

JOHN F. BRATZEL

Ph. D.

Ph. D.



103
086
THS



Ph. D.

Department of
Information
Systems



A POLITICAL PORTRAIT OF
CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS


Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
JOHN F. BRATZEL
1974

LIBRARY
Michigan State
University

This is to certify that the
thesis entitled
A Political Portrait of
Carlos Saavedra Lamas
presented by
John F. Bratzel

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in History


Major professor

Date November 14, 1974

O-7639

BINDING BY
HOAG & SONS
BOOK BINDERY INC.
LIBRARY BINDERS
SPRINGPORT, MICHIGAN

3 1293 00995 6644

SEP 0 5 1994

FBI



ABSTRACT

A POLITICAL PORTRAIT
OF
CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS

By
John F. Bratzel

This dissertation investigates the political life of Carlos Saavedra Lamas. It attempts to explain his background, rise to a position of prominence and subsequent fall, and to define his place in Argentine history.

Saavedra Lamas was born in 1878 to a wealthy oligarchic family. At age thirty he was elected to the Argentine House of Deputies where he worked for both increased immigration from Europe and the extension of the voting franchise to the entire male population. These goals, he believed, would yield a modern Argentina in the European mold. He realized that the newly enfranchised voters would probably not immediately support a member of the oligarchy. He assumed, however, this would only be temporary, but sixteen years elapsed before another opportunity to hold public office appeared. Consequently, he agreed to be Foreign Minister in the fraudulently elected and military-dominated Justo administration.




John F. Bratzel

The Argentine people have long seen themselves as a white literate, Europeanized bastion in a miscegenated, backward South America. Consequently, the nation adopted the premise that she should dominate South America and, as the leader of a continent be received into the councils of the powerful as an equal. Saavedra Lamas, as Foreign Minister of Argentina worked diligently to achieve this long cherished goal. Moreover, his efforts on behalf of his country complemented his personal desire to obtain prominence on the world stage. It is the contention of this work that Saavedra Lamas reached both of these objectives, thereby gaining an influence for himself and Argentina that was far out of proportion to the real importance of either.

Saavedra Lamas achieved his ends through deceitful, almost Machiavellian methods. Aiding him in his drive was his ability to take advantage of the disarray among the countries bordering Argentina and the Good Neighbor Policy of the United States. He also benefitted from European competition with the United States. Finally, Saavedra Lamas' ability to move quickly was enhanced by the virtual free hand given him by President Justo.


Immediately after taking office in February, 1932 Saavedra Lamas inserted himself strongly into the United States dominated mediation effort then being conducted in



John F. Bratzel

the dispute between Paraguay and Bolivia over ownership of the Chaco. To support his efforts in the contest that developed, Saavedra Lamas established an informal mediation group composed of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. By pitting the mediators as well as the belligerents against each other, the Argentine Chancellor controlled the situation and appeared as the peace maker while ironically insuring that Argentina's ally, Paraguay, was protected. With the exhaustion of the belligerents in mid-1935 the Argentine Chancellor arranged for a cease-fire and peace talks in Buenos Aires under his auspices. At the Conference Saavedra Lamas wanted the prestige a settlement would bring but also desired that Paraguay not make major concessions. Consequently, the negotiations moved slowly to the constant complaint of the other delegates. Consequently, no settlement was reached during his tenure.

While Saavedra Lamas was Foreign Minister two Inter-American meetings were held. In the 1933 Conference at Montevideo, both the Argentine Chancellor, as well as Secretary of State Cordell Hull wished to avoid a confrontation. The latter accepted Saavedra Lamas' Anti-War Pact in exchange for cooperation and consensus politics prevailed. At the December, 1936 Maintenance of Peace Conference, however,



John F. Bratzel

conflict developed. Saavedra Lamas who had just won the Nobel Peace Prize opposed Hull on virtually every issue. The latter was infuriated and directed protest to Justo about his Foreign Minister.

These complaints coupled with those from other Foreign Ministers over the Chaco negotiations were instrumental in Justo's decision to close higher office to Saavedra Lamas. The most important reason, however, was the Chancellor's failure to give sufficient credit to Justo when he won the Nobel Prize and the fact he constantly overshadowed the President.

Following his departure from office in February, 1938, Saavedra Lamas held only one more public office, the rectorship of the University of Buenos Aires. He died in 1959.

In the preparation of this study the Argentine Foreign Ministry Archives as well as the United States National Archives were consulted. Also newspapers, periodicals, published memoirs, government publications, and pertinent secondary works were examined. Finally data was also obtained from personal interviews with individuals having direct knowledge of the man and events.

A POLITICAL PORTRAIT
OF
CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS

By
John F. Bratzel

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1974

G 92080

© Copyright by
JOHN F. BRATZEL
1974

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	Page
PREFACE.	1
1. THE FIRST FIFTY-THREE YEARS.	5
Argentine Economic Development.	11
International Law	18
Education	22
The Voting Franchise.	25
2. THE DECLARATIONS OF AUGUST	34
Saavedra Lamas Takes Office	34
The Chaco Dispute	39
The ABCP Coalition.	49
3. "UNA CONFUSIÓN GRANDE"	65
Saavedra Lamas and the League of Nations.	65
Saavedra Lamas and the Committee of Neutrals	68
The Mendoza Proposal.	74
Argentina and Neutrality.	86
May to December, 1933	87
4. "THE TWO WINGS OF THE DOVE".	91
5. A MAN TO BE RECKONED WITH.	121
Chaco Negotiations January, 1934 to February, 1935	121
Final Settlement.	125
The Chaco Peace Conference.	132
Saavedra Lamas and the League	150
6. THE PERILS OF SUCCESS.	156
The Nobel Prize	156
Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace	160

TABLE OF CONTENTS--continued

Page

The Chaco Dispute, December, 1936.	177
January, 1937-February, 1938	185
EPILOGUE.	193
CONCLUSION.	197
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY	206
Biographical Sources	206
Works of Carlos Saavedra Lamas	207
Argentine Archival Sources	211
United States Archival Sources	212
Argentine Government Publications.	212
United States Government Publications.	213
Published Primary Sources.	214
Secondary Sources.	215

the first of these is the fact that the
the second is the fact that the
the third is the fact that the
the fourth is the fact that the
the fifth is the fact that the
the sixth is the fact that the
the seventh is the fact that the
the eighth is the fact that the
the ninth is the fact that the
the tenth is the fact that the
the eleventh is the fact that the
the twelfth is the fact that the
the thirteenth is the fact that the
the fourteenth is the fact that the
the fifteenth is the fact that the
the sixteenth is the fact that the
the seventeenth is the fact that the
the eighteenth is the fact that the
the nineteenth is the fact that the
the twentieth is the fact that the
the twenty-first is the fact that the
the twenty-second is the fact that the
the twenty-third is the fact that the
the twenty-fourth is the fact that the
the twenty-fifth is the fact that the
the twenty-sixth is the fact that the
the twenty-seventh is the fact that the
the twenty-eighth is the fact that the
the twenty-ninth is the fact that the
the thirtieth is the fact that the
the thirty-first is the fact that the
the thirty-second is the fact that the
the thirty-third is the fact that the
the thirty-fourth is the fact that the
the thirty-fifth is the fact that the
the thirty-sixth is the fact that the
the thirty-seventh is the fact that the
the thirty-eighth is the fact that the
the thirty-ninth is the fact that the
the fortieth is the fact that the
the forty-first is the fact that the
the forty-second is the fact that the
the forty-third is the fact that the
the forty-fourth is the fact that the
the forty-fifth is the fact that the
the forty-sixth is the fact that the
the forty-seventh is the fact that the
the forty-eighth is the fact that the
the forty-ninth is the fact that the
the fiftieth is the fact that the
the fifty-first is the fact that the
the fifty-second is the fact that the
the fifty-third is the fact that the
the fifty-fourth is the fact that the
the fifty-fifth is the fact that the
the fifty-sixth is the fact that the
the fifty-seventh is the fact that the
the fifty-eighth is the fact that the
the fifty-ninth is the fact that the
the sixtieth is the fact that the
the sixty-first is the fact that the
the sixty-second is the fact that the
the sixty-third is the fact that the
the sixty-fourth is the fact that the
the sixty-fifth is the fact that the
the sixty-sixth is the fact that the
the sixty-seventh is the fact that the
the sixty-eighth is the fact that the
the sixty-ninth is the fact that the
the seventieth is the fact that the
the seventy-first is the fact that the
the seventy-second is the fact that the
the seventy-third is the fact that the
the seventy-fourth is the fact that the
the seventy-fifth is the fact that the
the seventy-sixth is the fact that the
the seventy-seventh is the fact that the
the seventy-eighth is the fact that the
the seventy-ninth is the fact that the
the eightieth is the fact that the
the eighty-first is the fact that the
the eighty-second is the fact that the
the eighty-third is the fact that the
the eighty-fourth is the fact that the
the eighty-fifth is the fact that the
the eighty-sixth is the fact that the
the eighty-seventh is the fact that the
the eighty-eighth is the fact that the
the eighty-ninth is the fact that the
the ninetieth is the fact that the
the ninety-first is the fact that the
the ninety-second is the fact that the
the ninety-third is the fact that the
the ninety-fourth is the fact that the
the ninety-fifth is the fact that the
the ninety-sixth is the fact that the
the ninety-seventh is the fact that the
the ninety-eighth is the fact that the
the ninety-ninth is the fact that the
the hundredth is the fact that the

whi
bac
ad
and
cou
lan
to
hi
pre
of
se
re

al
ad
Ar
ie
we
si
hi

PREFACE

The Argentine people have long seen themselves as a white, literate, Europeanized bastion in a miscegenated, backward South America. Consequently, that nation has adopted the premise that she should dominate South America and, as the leader of a continent be received into the councils of the powerful as an equal. Carlos Saavedra Lamas, as Foreign Minister of Argentina worked diligently to achieve this goal. Moreover, his efforts on behalf of his country complemented his personal desire to obtain prominence on the world stage. Saavedra Lamas reached both of these objectives, thereby gaining an influence for himself and Argentina that was far out of proportion to the real importance of either.

Saavedra Lamas achieved his ends through deceitful, almost Machiavellian methods. That he did so, taints his achievement, but his tactics were not criticized in Argentina, where perhaps the highest compliment one can pay is to describe a person as "clever." But Saavedra Lamas was more than clever. Through opportunism he was able to seize the moment and turn the international situation to his benefit.

from h
It exa
Chaco
ings i
involv
also b
1933 a
the Ch
public
I
for he
goes t
inter
my de
and m
ways
tee,
Steid
to th
ing i
were
water
tor a
me ne

This study briefly traces the life of Saavedra Lamas from his birth to his appointment as Foreign Minister. It examines his policies and tactics in the war over the Chaco between Bolivia and Paraguay, including his maneuverings in the face of United States and League of Nations involvement in the conflict. Considerable emphasis will also be placed on the role Saavedra Lamas played during the 1933 and 1936 Inter-American meetings. The work ends with the Chancellor's loss of influence and subsequent exit from public life.

I am indebted to a number of persons and institutions for helping make this study possible. My appreciation goes to the late Charles C. Cumberland, who originally interested me in Latin American History. I wish to express my deepest gratitude and sincere thanks to my jefe supremo and mentor, Leslie B. Rout, Jr. who initiated me into the ways of academia. The other members of my guidance committee, Professors David C. Bailey, Paul A. Varg, Barbara Steidle, and Justin C. Kestenbaum also contributed greatly to the production of this work and to my historical training in general.

The librarians of La Prensa library in Buenos Aires were particularly helpful in allowing me access to delicate material. I am also indebted to Raul Vinuesa, an instructor at the Argentine Foreign Service Institute, for giving me new perspectives into the decision making processes of

the A
Piñero
allow
addit
nent
Perey
Insti
archi
burea
for h
who w
Argen
Joaqu
ne an
Bishk
tina
One c
Arger
an ir
indeb
Headc
Lama
I cov
NICH

the Argentine foreign office. He introduced me to Señor Piñero of the Foreign Ministry library, who not only allowed me access to material available nowhere else, but additionally aided me in obtaining interviews with prominent Argentines. A special thanks goes to Capitán José Pereyra, Jefe de despacho of the Argentine Foreign Service Institute, who shepherded my application to work in the archives of the Foreign Ministry through a voracious bureaucracy. I am obliged to Señora Zeballos Aguirre, too, for her aid in helping me locate documents.

I am deeply grateful to Roaslía and Alberto Ramón who were always hospitable and kind during my stay in Argentina. Additionally, I owe thanks to my good friend Joaquín Serrano who made a number of initial contacts for me and placed his resources at my disposal. Robert A. Bishkin, the General Consul of the United States in Argentina was helpful in introducing me to a number of people. One of them was Eduardo Tomás Pardo, the head of the Argentine Foreign Service Institute who helped me obtain an interview with Miguel Angel Cárcano. Finally, I am indebted to Señoras Silvia Pueyrredón and Elsie Rivera Heado for giving me significant insights into Saavedra Lamas and taking me to a number of social functions where I could make further contacts.

Closer to home, I must thank the staff of the Michigan State University Library, particularly

Mrs. Eleanor Boyles. Similarly, the staffs of both the United States Archives and University of Michigan Law Library proved very helpful. I acknowledge the Ford Foundation, whose grants administered by the Michigan State University Latin American Studies Center allowed me to go to both Buenos Aires and Washington, D. C. in the furtherance of this study.

Finally I owe more than I can say to my wife, Ruth, whose patience and hard work helped me immeasurably.

It goes without saying that none of the above are responsible for the shortcomings of this work. They are mine alone.

East Lansing, Michigan
October, 1974

J.F.B.



the
the
1823
with
fol
186
one
que
whi
abo
byw
bad
res
Pe
son
whi
mu
you

CHAPTER 1

THE FIRST FIFTY-THREE YEARS

Argentina became an independent country in 1816 and after an abortive attempt at constitutional government, the nation fell to the control of Juan Manuel de Rosas in 1829. A classic example of a caudillo, he ruled the nation with an iron fist until 1852. Another period of unrest followed until Bartolomé Mitre assumed the presidency in 1862. Under Mitre and his successors, Argentina became one of the largest suppliers of meat in the world. Subsequently, an oligarchy of landed beef producers developed which quickly assumed a leadership role in Argentina. Money abounded and perhaps because it did, corruption became the byword of government. By 1890, conditions had become so bad that the President, Miguel Juárez Celman was forced to resign in favor of his more liberal Vice-President, Carlos Pellegrini. Although the new chief executive did bring some reforms, the oligarchy of land owners and merchants, which benefited from the established system, was still very much in control.

During the next twenty-six years, their leadership would be challenged, but the principal weapon of the

olig
untl
inun
a de
votr
whi
ele
who

Lan
for
mon
onl
her
pro
who

Lan
"Se
lay
lec
La

or:
Cor
bi
Lan
Pw

oligarchy, the limited franchise, prevailed. It was not until a number of their own, called "liberal Tories," inured with the positivist doctrine of Auguste Comte, and a desire to modernize Argentina, came to the front that the vote was given at all. As a result, political parties which had long refused to vote in the oligarchy's sham elections, did so and won. One of the "liberal Tories" who had favored open voting was Carlos Saavedra Lamas.

On November 1, 1878,¹ when Carlos Alberto Saavedra Lamas was born, he automatically met all the requirements for membership into the oligarchy. Entrance required money, above all, but the highest social strata was open only to those who demonstrated an historically acceptable heritage. His parents were Mariano Saavedra Zabeleta, a prominent and wealthy lawyer, and Lucia Lamas, both of whom possessed distinguished Argentine names. Although the Lamas name was well known in literary circles, the apellido "Saavedra" provided the bedrock upon which his heritage lay. In 1810, his great grandfather, Cornelio Saavedra had led the provisional junta governing the Viceroyalty of La Plata from which the independence movement sprang.

¹In William Belmont Parker, Argentines of To-Day originally published in 1920 (New York: Krause Reprint Corp., 1967), pp. 675-676, the author gives the year of birth as 1880. Saavedra Lamas' sister, Señora Saavedra Lamas de Pueyrredón confirmed the 1878 date, Letter, Silvia Pueyrredón to John F. Bratzel, March 4, 1974.

His gra

governor

preside

Be

There v

inherit

added

pressur

family

clear.

herita

Right,

D

filled

father

prep s

because

city l

the su

In the

accor

2

Pueyrri

3

Provir

His grandfather was D. Mariano Saavedra who had been governor of Buenos Aires Province during and after the presidency of Mitre.

Balancing this obvious advantage, was responsibility. There was the expectation that anyone born with such an inheritance would be highly successful and would bring added prestige to the family. The result was constant pressure on Carlos to achieve and as the only boy in a family with five children, the necessity was even more clear. His father constantly reminded Carlos of his rich heritage and urged him forward with the admonition, "Be Right, Be Good, Study!"²

During his formative years, Carlos admirably fulfilled the requirements of his class and the advice of his father. At the Colegio Lacondaire, a private Buenos Aires prep school, Carlos enjoyed very high grades. Perhaps because he was so accomplished in school, he preferred city life in Buenos Aires to the comparative isolation of the summers spent on the family estancia in Santa Fe.³ In the city he could also enjoy the social life, and according to Julia Valentina Bunge, one of his

²Interview with Señora Silvia Saavedra Lamas de Pueyrredón, Buenos Aires, September 12, 1972.

³Ibid. The family owned four estancias in Santa Fe Province.

cont

While

his

was

Carl

ment

gove

Facu

of E

cate

mun

driv

fric

he

190

lew

tio

190

car
me

contemporaries, no party was complete without him.⁴ While Saavedra Lamas was attending the Colegio, however, his father died, placing added pressure on Carlos, for he was now head of the family. Despite this added burden, Carlos was presented with a medal for scholastic achievement upon graduation.

Like many young men who aspired to high positions in government or business, Carlos chose to attend the Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Exactas of the University of Buenos Aires. His earlier scholastic success was duplicated, as he won the gold medal for his thesis Sistema municipal en la capital de la República.⁵ His intense drive to succeed, however, had its drawbacks. A life-long friend, Jacobo Wainer, related that Carlos became ill when he received only nine of a possible ten on an examination.⁶

Following the completion of his college training in 1903, Saavedra Lamas chose to lecture at the University level. He credited the newly adopted competitive examination program for his success in attaining a position as

⁴Julia Valentina Bunge, Vida, Época Maravillosa, 1903-1911 (Buenos Aires: Emecé Editores, 1965), p. 113.

⁵Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Sistema municipal en la capital de la República (Buenos Aires: Compañía sud-americana de billetes de banco, 1903).

⁶La Nación, June 24, 1962.

Prof

Letr

scie

recl

came

reta

rela

In 1

the

the

the

Aire

sobr

cap

Aire

in .

Dep

tra

Saa

Car

191

fin

Cas

Professor of Sociology in the Facultad de Filosofía y Letras at the University of Buenos Aires. Due to his scientific orientation and the fact that he was the first recipient of the chair of Sociology, his positivist views came under constant attack.⁷ He was, however, able to retain his position and continue teaching courses on labor relations and public finance.

Nevertheless, he did not stay in teaching for long. In 1906, at the age of twenty-eight, he was appointed by the Consejo Deliberante as Director of Public Credit for the City of Buenos Aires. The following year, he accepted the office of Secretary of the Municipality of Buenos Aires. He also published a short tome entitled Informe sobre la situación financiera de la municipalidad de la capital⁸ detailing his views on the finances of Buenos Aires.

Saavedra Lamas left the administration of Buenos Aires in 1908 when he was elected to the Argentine House of Deputies on the Conservative Party ticket. Despite its

⁷ Miguel Cané, a Francophile author in the romantic tradition, was Saavedra Lamas' detractor. See Carlos Saavedra Lamas, La personalidad universitaria del Dr. Carlos Octavio Bunge (Buenos Aires: L. J. Russo y Cía., 1919), p. 11.

⁸ Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Informe sobre la situación financiera de la municipalidad de la capital (Buenos Aires: Casa editora de A. Grau, 1907).

name
ing
posi
term
appo
the
pres
tion
son-
his
poli
voti
supp
for
towa

but
devo

sder
elic
poli
a fo
did
sens
with
Alro
Rose
eye

name, the party did have a liberal membership with reforming instincts. Thus, it was a perfect place for a young positivist. Saavedra Lamas was re-elected for a second term in 1912, but did not finish it. In 1915, he was appointed Secretary of Justice and Public Instruction in the cabinet of Victorino de la Plaza, who had assumed the presidency upon the death of Roque Sáenz Peña. The indications are he received the appointment because he was the son-in-law of Sáenz Peña and de la Plaza wanted to assuage his supporters.⁹ In 1916, Saavedra Lamas left elective politics. The reason is not clear, but the extension of voting to the entire male population, which Saavedra Lamas supported, suggests that he believed that the new voters for a few years, at least, would not be positively disposed toward his class and himself.

As a private citizen, Saavedra Lamas practiced law, but because of his financial independence, he was able to devote much of his time to scholastic and research endeavors.

⁹While a Deputy, Saavedra Lamas met and married Rosa Sáenz Peña. As a wealthy man from a good family he was eligible to court the daughter not only of a very prominent politician, but also the granddaughter of Luis Sáenz Peña, a former President of Argentina. Because Saavedra Lamas did, in fact, marry the boss's daughter, he was extremely sensitive to the cynical gossip which existed. Interview with Señora Silvia Saavedra Lamas de Pueyrredón, Buenos Aires, September 12, 1972. An interview was conducted with Rosa Sáenz Peña de Saavedra Lamas, but due to her advanced age, her memory was inaccurate.

law
rai
to :
bef
Lan
are
edu
Arg
app
Air
ets
suc
Eur
Lef
fal
An
one
tha
cou
rec
imp
in
—
pp

He published massive works in such diverse fields as labor law, analysis of social treaties, international law, and railroad legislation. He also delivered numerous speeches to scholarly groups. Through these works, and his efforts before the Chamber of Deputies, a clear picture of Saavedra Lamas' thinking emerges. His efforts fall into four major areas: Argentine economic development, international law, education and the distribution of the voting franchise.

Argentine Economic Development

Saavedra Lamas' first public pronouncement on economics appeared in his report on the financial position of Buenos Aires. The most significant assertion was that sports tickets be taxed in lieu of a small import duty. He noted that such a duty would be harmful to the economy and might cause European nations to raise their tariffs on Argentine beef. Left unstated was the assumption that a tax on imports would fall more heavily on the wealthy who bought foreign goods. An idea which was of secondary importance in his report, but one which he would develop in detail later, was his hope that future immigrants to Argentina would move to the countryside instead of remaining in Buenos Aires. In that regard, he lauded the work of the national government in improving the infrastructure and educational opportunities in the provinces in order to attract immigrants.¹⁰

¹⁰ Saavedra Lamas, situación financiera., particularly pp. 6 and 28.

gran

he

It i

in

cerr

thar

disc

disc

naci

de

Saa

Min

Ita

she

with

slor

char

Conn

Saa

neco

and

the

to

ind

poig

The

dub

to

sta

wou

dip

que

the

tha

rel

anc

cat

the

tha

opt

The first problem, however, was to obtain the immigrants. Consequently, when Saavedra Lamas became a Deputy, he devoted considerable effort to immigration treaties. It is not strange, therefore, that while on a trip to Italy in February, 1910 he sounded out the Italian government concerning immigration. Although he had no accreditation other than that implicit in his position as Deputy, Saavedra Lamas discussed the whole matter with the Italian government.¹¹

¹¹ See Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Problemas de gobierno: discursos pronunciados en la cámara de diputados de la nación (Buenos Aires: Compañía sud-americana de billetes de banco, 1916), pp. 179-216. As part of the negotiations Saavedra Lamas sent a letter to Luigi Luzzati, the Italian Minister of Commerce. He began his letter by stating that Italy had the right to control emmigration and suggested she sign a pact with Argentina similar to the one signed with France in 1906. He noted that Argentine social provisions were not as modern as France's, but these could be changed to insure that the emmigrants would not suffer. Concerning the propaganda used to entice the Italians, Saavedra Lamas was very apolegetic, but concluded it was a necessary evil. On the question of traveling conditions and citizenship, Saavedra Lamas was very vague. Both of these were volatile issues and one suspects he was willing to leave these matters to others. Finally, Saavedra Lamas indicated the need for Argentine officials at embarkation points to insure no anarchists were allowed into Argentina. The "gaucho republic" had anarchist movements and movements dubbed anarchist, and even a "liberal tory" had no desire to introduce new radical elements.

The Italian reply came from two people. Luzzati stated that were Saavedra Lamas properly accredited, he would present his proposals to the cabinet, a singularly diplomatic, but meaningless response. Of much more consequence, was a letter from Professor Pasquale Fiore detailing the Italian position on citizenship. Basically, he observed that citizenship based upon geographical location was a relic of feudalism and that the method of determination by ancient Rome, parental heritage, was superior. He did indicate, however, willingness to compromise. He suggested that the Argentine system be generally accepted with the proviso that when an Italo-Argentine returned to Italy, he have the option of regaining Italian citizenship easily.

the
the
Ital
natl
bode
ther
Arge
Saav
acce
tric
coul
Cane
inst
man
set
at
a d
nif
dat

slo
la
Arg
fac
his
vit
tio
as
Saa

Upon returning from Italy, Saavedra Lamas presented the results of his work regarding Italian immigration to the Chamber of Deputies. He began by pointing out that Italy was making great strides in education and industrialization. This development, according to Saavedra Lamas, boded ill for the continuation of Italian immigration since there would be little excess population available for Argentina. What made this situation very discouraging for Saavedra Lamas was that he saw Argentina on the verge of accelerated economic development with immigration as the trigger. Proof that immigration was of critical importance could be found in the economic growth of the United States, Canada, and Australia. Therefore, as he saw it, two legal instruments were needed: a treaty with Italy to obtain as many people as possible, and an internal law regulating settlement of the newly arrived foreigners. Consequently, at the next session of Congress, Saavedra Lamas presented a detailed plan for immigration settlement. Its most significant provision required that agents of the newly mandated railroads act as colonizers along its path.¹²

¹²Ibid., pp. 348-497. All Saavedra Lamas' congressional statements also appear in the Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados, which served as the record for the Argentine legislature. Complicating this situation, is the fact that Saavedra Lamas privately published a number of his congressional projects and speeches in separate volumes with different titles than those appearing in the aforementioned works. For example, his Economica Colonial appears as "ley de colonizacion" in Problemas de Gobierno.... Saavedra Lamas' tendency to publish something about virtually

The pro

Italy'

Also, ,

little

long a

F

saaved

a book

tipo s

more p

Aires

he pre

laws.

from t

which

of the

He als

areas,

land,

seldor

laiss

ment

ible

speco

every

hard

The proposed plan, however, was never accepted due to Italy's prohibition on emmigration to Argentina in 1911-1912. Also, since the issue of the day was the voting franchise, little time could be devoted to the study of Saavedra Lamas' long and detailed report.

Following his departure from the House of Deputies, Saavedra Lamas continued his interest in immigration. In a book published in 1922, Tratados internacionales de tipo social..., he began by asserting that Argentina needed more people, but that there were too many people in Buenos Aires and not enough in the provinces. The situation, as he perceived it, could only be rectified by new settlement laws. According to Saavedra Lamas, the problem stemmed from the "governing classes" referring to the old oligarchy, which was wasting enormous tracts of land. Further, much of the remainder had fallen into the hands of speculators. He also noted that railroads were pushing into the wrong areas, causing further disequilibrium. The auctioning of land, he claimed, was not the answer because the immigrant seldom had much money. He concluded, therefore, that a laissez faire policy hindered settlement and that government controls must be used to give the immigrant the accessible land. Even though quite liberal sounding in his speech, Saavedra Lamas stopped well short of suggesting

everything he was involved in shows great dedication and hard work, but also demonstrates a great vanity.



exp

in

men

men

men

ent

aro

on

que

ave

in

any

ab

pr

in

fi

es

es

ti

ti

ti

ti

ti

ti

ti

ti

ti

ti

ti

expropriation. The answer lay, according to the ex-Deputy in distributing unused land to the new arrivals with payments deferred until the newcomers were settled.¹³

Still another work dealing with the economic development of Argentina was his massive volume published in 1918 entitled Los ferrocarriles ante la legislación positiva argentina. Although basically a highly legalistic treatise on railroad legislation, Saavedra Lamas did confront the question of foreign investment. In his work he expressly avoided the presumption that foreign investment was required in Argentina. The fact that he did not reject it or offer any alternatives to foreign investment leads to the inescapable conclusion that he simply could not bring himself to pronounce the unpleasant truth--Argentina needed foreign investment. In fact, the vast majority of his six hundred fifty page text dealt with how it should be controlled.¹⁴

In the general realm of economics another major interest of Saavedra Lamas' was the changing nature of labor

¹³Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Tratados internacionales de tipo social, las convenciones sobre emigración y trabajo, perspectivas que representan para los países sudamericanos y especialmente para la república argentina, conferencias de Washington y Ginebra (Buenos Aires: Facultad de derecho y ciencias sociales, 1922). A French translation was published in Paris by A. Pedone in 1924.

¹⁴Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Los ferrocarriles ante la legislación positiva argentina (Buenos Aires: L. J. Rosso y Cía, 1918).

rela

Los

ment

of a

The

with

work

advoc

receiv

duce

1924

La

Alti

str:

caus

hou

tion

and

the

ali

abl

ist

arg
ment

relations. He detailed his views in a 1922 work entitled Los asalariados en la república argentina. In it he lamented the end of the old "patrón" system and the arrival of an adversary relationship between capital and labor. The worker, he contended, should have a close association with the owner and be able to maintain some control over working conditions. To remedy the situation Saavedra Lamas advocated a profit sharing arrangement. The employee would receive a regular salary, but it would be augmented or reduced depending upon the profits of the company.¹⁵

In much the same liberal vein, Saavedra Lamas, in 1926, discussed the whole question of labor strikes in La huelga de la industria carbonera en inglaterra. Although avoiding a detailed discussion of the cause of the strike referred to in the title, he did maintain it was caused by management's decision to lower pay and increase hours. Socialists, he claimed, saw this event as confirmation of their fears. Saavedra Lamas, however, disagreed and pointed to the ability of England's democracy to handle the situation. Even when the Socialists called for nationalization, the ex-Deputy noted, the House of Commons was able to debate the plan calmly. Far from upholding Socialist ideas, Saavedra Lamas contended that the handling of

¹⁵ Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Los asalariados en la república argentina (Buenos Aires: Librería y casa editora de Jesús Menéndez, 1922).

the

in s

publ

vere

gove

ment

soci

inte

the

stat

list

mail

tion

stat

that

desc

velo

ecoo

ach

pop

car

Uni


the strike demonstrated the efficacy of democracy.¹⁶

He then offered his views on the role of government in strikes and more specifically, walkouts involving the public interest. Saavedra Lamas believed that labor strikes were a natural right and as such were recognized by many governments. He went on to remark, however, that governments have the duty to intervene if the interests of society are affected. In determining if governments should intervene, Saavedra Lamas counseled caution and only when the work performed was absolutely essential, should the state interfere. In defining "essential," Saavedra Lamas listed workers in public security, transportation, utilities, mail and certain basic industries. In conclusion, he cautioned against quick judgments and implied, but did not state, that the workers were often right.¹⁷ Considering that he wrote in 1926, Saavedra Lamas' ideas can only be described as forward looking.

In summarizing Saavedra Lamas' ideas on economic development, it is evident that above all he wanted an economically strong and socially modern Argentina. To achieve this end, according to Saavedra Lamas, a greater population was necessary and therefore he sought European

¹⁶ Carlos Saavedra Lamas, La huelga de la industria carbonera en Inglaterra (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad, 1926).

¹⁷ Ibid.



immigrants. Foreign investment, however, was also needed. Due to his nationalism, he was reticent about admitting that Argentina required it, but he would accept it if it were controlled. Saavedra Lamas also believed the needs of labor should be met as part of the advancement of society. Achievement of these goals, Saavedra Lamas argued, would lead to an orderly and progressive Argentina.

International Law

In July, 1909, Saavedra Lamas delivered his first major address regarding international law. It dealt with an arbitration treaty which had been negotiated with Italy in 1907, following the second Hague conference. It was subsequently presented to the Argentine congress where after a great deal of effort by Saavedra Lamas it was accepted in 1909. The arbitration agreement, however, was later proclaimed unconstitutional by the procurador general, Jaime Porter, and President Figueroa Alcorta allowed the treaty to die. In his 1909 speech Saavedra Lamas called for the resurrection of the accord and discussed some of the controversial sections. He concluded that the treaty was in the best tradition of Argentine juridical development. Singled out for criticism was the aforementioned procurador general, who based his opposition on the grounds that the treaty would infringe on Argentine sovereignty. Saavedra Lamas contended that because the constitution disallowed acts which

offended so
accepting o
assume that
able, but h
arbitration
Argentina f

Saaved
on the subj
his fellow
arbitration
lengthy spe
gress, anno
ineffectual
of the Ital
the area of
tion" of th
More than
tion demon
Saavedra L

Perha
al arbitra
early nego
pact with

18. Saa

19. Ibi

offended sovereignty, the issue need not be considered in accepting or rejecting a treaty.¹⁸ It is reasonable to assume that Saavedra Lamas knew his reasoning was questionable, but his main goal was to obtain acceptance of the arbitration pact. To that end he was successful, as Argentina finally adopted the treaty a year later.

Saavedra Lamas delivered another address in June, 1911 on the subject of arbitration. His main purpose was to prod his fellow delegates to renew their efforts on behalf of arbitration treaties. Consequently, he began this rather lengthy speech with a stinging attack on the Argentine congress, announcing to all that it was rapidly approaching ineffectualness. He affirmed categorically that the form of the Italian accord was the culmination of all efforts in the area of arbitration and was the "definitive consecration" of the efforts of the second Hague conference.¹⁹ More than anything else he did while a deputy, this declaration demonstrated the arrogance and vanity for which Saavedra Lamas was to become so well known.

Perhaps because of his intense interest in international arbitration in 1914 Saavedra Lamas was brought into the early negotiations pertaining to a proposed arbitration pact with France. Before its formal transmission the text

¹⁸Saavedra Lamas, Problemas de gobierno, pp. 2-19.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 123-148.

of the Arg
his opinio
Luis Murat
be replica
question o
exclusions
accord des
exception
in force
against a
arbitrate
being con
visions, I
interests
which was
Elihu Roo
Saavedra
American.
ence even
discussed
complete
Predictab
agreement
agreement

of the Argentine proposal was sent to Saavedra Lamas for his opinion. In his letter to the Foreign Minister, José Luis Muratue, Saavedra Lamas suggested the pact with Italy be replicated as closely as possible. On the critical question of infringement upon sovereignty, he proposed the exclusionary clause which had appeared in the Italian accord designating all disputes as arbitrable "with the exception of those affecting the constitutional provisions in force in one or the other states."²⁰ He counselled against allowing all issues, without qualification, to be arbitrated. He also opposed adding a clause which was being considered restricting not only constitutional provisions, but also those questions "affecting honor, vital interests or independence." Significantly, this clause, which was then in general use, had first been proposed by Elihu Root, the United States Secretary of State. Apparently Saavedra Lamas found it loathsome to use anything North American. He preferred to demonstrate Argentine independence even on rather small matters. Saavedra Lamas also discussed a number of other provisions and concluded with a complete formula he suggested be proposed to France. Predictably, it was a virtual duplicate of the Italian agreement. His work, however, went for naught, as no final agreement was reached between Argentina and France.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 148-178

Perhaps
when in 191
of Social S
Europe. He
by European
reasons.
was not th
upon which
perceiving
interests.

openness w

The f
according
World. He
the Americ
'artificia
not requir
He indica
for instr
provision
he held u
example o

21. Ca
curso del
cano de C
(Buenos A
may also
(Buenos A

Perhaps Saavedra Lamas was thinking of this failure, when in 1916 he delivered a speech to the American Congress of Social Science on international law and the war in Europe. He gave as the prime cause of the war the attempt by European nations to increase their territory for economic reasons. The failure of international law to prevent war was not the fault of the concept, but of the "fragile base" upon which it rested in Europe. He castigated Europe for perceiving treaties as only "transitory coordinations of interests." What was needed was international law based on openness which could prevent war.

The failure of European public law did not mean, according to Saavedra Lamas, that it was dead in the New World. He declared that the Old World was different from the Americas and that it was not necessary to create "artificial equilibriums." Imperialism, he asserted, was not required in the Americas because there was so much land. He indicated that Europe should now look to the New World for instruction in international law, including neutrality provisions. In contradistinction to his earlier stance, he held up the actions of the United States as a sterling example of impartiality.²¹

²¹ Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Problemas americanos; discurso del presidente en la inauguración del congreso americano de ciencias sociales en Tucumán el 6 de julio de 1916 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de Coni hermanos, 1916). This work may also be found in Por la paz de las Americas (Buenos Aires: Compañía Impresora Argentina, 1937), pp.

It is
internati
developme
deputies
ever poss
to predom
was shake
one of Eu
Americas
sang the
ture he
Nor pro-

Education

The
fested i
ject. I
he wrote
sidad de
educatio
according
not, how
scienti

21-40.
was ove
as the

It is clear that Saavedra Lamas had great faith in international law and believed Argentina should lead in its development and implementation. He chided his fellow deputies when he adjudged their efforts below par and, wherever possible, refused to allow concepts of other countries to predominate. When the whole concept of international law was shaken by World War I, he declared the problem to be one of European hypocrisy. He then willingly embraced the Americas and in terms reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine sang the praises of the New World. Although at this juncture he lauded the United States, he was not pro-American. Nor pro-European. He was pro-Argentine.

Education

The deep concern of Saavedra Lamas with education manifested itself early and he never lost interest in the subject. In 1912, while a member of the House of Deputies, he wrote an article, "Los estudios intensivos en la universidad de Buenos Aires," detailing his views on higher education. The present system of schooling in Argentina, according to Saavedra Lamas, should be abolished. It should not, however, duplicate the superior German system with its scientific orientation. Rather, the scientific orientation

21-40. Another reason Saavedra Lamas gave as a cause of war was overpopulation. Predictably, he suggested emmigration as the answer.

of the Ge
With a ne
change du
make prog
duty. So
and throu
it very c
success.

Class
Saavedra
listening
intensive
Monograph
vestigat
gested th
student

In
attempt
Minister
plan whi
degree.²

22
la unive
pp. 374-

23
the auth

of the German system should be adopted to Argentine reality. With a new system, which he believed would continue to change due to the laws of evolution, the Facultades could make progress in science. This, he believed, was their duty. Scholars would come together, pool their knowledge and through joint work, move closer to perfection. He made it very clear that a large library was a prerequisite to success.

Classes at such an institution could not consist, Saavedra Lamas indicated, as they had previously, of students listening to dogmatic statements. Instead study would be intensive with heavy student involvement on a narrow issue. Monographs, rather than textbooks, would be used and investigative techniques would be taught. Finally, he suggested there should be considerable interchange between student and teacher.²²

In August, 1915, Saavedra Lamas had an opportunity to attempt to put his programs into action when he became Minister of Justice and Public Instruction. He produced a plan which detailed the requirements for each type of degree.²³ The proposal, however, met with no success.

²² Carlos Saavedra Lamas, "Los estudios intensivos en la universidad de Buenos Aires," Atlantida, V (July, 1912), pp. 374-384.

²³ Official diagram of the program in the possession of the author.

Saavedra

debts; h

that he

believed

a differ

achieve

Saa

the Arge

in 1919,

Argentin

educatio

seconda

educati

economy

was, th

interio

be more

In

tion in

formaci

24

Pueyrre

Pueyrre

to fail

25

Saavedra Lamas' appointment was merely intended to pay old debts; he was not supposed to do anything. Also the fact that he was part of a caretaker government, which it was believed would be shortly supplanted by a new regime with a different political orientation, made his failure to achieve anything understandable.²⁴

Saavedra Lamas, however, maintained his interest in the Argentine educational structure. In a speech delivered in 1919, he stated categorically that public instruction in Argentina was incompetent. The problem was that primary education did not correlate with secondary education or secondary with superior. What was needed was vocational education. Saavedra Lamas pointed out that the Argentine economy was based upon beef and had little industry. It was, therefore, folly, as he saw it, to give people in the interior general education when technical education would be more useful.²⁵

In 1925, he returned to the problem of higher education in a short work entitled, La crisis universitaria y la formación de hombres de gobierno. Saavedra Lamas again

²⁴Interview with Señora Silvia Saavedra Lamas de Pueyrredón, Buenos Aires, September, 12, 1972. Señora Pueyrredón stated "political considerations" caused the plan to fail.

²⁵Saavedra Lamas, La personalidad universitaria.

chastized

was partic

Facultad,

another.

"Saxon" sy

between th

the "Saxon

Saavedra I

instituted

in Argent

thereby in

ties and

In h

demonstra

Argentina

the philo

ception o

Lamas was

tion.

The Votin

In 1

first dea

26.

formación

Peuser,

chastized the higher educational system of Argentina. He was particularly upset about the independence of each Facultad, which stifled the flow of ideas from one area to another. The remedy, according to Saavedra Lamas, was the "Saxon" system in which interchange of students was possible between the various departments of the University. Since the "Saxon" system would take time to put into practice, Saavedra Lamas proposed that special courses be temporarily instituted. These courses would deal with current problems in Argentine society and draw from all the Facultades, thereby increasing the movement of ideas in the universities and also training the leaders required by Argentina.²⁶

In his discussion of education, Saavedra Lamas clearly demonstrated his positivist orientation. Particularly in Argentina, scientific education was an integral part of the philosophy. With his scientific orientation and perception of long term evolutionary development, Saavedra Lamas was a leader in the development of Argentine education.

The Voting Franchise

In 1905 in his professional dissertation, Saavedra Lamas first dealt with the question of extending the franchise.

²⁶ Carlos Saavedra Lamas, La crisis universitaria y la formación de hombres de gobierno (Buenos Aires: Jacobo Peuser, Ltd., 1925).

Although h
ment of th
than it wo
cerned tha
acceptance
of voting
elections,
nations of
concluded
tion, but
accepted r
cated the
tion.

