TEACHING AS COMMUNICATION: AREAS OF PRESUPPOSITION IN ISRAEL SCHEFFLER'S RATIONAL RESTRICTIONS OF MANNER COMPLEMENTED BY EMPATHIC LISTENING

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ABSTRACT

TEACHING AS COMMUNICATION: AREAS OF PRESUPPOSITION IN ISRAEL SCHEFFLER'S RATIONAL RESTRICTIONS OF MANNER COMPLEMENTED BY EMPATHIC LISTENING

By

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The study of "Teaching as Communication" includes the following identifying features with respect to its purpose, problem statement, method and procedures, data, and findings.

The study is conceptual, eclectic, and in discussion format. It is designed to develop and to define a synthesizing concept of "Teaching as Communication" via an examination of Israel Scheffler's rational restrictions of manner connoting teaching, complemented by a notion of empathic listening, as this latter concept has been related to the teaching context by such psychologists as Rollo May and Carl Rogers.

The problem statement of this study is reflected in the following questions:

1. What are the major areas of presupposition in Israel Scheffler's conceptual interpretation of teaching (that is, the "restriction of manner") which make explicit

reference to the centrality of a communication concept, and which might be seen as intimating a perceptual concern with respect to teaching and communication?

2. What perceptual component of communication relative to teaching might be said to complement Scheffler's rational interpretation of teaching, given the particular emphases which appear to be presupposed in his "restrictions of manner" relative to teaching?

The specific statement of the objectives of the study are as follows: (1) to examine one of Israel Scheffler's interpretations of a philosophical model of teaching, with a view to extracting from this model a component of communication; and (2) to complement Scheffler's rational concept of teaching and communication with a perceptual concept of listening. This concept of listening may be seen to relate specifically to the selected concepts of communication and teaching.

The findings of this study are the following: (1) Scheffler's interpretation of teaching presupposes a rational concept of communication; (2) Scheffler's concept does not explicitly emphasize a perceptual notion of communication, but given the nature of his concept, it is readily capable of being accommodated with an empathic concept of listening associated with teaching; and (3) the concept of "Teaching as Communication," explicitly emphasizing rational, ethical, and perceptual

criteria--defined as an attitudinal disposition and fundamental orientation--is a reasonable and feasible concept when viewed in the context of its practical relevance to a "typical" teaching context.

The concept of "Teaching as Communication" is suggested as one particular way in which teaching should be viewed. The study demonstrates through the nature and treatment of its content that questions involving philosophical, human relations, and/or social issues can be effectively confronted through an amplification of concepts which relate to a concept of teaching as an activity. Several relatively specific implications for the practice of teacher education are cited at the end of the study.

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By

Carolyn LaDelle Bennett

A DISSERTATION

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TO IMOGEN:

A special friend who exemplifies that special combination of communication and "teaching," of ethics, rationality and empathic understanding.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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A particularly personal message is addressed to my parents, Laura and Thomas Bennett. Their moral support and occasional financial assistance helped me through some difficult times. I am deeply grateful.

The writer acknowledges also the permission granted by Dr. Israel Scheffler, and by the following publishers for incorporating in the following study the language of and direct quotations from the works cited:

1. Dr. Israel Scheffler, owner of copyright, Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology and Education.

2. Routledge and Kegal Paul Ltd.: Gilbert Ryle, "A Rational Animal," Education and the Development of Reason, eds. R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters.

3. Same publishers: John Passmore, "On Teaching to be Critical," Same work and edition.

4. Humanities Press, Inc.,: R. S. Peters, The Concept of Education.

5. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.: R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education.

6. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.: Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching.

7. Scott, Foresman and Company: Israel Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology and Education.

8. Charles C. Thomas Publisher: Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education.

9. Van Nostrand Reinhold Company: Rollo May, Psychology and the Human Delimma.

10. William C. Brown: Angelo Boy and Gerald Pine, Expanding the Self: Personal Growth for Teachers.

11. Abingdon Press: Rollo May, The Art of Counseling.

12. Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company: Carl R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn.

13. University of Chicago Press: Morris L. Cogan, "Current Issues in the Education of Teachers," Teacher Education The Seventy-Fourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (NSSE) Pt. II, ed. Kevin Ryan.

PREFACE

The following study of "Teaching as Communication" reflects this writer's concern that a combined philosophical, ethical, and personal perspective regarding the practice of teaching appears currently to be relegated to a role of subserviency. Evidence of this condition can be found in the currently predominant foci of research on teaching practice, and in reported findings which relate to various levels of institutionalized education.

The present writer makes, in this study, a modest attempt to rectify this condition by setting forth, via the discussions of Chapters III and IV, a development and definition of "Teaching as Communication" which explicitly emphasizes rational, ethical and perceptual criteria to be associated with teaching practice. The writer employs an eclectic approach, using the language of educational philosophers and psychologists along with the writer's own interpretative statements thereof, all of which are designed to examine and to explicate one of Israel Scheffler's interpretations of teaching with a

view to extracting a communication component, and in the final analysis, to set forth a definition of a synthesizing concept: "Teaching as Communication."

Why was the work of Israel Scheffler selected for the basis for this study? The genesis of the present writer's interest in the significant work of this important educational philosopher may be traced to a concern for the ethical element in teaching, and a concern for a kind of synthesis of theory and practice with respect to teaching which explicitly emphasizes ethical criteria.

The work of Israel Scheffler meets both of these criteria. Scheffler's analytical and normative approach to the study of teaching exposes and emphasizes ethical criteria which this writer found critically lacking in a large portion of studies related to teaching practice. Scheffler develops his interpretation of teaching in a logical and disciplined fashion which reflects the best elements of scientism and humanism. His work upholds the spirit of a disciplined scientific approach while at the same time reminding one of an ever present ethical commitment which is associated with a free and rational society, and which must, therefore, be taken into account when one sets out to educate, to teach, to enhance the intellectual development of students.

The work of Israel Scheffler also offers, in this writer's view, an important response to the teacher educator's expressed problem of fostering a synthesis of theory and practice in the education of teachers. Through his emphasis on "Practical Thought,"--a concept which is concerned with the guidance of actions (such as those related to the practice of teaching), the stating of ideals or norms which offer responses to such questions as "What should be done," and "How ought one to act"--Scheffler effects, at a conceptual level, a useful synthesis of the theory and practice of teaching.

The above prefatory statements represent the present writer's personal preception of the origin of the following study. Chapter I contains a detailed account of the origin of this study as it can be seen to emanate directly from professional literature which is relevant to the purposes, problem, and objectives of the study.

Specialized Treatment of Terms

Throughout the central discussions of the following study (particularly Chapters III and IV), the restricted usages of the concepts of listening, teaching, and knowledge and underlined. The references to Scheffler's "rational restrictions of manner" are enclosed in quotation marks. Exceptions to this procedure would be

contexts in which it is, or has become, obvious to the reader that the conceptual usage is, or is not, indicative to the restricted usages upon which the study focuses. Another stipulation relates to gender. In all references to the "teacher," the masculine third person is used for the sake of consistency and simplicity.

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CHAPTER I

ORIGIN AND PROBLEM OF THE STUDY

Purposes of the Study

The purpose of this study is to effect a synthesis of several distinct concepts into a single overarching concept, represented here by the phrase: "Teaching as Communication." An extensively explicated definition of this concept is the intended final outcome of the study.

The overall approach of the study is conceptual and eclectic and is in a discussion format. This means: (1) that its method of procedure is borrowed from what has been called by Joseph Schwab "the eclectic arts;"[1] (2) that its substantive content is made up of sets of concepts emanating from two distinct areas of knowledge which have bearing on a "standard activity-sense of teaching" (see alphabetical listing of key terms, page 46 below); and (3) that the two sets of concepts upon which the study is based are accommodated to each other on the basis of a common thread perceived by the present writer so as to form a potentially useful synthesizing concept.

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[1]Joseph Schwab, "The Practical: Arts of the Eclectic," School Review 79 (August 1971): 493-542.

As an initial formulation of the synthesizing concept which will be explicated in the following chapters, the concept of "Teaching as Communication" will include: (a) an underlying concept of rational communication as perceived in Israel Scheffler's "restrictions of manner," which he associates with a fundamental concept of teaching; and (b) a concept of listening which is a construct of interpersonal communication. The latter concept of listening is perceived by the writer as constituting some central elements which are relevant to what Scheffler emphasizes as rational and moral criteria (the "restrictions") associated with a philosophical concept of teaching.

The main body of the present work (that is, the conceptual explorations and delineations of Chapter III draws upon the works of and uses the language of, Scheffler, R. S. Peters, Gilbert Ryle, and John Passmore. The concept of listening (developed in Chapter IV) draws primarily upon the works of Rollo May and Carl R. Rogers.

Objectives of the Study

The study attempts to achieve two major objectives:

1. To examine one of Israel Scheffler's interpretations of a philosophical model of teaching, with a view to extracting from this model a component of communication; and

2. To complement Scheffler's rational concept of teaching and communication with a

> perceptual concept of listening. This concept of listening may be seen to relate specifically to the selected concepts of communication and teaching.

Supporting Rationales

The connection between the present study and the area of teacher education is reflected in the following need statement which may serve as the overarching working hypothesis of the study:

> The education of the teacher requires the broadest possible perspective, a perspective which effects a bringing together of the realms of theory and practice with the view of developing more experienced teachers, in terms of the sort of knowledge they possess and the personal sensitivity with which they approach the activity of teaching.

The following sections offer a detailed account of the ramifications of this need statement as they can be seen to pertain to the supporting rationales of this study. In this context, the pertinent data relate to (a) the issue of theory and practice--arguments for a normative approach; (b) the larger curricular contexts related to a study of a concept of teaching; and (c) the justifications for an eclectic approach.

The rationales supporting the present study (that is, its conceptual and eclectic approach and its discussion format) resides in passages selected from writers who have been concerned with (a) a philosophical concept of teaching as an activity; and simultaneously, (b) the

need for what Scheffler terms "a critical re-thinking of the foundations" associated with educational processes.[2]

The Issue of Theory and Practice: Arguments for a Normative Approach

Writers such as Scheffler, Hyman, Bandman, and Guttchen have argued that although conceptual and theoretical approaches to the study of teaching as an activity lack the proximity commanded by empirical studies relative to teaching practice, the former approaches can offer a type of perspective which is indispensable to the education of the teacher.[3] Bandman and Guttchen have further argued that descriptive studies concerned with the clarification of specific teaching activities (such as defining, valuing, inferring, etc.) as in the analyses of Smith,[4] are not in themselves sufficient for

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[2]Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1968), p. 8.

[3]Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973); See also Ronald Hyman, ed., Contemporary Thought on Teaching (Englewood Cliffs, N. N.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971); See also Bertram Bandman and Robert S. Guttchen, eds., Philosophical Essays on Teaching (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1969).

[4]B. Othanel Smith and Robert H. Ennis, "Language and Concepts of Education," in Philosophical Essays on Teaching, eds. Bertram Bandman and Robert S. Guttchen (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961), p. 3; See also Arno Bellack, et al., "The Classroom Game," in Teaching: Vantage Points for Study, ed: Ronald Hyman (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1968), pp. 321-328.

a full exposition of what constitutes "good teaching." In this respect, Bandman and Guttchen argue:

> Attention to a description based on what teachers actually do in the classroom has the advantage of keeping the concept of teaching closely tied with the practice of teaching . . . [however] it is a good thing for teachers to acquire a better understanding of what they are doing in the classroom. . . . Philosophical attention is necessary for such an understanding and . . . it is indispensable to the improvement of teaching.[5]

They continue their argument in specific support of a normative approach to the study of teaching activity, an approach which, according to these authors, has been used by such writers as Scheffler and Peters. They maintain that:

> Attention to accurate descriptions is required if our norms or ideals are ever to be achieved in practice. If teaching is construed as being only in descriptive terms, the goals of teaching are liable to be ignored or neglected and at any rate not sufficiently questioned and examined. We then lack rationally defensible norms, rules, or guidelines to help us decide what is to count as "good teaching."[6]

Bandman and Guttchen's argument in this context is in support of a normative approach to a definition of teaching, an approach, according to which "a definition of teaching is designed as a norm or rule for restricting

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[5]Bertram Bandman and Robert S. Guttchen, eds., Philosophical Essays on Teaching (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1969), pp. 2 and 4.

[6]Ibid., p. 4.

the activities to which the verb 'to teach' applies.[7] On the basis of their definition of a normative approach, they lend their support to the use of this approach as they discern it in the writings of Scheffler. It must be pointed out, however, that not all writers identified in connection with the present study agree on the nature of Scheffler's definition of teaching, nor do they agree with what is seen by some as the combined political, moral, and legal implications of his analysis of teaching.[8] What they do appear to agree upon, as is indicated in a statement by Flower, is that Scheffler's analysis of teaching has made "a most serious contribution to both education and philosophy," and that his analysis can be seen to involve "preliminary steps toward a 'descriptive definition of the standard sense of teaching'" which has been achieved by Scheffler "through the examination of teaching as an activity."[9] In defense of what Scheffler calls his "notion of teaching," he argues as follows:

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[7]Ibid., p. 3.

[8]Elizabeth Flower, "Elizabeth Flower on The Language of Education by Israel Scheffler," Studies in Philosophy and Education 4 (Spring 1965): 128; See also Hyman, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

[9]Ibid., pp. 124-125; See also Bandman and Guttchen, op. cit., p. 3; See also Hyman, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

> I think that teaching, as an activity, is normally distinguised from deliberate influence or modification of behavior, by reference to the giving of honest reasons. It is true that we often employ a role-notion of teaching, as referring to whatever teachers (an institutional class) do in fact. Insofar as this may be true, the ordinary word [teaching] is ambiguous, and I have chosen to explain the activity-sense of the word, using other means to talk about schools as institutions and the role of functionaries within them. This choice brings out the option of considering how far teaching (in the distinctive activity sense) is to be used in society as a model of cultural renewal. . . . My point is that the option, as a moral, not linguistic, issue, needs to be clearly exposed.[10]

This quotation from Scheffler's response to Flower appears to suggest a point which is consistent with Bandman and Guttchen's identification and support of the normative approach in Scheffler's writings. Bandman and Guttchen have written that the normative approach "is taken by those writers [including Scheffler and Peters] whose definition of teaching rules out indoctrination."[11] They continue by asserting that "both Scheffler and Peters argue that teaching involves at least at some points the giving of reasons and explanation."[12] It is this normative interpretation, evidenced in what Scheffler calls "restrictions of

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[10]Israel Scheffler, "Israel Scheffler's Reply to Elizabeth Flower," Studies in Philosophy and Education 4 (Spril 1965): 135-136

[11]Bandman and Guttchen, op. cit., p. 3.

[12]Ibid., pp. 3-4.

manner," that the present writer attempts to examine, and to combine with a complementary concept of listening.

Particularly relevant to the supporting rationale of the present study is Scheffler's support of a theoretical approach to the study of teaching as an activity. His arguments in this respect have been associated with the education of the teacher, and the bases upon which one might justify the inclusion of theoretical knowledge as an important aspect of the education of the teacher. He bases his argument not on the question of what is necessary for the education of the teacher, but on the question of what is desirable for the education of the teacher. "Justification of educational scholarship and theoretical sophistication" in the education of the teacher, he argues, "is not, . . . simply a matter of minimal necessity."[13]

> It is rather, a matter of desirability, and a thing may be desirable not because it is something we could do without, but because it transforms and enhances the quality of what we do and how we live. . . . It is a maximal rather than a minimal interpretation of the teacher's work that is thus relevant to a philosophical assessment of his education.[14]

Taking into account the question of practical proximity when theoretical study is compared, at this level of talk, with empirical study, Scheffler argues:

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[13]Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., p. 85.

[14]Ibid.

> Though educational scholarship and theoretical analysis. . . . do not directly enhance craftsmanship, they raise continually the sorts of questions that concern the larger goals, setting, and meaning of educational practice.[15]

This latter statement appears to correspond to Bandman and Guttchen's emphases on philosophical attention and the normative approach cited above. Both sets of statements might be viewed as a part of an overall theoretical approach to the study of teaching.

Larger Curricular Contexts Related to A Study of a Concept of Teaching

In addition to the connection which these writers have drawn between theoretical study, intellectual understanding of a teaching concept, and the education of the teacher, other writers, such as Ronald Hyman, have related the study of a teaching concept to the larger contexts of curricular, cultural, and social issues. "That the concept of teaching is a key concept in education is a truism that needs no explication," writes Hyman.[16] He goes on to delineate what he sees as an interrelationship between curriculum reform and

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[15]Ibid., pp. 92-93.

[16]Ronald Hyman, Contemporary Thought on Teaching (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), p. ix.

teaching reform, and the need of the former to respond to certain specific social problems. He writes:

> People realize full well that in their attempts to reform a school's curriculum, as one significant response to the social problems youth pose to the nation, they must know about teaching. Curriculum reforms in large measure depend on teaching reforms, which in turn depend on an understanding of teaching. This applies to all levels of teaching from nursery school through doctoral seminars.[17]

Hyman further contends that there is a growing concern about teaching which is a natural outgrowth of two related concerns which have been affirmed by laymen and professionals. He argues that the present era is one in which (a) "people urgently seek ways to understand the present social problems facing the nation at large and to work out solutions for the problems;" and (b) all professionals have a concern "for the clarification of key concepts and the development of theory in their respective fields."[18] In a similar vein, Scheffler has suggested that 20th Century analytic philosophy has made contributions to the field of education which can assist the educator who concerns himself with foundational concepts of education and with an examination of the findings of philosophical analysis. He writes:

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[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

> On the one hand, educators and educational theorists alike have, in recent years, increasingly affirmed the need for a critical re-thinking of the foundations of their subject; on the other hand, philosophy has increasingly devoted itself to the development and application of analytic instruments capable of assisting in such re-thinking.[19]

Elizabeth Flower, in a critique of Scheffler's The Language of Education further amplifies this point. She maintains that Scheffler's work contributes to the fields of education and philosophy (a) in demonstrating "that strong methodological demands can be made on a field dedicated to practice" [education]; and (b) in showing "that the ivory tower interests [philosophy] are not without their practical relevance."[20] Other writers, such as Hyman, R. S. Peters, C. J. B. Macmillan and Thomas Nelson, and Bertram Bandman and Robert Guttchen also recognize that Scheffler's specific analysis of teaching as an activity has made an important contribution to understanding and clarifying the concept of teaching.[21]

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[19]Scheffler, The Language of Education, op. cit., p. 8.

[20]Flower, op. cit., p. 124.

[21]Hyman, op. cit.; See also R. S. Peters, ed., The Concept of Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970); See also C. J. B. Macmillan and Thomas Nelson, eds., Concepts of Teaching: Philosophical Essays (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968).

Outside of the exclusive domain of educational philosophy, however, there is some indication that the conceptual analysis of Scheffler, and of others whose work is linked with the same philosophical orientation, receives little attention, in terms of further theoretical examination and discussion. The 1973 Handbook of Research on Teaching indicated in its article on "Contemporary Models of Teaching" that the rational model of teaching (that is, the model to which Scheffler's concept of teaching is linked) "has been criticized by being either ignored or misunderstood."[22] The authors of this article, Nuthall and Snook, in describing three "distinctive" models of teaching (rational, discovery-learning, and behavioral) conclude with the following observation:

> There is continued debate about critical issues among the proponents of the rational model, but their concerns have not been taken seriously by those committed to the empiricist-practicalist ideology. . . . Educational research has traditionally been psychological in orientation.[23]

All of the writers cited above, however, are concerned with a philosophical study of teaching, and they have, through specifically related arguments and/or through the example of their own works, supported the ligitimacy of a conceptual, theoretical, and discussion

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[22]Graham Nuthall and Ivan Snook, "Contemporary Models of Teaching," Second Handbook of Research on Teaching, ed. Robert M. W. Travers (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), p. 69.

[23]Ibid., pp. 69-70.

approach to the study of teaching. They have also suggested that the analysis of Israel Scheffler makes an important contribution to the area of educational practice, and that his analysis warrants further study by those who are concerned with the education of the teacher and a philosophical component of such education.

Other writers, two of which are Joyce and Weil, and Corsini and Howard, have alluded to the significance of a type of study which is akin to Scheffler's approach. In Models of Teaching, for example, Joyce and Weil suggest that the field of teacher education needs additional research which approaches the study of teaching (a) through existing, cross-disciplinary sources, and (b) through debate, dialogue, and/or discussion format.[24] In Critical Incidents in Teaching, Corsini and Howard provide some demonstrations of ways in which the teacher's conception of his role and his philosophical and psychological frames of reference can affect, for example, his "understanding of an interpersonal problem and his solution to it" in everyday interaction with students.[25]

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[24]Bruce Joyce and Marsha Weil, Models of Teaching (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 391 and 394; See also Christopher Lucas, "A Teapot in the Tempest," Teachers College Record 4 (1972): 581.

[25]R. J. Corsini and D. D. Howard, Critical Incidents in Teaching (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964): p. xxx.

In the light of these issues and their corresponding function as supporting rationales, one aim of this study is to further examine one philosophical interpretation of teaching (Scheffler's "restrictions of manner") with a view to extracting and amplifying a communication component.

Justifications for an Eclectic Approach

A final source of support for the present study relates to the use of an eclectic approach to the study of teaching. The eclectic approach, as it is employed within this study, is linked with (a) the familiar dictionary definitions of the term "eclectic," and (b) a more specialized use of the term as it has been set forth by Joseph Schwab and Israel Scheffler. The following sub-sections identify the criteria of the eclectic mode which are pertinent to the present study.

Familiar Dictionary Definitions.--The relevant dictionary definitions can be found in the Random House College Dictionary (revised edition, 1975): (1) "selecting; choosing from different sources;" and (2) [that which is] "made up of what is selected from different sources."[26] In its more specialized use, the term

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[26]Jess Stein, Chief ed., The Random House College Dictionary, revised edition (New York: Random House, Inc., 1975).

"eclectic" is said to involve, according to Schwab and Scheffler, a "plurality of theories."[27] Both of these writers agree on the legitimacy of using several theories, and/or theoretical frameworks, in an approach to the study of educational practice.

Schwab's and Scheffler's Criteria.--These two writers, though they agree on the significance and legitimacy of a plurality of theories, do not agree on the validity of a purely theoretical approach which may or may not be eclectic, nor do they agree on the definition of "theory." Schwab argues that the educational field has become overly theoretical in terms of its emphases on learning theory, teaching theory, and curriculum theory.[28] He maintains that the "theoretical" is too abstract, and that it millitates against achieving a synthesis of theoretical and practical aspects of educational processes. Therefore, in his work as teacher-educator and curriculum worker, he emphasizes combined criteria of social and behavioral theories and practical particularity. That is to say, his work involves presentations of selected behavioral and social theories in

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[27]Joseph Schwab, "The Practical: Arts of Eclectic," School Review 4 (August 1971): 493-542; See also Scheffler, "The Practical as a Focus for Curriculum: Reflections on Schwab's View," in Reason and Teaching, op. cit., pp. 181-197.

[28]Schwab, op. cit., pp. 493-494.

conjunction with practical activities (such as films, simulations, field and laboratory experiences) in which the teacher trainee is expected to selectively apply the appropriate theories or aspects of theoretical frameworks to situations and incidents which are associated with the practical experiences.[29] This type of theoretical-practical approach is further documented in Chapter II of the present study (see "Foundational Perspective," below).

Scheffler, on the other hand, while agreeing with Schwab's position on the significance of a plurality of theory in the education of the teacher, holds that "theory" in the educational field can be more broadly conceived than "theory" in a purely scientific sense, as the latter is seen to be associated with behavioral and social theory. In this respect, Scheffler quotes Hirst: "there is a legitimate and familiar sense of theory in which what is referred to is not scientific theory but the composite set of beliefs that serves to organize and guide a given realm of practice."[30] He continues this line of reasoning by stating that:

> In this sense, the concept of <u>educational theory</u> is perfectly legitimate, but such theory is not

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[29]Ibid., pp. 504-541.

[30]Paul H. Hirst, "Philosophy and Educational Theory," <u>British Journal of Educational Studies</u> 12 (1963): 51-64 in Scheffler, <u>Reason and Teaching</u>, op. cit., p. 187.

> to be confused with scientific theory; it is composed of diverse elements, and it includes philosophical and normative components, in particular. . . . The advantage of such a construction is that it recognizes not only the relative independence of practical thought but the full diversity of contributions to such thought. In particular, it recognizes the relevance of general doctrines of a philosophical and ethical character to educational theory.[31] (Scheffler's emphasis)

With respect to Schwab's argument against the abstract nature of theory, Scheffler argues that abstraction is a condition of both the theoretical and the practical. "It is inconceivable," he argues, "that there could be a theory which did not abstract." Moreover, he continues:

> Abstraction is not in any case peculiar to theory. Even when we bring theory into connection with particulars, our apprehension of the latter proceeds under certain aspects, rubrics, categories, or concepts. Thus if abstraction is a vice of theory, it is no less a vice of any form of thought, inclusive of the practical.[32]

Within a purely theoretical framework, Scheffler invokes the concept of "Practical Thought" in such a manner that it may be viewed in one sense as a tool which to some extent functions analogously to Schwab's use of practical particularity (practical experiences). In this respect, both of these writers are concerned with bringing together the realms of theory and practice.

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[31]Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., p. 187.

[32]Ibid., p. 190.

