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ABSTRACT
A POLITICAL PORTRAIT

OF
CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS

BY

John F. Bratzel

This dissertation investigates the political life of
Carlos Saavedra Lamas. It attempts to explain his back—
ground, rise to a position of prominence and subsequent
fall, and to define his place in Argentine history.

Saavedra Lamas was born in 1878 to a wealthy oligarchic
family. At age thirty he was elected to the Argentine House
of Deputies where he worked for both increased immigration
from Europe and the extension of the voting franchise to the
entire male population. These goals, he believed, would
yield a modern Argentina in the European mold. He realized
that the newly enfranchised voters would probably not im-
mediately support a member of the oligarchy. He assumed,
however, this would only be temporary, but sixteen years
elapsed before another opportunity to hold public office
appeared. Consequently, he agreed to be Foreign Minister in

the fraudalently elected and military—dominated Justo admin-

istration.

 

 

 

John F. Bratzel

The Argentine people have long seen themselves as a
white literate, Europeanized bastion in a miscegenated,
backward South America. Consequently, the nation adopted
the premise that she should dominate South America and, as
the leader of a continent be received into the councils of
the powerful as an equal. Saavedra Lamas, as Foreign Min-
ister of Argentina worked diligently to achieve this long
cherished goal. Moreover, his efforts on behalf of his
country complemented his personal desire to obtain prominence
on the world stage. It is the contention of this work that
Saavedra Lamas reached both of these objectives, thereby
gaining an influence for himself and Argentina that was far
out of proportion to the real importance of either.

Saavedra Lamas achieved his ends through deceitful,
almost Machiavellian methods. Aiding him in his drive was
his ability to take advantage of the disarray among the
countries bordering Argentina and the Good Neighbor Policy
of the United States. He also benefitted from European
competition with the United States. Finally, Saavedra Lamas'
ability to move quickly was enhanced by the virtual free
hand given him by President Justo.

Immediately after taking office in February, 1932
Saavedra Lamas inserted himself strongly into the United

States dominated mediation effort then being conducted in

 

 

John F. Bratzel

the dispute between Paraguay and Bolivia over ownership of
the Chaco. To support his efforts in the contest that
developed, Saavedra Lamas established an informal mediation
group composed of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. By
pitting the mediators as well as the belligerents against
each other, the Argentine Chancellor controlled the situa-
tion and appeared as the peace maker while ironically insur—
ing that Argentina‘s ally, Paraguay, was protected. With
the exhaustion of the belligerents in mid—1935 the Argentine
Chancellor arranged for a ceaserfire and peace talks in
Buenos Aires under his auspices. At the Conference Saavedra
Lamas wanted the prestige a settlement would bring but also
desired that Paraguay not make major concessions. Conse-
quently, the negotiations moved slowly to the constant com-
plaint of the other delegates. Consequently, no settlement
was reached during his tenure.

While Saavedra Lamas was Foreign Minister two Inter-
American meetings were held. In the 1933 Conference at
Montevideo, both the Argentine Chancellor, as well as Secre-
tary of State Cordell Hull wished to avoid a confrontation.
The latter accepted Saavedra Lamas' Anti-War Pact in exchange
for cooperation and consensus politics prevailed. At the

December, 1936 Maintenance of Peace Conference, however,

 

 

 

John F. Bratzel

conflict developed. Saavedra Lamas who had just won the
Nobel Peace Prize opposed Hull on virtually every issue.
The latter was infuriated and directed protest to Justo
about his Foreign Minister.

These complaints coupled with those from other Foreign
Ministers over the Chaco negotiations were instrumental in
Justo's decision to close higher office to Saavedra Lamas.
The.most important reason, however, was the Chancellor's
failure to give sufficient credit to Justo when he won the
Nobel Prize and the fact he constantly overshadowed the
President.

Following his departure from office in February, 1938,
Saavedra Lamas held only one more public office, the rector-
ship of the University of Buenos Aires. He died in 1959.

In the preparation of this study the Argentine Foreign
Ministry Archives as well as the United States National
Archives were consulted. Also newspapers, periodicals,
published memoirs, government publications, and pertinent
secondary works were examined. Finally data was also

obtained from personal interviews with individuals having

direct knowledge of the man and events.

 

 

 

A POLITICAL PORTRAIT
OF

CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS

BY UL

John F? Bratzel

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1974

 

 

 

 

@ Copyright by
JOHN F..BRATZEL

1974

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER

PREFACE. . . . . . . . . . . . .

THE FIRST FIFTY-THREE YEARS. . .

Argentine Economic Development.

International Law . . . . . .
Education . . . . . . . . . .
The Voting Franchise. . . . .

THE DECLARATIONS OF AUGUST . . .
Saavedra Lamas Takes Office .
The Chaco Dispute . . . . . .
The ABCP Coalition. . . . . .

"UNA CONFUSION GRANDE" . . . . .

Saavedra Lamas and the League of Nations.
Saavedra Lamas and the Committee of

Neutrals . . . . . . . . .
The Mendoza Proposal. . . . .
Argentina and Neutrality. . .
May to December, 1933 . . . .

"THE TWO WINGS OF THE DOVE". . .

A MAN TO BE RECKONED WITH. . . .

Chaco Negotiations January, 1934 to

February, 1935 . . . . . .
Final Settlement. . . . . . .
The Chaco Peace Conference. .
Saavedra Lamas and the League

THE PERILS OF SUCCESS. . . . . .
The Nobel Prize . . . . . . .

Inter-American Conference for
nance of Peace . . . . . .

Mainte—

Page

91
121
121
125
132
150
156
156

160

TAB]

 

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS--continued

The Chaco Dispute, December, 1936. . .
January, l937—February, 1938 . . . . .

EPILOGUE O O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O O O 0
CONCLUSION O 0' O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY . . . . . . . . . .

Biographical Sources . . . . . . . . .
WOrks of Carlos Saavedra Lamas . . . .
Argentine Archival Sources . . . . . .
United States Archival Sources . . . .
Argentine Government Publications. . .
United States Government Publications.
Published Primary Sources. . . . . . .
Secondary Sources. . . . . . . . . . .

iv

 

Page

177
185

193
197
206

206
207
211
212
212
213
214
215

 

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PREFACE

The Argentine people have long seen themselves as a
white, literate, Europeanized bastion in a miscegenated,
backward South America. Consequently, that nation has
adopted the premise that she should dominate South America
and, as the leader of a continent be received into the
councils of the powerful as an equal. Carlos Saavedra
Iamas, as Foreign Minister of Argentina worked diligently
to achieve this goal. Moreover, his efforts on behalf of
his country complemented his personal desire to obtain
prominence on the world stage. Saavedra Lamas reached both
of these objectives, thereby gaining an influence for him—
self and Argentina that was far out of proportion to the
real importance of either.

Saavedra Lamas achieved his ends through deceitful,
almost Machiavellian methods. That he did so, taints his
achievement, but his tactics were not criticized in
Argentina, where perhaps the highest compliment one can pay
is to describe a person as "clever." But Saavedra Lamas
was more than clever. Through opportunism he was able to
sieze the moment and turn the international situation to

his benefit.

 

 

 

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This study briefly traces the life of Saavedra Lamas
from his birth to his appointment as Foreign Minister.

It examines his policies and tactics in the war over the
Chaco between Bolivia and Paraguay, including his maneuver-
ings in the face of United States and League of Nations
involvement in the conflict. Considerable emphasis will
also be placed on the role Saavedra Lamas played during the
1933 and 1936 Inter—American meetings. The work ends with
the Chancellor's loss of influence and subsequent exit from
public life.

I am indebted to a number of persons and institutions
for helping make this study possible. My appreciation
goes to the late Charles C. Cumberland, who originally
interested me in Latin American History. I wish to express
my deepest gratitude and sincere thanks to my jefe supremo
and mentor, Leslie B. Rout, Jr. who initiated me into the
ways of academia. The other members of my guidance commit-
tee, Professors David C. Bailey, Paul A. Varg, Barbara
Steidle, and Justin C. Kestenbaum also contributed greatly
to the production of this work and to my historical train—
ing in general.

The librarians of La_Prensa library in Buenos Aires
were particularly helpful in allowing me access to delicate
material. I am also indebted to Raul Vinuesa, an instruc—
tor at the Argentine Foreign Service Institute, for giving

me new perspectives into the decision making processes of

 

 

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the Argentine foreign office. He introduced me to Senor
Pifiero of the Foreign Ministry library, who not only
allowed me access to material available nowhere else, but
additionally aided me in obtaining interviews with promi-
nent Argentines. A special thanks goes to Capitan José
Pereyra, Jefe de despacho of the Argentine Foreign Service
Institute, who shepherded my application to work in the
archives of the Foreign Ministry through a voracious
bureaucracy. I am obliged to Senora Zeballos Aguirre, too,
for her aid in helping me locate documents.

I am deeply grateful to Roaslia and Alberto Ramon
who were always hospitable and kind during my stay in
Argentina. Additionally, I owe thanks to my good friend
Joaquim Serrano who made a number of initial contacts for
me and placed his resources at my disposal. Robert A.
Bishkin, the General Consul of the United States in Argen-
tina was helpful in introducing me to a number of people.
One of them was Eduardo Tomas Pardo, the head of the
Argentine Foreign Service Institute who helped me obtain
an interview with Miguel Angel Carcano. Finally, I am
indebted to Sefioras Silvia Pueyrredén and Elsie Rivera
Heado for giving me significant insights into Saavedra
Lamas and taking me to a number of social functions where
I could make further contacts.

Closer to home, I must thank the staff of the

Michigan State University Library, particularly

 

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Mrs. Eleanor Boyles. Similarly, the staffs of both the
United States Archives and University of Michigan Law
Library proved very helpful. I acknowledge the Ford Foun-
dation, whose grants administered by the Michigan State
University Latin American Studies Center allowed me to go
to both Buenos Aires and Washington, D. C. in the further-
ance of this study. I

Finally I owe more than I can say to my wife, Ruth,
whose patience and hard work helped me immeasurably.

It goes without saying that none of the above are
responsible for the shortcomings of this work. They are

mine alone.

East Lansing, Michigan J.F.B.

October, 1974

 

 

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CHAPTER 1

THE FIRST FIFTY-THREE YEARS

Argentina became an independent country in 1816 and
after an abortive attempt at constitutional government,
the nation fell to the control of Juan Manuel de Rosas in
1829. A classic example of a caudillo, he ruled the nation
with an iron fist until 1852. Another period of unrest
followed until Bartolomé Mitre assumed the presidency in
1862. Under Mitre and his successors, Argentina became

one of the largest suppliers of meat in the world. Subse—

 

quently, an oligarchy of landed beef producers developed
which quickly assumed a leadership role in Argentina. Money
abounded and perhaps because it did, corruption became the
byword of government. By 1890, conditions had become so
bad that the President, Miguel Juarez Celman was forced to
resign in favor of his more liberal Vice—President, Carlos
Pelligrini. Although the new chief executive did bring
some reforms, the oligarchy of land owners and merchants,
which benefited from the established system, was still very
much in control.

During the next twenty—six years, their leadership

would be challenged, but the principal weapon of the

 

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oligarchy, the limited franchise, prevailed. It was not
until a number of their own, called "liberal tories,"
inured with the positivist doctrine of Auguste Comte, and

a desire to modernize Argentina, came to the front that the
vote was given at all. As a result, political parties

which had long refused to vote in the oligarchy's sham
elections, did so and won. One of the “liberal tories"
who had favored open voting was Carlos Saavedra Lamas.

On November 1, 1878,1 when Carlos Alberto Saavedra
Lamas was born, he automatically met all the requirements
for membership into the oligarchy. Entrance required
money, above all, but the highest social strata was open
only to those who demonstrated an historically acceptable

heritage. His parents were Mariano Saavedra Zabeleta, a

 

prominent and wealthy lawyer, and Lucia Lamas, both of

whom possessed distinguished Argentine names. Although the
Lamas name was well known in literary circles, the apellido
"Saavedra" provided the bedrock upon which his heritage
lay. In 1810, his great grandfather, Cornelio Saavedra had
led the provisional junta governing the Viceroyalty of

La Plata from which the independence movement sprang.

 

lIn William Belmont Parker, Argentines 9f To—Day

Originally published in 1920 (New York: Krause Reprint
Corp., 1967), pp. 675—676, the author gives the year of
birth as 1880. Saavedra Lamas' sister, Senora Saavedra
Lamas de Pueyrredén confirmed the 1878 date, Letter, Silvia
Pueyrredén to John F. Bratzel, March 4, 1974.

 

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His grandfather was D. Mariano Saavedra who had been
governor of Buenos Aires Province during and after the
presidency of Mitre.

Balancing this obvious advantage, was responsibility.
There was the expectation that anyone born with such an
inheritance would be highly successful and would bring
added prestige to the family. The result was constant
pressure on Carlos to achieve and as the only boy in a
family with five children, the necessity was even more
clear. His father constantly reminded Carlos of his rich
heritage and urged him forward with the admonition, "Be
Right, Be Good, Study!"2

During his formative years, Carlos admirably ful-

filled the requirements of his class and the advice of his

father. At the Colegio Lacondaire, a private Buenos Aires

 

prep school, Carlos enjoyed very high grades. Perhaps
because he waswso aCcomplished in school, he preferred
city life in Buenos Aires to the comparative isolation of
the summers Spent on the family estancia_in Santa Fe.3

In the city he could also enjoy the social life, and

according to Julia Valentina Bunge, one of his

2Interview with Sefiora Silvia Saavedra Lamas de
Pueyrredén, Buenos Aires, September 12, 1972.

3 g . I I
Ibid. The family owned four estancras in Santa Fe
Province.

 

 

 

 

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contemporaries, no party was complete without him.4

While Saavedra Lamas was attending the Colegio, however,
his father died, placing added pressure on Carlos, for he
was now head of the family. Despite this added burden,
Carlos was presented with a medal for scholastic achieve—
ment upon graduation.

Like many young men who aspired to high positions in
government or business, Carlos chose to attend the

Facultad de_Derecho y Ciencias Exactas of the University

 

of Buenos Aires. His earlier scholastic success was dupli-
cated, as he won the gold medal for his thesis Sistema

municipal en la_capital ge_la_Repfiblica.5 His intense

 

 

drive to succeed, however, had its drawbacks. A life-long

friend, Jacobo Wainer, related that Carlos became ill when

 

he received only nine of a possible ten on an examination.6
Following the completion of his college training in

1903, Saavedra Lamas chose to lecture at the University

level. He credited the newly adopted competitive examina-

tion program for his success in attaining a position as

4Julia Valentina Bunge, Vida, Epoca Maravillosa,
1903-1911 (Buenos Aires: Emecé Editores, 1965), p. 113.

 

. 5Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Sistema municipal §n_la
0a ital d3 13 Republica (Buenos Aires: Compafiia sud—
americana de billetes de banco, 1903).

 

 

6£§.Naci6n, June 24, 1962.

 

 

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Professor of Sociology in the Facultad gelFilosofia y

 

Letras at the University of Buenos Aires. Due to his
scientific orientation and the fact that he was the first
recipient of the chair of Sociology, his positivist views
came under constant attack.7 He was, however, able to
retain his position and continue teaching courses on labor
relations and public finance.

Nevertheless, he did not stay in teaching for long.
In 1906, at the age of twenty-eight, he was appointed by

the Consejg Deliberante as Director of Public Credit for

 

the City of Buenos Aires. The following year, he accepted
the office of Secretary of the Municipality of Buenos
Aires. He also published a shert tome entitled Informe

sobre la situacién finaciera de_la_muncipalidad de_la

 

 

capital8 detailing his views on the finances of Buenos
Aires.

Saavedra Lamas left the administration of Buenos Aires
in 1908 when he was elected to the Argentine House of

Deputies on the Conservative Party ticket. Despite its

7Miguel Cané, a Francophile author in the romantic
tradition, was Saavedra Lamas' detractor. See Carlos
Saavedra Lamas, La personalidad universitaria del Dr.
Carlos Octavio BEng (Buenos Aires: L. J. Russo y_Cia.,
1919), p. 11.

 

. 8Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Informe sobre la situacién
financiera geila_municipalidad g2 13 capital (Buenos Aires:
Casa editora de A. Grau, 1907).

 

 

 

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10

name, the party did have a liberal membership with reformv
ing instincts. Thus, it was a perfect place for a young
positivist. Saavedra Lamas was re-elected for a second
term in 1912, but did not finish it. In 1915, he was
appointed Secretary of Justice and Public Instruction in
the cabinet of Victorino de la Plaza, who had asSumed the
presidency upon the death of Roque Saenz Pefia. The indica-
tions are he received the appointment because he was the
sonrin-law of Saenz Pefia and de la Plaza wanted to assuage
his supporters.9 In 1916, Saavedra Lamas left elective
politics. The reason is not clear, but the extension of
voting to the entire male population, which Saavedra Lamas
supported, suggests that he believed that the new voters
for a few years, at least, would not be positively disposed
toward his class and himself.

As a private citizen, Saavedra Lamas practiced law,
but because of his financial independence, he was able to

devote much of his time to scholastic and research endeavors.

 

9While a Deputy, Saavedra Lamas met and married Rosa

Saenz Pena. As a wealthy man from a good family he was
eligible to court the daughter not only of a very prominent
politician, but also the granddaughter of Luis Saenz Pefia,
a.former President of Argentina. Because Saavedra Lamas
did, in fact, marry the boss's daughter, he was extremely
sensitive to the cynical gossip which existed. Interview
With Senora Silvia Saavedra Lamas de Pueyrredén, Buenos
Aires, September 12, 1972, An interview was conducted with
Rosa Séenz Pefia de Saavedra Lamas, but due to her advanced
age, her memory was inaccurate.

 

 

 

 

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11

He published massive works in such diverse fields as labor
law, analysis of social treaties, international law, and
railroad legislation. He also delivered numerous speeches
to scholarly groups. Through these works, and his efforts
before the Chamber of Deputies, a clear picture of Saavedra
Lamas' thinking emerges. His efforts fall into four major
areas: Argentine economic development, international law,

education and the distribution of the voting franchise.

Argentine Economic Development

Saavedra Lamas' first public pronouncement on economics
appeared in his report on the financial position of Buenos
Aires. The most significant assertion was that sports tick—
ets be taxed in lieu of a small import duty. He noted that
such a duty would be harmful to the economy and might cause
European nations to raise their tariffs on Argentine beef.
Left unstated was the assumption that a tax on imports would
fall more heavily on the wealthy who bought foreign goods.
An idea which was of secondary importance in his report, but
one which he would develop in detail later, was his hope
that future immigrants to Argentina would move to the
countryside instead of remaining in Buenos Aires. In that
regard, he lauded the work of the national government in
improving the infrastructure and educational opportunities

in the provinces in order to attract immigrants.lo

Saavedra Lamas, situacidn financiera., particularly
Pp. 6 and 28.

 

 

 

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12

The first problem, however, was to obtain the immi—
grants. Consequently, when Saavedra Lamas became a Deputy,
he devoted considerable effort to immigration treaties.

It is not strange, therefore, that while on a trip to Italy
in February, 1910 he sounded out the Italian government con-
cerning immigration. Although he had no accreditation other
than that implicit in his position as Deputy, Saavedra Lamas

discussed the whole matter with the Italian government.11

 

llSee Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Problemas de gobierno:

discursos pronunciados en_la_camara dehdiputades de la
nacidn (Buenos Aires: Compafiia sud—americana de billetes
de banco, 1916), pp. 179-216. As part of the negotiations
Saavedra Lamas sent a letter to Luigi Luzzati, the Italian
Minister of Commerce. He began his letter by stating that
Italy had the right to control emmigration and suggested
she sign a pact with Argentina similar to the one signed
with France in 1906. He noted that Argentine social provi—
sions were not as modern as France's, but these could be
changed to insure that the emmigrants would not suffer.
Concerning the propaganda used to entice the Italians,
Saavedra Lamas was very apolegetic, but concluded it was a
necessary evil. On the question of traveling conditions
and citizenship, Saavedra Lamas was very vague. Both of
these were volitile issues and one suspects he was willing
to leave these matters to others. Finally, Saavedra Lamas
indicated the need for Argentine officials at embarcation
points to insure no anarchists were allowed into Argentina.
The "gaucho republic" had anarchist movements and movements
dubbed anarchist, and even a "liberal tory" had no desire
to introduce new radical elements.

The Italian reply came from two people. Luzzati
stated that were Saavedra Lamas properly accredited, he
would present his proposals to the cabinet, a singularly
diplomatic, but meaningless response. Of much more conse-
quence, was a letter from Professor Pasquale Fiore detailing
the Italian position on citizenship. Basically, he observed
that citizenship based upon geographical location was a
relic of feudalism and that the method of determination bye
ancient Rome, parental heritage, was superior. He did indi-
cate, however, willingness to compromise. He suggested that
the Argentine system.be generally accepted with the proviso
that when an Italo-Argentine returned to Italy, he have the
Option of regaining Italian citizenship easily.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Upon returning from Italy, Saavedra Lamas presented
the results of his work regarding Italian immigration to
the Chamber of Deputies. He began by pointing out that
Italy was making great strides in education and industriali-
zation. This development, according to Saavedra Lamas,
boded ill for the continuation of Italian immigration since
there would be little excess population available for
Argentina. What made this situation very discouraging for
Saavedra Lamas was that he saw Argentina on the verge of
accelerated economic development with immigration as the
trigger. Proof that immigration was of critical importance
could be found in the economic growth of the United States,
Canada, and Australia. Therefore, as he saw it, two legal
instruments were needed: a treaty with Italy to obtain as
many people as possible, and an internal law regulating
settlement of the newly arrived foreigners. Consequently,
at the next session of Congress, Saavedra Lamas presented
a detailed plan for immigration settlement. Its most sig—
nificant provision required that agents of the newly mane

dated railroads act as colonizers along its path.12

12Ibid., pp. 348- 497. All Saavedra Lamas' congres-
sional statements also appear in the Diario de Sesiones de
la Camara de Diputados, which served as the recOrd for the
Argentine legislature. Complicating this situation, is the
fact that Saavedra Lamas privately published a number of
his congressional projects and speeches in separate volumes
With different titles than those appearing in the aforemen-
tioned works. For example, his Economica Colonial appears
as "ley de colonizacion" in Problemas de Gobierno....
Saavedra Lamas' tendency to publish something about virtually

 

 

 

 

 

 

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The proposed plan, however, was never accepted due to
Italy's prohibition on emmigration to Argentina in 1911—1912.
’Also, since the issue of the day was the voting franchise,
little time could be devoted to the study of Saavedra Lamas'
long and detailed report.

Following his departure from the House of Deputies,
Saavedra Lamas continued his interest in immigration. In

a book published in 1922, Tratados internacionales de

 

tipo social..., he began by asserting that Argentina needed

 

more peOple, but that there were too many people in Buenos
Aires and not enough in the provinces. The situation, as

he preceived it, could only be rectified by new settlement
laws. According to Saavedra Lamas, the problem stemmed

from the “governing classes" referring to the old oligarchy,
which was wasting enormous tracts of land. Further, much
of the remainder had fallen into the hands of speculators.
He also noted that railroads were pushing into the wrong
areas, causing further disequilibrium. The auctioning of
land, he claimed, was not the answer because the immigrant
seldom had much money. He concluded, therefore, that a
laissez faire policy hindered settlement and that govern-
ment controls must be used to give the immigrant the access—
ible land. Even though quite liberal sounding in his
Speech, Saavedra Lamas stopped well short of suggesting

—

everything he was involved in shows great dedication and
hard work, but also demonstrates a great vanity.

 

 

 

exp:

men

men

ent

£9

HKIQKFEIEE

 

15

expropriation. The answer lay, according to the ex—Deputy
in distributing unused land to the new arrivals with pay-
ments deferred until the newcomers were settled.13

Still another work dealing with the economic develop-

ment of Argentina was his massive volume published in 1918

 

entitled Los ferrocarriles ante lailegislacién positiva

 

 

argentina. Although basically a highly legalistic treatise

 

on railroad legislation, Saavedra Lamas did confront the
question of foreign investment. In his work he expressly
avoided the presumption that foreign investment was required
in Argentina. The fact that he did not reject it or offer
any alternatives to foreign investment leads to the inescap-
able conclusion that he simply could not bring himself to
pronounce the unpleasant truth-—Argentina needed foreign
investment. In fact, the vast majority of his six hundred
fifty page text dealt with how it should be controlled.14

In the general realm of economics another major inter—

est of Saavedra Lamas' was the changing nature of labor

13Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Tratados internacionales de
tipo social, 1as convenciones sobre emigracion y_trabajo,
perspectivas que representan para los pa1ses sudamericanos
y_especialmente para la republica argentina, conferencias
de Washington y_Ginebra (Buenos Aires: Facultad de derecho

 

 

 

y ~chiencias sociales, 1922). A French translation was pub—
lished in Paris by A. Pedone in 1924.
14

Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Los ferrocarriles ante la
legislacién positiva argentina (Buenos Aires: L. J. Rosso
Y Cla, 1918).

 

 

rela

ment
of a
The

with
work
advc
rece

duce

192i

Alt}
Str:
cau
hou
tim
and
the
ali

abl

/

53515?

 

l6

relations. He detailed his views in a 1922 work entitled
Los.aSalariados en la republica argentina. In it he lav
mented the end of the old "patron" system and the arrival
of an adversary relationship between capital and labor.

The worker, he contended, should have a close association
with the owner and be able to maintain some control over
working conditions. To remedy the situation Saavedra Lamas
advocated a profit sharing arrangement. The employee would
receive a regular salary, but it would be augmented or re-
15

duced depending upon the profits of the company.

In much the same liberal vain, Saavedra Lamas, in

 

1926, discussed the whole question of labor strikes in
L§_huelga dg.l§_industria carbonera en inglaterra.

Although avoiding a detailed discussion of the cause of the
strike referred to in the title, he did maintain it was
caused by management's decision to lower pay and increase
hours. Socialists, he claimed, saw this event as confirma-
tion of their fears. Saavedra Lamas, however, disagreed
and pointed to the ability of England's democracy to handle
the situation. Even when the Socialists called for nation-
alization, the ex—Deputy noted, the House of Commons was
able to debate the plan calmly. Far from upholding Social—

ist ideas, Saavedra Lamas contended that the handling of

15Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Los asalaridos en la republica
argentina (Buenos Aires: Libreria y casa editora de Jesus
Menendez, 1922).

 

 

the:

in 51
publ.‘
were
gove
ment
soci
inte
the

stat
list
mail
tion

stat

 

17

the strike demonstrated the efficacy of democracy.

He then offered his views on the role of government
in strikes and more specifically, walkouts involving the
public interest. Saavedra Lamas believed that labor strikes
were a natural right and as such were recognized by many
governments. He went on to remark, however, that govern—
ments have the duty to intervene if the interests of
society are affected. In determining if governments should
intervene, Saavedra Lamas counseled caution and only when
the work performed was absolutely essential, should the

state interfere. In defining "essential, Saavedra Lamas
listed workers in public security, transportation, utilities,
mail and certain basic industries. In conclusion, he cau-
tioned against quick judgments and implied, but did not
state, that the workers were often right.l7 Considering
that he wrote in 1926, Saavedra Lamas' ideas can only be
described as forward looking.

In summarizing Saavedra Lamas‘ ideas on economic de-
velopment, it is evident that above all he wanted an
economically strong and socially modern Argentina. To

achieve this end, according to Saavedra Lamas, a greater

population was necessary and therefore he sought European

6Carlos Saavedra Lamas, La huelga de la industria
carbonera en inglaterra (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la
Universidad, 1926).

17

 

Ibid.

 

 

 

18

immigrants. Foreign investment, however, was also needed.
Due to his nationalism, he was reticent about admitting
that Argentina required it, but he would accept it if it
were controlled. Saavedra Lamas also believed the needs
of labor should be met as part of the advancement of
society. Achievement of these goals, Saavedra Lamas

argued, would lead to an orderly and progressive Argentina.

International Law

 

In July, 1909, Saavedra Lamas delivered his first
major address regarding international law. It dealt with
an arbitration treaty which had been negotiated with Italy
in 1907, following the second Hague conference. It was sub~
sequently presented to the Argentine congress where after a
great deal of effort by Saavedra Lamas it was accepted in
1909. The arbitration agreement, however, was later pro—

claimed unconstitutional by the procurador general, Jaime

 

Porter, and President Figueroa Alcorta allowed the treaty

to die. In his 1909 speech Saavedra Lamas called for the
resurrection of the accord and discussed some of the contro«
versial sections. He concluded that the treaty was in the
best tradition of Argentine juridical development. Singled
out for criticism was the aforementioned procurador general,
who based his opposition on the grounds that the treaty
would infringe on Argentine sovereignty. Saavedra Lamas

contended that because the constitution disallowed acts which

 

‘

offended sor
accepting or
assume that
able, but 11:
arbitration
I Argentina f
Saaved

on the subj
his fellow
arbitration
lengthy spe
gress, annc
ineffectual

of the Ital

 

the area oi
tion“ of ti
More than
tion demon
Saavedra L
Perha
a1 arbitra

early nego

Pact with

   

 

19

offended sovereignty, the issue need not be considered in
accepting or rejecting a treaty.18 It is reasonable to
assume that Saavedra Lamas knew his reasoning was question?
able, but his main goal was to obtain acceptance of the
arbitration pact. To that end he was successful, as
Argentina finally adOpted the treaty a year later.

Saavedra Lamas delivered another address in June, 1911
on the subject or arbitration. His main purpose was to prod
his fellow delegates to renew their efforts on behalf of
arbitration treaties. Consequently, he began this rather
lengthy speech with a stinging attack on the Argentine cons
gress, announcing to all that it was rapidly approaching

ineffectualness. He affirmed categorically that the form

of the Italian accord was the culmination of all efforts in
the area of arbitration and was the "definitive consecra-
tion" of the efforts of the second Hague conference.19
More than anything else he did while a deputy, this declara-
tion demonstrated the arrogance and vanity for which
Saavedra Lamas was to become so well known.

Perhaps because of his intense interest in internation-
al arbitration in 1914 Saavedra Lamas was brought into the
early negotiations pertaining to a proposed arbitration

pact with France. Before its formal transmission the text

18Saavedra Lamas, Problemas g3 gobierno, pp. 2-19.

19Ibid., pp. 123-148.

 

 

‘

-‘- of the Arg
his opinic
Luis Murat
be replica
question c

exclusion:

 

accord des
exception
in force :‘
against a2
arbitrater
being con:
visions, 1
interests
which was
Elihu Roo
Saavedra

American.
ence even

discussed

complete

   

 

 

20

of the Argentine proposal was sent to Saavedra Lamas for
his opinion. In his letter to the Foreign Minister, José
Luis Muratue, Saavedra Lamas suggested the pact with Italy
be replicated as closely as possible. On the critical
question of infringement upon sovereignty, he proposed the
exclusionary clause which had appeared in the Italian
accord designating all disputes as arbitrable "with the
exception of those affecting the constitutional provisions
in force in one or the other states."20 He counselled
against allowing all issues, without qualification, to be
arbitrated. He also opposed adding a clause which was
being considered restricting not only constitutional pro-
visions, but also those questions "affecting honor, vital
interests or independence." Significantly, this clause,
which was then in general use, had first been proposed by
Elihu Root, the United States Secretary of State. Apparently
Saavedra Lamas found it loathsome to use anything North
American. He preferred to demonstrate Argentine independ-
ence even on rather small matters. Saavedra Lamas also
discussed a number of other provisions and concluded with a
complete formula he suggested be proposed to France.
Predictably, it was a virtual duplicate of the Italian
agreement. His work, however, went for naught, as no final
agreement was reached between Argentina and France.

20Ibid., pp. 148-178

 

 

 

 

 

 

of Social

 

Burepe. H
by Europea
reasons.
was not th
upon which
perceivin
interests.
openness w
The f
according
World. He
the Americ
"artificiz
not requii
He indicai
for instrr

Provision

he held u

example 0

 

 

 

 

 

Perhaps Saavedra Lamas was thinking of this failure,
when in 1916 he delivered a speech to the American Congress
of Social Science on international law and the war in
EurOpe. He gave as the prime cause of the war the attempt
by European nations to increase their territory for economic
reasons. The failure of international law to prevent war
was not the fault of the concept, but of the "fragile base"
upon which it rested in Europe. He castigated Europe for
perceiving treaties as only "transitory coordinations of
interests." What was needed was international law based on
openness which could prevent war.

The failure of European public law did not mean,
according to Saavedra Lamas, that it was dead in the New
WOrld. He declared that the Old World was different from
the Americas and that it was not necessary to create
"artificial equilibriums." Imperalism, he asserted, was
not required in the Americas because there was so much land.
He indicated that Europe should now look to the New WOrld
for instruction in international law, including neutrality
provisions. In contradistinction to his earlier stance,
he held up the actions of the United States as a sterling

example of impartiality.21

21Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Problemas americanos; dis—
curso del presidente §n_la inauguracidn del congreso ameri—
cano de Ciencias sociales en Tucuman e1 6 de julio de 1916
(Buenos Aires: Imprenta de —Coni hermanos, 1916). This work
may also be found in Por 1a paz de 1as americas

—_—-_r

(Buenos Aires: Compania Impresora Argentina, 1937), pp.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

It i:
internatim
developme
deputies
ever pose
to predom
was shake
one of Ev
Americas
sang the
tmre he .‘

Nor pro-1

Educatio
The

fested i

 

22

It is clear that Saavedra Lamas had great faith in
international law and believed Argentina should lead in its
development and implementation. He chided his fellow
deputies when he adjudged their efforts below par and, wher—
ever possible, refused to allow concepts of other countries
to predominate. When the whole concept of international law
was shaken by WOrld War I, he declared the problem to be
one of European hypocrisy. He then willingly embraced the
Americas and in terms reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine
sang the praises of the New World. Although at this junc-
ture he lauded the United States, he was not pro-American.

Nor pro—European. He was pro-Argentine.

Education

 

The deep concern of Saavedra Lamas with education mani—
fested itself early and he never lost interest in the sub-
ject. In 1912, while a member of the House of DeputieS,
he wrote an article, "Los estudios intensivos en la univer-
sidad de Buenos Aires," detailing his views on higher
education. The present system of schooling in Argentina,
according to Saavedra Lamas, should be abolished.~ It should
not, however, duplicate the superior German system with its
scientific orientation. Rather, the scientific orientation

~

21-40. Another reason Saavedra Lamas gave as a cause of war
was overpopulation. Predictably, he suggested emmigration
as the answer.

 

 

 

of the Ge

Hith a ne

success.
‘ .Cla
Saavedra
listening
intensive
Monograpl
vestigat:
gested t]
student a
In J
attempt ‘

Minister

Plan whi

 

 

 

 

23

of the German system should be adopted to Argentine reality.
With a new system, which he believed would continue to

change due to the laws of evolution, the Facultades could

 

make progress in science. This, he believed, was their
duty. Scholars would come together, pool their knowledge
and through joint work, move closer to perfection. He made
it very clear that a large library was a prerequisite to
success.

