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ABSTRACT

TEACHING AS COMMUNICATION: AREAS OF PRESUPPOSITION IN
ISRAEL SCHEFFLER'S RATIONAL RESTRICTIONS OF MANNER
COMPLEMENTED BY EMPATHIC LISTENING

BY

Carolyn LaDelle Bennett

The study of "Teaching as Communication" includes
the following identifying features with respect to its
purpose, problem statement, method and procedures, data,
and findings.

The study is conceptual, eclectic, and in dis-
cussion format. It is designed to develop and to define
a synthesizing concept of "Teaching as Communication" via
an examination of Israel Scheffler's rational restrictions
of manner connoting teaching, complemented by a notion of
empathic listening, as this latter concept has been relat-
ed to the teaching context by such psychologists as Rollo
May and Carl Rogers.

The problem statement of this study is reflected
in the following questions:

1. What are the major areas of presupposition

in Israel Scheffler's conceptual interpre—

tation of teaching (that is, the "restric-
tion of manner") which make explicit

Carolyn LaDelle Bennett

reference to the centrality of a communi-
cation concept, and which might be seen
as intimating a perceptual concern with
respect to teaching and communication?

2. What perceptual component of communi-

cation relative to teaching might be
said to complement Scheffler's rational
interpretation of teaching, given the
particular emphases which appear to

be presupposed in his "restrictions of
manner" relative to teaching?

The specific statement of the objectives of the
study are as follows: (1) to examine one of Israel
Scheffler's interpretations of a philosophical model of
teaching, with a View to extracting from this model a
component of communication; and (2) to complement Schef-
fler's rational concept of teaching and communication
with a perceptual concept of listening. This concept of
listening may be seen to relate specifically to the
selected concepts of communication and teaching.

The findings of this study are the following:

(1) Scheffler's interpretation of teaching presupposes a
rational concept of communication; (2) Scheffler's con-
cept does not explicitly emphasize a perceptual notion
of communication, but given the nature of his concept,
it is readily capable of being accommodated with an
empathic concept of listening associated with teaching;

and (3) the concept of "Teaching as Communication,"

explicitly emphasizing rational, ethical, and perceptual

Carolyn LaDelle Bennett

criteria-—defined as an attitudinal disposition and funda-
mental orientation--is a reasonable and feasible concept
when viewed in the context of its practical relevance to

a "typical" teaching context.

The concept of "Teaching as Communication" is
suggested as one particular way in which teaching should
be viewed. The study demonstrates through the nature and
treatment of its content that questions involving philo-
sophical, human relations, and/or social issues can be
effectively confronted through an amplification of con—
cepts which relate to a concept of teaching as an
activity. Several relatively specific implications for
the practice of teacher education are cited at the end

of the study.

TEACHING AS COMMUNICATION: AREAS OF
PRESUPPOSITION IN ISRAEL SCHEFFLER'S
RATIONAL RESTRICTIONS OF MANNER
COMPLEMENTED BY EMPATHIC

LISTENING

BY

Carolyn LaDelle Bennett

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Curriculum and Secondary Education

1976

 

 

@ Copyright by
Carolyn LeDelle Bennett

1976

 

TO IMOGEN :

A special friend who exemplifies that special
combination of communication and "teaching,"
of ethics, rationality and empathic under-
standing.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer wishes to express sincere appreciation
to the doctoral committee for its intellectual stimu—
lation and for its patience. This is addressed to Dr.
Keith Anderson, Dr. J. Bruce Burke, and Dr. Roger
Neimeyer of the College of Education at Michigan State
University. To my advisor and chairman (also of the
Michigan State University College of Education), I am
expecially appreciative. Had it not been for his addi—
tional intellectual stimulation, his understanding, and
his advice, the completion of this work would not have
been possible. Even more important, I would not have
acquired the desired depth of knowledge and personal
growth that has come out of this period of work. This
is addressed to an excellent advisor and a particularly
tolerant person: Dr. Ben Bohnhorst.

A particularly personal message is addressed to
my parents, Laura and Thomas Bennett. Their moral sup-
port and occasional financial assistance helped me

through some difficult times. I am deeply grateful.

The writer acknowledges also the permission
granted by Dr. Israel Scheffler, and by the following
publishers for incorporating in the following study the
language of and direct quotations from the works cited:

1. Dr. Israel Scheffler, owner of copyright,

Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge: An Introduction to
Epistemology and Education.

 

 

2. Routledge and Kegal Paul Ltd.: Gilbert Ryle,
"A Rational Animal," Education and the Development of
Reason, eds. R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and
R. S. Peters.

 

3. Same publishers: John Passmore, "On Teaching
to be Critical," Same work and edition.

4. Humanities Press, Inc.,: R. S. Peters, The
Concept of Education.

 

5. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.: R. S. Peters,
Ethics and Education.

 

6. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.: Israel
Scheffler, Reason and Teaching.

 

7. Scott, Foresman and Company: Israel
Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge: An Introduction to
Epistemology and Education.

 

 

8. Charles C. Thomas Publisher: Israel
Scheffler, The Language of Education.

 

9. Van Nostrand Reinhold Company: Rollo May,
Psychology and the Human Delimma.

 

10. William C. Brown: Angelo Boy and Gerald
Pine, Expanding the Self: Personal Growth for Teachers.

 

ll. Abingdon Press: Rollo May, The Art of
Counseling.

 

 

12. Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company: Carl
R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn.

 

iv

 

13. University of Chicago Press: Morris L. Cogan,
"Current Issues in the Education of Teachers," Teacher
Education The Seventy-Fourth Yearbook of the National
Society for the Study of Education (NSSE) Pt. II, ed.

Kevin Ryan.

PREFACE

The following study of "Teaching as Communication"
reflects this writer's concern that a combined philosoph-
ical, ethical, and personal perspective regarding the
practice of teaching appears currently to be relegated
to a role of subserviency. Evidence of this condition
can be found in the currently predominant foci of
research on teaching practice, and in reported findings
which relate to various levels of institutionalized edu-
cation.

The present writer makes, in this study, a modest
attempt to rectify this condition by setting forth, via
the discussions of Chapters III and IV, a development and
definition of "Teaching as Communication" which
explicitly emphasizes rational, ethical and perceptual
criteria to be associated with teaching practice. The
writer employs an eclectic approach, using the language
of educational philosophers and psychologists along with
the writer's own interpretative statements thereof, all
of which are designed to examine and to explicate one of

Israel Scheffler's interpretations of teaching with a

vi

View to extracting a communication component, and in the
final analysis, to set forth a definition of a synthe-
sizing concept: "Teaching as Communication."

Why was the work of Israel Scheffler selected for
the basis for this study? The genesis of the present
writer's interest in the significant work of this impor—
tant educational philosopher may be traced to a concern
for the ethical element in teaching, and a concern for a
kind of synthesis of theory and practice with respect to
teaching which explicitly emphasizes ethical criteria.

The work of Israel Scheffler meets both of these
criteria. Scheffler‘s analytical and normative approach
to the study of teaching exposes and emphasizes ethical
criteria which this writer found critically lacking in a
large portion of studies related to teaching practice.
Scheffler develops his interpretation of teaching in a
logical and disciplined fashion which reflects the best
elements of scientism and humanism. His work upholds the
spirit of a disciplined scientific approach while at the
same time reminding one of an ever present ethical com—
mitment which is associated with a free and rational
society, and which must, therefore, be taken into account
when one sets out to educate, to teach, to enhance the

intellectual development of students.

The work of Israel Scheffler also offers, in this
writer's View, an important response to the teacher edu-
cator's expressed problem of fostering a synthesis of
theory and practice in the education of teachers.

Through his emphasis on "Practical Thought,"——a concept
which is concerned with the guidance of actions (such as
those related to the practice of teaching), the stating
of ideals or norms which offer responses to such ques-
tions as "What should be done," and "How ought one to
act"--Scheffler effects, at a conceptual level, a useful
synthesis of the theory and practice of teaching.

The above prefatory statements represent the
present writer's personal preception of the origin of the
following study. Chapter I contains a detailed account
of the origin of this study as it can be seen to emanate
directly from professional literature which is relevant

to the purposes, problem, and objectives of the study.

Specialized Treatment of Terms

 

Throughout the central discussions of the follow-
ing study (particularly Chapters III and IV), the

restricted usages of the concepts of listening, teaching,

 

and knowledge and underlined. The references to Schef—
fler's "rational restrictions of manner" are enclosed in

quotation marks. Exceptions to this procedure would be

viii

contexts in which it is, or has become, obvious to the
reader that the conceptual usage is, or is not, indica-
tive to the restricted usages upon which the study
focuses. Another stipulation relates to gender. In all
references to the "teacher," the masculine third person

is used for the sake of consistency and simplicity.

ix

Chapter

I.

II.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ORIGIN AND PROBLEM OF THE STUDY . . .

Purposes of the Study . . . . .
Objectives of the Study . . . . .
Supporting Rationales . . .

The Issue of Theory and Practice:
Arguments for a Normative Approach

Larger Curricular Contexts Related to

A Study of a Concept of Teaching
Justifications for an Eclectic
Approach . . . . . .

Methods and Procedures .
Limitations, Teacher Education Issues,

and Problem Statement . . . . .

Clinical Experiences .

Developing a Modeling Relationship
Between Teacher and Student . .

Competency—Based Teacher Education

Personal and Perceptual Aspects .

Interim Summary . . . . .

Definitions of Key Terms

Concluding Statement of the Problem

THEORETICAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE STUDY

Introduction . .
Part One: Foundational Perspective .

A Familiar Foundations Course Con-
cept .
A Foundational Analytic Seminar .
A Foundational Human Relations
Seminar . . . . . . . .
Interim Summary .

Part Two: A Teaching Concept Perspec—

tive .

The General Perspective and Its Con-
ceptual Difficulties .

The Restricted Sense of the Teaching
Concept . .

Restatement of Objectives and Problem

Page

WNH

50
52

52
61

66
71

73
74

84
86

 

 

Chapter

III. AREAS OF PRESUPPOSITION ASSOCIATED WITH
ISRAEL SCHEFFLER'S RESTRICTIONS OF MANNER

The Presupposition of Ethical Obliga-
tion . . . . . . . . . . .
The Restrictions of Manner and Accul—

turation . . . . . . . . .
The Restrictions of Manner and Human

Consciousness
The Presuppositions of Human Rational1ty
Critical Thought and M1n . .
A Concept of Human Rat10nal1ty . .
A Concept of Critical Thought .

A Concept of Mind . . . . . .
The Underlying Notion of Communication:
A Set of Inferences . .

Teaching and Knowing: Mutual Partici-
pation of Teacher and Student . . .
Teaching and Knowing: The Perceptual
(Concern Withhqthe Belief Criterion
Rationale for a Personal Concept of
Listening: Findings and Inferences .

IV. A COMPLEMENTARY CONCEPT OF LISTENING . .

Introduction . . . . . . . . .
The Listening Concept Associated with
Empathy and Communication . . . .
Empathic Listening, Teaching, and Con—
versation . . . . . . . .
A Notion of Respect for Persons . . .
The Aspects of Understanding, Thera—
peutic Effect, Permissiveness, and
Technique . . . . . . . .
An Educative Concept of Conversation .
Conclusion: The Synthesizing Concept of
Teaching as Communication . . . .

V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EDUCATION OF
TEACHERS . . . . . . . . .

A Source of Self-Correction

Teaching as Communication and the Commu-
nity of Scholars . . . . . . . .
Summary of Imperatives . . . . . .

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . .

 

Page

88

92
96
99
103
111
119
126
139

141

148
154
161
161
163
166
167

171
177

187
192

196

I

 

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER I

ORIGIN AND PROBLEM OF THE STUDY

Purposes of the Study

 

The purpose of this study is to effect a synthesis
of several distinct concepts into a single overarching
concept, represented here by the phrase: "Teaching as
Communication." An extensively explicated definition of
this concept is the intended final outcome of the study.

The overall approach of the study is conceptual
and eclectic and is in a discussion format. This means:
(1) that its method of procedure is borrowed from what
has been called by Joseph Schwab "the eclectic arts;"1
(2) that its substantive content is made up of sets of
concepts emanating from two distinct areas of knowledge
which have bearing on a "standard activity—sense of teach-
ing" (see alphabetical listing of key terms, page 46
below); and (3) that the two sets of concepts upon which
the study is based are accommodated to each other on the
basis of a common thread perceived by the present writer

so as to form a potentially useful synthesizing concept.

 

lJoseph Schwab, "The Practical: Arts of the
Eclectic," School Review 79 (August 1971): 493-542.

 

 

 

As an initial formulation of the synthesizing
concept which will be explicated in the following chap;
ters, the concept of "Teaching as Communication" will
include: (a) an underlying concept of rational communi-
cation as perceived in Israel Scheffler's "restrictions,
of manner," which he associates with a fundamental con-

cept of teaching; and (b) a concept of listening which is

 

a construct of interpersonal communication. The latter
concept of listening is perceived by the writer as con-
stituting some central elements which are relevant to
what Scheffler emphasizes as rational and moral criteria
(the ”restrictions") associated with a philosophical con—
cept of teaching.

The main body of the present work (that is, the
conceptual explorations and delineations of Chapter III
draws upon the works of and uses the language of,
Scheffler, R. S. Peters, Gilbert Ryle, and John Passmore.
The concept of listening (developed in Chapter IV) draws

primarily upon the works of Rollo May and Carl R. Rogers.

Objectives of the Study

 

The study attempts to achieve two major objec-
tives:

1. To examine one of Israel Scheffler's inter-
pretations of a philosophical model of
teaching, with a view to extracting from
this model a component of communication;
and

2. To complement Scheffler's rational concept
of teaching and communication with a

 

perceptual concept of listening. This concept

of listening may be seen to relate specifically

to the selected concepts of communication and
teaching.
Supporting Rationales

The connection between the present study and
the area of teacher education is reflected in the follow-
ing need statement which may serve as the overarching
working hypothesis of the study:

The education of the teacher requires the broad-
est possible perspective, a perspective which
effects a bringing together of the realms of
theory and practice with the View of developing
more experienced teachers, in terms of the sort
of knowledge they possess and the personal
sensitivity with which they approach the activ-
ity of teaching.

The following sections offer a detailed account
of the ramifications of this need statement as they can
be seen to pertain to the supporting rationales of this
study. In this context, the pertinent data relate to
(a) the issue of theory and practice--arguments for a
normative approach; (b) the larger curricular contexts
related to a study of a concept of teaching; and (c) the
justifications for an eclectic approach.

The rationales supporting the present study (that
is, its conceptual and eclectic approach and its discus-
sion format) resides in passages selected from writers

who have been concerned with (a) a philosophical concept

of teaching as an activity; and simultaneously, (b) the

 

‘

4
need for what Scheffler terms "a critical re-thinking of

the foundations" associated with educational processes.2

The Issue of Theor and Prac-
tice: Arguments for a Norma-'
tive Approach
Writers such as Scheffler, Hyman, Bandman,

Guttchen have argued that although conceptual and theo-

retical approaches to the study of teaching as an activ-

ity lack the proximity commanded by empirical studies

relative to teaching practice, the former approaches

can offer a type of perspective which is indispensable

to the education of the teacher.3 Bandman and Guttchen

with the clarification of specific teaching activities

(such as defining, valuing, inferring, etc.) as in the

analyses of Smith,4

____________________

2Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education
(Springfield, 111.: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1968),
p. 8

are not in themselves sufficient for

3Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching (New York:
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973); See also Ronald
Hyman, ed., Contemporary Thought on Teaching (Englewood
Cliffs, N. N.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971); See also
Bertram Bandman and Robert S. Guttchen, eds., Philo-
sophical Essays on Teaching (New York: J. B. Lippincott
Company, 1969).

B. Othanel Smith and Robert H. Ennis,
and Concepts of Education," 1

; See also Arno
., "The Classroom Game "

, . , in Teaching:
Vantage P01nts for Study, ed: Ronald Hyman (Philadel-
phia: J. B. Lippincott, 1968),

pp. 321—328.

 

a full exposition of what constitutes Vgood teaching."
In this respect, Bandman and Guttchen argue:

Attention to a description based on what teach-
ers actually do in the classroom has the
advantage of keeping the concept of teaching
closely tied with the practice of teaching . . .
[however] it is a good thing for teachers to
acquire a better understanding of what they are
doing in the classroom. ._. . Philosophical
attention is necessary for such an understanding
and . . . it is indispensable to the improvement
of teaching.

They continue their argument in specific support of a
normative approach to the study of teaching activity,
an approach which, according to these authors, has been
used by such writers as Scheffler and Peters. They main-
tain that:
Attentiontx>accurate descriptions is required if
our norms or ideals are ever to be achieved in
practice. If teaching is construed as being only
in descriptive terms, the goals of teaching are
liable to be ignored or neglected and at any rate
not sufficiently questioned and examined. We
then lack rationally defensible norms, rules, or
guidelines to help us decide what is to count as
"good teaching."6
Bandman and Guttchen's argument in this context
is in support of a normative approach to a definition of

teaching, an approach, according to which "a definition

of teaching is designed as a norm or rule for restricting

 

5Bertram Bandman and Robert S. Guttchen, eds.,
Philosophical Essays on Teaching (New York: J. B.
Lippincott Company, 1969), pp. 2 and 4.

6

 

Ibid., p. 4.

 

 

the activities to which the verb 'to teach' applies.7

On the basis of their definition of a normative approach,
they lend their support to the use of this approach as
they discern it in the writings of Scheffler. It must

be pointed out, however, that not all writers identified
in connection with the present study agree on the nature
of Scheffler's definition of teaching, nor do they agree
with what is seen by some as the combined political,
moral, and legal implications of his analysis of teach-

8 What they do appear to agree upon, as is indi-

ing.
cated in a statement by Flower, is that Scheffler's
analysis of teaching has made "a most serious contribu-
tion to both education and philosophy," and that his
analysis can be seen to involve "preliminary steps
toward a 'descriptive definition of the standard sense
of teaching'" which has been achieved by Scheffler
"through the examination of teaching as an activity."9

In defense of what Scheffler calls his "notion of teach-

'ing," he argues as follows:

 

7rbid., p. 3.

8Elizabeth Flower, "Elizabeth Flower on The
Language of Education by Israel Scheffler," Studies in
Philosophy and Education 4 (Spring 1965): 128; See
also Hyman, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

 

 

 

9Ibid., pp. 124-125; See also Bandman and
Guttchen, op. cit., p. 3; See also Hyman, op. cit.,
pp. 29-30.

I think that teaching, as an activity, is normally
distinguised from deliberate influence or modifi-
cation of behavior, by reference to the giving of
honest reasons. It is true that we often employ
a role-notion of teaching, as referring to what-
ever teachers (an institutional class) do in fact.
Insofar as this may be true, the ordinary word
[teaching] is ambiguous, and I have chosen to
explain the activity-sense of the word, using
other means to talk about schools as institutions
and the role of functionaries within them. This
choice brings out the option of considering how
far teaching (in the distinctive activity sense)
is to be used in society as a model of cultural

renewal. . . . My point is that the option, as.a
moral, not linguistic, issue, needs to be clearly
exposed.10

This quotation from Scheffler's response to
Flower appears to suggest a point which is consistent
with Bandman and Guttchen's identification and support
of the normative approach in Scheffler's writings.
Bandman and Guttchen have written that the normative
approach "is taken by those writers [including Scheffler
and Peters] whose definition of teaching rules out

11

indoctrination." They continue by asserting that

"both Scheffler and Peters argue that teaching involves
at least at some points the giving of reasons and

"12

explanation. It is this normative interpretation,

evidenced in what Scheffler calls "restrictions of

 

loIsrael Scheffler, "Israel Scheffler's Reply
to Elizabeth Flower," Studies in Philosophy and Edu-
cation 4 (Spril 1965): 135-136

llBandman and Guttchen, op. cit;, p. 3.

12

Ibid., pp. 3-4.

 

manner," that the present writer attempts to examine,
and to combine with a complementary concept of listening.
Particularly relevant to the supporting ration—
ale of the present study is Scheffler's support of a
theoretical approach to the study of teaching as an
activity. His arguments in this respect have been asso-
ciated with the education of the teacher, and the bases
upon which one might justify the inclusion of theoreti-
cal knowledge as an important aspect of the education of
the teacher. He bases his argument not on the question

of what is necessary for the education of the teacher,

 

but on the question of what is desirable for the educa-

 

tion of the teacher. "Justification of educational
scholarship and theoretical SOphistication" in the edu-

cation of the teacher, he argues, "is not, . . . simply

a matter of minimal necessity."l3

It is rather, a matter of desirability, and a
thing may be desirable not because it is some-
thing we could do without, but because it trans-
forms and enhances the quality of what we do and
how we live. . . . It is a maximal rather than a
minimal interpretation of the teacher's work that
is thus relevant to a philosophical assessment of
his education.14

Taking into account the question of practical
proximity when theoretical study is compared, at this

level of talk, with empirical study, Scheffler argues:

 

l3Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit.,

 

p. 85.

l4Ibid.

 

Though educational scholarship and theoretical
analysis. . . . do not directly enhance crafts—
manship, they raise continually the sorts of
questions that concern the larger goals, setting,
and meaning of educational practice.
This latter statement appears to correspond to Bandman
and Guttchen's emphases on philosophical attention and
the normative approach cited above. Both sets of state-
ments might be viewed as a part of an overall theoreti-
cal approach to the study of teaching.
Larger Curricular Contexts

Related to A Study of’a
Concept of Teaching

 

 

 

In addition to the connection which these
writers have drawn between theoretical study, intellec-
tual understanding of a teaching concept, and the educa-
tion of the teacher, other writers, such as Ronald
Hyman, have related the study of a teaching concept to
the larger contexts of curricular, cultural, and social
issues. "That the concept of teaching is a key concept
in education is a truism that needs no explication,"

16

writes Hyman. He goes on to delineate what he sees

as an interrelationship between curriculum reform and

 

lsIbid., pp. 92-93.

l6Ronald Hyman, Contemporary Thought on Teach-
ing (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice—Hall, Inc.,
1971): p. 1X.

 

 

10

teaching reform, and the need of the former to respond

to certain specific social problems. He writes:
People realize full well that in their attempts
to reform a school's curriculum, as one signifi-
cant response to the social problems youth pose
to the nation, they must know about teaching.
Curriculum reforms in large measure depend on
teaching reforms, which in turn depend on an
understanding of teaching. This applies to all
levels of teaching from nursery school through
doctoral seminars.

Hyman further contends that there is a growing
concern about teaching which is a natural outgrowth of
two related concerns which have been affirmed by lay-
men and professionals. He argues that the present era
is one in which (a) "people urgently seek ways to under-
stand the present social problems facing the nation at
large and to work out solutions for the problems;" and
(b) all professionals have a concern "for the clarifi-
cation of key concepts and the development of theory in

18 In a similar vein, Scheffler

their respective fields."
has suggested that 20th Century analytic philOSOphy has
made contributions to the field of education which can
assist the educator who concerns himself with founda-

tional concepts of education and with an examination of

the findings of philosophical analysis. He writes:

 

17Ibid.

lBIbid.

 

11

On the one hand, educators and educational theo-
rists alike have, in recent years, increasingly
affirmed the need for a critical re-thinking of
the foundations of their subject; on the other
hand, philosophy has increasingly devoted itself
to the development and application of analytic
instruments capable of assisting in such .
re-thinking.19

Elizabeth Flower, in a critique of Scheffler's

The Language of Education further amplifies this point.

 

She maintains that Scheffler's work contributes to the
fields of education and philosophy (a) in demonstrating
"that strong methodological demands can be made on a
field dedicated to practice" [education]; and (b) in
showing "that the ivory tower interests [philosophy] are
not without their practical relevance."20 Other writers,
such as Hyman, R. S. Peters, C. J. B. Macmillan and
Thomas Nelson, and Bertram Bandman and Robert Guttchen
also recognize that Scheffler's specific analysis of
teaching as an activity has made an important contribu-
tion to understanding and clarifying the concept of

teaching.21

 

19Scheffler, The Language of Education, op. cit.,

20Flower, op. cit., p. 124.

21Hyman, op. cit.; See also R. S. Peters, ed.,
The Concept of Education (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1970); See also C. J. B. Macmillan and Thomas
Nelson, eds., Concepts of Teaching: PhilOSOphical
Essays (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968).

 

12

Outside of the exclusive domain of educational
philosophy, however, there is some indication that the
conceptual analysis of Scheffler, and of others whose
work is linked with the same philosophical orientation,
receives little attention, in terms of further theoretie
cal examination and discussion. The 1973 Handbook of

Research on Teaching indicated in its article on "Contem-

 

porary Models of Teaching" that the rational model of
teaching (that is, the model to which Scheffler's con—
cept of teaching is linked) "has been criticized by being

22 The authors of this

either ignored or misunderstood."
article,Nuthalland Snook, in describing three "distinCm
tive" models of teaching (rational, discovery-learning,
and behavioral) conclude with the following observation:
There is continued debate about critical issues
among the proponents of the rational model, but
their concerns have not been taken seriously by
those committed to the empiricist—practicalist
ideology. . . . Educational research has tradition—
ally been psychological in orientation.23
All of the writers cited above, however, are
concerned with a philosophical study of teaching, and
they have, through specifically related arguments and/or
through the example of their own works, supported the

ligitimacy of a conceptual, theoretical, and discussion

 

22Graham Nuthall and Ivan Snook, "Contemporary
Models of Teaching," Second Handbook of Research on
Teaching, ed. Robert M. W. Travers (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1973), P. 69.

23Ibid., pp. 69-70.

 

13

approach to the study of teaching. They have also sug-
gested that the analysis of Israel Scheffler makes an
important contribution to the area of educational prac-
tice, and that his analysis warrants further study by
those who are concerned with the education of the teacher
and a philosophical component of such education.

Other writers, two of which are Joyce and Weil,
and Corsini and Howard, have alluded to the significance
of a type of study which is akin to Scheffler's approach.

In Models of Teaching, for example, Joyce and Weil sug—

 

gest that the field of teacher education needs additional
research which approaches the study of teaching

(a) through existing, cross—disciplinary sources, and

(b) through debate, dialogue, and/or discussion format.24

In Critical Incidents in Teaching, Corsini and Howard

 

provide some demonstrations of ways in which the teach-
er's conception of his role and his philosophical and
psychological frames of reference can affect, for example,
his "understanding of an interpersonal problem and his
solution to it" in everyday interaction with Stu—

dents.25

 

24Bruce Joyce and Marsha Weil, Models of Teach-
igg (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972),
pp. 391 and 394; See also Christopher Lucas, "A Teapot
in the Tempest," Teachers College Record 4 (1972): 581.

25R. J. Corsini and D. D. Howard, Critical Inci—
dents in Teaching (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1964): p. xxx.

 

 

14

In the light of these issues and their correspond-
ing function as supporting rationales, one aim of this
study is to further examine one philosophical interpre—
tation of teaching (Scheffler's "restrictions of manner")
with a View to extracting and amplifying a communication
component.

Justifications for an
Eclecticggpproach

 

 

A final source of support for the present study
relates to the use of an eclectic approach to the study
of teaching. The eclectic approach, as it is employed
within this study, is linked with (a) the familiar dic-
tionary definitions of the term "eclectic," and (b) a
more specialized use of the term as it has been set
forth by Joseph Schwab and Israel Scheffler. The follow-
ing sub-sections identify the criteria of the eclectic

mode which are pertinent to the present study.

Familiar Dictionary Definitions.-—The relevant

 

dictionary definitions can be found in the Random House
College Dictionary (revised edition, 1975): (1) "select-
ing; choosing from different sources;" and (2) [that
which is] "made up of what is selected from different

2 . . .
sources." 6 In 1ts more spec1alized use, the term

 

26Jess Stein, Chief ed., The Random House College
Dictionary, revised edition (New York: Random House,

 

 

Inc., 1975).

15

"eclectic" is said to involve, according to Schwab and
Scheffler, a "plurality of theories."27 Both of these
writers agree on the legitimacy of using several theories,
and/or theoretical frameworks, in an approach to the

study of educational practice.

Schwab's and Scheffler's Criteria.--These two
writers, though they agree on the significance and
legitimacy of a plurality of theories, do not agree on
the validity of a purely theoretical approach which may
or may not be eclectic, nor do they agree on the defini-
tion of "theory." Schwab argues that the educational
field has become overly theoretical in terms of its
emphases on learning theory, teaching theory, and curricu—
lum theory.28 He maintains that the "theoretical" is too
abstract, and that it millitates against achieving a syn-
thesis of theoretical and practical aspects of educa—
tional processes. Therefore, in his work as teacher-
educator and curriculum worker, he emphasizes combined
criteria of social and behavioral theories and practical
particularity. That is to say, his work involves pre-

sentations of selected behavioral and social theories in

 

27Joseph Schwab, "The Practical: Arts of Eclec—
tic," School Review 4 (August 1971): 493—542; See also
Scheffler, "The Practical as a Focus for Curriculum:
Reflections on Schwab's View," in Reason and Teaching,
op. cit., pp. 181-197.