Scheffler seems to suggest that such a synthesis is possible within a theoretical framework which emphasizes an ethical component. His position is:

> Practical Thought attempts to answer such quesions as "How shall I act?" "What should be done?" "What course of action ought to be followed?" etc. . . . Practical Thought is concerned with the guidance of action; but the expressions and formulations in which it issues are to be distinguished from the actual decisions or actions guided by them. These expressions and formulations may, and normally do, draw upon a wide variety of parent sources in the scientific and humanistic fields?"[33]

From the specific standpoint of a writer's attempts to explain and/or interpret sets of beliefs (the familiar sense of theory as used by Scheffler) he seems to suggest that an eclectic approach (that is, a plurality of theories) is not only legitimate; it is desirable. He writes:

> Schwab's emphasis on the plurality of theories available is of the first importance, in my opinion. From the point of view of application to practice or indeed of explanation, the available plurality simply provides greater resources than are offered by a single theory. . . . In approaching problems of explanation, interpretation, and action, we ought surely to be ready to bring to bear the totality of our intellectual resources, at least in principle, and to override academic, disciplinary, and traditional divisions.[34]

The eclectic approach is not only characterized in terms of a plurality of theoretical content, it also

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[33]Ibid., pp. 188-189.

[34]Ibid., p. 191.

involves, according to Schwab and Scheffler, some specific procedural functions. Schwab, categorizing the eclectic mode as an aspect of what he calls the "eclectic arts," indicates that it is a procedure which lies between the purely theoretical realm and the purely practical realm. The "eclectic arts," in Schwab's view, "are arts by which we ready a theory for practical use . . . [and] by which we discover and take practical account of the distortions and limited perspective which a theory imposes on its subject." The aim of the eclectic arts, he continues, "is to reveal the particular limitations of any given theory and to join different theories in order to form a more appropriate tool for application to problems of practice."[35]

Scheffler, on the other hand, in a response to Schwab's "The Practical: Arts of the Eclectic," has argued that a conceptual presentation which is within the general framework of the eclectic is not necessarily required to indicate that a given theory, or theoretical framework, embodies distortions of reality relative to practical problems.[36] In this respect, Scheffler argues that since the truth of a theory is a "particular truth" expressed by statements of a given theory in the language which is appropriate to that theory, the eclectic need

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[35]Schwab, op. cit., pp. 501-504.

[36]Scheffler, op. cit., pp. 190-191.

not imply that one theory is a falsification or distortion of reality. Furthermore, he continues, no theory within a given time frame, nor any generalization emerging from characteristic methods of inquiry within a given area of knowledge, can be said to possess, nor to encompass, the totality of what is called "Truth."[37]

When Scheffler's argument is viewed in the context of the education of the teacher, he seems to be saying that the eclectic has a broader aim than that of citing theoretical distortions. The implication that he seems to suggest is that a plurality of theory (associated with an eclectic approach) aims at providing the broadest possible perspective (or repertoire) upon which the practitioner can selectively draw when confronted with an acutal practical, or simulated, teaching situation; moreover, that it is the intent to achieve this aim which to a great extent justifies the eclectic approach.[38]

The above rationales for an eclectic approach have been cited as justification for the combinative aim of the present study. This study does not, of course, intend to treat such large questions as the definition of "theory." Instead, the present work intends to proceed

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[37]Ibid., p. 191.

[38]Scheffler, "University Scholarship and the Education of Teachers," in Reason and Teaching, op. cit., pp. 82-94.

eclectically pursuant to the following methods and procedures.

Methods and Procedures

On the basis of the supporting rationales above, the present study attempts to implement a conceptual, eclectic, and discussion approach which aims at achieving the two major objectives of the study: (1) to examine one of Israel Scheffler's interpretations of a philosophical model of teaching, with a view to extracting from this model a component of communication; and (2) to complement Scheffler's rational concept of teaching and communication with a perceptual concept of listening, as the latter concept (listening) may be seen to relate specifically to the selected concepts of communication and teaching.

A review of literature--cited in part in the above supporting rationales, cited in a later section of the present chapter (see below, pp. 24-37), and to be cited more fully in Chapter II--suggests that philosophical and communication components are important areas of emphasis relative to the education of the teacher. The literature also suggests that there is a need for increased understanding of these areas as they are seen to relate to teaching.

The present writer attempts (a) to illuminate the emphases and core commitments which may be presupposed in

Scheffler's interpretation of teaching; (b) to show the relationships which may exist between Scheffler's rational orientation and the perceptual orientation associated with a listening concept; and (c) to accommodate the two sets of concepts to each other on the basis of common elements which may exist between them.

In an attempt to examine Scheffler's interpretation of a philosophical model of teaching, Chapter III focuses on the following areas of presupposition: (1) ethical obligation; (2) concepts of human rationality, critical thought, the mind and its development; and (3) perceptual concerns which are intimated by Scheffler in his conceptual and composite explication of knowing (and of teaching) "that something is the case."

In an attempt to facilitate the examination of the above mentioned areas of presuppostion, Chapter III raises two sub-questions which are designed to ascertain (a) what it is that Scheffler might mean by "rationaltiy," a concept which is the central criterion of his conceptual interpretation of teaching; and (b) on what bases might one be able to assume that his criterion of "rationality" has practical relevance to a "typical" classroom context. In the broad context of educational theory, these questions would seem to suggest other questions about theories of intellectual development, such as those of Piaget,

Bruner, Dewey, and others.[39] However, the present study limits itself to: (a) the philosophical analysis of Scheffler, and (b) the philosophical analysis of those writers who, like Scheffler, have been concerned with a philosophical and conceptual analysis of teaching.

The writers (identified by the present study) who seem to meet the latter criteria include Gilbert Ryle, R. S. Peters, and John Passmore. In addition to the analysis of Scheffler, the analyses of these writers which pertain to the areas of presupposition associated with Scheffler's concept are used to provide support and additional clarification. An elaboration of the rationale which underlies this eclectic borrowing of theories is found in Chapter III, pages 104-110.

Chapter IV concerns itself with a delineation of a concept of empathic listening as a complement to Scheffler's concept of "restrictions of manner." This chapter emphasizes a perceptual aspect of the teaching concept to which Scheffler alludes, but which he himself does not explicitly emphasize.

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[39]More extensive discussions of intellectual development and relevant ideological perspective may be found in the following works: William D. Rohwer, Jr., Paul R. Ammon, and Phebe Cramer, Understanding Intellectual Development: Three Approaches to Theory and Practice (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1974); Norman R. Bernier and Jack E. Williams, Beyond Beliefs: Ideological Foundations of American Education, and by the same authors Education for Liberation: Readings from an Ideological Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973).

Limitations, Teacher Education Issues, and Problem Statement

The present study is written from the perspective of a student of teacher education and as such has certain important limitations.

First, although the study touches upon several broad philosophical areas, it is specifically restricted to a single aspect of Israel Scheffler's rational interpretation of teaching. This interpretation Scheffler calls the "restrictions of manner' associated with the "standard activity-sense" of teaching. This standard activity sense of teaching is a designation which has been used by a group of writers, including Ryle, Smith, Scheffler, Green, and others who have applied philosophical analysis to the study of a concept of teaching. What distinguishes Scheffler's interpretation is the emphasis he places on the "restrictions of manner," distinctions of manner which limit, in his view, what is to count as teaching activity. Not all writers concerned with philosophical concepts of teaching agree with these emphasized criteria. Smith, for example, and to some extent, Green, as observed by Ronald Hyman, agree that the "standard" sense of teaching denotes an "intentional" and "goal oriented" use of the verb "to teach," but they do not fully agree with Scheffler's additional restrictions on the manner in which it is practiced. The present study

concerns itself with the latter's interpretation of teaching as it is specifically revealed in the "restrictions of manner" idea. Central to these restrictions are the criteria of rational explanation and critical dialogue.

Secondly, in its attempt to show a relationship between Scheffler's concept of teaching and a perceptual listening concept associated with communication and teaching, the present study limits itself to a single perceptual concept which has been called by such psychologists as Carl Rogers, Rollo May, and others, "empathic listening." Here again, although the study hereby may touch tangentially upon such broader domains as therapeutic counseling and a perceptual frame of reference associated with psychology, the study does not extend to any in-depth discussion of these areas.

A third area in which the study is restricted concerns its overall approach. It is not an empirical investigation, and it makes no empirical generalizations. The study deals only with sets of theories which have bearing on (a) Scheffler's concept of teaching, (b) concepts of communication, and (c) their relationship to the synthesizing concept of this study. All inferences which are drawn in Chapters III and IV (the main body of text) evolve from internal discussions, and their aim is to

facilitate the clarification of the conceptual data, and to achieve the two major objectives of the study. In short, the present study is concerned with Practical Thought, and it may be seen as an exercise in educational criticism.

A fourth limitation of the study resides in its attempt, through an examination of a single interpretation of teaching, to respond to only some of the critical issues pertaining to the whole area of teacher education, as these have been identified by educators and educational critics. Insofar as the study limits itself to Scheffler's rational and normative interpretation of teaching as an activity, it does not include, for example, discussions and/or comparative analysis of behavioral and discovery-learning models of teaching. From the standpoint of the whole area of teacher education, the present study makes a modest attempt to contribute to the area of need cited above on page 3 and reiterated here for convenience:

> The education of the teacher requires the broadest possible perspective, a perspective which effects a bringing together of the realms of theory and practice with the view of developing more experienced teachers, in terms of the sorts of knowledge they possess and the personal sensitivity with which they approach the activity of teaching.

The following sub-sections attempt to provide brief sketches of a few current issues of teacher

education which represent, according to some educational thinkers, areas where explicitly emphasized foundational perspectives have important bearings. In other words, this section is concerned with some of the theoretical and practical areas of teacher education. The areas identified include such practical areas as clinical programs, the question of modeling, and the currently central question of competency, and such theoretical areas as personal and perceptual attitudes and orientations relative to the education of the teacher.

Clinical Experiences

One of the critical problems associated with the curriculum and the education of the teacher, according to Lembo, emanates from the area of clinical programs. In some institutions, clinical experiences are not provided for the trainee until the senior year, and there is, Lembo claims, too often a tendency to discourage the trainee's taking a critical look at the realities of the classroom situation.[40] Frequently, he says, there is no organized effort which allows for critical analysis through discussion, media presentations, simulation, role playing, or the stimuli of actual experiences.[41]

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[40]John M. Lembo, Why Teachers Fail (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1971), p. 93.

[41]Ibid.

Moreover, others have observed a tendency within institutions to avoid or ignore "new developments" in the field which have potentials for offering clinical experiences to the trainee. A 1972 report of Cooper and Sadker, for example, indicates that such relatively new developments as "field-centered instruction," "early field experiences," "micro-teaching," and "simulation" activities are not being offered on a significant scale by institutions which have been accredited by the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE). The Cooper-Sadker report indicates that among these institutions, micro-teaching, for example, was not used at a rate of 47 percent, with occasional use at a rate of 29 percent. For simulation, the rates were 22 percent non-use, and 35 percent occasional use.[42]

Developing a Modeling Relationship Between Teacher and Student

Another author, Thomas Gordon, whose work includes the training of teachers in interpersonal communication, suggests that there is often, in effect, a failure in teacher education programs to develop those kinds of personal excellences which must be nurtured

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[42]James M. Cooper and David Sadker, "Current Trends in Teacher Education," Journal of Teacher Education 3 (1972): 316.

within the context of a "modeling relationship" between teacher and student. This effect was observed at higher education and high school levels. The problem here, according to Gordon and others, has a twofold nature: (a) though personal goals for students (such as independence, responsibility, self-direction, self-determination, self-control, self-evaluation), may be suggested by the curriculum content, nevertheless, in actual interaction between teacher and student, there exists, in effect, a contradiction between such theory and real practice; (b) the skills and methods needed to foster such development in children are frequently not taught at the teacher preparation level (for example, theory accompanied by practice in problem-solving, critical thinking, handling of confrontation and opposing views, and providing an atmosphere within the activity of teaching which is conducive to such interaction.)[43]

Competency-Based Teacher Education

A third area which has been the focus of much current literature on teacher education relates to the setting and interpretation of criteria relative to the selection and evaluation of teaching competence. The

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[43]Thomas Gordon (with Noel Burch), TET: Teacher Effectiveness Training (New York: Peter H. Wyden, Publisher, 1974), pp. 7-8.

critical issue of "competence" is one which continues to be seriously considered throughout the United States, and extensive investments are being made in its behalf. Indeed, the current scene in teacher education in the United States may be said to be characterized by a movement toward "competency-based teacher education."

This movement has specific relevance to the present study in that the"competency" trend in teacher education recognizes and claims to be responding to the above mentioned concerns of this study: a need for a broadened perspective which would effect a bringing together of theory and practice with the view of developing more experienced teachers, in terms of the sorts of knowledge possessed and a personally sensitive approach relative to teaching activity. Certain goals set forth in the present study are also the suggested goals of the "competency-based" movement. It is particularly in the area of means that emphases differ: the present study emphasizes conceptual amplification whereas competency-based approaches tend to emphasize operational analysis.

Competency-based programs are not yet altogether standardized across the several agencies--cities, states, departments of education, colleges and universities--by which they are implemented. Nevertheless, there are certain associated elements and emphases which suggest a

common response to the theory-practice question outlined above. For example, many proponents of the competency-based concept emphasize the interdisciplinary "pooling of . . . talents and enthusiasms."[44] The concept of a "consortium" is suggested as a means of assessing the needs of a given locality: providing access to the social and economic influences of a community; soliciting the cooperation of, and fostering a partnership with, the local school systems, the colleges and universities, parents, students, and the state department of education toward the aim of strengthening the prospecitve teaching professional.

Another medium with which the competency-based concept is associated is the American form of the notion of "teacher centers" (that is, American versions of teacher centers, as they may be distinguished from the original British versions): an essentially in-service phenomenon which provides re-training, up-dating of educational practices and methodologies, and/or staff development.[45]

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[44]William L. Smith, "First Steps First," Competency-Based Teacher Education: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, ed. W. Robert Houston and Robert B. Howsam (Chicago: Science Research Associates, Inc., 1972), pp. 172-173.

[45]Allen A. Schmieder and Stephen Holowenzak, "Consortia," same source as above, pp. 75-101; See also Marilyn Hapgood, ed. Supporting the Learning Teacher: A Source Book for Teacher Centers (New York: Agathon Press, 1973), p. 14.

Changes in, and flexibilities of, faculty roles at higher education levels represent another notion which is associated with the CBTE concept. Such titles as "clinic" professor, or "field professor," "teaching counselor," "learning resource director," and various professional "specialists" have been suggested by this movement as indicative of changes in function and post of operation. For example, the curriculum specialists, field professor, and teaching counselor work cooperatively in such roles as "arrangers, demonstrators, prescribers, evaluators, and diagnosticians" within the local school environment. Specialists, counselors, and student teachers concentrate, at a given time, on such activities as micro-teaching feedback, on teaching strategies and content, on interpersonal relations feedback, and on student concerns relative to the micro-teaching situation.[46]

CBTE also claims a responsiveness, through the "affective domains" of its programs, to the specific problems of the personal sensitivity of the trainee. The affective area of objectives takes into account such affective components as "attitudes, values, beliefs, and relationships."[47] J. Bruce Burke, for example, has noted

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[46]Howard L. Jones, "Implementation of Programs," Competency-Based Teacher Education, above, pp. 116-122.

[47]Howsam and Houston, "Change and Challenge," Competency Based Teacher Education, above, p. 7.

in this respect that "technology," which is central to the CBTE conceptualization, "serves as the facilitator" of such ends as "personal accountability," "human choice," and "personal interaction among individuals and within groups."[48] Noting that heretofore the teacher has been ill-prepared for the contemporary social make-up of the classroom, Burke suggests that CBTE can facilitate improvement in this area.[49] In addition to the area of "exploratory objectives" which provide the trainee with opportunities to experience and to observe, for example, the neighborhoods from which the student population is drawn, Burke has specified certain personal and affective competencies which are "fostered by a competency-based program." He writes:

> Competency in role versatility, tolerance for ad hoc structures, capacity for autonomous judgment --in short, the ability to cope with any situation that may arise--these are the basic personal competencies fostered by a competency-based program. Underlying these role skills and supporting their effectiveness are the affective skills of empathy, respect, and concern for children as people.[50]

The CBTE concept, in sum, embodies certain characteristic content emphases and goals in its response to the identified needs observed in the present study. The

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[48] J. Bruce Burke, "Curriculum Design," Competency-Based Teacher Education, above, p. 44.

[49] Ibid., p. 45.

[50] Ibid.

CBTE "orientation," write Schmieder and Holowenzak, includes: "individualized and personalized instruction, modularized curricula, emphasis on technology and systems, use of the behavior-modification laboratory, and field experiences.[51] CBTE's five broad domains, according to Howsam and Houston, include the objectives and corresponding criteria of cognition, performance, consequence, affect, and exploration.[52]

The impetus of this movement is being felt currently throughout this country because of the experimentation, implementation, and speculative literature which emanates from such universities as Michigan State; Houston; Wisconsin (Madison); Teachers College, Columbia; Georgia (Athens); Brigham Young; Indiana (Bloomington); and certain state colleges, for example, Weber at Utah, San Fernando Valley, and Southwest Minnesota. Moreover, the movement has been encouraged and generously supported by such agencies as the United States Office of Education, the National Advisory Committee on Performance-Based Teacher Education of the American Association of Colleges of Teacher Education, the National Council for the

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[51]Schmieder and Holowenzak, op. cit., p. 93.

[52]Howsam and Houston, "Change and Challenge," Comptency-Based Teacher Education, above, pp. 6-7.

Accreditation of Teacher Education, and the National Association of Teacher Educators.[53]

Personal and Perceptual Aspects

Accompanying the widespread positive attention which is being given to the CBTE concept and the actions of its advocates, there is another group of writers who differ with its definition of "competency" and its corresponding priorities. The claim is often made in this respect that there is in teacher education an imbalance in priorities and values relative to the notion of "competence," and that the "personal," or perceptual, aspect is often circumvented in actual practice. Cogan, for example, has emphasized three particular areas in which

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[53] Schmieder and Holowenzak, loc. cit.; See also Hapgood, ed. Supporting the Learning Teacher: A Source Book for Teacher Centers, above, pp. 1-25, and entire work; see also Donald J. McCarty and Associates, New Perspectives on Teacher Education (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973), pp. 15-17, 90-92, 127, 152, 179, 183, 240; Bruce Joyce, "Conceptions of Man and Their Implications for Teacher Education (The Competency Orientation)," Teacher Education The Seventy-Fourth Year Book of the National Society for the Study of Education, Pt. II, ed. Kevin Ryan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 134-144; N. L. Gage, and Philip H. Winne, "Performance-Based Teacher Education," same source above, pp. 146-172; Robert N. Bush, and Peter Enemark, "Control and Responsibility in Teacher Education (The Future of Certification," same source as above, pp. 285-286.

the contemporary teacher needs competence: (1) competence to teach creativity; (2) competence to teach successfully in an open school; and (3) competence to teach the culturally disadvantaged. In this respect he enumerates the following respective areas of competence:

> (1) a theoretical orientation; a tolerance for complexity; a capacity for creative thinking; a searching, inquiring attitude; a low motivation for controlling children; courage; a capacity to provide love, assistance, and protection; an interest in intellectual activity and problem-solving; and an introspective preoccupation with private psychological, spiritual, aesthetic, or metaphysical experiences.
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> (2) an interst in knowing pupils as individuals; an ability to establish a relationship of mutual trust and respect; a low need for coercion and punishment; an ingenuity in providing materials for students; a competence in leading and shaping discussions, and an ability to encourage and aid pupils involved in individual and small group tasks.
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> (3) concern and "caring" for students; readiness to build self-respect and trust; and an ability to accept feelings as facts.[54]

Present inadequacies of this "personal" aspect within the curriculum of teacher education are seen by Lembo as evolving from the tendency to emphasize the

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[54]Morris L. Cogan, "Current Issues in the Education of Teachers," NSSE, op. cit., pp. 226-227; See also E. Paul Torrance, Rewarding Creative Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 78-79; see also John Blackie, Inside the Primary School (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1967), pp. 37-39; See also Hilda Taba, and Deborah Elkins, Teaching Strategies for the Culturally Disadvantaged (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), pp. 265-266; See also Gordon J. Klopf, and Garda W. Bowman, Teacher Education in a Social Context (New York: Mental Health Materials Center, 1966), pp. 286-287.

"technology of teaching" (that is, the identification, planning, provision and assessment of appropriate learning opportunities), to the exclusion of matters related to the "art of teaching" (that is, the creation of a psychological climate which is conducive to learning, experimentation and the understanding and constructive employment of personal and interpersonal behavior).[55]

The conclusion which Lembo reaches with respect to the need to bring into balance the art and the technology of teaching is also indicated in a statement made by Israel Scheffler, whose concept of teaching is the major focus of this study. The preparation of the prospective or the teaching professional is "strengthened," writes Scheffler:

> Not simply through an increased mastery of procedures, but through a development of his resources for carrying on a significant conversation with the young; that is to say, through a widening of his intellectual perspectives, a quickening of his imaginative and critical powers, and a deepening of insight into his purposes as a teacher and the nature of the setting in which these purposes are pursued.[56]

Interim Summary

A summary of the above introductory discussion might be formulated as follows. First, the question of

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[55]Lembo, op. cit., pp. 83-84.

[56]Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973), pp. 87-88.

a properly broadened perspective in teacher education is obviously not yet finally resolved. Moreover, such a resolution would seem to be dependent upon who defines, and what definitions one gives, to the question of what constitutes a "broadened perspective." Secondly, the question of how best to bring together theory and practice with the view of developing more experienced teachers in terms of the sort of knowledge possessed and personal sensitivity in approach is also not yet resolved. In this instance the resolution of the question would seem to be dependent upon what answers are given to the underlying question of what should constitute the content of, and approach to, the study of educational practice.

Proponents of a competency-based approach, proponents of an interpersonal relationship emphasis, and proponents of a theoretical and foundational orientation all agree on certain goals, but they differ on content emphasis and the means of achieving the agreed upon goals. Moreover, they not infrequently disagree on the definitions of terms which are connected with their various emphases.

The present study does not pretend to resolve those complex issues, such as the above, which currently confront the field of teacher education; it does intend, however, to make a modest attempt to grapple with some

aspects of the problems. With respect to the problem of bringing together theory and practice, the study focuses upon an author whose work on a teaching concept has been described as an "extension into the practical of the theoretical" through the use of a descriptive approach and ethical statements.[57] With respect to the problem of knowledge depth and personal sensitivity, the present study is guided by the recommendations of a certain group of writers who have been concerned with philosophical and foundational aspects of teaching. A recommendation of the latter authors is that the curriculum of teacher education should be characterized, centrally, by such elements as (1) an interdisciplinary perspective (that is, subject matter, critical procedures, and research within the humanities and the behavioral sciences, together with an understanding of their direct relationship to educational practice and theory);[58] (2) an orientation which is scholarly and rationally conceived and implemented;[59] and (3) a sensitivity to cultural diversity in persons, and a

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[57]Elizabeth Flower, "Elizabeth Flower on The Language of Education by Israel Scheffler," Studies in Philosophy and Education 4 (Spring 1965): 124.

[58]Joe Park, "Toward Reconstructing Schools and Departments of Education," Educational Theory 13 (1973): 108-118 and 114-115.

[59]Israel Scheffler, "University Scholarship and the Education of Teachers," Teachers College Record 70 (1968): 1-12.

commitment to the "enlargement of human powers."[60] Rationales for such recommendations can be found in the works of Scheffler, Brameld, Schwab, and many others who have been concerned with the philosophical and foundational aspects of teaching. The following quotation from Schwab is one illustration of such an underlying rationale:

> The problems of education arise from exceedingly complex actions, reactions, and transactions of men. These doings constitute a skein of myriad threads which know no boundaries separating, say economics from politics, or sociology from psychology. . . . Yet our fullest and most reliable knowledge of these matters is not knowledge of the web as a whole. It is knowlege of various shreds and sections of the whole, each shred and section out of connection with other shreds and sections.[61]

Hence, the present study, pursuant to the above mentioned concerns, recommendations, and rationales, attempts to do some webbing. It attempts to draw a few shreds into fresh and new connections with one another. It attempts to implement an eclectic approach, and a particular interdisciplinary perspective relative to a single fundamental area of a teaching concept. Through its examinations of principal areas of presupposition in Scheffler's rational "restrictions of manner," and a

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[60]Thomas Howell and Nobuo Shimahara, "Educational Foundations: Contributions at Undergraduate Level," Teachers College Record 71 (1969): 208-209; See also Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., p. 92.

[61]Joseph Schwab, "The Practical: Arts of Eclectic," School Review 79 (August 1971): 501.

complementary perceptual concept of listening (both of which have been associated with teaching), the study attempts to effect a particular interdisciplinary, conceptual, foundational perspective which may be deemed important in terms of its potential for contributing to a broader view of the education of teachers.

Definitions of Key Terms

The following alphabetical list of definitions is representative of certain general terms which are found within the study. Other more specific definitions are included as part of the presentation of Chapters III and IV.

Affect (emotion).--A general concept which indicates a reference to such terms as attitudes, feelings, moods.[62]

Communication.--In the general sense, or everyday usage, it is indicative of an exchange between persons which might be verbal and/or nonverbal; and the conveying of a message from one person to another, whether or not the actual message is received by the person, or persons, for whom it is intended. Louise Berman's definition is particularly indicative of the personal (or perceptual)

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[62]C. H. Patterson, Humanistic Education (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 14.

concept of communication which is employed, though not exclusively employed, within the present study: an exchange which presupposes a disposition or willingness to speak and to listen. It entails more than the transmission of information from one person to another; it involves the mutual "sharing of personal meaning."[63]

Conceptual.--Dealing with selected sets of concepts, ideas, their meanings, and their interrelationships, as they may be seen specifically to relate to Israel Scheffler's interpretation of teaching, communication, a perceptual concept of listening, and the synthesizing concept of this study ("Teaching as Communication"). Thus defined, this term presupposes no connection with the specialized notion of "conceptual analysis," a method which has been used by analytic philosophers such as Scheffler, R. S. Peters, Gilbert Ryle, and others.[64]

Dialogue.--A verbal exchange between persons, the contribution and sharing of ideas; also used in the same context with the term "discussion," implying the same type of exchange with more than one other person.