The s
in careful
pline. Ac
he posited
rights (i
chise. H
weighted,
amount pe
however,
the undef
tinct sta
elections

Although he supported the enfranchisement of a larger segment of the citizenry, his stance was considerably less open than it would be seven years later. Perhaps he was concerned that he would be labeled radical and fail to obtain acceptance of his dissertation. He began his discussion of voting by noting that Argentina suffered from fraudulent elections, but mitigated his response by charging that the nations of the western world also faced this problem. He concluded that such practices were insusceptible of extirpation, but his chief concern was that they might become the accepted norm. Regarding Argentina specifically, he indicated the major source of abuse lay in the immigrant population.

The solution, Saavedra Lamas believed, was to be found in careful study, based on the new social science discipline. Acknowledging that free elections were dangerous, he posited the need for a plan which protected minority rights (i.e., the oligarchy) but still broadened the franchise. He pointed out that votes were only counted, not weighted, and opined that they should be apportioned on the amount people contributed. Monetary wealth, he concluded, however, was not an accurate gauge. Instead, he proposed the undefined criteria of efficacy and utility. His indistinct standards led to a vague final plan calling for open elections of an intermediate body which would then choose

the gov

Th

Lamas w

male su

demonst

sition.

that el

ments c

larly w

in prov

Saavedr

voting

S

fore C

evolut

oppose

August

conclu

The la

to the

lower

even i

a step

seded

the government officials.²⁷

The luxury of being indefinite was lost by Saavedra Lamas when in 1910 President Roque Sáenz Peña proposed full male suffrage. Perhaps more than at any other time he demonstrated his positivist nature by supporting the proposition. The oligarchy knew when Sáenz Peña was elected that electoral reform would follow, but recalcitrant elements of the Congress still bitterly opposed it, particularly when the mass based liberal parties did extremely well in provincial elections. It was this situation that led Saavedra Lamas in 1912 to deliver a detailed defense of the voting law.

Saavedra Lamas began his justification of the law before Congress by proclaiming it was a step in the natural evolution of society. Moreover, he pointed out that to oppose this act would be to oppose the positivist tenets of Auguste Comte. Failure to hold universal elections, he concluded, would be a disaster for the growth of Argentina. The law being proposed, he asserted, would bring Argentina to the level of European development and remove it from the lower levels of some (unnamed) Latin American nations. But even if it were a step in the right direction, it was only a step, an experiment, and it too would be eventually superseded as part of the natural development of society.

²⁷ Saavedra Lamas, Sistema municipal.

On
for the
tina. I
motest a
It would
the pop
that his
the opp
dictate

As
obvious
organiz
contact
who emp
Saavedr
way for
States
the ex
Argent
libera
age wo
positi
wider
expect

On a more practical note, he indicated that a victory for the opposition parties would not be harmful for Argentina. It would demonstrate, he observed, even to the remotest areas, that the Argentine government could be clean. It would also stimulate the democratic, orderly impulses of the population and prevent uprisings. His conclusion was that his fellow delegates should not worry, because once the opposition controlled the government, reality would dictate a moderation of views.²⁸

As a member of the Argentine oligarchy, Saavedra Lamas obviously desired that it continue as a powerful and stable organization. His education, however, had brought him into contact with the doctrines of Comte and Herbert Spencer, who emphasized the orderly progression of society. For Saavedra Lamas, the ideas of these philosophers pointed the way for reform in Argentina. The success of the United States and the military and economic power of Europe were the examples of the kind of achievement he desired for Argentina. His problem was how to achieve the status and liberalism of the developed nations which universal suffrage would bring, while insuring that his own and his family's position were not significantly altered. In voting for a wider franchise, it is evident that Saavedra Lamas did not expect a radical change in Argentina or in his status, but

²⁸ Saavedra Lamas, Problemas de gobierno, pp. 690-710.

that he
arially,

I
passag

of the

The po

Lamas,

Trigoy

compar

despit

aristo

when Y

increa

provec

time

the Y

order

troub

"inst

refor

the f

and d

gener

inter
in Bu

that he did realize he was surrendering at least temporarily any chance of elective office.

In the 1916 presidential election, the first since the passage of the Sáenz Peña election law, Hipólito Yrigoyen of the Unión Civica Radical (UCR) party was chosen president. The policies he followed were not approved of by Saavedra Lamas, although his writings contain no direct reference to Yrigoyen. Yrigoyen's successor, Marcelo T. Alvear, was comparatively more palatable to Saavedra Lamas because, despite his membership in the UCR, he was a wealthy landed aristocrat.²⁹ Saavedra Lamas, however, was vexed in 1928 when Yrigoyen again assumed the presidency, and his disdain increased when due to advanced age (seventy-six) Yrigoyen proved incapable of controlling his administration at a time of economic depression in Argentina.

In September, 1930, General José F. Uriburu overthrew the Yrigoyen government. Uriburu's goal was to establish order, particularly in the field of finance and in the trouble ridden universities. He also proposed an "institutional reorganization of the Republic by means of reforming the constitution so it could defend the country in the future [against] personalism, centralism, the oligarchy and demagoguery." Uriburu was, in essence, proposing a general restructuring of the Argentine political system.

²⁹ Saavedra Lamas' view of these two men came in an interview with Señora Silvia Saavedra Lamas de Pueyrredón in Buenos Aires, September 12, 1972.

The

ati

The

all

sec

was

opp

Uri

the

qu

la

th

de

st

19

P.

ba

Ho

t.

up

S

p

The Uriburistas wanted to turn the country into a corporatist state where a national elite would be in charge. There would be no political parties such as had traditionally existed in Argentina; personal liberties would take second place to the interests of the state. Saavedra Lamas was in general sympathy with Uriburu's intentions, but he opposed his methods (i.e., long term military control).³⁰

In order to legitimize and strengthen his government, Uriburu allowed a series of local elections. He assumed that the UCR would not be able to reorganize itself quickly enough to successfully oppose him. This miscalculation proved to be Uriburu's undoing because the UCR won the elections, thus discrediting his government. This development, coupled with ill health, persuaded Uriburu to step down and call a presidential election for November 1931.

The clear choice of the military was General Agustín P. Justo, who although a soldier, wished to maintain the basic structure of traditional Argentine government. However, since he needed more than just the army, a coalition of political parties called the Concordancia was set up. It included members of the Conservative, Independent, Socialist, and Antipersonalist parties. Under the latter party, Justo had been the minister of war. The Radical

³⁰ Ibid.

Party

to a

Their

Nich

exam

by i

in c

Urik

olig

1866

lon

as

and

for

was

and

Sar

ch

no

mo

La

De

19

Pe

fo

de

A

Party "chose" not to run a candidate, so opposition fell to a coalition of the Progressive Democrats and Socialists. Their ticket was composed of Lisandro de la Torre and Nicholás Repetto. The 1931 election was not a sterling example of the democratic process; it was in fact marked by illegality and corruption. Because the army was still in control of many important cabinet posts in the outgoing Uriburu administration, Justo's election was assured.³¹

Justo and most of his cabinet were from the wealthy oligarchical families which had controlled Argentina from 1862-1916. As José Luís de Imaz put it, "one simply belonged in government by right of ascription." Consequently, as a member of a well established family, both politically and financially, Saavedra Lamas was by definition eligible for a position. He had demonstrated skill in Congress and was well known as an eloquent speaker. Moreover, he liked and disliked the proper people. According to Dr. Pablo Santos Muñoz, a foreign office employee who eventually

³¹The discussion of Argentine events to 1932 is taken chiefly from the following work, except where otherwise noted: Alberto Ciria, Partidos y poder en la Argentina moderna (1930-1946) (Buenos Aires, 1968); Carlos Pérez, ed., La década infame (Buenos Aires, 1969); Marvin Goldwert, Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1966; An Interpretation (Austin, Texas, 1972); Robert A. Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928-1945 (Stanford, California, 1969); Jorge Abelardo Ramos, El sexto dominio (Buenos Aires, 1972); James R. Scobie, Argentina, A City and a Nation (New York, 1964), and Arthur P. Whitaker, Argentina (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964).

became

office

appoint

provide

brother

her fac

Th

rhetor.

suppli

of off

played

allied

nifica

resign

What e

but it

I

Lamas

an app

reali

virtu

conti

Saave

the r

broth

became Saavedra Lamas' assistant, the staff of the foreign office was not the least bit surprised when he was appointed Foreign Minister. Perhaps Saavedra Lamas' sister provided the clearest answer to the question, why was your brother chosen? The reply (complete with shocked look on her face), was "Why not?"

There were, however, others about which the same rhetorical question could be asked. Unfortunately no source supplies the details surrounding Saavedra Lamas' assumption of office. One point, however, is clear, family connections played a significant part. The Saavedra Lamas family was allied through marriage to the Pueyrredóns.³² It is significant to note, therefore, that Honorio Pueyrredón had resigned as Foreign Minister a scant four years earlier. What effect this alliance had is impossible to determine, but it should not be discounted.

In retrospect, it is probable that in 1916 Saavedra Lamas believed he would be returning relatively quickly to an appointive or even elective position. Argentina would realize that he was the best qualified man available for virtually every post. The Radical Party, however, had continued in office. Consequently, when a chance came for Saavedra Lamas to obtain a prominent position even though the regime had entered through election fraud, he accepted

³²Saavedra Lamas' sister married Carlos Pueyrredón, brother of Honorio Pueyrredón.

it. In

cabinet

sons why

not as e

be later

an almo

had the

Lamas m

ably be

positio

33

Septemb
the las

it. In fact, he became a leading exponent in the Justo cabinet of fixing elections.³³ There were also other reasons why Saavedra Lamas accepted the position. Although not as evident in his first fifty-three years as it would be later, Saavedra Lamas suffered from a great vanity and an almost all-consuming drive for personal fame. He also had the pressure of the family name. Finally, Saavedra Lamas must have realized that at his age there would probably be no other opportunities to hold a high government position.

³³ Interview with Miguel Angel Cárcano in Buenos Aires, September 8, 1972. Cárcano was Minister of Agriculture in the last half of the Justo regime.

Saave

V

(the

de R

tion

of w

eign

lead

the

Saav

tenu

des:

Exce

fac

Arg

Saa

pub

Acc

CHAPTER 2

THE DECLARATIONS OF AUGUST

Saavedra Lamas Takes Office

When Saavedra Lamas walked into the Anchorena Palace (the Foreign Ministry) for the first time as the Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (Minister of Foreign Relations and Worship) he had the benefit (or curse) of a set of well established goals and patterns for Argentine foreign policy. His predecessors had perceived of Argentina leading a Latin American coalition in counterpoise to both the United States and the Western European nations. Saavedra Lamas continued this orientation throughout his tenure as Foreign Minister.

Besides the aforementioned goal, Saavedra Lamas had a desire to gain personal fame in Argentina and the world. Except near the end of his tenure, he was able to enjoy the fact that there was no animosity between the aims of Argentina and the aims of himself. While it is true that Saavedra Lamas had an incredible vanity, his drive for publicity was also motivated by other considerations. According to Miguel Angel Cárcano, in the first years of

Justo

tende

The r

among

obser

have

any

1935

Mini

ress

fall

line

Soci

he

serv

ini

cho

Ant

Min

Aug

Ria

Per

Oc

Justo's administration, Saavedra Lamas was a leading contender to succeed the General as president of the Republic.¹ The realization that he would have to gain some notoriety among the bourgeois element might account for some of the obsessive headline hunting. Some of his vanity may also have had its basis in his compulsive drive to succeed. In any case, Saavedra Lamas pushed too hard, because in late 1935, Justo became upset when it appeared his Foreign Minister was overshadowing him and not producing any progress in important matters.² The Chancellor's subsequent fall from grace did not deter him. He still chased headlines and attempted to make friends with elements of the Socialist Party in order to gain support for the Presidency; he failed because in the opinion of Cárcano he was "too conservative and a bad politician."³

As the new Foreign Minister, one of Saavedra Lamas' initial tasks was to secure a staff. The first man he chose was Daniel Antekoletz, an expert in international law. Antekoletz's principal function was to supply his Foreign Minister with the historical and legal justification to back

¹Interview with Miguel Angel Cárcano, Buenos Aires, August 31, 1972.

²Ibid., and interview with Miguel Angel Cárcano, Buenos Aires, October 13, 1972. Cárcano was referring to the Chaco Peace talks to be discussed later in this study.

³Interview with Miguel Angel Cárcano, Buenos Aires, October 13, 1972.

up the

the Ant

authore

aides,

concern

Lamas r

ferenc:

A. Pod

He was

the Ch

of Saa

came a

backup

Al

tight.

Minis

Podes

one c

Lamas

4

August

5

The f

Mini.

L. J.

auth

up the policies Saavedra Lamas chose to follow. For example, the Anti-War Pact, to be discussed later, was virtually authored in its entirety by Antekoletz.⁴ Another of his aides, Alejandro Bunge saw to the publication of material concerning foreign office activities for which Saavedra Lamas received the credit. He wrote, for example, La conferencia interamericana de consolidación de la paz.⁵ Luís A. Podestá Costa acted as the Foreign Minister's "man Friday." He was entrusted with the important meetings and functions the Chancellor could not attend himself. In the later part of Saavedra Lamas' tenure, Dr. Pablo Santo Muñoz also became an important member of his coterie, principally as a backup man for Podestá Costa.

Although these people were important, Saavedra Lamas tightly controlled the direction and policy of the Foreign Ministry. Antekoletz might find the legal precedent, and Podestá Costa might enunciate the Argentine position, but one could be assured that little transpired without Saavedra Lamas' prior agreement. Even Justo had little to do with

⁴Interview with Miguel Angel Cárcano, Buenos Aires, August 31, 1972.

⁵(Buenos Aires, 1938.) This work was published twice. The first listed no author other than the Argentine Foreign Ministry. The second edition cited here was published by L. J. Rosso and proudly proclaims Saavedra Lamas as the author.

the m

that

ever

further

any i

actua

Pard

summe

Lama

carr

beca

even

care

deba

abi.

Aug

Aug

Air

Saa

Min

Aug

the machinations of the foreign office. Cárcano observed that the President "gave him a free hand. No pressure was ever on him and no one influenced him."⁶ Santos Muñoz went further, stating: "Carlos Saavedra Lamas would not allow any interference, even from Justo, and was very strong, actually making all his own decisions."⁷ Edward Tomás Pardo, the head of the Argentine Foreign Service Institute, summed up the impressions others had given him of Saavedra Lamas: "He was a strongman who formed opinions himself and carried them out himself--no one was allowed to interfere."⁸

Apparently Saavedra Lamas relished his independence, because he seldom reported what he was doing. Conceivably even when Saavedra Lamas did report, there were few who cared to challenge him. If nothing else, he was a consonant debater. Cárcano used the term "fantastic" to describe his ability in this area.⁹ Because of his great facility with

⁶Interview with Miguel Angel Cárcano, Buenos Aires, August 31, 1972.

⁷Interview with Pablo Santos Muñoz, Buenos Aires, August 31, 1972.

⁸Interview with Ambassador Eduardo Tomás Pardo, Buenos Aires, August 25, 1972. The only direct recollection of Saavedra Lamas that Ambassador Pardo has is the Foreign Minister playing "trains" with him when he was seven.

⁹Interview with Miguel Angel Cárcano, Buenos Aires, August 31, 1972.

the spe
and his

In
demons

his ea

and ar

hours

who we

Saaved

sulted

even h

Th

charac

Charg

from

'he n

Saave

cloth

ninet

natic

1

1

Aires

Aires

d'Af

in 1

the spoken word, he captivated the press. He personally, and his policies, always enjoyed favorable treatment.¹⁰

In his duties as Foreign Minister, Saavedra Lamas demonstrated the same dedication and hard work that marked his earlier endeavors. He often worked late into the night and arose early in the morning, taking only four or five hours of sleep. This practice created havoc with his staff who were often summoned to work in the middle of the night. Saavedra Lamas did have a watch which he constantly consulted, but the watch had been broken for years and did not even have hands.¹¹

The conduct of the office under Saavedra Lamas was characteristically very formal. Felipe Jiménez de Asua, Chargé d'Affaires for the Spanish embassy in Buenos Aires from 1936 to 1938, stated that Saavedra Lamas never relaxed, "he never forgot he was Chancellor."¹² He noted that Saavedra Lamas, with his high starched collar, old fashioned clothing and stiff demeanor was like a figure out of the nineteenth century. At the weekly meetings with the diplomatic corps, the officials accredited to Argentina had to

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Interview with Ambassador Eduardo Tomás Pardo, Buenos Aires, August 31, 1972.

¹² Interview with Dr. Felipe Jiménez de Asua, Buenos Aires, October 4, 1972. Dr. Jiménez de Asua was Chargé d'Affaires of the Spanish government accredited to Argentina in 1936-1968.

be ca.

easil

cello

only

Jimén

the C

The C

decis

the

Boli

land

on t

east

tenc

roug

ica.

use

ind

ly

the

and

be careful because Saavedra Lamas was highly sensitive and easily offended.¹³ At these conferences, only the Chancellor talked, everyone else listened, and questions could only be interjected while he was lighting a cigarette. Jiménez de Asua commented, rather sardonically, that luckily the Chancellor was a chain smoker.¹⁴

The Chaco Dispute

As Chancellor, Saavedra Lamas' first opportunity for decisive action concerned the ever worsening situation in the Chaco which had become an explosive issue between Bolivia and Paraguay. The Chaco is a pie shaped piece of land of approximately 115,000 square miles. It is bordered on the south and west by the Pilcomayo River and on the east by the Paraguay River. The northwestern boundary extends up to the Parapetí River in Bolivia. The land can be roughly divided into three regions. In the north is a tropical forest covered with quebracho trees which are very useful in the production of tannin used in the tanning industry. Further south, the forest gives way to a generally grassy plain interspersed with jungle. Finally, along the Pilcomayo, is a swampy area from sixty to one hundred and twenty miles wide. This region is subject to

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

devasta

Sim

or rich

lineate

area.

of the

Chaco

(1864-

Argent

day Vi

and de

quent.

tense

W

Argen

from

bound

Treat

Beni

due

ment

the

prod

Hist

devastating floods.¹⁵

Since the area has no precious metals, indigenous labor, or rich agricultural land, the Spanish never clearly delineated which colonial administrative unit governed the area. The same was true of the newly established nations of the revolutionary era. The question of who owned the Chaco first came up during the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870). At that time the conflict centered on an Argentine claim to the area around Villa Occidental (present-day Villa Hayes). President Rutherford B. Hayes arbitrated and decided in favor of Paraguay. This award would subsequently be a very important talking point for Paraguay in tense negotiations between 1927 and 1933.

With the Hayes decision, the Chaco appeared safe from Argentine encroachment, but the Bolivians began to move in from the north. Three attempts were made to arrive at a boundary between Bolivia and Paraguay: the Quijarro-Decoud Treaty of 1879; the Tamayo-Hicual Treaty of 1887; and the Benitez-Ichazo Treaty of 1894. They all failed, however, due to technicalities, rather than substantive disagreements. At this juncture, Argentina had stepped in and under the tutelage of her Foreign Minister, Estanislao Zeballos, produced the Pinilla-Soler Protocol (1907). The accord

¹⁵Ronald S. Main, "Behind the Chaco War," Current History, 42, No. 5 (August, 1935), 468-469.

called

tions

Argen

arbit

other

not

she

Atla

proc

tion

be

dem

bor

Mu

the

se

qu

No

di

di

o

t

m

-

s

called for the disputed area to be divided into three sections, the center one to be arbitrated by the President of Argentina. Even if Paraguay lost all of the land to be arbitrated, she would have gained more than any of the other treaties had granted her. Moreover, Bolivia would not be assured of an opening to the Paraguay River, which she desperately wanted in order to send her products to the Atlantic. Predictably enough, Paraguay ratified and Bolivia procrastinated. A subsequent rupture of diplomatic relations with Argentina destroyed any hope that the pact would be accepted by La Paz. The Argentine actions in 1906-1907 demonstrated an obvious partiality to her Paraguayan neighbor. Thirty years later this bias would still exist.

To these four failures, a fifth was added. The Ayala-Mujía Protocol of 1913 called for both nations to maintain the status quo in the Chaco while working towards a final settlement. Failing an agreement in two years, the whole question would then be arbitrated by an unspecified party. No definite accord was reached by 1915, but the disputants did agree to extend the deadline for one more year. They did so again in 1916, 1917, and 1918. 1919 marked the end of the official policy of talk without result and a shift to the policy of no talk at all. The position of the governments and peoples of the two countries was hardening.¹⁶

¹⁶For the story of the early attempts at settlement, see Leslie B. Rout, Jr., Politics of the Chaco Peace

Both

posts

1920

sout

exis

To m

have

woul

her

sha

ly

hos

the

int

di

De

Co

19

in

Ar

pc

(1

Fe

So

W

s

Both now began to construct a series of fortíns (small outposts) and to purchase arms.

Compromise became a less palatable alternative after 1920 with the discovery of oil in the Camiri region of southeastern Bolivia. It was assumed that petroleum also existed in the Chaco, and Bolivia dreamed of great wealth. To market the oil, however, Bolivia believed she had to have a port on the Paraguay River, but to attain that port would require negotiations with Paraguay which would assert her rights in the Chaco. Since Bolivia had no desire to share her unproven wealth, a resort to arms became virtually inevitable.

It was not long before a major incident between the hostile forces took place.¹⁷ A 1927 incident brought another mediation from Argentina, but this failed due to general intransigence on the part of both principals. After this diplomatic failure, more serious fighting broke out. On December 5, 1928, the Paraguayans attacked Fortín Vanguardia

Conference, 1935-1939 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971), pp. 9-14. A more comprehensive discussion of events, including copies of the various treaties, can be found in Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, La política argentina en la guerra del Chaco, I, pp. 1-115.

¹⁷David H. Zook, Jr. The Conduct of the Chaco War (New Haven, Conn.: Bookman Associates, 1960), p. 43. On February 25, 1927 a small Paraguayan scouting party led by Second Lieutenant Rojas Silva was captured by the Bolivians when it ventured too close to Fortín Sorpresa. Silva was shot when he tried to escape.

and t

Boque

the

tion

ther

no c

want

ceiv

offi

Par

Con

Was

the

and

ce

up

Ar

co

fi

"W

re

of

Co

S

and the Bolivians responded with an attack on Fortín Boquerón nine days later.¹⁸ At the time of this incident, the International Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration was meeting in Washington. In fact, there can be little doubt that the timing of the attack was no coincidence. Paraguay was anxious to avoid war and wanted the intervention of other countries. Paraguay received what it desired when, on December 17, the body offered its good offices to the quasi-belligerents. Paraguay accepted immediately, but Bolivia demurred. Consequently, it was not until January, 1929, that the Washington Conference took charge. Its duty, according to the Protocol, was to identify the aggressor in the Boquerón and Vanguardia incidents while the disputants maintained a cease fire.

The Commission of Investigation and Conciliation¹⁹ set up by the Washington Conference was originally to include Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Uruguay and the United States.

¹⁸As a result of these two attacks, passions in both countries reached high limits. Bolivia was particularly filled with war sentiment, replete with crowds screaming, "We want war." Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁹For the significant documents and correspondence relating to the "Commission," see United States, Department of State, Report of the Chairman Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation, Bolivia and Paraguay (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1929).

Both Ar

Argenti

tendere

Argenti

however

First,

tion w

a grou

to los

fluid

influe

When t

consi.

Unite

signi

conte

month

place

to th

D.C.

I, 8

Boli

I, p

had

tion

had

Fore

Both Argentina and Brazil, however, declined the offer. Argentina's stated reason for refusal was that she had tendered good offices earlier with no success, and that Argentina's mission had terminated.²⁰ Two other factors, however, might have played key roles in this decision. First, Argentina did not wish to place herself in a position where her prestige was dependent upon the success of a group dominated by the United States; she would have much to lose and nothing to gain. Secondly, in a situation as fluid as the Chaco dispute, Argentina could exert more influence outside the strictures of a multi-lateral group. When the Commission membership was finally agreed upon it consisted of Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Uruguay and the United States. Considering subsequent developments, it is significant that none of the countries bordering upon the contending nations were on the Commission.

From August, 1929, until its authorization expired six months later, the Commission met with no success. Its replacement, the Committee of Neutrals, did no better.

²⁰United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1934), I, 829-830. The proposal by Argentina had been rejected by Bolivia, see, U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1928, I, p. 684. Subsequently Irigoyen commented that Argentina had turned down the offer to "avoid being placed in the position of seeking to accomplish by circuitous means what he had failed to do by direct offer," U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1929, I, p. 684.

The

prom

from

she

tio

bri

obt

aft

of

to

loc

be

Ar

Al

Mi

At

re

di

wi

o

s

I

The contentious nations were simply not interested in compromise. Adding to the trouble of both mediating bodies from 1929-31 was the policy of Argentina. On two occasions she disrupted the talks, by attempting to wrest the mediation effort from the United States' dominated groups and bring them to Buenos Aires.²¹

Saavedra Lamas when he took office also attempted to obtain control of the negotiations. Consequently, shortly after taking office on February 20, 1932 he began a series of diplomatic maneuvers aimed at bringing the negotiations to the Argentine capital. His plan was to begin discussions looking toward the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the quasi-belligerents. If he was successful, Argentine mediation of the dispute would follow in Buenos Aires.²² The plan was first proposed to the Paraguayan Minister to Argentina, Vicente Rivarola, on March 16, 1932. At that time, Saavedra Lamas said that joint intervention, referring to action with the Committee of Neutrals, was too difficult. Saavedra Lamas told Rivarola that he had to talk with the Bolivian Foreign Minister, José María Zalles, and

²¹For a discussion of the activities of the Committee of Neutrals prior to the time Saavedra Lamas took office, see Rout, Politics, 28-36.

²²Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política argentina, I, 261-262.

that a

decisi

He wen

disag

bias

that

ceed.

and i

strat

Parag

tied

diplo

ship

and e

Buenc

stant

Arger

stre

Para

Aire

word

Whee

to D

that any success the proposal might have was based on the decision of the President of Bolivia, Daniel Salamanca. He went on to describe Salamanca as "coarse, diffident, and disagreeable"²³ in an attempt to show Paraguay where his bias lay. Saavedra Lamas must have known, nevertheless, that there was little chance that this gambit would succeed.²⁴ If it did, however, he would be deemed a genius, and if it did not, he would lose nothing. In the end, his strategy failed and his proposal was not even accepted by Paraguay.

Notwithstanding this rejection, Paraguay was closely tied to Argentina, as demonstrated by Saavedra Lamas' undiplomatic statements concerning Salamanca. This relationship was historical in nature and based upon propinquity and economics. Paraguay was up the Paraguay River from Buenos Aires, so contact between the two peoples was constant. Also, the bulk of Paraguay's trade came through Argentina, creating strong economic ties. These were strengthened further by direct Argentine investments in Paraguay, particularly in the Chaco region.²⁵ The wealthy

²³Vicente Rivarola, Memorias diplomáticas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Ayacucho, 1952-1957), II, pp. 87-88. The words used were "tosco, huraño y reconcentrado."

²⁴U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/1758, Wheeler (Asunción) to Dept. of State, April 17, 1932.

²⁵Ibid., Decimal File 710G/118, Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, Jan. 1, 1933.

Argen

holdi

Casad

relat

featu

orien

cons

with

coun

Para

on A

mair

He

for

rea

val

Lam

act

Lar

arr

an

wo

wh

Argentine businessman Carlos Casado, for example, had major holdings in the Chaco, including the entire town of Puerto Casado.

Bolivia, on the other hand, had a virtual adversary relationship with Argentina. Because of geographical features western Bolivia which bordered on Argentina was oriented more toward Buenos Aires than La Paz. There was constant fear that the people in western Bolivia might join with Argentina. As a result, relations between the two countries were poor.

That Saavedra Lamas was decidedly prejudiced toward Paraguay can be seen in a conversation he had with Rivarola on April 14, 1932. The Argentine Chancellor, at that time, maintained that if war came, Argentina would be neutral. He further explained, however, that Argentina had a bias for Paraguay, but that it "cannot be revealed for obvious reasons." Saavedra Lamas' comment was accepted at face value because in his report Rivarola commented that Saavedra Lamas would work hard for Paraguay.

The bias of Argentina resulted in significant unneutral acts. On July 22, 1932 a meeting was held between Saavedra Lamas, Colonel Rodríguez, a Captain Casal of the Argentina army and Vicente Rivarola. Rivarola asked to buy weapons and ammunition. Saavedra Lamas stated that such an act would be unneutral, and left the meeting. He obviously knew what was coming next, and wanted to be able to say truthfully

that

to Pa

the n

Captain

he wo

annou

Saave

obvi

Riva

lige

shou

Riva

Para

vict

that

He v

some

and

und

dip

that to his knowledge, his country was not supplying arms to Paraguay. Colonel Rodríguez remained quiet, leaving the negotiations to the expendable Captain Casal. The Captain asked Rivarola for his shopping list and said that he would telephone him. A short time later he did, and announced that Argentina would fill Paraguay's order.²⁶

Rivarola expressed no animosity in his memoirs about Saavedra Lamas' abrupt departure from the meeting. He obviously understood the Chancellor's position. In fact, Rivarola described Saavedra Lamas as a man of clear intelligence and a great capacity to work. He believed that he should have received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1936. Rivarola even observed that when Saavedra Lamas opposed Paraguay, it was because of his "profound juridical convictions." He did, however, mitigate his view commenting that

he [Saavedra Lamas] acted sometimes as if he were the only person who could inspire and dictate solutions, as if he were the only one called to make peace in order to get a diplomatic triumph for his country and above all for a personal success.

He went on to say that Saavedra Lamas was "strong and sure sometimes, fickle and unsure at other times in his decisions and words." Rivarola's conclusion was that he would never understand Saavedra Lamas.²⁷

²⁶ These events are described in Rivarola, Memorias diplomáticas, II, 163-164.

²⁷ Ibid., 83-85.

The ABC

O

again

He tri

bellig

order

Ambass

about

of New

would

Lamas

was a

elect

annou

self

He af

he co

sider

Lama.

Wash.

woul

5/14

to D

The ABCP Coalition

On April 5, 1932, Saavedra Lamas attempted to once again grab the initiative from the Committee of Neutrals. He tried to organize the countries bordering upon the quasi-belligerents, Argentine, Brazil, Chile, and Peru (ABCP) in order to present a proposal. Two days later, the Argentine Ambassador to the United States, Felipe Espil, was asked about the possibility of collaboration with the Committee of Neutrals. Espil replied that he thought "any joint action would be very difficult to bring about."²⁸ That Saavedra Lamas desired to avoid Washington and keep his options open was also evidenced in his conversations with the President-elect of Paraguay, Eusebio Ayala. The Argentine Chancellor announced it inappropriate for Argentina to associate herself in a secondary capacity in any collective movement. He affirmed he would take part in collective action only if he could do so on his own terms and at the moment he considered favorable.²⁹

Despite these assurances, on April 12, 1932, Saavedra Lamas did indicate a willingness to cooperate with the Washington based group. The shift resulted from fear he would not be able to organize the limitrophe countries at

²⁸U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/1723, 5/14 Conversation, White and Espil, April 7, 1932.

²⁹Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/1740 Wheeler (Asunción) to Dept. of State, April 10, 1932.

all
Neut.
tina
Also
Boli
inte
grou

bet
loo
bet
bec
agg
It
tha
Con
und
put
Lar
Ma
As

(S
Me
1

all without some sort of alliance with the Committee of Neutrals. Brazil had shown reluctance to join with Argentina, preferring to stay close to the United States.³⁰

Also, news had arrived that Chile was aligning herself with Bolivia, which had indicated she would "deeply regret" the intervention of the ABCP nations,³¹ probably fearing the group would be dominated by Argentina.

Consequently, in early May, discussions were begun between the ABCP countries and the Committee of Neutrals, looking toward the development of a non-aggression pact between the quasi-belligerents. Saavedra Lamas, however, became upset when he learned that a provision of the non-aggression pact would re-establish diplomatic relations. It is significant that it was Bolivia who first suggested that the renewal of diplomatic relations be taken up by the Committee of Neutrals. Apparently La Paz was trying to undercut Saavedra Lamas. Ironically, Paraguay agreed to put the question on the agenda which suggests that Saavedra Lamas' early proposals had never been taken seriously. On May 11, 1932, Espil was sent to talk to Frances White, Assistant Secretary of State and Chairman of the Committee

³⁰ Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/1689 Culbertson (Santiago) to Dept. of State, April 5, 1932 and Rivarola, Memorias diplomáticas, II, 88-91.

³¹ U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 138-139.

of N

Saav

conc

made

tion

cry

est

him

con

ups

str

of

tha

Ch

Ar

a

tr

ve

Fu

—

2/

1

of Neutrals about the Neutrals' apparent encroachment of Saavedra Lamas' turf. As White related in the memorandum concerning this question, it was true that Argentina had made efforts in this direction, but that of late, the question "had been absolutely dormant." White commented cryptically that if Saavedra Lamas could obtain the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, it was fine with him.³²

As the negotiations concerning a non-aggression pact continued in Washington, Paraguay was becoming increasingly upset. She was afraid of the power of Bolivia and desired stronger protection. On June 5th, the outgoing President of Paraguay, José Patricio Guggiari, sent Brazil a proposal that Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro "take possession of the Chaco and impose an arbitration upon Paraguay and Bolivia."³³ Argentina and Brazil, however, were not willing to take such a course without receiving formal requests from both countries. For too many years both countries had opposed intervention to plausibly consider it as an alternative. Furthermore, they did not trust each other.

³²U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/1776, 2/6 Conversation, White and Espil, May 11, 1932.

³³U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 141.

ing

Para

With

Saav

On t

Lama

Arg

Saa

mos

und

Bra

a s

rea

pro

sec

Ric

inc

imp

Ne

Lal

—

ti

Re

ab

19

14

Paraguay's panic was not unjustified, for heavy fighting broke out in the Chaco on June 15, 1932. On July 7, Paraguay withdrew from the non-aggression pact negotiations. With the Committee of Neutrals temporarily paralyzed, Saavedra Lamas became involved in two mediation efforts. On the 23rd of July, Brazil forwarded a proposal to Saavedra Lamas suggesting "joint action" (acción conjunta) with Argentina to halt the fighting in the Chaco. In reply, Saavedra Lamas indicated he was agreeable, but believed the most useful course would be to support continued negotiations under the auspices of the Committee of Neutrals.³⁴ The Brazilian suggestion and Saavedra Lamas' reply were reported a scant two days later by Espil to White in Washington. The reason the Argentine Chancellor sidestepped the Brazilian proposal is clear. First, Argentina did not want to be the second for a Brazilian proposal. Secondly, by rejecting Rio de Janeiro's overture for action exclusive of the Washington Committee and then "tattling" on Brazil, she could improve her standing in the eyes of the Committee of Neutrals.³⁵ The major reason, however, was that Saavedra Lamas had his own ideas.

³⁴ See Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política argentina, I, 374 and República Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Memoria presentada al honorable congreso nacional correspondiente al periodo 1932-1933 (Buenos Aires, 1933), p. 7.

³⁵ U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 144.

prop

four

forw.

nati

favo

end

Doct

епю]

term

exp

from

not

ret

Drp

Sta

agr

cus

dit

Sed

hi e

I,

1

On the 22nd of July, one day before the Brazilian proposal arrived, Chile had suggested joint action by all four limitrophe countries. Saavedra Lamas, ever ready, forwarded almost immediately a draft proposal to the ABCP nations for their opinion.³⁶ The reaction was generally favorable, although Brazil asked for clarifications.

In Washington, White suggested to Espil that he recommend to Saavedra Lamas the incorporation of the Stimson Doctrine into the Argentine accord. This doctrine, first employed toward Japan, called for the non-recognition of territory acquired by other than peaceful means. White explained such a statement might have more force if it came from a limitrophe nation, adding that the United States was not looking for any credit for the proposal. Espil was reticent about making such a suggestion to Saavedra Lamas, preferring to say the idea had originated in the United States, but White did not like that idea. Finally, it was agreed to tell Saavedra Lamas that the idea "had been discussed informally by certain of the Neutrals."³⁷ In this mini-conspiracy, left unstated was the certain knowledge of Saavedra Lamas' egoism. By dangling an idea in front of his nose, coupled with the implicit assumption that someone

³⁶ Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política argentina, I, 376-377.

³⁷ U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/1820, 13/15, Memorandum by White, July 26, 1932.

else

Lama

some

Espi

addi

gene

cant

ABCE

Whi

ly

Amb

the

Esp

had

res

pos

of

the

po

else might formally suggest it, it was believed Saavedra Lamas would include the Stimson Doctrine rather than allow someone else to obtain the glory. It is apparent that both Espil and White realized Saavedra Lamas would reject any additions he did not initiate.

The proposal which surfaced in Washington on July 29, generally consisted of platitudes. What made it significant was a clause in article three which stated that the ABCP nations were

offering it [the Committee of Neutrals] the collaboration that may be needed to put into practice the emergency measures that may be considered proper to prevent war between the republics of Bolivia and Paraguay.³⁸

Also, since it did not contain the Stimson Doctrine, White telephoned his ambassador to ask him to speak personally to Saavedra Lamas regarding the Doctrine. United States Ambassador to Argentina, Robert Bliss called back shortly thereafter, saying that a reply to White's idea was in Espil's new instructions and that although Chile and Peru had agreed to sign the Argentine letter, Brazil had not yet responded.

It is probable that White must have despaired over the possibility of including the Stimson Doctrine in a proposal

³⁸ An English translation is available in U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, pp. 152-152, or see the Spanish text in Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política argentina, 376-377.

to t
surp
look
conq
tina
pri
nat.
Arg
gov
mil
Saa
sup

the
cou
Esp
st.
op
de
me
wo
po
ne

to the belligerents. As such, he must have been pleasantly surprised when Espil said that the Argentine government now looked with favor upon a non-recognition of land taken in conquest statement. Espil, however, went on to say Argentina was still unwilling to suggest the Doctrine without prior knowledge of acceptance by the other limitrophe nations. Such a move, unsupported by others, would put Argentina in a very difficult position vis-a-vis the Bolivian government.³⁹ Bolivia was at this time conducting successful military operations in the Chaco and advancing eastward. Saavedra Lamas did not want Argentina to be the only nation supporting the loser, even if Paraguay was a friend.

On July 30, a meeting was held in Washington between the representatives of the Neutral Nations and the ABCP countries in order to draft a note to the belligerents. Espil told the meeting that his government approved of a statement "setting forth their [nineteen American nations] opposition to war and calling on Bolivia and Paraguay to desist at once from any warlike moves." Everyone at the meeting concurred with Espil and it was agreed that White would draw up a statement over the lunch break. The proposal as it subsequently appeared, however, was entirely new, having little in common with Saavedra Lamas'.

³⁹U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 150.

After

the

Amer

tier

He

war

Equ

min

ABC

Dec

St

in

al

or

ic

Re

Li

3

B

o

a

P

(

M

E

I

After some minor changes⁴⁰ this document became known as the Declaration of August 3, and was signed by the nineteen American Republics.⁴¹ It was frequently cited by all parties to the dispute when it fitted their needs.

The Declaration of August 3 was a victory for White. He had led the Americas in a solemn pronouncement against war and had obtained acceptance of the Stimson Doctrine. Equally important, by interjecting his proposal at the last minute, he had seemingly undercut Saavedra Lamas and the ABCP proposition.

Alas, he had not. Saavedra Lamas took credit for the Declaration, as if it were his own. He stated that

the principle which was the essential part, was maintained in all its force, as an initiative of our own; but we preferred to have its material consecration made jointly by all the countries of America grouped about the Neutral Commission [sic].⁴²

⁴⁰Ibid., 182-183. Chile was afraid that the use of the Stimson Doctrine would put the recent Tacna-Arica settlement in doubt. The protocol was written in such a way as to allay Chile's fears, but Saavedra Lamas would try more than once to secure Chile's release of Bolivia's littoral, an idea favorable to both belligerents.

⁴¹See the English text, U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 159-160 or the original Spanish text in Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política argentina, I, 386-387.

⁴²U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2072 Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 5, 1932. The original Spanish can be found in La Prensa, August 4, 1932 and Argentina, Memoria, 1932-1933, 16-20. See also Decimal File 724.3415/2090, 1/14 Telephone Conversation Bliss (Buenos Aires) and White, August 17, 1932. In Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política argentina, I, 378-379, 381 published in 1937, White is given credit for the August 3 Declaration with the help of Saavedra Lamas.

Throu
and
Blis
Whit

Blis
reco
into
how
eff
bel
for
Aug
mer
the
mer
tr
no
Al
ti
—
B.

Through interviews with the press he publicized it widely and did nothing to halt the misconceptions which developed. Bliss summarized the situation very well in a letter to White.

Both in editorial comment and in a statement given out by Dr. Saavedra Lamas, the United States has been acclaimed for its "magnanimous" gesture in turning to Argentina and other South American republics to come to the rescue of the Neutral Commission sitting in Washington for a solution.

Bliss went on to note that the Argentines believed the non-recognition clause to be a "transcendental contribution to international relations by Argentina." His conclusion was, however, that Saavedra Lamas' actions had had a positive effect on Argentine-United States relations. The Argentines believed the United States was substituting legal methods for strong arm tactics. When White received the letter of August 16th, he became furious. In the margin of the document he wrote, "Argentina was offered the chance to take the initiative and refused it." On the bottom of the document he also added, "When we succeeded, she jumped in to try to take the credit."⁴³ What must have angered White most, however, was Saavedra Lamas' statements to the press. Although eloquent, they can best be described as pontificalious.

⁴³U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2072
Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 5, 1932.

THE
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
JAN 10 1900

TO THE
HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE
NAVY

AND
THE
OFFICERS OF THE
NAVY

AND
THE
OFFICERS OF THE
NAVY

AND
THE
OFFICERS OF THE
NAVY

AND
THE
OFFICERS OF THE
NAVY

AND
THE
OFFICERS OF THE
NAVY

White could have reasonably believed that the August 3 Declaration precluded further proposals, but Saavedra Lamas had other ideas. He continued with his earlier proposal, minus the provision Brazil opposed regarding "emergency measures." The Declaration of August 6⁴⁴ which was promulgated on that date, destroyed the effectiveness either proposal might have had, were either of them the only one forwarded. The problem was that the August 3 proposal by virtue of the Stimson Doctrine required Bolivia to withdraw to the lines held on June 1. The ABCP plan called for an in-place cease-fire, which Bolivia found reasonable but to which Paraguay violently objected.

On August 8, two days after the publication of the ABCP manifesto, two conversations were held: one was between White and Espil in Washington, the other between Bliss and Saavedra Lamas in Buenos Aires. The tone of the report of the Washington meeting indicated White was quite annoyed with the actions of Saavedra Lamas. The Assistant Secretary of State began by noting that the limitrophe nations' declaration "would definitely scrap the position taken by the hemisphere on August 3," because it failed to include a withdrawal to the June 1, 1932 line. Espil, in reply, noted that the Bolivian government might fall if that nation were forced to withdraw. White's answer was sharp and to

⁴⁴U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 165-167.

the 22nd of the month
the 23rd of the month
the 24th of the month
the 25th of the month
the 26th of the month
the 27th of the month
the 28th of the month
the 29th of the month
the 30th of the month
the 31st of the month

the 1st of the month
the 2nd of the month
the 3rd of the month
the 4th of the month
the 5th of the month
the 6th of the month
the 7th of the month
the 8th of the month
the 9th of the month
the 10th of the month
the 11th of the month
the 12th of the month
the 13th of the month
the 14th of the month
the 15th of the month
the 16th of the month
the 17th of the month
the 18th of the month
the 19th of the month
the 20th of the month
the 21st of the month

the 1st of the month
the 2nd of the month
the 3rd of the month
the 4th of the month
the 5th of the month
the 6th of the month
the 7th of the month
the 8th of the month
the 9th of the month
the 10th of the month
the 11th of the month
the 12th of the month
the 13th of the month
the 14th of the month
the 15th of the month
the 16th of the month
the 17th of the month
the 18th of the month
the 19th of the month
the 20th of the month
the 21st of the month
the 22nd of the month
the 23rd of the month
the 24th of the month
the 25th of the month
the 26th of the month
the 27th of the month
the 28th of the month
the 29th of the month
the 30th of the month
the 31st of the month

the point, "... which was most essential for the good of the continent--to maintain the Doctrine enunciated on August 3 or to maintain the present individuals composing the Government of Bolivia[?]" White must have become furious when Espil showed him a telegram from Saavedra Lamas saying "that while they [ABCP] wanted to support the Neutral Commission, they [ABCP] would point out that in Argentina, they had all the background for handling this matter." Although unstated, it is obvious that the third "they" in this sentence should have read "Saavedra Lamas." White asked whether Espil was requesting that the Committee of Neutrals step aside, only to be met with a statement that Espil had no instructions on this point. White then asked Espil a critical set of questions:

Who represented the neighboring countries, where their organization was set up, whether they had a definite organization in Buenos Aires such as we have here, and whether in the event, he was to be the liaison between the two[?]

Espil could only respond lamely that he had no instructions on these points. In fact, Espil could answer none of these questions without demonstrating that Saavedra Lamas had not been specifically chosen by anyone and that no formal organization existed. What was important, however, was that these considerations did not seem to bother Saavedra Lamas, who continued to act as if he were in charge of a formal

mediating effort.⁴⁵

In the Buenos Aires conversation of August 8, the description of which was not received until the morning of the 9th, Saavedra Lamas explained to Bliss his position in the Chaco dispute. The Argentine Foreign Minister began by stating, rather incredibly, that the text of the August 6th message would prevent either of the belligerents from playing one side against the other. He went on to note, however, that Argentina's location, close to both belligerents, made it easier for Argentina (read Saavedra Lamas) to understand the situation, a statement very similar to the one Espil made in Washington. Bliss, however, did not ask the type of questions White did. Like Espil, the Chancellor also noted that Bolivia would not accept any proposal calling for withdrawal and therefore he had suggested to the belligerents a one month truce based upon the "status quo de facto." He had advised that the consuls of the neutral nations act as observers and work on an agreement (unspecified) to solve the whole problem. Saavedra Lamas emphasized that his country would not be an arbitrator but would be willing to draw up an arbitration agreement.⁴⁶

⁴⁵U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/1920, 2/14 Conversation Espil and White, August 8, 1932.

⁴⁶Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/1997 Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 8, 1932.

White, however, was not willing to hand the negotiations to Saavedra Lamas; he began an offensive of his own. On August 9, the Committee of Neutrals sent a strong note to Bolivia asking exactly what her stand was in reference to a cease fire based on positions as of June 1 and whether she would accept arbitration.⁴⁷ Bolivia, of course, rejected a withdrawal and very candidly stated that the citizenry would not agree to it.⁴⁸ It must be remembered, however, that Bolivia knew of Saavedra Lamas' cease-fire plan and was therefore even less likely seriously to consider withdrawal.

But what of Paraguay, the silent ally of the Foreign Minister? She was, as could be expected, extremely upset. In a letter from Rivarola to President Ayala, the Paraguayan minister castigated Saavedra Lamas. He stated that the Chancellor was "haughty with his triumph of nineteen American countries [referring to the August 3rd Declaration]" and that now, "in a desire to change the plan of the Washington Neutrals and anxious for a new triumph, wants a truce that costs us."⁴⁹ In a subsequent meeting, Saavedra Lamas'

⁴⁷U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 63-64.

⁴⁸Ibid., 65-66.

⁴⁹Rivarola, Memorias diplomáticas, II, 149.

1. The first part of the report is a general
introduction to the subject of the study.
2. The second part is a description of the
methodology used in the study.
3. The third part is a description of the
results of the study.
4. The fourth part is a discussion of the
results of the study.
5. The fifth part is a conclusion of the
study.
6. The sixth part is a list of references.
7. The seventh part is a list of figures.
8. The eighth part is a list of tables.
9. The ninth part is a list of appendices.
10. The tenth part is a list of footnotes.
11. The eleventh part is a list of glossary.
12. The twelfth part is a list of abbreviations.
13. The thirteenth part is a list of symbols.
14. The fourteenth part is a list of units.
15. The fifteenth part is a list of definitions.
16. The sixteenth part is a list of acronyms.
17. The seventeenth part is a list of initialisms.
18. The eighteenth part is a list of contractions.
19. The nineteenth part is a list of colloquialisms.
20. The twentieth part is a list of slang.
21. The twenty-first part is a list of idioms.
22. The twenty-second part is a list of proverbs.
23. The twenty-third part is a list of sayings.
24. The twenty-fourth part is a list of maxims.
25. The twenty-fifth part is a list of aphorisms.
26. The twenty-sixth part is a list of epigrams.
27. The twenty-seventh part is a list of epigrams.
28. The twenty-eighth part is a list of epigrams.
29. The twenty-ninth part is a list of epigrams.
30. The thirtieth part is a list of epigrams.

attempt to calm Rivarola seemed to have failed. The Argentine Chancellor stated that in the last analysis, "he would give the problem back to the Committee of Neutrals."

Rivarola tried to remind Saavedra Lamas of the inconsistencies of his position with that of the August 3 Declaration and reported the results in rather bitter terms:

But Dr. Saavedra Lamas never hears objections, enamored of his words and of his ideas, responding always with a continuation of his discourse as if he could not hear what was said to him.⁵⁰

Even considering the stand Bolivia took, Secretary of State Henry Stimson was unwilling to concede defeat for his non-recognition proposal. Taking the lead from White, he sent two bristling letters to the ABCP countries. The first, sent on the 11th of August, talked of the need for communications between the two mediating groups and noted a number of examples where the Committee of Neutrals had made its intentions known to the ABCP nations. Then Stimson indicated that Bolivia was trying to ignore the August 3 Declaration and that "the Neutrals are not fully informed of just what Argentina has done." He continued on, defending the idea that a cease-fire should be in terms of the June 1 positions.⁵¹ It is worth noting that by singling out Argentina for criticism in a letter to all of the limitrophe

⁵⁰Ibid., II, 150.

⁵¹U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 173-175.

nations, Stimson was conceding to Saavedra Lamas the leadership White had earlier questioned. The second letter, of August 12, was even more cryptic and biting. He stated that it was definitely true that Argentina had suggested a one month truce based upon the status quo and that Paraguay had rejected it. Therefore he asked that the limitrophe countries support his plan and reminded them they had agreed to work with the Neutrals.⁵²

It is ironic that instead of solving the dispute, the Declarations of August 3 and August 6 produced only discord among the mediating nations. The bulk of the responsibility for this fiasco rests, of course, with Saavedra Lamas, since he promulgated the second proposal. However, in deference to the Argentine Foreign Minister, it must be remembered that White substituted his own proposal for what should have been a re-write of Saavedra Lamas'. It must also be remembered that the Committee of Neutrals had proven itself impotent in its attempts to bring about a settlement. And if Saavedra Lamas was enamoured with the idea of bringing prestige and power to himself and Argentina, Stimson and White were similarly enamoured with their concepts of international law and the efficacy of the non-recognition doctrine. Although the motivation of the latter may be considered more altruistic, it was equally uncompromising

⁵²Ibid., 175-6.

THE
JOURNAL
OF
THE
ROYAL
ANTHROPOLOGICAL
INSTITUTE
VOLUME
LXXV
PART I
1945

and deliterious. Much worse, it was unrealistic. It is significant, however, that in the confrontation that developed, Argentina, a nation of considerably less power than the United States, bested the North Americans.

The first part of the paper discusses the importance of the
 research and the objectives of the study. It also outlines the
 methodology used in the study and the results of the research.
 The second part of the paper discusses the findings of the study
 and the implications of the research. It also discusses the
 limitations of the study and the need for further research.
 The third part of the paper discusses the conclusions of the study
 and the recommendations for future research. It also discusses
 the significance of the research and the contribution of the study
 to the field of research.

CHAPTER 3

"UNA CONFUSIÓN GRANDE"

Saavedra Lamas and the League of Nations

With the resounding failure of the August Declarations, suspicion and distrust developed between the limitrophe countries, the Committee of Neutrals and among the ABCP powers themselves. Saavedra Lamas complicated the situation further when Argentina re-joined the League of Nations in September, 1932. He initially indicated he would attempt to bring that body into the negotiations. That the United States looked with deep disfavor upon this possibility can be seen in a note White sent to Hugh Robert Wilson, United States Minister to Switzerland. In it, the Assistant Secretary stated that if Saavedra Lamas "tries to start something" Wilson should tell Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the League, that "the present Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saavedra Lamas ... is hunting publicity for himself." White continued by observing that "every diplomatic officer in Buenos Aires had complained that he [Saavedra Lamas] had double crossed him, misled him, and even directly


lied to him."¹ After this rather uncomplimentary description of the Argentine Foreign Minister's character, White stated that Saavedra Lamas' motive was "to have the League use Argentina as its spokesman in Latin American affairs and to get more kudos for himself."² The Assistant Secretary bitterly suggested the Argentine Chancellor would not hesitate to undercut the League, if it meant prestige for himself. So interested was White in keeping Argentina at bay, he supplemented his earlier note to Wilson with evidence that cartridges found upon Paraguayan soldiers were Argentine.³

¹United States Archives, Record Group 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2322A, White to Wilson (Berne) September 19, 1932. Initially the League had agreed to allow the Committee of Neutrals to act as mediator when the belligerents first brought the problem to the international body. However, as the war increased in intensity, the League members lost patience and on September 20, 1932, created a three member commission to look into the matter. Although Argentina was not a member of the commission, there can be little doubt that Saavedra Lamas was behind the program.

White also chastized Saavedra Lamas for trying to bring the negotiations to Buenos Aires so he could obtain credit and for hiding when things were bad, but associating himself with success.

²Ibid. The way to stop Saavedra Lamas, according to White, was through the use of Mexico, Colombia, and Cuba, which were all members of the Committee of Neutrals. Concerning the last member of the Neutrals, Uruguay, the Assistant Secretary indicated suspicion. White seems justified about Uruguay, as that country attempted to obtain the peace conference if any were to be held. See United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1942), 1932, Volume V, p. 197.


³U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2332B, White to Wilson (Berne) September 20, 1932.



Bliss, in a report to White, also discussed the question of the League and Saavedra Lamas, but without the degree of bitterness the Assistant Secretary had displayed. Bliss believed that the return of Argentina would please the League as a sign of "new support at a time when the League is subject to wide criticism for failure to prevent hostilities." The United States Ambassador also adjudged that Argentina would attempt to make itself the focus for all League activities dealing with Latin America.⁴

In reality, both these men were correct, but neither went far enough in their analyses. Bliss should have also observed that League membership, in the absence of formal representation by the United States, would have aided Saavedra Lamas in both organizing a Latin American coalition and bringing Argentina closer to Europe. These had both been goals of Argentina for generations. White was correct when he pointed out that the Argentine Foreign Minister was only using the League for his own ends. What he failed to enunciate was that Saavedra Lamas could obtain the aforementioned benefits without surrendering his prerogatives to the multi-national body. The League was willing to allow itself to be used by Saavedra Lamas because

⁴Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/2415, Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, September 30, 1932. Saavedra Lamas also attempted to persuade Paraguay to have closer relations with the League. Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/434, 1/2, White to Wilson (Geneva), November 5, 1932.



the alternative, demonstrating impotence, was unacceptable.

Saavedra Lamas and the Committee of Neutrals

It is clear from his subsequent actions that Saavedra Lamas believed he did not need to use the League, at least at this time. Even while in the process of joining the League, he was attempting to mediate on his own, much to the chagrin of the Neutrals. On the morning of September 3 he called Ambassador Bliss to his office to say he was trying to establish acceptable military guarantees for a cease-fire. He indicated that if he found them, he would send his proposal to the Neutrals. Saavedra Lamas observed that it would be useless to forward proposals to the Neutrals which the belligerents would reject. He also certainly knew that what he was doing was not what the Neutrals desired. White was vexed when he heard about these developments and "said it should be made clear to Saavedra [sic] that in informing Bliss of what he is doing, he is not cooperating with the Neutrals." He also commented that Saavedra Lamas' actions had caused a great deal of resentment against Argentina.⁵

⁵The situation is described in two virtually identical memos. See U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, 195-6 and U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/44, Conversation, Wilson and White, September 3, 1932.

1890-1891

1891-1892

1892-1893

1893-1894

1894-1895

1895-1896

1896-1897

1897-1898

1898-1899

1899-1900

1900-1901

1901-1902

1902-1903

1903-1904

1904-1905

1905-1906

1906-1907

1907-1908

1908-1909

1909-1910

1910-1911

1911-1912

1912-1913

1913-1914

1914-1915


The squabble between the Neutrals and Saavedra Lamas became considerably more serious in mid-October, 1932. Saavedra Lamas became upset when the Neutrals suggested to the belligerents that military observers be sent to the Chaco to police a cease-fire.⁶ Espil delivered a lengthy letter to the Neutrals pointing out that it was not clear what the military observers would do. When after reviewing a number of precedents, the note stated that Argentina "will not go along with ... any act which, extending beyond the limits of good offices ... might approximate an intervention." The October 18th letter went on to affirm that an action such as the one proposed had to have its basis in a treaty previously signed, which this did not.⁷

Regarding this message, Espil subsequently called upon White to say that he had "considerably" altered it from the way it was received from Saavedra Lamas.⁸ He stated that major changes had been made in regards to the authorship of the August 3 Declaration, Stimson's position in Manchuria, and the Drago Doctrine. In fact, the Ambassador rewrote a significant portion of the note and toned it down considerably. In the original, Saavedra Lamas had viciously

⁶U. A. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 93-94.

⁷U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2502, Espil to White, October 18, 1932.

⁸Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/2414, 7/13, Conversation Espil and White, October 22, 1932.




assailed those who questioned the authorship of the August 13 Declaration. He stated that the doctrine contained in that Declaration could be found in the Covenant of the League of Nations and that the question of authorship would only be brought up by those "deficiently informed regarding ... the most important doctrines of international law." Saavedra Lamas continued to observe that the Drago Doctrine had been ascribed by some to Great Britain.⁹ The important consideration, according to Saavedra Lamas, was not the novelty of the declaration, but the ability to seize the correct moment to enunciate it.¹⁰

⁹ Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/2576, Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, November 18, 1932. Concerning the Drago doctrine, which stated that a nation could not collect debts from other countries through force of arms, Saavedra Lamas' exact words were

I repeat, that the same thing happened with the classical announcement of the Drago Doctrine made by the Argentine Foreign Office on December 29, 1902, which was said to reproduce old theories of Lord Palmerston and of the Argentine essayist, Carlos Calvo....

¹⁰ Ibid. The Spanish text of this letter was published in La Política Argentina, I, 424-427. Bliss in his commentary, U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2576, Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, November 18, 1932, commented that this statement sounded like a reply to de la Torre. He was referring to a confrontation between the Socialist Senator and Saavedra Lamas in the Senate on September 12. In his opening statement that gave the history of the conflict and indicated that the Chaco dispute was subject to rapid settlement. He also stated he had originated peace proposals out of respect for the Committee of Neutrals. This body, he concluded, should not be forsaken just because problems had developed. After damning with faint praise, the Argentine Foreign Minister went on to laud Argentina's (read Saavedra Lamas') part in the



The Committee of Neutrals replied to Saavedra Lamas on November 4, 1932, pointing out that its proposal was not a threat because both sides would have to accept it before it went into force. Also the two parties would know beforehand the consequences if one of them violated the pact.¹¹ Before this answer became public, United States news reports were indicating it would be an "energetic but conciliatory reply." This annoyed the Argentine newspapers

August 3 Declaration. He did not go unchallenged in this regard. de la Torre alleged that the plan had originated in the United States. He went on to castigate Saavedra Lamas for failure to involve the League of Nations and, ironically, for allowing the United States to dominate the peace efforts through the Neutrals.

Saavedra Lamas did not respond to the charges concerning the United States' dominance of the peace-making efforts, but did comment on the assertion that he was not responsible for the August 3 Declaration. He stated that the United States was searching for a country to suggest the doctrine in order to avoid "awakening feelings of distrust." Saavedra Lamas' retreat was not accepted by de la Torre, who continued the attack, citing press reports as evidence. Pressed as he was, the Argentine Chancellor adjudged the whole question insignificant when compared to the fact that two sister Republics were fighting. de la Torre, he charged, was confusing the issue. He pointed out that regardless of what was going on in Geneva and Washington, he often talked with the representatives of Bolivia and Paraguay, "feeling certain that nobody would find it wrong were I fortunate enough to produce some kind of arbitration...." Saavedra Lamas had been placed in a difficult position because he could not admit what he had actually been doing. To do so he would have to affirm that he was undercutting the work of the Committee of Neutrals and more importantly that he had so far been unsuccessful. See *Ibid.*, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2337, Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, Sept. 14, 1932.


¹¹ *Ibid.*, Decimal File 724.3415/2502, Committee of Neutrals to Espil, November 4, 1932.

because they did not even know what the reply was in reference to. As a result, Saavedra Lamas suffered one of the few cases of press criticism he ever received. The Argentine Chancellor was lectured in the papers on the necessity of informing the press on what was taking place. The journalists even complained to President Justo.¹²

Although the subsequent reply sent on November 19 by Saavedra Lamas was a superior example of circumlocution, there can be no doubt that it rejected the Neutral's position. The note insultingly began by observing that the text of the Neutral's letter was unclear. Saavedra Lamas then pointed out that where moral suasion will not work, coercive measures must be used. But any coercive action, the note continued, must have its basis in an established legal instrument of which the August 3 Declaration was not one. Saavedra Lamas then announced that he was in the process of circulating an Anti-war Pact (to be discussed later in this paper) but it had not been accepted as yet. In answer, he contended, was to utilize the Covenant of the League of Nations to which both Bolivia and Paraguay had adhered. Not content with this, he informed the Committee of Neutrals in the most sarcastic terms that it was impotent.¹³ No reply was ever sent to Saavedra Lamas.

¹²Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/2538, Letter Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, November 9, 1932.

¹³U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 3-216.



White realized that to continue the dialogue might provoke Saavedra Lamas even more, a luxury the Committee of Neutrals could not afford.


On December 15, 1932, the Committee of Neutrals sent another proposal to the belligerents.¹⁴ Like all the others, it was rejected. This marked the effective end of the Committee of Neutrals which, after four years, had proved itself useless.¹⁵ When the Paraguayans asked why Saavedra Lamas had supported the proposal, the Argentine Foreign Minister stated that he had "accepted [it] without consideration." According to Rivarola, "he [Saavedra Lamas] said with a certain satisfaction that he will attend to the funeral of the Commission of Neutrals [sic]."¹⁶ Left unmentioned was a threat by White that failure to support the December 15 proposal would be reflected in the United States' attitude toward Saavedra Lamas' Anti-War Pact.¹⁷

¹⁴Ibid., 126-29. The proposal included a cease-fire, observers, and an arbitration formula.

¹⁵White virtually admitted this when he suggested on January 4, 1933, that the ABCP take unified actions. See Foreign Relations, 1933, IV, 241.

¹⁶Rivarola, Memorias diplomáticas, II, 261, 275.

¹⁷U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2688, 3/11, Conversation Espil and White, Dec. 22, 1932.



The Mendoza Proposal


With the discrediting of the Committee of Neutrals, the scene was set for Saavedra Lamas to step into the vacuum. Unfortunately for the Argentine Foreign Minister, the new Chilean Foreign Minister, Miguel Cruchaga Torconal had aspirations similar to his own.

Shortly after the apparent demise of the Neutral's proposal of December 15, Saavedra Lamas sent a confidential agent, Dr. Isidoro Ruíz Moreno to Paraguay to ascertain what Asunción would consider as a basis for negotiations. The ideas put forth by Ruíz Moreno were not new, but it was significant that the proposed mediating sessions would be held in Buenos Aires.¹⁸ According to La política Argentina en la guerra del Chaco, published in 1937, Ruíz Moreno told Ayala that discussion could be held "without obstruction [entropecer] of the negotiations of the Commission of Washington [sic]."¹⁹ Ayala, however, in a letter written to Rivarola, stated that Saavedra Lamas' agent had castigated the Neutrals as "a precarious entity, without effective authority."²⁰ Considering what has been presented

¹⁸ Rivarola, Memorias diplomáticas, II, 274.

¹⁹ Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política Argentina II, 4. The mission of Ruíz Moreno is described.

²⁰ Rivarola, Memorias diplomáticas, II, 272.




earlier, there can be little doubt that Ayala's version
as correct.

As a result of Ruíz Moreno's discussions, Saavedra
Lamas sent letters on January 2 directly to the Foreign
Ministers of Brazil, Chile and Peru. They were worded very
carefully to make it appear he had talked to both belliger-
ents, not just Paraguay, and indicated that as a result of
his discussion[s], a proposal would be forwarded to the
other limitrophe nations. He also stated that Paraguay had
the "evident [sensible] determination ... to withdraw her
representative from the Committee of Neutrals, putting an
end to good offices." This was followed by reference to
the Buenos Aires mediation efforts of 1927-1928 and the
consequent Argentine familiarity with the problem. One
could easily read in this the idea that the Argentine capi-
tal would be the best place for the projected talks.²¹

Upon receipt of the letter, both Peru and Brazil indi-
cated readiness to await developments. Cruchaga, however,
who was working on a proposal himself,²² immediately speeded

²¹Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política Argentina,
I, 8. See also U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.
415/2811 for English translation.

²²Apparently this was in response to a letter from the
Committee of Neutrals on December 31, 1932, asking what
action the limitrophe nations were willing to take. It is
notable that Saavedra Lamas' efforts were begun prior to
the arrival of the letter. See U. S. Dept. of State,
Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 218-219.



p his work and did not reply to Saavedra Lamas' letter. s justification for his actions, Cruchaga stated that aavedra Lamas was hostile toward the Committee of Neutrals and that his motive for putting forth a proposal was anity.²³ One can only wonder, however, who was the most ain.


The Chilean proposal appeared on January 9. Like ost of its predecessors, it called for a cease-fire fol- owed by discussions looking toward arbitration.²⁴ The olivians, for their part, were incensed at Chile's action. hey believed there was an implied threat to stop all arms nd ammunition going to Bolivia. The Bolivians also indi- ated that they did not appreciate pressure from single ountries and would find it agreeable only if the limitrophe ountries joined the Neutrals.²⁵

On the 9th, Saavedra Lamas also received a copy of he Chilean plan to what must have been his great dismay. ruchaga, knowing that he had undercut Saavedra Lamas, owever, sent a follow-up letter the next day which was stensibly a reply to the Argentine note of January 2.

²³U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2812
rweb (Santiago) to Dept. of State, January 10, 1933.

²⁴U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV,
8.

²⁵U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2804
ely (La Paz) to Dept. of State, January 10, 1933.



In it, Cruchaga indicated that both President Arturo Alessandri and himself believed it was necessary to bring peace to the hemisphere and toward that end, they had produced a proposal. He concluded by appealing to Saavedra Lamas to work with him.²⁶ It is probable that Cruchaga had little hope that Argentine support would be forthcoming.

Cruchaga's worst fears were realized, because Saavedra Lamas immediately set out to squelch the Chilean proposal. Rivarola saw Saavedra Lamas on the 11th of January and reported that the Chilean proposal had been received with "surprise and displeasure." This may be an understatement because the Argentine Chancellor asked his representative in Santiago, Federico M. Quintana, to ascertain the exact time Cruchaga received the Chancellor's letter and sent out his proposal. Saavedra Lamas wanted to know who had priority. Cruchaga told Quintana that he had already sent his project off before the January 2 note arrived. Rivarola commented laconically that the result of all this was "una confusión grande."²⁷

To aid him in his fight, Saavedra Lamas looked to an unlikely ally, White, of the Committee of Neutrals. On the 12th, Espil showed White the January 2 letter, and indicated that as far as Saavedra Lamas was concerned, his was

²⁶Argentine, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política Argentina, II, 10-11.

²⁷Rivarola, Memorias diplomáticas, II, 277-78.

the first proposal. In his report of the conversation, White observed that there was "grave disagreement between Saavedra Lamas and Cruchaga." Espil's task had been to inquire whether the belligerents had accepted the proposal. If White said Paraguay had accepted, Espil was to say she formally told Argentina she had not.²⁸ Rivarola, in his memoirs, does not indicate whether or not Paraguay made such a statement before the 12th of January. Even if she had not, Saavedra Lamas, it seems, was trying to stop a non-existent lie.²⁹ In fact, so worried was the Argentine Chancellor that he sent instructions to Espil to discuss White's now moribund December 15, 1932 plan.³⁰


Saavedra Lamas also took action in Argentina. In a meeting with Bliss and the representatives of Brazil, Peru and Chile, he read his January 2 note. He also indicated that he was unhappy about the Chilean proposal and that it was "not acceptable to the contending parties." Naturally, he had no basis for making such a pronouncement.

Cruchaga, however, was not willing to give up without a fight. On the 14th, the Chilean Chargé d'Affaires, Sr. Cohen, went to see White. He indicated that all of the

²⁸U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2824
5/10 Conversation, Espil and White, January 12, 1932.

²⁹Rivarola, Memorias diplomáticas, II, 277-78.

³⁰Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política Argentina, I, 13.



countries except Argentina had accepted the plan and that therefore the Committee of Neutrals should now support it. White correctly pointed out that Brazil was undecided and Peru had not yet answered. He further stated that Paraguay had not even formally received the Chilean proposal and would issue no statement until she had.³¹ Cruchaga's deception failed, but it was indicative of the extent to which both Chancellors were willing to go to achieve their ends.

It being apparent to both sides that little could be done, Cruchaga on January 17 logically suggested that the two men get together. The formal proposal, however, did not arrive until January 24.³² A subsequent telephone conversation the next day set the place as Mendoza, Argentina, on February 1. Bliss was told by an undisclosed person that the telephone was used "to avoid [a] possible embarrassing situation."³³ It is probable that they settled many matters during the conversation in order to avoid repetition of discord that marked their earlier correspondence.


³¹U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV, 257-8.

³²Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política Argentina, II, 13-14.

³³U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2821 Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, January 25, 1933.

The Chaco portion of the Mendoza proposal which also dealt with Chilean-Argentine problem was not novel. It called for a cease-fire, a disengagement of forces, reduction of the armies to peace time levels, and arbitration by the Hague Court. In fact, it was actually a more detailed version of the Chilean proposal. However, where the positions of Chile and Argentina diverged, such as over who would make the arbitration decision, Saavedra Lamas got his way. Of more importance were the provisions concerning how the proposal should be presented to the belligerents. First it was to go to Brazil and Peru for concurrence, and then to the belligerents and the Committee of Neutrals together. This was not according to the procedure the Neutrals had worked hard to establish, where proposals would flow through them to the belligerents. As proposed at Mendoza, the Washington-based group would simply act as a cheerleader for the ABCP nations. Buoying this assertion was section V of the Mendoza accord stating that any negotiations which might take place would be in an American capital,³⁴ and there can be no question that Buenos Aires was the location in question. Just as significant were those things notably missing from the proposal. The August Declaration was never mentioned in either the Mendoza proposal or in a subsequent press interview with Saavedra

³⁴U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2875
Miss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, February 3, 1933.




Lamas, while the August 6 Declaration was put forth as the vehicle for the ABCP unity.

At the Mendoza conference other topics were discussed besides the Chaco situation.³⁵ Although the points made did not mandate any action, they reveal much about Saavedra Lamas' orientation. The proposal spoke of "continental good will," but not pan-Americanism. Also, section XIII called for "open trade between the limitrophe countries and then, hopefully, with all of the Latin American nations." The United States was not mentioned.³⁶

In an interview with the press on February 3, after his return from Mendoza, the Argentine Foreign Minister asserted that the August 6 Declaration was a new pan-American instrument. He attacked the Committee of Neutrals for its proposals, which had the "character of polemics," and commented rather pejoratively that study and informal discussions must precede any peace effort. He ended by announcing that the proposal would go from the ABCP nations

³⁵For a copy of the Mendoza formula see Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política Argentina, II, 17-21.

³⁶In his analysis, Bliss observed that the proposal sounded like the work of Saavedra Lamas and that the propositions were in agreement with his goals. He also stated that the Argentine Chancellor was not per se anti-American, but rather that the United States was the prime obstacle to Saavedra Lamas' goal. This analysis is similar to mine. See U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2875, Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, February 3, 1933.



to the belligerents. Saavedra Lamas did not mention that copy would go to the Committee of Neutrals.³⁷


The first reaction of Brazil and Peru came on the 7th of February. Peru's reply, given by Foreign Minister J. M. Manzanilla, was circumspect. He had praise only for the statements which did not relate to the Chaco. The Chaco portion of the Mendoza proposal was not even mentioned.³⁸ Mello Franco de Mello Franco, the Foreign Minister of Brazil, in his reply, made a number of observations about the Chaco section of the Mendoza proposal. First, that no action should go beyond good offices or in any way infringe upon either belligerent's sovereignty. Secondly, the Committee of Neutrals should not be left out of the negotiations. Finally, Mello Franco stated that a state of war should not be proclaimed by the limitrophe nations for the sole purpose of bringing into effect the available peace instruments³⁹ such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

On the 22nd, when Lima finally responded after repeated requests, Manzanilla indicated that his country had some reservations. Peru would not join the Mendoza proposal as to be available to make suggestions concerning

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La Política Argentina, 23.

³⁹ Ibid., II, 23-25. For the text of the final agreement, see ibid., 27-29.



modifications.⁴⁰ Peru's motives are not clear, but in explaining why an answer had not been sent early, Manzanilla noted internal problems.⁴¹ His country was, in fact, in an almost chaotic state during this time. Also, there was trouble with Chile over the latter's stand in the Leticia dispute.⁴²

Peru's response caused Saavedra Lamas to take immediate and dramatic action. Apparently fearful he would look ridiculous if his highly touted Mendoza Act did not even receive adherence by all the limitrophe nations, he addressed a letter on February 24 to Lima, Rio de Janeiro, and Santiago suggesting a call for a cease-fire. As justification, he pointed to the fact that the Mendoza agreement was complete, but would take time to put into practice and that the fighting was increasing in intensity.⁴³ With reference to the latter consideration, Bolivia had launched a bloody but ineffective offensive in December, 1932.⁴⁴


⁴⁰Ibid., II, 25.

⁴¹Ibid., II, 25.

⁴²U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV, 271. Leticia was nominally a Colombian town on the Amazon which was attacked by Peru which also claimed ownership. The resultant war was settled through the League of Nations in 1934.

⁴³Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política Argentina, II, 25.

⁴⁴For a discussion of the military developments during this period, see David M. Zook, The Conduct of the Chaco War (New Haven, Conn.: Bookman Associates, 1960), pp. 125-153.




To forward his facesaving policy, Saavedra Lamas had Espil approach White on February 28 with a blunt proposal which revealed a great deal about Saavedra Lamas' view of the entire Chaco matter. After asking that White support a call for a cease-fire, the Assistant Secretary, reported Espil said, "that Argentina would deal with Paraguay if we [the United States] would deal with Bolivia." Espil also noted that aid from banking interests in the United States would be of "'uncontestible value.'"⁴⁵ The claim that Bolivia was supported by the United States, and Paraguay by the Argentines, had been mentioned before, but only in the statements of the Paraguayans.⁴⁶ This was the first time it was ever enunciated by Argentina. In many respects Saavedra Lamas saw the Chaco as a struggle between the United States and Argentina, as well as Bolivia and Paraguay. White, however, rejected the Argentine overture.

Saavedra Lamas was spared embarrassment by a second Peruvian note on the 24th of February, the day after his proposal to White was made. The letter indicated general adherence to the Mendoza proposal, but said that certain

⁴⁵U. S. Archives, RG 59 Decimal File 724.3415/2734, Conversation White and Espil, February 28, 1933.

⁴⁶Rivarola, Memorias diplomáticas, II, 278.



changes should be made.⁴⁷ Saavedra Lamas chose to perceive Peru's note as an acceptance of the Mendoza Act and ordered it transmitted to the belligerents. Neither Paraguay or Bolivia was happy to see it. Paraguay was about to declare war and Bolivia was continuing her offensive.⁴⁸

On the same day, Peru sent a message to Saavedra Lamas pronouncing that the letter of the 24th was not an acceptance of the Mendoza Act. Modifications would have to be made.⁴⁹ Unfortunately, there is no indication of what the Argentine Foreign Minister said in reply, or if there ever was one. In any case, he seems to have been successful with this less than ethical procedure.

The formal replies from Paraguay and Bolivia, both received on February 27, suggested changes that would make the Mendoza proposal acceptable. The alterations, however, were not of the variety to bring about peace, since they would be unacceptable to the other side.⁵⁰ The fighting was intense and both parties believed a military victory was possible. In those circumstances, little could be done.⁵¹

⁴⁷Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política Argentina, I, 26.

⁴⁸Ibid., II, 29-30.

⁴⁹Ibid., II, 30.

⁵⁰Ibid., II, 30-33.

⁵¹See U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/3005 and U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, II, 1933,

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

The war continued.

In April, the Mendoza proposal was resurrected once more and presented to the belligerents. Due to pressure from Argentina, Paraguay unconditionally accepted it. Bolivia, however, remained intransigent. The ABCP mediation ended on May 6, 1933, when Bolivia refused once again to seriously consider the Mendoza proposal. As a result, Paraguay declared war on the 10th of May.⁵²


Argentina and Neutrality

Like many other neutrality policies, although equal on paper for both sides, one side was aided much more than the other. Arms transshipped up the Paraguay River from Buenos Aires to Asunción continued unmolested, while foodstuffs the Bolivians tried to buy from Argentina across the Pilcomayo River were halted. Clearly, Asunción was the beneficiary of Argentina's neutrality.

Considering that Saavedra Lamas could interpret neutrality in ways deliterious to Paraguay, it must be made clear why he did not. This was of particular importance because halting transshipment of goods through Argentina, would make it almost impossible for Paraguay to obtain arms.⁵³

⁵²Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política Argentina, I, 64-69.

⁵³On September 9, 1932, Saavedra Lamas suggested a joint declaration by Chile and Argentina. The proposal contained nothing that could be classed as unusual, but the simple statement prohibiting the transport of military



For example, on December 1, 1932 when Rivarola talked to Saavedra Lamas about the neutrality question, the latter would give him nothing definite.⁵⁴ Justo, however, did not hesitate to tell Rivarola that Argentine neutrality would be benevolent for Paraguay and strict for Bolivia.⁵⁵ There could be little doubt about where loyalties stood as far as the Argentine president was concerned.

May to December, 1933

With the failure of the ABCP mediation and the discrediting of the Committee of Neutrals, the Chaco problem was taken up by the League of Nations. The League's initial proposals, however, were rejected by Bolivia.⁵⁶ Subsequently the Committee of Neutrals, in a last gasp effort, suggested in May, 1933, that the Neutrals and limitrophe nations

supplies across neutral territory was significant. See, ibid. I, 409-410. In the treaty of 1904 Chile had agreed to establish Arica as a free port on the Pacific for Bolivia and build a railroad to La Paz as part of the settlement from the War of the Pacific. Arms going to Bolivia would in fact transit her territory, but it was an open question whether a declaration of neutrality would require that this be stopped. Chile stated at that time she would adopt Saavedra Lamas' neutrality decree if the other limitrophe powers did, but nothing was said concerning the interpretation of the 1904 treaty. Ibid., 410-411.

⁵⁴Vicente Rivarola, Memorias diplomáticas, II, p. 246.

⁵⁵Ibid., II, 251, 254.

⁵⁶A good summary of events in Geneva is found in U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/3246, Gilbert (Geneva) to Dept. of State, July 14, 1933.

conduct joint discussions.⁵⁷ Saavedra Lamas refused to agree, citing the work of the League of Nations.⁵⁸ With his refusal the Argentine Chancellor sealed the fate of the Committee of Neutrals, which ceased to function on June 27, 1933.


The ABCP countries, however, continued to try to bring an end to the war. During this period, Brazil rather than Argentina was the generator of action, and Saavedra Lamas contented himself with torpedoing Rio de Janeiro's efforts. Apparently perceiving that fact, Mello Franco did what Cruchaga had done and joined with Saavedra Lamas in a proposal to the belligerents on October 11. Dubbed the Act of Rio, it was similar to the Mendoza proposal and met with the same response: Paraguay accepted, Bolivia did not.⁵⁹

In retrospect, it is clear that Saavedra Lamas' policy concerning the Chaco did not change significantly from the Declarations of August, 1932, to the end of 1933.

⁵⁷ Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/3114, White to Espil, May 9, 1933.


⁵⁸ Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/2159, Conversation White and Espil, May 23, 1933. United States sources indicate, however, that Saavedra Lamas was undermining the efforts of the League of Nations also. See, for example, U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, II, 340-41.

⁵⁹ A full discussion of the Act of Rio, including responses, can be found in Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política Argentina, II, 140-157.



Bliss summed it up well when he indicated that Saavedra Lamas would accept nothing which was not his own. The quickly formed alliances and the quickly broken ones, the undercutting of other mediating efforts, the spat over the authorship of the August 3 Declaration, all indicate the level of action the Foreign Minister was willing to stoop to in order to achieve prestige for himself and for Argentina.


The most important question is why was Saavedra Lamas allowed to carry on the antics he did. The answer is that the tactics used by the Foreign Minister were never clearly delineated to the Argentine public. Even if they had been it is doubtful that there would have been a general outcry because Saavedra Lamas had to date been successful in gaining a significant position for Argentina. Furthermore no country was in a position to call his bluff. Economically, the United States was not in a dominant position as regards Argentina, and a refusal to sell to that nation would have only meant that her purchases would be made in Europe. Furthermore, the Argentines sold relatively little to the United States. Consequently, an embargo on Argentine goods would have had almost no effect. Moreover, it might have increased the popularity of Saavedra Lamas in the eyes of the populace, which saw little wrong with annoying the Yankees. The possibility of using military force was probably never considered by Washington. The result in all



likelihood would have been war with a country seven thousand miles away on the ironic grounds that Argentina had not done enough for peace. Without these methods of coercion, the United States could only utilize talk and ineffectual inter-American devices.

The inability of the limitrophe countries to bring any coercion to bear stymied their efforts. As with the United States, war over the issue was unthinkable and the prevailing economic dependency among neighbors made sanctions impracticable. Another factor which circumscribed the activity of the North Americans as well as Brazil, Chile and Peru was the hold Argentina had over Paraguay. This is not to say that Saavedra Lamas was ever in a position to force settlement upon his neighbors up river.

The army which controlled Argentina, was solidly behind Paraguay. Saavedra Lamas could, however, use his influence to short circuit another country's proposal. Saavedra Lamas had the power to insure his control of the mediating effort, but he lacked the power to force a settlement. The result is una confusión grande.




CHAPTER 4

"THE TWO WINGS OF THE DOVE"

In December, 1933 the Seventh Inter-American Conference took place in Montevideo, Uruguay. This meeting provided a vehicle by which Saavedra Lamas was able to gain the appearance of successfully achieving some of his country's cherished goals in world politics. Chief among them was Argentina's determination to be the diplomatic and cultural leader in South America. At Montevideo, Argentina seemingly achieved this goal at the expense of her traditional rival, the United States, which adhered to, albeit with reservations, an Argentine inspired treaty which specifically renounced intervention. Argentina also obtained the United States' sanction for League of Nations activities in the Chaco. These events brought Argentina into the hemispheric spotlight and the architect of these events, Carlos Saavedra Lamas, basked in its glow. More honors and success would follow, but the transition from being just another recalcitrant Argentine Foreign Minister to a position of hemispheric and world importance had begun.


The success of Saavedra Lamas was shared by Cordell Hull, the United States Secretary of State. In keeping with



President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policy of the Good Neighbor, Hull wanted to allievate many of the troubles that had plagued inter-American relations. Significantly, Argentina, and specifically, Saavedra Lamas, was the beneficiary of the Yankee policy shift. That such was the case, was a tribute to Saavedra Lamas' diplomatic skill and to his consonant opportunism.

In order to understand the Montevideo Conference, a brief description of the earlier meetings is necessary. Beginning with the First Pan American Conference held in Washington D. C. in 1889 and extending through the Fifth Conference in Santiago, Chile, in 1923 relations between the United States and Latin America were marked by increasing suspicion. Following the 1923 meeting, "anti-American sentiment mounted during the next five years and reached a climax at the Sixth Pan American Conference held in Havana in 1928."¹ There the Latin American nations, led by Argentina's representative, Honorio Pueyrredón, demanded an end to the interventionist policies of the United States. Pueyrredón also strongly attacked the tariff policy and sanitary conventions of the United States, which severely limited Argentine beef sales there.

¹Federico G. Gil, Latin American--United States Relations (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1971), 152.




On the question of intervention, the North American representative, Charles Evans Hughes, was given instructions that any alteration of the policy "would be likely to encounter opposition in this country ... and thus would give rise to unnecessary controversy."² In accordance with his instructions, Hughes defended intervention as bringing stability to otherwise chaotic circumstances. On the economic question, Pueyrredón was rebuffed by the United States along with the other delegates both within his delegation and from other countries.³ As a result, Pueyrredón left the Conference and resigned his ambassadorship in the United States. Argentina had tried and failed to bring about a change in United States policy. Before she could be credible as a leader in Latin America, she would have to do better.

The Seventh Pan American Conference was scheduled for December, 1932 or January, 1933, but in February, 1932 steps were taken to postpone the meeting. The drive was led principally by Brazil, which was concerned that the Permanent Committee on Public Law, then meeting in Rio de Janeiro,

²United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1942), 1928, Volume 1, p. 577.

³Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1967), p. 299.




would not have its report ready.⁴ Saavedra Lamas, however, opposed postponement because he believed something must be done about the troubles in the Chaco. When White asked Espil about what the Conference could do about the Chaco situation, the latter vaguely mentioned the Pan American Conference for Arbitration and Conciliation which had set up the Commission of Neutrals. White countered by noting that the Commission of Neutrals was still functioning.⁵ It can be surmised, albeit with little evidence, that Saavedra Lamas was considering some type of action at the Conference as regards the Chaco. Perhaps he hoped to form a new commission, or to put forth his own proposal. What he planned to do at this time, if anything, never was revealed because in early April, 1932, the Montevideo Conference was postponed until December, 1933.⁶

Shortly after the postponement, Saavedra Lamas began a project that was to play an important part in the newly-scheduled Pan American meeting. He proposed, on August 20,

⁴See United States Archives, Record Group 59, Decimal File 710.G/64, Conversation Espil and White, February 23, 1932 and U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 1.

⁵U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.G/98 1/2 Conversation Espil and White, April 7, 1932.

⁶U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, V, 1932, 4-7.




1932, an anti-war treaty based upon the Declaration of August 3 for which, at that time, he was still taking credit.⁷ The proposal contained little that was new or imaginative, although it did attempt to raise the August 3 Declaration (Hoover-Stimson Doctrine) to the level of an international accord. Most of its other provisions were already to be found in other international agreements, a point Saavedra Lamas readily conceded in his pamphlet, Project de Traite Sud American pour provenir la guerre non-Agression et conciliation (1932).⁸ This work contained both the proposed instrument and an explanation of each article.

That Saavedra Lamas should have proposed such a pact was not surprising. As a national of a country with little economic and military power, he looked to international law

⁷de la Torre's attacks did not begin until September 2.

⁸Paris, Les Editions Internationales, Paris. For the Spanish text of the same thing, see Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Memoria presentado al honorable Congreso Nacional correspondiente al período 1932-1933 (Buenos Aires, 1933), Tomo I, pp. 148-244. For an English text see U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932 V 261-266. In Saavedra Lamas' work Por la paz de las Américas (Buenos Aires: M. Gleizer, 1937), he includes an article dealing with the Anti-War Pact. Unfortunately he only states that it is the essence of a publication appearing in Washington. It is, needless to say, very favorable to the Argentine Foreign Minister. A good analytical discussion of the proposal can be found in Philip C. Jessup, "The Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Draft Treaty," American Journal of International Law, XXVII (January, 1933), 109-115.




to control relations with world powers. Also, just prior to his accession to Foreign Minister, he wrote and published two works dealing with international law, La conception Argentine de l'Arbitrage et de l'intervention a l'ouverture de la Conférence de Wáshington, 1928 (1928) and La Crise de la codification et la doctrine Argentine du droit international (1931).

The first news of the proposed treaty came to the United States in a conversation between White and Espil on August 22, 1932. At that time, Espil stated that Saavedra Lamas was sending an outline of a proposal to supplement the Kellogg-Briand Pact.⁹ Within a week, Espil was back, announcing that since the United States had learned about the proposed treaty through Chile, he had instructions to give the text of it to White. It was at that time that he explained to White that Saavedra Lamas had intended to submit it first to the limitrophe countries and then, after obtaining their assent, to the United States. By so doing, generalized hemispheric pressure would fall on the United States, putting her in a position where it would be difficult to refuse. Even though his hoped for secrecy was breached, Saavedra Lamas continued to work for his original goal. He now, however, also pushed his project in the United States.¹⁰

⁹U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 260.


¹⁰U. S. Archies, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2158 5/6, Conversation Espil and White, August 30, 1932.



The initial response, however, was generally unfavorable. Fred Morris Dearing, the United States Ambassador to Peru, stated on September 5 that "in spite of the urgency with which the Argentine [sic] is pushing the matter ... the Argentine treaty [has] not yet [been] agreed to by the other neighboring powers."¹¹ At a diplomatic reception in Buenos Aires, Bliss learned that the Chilean and Peruvian Ambassadors approved of the treaty, but that the Mexican and Colombian ministers opposed it. The Brazilian representative remained non-committal.¹² Bliss also reported that a colleague, unnamed, believed the treaty was an attempt by the Argentine Chancellor "to form a Latin American group, headed by Argentina, in opposition to the United States in this hemisphere." This anonymous minister went on to state that he would not recommend that his government agree to the proposal, but was in favor of following the

¹¹U. S. Archives RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012-Anti-War/4 Dearing (Lima) to Dept. of State, Sept. 11, 1932.

¹²U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012-Anti-War/6, Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, Sept. 2, 1932, and U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012-Anti-War/9, Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, Sept. 9, 1932 and U. S. Dept. of State, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti-War/10, Cafferty (Bogotá) to Dept. of State, Sept. 17, 1932. At this same dinner party Bliss asked Saavedra Lamas why he had not sent a copy of his plan to the United States. The Argentine Chancellor said it "had slipped his mind." These were all the countries that the treaty had been submitted to.




same line as the United States.¹³

Bliss's perceptive confidant obviously believed the United States would not be overjoyed about Saavedra Lamas' proposal. Neither was Espil. This was revealed in his talk with White even before the project was formally presented. While handing the Assistant Secretary a copy of the pact for his personal use, the Ambassador showed him a letter he had written to Saavedra Lamas. In it Espil told Saavedra Lamas that the United States would not accept the pact with the title "South American Anti-War Pact", that "Pan American" should be substituted. He also said that an attempt should be made to get the United States to become one of the "original signatories" of the pact. In his response, Saavedra Lamas said that "South American" was only an attempt to indicate the origin of the treaty and that Espil could tear off the old cover of the treaty and have a new one printed with the words "Pan American." Neither Espil, nor by inference, White believed Saavedra Lamas on this point.¹⁴ It is probable they both thought,

¹³U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti-War/6, Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, Sept. 2, 1932.

¹⁴U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti-War/22, Conversation Espil and Wilson, September 12, 1932. Espil also noted that the name Saavedra Lamas would be linked inevitably to the treaty.




with some justification, that the initial strategy had dictated the name.

Inexplicably, however, when the treaty was formally presented by Espil to Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, it still bore the epithet "South American." The North American Secretary wasted no time in this September 22, 1932, meeting indicating he did not think Saavedra Lamas' endeavors were particularly useful. Stimson observed that the Anti-War Treaty was similar to the Kellogg-Briand Pact and that instead of suggesting new proposals, Argentina would be better advised to adhere to the existing international instrument. He pointed out that Argentina was one of a handful of countries that had not yet accepted the Pact.¹⁵

Some two weeks after the meeting with Stimson, Espil approached White to find out if there were any developments concerning the treaty. The Assistant Secretary replied that the proposal had to go through regular channels and that he probably would not hear anything for "the next couple of months." Espil then asked for his informal views on the Pact. The American indicated that he was "not inhospitable to the idea" but he believed the treaty was "hastily drawn up" and many modifications would be needed.

¹⁵U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 266-268.



Delay, coupled with a wait and see attitude, was the apparent United States' response.¹⁶

What the State Department was waiting for became crystal clear at a subsequent meeting. To the inevitable question concerning the status of the Anti-War Pact, White reported his reply to Stimson as follows:


if Argentina plays the game and supports this project [the December 15 note from the Committee of Neutrals] all the way through so that we get a settlement, we will then discuss with him ways in which the pact could be modified in order to make it worthwhile signing. Espil wanted some action right away and I told him that would be impossible and that if he wanted to keep Saavedra Lamas playing along with us he could say that the pact had been examined by the Treaty Division and would now have to be examined by the Legal Office.¹⁷

Whether White was actually proposing a deal, or simply serving notice on Saavedra Lamas that as long as Argentina appeared intransigent red tape would surround his Anti-War Pact, is not clear. What is clear is that Saavedra Lamas publicly supported the December 15 Committee of Neutrals proposal.¹⁸

¹⁶U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti-War/10½, Conversation White and Espil, October 5, 1932.

¹⁷U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3412/2683 8/11, Conversation Espil and White, December 22, 1932.


¹⁸U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2538, Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, November 9, 1932, p. 6.



It is worth commenting here on the use of "us" in the preceding quote. It refers to Espil and White. The former, although dutifully carrying out his orders, commiserated with the Assistant Secretary over the difficulties he had in dealing with the Argentine Chancellor. Occasionally he agreed that certain proposals did more harm than good or that Saavedra Lamas' actions delayed peace efforts. By so doing, he increased his credibility and avoided sharp breaks with the United States which might have ruined the schemes of his boss.

Since Saavedra Lamas' overall strategy had originally been to obtain acceptance by Latin American countries before presenting his proposal to the United States,¹⁹ the delaying tactics of the North Americans did not seriously affect the general strategy. While it is true that the failure of the United States to embrace the treaty would have had a chilling effect on the other hemispheric nations, there is no evidence of a concerted North American campaign against the Argentine proposal. As a result, Saavedra Lamas continued to advocate his treaty. Uruguay provides a good example of the tactics used. In November, 1932, Saavedra Lamas sent the Uruguayan Minister for Foreign Affairs, Juan Carlos Blanco, a letter "couched in rather intimate terms of friendship" requesting the latter's views

¹⁹Vicente Rivarola, Memorias diplomáticas, II, p. 261.




on the treaty.²⁰ What makes this unusual is that from July 14 to September 12, 1932, relations had been severed between the two countries over a trivial protocol matter. The dispute had been marked by acrimony and stubbornness for which both countries had refused to apologize.²¹ The point is that Saavedra Lamas was willing to overlook the past to get what he wanted. His behavior can best be ascribed to singlemindedness rather than to the cause of peace.

His dedication, however, began to pay off at the end of the year. The Brazilian Minister for Foreign Relations, Afranio de Mello Franco, on December 20, 1932, agreed to accept the treaty in principle, subject to reservations. Mello Franco sent a long letter to Saavedra Lamas detailing forty-three defects in the Anti-War Pact, most of which were small technical points.²² When Saavedra Lamas formally announced the receipt of Mello Franco's letter to the diplomats accredited to Argentina, he only observed that

²⁰U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti-War/18 Butler (Montevideo) to Dept. of State, January 12, 1933.

²¹For a good portion of the documents having reference to this incident see U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1932, V, 316-329.

²²For a copy of the letter, see Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Memorias, 1932-1933, pp. 199-208.



Mello Franco had objected to the "South American" in the title. He went on to state that this would be changed and recounted his instructions to Espil. He finished by exclaiming the need for United States adherence.²³

The Anti-War Pact received another boost at the Mendoza meeting in February, 1933. At that time, the Chilean Foreign Minister, Miguel Cruchaga Tocornal, agreed to accept the concept of the treaty.²⁴ What made this significant was that now Saavedra Lamas had the power and prestige of the ABC block.²⁵ Also the proposed treaty had been put on the agenda of the upcoming Pan American Conference.²⁶ Things appeared to be going well for the Argentine Chancellor.


Unfortunately, on March 4, Stimson addressed a letter to Espil indicating that the United States would not sign the Anti-War Pact. The Secretary of State's first objection

²³U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012/16, Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, January 5, 1933.

²⁴U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/2875, Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, February 3, 1933.

²⁵Commenting on this point the Uruguayan Foreign Minister, Blanco, stated that ABC action was actually "considerable of A, some of C and a little of B." See U. S. Dept. of State, RG 59, Decimal File 710.G/129 Wright (Montevideo) to Dept. of State, February 8, 1933.

²⁶U. S. Archives RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012/16, Bliss (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, January 5, 1933.




was that the "peace structure" was already too "cumbersome" and that existing instruments should be ratified before new instruments were introduced. His second demurrer was that the similarity of the Anti-War and Kellogg-Briand Pacts might cause conflicts in the interpretation of the latter. He suggested Argentina sign the Kellogg-Briand agreement.²⁷

Neither of Stimson's statements stand up to even cursory examination. The Kellogg-Briand Pact was of the character of a nice thought, and one doubts that it could ever be misinterpreted. The State Department realized that, like the aforementioned accord, the Anti-War Treaty was essentially harmless.²⁸ The opposition can be best understood as an unwillingness to give its Argentine rival and particularly, Saavedra Lamas, a victory. Supporting this assertion is the fact that Stimson told Espil of his decision on March 3, the day before he left office. Saavedra Lamas did not broadcast the United States' response or act as if it even existed.²⁹ There was, of course, the obvious

²⁷U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV, 228-231.

²⁸The report of the Treaty Division stated that the Anti-War Pact "though useless might not be seriously harmful." See U.S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti-War/11½, Treaty Division to Dept. of State, December 6, 1932.

²⁹As late as October, 1933 Hugh Gibson, United States Ambassador to Brazil, would report that, "There is nothing on the record here to show that the substance of Mr. Stimson's note was ever communicated to the Brazilian Government." U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti-War/25 Gibson (Rio de Janeiro) to Dept. of State, October 4, 1933.



possibility that the incoming Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, asked Stimson to perform this service so as to avoid starting off on a hostile note. There is, however, no evidence to this effect, and Hull's positive orientation toward Latin America is well-known. Coupled with the fact that ten months later Hull would sign the treaty, this position loses much of its credibility.

It was during October that Saavedra Lamas and the President of Argentina, Agustín P. Justo, journeyed to Rio de Janeiro for a conference with their Carioca counterparts. Although Saavedra Lamas gave the reason for the conference as "cementing relationships," there can be no doubt that the prime purpose was to dramatize Brazilian adherence to the Anti-War Pact. The new United States Ambassador to Argentina, Alexander Weddell, stated that he could not fathom any reason for the costly excursion to Rio de Janeiro. He believed that the trip was Saavedra Lamas' idea and "is a further manifestation of the Minister's desire to give himself international prominence in this part of South America." Weddell concluded that Saavedra Lamas' goal was to form the ABCP into a block under Argentine control to oppose the United States.³⁰

Besides Brazil and Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Mexico, and Uruguay also signed the Anti-War Pact. Apparently Chile

³⁰U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 835.001 Justo Agustín P./28, Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 11, 1933.

1890

1890

1891

1891

1892

1892

1893

1893

1894

1894

1895

1895

1896

1896

1897

1897

1898

1898

1899

1899

1900

1900

1901

1901

1902

1902

1903

1903

1904

1904

1905

1905

1906

1906

1907

1907

1908

1908

1909

1909

1910

1910

1911

1911

1912

1912

1913

1913

1914

1914

1915

1915

1916

1916

1917

1917

1918


1918

1919

1919

was worried that the United States would be irritated because she went to unusual lengths to demonstrate that Argentina had pressured her into signing. She supplied the United States with the chronology of events leading up to Chilean adherence, apparently terrified the United States might block nitrate sales. According to the chronology, until the eve of the Rio de Janeiro Conference, Chile had no intentions of signing. On October 4, however, while in route to Brazil, Saavedra Lamas sent a letter to Cruchaga suggesting he adhere "in a private character." What Saavedra Lamas meant is not clear. Cruchaga did not understand either, but although provoked by Saavedra Lamas' attitude, he sent a courteous reply declining the offer. Mello Franco then sent Cruchaga a letter urging adherence to uphold the "ABC ideal." He followed up his letter with a telephone call to his ambassador to be relayed to Cruchaga. Mello Franco pointed out that Saavedra Lamas had not asked earlier for Chilean concurrence because he knew Chile would not agree to a solely South American treaty excluding the United States. Since Mello Franco also opposed an anti-United States pact, he stated he had insisted Saavedra Lamas open the treaty to all nations and Saavedra Lamas had agreed.³¹ Cruchaga, with his prime objection disposed of and faced with pressure from Brazil and Argentina, signed.

³¹U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti-War/32 Norweb (Santiago) to Dept. of State, October 11, 1933.



Saavedra Lamas kept his word, for not only did he open the treaty to nations outside South America, he actively sought their adherence. In making his overtures, the Argentine Foreign Minister indicated that the United States would sign, although at that time he had no basis for making such a judgment.³² It was apparent that Saavedra Lamas had modified his general strategy. The hope of a South American block was gone, but a world wide treaty would be almost as good. Prestige would still accrue to Argentina, and moreover, the United States would be faced with considerably more pressure to adhere, lest she be the only important nation not to sign.³³

At the October meeting at Rio de Janeiro, another important subject came up--postponement of the Inter-American Conference. By October 13, it became known that Brazil desired a postponement and Argentina did not. Mello Franco believed it would be a mistake to hold the conference at a time when problem areas like Leticia, the Chaco and Cuba existed, but also said no one wanted the "onus" of suggesting

³²U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.1012 Anti-War/46 Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, November 17, 1933.

³³Some of the European countries which did eventually adhere included Italy, Spain, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Portugal, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Norway. Great Britain, France, and Germany were notable in their absence. For a complete list of ratifications and signings see Saavedra Lamas, Por la Paz., 124.

postponement.³⁴ A week and a half later, at a diplomatic reception, Saavedra Lamas indicated he did not want to postpone the Conference, but asked twice if the United States did. The Peruvian Ambassador told Weddell in a subsequent meeting that he thought both Brazil and Argentina favored a delay.³⁵

Hull was so worried that the Conference would not take place that he told Weddell to check with Saavedra Lamas again. To Weddell's question, Saavedra Lamas replied he was "very convinced" of the advisability of the Conference. He did, however, mention the need for preliminary talks and noted that the upcoming meeting of the American Institute of International Law would provide an excellent vehicle. Because Saavedra Lamas appeared to be hedging, Weddell asked once more if Argentina favored postponement. The Argentine Foreign Minister then stated that ideally postponement would be advisable, but that no nation wished to formally make the suggestion. Only Hull, he concluded, could take the lead in deferring the Conference.³⁶

³⁴The telegram referred to was apparently garbled in transmission but his intent is clear. See U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.G/275, Gibson (Rio de Janeiro) to Dept. of State, October 13, 1932. Cuba was in precarious state due to the United States supported removal of dictator, Gerardo Machado.

³⁵U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV, 33.

³⁶U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.G/299 Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 27, 1933.

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

2. The second part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

3.

4. The third part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

5.

6. The fourth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

7. The fifth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

8. The sixth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

9. The seventh part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

10. The eighth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

11. The ninth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

12. The tenth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

13. The eleventh part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

14. The twelfth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

15. The thirteenth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

16. The fourteenth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

17. The fifteenth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

18. The sixteenth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

19. The seventeenth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

20. The eighteenth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

21. The nineteenth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

22. The twentieth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

23. The twenty-first part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

24. The twenty-second part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

25. The twenty-third part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

26. The twenty-fourth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

27. The twenty-fifth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

28. The twenty-sixth part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the


main results of the paper.

29. The twenty-seventh part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

main results of the paper.

The next day Saavedra Lamas told Weddell that because of the general unstable situation, a three to four month delay was advisable. He also said that Uruguay, where the Conference was to meet, was in an unsettled condition. In the same report, the United States Ambassador to Uruguay, J. Butler Wright, indicated the political situation in Montevideo was "unchanged" and that Uruguay was annoyed by the actions of Saavedra Lamas. The Argentine Foreign Minister also indicated once again the utility of preliminary talks during the American Institute of International Law meeting and added that he had been asked to preside. The delaying tactics used can not wholly be ascribed to Saavedra Lamas' desire to head an international law conference in Buenos Aires,³⁷ although quite possibly it was this eventuality which stirred him to action. More likely, it was the fear that the Montevideo Conference would end as the previous Inter-American Conference had, with a general failure of Argentine leadership and the spectre of resignation in disgrace. Buoying this assertion is a note Saavedra Lamas directed to Washington suggesting that "the duration of the Conference [be made] briefer and revising and reducing the agenda to a smaller number of subjects, not too controversial." The preliminary talks would provide a

³⁷U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.0/307
Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 28, 1933.



vehicle by which Saavedra Lamas could quietly dicker and avoid appearing to be either recalcitrant or a lacky of the United States.


Saavedra Lamas immediately began a campaign to persuade the rest of the ABCP nations to also ask for a postponement.³⁸ He met with little success because preparations were simply too far advanced to call for a delay.³⁹ Perhaps that was why, in a telephone conversation with Espil in Washington on October 31, he agreed to go ahead with the meeting. On November 4, Saavedra Lamas announced that he would attend the Conference as scheduled.⁴⁰ Saavedra Lamas, however, was still worried lest the Conference turn into a brawl. In a talk with Weddell on November 7, he emphasized the need for "harmony and good will." He also stated that the preparation for the Conference had not been handled well and that only juridical rather than political subjects should be discussed.⁴¹ He wanted desperately, it appears,

³⁸U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.G/309 Norweb (Santiago) to Dept. of State, October 30, 1933.

³⁹U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.G/338 Conversation Espil and Cafferty, October 31, 1933.

⁴⁰U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.G/327 Wright (Montevideo) to Dept. of State, November 4, 1933.

⁴¹U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.G/357 Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, November 4, 1933. In this letter, Weddell also noted that Saavedra Lamas had had the American Institute of International Law meeting postponed.



to avoid difficult subjects.

If Saavedra Lamas was concerned about a failure, so was Cordell Hull. The London Economic Conference held earlier in the year had been a personal as well as general fiasco. The United States delegation had been poorly organized and the members argued among themselves. Meanwhile, back in Washington D. C., President Roosevelt refused to agree to the innocuous resolution supported by his own delegation. Hull could not afford another blow to his prestige and he hoped the world would not have to view another failure of international cooperation. The easy road would have been to delay the Conference and avoid what appeared to be an inevitable clash. Hull's friends suggested he not risk "two failures."⁴² Also, a member of the presidential staff suggested that he discuss only the Pan American Highway.⁴³ Hull went anyway, determined to succeed.

He expected, and with much justification, that the Argentine Chancellor would probably be the leader of the general opposition to the United States. In describing his thoughts about the Argentine Foreign Minister, Hull indicated that "Saavedra Lamas had long been one of the most outstanding and irrepressible opponents of the United States."⁴⁴ To enjoy a meaningful and successful Conference,

⁴²Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), 2 volumes, Vol. I, p. 317.

⁴³Ibid., 319.

⁴⁴Ibid., 322.


Hull would have to find some way to deal with his gaucho counterpart. He was aided in this quest by two unlikely sources, the Argentine ambassadors in Washington D. C. and Bogotá, Colombia. Both suggested to United States representatives that if Hull signed the Anti-War Pact, Saavedra Lamas could be won over.⁴⁵ Subsequently, Espil said the same thing directly to Hull.⁴⁶ It is interesting to note that this suggestion was put forward on the same day, in much the same words (both talked of "winning Saavedra Lamas over") but in two separate locations. Although there is no evidence other than what is cited above, it is probable that the suggestion was not spontaneous.

In any case, Hull followed it. Concerning the Anti-War Pact, the instructions to the United States delegates read as follows:

However, largely as a matter of expediency it may appear advisable for the United States to consider signing this treaty.... It is possible that if the United States should be willing to sign the Argentine Anti-War Pact, Argentina would consider favorably adherence to the Briand-Kellogg Pact.... Furthermore, an expressed willingness on our part to sign Señor Saavedra Lamas' Anti-War Treaty might conceivably be of considerable assistance to our delegation in working for cooperation and harmony at the Conference and avoiding the creation of embarrassing incidents arising through an attempt on the part of the other

⁴⁵ See U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.G/338 Conversation Espil and Cafferty, October 31, 1933 and 710.1012 Anti-War/42 Whitehouse (Bogotá) to Dept. of State, October 31, 1933.

⁴⁶ Hull, Memoirs, I, 322.



delegations to raise controversial questions, involving the United States.⁴⁷


If Saavedra Lamas had known this, he undoubtedly would have felt much better. Since he did not, he remained recalcitrant. Hull was shocked when he learned that although Saavedra Lamas had accepted Uruguay's invitation to the Conference on October 31, a delegation was not named until the last minute. He noted that Saavedra Lamas had planned to conduct business from across the river.⁴⁸ If the Argentine Foreign Minister had continued with the plan, the Conference would certainly have been destroyed.

Happily, this did not happen. Hull prevented catastrophe by courting his Argentine counterpart. Almost immediately upon hearing of the arrival of Saavedra Lamas, he went to visit him. The United States Secretary of State described his reception by Saavedra Lamas as courteous, but reserved and aloof. After assuring Saavedra Lamas that his only goal was to put into practice the concepts of the Good Neighbor Policy, he asked for the counsel of the Argentine Foreign Minister. Continuing to play on the vanity of Saavedra Lamas, Hull said, "I know from your record that you will help us take the right direction and do so in a thoroughly practical and efficient manner."⁴⁹

⁴⁷U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV, p. 54.

⁴⁸Hull, Memoirs, I, 327.

⁴⁹Ibid., 327-8.



Hull then put forward his proposition. He noted that strong policy stands were needed in the economic area and asserted the need for the nations present at the Conference to sign the available peace machinery. Then he dropped a bombshell by stating the United States would sign the Anti-War Pact. Saavedra Lamas "sat up straighter." Subsequently he suggested that since Saavedra Lamas was known for his work in the area of peace, the Argentine Chancellor should introduce the peace resolution, while he handled the economic side. According to the Secretary of State, Saavedra Lamas sat silently until he indicated that, if the Argentine Chancellor did not wish to do this maybe Mello Franco would. Saavedra Lamas asked for twenty-four hours to consider the proposition and indicated that a reply would be forthcoming.⁵⁰ What Hull was suggesting was indeed revolutionary. He was literally offering Saavedra Lamas a United States supported leadership role. Shortly thereafter, Saavedra Lamas returned and agreed to the deal. According to the Secretary of State, he said, "we shall be the two wings of the dove of peace, you the economic and I the political."⁵¹

In the meetings which followed, the details of the agreement were worked out. Saavedra Lamas found Hull's

⁵⁰ Ibid., 328-9.

⁵¹ Ibid., 329.

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

economic proposal to be deficient only in proper Spanish phraseology and requested that he be allowed to redraft it.⁵² When he returned with the document, however, the United States delegation found it to be "inferior in phraseology, intent and vigor." Confronted with this view, Saavedra Lamas, after a great deal of discussion, agreed to allow still a third draft. Wright, in his memorandum concerning this event, described the problem as "pride of

⁵²Hull's program grew out of the failure of the London Economic Conference in the summer of 1933. At that time the United States gave up the idea of general tariff reduction and shifted to reciprocal most-favored-nation agreements. In the case of Argentina this policy foundered because the United States would not significantly lower her tariffs or end her sanitary restrictions on beef. Saavedra Lamas, himself did not become seriously involved in the negotiation. At the suggestion of the Foreign Minister, Tomás LeBreton handled discussions concerning trade. At other times the Minister of Finance dealt with economic issues. See William Grant Cooper, "New Light on the Good Neighbor Policy: The United States and Argentina, 1933-1939" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1972). In Chapter IV (pp. 50-83), dealing with the reciprocal trade program, Saavedra Lamas is never mentioned. See also U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV, pp. 650-653; 1935, IV, p. 273; 1936, V, p. 200; and 1937, V, p. 222.

During the 1933 Montevideo Conference one of the concessions Saavedra Lamas obtained from Cordell Hull was acceptance of a Pan American Commercial Conference to be held in Buenos Aires. Scheduled from May 26 to June 19, 1935 it was not expected to produce much of a transcendental nature and fulfilled those expectations. It did, however, provide an opportunity for Saavedra Lamas and Argentina to once again gain the hemispheric spotlight. He used it to attack the economic policy of the United States. For the text of this address see Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Por la paz de los americanos (Buenos Aires: Compañía impresora Argentina, 1937), pp. 307-346.

authorship."⁵³ Conceit, also, probably caused Saavedra Lamas to read his peace proposal only once in English to Hull and not leave a copy.

During the remainder of the Conference, even Saavedra Lamas' well-known vanity did not disrupt the agreement between himself and Hull. They worked together in harmony. When the question of intervention came up, Saavedra Lamas, whom one would expect to be the loudest in his denunciations, said only enough to escape the charge of subservience to the United States. After Saavedra Lamas finished his statement, Hull went to him and indicated that he understood.⁵⁴ When the Mexican program on debt settlement was proposed, Saavedra Lamas helped Hull squelch it.

Saavedra Lamas also worked closely with Hull on the Chaco dispute, supporting his efforts to bring about a resolution calling for peace. On December 18 a resolution was passed, urging a settlement of the Chaco conflict.⁵⁵ On the same day, the League of Nations Peace Commission received a letter from President Eusebio Ayala of Paraguay, calling for a truce. Washington immediately cabled "warm

⁵³U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV, 178-185.

⁵⁴Hull, Memoirs, I, p. 335.

⁵⁵U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1933, IV, 377.

congratulations" to Hull.⁵⁶ The congratulations were, however, justified only in the most indirect way. Other events had actually determined Paraguay's policy. On the eleventh of December, a general offensive by the Paraguayans paid off with a victory at Campo Vía. Some 8,000 prisoners and a large arsenal of weapons fell to the Paraguayan troops. For the Bolivians, this was a crushing blow which left them in general disarray. Furthermore, the way was still open for another Paraguayan drive.⁵⁷

Ayala chose to propose an armistice because the victory gave him the power to deal from a position of strength. Ayala probably hoped that the power of the League, coupled with the strong support of the delegates in Montevideo, would stampede Bolivia into a settlement. In that regard, it can reasonably be argued that neither Saavedra Lamas nor Hull nor even the League Commission played a direct role in the cease fire.

When the Bolivians accepted the truce rather than risk the destruction of her army the Conference wasted no time calling for general support of the League of Nations

⁵⁶Ibid., 379.

⁵⁷For the story of the Campo Vía offensive see Zook, Chaco War, 158-184. It is notable that after the Paraguayan victory Leopoldo Melo, acting Chancellor in the absence of Saavedra Lamas, sent Ayala congratulations, as did the Minister of War, Rodriguez. See Rivarola, Memoria, III, 43.

mediation efforts. Unfortunately, the scene had quickly been sullied by a Bolivian charge, made on December 20, that Paraguay had already violated the truce.⁵⁸ Furthermore, the Paraguayan army indicated its disapproval of being leashed by not sending the necessary military observer to the negotiations in Montevideo until the day before the truce was to expire on December 20.⁵⁹ The League Commission therefore had to seek an extension of the truce. Ayala was only able to give eight more days due to pressure from the military,⁶⁰ which apparently saw its golden opportunity escaping.

After Saavedra Lamas returned to Buenos Aires, a general meeting was held of cabinet level officials, including President Justo. It was agreed there, apparently with the concurrence of Saavedra Lamas, that the League had no place in a purely American affair.⁶¹ Perhaps that is why

⁵⁸Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política argentina, III, 175.

⁵⁹Margaret La Foy, The Chaco Dispute and the League of Nations, p. 75.

⁶⁰U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/3465 Nicholson (Asunción) to Dept. of State, December 29, 1933.

⁶¹This account was given by Interior Minister Leopold Melo to Spruille Braden. See U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/3537, Braden to Dept. of State, January 1, 1934.

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $f(x)$ defined by the equation $f(x) = \int_0^x f(t) dt$. It is shown that $f(x)$ is a continuous function and that it satisfies the differential equation $f'(x) = f(x)$. The solution of this equation is $f(x) = Ce^{x}$, where C is a constant. The value of C is determined by the initial condition $f(0) = 1$, which gives $C = 1$. Therefore, the function $f(x)$ is $f(x) = e^x$.

2. In the second part, we consider the function $g(x) = \int_0^x g(t) dt$. It is shown that $g(x)$ is a continuous function and that it satisfies the differential equation $g'(x) = g(x)$. The solution of this equation is $g(x) = Ce^{x}$, where C is a constant. The value of C is determined by the initial condition $g(0) = 1$, which gives $C = 1$. Therefore, the function $g(x)$ is $g(x) = e^x$.

3. The third part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $h(x) = \int_0^x h(t) dt$. It is shown that $h(x)$ is a continuous function and that it satisfies the differential equation $h'(x) = h(x)$. The solution of this equation is $h(x) = Ce^{x}$, where C is a constant. The value of C is determined by the initial condition $h(0) = 1$, which gives $C = 1$. Therefore, the function $h(x)$ is $h(x) = e^x$.

4. In the fourth part, we consider the function $k(x) = \int_0^x k(t) dt$. It is shown that $k(x)$ is a continuous function and that it satisfies the differential equation $k'(x) = k(x)$. The solution of this equation is $k(x) = Ce^{x}$, where C is a constant. The value of C is determined by the initial condition $k(0) = 1$, which gives $C = 1$. Therefore, the function $k(x)$ is $k(x) = e^x$.

5. The fifth part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $l(x) = \int_0^x l(t) dt$. It is shown that $l(x)$ is a continuous function and that it satisfies the differential equation $l'(x) = l(x)$. The solution of this equation is $l(x) = Ce^{x}$, where C is a constant. The value of C is determined by the initial condition $l(0) = 1$, which gives $C = 1$. Therefore, the function $l(x)$ is $l(x) = e^x$.

6. In the sixth part, we consider the function $m(x) = \int_0^x m(t) dt$. It is shown that $m(x)$ is a continuous function and that it satisfies the differential equation $m'(x) = m(x)$. The solution of this equation is $m(x) = Ce^{x}$, where C is a constant. The value of C is determined by the initial condition $m(0) = 1$, which gives $C = 1$. Therefore, the function $m(x)$ is $m(x) = e^x$.

7. The seventh part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $n(x) = \int_0^x n(t) dt$. It is shown that $n(x)$ is a continuous function and that it satisfies the differential equation $n'(x) = n(x)$. The solution of this equation is $n(x) = Ce^{x}$, where C is a constant. The value of C is determined by the initial condition $n(0) = 1$, which gives $C = 1$. Therefore, the function $n(x)$ is $n(x) = e^x$.

8. In the eighth part, we consider the function $o(x) = \int_0^x o(t) dt$. It is shown that $o(x)$ is a continuous function and that it satisfies the differential equation $o'(x) = o(x)$. The solution of this equation is $o(x) = Ce^{x}$, where C is a constant. The value of C is determined by the initial condition $o(0) = 1$, which gives $C = 1$. Therefore, the function $o(x)$ is $o(x) = e^x$.

9. The ninth part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $p(x) = \int_0^x p(t) dt$. It is shown that $p(x)$ is a continuous function and that it satisfies the differential equation $p'(x) = p(x)$. The solution of this equation is $p(x) = Ce^{x}$, where C is a constant. The value of C is determined by the initial condition $p(0) = 1$, which gives $C = 1$. Therefore, the function $p(x)$ is $p(x) = e^x$.

10. In the tenth part, we consider the function $q(x) = \int_0^x q(t) dt$. It is shown that $q(x)$ is a continuous function and that it satisfies the differential equation $q'(x) = q(x)$. The solution of this equation is $q(x) = Ce^{x}$, where C is a constant. The value of C is determined by the initial condition $q(0) = 1$, which gives $C = 1$. Therefore, the function $q(x)$ is $q(x) = e^x$.

Saavedra Lamas suggested to Hull an economic conference in Buenos Aires to handle the financial aspects which the Argentine Chancellor had often suggested were a prime cause of the war.⁶² Earlier, during the Conference, he had proposed a similar step, under ABCP auspices.⁶³

Either of these proposals, had they been accepted, would have once again pushed Argentina and her Foreign Minister to the forefront. But such was not to be the case, for on January 6, 1934 the truce ended and the fighting began again. There would be no point in discussing economics while the decision remained on the battlefield.

In summing up the events at Montevideo in his Informe to President Justo, Saavedra Lamas never mentioned the early agreement with Hull. He did, however, mention that it was a happy coincidence when his economic proposal turned out to be similar to Hull's.⁶⁴ It is questionable, however,

⁶²U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/3491, Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, January 4, 1934. At this Buenos Aires meeting were Weddell, Hull, Justo and Saavedra Lamas.

⁶³Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Seventh International Conference of American States (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 14.

⁶⁴Carlos Saavedra Lamas, "Informe presentado por el presidente de la delegación Argentina." In Republica Argentina, Archivo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, VII Conferencia Internacional Americana, Box 1, Lejado 1, p. 3.


whether Saavedra Lamas ever had a firm set of economic proposals. Perhaps he would have supported Mexico's Anti-United States position. In any case, the cast Saavedra Lamas chose to put on the events sounded much better than indicating Hull had made a deal with him to accept the Anti-War Pact.

In that regard, Saavedra Lamas lauded Hull for his Pan American spirit. He noted that the concept of sovereignty was now secure and that his Anti-War Pact was now well on its way to general acceptance. He took particular delight in noting that the United States no longer appeared to be anti-League.⁶⁵

Saavedra Lamas must have been delighted with the Montevideo Conference. He had been courted by Hull, an honor which he might have been the last to admit was an honor. He received the leadership role so many of his predecessors had desired, and had placed himself in the forefront of Pan Americanism and international affairs in general. He achieved this goal at a time when an objective appraisal of Argentine power indicated it was not justified. Moreover, "Argentina yielded no principles and sacrificed no goals."⁶⁶

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 3-4, 7-8.

⁶⁶Harold F. Peterson, Argentina and the United States, 1810-1960 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1964), p. 384.



CHAPTER 5

A MAN TO BE RECKONED WITH


Chaco Negotiations January, 1934 to February, 1935

Despite the end of the truce arranged during the Montevideo Conference, the League continued its efforts to find an acceptable peace formula. On February 22, 1934, it proposed a plan to the belligerents.¹ It differed from the multitude of earlier projects solely in that the disputants would renounce previous reservations regarding arbitration. In order to obtain agreement, and with knowledge of Saavedra Lamas' previous actions, the League did not consult him on the formula.

This proved to be a fatal mistake. Because the basic outline of the proposal was available before it was actually presented, Rivarola was able to report on February 10 that Saavedra Lamas did not approve of the League project.²

¹United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1951), 1934, Volume IV, pp. 52-53.

²Vicente Rivarola, Memorias Diplomáticas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Ayacucho, 1957), Volume III, pp. 69-70.



That the reason was lack of consultation was shown clearly in two conversations with Weddell on February 26 and 27. In both the Argentine Chancellor emphasized the fact that the League Commission had not talked with him before presenting the formula. In the second conversation, the Argentine Foreign Minister belittled the League plan as "defective" and announced he would not support it. To avoid being publicly accused of opposing peace, however, Saavedra Lamas added that he hoped the belligerents would accept, although he was pessimistic.³

Bolivia accepted the League proposal, but the Paraguayans, assured of Argentine backing, refused.⁴ As a result, the United States, as well as the League Commission, became irritated by Saavedra Lamas' actions. Rivarola reported that the members of the League Commission were particularly critical of the Argentine Chancellor.⁵ There was even talk of going over Saavedra Lamas' head to Justo

³The first conversation referred to was United States Archives, Record Group 59, Decimal File 724.3415/3564, Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, February 26, 1934. For the second, see *ibid.*, Decimal File 724.3415/3569, Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, February 27, 1934.

⁴For a summary of the Bolivian response, see U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1934, IV, p. 64, for Paraguay see, *ibid.*, p. 63.

⁵Rivarola, Memorias, III, 94-95.

in order to have him place pressure on Paraguay.⁶

Characteristically, no action was taken and the League Commission went home.⁷

Bolivia, however, did not give up so easily. As a result of a desperate military situation in May, 1934, she asked for League sanctions (i.e., an embargo) under Article 15⁸ of the League of Nations Covenant. In order to forestall any action, Saavedra Lamas initiated a new peace proposal on July 12. It differed from other peace formulas in that it relied on the Anti-War Pact for its authority.⁹ At the same time he made news of the project known, he asked Brazil and the United States to join him in a tripartite effort. Both agreed after Saavedra Lamas informed them that Paraguay had already accepted without reservations.¹⁰

⁶Ibid., p. 80 and U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/3626, Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, March 15, 1934. What makes this absurd is that during this period Justo was negotiating a new loan for Paraguay. See Rivarola, Memorias, III, 82-92.

⁷The final Commission report, League of Nations, Dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay: Report of the Chaco Commission, May 11, 1934, Political, C. 154.M.64 VII (1934), says nothing unfavorable about Saavedra Lamas.

⁸Article 15 allowed action by the General Assembly if the Council was unable to stop a war between two members.

⁹U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/3946 Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, July 13, 1934.

¹⁰U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1934, IV, 142-143.

Subsequently, both Brazil and the United States began pressuring Bolivia to accept. La Paz, ever suspicious of anything engineered by Saavedra Lamas, initially demurred and then conditionally accepted on September 7.¹¹ Much to the other mediators' surprise, Saavedra Lamas immediately lost interest in the proposal. On September 11 he indicated pessimism about the proposal¹² and on the 12th, the Argentine representative at the League observed that the League should once again begin mediation.¹³ Lest they be left in a difficult position, Brazil and the United States ended their efforts.

The reason for Saavedra Lamas' change of heart is not absolutely clear. The stated justification, pessimism over Paraguayan acceptance of the Bolivian counter offer, is unconvincing.¹⁴ Another theme superficially alluded to, that the time was not "ripe" for a settlement, seems to supply the answer. Paraguay was on the offensive and delay meant more territory for Asunción. Also, since Bolivia

¹¹Ibid., pp. 193-195.

¹²U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/4117 Gibson (Rio de Janeiro) to Dept. of State, September 13, 1934.

¹³Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, La política argentina en la guerra del Chaco (Buenos Aires: Guillermo Kraft, 1937), p. 236.

¹⁴Ibid., The Argentine version stresses this point.

conditionally accepted the tripartite proposal, pressure to modify her position would fall upon Paraguay rather than Bolivia. It is likely that because the negotiations were hurting Argentina's ally, Saavedra Lamas decided, or possibly was ordered, to scuttle them.

It was not until November, 1934, that the League was able to produce another peace formula. It was not materially different from early plans. On December 10 Bolivia accepted. Paraguay, still advancing on the battlefield, delayed sending a response until January 16, 1935, when she rejected the proposal. In retaliation, the League lifted the military arms embargo on Bolivia which it had placed upon both belligerents on December 1, 1934.¹⁵ By so doing, the Geneva-based body dubbed Paraguay the aggressor. Paraguay therefore quit the League, but because Argentina continued to ship arms to Asunción, the embargo was not fatal.¹⁶

Final Settlement

The League, however, was considering stronger sanctions

¹⁵ In the summer of 1934, thirty-nine nations prohibited sales of arms to the belligerents. Sales, however, continued. For a closer examination of the embargo see U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1934, IV, pp. 247-299.

¹⁶ For the details on the last efforts of the League, see Leslie B. Rout, Jr., Politics of the Chaco Peace Conference, 1935-1939 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), pp. 92-94.

1. The first part of the paper discusses the importance of the study of the history of the United States. It is argued that a knowledge of the past is essential for a full understanding of the present and for the development of a sound policy for the future.

2. The second part of the paper discusses the role of the government in the development of the United States. It is argued that the government has played a crucial role in the development of the country, and that its actions have been guided by a set of principles that have been passed down from generation to generation.

3. The third part of the paper discusses the role of the individual in the development of the United States. It is argued that the individual has played a crucial role in the development of the country, and that his actions have been guided by a set of principles that have been passed down from generation to generation.

4. The fourth part of the paper discusses the role of the community in the development of the United States. It is argued that the community has played a crucial role in the development of the country, and that its actions have been guided by a set of principles that have been passed down from generation to generation.

5. The fifth part of the paper discusses the role of the nation in the development of the United States. It is argued that the nation has played a crucial role in the development of the country, and that its actions have been guided by a set of principles that have been passed down from generation to generation.

6. The sixth part of the paper discusses the role of the world in the development of the United States. It is argued that the world has played a crucial role in the development of the country, and that its actions have been guided by a set of principles that have been passed down from generation to generation.

7. The seventh part of the paper discusses the role of the future in the development of the United States. It is argued that the future has played a crucial role in the development of the country, and that its actions have been guided by a set of principles that have been passed down from generation to generation.

8. The eighth part of the paper discusses the role of the past in the development of the United States. It is argued that the past has played a crucial role in the development of the country, and that its actions have been guided by a set of principles that have been passed down from generation to generation.

9. The ninth part of the paper discusses the role of the present in the development of the United States. It is argued that the present has played a crucial role in the development of the country, and that its actions have been guided by a set of principles that have been passed down from generation to generation.

10. The tenth part of the paper discusses the role of the future in the development of the United States. It is argued that the future has played a crucial role in the development of the country, and that its actions have been guided by a set of principles that have been passed down from generation to generation.

against Paraguay and although the idea never went beyond the talking stage, it did provide the impetus which brought a final peace plan. It did so by placing Saavedra Lamas in a difficult position; he did not want increased sanctions,¹⁷ but also he did not want to appear anti-League. Consequently, in order to stop the League, another mediation effort was begun by Saavedra Lamas in alliance with Chile. Envoys were secretly sent to the contentious powers. Saavedra Lamas dispatched Podestá Costa to Paraguay and Cruchaga sent Félix Nieto del Río to Bolivia.¹⁸

On March 14, Chile and Argentina jointly announced that efforts were being undertaken. In order to demonstrate they were serious, Espil approached Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles asking for United States cooperation. Welles foiled Saavedra Lamas' attempt at recruitment by saying he would have to have more information before he could give direct support.¹⁹ Undaunted, Saavedra Lamas instructed his minister at the League to announce that Brazil had agreed to cooperate with Chile and Argentina in

¹⁷Argentina, Min. de Rel. Ext., La política argentina, pp. 261-262 gave a very negative account of the League action and dubbed it "unjust."

¹⁸U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/4590, Cox (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, March 14, 1935 details the early developments.

¹⁹U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV, pp. 14-16.

this new attempt at peace. The Brazilians were aghast at this, and lost little time in informing both the United States and the League that the Argentine statement was in error.²⁰

On April 1, 1935, after the transmittal of a vague outline of the proposed plan, Chile formally asked Peru, the United States and Brazil to join with herself and Argentina in Buenos Aires to look for a solution to the Chaco war. The United States and Peru both accepted by April 7,²¹ but Brazil did not immediately respond. The problem was that she did not receive an invitation to a proposed economic part of the conference relative to the Chaco. Adding to Brazil's anger was the absurdity of Saavedra Lamas' statement that the reason she was not invited was due to a typographical error.²² The Argentine Chancellor was actually attempting to halt competition from Brazil.²³ Finally, an apology was sent, and on May 2 Brazil agreed to join in the mediation effort.

²⁰ Ibid., 19.

²¹ U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/4731B, Hull to United States Embassy in Argentina, April 6, 1935.

²² Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/4733, Hull to United States Embassy in Brazil, April 9, 1935.

²³ See U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations., 1935, IV, pp. 28-30. The Brazilians indicated this could very possibly be the reason.

A week later the mediation group composed of Saavedra Lamas (Argentina), Nieto del Río (Chile), José Bonifacio de Andrade e Silva (Brazil), and Felipe Barrera Loas (Peru) began work. The interim representative of the United States was Raymond Cox, who was supplanted in mid-June by Hugh Gibson. The goal was to find a peace formula acceptable to the belligerents, but their first act was to invite Uruguay to participate. Montevideo accepted and sent Eugenio Martínez Thedy as its representative. The mediation group then formally requested that Bolivia and Paraguay send representatives.

Both groups agreed by May 14 to send delegates. Both Paraguay and Bolivia were represented by their Foreign Ministers, Luis A. Riart and Tomás Elío. The principal reason the belligerents accepted was the stalemate which resulted from their inability to successfully carry on military operations. Paraguay's victories had taken her army far into the Chaco and she could no longer adequately supply her troops. Bolivian defeats had left her army in disarray, but because the front line was now closer to the population centers her logistical problems were less pressing.

The serious work of the mediation group began with the arrival in Buenos Aires of the President of Brazil, Getúlio Vargas, and his foreign minister, José Carlos de Macedo

Soares on May 26.²⁴ The trip had been planned much earlier as a return visit for the 1933 excursion by Justo and Saavedra Lamas. Macedo Soares, however, lost little time in entering into the negotiations. He suggested a number of plans to the belligerents, but Paraguay raised objections to all of them. Meanwhile, Saavedra Lamas was growing increasingly perplexed at his guest's presumptuousness. Not only was the Brazilian stealing the show, but he was conducting the negotiations in his residence. The Argentine Chancellor quickly put a stop to this by insisting that all negotiations take place in the Anchorena Palace, where he could control matters.²⁵ According to Bautista Saavedra, a Bolivian delegate, this was "a jar of cold water flung directly into [Macedo] Soares' face."²⁶

At issue in the negotiations were the same points that had plagued the mediation efforts for years. Paraguay wanted guarantees against renewed fighting, including international inspection of the reduction of both armies to peace time levels. For her part, Bolivia wanted a time limit on mediation and pre-agreement on the nature of

²⁴ Macedo Soares had replaced Mello Franco in July, 1934.

²⁵ U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/4930, Gordon (Rio de Janeiro) to Dept. of State, June 4, 1935.

²⁶ Bautista Saavedra, El Chaco y la conferencia de paz de Buenos Aires (Santiago: Editorial Nacimiento, 1939), p. 63.

arbitration before a cease-fire would be accepted. A number of formulas were forwarded, but it was not until June 3 that the first significant compromise took place. Paraguay agreed to an arbitration formula in exchange for Bolivian guarantees.²⁷

The final problem, that of setting a limit on the duration of the conference, was more difficult. Paraguay was willing to talk forever since she controlled the Chaco. Bolivia, of course, wanted a quick decision because the longer Paraguay occupied the Chaco, the more difficult it would be to force her out. Again, a number of proposals were forwarded, only to be rejected. The Paraguayan, Riart, on June 8 suggested that the mediators decide when their efforts would end and arbitration would begin. Bolivia would have rejected this proposal, but Saavedra Lamas gave his personal assurance that the negotiations would continue until a settlement was reached. Elío of Bolivia tried to ignore the statement, but Macedo Soares backed his Argentine counterpart. Elío was trapped between insulting the Foreign Ministers of Brazil and Argentina or accepting the formula. At 1:15 AM., June 9, he accepted the latter.²⁸ What makes

²⁷U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV, pp. 68-71.

²⁸Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Archivo, La Conferencia de la paz del Chaco, Box 4 Expediente II, "Actos Originales del Grupo Mediadores," pp. 12-19. Elío was able to obtain one more concession. Any arbitration would be done by the Hague Court.

October 1st 1900

Dear Mr. [Name]

I have received your letter of the 28th

and am glad to hear from you

I am well and hope these few lines

will find you the same

I am, Sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

[Signature]

[Name]

[Address]

[City]

[State]

[Country]

[Post Office]

[Telephone]

[Railroad Station]

[Steamship Company]

[Agent]

[Firm]

[Branch]

[Department]

[Division]

[Section]

[Office]

[Room]

[Box]

this ironic is that Bolivia accepted a peace formula based upon assurances by the man whose government had supplied the arms which allowed Paraguay to win.

The final protocol was signed at noon on June 12, 1935, but not without the usual antics by Saavedra Lamas. The Foreign Ministers of Chile and Peru were due to arrive in Buenos Aires at 2:00 P.M. Saavedra Lamas refused to allow a delay and went ahead with the formal signing. He was serving notice early and to all that this was his Conference.

Unfortunately, the June 12 Protocol²⁹ was drawn up hastily and as a result there were serious defects. The most glaring was in regards to the boundary separating the armies. In Article II, clauses a and c, "line" singular was used, while the plural "lines" was utilized in clause d. It is probable that this was not accidental. There was also no enforcement provision as regards demobilization.³⁰ These points caused delays and confusion in reaching a final definitive settlement.

It is evident that during the last year and one-half of fighting, Saavedra Lamas pursued the same policy and tactics he had earlier. By constantly shifting the peace

²⁹For a copy of the June 12 Protocol see United States Department of State, Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Peace Conference Held at Buenos Aires July 1, 1935-January 23, 1939. Conference Series 46 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1940), pp. 49-52.

³⁰See Ibid., pp. 9-11.

efforts between himself and other mediating groups he controlled the situation. By this means he was able to insure a preeminent position for himself and Argentina and at the same time protect the Paraguayans. When a peace effort finally did succeed after so many had failed, the reason was the inability of both belligerents to maintain effective military operations. It is to Saavedra Lamas' credit that he supplied the vehicle for the mutual standdown. His motive, however, that of forestalling the League, detracts from any distinction he is due. In that regard, his statement to the Bolivians announcing his attention to keep the Conference in session probably would have remained only a passing comment had not Macedo Soares seized upon it.

The Chaco Peace Conference

The first meeting of the Chaco Peace Conference was held on July 1, 1935, and it became obvious that the same type of acrimony and distrust that had marked the endeavors to end the fighting would continue. After Saavedra Lamas was chosen President of the Conference, he insisted that when he was absent the Vice-Presidency rotate among the delegates. The Argentine Chancellor wanted to avoid sanctioning a competition for leadership. In his actions, however, Saavedra Lamas double crossed Macedo Soares, to whom he had promised that the Brazilian delegate to the

1. The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study. It discusses the importance of the study and the objectives of the research.

2. The second part of the report is a detailed description of the methodology used in the study. It includes information about the sample size, the data collection methods, and the statistical analysis techniques.

3. The third part of the report is a presentation of the results of the study. It includes tables and graphs showing the data and the findings of the research.

4. The fourth part of the report is a discussion of the results and their implications. It discusses the strengths and limitations of the study and provides recommendations for future research.

5. The fifth part of the report is a conclusion and a summary of the findings. It provides a final statement on the results of the study and the overall conclusions.

The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study. It discusses the importance of the study and the objectives of the research.

The second part of the report is a detailed description of the methodology used in the study. It includes information about the sample size, the data collection methods, and the statistical analysis techniques.

The third part of the report is a presentation of the results of the study. It includes tables and graphs showing the data and the findings of the research.

The fourth part of the report is a discussion of the results and their implications. It discusses the strengths and limitations of the study and provides recommendations for future research.

The fifth part of the report is a conclusion and a summary of the findings. It provides a final statement on the results of the study and the overall conclusions.

The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study. It discusses the importance of the study and the objectives of the research.

The second part of the report is a detailed description of the methodology used in the study. It includes information about the sample size, the data collection methods, and the statistical analysis techniques.

The third part of the report is a presentation of the results of the study. It includes tables and graphs showing the data and the findings of the research.

The fourth part of the report is a discussion of the results and their implications. It discusses the strengths and limitations of the study and provides recommendations for future research.

The fifth part of the report is a conclusion and a summary of the findings. It provides a final statement on the results of the study and the overall conclusions.

Conference would be Vice-President.³¹

In Saavedra Lamas' letter to his Ambassador in Brazil, Ramón J. Cárcano, telling him to make amends, he appended his letter with the statement, "Argentina [that is, Saavedra Lamas] has to be the center of the Conference."³² That the Argentine Chancellor was serious in this statement is borne out by his demand that all discussions would be held by the full conference rather than in committee.³³ For tactical reasons, he was determined to retain control of the Conference.

The first policy Saavedra Lamas followed was that of delaying the Conference. The only open and consistently enunciated justification for waiting was that demobilization would continually decrease the chances of renewed fighting.³⁴ Moreover, it would also allow him time to

³¹Argentina, Archives, Box 4, Expediente 1, "Asuntos Varios," Telegram Cifrado 458, Saavedra Lamas to Cárcano (Rio de Janeiro), July 6, 1935. In revenge the Brazilian attempted to replace Saavedra Lamas' choice for Secretary of the Conference, Podestá Costa, with the North American, Allen Dawson. He was, however, unsuccessful.

³²Ibid.

³³U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV, pp. 92-93.

³⁴U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/35, Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, July 12, 1935.

collect information and precedents from past conferences,³⁵ and provide time for the other Foreign Ministers who had arrived for the opening of the Conference to go home.³⁶ The most important reason for delay, however, was that it would work to the benefit of Paraguay.

Saavedra Lamas' general orientation, nevertheless, did not stop him from trying to obtain a quick final settlement during July, 1935 in terms eminently favorable to Argentina and Paraguay. He did this by dropping none too subtle hints on numerous occasions. In his plan, the United States would give, or convince banks to loan, money to Bolivia which she would then use to pay reparations to Paraguay. At one point, on July 29, he even suggested that concessions could be purchased from Asunción.³⁷ Bolivia would be assuaged further by Chile, which would return Bolivia's lost littoral.³⁸ How this was to be accomplished

³⁵Argentina, Archives, Box 4, Expediente I, "Asuntos Varios," Telegram Cifrado 478, Saavedra Lamas to Argentine Embassy in Paris, July 11, 1935 and *ibid.*, Box 4, Expediente I, "Asuntos Varios," Telegram ordinario 1226, Le Breton (Paris) to Saavedra Lamas, July 13, indicated that five volumes on prisoners and their disposition, would be sent. A large volume of material relative to other topics to be discussed by the Conference was also forwarded.

³⁶U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV, p. 95.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 95.

³⁸For the basic outline of this plan, see *ibid.*, 98, 100-101, 106-107, 111-112. In mentioning Chile's role, Saavedra Lamas said that surrendering the sea coast would be a "noble gesture."

was not clear, but presumably, the United States was expected in some way to cooperate. Never mentioned was the fact that the money Bolivia would receive would eventually end up in Buenos Aires to pay off Argentina's loans to Paraguay. The beauty of the plan as far as Saavedra Lamas was concerned was that it would bring in always needed money and satisfy the belligerents at the expense of the United States and Chile. Moreover, the credit for the settlement would rebound upon Saavedra Lamas. Predictably, Santiago and Washington D.C. quickly and vociferously rejected the program.³⁹

In early August, another scheme manifested itself, that of bringing together the presidents of Bolivia and Paraguay. There is not concrete proof, but it appears that Saavedra Lamas was behind this gambit.⁴⁰ The idea went for naught, but did result in an embarrassing situation for the Argentine Foreign Minister. On August 16, Macedo Soares

³⁹For the United States view, see U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/45 Philips to Gibson (Buenos Aires) July 18, 1935. The Chilean opinion can be found in Argentina, Archives, Box 5, Expediente 1. "Asuntos Varios" Confidential letter 200, Quintana (Santiago) to Saavedra Lamas, July 21, 1935.

⁴⁰Ibid., Box 7 Expediente 1, "cuestiones de fondo," Telegram Cifrado 904 (Muy Reservado), Freyre (Asunción) to Saavedra Lamas, July 12, 1935. In this telegram there is a strong indication that Saavedra Lamas ordered Freyre to look into this matter.

called in the Argentine Ambassador, Cárcano, and said he believed any meeting was premature and indicated opposition.⁴¹ The Argentine Chancellor, upon receipt of the note, told Cárcano to tell Macedo Soares he had nothing to do with the proposal.⁴² When he heard Saavedra Lamas' answer, the Brazilian Foreign Minister became furious and produced letters he had received from his representative in La Paz reporting that the Argentine government was putting pressure upon the Bolivians to have such a parly.⁴³ There is no evidence of a response from Buenos Aires.

Saavedra Lamas' delaying tactics were more successful than his larger plans. Unfortunately, progress had to be demonstrated or criticism would fall on the President of the Conference. Moreover, Saavedra Lamas' plans were not public knowledge. Consequently, the Argentine Chancellor had to show that the Conference was moving forward while delaying any definite action. As a result, on July 19, when the delegates of the United States, Chile and Brazil

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Box 4, Expediente 1, "Asuntos Varios," Telegram Cifrado 1011, Cárcano (Rio de Janeiro) to Saavedra Lamas, August 16, 1935.

⁴² *Ibid.*, Box 4, Expediente 1, "Asuntos Varios" Telegram Cifrado 532, Saavedra Lamas to Cárcano (Rio de Janeiro), August 17, 1935.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Box 4, Expediente 1, "Asuntos Varios," Telegram Cifrado 1023, Cárcano (Rio de Janeiro) to Saavedra Lamas, August 20, 1935.

The first part of the report is a general
 description of the project. It is a study
 of the effect of the new law on the
 economy. The study was conducted by
 the Department of Economics at the
 University of California, Berkeley.
 The results of the study are as follows:
 1. The new law has had a significant
 effect on the economy.
 2. The effect has been both positive
 and negative.
 3. The positive effect has been in the
 area of the stock market.
 4. The negative effect has been in the
 area of the bond market.
 5. The overall effect has been a
 slight increase in the economy.
 6. The study has shown that the
 new law is a good idea.
 7. It has also shown that the
 law needs to be revised.
 8. The revision should be made
 as soon as possible.
 9. The study has also shown that
 the law is a good idea.
 10. It has also shown that the
 law needs to be revised.
 11. The revision should be made
 as soon as possible.
 12. The study has also shown that
 the law is a good idea.
 13. It has also shown that the
 law needs to be revised.
 14. The revision should be made
 as soon as possible.
 15. The study has also shown that
 the law is a good idea.
 16. It has also shown that the
 law needs to be revised.
 17. The revision should be made
 as soon as possible.
 18. The study has also shown that
 the law is a good idea.
 19. It has also shown that the
 law needs to be revised.
 20. The revision should be made
 as soon as possible.

The second part of the report is a
 detailed description of the project.
 It is a study of the effect of the
 new law on the economy. The study
 was conducted by the Department of
 Economics at the University of
 California, Berkeley. The results of
 the study are as follows:
 1. The new law has had a significant
 effect on the economy.
 2. The effect has been both positive
 and negative.
 3. The positive effect has been in the
 area of the stock market.
 4. The negative effect has been in the
 area of the bond market.
 5. The overall effect has been a
 slight increase in the economy.
 6. The study has shown that the
 new law is a good idea.
 7. It has also shown that the
 law needs to be revised.
 8. The revision should be made
 as soon as possible.
 9. The study has also shown that
 the law is a good idea.
 10. It has also shown that the
 law needs to be revised.
 11. The revision should be made
 as soon as possible.
 12. The study has also shown that
 the law is a good idea.
 13. It has also shown that the
 law needs to be revised.
 14. The revision should be made
 as soon as possible.
 15. The study has also shown that
 the law is a good idea.
 16. It has also shown that the
 law needs to be revised.
 17. The revision should be made
 as soon as possible.
 18. The study has also shown that
 the law is a good idea.
 19. It has also shown that the
 law needs to be revised.
 20. The revision should be made
 as soon as possible.

suggested committees be set up to study the questions of prisoners, Saavedra Lamas agreed.⁴⁴

Ten days later, Saavedra Lamas completely reversed himself, and in what Hugh Gibson, the United States' delegate, described as a "violent tirade" announced that subsidiary issues, such as the disposition of prisoners would have to wait. The captives, he asserted would be bargaining points for the more important issue of territorial settlement. Paraguay had approximately 17,000 Bolivians, while Bolivia had only 2,500 Paraguayans.⁴⁵ Saavedra Lamas went on to state that Paraguay had won the war and La Paz would have to pay reparations. The next day, apparently calmed, he reversed himself and indicated that the prisoner committee could continue.⁴⁶ The minutes of the subsequent meeting, however, which were prepared under the auspices of Saavedra Lamas, referred to the delegates working on the prisoners problem as a "special" committee which would study the question in its "juridical aspects."⁴⁷

⁴⁴U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV, p. 101.

⁴⁵There was considerable disagreement over the number of prisoners that were held by both sides. In round figures, Bolivia had 2,500 Paraguayans and Paraguay had 17,000 Bolivians. For a full discussion of numbers see Rout, Politics, 134-139.

⁴⁶U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/80 Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, July 29, 1935.

⁴⁷Ibid.

1871

1872

1873

1874

1875

1876

1877

1878

1879

1880

1881

1882

1883

1884

1885

1886

1887

1888

1889

1890

1891

1892

1893

1894

1895

1896

1897

1898

1899

1900

Eventually, after a few more gyrations, the prisoner committee was finally established. By August 6 it presented the belligerents with a draft agreement following lengthy discussions with Paraguay and Bolivia. Saavedra Lamas had originally countenanced an effort at this time because if the Paraguayan and Bolivian presidents met⁴⁸ they would have to be supplied with something to sign. After it became clear that the presidential conference would not take place, the Argentine Foreign Minister torpedoed the plan. He did this by informing Paraguay that it was a United States proposal.⁴⁹ Moreover, in subsequent discussions, he constantly referred to the plan as "Gibson's proposal."⁵⁰ Since the formula tended toward the Bolivian view that the prisoners held should simply be repatriated, Paraguay found it objectionable because she held far more prisoners and it was a valuable bargaining tool.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Ibid., Decimal File 724.34119/84, Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 3, 1935.

⁴⁹ Ibid., Decimal File 724.34119/96, Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 11, 1935.

⁵⁰ Ibid., Decimal File 724.34119/111, Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 14, 1935.

⁵¹ U. S. Dept. of State, Chaco Peace Conference, p. 20.

Approximately a week after it was decided to study the prisoner question, the Conference took up the problem of determining war responsibility, which the June 12 protocol had mandated be dealt with. On July 26, at the seventh plenary session of the Conference, a committee composed of representatives from Peru, Brazil, Uruguay and the belligerents was set up to deal with the subject. The Peruvian delegate, Barreda Laos, who did not attend the meeting, suddenly found he was a member of the committee. Perhaps because he was annoyed, he tried to stop the committee from taking any action. He objected to separating the territorial settlement from the responsibility question. Saavedra Lamas' willingness to discuss this issue as opposed to prisoners was probably due to the fact he believed that it would be years before a decision could be made and by that time, it would be irrelevant. Eventually, on August 2, a program calling for a three judge panel, one from each belligerent and a third from an American state, was drawn up. Both belligerents agreed to take the proposal under advisement, but internal difficulties within the Bolivian delegation caused a rejection on August 13.

On the territorial question, Saavedra Lamas had to do very little to cause an impasse and its resultant delay. Both belligerents proffered extreme positions. Nevertheless, the Argentine Chancellor took the opportunity to berate the

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a general discussion of the problem.

2. The second part is devoted to a detailed analysis of the case.

3. The third part is devoted to a summary of the results.

4. The fourth part is devoted to a discussion of the conclusions.

5. The fifth part is devoted to a discussion of the future work.

6. The sixth part is devoted to a discussion of the references.

7. The seventh part is devoted to a discussion of the appendix.

8. The eighth part is devoted to a discussion of the figures.

9. The ninth part is devoted to a discussion of the tables.

10. The tenth part is devoted to a discussion of the conclusions.

11. The eleventh part is devoted to a discussion of the future work.

12. The twelfth part is devoted to a discussion of the references.

13. The thirteenth part is devoted to a discussion of the appendix.

14. The fourteenth part is devoted to a discussion of the figures.

15. The fifteenth part is devoted to a discussion of the tables.

16. The sixteenth part is devoted to a discussion of the conclusions.

17. The seventeenth part is devoted to a discussion of the future work.

18. The eighteenth part is devoted to a discussion of the references.

19. The nineteenth part is devoted to a discussion of the appendix.

20. The twentieth part is devoted to a discussion of the figures.

21. The twenty-first part is devoted to a discussion of the tables.

22. The twenty-second part is devoted to a discussion of the conclusions.

23. The twenty-third part is devoted to a discussion of the future work.

24. The twenty-fourth part is devoted to a discussion of the references.

25. The twenty-fifth part is devoted to a discussion of the appendix.

26. The twenty-sixth part is devoted to a discussion of the figures.

27. The twenty-seventh part is devoted to a discussion of the tables.

28. The twenty-eighth part is devoted to a discussion of the conclusions.

29. The twenty-ninth part is devoted to a discussion of the future work.

30. The thirtieth part is devoted to a discussion of the references.

Bolivians for their intransigence.⁵² In an August 3 conversation, Saavedra Lamas detailed his views on the territorial issue in terms reminiscent of those used in his earlier discussion in regard to prisoners. He stated the answer was to declare that Bolivia was the aggressor and that she would have to buy access to the Paraguay River.⁵³ Subsequently, he observed it might take two years to reach a land settlement.⁵⁴

With the important issues of the final territorial agreement and prisoner repatriation bottled up, Saavedra Lamas had to find an explanation. The Peruvian, Barreda Laos, with his continuing opposition to dealing with the responsibility question separately from the territorial issue, supplied the Argentine Foreign Minister with a scapegoat. Following representations made to Lima,⁵⁵ Saavedra Lamas sent letters to Santiago,⁵⁶ Rio de Janeiro,⁵⁷

⁵²U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, p. 109.

⁵³U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/84 Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 3, 1935.

⁵⁴Ibid., Decimal File 724.34119/96, Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 11, 1935.

⁵⁵Ibid., Decumal File 724.34119/84, Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 3, 1935.

⁵⁶Argentina, Archives, Box 4, Expediente II, "Asuntos Varios," Telegram Cifrado 543, Saavedra Lamas to Argentine Embassy (Santiago), August 23, 1935.

⁵⁷Ibid., Box 4, Expediente II, "Asuntos Varios," Telegram Cifrado 542, Saavedra Lamas to Argentine Embassy (Rio de Janeiro), August 23, 1935. In this letter Saavedra Lamas

2. The second part outlines the procedures for reconciling bank statements with the company's internal records. This process is crucial for identifying discrepancies and ensuring that the books are balanced.

3. The third part covers the requirements for submitting financial reports to the relevant authorities. It details the format, content, and deadlines for these reports, ensuring compliance with all applicable regulations.

4. The fourth part discusses the role of internal controls in preventing fraud and errors. It highlights the need for a robust system of checks and balances to protect the company's assets.

5. The fifth part provides guidance on the proper handling of cash and other physical assets. It includes instructions on how to count, store, and transport these assets safely.

6. The sixth part addresses the issue of tax compliance. It explains the various taxes that the company is required to pay and provides information on how to calculate and remit these payments.

7. The seventh part discusses the importance of maintaining accurate inventory records. It describes the methods for counting and valuing inventory, as well as the procedures for updating these records.

8. The eighth part covers the requirements for maintaining accurate records of fixed assets. It includes instructions on how to classify, depreciate, and dispose of these assets.

9. The ninth part discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of liabilities. It describes the methods for identifying, measuring, and reporting these liabilities.

10. The tenth part provides a summary of the key points discussed in the document and offers final recommendations for ensuring the accuracy and reliability of the financial records.

and Washington D. C. denouncing Barreda Laos for causing delays. In his letter to Espil for transmittal to Welles, he stated that "the Conference is obstructed in its work [marcha] by personnel factors principally radiating from the Peruvian Ambassador, Barreda [Laos]."⁵⁸

With the Conference deadlocked, Saavedra Lamas announced that he was going to take a vacation. He did this for his own health and in order to slow the negotiations. At about the same time, however, the Argentine Chancellor apparently became worried that nothing was being accomplished and commented to that effect in a conversation with Gibson on August 28.⁵⁹ The next day he reiterated his fears and indicated that the Conference would continue the search for a settlement in his absence.⁶⁰

While on vacation, Saavedra Lamas definitely decided progress must be made. Spurring his activity was the necessity for assuaging the other delegates who demanded action. He wanted to nip any independent negotiating. Moreover, demobilization was progressing rapidly and when

suggested Cárcano talk to the Peruvian Ambassador about Barreda Laos.

⁵⁸Ibid., Box 4, Expediente II, "Asuntos Varios," Telegram Cifrado 544, Saavedra Lamas to Argentine Embassy (Washington D.C.) August 24, 1935.

⁵⁹U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV, pp. 130-131.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 131.

it was completed, the June 12 protocol mandated an end to the war. It would be difficult to explain why Asunción still retained the Bolivian captives. The Paraguayans, however, continued to favor delay and as a result a rift developed between Buenos Aires and Asunción. While Saavedra Lamas was away, a telegram arrived on September 6 from the Argentine Ambassador in Asunción stating that Paraguay believed the Conference should recess until the political situation in Bolivia settled down.⁶¹ When Saavedra Lamas returned, he informed the other mediators of Paraguay's position and indicated he opposed a recess. He announced he had informed Asunción that a declaration ending the war would have to be made and therefore Paraguay should modify its position concerning prisoner exchange.⁶² Paraguay became upset. The Argentine Foreign Minister was considerably more blunt with the new Paraguayan delegate, Gerónimo Zubizarreta. He told him that on September 17 the prisoner question would be decided "with or without his cooperation," and that talk of a new suspension of activity was absurd.⁶³ It was just this type of action that prompted

⁶¹Argentina, Archives, Box 4, Expediente II, "Asuntos Varios," Telegram Cifrado 1091, Freyre (Asunción) to Saavedra Lamas September 6, 1935.

⁶²U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV, pp. 140-141.

⁶³Argentina, Archives, Box 5, Expediente 1, "Asuntos Varios," Telegram Cifrado 599, Saavedra Lamas to Martinez Pita (Asunción) September 17, 1935.

1904

1214

Gibson to report that "both parties manifest growing suspicion of Saavedra Lamas."⁶⁴

Saavedra Lamas also attempted to obtain acceptance of a new responsibilities formula which had been proposed by Barreda Laos on September 14. It called for a three judge panel, the first two chosen by the belligerents, the third to be a member of the United States Supreme Court.⁶⁵ After the United States indicated it might be difficult to obtain a presiding Justice, the proposal was modified to include other Federal judges. On October 2, it was signed,⁶⁶ but no significant progress was made toward implementation.

The major issues of prisoners and a final territorial settlement remained. With the end of the war imminent, the former had to be disposed of. Gibson, with the help of the Brazilian delegate, José de Paula Rodriguez Alves, and the Argentine, Podestá Costa, decided to link the problems and suggest a solution. Saavedra Lamas indicated initial agreement but, apparently fearful that the whole Conference would fail, subsequently cautioned delay. Podestá Costa,

⁶⁴U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV, p. 145.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 140, 143.

⁶⁶For a copy see, U. S. Dept. of State, Chaco Peace Conference, pp. 95-98.

The first thing I noticed when I stepped
out of the car was the cold air. It was
a relief after the warm car. I looked
around and saw a few people walking
towards the building. The entrance was
large and modern, with a glass door.

I walked inside and saw a receptionist
at the desk. She smiled and asked
my name. I told her and she led me
to a waiting area. There were several
chairs and a small table.

I sat down and waited. A few minutes
later, a man in a suit came to see
me. He introduced himself as Mr. Smith.

He asked me how I was and I told him
I was fine. He then asked me about my
work.

I told him about my current job and
he seemed interested. He asked me
if I had any experience in the field.

I told him I had some experience and
he asked me to follow him. He led me
to a conference room.

There were several people in the room
and they all seemed to be waiting for
me. Mr. Smith introduced me to them.

They all seemed to be interested in
what I had to say. They asked me
several questions and I answered them.

At the end of the meeting, Mr. Smith
told me that they were considering
my application. He asked me to wait
for a few days.

I thanked them and left the room. I
felt a bit nervous but I was happy
to have been there.

I walked back to the car and got in.
I felt a bit better now. I was
going to wait for a few days.

however, continued to work on the inclusive formula.⁶⁷ There is no evidence indicating whether or not Saavedra Lamas found out about his aide's finagling, but Gibson reported later the same day, October 4, that the Argentine Foreign Minister was worried that he was losing control of the Conference.⁶⁸

The work toward finalizing the inclusive plan went quickly, and it was ready by October 11. The next day, prior to the forwarding of the plan to the belligerents, Saavedra Lamas indicated he thought it would not succeed, and rather than "'admit failure'" he suggested that the Chaco matter be shifted to the upcoming conference of American states scheduled for December, 1936. He stated that it was necessary to "'make them [all the American states] shoulder their share of the blame.'"⁶⁹ In his letter to Espil asking him to bring the matter before Welles, he wrote that the Conference would collapse because the end of the war would shortly be proclaimed and the prisoner question was locked in an "insolvable contradiction." Settlement, he contended, was impossible because

⁶⁷U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/214, Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 4, 1935.

⁶⁸Ibid., Decimal File 724.34119/215, Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 4, 1935.

⁶⁹Ibid., Decimal File 724.3415/5111, Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 12, 1935.

of the internal situation in both Bolivia and Paraguay.⁷⁰ On October 16, Espil sent Saavedra Lamas a negative response by the United States to his suggestion.⁷¹ On the 18th, Gibson reported that the Argentine Chancellor had completely given up the idea and acted as if the suggestion was never made.⁷²

The inclusive plan had been submitted on October 15, and three days later Paraguay rejected it, deeming the proposal "preposterous."⁷³ Bolivia's reply was less vociferous, but required modifications Paraguay could not have reasonably been expected to consider. Following the declaration ending the war on October 25, 1935,⁷⁴ the stalemate Saavedra Lamas feared came about. There was serious talk on the part of the other delegates, as well as Saavedra Lamas, of adjourning for a few months in the hope

⁷⁰Argentina, Archives, Box 7, Expediente I, "Cuestiones de fondo," Telegram Cifrado 664, Saavedra Lamas to Espil (Washington D.C.), October 14, 1935.

⁷¹Ibid., Box 7, Expediente I, "Cuestiones de Fondo," Telegram Cifrado 1267, Espil (Washington D.C.) to Saavedra Lamas.

⁷²U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/240, Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 18, 1935.

⁷³U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV, p. 165.

⁷⁴U. S. Dept. of State, Chaco Peace Conference, pp. 67-68.

that time would make one of the belligerents more reasonable.⁷⁵

Adjournment as a possibility lost credence when a breakthrough occurred on the prisoner issue. Paraguay had found that the support of approximately 17,000 Bolivian prisoners was very expensive, even though they were used as general laborers. Consequently, in early November, Asunción indicated she would consider returning the captives if Bolivia reimbursed her for their maintenance. In mid-November Spruille Braden replaced Gibson as the United States delegate. Saavedra Lamas, in filling him in on events to date, discussed the prisoner question. It was the Argentine Foreign Minister's opinion that it would be settled in ten days but that the Paraguayans were "tricky" and had to be watched. He observed that the Paraguayans had always assumed they could control the conference, but that his unbiased treatment had stopped Asunción.⁷⁶

Saavedra Lamas was wrong about the ease of obtaining a settlement and right about the trickiness of the Paraguayans. Initially it looked as if the only problem would involve haggling over how much money was to be paid.

⁷⁵U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV, pp. 176-182.

⁷⁶U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/295½, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, November 20, 1935. The conversation took place on November 18.

The first part of the report
 describes the general situation
 and the results of the
 investigation. The second part
 contains the detailed description
 of the methods used and the
 results of the experiments.
 The third part discusses the
 results and compares them with
 the theoretical predictions.
 The fourth part contains the
 conclusions and the
 recommendations for further
 work. The fifth part is the
 bibliography.

On December 2, however, Paraguay complicated matters by insisting upon retaining the current cease-fire lines until a definitive peace could be established. Bolivia realized any such agreement would make dislodging the Paraguayans virtually impossible and therefore opposed it. A second factor causing trouble was a split in the Paraguayan delegation. Gerónimo Zubizarreta, who had replaced Riart, had presidential ambitions. As a result, he refused to compromise.⁷⁷

To break the impasse, Saavedra Lamas acceded to a suggestion of Braden's that he lead a delegation to explain the situation directly to the Paraguayan President. According to Braden, he had little trouble with Ayala.⁷⁸ Asunción agreed to an acceptable prisoner accord and also was willing to drop the question of responsibilities, which Bolivia had indicated she was not particularly interested in pursuing.

Translating the general agreement to a specific written statement proved to be an ordeal. Braden, in his memoirs, discussed how he engineered the final settlement although there is no documentary evidence, including reports to the State Department, to directly support his account.

⁷⁷U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV, pp. 192-195.

⁷⁸Spruille Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1971), pp. 163-165.

the first of these is the fact that the
the second is the fact that the
the third is the fact that the
the fourth is the fact that the
the fifth is the fact that the
the sixth is the fact that the
the seventh is the fact that the
the eighth is the fact that the
the ninth is the fact that the
the tenth is the fact that the
the eleventh is the fact that the
the twelfth is the fact that the
the thirteenth is the fact that the
the fourteenth is the fact that the
the fifteenth is the fact that the
the sixteenth is the fact that the
the seventeenth is the fact that the
the eighteenth is the fact that the
the nineteenth is the fact that the
the twentieth is the fact that the
the twenty-first is the fact that the
the twenty-second is the fact that the
the twenty-third is the fact that the
the twenty-fourth is the fact that the
the twenty-fifth is the fact that the
the twenty-sixth is the fact that the
the twenty-seventh is the fact that the
the twenty-eighth is the fact that the
the twenty-ninth is the fact that the
the thirtieth is the fact that the
the thirty-first is the fact that the
the thirty-second is the fact that the
the thirty-third is the fact that the
the thirty-fourth is the fact that the
the thirty-fifth is the fact that the
the thirty-sixth is the fact that the
the thirty-seventh is the fact that the
the thirty-eighth is the fact that the
the thirty-ninth is the fact that the
the fortieth is the fact that the
the forty-first is the fact that the
the forty-second is the fact that the
the forty-third is the fact that the
the forty-fourth is the fact that the
the forty-fifth is the fact that the
the forty-sixth is the fact that the
the forty-seventh is the fact that the
the forty-eighth is the fact that the
the forty-ninth is the fact that the
the fiftieth is the fact that the
the fifty-first is the fact that the
the fifty-second is the fact that the
the fifty-third is the fact that the
the fifty-fourth is the fact that the
the fifty-fifth is the fact that the
the fifty-sixth is the fact that the
the fifty-seventh is the fact that the
the fifty-eighth is the fact that the
the fifty-ninth is the fact that the
the sixtieth is the fact that the
the sixty-first is the fact that the
the sixty-second is the fact that the
the sixty-third is the fact that the
the sixty-fourth is the fact that the
the sixty-fifth is the fact that the
the sixty-sixth is the fact that the
the sixty-seventh is the fact that the
the sixty-eighth is the fact that the
the sixty-ninth is the fact that the
the seventieth is the fact that the
the seventy-first is the fact that the
the seventy-second is the fact that the
the seventy-third is the fact that the
the seventy-fourth is the fact that the
the seventy-fifth is the fact that the
the seventy-sixth is the fact that the
the seventy-seventh is the fact that the
the seventy-eighth is the fact that the
the seventy-ninth is the fact that the
the eightieth is the fact that the
the eighty-first is the fact that the
the eighty-second is the fact that the
the eighty-third is the fact that the
the eighty-fourth is the fact that the
the eighty-fifth is the fact that the
the eighty-sixth is the fact that the
the eighty-seventh is the fact that the
the eighty-eighth is the fact that the
the eighty-ninth is the fact that the
the ninetieth is the fact that the
the ninety-first is the fact that the
the ninety-second is the fact that the
the ninety-third is the fact that the
the ninety-fourth is the fact that the
the ninety-fifth is the fact that the
the ninety-sixth is the fact that the
the ninety-seventh is the fact that the
the ninety-eighth is the fact that the
the ninety-ninth is the fact that the
the hundredth is the fact that the

offices

According to the United States Delegate, Zubizarreta continued to oppose the prisoner accord, even after his president had agreed. At a meeting to finalize the proposed act, Saavedra Lamas was "coached" by the other delegates to state that the Paraguayan delegate had accepted the basic outline earlier. The Argentine Chancellor, however, began to discuss the territorial issue. Since the issue was a volatile one, Braden stated that both he and Podestá Costa tried to stop Saavedra Lamas from making Zubizarreta even more recalcitrant. When attempts to interrupt the Argentine Foreign Minister failed, according to Braden, he flipped a wicker table full of coffee into Saavedra Lamas' lap. The Argentine Foreign Minister leaped up and while he was changing his trousers Zubizarreta agreed to the accord.⁷⁹

The formal signing of the protocol did not take place until January 20, 1936. For the remainder of the year very little was accomplished due to changes in the governments of Paraguay and Bolivia. In February Rafael Franco seized the government in Paraguay. Shortly after the renewal of

⁷⁹ Braden, Diplomats, 165-169. In his work, Braden describes Saavedra Lamas as "vain, pathologically ambitious, essentially a stupid and wicked man" (p. 152). Lest too much credence be given Braden, it must be noted that Braden described everyone who disagreed with him as stupid, fascist or communist and in the case of Juan Perón, all three epithets were utilized.

1. The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

2. The second part of the report deals with the results of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

3. The third part of the report deals with the conclusions of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

4. The fourth part of the report deals with the recommendations of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

5. The fifth part of the report deals with the summary of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

6. The sixth part of the report deals with the appendixes of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

7. The seventh part of the report deals with the bibliography of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

8. The eighth part of the report deals with the index of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

9. The ninth part of the report deals with the list of figures of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

10. The tenth part of the report deals with the list of tables of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

11. The eleventh part of the report deals with the list of references of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

12. The twelfth part of the report deals with the list of abbreviations of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

13. The thirteenth part of the report deals with the list of symbols of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

14. The fourteenth part of the report deals with the list of units of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

15. The fifteenth part of the report deals with the list of definitions of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

16. The sixteenth part of the report deals with the list of formulas of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

17. The seventeenth part of the report deals with the list of equations of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

18. The eighteenth part of the report deals with the list of theorems of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

19. The nineteenth part of the report deals with the list of lemmas of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

20. The twentieth part of the report deals with the list of propositions of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

21. The twenty-first part of the report deals with the list of definitions of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

22. The twenty-second part of the report deals with the list of formulas of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

23. The twenty-third part of the report deals with the list of equations of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

24. The twenty-fourth part of the report deals with the list of theorems of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

25. The twenty-fifth part of the report deals with the list of lemmas of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

26. The twenty-sixth part of the report deals with the list of propositions of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

27. The twenty-seventh part of the report deals with the list of definitions of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

28. The twenty-eighth part of the report deals with the list of formulas of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

29. The twenty-ninth part of the report deals with the list of equations of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

30. The thirtieth part of the report deals with the list of theorems of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

31. The thirty-first part of the report deals with the list of lemmas of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

32. The thirty-second part of the report deals with the list of propositions of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

33. The thirty-third part of the report deals with the list of definitions of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

34. The thirty-fourth part of the report deals with the list of formulas of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

35. The thirty-fifth part of the report deals with the list of equations of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

36. The thirty-sixth part of the report deals with the list of theorems of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

37. The thirty-seventh part of the report deals with the list of lemmas of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

38. The thirty-eighth part of the report deals with the list of propositions of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

39. The thirty-ninth part of the report deals with the list of definitions of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

40. The fortieth part of the report deals with the list of formulas of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

41. The forty-first part of the report deals with the list of equations of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

42. The forty-second part of the report deals with the list of theorems of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

43. The forty-third part of the report deals with the list of lemmas of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

44. The forty-fourth part of the report deals with the list of propositions of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

45. The forty-fifth part of the report deals with the list of definitions of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

46. The forty-sixth part of the report deals with the list of formulas of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

47. The forty-seventh part of the report deals with the list of equations of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

48. The forty-eighth part of the report deals with the list of theorems of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

49. The forty-ninth part of the report deals with the list of lemmas of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

50. The fiftieth part of the report deals with the list of propositions of the work. It is a very interesting and useful document.

serious negotiations, Colonel David Toro on May 31 led a successful coup d'état in Bolivia. As a result a good portion of the Conference members' time and energy were devoted to how and when these governments should be recognized, and to insuring the acceptance of the proposals agreed to by their predecessors. The only substantial accomplishment of the Conference during 1936 was overcoming Paraguayan recalcitrance and achieving the actual repatriation of the prisoners by August 21, 1936. Ironically, Bolivia took this opportunity to award Saavedra Lamas with a medal the Cóndor de los Andes, for his work on the prisoner exchange.

It is evident that Saavedra Lamas' main goals were to control the Conference in order to gain whatever credit was produced and also to support Paraguay's desire to retain the Chaco. Gaining honors, however, required a show of progress which unfortunately was inimical to Paraguay's aspirations. The result was a constantly shifting policy which dissatisfied both of the belligerents as well as the other delegates. When, however, Saavedra Lamas had to choose between his own prestige or the Paraguayans, Asunción took second place. It is reasonable to assume that the Argentine military allowed Saavedra Lamas more latitude than it had earlier. Also, issues in question were probably perceived as tertiary since the territorial settlement was not directly involved.

It is, of course, impossible to determine if Saavedra Lamas' behavior precluded a quick settlement. Certainly his plans did not help the situation. What is more evident is that the Argentine Foreign Minister did not have the confidence of the delegates. Gibson certainly distrusted him. Detest might be the best word to describe Braden's opinion. Nieto del Rio is reputed to have said, "'When the Foreign Minister uses his voice, he loses the use of his head.'"⁸⁰ Significantly, however, the distaste for Saavedra Lamas was not public knowledge.

Saavedra Lamas and the League

Besides the Peace Conference, in 1936 Saavedra Lamas was also involved with the League of Nations and its principal issue, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in October, 1935. Immediately following the attack, Argentina voted in the League for sanctions against Rome. Buenos Aires, however, in approving sanctions stated that the embargo would only be respected in areas non-prejudicial to her economic and commercial interests.⁸¹ Although the reservation negates what slight effect Argentina's actions might have had, it must be noted that at that time Argentina had a huge population of first and second generation Italians. According

⁸⁰ Ibid., 168.

⁸¹ New York Times, October 13, 1935.

4. The fourth part of the document discusses the implications of the findings and offers recommendations for future research. It suggests that further studies should be conducted to explore the underlying causes of the observed trends.

5. The fifth part of the document concludes the report by summarizing the key points and reiterating the importance of the research. It expresses the hope that the findings will be useful to the readers and contribute to the field of study.

to Cárcano, the Cabinet was aghast when it heard what Saavedra Lamas had done. No one, however, was willing to challenge him out of fear he would belittle them.⁸²

Four months later, after the Italians had conquered Ethiopia, the League was left in a quandry over what action should be taken. The major powers, fearful of driving Italy into Germany's arms, wanted to avoid decisive action and generally delay activity. Saavedra Lamas had other ideas. He announced he was considering calling an early meeting of the Assembly of the League to discuss the problem of sanctions and recognition of the new Italian-Ethiopian state. Subsequently, he threatened that if his call in the Council of the League for an Assembly session was not granted, "Argentina would refuse to vote there [the Council] and would make its reasons known." In subsequent conversations, Saavedra Lamas' representative observed that his boss was looking for "broad support" for the non-recognition section of the Anti-War Pact.⁸³

Saavedra Lamas wanted a meeting on June 30, 1936, but on June 19 it was learned by the United States that the British were putting pressure on Saavedra Lamas to modify his position.⁸⁴ British influence, presumably of an

⁸²Interview with Miguel Angel Cárcano, Buenos Aires, September 8, 1972.

⁸³U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1936, III, pp. 145-158. The quoted material is on pages 148 and 156.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 160.

1. The first part of the report is a general
description of the project and its objectives.
2. The second part is a detailed description of
the methods used in the study.
3. The third part is a description of the results
of the study.
4. The fourth part is a discussion of the results
and their implications.
5. The fifth part is a conclusion and a list of
references.

6. The sixth part is a list of references.
7. The seventh part is a list of references.
8. The eighth part is a list of references.
9. The ninth part is a list of references.
10. The tenth part is a list of references.
11. The eleventh part is a list of references.
12. The twelfth part is a list of references.
13. The thirteenth part is a list of references.
14. The fourteenth part is a list of references.
15. The fifteenth part is a list of references.
16. The sixteenth part is a list of references.
17. The seventeenth part is a list of references.
18. The eighteenth part is a list of references.
19. The nineteenth part is a list of references.
20. The twentieth part is a list of references.

21. The twenty-first part is a list of references.
22. The twenty-second part is a list of references.
23. The twenty-third part is a list of references.
24. The twenty-fourth part is a list of references.
25. The twenty-fifth part is a list of references.
26. The twenty-sixth part is a list of references.
27. The twenty-seventh part is a list of references.
28. The twenty-eighth part is a list of references.
29. The twenty-ninth part is a list of references.
30. The thirtieth part is a list of references.

economic nature, bore fruit quickly. Argentina made it known that although the doctrine of non-recognition was absolute, it did not have to be applied to the Ethiopian situation.⁸⁵ The other Latin Americans were also irritated with Argentina. As she retreated from her position, many American states were left in a difficult situation. There was serious talk of deserting the self-proclaimed leader of their coalition.⁸⁶

At the June meeting the Argentine delegate, José María Cantilo, began by lauding the non-recognition doctrine as enunciated in the August 3 Declaration. He went on to say that the League should once again indicate its fealty to the doctrine and noted that it was contained in the Covenant. If the League of Nations, Cantilo continued, did not re-affirm non-recognition, Argentina might be forced to withdraw. Although the statement appeared to be strong, in reality it was not since Ethiopia was never mentioned. Consequently, the Assembly was able to assuage Argentina's demand with a simple statement of reaffirmation.⁸⁷

Even though the action the Assembly took fell considerably short of an Argentine victory, Saavedra Lamas did not

⁸⁵ Ibid., pp. 160-161.

⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 171-172, 175-176.

⁸⁷ League of Nations, The Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, XVI (June, 1936), 154-155, 181.

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a general discussion of the problem of the existence of solutions of the system of equations (1) and (2) for arbitrary values of the parameters α and β . It is shown that the system has solutions for all values of the parameters α and β if the function $f(x)$ is continuous and the function $g(x)$ is piecewise continuous.

2. In the second part of the paper the problem of the existence of solutions of the system of equations (1) and (2) for arbitrary values of the parameters α and β is solved. It is shown that the system has solutions for all values of the parameters α and β if the function $f(x)$ is continuous and the function $g(x)$ is piecewise continuous.

3. In the third part of the paper the problem of the existence of solutions of the system of equations (1) and (2) for arbitrary values of the parameters α and β is solved. It is shown that the system has solutions for all values of the parameters α and β if the function $f(x)$ is continuous and the function $g(x)$ is piecewise continuous.

4. In the fourth part of the paper the problem of the existence of solutions of the system of equations (1) and (2) for arbitrary values of the parameters α and β is solved. It is shown that the system has solutions for all values of the parameters α and β if the function $f(x)$ is continuous and the function $g(x)$ is piecewise continuous.

5. In the fifth part of the paper the problem of the existence of solutions of the system of equations (1) and (2) for arbitrary values of the parameters α and β is solved. It is shown that the system has solutions for all values of the parameters α and β if the function $f(x)$ is continuous and the function $g(x)$ is piecewise continuous.

6. In the sixth part of the paper the problem of the existence of solutions of the system of equations (1) and (2) for arbitrary values of the parameters α and β is solved. It is shown that the system has solutions for all values of the parameters α and β if the function $f(x)$ is continuous and the function $g(x)$ is piecewise continuous.

7. In the seventh part of the paper the problem of the existence of solutions of the system of equations (1) and (2) for arbitrary values of the parameters α and β is solved. It is shown that the system has solutions for all values of the parameters α and β if the function $f(x)$ is continuous and the function $g(x)$ is piecewise continuous.

8. In the eighth part of the paper the problem of the existence of solutions of the system of equations (1) and (2) for arbitrary values of the parameters α and β is solved. It is shown that the system has solutions for all values of the parameters α and β if the function $f(x)$ is continuous and the function $g(x)$ is piecewise continuous.

9. In the ninth part of the paper the problem of the existence of solutions of the system of equations (1) and (2) for arbitrary values of the parameters α and β is solved. It is shown that the system has solutions for all values of the parameters α and β if the function $f(x)$ is continuous and the function $g(x)$ is piecewise continuous.

10. In the tenth part of the paper the problem of the existence of solutions of the system of equations (1) and (2) for arbitrary values of the parameters α and β is solved. It is shown that the system has solutions for all values of the parameters α and β if the function $f(x)$ is continuous and the function $g(x)$ is piecewise continuous.

forsake the League. In fact, he realized that after the Ethiopian debacle, the League would welcome anyone who demonstrated faith in the multi-national body. Consequently, in September, 1936 Saavedra Lamas journeyed to Geneva with the safe assurance he would be elected President of the Assembly and be praised for his work. After all, as far as the League was concerned he was now the leader of the Latin American bloc. What he hoped for came true and while little of substance was accomplished, Saavedra Lamas enjoyed exposure before a world-wide audience.⁸⁸ He also wanted to establish strong ties with the League delegates and demonstrate that he appreciated the honor accorded him. To this end he held the largest and most lavish party in League history reportedly costing 100,000 Swiss Francs (30,000 dollars). Whether this monstrous demonstration of ostentation increased his prestige or not is impossible to determine, but for years it was the most talked about social event.⁸⁹

The motives underlying Saavedra Lamas' actions at the League were summed up by the French Foreign Office, which

⁸⁸Ibid. (September, 1936), 250-282. His speech is summarized on page 252.

⁸⁹The source for these assertions is Eduardo Tómas Pardo, interview conducted in Buenos Aires, August 25, 1972. He was told this information by his father, who was a representative in Geneva.

1. The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work. It is a very interesting and informative account of the work done during the year.

2. The second part of the report deals with the results of the work. It is a very interesting and informative account of the work done during the year.

3. The third part of the report deals with the results of the work. It is a very interesting and informative account of the work done during the year.

4. The fourth part of the report deals with the results of the work. It is a very interesting and informative account of the work done during the year.

5. The fifth part of the report deals with the results of the work. It is a very interesting and informative account of the work done during the year.

6. The sixth part of the report deals with the results of the work. It is a very interesting and informative account of the work done during the year.

7. The seventh part of the report deals with the results of the work. It is a very interesting and informative account of the work done during the year.

8. The eighth part of the report deals with the results of the work. It is a very interesting and informative account of the work done during the year.

9. The ninth part of the report deals with the results of the work. It is a very interesting and informative account of the work done during the year.

10. The tenth part of the report deals with the results of the work. It is a very interesting and informative account of the work done during the year.

believed they were dictated by his "well-known desire to play a great role in the international scene."⁹⁰ There is little doubt that the Franch were correct. There can also be little doubt that as Foreign Minister of a secondline power, Saavedra Lamas had made the most of his opportunities.⁹¹

⁹⁰U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1936, III, p. 152.

⁹¹Following the stint at the League Saavedra Lamas made a quick trip to London. He went to look into the renegotiation of the Roca-Runciman treaty, which had been signed three years earlier. The 1933 accord had grown out of the Ottawa Conference in August, 1932, at which the British had adopted a strong Dominion preference system. Consequently, the quota for Argentine chilled beef would be held at the level for the year ending June 30, 1932, one of the lowest in history. Furthermore, imports of frozen beef would be reduced in stages to 65% of what they had been in the same base year.

As a result, Justo sent a delegation led by Vice-President Julio A. Roca and including Miguel Angel Cárcano to London in an attempt to halt a drastic narrowing of Argentina's most important market. The South American negotiators, however, were in a poor bargaining position because England could buy in many markets. In the final accord London agreed not to reduce the quota for Argentina beef unless the quota was reduced for the Dominions. More disturbing for the Argentines was a provision which gave Buenos Aires only fifteen percent of the meat-packing business at a time when she coveted much more. See Peter H. Smith, Politics and Beef in Argentina (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 143-147. The text of the agreement is available in, Daniel Drosdoff, El gobierno de las vacas; 1933-1956 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Astrea de Rodolfo Depalma y Hnos., 1972), pp. 169-183.

While the negotiations were going on Saavedra Lamas and the Ministro de Hacienda, Alberto Hueyo indicated that they opposed major concessions to the British. They could, however, exert little pressure against the Argentine Vice-President. It is ironic therefore that in the Senate, de la Torre attacked Saavedra Lamas for the treaty. For an

9.40

During the three year period 1934-1936 Saavedra Lamas slowly amassed prestige and influence. He received the credit for bringing about a cease-fire in the Chaco and became head of the mediating body charged with bringing about a definitive end to the war. Since his methods and motives were not public knowledge, he could readily adopt the title of peace maker of the Chaco. His stand on the Italo-Ethiopian dispute and his Presidency of the League Assembly elevated Saavedra Lamas to the center of the world stage. That he accomplished nothing and indeed only caused trouble regarding Italy and Ethiopia was irrelevant. He was serving notice to the world as he had done earlier in the Americas, that Saavedra Lamas was a man to be reckoned with.

account of the debate see República Argentina, Cámara de Diputados, Diario de sesiones, 1933, II, pp. 335-380, and Lisandor de la Torre, Escritos y Discursos (Buenos Aires: Colegio libre de estudios superiores, 1947), pp. 13-62.

One of the provisions of the original treaty called for an investigation of the British controlled meat-packing business. The British did not cooperate which prompted numerous representations from Saavedra Lamas. During his 1936 trip the Argentine Foreign Minister was able to obtain more control over beef marketing. See Drosdoff, Gobierno, pp. 55-77, passim.

CHAPTER 6

THE PERILS OF SUCCESS

In December 1936, Saavedra Lamas reached the apogee of his fame and influence. Not only was he involved with the Chaco Peace Conference but he was also to preside at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Moreover, in November, 1936, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. December, 1936, marked, however, the beginning of Saavedra Lamas' decline in prestige and power. Although he attempted to reverse this situation throughout 1937 and part of 1938 he was unable to do so and consequently was retired at the end of the Justo administration.

The Nobel Prize

It is difficult to know whether Saavedra Lamas had the Nobel Peace Prize in mind when the Anti-War Pact was drawn up in 1932. He certainly knew that Frank B. Kellogg had received the prize in 1929 for a similar effort. Saavedra Lamas, however, did not begin a concerted drive to garner the award until early 1936, following the settlement of the prisoner repatriation issue. At that time, he asked Braden to request of Roosevelt and Hull their support in

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1.

securing the Nobel Prize.¹ He stated that he already had the backing of the Balkan countries, and United States support was all that was needed to insure him receipt of the award. Braden gave an evasive reply and assumed that Washington would demur. Much to his surprise, Washington agreed to back the Argentine Foreign Minister. In his memoirs, Hull stated that he "virtually managed the movement in his [Saavedra Lamas'] behalf ... because of his outstanding services for the cause of peace."² Actually Hull probably should have said that up to that time his Argentine counterpart had not done anything publicly to seriously disrupt the Good Neighbor Policy.

The efforts of Hull paid off, and on November 24, 1936, it was announced that Saavedra Lamas would soon become the first South American recipient of the coveted Peace Prize. The decision of the Nobel Prize Committee met with general approbation in Buenos Aires. Both the major newspapers of the Argentine capital devoted considerable

¹Spruille Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1971), pp. 153-154. Braden said that while Saavedra Lamas was making his request he put on "all his charm."

²Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New Rochelle, New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), 2 volumes, Vol. I, p. 497. See also United States Archives, Record Group 59, Decimal File 093.57N66/277, Hull to Braden (Buenos Aires), January 30, 1936 and ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 093.57N66/280, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, January 31, 1936.

space to the event. Secretary of State Hull's comment that the award was merited was reported, along with statements that the news was well received in Rio de Janeiro and Geneva.³ On the 25th of November, La Nación published an editorial that was so laudatory to the Argentine Foreign Minister it can reasonably be said he could not have written a better one himself.⁴ In it he was given credit for introducing a major new international instrument, the Anti-War Pact, bringing the fighting to a close in the Chaco, and blunting the interventionist predelections of the United States.

Saavedra Lamas was, of course, delighted to receive the Prize and the \$32,000 that went along with it. The money, however, probably was not as important to him as the prestige. In his statement to the press, the Argentine Chancellor explained that although he would not be able to go to Europe to accept the distinction due to the demands of his office, he was deeply honored. He contended that although the award bore his name, it should actually have been given to the Argentine people. Saavedra Lamas, in response to a question, added that he had not let any of

³ See La Nación and La Prensa for November 25, 1936.

⁴ La Nación, November 28, 1936.

2. The second part of the document provides a detailed description of the accounting system used by the company. It outlines the various accounts maintained, including the general ledger, subsidiary ledgers, and the trial balance. It also describes the methods used for recording transactions and for reconciling the accounts.

3. The third part of the document presents a summary of the financial results of the company for the year ending December 31, 19XX. It includes a statement of income, a statement of assets and liabilities, and a statement of equity. These statements provide a clear and concise overview of the company's financial performance and position.

4. The fourth part of the document contains a series of footnotes and explanatory notes that provide additional information about the financial statements and the accounting system. These notes are intended to provide a more complete understanding of the company's financial affairs and to ensure that all relevant information is disclosed to the readers of the financial statements.

5. The fifth part of the document is a concluding statement that expresses the confidence of the management in the accuracy and reliability of the financial information presented. It also states that the company is committed to maintaining the highest standards of financial reporting and to providing transparent and timely information to all stakeholders.

his friends campaign on his behalf for the Nobel Prize.⁵ As usual he deemed it impolitic to tell the truth.

As is common following such events, a reception was held to honor the Argentine Foreign Minister, on November 27. The best of Argentine society, and government, plus the diplomatic corps was invited and everyone came with one exception; noticeably absent was President Justo.⁶ Both Cárcano and Braden stated that Justo was incensed that Saavedra Lamas had not mentioned him in connection with the Anti-War Pact or Chaco Peace Conference. Cárcano also indicated that the Argentine President was enraged that his Foreign Minister was constantly upstaging him.⁷


That Saavedra Lamas committed a grave error when he snubbed Justo is unquestionable. It is possible that the Foreign Minister had no respect for him. Braden related that Saavedra Lamas referred to Justo as the "little fatty."⁸ It is more plausible to assume, however, that the Argentine Chancellor simply wanted the available kudos for himself. Alas, Saavedra Lamas would discover much to his displeasure that his lack of charity engendered revenge. "Little fatty,"

⁵New York Times, November 29, 1936.

⁶La Nación, November 28, 1936.

⁷Interview with Miguel Angel Cárcano, Buenos Aires, October 13, 1972; Braden, Diplomats, p. 154.

⁸Braden, Diplomats, p. 152.



it developed, was both willing and able to take action against his Foreign Minister.

Inter-American Conference for the
Maintenance of Peace

Early in 1935 discussions began within the United States Department of State relative to the possibility of convoking a special inter-American meeting following the end of the Chaco War. The purpose would be to provide machinery within the Western Hemisphere in order to prevent wars among the American nations and take joint action should war threaten or begin elsewhere. Washington planners were convinced that a bulwark of continental solidarity was needed in the face of world wide unrest. In Europe, the Italians were contemplating an invasion of Ethiopia, and the situation in Germany was precarious. Moreover, in the Pacific, Japan's aggressive actions foretold future problems. Internal American disputes would serve to weaken the Hemisphere and provide the gaps through which elements unfriendly to the United States could move.

The first diplomatic overtures concerning the proposed conference were made only six weeks after the signing of the June 12, 1935 Protocol, which ended the fighting but not the war. Almost immediately problems developed with the Peruvians. Lima was slated as the site for the as yet unscheduled Eighth Pan American meeting. Although Peru

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a general discussion of the problem of the existence of solutions of the system of equations (1) for arbitrary values of the parameters α and β . It is shown that the system has solutions for arbitrary values of the parameters α and β if and only if the condition $\alpha + \beta = 1$ is satisfied. In this case the solutions are unique and are given by the formulas

$$x = \frac{1}{\alpha} \ln \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \quad \text{and} \quad y = \frac{1}{\beta} \ln \frac{1}{1 - \beta}.$$

2. In the second part of the paper the problem of the stability of the solutions of the system (1) is considered. It is shown that the solutions are stable with respect to the initial conditions if and only if the condition $\alpha + \beta = 1$ is satisfied. In this case the solutions are stable with respect to the initial conditions and are given by the formulas

$$x = \frac{1}{\alpha} \ln \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \quad \text{and} \quad y = \frac{1}{\beta} \ln \frac{1}{1 - \beta}.$$

3. In the third part of the paper the problem of the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1) is considered. It is shown that the solutions are asymptotically stable with respect to the initial conditions if and only if the condition $\alpha + \beta = 1$ is satisfied. In this case the solutions are asymptotically stable with respect to the initial conditions and are given by the formulas

$$x = \frac{1}{\alpha} \ln \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \quad \text{and} \quad y = \frac{1}{\beta} \ln \frac{1}{1 - \beta}.$$

4. In the fourth part of the paper the problem of the bifurcation of the solutions of the system (1) is considered. It is shown that the solutions are bifurcated if and only if the condition $\alpha + \beta = 1$ is satisfied. In this case the solutions are bifurcated and are given by the formulas

$$x = \frac{1}{\alpha} \ln \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \quad \text{and} \quad y = \frac{1}{\beta} \ln \frac{1}{1 - \beta}.$$

5. In the fifth part of the paper the problem of the global behavior of the solutions of the system (1) is considered. It is shown that the solutions are globally stable with respect to the initial conditions if and only if the condition $\alpha + \beta = 1$ is satisfied. In this case the solutions are globally stable with respect to the initial conditions and are given by the formulas

$$x = \frac{1}{\alpha} \ln \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \quad \text{and} \quad y = \frac{1}{\beta} \ln \frac{1}{1 - \beta}.$$

6. In the sixth part of the paper the problem of the periodic behavior of the solutions of the system (1) is considered. It is shown that the solutions are periodic if and only if the condition $\alpha + \beta = 1$ is satisfied. In this case the solutions are periodic and are given by the formulas

$$x = \frac{1}{\alpha} \ln \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \quad \text{and} \quad y = \frac{1}{\beta} \ln \frac{1}{1 - \beta}.$$

7. In the seventh part of the paper the problem of the chaotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1) is considered. It is shown that the solutions are chaotic if and only if the condition $\alpha + \beta = 1$ is satisfied. In this case the solutions are chaotic and are given by the formulas

$$x = \frac{1}{\alpha} \ln \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \quad \text{and} \quad y = \frac{1}{\beta} \ln \frac{1}{1 - \beta}.$$

did not object to the United States' suggestions to alter the usual format, her Foreign Minister, Carlos Concha, was deeply concerned about the possibility he would have to play "second fiddle" to Saavedra Lamas. He also added parenthetically that his counterpart in Argentina would consider the United States' plan as an indication that the North Americans believed the Chaco Peace Conference would fail.⁹ The United States Ambassador in Peru, Fred Morris Dearing, in his analysis of the Peruvian response, believed that fear of Saavedra Lamas was the prime motive, and that the other reason given was merely a smoke screen.¹⁰

Dearing was probably correct about Concha's real purpose, but it is interesting that Saavedra Lamas took a position akin to the Peruvian Foreign Minister's second point. The Argentine Chancellor observed that planning a general conference on peace would be a mistake at that time. Any such event would have to wait until the end of the Chaco negotiations.¹¹ Saavedra Lamas also stated that if the

⁹United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1953), 1935, Volume IV, p. 3. Concha mentioned that Saavedra Lamas was after the Nobel Peace Prize.

¹⁰U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.Peace/7, Dearing (Lima) to Dept. of State, August 13, 1935.

¹¹Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/84, Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 3, 1935.

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

United States did not ratify the newly negotiated Sanitary Treaty, which lowered the requirements for many Argentine products including beef, the Argentine view of Pan Americanism would change.¹² That is, she would stop any conference. Apparently, the complications with Peru and Argentina were too much for the United States. The State Department announced it was going to "re-examine" the situation.¹³ The Mexican Undersecretary of Foreign Relations, upon hearing of the North American decision, commented sardonically that "Saavedra Lamas would never become enthusiastic over someone else's idea."¹⁴

Saavedra Lamas, however, changed his mind in October, 1935, when he thought the Chaco Peace Conference was collapsing. As reported in Chapter 5, he wanted to shift the blame to the other American nations. The United States did not agree and the whole matter was quickly dropped.¹⁵

It was a scant ten days after the January 20, 1936 Protocol was signed that President Roosevelt addressed a

¹²Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 710.Peace/11, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Welles, February 6, 1936.

¹³U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1935, IV, pp. 4-5.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁵See U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.3415/511, Gibson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 12, 1935.

letter to Justo regarding the proposed Conference. In his message, the North American president proposed the same thing he had earlier, with one major change. Significantly, he asked that Buenos Aires be the site for the conclave if Justo was agreeable. He also alluded to a problem which was to surface later, the relationship of the Conference to the work of the League of Nations. Roosevelt contended that the proposed Buenos Aires meeting would "supplement and reinforce" League efforts.¹⁶

The initial reaction to Roosevelt's letter on February 6, 1936, by Saavedra Lamas was very positive. He indicated that the time was "propitious" for a general conference on peace. Furthermore, he agreed that there was a need to establish a system of neutral mediation. The critical question of whether or not Buenos Aires was acceptable as the location was never brought up. Saavedra Lamas simply acted as if there could be no question. When Braden broached the subject of Saavedra Lamas' negative response seven months earlier, the Argentine Chancellor noted that his answer was dictated by fear that Paraguay would desert the Chaco Conference if there was another alternative. On the

¹⁶United States, Department of State, Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1937), pp. 45-46.

1. The first part of the report is a general statement of the purpose of the study and the scope of the work.

2. The second part of the report is a description of the methods used in the study.

3. The third part of the report is a description of the results of the study.

4. The fourth part of the report is a discussion of the results and their implications.

5. The fifth part of the report is a conclusion and a list of references.

6. The sixth part of the report is a list of appendices.

7. The seventh part of the report is a list of figures and tables.

8. The eighth part of the report is a list of footnotes.

9. The ninth part of the report is a list of references.

10. The tenth part of the report is a list of appendices.

11. The eleventh part of the report is a list of figures and tables.

12. The twelfth part of the report is a list of footnotes.

13. The thirteenth part of the report is a list of references.

14. The fourteenth part of the report is a list of appendices.

matter of the Sanitary Treaty, Saavedra Lamas observed that this had been simply a tactic to assure postponement of the Maintenance of Peace Conference.¹⁷

A week later, on February 13, Saavedra Lamas indicated he was having second thoughts about the Conference. In an informal meeting of the Chaco Peace Conference delegates, he declared that a discussion of economic questions would be more useful than a peace meeting. He went on to say that he was worried about Argentine beef sales to Europe and suggested that with the economic upturn in the United States, the North Americans could now take three percent of Argentina's meat production. Actually, the United States was talking in terms of two percent at that time. Saavedra Lamas also contradicted his earlier statement, observing that a conference on peace would be useless because there were already adequate treaties. He opined that what was needed was ratification of those instruments. Unmentioned was the fact that Argentina had the worst record in that regard, save Bolivia.¹⁸

One of the few positive purposes that the Conference could serve, as the Argentine Chancellor perceived it, was

¹⁷United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1954), 1936, Volume V, pp. 5-6.

¹⁸U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.Peace/147, Dawson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, February 14, 1936.

1890-1891

1

1891-1892

2

1892-1893

3

1893-1894

4

5

6

7

1894-1895

8

9

10

11

12

13

1895-1896

14

1896-1897

15

1897-1898

16

to supply a place to "unload" the Chaco dispute. In that regard, however, he quickly asserted that such a move would be "dishonorable." It could also, he added, provide a general embargo system, including not only arms and munitions, but petroleum products, should war develop. Foodstuffs, however, should not be declared contraband for "humanitarian" purposes. Again, he failed, as he had previously, to note that since food was Argentina's prime export, his proposal was in his country's self-interest. Finally, he indicated that it would be desirable to examine the letter Roosevelt sent to Justo. Allen Dawson, a United States Conference delegate, in analyzing this point, observed that Saavedra Lamas, had not seen the letter and had only Espil's assurances that the meeting would be held in Buenos Aires, and that current press stories were suggesting the location would be Washington D.C. This, he believed, caused Saavedra Lamas to shift his position.¹⁹

Although the official response of the majority of American states was favorable, Bolivia did make known her fear that the Chaco dispute would be brought under the auspices of the Maintenance of Peace Conference. Such a move, she reasoned, would cause delay and thereby improve Paraguay's position. The delegates to the Chaco Peace Conference were also concerned about the proposed

¹⁹Ibid.

1. The first part of the report

2. The second part of the report

3. The third part of the report

4. The fourth part of the report

5. The fifth part of the report

6. The sixth part of the report

7. The seventh part of the report

8. The eighth part of the report

9. The ninth part of the report

10. The tenth part of the report

11. The eleventh part of the report

12. The twelfth part of the report

13. The thirteenth part of the report

14. The fourteenth part of the report

15. The fifteenth part of the report

16. The sixteenth part of the report

17. The seventeenth part of the report

18. The eighteenth part of the report

19. The nineteenth part of the report

20. The twentieth part of the report

21. The twenty-first part of the report

22. The twenty-second part of the report

23. The twenty-third part of the report

24. The twenty-fourth part of the report

25. The twenty-fifth part of the report

26. The twenty-sixth part of the report

27. The twenty-seventh part of the report

28. The twenty-eighth part of the report

29. The twenty-ninth part of the report

30. The thirtieth part of the report

31. The thirty-first part of the report

32. The thirty-second part of the report

33. The thirty-third part of the report

34. The thirty-fourth part of the report

35. The thirty-fifth part of the report

36. The thirty-sixth part of the report

37. The thirty-seventh part of the report

38. The thirty-eighth part of the report

39. The thirty-ninth part of the report

40. The fortieth part of the report

41. The forty-first part of the report

42. The forty-second part of the report

43. The forty-third part of the report

44. The forty-fourth part of the report

45. The forty-fifth part of the report

46. The forty-sixth part of the report

47. The forty-seventh part of the report

48. The forty-eighth part of the report

49. The forty-ninth part of the report

50. The fiftieth part of the report

51. The fifty-first part of the report

52. The fifty-second part of the report

53. The fifty-third part of the report

54. The fifty-fourth part of the report

55. The fifty-fifth part of the report

56. The fifty-sixth part of the report

57. The fifty-seventh part of the report

58. The fifty-eighth part of the report

59. The fifty-ninth part of the report

60. The sixtieth part of the report

61. The sixty-first part of the report

62. The sixty-second part of the report

63. The sixty-third part of the report

64. The sixty-fourth part of the report

65. The sixty-fifth part of the report

66. The sixty-sixth part of the report

67. The sixty-seventh part of the report

68. The sixty-eighth part of the report

69. The sixty-ninth part of the report

inter-American gathering. Both Nieto del Río (Chile) and Rodriguez Alves (Brazil) were opposed to locating the meeting in Buenos Aires because Saavedra Lamas would be the chairman. The United States delegate, Braden, informed Washington that he was also against the idea for the same reason. He added that since Podestá Costa had been sent to the League as the Argentine representative, there would be no one who could handle the details of the Conference.²⁰

Washington also heard discouraging words from Mexico City and Lima. Concha indicated he considered Washington D.C. to be the best location and was against Buenos Aires as the site.²¹ The Mexican Undersecretary stated that "propinquity might afford Saavedra Lamas influence undesired by Mexico."²² These internal and unofficial comments, however, were not public knowledge. Consequently, when General Justo sent a formal acceptance to the United States,

²⁰Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 710.Peace/76, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, February 16, 1936.

²¹Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 710.Peace/73, Dearing (Lima) to Dept. of State, February 15, 1936. In the document Nieto del Río was incorrectly referred to as "Vieto."

²²Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 710.Peace/83, Norweb (Mexico City) to Dept. of State, February 17, 1936. In a subsequent telegram, RG 59, Decimal File 710.Peace/118, Norweb (Mexico City) to Dept. of State, February 17, 1936, the Mexican Undersecretary indicated that the "Anti-War Pact [was] a piece of showmanship and ... Mexico was in no hurry to ratify it."

1. The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study.

2. The second part of the report is a detailed description of the methods used in the study.

3. The third part of the report is a discussion of the results of the study.

4. The fourth part of the report is a conclusion and a list of references.

5. The fifth part of the report is a list of appendices.

6. The sixth part of the report is a list of figures and tables.

7. The seventh part of the report is a list of footnotes.

8. The eighth part of the report is a list of acknowledgments.

9. The ninth part of the report is a list of abbreviations.

10. The tenth part of the report is a list of symbols.

11. The eleventh part of the report is a list of equations.

12. The twelfth part of the report is a list of definitions.

13. The thirteenth part of the report is a list of terms.

14. The fourteenth part of the report is a list of notes.

15. The fifteenth part of the report is a list of references.

it appeared as if everything was going well and that only the exact agenda and date were undecided.

On the latter issue, Saavedra Lamas in mid-March, 1936, suggested that the conference be held in June because he was planning to attend the Assembly of the League of Nations in July. Washington, however, did not like the idea of holding the Conference that soon because much of the preliminary work was still unfinished. Saavedra Lamas did not accept the first refusal and subsequently informed the United States that President Justo had accepted a July 15 date. Apparently, he was willing to shift the time and delay his departure, but he definitely wanted an early meeting. Saavedra Lamas' attempt to make the date he wanted unassailable by attaching Justo's name to it failed as the North Americans continued to demand a later date.²³ The Conference was finally fixed for December 1, 1936.

Besides his trip to the League, Saavedra Lamas' insistence upon an early meeting was probably motivated by the fact that he had already drawn up a full set of proposals. A quick meeting could have conceivably resulted in his program forming the basic blueprint for the Conference. On March 31, the Argentine Foreign Minister supplied Braden

²³For the correspondence see U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1936, V, pp. 10-12. Another reason the North Americans opposed the early date was due to the fact it conflicted with the Democratic Party Convention, which Hull was to attend.

with copies of his proposal and in May published it in English in Washington D.C. In his Draft of a Convention for the Maintenance of Peace, Saavedra Lamas predictably raised the August 3 Declaration, non-recognition of territory acquired by other than peaceful means, to a prominent position. He also proposed that an embargo be used as a sanction should conciliation fail under neutral auspices. As he had hinted earlier, fuel was to be embargoed, but foodstuffs could still be exported. The Argentine Chancellor also took a slap at the United States by adding a provision against intervention. He even went so far as to include "excessive diplomatic protection" of nationals living in another country.

A stipulation Saavedra Lamas must have realized was anathema to the United States required signatories of either the Kellogg-Briand and/or the Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Pact to cooperate in sanctions imposed by the League of Nations. In other words, the United States would enjoy none of the benefits and all of the responsibilities of League membership. In a similar vein, Saavedra Lamas also desired to open up a number of solely American treaties to world wide adherence. Finally, in the economic section of his proposed convention, he included an article requiring a gradual reduction in tariffs and documentary proof of

contamination before sanitary provisions could be applied.²⁴ If what Saavedra Lamas proposed was antithetical to the United States, so was what he failed to say. Conspicuously absent were "any provisions to protect the common interest of the Americas against overseas emergencies."²⁵

The initial response in Argentina to Saavedra Lamas' project was favorable. La Prensa, in a May 30 editorial, after lauding the work of the Foreign Minister, attacked the United States. Economics, the paper asserted, brought countries together and therefore the United States should modify her policies. Furthermore, La Prensa continued, the North Americans should do more to prevent wars, such as working with the League of Nations, rather than trying to seal off the New World from the Old.²⁶

Following the presentation of the Argentine program, a problem developed which demonstrated the polarization taking place. While at the League of Nations in August, Saavedra Lamas learned that the Geneva based organization was very concerned that it would be shunted aside at Buenos

²⁴ Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Draft of a Convention for the Maintenance of Peace (Washington D.C.: No publisher listed, May, 1936).

²⁵ J. Lloyd Meham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), p. 128.

²⁶ La Prensa, May 30, 1936.

1. The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study. It discusses the importance of the research and the objectives of the study.

2. The second part of the report is a detailed description of the methods used in the study. It includes information about the sample, the data collection methods, and the statistical analysis.

3. The third part of the report is a presentation of the results of the study. It includes tables, figures, and text describing the findings.

4. The fourth part of the report is a discussion of the results and their implications. It discusses the strengths and limitations of the study and suggests areas for future research.

5. The fifth part of the report is a conclusion. It summarizes the main findings of the study and provides a final statement on the research.

6. The sixth part of the report is a list of references. It includes all the sources used in the study.

7. The seventh part of the report is an appendix. It includes any additional information that is relevant to the study but is not included in the main text.

8. The eighth part of the report is a glossary. It defines the key terms used in the study.

9. The ninth part of the report is a bibliography. It lists all the books and articles cited in the study.

10. The tenth part of the report is a list of figures. It includes all the figures used in the study.

11. The eleventh part of the report is a list of tables. It includes all the tables used in the study.

12. The twelfth part of the report is a list of abbreviations. It includes all the abbreviations used in the study.

13. The thirteenth part of the report is a list of symbols. It includes all the symbols used in the study.

14. The fourteenth part of the report is a list of footnotes. It includes all the footnotes used in the study.

15. The fifteenth part of the report is a list of appendices. It includes all the appendices used in the study.

Aires. To calm the concern, Saavedra Lamas implied that an observer from the League would be welcome. Subsequently, the United States was forced to inform the League of North American opposition to a representative attending.²⁷

In much the same regard, the Argentine Chancellor moved quickly to squelch a Colombian proposal for an American League of Nations. When the subject was brought before the agenda Committee in Washington, the Argentine representative, Espil, announced that in any such organization, the small Central American states should not have equal voting status with Argentina. This comment not only irritated the Central American nations, but it also made them leary of the whole Colombian idea.²⁸ It is probable that Espil was ordered to do what he did, since he was too skilled a diplomat to make such a gaffe with no purpose in mind. Saavedra Lamas had sullied the entire project by putting the fear of diminished status into the minds of the smaller states. By the same action, he also demonstrated his friendship for the Geneva based League. Finally, he won praise at home for his opposition.²⁹

²⁷ See U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, 1936, V, pp. 18-20, 25-26, and 31-32.

²⁸ U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 710.Peace/601 Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, May 27, 1936.

²⁹ See editorials, La Prensa, June 7, 1936 and La Nación, Julh 7, 1936.

The Inter-American Peace Conference actually began on November 30, 1936, the date Roosevelt arrived in Buenos Aires. He had decided in late August that his presence would be helpful in achieving acceptance of the United States program. Along with a huge crowd, Saavedra Lamas was at the pier to greet the President. Time magazine stated that the Argentine Foreign Minister "frantically waved his hat" and commented sarcastically that this was a "triumph of U. S. diplomacy." The newsweekly went on to indicate that the reason he was so excited was he had received the Nobel Peace Prize the day before and could not wait to be congratulated.³⁰

The next day the Conference began its work, with speeches by Justo and Roosevelt which revealed a clear dichotomy of purpose. The Argentine President, after noting the debt the New World owed to the Old stated:

It is impossible to suppose that the work today beginning would fail to recognize the world interdependence which governs the economic and political life of these nations or to think that the action to be taken could alter age-old connections with countries of the Old world.³¹

Roosevelt responded with

In this determination to live at peace among ourselves we in the Americas make it at the same time clear that we stand shoulder to shoulder in our final determination that others driven by war madness or land hunger,

³⁰Time, "Pan American Party," XXVIII (December 7, 1936), 12-14.

³¹U. S. Dept. of State, Report of the Delegates, pp. 73-76.

100 100 100 100

155

1. *Chlorophyll a* (Chl *a*)

1


might seek to commit acts of aggression against us, will find a hemisphere wholly prepared to consult together for our national safety and our national good. I repeat what I said in speaking before the Congress and the Supreme Court of Brazil. 'Each one of us has learned the glories of independence. Let each one of us learn the glories of interdependence.'³²

It became clear very quickly that while the Argentines might applaud Roosevelt's words, they had no intention of adopting the program of the United States. Hull believed there were enough peace instruments available in the Americas, and that the major problem was coordinating their use. As such, he proposed the creation of a permanent consulting body of Foreign Ministers. If a war was threatened or broke out, the body could quickly meet to plan a joint response. The second proposal of Hull was an attempt, in essence, to extend the 1935 United States neutrality legislation requiring an embargo on both combatants to a dispute by all the countries in the Western Hemisphere. Saavedra Lamas' proposal allowed for the lifting of an embargo after the aggressor was determined.

Conflict between Saavedra Lamas and Hull began very quickly. Hull described the situation in his memoirs:

I had several conferences alone with Saavedra Lamas and several in company with Welles and one or two other members of the delegation. These discussions became increasingly animated. Our last conference was heated, some sharp words were exchanged at least on my side, and we parted with no signs of complete

³²Ibid., pp. 77-81.



agreement. I saw no more of Saavedra Lamas before leaving Buenos Aires. He did not extend the usual courtesy of seeing me off.³³


Actually, Hull had been informed earlier by Braden that Saavedra Lamas would not see him to the ship. Hull commented, according to Braden, "that he was damn glad and that he would refuse to shake hands with Saavedra [Lamas] if he did show up." Hull added, as Braden related in his memoirs, "We should let President Justo know ... that as long as Saavedra Lamas was his Foreign Minister, it would be impossible for us to get along with the blankety blank (here he used his best cuss words)."³⁴

In fact, Hull did make his views on Saavedra Lamas well known. In a conversation with Miguel Angel Cárcano, who had become Minister of Agriculture in 1935, he attacked the Argentine Foreign Minister viciously, calling him "disloyal" because Hull, had helped him obtain the Nobel Prize. He became so agitated, in fact, that Cárcano eventually had to ask the United States Secretary of State to stop because Saavedra Lamas was a fellow cabinet minister.³⁵

³³Hull, Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 499.

³⁴Braden, Diplomats, p. 175. The treaties referred to would include the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration as well as many of the protocols adopted by Inter-American Conferences. The parentheses are Braden's.

³⁵Interview with Miguel Angel Cárcano, Buenos Aires, August 31, 1972.



Even though he cut Hull short, Cárcano stated that he was in sympathy with what was being said. Hull also went further than venting his frustration to the Agriculture Minister. Apparently, he ordered Welles, through Braden, to arrange a meeting between Leopoldo Melo, the Argentine Minister of Interior and head of the Cabinet, and Welles. The North American Undersecretary apparently had little good to say about Saavedra Lamas because, according to Braden, Melo "went to President Justo and demanded that Saavedra [Lamas] be restrained." Braden stated that the Argentine Chancellor "improved for a few days."³⁶

As can be adduced from the quantity and quality of the discord produced, the Conference achieved little of substance. The Convention to Coordinate, Extend and Assure Fulfillment of the Existing Treaties Between the American States, which represented Hull's attempt to set up a permanent organization of Foreign Ministers to determine action should trouble arise, was watered down to such an extent that it became meaningless. Article II, for example, stated that in case of emergency, the American Republics would "take counsel together with full recognition of their judicial equality, as sovereign and independent states, and of their general right of individual liberty of action."³⁷

³⁶Braden, Diplomats, p. 175.

³⁷U. S. Dept. of State, Report of the Delegation, p. 136.

1000
1000
1000
1000

1000
1000
1000
1000

1000
1000
1000

1000
1000

1000
1000

It was hardly a warrant for close cooperation, and in fact, according to Harold F. Peterson, "mandated no action, created no permanent organ, and referred to a common neutrality policy only as a desirable objective."³⁸

In another treaty, called the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Re-establishment of Peace and Declaration of Principals of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation, Saavedra Lamas effectively took the teeth out of Hull's desire for consultative machinery. A portion of the accord stipulated that "in the event of an international war outside America which might menace the peace of the American Republics, such consultation shall ... take place to determine the proper time and manner in which the signatory states, if they so desire, may eventually cooperate in some action."³⁹ The key phrase, "if they so desired," was demanded by the Argentine Foreign Minister. Moreover, Saavedra Lamas insisted successfully that a statement of non-intervention also be accepted at the Conference.⁴⁰ Although Hull had appended a reservation to the protocol

³⁸This statement was made by Harold F. Peterson, Argentina and the United States, 1810-1960 (New York: State University of New York, 1964), p. 392.

³⁹U. S. Dept. of State, Report of the Delegation, p. 120.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 127-128.

adopted at Montevideo, there can be little doubt that the North American Secretary found the whole affair insulting.

In his memoirs, Hull commented that because both his and Saavedra Lamas' goals were so well known, he could not employ the same tactics that had worked in Montevideo, allowing the Argentine Chancellor to introduce the United States proposals and generally giving him the credit.⁴¹ In actuality, the Montevideo ploy would not have worked out in any case, because the situation was different. In 1933 Saavedra Lamas was not well known. He had to his credit only the Anti-War Pact and even that would account for little if the United States did not sign it. Consequently, when Saavedra Lamas cooperated, he was establishing a name for himself. In 1936 this was not necessary. He had been President of the Assembly of the League of Nations and won the Nobel Peace Prize. Cooperation was not required.

In defense of Saavedra Lamas it must be noted that Hull was trying to establish a mild form of hemispheric isolationism. The refusal of Saavedra Lamas to agree was consistent with Argentina's past policies as well as with those fostered by the Foreign Minister. The problem was that in stopping Hull, Saavedra Lamas would not compromise at all and even demanded provisions anathema to the United States.

⁴¹U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/713, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Welles (Buenos Aires), December 4, 1936.

10. 11. 1958

11. 11. 1958

12. 11. 1958

13. 11. 1958

14. 11. 1958

15. 11. 1958

16. 11. 1958

17. 11. 1958

18. 11. 1958

19. 11. 1958

20. 11. 1958

21. 11. 1958

22. 11. 1958

23. 11. 1958

24. 11. 1958

25. 11. 1958

26. 11. 1958

27. 11. 1958

28. 11. 1958

29. 11. 1958

30. 11. 1958

31. 11. 1958

32. 11. 1958

33. 11. 1958

34. 11. 1958

35. 11. 1958

36. 11. 1958

37. 11. 1958

38. 11. 1958

39. 11. 1958

10. 11. 1958

11. 11. 1958

12. 11. 1958

13. 11. 1958

14. 11. 1958

15. 11. 1958

16. 11. 1958

17. 11. 1958

18. 11. 1958

19. 11. 1958

20. 11. 1958

21. 11. 1958

22. 11. 1958

23. 11. 1958

24. 11. 1958

25. 11. 1958

26. 11. 1958

27. 11. 1958

28. 11. 1958

29. 11. 1958

30. 11. 1958

31. 11. 1958

32. 11. 1958

33. 11. 1958

34. 11. 1958

35. 11. 1958

36. 11. 1958

37. 11. 1958

38. 11. 1958

39. 11. 1958

This incensed Hull but what especially infuriated the North American Secretary of State was the failure of Saavedra Lamas to keep the unwritten and probably undiscussed agreement. In exchange for the Nobel Prize, Saavedra Lamas was expected to cooperate with the United States. That Saavedra Lamas did not understand the arrangement is unlikely. What is probable is that he decided to ignore it after he had received the award. Apparently Saavedra Lamas did not consider that his double-cross would result in a representation to Justo and the possible ruination of his career.

The Chaco Dispute, December, 1936

As in the 1933 Montevideo Conference, the Chaco dispute was not on the agenda of the Maintenance of Peace Conference, but much to the chagrin of Saavedra Lamas, it received a great deal of attention. It became apparent very early that the Argentine Chancellor had absolutely no intention of calling a meeting of the Chaco Conference while the larger conference was in Buenos Aires. In order to retain what little momentum the Chaco Conference had, Braden suggested to Saavedra Lamas that meetings continue, with the Vice-President in charge. The Argentine Chancellor replied: "Oh, no. I have ample time whenever you want." Braden, in his report, commented that despite what Saavedra Lamas had

1870

1871

1872

1873

1874

1875

1876

1877

1878

1879

1880

1881

1882

1883

1884

1885

1886

1887

1888

1889

1890

1891

1892

1893

1894

1895

1896

1897

1898

1899

1900

1901

1902

1903

1904

1905

1906

1907

1908

1909

1910

1911

1912

1913

1914

1915

1916

1917

1918

1919

1920

1921

said, he believed there would still be delay.⁴²

Braden was incorrect. Saavedra Lamas did call meetings, but it was clearly his intention that nothing substantial would be discussed. He was, however, annoyed that the Brazilian and Chilean Foreign Ministers, Macedo Soares and Cruchaga, insisted on attending the sessions. In fact, nasty remarks were exchanged between the South American Chancellors. Indeed, at one point, the Bolivian Foreign Minister commented to the Bolivian delegate that "we should offer our mediating services to the mediatory Foreign Ministers."⁴³

At a December 9 meeting, which had been called to draw up a statement describing the accomplishments of the Conference, Saavedra Lamas was outmaneuvered by his Brazilian and Chilean counterparts. Saavedra Lamas continually attempted to cut the session short by announcing over and over again that he had to attend a reception at the United States Embassy. Each time he brought the subject up, Macedo Soares was able to keep the meeting going by reference to its high purpose. Finally, apparently without thinking, the Argentine Chancellor proposed that a committee of representatives from three nations carry on the negotiations during the Maintenance of Peace Conference. According

⁴²Hull, Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 499.

⁴³Braden, Diplomats, p. 176.

1. The first part of the report is a general statement of the purpose of the study and the scope of the work.

2. The second part of the report is a description of the methods used in the study and the results of the experiments.

3. The third part of the report is a discussion of the results of the study and the conclusions drawn from the experiments.

4. The fourth part of the report is a summary of the work and the conclusions drawn from the experiments.

5. The fifth part of the report is a list of the references used in the study.

6. The sixth part of the report is a list of the figures and tables used in the study.

7. The seventh part of the report is a list of the appendices used in the study.

8. The eighth part of the report is a list of the acknowledgments.

9. The ninth part of the report is a list of the references used in the study.

10. The tenth part of the report is a list of the figures and tables used in the study.

11. The eleventh part of the report is a list of the appendices used in the study.

12. The twelfth part of the report is a list of the acknowledgments.

13. The thirteenth part of the report is a list of the references used in the study.

14. The fourteenth part of the report is a list of the figures and tables used in the study.

15. The fifteenth part of the report is a list of the appendices used in the study.

to Braden, he wanted to leave the Chaco dispute in the hands of Barreda Laos (Peru), Martinez Thédy (Uruguay), and an Argentine representative. From the past records of these two men, he knew that no progress would be made. There can be no doubt that he did not expect Macedo Soares suddenly to volunteer to be on the committee. He must have been even more irritated when Cruchaga followed suit. Since Saavedra Lamas had suggested the plan in the first place, to facilitate his work as President of the Maintenance of Peace Conference, he could not volunteer himself. Consequently, Braden was chosen as the third member, representing Hull. In essence, within the space of a few minutes, Saavedra Lamas not only lost direct control of the Chaco negotiations, but without even a representative, he lost indirect control.⁴⁴

Braden, with some justification, was frightened about what Saavedra Lamas would do. In fact, immediately after the usurpation by Macedo Soares he told the Argentine Chancellor he would keep him informed of all developments. The North American delegate, however, indicated that Saavedra Lamas' suspicions were not allayed. At the afternoon meeting the next day, the Argentine Chancellor appeared, although he had no formal standing. The session was going

⁴⁴ See ibid., pp. 176-177 and U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/715 Barden (Buenos Aires) to Welles (Buenos Aires), December 10, 1936.

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

well (even though Saavedra Lamas was there) when a fifteen minute recess was agreed upon. Suddenly, as Braden related it, he noticed that Saavedra Lamas and the Foreign Ministers of Paraguay and Bolivia, Stefanich and Finot, were missing. He ran outside, only to see the three men get into a car. Braden called on them to wait but "Saavedra Lamas waved me aside, jumped into the car, slammed the door and off they rode." Macedo Soares was outraged. It must have been particularly galling that Saavedra Lamas used the Brazilian's car in the abduction.⁴⁵ What the Argentine Chancellor said or did to entice the ex-belligerents away unfortunately is not recorded.

The next day, December 12, the Chaco Conference met again, and nothing unusual occurred. Before the session began, however, Saavedra Lamas made another bid to grab back control of the situation, albeit in a considerably less dramatic fashion. He suggested that the members of the Committee of Three, as the new mediators became known, meet with him the next day together with the Paraguayan delegation, to discuss a proposed boundary line. The Committee subsequently agreed with the proviso that the Paraguayans

⁴⁵ Ibid., and U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724. 34119/715, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Wells (Buenos Aires), December 10, 1936. Braden, in his memoirs, was wrong when he included Stefanich among the abductees. Stefanich was not then in Buenos Aires.

would not attend,⁴⁶ lest it appear to be a conspiracy against Bolivia. Saavedra Lamas accepted but Braden warned his fellow committee members that they should not come, because the Paraguayans would be there. The North American was only partially correct. The Paraguayans arrived an hour after the scheduled start of the meeting.⁴⁷

At that meeting, the Argentine Foreign Minister suggested to the Paraguayans that they increase their territorial demands. They found this suggestion eminently reasonable, along with Saavedra Lamas' statement that Paraguay should not give up the land for which she had shed her blood. In essence, he was proposing that Asunción keep all the captured land and negotiate the area still under Bolivian control. Braden's mention of the August 3rd Declaration was ignored. The Argentine Chancellor was making it clear to Asunción that more could be expected if Argentina were mediating.⁴⁸

Prior to this gambit, Macedo Soares had been so angry, that along with Cruchaga he went to see Justo to demand that their Argentine counterpart be restrained. Saavedra Lamas told Braden that as a result of this discussion, Justo had

⁴⁶U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/720, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Welles (Buenos Aires), December 18, 1935. The memo was written December 12.

⁴⁷Ibid., Memo of December 14, 1936.

⁴⁸Ibid.

1. The first of these is the fact that the
 2. second of these is the fact that the
 3. third of these is the fact that the
 4. fourth of these is the fact that the
 5. fifth of these is the fact that the
 6. sixth of these is the fact that the
 7. seventh of these is the fact that the
 8. eighth of these is the fact that the
 9. ninth of these is the fact that the
 10. tenth of these is the fact that the
 11. eleventh of these is the fact that the
 12. twelfth of these is the fact that the
 13. thirteenth of these is the fact that the
 14. fourteenth of these is the fact that the
 15. fifteenth of these is the fact that the
 16. sixteenth of these is the fact that the
 17. seventeenth of these is the fact that the
 18. eighteenth of these is the fact that the
 19. nineteenth of these is the fact that the
 20. twentieth of these is the fact that the
 21. twenty-first of these is the fact that the
 22. twenty-second of these is the fact that the
 23. twenty-third of these is the fact that the
 24. twenty-fourth of these is the fact that the
 25. twenty-fifth of these is the fact that the
 26. twenty-sixth of these is the fact that the
 27. twenty-seventh of these is the fact that the
 28. twenty-eighth of these is the fact that the
 29. twenty-ninth of these is the fact that the
 30. thirtieth of these is the fact that the
 31. thirty-first of these is the fact that the
 32. thirty-second of these is the fact that the
 33. thirty-third of these is the fact that the
 34. thirty-fourth of these is the fact that the
 35. thirty-fifth of these is the fact that the
 36. thirty-sixth of these is the fact that the
 37. thirty-seventh of these is the fact that the
 38. thirty-eighth of these is the fact that the
 39. thirty-ninth of these is the fact that the
 40. fortieth of these is the fact that the
 41. forty-first of these is the fact that the
 42. forty-second of these is the fact that the
 43. forty-third of these is the fact that the
 44. forty-fourth of these is the fact that the
 45. forty-fifth of these is the fact that the
 46. forty-sixth of these is the fact that the
 47. forty-seventh of these is the fact that the
 48. forty-eighth of these is the fact that the
 49. forty-ninth of these is the fact that the
 50. fiftieth of these is the fact that the
 51. fifty-first of these is the fact that the
 52. fifty-second of these is the fact that the
 53. fifty-third of these is the fact that the
 54. fifty-fourth of these is the fact that the
 55. fifty-fifth of these is the fact that the
 56. fifty-sixth of these is the fact that the
 57. fifty-seventh of these is the fact that the
 58. fifty-eighth of these is the fact that the
 59. fifty-ninth of these is the fact that the
 60. sixtieth of these is the fact that the
 61. sixty-first of these is the fact that the
 62. sixty-second of these is the fact that the
 63. sixty-third of these is the fact that the
 64. sixty-fourth of these is the fact that the
 65. sixty-fifth of these is the fact that the
 66. sixty-sixth of these is the fact that the
 67. sixty-seventh of these is the fact that the
 68. sixty-eighth of these is the fact that the
 69. sixty-ninth of these is the fact that the
 70. seventieth of these is the fact that the
 71. seventy-first of these is the fact that the
 72. seventy-second of these is the fact that the
 73. seventy-third of these is the fact that the
 74. seventy-fourth of these is the fact that the
 75. seventy-fifth of these is the fact that the
 76. seventy-sixth of these is the fact that the
 77. seventy-seventh of these is the fact that the
 78. seventy-eighth of these is the fact that the
 79. seventy-ninth of these is the fact that the
 80. eightieth of these is the fact that the
 81. eighty-first of these is the fact that the
 82. eighty-second of these is the fact that the
 83. eighty-third of these is the fact that the
 84. eighty-fourth of these is the fact that the
 85. eighty-fifth of these is the fact that the
 86. eighty-sixth of these is the fact that the
 87. eighty-seventh of these is the fact that the
 88. eighty-eighth of these is the fact that the
 89. eighty-ninth of these is the fact that the
 90. ninetieth of these is the fact that the
 91. ninety-first of these is the fact that the
 92. ninety-second of these is the fact that the
 93. ninety-third of these is the fact that the
 94. ninety-fourth of these is the fact that the
 95. ninety-fifth of these is the fact that the
 96. ninety-sixth of these is the fact that the
 97. ninety-seventh of these is the fact that the
 98. ninety-eighth of these is the fact that the
 99. ninety-ninth of these is the fact that the
 100. hundredth of these is the fact that the

said to him "What is the matter? You are my Foreign Minister and should be handling the Chaco business; nevertheless, the Brazilian and Chilean Foreign Ministers came to see me." Saavedra Lamas said in reply, that he would collaborate with the Committee of Three. By his account, it would appear that the two Foreign Ministers wanted his help. That this was not what was requested is borne out by Braden's statement that the Brazilian was "indiscreet in his bitterness." Apparently, he had made his views known to others besides Justo.⁴⁹

Macedo Soares was not satisfied with complaining to Justo once. He demanded and received another appointment on December 16. Again, according to reports Braden heard, the Brazilian denounced Saavedra Lamas for trying to disrupt the work of the Committee of Three. Subsequently, Saavedra Lamas himself was brought in and Macedo Soares repeated his accusations to the Argentine's face. For his part, the Argentine Chancellor disclaimed blame for the entire affair. In order to make his point even clearer, at a reception the Brazilian praised Justo, but never mentioned the Argentine Foreign Minister.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/721, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Welles (Buenos Aires) December 24, 1936.

1. The first of these is the fact that the
the second is the fact that the
the third is the fact that the
the fourth is the fact that the
the fifth is the fact that the
the sixth is the fact that the
the seventh is the fact that the
the eighth is the fact that the
the ninth is the fact that the
the tenth is the fact that the
the eleventh is the fact that the
the twelfth is the fact that the
the thirteenth is the fact that the
the fourteenth is the fact that the
the fifteenth is the fact that the
the sixteenth is the fact that the
the seventeenth is the fact that the
the eighteenth is the fact that the
the nineteenth is the fact that the
the twentieth is the fact that the
the twenty-first is the fact that the
the twenty-second is the fact that the
the twenty-third is the fact that the
the twenty-fourth is the fact that the
the twenty-fifth is the fact that the
the twenty-sixth is the fact that the
the twenty-seventh is the fact that the
the twenty-eighth is the fact that the
the twenty-ninth is the fact that the
the thirtieth is the fact that the
the thirty-first is the fact that the
the thirty-second is the fact that the
the thirty-third is the fact that the
the thirty-fourth is the fact that the
the thirty-fifth is the fact that the
the thirty-sixth is the fact that the
the thirty-seventh is the fact that the
the thirty-eighth is the fact that the
the thirty-ninth is the fact that the
the fortieth is the fact that the
the forty-first is the fact that the
the forty-second is the fact that the
the forty-third is the fact that the
the forty-fourth is the fact that the
the forty-fifth is the fact that the
the forty-sixth is the fact that the
the forty-seventh is the fact that the
the forty-eighth is the fact that the
the forty-ninth is the fact that the
the fiftieth is the fact that the
the fifty-first is the fact that the
the fifty-second is the fact that the
the fifty-third is the fact that the
the fifty-fourth is the fact that the
the fifty-fifth is the fact that the
the fifty-sixth is the fact that the
the fifty-seventh is the fact that the
the fifty-eighth is the fact that the
the fifty-ninth is the fact that the
the sixtieth is the fact that the
the sixty-first is the fact that the
the sixty-second is the fact that the
the sixty-third is the fact that the
the sixty-fourth is the fact that the
the sixty-fifth is the fact that the
the sixty-sixth is the fact that the
the sixty-seventh is the fact that the
the sixty-eighth is the fact that the
the sixty-ninth is the fact that the
the seventieth is the fact that the
the seventy-first is the fact that the
the seventy-second is the fact that the
the seventy-third is the fact that the
the seventy-fourth is the fact that the
the seventy-fifth is the fact that the
the seventy-sixth is the fact that the
the seventy-seventh is the fact that the
the seventy-eighth is the fact that the
the seventy-ninth is the fact that the
the eightieth is the fact that the
the eighty-first is the fact that the
the eighty-second is the fact that the
the eighty-third is the fact that the
the eighty-fourth is the fact that the
the eighty-fifth is the fact that the
the eighty-sixth is the fact that the
the eighty-seventh is the fact that the
the eighty-eighth is the fact that the
the eighty-ninth is the fact that the
the ninetieth is the fact that the
the ninety-first is the fact that the
the ninety-second is the fact that the
the ninety-third is the fact that the
the ninety-fourth is the fact that the
the ninety-fifth is the fact that the
the ninety-sixth is the fact that the
the ninety-seventh is the fact that the
the ninety-eighth is the fact that the
the ninety-ninth is the fact that the
the hundredth is the fact that the

It is evident that in December, 1936, Saavedra Lamas wanted to devote all his energies to the Maintenance of Peace Conference and avoid any involvement with the Chaco dispute. Even when the Foreign Ministers of Chile and Brazil began attending Chaco Conference sessions, he could probably have contained the matter, but his unthinking suggestion for a committee of three changed the desired scenario. After that Saavedra Lamas went to extreme lengths to shatter any advances his counterparts might have made. The result was no progress. Of more significance for Saavedra Lamas, the remark caused two protests against him to be made to Justo.

There can be no question that during 1936 Saavedra Lamas reached the height of his career. He headed the mediating group which brought the Chaco war officially to an end. He became involved with the Italo-Ethiopian dispute and achieved notoriety by supporting the underdog. Most importantly, he won the Nobel Peace Prize and presided over a major inter-American Conference. Such accolades and distinctions should have placed Saavedra Lamas in line for even higher office, or at least assured continuing service in his current one.

Unfortunately for Saavedra Lamas, his actions in obtaining his fame, plus probably a certain jealousy, caused his standing in the Justo administration to plummet.

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the
 2. various methods of determining the rate of reaction.
 3. The second part is devoted to a discussion of the
 4. various methods of determining the order of reaction.
 5. The third part is devoted to a discussion of the
 6. various methods of determining the activation energy.
 7. The fourth part is devoted to a discussion of the
 8. various methods of determining the equilibrium constant.
 9. The fifth part is devoted to a discussion of the
 10. various methods of determining the rate of reaction.

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the
 2. various methods of determining the rate of reaction.
 3. The second part is devoted to a discussion of the
 4. various methods of determining the order of reaction.
 5. The third part is devoted to a discussion of the
 6. various methods of determining the activation energy.
 7. The fourth part is devoted to a discussion of the
 8. various methods of determining the equilibrium constant.
 9. The fifth part is devoted to a discussion of the
 10. various methods of determining the rate of reaction.

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the
 2. various methods of determining the rate of reaction.
 3. The second part is devoted to a discussion of the
 4. various methods of determining the order of reaction.
 5. The third part is devoted to a discussion of the
 6. various methods of determining the activation energy.
 7. The fourth part is devoted to a discussion of the
 8. various methods of determining the equilibrium constant.
 9. The fifth part is devoted to a discussion of the
 10. various methods of determining the rate of reaction.

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the
 2. various methods of determining the rate of reaction.
 3. The second part is devoted to a discussion of the
 4. various methods of determining the order of reaction.
 5. The third part is devoted to a discussion of the
 6. various methods of determining the activation energy.
 7. The fourth part is devoted to a discussion of the
 8. various methods of determining the equilibrium constant.
 9. The fifth part is devoted to a discussion of the
 10. various methods of determining the rate of reaction.

Braden claimed that the Argentine Chancellor's failure to give Justo some credit for the Nobel Prize lost Saavedra Lamas the presidential nomination in 1937.⁵¹ It is reasonable to assume the complaints by the Brazilians, Chileans and the United States sealed his fate. Aside from England, these nations were the ones Argentina was most involved with, and representations made by their Foreign Ministers directly to the President could not be ignored.

Whether the debacle over the Nobel Prize, or the protestations of the Foreign Ministers, or both, effectively ended Saavedra Lamas' public career is impossible to determine. But higher political office was closed to him. According to a report by Weddell, as late as September, 1936 Justo was considering a compromise ticket composed of ex-president and Anti-personalista leader Marcelo T. de Alvear and either Saavedra Lamas or Roberto M. Ortiz for Vice President. The report went on to state, however, that within Justo's own party, the Concordancia, only the last two were being considered, and they for President.⁵² A scant seven months later, in April, 1937, Ortiz was the front runner and the Argentine Foreign Minister was not even mentioned.⁵³

⁵¹Braden, Diplomats, p. 154.

⁵²U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 835.00/765 (Strictly Confidential), Weddell (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, September 11, 1936.

⁵³Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 835.00/776 Wilson (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State. Wilson was Chargé d'Affaires. The idea of a compromise candidate apparently was dropped.

1. The first part of the paper discusses the importance of the study of the history of the United States. It is argued that a knowledge of the past is essential for a full understanding of the present and for the development of a sound policy for the future.

2. The second part of the paper is a survey of the history of the United States from the time of the first settlement to the present. It is divided into three main periods: the colonial period, the revolutionary period, and the national period.

3. The third part of the paper is a discussion of the problems of the United States in the present. It is argued that the United States is facing a number of serious problems, including economic depression, social unrest, and political corruption.

4. The fourth part of the paper is a discussion of the solutions to these problems. It is argued that the only way to solve these problems is by a return to the principles of the American Revolution.

5. The fifth part of the paper is a conclusion. It is argued that the study of the history of the United States is essential for a full understanding of the present and for the development of a sound policy for the future.

6. The sixth part of the paper is a list of references.

7. The seventh part of the paper is a list of footnotes.

8. The eighth part of the paper is a list of appendices.

9. The ninth part of the paper is a list of indexes.

10. The tenth part of the paper is a list of tables.

11. The eleventh part of the paper is a list of figures.

12. The twelfth part of the paper is a list of maps.

13. The thirteenth part of the paper is a list of illustrations.

14. The fourteenth part of the paper is a list of plates.

15. The fifteenth part of the paper is a list of tables.

16. The sixteenth part of the paper is a list of figures.

17. The seventeenth part of the paper is a list of maps.

18. The eighteenth part of the paper is a list of illustrations.

19. The nineteenth part of the paper is a list of plates.

20. The twentieth part of the paper is a list of tables.

21. The twenty-first part of the paper is a list of figures.

22. The twenty-second part of the paper is a list of maps.

23. The twenty-third part of the paper is a list of illustrations.

24. The twenty-fourth part of the paper is a list of plates.

25. The twenty-fifth part of the paper is a list of tables.

26. The twenty-sixth part of the paper is a list of figures.

27. The twenty-seventh part of the paper is a list of maps.

28. The twenty-eighth part of the paper is a list of illustrations.

29. The twenty-ninth part of the paper is a list of plates.

30. The thirtieth part of the paper is a list of tables.

31. The thirty-first part of the paper is a list of figures.

32. The thirty-second part of the paper is a list of maps.

33. The thirty-third part of the paper is a list of illustrations.

34. The thirty-fourth part of the paper is a list of plates.

35. The thirty-fifth part of the paper is a list of tables.

36. The thirty-sixth part of the paper is a list of figures.

37. The thirty-seventh part of the paper is a list of maps.

38. The thirty-eighth part of the paper is a list of illustrations.

39. The thirty-ninth part of the paper is a list of plates.

40. The fortieth part of the paper is a list of tables.

41. The forty-first part of the paper is a list of figures.

42. The forty-second part of the paper is a list of maps.

43. The forty-third part of the paper is a list of illustrations.

44. The forty-fourth part of the paper is a list of plates.

45. The forty-fifth part of the paper is a list of tables.

46. The forty-sixth part of the paper is a list of figures.

47. The forty-seventh part of the paper is a list of maps.

48. The forty-eighth part of the paper is a list of illustrations.

49. The forty-ninth part of the paper is a list of plates.

50. The fiftieth part of the paper is a list of tables.

January, 1937-February, 1938

Saavedra Lamas' loss of power and prestige became known very quickly to the delegates at the Chaco Conference. The necessity of deferring to the Argentine Chancellor was suddenly no longer absolute. Spurring the delegates on was the spectacle of their own foreign ministers coming to blows with their Argentine counterpart. Consequently, when Saavedra Lamas continued to follow a policy of delay on the all important issue of the final territorial settlement, he found the delegates to be considerably more courageous than ever before.

The territorial question was intimately involved with the oil fields in the western Chaco. As the Paraguayans drove across the Chaco, ostensibly defending their own land, they were not ignorant of the fact that they were approaching the Bolivian oil fields near Camiri. In fact, their drive was halted a scant thirty miles from Camiri at the outskirts of Boyuibé. The Paraguayans immediately began drilling for oil but the bonanza of black gold never materialized. Meanwhile, Saavedra Lamas began intensive efforts to insure that Bolivian oil would go to Argentina. As early as November, 1935, a report was forwarded by the Estado Mayor General de Marina to Saavedra Lamas pointing out the need for Bolivian oil.⁵⁴


⁵⁴Argentina, Archives, Box 5, Expediente II, "Memorandum sobre informaciones y consideraciones relacionadas con

In September, 1936, the Argentine Chancellor sent Horacio Carillo to Bolivia to discuss the possibility of building a railroad from Yacuiba, Argentina, to Santa Cruz, Bolivia, through the oil fields. What Carillo said is not known, but on December 21, 1936, a national company to exploit the petroleum was inaugurated in La Paz. Shortly thereafter, on March 13, 1937, Bolivia expropriated Standard Oil's holdings and in April an announcement was made that a Yacuiba-Santa Cruz railroad was being considered. That Argentina was a factor in this expropriation can be seen in a conversation between Finot and the United States Ambassador in La Paz, R. Henry Norweb on May 8, 1937. At that time, Finot stated that neither Brazil, Chile nor the United States was willing to challenge Argentina. Since Argentina was decidedly pro-Paraguayan, the only way to placate Buenos Aires according to La Paz, was to make her oil available.⁵⁵

Bolivia's plan did not work as well as Finot probably hoped it would. Before Saavedra Lamas would agree to allow a territorial settlement, a treaty had to be negotiated with Bolivia. This was not, however, the only, or in fact, the crucial reason for delay on the part of the Argentine

los problemas inherentes a las vinulaciones exteriores de Bolivia," Estado Mayor General de Marina to Saavedra Lamas, November, 1935, pp. 19-20.

⁵⁵U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations, V, 1937, p. 287.



Chancellor. There was also the possibility, that Paraguay would eventually discover oil. The most important reason for delay, however, apparently sprang from Saavedra Lamas' desire to prevent the Conference from collapsing while he was the leader. He was willing to shift it to another forum or simply avoid a settlement before he left office. In either case, he would be rid of the Chaco albatross and would not be blamed if it failed.⁵⁶

In order to halt the delaying tactics of Saavedra Lamas the representatives of Chile, Brazil and the United States decided in April, 1937, to complain to President Justo once again. Following the meeting, the three delegates concluded that the Argentine Foreign Minister was profoundly displeased with their actions. They were of the opinion, however, that Justo would halt the antics of his Foreign Minister.⁵⁷ The meeting initially, however, had the opposite effect desired. At a session five days later, the Argentine Chancellor recounted a report he had received from the Paraguayan delegate that President Vargas of Brazil

⁵⁶U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/894, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, June 7, 1937. See also ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/1043, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, September 23, 1937.

⁵⁷Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/864, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, May 7, 1927. The memorandum was drawn up by the delegates and duplicates were sent to their respective Foreign Ministries.

1870

1870

1871

1871

1872

1872

1873

1873

1874

1874

1875

1875

1876

1876

1877

1877

1878

1878

1879

1879

1880

1880

1881

1881

1882

1882

1883

1883

1884

1884

1885

1885

1886

1886

1887

1887

1888

1888

1889

1889

1890

1890

1891

1891

1892

1892

1893

1893

1894

1894

1895

1895

1896

1896

1897

1897

1898

1898

avored a slow, deliberative approach. Although it was pointed out that Saavedra Lamas had left out a good deal of what Vargas had said,⁵⁸ there can be no doubt that the counterattack had begun. In his report on events to Espil, the Argentine Chancellor called the behavior of the delegates "grotesque." Curiously, he claimed that Nieto del Río, the Chilean representative, was responsible for the trouble.⁵⁹

In August, Saavedra Lamas indicated that he was ready for serious negotiations. Spurring him on was a threat by Braden to call publicly for an end to direct negotiations in favor of outside arbitration.⁶⁰ The United States delegate's explanation if he took such an action would certainly not be flattering to Saavedra Lamas. Also, Justo had given his Foreign Minister direct orders to settle the matter before the president's administration left office.⁶¹ Probably the most important reason, however, was that it

⁵⁸ Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/853, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, April 30, 1937.

⁵⁹ Argentina, Archives, Box 5, Expediente IV, "asuntos varios," Letter (muy reservado) from Saavedra Lamas to Felpie Espil (Washington D.C.), May 3, 1937.

⁶⁰ U. S. Archives, RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/977, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 4, 1937. Braden indicated that Saavedra Lamas had given up the idea of shifting the dispute to the World Court.

⁶¹ Ibid., RG 59 Decimal File 724.34119/960, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 10, 1937.

... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..

... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..

... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..

... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..

... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..

... ..
... ..
... ..

had become clear to Saavedra Lamas that even to retain his present position in the certain to be elected Concordancia administration under Ortiz, the Chaco dispute would have to be concluded. The fight for the presidency was over, and the fight for the Foreign Ministry had begun.

Unfortunately, Saavedra Lamas learned quickly that progress would be difficult on such a critical issue. Both ex-belligerents had become even more suspicious once such an important matter was being discussed. Furthermore, Bolivia was also negotiating with Brazil to build a railroad to the oil fields. Finally, there were few people willing to cooperate with Saavedra Lamas now that he might be leaving office.⁶² Nieto del Río, in a letter to Braden, wrote "every day I open the newspaper hoping to find a notice of the resignation of Saavedra Lamas."⁶³ Cisneros of Peru observed that "[Saavedra Lamas] has a capacity for both good and evil, but even when he does good it is with evil

⁶² Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/1070, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 9, 1937.

⁶³ Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/1000, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 25, 1937. This statement came from a personal letter from Nieto del Río forwarded by Braden to the State Department. In ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/1070, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 9, 1937, Nieto del Río stated that after Saavedra Lamas left office, he would provoke a personal incident with the Argentine. Macedo Soares said he would write a letter exposing the Argentine Chancellor.

intent."⁶⁴

Saavedra Lamas, however, did successfully conclude on November 19 a railroad and petroleum treaty with Bolivia. Unfortunately, the railroad would have to run through territory occupied by Paraguay. Realizing this, Saavedra Lamas had in late October given instructions to the military attaché in La Paz, Captain Carlos Mauriño, to suggest negotiations outside the framework of the Conference.⁶⁵ Alas, the Brazilians, through undisclosed means, learned of this gambit.⁶⁶ Meanwhile, in order to soothe relations with Paraguay, Argentina began negotiations on a new commercial treaty with Asunción. Bolivia consequently became suspicious. In essence, Saavedra Lamas' activities only increased the distrust of the ex-belligerents, and made more difficult a final settlement which might have allowed the Argentine Chancellor to remain Chancellor.

⁶⁴Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/1007, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 31, 1937.

⁶⁵Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/1096, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, October 29, 1937. At the same time, Saavedra Lamas was telling the Conference that slow, deliberate action was needed. See ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/114, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, November 3, 1937.

⁶⁶Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/1150, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, December 14, 1937. Ruiz Moreno added it would be "catastrophic for Argentina and all of the Americas" if Saavedra Lamas was reappointed.

The Conference, however, gave Saavedra Lamas one more chance to obtain a settlement. The Foreign Minister proposed that Paraguay withdraw from the Villa Montes-Boyuibé road, an important north-south artery in exchange for a Bolivian territorial session in the northern Chaco. Also, the talks in Buenos Aires would recess while the ex-belligerents attempted to settle their problems directly. The plan met with no success. Braden as well as others, however, knew that he would fail even before he started.⁶⁷ It must have seemed the height of revenge to see him charge on to the field of battle with an empty gun. Indeed, although Braden refused, Ruíz Moreno, the number two man in the Argentine foreign office, had asked Braden to defer a settlement until after Saavedra Lamas left office. Although there is no direct evidence, it is probable that President-elect Ortiz was behind the overture. In the end, the Argentine Foreign Minister had no friends at all. Two and one-half years of delaying tactics mixed with wild schemes, double-crosses and several lies had destroyed whatever influence he might have had.


On February 10, 1938, Ortiz announced that José María Cantilo would be the next Foreign Minister. Saavedra Lamas thereupon made it known he expected an homenaje or testimonial in his honor. Braden, however, refused to go along.

⁶⁷ Ibid., RG 59, Decimal File 724.34119/1167, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, December 31, 1937.

Eventually, it was agreed that a testimonial lunch with one speech would be arranged. Rodriguez Alves, who was supposed to give it, left town and the task fell to Braden. He proceeded to praise Justo and play down the Argentine Foreign Minister's role. The Argentine Chancellor was infuriated.⁶⁸

It is clear that once Saavedra Lamas lost support at home, he lost power in the Chaco Peace Conference. He was still able to delay any settlement, but when he was forced to act he could not. Suspicion engendered over time made the ex-belligerents leary of any project he forwarded. Furthermore, the Conference delegates, besides being wary of the Argentine Chancellor, apparently were willing to allow themselves the luxury of revenge in dealing with him. Consequently, when he left office on February 20, 1938, there were few to sing his praises. Show was no substitute for substance.

⁶⁸Braden, Diplomats, pp. 180-181.



EPILOGUE

The administration of Roberto Ortiz took office on February 20, 1938. The newspapers devoted considerable space to the new Foreign Minister, José María Cantilo. Predictably, the outgoing minister, Saavedra Lamas, received almost no mention. In La Nación there was only a short announcement at the bottom of page four stating that the departing Chancellor had personally thanked all the people with whom he had worked.¹ Ortiz had decided not to employ Saavedra Lamas in another position. Behind this decision, perhaps, was a rumor which had circulated in August, 1937, to the effect that Saavedra Lamas was planning to detail the electoral fraud perpetrated in the election.² Whether this was a blackmail attempt is impossible to determine. In any case, Saavedra Lamas became a private citizen.

Ortiz's stewardship was brief and tragic. Diabetes soon claimed both his vision and energy. The Vice-President Ramón S. Castillo, took over effective control of the

¹La Nación, February 21, 1938.

²United States Archives, Record Group 59, Decimal File 724.34119/1000, Braden (Buenos Aires) to Dept. of State, August 25, 1937.

government in mid-1940, and official control in June, 1942. In October, 1941, while Ortiz was incapacitated, Saavedra Lamas was appointed Rector of the University of Buenos Aires. It was not an important policy making position, but it carried great prestige. He held the post until the overthrow of Castillo in June, 1943. During his tenure, the ex-Chancellor accomplished nothing of significance.

Saavedra Lamas, however, exploited his academic forum to discuss important issues. On education, his comments were almost duplicates of those made twenty-five years earlier. For example, he chastized Argentine instruction for its fragmented and unscientific approach to problems. He also charged that when students graduated they had no saleable occupation and therefore, he called for more vocational education.³

Although he seldom commented on public developments after he left office, Saavedra Lamas did discuss some of the events during his tenure with an eye toward contemporary policies. For example, in an October 26, 1942 homenaje (testimonial) to the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Saavedra Lamas proclaimed that the 1936 Maintenance of Peace Conference had established a basis for consultation and

³Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Discursos del Rector (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad, 1943). See particularly "La universidad y el gobierno de la instrucción publica" given October 15, 1941, pp. 6-18, and "La universidad y el fomento industrial del país" given April 14, 1942, pp. 39-55.

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses, including:

- Mr. J. H. Smith, 123 Main St., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. W. B. Jones, 456 Elm St., Boston, Mass.
- Mr. C. D. Brown, 789 Oak St., Chicago, Ill.
- Mr. E. F. Green, 101 Pine St., Philadelphia, Pa.
- Mr. G. H. White, 202 Cedar St., St. Louis, Mo.
- Mr. I. J. Black, 303 Maple St., Kansas City, Mo.
- Mr. K. L. Gray, 404 Birch St., Denver, Colo.
- Mr. M. N. Hall, 505 Spruce St., Portland, Me.
- Mr. O. P. Young, 606 Ash St., Seattle, Wash.
- Mr. Q. R. King, 707 Hickory St., San Francisco, Cal.
- Mr. S. T. Lee, 808 Walnut St., Los Angeles, Cal.
- Mr. U. V. Scott, 909 Chestnut St., San Diego, Cal.
- Mr. W. X. Adams, 1010 Broadway, New York, N. Y.
- Mr. Y. Z. Baker, 1111 Madison Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. A. B. Carter, 1212 Park Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. C. D. Evans, 1313 Fifth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. E. F. Harris, 1414 Sixth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. G. H. King, 1515 Seventh Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. I. J. Lee, 1616 Eighth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. K. L. Scott, 1717 Ninth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. M. N. Adams, 1818 Tenth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. O. P. Baker, 1919 Eleventh Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. Q. R. Carter, 2020 Twelfth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. S. T. Evans, 2121 Thirteenth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. U. V. Harris, 2222 Fourteenth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. W. X. King, 2323 Fifteenth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. Y. Z. Lee, 2424 Sixteenth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. A. B. Scott, 2525 Seventeenth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. C. D. Adams, 2626 Eighteenth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. E. F. Baker, 2727 Nineteenth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. G. H. Carter, 2828 Twentieth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. I. J. Evans, 2929 Twenty-first Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. K. L. Harris, 3030 Twenty-second Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. M. N. King, 3131 Twenty-third Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. O. P. Lee, 3232 Twenty-fourth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. Q. R. Scott, 3333 Twenty-fifth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. S. T. Adams, 3434 Twenty-sixth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. U. V. Baker, 3535 Twenty-seventh Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. W. X. Carter, 3636 Twenty-eighth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. Y. Z. Evans, 3737 Twenty-ninth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. A. B. Harris, 3838 Thirtieth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. C. D. King, 3939 Thirty-first Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. E. F. Lee, 4040 Thirty-second Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. G. H. Scott, 4141 Thirty-third Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. I. J. Adams, 4242 Thirty-fourth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. K. L. Baker, 4343 Thirty-fifth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. M. N. Carter, 4444 Thirty-sixth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. O. P. Evans, 4545 Thirty-seventh Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. Q. R. Harris, 4646 Thirty-eighth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. S. T. King, 4747 Thirty-ninth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. U. V. Lee, 4848 Fortieth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. W. X. Scott, 4949 Forty-first Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. Y. Z. Adams, 5050 Forty-second Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. A. B. Baker, 5151 Forty-third Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. C. D. Carter, 5252 Forty-fourth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. E. F. Evans, 5353 Forty-fifth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. G. H. Harris, 5454 Forty-sixth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. I. J. King, 5555 Forty-seventh Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. K. L. Lee, 5656 Forty-eighth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. M. N. Scott, 5757 Forty-ninth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. O. P. Adams, 5858 Fiftieth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. Q. R. Baker, 5959 Fifty-first Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. S. T. Carter, 6060 Fifty-second Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. U. V. Evans, 6161 Fifty-third Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. W. X. Harris, 6262 Fifty-fourth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. Y. Z. King, 6363 Fifty-fifth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. A. B. Lee, 6464 Fifty-sixth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. C. D. Scott, 6565 Fifty-seventh Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. E. F. Adams, 6666 Fifty-eighth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. G. H. Baker, 6767 Fifty-ninth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. I. J. Carter, 6868 Sixtieth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. K. L. Evans, 6969 Sixty-first Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. M. N. Harris, 7070 Sixty-second Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. O. P. King, 7171 Sixty-third Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. Q. R. Lee, 7272 Sixty-fourth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. S. T. Scott, 7373 Sixty-fifth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. U. V. Adams, 7474 Sixty-sixth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. W. X. Baker, 7575 Sixty-seventh Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. Y. Z. Carter, 7676 Sixty-eighth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. A. B. Evans, 7777 Sixty-ninth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. C. D. Harris, 7878 Seventieth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. E. F. King, 7979 Seventy-first Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. G. H. Lee, 8080 Seventy-second Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. I. J. Scott, 8181 Seventy-third Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. K. L. Adams, 8282 Seventy-fourth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. M. N. Baker, 8383 Seventy-fifth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. O. P. Carter, 8484 Seventy-sixth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. Q. R. Evans, 8585 Seventy-seventh Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. S. T. Harris, 8686 Seventy-eighth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. U. V. King, 8787 Seventy-ninth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. W. X. Lee, 8888 Eightieth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. Y. Z. Scott, 8989 Eighty-first Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. A. B. Adams, 9090 Eighty-second Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. C. D. Baker, 9191 Eighty-third Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. E. F. Carter, 9292 Eighty-fourth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. G. H. Evans, 9393 Eighty-fifth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. I. J. Harris, 9494 Eighty-sixth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. K. L. King, 9595 Eighty-seventh Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. M. N. Lee, 9696 Eighty-eighth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. O. P. Scott, 9797 Eighty-ninth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. Q. R. Adams, 9898 Ninetieth Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Mr. S. T. Baker, 9999 One hundredth Ave., New York, N. Y.

cooperation which should be continued.⁴ Although Hull might have laughed if he read this statement, the ex-Foreign Minister was clearly criticising the recalcitrant stand Argentina had taken in the Rio de Janeiro Conference of January, 1942 following the entry of the United States into World War II. Like his old boss, Justo, Saavedra Lamas feared close cooperation with the Axis powers. Opposed though he was to dependence on the United States, he was too aristocratic and his almost Edwardian impulses were too strong to permit him to align on the side of Hitlerian Germany.

In 1943, the Castillo government was replaced by one even more friendly to the Axis. Consequently, Saavedra Lamas was removed from office. When Juan Perón finally emerged as the leader of the country, he found in Saavedra Lamas an implacable opponent. Ironically, Saavedra Lamas helped Braden, who had become United States ambassador to Argentina and was also anti-Perón, to avoid an anti-United States mob.⁵ They might have hated each other, but they

⁴Ibid., see "Homenaje y entrega del titulo de Doctor Honoris Causa al Canciller de la República de Venezuela doctor Caracciolo Parra Perez," October 26, 1942, pp. 66-70. In a speech given earlier, on November 10, 1941, entitled "A la juventud" Saavedra Lamas praised the Good Neighbor Policy as "noble" and "moral." He added that the United States was the "exponent of liberty and justice," p. 10.

⁵Spruille Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1971), p. 307.

The first of these is the fact that the
 government has been unable to raise the
 necessary funds to carry out its
 policy of non-interference.

The second is the fact that the
 government has been unable to
 maintain a stable currency. This
 has led to a loss of confidence in
 the government and a consequent
 decline in the value of the
 national currency.

The third is the fact that the
 government has been unable to
 maintain a stable political
 situation. This has led to a
 loss of confidence in the
 government and a consequent
 decline in the value of the
 national currency.


The fourth is the fact that the
 government has been unable to
 maintain a stable economic
 situation. This has led to a
 loss of confidence in the
 government and a consequent
 decline in the value of the
 national currency.

The fifth is the fact that the
 government has been unable to
 maintain a stable social
 situation. This has led to a
 loss of confidence in the
 government and a consequent
 decline in the value of the
 national currency.

agreed that Perón was unsatisfactory. In 1951, Perón, in an apparent attempt to give his government a larger base, and perhaps seeking the prestige of a Nobel Prize winner, asked Saavedra Lamas to be Chancellor once more. A seventy-two year old Saavedra Lamas refused, and as a result spent three days in San Telmo Prison.⁶

The ex-Chancellor had been in retirement, and one suspects that the aforementioned ordeal convinced him to stay that way. He produced no more significant works and gave only a few speeches, testimonials to his friends who had died. He joined them on May 5, 1959, at the age of 80. As befitted his patrician heritage, he was interred in La Recoleta cemetery, where many of Argentina's illustrious historical figures are buried.


⁶Interview with Señora Pueyrredón, Buenos Aires, September 12, 1972.



CONCLUSION

When Carlos Saavedra Lamas was born he had all the prerequisites for success and all of the burdens of one so endowed. He was expected to achieve high position, and his early scholastic success indicated that he would. Elected at an early age to the Cámara de Diputados he distinguished himself as an excellent speaker and debator. He was imbued with positivist thought during his education and he worked for an economically strong Argentina. The means to achieve this end, he believed, was through immigration from Europe. Consequently, he endeavored to establish new laws and programs to insure successful settlement.

A modern Argentina, according to Saavedra Lamas, also required a more democratic social structure. No longer should a small elite control the government through a limited voting franchise. Consequently, Saavedra Lamas voted for the Sáenz Peña law which enfranchised the male population, even though he was a member of the ruling elite. He expected, however, that the new voters would chose the best qualified people, which included himself. They did not, and suddenly Saavedra Lamas was out of public office, a



victim of his own idealism. It is not, therefore, difficult to understand why Saavedra Lamas was willing to accept the position as Foreign Minister in the fraudulently elected and military dominated government of General Justo.

When the new Chancellor took office, he inherited a foreign policy intent upon assuring Argentine leadership in Latin America. As translated by Saavedra Lamas and his predecessors, this meant opposition to the United States domination in the Western hemisphere. To aid in halting the North Americans, European countries or the League of Nations would be utilized as a counterpoise to the United States. Besides this general policy orientation, Saavedra Lamas had his own personal goal: to achieve prestige for himself. Augmenting this drive was the fact that, with a few notable exceptions, he was given a free hand by President Justo. Only at the end of his term did his own ambitions and the traditional ambitions of Argentine leadership seriously conflict.

The first area in which the Argentine Chancellor demonstrated the type of concerted effort which characterized his work was in the dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay over ownership of the Chaco. He inserted himself strongly into the mediation then being conducted by the United States dominated Committee of Neutrals. In order to attack the Neutrals as well as to help himself attain hemispheric

leadership, Saavedra Lamas established an informal mediating group composed of Brazil, Chile, Peru and Argentina.

In the subsequent conflict which erupted between the two mediating groups, there can be little doubt that Saavedra Lamas came out ahead. The Chancellor claimed credit for a new international axiom, that territory taken by illegal means would not be recognized. That this doctrine, dubbed the Declaration of August 3, had been used earlier relative to Japan and in essence was suggested by the United States to Saavedra Lamas, was never acknowledged. Unsatisfied, the Argentine Foreign Minister forwarded a second Declaration three days later which negated the first. Saavedra Lamas took credit for both, with the firm knowledge that only a very few would realize the truth, and they would say nothing publicly. Following this development, the Argentine Chancellor initiated with Chile a proposal to end the fighting in the Chaco. It failed, as did numerous other proposals forwarded by various parties and by Saavedra Lamas himself.

A number of factors explain this lack of success. Primarily, the belligerents had settled on arms as the means to adjudicate their problem. Whether anyone could have induced an agreement is impossible to determine, but Saavedra Lamas was certainly trying to reach one. He would not, however, accept any proposal which he did not initiate, and actively worked against plans forwarded by others. Undercutting the Foreign Minister's total control was the

Argentine military's insistence on supplying Paraguay with arms. If Saavedra Lamas had the ability to cut off military supplies to Paraguay, he would have had considerably more power.

The Argentine Chancellor was able to act as he did because no nation wished to confront Argentina. Other limitrophe nations, such as Brazil and Chile, had an interest in the dispute, but this was outweighed by the desire to avoid conflict with Argentina. The Depression and the possibility of war with Buenos Aires mediated against any sharp move to counter Argentina.

The desire by the United States to foster the Good Neighbor Policy led to accommodation with the Argentine Foreign Minister at the Seventh Inter-American Conference in Montevideo. Hull accepted Saavedra Lamas' Anti-War Pact even though the previous administration had rejected it. The United States gave to the Argentine Chancellor the leadership role he coveted, and in accepting it, however, Saavedra Lamas surrendered none of his prerogatives or ideas.

This interlude was followed by a return to the bickering that had earlier marked the Chaco talks. By the beginning of 1935, however, Saavedra Lamas lost control of the mediation efforts, and the League of Nations threatened to impose harsh sanctions upon Paraguay. Not only was the League impinging upon an area perceived as being within the

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

2.

3. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

4.

5. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

6.

7. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

8. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

15. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

16. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

17.

18.

19. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

20. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

21.

22. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

23. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

24. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

25.

26. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

27. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

28. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

29.

30.

31. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

32. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

33. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

34. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

35. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

Argentine sphere, but due to the military stalemate in the Chaco, there was the possibility that Geneva might bring an end to the war and gain the credit Saavedra Lamas desired. Moving with dispatch, Saavedra Lamas put together a mediating body composed of the ABCP countries, the United States and Uruguay. Based on the Argentine Foreign Minister's personal assurances that the talks would continue until a settlement was reached, a cease-fire was arranged. The credit went to Saavedra Lamas.

At the Chaco Peace Conference, the Argentine Chancellor initially followed a policy of delay until the Foreign Ministers of the other countries involved departed. He continued this tactic while he ascertained the views of the delegates on his own plan. When they declared it to be unacceptable, Saavedra Lamas found himself in a difficult position. He wanted to gain the prestige a settlement would bring, but he also wanted to insure that Paraguay, as the victor, would not have to make too many concessions. Consequently, under Saavedra Lamas' direction, the Conference moved slowly, as the Argentine Chancellor tried to harmonize two conflicting goals. The result was general dissatisfaction on the part of all involved. During the first year and a half, however, there were some notable accomplishments. The war was officially declared over and the prisoners were returned.

At about the same time as the repatriation, Saavedra Lamas journeyed to the League of Nations and, as he expected, was elected President of the Assembly. Ironically, the Argentine Foreign Minister had only used the League for his own ends. He had never demonstrated faith in it, and had, in fact, opposed League action against Paraguay. Indeed, Saavedra Lamas seems to have been accorded this honor more for participating in the Geneva-based body than for any other reason. In any case, the Argentine Chancellor received what he wanted: applause for his statesmanship prior to the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference.

Of infinitely more importance was the announcement in November, 1936, that Saavedra Lamas had won the Nobel Peace Prize. He would be receiving the award for the Anti-War Pact and for his efforts in bringing an end to the Chaco War. In reality, the Pact was never considered to have much significance. Those who signed it did so to avoid annoying Argentina and appearing pro-war. In the case of the Chaco War, Saavedra Lamas' problem was not bringing peace, but obtaining credit for a settlement favorable to Paraguay. If there can be the slightest justification for the award, it was on the grounds that the Argentine Chancellor publicly acted and talked like a peacemaker.

In many respects, the Peace Prize can best be seen as part of a cynical deal. Hull was willing to support Saavedra Lamas' drive for the honor in exchange for

1. The first part of the report

is devoted to a general

description of the

method used

in the investigation

and the results

obtained from the

experiments

It

is found that

the

results are

in good agreement

with the theory

and the

experimental

data are

in good agreement

with the

theoretical

results.

The

It

is

the

results

are

in good

agreement

with the

theoretical

results.

The

results

are

in good

cooperation at the December, 1936, Maintenance of Peace Conference. Once Hull delivered the support, however, the Argentine Chancellor double-crossed him and opposed his programs in Buenos Aires. Admittedly for a number of reasons Saavedra Lamas was justified in halting Hull's program. Hemispheric isolation, which the North American Secretary of State wanted, would not have been in Argentina's best interests and would have foreclosed future prerogatives. Whatever the justification for Saavedra Lamas' tactics at the 1936 meeting, they resulted in angry representations by Hull to Justo. The Argentine Chancellor learned that it was one thing to oppose Hull's program and another to betray him.

Not only did he infuriate Hull, but he also earned the wrath of the Brazilian and Chilean Foreign Ministers with his unsavory tactics regarding the Chaco talks. He evinced an almost pathological drive to stop Macedo Soares and Cruchaga from finding a formula to end the Chaco War. If there was going to be a settlement, it must be arranged by the Argentine Foreign Minister. The result of Saavedra Lamas' actions were further hostile complaints to Justo.

These representations were instrumental in bringing an end to any chance Saavedra Lamas had for higher office, but the most important factor ending the Argentine Chancellor's ambitions was his relationship with Justo. The General clearly did not appreciate his Foreign Minister

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the general principles of the theory of the structure of the atom. It is shown that the structure of the atom is determined by the laws of quantum mechanics, which are based on the principle of the uncertainty of the position and momentum of the particles.

2. In the second part of the paper, the author discusses the problem of the structure of the nucleus. It is shown that the structure of the nucleus is determined by the laws of quantum mechanics, which are based on the principle of the uncertainty of the position and momentum of the particles.

3. In the third part of the paper, the author discusses the problem of the structure of the molecule. It is shown that the structure of the molecule is determined by the laws of quantum mechanics, which are based on the principle of the uncertainty of the position and momentum of the particles.

4. In the fourth part of the paper, the author discusses the problem of the structure of the crystal. It is shown that the structure of the crystal is determined by the laws of quantum mechanics, which are based on the principle of the uncertainty of the position and momentum of the particles.

5. In the fifth part of the paper, the author discusses the problem of the structure of the liquid. It is shown that the structure of the liquid is determined by the laws of quantum mechanics, which are based on the principle of the uncertainty of the position and momentum of the particles.

6. In the sixth part of the paper, the author discusses the problem of the structure of the gas. It is shown that the structure of the gas is determined by the laws of quantum mechanics, which are based on the principle of the uncertainty of the position and momentum of the particles.

7. In the seventh part of the paper, the author discusses the problem of the structure of the plasma. It is shown that the structure of the plasma is determined by the laws of quantum mechanics, which are based on the principle of the uncertainty of the position and momentum of the particles.

8. In the eighth part of the paper, the author discusses the problem of the structure of the solid. It is shown that the structure of the solid is determined by the laws of quantum mechanics, which are based on the principle of the uncertainty of the position and momentum of the particles.

stealing the spotlight from him or referring to him as "little fatty." The final blow was his failure to give sufficient credit to Justo when he received the Nobel Prize. Consequently, the President chose not to include Saavedra Lamas on the Concordancia ticket in the 1937 presidential election.

The diminution of Saavedra Lamas' power in the administration led to disaster for the Argentine Chancellor in the Chaco Peace talks. The delegates who had at least openly deferred to him, grew suddenly argumentative. Buoying their boldness was the spectre, in at least three cases, of the representatives' own Foreign Ministers complaining to Justo about his Chancellor. Saavedra Lamas' own actions made the situation worse. In an attempt to secure Bolivian oil for Argentina, he alienated Paraguay. Subsequent attempts to assuage Asunción caused La Paz to be suspicious. The result was no progress.

With the presidency and vice-presidency closed to him, Saavedra Lamas began a concerted effort to save his position as Chancellor. In the last week of December, 1937, he obtained from the Conference the power to try to find a peace formula on his own.

But the details of what he was going to suggest were well known already and it was common knowledge that his plan would fail. He was given the go ahead and like a latter-day

1890

1891

1892

1893

1894

1895

1896

1897

1898

1899

1900

1901

1902

1903

1904

1905

1906

1907

1908

1909


1910

1911

1912

Don Quixote, he charged the windmill and alas, suffered the same fate.


The importance of Saavedra Lamas lies not in his accomplishments, none of which were of great significance, but in his achievement of a leadership role for Argentina in the Americas that its military and economic position did not justify. This is a major success, when one considers that such a goal had long been sought by Argentine statesmen. That he achieved these ends more for personal reasons than for patriotic ones, and through the use of unsavory tactics, tarnishes the accomplishment. But the fact that he achieved Argentina's long awaited place in the sun is undeniable.



BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

Biographical Sources

There is no substantial biography of Carlos Saavedra Lamas. The only works available are short sketches of his life in biographical anthologies and homenajes. The best of these was done by Jacobo Weiner, his close friend and secretary in a June 24, 1962 article in the Buenos Aires newspaper, La Nación. The work, unfortunately, covers only about half a page and is a tribute rather than an analytical study. Other than this, there are entries in Who is Who and its Argentine equivalent, Quién es Quién en la Argentina. Another source, William Belmont Parker's Argentines of To-day originally published in 1920 (New York: Krause Reprint Corp., 1967), gives the wrong date of his birth and supplies little other information. In 1943 José Acre personally published Carlos Saavedra Lamas versus la univervidad de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires: Amorrortu) in which he bitterly chastized the ex-Chancellor. The dispute centered upon who would pay the taxes on a donation Acre made to the University; the author was unquestionably furious when Saavedra Lamas refused to cooperate.



Works of Carlos Saavedra Lamas

The first publication of Saavedra Lamas was his professional thesis entitled Sistema municipal en la capital de la República (Buenos Aires: Compañía sud-americana billetes de banco, 1903). It was far from his best work, but notwithstanding the title, he did confront some of the major issues of the day, such as the availability of the voting franchise. Four years later, Saavedra Lamas published a small volume, Informe sobre la situación financiera de la municipalidad de la capital (Buenos Aires: Casa editora de A. Grau). The title adequately describes this work.

All of Saavedra Lamas' major speeches and projects delivered in the House of Deputies were published in 1916 under the title Problemas de Gobierno, discursos pronunciados en la cámara de diputados de la nación (Buenos Aires: Compañía sub-americana de billetes de banco, 1916). Three legislative programs which appeared in this volume were published earlier, two of which had different titles. The only one with the same title was Proyecto de ley sobre ferrocarriles secundarios (Buenos Aires: L. J. Rosso, 1914). In this tome, he proposed a means of financing railroad construction. Economía colonial (Buenos Aires: L. J. Rosso, 1910) appeared in Problemas de gobierno as Ley de Colonización. The second title describes the work well.

1. The first of these is the	1. The first of these is the
2. The second is the	2. The second is the
3. The third is the	3. The third is the
4. The fourth is the	4. The fourth is the
5. The fifth is the	5. The fifth is the
6. The sixth is the	6. The sixth is the
7. The seventh is the	7. The seventh is the
8. The eighth is the	8. The eighth is the
9. The ninth is the	9. The ninth is the
10. The tenth is the	10. The tenth is the
11. The eleventh is the	11. The eleventh is the
12. The twelfth is the	12. The twelfth is the
13. The thirteenth is the	13. The thirteenth is the
14. The fourteenth is the	14. The fourteenth is the
15. The fifteenth is the	15. The fifteenth is the
16. The sixteenth is the	16. The sixteenth is the
17. The seventeenth is the	17. The seventeenth is the
18. The eighteenth is the	18. The eighteenth is the
19. The nineteenth is the	19. The nineteenth is the
20. The twentieth is the	20. The twentieth is the
21. The twenty-first is the	21. The twenty-first is the
22. The twenty-second is the	22. The twenty-second is the
23. The twenty-third is the	23. The twenty-third is the
24. The twenty-fourth is the	24. The twenty-fourth is the
25. The twenty-fifth is the	25. The twenty-fifth is the
26. The twenty-sixth is the	26. The twenty-sixth is the
27. The twenty-seventh is the	27. The twenty-seventh is the
28. The twenty-eighth is the	28. The twenty-eighth is the
29. The twenty-ninth is the	29. The twenty-ninth is the
30. The thirtieth is the	30. The thirtieth is the
31. The thirty-first is the	31. The thirty-first is the
32. The thirty-second is the	32. The thirty-second is the
33. The thirty-third is the	33. The thirty-third is the
34. The thirty-fourth is the	34. The thirty-fourth is the
35. The thirty-fifth is the	35. The thirty-fifth is the
36. The thirty-sixth is the	36. The thirty-sixth is the
37. The thirty-seventh is the	37. The thirty-seventh is the
38. The thirty-eighth is the	38. The thirty-eighth is the
39. The thirty-ninth is the	39. The thirty-ninth is the
40. The fortieth is the	40. The fortieth is the
41. The forty-first is the	41. The forty-first is the
42. The forty-second is the	42. The forty-second is the
43. The forty-third is the	43. The forty-third is the
44. The forty-fourth is the	44. The forty-fourth is the
45. The forty-fifth is the	45. The forty-fifth is the
46. The forty-sixth is the	46. The forty-sixth is the
47. The forty-seventh is the	47. The forty-seventh is the
48. The forty-eighth is the	48. The forty-eighth is the
49. The forty-ninth is the	49. The forty-ninth is the
50. The fiftieth is the	50. The fiftieth is the
51. The fifty-first is the	51. The fifty-first is the
52. The fifty-second is the	52. The fifty-second is the
53. The fifty-third is the	53. The fifty-third is the
54. The fifty-fourth is the	54. The fifty-fourth is the
55. The fifty-fifth is the	55. The fifty-fifth is the
56. The fifty-sixth is the	56. The fifty-sixth is the
57. The fifty-seventh is the	57. The fifty-seventh is the
58. The fifty-eighth is the	58. The fifty-eighth is the
59. The fifty-ninth is the	59. The fifty-ninth is the
60. The sixtieth is the	60. The sixtieth is the
61. The sixty-first is the	61. The sixty-first is the
62. The sixty-second is the	62. The sixty-second is the
63. The sixty-third is the	63. The sixty-third is the
64. The sixty-fourth is the	64. The sixty-fourth is the
65. The sixty-fifth is the	65. The sixty-fifth is the
66. The sixty-sixth is the	66. The sixty-sixth is the
67. The sixty-seventh is the	67. The sixty-seventh is the
68. The sixty-eighth is the	68. The sixty-eighth is the
69. The sixty-ninth is the	69. The sixty-ninth is the
70. The seventieth is the	70. The seventieth is the
71. The seventy-first is the	71. The seventy-first is the
72. The seventy-second is the	72. The seventy-second is the
73. The seventy-third is the	73. The seventy-third is the
74. The seventy-fourth is the	74. The seventy-fourth is the
75. The seventy-fifth is the	75. The seventy-fifth is the
76. The seventy-sixth is the	76. The seventy-sixth is the
77. The seventy-seventh is the	77. The seventy-seventh is the
78. The seventy-eighth is the	78. The seventy-eighth is the
79. The seventy-ninth is the	79. The seventy-ninth is the
80. The eightieth is the	80. The eightieth is the
81. The eighty-first is the	81. The eighty-first is the
82. The eighty-second is the	82. The eighty-second is the
83. The eighty-third is the	83. The eighty-third is the
84. The eighty-fourth is the	84. The eighty-fourth is the
85. The eighty-fifth is the	85. The eighty-fifth is the
86. The eighty-sixth is the	86. The eighty-sixth is the
87. The eighty-seventh is the	87. The eighty-seventh is the
88. The eighty-eighth is the	88. The eighty-eighth is the
89. The eighty-ninth is the	89. The eighty-ninth is the
90. The ninetieth is the	90. The ninetieth is the
91. The ninety-first is the	91. The ninety-first is the
92. The ninety-second is the	92. The ninety-second is the
93. The ninety-third is the	93. The ninety-third is the
94. The ninety-fourth is the	94. The ninety-fourth is the
95. The ninety-fifth is the	95. The ninety-fifth is the
96. The ninety-sixth is the	96. The ninety-sixth is the
97. The ninety-seventh is the	97. The ninety-seventh is the
98. The ninety-eighth is the	98. The ninety-eighth is the
99. The ninety-ninth is the	99. The ninety-ninth is the
100. The hundredth is the	100. The hundredth is the

In Problemas de gobierno, Por las provincias del norte, estudios sobre el Régime de la industria azucarera (Buenos Aires: L. J. Rosso y cía., 1911) became El régimen legal de la producción de azúcar en la república, Ley de desgravación azucarera. Finally, all Saavedra Lamas' utterances in Congress were reported in the Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados.

Following his departure from the House of Deputies, Saavedra Lamas wrote a number of works dealing with Argentina's economic position. In 1918 Los ferrocarriles ante la legislación positiva argentina (Buenos Aires: Talleres graficos de L. J. Rosso y cía.) was published at the behest of the Empresa del Ferrocarril Oeste de Buenos Aires. It was a highly legalistic discussion of Argentine railroad legislation. In both Los asalariados en la República Argentina (Buenos Aires: Libreria y casa editora de Jesús Menendea, 1922) and La huelga de la industria carbonera en la Inglaterra (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad, 1926), Saavedra Lamas called for consensus rather than conflict in labor-management relations.

Another topic to which Saavedra Lamas devoted considerable effort was education. His first concise statement of views appeared in Atlantida (Tomo V, 1912) and was entitled "Los estudios intensivos en la Universidad de Buenos Aires." Here, as in other statements on education, he called

for liberalization of curriculum coupled with a scientific approach to problem solving. He took the same position in Problemas Americanos, discurso del presidente en la inauguración del congreso americano de ciencias sociales en Tucumán el 6 de julio de 1916 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de Coni Hermanos, 1916), La personalidad universitaria del Dr. Carlos Octavio Bunge (Buenos Aires: Talleres Graficos Argentinas de L. J. Rosso y cia., 1919), and La crisis universitaria y la formación de hombre de gobierno (Buenos Aires: Jacobo Peuser, Ltda., 1925). After Saavedra Lamas left the Foreign Ministry and became Rector of the University of Buenos Aires he published Discursos del Rector (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad, 1943). Included in this collection of speeches were a number of graduation addresses.

Between the time Saavedra Lamas left the House of Deputies and the time he became Chancellor, he wrote four books on Foreign affairs. The two written in 1922, La Legislación social despues de la guerra, la crisis del socialismo y el maximalismo (Buenos Aires: Establecimiento gráfico A. de Martino) and Tratados internacionales de tipo social, las convenciones sobre emigración y trabajo, perspectivas que representan para los países sub-americanos y especialmente para la República argentina conferencias de Wáshington y Ginebra (Buenos Aires: Facultad de derécho y ciencias sociales) deal principally with concepts of

international law. An edition of the latter work was published in French in 1924. Another work on international law, published in French was La conception argentine de arbitrage et de l'intervention a l'ouverture de la Conférence de Washington (Paris: Les Editions internationales, 1928). Included was a detailed discussion of the Gondra Treaty, which set up a commission to settle disputes in the Americas.

While Foreign Minister, Saavedra Lamas published a number of works. The Anti-War Pact was detailed in Project de Traité Sub-Américain pour prevenir la guerre Non-Agression et Conciliation (Paris: Les Editions internationales, 1932). The Spanish text appeared in Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Memoria presentada al Honorable Congreso Nacional correspondiente al periodo 1932-1933 (Buenos Aires: Gmo. Kraft. Ltda., 1933). For an English translation of the treaty see United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932, Volume V. Before the 1936 Maintenance of Peace Conference, Saavedra Lamas published Draft of a Convention for the Maintenance of Peace (Washington D.C. n.p., 1936) in which he presented his program.

Following the award of the Nobel Peace Prize, Saavedra Lamas published a compendium of material concerning his Chancellorship. Entitled Por la paz de las Américas (Buenos Aires: M. Gleizer, 1937) it included many of the Foreign

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a general
 introduction of the subject and to a brief review of the
 literature. It is shown that the problem of the
 existence of solutions of the system of equations
 (1) is a very important one in the theory of
 differential equations. The problem is solved in the
 case of linear equations, but in the case of non-
 linear equations it is still an open question. The
 purpose of this paper is to give a general
 proof of the existence of solutions of the system of
 equations (1) in the case of non-linear equations.

2. The second part of the paper is devoted to a
 detailed study of the problem of the existence of
 solutions of the system of equations (1) in the
 case of non-linear equations. It is shown that the
 problem is solved in the case of linear equations,
 but in the case of non-linear equations it is still
 an open question. The purpose of this paper is to
 give a general proof of the existence of solutions
 of the system of equations (1) in the case of non-
 linear equations.

3. The third part of the paper is devoted to a
 detailed study of the problem of the existence of
 solutions of the system of equations (1) in the
 case of non-linear equations. It is shown that the
 problem is solved in the case of linear equations,
 but in the case of non-linear equations it is still
 an open question. The purpose of this paper is to
 give a general proof of the existence of solutions
 of the system of equations (1) in the case of non-
 linear equations.

Minister's speeches as well as some articles describing his work. Outside material is only identified by a footnote and even then, the reference would only read a "prominent newspaper." In much the same vein, a collection of documents relative to the Chaco War, La conferencia interamericana de consolidación de la paz (Buenos Aires: Talleres gráficos L. J. Rosso, 1938), listed Saavedra Lamas as the author. The same work was also issued, although no publisher was identified, by the Argentine Foreign Ministry.

Argentine Archival Sources

The Argentine Foreign Ministry Archives proved to be an invaluable source for this study. Although it is apparent that much material has been culled from the files, considerable information was available. There are twelve boxes of papers relative to the Chaco Peace Conference. Box three is mistakenly labeled as the second box eleven. All of them are labeled "Conferencia de la Paz." For the 1933 Montevideo meeting there is only a single box filled mostly with general memoranda given to the delegates. Three boxes are devoted to the Maintenance of Peace Conference. Most of the material relates to the origin and conduct of the Conference and includes such trivia as the menu's for the major receptions, but there is some formal diplomatic correspondence.

$$f_{\text{max}} = \frac{1}{2\pi} \sqrt{\frac{1}{L C_{\text{eff}}}} = \frac{1}{2\pi} \sqrt{\frac{1}{L \left(C_{\text{eff}} + \frac{C_{\text{gate}}}{\omega^2 L^2} \right)}}$$

United States Archival Sources

A serious study of Saavedra Lamas would not have been possible without the massive resources of Record Group 59 in the United States Archives. By far the most comprehensive and significant files relative to the Chaco are 724.3415 and 724.34119. For the correspondence and memoranda dealing with the two inter-American meetings see (1933) and 710.Peace, 811.001Roosevelt Visit (1936). The documentation concerning Saavedra Lamas and the League of Nations can be found in files 710.League of Nations, 500.001, 500.C111, and 500.C Covenant. Of lesser importance are files 724.3411, 835.00General Conditions, 835.002, 711.35, 724.3215, 835.001Justo, Agustin P., 724.25, and 725.35.

Argentine Government Publications

The best general source published by the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto relative to the 1930's is Memorias. This yearly series, ostensibly a report of Congress, is a collection of documents. Because it is made public, however, the material details the formalities of foreign relations rather than the substance. The same is true of La conferencia de paz del Chaco 1935-1939 (Buenos Aires: E. L. Frigerico e Hijo, 1939). A reading of the material included would yield the impression that the whole conference went smoothly. Another example of form rather

1871-1872

1872-1873

1873-1874

1874-1875

1875-1876

1876-1877

1877-1878

1878-1879

1879-1880

1880-1881

1881-1882

1882-1883

1883-1884

1884-1885

1885-1886

1886-1887

1887-1888

1888-1889

1889-1890

1890-1891

1891-1892

1892-1893

1893-1894

1894-1895

1895-1896

1896-1897

1897-1898

than substance is La neutralidad argentina en el conflicto boliviano-paraguayo (Buenos Aires: Jacobo Peuser, Ltda., 1933). This slim volume also appeared in Memorias. Without question the most useful Argentine government source is the two volume La politica argentina en la guerra del Chaco (Buenos Aires: Guillermo Kraft, 1937). Besides providing some documentation, the work outlines the policy and motives of Argentina until July, 1925. It was produced while Saavedra Lamas was in office and is highly laudatory of his actions.

The Argentine Foreign Ministry also brought out reports on the major Inter-American meetings of 1933 and 1936.

Séptima Conferencia Internacional Americana Reunida en la Ciudad de Montevideo del 3 la 24 de diciembre de 1933, informe presentada por el Presidente de la delegación Argentina Dr. Carlos Saavedra Lamas (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1934) includes the speeches given by the Argentine delegation and the protocols and treaties signed. Although the volume dealing with 1936, La conferencia interamericana de la paz, is considerably larger, it has a similar format.

United States Government Publications

For information on the Chaco dispute, the Inter-American conferences, and economic matters the series, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing

Office, various years) is invaluable. Another helpful source is the conference series of the United States. Relative to Saavedra Lamas' tenure in Argentina, the most useful are Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Seventh Inter-American Conference, 1933 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1934), Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the International Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires, 1936 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1937) and Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Peace Conference Held at Buenos Aires, July 1, 1935-January 23, 1939 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1940).

Published Primary Sources

There are a number of published memoirs of people who were involved in the diplomacy surrounding the dispute. The most useful is Vicente Rivarola's three volume work, Memorias diplomáticas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Ayacucho, 1952-1957). The work's utility is enhanced by the inclusion of numerous documents. Another helpful volume is Bautista Saavedra's El Chaco y la conferencia de la Paz de Buenos Aires (Chile: Editorial Nacimiento, 1939), a defense of Saavedra's actions. For a vicious indictment of Argentina in general and Saavedra Lamas in particular, see Miguel

Mercado Moreira, Historia diplomática de la guerra del Chaco (La Paz: Talleres Gráficos Bolivianos, 1966).

Another book highly critical of Saavedra Lamas is Diplomats and Demagogues (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1971) by Spruille Braden. Also included is information relative to the Inter-American meetings. Finally a work which is indispensable to any discussion of the period is The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948) by Cordell Hull.

Secondary Sources

The works by Argentine authors dealing with the 1930's are generally polemical although some are useful if read with caution. La Democracia Fraudulenta (Buenos Aires: Editorial Jorge Alvarez S.A., 1968) by Rodolfo Puiggrós reveals its bias in the title. La década infame (Buenos Aires: Talleres Gráficos Lumen, 1969) edited by Carlos Pérez, is also critical. Two good works on the period are Alberto Ciria, Partidas y Poder en la Argentina moderna, 1930-1946 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Jorge Alvarez, 1968) and Jorge Abelardo Ramos, El Sexto Domino (Buenos Aires: Editorial Plus Ultra, 1972). A very useful and excellent work dealing with the oligarchy is José Luis de Imaz's Los Que Mandan (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1964).

In English two works which stand out for their depth of analysis are The Army and Politics in Argentina 1928-1945 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,

OFFICE

RECEIVED

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1911

1969) by Robert A. Potash and Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1966: An Interpretation (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972) by Marvin Goldwert. For the purposes of this study Potash's book proved to be more useful.

Concerning the economic policy of Saavedra Lamas during the 1930's, the most informative work relative to the Roca-Runciman Treaty is El gobierno de las vacas, 1933-1956 (Buenos Aires: Ediciones la Bastilla, 1972) by Daniel Prosdoff. The author sees the treaty as unfortunate, but necessary. A more general study of Argentine economic policy as it relates to the United States is "New Light on the Good Neighbor Policy: The United States and Argentina, 1933-1939" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1972) by William Grant Cooper. The total lack of Spanish language sources detracts from the work.

There are a great many books dealing all or in part with the diplomatic relations between the United States and Argentina during the 1930's. The best work is Harold F. Peterson's Argentina and the United States, 1810-1960 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1964). Another useful work with a greater emphasis on the background of United States policy is The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962) by J. Lloyd Meham. A critical view of United States policy can be found in Yankee Diplomacy (Dallas: Southern Methodist

1. The first part of the report is a general statement of the purpose of the study. It is to determine the effect of the new method of teaching on the learning of the subject.

2. The second part of the report is a description of the method of teaching. It is a new method of teaching which is based on the principles of the new method of teaching.

3. The third part of the report is a description of the results of the study. It is a new method of teaching which is based on the principles of the new method of teaching.

4. The fourth part of the report is a description of the conclusions of the study. It is a new method of teaching which is based on the principles of the new method of teaching.

5. The fifth part of the report is a description of the recommendations of the study. It is a new method of teaching which is based on the principles of the new method of teaching.

6. The sixth part of the report is a description of the limitations of the study. It is a new method of teaching which is based on the principles of the new method of teaching.

7. The seventh part of the report is a description of the future research. It is a new method of teaching which is based on the principles of the new method of teaching.

8. The eighth part of the report is a description of the references. It is a new method of teaching which is based on the principles of the new method of teaching.

9. The ninth part of the report is a description of the appendix. It is a new method of teaching which is based on the principles of the new method of teaching.

10. The tenth part of the report is a description of the bibliography. It is a new method of teaching which is based on the principles of the new method of teaching.

University Press, 1953) by Edmund Smith, Jr. An opposite view of United States policy is available in The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1967) by Samuel Flagg Bemis. A work the researcher should definitely consult is Argentine Foreign Policy (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966) by Alberto Conil Paz and Gustavo Ferrari. The book was translated from Spanish by John J. Kennedy

Regarding the Chaco War, the best and most comprehensive work is Politics of the Chaco Peace Conference, 1935-1939 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), by Leslie B. Rout, Jr. Another fine source is Bryce Wood's The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932-1942 (New York: Colombia University Press, 1958). This volume integrates the Chaco War into other disputes of the 1930's. For the military side of the conflict, see David H. Zook, Jr., The Conduct of the Chaco War (New Haven: Bookman Associates, 1960). The only work spotlighting the response of the League of Nations to the Chaco War is Margaret La Foy, The Chaco Dispute and the League of Nations (Ann Arbor: Edward Brothers, Inc., 1946), which suffers from inadequate research.

