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NW \Hiliihiiilili 3 12930 This is to certify that the dissertation entitled Public Debt and Public Creditors: A Study of the Distribution of Shares of the Public Debt of Early-Modern Bologna, 1555-1655. presented by Mauro Carboni has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for PhD. degree in History WW Maj} professor V Date __.D_e_2_1_._l.39_3__J U MSU is an Affirmatt'vr Actt'un/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771 LIBRARY Michigan State University PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove We checkout from your record. TO AVOID FINES return on or before date duo. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE [:JE- l _| k I lg-LJ I ll H | IL MSU le An Affirmative ActIon/Equel Oppomnlty Institution cmmS-p.‘ PUBLIC CREDIT AND PUBLIC CREDITORS ‘A STUDY OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF SHARES OF THE PUBLIC DEBT OF EARLY MODERN BOLOGNA, 1555-1655 BY Mauro Carboni A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History 1993 ABSTRACT PUBLIC DEBT AND PUBLIC CREDITORS A STUDY OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF SHARES OF THE PUBLIC DEBT OF EARLY MODERN BOLOGNA, 1555-1655 BY Mauro Carboni Students of public finances have regarded the expansion of the elaborate systems of public credit of the early modern era, as a manifestation of the growing power of state authority and its greater capacity to draw into the public purse the savings of large section of the population. In keeping with this interpretive approach, most scholarly attention has centered on the needs and behaviors of financial offices. But the creation of bond markets had profound social imnplication: we must ask under what conditions and from what sort of people governments raised money. This research investigates the pattern of investment in the public debt of the We Bolognese, the richest province of the Papal States, and has a twofold purpose: firstly, it argues that the creation of the large funded debt of Bologna in the decades that followed the city’s annexation ‘to Rome was not the result of papal effort at centralization, rather it satisfied papal and local needs for funds in a fashion that suited the perpetuation of the traditional administrative autonomy of the nggzigng. Secondly, it points out that the trick of the Bolognese debt system was to shore up local and papal budgets alike in a way that, not only did not disturb the continued predominance of the local governing elite, but afforded that same elite a tool contributing to the perpetuation of their prominence and wealth. While patterns of investment in securities cannot be generalized, because they are likely to depend on the makeup of each society, the case of Bologna further suggests that large investment in bonds was not simply associated to being affluent, but rather to being recipients of a certain wealth. Mapping the distribution of shares at regular intervals, we have found that although ownership of shares of the Bolognese debt spread across a wide social spectrum, the bond market was constantly dominated by members of an inner circle of families, sharing affluence, social distinction and political leverage . Copyright by MAURO CARBONI 1993 ACKNWLEDG-HENTS It is a special pleasure to thank those who have been of valuable assistance in the preparation of this study. I would like [to thank the Italian W, for the support of my research. I wish to give special recognition to Stanley Ckojnacki, who has offered me sound advice and encouragement both as an advisor and as a friend. I owe a great debt to Ivo Hattozzi, who has been most generous with his time and his support. I would like also to thank Josef Konvitz and David Loromer for their critical reading of the manuscript at various stages. I am grateful to Alan Fisher, Richard Sullivan, Angela De Benedictis, Alfeo Giacomelli and Anthony Molho. Two friends, Riccardo Coen Ara and Gord Horrell, merit special thanks for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this work. I want to acknowledge the help of the staff of the W in gathering archival material, a special note of thanks is owed to Ingrid Germani. Finally, I want to thank my parents, who have been supportive for so many years, and I wish to give special recognition to my wife, without whose affectionate encouragement the completion of this research would not have been possible . TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES viii LIST OF FIGURES x LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xi INTRODUCTION 1 I. PUBLIC CREDIT, STATE AND SOCIETY 7 An Overview 7 II. THE LEQAZIQHE BOLOGNESE 26 The Bolognese Region 29 Bologna and Rome 32 Local Government 37 City and Countryside 45 Self-governance and Oligarchy 47 Patricians and Citizens 52 III. THE PUBLIC FINANCES OF THE LEQAZIQHE BOLOGNESE 64 Origins 67 The Ordinary Fiscal Structure 70 The Extraordinary Fiscal Structure 78 Tax Distribution 88 IV} SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 101 The Archive of the flgnti 102 Classification and Methodology 106 'V. THE HQNII OF BOLOGNA AND THEIR SHAREHOLDERS 123 Gender 153 Foreign Investors 160 Bolognese Investors 165 Corporate Investors 166 Individuals 178 vi vii VI. BOLOGNESE INVESTORS Clerical Proprietors Non-noble Proprietors Noble Proprietors CONCLUSION APPENDIX A SUMMARY OF THE HQHII "ERECTED" IN BOLOGNA (1506-1655) APPENDIX B LIST OF DOCUMENTED PROPRIETORS OF ACCOUNTS AND ANNUAL INTEREST PAYMENTS IN 1555 APPENDIX C LIST OF DOCUMENTED PROPRIETORS OF ACCOUNTS AND ANNUAL INTEREST PAYMENTS IN 1595 APPENDIX D LIST OF DOCUMENTED PROPRIETORS OF ACCOUNTS AND ANNUAL INTEREST PAYMENTS IN 1655 BIBLIOGRAPHY 194 199 201 204 238 241 246 273 316 350 O O O O Hl-‘Dmfloom DUMP O p NI-‘O p u UIUIUIUIUIUIUIUIUIUI UIUIUIUI O... O .0 g..- h 5.15 5.16 5.17 5.18 5.19 5.20 5.21 5.22 5.23 5.24 5.25 5.26 5.27 5.28 5.29 5.30 0| (.0 p GGGGO‘UI eeeeee LIST OF TABLES The Bolognese Public Debt, 1555 The Bolognese Public Debt, 1595 The Bolognese Public Debt, 1655 Summary of the Documented Investment in Shares of the Bolognese Monti Investment in the Bolognese Public Debt, 1555 Investment in the Bolognese Public Debt, 1595 Investment in the Bolognese Public Debt, 1655 Income Distribution, 1555 Income Distribution, 1595 Income Distribution, 1655 Proprietors and Income, 1555—1655 Summary of Women Proprietors and Income, 1555-1655 Summary of Men Proprietors and Income, 1555-1655 Comparative Summary of Average per Capita Income, 1555-1655 Summary of Foreign Investment and Income, 1555-1655 Income Distribution among Foreign Investors, 1555 Income Distribution among Foreign Investors, 1595 Income Distribution among Foreign Investors, 1655 Genoese Proprietors of Accoounts, 1555-1655 Summary of Foreign Corporate Investment, 1555-1655 Bolognese Institutions, 1555 Bolognese Institutions, 1595 Bolognese Institutions, 1655 Income Distribution among Bolognese Agencies, 1555 Income Distribution among Bolognese Agencies, 1595 Income Distribution among Bolognese Agencies, 1655 Ecclesiastical Agencies, 1555-1655 Bolognese Private Proprietors, 1555-1655 Income Distribution among Bolognese Private Proprietors, 1555 Income Distribution among Bolognese Private Proprietors, 1595 Income Distribution among Bolognese Private Proprietors, 1655 Bolognese Private Proprietors, 1555-1655 Bolognese Proprietors, 1555 Bolognese Proprietors, 1595 Bolognese Proprietors, 1655 Summary of Bolognese Proprietors Income, 1555-1655 Income Distribution (Non-Noble Proprietors), 1555 viii 128 129 131 134 139 141 141 143 144 144 145 156 156 160 161 161 162 162 164 165 168 168 168 170 171 172 174 179' 181 181 184 184 196 196 197 197 202 ix Income Distribution (Non-Noble Proprietors), 1595 Income Distribution (Non-Noble Proprietors), 1655 Bolognese Noble Proprietors (All), 1555-1655 Bolognese Senatorial Nobility, 1555-1655 Income Income Income Income Income Income Income Income Income Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution (Noble Proprietors), 1555 (Noble Families), 1555 (Senatorial Families), 1555 (Noble Proprietors), 1595 (Noble Families), 1595 (Senatorial Families), 1595 (Noble Proprietors). 1655 (Noble Families), 1655 (Senatorial Families), 1655 203 203 206 206 206 210 212 218 219 221 226 227 230 0.0000000000000000 H‘OQVO‘W‘UNHQVO‘W‘UNH Ul mmmmmmmmmuuuwwuuuu LIST OF FIGURES Income of Bolognese Fiscal Agencies Debt Expenses and Fiscal Income, 1575-1655 Distribution of Fiscal Income, 1575 Distribution of Fiscal Income, 1595 Distribution of Fiscal Income, 1615 Distribution of Fiscal Income, 1655 Annual Interest Payments/Bolognese POpulation Indices of Silver Depreciation and Debt Expenses Investment in the Bolognese Debt, 1555-1655 Proprietors of Accounts, 1555-1655 Average Dividend per Account, 1555-1655 Groups of Proprietors, 1555-1655 Investors in the Public Debt by Segments of Income Dividend Distribution by Segment of Income Dividend Distribution, 1555 Dividend Distribution, 1595 Dividend Distribution, 1655 Income Distribution by Groups of Proprietors, 1555-1655 Income Distribution by Groups of Proprietors (Percental Share), 1555-1655 Investors in the Bolognese Debt by Gender Income Distribution by Gender Income of Bolognese Private Investors Income of Bolognese Private Investors Income Distribution among Top Holders, 1555 Overall Income Distribution, 1555 Income Distribution among Top Holders, 1595 Overall Income Distribution, 1595 Income Distribution among Top Holders, 1655 Overall Income Distribution, 1655 Blocs of Bolognese Investors Income Distribution of Blocs of Investors Income Distribution (Blocs of Private Proprietors) Income Distribution (Percental Share) 77 89 92 93 94 95 97 100 135 137 138 140 146 147 150 151 152 154 155 157 158 182 183 188 189 190 191 192 193 198 199 236 237 LI ST 01" ABBREVIATIONS ASB Archivio di Stato di Bologna BCB Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio xi INTRODUCTION This study is an investigation of investment in the public debt of the Papal province of Bologna. In the decades that followed the city's annexation to the Papal domains in 1506, the public debt of the ngazigng Bolognese expanded at a nearly exponential rate: in the middle of the seventeenth century, Bologna was committed to financing a debt of over eight million silver lire, a sum eighty times as large as it had been at the moment of the Papal conquest. At first sight this sum may not impress the modern reader, accustomed to government debts estimated in billions and trillions. However, to keep things in proper perspective, we ought to consider that the sheer cost of paying yearly interest to creditors came to constitute an amount which dwarfed the ordinary revenues of the entire province by a ratio of two to one. By the middle of the seventeenth century, interest payments on the debt constituted the single largest expenditure the fisc had to meet.1 The establishment of a funded debt is an act of public policy, but whose act was it in Bologna, and what sort of ‘ See the introduction of G.Orlandelli, "I Monti di pubbliche prestanze in Bologna," Ag;§_ltglign 14 (1969): ix- xxiv. 'I we 0 n;" nud- u' 0‘. l .w' I \' ‘ A: 'cuy‘ =ti ‘n I~I 2 thinking lay behind it? According to Orlandelli, the most influential student of Bolognese public finance, resort to credit was the Papacy's strategy for tapping Bolognese wealth without having to cut through the bastions of fiscal and administrative privileges granted to the city. However, if Papal reasons may be clear, it is less obvious why the local governing Senate, the jealous and vocal custodian of Bolognese prerogatives, would be eager to go along. The matter needs explanation. A second set of questions concerns buyers of securities. Since in Bologna the acquisition of shares was based on voluntary subscription, it is plain that the expansion of public indebtedness must have met with the growing popularity of city-issued bonds. Yet, although lists of subscribers are available, scholars have made no effort to determine what sort of people purchased bonds, and under what conditions they did so. To be sure, this state of affairs is not peculiar to the historiography of Bolognese public finance. In fact, although historians of early modern Italy have noticed the extraordinary increase in investment in securities, they have devoted little attention to the people who flocked to purchase state and city-issued bonds. To the middle of the seventeenth century, for instance, Milan, Rome and Naples, were among the most active credit-markets in Europe, yet, to date, the available literature offers little more than impressionistic observations when it comes to investors. Some attention has .N «i I w'. “.1 . . > A 1“. rm‘ 3 been paid to the main dealers, a few prominent Florentine banking houses and Genoese consortiums stand out, but on the whole we know remarkably little about the people who subscribed interest-bearing securities.2 This neglect of the social underpinnings of public debts is by no means accidental. It rather derives from a set of assumptions about the function and the nature of early modern public indebtedness. In the main, students of public finance have regarded the development of early modern debts, and the consequent. mobilization of the private savings of large sections of the population, as a manifestation of the growing capacity of governments to assert their authority upon often reluctant societies. In keeping with this interpretive approach, most scholarly attention has centered on the needs and behaviors of 3 The recent work of Antonio Calabria on the finances of sixteenth-century Naples constitutes a notable exception. Investors in the Neapolitan securities market are discussed in the last section of the book. See A.Calabria, Ing_§g§§_gf Empire (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 104-129. On the roman credit market we have numerous contributions, but hardly any attempt at mapping the distribution of investment. See P.Partner, ”Papal Financial Policy in the iRenaissance and Counter- Reformation,” £§§t_§nd_£re§§nt 88 (1980): 17-62; H.Bullard, Winning—am (Cambridge. 1980): I E' !°E" 1! :.,.E 1 I! ”a? H.Honaco, San;g_§piritg (Lecce, 1974). On the milanese debt system, the study of Alberto Cova on the W remains of fundamental importance. See A. Cova, ' (Milan, 1972). On the activities of Genoese financiers, Felloni provides a useful introduction: G. Felloni, ' W W (Milan. 1971). 0.4;" ”.m- r A ‘a: :3. v]. ., m.“ I ‘V... ‘tte{ u-.. 9 n.‘ “- b.‘_‘ .0 H. ‘3.“ .'"~.. c \Q 4 financial offices, on the mechanism by which governments were able to draw private wealth into the public purse, and on the way the enormous sums thus raised were allocated. But the working of the mechanisms, by which governments were able to draw into the public purse the enormous sums they needed, deserves to be viewed in a wider context than that of public finance alone. We must ask not only how governments raised money, but also under what conditions and from what sort of people they borrowed. What I want to suggest here is that the nature and function of state indebtedness can be more fruitfully pursued by considering the specific social and institutional contexts in which particular state debts developed. It is a curious historiographical phenomenon that, while most students of medieval finance have immediately seen in public debts not just formidable tools to mobilize future resources for present. needs, but also institutions with profound social implications, the social underpinnings of early modern debts have received little attention. Yet, although the sixteenth century expansion changed the scope and reach of public debts, it did not change their essential character: not unlike municipal authorities, national and regional states had to rely on the willing cooperation of a variety of corporate groups, which had the resources governments needed but were the ones which governments were least able, or could least afford, to tax. . tI'I‘ nu ’v rt) -u(o . ”be 139! l Osp- nIe be I n, . '2': I o C, 5 Under the influence of social history, scholars are abandoning the notion of early modern states and their agencies as abstract, impersonal entities molding rebellious societies, to come to the realization that forces in society were orienting, if not defining, the very working of institutions. In other words, early modern states have begun to emerge as networks of agencies through which a variety of forces tried to pursue their W.’ Yet, a reassessment along similar lines of the role and functions of the public finances of early modern states is still in its infancy. This work has a twofold purpose: firstly, it argues that the creation of the large funded debt of the W Bolognese in the decades that followed the city's annexation toIRome*was not the result of papal efforts at centralization: rather it.suited.thelgrowing financial needs of authorities in both the city itself and its province. Secondly, it suggests that the debt system satisfied local and papal need for money in a fashion that left the local elite in control of the provincial administration, while affording that same elite a profitable source of investment. The first chapter contains a discussion of the development.of the various forms of public debt to be found at the outset of the early modern era. Chapter 2 introduces the main features of the Legazigne Bolognese in the sixteenth and ’ See W-Beik. WWI: Langngdgg (Cambridge, 1985), p. 17. 6 seventeenth century. It examines political and administrative structures as well as the social bases of power. Chapter 3 contains a detailed description of the public finance of the ngazigng, with emphasis on the changes brought about by the establishment of a local bond market. Chapter 4 analyzes in some detail the problems presented by the sources and discusses the methodology we have adopted in classifying holders of securities. Chapter 5 and 6 chart patterns of investment in shares of the Bolognese debt in 1555, 1595 and 1655 on the basis of a computer analysis of the accounts of about 3,000 investors. The main body of the work is followed by four appendices, which contain in tabular form the data we have used for tables and figures in the text. O. 'V 4‘... #2.. ‘.'~. an. a CHAPTER I PUBLIC CREDIT, STATE AND SOCIETY This chapter sets out to»do two things. Firstly, it seeks to provide a background to the investigation of the funded debt of Bologna, through a review of the development of the forms of long-term public borrowing. Secondly, it discusses analytical issues pertinent to public finance. Though immediately relevant for Bologna, it is hoped that these discussions may prove of more than local interest. Mme! Government recourse to credit on a long-term basis, and modern methods of issuing and transfering obligations were pioneered in the cities of both northern and southern Europe in the late Middle Ages. The towns of Flanders, Germany and, above all, the powerful communes of north and central Italy experimented with credit as early as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Permanent debt, in its various forms, began as a device for facing expenses which could not be easily met by resorting to ordinary revenues, either because of the suddenness of fiscal need, or because the demands exceeded the available fiscal income. Endowed with limited D .~-AI I .wus- *eel I’m“ A... "5 e.‘ .«:" N ‘. ‘e f :4 'V. ' II-- III .'.' I" I} .‘ .‘v - - I. ' I (It, - ‘5 ‘. u . C l- 8 fiscal resources and confronted with the problem of raising enormous sums in order to finance their interminable wars, Italian communes resorted to a variety of extraordinary financial means, the most notable of which was the institution of flanti, long-term loans guaranteed by obligating specific revenues. Behind the successful armies of the gondgttiezi of Venice and Florence there were sizable war chests, mostly built on credit.1 As a preliminary step, it may prove useful to clarify an important distinction between long-term and short-term borrowing. The long-term or consolidated debt consisted of interest-bearing securities, at times nonredeemable, guaranteed by pledging specific revenues to meet interest payments. Not unusually, such pledging took the form of legally binding contracts. The short-term or floating debt consisted of loans at high interest rates, which creditors expected to be redeemed or renegotiated in a few years. The specific time frame was commonly specified at the moment the interested parties instituted the debt.2 In Italian cities, the above distinction was often a merely theoretical one, because municipal funded debts 1 Useful introductions to the developments of forms of public credit in northern Europe and in Italy are provided by E.B.Fryde and N.H.Fryde, "Public Credit with Special Reference to North-Western Europe" in H.Postan, E.Rich and E.Hiller, ed8-. W (Cambridge. 1963) v.3. pp. 430-553: and J-Day. W (New York. 1987). 3 See J.Tracy, Nethszlnndfi (Berkeley, 1985): P-8- ‘vawé ..e" O .q..z“ '3...“ ..!II I‘ \ne' 0 S- ' _' 1 , . l C I r-_ 0 ea 0 9 frequently took the form of forced loans. From the thirteenth century, the Venetian government levied interest-bearing loans. In practice, citizens were required to contribute a fixed percentage of their wealth, as recorded in the eating drawn up by the officials of the W. Characteristically, medieval Venice, Florence and Siena gave their preference to this form of borrowing. The actual contribution of individual citizens to such loans, preetm in Venice and prestanze in Florence and Siena, was not voluntary, but determined by city officials on the basis of efiini.’ Lenders had, however, little reason to complain, since they were either promptly reimbursed, or promised interest 3 A comparative fiscal history of the Italian city-states has yet to be written. Particularly useful for a synthesis of the work in progress are the following studies: P. L. Spaggiari, "Le finanze degli stati italiani" in R. Romano and C. Vivanti, edso. Went]. (Turin. 1973). pp- 810- 36; and J. Day, "Moneta metallica e moneta creditizia" in R. Romano and U. Tucci, eds. , ' (Turin, 1984), pp. 353- 360. Specific works on the public finances of Italian states are certainly more numerous. Here are a few valuable items: 6 Luzzatto, WWW (Milan, 1963) . G. Chittolini, ”Entrate e alienazione di entrate nell’amministrazione sforzesca" in Win; (Milan, 1977), pp. 9-27; H. Sieveking, ”Studio sulle finanze genovesi nel Medioevo e in particolare sulla .Casa di San Giorgio," m1 ' 35 (1905-1907); D.Gioffré. I1__dahitg__nuhhligo__§engxeas (Milan. 1967): B - Barbadoro . WW ( Florence . 1929): M.Becker, "Problemi della finanza pubblica fiorentina della seconda meta' del Trecento e dei primi del QuattrocentO." Arghixio__519rigg_1§alian9 123 (1965): 433- 466: A.M01ho, ' Renaieeenee (Cambridge, Mass. 1971); E. Conti, " ' (Rome, 1984); and W Bowsky. Wang: (Oxford 1970). u.. b. '.-Q¥:' al.31- '9‘. ..."~ '1 :tte Elma“. vvfii I 6'- ., ‘ -'~ 'E. W§q‘-IG '0 5‘. u “"‘I 5'...“ o P. O ‘Igg. "VA bl- . . ‘.| .‘5.’ " is“ 4“ ‘ \'..’ w‘g' U-. 10 rates paying attractive annual returns on investment. Venice offered a 5 percent interest rate on the bonds of the m Vegehie. Payments, which from 1262 were guaranteed by the income of eight specified duties, were remarkably regular up to the middle of the fifteenth century, with the sole exception of the years of the war of Chioggia (1378-81), when the very existence of the Republic seemed at stake. Florentine creditors did not fare quite so well. In keeping with the stormy political life of the city, the history of the Florentine public debt is very intricate. Commonly, shifting political alliances translated into different attitudes toward the debt and its obligations. As a result, interest on the shares of the Florentine debt, the so called W, was often paid irregularly. However, there was a reverse side of the coin: in times of need Florence was often forced to offer 10 and even 15 percent interest rates, rather than the nominal 5 percent, in order to obtain a fresh inflow of cash.‘ Although common, forced loans were not the sole route to public credit. This is best exemplified by the case of Genoa, the other major financial powerhouse in medieval Italy. Unlike Venice and Florence, Genoa did not experiment with forced borrowing. When the Commune needed capital , prospective investors formed a syndicate (eenpere) , which was then endowed with the ownership of a specific indirect impost or portion thereof, created M to service and, possibly, to retire ‘ See AouolhO. W. 99- 66-67- 11 the loan. The latter outcome, however, was a rare occurrence indeed. The management of the debt was thus entrusted to the creditors themselves or, to be more precise, to the board of each m. Not surprisingly, interest rates in Genoa tended to be considerably higher than in Venice: from 7 to 10 percent. Even more startling is the fact that when a large conglomerate of eempeze combined in 1407 to form the flange of San Giorgio, the new board eclipsed in power the nominal government of the W itself. In fact, the prerogatives and the privileges of the creditors gave them access to, and in many cases outright control over, the revenues of the city and its colonies in the Levant.5 North of the Alps public debts were not unknown during the Middle Ages. In a sense, from the thirteenth century complete systems of consolidated debt developed at the municipal level. French, Flemish and German towns experimented with a.variety of long-term obligations: particularly popular was the sale of annuities, which were adaptations of techniques developed in the realm of private credit. As was the case in Italian communes, specific revenues were pledged to reassure investors, and tax farmers assumed the ’ See Jofieer. Wiggle (Paris, 1961). pp- 86- 106. Very useful are also: H.Sieveking, ”Studio sulle finanze genovesiz" and D.Gioffre, ”Il debito pubblico genovese." ..