.Classes at such an institution could not consist,
Saavedra Lamas indicated, as they had previously, of students
listening to dogmatic statements. Instead study would be
intensive with heavy student involvement on a narrow issue.
Monographs, rather than textbooks, would be used and in-
vestigative techniques would be taught. Finally, he sug-
gested there should be considerable interchange between
student and teacher.22

In August, 1915, Saavedra Lamas had an opportunity to
attempt to put his programs into action when he became
Minister of Justice and Public Instruction. He produced a
plan which detailed the requirements for each type of;

degree.23 The proposal, however, met with no success.

22Carlos Saavedra Lamas, "Los estudios intensivos en
la universidad de Buenos Aires," Atlantida, V (July, 1912),
PP. 374—384 0

23official diagram of the program in the possession of
the author.

 

 

Saavedra
debts; h
that he
believed
a differ
achieve
Sea
the Argo
in 1919.
Argenti:
educati:
secondau
educatiw
economy
was, th

interio

be more

 

 

24

Saavedra Lamas' appointment was merely intended to pay old
debts; he was not supposed to do anything. Also the fact
that he was part of a caretaker government, which it was
believed would be shortly supplanted by a new regime with
a different political orientation, made his failure to
achieve anything understandable.24
Saavedra Lamas, however, maintained his interest in
the Argentine educational structure. In a speech delivered
in 1919, he stated categorically that public instruction in
Argentina was incompetent. The problem was that primary
education did not correlate with secondary education or
secondary with superior. What was needed was vocational
education. Saavedra Lamas pointed out that the Argentine
economy was based upon beef and had little industry. It
was, therefore, folly, as he saw it, to give people in the
interior general education when technical education would
be more useful.25
In 1925, he returned to the problem of higher educa—
tion in a short work entitled, La crisis universitaria y 13

formacién de hombres de gobierno. Saavedra Lamas again

 

24Interview with Sefiora Silvia Saavedra Lamas de
Pueyrredén, Buenos Aires, September, 12, 1972. Sefiora
Pueyrredén stated "political considerations" caused the plan
to fail.

25Saavedra Lamas, La personalidad universitaria.

 

 

 

 

ohastized

was partic
Facultad,

another .

the "Saxo
Saavedra
institute
in Argent
thereby i
ties and r
In h,
demonstra‘
Argentina
the philo
caption o
Lamas was

tion.

[he Votir

In]

first dea

 

 

25

chastized the higher educational system of Argentina. He
was particularly upset about the independence of each
Facultad, which stifled the flow of ideas from one area to
another. The remedy, according to Saavedra Lamas, was the
"Saxon" system in which interchange of students was possible
between the various departments of the University. Since
the "Saxon" system would take time to put into practice,
Saavedra Lamas proposed that special courses be temporarily
instituted. These courses would deal with current problems

in Argentine society and draw from all the Facultades,

 

thereby increasing the movement of ideas in the universi—

ties and also training the leaders required by Argentina.26
In his discussion of education, Saavedra Lamas clearly

demonstrated his positivist orientation. Particularly in

Argentina, scientific education was an integral part of

the philosophy. With his scientific orientation and per—

ception of long term evolutionary development, Saavedra

Lamas was a leader in the development of Argentine educa—

tion.

The Voting Franchise

 

In 1905 in his professional dissertation, Saavedra Lamas

first dealt with the question of extending the franchise.

26Carlos Saavedra Lamas, La_crisis universitaria y_la
formacidn d3 hombres g§_gobierno (Buenos Aires: Jacobo
Peuser, Ltd., 1925).

 

 

 

Although h.
ment of th
than it wo
cerned tha
acceptance
of voting

elections,
nations of
concluded

tion, but

accepted I
Gated the

tion.

The s
in Careful
Pline. A<
he POSite(
rights (i
chase, H.
weighted,
Mount P61
howfiller, w
the undef
tinct Sta.

electiOns

 

 

26

Although he supported the enfranchisement of a larger seg-
ment of the citizenry, his stance was considerably less open
than it would be seven years later. Perhaps he was con-
cerned that he would be labeled radical and fail to obtain
acceptance of his dissertation. He began his discussion

of voting by noting that Argentina suffered from fradulent
elections, but mitigated his response by charging that the
nations of the western world also faced this problem. He
concluded that such practices were insusceptible of extirpa—
tion, but his chief concern was that they might become the
accepted norm. Regarding Argentina specifically, he indi-
cated the major source of abuse lay in the immigrant popula—
tion.

The solution, Saavedra Lamas believed, was to be found
in careful study, based on the new social science discik
pline. Acknowledging that free elections were dangerous,
he posited the need for a plan which protected minority
rights (i.e., the oligarchy) but still broadened the fran—
chise. He pointed out that votes were only counted, not
weighted, and opined that they should be apportioned on the
amount people contributed. Monetary wealth, he concluded,
however, was not an accurate guage. Instead, he proposed
the undefined criteria of efficacy and utility. His indis-
tinct standards led to a vague final plan calling for open

elections of an intermediate body which would then choose

 

the gov
Th
Lamas w
male su
demonst
sition.
that el
ments c
larly w
in pron
Saaved]
voting
Se

fore c,
evolut.
0PPose
Angust
conclu
The la
to the
lower
even i
5‘ Ste;

SEded

\

e
I

 

 

27
the government officials.27
The luxury of being indefinite was lost by Saavedra
Lamas when in 1910 President Roque Saenz Pefia proposed full

male sufferage. Perhaps more than at any other time he
demonstrated his positivist nature by supporting the propo—
sition. The oligarchy knew when Séenz Pefia was elected

that electoral reform would follow, but recalcitrant ele—
ments of the Congress still bitterly opposed it, particu-
alarly when the mass based liberal parties did extremely well
in provincial elections. It was this situation that led
Saavedra Lamas in 1912 to deliver a detailed defense of the
voting law.

Saavedra Lamas began his justification of the law be-
fore Congress by proclaiming it was a step in the natural
evolution of society. Moreover, he pointed out that to
oppose this act would be to oppose the positivist tenets of
Auguste Comte. Failure to hold universal elections, he
concluded, would be a disaster for the growth of Argentina.
The law being proposed, he asserted, would bring Argentina
to the level of European development and remove it from the
lower levels of some (unnamed) Latin American nations. But
even if it were a step in the right direction, it was only
a step, an experiment, and it too would be eventually super—

seded as part of the natural development of society.

 

27Saavedra Lamas, Sistema municipal.

 

On
for the
tina. I
motest ‘a
It would
the pop
that his
the 0pp<
dictate

As
obvious
Organiz
Contact
who am;
Saaved:
“all for
States
the ex;
Aroent:
libera;
age We
Positi
wider

exPect

\

I.

 

 

28

On a more practical note, he indicated that a victory

for the opposition parties would not be harmful for Argen-

 

tina. It would demonstrate, he observed, even to the re-
motest‘areas, that the Argentine government could be clean.
It would also stimulate the democratic, orderly impulses of
the population and prevent uprisings. His conclusion was
that his fellow delegates should not worry, because once
the opposition controlled the government, reality would

dictate a moderation of views.2

 

As a member of the Argentine oligarchy, Saavedra Lamas
obviously desired that it continue as a powerful and stable
organization. His education, however, had brought him into
contact with the doctrines of Comte and Herbert Spencer,
who emphasized the orderly progression of society. For
Saavedra Lamas, the ideas of these philosophers pointed the
way for reform in Argentina. The success of the United
States and the military and economic power of Europe were
the examples of the kind of achievement he desired for
Argentina. His problem was how to achieve the status and
liberalism of the developed nations which universal suffer—
age would bring, while insuring that his own and his family's
position were not significantly altered. In voting for a
wider franchise, it is evident that Saavedra Lamas did not
expect a radical change in Argentina or in his status, but

28Saavedra Lamas, Problemas d3 gobierno, pp. 690-710.

 

 

that h(
ariallj

I
passag
of the
The po
Lamas,
Trigoy
compar
despit
aristc
Then T
increa
Prover

time <

the Y:
order
troub
llinst
refer
the f
and d

teller
\

later
in B1

 

 

29

that he did realize he was surrendering at least tempor-r
arially any chance of elective office.

In the 1916 presidential election, the first since the
passage of the Séenz Pena election law, Hipélito Yrigoyen

of the Unién Civica Radical (UCR) party was chosen president.

 

The policies he followed were not approved of by Saavedra
Lamas, although his writings contain no direct reference to
Yrigoyen. Yrigoyen's successor, Marcelo T. Alvear, was
comparatively more palatable to Saavedra Lamas because,
despite his membership in the U93, he was a wealthy landed
aristocrat.29 Saavedra Lamas, however, was vexed in 1928
when Yirgoyen again assumed the presidency, and his disdain
increased when due to advanced age (seventy—six) Yrigoyen
proved incapable of controlling his administration.at a
time of economic depression in Argentina.

In September, 1930, General José F. Uriburu overthrew
the Yrigoyen government. Uriburu's goal was to establish
order, particularly in the field of finance and in the
trouble ridden universities. He also proposed an
“institutional reorganization of the Republic by means of
reforming the constitution so it could defend the country in
the future [against] personalism, centralism, the oligarchy
and demagoguery." Uriburu was, in essence, proposing a
general restructuring of the Argentine political system.

__

. 29Saavedra Lamas' view of these two men came in an
interview with Sefiora Silvia Saavedra Lamas de Pueyrredén
in Buenos Aires, September 12, 1972.

 

 

 

 

 

The
ati:
The:
all;
sec

was

OPP

Uri
the
qui
lat
tht
de'
st

19

 

30

The Uriburistas wanted to turn the country into a corpor-
atist state where a national elite would be in charge.
There would be no political parties such as had tradition-
ally existed in Argentina; personal liberties would take
second place to the interests of the state. Saavedra Lamas
was in general sympathy with Uriburu's intentions, but he
opposed his methods (i.e., long term military control).30

In order to legitimize and strengthen his government,
Uriburu allowed a series of local elections. He assumed
that the U93 would not be able to reorganize itself
quickly enough to successfully oppose him. This miscalcu-
1ation proved to be Uriburu's undoing because the U93 won
the elections, thus discrediting his government. This
development, coupled with ill health, persuaded Uriburu to
step down and call a presidential election for November
1931.

The clear choice of the military was General Agustin
P. Justo, who although a soldier, wished to maintain the
basic structure of traditional Argentine government.
However, since he needed more than just the army, a coali-
tion of political parties called the Concordancia was set
up. It included members of the Conservative, Independent,
Socialist, and Antipersonalist parties. Under the latter

party, Justo had been the minister of war. The Radical

30

Ibid.

 

 

 

 

lb

Party
to a
Theiw
Niclm
exam
by i
in c

Urib

olig
1861
ions

as.

h
0

{5'0

[SIB/575

PC
It
dc

3"]

IE”

 

31

Party "chose" not to run a candidate, so opposition fell
to a coalition of the Progressive Democrats and Socialists.
Their ticket was composed of Lisandro de la Torre and
Nicholas Repetto. The 1931 election was not a sterling
example of the democratic process; it was in fact marked
by illegality and corruption. Because the army was still
in control of many important cabinet posts in the outgoing
Uriburu administration, Justo's election was assured.31
Justo and most of his cabinet were from the wealthy
oligarchical families which had controlled Argentina from
1862-1916. As José Luis de Imaz put it, "one simply be-
longed in government by right of ascription." Consequently,
as a member of a well established family, both politically
and financially, Saavedra Lamas was by definition eligible
for a position. He had demonstrated skill in Congress and
was well known as an eloquent speaker. Moreover, he liked
and disliked the proper people. According to Dr. Pablo

Santos Mufioz, a foreign office employee who eventually

 

31The discussion of Argentine events to 1932 is taken
chiefly from the following work, except where otherwise
noted: Alberto Ciria, Partidos y poder en La Argentina
moderna (1930- 1946) (Buenos Aires, 1968); Carlos Perez, ed.,
La decada infame (Buenos Aires, 1969); Marvin Goldwert,
Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-
1966; An Interpretation (Austin, Texas, 1972); Robert A.
Potash, The Army_and Politics in Argentina, 1928- 1945 (Stan-
ford, California, 1969); Jorge Abelardo Ramos, El“ sexto
dominio (Buenos Aires, 1972); James R. Scobie, Argentina,
A Ci ty and a Nation (New York, 1964), and Arthur P. Whitaker,
Argentina (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

became
office
appoint
provide
brother
her fac
T1
rhetor:
Supplie
0f off:
Played
allied
nifica
resign
What 6
but it
1
Lamas
5‘“ am
reali:
Virtm
Conti:
Saave.

the r
\

broth

32

became Saavedra Lamas' assistant, the staff of the foreign
office was not the least bit surprised when he was
appointed Foreign Minister. Perhaps Saavedra Lamas' sister
provided the clearest answer to the question, why was your
brother chosen? The reply (complete with shocked look on
her face), was "Why not?"

There were, however, others about which the same

rhetorical question could be asked. Unfortunately no source

 

supplies the details surrounding Saavedra Lamas' assumption
of office. One point, however, is clear, family connections
played a significant part. The Saavedra Lamas family was
allied through marriage to the Pueyrredéns.32 It is sig—
nificant to note, therefore, that Honorio Pueyrredén had
resigned as Foreign Minister a scant four years earlier.
What effect this alliance had is impossible to determine,
but it should not be discounted.
In retrospect, is is probable that in 1916 Saavedra
« Lamas believed he would be returning relatively quickly to
an appointive or even elective position. Argentina would
% realize that he was the best qualified man available for
virtually every post. The Radical Party, however, had
continued in office. Consequently, when a chance came for
Saavedra Lamas to obtain a prominent position even though

the regime had entered through election fraud, he accepted

 

32Saavedra Lamas' sister married Carlos Pueyrredén,
brother of Honorio Pueyrredén.

 

 

it. In
cabinet
sons why
mtase
be later
an almo:
had the
Lamas m‘
ably be

Positio

33

Septemk
the la:

 

33

it. In fact, he became a leading exponent in the Justo

33 There were also other rea—

cabinet of fixing elections.
suns why Saavedra Lamas accepted the position. Although
not as evident in his first fifty—three years as it would
be later, Saavedra Lamas suffered from a great vanity and
an almost all—consuming drive for personal fame. He also
had the pressure of the family name. Finally, Saavedra

Tamas must have realized that at his age there would prob-

ably be no other opportunities to hold a high government

 

position.

 

h

33

Interview with.Miguel Angel Carcano in Buenos Aires,
September 8, 1972. Carcano was Minister of Agriculture in
the last half of the Justo regime.

 

 

 

Saar

tent

desj
Exes

facl

Saa
PUb

bee

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER 2

THE DECLARATIONS OF AUGUST

Saavedra Lamas Takes'Office

 

When Saavedra Lamas walked into the Anchorena Palace
(the Foreign Ministry) for the first time as the Ministro

dg_Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (Minister of Foreign Rela-

 

tions and Worship) he had the benefit (or curse) of a set
of well established goals and patterns for Argentine for-
eign policy. His predecessors had perceived of Argentina
leading a Latin American coalition in counterpoise to both
the United States and the Western European nations.
Saavedra Lamas continued this orientation throughout his
tenure as Foreign Minister.

Besides the aforementioned goal, Saavedra Lamas had a
desire to gain personal fame in Argentina and the world.
Except near the end of his tenure, he was able to enjoy the
fact that there was no animosity between the aims of
Argentina and the aims of himself. While it is true that
Saavedra Lamas had an incredible vanity, his drive for
publicity was also motivated by other considerations.

According to Miguel Angel Cércano, in the first years of

 

 

Justo
tende
The I
among
obse:
have
any<
1935
Mini
ress
fall
line
Soci
he 1

sen

ini

Cho

Min

Aug

Ail
Pee

 

 

 

Justo's administration, Saavedra Lamas was a leading con-
tender to succeed the General as president of the Republic.1
The realization that he would have to gain some notoriety
among the bourgeois element might account for some of the
obsessive headline hunting. Some of his vanity may also
have had its basis in his compulsive drive to succeed. In
any case, Saavedra Lamas pushed too hard, because in late
1935, Justo became upset when it appeared his Foreign
Minister was overshadowing him and not producing any prog-
ress in important matters.2 The Chancellor's subsequent
fall from grace did not deter him. He still chased head-
lines and attempted to make friends with elements of the
Socialist Party in order to gain support for the Presidency;
he failed because in the opinion of Cércano he was "too con—
servative and a bad politician."3
As the new Foreign Minister, one of Saavedra Lamas'
initial tasks was to secure a staff. The first man he
chose was Daniel Antekoletz, an expert in international law.
Antekoletz's principal function was to supply his Foreign

Minister with the historical and legal justification to back

1Interview with Miguel Angel Cércano, Buenos Aires,
August 31, 1972.

_ 2;§i§,, and interview with Miguel Angel Carcano, Buenos
Aires, October 13, 1972. Cércano was referring to the Chaco
Peace talks to be discussed later in this study.

3Interview with Miguel Angel Carcano, Buenos Aires,
OCtOber 13, 1972.

 

 

 

 

up the j
the Ant
authore
aides,
concern
Lamas I
f_er_en_c_j
A. Pod:
He was
the Ch.
0f Saa
came a
backu;
A]
tight]
Minis1
Podes+
one c.

Lamas

“We

(11

The f
Mini c
L. J‘
allthq

 

 

up the policies Saavedra Lamas chose to follow. For example,
the Anti-War Pact, to be discussed later, was virtually
authored in its entirety by Antekoletz.4 Another of his
aides, Alejandro Bunge saw to the publication of material
concerning foreign office activities for which Saavedra
Tamas received the credit. He wrote, for example, La gon-
ferencia interamericana debconsolidacion de la_pa_.5 Luis
A. Podesté Costa acted as the Foreign Minister's "man Friday."
He was entrusted with the important meetings and functions
the Chancellor could not attend himself. In the later part
of Saavedra Lamas' tenure, Dr. Pablo Santo Mufioz also be-
came an important member of his coterie, principally as a
backup man for Podesté Costa.

Although these people were important, Saavedra Lamas
tightly controlled the direction and policy of the Foreign
Ministry. Antekoletz might find the legal precedent, and
Podesté Costa might ennunciate the Argentine position, but
one could be assured that little transpired without Saavedra

Lamas' prior agreement. Even Justo had little to do with

 

4Interview with Miguel Angel Carcano, Buenos Aires,
August 31, 1972.

5(Buenos Aires, 1938.) This work was published twice.
The first listed no author other than the Argentine Foreign
Ministry. The second edition cited here was published by
L. J. Rosso and proudly proclaims Saavedra Lamas as the

author.

 

 

 

the m
that

ever

furth
any i
actue
Pard<
summ<
Lama:

car r.

beca
even
care
debs

abi]

A1191

Aug

Air
Saa
Min

ling

 

 

the machinations of the foreign office. Cércano observed

that the President "gave him a free hand. No pressure was

6

ever on him and no one influenced him.“ Santos Mufioz went

further, stating: "Carlos Saavedra Lamas would not allow
any interference, even from Justo, and was very strong,
actually making all his own decisions."7 Edward Tomas
Pardo, the head of the Argentine Foreign Service Institute,
summed up the impressions others had given him of Saavedra
Lamas: "He was a strongman who formed opinions himself and
carried them out himselfv-no one was allowed to interfere."
Apparently Saavedra Lamas relished his independence,
because he seldom reported what he was doing. Conceivably
even when Saavedra Lamas did report, there were few who
cared to challenge him. If nothing else, he was a cons0nant
debater. Cércano used the term "fantastic" to describe his

ability in this area.9 Because of his great facility with

 

6Interview with Miguel Angel Carcano, Buenos Aires,
August 31, 1972.

7Interview with Pablo Santos-Munoz, Buenos Aires,
August 31, 1972.

8Interview with Ambassador Eduardo Tomas Pardo, Buenos
Aires, August 25, 1972. The only direct recollection of
Saavedra Lamas that Ambassador Pardo has is the Foreign
Minister playing "trains" with him when he was seven.

9Interview with Miguel Angel Cércano, Buenos Aires,
August 31, 1972.

 

the spc
and his
In
demons
his ea:
and ar
hours
who we
Saaved
suited
even t
T1
charm
Chargv
from j
"he n
SaaVe
Cloth
ninet

matic

 

 

 

38

the spoken word, he captivated the press. He personally,
and his policies, always enjoyed favorable treatment.10

In his duties as Foreign Minister, Saavedra Lamas
demonstrated the same dedication and hard work that marked
his earlier endeavors. He often worked late into the night
and arose early in the morning, taking only four or five
hours of sleep. This practice created havoc with his staff
who were often summoned to work in the middle of the night.
Saavedra Lamas did have a watch which he constantly con-
sulted, but the watch had been broken for years and did not
even have hands.11

The conduct of the office under Saavedra Lamas was
characteristically very formal. Felipe Jiménez de Asua,
Charge d‘Affaires for the Spanish embassy in Buenos Aires
from 1936 to 1938, stated that Saavedra Lamas never relaxed,
"he never forgot he was Chancellor."12 He noted that
Saavedra Lamas, with his high starched collar, old fashioned
clothing and stiff demeanor was like a figure out of the

nineteenth century. At the weekly meetings with the diplo—

matic corps, the officials accredited to Argentina had to

 

lOIbid.

11Interview with Ambassador Eduardo Tomas Pardo, Buenos
Aires, August 31, 1972.

12Interview with Dr. Felipe Jimenez de Asua, Buenos
Aires, October 4, 1972. Dr. Jimenez de Asua was Chargé
d' Affaires of the Spanish government accredited to Argentina
in 1936-1968.

 

 

 

 

be can
easilj
cello
only

Jnén

the C

east
tent
roug
ica:
use:

ind'

the

and

 

 

 

 

be careful because Saavedra Lamas was highly sensitive and
easily offended.13 At these conferences, only the Chan-
cellor talked, everyone else listened, and questions could
only be interjected while he was lighting a cigarette.
Jimenez de Asua commented, rather sardonically, that luckily

the Chancellor was a chain smoker.l4

The Chaco Dispute

As Chancellor, Saavedra Lamas' first opportunity for

decisive action concerned the ever worsening situation in

 

the Chaco which had become an explosive issue between

Bolivia and Paraguay. The Chaco is a pie shaped piece of
land of approximately 115,000 square miles. It is bordered
on the south and west by the Pilcomayo River and on the

east by the Paraguay River. The northwestern boundary ex-
tends up to the Parapeti River in Bolivia. The land can be
roughly divided into three regions. In the north is a trop—
ical forest covered with quebracho trees which are very
useful in the production of tannin used in the tanning
industry. Further south, the forest gives way to a general-
ly grassy plain interspersed with jungle. Finally, along
the Pilcomayo, is a swampy area from sixty to one hundred

and twenty miles wide. This region is subject to

l3Ibid.

l4Ibid.

 

 

 

devasta
Sin
or rich
lineate
area.
of the
Chaco
(1864-
Argent
day Vi
and dc
quenti
tense
W
Argen
from
bound
Treat
Beniv

due '

40

devastating floods.15

Since the area has no precious metals, indigenous labor,
or rich agricultural land, the Spanish never clearly de—
lineated which colonial administrative unit governed the
area. The same was true of the newly established nations
of the revolutionary era. The question of who owned the
Chaco first came up during the War of the Triple Alliance
(1864—1870). At that time the conflict centered on an
Argentine claim to the area around Villa Occidental (present—
day Villa Hayes). President Rutherford B. Hayes arbitrated
and decided in favor of Paraguay. This award would subse-
quently be a very important talking point for Paraguay in
tense negotiations between 1927 and 1933.

With the Hayes decision, the Chaco appeared safe from
Argentine encroachment, but the Bolivians began to move in
from the north. Three attempts were made to arrive at a
boundary.between Bolivia and Paraguay: the QuijarrOvDecoud
Treaty of 1879; the Tamayo-Hicual Treaty of 1887; and the
Benitez-Ichazo Treaty of 1894. They all failed, however,
due to technicalities, rather than substantive disagreee
ments. At this juncture, Argentina had stepped in and under
the tutelage of her Foreign Minister, Estanislao Zeballos,

produced the Pinilla—Soler Protocol (1907). The accord

5Ronald S. Main, "Behind the Chaco War,“ Current
M1. 42, No. 5 (August, 1935), 468—469. ‘——"‘—

 

 

callel
tions
Argen
arbit
other
not 1
she
Atla
proc
tior
be i
den;

bor

Muj
the
se-
in
No

di

 

41

called for the disputed area to be divided into three sec-
tions, the center one to be arbitrated by the President of
Argentina. Even if Paraguay lost all of the land to be
arbitrated, she would have gained more than any of the
other treaties had granted her. Moreover, Bolivia would
not be assured of an opening to the Paraguay River, which
she desperately wanted in order to send her products to the
Atlantic. Predictably enough, Paraguay ratified and Bolivia
procrastinated. A subsequent rupture of diplomatic rela-
tions with Argentina destroyed any hope that the pact would
be accepted by La Paz. The Argentine actions in 1906—1907
demonstrated an obvious partiality to her Paraguayan neigh—
bor. Thirty years later this bias would still exist.

To these four failures, a fifth was added. The Ayala—
Mujia Protocol of 1913 called for both nations to maintain
the status quo in the Chaco while working towards a final
settlement. Failing an agreement in two years, the whole
question would then be arbitrated by an unspecified party.
No definite accord was reached by 1915, but the disputants
did agree to extend the deadline for one more year. They
did so again in 1916, 1917, and 1918. 1919 marked the end
0f the official policy of talk without result and a shift
to the policy of no talk at all. The position of the govern“

ments and peoples of the two countries was hardening.l6

16For the story of the early attempts at settlement,

see Leslie B. Rout, Jr., Politics 9£_the Chaco Peace

 

 

 

 

Both

posts

1920
sout
exis
To n
have
vou]
her

sha:

hos
the

int

42

Both now began to construct a series of fortins (small out—

posts) and to purchase arms.

Compromise became a less palatable alternative after
1920 with the discovery of oil in the Camiri region of
southeastern Bolivia. It was assumed that petroleum also
existed in the Chaco, and Bolivia dreamed of great wealth.
To market the oil, however, Bolivia believed she had to
have a port on the Paraguay River, but to attain that port
would require negotiations with Paraguay which would assert
her rights in the Chaco. Since Bolivia had no desire to

share her unproven wealth, a resort to arms became virtual-

1y inevitable.

It was not long before a major incident between the

hostile forces took place.17 A 1927 incident brought ano-

ther mediation from Argentina, but this failed due to general
intransigence on the part of both principals. After this
diplomatic failure, more serious fighting broke out. On

December 5, 1928, the Paraguayans attacked Fortin Vanguardia

Conference, 1935-1939 (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1971), pp. 9-14. A more comprehensive discussion of events,
including c0pies of the various treaties, can be found in
Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, La
pglitica argentina en la guerra del Chaco, I, pp. 1-115.

17David H. Zook, Jr. The Conduct g£_the Chaco War
(New Haven, Conn.: Bookman Associates, 1960), p. 43. On
February 25, 1927 a small Paraguayan scouting party led by
Second Lieutenant Rojas Silva was captured by the Bolivians
When it ventured too close to Fortin Sorpresa. Silva was
shot when he tried to escape.

 

 

 

 

and t
Boque
the 2
tion
ther
no 0
want
ceiv
Offs
Pare
Con
has
the
and

066

11p
Art

 

 

 

and the Bolivians responded with an attack on Fortin

18 At the time of this incident,

Boqueron nine days later.
the International Conference of American States on Concilia-
tion and Arbitration was meeting in Washington. In fact,
there can be little doubt that the timing of the attack was
no coincidence. Paraguay was anxious to avoid war and
wanted the intervention of other countries. Paraguay re-
ceived what it desired when, on December 17, the body
offered its good offices to the quasi-belligerents.
Paraguay accepted immediately, but Bolivia demurred.
Consequently, it was not until January, 1929, that the
Washington Conference took charge. Its duty, according to
the Protocol, was to identify the aggressor in the Boquerén
and Vanguardia incidents while the disputants maintained a
cease fire.

The Commission of Investigation and Conciliationlg set

up by the Washington Conference was originally to include

Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Uruguay and the United States.

18As a result of these two attacks, passions in both
countries reached high limits. Bolivia was particularly
filled with war sentiment, replete with crowds screaming,
"We want war." Ibid., p. 50.

19For the significant documents and correspondence
relating to the "Commission," see United States, Department
of State, Report of the Chairman Commission g£_Inquiry and
anciliation, BoliVia and Paraguay (Washington: United
States Government Printing Office, 1929).

 

 

 

 

 

 

Both Ar«
Argenti
tenders
Argenti
however
First,

tion w]
a grouj
to 10s
fluid

influe
When t
consi:
Unitev
Signi

Conte

month

Place

F
a

 

 

 

Both Argentina and Brazil, however, declined the offer.
Argentina's stated reason for refusal was that she had
tendered good offices earlier with no success, and that

20 Two other factors,

Argentina's mission had terminated.
however, might have played key roles in this decision.
First, Argentina did not wish to place herself in a posi-
tion where her prestige was dependent upon the success of
a group dominated by the United States; she would have much
to lose and nothing to gain. Secondly, in a situation as
fluid as the Chaco dispute, Argentina could exert more
influence outside the strictures of a multi-lateral group.
When the Commission membership was finally agreed upon it
consisted of Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Uruguay and the
United States. Considering subsequent developments, it is
significant that none of the countries bordering upon the
contending nations were on the Commission.

From August, 1929, until its authorization expired six
months later, the.Cemmission met with no success. Its re-

placement; the Cemmittee of Neutrals, did no better.

, 20United States, Department of State, Papers Relating
§g_the Fdreign Relations gf_the United States (Washington,
D.C.: United States Government Pringing Office, 1934),

I: 829-830. The proposal by Argentina had been rejected by
Bolivia, see, U. 8. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1928,
I: p. 684. Subsequently Irigoyen commented that Argentina
had turned down the offer to "avoid being placed in the posi-
tion of seeking to accomplish by circutous:means what he

had failed to do by direct offer," U. S. Dept. of State,
Egreign Relations, 1929, I, p. 684.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The
pron
fror
she
tiov

bri

obt
aft
of
to
lo<
he
An
Al
Mi
At
re

di

 

 

45

The contentious nations were simply not interested in com—
promise. Adding to the trouble of both mediating bodies
from 1929-31 was the policy of Argentina. On two occasions
she disrupted the talks, by attempting to wrest the media—
tion effort from the United States' dominated groups and
bring them to Buenos Aires.21
Saavedra Lamas when he took office also attempted to
obtain control of the negotiations. Consequently, shortly
after taking office on February 20, 1932 he began a series
of diplomatic manuevers aimed at bringing the negotiations
to the Argentine capital. His plan was to begin discussions
looking toward the re-establishment of diplomatic relations
between the quasi-belligerents. If he was successful,
Argentine mediation of the dispute would follow in Buenos

Aires.22

The plan was first prOposed to the Paraguayan
Minister to Argentina, Vicente Rivarola, on March 16, 1932.
At that time, Saavedra Lamas said that joint intervention,
referring to action with the Committee of Neutrals, was too

difficult. Saavedra Lamas told Rivarola that he had to talk

with the Bolivian Foreign Minister, José Maria Zalles, and

21For a discussion of the activities of the Committee
of Neutrals prior to the time Saavedra Lamas took office,
see Rout, Politics, 28-36.

22Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La politica argentina,
I] 261-262.

 

 

 

that a
decisi
He wer
disagi
bias I
that 1
ceed.I
and i
strat

Parag

tied

diplo
ship

and e
Buenc
Stant
Arger
Strer

Paras

Airs:
w0rd:

toD

46

that any success the proposal might have was based on the
decision of the President of Bolivia, Daniel Salamanca.

He went on to describe Salamanca as "coarse, diffident, and
disagreeable“23 in an attempt to show Paraguay where his
bias lay. Saavedra Laman must have known, nevertheless,
that there was little chance that this gambit would suc-
ceed.24 If it did, however, he would be deemed a genius,

and if it did not, he would lose nothing. In the end, his

strategy failed and his proposal was not even accepted by

 

Paraguay.
Notwithstanding this rejection, Paraguay was closely

tied to Argentina, as demonstrated by Saavedra Lamas' un-

 

diplomatic statements concerning Salamanca. This relation—
ship was historical in nature and based upon propinquity
and economics. Paraguay was up the Paraguay River from
Buenos Aires, so contact between the two peoples was con-
stant. Also, the bulk of Paraguay's trade came through
Argentina, creating strong economic ties. These were
strengthened further by direct Argentine investments in

Paraguay, particularly in the Chaco region.25 The wealthy

. 23Vicente Rivarola, Memorias diplométicas (Buenos
Aires: Editorial Ayacucho, 1952-1957), II, pp. 87—88. The
words used were "tosco, hurafio y reconcentrado."

24 . . .
U. S. Archives, RG 59, Dec1ma1 File 724.3415/1758,
Wheeler (Asuncidn) to Dept. of State, April 17, 1932.

 

 

 

 

25 . . . . .
Ibid., Dec1ma1 File 7lOG/ll8, Bliss (Buenos Aires)

to Dept. of State, Jan. 1, 1933.

 

 

 

 

Argent
hoidiv

Casadl

relat
featr
orier
const
with

001111

Para
on A
mair
He 1
for
rea:
val

Lam

dCt
Lav
arr
an.
we

Wh

47

Argentine businessman Carlos Casado, for example, had major
holdings in the Chaco, including the entire town of Puerto
Casado.

Bolivia, on the other hand, had a virtual adversary
relationship with Argentina. Because of geographical
features western Bolivia which bordered on Argentina was
oriented more toward Buenos Aires than La Paz. There was
constant fear that the peOple in western Bolivia.might join
with Argentina. As a result, relations between the two
countries were poor.

That Saavedra Lamas was decidedly prejudiced toward
Paraguay can be seen in a conversation he had with Rivarola
on April 14, 1932. The Argentine Chancellor, at that time,
maintained that if war came, Argentina would be neutral.

He further explained, however, that Argentina had a bias

for Paraguay, but that it “cannot be revealed for obvious
reasons." Saavedra Lamas' comment was accepted at face
value because in his report Rivarola commented that Saavedra
Lamas would work hard for Paraguay.

The bias of Argentina resulted in significant unneutral
acts. On July 22, 1932 a meeting was held between Saavedra
Lamas, Colonel Rodriquez, a Captain Casal of the Argentina
army and Vicente Rivarola. Rivarola asked to buy weapons
and ammunition- Saavedra Lamas stated that such an act
Would be unneutral, and left the meeting. He obviously knew

What was caming next, and wanted to be able to say truthfully

 

 

 

that '
to Pa
the hi
Capta
he no

annou

Saave

obvic

 

Riva]
ligel
shoal
Riva:
Para
vict

that

Some
and

find.

 

 

 

that to his knowledge, his country was not supplying arms

Colonel Rodriguez remained quiet, leaving

to Paraguay.
The

the negotiations to the expendable Captain Casal.

Captain asked Rivarola for his shopping list and said that

he would telephone him. A short time later he did, and
2

announced that Argentina would fill Paraguay's order.