28

 

Schwab, op. cit., pp. 493-494.

16

conjunction with practical activities (such as films,
simulations, field and laboratory experiences) in which
the teacher trainee is expected to selectively apply the
appropriate theories or aspects of theoretical frameworks
to situations and incidents which are associated with the
practical experiences.29 This type of theoretical-
practical approach is further documented in Chapter II

of the present study (see "Foundational Perspective,"
below).

Scheffler, on the other hand, while agreeing with
Schwab's position on the significance of a plurality of
theory in the education of the teacher, holds that
"theory" in the educational field can be more broadly
conceived than "theory" in a purely scientific sense, as
the latter is seen to be associated with behavioral and
social theory. In this respect, Scheffler quotes Hirst:
"there is a legitimate and familiar sense of theory in
which what is referred to is not scientific theory but
the composite set of beliefs that serves to organize

"30

and guide a given realm of practice. He continues

this line of reasoning by stating that:

In this sense, the concept of educational theory
is perfectly legitimate, but such theory is not

 

291bid., pp. 504-541.

30Paul H. Hirst, "Philosophy and Educational
Theory," British Journal of Educational Studies 12
(1963): 51-64 in Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op.
cit., p. 187.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

17

to be confused with scientific theory; it is com—
posed of diverse elements, and it includes philo-
sophical and normative components, in particu—
lar. . . . The advantage of such a construction

is that it recognizes not only the relative inde-
pendence of practical thought but the full divers-
ity of contributions to such thought. In particu-
lar, it recognizes 13m: relevance of general
doctrines of a philoso hical and ethical character
to educational theory. 1 (Scheffler's emphasis)

With respect to Schwab's argument against the
abstract nature of theory, Scheffler argues that abstrac-
tion is a condition of both the theoretical and the prac-
tical. "It is inconceivable," he argues, "that there
could be a theory which did not abstract." Moreover, he
continues:

Abstraction is not in any case peculiar to theory.
Even when we bring theory into connection with
particulars, our apprehension of the latter pro-
ceeds under certain aspects, rubrics, categories,
or concepts. Thus if abstraction is a vice of
theory, it is no less a vice of any form of
thought, inclusive of the practical.32

Within a purely theoretical framework, Scheffler
invokes the concept of "Practical Thought" in such a
manner that it may be viewed in one sense as a tool which
to some extent functions analogously to Schwab's use of
practical particularity (practical experiences). In

this respect, both of these writers are concerned with

bringing together the realms of theory and practice.

 

31
p. 187.
32

Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit.,

 

Ibid., p. 190.

18

Scheffler seems to suggest that such a synthesis is pos-
sible within a theoretical framework which emphasizes an
ethical component. His position is:

Practical Thought attempts to answer such quesions
as "How shall I act?" "What should be done?"

"What course of action ought to be followed?"

etc. . . . Practical Thought is concerned with the
guidance of action; but the expressions and formu-
lations in which it issues are to be distinguished
from the actual decisions or actions guided by
them. These expressions and formulations may, and
normally do, draw upon a wide variety of parent 33
sources in the scientific and humanistic fields?"

From the specific standpoint of a writer's
attempts to explain and/or interpret sets of beliefs
(the familiar sense of theory as used by Scheffler) he
seems to suggest that an eclectic approach (that is, a
plurality of theories) is not only legitimate; it is
desirable. He writes:

Schwab's emphasis on the plurality of theories
available is of the first importance, in my opin—
ion. From the point of View of application to
practice or indeed of explanation, the available
plurality simply provides greater resources than
are offered by a single theory. . . . In approach-
ing problems of explanation, interpretation, and
action, we ought surely to be ready to bring to
bear the totality of our intellectual resources,
at least in principle, and to override academic,
disciplinary, and traditional divisions.

The eclectic approach is not only characterized

in terms of a plurality of theoretical content, it also

 

33Ibid., pp. 188-189.

34Ibid., p. 191.

l9

involves, according to Schwab and Scheffler, some spe-
cific procedural functions. Schwab, categorizing the
eclectic mode as an aspect of what he calls the "eclectic
arts," indicates that it is a procedure which lies
between the purely theoretical realm and the purely
practical realm. The "eclectic arts," in Schwab's View,
"are arts by which we ready a theory for practical
use . . . [and] by which we discover and take practical
account of the distortions and limited perspective which
a theory imposes on its subject." The aim of the eclec-
tic arts, he continues, "is to reveal the particular
limitations of any given theory and to join different
theories in order to form a more appropriate tool for
application to problems of practice."35
Scheffler, on the other hand, in a response to
Schwab's "The Practical: Arts of the Eclectic," has
argued that a conceptual presentation which is within
the general framework of the eclectic is not necessarily
required to indicate that a given theory, or theoretical
framework, embodies distortions of reality relative to

36 In this respect, Scheffler argues

practical problems.
that since the truth of a theory is a "particular truth"
expressed by statements of a given theory in the language

which is appropriate to that theory, the eclectic need

 

35Schwab, op. cit., pp. 501—504.

36Scheffler, op. cit., pp. 190-191.

20

not imply that one theory is a falsification or distortion
of reality. Furthermore, he continues, no theory within
a given time frame, nor any generalization emerging from
characteristic methods of inquiry within a given area of
knowledge, can be said to possess, nor to encompass, the
totality of what is called "Truth."37
When Scheffler's argument is viewed in the con-
text of the education of the teacher, he seems to be say-
ing that the eclectic has a broader aim than that of
citing theoretical distortions. The implication that he
seems to suggest is that a plurality of theory (associated
with an eclectic approach) aims at providing the broadest
possible perspective (or repertoire) upon which the prac-
titioner can selectively draw when confronted with an
acutal practical, or simulated, teaching situation; more-
over, that it is the intent to achieve this aim which to
a great extent justifies the eclectic approach.38
The above rationales for an eclectic approach
have been cited as justification for the combinative aim
of the present study. This study does not, of course,

intend to treat such large questions as the definition of

"theory." Instead, the present work intends to proceed

 

37Ibid., p. 191.

38Scheffler, "University Scholarship and the Edu-
cation of Teachers," in Reason and Teaching, op. cit.,
pp. 82-94.

 

21

eclectically pursuant to the following methods and pro-

cedures.

Methods and Procedures

On the basis of the supporting rationales above,
the present study attempts to implement a conceptual,
eclectic, and discussion approach which aims at achieving
the two major objectives of the study: (1) to examine one
of Israel Scheffler's interpretations of a philosophical
model of teaching, with a View to extracting from this
model a component of communication; and (2) to complement
Scheffler's rational concept of teaching and communication
with a perceptual concept of listening, as the latter con-
cept (listening) may be seen to relate specifically to the
selected concepts of communication and teaching.

A review of literature-~cited in part in the above
supporting rationales, cited in a later section of the
present chapter (see below, pp.:24—37), and to be cited
more fully in Chapter II--suggests that philosophical and
communication components are important areas of emphasis
relative to the education of the teacher. The literature
also suggests that there is a need for increased under-
standing of these areas as they are seen to relate to
teaching.

The present writer attempts (a) to illuminate the

emphases and core commitments which may be presupposed in

22

Scheffler's interpretation of teaching; (b) to show the
relationships which may exist between Scheffler's rational
orientation and the perceptual orientation associated with
a listening concept; and (c) to accommodate the two sets
of concepts to each other on the basis of common elements
which may exist between them.

In an attempt to examine Scheffler's interpreta-
tion of a philosophical model of teaching, Chapter III
focuses on the following areas of presupposition:
(l) ethical obligation; (2) concepts of human rationality,
critical thought, the mind and its development; and
(3) perceptual concerns which are intimated by Scheffler
in his conceptual and composite explication of knowing
(and of teaching) "that something is the case."

In an attempt to facilitate the examination of
the above mentioned areas of presuppostion, Chapter III
raises two sub-questions which are designed to ascertain
(a) what it is that Scheffler might mean by "rationaltiy,"
a concept which is the central criterion of his conceptual
interpretation of teaching; and (b) on what bases might
one be able to assume that his criterion of "rationality"
has practical relevance to a "typical" classroom context.
In the broad context of educational theory, these ques—
tions would seem to suggest other questions about theor-

ies of intellectual development, such as those of Piaget,

23

Bruner, Dewey, and others.39 However, the present study
limits itself to: (a) the philosophical analysis of
Scheffler, and (b) the philosophical analysis of those
writers who, like Scheffler, have been concerned with a
philosophical and conceptual analysis of teaching.

The writers (identified by the present study)
who seem to meet the latter criteria include Gilbert Ryle,
R. S. Peters, and John Passmore. In addition to the
analysis of Scheffler, the analyses of these writers which
pertain to the areas of presupposition associated with
Scheffler's concept are used to provide support and addi—
tional clarification. An elaboration of the rationale
which underlies this eclectic borrowing of theories is
found in Chapter III, pages 104-110.

Chapter IV concerns itself with a delineation of
a concept of empathic listening as a complement to Schef-
1er's concept of "restrictions of manner." This chapter
emphasizes a perceptual aspect of the teaching concept to
which Scheffler alludes, but which he himself does not

explicitly emphasize.

 

39More extensive discussions of intellectual
development and relevant ideological perspective may be
found in the following works: William D. Rohwer, Jr.,
Paul R. Ammon, and Phebe Cramer, Understanding Intellec—
tual Development: Three Approaches to Theory and Prac-
tice (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1974); Norman R.
Bernier and Jack E. Williams, Beyond Beliefs: Ideologi-
cal Foundations of American Education, and by the same
authors Education for Liberation: Readings from an
Ideological Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973).

 

 

 

24

Limitations, Teacher Education Issues,
and Problem Statement

 

 

The present study is written from the perspec-
tive of a student of teacher education and as such has
certain important limitations.

First, although the study touches upon several
broad philosophical areas, it is specifically restricted
to a single aspect of Israel Scheffler's rational inter-
pretation of teaching. This interpretation Scheffler
calls the "restrictions of manner' associated with the
"standard activity-sense" of teaching. This standard
activity sense of teaching is a designation which has
been used by a group of writers, including Ryle, Smith,
Scheffler, Green, and others who have applied philosophi-
cal analysis to the study of a concept of teaching. What
distinguishes Scheffler's interpretation is the emphasis
he places on the "restrictions of manner," distinctions of
manner which limit, in his View, what is to count as
teaching activity. Not all writers concerned with philo-
sophical concepts of teaching agree with these emphasized
criteria. Smith, for example, and to some extent, Green,
as observed by Ronald Hyman, agree that the "standard"
sense of teaching denotes an "intentional" and "goal
oriented" use of the verb "to teach," but they do not
fully agree with Scheffler's additional restrictions on

the manner in which it is practiced. The present study

up

‘1
n

(1‘
(I;

‘~
5‘
'~

 

 

 

 

 

25

concerns itself with the latter's interpretation of
teaching as it is specifically revealed in the "restric—
tions of manner" idea. Central to these restrictions are
the criteria of rational explanation and critical dia-
logue.

Secondly, in its attempt to show a relationship
between Scheffler's concept of teaching and a perceptual
listening concept associated with communication and
teaching, the present study limits itself to a single
perceptual concept which has been called by such psycholo-
gists as Carl Rogers, Rollo May, and others, "empathic
listening." Here again, although the study hereby may
touch tangentially upon such broader domains as thera-
peutic counseling and a perceptual frame of reference
associated with psychology, the study does not extend to
any in-depth discussion of these areas.

A third area in which the study is restricted
concerns its overall approach. It is not an empirical
investigation, and it makes no empirical generalizations.
The study deals only with sets of theories which have
bearing on (a) Scheffler's concept of teaching, (b) con-
cepts of communication, and (c) their relationship to
the synthesizing concept of this study. All inferences
which are drawn in Chapters III and IV (the main body of

text) evolve from internal discussions,enuitheir aim is to

26

facilitate the clarification of the conceptual data, and
to achieve the two major objectives of the study. In
short, the present study is concerned with Practical
Thought, and it may be seen as an exercise in educational
criticism.

A fourth limitation of the study resides in its
attempt, through an examination of a single interpreta-
tion of teaching, to respond to only some of the critical
issues pertaining to the whole area of teacher education,
as these have been identified by educators and educational
critics. Insofar as the study limits itself to Schef-
fler's rational and normative interpretation of teaching
as an activity, it does not include, for example, discus-
sions and/or comparative analysis of behavioral and
discovery-learning models of teaching. From the stand-
point of the whole area of teacher education, the present
study makes a modest attempt to contribute to the area of
need cited above on page 3 and reiterated here for con-
venience:

The education of the teacher requires the broadest
possible perspective, a perspective which effects
a bringing together of the realms of theory and
practice with the View of developing more expe—
rienced teachers, in terms of the sorts of knowl-
edge they possess and the personal sensitivity
with which they approach the activity of teaching.

The following sub-sections attempt to provide

brief sketches of a few current issues of teacher

27

education which represent, according to some educational
thinkers, areas where explicitly emphasized foundational
perspectives have important bearings. In other words,
this section is concerned with some of the theoretical

and practical areas of teacher education. The areas
identified include such practical areas as clinical pro—
grams, the question of modeling, and the currently central
question of competency, and such theoretical areas as
personal and perceptual attitudes and orientations rela—

tive to the education of the teacher.

Clinical Experiences

One of the critical problems associated with the
curriculum and the education of the teacher, according to
Lembo, emanates from the area of clinical programs. In
some institutions, clinical experiences are not provided
for the trainee until the senior year, and there is, Lembo
claims, too often a tendency to disCourage the trainee's
taking a critical look at the realities of the classroom

40 Frequently, he says, there is no organized

situation.
effort which allows for critical analysis through discus-
sion, media presentations, simulation, role playing, or

the stimuli of actual experiences.

 

40John M. Lembo, Why Teachers Fail (Columbus,
Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1971),
p..93.

4lIbid.

 

28

Moreover, others have observed a tendency within
institutions to avoid or ignore "new developments" in
the field which have potentials for offering clinical
experiences to the trainee. A 1972 report of COOper and
Sadker, for example, indicates that such relatively new
developments as "field-centered instruction," "early
field experiences," "micro-teaching," and "simulation"
activities are not being offered on a significant scale
by institutions which have been accredited by the
National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Educa-
tion (NCATE). The Cooper-Sadker report indicates that
among these institutions, micro-teaching, for example,
was not used at a rate of 47 percent, with occasional use
at a rate of 29 percent. For simulation, the rates were

22 percent non-use, and 35 percent occasional use.42

Deve10ping a Modeling Rela—
tionship Between Teacher
and Student

 

Another author, Thomas Gordon, whose work
includes the training of teachers in interpersonal commu-
nication, suggests that there is often, in effect, a
failure in teacher education programs to develop those

kinds of personal excellences which must be nurtured

 

42James M. Cooper and David Sadker, "Current
Trends in Teacher Education," Journal of Teacher Educa-
tion 3 (1972): 316.

29

within the context of a "modeling relationship" between
teacher and student. This effect was observed at higher
education and high school levels. The problem here,
according to Gordon and others, has a twofold nature:

(a) though personal goals for students (such as independ-
ence, responsibility, self-direction, self-determination,
self-control, self—evaluation), may be suggested by the
curriculum content, nevertheless, in actual interaction
between teacher and student, there exists, in effect, a
contradiction between such theory and real practice;

(b) the skills and methods needed to foster such develop-
ment in children are frequently not taught at the teacher
preparation level (for example, theory accompanied by
practice in problem-solving, critical thinking, handling
of confrontation and opposing views, and providing an
atmosphere within the activity of teaching which is con-

ducive to such interaction.)43

Competency-Based Teacher
Education

 

A third area which has been the focus of much
current literature on teacher education relates to the
setting and interpretation of criteria relative to the

selection and evaluation of teaching competence. The

 

43Thomas Gordon (with Noel Burch), TET: Teacher
Effectiveness Training (New York: Peter H. Wyden, Pub—
lisher, 1974), pp. 7—8.

 

30

critical issue of "competence" is one which continues to
be seriously considered throughout the United States, and
extensive investments are being made in its behalf.
Indeed, the current scene in teacher education in the
United States may be said to be characterized by a move-
ment toward "competency-based teacher education."

This movement has specific relevance to the pres-
ent study in that the"competency" trend in teacher educa-
tion recognizes and claims to be responding to the above
mentioned concerns of this study: a need for a broadened
perspective which would effect a bringing together of
theory and practice with the View of developing more
experienced teachers, in terms of the sorts of knowledge
possessed and a personally sensitive approach relative to
teaching activity. Certain goals set forth in the present
study are also the suggested goals of the "competency-
based" movement. It is particularly in the area of means
that emphases differ: the present study emphasizes con-
ceptual amplification whereas competency—based approaches
tend to emphasize operational analysis.

Competency-based programs are not yet altogether
standardized across the several agencies--cities, states,
departments of education, colleges and universities-—by
which they are implemented. Nevertheless, there are

certain associated elements and emphases which suggest a

31

common response to the theory-practice question outlined
above. For example, many proponents of the competency-
based concept emphasize the interdisciplinary "pooling

44 The concept of a

of . . . talents and enthusiasms."
"consortium" is suggested as a means of assessing the
needs of a given locality: providing access to the
social and economic influences of a community; solicit-
ing the cooperation of, and fostering a partnership with,
the local school systems, the colleges and universities,
parents, students, and the state department of education
toward the aim of strengthening the prospecitve teaching
professional.

Another medium with which the competency-based
concept is associated is the American form of the notion
of "teacher centers" (that is, American versions of
teacher centers, as they may be distinguished from the
original British versions): an essentially in-service
phenomenon which provides re—training, up-dating of edu—
cational practices and methodologies, and/or staff devel—

opment.45

 

44William L. Smith, "First Steps First," Comp -
tency-Based Teacher Education: Progress, Problems, and
Prospects, ed. W. Robert Houston and Robert B. Howsam
(Chicago: Science Research Associates, Inc., 1972),
pp. 172-173.

45Allen A. Schmieder and Stephen Holowenzak,
"Consortia," same source as above, pp. 75—101; See also
Marilyn Hapgood,eai.Supporting the Learning Teacher: A
Source Book for Teacher Centers (New York: Agathon Press,
1973), p. 14.

 

 

32

Changes in, and flexibilities of, faculty roles
at higher education levels represent another notion Which
is associated with the CBTE concept. Such titles as
"clinic" professor, or "field professor," "teaching
counselor," "learning resource director," and various pro-
fessional "specialists“ have been suggested by this move-
ment as indicative of changes in function and post of
operation. For example, the curriculum specialists,
field professor, and teaching counselor work coopera-’
tively in such roles as "arrangers, demonstrators, pre-
scribers, evaluators, and diagnosticians" within the
local school environment. Specialists, counselors, and
student teachers concentrate, at a given time, on such
activities as micro-teaching feedback, on teaching strate-
gies and content, on interpersonal relations feedback,
and on student concerns relative to the micro—teaching
situation.46

CBTE also claims a responsiveness, through the
"affective domains" of its programs, to the specific
problems of the personal sensitivity of the trainee. The
affective area of objectives takes into account such
affective components as "attitudes, values, beliefs, and

"47

relationships. J. Bruce Burke, for example, has noted

 

46Howard L. Jones, "Implementation of Programs,"
Competency-Based Teacher Education, above, pp. 116—122.

 

47Howsam and Houston, "Change and Challenge,"
Competency Based Teacher Education, above, p. 7.

33

in this respect that "technology," which is central to
the CBTE conceptualization, "serves as the facilitator"
of such ends as "personal accountability,“ "human
choice," and "personal interaction among individuals and
within groups."48 Noting that heretofore the teacher has
been ill-prepared for the contemporary social make-up of
the classroom, Burke suggests that CBTE can facilitate
improvement in this area.49 In addition to the area of
"exploratory objectives" which provide the trainee with
opportunities to experience and to observe, for example,
the neighborhoods from which the student population is
drawn, Burke has specified certain personal and affective
competencies which are "fostered by a competency-based
program." He writes:

Competency in role versatility, tolerance for ad

hoc structures, capacity for autonomous judgment

--in short, the ability to cope with any situation

that may arise--these are the basic personal com—

petencies fostered by a competency-based program.

Underlying these role skills and supporting their

effectiveness are the affective skills of empathy,

respect, and concern for children as people. 0

The CBTE concept, in sum, embodies certain char-

acteristic content emphases and goals in its response to

the identified needs observed in the present study. The

 

48J. Bruce Burke, "Curriculum Design," Competency-
Based Teacher Education, above, p. 44.

49

 

Ibid., p. 45.

50Ibid.

I

34

CBTE "orientation," write Schmieder and Holowenzak,
includes: "individualized and personalized instruction,
modularized curricula, emphasis on technology and sys—
tems, use of the behavior—modification laboratory, and
field experiences.51 CBTE's five broad domains, accord—
ing to Howsam and Houston, include the objectives and
corresponding criteria of cognition, performance, conse—
quence, affect, and exploration.52

The impetus of this movement is being felt cur—
rently throughout this country because of the experimenta-
tion, implementation, and speculative literature which
emanates from such universities as Michigan State;
Houston; Wisconsin (Madison); Teachers College, Columbia;
Georgia (Athens); Brigham Young; Indiana (Bloomington);
and certain state colleges, for example, Weber at Utah,
San Fernando Valley, and Southwest Minnesota. Moreover,
the movement has been encouraged and generously supported
by such agencies as the United States Office of Education,
the National Advisory Committee on Performance-Based
Teacher Education of the American Association of Colleges

of Teacher Education, the National Council for the

 

51Schmieder and Holowenzak, op. cit., p. 93.

52Howsam and Houston, "Change and Challenge,"
Comptency-Based Teacher Education, above, pp. 6-7.

fi

35

Accreditation of Teacher Education, and the National

Association of Teacher Educators.53

Personal and Perceptual
Aspects

Accompanying the widespread positive attention
which is being given to the CBTE concept and the actions
of its advocates, there is another group of writers who
differ with its definition of "competency" and its corre-
sponding priorities. The claim is often made in this
respect that there is in teacher education an imbalance
in priorities and values relative to the notion of "compe-
tence," and that the "personal," or perceptual, aspect is
often circumvented in actual practice. Cogan, for

example, has emphasized three particular areas in which

____________________
53Schmieder and Holowenzak, loc. cit.; See also
Hapgood, ed. Supporting the Learning Teacher: A Source
Book for Teacher Centers, above, pp. 1—25, and entire .
work; see also Donald J. McCarty and Associates, New
Perspectives on Teacher Education (San Francisco:—_3ossey—
Bass Publishers, 1973), pp. 15—17, 90—92, 127, 152, 179,

183, 240; Bruce Joyce, "Conceptions of Man and Their

Pt. II, ed. Kev1n Ryan (Ch1cago: University of Chicago
Press, 1975), pp. 134-144; N. L. Gage, and Philip H.
Winne, "Performance—Based Teacher Education," same source
above, pp. 146-172; Robert N. Bush,andPeter Enemark,
"Control and Responsibility in Teacher Education (The
Future of Certification," same source as above, pp. 285—
286.

36

the contemporary teacher needs competence: (l) compe-
tence to teach creativity; (2) competence to teach suc-
cessfully in an open school; and (3) competence to teach
the culturally disadvantaged. In this respect he enumer-
ates the following respective areas of competence:

(1) a theoretical orientation; a tolerance for com-
plexity; a capacity for creative thinking; a search-
ing, inquiring attitude; a low motivation for
controlling children; courage; a capacity to provide
love, assistance, and protection; an interest in
intellectual activity and problem-solving; and an
introspective preoccupation with private psycholo—
gical, spiritual, aesthetic, or metaphysical expe-
riences.

(2) an interst in knowing pupils as individuals;
an ability to establish a relationship of mutual
trust and respect; a low need for coercion and
punishment; an ingenuity in providing materials
for students; a competence in leading and shaping
discussions, and an ability to encourage and aid
pupils involved in individual and small group
tasks.

(3) concern and "caring" for students; readiness
to build self-respect and trust; and an ability
to accept feelings as facts.54

Present inadequacies of this "personal" aspect

within the curriculum of teacher education are seen by

Lembo as evolving from the tendency to emphasize the

 

54Morris L. Cogan, "Current Issues in the Educa-
tion of Teachers," NSSE, op. cit., pp. 226—227; See also
E. Paul Torrance, Rewarding Creative Behavior (Englewood
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 78-79;
see also John Blackie, Inside the Primary School (London:
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1967), pp. 37-39; See
also Hilda Taba, and Deborah Elkins, Teaching Strategies
for the Culturally Disadvantaged (Chicago: Rand McNally
and Company, 1966), pp. 265-266; See also Gordon J. Klopf,
and Garda W. Bowman, Teacher Education in a Social Con-
text (New York: Mental Health Materials Center, 1966),
pp. 286-287.

 

 

37

"technology of teaching" (that is, the identification,
planning, provision and assessment of appropriate learn-
ing opportunities), to the exclusion of matters related
to the "art of teaching" (that is, the creation of a psy-
chological climate which is conducive to learning, experi—
mentation and the understanding and constructive employ—
ment of personal and interpersonal behavior).55
The conclusion which Lembo reaches with respect

to the need to bring into balance the art and the tech—
nology of teaching is also indicated in a statement made
by Israel Scheffler, whose concept of teaching is the
major focus of this study. The preparation of the pro-
spective or the teaching professional is "strengthened,"
writes Scheffler:

Not simply through an increased mastery of pro—

cedures, but through a development of his resources

for carrying on a significant conversation with

the young; that is to say, through a widening of

his intellectual perspectives, a quickening of his

imaginative and critical powers, and a deepening of

insight into his purposes as a teacher and the

nature of the setting in which these purposes are

pursued.56
Interim Summary

A summary of the above introductory discussion

might be formulated as follows. First, the question of

 

55Lembo, op. cit., pp. 83—84.

6Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching (New York:
The Bobbs—Merrill Company, Inc.,Il973), pp. 87—88.

38

a properly broadened perspective in teacher education is
obviously not yet finally resolved. Moreover, such a
resolution would seem to be dependent upon who defines,
and what definitions one gives, to the question of what
constitutes a "broadened perspective." Secondly, the
question of how best to bring together theory and prac-
tice with the view of developing more experienced teach-
ers in terms of the sort of knowledge possessed and
personal sensitivity in approach is also not yet resolved.
In this instance the resolution of the question would
seem to be dependent upon what answers are given to the
underlying question of what should constitute the content
of, and approach to, the study of educational practice.

Proponents of a competency-based approach, pro-
ponents of an interpersonal relationship emphasis, and
proponents of a theoretical and foundational orientation
all agree on certain goals, but they differ on content
emphasis and the means of achieving the agreed upon goals.
Moreover, they not infrequently disagree on the definie
tions of terms which are connected with their various
emphases.

The present study does not pretend to resolve
those complex issues, such as the above, which currently
confront the field of teacher education; it does intend,

however, to make a modest attempt to grapple with some

 

39

aspects of the problems. With respect to the problem of
bringing together theory and practice, the study focuses
upon an author whose work on a teaching concept has been
described as an "extension into the practical of the the-'
oretical" through the use of a descriptive approach and

57 With respect to the problem of

ethical statements.
knowledge depth and personal sensitivity, the present
study is guided by the recommendations of a certain group
of writers who have been concerned with philosophical and
foundational aspects of teaching. A recommendation of
the latter authors is that the curriculum of teacher edu—
cation should be characterized, centrally, by such ele-
ments as (1) an interdisciplinary perspective (that is,
subject matter, critical procedures, and research within
the humanities and the behavioral sciences, together with
an understanding of their direct relationship to educa—

tional practice and theory);58 (2) an orientation which is

scholarly and rationally conceived and implemented;59 and

(3) a sensitivity to cultural diversity in persons, and a

 

57Elizabeth Flower, "Elizabeth Flower on The Lan—
gpage of Education by Israel Scheffler," Studies in Phil-
osophy and Education 4 (Spring 1965): 124.

58Joe Park, "Toward Reconstructing Schools and
Departments of Education," Educational Theory 13 (1973):
108-118 and 114—115.

59Israel Scheffler, "University Scholarship and
the Education of Teachers," Teachers College Record 70
(1968): 1-12.