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[63]Louise M. Berman, New Priorities in the Curriculum (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 45-47.

[64]James Gribble, Introduction to Philosophy of Education (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969), pp. 3-4.

Feelings.--Aspects of the "emotion" concept, such as anger, trust, fear, which involve cognitive appraisals of oneself, and of objects and situations of one's environment; manifestations of mental activity (Peters, 1966).[65] From the perceptual frame of reference: terms depicting the perception of oneself, the perception of the situation in which one is involved and the interrelationship between one's perception of himself and his perception of the situation in which he is involved (Combs and Snygg, 1959).[66]

Interactions.--The relationship between persons.[67]

Interpersonal.--A concept relating to the area of social relationship: the quality of relationship which takes into account attitudes, feelings, moods, personal reactions to oneself, to other persons in the general social environment and in the classroom environment in particular.[68]

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[65]R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1966), pp. 111-112.

[66]Authur W. Combs and Donald Snygg, Individual Behavior: A Perceptual Approach to Behavior (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1959), p. 232.

[67]Carl R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969), p. 32.

[68]Ibid., p. 106.

Interpersonal Communication.--An exchange between persons which requires an extra aspect of personal sensitivity to persons so engaged, and a sensitivity to the situational context in which the exchange takes place; simple talk and listening which requires, or might require, for its optimal effectiveness some specialized training.[69]

Listening.--A concept which is indicative of the dual aspects of hearing and the intent to understand the thoughts and feelings of another. Hearing which avoids judgment, diagnosis, appraisal, or the evaluation of persons; concentrated hearing which seeks clarification of the thoughts, feelings, values, beliefs of another.[70]

Personal.--A concept which is indicative of a reference to the frame of reference of perceptual psychology. The latter is based on the principle that behavior, or human action, is explained and understood from the frame of reference of the behaving and perceiving individual.[71] The totality of external and internal

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[69]Gordon, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

[70]Rogers, op. cit., pp. 225-226.

[71]Combs and Snygg, op. cit., p. 11; See also Arthur Combs, et al., A Perceptual View of Effective Teaching," Second Edition The Professional Education of Teachers: A Humanistic Approach to Teacher Preparation (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1974), pp. 11-28.

factors operating at a given time which constitute the point of view of the person acting, and which mutually determine the nature of actions and judgment. The particular patterning of the perceptual network is a function of personal experience and socio-cultural influences.[72]

Practical Thought.--A concept which suggests that a given text or context embodies discourse which is, in a general and fundamental sense, associated with ethical and social considerations relative to human beings. It relates to the serious asking of the question: "What ought one to do," or "How ought one proceed?" It is based on the assumption that there are reasons which can be stated for what is to be done.[73]

Rational.--A concept of "thought" which presupposes the norm of impartiality in the giving and the consideration of reasons (evidence), for knowledge claims, beliefs, and/or actions. In the general sense, it connotes general intelligence, the use and/or exertion of wit.[74] In relation to Practical Reason, it involves

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[72]C. M. Fleming, Teaching: A Psychological Analysis (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1958), p. 81.

[73]Peters, op. cit., pp. 180-182, 208-216.

[74]Gilbert Ryle, "A Rational Animal," Education and the Development of Reason, eds., R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1972), pp. 184-187.

moral and social principles of conduct and deliberation.[75] Relative to Theoretical Reason, it involves propositional knowledge, and operating with and from propositions according to principles of deliberation, or objective rules of critical procedure.[76]

Standard Activity-Sense of Teaching.--A procedural (practice-oriented) and fundamental concept of teaching which is intentional (involving trying) and oriented toward the goal of some sort of student learning. This is a designation which has been employed by writers such as Green, Smith, Scheffler, Peters, and others who have been concerned with a philosophical analysis of teaching as an activity. A third criterion of this concept is found in Scheffler's interpretation of teaching (the "restrictions of manner") which entails "rational explanation" and "critical dialogue;" these are the rules by which teaching, from Scheffler's perspective, is to proceed and learning (knowledge achievement) is to be obtained.[77]

Theory.--A concept, in its familiar and comprehensive sense, which entails a "composite set of beliefs that serves to organize and guide a given realm of practice." It is associated with the realm of educational

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[75]Ryle, op. cit., p. 178

[76]Ibid.

[77]Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., p. 67.

theory and practice, and entails within its scope philosophical and normative components.[78]

Concluding Statement of the Problem

The problem of the study is reflected in two questions:

1. What are the major areas of presupposition in Israel Scheffler's conceptual interpretation of teaching (that is, the "restrictions of manner") which make explicit reference to the centrality of a communication concept, and which might be seen as intimating a perceptual concern with respect to teaching and communication?

2. What perceptual component of communication relative to teaching might be said to complement Scheffler's rational interpretation of teaching, given the particular emphases which appear to be presupposed in his "restrictions of manner" relative to teaching?

These central questions form the bases of Chapter III and IV. Within these chapters the conceptual, eclectic, and discussion approaches mentioned above are implemented in an attempt to arrive at a synthesizing definition of the concept of "Teaching as Communication." Chapter II sets forth theoretical backgrounds for the discussion in Chapters III and IV. The final chapter (Chapter V) suggests some of the implications which the

[78] Ibid., p. 187.

synthesizing concept might have for the area of teacher education.

It is important to point out, in summary, that the ideas and ideals, the criteria or rules, which are dealt with in this study in connection with Scheffler's interpretation of a teaching concept are likely to suggest critical, philosophical, and educational questions with which many educators, educational theorists, teachers, and students have taken, and would take, serious issue. Although it is not within the scope of the present work to examine the arguments which are in oppositon to Scheffler's concept, it does seem reasonable to suggest that such objections raised in other contexts (such as, in a subsequent study, or in classroom discussion between students and teacher educators) might exemplify one of the benefits which could issue from a study such as the present one. In such contexts, the study could be subjected to the criticism of serious students of teacher education (a) who would concern themselves with further discussion of a philosophical concept of teaching; and (b) who would concern themselves with bringing to bear relevant evidence for and against the conceptual data which are presented within this work.

For the present, the discussions to be engaged in within the main body of this work are concentrated

upon the above mentioned examination of what appears to be principal areas of presupposition in Scheffler's interpretation of teaching. When viewed from an overall perspective, this study may be seen as an attempt, while concentrating upon one concept of teaching, to facilitate further clarification and understanding by freshly recombining selected conceptual elements into new patterns.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE STUDY

Introduction

This chapter contains an abbreviated review of related literature. Its specific function is to identify the theoretical backgrounds which would appear to be particularly relevant to the study of a fundamental concept of teaching.

The previous chapter sought to establish a connection between this study and the area of teacher education, and to identify the interpretation of teaching which this study attempts to examine. The need statement, cited on pages 3 and 26 above, sought to stabilize the above connection. The suggestion was made that the present study represents a modest attempt to respond to the need for the broadest possible perspective in the education of the teacher, a perspective which would take into account (a) the question of a synthesis of theory and practice, and correlatively, (b) the question of knowledge depth and personal sensitivity.

The interrelated suggestions which emerged from Chapter I are the following. First, the study of a concept of teaching may have implications not only for the

understanding and clarification of teaching activity--such study may also have implications for larger issues associated with cultural, social, and curricular contexts. Secondly, the study of a teaching concept may be seen as one aspect of a larger foundational perspective associated with the education of the teacher. Thirdly, such a perspective would (ideally) emphasize, according to the recommendations of the previous chapter, cross-disciplinary content and critical procedure. This perspective would exemplify and encourage orientations which are scholarly and rational, and which are culturally and socially sensitive. Fourthly, a combined foundational and philosophical approach to the study of teaching may represent one type of response to the need for a broadened perspective in the education of the teacher.

The present chapter attempts further to amplify these points and to provide a detailed account based on professional literature of (a) relevant foundational backgrounds which seem to be intimated in the above suggestions; and (b) relevant background associated with the above mentioned philosophical concept of teaching. The first section of this chapter discusses: (1) a familiar interdisciplinary foundations course concept; (2) a foundational type of analytic seminar which emphasizes application and occupational concerns relative to teaching;

and (2) relationships between the former (conceptual context) and the restricted interpretation of teaching (Israel Scheffler's "restrictions of manner") which the study attempts to examine in particular.

Part One: Foundational Perspective

This section delineates three aspects of the foundational perspective: (a) a familiar interdisciplinary foundational course concept; (b) a foundational type seminar which focuses on analysis related to professional (application and occupational) concerns; and (c) a foundational type seminar which focuses on analysis and introspection relative to the personal sensitivity of the student of teacher education.

A Familiar Foundations Course Concept

A foundational perspective is most readily revealed in a concept of a foundations course; sometimes called social and philosophical foundations. This concept suggests, according to some writers, a broad interdisciplinary content which draws upon the resources of the entire university: the sciences and humanities, the generalists and specialists, the educational scholars and scholars within the traditional disciplines who are interested in the problems of education.[1] It is

[1]John A. Laska, "Current Progress in the Foundations of Education," Teachers College Record 71 (1969): 199.

essentially a liberal concept of education (that is, as it is viewed in terms of a characteristic breadth of content and critical procedure) whose central purposes are said to include the "academic" study of the educative process and the school as a fundamental societal institution, and the encouragement of increased integration of the field of educational studies (a course format which evinces an integration of parent disciplines, subject matter areas and methods, and their combined influence on educational theory and practice).[2]

A foundations perspective, particularly a foundations course concept, has been discussed in the literature from many and various points of emphasis. Writers do not always agree on such aspects as the particular depth and breadth of content; nor do they always agree on a rationale which would underlie all of the suggested content emphases; nor is there agreement on which faculty (the education faculty, the faculties of the parent disciplines, or a combination of these) is to teach the suggested content.[3] However, in terms of its relevancy to

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[2]Ibid.

[3]William O. Stanley, "The Dilemma of Education," Education and Social Integration (New York: Teachers College Columbia University, 1963), pp. 118-136; See also Harry S. Broudy, "The Role of the Foundational Studies in the Preparation of Teachers," Improving Teacher Education in the United States, ed. Stanley Elam (Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, Incorporated, 1967), pp. 1-33. See also Theodore Brameld, Education for the Emerging Age: New Ends and Stronger Means (New York: Harper and

the preparation of teachers, there is a consistent implication that the prospective teacher needs--indeed his "qualifications" for teaching is, according to some writers, in large portion dependent upon his possession of--a substantive theoretical orientation, which may be offered through a foundations course in teacher education.[4] According to such writers as Stanley, Brameld, Howell and Shimahara, such a theoretical orientation would (ideally) include: (1) an approach which is scholarly, rational and/or academic; (2) content which is thoroughly interdisciplinary with particular emphasis on a philosophical component; (3) an intermingling of the approach and content (above) and the theory, history, patterns, and/or dynamics of the larger culture; and (4) the synthesis and clarification of all of the above relative to teaching practice and the entire educational enterprise.[5]

From the standpoint of its approach and content, the foundational course has been conceptualized as

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Brothers, 1961), Parts I and II, pp. 21-141; See also Brameld, Cultural Foundations of Education: An Interdisciplinary Exploration (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers), pp. 191-273.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid., See also Thomas Howell and Nobuo Shimahara, "Educational Foundations: Contributions at Undergraduate Level," Teachers College Record 71 (1969): 207-216.

"academic," which suggests, according to Lucas, that its primary emphasis is on the impartation and the achievement of knowledge without an explicit regard for the utilization of knowledge--its practical and occupational application.[6] Such a description is capable of evoking serious objections, given the pervasively practical (or applied) orientation which is also often associated with teacher education. The purpose here, however, is not to engage in argument for or against this "academic" conceptualization, such as the one described by Christopher Lucas, for example. Instead, the present purpose, as is the case with this entire section on foundational perspective, is to illustrate the type of foundational perspective (its emphases and rationales) which were intimated in Chapter I.

To illustrate this point, one might reflect upon Scheffler's justification of "desirability" as the basis upon which he advocates the inclusion of theoretical study and scholarly inquiry in the education of the teacher (cited in part in Chapter I). Scheffler's conception in this respect is consistent with the emphases of Lucas and other writers who are proponents of the foundational course concept which is presently being described. Scheffler's arguments presuppose a particular

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[6]Christopher Lucas, "A Teapot in the Tempest," Teachers College Record 73 (1972): 581.

concept of the "education of teachers." In Reason and Teaching, he writes as follows:

> We . . . conceive of the education of teachers not simply as the training of individual classroom performers, but as the development of a class of intellectuals vital to a free society.[7]

Lucas holds that foundational work should be at the heart of the education of the teacher. This work would entail, in his opinion, giving primary attention to the "creation and impartation of a broadly-based perspective on educational concerns.[8] While Lucas does not exclude the performance aspect of teacher education, as is also the case with Scheffler's position, neither does he emphasize it. Lucas takes the position that the preparation of the teacher should alter its priorities in terms of "discrete task performance skills" replacing this emphasis with the emphasis on a "broadly-based understanding of education as an academic field of inquiry."[9] Broudy has referred to this particular emphasis as a "general interpretative" aspect of professional studies.[10]

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[7]Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973), p. 92.

[8]Lucas, loc. cit.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Harry S. Broudy, "The Role of the Foundational Studies in the Preparation of Teachers," Improving Teacher Education in the United States, ed. Stanley Elam (Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, Incorporated, 1967), pp. 12-22.

Underlying this view is the rationale that the foundations course can, in view of its characteristically interdisciplinary content and its commitment to critical thought and responsible inquiry, effect in the teacher a pervasive change in outlook--an occurrence which is considered by such thinkers as Scheffler, Peters, and others to be a central criterion of what is meant by "being educated."[11] Israel Scheffler argues, in this respect, that such a course can effect "an enlargement of the intellectual context within which the teacher views his work" and an encouragement for the teacher "to attain a more rational insight into his task."[12]

The areas of content associated with the foundational concept range from the general to the specific. Broudy, Brameld, and others include studies in psychology (also psychiatry, social psychology, and other divisions), sociology, anthropology, economics, history, philosophy, art, and political science. At a deeper level, and extending the duration of teacher preparation, Brameld includes major divisions of a general history of philosophy (ontology, the study of reality; epistemology, the study of knowledge; and axiology, the study of value),

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[11] R. S. Peters, The Concept of Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970).

[12] Israel Scheffler, "University Scholarship and the Education of Teachers," Teachers College Record, 70 (1968): 12.

and the relationship between the various aspects of philosophy and the behavioral sciences, the humanities, and education as a field in itself.[13]

Broudy and Brameld have set forth comprehensive designs for the content of teacher education which reflect distinctive areas of justification in terms of the teacher as professional and the teacher as a citizen of culture, respectively. Among the three areas of Broudy's design is included what he calls the "general interpretive," or "general professional" studies (that is, histories of philosophy, education, and cultural history; philosophy of education and aesthetic education). He maintains that such studies are not justified on the basis of the personal character and development of the teacher; they "are essential to being a first-rate professional, not to a scholar as scholar not to a craftsman . . ."

> They are essential for the understanding and interpretation of the educational enterprise as a whole as well as of one's speciality. Although they are not used applicatively, they are not on that account useless.[14]

Brameld's design, on the other hand, takes into account a broader area of justification. It also requires an extension of the duration of teacher preparation. In his four-area design (general education,

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[13]Broudy, op. cit., p. 12; See also Brameld, Education for the Emerging Age, op. cit., p. 202.

[14]Broudy, op. cit., p. 22.

specialized knowledge, practice, and unifying theory), Brameld maintains a pervasive intermingling of educational philosophy, and a constant emphasis on the history, theory, processes, dynamics and patterns of culture. He proposes a nine or ten year preparation period which includes two four-year periods of general education, and the knowledge-practice-theory programs, respectively, and one or two additional years of internship.[15]

The justification for this design relates to Brameld's concern with the stabilization and clarification of belief relative to the individual teacher, and to the larger cultural context. He maintains that:

> We are no longer certain as to what our governing beliefs are or should be. . . . [and there exists] deep-seated maladjustments of contemporary culture that are responsible for the necessity of restoring an active philosophy-education partnership. . . . [Even more] Culture is the key to a new and vital approach to education [and] human relations are the proper and central theme of education (Bremeld's emphasis).[16]

Brameld's explicit concern with the condition of culture and the corresponding responsibilities of education is a concern which has also been emphasized over the past two decades in such writings as those of Stanley, Benne, Howell and Shimahara. Benne, for example, has warned that:

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[15]Brameld, op. cit., pp. 197-202.

[16]Brameld, op. cit., p. 205 and pp. 131-141.

> Human society is today in a state of crisis, in transition from one cultural system of fundamental order to some other. An order of relationships between life conditions, institutions, and a system of ideas, ideals, an order linking these factors, in some semblance of meaningful and livable integration, has been challenged deeply. No viable new order has succeeded in establishing itself. The disorder of contemporary culture is not confined to the human middle ground of political economy, but penetrates also to the human microcomos. Men everywhere confront the basic questions, "Who am I?" and "What model of 'right' interpersonal relations should guide my reactions with other men?"[7] (Benne's emphases)

Stanley has suggested, as does Benne, that a large portion of the problem stems from the intellectual and moral realms of the culture, of which the field of education is one influential aspect.[18] This suggestion is also intimated in Scheffler's explicit concern with rational and moral criteria in his interpretation of teaching as an activity.

The arguments of these writers suggest, in sum, that this aspect of a foundational perspective, as revealed through this concept of a foundations course can help to resolve certain types of problems. The critical problem areas which these writers identify include: (a) problems related to cultural conditions; (b) problems related to personal belief and reasoning capacity;

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[17] Kenneth D. Benne, Education for Tragedy: Essays in Disenchanged Hope for Modern Man (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), p. 3.

[18] Stanley, Education and Social Integration, op. cit., p. 116.

(c) problems related to interpersonal and ethical relationships; and (d) the interrelationship between these problem areas and the enterprise of education and educational practice.[19] Although the foundations course concept, or the foundational perspective, is not sufficient in itself for the education of the teacher, it would seem to provide some basic guiding principles which are important for the education of teachers. In their discussion of "Educational Foundations: Contributions at Undergraduate Level," Howell and Shimahara, conclude that:

> The social and philosophical foundations are organized efforts to inquire into contingent needs generated in the dynamics of social life. They oblige, through their orientations, the teacher trainee to see himself as a member of the community and a member of the profession. . . . The foundational studies can be seen as an attempt to prevent the teacher trainee from stopping with a limited conception of the school or such a parochial conception of teaching "as telling students about his subject"; they help create and recreate his vision of education and of its more active relations with the community as a culturally indigenous product.[20]

A Foundational Analytic Seminar

From a more practice-oriented perspective within teacher education, a foundational course has been

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[19]Thomas Howell and Nobuo Shimahara, "Educational Foundations: Contributions at Undergraduate Level," Teachers College Record, 71 (1969): 207-216.

[20]Ibid., p. 210.

conceptualized as seminars of various sorts which include purely professional and purely personal concerns, as well as combinations of these elements. In some institutions where there is an extensive clinical program[21] involving a year or more of practical experience in the schools, or where there is an on-campus laboratory program, and/or where micro-teaching and simulation experiences have been implemented, the foundational type of seminar often functions as the supplementary analytical medium. It functions to help students bring together the theoretical and practical aspects of teaching.

An illustration of this type of integrated approach has been reported by Klingele and Borland.[22] In their conception, this approach involves essentially a five phase clinical program which extends over a one-year period. The first and final phases include presentations and discussions among students, their peers, and their supervisors: the first phase having the function of

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[21]Gordon R. McIntosh, "The Clinical Approach to Teacher Education," The Journal of Teacher Education 22 (Spring 1971): 23-24; See also Frances F. Fuller and Oliver H. Bown, "Becoming a Teacher," Teacher Education, The Seventy-Fourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (NSSE) Pt. II, Ed. Kevin Ryan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 25-52; See also Morris L. Cogan, "Current Trends in the Education of Teachers," NSSE, 212-213.

[22]William E. Klingele and David R. Borland, "The Professional Year in Teacher Education," High School Journal 55 (1972): 309-319.

integrating subject matter, general foundations, methods of education and principles of human development; the final phase having the function of consolidating the student teacher's professional opinions, experiences, and knowledge into a synthesis which is deemed operational for his entry into the profession.[23] Another illustration involves the seminar element as a pre-practicum requirement. In conjunction with on-campus laboratory school experiences with adolescents, the trainees also participate in role playing and discussion sessions in which their peers provide the audience and adolescent roles, as well as the resources for critical feedback on such aspects as overall presentation of material, planning, media presentation and questioning procedure.[24]

The proponents of this particular foundational approach (the analytic seminar) suggest a combined format of theoretical frameworks (in the scientific and humanistic senses), analysis, and experiential activity. The analytical aspect is concerned with professional problems, that is, incidents which occur, or which have occurred, within an actual classroom situation; or incidents which have been experienced more indirectly as

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[23]Ibid., pp. 314-315.

[24]Lee C. Cain and others, "Innovation in a Pre-Service Education Course," Improving College and University Teaching 20 (1972): 151-153 and p. 157.

through observation, or simulation exercises. This approach can be seen as being founded upon a rationale which holds that the practical, or experiential aspect (such as practice teaching) is no longer sufficient in itself for the education of the teacher. In this respect, the emphases appear to shift slightly when compared with the foundational course concept referred to previously: the previous concept evinces heavily theoretical and philosophical content; whereas the analytic seminar evinces a more complex and flexible format.

Schwab, for example, employs a combined approach which effects a practice-oriented emphasis. Identified as an eclectic approach, Schwab's model involves in a single course social and behavioral theory, experiential activity, analysis of classroom incidents, and selective application of theories. In other words, his approach involves sets of theoretical and practical sequences which can be viewed from a more general standpoint as behavioral and social theories, interspersed with films, simulations, and actual experiences relative to which students engage in discussion, diagnosis, analysis, applying certain theories, and aspects of theoretical frameworks to various situational contexts.[25] Schwab's

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[25]Joseph Schwab, "The Practical: Arts of Eclectic," School Review 79 (1971): 493-542.

approach, while illustrating a combined format, also emphasizes the practical in an effort to bring theory and practice together, and to avoid what he sees as the limiting effects of theoretical abstraction.[26]

Shawver, on the other hand, shifts the emphasis in this foundational approach to the theoretical and analytical. He bases his recommendations in this respect on the premise that "practice can be miseducative for the teacher if it does not allow for time and help in seeing a specific practical skill in relation to the total problem of educating the child."[27] He then makes the recommendation that there should be an elimination of most of the methods and laboratory courses, replacing them with the implementation of an extensive internship-analytic program. This means, according to Shawver, that the direct experiences should be accompanied by analysis of the experiences. The synthesis which he perceives entails a broad education in educational philosophy and aims, a strong theoretical understanding of psychology, and a considerable proficiency in specific teaching

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[26]Ibid., pp. 493-495.

[27]David Shawver, "Professional Education or Apprenticeships?" Teachers College Record 70 (1968): 3.

skills.[28] Both of these writers evince a concern for the bringing together of theory and practice with the view of developing more experienced teachers in terms of the depth and breadth of knowledge that teachers might achieve.

A Foundational Human Relations Seminar

A second type of foundational seminar focuses on the personal sensitivity of the prospective teacher. This type of seminar involves personal introspection, interpersonal communication training, and it is frequently designated as some kind of "human relations" experience. It is often offered within the area of a specifically designated "foundations course," or as an aspect of a clinical program. Its rationale suggests several areas of emphasis.

In one view, this type of seminar is based on the belief that there is a fundamental gap between what the teacher teaches, and the learning which must be achieved by the pupil.[29] In order to bridge this gap, the teacher

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[28] Ibid.; See also Arthur Combs and others, "Organizing the Professional Aspects of a Teacher Preparation Program: Theory and Practice," The Professional Education of Teachers A Humanistic Approach to Teacher Preparation 2nd ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1974), pp. 148-164; See also Morris L. Cogan, "Current Trends in the Education of Teachers, NSSE ed., Kevin Ryan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), same as above, pp. 204-229.

[29] Thomas Gordon (with Noel Burch), TET: Teacher Effectiveness Training (New York: Peter H. Wyden Publisher, 1974), p. 3.

must be able to communicate with the student. In describing his notion of "education as initiation," R. S. Peters has suggested that in order for a person to become "educated," in the strongest sense of understanding underlying principles, or the "why" of an area of knoweldge, the student must be "initiated," that is, invited to enter, into an area of knowledge and the heritage of culture.[30] This necessitates sensitive communication between teacher and student. A third view focuses on the problem child, or the disruptive child. It suggests that until rapport is developed in the classroom situation, neither teaching nor learning is possible.[31] A final view, espoused by Mark Chesler, focuses on the unique problems of the multi-cultural and multi-racial classrooms.[32] The personal knowledge which Chesler suggests as emanating from the interpersonal type of seminar has also been the focus of such writers as Rogers, Maslow, Carkhuff, Stanford

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[30]R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1966), pp. 51-52.

[31]Bernard G. Guerney, Psychotherapeutic Agents: New Roles for Non-Professionals: Parents and Teachers (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 339-340; See also Arthur W. Combs, Donald L. Avila, and William W. Purkey, Helping Relationships: Basic Concepts for the Helping Professions (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1974), p. 290.