‘AI'Q‘ k‘du‘ Al'u‘ 4 I): a: In 12 responsibility of meeting interest payment in a timely fashion.‘ Systems of public credit in the north differed from Italian models in several ways. First, perhaps because of the weaker coercive power of municipal governments there, loans were voluntary. And rates of interest offered were generally higher, closer to the Genoese than the Venetian example. According to Fryde and Fryde, in the Netherlands , towns commonly paid from 8 to 12.5 percent on life-rents. In Germany, yearly returns on annuities ranged from 8 percent in Cologne to over 13 percent in the smaller towns of the east.7 Second, unlike most Italian communes, northern cities frequently paddled a large share of their securities to foreigners. The city of Ghent found buyers of its first series of annuities among the citizens of nearby Arras. Later Ghent managed to lure investors from Brussels and Leuven.‘ Third, the dimension of the phenomenon in the north seems to have been generally more modest than in Italy. This does not come as a surprise: Italian cities could rely on the richest and most sophisticated money economy in Europe and were most ‘ See the surveys provided by E. B. Fryde and M. M.Fryde, "Public Credit, " pp. 527-553: and by J. Tracy, mam 391mm 911- 13-17- 7 See E.B.Fryde and M.M.Fryde, ”Public Credit,” p. 532. ' See J-Tracy. W. 99- 14-15: E.B.Fryde and M.M.Fryde, "Public Credit," pp. 538-540. Among large Italian cities, only medieval Milan had a sizable portion of its debt in the hands of foreign investors. See the important contribution by G.Chittolini, "Entrate e alienazioni di entrate," pp. 9-27. -1 1"“ arm‘- I CIDC «mfi‘AF‘ .JJi-‘V‘ hm ,t r‘Ohfi‘ - imwv. 3 L' a. Q I §¢h&\ . : “VI 13 accustomed to regular use of credit. Furthermore, the cities of northern Europe , although largely autonomous , were not independent and did not undertake the costly military campaigning of their Italian counterparts. The development of elaborate forms of municipal borrowing requires further comment. What induced civic authorities to resort to borrowing in such a systematic fashion? Some scholars have regarded credit as a fundamentally neutral tool , recourse to which permitted the spreading out over time of financial burdens imposed by necessity rather than choice.’ However, to argue that need induced governments to resort to borrowing is to take a mere rationalization as a cause. With characteristic sharpness Lauro Martines noted that the imposition of public loans amounted to the imposition of ”a profit on a select list of lenders".‘° Others, without denying an element of necessity, have pointed out that to meet current financial difficulties by contracting debts could, and often did, hold attractive advantages to men in charge of municipal governments. It prevented, or postponed, the imposition of severe taxation and provided a desirable investment opportunity to affluent urbanites. For instance, ’ See J-Day. Minimum. p- 155- ‘° L.Martines, ' ' .- Bsnaissamlealx (Baltimore. 1979). p- 177- . 2w .. ' a I :7 t v p) to a? W V5 1' - at C..- is": I “51.. . ~. “I hum.- "r4‘ ”8“ ‘9“... 'V‘.‘ . RA .R W .U a.‘.‘ “at: 0.- ~‘.' ’F’. 14 Fryde and Fryde have observed that oligarchical regimes tended to tax the least and to pile up debts most quickly.n From its earliest appearance in Italian cities, recourse to credit produced profound social and political implications, which go beyond what Marvin Becker called an investment in the Renaissance state.12 Borrowing, either in the form of voluntary or forced loans, was the focal point of a mobilization and reallocation of resources. But what was the character of this transfer? On the one hand, there is little doubt 'that it revealed ‘the precocious strength and. the coercive power of Italian civic authorities. The quarrelsome urban patriciate was tied to the cause of the city-state, and its stake in the debt worked as a powerful cement of internal cohesion. On the other hand, it was clear from the outset that the process was not socially neutral. The crescendo of issues and the new taxes and surtaxes instituted to service the debt became the tools of a massive transfer of wealth, by means of the fisc but hardly to the sole advantage of the fisc. In the main, bonds were held by the wealthy and the revenues pledged to pay interest came from regressive indirect taxes, such as gabelles, tolls and duties. Since the fiscal system of all medieval cities followed a similar pattern, recourse to a 1‘ Cfr. E.B.Fryde and M.M.Fryde, "Public Credit,” pp. 527- 529. Though directed to the oligarchical regimes of the towns of northern Europe, these observations suit.well the behavior of the municipal governments of Italian communes. ’3 See M.Becker, "The Mbnte from Its Founding Until the ILate Fourteenth Century" in M.Becker, ed., Elezenee__1n Transitien (Baltimore, 1968), p. 160. '-vfl£ I on .aV m: ‘QQO d m. .t 15 large public debt involved large transfers of wealth not just from the body of the citizenry to state coffers, but from the poor to the rich through the mediation of the fisc as well. Contemporaries seemed to be perfectly aware of the direction of the process: indeed the popular classes were stubborn enemies of the public debt. The Florentine Qienpi demanded the extinction of the Henge, the suSpension of interest payment and the substitution of direct taxes for the prestanze. Similar reforms were advocated by Simon Boccanegra in f ourteenth-century Genoa , but the project had eventually to be abandoned for the fierce opposition of what we might call the ”moneyed interest" .1" It could be argued that forced loans were more equitable than voluntary ones because the wealthy were not given a choice and bond ownership was more widespread. But the fundamental working of the system was not essentially different. Besides, from the fourteenth century, an active secondary market of debt certificates developed. meg-.131 credits could be sold to third parties. Men of substance could actually profit by purchasing other people's certificates, at times at a discount. Regardless of the kind of loans ‘3 See H.Sieveking, ”Studio sulle finanze genovesi," p. 126. In his beautiful essay on the Qaea of S.Giorgio, Savelli arrived to similar conclusions, indicating the tight linkage between S.Giorgio (private) and the Senate (public): R. Savelli, "Tra Machiavelli e S. Giorgio. Cultura giuspolitica e dibattito istituzionale a Genova nel Cinque-Seicento" in A. De Maddalena and H. Kellenbenz, eds., W 1984), pp. 249-321. c I 9 I“ .R‘ -. I ...d- I?" t. v- I Am. .1 a ‘0. math Fee- eb" "ID ... s... .e ‘X‘ . ‘\ 8““. 16 "erected", growing government expenses were financed in a way that placed the burden elsewhere than on the ruling elites. Indeed, as has been remarked by Frederic Lane, this system probably contributed to their affluence.“ Students of public finance agree that the sixteenth century marked a significant turning point in the history of public credit. While forms and techniques of credit changed little, dramatic mutations occurred in the scale of the resources that were mobilized and the political geography of the credit market.”’Governments were able to contract loans, "surpassing anything encountered in the Middle Ages".“ Besides, up 'to the fifteenth century, public debts had developed strongly' at ‘the municipal level, without. much interference or competition from sovereigns. It is only in the sixteenth century that one can properly begin to talk of the funded debts of nation states. This is not to say that kings and princes did not engage in borrowing before the sixteenth century, but rather that the paucity of fiscal means and the prevailing conception of sovereign power proved formidable obstacles to the formation " See F. Lane, ”Public Debt and Private Wealth: Particularly in Sixteenth Century Venice" in Helm (Toulouse. 1973). p. 324. 1“ See E. B. Fryde and M. M. Fryde, "Public Credit, ” pp. 430- 440, H. Van der Wee, "Menetary, Credit and Banking Systems" in E. Rich and H. Wilson, eds., (Cambridge, 1977) v. 5, pp. 358- 362. “ E.B.Fryde and M.M.Fryde, "Public Credit," p. 440. 17 of state debts. As noted by Van der Wee, since a variety of corporate bodies vied for control of public finance and taxation, rulers managed only a fraction of what we would consider the total public incomei" Worse still, in keeping with the prevailing medieval conception of sovereign power, the debts of a ruler were regarded as "personal", rather than "public" (i.e. collective) obligations.“ Martin Wolfe has appropriately concluded that the promise of a prince did not provide a sufficient guarantee to prospective lenders, because he could not pledge the full means of the commonwealth.” Unlike civic authorities, medieval monarchs were in no position to borrow in a systematic fashion: when they needed extraordinary resources, they resorted to the services of banking firms, mostly Italian and German houses. The results, however, were hardly encouraging: kings' tendency to default upon their debts prevented continuity, and induced the bankers who took the risk to charge usurious interest rates.20 ‘7 H.Van der Wee, "Monetary, Credit and Banking Systems, " p. 358. " Fryde and Fryde have minimized the practical consequences of this conception of sovereign power, noting that frequently "rulers assumed responsibility for the debts of their predecessors". See E.B.Fryde and M.M.Fryde, "Public Credit," pp. 430-431; see also M.Wolfe, W (New Haven. 1972). pp- 92-93- ” M Wolfe. W. D!» 92- 93: see also the comments of Fryde and Fryde, "Public Credit, " PP- 430-431: and J Tracy. W p. 19- ‘” The great bankruptcy of the Bardi in the fourteenth century was caused by the English king defaulting on his loans. Nonetheless, lending' to monarchs could still be profitable business when interest rates ranging from 25 to 50 I»! 0-. A: I‘ h s k i .\ .. 18 The formation and the stupendous expansion of systems of funded debt in the sixteenth century involve two issues, which are better dealt with separately. First of all, there is the question of why and.how'governments drew into the public purse the savings of large sections of the population. Second, we must ask. what sort of people entrusted ‘their’ money to governments, and under what conditions they were willing to do so. Since pre-modern tax systems tended to produce too little revenue too slowly for an efficient cash flow, to a certain extent recourse to borrowing was unavoidable. Besides, it was far from unusual that revenues would fall short of normal expenditures, making it necessary to resort.to the services of financiers, who were usually prepared to grant advances and prepayments against future revenues . In the sixteenth century, short-term loans were routinely contracted on the international financial market, mostly at the money-fairs of Lyon, Besancon and, later, Piacenza, where major financial transactions took place four times a year. Such loans were contracted at the prevailing interest rates and were fairly expensive. To lower the burden, governments issued a variety of long term obligations (at lower interest rates) to redeem short term ones, or converted floating debts, forcing lenders to accept long-term securities as repayment. To governments, the issuance of long-term interest-bearing certificates held percent were charged. See E.B.Fryde and M.M.Fryde, "Public Credit," p. 435. 19 two desirable features: it was the most obvious alternative to the high rates and the volatility of the international money market, and it allowed the mobilization of the savings of large sections of the population on a long-term basis. The frequent bankruptcies of sixteenth-century Spain were not nearly as disastrous as commonly thought, because in practice they amounted to forced conversions of short-term obligations into long-term ones. For example, as long as interest payments on the Spanish jnme (bonds of the permanent debt) continued to be honored regularly, Spain had no problem competing for credit on the international market. This was because it was easy for moneylenders, who were repaid in securities rather than hard currency, to find customers and convert such securities, at times even at a premium. The practice was so successful that jams came to be issued directly by Genoese contractors, acting as royal agents. Throughout the sixteenth century Spanish jams enjoyed an extraordinary favor. The studies of Bennassar and Castillo Pintado suggest that investment in this form of securities was widespread in Castile. To be sure, this was not an anomaly. According to James Tracy, Lenses and annuities were at least as popular in the Netherlands. And the Mange (bonds) issued in Italy met with an equally favorable public response. To paraphrase Braudel , the striking novelty seems to be not so n; gov the cred T)? 2813;: asacm I: a se greater :3 the t iallerst meme was a Wars, 5 .‘. .«e:.er men. a. iii-in e 20 much government borrowing peLee, but rather the expansion of the credit market.21 Typically, students of public finance have viewed the development of the large funded debts of the early-modern era as a crucial step toward the creation of modern state finance. In a sense, public borrowing was both a manifestation of greater state authority, and a fundamental tool contributing to the tightening grip of that very authority. To paraphrase Wallerstein, public debts reflected creditors’ confidence in governmental ability to keep promises, and provided financial means that allowed states to expand their functions and powers, becoming even more credible."2 In other words, greater access to credit had to be bound up with vigorous governmental gains in asserting leadership in fiscal matters and in expanding available revenues. There is little doubt that, by the early sixteenth century, rulers were considerably better equipped in claiming control of fiscal resources and in centralizing the administration of finances. Nonetheless, governments had a good deal less than total control. They were confronted with 3‘ See F.Braudel, - .- ' - _ - ° - WW. (Now York 1972). pp- 500-15 693-700. See also: A.Castillo Pintado, "Dette flottante et dette consolidee en Espagne de 1557 a 1600," Annalee 18 (1963): 745-59: A. Castillo Pintado, "Los juros de Castilla: apogeo y fin de un instrumento de credito," Him 23 (1963): 43- 70: J Tracy. W. 3’ See I Wallorstein. W. '- O Q Q- o 0915;. 9- (New York 1974). p- 194 czrstrai resource tizh Ha ;:se1f . iegree c Day" :.;p "“«e 21 constraints to their ability to raise money and mobilize resources by the numerous corporate bodies, the cooperation of which was essential to the practical functioning of government itself. Estates, cities and communities retained to a large degree control of their fiscal destinies, and where they did not, the old system of tax collecting and apportioning was hardly altered. The point is that no government could assess and collect revenues without the cooperation and the active involvement of local brokers: no goverment could borrow money without winning the confidence of local elites. It was the cooperation of these very forces that abetted the ever- expanding 100p of expenses and indebtedness upon which the process of sixteenth-century state building came increasingly to rely: local notables lent money to the government, in return they collected interest appropriating a proportional share of the local fiscal income. The ability to borrow was directly linked to the ability to tax, without which no satisfactory guarantees could be offered. To obtain the resources needed for their enterprises, governments had to coopt corporate groups to share in the responsibility as well as in the profits of the operation.” For instance, the obligations which Charles V's officials issued in Holland from 1522 to 1555 were backed by the 3’ On this, see J-C.Waquet, ”Who Profited from the Alienation of Public Revenues in Ancien Regime Societies? Some Reflection on the Examples of France, Piedmont, and Naples in the XVIIth and XVIIIth Centuries," WW Emulator! 11 (1982): 665-673- ccllectiw Emlarly barrow e: revenues Fae: 22 collective credit of the cities and the nobles of Holland." Simi larly, Francis I and Henri II of France were able to borrow enormous sums, mortgaging a number of lucrative revenues of the Mile of Paris.” When the Roman W needed capital it issued a m, offering shares to the general public through the cooperation of a banking house. During the sixteenth century alone, no less than 40 menu. were "erected" and funded by 0b]. igating existing revenues or, more frequently, resorting to new surtaxes. Shareholders of each mente formed a board, which aSsumed control of the revenues pledged to fund the issue. p‘Jlblic confidence in Papal mi was such that, by Braudel’s reCtlironing, Pope Sixtus V was able to lock up in the treasury 0f Castel Sant'Angelo twenty-six tons of silver and three tons 0f gold, obligating a vast array of revenues and surrendering their control to syndicates of lenders." It was not unusual for cities and provinces to issue their own long-term obligations, upon the authorization of QOVernments which had won the right to exact contributions from provinces but had little means, and often little interest in disputing local boards' rights to determine how such requests were to be met. Typically, a government's compromise with provincial authorities was simple: the 'center' \ " See J-Tracy. W. pp- 16-17- ’5 See M.Wolfe, W, pp. 91-93; and B.Schnapper, W (Paris, 1957). pp- 151-173- “ See F-Braudel. W. p- 698- my a: raise acquire Livestir it: be: t': 5 Her m the 23 determined the amount to be raised, local boards decided how to raise it. Through this arrangement governments did not just acquire needed funds, they also acquired the commitment of the investing groups which, in turn, reaped substantial benefits, both because the fisc rewarded their investment, and because they were often in a position to control the fisc, determining Whom the fisc would tax and whom it would exempt.” To be sure, as the case of sixteenth and seventeenth- cantury France would prove, such arrangements were not necessarily stable, and often implied skillful maneuvering, 81'l-ifting alliances and violent clashes among competing corporate groups." This is not to say that the interests of a Specific group were necessarily bound to prevail. It is 1rather to suggest that provincial systems of public credit functioned on the basis of a tradeoff: on the one hand, QOVernments won the willing cooperation of local dominant groups while being afforded greater funds, on the other hand, l<><=al elites retained control of the provincial administrative aQparatus while being offered a profitable source of i livestment . \ "’ See W-Beik. 512W Law (Cambridge, 1985) pp. 258- 278; see also J. Tracy, A Wm. 99- 215-217- ” See J 60111118. MW” (Berkeley. 1988); D. Hickey. Wm. W (Toronto . 1986): w. Beik, W: and '3.-Dent Wm Wm (Newton Abbot 1973) New! elites a: arr: sort! he find 313:"; seventee' l“ lair' me: u 233's r Lilian Early 4 EM tc I x} '._ 'J ) "h' I I I ' v ’ In .‘ 1 ( rq ( ‘II A , . '0' 1‘5. _‘ a.. I'll 0-4 p ._ u “ ’ r? H {g '4' -0 54- H .7 4 .p rt 1 J 24 Nowhere in early modern Europe was the dominance of local elites as complete and pervasive as in the states of central and northern Italy, perhaps with the exception of Piedmont.” The findings of Cova’s study on Milanese borrowing under the Habsburgs offers a case in point. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Milanese municipal authorities, pressed by Madrid for contributions to Spanish war efforts, began to answer with the issuing of securities through the W W, which were guaranteed by city revenues. By Cova's reckoning Milanese indebtedness grew from just about 2 million lire, at the outset of the seventeenth century, to nearly 44 million in 1658. While Madrid could have hardly hoped to raise such staggering sums through the proceeds of taxation, the operation provided a profitable outlet to Milanese lenders. On average, the m paid a 5 percent interest on shares. By 1660 the annual fiscal income of Milan was hardly sufficient to service the debt contracted with the m, and when the city ultimately defaulted upon interest payments, the management of 60 percent of Milanese income passed into the hands of the board of the Bangs; itself. The loss of the rolls of the flange does not permit the identification of the members of its board, however, it seems 3’ This evaluation is mainly based on the findings of Enrico Stumpo on the Piedmontese public finance. E. Stumpo, ' ~ - - - (Roma, 1979); E. Stumpo, "La distribuzione sociale degli acquirenti dei titoli del debito pubblico in Piemonte nella seconda meta del Seicento" in Ecole Francaise de Rome, ed. , W W (Rome.1980). pp. 113- -124. 1:12: we D‘A-y: “h VAV' Voila raised b' tic: He: 1% elitt 25 very likely that those who ran the Bangg, those who had the largest financial stakes in it, and those who ran the local Senate, which had to approve what amounted to a virtual privatization of the municipal fisc, belonged to the same exclusive political elite.30 Similarly, the contributions that the autonomous Papal province of Bologna paid to Rome came from sums which were raised by issuing interest-bearing obligations to the public which were guaranteed by pledging specific municipal revenues. The elite of dominant families, which staffed local governing boards and were in charge of the fisc, formed precisely the bloc of people who were more likely to have large stakes in the Bolognese security market. The point is that, as in the case of Milan, Bolognese contributions to the financing of Papal state building took forms that were acceptable to, and probably contributed to the perpetuation and.to the‘wealth.of, the local ruling elite. ’° See A-Cova. Win WWII (Milano, 1972): idem. ”I1 Banco di Sant'Ambrogio e le sovvenzioni alla citta di Milano nel XVII secolo.”Ar_Ql11x19_S&9r_1co_L9mbar_do s. ix, 4 (1964): 65- 83. See also: C. A. Vianello, ”Il debito pubblica dello stato di Milano," WW 7 (1942):131-139. l.- 4 13'" l f 7" IA) .4 ' (r, (T‘ I III ‘ . 11 /¢‘/{ 4 f CHAPTER II THE LEQAZIQHE BOLOGNESE The formation of the so called stgt1_;§gignali, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, has lost some of its aura as a moment of passage to the modern state. Since the studies of Federico Chabod, the view that regional states were a prime example of conscious state building, and a step toward the creation of the national state that was to materialize with the Risorgimento, have fallen into disfavor. Recent historiography' has looked for other signs of precocious modernity, such as bureaucratization, centralization and internal cohesion.1 ‘ The work of Federico Chabod has had a tremendous influence in reshaping the discussion on the character of Italian Renaissance states. The following article provides a fundamental point of departure: F.Chabod, "Y a-t-il un état de la Renaissance?" in ' (Paris, 1958), pp. 57-73. Among recent studies on the formation of regional states, especially important are the following items: G. Galasso, "Le forme del potere, classi e gerarchie sociali” in R. Romano and C. Vivanti, eds., 539:1; (Turin, 1972), pp. 401-599: pp. 486—508; G. Chittolini, W(Turin,1979); A. Ventura,, nobiltg a DQDQJQ nella EQQjEIa Meneta del ’Afln g 'EQQ (Bari, 1964); F.Diaz, ' ' (Turin, 1976); M. Berengo, (Turin. 1965): and P .Prodi. Il_§gxrano_nontefige1_un_99:22.3 (Bologna, 1982). fl “Aer ..' I" no u ase'vb EEC-1'8 fanatic 21:55 on 27 There are numerous indications that, with varying degrees of effectiveness, these new states not only constituted larger and more complex territorial units, but pioneered new forms of domination. However, the character and the direction of this transformation have been increasingly questioned. Without necessarily denying greater concentration of ruling functions into the hands of central governments, modern scholarship has displayed less impetus to search for aspects of modernity. While the process leading to the formation of regional states is commonly considered a ”definite passage out of the Middle Ages",2 few historians view it as a transition into the modern state: regional states were from the outset compartmentalized, and their governments proved unable to integrate the many component parts.3 Given the recent historiographic tendency to emphasize the deficiencies of medieval and early modern state building, it is almost ironic to note that students of the Papal States not only have not participated in this development, but they have actually' moved counter’ to it. Perhaps because the ’ See J. Grubb, ' ' W (Baltimore 1988). p- 164- ’ On this subject an essential contribution is provided by E.Fasano Guarini, "Gli stati dell'Italia centro- settentrionale tra Quattro e Cinquecento: continuita e ‘trasformazioni," SQQi§§£_§_§LQIi§,§ (1983): 616-639. See also C. Vivanti, "Citta e campagna” in R. Romano, ed., 339:1; MW (Turin. 1991), pp. 243-283; E. Fasano Guarini, "Introduzione" in E Fasano Guarini, ed., W W (Bologna. 1978). pp- 7-47: and 11.1 Pini. WWW (Bologna, 1986), pp. 125-139. t '. 5332:3114 «in‘3rsl Milieu. a w. ' ;.pa:t1c '3 .' . €1.90va ‘ IF! I Iv. ,, I 8.5.. '1 \‘2 : : CL I‘ n11C lag: f2 ‘18:. Pinata ”.EEIIIY am ever 28 centralizing efforts of Renaissance and Tridentine popes have traditionally been regarded less than favorably, recent scholarship has actively worked at redressing that judgment. In particular, the studies of Carocci, Delumeau and Prodi have effectively dismissed the view of the ecclesiastical domain as a nonorganic and fragmentary state, an irrational hodgepodge of municipal particularism, pointing out that, despite its later failure, the process of territorial unification and political centralization was well under way in the sixteenth century Papal States, perhaps more so than in other Italian, and even European polities.‘ On the other hand, it is equally curious to observe that while these studies have reshaped our perception of the nature ‘ Although their appraisal of the state building effort of the papal monarchy in the sixteenth century tends to diverge, there is angeneral consensus on the coherence and the effectiveness of the undertaking itself. Delumeau is probably the most outspoken: "Ainsi, vers 1600, contrairement 8 ce que l'on.pourrait croire, l’Etat Pontifical n'etait pas, du point de vue de la concentration de l'autorité, en retard sur les autres Etats Europeans". See J. Delumeau, ”Les progres de la centralisation dans l’Etat Pontifical au XVIe siecle," Beyng Histgzigne 126 (1961): p. 404. But certainly the centralizing process never materialized into the integration of Bologna within the Papal States. On this, see also: G.P.Carocci, L9 0 0.: 9‘»; 1 _‘, on; u: 169‘, ,-‘ 0 o A (Milan, 1961); J. Delumeau, ', - 1,. f ' f 1 , ae99nde_moiti¢_dn_xyle_siegle (Paris. 1957- 59); P. Prodi, Lo 511W (Bologna. 1969); P.Prodi, MW: and P. Prodi, "Il sovrano pontefice” in G.Chittolini and G. Miccoli, eds., atgz1n ' ' ' (Turin, 1986), pp. 195-216. The most significant dissenting voice remains the following: A.Caracciolo and M. Caravale, Lg_§tatg W (Turin. 1978) See also G. Tocci, "Le legazioni di Romagna e di Ferrara dal XVI al XVIII secolo" in A Berselli. ed” WWW (Bologna, 1977), v. 2, pp. 65-99. 9.1.3. unai «(u-O: Inn} '1 .. ' 7': I .‘I ‘me‘ on. . In C ) ~.. 5‘. t“ \ C I? .N' 29 and effectiveness of the papal monarchy between the age of Julius II (1503-1513) and the disastrous war of Castro (1641- 1644), they have steered clear of the issues raised by the continued special status of provinces such as Bologna and Ferrara, two of the richest jewels of the papal crown, on the very ground that they were not ordinary provinces. The history of the Papal States written by Caracciolo and Caravale, for instance, devotes to Bologna just seven pages out of more than seven hundred.£5 Yet, an examination of the relations between Rome and Bologna and of the geography of power within the W is crucial to our understanding of the limits and constraints the papal monarchy faced in dealing with established provincial polities. With the papal annexation of Bologna, we come up squarely against the peculiar problem of a city, which came to be part of a larger territorial state, but did not surrender its status and its autonomy . The "liberties" Bologna enjoyed under papal sovereignty may have had few parallels, but the problem they posed was hardly unique in early modern Europe: the governance of a formerly free polity, brought under a dominant authority. WW By the reckoning of Alfeo Giacomelli and Angela De Benedictis, the Bolognese W covered about 3,600 square kilometers, approximately one-tenth of the territory ruled by 5 See M.Caravale and A.Caracciolo, W. 30 the Papacy at the end of the sixteenth century.‘ Bologna was located at the heart of this substantial district, which the city had dominated since the mid-thirteenth century. Divided in two halves, roughly equal in size, by the ancient Roman 11; 33111:, the northern section of the W consisted of fertile lowlands, slowly turning to marshes near its northeastern boundary. It was over this area that Bologna exercised its firmest control: from this intensely cultivated area Bologna received most of the wheat and wine consumed by its population, as well as the raw hemp and silk that nourished urban industries. Turning south from the W the landscape changes rapidly. In proceeding towards the Appennines, we encounter a wide range of gentle hills and river valleys turning progressively to unproductive mountainous terrain, which supported little more than subsistence agriculture, despite relatively modest altitudes.’ At the middle of the seventeenth century about one-eighth of the inhabitants of the Papal States resided in the Bolognese region. It may be useful to note that the size of the W's population did not undergo major alterations during the period under consideration. It fluctuated from roughly 234,000 inhabitants in 1581, to 225,000 in 1656, with ‘ The term W identified the papal provinces governed by a Cardinal Legate . " See A. Giacomelli, “Le aree chiave della bonifica bolognese" in ' . . - ', - .. z. (Bologna, 1983), p. 126; and A.De Benedictis, W W (Bologna. 1984), pp. 20-22. 31 a peak at nearly 240,000 inhabitants in 1617 and a minimum at 201,000 in 1595. Broadly speaking, Bolognese urban dwellers followed a similar curve, and made up between 25 and 30 percent of the region's overall population. The Bolognese population within the walls oscillated between 60,000 and 70,000 inhabitants, with an isolated peak at 72,000 in the late 1580s. To put things in broader perspective, Bologna ranked constantly among the ten most populous Italian urban centers, and was overtaken by Rome only in the later part of the sixteenth century. In Europe, among cities other than state capitals, only Lyons was larger at the end of the sixteenth century.‘ The importance of early modern Bologna went well beyond its size. To paraphrase Giacomelli, the nickname 1§_g1§§§a (the fat) was not just a reference to cuisine but to its being a.prime example of affluent society in the context of medieval and Renaissance Europe’. Indeed, the studies of Dal Pane and Poni have amply documented that Bologna was the main business and manufacturing center of the papal domain. While Rome ' To the end.of the eighteenth century Bologna was by far the second largest center of the Papal States: the Bolognese population stood at two thirds that of Rome and was at least twice that of Ferrara. See R. Mols, "Population in Europe" in C-HoCiPolla. ed., 2W (London, 1974), v.2, pp. 49-50. All figures regarding Bologna are Ibased, on, the accurate series of demographic ‘tables published by Athos Bellettini. See A.Bellettini, La mm (Bologna. 1961). pp. 25-26 48. ’ See A .Giacomelli, "Carlo Grassi e le riforme bolognesi del Settecento. L’eta lambertiniana," Quade1n1__gn1tgzg11 mm 10 (1979): 8. 32 hosted legions of servants, beggars, vagrants and prostitutes, Bologna employed half of its population in the various stages of textile production. In spite of the economic downturn of the second half of the seventeenth century, Bologna and its district remained one of the capitals of silk manufacturing well into the eighteenth century . 1° W During the nearly three centuries from the ousting in 1506 of the Bentivoglio, the last §1gngr1 of the city, to the arrival of French troops in 1796, Bologna occupied a peculiar political position. It was part of the Papal States, yet it was no ordinary province, since the edicts issued in Rome did not apply to it. It was the see of a papal governor, the Cardinal Legate, yet he could not pass a single provision without the consent of the local Senate. And its citizens likened themselves more to the inhabitants of the free republic of Lucca rather than to the subjects of the other polities of the Papal States.11 1° See L-Frati. 1W XXIII (Bologna, 1900), p. 185. For an history of Bolognese economic activities, the massive study of Luigi Dal Pane remains of fundamental importance: L. Dal Pane, Emu MW (Bologna. 1969) 011 silk manufacturing see: C. Poni, "Per la storia del distretto industriale serico di Bologna (secoli XVI-XIX),"Quadgm1 51.21191 n. s., 73 (1990): 93- 167. ‘1 An accurate and concise survey of the relations between Rome and Bologna during the W is provided by A.Ciacomelli, ”Carlo Grassi e le riforme bolognesi," pp. 5-8. The cf the d. 3361, es :ter (:1 gpal de :ainal uses, it the am Bing-ma retained minis: aJiessad '-«er 1). State’s In 3.311351 2 M a?“ b 33 The turn of events of 1506, precipitated by the collapse of the delicate balance of powers engineered by the peace of Lodi, established papal overlordship for good."2 Not unlike other cities and autonomous enclaves, Bologna fell victim to papal determination to give concrete substance to its many nominal overlordships in central Italy. Yet, unlike other cases, in that of Bologna the conquest was not the prelude to the uprooting of the municipal government and its autonomy. Bologna did not share the fate of Perugia;” it instead retained a large measure of economic independence and administrative autonomy, to the point of even keeping an ambassador in Rome and a small, yet highly symbolic, army under the direct orders of the W, the Senate's leader. In keeping with a long tradition, Bolognese historians have minimized the reality of the papal overlordship, emphasizing the "real” powers of the local Senate vs. the "theoretical" powers of the papal Legate. Notably, Colliva went even further, suggesting that the diarchy was not really a W, as it was called, but rather a senatorial 1“ In the delicate balance of powers of late Quagtrggentg Italy the Bentivoglio traditionally sided with the duke of Milan. The defeat of the Franco-Milanese alliance at the hand of Spain left the Bentivoglio regime an easy prey to papal ambitions. ” On the case of Perugia, probably the hardest hit among cities reclaimed by the Papacy, see R. Paci, "La ricomposizione sotto la Santa Sede: offuscamento e marginalita della funzione storica dell’Umbria pontificia" in E.Fasano Guarini, ed. . WW. . h 1» 'Al to.- '8 .1 '8 w»; - 34 regime. There is little question that Bologna defended with stubborn determination each and every one of her privileges and prerogatives.“ The Roman Q1111; could mock the Bolognese ambassador, labeling him the ambassador of the W,‘ nonetheless that same Q1113 had to dispatch energetic Legates on several occasions, in order to counteract the tendency of the city to disregard papal directives even in foreign affairs. In resisting papal direction, Bologna could bank on several advantages. First of all its size: the second largest urban center of the state at the end of sixteenth century, Bologna was roughly equal to Florence in population, and it was the most prosperous commercial and manufacturing center of the State of the Church. Secondly, it lay at the very northern border of the Papal States and geopolitical consideration would and did recommend caution to Roman pol icy-makers. Thirdly, unlike most of the other cities and communities under 1‘ See P. Colliva, "Bologna dal XIV a1 XVIII secolo: governo misto o. signoria senatoria?” in A. Berselli, ed., (Bologna, 1977) v.2, pp. 13- 34. The issue has been recently revisited: G. Ricci, ”Fu una capitale? Il rango di Bologna tra realta e percezione" in W. Tega, ed., (Repubblica di San Marino, 1989), v. 3, pp. 101-120. For an introduction to the period see also G.Orlandelli, "Note di storia economica sulla Signoria dei Bentivoglio,” ' ' ' ' ' ' ' (1951-53): 205-398: and A.Giacomelli "Carlo Grassi e 1e riforme," with special reference to pp. 5-12. 1” The term refers to a peculiar kind of salami which, in most of Italy and even abroad, was (and still is) popularly called Bologna. See A.Giacomelli, ”Carlo Grassi e 1e riforme," p. 5. 35 Rome, it had a proud communal past and held fast to the constitutional "liberties" the capital city had granted by treaty before Bologna came definitively under its sway. In fact, for all practical purposes, the shock of the conquest was mitigated m by the papal renunciation of a visible military presence in the city, and by the papal abidance by the series of bilateral agreements, which had been sealed during the previous two centuries.“5 Threatened by the growing appetite of such ambitious neighbors as Florence and Milan, Bologna had ’freely' accepted papal overlordship as a lesser evil as early as 1278, but under the clear provision that her offices, her autonomy and the territory under her control were not to be disturbed: J l ! ! ! . ii ! i 'l !' tgn1tgz11 g; 511 511:1 91-315 figment!“ 1 1135a . ‘7 These provisions, the breach of which caused the abrupt dismissal of several papal Legates, were again to provide the basis for the lasting compromise sealed in 1447 after a ten-year-long negotiation. The gapitgli issued by Pope Nicholas V laid the constitutional foundation of the peculiar Bolognese diarchy, balancing papal claims with local powers, formally recognizing the special status of Bologna and her territory. The wording itself was so ambiguous that boundaries could never be “ No papal troops were stationed in Bologna after 1511. 1’ See N. Rodolico, W W (Bologna. 1898). p- 111- 36 precisely drawn. There remained ample space to accommodate both the most extreme claims to Bolognese autonomy on one side and the far more restrictive views of papal emissaries on the other.” As a matter of course, what Bologna saw as rights and prerogatives Rome regarded as concessions. In emphasizing the free volition of the submission, Bolognese rhetoric claimed that the relation between the two sides was inherently equal, not one of master to subject. In rejecting the contractual nature of the relation, Roman policy-makers ostensibly took the opposite view, implying that what Rome conceded, it could revoke.” However, since neither side ever felt confident enough to force the issue to a head, the crucial point remains that the 99911911 granted civic authorities considerable latitude for independent action, and guaranteed that Roman will would be mediated through city offices, which were “ The 99913911 stated that the papal Legate could not rule without the consent of the local magistrates and viceversa: . ,. . a 4 a a - .- .A- ; . W On this subject the following works are indispensable: S. Verardi Ventura, "L’ ord1namento bolognese nei secoli XVI e XVII, " W9 74 (1979): 181- 425. See also: G. Orlandelli, "Considerazioni sui capitoli di Niccolo V 601 Bolognesi" . We; MW 8. viii, 4 (1949): 454- 73; M.Bartolotti, I'Sui Capitoli di Niccolo V per la citta di Bologna nella storia del conflitto col governo centrale ," ' 3-4 (1970-71): 513-38: and P.Colliva, "Bologna dal XIV al XVIII secolo." ” See A.Giacomelli, ”Carlo Grassi e 1e riforme,” pp. 5-6. 37 Bolognese in membership and autonomous in operation. understandably, Bolognese political discourse was invariably conservative: innovation or resistance to innovation was justified in reference to the word and spirit of the 99919911. Logal_soxernment In a sense, it can be said that when Bologna came under direct papal domination, the status of the city, that is the continued exercise of a broad autonomy under a local government had already been defined, and was not to be modified. By right.of conquest, successive popes could and.did reform Bologna's governing regime, but they introduced little more than cosmetic adjustments, which did not alter the prerogatives and powers of local ruling offices and the families that ran them. The §1gn9n19 had been decapitated in 1506, but governing functions remained squarely in the hands of the the same Oligarchy of families that had cooperated with Giovanni II Bentivoglio. The magistracy of the E1£9zngt9z1, the powerful executive council of the Bentivoglio regime, was disbanded, but only to be turned first into the Senate of forty, then into the Senate of fifty.‘20 To paraphrase ‘” The Senate or 89991mgn§9 of forty was introduced by Pope Julius II in 1507 and confirmed by Pope Leo X in 1513. The number of senators was raised to fifty by Pope Sixtus V in 1589. See S.Verardi Ventura, “L'ordinamento bolognese,” pp. 330-333. D 94-1 wk II. ‘V.. (I! ‘e . ‘~‘ '1' i 38 Colliva, nothing changed in the structure of government, except the name and the number of the participants.21 The continuing preeminence of civic forms of self- governance cannot be viewed simply as the resilience of municipal powers y15 a y15 embryonic, or inadequate, state apparatuses. First, the Papacy did not try to establish its own power base, neither vying for the support of people who had been powerless under the previous regime, nor creating an administrative network independent of local municipal offices. Second, despite occasional conflicts and tensions, the Bolognese ruling elite tied the stubborn defense of municipal prerogatives to loyalty to the pope/king. In other words, the perpetuation of civic liberties coincided, with. the consolidationlof the political and social primacy of a limited elite. Indeed, there is no evidence that, after its incorporation into the papal domain, Bologna tried to regain its independence.22 As the continued exercise of Bolognese autonomy went together with the relative narrowing of the political system, governing powers came to be concentrated in the office of the 3119;99:921, consisting first of sixteen and then twenty-one a'See P.Colliva, "Bologna dal XIV a1 XVIII secolo,” p. 24. ’3 On this aspect Angela De Benedictis has lucidly :remarked that the decades of most active papal state building (coincided with the consolidation of Bolognese autonomy. See Anne Benedictis, "Governo cittadino e riforme amministrative a.Bologna nel '700" in ' ' ' ° ' WW1 W (Bologna. 1980). pp~ 17-18- 39 members. Created in the early fifteenth century as a 9:9 39mm extraordinary magistracy, and granted sweeping powers, the mm were turned into the governing city-council under the Bentivoglio, who won papal approval, secured a permanent post for themselves and staffed the board with members of a selected circle of oligarchical families.” The re-establishment of Papal authority did not dismantle the system of power set up by the Bentivoglio regime. In securing Bolognese loyalty and cooperation, the Papacy confirmed both the office and the families, which were already in a position of power. 22.11113 the new Senate of forty was an emanation of the sovereignty reclaimed by Pope Julius II: 99_£99;9 it was in many ways a continuation of the magistracy of the W. from which it inherited the political preeminence, the prerogatives and, largely, the personnel. Of the forty senators named in 1506 a solid majority, twenty-six, came from families that had participated in the Bentivoglio government after 1466. The most significant novelty was the addition of such important lineages as the Pepoli, the Felicini, the Isolani, the GJassi and the Bolognini, which had previously been excluded." 3’ The office of the W received the confirmation of Pope Paul II in 1465. Its twenty-one members held their posts for life, signalling a clear cut departure from the frequent rotation of medieval communal offices. See S.Verardi Ventura, 'L'ordinamento bolognese", pp. 300-318. 3‘ The following families formed the 1506 Senate of forty. An asterisk identifies "old" families: Bolognini, Marsili*, Grati*, Gozzadini*, Ghisilieri*, Felicini, Sampieri*, Grassi, Campeggi, Bentivoglio*, Pepoli, Poeti*, Orsi*, Carbonesi, 40 The ' reform’ introduced by Pope Sixtus V in 1589 followed similar guidelines: it boiled down to raising the number of senators in office from forty to fifty while confirming in 9999 the powers of the Senate.‘25 Besides, both the criteria used for electing senators, and the privileges that went with the post offered little political leverage to papal emissaries. In fact, while successive pontiffs retained for themselves the right to fill vacant senatorial seats, they could do so only by choosing from a list of four candidates submitted by the Bolognese Senate itself. Moreover, since tradition required mantaining a family in possession of its post, often the 99:19 had no choice at all.“ From the 1540s the Senate became identified ever more closely with the administration of the L99921999, through the formation of eight senatorial commissions, called 95mm.” The 9559;139:19, senatorial in membership and Malvezzi*, Marescotti*, Isolani, Legnani, Foscherari, Zambeccari, Bianchetti*, Aldrovandi*, Bianchi*, Volta*, Ariosti*, Ringhiera*, Armi*, Castelli*, Ludovisi, Manzoli, Fantuzzi*, Cattani*, Cospi, Albergati, Ranuzzi*, Lini*, Guidotti*, Sassoni*, Bargellini*, Lambertini*. BCB. Halvezzi. WWW. cart- 31, f. 7. ”’ Paolo Colliva has convincingly argued that, by expanding the number of senators in office, Rome hoped to weaken from within the cohesion of the Bolognese Oligarchy, but to no avail. See P.Colliva, "Bologna dal XIV a1 XVIII secolo," p. 25. ‘“ See S.Verardi Ventura, “L’ordinamento bolognese,” pp. 330-336. 27'In 1538 a senatorial decree ruled that the Senate and its appointees had. exclusive jurisdiction 1on all public affairs. See A.De Benedictis, "Governo cittadino e riforme," 41 appointed on an annual basis by the Senate, regulated and supervised specific sectors of governance, guaranteeing the Senate complete control of the administrative structure and considerable capacity for action. Deputies (95591191) dealt with nearly every act of administration, collaborated and participated in lesser civic boards, and proposed legislation before the Senate. A brief summary of the competences of the main W may be useful to illuminate further the broad jurisdiction held by the Senate and its commissions: 9919:39, governance of the Bolognese rural hinterland: 9999:9, fiscal administration: 1mm, tax-collection in the rural districts: 9:11999, building and planning: mm, silk fair: 9111219, garrisoning and provisioning of local troops (jointly with the Legate); 11991219119, administration of military hardware and infrastructures of strategic importance: 29999, coinage. The structure of the 9551mm was completed with three lesser commissions and the provision that permitted the creation of extraordinary 9559mm upon necessity." The system of governance of the 9559;199:19 contributed decisively to consolidating the autonomy of Bolognese pp. 10-12 0 3‘ Ordinary 9551;999:19, but of lesser relevance, were: W, relief of cameral debt; W, river monitoring; W, screening the candidates to the so called offices 99.91192: (anziani and W) The Senate retained the right to appoint extraordinary commissions to face emergencies, or to report on specific issues. The most important extraordinary 9559mm was the 999911991129, food provis ioning and rationing . See S . Verardi Ventura , "L'ordinamento bolognese," pp. 365-370: A.De Benedictis, 'Governo cittadino e riforme," pp. 12-26. 42 administration and to the tight grip of the Senate upon it. Counter to the recommendations of the Roman envoy, 99951999: Fabio Della Cornia, who upon "visiting” Bologna in 1587 had advised the pontiff to curb Bolognese ”liberties" in fiscal matters and in the administration of rural districts, in 1592 Pope Clement VIII formally exempted Bologna from the jurisdiction of the WW, confirming the Senate and its commissions in the exercise of exclusive powers, which elsewhere had been made the preserve of papal Vicars and governors.” Equally relevant was the uninterrupted functioning of the Bolognese mint, the 29999, which was actually given new splendid headquarters in the sixteenth century. This is all the more significant, when considered in light of the fact that at the same time the mints of the towns of Umbria and the Marches, also in the Papal States, were closed. Control of coinage was vital for monetary stability, was very lucrative and, most important, was also one of the chief functions associated with sovereignty. In stressing the modest financial weight of the Bolognese 29999, historians of the early-modern 3’ Provisions exempting Bologna from the jurisdiction of Papal offices had already been enacted by Pope Gregory XIII (1572-1585), he himself a Bolognese, under the formula . See C. Penuti, ”Aspetti della politica economica nello Stato Pontificio sul finire del ’500: le ’visite economiche’ di Sisto V, " 599911 - 2 (1976): 183- 202; A.De Benedictis, "Governo cittadino e riforme," pp. 17-18. 43 Papacy miss the highly symbolic message delivered by coins that on one side carried the coat of arms of the city.30 Behind the broad competences claimed by the Bolognese Senate and its commissions loomed the authority of the papal Legate. The 99919911 required the Senate to govern 91mg1_9gm the Legate and, as a constant reminder of Roman pretensions, papal correspondence invariably named the Legate before Bolognese magistrates. In theory, legates had the power to make the papal will felt in all aspect of governance. In practice, however, few legates were inclined to do so. Several considerations suggest that local structures would commonly predominate. Inexperience in Bolognese affairs, and the lack of an administrative network at their disposal obliged most legates to work closely with the Senate and its commissions. In addition, legates served for a maximum of two three-years terms, but most of then remained in office considerably less: they came and went, while the Senate was always 1n_1999. In other words, papal legates had hardly a chance to master the subtleties of the Bolognese political system, or to establish an independent presence. Even energetic legates, such as Francesco Alidosi (1508-1510), Antonio Maria Salviati (1585- 1586), and Benedetto Giustiniani (1606-1611) could do little to modify this state of affairs. In addition, Rome was often reluctant to back its own representative when risking a 3° The 999112911 of the Bolognese 29999 received final confirmation in 1596. See G.B.Salvioni, 11_y919:9_d9119_11z9 Mums: (Bologna, 1961), pp. 516-518. 44 serious institutional confrontation: a case in point was the Legate Benedetto Giustiniani, whose governorship was terminated in 1611, a year before his second mandate was to expire.31 Beset by an array of strictures and difficulties in intervening in administrative matters, legates enjoyed a more favorable distribution of authority over the administration of justice. All civil cases were put under the jurisdiction of the five W, appointed jointly by the Legate and the Senate."2 Criminal justice was instead the exclusive preserve of the W, a Papal nominee. However, in this sensitive area the Senate won two relevant concessions: the right to commute a death sentence, and the exemption of Bolognese offenders from confiscation of their properties . ’3 ’1 See S.Verardi Ventura, "L'ordinamento bolognese,” pp. 386-425; P.Colliva, "Bologna dal XIV a1 XVIII secolo," pp. 28- 29; A.Giacomelli, ”Carlo Grassi e 1e riforme,” pp. 6-7. 0n the specific issue of the residence of Benedetto Giustiniani and his difficult relations with the Senate, see also: M. Fanti, "Le classi sociali e il governo di Bologna all’inizio del XVII secolo, in un' opera inedita di Camillo Baldi,"§3;:99n9_$§91199 5919911999 11 (1961):175-179. 3’ Since 1151199111 had to be foreigners and non-residents before their nomination, it is likely that the Senate could exercise limited leverage on them. See S.Verardi Ventura, "L’ordinamento bolognese," pp. 370-372. 3’ Ibid., pp. 373-380. In the main, these provisions confirmed the special status of the W, and cautioned individual senators against the most severe forms of prosecution. Only the gravest of crimes, lese-majesty, would bring the suspension of these constitutional guarantees. Such was the circumstance that led to the execution of Count Giovanni Pepoli in 1585. Even then, to avoid a commotion, the sentence was carried out secretly and no confiscation took 45 :.l i 2 l . 3 Jurisdiction over the countryside was an essential measure of the degree of autonomy a provincial city enjoyed. Cities depended on their hinterlands for their food supply and for the raw materials needed by urban manufacturers. City treasuries relied heavily on the taxes levied on rural population, and urban upper classes dominated the agrarian economy, investing and speculating in land. Forfeiting jurisdiction over their 99n§999, cities would lose much more than control over a rural district: they would forfeit the control of their own well-being and economic destiny. Indeed, while subject cities often managed to win recognition of considerable privileges, central governments routinely challenged the claims of provincial cities to govern their hinterlands. Sovereigns found a measure of security in subdividing their dominions into separate units governed directly from the capital. To be sure, while the main lines of this development are clear, the process itself presented numerous variations and exceptions. For instance, fifteenth-century Milanese rulers stripped conquered cities of most of their 9911129519." Florence carved the 99119999 of Pisa, Pistoia and Arezzo into M and “3199:9919, that is, administrative units place . 3‘ See G.Chittolini, WW. pp- 254-265. 46 governed by Florentine officials. However, Florence did not risk depriving Siena of its hinterland.” Not dissimilar was the attitude of Venice, which left the subject cities of the veneto in control of sizable portions of their former districts . 3‘ Whereas the governments of regional states, and the Papacy itself elsewhere, denied provincial cities exclusive control over their 9999999, Bologna retained its traditional dominance over the 999199999, the rural district governed from the mid-thirteenth century. Though not without challenges, mostly from a few privileged enclaves and towns, the mid- sixteenth-century restructuring of the Bolognese governing offices, with the creation of the system of senatorial commissions, did not weaken Bolognese control over the 9999999; rather it reinforced it. In fact, while confirming previous statutes, it brought rural communities under the jurisdiction of the W. This state of affairs was formally ratified in 1572 by Pope Gregory XIII, and subsequently confirmed in 1605 by Pope Paul V.” 3‘ On this, see: G.Chittolini, W W. pp. 292-318; H. Mirri, "Livorno e Pisa: due citta e un territorio nella politica odei Medici" in E. Fasano Guarini, W121 (Pisa. 1980). pp- 13-16: and J Brown. In .. O - - ‘ p.00‘ 0 o -. 0 Q o - Q \‘g. - .q ‘ 293919 (New York, 1982), pp. 199-202. 3‘ See J-Grubb. W. pP- 63-66- ” Typically, rural districts and townships often welcomed the chance to exchange domination by a nearby city for administration from a more distant capital. Similar dynamics were set in motion in the years following the papal conquest, 47 The wide range of competences which the senatorial 99511999919_91_99991:99 took upon itself may offer a more precise indication of the broad jurisdiction Bolognese authorities exercised over the 9999999. 9999991 claimed the right "WWI—£9 W". with the sole mitigating clause that communities could appeal against sentences to the legatefi” And new 99919911 issued in 1556, regulating relations between municipal authorities and rural communities, reduced both the autonomy of rural councils, and gave 9999991 a say even in their membership.” WW Studies on the evolution of Italian city-states clearly indicate the rise to power of loosely constructed oligarchical elites, either through the occupation of existing municipal but with modest results. The ”castles" and the townships of Budrio, Medicina, Castel San Pietro, Crevalcore, San Giovanni in. Persiceto and Castelfranco won recognition of their 'fliberties", most of which, however, were well established tnfore the sixteenth century, but remained under the administrative and fiscal control of Bolognese officials. On the other hand, the Bolognese Senate was equally successful in countering papal attempts at weakening Bolognese grip, by carving feudal enclaves, awarded to prominent families and excused from Bolognese jurisdiction. An excellent analysis of the administration of the Bolognese 9999999 is provided by A.De Benedictis, W199, pp. 20- 65. See also I..Aquilano, "Bologna e le comunita del contado in eta noderna," W9 9 (1983): 27-41; A.Giacomelli, "Le aree chiave della bonifica Bolognese," p. 126; Idem, ”Carlo Grassi e 1e riforme," p. 7. " A-De Benedictis, Wain. pp- 37-38- ” Ibid., pp. 76-78. 48 offices, or through the creation of 99_999 ruling bodies. From the fifteenth century, in the city-states of northern and central Italy, access to magistracies came to be formally associated with social distinction. In Florence as in Venice, in Lucca as in Bologna, the highest offices were regularly occupied by men who were social peers, and combined affluence with political prominence.‘o While Bologna participated in this development, the Bolognese situation presents an additional difficulty, because the consolidation of oligarchical forms of governance interacted with the establishment of papal overlordship over the city in the sixteenth century. Admittedly, the papal conquest introduced an external factor in the inner dynamics of Bolognese political development. Nonetheless it did not alter its course. There was no sudden influx of foreign functionaries and civil servants, or even ecclesiastics, to replace local ones, disturbing the oligarchical evolution of the Bolognese political system.“ As public life came to be dominated by small councils and powerful 99_999 committees, posts on those boards were claimed by a small class of citizens. In Bologna, the rise to political preeminence first of the office of the 31999999991, ‘° See L.Martines, ' - E9u9r_and_Imagina§19n1_citx_5ta§es_in W19 (Baltimore, 1979), pp. 148-161; see also H-Berengm W (Turin, 1974), pp. 11-13. ‘1 See A.De Benedictis, W199, pp. 29-34; S.Verardi Ventura, "L’ordinamento bolognese," pp. 335-337. 49 then of the Senate and its commissions, went together with a virtual monopoly on holding posts by a limited number of families. Inheritance of seats and the Senate's insistence on its right to nominate members to vacant posts were certainly not provisions devised to promote rapid turnover. As a matter of fact, the same family names appears over and over in lists of senators: over the nearly two centuries from 1465 to 1660, a total of just eighty-seven families monopolized senatorial seats.“ As a consequence of the progressive closing of the political system, the old communal offices were either suppressed, or were subordinated to the Senate and reduced to perfunctory functions. For instance, the two most important magistracies of the medieval Commune, the 9921991 and the “91999999991991.1991 became relics of the past. The board of the eight 9991991, the dominant civic office from the late thirteenth century to the creation of the magistracy of the R1£9n99991 in the fifteenth century, retained its former preeminence in civic ceremonies, but its jurisdiction was limited to minor offenses and civil cases. Similarly, the W. staffed by sixteen W (representatives of the four city quarters) and by the 9999991 of the 91:91 (guilds), saw its say limited to commercial legislation. The 91:91, the backbone of the Commune until the " See A-Hasini. W (Bologna. 1666). v.3. pp. 10-11. 50 later Trecento, lost political voice to the point.of having to submit their Statutes to senatorial approval.‘3 However, in spite of their becoming politically marginal, municipal offices and corporate colleges turned exclusive in membership: citizenship and occupational requirements increasingly restricted eligibility and access. Requisites for admissions to the old magistracies of the 9991991 and the 1919991 were gradually raised to exclude common folk. In other words, since access to civic offices was the main way in which social distinction was manifested, political rights came to be graduated accordingly.“ Oligarchical exclusiveness was not confined to a monopoly on civic offices and political participation, it extended to a large number of agencies that dotted early-modern Bologna. Posts of authority regularly went to members of a narrow circle of families. The E9999199_91_599_29999919, the agency that supervised the building of the basilica located in the main square of Bologna, provides a case in point. Not unlike similar institutions elsewhere, it was the expression of Bolognese civic pride. Even the colors of the marbles, white and red, emphasized the point. They were the colors of the coat of arms of the Commune. From the mid-fifteenth century “ See S.Verardi Ventura, “L’ordinamento bolognese," pp. 298-299, 355-360; and A.De Benedictis, "Governo cittadino e riforme," pp. 11-12. “ See A.Giacomelli, ”La dinamica della nobilta bolognese nel XVIII secolo" in W W (Bologna 1980). pp- 55-59- 51 the chairman of the board was a papal nominee, but in fact he was invariably a member of the Senate, as were the other four 9999919991 sitting on the board.‘5 Charities. W. W and Mali were also centers of political maneuvering. From the late 999999999999 these agencies proliferated: by the reckoning of Gabriella Zarri, in 1604 there were fifty fraternities and twenty-one hospitals and charitable institutes within the city 46 walls alone. Despite their being subject to ecclesiastical authority, these agencies came under scrutiny of the Bolognese 3999199999. By statute, important foundations such as the 99999 91 21999 (1473), the Qsm9919 991 3999999191 (1494), the 99999 991 291991 2999999951 (1495), the 99999 991 9999199991 (1560) , the H9999_991_fl999199919 (1583) were run by lay boards staffed by 9999991, 999911999191, and regularly presided over by senators. As a rule, even lay 9999999999199 named a senator as their agitate." ‘“ The chairman of the board, the so called 9999199999 99999999, was named for life and the office tended to become hereditary. Between the sixteenth and the eighteenth century we find as chairmans two members of the Pepoli family, then two Cospi, followed by three Fachinetti and finally four members of the Albergati family. See H.Fanti, L9_£9999199_91 WW (Roma. 1980). pp. 175-190. “ See G. Zarri, "Istituzioni ecclesiastiche e vita religiosa a Bologna (1450-1700)" in W. Tega, ed., 599919 WM (Repubblica San Marine. 1989). V- 2. pp- 161- -200, esp. 197. ‘7 Giorgio Chittolini has called attention to the strong influence civic boards and individual patrician houses exercised on charitable and clerical agencies from the 9119999999999. See G.Chittolini, "Stati regionali e istituzioni 52 E ! . . i :.l . The f ifteenth-century triumph and the subsequent perpetuation of oligarchical forms of governance were moored in developments taking place in the realm of social relations. For all the relative fluidity and openness that Bolognese society showed until the end of the sixteenth century, social divisions gradually hardened. Without resorting to caste legislation on the Venetian model , groups at the top developed arguments to go with Oligarchy, by setting a special price on birth, lineage and family tradition.“ ecclesiastiche nell'Italia centrosettentrionale del Quattrocento" in G.Chittolini and G.Miccoli, eds., $99919 Wm (Turin. 1986), pp. 147-193. For Bologna, see the following important contributions: See 1!. Fanti, ed., WEIR '0’. 0. z. ' ._ . ‘1 '9 :10 ”no. r ’ (Bologna, 1984). F.Giusberti, "La citta assistenziale: riflessioni su un sistema piramidale" in H. Fanti, ed., W o: ’g-‘-go :1- ‘ - ‘ g g. . 0.5.1.. -on‘ (Bologna, 1984), pp. 13- -29; M.Fanti, "Istituzioni di carita e assistenza a Bologna alla fine del Medioevo" in H. Fanti, ed. , , pp. 31-64; M.Maragi, "Istituzioni sociali non caritative" in M.Fanti, ed., £9999_9_§9gg9991, pp. 145- 162; A. Giacomelli, ”Conservazione e innovazione nell'assistenza bolognese nel Settecento" in M. Fanti, ed., W1, pp. 163- 265; G. Zarri, "Istituzioni ecclesiastiche," pp. 195- -200; and H.Fanti, "Confraternite e istituzioni di assistenza nel Medioevo e nell'eta moderna" in WJI‘ega. edn Wm (Repubblica San Marina, 1989), v. 3, pp. 81-100. " A useful introduction to the usage of the term nobility is provided by the following article: ILL. Bush, "An Anatomy of Nobility” in H L Bush ed-. WW 9 51 y o 0‘; g ‘ I I o ‘ - 0‘ . o . (London, 1992), pp. 26- 46. For an updated discussion of the Italian nobility and its ideology see: C. Donati, 1.91999_91 W (Bari. 1988) A lucid analysis of the character and of the ideology of the Bolognese 53 The traditional prerequisite for participation in the running of municipal governments was citizenship. Therefore, in restricting political participation, municipal statutes typically stiffened requirements for urban citizenship. Bolognese authorities followed an alternate route: they created separate categories of citizenship. To the end of the sixteenth century, ordinary citizenship (9111999_999939119) continued to be granted rather casually, upon documenting ten years of continuous and honorable residence (19991999), but this simple 9111999_ ceased to confer political rights. Eligibility to offices was progressively restricted to selected categories of citizens, i.e. those who were granted higher forms of citizenship: namely the 9111999_99919_9m919 (ennobling the offspring of the recipient) and the 9.111999 9991199199 (immediately ennobling the recipient and his family). The expansion of the economy and the demographic growth of the second half of the sixteenth century slowed, but did not halt.the process of social and political crystallization. Recent immigration.brought Bologna to its demographic peak in the late sixteenth century, but the influx of newcomers coincided with the rapid evaporation of the residual political rights granted with the 9111999__99m31919. At any rate, such nobility is provided by G.Angelozzi, "La trattatistica su nobilta ed onore a Bologna nei secoli XVI e XVII," W999 ' ° ' , n.s. 25-26 (1974- 75): 187-265. See also A.Giacomelli, "La dinamica della nobilta bolognese," pp. 55-112. 54 expansion levelled off before any pressure from below could make itself felt at the political level." Economic growth was all too ephemeral as well. Moreover, the most dynamic and resilient urban manufacturing sector, the silk industry, was the least suited to attract newcomers, because of secretive and carefully protected technological know-how, costly fixed investments, and a well-established tradition. Surviving matriculation records document the progressive closure of guilds and their boards. While hereditary privileges and transfers were long standing characteristics of all guilds, from the 999999999999 they combined with increasingly severe restrictions to reduce the access of outsiders to a trickle."0 From the end of the fifteenth century Bolognese chroniclers furnished lists of conspicuous families, yet if such lists simplify the task of identifying who the local worthies were, there remain numerous problems with definition and segregation. Two questions need answering. What were the criteria for selection? Was there any formal demarcation separating the elite from the rest of the citizenry? In Bologna, as in Italian cities at large, where the old feudal nobility had been long either eliminated or assimilated, noble status ratified the 99_£9999 eminence of " See A-Bellettini. WM. pp- 25- 26. 9° See AnGiacomelli, "La dinamica della nobilta bolognese," p. 60. 55 former 99991999 families. In other words, social distinction went with political power, with the capacity of a limited group to direct government and to dominate society. But 99 £9999 eminence did not provide indelible marks of distinction, nor it held adequate guarantees of perpetuation. Thus urban elites strove for the legitimization of their leadership through the acquisition of the reassuring cachet of prestigious ancestry, titles and possessions that went with the noble condition elsewhere. In securing its social and political primacy, Bologna’s elite‘was peculiar in several ways. First of all, it held fast to its urban roots with a determination that had few analogies even in republican regimes. Well aware that the greatest source of aristocratic legitimation came from titles derived from authorities external to municipal government, the Bolognese Senate was careful to tie status firmly to citizenship in its higher forms. The 9111999_99919_99919 and the 9111999_9991199199, both conferred by the Senate, ranked recipients and provided.the sole route to office. As a result, members of families of recent immigration, no matter how illustrious, could not enter the Bolognese political system without winning senatorial recognition of their worthiness.”' This is not to say that members of the Bolognese elite were immune from the desire of closing ranks and of skrengthening their claims through the acquisition of feudal ‘1 Ibid., pp. 55-63. 56 titles "with all the social cachet and reassurance which this represented"."2 By the late sixteenth century several Bolognese families had acquired one or more feudal titles. The Boncompagni had become 99999991 of the nearby town of Vignola, 9199991 of Arpino and dukes of Sora. The Bentivoglio had acquired the titles of 99991 of Magliano and 9199991 of Gualtiero. The Halvezzi had added the 9999919 of Taranto to their previous possessions, the counties of Selva and Castelguelfo, localities in the 199921999.” A common expression of this desire to legitimize aristocratic status was the proliferation of fanciful genealogies, which linked Bolognese families to the lineages and even the deities of ancient Rome. The Ercolani claimed ancestors in republican Rome, the Ghisilieri, the Gozzadini and the Griffoni boasted exotic Byzantine origins, while the Poeti managed to trace their lineage all the way back to the ‘3 A.F.Cowan, 199 99999 Eggnl'gjatg 11:1thng and Slgnmg lififlleQQ (Cologne, 1985): P- 12- " Most other families retained or acquired feudal possessions within the L999z1999 or in nearby territories of Modena and Romagna. The Pepoli were 99991 of Castiglione, the Bianchi were 99991 of Piano and the Ranuzzi were 99991 of Bagno, all localities of the Bolognese Appennines. The Lambertini were 99991 of Poggio in the lowland. The Boschetti acquired the county of S.Cesareo, the Casali became 99991 of Castelvetro and the Marescotti claimed the county of Marano, all in Modenese territory. The Campeggi were 99991 of Dozza and the Hanzoli acquired the county of Tudorano , both in the papal province of Romagna. See F-Bianchi. WWW (Ferrara, 1591). 57 Latin poet Ruffo, a contemporary of Cicero.“ Many a prominent family, however, was slow in acquiring titles, while others found the roots of their prestige soberly closer to home. Prestigious patrician lineages as the Fantuzzi did not become 99991 until the 16208, others, such as the famed Bolognini and Bolognetti, did not gain titles until much later.” Participants in the contemporary debate on true nobility generally admitted, and at times insisted on, learning and knowledge as ennobling qualifications.“ While these arguments often carried limited weight in practical classifications, in Bologna the presence of a prestigious university and of a vocal doctoral "class” gave these considerations greater practical relevance. Two additional elements should be brought to bear. First of all, a large proportion of illustrious families could draw upon a venerable academic tradition. Second, Emperor Charles V, upon his coronation in Bologna in 1530, granted the title of knights to the doctors of the colleges of the 599919. It goes without “ See P Dolfi. 9W 3919999 (Bologna, 1670), pp. 288, 348, 368, 404; and G Guidicini. WW (Bologna. 1869), v. 1, pp. 339- 341. 5‘ See P.Dolfi, 999mm, p. 307; BCB, B.H.Carrati, ' ° ° 'Wmnn (1778) B698/2 0- 17; 3699, c. 44. 5‘ 0n the debate on nobility in Bologna see: G.Angelozzi, ”La trattatistica su nobilta ed onore.” 58 saying that the prestige of an imperial title propelled the holders to the apex of the social ladder.” Academic merits were behind brilliant social rises. Families as the Pini and the Bero owed their distinction to the renown won by famed jurists such as Lorenzo, Bernardo and Paolo Pini, and Agostino Bero. Other doctoral lineages, as the Pietramellara, the Zambeccari, and the Barbazzi entered the Senate. And established patrician families had no disdain for legal or academic activities, so much so that the‘professorial ranks of the university were filled with aristocrats, at times, reform-minded critics complained, to the detriment of learning“. Unlike the ruling aristocracies of Venice and Genoa, which were precocious in passing exclusive legislation, designed precisely to keep newcomers out, the Bolognese nobility remained relatively easily accessible, even after the end of the sixteenth century. As we have just noted, the legal and academic professions were common grounds for recruitment, but mercantile activities were certainly not frowned upon. Wealthy merchants were often coopted, because "911199319 5" Contemporary commentators debated the right of colleges to issue their own patents of ennoblement. Wary of the political danger, the local Senate was adamant in denying such right. See A.Giacomelli, "La dinamica della nobilta," p. 58- 59. " See P.Dolfi, 9999919919, pp. 79—81, 129-135, 166-172, 620-622, 719-733. 0. . .. .Q o . . ‘ H19!!! 591-92,? -7 !_._°H,,. ! ._ W"-“ In sixteenth-century Bologna, participation in banking and trade, albeit on a large scale, did not disqualify an individual's or a family's nobility. Most ancient lineages as the Malvezzi, the Malvasia, the Ercolani, the Ranuzzi, the Ghisilieri, the Magnani, the Bentivoglio, the Albergati, to name just a few, were not exclusively rentiers or investors in real estate. The Malvezzi and the Malvasia invested and participated in financial ventures and money-lending. The Magnani and the Ercolani invested heavily in urban and rural workshops. The Bentivoglio, the Albergati, the Malvezzi participated in trading ventures. The Ranuzzi and the Ghisilieri had large investments in silk manufacturing. Successful engagement in business activities was far from detrimental to social standing. Mario Scappi provides a case in point: a wealthy banker and a member of a distinguished family he was addressed by scribes either as 999119 or as 999991999. In 1590 he was the first of his lineage to hold a post in the Senate. Even more illuminating is perhaps the case of the Davia, a family of affluent Milanese merchants settled in Bologna in 1614. PietroAntonio Davia was granted the ennobling 91119999991999919 in 1654, his nephew Virgilio completed the family’ 5 successful rise by entering the Senate in 1672. 5’ A.Giacomelli, "La dinamica della nobilta," p. 60. 60 Mechanisms of ennoblement were not complicated: a title or academic merits would immediately qualify, and, according to ‘the: guidelines issued in 1532, three generations of documented.citizenship and thirty years of 'noble' life-style would suffice. At the end of the sixteenth century, most of the old resident families qualified either for the sayings sati§__§npln, or the giyi§a§__§mpli§§ima. In Giancarlo Angelozzi’s reckoning, the number of 'enfranchised' citizens amounted to no less than 8 percent of the male population of Bologna. If anything, this figure confirms that the Bolognese nobility was not a closed caste, it was rather a broad and composite elite of 'enfranchised’ citizens.‘0 A look at the rolls of the gnzianatg, the most prestigious and carefully guarded of the magistracies W may be useful to give more precise contours to the breadth and heterogeneous composition of Bolognese elite. In spite of the perfunctory functions of the office, access to the board of the eight M was a privilege reserved to Bolognese nobles. Likewise, admission to it amounted to a recognition of ennoblement. From 1506 to 1660, members of over 450 families appear on the rolls. However, a constant body of powerful lineages nearly monopolized the office, while members of lesser families frequently skipped office, or rose from the “’Ibid., p. 59. See also G.Angelozzi, “Nobili, mercanti, «dottori, cavalieri, artigiani. Stratificazione sociale e ideologia a Bologna nei secoli XVI e XVIII" in W. Tega, ed., WM (Repubblica San Marina 1989) . V- 2, p. 45. 61 ranks for a brief spell. Throughout the period, the Pepoli claimed sixty-four gnziani, the Boccadiferro sixty-five, the Cospi sixty-eight, the Bolognetti seventy-two, the Ercolani seventy-five, the Zani seventy-seven, the Guidotti seventy- nine, the Zambeccari eighty, the Bargellini ninety-two, the Halvasia ninety-four, the Angelelli and the Gozzadini ninety- nine, the Bentivoglio 101, the Malvezzi 108. At the Opposite end of the spectrum we find families as the Arrighi, the Baldi, the Borzani, the Casarenghi, the Cupellini, the Droghi, the Luminasi, the Hattesilani, the Sacchi, the Tomacelli, that held a post less than five times. The elite also generated an inner circle, perhaps all the more carefully guarded as access to the general run of nobles remained uncomplicated. Already contemporaries, in listing illustrious families, distinguished the senatorial patriciate from the rest. And families that enjoyed the much coveted Wig insisted on their exclusive right to use the appellative ”patrician". To be sure, for all the potential divisive tensions between patricians and lesser nobles, privilege and a sense of being different from the commonalty united rather than divided the Bolognese elite. Also unifying were family ties, reinforced by frequent intermarriage: older families did not hesitate to restore their fortunes through marriages with those of lower rank, or even upstarts. Moreover, this hierarchy allowed for a certain mobility. While positions on the Senate were monopolized by those holding seats and their heirs, senatorial families were prepared to 62 coopt new members, if for no other reason than to fill the posts vacated by those families that died out or failed to produce sons. Noble monopoly on public authority constituted one of the central themes of Bolognese governance during the early-modern era. To paraphrase the acute observation of Angela De Benedictis, the vigilant defense of Bolognese autonomy against Papal intrusion went together with the careful defense of group privilege and political power.“1 The benefits of governing the M were legion: control of legislation and administration furthered and protected the amassing of large land—holdings in the ggntadg. Tax law favored wealthy citizens to the detriment of rustics and urban poor: fiscal legislation exempted Bolognese landowners from property taxes, commonly did not impose gabelles on foodstuffs imported from their estates, and frequently granted a wide range of exemptions on urban gabelles as well. But rustics paid property taxes and landless urbanites paid heavy duties on food purchased in urban markets. The splendid palaces that dot Bologna’ s streets are a good indicator of the nobility’ s wealth, power and attitudes. Their large number and different styles testify to the capacity of the Bolognese elite to combine exclusiveness with a certain flexibility to let in new blood and new wealth. Iconographically they send an ambivalent message, which ‘1 See A.De Benedictis, "Governo cittadino e riforme," pp. 18-19. 63 perhaps sums up the values of the governing elite. 0n the one hand, the massive mansions of the Albergati, the Fantuzzi, the Pepoli, the Ranuzzi, the Sanuti, to name the most impressive, are free’standing'and isolated. On the other hand, the palaces of the Bolognini, the Orsi, the Hagnani continue traditional Bolognese architecture, the most salient element of which.was the portigg. They blended neatly in the urban landscape. In short, they' were declarations of a class that. combined magnificence, exclusivity, and even aloofness with traditional attachment to urban roots and civic leadership.“ ‘“ See G. Cuppini, "La struttura del potere a Bologna fra XVI e XVIII secolo: i palazzi senatori" in W. Tega, ed. , mm W (Repubblica San Marina. 1989). v. 2. pp. 201-220. CHAPTER III THE PUBLIC FINANCES OF THE LEQAZIQHE BOLOGNESE The public finances of early modern Bologna are a topic to which frequent references are made, but one about which little has been written by modern historians. The research of Gianfranco Orlandelli, to cite an indispensable point of departure, has illuminated vital aspects of‘the‘early forms of the system as it began to take shape during the Quattrgggntg. At the other end of the spectrum, the works of Dal Pane and Zangheri have effectively illuminated the elements leading to the fiscal crisis of the late eighteenth century and to the reform movement of the age of Pope Pius VI (1775-1799). However, it would be a mistake to assume that the conditions described in these studies may be applied to the centuries between, which stand as an ill-defined half-way house. Although the passage to direct papal domination brought little innovation in the structure of Bolognese public finances, during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries important cmanges did take place, and they concerned the intensity of 64 65 fiscal pressure and the growing recourse to borrowing, through the creation of a market in civic bonds.1 In trying to fill the most obvious gaps in the basic knowledge of the structure of Bolognese public finances, this chapter deals with several interwoven issues. First, what constituted the revenue yield? 0n the whole, there existed a considerable discrepancy between what was collected from taxpayers and what made up the fiscal income proper, an aspect about which historians have frequently been imprecise. It is not just a question of technical accuracy, which would obviously be important for its own sake. The point is that, in the main, the figures entered in early modern budgets referred to net revenues, that is, to what was due from tax-farmers. But that was only a portion of the true revenue yield (gross), 1 There is no comprehensive study on the fiscal history of the ngazigne. The works of Orlandelli remain of fundamental relevance, however their main focus is on the Bentivoglio regime rather than on the subsequent period: G.Orlandelli, ”Note di storia economica sulla Signoria dei Bentivoglio," ' ° ’ ' (1951- 53). 205- 398; G. Orlandelli, "I Monti di pubbliche prestanze in Bologna," W 14 (1969). On the fiscal structure of sixteenth and seventeenth- century Bologna an excellent introduction is provided by D.Sabbioni, "Fiscalita ed economia a Bologna tra ' 500 e ' 600: l'appalto delle imposte e l’azienda daziaria" (tesi di laurea, University of Bologna, 1983-84); see also F. Piro, "Sistema fiscale, struttura e congiuntura in una economia pre- industriale. Il caso di Bologna, 1564-1666, " Annali_1stitntg W 2 (1976): 117-182. On the debate about fiscal reform in the eighteenth century the following items remain particularly valuable: L. Dal Pane, W a__nQ1Q9na__ne1l_eta__de1__Bisgrgimentg (Bologna. 1969); R Zangheri. WWW Wes; (Bologna, 1961); and A. De Benedictis, ”Governo cittadino e riforme a Bologna nel Settecento" in O H ‘ ‘o- 0! «.0 v‘ s. 310 0.1.9‘ W (Bologna. 1980). pp- 9- -54- 66 which was much larger, since it included operating expenses and the payments of large sums which did not pass through the fiscal offices. Neglecting this difference we miss the important fact that the fisc mobilized a massive flow of resources, in the collection and appropriation of which a variety of groups participated and shared. In the case of Bologna, if one relies purely on budgetary records, one can produce a picture of Bolognese fiscal receipts that has to be regarded as inadequate at best. Take, for example, Piro's article on the budgets of the Bolognese Camera between 1564 and 1666. It produces a nicely detailed but largely incomplete account, because cameral budget sheets included only a portion of the financial operations of the Bolognese government, and their figures would distort the picture of Bolognese taxation.2 Clerks recorded the cameral income, but that was only a fraction of what local tax-farmers collected. For instance, cameral clerks had no reason to register the yield of the so called menu (surtaxes) , which by the end of the sixteenth century was the single largest fiscal source, because those additional revenues went to pay interest on the city debt and could not be appropriated by the 9mm- Second, there is the issue of the fiscal relations between Bologna and Rome. We must appreciate that, although Bologna was not immune from the demands of the dominant city, 3 See P.Piro, "Sistema fiscale, struttura e congiuntura," pp. 117-182. 67 local control of the fiscal apparatus presented civic authorities with ample opportunities to negotiate terms and conditions of Bolognese contributions. Third, there is the issue of the sources of government income. In keeping with a common character of early modern fiscal systems, the proceeds from taxation were complemented by financial expedients that provided important sums, but involved the ever-growing mortgaging of fiscal resources. : . . Orlandelli has convincingly argued that the Bolognese ruling class negotiated the surrender of the political independence of the city in order to salvage control over its fiscal apparatus. In fact, one of the key provisions of the Capitoli of 1447 was formal Papal recognition of that most peculiar arrangement, the so called M, which was to become the cornerstone on which the autonomy of the Bolognese fisc rested. Engineered between 1434 (Iefigzezia Zambia) and 1440 (W). the Credits: was a veritable financial masterpiece.’ In practice, the revenues of the city M were pledged to guarantee a series of nonredeemable loans to the Commune. Behind this harmless facade, control over the fisc was turned over to a private group of twenty-one treasurers, members of the twenty-one ’ See:G.Orlandelli, ”I MOnti di pubbliche prestanze," pp. :xdv-xv. The Bentivoglio themselves, Signgzi of Bologna from :1443 to 1506, entered the Igsgzezia in 1455 with the issuing of the BMW 68 leading patrician families sitting on the board of the W. the W Senate- Shareholders of the Creditg became members of the board of the W for life. Participation in the loan also produced a most handsome yearly interest (66.67 percent), which however was rationalized as a salary owed to the members of the board for their services. For all practical purposes treasurers and magistrates of the civic government were identical: either they were the same persons or belonged to the same families. But while the Senate embodied the "public" authority of the Commune, the W was a private board, which meant that even a political purging of the governing council would nonetheless leave intact the Iesgzezia.‘ The ousting of the Bentivoglio in 1506 brought about the dismissal of the old magistracy of the W, but had no bearing on the W15, the members of which overlapped with the twenty-one senators, but which, owing to its private nature, could not be disbanded by decree. Short of a repudiation of the Capitoli of 1447, there was little opportunity to modify financial machinery which was not the instrument of a family or a clan, but rather, to paraphrase ‘ The books of the office of Tesgzezia left the archive of the Commune in 1440 and were not to reappear. The trading of shares of the Wm was very restricted, understandably so given the importance of the office. Any transaction had to be approved by the board of the treasurers. See G.Orlandelli, "I Monti di pubbliche prestanze,” pp. XII-XVI. 69 Orlandelli, the expression of the solidarity of an entire ruling class.5 At the end of the sixteenth century, the broad fiscal autonomy of the W found lasting confirmation in the formal exclusion of Bologna from the jurisdiction of the WW. Besides dispelling for good any possibility of a breach of the mu. such exclusion confirmed several tenets dear to Bolognese policymakers. First, control of the fiscal apparatus remained squarely in the hands of the local Camera. Second, Rome renounced interference with Bolognese impositions and with the right of civic authorities to continue regulating them. Third, Bologna was formally excused from tributes the W levied on other provinces. This is not to say that Bologna was granted immunity from papal "extractions", but contributions to Rome were W transfer payments to be negotiated on a case by case basis, rather than unilateral papal impositions.‘ ‘ Ibid., p. xv. ‘ The possibility of a papal breach of the Capitoli or of a new interpretation of them was far from a hypothetical one in the age of Sixtus V (1585-1590). As noted earlier, the papal advisor Fabio della Cornia, upon his official visit to Bologna in 1587, had indeed recommended bringing Bolognese finances under the direct control of the W. And Bologna showed again and again a certain uneasiness, asking new popes to confirm, with the full formality of a B1313. papal respect for the provisions of the 9321:5211. See C. Penuti, ”Aspetti della politica economica nello Stato pontificio sul finire del ’500: le ‘visite economiche' di Sisto V " Wain 2 (1976): 183- -202; S. Verardi Ventura, "L'ordinamento bolognese dei secoli XVI- XVIII, " W 74 (1979). 276-78. For a history of the financial policy of the Papacy during the sixteenth and seventeenth century the following study by 70 I] :1. 1"." .15! ! In keeping with the political primacy of the Senate, it was the senatorial office of the Camera which was the focal point of the Bolognese fisc. It was not the sole institution involved in the administration of civic revenues, but it was by far the most important, since it controlled no less than three-fourths of the ordinary fiscal income of the city. Furthermore, it was the Camera which governed Bolognese fiscal policy. There was a second fiscal agency, the Cabe11a_Cre§aa, which managed the customs, but its administration was entrusted to the three Cellegi (departments) of the University. This arrangement underlined the peculiar status enjoyed by the flatten. of the Bolognese 33.315119, and had a certain relevance in terms of Bolognese internal politics. However, it was of little consequence from the point of view of the W. The revenues of the customs were not under the scrutiny of the Teeereria, but they were committed Delumeau provides a fundamental point of departure: J.Delumeau, ' ' ' ' (Paris, 1957-1959). Very important are also: P.Partner, "Papal Financial Policy in the Renaissance ‘and Counter-Reformation," £a§r_and_2re§ent 78 (1980): 18—62: and E-StuInPO. W W (Milan, 1985), which provides a very useful assessment of the work in progress and a critical revision of the budgetary figures circulated by previous studies. 71 to the funding of the University and could not be diverted in any case.7 The core of the Bolognese fiscal system was made up of a host of indirect imposts, the so called W. They consisted of duties on the sale and the processing of foodstuffs and gabelles on economic activities: Melina (a duty on wheat and the sale of bread), Retrague (a duty on the butchering and sale of meat), Reggae (a duty on the sale of fish), Zalde (a duty on the sale of sweets), filing (a wine toll): duties on commercial activities: Eerte (a gate tax levied on carriages entering the city), Paragliene (a duty levied on the sale of silk at the city silk market), Piazza (a tax levied on the market fair routinely held in the main square), Cam (customs duties); and the monopoly of the sale of salt, the Sale. In addition a head tax was levied on the inhabitants of the countryside: W. The revenues provided by 5313. 11911113, Rm. 2.9593, 2.11513: Eerie. Ringling. Piazza and Ianstaflaiti came under the competence of the Camera, while the yield of the customs was controlled by the university’s administration of the Capella Creeea and the income of the wine toll was entrusted to the I . 1151'. " Cooperation between senatorial Camera and doctoral Gabella was far from easy. However, cameral supervision was forced on the Gabella in 1603 with the admission of seven senators to its board. See M.Carboni, "La Gabella Grossa di Bologna. La formazione di una grande azienda fiscale," 11 My, 16 (1990): 113-122. 72 This reliance upon the proceeds from tolls and duties was hardly a Bolognese peculiarity. In urban Italy, wherever we look we find similar fiscal structures, based upon what Lauro Martines has aptly called the unspoken assumption that the powerless sectors of the population should carry most of the fiscal onus.‘ Venice, Milan and Florence obtained at least 70— 75 percent of their income from the yield of tolls and duties. Nonetheless, other major Italian cities had at one time or another, during the period from the fourteenth through the sixteenth.centuries, experimented with some rudimentary forms of direct ‘taxation, such as the ‘Venetian. graxezza, the Milanese mereimgn1e or the Florentine We. Bologna, by contrast, had not implemented any such measures. The only direct tax was the Impe53a_e_un1t1, but it was levied solely on the rustics.9 The collection of each duty was carefully regulated by tariffs and eap1re11, which in most cases had been issued or 'See L.Martines, - BeaainaaeLInlx (Baltimore. 1988), pp- 184-185- ’ Only once did Bologna come close to experimenting with the imposition of direct taxation. In 1502 a land census was taken, probably with a fiscal purpose in mind, but after the events of 1506 the wmole matter was dropped. Two elements probably combined to dissuade Bolognese authorities from further pursuing this route: first, most of the burden would have had to be shouldered by the urban elite which, by Farolfi's reckoning, owned over two thirds of the properties registered in the countryside. Second, revenues from a new impost would not have been protected by the system of the Credire_d1_1e§erer1a and hence would have been vulnerable to papal claims. According to Farolfi’ 8 study, members of 82 Bolognese:noble families.owned about 65 percent of properties. See B. Farolfi, W (Bologna. 1977) 73 re-issued in the mid-fifteenth century, and which received final confirmation in 1554. The exception, once again, was the W, whose tariffs received a sweeping review in 1579-80. In the main, the actual management of each duty was entrusted to a daz1ere, who literally acquired the right to collect revenues at a public auction.10 The daz1ere took upon himself all managerial expenses, and agreed to pay to the Camera or the Gabella a pre-determined amount in quarterly installments . n A board staffed by four senatorial aeaan1 and several lesser city officials supervised the 1n9anr9 (auctioning) of all imposts. Most cameral gabelles were leased on an annual basis (Heliae, Bettaelio. Porn, Emeline, Rene). However. there were notable exceptions: the Sale, farmed out on a f ive- year basis, and the customs, farmed on a seven-year lease.12 The board reviewed the bids of would-be 9az1er1, but retained the right to withdraw dazi that failed to attract satisfactory offers. In the latter case (a rare occurrence), the fiscal ‘° Both the Bolognese State Archive (ASB) and the Archiginnasio Library (BCB) possess several copies of the Cam1r911 regulating the management of both cameral duties and the customs. A splendid analysis of the cameral tax-farming system is provided by D.Sabbioni, "Fiscalita ed economia a Bologna," pp. 7-26. ‘1 Daz1er1 could file for suspension or remission of payments only under the gravest circumstances, such as war or the outbreak of an epidemic. 1’ The W191 was the sole revenue which was never farmed out, because of political considerations: the Senate was wary of abuses and mismanagement on the part of unscrupulous tax collectors in the countryside. 74 agency kept the duty 1n_9aea, in other words it took direct responsibility for the collection of the impost.13 Since cameral budget sheets between 1564 and 1666 have survived with relatively few lacunae, and an even longer series is available for the Capella_Cr9eea, we can estimate the fiscal income appropriated by Bolognese agencies. In considering these budgets, it must be kept in mind that they give net figures, that is, the sums tax-farmers paid to the Camera and the Capella in any given year, whereas they tell us practically nothing about the gross amount collected by 9az19r1, which was obviously considerably larger, including as it.did operational expenses, as salaries to subordinates, and the tax-farmers’ profit.“ In 1575 the 9az1er1 paid 182,463 lire to the Camera and 47,000 lire to the Cahella_Cr9e§a. Owing to a sizable growth in population and a favorable economic conjuncture (up to the crisis of the 15905), revenues posted a steady increase, peaking at 264,982 lire (cameral income) and 79,005 lire (Cahella income) in 1590. Fiscal income then levelled off: cameral revenues dwelled mostly between 220,000 and 240,000 1’ See D.Sabbioni, ”Fiscalita ed economia a Bologna," pp. 7-18: see also A.Masini, W (Bologna, 1666), v. 1, p. 532. ‘“ The right to a profit was explicitly recognized by the gaa91r9l1 and regulated accordingly: it was not expected to exceed 12 percent of the investment and tax-farmers agreed to tnurn over to the Camera any profit exceeding the maximum. On the other hand, provisions were made to compensate tax-farmers in case of disastrous losses, due to major disruptions such as breakout of war or epidemics. 75 lire to the middle of the seventeenth century. Over the same period, the fiscal income claimed by the Cabellafireeea ranged from 60,000 to 70,000.” In keeping with the local control of the fiscal apparatus, budgets were tailored in such a fashion that local expenditures claimed the lion’s share. Essentially, ordinary cameral receipts were committed to pay for local administration, mostly salaries to city officials and employees, and routine expenses for the the maintenance of public property. Similarly, the proceeds from the customs went to pay stipends to university personnel, to meet expenditures for the upkeeping of the 599919 (the university), the 999ana (the customs-house), and the Canale (the city water-way). might be expected, ordinary contributions to Rome were correspondingly modest. At the end of the sixteenth century, Rome "extracted" from Bologna little more than the proceeds from the wine toll (Tee9rer1a__del_11n9) , which had been awarded to the ,Camera__Ap9§r9l19a_ as part of the 1447 agreement.“ 4” ASB Aseuateria_di_9amera .Ieyele_di_eatrate_e_snese: Ibid-. Gabella_§roesa. Camaioae_aer_il_readimeato_nei_ooati naixersali bb- 874- 875: ASB Gahe11a_§rossa .Iastrnaeati b 152, b. 154. ‘“ Even in this circumstance the approach was prudent and low profile, careful not to stir resentment. The management of the Te§9rer1a_del_11n9 was traditionally entrusted to a local teser1ere who, as a rule, was a member of a prominent senatorial family. ASB, Aeamnrer1a_d1_c_amera, "Informazione veridica sopra la istituzione di tutti i dazi della citta' di Bologna,” 1767. 76 Although a comparative assessment of the fiscal burden shouldered by the various provinces of the Papal States remains especially difficult, all the information we have converges in indicating the relative modesty of the ordinary Bolognese contribution. For instance, in his recent work on the papal fiscal system, Enrico Stumpo estimated that Bologna, with approximately 12 percent of the Papal States’ population, contributed 1.3 percent in 1619 and 1.6 percent in 1656 to the annual entrateneanrali of the W. far and away the lowest share among Papal provinces.‘7 1" See E-StmIIPO. WW. pp- 133- 136. In 1619 the W received 237,819 scudi from the Marche, 150,832 from Romagna, 145,714 from Ferrara, 133,879 from Umbria and 17,100 from Bologna. In 1656 the sums entered in the papal budget were respectively 408,397 scudi from the Marche, 220,369 from Romagna, 111,810 from Ferrara, 240,766 from Umbria and 34,977 from Bologna. Stumpo's findings are confirmed by the 1691 budget published by Luigi Nina. On thiS. see L-Nina. LLfiaaaZLnatifieinnttenlemeaMI (Milan, 1928), pp. 142-143. In 1691 the W received 304,764 scudi from the Marche, 191,401 from Romagna, and 64,610 from Ferrara, and 37,260 scudi from Bologna. 77 Income of Bolognese flscal agencies Inlcctqd yonr- “F. M 1575 1599 1615 1535 1555 manner-l Incan- -G-bolln Incom- Figure 3.1 Income of Bolognese Fiscal Agencies 78 'n ' S ct re The second broad division of early modern public finances was that of the extraordinary financial structure. By and large, this was a common and widely accepted distinction, stemming from the very limits of ordinary taxation: budgets were tailored to suit governmental needs under relatively benign, "normal" circumstances, with no provisions for such emergencies as war, famine, epidemics and the like, calling for increased expenditures. These extra expenses were expected to be met outside the normal budgetary procedure. In Bologna, an important additional factor lay in papal demands for contributions, which the Bolognese Regg1men§9 treated as extraordinary expenditures. In the main, Bolognese fiscal agencies were used to facing sudden crises and unforeseen obligations by borrowing. Typically, the Bolognese Camera raised the sums of ready cash it needed through the "erection" of a menre (an issue of the civic debt), that is, by offering to the general public interest-bearing securities, guaranteed by the future proceeds from anmenr1 (surtaxes), specifically decreed and earmarked. However, it was during the decades following the papal conquest that recourse to borrowing became commonplace. While the issuance of bonds could be dictated by emergencies 1m 1999, the root cause of the systematic recourse to borrowing was the papal inability to obtain regular contributions from 79 the richest but most reluctant province of the domain in any other fashion. The case of the W may help illuminate the matter. Issued in 1543 as an extraordinary tribute to be paid by all provinces and communities regardless of their status and privileges, the Ir1ennale became permanent and it is commonly regarded by historians of papal finance as the most significant attempt of the W to give some degree of uniformity to fiscal pressure based on highly diverse local systems inherited from previous regimes. This tribute, which was to be based on a land census, attacked two vital tenets of Bolognese fiscal autonomy: a) it was a unilateral Roman decision, in open defiance of the Ca91§9l1, which explicitly required consultation with the Senate: b) worse than that, it was a measure that, at least implicitly, degraded Bologna to the status of an ordinary province. In fact, it threatened to transfer to the Roman Camera_Amsj;9119a not just the right to tax, but also the right to determine who would be taxed. The compromise that was to be worked out between 1543 and 1552 laid the basis on which Bolognese extraordinary finances were to keep functioning for over two centuries. By means of a papal Brexe, Rome authorized the Bolognese Camera to "erect" the W, offering interest-bearing shares to the general public. The sum thus raised (162,500 scudi) was to be paid in Rome, while the Bolognese Camera was burdened with the financial responsibility of guaranteeing the M91199. This 80 solution introduced two important elements: first, it confirmed the point of view, dear to Bolognese policy-makers, that imposts levied on other provinces could not be imposed on Bologna. Second, contributions to Rome were 9na_t_an_t_um tributes to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. A system of menr1, issued under different circumstances and independent of one another, made up the core of Bolognese extraordinary finance. The "erection" of a mgnte was a complex financial operation. It involved the issuance of shares in loans for which interest payment was guaranteed. The loan had to be funded, that is, a specific fiscal endowment had to be pledged and set aside for that purpose. There had to be confidence, too, not just in the Regg1menr9's ability to keep up with interest payments but in its willingness to do so. Consequently, the issuer was keen to reassure prospective lenders by means of sweeping rights and privileges. It was the full force of a papal Brexe that authorized the issuance, the redemption, and the re-issuance of a mate. It specified the sum to be raised, the terms offered to would- be lenders, and the fiscal resources pledged to guarantee the principal. Since the purchase of shares was not obligatory, unlike forced loans imposed elsewhere, these specifications responded to realistic assessments of prospective demand. Unattractive lending conditions could abort the entire financial operation. For instance, the first issuance of the W in the early 15908 failed to attract buyers precisely because the resources pledged were not deemed 81 sufficient: the menre had to be withdrawn and re-issued in three separately endowed installments. As we noted earlier, Bolognese anLi were "erected" to meet the difficulties over money of the Bolognese Camera, or to satisfy requests of contributions from the papal Camera 5999;9119a. The Breye specified whether a loan funded local needs or met papal demands, and its wording varied accordingly. When the issuing Brege responded to the solicitation of the Bolognese Camera, it provided the local fisc with the full backing of the Camera_Ap9er9119a, which acted.as.a.guarantor of the credit.worthiness of the Bolognese Camera. When the issuance originated in Rome, it was the turn of the Bolognese fisc to be called as a guarantor. Indeed, although the areye took the compelling form of a papal meta 9r99r19, its wording was tempered with the quick recognition that Bolognese officials approved and stood by the terms of the loan to be issued. It was not a mere technicality. Even discounting that the Camera 5999;9l19a had hardly the means to mobilize Bolognese resources without Bolognese consent, the full commitment of Bolognese officials was crucial to pledge the necessary fiscal means to service the debt and to win the confidence of would-be lenders. Besides these guarantees, investors were granted rights and privileges that had no match outside the Papal States. Individual investors were further assured of the safety and inalienability of their investment: unlike any other form of possession, shares of m9nr1 could not be confiscated for any reason right was er syndic T waits , practi Mn», : “hf-“.1 ~— farms. direct securi Offere Off ici Bcloqy1 rePres 0f int haFlkin CoYipet right . 82 reason, not even the gravest crimes.m Collectively, the right of shareholders to control the 99319 with which the mute was endowed was fully recognized as was their right to form syndicates to look after their interests.” The capital of each m9n§e was generally subdivided into units, called W, of 100 lire or more, even if in practice shares could be fractioned at will.‘20 The offer of Ware to the general public could take several forms. In its simplest and commonest fashion, shares.were sold directly' to investors by ‘the issuer, not. unlike :modern securities. In 1573 the la9gh1 of the m9nre_C9mp9e1z19ne_were offered directly to the public by a team of government officials, headed by the notary Sforza Mezzovillani for the Bolognese ,Begg1menr9, and the notary Lattanzio Lattanzi, representative of the papal Legate.21 On occasion, the offer of interest-bearing shares of a mgnre was entrusted to a banking house. In other words, the issuer offered the m9nre to competing firms, with the highest bidder then acquiring the right to offer an agreed number of la9gh1 to the public. For 1' "- . .aallateaainafisnrinniat" recited the formula repeated in Bren after Bren See ASB. W presranze, £19_Er11m9, Statuti "Bolla del Monte Pio Primo della citta di Bologna," c. 5. 1’ Ibid., cc. 5-6. ’° ASB. Minnow. Monte Giulia. Statuti e Bolle. See also G. Felloni, Cl1__1nxear1menr1 O 1.. ; a-.. ‘ on.~ : ‘ " o Renaarazioae (Milan. 1971). p. 180- " ASB. noatiJiMimeJrenaaze. nansizioae. Atti erezione (1573) f. 1. 83 instance, in 1587 the re-issuance of the m9mre Concordia was carried out through the services of Florence’s Banco Antinori.” Bolognese m9n§1 belonged to two distinct categories: redeemable and nonredeemable. Redeemable issues could be compared to modern medium and long-term loans: they offered higher returns and the issuer retained the right to retire or to re—issue the loan after a few years (commonly not less than twelve). Since redeemable loans were seldom if ever retired, they were either periodically re-erected, or turned into nonredeemable menri at a lower interest rate. Creditors were offered a choice of either trading their old shares for shares of the new issue, or going 'liquid’. Nonredeemable loans (m9nL1__perpe§ai) offered buyers perpetual obligations. The difference between these and shares of redeemable m9nr1 was that the unredeemable category could not be bought back by the government , which was committed neither to alter the interest rate, nor to retire the loan, thus committing itself to pay a fixed dividend in perpetuity. The issuance of these m9nr1_perperm1, common in the sixteenth century, when rising interest rates and a volatile financial :market rendered the practice attractive for issuers to secure long-term loans at a fixed interest rate, declined rapidly with the changing financial climate. No new m9nr1_perpetai were erected after 1600, when falling interest rates and ” ASB. WW. nanroia. Campione creditori , v . A. 84 declining investment opportunities rendered the practice peculiarly unprofitable to issuers. Shares of existing non redeemable m1 tended to trade several times above par.23 The proliferation of ammenri was the effective underpinning of the Bolognese extraordinary finance. It was the additional fiscal income generated by aamenr1 that backed the m9n3;_1 issued by the Camera and the Gabella. It must be remarked, however, that the multiplication of surtaxes brought little innovation into the Legaz19neis, tax-system. The fiscal endowment of a mare (the so called 99:99) consisted of the yield of a9_h99 increases imposed on existing tolls and duties. Primarily, the daz1_an1;_19111 were the target of new levies, which were added to the existing ordinary duties. For all practical purposes, extraordinary tributes mirrored ordinary ones, and the only change concerned the intensity of fiscal pressure. The m9n§1 Pavaglione, Composizione, Pio Secondo and Innocenzo Secondo were funded by surcharges levied on the transactions at the silk-fair of the Pavaglione, the m9n91 Augmento , Rettaglio and Residuo were funded by ammenri imposed on excise taxes levied on the sale of meat, and so on. Tax-farmers collected the proceeds from additional revenues alongside ordinary ones, but kept them separate because the income generated by surtaxes belonged to the m9n_t_1§t_1 (the ’3 At the end of the seventeenth century new obligations paid returns as low as 4 and even 3.5 percent, while shares of sixteenth century non—redeemable m9nr1 paid interest rates of 7 and 8 percent. 85 holders of shares of each issue of the debt) and was to be paid in quarterly installments to the college of each m9nre. From 1530 to 1651 the Payagl19ne, the tax on silk, was the target of seven distinct aamenri. From 1506 to 1600 three ammenri were levied on the processing and the sale of bread, and an equal number went to burden the sale of meat. In 1506 a baker would pay forty-four denari in ordinary duty (about one-sixth of a lira) on a 99rba of wheat (160 lb.).“ By 1550 that same 99rha would pay an additional fifty-four denari in surtaxes (total ninety-eight. denari), and, by 1600 other eighty-six denari would be levied on a 99rba. At the Pagagl19ne fair raw silk from the 99nrad9 would pay fourteen denari per lb. of ordinary impost. By 1655, fifteen denari of surtaxes per lb. were added. Foreign silk paid an ordinary duty of thirty-nine denari per lb. . By the middle of the seventeenth century 140 additional denari were levied on every lb. of foreign silk introduced in Bologna.25 Likewise, wares exported from Bologna faced increasingly steep customs duties. The ordinary impost on a e9ma (500 lb.) of hemp, a common Bolognese export, was 300 denari. By the end of the sixteenth century that same a9ma was charged 500 denari in extraordinary duties, bringing the total to 800 denari.“ 1“ One lira could be fractioned in 20 soldi and each soldo could be further subdivided in 12 denari. 3’ ASB, Assunteria di Camera, . . . . . . ' 1767. ‘“ ASB, Congregazione di Gabella Grossa, Iar1ffe_9ella Winn. b. 361- 86 In order to introduce some additional elements to our analysis, it may be useful at this juncture to give a comprehensive summary of the extraordinary finance of the Commune in 1506, the base line of our discussion. Between 1394 and 1500 four u9n91 were issued. The earliest one, Quarrr9m11a_elefl;e (1394), was a rather curious item: subscribers and beneficiaries were not individuals but the four quarters of the city. Given its peculiar nature, this m9nte will not be considered an integral part of the W’s system of extraordinary finance, and in fact it was never assimilated to it. However, this is not true of the other three issues, which did participate in it. Their features foreshadowed those of later m9nr1: M9rell1 (1434) , M1119 (1448) and W (1500). Their aggregate capital amounted to a rather modest 151,566 lire of silver bolognini, a far cry from the 8 million gold florins Florence owed to its creditors in the second half of the fifteenth century.” It is immediately apparent that, unlike other large Italian C9mnn1, Bologna had not resorted to credit in any significant way before the sixteenth century. This was largely due to the inconspicuous role played by Bologna in the warfare endemic in Italy during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The institution of the public debt, which had made 3" See G. Orlandelli, “I Monti di Pubbliche Prestanze," p. xx; J. Day, "Moneta metallica e moneta creditizia" in R. Romano and U. Tucci, ed., aatmlneooxmiamoaetaria (Turin. 1983). p- 354- 87 its appearance as early as the thirteenth century in Venice and Genoa, was introduced in Bologna only at the end of the fourteenth century, and Bolognese indebtedness began to expand rapidly only from the early sixteenth century, shortly after the city's political annexation to the Papal States. Yet despite its relatively late’development, by the second half of the seventeenth century the public debt of the Legaz19ne was proportionally the highest among the provinces of the Papal States.” Between 1506 and 1660, the debt of Bologna boomed at an almost exponential rate: thirty-one M9n§1 were issued, only two of which were completely redeemed.” The total capital borrowed moved rapidly upward from the 151,566 lire of 1506, to 1,178,751 in 1555. It further grew to 4,096,381 in 1595, and reached 8,670,666 lire in 1655.30 As we have noted earlier, the expansion of the debt was fueled only in part by the needs created by local emergencies, while it found a powerful incentive in papal requests for extraordinary aid (mostly toward military spending). During the sixteenth century Camera and Capella contracted loans for an aggregate 3.92 million lire: approximately 49 percent served cameral 3' A comparative assessment of the indebtedness of Italian states at the end of the XVII century is provided by G.Felloni.§li_iaxen1aeat1_f1aaaziari ‘” Seven Henri, were retired over the period under consideration, but in fact five were re-issued. ‘” See G.Orlandelli, "Note di storia economica," p. 211; see also D.Sabbioni, "Fiscalita ed economia a Bologna," p. 162. 88 needs, while the remaining 51 percent were ana__t_anrmm contributions to Rome. The same pattern was reproduced between 1600 and 1655: the Camera borrowed 4.15 million lire, of which 1.95 million (47 percent) served papal needs. I I: . ! .1 !' Floating securities provided the Bolognese W with large sums of ready cash. However, that was a boon only in the short run. Every new loan floated by the Camera channelled tax monies back into the pockets of creditors as interest. In fact, ammempi were decreed to back the securities sold, and their proceeds were committed to pay annual interest on the debt. Tax-farmers paid the sums which were due to the colleges of bond-holders, without going through either the Camera or the Capella. Although the Camera knew what the collected revenues were, those monies were not appropriated by Bolognese fiscal offices, were not handled by them and were not entered in budget-sheets. Since we do not have the books of the am, we do not know the actual yield of the aamenti; however we can estimate the sums involved from the ledgers of annual dividend payments to holders of shares. In keeping with the multiplication of m9nr1, yearly interest payments to creditors posted a nearly geometric progression. They rose from 10,130 lire in 1506 to 86,586 lire in 1555, reached 284,293 lire in 1595, and then climbed to 520,446 lire in 1655. 89 debt expenses and fiscal income 1575-1855 600 500 400 n : nfi : : . . I h a 300 _ 3 w? l)- U 200 \ , 100 1 0 1575 1595 1615 1835 1655 m debt expenses .\\\\‘ revenues Figure 3.2 Debt Expenses and Fiscal Income, 1575-1655 90 In this scenario, the relative stability of ordinary revenues is indeed all the more striking. As Figure 3.2 clearly shows, the sums committed to interest payment rapidly outdistanced the city’s fiscal income. In 1575 the sheer financing of the debt required a budget approximately as large as the combined income of the Camera and of the Capella. By 1655 interest payment on the debt required a budget twice as large. Combining various records it is possible to measure, albeit approximately, the tax flow and to determine the destination of fiscal resources. Using the budget-sheets produced by clerks of the Camera and the Capella, and the ledgers of interest payments to the m9mr1§_111, we have attempted to do a breakdown for the years 1575, 1595, 1615, and 1655, years which present sufficient information from all the sources. These charts are to be handled with caution. They refer to payments made by tax-farmers to fiscal offices and to the colleges of the m9nr1. In other words, they provide a clear indication of the destination and of the recipients of tax-money, but they do not give the exact sums collected from taxpayers. Specifically, we lack information about two important items: the profit pocketed by 9az19r1, and the operating expenses. Let us look at the distribution for 1575 which is presented in Figure 3.3. As the figure clearly shows, the most salient feature was the large percentage of tax-money that went to fund the civic debt. The colleges of the m9np1 91 accounted for a sum which was nearly as large as the total income claimed by the fiscal offices of the Camera and of the sabella- By plotting the sums dazieri paid to holders of securities, and the payments they annually made to the Camera and to the W. Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6, below, call attention to the steadily growing preeminence of debt servicing in the destination of fiscal resources. In 1595 and in 1615, m9nr1er1 received approximately 55 percent of tax- money in interest payments, and in 1655 m9nr1§111 claimed nearly two-thirds of the tax revenues paid by daz1er1. 92 1575 distribution of fiscai income mboi la revenues (10. 38) debt expenses i: 49 . BX) camera I revenues (40 . 1%) Figure 3.3 Distribution of Fiscal Income, 1575 93 1595 dlstribution of fiscal income gabella revenues Figure 3.4 Distribution of Fiscal Income, 1595 94 ’IS’IS distribution of fiscal income oebeiia revenues (9.1x) debt expenses (53.4%) cannral revenues (37.5!) Figure 3.5 Distribution of Fiscal Income, 1615 96 To put things in proper perspective, one would ideally like to have some indication of changes in the Bolognese GNP or 9er_9ap1pa income over the same period. This is precisely the sort of high quality data we can never mine from pre- modern account books. It is instead possible to assess, albeit approximately, the relative weight of interest payments, estimating the burden weighing upon each inhabitant. Figure 3.7 clearly points out that Bolognese residents had to shoulder a progressively larger per__9ap_1;a quota. With an urban population close to 60,000, annual payment of interest cost each Bolognese about one and a half lira in 1555. This figure corresponded to a ratio debt/population approaching twenty lire per inhabitant. Given a resident population that expanded moderately in the second half of the sixteenth century, and actually contracted afterwards, the continued growth of the debt implied a higher burden per_9ap_1;ta. The sheer cost of debt financing rose to over four lire per resident in 1595 and to more than nine lire in 1655.31 Before closing we must consider a further set of questions, which may be stated as follows. What is the meaning of these figures in a century plagued by inflation? How far were rises in indebtedness the effect of the depreciation of the Bolognese silver lira? The graph plotted in Figure 3.8 shows that from the outset debt expenses outdistanced ’1 In estimating Bolognese population figures, we have referred to the tables published by Adolfo Bellettini. See A . Bellettini , ' ' mm (30109118. 1961). PP- 25'26- 97 lOl'l terest payments/populat’ | n annual average per capita burden 10 CL: Figure 3.7 Annual Interest Payments/Bolognese Population 98 inflation. In 1655 the index of silver depreciation stood at a value of 190, indicating that, over the period under consideration, the purchasing power of silver was nearly cut in half. The index of annual interest payments on the debt stood at 604 instead, indicating a sixfold increase in debt servicing expenses.32 The most notable thing about the distribution of tax money during the period 1555-1655 is the growing share claimed by interest payment on the debt. At the end of the sixteenth century interest payments to the colleges of the Bolognese m9m11 were the dominant component of the tax distribution. And by the middle of the seventeenth century, tax-farmers paid back to creditors of the Bolognese Beggimenr9 two-thirds of the fiscal income that they collected. In the chapters that follow, we will explore the social dimension of the §1§rema m9m;1_s_t_a through a series of observations of investors in shares. Here perhaps it is sufficient to state that the combination of loans and taxes involved a massive transfer of income not just from taxpayers to fiscal offices, but from taxpayers to bondholders. 3’ The index of silver depreciation is based on the tables compiled by Salvioni. See G. B. Salvioni, 11W mlggneee (Bologna, 1961), pp. 556, 558- 559, 731, 825-826. In (nonfirming the moderate bahaviour of Italian inflation in the sixteenth century, the series presented by Salvioni are consistent with price rises monitored in other Italian cities. See G. Felloni, ”Italy” in C.Wilson and G.Parker, eds. , An . 010_ (O. O Q‘ C ‘ O a OOL‘QQ ....”. 9 s 0 (London, 1980), pp. 24- 27. 99 On the whole the operation was highly regressive: bonds were held by the well-to-do and by foundations, while revenues to pay interest on la9gp1_91_m9nre came from indirect taxes, which. were mostly paid. by the common lot of Bolognese residents and the inhabitants of the 99n§a99. In a sense, wealthy urbanites lent money to the Reggimemp9 and collected interest from the general populace. To summarize, it can be said that the Bolognese Reggnienm was the preserve of an oligarchy which pursued policies beneficial mostly to itself. As a matter of fact, the W financed its growing needs and met the extraordinary obligations imposed by Rome in a fashion that was far from ruinous to the Bolognese elite. While the burden of taxes continued to hit the hardest the poorer sectors of the population, the creation of a bond market offered a novel profitable outlet to those with surplus money to invest. 100 silver depreciation and debt expenses lndices of growth 700 600 L 500 400 300 200 100 l l l l 1555 1575 1595 181 S 1835 1655 Ci 5! lver‘ depreciation + debt expenses Figure 3.8 Indices of Silver Depreciation and Debt Expenses CHAPTER IV SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY One of the more interesting aspects of the Bolognese a19tema_m9nr1s_ra concerns the identity of investors. The archive of the m9nr1 provides a wealth of information concerning the issuance and the trading of securities. Registers contain lists of buyers, complete with the number of shares purchased, and the date of the transaction. And rolls of receipt provide complete series of interest payments to holders of shares. To date, however, this source has been utterly neglected. It has to be admitted that the task of examining the registers of the m9nr1 and their entries is an exacting one. Bolognese m9nr1 were numerous and highly diverse; they were ”erected” under different circumstances and in a variety of currencies: the amount of capital borrowed could vary from a few thousand lire to several hundred thousand: interest rates ranged from a minimum of 4 percent to a maximum of 10 percent. Besides, there are thousands of pages of registers and the variety of classificatory styles adopted by different scribes further complicates the researcher’s work. 101 102 In view of the difficulties outlined above, this chapter will be devoted at discussing the technical difficulties we have encountered and the methodology we have used. In what follows, we will first examine the character and the structure of the sources. The discussion will then focus on the issue of identification and classification of holders of shares. I] E l . E I] II I . It is not difficult to see why the administration of each issue of the debt needed the services of a number of officials. Dividends had to be paid, share certificates to be issued, and record of the payments to be kept. No matter what its type, the administration of a m was carefully regulated by statutes and entrusted to the board of its shareholders. The main governing body was the 99r99rale (assembly of shareholders), to be called at least once a year (typically in December or January). The 99rp9rale would elect the officials of the mate: a board of trustees (991leg19), a W19 (bailiff) and a 9am919n19re (notary and bookkeeper).1 Ownership of shares was required for membership in the 99rp9rale. Admission and voting rights were granted per account, regardless of the number of shares owned by a 1 A88. iioatiJiMlieamnaaze. W. Statuti e Bolle, "Bullae, Brevia, Iura et Ordinationes Collegii Mantis Iulii Civitatis Bononiae," cc. 19-30: mare 2r1 m9 9 3999999 Quarrri n9, Statuti; M9nte...¥1no_" Yenhlu' 111.1919. Statuti, cc. 8-15: Wm, Statuti, "Provvisioni e ordinazioni del Collegio de' creditori del Monte Secondo dell'Annona," cc. 15—36, dated 1660. 103 proprietor. However, other provisions regulated the access to the 99rp9rale: proprietors of small accounts were excluded (routinely accounts totalling a capital of less than 200 lire), and so were minors, women and foreigners, though they could name a representative to look after their interests. Minors could be represented by their father or by a male tutor, women by their husbands or (if widowed) by an adult son.2 Foreigners, agencies and societies could name a local agent or a procurator. The 99llegi9 (from eight to twelve members) acted as a board of trustees. Its members were drawn yearly by lot from those sitting in the 99r99rale, but each nominee had to meet additional requirements to be eligible (1mp9rear9). Would-be officials had to be Bolognese citizens of at least twenty-five years of age, and had to be proprietors of accounts twice as large as the minimum required to enter the 99rp9rale. Women, foreigners and regular clergy were all excluded. In each m9nre the two most important officials were the 9e9991rar19 and the 9amp19n1ere. The dep9elrar19‘was elected yearly by secret ballot by the members of the 99rp9rale. Citizenship and share-ownership was required. The W19 was responsible for the collection of the installments of the We endowment from the city's tax-officials and the authorization of timely interest payments to the shareholders. Not unlike the W, the 9am919n19re was elected by ’ Eighteen years of age was the required minimum. 104 secret ballot by the 99rp9rale, but a majority of two-thirds was required and the office could be renewed indefinitely. The 9am919n1ere, who had to be a notary, was in charge of the bookkeeping of the menre. He kept and updated the ledgers of creditors (9am919n1), compiled the orders of payment to the mantisti (ta9l19l1), and issued the receipts certifying the trading of shares (reea91r1). The archive of each mate is the preserved work of several generations of 9amp19n1er1_and consists mainly of the three above-mentioned items: l1pr1__9amp19ne, ragl19l1, reea91_t1. However, given the separate bookkeeping of the diverse issues, complete uniformity and continuity of techniques are not to be expected. Besides, while some clerks were immaculate in their bookkeeping, regular in writing, and accurate in indexing, others were untidy. Most commonly, early-sixteenth-century clerks used Latin formulas and Roman numbers, a good many of their successors retained the formulas but switched. to .Arabic numerals, still others. wrote in Italian, at times with curious local dialectal inflections. Some copyists tended to record the patronymic beside the name of the subscriber, others did not. In the case of women some recorded the husband's name as well, others did not, others still did considerably worse, registering only the husband's last name and dropping the maiden name. The l1pr1_9amp19ne are ledgers of shareholders, whose names and holdings were recorded and regularly updated according to the technique of double-entry, that is, a column 105 for the acquisition of lampi or portions thereof, and a column for their sale. Usually these registers are reasonably clean and clear, and one can follow accounts from one book to another without much difficulty. Each record makes reference to the date of the sale and purchase, to or from whom, and on occasions contains additional information about the status and the domicile of the interested parties. Scribes generally recorded to whom the interest was to be paid, whenever the nominal holder of a share (either an individual or an institution) was not the beneficiary. This added piece of information is particularly useful when dealing with usufructuaries. Unlike the W, the ragl19l1 may or may not be collected in registers. At times they are just stacked in large collection of leaflets, a circumstance that has obviously increased losses of material and the overall perishability of the source. They are dated orders of payment, mostly recording simply the names of the creditors and the interest paid. Finally, the reeapiri are collections of standard notarized receipts, registering the trading of shares. Since our purpose is to chart the distribution of holdings as accurately as possible at regular intervals, the simplicity of the W has led to their being given preference whenever their legibility, accuracy and clarity rendered them reliable and sufficiently informative. The ”911911 are particularly useful for the seventeenth century, 106 when recording of interest payments tended to become more orderly and losses less acute. Missing or poorly preserved tagl19l1 have, however, made the l1prr_9am919ne the most reliable source for the sixteenth century. The reea91r1 have been used only for purposes of cross-checking whenever the name of an individual shareholder could not be satisfactorily identified in the main registers or in the indexes that usually accompany them. :1 'E' l' i H I] l J In processing the data, we have adapted the established rules used for censuses. In part this is due to the lack of directly related studies, in part to the fact that we are facing very similar problems: a) identification of proprietors, b) correct attribution of ownership, c) use of coherent measuring units, d) social classification of proprietors. The first problem is in part solved at the level of the sources. Shares or portions of them were registered; their acquisition and trading was certified by notarized acts, which identified the owner. An exception has been made for usufructuaries: we have attributed the property to the beneficiary (person or institution) rather than to the nominal owner, since the former was the one who benefited from the investment. However, although proper and satisfactory identification of the shareholders of any documented issue is the necessary point of departure, it is not sufficient and 107 does not translate into the creation of reliable collective data sets. As we have just illustrated, the Bolognese public debt was not consolidated in a single issue, nor did it come under the practical supervision of a single board. Instead, it was divided into a multitude of distinct m9911, which were administered by their own boards and had separate bookkeeping. From 1555 to 1655 the number of m9nr'1 increased from fourteen to twenty-six, because of the expansion of civic borrowing that, most commonly, took the form of the issuance of new menti- How can we create large data sets based on information coming from different registers? It is not just a matter of fitting diverse techniques together: essentially what is at stake is the creation of reliable and homogeneous sets of data. Typically, investors held shares in more than one issue, but how can we be reasonably certain that a name appearing in two or more registers referred to the same person? While in corporate investors our basis of decision can rest on names alone, in the case of individual investors, affirmative or negative conclusions concerning the identification of persons depend on what additional pieces of information we can muster. Ultimately, identification is rejected if: 1) patronymics are not identical or common variants of the same name: 2) spouse's name does not correspond: 3) information on titles, status or occupation is not consistent and its accuracy cannot be verified through other sources, most notably genealogical trees . 108 The second issue concerns the correct attribution of ownership. It poses a subtler but not less fundamental problem to the successful generation of coherent sets of data. To create a collective census of shareholders we need to cumulate the nominal lists of proprietors of shares of each documented m9nre. Given the variety and frequent complexity of the information to be assembled the selection of a specific date is crucial. We have to keep in mind that shares were exchanged and even if trading was not heavy, it is obvious that the lack of a common date would inevitably increase the likelihood of distortions. We can illustrate the problem referring specifically to the nature of our sources, main registers (9am919n1) and rolls of receipts (tagl1911). The issues for which the registers are available do not pose difficulties, because scribes recorded not just the year but the month and the day a certain transaction took place, and did likewise for variations and corrections. Our options are drastically limited when we possess only the rolls of receipts. In most m1, the receipt rolls, which identified current holders and specified their dividend, were compiled six times a year: in some m9nr1 rolls were compiled four times a year, at the end of every quarter: and in a few other issues rolls were taken only twice a year, at the end of every semester. It is immediately apparent that our choice is in practice restricted to two possible dates, either 30 June or 31 December. In all three data sets we have opted for the latter and have considered as proprietors those who owned shares on 31 109 December of the selected years. The third point introduces a complex technical problem: the disentangling of different currencies. Our procedure has been to use the standard Bolognese currency, converting all others to it. M9nr1 were issued using three main kinds of currencies: silver lire, golden scudi and golden ducats. The procedure is further complicated by two additional factors: varied bookkeeping techniques, and inflation. M91191 "erected” in gold currencies present an especially delicate problem because Camp19n19r1 recorded the sums deposited by m9nr15_t_1 following different guidelines. At times they converted the actual sums to their equivalent in lire, at times they did not. At times they indicated a rate of conversion, at times they did not. Sometimes interest was computed in the same gold currencies in which the mate had been issued, in others it was computed in lire. A second variable is the depreciation of silver against gold; concretely that meant more silver bolognini to be progressively paid for each ducat or scudo of dividend. But here too we have little uniformity. In some instances the transaction was made at the current floating rate of exchange: in others it was applied a fixed rate, negotiated from time to time between the board of shareholders and the Camera. Sixteenth- century inflation did not affect only the ratio silver/gold, it affected also the rate of exchange of silver and golden currencies vs. the common coins of less noble metals, such as the Bolognese m1. The matter is not less relevant, because most everyday business transactions de 3F Si R we ir di ir ac PI tc E 1% .EG. H Left. .8 110 were carried out in these smaller coins. While up to 1555 no distinction was made between the silver lira and the lira of gnarrr1n1, in the second half of the sixteenth century the depreciation of the lira of mmini became increasingly apparent, inducing scribes to specify whether sums referred to silver lire or lire of gum; Following the practice among scribes, in 1595 and 1655, we have opted for the lira of gaarrr1n1 as a unit.‘ The data have been subdivided in two main blocs: institutions and individuals. Since a few corporate investors were :not based. in Bologna, we .have introduced. a first distinction, separating Bolognese from non-Bolognese institutions. Agencies based outside the city but within the administrative domain of the Legaz19ne have been classified as Bolognese, while all others (including those based in other provinces of the Papal States) have been considered foreign. Bolognese institutions have been further classified according to the following scheme: 3 The depreciation of the lira of {1113;121:1111 vs. the silver lira received official recognition in 1592 and it was fixed at 12%. ASB, Aeaunrer1a__91__Camera, "Informazione veridica sopra la istituzione di tutti i dazi della citta di Bologna," 1767. ‘ Particularly useful have been the series of rates of exchange provided by G. B. Salvioni, ll___yal9re__della_l1ra W (Bologna. 1909): G B Salvioni. 11 WW (Bologna. 1922): G. B. Salvioni, (Bologna, 1927). See also F.Panvini Rosati, ed., La_1999a_91 - (Bologna. 1978): and A88. 51W. Bandi, "Provisione novamente reformata sopra la valuta," 1574, b. 381. 111 1 - government and administrative institutions: 2 - charitable institutions: hospitals, charities, moati_di_nieta, nonredelmatrimmio; 3 - religious institutions: regular: nunneries, friaries; secular: chapters, parishes, chapels and benefices, schools, ecclesiastical offices, societies; 4 - university and colleges: 5 - guilds. The first group clusters the acquisitions made by diverse branches of the Bolognese government itself. Most prominent is the presence of the Camera, the main financial office of the city, and the Capella_Cr9§aa, the fiscal agency in charge of the administration of the customs. Into this group we have assimilated two other important institutions: the W1 Sanetroaio and the W The Eabhrin was the agency that supervised the maintenance of the basilica located in the main square of Bologna. It had a lay board and its activities were outside the realm of the ecclesiastical authority. We have followed a similar reasoning in classifying the W (a health agency activated in times of epidemics): it was funded by city revenues and, unlike other charitable institutions, its 112 activities were under the direct guidance of the senatorial AssunteriaJLSaain- The second group clusters a variety of institutions, the unifying features of which were their charitable undertakings: non-prof it financial agencies, such as pawnshops, agencies committed to the relief of the local poor, and hospitals and orphanages. The first sub-group comprehends two agencies: the W and the annJelJiatrmoaio The former. created in 1473, was a conglomerate of pawnshops, located in Bologna and her territory, headed and governed by the main branch, the W. The latter, instituted in 1583, was a dowry fund, not unlike Florence's M9nte_99lle 99111.” The second and third sub-groups, charities and hospitals, include several agencies devoted to the assistance of the destitute. Typically, they were run by lay boards, and a good many of them had been created and funded through generous private donations. For instance, this was the case of the WWW. probably the wealthiest of such institutions. It had been founded in 1495 by four " See A Hasini. W (Bologna. 1666). v. 1, pp. 103- 104, 251:. see also M. Fanti, ed., Cl1_ar9p1x1_delle 'I ' ‘ i :0 ‘0": i‘ Wm (Bologna. 1984). pp- 135-136: M. Maragi, "Istituzioni sociali non caritative" in M.Fanti, ed., oqu‘ ‘ 009‘ ‘ ' i ‘e‘i 0 ‘ .10? Wine (Bologna. 1984). pp- 148-156- 113 noblemen with the specific task of discreetly helping respectable families in times of need.‘ Under the label ”ecclesiastical" we have grouped all those institutions that fell under the jurisdiction of the Bolognese archbishopric, or resided within its limits. However, we have drawn several sub-divisions within the vast galaxy of religious corporations. The first, and most obvious, is.between.the agencies of the regular and.secu1ar clergy. The former includes all local monasteries (friaries and nunneries) ." The latter presents a more diversified structure, pulverized in a myriad of agencies: parishes, chapters, chapels and pener191a. While there were only three chapters (nnjierro. samrerroaio and W) . parishes. chapels, and penef191a numbered in the hundreds.‘ Besides the various bodies and agencies of the regular and secular clergy, we have included ecclesiastical offices and religious societies and fraternities. In the first case we refer to accounts registered in the name of specific clerical positions rather than individual clerics. Even if, ultimately, the beneficiaries were individuals, it.was not the person but ‘ See A. Masini, B9l99na_9erlnerrata, pp. 48-49,85, 117, 137, 208, 252, 297, 300, 311, 395, 410, 416- 417: M. Fanti, ed., Wow. 99- 115- 116: A. Giacomelli, "Conservazione e innovazione nell'assistenza bolognese nel Settecento" in M. Fanti, ed., E9rme_e_a9ggerr1 dellLiatenLeatLanisteaziale. pp- 219- 220. 221-229. 7 In the city alone, according to Antonio Masini, in the ‘midrseventeenth century there were seventy-two monasteries. See A-Hasini. W. p. 48- ' Ibid., pp. 43-49, 108-110, 134. 0: SC re 0C 1‘. fl! .' 1 114 the office that was funded. In societies and fraternites, we have considered that, although their members were laymen, the activities and the very existence of societies depended on the approval of the archbishop of Bologna. Group Four includes the 99llegi both of students and of professors of the university. The fifth group clusters the arr1, that is, the professional organizations of Bolognese trades. For all the wealth of information provided by the sources themselves, the identification and classification of individuals have confronted us with several difficulties. Registers of share ownership cannot be expected to be as detailed or as uniform as the massive census surveys, which historians have saluted as the greatest administrative achievements of Italian city-states. Most clerks added valuable pieces of information so as to identify owners of shares. Besides the name and the quota of each holder, they often recorded patronymic and domicile. In the case of women, scribes frequently added the husband’s name. They had no reason, however, to go into any depth on such matters as occupation or social status. When they did so, it was probably out of respect for the prominence of distinguished individuals (senators, university professors and notaries were the ones most frequently identified), or to avoid possible confusion. Since a sizable number of holders of shares were women, the first and most obvious distinction is by gender. However, any additional subdivision among female proprietors raises a usuf Near of t prod adde actu reg i IEga fore. resil Statl SCIi] doli< bit} take resic the r that City 115 variety of problems. Numerous women who owned or were usufructuaries of shares spent their lives in Cloisters. Nearly all others married, at times remarried, and a good many of them were widowed. The changing legal status of women has produced.different patterns of registrations. Mostly, scribes added the name of the husband to the maiden name of a married or a widowed woman. However, if she remarried she took a new name, while the name of the former husband was dropped. Since we consider the owner or the legal usufructuary to be the actual beneficiary of an account, we have entered all accounts registered to women under their maiden name, whatever their legal status. Another issue is domicile. We have segregated as foreigners all those proprietors of accounts who were residents of other states, or other provinces of the Papal States. The task has been considerably simplified by the scribes themselves, for they routinely added the label f9rear1ere beside the name of those proprietors who were not domiciled in Bologna. Problems of a different sort are posed by the classification of resident buyers. First, we have to take into account the distinction between 91mm, those who resided within the perimeter of the city proper, and 99m1rar1n1, those who did not, typically the inhabitants of the rural communities of the legaz19ne and the few small towns 'that were under Bolognese jurisdiction. City walls separated (city and countryside not just in a physical sense but in a 116 juridical one as well. For only citizens could be elected to city councils and magistracies. We have not concerned ourselves with the 99m1_tar1n1, because they had no documented stake in Bolognese securities. We have found only one account registered to a buyer probably domiciled in the 9991399.” Even discounting scribes' and our own inaccuracies, it seems obvious that the rural inhabitants of the Legaz19ne played a negligible role at best. This, however, does not settle matters entirely, because residence within the perimeter of the city was a prerequisite for obtaining Bolognese citizenship but did not equate with it: nor did the requirements of citizenship remain unchanged. For most of the sixteenth.century, ten.years of continuous and documented domicile (1n99lar9) were the prerequisite. But in 1597, although citizenship had lost most of its political value, the Senate raised the required threshold from ten to twenty-five years of honorable 1ne9lar9. The sources, generally precise and accurate in distinguishing between Bolognese and £9reer1er1, do not specify with any degree of clarity between city dwellers and citizens. Therefore, in classifying holders as Bolognese we have considered their ’ The account is registered to Mar1a della ralle del Laxine, probably a servant. at ‘is 1 II. I 1 c {‘<1 117 attributed domicile rather than their formal citizenship.1° Since an important aim of this research is to cut through the mass of Bolognese holders, seeking to grasp the social make up of share-ownership, we have classified buyers in terms of status, according to the following scheme: A) Nobility l- patriciate, lay ecclesiastics 2- lesser nobility lay ecclesiastics B) Commoners lay ecclesiastics In grouping proprietors, we have tried to do two things: first, to separate members of the urban nobility (sector A) from common folk (sector B); second, to introduce a distinction within the upper crust of Bolognese society. Accordingly, in sector A we have clustered noble holders, that is, members of a limited circle of ’enfranchised' urban families, identified. by' privileges and. offices. We ‘then divided this group into two segments, separating proprietors ’9 The motives behind the provision of 1597 were fiscal rather than political. Citizenship continued to carry the privilege of tax-exemption on land property. Rendering the :right of citizenship harder to obtain the Senate was simply trying to limit the erosion of the taxpayers' base in the countryside. See A.DeBenedictis, Parr1z1__e__c9mnn1_ta_._ll WW (Bologna. 1984). pp- 91-92. 118 who belonged to politically prominent families (patriciate), from those who did not. As the foregoing description.may suggest, eligibility to certain offices, either of bond-holders themselves, or of their kinfolk, has provided the main basis of classification. This is another way of saying that social and political primacy tended to coincide. To be sure, this was hardly a Bolognese peculiarity: as Marino Berengo has pointed out, in the city-states of sixteenth-century northern Italy, access to magistracies came to be formally associated with noble lineage.n Let us turn now our attention to the two segments, into which we have segregated noble holders: patriciate (or senatorial nobility) and lesser nobility (or non-senatorial nobility). Parr191arer As eligibility to magistracies separated 'enfranchised' citizens from.the mass of residents, similarly political functions separated an exclusive club of ruling families from the rest. In fact, only a tiny minority of lineages participated in the running of the Regg1menr9 (government). By the middle of the sixteenth century, governing capacities had been concentrated in the Senate, a council staffed and monopolized by members of a oligarchical inner circle of families, which claimed for themselves the “ See 14 BerengO. We]. ciameeearo (Turin. 1974). pp- 11-13- 119 exclusive appellation of patrician.“2 It has to be noted that, de_1_ure access to the Senate was elective, and depended on senatorial nomination and subsequent papal confirmation, but m the privilege was hereditary and families tended to be perpetuated in office. The senatorial oligarchy did not remain immutable over time: some families died out or failed to produce eligible nominees; others were then coopted. As a matter of course the privilege was bestowed sparingly: during the century under consideration a mere twenty-two new families joined the sixty- five which enjoyed the dign1pa_senat9r1a in 1555. And in practice the number of "active” families changed even less significantly, because in the meantime several families either withered or were greatly enfeebled. To account for these occurrences, families having at least one member elevated to the Senate have been classified as senatorial, from the date they entered the council. To simplify matters, in each observation we have indicated new admissions, the families that were "active" (i.e. families that either had a member currently in office, or had recently had one), and those that had withered. Leaaer__n9p111ry_._ This second segment includes proprietors who belonged to the larger pool of distinguished, 1’ At first known as the magistracy of the Sixteen leermat9r1, during the Bentivoglio era the Senate was made up of twenty-one members. The number of senators was raised to forty in 1506 by Pope Julius II, then to fifty in 1590 by Pope Sixtus V. 120 'enfranchised' families: eligible for office, but not politically dominant, that is, not belonging to the Senate. It has to be admitted that this distinction is, to some extent, an artificial one: intermarriage was frequent, and members of both groups shared a common desire to define and legitimize their aristocratic status. Besides, although non-patricians were excluded from the running of government, they joined in staffing other civic offices, such as the rr1p9nar9 and the amz1anar9, which, in spite of their political irrelevance, continued to carry considerable prestige. In our classification we have resorted to three main sources, none of which is aer_se satisfactory, but the combined use of which has most likely kept mistakes to a minimum: the rolls of the office of the anz1ani, the L1pr9 919r9 of the nobility of Bologna, and the rolls of citizenships granted. by the Senate.13 The rolls of the ‘3 BCB, G.N.Alidosi, ' ' ' ' ° , 1670, Gozz. 396: BCB. WW. HaIV- cart- 31, fasc. 7: ASB, Assunteria Magistrati, N9pilra_1, "Catalogo delle famiglie abilitate all'anzianato," fasc. 4, dated 1748. Names and status of individuals have been routinely checked consulting the following items: BCB, B. Carrati, famiel1e_aobili_di_nelnaa. 1778. 8698/2. 8699. B700: B701. 8702: Men. W. 1758. B791: 808. . a ‘11. 0‘.‘ ; r e: j :u q - gee e 2‘. on"; 1 -, . d9m191l19r_1n__91rra, 1740, Malv. b. 19, fasc. 1; BCB, Adi. Garimberti . .nr1e_d.i._faaie].io_e_di_nooerri_a_ni o; ':,:e . _ : '1 3. ._ o; no ‘9; e 0; WW without date. 8788. A88. F Guidicini. AlbeuJeaealniei; ASB, Cea1§_del_l1bro 0'. e 01 ;_ e :e 03.; - ‘q o “ ‘l . .130 0100-, .l .00. ‘ 0,- o :00 o: '. .0. WM. without date. The litre 919r9 is a fundamental tool but, it is not sufficient because of 1i Se pr we c.‘ ta “.54 8.1.... ....\..n....\ .....\.: G» at QC . e \ .4.4a .— i..e Th4 E\ f\.......... 121 anz1an1 are particularly useful for the character of the office and the number of individuals involved. Although limited to modest ceremonial functions by the rise of the Senate, the office of the W retained considerable prestige, because of its medieval past as the ruling magistracy of the city. Access to this eight-member council was the strict preserve of the nobility. Since m1am1 sat in office for two months at a time, it is clear that each noble family could expect to have a member participating in the council every few years. We have supplemented the wealth of information provided by the rolls of the ama1ani with the L1pr9_sl_'_9r9 of the Bolognese nobility and the rolls of citizenships granted by the Senate. Insufficient on their own, they provide a useful complement. The former lists all the families which enjoyed noble status and gives the date each family had been admitted. However, the surviving copy dates from the end of the eighteenth century and does not include the families that had withered before then. Likewise, the latter lists newly admitted individuals and families, but does the surviving copy dates from the end of the eighteenth century and does not include families which had become extinct before then. Other useful works are: F. Bianchi, fireye_trar§ar9 n_eh_huomiai_illas_trLB_elnaesi (Ferrara. 1591). A Masini. W (Bologna. 1666). P. Dolfi, Qrenlniedelle famiolmmilminlnm (Bologna. 1670): G Guidicini. nn Woman. 5 vols. (Bologna. 1868- 73): idem. Hinellannfliommtrimnlomen (Bologna. 1872): eleaernallennmetabilmmlnxmlla L. Breventani, Sap: ]] l _ l . i' :i’ :i 'i' . . (Bologna, 1908): G Gozzadini. nWWle faaiel1e_al].e_mali_ariaa_aooarrenaero (Bologna. 1875). RRII SS. W. t XVIII. PI. v.4- 122 not mention old resident families, which obviously constituted the bulk of the nobility. C9mm999rar In this last sector we have clustered a mixed bag of proprietors, whose salient feature was a lack of distinction. Either 91yea_99mmane§, or simply city—dwellers they were part of the vast mass of what we can label commonalty. Our sources tell us very little about them, and.no further sub-grouping is possible. A handful of artisans and professionals stand out, about all others we know little, but their names and petty dividends. cei his eai Yet the the the the in ‘ 0bv 86:. Pin bUt Wen] inVe CHAPTER V THE MONTI OF BOLOGNA AND THEIR SHAREHOLDERS In his recent work on rearen and rentemera in sixteenth- century Holland, James Tracy observed that, to date, historians have devoted only token attention to investors in early-modern public debts. And the available literature "offers impressionistic comments, but no systematic studies".1 Yet, from the scattered observations we do have it emerges that the social make-up of the debt, that is, the identity of the investors in securities, is not just a relevant aspect of the bond market, but is of the greatest significance in deepening our understanding of the role played by state debts in orienting fiscal policies and economic behaviors: investors obviously had means, but lists of buyers of shares do not merely indicate who the rich were. As a matter of course, the purchase of shares called for a certain degree of affluence, but implied the willingness to entrust money to securities. It would seem that the likelihood of persons and agencies investing in the bond market depended on several variables, which were tightly linked to the peculiar make-up of society: ‘ J-Traoy. Washers Netherlands (Berkeley, 1985). P- 140- 123 Bc ch 6C pr $04 del Che BEt eff 80c QXC . a i. 41 8' I“ Vl‘ h 0 0 h i 3 Y? CO A 124 hence the large presence of foreign bankers and clerical agencies in sixteenth-century Spain, the predominance of office-holders in Holland, the prevalence of local nobles and foreign financiers in Naples, and the nearly monopolistic dominance of a cohort of professional financiers and notables in seventeenth-century Languedoc.2 The systematic study of the buyers of shares of the Bolognese public debt is precisely the purpose of this chapter, and it is statistics which form its backbone. Sources as the 9am919n1 and the taglieli. which document the acquisition and trading of issues of the Bolognese M91191, provide the foundation for a quantitative assessment of the social distribution of investment in shares of the public debt. As Lawrence Stone has remarked, statistical elaboration is the only means of extracting a coherent pattern from the chaos of personal behaviour. And while the use of such a method is not necessarily to be privileged, it is the most effective means of avoiding "implausible generalizations about social phenomena" and of separating the typical from the exceptional . 3 ’ See A.Castillo Pintado, "Los juros de Castilla. Apogeo Y fin de un instrumento de credito," H159an1a 23 (1963): 43- 70‘ J Tracy. magniaLRexelatioa W Beik. Wad '4 i" '5 i0 ' j'(Cambridge, 1985); and A.Calabria, ' (Cambridge, 1991). " See L Stone. WW (Oxford, 1965), pp. 3-4. $01 cox ave Spe of 0f Shh Sin. aCc< Fla: eXpa the Obie. arch: 125 This study of the pattern of investment in Bolognese securities sets out to accomplish two things: first to determine exactly what kind of people purchased obligations, second to chart changes in the make-up of share-ownership between the mid-sixteenth and the mid-seventeenth centuries. It is therefore composed of two necessary elements: the description of a pre-selected number of observations, and the analysis of long-term variations in the structure of ownership. We have examined separately the distribution of shares in a selected number of years: 1555, 1595 and 1655. In choosing these years we have taken into account two main elements: the sources and the growth of the debt. The first and most obvious concern has been the selection of dates for which the available archival documentation is adequate. The choice of specific years has been in part dictated by the preservation of the materials. Secondly, we have considered the expansion of Bolognese civic borrowing, which translated into a substantial increase in the amount of circulating shares. Since this expansion did not proceed evenly but in spurts, according to needs and emergencies rather than any precise Plan, we have tailored our observations to mirror that eXipansion. Before moving to the evidence yielded by the registers of the Bolognese M91131 it is necessary to consider two possible Objections. The first one may be stated as follows. Owing to archival losses, the structure of ownership of shares as 126 recorded in the receipt books cannot be documented for every mange. These losses raise the issue of how representative the available data may be. On the whole, while the possibility of distortions cannot be ruled out, it seems remote. Documentation comes from a wide range of issues, and in percentage terms, missing or poorly preserved.materials range from a minimum of 16 percent of long-term civic obligations in 1595, to a maximum of about 30 percent in the 1655 observation. These deficiencies do not undermine the overall value of the sample. The second objection has to do with the reliability of the information provided by registers and rolls of receipts. Did the names of the proprietors listed in registers correspond to the actual owners of shares? We have cross- checked a number of names chosen at random in the campigni (main registers) against the names given in the 39.1.1211 (dividend receipts) and the names in the W (contracts). We have not found any significant discrepancy. Furthermore, bond-holders had no reasons to wish to conceal their investment in lugghi_di_ngn§§. Dividends were not subject to taxation and when, during the seventeenth century, a fee was assessed, it was witheld at the source, i.e. from. the bimonthly or quarterly instalment to be paid to the mantisti. For reasons of tax evasion, concealment of the identity of holders would have been useless. Finally, we have noticed that when the buyer of shares acted as a broker, scribes were careful to separate the name of the agent (procuratgzg) from 127 the name of the actual proprietor' of the account. The conclusion is that the available records provide an adequate source of information about investors in Bolognese securities. Although Florentine and Genoese public debts provided models for Bolognese mgnti, the Bolognese sis;gma_mgn§i§ta developed distinctive traits of its own. Unlike the debt of Florence, which was consolidated in a single issue, the ugntg Comma, or the Genoese compare, which merged to form the syndacate of $an__§igzgig, Bolognese public indebtedness generated an ever larger number of anLi which were "erected" and run as separate issues, independent of one another. Boards of shareholders managed the bookkeeping of each mate and were vested with the right to control the specific fiscal resources by which each mtg was funded. In 1555 Bologna had an outstanding debt of nearly 1.2 million lire, which was subdivided into fourteen distinct issues. By 1595 civic indebtedness was over 4 million lire, and the number of ngnti had climbed to twenty-one. In 1655, with Bolognese overall borrowing nearly 8.7 million lire, the number of issues had risen to twenty-six. Tables 5.1 through 5.3 illustrate the W in the three selected years, giving a detailed account of the issues forming the public debt, the rates of interest offered and the annual dividend paid to buyers of shares of each mange. 128 Table 5.1 The Bolognese Public Debt, 1555 Issue capital interest annual (lire) rate dividend (lire) ngglli, 12,000 7.5 900 $fll§.¥£§§hi§. 129,000 6 7.740 Sal§_HnQ!Q. 10.566 8 845 Ugling, 200,000 5 10,000 Xin9_!§Q£hiQ. 100.000 8 8.000 Gabella_!ecghia. 105.000 8 8.400 Egzgg, 130,000 10 13,000 Eaxagliene. 16.595 10 1.659 66,809 5 3,340 Egsgg, 50,000 8 4,000 Rettaglio. 50,000 3 4.000 Ein9_nuoxo. 40.000 8 3.200 Concordia, 183,382 8 14,670 Engyg, 25,000 8 2,000 flagiglig, 60,400 8 4,832 total 1,178,752 86,586 The fourteen magi listed in Table 5.1 were "erected" between 1434 and 1551. In 1555 they totalled a capital of 1,178,752 lire, with an overall financial burden which came to 86,586 lire a year. It has to be noted that three of these nonti (Yino_!ecchig. Concordia.and Eino_nnoyo) had not been issued in silver lire but in gold ducats (the first two) and in scudi (the third one). We have converted into lire both the capital and the dividend paid to montisti according to the following guidelines: we have converted the gold figures given for shares of the Whig and W into lire, according to the standard 1555 rate of exchange of four silver lire per gold scudo»or ducat. In the case of the shares of the 129 nonto_§onoordi§ we have instead applied a rate of conversion of 3.5 lire nor ducat, because dividends to montisii were paid in lire according to this latter rate, which.had.been fixed in negotiations by the Camera and the board of the monto.‘ Table 5.2 The Bolognese Public Debt, 1595 Issue capital interest annual (lire) rate dividend (lire) Morgiii, 13,000 7.5 1,002 3513.2999h19. 139.750 6 8.248 $§1§_HHQ!Q. 11,382 8 910 Hoiing, 216,666 5 10,833 Xin9_!scchig. 130.000 8 10.400 Gabella_!ecchia. 113.750 8 9.100 Rorgg, 140,833 10 14,083 Eaxagligne. 18.071 10 1.807 72,284 5 3,614 Egfigg, 54,166 8 4,333 Rettaglio. 54.166 8 4.333 yino_nnoxo. 48.000 8 3.840 gonoordia, 261,976 6 14,795 Angmgngo, 411,427 7 28,800 Bgsidno, 219,427 7 15,360 yino.£in_nnoxg. 48.000 8 3.840 212.1, 250,000 8 20,000 Eio_2, 255,000 7 17,850 Giulio 891,081 7 62,375 composizione. 142.677 7 9.987 Gregorio, 104,725 6 6,283 Annona_2. 500,000 6 32,500 total 4,096,381 284,293 ‘ unnte_!in9_yeoonio. 25,000 ducats; Hgnte_!in9_unoxo 10,000 scudi: nonto_gonooroia, 52, 395 ducats. In determining the rate of exchange of the Bolognese lira we have referred, to the sources themselves (on a number of occasions scribes indicated current rates of conversion), and to the tables provided by Salvioni. See G.B.Salvioni, Ii_yoioro_ooiio_1ira h9lagnese_dal_15§1_al_1694 (Bologna. 1909)- 130 In 1595 the Bolognese public debt was formed by twenty- one issues and totalled 4,096,381 lire, while the yearly dividend paid to holders of shares amounted to 284,293 lire, a burden three times larger than forty years before. Ninety- five percent of the 2.9 million increase in civic indebtedness came from eight new monti. The remaining 5 percent derived from depreciation of the lira and re-issuance of nonri.s Six of the eight new monti were "erected" in gold currencies: we have converted into lire both the capital and the annual dividend paid according to the various rates of exchange gold scudo:lira to which we have found specific references either in the main registers or in the rolls of receipts. Investment in Shares 0f the following monti. Augmento. Residuo, 311nm ' ' unovo, and Giulio have been assessed at 4.8 lire nor scudo: while investment in shares of the monti_gomoo§iziono and Rio ‘ nonri_nnoyo and noxioiio were retired and jointly re- issued in 1573 as monro_§rooorio, at a reduced interest rate of 6 percent. Similarly, the interest rate paid on shares of W was reduced from 8 to 6 percent, but new shares were issued, bringing the capital of this route to 261, 976 lire and leaving'nearly'unaltered.the amount of yearly interest to be paid. The capital and the dividend of nonri yinoryooonio,and.¥ino_nnoyo,has been re-assessed according to the ducat/lira and scudo/lira rates of excahnge indicated in the toolioli: 5. 2 lire oer ducat and 4. 8 lire nor scudo. Capital and dividends paid by the monri W . . . vo .: . . -.- ° - and Mono have been reasseSsed according to the official devaluation of the Bolognese lira, as ratified by a Breyo issued by Pope Clement VIII in 1595. See ASB, Assuntorio_di camera, 'Informazione veridica sopra la istituzione di tutti i dazi della citta di Bologna,” 1767. 131 2, have been assessed at 4.25 and 4.2 lire oer scudo respectively. Table 5.3 The Bolognese Public Debt, 1655 Issue capital interest annual (lire) rate dividend (lire) 3923111: 13,000 7.5 1,002 $§1§_!§QthQ. 139.750 6 8:248 $§l£_HnQ!Q. 11,382 8 910 Holine, 216,666 5 10,833 ying_¥ecghie. 193.750 8 15,500 Gabell§_¥£Qthfl. 113.750 8 9.100 Borge, 140,833 10 14,083 Raxaglione. 18.071 10 1.807 72,284 5 3,614 Eesge, 54,166 8 4,333 Rettaglio. 54.166 8 4.333 YinQ_HnQ!Q, 72.500 8 5.800 Qonoordie, 261,976 6 14,795 Augmento, 437,141 7 30,600 Refiidno, 233,141 7 16,320 yino_Bin_nnoxo. 72.500 8 5.800 219.1, 250,000 8 20,000 219.2, 255,000 7 17,850 Giulio 947,142 7 66,300 Composizione, 142.677 7 9.987 Gregorio, 104,725 6 6,283 Annone_2, 719,200 5 35,960 Rettaglio_nngxo. 346.000 5 17.300 Annona_1. 100,100 5 5,005 Innocenzo_1. 1,698,886 4.5 88,611 Qngrgrino, 582,900 6 34,974 1,021,958 5 51,098 Innooenzo_2, 400,000 5 20,000 total 8,670,666 520,446 Between 1595 and 1655 the size of the debt more than doubled, reaching 8,670,666 lire, and the annual dividend di dc an en qa mv. f mv\..‘w Wm -MN WM Maw .. he 0 h) v,» d . e a p I K a c 132 servicing the debt nearly doubled at 520,446 lire.‘ Ninety—one percent of this increase came from five new anLi. while the remaining 9 percent was due to re-issuance and depreciation of the Bolognese lira.7 Although not complete, our documentation of share- ownership is substantial. As illustrated in Table 5.4 and Figure 5.1, for 1555 we can document 79.7 percent of the investment and 79.1 percent of the annual dividend: for 1595 we can document 82.4 percent of the obligations: and for 1655 our documentation covers 68.6 percent of the investment and 70.6 percent of the yearly dividend. By and large, the distribution of ownership of shares of most issues is well documented, yet there are exceptions. For example, registers and rolls of the mon:_e_de1_nej;_teoiio (issued in 1540) are entirely missing. In other circumstances as well there are gaps in the documentation: the registers of the We]. Moro (issued in 1500), and of the monte_de1_£esoe (issued in 1537) are usable in 1595 but are missing in 1555. Similarly, archival documentation of the Winoefiecondo ‘ The discrepancy was due to a decline in interest rates. 7 We have reassessed capital and yearly dividend of the nonti erected in gold scudi and ducats according to the rates of exchange indicated in the 183115211- Shares of the yino yeoonio were assessed at 7. 75 lire per ducat, shares of the W and mm were assessed at 7. 25 lire m ducat: shares of the following nonri, Augmento, Residuo, and Qiniio, were assessed at 5.1 lire per scudo: while the rate of exchange of all other issues remained unchanged. The Monte W was retired and re-issued: the interest rate paid on shares was reduced from 6 to 5 percent, while the capital of the monre was raised from 500,000 to 719,200 lire. II‘ ‘11‘! ‘I‘ l. "E 133 Querrrino and of the monte_fieoondo_Annone is incomplete, and surviving rolls and receipts permit the identification of only a segment of buyers of shares.“ The intricacy of the eie;eme_mon§i§;o_is fully reflected in the portfolios owned by stock-holders. Typically, proprietors owned shares of several monti, and the accounts, especially large ones, tend to become complex patchworks of bonds issued in different currencies and paying different interest rates. In part, however, this intricacy was the result of investment behaviors. The great majority of stock- holders, either individuals or institutions, were not active traders: the acquisition of shares was a long term investment. Accounts were 'built' over an extended period of time, and ' ASB, WW. Augmento. campione creditori (1557-1709) v. +: taglioli (1595-1697): Composizione, campione creditori (1573-1700) v. +: taglioli (1580-1707) regg.7 :Qonooroio, campione creditori (1543- 1701) v. +, A; fiebeiie_yeoohie, campione creditori (1528- 1738) v. + A, B, C; Qreoorio_£eroetno, campione creditori (1573-1738) v. +: atti, recapiti, taglioli (1573-1737): Qin119,campioni dare e avere (1587-1691) v. +, A, B, C: Statuti (1587): taglioli (1594-1796) vv. 9; WW azaleas. atti, taglioli (1645-1700): banana—Secondo. recapiti,: “none—Term, campione creditori (1642-94); W. taglioli (1651-1701): Molina. campione creditori (1528-1701) v. A, B, C: Moreiii, campione creditori (1545-1798) v. E, F: 23593 Instrumenti: EiQ_EIimQ, campione creditori (1564- 1707) v. +; £io_§eoondo, campione creditori (1568—1701): taglioli (1594-1700); Eorte__e__£eyegiione, campione creditori (1546- 1702) v. A: Erimo__e__$eoondo Qnetrrino, instrumenti: campione creditori (1659-1702): Residuo, campione creditori (1558-1708): taglioli (1598-1707) vv. 2; W, campione creditori (1557-1701): Sale yeoohio, taglioli e mandati (1555-1564), campione creditori (1555-1701) v. D: W. campione creditori (1533- 1747), v. +, A, B; yino_£in_nnoyo, campione creditori (1557-1747): taglioli (1566- 1747) regg. 9. , Monte Annona, bb. 717-719. 134 proprietors were content to draw dividends and leave the principal untouched. For instance, it was not unusual that blocs of shares would remain part of a family's portfolio for several generations. Table 5.4 Summary of the Documented Investment in Shares of the Bolognese Monti. Year n. of documented % of documented % of holders capital total dividend total (lire) (lire) 1555 735 940,011 79.7 68,533 79.1 1595 1,196 3,373,673 82.4 238,380 83.9 1655 1,022 5,947,880 68.6 367,477 70.6 As to the actual number of stock-holders we can turn our attention to Table 5.4, which permits a few preliminary observations. Two things are immediately clear: first of all, the number of buyers involved was never very large. Secondly, the growth of the amount of circulating stock tended to translate into larger accounts rather than in an increased pool of buyers. The growth of the number of proprietors lagged far behind the issuance of new shares: in fact, while the number of documented holders increased 63 percent between 1555 and 1595, documented investment in Bolognese securities over the same period increased about 262 percent. It is safe to assert that obligations tended to concentrate in relatively fewer hands. In 1555 the average account had a capital of 1,279 lire and earned an annual dividend of 93 lire: in 1595, the average account was two and a half times as large: 2,820 lire, and posted annual earnings 135 investment in the Bolognese debt (Millions) 4595 1855 1555 mmCLmented lnvestm. k\\\‘ non-doc. lnvestm. Figure 5.1 Investment in the Bolognese Debt, 1555-1655 136 of 199 lire. If anything, the figures available for 1655 emphasize this tendency. Compared to 1595, the number of shareholders shrank by nearly 15 percent, while documented investment in securities increased 76 percent. Earnings per account nearly doubled. The average account had a capital of 5,820 lire, and earned a yearly income of 359 lire (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3). These findings run counter to the indications provided by the few' other works which have studied the pattern of investment in early-modern public debts. