, goal, strength and other factors that impact motivation.

a. What ways do adults deal with discrepancies between belief and behavior?

b. Are goals common to adults or individual?

c. Assuming there are different ends what determines which ends an adult chooses?

d. Why are certain ends chosen by individual adults?

e. Is the awareness in itself motivational or are other factors significant?

f. On what is the relative strength of motivation dependent?

D. How do those motivated by an awareness of discrepancies between belief and behavior seek to resolve them?

While the third research question focuses on ends, the fourth focuses on means. Assuming that an adult is aware of a given discrepancy, evaluates it as important and desires some resolution, it is important to understand the strategies that are employed.

a. Once aware, motivated and having chosen a direction what strategies do adults employ to resolve discrepancies?

b. Why are those strategies chosen?





- c. Are there common strategies or are they strictly individual?
- d. Are all strategies regarded as equally successful?
- e. On what basis are strategies regarded as successful?
- f. What is needed by the individual to successfully carry out a strategy?
- g. What obstacles does an individual face?

E. When dealing with discrepancies between belief and behavior what differences exist between those adults who claim a Christian belief base and those who do not?

Assuming different sources of belief systems, it is important to understand if the source impacts the awareness, evaluation, motivation or resolution of discrepancies.

- a. Does the belief system source make a difference in the awareness of discrepancies?
- b. What impact does the belief system have on the evaluation of discrepancies?
- c. Does the belief system source impact the motivational quality of the awareness of discrepancies between belief and behavior?
- d. Does it change in some way the ends adults seek or the means by which they seek those ends?
- e. If it makes a difference in these areas, why?

Worth and Value of the Study

This study has worth and value on a number of grounds. First, the study addresses a legitimate area of human and educational concern. Adding to the understanding of the relationship between belief and behavior by examining one small piece of a very complex puzzle. If the

process by which adults become aware of and resolve discrepancies between belief and behavior, can be understood and described, it will add to our understanding of the person as adult and learner.

A second area of worth is the study's potential of serving the adult learner. Assuming that individuals, aware of discrepancies between belief and behavior, wish to create consistency it is likely that an understanding of the process has the potential of assisting them. Such an understanding can help the learner anticipate and overcome barriers. The learner gains greater control over the impact of his life and experience. Like any other insight into behavior it may be useful as individuals create their lives.

Finally the study has value to those concerned with adult education. First, it increases one's understanding of what makes the adult learner "tick". Additionally, increased understanding of this process can provide important insights into the teaching/learning process and its impact on the adult learner. Teaching strategies and methods can be evaluated from the perspective of their impact on the resolution of discrepancy. Educational experiences may be found to facilitate, hinder, serve as a catalyst, accelerate or delay the process. Conversely, educational experiences may have little or nothing to do with the process. Educator effectiveness may also be enhanced by a better understanding of the awareness and resolution of discrepancies.

#### Overview of Procedure

The procedure of the study requires four distinct steps. The first issue that needed resolution was the matter of population and sample. Since the study is concerned with adults the population consisted of

those adults involved in religious and non-religious adult education programs within an accessible geographic area. From this population four adult education sites were selected. Two of the sites were churches and two were non-religious adult education programs. The class lists of these institutions were used to randomly select adults from each program to serve as a sample.

These adults were divided into two groups and each group was divided into two sections. Placement in the Christian or non-religious category was by the individual's perception of the source of their belief system. Individuals asserting a Christian belief base and drawn from church education programs were assigned to group I. Individuals asserting a non-religious belief base and drawn from the two non-religious adult education programs were assigned to group II. The process of screening individuals by belief system was handled by a research assistant. This procedure was performed in an effort to prevent interviewer bias.

Next, the the members of the sample were interviewed. First, background information including name, address, phone, age, educational level, marital status and occupation was gathered. Then, each member of the sample was questioned regarding his or her awareness of personally experienced belief/behavior discrepancies or those observed in others, the context of that awareness, the criteria by which he or she evaluated the significance of a given discrepancy, the motivating impact of the awareness of discrepancies and the strategies the individual develops to resolve them.

Following these interviews the information was analyzed in an effort to extract the common features and response to each research



question. The data were analyzed to determine and describe adult awareness of discrepancies between belief and behavior, and the motivation and consequences of that awareness. Additionally, the information gathered from those who stated a Christian base for their belief system was compared with those who state a non-religious base to determine distinct and common features.

### Limitations

This study faces some limitations. The first limitation comes from the nature of the study itself. Since the purpose of the study is not to test hypotheses by experimentation or test strategies by evaluation, the study cannot be expected to accomplish either. Its purpose is to discover and describe a phenomenon that may exist in the lives of adult learners and to explore some of the implications of that discovery. The findings of this study should not be taken beyond that point.

A second limitation comes from the manner in which the population and sample have been drawn. While the rationale for such a selection has already been expressed, it is important to point out that the procedure does not address the all concerns of generalizability. Despite the random selection procedures used and the fact that the subjects were drawn from four different institutions, they cannot be considered a representative sample. First, individuals were free to not participate. Those who chose to participate cannot be expected to adequately represent those who did not. Second, those who chose to participate did so for their own reasons and therefore may not truly represent all those who participate in adult education.

Finally, the nature of the data collection creates some limits.

question. The data were analyzed to determine the association of the variables of demographic characteristics, religious affiliation, and the motivation and commitment of the respondents. Additionally, the information gathered from those who stated a Christian faith for their belief system was compared with those who stated a non-Christian faith for

belief system. The results of the analysis are presented in the following tables.

### Table 1

Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

The following table presents the demographic characteristics of the respondents who participated in the study.

The success of the interview method depends to a large degree on the skill of the interviewer, the quality of the questions and the ability to ask appropriate follow-up questions. Of some concern was the type of data being collected. The descriptions of individuals may have been flawed by an inaccurate memory, or biased through self interest or an unwillingness to reveal self. Despite these limitations this approach to data collection is believed to offer the best route to fulfilling the objectives of the study.





## Chapter 2: Literature Review

"To bring conduct under the dominion of morality is the great task, . . . it is the struggle for character" (Brown, p. 414).

In this review of the literature it is equally important to outline broad streams of concern and to examine specific research that has been done in each of those streams. This review will focus on belief/behavior discrepancy research, moral development and moral education.

### Belief/Behavior Discrepancy Research

Much of the research on belief and behavior discrepancies has focused on the inconsistencies that occur when an individual's expressed attitudes are measured and then compared with their specific behavior. These studies have repeatedly demonstrated that expressed attitudes are very poor predictors of actual behavior. In the face of such research others have suggested that behavior can be accounted for in terms of attitude and "other variables." These two lines of research will be examined in the following section. Much research in these areas has been done over a long period of time. Both the historical studies and the



reviews of more recent studies will be considered.

### Historical Studies

As early as 1928 studies indicated that inconsistencies existed between an individual's stated beliefs and his or her behavior. Likona summarized Hartshorne and May's study of 11,000 children stating ". . . that the inconsistency of children was striking and that it was impossible to predict, for example, whether a child who cheated on an arithmetic test would also cheat on a spelling test" (p. 15). Summarizing a later study conducted by Hartshorne, May and Shuttlesworth Likona indicated that a subject's scores on tests on moral knowledge and opinion varied widely depending on whether the test was taken at a club, home, in the classroom, or in Sunday school. This fact lead them to believe that a child does not have a uniform set of morals but varies his opinions to suit the situation in which he finds himself (p. 15).

In 1934 Richard LaPiere challenged the assumption that there is a ". . . mechanical relationship . . ." between attitudes inferred by the questionnaire technique and actual behavior. He carried out his study, dealing with discrimination toward Asians, by seeking public accommodations at 251 different places while accompanied by an Asian couple. Only once did the fact that he was accompanied by a Chinese couple affect them adversely. He followed this by sending a questionnaire to those same establishments asking "Will you accept members of the Chinese race as guests in your establishment ?" (LaPiere, p. 29). Ninety-one percent of the establishments that replied to the questionnaire stated they would not accept members of the Chinese race as guests.



### Reviews of the Literature

In 1969b Wicker reviewed some 46 different studies dealing with the relationship between attitude and behavior. He considered studies that dealt with attitudes and behaviors toward jobs and industrial organizations (Vroom 1964; Bernberg 1952; Weitz and Nucklos 1953; etc.) attitudes and behaviors toward members of minority groups (Kutner, Wilkins and Yarrow 1952; DeFluer & Westie 1958; Mann 1959; etc.) and attitudes and behaviors toward miscellaneous objects including civil rights activities (Carr and Roberts, 1965), labor union meetings (Dean, 1958), time and money spent on activities (Cattell et al 1950), cheating on examinations (Corey 1937), voting in student elections (Tittle and Hill, 1967), applying for public housing (Bellin and Kriesberg 1967), breast feeding (Newton and Newton 1950, etc.), and participating in psychological research (Wicker 1969a).

Wicker (1969b) summarizes these empirical studies by writing

These studies . . . have covered a wide range of subject populations, verbal attitude measures, overt behavioral measures and attitude objects . . . It is considerable more likely that attitudes will be unrelated or only slightly related to overt behaviors than that attitudes will be closely related to actions (p. 65).

He points out that several explanations for these inconsistencies have been suggested. Some studies (Bellin and Kriesberg 1967; Fendrich 1967; Green 1969; etc.) have suggested that consistency may be greater when the overt behavior or a behavioral commitment is assessed in advance of the attitude measurement (p. 65). Other studies (Dean 1958; Freeman and Aatov, 1960; LaPiere 1934) have been conducted in which behavioral measures preceded attitude assessment and which show inconsistency. Insko and Schopler (1967) suggest that much evidence showing a close relationship between verbal and overt behavioral



responses has been obtained but never published because investigators and journal editors considered such findings "unexciting" or "not worthy of publication" (Wicker 1969b, p. 65). Finally, Wicker points out that some would argue that if the "proper" attitude measures were employed, greater consistency would result (p. 65).

On the other hand, Ronald Dillehay (1973) challenges the value of three of the classical studies on attitude-behavior consistency (Lapierre; Kutner, Wilkins and Yarrow; and Minard) and the grounds of their methodology. He summarizes his criticism by writing

These experiments likely did not have a measure of attitude and behavior from the same persons . . . nor did they use the individual as the unit of sampling . . . Furthermore, the measure of "behavior" is more plausibly regarded as an intervention, paralleling that in the typical experimental treatment group in a forced compliance experiment . . . unfortunately the experiments were conducted under conditions, given the lag in measurement of "attitude", that do not allow predictions to consequences for "attitude" . . . (p. 889).

Two other reviews of this literature have been done. Gross and Niman (1975) suggested that the most popular variables postulated to contribute to the discrepancy between attitude and behavior fall into one of three groups of factors: (1) personal; (2) situational and (3) methodological (p. 361). The literature they review suggests that the personal factors contributing to the inconsistency are: a) other attitudes; b) competing motives; c) verbal; intellectual and social abilities; and d) activity levels (pp. 362-363). Situational factors they list include: a) actual or believed presence of certain people; b) normative prescriptions of proper behavior; c) alternative behaviors available; d) specificity of attitude objects; e) unforeseen extraneous events; and f) expected and/or actual consequences of various acts (pp. 363-366). The final group of factors are methodological and





include such things as: a) the attitude measure used; b) the behavioral criterion; c) the circumstances of the behavioral criterion; d) reliability of the testing instrument; and e) what attitudes are associated with what behaviors (pp. 366-367).

Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) also reviewed and analyzed 78 studies dealing with the relationship between attitude and behavior. They looked at the research from a different perspective. In their view ". . . a single behavior is determined by the intention to perform the behavior in question; a person's intention is in turn a function of his attitude toward performing the behavior not of his subjective norm" (p. 888). Ajzen and Fishbein contend that attitudinal and behavioral entities consist of four elements: the action; the target at which the action is directed; the context in which the action is performed and the time at which it is performed (p. 889). For an attitude predictor to correspond with the behavioral entity it must be identical in all four elements (p. 890).

Using these elements they analyzed the empirical research by looking for correspondence between the target and action elements. Ajzen and Fishbein determined that in 17 studies the target and action elements of the attitude failed to correspond with the target and action elements of the behavior, and concluded that attitude-behavior relations under lack of correspondence are low and insignificant (p. 894). Forty-seven studies conducted under partial correspondence were also reviewed of which 17 reported nonsignificant relations, 15 reported significant relations of low to moderate magnitude, and 15 obtained inconsistent results (p. 899). Finally, 14 studies were judged to have established a high correspondence between attitudinal and behavioral

includes such things as: a) the attitude measure itself; b) the behavioral criterion; c) the circumstances of the behavioral criterion; d) reliability of the testing instrument; and e) what subjects are associated with what behaviors (pp. 386-387).

Agnew and Rickman (1977) also reviewed and analyzed 78 studies

dealing with the relationship between attitude and behavior. They

looked at the relationship between attitude and behavior from their view

of the relationship between attitude and behavior. They

found that the relationship between attitude and behavior is

stronger when the attitude is specific to the behavior than when

the attitude is general. They also found that the relationship

between attitude and behavior is stronger when the attitude is

measured by a self-report measure than when it is measured by

an observational measure. They also found that the relationship

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an observational measure. They also found that the relationship

entities were reviewed and, without exception, were found strong in significant attitude-behavior relations (p. 901).

They conclude that much of the discrepancies found in this research is the result of the manner in which the research is conducted. The low correspondence is not the result of true inconsistencies but poor research procedures.

. . . our review and theoretical analysis suggest that low and inconsistent attitude-behavior relations are attributable to low or partial correspondence between attitudinal and behavioral entities. To predict behavior from attitude the investigator has to ensure high correspondence between at least the target and action elements of the measures he employs (p. 913).

#### Explanations of Belief/Behavior Inconsistency

The repeated failures in the research to demonstrate a strong consistency between attitudes and behavior has both been denied and explained away. It has been argued that attitudes are only one of many variables which influence behavior and that if the other variables were taken into account better behavioral predictions could be made, and a wide number of other variables have been suggested (Wicker 1971, p. 18).

An attitude . . . is simply one of the terms in the complex regression equation we use to predict behavior; . . . the embarrassing thing is that we have not systematically investigated these other sources of influence on overt behavior and not that we are unable to predict overt behavior solely from the predisposition (Weissberg 1965, p. 424).

Along the same lines Triandis (1964) wrote that ". . . greater precision in predicting behavior from attitudes will probably be obtained when specific behaviors . . . are predicted . . . from linear combinations of several independent, but relevant factors underlying the behavioral component of attitudes" (p. 219).

In reacting to Chein's (1948) statement that ". . . people may act

Correspondence is not the result of true individualities but of

Research by

contrary to their attitudes . . ." (p.178) Rokeach (1969) states flatly that he does not see how this is possible.

If a person acts contrary to one attitude it must mean that he acted in accord with a second (or third or fourth) attitude that overrode the first attitude. When there is a negative correlation between a given attitude and behavior, there is always the possibility that some other attitude that was not measured may be congruent with the behavior (p. 128).

He agrees with Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey (1962) when they say that ". . . action is determined not by a single attitude but by a number of attitudes, wants, and situational conditions . . .", and that ". . . attitude test scores alone are usually not enough to predict behavior" (p. 163).

Rokeach's own early (1960) research produced results that failed to link belief system to behavior.

Finally, we have not meant to imply that the correlation found between behavior and perceived similarity of the disbelief sub-system to the belief system is necessarily a direct one or a causal one or one that involves conscious awareness. Actually, our findings permit us to conclude only that concomitant relationships exist between perceived similarity on the one hand and rates of joining and leaving a church . . . (p. 330).

He does recognize that ". . . studies that have systematically examined the relationship between attitudes and behavior have generally found a lack of correspondence, or at best, a low correspondence between verbally expressed attitudes and overt behavior" (Rokeach and Kliejunas 1972, p. 194).

Definitional explanations. To explain the relationship between attitude and behavior Rokeach advances a perspective in which behavior-with-respect-to-an-object is always a function of at least two



interacting attitudes; attitude-toward-object (A/o) and attitude-toward-situation (A/s) (Rokeach and Kliejunas, p. 195). In a study, dealing with class attendance, conducted to test this perspective Rokeach and Kliejunas asserted four hypotheses: a) A/o and A/s are independant; b) A/o and A/s will each predict behavior to some extent; c) behavior will be more accurately predicted if both A/o and A/s are taken into consideration and d) behavior is more accurately predicted if A/o and A/s are weighted for perceived importance (pp. 197-198). They concluded that

. . . results of the present study lend support to the general hypothesis that behavior can be more accurately predicted than is widely supposed, from a knowledge of verbally expressed attitudes. The more specific hypothesis that prediction of behavior . . . will be more accurate when based on knowledge of the cognitive interaction between A/o and A/s than when based on knowledge of either attitude alone is supported . . . (pp. 200-201).

In addition to attitude-toward-object and attitude-toward-situation Rokeach (1969) asserts that attitudes are related to values in value-attitude systems (see ch. 1). He postulates ". . . that this value-attitude system is more or less internally consistent and will determine behavior, and that a change in any part of the system will affect other connected parts and lead to behavioral change" (p. 162). From this concept Rokeach has constructed a matrix detailing the interaction of different subsystems of the larger value-attitude system. The components of the value-attitude system include: a) a specific attitude; b) an attitudinal system; c) an instrumental value system; d) a terminal value system; e) cognitions a person may have about his own behavior or intended behavior; f) cognitions about the attitudes, values, motives and behavior of significant others; and g) cognitions about the behavior of physical objects (pp. 162-163).





For Rokeach inconsistency exists only within the value-attitude system and never between the system and behavior. He asserts that people strive for consistency with self-esteem and with logic or reality, and that consistency with self-esteem is the more compelling consideration (1969, p. 164). It is the recognition and resolution of these inconsistencies that has the effect of changing the system and behavior. Therefore, inducing a state of inconsistency motivating the individual to change his system has merit. He suggests three methods: a) induce a person to engage in behavior that is inconsistent with his attitudes and values; b) expose a person to new information from a significant other that is inconsistent with information already represented within his attitude-value system; and c) expose the person to information about states of inconsistency already existing within his own value system (1969, p. 167).

In addition to this Rokeach postulates that

. . . since . . . terminal values are the most centrally located structures, (within the value-attitude system) having many connections with other parts of the system, we would expect inconsistencies that implicate such values to be emotionally upsetting and their effects to dissipate slowly, to be long remembered, to endure over time, to lead to systematic changes in the rest of the value system, to lead to systematic changes in connected attitudes and finally to culminate in behavior change (p. 167).

Rokeach (1973) suggests that both values and attitudes are intervening variables (p. 122). He conducted a number of experiments designed to test the relationship between values and behavior asserting that

. . . if it is indeed the case that terminal and instrumental values are standards that guide actions as well as attitudes, then knowing a person's values should enable us to predict how he will behave in various experimental and real-life situations (p. 122).



He reports on a number of experiments dealing with civil rights, religion, politics, the war in Viet Nam, honest and dishonest behavior, interpersonal conflict, behavior in the counseling situation, academic pursuits, lifestyle and occupational roles and choices. He concludes, not surprisingly, that different values, as determined by his

instrument, are indeed significantly related to behavior (p. 159).

However, Rokeach also concludes that there is no reason to expect that any one value or attitude should predict behavior perfectly (p. 162).

Shotland and Berger (1970) attempted behavioral validation of several values from the Rokeach Scale as an index of honesty. In their study, they correlated the rate at which individuals returned scoring pencils with certain items on the Rokeach Value scale. Shotland and Berger determined that those who returned the pencils ranked the values of "honesty", "salvation", and "a world at peace" significantly higher than those who did not return the pencils. They conclude that ". . . the Rokeach Value Scale may prove to be a potentially useful predictor of honesty . . ." (p. 435).

Other variables explanations. In addition to the studies previously cited Wicker (1969b) has catalogued a number of different potential "other variables" and the research that should be taken into consideration when trying to understand attitude-behavior inconsistency. He organizes these factors into two categories. The first category is made up of "Personal Factors" including: a) other attitudes; b) competing motives; c) verbal, intellectual and social abilities and d) activity levels (pp. 68-69). The second category is made up of "Situational Factors" including: a) actual or considered presence of



others; b) normative prescriptions of proper behavior; c) alternative behaviors available; d) specificity of attitude objects; d) unforeseen extraneous events and d) expected and/or actual consequences of various acts (pp. 69-73).

Wicker (1971) also tested the "other variables" explanation of attitude-behavior inconsistency. In a study, designed to predict members' behavior toward their church, he used the multiple regression approach to assess the contribution of attitude and three other variables including: a) perceived consequence of behavior; b) subject evaluation of various levels of church involvement and c) the influence of unplanned, extraneous events on the subject's behavior (p. 19). His findings were consistent with other studies. Across four attitudes and three overt behaviors the measured attitudes were relatively poor predictors of overt behavior (p. 27).

Fishbein (1967b) has attempted to combine several of these factors into a systematic formulation. He writes,

. . . the present approach suggests a radical change in investigating and understanding the attitude-behavior relationship. Instead of assuming some underlying relationship between an individual's attitude toward a given object and his behavior with respect to that object, the proposed theory recognizes the importance of situational variables, norms and motivation as factors influencing behavior. Rather than viewing attitude toward a stimulus object as a major object the theory identifies three kinds of variables that function as a basic determinants of behavior: (1) attitudes toward the behavior; (2) normative beliefs (both personal and social); and (3) motivation to comply with the norms. Furthermore, although the theory suggests that other variables can also influence behavior, it indicates that these variable operate indirectly, that is, by influencing one or more of the three basic determinants (p. 490).

Ajzen and Fishbein (1972) conducted a study to determine the effects of attitudes toward an act and normative beliefs as predictors

alternatives; b) normative presentation of proper behavior; c) alternative  
behavioral modification; d) possibility of ethical aspects; e) discussion  
of the ethical aspects of the research; f) ethical aspects of the research;  
g) ethical aspects of the research; h) ethical aspects of the research;

(p. 22-23).

Wickens (1971) also noted the "other variables" explanation of

attitude-behavior inconsistency. In a study designed to predict

members' attitudes toward the Vietnam War, the multiple regression

model was used to predict attitudes from a number of variables.

The results showed that the model accounted for 40% of the variance

in attitudes toward the Vietnam War. The variables included in the

model were: age, sex, education, income, and political ideology.

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of behavioral intentions. They examined a person's attitude toward performing a particular act in a given situation, not his attitude toward the object or class of objects per se (p. 1). The assumption that behavioral intentions (and corresponding overt behaviors) are a function of "... two components, the attitude toward the act and normative belief" (p. 1) was their starting point. Ajzen and Fishbein determined that both the individual's attitude toward the act and his normative beliefs (what he believed his close family and friends expected him to do) predicted behavioral intentions, but that the attitude toward the act carried more weight than the normative belief (p. 8).

Davidson and Jaccard (1979) conducted a longitudinal survey to determine variables that moderate the attitude-behavior relationship. The following factors were hypothesized as moderating that relationship: a) the behavioral sequence that must be successfully completed prior to the occurrence of the behavior; b) the time interval between the measurement of the attitudes and behavior; c) attitude change; d) educational level; and e) the degree of correspondence between attitudinal and behavioral variables (p. 1346). They discovered that, consistent with the hypothesis, the relations between behavior and intention and the model's attitudinal and normative components, were substantially attenuated by: a) events in the behavioral sequence not under the control of the person; b) an increase in the time interval between the measurement of attitudes and behavior; and c) changes in the attitudinal and normative components. The respondent's educational level did not affect attitude-behavior consistency. Correlation between attitude and behavior increased significantly as the degree of

of behavioral intentions. They examined a person's attitude toward performing a particular act in a given situation, not his attitude toward the act itself. The assumption is that the assumption of behavioral intentions is that a person's attitude toward a particular act in a given situation is a function of his attitude toward the act itself and his attitude toward the situation.



correspondence between the two variables increased (p. 1364).

Structural explanation. Guttman (1959) offers a structural theory for the relation of beliefs and action. He proposes that the totality of social behavior is a universe that can be divided into subuniverses (p. 318). The universe of interracial behavior is divided into four subuniverses: a) stereotype; b) norm; c) hypothetical interaction; and d) personal interaction (p. 319). Each subuniverse differs in terms of the subjects belief, referent, and referent's intergroup behavior (p. 320). He then provides a structural model of how these subuniverses would interact as an analytical and predictive tool.

General equivalence explanation. Liska's (1974) study dealt with attitude-behavior consistency as a function of generality equivalence between attitude and behavior object. He writes

... if we wish to predict behavior toward a specific attitude object then we should measure attitude toward that specific object. The directive is apparently based on the implicit assumption that members of a general class of objects are seldom completely homogeneous. Hence, given some degree of heterogeneity between members of a general class, while general attitude may well predict commonalities in behavior (a general behavior orientation) toward most members of the general class, it may not be a good predictor of behavior toward a particular member of the class... a strong relationship between attitude and behavior depends on the extent to which attitude and behavior are measured at an equivalent level of generality (p. 218).

The paper focuses on this generality equivalence hypothesis and limits the analysis to attitude toward behavior as opposed to attitude toward the object of the behavior (i.e. Wicker 1971). Liska has reported that attitude toward a particular religious activity is a better predictor of engagement in that activity than attitude toward the local church



engagement in that activity than attitude toward the local church (p. 218).

The study, designed to test the generality equivalence hypothesis, dealt with behavior measured at two levels of generality and attitude at five levels of generality. In terms of this study, the generality equivalence hypothesis suggests that

. . . the relationship between each of the eight specific coping patterns and the relevant specific attitude should be greater than the relationship between each of the eight specific coping patterns and the more general attitudes; however, for the general behavior measure of the use of others in preparing for and taking examinations we expect the more general attitudes to be the best predictors, particularly the attitude measured at the equivalent level of generality (Liska p. 222).

Liska concludes, from this study, that the data supports the object generality equivalency hypothesis that the relationship between attitude and behavior depends on the level of generality equivalence between the attitude and behavior objects (pp. 226-227). In addition he concludes that the impact of attitude on behavior is maximal when:

- a) the object of the attitude is behavior itself (rather than the object of the behavior) and
- b) attitude and behavior are measured at an equivalent level of generality (p. 227).

Affective-cognitive consistency explanation. Norman (1975) conducted three studies to investigate the relationship between consistency of the affective-cognitive components of an attitude and the strength of attitude-behavior consistency. He determined that those showing a high degree of consistency between the affective-cognitive components of an attitude were more likely to act in accord with the stated attitude but were no less likely to conform their actions to



others (p. 83).

Temporal instability explanation. Schwartz (1978) did a study that tested temporal instability as a moderator of the attitude-behavior relationship. He hypothesized: a) that the correlation of attitudes with behavior is stronger the shorter the time interval between attitude measurement and subsequent behavior and b) that the correlation between attitudes and behavior is stronger the more stable the individual's attitude across time (pp. 716-717). Schwartz examined the effects of temporal instability in attitudes on the attitude-behavior relationship of volunteering to tutor blind students. His study provided empirical support for the oft repeated contention that temporal instability in attitudes weakens the attitude-behavior relationship (p. 723). The most interesting finding of the study is that the magnitude of association between the specific attitude and behavior was moderated by stability in the general set of relevant attitudes (p. 724).

Self image explanations. Gibbons (1978) conducted three studies to test the hypothesis derived from self awareness theory that behavior would be more consistent with personal attitudes or standards when attention is self-focused. The results of the studies suggest that focusing attention upon the self tends to inhibit behaviors that are inconsistent with personal attitudes or standards (p. 976).

Prototype explanation. Lord, Lepper and Mackie (1984) conducted two experiments based on the assumption that individuals determine their attitudes toward a social group by assessing their reaction to an

General instability hypothesis. Schultz (1970) and many others tested temporal instability as a function of the stimulus-behavior relationship. He hypothesized: a) that the correlation of attitudes with behavior is stronger the shorter the time interval between attitude measurement and behavior (e.g., 1970) and the correlation between

attitudes and behavior is weaker the longer the time interval

between attitude measurement and behavior (e.g., 1970)

and b) that the correlation between attitudes and behavior is

weaker the longer the time interval between attitude measurement

and behavior (e.g., 1970)

and c) that the correlation between attitudes and behavior is

imagined group representative who embodies the defining or central group characteristics--the prototypical group member. They hypothesized that when individuals encounter a specific group member whose characteristics match well those of the "attitude prototype," individuals display attitude-behavior consistency. When the match is poor individuals display attitude-behavior inconsistency. In each of these studies the attitude-behavior relationship was greater in relation to prototypical than to unprototypical group members. Additionally, knowledge of an unprototypical group member had little or no effect on attitude prototypes. The existence of an unprototypical group member was dismissed as atypical, leaving the prototype intact to influence future social behavior (p. 1254)

Reason analysis explanation. Wilson, Dunn, Bybee, Hyman and Rotondo (1984) conducted three studies on the effects of analyzing the reasons for one's feelings on subsequent attitudes and behavior. In all three studies subjects who explained reasons for their attitudes had significantly lower correlations between their attitudes and behavior than subjects who did not explain their attitudes (p. 5). They offer several explanations for this effect. First, analyzing the reasons for one's feelings may not affect verbal reports of attitudes but changes behavior (p. 13). Analyzing the reasons for one's feelings may lower peoples confidence in their attitudes or may compel subjects to report how they thought they should feel rather than how they actually felt (p. 14).





Information availability explanation. Davidson, Yanis, M. Norwood and D. Norwood (1985) tested, in three longitudinal studies, the hypothesis that the degree of consistency between attitudes and behavior will increase as a function of the amount of information available about the attitude object (p. 1184). In support of the hypothesis, in each study, the amount of information moderated the consistency between attitudes and behavior. The significance of this relation remained even after controlling for the effects of a number of other potential moderators, including prior direct experience with the attitude object and attitude certainty. Consistent with previous research, direct behavioral experience was also a determinant of attitude-behavior consistency and ". . . was independent from the effect of the amount of information" (p. 1184).

#### Latent Process Notions

DeFleur and Westie (1958) determined that a significant difficulty in studying verbal attitudes and overt acts was the lack of ". . . standardized overt action opportunities . . ." (p. 673). In their experimental design they first determined the subject's attitude toward blacks and then provided a standardized overt action opportunity by signing an agreement to have the subject's photograph taken with a black to be used in different ways. They determined that ". . . verbally expressed attitudes were significantly related to the direction of the action taken by subjects regarding being photographed with a Negro of the opposite sex" (p. 673).

Despite this relationship, fully a third of the participants behaved in a manner quite inconsistent with that which might be expected



from their verbal attitudes. They explain this inconsistency as a possible misclassification of the subjects (p. 672). However, they contend that this inconsistency "... may be explained in terms of some sort of social involvement of the subject in a system of social constraints, preventing him from acting in the direction of his convictions . . ." (p. 672). They concluded that "... whatever the direction of the action . . . it was a peer-directed decision for the majority. The subjects made significant use of their beliefs concerning possible approval or disapproval of reference groups as guides for behavior" (p. 673).

Warner and DeFleur (1969) tested social constraint and social distance as intervening variables between attitudes and actions. Social constraint refers to potential influences on behavior which are introduced into a situation of action because the nature of that behavior is likely to be known to others whose opinions and reactions are important to the actor (p. 155). Social distance is based upon status-position and role expectations in a social relationship (p. 155). In this study, dealing with prejudice toward blacks, they focused attention on three propositions: a) there will be a significant relationship between initial attitude and overt behavior; b) there will be a significant relationship between social constraint and overt behavior; and c) there will be a significant relationship between social distance considerations and overt behavior (p. 160).

Warner and DeFleur determined that all three propositions were generally supported by the research (p. 164). They discovered that the disclosure of an act (high social constraint situation) makes it possible for others to administer external sanctions upon one's behavior



(p. 166). Attitudes and actions tended to correspond under low social constraint (anonymity protected) and social distance maintaining situations. However, when the the subjects were asked to behave favorably toward the attitude object in situations in which they would be violating norms (social distance reduction), and directly disclosing their acts to others (high social constraint), a great deal of inconsistency was noted between their attitudes and behavior (pp. 166-167).

#### Impact of Action on Attitudes

Insko and Schopler (1967) presented a statement concerning affective-cognitive and conative consistency, taking as a basic tenet, that there is a tendency for attitudes, cognitions and behaviors to be consistently related (p. 365). After presenting definitions of these three areas, they discuss the notion of consistency between them. In discussing cognitive and affective consistency, Insko and Schopler see two objects of positive or negative affective significance linked by a positive or negative cognition (p. 364). Consistency is determined by multiplying the positive (+) and negative (-) parts of the equation. A positive product indicates a consistent relationship while a negative product indicates an inconsistent relationship. Following others, they suggest that the greater the polarity in the linked objects of affective significance, the greater will be the tendency to resolve inconsistency (p. 365).

Further, Insko and Schopler contend that attitudes are linked to behavior by negative or positive cognitive relations in the same way as to affective objects. The same methodology is applied to predict



triadic consistency as to predict affective-cognitive consistency (i.e. +/- behavior linked by +/- cognition to +/- affective object). While attitudes, cognitions, and behavior are not necessarily consistent, there is a tendency toward consistency; and a probabilistic relation exists between holding certain beliefs and manifesting certain behavior (p. 366).

Turning their attention to the movement toward triadic consistency which can occur in two basic situations—attitude-belief change following behavior change and behavior change following attitude-belief change—the authors contend that the former is more likely than the latter to produce triadic consistency (p. 361). The introduction of new behaviors will be more likely to produce a change toward consistency and away from inconsistency when: a) the polarity is greater between the new behavior and the associated object or objects of affective significance; b) the commitment is greater to the new behavior and c) the intensity of a cognitive relationship is greater (pp. 366-367).

Behavior change following attitude-belief change is much less likely because the individual must perceive and accept the cognitive relation between the new attitude and some behavior (p. 370). If that link is not established, no change is possible. Behavior change may also fail because of various hedonistic considerations both present and future (p. 370). People will be reluctant to engage in behavior that they believe will have present or future negative impacts. A third reason for this failure is that even if the other two obstacles are overcome, an opportunity for the new behavior may not arise (p. 372). A final reason why consistent behavior may not occur relates to the existence of competing triads (p. 373). Positive behavior that balances





a given triad will not tend to occur if that behavior simultaneously imbalances a second triad involving a more polarized object of affective significance (p. 374). They conclude their discussion with by writing

We are inclined to believe that the causal link from behavior change to attitude change is both stronger and more direct than is the causal link from attitude change to behavior change . . . in general (we are) inclined to believe that most of the triadic consistency existing in the social environment results from attitudes being adapted so as to be consistent with behavior (pp. 374-375).

Attitudes and induced discrepancies. Cohen (1967) also looked at the impact of behavior on attitudes in his review of studies dealing with the attitudinal consequences of induced discrepancies between cognitions and behavior. He points out that ". . . it has often been demonstrated that forcing a person to express an opinion position discrepant from what he privately believes . . . creates 'dissonance,' or psychological tension, having drive force . . ." which ". . . may be reduced by changing one's private position to coincide more nearly with the position expressed" (p. 332). The magnitude of the dissonance depends on the nature of the reasons for taking the stand (p. 333). The more compelling the reasons for taking the discrepant position are, the less dissonance is created and the less attitude change results (p. 333). On the other hand, the greater the amount of dissonance the stronger will be the attempts to reduce it (p. 333). "Tolerance for dissonance" is a personality variable that leads individuals to differ in the magnitude of their reaction to a given dissonance (p. 340).

Attitudes and new information. Kelman (1974) argues that the attitude change processes are most likely to be set in motion if a person is sharply confronted with a discrepancy between attitude and



some item of new information (p. 317). Three major types of discrepancies are conducive to attitude change: a) discrepancy between the attitude and information about reality; b) discrepancy between the attitude and the attitudes of significant others and c) discrepancy between the attitude and one's own actions (p. 317). He focuses on the third type of discrepancy and argues that discrepant actions may create the conditions for reassessment and revision of related attitudes and thus set in motion the process of attitude change (p. 317). Three components of action are described: a) the context; b) the contemplation; and c) the consequences. The motivational and informational processes generated by each were also considered (pp. 317-321). This analysis ". . . shows most clearly the engagement of attitude and action in the continuing, reciprocal, circular process . . ." in which attitude is not only ". . . an integral part of action but action is an integral part of the development, testing and crystallization of attitude" (p. 324).

Attitudes and personal experience. Regan and Fazio (1977) see the crucial variable affecting consistency between attitudes and behavior as the method by which the attitude was formed (p. 28). They tested the notion that

. . . attitudes which have been formed and developed through direct personal interaction with the attitude object are maximally likely to influence and therefore be good predictors of subsequent behavior toward the object . . . Attitudes which have not yet been tested in the behavioral arena lack the stability and clarity which make them sometimes a determinant of action . . . two individuals having the same attitude . . . may differ considerably in the degree to which they will act consistently with the attitude. The person whose attitude is a product of direct interaction with the attitude object will be more likely, in general, to behave consistently with that attitude than



someone whose attitude was formed in a less direct manner (pp. 30-31).

Regan and Fazio cite two experiments in both of which two groups of subjects were involved. One group had direct prior behavioral experience with the attitude object in question and the other, while indicating similar attitudes, did not have the same direct experience. "In both studies greater attitude-behavior consistency was demonstrated by the subjects who had direct prior action experience with the attitude object" (p. 41). They support the thesis that ". . . not only is attitude an integral part of action, but action is an integral part of the development, testing and crystallization of attitudes" (Kelman 1974, p. 324).

Several studies focus on the relationship of behavior to attitudes and the resulting levels of consistency (Fazio and Zanna 1978; Zanna, Olson and Fazio 1980; Fazio, Chen, McDonel and Sherman 1982; and Fazio, Powell and Herr 1983). Fazio and Zanna (1978) found that attitude-behavior consistency was significantly related to: 1) the amount of direct experience upon which a subject's attitude was based; 2) the degree of certainty with which the attitude was held; and 3) how well-defined the subject's attitude was as measured by the width of his latitude of rejection (Regan and Fazio p. 398).

Building on the research which suggests that an attitude representing a summary of prior behaviors toward the attitude object is more predictive of subsequent behaviors than an attitude based on non-behavioral information, Zanna, Olson and Fazio (1980) conducted studies which determined that only individuals whose past behaviors have been relatively invariant (low past behavior variability), and who tend to infer their attitudes from those past behaviors



(low self monitoring), would express attitudes that summarize past behaviors and hence strongly predict future behaviors (p. 432). If one or both of these requirements is not satisfied the attitude-behavior correlation will be low (p. 439).

Fazio, Chen, McDonel and Sherman (1982) conducted two experiments to examine the accessibility of attitudes from memory as a function of the manner of attitude formation and determined that attitudes were more rapidly accessible when based on direct behavioral experience than when they were based on nonbehavioral experience (p. 339). In two further experiments they determined that the manner of attitude formation affects attitude-behavior consistency because direct experience produces a stronger object-evaluation association, and hence, a more accessible attitude than does indirect experience (p. 339).

Borgida and Campbell (1982) also examined the role of personal experience as a moderating factor in the relationship between belief relevance and attitude behavior consistency. In their experiment, they examined whether belief relevance enhances the degree of attitude-behavior consistency when the behavioral implications of a global attitude contradict the behavioral implications of prior personal experience (p. 239). They conclude that their research provides ". . . strong support for the proposition that the degree to which global attitudes and their behavioral implications are cognitively accessible may be a key determinant of attitude-behavior consistency" (p. 245). However, the effects of cognitive accessibility of global attitudes depend on the type and extent of and individual's prior personal experience in the particular domain under consideration (p. 246). A person is most likely to engage in behaviors that are

(low self monitoring), would express attitudes that minimize past behavior and hence strongly predict future behavior (p. 432). If one or both of these requirements is not satisfied the attitude-behavior correlation will be low (p. 433).

Smith, Green, Johnson and Sherman (1982) conducted two experiments

to examine the accessibility of attitudes from memory as a function of the manner of attitude formation and to determine that attitudes were more readily accessible when they were formed in a more automatic manner than when they were formed in a more controlled manner. In the first experiment, participants were asked to evaluate a target person on a scale of 1 to 7. In the second experiment, participants were asked to evaluate the same target person on a scale of 1 to 7.

The results of the two experiments are shown in Table 1.

As can be seen from Table 1, the correlation between attitude and behavior

was significantly higher in the automatic condition than in the controlled

condition. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that attitudes

formed in an automatic manner are more accessible from memory than

attitudes formed in a controlled manner.



congruent with their attention when they stand to personally benefit from them (p. 246).

Two other studies were conducted by Fazio, Powell and Herr (1983) concerning the likelihood that individuals will spontaneously access their attitudes from memory upon mere observation of the attitude object (p. 723). They determined that attitude formation through direct, behavioral experience resulted in accessing the attitude upon mere observation of the attitude object. While attitude formation through indirect nonbehavioral experience did not result in accessing the attitude upon mere observation of the attitude object unless the object-evaluation was strengthened by having the subjects repeatedly express their attitudes (p. 723). On the basis of their findings they advance the following model.

To summarize, the present model of the attitude-behavior relation involves the following sequence: (a) Upon observation of the attitude object one's attitude must be accessed from memory. That is the particular evaluative categories with which one has associated the object must become salient. (b) These evaluations are apt, through the process of selective perception, to "color" one's perception of the object in the immediate situation. (c) These immediate perceptions, filtered as they are through the attitude, then influence the individual's behavioral response (p. 734).

Attitudes and inconsistent behavior. Sherman and Gorkin (1980) conducted an experiment, dealing with sexism, to study the effects of behaving inconsistently with a central, self-relevant attitude. They hypothesized that the most viable route to reduce the feelings of dissonance is to bolster or strengthen the initial attitude system in order to reestablish the validity of the actor's initial set of central, self-relevant beliefs by adopting other behavior that is consistent with



the original attitude (p. 389). The conclusion reached by Sherman and Gorkin was that ". . . threats to central aspects of one's self-image seem to motivate behavior to reestablish that image, but the effects may not last past the first act" (p. 401).

### Consistency and Morals

Consistency is a concern in values literature. Gustafson (1970) wrote that ". . . character . . . is the persistency of identity that makes us expect some consistency in a person's moral judgments, attitudes and actions . . ." (pp. 16-17). Likona summarized the 1929 research on character education of Hartshorne and May and found striking evidence of inconsistency in their subjects (p. 15). He also examined a subsequent study by Hartshorne, May and Shuttlesworth, and concluded that ". . . a child does not have a uniform generalized code of morals but varies his opinions to suit the situation in which he finds himself (p. 15). The findings of these studies were summarized by Kohlberg and Turiel (1971, pp. 422-423) as follows.

1. The world cannot be divided into honest and dishonest people. Almost everyone cheats some of the time.
2. If a person cheats in one situation it does not mean he will or will not cheat in another.
3. People's verbal moral values about honesty have nothing to do with how they act.
4. There is little correlation between teacher's ratings of honest and actual experimental measures of honesty.
5. The decision to cheat or not is largely determined by expediency.
6. Even honest behavior is not dictated by concern about punishment or detection, it is largely determined by immediate situational factors or group approval and example (as opposed to being determined by internal moral values).



7. Where honesty is determined by cultural value-forces these values are relative or specific to social class or group.

Research on Piagetian moral judgments has failed to reveal anything like a consistent mode of moral thought stable across different content areas (Likona 1976, p.14). The search for "dynamic consistency," the tendency for a person who holds a particular moral standard to act according to it and to feel guilty when he does not, has produced meager results (Likona 1976, p. 15). Hoffman (1963) also finds some evidence that as children grow they will manifest greater behavioral consistency and increasing integration of behavior with other aspects of morality (Likona 1976, p. 15). These and other researchers have observed with Roger Brown that ". . . to bring conduct under the dominion of morality is the great task; it is the struggle for character" (p. 414).

#### Modification of Values, Attitudes and Behavior

Rokeach (1967) conducted a series of experiments on the long-range experimental modification of values, attitudes and behavior. In these experiments he recognized that a necessary prerequisite to cognitive or attitude change is the presence or a state of imbalance or inconsistency. Generally such a state is created by: a) inducing a person to engage in a behavior that is incompatible with his attitudes and values and b) exposing him to information about attitudes or values of significant others that are incompatible with his own (p. 453). To these generally accepted ideas Rokeach added, c) the exposure of a person to information designed to make him consciously aware of the state of inconsistency that exists chronically within his own



value-attitude system below the level of his conscious awareness (p. 453).

Rokeach measured psychological states of dissonance (imbalance, inconsistency, incongruity) in terms of the self (X) and one's perception of performance or behavior (Y). X and Y are dissonant if the person's behavior in a given situation leads him to become dissatisfied with himself and consonant if his behavior leads him to remain self-satisfied (p. 453).

These experiments induced situation-specific states of self-dissatisfaction concerning an individual's values, attitudes and behavior by a self-confrontation procedure which allowed the subjects to compare their values of freedom and equality with their participation in the civil rights movement. Following this confrontation the subjects were twice invited to join the NAACP. The rate of subjects joining the NAACP was compared with the rate of a control group who had not experienced the self-confrontation procedure. The treatment had the effect of relatively enduring changes in values, attitudes and behavior (p. 458).

#### Moral Cognition and Moral Action

A major issue has been the consistency of personality functioning across situations. Trait theorists have argued that morality possesses such consistency. Behavior theorists, on the other hand, have emphasized the lack of consistency in moral behavior. According to their view any consistency of moral behavior is a consequence of the common stimulus elements which are present in different situations (Santrock, p. 201).





Different kinds of assumptions, about the relationship between moral cognition and moral action, are made. Blasi (1980) contends that moral action has been viewed as either: a) the immediate result of action tendencies and their interplay or b) as mediated by such cognitive processes as moral definitions, moral beliefs and moral reasoning (p. 2). In the first view, moral action is essentially irrational and is different from morally neutral action only in terms of specific content categories or in terms of the social function served by morality (p. 3; see also Hogan 1973, Simpson 1976, Rotter et al. 1972).

The second approach considers moral functioning as an essentially rational response derived from understanding and reasons concerning both the fundamental goals of human beings and the means to pursue them. This approach differs from the other in emphasizing the processes by which goals are thought to exercise their influence, and in seeing these cognitive processes are not simply stitching needs and actions together but constructing moral meaning (Blasi 1980, p. 4). These two views of moral action ultimately reflect two very different views of human actions in general.

According to the first conception, human action, like any other event is caused by a finite number of elements and their interactions. Examples of elements are genes, stimulus response associations, attitudes and traits . . . The interaction among the elements in a specific prediction is mathematically measurable. A failure to predict behavior, then, demands the introduction of new elements in the equation or new interactions among old elements (p. 4).

Within the second conception of human action, determination is a more appropriate notion than causation. A useful analogy for this understanding of the effect that moral rules have on behavior is the determination of a conclusion from a set of premises (p. 4).



The basic elements, then, are rules and principles, which interact with each other according to superordinate rules and principles . . . a situation is read interpreted and assimilated according to rules, or vice versa; rules are applied to a situation (Blasi p. 4).

Assumptions about the kind of experiences that lead to an ability for principled moral judgments and behavior and their resulting theoretical positions have been outlined by Haan, Smith and Block (1968). First, they discuss Kohlberg's developmental perspective. Since the individual is seen, in this perspective, as developing morality in his own terms, the role of socializing agencies and institutions is to provide role-taking opportunities. Allied with this developmental perspective is the notion of moral reasoning and its process properties: objectivity, generality, inclusiveness, universality and impersonalness.

On the other hand, the social learning perspective sees moral attainment in terms of selective reinforcement of experiences, modeling behavior, and the role of socializing agents. It focuses on conformity to the value content of some social ideal. They conclude that the form of reasoning may likely have greater predictability and wider application than time-and-group-bound content because simple knowledge of socially approved ideals is known to be only a weak predictor of moral behavior (p. 183).

Melden (1971) makes the same distinction between these two approaches, and advocates the rational approach when he writes

Surely we need here not the conception of an "agent" who is merely programmed to respond to the input of information with the motion of his bodily parts, or the conception of a self whose function it is merely to provide the housing for interior mental events, but rather, the flesh and blood notion of a human being who has acquired the ability through training and instruction to recognize the situations in

The basic elements, then, are rules and principles, which interact with each other according to experimental rules and principles . . . a situation is then investigated and analyzed according to rules, or vice versa; rules are applied to a situation (Stall p. 4).

Investigations about the kind of experiences that lead to an ability

are performed with reference and behavior and their resulting

theoretical observations. . . . (Stall p. 4)

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which he goes about his affairs for what they are, and, who understands the relevance and appropriateness of his actions to the concerns and interests he has acquired in the process of his development (p. 116).

Blasi (1980), Haan (1975) and Mendel (1971) point out that considerations of the relationship between moral belief and moral action fall into two major approaches. The following examination of the literature will follow this structure. The first section will focus on Kohlberg's developmental approach to moral judgments and its implications for belief/behavior consistency and adult education. The second section will focus on non-Kohlberg approaches and their educational implications.

#### Kohlberg and Moral Development

Kohlberg's research is based on that of John Dewey (1909) and Jean Piaget (1965). He developed his theory of stages of moral development as a result of his longitudinal study of 75 individuals.

Definitions and descriptions. Two sets of important assumptions are made by Kohlberg and the other developmentalists. Kohlberg (1977) summarizes the interactional assumptions of cognitive-developmental stages as:

1. The different stage structures form an invariant sequence, order or succession in individual development. While cultural factors may speed up, slow down, or stop development, they do not change its sequence.
2. Stages are hierarchical integrations. Accordingly, higher stages displace (or rather, reintegrate) the structures found at lower stages.
3. Stage progression occurs as the result of transformation in mental structures as they attempt to assimilate experiences which are somewhat discrepant from those already assimilated (p. 188).

which he goes about his affairs for what they may, and who understands the relations and responsibilities of his actions to the community and interests he has acquired in the process of his development (p. 116).

Blasi (1980), Band (1975) and Band (1975) point out that

considerations of the relationship between moral belief and moral action

fall into two major approaches. The following examination of the

literature will indicate that a third, and more recent, view has emerged on which focus on

the individual's internal state of mind and the role of the social environment

in the development of moral behavior. This approach is the focus of the present study.

The first approach is the cognitive-developmental model.

The second approach is the

third approach is the

These interactional assumptions of the cognitive-developmental stage-movement are required if one is to claim that a later stage is a better stage and if one is to interpret stage-movement in terms of educational process (p. 188).

The second set of assumptions is implicit in the initial conceptualization of the stages themselves. These assumptions are that:

1. Stages are defined as differences in form or organization of response, not in content or function of the response. Each . . . stage involves a new set of interests and concerns and defines a new function . . . each cognitive or moral stage serves the same function, logical inference or moral judgment, but serves it in a new way, form or pattern of functioning.
2. Differences in form are qualitative not quantitative.
3. In a certain sense, then, stages are "cognitive," not in the sense of being free of emotions, but in the sense that a structure, or form of organization of personality is always a form of organizing thinking. Emotions develop as well as thoughts, but new emotions always have a base in thought and perception. In morality, one cannot develop from fear of punishment to guilt without developing the cognitive capacity to make moral self-judgments (as opposed to simply anticipating-punishing events).
4. Stages, as cognitive, are largely defined by competence not by performance. A capacity for judging in terms of moral principles is not always translated into morally principled behavior. Morally principled behavior, however, presupposes the competence to make principled moral judgment (1977, pp. 188-189).

Kohlberg (1971) has elsewhere argued that the higher stages of moral reasoning are "better" than lower stages, and that the goal of moral education should be to move individuals to those higher stages (Leming, p. 214). He has tried to establish this claim of higher stage superiority in two ways. First, he has argued that higher stages are more philosophically adequate ways of resolving moral conflicts. Secondly, higher stages are more adequate because they offer clearer





guides to action (Leming, p. 214). Kohlberg (1977) writes

. . . the logic for moving between the claim that there is a universal stage sequence and that persons ought to progress through the sequence because a later moral stage resolves moral questions better than does an earlier stage . . . a higher stage is better because it serves the function better, it solves universal problems better (p. 187).

Kohlberg has posited that consistency between moral actions must be assessed according to the stage of moral development the person has attained. Within each stage moral thinking should be positively related to moral behavior (Santrock, p. 202). In short, cognitive-developmental theorists argue that higher levels of moral cognition (judgments) entail more genuine and profound awareness and consideration of the welfare of others and activate behavior that is unselfish, compassionate and socially beneficial (Harris, Mussen and Rutherford 1977, p. 132).

People may be more likely to talk about moral values than to act on them but it must be remembered that Kohlberg makes a fundamental distinction between people's espoused values and the way they structure their judgments about moral issues, that is, between content and form (Hersh, Paolitto and Reimer 1979, pp. 94-95). Hersh, Paolitto and Reimer draw some conclusions about the role of moral judgment in influencing behavior, including: a) general support for the idea that people at principled stages will tend to act more consistently; b) generalizations should be made very cautiously; and c) the particular setting plays an important role in promoting consistency between judgment and action (p. 99).

Disagreements. Needless to say not everyone agrees with this assessment. Kohlberg's perspective has been criticized on several grounds summarized by Sebes and Ford (1984).



1. This frame-work does not focus on moral development and behavior but only on one limited aspect of cognitive functioning called moral reasoning. It has focused on one small aspect of a much broader problem.

2. Little data have been generated to demonstrated a relationship between moral reasoning and other cognitive, emotional or behavioral variables important to moral development and behavior.

3. Looked at comprehensively, the data do not seem to support a stage conception of moral reasoning or development. In general, inferences concerning the existence of stages are not based on the study of individuals' developmental patterns of moral reasoning but on group means for samples of different ages.

4. A wider variety of form and content of moral reasoning may be potentially available at a much younger age than the Kohlberg model suggests.

5. Moral reasoning seems more heavily influenced by situational variability than the trait-like Kohlberg view suggests. For example, comparisons of different kinds of situations with different measures produce different kinds of information (pp. 379-380).

Don Locke (1984) advanced ". . . a model of the connection between stage of moral reasoning and behavior . . . as involving two separate steps, from reasoning to judgment and from judgment to behavior" (p. 11). His discussion suggests three possible ways moral reasoning might influence behavior. These are:

(a) by affecting the content of specific moral judgments which in turn affect behavior

(b) by affecting the extent to which individuals will be motivated by their moral judgments

(c) by affecting the likelihood of their seeing those judgments as relevant to concrete situations in which they find themselves (p.11).

Locke concludes that these influences are indirect and uncertain. He suggests that it might be more effective for moral education to focus on inculcating the appropriate moral beliefs or influencing the manifold other factors which also affect behavior but are largely disregarded by

1. This framework does not focus on social development and behavior but only on the limited aspect of cognitive functioning called social reasoning. It has focused on one small aspect of a much broader problem.

2. Little data have been generated to demonstrate a relationship between social reasoning and other cognitive, emotional or behavioral variables important to social development and behavior.

3. Looked at comprehensively, the data do not seem to support a hypothesis of social reasoning or development. In general, it does not seem to be related to other variables of the study or to social development and behavior. It is not clear that social reasoning is related to social development and behavior.

4. The data do not seem to support a hypothesis of social reasoning or development. In general, it does not seem to be related to other variables of the study or to social development and behavior.

5. The data do not seem to support a hypothesis of social reasoning or development. In general, it does not seem to be related to other variables of the study or to social development and behavior.

6. The data do not seem to support a hypothesis of social reasoning or development. In general, it does not seem to be related to other variables of the study or to social development and behavior.

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9. The data do not seem to support a hypothesis of social reasoning or development. In general, it does not seem to be related to other variables of the study or to social development and behavior.

10. The data do not seem to support a hypothesis of social reasoning or development. In general, it does not seem to be related to other variables of the study or to social development and behavior.

cognitive-developmental approaches (p. 21). Emphasizing the central importance of moral content, the particular moral judgments, as opposed to the general form or structure of moral reasoning, and investigating the relationship between moral cognition and human conduct (p. 23) Locke writes

. . . more importantly, if moral reasoning is to have any effect on behavior at all, it will be because particular actions are judged to be good, right or moral and others to be bad wrong or immoral. That is, the effect of moral cognition on conduct must depend not merely on the stage of moral reasoning but on the content of particular moral judgments or beliefs (p. 23).

#### Moral Development and Consistency Research

The research literature is mixed in its support of the belief that level of moral judgment predicts moral behavior (Santrock, p. 202).

Two critical pieces of research in this area were done by Haan, Smith and Block (1968) and Haan (1975). In their study of the moral development of individuals involved in the free speech movement at Berkeley in the late 60's Haan, Smith and Block determined that within the limitations of the study ". . . the results show strong association between political protest, social action and principled reasoning—qualified by the finding that premoral men also protest—and that young people of conventional moral reasoning are inactive" (p. 198).

Haan, Smith and Block (1968) refer to another similar study, reported by Kohlberg, involving students who were asked by an authority figure to violate the universal dictate of not hurting others for insufficient reasons by shocking victims who did not learn rapidly. Since the subjects needed to take emphatic and disobedient action to



solve their dilemma, the situation was similar to ones in which the student protestors Haan, Smith and Block studied believed themselves to be engaged. Kohlberg found that 75% of the subjects who used some stage-6 thinking quit the experiment, compared to only 13% of conventional or pure stage-5 subjects. Haan, Smith and Block (1968) conclude that Kohlberg's study, as well as their own, demonstrate that stage-6 individuals are less likely to comply with requirements they regard as morally indefensible (p. 200).

Haan (1975) continued this line of investigation by looking at hypothetical and actual moral reasoning in a situation of civil disobedience (p. 255). She determined that two-thirds of the subjects used a different stage of reasoning (46% higher and 20% lower) for the actual situation than they did for the hypothetical dilemmas (p. 266). The patterns of gains were consistent with the cognitive-moral theory's propositions concerning developmental readiness in young adults within a disequilibrating situation. Action that supported ideology was associated with gain.

We see then that the theory's normative, genetic descriptions of gain is approximately correct, that mere confrontation with moral conflict is sufficient to enable most university students of lower stages to use higher stage forms, and that action that is consistent with ideology apparently energizes moral thought. When the action is nontrivial it may well be the first, rather than the last manifestation of an evolving comprehension of more sufficient moral structuring that can yet be articulated in a cognitive-hypothetical way (p. 268).

Loss in the stage of moral judgment, not predicted by the theory, characterized students whose action and ideology were inconsistent.

The loss group was generally characterized by distinctive personal-social constructions, suggesting that they had particular difficulties and hesitations in dealing with authority conflict and disobedience (p. 269).





The thrust of Haan's research is that there are systematic differences, apparently attributable to non-moral characteristics of participants, between giving a story character fictitious moral advice and formulating and acting on advice for oneself (p. 269).

Moral stage level and consistency. Much research has been done to determine if those who have achieved a higher level of moral development are more consistent than those at lower stages. Kohlberg has argued that the higher stages--because of greater integration, differentiation, and more universal characteristics--offer more clear and consistent guides to action leading to the expectation that principled moral thinkers--because of the universal characteristics of their principles--would show a greater consistency of moral action than would individuals at lower stages (Leming p. 214).

Research base. In 1976 James Rest reviewed and discussed the research base of the cognitive developmental approach to moral education. He contrasted the approach to the psychoanalytical, behavioristic and humanistic approaches (pp. 103-106). Rest discussed major research findings, and their implications for education, including age-trend studies (p. 111), studies dealing with the correlations of moral judgment with other cognitive variables (p. 113), correlations with non-cognitive variables (p. 114) and studies dealing with experimentally and educationally induced change (p. 116). He concludes that the efforts to develop moral curriculum ". . . as yet have not fully demonstrated their effectiveness and usefulness . . ." but that ". . . the enterprise is grounded on a psychological variable that has



been demonstrated empirical reality . . . " (p. 119).

In 1980 Augusto Blasi conducted a critical review of the literature dealing with moral cognition and moral action. In his review he looked at 74 studies in five different areas. He examined 15 studies dealing with moral reasoning and delinquency (p. 11), 12 dealing with moral reasoning and real-life behavior (p. 12), 17 dealing with moral reasoning and honesty (p. 17), 19 dealing with moral reasoning and altruistic behavior (p. 25) and 11 dealing with moral reasoning and resistance to conformity (p. 35). He concludes that,

The body of research reviewed here seems to offer considerable support for the hypothesis that moral reasoning and moral action are statistically related. This statement, however, should be qualified . . . Empirical support . . . varies from area to area . . . strongest for the hypothesis that moral reasoning differs between delinquents and nondelinquents and that at higher stages of moral reasoning there is greater resistance to the pressure of conforming one's judgment to others views . . . less strong [support] for the hypothesis that higher moral stage individuals tend to be more honest or more altruistic. Finally, there is little support for the expectation that individuals of the post-conventional level resist, more than others, social pressure to conform their moral action (p. 37).

Moral behavior, judgment and affect. Santrock (1975) conducted a study to determine the interrelations of moral behavior, moral judgment and moral affect (p. 209). He determined first, that, congruent with prior investigations of moral behavior, little or no consistency across moral behavior situations was found, supporting the contention that morality is not consistent across different moral situations and moral behaviors (pp. 210-211). Second, he discovered less consistency across moral judgment items than was found in other research, reflecting greater situational variability in moral judgment (p. 211). Finally, with respect to the relation of moral judgment to moral behavior, a far



greater proportion of the variance in moral behavior appears to be situational rather than due to generality in moral understanding (p. 211).

Exposure to higher stages and behavioral choices. Rothman (1976) examined ways in which exposure to moral reasoning statements affected subsequent behavioral choices (p. 397). Her research suggests that individuals at higher stages of moral thought more successfully related reasoning a stage above their level to behavioral choices. It also suggests the sequential development of both moral reasoning and behavioral changes. Both reasoning in response to hypothetical dilemmas and behavior in concrete situations seem to reflect structural processes (p. 405).

Correlates to moral judgment maturity. Harris, Mussen and Rutherford (1977) conducted a study designed to test the hypothesis that maturity of moral judgment is related to moral behavior and certain personality characteristics (p. 123). Maturity of moral judgment was found to be significantly correlated with general cognitive ability, resistance to temptation, reputation for being concerned with the welfare of others, self-confidence, and security in social relationships with peers (p. 123). They conclude that their study reinforces ". . . the findings of earlier studies which demonstrate that levels of moral judgment and maturity of moral action are significantly associated (pp. 131-132).



Moral behavior, moral development and motivation. Sharie McNamee (1977) studied the relationship between moral behavior, level of moral development and motivation in an experiment in which it was necessary for the subject to violate the experimenter's authority to help someone (p. 27). From this study she drew three conclusions. First, "people at almost all stages development fail to help someone in need whom they think should be helped but for many different reasons" (p. 30). Second, the study found that only at stage 6 did every subject help the person in need. The analysis of Stages 1-5 ". . . reveals that an increasing percentage at each stage defied authority in order to help someone" (p. 30). Finally, the significance ". . . of this study is the confirmation it provides for Kohlberg's theory that moral judgment predicts moral behavior in a situation by determining the interpretation of the situation and consequently the response to it" (p. 30).

Moral reasoning and behavior in conventional adults. Krebs and Rosenwald (1977) focused on the conventional conceptions of morality characteristic of subjects at Kohlberg's stages 3 and 4 (p. 78). They conclude that ". . . the findings of the present study force the conclusion that Kohlberg's test measures something that predicts 'moral' behavior" (p. 82). They add, however, that ". . . Kohlberg's test would not be expected to predict impulsive behaviors that are minimally mediated by cognitive processes as well, including many of the behaviors commonly considered most moral and immoral, like acts of heroism, rape, and murder" (p. 86).





Moral development and cheating behavior. Leming (1978) conducted an experiment to test cheating behavior among college undergraduates in two different situations: high threat/high supervision and low threat/low supervision. He found among all subjects and across both situations that subjects high in moral development cheated less than other subjects (p. 214) and "lows" cheated more than "mediums" who cheated more than "highs" (p. 216). But in the low threat/low supervision situations, subjects high in moral development were just as likely as others to cheat. This "get away with it if you can" behavior by principled moral reasoners is contrary to the picture that the cognitive developmentalist suggest, but is consistent with other research (Leming p. 217). The research also suggests that variations in the situation influence behavior.

Values and behavior. In 1983 Roger Straughan wrote an essay, based on previous research concerning the "... nature of the logical relationship between children's moral values and their behavior" (p. 187). He suggests that the relationship is less tight than is often supposed and that there are no necessary behavioral or motivational criteria to determine whether or not a particular value is held. There must always remain the possibility of a gap existing between the holding and enactment of a moral value (p. 1987). He points out that it "... appears then to be perfectly meaningful to say of any adult or child that he or she holds a particular value, yet frequently fails to translate it into action (p. 188). He sees this failure in terms of a conflict between "justificatory" and "motivational" reasons for action (p. 188). Straughn concluded that, "... failing to act upon a value,

*Local development and planning literature* - January 1978) contained

an experiment to test whether behavior among college students was

the different situation: high threat/high responsibility and low

threat/low responsibility. He found among all subjects and across both

situations that subjects high in social development showed less than

other subjects (p. 104) and "low" created more than "medium" who

observed more than "high" (p. 105) in the low responsibility

situation. In the high responsibility situation, subjects high in

social development showed less than other subjects (p. 105) in the

high responsibility situation. In the low responsibility

situation, subjects high in social development showed less than

other subjects (p. 105) in the low responsibility situation.

therefore, and even failing to want to act upon it are not indicators that the value is not held" (p. 189).

His position is similar to that taken by Likona (1976) when he stated that ". . . consistency must be defined in theoretical rather than in purely behavioral terms—which is to say that it must be defined from the subject's point of view . . ." (p. 16) and that it ". . . must be defined psychologically in terms of the person's rationale for his behavior and cannot validly be equated with behavioral predictability . . ." (p. 17).

Straughan (1983) sees at least three important educational and methodological implications of this position. First, teachers and researchers cannot expect a full and accurate picture of what values are held merely by observing behavior (p. 189). Second, the conflict between justificatory and motivational reasons should be explained and discussed in concrete terms and with reference to life experiences (p. 190). Finally, unless the need is recognized for a more philosophical analysis on the concept of "value" and what it means to "hold a value", there is great danger that values education will proceed on the blind assumptions that values are self-evident, to be identified behaviorally, and that holding a value is to be equated with performing particular, specifiable actions (p. 190).

Reasoning, moral judgment and moral conduct. McLaughlin and Stephens (1984) conducted a longitudinal study among retarded and non-retarded subjects to examine the evolution of interrelationships among measures of reasoning, moral judgment and moral conduct (p. 156).

therefore, and even failing to want to act upon it are not indicators

that the value is not held" (p. 100).

His position is similar to that taken by Liska (1970) when he

stated that "... consistency must be defined in theoretical rather

than in purely behavioral terms--which is to say that it must be defined

from the subject's point of view . . ." (p. 16) and that if "... most

as defined behavioral . . . and . . . the person is responsible for his

behavior . . . and . . . the person is responsible for his

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They determined that

While reasoning and moral conduct relationships tended to strengthen in retarded subjects, it was reasoning and moral judgment as well as standard intelligence and moral judgment that exhibited increasing interrelationship in non-retarded subjects, i.e., abilities involving intelligence and logical and moral reasoning were evolving but were not influencing observed behavior (p. 160).

It is suggested that as an individual develops, reasoning ability increasingly contributes to his moral decision making (p. 161).

Justice reasoning and altruistic behavior. Blotner and Bearison (1984) conducted a study to examine the developmental consistencies between and within levels of moral reasoning, altruism and perspective coordination (p. 349). The findings partially supported the cognitive-developmental theory. The level of hypothetical moral reasoning was found to be significantly related to behavior in the sharing and helping situations (p. 349) and was a better predictor of altruistic behavior than was perspective coordination (pp. 365-366).

#### Implications of Kohlberg's Theory

Two critical themes will be dealt with in this section. First, the implication of Kohlberg's developmental thought on the notion of adult moral development and second, the educational implications of his work.

Adult moral development. Early in the development of his thought Kohlberg came to the conclusion that moral development ends in adolescence. He claimed that the attainment of formal operational logic in adolescence, provided no basis for further structural changes in

They determined that

While reasoning and moral conduct relationships seemed to  
 strengthen in related subjects, it was reasoning and moral  
 judgment as well as standard intelligence and moral conduct  
 that exhibited increasing interrelationships in non-related  
 subjects, i.e., activities involving intelligence and logical  
 and moral reasoning were growing but were not influencing  
 character behavior (p. 188).

It is suggested that an individual develops reasoning ability

increasingly until the age of 18 years (p. 189).

moral judgment (Murphy and Gilligan, p. 81). However, mounting research evidence of relativist regression led Kohlberg to reconsider his earlier argument and posit that the attainment of principled moral judgment is a phenomenon of adult development and results from ". . . the experience of sustained responsibility for the welfare of others and the experience of irreversible moral choice" (Kohlberg 1973, p. 196).

The leaders in the arena of moral development (Lawrence Kohlberg, James Rest and James Fowler) follow developmental assumptions. Development is viewed as an irreversible movement through a sequence of structured states or stages (Peatling 1977, p. 212). Though developmentalists admit that adults may be stopped, frozen or fixated at some stage, they presume that those who are not stopped will reach higher stages and that once reached, and regression to a lower stage is out of the question. It is a non-developmental concept (p. 213).

The results of Peatling's four-decade study (sampling adults in their 20s, 30s, 40s and 50s) challenged these assumptions. He determined that throughout most of this period there appears to be a very considerable degree of ambiguity in adult moral judgment (p. 219). He summarizes his findings by writing that

. . . moral judgments appears to reach a plateau . . . sometime around the college years, decay into ambiguity during the 20s recover . . . in the early 30s, decay into ambiguity again in the late 30s and early 40s and finally settle into a semi-structure in the late 40s and 50s (p. 219).

Murphy and Gilligan (1980) advanced a radical reconstruction of Kohlberg's theory, and provided a conception of postconventional moral development which fits existing data on late adolescent and adult moral judgment but differs from Kohlberg's higher stage descriptions (p. 77). The persistence of relativistic regression in these data suggest the





need to revise Kohlberg's theory (p. 77). They conclude that there may be another form of postconventional moral judgment that, given the constraints of the Kohlberg scoring system (p.93) and contextual relativism (p.96), has been mistaken previously for regression or developmental failure.

The present paper has demonstrated that in some subjects, at least, Kohlberg's theory cannot distinguish between the absolutism of adolescent logic and adult principled thinking . . . we claim that these individuals are capable of full formal operations even in their early absolutism and that its relativizing has many of the characteristics of structural stage change. Since the Kohlberg stages do not take this cognitive shift into account they cannot reliably code moral development after adolescence in many higher stage subjects because they mistake contextual relativizing for moral regression (p. 101).

Marchand-Jodoin and Samson (1982) conducted a study to investigate the moral and sexual development of adults. Previous research indicated that children and adolescents can progress in the stages of moral development. But, in the case of adults, Kohlberg (1973) suggested that there might be a crystallization after the age 25 (Marchand-Jodoin and Samson, p. 247). Results of the study showed that there was significant increase in the post-test scores in both general and sexual moral judgment; and that subjects over 25 also increased their scores, indicating that the structure of moral judgment does not crystallize after that age (p. 247). They concluded that at an adult age moral judgment can still undergo developmental change, that adulthood does not represent an insurmountable obstacle to the development of moral judgment (p. 255); and that progress in moral judgment made by the adults who participated in the study was not only caused by the pedagogical strategy used during the course but by the subject matter, sexuality (p. 256).



Pratt, Golding and Hunter (1983) hypothesized that with maturity, moral judgments would become more organized and consistent over the life span (p. 277). The results showed few differences in average stage level or orientation among three age groups (18-24, 30-50, 60-75). However, consistency between moral stage produced and those preferred by the subjects increased markedly with age, as did the consistency of moral orientation usage (p. 277). The oldest sample in the study exhibited a greater organization in their moral thinking. Moral stage level, was more congruent, stage level judgments were more upwardly consolidated. A more reflective pattern of consistent adherence to, and application of, either a fairness or utilitarian moral orientation was suggested by this group (p. 286).

Implications for adult education. Can moral behavior be taught through cognitive means? The response to that question turns on whether or not one believes, as Kohlberg does, that there is consistency between moral judgment at a given level and behavior. The assumption that ". . . when the changes in a person's cognitive functioning are towards greater accuracy and comprehension, then his or her moral behavior can be expected to be an improvement on what has occurred before" (McNaughton, p. 331). All that is required is the correct kind of teaching. Piaget's research suggests that discussions about contrasting perceptions can have an effect on behavior (p. 331).

Kohlberg (1970) rejects much of the traditional view of moral education. He rejects the "bag of virtues" (values inculcation) concept of moral education on the grounds, first, that there is no such thing and second, that if there were they couldn't be taught, or at least, we



don't know how or who could teach them (p. 69). He also rejects, as misleading (p. 231), the notion that moral decision ". . . involves a conscious conflict between two lines of action and a strong emotional component" (1971, p. 226). These views were rejected by Kohlberg in favor of a view that moral judgment dispositions influence action through being stable cognitive dispositions (p. 230); and appealing to moral principle, ". . . a mode of choosing which is universal, a rule of choosing which we want all people to adopt always in all situations; justice" (1970, pp. 69-70). Moral education, then, is to teach virtue. He suggest two steps: a) ". . . creating dissatisfaction in the student about his present knowledge of the good" and b) exposing the student to ". . . disagreement and argument about these situations with his peers." These steps are based on the belief that the way to the next step the developmental ladder will be opened if cognitive conflict is inspired in the student (p. 82).

The goal of such education is moral development, and the vehicle is to provide the elements ". . . for intellectual and moral stage development which are found in any stimulating environment . . ." (1977, p. 183). This requires the extension of classroom discussion of justice to real life, and to deal with issues of justice in the school (1980a, p. 87). This requires: a) the enhancement of participation and role-taking opportunities and b) participation in the structure and decisions of the school itself (pp. 87-88).

These two strands of Kohlberg's educational work have been summarized by Hersch, Paolitto and Reimer (1979) as follows;

- (1) incorporating within the classroom curriculum a concern for the discussion of moral issues and the stimulation of moral growth, and
- (2) restructuring the school environment to allow for greater democratic participation by students in

don't know how or who could reach them (p. 22). He also suggests, as misleading (p. 23), the notion that moral decisions "... involve a conscious conflict between two lines of action and a strong emotional component" (1971, p. 128). These views were repeated by Kohlberg in

... of a view that moral judgments are based on  
 through being able to solve dilemmas (p. 230); and appealing to  
 moral "rightness" ... is universal, a rule of  
 consistency ...

... of the moral development ...

the school's governing process. Underlying these efforts are two assumptions central to Kohlberg's philosophy of education: (1) schooling inevitably involves the transmission of values; and (2) the aim of education ought to be the development of students' inherent capacities (p. 107).

~~Stage is a better stage and higher stage is reached through~~  
~~experience~~ **Reactions to Kohlberg's approach.** Others contend that cognitive

analysis alone is not enough. Wallen points out that ". . . what is needed are methods combining affective reaction and cognitive analysis"

(p. 330). He asserts that ". . . when we are dealing with morality we are . . . dealing with behavior that is largely emotional" (p. 329).

Kohlberg sees moral education in terms of the total environment and role models in which moral issues are resolved by: a) accepting strong emotional reactions; b) examining the real dynamics of conflict; and c) seeking the most humane solutions (p. 331).

Sebes and Ford (1984) outline six issues that they see as important in the design of effective moral education intervention programs.

First, although some of these programs attempt to view the child's total functioning, most fall short of an integrated approach to the multiple facets of moral development and behavior. This criticism includes the conspicuous absence of references to moral behavior.

A second issue in program design is the failure of most if not all of the currently used intervention programs to view moral reasoning and behavior from a truly developmental frame work.

A third set of program design issues addresses the need to evaluate programs in terms of outcomes, processes, and relationships to the problems they address.

A fourth issue is generalizability from the training context to other contexts. The situation-specific characteristics of moral reasoning and behavior suggested by the literature requires consideration of this issue.

A fifth issue involves the educational or training methods used.





Somewhat related to the fifth issue is the availability of the programs (p. 380).

Kohlberg (1977) claims that his conception of the principled moral judgment stages helps define an aim of adult education because a higher stage is a better stage and because stage movement occurs through experience, not through pure maturation (1977, p. 196). He has also suggested that moral development is promoted by the cognitive reorganizations that occur when the moral conflicts of naturalistic social interactions are discussed openly, that is, the vehicle for cognitive development is cognitive disequilibrium (Haan, Smith and Block 1968, p. 197).

Kohlberg, citing Dewey, conceives of moral education in terms of growth. Education is, in Kohlberg's mind, ". . . supplying the conditions for intellectual and moral stage development which are found in any stimulating environment" (Kohlberg 1977, p. 183). Kohlberg writes

. . . we have not instructed in values but have tried to bring to the school those elements which research indicates stimulate development in the non-school environment, in the family, the peer group, the church. Insofar as we "instruct" we have gone back to the pedagogy of the first great moral educator, Socrates. In our approach the teacher uses Socratic questioning to establish a classroom dialogue among students with conflicting views about moral choices in dilemmas, real and hypothetical. More importantly in bringing the conditions for development into the school we have followed Dewey's lead and helped establish a school government based on participatory democracy . . . (pp. 183-184).

Application of Kohlberg's view. Kohlberg's conceptualization of moral development has been applied in the area of moral education. The kind of classroom experience and the elements necessary for a successful moral education experience have been the subjects of much research.



Kohlberg and Selman found a recognized moral dilemma, a discussion leader to keep the focus on moral reasoning, a classroom environment conducive to free expression of individual reasoning as necessary ingredients for a successful moral education experience (Goldbecker 1976, p. 16-17). Also necessary is a knowledge of the stage of moral development the learners are functioning, and exposure to reasoning one stage above their own.

Additional research on the dilemma discussion approach has been done. Galbraith and Jones developed a discussion-oriented teaching plan applying Kohlberg's theory (1976); and Selman and Lieberman (1974) tested a media approach to see if a sound filmstrip and discussion could bring about significant change in moral levels (Goldecker 1976, p. 17). Further research has been done by Coombs, Coombs and Meux, and Chadwich and Meux. In their research they found that the values analysis steps of identifying a value, examining the facts about it, and then applying it to a life situation, resulted in greater understanding and group discussion, as well as greater student motivation and enthusiasm (pp.17-18).

However, John Houston (1984) conducted a study to determine if moral behavior, as well as moral thought, can be affected by discussion of Kohlberg-type moral dilemmas. Cheating behavior was reduced when related dilemmas were discussed and free-recall test was immediate, suggesting that Kohlberg is correct in suggesting that moral behavior, as well as thought, can sometimes be taught. But when discussion was unrelated to cheating, or the recall test was delayed, no behavioral effect appeared (p. 196). Houston concludes that ". . . even though moral instruction may affect the level of moral thought, and that the



altered level of moral thinking may sometimes affect behavior, there are times when moral thought may be affected but behavior is unchanged" (p. 202).

### Non-Kohlberg Approaches To Moral Education

Others have approached the issue of moral education. Several different views are presented here.

Values inculcation. Values inculcation views moral education as the instillation and internalization of certain desired values into students and is represented by Donald Superka. Values are the standards or rules of behavior established by a society or culture, and the process of acquiring values is that of identifying with a person, group or society (Superka, p. 79). Teaching methods include modeling, positive and negative reinforcement, explanation and manipulation.

The explicit teaching of specific values is probably the most traditional type of moral instruction (Coursen 1976 p. 17). This is the "bag of virtues" approach to which Kohlberg so violently objects (1970, p. 59). Kohlberg writes

. . . Aristotle's original bag included temperance, liberality, pride, good temper truthfulness and justice. The Boy Scout bag is well known, a scout should be honest, loyal reverent clean and brave.

Given a bag of virtues, it is evident how we build character. Children should be exhorted to practice these virtues, should be told that happiness, fortune and good repute will follow in their wake; adults around them should be living examples of these virtues; and children should be given daily opportunities to practice them (pp. 59-60).

Kohlberg rejects this notion on the basis of the research that fails to provide any positive evidence as to the effects of character-building programs, and concludes that ". . . it is hardly surprising that this



approach to moral education doesn't work" (p. 60).

Human action approach. Gauthier (1971) argues that there are three clearly distinguishable aspects of conscious moral behavior. The first stage in his conception of the development of moral behavior is the acquisition of certain dispositions to actions, virtues and vices, that comprise moral character and are acquired by the child before he is able to recognize their moral significance (p. 141). The second stage is that of formulating a policy of action (p. 143) based on reflective awareness of their goals and on treating others as objects of concern (p. 144). The third and final stage is moral awareness which involves an appreciation of what one is doing and a responsiveness to those with whom one is interacting in terms of their aims and claims (p. 141), and bringing this moral sensitivity to bear on all those areas affected by one's actions (p. 145).

At this point Gauthier discusses his view of moral education in which the moral educator should focus on what human actions cause, not the causes of human actions (p. 145). He sees belief/behavior discrepancies as the result of poor moral education.

It is not an inculcation of moral precepts or a teaching of moral attitudes. This Sunday-School approach produces Sunday-School results: people who mouth the appropriate platitudes on demand but who go about their weekday affairs without a moment's concern for the implications of their actions. Moral education involves simply showing people what they are really doing. And it is aimed, not at those who lack practical wisdom or moral virtue but at those who, possessing these characteristics, nevertheless fail to do as they ought because "they do not know what they do." Moral education is not preaching; it is muckraking (p. 146).





Values clarification. In addition to the work done by Rath and Simon in the area of values clarification, Peck and Havighurst (1960) described, in a study carried out in a midwestern town, how values are learned by examining those attitudes rather than actual content. Bull did research into the relationship between the four key variables of socio-economic background, religion, sex and intelligence and the learning of values. He discovered that socio-economic class was the most significant variable and religion the least (1969). The Harvard Social Studies Project dealt with three basic elements of values clarification: a) public controversy; b) clarification of one's view; and c) the discussion process. It was determined from this study that discussion of such conflicts could provide a basis for a type of moral education (Purpel and Ryan 1976, p. 257).

Values clarification involves: a) prizing one's beliefs by both cherishing and publicly affirming them; b) choosing ones beliefs freely from alternatives and after consideration of the consequences; and c) acting on those beliefs with a pattern, consistency and repetition (Hersch, Paolitto and Reimer 1979, p. 9-10). The purpose of the process is to help a person determine how strongly he or she holds a particular value without teaching a particular value position (pp. 9-10). Instead of a "bag of virtues" the student is taught a valuing process by which to determine what he really values (Goldbecker 1976, p. 11).

This strategy is criticized on the basis that since it is based on the values of its creators it is not really value free. The strategy was also criticized on the basis that it focuses on the content of values and the process of valuing but ignores the structure of valuing (Goldbecker 1976, p. 15). Others have criticized it because it fails to



help students cope with values conflicts (Hersch, Paolitto and Reimer 1979, p. 10). Alan Lockwood has criticized this approach on three grounds: a) the definition and theory; b) the characterization of values clarification as a treatment process much like client-centered therapy that treats emotional needs rather than value needs and; c) the tendency of values clarification to teach ethical relativism to children by presenting all values as equally valid (Goldbecker 1976, p. 15).

Conscientization. Freire is directly concerned with conscientization, the relationship between people and the reality of people in that world that involves reflection and action: the development of humane values (Mackie 1981, p. 58). He asserts a methodology of praxis (action-reflection-action) as a way to change both attitudes and behavior. The effectiveness of such an educational approach is documented by Freire in the context of his work with literacy (Freire, 1977). While praxis has not been subjected to empirical research, it has been extensively used in the field and has demonstrated its power to impact attitude and behavior.

Freire (1970) points out that there are two modes of education: banking education, which mirrors the oppressive society, in which ". . . education becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor . . ." (p. 64); and liberation education, which is the ". . . process of humanization . . . not another deposit to be made in men . . . the action of reflection of men upon their world in order to transform it" (p. 66). Liberation education does not dichotomize the activity of the teacher-student, but sees all those in the learning environment as both teachers and



learners.

For Freire the essence of education is dialogical: a) its program content arises from the concrete relation of men and women with the world; b) the starting point is the investigation of generative themes; and c) its purposes is the awakening of critical consciousness: conscientization (Monette 1979, p. 551). Conscientization is the critical thinking by which men discover each other to be "in a situation," the emergence from their submersion in that situation and the ability to intervene in the reality as it is unveiled (p. 101). This intervention in reality is a step forward from emergence and results from the conscientization of the situation so that conscientization is the deepening of the attitude of awareness characteristic of all emergence (Freire 1970, p. 101). A key issue in conscientization is the concept of reality. Conscientization involves both the emergence of the awareness of reality and intervention into that reality.

The method of conscientization is praxis. At the core of praxis are two alternating, cyclic steps of "reflection" on reality and "action" in response to that reality (p. 75). It is at once the means of conscientization and the result of conscientization. The purpose is to transform the reality of the world. The vehicle of praxis is the "culture circle" in which the participants attempt through group debate to either "clarify" (reflect) or to seek action arising from that clarification (Freire 1973, p. 42). Real praxis must avoid the danger of a dichotomy between action and reflection. Sacrificing action leaves only idle chatter while sacrificing reflection leaves only activism (Freire 1970, p. 76). Nor can praxis tolerate an absurd dichotomy in



which praxis of the people is merely the following of a leaders decision (p. 76).

Education for moral action. This approach to moral education is based on "interpersonal morality" and was developed by Dr. Norma Haan (Shields 1980, p. 129). Haan asserts that ". . . reality is something which we socially construct and this truth is dependent upon consent and practical usefulness (Shields 1980, p. 129). Since moral truth

. . . must be constructed rather than deduced from pre-existing principles the central structure of interpersonal morality is moral dialogue . . . through . . . (which) . . . we enter into those mutual obligations and agreements with one another which are the basis for all moral "duties" (Shields 1980. p. 130).

Three concepts make up her approach: a) moral dialogue through which people reach common agreement with regard to mutual obligations; b) moral balance which is achieved when ". . . two or more people . . . are in common agreement that each party has done, is doing or will do for the other what is mutually agreed upon as desirable for all;" and c) moral truth which is the ". . . pragmatic concensus that discussion reaches . . . about a satisfactory course that all can take so participants can live together and enhance each other's lives" (pp. 130-131).

An educational methodology based on this approach would be based on the type of experience which will most directly facilitate moral growth and can be characterized by the following features: a) it is interpersonal; b) it demands interdependence; and c) it demands negotiation (pp. 140-141). This strategy is based on the assumption that moral education has to do with process, not with content. The use this educational methodology would not replace one curriculum with





another but would provide a form by which the content of moral instruction could be made more effective for moral growth (p. 141).

Laboratory of Christian living. Lee (1985) sets forth the optimal set of conditions for learning "Christian lifestyle." He calls this type of learning a laboratory and sees it as being made up of at least seven major elements that are not wholly discrete but overlap to some degree. This laboratory: a) features concrete here-and-now performance; b) necessarily involves first-hand experience; c) requires for its enactment the holistic integration of all the major domains of human functioning; d) is typified by controlled conditions; e) involves experimentation; f) includes ongoing performance-based validation of Christian lifestyle activities and behaviors; and g) inevitably intertwines theory and practice in a mutually expansive and corrective fashion (pp. 619-613).

The literature reviewed above provides a background for the specific research that follows. Its purpose is to shed light on the complex issues surrounding the relationship of belief and behavior in the lives of adults. The same concerns also define its breadth and depth.



### Chapter 3: Study Procedure

St. Francis of Assisi wrote, "A person has as much knowledge as he lives out" (Lee 1985, p. 613).

#### Introduction

While much can be learned about belief/behavior discrepancies from a review of the pertinent literature, it is not possible to completely resolve this study's research questions from such a review. This section describes the procedures that were used to generate answers to those questions. It includes an examination of the population under consideration, sampling procedures and the data collection methods.

#### Overview of Methodology

A sample of 35 adults who were involved in religious or non-religious adult education programs were interviewed concerning their awareness of discrepancies between their belief system and their behavior, the relative importance of that awareness to their lives, its motivational character and the strategies they use to resolve those discrepancies. The sample was divided into 4 groups.



### Population

In the last two decades a tremendous shift in the educational needs and desires of our nation has occurred. The rapid demographic, economic and social changes that have challenged our society have created a tremendous demand for adult education.

Today, there is a crucial need for lifelong learning. More and more people, many well beyond traditional college age, are seeking opportunities for continuing education to expand their intellectual horizons, to develop a better understanding of society and its institutions, and to gain new knowledge to enable them to cope with rapid change. Others, confronted by the growing complexity of technology, seek re-training to upgrade their skills or prepare for entirely new careers. Groups and individuals pressing for new options in society—blacks, women, the poor—look increasingly to education as their only door to greater opportunity and fulfillment. And many young people who drifted through or dropped out of high school are perceiving their action as a mistake and see education as a crucial second chance to gain much-needed skills.

These people—from all socioeconomic levels and all ages—are turning to continuing education agencies for lifelong learning opportunities. This trend will continue . . . (Boyle 1981, p. 3).

The adults who seek continuing education represent a significant new element in our society. Coming to understand the belief/behavior discrepancies they face and the ways they resolve them is the challenge of this study. The specific population for this study are those adults involved in Christian or secular (non-religious) adult education programs within an accessible geographic area.

### Sample

The sample was made up of participants from four programs; two Christian and two secular. The adult education programs of two local churches were selected to serve as the religious portion of the sample. The secular portion of the sample was drawn from two local adult and



continuing education programs. From this population thirty-five adults were randomly selected to serve as the sample. Twenty were drawn from two different Christian adult education programs and fifteen were drawn from two secular adult education programs.<sup>1</sup>

### Belief Base

One of the concerns of this study is to determine if any differences exist between those adults who claim a Christian base for their belief systems and those who don't when they deal with belief/behavior discrepancies. Identifying the base or source of an individual's belief system is a crucial part of the study. For the purposes of this study the source of belief systems can be thought of in three categories: a) a particular religious belief system; b) non-religious sources, both internal and external to the individual; and c) religious belief systems other than category (a). These three categories represent three potential sub-samples.

In this study Christianity, represents category (a), a particular religious belief system (sub-sample "A"). While recognizing the diversity that exists within Christianity, no effort will be made to distinguish between different kinds of Christian belief systems. Twenty of the 35 subjects claimed a Christian base for their belief system and participated in church sponsored adult education programs. The other 15 subjects held a non-religious base for their belief system

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<sup>1</sup>Ideally twenty subjects would have participated in both the Christian and the non-religious portions of the sample. All those participating in the adult education programs of both secular institution were contacted. The smaller size of the non-religious group was due to the sample screening procedures and the unwillingness or inability of some potentially eligible subjects to participate.





(sub-sample "B"). These 15 individuals claimed a non-religious base for their belief system and participated in secular adult education programs were selected to complete the 35 person sample.

Those in category (c), who cited a non-Christian religious base for their belief system (i.e., Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, Mormonism etc.), were eliminated from the study. This procedure allows others to replicate the study and focus on non-Christian religions. It also eliminates potential confounding elements. Those claiming a Christian and non-Christian religious belief base may share perspectives that are common to religious belief. The presence, in the sample, of those claiming a non-Christian religious belief base would have made it much more difficult to identify differences that may exist between those who identify a Christian base for their belief system and those who don't.

#### Sample Selection Procedures

Selection of the sample required several steps. First, those responsible for administering two Christian and two secular adult education programs were identified, contacted and agreed to assist in the study. These individuals provided lists of those who participated in their respective programs, endorsed the study and communicated with their participants. From the lists of participants, members of the sample were drawn using a table of random numbers (Borg and Gall 1983, pp. 651, 905-907). Each person selected in this manner was contacted, invited to participate and screened as to the source of their belief system.

The researcher participated in the identification and selection of the programs from which the samples were drawn. He did not randomly



select, contact, invite to participate, screen as to source of belief, or set up appointments for the interviews, with members of the sample. Those duties were handled by a trained research assistant. This procedure reduced the possibility that the researcher would have knowledge of an individual's source of belief system. Using the procedure helped eliminate researcher bias and the possibility that leading interviews, in support that bias, would be conducted (see Appendix A).

#### Sample Screening Procedures

Of particular concern to this study was screening participants based on their stated source of belief system. The twenty adults in sub-sample "A" were selected because they identified Christianity as the basis of their belief system. In the process of selecting the sample each person was asked to state the source of their belief system. If the individual was unable to respond, or did not understand the question, he or she was asked a follow-up question, "Do you believe what you do because you are a Christian, a Jew, a Moslem, a Buddhist, or belong to another religious group?" Those asserting a religious base were asked to identify their specific religious group. Individuals indicating a Christian base for their beliefs were eligible for the study.

The fifteen adults in sub-sample "B" were selected because they identified a non-religious basis for their belief system. The procedure described above was followed. Those asserting a non-Christian religious belief base were ineligible for the study. If they asserted a Christian belief base, they were asked, "Would you say that your present belief

select, contact, invite to participate, agree as to source of belief, or set up appointments for the interview, with members of the sample. These duties were handled by a trained research assistant. This procedure reduced the possibility that the researcher would have knowledge of an individual's source of belief system. Using the

procedure helped eliminate researcher bias and the possibility that

leading interview questions would be asked (the

Appendix

system is directly based on Christian teaching?". If they contended that their belief system had no religious base, or was not presently based on previous Christian teaching, they were eligible for the study. In both cases, the source of the individual's belief system was recorded and used in the data analysis.

Once potential participants were randomly selected they were contacted by mail. This mailing included the statement of purposes, procedures, requirements of the study and their rights as stated in the "Explanatory Letter/Consent Form" (see Appendix B). A letter of endorsement from the administrator of the adult education program in which they participated and a letter from the researcher explaining the procedure were also included in this mailing. Following this contact, those with telephones were called, by the research assistant, and screened as to the source of their beliefs, as described above. If the individual was eligible for the study and agreed to participate, an interview was scheduled.

Those potential participants that could not be screened by telephone were mailed, in addition to the items mentioned above, a note explaining their selection as a potential participant in the study and how to contact the research assistant by telephone or mail. In addition a response card and a stamped, addressed envelope were enclosed. If they chose to contact the research assistant by telephone, then the procedure explained above was followed. They could also respond by completing following response card shown in Figure 1.



Name \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ I have read and understood the information sent and am unwilling to participate in the study. (Please return but do not complete the rest of the card.)

\_\_\_\_\_ I have read and understood the information sent and wish to participate in the study. (Please complete the rest of the card and return.)

Check One:

- \_\_\_\_\_ I would say that the basis of my beliefs is Christianity  
 \_\_\_\_\_ I would say that the basis of my beliefs is religious other than Christianity.  
 \_\_\_\_\_ I would say that the basis of my beliefs is non-religious.

The best time for me to meet for an interview is \_\_\_\_\_.

Figure 1—Subject Response Form

### Data Collection

Uncovering the awareness of belief/behavior discrepancies, its motivational impact, the ways adults evaluate their importance and resolve them requires methodology suited to the task. While many potential approaches exist, the investigative method of the open interview seemed to hold the most promise. It allowed the researcher the opportunity to discover what was "reality" for the subjects, rather than impose his view of reality and then test to see if the researchers view matched the subject's. While the open interview has limitations, it was believed to have more advantages and far fewer disadvantages than the survey, testing or other methods that could have been used.

### Interview: Phase I

All members of the sample participated in an initial interview in two parts. The first part of the initial interview (Phase I) served as a "get acquainted" time as well as a time to collect demographic

\_\_\_\_\_ I have read and understood the information sent and wish to  
 to participate in the study. (Please return this card separate the rest  
 of the card.)

\_\_\_\_\_ I have read and understood the information sent and wish to  
 participate in the study. (Please complete the rest of the card and  
 return.)

Check One:

\_\_\_\_\_ I would be interested in participating in the study.  
 \_\_\_\_\_ I would like to participate in the study.  
 \_\_\_\_\_ I would like to participate in the study.



information (name, age, sex, address, phone number, educational level, marital status and occupation). The information was gathered verbally and recorded on a card by the researcher. At this point in the interview the subject was given a copy of an explanatory letter, detailing the purpose and requirements of the study, was asked to read it, and was given an opportunity to ask questions about the study. Once any questions had been satisfactorily answered the subjects were asked to sign the consent portion of the form indicating their willingness to participate in the study. This explanatory letter constituted the subjects informed consent.

#### Interview: Phase II

The second part of the initial interview (Phase 2) examined the study's research questions. After the data from this initial interview were analyzed a second follow-up interview was scheduled with some members of the sample to probe and further examine the issues surfaced in the first interview.

Open questions were used in the second part of the interview. Payne (1979) describes at length the types and uses of open questions. For the purposes of this interview the questions, within a given area of investigation, followed the basic format of moving from general to specific. The interview began with an "opener" question to elicit non-directed, unstructured replies which were intended to provide the background for interpreting the more detailed and specific questions that would be asked later in the interview. Further elaboration was gained by asking "follow-up" and "reason-why" questions. Subjects were then asked "probes" designed to obtain additional respondent insights,



even though they are not stated initially (p. 34 ff).

The advantages and disadvantages of open questions are also detailed by Payne (1979). Free-answer questions elicit uninfluenced answers, a wide variety of responses, serve as a good introduction to a subject, and provide needed background information for interpreting other questions. They can also be used to obtain elaborations, to elicit reasons, explore knowledge and classify respondents. Free-answer questions also aid in the development of questions for the follow-up interview and are clearly indicated as a preliminary step to preparing questions on any unexplored issue. The method does have some disadvantages. These include: the difficulty of obtaining uniformity in the answers and the way they are recorded; respondents neglect to state their most pertinent observations simply because they are obvious; few people use the same words even when expressing the same idea; and other problems which are specifically related to coding (pp. 49-54). Despite these disadvantages, the use of open questions and the open interview technique seemed to be the most viable option for this study.

Using the basic methodology described by Payne, the second part of the initial interview (Phase 2) was conducted in two distinct parts. Part "A" endeavored to generate data concerning the contexts in which adults become aware of belief/behavior discrepancies and the criteria by which adults evaluate the importance of a given area of discrepancy, that is, the first two research questions.

Interview procedure: phase II "A". Several distinct and important steps were taken in this part of the interview.



Step 1

The "opener" used in this interview was the following brief story. It was read to each member of the sample as a starting place, a framework of common understanding between the researcher and the individual being sampled.

John has always placed a high value on honesty and his personal integrity. He's been very open with his family, partners and employees that he believes in honesty above all else in word and action. However, in the last several years his business has run into financial difficulty and John fears that it may fail. He has begun to use business tactics that are less than honest and low risk ways to cheat on his taxes. His partners, employees and family can see that he is going against his own beliefs but John insists he's doing nothing wrong. One day he comes home and announces to his wife that he realizes he's been dishonest.

Step 2:

Following the presentation of this story the subjects were asked, "Can you tell me about a person you know whose experience would fit this story?"

Step 3:

After the subject has related a story about another person's experience with belief/behavior discrepancies they were asked, "Have you ever found yourself thinking about things this way? Can you tell me about it?" After the subject related an account of their experience with belief/behavior discrepancies they were asked to think of another. This process was repeated until each participant shared a maximum of five such stories, or until they could think of no other incidents. The stories were summarized by the researcher on cards that indicated the belief, the contradictory behavior and how the subject became aware of the discrepancies.



Step 4:

After these incidents were related and recorded, the summarization cards were returned to the participants who were asked to prioritize them from the most important to the least important. When they had completed this task the cards were returned to the researcher and the subjects were asked to explain the reasons for the placement of each card relative to the others. Each incident was discussed using "follow-up" questions until the subject could shed no further light on his or her thinking.

Interview procedure: phase II "B". Part "B" of this phase of the initial interview was designed to generate information concerning the end toward which the awareness of belief/behavior discrepancies motivate adults and how they seek to resolve them (research questions 3 and 4). The approach was to present each participant with a set of 15 cards, each describing a different belief/behavior discrepancy situation. The subjects were asked to sort the discrepancy situations into three possible resolution strategies. They were asked to determine if the person described in that situation should: a) change his or her behavior; b) do nothing; or c) change his or her belief.

The 15 belief/behavior discrepancy situations were made up of three situations in each of five different classes of belief as identified by Rokeach (1969, pp. 6-11). He cites "Primitive Beliefs, 100% Consensus" as the most central of those beliefs. "Primitive Beliefs" of this sort are learned by direct encounter with the object of belief. These beliefs are of an axiomatic, taken-for-granted character and represent





the "basic truths" of a person's belief system (p. 6). Next he cites "Primitive Beliefs, 0% Consensus" as those beliefs that are learned by direct encounter with the object of belief. They are held by faith and neither shared with anyone else nor dependent on what others think.

(pp.8-9). The third class of beliefs are "Authority Beliefs" concerning those persons or groups the individual sees as an authority figure to be followed and trusted. "Derived Beliefs" are the fourth class and concern those beliefs that emanate from a credible authority (p. 10). Finally, Rokeach identifies "Inconsequential Beliefs" as those beliefs that represent more or less arbitrary matters of taste (p. 11).

In studying beliefs, Rokeach developed a "Belief Inventory" (1969 pp. 26-29) in which he created 11 different examples of beliefs for each category. These beliefs were designed to exemplify one and only one of the five belief types (p. 25). The "Belief Inventory" and the specific items were used as guides in developing the 15 belief/behavior discrepancy situations, and in some cases, items from the "Belief Inventory" were utilized more directly as the "belief" portion of the belief/behavior discrepancy situation. The validity of these vignettes was determined by expert consultation who attested to the fact that they were representative of Rokeach's scheme. The 15 situations used in this study were as follows.

#### A. Primitive Beliefs, 100% Consensus

1. When James turned 50 he began to feel old. Shortly after his fiftieth birthday he was asked his age and he said 45. Since then he gives his age as being five years younger than he actually is.
2. Juan was born into a Cuban immigrant family. He feels embarrassed by his parents' heavily accented English, Cuban customs and traditions. He denies his ethnic background, refuses to participate in specifically ethnic cultural traditions and desires to change his to one that is more "American". Juan insists that he is an American not a Cuban.



3. While visiting relatives out of town Jane became a "born again" Christian. However, since she returned home she hasn't talked about that experience with her co-workers or friends. While she thinks of herself as a Christian, she refuses to state her faith even when asked, and hides that fact from others.

#### B. Primitive Beliefs, 0% Consensus

1. Sally loves her mother and believes her mother has her best interests at heart. But sometimes she gets so angry with her mother that she feels like she would like to kill her. Sally feels such strong hatred at these times that she completely ignores her mother, or argues violently with her mother.

2. Sam believes there is a God. In fact, he is very open about that belief. However, when a co-worker invited him to attend church with him Sam, flatly refused. Despite his stated belief, Sam never engages in any acts of worship.

3. Sarah's parents believe she is a trustworthy and responsible 16 year old. But they consistently refuses to allow her privileges that would require that they really trust her. Sarah has often complained that her parents don't really trust her, even though they say they do.

#### C. Authority Beliefs

1. Rachel believes that Christ is the Son of God and that his teachings ought to be obeyed. However, when asked to contribute money to help provide for the needs of the poor, she refused to make any contribution. She complains and resents being asked to share with them.

2. Roy believes and has taught his children to believe that people who occupy places of authority should be respected and obeyed. However, he strongly dislikes and disagrees with his new foreman at work. Roy complains about the foreman to his co-workers, purposefully disregards his instructions, and challenges him at every opportunity.

3. Robin is a devout Roman Catholic and believes in the infallibility of the Pope. However, she advocates the right of women to have abortions, and the use of artificial contraceptives.

#### D. Derived Beliefs

1. Ben believes that The Ten Commandments are of divine origin and ought to be followed. But when confronted by his boss with a serious mistake he made at work, he denied any knowledge or responsibility, and blamed a co-worker. He also has taken tools and other supplies from the shop and has not returned them.



2. Bob, a black ACLU lawyer, strongly believes in the constitution and right of freedom of speech. However, when he became aware of the Klu Klux Klan's intention to hold a rally in his neighborhood park, he threw all of his efforts into stopping the rally.

3. Barbara is a physician and cancer specialist who has read and believes the Surgeon General's report on the health risks associated with smoking tobacco. However, she has been a heavy smoker since high school, and continues to smoke, despite the fact that she truly believes her health is a risk.

#### E. Inconsequential Beliefs

1. Tom, a professional athlete, believes that superstitions are silly and makes fun of others who avoid black cats, won't walk under ladders, or step on a crack in the sidewalk. However, each time he competes he wears, under his uniform, the shirt he was wearing when his high school team won the state championship.

2. Terry believes in being safe and taking every precaution. She feels that wearing seat belts in the car is an important safety precaution and insists that those riding with her wear their belts. However, she feels "closed in" and uncomfortable when she wears them. So she never wears a seat belt herself.

3. Tyler believes that church attendance is an important part of life. He insists that his children attend and makes sure that they are in church each Sunday. However, he rarely attends.

The cards were color coded and numbered so the researcher to readily identify the way each type of belief and each specific belief/behavior item were sorted by each participant. The cards were kept as they were sorted by the participants so that the placement of each specific item could be recorded and analyzed.

#### Step 1:

Each participant was given the set of belief/behavior discrepancy cards and asked to sort them into three groups: those they felt should change behavior; those they felt should do nothing, and those they felt should change belief. Each participant was allowed sufficient time to complete this task.



Step 2:

After the participant had sorted the 15 belief/behavior discrepancy situation cards the researcher put a rubber band around each pile to insure that the cards were not mixed. The researcher then took the cards assigned to each set, and asked the participants to describe what it was about these situations that made him think they should be resolved in this manner. Subjects were ask to describe their attitudes toward all the situations assigned to a given discrepancy resolution strategy, as well as each individual situation. Their responses were probed by asking, "How did you decide which resolution was the right one for each situation?" and, "Why did you make that choice?"

Step 3:

In this step of the interview, each participant was asked to focus again on his or her personal belief/behavior discrepancy experiences, and was asked to describe "How do you make changes in belief?"; "How do you make changes in behavior?"; "What are the obstacles you face?"; "What do you find helpful when dealing with one of these situations?"; "What resources do you use, or have you used, to resolve belief/behavior discrepancies?"

Interviews were scheduled for one hour with a 30 minute minute break between interviews. That break was used to reduce the responses to writing on a prepared sheet which restated each question. This procedure enabled not only accurate recording of the responses but brought a certain uniformity to the data which proved very useful in the subsequent data analysis.





## Chapter 4: Data Analysis

"While there is no such thing as moral behavior as such, there is such a thing as behavior which is consistent with an individual's moral principles . . . " (Kohlberg 1971, p.228).

### Introduction

Data generated by this study can be organized into ten major areas. Within these areas the findings will be summarized for a) the total sample (ts), b) those claiming a Christian belief base (C), c) those claiming a non-religious belief base (nr) and d) a comparison of those two groups. A brief introduction and description of each area will precede each summary. Finally, the entire study will be summarized in light of the research questions of chapter 3.

### Demographic Information

Important demographic information including sex, age, level of education completed, level of education participated in, occupation and marital status was gathered.



Total Sample

The 35 individuals, 11 men and 24 women, ranged in age from 18 to 84 years, averaged 40 years with a median age of 35. All thirty five had completed high school (4 by GED), 20 had undergraduate college experience, 5 held bachelors degrees, 4 held master's degrees and one held a doctorate. Twenty-three of the subjects were married. Of the twelve single members of the sample 9 had never married, 2 were divorced and 1 was widowed. They were engaged in a variety of occupations including clerical (9), factory (5), teaching (5), retired (4), management (3), housewife (2), students (2), farming (2), minister's assistant, nursing (1), and child care (1).

The "typical" subject was a 40 years old, married, female with children who had completed high school, taken some college courses but not completed an undergraduate degree and was engaged in clerical work. The subjects were engaged in adult education as part of their religious commitment, for recreation or because their employer had recommended or required some study.

Christian Belief Base

The 9 male and 12 female subjects who claimed a Christian belief base ranged in age from 22 to 84 years, averaged 46 years with a median age of 48. All 20 had completed high school, 4 by GED, 9 had participated in college, 2 held bachelors degrees, 3 held masters degrees and 1 an earned doctorate. Fifteen of the subjects were married, 3 were single and had never married, 1 was divorced and one was widowed. Five were engaged in factory work, 4 were retired, 3 were teaching, 2 were housewives. A nurse, a supervisor, a secretary, a



minister's assistant and a child care giver rounded out the sample.

These participants were drawn from two local church education programs. Both were protestant churches with active education programs and congregations of approximately 200. One of the churches was of a traditional, mainline, liberal, protestant denomination numbering many upper-middle class families in the congregation. All ten subjects drawn from this congregation had graduated from high school; four had attended college but not graduated, two held bachelors degrees, three held masters degrees and one had an earned doctorate. They ranged in age from 35 to 84 years, average age was 59, and the median age was 59. Nine were engaged in or retire from professions. One was a housewife.

The other church education program drawn was a conservative, pentecostal denomination with a primarily "blue-collar" congregation. All ten subjects had completed high school, six had graduated and 4 had received high school equivalency certificates. None had graduated from college but four had attended. They ranged in age from 22 to 67 years, average age was 37, with a median age of 30. Six of the subjects were engaged in factory work, 1 was a housewife, 1 a supervisor, 1 a secretary and 1 involved in child care. As a group these subjects had received less formal education, were younger, and less affluent than their mainline counter-parts.

#### Non-Religious Belief Base

The 15 subjects drawn from the non-religious education programs all claimed a non-religious base for their beliefs. Thirteen female and 2 male subjects ranged in age from 18 to 52, averaged 30 years with a median age of 29. All had completed high school, 3 had bachelor's



degrees and 1 a master's degree. Eight were married, 6 had never married and 1 was divorced. Eight were engaged in clerical work, 2 were students, 2 were in supervision, 2 farmed and 1 taught. While these subjects were drawn from two different institutions the programs were remarkably similar. However, these subjects were involved for a variety of reasons. Some were recreational students, others had taken courses recommended or required by their employers and others were launching a first or second career.

### Comparisons and Comments

The two groups that made up the sample were different at a number of points. Taken as a whole the non-religious group was younger, predominantly female, equally single and married, with less occupational diversity. Those claiming a Christian belief base were older, equally male and female, predominantly married and had a greater occupational diversity, both in the number and in the range of occupations. They were similar to their non-religious counter-parts in their level of formal education and the predominance of "white collar" service oriented occupations.

### Belief-Behavior Discrepancy Awareness

The interview continued with reading a short story describing a particular belief-behavior discrepancy situation (see ch. 3). The subjects were then asked if they had ever observed similar behavior in others, or if they had ever found themselves thinking about things in this way. Each subject was encouraged to share a maximum of five specific examples which were recorded on cards. Then they were asked to





order them from most to least important and finally to explain their reasoning. From this portion of the interview five important pieces of information were generated: first, the level of general awareness of belief-behavior discrepancies was determined; second, the level of that awareness for self and others was determined; third, the type of discrepancies was determined; fourth, the relative significance placed by the subjects on discrepancies personally experienced or observed in others was determined; and finally, the values used to evaluate the significance of these discrepancies was determined.

#### Total Sample

These 35 subjects described 149 belief-behavior discrepancy situations: about 4 per subject. Discrepancies observed in others (97 or 65% of all discrepancies mentioned) outnumbered personally experienced discrepancies (52 or 35% of all discrepancies mentioned) by about a 2 to 1 ratio. Thirty-four of the subjects were able to identify at least 2 discrepancies, and subjects were not allowed to share more than 5. No personally experienced discrepancies were related by 11 subjects. While some of the subjects reported only those discrepancies observed in others none of the subjects reported only personally experienced discrepancies. Of the discrepancies described as "most significant" 13 (38%) subjects listed a personally experienced discrepancy, while 21 (62%) listed a discrepancy observed in another. These results are summarized in Table 1.

order that this book be least important and likely to explain their reasoning. From this position of the interactive line important factors of information were generated. Next, the level of general awareness of belief-behavior discrepancies was determined. The level of that awareness for self and others was determined. Third, the type of

discrepancies was determined; fourth, the relative significance placed

by the subjects on differences between belief-behavior discrepancies or observed in

others was determined. Fifth, the subjects were asked to indicate the

direction of the discrepancy and the direction of the discrepancy.

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Table 1--Relief/Behavior Discrepancy Awareness Examples (ts)

Response	Christian	Non-Religious	Total Sample
Examples of Discrepancies	81	68	149
Avg. No. of Discrepancies per subject	4	4.5	4.2
Personal discrepancy example			
most important	5 (36%)	8 (54%)	13 (38%)
least important	6 (32%)	4 (27%)	10 (29%)
Discrepancy observed in another			
most important	14 (64%)	7 (46%)	21 (62%)
least important	13 (68%)	11 (73%)	24 (71%)

These 149 discrepancy situations were categorized under 5 headings. Seventeen (11.5%) discrepancy situations involved "information" or "knowledge." In these situations the person actions were discrepant with what he or she knew (i.e. a person knows their budget but over spends on a shopping trip). A second type of discrepancy involved an expressed statement of "will or desire." Thirteen (8.7%) discrepancy situations, in which a person says one thing and does another were cited. Discrepancies involving various "religious conviction" were cited 47 (31%) times. "Moral Convictions" were involved in 40 (26.8%) discrepancy convictions. Finally 32 (21.5%) discrepancy situations involved "relationships".

This categorization emerged from the data gathered in the interviews. Certain types of discrepancies were repeated by the subjects. Organizing them around these discrepancy domains provides a basis for comparison and insight into the kinds of discrepancies of which people are aware. While this structure may not be exhaustive, it easily accommodates the discrepancy examples cited by these subjects.

It should be pointed out that in assigning specific situations to a given domain, the belief stated, not the behavior, was used as the



criterion. The same action, for example lying, could be a violation of what one knows, what one states as his intentions, of one's religious or moral convictions or of a relationship. In fact it could be a violation of all these at the same time. The subjects, however, viewed given actions as violations of given beliefs. Significance was seen not in the act of discrepancy itself, but what belief the subject saw as having been violated.

After the subjects had rated their discrepancy descriptions from "most" to "least significant" they were also asked to describe what criteria they used to make their decisions. Each subject was able to state one or more value that guided his or her evaluations. These criteria are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2—Discrepancy Evaluative Criteria (ts)

a. Impact on others	17 (38.6%)
b. Impact on self	8 (18.2%)
c. Impact on a relationship	6 (13.6%)
d. Impact on the church	4 (9.1%)
e. Subject values	4 (9.1%)
f. Lack of justification	2 (4.5%)
g. Level of knowledge	1 (2.3%)
h. Impact eternal life	1 (2.3%)
i. Church attendance	1 (2.3%)

It should be pointed out that the four most frequently mentioned evaluative criteria were "relational". All of them have to do with others, and make up 80% of all the values mentioned. The final five values are all more abstract, and are more principle or "virtue" oriented. This dominance of "relational" evaluative criteria over "principled" criteria is an important finding of the study. What makes a discrepancy more or less significant is its perceived impact on real people in real life and not its conformity to or violation of an



abstract principle. The significance can be measured in both the number of people impacted as well as the degree of impact on another.

#### Christian Belief Base

Those subjects claiming a Christian belief base cited 81 examples of belief-behavior discrepancies. Twenty-two (27%) of these were examples of personally experienced discrepancies. The other 59 (73%) were examples of discrepancies observed in others. The ratio between the two is approximately 3 to 1. Nineteen (95%) of the subjects were able to identify two to five examples. Of these, 11 (55%) listed examples dealing with self and with others. Among these, the number of personally experienced discrepancy examples ranged from 1 to 4 and averaged 2 per subject. Eight (40%) of the subjects cited only examples of discrepancy behavior in others. None of the subjects cited only personal examples.

An insight provided by this data is the relative importance individuals place on personally experienced belief-behavior discrepancies and those observed in others. Of the nineteen who were able to cite examples fourteen, (64%) listed a discrepancy they observed in another as the most important, and 5 (26%) listed a personal discrepancy as being most important. In that same group 13 (69%) listed a discrepancy by another as least important, and 6 (31%) listed a personal discrepancy as least important. Among those eleven subjects who listed examples of discrepancies in themselves and others, the distribution was more even. Six (54.5%) listed the discrepancy in others, and 5 (45.5%) listed a discrepancy in themselves as most important. Five saw a discrepancy in others and 6 saw a discrepancy in





themselves as least important (see Table 1).

In summary it could be said that only about half of these subjects are aware of and willing to recount personally experienced examples of belief-behavior discrepancy. If one is aware he is just as likely to regard it as most significant or least significant. The issue turns, as we will see in the next section, not so much on whether it is a personal discrepancy but on what value system is used to judge these discrepancies. However the the recognition and evaluation of personally experienced belief-behavior discrepancies is a significant issue that has a direct bearing on the belief-behavior discrepancy resolution process.

The 81 discrepancy situations described by those subjects who claimed a Christian belief base can be seen in the five categories previously discussed and are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3--Discrepancy Example Type (C)

a. Information/Knowledge:	9	(11.1%)
b. Expressed Will of Desire:	7	(8.6%)
c. Religious Conviction:	38	(47%)
d. Moral Conviction:	15	(18.5%)
e. Relationship:	12	(14.8%)

Almost half of the described discrepancy situations involved matters of religious conviction. The situations included such issues as: a) honesty (11); b) one's obligation to the church (9); c) abstinence from alcohol (3); and d) adultery (2). Other vices mentioned included swearing, gambling, working on Sunday, playing cards on Sunday, and failing to tithe, love others, pray, and read the Bible. Again, these issues were assigned to the "religious conviction" category because the subjects saw these acts as, in some way, violating one's

Therapeutic and prophylactic use of the

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religious commitment.

The second most frequently mentioned type of discrepancy was a violation of a "moral convictions." Convictions violated in this category included: honesty (8); sexual morality (3); pro-life (2); race equality (1); and professional ethics (1). "Relationships" were the third most frequently mentioned type of discrepancy. The types of relationships mentioned included: one's spouse (5); children (3); co-workers (3); and friends (1). Of the discrepancies described by those subjects claiming a Christian belief base, 80% fall into one of these three categories: a) religious convictions, b) moral convictions and c) relationships.

Those subjects claiming a Christian belief base were also asked the reasons they prioritized the situations as they did. Table 4 summarized the reasons given by these subjects.

Table 4--Discrepancy Evaluative Criteria (C)

a) Impact on others	7 (35%)
b) Impact on the church/God	4 (20%)
c) Impact on a relationship	3 (15%)
d) Impact on self	3 (15%)
e) Level of knowledge	1 ( 5%)
f) Impact on eternal life	1 ( 5%)

For those subjects claiming a Christian belief base the evaluation of discrepancy is dominated by "relational" criteria. Seventeen (90%) of the 19 reasons cited fall into that domain ("a" through "d" above).

Only two individuals cited an abstract "principle" as their primary evaluative criteria. Other values were expressed as secondary to those cited as primary evaluative criteria. These secondary evaluative criteria include the standard the individual took initially, (the more flagrant the violation of that position, the more significant the



inconsistency is considered), the degree to which a belief is personally held, the degree of self deception and being a poor example.

#### Non-Religious Belief Base

All 15 individuals who claimed a non-religious belief base were able to cite examples of belief-behavior discrepancies. A total of 68 such examples were described by these subjects. An average of 4-5 situations were described by each subject. Thirteen (87%) cited examples of discrepancies both personally experienced and observed in others, while 2 (17%) cited only discrepancies observed in others. Examples of personally experienced discrepancies, and those observed in others, were mentioned at an almost equal rate (30 to 38, respectively). Eight (53.3%) of these subjects rated personally experienced discrepancies as most significant. The rest (7, 46.7%) rated an observed discrepancy as most significant. Discrepancies observed in others was rated as least significant by 11 subjects; and 4 rated a personally experienced discrepancy as least significant.

Sixty-eight different examples of belief-behavior discrepancies were cited by this group. Table 5 summarizes the categorization of these discrepancies by type.

Table 5—Discrepancy Example Type (nr)

a. Information/knowledge	8 (11.7%)
b. Expressed will or desire	6 (8.8%)
c. Religious conviction	9 (13.3%)
d. Moral conviction	25 (36.8%)
e. Relationship	20 (29.4%)

The two most frequently mentioned types of discrepancies involved



"moral convictions" and "relationships." The most frequently mentioned specific issue cited in the "moral conviction" category was honesty (12, 17.6%). Other items mentioned once, included such issues as non-violence, resource conservation, race relations, sexuality, and gossip. Discrepancies involving friends (6, 8.8%), co-workers (5, 7.4%), spouses (4, 5.9%), children (4, 5.9%) and an authority figure (1, 1.5%) were mentioned in the relationship category. These two categories, "moral convictions" and "relationships", account for 45 (66%) of all the discrepancies described. The balance of the discrepancies are more or less equally divided among the other categories.

The criteria used, by those subjects claiming a non-religious belief base, to evaluate the significance of the discrepancies they described was also discussed. Twenty criteria of five different types were mentioned by these 15 subjects and are summarized in Table 6.

Table 6--Discrepancy Evaluative Criteria (nr)

a. Impact on others	7 (35%)
b. Impact on self	6 (30%)
c. Subjects personal values	4 (20%)
d. Lack of justification	2 (10%)
e. Impact on relationship	1 (5%)

"Relational" criteria ("a", "b" and "e" above) were used by these subjects 70% of the time to evaluate the significance of a discrepancy as opposed to a "principled" criteria.

#### Comparisons and Comments

The two groups, those claiming a Christian and those claiming a non-religious belief base, can be compared at several points. They are





equally able to describe personally experienced belief-behavior discrepancies and those observed in others. The non-religious group is more likely to share both personally experienced discrepancies. Nearly half of those claiming a Christian belief base shared no personal discrepancy experiences. Discrepancies observed in others dominated the descriptions of those claiming a Christian belief base while those claiming a non-religious belief base described both types of discrepancies, those observed in others and those personally experienced, more equally. Both groups were equally likely to evaluate personally experienced discrepancies and those observed in others as the "most significant" of their examples.

When comparing the awareness of discrepancy by domain, the two groups cited examples in the "Information/Knowledge" and "Expressed Will or Desire" domains at virtually the same percentage of the total. However, as Table 7 illustrates, the two groups differed greatly in their awareness of discrepancy in the "Religious Conviction," "Moral Conviction" and "Relationship" domains.

Table 7—Discrepancy Awareness by Domain (ts)

Domain	Total Sample	Christian	Non-Religious
Religious Conviction	31%	48%	13.3%
Moral Conviction	26.8%	18.5%	36.8%
Relationship	21.5%	14.8%	29.4%

Those expressing a Christian belief base are far more likely to cite discrepancies in the "Religious Conviction" domain than their non-religious counter-parts. While those expressing a non-religious belief base are far more likely (at a 2 to 1 ratio) to cite discrepancies in the "Moral Conviction" and "Relationship" domains than



the "Religious Conviction" domain. This sharp distinction is blurred by the results for the total sample. The two groups tend to off-set each other and their sharp differences are lost.

The third significant area of comparison involves the evaluative criteria used by each group. First, both groups equally demonstrated a heavy dependence on "relational" criteria. Four specific criteria mentioned by those claiming a Christian belief base were not mentioned by their non-religious counter-parts. Three of those criteria (impact on eternity, church attendance, impact on the church) were directly related to the individual's religious convictions. Those expressing a non-religious belief base relied on personal values and justification rather than the religious values of their counterparts.

#### Consistency and the Individual

While not initially part of the research design, it became apparent that not only were the subjects aware of belief-behavior discrepancies, but that they had definite opinions about the "rightness" or "wrongness" of these discrepancies. Many of the subjects felt that an individual's behavior "ought" to be consistent with their beliefs. Some of these attached a stigma to the failure to act consistently. Still others felt that while people probably should be consistent, they could accept inconsistency as a normal part of life.

#### Total Sample

Taken as a group these subjects believed that people ought to act consistently with their beliefs (33 of 35; 94%). A certain stigma for not acting consistently was also attached to discrepancies by 22



(63%) of the subjects. Some of the subjects expressed sentiments in favor of consistency but were quick to point out that ". . . it's not a consistent world . . ." and inconsistency is something ". . . everyone does . . ." and is "normal." While people try to be consistent, they usually aren't. Not every subject justified his feelings with an explanation. For several members of the sample the "oughtness" of consistency was expressed as an assumed value held without much justification. Others felt that one ought to be consistent for a number of good reasons, including being a good example (5), personal satisfaction and growth (2) and response to the internal need for consistency (1).

The catalogue of epithets these subjects used to describe those who are inconsistent is extensive. Inconsistent people are variously described as hypocritical, selfish, stupid, silly, weak, dishonest, bad examples, lacking personal pride and not being trustworthy. Their inconsistency damages relationships, injures themselves, hurts others and blocks personal growth and development. While many of these subjects willingly related illustrations of personally experienced discrepancy situations they felt there was something wrong with being inconsistent. This negative attitude toward discrepancy was expressed by one subject when asked if she had ever personally experienced a belief-behavior discrepancy. She replied, "No! I'm not the kind of person who's afraid to do what they think is right."

#### Christian Belief Base

Of the 20 individuals in this portion of the sample, 19 expressed the opinion that there should be consistency between belief and



behavior. They cited several different reasons for their feelings, including their belief: a) that being consistent is "... setting a good example ..." for others; b) that "... people will be happier if they resolve their inconsistencies ...;" c) that the process of resolving inconsistencies is "... a way to grow, they push us little by little ...;" d) that people have "... an internal need for consistency...;" e) that consistent individuals have pride in themselves; and f) gain a sense of personal satisfaction.

Ten members (50% of the Christians) supported their opinion that people should be consistent, by pointing to the evils of being inconsistent. Belief-behavior inconsistency was seen as: a) "...hypocritical...;" b) "... self destructive ...;" c) "... selfish ...;" d) "... a bad example ...;" e) something that "... ruins trust ...;" f) is "... off base ...;" f) something people "... should be ashamed of ...;" and g) the result of "... not working ... their beliefs. Some identified the source of such inconsistencies as the result of: a) "... the flesh. ... spiritual weakness. ...;" b) a failure of love for God and self; or c) weak belief.

Finally there were 3 members of this sample who agreed that people should be consistent, but accepted the notion that many people aren't without recrimination. They tended to see this as the way of the world. Such inconsistencies were accepted because they were not seen as significant. While another subject stressed the value of being able to accept people for who and what they are.





Non-Religious Belief Base

Those expressing a non-religious belief base also discussed the issue that people "ought" to be consistent. They, too, felt (14 out of 15 subjects, 93.3%) that individuals should be consistent. Some (12 out of 15 subjects, 80%) attached some stigma to inconsistency. One who is consistent was seen as being more honest, or a good person. Five of the subjects pointed out that while people ought to be consistent, they usually aren't. Again, not all the subjects cited specific reasons for the "oughtness" of consistency. Among those who expressed a reason for their feeling that people ought to be consistent, the stigma of inconsistency far out weighed the benefits of consistency, as a motivation for behavior consistent with belief. They saw people who act inconsistently as not trustworthy, dishonest, hypocritical, afraid and weak. Those acting inconsistently were seen as hurting themselves and others, and destroy relationships.

Comparisons and Comments

Both those claiming a Christian and those claiming a non-religious belief base agree that one should be consistent; and both attached stigma to failures of consistency. Those expressing a Christian belief base were more likely to talk about the benefits of consistency for the person and others, while their counterparts were more likely to emphasize the negative aspects of consistency failures. Those expressing a non-religious belief base were more likely to attach stigma to consistency failures than their Christian counterparts (80% to 50%, respectively). There were no major differences in the kind of justification or stigma the two groups cited.



Given the high degree of "oughtness" and "stigma" associated with belief-behavior discrepancies it is not surprising that the subjects cited far fewer examples of personally experienced discrepancies than those they observed in others (at a 2 to 1 ratio). Nor is it surprising that personally experienced discrepancies were seen as less important than those observed in others (by a 2 to 1 margin). Given this evaluation, it is a little surprising that so many subjects willingly shared their personal experiences (35%) and rated them as most significant (38%). Some subjects were aware of and willingly reported personally experienced discrepancies. Other subjects were unaware or unwilling to report personally experienced discrepancies. The reasons, for this difference, are not apparent from the data.

#### The Belief Behavior Relationship

Another interesting area that unintentionally developed in the course of the interviews was the relationship the subjects perceived between belief and behavior. Much discussion in the literature surrounds this relationship. Some have conceptualized them as independent of each other. Others have contended that behavioral experiences shape beliefs far more than beliefs shape behavior. In addition to these views is the more traditional approach that beliefs are the core or foundation of behavior.

#### Total Sample

The belief-behavior relationship was expressed by these subjects in one of three ways. First, 2 of the subjects (5.7%) saw a hierarchy of belief. They expressed this in two different ways. One talked about a

Given the high degree of "captivity" and "cage" associated with belief-defector phenomena it is not surprising that the subjects cited far fewer examples of personally experienced characteristics than those they observed in others (as a 2 to 1 ratio). Nor is it surprising that personally experienced characteristics were seen as less important than those observed in others (by a 2 to 1 margin). Given this

evaluation, it is a little surprising that so many subjects willingly

shared their own experiences with others.

As a result, the data suggest that the subjects' experiences

with belief-defector phenomena are not as important as those

observed in others.

true hierarchy of beliefs and saw people as "... acting more consistently with what's most important ..." to them. Another subject saw this hierarchy as involving not only beliefs but instincts and needs. In that person's view one's instincts or the needs of a given situation may over-ride a given belief. The subject cited a pacifist's violent reaction to a life-threatening situation as an example of a time an instinct (self-preservation) could over-ride a belief (non-violence).

Second, 9 (25.7%) of the subjects expressed ignorance or no opinion when asked about the belief behavior relationship. They stated that they didn't know, hadn't thought much about it, or didn't have an opinion one way or the other. It was not surprising that some of the individuals didn't express an opinion; but the high percentage was unexpected.

Third, the rest of the sample saw belief and behavior as connected in some way. One portion of the sample (11 subjects, 31.4%) felt that belief leads to behavior, or that behavior flows out of belief. In their view, belief is the primary cause of behavior; behavior's foundation and framework. The other portion of the sample (13 subjects, 38.2%) that saw a belief-behavior connection viewed it as behavior revealing true belief. Pointing out the difference between espoused beliefs and "real" beliefs, these subjects explained that behavior was a more accurate indicator of true belief than words. In that sense, what one "really" believes can be inferred from what one really does.

#### Christian Belief Base

For those subjects claiming a Christian belief base the relationship between belief and behavior can be expressed in three

this hierarchy of beliefs and the people as " . . . holding true  
 consistently with what's now important . . . " to them. Another subject  
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interlocking ideas. First, belief is the foundation on which behavior is built. Second, behavior reveals true belief. Finally, behavior that is inconsistent with an espoused belief betrays the weakness of that particular belief. One or more of these notions was expressed by 14 (60%) of the subjects in this group.

First, these subjects feel that an individual's belief system is at the foundation of behavior. They expressed this idea in a number of ways. They stated that beliefs were: a) ". . . at the foundation of behavior. . .;" b) ". . . the frame work for behavior . . .;" c) ". . . connected to behavior . . .;" d) ". . . at the core, central . . ." to life and behavior; and e) ". . . what behavior depends on." Among these subjects there is little doubt concerning the flow of the belief-behavior relationship. Clearly, behavior flows out of belief. Recognizing that people do not always act consistently with their beliefs they still saw the belief system as an essential guidance system for life. Unlike individuals from the non-religious group none of those subjects claiming a Christian belief base suggested that behavior had its roots and control in anything but the individual's belief system.

Second, these subjects felt that an individual's true beliefs are revealed by what that person does rather than what the person says. They contend that: a) an inconsistent individual ". . . doesn't really believe . . .;" b) ". . . actions prove belief . . .;" c) ". . . actions speak louder than words . . .;" d) ". . . actions tell you more than what people say . . .;" and e) ". . . if I believe my behavior will be positive toward that belief: I wouldn't go in another direction." In taking this position, these subjects agree with Rokeach (see ch. 2) who





rejected the whole notion of inconsistency on the basis that behavior inconsistent with one belief is necessarily consistent with another. A person can tell you anything but by their actions their true beliefs are known.

A third insight is linked to the first two. Those subjects claiming a Christian belief base hold that an individuals real beliefs, the strong beliefs, will be expressed in action. They feel that:

a) individuals ". . . act consistently with what's most important to them . . .;" b) that ". . . deeply held beliefs are expressed . . .;" c) that ". . . if you believe strong enough you'll act . . .;" and d) that ". . . there is corresponding action . . ." if a person really believes. This line of thinking reveals a number of important insights. First, implied in this position, is the notion that beliefs are held with differing degrees of intensity. Second, that a clear distinction between espoused beliefs and "real" beliefs was made. For an espoused belief to be regarded as a strongly held belief, a real belief, it must be validated by action. Finally, an individual's behavior is both the vehicle of belief expression and the litmus test of his or her espoused beliefs.

#### Non-Religious Belief Base

Those subjects claiming a non-religious belief base saw the same kinds of belief-behavior relationships as their Christian counterparts. One subject saw a hierarchical relationship, 3 expressed no opinion and the remaining 11 (73.3%) saw belief and behavior as connected. These 11 also saw this connection as belief leading to behavior (5) or behavior revealing true belief (6).

1984-1985

Those subjects who felt that belief leads to behavior expressed it in various ways including describing belief as ". . . the primary cause . . . of behavior," and the belief/behavior relationship in different ways including: a) ". . . if you really believe you will act. . .;" b) ". . . if he didn't believe that way he wouldn't act that way. . .;" and c) ". . . beliefs strongly influence . . ." behavior. One subject described the relationship between belief and behavior as a direct ratio, that ought to balance or coincide. They also felt this view was true for a certain kind of person. Good" and "trustworthy" people act on their beliefs.

Other non-religious subjects felt that behavior reveals true belief and expressed this idea by stating that inconsistent behavior: a) ". . . indicates no confidence in the belief . . .;" b) "indicates a false or weak belief . . .;" and c) that ". . . what people do tells . . ." what they really believe. Behavior also reveals something about the person. Those engaged in inconsistencies: a) ". . . don't keep their word to themselves . . . can't be trusted to keep their word to others . . .;" b) create uncertainty because ". . . you never know how much is just talk . . . its better to judge people's honesty by what they do than what they say . . .;" c) ". . . don't have a sense of pride, they don't care about themselves . . .;" and d) are "weak."

One subject described the process she saw in the connections between belief and behavior in the following way. If a person believes in something they should be willing to believe in everything it implies. That may challenge them to change a cherished behavior. In her judgment most people are selfish and want their own way. So, they put limits on what they believe and turn it around to fit their own needs. Then, the



behavior doesn't match up with what they say they believe. The belief-behavior discrepancy exists between the espoused belief and the behavior. But, the behavior is consistent with the modified belief; the "real" belief. Behavior is merely the fruit of this process of creating a "real" belief.

### Comparisons and Comments

Both those expressing a Christian and those expressing a non-religious belief base dealt with the question of the relationship between belief and behavior in the same three ways and in about the same proportions. Nor were their any major differences in the ways the two groups described the connections between belief and behavior. Both groups mentioned "behavior revealing belief" slightly more than "belief leading to behavior" and far more than a "hierarchical" connection. In fact the comments, used by both groups to describe the connections, were strikingly similar. About 75% of the subjects saw a direct link between belief and behavior either as hierarchical, foundational or revealing. No subject took the position that people act contrary to "real" beliefs or that there is no connection between belief and behavior.

### When an Inconsistency Isn't an Inconsistency

In the next part of the interview the subjects were asked to determine how the individuals described in fifteen belief-behavior discrepancy situations should resolve their discrepancy. Within the discrepancy situations five different types of beliefs were represented (see ch. 3). The subjects could choose between three possible discrepancy resolution strategies: a) change neither belief or behavior,

behavior doesn't match up with what they say they believe. The belief-behavior discrepancy exists between the expressed belief and the behavior. But, the behavior is consistent with the modified belief; the "real" belief. Behavior is merely the limit of this process of creating a "real" belief.

#### Regulations and Consensus

Both the... and the... are...  
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that is, change nothing; b) change behavior; and c) change belief. Certain discrepancy situations, for certain reasons, were consistently regarded as not inconsistent. That is, the subjects held that persons described in the situations needed to change nothing.

To adequately explore this data several specific pieces of data must be examined. Key issues include the types of belief and specific discrepancy situations that were regarded as requiring no change, the rationale supporting that position and identifying those situations that were regarded as are needing no change by all the subjects. One of the keys to mining and refining this data is to grasp the kind of beliefs described by the situations and the specific content. These are fully described in chapter 3 but are summarized here for the reader's convenience.

#### Type of Belief and Discrepancy Situations

Type "A": Primitive Beliefs, 100% Consensus are axiomatic, taken-for-granted, shared by anyone who knows the individual and represent the "basic truths" of a persons belief system (Rokeach 1969, p. 6).

1. A person who knows the year they were born consistently gives their age as five years younger than it actually is.
2. A person born into an immigrant family denies their ethnic background by refusing to participate in ethnic traditions and changing their name.
3. A person who is a Christian refuses to state his faith even when asked and hides the fact from his co-workers and friends.

Type "B": Primitive Beliefs, 0% Consensus These beliefs are not shared with anyone else or dependent on what others think and are held on faith (Rokeach 1969, pp. 8-9).

4. A woman believes that her mother loves her and has her best interest at heart but gets so angry with her that she would like to kill her and ignores and argues with her mother.

that is, change nothing (b) change behavior and (c) change beliefs.  
 Certain changing situations, for certain reasons, are consistently  
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**Intelligence** subjects were required to determine no change, the  
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 were required to determine no change, the rational approach.



5. A person believes there is a God but does not attend church or any other house of worship.
6. A person believes their child is trustworthy and responsible but refuses to allow the child privileges other trustworthy and responsible children are given.

Type "C": Authority Beliefs concern those persons or groups the individual sees as an authority figure to be followed and trusted (Rokeach 1969, p. 10).

7. A person believes the teachings of Christ ought to be obeyed but refuses to help provide for the needs of the poor and resents being asked to share with them.
8. A person believes that those in authority should be respected and obey but dislikes, disobeys and complains about his foreman at work.
9. A person believes in the infallibility of the pope but advocates the right of women to have abortions and the use of artificial contraceptives.

Type "D": Derived Beliefs are those beliefs that emanate from credible authority (Rokeach 1969, p. 10).

10. A person believes that The Ten Commandments are of divine origin but lies and steals if they feel it is in their best interest.
11. A person believes in freedom of speech but seeks to keep the Klu Klux Klan from holding a rally in his neighborhood park.
12. A person believes the Surgeon General's report on the health risks associated with smoking but continues to smoke.

Type "E": Inconsequential Beliefs are those that represent more or less arbitrary matters of taste (Rokeach 1969, p.11).

13. A person believes superstitions are silly but wears his lucky shirt whenever he competes.
14. A person believes that wearing seat belts is an important safety precaution, insists that others in the car wear them but refuses to wear them himself.
15. A person believes that church attendance is important and makes sure his children attend but refuses to attend himself.

3. A person believes there is a God and does not believe in the existence of any other form of deity.

4. A person believes that there is a God and that the responsibility for the actions of individuals and nations is placed on God.

5. A person believes that there is a God and that the responsibility for the actions of individuals and nations is placed on God and that the individual is responsible for his actions and the nation is responsible for its actions. (March 1955, p. 10).

6. A person believes that there is a God and that the responsibility for the actions of individuals and nations is placed on God and that the individual is responsible for his actions and the nation is responsible for its actions. (March 1955, p. 10).

The data reviewed first from this part of the interview deals with the type of belief, specific situations and rationale given by the subjects for changing nothing.

#### Total Sample

Table 8 summarizes the way these subjects chose resolution strategies for the discrepancy situations by belief type.

Table 8--Discrepancy Resolution Strategy Selection (ts)

Type of Belief	Change Nothing	Change Behavior	Change Belief	Total
"A"	26	53	26	105
"B"	16	76	13	105
"C"	14	68	23	105
"D"	12	87	6	105
"E"	13	77	15	105
Total	81	361	83	525
% of Total	15.4%	68.7%	15.9%	100%

Twenty-nine of the subjects (82.8%) assigned one or more discrepancy situations to the "change nothing" resolution strategy while 6 did not. A total of 77 such assignments were made or an average of 2-3 per subject, situation. The discrepancy situations were most likely to be assigned to the "change behavior" resolution strategy and least likely to the "change nothing" category. Five of the subjects who assigned no situations to the "change nothing" resolution strategy were drawn from the religious education programs while 1 came from the non-religious programs. Two of the six were men and 4 were women. Seventy-five percent of the Christian group and 93% of the non-religious group used the strategy.

Situations of different belief types were assigned to this strategy at different rates. Of the 81 times the subjects used this category



type "A" beliefs were assigned to it 26 times (32.5%), type "B" beliefs 16 times (20.7%), type "C" beliefs 14 times (18.2%), type "D" beliefs 12 times (15.6%) and type "E" beliefs 3 times (13%). Type "A" beliefs were most likely to be assigned to this strategy and type "E" the least likely. Type "A" beliefs also had the highest ratio of "change nothing" when compared to the other possible resolution strategies.

While this strategy was selected for every type of belief it was not selected for every specific situation. None of the subjects chose this strategy for three of the situations; #8, #10 and #12. All three of these situations deal with beliefs based on an authority figure (#8) or derived from a credible authority (#10 & #12). However other situations of this type were assigned to the "change nothing" resolution strategy.

Eighty different explanations for using the "change nothing" resolution strategy of seven different kinds were offered by the subjects. Table 9 summarizes their rationale in these categories.

Table 9—"Change Nothing" Resolution Strategy Rationale (ts)

a. Off-setting Beliefs	16	(20%)
b. Personal Prerogative	16	(20%)
c. Not real	14	(17.5%)
d. Time	13	(16.25%)
e. Trivia	9	(11.25%)
f. Justification	7	(8.75%)
g. Harmless	5	(6.25%)
Total	80	(100%)

The subjects view of these categories is important. Some situations were seen as having "off-setting" beliefs, one stated in the situation and one inferred by the subject to explain the behavior. Both beliefs were seen as valuable and the subjects were unwilling to choose between the two. Other subjects were regarded as matters of personal

Q. The 7" ball was measured to be 26 inches (66.02), the 8" ball

is 28 inches (71.12), the 9" ball is 30 inches (76.20), the 10" ball is

32 inches (81.28)

and the 11" ball

is 34 inches

(86.36)

prerogative and not needing change. The refusal of the subject to accept the "realness" of the described discrepancy was a third type of rational. They did not accept the discrepancy premise as stated in the description. For example, one subject judged situation #11 as unreal because, in their view, freedom of speech is not an absolute right. Those situations judged as being resolved naturally if given enough time were also assigned to the "change nothing" resolution strategy. Others were seen as so trivial, harmless or justified <sup>2</sup> that no change in belief or behavior was needed.

Table 10 summarizes the type of rationale used by these subjects for each discrepancy situation.

Table 10 "Change Nothing" Resolution Strategy by Situation (ts)

Situation	Off-setting	Unreal	Trivia	Time	Justified	Harmless	Personal
1		1	2	2		3	2
"A" 2	1	1		3		2	1
3				2	2		4
4		1					
"B" 5		5			2		1
6				4	1		1
7	1		1				1
"C" 8							
9	6	3			1		2
10							
"D" 11	8	2			1		1
12							
13		1	5	1	1		1
"E" 14							2
15			1				

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<sup>2</sup>Justification of a discrepancy must be seen from the subjects perspective. One subject who described herself as the kind of person "who does what they say" failed to keep two appointment with the researcher. When interviewed she did not see her actions as inconsistent with her self perception. She stated that she had good reason. First she didn't know the researcher and wasn't his friend and she had other things to do.





These reasons naturally fall into two categories. On one hand are discrepancies perceived as harmless, trivial, matters of personal prerogative or something to be out grown. These inconsistencies aren't really inconsistent because they're viewed as impotent, having no real impact on self or others. The other category are those inconsistencies in which the inconsistent behavior can be justified: by not accepting the ground of the inconsistency as real, by off-setting beliefs, or some other "good reason". As a group these subjects were slightly more inclined to assign situations regarded as "impotent" (43) than those they regarded as "justified" (37) to this resolution strategy.

#### Christian Belief Base

Table 11 summarizes the way those subjects claiming a Christian belief base chose resolution strategies for the discrepancy situations by belief type.

Table 11 Discrepancy Resolution Strategy Selection (C)

Type of Belief	Change Nothing	Change Behavior	Change Belief	Total
"A"	15 25%	34 56.7%	11 18.3%	60
"B"	4 6.7%	47 78.3%	9 15%	60
"C"	6 10%	41 68.3%	13 21.6%	60
"D"	8 13.3%	46 76.6%	6 10%	60
"E"	7 11.6%	44 73.3%	9 15%	60
Total	40	211	49	300
% of Total	13.3%	70.3%	16.3%	100%

Fifteen (75%) of these subjects assigned one or more of these situations to the "Change Nothing" category while 5 did not. The subjects in this group averaged 2 such assignments per set or about 13% of the time. Discrepancy situations were least (13.3% of the time) often assigned to the "change nothing" resolution strategy and most



(70% of the time) assigned to the "Change Behavior" resolution strategy. Of the five subjects that assigned no situation to the "change nothing" resolution strategy one was drawn from the "main-line" and 4 were drawn from the more conservative, pentecostal church. Ninety percent of those drawn from the "main-line" church judged inconsistencies as not real while only 60% of their counterparts saw that possibility. Two of the five subjects were men and three were women.

Another feature of the data is the relative frequency with which different kinds of beliefs are assigned to this resolution strategy. Each of the 20 subjects had three situations of each kind of belief to assign. Of the 60 times each type of belief could be assigned to the "change nothing" resolution strategy type "A" beliefs were so assigned 15 times (25%), type "B" beliefs were so assigned 4 times (6.6%), type "C" beliefs were so assigned 6 times (10%), type "D" beliefs were so assigned 8 times (13.3%) and type "E" beliefs were so assigned 7 times (11.6%). Type "A" beliefs were most often (by a 2 to 1 margin) assigned the "change nothing" resolution strategy. Type "A" belief also had more situations assigned to the "change nothing" resolution strategy than either of the other two possible resolution strategies.

The subjects offered several explanations for assigning situations to the "change nothing" resolution strategy which are summarized in Table 12. For those subjects claiming a Christian belief base the rationale for selecting this strategy is almost equally divided between those situation (Time, Trivia, Personal and Hamless) that are viewed as "impotent" (22, 55% ) and those (Off-setting, Unreal, and Justified) that are viewed as "justified" (18, 45%).



Table 12—"Change Nothing" Resolution Strategy Rationale (C)

a. Off-Setting Belief	10	25%
b. Unreal	6	15%
c. Time	10	25%
d. Trivia	5	12.5%
e. Personal Prerogative	6	15%
f. Harmless	1	2.5%
g. Justified	2	5%

The type of rationale given for each discrepancy situation is summarized Table 13.

Table 13—"Change Nothing" Rationale by Situation (C)

Situation	Offsetting	Unreal	Trivial	Time	Justified	Harmless	Personal
"A"	1	1	2	1			1
	2	1	1	2			
	3			2	2		
"B"	4						
	5	1					
	6			3			
"C"	7						
	8						
	9	3	1	1			1
"D"	10						
	11	6	2				1
	12						
"E"	13		3	1			1
	14						2
	15						

All of the reasons given above were used by at least one subject for assigning a type "A" belief to the "change nothing" category but most (10 of 14) were focused on the impotency of the inconsistency. Type "B" beliefs were seen as not real or something to be out grown. The type "C" belief (no. 9) and the type "D" belief (no. 10) were assigned to this category because of the off-setting character of the beliefs involved. The trivial or personal nature of the type "E" beliefs cause them to be assigned to this category.

Table 12 - "General Statistics" (continued)

a. All-India	100
b. General	100
c. India	100
d. India	100
e. India	100
f. India	100
g. India	100
h. India	100
i. India	100
j. India	100
k. India	100
l. India	100
m. India	100
n. India	100
o. India	100
p. India	100
q. India	100
r. India	100
s. India	100
t. India	100
u. India	100
v. India	100
w. India	100
x. India	100
y. India	100
z. India	100

The type of information given in the following table is summarized Table 12.

Table 13 - "General Statistics" (continued)

a. All-India	100
b. General	100
c. India	100
d. India	100
e. India	100
f. India	100
g. India	100
h. India	100
i. India	100
j. India	100
k. India	100
l. India	100
m. India	100
n. India	100
o. India	100
p. India	100
q. India	100
r. India	100
s. India	100
t. India	100
u. India	100
v. India	100
w. India	100
x. India	100
y. India	100
z. India	100

Non-Religious Belief Base

Table 14 summarizes the way those subjects claiming a non-religious belief base chose resolution strategies for the discrepancy situations by belief type.

Table 14—Discrepancy Resolution Strategy Selection (nr)

Type of Belief	Change Nothing	Change Behavior	Change Belief	Total
"A"	11	19	15	45
"B"	12	29	4	45
"C"	8	27	10	45
"D"	4	41	0	45
"E"	6	33	6	45
Total	42	148	35	225
% of Total	18.6%	65.7%	15.7%	100%

Fourteen of these 15 subjects assigned a one or more discrepancy situations to the "change nothing" resolution strategy. A total of 38 such assignments were made: an average of 2-3 per subject. Type "B" beliefs were the most frequently (12, 26.7%) assigned to this strategy followed by type "A" (11, 24.5%), type "C" (8, 17.8%), type "E" (6, 13.3%) and type "D" (4, 8.9%).

As with their Christian counterparts these subjects assigned situations from every type of belief to this resolution strategy but did not assign four particular situations, numbers 8, 10, 12, and 14, to this strategy. Situation 14 dealt with an individual who refused to wear seat belts but insisted others in the car wear them. As with the others these subjects view such behavior as injurious to self and sets a bad example for others pushed these subjects away from this resolution strategy.

Those subjects claiming a non-religious belief base also offered explanations for their choice of this strategy. Their explanations fell





into the same categories as their Christian counter-parts but with a slightly different frequency. Table 15 summarizes their rationale.

Table 15--"No Change" Resolution Strategy Rationale (nr)

a. Off-Setting Beliefs	6	15%
b. Unreal	8	20%
c. Time	3	7.5%
d. Trivia	4	10%
e. Personal Prerogative	10	25%
f. Harmless	4	10%
g. Justified	5	12.5%

They to were almost equally likely to assign situations they regarded as "impotent": "Time", "Trivia", "Personal Prerogative" and "Harmless" (21, 52.5%), and situations they regarded as "justified": "Off-setting Beliefs", "Unreal" and "Justified" (19, 47.5%), to this resolution strategy.

The rationale used by those subjects claiming a non-religious belief base to assign each situation to the "change nothing" resolution strategy is summarized in Table 16 below.

Table 16--"Change Nothing" Resolution Strategy by Situation (nr)

Situation	Off-Setting	Unreal	Trivial	Time	Justified	Harmless	Personal
1				1		2	1
"A" 2				1		2	1
3							4
4		1					
"B" 5		4			2		1
6				1	1		1
7	1		1				1
"C" 8							
9	3	2					1
10							
"D" 11	2				1		
12							
13		1	2		1		
"E" 14							
15			1				

into the same categories as their Christian counterparts but with a slightly different frequency. Table 12 summarizes their responses.

Table 12—"No Change" Respondents' Religious Beliefs (%)

a. Life-saving beliefs	5	100
b. Unusual	5	200
c. Other	5	7.50
d. None	5	100
e. Personal experience	10	200
f. None	5	100

5. Justified

They do not believe in any of the above.

"Impotent": "I am not a religious person."

"I am not a religious person."

"I am not a religious person."

"I am not a religious person."

"I am not a religious person."

"I am not a religious person."

"I am not a religious person."

"I am not a religious person."

"I am not a religious person."

"I am not a religious person."

"I am not a religious person."

"I am not a religious person."

"I am not a religious person."

"I am not a religious person."

"I am not a religious person."

### Comparisons and Comments

The two groups of subjects are alike in many ways. They assigned situations to the "change nothing" resolution strategy at about the same rate, within the same types of beliefs and for the same reasons. While there was some slight variation in the usage of specific rationale the two groups were similar. However, a higher percentage of those expressing a non-religious belief based actually utilized the strategy. The non-religious subjects were also more likely to assign situations in type "B" to the category. The rationale used by the subjects is summarized for each groups in Table 17.

Table 17 "Change Nothing" Resolution Strategy by Rationale (C & nr)

Rationale	Christian	Non-Religious
a. Off-setting Beliefs	25%	15%
b. Unreal	15%	20%
c. Time	25%	7.5%
d. Trivial	12.5%	10%
e. Personal Prerogative	15%	25%
f. Harmless	2.5%	10%
g. Justified	5%	12.5%

In summary, there are several important insights to be gained from this portion of the study. First, individuals see some belief-behavior discrepancies as best handled by changing neither belief or behavior. They judge in this way based on the specifics of the situation not on the type of belief. Some kinds of things are never seen as something that could be left alone. They must be dealt with. Finally two types of reasons are given for handling situations this way: a) inconsistent behavior can be justified or b) the inconsistency has so little impact that it isn't worth the trouble.

# Experimental and Observational

The two groups of subjects are alike in many ways. They assigned situations to the "change nothing" condition although it about the same rate, within the same types of behavior and for the same reasons. While there was some slight variation in the ways of specific reactions the two groups were similar. However, a higher percentage of those

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### Discrepancy Resolution by Changed Belief

A second possibility for belief-behavior discrepancy resolution offered to the subjects was "change belief". The subjects were not told how the beliefs could be changed or for what reason. In considering this area it is important to consider several features including: a) the frequency with which this discrepancy resolution strategy was chosen over the other two resolution strategies; b) the frequency with which this discrepancy resolution strategy was chosen in each belief type and for each discrepancy situation; and c) the ways in which the subjects thought the beliefs should change.

### Total Sample

The 35 subjects selected this strategy 83 out of a possible 525 times (15.9%). Thirty-three of the 35 subjects assigned at least one situation to this resolution strategy. The number of situations placed in this category by an individual ranged for 1 to 7 and averaged just over 2 (2.3) situations per subject. Both those claiming a Christian and a non-religious belief base used this category about 16% of the time. All the discrepancy situations, except no. 14, were assigned to the "change belief" strategy least once. The usage of the strategy by type of belief and discrepancy situation is summarized in Table 18 which shows that the situation most often assigned to this resolution strategy is no. 9 (19.2% of the time) and the type of belief most often assigned here is type "A" (31.3% of the time).



Table 18 "Change Belief" Resolution Strategy (ts)

Type of Belief	Discrepancy Situation	Times Used	%
A	1	9	10.8%
	2	11	13.25%
	3	6	7.2%
B	4	2	2.4%
	5	6	7.2%
	6	5	6%
C	7	4	4.8%
	8	3	3.6%
	9	16	19.2%
D	10	0	0%
	11	4	4.8%
	12	2	2.4%
E	13	9	10.8%
	14	4	4.8%
	15	2	2.4%
Total		83	100%

Three possible ways to change belief were advocated by these subjects. First, and most prominent, was to strengthen an already held belief, second was to change a belief not stated in situation but inferred by the subject, and third was to make a real change. Some of the subjects didn't advocate a way to change belief but expressed why they believed the subject should make real changes in their beliefs.

Clearly the most prominent way (67% of the time) these subjects wanted those described in the belief-behavior discrepancy situations to change was in the intensity of their belief not the content. This change was seen as occurring through personal reflection on the belief. These subject stated that people in these situations should be "... more objective ..." about their beliefs: "... to evaluate ...", "... to examine ..." their beliefs, and to recognize their "real" beliefs. Others saw a change in intensity by strengthening their beliefs and thought these people should: "... grow in their beliefs. . .", "... believe stronger so they will act . . .", and to "... put





more trust . . ." in their beliefs.

The second most prominent way (20.5% of the time) these subjects wanted those described in the belief-behavior discrepancy situation to change was to alter a belief inferred by the subject but not stated in the situation. All of these occurred in type "A" situations in which the "belief" described in the discrepancy was one for which there was 100% consensus; a fact. In point of fact, type "A" situations, if taken as written, cannot be resolved by changing belief because ones age or ethnic origin cannot be changed. But the subjects managed it by inferring a belief to account for, or as a motive of, the discrepant behavior and then decided that the inferred belief should be changed.<sup>3</sup>

A third kind of change of belief some (7.2%) of the subjects wanted made was a real change. All of these were mentioned in connection with situation no. 9 and no. 13. In dealing with no. 9 all the subjects who selected this strategy wanted the person to find another church home. Again, the fact that all the subjects are protestant or non-religious cannot be overlooked. Nor can the fact that of the 16 subjects who judged this situation in this way only 3 wanted the person described to make a real change, two expressed their personal objections to papal authority and the other seven wanted the person to reflect on or and

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<sup>3</sup>Several examples of this inference can be found in the subjects responses. In assessing with situation no. 1 which deals with a man lying about his age one subject felt the belief that should be changed was that he was tricking anyone by lying. In point of fact the situation as written did not state that he was trying to trick any one. That motive was inferred by the subject and is not the only possible explanation for his behavior. The description states that the person felt old. In assessing situation no. 2 which deals with the son of an immigrant family who wants to more American one subject inferred that he was ashamed of his ethnic heritage. Embarrassment of his parent's behavior but not shame of his heritage is stated. It was inferred by the subject and is not the only reason one may be embarrassed.

new kind of "in their hands".

The second part, consisting of 10.7% of the total, these subjects  
 stated those described in the initial-estimated description of the  
 group was to show a total interest in the subject and not stated in  
 the statement. All of these occurred in the "A" situation in which  
 the "initial" described in the description was one for which there was  
 this statement, a total. In point of fact, the "A" situation, it seems

as written, and the "A" situation, it seems

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strengthen their commitment to Catholicism.

#### Christian Belief Base

Those subjects claiming a Christian belief base chose this option 49 out of a possible 300 times: about 16% of the time. Nineteen of the 20 subjects assigned a least one of the situations to this category. The number of situations assigned to this resolution strategy ranged from 1 to 7 and the averaged 2 to 3 per subject. The use of this category was almost equally divided between subjects drawn from each of the two congregations. Those from the mainline congregation were a little less likely to use it (22 times, 45%, average of 2.2 incidences per subject) than those from the pentecostal congregation (27 times, 55%, 3.2 incidences per subject). Men were slightly less likely to use this category (22 times, 45%. 2.2 incidences per subject) than women (27 times, 55%, 3.2 incidences per subject).

One or more situation from each belief category were assigned to the "change belief" resolution strategy by at least one of the subjects. All three situations of belief types "A", "B" and "E" and two situations of belief types "C" and "D" were designated as "change belief" situations. Only two specific situations, no. 8 which dealt with authority conflict and no. 10 which dealt with lying and stealing did not occur in this category. Of the 60 times these subjects could have assigned a discrepancy to this category within each kind of belief they did so 11 times (18%) for type "A" beliefs, 9 times (15%) for type "B" beliefs, 13 times (22 %) for type "C" beliefs, 6 times (10%) for type "D" beliefs and 9 times for type "E" beliefs. Authority beliefs were most likely to be found in this category and derived beliefs least

investigation their commission for Classification.

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likely.

The use of this resolution strategy, by those claiming a Christian belief base, for each discrepancy situation is summarized in Table 19.

Table 19--"Change Belief" Resolution Strategy (C)

Type of Belief	Discrepancy Situation	Change Belief	% of Total
"A"	1	5	25%
	2	4	20%
	3	2	10%
"B"	4	1	5%
	5	5	25%
	6	3	15%
"C"	7	3	15%
	8	0	0%
	9	10	50%
"D"	10	0	0%
	11	4	20%
	12	2	10%
"E"	13	5	25%
	14	3	20%
	15	1	5%

Those subjects claiming a Christian belief base saw three types of belief changes. First they advocated a change of "inferred beliefs" nine times in dealing with type "A" beliefs 1 and 2. Second, they expressed a desire for a real change in belief four times, all related to situation 9, and expressed the desire for a real change based on their belief system three times in dealing with to situations 9 and 13. Finally, these subjects wanted those described in the discrepancy situation to strengthen their beliefs 33 times. This type of change was used for every discrepancy situation except no. 1 and no. 2.

#### Non-Religious Belief Base

The 15 subjects claiming a non-religious belief base used the "change belief" discrepancy resolution strategy 35 times: about 2 per

Table 19—Continued

subject. They used it in dealing with 12 of the discrepancy situations and in four of the belief type categories. None of these subjects used this strategy to resolve a type "D" discrepancy. This resolution strategy was most frequently used by these subjects with type "A" beliefs (11 times, or 31.4%) and least frequently with type "B" beliefs (6 times, 17.1%). It was used with type "C" beliefs 10 times (28.5%), and with with type "E" beliefs 6 times (17.1%). Situation 2 was resolved this way by 7 of the subjects while it was used by 6 of the subjects to solve number 9. The use of this strategy is summarized in Table 20.

Table 20—"Change Belief" Resolution Strategy (nr)

Type of Belief	Discrepancy Situation	Change Belief	% of Total
A	1	4	11.4%
	2	7	20%
	3	4	11.4%
B	4	1	2.8%
	5	1	2.8%
	6	2	5.6%
C	7	1	2.8%
	8	3	8.5%
	9	6	17.5%
D	10	0	0%
	11	0	0%
	12	0	0%
E	13	4	11.4%
	14	1	2.8%
	15	1	2.8%

When compared to the other resolution strategies those subjects claiming a non-religious belief base used the "change belief" resolution strategy 15.7% of the time. Overall, this resolution strategy was the least utilized choice and had the fewest number of assignments in three of the five belief types. However, it was used more often than the "change nothing" resolution strategy with type "A" discrepancy situations and the same number of times as the "change nothing" strategy

It was noted with type "C" pellets (28.2%) and least frequently with type "B" pellets (11 times, or 31.4%).

subject to the same conditions as the other two.



with type "C" discrepancy situations. This resolution strategy was outnumbered by the "change behavior" strategy in all five types of belief.

As with their Christian counterparts those subjects claiming a non-religious belief base detailed the kind of changes they wanted those described in the discrepancy situations to make. The most frequently mentioned change was to "strengthen belief". It was used 20 times (57.1%) with every belief type (except "D") and with every situation (except 2). "Change in inferred belief" was the next most prominent category. The 9 times (25.7%) it was used were to deal with type "A" situations 1 and 2. Finally a "real change" was sought 5 times. Again the attention for this type of change was focused on situations 9 and 13 (see this section "Total Sample" for discussion).

#### Comparisons and Comments

Again, there was little or no demonstrable difference between the two groups of subjects on this issue. Both selected selected this strategy about 16% of the time. Both identified the same types of belief changes at approximately the same ratio. The specific choices were concentrated around the same belief type and specific situations. The one outstanding difference is that those who expressed a non-religious belief base didn't use this strategy with any of the type "D" belief while their Christian counterparts did. Nothing in the data adequately accounts for this difference.

with type "C" discrepancy situations. This mediation strategy was  
 demonstrated by the "change location" strategy in all five types of

beliefs.

As with the other strategies, the "change location" strategy was  
 non-religious.

Summary

Table

### Discrepancy Resolution by Changed Behavior

A third way the subjects could resolve the belief-behavior discrepancy situations was by advocating "changed behavior." The subjects were not told how or under what conditions the behavior could or should be changed. If the subject felt, for whatever reason, that the person described in the situation should act differently they were instructed to assign that situation to the "change behavior" resolution strategy.

### Total Sample

At least one one situation was assigned to the change belief category by all the subjects. The strategy was used 361 times by the 35 subjects or about 10 times per subject. It was the most frequently used resolution strategy accounting of 68.7% of all the choices. The number of assignments per situation ranged from 7 to 35. It was used for type "A" beliefs 53 times, type "B" beliefs 76 times, type "C" beliefs 68 times, type "D" beliefs 87 times and for type "E" beliefs 77 times. One situation, number 10 was always resolved this way and three others, numbers 8 (32 of 35 times, 91.4%), 12 (33 of 35 times, 94.3%) and 15 (32 of 35 times, 91.4%), were resolved this way by more than 90% of the subjects. The situation least likely to be resolved by this method (7 times) and the only situation resolve by this method by less than 50% of the subjects (20%) is number 9. The use of this strategy by these subjects is summarized in Table 21.

Several features of this data should be noted: first, the overwhelming dominance of this resolution strategy as opposed to the

# DISCUSSION

The results of the present study indicate that the use of a single dose of 100 mg of diazepam is sufficient to produce a significant reduction in the number of seizures in patients with epilepsy. The results also indicate that the use of a single dose of 100 mg of diazepam is sufficient to produce a significant reduction in the number of seizures in patients with epilepsy.

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others, and second, the wide swings that are possible within a given type of belief. Two type "C" beliefs, based on an authority figure, received the lowest and one of the highest ratings. One of two type "D" beliefs was selected by 100% of the subjects and the other by only 54% of the subjects. While these wide swings within categories should be noted, it should also be noted that the within types of beliefs also vary a great deal in the number of times the subjects used this resolution strategy.

Table 21--"Change Behavior" Resolution Strategy (ts)

Discrepancy Situation	Change Behavior	%
A	1	48.6%
	2	42.9%
	3	60%
B	4	85.7%
	5	60%
	6	71.4%
C	7	82.9%
	8	91.4%
	9	20%
D	10	35%
	11	54.3%
	12	94.3%
E	13	45.7%
	14	82.9%
	15	91.4%

The subjects offered several different reasons for using this resolution strategy. Thirty-three of the 35 subjects (94%) stated that individuals should conform their behavior to their beliefs. This sentiment was expressed by one subject who said, "If you believe you should do something about it." A second frequently used rationale for selecting the "change behavior" resolution strategy was the negative impact of the described inconsistent behavior. The behavior was seen as having a negative impact on both the person (13 subjects, 30.4%) or on

others, and second, the wide wings that are possible within a given type of belief. Two type "C" beliefs, based on an arbitrary figure, received the lowest and one of the highest ratings. One of two type "D" beliefs was selected by 10% of the subjects and the other by only 5% of the subjects. While these wide wings within categories should be noted, it should also be noted that the within type of beliefs also vary a great deal in the number of times the subjects select them.

#### Conclusion (Table 1)

Table 1 shows the results of the experiment.

Table 1. Results of the experiment.

Belief Type	Number of Subjects	Percentage of Total
Type A	10	10.0%
Type B	20	20.0%
Type C	10	10.0%
Type D	5	5.0%
Type E	10	10.0%
Type F	10	10.0%
Type G	10	10.0%
Type H	10	10.0%
Type I	10	10.0%
Type J	10	10.0%
Type K	10	10.0%
Type L	10	10.0%
Type M	10	10.0%
Type N	10	10.0%
Type O	10	10.0%
Type P	10	10.0%
Type Q	10	10.0%
Type R	10	10.0%
Type S	10	10.0%
Type T	10	10.0%
Type U	10	10.0%
Type V	10	10.0%
Type W	10	10.0%
Type X	10	10.0%
Type Y	10	10.0%
Type Z	10	10.0%

others (16 subjects, 37.2%). The subjects felt the people described in these situations would be "... happier if they resolved the situation . . .", were using "... bad strategies . . ." to solve their problems, were engaged in self deception, and weren't helping themselves. The subjects also felt that the described behavior should be changed because people shouldn't "... belittle others. . .," be "... hypocritical . . .," "... set a bad example . . .," or "... ruin . . ." trust.

Four subjects (9.3%) focused on the third type of rationale: the benefits derived from consistency. A fourth rationale was advanced by 7 (16.3%) subjects who focused on their own value system. These subjects endorsed the beliefs described in the discrepancy situations and therefore wanted to resolve the situation through changed behavior: "They had the right belief but the wrong behavior" or as another subject put it, "These were the beliefs I agreed with, so the behavior should be changed". Finally, 3 (6.9%) subjects opted for change in behavior because they believed it easier to change behavior than to change belief. They regarded the belief as "already there" and the behavior as something that "can be changed". Table 22 summarizes the various reasons the subjects gave for choosing this resolution strategy.

Table 22—"Change Behavior" Rationale (ts)

Rationale	Christian	Non-Religious	Total	Sample
a. "Should"	19 (96%)	14 (93%)	33	(94%)
b. Can/Easier	3 (15%)	0	3	(6.9%)
c. Subject Value	3 (15%)	4 (26%)	7	(16.3%)
d. Benefit Self	3 (15%)	1 (6.6%)	4	(9.3%)
e. Harm Self	7 (35%)	6 (40%)	13	(30.4%)
f. Harm Others	12 (60%)	4 (26.7%)	16	(37.2%)

others (16 subjects, 37.5%). The subjects felt the people described in these situations would be "... better if they received the situation ...", "... were better ...", "... had experienced ...", "... to solve their

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### Christian Belief Base

All twenty of the subjects who claimed a Christian belief base assigned at least 1 situation to the "change behavior" discrepancy resolution strategy. Regardless of sex or church affiliation, the number of situations assigned to this strategy ranged from 7-15: an average of 10 per subject. Those discrepancy situations assigned to this resolution strategy included all 15 specific situations from all five belief types. Of the 300 times these subjects could have assigned a situation to this discrepancy resolution strategy they did so 211 times: about 70% of the time.

The number of assignments per situation ranged from 4 to 20. The average number of such assignments varied slightly with the type of belief. Type "A" beliefs were assigned to this strategy an average of 11 times, type "B" 16 times, type "C" beliefs 14 times, type "D" beliefs 15 times and type "E" beliefs 15 times. Two specific situations, numbers 8 and 10, were resolved this way by all 20 subjects. Nineteen subjects resolved two others, numbers 4 and 15, in this way. The least likely situations to be resolved by a change of behavior were number "1" (9 times), number 9 (4 times) and number 11 (8 times). Table 23 details the number of times a specific situation was assigned to this discrepancy resolution strategy.

One feature of this data that should be noted is the wide range assignments within a given type of belief. The least and the most number of assignments were made within the same category of belief: beliefs based on an authority figure. All twenty subjects felt that situation no. 8 (dealing with respect for authority) should be resolved by conforming behavior to belief but only four subjects felt situation

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no. 9 (dealing with a Catholic's advocacy of abortion and artificial contraceptives) should be resolved that way.

Table 23--"Change Behavior" Resolution Strategy (C)

Type of Belief	Discrepancy Situation	Change Behavior	%
A	1	9	45%
	2	11	55%
	3	14	70%
B	4	19	95%
	5	14	70%
	6	14	70%
C	7	17	85%
	8	20	100%
	9	4	20%
D	10	20	100%
	11	8	40%
	12	18	90%
E	13	10	50%
	14	15	75%
	15	19	95%

All twenty subjects claiming a Christian belief base chose this resolution strategy and offered four different rationales (see Table 22). First, 19 subjects expressed the value that people should conform their behavior to their belief. Second, 22 of the subjects felt that the behavior should be changed because of its negative impact on self (10) or others (12). A third rationale was offered by those (3) who felt change in behavior was easier to achieve than change in belief. Finally, some felt that behavior should be changed because they endorsed the belief described in the situation.

#### Non-Religious Belief Base

The 15 subjects who claimed a non-religious belief base also made use of this resolution strategy. All 15 discrepancy situations were assigned by some of the subjects to this discrepancy resolution



strategy: from 3 to 15 per situation. This strategy was used a total of 138 times and averaged 9 such assignments per subject. It was most frequently used with type "D" beliefs (41 times, 29.7%) and least frequently with type "A" beliefs (19 times, 13.8%). These subjects used it 33 times with type "E" beliefs (23.9%), 29 times with type "B" beliefs (21%), and 27 times with type "C" beliefs (19.5%). The "change behavior" discrepancy resolution strategy was used for every discrepancy situation and was chosen by all 15 subjects for situations 10 and 12. Fourteen of these subjects used it to resolve situation 14. The use of this discrepancy resolution strategy by the subjects claiming a non-religious belief base is summarized in Table 24.

Table 24 "Change Behavior" Resolution Strategy (nr)

Type of Belief	Discrepancy Situation	Change Behavior	%
A	1	8	53.3%
	2	4	26.6%
	3	7	46.6%
B	4	11	73.3%
	5	7	46.6%
	6	11	73.3%
C	7	12	80%
	8	12	80%
	9	3	20%
D	10	15	100%
	11	11	73.3%
	12	15	100%
E	13	6	40%
	14	14	93.3%
	15	13	86.6%

Again, the wide swings within type of belief categories should be noted. Within type "C" this strategy was chosen by 80% of the subjects for 2 situations (no. 7 and no. 8) but by only 20% of the subjects for the third situation (no. 9). The two situations resolved by this

... and 27 times with type "C" pellets (19.25). The "change

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the situation.

strategy by all 15 subjects claiming a non-religious belief base are both type "D" (no.10 and no. 12): beliefs derived from credible authority. Five of these situations (2, 3, 5, 9 and 13), representing four different types of belief (all except "D") were resolved in this way by less than 50% of the subjects.

A range of explanations were also offered by those subjects claiming a non-religious belief base (see Table 22). Fourteen based their choice on the belief that people should behave consistently. Ten based their choice on the negative impact of the described behavior on the person or others. Four advocated this strategy based on their own values and 1 advocated this strategy based on their belief of the benefits of consistency. Unlike their Christian counterparts none of these subjects justified their choice on the grounds that behavior is easier to change than belief.

#### Comparisons and Comments

The two groups of subjects are similar. Both favored this strategy above the others. Those expressing a Christian belief base favored this discrepancy resolution strategy at a slightly higher rate (70.3%) than their non-religious counter-parts (65.7%). Nor was their much difference in the rationale upon which the subjects from both groups based their advocacy of this resolution strategy. Both groups cited their opinion that behavior should conform to belief most frequently followed by the negative impact of the described behavior on the person and others. In both groups these two rationales accounted for about 80% of these reasons given. While the use of the other explanations varied, the same categories were mentioned by both groups.

strategy by all 12 subjects claiming a non-religious belief was one

both type "B" (no.16 and no.18) believe derived from evidence

authorities. (no.16 and no.18) believe derived from evidence

from authorities

was derived



### Discrepancy Resolution Barriers

Following the belief/behavior discrepancy resolution sort the subjects were asked to discuss what they felt kept people from being consistent and from resolving belief/behavior discrepancies in their lives. While a wide number of specific barriers were suggested they fell into two categories. First, are internal barriers: personality flaws that were viewed as responsible for belief/behavior discrepancies and the failure to resolve them. Another category of barrier were those external to the individual: things beyond the control of the person. In the following discussion of results, both internal and external barriers will be discussed.

### Total Sample

A total of total of 87 internal and external barriers to consistency were cited by these subjects. Internal barriers mentioned outnumbered external 55 (63%) to 32 (37%). However, the most frequently mentioned barrier, "other people," was an external barrier not an internal barrier. The internal barriers can further be divided into those in which the individual contributes to the barrier, or "co-op internal barriers," and those, "passive internal barriers", over which they have not control. Individuals were seen as able to exercise some degree of control over all of these "co-op internal barriers" assigned to this group. Other internal barriers were mentioned in which the individual does not contribute to the barrier and in which the person is viewed as the passive victim of the barrier. Three external barriers were also mentioned by the subjects. While this categorization may seem somewhat arbitrary and the assignment of individual barriers could be

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contested, this method of categorization does reflect the subjects' own thinking. Table 25 summarizes the barriers and the frequency of their use.

Table 25—Discrepancy Resolution Barriers (ts)

<b>A. Internal Barriers (62.8%)</b>	
1. Co-op Internal Barriers	
a. Lack of Determination/Discipline	5
b. Lack of Motivation/Lazy	9
c. Rationalization	7
d. Selfishness	4
e. Religious Belief	2
f. Lack of Strength	<u>1</u>
	28
2. Passive Internal Barriers	
a. Lack of Understanding/Awareness	11
b. Personality Flaws	2
c. Poor self-image	2
d. Fear	10
e. Lack of faith	<u>1</u>
	26
<b>B. External Barriers (37.2%)</b>	
1. Other people	20
2. Situation	9
3. Family Background	<u>3</u>
	32

From this review several insights can be gleaned. First, other people are seen as the most dominant single reason individuals are inconsistent and fail to resolve belief-behavior discrepancies. Second, internal barriers are seen as significant barriers and mentioned more frequently than external barriers. "Co-op" and "passive" internal barriers were mentioned in almost equal numbers. The subjects' responses reveal the complexity of the issue. They realize that other people, personal failures and situational forces come into play with relatively equal frequency.

concluded, the method of investigation then reflects the subject's own  
 choice. While it is possible to control the subject's choice of method

and

the subject's choice of method

the subject's choice of method

Christian Belief Base

Those claiming a Christian belief base offered a total of 50 internal and external barriers to consistency: 2-3 per subject. These suggested barriers can be organized into 14 internal and 3 external barriers. Only 10 subjects mentioned any external barriers while all 20 cited at least one internal barrier. The internal barriers can be organized into "co-op internal barriers" and "passive internal barriers." Table 26 summarizes the used those subjects claiming a Christian belief base made of these internal and external barriers.

Table 26--Discrepancy Resolution Barriers (C)

A. Internal Barriers (68%)	
1. Co-op Barriers	
a. Lack of Determination/Discipline	5
b. Lack of Motivation	4
c. Rationalization	4
d. Selfishness	4
e. Lack of Motivation	4
f. Habit	<u>2</u>
	23 (46%)
2. Passive Barriers	
a. Lack of Understanding/Awareness	4
b. Personality Flaws	2
c. Poor self image	1
d. Fear	1
e. Lack of faith	<u>1</u>
	11 (22%)
B. External Barriers (32%)	
1. Other People	9
2. The Situation	5
3. Family Background	<u>2</u>
	16

Several facts from this data should be noted. First, subjects claiming a Christian belief base were far more likely to blame inconsistencies or the failure to resolve inconsistencies on the "internal" barriers (mentioned 34 times, 68%) than the "external" barriers (mentioned 16 times, 32%). Even more striking is the fact that



almost half of the barriers mentioned were "co-op" barriers. These subjects laid the blame squarely on the shoulders of the person experiencing the discrepancy and most felt that the person actively contributed to their own inconsistency.

Table 27 ranks these barriers to discrepancy resolution by the number of times each was mentioned by subjects claiming a Christianly 3 belief base.

Table 27—Discrepancy Resolution Barriers By Frequency (C)

1. Other People	9	18%
2. Lack of Motivation/Discipline	5	10%
3. The Situation	5	10%
4. Lack of Understanding/Awareness	4	8%
5. Lack of Determination/Discipline	4	8%
6. Lack of Motivation	4	8%
7. Rationalization	4	8%
8. Habit	2	4%
9. Personality Flaws	2	4%
10. Family Background	2	4%
11. Poor Self Image	1	2%
12. Fear	1	2%
13. Lack of Faith	1	2%
	50	100%

Despite the dominance of internal barriers the most frequently mentioned barrier was "other people": an external barrier. This fact illustrates the great influence others people are seen as having on the behavior of others. Of the three most frequently mentioned barriers two are external. "The situation" was the third most frequently mentioned barrier. These subjects were also sensitive to the pressure real life situations place on an individual. Looked at in this way it becomes apparent that these subject, as a group, recognize the complexity of belief/behavior discrepancy. Certainly they feel that the individual must ultimately bear the responsibility for their own lives but the

about half of the carriers mentioned were "co-op" carriers. These

subjects laid the blame squarely on the shoulders of the person

expecting the carrier to be able to handle the person actively

confronted with the situation.

Table 27 shows these barriers to discrepancy resolution by the

number of times each was mentioned by subjects claiming a Christian

religion.

Table 27--Discrepancy Resolution Barriers

Barrier	Number of Times Mentioned
1. Lack of information	10
2. Lack of resources	8
3. Lack of time	7
4. Lack of motivation	6
5. Lack of ability	5
6. Lack of knowledge	4
7. Lack of interest	3
8. Lack of skill	2
9. Lack of experience	1
10. Lack of confidence	1



recognize important mitigating factors.

#### Non-Religious Belief Base

Those expressing a non-religious belief base were also asked to discuss the barriers to consistency. These 15 sited a total of 28 internal (63.6%) and 16 external (36.3%) barriers an average of nearly 3 barriers per subject. Ten of the subjects expressed both internal and external barriers. Two expressed only external barriers and 3 only internal barriers. Seven different internal barriers and three external barriers were mentioned. Again the internal barriers can be divided into "co-op" barriers and "passive" barriers. The barriers are summarized below in Table 28.

Table 28—Discrepancy Resolution Barriers (nr)

A. Internal Barriers (63.6%)	
1. Co-op Barriers	
a. Lack of Motivation	4
b. Rationalization	3
c. Religious Belief	2
d. Lack of Determination/Discipline	1
	10 (22.7%)
2. Passive Barriers	
a. Lack of Understanding/Awareness	7
b. Poor Self-Image	2
c. Fear	9
	18 (40.9%)
B. External Barriers (36.3%)	
1. Other People	11
2. Situation	4
3. Family Background	1
	16

Again, all three types of barriers are mentioned by those subjects claiming a non-religious belief base. Again, "other people" are the single most mentioned barrier to consistency. Passive barriers, especially fear, dominate the barriers mentioned. The emphasis in this

recognize important differences between

the two groups.

There is a significant difference

between the two groups.

There is a significant difference

between the two groups.

groups is on the impact of other people and fear. The fear the mentioned is of two types including: a) fear of other people and b) fear of the consequences of change.

### Comparisons and Comments

As Table 29 indicates the two groups of subjects dealt with this issue in a similar but not identical matter. External barriers and internal barriers of both types were mentioned by both groups. However emphasis was placed equally on several internal co-op barriers by those claiming a Christian belief base while their counter parts places the emphasis on fear and the other passive internal barriers. Both groups cited other people as the most frequently mentioned external barrier. Table 29 details the way both those claiming a Christian and those claiming a non-religious belief base view belief/behavior discrepancy resolution barriers.

Guilt for belief-behavior inconsistencies and the failure to resolve them lies at the feet of the individual's weaknesses and flaws, his fear and other people. A person must take responsibility for his own failures, but not all the blame. In striving for consistency a person is challenged by these barriers. Overcoming these barriers demands every available resource.



Table 29--Discrepancy Resolution Barriers (C and nr)

<u>Resolution Barriers</u>		<u>Christian</u>	<u>Non-Religious</u>
<u>A. Internal Barriers</u>			
1. Co-op Barriers			
a. Lack of Determination/Discipline	5	1	
b. Lack of Motivation	4	4	
c. Rationalization	4	3	
d. Selfishness	4		
e. Lack of Motivation	4		
f. Religious Beliefs		1	
g. Habit	2		
	23 (46%)	10 (22%)	
2. Passive Barriers			
a. Lack of Understanding/Awareness	4	7	
b. Personality Flaws	2		
c. Poor self image	1	2	
d. Fear	1	9	
e. Lack of faith	1		
	11 (22%)	18 (40.9%)	
<u>B. External Barriers</u>			
1. Other People	9	11	
2. The Situation	5	4	
3. Family Background	2	1	
	16 (32%)	16 (36%)	

Discrepancy Resolution Resources

The subjects were also asked to comment on the kind of things that are resources for people trying to resolve a belief-behavior discrepancy. A wide variety of possible discrepancy resolution resources were offered by the subjects. Like the discrepancy resolution barriers discussed earlier these barriers can be thought of as "internal," those personal qualities of individuals and "external," those resources outside the person.

Total Sample

A total of 83 different discrepancy resolution resources were mentioned by the subjects. About one quarter (25.4%) of them were

Table 22-Continued (continued)

Continued

1	2
3	4
5	6
7	8
9	10
11	12
13	14
15	16
17	18
19	20
21	22
23	24
25	26
27	28
29	30
31	32
33	34
35	36
37	38
39	40
41	42
43	44
45	46
47	48
49	50
51	52
53	54
55	56
57	58
59	60
61	62
63	64
65	66
67	68
69	70
71	72
73	74
75	76
77	78
79	80
81	82
83	84
85	86
87	88
89	90
91	92
93	94
95	96
97	98
99	100

1. Lack of information, knowledge, or skill  
 2. Lack of motivation  
 3. Lack of resources  
 4. Lack of time  
 5. Lack of opportunity  
 6. Lack of information, knowledge, or skill  
 7. Lack of motivation  
 8. Lack of resources  
 9. Lack of time  
 10. Lack of opportunity

"internal" resources and the rest (74.6%) were "external" resources. The most prominently mentioned external resources were "other people," "God/prayer" and "written material". The discrepancy resolution resources mentioned by the subjects are summarized in Table 30.

Table 30—Discrepancy Resolution Resources (ts)

Internal Resources	
a. Personal Strength	3
b. Past Experience	3
c. Personal Courage	3
d. Trust/Faith	2
e. Conscience/Principle	3
f. Vision of Future	1
g. Physical Health	1
h. Self Image	1
h. Reflection	<u>4</u>
	21
External Resources	
a. Other People	28
b. God/Prayer	13
c. Written Material/Bible	11
d. Family Background	3
e. Education	6
f. Time	<u>1</u>
	62

The two most frequently mentioned resources are both relational. When these subjects talked about "other people" as a discrepancy resolution resource they mentioned friends, family, counselor, ministers and the church. They saw these people as helping them by being supportive and encouraging, by listening, counseling, sharing their experiences, serving as role models or by just being there and caring. Those with a Christian belief-base looked to "God/prayer" as a source of spiritual help and power.

A second important insight revealed here is the focus of the group on external resources. The emphasis was clearly on the "external" side and clearly centered on significant relationships (whether with other

"internal" resources and the rest (74.6%) were "external" resources.

The most frequently mentioned external resources were "other people,"

"God/proper," and "spiritual resources." External resources were mentioned

resources mentioned by the subjects the majority of time 30.

# Internal Resources

## Internal Resources

- a. Personal life
- b. Self-worth
- c. Self-worth
- d. Self-worth
- e. Self-worth
- f. Self-worth
- g. Self-worth
- h. Self-worth
- i. Self-worth
- j. Self-worth



people or God). In fact over half of the times a resource was mentioned it involved one of these relationships. There is much less emphasis, by a 3-1 margin, and much less focus, on the "internal" resources. More individual "internal" resources are mentioned but far less frequently. These subjects have a firm grip on where people go to get help but not on the kind of person who will use that help.

A third insight that must be pointed out is the rarity with which education was mentioned as a resource by these subjects. Only six subjects mentioned any kind of educational experiences as a resource people tap to solve belief/behavior discrepancies. Eleven others mentioned reading material, including the Bible, accounts of other people's experiences, encouraging/inspirational material and study guides. What is particularly interesting is that these same subjects identified a step in the resolution process (which will be discussed at length later) involving a search for information. Gathering information is an important part of the resolution process but that information is not being gathered from formal educational experiences.

#### Christian Belief Base

Those twenty members of the sample who claimed a Christian belief base mentioned 16 different resources a total of 56 times: about 3 resources per subject. These resources can be organized into 8 "internal" resources and 6 "external" resources. Only 9 of these subjects mentioned any "internal" resources while 19 of the 20 mentioned one or more "external" resource. One subject named neither internal or external resources. Table 31 summarizes these results and demonstrates that despite the larger number of individual "internal" resources, the

people or God). In last year's bill of the House a provision was included which involved one of those organizations. That bill was later withdrawn by a 10-1 vote. The House of Representatives is now considering a bill which would "authorize" the Federal Bureau of Investigation to have a film strip on where people go to

work, but not on the kind of person who will use that help.

A third measure, which is the subject of the bill, is the

education of the public in the use of the law.

The bill is now in the hands of the Senate.

The bill is now in the hands of the Senate.

The bill is now in the hands of the Senate.

fewer "external" resources were mentioned far more frequently.

Table 31 demonstrates several features of the data. First, those subjects claiming a Christian belief base are very clear about where to look for discrepancy resolution resources: "other people". "Other people" are not only the most frequently mentioned resource but also the most frequently mentioned barrier. Second, education was rarely mentioned by these subjects as a discrepancy resolution resource. They mentioned family background more frequently than education. Finally, these subjects have a grip on the kind of internal resources they believed were in the resolution process.

Table 31--Discrepancy Resolution Resources (C)

Internal Resources

a. Personal Strength	3	5.4%
b. Past Experience	3	5.4%
c. Personal Courage	2	3.5%
d. Trust/Faith	2	3.5%
e. Conscience/Principle	2	3.5%
f. Vision of Future	1	1.8%
g. Physical Health	1	1.8%
h. Reflection	1	1.8%
	15	26.7%

External Resources

a. Other People	17	30.4%
b. God/Prayer	10	17.8%
c. Written Material/Bible	8	14.4%
d. Family Background	3	5.4%
e. Education	2	3.5%
f. Time	1	1.8%
	42	73.7%

Non-Religious Belief Base

Twenty-eight "internal" and "external" discrepancy resolution resources were listed by those subjects claiming a non-religious belief base. "Internal" resources made up 25% while "external" resources accounted for 75% of all the resources mentioned. A total of eight

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discrepancy resolution resources, four "internal" and four "external," were mentioned. Table 32 summarizes the discrepancy resolution resources mentioned by these subjects.

Table 32--Discrepancy Resolution Resources (nr)

Internal Resources			
a. Personal Courage	1	3.6%	
b. Conscience/Principle	2	7.1%	
c. Self Image	1	3.6%	
d. Reflection	3	10.7%	
	<u>7</u>	<u>25%</u>	
External Resources			
a. Other People	11	39.3%	
b. God/Prayer	3	10.7%	
c. Written Material/Bible	3	10.7%	
d. Education	4	14.3%	
	<u>21</u>	<u>75%</u>	

As with their Christian counterparts, "other people" were the dominant discrepancy resolution resource for these subjects. "Other people" accounted for 39.3% of all resources mentioned and out numbering all the "internal" resources combined. Those subjects claiming a non-religious belief base described these "other people" in various relationships including "supportive communities", counselors, family and friends. They looked to these people to give approval and support, to share their experiences and points of view and to give advice. While "education" was mentioned far less frequently than "other people," it was mentioned more frequently than any other single "internal" or "external" resource. These subjects mentioned college courses, seminars and non-print educational resources as valuable. Two of these subjects related their current educational dilemmas directly to an attempt to

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resolve a personal belief-behavior discrepancy.<sup>4</sup> Other subjects cited education as a way to gather information as part of the discrepancy resolution process. In short, education as a discrepancy resolution resource fared better with these subjects than with their Christian counterparts.

### Comparisons and Comments

The view of discrepancy resolution resources presented by those subjects claiming a non-religious belief base was somewhat different than their Christian counterparts. First, the number of internal resources listed by those claiming a non-religious belief base was far smaller (4) than the number (10) listed by their Christian counterparts. Second, while those claiming a non-religious belief base listed most of the same external resources cited by those claiming a Christian belief base, none of them cited "family background." None of the non-religious subjects mentioned "personal strength," "past experience," "faith," "a vision of the future" or "physical health" while none of those claiming a Christian belief base mentioned "self-image" among the "internal" resources. Those claiming a non-religious belief base excluded "time" and "family background" from their list of "external" resources. They also mentioned "God/prayer" far less and "education" far more than their

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<sup>4</sup>Both subject were women who had left school after high school. One was a very dissatisfied secretary who had returned to school in hopes of better employment. She viewed her present employment and lifestyle as inconsistent with what life ought to be. College became here ticket to resolving that discrepancy.

The other subject was also unhappy in her life. Unmarried and a single parent she felt that life was going no where. She had returned to school in hopes that it would restore her sense of purpose and meaning in life. She said, "I hoped it would help. It didn't."

include a personal belief statement. Other subjects also

submitted as a way to express information as part of the discussion

conclusion. The following is a summary of the discussion.

Conclusion

Conclusion

Conclusion



Christian counterparts. These differences are summarized in Table 33.

Table 33—Discrepancy Resolution Resources (C & nr)

<u>Discrepancy Resolution Resources</u>	<u>Christian</u>	<u>Non-Christian</u>
<u>Internal Resources</u>		
a. Personal Strength	3 (5.4%)	
b. Past Experience	3 (5.4%)	
c. Personal Courage	2 (3.5%)	1 (3.6%)
d. Trust/Faith	2 (3.5%)	
e. Conscience/Principle	2 (3.5%)	2 (7.1%)
f. Vision of Future	1 (1.8%)	
g. Physical Health	1 (1.8%)	
h. Self Image		1 (3.6%)
i. Reflection	1 (1.8%)	3 (10.7%)
	15 (26.7%)	7 (25%)
<u>External Resources</u>		
a. Other People	17 (30.4%)	11 (39.3%)
b. God/Prayer	10 (17.8%)	3 (10.7%)
c. Written Material/Bible	8 (14.3%)	3 (10.7%)
d. Family Background	3 (5.4%)	
e. Education	2 (3.5%)	4 (14.3%)
f. Time	1 (1.8%)	
	42 (73.2%)	21 (75%)

However, there were similarities between the two groups of subjects. The ratio at which "internal" resources were dominated by "external" resources was almost identical for both group (25% to 75%). The dominance of "other people" as the most frequently mentioned resource was another similarity. Several of the same "internal" and "external" discrepancy resolution resources mentioned by both groups of subjects.

#### Discrepancy Resolution Process

The final portion of the interview focused on the resolution process. The subjects were asked how they, or others, went about resolving a belief/behavior discrepancy situation. The focus, in this part of the interview, was on gaining insight into the mental processes

Chlorine compounds. These differences are presented in Table 1.

Table 1—Chlorine compounds (continued)

Chlorine compounds (continued)

Chlorine compounds

Chlorine compounds

Chlorine compounds

Chlorine compounds

Chlorine compounds

Chlorine compounds

Chlorine compounds

Chlorine compounds

by which adults seek resolutions to belief/behavior discrepancies. As with the other parts of the interview, several different perspectives were advanced by the subjects. Some of the subjects were unable to express any insight into the discrepancy resolution process. However, most of the subjects (32, 91.4%) were able to articulate a resolution process. From these varying accounts and perspectives a pattern emerged. While each subject shared a unique variation on the theme there was indeed a theme.

To this point, it has been useful to present the data by reviewing the total sample, to recount the peculiarities of those claiming a Christian and those claiming a non-religious belief base within the sample, and then to compare and contrast the two groups. This final section does not lend itself well, if at all, to that approach. While a pattern emerged the individual variations were considerable. Nor would it be helpful to try to present a Christian version and a non-religious version. At some points the two versions would be so similar as to be redundant and at other points so dissimilar as to make comparison impossible. It seems more profitable to present a unified, composite, picture of that process. Following this, specific variations on the composite theme, and a comparison of the similarities and differences the two groups of subjects demonstrated will be detailed. Finally a detailed account of the composite resolution process will be presented including definitions and descriptions of each step and supporting material from the data.

#### Resolution Process Composite

The composite picture of the discrepancy resolution process

in which certain new resolutions to collect/revise the  
 with the other parts of the material, covered different perspectives  
 were advanced by the same group. The resolutions were  
 expressed as follows into the discussion resolution record. However,  
 most of the resolutions (22, 21-44) were able to articulate a resolution  
 from these varying documents and perspectives. Further  
 While on the one hand, the resolutions of the group

there was then

To it is

the first

the first

the first

described by the subjects is presented here in outline form. This approach provides an overview of both the elements that make up the process and its "flow" or "direction".

### Discrepancy Resolution Process"

#### Step I: Awareness of Discrepancy

- A. Internal Sources of Awareness
  - 1. Conscience
  - 2. Personal Reflection and Insight
  - 3. Holy Spirit/Prayer
- B. External Sources of Awareness
  - 1. Other People
    - a. Through Confrontation
    - b. Through Shared Insight
  - 2. Personal Incident or Experience
  - 3. Information
  - 4. Personal Crisis
- C. Impact of Awareness
  - 1. Internal Prodding/Motivation
  - 2. Denial/Anger/Frustration
  - 3. Choice

#### Step II: Deliberation

- A. The Search
  - 1. For Information
  - 2. For Advice
  - 3. For Support
- B. The Evaluation
  - 1. Of the Consequences
    - a. Present Behavior
    - b. Future Action
  - 2. Alternate Plans
  - 3. Principles
  - 4. Self
- C. Desire

#### Step III: Decision

- A. Determining a Course of Action
  - 1. Setting Aside Alternatives
  - 2. Counting the Cost
- B. Committing to a Course of Action
- C. Desire

dedicated to the subject of American art in various forms. The

document provides an overview of both the current state of the

process and the "history"

of the "history"

of the

## Step IV: Action

A. Taking the First Step

B. Discipline

C. Perseverance

Variations on the Process

Obviously, this is a composite drawn from the data. Not all of the subjects mentioned all four major steps. Nor did those subjects that mentioned all four major steps include all the sub-steps that expand the meaning of those major steps. Of the thirty-five subjects four (2 from each group) were unable to describe any process, fourteen (3 from the non-religious group and 11 from the religious group) describe processes that included some but not all of the major steps and 17 of the subjects (10 from the non-religious group and 7 from the Christian group) describe processes that included all four major steps. Table 34 summarizes the partial processes and the variations as presented by both those claiming a Christian and those claiming a non-religious belief base.

Table 34 Partial Resolution Process

Partial Process Steps	Christian	Non-Religious	Total
a. Steps 1, 3 and 4	7	1	8
b. Steps 1, 2, and 4	1	1	2
c. Steps 1 and 2	2		2
d. Steps 1 and 3	1		1
e. Steps 1 and 4		1	1

Several things should be noted from these results. First, all of the subjects, except those who could relate no resolution process, mentioned the importance of "awareness" to the discrepancy resolution process. Second, with those exceptions and three others, all of the

Step IV: Section  
A. Taking the First Step

B. Mapping

C. Measurement

Validation on the X-axis

Step V:

Mapping



subjects saw a direct link between "awareness" of a discrepancy and "action." Third, with two exceptions, there is virtually no difference between those claiming a Christian belief base and their non-religious counterparts. The first exception is the much higher rate at which the non-religious subjects cited a four step process (66% for the non-religious subjects to 35% of the Christian subjects). The other exception is that those claiming a Christian belief base mentioned "partial process "a" far more than their non-religious counterparts (7 to 1). The absence of the "deliberation" step from the process described by those 7 subjects claiming a Christian belief base is unaccounted for in the data.

#### Review of the Process

The subjects described a four step discrepancy resolution process that included: A) Awareness; B) Deliberation; C) Decision; and D) Action. Each of these major steps is made of component parts and will be discussed in turn.

Awareness is the first of the major steps. Three major component parts make up this step: a) the internal sources of awareness; b) the external sources of awareness; and c) the impact of that awareness. As a concept used by these subjects, "awareness" is more than the knowledge of an inconsistency. Rather, it is the crystallization of the discrepancy as something that must be dealt with. The subjects talked about this crystallization as ". . . a point of climax . . .," ". . . the straw that broke the camel's back . . .," ". . . hitting bottom . . .," feeling ". . .nauseated . . .," ". . . sick of . . ." and ". . . coming to . . ." one's self. It is clear, from their discussion,

objects are a direct line between "concrete" and "abstract" and "action". This is the only way in which we can understand the objects and their relations.

concrete objects  
non-relational  
non-relational  
non-relational

that knowing a discrepancy exists is not the same as "awareness" of the discrepancy. A known discrepancy will go untended until a point of "awareness" is reached and the discrepancy can no longer be ignored.

The first of the component parts of "awareness" are the internal sources of awareness. The subjects felt that certain internal processes contribute to the sense of urgency that is at the heart of this concept of awareness. These internal sources of awareness are the ways people make themselves aware of belief/behavior discrepancies. They function as an internal warning and guidance system. The internal sources of "awareness" described by the subjects are: a) the conscience; b) insight via personal reflection; and c) the work of the Holy Spirit and prayer. Some of the subjects that ". . . people know what's right from wrong . . ." and are ". . . born with the ability to recognize . . ." that difference.

The subjects also listed a number of sources of "awareness" that are external to the individual. These external sources of awareness are the ways a persons interactions with life contribute to an "awareness" of a belief/behavior discrepancy. External sources of awareness include: a) other people; b) a life incident or experience; c) information; and d) a personal crisis. As an external source of awareness other people are seen as functioning in two distinct ways. The first is direct confrontation. In a confrontation of this sort, one individual would confront another with what they perceive as a belief/behavior discrepancy in the other person. A second way others act as an external source of awareness is through shared insight. As people share their life experiences and insights with each other they help each other become aware of inconsistencies and the need for change.



In addition to other people the subjects mention three other external sources of awareness. Personal experience, information and a personal crisis were also external sources of awareness. They all serve the discrepancy resolution process by confronting individuals with life situations that cannot be ignored. In the process of dealing with these life events the individual is confronted with their own belief/behavior inconsistencies. It is life itself and the individuals interactions with life that create opportunities for "awareness."

One feature of "awareness" that shouldn't be overlooked is the sense of urgency it creates. These subjects described it in different ways including a ". . . prodding . . .," or reaching the ". . . down time of my life-I was sick of myself . . .," or coming to a place where "I had to do something", or ". . . your conscience keeps bugging you . . ." until some action is taken to resolve the discrepancy. Several subjects talked about being aware of the discrepancy but not dealing with it until something,, a confrontation, experience or crisis, crystallized that knowledge into "awareness" and helped create a sense of urgency. Implied in these comments is the insight that simply knowing one is inconsistent is insufficient grounds for action. That knowledge must be somehow transformed into something that has to be dealt with. In their view this sense of urgency fueled the resolution process.

Several subjects described "awareness", the sense of urgency, in terms of a struggle. It takes ". . . the straw that breaks the camels back . . ." and even then there is a sense of ". . . denial and struggle . . ." and, perhaps, ". . . anger . . ." directed at the self and others. Other subjects described the difficulty of accepting

[illegible]

... ..

[illegible]

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"awareness" as finally "... facing the facts ...", or "... coming back ..." to reality. "Awareness" was not welcomed as a friend but seen as something to be resisted until it can no longer be denied. Once the denial has been resolved and awareness of the discrepancy has been accepted the person can continue the discrepancy resolution process can continue.

In the final component part of this step, a person must decide to proceed with the resolution process or to retreat the discrepancy. The process can be terminated at this early point if the individual chooses to deny, ignore or retreat from their sense of "awareness". Despite the feelings of urgency so many of the subjects mentioned, several subjects pointed out that even at the point of "awareness" a person experiencing a belief/behavior discrepancy can turn his back on those feelings. As one subject put it, even when "... people know ... they are doing something they don't believe in ... they can block it out of their minds ... " Or as another said its possible to "... stop half-way in the middle."

Deliberation is the second step of the discrepancy resolution process. The period of deliberation was characterized by one subject as a time people ask "How do I change it ? How do I make it right ?" Another subject described it as trying to "... find a way to repair the damage ..." caused by the discrepancy. The subjects talked about "... lying awake nights ...," "... dwelling on it ...," and "... settling things ..." in their own minds.

Within this step can be seen two distinct components. This is a





time of searching and a time of evaluation. Aware of a belief-behavior discrepancy individuals are searching for: a) information; b) advice; and c) support. In short, it is a time of searching for the resources that can help the individual overcome the discrepancy and achieve the desired changes. By far the most frequently mentioned resource the subjects were searching for was the support of others. Information to help resolve a discrepancy situation is sought through formal educational experiences, but more often informal sources readily available to the subject. The advice of respected others is another key resources they search for.

Evaluation is the second component of the deliberation step. The subjects described a person experiencing a belief/behavior discrepancy as evaluating: a) the discrepancy; b) various solutions; c) consequences of the discrepant behavior and the possible solutions; and d) the individual's values and principles. In evaluating the discrepancy the subjects felt that those experiencing a belief/behavior discrepancies were concerned with its significance in their lives and others. "Does it matter?," "Is it hurting anyone?," "What difference does it make?" are they types of questions people ask during the deliberation step. The subjects felt that those experiencing a belief/behavior discrepancy were also evaluating possible resolutions and weighing the feasibility, merit and consequences of various courses of action. Finally, some of the subjects point out that individuals take a long, hard look at themselves: their principles, values and dreams.

Decisions is the third step described by the subjects in the resolution process. At some point, the individual experiencing a



belief/behavior discrepancy was seen, by the subjects, as having to make up his mind. The decision step can be seen as having three component parts. The individual must: a) set a course of action; b) commit to **that course** of action; and c) desire the change. In setting a course of action the individual must not only select the one course, deemed most appropriate from the alternatives, but must also "**... set *Generally* aside . . .**" other possible resolution strategies. In setting this course of action the individual must also think through "**... what it takes . . .**" to achieve that course of action. Commitment to that course of action was mentioned by a few subjects. They felt that it is not enough for an individual experiencing a belief/behavior discrepancy to select a course of action. They must also commit themselves to that course of action. Finally, there must be a desire to see the decision through. A person has to "**... want to . . .**" solve the discrepancy.

Action is the final step of the discrepancy resolution process. The subjects felt that at some point an individual experiencing a belief/behavior discrepancy must "**... take the step . . .**" necessary to resolve the discrepancy. If the process does not result in action it has failed. The kind of action to be taken is described by these subjects in different ways. One must be; "**... disciplined to carry it out . . .**," "**... draw on their inner strength . . .**," "**... work on it . . .**," and "**... try to do it the best . . .**" they can. The subjects placed a premium not only on action but on effort, discipline and perseverance. Changes are not immediate and they are not easy. They demand great effort, great persistence and great dedication.

believed that the character of the subject, as having to make up his mind. The decision may be made in having three separate parts. The individual subject is not a member of the group, but is a member of the group.

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action the individual

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### Reflections

What should not be overlooked in this analysis of the process is that the subjects often described the process in light of a personally experienced belief-behavior discrepancy resolution. Of course, some were more analytical and theoretical but the most helpful insights came from those subjects who reflected on their own experiences. Generally these subjects discussed the process in light of a fairly serious situation. These ranged from religious conversion, resolution of family difficulties, divorce, and even immigration to the United States from a country engaged in a civil war. These major issues in their lives were viewed as belief/behavior discrepancies and resolved using this process.

### Summary of Results

Research Question 1: What are the contexts in which adults become aware of discrepancies between belief and behavior?

Adults became aware of their belief/behavior discrepancies through external and internal sources. The most prominent external sources are other people and a personal crisis or other experience. Internally, people became aware through their conscience and through reflection on their own lives. Educational experiences don't seem to play a major role in the awareness. It plays a role but is overshadowed by other forces. There are predictable barriers and resources to discrepancy awareness and resolution. It seems to be part process and part sudden impact. The sense of awareness may build over a considerable time but through crisis or confrontation be suddenly crystallized into something that must be dealt with.



Research Question 2: By what criteria does an adult evaluate the importance of a given area of discrepancy between belief and behavior?

Adults evaluate these discrepancy around a number of different criteria. However, the impact of the discrepancy on self and others plays a major role. What is more significant is the perceptual and evaluative functioning of the "core value" used to judge discrepancies. In a very real sense the adult can and does shape his own reality. Belief/behavior discrepancy is not as objective as it may seem. An individual may be observed behaving in a way that seems inconsistent to another but is perfectly consistent with his own shaping of reality.

Research Question 3: Toward what end does an awareness of discrepancy between belief and behavior motivate the adult?

Clearly a discrepancy, crystallized into awareness and demanding action, motivates the adult to resolve the discrepancy by changing behavior. Under certain specific conditions it is possible for the adult to change nothing or change belief. Motivating the resolution process is the negative view most seem to have of inconsistency and the benefits gathered from being consistent.

Research Question 4: How do those motivated by an awareness of discrepancies between belief and behavior seek to resolve them?

The resolution process already discussed is the primary vehicle for resolution. For the resolution to be successful the adult must have available and utilize internal and external resources. Beyond those resources the individuals willingness to confront the inconsistency and deal with it in some meaningful way remain the key.

Research Question 1: Do men and women have an equal number of

relationships of a given type in a given year? (b) Do men and women

have an equal number of relationships of a given type in a given

year? (c) Do men and women have an equal number of relationships

of a given type in a given year? (d) Do men and women have an

equal number of relationships of a given type in a given year?

What is more significant in the present study and

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Research Question 5: When dealing with discrepancies between belief and behavior, what differences exist between those adults who claim a Christian belief base and those who do not?

While specific difference between these two groups have already been pointed out it should be noted that in most areas the two groups are very similar. However throughout the areas analyzed the faith position colors the perspective. It would be wrong to say that the groups are identical. The structure both groups use to evaluate and resolve discrepancies are very similar. Their insights are much the same. However, the religious persuasion of the subject does influence and color the data.

...the differences between these two groups have already been pointed out. It should be noted that in most cases the two groups are very similar. However, it is noted that the differences between the two groups are not always the same. In some cases, the differences are very small, while in other cases, they are very large. This is due to the fact that the two groups are not always the same. In some cases, the two groups are very similar, while in other cases, they are very different. This is due to the fact that the two groups are not always the same. In some cases, the two groups are very similar, while in other cases, they are very different. This is due to the fact that the two groups are not always the same.

## Chapter 5: Conclusions

"No overt behavior is simply external because the whole person, and nothing but the whole person, is engaged in a particular overt behavior" (Lee 1985, p. 613).

### The Discrepancy Dilemma

The existence of belief/behavior discrepancies, as has been discussed in the literature, is something of a dilemma. Some question their reality and others question their significance. This section will focus on those two important issues. While this will involve some rehearsal of what has been said before, it is a necessary first step. The implications one sees for adults and education depends largely on how these two questions are answered.

### The Reality Question

Is there such a thing as a real belief/behavior discrepancy or is it merely a verbal parlor trick? There are those who contend that such discrepancies are indeed real and those who claim they are not. The majority of attitude-behavior research, since the days of LaPiere, has assumed that such discrepancies are indeed real. The assumption has



been made that people hold certain beliefs or attitudes but for one reason or another fail to act on them. Beginning with that assumption these researchers have focused on the variables and mitigating factors that interfere with consistency. Many, who have taken this approach, want to understand the process by an almost mathematical formula. If all the variables can be identified, properly weighted and related, behavior, based on attitude, can be predicted. Belief and behavior are connected but that connection can be broken.

Others have taken a very different approach. They contend that to talk of belief/behavior discrepancies is to use a contradiction in terms. A behavior that is inconsistent with one attitude is axiomatically and automatically consistent with another. Rather than focusing on the variables that interrupt the belief/behavior connection, they have focused on understanding the way beliefs are organized and interact with one another. For these, behavior is always consistent with one belief or another. A given behavior might not be consistent with espoused beliefs and may even surprise the individual and others but it is consistent with some belief.

The subjects interviewed in this study did little to resolve this issue. They contended, on the one hand, that people can and do act inconsistently. On the other hand, they expressed a view that belief and behavior are very closely linked. In fact, behavior reveals true belief and what is really important to the individual. While holding that some external factors prevent consistency and the resolution of inconsistency, they blamed flaws in character and other internal factors as the cause of inconsistency. As a group, the subjects believed that discrepancies could be resolved and that there were resources available.

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reason or another fail to see the other. Beginning with that assumption

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At the same time, they talked about belief/behavior discrepancies as a reality they had experienced, observed in others, that is resolvable they talked about the consistency between behavior and "real" or "strongly held" belief.

~~sub-~~This case of "double vision" can be illustrated by way the subjects dealt with discrepancies observed in others as opposed to personally experienced discrepancies. The subjects were more likely (by a 2 to 1 margin) to describe, and see as significant, a belief/behavior discrepancy observed in another. Only about half the subjects were aware of and willing to recount personally experienced examples of belief/behavior discrepancies. However, if a person is aware of his own belief/behavior discrepancy he equally likely to regard it as most significant as a discrepancy observed in another. The reality of these discrepancies seems to turn on the value system used to judge discrepancies. However, the recognition and evaluation of personally experienced belief/behavior discrepancies is a significant issue that has a direct bearing on the reality question.

Several explanations for this result could be advanced. First, it is possible that the subjects are less aware of their own discrepancies than the discrepancies of others. Only a little more than half of the subjects could list any personal examples of belief/behavior discrepancy. Three of the subjects could list only 2 examples and 1 subject could list no examples. Some subjects simply chose not to notice discrepancies regarding them as ". . . not important enough . . ." to remember. Others simply wanted to take ". . . people as they are . . ." and accepted such discrepancies as normal.





Second, it is possible that the subjects were less willing to admit, to the researcher, their own perceived failures than those of other. Substantiating this view would be the finding that belief/behavior discrepancies are viewed with distain by many of the subjects. This fact is illustrated by one subjects who, when asked to cite personal examples of belief/behavior discrepancies, replied, "I'm not that kind of person!" Some subjects extended that attitude to others and believed, as one subject put it, ". . . 98% of the people act consistently . . ." with what they believe.

On the other hand these same subjects feel that an individual's belief system is at the foundation of behavior, that true beliefs are revealed by behavior and that true or real beliefs will be expressed in behavior. These three interlocking ideas are important to an understanding of the whole notion of the reality of belief/behavior discrepancies. When viewed from this perspectives belief/behavior discrepancies can exist and can be explained. In a way, these subjects felt, it is possible to "have your cake and eat it too." Discrepancies occur with espoused or weak beliefs. When consistency between belief and behavior occurs strongly held or "real" beliefs are revealed. In one sense, the discrepancy that occurs is between "kinds" of beliefs not between belief and behavior.

This perspective is illustrated by the subjects' use of the "change belief" resolution strategy. By an overwhelming margin, the subjects felt that an individual who resolves a discrepancy by the "change belief" strategy should strengthen an existing belief or change an inferred belief. This approach to changing beliefs by changing the intensity of the belief underscores the linkage the subjects saw between

Second, it is possible that the subjects were less willing to admit to the researcher that they perceived behavior than those of other, nonresearching individuals. This would be the case if the belief/behavior discrepancies are viewed with disfavor. If, on the other hand, the fact is illustrated by one subject who, when asked to give personal examples of belief/behavior discrepancies, replied, "I'm not that kind of person!" Then subjects did not view the discrepancy as others and believed that they were not that kind of person.

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belief and behavior. A discrepant behavior is the result of a weak or unclear belief. If one simply clarifies and/or strengthens his belief he will become consistent.

Further illustrating this view is the way type "A" beliefs were assigned to the "change belief" resolution strategy. In dealing with these the beliefs the subjects wanted changed were inferred by the subject and not stated in the description of the discrepancy. The link between belief and behavior was so strong in the minds of some of the subjects that they could only account for a given behavior by an inferred belief. Once the "straw-man" belief was stuffed with inference the subjects could deal with the discrepancy. Linked to that concept is the assumption that once an inferred belief was changed the discrepant behavior would also change.

The third way subjects wanted those described in the discrepancy situations to "change belief" was to make a real change. Again the implication is that a change in belief will result in a change in behavior. While this approach was the least utilized by the subjects it further reflects the strong link the subjects saw between belief and behavior.

This view point is a little inconsistent with the subjects own descriptions of personally experienced discrepancies and those observed in others. If the link between belief and behavior is as they have described then a true belief/behavior discrepancy is impossible. While an individual may not act consistently with an espoused or weak belief they will always act consistently with a "real" belief. If one begins with the premise that belief is the foundation of behavior and expresses and reveals true belief, then, its difficult to contend that real

policy and behavior. A dominant behavior is the result of a set of  
 and/or policy. It is not a policy. It is a behavior. It is a behavior.  
 It will be a behavior.

Policy

Policy

Policy

belief/behavior discrepancies exist. Yet all of the subjects cited 2-5 examples of personally experienced discrepancies and those observed in others.

**This apparent** logical contradiction can be addressed in three ways. First, discrepancies observed in another can only compare espoused belief and behavior. Therefore, what appears as inconsistent to another may not be regarded as inconsistent by the person being observed. Second, apparent discrepancies may reflect the "bumping" of a lower order belief by a belief that is higher on the belief hierarchy. Behavior regarded as inconsistent with a belief at one level may be completely consistent with a "more real" belief. In this view it is possible to assert consistency, inconsistency, belief leading to behavior and behavior revealing true belief, at the same time.

A third possible explanation is to assert that people sometimes find themselves in "no win" situations. They feel caught between two more or less equally held beliefs. In this situation the individual will be inconsistent with one or more of their values regardless of their course of action.<sup>5</sup> While these explanations do not remove the inherent inconsistency in the positions taken by the subject they do

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<sup>5</sup>One subject share such an occurrence. The subject strongly opposed abortion on religious and moral grounds. At one point a young friend of the subject became pregnant and desired an abortion. She made the appointment and went for the abortion intending to pay with a check drawn on an out of state bank. The physician, however, insisted on being paid in cash. Unable to cash the check made out to the physician and not having sufficient funds to pay for the abortion the young woman sought help from the subject and asked for loan. The subject expressed the feeling that while she did not want to assist in the abortion in any way she was also outraged by the physicians action and strongly desired to help her friend. Action consistent with one strongly held belief meant being inconsistent with another. The subject could not avoid discrepant behavior.



provide insight into the subjects views on the reality of belief/behavior discrepancies.

As is so often the case, the best answer to the reality question may not be real or unreal but real and unreal. The question of the reality of discrepancies, perhaps, deserves a more subtle approach. Better questions should be asked than questioning the reality of belief/behavior discrepancies. When do adults feel that a discrepancy is real? under what conditions? at what level? From the literature and the research a different kind of image emerges. This perspective is not based so much on sociological and psychological research as it is based on the "inside-out" perspective of the subjects. The question isn't are discrepancies an objective, philosophical and logical reality. But do people feel that their behavior, and the behavior of others, is inconsistent with what is believed. As with many facets of human experience the perception is as important as the reality.

Rokeach and those who follow his approach maybe, and probably are, correct. The subjects of this study would agree. A person's behavior does stem from a belief and in some way reveals belief. The discrepancies occur at the belief level and are only revealed through behavior. But, that does not change the realness of the feelings. There is a struggle. There are times when people follow a less noble belief and feel they have failed and are ashamed. The important reality is that adults experience discrepancies between what they, at one level want to do, and what they actually do. Dismissing the experience on the logical notion that since all behavior stems from and is consistent with a belief no behavior can really be inconsistent isn't much consolation.

Clearly, again following Rokeach, beliefs are organized and to some

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the research, it is not possible to determine the exact number of people who have been affected by the disease.

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degree hierarchical. These subjects see the organization and contend that behavior is most likely to follow the more central, more strongly held beliefs than others. So discrepancies between espoused beliefs, practical reality and deeply held convictions are inevitable. Since life demands that belief be translated into action belief/behavior discrepancies will occur. That fact requires consideration of possible actions, establishing a priority or hierarchy of beliefs to guide the behavior, and, ultimately, inconsistency with one belief caused by consistency with another.

From the "inside-out" perspective belief/behavior discrepancies are real enough. Belief/behavior discrepancies often come down to choosing between acting on the vision of what ought to be and acting on the reality of what is. One's beliefs of what ought to be, the kind of person he or she wants to be, and the desire to fulfill that dream are in conflict with what is: what has been previously experienced, chosen and the risks inherent in acting on the dream. Which ever road is taken inconsistency will result. If the individual follows his dreams they may be seen as not using "common sense" or "kidding themselves". If the individual faces hard reality and act accordingly they can lose the dream and, with it, the possibility of a new reality. Life is full of such conflicts. Some are little issues but some of life's most significant issues are only solved by dealing with belief/behavior discrepancies.

#### Significance of Belief/Behavior Discrepancies

But does it matter? Is belief/behavior consistency important? These questions can be addressed at different levels. At one level

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Behavior, 2000, 11(1), 1-10

consistency and the trust it breeds between people is the fuel society runs on. It is hard, if not impossible, to imagine what a human society would be like if there were no consistency between what people say and what they do. Chaos may be the only inadequate word that comes close to a world without consistency. Indeed, many of the ills a society, any society, experiences can be traced to individuals who know the "better" but do not do that "better." Everything from drug abuse to political scandal can, in one way or another, be traced to inconsistency between what one knows ought to be done and what is actually done.

But consistency and the resolution of belief/behavior discrepancies may be most significant at an individual level. After all, a society is the interactions of its individual members. Many of life's most significant issues can be seen as discrepancies between belief and behavior. Further more, facing and resolving discrepancies can be viewed as beneficial to the individual. Discrepancies present unique opportunities for growth and development, enhance self awareness and, when successfully resolved, provide the individual with a sense of well being. While the notion of significance is certainly relative, depending on the person and the situation, no one can argue that belief/behavior consistency is a trivial issue.

The subjects clearly value belief/behavior consistency as a quality of life desirable in themselves and others. They regard inconsistency as a moral failure. This perspective both helps and hinders the discrepancy resolution process. First, it assures some degree of motivation for resolution. Since consistency is viewed as a good thing, a worthy goal, and inconsistency is viewed as a bad thing to be avoided, individuals may be willing to invest the time and energy needed to

consistency and the trust it breeds between people in the local society runs out. It is hard, if not impossible, to imagine what a human society would be like if there were no consistency between what people say and what they do. Consistency is the only insurance we have against chaos in a world without consistency. Indeed, many of the life of a society, any society, hinges on the consistency of individuals who know the "better" and choose to do that "better." And it is this consistency that makes a society possible, in the first place. It is this consistency that makes a society possible, in the first place. It is this consistency that makes a society possible, in the first place. But one more thing, it is this consistency that makes a society possible, in the first place.

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resolve belief/behavior discrepancies.

However, this perspective could also hinder the discrepancy resolution process. Regarding inconsistency so negatively could make the individual hesitant to admit to a belief/behavior discrepancy. In addition it could lead an individual to rationalize and avoid the discrepancy. Admitting to the discrepancy could also hinder one's self image and confidence thus injuring the person's ability to resolve the discrepancy.

In short, the subjects believe that a person should be consistent, view those who engage in belief/behavior inconsistencies negatively and see both positive and negative motivations for consistency.

#### Discrepancies and the Adult

When an adult confronts a belief/behavior dilemma a number of factors come into play; the nature and function of "core values", relationships, and other factors.

#### The Vision

One of the most significant issues that came up in this research was the role of a "core value". Individuals seemed to evaluate belief/behavior discrepancies by using a centrally held value. While many different values were expressed and different individuals talked about it in different ways several common threads were found. Two of these dealt with the nature and function of these "core values".

The nature of core value. Lawrence Kohlberg advanced the notion that an individual's stage of moral development could be determined by

reactive behavior/behavior characteristics.

However, this perspective could also hinder the development

of a more comprehensive understanding of the individual's role in

the individual's behavior. In addition, it could also

lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the individual's

behavior. In addition, it could also lead to a more comprehensive

understanding of the individual's behavior. In addition, it could

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the cognitive structure, the principle, used to deal with a moral dilemma. His contention that the cognitive structure, not a person's "bag of virtues" or feelings, is the primary determinant of moral judgment. Additionally, Kohlberg contends that those at higher stages are more likely to act consistently with their principles because these higher principles are more adequate. This view has had profound impact on the way moral thought and behavior is viewed.

Rokeach, coming from another direction, arrived at a similar conclusion. He felt that individual beliefs, about what is true or false and good or bad, focused in a given situation form attitudes. At the pinnacle of this hierarchy are a few values, single beliefs, that transcend specific situations and guide the individual's actions. Rokeach differs from Kohlberg in that Rokeach sees the possibility of a view such values and Kohlberg contends that virtue is found in one principle; justice.

Despite their differences Kohlberg and Rokeach come to much the same place. Individual moral thought and action can be traced to cognitive structures, variously called principle or values. The subjects in this study would agree that there are "core values" that serve as the primary guides to behavior. Several important features of core value need to be pointed out. First, these values are strongly linked to an individual's self-image (i.e. "I am an honest person!"). Second, they are entirely subjective (i.e. "That's what I think is really important."). What's one judges as good, bad or indifferent is ultimately an individual issue. Such judgments are always, and can only, be made from the "inside-out." Finally "core values" provide the cognitive structure, the means of thought, for dealing with moral issues

The cognitive structure, the principle, used to deal with a moral dilemma. His contention that the cognitive structure, not a person's "bag of virtues or feelings," is the basis of moral judgment.

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in general and belief/behavior discrepancies in particular.

The function of core values. These "core values" seem to provide three important structural functions. First, they are the primary organizing principle. They are used to establish what is important or trivial and to establish priorities. This is a very useful and needed function. In making a judgment or evaluating an action the individual must sort through a myriad of facts, beliefs, opinions and ideas. Without a functioning set of "core values" or a principle upon which to make decision any action, and any judgment or evaluation becomes impossible. Everything else in the belief-system universe orbits around these few key ideas.

The power of these "core values" is the ability to shape any situation and value so that any desired behavior is regarded as consistent. One of the subjects, who claims a Christian belief base, stated a "core value" of ". . .the kind of person I want to be with myself and others . . ." by which he evaluated examples of belief/behavior discrepancies. In his view the worst kind of discrepancies were those in which a person was perceived as violating self. In this context he recounted his pre-marital sexual activity as an example of a belief/behavior inconsistency. While recognizing such behavior as discrepant with his Christian commitment he perceived it as the least significant of the discrepancies he described. Since, he perceived the behavior as consistent with his "core value" such conduct was almost trivial, despite the prohibitions of his faith. In short, by way of the "core value", he created a reality in which the violation of the teachings of his faith was not a significant discrepancy.

in general and belief/behavior change in particular.

The function of each of these "tools" will be to provide

three important functions: first, they are designed

organizing knowledge. They are used to establish what is important or

critical to establish information. This is a very useful and needed

function. In making a change of belief or behavior, the individual

must sort through a great deal of information and

without a framework or structure to organize the information

make decisions about what to believe or do.

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A second important function these "core values" seem to carry out is perceptual. They help create a persons view of reality, the self, others and moral conduct and content. Not only are they organized differently but they are perceived differently. To a certain degree what one holds as a value shapes the reality he experiences. The same incident will have vastly different meaning for different individuals based on what they valued. This perceptual function is important to the discrepancy resolution process. Obviously, one is not likely to resolve a discrepancy of which one is not aware.

One subject, who had failed to keep two previous appointments with the researcher, expressed her view that people should do what they say and that she was the kind of person who kept her word. Examples of failures to do so by other people were judged, by the subject, as a very serious belief/behavior discrepancies. In the discussion she denied that her behavior was in any way inconsistent with her belief. She excused her own failure to keep her appointments with the researcher on the basis that she ". . . had other things to do . . ." and that she didn't know the researcher and he wasn't her friend. Despite the objective fact, that she had given her word and not kept it, she did not perceive her behavior as inconsistent. Apparently, the espoused belief was modified by a more basic "core value" that may or may not have been expressed in her explanations.

Finally, they serve an evaluative function. Not only to they shape a persons view or reality, organize beliefs into systems but are the primary basis for judging the "rightness", "wrongness", "consistency" or "inconsistency" of attitude and action. An action that would be judged as inconsistent by one will be judged as consistent by another. The way

A second important function these "core values" seem to carry out is perceptual. They help create a personal view of reality, the self, others and social context. In other words, they organize and interpret reality in a personally meaningful way. The same values one holds as a value shape the reality he experiences. The same individuals have vastly different meanings for different individuals.

subjects handled situations they judged to require a "change nothing" resolution strategy illustrates the evaluative function of "core values." Certain discrepancy situations were regarded as "impotent" or "justified" on the basis the persons values.

Such an evaluation has an important bearing on the discrepancy resolution process. A belief/behavior discrepancy that is evaluated as "impotent" or "justified", by the person experiencing it, is not likely to get the attention others may feel it deserves. This is particularly crucial at the awareness step of the resolution process. It is, difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a situation in which a discrepancy was evaluated as "impotent" or "justified" and in which the person had a sense of urgency to resolve it.

The significance of this evaluative function can be seen in the way the subjects dealt with certain discrepancy situations. One of the situations used in this study, no. 9, dealt with a catholic's struggle with papal authority. The fact that all the subjects were protestant or expressed a non-religious belief base impacted the way they dealt with this issue. They were far more likely to resolve this discrepancy by the "change belief" resolution strategy than the other two discrepancies of the same belief type. The same situation existed for discrepancy situation no. 13 which dealt with superstition. In dealing with both of these situations many of the subjects expressed their personal objections to the doctrine of papal authority and superstitious belief as the reason for their selection of the "change belief" resolution strategy.

The way the subjects discussed the evaluative function of their "core values" also provides needed insight. What may appear as

negative panelled situations they judged to require a "change nothing"

reaction strategy. (In general, the average ratings of "none"

values "Current situation")

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inconsistent at the level of an externally taught belief or an espoused belief may not be at all inconsistent at the core or evaluative level. Apparent discrepancies may not be the result of personality flaws, a lack of information or moral weakness, as has so often been suggested. But rather a function of the way an individual is ordering their own world by their "core values".

Before discussing the significance of these "core values" it should be pointed out that there is a role for specific moral content. Kohlberg rejected the notion of teaching a "bag of virtues" in favor of moral development. Two issues should be pointed out. First, specific moral content is important. It is the grist for the mill. Moral content challenges, modifies and may even displace, to a small degree, a core value. Second, any specific piece of moral content can be shaped, perceived, judged and fit into a person's moral organization by the more powerful "core value".<sup>6</sup>

Finally, this finding is extremely significant. The ability to organize life and shape reality around a "core value" means that anything is possible depending on where one starts and the paths taken. Anything can be judged as good (even Auschwitz) and anything can be judged as insignificant. More important, any belief, value or virtue can be transformed and made to fit. So much effort has been placed on teaching specific moral behavior or providing information in the hope

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<sup>6</sup>A striking example of this was presented by one of the subjects. A person, who claimed that honesty was the most important thing, recounted an incident in which she engaged in lying and deceit. The behavior was judged as relatively insignificant because she had acted "honestly with herself". The honesty that was so important to her was not the abstract principle but one perceived, modified, and shaped to fit her own real "core value".

inconsistent at the level of an extremely broad belief in an ordered  
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that it will make a difference. When in fact whatever moral teaching or information is provided will be transformed by the individual. In this Kohlberg provides valuable insight. The cognitive structure used by the individual is at the heart of moral judgment and behavior.

### Relationship

A second major feature is the relational quality of discrepancy. Other people and the various relationships people find themselves in contribute to their discrepant behavior, are considered a barrier to resolving those discrepancies and may provide the major resources needed for successful resolution. Morality is a relational activity and people live by the ethics of consensus. Despite the fact that the interviews focused on individuals and their awareness of belief/behavior discrepancies other relationships were discussed. These subjects did not actualized their beliefs or "core values" without concern for others. The impact of others was strong enough to over-ride even espoused "core values".

All sorts of discrepant behavior was justified on the basis of the subjects relationships. What is particularly significant is the reality that, in terms of function, belief/behavior consistency may be a group process. Whether that fact is good or bad depends on the individuals value. Some regarded it as moral weakness, others accepted it as reality and others saw it as a good thing. At any level its clear that living consistently with one's own beliefs and successfully resolving belief/behavior inconsistencies depends as much on one's relationships as it does on one's "core values", and maybe more.

Again, this is a significant insight. Much of the education geared

that it will make a difference. When in fact whatever moral teaching or information is provided will be transmitted by the individual. In this Kolbert provides various instances. The following passage from her book illustrates the point of moral judgment and action.

Relationships

A second major feature is the moral teaching of relationships. People and the relationships between them are the most important factors in the moral development of individuals. Relationships are the most important factors in the moral development of individuals. Relationships are the most important factors in the moral development of individuals.

for the most part, the moral development of individuals is a process of learning from others.

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to change a destructive behavior (i.e. the information campaign to battle drunk driving) has focused on the individual by trying to appeal to their sense of self interest. When, in point of fact, behavior consistent with that information will depend on how the person manipulates it via the "core value" and how significant others in his life deal with it. It seems that even a potentially life threatening behavior will be carried out if the individual judges it as insignificant and others support that decision. For information or educational experiences to "reach" the person must occur in the relational context.

#### Other Factors

In addition to the individual's "core values" and relationships three other inter-locking factors seem to hold a key place in an adult's dealing with belief/behavior discrepancies. First, the hierarchy or priority system at work in an individual's life is significant. Many researchers have focused on the salience of a given attitude at a given time.

The way the subjects assigned discrepancy situations to the "change behavior" resolution strategy illustrates this point. The "change behavior" resolution strategy was most often recommended in situation in which the belief was based on an authority figure or on derived authority. Apparently the more personally held kinds of beliefs were viewed as less subject to resolution by the "change behavior" strategy. This result underscores the notion that certain kinds of beliefs are seen as more significant than others.

Linked to this factor is that of the specific situation. Values

...the "core value" and how significant others in his

...will be carried out

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0176193

are not operated on without careful consideration being given to the situation and the implications of a given course of action. Again, the perception of a given reality is shaped by ones "core values" but a course of action is not axiomatic. The impact of the situation on discrepancy situations can be seen in the way the subjects dealt resolved discrepancy situations. In selecting the "change nothing" resolution strategy. None of the subjects assigned situations no. 8, no. 10 or no. 12 to this strategy although they used it to resolve other situations of the same belief types. Apparently, it is not the type of belief but the specific situation that determined the choice. All three of these situations deal with behavior that is regarded as harmful to the person or others. This perception seemed to push the subjects toward a change in belief or behavior.

The impact of the specific situation can also be seen in the fact that all of the "change nothing" resolution strategy assignments among type "D" beliefs were used with situation no. 11. That situation dealt with a black, ACLU lawyer's opposition to the use of a neighborhood park by the Klu Klux Klan. One third of the subjects were willing to allow the lawyer to believe in freedom of speech and deny it to the Klan. A similar situation was true with situation no. 9 which dealt with a catholics advocacy of abortion and artificial contraception. While the subjects justified their choice on a number of grounds, it is clear that the specifics of the situation, not the type of belief, influenced the choice of this resolution strategy.

The same influence can be seen with those subjects who claimed a Christian belief base. Although the "change nothing" resolution strategy was used by these subjects for every type of belief it was not



used for every discrepancy situation. A review of the situations in which this strategy was not used and the content that may have influenced subject assignment may be helpful. This strategy was not used with situations no. 4; which dealt with strong emotions, no.7; which dealt with a person's refusal to help the poor, no. 8; which dealt with teach children one view of authority an living another, no. 10; which dealt with lying and stealing, no. 12; which dealt with the risks of smoking, and no. 15; which dealt with a parent teaching his children the importance of church attendance but refusing to attend himself. The failure to assign these specific situations to this resolution strategy can be accounted for in their content and the values of the subjects. In two of the situations the behavior was injurious to children and the rest dealt with issues that have been the subject of recent societal debate.

Finally the justification for an action is taken into account. If an action, even a discrepant action, seems justified it is more likely to be carried out. Again it should be noted that what is "good reason" is a subjective judgment by the individual.

These factor, the priority at work at the time the action occurs, the specifics of the situation and the presence of "good reasons" all play an important part in the process. These areas, along with specific relationships, are subject to change over time. Part of the inconsistency reality is accounted for that situations are different, relationships are different and an individual's priorities are different at different times. The application of principle is complicated by these factors.

The significance of these insights is to underscore the process

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nature of moral behavior and belief/ behavior resolution strategies. It further emphasized the important role of the "core values" by which the individual determines his priorities, evaluates the specifics of a situation and justifies his ultimate choice. It also underscores the role of significant relationships. Though it is through interactions with others that these issues are defined, alternatives are explored and support sought.

### Discrepancies and Adult Education

The final task of this chapter is to look at adult education through these insights. What do these things have to say to those who are involved in adult education? First, while much of the data and discussion has centered around moral education, all those in adult education should be concerned. Education, in its myriad forms, is the primary vehicle used by our society to address many of its ill. Various government and private agencies are busy trying to solve problems by helping people conform their behavior to the "facts". These attempts can be seen every day in the televised anti-smoking, anti-drinking, anti-drug, anti-litter and anti-AIDS campaigns. All of these and others are designed to encourage individuals to bring their behavior into line with "reality."

The fact of the matter is that despite these campaigns, despite knowing the dangers, despite all the hard facts, individuals still smoke, still drive drunk, still do drugs, and still pollute the environment. Apparently information is a necessary but insufficient piece of the discrepancy resolution process. Personal awareness, personal responsibility and personal effort are also required. This

source of moral behavior and belief/behavior regulation. It

further explained the important role of the "core values" by which the

individuals determine the

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section will examine the role education can play in the discrepancy resolution process, educational objectives in light of belief/behavior discrepancies and the implications for educational methodology will be discussed.

search for information as an important part of the discrepancy resolution

### Discrepancies and Utilizing Education

Belief/behavior discrepancy awareness can be the friend or foe of adult education efforts. The need for consistency and the desire to resolve discrepancy can motivate some to seek educational resources. The educational institutions are a rich resource for individuals who seek this kind of help. Indeed members of the sample in this study sought out adult education programs to resolve their belief/behavior discrepancies. The sense of need that is created by one who desires to make a change in their lives helps the educational process.

However the awareness of belief/behavior discrepancy can be the foe of adult education. The stigma of admitting to the discrepancy can keep some who would benefit from educational experiences from accessing those resources. A second complicating factor is that the immediate quality of the need and the idiosyncratic nature of some discrepancies are obstacles to the educational process. While some of the subjects sought out educational experiences most others did not. Apparently, educational activities as the subjects had experienced them were not regarded as significant resources.

This is demonstrated by the rarity with which education was mentioned as a discrepancy resolution resource by the subjects. Only 6 (17.1%) subjects mentioned any kind of formal educational experiences as a resource people tap to resolve belief/behavior discrepancies. Eleven

section will examine the role education can play in the development of resolution process, educational objectives in light of behavior management and the development of educational objectives will be discussed.

### Behavioral and Educational Objectives

Behavioral and educational objectives are two different concepts. Behavioral objectives are specific, measurable, and observable. Educational objectives are broad, general, and often unobservable. The educational objectives of a program are often stated in terms of the knowledge, skills, and attitudes that students should acquire. Behavioral objectives, on the other hand, are stated in terms of specific behaviors that students should demonstrate. For example, an educational objective might be "Students will understand the importance of community service." A behavioral objective might be "Students will volunteer at a community service project at least once a month." Behavioral objectives are often used to evaluate the effectiveness of a program, while educational objectives are used to guide the development of the program.

others mentioned informal educational resources such as reading material, including the Bible, accounts or other peoples experiences, encouraging or inspirational material, and study guides. What is particularly interesting is that these same subjects identified the search for information as an important part of the discrepancy resolution process but did not identify educational experiences as a source for that information. The place of education on the list of resources is also noteworthy. Only time was mentioned less frequently among the external resolution resources but education was mentioned more frequently than any of the internal resolution resources.

The implications of a comparison of the discrepancy resolution barriers and resources in the light of educational experiences is important. The subjects felt that the barriers to discrepancy resolution were largely internal while the resources were largely external. A view of human behavior emerges from the data in which people are viewed as "flawed" to the the extent that other people and the situation can block discrepancy resolution. Help comes from outside the person. It is a world in which people are held responsible for their discrepant behavior but unable to resolve the discrepancy without outside help.

The various external resources mentioned by the subjects contribute at different times and in different ways to the resolution process. What should not be overlooked is that individuals facing significant belief/behavior discrepancy situations look outside themselves for help. The help they are most likely to use is available and accessible at the time they need it, is mediated through other people and addresses the specific situation. Formal, institutional educational opportunities are

Other mentioned internal security resources were as follows:  
 material, including the files, documents or other paper documents  
 concerning or investigating activities, and other things, that is

particularly interesting

search for information

investigation

action for

limited in their ability to respond to this kind of need. Perhaps this, in part, accounts for the low visibility of education in the subjects' list of resolution resources.

Education was rarely mentioned by the subjects. This result is interesting given the relatively high educational level of the subjects. An interesting, and unanswered question, is whether education is truly not regarded as a resource or whether the subjects' own, self-imposed, definition of belief/behavior discrepancies precludes education as a resource. At any rate, the subjects made little or no connection between the kind of belief/behavior discrepancies they had personally experienced, observed in others or had been exposed to in the course of the interview and the kind of education they had experienced.

#### Discrepancies and The Place of Education

That is not to say that adult education cannot or should not play a significant role in the belief/behavior discrepancy process. In spite of the formidable obstacles adult education, under certain conditions, could assist those individuals struggling with a discrepancy. Perhaps the clearest way to see this is to reflect on the major steps of the resolution process and the place education could play.

Educational experiences could play a significant role in the first step, Awareness. In fact it already does. The process of providing information, experiences, and interaction with others create the opportunities for the external sources of awareness to occur. Additionally, it can provide a place for the individual to reflect on the impact of that awareness and to begin to take ownership. Educational experiences have long been known to stimulate thought and

limited in their ability to respond to this kind of need. Perhaps this, in part, accounts for the low visibility of education in the subjects' list of resolution recommendations.

Education was rarely mentioned by the subjects. This result is interesting given the relatively high educational level of the subjects.

In addition, and unanswered question, is whether education is truly not regarded as a relevant concept, or whether, only when it is

in relation to better education, it is relevant. This is a question between the lines of the subjects' responses.

It is also possible that the subjects' responses are a reflection of the fact that they are not experts in the field of education.

But, as a result of the subjects' responses, it is clear that

the subjects' responses are a reflection of the fact that they are not

experts in the field of education.

It is also possible that the subjects' responses are a reflection of the

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fact that they are not experts in the field of education.



reflection, to challenge old ideas, to expose students to new ways of looking at the world. All of this can happen in the context of adult education.

Educational programs are particularly able to assist the individual in the second step of Deliberation. The educational context can provide the person, aware of the discrepancy, with the information, advice and insights being searched for. At least it has that potential. The role of education is less obvious in the Decision step. Again, however, the resources available in the educational setting are important to coming to a decision. But perhaps the support of others is the most significant resource for this step and the final step of Action. The encouragement and support of other participants and the facilitator can make a significant difference in whether or not a chosen course of action is actually carried out. The people who together participate should not be overlooked as a significant resource.

### Discrepancies and Educational Objectives

Obviously, for adult education to make a significant contribution to a person dealing with a belief/behavior discrepancy it must be a particular kind of educational experience. Some specific features are required for it to be serviceable for adults. These qualities are examined here with a look at possible methodologies to follow.

The first educational objective would be to deal at the level of "core values" or principle. Information must be included and available but the interaction must reach beyond that to a consideration of its meaning to the individual and his life. Those charged with facilitating such experiences should not assume that those involved share common



values but be willing to assist the individual in his exploration of the issues and his examination and evaluation of his beliefs and behaviors.

If the experience is based on values or principles not held by the participant and there is not opportunity or encouragement for interaction there is little hope of significant impact. If, on the other hand, participants are encouraged to interact on the issue from their perspective and determine its significance they are more likely to gain from the experience.

A second educational objective would be for the experience to occur in an relational environment. It is important that participants are able to interact with each other and the facilitator as individuals and peers rather than in their roles as students and teacher. A supportive, caring environment in which participants feel free to express their perspectives and related their experiences will enhance the impact. It is through these kinds of interactions that people are not only stimulated to reconsider issues in their own lives but also to come in contact with others whose experiences are meaningful. These relationships can have a powerful impact long after the educational experience is past. The facilitator should remember that other people are considered not only the main vehicle of awareness but the primary resource for discrepancy resolution.

A third objective would be to create an educational experience in which there were opportunities for awareness. The subjects mention three primary external resources of awareness; other people, personal experiences, and confrontation. Regardless of the subject matter the facilitator should utilize these resources. Educational methodology that encourages people to talk with each other, meaningful classroom and

which are willing to make the individual in the position of the  
 leader and his examination and evaluation of his actions and behavior.

If the experience is taken as a whole, the individual is not

participating in the experience as a whole, but as a part of it.

It is not the individual who is the subject of the experience, but

the experience itself, which is the subject of the experience.

The individual is not the subject of the experience, but the

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non-classroom experiences via direct encounter or simulation and confrontation. Confrontation need not be considered as a negative occurrence. Rather, this kind of confrontation challenges the individual to re-consider their beliefs and behavior. Another important experience is the opportunity to reflect; to think an issue through and express it in some way. Far more valuable to the individual than just knowing the information is knowing what it means and what it means to that individual.

A fourth objective is to create an educational experience that is inquisitive and exploratory. A willingness to allow and encourage individuals to seek out and pursue those issues that are meaningful to them is essential. Also essential is the awareness of resources and resource people who can create opportunities for exploration. The process of exploring new ways to think and to perceive life is a great asset in the discrepancy resolution process.

Fifth, the experience should be individual and life oriented and willing to be need meeting. Being available to the participants and willing to help them meet their needs is crucial. Belief/behavior discrepancies are individual and, within the confines of the experience, an individual will benefit most from setting and taking responsibility for the experience. Without this personal stake in the process it is unlikely that the participant will engage the issues at the most meaningful level.

#### Discrepancies and Educational Methodology

Given that kind of educational agenda what methodologies seem to have the best potential for helping individuals successfully deal with

new-fangled experience via direct experience or simulation and  
 confrontation. Confrontation need not be considered as a separate  
 experience. Indeed, this kind of confrontation is

individual to individual. It is not a confrontation with the  
 experience of the individual. It is a confrontation with the

experience of the individual. It is a confrontation with the  
 experience of the individual. It is a confrontation with the

experience of the individual. It is a confrontation with the  
 experience of the individual. It is a confrontation with the

belief/behavior inconsistencies? Several educational models were outlined earlier. That information will not be repeated here. However certain key educational methodological ideas should be underscored.

The moral development strategy of induced discrepancy through the use of moral dilemma is worthy of note. It may be possible to help participants grapple with their "core values," their behavior and belief/behavior discrepancies by dealing with hypothetical situations. Kohlberg's advocacy of moral discussion at one level above the level of the student is interesting but hardly practical. What is practical is to utilize dilemmas and discussion to challenge existing structures and ways of looking at issues.

Perhaps the single most fruitful methodology is Friere's "culture circle". It incorporates many of the most important features. First, it is highly relational. Over the course of the circle's life the members have ample opportunities to develop quality relationship. It's focus on the "reality" of life through challenges people's "core values" and their vision of reality. It gets at the most critical issues. Third, the emphasis on action provides the opportunity for direct experience with the object under discussion. The methodology of praxis, action-reflection, has proven a powerful vehicle for conscientization. And conscientization is the awareness and resolution of discrepancies between the belief that people should not be oppressed and the oppression they experience.

Finally, the adults' experience of discrepancies between their beliefs and their behaviors is quite real, at least it seems real to those experiencing them. Perhaps the greatest belief/behavior we

beliefs/behavior inconsistencies? Several educational models were outlined earlier. That information will not be repeated here. However, certain key educational considerations should be kept in mind. The most important strategy of behavior change is through the use of social learning as worthy of note. It may be possible to help participants graphic with their "core values," their behavior and

participate in behavior change. The use of social learning and behavior change is a key concept in the study of behavior change. The use of social learning and behavior change is a key concept in the study of behavior change. The use of social learning and behavior change is a key concept in the study of behavior change.

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experience is the difference between the life conditions beyond our control and our choices have created and the life we dream of. In one **real** sense the challenge of living is to confront our reality with our **dreams and make the dreams our reality. The dreams** are different but the challenge is the same.

experience is the difference between the life conditions beyond our control and our choices have created and the life we dream of. In one word, since the challenge of living is to reconcile our reality with our dream and not to let the dream be the reality. The dream is the difference between the challenge and the reality.

# APPENDIX A

## Research Assistant Positions

For information on the positions listed below, please contact:

### Department of Research Procedures:

1. Research Assistant - Research Assistant - Research Assistant of

Research Assistant, and

2. Research Assistant - Research Assistant - Research Assistant

and

3.

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## APPENDICES



## APPENDIX A

## Research Assistant Procedure

## Overview of Research Procedure:

The research is designed to investigate the adult's awareness of discrepancies between belief and behavior, its motivational impact, and the ways adults evaluate the importance and resolve these discrepancies. The sample will be made up of participants from four adult education programs; two Christian (drawn from two local churches) and two secular (drawn from two local adult and continuing education programs). It will be made up of 40 randomly selected adults, 20 are to be drawn from the two christian programs (10 from each church) and 20 are to be drawn from the two secular programs (10 from each program). The following steps should be followed by the research assistant.

- Step 1: From the lists of students randomly select 10 subjects from each institutions.
- Step 2: Mail those subjects the following items: a) the researcher's cover letter; b) the explanatory letter and consent form; c) a letter of endorsement from the university; and d) a letter of endorsement from their respective place of study.
- Step 3: Wait several days for the letters to arrive and then contact potential participants by phone. This contact has three purposes; first, to determine if the individual is willing to participate in the study, second, to screen the potential participants as to the source of their belief system and third

## APPENDIX A

## RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCEDURES

## Overview of Research Procedures:

The research is designed to investigate the awareness of  
 the ways adult witnesses evaluate the impact of the direct testimony.  
 The sample will be made up of all witnesses to the crime location.

Program and the following procedures:

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 The sample will be made up of all witnesses to the crime location.

to schedule an interview.

First, ask the individual if they have read the material and if they are willing to participate in the study. Be willing to answer any question they may have regarding the study. If they refuse to participate thank them and move to the next person. If they agree to participate explain that the study requires that those participating meet certain requirements.

Next screen those who agree to participate as to the source of their belief system in the following manner.

A. Those Drawn from the Christian Programs.

1. Ask: What would you say is the base or source of your belief system? If their response indicates a Christian base they are eligible for the study and an interview should be scheduled.
2. If they are unable to answer ask: Do you believe as you do because you are a Christian, Jewish, Moslem, Buddhist or belong to another religious group or for some other non-religious reason?

If they respond that their belief base is Christian they are eligible for the study and an interview should be scheduled. If they respond that their belief base is religious but not christian they are not eligible for the study and should be given an adequate explanation and thanked. If they answer that the source of their belief system is not religious (a secular philosophy, family traditions etc they are not eligible for the

to schedule an interview.

State

and is

public



study.

B. Those Drawn from the Secular Programs

1. Repeat the initial question in step 1 above.

If their response indicates a non-religious belief base they are eligible for the study and an interview should be scheduled.

2. If they are unable to answer repeat step 2 above.

If their response indicates a non-religious belief base they are eligible for the study and an interview should be scheduled.

If their response indicates a religious non-christian base they are not eligible for the study and should be given adequate explanation and thanked.

3. If their response indicates a christian base ask: Would you say that your present belief system is directly based on christian teaching?

If they answer "yes" they are not eligible for the study and should be given adequate explanation and thanked. If their answer is no they are eligible for the study and an interview should be scheduled.

Step 4: Interviews should be scheduled at the participants convenience during the first week of December every 90 minutes. The actual interview will last one hour and the remaining 30 minutes will be used to record data from the interview.

• If their company has a good record on safety, they will be able to attract more workers.

These they are eligible for the study and an interview

should be supported.

5. It may be argued that the

## APPENDIX B

## Explanatory Letter and Consent Form

Purpose and Procedures:

The purpose of this study is to examine the adult's awareness of discrepancies between their belief and their behavior including the contexts in which adults become aware of these discrepancies, the criteria by which they are evaluated, the motivational impact of that awareness, how adults resolve those discrepancies and the differences that exist between those adults who claim a Christian base for their beliefs and those who claim a non-religious belief base.

Data will be gathered by interviewing each participant. The interview will last about 90 minutes and consist of two phases. The first will gather necessary background information and the second will discuss belief/behavior discrepancies. The second phase of the interview will be divided into two parts. In the first part the participant will be asked to discuss the contexts in which awareness of these discrepancies occur on the criteria by which they are evaluated. In the second part of this phase of the interview participants will be asked to discuss the motivational impact of the awareness of these discrepancies and its motivational impact. A follow-up interview may be scheduled with some participants.

Potential Risks

The subjects involved in this study face little or no physical, social or legal risk that is not part of everyday life. The

# Polymers for the Environment

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psychological risk to the subjects is minimal. Since the study focuses on belief in relation to behavior the subjects will be asked to discuss discrepancies they have observed in others and in their own lives. It is not the purpose of the study to seek information that is personally painful, uncomfortable, embarrassing or incriminating and the subjects will not be asked specific questions regarding such matters.

### Participant Rights

First you are free to participate or not participate in the study as you may wish. If you choose to participate you are free to discontinue your participation in the study at any time without any recrimination. All the results of the study will be treated with the strict confidence and subjects will remain anonymous. You may request and will be given, within these restrictions, the results of the study.

If you feel that this study has been fully explained to you, that you fully understand it's purposes requirements and risks and freely wish to participate in it please sign below.

Signature\_\_\_\_\_

Date\_\_\_\_\_

psychological risk to the subjects is minimal. Since the study focuses on belief in relation to behavior the subjects will be asked to discuss discrepancies they have observed in their own behavior. It is not the purpose of the study to seek information that is potentially painful, embarrassing or incriminating and the subjects will not be asked specific questions regarding such matters.

#### Participant Rights

First, participants will be informed of the purpose of the study and the procedures that will be followed. They will be asked to sign a consent form indicating that they understand the study and agree to participate. They will be informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. They will be informed of the confidentiality of the study and that their responses will be kept confidential. They will be informed of the potential risks and benefits of the study. They will be informed of the contact information for the researcher and the Institutional Review Board. They will be informed of the contact information for the researcher and the Institutional Review Board.

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