[32]Mark A. Chesler, "Teacher Training Designs for Improving Instruction in Interracial Classrooms," Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 7 (1971): 216-641; See also Cogan, op. cit., pp. 204-226; and entire chapter.

and Roark, May, and Brameld, and of numerous other writers whose psychological orientation is of the interpersonal and/or perceptual sort, and/or who have included in their writings the aspect of human relations and its implications for the teacher education context. These writers do not always agree on the skill emphasis, but they do agree on the significance of attitudinal disposition and personal communication in teaching.[33]

Chesler has suggested that the personal knowledge facilitated by such a human relations seminar includes such elements as the clarification and explanation of characteristic personal feelings and values regarding racially potent matters; the quality of relationship between trainee and students--for example, the tendency to invite students to participate in their own learning, or the avoidance of this practice; and the trainee's

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[33]Rollo May, The Art of Counseling (New York: Abingdon Press, 1967), pp. 75-91; See also Carl R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 105-127; See also Angelo Boy and Gerald Pine, Expanding the Self: Personal Growth for Teachers (Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown Company Publishers, 1971), pp. 6-15; See also Robert Carkhuff, Helping and Human Relations: A Primer for Lay and Professional Helpers Vol. I (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 21-22; See also Carl Rogers and Barry Stevens, Person to Person: The Problem of Being Human (New York: Pocket Books and Real People Press, 1972), pp. 85-94; See also Gene Stanford and Albert E. Roark, Human Interaction in Education (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1974), entire work; See also Brameld, op. cit., Chapter 13, pp. 131-141.

ability to share with peers, or colleagues, his thoughts, feelings, experiences, to give and receive constructive feedback on such aspects as performance, beliefs, thoughts, feelings, and nonverbal mannerisms.[34]

When a human relations seminar is offered in conjunction with a clinical program, it is frequently an experimental program which is of relatively short duration.[35] Its intent is usually to foster the development of an understanding of the importance of interpersonal relations in the classroom, and to provide trainees with skills which are deemed relevant to the sorts of behaviors which are indicative of an intent, or willingness, to understand the thoughts and feelings of another. The underlying rationale associated with this type of seminar is that if the prospective teacher internalizes the related skills, they would be immediately available to him, as a teacher, as he interacts with his students in various types of classroom situations. The seminar characteristically includes such elements as methods of problem-solving, written reflections in diaries, videotaping of verbal and nonverbal communication, focused exercises in empathy, feedback experiences, general sharing, and the giving and receiving of emotional suport

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[34]Chesler, op. cit.,pp. 616-621.

[35]Cogan, op. cit., 213-222.

from leaders and peers. In the practice teaching experiences, the trainees experiment with solving immediate problems, and with devising more constructive ways of communicating with their students. Their findings and experiences are then reported, analyzed, and discussed in the human relations seminar.[36]

These illustrations suggest that communication is perceived as having fundamental import, and that the ability to communicate effectively is indispensible to the teaching context.[37] Whether the situation demands the building of rapport with students, the handling of conflict or confrontation, dealing with various sorts of formal and/or impromptu discussions and interactions, in any situation of human contact and verbal exchange in which there are opposing views, in which students ask for reasons in support of positions taken by the teacher relative to areas of subject matter, values, and/or

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[36]Helene Borke and Joan W. Burstyn, "The New Teacher and Interpersonal Relations in the Classroom," The Journal of Teacher Education 21 (1970): 378-381; See also Richard A. Schmuck, "Helping Teachers Improve Classroom Group Processes," Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 4 (1968): 401-435.

[37]Louise M. Berman, New Priorities in the Curriculum (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 43-53; See also R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), pp. 59 and 88; See also "Report of the Joint Commission on Mental Health of Children," Crisis in Child Mental Health: Challenge for the 1970's (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970), p. 395; See also Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 62 and 87-88.

morals, the teacher normally must make some form of response. Moreover, the quality of his response can be effective or ineffective, helpful or harmful, clear or ambiguous, depending upon the fundamental orientation, the disposition, the attitudes that he brings to the teaching situation.[38]

Interim Summary

The foundational perspective generally entails the facilitation of a broad intellectual perspective and rational capacity, the examining of professional and cultural contexts, and analysis of the personal sensitivities of the student of teacher education.

The preceding sections suggest that the foundational perspective, which generally encompasses the target concept of this study, is sufficiently broad to encompass academically, professionally, culturally, and personally associated elements. Its characteristic elements are both conceptually and experientially related, which is to say that they include broad interdisciplinary content and critical procedures which, when understood, accepted, and internalized by the student of teacher education, can foster a sense of professionalism, plus changes in the teacher's philosophical orientation, his veiw of the task

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[38]Chesler, op. cit., pp. 612-641; See also Cogan, op. cit., pp. 225-229; See also Fuller and Brown, op. cit., pp. 42-45.

of teaching, his view of the educative and cultural contexts, and his view of the relationship between the educational and cultural contexts. Through the media of analytic procedures and personal introspection, the student can take a critical look at the classroom situation and consider the applicability, or inapplicability, of various educational and philosophical theories. Moreover, he can criticize his own role and his sensitivity as person and teacher with respect to his approach to the activity of teaching.

The need statement (cited in Chapter I) suggested that one of the major areas of concern relative to the education of the teacher is the issue of a broadened perspective, a perspective which will effect a synthesis of theory and practice with the view of developing more experienced teachers, in terms of the sort of knowledge they possess and the personal sensitivity with which they approach the activity of teaching. The present section has revealed one type of perspective (a foundational perspective) associated with teacher education whose emphases seem to suggest that it is a suitable medium from which to respond to the above concern. The examination of Scheffler's interpretation of teaching and the particular synthesis arrived at within this study would appear to be consistent with the foundational perspective

outlined above, and may be viewed as a specific type of response to the above concern. The section which follows is concerned with the conceptual perspective which surrounds Scheffler's interpretation of teaching as an activity.

Part Two: A Teaching Concept Perspective

The problem of this study centers around one of Israel Scheffler's interpretations of teaching. This interpretation he calls the "restrictions of manner." These "restrictions" represent a view of the way in which the "standard activity-sense" of teaching can be said to appropriately proceed. That is to say, these "distinctions of manner" restrict, conceptually, the activities to which the verb "to teach" can be said to apply.

In view of the fact that the main body of the study concerns itself with an examination of this specialized concept of teaching, it is necessary to describe the perspective--the conceptual language, category, and analytical structures--in which it is couched. The present section, therefore, serves a clarification function of delineating some of the relevant problems of definition and conceptual difficulties which are related to the restricted notion of teaching which the study attempts to examine.

The General Perspective and Its Conceptual Difficulties

When the term "teaching" is employed, to what, exactly, is one referring? The ramifications of this question have been extensively dealt with by a group of writers who are called the "Ordinary Language philosophers," or 20th Century analytic philosophers, such as Ryle, Peters, Green, Komisar, Scheffler, Smith, and others. This section draws upon and uses the language of these writers in an effort to explore the above question.

In common language usage, subordinate to the level of what Scheffler, Smith, and others call "standard" uses, the term "teaching" might refer to doctrines, such as the "teachings" of a sect, religious order, or some religious or philosophical leader or orientation.[39] This term might also be used to designate the occupation of one who is institutionally designated or certified to "teach," thereby differentiating the occupation of teaching from other occupations, such as engineering, law, or medicine.[40] At another level of talk, the term "teaching" might denote the "general activity" in which one usually

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[39] B. Othanel Smith, "A Concept of Teaching," Concepts of Teaching: Philosophical Essays, eds., C. J. B. MacMillan and Thomas W. Nelson (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968), p. 12.

[40] Ibid.

engages who is called "teacher."[41] This designation, specifically within the context of the school, serves to differentiate "teaching" from, for example, participating in a staff meeting, or conversing socially in the staff room. This "general activity" of teaching might include such activities as marking, lecturing, giving assignments, individual tutoring, counseling, training, drill and/or instruction in basic skills.[42] In addition to these three levels of talk about teaching, there is a fourth level which is designated by educational philosophers, such as Scheffler, Peters, Smith, and others, as the "standard-activity-sense of teaching."[43] Komisar allows for what may be seen as an analogous designation in what he includes as a third "level of talk" about the

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[41]Ibid.: See Also R. Paul Komisar, "Teaching: Act and Enterprise," Concepts of Teaching: Philosophical Essays, eds., C. J. B. Macmillan and Thomas W. Nelson (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968), pp. 71-74.

[42]Komisar, loc. cit.

[43]Israel Scheffler, "The Concept of Teaching," Concepts of Teaching: Philosophical Essays, eds., C. J. B. Macmillan and Thomas W. Nelson (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968), pp. 17-19; See also Thomas F. Green, "A Topology of the Teaching Concept," same edition, pp. 28-62; See also Contemporary Thought on Teaching, ed., Ronald T. Hyman (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971); See also Graham Nuthall and Ivan Snook, "Contemporary Models of Teaching," Second Handbook of Research on Teaching, ed., M. W. Travers (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1973), pp. 49-50 and pp. 65-70.

term "teaching." The following is a summarization of Komisar's categories (the emphases are those of Komisar):

> (1) Teaching names an occupation or an activity habitually, characteristically engaged in; (2) [it] refers to a general enterprise, some activity being engaged in; and (3) [it] characterizes an act or alludes to an act as being of a certain sort.[44]

The problems surrounding the term "teaching" relate not only to differentiations in common usage, and between common usage and philosophical usage. They also relate to the variety of distinctions which have been made by philosophical analysts in their definitions of teaching, or in their characterization of a teaching concept. Komisar, for example, uses distinctions of "general enterprise," and specific "act" in his definition of teaching. Other writers, such as Ryle, Smith, Green, Scheffler, and others use in their analysis distinctions of an "intentional" use of the term teaching, and a "success" use of the term teaching. The criterion of "intent" is used by these writers to restrict the activities to which the term "teach" can be said to apply. Within this standard activity which is characterized in terms of its intentional and goal-oriented nature, Scheffler invokes another set of distinctions which he calls the "restrictions of manner." A common thread which runs through these sets of distinctions is an emphasis, in greater and

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[44]Komisar, op. cit., p. 68.

lesser degrees, on a criterion of intellectual exchange, a particular quality of such exchange. The following text attempts to describe these categorial distinctions, and their relationship to the distinctions of Scheffler which is the major focus of this study.

Smith has on occasion used criteria in defining teaching which is in some sense closely related to Komisar's "enterprise" and "act" distinctions relative to teaching. In this respect, Smith has described a "generic-sense" of teaching involving "a system of actions intended to induce learning," and an "activity-sense" of teaching entailing the nature of the individual acts which are, or can be, designated as "'teaching' acts."[45]

According to Smith's "generic" distinction, teaching is characterized as "intentional" and "goal-oriented" in the general sense that teaching is not teaching at all unless it intends that some learning should issue, the achievement of which is envisioned in the "teaching" and identified in the context of the learning. In this sense, moreover, teaching is perceived as being the same everywhere, irrespective of the cultural context, or the individual teaching professional within a single cultural framework.[46] The "generic" level is relatively comparable

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[45]Smith, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

[46]Ibid., p. 13.

to Komisar's "enterprise-sense" of teaching. Viewed from the standpoint of "specific actions," however, the criteria become more restrictive in terms of a requisite of "intellectual" quality;[47] this level appears to be comparable to Komisar's "act" level.

The teaching concept at this level (the "act"), according to Smith, suggests and requires a dependency upon the state of knowledge about the complex concept of teaching, as well as the pedagogical knowledge and skill of the teacher. What can qualify as "teaching activity" at this level must satisfy the dual "intellectual" requisite of (a) engaging the mind of the student (from the standpoint of the teacher) and (b) participating in one's learning by exerting one's intellectual capacity (as viewed from the standpoint of the student, encouraged by the teacher).[48] It is this latter distinction which Scheffler, unlike Smith, raises to the level of an indispensable "rule" in his normative concept of teaching. According to Scheffler, for an act to count as a specifically "teaching" act, it must meet specific criteria restricting the way in which learning can proceed. In other words, "teaching" is defined not only in terms of

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[47] Ibid.; See also Lomisar, op. cit., pp. 79-84.

[48] Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

its "intent" (effort) and its orientation toward a goal of student learning, it must also include the elements (in Scheffler's view) of "rational explanation" and "critical dialogue" which, in effect, restrict the "manner" in which "teaching" and "learning" can be said to proceed.[49]

Ronald Hyman has observed that Smith agrees with Scheffler's position up to the point where Scheffler explicitly emphasizes the "distinctions of manner" concept as a constant criterion of the activity of teaching."[50]

In addition to these general difficulties involved in isolating what is meant when the term "teaching activity" is used, there are problems associated with the conceptual complex of the "teaching-learning" relationship. The problem centers around the issue: Can there be teaching, in the standard sense (noted above) when and if there is no learning; or, stated more precisely: "Does 'teaching' imply learning?" The rational view of teaching, as represented, for example, by Scheffler and Smith, suggests a negative answer to this question.[51]

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[49]Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1968), pp. 57-59.

[50]Ronald T. Hyman, Contemporary Thought on Teaching, op. cit., p. 31.

[51]Komisar, op. cit., p. 63.

Smith, for example, illustrates this point with a type of conceptual analysis which involves a teaching-learning, selling-buying analogy.[52] He begins his line of reasoning with the area in which there is, according to Smith, an analogous relationship associated with teaching and learning, and selling and buying. He argues that only in the area of required interactional process is there an analogous relationship. That is to say, in cases of certain uses of verbs, such as "negotiate," "sell," and "teach," there is a clear indication of proceedings between two or more individuals involving "some sort of deliberation with adjustment of mutual claims and interests in expectation that some result will issue.[53] If there is no process of interaction, "there can be neither teacher nor pupil just as there can be neither seller nor buyer;"[54] "unless there are pupils, there could be no teachers."[55] Beyond this area, however, Smith argues that there is not a thoroughgoing analogy between the "teaching-learning," "buying-selling" complexes.

His argument is based on what can be legitimately asserted in statements (i.e., in a conceptual context),

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[52]Smith, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

[53]Ibid., p. 14.

[54]Ibid.

[55]Ibid.

which use the terms "selling" and "buying." From the premise that the "teaching-learning" relationship is not of the same sort of relationship as the "selling-buying" relationship, Smith's argument is essentially the following. To say that one is selling already implies, without having to state it explicitly, that someone is buying something from the seller who makes the assertion at a given time and place. However, when one asserts that he is "teaching" someone, i.e., that he is showing someone how to do something, or telling someone that such and such is the case, an analogous implication does not exist. That is to say, there is no implication that the person is learning that which is being taught (intended, aimed at in the teaching), nor any implication that what the person has learned is what he was being taught. "Teaching," for example, that Columbus discovered America, or that water contains two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, or "teaching" someone how to play a chromatic scale on a musical instrument, does not suggest that the auditor for whom these teaching instances are intended is learning that which the teaching aims at; it simply means that there is intent and a goal aimed at ("teaching"), and an auditor present.

The phrase: "giving instruction," argues Smith, would have a logical relationship comparable to selling

and buying on the grounds that when one asserts that he is "giving instruction," there is implied, without having to state it explicitly, the assertion that someone is "receiving instruction."[56] The crux of his conceptual distinctions is illustrated in the following concluding statements which are made by Smith:

> "I taught X to A" means I showed A how to do X, or told him such and such about X. This expression does not include the idea that A learned from me how to do X. It is thus not repeating the idea to add it to the expression. Hence, "I taught X to A" says something different from "I taught X to A and he learned X."[57]

Smith's argument is essentially based (with respect to the context cited), on the "conceptual" differentiation between the verb "to teach," and the verb "to instruct." To instruct implies that someone is receiving, or has received the instruction; "to teach" does not imply that someone is learning, or has learned, that which was intended, and aimed at, in the teaching. This is one illustration of the type of conceptual analytic justification which is used to support the thesis that "teaching" (in the "standard" sense of the term), does not imply learning. A second type of conceptual justification engaged in by Gilbert Ryle, and to some extent by Scheffler, further points up the difficulties

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[56] Ibid., p. 15.

[57] Ibid.

surrounding the teaching concept, and serves to clarify the level of talk which is the focus of the following chapter.

Ryle's conceptual analysis, briefly stated, functions to differentiate "teaching" and "learning" on the basis of their separate categorial affiliations in terms of a "task" category (also called by Scheffler the intent"), and an "achievement" (or "success") category, respectively.[58] Ryle's argument is essentially that learning is an "achievement" word which parallels the "task" sense of teaching. In the "task" category, words usually involve "trying," and they express an activity, or extended proceedings.[59] In the "achievement" category,

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[58] Ibid., pp. 15-16; See also Scheffler, The Language of Education, op. cit., pp. 60-61; See also Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1949).

[59] Ryle's implication that "teaching" is a "process" --"extended proceedings," is not a notion which is shared by Scheffler. Scheffler consistently uses the designation "activity" in reference to teaching. Although he accepts the "achievement-task" categories as the appropriate general categories, he argues that "to teach" is not to be bound up in a "process." "Teaching" has certain "time" limitations. That is, no one engages in "teaching" without at the same time intending that a particular sort of learning will occur, whether the time frame and teaching interval involves, for example, one lesson, a series of lessons, a few hours, or a year or more. One does not usually speak of "unintentional teaching." By contrast, it is appropriate to speak of the learning "process" in that it characteristically does not entail deliberate intent, nor is bound by temporal restrictions, as in the case of "teaching activity." Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education (Springfield,

words indicate "occurrences," or "episodes;" they refer "to more than just the doing of something; they also refer to the successful outcome of what one is doing, or has done."[60] Moreover, when the term "teaching" is used, it is conceptually appropriate to describe it as being done, or having been done, "skillfully" or "ineffectually," but when the term "learning" is used it is conceptually inappropriate to speak of "unsuccessful" learning, or learning unsuccessfully. The term itself already denotes "success," i.e., learning is itself the achievement. The concept of teaching which is focused upon in this study falls, in the general sense, within this categorial designation of "teaching" as an activity, or a task, whose success sense is defined in terms of the learning state to which it aims.

The Restricted Sense of the Teaching Concept

The previous section has sought to describe the general perspective of the teaching concept highlighting those areas in which there is agreement among writers who have been concerned with a rational model of teaching,

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Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1968), pp. 60-69; See also Israel Scheffler, "The Concept of Teaching," Concepts of Teaching Philosophical Essays, eds. C. J. B. Macmillan and Thomas W. Nelson (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968), pp. 22-26.

[60]Smith, op. cit., p. 16.

and with a conceptual analysis of a concept of teaching as an activity. The section has sought to describe some of the distinctions of the term "teaching" in terms of its substandard uses indicative of doctrines, occupation, and general enterprise. It has restricted the concept at one level which has been called by such writers as Scheffler, Peters, and others the "standard activity-sense," or the "everyday, standard use," of teaching.

Within this general category of a "standard activity-sense" is Scheffler's further distinctions whose principal areas of presupposition this study attempts to examine in further detail. Scheffler's precise characterization is illustrated in the following statements.

> Teaching is an activity involving the attempt to achieve a certain sort of learning within certain restrictions of manner.[61] (present writer's emphasis)

In another place, Scheffler reveals a major thrust of his normative interpretation of teaching activity. He writes:

> Teaching may be characterized as an activity . . . [which is] practiced in such a manner as to respect the student's intellectual integrity and capacity for independent judgment. [This aspect of its characterization] differentiates the activity of teaching from such other activities as propaganda, conditioning, suggestion, and indoctrination, which are aimed at modifying the person but strive at all

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[61] Scheffler, The Language of Education, op. cit., p. 63.

> costs to avoid a genuine engagement of his judgment on underlying issues.[62]

Restatement of Objectives and Problem

Guided by the following objectives, Chapters III and IV involve an attempt to examine principal areas of presupposition which are intimated in the above normative and rational characterization of teaching, as it is specifically associated with Israel Scheffler. A restatement of the two major objectives of this study are:

1. To examine one of Israel Scheffler's interpretations of a philosophical model of teaching, with a view to extracting from this model a component of communication; and

2. To complement Scheffler's rational concept of teaching and communication with a perceptual concept of listening. This concept of listening may be seen to relate specifically to the selected concepts of communication and teaching.

The areas of presupposition which help to clarify and to understand Scheffler's "restrictions of manner" are the following: (1) ethical obligation; (2) concepts of human rationality, critical thought, the human mind and its development; and (3) perceptual and interpersonal concerns evidenced in Scheffler's criteria of "belief" and "evidence" associated with his combined concept of "knowing that" and of "teaching that" something is the

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[62]Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., p. 67.

case. The following is a restatement of the questions which are explored within Chapters III and IV.

1. What are the major areas of presupposition in Israel Scheffler's conceptual interpretation of teaching (that is the "restrictions of manner") which make explicit reference to the centrality of a communication concept, and which might be seen as intimating a perceptual concern with respect to teaching and communication?

2. What perceptual component of communication relative to teaching might be said to complement Scheffler's rational interpretation of teaching, given the particular emphases which appear to be presupposed in his "restrictions of manner" relative to teaching?

CHAPTER III

AREAS OF PRESUPPOSITION ASSOCIATED WITH ISRAEL SCHEFFLER'S RESTRICTIONS OF MANNER

The present chapter and the following chapter contain the major discussions of the study. This two-chapter unit can be viewed as (a) an exercise in educational criticism, and (b) a concern with Practical Thought.

The conceptual interpretation of teaching which this study attempts to examine is permeated with ethical and normative elements, and because of this condition, it is important to reflect upon the concepts of a "normative" approach and "Practical Thought" which were cited in Chapter I.

The normative approach, as it has been observed in Scheffler's writings, as well as in those of Peters, involves a definition of teaching which embodies rules, criteria, norms, or ideals, which restrict the activities to which the verb "to teach" can be said to apply. An illustration of this approach was documented in Chapter II in a quotation from Reason and Teaching in which Scheffler

characterizes teaching activity not only in terms of intent and goal-orientedness, but in terms of ethical and intellectual rules, or criteria governing its "manner" of practice. "Teaching activity," he claims, is an activity which is "practiced in such a manner as to respect the student's intellectual integrity and capacity for independent judgment." Insofar as it is defined in this way, he continues, it is differentiated from such other activities as propaganda, conditioning, suggestion, and indoctrination. This "respect" for the student's intellectual integrity and capacity becomes a conerstone for a broadened approach to the study of teaching. Such "respect" appears too often to be lacking in many current programs of teacher education.

With regard to the concept of "Practical Thought," which is also central to Scheffler's interpretation, the suggestion was made in Chapter I that this concept may be seen as a tool which allows one to offer a useful synthesis of practical and theoretical realms at a conceptual level of discussion. Scheffler's characterization of the Practical Thought concept, also presupposed by Scheffler in the terms "practical context," is as follows:

> Practical Thought attempts to answer such questions as "How shall I act?" "What should be done?" "What course of action ought to be followed?" etc. . . . Practical Thought is concerned with the guidance of action; but the expressions and formulations in which it issues are to be distinguished

> from the actual decisions or actions guided by them. These expressions and formulations may, and normally do, draw upon a wide variety of parent sources in the scientific and humanistic fields.[1]

The normative and practical thought elements in Scheffler's interpretation can be seen as interrelated conditions which permeate his work; and the above reflection on these concepts is important for the following reasons. First, the overall flavor which permeates the language of such writers as Ryle, Passmore, Peters, as well as of Scheffler is directly linked with the rationale which resides in Scheffler's and Peters' description of Practical Thought. A second reason is that this study, in grappling with areas of presupposition associated with Scheffler's interpretation, and in attempting to arrive at a definition of "Teaching as Communication," seeks at the same time to offer a response to the question: How should teaching be viewed? This question would appear to be legitimate when viewed in the context of Scheffler's description of Practical Thought. What this means is that the present study, in arriving at the above synthesis, will at the same time be suggesting that this particular synthesis is <u>one</u> way of viewing the activity of teaching. It is an eclectic way, which prefers maximizing the intellectual bases for

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[1]Israel Scheffler, <u>Reason and Teaching</u> (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973), pp. 188-189.

the study of teaching and prefers programs of teacher education which draw from many parental sources in the humanities and sciences.

A restatement of the areas of presuppostion which are discussed in the present chapter is as follows: (1) ethical obligation; (2) concepts of human rationality, critical thought, the human mind and its development; and (3) perceptual and interpersonal concerns evidenced in Scheffler's criteria of "belief" and "evidence" associated with his combined concept of "knowing that" and of "teaching that" something is the case.

The conceptual data within this chapter is in the language of Scheffler, Peters, Ryle, and Passmore.[2] The

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[2]This chapter contains extensive excerpts (general language and direct quotations) from the following works by permission of the publishers indicated. Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education, Charles C. Thomas Publisher, pp. 51-52, 54, 57, 104-105; Scheffler's "Knowledge and Teaching," "Knowledge and Evidence," and "Knowledge and Belief" in Conditions of Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology and Education (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, and Company (permission also granted by Dr. Scheffler), pp. 7-14, 21, 55-90, 106-107; Scheffler's "Philosophical Models of Teaching," "University Scholarship and the Education of Teachers" in Reason and Teaching (Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.), pp. 2-3, 74-78, 87-88; Gilbert Ryle, "A Rational Animal: and John Passmore, "On Teaching to be Critical" in Education and the Development of Reason (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.,) pp. 176-178, 186-193, 418, 421, 423-424, 427, 430-431; R. S. Peters, "What is an Educational Process?" in The Concept of Education, (Humanities Press, Inc.), pp. 3-6, 8-22; R. S. Peters, "Education as Initiation," in Ethics and Education (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.), pp. 46-59, 35-43, 88, 105-107, 121-126, 165, 208-215.

general relationship between these writers which is relevant to the present study is as follows: (a) their affiliation with Twentieth-century Analytic Philosophy; (b) their support of a rational model of teaching (cited in Chapter I); and (c) their use of a conceptual form of analysis in their study of teaching.

The Presupposition of Ethical Obligation

Teaching, viewed in a context of Practical Thought, is also viewed as a component of a "practical context,"[3] which is (in Scheffler's view) bound by an ethical criterion. That is to say, this context of practical matters embodies, by definition, an ethical core. This is said to be true whether the immediate concern relates to the clinical area of actual, concrete, practice, or to the area of educational policy, or to a type of inquiry which is oriented in Practical Thought.

In this respect, two fundamental, pervasive, and interrelated questions have been identified which are said to be indicative of the practical context, and which are said to be at the core of social controversy about education. According to the writings of Scheffler and

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[3]R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1966), pp. 121-126, 105, 209; See also Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1968), p. 54.

Peters, these guiding questions are: (1) "What is to be done?" and (2) "What ought to be done?" Within the scope of what is called "education," particularly within the context of schooling, the derivative question: "On what procedural principles is, and should, the practice of teaching be based?" and the follow-up question: "On what grounds?" are, in some sense, as suggested by Peters, even more deeply rooted in social and educational issues than a question related to subject matter content: "Of what shall the content of 'education' consist?"[4]

This presumed centrality of an ethical consideration in practical matters associated with education is, in large measure, the rationale for Scheffler's restricting the "manner" in which teaching can proceed, if it is to be called teaching at all. The "restrictions of manner" are defined explicitly in terms of the procedures of "rational explanation" and "critical dialogue,"[5] but what they imply is more than the impartial principles of rational deliberation. The "restrictions" are equally founded upon ethical considerations associated with principles of individual choice and respect for persons. In other words, according to Scheffler, the "restrictions"

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[4]R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit., p. 35-43.

[5]Israel Scheffler, "The Concept of Teaching: Restrictions of Manner," Concepts of Teaching: Philosophical Essays eds. C. J. B. Macmillan and Thomas W. Nelson (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968), pp. 17-19.

emphasize a notion of rationality which has both moral and cognitive import.[6]

Scheffler places emphasis on the dual concept of "principles" and "reasons," which is to say that the concept of teaching (in the strictest sense), suggests the elements of objectively interpreted principled conduct in the teacher's dealings with students, and the honest exchange of "reasons" with respect to any knowledge claims which are made within the context of teaching.[7] Scheffler's concept implies a general concern for the development of character in the student. This dual cognitive and moral element conjoined in the term "rationality" is central to an understanding of the "restrictions of manner." The specific definition of this core concept is as follows:

> Rationality . . . (i.e., involving the autonomy of the student's judgment, his right to seek reasons in support of claims upon his credibilities and loyalties, and his correlative obligation to deal with such reasons in a principled manner), . . . is a fundamental cognitive and moral virtue . . .; in the cognitive realm, reason is a kind of justice to the evidence, a fair treatment of the merits of the case, in the interests of truth. In the moral realm, reason is action on principle, action that therefore does not bend with the wind, nor lean to the

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[6]Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973), p. 76.

[7]Israel Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology and Education (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1965), pp. 11-12.

side of advantage or power out of weakness or self-interest.[8]

Implied in these statements (but purely on the basis of Scheffler's philosophical and normative analysis, as distinct from empirical generalization, such as those associated with, for example, Piaget's study of stages of intellectual development) is the notion that the student possesses a capacity for making, and should have the right to make, choices. This is explicitly dealt with in the presuppositions associated with human rationality and mind. In the present context, however, these statements suggest that teaching is obligated to take into account the possibility that such capacity does exist in the student.[9] As Scheffler restricts the "standard activity-sense of teaching" at this level on the basis of the consideration for individual choice, he at the same time makes a careful distinction between teaching and other activities which are generally related to the education of persons.[10] He does not, for instance, include behavior modification techniques in his concept of teaching.

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[8]Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., pp. 78 and 76.

[9]Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education, op. cit., pp. 57-59.

[10]R. S. Peters, Ed., The Concept of Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul and New York: The Humanities Press, 1970), pp. 9-21.

The Restrictions of Manner and Acculturation

The complex process of acculturation is a characteristically broad area which Scheffler carefully distinguishes from his concept of teaching on the basis of the above ethical principles.[11] The essential rationale is that the complex process of acculturation is too broadly defined; it includes numerous activities which are not only incompatible with the "standard sense" of teaching, but as a complex process, it tends (in effect) to obscure, avoid, and/or discount the principles of individual choice and respect for persons.[12]

The following is essentially Scheffler's line of reasoning.[13] The acculturation process is generally deemed necessary for continuing the heritage, or content, of a culture; and education (in the specific context of schooling), is often said to have the function of transmitting to the young the culture and its traditions (e.g., its societal rules, ideology, technology, folklore, etc.). With this, Scheffler has no objection. However, he continues, the concept of acculturation as a process may proceed in various ways: in informal and indirect

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[11] Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education, op. cit., p. 104.

[12] Ibid., p. 54.

[13] Ibid., pp. 54-57 and p. 105.

ways, as in the case of language transmission; or in formal and deliberate ways, as in various institutional contexts--in the churches, clubs of various sorts, as well as in the schools. Moreover, in that various cultures and individual societies decide within their individual frameworks what is to be meant by "continuity" relative to cultural transmission, the complex process may well include such activities as indoctrination, conditioning, propaganda, force, and/or deception.

It is in this area of the type of activity and its means that Scheffler draws the line between his interpretation of teaching and other activities. In other words, Scheffler argues, acculturation can, and does, entail means and methods which avoid engaging the mind, particularly the "reason" of the student, by means of which underlying principles, beliefs, institutions, and the processes themselves are questioned, criticized, and evaluated. "Engaging the mind" (the indispensable criterion of teaching) involves more than getting a person to believe, to attend to, to absorb, and to process information connected with bodies of knowledge.

The "restrictions of manner" obligate teaching to the consideration of ethical principles which are generally avoided, obscured, and/or discounted in the concept of acculturation. The complex process of

acculturation along with its underlying mandate that "culture shall be transmitted" to the young fails to take into account the "practical" question of "How it is to be transmitted," and correspondingly, "How should it be transmitted?" (i.e., by what means).[14] In Scheffler's view, it avoids the essentially moral question associated with individual choice and control, a question to which social processes, and even more so "education" and teaching, are subject. To consider the possibility of even some alternative choices as a moral consideration appears to entail in Scheffler's analysis a commitment to a particular view of human nature and to certain convictions about how the individual as a human being is to be treated.

The following section deals with this central issue of human nature which undergirds Scheffler's concept and lends an important point of justification to the present study. The points are: (1) that there can be seen an essential cognitive concept presupposed in Scheffler's work which suggests the possibility of human choice; and (2) that there exists a basic relationship between the rational and perceptual theoretical frameworks which is vital if one is to accept the assumption that this study ultimately makes, namely, that there is

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[14]Ibid., p. 58.

sufficient similarity between Scheffler's rational concept and the listening concept to be formulated here, so that the suggestion of a complementary relationship between the two can be said to rest on sound reasoning.

The Restrictions of Manner and Human Consciousness

Scheffler's "restrictions of manner" are, in a fundamental sense, based on the premise that human nature is such that individual choice is possible. On one occasion, he writes that human nature is in some sense analogous to the "sculptor's statue:" it does not automatically select, but it can and does, given its internal structure, reject certain forms and ideas which one might wish to impose upon it.[15] Scheffler's approach thus appears to be not incompatible with structuralist views of human nature.

Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of the question of human choice is not only evidenced by Scheffler's explicitly moral referent; his position can be seen within contemporary arguments on the issue of "determinism versus freedom.[16] The view of Scheffler, as well as the views of certain psychologists of perceptual and interpersonal

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[15] Ibid., pp. 51-52.

[16] Rollo May, Psychology and the Human Dilemma (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1967), pp. 3-20; See also Carl R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 259-275.

orientations, can be perceived as representing a middle ground between the notion of individual choice on the one hand, and absolutely no capacity for individual choice on the other. The basic premise to which Scheffler subscribes with respect to human nature is not unlike some of the inferences which have been drawn by psychologists of the above mentioned orientations.

The statement by Rollo May, for example, that man "is both bound and free"[17] is illustrative of the case in point. May's statement is associated with a core concept of "consciousness" which is central to a concept of mind (described in a later section) to which educational philosophers such as R. S. Peters and Scheffler subscribe. This core concept of "consciousness" is conceptualized by Peters as the characteristic feature of mind, and an identifying feature of human nature.[18] The following is May's description of the implications of this characteristic feature within the human being:

> It is by virtue of the emergence of consciousness that man possesses . . . freedom of movement in relation to the objective environment . . . [For this reason, although man] is subject to death, illness, limitations of intelligence, perception, experience, and other deterministic forces. . . . at the same time man has freedom to relate to these forces; he can be aware of them, give them

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[17] Rollo May, op. cit., p. 11.

[18] Ibid; See also R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit., pp. 46-51.

> meaning, and select and throw his weight in favor of this or that force operating on him.[19] (May's emphasis)

Another psychologist, Carl Rogers,[20] has also on occasion taken this middle ground relative to human nature and alluded to the centrality of "consciousness" and its implications. Although Rogers' views are most frequently interpreted from the standpoint of his position at the "freedom" end of the "deterministic-freedom" continuum, the following statement implies a view of Rogers which is not, in this context, dissimilar to the views of Scheffler, Peters, and May:

> A part of modern living is to face the paradox that, viewed from one perspective, man is a complex machine. . . . On the other hand, in another significant dimension of his existence, man is subjectively free; his personal choice and responsibility account for the shape of his life; he is in fact the architect of himself.[21]

The use of these illustrations and their perceived value in this context is not to discount the fact that the areas represented [educational (analytic) philosophy and behavioral science] employ different methods of inquiry in the reaching of conclusions. It is <u>because</u> they represent distinctive disciplinary areas that they may help to provide, for the purposes of the present

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[19] Ibid., p. 11.

[20] Ibid., p. 19.

[21] Carl R. Rogers, <u>Freedom to Learn</u>, op. cit., p. 275.

study, a clearer explication of principles which are particularly relevant to the synthesizing concept of the study. The above comparative illustrations make several points.

First, Scheffler's concern with the possiblity of alternative choice has pervasive import which exceeds specialized disciplinary boundaries and which gathers support from such psychological orientations as those exemplified by Rollo May and Carl Rogers (above), with respect to his basic premise regarding human nature.

Secondly, given the identified similarities between positions on human nature, there appears to be some degree of common ground between a rational view (Scheffler), and an interpersonal, or perceptual view. Moreover, the rational orientation of Scheffler, with its cognitive and moral emphases relative to teaching, is not totally segregated from a characteristically interpersonal, or personal, concern which emanates from other frames of reference in psychology. (This point is further elaborated upon below, pages 148-160.)

The present section aims at the overall point that Scheffler's "restrictions of manner" presuppose an ethical obligation, and that it is this obligation which distinguishes teaching from the complex process of acculturation with its inherent activities which fail, in

effect, to take into account the emphases of engaging the mind, and the moral principles pertaining thereto. This ethical obligation is embedded in Scheffler's criteria of teaching; it permeates his entire work, and it is particularly connected with principles of individual choice and respect for persons. This ethical core is central to the "practical context" (as it is seen to be linked with "Practical Thought"), and it is fundamentally connected with interpersonal, social, and educational concerns. A major portion of the justification for Scheffler's "restrictive" criteria connoting teaching rests upon the specific assumption that within the human being a capacity for making alternative choices is possible.

In the sections immediately following this one, three concepts are explored (human rationality, critical thought, and mind). These concepts are intertwined with the above mentioned ethical considerations; together they reflect Scheffler's moral and cognitive emphases which he uses to define his interpretation of teaching.

The Presuppositions of Human Rationality, Critical Thought and Mind

The preceding section suggested that Scheffler's concept of teaching presupposes (from a moral and cognitive standpoint) that the human being possibly possesses a capacity for alternative choice-making, which is also

to say (in Scheffler's view), that the human being possesses a capacity for "rationality." Scheffler employs two senses of the term rationality, and both of these senses can be seen to represent a combined area of presupposition in connection with his teaching concept.[22] Therefore, further examination of this teaching-rationality construct appears to be in order.

The two senses in which Scheffler uses the term "rationality" in connection with his interpretation of teaching are the following. In one instance, he defines rationality in procedural terms, depicting the nature of the act of teaching. In this instance, it means "reasons"[23] (that is, the exchange of reasons, the act of justifying, the act of bringing evidence to bear, relative to beliefs and knowledge claims). In the second instance, the term "rationality" implies a capacity[24] within the student, the potential learner. In this instance, it is defined in general terms which would seem to suggest an entity which constitutes a "specifically" human capacity within persons. An illustration of this implication is found within the following statement:

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[22]Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

[23]Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[24]Ibid., pp. 76-77.

> Rationality is an essential aspect of human dignity and the rational goal of humanity is to construct a society in which such dignity shall flower, a society so ordered as to adjudicate rationally the affairs of free rational agents.[25]

In view of these two senses of the term "rationality" and in view of the likelihood of ambiguity in the language of the above characterization of human rationality, additional clarification seems warranted.

If one removes Scheffler's statements from an isolated to a broader eclectic context, one might be able to shed additional light on and extend the scope of his concept of rationality associated with teaching. One might be able to avoid to some extent the critical issue raised by George Kneller, for example: that the scope of Scheffler's rationality is critically limited with respect to a teaching context. In his critique of Scheffler's rationality-teaching construct, Kneller concludes as follows:

> For me, the act of teaching cannot be so neatly prescribed. How relatively simple our lot would be if we could in fact stay within the bounds of Scheffler's understanding of rationality. But people are non-rational [e.g., emotional and value-laden] too.[26]

The article by Nuthall and Snook cited in Chapter I concluded that the writings of the proponents of the

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[25]Ibid., p. 76.

[26]George F. Kneller, "Kneller on Conditions of Knowledge by Israel Scheffler," Studies in Philosophy and Education 5 (1966): 134.

rational model of teaching are indeed frequently subject to misunderstanding.

For the purposes of the present study, therefore, it is important to find out what other conceptual analysts might say about the nature of this rationality which would make Scheffler's two senses of rationaltiy seem reasonable and feasible vis-a-vis a "normal" classroom context, and vis-a-vis the potential learner. In other words, the needs for clarification suggest the following objectives: (1) to find out what Scheffler might mean (using his fellow conceptual analysts to aid in this clarification) with respect to his rationality-teaching construct; and (2) to find out, given the practical nature of education, what grounds can be stated by conceptual analysts which would suggest that Scheffler's criterion of rationality has practical relevance. Gilbert Ryle's analysis in this respect is particularly useful because of his comprehensive description of the scope of rationality; it allows for rational, nonrational, and irrational elements characterizing that which is, or can be included as, human.

Additional clarification also seems warranted in view of the fact that the above directly quoted sense of "rationality" leaves room for one to infer or to construe Scheffler's "restrictions" as presupposing a

naturalistic, or innate essence, in the human being (particularly within the student) which would, in effect, guarantee a capacity for rationality. To effect the necessary clarification of a presupposed rationality in the human being, the following questions were raised:

1. What is the nature of this rationality which Scheffler appears to attribute to the human being; and

2. On what basis can one reasonably assume that a student, of any level of schooling, has the capacity which is presupposed, indeed required, in Scheffler's rational restrictions of manner?

In its attempt to answer these questions, this section uses the language of relevant analyses of Ryle, Passmore, and Peters. The general rationale associated with this eclecticism relates to the need for additional clarification in areas which are supportive of Scheffler's view, and which have not received sufficient detail in Scheffler's analysis to satisfy the objectives of the present study. It would be helpful at this point to remember that this chapter attempts to achieve the objective of examining one of Scheffler's interpretations of a philosophical model (rational model) of teaching, with a view to extracting from this model a component of communication.

The general rationale associated with the eclecticism of this chapter relates to the following additional

findings. First, the writer found that in the several major sources in which the "restrictions of manner" are mentioned, Scheffler provides general discussions of the concepts of rationality in man (universal man), critical thought, and mind in connection with his teaching concept, but he does not give explicit enough detail regarding these concepts as they may be seen to relate to communication and teaching. Scheffler's analysis, unlike the present study, highlights a "teaching-knowing" construct, and a "teaching-reasoning" construct. The present work highlights, through an examination of Scheffler's works, a "teaching-communication" construct. The evidence of Scheffler's emphases can be found in three of his major works: The Language of Education, Conditions of Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology and Education, and Reason and Teaching.

Another finding which suggested to this writer the need for additional clarification relates to Scheffler's conceptual emphasis on the rule of respecting the "intellectual integrity" and "independent judgment" of the student. Such a rule would seem to imply that a student does possess capacities for judgment and intellectual work (that is, capacities for reasoning). Scheffler does not explain and clarify in explicit enough detail the conceptual bases upon which this claim rests. Moreover, from a more general perspective, some writers have

intimated that although Scheffler's interpretation of teaching is an important contribution to the understanding of a teaching concept, it is often seen as being so far removed from the practical classroom arena as to be rendered inapplicable to that context.[27]

For these particular reasons, the writer concluded that a part of the strategic attempt to achieve the stated objectives of the study should be the attempt to suggest some additional grounds on which one might be able to say that the rational criteria of the restrictions are reasonable for a "typical" classroom context. In order to establish such grounds, the writer had to find out, through other sources which have been concerned with a rational concept of teaching, what Scheffler might mean at a level which is not clearly explicated by him, and to examine his interpretation in light of his and other analyses.

A third finding relates to the particular synthesis at which the study seeks to arrive. In this instance, the finding is that Scheffler alludes to the necessity of a perceptual sort of communication relative to teaching, but he does not build such a concept into the explicit criteria of his interpretation of teaching. This finding is reflected in a transition section of this

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[27]Elizabeth Flower, "Elizabeth Flower on The Language of Education by Israel Scheffler," Studies in Philosophy and Education 4 (Spring 1965): 133; See also Kneller, loc. cit.

chapter, in the second objective of the study, and in Chapter IV.

In view of these findings and the need for additional clarification, the language of Ryle, Passmore, and Peters[28] are incorporated to aid in the examination of Scheffler's concept, trying carefully, however, to avoid distorting or misrepresenting Scheffler's views relative to the "restrictions of manner" connoting teaching. The relationship between these writers was cited in the introductory section of this chapter. In addition to this general relationship of philosophical analytical, teaching model, and conceptual analytical orientations, there is a closer relationship between Peters and Scheffler. Both writers exemplify the normative, the ethical, and the Practical Thought elements in their approach to the study of educational practice.

The following series of three sections includes these emphases with respect to the rationality-teaching construct:

1. Ryle's broadly construed concept of human rationality as "general intelligence," "wit," and the "exertion of wit;"

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[28]Gilbert Ryle, "A Rational Animal," Education and the Development of Reason, eds. R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst, and R.S. Peters (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 176-193; See also John Passmore, "On Teaching to be Critical," same source, pp. 415-433; See also R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit., pp. 46-51.

2. Passmore's concept of critical thought (that is, "reasoning"), as an ideal construct, construed as developmental in nature, and pervasively applicable to a "normal" classroom context; and

3. Peters' concept of mind which suggests the dual influence of objective and subjective determinants relative to the human being's mental development, his view on the world, and the process and state of "being educated."

A Concept of Human Rationality

This section and the following section employ the categories of "human rationality" and "critical thought," respectively, to describe the two senses of rationality which are presupposed in Scheffler's interpretation of teaching.

The "restrictions of manner" are specifically defined by Scheffler as "critical dialogue" and "rational explanation." These elements may be seen to presuppose what Gilbert Ryle identifies as a "dual Faculty of Theoretical and Practical Reason."[29] This "dual Faculty" appears to be relatively comparable to Scheffler's "cognitive" and "moral" elements of "rationality" (described earlier in the present chapter), and this faculty seems to be clearly indicated in Scheffler's "strong sense" of "knowing that something is the case" which he describes

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[29]Gilbert Ryle, op. cit., p. 178.

in connection with "teaching that something is the case" (see pages 141-143, below).

Ryle's descriptive analysis of "Theoretical Reason" suggests that this concept is synonymous with what he variously terms "schooled," "academic," "specialized," and "professional" Reason.[30] This concept entails, according to Ryle, the ability to operate from and with propositions: to set forth, to follow, and to understand a line of reasoning and various sorts of strategies of argument; to bring to bear objective and relevant evidence ("reasons") in connection with bodies of knowledge (for example, scientific, philosophical, historical, and/or mathematical areas of thought). The concept of "Practical Reason," says Ryle, involves moral principles of conduct and feelings of persons in connection with their relating to the objects (that is, other beings and inanimate objects) of the public world.[31] These positions represent current discussions stemming from the tradition of Immanuel Kant.

Each aspect of this "dual Faculty"--Theoretical and Practical Reason--has a specialized quality which, if taken on the basis of the above definition alone, would appear at first to negate the suggestion in Scheffler's concept that all human beings (including children and

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[30]Ibid., pp. 177-178 and 187-192.

[31]Ibid., p. 178

various types of students), possess such a "specifically human" quality as rationality.[32]

The required abilities associated with the concept of Theoretical Reason, for example, are not, as Ryle's conceptual analysis shows, the abilities which would fall within the capacities of a pre-school child, the early school aged child, nor invariably within the capacities of various students above this level, or various adults who may be considered even "brighter." Moreover, Ryle argues, there are numerous tasks of reasoning which are neither of the "specialized" short, nor can they be said to necessarily involve moral elements, moral deliberation, or reflection of any kind. Instances of everyday conversation, playing a musical instrument, or games of various sorts are types of phenomena which Ryle uses to illustrate these latter tasks of reasoning.

This further analysis of Ryle with respect to a concept of rationality has sought to dispel certain myths which he sees as being connected with a concept of human rationality.[33] The arguments he sets forth in this respect may allow one thereby to examine Scheffler's "rationality" in a broader perspective. Ryle's broader concept of rationality is particularly designed to dispel the

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[32]Ibid., pp. 176-178.

[33]Ibid., pp. 176-193.

"mythical" notion that rationality must be restricted to the Theoretical level, such that this level alone defines what is "specifically human" about the human being; and that it must therefore, given its conceived required abilities, exclude certain "lesser" (or less "civilized") beings.

Ryle, invoking a more generous notion of the term rationality, calls it simply "Thought;" "general intelligence," exerted and non-exerted "wit." Defined in this comprehensive fashion, it is, according to Ryle, sufficiently broad to encompass a wide range of actions, reactions, thoughts and feelings which are within the scope of what is deemed "specifically human." Moreover, when rationality is explicated in such broad terms, one may be able to avoid such objections as those raised by Kneller. Man, Kneller argues, is not only rational; he is also non-rational.

Ryle's analysis, on the other hand, suggests that, as a specifically human concept, rationality may be viewed as a relative quality which spans a full spectrum from irrationality (distorted rationality) through varying degrees of witfulness, embracing both theoretical and non-theoretical (or specialized and non-specialized) rationality. Rationality from this point of view can be identified in smaller and/or greater amounts in various people. It varies within individuals at various times

and with various kinds of problems, situational contexts, and knowledge content.

Ryle's generous notion of rationality has sufficient breadth to encompass also a wide range of activities. In addition to its ability to encompass "specialized reasoning," it includes such mental activity as pondering, wondering, speculating, reflecting, trying to see a point, trying to solve problems which are theoretical, practical, and otherwise categorized; activity which may or may not require moral consideration, or deliberation. This view of rationality suggests, moreover, that the notions of acting (doings) and thinking (or "rationality") are inseparable. Conceptualized as "Thought," it can be employed in reference to actions, whether or not they are successful or well executed; it can also be employed in reference to perceptions, whether or not they are considered objectively accurate. Ryle illustrates these points in suggesting that such activities as seeing a practical joke correctly or incorrectly apprehended, playing tennis poorly or well, and the professional historian's explaining an historical event are all instances involving the notion of "general intelligence," "Thought," or "rationality." Other instances include the momentary hesitation (possible reflection, or pondering), of the tennis player between his movements during the course of a game, or the perplexity evidenced by a person who is

trying to figure out a practical joke, or the same quality which is evidenced by the professional historian who is temporarily without an explanation which he requires relative to some historical event being considered.

Hence, when the term "rationality" is construed in this broad fashion, as Ryle would have it, it encompasses instances of general reflection; it entails "wit" which is perceived as intertwined with actions, and the "wit" which is exerted in trying to solve a particular problem. Conceptualized in this fashion, it is not, moreover, limited to successful doings (as in the reaching of a solution to a problem), nor is it limited to accurate perceivings. This, however, does not preclude the fact that there might be associated with the doing the aim of achieving success; the point being made here relates only, in this context, to the breadth of the notion of rationality as it is contrasted with more specialized uses, and as it is relevant to the fundamental areas of presupposition under consideration here.

The following illustration indicates precisely the comprehensive notion of human rationality which has been set forth by Ryle:

> Both seeing the joke without hesitation or effort and trying to see it, i.e., thinking it over, exemplify intelligence or, if you like, rationality, in the most hospitable sense of the words. [Moreover], the qualities of a man's wits are shown both by his effortless gettings and accomplishings and by his effortful gettings and/or

> missings, accomplishings or failures. But it is the latter which have made the former possible.[34]

In suggesting (as this chapter intends to suggest) that Ryle's generous notion of human rationality may be presupposed at a level not explicated by Scheffler when one is examining the "rational restrictions of manner," there are certain important effects which can be observed. This suggestion does not intend to imply that Scheffler himself uses Ryle's analysis in support of his own thesis. What it does suggest is that an extension of a concept of rationality along the lines of Ryle's concept may serve to lend further clarification to what Scheffler might mean with respect to his teaching-rationality construct.

One effect of Ryle's notion of rationality is that it allows for a wide range of human beings to whom the quality of rationality and a capacity for rationality can be attributed; this is possible in that this notion excludes only what can be defined as infancy and idiocy. Rationality is not, therefore, reserved for a "civilized elite," nor is it limited to the realm of "academia." For a teaching context, this means that it may be reasonable to assume that there exists a fundamental capacity for rationality in all students, regardless of class, grade level, age, academic area or status, or other differential characteristics by which people and groups

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[34] Ibid., p. 186.

are identified, separated, or categorized. Passmore's analysis in the following section lends further support to such a claim.

A second effect is in the suggestion that rationality need not be limited, according to Ryle, to the specialized category of Theoretical Reason, which is developed ideally within the formal context of schooling, and which is a progressive phenomenon in the sense that it develops throughout the process of becoming educated. On the basis of Ryle's conceptual analysis, there may be discerned a comprehensive rational faculty within the school aged human being which is itself variable, and which contains other faculties whose capacities are also variable.

A third effect relates to a concrete manifestation of a concept of rationality (detailed in the following section): the evidenced ability to reason in the philosophical sense of "thinking critically about beliefs, claims, propositions, or assertions."[35] This concept is presupposed in Scheffler's procedural definition of rationality as the "giving of reasons," the exchange of reasons between teacher and student. It involves, according to Ryle, a fundamental commitment to an ever-present "justification demand."[36] Consistent with his generous

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[35]R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit., p. 51.

[36]Gilbert Ryle, op. cit., p. 192.

view of rationality, Ryle has suggested that the "justification demand" is a phenomenon which is not limited to the contexts of "Theoretical" and "Practical" reasoning. It can always be made: reasons can always be given or demanded for any action that is performed, and for any feelings which are to rank as "specifically" human.[37]

A Concept of Critical Thought

Critical thought, according to Passmore, is a progressive phenomenon which requires the indispensable criterion of critical exchange: its development advances via the medium of critical discussion. According to Peters,[38] it requires that one must keep company with other critical and rational beings so as to incorporate "a critic" into the consciousness.

In a superficial sense, thinking critically can be conceived of as involving questioning and stating objections relative to acts, thoughts, and feelings. For this reason, it can be said to exist, according to Passmore, in an embryonic sense, within a pre-school child. Passmore claims that it is evidenced, for example, when a child of any age objects to what he sees as unfair, or undeserved, treatment: the scolding, or the overt rejection of an adult, in his immediate environment; or when

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[37] Ibid.

[38] R.S. Peters, loc. cit.

the child asserts that some type of performance--a musical rendition, or the playing of a game--is poorly, or inaccurately exectued.[39]

From this embryonic existence, Passmore suggests that critical thought, conceptualized in the above manner, can be encouraged, improved upon, advanced, or built up in any subject matter area, or level, from the earliest years of schooling.[40] From the early years, he claims, critical thought can be advanced through the critical discussion of "accepted rules" which are affecting the child's life. From this stage, the child can progressively shape what was initially a vacuous stating of objections into an understanding of what it is like to discuss a question critically. As he progresses through school and enters the disciplines with their differentiated content and modes of criticism, the area of discussion widens, and the student is enabled to perceive the more clearly defined differences between types of discussion. His capacity for critical thought develops and increases through this process.

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[39]Ryle, op. cit., pp. 180 and 184.

[40]John Passmore, "On teaching to be Critical," Education and the Development of Reason, eds. R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst, and R.S. Peters (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 424-427 and 430-431.

In the strongest and most ideal sense, Passmore conceives of critical thought as a "character trait"[41] (that by which a person is known): one is referred to, or characterized, as a "resonable" person, meaning that one evinces this quality as an active tendency. As an ideal concept, he argues, it involves more than habit and skill. It is identified by the criteria of principled criticism and imagination; it is the exercise of imagination which is indicative of critical discussion and dialogue.

The strong sense of the concept of critical thinking has been described as "critico-creative" thinking,[42] and "disciplined" thinking by Passmore and by Ryle, respectively.[43] "Critico-creative thought" is indicative of a single form of thinking which embodies conjointly the aspect from which new ideas evolve (imagination), and the aspect which reveals the need for new ideas (the raising of objections). Its model is taken from the sort of critical thinking which is evidenced within the "great traditions" (the disciplines), of literature, science, history, philosophy, and technology.[44] The description of critical thought as "disciplined" indicates not that

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[41] Ibid., pp. 418 and 423.

[42] Ibid., p. 423.

[43] Ryle, op. cit., p. 191.

[44] John Passmore, loc. cit.

it involves regimentation, drill, or indoctrination, but that it involves a caring for one's standards (and objective standards), and a caring for the condition of one's knowledge. In the general sense, it suggests that the "Thinker" evinces a serious concern about whether he gets something right or wrong; he is at least slightly concerned to "think" properly; and for the "Thinker," the "justification-demand" is uppermost in his thoughts.[45] Stated more specifically, the concept of critical thought suggests, as Ryle puts it, that:

> One systematically takes precautions against personal bias, tries to improve the orderliness or clarity of his theory, checks his references, his dates or his calculations, listens attentively to his critics, hunts industriously for exceptions to his generalizations, deletes ambiguous, vague, or metaphorical expressions from the sinews of his arguments.... His thinking is controlled in high or low degree, by a wide range of quite specific scruples.[46] (present writer's emphasis)

As a "character trait," Passmore's concept of the development of critical thought (like Ryle's concept of human rationality) spans an extended period of time; it is variable within and among individuals, and its capacity is relative to various contents and situational contexts. Within the context of teaching, it necessarily requires a healthy enthusiasm, on the part of teacher and student, for the "give-and-take" of critical discussion. It

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[45] Ryle, op. cit., pp. 191-192.

[46] Ibid., p. 191.

requires also a school and classroom climate which stimulates its continual practice and development.

Also within the context of teaching, according to Passmore, the concept of critical thought requires a certain attitudinal disposition, a particular type of "radical" orientedness: the realization and acceptance of the fact that at any time either teacher or student could be called upon to defend a belief or knowledge claim by producing relevant evidence for such claims. They must also maintain an openness to certain types of issues which have bearing upon the institution of classroom and school. Passmore contends that such issues as the following are not removed from consideration: (a) the possibility that established norms ought to be rejected; (b) rules ought to be altered; (c) standards of judging performance ought to be modified; or (d) methods of performance ought to be abolished. Any issue of a controversial sort is not immune from the scrutiny of critical discussion. According to Passmore's position, the notion of a critical orientation and the appropriate atmosphere which surrounds it suggests, moreover, that it is more important to acquire the tendency of examining critically the value and the reason Why, of the performances in which one is asked to engage, than it is to acquire the tendency of examining the level, and relative levels, of achievement within given performances. It is this critical

orientation which is presupposed in Scheffler's "restrictions of manner." In Scheffler's words: Teaching involves "the enterprise of giving honest reasons and welcoming radical questions."[47]

A final note on this concept of critical thought takes into account those activities which Passmore explicitly excludes from this concept, and which he deems incompatible with the concept. In the strong and ideal sense, it would not entail, he argues, imparting facts, or merely the development and application of a skill (e.g., making objections, identifying distortions or fallacies in arguments, being competent in criticizing techniques, or reproducing the rules by which criticisms are made). From the standpoint of the teacher, it would not involve, in Passmore's view, such activities as drawing attention to the student's deviations from fixed norms: pointing out perceived defects in the student, criticizing his answers to focused questions, or criticizing the student's behavior and the principles by which he governs his conduct. It does not ential demanding the student's conformance with the teacher's notion of "high standards;" this does not mean, however, that genuinely high, and reasonable, standards are not to be observed. Scheffler has written with respect to this ideal context of what

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[47]Israel Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology and Education, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

constitutes critical thought in teaching that it requires not an arbitrary, nor personally biased, nor absolute, application of standards. The application of standards requires, in his view, principled deliberation, and appropriate regard for differential factors of attitude, background, developing capacities, and general maturity, within and among students.[48]

The previous two sub-sections have illuminated certain important points. From the standpoint of the presupposed concepts of human rationality and critical thought, the following inferences may be drawn.

First, Scheffler's "restrictions of manner" may be viewed as presupposing an essential concept of rationality which is broader than, and prior to, his explicit emphases associated with tasks of "Theoretical" and "Practical" reasoning. If Scheffler's concept is set in the broader contexts of Ryle's "general intelligence" and Passmore's developmental trait of "critical thought," then Scheffler's restrictions may be seen to have more directly practical relevance in terms of applications to actual classroom teaching.

Secondly, the "restrictions" may be taken as presupposing an orientation and an atmosphere in which

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[48]Ibid., pp. 57-58; See also Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

the traits of critical thinking and rationality can develop progressively.

Finally, the notion of critical thought (that is, the concept of reasoning ability) conceptualized as a "character trait," which is a central aim of Scheffler's teaching concept, is dependent upon critical discussion and dialogue. Under the sub-heading "Teaching and Knowing" (pages 143-148), these procedural aspects will be explicitly designated as "rational communication."

A Concept of Mind

The concept of mind can be seen as the connecting and overlapping link between Scheffler's human and procedural senses of rationality, and an underlying notion of "being educated," or achieving a state of "knowing." The present discussion of a concept of mind is taken from the analysis of R.S. Peters. This particular concept provides additional grounds on which one might be able to state that Scheffler's interpretation of teaching has practical relevance vis-a-vis a "typical" teaching context.

This concept is discussed by Peters in terms of three key elements: consciousness, language, and thinking (in the sense of an activity of reasoning, or thinking critically). The development of mind has been discussed by Peters in terms of its centrality to the notions of acquiring knowledge, and being "educated."

The concept of an "educated" person involves, in Peters' view, more than knowing about things, or knowing how to do something, accumulating information, or being well-informed.[49] It entails a sort of empathic delving into, getting beneath the surface of information, in such fashion that what becomes known effects a transformation of one's outlook, one's view of the world (that is, what and how one thinks and feels, what one values). To be "educated," writes Peters, "is not to have arrived; it is to travel with a different view."[50]

The concept of the development of mind essentially denotes, according to Peters' view, the means of achieving a state of "being educated." The main feature of mind is said by Peters to be the aspect of consciousness;[51] referred to on pages 99-101 in connection with the ethical obligation. Peters claims that this aspect exists in an undifferentiated state at birth, and it represents a constant, unless (as in cases of coma, or other such cases), there is a state of temporary or terminal unconsciousness. From this initial center of consciousness,

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[49] R.S. Peters, The Concept of Education, op. cit., pp. 8-9; See also R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education, pp. 46-62.

[50] R.S. Peters, The Concept of Education, op. cit., p. 8.

[51] R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

the mind develops, i.e., it becomes differentiated, according to Peters' concept, by way of activity in external and internal dimensions. Central to its development is what Peters calls the "social dimension,"[52] a notion which can be seen as being centrally linked with Peters' ethical orientation with respect to educational matters. This notion suggests that mental development is achieved by a sort of interaction between the experiencings, meanings, and perceptions of the individual, and the public (external) knowledge "embedded in the language of a culture" of which one is conscious.

This "social dimension" is vital not only to Peters' concept of mind, as it is interpreted in this context, it also carries with it implications which are central to Scheffler's concepts of teaching and knowing. From Peters' perspective this notion implies that the mind cannot be viewed simply as a medium for receiving, absorbing, or processing information. It suggests that mental development entails the individual's imprinting on public knowledge (i.e., the knowledge of which one is conscious), "his own style and pattern of being."[53] This personal imprint enamates from the experiential content which is indicative of a personally unique

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[52]Ibid., pp. 51-54.

[53]Ibid., p. 50.

life-history, existing at a given time, or stage of biological, psychological, and cognitive development.

Scheffler's phrase: "growth of knowledge in the individual" (an aim of teaching), which is analogous to the development of mind, corresponds to concepts of Peters. In the context of analyzing certain "Philosophical Models of Teaching,"[54] Scheffler makes these postulations: (a) the mind is not solely a receiver, sifter, and storer of information; (b) nor is the "growth of knowledge in the individual"--the development of mind--dependent only upon experience or sensory data to which the mind is receptive; moreover, (c) to know is more than to have experience, and insight (i.e., the seeing of underlying realities or principles pertaining to bodies of knowledge, or skills).[55]

As Scheffler develops his view of the role of the learner relative to the teaching-knowing complex, a "social dimension" concept is clearly implied. Scheffler writes that the "growth of knowledge in the individual learner" requires "innovation"--a criterion which is implied to some extent in the concept of "insight" (the cognitive activity of seeing the point, and seeing the underlying principles)--but even more, such growth requires

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[54]Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., pp. 67-81.

[55]Ibid., pp. 68-77.

objective evidence (reasons) and principled judgment and conduct.[56] "The role of principles in the exercise of cognitive judgment involves," in Scheffler's view:

> The capacity for a principled assessment of reasons bearing on justification of [a] belief in question. The knower,...must typically earn the right to confidence in his belief by acquiring the capacity to make a reasonable case for the belief in question.... [It is not] sufficient for this case to have been explicitly taught. What is generally expected of the knower is that his autonomy be evidenced in the ability to construct and evaluate fresh and alternative arguments, the power to innovate, rather than the capacity to reproduce stale arguments earlier stored.[57]

The concept of knowledge (knowing) requires, and therefore a concept of teaching must take into account, according to Scheffler's view, that which goes "beyond... cognitive insight" to "the fundamental commitment to principles by which insights are to be criticized and assessed, in the light of publicly available evidence or reasons...."

> The concept of principles and the concept of reasons together underlie not only the notions of rational deliberation and critical judgment, but also the notions of rational and moral conduct.[58]

These statements very clearly and explicitly indicate that there is an ethical obligation on the part of the student pertaining to the acquiring of knowledge, or the development of mind. Peters' "social dimension"

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[56] Ibid., p. 77.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid., pp. 75-76.

suggests also, as does Scheffler's interrelated concepts of teaching and knowing, that there is a corresponding ethical obligation on the part of the teacher. Peters' suggestion that the development of mind requires not only objective knowledge but the individual's "response to" that knowledge carries with it the idea that the student possesses an internal structure--an individual "center of consciousness"--which allows him to select from, accept, or reject that which is offered to him in the context of teaching.

Therefore, those who are engaged in "educating" must take into account the "consciousness and consent" of the student. Peters writes that the activities which would "educate" persons (or which would achieve some state of mind in the student), must be "morally unobjectionable." Such "educative" activities are bound by the principle of "respect for persons."[59] Moreover, it is on the basis of this moral principle that certain activities are excluded in a particular "task sense" of "education."[60] Peters takes the position that the most morally objectionable activity is "conditioning" activity. This activity is excluded from his concept of "education" when and if it involves the teacher's trying to coerce, persuade, or

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[59]Peters, The Concept of Education, op. cit., pp. 3-6.

[60]Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit., pp. 35-43.

lead, the student to "pick up" certain things without the latter's realizing that he is picking up anything. Such practices as giving orders to the student and discouraging the student's tendency to make individual choices may also be ruled out of the notion of "education," says Peters, on moral grounds associated with "respect for persons."

The second and interrelated component of Peters' "social dimension" of the development of mind can be seen in its emphasis on the role of language: "knowledge is enshrined in the language of a culture," says Peters. The emphasis in this view is on language as the object of knowledge, as distinguished from a related cognitive theory which places emphasis on language as the instrument of knowledge. The differentiation of mind begins with the learning of a language, writes Peters, and he goes on to emphasize that "a people's language is the key to the form of life which they enjoy."[61] For example:

> The working class man... who has access only to a limited vocabulary and to a limited set of symbolic structures, literally lives in a different world from the professional man who has a much wider and more varied vocabulary and whose education in the various differentiated forms of thought has continued for nearly a decade longer.[62]

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[61] Ibid., p. 52.

[62] Ibid., pp. 52-53.

In a similar vein, Scheffler maintains that "knowledge is, first and foremost, embodied in language," and it involves four central factors: (a) an objectively construed "conceptual apparatus;" (b) a creatively and individualistically construed body of theory which has developed throughout cultural history;[63] (c) the inculcation of language: the theories, i.e., the statements about sense data which have been accepted as truth assertions; and (d) the testing of accepted theories through individual experience.[64] By invoking his constant referent of knowledge and the growth of knowledge in the individual, Scheffler writes:

> In the process of learning, the child gets not only sense experiences but the language and theory of his heritage in complicated linkages with discriminable contexts.[65]

In more specific terms, Peters distinguishes two levels of mental development: one prior to school age, the other within the context of schooling. He maintains that from the onset of language leanring, the mind undergoes general and specialized sorts of differentiation. The child begins this course in developing a structure of categories and a conceptual apparatus, by questioning,

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[63] Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

[64] Ibid., p. 70.

[65] Ibid.

identifying, reflecting, deciding. In so doing, he is enabled to differentiate himself from others within his immediate environment; he is enabled to differentiate between persons and between objects. He develops a sense of objects in a space-time framework, an awareness of causal connections, and of means-end relations. Within the context of schooling, the mind develops more specialized differentiations. This occurs thorugh the process of learning basic skills, content, and specialized bodies of knowledge and methods (critical procedures) by which content has been accumulated, and by which it is criticized and revised.[66]

In sum, the concept of mind and its development entails the assumption of an initially undifferentiated aspect of consciousness; a developing individual center of consciousness; and a language integral to which is the aspect of objective knowledge. Language is the embodiment of conceptual structures, theories, beliefs, standards, feelings, and purposes, which constitute a public inheritance.[67] In learning a language, by using the capacity for reasoning, and by engaging in critical exchange, the developing person shares in, participates in, and is enabled to contribute to, this public inheritance.

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[66]Peters, Ethics and Education, pp. 46-51.

[67]Ibid., p. 53.

The set of conclusions which follow presently will show the relationship between the concept of mind and Scheffler's "restrictions of manner." However, in view of the above emphasis on the "language of a culture," and this chapter's earlier discussion of acculturation and the "restrictions," it is important to describe briefly now the nature of the relationship between the teaching concept and acculturation.

The emphasis on cultural language as the object of knowledge suggests the area in which there is a relationship between teaching and the previously mentioned concept of acculturation. Is there a contradiction in Scheffler's theory, as it has been represented in this study? The answer to this question is found in Scheffler's distinctions of "manner."[68]

Scheffler does not reject the notion of acculturation, i.e., he does not reject the notion that culture should be transmitted to the young. What he does is to distinguish between teaching on the one hand, requiring rational explanation and critical dialogue, and "fostering the acquisition of modes of behavior or belief"--acculturation--on the other.[69] These are Scheffler's "distinctions of manner" which "depend on the manner in

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[68]Scheffler, The Language of Education, op. cit., p. 58.

[69]Ibid., pp. 57-59.

which such acquisition is fostered," distinctions which take into account a fundamental moral question.[70] These distinctions further imply that the "standard sense of teaching," central to which are Scheffler's "restrictions of manner," is not a phenomenon which can be automatically presumed whenever there is a process of cultural transmission, or cultural renewal. Scheffler suggests that the concept of teaching is one which must be chosen by the society and the institution; it is not a given. The following statements illustrate what he sees as the relationship between acculturation and teaching:

> The fact that every culture may be said to renew itself by getting newborn members to behave according to its norms emphatically does not mean that such a renewal is everywhere a product of teaching in the standard sense.... To favor the widest diffusion of teaching as a mode and as a model of cultural renewal is, in fact, a significant social option of a fundamental kind involving the widest possible extension of reasoned criticism to the culture itself.... The issue,... is not whether culture shall be renewed, but in what manner such renewal is to be institutionalized. It is this fundamental practical issue that must not be obscured in practical contexts.[71]

Thus the answer to the question of whether there is a contradiction in Scheffler's theory is negative. The distinctions he makes in this respect relate not to the content (the subject matter) of the process of

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[70] Ibid., pp. 53-57.

[71] Ibid., pp. 58-59.

acculturation, nor to the If of the transmission, but to the How of the transmission.

In view of the above concept of mind, the following interim conclusions may now be drawn.

First, the concept of mind which is presupposed in Scheffler's "restrictions of manner" connoting teaching is made up of the three interlocking elements of consciousness, language, and thinking. These carry with them the implication that there is a central core and a developing capacity within the person which becomes differentiated through the media of verbal exchange, conversation, critical discussion and dialogue with oneself and with the public world of which one is conscious.

Secondly, the notion of education or the growth of knowledge in the indivudal involves achieving a pervasive and comprehensive state of mind. This implies both a liberal breadth of education (in terms of thoughts, feelings, values, standards of judgment, purposes, beliefs, choices, principles of conduct) and the rationales (i.e., the underlying principles), relative to bodies of knowledge and relative to the performance associated with activities which would facilitate the development of mind. Consistent with this view of mind, the notion of teaching is viewed as the "educational process" by means of which people are brought to understand principles...: the term "teach" (unlike the term "instruct"), suggests, according to

Peters, that "a rationale is to be grasped behind the skill or body of knowledge." Scheffler expands on this requirement by invoking the concepts of principles and reasons by which underlying principles themselves are "criticized and assessed, in light of publicly available evidence;" thereby, committing the student and the teacher, in theory, to "rational deliberation," "critical judgment," "rational conduct," and "moral conduct." This is the essentially moral and cognitive core of Scheffler's theory which is in this respect equally subscribed to by Peters. It is the core which (the present thesis would maintain) should inform the shaping and practice of teacher education.

Finally, the concept of mind suggests a "social dimension" which is intertwined with an ethical obligation relative to the manner in which the development of mind can be achieved. This carries with it the notion of respecting the mind: taking into account the "consciousness and consent" of the individual whose mind would be developed. It involves acknowledging the principle of individual choice, and committing oneself to the ethical consideration of "respect for persons." This too should be a central characteristic of teacher education practices.

The Underlying Notion of Communication: A Set of Inferences

The focused areas of presupposition have illuminated certain central emphases, rationales, and a communication aspect in relation to Scheffler's "restrictions of manner" associated with teaching. On the basis of the four preceding sections, the following inferences can be drawn.

First, the "restrictions" presuppose a broadly liberal concept of becoming "educated" which emphasizes the development of the reasoning facility of the human being.

Secondly, on the basis of the presupposed concepts of rationality (both as a specifically human quality, and as a critical procedure), and on the basis of the concept of mind, a rationale is illuminated which supports the assumption that Scheffler's "restrictions" would be applicable to any "typical" classroom context. Exceptions are noted in the third inference below.

Thirdly, there is a sense in which all human beings can be said to possess at least an embryonic potential for reasoning by virtue of an individual center of consciousness (i.e., a "point of view on the world"). Moreover, all students (excepting actual cases defined as infants and idiots) can be said to possess changing and variable capacities for reasoning in the sense of thinking critically.

Fourthly, in view of the internal structure of the human being, i.e., as it is represented by the notion of mind and its interlocking concepts, it seems fair to state that there exists, in theory, the potential and some capacity for indivdual choice. Therefore, those who would educate, and the activities which aim at the development of mind, are bound by ethical considerations associated with the acknowledgement of such individual choice, and a respect for persons.

Fifth, the concept of mind and its interlocking concepts (that is, human rationality and critical thought) identify conjointly an aim and a process: the achievement of a pervasive and comprehensive state of mind, and the procedures of critical dialogue and discussion (engaging the mind), as the means of facilitating the development of mind. This aim and procedure appear to presuppose a concept of communication.

Finally, in view of the centrality of language and thinking, and in view of the emphasized principles of critical discussion and dialogue relative to the development of mind and the notion of becoming "educated," it seems reasonable to assume that a fundamental notion of communication is indeed presupposed in Scheffler's "restrictions of manner."

The Presupposition of Rational Communication: A Transition

The following section is intended to serve as a bridge which connects Chapter III with Chapter IV. It aims at illuminating Scheffler's explicit references to the centrality of a concept of rational communication, and it aims at illuminating the perceptual concerns which are indicated by Scheffler and which suggest a rationale for a personal concept of communication. The clearest evidence of these references is found in Scheffler's delineation of what he calls a "'strong sense' of knowing" and its relationship with the concept of teaching: the propositional case of "knowing that" and "teaching that" something is the case.[72]

Scheffler places the greater emphasis in his analysis on the objectively construed propositional case of knowledge. This is to be distinguished from a "procedural" case involving skill, skill development, knack, or "knowing how" to do something. It is also to be distinguished from a propositional case of "perceptual knowledge," i.e., cases in which a person is in a direct position to know that which he asserts in a statement without being required, necessarily, to support his assertion with public evidence, e.g., instances in which one states his own name, or asserts verbally that he is

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[72] Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, op. cit., pp. 7-14 and pp. 55-90; See also pp. 106-107.

in pain, or asserts in looking through a window that the weather is cloudy, or the postman is coming up the sidewalk--instances involving thoughts, feelings, moods which may or may not be supported by objective evidence. This section, therefore, will concern itself with aspects of the former, "strong sense" of propositional knowledge,[73] in view of its particular relevance to the teaching concept.

When teaching aims at the student's coming to know (in the "strong sense") that something is the case, the knowing involves, in Scheffler's view, more than the notions of "learning" and "believing." Such knowing, to be called knowing (e.g., saying that the student knows that such and such is the case), requires the conditions of "Truth," "Belief," and "Evidence"--the combination of these three conditions is necessary. The distinction Scheffler draws between "learning" and "believing" on the one hand, and knowing on the other relates primarily to the requirement of "relevant evidence" in connection with a belief or a knowledge claim. For example, to teach that Columbus discovered American (one of Scheffler's examples), with the intent of having the student come to know that Columbus discovered America, the teacher must assert that,

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[73] Ibid., p. 21.

and commit himself personally to the substantive assertion that, on the basis of currently available evidence, Columbus did in fact discover America. (The counter argument can also be made, duly observing the three conditions of knowing). Moreover, the achievement of knowing, which is the aim of teaching (in this context)[74] is gained by the student through the critical processes of "deliberation, argument, judgment, appraisal of reasons pro and con, weighing of evidence, appeal to principles, and decision-making."[75]

Teaching and Knowing: Mutual Participation of Teacher and Student

In this "strong sense" of knowing and teaching, a notion of communication appears to be a pervasive and fundamental factor. It suggests that teaching is viewed in terms of the mutual participation of teacher and student. The student is not, Scheffler writes, mere inert material to be worked on by rule:

> [The student] enters into communication with the teacher and, through the teacher, with the heritage of culture common to both. Such communication broadens and refines the student's

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[74] Scheffler includes also in his analyses the procedural "teaching how to," and "teaching to" as associated with moral conduct and social excellences. "Teaching and Telling," The Language of Education (1968), pp. 76-101. These are not within the scope of the present study.

[75] Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., p. 75.

initial outlook, and thereby increases his understanding.[76]

From the standpoint of the student, according to Scheffler's analysis, knowledge is not simply given to him, nor does he come to know simply by being told something or by obtaining, storing, processing and reproducing information, or seeing the point. The student is required to gain understanding through the exertion of his reasoning capacity: to, in Scheffler's words, "earn the 'right to be sure'" of the truth of any knowledge claim which is made by him, or by the teacher, in the context of teaching. To produce, or reproduce right answers on a test, or to have been told certain answers by an authority, is not sufficient in itself to attribute knowing to the student. Both teacher and student, in this respect of the latter's "earning the right to his assurance" of the truth of any information, belief, or knowledge claim, are bound by the rule of "principled deliberation."[77] Peters has referred to this mutual commitment to "principled deliberation" as the area of "holy ground" (quoting D.H. Lawrence), which "stands between teacher and taught." That is to say, the notion of "critical procedures" (implied in Scheffler's "principled deliberation"), conceptualized as the means by which knowledge is "assessed, revised, and adapted to new discoveries..."

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[76] Ibid., p. 87.

[77] Ibid., pp. 74-75 and pp. 77-78; See also Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, op. cit., pp. 58-74.

> ...presupposes public principles that stand as impersonal standards to which teacher and learner must give their allegiance.[78]

Scheffler holds that the teacher, as a mutual participant in the teaching-knowing complex, is bound also by certain other more specific commitments. In addition to his commitment to the truth of any assertion which he makes in the context of teaching, he is also obligated to submit himself to the questioning of the student (indeed, to encourage the same), and to support knowledge claims with honest reasons in the context of teaching that something is the case. Moreover, as assessor of student evidence (in terms of the condition of the student's knowledge), he must apply his standards of judgment with appropriate sensitivity to individual differences and capacities. That is to say, he must take into account the relevant differences in cultural background, chronological age, attitudes, and general maturity, which influence the capacities, and changing levels of capacity, within and among students.

The following sets of quotations are illustrative of the points being made in this sub-section: (1) that there is a fundamental concept of rational communication which emanates from Scheffler's "evidence condition" defining the "strong sense" of knowing (referred to

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[78]Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit., pp. 52-54.

earlier in this chapter as the procedural aspect of "rationality"), and which is particularly manifested in the notion of mutual participation of teacher and student relative to the teaching-knowing complex; and (2) that the concepts of teaching and knowing require an element of sensitivity on the part of the teacher in assessing the actual condition of the student's knowledge. The first quotation illuminates the aspect of the "dialogue:" the mutual exchange of "reasons" which is required for the teaching concept, and for the student to "earn the right to be sure." Teaching, in this respect, is distinct from such activity as debating, or propagandizing, writes Scheffler, because of "its special connection with... the enterprise of giving honest reasons and welcoming radical questions...."

> The person engaged in teaching does not merely want to bring about belief, but to bring it about through the exercise of free rational judgment by the student. .... In teaching, the teacher is revealing his reasons for the beliefs he wants to transmit and is thus, in effect, submitting his own judgment to the critical scrutiny and evaluation of the student; he is fully engaged in the dialogue by which he hopes to teach and is risking his own beliefs, in lesser or greater degree, as he teaches.[79]

The emphases in the above quotation are those of the present writer; the underlined passages illuminate the specific references to the interrelated notions of mutual participation and rational communication.

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[79] Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

The final quotation in this context indicates the care which must be taken by the teacher in applying variable standards to the student's performance, i.e., to the nature of his evidence in "earning the 'right to be sure.'" Scheffler writes that the required variability in the application of the teacher's standards does not preclude the teacher's possessing a stringently defined concept of critical standards, and standards of judgment, relative to an objectively construed definition of standards, or standards which are based on expert knowledge in a given area; however:

> If knowledge appraisals are to be capable of marking relevant advances [within the student], the stringency with which standards are applied needs to keep pace with changing levels of capacity. As capacity grows, the same subject may thus come to be known under ever more stringent interpretations of known.[80] (Scheffler's emphasis).

In the "belief" condition of knowing, Scheffler makes an even stronger reference to a perceptual concern (more so than the above implication of a perceptual sensitivity in the application of "variable standards" in assessing the adequacy of the student's evidence relative to the condition of his knowledge). Moreover, in the "belief" condition of knowing that something is the case, Scheffler's reference to the communication concept has the flavor of a personal quality of communication

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[80] Ibid., p. 57.

(similar to the listening concept of the following chapter), but such a notion is not explicitly emphasized within the concept of teaching per se.

Teaching and Knowing: The Perceptual Concern Within the Belief Criterion

Scheffler's "belief" condition of knowing that something is the case suggests that the potential knower must "genuinely believe" that such and such is the case.[81] However, Scheffler acknowledges that a condition of "genuine belief," as a "purely psychological" notion, is difficult to assess in another person. The student's verbalized espousal: "I believe that such and such is the case" (for example, that Columbus discovered America, or that water is made up of two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen), is not sufficient in itself to satisfy the condition of "genuine belief;" it does not guarantee that he actually does "believe." Nor does the failure of the student to make such an avowal indicate that he actually does not "believe" (i.e., that he does not have the relevant evidence, and thus the "right to be sure").

It is Scheffler's opinion that the problem with assessing "genuine belief"--either self-assessment or teacher assessment, whether overtly expressed, or held and not expressed overtly, or acknowledged on any level--has

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[81] Ibid., pp. 75-90.

to do with the nature of "belief" itself as a complex of dispositions. "Belief" is a complicated complex of other operative factors: other beliefs, purposes, motivations, objectives, and psychological, environmental, and biological states related to the individual "believer." The following is a brief sketch of some of the difficulties of "outer" and "inner-response" which affect the assessment of "genuine belief" within the student. These examples suggest, moreover, a rationale for the personal concept of listening which is set forth in the following chapter.

There are variable conditions connected with the student's decision on a given occasion to reveal his actual "belief," or to suppress, subvert, distort, or avoid revealing his actual "belief." Such factors as embarrassment, and the desire to be approved of by someone within his environment, might represent the overriding motivational factors. Scheffler suggests that the "verbal inhibitions" of a child, for example, might indicate "not a lack of relevant beliefs," but an overriding motivation connected with the child's "fear of adults or his desire to win or maintain their approval."[82] Another instance of this sort of resistance is found in Scheffler's example of the student who lies deliberately and systematically so as to bring his expressed beliefs into line with what

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[82]Ibid., p. 80.

is thought to be the teacher's beliefs, or beliefs which other adults will approve of. The test situation often involves the student's practice of making verbal responses which are "thought to reflect the attitudes and opinions of the test-makers, independently of the student's own 'genuine beliefs.'"[83]

In addition to the complexity of outward expression affecting the assessment of "genuine belief," Scheffler argues that there is also a problem associated with what he calls "inner response."[84] In this respect, there is a sense in which people, including students, can be out of touch with, or never really know, what they actually believe; they intend that their expressions and what they hold as beliefs are actual beliefs, but the inner and outer espousals are in fact distortions of "belief;" "genuine belief," in such cases, can neither be acknowledged to oneself, nor to the outside world. Scheffler sees these distortions as resulting from the person's holding other beliefs, purposes, or perceptions.

For example, when a person, upon reflection, disapproves of a belief, or he perceives that it is dangerous to have such a belief, or that the society would not approve of it, he fails to acknowledge to himself that

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[83]Ibid.

[84]Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 83.

such a belief is in fact his belief. Beliefs associated with various types of social prejudices represent a case in point; such beliefs are held but sincerely denied. In other instances, people often succeed in "talking themselves into," and subsequently professing, a belief which, though not deeply ingrained, is thought upon reflection to have the carriage of social sanction. Certain "religious beliefs" may be of this order. Such beliefs, Scheffler maintains, are often not "genuinely" held, but they are sincerely professed: the person actually thinks, and intends, that these beliefs are "genuine beliefs."

These difficulties surrounding what Scheffler calls "outer" and "inner response" have critical bearing on the teaching-knowing complex. Moreover, the nature of these difficulties in connection with assessment of "genuine belief" as a condition of knowing would seem to suggest the need for some additional perceptual means of facilitating the clarification of "genuine belief," both for the teacher and for the student. The teacher would have to know the What and the If of the student's belief in order to accurately assess the condition of his knowledge. Moreover, it would also seem important that the student knows What and If he actually believes that something is the case. Peters has observed, in this respect, that there is a sense in which a person does not actually know what he feels and believes until he places

it in public, and brings evidence in its support.[85] In another place he notes that the context of "critical discussion" (the central criterion of Scheffler's "restrictions of manner"), embodies the "principle of impartiality" which requires, in itself, a notion of listening: the acts of assenting and dissenting with others according to (in Peters' words) "relevant criteria," for example, "the quality of arguments adduced," as opposed to "irrelevant considerations such as the colour of the eyes or hair of the contributors."[86]

This objectively construed, rational and ethical, concept of "listening" does not, however, explicitly allow for the emphasized personal aspect of the concept of listening. The following statement is indicative of Scheffler's strongest admission in this respect. In light of the difficulties surrounding the "belief condition," as it is conceived by Scheffler, he refers to a notion of communication which is purely rational, but it has the overtones, the flavor, of a perceptual psychological condition associated with communication.

Directing his remarks strictly to the classroom context, Scheffler writes that there is a serious problem in "mistaking verbal dispositions for belief;" therefore,

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[85]R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit., p. 59.

[86]Ibid., p. 214.

the teacher has to recognize "not only the ramifications of belief in conduct," but he also has to recognize "the influence of motivation and social climate on verbal expression..."

> If we aim to engage the student's belief and not simply to shape his verbal output, we need to be able to communicate with him. For this to be possible we need to create an atmosphere of security, so that verbal expression may approximate genuine belief. Such an atmosphere itself would seem to require an emphasis on rational discussion free of constraint and free of propagandistic tendencies: this emphasis underlies the common or standard sense of teaching.[87] (Scheffler's emphases).

This quotation clearly indicates that what seems up to a point to be Scheffler's suggestion of a personal, or psychological, condition of communication, is in fact (as is indicated in the last sentence above), a suggestion of a rational sort of communication. It is also clear that he alludes to the significance of the psychological climate of "security" in connection with rational communication and teaching procedure. (The chapter which follows places explicit emphasis on a personal condition, relative to the teaching concept, which Scheffler does not explicitly emphasize in his interpretation of teaching). The following quotation is a clear illustration of Scheffler's probable intent relative to the personal condition and the teaching concept. In The Language of

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[87] Scheffler, op. cit., p. 90.

Education, he explicitly states that the "restrictions of manner" require an acknowledgement of the student's sense of "reasons," but:

> Teaching cannot.... be assimilated to such psychological notions as setting up conditions under which learning will most effectively take place.[88]

If by the use of the term "assimilation," Scheffler implies that such "conditions" (of which the listening concept is one aspect), cannot be "absorbed into" the concept of teaching, then the point made in this section stands. That is to say, although Scheffler alludes to the significance of a personal condition of communication, it is, in effect, avoided in the explicit criteria of his concept.

Rationale for a Personal Concept of Listening: Findings and Inferences

The presentation of a concept of listening in the following chapter is based upon certain reasons which emanate from the preceding areas of presupposition: ethical obligation; concepts of human rationality, critical thought, and mind; and an underlying concept of communication.

One general inference can be drawn. There was found a substantive conceptual relationship among Scheffler's "evidence" and "belief" conditions of knowing;

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[88] Scheffler, The Language of Education, op. cit., pp. 104-105.

Peters' "social dimension" of the concept of mind; and a perceptual concept of listening. Each of these concepts possesses an objective (intellectual, or cognitive), and a perceptual referent. In Scheffler's definition of knowing, this is evidenced in the "evidence" and "belief" conditions, respectively. In Peters' concept of mind, this is evidenced in the "social dimension" of mental development, described earlier in this chapter as a sort of interaction between knowledge "enshrined in the language" of a culture, and the "individual center of consciousness," which "imprints its own style of being" (a personal "viewpoint") on the world of which one is conscious.

The concept of listening which follows in Chapter IV has an essentially affective and perceptual emphasis with cognitive import: it aims at understanding of both intellectual and psychological sorts, and its procedural aspect requires the elements of both intellect and affect. Moreover, these three concepts (the acquiring of knowledge, the development of mind, and personal listening), are in some sense fundamentally related to the ethical principle of "respect for persons," and each concept presupposes some form of communication. An enumeration of the specific inferences emanating from the preceding conceptual data are the following.

First, in that there is a central notion of communication presupposed in the "restrictions of manner" and an intimated personal notion associated with this concept, a personal concept of listening (an aspect of interpersonal communication), would not seem incompatible with Scheffler's conceptualizations. In Reason and Teaching, for example, Scheffler makes a statement which may be seen as suggesting a "teaching-communication" emphasis. He argues that the preparation for teaching is strengthened through the development of the teacher's resources for:

> ...carrying on significant conversation with the young;...through a widening of his intellectual perspectives, a quickening of his imaginative and critical powers, and a deepening of insight into his purposes as a teacher and the nature of the setting in which these purposes are pursued.[89] (Present writer's emphasis).

This statement would seem to imply not only the "rational communication" component and a breadth of knowledge, but also an understanding of the student who is a part of "the setting in which [the teacher's] purposes are pursued." The listening concept described in Chapter IV is responsive to the need for a notion of personal understanding, as an emphasized aspect of the concept of teaching.

Secondly, although psychological conditions are not explicitly included in the teaching concept per se,

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[89]Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

there is strong indication that Scheffler deems such aspects significant, at least as a pre-condition of teaching. The "belief" condition of knowing that something is the case clearly suggests the rationale for a personal concept of communication which aims at understanding the student, in light of the complex disposition of "belief," and in light of the difficulties involved in accurately assessing this condition within the student. In Ethics and Education, Peters makes this point quite clear when he states that although teacher and student are bound by impartial and impersonal standards, as associated with the rational concept of teaching which is under consideration, it must also be said that:

> The ability to form and maintain satisfactory personal relationships is almost a necessary condition of doing anything... in a manner that is not warped and stunted. ... A firm basis of love and trust, together with a continuing education in personal relationships, is... a crucial underpinning of any other more specific educational enterprise. The teacher himself must obviously be an exemplar in this respect if he is to do his job effectively.[90]

In this respect, Scheffler also, on occasion, alludes to a psychological condition of understanding on the part of both teacher and student. He has stated that the student not only responds to the explicit material of a lesson, and to what the teacher does, but the student

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[90]Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit., p. 58.

also responds to what the teacher "intends," and to what he "represents."[91] The teacher, moreover, in revealing and risking his own judgments and loyalties in the act of teaching students, Scheffler says:

> He is himself forced to a heightened self-awareness, and a more reflective attitude toward his own presuppositions; his own outlook is thereby broadened and refined.[92]

Thirdly, the pervasive concept of mind suggests another reason for incorporating an emphasized concept of listening. The development of mind was depicted as the means of achieving the growth of knowledge, and a state of "being educated." However, it was also pointed out that the development of mind is influenced not only by external knowledge, but by the individual center of consciousness with its network of personal perceptions associated with: thoughts, feelings, values, standards, purposes, beliefs, principles associated with personal conduct, academic performance, and the bodies of knowledge themselves. This particular nature of the individual's internal structure would seem to suggest the need for an extra measure of sensitivity with respect to the teacher's dealings with students.

Fourthly, the concept of the teaching act itself suggests that there is a gap between teaching, and the

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[91]Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, op. cit., p. 87.

[92]Ibid.

achievement of the sort of student learning which has been considered in this chapter. The point has been made that, although teaching intends, and aims at, some sort of student learning, it does not imply, nor can it guarantee, that learning shall take place in the student as a result of the teaching. Personal communication (as was pointed out in Chapter II), may help to bridge this gap between teaching and learning, in the sense of helping to facilitate the acquiring of knowledge.

Finally, there is an overall sense in which a rational orientation is not sufficient in view of the concrete, everyday, problems assoicated with the "person" who is called "teacher:" the attitudinal disposition of this person, and his complex structure of beliefs. The "restrictions of manner" are not sufficient in themselves to ensure, to the extent that this is possible, that the teacher will in fact encourage, and participate mutually in the activities which Scheffler suggests. A statement has been made by Passmore which gets at the nature of this particular problem:

> The teacher will almost certainly have many beliefs, which he is not prepared to submit to criticism, and he will be enforcing many rules of which the same is true. These beliefs and these rules may be closely related to subjects which the pupils are particularly eager to discuss in critical terms--sex, for example, or religion and politics. If the teacher refuses to allow critical discussion on these questions, if he reacts to dissent with anger

> or shocked disapproval, he is unlikely to encourage a critical spirit in his pupils.[93]

A synthesis of Scheffler's concept and the listening concept, as a particular type of orientation, may effect a useful broadening of the view of teaching as an activity.

On the basis of this set of findings and inferences, the next chapter suggests a personal concept of listening which aims at understanding. This concept is suggested as a complement to Scheffler's rational "restrictions of manner" associated with teaching. This complementary concept, along with Scheffler's rational concept, constitute the synthesizing concept of this study. For the purposes of this study, this synthesizing concept is called "Teaching as Communication."

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[93]John Passmore, op. cit., p. 421.

CHAPTER IV

A COMPLEMENTARY CONCEPT OF LISTENING

Introduction

The preceding chapter explored the first of the two major questions of this study, examining principal areas of presupposition associated with Israel Scheffler's interpretation of teaching which make explicit reference to the centrality of a communication concept and intimate a perceptual concern with respect to communication and teaching. The present chapter explores the final question of the study, namely:

> What perceptual component of communication relative to teaching might serve to complement Scheffler's rational interpretation of teaching, given the particular emphases which are presupposed in his "restrictions of manner" relative to teaching?

The findings of the previous chapter suggested the supportive rationale for the complementary concept of listening. A summary of the significant implications of that context are the following. First, the purely personal or perceptual (attitudinal and affective) elements of sensitivity, empathy, understanding, and caring, are outside of the range of a purely rational (i.e., impartial and impersonal), concept of communication.

Secondly, the affective and attitudinal qualities which are emphasized in the present concept of listening are distinct qualities, but they are readily capable of being accomodated to the notions of rationality and mind which are presupposed in Scheffler's "restrictions of manner."

There are at least two underlying core concepts which are common to both the rational and personal perspectives: (a) the notion of "individual consciousness" (alluded to in the quotations of May and Rogers in the first section of Chapter III, and explicitly delineated in the concept of mind), as a centrally influential factor relative to human mental development; and (b) the principle of "respect for persons" as an ethical and interpersonal consideration connected with the treatment of persons. This latter core concept is particularly applicable to the general context of social and communicative contact.

This chapter describes the principle of "respect for persons" as defined by Peters, and as it is seen to underlie a personal concept of listening. [1] The

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[1]This chapter contains excerpts (general language and direct quotations) from the following works by permission of the publishers indicated. Rollo May's Empathy--Key to the Counseling Process" in The Art of Counseling, Abingdon Press (1967), pp. 77-82; R. S. Peters, "Education as Initiation" in Ethics and Education, Allen and Unwin, Ltd., (1966), pp. 46-59; Carl Rogers, Freedom to Learn, (Charles E. Merrill Publishing

listening concept is illuminated in terms of (a) its conceptual connection with empathy and communication, and (b) its specific designation as empathic listening, as it may be seen to relate to teaching and an "educative" concept of conversation. On the basis of this description, plus the preceding discussions of the previous three chapters, a concluding section of this chapter sets forth a definition of a synthesizing concept: "Teaching as Communication." The reader will recall that this chapter will make extensive use of the concepts and language drawn from the writings of Rollo May and Carl Rogers, as well as of R. S. Peters, as its principal sources.

The Listening Concept Associated with Empathy and Communication

When the concept of listening is viewed from the general standpoint of its connection with such personal terms as sensitivity, empathy, and understanding, it can be clarified by reflecting upon the context of human relationships (that is, interactions among persons), and a comparable context of relationships which occurs between persons and inanimate aspects of a public

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[1]Company (1969), pp. 111-112, 222, 225-226, 259-275; Boy and Pine, "The Expanded Person as a Teacher," in Expanding the Self: Personal Growth for Teachers (William C. Brown Company Publishers, (1971), pp. 6-9; Clark Moustakas, The Authentic Teacher: Sensitivity and Awareness in the Classroom, (Howard A. Doyle Publishing Company, (1966), pp. 30-31 and 42-43.

world.[2] Both contexts involve, to some extent, the element of encounter, and both involve the intent to achieve understanding in the personal sense of "getting on the inside of" that which is outside of oneself. The constructs of encounter and personal understanding include each other in the sense that both involve contact which is characterized by perceptual depth: a perceptual sense of "knowing," or "feeling into," a being or an inanimate object which is external to the perceiving person.

Rollo May has used the active tendencies of aesthetic understanding and appreciation to illustrate what may be involved when one uses the term "empathy," or the terms "empathic understanding." May suggests that when one views or studies a pictorial or graphic work of art, for example, it is not uncommon nor inappropriate to speak of "getting over into," or "getting on the inside of" such a work so as to "understand" it. An auditor, or a performer, for example, might use the term "empathy" (or a similar descriptive word) in expressing what he feels as he listens to views, or performs, certain dramatic portrayals, or musical works. It is not uncommon in this respect for one to speak of being totally "immersed in" a portrayal of Elizabeth I or being "carried away" by a Mozart quartet. Such personal

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[2]Rollo May, The Art of Counseling (New York: Abingdon Press, 1967), pp. 77-78.

references and expressions are also made in connection with persons and bodies of public knowledge. Peters, for example, implies an empathic concept when he suggests that the attempt to "educate," to "teach" in particular, requires that the "educator" invites the student to "get on the inside of modes of thought and awareness" so as to "understand" and to "identify" with their underlying principles.

When a concept of listening is associated with the general context of human relationships (that is, the interactions among persons), it is often designated as empathic listening, or variously: "sensitive listening," "sensitive understanding," "non-judgmental listening," "active listening," and "concentrated listening."[3] Within this general context, the designation empathic listening denotes the "contact, influence, and interaction of personalities." In the literal sense, according to May, it means a "feeling into," or " a participation in other persons or objects,"[4] Within the context of communication among persons, it is a variable concept. That is to say, to some extent it exists in any

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[3]Carl R. Rogers, Freedom to Learn, op. cit. pp. 226-227; See also Carl Rogers and Barry Stevens, Person to Person: The Problem of Being Human, A New Trend in Psychology (New York: Pocket books, 1972), pp. 89-90; See also Angelo Boy and Gerald Pine, Expanding the Self: Personal Growth for Teachers (Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown Company Publishers, 1971), p. 9.

[4]Rollo May, op. cit., pp. 79-82.

communication situation, whether or not it involves conflict or controversy. Moreover, from the standpoint of various individuals, the essential elements of intent to understand, depth of understanding, and the practice of genuine listening are all variable.

A particular listening concept, as has been stated above, may be viewed as essentially an affective construct of interpersonal or "effective" communication, which is analogous to the phenomena of empathic understanding associated with relationships between persons and inanimate aspects of a public world. From the standpoint of relationships among persons, it entails some verbal exchange, some response (verbal and/or nonverbal), or the conveying of some message. Moreover, such a concept, as described in this chapter, is to be contrasted with all passive sorts of listening which entail only semi-, quasi-, or pseudo-attention, or even total inattention. In its strictest sense, this listening concept emphasizes empathic understanding.

Empathic Listening, Teaching, and Conversation

This section provides sketches of certain central concepts which have bearing on relationships between teaching and listening: (1) the fundamental notion of "respect for persons;" (2) therapeutic, permissive, and

technical referents; and (3) an "educative concept of conversation, the procedural aspects of which might enhance the perspective in which one views the activity of teaching.

A Notion of Respect for Persons

A principle of "respect for persons" has been identified by psychologist Carl Rogers, and by Rogerian oriented writers (such as Boy and Pine, C. H. Paterson, Stanford and Roark, and others) as the basis upon which the concept of empathic listening, as an attitudinal disposition, is founded. R. S. Peters has isolated the single principle of "respect for persons," and discussed it in terms of its ethical ramifications and the importance of possessing a clearly defined concept of "person." Peters holds that the notion of "respect for persons" is rendered meaningless unless and until one possesses a clear concept of what is meant by the term "person."

As a concept, Peters writes, "person" suggests that the "individual" (as "person") represents "an assertive point of view," which is to say, according to Peters, a "person" embodies "judgments, appraisals, intentions, and decisions that shape events, decisions whose characteristic stamp is determined by previous decisions that have given rise to permanent or semi-

permanent dispositions.[5] When one accepts such a concept as indicative of all individual "persons"--excepting say, Ryle's "infants" and "idiots"--one must also embrace, according to Peters, the position "that it matters that individuals represent distinct assertive points of view.[6] Moreover, Peters reasons, insofar as this condition matters to one who is committed to the principle of respect for persons, one would deplore certain types of activities--for example, activities which disregard the feelings of others; or activities which refuse the entry of others into situations in which their intentions, decisions, appraisals, and choices can operate effectively; or activities which deliberately interfere with another's capacity for self-direction; or activities which are designed to settle, or handle, the affairs of another without engaging in prior consultation with the person for whom one is acting.

Within the classroom context, with a view to the developing capacities of persons, it is particularly important for the teacher to encourage the student's

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[5]R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd, 1966), p. 210.

[6]Ibid, p. 213.

development of "an assertive point of view."[7] Without such encouragement, according to Peters' concept, individual tendencies associated with character assertion would frequently become more passive than active. In Peters' view, a proper assertiveness should lead to taking pride in achievements, carefully deliberating and choosing for oneself what one ought to do, and to developing one's own individual style of emotional reaction. The concept of "respect for persons," and the inherent concept of "person," suggests, in Peters' view, that "person" is a progressive phenomenon which develops via two forces: the broader notion of one's individuality, and the encouragement and stimulation supplied from the external world, that is, the environments of the developing "person."

The teacher has the specific role, in this context, of recognizing what Boy and Pine call the intrinsic value of the student: respecting his individuality, his complexity and uniqueness, his capacity for making choices, his humanness, his right to govern his own life and select his own values, and respecting his idiosyncratic potential.[8] The condition of "respecting

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[7]Ibid., p. 211.

[8]Angelo Boy and Gerald Pine, Expanding the Self: Personal Growth for Teachers (Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown Company Publishers, 1971), pp. 6-7.

a person," to use a conclusion of Peters, involves a "feeling" which is awakened when:

> Another is regarded as a distinctive centre of consciousness with peculiar feelings and purposes that criss-cross institutional roles. It is connected with the awareness one has that each man has his own aspiration, his own viewpoint on the world, that each man takes pride in his achievements, however idiosyncratic they may be. To respect a person is to realize all this and to care.[9]

The notions of empathy, sensitivity, and respect take on special emphasis and seriousness in situations involving children, particularly in view of the nature of adult influence. As developing "persons," students are particularly vulnerable: they are influenced not only by the subject matter; they are also influenced by the attitudes, actions, and reactions of the teacher. Peters emphasizes that the development of students could be seriously hampered if there exists a lack of adequate sensitivity. "No one quite knows what he thinks or feels," Peters says, "until, he has made a view his own by identifying himself with it and defending it in public." Moreover, he continues:

> To take a hatchet to a pupil's contribution before he has much equipment to defend it, is not only likely to arrest or warp his growth in this form of thought; it is also to be insensitive to him as a person.[10]

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[9]Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit. pp. 57-58.

[10]Ibid., p. 59.

The concept of empathic listening presupposes this fundamental principle and the inherent concepts of person, sensitivity, and empathy. In addition to this principled base, the concept of listening involves certain other more specific and practical elements. As a practical skill, listening is characterized as an achievement which is difficult to acquire; it involves an element of risk which is difficult to overcome.[11] For example, people are generally disinclined to give up their beliefs and generalizations, but these are the particular areas which are threatened when one "opens his mind" to listen to another person. There exists in this respect a perceived threat that one may be impelled to change his manner of behaving, change his thoughts, feelings, or beliefs, as a result of the listening. Therefore, to paraphrase Rogers, the ultimate aim of empathic listening--to fully understand another person--is never fully achieved.[12]

The Aspects of Understanding, Therapeutic Effect, Permissiveness, and Technique

In view of the difficulties associated with achieving a full understanding of another, Carl Rogers has noted that it is important for one to convey, through

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[11] Ibid., pp. 88 and 165.

[12] Carl Rogers, Freedom to Learn, op. cit., p. 222.

listening, the "intent" to understand. In this sense, the teacher would communicate to the student his willingness to understand; he would indicate, through the medium of concentrated listening, that he is trying to understand the thoughts and feelings of the student. In so doing, the teacher conveys, ideally, the dual message that the student is, in the teacher's perception, valued, and that the student's meanings are worth understanding.[13]

Percival Symonds has observed that teachers, like psychotherapists, "have a responsibility to understand the child." In his view, this means that:

> A teacher is expected to be particularly sensitive to conscious motives and interests, but the teacher who is also sensitive to unconscious motives may be better able to tolerate the bad in a child and hence to find opportunity for the release of negative feelings while at the same time he may appreciate untapped possibilities for constructive growth and be more courageous and patient in encouraging their expression.[14]

This is not to imply that "teaching" is to be construed as "therapy." In this context, the opinions of Symonds

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[13]Rogers, Person to Person, op. cit., p. 89.

[14]Percival M. Symonds, "Education and Psychotherapy" The Journal of Educational Psychology 40 (January 1949): 10.

suggest two points: (1) that certain facilitative qualities--such as understanding--are to some extent common to concepts of educational and psychotherapeutic practices; and (2) that these are qualities which are also reflected in a listening concept, as it is viewed in connection with communication and teaching. Moreover, the Symonds' quotation helps to clarify the nature of the particular quality of understanding which can be associated with a concept of teaching.

Although teaching is not in this context to be construed as therapy, the listening concept which is herein associated with teaching can be viewed as "therapeutic." The works of Rogers and of Rogerian oriented thinkers, for example, have suggested that there is a sense in which the act of listening can be termed "therapeutic."[15] This means that listening empathically to the child, for example, might effect a relaxation of tension, or anxiety which is often associated with feelings of fear, anticipation, discouragement reflective of past experiences, or relative to the student's meeting new subject matter, or new social situations. When the teacher, in this context, is able to understand the student's reactions from the inside, to be

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[15] Rogers, Freedom to Learn, op. cit. pp. 225-226.

sensitively aware of the way that the process of education and learning seems to the student, both teacher and student can achieve clarification of thoughts and feelings.

Boy and Pine would have one believe that there is a "therapeutic effect" associated with what they call an "effective" response of the teacher, a response which clearly indicates that the teacher is "hearing" the student: that the teacher is receiving the message that the student is communicating; that the teacher is responding to the composite of verbal and nonverbal, cognitive and affective meanings and expressions of the student.[16] This type of listening, in Rogers' view, suggests that the teacher has sought to avoid the element of incomprehension which results from a misunderstanding of the student's words, for example, or from simply not attending to what the student is saying. It further suggests according to Rogers, that the teacher has sought to avoid hampering his own ability to listen because he finds the student's words threatening, or because he feels the need to distort, or twist, the words of the student so as to render them congruent with what he wants to hear.

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[16]Boy and Pine, op. cit., pp. 7-10; See also Rogers, Freedom to Learn, op. cit., pp. 111-112 and pp. 226-227.

The therapeutic quality associated with the "effective" act of listening also presupposes a notion of "permissiveness," which is not to imply in this context that it entails an attitude or condition of exclusive non-interference. It does suggest a condition which rejects undue interference.[17] Again, in reference to Symonds' comparisons of the nature of this concept relative to the teacher and the psychotherapist, he holds that "permissiveness" in the teaching context suggests that the teacher should:

> Give the child permission to be himself, in feeling particularly, in behavior as far as possible. Both teachers and therapists believe in the practice of restraining dangerous and destructive behavior, and both believe in giving freedom for the expression of feeling. But the teacher is not merely a permissive person; he also positively encourages, stimulates and directs. A good teacher finds a happy balance between being permissive on the one hand, and using his influence in directing, acting, thinking, and feeling on the other.[18]

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[17]Clark Moustakas, The Authentic Teacher: Sensitivity and Awareness in the Classroom (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Howard A. Doyle Publishing Company, 1966), pp. 30-31 and pp. 42-43.

[18]Percival M. Symonds, op. cit., p. 10 and 27; See also Virginia M. Axline, "Practical Schoolroom Application." Play Therapy (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), p. 141.

Within these boundaries, therefore, the concept of permissiveness suggests that the teacher "permits" the student to express thoughts and feelings without pressing his own thoughts and feelings upon the student. It means that attitudes of bias are removed, or contained, while the teacher concentrates his listening on what experiences mean to the student: while he attempts to understand (that is, to come to know), the attitudes, concepts, beliefs, and values of the student. It involves seeing these aspects, not from an external frame of reference (as for purposes of evaluating, or judging the student), but from the frame of reference of the child himself. Such listening can have the effect of permitting the child, or student, to be himself, within the bounds of what is fair to the teacher and to the student, and what is safe within the context of the classroom.

The concept of listening which is focused upon in this section, and whose centrally defining criterion is the notion of empathic understanding, is not to be interpretated as a technique, or a gesture of the social or polite sorts.[19] The latter sort of interpretation might involve, as has been suggested by Boy and Pine, the teacher's tolerating the student's verbalizations;

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[19]Boy and Pine, op. cit., p. 8.

waiting patiently, for example until the student completes his expressions so that the teacher can get his original point across, or so that he can give detailed analysis of the significance, or insignificance, of the student's remarks. This type of polite, social listening would violate the criterion mentioned earlier: it would convey the message that the thoughts and feelings of the student are not perceived as having worth. It would thus violate the fundamental principle of "respect for persons."

The concept of listening might involve training, practice and skill, but it also involves a basic attitudinal disposition, an esentially personal orientation, so as not to reduce solely into skill, technique, or polite gesture. Pursuant to the objectives of the present study, the concept of empathic listening, as a complement to Scheffler's "rational restrictions of manner," may be said to provide an amplified conceptual disposition or perspective which would strengthen the skill, technical, and behavioral aspects of teaching.

An Educative Concept of Conversation

The notion of conversation as an "educative" concept is included in this series of concepts because it illustrates the force of the listening concept.

Moreover, in that its procedural aspect is characterized by rational and personal qualities consistent with Scheffler's "restrictions of manner" and with the concept of empathic listening, it reflects the synthesizing concept of this study.

The ability to engage in "conversation," like the ability to listen, involves an achievement which is difficult to attain.[20] Not only does it require, in Peters' view, the criteria of knowledge, understanding, and objectivity; it also requires a sensitivity to those with whom one would converse, and to whom one would listen. In such "conversation," one does not lecture or try to teach (that is, in an institutionally prescribed sense of the term "teach"); one does not aim at someone's learning some particular thing. Moreover, the listening which is central to educative "conversation" does not carry with it the intent of making particular use of the expressions of another, nor the intent of making use of the conversant in any way. "Conversation," as an "educative" notion, writes Peters, "is an informal sort of learning situation that is not structured like a discussion group in terms of one form of thought or towards the solution of a problem. . . ."

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[20]Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit., p. 88; See also Peters, The Concept of Education, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

> Lecturing to others is bad form; so is using the remarks of others as springboards for self display. The point is to create a common world in which all bring their distinctive contributions. By participating in such a shared experience much is learnt, though no one sets out to teach anyone anything. And one of the things that is learnt is to see the world from the viewpoint of another whose perspective is very different.[21] (present writer's emphasis).

This particular concept of "conversation" is indicative of a procedure and an achievement. This essential quality, or spirit, suggestive of rational and personal elements, is central to "Teaching as Communication."

Conclusion: The Synthesizing Concept of Teaching as Communication

This concluding section of the central discussions of the study has the single function of defining "Teaching as Communication." In offering the criteria for such a concept, the study is suggesting that "Teaching as Communication" is one way in which the procedure of teaching is capable of being viewed (responsive to the practical question "How is the procedure of teaching to be viewed?"), and furthermore it is one way--though perhaps not the only way--in which the procedure of teaching should be viewed (responsive to the practical question "How should the procedure of teaching be viewed?").

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[21] R. S. Peters, ed. The Concept of Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 21-22.

The following criteria of rational and perceptual emphases would define the notion of "Teaching as Communication." Teaching should be viewed, in the general sense, as a fundamental orientation, an attitudinal disposition, which is characterized by an openness, an intent, and an overt attempt, to communicate effectively with the person who would be taught. Toward what end? Toward an end which is strictly within the bounds of this suggested concept. That is to say, the viewing of teaching in this way has the aim of broadening the perspective in which one contemplates, or reflects upon, the totality of what can be known as "teaching activity."

In this respect, teaching should have the aim not only of developing a liberally educated person in terms of the inherent content and critical procedures of the traditional disciplines; teaching should also aim at the student's coming to know "where he stands," personally, in relation to the inherent standards, beliefs, principles and feelings of public knowledge.

Finally, the notion of "teaching as communication" requires respecting the mind and the "person" of the individual who would be taught. This suggests that its procedural aspect must be characterized by (a) <u>rational exchange</u> between teacher and student; (b) <u>perceptual responsiveness</u> to the thoughts and feelings of the

student; (c) an expressed effort to understand the student empathically (that is, to see from the student's frame of reference); (d) an expressed effort to aid the student in achieving clarification of his beliefs, thoughts, feelings, values, principles of conduct, and the rationales which underlie areas of knowledge and types of performance associated with teaching and knowing; and (e) a commitment to ethical and interpersonal principles in connection with all encounters with learners. These elements represent a concept of teaching which explicitly emphasizes the criterion of rational and personal communication.

CHAPTER V

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EDUCATION OF TEACHERS

This study implies that emphases of rational, ethical, and personally sensitive reflection, deliberation, and interaction combine into an important perspective for the education of the teacher, a perspective which should be achieved by the student of teacher education, and one which should be encouraged in one's approach to the study of educational practice.

Such a perspective presupposes a fundamental orientation and attitudinal disposition which would be facilitative of the communication of such a combined perspective in the act of teaching. The combined perspective is illustrated in Scheffler's "restrictions of manner" and in the listening concept associated with the activity of teaching. A particular foundational orientation and attitudinal disposition is reflected in Scheffler's interpretation of teaching as complemented by a concept of empathic listening. This synthesis is referred to in this study under the rubric, "Teaching as Communication."

This final chapter contains some of the writer's thoughts on the implications of the above perspective for those areas of teacher education curriculum which might foster such a broadly theoretical and eclectic approach to the study of teaching, with a view toward developing more experienced teachers in terms of the depth of their knowledge and their personal sensitivity with which they approach the activity of teaching. The chapter makes two major suggestions: (1) the conceptual perspective of this study has potential for providing a source of self-correction for the teacher; and (2) the conceptual perspective of this study presupposes alternative kinds of relationships in teacher education which are reminiscent of a "community of scholars" idea.

The following suggestions represent ideals in the sense that they do not reflect currently pervasive tendencies within the area of teacher education. Instead, they provide a resource from which hypotheses may be generated for further study. In addition to the two major suggestions referred to above, this chapter also contains at its end a list of relatively specific imperatives which the writer believes to be reasonably implied in the foregoing discussion.

A Source of Self-Correction

The conceptual perspective reflected in this study has the potential for offering to the student of teacher education a source of self-correction. The study has sought to provide this through its objectives of examining and clarifying the inherent criteria, the emphases, and the commitments of the concepts of teaching (Scheffler's restrictions of manner"), empathic listening, and the synthesis of these in the notion of "Teaching as Communication."

These are concepts which the student of teacher education may not fully accept, not attempt to operationalize, but these concepts do represent a standard source in view of which he can determine, to some extent, what he is, or is not, doing within the general context of teaching activity. This study has attempted to show that both Scheffler's concept and the complementary listening concept are reasonable notions vis-a-vis a "typical" classroom context, and that the conjoining of these aspects within a teaching concept is a reasonable suggestion.

If the student of teacher education examines critically, accepts, and empathically understands the focused concepts, he can make some prior assumptions which might benefit his teaching and his student's

attainment of knowledge. For example, in making the prior assumption that the school-aged human being has some capacity for thinking critically, for judging, for deciding, for directing his own actions, and that there are reasons for his actions, the teacher might be able to avoid, or lessen, the self-fulfilling prophecy syndrome which thwarts the growth of knowledge within so many students. He can sensitize himself to the probability that his (the teacher's), actions, reactions, attitudes, and/or explicit verbalizations might be interpreted by the student as data which confirm the "fact" that he (the student, or pupil), cannot perform adequately, or that he cannot think for himself, or decide and judge, or that he cannot be trusted to direct his own actions. The probable harm which issues from the self-fulfilling prophecy syndrome is that these "facts," fulfilled often enough, become progressive tendencies.

On the positive side, if the student of teacher education accepts the view of teaching which has been examined, he (in theory) commits himself to, and is guided by, the notion of respecting the individual as a "person." He accepts the fact that the pupil, like the teacher, embodies "a point of view on the world;" like the teacher, he embodies a mind whose reasoning facility (if it is to be continually developed and improved upon) must be exerted, the mind must be engaged, and the person

must be allowed intellectual stimulation, encouragement in his efforts, practice, and personal understanding (through the medium of empathic listening, for example), so that the student might risk the genuine expression of his thoughts, feelings, beliefs, in the serious and educative context of discussion, dialogue, and conversation. These same committments are especially demanded of those who would serve on faculties of education--who would be the teachers of students of education.

Moreover, if teaching and knowing are viewed as shared participation of teacher and taught, the negative impact of an institutionalized hierarchical relationship can be circumvented. This suggests that the teacher would view the pupil (as he would view himself), as a potential "knower" whose knowledge attainment in any area of thought, or awareness, is dependent upon the dual aspects of personal, individual consciousness, and the impersonality of public knowledge. In this respect, the only important difference between teacher and taught is that, in Peters' language, the former is more cognizant of the greater variety of stategies by means of which knowledge is acquired.

A final observation which suggests a source of self-correction relates to the "active" nature of knowledge. Within the context of "being educated,"

knowledge within the student cannot be viewed as inert. That is to say, one who acquires knowledge in the sense of "becoming educated" must be able to selectively apply his knowledge--in a principled and rational fashion--to diverse, everyday situations and problems, both within and outside of the restricted environment of the classroom. The possessor of knowledge must perceive his possession as personal knowledge, knowledge of which he is conscious, and to which he gives, or has given his consent. This implies that such knowledge is (as described within this study) most properly transmitted not by such means as those associated with persuasion, coercion, conditioning, and/or deception. These activities are not within the range of the concept of teaching, and the related concept of knowing, which has been described within this study. In sum, what a teacher should look for as a source of self-correction in his teaching would be the emphasis on, and the quality of, communication in the activity of teaching.

Teaching as Communication and the Community of Scholars

The conceptual perspective reflected in "Teaching as Communication" presupposes alternative kinds of relationships between teacher educators and among

teacher educators and students of teacher education which are reminiscent of a "community of scholars" idea.

Certain kinds of attitudes and conditions must obtain if the practical relevance of "Teaching as Communication" is to be significantly enhanced. This means, for example, that barriers of access among educators, and among students and educators must be removed; that scheduling patterns and classroom arrangements must be staggered and flexible; that teacher educators and students must broaden their knowledge base, their intellectual interests, and their cultural and social awareness and sensitivity.

It is a known fact that colleges of education which house teacher education departments already possess substantive cross-disciplinary resources and interests among their staffs. However, what this writer thinks is additionally needed are pervasive attitudes of inquiry, cooperation, and sharing which are exemplified by these staffs, and transmitted collectively to the students of teacher education. This means that there must be a willingness on the part of the staffs to reorganize themselves as a community of scholars--to share talents and specialized knowledge, and to generate among themselves an interest in searching for the broadest possible perspective of personal knowledge.

Moreover, if such attitudes and active tendencies are developed among staffs and/or particular groups of staff members, and if these attitudes and active tendencies are to be transmitted to students, the currently predominant arrangement of undergraduate classrooms must also be altered. The mass lecture format, for example, will have to be replaced with seminars, and alternating lecture-small group-large group arrangements. Students and cooperative faculties will have to make themselves available for dialogues, informal discussion, and educative conversation. Within this type of environment cooperative faculties and students would be able to share a wide variety of experiences and literature which is consistent with the idea of "Teaching as Communication." In this type of environment of mutual respect, the student of teacher education would be able to enhance his perspective of teaching not only through the exposure to focused theoretical knowledge (such as a combination of philosophical concepts of teaching, interpersonal and ethical principles, and social issues), his perspective would also be enhanced through appropriate modeling of underlying principles in cooperation with his peers and with teacher educators.

Teacher educators who are willing to commit themselves to all of the presuppositions associated with the concept of "Teaching as Communication" would have seriously asked themselves questions such as the following. Without a fundamental rational, ethical, and personal orientation, how is the teacher (especially the beginning teacher), to relate effectively with persons whose values, beliefs, and backgrounds are extremely different from his own? How is he to deal with his own personal values, biases, and preconceptions about certain types of people in such an environment? How is he to teach in situations in which he strongly disagrees with the values, the beliefs, and the attitudes of those whom he would teach? Finally, how is he to teach in situations in which he totally dislikes, because of physical characteristics, or nationality, those whom he is assigned to teach? The present study has attempted to demonstrate through the nature and treatment of its content that such questions involving philosophical, human relations, and/or social issues can be confronted, to some extent, through the amplification of concepts which relate to a concept of teaching as an activity. The practical relevance of "Teaching as Communication"

cannot be fully realized, however, until it is incorporated into the fabric of teacher education, and presented in an atmosphere which is reminiscent of a community of scholars.

In view of the existing curricula of teacher education, the present study's single perspective on teaching may be seen as an effort toward the development of a foundations course on teaching which would be most effectively implemented in conjunction with an extensive experiential (clinical, or internship) program extending over a period of at least two years of post secondary education. Particularly in view of the fact that, as suggested in this study, the act of teaching should be viewed as a fundamental orientation and attitudinal disposition, the criteria of extensiveness and theoretical depth are vitally important.

Such a disposition requires (like its inherent concept of empathic listening, rational, ethical, and critical orientation), an extended period of concentration for its optimal development. The student teacher, and the student of teacher education in general, needs time to reflect upon the complex dispositions which he brings to the college of education, as a function of at least twelve years of past experience in the primary and secondary schools (even more years constituting his

life-history). He needs additional time to examine his beliefs not only in terms of established theories, but also his beliefs about various kinds of people. He needs time to examine other theories which are offered to him within the context of teacher education. He needs to clarify "where he stands" in terms of the new differentiations which he achieves. Finally, he needs to achieve an operational synthesis. With a perspective such as the present example, and with the help of such approaches as those associated with the competency-based teacher education programs and the extended clinical programs, the student of teacher education might achieve the kind of operational synthesis which would presumably serve him well as a teaching professional.

Summary of Imperatives

In conclusion and by way of final summary, the following list of imperatives are drawn from the previous discussions, and the writer believes they are reasonably based therein.

1. Respect students' intellectual integrity.
2. Respect students' independence of choice and judgment.
3. Deemphasize propagandizing, behavior modification, indoctrination.
4. Focus continually on the questions of how to act, what should be done.

5. Involve students in deliberately formulating relationships between a wide range of scientific and humanistic sources and guidelines of teaching practice--seek procedural principles and grounds.

6. Deliberately generate learning strategies which demand the use of critical dialogue and adducing rational explanations.

7. Explicitly focus on the development of character among the students of teacher education: focus on the formulation of ethical principles and the applications of them.

8. Seek to foster the emergence of higher levels of consciousness among students of teacher education of the rational and moral issues in the practice of teaching.

9. Seek to foster the development of student capacities for formulating, weighing, making and acting upon alternative choices.

10. Design learning activities which elicit the exchanging of reasons among students and between teachers and students.

11. Perceive student mistakes and failures as important opportunities for helping them learn how to achieve success.

12. Direct students of teacher education in identifying qualities of rationality among school children at various levels of development and among school children who come from varying socio-economic backgrounds.

13. Conduct teacher education programs in such a manner that the students of teaching continually encounter demands for justification (for beliefs stated, actions engaged in, claims made, proposals offered, et cetera).

14. Encourage the raising of objections on the part of students, and develop critical discussions based upon them. Welcome radical questions.

15. Promote among students their caring for and giving allegiance to impersonal standards regarding the conditions of their own knowledge.

16. Constantly examine values critically. Facilitate the transformation of student outlooks and values.

17. Foster student autonomy in constructing innovative alternative arguments.

18. Let our programs of teacher education reflect a full appreciation of the absolutely crucial role which language plays (in particular, the language of education) in the mental development of teachers. Language is as much the object of knowledge as it is the instrument of knowledge.

19. Seek constantly to criticize, to renew, and to diffuse the principles for shaping teacher education as set forth above.

20. Require the conditions of truth, belief, and evidence in helping students establish claims to knowledge.

21. Continually assess as sensitively as possible the current and unfolding conditions of individual students' knowledge.

22. Let professors of teacher education ever be prepared to risk their own beliefs.

23. Develop strategies which facilitate the clarification for the student of the genuine nature of his beliefs.

24. Help students develop insights into their personal purposes as teachers.

25. Let the educators of teachers constantly seek on a firm basis love and trust to understand as fully and as accurately as possible the nature of their students' individual sets of beliefs.

26. Let the educators of teachers seek constantly to broaden, heighten, and refine their own personal self-awareness.

27. Let teacher educators operate on the principle that students' assertive points of view matter. Let teachers care about student points of view.

28. Encourage student development of proper assertive points of view.

29. Let teacher educators become capable in empathic listening.

30. Let students of teaching be helped to develop empathic listening ability.

31. Let teachers learn how to see the world from the viewpoint of their students through engaging in educational conversation.

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