Rivarola expressed no animosity in his memoirs about

Saavedra Lamas' abrupt departure from the meeting. He

obviously understood the Chancellor's position. In fact,
Rivarola described Saavedra Lamas as a man of clear intel—
ligence and a great capacity to work. He believed that he
should have received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1936.
Rivarola even observed that when Saavedra Lamas opposed
Paraguay, it was because of his "profound juridical con-

victions." He did, however, mitigate his View commenting

that

he [Saavedra LamasJ acted sometimes as if he were
the only person who could inspire and dictate solu—
tions, as if he were the only one called to make

peace in order to get a diplomatic triumph for his

country and above all for a personal success.
He went on to say that Saavedra Lamas was "strong and sure

sometimes, fickle and unsure at other times in his decisions
Rivarola's conclusion was that he would never

and words."
27

understand Saavedra Lamas.

26These events are described in Rivarola, Memorias

diplomaticas, II, 163—164.

27Ibid. , 83-85.

 

 

 

was a.
elect
annou
self

He af
he cc

Side:

Lama:
Wash;

WOul.

5/14

ton

 

 

 

The ABCP Coalition
On April 5, 1932, Saavedra Lamas attempted to once

again grab the initiative from the Committee of Neutrals.
He tried to organize the countries bordering upon the quasi-

belligerents, Argentine, Brazil, Chile, and Peru (ABCP) in
order to present a proposal. Two days later, the Argentine
Ambassador to the United States, Felipe Espil, was asked
about the possibility of collaboration with the Committee

of Neutrals. Espil replied that he thought “any joint action
would be very difficult to bring about."28 That Saavedra
Lamas desired to avoid Washington and keep his options open
was also evidenced in his conversations with the President—
elect of Paraguay, Eusebio Ayala. The Argentine Chancellor
announced it inappropriate for Argentina to associate her—

self in a secondary capacity in any collective movement.

He affirmed he would take part in collective action only if

he could do so on his own terms and at the moment he con—
29

sidered favorable.
Despite these assurances,on April 12, 1932, Saavedra

Lamas did indicate a willingness to cooperate with the
The shift resulted from fear he

washington based group.
would not be able to organize the limitrophe countries at

 

23H. 3. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/1723,
5/14 Conversation, White and Espil, April 7, 1932.
Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/1740 Wheeler (Asuncién)

29
of State, April 10, 1932.

to Dept.

 

aii‘
Neut
tina
Also
Boii
inte

groi

hen
ioo
bet
bec

agg

the
Con

unt

50

all without some sort of alliance with the Committee of
Neutrals. Brazil had shown reluctance to join with Argen-
tina, preferring to stay close to the United States.30
Also, news had arrived that Chile was aligning herselfwith
Bolivia, which had indicated she would "deeply regret" the
intervention of the A§g§_nations,31 probably fearing the
group would be dominated by Argentina.

Consequently, in early May, discussions were begun
between the ABCP countries and the Committee of Neutrals,
looking toward the develOpmentof a non-aggression pact
between the quasi—belligerents. Saavedra Lamas, however,
became upset when he learned that a provision of the non—
aggression pact would re-establish diplomatic relations.

It is significant that it was Bolivia who first suggested
that the renewal of diplomatic relations be taken up by the
Committee of Neutrals. Apparently La Paz was trying to
undercut Saavedra Lamas. Ironically, Paraguay agreed to
put the question on the agenda which suggests that Saavedra
Lamas‘ early proposals had never been taken seriously. On
May 11, 1932, Espil was sent to talk to Frances White,

Assistant Secretary of State and Chairman of the Committee

30Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/1689 Culbertson
(Santiago) to Dept. of State, April 5, 1932 and Rivarola,
Memorias diplomaticas, II, 88-91.

31U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V,

 

 

 

of N
Saav
conc
made
tio:
cry]
est.

him

con
ups
st:
of

the
Che

Arc

tr
Ve:

Fm

 

 

51

of Neutrals about the Neutrals‘ apparent encroachment of
Saavedra Lamas' turf. As White related in the memorandum
concerning this question, it was true that Argentina had
made efforts in this direction, but that of late, the ques-
tion "had been absolutely dormant." White commented
cryptically that if Saavedra Lamas could obtain the re—
establishment of diplomatic relations, it was fine with
him.32
As the negotiations concerning a non—aggression pact
continued in Washington, Paraguay was becoming increasingly
upset. She was afraid of the power of Bolivia and desired
stronger protection. On June 5th, the outgoing President
of Paraguay, José Patricio Guggiari, sent Brazil aproposal.
that Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro "take possession of the
Chaco and impose an arbitration upon Paraguay and Bolivia."33
Argentina and Brazil, however, were not willing to take such
a course without receiving formal requests from both coun-
tries. For too many years both countries had opposedrinter—

vention to plausibly consider it as an alternative.

Furthermore, they did not trust each other.

32v. 8. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/1776,
2/6 Conversation, White and Espil, May 11, 1932.

141 33U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V,

 

 

 

 

 

 

ing

Para
With
Saav
0n t
Lama
Arge
Saav
mos-
and.
Bra
a S
rea
pro
sec
Ric
ing

in;

Nev

Ln

[*4/81 5.57/2"-

l—l

4

 

 

 

52

Paraguay's panic was not unjustified, for heavy fight-
ing broke out in the Chaco on June 15, 1932. On July 7,
Paraguay withdrew from the non-aggression pact negotiations.
With the Committee of Neutrals temporarially paralyzed,
Saavedra Lamas became involved in two mediation efforts.
On the 23rd of July, Brazil forwarded a proposal to Saavedra

Lamas suggesting "joint action" (acci6n conjunto) with

 

Argentina to halt the fighting in the Chaco. In reply,
Saavedra Lamas indicated he was agreeable, but believed the
most useful course would be to support continued negotiations
under the auspices of the Committee of Neutrals.34 The
Brazilian suggestion and Saavedra Lamas} reply were reported
a scant two days later by Espil to White in washington. The
reason the Argentine Chancellor sidestepped the Brazilian
proposal is clear. First, Argentina did not want to be the
second for a Brazilian proposal. Secondly, by rejecting

Rio de Janeiro's overture for action exclusive of the Wash—
ington Committee and then "tattling" on Brazil, she could
improve her standing in the eyes of the Committee of

Neutrals.35 The major reason, however, was that Saavedra

Lamas had his own ideas.

. 34See Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La politica argen—
Eifli: I, 374 and Repfiblica Argentina, Ministerio de
Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Memoria presentada a1 honor-
Eéie Congress nacional correspondiente a1 periodo T932-
$2§§ (Buenos Aires, 1933), p. 7. '__

35 . .
U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V,

 

 

 

 

144.

 

 

 

propt
four
forw
nati

favo

mend
Doct
emp]
teri
exp:
frox
not
ret
pre
Sta
agr

CUS

 

53

On the 22nd of July, one day before the Brazilian
proposal arrived, Chile had suggested joint action by all
four limitrophe countries. Saavedra Lamas, ever ready,
forwarded almost immediately a draft proposal to the ABCP

nations for their opinion.36

The reaction was generally
favorable, although Brazil asked for clarifications.

In Washington, White suggested to Espil that he recom-
mend to Saavedra Lamas the incorporation of the Stimson
Doctrine into the Argentine accord. This doctrine, first
employed toward Japan, called for the non—recognition of
territory acquired by other than peaceful means. White
explained such a statement might have more force if it came
from a limitrophe nation, adding that the United States was
not looking for any credit for the proposal. Espil was
reticent about making such a suggestion to Saavedra Lamas,
preferring to say the idea had originated in the United
States, but White did not like that idea. Finally, it was
agreed to tell Saavedra Lamas that the idea "had been dis—
cussed informally by certain of the Neutrals."37 In this
mini-conspiracy, left unstated was the certain knowledge of

Saavedra Lamas' egoism. By dangling an idea in front of

his nose, coupled with the implicit assumption that someone

 

3 . . . . .
6Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La polltlca argentina,

I: 376-377.

3 . .
7U. S. Archives, RG 59, De01mal File 724.3415/1820,

l3/15, Memorandum by White, July 26, 1932.

 

   

 

 

 

 

else
Lama:
some:
Espi

addi

gene
cant

neg

Whi'

 

 

 

 

else might formally suggest it, it was believed Saavedra
Lamas would include the Stimson Doctrine rather than allow
someone else to obtain the glory. It is apparent that both
Espil and White realized Saavedra Lamas would reject any
additions he did not initiate.

The prOposal which surfaced in Washington on July 29,
generally consisted of platitudes. What made it signifi-
cant was a clause in article three which stated that the
A§g§_nations were

offering it [the Committee of Neutrals] the collabora-

tion that may be needed to put into practice the

emergency measures that may be considered proper to

prevent war between the republics of Bolivia and
Paraguay.38

Also, since it did not contain the Stimson Doctrine,
White telephoned his ambassador to ask him to speak personal-
ly to Saavedra Lamas regarding the Doctrine. United States
Ambassador to Argentina, Robert Bliss called back shortly
thereafter, saying that a reply to White's idea was in
Espil's new instructions and that although Chile and Peru
had agreed to sign the Argentine letter, Brazil had not yet
responded.

It is probable that White must have despaired over the
possibility of including the Stimson Doctrine in a proposal

38An English translation is available in U. S. Dept.

of State, Foreign_Relations, 1932, V, pp. 152-152, or see

 

 

the Spanish text in Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext.,‘La
Eglitica argentina, 376-377.

 

 

 

 

 

to t
surp
look
cone
tina
pric
mat:
Arge
govt
mil
Saa

sup

the
cor
Es;
ste
OP]
de
me
W0
Do

me

55

to the belligerents. As such, he must have been pleasantly
surprised when Espil said that the Argentine government now
looked with favor upon a non—recognition of land taken in
conquest statement. Espil, however, went on to say Argen—
tina was still unwilling to suggest the Doctrine without
prior knoWledge of acceptance by the other limitrophe
nations. Such a move, unsupported by others, would put
Argentina in a very difficult position vis—a—vis the Bolivian
government.39 Bolivia was at this time conducting successful
military operations in the Chaco and advancing eastward.
Saavedra Lamas did not want Argentina to be the only nation
supporting the loser, even if Paraguay was a friend.

On July 30, a meeting was held in Washington between
the representatives of the Neutral Nations and the ABCP
countries in order to draft a note to the belligerents.
ESpil told the meeting that his government approved of a
statement "setting forth their [nineteen American nations]
opposition to war and calling on Bolivia and Paraguay to
desist at once from any warlike moves." Everyone at the
meeting concurred with Espil and it was agreed that White
would draw up a statement over the lunch break. The pro—l
posal as it subsequently appeared, however, was entirely

new, having little in common with Saavedra Lamas‘.

39
150.

U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V,

 

 

Afte
the
Amer

ties

war
Equ

min

Dec

 

 

 

 

After some minor changes40 this document became known as
the Declaration of August 3, and was signed by the nineteen
American Republics.41 It was frequently cited by all par-
ties to the dispute when it fitted their needs.
The Declaration of August 3 was a victory for White.
He had led the Americas in a solemn pronouncement against
war and had obtained acceptance of the Stimson Doctrine.
Equally important, by interjecting his proposal at the last
minute, he had seemingly undercut Saavedra Lamas and the
A§g3_proposition.
Alas, he had not. Saavedra Lamas took credit for the
Declaration, as if it were his own. He stated that
the principle which was the essential part, was main—
tained in all its force, as an initiative of our own;
but we preferred to have its material consecration

made jointly by all the countries of America grouped
about the Neutral Commission [sic].

 

4OIbid., 182- 183. Chile was afraid that the use of the

Stimson— Doctrine would put the recent Tacna—Arica settlement
in doubt. The protocol was written in such a way as to
allay Chile's fears, but Saavedra Lamas would try more than
once to secure Chile's release of Bolivia's littoral, an
idea favorable to both belligerents.

41See the English text, U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign
Relations, 1932, V, 159- 160 or the original Spanish text

in Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La polltica argentina, I,
386- -387.

42U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2072
Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 5, 1932. The
original Spanish can be found in La Prensa, August 4,1932
and Argentina, Memoria, 1932— -l933, —16— 20. See also Decimal
File 724. 3415/2090, 1/14 Telephone Conversation Bliss
(Buenos Aires) and White, August 17, 1932. In Argentina,
Min. de Rel. Ext., La politica argentina, I, 378-379, 381
published in 1937, White is given credit for the August 3
Declaration with the help of Saavedra Lamas.

 

 

 

 

 

Thror
and C
Biis:

Whit!

Blie
rece
inte
howl
eff
bel
for
Aug

mer

 

57

Through interviews with the press he publicized it widely
and did nothing to halt the misconceptions which developed.
Bliss summarized the situation very well in a letter to
White.

Both in editorial comment and in a statement given

out by Dr. Saavedra Lamas, the United States has been

acclaimed for its “magnanimOUS“ gesture in turning

to Argentina and other South American republics to'

come to the rescue of the Neutral Commission sitting

in washington for a solution.
Bliss went on to note that the Argentines believed the non-
recognition clause to be a "transcendental contribution to
international relations by Argentina." His conclusion was,
however, that Saavedra Lamas' actions had had a positive
effect on Argentine—United States relations. The Argentines
believed the United States was substituting legal methods
for strong arm tactics. When White received the letter of
August 16th, he became furious. In the margin of the docu—
ment he wrote, "Argentina was offered the chance to take
the initiative and refused it." On the bottom of the docu—
ment he also added, “When we succeeded, she jumped in to

"43 What must have angered White

try to take the credit.
most, however, was Saavedra Lamas' statements to the press.
Although eloquent, they can best be described as pontifica—

tious.

43U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2072

Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 5, 1932.

 

 

 

 

 

 

58

White could have reasonably believed that the August
3 Declaration precluded further proposals, but Saavedra
Lamas had other ideas. He continued with his earlier
proposal, minus the provision Brazil opposed regarding
"emergency measures.“ The Declaration of August 644 which
was promulgated on that date, destroyed the effectiveness
either proposal might have had, were either of them the
only one forwarded. The problem was that the August 3
proposal by virtue of the Stimson Doctrine required Bolivia
to withdraw to the lines held on June 1. The ABCP plan
called for an in—place cease—fire, which Bolivia found
reasonable but to which Paraguay violently objected.

On August 8, two days after the publication of the
A§93_manifesto, two conVersations were held: one was be«
tween White and Espil in Washington, the other between Bliss
and Saavedra Lamas in Buenos Aires. The tone of the report
of the Washington meeting indicated White was quite annoyed
with the actions of Saavedra Lamas. The Assistant Secretary
of State began by noting that the limitrohpe nations'
declaration “would definitely scrap the position taken by
the hemisphere on August 3," because it failed to include
a withdrawal to the June 1, 1932 line. Espil, in reply,
noted that the Bolivian government might fall if that nation

were forced to withdraw. White's answer was sharp and to

44

. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V,
165-167.

 

59

the point, "... which was most essential for the good of
the continent--to maintain the Doctrine ennunciated on
August 3 or to maintain the present individuals composing
the Government of Bolivia[?J" White must have become furi-
ous when Espil showed him a telegram from Saavedra Lamas
saying "that while they [ABQPJ wanted to support the
Neutral Commission, they [ABCP] would point out that in
Argentina, they had all the background for handling this
matter." Although unstated, it is obvious that the third
"they" in this sentence should have read "Saavedra Lamas."
White asked whether Espil was requesting that the Committee
of Neutrals step aside, only to be met with a statement
that Espil had no instructions on this point. White then
asked Espil a critical set of questions:

Who represented the neighboring countries, where

their organization was set up, whether they had a

definite organization in Buenos Aires such as we have

here, and whether in the event, he was to be the

liaison between the two[?J
Espil could only respond lamely that he had no instructions
on these points. In fact, Espil could ansWer none of these
questions without demonstrating that Saavedra Lamas had not
been Specifically chosen by anyone and that no formal organ—
ization existed. What was important, however, was that‘

these considerations did not seem to bother Saavedra Lamas,

who continued to act as if he were in charge of a formal

 

 

 

.C 1| 1| \I. i

 

60
mediating effort.45
In the Buenos Aires conversation of August 8, the
description of which was not received until the morning of
the 9th, Saavedra Lamas explained to Bliss his position in

the Chaco dispute. The Argentine Foreign Minister began
by stating, rather incredibly, that the text of the August
6th.message would prevent either of the belligerents from

playing one side against the other. He went on to note,

1

however, that Argentina's location, close to both belliger
ents, made it easier for A¥gentina (read Saavedra Lamas)
to understand the situation, a statement very similar to
the one Espil made in Washington. Bliss, however, did not
ask the type of questions White did. Like Espil, the.
Chancellor also noted that Bolivia would not accept any
prOposal calling for withdrawal and therefore he had sugv

gested to the belligerents a one month truce based upon the

 

“status quo de facto." He had advised that the consuls of
the neutral nations act as observers and work on an agree—
ment (unspecified) to solve the whole problem. Saavedra

Lamas emphasized that his country would not be an arbitrator

=but would be willing to draw up an arbitration agreement.46

45U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/1920,

2/14 Conversation Espil and White, August 8, 1932.
4 . . . . .
6Ib1d., Dec1ma1 File 724.3415/1997 BllSS (Buenos Alres)
t0 Dept. of State, August 8, 1932.

1|

 

 

 

61

White, however, was not willing to hand the negotia—
tions to Saavedra Lamas; he began an offensive of his own.
On AuguSt 9, the Committee of Neutrals sent a strong note
to Bolivia asking exactly what her stand was in reference
to a cease fire based on positions as of June 1 and whether
she would accept arbitration.47 Bolivia, of course, re-
jected a withdrawal and very candidly stated that the
citizenry would not agree to it.48 It must be remembered,
however, that Bolivia knew of Saavedra Lamas' cease—fire
plan and was therefore even less likely seriously to con-
sider withdrawal.

But what of Paraguay, the silent ally of the Foreign
Minister? She was, as could be expected, extremely upset.
In a letter from Rivarola to President Ayala, the Paraguayan
minister castigated Saavedra Lamas. He stated that the

Chancellor was "haughty with his triumph of nineteen Ameri—

can countries [referring to the August 3rd Declaration "

 

and that now, "in a desire to change the plan of the wash“
ington Neutrals and anxious for a new triumph, wants a truce
that costs us."49 In a subsequent meeting, Saavedra Lamas'

63 47U. 3. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations! 1932' V'
‘64.

48Ibid., 65-66.

 

9Rivarola, Memorias diplomaticas, II, 149.

 

 

   

 

62

attempt to calm Rivarola seemed to have failed. The Argen-
tine Chancellor stated that in the last analysis, "he would
give the problem back to the Committee of Neutrals."
Rivarola tried to remind Saavedra Lamas of the inconsisten-
cies of his position with that of the August 3 Declaration
and reported the results in rather bitter terms:

But Dr. Saavedra Lamas never hears objections,

enamored of his words and of his ideas, responding

always with a continuation of his discourse as if

he could not hear what was said to him.50

Even considering the stand Bolivia took, Secretary of
State Henry Stimson was unwilling to concede defeat for his
non-recognition proposal. Taking the lead from White, he
sent two bristling letters to the A§93_countries. The
first, sent on the 11th of August, talked of the need for
communications between the two mediating groups and noted
a number of examples where the Committee of Neutrals had
made its intentions known to the A§93_nations. Then Stimson
indicated that Bolivia was trying to ignore the August 3
‘Declaration and that “the Neutrals are not fully informed
Of just what Argentina has done.“ He continued on, defendv
ing the idea that a cease—fire should be in terms of the

51

June 1 positions. It is worth noting that by singling out

‘Argentina for criticism in a letter to all of the limitrophe

M

50lbid., II, 150.

51
U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V,

173-175.

 

63

nations, Stimson was conceding to Saavedra Lamas the leader-
ship White had earlier questioned. The second letter, of
August 12, was even more cryptic and biting. He stated
that it was definitely true that Argentina had suggested
a one month truce based upon the status quo and that
Paraguay had rejected it. Therefore he asked that the
limitrophe countries support his plan and reminded them
they had agreed to work with the Neutrals.52

It is ironic that instead of solving the dispute, the
Declarations of August 3 and August 6 produced only discord
among the mediating nations. The bulk of the responsibil—
ity for this fiasco rests, of course, with Saavedra Lamas,
since he promulgated the second proposal. However, in
deference to the Argentine Foreign Minister, it must be
remembered that White substituted his own proposal for what
should have been a re—write of Saavedra Lamas‘. It must
:also be remembered that the Committee of Neutrals had proven
‘itself impotent in its attempts to bring about a settlement.
*And if Saavedra Lamas was enamoured with the idea of bring—
ling prestige and power to himself and Argentina, Stimson
hand White were similarly enamoured with their concepts of
Of international law and the efficacy of the non—recognition
idoctrine. Although the motivation of the latter may be

3Considered more altruistic, it was equally uncompromising

 

 

52Ibid., 175—6.

64

and deliterious. Much worse, it was unrealistic. It is
significant, however, that in the confrontation that
developed, Argentina, a nation of considerably less power

than the United States, bested the North Americans.

 

CHAPTER 3

"UNA CONFUSION GRANDE"

Saavedra Lamas and the League 9£_Nations

 

With the resounding failure of the August Declarations,
suspicion and distrust developed between the limitrophe
countries, the Committee of Neutrals and among the A§93_
powers themselves. Saavedra Lamas complicated the situa—
tion further when Argentina re-joined the League of Nations
in September, 1932. He initially indicated he would attempt
to bring that body into the negotiations. That the United
States looked with deep disfavor upon this possibility can
be seen in a note White sent to Hugh Robert Wilson, United
States Minister to Switzerland. In it, the Assistant
Secretary stated that if Saavedra Lamas "tries to start some-
thing" Wilson should tell Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary
General of the League, that "the present Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Saavedra Lamas ... is hunting publicity for him—
self.“ White continued by observing that "every diplomatic
officer in Buenos Aires had complained that he [Saavedra

Lamas] had double crossed him, misled him, and even directly

65

 

 

 

 

66

lied to him."1 After this rather uncomplimentary descrip—
tion of the Argentine Foreign Minister's character, White
stated that Saavedra Lamas' motive was "to have the League
use Argentina as its spokesman in Latin American affairs
and to get more kudos for himself."2 The Assistant Secre-
tary bihterly suggested the Argentine Chancellor would not
hesitate to undercut the League, if it meant prestige for
himself. So interested was White in keeping Argentina at
bay, he supplemented his earlier note to Wilson with evi-
dence that cartridges found upon Paraguayan soldiers were

Argentine.3

 

1United States Archives, Record Group 59, Decimal File
724.3415/2322A, White to Wilson (Berne) September 19, 1932.
Initially the League had agreed to allow the Committee of
Neutrals to act as mediator when the belligerents first
brought the problem to the international body. However, as
the war increased in intensity, the League members lost
patience and on September 20, 1932, created a three member
commission to look into the matter. Although Argentina was
not a member of the commission, there Can be little doubt
that Saavedra Lamas was behind the program.

White also chastized Saavedra Lamas for trying to
bring the negotiations to Buenos Aires so he could obtain cred-
it and for hiding when things were bad, but associating him—
self with success.

2Ibid. The way to stOp Saavedra Lamas, according to
White, was through the use of Mexico, Colombia, and Cuba,
which were all members of the Committee of Neutrals.
Concerning the last member of the Neutrals, Uruguay, the
Assistant Secretary indicated suSpicion. White seems justi-
fied about Uruguay, as that country attempted to obtain the
peace conference if any were to be held. See United State,
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States

 

 

(Washington, D.C.: United States G6verfifient Printihg Office,
1942), 1932, Volume V, p. 197.
3

U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2332B,
White to Wilson (Berne) September 20, 1932.

 

 

 

 

67

Bliss, in a report to White, also discussed the ques-
:ion of the League and Saavedra Lamas, but without the
iegree of bitterness the Assistant Secretary had displayed.
Bliss believed that the return of Argentina would please
:he League as a sign of "new support at a time when the
League is subject to wide criticism for failure to prevent
lostilities." The United States Ambassador also adjudged
that Argentina would attempt to make itself the focus for
all League activities dealing with Latin America.4

In reality, both these men were correct, but neither
went far enough in their analyses. Bliss should have also
abserved that League membership, in the absence of formal
representation by the United States, would have aided
Saavedra Lamas in both organizing a Latin American coali—
-ion and bringing Argentina closer to Europe. These had
oth been goals of Argentina for generations. White was
:orrect when he pointed out that the Argentine Foreign
iinister was only using the League for his own ends. What
1e failed to enunciate was that Saavedra Lamas could obtain
:he aforementioned benefits without surrendering his pre—

rogatives to the multi-national body. The League was will-

 

;ng to allow itself to be used by Saavedra Lamas because

 

4Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/2415, Bliss (Buenos
.ires) to Dept. of State, September 30, 1932. Saavedra
amas also attempted to persuade Paraguay to have closer
'elations with the League. Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/
434, l/2, White to Wilson (Geneva), November 5, 1932.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

68

the alternative, demonstrating impotence, was unaccept-

able.

Saavedra Lamas and the Committee of Neutrals

 

 

It is clear from his subsequent actions that Saavedra
Lamas believed he did not need to use the League, at least
at this time. Even while in the process of joining the
League, he was attempting to mediate on his own, much to
the chagrin of the Neutrals. On the morning of September 3
he called Ambassador Bliss to his office to say he was
trying to establish acceptable military guarantees for a
:ease-fire. Heindicated that if he found them, he would
send his proposal to the Neutrals. Saavedra Lamas observed
:hat it would be useless to forward proposals to the Neutrals
which the belligerents would reject. He also certainly
:new that what he was doing was not what the Neutrals de-
:ired. White was vexed when he heard about these develOp—
ents and "said it should be made clear to Saavedra [sic]
.hat in informing Bliss of what he is doing, he is not
00perating with the Neutrals." He also commented that
aavedra Lamas' actions had caused a great deal of resent—

ent against Argentina.5

 

5The situation is described in two virtually identical
amos. See U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932,
'195—6 and U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/
:44, Conversation, Wilson and White, September 3, 1932.

 

69

The squabble between the Neutrals and Saavedra Lamas
became considerably more serious in mid-October, 1932.
Saavedra Lamas became upset when the Neutrals suggested to
the belligerents that military observers be sent to the
Chaco to police a cease-fire.6 Espil delivered a lengthy
letter to the Neutrals pointing out that it was notclear
what the military observers would do. When after reviewing
a number of precedents, the note stated that Argentina
"will not go along with ... any act which, extending beyond
the limits of good offices ... might approximate an inter—
vention." The October 18th letter went on to affirm that
an action such as the one proposed had to have its basis
in a treaty previously signed, Which this did not.7

Regarding this message, Espil subsequently called upon
White to say that he had "considerably" altered it from the
way it was received from Saavedra Lamas.8 He stated that
major changes had been made in regards to the authorship of
the August 3 Declaration, Stimson's position in Manchuria,
and the Drago Doctrine. In fact, the Ambassador rewrote a

significant portion of the note and toned it down consider—

ably. In the original, Saavedra Lamas had viciously

6U. A. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V,
93-94.

7U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2502,
Espil to White, October 18, 1932.

8Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/2414, 7/13, Conversation
Ispil and White, October 22, 1932.

 

 

7O

assailed those who questioned the authorship of the August
3 Declaration. He stated that the doctrine contained in
:hat Declaration could be found in the Covenant of the
;eague of Nations and that the question of authorship would
>n1y be brought up by those "deficiently informed regarding
... the most important doctrines of international law."
Saavedra Lamas continued to observe that the Drago Doctrine
lad been ascribed by some to Great Britain.9 The important
:onsideration, according to Saavedra Lamas, was not the

novelty of the declaration, but the ability to seize the

. . 10
:orrect moment to enunc1ate 1t.

91bid., Decimal File 724.3415/2576, Bliss (Buenos
tires) to Dept. of State, November 18, 1932, Concerning,
:he Drago doctrine, which stated that‘a nation could not
:ollect debts from other countries through force of arms,
Taavedra Lamas' exact words were
I repeat, that the same thing happened with the
classical announcement of the Drago Doctrine made by
the Argentine Foreign Office on December 29, 1902,
which was said to reproduce old theories of Lord
Palmerston and of the Argentine essayist, Carlos
Calvo....

loIbid. The Spanish text of this letter was published
a La Pol1tica Argentina, I, 424—427. Bliss in his commen-
iry, U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2576‘
Liss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, November 18, 1932,
>mmented that this statement sounded like a reply to de
l Torre. He was referring to a confrontation between the
>cialist Senator and Saavedra Lamas in the Senate on
:ptember 12. In his opening statement that gave the his—
iry of the conflict and indicated that the Chaco dispute
3 subject to rapid settlement. He also stated he had
t originated peace proposals out of respect for the Commit—
e of Neutrals. This body, he concluded, should not be
rsaken just because problems had developed. After damning
th faint praise, the Argentine Foreign Minister went on
laud Argentina's (read Saavedra Lamas') part in the

 

71

The Committee of Neutrals replied to Saavedra Lamas
on November 4, 1932, pointing out that its proposal was not
a threat because both sides would have to accept it before
it went into force. Also the two parties would know before-
hand the consequences if one of them violated the pact.11
Before this answer became public, United States news

reports were indicating it would be an "energetic but con—

ciliatory reply." This annoyed the Argentine newspapers

 

August 3 Declaration. He did not go unchallenged in this
regard. de la Torre alleged that the plan had originated
in the United States. He went on to'castigate Saavedra
Lamas for failure to involve the League of Nations and,
ironically, for allowing the United States to dominate the
peace efforts through the Neutrals.

Saavedra Lamas did not respond to the charges con—
cerning the United States' dominance of the peaceemaklng
efforts, but did comment on the assertion that he was not
responsible for the August 3 Declaration. He stated that
the United States was searching for a country to suggest
the doctrine in order to avoid "awakening feelings of dls—
trust." Saavedra Lamas' retreat was not accepted by de la
Torre, who continued the attack, citing press reports as
evidence. Pressed as he was, the Argentine Chancellor
adjudged the whole question insignificant when compared to
the fact that two sister Republics were flghtlng. .de la
Torre, he charged, was confusing the issue. He p01nted out
that regardless of what was going on in Geneva and washing—
ton, he often talked with the representatives of Bollvla
and Paraguay, "feeling certain that nobody would find it
Wrong were I fortunate enough to produce some kind of _
arbitration....“ Saavedra Lamas had been placed in a dlf‘
ficult position because he could not admit what he had
actually been doing. To do so he would have to affirm that
he was undercutting the work of the Commlttee of Neutrals
and more importantly that he had so far been unsuccessful.
See Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2337, Bllss (Buenos
Aires) to Dept. of State, Sept. 14, 1932.

 

hillbid., Decimal File 724.3415/2502, Committee of
Neutrals to Espil, November 4, 1932.

72

acause they did not even know what the reply was in referv
ice to. As a result, Saavedra Lamas suffered one of the
aw cases of press criticism he ever received. The Argenv
.ne Chancellor was lectured in the papers on the necessity
3 informing the press on what was taking place. The jour—
rlists even complained to President Justo.12

Although the subsequent reply sent on November 19 by
Lavedra Lamas was a superior example of circumlocution,
rere can be no doubt that it rejected the Neutral's posin
.on. The note insultingly began by observing that the
axt of the Neutral's letter was unclear. Saavedra Lamas
len pointed out that where moral suasion will not work,
>ercive measures must be used. But any coercive action,
re note continued,.must have its basis in an established
:gal instrument of which the August 3 Declaration was not
.e. Saavedra Lamas then announced that he was in the
'ocess of circulating an Anti—war Pact (to be discussed
ter in this paper) but it had not been accepted as yet.
e answer, he contended, was to utilize the Covenant of
e League of Nations to which both Bolivia and Paraguay
'd adherred. Not content with this, he informed the Come

ttee of Neutrals in the most sarcastic terms that it was
13

 

hotent. No reply was ever sent to Saavedra Lamas.

i

J

{ lzIbid., Decimal File 724.3415/2538, Letter Bliss
uenos Aires) to Dept. of State, November 9, 1932.

I 13U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V,
3-216. '

- —_—-__~._ __

 

73

White realized that to continue the dialogue might provoke
Saavedra Lamas even more, a luxury the Committee of Neutrals
could not afford.

On December 15, 1932, the Committee of Neutrals sent

another proposal to the belligerents.l4

Like all the
others, it was rejected. This marked the effeCtive end of
the Committee of Neutrals which, after four years, had
proved itself useless.15 When the Paraguayans asked why
Saavedra Lamas had supported the proposal, the Argentine
Foreign Minister stated that he had “accepted [it] without
consideration." According to Rivarola, "he [Saavedra Lamas]
said with a certain satisfaction that he will attend to the
funeral of the Commission of Neutrals [sic]."l6 Left unmen—
tioned was a threat by White that failure to support the
tecember 15 proposal would be reflected in the United States'

ttitude toward Saavedra Lamas' Anti—war Pact.l7

! . l4Ibid., 126—29. The proposal included a cease—fire,
abservers, and an arbitration formula.

15White virtually admitted this when he suggested on
January 4, 1933, that the ABCP take unified actions. See
Foreign Relations, 1933, IV, 241.

 

*4.—

 

l6Rivarola, Memorias diplomaticas, II, 261, 275.

17U. 8. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2688,
3/11, Conversation Espil and White, Dec. 22, 1932.

 

 

 

 

74

The Mendoza Proposal

 

With the discrediting of the Committee of Neutrals,
the scene was set for Saavedra Lamas to step into the
vacuum; Unfortunately for the Argentine Foreign Minister,
the new Chilean Foreign Minister, Miguel cruchaga Torconal
had aspirations similar to his own.

Shortly after the apparent demise of the Neutral's
proposal of December 15, Saavedra Lamas sent a confidential
agent, Dr. Isidoro Ruiz Moreno to Paraguay to ascertain
what Asuncién would consider as a basis for negotiations.
The ideas put forth by Ruiz Moreno were not new, but it was
significant that the proposed mediating sessions would be

18

held in Buenos Aires. According to La politica Argentina

 

§£.l2 guerra del Chaco, published in 1937, Ruiz Moreno

 

told Ayala that discussion could be held "without obstrqu

tion [entrOpecer] of the negotiations of the Commission of
19

 

WashingtonIsiCJ." Ayala, however, in a letter written

to Rivarola, stated that Saavedra Lamas' agent had casti—

gated the Neutrals as "a precarious entity, without effec-

20

tive authority." Considering what has been preSented

8Rivarola, Memorias diplomaticas, II, 274.
19

 

Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., Lgbpolitica Argentina

II, 4. The mission of Ruiz Moreno is described.
20

Rivarola, Memorias diplomaticas, II, 272.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

75

arlier, there can be little doubt that Ayala's version
as correct.

As a result of Ruiz Moreno's discussions, Saavedra
amas sent letters on January 2 directly to the Foreign
inisters of Brazil, Chile and Peru. They were worded very
arefully to make it appear he had talked to both belliger—
nts, not just Paraguay, and indicated that as a result of
is discussionigip a proposal would be forwarded to the
ther limitrophe nations. He also stated that Paraguay had

he "evident [sensible] determination ... to withdraw her

 

epresentative from the Committee of Neutrals, putting an
ad to good offices." This was followed by referende to
he Buenos Aires mediation efforts of 1927-1928 and the
onsequent Argentine familiarity with the problem. One
uld easily read in this the idea that the Argentine capi—
1 would be the best place for the projected talks.21
Upon receipt of the letter, both Peru and Brazil indi—
ated readiness to await developments. Cruchaga, however,

10 was working on a proposal himself,22 immediately speeded

 

lArgentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., L§_politica Argentina,
E, 8. See also U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.
115/2811 for English translation.

2Apparently this was in response to a letter from the
>mmittee of Neutrals on December 31, 1932, asking what
:tion the limitrophe nations were willing to take. It is
>table that Saavedra Lamas' efforts were begun prior to

1e arrival of the letter. See U. S. Dept. of State,

reign Relations, 1932, V, 218—219.

 

 

 

 

 

76

p his work and did not reply to Saavedra Lamas' letter.
s justification for his actions, cruchaga stated that
aavedra Lamas was hostile toward the Committee of Neutrals
nd that his motive for putting forth a proposal was
anity,23 One can only wonder, however, who was the most
ain.

The Chilean proposal appeared on January 9. Like
ost of its predecessors, it called for a cease—fire fol—
owed by discussions looking toward arbitration.24 The
olivians, for their part, were incensed at Chile's action.
hey believed there was an implied threat to stop all arms
nd ammunition going to Bolivia. The Bolivians also indi—
ated that they did not appreciate pressure from single

ountries and would find it agreeable only if the limitrophe
25

untries joined the Neutrals.
On the 9th, Saavedra Lamas also received a copy of
e Chilean plan to what must have been his great dismay.
uchaga, knowing that he had undercut Saavedra Lamas,
wever, sent a follow—up letter the next day which was

tensibly a reply to the Argentine note of January 2.

 

23U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2812

rweb (Santiago) to Dept. of State, January 10, 1933.

24U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV,

 

 

25U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2804

ely (La Paz) to Dept. of State, January 10, 1933.

 

77

In it, Cruchaga indicated that both President Arturo
Alessandri and himself believed it was necessary to bring
peace to the hemisphere and toward that end, they had pro—
duced a proposal. He concluded by appealing to Saavedra

26 It is probable that Cruchaga

Lamas to work with him.
had little hope that Argentine support would be forthcoming.
CrUChaga's worst fears were realized, because Saavedra

Lamas immediately set out to squelch the Chilean proposal.

Rivarola saw Saavedra Lamas on the 11th of January and

 

reported that the Chilean proposal had been received with
“surprise and displeasure." This may be an understatement
because the Argentine Chancellor asked his representative
in Santiago, Federico M. Quintana, to ascertain the exact
time Cruchaga received the Chancellor's letter and sent out
his proposal. Saavedra Lamas wanted to know who had
priority. Cruchaga told Quintana that he had already sent
his project off before the January 2 note arrived. Rivarola
commented laconically that the result of all this was "222;
Iconfusion grande."27 I
To aid him in his fight, Saavedra Lamas looked to an
sunlikely ally, White, of the Committee of Neutrals. On the 1
12th, Espil showed White the January 2 letter, and indi—

icated that as far as Saavedra Lamas was concerned, his was

i

_

26Argentine, Min. de Rel. Ext., La_politica Argentina,
II] 10—11 0

27

 

Rivarola, Memorias diplomaticas, II, 277—78.

 

78

the first proposal. In his report of the conversation,
White observed that there was "grave disagreement between
Saavedra Lamas and Cruchaga." Espil's task had been to
inquire whether the belligerents had accepted the proposal.
If White said Paraguay had accepted, Espil was to say she
formally told Argentina she had not.28 Rivarola, in his
memoirs, does not indicate whether or not Paraguay made such
a statement before the 12th of January. Even if she had
not, Saavedra Lamas, it seems, was trying to stop a non—
existent lie.29 In fact, so worried was the Argentine
Chancellor that he sent instructions to Espil to discuss
White's now moribund December 15, 1932 plan.30

Saavedra Lamas also took action in Argentina. In a
meeting with Bliss and the representatives of Brazil, Peru
and Chile, he read his January 2 note. He also indicated
that he was unhappy about the Chilean proposal and that it
was "not acceptable to the contending parties." Naturally,
1e had no basis for making such a pronouncement.

Cruchaga, however, was not willing to give up without

a fight. On the 14th, the Chilean Chargé d'Affaires, Sr.

:ohen, went to see White. He indicated that all of the

 

‘ 28U. 5. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724. 3415/2824
5/10 Conversation, Espil and White, January 12,1932.

29Rivarola, Memorias diplomaticas, II, 277—78.

30Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La politica Argentina,

I o

 

1'-L“\v-L —u IF —. _f 4

79

countries except Argentina had accepted the plan and that
therefore the Committee of Neutrals should now support it.
White correctly pointed out that Brazil was undecided and
Peru had not yet answered. He further stated that Paraguay
had not even formally received the Chilean proposal and

would issue no statement until she had.31

Cruchaga's
deception failed, but it was indicative of the extent to
which both Chancellors were willing to go to achieve their
ends.

It being apparent to both sides that little could be
done, Cruchaga on January 17 logically suggested that the
two men get together. The formal proposal, however, did
not arrive until January 24.32 A subsequent telephone con-
versation the next day set the place as Mendoza, Argentina,
on February 1. Bliss was told by an undisclosed person
that the telephone was used "to avoid [a] possible embar-

33

rassing situation." It is probable that they settled

many matters during the conversation in order to avoid repe-

tition of discord that marked their earlier correspondence.

31U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV,
257-8.

32Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La_politica Argentina,

III 13-140
. 33U. 8. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2821
Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, January 25, 1933.

 

 

 

80

The Chaco portion of the Mendoza proposal which also
dealt with Chilean-Argentine problem was not novel. It
called for a cease—fire, a disengagement of forces, reduc-
tion of the armies to peace time levels, and arbitration by
the Hague Court. In fact, it was actually a more detailed
version of the Chilean proposal. However, where the posi-
tions of Chile and Argentina diverged, such as over who
would make the arbitration decision, Saavedra Lamas got his
way. Of more importance were the provisions concerning how
the proposal should be presented to the belligerents.

Tirst it was to go to Brazil and Peru for concurrence, and
then to the belligerents and the Committee of Neutrals
:ogether. This was not according to the procedure the
Jautrals had worked hard to establish, where proposals would
flow through them to the belligerents. As proposed at
iendoza, the Washington—based group would simply act as’a
:heerleader for the ABCP nations. Buoying this assertion
ras section V of the Mendoza accord stating that any nego—
,iations which might take place would be in an American
apital,34 and there can be no question that Buenos Aires
as the location in question. Just as significant were
hose things notably missing from the proposal. The August
Declaration was never mentioned in either the Mendoza

roposal or in a subsequent press interview with Saavedra

 

34v. 5. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2875

Liss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, February 3, 1933.

 

81

Lamas, while the August 6 Declaration was put forth as the
vehicle for the ABCP unity.

At the Mendoza conference other topics were discussed
besides the Chaco situation.35 Although the points made
did not mandate any action, they reveal much about Saavedra
Lamas' orientation. The proposal spoke of "continental
good will," but not pan-Americanism. Also, section XIII
called for "open trade between the limitrophe countries and
then, hopefully, with all of the Latin American nations.“
The United States was not mentioned.36

In an interview with the press on February 3, after
his return from Mendoza, the Argentine Foreign Minister
asserted that the August 6 Declaration was a new pan—
American instrument. He attacked the Committee of Neutrals
for its proposals, which had the “character of polemics,"
and commented rather pejoratiVely that study and informal
discussions must precede any peace effort. He ended by

announcing that the proposal would go from the ABCP nations

 

35For a copy of the Mendoza formula see Argentina,
iin. de Rel. Ext., La politica Argentina, II, l7v21.

36In his analysis, Bliss observed that the proposal
:ounded like the work of Saavedra Lamas and that the propo—
:itions were in agreement with his goals. He also stated
Lhat the Argentine Chancellor was not per se antivAmerican,
tut rather that the United States was the prime obstacle to
aavedra Lamas' goal. This analysis is similar to mine.
ee U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2875,
liss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, February 3, 1933.

 

82

3 the belligerents. Saavedra Lamas did not mention that
copy would go to the Committee of Neutrals.37
The first reaction of Brazil and Peru came on the 7th
E February. Peru's reply, given by Foreign Minister J. M.
anzanilla, was circumspect. He had praise only for the
tatements which did not relate to the Chaco. The Chaco
>rtion of the Mendoza proposal was not even mentioned.38
franio de Mello Franco, the Foreign Minister of Brazil, in
is reply, made a number of observations about the Chaco
action of the Mendoza proposal. First, that no action
lould go beyond good offiCes or in any way infringe upon
.ther belligerent‘s sovereignty. Secondly, the Committee
3 Neutrals should not be left out of the negotiations.
.nally, Mello Franco stated that a state of war should not
: proclaimed by the limitrophe nations for the sole pur—
se of bringing into effect the available peace instru—

nts39

such as the Kellogg—Briand Pact.
On the 22nd, when Lima finally responded after repeat—
requests, Manzanilla indicated that his country had some

servations. Peru would not join the Mendoza proposal

as to be available to make suggestions concerning

 

37Ibid.

38Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La Politica Argentina,

 

39Ibid., II, 23—25. For the text of the final agree-

rt, see ibid., 27—29.

 

 

83

modifications.4O Peru's motives are not clear, but in ex-
plaining why an answer had not been sent early, Manzanilla
noted internal problems.41 His country was, in fact, in
an almost chaotic state during this time. Also, there was
trouble with Chile over the latter's stand in the Leticia
dispute.42

Peru's response caused Saavedra Lamas to take immedi—
ate and dramatic action. Apparently fearful he would look
ridiculous if his highly touted Mendoza Act did not even
receive adherrence by all the limitrophe nations, he
addressed a letter on February 24 to Lima, Rio de Janeiro,
and Santiago suggesting a call for a cease—fire. As justi-
fication, he pointed to the fact that the Mendoza agree-
ment was complete, but would take time to put into practice
and that the fighting was increasing in intensity.43 With
reference to the latter consideration, Bolivia had launched

44
a bloody but ineffective offensive in December, 1932.

 

4OIbid., II, 25.

41Ibid., II, 25.

42U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV,
271. Leticia was nominally a Colombian town on the Amazon
which was attacked by Peru which also claimed ownership.
The resultant war was settled through the League of Nations
in 1934.

43Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La politica Argentina,
II, 25.

44For‘a discussion of the military developments during
this period, see David M. Zook, The Conduct of the Chaco War
(New Havenr Cbnn.: Bookman Assoc1ates, 1960), pp. 125-153.

84

To forward his facesaving policy, Saavedra Lamas had
Espil approach White on February 28 with a blunt proposal
which revealed a great deal about Saavedra Lamas' View of
the entire Chaco matter. After asking that White support
a call for a cease-fire, the Assistant Secretary, reported
Espil said, "that Argentina would deal with Paraguay if we
[the United States] would deal with Bolivia." Espil also

noted that aid from banking interests in the United States

45

would be of "'uncontestible value.'" The claim that

Bolivia was supported by the United States, and Paraguay by
the Argentines, had been mentioned before, but only in the
statements of the Paraguayans.46 This was the first time
it was ever enunciated by Argentina. In many reSpects
Saavedra Lamas saw the Chaco as a struggle between the
United States and Argentina, as well as Bolivia and Paraguay.
White, however, rejected the Argentine overture.

Saavedra Lamas was spared embarrassment by a second
Peruvian note on the 24th of February, the day after his
proposal to White was made. The letter indicated general

adherence to the Mendoza proposal, but said that certain

45U. S. Archives, RG 59 Decimal File 724.3415/2734,
Conversation White and Espil, February 28, 1933.

46Rivarola, Memorias diplomaticas, II, 278.

 

85

changes should be made.47 Saavedra Lamas chose to perceive

Peru's note as an acceptance of the Mendoza Act and ordered
it transmitted to the belligerents. Neither Paraguay or

Bolivia was happy to see it. Paraguay was about to declare

O O 0 O I 48
war and B011V1a was continuing her offens1ve.

On the same day, Peru sent a message to Saavedra Lamas
pronouncing that the letter of the 24th was not an accept-

ance of the Mendoza Act. Modifications would have to be

made.49 Unfortunately, there is no indication of what the

Argentine Foreign Minister said in reply, or if there ever

was one. In any case, he seems to have been succesSful with

this less than ethical procedure.

The formal replies from Paraguay and Bolivia, both
received on February 27, suggested changes that would make
the Mendoza proposal acceptable. The alterations, however,

were not of the variety to bring about peace, since they
would be unacceptable to the other side.50 The fighting was
intense and both parties believed a military victory was

>ossible. In those circumstances, little could be done.51

47Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La_politica Argentina,
II, 26.

48Ibid., II, 29—30.

49Ibid., II, 30.

50Ibid., II, 30-33.

5"I'See U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/3005
nd U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, II, 1933,

 

86

The war continued.

In April, the Mendoza proposal was resurrected once
more and presented to the belligerents. Due to pressure
from Argentina, Paraguay unconditionally accepted it.
Bolivia, however, remained intransigent. The A§93_media-
tion ended on May 6, 1933, when Bolivia refused once again
to seriously consider the Mendoza proposal. As a result,

Paraguay declared war on the 10th of May.52

Argentina and Neutrality

Like many other neutrality policies, although equal
on paper for both sides, one side was aided much more than
the other. Arms transshipped up the Paraguay River from
Buenos Aires to Asuncidn continued unmolested, while food-
stuffs the Bolivians tried to buy from Argentina across the
Pilcomayo River were halted. Clearly, Asuncidn was the
beneficiary of Argentina's neutrality.

Considering that Saavedra Lamas could interpret neu-
trality in ways deliterious to Paraguay, it must be made
:lear why he did not. This was of particular importance
>ecause halting transshipment of goods through Argentina,

vould make it almost impossible for Paraguay to obtain arms.

52Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La_politica Argentina,
II, 64-69.

53On September 9, 1932, Saavedra Lamas suggested a
oint declaration by Chile and Argentina. The proposal con-
;ained nothing that could be classed as unusual, but the
:imple statement prohibiting the transport of military

53

 

87

For example, on December 1, 1932 when Rivarola talked to

Saavedra Lamas about the neutrality question, the latter

54

would give him nothing definite. Justo, however, did not

hesitate to tell Rivarola that Argentine neutrality would
be benevolent for Paraguay and strict for Bolivia.55 There
could be little doubt about where loyalities stood as far

as the Argentine president was concerned.

May Eg_December, 1933
With the failure of the ABCP mediation and the dis-
crediting of the Committee of Neutrals, the Chaco problem

was taken up by the League of Nations. The League's initial

56

proposals, however, were rejected by Bolivia. Subsequently

the Committee of Neutrals, in a last gasp effort, suggested

in May, 1933, that the Neutrals and limitrophe nations

 

supplies across neutral territory was significant. See,
ibid. I, 409-410. In the treaty of 1904 Chile had agreed
to establish Arica as a free port on the Pacific for Bolivia
and build a railroad to La Paz as part of the settlement
from the War of the Pacific. Arms going to Bolivia would
in fact transit her territory, but it was an open question
whether a declaration of neutrality would require that this
be stopped. Chile stated at that time she would adopt
Saavedra Lamas' neutrality decree if the other limitrophe
powers did, but nothing was said concerning the interpreta-
tion of the 1904 treaty. Ibid., 410-411.

54Vicente Rivarola, Memorias diplomaticas, II, p. 246.

551bid., II, 251, 254.

56A good summary of events in Geneva is found in U. S.
Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/3246, Gilbert
(GeneVa) to Dept. of State, July 14, 1933.

88

conduct joint discussions.57 Saavedra Lamas refused to
agree, citing the work of the League of Nations.58 With
his refusal the Argentine Chancellor sealed the fate of
the Committee of Neutrals, which ceased to function on
June 27, 1933.

The ABCP countries, however, continued to try to bring
an end to the war. During this period, Brazil rather than
Argentina was the generator of action, and Saavedra Lamas
contented himself with torpedoing Rio de Janeiro's efforts.
Apparently perceiving that fact, Mello Franco did what
Cruchaga had done and joined with Saavedra Lamas in a pro—
posal to the belligerents on October 11. Dubbed the Act of
Rio, it was similar to the Mendoza proposal and met with

the same response: Paraguay accepted, Bolivia did not.59

In retrospect, it is clear that Saavedra Lamas' policy.

concerning the Chaco did not change significantly from the

Declarations of August, 1932, to the end of 1933.

57Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/3114, White to Espil,
May 9, 1933.

58Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/2159, Conversation White
and Espil, May 23, 1933. United States sources indicate,
however, that Saavedra Lamas was undermining the efforts of
the League of Nations also. See, for example, U. S. Dept.
of State, Foreign Relations, II, 340-41.

”'59A full discussion of the Act of Rio, including re—

spOnses, can be found in Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext.,
92 politica Argentina, II, 140-157.

89

Bliss summed it up well when he indicated that Saavedra
lamas would accept nothing which was not his own. The
{uickly formed alliances and the quickly broken ones, the
endercutting of other mediating efforts, the spat over the
Luthorship of the August 3 Declaration, all indicate the
.evel of action the Foreign Minister was willing to stoop
o in order to achieve prestige for himself and for
rgentina.

The most important question is why was Saavedra Lamas
llowed to carry on the antics he did. The answer is that
he tactics used by the Foreign Minister were never clearly
elineated to the Argentine public. Even if they had been
t is doubtful that there would have been a general outcry
ecause Saavedra Lamas had to date been successful in gain-
lg a significant position for Argentina. Furthermore no
>untry was in a position to call his bluff. Economically,
1e United States was not in a dominant position as regards
:gentina, and a refusal to sell to that nation would have
11y meant that her purchases would be made in Europe.
Lrthermore, the Argentines sold relatively little to they
rited States. Consequently, an embargo on Argentine goods
[uld have had almost no effect. Moreover, it might have
.creased the popularity of Saavedra Lamas in the eyes of
.e populace, which saw little wrong with annoying the
nkees. The possibility of using military force was prob—

1y never considered by Washington. The result in all

9O

.ikelihood would have been war with a country seven thousand

tiles away on the ironic grounds that Argentina had not done

enough for peace._ Without these methods of coercion, the
nited States could only utilize talk and ineffectual inter-
erican devices.

The inability of the limitrophe countries to bring any
percion to bear stymied their efforts. As with the United
tates, war over the issue was unthinkable and the prevail-
mg economic dependency among neighbors made sanctions
npracticable. Another factor which circumscribed the
:tivity of the North Americans as well as Brazil, Chile and
aru was the hold Argentina had over Paraguay. This is not
> say that Saavedra Lamas was ever in a position to force
settlement upon his neighbors up river.

The army which controlled Argentina, was solidly behind
,raguay. Saavedra Lamas could, however, use his influence
short circuit another country's proposal. Saavedra Lamas
d the power to insure his control of the mediating effort,
t he lacked the power to force a settlement. The result

5 una confusién grande.

 

CHAPTER 4

"THE TWO WINGS OF THE DOVE"

In December, 1933 the Seventh Inter-American Conference
took place in Montevideo, Uruguay. This meeting provided
a vehicle by which Saavedra Lamas was able to gain the ap—
pearance of successfully achieving some of his country's
cherished goals in world politics. Chief among them was
Argentina's determination to be the diplomatic and cultural
leader in South America. At Montevideo, Argentina seeming—
ly achieved this goal at the expense of her traditional
rival, the United States, which adherred to, albeit with
reservations, an Argentine inspired treaty which specifi»
cally renounced intervention. Argentina also obtained the
United States' sanction for League of Nations activities in
the Chaco. These events brought Argentina into the hemiSv
gheric spotlight and the architect of these events, Carlos
Saavedra Lamas, basked in its glow. More honors and success
vould follow, but the transition from being just another
recalcitrant Argentine Foreign Minister to a position of
remispheric and world importance had begun.

The success of Saavedra Lamas was shared by Cordell

lull, the United States Secretary of State. In keeping with

91

92

President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policy of the Good
Neighbor, Hull wanted to allievate many of the troubles
that had plagued intervAmerican relations.. Significantly,
Argentina, and specifically, Saavedra Lamas, was the benev
ficiary of the Yankee policy shift. That such.was the
case, was a tribute to Saavedra Lamas' diplomatic skill and
0 his consonant opportunism.

In order to understand the Montevideo Conference, a
brief description of the earlier meetings is necessary.
Beginning with the First Pan American Conference held in
dashington D. C. in 1889 and extending through the Fifth
Zonference in Santiago, Chile, in 1923 relations between
:he United States and Latin America were marked by increas-
.ng suspicion. Following the 1923 meeting, "anti—American
tentiment mounted during the next five years and reached a
limax at the Sixth Pan American Conference held in Havana

1 There the Latin American nations, led by

n 1928."
rgentina's representative, Honorio Pueyrredén, demanded

n end to the interventionist policies of the United States.
ueyrredén also strongly attacked the tariff policy and

anitary conventions of the United States, which severely

Lmited Argentine beef sales there.

lFederico G. Gil, Latin American—-United States Rela—
.ons (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1971),
152.

 

 

 

93

On the question of intervention, the North American
representative, Charles Evans Hughes, was given instruc-
tions that any alteration of the policy "would be likely to
encounter opposition in this country ... and thus would
give rise to unnecessary controversy."2 In accordance with
his instructions, Hughes defended intervention as bringing
stability to otherwise chaotic circumstances. On the eco-
nomic question, Pueyrredon was rebuffed by the United
States along with the other delegates both within his dele-
gation and from other countries.3 As a reSult, Pueyrredén
left the Conference and resigned his ambassadorship in the
United States. Argentina had tried and failed to bring
about a change in United States policy. Before she could
be credible as a leader in Latin America, she would have to
edo better.

The Seventh Pan American Conference was scheduled for
December, 1932 or January, 1933, but in February, 1932 steps
were taken to postpone the meeting. The drive was led

principally by Brazil, which was concerned that the Perman—

 

hnt Committee on Public Law, then meeting in Rio de Janeiro,

5 2United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations
f the United States (Washington: United States Government
Efinting Office, 1942), 1928, Volume 1, p. 577.

 

 

) ”Mi [it ((

3Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the
Jnited States (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1967), p. —299.

 

94

would not have its report ready.4 Saavedra Lamas, however,
opposed postponement because he believed something must be
done about the troubles in the Chaco. When White asked
Espil about what the Conference could do about the Chaco
situation, the latter vaguely mentioned the Pan American
Conference for Arbitration and Conciliation which had set
up the Commission of Neutrals. White countered by noting
that the Commission of Neutrals was still functioning.5

It can be surmised, albeit with little evidence, that
Saavedra Lamas was considering some type of action at the
Conference as regards the Chaco. Perhaps he hoped to form
a new commission, or to put forth his own proposal. What
he planned to do at this time, if anything, never was re—

vealed because in early April, 1932, the Montevideo Con-
6

l

:ference was postponed until December, 1933.
Shortly after the postponement, Saavedra Lamas began

ea project that was to play an important part in the newly-

fscheduled Pan American meeting. He proposed, on August 20,

!

 

. 4See United States Archives, Record Group 59, Decimal
F11e 710.G/64, Conversation Espil and White, February 23,
1932 and U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932,
év] lo
1

| 5U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.G/98 1/2
Conversation Espil and White, April 7, 1932.

j: . .
* 6U. 8. Dept. of State, Forelgn Relationsr V! 1932'
4-7.

 

 

95

1932, an anti-war treaty based upon the Declaration of
August 3 for which, at that time, he was still taking
:redit.7 The proposal contained little that was new or
imaginative, although it did attempt to raise the August 3
Declaration (Hoover-Stimson Doctrine) to the level of an
Lnternational accord. Most of its other provisions were
ilready to be found in other international agreements, a
>oint Saavedra Lamas readily conceded in his pamphlet,

'roject gg Traite Sud American pour provenir la guerre
8

 

[Qn—Agressionet conciliation (1932). This work contained

 

 

toth the proposed instrument and an explanation of each
rticle.

That Saavedra Lamas should have proposed such a pact
as not surprising. As a national of a country with little

conomic and military power, he looked to international law

7de la Torre's attacks did not begin until September

8Paris, Les Editions Internationales, Paris. For the

panish text of the same thing, see Argentina, Ministerio
3 Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Memoria presentado a1
gnorable Congreso Nacional correspondiente a1 periodo 1932-
[33 (Buenos Aires, 1933), Tomo I, pp. 148-244. For an
Lglish text see U. S. Dept. of State,Foreign Relations,
’32 V 261-266. In Saavedra Lamaé' work Pg£_la_pag_d§'l§§
léricas (Buenos Aires: M. Gleizer, 1937), he includes an
’ticle dealing with the Anti-war Pact. Unfortunately he

1y states that it is the essence of a publication appear-
g in Washington. It is, needless to say, very favorable
the Argentine Foreign Minister. A good analytical dis-
ssion of the proposal can be found in Philip C. Jessup
he Saavedra Lamas Anti—War Draft Treaty," American
urnal of International Law, XXVII (January, 1933), 109-115.

 

 

 

 

‘ X ‘ ‘“”-_—7

96

to control relations with world powers. Also, just prior
to his accession to Foreign Minister, he wrote and pub-
lished two works dealing with international law, La concep-

tion Argentine d§_l'Arbitrage §E_§§ 1'intervention a

 

l'ouverture gg_la Conference gg Washington, 1928 (1928)

and La Crise deila_codification 35 la doctrine Argentine

 

du_droit international (1931).

The first news of the proposed treaty came to the
United States in a conversation between White and Espil on
August 22, 1932. At that time, Espil stated that Saavedra
Lamas was sending an outline of a proposal to supplement

the Kellogg—Briand Pact.9

Within a week, Espil was back,
announcing that since the United States had learned about
the proposed treaty through Chile, he had instructions to

give the text of it to White. It was at that time that

7 he explained to White that Saavedra Lamas had intended to

submit it first to the limitrophe countries and then, after
obtaining their assent, to the United States. By so doing,
generalized hemispheric pressure would fall on the United
States, putting her in a position where it would be diffi-
cult to refuse. Even though his hoped for secrecy was
breached, Saavedra Lamas continued to work for his original

goal. He now, however, also pushed his project in the

United States.10

;

9U. 3. Dept. of State, Foreign gglations, 1932, v, 260.

10 . . .
U. S. Archies, RG 59, Dec1mal File 724.3415/2158 5/6,
Conversation Espil and White, August 30, 1932.

97

The initial response, however, was generally unfavor-
able. Fred Morris Dearing, the United States Ambassador to
Peru, stated on September 5 that "in spite of the urgency
with which the Argentine [sic] is pushing the matter ...
the Argentine treaty [has] not yet [been] agreed to by the

11 At a diplomatic reception in

other neighboring powers."
Buenos Aires, Bliss learned that the Chilean and Peruvian
Ambassadors approved of the treaty, but that the Mexican

and Colombian ministers opposed it. The Brazilian repre-

sentative remained non—committal.12

Bliss also reported
that a colleague, unnamed, believed the treaty was an
attempt by the Argentine Chancellor "to form a Latin Ameri-
can group, headed by Argentina, in opposition to the United
States in this hemisphere." This anonymous minister went on

to state that he would not recommend that his government

agree to the proposal, but was in favor of following the

 

llU. S. Archives RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012—Anti-

War/4 Dearing (Lima) to Dept. of State, Sept. 11, 1932.

12U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012—Anti-
War/6, Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, Sept. 2,
1932, and U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012—
Anti—War/9, Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, Sept.
9, 1932 and U. S. Dept. of State, RG 59, Decimal File 710.
1012 Anti—War/lO, Cafferty (Bogota) to Dept. of State,
Sept. 17, 1932. At this same dinner party Bliss asked
Saavedra Lamas why he had not sent a copy of his plan to
the United States. The Argentine Chancellor said it "had
slipped his mind." These were all the countries that the
treaty had been submitted to.

 

 

 

98
same line as the United States.13
Bliss's perceptive confidant obviously believed the
United States would not be overjoyed about Saavedra Lamas‘
proposal. Neither was Espil. This was revealed in his
talk with White even before the project was formally pre—
sented. While handing the Assistant Secretary a copy of
the pact for his personal use, the Ambassador showed him
a letter he had written to Saavedra Lamas. In it Espil
told Saavedra Lamas that the United States would not accept
the pact with the title “South American Anti—War Pact“,
that “Pan American“ should be substituted. He also said
that an attempt should be made to get the United States
to become one of the l‘original signatories‘l of the pact.
In his response, Saavedra Lamas said that "South American"
was only an attempt to indicate the origin of the treaty
and that Espil could tear off the old cover of the treaty
and have a new one printed with the words "Pan American."
Neither Espil, nor by inference, White believed Saavedra

l4

Lamas on this point. It is probable they both thought,

 

131;. 3. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti-
War/6, Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, Sept. 2,
1932.

14U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti—
War/22, Conversation Espil and Wilson, September 12, 1932.
Espil also noted that the name Saavedra Lamas would be
linked inevitably to the treaty.

99

with some justification, that the initial strategy had
dictated the name.

Inexplicably, however, when the treaty was formally
presented by Espil to Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson,
it still bore the epithet "South American." The North
American Secretary wasted no time in this September 22,
1932, meeting indicating he did not think Saavedra Lamas'
endeavors were particularly useful. Stimson observed that
the Anti—War Treaty was similar to the Kellogg-Briand Pact
and that instead of suggesting new proposals, Argentina
would be better advised to adhere to the existing inter-
national instrument. He pointed out that Argentina was one
of a handful of countries that had not yet accepted the
Pact.15

Some two weeks after the meeting with Stimson, Espil
approached White to find out if there were any developments
concerning the treaty. The Assistant Secretary replied ’
that the proposal had to go through regular channels and
that he probably would not hear anything for "the next
couple of months." Espil then asked for his informal views
on the Pact. The American indicated that he was "not in—
hospitable to the idea" but he believed the treaty was

"hastily drawn up" and many modifications would be needed.

1 . .
5U. S. Dept. of State, Fore1gn Relations, 1932, V,

266-268.

 

lOO

Delay, coupled with a wait and see attitude, was the appar-

ent United States' response.16

What the State Department was waiting for became
crystal clear at a subsequent meeting. To the inevitable
question concerning the status of the Anti—War Pact, White
reported his reply to Stimson as follows:

if Argentina plays the game and supports this project
[the December 15 note from the Committee of Neutrals]
all the way through so that we get a settlement, we
will then discuss with him ways in which the pact
could be modified in order to make it worthwhile
signing. Espil wanted some action right away and I
told him that would be impossible and that if he
wanted to keep Saavedra Lamas playing along with us
he could say that the pact had been examined by the‘
Treaty Division and would now have to be examined by
the Legal Office.17

Whether White was actually proposing a deal, or simply serv-
ing notice on Saavedra Lamas that as long as Argentina
appeared intransigent red tape would surround his Anti-War
Pact, is not clear. What is clear is that Saavedra Lamas
publicly supported the December 15 Committee of Neutrals

proposal.18

 

16U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti-
War/10%, Conversation White and Espil, October 5, 1932.

17U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3412/2683
8/ll, Conversation ESpil and White, December 22, 1932.

. 18U. 3. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2538,
B11ss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, November 9, 1932,
p. 6.

 

101

It is worth commenting here on the use of us" in the
preceding quote. It refers to Espil and White. The former,
although dutifully carrying out his orders, commiserated
with the Assistant Secretary over the difficulties he had
in dealing with the Argentine Chancellor. Occasionally he
agreed that certain proposals did more harm than good or
that Saavedra Lamas' actions delayed peace efforts. By so
doing, he increased his credibility and avoided sharp
breaks with the United States which might have ruined the
schemes of his boss.

Since Saavedra Lamas' overall strategy had originally
been to obtain acceptance by Latin American countries be-

fore presenting his proposal to the United States,19 the

s...

delaying tactics of the North Americans did-not seriously
affect the general strategy. While it is true that the
failure of the United States to embrace the treaty would
have had a chilling effect on the other hemispheric nations,
there is no evidence of a concerted North American campaign
against the Argentine proposal. As a result, Saavedra
Lamas continued to advocate his treaty. Uruguay provides

a good example of the tactics used. In November, 1932,
Saavedra Lamas sent the Uruguayan Minister for FOreign
Affairs, Juan Carlos Blanco, a letter "couched in rather
intimate terms of friendship" requesting the latter‘s views

19VicenteRivarola, Memorias diplomaticos, II, p. 261.

 

 

 

 

102

O What.makes this unusual is that frcm

on the treaty.2
July 14 to September 12, 1932, relations had been seVered
between the two countries over a trivial protocol matter.
The dispute had been marked by acrimony and stubbornness
for which both countries had refused to apologize.21 The
point is that Saavedra Lamas was willing to overlook the
past to get what he wanted. His behavior can best be
ascribed to singlemindedness rather than to the cause of
peace.

His dedication, however, began to pay off at the end
of the year. The Brazilian Minister for Foreign Relations,
Afranio de Mello Franco, on December 20, 1932, agreed to
accept the treaty in principle, subject to reservations.
Mello Franco sent a long letter to Saavedra Lamas detailing
forty-three defects in the Anti-War Pact, most of which
were small technical points.22 When Saavedra Lamas formally

announced the receipt of Mello Franco‘s letter to the

diplomats accredited to Argentina, he only observed that

 

20U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti-
War/18 Butler (Montevideo) to Dept. of State, January 12,
1933.

21For a good portion of the documents having reference
to this incident see U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations,
1932, V, 316-329.

22For a copy of the letter, see Argentina, Ministerio
de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Memorias, 1932-1933, pp.
199-208.

 

103

Mello Franco had objected to the “South.American" in the
title. He went on to state that this would be changed and
recounted his instructions to Espil. He finished by
exclaiming the need for United States adherence.23
The Antiewar Pact received another boost at the
Mendoza meeting in February, 1933.' At that time, the
Chilean Foreign Minister, Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal, agreed
to accept the concept of the treaty.24 What made this sig-
nificant was that now Saavedra Lamas had the power and
prestige of thel§§§_block.25 Also the prOposed treaty
had been put on the agenda of the upcoming Pan American

26 Things appeared to be going Well for the

Conference.
Argentine Chancellor.
Unfortunately, on March 4, Stimson addressed a letter

to Espil indicating that the United States would not sign

the Anti—War Pact. The Secretary of State's first objection

 

23U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012/l6,
Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, January 5, 1933.

24U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2875,
Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, February 3, 1933.

5Commenting on this point the Uruguayan Foreign
Minister, Blanco, stated that ABC action was actually
"considerable of A, some of C and a little of B." See U. S.
Dept. Cflf State, RG 59, Decimal File 710.G/129 wright
(Montevideo) to Dept. of State, February 8, 1933.

26U. S. Archives RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012/16,
Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, January 5, 1933.

 

 

104

was that the “peace structure“ was already too "cumbersome"
and that existing instruments should be ratified before new
instruments were introduced. His second demurrer was that
the similarity of the Anti-War and Kellogg—Briand Pacts
might cause conflicts in the interpretationiof the latter.
He suggested Argentina Sign the Kellogg—Briand agreement.27
Neither of Stimson's statements stand up to even
cursory examination. The Kellogngriand Pact was of the
character of a nice thought, and one doubts that it could
ever be misinterpreted. The State Department realized that,
like the aforementioned accord, the Anti-War Treaty was
essentially harmless.28 The opposition can be best under—
stood as an unwillingness to give its Argentine rival and
particularly, Saavedra Lamas, a victory. Supporting this
assertion is the fact that Stimson told Espil of his de-
cision on March 3, the day before he left office. Saavedra
Lamas did not broadcast the United States' response or act

as if it even existed.29 There was, of course, the obvious

27U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV,
228-231.

28The report of the Treaty Division stated that the Anti-
war Pact "though useless might not be seriously harmful."
See U.S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti-War/lla,
Treaty Division to Dept. of State, December 6, 1932.

29As late as October, 1933 Hugh Gibson, United States
Ambassador to Brazil, would report that, "There is nothing
on the record here to show that the substance of Mr. Stimson's
note was ever communicated to the Brazilian Government."
U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti-War/ZS
Gibson (Rio de Janeiro) to Dept. of STate, October 4, 1933.

 

 

 

 

 

105

possibility that the incoming Secretary of State, Cordell
Hull, asked Stimson to perform this service so as to avoid
starting off on a hostile note. There is, however, no
evidence to this effect, and Hull's positive orientation
toward Latin America is well—known. Coupled with the fact
that ten months later Hull would sign the treaty, this
position loses much of its credibility.

It was during October that Saavedra Lamas and the
President of Argentina, Agustin P. Justo, journeyed to Rio
de Janeiro for a conference with their Carioca counterparts.
Although Saavedra Lamas gave the reason for the conference
as "cementing relationships,“ there can be no doubt that
the prime purpose was to dramatize Brazilian adherence to
the Anti—War Pact. The new United States Ambassador to
Argentina, Alexander Weddell, stated that he could not
fathom any reason for the costly excursion to Rio de Janeiro.
He believed that the trip was Saavedra Lamas' idea and "is
a further manifestation of the Minister's desire to give
himself international prominence in this part of South
America." Weddell concluded that Saavedra Lamas' goal was
to form the ABCP into a block under Argentine control to
Oppose the United States.30

Besides Brazil and Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Mexico,

and Uruguay also signed the Anti-War Pact. Apparently Chile

 

 

30U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 835.001 Justo
Agustin P./28, Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State,
October 11, 1933.

 

 

 

106

was worried that the United States would be irritated be-
cause she went to unusual lengths to demonstrate that
Argentina had pressured her into signing. She supplied the
United States with the chronology of events leading up to
Chilean adherence, apparently terrified the United States
might block nitrate sales. According to the chronology,
until the eve of the Rio de Janeiro Conference, Chile had
no intentions of signing. On October 4, however, while in
route to Brazil, Saavedra Lamas sent a letter to Cruchaga
suggesting he adhere "in a private character." What
Saavedra Lamas meant is not clear. Cruchaga did not under-
stand either, but although provoked by Saavedra Lamas'
attitude, he sent a courteous reply declining the offer.
Mello Franco then sent Cruchaga a letter urging adherrence
to uphold the "ABC ideal." He followed up his letter with
a telephone call to his ambassador to be relayed to Cruchaga.
Mello Franco pointed out that Saavedra Lamas had not asked
earlier for Chilean concurrence because he knew Chile would
not agree to a solely South American treaty excluding the
United States. Since Mello Franco also opposed an anti-
United States pact, he stated he had insisted Saavedra Lamas
Open the treaty to all nations and Saavedra Lamas had
agreed.31 Cruchaga, with his prime objection disposed of

and faced with pressure from Brazil and Argentina, signed.

31U. 8. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti-
War/32 Norweb (Santiago) to Dept. of State, October 11, 1933.

 

 

 

 

107

Saavedra Lamas kept his word, for not only did he open
the treaty to nations outside South America, he actively
sought their adherence. In making his overtures, the
Argentine Foreign Minister indicated that the United States
would sign, although at that time he had no basis for making
such a judgment.32 It was apparent that Saavedra Lamas had
modified his general strategy. The hope of a South American
block was gone, but a world wide treaty would be almost as
good. Prestige would still accrue to Argentina, and more-
over, the United States would be faced with considerably
more pressure to adhere, lest she be the only important
nation not to sign.33

At the October meeting at Rio de Janeiro, another im-
portant subject came up-—postponement of the Inter-American
Conference. By October 13, it became known that Brazil
desired a postponement and Argentina did not. Mello Franco
believed it would be a mistake to hold the conference at a
time when problem areas like Leticia, the Chaco and Cuba

existed, but also said no one wanted the "onus" of suggesting

32a. 5. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti-War/
46 Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, November 17,1933.

3Some of the European countries which did eventually
adhere included Italy, Spain, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslo-
vakia, Portugal, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Norway. ‘Great
Britain, France, and Germany were notable in their absence.
For a complete list of ratifications and signings see
Saavedra Lamas, Pg£_la_gaz., 124.

108

postponement.34 A week and a half later, at a diplomatic
reception, Saavedra Lamas indicated he did not want to
postpone the Conference, but asked twice if the United
States did. The Peruvian Ambassador told Weddell in a
subsequent meeting that he thought both Brazil and Argentina
favored a delay.35

Hull was so worried that the Conference would not take
place that he told Weddell to check with Saavedra Lamas
again. To Weddell's question, Saavedra Lamas replied he
was "very convinced" of the advisability of the Conference.
He did, however, mention the need for preliminary talks and
noted that the upcoming meeting of the American Institute
of International Law would provide an excellent vehicle.
Because Saavedra Lamas appeared to be hedging, Weddell asked
once more if Argentina favored postponement. The Argentine
Foreign Minister then stated that ideally postponement would
be advisable, but that no nation wished to formally make

the suggestion. Only Hull, he concluded, could take the

lead in deferring the Conference.36

 

34The telegram referred to was apparently garbled in
transmission but his intent is clear. See U. S. Archives,
RG 59, Decimal File 710.G/275, Gibson (Rio de Janeiro) to
Dept. of State, October 13, 1932. Cuba was in precarious
state due to the United States supported removal of dictator,
Gerardo Machado.

35 . .
U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV,

 

33.

36 . . .
U. S. Archives, RG 59, DeCimal File 710.G/299 Weddell

(Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 27, 1933.

109

“The next day Saavedra Lamas told Weddell that because
of the general unstable situation, a three to four month
delay was advisable. He also said that Uruguay, where the
Conference was to meet, was in an unsettled condition. In
the same report, the United States Ambassador to Uruguay,
J. Butler Wright, indicated the political situation in
Montevideo was "unchanged" and that Uruguay was annoyed by
the actions of Saavedra Lamas. The Argentine Foreign
Minister also indicated once again the utility of prelimi-
nary talks during the American Institute of International
Law meeting and added that he had been asked to preside.
The delaying tactics used can not wholly be ascribed to
Saavedra Lamas' desire to head an international law confer-
ence in Buenos Aires,37 although quite possibly it was this
eventuality which stirred him to action. More likely, it
was the fear that the Montevideo Conference would end as
the previous Inter-American Conference had, with a general
failure of Argentine leadership and the spectre of resigna-
tion in disgrace. Buoying this assertion is a note Saavedra
Lamas directed to Washington suggesting that "the duration
of the Conference [be made] briefer and revising and reduc—
ing the agenda to a smaller number of subjects, not too

controversial." The preliminary talks would provide a

37U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.0/307

Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 28, 1933.

110

vehicle by which Saavedra Lamas could quietly dicker and
avoid appearing to be either recalcitrant or a lacky of
the United States.

Saavedra Lamas immediately began a campaign to persuade
the rest of the ABCP nations to also ask for a postpone-
ment.38 He met with little success because preparations
were simply too far advanced to call for a delay.39 Perhaps
that was why, in a telephone conversation with Espil in
Washington on October 31, he agreed to go ahead with the
meeting. On November 4, Saavedra Lamas announced that he
would attend the Conference as scheduled.40 Saavedra Lamas,
however, was still worried lest the Conference turn into a
brawl. In a talk with Weddell on November 7, he emphasized
the need for "harmony and good will.“ He also stated that
the preparation for the Conference had not been handled

well and that only juridical rather than political subjects

should be discussed.41 He wanted desperately, it appears,

 

38U. S. Archives, RG 595 Decimal File 710.G/309
Norweb (Santiago) to Dept. of State, October 30, 1933.

39U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.G/338
Conversation Espil and Cafferty, October 31, 1933.

40U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.G/327 Wright
(Montevideo) to Dept. of State, November 4, 1933.

41U. s. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.G/357
Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, November 4, 1933.
In this letter, Weddell also noted that Saavedra Lamas had
had the American Institute of International Law meeting
postponed.

 

 

111

to avoid difficult subjects.

If Saavedra Lamas was concerned about a failure, so
was Cordell Hull. The London Economic Conference held
earlier in the year had been a personal as well as general
fiasco. The United States delegation had been poorly organs
ized and the members argued among themselves. .Meanwhile,
back in Washington D. C., President Roosevelt refused to
agree to the innocuous resolution supported by his own
delegation. Hull could not afford another blow to his
prestige and he hoped the world would not have to View
another failure of international cooperation.‘ The easy
road would have been to delay the Conference and avoid what
appeared to be an inevitable clash. Hull's friends sug—
gested he not risk “two failures."42 Also, a member of the
presidential staff suggested that he discuss only the Pan
American Highway.43 Hull went anyway, determined to succeed.

He expected, and with.much justification, that the
Argentine Chancellor would probably be the leader of the
general opposition to the United States. In describing his
thoughts about the Argentine Foreign Minister, Hull indi—
cated that "Saavedra Lamas had long been one of the most
outstanding and irrepressible opponents of the United:

44

States." To enjoy a meaningful and successful Conference,

42Cordell Hull, The Memoirs 9£_Cordell Hull (New York:

Macmillan C02, 1948), 2 volumes, Vol. I, p. 317.
43

 

Ibid., 319.

441bid., 322.

 

 

112

Hull would have to find some way to deal with his gaucho
counterpart.i He was aided in this quest by two unlikely
sources, the Argentine ambassadors in Washington D. C. and
Bogota, Colombia. Both suggested to United States repre-
sentatives that if Hull signed the Anti-War Pact, Saavedra

Lamas could be won over.45 Subsequently, Espil said the

46

same thing directly to Hull. It is interesting to note

that this suggestion was put forward on the same day, in
much the same words (both talked of "winning Saavedra Lamas
over") but in two separate locations. Although there is
no evidence other than what is cited above, it is probable
that the suggestion was not spontaneous.

In any case, Hull followed it. Concerning the Anti-
War Pact, the instructions to the United States delegates
read as follows:

However, largely as a matter of expediency it may ap-
pear advisable for the United States to consider
signing this treaty.... ‘It is possible that if the
United States should be willing to sign the Argentine
Anti—war Pact, Argentina would consider favorably
:adherence to the Briand-Kellogg Pact.... Furthermore,
an expressed willingness on our part to sign Senor
Saavedra Lamas' Anti-War Treaty might conceivably be
of considerable assistance to our delegation in work-
ing for cooperation and harmony at the Conference and
avoiding the creation of embarrassing incidents aris-
ing through an attempt on the part of the other

45See U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.G/338
Conversation Espil and Cafferty, October 31, 1933 and 710.
1012 Anti—war 42 Whitehouse (Bogota) to Dept. of State,
October 31, 1 33.

46Hull, Memoirs, I, 322.

113

delegations to raise controversial questions, involv—
ing the United States.47

If Saavedra Lamas had known this, he undoubtedly would
have felt much better. Since he did not, he remained recal-
citrant. Hull was shocked when he learned that although
Saavedra Lamas had accepted Uruguay's invitation to the
Conference on October 31, a delegation was not named until
the last minute. He noted that Saavedra Lamas had planned
to conduct business from across the river.48 If the Argen-
tine Foreign Minister had continued with the plan, the
Conference would certainly have been destroyed.

Happily, this did not happen. Hull prevented casta-
trophe by courting his Argentine counterpart. Almost imme-
diately upon hearing of the arrival of Saavedra Lamas, he
went to visit him. The United States Secretary of State
described his reception by Saavedra Lamas as courteous, but
reserved and aloof. After assuring Saavedra Lamas that his
only goal was to put into practice the concepts of the Good
Neighbor Policy, he asked for the counsel of the Argentine
Foreign Minister. Continuing to play on the vanity of
Saavedra Lamas, Hull said, "I know from your record that you
will help us take the right direction and do so in a thor-

oughly practical and efficient manner."49

47U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV,
p. 54.

48Hull, Memoirs, I, 327.

491bid., 327-8.

 

 

114

Hull then put forward his proposition. He noted that
strong policy stands were needed in the economic area and
asserted the need for the nations present at the Conference
to sign the available peace machinery. Then he dropped a
bombshell by stating the United States would sign the Anti-
War Pact. Saavedra Lamas "sat up straighter." Subsequently
he suggested that since Saavedra Lamas was known for his
work in the area of peace, the Argentine Chancellor should
introduce the peace resolution, while he handled.the~.
economic side. According to the Secretary of State,
Saavedra Lamas sat silently until he indicated that, if the
Argentine Chancellor did not wish to do this maybe Mello
Franco would. Saavedra Lamas asked for twenty-four hours
to consider the proposition and indicated that a reply

50 What Hull was suggesting was indeed

would be forthcoming.
revolutionary. He was literally offering Saavedra Lamas a
United States supported leadership role. Shortly there-
after, Saavedra Lamas returned and agreed to the deal.
According to the Secretary of State, he said, "we shall be
the two wings of the dove of peace, you the economic and I
the political."51
In the meetings which followed, the details of the

agreement were worked out. Saavedra Lamas found Hull‘s

 

51Ibid., 329.

 

 

 

 

115

economic proposal to be deficient only in prOper Spanish
phraseology and requested that he be allowed to redraft
it.52 When he returned with the document, however, the
United States delegation found it to be "inferior in phrase-
ology, intent and vigor." Confronted with this view,
Saavedra Lamas, after a great deal of discussion, agreed

to allow still a third draft. Wright, in his memorandum

concerning-thiS-event, described the problem as."pride of

 

52Hull's program grew out of the failure of the London
Economic Conference in the summer of 1933. At that time
the United States gave up the idea of general tariff reduc-
tion and shifted to reciprocal most-favored-nation agree-
ments. In the case of Argentina this policy foundered
because the United States would not significantly lower her
tariffs or end her sanitary restrictions on beef. Saavedra
Lamas, himself did not become seriously involved in the
negotiation. At the suggestion of the Foreign Minister,
Tomas LeBreton handled discussions concerning trade. At
other times the Minister of Finance dealt with economic is-
sues. See William Grant Cooper, "New Light on the Good
Neighbor Policy: The United States and Argentina,-l933-
1939" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsyl-
vania, 1972). In Chapter IV (pp. 50—83), dealing with the
reciprocal trade program, Saavedra Lamas is never mentioned.
See also U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV,
pp. 650-653; 1935, IV, p. 273; 1936, V, p. 200; and 1937, V,
p. 222.

During the 1933 Montevideo Conference one of the con-
cessions Saavedra Lamas obtained from Cordell Hull was
acceptance of a Pan American Commercial Conference to be
held in Buenos Aires. Scheduled from May 26 to June 19,
1935 it was not expected to produce much of a transendental
nature and fulfilled those expectations. It did, however,
provide an opportunity for Saavedra Lamas and Argentina to
once again gain the hemispheric spotlight. He used it to
attack the economic policy of the United States. For the
text of this address see Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Pgr_l§_ az
fig,los americas (Buenos Aires: Compafiia impresora Argentina,
193777 pp. 307-346.

 

 

 

 

116

authorship."53 Conceit, also, probably caused Saavedra
Lamas to read his peace proposal only once in English to
Hull and not leave a copy.

During the remainder of the Conference, even Saavedra
Lamas' well-known vanity did not disrupt the agreement
between himself and Hull. They worked together in harmony.
When the question of intervention came up, Saavedra Lamas,

whom one would expect to be the loudest in his denuncia-

 

tions, said only enough to escape the charge of subservir'
ence to the United States. After Saavedra Lamas finished
his statement, Hull went to him and indicated that he under-
stood.54 When the Mexican program on debt settlement was
proposed, Saavedra Lamas helped Hull squelch it.

Saavedra Lamas also worked closely with Hull on the
Chaco dispute, supporting his efforts to bring about a
resolution calling for peace. :On December 18 a resolution
was passed, urging a settlement of the Chaco conflict.55
On the same day, the League of Nations Peace Commission

received a letter from President Eusebio Ayala of Paraguay,

calling for a truce. Washington immediately cabled "warm

53U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV,

54Hull, Memoirs, I, p. 335.

 

55U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV,

 

377.

 

117

56 The congratulations were,

congratulations" to Hull.
however, justified only in the most indirect way. Other
events had actually determined Paraguay's policy. On the
eleventh of December, a general offensive by the Paraguayans
paid off with a victory at Campo Via. Some 8,000 prisoners
and a large arsenal of weapons fell to the Paraguayan
troops. For the Bolivians, this was a crushing blow which
left them in general disarray. Furthermore, the way was
still open for another Paraguayan drive.57

Ayala chose to propose an armistice because the victory
gave him the power to deal from a position of strength.
Ayala probably hoped that the power of the League, coupled
with the strong support of the delegates in Montevideo,
would stampede Bolivia into a settlement. In that regard,
it can reasonably be argued that neither Saavedra Lamas
nor Hull nor even the League Commission played a direct role
in the cease fire.

When the Bolivians accepted the truce rather than risk

the distruction of her army the Conference wasted no time

calling for general support of the League of Nations

 

561bid., 379.

57For the story of the Campo Via offensive see Zook,
Chaco War, 158-184. It is notable that after the Paraguayan
victory Leopoldo Melo, acting Chancellor in the absence of
Saavedra Lamas, sent Ayala congratulations, as did the
Minister of War, Rodriguez. See Rivarola, Memoria, III, 43.

 

fill

 

 

118

mediation efforts. Unfortunately, the scene had quickly
been sullied by a Bolivian charge, made on December 20,

that Paraguay had already violated the truce.58 Furthermore,
the Paraguayan army indicated its disapproval of being
leashed by not sending the necessary military observer to

the negotiations in Montevideo until the day before the

truce was to expire on December 20.59

The League Commission
therefore had to seek an extension of the truce. Ayala was
only able to give eight.more days due to pressure from the

military,60

which apparently saw its golden opportunity
escaping.

After Saavedra Lamas returned to Buenos Aires, a
general meeting was held of cabinet level officials, includ—
ing President Justo. It was agreed there, apparently with'
the concurrence of SaaVedra Lamas, that the League had no

61

place in a purely American affair. Perhaps that is why

 

58Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., L§_politica argentina,
III, 175.

59Margaret La Foy, The Chaco Dispute and the League
g£_Nations, p. 75.

60U. 5. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/3465
Nicholson (Asuncién) to Dept. of State, December 29, 1933.

61This account was given by Interior Minister Leopold
Melo to Spruille Braden. See U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal
File 724.3415/3537, Braden to Dept. of State, January 1,
1934.

 

 

 

 

119

Saavedra Lamas suggested to Hull an economic conference
in Buenos Aires to handle the financial aspects which the
Argentine Chancellor had often suggested were a prime
cause of the war.62 Earlier, during the Conference, he
had proposed a similar step, under A§93.auspices.63
Either of these proposals, had they been accepted, would
have once again pushed Argentina and her Foreign Minister
to the forefront. But such was not to be the case, for on
January 6, 1934 the truce ended and the fighting began
again. There would be no point in discussing economics
while the decision remained on the battlefield.

In summing up the events at Montevideo in his Informe
to President Justo, Saavedra Lamas neVer mentioned the
early agreement with Hull. He did, however, mention that
it was a happy coincidence when his economic proposal turned

out to be similar to Hull's.64 It is questionable, however,

 

62U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/3491,
Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, January 4, 1934.
At this Buenos Aires meeting were weddell, Hull, Justo and
Saavedra Lamas.

63Report 9f the Delegates of the United States of.
America to the Seventh International Conference of American
States (washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1934),
p. 14. '

64Carlos Saavedra Lamas, "Informe presentado por el
presidente de la delegacién Argentina." In Republica Argen-
tina, Archivo del Ministerio de_Relaciones Exteriores
Culto, VII Conferencia International Americana, Box 1,
Lejado 1, p. 3.

 

 

 

 

 

 

120

whether Saavedra Lamas ever had a firm set of economic pro—
posals. Perhaps he would have supported Mexico's Anti-
United States position. In any case, the cast Saavedra
Lamas chose to put on the events sounded much better than
indicating Hull had made a deal with him to accept the Anti-
war Pact.

In that regard, Saavedra Lamas lauded Hull for his
Pan American spirit. He noted that the concept of
sovereignity was now secure and that his Anti—War Pact was
now well on its way to general acceptance. He took particu-
lar delight in noting that the United States no longer
appeared to be anti-League.65

Saavedra Lamas must have been delighted with the
Montevideo Conference. He had been courted by Hull, an
honor which he might have been the last to admit Was an
honor. He received the leadership role so many of his
predecessors had desired, and had placed himself in the fore-
front of Pan Americanism and international affairs in gen-
eral. He achieved this goal at a time when an objective
appraisal of Argentine power indicated it was not justified.
Moreover, "Argentina yielded no principles and sacrificed

- I
no goals."66

 

HRHR

651bid., pp. 3-4, 7-8. 1

66Harold F. Peterson, Argentina and the United States,
1810-1960 (New York: ,Macmillan Co., 1964). p. 384-

 

 

CHAPTER 5

A MAN TO BE RECKONED WITH

Chaco Negotiations January, 193422.
February, 1935

 

Despite the end of the truce arranged during the
Montevideo Conference, the League continued its efforts to
find an acceptable peace formula. On February 22, 1934,
it proposed a plan to the belligerents.l It differed from
the multitude of earlier projects solely in that the dis—
putants would renounce previous reservations regarding
arbitration. In order to obtain agreement, and with knowl—
edge of Saavedra Lamas' previous actions, the League did
not consult him on the formula.

This proved to be a fatal mistake. Because the basic
outline of the proposal was available before it was actually
presented, Rivarola was able to report on February 10 that

Saavedra Lamas did not approve of the League project.

 

1United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations
9£_the United States (Washington D.C.: United States Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1951), 1934, Volume IV, pp. 52-53.

 

2Vicente Rivarola, Memorias Diplomaticas (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Ayacucho, 1957), Volume III, pp. 69-70.

121

 

 

 

122

That the reason was lack of consultation was shown clearly
in two conversations with Weddell on February 26 and 27.
In both the Argentine Chancellor emphasized the fact that
the League Commission had not talked with him before pre-
senting the formula. In the second conversation, the
Argentine Foreign Minister belittled the League plan as
"defective“ and announced he would not support it. To
avoid being publicly accused of opposing peace, however,
Saavedra Lamas added that he hoped the belligerents would
accept, although he was pessimistic.3

Bolivia accepted the League proposal, but the Para-
guayans, assured of Argentine backing, refused.4 As a
result, the United States, as well as the League Commission,
became irritated by Saavedra Lamas' actions. Rivarola re—
ported that the members of the League Commission were
particularly critical of the Argentine Chancellor.5: There

was even talk of going over Saavedra Lamas' head tc-Justo

 

3The first conversation referred to was United States
Archives, Record Group 59, Decimal File 724.3415/3564,
Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, February 26, 1934.
For the second, see ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/3569,
Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, February 27, 1934.

4For a summary of the Bolivian response, see U. S.
Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1934, IV, p. 64, for
Paraguay see, ibid., p. 63.

 

5Rivarola, Memorias, III, 94-95.

 

 

 

123

in order to have him place pressure on Paraguay.

Characteristically, no action was taken and the League

I O 7
Comm1531on went home.

Bolivia, however, did not give up so easily. As a
result of a desparate military situation in May, 1934, she
asked for League sanctions (i.e., an embargo) under Article
158 of the League of Nations Covenant. In order to fore-
stall any action, Saavedra Lamas initiated a new peace
proposal on July 12. It differed from other peace formu—
1as in that it relied on the Anti-war Pact for its author-
ity.9 At the same time he made news of the project known,
he asked Brazil and the United States to join him in a
tripartite effort. Both agreed after Saavedra Lamas in—

formed them that Paraguay had already accepted without

. lO
reservations.

 

6Ibid., p. 80 and U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File
724. 3415/3626, Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State,
March 15,1934. What makes this absurd is that during this
period Justo was negotiating a new loan for Paraguay. See

Rivarola, Memorias, III, 82- 92.

7The final Commission report, League of Nations,
Dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay: Report 9f the Chaco
ggmmission, May 11, 1934, Political, C. 154.M.64 VII
(1934), says nothing unfavorable about Saavedra Lamas.

 

8Article 15 allowed action by the General Assembly if
the Council was unable to stop a war between two members. i

9U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/3946 j
Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, July 13, 1934. i

10U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1934, IV,
142—143. :

124

Subsequently, both Brazil and the United States began
pressuring Bolivia to accept. La Paz, ever suspicious of
anything engineered by Saavedra Lamas, initially demurred
and then conditionally accepted on September 7.11 Much to
the other mediators' surprise, Saavedra Lamas immediately
lost interest in the proposal. On September 11 he indi—
cated pessimism about the proposal12 and on the 12th, the
Argentine representative at the League observed that the
League should once again begin mediation.l3 Lest they be
left in a difficult position, Brazil and the United States
ended their efforts.

The reason for Saavedra Lamas' change of heart is not
absolutely clear. The stated justification, pessimism
over Paraguayan acceptance of the Bolivian counter offer,

! is unconvincing.l4 Another theme superficially alluded to,
that the time was not "ripe" for a settlement, seems to
supply the answer. Paraguay was on the offensive and delay

meant more territory for Asuncién. Also, since Bolivia

 

llIbid., pp. 193—195.

. le. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/4117
Gibson (Rio de Janeiro) to Dept. of State, September 13,
934.

13Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y
Culto, La politica argentina en la guerra del Chaco (Buenos

—~_._..____—.—

Aires: _Guillermo Kraft, 1937), p. 236-

l . . . . .
4Ibid., The Argentine ver31on stresses this pOlnt.

 

 

 

 

125

conditionally accepted the tripartite proposal, pressure

to modify her position would fall upon Paraguay rather than
rBolivia. It is likely that because the negotiations were
hurting Argentina's ally, Saavedra Lamas decided, or pos—
sibly was ordered, to scuttle them.

It was not until November, 1934, that the League was
able to produce another peace formula. It was not material—
ly different from early plans. On December 10 Bolivia
accepted. Paraguay, still advancing on the battlefield,
delayed sending a response until January 16, 1935, when
she rejected the proposal. In retaliation, the League
lifted the military arms embargo on Bolivia which it had
placed upon both belligerents on December 1, 1934.15 By so
doing, the Geneva—based body dubbed Paraguay the aggressor.
Paraguay therefore quit the League, but because Argentina
continued to ship arms to Asuncion, the embargo was not

fatal.16

Final Settlement

The League, however, was considering stronger sanctions

 

15In the summer of 1934, thirty-nine nations prohibited
sales of arms to the belligerents. Sales, however, contin-
ued. For a closer examination of the embargo see U. S. Dept.
of State, Foreign Relations, 1934, IV, pp. 247-299.

16For the details on the last efforts of the League,
see Leslie B. Rout, Jr., Politics of the Chaco Peace Con-

ference, 1935-1939 (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1970), pp. 92—94.

 

 

 

 

 

 

126

against Paraguay and although the idea never went beyond
the talking stage, it did provide the impetus which brought
a final peace plan. It did so by placing Saavedra Lamas
in a difficult position; he did not want increased sanc—
tions,17 but also he did not want to appear anti—League.
Consequently, in order to stop the League, another mediation
effort was begun by Saavedra Lamas in alliance with Chile.
Envoys were secretly sent to the contentious powers.
Saavedra Lamas dispatched Podesta Costa to Paraguay and
Cruchaga sent Félix Nieto del Rio to Bolivia.l8
On March 14, Chile and Argentina jointly announced that
efforts were being undertaken. In order to demonstrate
they were serious, Espil approached Assistant Secretary of
State Sumner Welles asking for United States cooperation.
Welles foiled Saavedra Lamas' attempt at recruitment by
saying he would have to have more information before he
could give direct support.19 Undaunted, Saavedra Lamas
instructed his minister at the League to announce that

Brazil had agreed to cooperate with Chile and Argentina in

 

l7Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La politica argentina,
pp. 261—262 gave a very negative account of the League
action and dubbed it "unjust."

l8U. 5. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/4590,
Cox (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, March 14, 1935 de-
tails the early developments.

19

U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV,
Pp. 14-16.

 

 

 

 

127

this new attempt at peace. The Brazilians were aghast at
this, and lost little time in informing both the United
States and the League that the Argentine statement was in
error.20

On April 1, 1935, after the transmittal of a vague
outline of the proposed plan, Chile formally asked Peru,
the United States and Brazil to join with herself and
Argentina in Buenos Aires to look for a solution to the
Chaco war. The United States and Peru both accepted by
April 7,21 but Brazil did not immediately respond. The
problem was that she did not receive an invitation to a
proposed economic part of the conference relative to the
Chaco. Adding to Brazil's anger was the absurdity of
Saavedra Lamas' statement that the reason she was not in—
vited was due to a typographical error.22 The Argentine
Chancellor was actually attempting to halt competition from
Brazil.23 Finally, an apology was sent, and on May 2 Brazil

agreed to join in the mediation effort.

 

20Ibid., 19.

21U. 3. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/47313,
Hull to United States Embassy in Argentina, April 6, 1935.

22Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/4733, Hull to United
States Embassy in Brazil, April 9, 1935.

 

23 . .
See U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations., 1935,
IV: pp. 28-30. The Brazilians indicated this could very
poss1bly be the reason.

 

 

 

128

A week later the mediation group composed of Saavedra
Lamas (Argentina), Nieto del Rio (Chile), José Bonifacio
de Andrade e Silva (Brazil), and Felipe Barreda Loas (Peru)
began work. The interim representative of the United
States was Raymond Cox, who was supplanted in mid—June by
Hugh Gibson. The goal was to find a peace formula accept-
able to the belligerents, but their first act was to invite
Uruguay to participate. Montevideo accepted and sent
Eugenio Martinez Thédy as its representative. The media-
tion group then formally requested that Bolivia and Paraguay
send representatives.

Both groups agreed by May 14 to send delegates. Both
Paraguay and Bolivia were represented by their Foreign
Ministers, Luis A. Riart and Tomas Elio. The principal
reason the belligerents accepted was the stalemate which
resulted from their inability to successfully carry on
military operations. Paraguay's victories had taken her
army far into the Chaco and she could no longer adequately
supply her troops. Bolivian defeats had left her army in
disarray, but because the front line was now closer to the
population centers her logistical problems were less press—
ing.

The serious work of the mediation group began with the
arrival in Buenos Aires of the President of Brazil, Getfilio

Vargas, and his foreign minister, José Carlos de Macedo

 

 

 

 

 

 

129
Scares on May 26.24 The trip had been planned much earlier
as a return visit for the 1933 excursion by Justo and
Saavedra Lamas. Macedo Scares, however, lost little time
in entering into the negotiations. He suggested a number

of plans to the belligerents, but Paraguay raised objections

 

to all of them. Meanwhile, Saavedra Lamas was growing in-
creasingly perplexed at his guest's presumptuousness. Not
only was the Brazilian stealing the show, but he was conduct-
ing the negotiations in his residence. The Argentine
Chancellor quickly put a stop to this by insisting that all
negotiations take place in the Anchorena Palace, where he
could controlmatters.2-5 According to Bautista Saavedra,
a Bolivian delegate, this was "a jar of cold water flung
directly into [Macedo] Soares' face."26
At issue in the negotiations were the same points that
had plagued the mediation efforts for years. Paraguay

wanted guarantees against renewed fighting, including inter-

national inspection of the reduction of both armies to

 

peace time levels. For her part, Bolivia wanted a time
limit on mediation and pre-agreement on the nature of
24Macedo Soares had replaced Mello Franco in July, 1934.

25U. 3. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/4930,
Gordon (Rio de Janeiro) to Dept. of State, June 4, 1935.

26Bautista Saavedra, El Chaco y_la conferencia d3 az
de Buenos Aires (Santiago: Editorial Nacimiento, 1939),
p. 63.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

130

arbitration before a cease-fire would be accepted. A number
of formulas were forwarded, but it Was not until June 3
that the first significant compromise took place. Paraguay
agreed to an arbitration formula in exchange for Bolivian
guarantees.27

The final problem, that of setting a limit on the dura-
tion of the conference, was more difficult. Paraguay was
willing to talk forever since she controlled the Chaco.
Bolivia, of course, wanted a quick decision because the
longer Paraguay occupied the Chaco, the more difficult it
would be to force her out. Again, a number of propOsals
were forwarded, only to be rejected. The Paraguayan, Riart,
on June 8 suggested that the mediators decide when their
efforts would end and arbitration would begin. Bolivia would
have rejected this proposal, but Saavedra Lamas gave his
personal assurance that the negotiations would continue un-
til a settlement was reached. Elio of Bolivia tried to
ignore the statement, but MaCedo Scares backed his Argentine:
counterpart. Elio was trapped between insulting the Foreign
Ministers of Brazil and Argentina or accepting the formula.

At 1:15 AM., June 9, he accepted the latter.28 What makes

 

27U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV,
PP. 68.71..

28Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y
Culto, Archivo, La Conferencia d§_la paz del Chaco, Box 4
Expedinete II, "AEtBS OEiginales del Grupo Mediadores," pp.
12—19. Elio was able to obtain one more concession. Any
arbitration would be done by the Hague Court.

J—

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

131

this ironic is that Bolivia.accepted a peace formula based
upon assurances by the man whose government had supplied
the arms which allowed Paraguay to win.

The final protocol was signed at noon on June 12, 1935,
but not without the usual antics by Saavedra Lamas. The
Foreign Ministers of Chile and Peru were due to arrive in
Buenos Aires at 2:00 P.M. Saavedra Lamas refused to allow
a delay and went ahead with the formal signing. He was
serving notice early and to all that this was his Conference.

Unfortunately, the June 12 Protocol29 was drawn up
hastily and as a result there were serious defects. The
most glaring was in regards to the boundary separating the
armies. In Article II, clauses a and c, "line" singular
was used, while the plural "lines" was utilized in Clause
d. It is probable that this was not accidental. There was
also no enforcement provisibn as regards demobilization.30
These points caused delays and confusion in reaching a final
definitive settlement.

It is evident that during the last year and one-half
of fighting, Saavedra Lamas pursued the same policy and

tactics he had earlier. By constantly shifting the peace

 

29For a copy of the June 12 Protocol see United States

Department of State, Report of the Delegation of the United
States of America to the Peace Conference Held— at BuenOs
Aires July l,1935-—January 23,1939. CpnferenCe Series 46
(Washington_ D. C.: United States Government Printing Office,
1940), pP. 49- 52.

3O

 

 

 

 

See Ibid., pp. 9~ll.

 

 

 

132

efforts between himself and other mediating groups he con-
trolled the situation. By this means he was able to insure
a preeminent position for himself and Argentina and at the
same time protect the Paraguayans. When a peace effort
finally did succeed after so many had failed, the reason
was the inability of both belligerents to maintain effec-
tive military operations. It is to Saavedra Lamas' credit
that he supplied the vehicle for the mutual standdown.

His motive, however, that of forestalling the League, de-
tracts from any distinction he is due. In that regard, his
statement to the Bolivians announcing his attention to keep
the Conference in session probably would have remained only

a passing comment had not Macedo Soares seized upon it.

The Chaco Peace Conference

The first meeting of the Chaco Peace Conference was
held on July 1, 1935, and it became obvious that the same
type of acrimony and distrust that had marked the endeavors
to end the fighting would continue. After Saavedra Lamas
was chosen President of the Conference, he insisted that
when he was absent the Vice-Presidency rotate among the
delegates. The Argentine Chancellor wanted to avoid sanc—
tioning a competition for leadership. In his actions,
however, Saavedra Lamas double crossed Macedo Soares, to

whom.he had promised that the Brazilian delegate to the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

133
Conference would be Vice-President.31

In Saavedra Lamas' letter to his Ambassador in Brazil,
Ramdn J. Carcano, telling him to make amends, he appended
his letter with the statement, "Argentina [that is, Saavedra
Lamas] has to be the center of the Conference."32 That the
Argentine Chancellor was serious in this statement is borne
out by his demand that all discussions would be held by
the full conference rather than in committee?"3 For tace
tical reasons, he was determined to retain control of the
Conference.

The first policy Saavedra Lamas followed was that of
delaying the Conference. The only open and consistently
enunciated justification for waiting was that demobiliza-
tion would continually decrease the chances of renewed

fighting.34 Moreover, it would also allow him time to

 

31Argentina, Archives, Box 4, Expediente l, "Asuntos

Varios," Telegram Cifrado 458, Saavedra Lamas to Carcano
(Rio de Janeiro), July 6, 1935. In revenge the Brazilian
attempted to replace Saavedra Lamas' choice for Secretary
of the Conference, Podesta Costa, with the North American,
Allen Dawson. He was, however, unsuccessful.

321bid.

33U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV,
pp. 92-93.
34v. 3. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/35,
Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, July 12, 1935.

 

 

 

 

134

collect information and precedents from past conferences,35
and provide time for the other Foreign Ministers who had
arrived for the Opening of the Conference to go home.36
The most important reason for delay, however, was that it
would work to the benefit of Paraguay.

Saavedra Lamas' general orientation, nevertheless,
did not stop him from trying to obtain a quick final settle-
ment during July, 1935 in terms eminently favorable to
Argentina and Paraguay. He did this by dropping none too
subtle hints on numerous occasions. In his plan, the
United States would give, or convince banks to loan, money
to Bolivia which she would then use to pay reparations to
Paraguay. At one point, on July 29, he even suggested that
concessions could be purchased from Asuncidn.37 Bolivia

would be assuaged further by Chile, which would return

Bolivia's lost littoral.38 How this was to be accomplished

 

35Argentina, Archives, Box 4, Expediente I, "Asuntos
Varios," Telegram Cifrado 478, Saavedra Lamas to Argentine
Embassy in Paris, July 11, 1935 and ibid., Box 4, Expediente
I, "Asuntos Varios," Telegram ordinario 1226, Le Breton
(Paris) to Saavedra Lamas, July 13, indicated that five vol—
umes on prisoners and their disposition, would be sent.
A large volume of material relative to other topics to be
discussed by the Conference was also forwarded.

 

36U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV,
p. 95.

37Ibid., p. 95.

38

For the basic outline of this plan, see ibid., 98,
100-101, 106-107, 111—112. In mentioning Chile's role,
Saavedra Lamas said that surrendering the sea coast would
be a "noble gesture."

 

 

 

135

was not clear, but presumably, the United States was ex-
pected in some way to cooperate. Never mentioned was the
fact that the money Bolivia would receive would eventually
end up in Buenos Aires to pay off Argentina's loans to
Paraguay. The beauty of the plan as far as Saavedra Lamas
was concerned was that it would bring in always needed
money and satisfy the belligerents at the expense of the
United States and Chile. Moreover, the credit for the
settlement would rebound upon Saavedra Lamas. Predictably,
Santiago and Washington D.C. quickly and vociferously re-‘
jected the program.39
In early August, another scheme manifested itself,
that of bringing together the presidents of Bolivia and
Paraguay. There is not concrete proof, but it appears that

40 The idea went for

Saavedra Lamas was behind this gambit.
naught, but did result in an embarrassing situation for the

Argentine Foreign Minister. On August 16, Macedo Soares

 

39For the United States view, see U. S. Archives, RG
59, Decimal File 724.34119/45 Philips to Gibson (Buenos
Aires) July 18, 1935. The Chilean opinion can be found in
Argentina, Archives, Box 5, Expediente l. "Asuntos Varios'
Confidential letter 200, Quintana (Santiago) to Saavedra
Lamas, July 21, 1935.

40Ibid., Box 7 Expediente 1, "cuestiones de fondo,"
Telegram Cifrado 904 (Muy Reservado), Freyre (Asuncidn) to
Saavedra Lamas, July 12, 1935. In this telegram there is
a strong indication that Saavedra Lamas ordered Freyre to
look into this matter.

 

 

 

 

136

called in the Argentine Ambassador, Cércano, and said he
believed any meeting was premature and indicated opposi-
tion.41 The Argentine Chancellor, upon receipt of the note,
told Carcano to tell Macedo Soares he had nothing to do
with the proposal.42 When he heard Saavedra Lamas' answer,
the Brazilian Foreign Minister became furious and produced
letters he had received from his representative in La Paz
reporting that the Argentine government was putting pres—
sure upon the Bolivians to have such a parly.43 There is
no evidence of a response from Buenos Aires.

Saavedra Lamas' delaying tactics were more successful
than his larger plans. Unfortunately, prOgress had to be
demonstrated or criticism would fall on the President of
the Conference. Moreover, Saavedra Lamas' plans were not
public knowledge. Consequently, the Argentine Chancellor
had to show that the Conference was moving forward while

delaying any definite action. As a result, on July 19, when

the delegates of the United States, Chile and Brazil

 

41Ibid., Box 4, Expediente 1, "Asuntos VArios,‘l
Telegram Cifrado 1011, Carcano (Rio de Janeiro) to Saavedra
Lamas, August 16, 1935.

42;p;g,, Box 4, Expediente 1, “Asuntos Varios"
Telegram Cifrado 532, Saavedra Lamas to Carcano (Rio de
Janeiro), August 17, 1935.

43Ibid., Box 4, Expediente l, "Asuntos~Varios,"
Telegram Cifrado 1023, Carcano (Rio de Janeiro) to Saavedra
Lamas, August 20, 1935.

 

 

 

137

suggested committees be set up to study the questions of
prisoners, Saavedra Lamas agreed.44

Ten days later, Saavedra Lamas completely reversed
himself, and in what Hugh Gibson, the United States' dele-
gate, described as a "violent tirade" announced that sub-
sidiary issues, such as the disposition of prisoners would
have to wait. The captives, he asserted would be bargain-
ing points for the more important issue of territorial
settlement. Paraguay had approximately 17,000 Bolivians,
while Bolivia had only 2,500 Paraguayans.45 Saavedra Lamas
went on to state that Paraguay had won the war and La Paz
would have to pay reparations. The next day, apparently
calmed, he reversed himSelf and indicated that the prisoner
committee could continue.46 The minutes of the subsequent
meeting, however, which were prepared under the auspices
of Saavedra Lamas, referred to the delegates working on the
prisoners problem as a "special" committee which would study

the question in its "juridical aspects."47

 

44U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV,
p. 101.

45There was considerable disagreement over the number
of prisoners that were held by both sides. In round
figures, Bolivia had 2,500 Paraguayans and Paraguay had
17,000 Bolivians. For a full discussion of numbers see
Rout, Politics, 134-139.

. 46v. 3. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/80
Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, July 29, 1935.

47

 

Ibid.

 

138

Eventually, after a few more gyrations, the prisoner
committee was finally established. By August 6 it pre-
sented the belligerents with a draft agreement following
lengthy discussions with Paraguay and Bolivia. Saavedra
Lamas had originally countenanced an effort at this time
because if the Paraguayan and Bolivian presidents met48
they would have to be supplied with something to sign.
After it became clear that the presidential conference
would not take place, the Argentine Foreign Minister
torpedoed the plan. He did this by informing Paraguay
that it was a United States proposal.49 Moreover, in
subsequent discussions, he constantly referred to the plan
as "Gibson's proposal."50 Since the formula tended toward
the Bolivian view that the prisoners held should simply be
repatriated, Paraguay found it objectionable because she
held far more prisoners and it was a valuable bargaining

tool.51

 

48;pig,, Decimal File 724.34119/84, Gibson (Buenos
Aires) to Dept. of State, August 3, 1935.

49$§$§3r Decimal File 724.34119/96, Gibson (Buenos
Aires) to Dept. of State, August 11, 1935.

5°;p;g,, Decimal File 724.34119/111, Gibson (Buenos
Aires) to Dept. of State, August 14, 1935.

51U. S. Dept. of State, Chaco Peace Conference, p. 20.

 

 

139

Approximately a week after it was decided to study
the prisoner question, the Conference took up the problem
of determining war responsibility, which the June 12 proto-
col had mandated be dealt with. On July 26, at the seventh
plenary session of the Conference, a committee composed
of representatives from Peru, Brazil, Uruguay and the
belligerents was set up to deal with the subject. The
Peruvian delegate, Barreda Laos, who did not attend the
meeting, suddenly found he was a member of the committee.
Perhaps because he was annoyed, he tried to stop the com-
mittee from taking any action. He objected to separating
the territorial settlement from the responsibility question.
Saavedra Lamas' willingness to discuss this issue as opposed
to prisoners was probably due to the fact he believed that
it would be years before a decision could be made and by
that time, it would be irrelevant. Eventually, on AugUst
2, a program calling for a three judge panel, one from each
belligerent and a third from an American state, was drawn
up. Both belligerents agreed to take the proposal under
advisement, but internal difficulties within the Bolivian
delegation caused a rejection on August 13.

On the territorial question, Saavedra Lamas had to do
very little to cause an impasse and its resultant delay.
Both belligerents proferred extreme positions. Nevertheless,

the Argentine Chancellor took the opportunity to berate the

140

Bolivians for their intransigence.52 In an August 3 conver-
sation, Saavedra Lamas detailed his views on the territorial
issue in terms reminiscent of those used in his earlier
discussion in regard to prisoners. He stated the answer
was to declare that Bolivia was the aggressor and that she
would have to buy access to the Paraguay River.53 Subse-
quently, he observed it might take two years to reaCh a land
settlement.54

.With the important issues of the final territorial
agreement and prisoner repatriation bottled up, Saavedra
Lamas had to find an explanation. The Peruvian, Barreda
Laos, with his continuing opposition to dealing with the
responsibility question separately from the territOrial
issue, supplied the Argentine Foreign Minister with a scape—
goat. Following representations made to Lima,55 Saavedra

56 57

Lamas sent letters to Santiago, Rio de Janeiro,

 

I
52U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, p.

 

109.

53U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/84
Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 3, 1935.

54i§i§3r Decimal File 724.34119/96,Gibson (Buenos
Aires) to Dept. of State, August 11, 1935.

55;pgg., Decumal File 724.34119/84, Gibson (Buenos
Aires) to Dept. of State, August 3, 1935.

56Argentina, Archives, Box 4, Expediente II, "Asuntos
Varios," Telegram Cifrado 543, Saavedra Lamas to Argentine
Embassy (Santiago), AugUst 23, 1935.

57Ibid., Box 4, Expediente II, "Asuntos Varios," Tele-
gram Cifrado 542, Saavedra Lamas to Argentine Embassy (Rio
de Janeiro), August 23, 1935. In this letter Saavedra Lamas

141

and Washington D. C. denouncing Barreda Laos for causing
delays. In his letter to ESpil for transmittal to Welles,
he stated that "the Conference is obstructed in its work
[marcha] by personnel factors principally radiating from
the Peruvian Ambassador, Barreda [Laos]."58
With the Conference deadlocked, Saavedra Lamas
announced that he was going to take a vacation. He did this
for his oWn health and in order to slow the negotiations.
At about the same time, hoWever, the Argentine Chancellor
apparently became worried that nothing was being acdom—
plished and commented to that effect in a conversation with

59 The next day he reiterated his

Gibson on August 28.
fears and indicated that the Conference would continue the
search for a settlement in his absence.60

While on vacation, Saavedra Lamas definitely decided
progress must be made. Spurring his activity was the
necessity for assuaging the other delegates who demanded

action. He wanted to nip any independent negotiating.

Moreover, demobilization was progressing rapidly and when

 

suggested Carcano talk to the Peruvian Ambassador about
Barreda Laos.

58Ibid., Box 4, Expediente II, "Asuntos Varios,"
Telegram Cifrado 544, Saavedra Lamas to Argentine Embassy
(Washington D.C.) August 24, 1935.

59U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV,
pp. 130-131.

60

 

Ibid., p. 131.

 

 

 

142

it was completed, the June 12 protocol mandated an end to
the war. It would be difficult to explain why Asuncion
still retained the Bolivian captives. The Paraguayans,
however, continued to favor delay and as a result a rift
developed between Buenos Aires and Asuncién. While
Saavedra Lamas was away, a telegram arrived on September 6
from the Argentine Ambassador in Asuncién stating that
Paraguay believed the Conference should recess until the
political situation in Bolivia settled down.61 When
Saavedra Lamas returned, he informed the other mediators
of Paraguay's position and indicated he opposed a recess.
He announced he had informed Asuncién that a declaration
ending the war would have to be made and thErefore Paraguay
should modify its position concerning prisoner exchange.62
Paraguay became upset. The Argentine Foreign Minister was
considerably more blunt with the new Paraguayan delegate,
Gerénimo Zubizarreta. He told him that on September 17 the
prisoner question would be decided "with or without his
COOperation," and that talk of a new suspension of activity

was absurd.63 It was just this type of action that prompted

61Argentina, Archives, Box 4, Expediente II, "Asuntos
Varios," Telegram Cifrado 1091, Freyre (Asuncion) to
Saavedra Lamas September 6, 1935.

62U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV,
pp. 140-141.

63Argentina, Archives, Box 5, Expediente l, "Asuntos
Varios," Telegram Cifrado 599, Saavedra Lamas to Martinez
Pita (Asuncién) September 17, 1935.

 

 

 

143

Gibson to report that "both parties manifest growing sus-

picion of Saavedra Lamas.“64

Saavedra Lamas also attempted to obtain acceptance of
a new responsibilities formula which had been proposed by
Barreda Laos on September 14. It called for a three judge
panel, the first two chosen by the belligerents, the third
to be a member of the United States Supreme Court.65 After
the United States indicated it might be difficult to obtain
a presiding Justice, the proposal was modified to include
other Federal judges. On October 2, it was signed,66 but
no significant progress was made toward implementation.

The major isSues of prisoners and a final territorial
settlement remained. With the end of the war imminent,
the former had to be disposed of. Gibson, with the help of
the Brazilian delegate, José-de Paula Rodriguez Alves, and
the Argentine, Podesta Costa, decided to link the problems
and suggest a solution. Saavedra Lamas indicated initial
agreement but, apparently fearful that the whole Conference

would fail, subsequently cautioned delay. Podesta Costa,

 

 

64U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV,
p. 145.

651bid., pp. 140, 143.

66

For a copy see, U. 8. Dept. of State, Chaco Peace
ggnference, pp. 95-98.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

144
however, continued to work on the inclusive formula.67
There is no evidence indicating whether or not Saavedra
Lamas found out about his aide's finagling, but Gibson re-
ported later the same day, October 4, that the Argentine
Foreign Minister was worried that he was losing control of
the Conference.68
The work toward finalizing the inclusive plan went
quickly, and it was ready by October 11. The next day,
prior to the forwarding of the plan to the belligerents,
Saavedra Lamas indicated he thought it would not succeed,
and rather than "'admit failure'" he suggested that the
Chaco matter be shifted to the upcoming conference of
American states scheduled for December, 1936. He stated
that it was necessary to "'make them [all the American

'"69 In his.f

states] shoulder their share of the blame.
letter-to Espil asking him to bring the matter before
Welles, he wrote that the Conference would collapse because
the end of the war would shortly be proclaimed and the

prisoner question was locked in an "insolvable contradic—

tion." Settlement, he contended, was impossible because

 

67U. 3. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/214,

Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 4, 1935.
. 68Ibid., Decimal File 724.34119/215, Gibson (Buenos
Aires) to Dept. of State, October 4, 1935.
69 . . . .
. Epid., Dec1ma1 File 724.3415/5111, Gibson (Buenos
Aires) to Dept. of State, October 12, 1935.

 

 

 

 

 

 

145
of the internal situation in both Bolivia and Paraguay.70
On October 16, Espil sent Saavedra Lamas a negative re—

71 On the

sponse by the United States to his suggestion.
18th, Gibson reported that the Argentine Chancellor had
completely given up the idea and acted as if the sugges—
tion was never made.72
The inclusive plan had been submitted on October 15,
and three days later Paraguay rejected it, deeming the

73 Bolivia's reply was less vocié

proposal "preposterous."
ferous, but required modifications Paraguay could not have
reasonably been expected to consider. Following the
declaration ending the War on October 25, 1935,74 the
stalemate Saavedra Lamas feared came about. There was
serious talk on the part of the other delegates, as well as

Saavedra Lamas, of adjourning for a few months in the hope

 

70Argentina, Archives, Box 7, Expediente I, "Cuestiones
de fondo," Telegram Cifrado 664, Saavedra Lamas to ESpil
(washington D.C.), October 14, 1935.

7li§i§31 BOX 7, Expediente I, “Cuestiones de Fondo,"
Telegram Cifrado 1267: ESpil (washington D.C.) to Saavedra
Lamas.

. 72U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/240,
Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 18, 1935.

7 . . .
1 3U. 8. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations; 1935, IV,
p. 65.

74

 

U. S. Dept. of State, Chaco Peace Conference,
pp. 67-68.

 

 

 

 

 

146

that time would make one of the belligerents more reason-

able.75

Adjournment as a possibility lost credence when a
breakthrough occurred on the prisoner issue. Paraguay had
found that the support of approximately 17,000 Bolivian
prisoners was very expensive, even though they were used
as general laborers. Consequently, in early November,
Asuncién indicated she would consider returning the captives
if Bolivia reinbursed her for their maintenance. In mid-
November Spruille Braden replaced Gibson as the United
States delegate. Saavedra Lamas, in filling him in on
events to date, discussed the prisoner question. It was
the Argentine Foreign Minister's opinion that it would be
settled in ten days but that the Paraguayans were "tricky"
and had to be watched. He observed that the Paraguayans
had always assumed they could control the conference, but
that his unbiased treatment had stopped Asuncidn.76

Saavedra Lamas was wrong about the ease of obtaining
a settlement and right about the trickiness of the Para—

guayans. Initially it looked as if the only problem would

involve haggling over how much money was to be paid.

75U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV,
Pp. 176-182.

76F. 5. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/2955,
Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, November 20, 1935.
The conversation took place on November 18.

 

—_____

 

 

 

 

.1.

 

 

 

147

On December 2, however, Paraguay complicated matters by
insisting upon retaining the current cease—fire lines until
a definitive peace could be established. Bolivia realized
any such agreement would make dislodging the Paraguayans
virtually impossible and therefOre opposed it. A second
factor causing trouble was a Split in the Paraguayan dele-
gation. Gerénimo Zubizarreta, who had replaced Riart, had
presidential ambitions. As a result, he refused to compo—

mise.77

To break the impasse, Saavedra Lamas acceded to a sug—
gestion of Braden's that he lead a delegation to explain
the situation directly to the Paraguayan President.
According to Braden, he had little trouble with Ayala.78
Asuncién agreed to an acceptable prisoner accord and also
was willing to drop the question of responsibilities, which
Bolivia had indicated she was not particularly interested
in pursuing.

Translating the general agreement to a specific writ—
ten statement proved to be an ordeal. Braden, in his
memoirs, discussed how he engineered the final settlement'
although there is no documentary evidence, including reports

to the State Department, to directly support his account.

 

77U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV,

pp. 192-195.

78Spruille Braden, Diplomats and Demo 0 nos (New

Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1971 , pp.-163—l65.

 

 

 

 

148

According to the United States Delegate, Zubizarreta con—
tinued to oppose the prisoner accord, even after his
president had agreed. At a meeting to finalize the pro—
posed act, Saavedra Lamas was "coached" by the other
delegates to state that the Paraguayan-delegate had
accepted the basic outline earlier. The Argentine Chan—
cellor, however, began to discuss the territorial issue.
Since the issue was a volatile one, Braden stated that both
he and Podesta Costa tried to stop SaaVedra Lamas from
.making Zubizarreta even more recalcitrant. When attempts
to interrupt the Argentine Foreign Minister failed, accord—
ing to Braden, he flipped a wicker table full of coffee into
Saavedra Lamas' lap. The Argentine Foreign Minister leaped
up and while he was changing his trousers Zubizarreta agreed
to the accord.79
The formal signing of the protocol did not take place
until January 20, 1936. For the remainder of the year very
little was accomplished due to changes in the governments.
of Paraguay and Bolivia. In February Rafael Franco seized

the government in Paraguay. Shortly after the renewal of

 

9Braden, Diplomats, 165-169. In his work, Braden.
describes Saavedra Lamas as "vain, pathologically ambitious,
essentially a stupid and wicked man" (p. 152). Lest too
much credence be given Braden, it must be noted that Braden
described everyone who disagreed with him as stupid, facist
or communist and in the case of Juan Perén, all three epi-
thets were utilized.

 

 

. .7.

2‘»:

 

 

 

149

serious negotiations, Colonel David Toro on May 31 led a
successful coup d'état in Bolivia. As a result a good por—
tion of the Conference members' time and energy were devoted
to how and when these governments should be recognized, and
to insuring the acceptance of the proposals agreed to by
their predecessors. The only substantial accomplishment

of the Conference during 1936 was overcoming Paraguayan
recalcitrance and achieving the actual repatriation of the
prisoners byAugust 21, 1936. Ironically, Bolivia took

this opportunity to award Saavedra Lamas with a medal the

Condor d§_1os Andes, for his work on the prisoner exchange.

 

It is evident that Saavedra Lamas' main goals were to
control the Conference in order to gain whatever credit was
produced and also to support Paraguay's desire to retain
the Chaco. Gaining honors, however, required a show of
progress which unfortunately was inimical to Paraguay's
aspirations. The result was a constantly shifting policy
which dissatisfied both of the belligerents as well as the
other delegates. When, however, Saavedra Lamas had to choose

between his own prestige or the Paraguayans, Asuncion took

second place. It is reasonable to assume that the Argentine
military allowed Saavedra Lamas more latitude than it had
earlier. Also, issues in question were probably perceived
as tertiary since the territorial settlement was not direct—

1y involved.

150

It is, of course, impossible to determine if Saavedra
Lamas"behavior precluded a quick settlement. Certainly
his plans did not help the situation. What is more evident
is that the Argentine Foreign Minister did not have the
confidence of the delegates. Gibson certainly distrusted
him. Detest might be the best word to describe Braden's
opinion. Nieto del Rio is reputed to have said, "'When the
Foreign Minister uses his voice, he loses the use of his

lu80

head. Significantly, however, the distaste for Saavedra

Lamas was not public knowledge.

Saavedra Lamas and the Leagpe

 

Besides the Peace Conference, in 1936 Saavedra Lamas
was also involved with the League of Nations and its princi—
pal issue, the Italian invasion of EthiOpia in October, 1935.
Immediately following the attack, Argentina voted in the
League for sanctions against Rome. Buenos Aires, however,
in approving sanctions stated that the embargo would only
be respected in areas non—prejudicial to her economic and

81 Although the reservation negates

commercial interests.
what slight effect Argentina's actions might have had, it
must be noted that at that time Argentina had a huge popue

lation of first and second generation Italians. According

801bid., 168.

81New York Times, October 13, 1935.

 

151

to Carcano, the Cabinet was aghast when it heard what
Saavedra Lamas had done. No one, however, was willing to.
challenge him out of fear he would belittle them.82
Four months later, after the Italians had conquered
Ethiopia, the League was left in a quandry over what action
should be taken. The major powers, fearful of driving
Italy into Germany's arms, wanted to avoid decisive action
and generally delay activity. Saavedra Lamas had other
ideas. He announced he was considering calling an early
meeting of the Assembly of the League to discuss the prob-
lem of sanctions and recognition of the new Italian—
Ethiopian state. Subsequently, he threatened that if his
call in the Council of the League for an Assembly session
was not granted, "Argentina would refuse to vote there
[the Council] and would make its reasons known." In sub—
sequent conversations, Saavedra Lamas' representative ob—
served that his boss was looking for "broad support" for
the non-recognition section of the Anti—War Pact.83
saavedra Lamas wanted a meeting on June 30, 1936, but
on June 19 it was learned by the United States that the
British were putting pressure on Saavedra Lamas to modify

84

his position. British influence, presumably of an

 

2Interview with Miguel Angel Carcano, Buenos Aires,
September 8, 1972.

83U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1936, III,

pp. 145-158. The quoted material is on pages 148 and 156.
84

 

Ibid., p. 160.

 

 

 

152

economic nature, bore fruit quickly. Argentina made it
known that although the doctrine of non-recognition was
absolute, it did not have to be applied to the Ethiopian

situation.85

The other Latin Americans were also irritated
with Argentina. As she retreated from her position, many
American states were left in a difficult situation. There
was serious talk of deserting the self—proclaimed leader
of their coalition.86

At the June meeting the Argentine delegate, José Maria
Cantilo, began by lauding the non-recognition doctrine as
enunciated in the August 3 Declaration. He went on to
say that the League should once again indicate its fealty
to the doctrine and noted that it was contained in the
Covenant. If the League of Nations, Cantilo continued,
did not re-affirm non-recognition, Argentina might be forced
to withdraw. Although the statement appeared to be strong,
in reality it was not since Ethiopia was never mentioned.
Consequently, the Assembly was able to assuage Argentina's
demand with a simple statement of reaffirmation.87

Even though the action the Assembly took fell consider—

ably short of an Argentine victory, Saavedra Lamas did not

 

851bid.. pp. 160-161.

86%.! Pp. 171-172, l75‘l76.

7League of Nations, The Menthly_5ummary g£_the League
g£_Nations, XVI (June, 1936), 154—155, 181.

 

153

forsake the League. In fact, he realized that after the
Ethiopian debacle, the League would welcome anyone who
demonstrated faith in the multi-national body. Consequently,
in September, 1936 Saavedra Lamas journeyed to Geneva with
the safe assurance he would be elected President of the
Assembly and be praised for his work. After all, as far as
the League was concerned he was now the leader of the Latin
American bloc. What he hoped for came true and while little
of substance was accomplished, Saavedra Lamas enjoyed

88 He also wanted to

exposure before a world-wide audience.
establish strong ties with the League delegates and demon-
strate that he appreciated the honor accorded him. To this
end he held the largest and most lavish party in League
history reportedly costing 100,000 Swiss Francs (30,000
dollars). Whether this monstorous demonstration of oSten—
tation increased his prestige or not is impossible to
determine, but for years it was the most talked about social
event.89

The motives underlying Saavedra Lamas' actions at the
League were summed up by the French Foreign Office, which

_.£.~

Bagpig. (September, 1936), 250—282. His speech is
summarized on page 252.

89The source for these assertions is Eduardo Témas
Pardo, interview conducted in Buenos Aires, August 25, 1972.
He‘was told this information by his father, who was a
representative in Geneva.

154

believed they were dictated by his "well-known desire to
play a great role in the international scene."90 There is
little doubt that the Franch were correct. There can also
be little doubt that as Foreign Minister of a secondline
power, Saavedra Lamas had made the most of his opportuni-

ties.91

 

90
p. 152.

91Following the stint at the League Saavedra Lamas
made a quick trip to London. He went to look into the
renegotiation of the Roca—Runciman treaty, which had been
signed three years earlier. The 1933 accord had grown out
of the Ottawa Conference in August, 1932, at which the
British had adopted a strong Dominion preference system.
Consequently, the quota for Argentine chilled beef would be
held at the level for the year ending June 30, 1932, one of
the lowest in history. Furthermore, imports of frozen beef
would be reduced in stages to 65% of what they had been in
the same base year.

As a result, Justo sent a delegation led by Vice—
President Julio A. Roca and including Miguel Angel Carcano
to London in an attempt to halt a drastic narrowing of
Argentina's most important market. The South American nego—
tiators, however, were in a poor bargaining position because
England could buy in many markets. In the final accord ‘
.London agreed not to reduce the quota for Argentina beef.
unless the quota was reduced for the Dominions. More disB
turbing for the Argentines was a provision which gave Buenos
Aires only fifteen percent of the meat—packing business at
a time when she coveted much more. See Peter H. Smith,
Politics and Beef in_Argentina (New York: Columbia Univer—
sity Press, 1969), pp. 143-147. The text of the agreement
is available in, Daniel Drosdoff, El gobierno deplas vacas;
1933-1956 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Astrea de Rodolfo
Depalma y HnOs., 1972), pp. 169—183.

While the negotiations were going on Saavedra Lamas and
the Ministro de Hacienda, Alberto Hueyo indicated that they
Opposed major concessions to the British. They could, how—
ever, exert little pressure against the Argentine Vice—
President. It is ironic therefore that in the Senate, de
la Torre attacked Saavedra Lamas for the treaty,’ For an

U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1936, III,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

155

During the three year period 1934-1936 Saavedra Lamas
slowly amassed prestige and influence. He received the
credit for bringing about a ceaseefire in the Chaco and
became head of the mediating body charged with bringing
about a definitive end to the.war. Since his methods and
motives were not public knowledge, he could readily adopt
the title of peace maker of the Chaco. His stand on the
Italo—Ethiopian dispute and his Presidency of the League
Assembly elevated Saavedra Lamas to the center Of the
world stage. That he accomplished nothing and indeed only
caused trouble regarding Italy and EthiOpia was irrelavant.
He was serving notice to the world as he had done earlier
in the Americas, that Saavedra Lamas was a man to be

reckoned with.

 

account of the debate see Republica Argentina, Cémara d§_
Diputados, Diario de sesiones, 1933, II, pp. 335—380, and
Lisandor de la Torre, Escritos y Discursos (Buenos Aires:
Colegio libre de estudios superiores, 1947), pp. 13—62.

One of the provisions of the original treaty called
for an investigation of the British controlled meat—packing
business. The British did not cooperate which prompted
numerous representations from Saavedra Lamas. During his
1936 trip the Argentine Foreign Minister was able to obtain
Amore control over beef marketing. See Drosdoff, Gobierno,

pp. 55-77, passim.

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

CHAPTER 6

THE PERILS OF SUCCESS

In December 1936, Saavedra Lamas reached the apogee
of his fame and influence. Not only was he involved with
the Chaco PeaCe Conference but he was also to preside at
the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace.
Moreover, in November, 1936, he was awarded the Nobel Peace
Price. December, 1936, marked, however, the beginning of
Saavedra Lamas' decline in prestige and power. Although he
attempted to reverse this situation throughout 1937 and
part of 1938 he was unable to do so.and consequently was

retired at the end of the Justo administration.

The Nobel Prize

It is difficult to know whether Saavedra Lamas had
the Nobel Peace Prize in mind when the Anti—War Pact was
drawn up in 1932. He certainly knew that Frank B. Kellogg
had received the prize in 1929 for a similar effort.
Saavedra Lamas, however, did not begin a concerted drive to
garner the award until early 1936, following the settlement
of the prisoner repatriation issue. At that time, he asked

Braden to request of Roosevelt and Hull their support in

156

 

 

157

He stated that he already had

securing the Nobel Prize.
the backing of the Balkan countries, and United States
support was all that was needed to insure him receipt of
the award. Braden gave an evasive reply and assumed that
Washington would demur. Much to his surprise, Washington
agreed to back the Argentine Foreign Minister. In his
memoirs, Hull stated that he "virtually managed the move—
ment in his [Saavedra Lamas'] behalf because of his

outstanding services for the cause of peace." Actually
Hull probably should have said that up to that time his
Argentine counterpart had not done anything publicly to

seriously disrupt the Good Neighbor Policy.
The efforts of Hull paid off, and on November 24,

it was announced that Saavedra Lamas would soon be—

1936,
come the first South American recipient of the coveted

The decision of the Nobel Prize Committee met

Peace Prize.
Both the major

with general approbation in Buenos Aires.

newspapers of the Argentine capital devoted considerable

 

Spruille Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues (New Rochelle,
Braden said

New York: Arlington House, 1971), pp. 153—154.
that while Saavedra Lamas was making his request he put on
"all his charm."
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs 2: Cordell Hull (New Rochelle,
New York: Macmillan—C51, 1948), 2 volumes, Vol. I, p. 497.
See also United States Archives, Record Group 59, Decimal
File 093.57N66/277, Hull to Braden (Buenos AireS), January 30,
1936 and ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 093.57N66/280, Braden

(Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, January 31, 1936.

 

 

 

158

space to the event. Secretary of State Hull's comment

that the award was merited was reported, along with state-
ments that the news was well received in Rio de Janeiro

and Geneva.3 On the 25th of November, La Nacion published
an editorial that was so laudatory to the Argentine Foreign
Minister it can reasonably be said he could not have written
a better one himself.4 In it he was given credit for intro—

ducing a major new international instrument, the Anti—war

Pact, bringing the fighting to a close in the Chaco, and
blunting the interventionist predelections of the United
States.

Saavedra Lamas was, of course, delighted to receive
the Prize and the $32,000 that went along with it. The
money, however, probably was not as important to him as the
prestige. In his statement to the-press, the Argentine
Chancellor explained that although he would not be able to
go to Europe to accept the distinction due to the demands
of his office, he was deeply honored. He contended that
although the award bore his name, it Should actually have
been given to the Argentine people. Saavedra Lamas, in

response to a question, added that he had not let any of

 

3See La_Naci6n and L3_Prensa for November 25, 1936.

4L2'Naci6n, November 28, 1936.

 

 

 

l59
his friends campaign on his behalf for the Nobel Prize.5
As usual he deemed it impolitic to tell the truth.

As is common following such events, a reception was
held to honor the Argentine Foreign Minister, on November
27. The best of Argentine society, and government, plus
the diplomatic corps was invited and everyone came with one
exception; noticeably absent was President Justo.6 Both
Carcano and Braden stated that Justo was incensed that
Saavedra Lamas had not mentioned him in connection with the
Anti-War Pact or Chaco Peace Conference. Carcano also
‘ indicated that the Argentine President was enraged that his
Foreign Minister was constantly upstaging him.7

That Saavedra Lamas committed a grave error when he
snubbed Justo is unquestionable. It is posSible that the
Foreign Minister had no respect for him. Braden related
that Saavedra Lamas referred to Justo as the “little fatty."8
It is more plausible to assume, however, that the Argentine
Chancellor simply wanted the available kudos for himself.
Alas, Saavedra Lamas would discover much to his displeasure

that his lack of charity engendered revenge. “Little fatty,“

 

5New York Times, November 29, 1936.

 

6L3_Nacion, November 28, 1936.

7Interview with Miguel Angel Carcano, Buenos Aires,
October 13, 1972; Braden, Diplomats, p. 154.

 

8Braden, Diplomats, p. 152.

 

160

it developed, was both willing and able to take action
against his Foreign Minister.

Inter-American Conference for the
Maintenance g£_Peace

Early in 1935 discussions began within the United
States Department of State relative to the possibility of
convoking a special inter-American meeting following the
end of the Chaco War. The purpose would be to provide
machinery within the Western Hemisphere in order to prevent
wars among the American nations and take joint action should
war threaten or begin elsewhere. Washington planners were
convinced that a bulwark of continental solidarity was
needed in the face of world wide unrest. In Europe, the
Italians were contemplating an invasion of Ethiopia, and
the situation in Germany was precarious. Moreover, in the
Pacific, Japan's aggressive actions foretold future problems.
Internal American disputes would serve to weaken the Hemis—
phere and provide the gaps threugh which elements unfriendly
to the United States could move.

The first diplomatic overtures concerning the proposed
conference were made only six weeks after the signing of
the June 12, 1935 Protocol, which ended the fighting but
not the war. Almost immediately problems developed with
the Peruvians. Lima was slated as the site for the as yet

unscheduled Eighth Pan American meeting. Although Peru

 

 

 

161

did not object to the United States‘ suggestions to alter
the usual format, her Foreign Minister, Carlos Concha, was
deeply concerned about the possibility he would have to
play "second fiddle" to Saavedra Lamas. He also added
parenthetically that his counterpart in Argehtina would
consider the United States' plan as an indication that the
North Americans believed the Chaco Peace Conference would
fail.9 The United States Ambassador in Peru, Fred Morris
Dearing, in his analysis of the Peruvian reSponse, believed
that fear of Saavedra Lamas was the prime motive, and that
the other reason given was merely a smoke screen.10
Dearing was probably correct about Concha's real pur—
pose, but it is interesting that Saavedra Lamas took a
position akin to the Peruvian Foreign Minister's second
point. The Argentine Chancellor observed that planning a
general conference on peace would be a mistake at that time.

Any such event would have to wait until the end of the Chaco

negotiations.ll Saavedra Lamas also stated that if the

 

9United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations
2: the United States (Washington D.C.: United States Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1953), 1935, Volume IV, p. 3. Concha
mentioned that Saavedra Lamas was after the Nobel Peace

Prize.

 

10U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 7lO.Peace/7,
Dearing (Lima) to Dept. of State,.August l3, 1935.

llIbid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/31, Gibson
(Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 3, 1935.

 

162

United States did not ratify the newly negotiated Sanitary
Treaty, which lowered the requirements for many Argentine
products including beef, the Argentine view of Pan Ameri-
canism would change.12 That is, she would stop any confer—
ence. Apparently, the complications with Peru and Argentina
were too much for the United States. The State Department
announced it was going to "re-examine" the situation.13
The Mexican Undersecretary of Foreign Relations, upon

hearing of the North American decision, commented sardon-

ically that "Saavedra Lamas would never become enthusiastic

. 14
over someone else's idea."

Saavedra Lamas, however, changed his mind in October,
1935, when he thought the Chaco Peace Conference was col-
lapsing. As reported in Chapter 5, he wanted to shift the
blame to the other American nations. The United States
did not agree and the whole matter was quickly dropped.15

It was a scant ten days after the January 20, 1936

Protocol was signed that President Roosevelt addressed a

 

12Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 7lO.Peace/ll, Braden
(Buenos Aires) to welles, February 6, 1936.

13U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV,
pp. 4—5.

14Ibid., p. 6.

15See U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/511,
Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 12, 1935.

 

163

letter to Justo regarding the proposed Conference. In his
message, the North American president proposed the same
thing he had earlier, with one major change. Significantly,
he asked that Buenos Aires be the site for the conclave if
Justo was agreeable. He also alluded to a problem which
was to surface later, the relationship of the Conference to
the work of the League of Nations. Roosevelt contended
that the proposed Buenos Aires meeting would "supplement.
and reinforce" League efforts.16
The initial reaction to Roosevelt's letter on February
6, l936, by Saavedra Lamas was very positive. He indicated
that the time was "propitious" for a general conference on
peace. Furthermore, he agreed that there was a need to
establish a system of neutral mediation. The critical ques—
tion of whether or not Buenos Aires was acceptable as the
location was never brought up. Saavedra Lamas simply acted
as if there could be no question. When Braden broached
the subject of Saavedra Lamas' negative response seven
months earlier, the Argentine Chancellor noted that his
answer was dictated by fear that Paraguay would desert the

Chaco Conference if there was another alternative. On the

 

16United States, Department of State, Report of £22
Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-
American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace (Washington
D. C. United States Government Printing Office, 1937), pp.
45- 46.

 

 

 

164

matter of the Sanitary Treaty, Saavedra Lamas observed that
this had been simply a tactic to assure postponement of the
Maintenance of Peace Conference.17
A week later, on February 13, Saavedra Lamas indi-
cated he was having second thoughts about the Conference.
In an informal meeting of the Chaco Peace Conference dele-
gates, he declared that a discussion of economic questions

would be more useful than a peace meeting. He went on to

say that he was worried about Argentine beef sales to Europe

 

and suggested that with the economic upturn in the United
States, the North Americans could now take three percent of
Argentina's meat production. Actually, the United States
was talking in terms of two percent at that time. Saavedra
Lamas also contradicted his earlier statement, observing
that a conference on peace would be useless because there
were already adequate treaties. He opined that what was
needed was ratification of those instruments. Unmentioned
was the fact that Artentina had the worst record in that
regard, save Bolivia.18

One of the few positive purposes that the Conference

could serve, as the Argentine Chancellor perceived it, was

17United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations
g: the United States (washington D.C.: United States Govern—
ment Printing Office, 1954), 1936, Volume V, pp. 5-6.

18U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 7lO.Peace/l47,
Dawson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, February 14, 1936.

 

 

165

to supply a place to "unload" the Chaco dispute. In that
regard, however, he quickly asserted that such a move
would be "dishonorable." It could also, he added, provide
a general embargo system, including not only arms and
munitions, but petroleum products, should war develop.
Foodstuffs, however, should not be declared contraband for
"humanitarian" purposes. Again, he failed, as he had
previously, to note that since food was Argentina's prime
export, his proposal was in his country's self—interest.
Finally, he indicated that it would be desirableto examine
the letter Roosevelt sent to Justo. Allen Dawson, a United
States Conference delegate, in analyzing this point, ob-
served that Saavedra Lamas, had not seen the letter and
had only Espil's assurances that the meeting would be held
in Buenos Aires, and that current press stories were sug-
gesting the location would be Washington D.C. This, he
believed, caused Saavedra Lamas to shift his position.19
Although the official response of the majority of
American states was favorable, Bolivia did make known her
fear that the Chaco dispute would be brought under the
auspices of the Maintenance of Peace Conference. Such a
move, she reasoned, would cause delay and thereby improve
Paraguay's position. The delegates to the Chaco Peace

Conference were also concerned about the proposedr

 

19Ibid.

 

166

inter—American gathering. Both Nieto del Rio (Chile) and
Rodriguez Alves (Brazil) were opposed to locating the
meeting in Buenos Aires because Saavedra Lamas would be
the chairman. The United States delegate, Braden, informed
Washington that he was also against the idea for the same
reason. He added that since Podesta Costa had been sent to
the League as the Argentine representative, there would be
no one who could handle the details of the Conference.20
washington also heard discouraging words from Mexico
City and Lima. Concha indicated he considered Washington
D.C. to be the best location and was against Buenos Aires
as the site.21 The Mexican Undersecretary stated that
"propinquity'1might afford Saavedra Lamas influence unde—

22 These internal and unofficial comments,

sired by Mexico."
however, were not public knowledge. Consequently, when

General Justo sent a formal acceptance to the United States,

 

205259,. RG 59, Decimal File 710.Peace/76, Braden
(Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, February 16, l936.

21Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 710.Peace/73, Dearing
(Lima) to Dept. of State, February 15, 1936. In the docu—
ment Nieto del Rio was incorrectly referred to as "Vieto."

22Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 710.Peace/83, Norweb
(Mexico City) to Dept. of State, February 17, 1936. In a
subsequent telegram, RG 59, Decimal File 710.Peace/ll8,
Norweb (Mexico City) to Dept. of State, February 17, 1936,
the Mexican Undersecretary indicated that the "Anti—War
Pact [was] a piece of Showmanship and ... Mexico was in no
hurry to ratify it."

 

167

it appeared as if everything was going well and that only
the exact agenda and date were undecided.

On the latter issue, Saavedra Lamas in mid-March,
1936, suggested that the conference be held in June because
he was planning to attend the Assembly of the League of
Nations in July. Washington, however, did not like the
idea of holding the Conference that soon because much of
the preliminary work was still unfinished. Saavedra Lamas
did not accept the first refusal and subsequently informed
the United States that President Justo had accepted a July
15 date. Apparently, he was willing to shift the time and
delay his departure, but he definitely wanted an early
meeting. Saavedra Lamas' attempt to make the date he wanted
unassailable by attaching Justo's name to it failed as the
North Americans continued to demand a later date.23 The
Conference was finally fixed for December l, 1936.

Besides his trip to the League, Saavedra Lamas' insist-
ence upon an early meeting was probably motivated by the
fact that he had already drawn up a full set of proposals.

A quick meeting could have conceivably resulted in his pro-
gram forming the-basic blueprint for the Conference. On

March 31, the Argentine Foreign Minister supplied Braden

 

23For the correspondence see U. S. Dept. of State,
Foreign Relations, 1936, V, pp. 10-12. Another reason the
North Americans opposed the early date was due to the fact
it conflicted with the Democratic Party Convention, which
Hull was to attend.

 

 

 

 

168

with copies of his prOposal and in May published it in
English in Washington D.C. In his Draft 9£_§ Convention

for the Maintenance of Peace, Saavedra Lamas predictably

 

raised the August 3 Declaration, non—recognition of terri-
tory acquired by other than peaceful means, to a prominent
position. He also proposed that an embargo be used as a
sanction should conciliation fail under neutral auspices.
As he had hinted earlier, fuel was to be embargoed, but
foodstuffs could still be exported. The Argentine Chan-
cellor also took a slap at the United States by adding a
provision against intervention. He even went so far as to
include “excessive diplomatic protection" of nationals
living in another country.

A stipulation Saavedra Lamas must have realized was
anathema to the United States required signatories of
either the Kellogg-Briand and/or the Saavedra Lamas Anti-
War Pact to cooperate in sanctions imposed by the League
of Nations. In other words, the United States would enjoy
none of the benefits and all of the responsibilities of
League membership. In a similar vein, Saavedra Lamas also
desired to open up a number of solely American treaties to
world wide adherrence. Finally, in the economic section of
his proposed convention, he included an article requiring

a gradual reduction in tariffs and documentary proof of

 

 

 

169

contamination before sanitary provisions could be applied.
If what Saavedra Lamas proposed was antithetical to the
United States, so was what he failed to say. Conspicuously
absent were "any provisions to protect the common interest
of the Americs against overseas emergencies."25 »

The initial response in Argentina to Saavedra Lamas'
project was favorable. La Prensa, in a May 30 editorial,
after landing the work of the Foreign Minister, attacked the
United States. Economics, the paper asserted, brought
countries together and therefore the United States should
modify her policies. Furthermore, La_Prensa Continued, the
North Americans should do more to prevent wars, such as
working with the League of Nations, rather than trying to
seal off the New World from the Old.26

Following the presentation of the Argentine program,
a problem developed which demonstrated the polarization
taking place. While at the League of Nations in August,

Saavedra Lamas learned that the Geneva based organization

was very concerned that it would be shunted aside at Buenos

 

24Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Draft of a Convention for the

Maintenance g£_Peace (Washington D.CT7'No publisher listed,
May, 1936).

25J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American
Security, 1889-1960 (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1961), p. 128.

2GLEPrensa, May 30, 1936.

 

 

 

170

Aires. To calm the concern, Saavedra Lamas implied that

an observer from the League would be welcome. Subsequently,
the United States was forced to inform the League of North
American opposition to a representative attending.27

In much the same regard, the Argentine Chancellor

moved quickly to squelch a Colombian proposal for an Ameri-
can League of Nations. When the subject was brought before
the agenda Committee in Washington, the Argentine repre-
sentative, Espil, announced that in any such organization,
the small Central American states should not have equal
voting status with Argentina. This comment not only irri-
tated the Central American nations, but it also made them

28 It is probable that

leary of the whole Colombian idea.
Espil was ordered to do what he did, since he was too
skilled a diplomat to make such a gaffe with no purpose in
mind. Saavedra Lamas had sullied the entire project by
putting the fear of diminished status into the minds of the
smaller states. By the same action, he also demonstrated
his friendship for the Geneva based League. Finally, he

won praise at home for his opposition.29

 

2 . .
7See U. S. Dept. of State,.Forelgn Relations, 1936,

V. pp. l8-20, 25—26, and 31—32.
28U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.Peace/60l
Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, May 27, 1936.

2 I .
.?See editorials, Ea Prensa, June 7, 1936 and
§§_Nac16n, Julh 7, 1936.

 

171

The Inter-American Peace Conference actually began on

November 30, 1936, the date Roosevelt arrived in Buenos

Aires. He had decided in late August that his presence

would be helpful in achieving acceptance of the United

States programs Along with a huge crowd, Saavedra Lamas

was at the pier to greet the President. Time magazine

stated that the Argentine Foreign Minister "franticly waved

his hat" and commented sarcastically that this was a

"triumph of U. S. diplomacy." The newsweekly went on to

indicate that the reason he was so excited was he had re—

ceived the Nobel Peace Prize the day before and could not

wait to be congratulated.30

The next day the Conference began its work, with

speeches by Justo and Roosevelt which revealed a clear

dichotomy of purpose. The Argentine President, after noting

the debt the New WCrld owed to the Old stated:

It is impossible to suppose that the work today begin—
ning would fail to recognize the world interdependence
which governs the economic and political life of these
nations or to think that the action to be taken could
alter a e—old connections with countries of the Old

world.3

Roosevelt responded with

In this determination to live at peace among ourselves
we in the Americas make it at the same time clear that
we stand shoulder to shoulder in our final determina-
tion that others driven by war madness or land hunger,

 

30 "Pan American Party," XXVIII (December 7, 1936),

12—14.
31
U. 8. Dept. of State, Report g£_the Delegates, pp.

73-76.

Time,

 

 

 

 

172

might seek to commit acts of aggression against us,
will find a hemiSphere wholly prepared to consult
together for our national safety and our national
I repeat what I said in speaking before the

'Each one

good.

Congress and the Supreme Court of Brazil.

of us has learned the glories of independence. Let 32
each one of us learn the glories of interdependence.’

It became clear very quickly that while the Argentines

might applaud Roosevelt's words, they had no intention
of adopting the program of the United States. Hull be—

lieved there were enough peace instruments available in the

Americas, and that the major problem was coordinating their

use. ‘As such, he proposed the creation of a permanent
consulting body of Foreign Ministers. If a war was

threatened or broke out, the body could quickly meet to plan

The second proposal of Hull was an

a joint reSponse.
to extend the 1935 United States neu-

attempt, in essence,

trality legislation requiring an embargo on both combatants

to a diSpute by all the countries in the western Hemisphere.
Saavedra Lamas' proposal allowed for the lifting of an

embargo after the aggressor Was determined.
Conflict between Saavedra Lamas and Hull began very

quickly. Hull described the situation in his memoirs:
I had several conferences alOne with Saavedra Lamas
and several in company with welles and one or two
other members of the delegation. These discussions
became increasingly animated. Our last conference
was heated, some sharp words were exchanged at least
on my side, and we parted with no signs of complete

 

32Ibid., pp. 77-8l.

 

173

agreement. I saw no more of Saavedra Lamas before
leaving Buenos Aires. He did not extend the usual
courtesy of seeing me off.33
Actually, Hull had been informed earlier by Braden that
Saavedra Lamas would not see him to the ship. Hull com—
mented, according to Braden, "that he was damn glad and
that he would refuse to shake hands with Saavedra [Lamas]
if he did show up." Hull added, as Braden related in his
memoirs, "we should let President Justo know ... that as
long as Saavedra Lamas was his Foreign Minister, it would
be impossible for us to get along with the blankety blank
(here he used his best cuss words)."'34
In fact, Hull did make his views on Saavedra Lamas
well known. In a conversation with Miguel Angel Cércano,

who had become Minister of Agriculture in 1935, he attacked

the Argentine Foreign Minister viciously, calling him

"disloyal" because Hull, had helped him obtain the Nobel
Prize. He became so agitated, in fact, that Carcano even-
tually had to ask the United States Secretary of State to

stop because Saavedra Lamas was a fellow cabinet minister.35

 

 

33Hull, Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 499.

34Braden, Diplomats, p. 175. The treaties referred to
would include the General Treaty of Inter—American Arbitra-
tion as well as many of the protocols adopted by Inter-
American Conferences. The parentheses are Braden's.

 

5Interview with Miguel Angel Carcano, Buenos Aires,
August 31, 1972.

 

174

Even though he cut Hull short, Carcano stated that he was
in sympathy with what was being said. Hull also went fur—
ther than venting his frustration to the Agriculture
.Minister. Apparently, he ordered welles, through Braden,
to arrange a meeting between LeOpoldo Melo, the Argentine
Minister of Interior and head of the Cabinet, and Welles.
The North American Undersecretary apparently had little
good to say about Saavedra Lamas because, according to
Braden, Melo "went to President Justo and demanded that
Saavedra [Lamas] be restrained.“ Braden stated that the
Argentine Chancellor "improved for a few days."36
As can be adduced from the quantity and quality of the
discord produced, the Conference achieved little of sub—
stance. .The Convention to Coordinate, Extend and Assure
Fulfillment of the Existing Treaties Between the American
States, which represented Hull's attempt to set up a per—
manent organization of Foreign Ministers to determine action
should trouble arise, was watered down to such an extent
that it became meaningless. Article II, for example,
stated that in case of emergency, the American Republics
would "take counsel together with full recognition of their
judicial equality, as sovereign and independent states, and

of their general right of individual liberty of action."37

 

36Braden, Diplomats, p. 175.
37

 

U. S. Dept. of State, Report of the Delegation, p.

 

136.

 

 

175

It was hardly a warrant for close c00peration, and in fact,
according to Harold F. Peterson, "mandated no action,
created no permanent organ, and referred to a common neu-
trality policy only as a desirable objective."38'
In another treaty, called the Convention for the
Maintenance, Preservation and Re-establishment of Peace
and Declaration of Principals of Inter—American Solidarity
and Cooperation, Saavedra Lamas effectively took the teeth
out of Hull's desire for consultative machinery. A portion
of the accord stipulated that "in the event of an inter—
national war outside America which.might menace the peace
of the American Republics, such consultation shall ... take ,
place to determine the prOper time and manner in which the
signatory states, if they so desire, may eventually cooper—

39 The key phrase, "if they so desired,"

ate in some action."
was demanded by the Argentine Foreign Minister. Moreover,
Saavedra Lamas insisted successfully that a statement of

non-intervention also be accepted at the Conference.40

Although Hull had appended a reservation to the protocol

 

38This statement was made by Harold F. Peterson,
Argentina and the United States, l8lO—l960 (New York:
State University of New York, 1964), p. 392.

39

 

U. S. Dept. of State, Report of the Delegation, p.

 

120.

40Ibid., pp. 127-l28.

 

176

adopted at Montevideo, there can be little doubt that the
North American Secretary found the whole affair insulting.

In his memoirs, Hull commented that because both his
and Saavedra Lamas' goals were so well known, he could not
employ the same tactics that had worked in Montevideo,
allowing the Argentine Chancellor to introduce the United
States proposals and generally giving him the credit.41
In actuality, the Montevideo ploy would not have worked out
in any case, because the situation was different. In 1933
Saavedra Lamas was not well known. He had to his credit
only the Anti—War Pact and even that would account for
little if the United States did not sign it. Consequently,
when Saavedra Lamas cooperated, he was establishing a name
for himself. In 1936 this was not necessary. He had been
President of the Assembly of the League of Nations and won
the Nobel Peace Prize. Cooperation was not required.

In defense of Saavedra Lamas it must be noted that Hull
was trying to establish a mild form of hemispheric isola—
tionism. The refusal of Saavedra Lamas to agree was con—
sistent with Argentina's past pOIicies as well as with those
fostered by the Foreign Minister. The problem was that in
stopping Hull, Saavedra Lamas would not compromise at all

and even demanded provisions anathema to the United States.

 

410. 3. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/713,

Braden (Buenos Aires) to Welles (Buenos Aires), December 4,
1936.

 

177

This incensed Hull but what especially infuriated the North
American Secretary of State was the failure of Saavedra
Lamas to keep the unwritten and probably undiscussed agree-
ment. In exchange for the Nobel Prize, Saavedra Lamas was
expected to cooperate with the United States. That
Saavedra Lamas did not understand the arrangement is un—
likely. What is probable is that he decided to ignore it
after he had received the award. Apparently Saavedra Lamas
did not consider that his double—cross would result in a
representation to Justo and the possible ruination of his

career.

The Chaco Dispute, December, 1936

 

 

As in the 1933 Montevideo Conference, the Chaco dispute
was not on the agenda of the Maintenance of Peace Conference,
but much to the chagrin of Saavedra Lamas, it received a
great deal of attention. It became apparent very early that
the Argentine Chancellor had absolutely no intention of call—
ing a meeting of the Chaco Conference while the larger
conference was in Buenos Aires. In order to retain what
little momentum the Chaco Conference had, Braden suggested
to Saavedra Lamas that meetings continue, with the Vice—
President in charge. The Argentine Chancellor replied:

"Oh, no. I have ample time whenever you want." Braden, in

his report, commented that despite what Saavedra Lamas had

 

178
said, he believed there would still be delay.42
Braden was incorrect. Saavedra Lamas did call meet—
ings, but it was clearly his intention that nothing sub-
stantial would be discussed. He was, however, annoyed
that the Brazilian and Chilean Foreign Ministers, Macedo
Soares and Cruchaga, insisted on attending the sessions.
In fact, nasty remarks were exchanged between the South
American Chancellors. Indeed, at one point, the Bolivian

Foreign Minister commented to the Bolivian delegate that

 

"we should offer our mediating services to the mediatory
Foreign Ministers."43
At a December 9 meeting, which had been called to draw
up a statement describing the accomplishments of the Con-
ference, Saavedra Lamas was outmanuevered by his Brazilian
and Chilean counterparts. Saavedra Lamas continually
attempted to cut the session short by announcing over and
over again that he had to attend a reception at the United
States Embassy. Each time he brought the subject up,
Macedo Soares was able to keep the meeting going by refer-
ence to its high purpose. Finally, apparently without
thinking, the Argentine Chancellor proposed that a committee

of representatives from three nations carry on the negotia-

tions during the Maintenance of Peace Conference. According

 

42Hull, Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 499.

43Braden, Diplomats, p. 176.

 

179

to Braden, he wanted to leave the Chaco dispute in the
hands of Barreda Laos (Peru), Martinez Thédy (Uruguay), and
an Argentine representative. From the past records of
these two men, he knew that no progress would be made.
There can be no doubt that he did not expect Macedo Soares
suddenly to volunteer to be on the committee. He must have
’been even more irritated when Cruchaga followed suit.
Since Saavedra Lamas had suggested the plan in the first
place, to facilitate his work as President of the Main-
tenance of Peace Conference, he could not volunteer himself.
Consequently, Braden was chosen as the third member,
representing Hull. In essence, within the space of a few
minutes, Saavedra Lamas not only lost direct control of
the Chaco negotiations, but without even a representative,
he lost indirect control.44 1

Braden, with some justification, was frightened about
what Saavedra Lamas would do. In fact, immediately after
the usurpation by Macedo Soares he told the Argentine Chan-
cellor he would keep him informed of all developments.
The North American delegate, however, indicated that Saavedra
Lamas' suSpicions were not allayed. At the afternoon meet—
ing the next day, the Argentine Chancellor appeared,

although he had no formal standing. The session was going

 

44See ibid., pp. 176—177 and U. 5. Archives, as 5%;
Decimal File 724.34119/715 Barden (Buenos Aires)’toWWélles
(Buenos Aires), December 10, I936.

 

 

 

180

well (even though Saavedra Lamas was there) when a fifteen
minute recess was agreed upon. Suddenly, as Braden re—
lated it, he noticed that Saavedra Lamas and the Foreign
Ministers of Paraguay and Bolivia, Stefanich and Finot,

were missing. He ran outside, only to see the three men

get into a car. Braden called on them to wait but "Saavedra
Lamas waved me aside, jumped into the car, slammed the door
and off they rode." Macedo Soares was outraged. It must
have been particularly galling that Saavedra Lamas used the

45 What the Argentine

Brazilian's car in the abduction.
Chancellor said or did to entice the ex—belligerents away
unfortunately is not recorded.

The next day, December 12, the Chaco Conference met
again, and nothing unusual occurred. Before the session
began, however, Saavedra Lamas made another bid to grab
back control of the situation, albeit in a considerably
less dramatic fashion. He suggested that the members of the
Committee of Three, as the new mediators became known, meet
with him the next day together with the Paraguayan delega-

tion, to discuss a proposed boundary line. The Committee

subsequently agreed with the proviso that the Paraguayans

 

45Ibid., and U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.
34119/715, Braden (Buenos Aires) to wells (Buenos Aires),
December 10, 1936. Braden, in his memoirs, was wrong when
he included Stefanich among the abductees. Stefanich was
not then in Buenos Aires.

 

 

 

 

\

 

 

181

46 lest it appear to be a conspiracy

would not attend,
against Bolivia. Saavedra Lamas accepted but Braden warned
his fellow committee members that they should not come,
because the Paraguayans would be there. The North American
was only partially correct. The Paraguayans arrived an
hour after the scheduled start of the meeting.47

At that meeting, the Argentine Foreign Minister sug-
gested to the Paraguayans that they increase their terri—
torial demands. They found this suggestion eminently
reasonable, along with Saavedra Lamas' statement that
Paraguay should not give up the land for which she had shed
her blood. In essence, he was proposing that Asuncién keep
all the captured land and negotiate the area still under .
Bolivian control. Braden's mention of the August 3rd
Declaration was ignored. The Argentine Chancellor was mak—
ing it clear to Asuncién that more could be expected if
Argentina were mediating.48

Prior to this gambit, Macedo Soares had been so angry,
that along with*Cruchaga he went to see JuSto to demand that
their Argentine counterpart be restrained. Saavedra Lamas

told Braden that as a result of this discussion, Justo had

 

46U. s. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724(34ll9/720,
Braden (Buenos Aires) to Welles (Buenos Aires), December 18,
1935. The memo was written December 12.

47Ibid., Memo of December 14, 1936.

48Ibid.

 

 

 

182

l

a

J

I

said to him "What is the matter? You are my Foreign Minv f
ister and should be handling the Chaco business; neverthe— 3
less, the Brazilian and Chilean Foreign Ministers came to 1
I

see me." Saavedra Lamas said in reply, that he would :
collaborate with the Committee of Three. By his account,
it would appear that the two Foreign Ministers wanted his

help. That this was not what was requested is borne out

by Braden's statement that the Brazilian was "indiscreet

 

in his bitterness.“ Apparently, he had made his views
known to others besides Justo.49

Macedo Soares was not satisfied with complaining to
Justo once. He demanded and received another appointment
on December 16. Again, according to reports Braden heard,
the Brazilian denounced Saavedra Lamas for trying to dis—
rupt the work of the Committee of Three. Subsequently,
Saavedra Lamas himself was brought in and Macedo Soares
repeated his accusations to the Argentine's face. For his
part, the Argentine Chancellor disclaimed blame for the

entire affair. In order to make his point even clearer, at

a reception the BraZilian praised Justo, but never mentioned

the Argentine Foreign Minister.50

49Ibid.

50;§i§,, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/721, Braden
(Buenos Aires) to Welles (Buenos Aires) December 24,
1936.

183

It is evident that in December, 1936, Saavedra Lamas
wanted to devote all his energies to the Maintenance of
Peace Conference and avoid any involvement withwthe Chaco
dispute. Even when the Foreign Ministers of Chile and
Brazil began attending Chaco Conference sessions, he could
probably have contained the matter, but his unthinking sug-
gestion for a committee of three changed the desired
scenario. After that Saavedra Lamas went to extreme lengths
to shatter any advances his counterparts might have made.

The result was no progress. Of moresignificance for
Saavedra Lamas, the remark caused two protests against him
to be made to Justo.

There can be no question that during 1936 Saavedra
Lamas reached the height of his career. He headed the medi-
ating group which brought the Chaco War officially to an
end. He became involved with the Italo-Ethiopian dispute
and achieved notoriety by supporting the underdog. Most
importantly, he won the Nobel Peace Prize and presided over
a major inter—American Conference. Such accolades and dis—
tinctions should have placed Saavedra Lamas in line for even
higher office, or at leaSt assured continuing service in

his current one.

Unfortunately for Saavedra Lamas, his actions in ob-

taining his fame, plus probably a certain jealousy, caused”

his standing in the Justo administration to plummet.

 

x—i _r_.r

 

184

Braden claimed that the Argentine Chancellor's failure to
give Justo some credit for the Nobel Prize lost Saavedra

51 It is reason-

Lamas the presidential nomination in 1937.
able to assume the complaints by the Brazilians, Chileans
and the United States sealed his fate. Aside from England,
these nations were the ones Argentina was most involved
with, and representations made by their Foreign Ministers
directly to the President could not be ignored.

Whether the debacle over the Nobel Prize, or the protes—
tations of the Foreign Ministers, or both, effectively ended
Saavedra Lamas' public career is impossible to determine.

But higher political office was closed to him. According to
a report by Weddell, as late as September, 1936 Justo was
considering a compromise ticket composed of ex-president and
Anti—personalista leader Marcelo T. de Alvear and either
Saavedra Lamas or Roberto M. Ortiz for Vice President. The
report went on to state, however, that within Justo's own
'party, the Concordancia, only the last two were being con—
sidered, and they for President.52 A scant seven months
later, in April, 1937, Ortiz was the front runner and the

Argentine Foreign Minister was not evenmentioned.53

 

51Braden, Diplomats, p. 154.

 

52U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 835.00/765
(Strictly Confidential), Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of
State, September ll, l936.

53lbid., RG 59, Decimal File 835.00/776 Wilson (Buenos
Aires) to Dept. of State. Wilson was Chargé d'Affaires.
The idea of a compromise candidate apparently was dropped.

185

January, 1937-February, 1938

 

Saavedra Lamas' loss of power and prestige became
known very quickly to the delegates at the Chaco Conference.
The necessity of deferring to the Argentine Chancellor was
suddenly no longer absolute. Spurring the delegates on
was the spectacle of their own foreign ministers coming to
blows with their Argentine counterpart. Consequently, when
Saavedra Lamas continued to follow a policy of delay on
the all important issue of the final territorial settlement,
he found the delegates to be considerably more courageous
than ever before.

The territorial question was intimately involved with
the oil fields in the western Chaco. As the Paraguayans
drove across the Chaco, ostensibly defending their own land,
they were not ignorant of the fact that they were approach-
ing the Bolivian oil fields near Camiri. In fact, their
drive was halted a scant thirty miles from Camiri at the
outskirts of Boyuibé. The Paraguayans immediately began
drilling for oil but the bonanza of black gold never
materialized. Meanwhile, Saavedra Lamas began intensive
efforts to insure that Bolivian oil would go to Argentina.
As early as November, 1935, a report was forwarded by the
Estado Mayor General de Marina to Saavedra Lamas pointing

out the need for Bolivian oil.54

 

54 . . .
Argentina, Archives, Box 5, Expediente II, "Memoran-
dum sobre informaciones y consideraciones relacionadas con

186

In September, 1936, the Argentine Chancellor sent
Horacio Carillo to Bolivia to discuss the possibility of
building a railroad from Yacuiba, Argentina, to Santa Cruz,
Bolivia, through the oil fields. What Carillo said is not
known, but on December 21, 1936, a national company to
exploit the petroleum was inaugurated in La Paz. Shortly
thereafter, on March 13, 1937, Bolivia exprOpriated
Standard Oil's holdings and in April an announcement was
made that a Yacuiba-Santa Cruz railroad was being considered.
That Argentina was a factor in this expropriation can be
seen in a conversation between Finot and the United States
Ambassador in La Paz, R. Henry Norweb on May 8, 1937. At
that time, Finot stated that neither Brazil, Chile nor the
United States was willing to challenge Argentina. Since 1
Argentina was decidedly pro—Paraguayan, the only way to
placate Buenos Aires according to La Paz, was to make her
oil available.55

Bolivia's plan did not work as well as Finot probably
hoped it would. Before Saavedra Lamas would agree to allow
a territorial settlement, a treaty had to be negotiated
with Bolivia. This was not, however, the only, or in fact,.

the crucial reason for delay on the part of the Argentine

 

los problemas inherentes a las vinulaciones exteriores de
Bolivia," Estado Mayor General de Marina to Saavedra Lamas,
November, 1935, pp. l9-20.

55U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, V, 1937, p.

 

287.

I.

187

Chancellor. There was also the possibility, that Paraguay
would eventually discover oil. The most important reason
for delay, however, apparently sprang from Saavedra Lamas'
desire to prevent the Conference from collapsing while he
was the leader. He was willing to shift it to another
forum or simply avoid a settlement before he left office.
In either case, he would be rid of the Chaco albatross and
would not be blamed if it failed.56
In order to halt the delaying tactics of Saavedra
Lamas the representatives of Chile, Brazil and the United
States decided in April, 1937, to complain to President
Justo once again. Following the meeting, the three dele-
gates concluded that the Argentine Foreign Minister was
profoundly displeased with their actiOns. They were of the
opinion, however, that Justo would halt the antics of his
Foreign Minister.57 The meeting initially, however, had
the opposite effect desired. At a session five days later,
the Argentine Chancellor reCounted a report he had received

from the Paraguayan delegate that President Vargas of Brazil

 

56U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/894,
Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, June 7, 1937. See
also ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/1043, Braden
(Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, September 23, 1937.

57Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/864, Braden
(Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, May 7, 1927. The memoran-
dum was drawn up by the delegates and duplicates were sent
to their respective Foreign Ministries.

188

favored a slow, deliberative approach. Although it was
pointed out that Saavedra Lamas had left out a good deal

58 there can be no doubt that the

of what Vargas had said,
counterattack had begun. In his report on events to Espil,
the Argentine Chancellor called the behavior of the dele-
gates “grotesque." Curiously, he claimed that Nieto del
Rio, the Chilean representative, was responsible for the
trouble.59
In August, Saavedra Lamas indicated that he was ready '1
for serious negotiations. Spurring him on was a threat by
Braden to call publicly for an end to direct negotiations

60 The United States dele—

in favor of outside arbitration.
gate's explanation if he took such an action would certainly
not be flattering to Saavedra Lamas. Also, Justo had given
his Foreign Minister direct orders to settle the matter

before the president's administration left.office.6l

Probably the most important reason, however, was that it

 

58Ibid., RG 59', Decimal File 724.34119/853, Braden
(Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, April 30, 1937.

59Argentina, Archives, Box 5, Expediente IV, "asuntos
varios," Letter (muy reservado) from Saavedra Lamas to
Felpie Espil (washington D.C.), May 3, 1937.

60U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/977,
Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 4, 1937.
Braden indicated that Saavedra Lamas had given up the idea
of shifting the dispute to the World Court.

61;bid., RG 59 Decimal File 724.34119/960, Braden
(Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 10, 1937.

189

had become clear to Saavedra Lamas that even to retain his
present position in the certain to be elected Concordancia
administration under Ortiz, the Chaco dispute would have to
be concluded. The fight for the presidency was over, and
the fight for the Foreign Ministry had begun.
Unfortunately, Saavedra Lamas learned quickly that
progress would be difficult on such a critical issue. Both
ex—belligerents had become even more suspicious once such
an important matter was being discussed. Furthermore,
Bolivia was also negotiating with Brazil to build a railroad
to the oil fields. Finally, there were few people willing
to cooperate with Saavedra Lamas now that he might be leav—
ing office.62 Nieto del Rio, in a letter to Braden, wrote
"every day I open the newspaper hoping to find a notice of

“63 Cisneros of Peru

the resignation of Saavedra Lamas.
observed that "[Saavedra Lamas] has a capacity for both good

and evil, but even when he does good it is with evil

 

62Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/1070, Braden
(Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 9, 1937.

63Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/1000, Braden
(Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 25, 1937. This
statement came from a personal letter from Nieto del Rio
forwarded by Braden to the State Department. In ibid., RG
59, Decimal File 724.34119/1070, Braden (Buenos Aires) to
Dept. of State, October 9, 1937, Nieto del Rio stated that
after Saavedra Lamas left office, he would provoke a per-
sonal incident with the Argentine. Macedo Soares said he
would write a letter exposing the Argentine Chancellor.

 

l90

intent."64

Saavedra Lamas, however, did successfully conclude
on November 19 a railroad and petroleum treaty with Bolivia.
Unfortunately, the railroad would have to run through
territory occupied by Paraguay. Realizing this, Saavedra
Lamas had in late October given instructions to the mili—
tary attaché in La Paz, Captain Carlos Maurifio, to suggest
negotiations outside the framework of the Conference.65
Alas, the Brazilians, through undisclosed means, learned of
this gambit.66 Meanwhile, in order to soothe relations with
Paraguay, Argentina began negotiations on a new commercial
treaty with Asuncién. Bolivia consequently became suspi—
cious. In essence, Saavedra Lamas' activities only increased
the distrust of the ex-belligerents, and made more difficult
a final settlement which might have allowed the Argentine

Chancellor to remain Chancellor.

 

64Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/1007, Braden
(Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 31, 1937.

65Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34ll9/l096, Braden
(Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 29, 1937. At the
same time, Saavedra Lamas was telling the Conference that
slow, deliberate action was needed. See ibid., RG 59,
Decimal File 724.34119/114, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept.
of State, November 3, 1937.

66Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/1150, Braden
(Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, December 14, 1937.
Ruiz Moreno added it would be "catastrophic for Argentina
and all of the Americas" if Saavedra Lamas was reappointed.

 

 

 

191

The Conference, however, gave Saavedra Lamas one more
chance to obtain a settlement. The Foreign Minister pro-
posed that Paraguay withdraw from the Villa Montes—Boyuibé
road, an important north-south artery in exchange for a
Bolivian territorial session in the northern Chaco. Also,
the talks in Buenos Aires would recess while the ex-
belligerents attempted to settle their problems directly.
The plan met with no success. Braden as well as others,
however, knew that he would fail even before he started.67
It must have seemed the height of revenge to see him charge
on to the field of battle with an empty gun. Indeed,
although Braden refused, Ruiz Moreno, the number two man in
the Argentine foreign office, had asked Braden to defer a
settlement until after Saavedra Lamas left office. Although
there is no direct evidence,it is probable that President-
elect Ortiz was behind the overture. In the end, the
Argentine Foreign Minister had no friends at all. Two and
onethalf years of delaying tactics mixed with wild schemes,
double-crosses and several lies had destroyed whatever in—
fluence he might have had.

On February 10, 1938, Ortiz announced that José Maria
Cantilo would be the next Foreign Minister. Saavedra Lamas

thereupon made it known he expected an homenaje or testi-

 

monial in his honor. Braden, however, refused to go along.

 

67£§i§., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/1167, Braden_
(Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, December 31, 1937.

192

Eventually, it was agreed that a testimonial lunch with
one speech would be arranged. Rodriguez Alves, who was
supposed to give it, left town and the task fell to Braden.
He proceeded to praise Justo and play down the Argentine
Foreign Minister's role. The Argentine Chancellor was in-
furiated.68
It is clear that once Saavedra Lamas lost support at
home, he lost power in the Chaco Peace Conference. He was
still able to delay any settlement, but when he was forced
to act he could not. Suspicion engendered over time made
the ex-belligerents leary of any project he forwarded.
Furthermore, the Conference delegates, besides being wary
of the Argentine Chancellor, apparently were willing to
allow themselves the luxury of revenge in dealing with him.
Consequently, when he left office on February 20, 1938,
there were few to sing his praises. Show was no substitute

for substance.

 

68Braden, Diplomats, pp. 180-181.

 

EPILOGUE

The administration of Roberto Ortiz took office on
February 20, 1938. The newspapers devoted considerable
space to the new Foreign Minister, José Maria Cantilo.
Predictably, the outgoing minister, Saavedra Lamas, received

almost no mention. In L3.Naci6n there was only a short

 

announcement at the bottom of page four stating that the
departing Chancellor had personally thanked all the people
with whom he had worked.1 Ortiz had decided not to employ
Saavedra Lamas in another position. Behind this decision,
perhaps, was a rumor which had circulated in August, 1937,
to the effect that Saavedra Lamas was planning to detail the
electoral fraud perpetrated in theelection.2 Whether this
was a blackmail attempt is impossible to determine. In any
case, Saavedra Lamas became a private citizen.

Ortiz's stewardship was brief and tragic. Diabetes
soon claimed both his vision and energy. The Vice-President

Ramén S. Castillo, took over effective control of the

 

lLa'Nacion, February 21, 1938.

2United States Archives, Record Group 59, Decimal File
724.34119/1000, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State,
August 25, 1937.

193

194

government in.mid~1940, and official control in June, 1942.
In October, 1941, while Ortiz was incapacitated, Saavedra
Lamas was appointed Rector of the University of Buenos
Aires. It was not an important policy making position, but
it carried great prestige. He held the post until the
overthrow of Castillo in June, 1943. During his tenure,
the ex-Chancellor accomplished nothing of significance.

Saavedra Lamas, however, exploited his academic forum
to discuss important issues. On education, his comments
were almost duplicates of those made twentyvfive years
earlier. For example, he chastized Argentine instruction
for its fragmented and unscientific approach to problems.
He also charged that when students graduated they had no
saleable occupation and therefore, he called for more.
vocational education.3

Although he seldom commented on public developments
after he left office, Saavedra Lamas did discuss some of
the events during his tenure with an eye toward contemporary

policies. For example, in an October 26, 1942 homenaje

 

(testimonial) to the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Saavedra
Lamas proclaimed that the 1936 Maintenance of Peace Con—

ference had established a basis for consultation and

 

.. an

3Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Discursos del Rector (Buenos
Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad, 1943). See particularly
"La universidad y el gobierno de la instruccion publica"
given October 15, 1941, pp. 6—18, and "La universidad y el
fomento industrial del pais" given April 14, 1942, pp.
39-55.

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

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n)... . I. .. . .a . .. ..
n .1 n D l- - I - . l-

.. . a. i T
V . . : . . .. I .

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. . .
. a . . .o ..

 

 

195

cooperation which should be continued.4 Although Hull
might have laughed if he read this statement, the ex-
Foreign Minister was clearly criticising the recalcitrant
stand Argentina had taken in the Rio de Janeiro Conference
of January, 1942 following the entry of the United States

into World war II. Like his old boss, Justo, Saavedra Lamas

feared close cooperation with the Axis powers. Opposed

though he was to dependence on the United States, he was

 

too aristocratic and his almost Edwardian impulses were too

strong to permit him to align on the side of Hitlerian

Germany.
In 1943, the Castillo government was replaced by one
even more friendly to the Axis. Consequently, Saavedra }

Lamas was removed from office. When Juan Per6n finally I

emerged as the leader of the country, he found in Saavedra

Lamas an implacable opponent. Ironically, Saavedra Lamas

helped Braden, who had become United States ambassador-to I
Argentina and was also antivPerén, to avoid an anti-United /

States mob.5 They might have hated each other, but they

 

4Ibid., see "Homena e y entrega del titulo de Doctor
Honoris Causa al Canciller de la Republica de Venezuela
doctor Caracciolo Parra Perez," October 26, 1942, pp. 66-70.
In a speech given earlier, on November 10, 1941, entitled
"A la joventud" Saavedra Lamas praised the Good Neighbor

Policy as "noble" and "moral." He added that the United

States was the "exponent of liberty and justice," p. 10.

.__._
—"‘————._ _ __s_.—.__

5Spruille Braden, Diplomats and Demagoges (New Rochelle, (
New York: Arlington House, l97l),£p. 307. ' /

196

agreed that Perén was unsatisfactory. In 1951, Perén, in
an apparent attempt to give his government a larger base,
and perhaps seeking the prestige of a Nobel Prize winner,
asked Saavedra Lamas to be Chancellor once more. A seventy-
two year old Saavedra Lamas refused, and as a result spent
three days in San Telmo Prison.6

The ex-Chancellor had been in retirement, and one
suspects that the aforementioned ordeal convinced him to
stay that way. He produced no more significant works and
gave only a few speeches, testimonials to his friends who
had died. He joined them on May 5, 1959, at the age of 80.
As befitted his patrician heritage, he was interred in
La Recoleta cemetary, where many of Argentina's illustrious

historical figures are buried.

 

6Interview with Sefiora Pueyrredén, Buenos Aires,
September 12, 1972.

CONCLUSION

When Carlos Saavedra Lamas was born he had all the
prerequisites for success and all of the burdens of one so
endowed. He was expected to achieve high position, and
his early scholastic success indicated that he would.
Elected at an early age to the Camara de Diputados he dis-
tinguished himself as an excellent speaker and debator.

He was imbued with positivist thought during his education
and he worked for an economically strong Argentina. The
means to achieve this end, he believed, was through immi-
gration from EurOpe. Consequently, he endeavored to
establish new laws and programs to insure successful settle-
ment.

A modern Argentina, according to Saavedra Lamas, also
required a more democratic social structure. No longer

should a small elite control the government through a
limited voting franchise. Consequently, Saavedra Lamas
voted for the Saenz Pefia law which enfranchised the male
population, even though he was a member of the ruling elite.
He expected, however, that the new voters would chose the
best qualified people, which included himself.‘ They did not,

and suddenly Saavedra Lamas was out of public office, a

197

 

 

 

 

 

 

198

victim of his own idealism. It is not, therefore, difficult
to understand why Saavedra Lamas was willing to accept the
position as Foreign Minister in the fradulently elected

and military dominated government of General Justo.

When the new Chancellor took office, he inherited a
foreign policy intent upon assuring Argentine leadership in
Latin America. As translated by Saavedra Lamas and his
predecessors, this meant opposition to the United States
domination in the Western hemisphere. To aid in halting
the North Americans, European countries or the League of
Nations would be utilized as a counterpoise to the United
States. Besides this general policy orientation, Saavedra
Lamas had his own personal goal: to achieve prestige for
himself. Augmenting this drive was the fact that, with a
few notable exceptions, he was given a free hand by President
Justo. Only at the end of his term did his own ambitions
and the traditional ambitions of Argentine leadership seri-
ously conflict.

The first area in which the Argentine Chancellor demonr
strated the type of concerted effort which characterized his
work was in the dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay over
ownership of the Chaco. He inserted himself strongly into
the mediation then being conducted by the United States
dominated Committee of Neutrals. In order to attack the

Neutrals as well as to help himself attain hemispheric

 

 

 

199

leadership, Saavedra Lamas established an informal mediating
group composed of Brazil, Chile, Peru and Argentina.

In the subsequent conflict which erupted between the
two mediating groups, there can be little doubt that Saavedra
Lamas came out ahead. The Chancellor claimed credit for a
new international axiom, that territory taken by illegal
means would not be recognized. That this doctrine, dubbed
the Declaration of August 3, had been used earlier relative
to Japan and in essence was suggested by the United States
to Saavedra Lamas, was never acknowledged. Unsatisfied, the
Argentine Foreign Minister forwarded a second Declaration
three days later which negated the first. Saavedra Lamas
took credit for both, with the firm knowledge that only a
very few would realize the truth, and they would say nothing
publicly. Following this development, the Argentine Chan—
cellor initiated with Chile a proposal to end the fighting
in the Chaco. It failed, as did numerous other proposals
forwarded by various parties and by Saavedra Lamas himself.

A number of factors explain this lack of success.
Primarily, the belligerents had settled on arms as the means
to ajudicate their problem. Whether anyone could have in-
duced an agreement is impossible to determine, but Saavedra
Lamas was certainly trying to reach one. He would not,
however, accept any proposal which he did not initiate, and
actively worked against plans forwarded by others. Under—

cutting the Foreign Minister's total control was the

200

Argentine military's insistence on supplying Paraguay with
arms. If Saavedra Lamas had the ability to cut off military
supplies to Paraguay, he would have had considerably more
power.

The Argentine Chancellor was able to act as he did
because no nation wished to confront Argentina. Other limi-
trOphe nations, such as Brazil and Chile, had an interest
in the dispute, but this was outweighed by the desire to
avoid conflict with Argentina. The Depression and the pos—
sibility of war with Buenos Aires mediated against any sharp
move to counter Argentina.

The desire by the United States to foster the Good
Neighbor Policy led to accommodation with the Argentine
Foreign Minister at the Seventh Inter-American Conference
in Montevideo. Hull accepted Saavedra Lamas' Anti-War Pact
even though the previous administration had rejected it.
The United States gave to the Argentine Chancellor the
leadership role he coveted, and in accepting it, however,
Saavedra Lamas surrendered none of his prerogatives or
ideas.

This interlude was followed by a return to the bicker-
ing that had earlier marked the Chaco talks. By the
beginning of 1935, however, Saavedra Lamas lost control of
the mediation efforts, and the League of Nations threatened
to impose harsh sanctions upon Paraguay. Not only was the

League impinging upon an area perceived as being within the

201

Argentine sphere, but due to the military stalemate in the
Chaco, there was the possibility that Geneva might bring
an end to the war and gain the credit Saavedra Lamas de—
sired. Moving with dispatch, Saavedra Lamas put together
a mediating body composed of the ABCP countries, the United
States and Uruguay. Based on the Argentine Foreign Minis-
ter's personal assurances that the talks would continue
until a settlement was reached, a cease—fire was arranged.
The credit went to Saavedra Lamas.

At the Chaco Peace Conference, the Argentine Chancellor
initially followed a policy of delay until the Foreign
Ministers of the other countries involved departed. He
continued this tactic while he ascertained the views of the
delegates on his own plan. When they declared it to be un-
acceptable, Saavedra Lamas found himself in a difficult
position. He wanted to gain the prestige a settlement
would.bring, but he also wanted to insure that Paraguay, as
the victor, would not have to make too many concessions.
Consequently, under Saavedra Lamas' direction, the Confer-
ence moved slowly, as the Argentine Chancellor tried to
harmonize two conflicting goals. The result was general
dissatisfaction on the part of all involved. During the
first year and a half, hawever, there were some notable
accomplishments. The war was officially declared over and

the prisoners were returned.

202

At about the same-time_as the repatriation, Saavedra
Lamas journeyed to the League of Nations and, as he expected,
was elected President of the Assembly. Ironically, the
Argentine Foreign Minister had only used the League for his

own ends. He had never demonstrated faith in it, and had,

in fact, opposed League action against Paraguay. Indeed,

Saavedra Lamas seems to have been accorded this honor more
for participating in the Geneva—based body than for any

other reason. In any case, the Argentine Chancellor re-

ceived what he wanted: applause for his statesmanship prior
to the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference.

Of infinitely more importance was the announcement in
November, 1936, that Saavedra Lamas had won the Nobel Peace

Prize. He would be receiving the award for the Anti-War

Pact and for his efforts in bringing an end to the Chaco
War. In reality, the Pact was never considered to have much

significance. Those who signed it did so to avoid annoying

Argentina and appearing pro—war. In the case of the Chaco

War, Saavedra Lamas' problem was not bringing peace, but
obtaining credit for a settlement favorable to Paraguay.
If there can be the slightest justification for the award,
it was on the grounds that the Argentine Chancellor publicly
acted and talked like a peacemaker.

In many respects, the Peace Prize can best be seen as
part of a cynical deal. Hull was willing to support

Saavedra Lamas' drive for the honor in exchange for

203

cooperation at the December, 1936, Maintenance of Peace Con—
ference. Once Hull delivered the support, however, the
Argentine Chancellor double-crossed him and opposed his
programs in Buenos Aires. Admittedly for a number of
reasons Saavedra Lamas was justified in halting Hull's pro-
gram. Hemispheric isolation, which the North American
Secretary of State wanted, would not have been in Argentina's
best interests and would have foreclosed future preroga-
tives. Whatever the justification for Saavedra Lamas' tac-
tics at the 1936 meeting, they resulted in angry representa-
tions by Hull to Justo. The Argentine Chancellor learned
that it was one thing to oppose Hull's program and another
to betray him.

Not only did he infuriate Hull, but he also earned the
wrath of the Brazilian and Chilean Foreign Ministers with
his unsavory tactics regarding the Chaco talks. He evinced
an almost pathological drive to stop Macedo Soares and
Cruchaga from finding a formula to end the Chaco War. If
there was going to be a settlement, it must be arranged by
the Argentine Foreign Minister. The result of Saavedra
Lamas' actions were further hostile complaints to Justo.

These representations were instrumental in bringing
an end to any chance Saavedra Lamas had for higher office,
but the most important factor ending the Argentine Chan-
cellor's ambitions was his relationship with Justo. The

General clearly did not appreciate his Foreign Minister

 

204

stealing the spotlight from him or referring to him as
"little fatty." The final blow was his failure to give
sufficient credit to Justo when he received the Nobel Prize.
Consequently, the President chose not to include Saavedra

Lamas on the Concordancia ticket in the 1937 presidential

 

election.

The diminution of Saavedra Lamas' power in the admin—
istration led to disaster for the Argentine Chancellor in
the Chaco Peace talks. The delegates who had at least
openly deferred to him, grew suddenly argumentative.
Buoying their boldness was the spectre, in at least three
cases, of the representatives' own Foreign Ministers com-
plaining to Justo about his Chancellor. Saavedra Lamas'
own actions made the situation worse. In an attempt to
secure Bolivian oil for Argentina, he alienated Paraguay.
Subsequent attempts to assuage Asuncion caused La Paz to be
-suspicious. The result was no progress.

With the presidency and vice-presidency closed to him,
Saavedra Lamas began a concerted effort to save his posi-
tion as Chancellor. In the last week of December, 1937, he
obtained from the Conference the power to try to find a'
peace formula on his own.

But the details of what he was going to suggest were
well known already and it was common knowledge that his plan

would fail. He was given the go ahead and like a latter—day

I
I
i
i.
I
I

 

205

Don Quixote, he charged the windmill and alas, suffered the
same fate.

The importance of Saavedra Lamas lies not in his accom—
plishments, none of which were of great significance, but
in his achievement of a leadership role for Argentina in
the Americas that its military and economic position did not
justify. This is a major success, when one considers that
such a goal had long been sought by Argentine statesmen.
That he achieved these ends.more for personal reasons than
for patriotic ones, and through the use of unsavory tactics,
tarnishes the accomplishment. But the fact that he achieved

Argentina's long awaited place in the sun is undeniable.

._ .... -_

_4_d_-._ — —
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wfl-.,—-_,——-

1
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:

 

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

Biographical Sources
There is no substantial biography of Carlos Saavedra
Lamas. The only works available are short sketches of his

life in biographical anthologies and homenajes. The best

 

of these was done by Jacobo weiner, his close friend and
secretary in a June 24, 1962 article in the Buenos Aires
newspaper, La_Naci6n. The work, unfortunately, covers only
about half a pageand is a tribute rather than an analytical
study. Other than this, there are entries in HHS.£§.HHQ.

tina. Another source, William Belmont Parker's Argentines

 

_ of To—day originally published in 1920 (New York: Krause
Reprint Corp., 1967), gives the wrong date of his birth and
supplies little other information. In 1943 José Acre per—

sonally published Carlos Saavedra Lamas versus 13 univeridad

 

dnguenos Aires (Buenos Aires: Amorrortu) in which he

bitterly chastized the ex—Chancellor. The dispute centered
upon who would pay the taxes on a donation Acre made to the E
University; the author was unquestionably furious when

Saavedra Lamas refused to cooperate. f

206

207

works of Carlos Saavedra Lamas
The first publication of Saavedra Lamas was his pro-

fessional thesis entitled Sistema municpal egpla_capitallv

 

dg_l§_Repfiblica (Buenos Aires: Compafiiamsud—americana
billetes de banco, 1903). It was far from his best work,
but notwithstanding the title, he did confront some of the
major issues of the day, such as the availability of the
voting franchise. Four years later, Saavedra Lamas pub-

lished a small volume, Informe sobre la situacién finan-

 

giera de la muncipalidad de la capital (Buenos Aires: Casa
editora de A. Grau). The title adequately describes this
work.

All of Saavedra Lamas' major speeches and projects
delivered in the House of Deputies were published in 1916

under the title Problemas d3 Gobierno, discursos pronuncia-

 

Compafiia sub-americana de billetes de banco, 1916). Three
legislative programs which appeared in this volume were
published earlier, two of which had different titles. The

only one with the same title was Proyecto de'ley sobre

 

ferrocarriles secundarios (Buenos Aires: L. J. Rosso, 1914).
In this tome, he prOposed a means of financing railroad
construction. ’Economia colonial (Buenos Aires: L. J. Rosso,
1910) appeared in Problemas d3 gobierno as Lgy.de Coloniza—

cién. The second title describes the work well.

208

In Problemas d3 gobierno, Por las provincias del norte,

 

 

estudios sobre el Regime de la industria.azucarera

 

 

(Buenos Aires: L. J. Rosso y cia., 1911) became E1 régimen

legal g§_l§_producci6n do azficar en la repfiblica, Ley'de

 

 

desgravacién azucarera. Finally, all Saavedra Lamas'

 

utterances in Congress were reported in the Diario de

Sessiones de la Camara d3 Diputados.

 

 

Following his departure from the House of Deputies,
Saavedra Lamas wrote a number of works dealing with Argen—

tina's economic position. In 1918 Los ferrocarriles ante.

 

 

la legislacién positiva argentina (Buenos Aires:, Talleres

 

graficos de L. J. Rosso y cia.) was published at the behest
of the Empresa del Ferrocarril Oeste de Buenos Aires. It
was a highly legalistic discussion of Argentine railroad_

legislation. In both Los aslariados en la_Repfiblica

 

 

Argentina (Buenos Aires: Libreria y casa editora de Jesfis

 

 

Menendea, 1922) and La huelga d§_l§ industria carbonera en

la Ingalterra (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad,

 

1926), Saavedra Lamas called for consensus rather than con-
flict in labor—management relations.

Another topic to which Saavedra Lamas devoted consider-
able effort was education. His first concise statemént

of views appeared in Atlantida (Tomo V, 1912) and wad en-

 

titled "Los estudios intensivos en la Universidad de Buenos

Aires." Here, as in other statements on education, he called

 

209

for liberalization of curriculum coupled with a scientific
approach to problem solving. He took the same position in
Problemas Americanos, discurso del presidente §2_l§
inauguracién del congreso americano de Ciencias sociales ea
Tucumén el_§fld§ julio gerlglg (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de
Coni Hermanos, 1916), La personalidad universitaria del

23. Carlos Octavio Bunge (Buenos Aires: Talleres Graficos

 

Argentinas de L. J. Rosso y cia., 1919), and La crisis

universitaria y la_formaci6n d9 hombre de_gobierno (Buenos

 

 

Aires: Jacobo Peuser, Ltda., 1925). After Saavedra Lamas
left the Foreign Ministry and became Rector of the Univer-
sity of Buenos Aires he published Discursos del Rector
(Buenos Aifes: Imprenta de la Universidad, 1943). Included
in this collection of speeches were a number of graduatipn
addresses.

Between the time Saavedra Lamas left the House of
Deputies and the time he became Chancellor, he wrote four
books on Foreign affairs. The two written in 1922, La
Legislacion social despues de la guerra, 13 crisis del

socialismo y_el_maxima1ismo (Buenos Aires: Establecimiento

 

 

grdfico A. de Martino) and Tratados internacionales_§e tipo

social, las convenciones sobre emigracién y trabajo, per-

pectivas gue representan para los pafses sub-americanos y

 

especialmente para la Repfiblica argentina conferencias d2

 

Washington 1 Ginebra (Buenos Aires: Facultad de derécho y

 

Ciencias sociales) deal principally with concepts of .

210

international law. An edition of the latter work was pub-
lished in French in 1924. Another work on international

law, published in French was La conception argentine d3

 

arbitrage gt d2.l'intervention a l'ouverture de_la_Con—

 

 

 

férence de Washington (Paris: Les Editions internationales,

 

1928). Included was a detailed discussion of the Gondra
Treaty, which set up a commission to settle disputes in the
Americas.

While Foreign Minister, Saavedra Lamas published a

number of works. The Anti-War Pact was detailed in Project

 

.92 Traité Sub-Américain pour prevenir l§_guerre Non—

 

Agression gt Conciliation (Paris: Les Editions internation-

 

 

ales, 1932). The Spanish text appeared in Argentina,

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Memoria pre—

 

sentada 31 Honorable Congreso Nacional correspondiente a1

 

periodo 1932—1933 (Buenos Aires: Gmo. Kraft. Ltda., 1933).

 

For an English translation of the treaty see United States

 

Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1932, Volume V. Before the 1936 Maintenance of Peace

Conference, Saavedra Lamas published Draft 9f.a Convention

 

 

for the Maintenance pf Peage (washington D.C. n.p., 1936)

in which he presented his program. .
Following the award of the Nobel Peace Prize, Saavedra

Lamas published a compendium of material concerning his

Chancellorship. Entitled Por la_paz‘g§_las Américas (Buenos

 

Aires: .M. Gleizer, 1937) it included many of the Foreign

211

Minister's speeches as well as some articles describing
his work. Outside material is only identified by a foot-
note and even then, the reference would only read a
"prominent newspaper.“ In much the same vein, a collection

of documents relative to the Chaco War, La_conferencia

 

interamericana de consolidacién de la paz (Buenos Aires:'

 

 

Talleres graficos L. J. Rosso, 1938), listed Saavedra Lamas
as the author. The same work was also issued, although no

publisher was identified, by the Argentine Foreign Ministry.

Argentine Archival Sources

 

..The.Argentine'Foreign Ministry Archives proved to be an
invaluable source for this study. Although it is apparent-
that much material has been culled from the files, con—
siderable information was available. There are twelve
boxes of papers relative to the Chaco Peace Conference. Box
three is mistakenly labeled as the second box eleven. All
of them are labeled "Conferencia de la Paz." For the 1933
Montevideo meeting there is only a single box filled mostly
with general memoranda given to the delegates. Three boxes
are devoted to the Maintenance of Peace Conference. Most of
the material relates to the origin and conduct of the Con-
ference and includes such trivia as the menu's for the major
receptions, but there is some formal diplomatic correspon—

dence.

212

United States Archival Sources

 

A serious study of Saavedra Lamas would not have been
possible without the massive resources of Record Group 59
in the United States Archives. By far the most comprehen-
sive and significant files relative to the Chaco are .
724.3415 and 724.34119. For the correspondence and memoe
randa dealing with the two.inter—American meetings see”"
(1933) and 710.Peace, 811.001Roosevelt Visit (1936). The
documentation concerning Saavedra Lamas and the League of
Nations can be found in files 710.League of Nations,
500.001, 500.Clll, and 500.C Covenant. Of lesser importance
are files 724.3411, 835.006enera1 Conditions, 835.002,
711.35, 724.3215, 835.001Justo, Agustin P., 724.25, and

725.35.

Argentine Government Publications

 

The best general source published by the Ministerio de
Relaciones Exteriores y Culto relative to the 1930's is

Memorias. This yearly series, ostensibly a report of

 

Congress, is a collection of documents. Because it is made
public, however, the material details the formalities of
foreign relations rather than the substance. The same is

true of La_conferencia de paz del Chaco 1935—1939 (Buenos

 

 

Aires: E. L. Frigerico e Hijo, 1939). A reading of the
material included would yield the impression that the whole

conference went smoothly. Another example of form rather

213

 

 

than substance is §a_neutralidad argentina §n_e1_conf1icto

boliviano—paraguayo (Buenos Aires: Jacobo Peuser, Ltda.,

 

1933). This slim volume also appeared in MemOrias. With-

 

out question the most useful Argentine government source

 

is the two volume La_politica argentina en_la_guerra del

 

Chagg_(Buenos Aires: Guillermo Kraft, 1937). Besides
providing some documentation, the work outlines the policy
and motives of Argentina until July, 1925. It was produced
while Saavedra Lamas was in office and is highly laudatory
of his actions.

The Argentine Foreign Ministry also brought out reports
on the major Inter—American meetings of 1933 and 1936..
Séptima Conferencia Internacional Americana Reunida en_1a

Ciudad d2 Montevideo del 3'1§_24_g§_diciembre do 1933,

 

 

informe presentada por el Presidente de la delegacién

 

 

 

Argentina Dr. Carlos Saavedra Lamas (Buenos Aires: n.p.,

 

 

1934) includes the speeches given by the Argentine delega-
tion and the protocols and treaties signed. Although the

volume dealing with 1936, La conferencia interamericana d3

 

1§_paz, is considerably larger, it has a similar format.

United States Government Publications

 

For information on the Chaco dispute, the Inter-
American conferences, and economic matters the series,

Papers Relating tg_the Foreign Relations g£_the Unitedir

 

 

 

States (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing

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214

Office, various years) is invaluable. Another helpful
source is the conference series of the United States.
Relative to Saavedra Lamas' tenure in Argentina, the most

useful are Report pp the Delegates pf_the United States pf_

 

 

 

g£_America:§g;theSeventh~Inter—American Conference, 1933
(washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office,

1934), Report 2: the Delegates g: the United States pf

 

 

America Ep_the International Conference for the Maintenance

9: Peace §E_Buenos Aires, 1936 (Washington D.C.: United

 

States Government Printing Office, 1937) and Report pf the

Delegation pf the United States 9f_America pp_the Peace

 

 

 

Conference Held §p_Buenos Aires,July 1, 1935-January 2;,

 

 

 

1939 (washington D.C.: United States Government Printing

Office, 1940).

Published Primary Sources

 

There are a number of published memoirs of people who
were involved in the diplomacy surrounding the dispute.
The most useful is Vicente Rivarola's three volume work,

Memorias diplomaticas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Ayacucho,

 

1952—1957).) The work's utility is enhanced by the inclusion
of numerous documents. Another helpful volume is Bautista

Saavedra's E; Chaco X.l§ conferencia de la Paz de Buenos

“fl_—

 

Aires (Chile: Editorial Nacimiento, 1939), a defense of
Saavedra's actions. For a vicious indictment of Argentina

in general and Saavedra Lamas in particular, see Miguel

.'i J 3:" '1 .;a.'-;
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215

 

Mercado Moreira, Historia diplomética g3 i3 guerra ggi
Chaco (La Paz: Talleres Gréficos Bolivianos, 1966).
Another book highly critical of Saavedra Lamas is Diplomats
pad Demagogues (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House,
1971) by Spruille Braden. Also included is information
relative to the Inter—American meetings. Finally a work
which is indispensible to any discussion of the period is

The Memoirs pf Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan Co.,

 

1948) by Cordell Hull.

Secondary Sources

 

The works by Argentine authors dealing with the 1930's
are generally polemical although some are usefu1 if read

with caution. pg Democracia Fraudulenta (Buenos Aires:

 

Editorial Jorge Alvarez S.A., 1968) by Rodolfo Puiggrés
reveals its bias in the title. £3 década infame (Buenos
Aires: Talleres Graficos Lumen, 1969) edited by Carlos
Pérez, is also critical. Two good works on the period are

Alberto Ciria, Partidas y Poder pp 13 Argentina moderna,

 

lggg-igflé (Buenos Aires: Editorial Jorge Alvarez, 1968)
and Jorge Abelardo Ramos, E1 §§§EQ Domino (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Plus Ultra, 1972). A very useful and excellent
work dealing with the oligarchy is José Luis de Imaz's Egg
Qp§_Mandan (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1964).

In English two works which stand out for their depth

of analysis are The Army'and Politics ip_Argentina 1928—

 

1945 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

216

1969) by Robert A. Potash and Democracy, Militarism, and

 

 

 

Nationalism ip_Argentina, 1930-1966: Ap Interpretation

 

(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972) by Marvin
Goldwert. For the purposes of this study Potash's book
proved to be more useful.

Concerning the economic policy of Saavedra Lamas dur-

ing the 1930's, the most informative work relative to the

 

Roca-Runciman Treaty is E1_gobierno d3 1as vacas, 1933-

 

.igié (Buenos Aires: Ediciones la Bastilla, 1972) by Daniel
Prosdoff. The author sees the treaty as unfortunate, but
necessary. A more general study of Argentine economic
policy as it relates to the United States is "New Light on
the Good Neighbor Policy: The United States and Argentina,
1933-1939" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Pennsylvania, 1972) by William Grant Cooper. The total
lack of Spanish language sources detracts from.the work.
There are a great many books dealing all or in part
with the diplomatic relations between the United States and
Argentina during the 1930's. The best work is Harold F.

Peterson's Argentina and the United States, 1810-1960

 

 

(New York: Macmillan Co., 1964). Another useful work with
a greater emphasis on the background of United States policy

is The United States and Inter—American Security, 1889-1960

 

(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962) by J. Lloyd
Mecham. A critical view of United States policy can be

found in Yankee Diplomacy (Dallas: Southern Methodist

 

217

University Press, 1953) by Edmund Smith, Jr. An opposite
view of United States policy is available in Tpg pgpip
American Policy Q: phg United States (New York: W. W. Norton
and Co., 1967) by Samuel Flagg Bemis. A work the researcher

should definitely consult is Argentine Foreign Policy (Notre

 

Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966) by Alberto
Conil Paz and Gustavo Ferrari. The book was translated
from Spanish by John J. Kennedy

Regarding the Chaco War, the best and most comprehen—

sive work is Politics pf the Chaco Peace Conference, 1935-

 

;ggg (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), by Leslie
B. Rout, Jr. Another fine source is Bryce Wood's Th3 United
States §E§,E3Eifl American ngg, igégflggg (New York:
Colombia University Press, 1958). This volume integrates
the Chaco War into other disputes of the 1930's. For the
military side of the conflict, see David H. Zook, Jr.,

EH9 Conduct 9: phg ghggg W35 (New Haven: Bookman Associates,
1960). The only work spotlighting the response of the
League of Nations to the Chaco War is Margaret La Foy,

Th3 ghggg Dispute gpd phg League pf Nations (Ann Arbor:
Edward Brothers, Inc., 1946), which suffers from inadequate

research.

 

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