 

 

 

40

commitment to the "enlargement of human powers.“60

Rationales for such recommendations can be found in the
works of Scheffler, Brameld, Schwab, and many others who
have been concerned with the philosophical and founda-
tional aspects of teaching. The following quotation from
Schwab is one illustration of such an underlying ration-
ale:
The problems of education arise from exceedingly
complex actions, reactions, and transactions of
men. These doings constitute a skein of myriad
threads which know no boundaries separating, say
economics from politics, or sociology from psy—
chology. . . . Yet our fullest and most reliable
knowledge of these matters is not knowledge of the
web as a whole. It is knowlege of various shreds
and sections of the whole, each shred and section
out of connection with other shreds and sections.61
Hence, the present study, pursuant to the above
mentioned concerns, recommendations, and rationales,
attempts to do some webbing. It attempts to draw a few
shreds into fresh and new connections with one another.
It attempts to implement an eclectic approach, and a
particular interdisciplinary perspective relative to a
single fundamental area of a teaching concept. Through

its examinations of principal areas of presupposition in

Scheffler's rational "restrictions of manner," and a

 

60Thomas Howell and Nobuo Shimahara, "Educational
Foundations: Contributions at Undergraduate Level,"
Teachers College Record 71 (1969): 208—209; See also
Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., p. 92.

61Joseph Schwab,"The Practical: Arts of Eclec—
tic," School Review 79 (August 1971): 501.

 

 

41

complementary perceptual concept of listening (both of
which have been associated with teaching), the study
attempts to effect a particular interdisciplinary, con-
ceptual, foundational perspective which may be deemed
important in terms of its potential for contributing to

a broader view of the education of teachers.

Definitions of Key Terms

 

The following alphabetical list of definitions is
representative of certain general terms which are found
within the study. Other more specific definitions are
included as part of the presentation of Chapters III and

IV.

Affect (emotion).—-A general concept which indi-
cates a reference to such terms as attitudes, feelings,

moods.62

Communication.--In the general sense, or everyday
usage, it is indicative of an exchange between persons
which might be verbal and/or nonverbal; and the conveying
of a message from one person to another, whether or not
the actual message is received by the person, or persons,
for whom it is intended. Louise Berman's definition is

particularly indicative of the personal (or perceptual)

 

62C. H. Patterson, Humanistic Education (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice—Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 14.

42

concept of communication which is employed, though not
exclusively employed, within the present study: an
exchange which presupposes a disposition or willingness
to speak and to listen. It entails more than the trans-
mission of information from one person to another; it

involves the mutual "sharing of pers0na1 meaning."63

Conceptual.--Dealing with selected sets of con-
cepts, ideas, their meanings, and their interrelation-
ships, as they may be seen specifically to relate to
Israel Scheffler's interpretation of teaching, communi-
cation, a perceptual concept of listening, and the synthe-
sizing concept of this study ("Teaching as Communica-
tion"). Thus defined, this term presupposes no connection
with the specialized notion of "conceptual analysis," a
method which has been used by analytic philosophers such

as Scheffler, R. S. Peters, Gilbert Ryle, and others.64

Dialogue.-—A verbal exchange between persons, the
contribution and sharing of ideas; also used in the same
context with the term "discussion," implying the same

type of exchange with more than one other person.

 

63Louise M. Berman, New Priorities in the Cur—
riculum (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing
Company, 1968), PP. 45—47.

64James Gribble, Introduction to Philosophy of
Education (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969), pp. 3-4.

 

43

Feelings.--Aspects of the "emotion" concept, such
as anger, trust, fear, which involve cognitive appraisals
of oneself, and of objects and situations of one's envi—
ronment; manifestations of mental activity (Peters,
1966).65 From the perceptual frame of reference: terms
depicting the perception of oneself, the perception of
the situation in which one is involved and the interrela—
tionship between one's perception of himself and his per-
ception of the situation in which he is involved (Combs

and Snygg, 1959).66

Interactions.-—The relationship between per-

sons . 67

Interpersonal.-—A concept relating to the area of
social relationship: the quality of relationship which
takes into account attitudes, feelings, moods, personal
reactions to oneself, to other persons in the general
social environment and in the classroom environment in

particular.68

 

65R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education (London:
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1966), pp. 111—112.

66Authur W. Combs and Donald Snygg, Individual
Behavior: A Perceptual Approach to Behavior (New York:
Harper and Row Publishers, 1959), p. 232.

67Carl R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn (Columbus,
Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969),
p. 32.

 

68Ibid., p. 106.

44

Interpersonal CommunicatiOn.—-An exchange between

 

persons which requires an extra aspect of personal sensi—
tivity to persons so engaged, and a sensitivity to the
situational context in which the exchange takes place;
simple talk and listening which requires, or might
require, for its optimal effectiveness some specialized

training.69

Listening.--A concept which is indicative of the
dual aspects of hearing and the intent to understand the
thoughts and feelings of another. Hearing which avoids
judgment, diagnosis, appraisal, or the evaluation of per-
sons; concentrated hearing which seeks clarification of

the thoughts, feelings, values, beliefs of another.70

Persona1.--A concept which is indicative of a
reference to the frame of reference of perceptual psy-
chology. The latter is based on the principle that
behavior, or human action, is explained and understood

from the frame of reference of the behaving and perceiv-

. . . . .71 .
ing 1nd1v1dual. The totality of external and internal

 

69Gordon, op. cit., pp. 3—4.

70Rogers, op. cit., pp. 225—226.

71Combs and Snygg, op. cit., p. 11; See also
Arthur Combs, et a1., A Perceptual View of Effective
Teaching," Second Edition The Professional Education of
Teachers: A Humanistic Approach to Teacher Preparation
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1974), pp. 11-28.

45

factors operating at a given time which constitute the
point of view of the person acting, and which mutually
determine the nature of actions and judgment. The par—
ticular patterning of the perceptual network is a function

‘ . . . 72
of personal exper1ence and soc1o-cultural influences.

Practical Thought.--A concept which suggests that

 

a given text or context embodies discourse which is, in a
‘general and fundamental sense, associated with ethical

and social considerations relative to human beings. It
relates to the serious asking of the question: "What
ought one to do," or "How ought one proceed?" It is based
on the assumption that there are reasons which can be

stated for what is to be done.73

Rational.—-A concept of "thought" which presup-
poses the norm of impartiality in the giving and the con-
sideration of reasons (evidence), for knowledge claims,
beliefs, and/or actions. In the general sense, it con-
notes general intelligence, the use and/or exertion of

wit.74 In relation to Practical Reason, it involves

 

72C. M. Fleming, Teaching: A Psychological Analy-
sis (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1958), p. 81.

73Peters, op. cit., pp. 180—182, 208—216.

74Gilbert Ryle, "A Rational Animal," Education
and the Development of Reason, eds., R. F. Dearden,
P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1972), pp. 184-187.

 

46

moral and social principles of conduct and delibera—

75 Relative to Theoretical Reason, it involves

tion.
propositional knowledge, amfloperating with and from propo-
sitions according to principles of deliberation, or

objective rules of critical procedure.76

Standard Activity-Sense of Teaching.-—A proced-

 

ural (practice-oriented) and fundamental concept of teach-
ing which is intentional (involving trying) and oriented
toward the goal of some sort of student learning. This

is a designation which has been employed by writers such
as Green, Smith, Scheffler, Peters, and others who have
been concerned with a philosophical analysis of teaching
as an activity. A third criterion of this concept is
found in Scheffler's interpretation of teaching (the
"restrictions of manner") which entails "rational explana-
tion" and "critical dialogue;" these are the rules by
which teaching, from Scheffler's perspective, is to pro—
ceed and learning (knowledge achievement) is to be

obtained.77

Theory.—-A concept, in its familiar and compre-
hensive sense, which entails a "composite set of beliefs
that serves to organize and guide a given realm of prac—

tice." It is associated with the realm of educational

 

75Ryle, op. cit., p. 178

76Ibid.

77Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., p. 67.

 

47

theory and practice, and entails within its scope philo—

sophical and normative components.78

Concluding Statement of
the Problem

 

The problem of the study is reflected in two
questions:

1. What are the major areas of presupposition in
Israel Scheffler's conceptual interpretation of teaching
(that is, the "restrictions of manner") which make
explicit reference to the centrality of a communication
concept, and which might be seen as intimating a percep-
tual concern with respect to teaching and communication?

2. What perceptual component of communication
relative to teaching might be said to complement Schef—
fler's rational interpretation of teaching, given the
particular emphases which appear to be presupposed in
his "restrictions of manner" relative to teaching?

These central questions form the bases of Chap-
ter III and IV. Within these chapters the conceptual,
eclectic, and discussion approaches mentioned above are
implemented in an attempt to arrive at a synthesizing
definition of the concept of "Teaching as Communication."
Chapter II sets forth theoretical backgrounds for the
discussion in Chapters III and IV. The final chapter

(Chapter V) suggests some of the implications which the

 

78Ibid., p. 187.

48

synthesizing concept might have for the area of teacher
education.

It is important to point out, in summary, that
the ideas and ideals, the criteria or rules, which are
dealt with in this study in connection with Scheffler's
interpretation of a teaching concept are likely to sug-
gest critical, philosophical, and educational questions
with which many educators, educational theorists, teach—
ers, and students have taken, and would take, serious
issue. Although it is not within the scope of the pres-
ent work to examine the arguments which are in oppositon
to Scheffler's concept, it does seem reasonable to suggest
that such objections raised in other contexts (such as,
in a subsequent study, or in classroom discussion between
students and teacher educators) might exemplify one of
the benefits which could issue from a study such as the
present one. In such contexts, the study could be sub-
jected to the criticism of serious students of teacher
education (a) who would concern themselves with further
discussion of a philosophical concept of teaching; and
(b) who would concern themselves with bringing to bear
relevant evidence for and against the conceptual data
which are presented within this work.

For the present, the discussions to be engaged

in within the main body of this work are concentrated

49

upon the above mentioned examination of what appears to
be principal areas of presupposition in Scheffler's
interpretation of teaching. When viewed from an overall
perspective, this study may be seen as an attempt, while
concentrating upon one concept of teaching, to facilitate
further clarification and understanding by freshly recom-

bining selected conceptual elements into new patterns.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE STUDY

Introduction

This chapter contains an abbreviated review of
related literature. Its specific function is to identify
the theoretical backgrounds which would appear to be par-
ticularly relevant to the study of a fundamental concept
of teaching.

The previous chapter sought to establish a con—
nection between this study and the area of teacher educa-
tion, and to identify the interpretation of teaching
which this study attempts to examine. The need state-
ment, cited on pages 3 and 26 above, sought to stabilize
the above connection. The suggestion was made that the
present study represents a modest attempt to respond to
the need for the broadest possible perspective in the
education of the teacher, a perspective which would take
into account (a) the question of a synthesis of theory and
practice, and correlatively, (b) the question of knowledge
depth and personal sensitivity.

The interrelated suggestions which emerged from
Chapter I are the following. First, the study of a con-
cept of teaching may have implications not only for the

50

 

 

 

51

understanding and clarification of teaching activity--
such study may also have implications for larger issues
associated with cultural, social, and curricular con-
texts. Secondly, the study of a teaching concept may be
seen as one aspect of a larger foundational perspective
associated with the education of the teacher. Thirdly,
such a perspective would (ideally) emphasize, according
to the recommendations of the previous chapter, cross-
disciplinary content and critical procedure. This per-
spective would exemplify and encourage orientations which
are scholarly and rational, and which are culturally and
socially sensitive. Fourthly, a combined foundational
and philOSOphical approach to the study of teaching may
represent one type of response to the need for a broadened
perspective in the education of the teacher.

The present chapter attempts further to amplify
these points and to provide a detailed account based on
professional literature of (a) relevant foundational
backgrounds which seem to be intimated in the above sug-
gestions; and (b) relevant background associated with the
above mentioned philosophical concept of teaching. The
first section of this chapter discusses: (1) a familiar
interdisciplinary foundations course concept; (2) a foun-
dational type of analytic seminar which emphasizes appli-

cation and occupational concerns relative to teaching;

52

and (2) relationships between the former (conceptual con-
text) and the restricted interpretation of teaching
(Israel Scheffler's "restrictions of manner") which the

study attempts to examine in particular.

Part One: Foundational Perspective

 

This section delineates three aspects of the
foundational perspective: (a) a familiar interdisciplin-z
ary foundational course concept; (b) a foundational type
seminar which focuses on analysis related to professional
(application and occupational) concerns; and (c) a foun-
dational type seminar which focuses on analysis and '
introspection relative to the personal sensitivity of the
student of teacher education.

A Familiar Foundations
Course Concept

 

 

A foundational perspective is most readily
revealed in a concept of a foundations course; sometimes
called social and philOSOphical foundations. This con-
cept suggests, according to some writers, a broad inter-
disciplinary content which draws upon the resources of

the entire university: the sciences and humanities, the

.generalists and specialists, the educational scholars

and scholars within the traditional disciplines who are

interested in the problems of education.1 It is

 

1John A. Laska, "Current Progress in the Founda-
tions of Education," Teachers College Record 71 (1969):
199.

 

53

essentially a liberal concept of education (that is, as
it is viewed in terms of a characteristic breadth of con-
tent and critical procedure) whose central purposes are
said to include the "academic" study of the educative
process and the school as a fundamental societal institu-
tion, and the encouragement of increased integration of
the field of educational studies (a course format which
evinces an integration of parent disciplines, subject
matter areas and methods, and their combined influence
on educational theory and practice).2
A foundations perspective, particularly a founda-
tions course concept, has been discussed in the litera—
ture from many and various points of emphasis. Writers
do not always agree on such aspects as the particular
depth and breadth of content; nor do they always agree on
I a rationale which would underlie all of the suggested
content emphases; nor is there agreement on which faculty
(the education faculty, the faculties of the parent dis-
ciplines, or a combination of these) is to teach the sug-

gested content.3 However, in terms of its relevancy to

 

2Ibid.

3William 0. Stanley, "The Dilemma of Education,"
Education and Social Integration (New York: Teachers
College Columbia University, 1963), pp. 118-136; See also
Harry S. Broudy, "The Role of the Foundational Studies in
the Preparation of Teachers," Improving Teacher Education
in the United States, ed. Stanley Elam (Bloomington,
Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, Incorporated, 1967), pp. 1-33.
See also Theodore Brameld, Education for the Emerging
Age: New Ends and Stronger Means (New York: Harper and

 

54

the preparation of teachers, there is a consistent impli-
cation that the prospective teacher needs--indeed his
"qualifications" for teaching is, according to some
writers, in large portion dependent upon his possession
of—-a substantive theoretical orientation, which may be
offered through a foundations course in teacher educa-
tion.4 According to such writers as Stanley, Brameld,
Howell and Shimahara, such a theoretical orientation
would (ideally) include: (1) an approach which is schol-
arly, rational and/or academic; (2) content which is
thoroughly interdisciplinary with particular emphasis on
a philosophical component; (3) an intermingling of the
approach and content (above) and the theory, history,
patterns, and/or dynamics of the larger culture; and (4)
the synthesis and clarification of all of the above rela-
tive to teaching practice and the entire educational
enterprise.5
From the standpoint of its approach and content,

the foundational course has been conceptualized as

 

Brothers, 1961), Parts I and II, pp. 21-141; See also
Brameld, Cultural Foundations of Education: An Inter—
disciplinary Exploration (New York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers), pp. 191-273.

4

 

Ibid.

5Ibid., See also Thomas Howell and Nobuo Shima-
hara, "Educational Foundations: Contributions at Under-
graduate Level," Teachers College Record 71 (1969): 207-
216.

 

55

"academic," which suggests, according to Lucas, that its
primary emphasis is on the impartation and the achieve-
ment of knowledge without an explicit regard for the
utilization of knowledge--its practical and occupational
application.6 Such a description is capable of evoking
serious objections, given the pervasively practical (or
applied) orientation which is also often associated with
teacher education. The purpose here, however, is not to
engage in argument for or against this "academic" con-
ceptualization, such as the one described by Christopher
Lucas, for example. Instead, the present purpose, as is
the case with this entire section on foundational per-
spective, is to illustrate the type of foundational per-
spective (its emphases and rationales) which were
intimated in Chapter I.

To illustrate this point, one might reflect upon
Scheffler's justification of "desirability" as the basis
upon which he advocates the inclusion of theoretical
study and scholarly inquiry in the education of the
teacher (cited in part in Chapter I). Scheffler's con-
ception in this respect is consistent with the emphases
of Lucas and other writers who are proponents of the
foundational course concept which is presently being

described. Scheffler's arguments presuppose a particular

 

6Christopher Lucas, "A Teapot in the Tempest,"
Teachers_College Record 73 (1972): 581.

56

concept of the "education of teachers." In Reason and

 

Teaching, he writes as follows:
We . . . conceive of the education of teachers
not simply as the training of individual class-
room performers, but as the development of a
class of intellectuals vital to a free society.
Lucas holds that foundational work should be at
the heart of the education of the teacher. This work

would entail, in his opinion, giving primary attention

to the "creation and impartation of a broadly-based per-

 

spective on educational concerns.8 While Lucas does not
exclude the performance aspect of teacher education, as

is also the case with Scheffler's position, neither does
he emphasize it. Lucas takes the position that the prepa-
ration of the teacher should alter its priorities in
termscfif"discrete task performance skills" replacing this
emphasis with the emphasis on a "broadly-based understand-
ing of education as an academic field of inquiry."9

Broudy has referred to this particular emphasis as a

"general interpretative" aspect of professional studies.10

 

7Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching (New York:
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973), p. 92.

8Lucas, 100. cit.

9Ibid.

10Harry S. Broudy, "The Role of the Foundational
Studies in the Preparation of Teachers," Improving
Teacher Education in the United States, ed. Stanley Elam
(Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, Incorporated,
1967), pp. 12-22.

 

57

Underlying this view is the rationale that the
foundations course can, in View of its characteristically
interdisciplinary content and its commitment to critical
thought and responsible inquiry, effect in the teacher a
pervasive change in outlook--an occurrence which is con—
sidered by such thinkers as Scheffler, Peters, and_others
to be a central criterion of what is meant by "being edu-
cated."ll Israel Scheffler argues, in this respect, that
such a course can effect "an enlargement of the intellec-
tual context within which the teacher views his work"
and an encouragement for the teacher "to attain a more
rational insight into his task."12

The areas of content associated with the founda-
tional concept range from the general to the specific.
Broudy, Brameld, and others include studies in psychology
(also psychiatry, social psychology, and other divisions),
sociology, anthropology, economics, history, philosophy,
art, and political science. At a deeper level, and
extending the duration of teacher preparation, Brameld
includes major divisions of a general history of philos-

Ophy (ontology, the study of reality; epistemology, the

study of knowledge; and axiology, the study of value),

 

llR. S. Peters, The Concept of Education (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970).

12Israel Scheffler, "University Scholarship and
the Education of Teachers," Teachers College Record, 70
(1968): 12.

58

and.the relationship between the various aspects of phi-
losophy and the behavioral sciences, the humanities, and
education as a field in itself.13
Broudy and Brameld have set forth comprehensive

designs for the content of teacher education which reflect
distinctive areas of justification in terms of the teacher
as professional and the teacher as a citizen of culture,
respectively. Among the three areas of Broudy's design
is included what he calls the "general interpretive," or
"general professional" studies (that is, histories of
philosophy, education, and cultural history; philosophy
of education and aesthetic education). He maintains that
such studies are not justified on the basis of the per-
sonal character and development of the teacher; they "are
essential to being a first-rate professional, not to a
scholar as scholar not to a craftsman . . ."

They are essential for the understanding and

interpretation of the educational enterprise

as a whole as well as of one's Speciality.

Although they are not used applicatively, they

are not on that account useless.14

Brameld's design, on the other hand, takes into

account a broader area of justification. It also

requires an extension of the duration of teacher prepara-

tion. In his four-area design (general education,

 

l3Broudy, op. cit., p. 12; See also Brameld,
Education for the Emerging_Age, Op. cit., p. 202.

14Broudy, op. cit., p. 22.

59

specialized knowledge, practice, and unifying theory),
Brameld maintains a pervasive intermingling of educael
tional philosophy, and a constant emphasis on the history,
theory, processes, dynamics and patterns of culture. He
proposes a nine or ten year preparation period which
includes two four-year periods of general education, and
the knowledge-practice-theory programs, respectively, and
one or two additional years of internship.15
The justification for this design relates to

Brameld's concern with the stabilization and clarifica-
tion of belief relative to the individual teacher, and
to the larger cultural context. He maintains that:

We are no longer certain as to what our governing

beliefs are or should be. . . . [and there exists]

deep-seated maladjustments of contemporary culture

that are responsible for the necessity of restor-

ing an active philosophy—education partner-.

ship. . . . [Even more] Culture is the key to a

new and vital approach pg education [and] human

relations are the proper and central theme 9:

education (Bremeld's emphasis).l6

Brameld's explicit concern with the condition of

culture and the corresponding responsibilities of educa-
tion is a concern which has also been emphasized over the
past two decades in such writings as those of Stanley,

Benne, Howell and Shimahara. Benne, for example, has

warned that:

 

15Brameld, op. cit., pp. 197—202.

l6Brameld, op. cit., p. 205 and pp. 131-141.

60

Human society is today in a state of crisis, in
transition from one cultural system of fundamental
order to some other. An order of relationships
between life conditions, institutions, and a sys-
tem of ideas, ideals, an order linking these fac-
tors, in some semblance of meaningful and livable
integration, has been challenged deeply. No via-
ble new order has succeeded in establishing itself.
The disorder of contemporary culture is not con-
fined to the human middle ground of political
economy, but penetrates also to the human micro-
comos. Men everywhere confront the basic ques—
tions, "Who am I?" and "What model of 'right'
interpersonal relations should guide my reac-.
tions with other men?"7 (Benne's emphases)

 

Stanley has suggested, as does Benne, that a large por-
tion of the problem stems from the intellectual and moral
realms of the culture,of which the field of education is
one influential aspect.18 This suggestion is also inti-
mated in Scheffler's explicit concern with rational and
moral criteria in his interpretation of teaching as an
activity.

The arguments of these writers suggest, in sum,
that this aspect of a foundational perspective, as
revealed through this concept of a foundations course
can help to resolve certain types of problems. The criti-
cal problem areas which these writers identify include:
(a) problems related to cultural conditions; (b) problems

related to personal belief and reasoning capacity;

 

17Kenneth D. Benne, Education for Tragedy: Essays
in Disenchanged Hope for Modern Man (Lexington, Kentucky:
University of Kentucky Press, 1967), p. 3.

18Stanley, Education and Social Integration, op.
cit., p. 116.

 

61

(0) problems related to interpersonal and ethical rela-
tionships; and (d) the interrelationship between these

problem areas and the enterprise of education and edue

19

cational practice. Although the foundations course

concept, or the foundational perspective, is not suffi-
cient in itself for the education of the teacher, it
would Seem to provide some basic guiding principles
which are important for the education of teachers. In
their discussion of "Educational Foundations: Contribu-
tions at Undergraduate Level," Howell and Shimahara,
conclude that:

The social and philosophical foundations are
organized efforts to inquire into contingent
needs generated in the dynamics of social life.
They oblige, through their orientations,.the
teacher trainee to see himself as a member of
the community and a member of the profes-
sion. . . . The foundational studies can be
seen as an attempt to prevent the teacher
trainee from stopping with a limited concep-
tion of the school er such a parochial concep-
tion of teaching "as telling students about
his subject"; they help create and recreate
his vision of education and of its more active
relations with the community as a culturally
indigenous product.20

A Foundational Analytic
Seminar

From a more practice-oriented perspective within

teacher education, a foundational course has been

 

 

19Thomas Howell and Nobuo Shimahara, "Educational
Foundations: Contributions at Undergraduate Level,"
Teachers College Record, 71 (1969): 207-216.

20

Ibid., p. 210.

62

conceptualized as seminars of various sorts which include
purely professional and purely personal concerns, as well
as combinations of these elements. In some institutions
where there is an extensive clinical program21 involving
a year or more of practical experience in the schools,

or where there is an on-campus laboratory program, and/or
where micro-teaching and simulation experiences have been
implemented, the foundational type of seminar often func-
tions as the supplementary analytical medium. It func-
tions to help students bring together the theoretical and
practical aspects of teaching.

An illustration of this type of integrated
approach has been reported by Klingele and Borland.22 In
their conception, this approach involves essentially a
five phase clinical program which extends over a one-year
period. The first and final phases include presentations
and discussions among students, their peers, and their

supervisors: the first phase having the function of

 

21Gordon R. McIntosh, "The Clinical Approach to
Teacher Education," The Journal of Teacher Education 22
(Spring 1971): 23-24; See also Frances F. Fuller and
Oliver H. Bown, "Becoming a Teacher," Teacher Education,
The Seventy-Fourth Yearbook of the National Society for
the Study of Education (NSSE) Pt. II, Ed. Kevin Ryan
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975),
pp. 25—52; See also Morris L. Cogan, "Current Trends in
the Education of Teachers," NSSE, 212-213.

22William E. Klingele and David R. Borland, "The
Professional Year in Teacher Education," High School
Journal 55 (1972): 309-319.

63

integrating subject matter, general foundations, methods
of education and principles of human development; the
final phase having the function of consolidating the
student teacher's professional opinions, experiences, and
knowledge into a synthesis which is deemed operational
for his entry into the profession.23 Another illustra-
tion involves the seminar element as a pre-practicum
requirement. In conjunction with on-campus laboratory

school experiences with adolescents, the trainees also

 

participate in role playing and discussion sessions in
which their peers provide the audience and adolescent
roles, as well as the resources for critical feedback on
such aspects as overall presentation of material, plan—
ning, media presentation and questioning procedure.

The proponents of this particular foundational
approach (the analytic seminar) suggest a combined for-
mat of theoretical frameworks (in the scientific and
humanistic senses), analysis, and experiential activity.
The analytical aspect is concerned with professional
problems, that is, incidents which occur, or which have
occurred, within an actual classroom situation; or inci-

dents which have been experienced more indirectly as

 

 

23Ibid., pp. 314-315.

24Lee C. Cain and others, "Innovation in a Pre-
Service Education Course," Improving College and Univers-
ity Teaching 20 (1972): 151—153 and p. 157.

 

64

through observation, or simulation exercises. This
approach can be seen as being founded upon a rationale
which holds that the practical, or experiential aspect
(such as practice teaching) is no longer sufficient in
itself for the education of the teacher. In this respect,
the emphases appear to shift slightly when compared with
the foundational course concept referred to previously:
the previous concept evinces heavily theoretical and
philosophical content; whereas the analytic seminar evinces
a more complex and flexible format.

Schwab, for example, employs a combined approach
which effects a practice-oriented emphasis. Identified
as an eclectic approach, Schwab's model involves in a
single course social and behavioral theory, experiential
activity, analysis of classroom incidents, and selective
application of theories. In other words, his approach
involves sets of theoretical and practical sequences
which can be viewed from a more general standpoint as
behavioral and social theories, interspersed with films,
simulations, and actual experiences relative to which
students engage in discussion, diagnosis, analysis, apply-
ing certain theories, and aspects of theoretical frame-

works to various situational contexts. 5 Schwab's

 

25Joseph Schwab, "The Practical: Arts of Eclec-
tic," School Review 79 (1971): 493-542.

 

65

approach, while illustrating a combined format, also
emphasizes the practical in an effort to bring theory
and practice together, and to avoid what he sees as the
limiting effects of theoretical abstraction.26

Shawver, on the other hand, shifts the emphasis
in this foundational approach to the theoretical and
analytical. He bases his recommendations in this respect
on the premise that "practice can be miseducative for the
teacher if it does not allow for time and help in seeing
a specific practical skill in relation to the total prob-

27 He then makes the recom-

lem of educating the child."
mendation that there should be an elimination of most of
the methods and laboratory courses, replacing them with
the implementation of an extensive internship-analytic
program. This means, according to Shawver, that the
direct experiences should be accompanied by analysis of
the experiences. The synthesis which he perceives
entails a broad education in educational philosophy and

aims, a strong theoretical understanding of psychology,

and a considerable proficiency in specific teaching

 

26Ibid., pp. 493-495.

27David Shawver, "Professional Education or
Apprenticeships?" Teachers College Record 70 (1968):
3.

 

 

66

skills.28 Both of these writers evince a concern for the

bringing together of theory and practice with the view of
developing more experienced teachers in terms of the
depth and breadth of knowledge that teachers might achieve.

A Foundational Human
Relations Seminar

 

 

A second type of foundational seminar focuses on
the personal sensitivity of the prospective teacher. This
type of seminar involves personal introspection, inter-
personal communication training, and it is frequently
designated as some kind of "human relations" experience.
It is often offered within the area of a specifically
designated "foundations course," or as an aspect of a
clinical program. Its rationale suggests several areas
of emphasis.

In one View, this type of seminar is based on the
belief that there is a fundamental gap between what the
teacher teaches, and the learning which must be achieved

29

by the pupil. In order to bridge this gap, the teacher

 

28Ibid.; See also Arthur Combs and others, "Organ-

izing the Professional Aspects of a Teacher Preparation
Program: Theory and Practice," The Professional Educa-
tion of Teachers A Humanistic Approach to Teacher Prepa-
ration 2nd ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1974),

pp. 148-164; See also Morris L. Cogan, "Current Trends

in the Education of Teachers, NSSE ed., Kevin Ryan
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), same

as above, pp. 204—229.

29Thomas Gordon (with Noel Burch), TET: Teacher
Effectiveness Trainipg (New York: Peter H. Wyden Pub-
lisher, 1974), p. 3.

 

 

67

must be able to communicate with the student. In describ-

 

ing his notion of "education as initiation," R. S. Peters
has suggested that in order for a person to become "edu-
cated," in the strongest sense of understanding underly-
ing principles, or the "why" of an area of knoweldge, the
student must be "initiated," that is, invited to enter,
into an area of knowledge and the heritage of culture.30
This necessitates sensitive communication between teacher
and student. A third View focuses on the problem child,
or the disruptive child. It suggests that until rapport
is developed in the classroom situation, neither teach—
ing nor learning is possible.31 A final View, espoused
by Mark Chesler, focuses on the unique problems of the
multi-cultural and multi-racial classrooms.32 The per-
sonal knowledge which Chesler.suggests as emanating from

the interpersonal type of seminar has also been the focus

of such writers as Rogers, Maslow, Carkhuff, Stanford

 

30R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education (London:
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1966), pp. 51-52.

31Bernard G. Guerney, Psychotherapeutic Agents:
New Roles for Non—Professionals: Parents and Teachers
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969),
pp. 339-340; See also Arthur W. Combs, Donald L. Avila,
and William W. Purkey, Helping Relationships: Basic
Concepts for the Helping Professions (Boston: Allyn and
Bacon, Inc., 1974), p. 290.

32Mark A. Chesler, "Teacher Training Designs for
Improving Instruction in Interracial Classrooms," Journal
of Applied Behavioral Science 7 (1971): 216-641; See also
Cogan, op. cit., pp. 204-226; and entire chapter.

 

68

and Roark, May, and Brameld, and of numerous other writers
whose psychological orientation is of the interpersonal
and/or perceptual sort, and/or who have included in their
writings the aspect of human relations and its implica—
tions for the teacher education context. These writers
do not always agree on the skill emphasis, but they do
agree on the significance of attitudinal disposition and
personal communication in teaching.33
Chesler has suggested that the personal knowledge
facilitated by such a human relations seminar includes
such elements as the clarification and explanation of
characteristic personal feelings and values regarding
racially potent matters; the quality of relationship
between trainee and students-—for example, the tendency

to invite students to participate in their own learning,

or the avoidance of this practice; and the trainee's

 

33Rollo May, The Art of Counseling (New York:
Abingdon Press, 1967), pp. 75-91; See also Carl R. Rogers,
Freedom to Learn (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill
Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 105-127; See also Angelo
Boy and Gerald Pine, Expanding the Self: Personal Growth
for Teachers (Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown Company
Publishers, 1971), pp. 6-15; See also Robert Carkhuff,
Helping and Human Relations: A Primer for Lay and Pro-
fessional Helpers Vol. I (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, Inc., 1969): PP. 21—22; See also Carl Rogers
and Barry Stevens, Person to Person: The Problem of
Being Human (New York: Pocket Books and Real People
Press, 1972), pp. 85-94; See also Gene Stanford and
Albert E. Roark, Human Interaction in Education (Boston:
Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1974), entire work; See also
Brameld, 0p. cit., Chapter 13, pp. 131-141.

 

 

 

 

 

69

ability to share with peers, or colleagues, his thoughts,
feelings, experiences, to give and receive constructive
feedback on such aspects as performance, beliefs,
thoughts, feelings, and nonverbal mannerisms.34
When a human relations seminar is offered in con-
junction with a clinical program, it is frequently an
experimental program which is of relatively short dura-

35 Its intent is usually to foster the development

tion.
of an understanding of the importance of interpersonal
relations in the classroom, and to provide trainees with
skills which are deemed relevant to the sorts of behav-
iors vflfirfll are indicative of an intent, or willingness,
to understand the thoughts and feelings of another. The
underlying rationale associated with this type of seminar
is that if the prospective teacher internalizes the
related skills, they would be immediately available to
him, as a teacher, as he interacts with his students in
various types of classroom situations. The seminar char-
acteristically includes such elements as methods of
problem-solving, written reflections in diaries, video-
taping of verbal and nonverbal communication, focused
exercises in empathy, feedback experiences, general shar-

ing, and the giving and receiving of emotional suport

 

34Chesler, 0p. cit.,pp. 616—621.

35Cogan, op. cit., 213-222.

70

from leaders and peers. In the practice teaching expe-
riences, the trainees experiment with solving immediate
problems, and with devising more constructive ways of
communicating with their students. Their findings and
experiences are then reported, analyzed, and discussed
in the human relations seminar.36
These illustrations suggest that communication
is perceived as having fundamental import, and that the
ability to communicate effectively is indispensible to

37 Whether the situation demands

the teaching context.
the building of rapport with students, the handling of
conflict or confrontation, dealing with various sorts of
formal and/or impromptu discussions and interactions, in
any situation of human contact and verbal exchange in
which there are opposing views, in which students ask

for reasons in support of positions taken by the teacher

relative to areas of subject matter, values, and/or

 

36Helene BorkeanuiJoan W. Burstyn, "The New
Teacher and Interpersonal Relations in the Classroom,"
The Journal of Teacher Education 21 (1970): 378-381; See
also Richard A. Schmuck, "Helping Teachers Improve Class-
room Group Processes," Journal of Applied Behavioral
Science 4 (1968): 401-435.

37Louise M. Berman, New Priorities in the Curricu-
lpm (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Com-
pany, 1968), pp. 43—53; See also R. S. Peters, Ethics and
Education (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966),
pp. 59 and 88; See also "Report of the Joint Commission
on Mental Health of Childrenf'Crisis in Child Mental
Health: Challenge for the 1970's (New York: Harper and
Row, Publishers, 1970), p. 395; See also Israel Scheffler,
Reason and Teaching (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1973), pp. 62 and 87—88.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Fi—n—— I

71

morals, the teacher normally must make some form of
response. Moreover, the quality of his response can be
’ effective or ineffective, helpful or harmful, clear or
ambiguous, depending upon the fundamental orientation,
the disposition, the attitudes that he brings to the

teaching situation.38

Interim Summary

 

The foundational perspective generally entails
the facilitation of a broad intellectual perspective and
rational capacity, the examining of professional and cul-
tural contexts, and analysis of the personal sensitivi-
ties of the student of teacher education.

The preceding sections suggest that the founda—
tional perspective, which generally encompasses the target
concept of this study, is sufficiently broad to encompass
academically, professionally, culturally, and personally
associated elements. Its characteristic elements are both
conceptually and experientially related, which is to say
that they include broad interdisciplinary content and
critical procedures which, when understood, accepted,

I and internalized by the student of teacher education, can
foster a sense of professionalism, plus changes in the

teacher's philosophical orientation, his veiw of the task

 

38Chesler, op. cit., pp. 612-641; See also Cogan,
op. cit., pp. 225-229; See also Fuller and Brown, op.
I cit., pp. 42-45.

72

of teaching, his View of the educative and cultural con-
texts, and his view of the relationship between the edu-
cational and cultural contexts. Through the media of
analytic procedures and personal introspection, the stu-
dent can take a critical look at the classroom situation
and consider the applicability, or inapplicability, of
various educational and philosophical theories. Moreover,
he can criticize his own role and his sensitivity as
person and teacher with respect to his approach to the
activity of teaching.

The need statement (cited in Chapter I) suggested
that one of the major areas of concern relative to the
education of the teacher is the issue of a broadened
perspective, a perspective which will effect a synthesis
of theory and practice with the View of developing more
experienced teachers, in terms of the sort of knowledge
they possess and the personal sensitivity with which they
approach the activity of teaching. The present section
has revealed one type of perspective (a foundational
perspective) associated with teacher education whose
emphases seem to suggest that it is a suitable medium
from which to respond to the above concern. The examina-
tion of Scheffler's interpretation of teaching and the
particular synthesis arrived at within this study would

appear to be consistent with the foundational perspective

 

73

outlined above, and may be viewed as a specific type of
response to the above concern. The section which follows
is concerned with the conceptual perspective which sur-
rounds Scheffler's interpretation of teaching as an

activity.

Part Two: A Teaching Concppt Perspective

 

The problem of this study centers around one of
Israel Scheffler's interpretations of teaching. This
interpretation he calls the "restrictions of manner."
These "restrictions" represent a View of the way in which
the "standard activity-sense" of teaching can be said to
apprOpriately proceed. That is to say, these "distinc-
tions of manner" restrict, conceptually, the activities
to which the verb "to teach" can be said to apply.

In View of the fact that the main body of the
study concerns itself with an examination of this spe-
cialized concept of teaching, it is necessary to describe
the perspective--the conceptual language, category, and
analytical structures--in which it is couched. The
present section, therefore, serves a clarification func-
tion of delineating some of the relevant problems of
definition and conceptual difficulties which are related
to the restricted notion of teaching which the study

attempts to examine.

 

“lw—w—‘r

The General Perspective and
Its Conceptual Difficulties

 

When the term "teaching" is employed, to what,
exactly, is one referring? The ramifications of this
question have been extensively dealt with by a group of
writers who are called the "Ordinary Language philoso-
phers," or 20th Century analytic philosophers, such as
Ryle, Peters, Green, Komisar, Scheffler, Smith, and
others. This section draws upon and uses the language
of these writers in an effort to explore the above ques-
tion.

In common language usage, subordinate to the
level of what Scheffler, Smith, and others call "standard"
uses, the term "teaching" might refer to doctrines, such
as the "teachings" of a sect, religious order, or some

39 This

religious or philosophical leader or orientation.
term might also be used to designate the occupation of
one who is institutionally designated or certified to
"teach," thereby differentiating the occupation of teach-
ing from other occupations, such as engineering, law, or

40

medicine. At another level of talk, the term "teaching"

might denote the "general activity" in which one usually

 

39B. Othanel Smith, "A Concept of Teaching,"
Concepts of Teaching: Philosophical Essays, eds.,C. J. B.
MacMillan and Thomas W. Nelson (Chicago: Rand McNally
and Company, 1968), p. 12.

4OIbid.

 

75

engages who is called "teacher."41

This designation, spe-
cifically within the context of the school, serves to
differentiate "teaching" from, for example, participating
in a staff meeting, or conversing socially in the staff
room. This "general activity" of teaching might include
such activities as marking, lecturing, giving assign-
ments, individual tutoring, counseling, training, drill
and/or instruction in basic skills.42 In addition to
these three levels of talk about teaching, there is a
fourth level which is designated by educational philoso-
phers, such as Scheffler, Peters, Smith, and others, as
the "standard-activity-sense of teaching."43 Komisar

allows for what may be seen as an analogous designation in

what he includes as a third "level of talk" about the

 

41Ibid.: See Also R. Paul Komisar, "Teaching:
Act and Enterprise," Concppts of Teaching: Philosophical
Essays, eds., C. J. B. Macmillan and Thomas W. Nelson
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968), pP. 71-74.

42Komisar, loc. cit.

43Israel Scheffler, "The Concept of Teaching,"
Concepts of Teaching: Philosophical Essays, eds., C. J.
B. Macmillan and Thomas W. Nelson (Chicago: Rand McNally
and Company, 1968), pp. 17-19; See also Thomas F. Green,
"A Topology of the Teaching Concept," same edition,
pp. 28-62; See also Contemporary Thought on Teaching,
ed., Ronald T. Hyman (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1971); See also Graham Nuthall and Ivan Snook,
"Contemporary Models of Teaching," Second Handbook of
Research on Teaching, ed., M. W. Travers (Chicago: Rand
McNally and Company, 1973), pp. 49—50 and pp. 65-70.

 

76

term "teaching." The following is a summarization of
Komisar's categories (the emphases are those of Komisar):

(1) Teaching names an occupation or an activity
habitually, characteristically engaged in; (2) [it]
refers to a general entepprise, some activity being
engaged in; and (3) [it] characterizes an act_or
alludes to an act as being of a certain sort.44

 

The problems surrounding the term "teaching" relate
not only to differentiations in common usage, and between
common usage and philosophical usage. They also relate
to the variety of distinctions which have been made by
philosophical analysts in their definitions of teaching,
or in their characterization of a teaching concept.
Komisar, for example, uses distinctions of "general enter-
prise," and specific "act" in his definition of teaching.
Other writers, such as Ryle, Smith, Green, Scheffler, and
others use in their analysis distinctions of an "inten-
tional" use of the term teaching, and a "success" use of
the term teaching. The criterion of "intent" is used by
these writers to restrict the activities to which the
term "teach" can be said to apply. Within this standard
activity which is characterized in terms of its inten-
tional and goal—oriented nature, Scheffler invokes
another set of distinctions which he calls the "restric-
tions of manner." A common thread which runs through

these sets of distinctions is an emphasis, in greater and

 

44Komisar, op. cit., p. 68.

 

 

77

lesser degrees, on a criterion of intellectual exchange,
a particular quality of such exchange. The following
text attempts to describe these categorial distinctions,
and their relationship to the distinctions of Scheffler
which is the major focus of this study.

Smith has on occasion used criteria in defining
teaching which is in some sense closely related to
Komisar's "enterprise" and "act" distinctions relative
to teaching. In this respect, Smith has described a
"generic-sense" of teaching involving "a system of actions
intended to induce learning," and an "activity-sense" of
teaching entailing the nature of the individual acts
which are, or can be, designated as "'teaching' acts."45

According to Smith's "generic" distinction, teach-
ing is characterized as "intentional" and "goal-oriented"
in the general sense that teaching is not teaching at all
unless it intends that some learning should issue, the
achievement of which is envisioned in the "teaching" and
identified in the context of the learning. In this sense,
moreover, teaching is perceived as being the same every-
where, irrespective of the cultural context, or the indi—
vidual teaching professional within a single cultural

framework.46 The "generic" level is relatively comparable

 

45Smith, 0p. cit., pp. 12-13.

46Ibid., p. 13.

 

 

78

to Komisar's "enterprise-sense" of teaching. Viewed from
the standpoint of "specific actions," however, the cri-
teria become more restrictive in terms of a requisite of
"intellectual" quality;47 this level appears to be com-

parable to Komisar's "act" level.

 

The teaching concept at this level (the "act"),
according to Smith, suggests and requires a dependency
upon the state of knowledge about the complex concept of

teaching, as well as the pedagogical knowledge and skill

 

of the teacher. What can qualify as "teaching activity"
at this level must satisfy the dual "intellectual" requi-
site of (a) engaging the mind of the student (from the
standpoint of the teacher) and (b) participating in one's
learning by exerting one's intellectual capacity (as
viewed from the standpoint of the student, encouraged by
the teacher).48 It is this latter distinction which
Scheffler, unlike Smith, raises to the level of an indis—
pensable "rule" in his normative concept of teaching.
According to Scheffler, for an act to count as a spe-
cifically "teaching" act, it must meet specific criteria
restricting the way in which learning can proceed. In

other words, "teaching" is defined not only in terms of

 

47Ibid.; See also Lomisar, op. cit., pp. 79-84.

48
pp. 74-75.

Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit.,

 

79

its flintent" (effort) and its orientation toward a goal
of student learning, it must also include the elements
(in Scheffler's View) of "rational explanation"enui"criti—
cal dialogue" which, in effect, restrict the "manner" in
which "teaching" and "learning" can be said to proceed.49
Ronald Hyman has observed that Smith agrees with
Scheffler's position up to the point where Scheffler
explicitly emphasizes the "distinctions of manner" con-
cept as a constant criterion of the activity of teach-
ing."50
In additiontx>these general difficulties involved
in isolating what is meant when the term "teaching activ-
ity" is used, there are problems associated with the con-
ceptual complex of the "teaching-learning" relationship.
The problem centers around the issue: Can there be teach-
ing, in the standard sense (noted above) when and if
there is no learning; or, stated more precisely: "Does
'teaching' imply learning?" The rational View of teach-
ing, as represented, for example, by Scheffler and Smith,

suggests a negative answer to this question.51

 

49Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education
(Springfield, 111.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1968),
pp. 57-59.

50Ronald T. Hyman, Contemporary Thought on Teach—
ing, op. cit., p. 31.

51

 

 

Komisar, op. cit., p. 63.

 

80

Smith, for example, illustrates this point with
a type of conceptual analysis which involves a teaching-

learning,selling-bpying analogy.52

He begins his line of
reasoning with the area in which there is, according to
Smith, an analogous relationship associated with teach-
ing and learning, and selling and buying. He argues that
only in the area of required interactional process is
there an analogous relationship. That is to say, in cases

of certain uses of verbs, such as "negotiate," "sell,"

and "teach," there is a clear indication of proceedings

 

between two or more individuals involving "some sort of
deliberation with adjustment of mutual claims and inter-
ests in expectation that some result will issue.53 If
there is no process of interaction, "there can be neither
teacher nor pupil just as there can be neither seller

54

nor buyer;" "unless thereanxapupils, there could be no

55 Beyond this area, however, Smith argues

teachers."
that there is not a thoroughgoing analogy between the
"teaching-learning," "buying-selling" complexes.

His argument is based on what can be legitimately

asserted in statements (i.e., in a conceptual context),

 

52Smith, 0p. cit., pp. 14-15.
53Ibid., p. 14.

54Ibid.

55

Ibid.

81

Which use the terms "selling" and "buying." From the
premise that the "teaching-learning" relationship is not
of the same sort of relationship as the "selling-buying"
relationship, Smith's argument is essentially the follow-
ing. To say that one is selling already implies, without
having to state it explicitly, that someone is buying
something from the seller who makes the assertion at a
given time and place. However, when one asserts that
he is "teaching" someone, i.e., that he is showing some-
one how to do something, or telling someone that such and
such is the case, an analogous implication does not exist.
That is to say, there is no implication that the person
is learning that which is being taught (intended, aimed
at in the teaching), nor any implication that what the
person has learned is what he was being taught. "Teach-
ing," for example, that Columbus discovered America, or
that water contains two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen
atom, or "teaching" someone how to play a chromatic scale
on a musical instrument, does not suggest that the audi-
tor for whom these teaching instances are intended is
learning that which the teaching aims at; it simply means
that there is intent and a goal aimed at ("teaching"),
and an auditor present.

The phrase: "giving instruction," argues Smith,

would have a logical relationship comparable to selling

 

v

 

82

and buying on the grounds that when one asserts that he
is "giving instruction," there is implied,‘without-hav-
ing to state it explicitly, the assertion that someone is

56 The crux of his conceptual

"receiving instruction."
distinctions is illustrated in the following concluding
statements which are made by Smith:

"I taught X to A" means I showed A how to do X,

or told him such and such about X. This expres-

sion does not include the idea that A learned

from me how to do X. It is thus not repeating

the idea to add it to the expression. Hence, "I

taught X to A" says something different from "I

taught X to A and he learned X."57

Smith's argument is essentially based (with

respect to the context cited), on the "conceptual" dif-
ferentiation between the verb "to teach," and the verb
"to instruct." To instruct implies that someone is
receiving, or has received the instruction; "to teach"
does not imply that someone is learning, or has learned,
that which was intended, and aimed at, in the teaching.
This is one illustration of the type of conceptual analy-
tic justification which is used to support the thesis
that "teaching" (in the "standard" sense of the term),
does not imply learning. A second type of conceptual

justification engaged in by Gilbert Ryle, and to some

extent by Scheffler, further points up the difficulties

 

56Ibid., p. 15.

57Ibid.

 

83

surrounding the teaching concept, and serves to clarify
the level of talk which is the focus of the following
chapter.

Ryle's conceptual analysis, briefly stated, func-
tions to differentiate "teaching" and "learning" on the
basis of their separate categorial affiliations in terms
of a "task" category (also called by Scheffler the
intent"), and an "achievement" (or "success") category,
respectively.58 Ryle's argument is essentially that
learning is an "achievement" word which parallels the
"task" sense of teaching. In the "task" category, words
usually involve "trying," and they express an activity,

or extended proceedings.59 In the "achievement" category,

 

58Ibid., pp. 15-16; See also Scheffler, The Lan—
guage of Education, op. cit., pp. 60-61; See also Gilbert
Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson's Univer-
sity Library, 1949).

59Ryle's implication that "teaching" is a "process"
-—"extended proceedings," is not a notion which is shared
by Scheffler. Scheffler consistently uses the designa—
tion "activity" in reference to teaching. Although he
accepts the "achievement—task" categories as the appro—
priate general categories, he argues that "to teach" is
not to be bound up in a "process." "Teaching" has cer-
tain "time" limitations. That is, no one engages in
"teaching" without at the same time intending that a par-
ticular sort of learning will occur, whether the time
frame and teaching interval involves, for example, one
lesson, a series of lessons, a few hours, or a year or
more. One does not usually speak of "unintentional
teaching." By contrast, it is appropriate to speak of
the learning "process" in that it characteristically does
not entail deliberate intent, nor is bound by temporal
restrictions, as in the case of "teaching activity."
Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education (Springfield,

 

 

 

 

84

words indicate "occurrences," or "episodes;" they refer
"to more than just the doing of something; they also

refer to the successful outcome of what one is doing, or

60

has done." Moreover, when the term "teaching" is used,

 

it is conceptually appropriate to describe it as being
done, or having been done, "skillfully" or "ineffectu-
ally," but when the term "learning" is used it is con-
ceptually inappropriate to speak of "unsuccessful" learn-

ing, or learning unsuccessfully. The term itself already

 

denotes "success," i.e., learning is itself the achieve-
ment. The concept of teaching which is focused upon in
this study falls, in the general sense, within this cate-
gorial designation of "teaching" as an activity, or a
task, whose success sense is defined in terms of the
learning state to which it aims.

vThe Restricted Sense of the
Teaching Concept

 

 

The previous section has sought to describe the
general perspective of the teaching concept highlighting
those areas in which there is agreement among writers who

have been concerned with a rational model of teaching,

 

Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1968), pp. 60-69;
See also Israel Scheffler, "The Concept of Teaching,"
Concepts of Teaching Philosophical Essays, eds. C. J. B.
Macmillan and Thomas W. Nelson (Chicago: Rand McNally
and Company, 1968), PP. 22—26.

60Smith, op. cit., p. 16.

85

and with a conceptual analysis of a concept of teaching
as an activity. The section.has sought to describe some
of the distinctions of the term "teaching" in terms of
its substandard uses indicative of doctrines, occupation,
and general enterprise. It has restricted the concept at
one level which has been called by such writers as Schef-
fler, Peters, and others the "standard activity-sense,"
or the "everyday, standard use," of teaching.

Within this general category of a "standard
activity—sense" is Scheffler's further distinctions whose
principal areas of presupposition this study attempts to
examine in further detail. Scheffler's precise character—
ization is illustrated in the following statements.

Teaching is an activity involving the attempt to
achieve a certain sort of learning within certain

restrictions of manner.61 (present writer's
emphasis)

 

In another place, Scheffler reveals a major thrust of his
normative interpretation of teaching activity. He writes:

Teaching may be characterized as an activity

. . . [which is] practiced in such a manner

as to respect the student's intellectual
integrity and capacity for independent judg-
ment. [This aspect of its characterization]
differentiates the activity of teaching from
such other activities as propaganda, condition-
ing, suggestion, and indoctrination, which are
aimed at modifying the person but strive at all

 

61Scheffler, The Language of Education, op. cit.,

 

 

 

 

86

costs to avoid a genuine engagement of his
judgment on underlying issues.52

Restatement of Objectives and Problem

 

Guided by the following objectives, Chapters III
and IV involve an attempt to examine principal areas of
presupposition which are intimated in the above normative
and rational characterization of teaching, as it is spe-
cifically associated with Israel Scheffler. A restate—
ment of the two major objeCtives of this study are:

1. To examine one of Israel Scheffler's

interpretations<mfa philosophical model
of teaching, with a view to extracting
from this model a component of communi-
cation; and

2. To complement Scheffler's rational con-

cept of teaching and communication with
a perceptual concept of listening. This
concept of listening may be seen to
relate specifically to the selected con-
cepts of communication and teaching.

The areas of presupposition which help to clarify
and to understand Scheffler's "restrictions of manner"
are the following: (1) ethical obligation; (2) concepts
of human rationality, critical thought, the human mind
and its development; and (3) perceptual and interpersonal
concerns evidenced in Scheffler's criteria of "belief"

and "evidence" associated with his combined concept of

"knowing that" and of "teaching that" something is the

 

62Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., p. 67.

 

 

 

87

case. The following is a restatement of the questions
which are explored within Chapters III and IV.

1. What are the major areas of presupposition
in Israel Scheffler's conceptual interpretation of teach-
ing (that is the "restrictions of manner") which make
explicit reference to the centrality of a communication
concept, and which might be seen as intimating a per-
ceptual concern with respect to teaching and communica-
tion?

2. What perceptual component of communication
relative to teaching might be said to complement Schef-
fler's rational interpretation of teaching, given the
particular emphases which appear to be presupposed in

his "restrictions of manner" relative to teaching?

 

 

CHAPTER III

AREAS OF PRESUPPOSITION ASSOCIATED WITH
ISRAEL SCHEFFLER'S RESTRICTIONS

OF MANNER

The present chapter and the following chapter
contain the major discussions of the study. This two—
chapter unit can be viewed as (a) an exercise in educa-
tional criticism, and (b) a concern with Practical
Thought.

The conceptual interpretation of teaching which
this study attempts to examine is permeated with ethical
and normative elements, and because of this condition, it
is important to reflect upon the concepts of a "normative"
approach and "Practical Thought" which were cited in
Chapter I.

The normative approach, as it has been observed
in Scheffler's writings, as well as in those of Peters,
involves a definition of teaching which embodies rules,
criteria, norms, or ideals, which restrict the activities
to which the verb "to teach" can be said to apply. An
illustration of this approach was documented in Chapter II

in a quotation from Reason and Teaching in which Scheffler

 

88

89

characterizes teaching activity not only in terms of
intent and goal-orientedness, but in terms of ethical and
intellectual rules, or criteria governing its "manner"

of practice. "Teaching activity," he claims, is an
activity which is "practiced in such a manner as to
respect the student's intellectual integrity and capacity
for independent judgment." Insofar as it is defined in
this way, he continues, it is differentiated from such
other activities as propaganda, conditioning, suggestion,
and indoctrination. This "respect" for the student's
intellectual integrity and capacity becomes a conerstone
for a broadened approach to the study of teaching. Such
"respect" appears too often to be lacking in many current
programs of teacher education.

With regard to the concept of "Practical Thought,"
which is also central to Scheffler's interpretation, the
suggestion was made in Chapter I that this concept may
be seen as a tool which allows one to offer a useful syn-
thesis of practical and theoretical realms at a conceptual
level of discussion. Scheffler's characterization of the
Practical Thought concept, also presupposed by Scheffler
in the terms "practical context," is as follows:

Practical Thought attempts to answer such ques-
tions as "How shall I act?" "What should be done?"
"What course of action ought to be followed?"

etc. . . . Practical Thought is concerned with the

guidancetxfaction; but the expressions and formula-
tions in which it issues are to be distinguished

90

from the actual decisions or actions guided by

them. These expressions and formulations may,

and normally do, draw upon a wide variety of

parent sources in the scientific and humanistic

fields.1

The normative and practical thought elements in

Scheffler's interpretation can be seen as interrelated
conditions which permeate his work; and the above
reflection on these concepts is important for the follow-
ing reasons. First, the overall flavor which permeates
the language of such writers as Ryle, Passmore, Peters,
as well as of Scheffler is directly linked with the
rationale which resides in Scheffler's and Peters'
description of Practical Thought. A second reason is
that this study, in grappling with areas of presupposi-
tion associated with Scheffler's interpretation, and in
attempting to arrive at a definition of "Teaching as
Communicationf'seeks at the same time to offer a response
to the question: How should teaching be viewed? This
question would appear to be legitimate when viewed in
the context of Scheffler's description of Practical
Thought. What this means is that the present study, in
arriving at the above synthesis, will at the same time
be suggesting that this particular synthesis is ppp_way

of viewing the activity of teaching. It is an eclectic

way, which prefers maximizing the intellectual bases for

 

lIsrael Scheffler, Rgason and Teaching (New York:
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973), pp. 188-189.

91

the study of teaching and prefers programs of teacher
education which draw from many parental sources in the
humanities and sciences.

A restatement of the areas of presuppostion which
are discussed in the present chapter is as follows: (1)
ethical obligation; (2) concepts of human rationality,
critical thought, the human mind and its development; and
(3) perceptual and interpersonal concerns evidenced in
Scheffler's criteria of "belief" and "evidence" associated
with his combined concept of "knowing that" and of "teach-
ing that" something is the case.

The conceptual data within this chapter is in the

language of Scheffler, Peters, Ryle, and Passmore.2 The

 

2This chapter contains extensive excerpts (gen-
eral language and direct quotations) from the following
works by permission of the publishers indicated. Israel
Scheffler, The Language of Education, Charles C. Thomas
Publisher, pp. 51—52, 54, 57, 104-105; Scheffler's
"Knowledge and Teaching," "Knowledge and Evidence," and
"Knowledge and Belief" in Conditions of Knowledge: An J
Introduction to Epistemology and Education (Glenview,

 

 

Ill.: Scott, Foresman, and Company (permission also
granted by Dr. Scheffler), pp. 7-14, 21, 55—90, 106-107;
Scheffler's "Philosophical Models of Teaching," "Univers-

ity Scholarship and the Education of Teachers" in Reason
and Teaching (Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.), pp. 2-3, 74-
78, 87-88; Gilbert Ryle, "A Rational Animal: and John
Passmore, "On Teaching to be Critical" in Education and
the Development of Reason (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.,)
pp. 176-178, 186—193, 418, 421, 423-424, 427, 430-431;
R. S. Peters, "What is an Educational Process?" in IE2
Concept of Education,(Humanities Press, Inc.), pp. 3-6,
8-22; R. S. Peters, "Education as Initiation," in Ethics
and Education (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.), pp. 46-59,
35-43, 88, 105-107, 121-126, 165, 208-215.

 

 

 

 

92

general relationship between these writers which is rele-
vant to the present study is as follows: (a) their affil—
iation with Twentieth-century Analytic Philosophy; (b)
their support of a rational model of teaching (cited in
Chapter I); and (c) their use of a conceptual form of
analysis in their study of teaching.

The Presupposition of
Ethical Obligation

 

 

Teaching, viewed in a context of Practical
Thought, is also viewed as a component of a "practical
context,"3 which is (in Scheffler's View) bound by an
ethical criterion. That is to say, this context of prac-
tical matters embodies, by definition, an ethical core.
This is said to be true whether the immediate concern
relates to the clinical area of actual, concrete, prac-
tice, or to the area of educational policy, or to a type
of inquiry which is oriented in Practical Thought.

In this respect, two fundamental, pervasive, and
interrelated questions have been identified which are
said to be indicative of the practical context, and which
are said to be at the core of social controversy about

education. According to the writings of Scheffler and

 

3R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education (London:
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1966), pp. 121-126, 105,
209; See also Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education
(Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1968),
p. 54.

 

93

Peters, these guiding questions are: (1) "What is to be
done?" and (2) "What ought to be done?" Within the scope
of what is called "education," particularly within the
context of schooling, the derivative question: "On what
procedural principles is, and should, the practice of
teaching be based?" and the follow-up question: "On what
grounds?" are, in some sense, as suggested by Peters,
even more deeply rooted in social and educational issues
than a question related to subject matter content: "Of
what shall the content of 'education' consist?"4

This presumed centrality of an ethical considera-
tion in practical matters associated with education is,
in large measure, the rationale for Scheffler's restrict-
ing the "manner" in which teaching can proceed, i: it is
to be called teaching at all. The "restrictions of
manner" are defined explicitly in terms of the procedures
of "rational explanation" and "critical dialogue,"5 but
what they imply is more than the impartial principles of
rational deliberation. The "restrictions" are equally
founded upon ethical considerations associated with prin-
ciples of individual choice and respect for persons. In

other words, according to Scheffler, the "restrictions"

 

4
p. 35-43.

R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit.,

5Israel Scheffler, "The Concept of Teaching:
Restrictions of Manner," Concepts of Teaching: Philospph-
ical Essays eds. C. J. B. Macmillan and Thomas W. Nelson
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968), pp. 17-19.

 

 

94

emphasize a notion of rationality which has both moral
and cognitive import.6
Scheffler places emphasis on the dual concept of

"principles" and "reasons,' which is to say that the
concept of teaching (in the strictest sense), suggests
the elements of objectively interpreted principled con-
duct in the teacher's dealings with students, and the
honest exchange of "reasons" with respect to any knowl-
edge claims which are made within the context of teach
ing.7 Scheffler's concept implies a general concern for
the development of character in the student. This dual
cognitive and moral element conjoined in the term "ration-
ality" is central to an understanding of the "restrictions
of manner." The specific definition of this core concept
is as follows:

Rationality . . . (i.e., involving the autonomy

of the student's judgment, his right to seek

reasons in support of claims upon his credibili—

ties and loyalties, and his correlative obliga-

tion to deal with such reasons in a principled

manner), . . . is a fundamental cognitive and

moral virtue . . .; in the cognitive realm,

reason is a kind of justice to the evidence, a

fair treatment of the merits of the case, in

the interests of truth. In the moral realm,

reason is action on principle, action that there-
fore does not bend with the wind, nor lean to the

 

6Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching (New York:
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973), p. 76.

7Israel Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge: An
Introduction to Epistemplogy and Education (Glenview,
Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1965), pp. 11-12.

 

95
side of advantage or power out of weakness or
self-interest.8
Implied in these statements (but purely on the

basis of Scheffler's philOSOphical and normative analysis,
as distinct from empirical generalization, such as those
associated with, for example, Piaget's study of stages of
intellectual development) is the notion that the student
possesses a capacity for making, and should have the
right to make, choices. This is explicitly dealt with in
the presuppositions associated with human rationality and
mind. In the present context, however, these statements

suggest that teaching is obligated to take into account

 

the possibility that such capacity does exist in the

9 As Scheffler restricts the "standard activity—

student.
sense of teaching" at this level on the basis of the con-
sideration for individual choice, he at the same time
makes a careful distinction between teaching and other
activities which are generally related to the education

of persons.10 He does not, for instance, include behav-

ior modification techniques in his concept of teaching.

 

8Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit.,
pp. 78 and 76.

9Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education,
op. cit., pp. 57-59.

10R. S. Peters, Ed., The Concept of Education
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul and New York: The
Humanities Press, 1970), pp. 9-21.

 

 

96

The Restrictions of Manner
and Acculturation

 

 

The complex process of acculturation is a charac-
teristically broad area which Scheffler carefully dis-
tinguishes from his concept of teaching on the basis of

11 The essential rationale

the above ethical principles.
is that the complex process of acculturation is too
broadly defined; it includes numerous activities which
are not only incompatible with the "standard sense" of
teaching, but as a complex process, it tends (in effect)
to obscure, avoid, and/or discount the principles of indi-
vidual choice and respect for persons.12

The following is essentially Scheffler's line of
reasoning.13 The acculturation process is generally
deemed necessary for continuing the heritage, or content,
of a culture; and education (in the specific context of
schooling), is often said to have the function of trans-
mitting to the young the culture and its traditions (e.g.,
its societal rules, ideology, technology, folklore,
etc.). With this, Scheffler has no objection. However,

he continues, the concept of acculturation as a process

may proceed in various ways: in informal and indirect

 

llIsrael Scheffler, The Language of Education,
op. cit., p. 104.

lzIbid., p. 54.

l3Ibid., pp. 54-57 and p. 105.

 

 

97

ways, as in the case of language transmission; or in
formal and deliberate ways, as in various institutional
contexts--in the churches, clubs of various sorts, as
well as in the schools. Moreover, in that various cul-
tures and individual societies decide within their indi—
vidual frameworks what is to be meant by "continuity"
relative to cultural transmission, the complex process
may well include such activities as indoctrination, con-

ditioning, propaganda, force, and/or deception.

 

It is in this area of the pypp_of activity and
its ppgpp that Scheffler draws the line between his
interpretation of teaching and other activities. In
other words, Scheffler argues, acculturation can, and
does, entail means and methods which avoid engaging the
mind, particularly the "reason" of the student, by means
of which underlying principles, beliefs, institutions,
and the processes themselves are questioned, criticized,
and evaluated. "Engaging the mind" (the indispensable
criterion of teaching) involves more than getting a per-
son to believe, to attend to, to absorb, and to process
information connected with bodies of knowledge.

The "restrictions of manner" obligate teaching

to the consideration of ethical principles which are

 

generally avoided, obscured, and/or discounted in the

concept of acculturation. The complex process of

 

98

acculturation along with its underlying mandate that
"culture shall be transmitted" to the young fails to take
into account the "practical" question of "How it is to be
transmitted," and correspondingly, "How should it be
transmitted?" (i.e., by what means).14 In Scheffler's
View, it avoids the essentially moral question associated
with individual choice and control, a question to which
social processes, and even more so "education" and teach-
ing, are subject. To consider the possibility of even
some alternative choices as a moral consideration appears
to entail in Scheffler's analysis a commitment to a par-
ticular view of human nature and to certain convictions
about how the individual as a human being is to be
treated.

The following section deals with this central
issue of human nature which undergirds Scheffler's con-
cept and lends an important point of justification to
the present study. The points are: (1) that there can
be seen an essential cognitive concept presupposed in
Scheffler's work which suggests the possibility of human
choice; and (2) that there exists a basic relationship

between the rational and perceptual theoretical frame-

 

works which is vital if one is to accept the assumption

that this study ultimately makes, namely, that there is

 

l4Ibid., p. 58.

99

sufficient similarity between Scheffler's rational con-
cept and the listening concept to be formulated here, so
that the suggestion of a complementary relationship
between the two can be said to rest on sound reasoning.

The Restrictions of Manner
and Human Consciousness

 

 

Scheffler's "restrictions of manner" are, in a
fundamental sense, based on the premise that human nature
is such that individual choice is possible. On one
occasion, he writes that human nature is in some sense-
analogous to the "sculptor's statue:" it does not auto-
matically select, but it can and does, given its internal
structure, reject certain forms and ideas which one might
wish to impose upon it.15 Scheffler's approach thus
appears to be not incompatible with structuralist views
of human nature.

Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of the question
of human choice is not only evidenced by Scheffler's
explicitly moral referent; his position can be seen within
contemporary arguments on the issue of "determinism versus

16

freedom. The View of Scheffler, as well as the views of

certain psychologists of perceptual and interpersonal

 

lSIbid., pp. 51-52.

l6Rollo May, Psychology and the Human Dilemma
(New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1967), pp. 3-
20; See also Carl R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn (Columbus,
Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969),
pp. 259-275.

 

 

100

orientations, can be perceived as representing a middle
ground between the notion of individual choice on the one
hand, and absolutely no capacity for individual choice
on the other. The basic premise to which Scheffler sub-
scribes with respect to human nature is not unlike some
of the inferences which have been drawn by psychologists
of the above mentioned orientations.
The statement by Rollo May, for example, that man

"is both bound and free"17 is illustrative of the case in
point. May's statement is associated with a core concept
of."consciousness" which is central to a concept of mind
(described in a later section) to which educational
philosophers such as R. S. Peters and Scheffler subscribe.
This core concept of "consciousness" is conceptualized
by Peters as the characteristic feature of mind, and an
identifying feature of human nature.18 The following is
May's description of the implications of this character-
istic feature within the human being:

It is by virture of the emergence of consciousness

that man possesses . . . freedom of movement in

relation to the objective environment . . . [For

this reason, although man] is subject to death,

illness, limitations of intelligence, perception,

experience, and other deterministic forces. . . .

at the same time man has freedom to relate to
these forces; he can be aware of them, give them

 

l7Rollo May, 0p. cit., p. 11.

18Ibid; See also R. S. Peters, Ethics and Educa-
tion, op. cit., pp. 46-51.

 

 

101

meaning, and select and throw his weight in
favor of this or that force operating on
him.19 (May's emphasis)

Another psychologist, Carl Rogers,20 has also on
occasion taken this middle ground relative to human
nature and alluded to the centrality of "consciousness"
and its implications. Although Rogers' views are most
frequently interpreted from the standpoint of his posi-
tion at the "freedom" end of the "deterministic-freedom"
continuum, the following statement implies a View of
Rogers which is not, in this context, dissimilar to the
views of Scheffler, Peters, and May:

A part of modern living is to face the paradox
that, viewed from one perspective, man is a
complex machine. . . . On the other hand, in
another significant dimension of his existence,
man is subjectively free; his personal choice
and responsibility account for the shape of his
life; he is in fact the architect of himself.21

The use of these illustrations and their perceived
value in this context is not to discount the fact that
the areas represented [educational (analytic) philosophy
and behavioral science] employ different methods of
inquiry in the reaching of conclusions. It is because

they represent distinctive disciplinary areas that they

may help to provide, for the purposes of the present

 

lgIbid., p. 11.1

20:bid., p. 19.

21
p. 275.

Carl R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn, op. cit.,

 

 

 

102

study, a clearer explication of principles which are
particularly relevant to the synthesizing concept of the
study. The above comparative illustrations make several
points.

First, Scheffler's concern with the possiblity
of alternative choice has pervasive import which exceeds
specialized disciplinary boundaries and which gathers
support from such psychological orientations as those
exemplified by Rollo May and Carl Rogers (above), with
respect to his basic premise regarding human nature.

Secondly, given the identified similarities
between positions on human nature, there appears to be
some degree of common ground between a rational View
(Scheffler), and an interpersonal, or perceptual View.
Moreover, the rational orientation of Scheffler, with
its cognitive and moral emphases relative to teaching, is
not totally segregated from a characteristically inter-
personal, or personal, concern which emanates from other
frames of reference in psychology. (This point is fur-
ther elaborated upon below, pages 148-160.)

The present section aims at the overall point
that Scheffler's "restrictions of manner" presuppose an
ethical obligation, and that it is this obligation which
distinguishes teaching from the complex process of accul-

turation with its inherent activities which fail, in

 

103

effect, to take into account the emphases of engaging

the mind, and the moral principles pertaining thereto.
This ethical obligation is embedded in Scheffler's cri-
teria of teaching; it permeates his entire work, and it
is particularly connected with principles of individual
choice and respect for persons. This ethical core is
central to the "practical context" (as it is seen to be
linked with "Practical Thought"), and it is fundamentally

connected with interpersonal, social, and educational con-

 

cerns. A major portion of the justification for Schef-
fler's "restrictive" criteria connoting teaching rests
upon the specific assumption that within the human being
a capacity for making alternative choices is possible.

In the sections immediately following this one,
three concepts are explored (human rationality, critical
thought, and mind). These concepts are intertwined with
the above mentioned ethical considerations; together they
reflect Scheffler's moral and cognitive emphases which
he uses to define his interpretation of teaching.

The Presuppositions of Human Rationality,

Critical Thought and Mind

The preceding section suggested that Scheffler's
concept of teaching presupposes (from a moral and cogni-
tive standpoint) that the human being possibly possesses

a capacity for alternative choice-making, which is also

 

104

to say (in Scheffler's View), that the human being poses-
ses a capacity for "rationality." Scheffler employs two
senses of the term rationality, and both of these senses
can be seen to represent a combined area of presupposi-
tion in connection with his teaching concept.22 There-
fore, further examination of this teaching-rationality
construct appears to be in order.

The two senses in which Scheffler uses the term

"rationality" in connection with his interpretation of

 

teaching are the following. In one instance, he defines
rationality in procedural terms, depicting the nature of
the act of teaching. In this instance, it means "rea—

"23 (that is, the exchange of reasons, the act of

sons
justifying, the act of bringing evidence to bear, rela—
tive to beliefs and knowledge.c1aims). In the second
instance, the term "rationality" implies a capacity24
within the student, the potential learner. In this
instance, it is defined in general terms which would seem
to suggest an entity which constitutes a "specifically"

human capacity within persons. An illustration of this

implication is found within the following statement:

 

 

22Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit.,
pp. 2-3.

23Ibid., pp. 2-3.

24

Ibid., pp. 76-77.

 

105

Rationality is an essential aspect of human dig-

nity and the rational goal of humanity is to con-

struct a society in which such dignity shall

flower, a society so ordered as to adjudicate

rationally the affairs of free rational agents.2

In view of these two senses of the term "ration-

ality" and in View of the likelihood of ambiguity in the
language of the above characterization of human ration—
ality, additional clarification seems warranted.

If one removes Scheffler's statements from an

isolated to a broader eclectic context, one might be able

 

to shed additional light on and extend the sc0pe of his
concept of rationality associated with teaching. One
might be able to avoid to some extent the critical issue
raised by George Kneller, for example: that the scope
of Scheffler's rationality is critically limited with
respect to a teaching context. In his critique of
Scheffler's rationality-teaching construct, Kneller con—
cludes as follows:

For me, the act of teaching cannot be so neatly

prescribed. How relatively simple our lot would

be if we could in fact stay within the bounds of

Scheffler's understanding of rationality. But

peOple are non-rational [e.g., emotional and

value-laden] too.26

The article by Nuthall and Snook cited in Chapter I con-

cluded that the writings of the proponents of the

 

25Ibid., p. 76.

6George F. Kneller, "Kneller on Conditions of
Knowledge by Israel Scheffler," Studies in Philosophy
and Education 5 (1966): 134.

 

 

 

 

106

rational model of teaching are indeed frequently subject
to misunderstanding.

For the purposes of the present study, there-
fore, it is important to find out what other conceptual
analysts might say about the nature of this rationality
which would make Scheffler's two senses of rationaltiy
seem reasonable and feasible vis-a-vis a "normal" class-
room context, and vis-a-vis the potential learner. In
other words, the needs for clarification suggest the
following objectives: (1) to find out what Scheffler
might mean (using his fellow conceptual analysts to aid
in this clarification) with respect to his rationality-
teaching construct; and (2) to find out, given the prac-
tical nature of education, what grounds can be stated
by conceptual analysts which would suggest that Schef-
fler's criterion of rationality has practical relevance.
Gilbert Ryle's analysis in this respect is particularly
useful because of his comprehensive description of the
scope of rationality; it allows for rational, nonrational,
and irrational elements characterizing that which is, or
can be included as, human.

Additional clarification also seems warranted

in view of the fact that the above directly quoted sense

 

cf "rationality" leaves room for one to infer or to con-

strue Scheffler's "restrictions" as presupposing a

 

107

naturalistic, or innate essence, in the human being
(particularly within the student) which would, in effect,
guarantee a capacity for rationality. To effect the nec-
essary clarification of a presupposed rationality in the
human being, the following questions were raised:

1. What is the nature of this rationality

which Scheffler appears to attribute
to the human being; and

2. On what basis can one reasonably assume

that a student, of any level of school-
ing, has the capacity which is presupposed,
indeed required, in Scheffler's rational
restrictions of manner?

In its attempt to answer these questions, this
section uses the language of relevant analyses of Ryle,
Passmore, and Peters. The general rationale associated
with this eclecticism relates to the need for additional
clarification in areas which are supportive of Scheffler's
View, and which have not received sufficient detail in
Scheffler's analysis to satisfy the objectives of the
present study. It would be helpful at this point to
remember that this chapter attempts to achieve the objec-
tive of examining one of Scheffler's interpretations of

a philosophical model (rational model) of teaching, with

a View to extracting from this model a component of

 

communication.

 

The general rationale associated with the eclec-

ticism of this chapter relates to the following additional

 

108

findings. First, the writer found that in the several
major sources in which the "restrictions of manner" are
mentioned, Scheffler provides general discussions of the
concepts of rationality in man (universal man), critical
thought, and mind in connection with his teaching con-
cept, but he does not give explicit enough detail regard-
ing these concepts as they may be seen to relate to com-
munication and teaching. Scheffler's analysis, unlike
the present study, highlights a "teaching-knowing" con-
.struct, and a "teaching—reasoning" construct. The present
work highlights, through an examination of Scheffler's
works, a "teaching-communication" construct. The evidence
of Scheffler's emphases can be found in three of his major
works: The Language of Education, Conditions of Knowl-
edge: An Introduction to Epistemology and Education, and
Reason and Teaching.

Another finding which suggested to this writer
the need for additional clarification relates to Schef-
fler's conceptual emphasis on the rule of respecting the
"intellectual integrity" and "independent judgment" of
the student. Such a rule would seem to imply that a stu-
dent does possess capacities for judgment and intellec—
tual work (that is, capacities for reasoning). Scheffler
does not explain and clarify in explicit enough detail
the conceptual bases upon which this claim rests. More-

over, from a more general perspective, some writers have

 

109

intimated that although Scheffler's interpretation of
teaching is an important contribution to the understanding
of a teaching concept, it is often seen as being so far
removed from the practical classroom arena as to be ren-
dered inapplicable to that context.27

For these particular reasons, the writer concluded
that a part of the strategic attempt to achieve the stated
objectives of the study should be the attempt to suggest
some additional grounds on which one might be able to say
that the rational criteria of the restrictions are reason-
able for a "typical" classroom context. In order to estab-
lish such grounds, the writer had to find out, through
other sources which have been concerned with a rational
concept of teaching, what Scheffler might mean at a level
which is not clearly explicated by him, and to examine
his interpretation in light of his and other analyses.

A third finding relates to the particular syn-
thesis at which the study seeks to arrive. In this
instance, the finding is that Scheffler alludes to the
necessity of a perceptual sort of communication relative
to teaching, but he does not build such a concept into
the explicit criteria of his interpretation of teaching.

ThiSfinding is reflected in a transition section of this

 

27Elizabeth Flower, "Elizabeth Flower on 322
Language of Education by Israel Scheffler," Studies in
Philosophy and Education 4 (Spring 1965): 133; See
also Kneller,loc. cit.

110

chapter, in the second objective of the study, and in
Chapter IV.

In View of these findings and the need for addi-
tional clarification, the language of Ryle, Passmore, and
Peters28 are incorporated to aid in the examination of
Scheffler's concept, trying carefully, however, to avoid
distorting or misrepresenting Scheffler's Views relative
to the "restrictions of manner" connoting teaching. The
relationship between these writers was cited in the intro-
ductory section of this chapter. In addition to this
general relationship of philosophical analytical, teaching
model, and conceptual analytical orientations, there is
a closer relationship between Peters and Scheffler. Both
writers exemplify the normative, the ethical, and the
Practical Thought elements in their approach to the study
of educational practice.

The following series of three sections includes

these emphases with respect to the rationality-teaching

 

construct:

l. Ryle's broadly construed concept of human
rationality as "general intelligence," "wit,"
and the "exertion of wit;"

28

Gilbert Ryle, "A Rational Animal," Education

and the Development of Reason, eds. R.F. Dearden, P.H.
Hirst, and R.S. Peters (London and Boston: Routledge

and Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 176-193; See also John Passmore,
"On Teaching to be Critical," same source, pp. 415-433;

See also R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit.,

pp. 46-51.

 

111

2. Passmore's concept of critical thought (that
is, "reasoning"), as an ideal construct, con-
strued as developmental in nature, and per-
vasively applicable to a "normal" classroom
context; and

3. Peters' concept of mind which suggests the
dual influence of objective and subjective
determinants relative to the human being's
mental development, his View on the world, and
the process and state of "being educated."

A Concept of Human
Rationalipy

 

 

This section and the following section employ the
categories of "human rationality" and "critical thought,"
respectively, to describe the two senses of rationality
which are presupposed in Scheffler's interpretation of
teaching.

The "restrictions of manner" are specifically
defined by Scheffler as "critical dialogue" and "rational
explanation." These elements may be seen to presuppose
what Gilbert Ryle identifies as a "dual Faculty of Theo-
retical and Practical Reason."29 This "dual Faculty"
appears to be relatively comparable to Scheffler's "cog-
nitive" and "moral" elements of "rationality" (described
earlier in the present chapter), and this faculty seems
to be clearly indicated in Scheffler's "strong sense" of

"knowing that something is the case" which he describes

 

29Gilbert Ryle, op. cit., p. 178.

'112

in connection with "teaching that something is the case"
(see pages 141-143, below).

Ryle's descriptive analysis of "Theoretical
Reason" suggests that this concept is synonymous with
what he variously terms "schooled," "academic," "special-
ized," and "professional" Reason.30 This concept entails,
according to Ryle, the ability to operate from and with
propositions: to set forth, to follow, and to understand
a line of reasoning and various sorts of strategies of
argument; to bring to bear objective and relevant evidence
("reasons") in connection with bodies of knowledge (for
example, scientific, philosophical, historical, and/or
mathematical areas of thoughtl. The concept of "Practical
Reason," says Ryle, involves moral principles of conduct
and feelings of persons in connection with their relating
to the objects (that is, other beings and inanimate
objects) of the public world.31 These positions represent
current discussions stemming from the tradition of Immanuel
Kant.

Each aspect of this "dual Faculty"—-Theoretical
and Practical Reason--has a specialized quality which,
if taken on the basis of the above definition alone, would
appear at first to negate the suggestion in Scheffler's

concept that all human beings (including children and

 

30Ibid., PP. 177-178 and 187-192.

311bid., p. 178

113

various types of students), possess such a "specifically
human" quality as rationality.32

The required abilities associated with the con-
cept of Theoretical Reason, for example, are not, as
Ryle's conceptual analysis shows, the abilities which
would fall within the capacities of a pre-school child,
the early school aged child, nor invariably within the
capacities of various students above this level, or var-
ious adults who may be considered even "brighter." More-
over, Ryle argues, there are numerous tasks of reasoning
which are neither of the "specialized" short, nor can they
be said to necessarily involve moral elements, moral
deliberation,cn:ref1ection of any kind. Instances<mfevery-
day conversation, playing a musical instrument, or games
of various sorts are types of phenomena which Ryle uses
to illustrate these latter tasks of reasoning.

This further analysis of Ryle with respect to a
concept of rationality has sought to dispel certain myths
which he sees as being connected with a concept of human
rationality.33 The arguments he sets forth in this respect
may allow one thereby to examine Scheffler's "rationality"
in a broader perspective. Ryle's broader concept of

rationality is particularly designed to dispel the

 

321bid., pp. 176—178.

33Ibid., pp. 176-193.

114

"mythical" notion that rationality must be restricted to
the Theoretical level, such that this level alone defines
what is "specifically human" about the human being; and
that it must therefore, given its conceived required
abilities, exclude certain "lesser" (or less "civilized")
beings.

Ryle, invoking a more generous notion of the
term rationality, calls it simply "Thought;" "general
intelligence," exerted and non-exerted "wit." Defined in
this comprehensive fashion, it is, according to Ryle,
sufficiently broad to encompass a wide range of actions,
reactions, thoughts and feelings which are within the
scope of what is deemed "specifically human." Moreover,
when rationality is explicated in such broad terms, one
may be able to avoid such objections as those raised by
Kneller. Man, Kneller argues, is not only rational; he
is also non-rational.

Ryle's analysis, on the other hand, suggests that,
as a specifically human concept, rationality may be
viewed as a relative quality which spans a full spectrum
from irrationality (distorted rationality) through varying
degrees of witfulness, embracing both theoretical and
non-theoretical (or specialized and non-specialized)
rationality. Rationality from this point of View can be
identified in smaller and/or greater amounts in various

people. It varies within individuals at various times

115

and with various kinds of problems, situational contexts,
and knowledge content.

Ryle's generous notion of rationality has suffi-
cient breadth to encompass also a wide range of activities.
In addition to its ability to encompass "specialized
reasoning," it includes such mental activity as pondering,
wondering, speculating, reflecting, trying to see a point,
trying to solve problems which are theoretical, practical,
and otherwise categorized; activity which may or may not
require moral consideration, or deliberation. This view
of rationality suggests, moreover, that the notions of
acting (doings) and thinking (or "rationality") are
inseparable. Conceptualized as "Thought," it can be
employed in reference to actions, whether or not they are
successful or well executed; it can also be employed in
reference to perceptions, whether or not they are con-
sidered objectively accurate. Ryle illustrates these
points in suggesting that such activities as seeing a
practical joke correctly or incorrectly apprehended,
playing tennis poorly or well, and the professional his-
torian's explaining an historical event are all instances
involving the notion of "general intelligence," "Thought,"
or "rationality." Other instances include the momentary
hesitation (possible reflection, or pondering), of the
tennis player between his movements during the course of

a game, or the perplexity evidenced by a person who is

116

trying to figure out a practical joke, or the same quality
which is evidenced by the professional historian who is
temporarily without an explanation which he requires rela-
tive to some historical event being considered.
Hence, when the term "rationality" is construed
in this broad fashion, as Ryle would have it, it encom-
passes instances of general reflection; it entails "wit"
which is perceived as intertwined with actions, and the
"wit" which is exerted in trying to solve a particular
problem. Conceptualized in this fashion, it is not,
moreover, limited to successful doings (as in the reaching
of a solution to a problem), nor is it limited to accur-
ate perceivings. This, however, does not preclude the fact
that there might be associated with the doing the aim of
achieving success; the point being made here relates
only, in this context, to the breadth of the notion of
rationality as it is contrasted with more specialized
uses, and as it is relevant to the fundamental areas of
presupposition under consideration here.
The following illustration indicates precisely

the comprehensive notion of human rationality which has
been set forth by Ryle:

Both seeing the joke without hesitation or effort

and trying to see it, i.e., thinking it over,

exemplify intelligence or, if you like, ration-

ality, in the most hospitable sense of the words.

[Moreover], the qualities of a man's wits are

shown both by his effortless gettings and accom-
plishings and by his effortful gettings and/or

117
missings, accomplishings or failures. But it is the
latter which have made the former possible.34

In suggesting (as this chapter intends to suggest)
that Ryle's generous notion of human rationality may be
presupposed at a level not explicated by Scheffler when
one is examining the "rational restrictions of manner,"
‘there are certain important effects which can be observed.
This suggestion does not intend to imply that Scheffler
himself uses Ryle's analysis in support of his own thesis.
What it does suggest is that an extension of a concept of
rationality along the lines of Ryle's concept may serve
to lend further clarification to what Scheffler might
mean with respect to his teaching-rationality construct.

One effect of Ryle's notion of rationality is
that it allows for a wide range of human beings to whom
the quality of rationality and a capacity for rationality
can be attributed; this is possible in that this notion
excludes only what can be defined as infancy and idiocy.
Rationality is not, therefore, reserved for a "civilized
elite," nor is it limited to the realm of "academia."
For a teaching context, this means that it may be reason-
able to assume that there exists a fundamental capacity
for rationality in all students, regardless of class,
grade level, age, academic area or status, or other

differential characteristics by which people and groups

 

34Ibid., p. 186.

118

are identified, separated, or categorized. Passmore's
analysis in the following section lends further support
to such a claim.

A second effect is in the suggestion that ration-
ality need not be limited, according to Ryle, to the
specialized category of Theoretical Reason, which is
developed ideally within the formal context of schooling,
and which is a progressive phenomenon in the sense that
it develops throughout the process of becoming educated.
On the basis of Ryle's conceptual analysis, there may
be discerned a comprehensive rational faculty within the
school aged human being which is itself variable, and
which contains other faculties whose capacities are also
variable.

A third effect relates to a concrete manifestation
of a concept of rationality (detailed in the following
section): the evidenced ability to reason in the phil-
osophical sense of "thinking critically about beliefs,

"35 This concept is

claims, propositions, or assertions.
-presupposed in Scheffler's procedural definition of
rationality as the "giving of reasons," the exchange of
reasons between teacher and student. It involves, accord-

ing to Ryle, a fundamental commitment to an ever-present

"justification demand."36 Consistent with his generous

 

35R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit.,

p. 51.

36Gilbert Ryle, op. cit., p. 192.

119

view of rationality, Ryle has suggested that the "justi-
fication demand" is a phenomenon which is not limited

to the contexts of "Theoretical" and "Practical" reason-
ing. It can always be made: reasons can always be given
or demanded for any action that is performed, and for

any feelings which are to rank as "specifically" human.37

A Concept of Critical
Thought

Critical thought, according to Passmore, is a
progressive phenomenon which requires the indispensable
criterion of critical exchange: its development advances
via the medium of critical discussion. According to
Peters,38 it requires that one must keep company with
other critical and rational beings so as to incorporate
"a critic" into the consciousness.

In a superficial sense, thinking critically can
be conceived of as involving questioning and stating
objections relative to acts, thoughts, and feelings.

For this reason, it can be said to exist, according to
.Passmore, in an embryonic sense, within a pre-school child.
Passmore claims that it is evidenced, for example, when

a child of any age objects to what he sees as unfair, or
undeserved, treatment: the scolding, or the overt rejec-

tion of an adult, in his immediate environment; or when

 

37Ibid.

38R.S. Peters, loc. cit.

'_I
[\“I
O

the child asserts that some type of performance-—a musical
rendition, or the playing of a game--is poorly, or inac—
curately exectued.39

From this embryonic existence, Passmore suggests
that critical thought, conceptualized in the above manner,
can be encouraged, improved upon, advanced, or built up
in any subject matter area, or level, from the earliest

40 From the early years, he claims,

years of schooling.
critical thought can be advanced through the critical
discussion of "accepted rules" which are affecting the
child's life. From this stage, the child can progressively
shape what was initially a vacuous stating of objections
into an understanding of what it is like to discuss a
question critically. As he progresses through school and
enters the disciplines with their differentiated content
and modes of criticism, the area of discussion widens,

and the student is enabled to perceive the more clearly
defined differences between types of discussion. His

capacity for critical thought develops and increases

through this process.

 

39Ryle, op. cit., pp. 180 and 184.

40John Passmore, "On teaching to be Critical,"
Education and the Development of Reason, eds. R.F.
Dearden, P.H. Hirst, and R.S. Peters (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 424—427 and
430-431.

121

In the strongest and most ideal sense, Passmore
conceives of critical thought as a "character trait"41
(that by which a person is known): one is referred to,
or characterized, as a "resonable" person, meaning that
one evinces this quality as an active tendency. As an
ideal concept, he argues, it involves more than habit
and skill. It is identified by the criteria of principled
criticism and imagination; it is the exercise of imagina-
tion which is indicative of critical discussion and
dialogue.

The strong sense of the concept of critical think-
ing has been described as "critico-creative" thinking,42
and "disciplined" thinking by Passmore and by Ryle,

43 "Critico-creative thought" is indicative

respectively.
of a single form of thinking which embodies conjointly
the aspect from which new ideas evolve (imagination), and
the aspect which reveals the need for new ideas (the
raising of objections). Its model is taken from the sort
of critical thinking which is evidenced within the "great
traditions" (the disciplines), of literature, Science,

history, philosophy, and technology.44 The description

of critical thought as "disciplined" indicates not that

 

41Ibid., pp. 418 and 423.

42Ibid., p. 423.

43Ryle, cp. cit., p. 191.

44 . .
John Passmore, loc. c1t.

122

it involves regimentation, drill, or indoctrination, but
that it involves a caring for one's standards (and objec-
tive standards), and a caring for the condition of one's
knowledge. In the general sense, it suggests that the
"Thinker" evinces a serious concern about whether he gets
something right or wrong; he is at least slightly con-
cerned to "think" properly; and for the "Thinker," the
"justification-demand" is uppermost in his thoughts.45
Stated more specifically, the concept of critical thought
suggests, as Ryle puts it, that:

One systematically takes precautions against per—

sonal bias, tries to improve the orderliness or

clarity of his theory, checks his references, his

dates or his calculations, listens attentively to

his critics, hunts industriously for exceptions to

his generalizations, deletes ambiguous, vague,

or metaphorical expressions from the sinews of his

arguments.... His thinking is controlled in high

or low de ree, by a wide range of quite specific

scruples. 6 (present writer's emphasis)

As a "character trait," Passmore's concept of the
development of critical thought (like Ryle's concept of
human rationality) spans an extended period of time; it
is variable within and among individuals, and its capacity

is relative to various contents and situational contexts.

Within the context of teaching, it necessarily requires

 

a healthy enthusiasm, on the part of teacher and student,

for the "give-and-take" of critical discussion. It

 

45Ryle, 0p. cit., pp. 191-192.

46Ibid., p. 191.

123

requires also a school and classroom climate which stim-
ulates its continual practice and development.

Also within the context of teaching, according to
Passmore, the concept of critical thought requires a cer-
tain attitudinal disposition, a particular type of “rad-
ical" orientedness: the realization and acceptance of
the fact that at any time either teacher or student could
be called upon to defend a belief or knowledge claim by
producing relevant evidence for such claims. They must
also maintain an openness to certain types of issues
which have bearing upon the institution of classroom
and school. Passmore contends that such issues as the
following are not removed from consideration: (a) the
possibility that established norms ought to be rejected;
(b) rules ought to be altered; (c) standards of judging
performance ought to be modified; or (d) methods of per-
formance ought to be abolished. Any issue of a contro-
versial sort is not immune from the scrutiny of critical
discussion. According to Passmore's position, the notion
of a critical orientation and the appropriate atmosphere
which surrounds it suggests, moreover, that it is more
important to acquire the tendency of examining critically
the yglpp and the reason Why, of the performances in which
one is asked to engage, than it is to acquire the tendency
of examining the level, and relative levels, of achieve-

ment within given performances. It is this critical

124

orientation which is presupposed in Scheffler's "restric—
tions of manner." In Scheffler's words: Teaching
involves "the enterprise of giving honest reasons and
welcoming radical questions."47
A final note on this concept of critical thought
takes into account those activities which Passmore
explicitly excludes from this concept, and which he deems
incompatible with the concept. In the streng and ideal
sense, it would not entail, he argues, imparting facts,
or merely the development and application of a skill (e.g.,
making objections, identifying distortions or fallacies
in arguments, being competent in criticizing techniques,
or reproducing the rules by which criticisms are made).
From the standpoint of the teacher, it would not involve,
in Passmore's View, such activities as drawing attention
to the student's deviations from fixed norms: pointing
out perceived defects in the student, criticizing his
answers to focused questions, or criticizing the student's
behavior and the principles by which he governs his con-
duct. It does not ential demanding the student's con-
formance with the teacher's notion of "high standards;"
this does not mean, however, that genuinely high, and
reasonable, standards are not to be observed. Scheffler

has written with respect to this ideal context of what

 

47Israel Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge: An
Introduction to Epistemology and Education, op. cit., pp.
ll-12.

 

 

125

constitutes critical thought in teaching that it requires
\not an arbitrary, nor personally biased, nor absolute,
application of standards. The application of standards
requires, in his view, principled deliberation, and
appropriate regard for differential factors of attitude,
background, developing capacities, and general maturity,
within and among students.48

The previous two sub-sections have illuminated
certain important points. From the standpoint of the
presupposed concepts of human rationality and critical
thought, the following inferences may be drawn.

First, Scheffler's "restrictions of manner" may
be viewed as presupposing an essential concept of ration-
ality which is broader than, and prior to, his explicit
emphases associated with tasks of "Theoretical" and
"Practical" reasoning. If Scheffler's concept is set in
the broader contexts of Ryle's "general intelligence"
and Passmore's developmental trait of "critical thought,"
then Scheffler's restrictions may be seen to have more
directly practical relevance in terms of applications to
actual classroom teaching.

Secondly, the "restrictions" may be taken as

presupposing an orientation and an atmosphere in which

 

48Ibid., pp. 57-58; See also Scheffler, Reason
and Teaching, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

 

126

the traits of critical thinking and rationality can
develop progressively.

Finally, the notion of critical thought (that is,
the concept of reasoning ability) conceptualized as a
"character trait," which is a central aim of Scheffler's
teaching concept, is dependent upon critical discussion
and dialogue. Under the sub-heading "Teaching and Know—
ing" (pages 143-148), these procedural aspects will be

explicitly designated as "rational communication."

A Concept of Mind

 

The concept of mind can be seen as the connecting
and overlapping link between Scheffler's human and pro-
cedural senses of rationality, and an underlying notion
of "being educated," or achieving a state of "knowing."
The present discussion of a concept of mind is taken from
the analysis of R.S. Peters. This particular concept
provides additional grounds on which one might be able to
state that Scheffler's interpretation of teaching has
practical relevance vis—a—vis a "typical" teaching context.

This concept is discussed by Peters in terms of
three key elements: consciousness, language, and think—
ing (in the sense of an activity of reasoning, or thinking
critically). The development of mind has been discussed
by Peters in terms of its centrality to the notions of

acquiring knowledge, and being "educated."

127

The concept of an "educated" person involves, in
Peters' view, more than knowing about things, or knowing
how to do something, accumulating information, or being

49 It entails a sort of empathic delving

well—informed.
into, getting beneath the surface of information, in such
fashion that what becomes kppyp effects a transformation
of one's outlook, one's View of the world (that is, what
and how one thinks and feels, what one values). To be
"educated," writes Peters, "is not to have arrived; it is
to travel with a different View."50
The concept of the development of mind essentially
denotes, according to Peters' view, the means of achieving
a ppgpp of "being educated." The main feature of mind
is said by Peters to be the aspect of consciousness;51
referred to on pages 99-101 in connection with the ethical
obligation. Peters claims that this aspect exists in an
undifferentiated state at birth, and it represents a
constant, unless (as in cases of coma, or other such

cases), there is a state of temporary or terminal ppcon-

sciousness. From this initial center of consciousness,

 

49R.S. Peters, The Concept of Education, op. cit.,
pp. 8-9; See also R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education, pp.
46-62.

50R.S. Peters, The Concept of Education, op. cit.,

p. 8.
51

pp. 49-50.

R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit.,

 

128

the mind develops, i.e., it becomes differentiated,
according to Peters' concept, by way of activity in
external and internal dimensions. Central to its develop-
ment is what Peters calls the "social dimension,"52 a
notion which can be seen as being centrally linked with
Peters' ethical orientation with respect to educational
matters. This notion suggests that mental development is
achieved by a sort of interaction between the experi-
encings, meanings, and perceptions of the individual, and
the public (external) knowledge "embedded in the language
of a culture" of which one is conscious. .
This "social dimension" is vital not only to
Peters' concept of mind, as it is interpreted in this
context, it also carries with it implications which are
central to Scheffler's concepts of teaching and knowing.
From Peters' perspective this notion implies that the
mind cannot be viewed simply as a medium for receiving,
absorbing, or processing information. It suggests that
mental development entails the individual's imprinting on
public knowledge (i.e., the knowledge of which one is
conscious), "his own style and pattern of being."
This personal imprint enamates from the experiential con-

tent which is indicative of a personally unique

 

52Ibid., pp. 51—54.

53Ibid., p. 50.

129

life-history, existing at a given time, or stage of
biological, psychological, and cognitive development.
Scheffler's phrase: "growth of knowledge in the
individual" (an aim of teaching), which is analogous to
the development of mind, corresponds to concepts of
Peters. In the context of analyzing certain "Philosophical
Models of Teaching,"54 Scheffler makes these postulations:
(a) the mind is not solely a receiver, Sifter, and
storer of information; (b) nor is the "growth of knowledge
in the individua1"-—the develOpment of mind—-dependent
only upon experience or sensory data to which the mind is
receptive; moreover, (c) to kpgy_is more than to have
experience, and insight (i.e., the seeing of underlying
realities or principles pertaining to bodies of knowledge,
or skills).55
As Scheffler develops his View of the role of
the learner relative to the teaching-knowing complex, a
"social dimension" concept is clearly implied. Scheffler
writes that the "growth of knowledge in the individual
learner" requires "innovation"--a criterion which is
implied to some extent in the concept of "insight" (the
cognitive activity of seeing the point, and seeing the

underlying principles)--but even more, such growth requires

 

54
pp. 67-81.
55

Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit.,

Ibido ' pp. 68-770

130

objective evidence (reasons) and principled judgment and

56

conduct. "The role of principles in the exercise of

cognitive judgment involves," in Scheffler's View:

The capacity for a principled assessment of
reasons bearing on justification of [a] belief

in question. The knower,...must typically earn
the right to confidence in his belief by acquiring
the capacity to make a reasonable case for the
belief in question.... [It is not] sufficient for
this case to have been explicitly taught. What is
generally expected of the knower is that his
autonomy be evidenced in the ability to construct
and evaluate fresh and alternative arguments, the
power to innovate, rather than the capacit to
reproduce stale arguments earlier stored.5

The concept of knowledge (knowing) requires, and therefore

 

a concept of teaching must take into account, according
to Scheffler's view, that which goes "beyond... cognitive
insight" to "the fundamental commitment to principles by
which insights are to be criticized and assessed, in the
light of publicly available evidence or reasons...."

The concept of principles and the concept of

reasons together underlie not only the notions

of rational deliberation and critical judgment,

‘but also the notions of rational and moral

conduct.58

These statements very clearly and explicitly

indicate that there is an ethical obligation on the part

of the student pertaining to the acquiring of knowledge,

or the development of mind. Peters' "social dimension"

 

56Ibid., p. 77.

57Ibid.

58Ibid., pp. 75-76.

 

131

suggests also, as does Scheffler's interrelated concepts
of teaching and knowing, that there is a corresponding
ethical obligation on the part of the teacher. Peters'
suggestion that the development of mind requires not only
objective knowledge but the individual's "response to"
that knowledge carries with it the idea that the student
possesses an internal structure~—an individual "center
of consciousness"—-which allows him to select from, accept,
or reject that which is offered to him in the context of
teaching.

Therefore, those who are engaged in "educating"
must take into account the "consciousness and consent"
of the student. Peters writes that the activities which
would "educate" persons (or which would achieve some state
of mind in the student), must be "morally unobjectionable."
Such "educative" activities are bound by the principle
of "respect for persons."59 Moreover, it is on the
basis of this moral principle that certain activities
are excluded in.a particular "task sense" of "education."60
Peters takes the position that the most morally objection-
able activity is "conditioning" activity. This activity
is excluded from his concept of "education" when and if

it involves the teacher's trying to coerce, persuade, or

 

59Peters, The Concept of Education, op. cit.,

 

pp. 3-6.

60Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit., pp.

 

35-43.

132

lead, the student to "pick up" certain things without
the latter's realizing that he is picking up anything.
Such practices as giving orders to the student and dis-
couraging the student's tendency to make individual
choices may also be ruled out of the notion of "educa-
tion," says Peters, on moral grounds associated with
"respect for persons."

The second and interrelated component of Peters'
"social dimension" of the development of mind can be seen
in its emphasis on the role of language: "knowledge is
enshrined in the language of a culture," says Peters.
The emphasis in this View is on language as the object
of knowledge, as distinguished from a related cognitive
theory which places emphasis on language as the instru-

ment of knowledge. The differentiation of mind begins

 

with the learning of a language, writes Peters, and he
goes on to emphasize that "a people's language is the key
to the form of life which they enjoy."61 For example:

The working class man... who has access only to

a limited vocabulary and to a limited set of
symbolic structures, literally lives in a different
world from the professional man who has a much
wider and more varied vocabulary and whose educa-
tion in the various differentiated forms of thought
has continued for nearly a decade longer.6

 

61Ibid., p. 52.

62Ibid., pp. 52-53.

 

 

133

In a similar vein, Scheffler maintains that
"knowledge is, first and foremost, embodied in language,"
and it involves four central factors: (a) an objectively
construed "conceptual apparatus;" (b) a creatively and
individualistically construed body of theory which has
developed throughout cultural history;63 (c) the incul—
cation of language: the theories, i.e., the statements
about sense data which have been accepted as truth asser-
tions; and (d) the testing of accepted theories through
individual experience.64 By invoking his constant
referent of knowledge and the growth of knowledge in the
individual, Scheffler writes:

In the process of learning, the child gets not only
sense experiences but the language and theory of
his heritage in complicated linkages with dis-
criminable contexts.65

In more specific terms, Peters distinguishes two
levels of mental development: one prior to school age,
the other within the context of schooling. He maintains
that from the onset of language leanring, the mind under-
goes general and specialized sorts of differentiation.
The child begins this course in developing a structure

of categories and a conceptual apparatus, by questioning,

 

 

63Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit.,
pp. 69-70.

64Ibid., p. 70.

65

Ibid.

134

identifying, reflecting, deciding. In so doing, he is
enabled to differentiate himself from others within his
immediate environment; he is enabled to differentiate
between persons and between objects. He develops a sense
of objects in a space-time framework, an awareness of
causal connections, and of means-end relations. Within
the context of schooling, the mind develops more special-
ized differentiations. This occurs thorugh the process
of learning basic skills, content, and specialized bodies
of knowledge and methods (critical procedures) by which
content has been accumulated, and by which it is criti-
cized and revised.66
In sum, the concept of mind and its development
entails the assumption of an initially undifferentiated
aspect of consciousness; a developing individual center
of consciousness; and a language integral to which is the
aspect of objective knowledge. Language is the embodiment
of conceptual structures, theories, beliefs, standards,
feelings, and purposes, which constitute a public inheri-
tance.67 In learning a language, by using the capacity
for reasoning, and by engaging in critical exchange, the

developing person shares in, participates in, and is

enabled to contribute to, this public inheritance.

 

66Peters, Ethics and Education, pp. 46-51.

 

67Ibid., p. 53.

 

135

The set of conclusions which follow presently
will show the relationship between the concept of mind
and Scheffler's "restrictions of manner." However, in
view of the above emphasis on the "language of a culture,"
and this chapter's earlier discussion of acculturation
and the "restrictions," it is important to describe
briefly now the nature of the relationship between the
teaching concept and acculturation.

The emphasis on cultural language as the object
of knowledge suggests the area in which there is a rela-
tionship between teaching and the previously mentioned
concept of acculturation. Is there a contradiction in
Scheffler's theory, as it has been represented in this
study? The answer to this question is found in Scheffler's
distinctions of "manner."68

Scheffler does not reject the notion of accultur-
ation, i.e., he does not reject the notion that culture
should be transmitted to the young. What he does is to
distinguish between teaching on the one hand, requiring
rational explanation and critical dialogue, and "foster—
ing the acquisition of modes of behavior or belief"-—

69

acculturation——on the other. These are Scheffler's

"distinctions of manner" which "depend on the manner in

 

68Scheffler, The Language of Education, op. cit.,

 

p. 58.

691bid., pp. 57—59.

136

which such acquisition is fostered," distinctions which
take into account a fundamental moral question.70 These
distinctions further imply that the "standard sense of
teaching," central to which are Scheffler's "restrictions
of manner," is not a phenomenon which can be automatically
presumed whenever there is a process of cultural trans-
mission, or cultural renewal. Scheffler suggests that the
concept of teaching is one which must be chosen by the
society and the institution; it is not a given. The
following statements illustrate what he sees as the
relationship between acculturation and teaching:

The fact that every culture may be said to

renew itself by getting newborn members to behave

according to its norms emphatically does not mean

that such a renewal is everywhere a product of

teaching in the standard sense.... To favor the

widest diffusion of teaching as a mode and as a

model of cultural renewal is, in fact, a signifi-

cant social option of a fundamental kind involving

the widest possible extension of reasoned criticism

to the culture itself.... The issue,... is not

whether culture shall be renewed, but in what

manner such renewal is to be institutionalized.

It is this fundamental practical issue that.

must not be obscured in practical contexts. 1

Thus the answer to the question of whether there

is a contradiction in Scheffler's theory is negative.

The distinctions he makes in this respect relate not to

the content (the subject matter) of the process of

 

7OIbid., pp. 53—57.

7lIbid., pp. 58-59.

137

acculturation, nor to the g: of the transmission, but
to the Egg of the transmission.

In view of the above concept of mind, the follow-
ing interim conclusions may now be drawn.

First, the concept of mind which is presupposed
in Scheffler's "restrictions of manner" connoting teaching
is made up of the three interlocking elements of conscious-
ness, language, and thinking. These carry with them the
implication that there is a central core and a developing
capacity within the person which becomes differentiated
through the media of verbal exchange, conversation,
critical discussion and dialogue with oneself and with
the public world of which one is conscious.

Secondly, the notion of education or the growth
of knowledge in the indivudal involves achieving a per-
vasive and comprehensive state of mind. This implies

both a liberal breadth of education (in terms of thoughts,

 

feelings, values, standards of judgment, purposes, beliefs,
choices, principles of conduct) and the rationales (i.e.,
the underlying principles), relative to bodies of knowledge
and relative to the performance associated with activities
which would facilitate the development of mind. Consistent
with this view of mind, the notion of teaching is Viewed

as the "educational process" by means of which people are
brought to understand principles...: the term "£2322"

(unlike the term "instruct"), suggests, according to

138

Peters, that "a rationale is to be grasped behind the
skill or body of knowledge." Scheffler expands on this
requirement by invoking the concepts of principles and
reasons by which underlying principles themselves are
"criticized and assessed, in light of publicly available
evidence;" thereby, committing the student and the
teacher, in theory, to "rational deliberation," "critical
judgment," "rational conduct," and "moral conduct." This
is the essentially moral and cognitive core of Scheffler's
theory which is in this respect equally subscribed to by
Peters. It is the core which (the present thesis would
maintain) should inform the shaping and practice of
teacher education.

Finally, the concept of mind suggests a "social
dimension" which is intertwined with an ethical obliga-
tion relative to the manner in which the development of
mind can be achieved. This carries With it the notion

of respecting the mind: taking into account the "con-

 

sciousness and consent" of the individual whose mind would
be developed. It involves acknowledging the principle

of individual choice, and committing oneself to the
ethical consideration of "respect for persons." This too
should be a central characteristic of teacher education

practices.

 

 

139
The Underlying Notion of Communication:
A Set of Inferences
The focused areas of presupposition have illum-
inated certain central emphases, rationales, and a com-
munication aspect in relation to Scheffler's "restric-

tions of manner" associated with teaching. On the basis

 

of the four preceding sections, the following inferences
can be drawn.
First, the "restrictions" presuppose a broadly

liberal concept of becoming "educated" which emphasizes

 

the development of the reasoning facility of the human
being.

Secondly, on the basis of the presupposed concepts
of rationality (both as a specifically human quality,
and as a critical procedure), and on the basis of the
concept of mind, a rationale is illuminated which supports
the assumption that Scheffler's "restrictions" would
be applicable to any "typical" classroom context. Excep-
tions are noted in the third inference below.

Thirdly, there is a sense in which all human
beings can be said to possess at least an embryonic
potential for reasoning by virtue of an individual center
cf consciousness (i.e., a "point of view on the world").
Moreover, all students (excepting actual cases defined
as infants and idiots) can be said to possess changing
and variable capacities for reasoning in the sense of

thinking critically.

140

Fourthly, in View of the internal structure of
the human being, i.e., as it is represented by the notion
of mind and its interlocking concepts, it seems fair to
state that there exists, in theory, the potential and some
capacity for indivdual choice. Therefore, those who would
educate, and the activities which aim at the development
of mind, are bound by ethical considerations associated
with the acknowledgement of such individual choice, and a
respect for persons.

Fifth, the concept of mind and its interlocking
concepts (that is, human rationality and critical
thought) identify conjointly an aim and a process: the
achievement of a pervasive and comprehensive state of mind,
and the procedures of critical dialogue and discussion
(engaging the mind), as the means of facilitating the
development of mind. This aim and procedure appear to
presuppose a concept of communication.

Finally, in view of the centrality of language
and thinking, and in View of the emphasized principles of
critical discussion and dialogue relative to the develop-
ment of mind and the notion of becoming "educated," it
_seems reasonable to assume that a fundamental notion of
communication is indeed presupposed in Scheffler's

"restrictions of manner."

141
The Presuppgsition of Rapional
Commun1cation: A Tran51tion
The following section is intended to serve as a

bridge which connects Chapter III with Chapter IV. It aims
at illuminating Scheffler's explicit references to the
centrality of a concept of rational communication, and it
aims at illuminating the perceptual concerns which are
indicated by Scheffler and which suggest a rationale for
a personal concept of communication. The clearest evi-
dence of these references is found in Scheffler's delin-
eation of what he calls a "'strong sense' of knowing" and

its relationship with the concept of teaching: the prop-

 

ositional case of "knowing that" and "teaching that"

something is the case.72

Scheffler places the greater emphasis in his
analysis on the objectively construed propositional case
of knowledge. This is to be distinguished from a "pro-
cedural" case involving skill, skill development, knack,
or "knowing how" to do something. It is also to be dis-
tinguished from a propositional case of "perceptual know-
ledge," i.e., cases in which a person is in a direct

position to know that which he asserts in a statement

 

‘without being required, necessarily, to support his
assertion with public evidence, e.g., instances in which

one states his own name, or asserts verbally that he is

 

72Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, op. cit.,
pp. 7-14 and pp. 55-90; See also pp. 106-107.

 

142

in pain, or asserts in looking through a window that

the weather is cloudy, or the postman is coming up the
sidewalk--instances involving thoughts, feelings, moods
which may or may not be supported by objective evidence.
This section, therefore, will concern itself with aspects
of the former, "strong sense" of propositional knowledge,73
in View of its particular relevance to the teaching con-
cept.

When teaching aims at the student's coming to
kppp (in the "strong sense") that something is the case,
the knowing involves, in Scheffler‘s View, more than the
notions of "learning" and "believing." Such knowing, to
be called knowing (e.g., saying that the student kpgyg
that such and such is the case), requires the conditions
of "Truth," "Belief," and "Evidence"--the combination of
these three conditions is necessary. The distinction
Scheffler draws between "learning“ and "believing" on the
one hand, and knowing on the other relates primarily to
the requirement of "relevant evidence" in connection with
a belief or a knowledge claim. For example, to ppggp that
Columbus discovered American (one of Scheffler's examples),
with the intent of having the student come to kppg that

Columbus discovered America, the teacher must assert that,

 

73Ibid., p. 21.

 

143

and commit himself personally to the substantive assertion
that, on the basis of currently available evidence,
Columbus did in fact discover America. (The counter
argument can also be made, duly observing the three con-
ditions of knowing). Moreover, the achievement of knowing,
which is the aim of teaching (in this context)74 is gained
by the student through the critical processes of "deliber-
ation, argument, judgment, appraisal of reasons pro and
con, weighing of evidence, appeal to principles, and

decision—making."75

Teaching and Knowing: Mutual
Participation of Teacher
and Student

 

 

In this "strong sense" of knowing and teaching, a
notion of communication appears to be a pervasive and
fundamental factor. It suggests that teaching is viewed
in terms of the mutual participation of teacher and
student. The student is not, Scheffler writes, mere
inert material to be worked on by rule:

[The student] enters into communication with the
teacher and, through the teacher, with the

heritage of culture common to both. Such com-
munication broadens and refines the student's

 

74Scheffler includes also in his analyses the
procedural "teaching how to," and "teaching to" as asso—
ciated with moral conduct and social excellences. "Teach-
ing and Telling," The Language of Education (1968), pp.
76-101. These are not within the scope of the present
study.

75Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., p. 75.

144
initial outlook, and thereby increases his
understanding.76
From the standpoint of the student, according

to Scheffler's analysis, knowledge is not simply given to

 

him, nor does he come to know simply by being told some-
thing or by obtaining, storing, processing and reproducing
information, or seeing the point. The student is required

to gain understanding through the exertion of his reason-

 

ing capacity: to, in Scheffler's words, "earn the 'right
to be sure'" of the truth of any knowledge claim which is
made by him, or by the teacher, in the context of teaching.
To produce, or reproduce right answers on a test, or to
have been told certain answers by an authority, is not
sufficient in itself to attribute knowing to the student.
Both teacher and student, in this respect of the latter's
"earning the right to his assurance" of the truth of any
information, belief, or knowledge claim, are bound by the

“77 Peters has referred

rule of "principled deliberation.
to this mutual commitment to "principled deliberation"
as the area of "holy ground" (quoting D.H. Lawrence),
which "stands between teacher and taught." That is to
say, the notion of "critical procedures" (implied in
Scheffler's "principled deliberation"), conceptualized

as the means by which knowledge is "assessed, revised, and

adapted to new discoveries..."

 

76Ibid., p. 87.

77Ibid., pp. 74-75 and pp. 77-78; See also
Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, op. cit., pp. 58-74.

145

...presupposes public principles that stand as imper-
sonal standards to which teacher and learner
must give their allegiance.78
Scheffler holds that the teacher, as a mutual
participant in the teaching-knowing complex, is bound also
by certain other more specific commitments. In addition

to his commitment to the truth of any assertion which he

makes in the context of teaching, he is also obligated to

 

submit himself to the questioning of the student (indeed,
to encourage the same), and to support knowledge claims

with honest reasons in the context of teaching that some-

 

thing is the case. Moreover, as assessor of student
evidence (in terms of the condition of the student's

knowledge), he must apply his standards of judgment with

 

appropriate sensitivity to individual differences and
capacities. That is to say, he must take into account
the relevant differences in cultural background, chron-
ological age, attitudes, and general maturity, which
influence the capacities, and changing levels of capacity,
within and among students.

The following sets of quotations are illustrative
of the points being made in this sub-section: (1) that
there is a fundamental concept of rational communication
which emanates from Scheffler's "evidence condition"

defining the "strong sense" of knowing (referred to

 

78Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit., pp.

52-54.

146

earlier in this chapter as the procedural aspect of
"rationality"), and which is particularly manifested in
the notion of mutual participation of teacher and student
relative to the teaching—knowing complex; and (2) that the
concepts of teaching and knowing require an element of
sensitivity on the part of the teacher in assessing the

actual condition of the student's knowledge. The first

 

quotation illuminates the aspect of the "dialogue:" the
mutual exchange of "reasons" which is required for the

teaching concept, and for the student to "earn the right

 

to be sure." Teaching, in this respect, is distinct from

 

such activity as debating, or propagandizing, writes
Scheffler, because of "its special connection with... the

enterprise of giving honest reasons and welcoming radical

questions....

The person engaged in teaching does not merely want
to bring about belief, but to bring it about through
the exercise of free rational judgment by the student.
.... In teaching, the teacher is revealing his
reasons for the beliefs he wants to transmit and is
thus, in effect, submitting his own judgment to the
critical scrutiny and evaluation of the student; he

is fully engaged in the dialogue by which he hopes

to teach and is riskIng'his own beliefs, in lesser

or greater degree, as he teaches.79

The emphases in the above quotation are those of the
present writer; the underlined passages illuminate the
specific references to the interrelated notions of mutual

participation and rational communication.

 

79
pp. 11—12.

Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, op. cit.,

147

The final quotation in this context indicates the
care which must be taken by the teacher in applying var-
iable standards to the student's performance, i.e., to
the nature of his evidence in "earning the 'right to be
sure.'" Scheffler writes that the required variability
in the application of the teacher's standards does not
preclude the teacher's possessing a stringently defined
concept of critical standards, and standards of judgment,
relative to an objectively construed definition of stand-
ards, or standards which are based on expert knowledge
in a given area; however:

If knowledge appraisals are to be capable of marking
relevant advances [within the student], the stringency
with which standards are applied needs to keep pace
with changing levels of capacity. As capacity grows,
the same subject may thus come to be known under

ever more stringent interpretations of known.80
(Scheffler's emphasis).

In the "belief" condition of knowing, Scheffler
makes an even stronger reference to a perceptual concern
(more so than the above implication of a perceptual sen-
sitivity in the application of "variable standards" in

assessing the adequacy of the student's evidence relative

to the condition of his knowledge). Moreover, in the

 

"belief" condition of knowing that something is the case,
Scheffler's reference to the communication concept has

the flavor of a personal quality of communication

 

801bid., p. 57.

148

(similar to the listening concept of the following chap-

 

ter), but such a notion is not explicitly emphasized
within the concept of teaching per se.
Teaching and Knowing: The

Perceptual Concern Within
the Belief Criterion

 

 

Scheffler's "belief" condition of knowing that
something is the case suggests that the potential knower .
must "genuinely believe" that such and such is the case.81
However, Scheffler acknowledges that a condition of
"genuine belief," as a "purely psychological" notion,
is difficult to assess in another person. The student's
verbalized espousal: "I believe that such and such is
the case" (for example, that Columbus discovered America,
or that water is made up of two parts hydrogen and one
part oxygen), is not sufficient in itself to satisfy the
condition of "genuine belief;" it does not guarantee that
he actually does "believe." Nor does the failure of the
student to make such an avowal indicate that he actually
does not "believe" (i.e., that he does not have the
relevant evidence, and thus the "right to be sure").

It is Scheffler's opinion that the problem with
assessing "genuine belief"--either self-assessment or

teacher assessment, whether overtly expressed, or held and

not expressed overtly, or acknowledged on any level—-has

 

811bid.. pp..75-9o.

149

to do with the nature of "belief" itself as a complex of
dispositions. "Belief" is a complicated complex of other
operative factors: other beliefs, purposes, motivations,
objectives, and psychological, environmental, and bio-
logical states related to the individual "believer." The
following is a brief sketch of some of the difficulties of
"outer" and "inner-response" which affect the assessment
of "genuine belief" within the student. These examples
suggest, moreover, a rationale for the personal concept

of listening which is set forth in the following chapter.

 

There are variable conditions connected with the
student's decision on a given occasion to reveal his
actual "belief," or to suppress, subvert, distort, or
avoid revealing his actual "belief." Such factors as
embarrassment, and the desire to be approved of by sOmeone
within his environment, might represent the overriding
motivational factors. Scheffler suggests that the "verbal
inhibitions" of a child, for example, might indicate "not
a lack of relevant beliefs," but an overriding motivation
connected with the child's "fear of adults or his desire

"82

to win or maintain their approval. Another instance

of this sort of resistance is found in Scheffler's example
of the student who lies deliberately and systematically

so as to bring his expressed beliefs into line with what

 

 

82Ibid., p. 80.

150

is thought to be the teacher's beliefs, or beliefs which
other adults will approve of. The test situation often
involves the student's practice of making verbal responses
which are "thought to reflect the attitudes and opinions
of the test-makers, independently of the student's own
'genuine beliefs.”83
In addition to the complexity of outward expression
affecting the assessment of "genuine belief," Scheffler
argues that there is also a problem associated with what

"84 In this respect, there is

he calls "inner response.
a sense in which people, including students, can be out
of touch with, or never really know, what they actually
believe; they intend that their expressions and what they
hold as beliefs are actual beliefs, but the inner and
outer espousals are in fact distortions of "belief;"
"genuine belief," in such cases, can neither be acknow-
ledged to oneself, nor to the outside world. Scheffler
sees these distortions as resulting from the person's
holding other beliefs, purposes, or perceptions.

For example, when a person, upon reflection, dis—
approves of a belief, or he perceives that it is dangerous

to have such a belief, or that the society would not

approve of it, he fails to acknowledge to himself that

 

83Ibid.

84Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, op. cit.,

p. 83.

 

151

such a belief is in fact pip belief. Beliefs associated
with various types of social prejudices represent a case
in point; such beliefs are held but sincerely denied.
In other instances, people often succeed in "talking them-
selves into," and subsequently professing, a belief which,
though not deeply ingrained, is thought upon reflection
to have the carriage of social sanction. Certain
"religious beliefs" may be of this order. Such beliefs,
Scheffler maintains, are often not "genuinely" held, but
they are sincerely professed: the person actually thinks,
and intends, that these beliefs are "genuine beliefs."
These difficulties surrounding what Scheffler
calls "outer" and "inner response" have critical bearing

on the teaching—knowing complex. Moreover, the nature of

 

these difficulties in connection with assessment of
"genuine belief" as a condition of knowing would seem to
suggest the need for some additional perceptual means of
facilitating the clarification of "genuine belief," both
for the teacher and for the student. The teacher would
have to know the ngp and the g: of the student's belief
in order to accurately assess the condition of his know-
ledge. Moreover, it would also seem important that the
student knows ngp and i: he actually believes that
something is the case. Peters has observed, in this
respect, that there is a sense in which a person does not

actually know what he feels and believes until he places

152

it in public, and brings evidence in its support.85 In

another place he notes that the context of "critical
discussion“ (the central criterion of Scheffler's "restric-
tions of manner"), embodies the "principle of impartiality"
which requires, in itself, a notion of listening: the
acts of assenting and dissenting with others according to
(in Peters' words) "relevant criteria," for example, "the
quality of arguments adduced," as opposed to "irrelevant
considerations such as the colour of the eyes or hair of
the contributors."86
This objectively construed, rational and ethical,
concept of "listening" does not, however, explicitly allow

for the emphasized personal aspect of the concept of

listening. The following statement is indicative of

 

Scheffler's strongest admission in this respect. In light
of the difficulties surrounding the "belief condition,"
as it is conceived by Scheffler, he refers to a notion of

communication which is purely rational, but it has the

 

overtones, the flavor, of a perceptual psychological con-
dition associated with communication.

Directing his remarks strictly to the classroom
context, Scheffler writes that there is a serious problem

in "mistaking verbal dispositions for belief;" therefore,

 

85R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit.,

 

86Ibid., p. 214.

153

the teacher has to recognize "not only the ramifications
of belief in conduct," but he also has to recognize "the

influence of motivation and social climate on verbal

 

expression..."

If we aim to engage the student's belief and not
simply to shape his verbal output, we need to be
able to communicate with him. For this to be
possible we need to create an atmosphere of
security, so that verbal expression may approximate
genuine belief. Such an atmosphere itself would
seem to require an emphasis on rational discussion
free of constraint and free of propagandistic tend-
encies: this emphasis underlies the common or
standard sense of teaching.37 (Scheffler's
emphases).

 

This quotation clearly indicates that what seems
up to a point to be Scheffler's suggestion of a personal,
or psychological, condition of communication, is in fact
(as is indicated in the last sentence above), a suggestion
of a rational sort of communication. It is also clear
that he alludes to the significance of the psychological
climate of "security" in connection with rational commun-
ication and teaching procedure. (The chapter which
follows places explicit emphasis on a personal condition,
relative to the teaching concept, which Scheffler does
not explicitly emphasize in his interpretation of teach-
ing). The following quotation is a clear illustration
of Scheffler's probable intent relative to the personal

condition and the teaching concept. In The Language of

 

 

87Scheffler, op. cit., p. 90.

154

Education, be explicitly states that the "restrictions

 

of manner" require an acknowledgement of the student's
sense of "reasons," but:
Teaching cannot.... be assimilated to such psycho-
logical notions as setting up conditions under
which learning will most effectively take place.88
If by the use of the term "assimilation,"

Scheffler implies that such “conditions" (of which the

listening concept is one aspect), cannot be "absorbed

 

into" the concept of teaching, then the point made in this

 

section stands. That is to say, although Scheffler
alludes to the significance of a perSonal condition of
communication, it is, in effect, avoided in the explicit
criteria of his concept.

Rationale fora Personal Concept of

Listening: Findings and
Inferences

 

The presentation of a concept of listening in the
following chapter is based upon certain reasons which
emanate from the preceding areas of presupposition:
ethical obligation; concepts of human rationality, critical
thought, and mind; and an underlying concept of communi-
cation.

One general inference can be drawn. There was
found a substantive conceptual relationship among

Scheffler's "evidence" and "belief" conditions of knowing;

 

88Scheffler, The Language of Education, op. cit.,
pp. 104—105.

 

155

Peters' "social dimension" of the concept of mind; and a

perceptual concept of listening. Each of these concepts

 

possesses an objective (intellectual, or cognitive), and
a perceptual referent. In Scheffler's definition of
knowing, this is evidenced in the "evidence" and "belief"
conditions, respectively. In Peters' concept of mind,
this is evidenced in the "social dimension" of mental
development, described earlier in this chapter as a sort
of interaction between knowledge "enshrined in the
language" of a culture, and the "individual center of
consciousness," which "imprints its own style of being"
(a personal "viewpoint") on the world of which one is
conscious.

The concept of listening which follows in Chapter
IV has an essentially affective and perceptual emphasis

with cognitive import: it aims at understanding of both

 

intellectual and psychological sorts, and its procedural
aspect requires the elements of both intellect and affect.
Moreover, these three concepts (the acquiring of knowledge,
the development of mind, and personal listening), are in
some sense fundamentally related to the ethical principle
of “respect for persons," and each concept presupposes
some form of communication. An enumeration of the

specific inferences emanating from the preceding concep-

tual data are the following.

156

First, in that there is a central notion of com-
munication presupposed in the "restrictions of manner"
and an intimated personal notion associated with this
concept, a personal concept of listening (an aspect of
interpersonal communication), would not seem incompatible
with Scheffler's conceptualizations. In Reason and Teach-
ing, for example, Scheffler makes a statement which may
be seen as suggesting a "teaching-communication" emphasis.
He argues that the preparation for teaching is strengthened
through the development of the teacher's resources for:

...carrying on significant conversation with the
young;...through a widening of his intellectual
perspectives, a quickening of his imaginative and
critical powers, and a deepening of insight into
his purposes as a teacher and the nature of the
setting in which these purposes are pursued.89
(Present erterTs emphasis).

This statement would seem to imply not only the
"rational communication" component and a breadth of know-
ledge, but also an understanding of the student who is
a part of "the setting in which [the teacher's] purposes
are pursued." The listening concept described in Chapter

IV.h3responsive to the need for a notion of personal

understanding, as an emphasized aspect of the concept of

 

teaching.

Secondly, although psychological conditions are

not explicitly included in the teaching concept per se,

 

. 89Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., pp.
87—88.

157

there is strong indication that Scheffler deems such
aspects significant, at least as a pre-condition of
teaching. The "belief" condition of knowing that something
is the case clearly suggests the rationale for a personal
concept of communication which aims at understanding the
student, in light of the complex disposition of "belief,"
and in light of the difficulties involved in accurately
assessing this condition within the student. In Ethics

and Education, Peters makes this point quite clear when he

 

states that although teacher and student are bound by
impartial and impersonal standards, as associated with the

rational concept of teaching which is under consideration,

 

it must also be said that:

The ability to form and maintain satisfactory personal
relationships is almost a necessary condition of

doing anything... in a manner that is not warped and
stunted. ... A firm basis of love and trust, together
with a continuing education in personal relationships,
is... a crucial underpinning of any other more specific
educational enterprise. The teacher himself must
obviously be an exemplar in this respect if he is

to do his job effectively.90

In this respect, Scheffler also, on occasion,
alludes to a psychological condition of understandipg on
the part of both teacher and student. He has stated that
the student not only responds to the explicit material of

a lesson, and to what the teacher does, but the student

 

90Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit.,

 

158

also responds to what the teacher "intends," and to what

91 O O
The teacher, moreover, 1n revealing

he "represents."
and risking his own judgments and loyalties in the act of

teaching students, Scheffler says:

 

He is himself forced to a heightened self-awareness,

and a more reflective attitude toward his own

presuppositions; his own outlook is thereby

broadened and refined.92

Thirdly, the pervasive concept of mind suggests

another reason for incorporating an emphasized concept of
listening. The development of mind was depicted as the
means of achieving the growth of knowledge, and a state
of "being educated." However, it was also pointed out
that the development of mind is influenced not only by
external knowledge, but by the individual center of con-
sciousness with its network of personal perceptions asso-
ciated with: thoughts, feelings, values, standards,
purposes, beliefs, principles associated with personal
conduct, academic performance, and the bodies of knowledge
themselves. This particular nature of the individual's
internal structure would seem to suggest the need for an
extra measure of sensitivity with respect to the teacher's
dealings with students.

Fourthly, the concept of the teaching act itself

suggests that there is a gap between teaching, and the

 

91Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., p. 87.

 

92Ibid.

159

achievement of the sort of student learning which has been
considered in this chapter. The point has been made that,
although teaching intends, and aims at, some sort of

student learning, it does not imply, nor can it guarantee,
that learning shall take place in the student as a result

of the teaching. Personal communication (as was pointed out
in Chapter.IIl,may help to bridge this gap between teach-
ing and learning, in the sense of helping to facilitate

the acquiring of knowledge.

Finally, there is an overall sense in which a
rational orientation is not sufficient in view of the
concrete, everyday, problems assoicated with the "person"
who is called "teacher:" the attitudinal disposition of
this person, and his complex structure of beliefs. The
"restrictions of manner" are not sufficient in themselves
to ensure, to the extent that this is possible, that the
teacher will in fact encourage, and participate mutually
in the activities which Scheffler suggests. A statement
has been made by Passmore which gets at the nature of
this particular problem:

The teacher will almost certainly have many beliefs,
which he is not prepared to submit to criticism,

and he will be enforcing many rules of which the
same is true. These beliefs and these rules may be
closely related to subjects which the pupils are
particularly eager to discuss in critical terms--
sex, for example, or religion and politics. If the

teacher refuses to allow critical discussion on
these questions, if he reacts to dissent with anger

160

or shocked disapproval, he is unlikely to encourage

a critical spirit in his pupils.93
A synthesis of Scheffler's concept and the listening con-
cept, as a particular type of orientation, may effect a
useful broadening of the View ofteaching as an activity.

On the basis of this set of findings and infer—

ences, the next chapter suggests a personal concept of

listening which aims at understanding. This concept is

 

suggested as a complement to Scheffler's rational "restric-
tions of manner" associated with teaching. This comple-
mentary concept, along with Scheffler's rational concept,
constitute the synthesizing concept of this study. For

the purposes of this study, this synthesizing concept is

called "Teaching as Communication."

 

93John Passmore, op. cit., p. 421.

CHAPTER IV

A COMPLEMENTARY CONCEPT OF LISTENING

Introduction

 

The preceding chapter explored the first of the
two major questions of this study, examining principal
areas of presupposition associated with Israel Schef-
fler's interpretation of teaching which make explicit
reference to the centrality of a communication concept
and intimate a perceptual concern with respect to commu-
nication and teaching. The present chapter explores the
final question of the study, namely:

What perceptual component of communication rela-
tive to teaching might serve to complement
Scheffler's rational interpretation of teaching,
given the particular emphases which are pre—
supposed in his "restrictions of manner" rela-
tive to teaching?

The findings of the previous chapter suggested

the supportive rationale for the complementary concept

of listening. A summary of the significant implications

 

of that context are the following. First, the purely
personal or perceptual (attitudinal and affective) ele-
ments of sensitivity, empathy, understanding, and caring,
are outside of the range of a purely rational (i.e.,

impartial and impersonal), concept of communication.

161

162

Secondly, the affective and attitudinal qualities which
are emphasized in the present concept of listening are
distinct qualities, but they are readily capable of being
accomodated to the notions of rationality and mind which
are presupposed in Scheffler's "restrictions of manner."

There are at least two underlying core concepts
which are common to both the rational and personal per-
spectives: (a) the notion of "individual consciousness"
(alluded to in the quotations of May and Rogers in the
first section of Chapter III, and explicitly delineated
in the concept of mind), as a centrally influential fac-;
tor relative to human mental development; and (b) the
principle of "respect for persons" as an ethical and
interpersonal consideration connected with the treatment
of persons. This latter core concept is particularly
applicable to the general context of social and commu-
nicative contact.

This chapter describes the principle of "respect
for persons" as defined by Peters, and as it is seen to

underlie a personal concept of listening. 1 The

 

 

1This chapter contains excerpts (general lan-
guage and direct quotations) from the following works by
permission of the publishers indicated. Rollo May's
Empathyw—Key to the Counseling Process" in The Art of
Counseling, Abingdon Press (1967), pp. 77-82; R. S.
Peters, "Education as Initiation" in Ethics and Educa-
tion, Allen and Unwin, Ltd., (1966), pp. 46—59; Carl
Rogers, Freedom to Learn, (Charles E. Merrill Publishing

 

 

 

163

listening concept is illuminated in terms of (a) its con—

 

ceptual connection with empathy and communication, and
(b) its specific designation as empathic listening, as
it may be seen to relate to teaching and an "educative"
concept of conversation. On the basis of this descrip—
tion, plus the preceding discussions of the previous
three chapters, a concluding section of this chapter
sets forth a definition of a synthesizing concept:
"Teaching as Communication." The reader will recall
that this chapter will make extensive use of the con-
cepts and language drawn from the writings of Rollo May
and Carl Rogers, as well as of R. S. Peters, as its

principal sources.

The Listening Concept Associated with
Empathy and Communication

When the concept of listening is viewed from the

 

general standpoint of its connection with such personal
terms as sensitivity, empathy, and understanding, it can
be clarified by reflecting upon the context of human
relationships (that is, interactions among persons), and
a comparable context of relationships which occurs

between persons and inanimate aspects of a public

 

1Company (1969), pp. 111-112, 222, 225-226, 259-
275; Boy and Pine, "The Expanded Person as a Teacher,"
in Expanding the Self: Personal Growth for Teachers
(William C. Brown Company Publishers, (1971), pp. 6—9;
Clark Moustakas, The Authentic Teacher: Sensitivity and
Awareness in the Classroom, (Howard A. Doyle Publishing
Company, (lgEG), pp. 30-31 and 42-43.

 

 

164

world.2 Both contexts involve, to some extent, the ele-
ment of encounter, and both involve the intent to achieve
understanding in the personal sense of "getting on the
inside of" that which is outside of oneself. The con-
structs of encounter and personal understanding include
each other in the sense that both involve contact which
is characterized by perceptual depth: a perceptual sense
of "knowing," or "feeling.into," a being or an inanimate
object which is external to the perceiving person.

Rollo May has used the active tendencies of
aesthetic understanding and appreciation to illustrate
what may be involved when one uses the term "empathy,"
or the terms "empathic understanding." May suggests that
when one views or studies a pictorial or graphic work of
art, for example, it is not uncommon nor inappropriate
to speak of "getting over into," or "getting on the
inside of" such a work so as to "understand" it. An
auditor, or a performer, for example, might use the term
"empathy" (or a similar descriptive word) in expressing
what he feels as he listens to views, or performs,
certain dramatic portrayals, or musical works. It is
not uncommon in this reSpect for one to speak of being
totally "immersed in" a portrayal of Elizabeth I or being

"carried away" by a Mozart quartet. Such personal

 

2Rollo May, The Art of Counseling (New York:
Abingdon Press, 1967), pp. 77-78.

 

165

references and expressions are also made in connection
with persons and bodies of public knowledge. Peters,
for example, implies an empathic concept when he sug-
gests that the attempt to "educate," to "teach" in
particular, requires that the "educator" invites the

student to "get on the inside of modes of thought and

 

awareness" so as to "understand" and to "identify" with
their underlying principles.

When a concept of listening is associated with
the general context of human relationships (that is, the
interactions among persons), it is often designated as

empathic listening, or variously: "sensitive listening,"

 

"sensitive understanding," "non—judgmental listening,"
"active listening," and "concentrated listening."3
Within this general context, the designation empathic
listening denotes the "contact, influence, and inter—
action of personalities." In the literal sense,
according to May, it means a "feeling into," or " a
participation in other persons or objects,"4 Within the
context of communication among persons, it is a variable

concept. That is to say, to some extent it exists in any

 

3Carl R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn, op. cit. pp.
226-227; See also Carl Rogers and Barry Stevens, Person
to Person: The Problem of Being Human, A New Trend in
Psychology (New York: Pocket books, 1972), pp. 89-90;
See also Angelo Boy and Gerald Pine, Expanding the Self:
Personal Growth for Teachers (Dubuque, Iowa: William C.
Brown Company Publishers, 1971), p. 9.

4

 

 

Rollo May, op. cit., pp. 79—82.

166

communication situation, whether or not it involves con-
flict or controversy. Moreover, from the standpoint of

various individuals, the essential elements of intent to
understand, depth of understanding, and the practice of

genuine listening are all variable.

A particular listening concept, as has been
stated above, may be viewed as essentially an affective
construct of interpersonal or "effective" communication,
which is analogous to the phenomena of empathic under-
standing associated with relationships between persons
and inanimate aspects of a public world. From the stand-
point of relationships among persons, it entails some
verbal exchange, some response (verbal and/or nonverbal),
or the conveying of some message. Moreover, such a con-
cept, as described in this chapter, is to be contrasted
with all passive sorts of listening which entail only
semi-, quasi—, or pseudo—attention, or even total inat—
tention. In its strictest sense, this listening con-

cept emphasizes empathic understanding.

 

Empathic Listening, Teaching,
and Conversation

 

This section provides sketches of certain central
concepts which have bearing on relationships between
teaching and listening: (1) the fundamental notion of

"respect for persons;" (2) therapeutic, permissive, and

167

technical referents; and (3) an "educative concept of
conversation, the procedural aspects of which might

enhance the perspective in which one views the activity

of teaching.

A Notion of Respect
for Persons

 

 

A principle of "respect for persons" has been
identified by psychologist Carl Rogers, and by Rogerian
oriented writers (such as Boy and Pine, C. H. Paterson,
Stanford and Roark, and others) as the basis upon which
the concept of empathic listening, as an attitudinal
disposition, is founded“ R. S. Petershas isolated the
single principle of "respect for persons," and discussed
it in terms of its ethical ramifications and the impor-
tance of possessing a clearly defined concept of "per-
son." Peters holds that the notion of "respect for
persons" is rendered meaningless unless and until one
possesses a clear concept of what is meant by the term
"person."

As a concept, Peters writes, "person" suggests
that the "individual" (as "person") represents "an
assertive point of View," which is to say, according to
Peters, a "person" embodies "judgments, appraisals,
intentions, and decisions that shape events, decisions
whose characteristic stamp is determined by previous

decisions that have given rise to permanent or semi—

168

permanent dispositions.5 When one accepts such a con-
cept as indicative of all individual "persons"--—except-
ing say, Ryle's "infants" and "idiots"--one must also
embrace, according to Peters, the position "that it
matters that individuals represent.distinct assertive
points of View.6 Moreover, Peters reasons, insofar as
this condition matters to one who is committed to the
principle of respect for persons, one would deplore
certain types of activities--for example, activities
which disregard the feelings of others; or activities
which refuse the entry of others into situations in
which their intentions, decisions, appraisals, and
choices can Operate effectively; or activities which
deliberately interfere with another's capacity for self-
direction; or activities which are designed to settle, or
handle, the affairs of another without engaging in prior
consultation with the person for whom one is acting.-
Within the classroom context, with a View to the
developing capacities of persons, it is particularly

important for the teacher to encourage the student's

 

5R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education (London:
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd, 1966), p. 210.

6

 

Ibid, p. 213.

169

development of "an assertive point of view."7 Without
such encouragement, according to Peters' concept,
individual tendencies associated with character assert-
ion would frequently become more passive than active.

In Peters' View, a proper assertiveness should lead to
taking pride in achievements, carefully deliberating and
choosing for oneself what one ought to do, and to develé
oping one's own individual style of emotional reaction.
The concept of "respect for persons," and the inherent
concept of "person," suggests, in Peters' View, that
"person" is a progressive phenomenon which develops via
two forces: the broader notion of one's individuality,
and the encouragement and stimulation supplied from the
external world, that is, the environments of the devel-
Oping "person."

The teacher has the specific role, in this con-
text, of recognizing what Boy and Pine call the
intrinsic value of the student: respecting his individ-
uality, his complexity and uniqueness, his capacity for
making choices, his humanness, his right to govern his
own life and select his own values, and respecting his

idiosyncratic potential.8 The condition of "respecting

 

7Ibid., p. 211.

8Angelo Boy and Gerald Pine, Expanding the Self:
Personal Growth for Teachers (Dubuque, Iowa: William C.
Brown Company Publishers, 1971), pp. 6-7.

170

a person," to use a conclusion of Peters, involves a
"feeling" which is awakened when:
Another is regarded as a distinctive centre
of consciousness with peculiar feelings and
purposes thatcmiss-crossinstitutional
roles. It is connected with the awareness
one has that each man has his own aspira-
tion, his own viewpoint on the world, that
each man takes pride in his achievements,
however idiosyncratic they may be. To
respect a person is to realize all this
and to care.

The notions of empathy, sensitivity, and respect
take on special emphasis and seriousness in situations
involving children, particularly in View of the nature
of adult influence. As developing "persons," students
are particularly vulnerable: they are influenced not
only by the subject matter; they are also influenced by
the attitudes, actions, and reactions of the teacher.
Peters emphasizes that the development of students could
be seriously hampered if there exists a lack of adequate
sensitivity. "No one quite knows what he thinks or
feels," Peters says, "until, he has made a View his own
by identifying himself with it and defending it in pub-
lic." Moreover, he continues:

To take a hatchet to a pupil‘s contribution
before he has much equipment to defend it,
is not only likely to arrest or warp his

growth in this form of thought; it is also
to be insensitive to him as a person.

 

9Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit. pp. 57-58.
10

 

Ibid., p. 59.

171

The concept of empathic listening presupposes

 

this fundamental principle and the inherent concepts of
person, sensitivity, and empathy. In addition to this

principled base, the concept of listening involves cer-

 

tain other more specific and practical elements. As a

practical skill, listening is characterized as an achieve—

 

ment which is difficult to acquire; it involves an ele-
ment of risk which is difficult to overcome.11 For
example, people are generally disinclined to give up
their beliefs and generalizations, but these are the
particular areas which are threatened when one "Opens
his mind" to listen to another person. There exists in
this respect a perceived threat that one may be impelled

to change his manner of behaving, change his thoughts,

feelings, or beliefs, as a result of the listening.

 

Therefore, to paraphrase Rogers, the ultimate aim of

empathic listening--to fully understand another person--
12

 

is never fully achieved.

The Aspects of Understanding,
Therapeutic Effect, Permis-
siveness, and Technique

 

 

In View of the difficulties associated with
achieving a full understanding of another, Carl Rogers

has noted that it is important for one to convey, through

 

llIbid., pp. 88 and 165.

12Carl Rogers, Freedom to Learn, 0p. cit., p. 222.

 

 

172

listening, the "intent" to understand. In this sense,
the teacher would communicate to the student his will-

ingness to understand; he would indicate, through the

 

medium of concentrated listening, that he is trying to
understand the thoughts and feelings of the student. In
so doing, the teacher conveys, ideally, the dual message
that the student is, in the teacher's perception, val-
ued, and that the student's meanings are worth under-

standing.13

Percival Symonds has observed that teachers, like
psychotherapists, "have a responsibility tg_understand

the child." In his View, this means that:

 

A teacher is expected to be particularly sen-
sitive to conscious motives and interests,
but the teacher who is also sensitive to
unconscious motives may be better able to
tolerate the bad in a child and hence to
find opportunity for the release of nega-
tive feelings while at the same time he
may appreciate untapped possibilities for
constructive growth and be more coura-
geous and patient in encouraging their
expression.

This is not to imply that "teaching" is to be construed

as "therapy." In this context, the opinions of Symonds

 

13Rogers, Person to Person, op. cit., p. 89.

l4Percival M. Symonds, "Education and Psychother-
apy" The Journal of Educational Psychology 40 (January
1949): 10.

 

173

suggest two points: (1) that certain facilitative quali-
ties--such as understanding--are to some extent common

to concepts of educational and psychotherapeutic prac~
tices; and (2) that these are qualities which are also
reflected in a listening concept, as it is viewed in
connection with communication and teaching. Moreover,
the Symonds' quotation helps to clarify the nature of

the particular quality of understanding which can be
associated with a concept of teaching.

Although teaching is not in this context to be
construed as therapy, the listening concept which is
herein associated with teaching can be viewed as "thera-
peutic." The works of Rogers and of Rogerian oriented
thinkers, for example, have suggested that there is a
sense in which the act of listening can be termed

"15 This means that listening empathically

"therapeutic.
to the child, for example, might effect a relaxation of
tension, or anxiety which is often associated with
feelings of fear, anticipation, discouragement reflec—
tive of past experiences, or relative to the student's
meeting new subject matter, or new social situations.

When the teacher, in this context, is able to under-

stand the student's reactions from the inside, to be

 

15Rogers, Freedom to Learn, op. cit. pp. 225-226.

 

174

sensitively aware of the way that the process of educ-
ation and learning seems to the student, both teacher
and student can achieve clarification of thoughts and
feelings.

Boy and Pine would have one believe that there
is a "therapeutic effect" associated with what they call
an "effective" response of the teacher, a response which
clearly indicates that the teacher is "hearing" the
student: that the teacher is receiving the message that
the student is communicating; that the teacher is
responding to the composite of verbal and nonverbal,
cognitive and affective meanings and expressions of the

student.16 This type of listening, in Rogers' view,

 

suggests that the teacher has sought to avoid the element
of incomprehension which results from a misunderstanding
of thestudent's words, for example, or from simply not
attending to what the student is saying. It further sug-
gests according to Rogers, that the teacher has sought

to avoid hampering his own ability to listen because he
finds the student's words threatening, or because he
feels the need to distort, or twist, the words of the
student so as to render them congruent with what he wants

to hear.

 

16Boy and Pine, 0p. cit., pp. 7-10; See also
Rogers, Freedom to Learn, op. cit., pp. 111-112 and pp.
226-227.

 

175

The therapeutic quality associated with the

"effective" act of listening also presupposes a notion

 

of "permissiveness," which is not to imply in this con-
text that it entails an attitude or condition of exclu-

sive non-interference. It does suggest a condition which

. . l7 . .
rejects undue interference. Again, in reference to

Symonds' comparisons of the nature of this concept
relative to the teacher and the psychotherapist, he
holds that "permissiveness" in the teaching context sug-
gests that the teacher should:

Give the child permission to be himself, in feel-
ing particularly, in behavior as far as possible.
Both teachers and therapists believe in the prac-
tice of restraining dangerous and destructive
behavior, and both believe in giving freedom for
the expression of feeling. But the teacher is
not merely a permissive person; he also positively
encourages, stimulates and directs. A good
teacher finds a happy balance between being per-
missive on the one hand, and using his influence
in directing, acting, thinking, and feeling on
the other.1

 

17Clark Moustakas, The Authentic Teacher:
Sensitivity and Awareness in the Classroom (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Howard A. Doyle PubliShing Company,
1966), pp. 30-31 and pp. 42-43.

l8Percival M. Symonds, op. cit., p. 10 and 27;
See also Virginia M. Axline, "Practical Schoolroom
Application." Play Therapy (New York: Ballantine Books,
1969), p. 141.

 

 

 

176

Within these boundaries, therefore, the concept
of permissiveness suggests that the teacher "permits"
the student to express thoughts and feelings without
pressing his own thoughts and feelings upon the student.
It means that attitudes of bias are removed” curcontained,

while the teacher concentrates his listening on what

 

experiences mean to the student: while he attempts to
understand (that is, to come to know), the attitudes,
concepts, beliefs, and values of the student. It
involves seeing these aspects, not from an external
frame of reference (as for purposes of evaluating, or
_judging the student), but from the frame of reference of

the child himself. Such listening can have the effect

 

of permitting the child, or student, to be himself,
within the bounds of what is fair to the teacher and to
the student, and what is safe within the context of the

classroom.

The concept of listening which is focused upon

 

in this section, and whose centrally defining criterion
is the notion of empathic understanding, is not to be
interpretated as a technique, or a gesture of the social
or polite sorts.19 The latter sort of interpretation
might involve, as has been suggested by Boy and Pine, the

teacher's tolerating the student's verbalizations;

 

19Boy and Pine, op. cit., p. 8.

177

waiting patiently, for example until the student com-
pletes his expressions so that the teacher can get his
original point across, or so that he can give detailed
analysis of the significance, or insignificance, of the
student's remarks. This type of polite, social listen-
ing would violate the criterion mentioned earlier: it
would convey the message that the thoughts and feelings
of the student are not perceived as having worth. It
would thus violate the fundamental principle of "respect
for persons."

The concept of listening might involve training,

 

practice and skill, but it also involves a basic attitu-
dinal disposition, an esentially personal orientation,
so as not to reduce solely into skill, technique, or
polite gesture. Pursuant to the objectives of the pres-

ent study, the concept of empathic listening, as a com-

 

plement to Scheffler's "rational restrictions of manner,"
may be said to provide an amplified conceptual dispo-
sition or perSpectiVe which would strengthen the skill,
technical, and behavioral aspects of teaching.

An Educative Concept
of Conversation

 

 

The notion of conversation as an "educative"
concept is included in this series of concepts because

it illustrates the force of the listening concept.

 

178

Moreover, in that its procedural aspect is characterized
by rational and personal qualities consistent with
Scheffler's "restrictions of manner" and with the concept

of empathic listening, it reflects the synthesizing con-

 

cept of this study.

The ability to engage in "conversation," like the
ability to listen, involves an achievement which is dif-
ficult to attain.20 Not only does it require, in Peters'
View, the criteria of knowledge, understanding, and
objectivity; it also requires a sensitivity to those with

whom one would converse, and to whom one would listen.

 

In such "conversation," one does not lecture or try to
teach (that is, in an institutionally prescribed sense of
the term "teach"); one does not aim at someone's learning
some particular thing. Moreover, the listening which is
central to educative "conversation" does not carry with

it the intent of making particular use of the expressions
of another, nor the intent of making use of the conversant
in any way. "Conversation," as an "educative" notion,

writes Peters, "is an informal sort of learning situation

 

that is not structured like a discussion group in terms

of one form of thought or towards the solution of a

 

OPeters, Ethics and Education, op. cit., p. 88;
See also Peters, The Concept of Education, op. cit., pp.
21-22 0

 

 

179

Lecturing to others is bad form; so is using
the remarks of others as springboards for self
display. The point is to create a common world
in which all bring their distinctive contri-
butions. By participating in such a shared
experience much is learnt, though no one sets
out to teach anyone anything. And one of the
things that is learnt is to see the world

from the vieWpoint of appther whose perspec-
tive is very different.“L (present writer's
emphasis). -

 

This particular concept of "conversatiod'is indicative
of a procedure and an achievement. This essential
quality, or Spirit, suggestive of rational and personal
elements, is central to "Teaching as Communication."

Conclusion: The Synthesizing Concept of
Teaching as Communication

 

This concluding section of the central discus-
sions of the study has the single function of defining
"Teaching as Communication." In offering the criteria
for such a concept, the study is suggesting that "Teach-
ing as Communication" is one way in which the procedure
of teaching is capable of being viewed (responsive to the
practical question "How is the procedure of teaching to
be viewed?"), and furthermore it is one way--though per-
haps not the only_way--in which the procedure of teaching
should be viewed (responsive to the practical question

"How should the procedure of teaching be viewed?").

 

21R. S. Peters, ed. The Concept of Education
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 21-22.

 

180

The following criteria of rational and perceptual
emphases would define the notion of "Teaching as Communi—
cation." Teaching should be viewed, in the general
sense, as,a fundamental orientation, an attitudinal dis-
position, which is characterized by an openness, an
intent, and an overt attempt, to communicate effectively
with the person who would be taught. Toward what end?
Toward an end which is strictly within the bounds of this
suggested concept. That is to say, the viewing of teach-
ing in this way has the aim of broadening the perspective
in which one contemplates, or reflects upon, the totality
of what can be known as "teaching activity."

In this respect, teaching should have the aim not
only of developing a liberally educated person in terms
of the inherent content and critical procedures of the
traditional disciplines; teaching should also aim at the
student's coming to know "where he stands," personally,
in relation to the inherent standards, beliefs, prin—
ciples and feelings of public knowledge.

Finally, the notion of "teaching as communication"
requires respecting the mind and the "person" of the
individual who would be taught. This suggests that its

procedural aspect must be characterized by (a) rational

 

exchange between teacher and student; (b) perceptual

 

 

responsiveness to the thoughts and feelings of the

 

181

student; (c) an expressed effort to understand the

student empathically (that is, to see from the student's

 

frame of reference); (d) an expressed effort to aid the

student in achieving clarification of his beliefs,

 

thoughts, feelings, values, principles of conduct, and
the rationales which underlie areas of knowledge and
types of performance associated with teaching and know-

ing; and (e) a commitment to ethical and interpersonal

 

principles in connection with all encounters with

 

learners. These elements represent a concept of teaching
which explicitly emphasizes the criterion of rational and

personal communication.

 

 

CHAPTER V

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EDUCATION

OF TEACHERS

This study implies that emphases of rational,
ethical, and personally sensitive reflection, deliber-
ation, and interaction combine into an important per-
spective for the education of the teacher, a perspective
which should be achieved by the student of teacher educa-
tion, and one which should be encouraged in one's approach
to the study of educational practice.

Such a perspective presupposes a fundamental
orientation and attitudinal disposition which would be
facilitative of the communication of such a combined
perSpective in the act of teaching. The combined per-
spective is illustrated in Scheffler's "restrictions of
manner" and in the listening concept associated with the
activity of teaching. A particular foundational orien-
tation and attitudinal disposition is reflected in
Scheffler's interpretation of teaching as complemented
by a concept of empathic listening. This synthesis is
referred to in this study under the rubric, "Teaching as

Communication."

182

 

183

This final chapter contains some of the writer's
thoughts on the implications of the above perspective for
those areas of teacher education curriculum which might
foster such a broadly theoretical and eclectic approach
to the study of teaching, with a view toward developing
more experienced teachers in terms of the depth of their
knowledge and their personal sensitivity with which they
approach the activity of teaching. The chapter makes
two major suggestions: (1) the conceptual perspective
of this study has potential for providing a source of
self-correction for the teacher; and (2) the conceptual
perspective of this study presupposes alternative kinds
of relationships in teacher education which are remi—
niscent of a "community of scholars" idea.

i The following suggestions represent ideals in the
sense that they do not reflect currently pervasive ten-
dencies within the area of teacher education. Instead,
they provide a resource from which hypotheses may be gen—
erated for further study. In addition to the two major
suggestions referred to above, this chapter also contains
at its end a list of relatively specific imperatives
which the writer believes to be reasonably implied in the

foregoing discussion.

184

A Source of Self-Correction

The conceptual perspective reflected in this
study has the potential for offering to the student
of teacher education a source of self-correction. The
study has sought to provide this through its objectives
of examining and clarifying the inherent criteria, the
emphases, and the commitments of the concepts of teach-
ing (Scheffler's restrictions of manner"), empathic
listening, and the synthesis of these in the notion of
"Teaching as Communication."

These are concepts which the student of teacher
education may not fully accept, not attempt to operation-
alize, but these concepts do represent a standard source
in view of which he can determine, to some extent, what
he is, or is not, doing within the general context of
teaching activity. This study has attempted to show that
both Scheffler's concept and the complementary listening
concept are reasonable notions vis-a-vis a "typical"
classroom context, and that the conjoining of these
aspects within a teaching concept is a reasonable sug-
gestion.

If the student of teacher education examines
critically, accepts, and empathically understands the
focused concepts, he can make some prior assumptions

which might benefit his teaching and his student's

185

attainment of knowledge. For example, in making the
prior assumption that the school-aged human being has
some capacity for thinking critically, for judging, for
deciding, for directing his own actions, and that there
are reasons for his actions, the teacher might be able
to avoid, or lessen, the self-fulfilling prophecy syn—
drome which thwarts the growth of knowledge within so
many students. He can sensitize himself to the proba-
bility that his (the teacher's), actions, reactions,
attitudes, and/or explicit verbalizations might be
interpreted by the student as data which confirm the
"fact" that he (the student, or pupil), cannot perform
adequately, or that he cannot think for himself, or
decide and judge, or that he cannot be trusted to direct
his own actions. The probable harm which issues from the
self-fulfilling prophecy syndrome is that these "facts,"
fulfilled often enough, become progressive tendencies.
On the positive side, if the student of teacher
education accepts the View of teaching which has been
examined, he (in theory) commits himself to, and is
guided by, the notion of respecting the individual as a
"person." He accepts the fact that the pupil, like the
teacher, embodies "a point of View on the world;" like
the teacher, he embodies a mind whose reasoning facility
(if it is to be continually developed and improved upon)

must be exerted, the mind must be engaged, and the person

 

 

186

must be allowed intellectual stimulation, encouragement
in his efforts, practice, and personal understanding
(through the medium of empathic listening, for example),
so that the student might risk the genuine expression of
his thoughts, feelings, beliefs, in the serious and
educative context of discussion, dialogue, and conver-
sation. These same committments are especially demanded
of those who would serve on faculties of education—-who

would be the teachers of students of education.

 

Moreover, if teaching and knowing are viewed as
shared participation of teacher and taught, the negative
impact of an institutionalized hierarchical relationship
can be circumvented. This suggests that the teacher
. would View the pupil (as he would View himself), as a
potential "knower" whose knowledge attainment in any
area of thought, or awareness, is dependent upon the
dual aspects of personal, individual consciousness, and
the impersonality of public knowledge. In this respect,
the only important difference between teacher and taught
is that, in Peters' language, the former is more cogni-
zant of the greater variety of stategies by means of
which knowledge is acquired.

A final observation which suggests a source of
self—correction relates to the "active" nature of knowl-

edge. Within the context of "being educated,"

187

knowledge within the student cannot be viewed as inert.
That is to say, one who acquires knowledge in the sense
of "becoming educated" must be able to selectively apply
his knowledge--in a principled and rational fashion-—to
diverse, everyday situations and problems, both within
and outside of the restricted environment of the class—
room. The possessor of knowledge must perceive his pos-
session as personal knowledge, knowledge of which he is
conscious, and to which he gives, or has given his con-

sent. This implies that such knowledge is (as described

 

within this study) most properly transmitted not by such.
means as those associated with persuasion, coercion,
conditioning, and/or deception. These activities are not
within the range of the concept of teaching, and the
related concept of knowing, which has been described
within this study. In sum, what a teacher should look
for as a source of self—correction in his teaching would
be the emphasis on, and the quality of, communication in
the activity of teaching.

Teaching as Communication and the
Community of Scholars

 

 

The conceptual perspective reflected in "Teaching
as Communication" presupposes alternative kinds of

relationships between teacher educators and among

 

188

teacher educators and students of teacher education
which are reminiscent of a "community of scholars" idea.

Certain kinds of attitudes and conditions must
obtain if the practical relevance of "Teaching as Com-
munication" is to be significantly enhanced. This means,
for example, that barriers of access among educators,
and among students and educators must be removed; that
scheduling patterns and classroom arrangements must be
staggered and flexible; that teacher educators and
students must broaden their knowledge base, their intel-
lectual interests, and their cultural and social aware-
ness and sensitivity.

It is a known fact that colleges of education
which house teacher education departments already possess
substantive cross-disciplinary resources and interests
among their staffs. However, what this writer thinks is
additionally needed are pervasive attitudes of inquiry,
cooperation, and sharing which are exemplified by these
staffs, and transmitted collectively to the students of
teacher education. This means that there must be a
willingness on the part of the staffs to reorganize
themselves as a community of scholars-~to share talents
and specialized knowledge, and to generate among them-
selves an interest in searching for the broadest possible

perspective of personal knowledge.

 

189

Moreover, if such attitudes and active tendencies
are developed among staffs and/or particular groups of.
staff members, and if these attitudes and active tenden-
cies are to be transmitted to students, the currently
predominant arrangement of undergraduate classrooms must
also be altered. The mass lecture format, for example,
will have to be replaced with seminars, and alternating
lecture-small group-large group arrangements. Students
and cooperative faculties will have to make themselves
available for dialogues, informal discussion, and
educative conversation. Within this type of environment
cooperative faculties and students would be able to share
a wide variety of experiences and literature which is
consistent with the idea of "Teaching as Communication."
In this type of environment of mutual respect, the stu-
dent of teacher education would be able to enhance his
perspective of teaching not only through the exposure to
focused theoretical knowledge (such as a combination of
philOSOphical concepts of teaching, interpersonal and
ethical principles, and social issues), his perspective
would also be enhanced through appropriate modeling of
underlying principles in cooperation with his peers and

with teacher educators.

 

190

Teacher educators who are willing to commit them-
selves to all of the presuppositions associated with the
concept of "Teaching as Communication" would have
seriously asked themselves questions such as the follow-

ing. Without a fundamental rational, ethical, and per-

 

sonal orientation, how is the teacher (especially the
beginning teacher), to relate effectively with persons
whose values, beliefs, and backgrounds are extremely dif-

ferent from his own? How is he to deal with his own per-

 

sonal values, biases, and preconceptions about certain
types of people in such an environment? How is he to
teach in situations in which he strongly disagrees with
the values, the beliefs, and the attitudes of those whom
he would teach? Finally, how is he to teach in situa-
tions in which he totally dislikes, because of physical
characteristics, or nationality, those whom he is
assigned to teach? The present study has attempted to
demonstrate through the nature and treatment of its
content that such questions involving philosophical,
human relations, and/or social issues can be confronted,
to some extent, through the amplification of concepts
which relate to a concept of teaching as an activity.

The practical relevance of "Teaching as Communication"

191

cannot be fully realized, however, until it is incor—
porated into the fabric of teacher education, and pre-
sented in an atmosphere which is reminiscent of a
community of scholars.

In View of the existing curricula of teacher
education, the present study's single perspective on
teaching may be seen as an effort toward the development
of a foundations course on teaching which would be most
effectively implemented in conjunction with an extensive
experiential (clinical, or internship) program extending
over a period of at least two years of post secondary
education. Particularly in View of the fact that, as
suggested in this study, the act of teaching should be
viewed as a fundamental orientation and attitudinal
disposition, the criteria of extensiveness and theoreti-
cal depth are vitally important.

Such a disposition requires (like its inherent
concept of empathic listening, rational, ethical, and
critical orientation), an extended period of concentra-
tion for its Optimal development. The student teacher,
and the student of teacher education in general, needs
time to reflect upon the complex dispositions which he
brings to the college of education, as a function of at
least twelve years of past experience in the primary and

secondary schools (even more years constituting his

 

 

192

life-history). He needs additional time to examine his
beliefs not only in terms of established theories, but
also his beliefs about various kinds of people. He needs
time to examine other theories which are offered to him
within the context of teacher education. He needs to
clarify "where he stands" in terms of the new differen-
tiations which he achieves. Finally, he needs to achieve
an operational synthesis. With a perspective such as

the present example, and with the help of such approaches
as those associated with the competency-based teacher
education programs and the extended clinical proqrams,
the student of teacher education might achieve the kind
of operational synthesis which would presumably serve

him well as a teaching professional.

Summary of Imperatives

 

In conclusion and by way of final summary, the
following list of imperatives are drawn from the previous
discussions, and the writer believes they are reasonably
based therein.

1. Respect students' intellectual integrity.

2. Respect students' independence of choice and
judgment.

3. Deemphasize propagandizing, behavior modifi-
cation, indoctrination.

4. Focus continually on the questions of how to
act, what should be done.

 

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

193

Involve students in deliberately formulating
relationships between a wide range of scien-
tific and humanistic sources and guidelines<xf
teaching practice--seek procedural princi-
ples and grounds.

Deliberately generate learning strategies
which demand the use of critical dialogue
and adducing rational explanations.

Explicitly focus on the development of
character among the students of teacher
education: focus on the formulation of
ethical principles and the applications
of them.

Seek to foster the emergence of higher levels
of consciousness among students of teacher
education of the rational and moral issues

in the practice of teaching.

Seek to foster the development of student
capacities for formulating, weighing, making
and acting upon alternative choices.

Design learning activities which elicit the
exchanging of reasons among students and
between teachers and students.

Perceive student mistakes and failures as
important opportunities for helping them
learn how to achieve success.

Direct students of teacher education in iden-
tifying qualities of rationality among school
children at various levels of development

and among school children who come from
varying socio-economic backgrounds.

Conduct teacher education programs in such a
manner that the students of teaching con-
tinually encounter demands for justification
(for beliefs stated, actions engaged in,
claims made, proposals offered, et cetera).

Encourage the raising of objections on the

part of students, and develop critical dis-
cussions based upon them. Welcome radical

questions.

 

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

194

Promote among students their caring for and
giving allegiance to impersonal standards
regarding the conditions of their own knowl-
edge.

Constantly examine values critically.
Facilitate the transformation of student out-

looks and values.

Foster student autonomy in constructing inno—
vative alternative arguments.

Let our programs of teacher education reflect
a full appreciation of the absolutely crucial
role which language plays (in particular, the
language of educatiom in the mental develop-
ment of teachers. Language is as much the
object of knowledge as it is the instrument
of knowledge.

Seek constantly to criticize, to renew, and
to diffuse the principles for shaping teacher
education as set forth above.

Require the conditions of truth, belief, and
evidence in helping students establish claims
to knowledge.

Continually assess as sensitively as possible
the current and unfolding conditions of indi-
vidual students' knowledge.

Let professors of teacher education ever be
prepared to risk their own beliefs.

Develop strategies which facilitate the
clarification for the student of the genuine
nature of his beliefs.

Help students develop insights into their
personal purposes as teachers.

Let the educators of teachers constantly seek
on a firm basis love and trust to understand
as fully and as accurately as possible the
nature of their students' individual sets of
beliefs.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

195

Let the educators of teachers seek constantly
to broaden, heighten, and refine their own
personal self-awareness.

Let teacher educators operate on the principle
that students' assertive points of View
matter. Let teachers care about student
p01nts of view.

Encourage student development of prOper
assertive points of View.

Let teacher educators become capable in
empathic listening.

Let students of teaching be helped to develop
empathic listening ability.

Let teachers learn how to see the world from
the viewpoint of their students through
engaging in educational conversation.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

196

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Lippincott Company, 1969.

 

Benne, Kenneth D. Education for Tragedy: Essays in
Disenchanted Hope for Modern Man. Lexington,
Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1967.

Berman, Louise M. New Priorities in the Curriculum.
Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing
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Borke, Helene, and Burstyn, Joan W. "The New Teacher
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Boy, Angelo, and Pine, Gerald. Expanding the Self:
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Brameld, Theodore. Education for the Emerging Age.
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. Cultural Foundations of Education. New York:
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Cain, Lee C. and others. "Innovation in a Pre-Service
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Carkhuff, Robert. Helping and Human Relations: A Primer
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Chesler, Mark A. "Teacher Training Designs for Improving
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Combs, Arthur W.; Avila, Donald L.; and Purkey, William W.
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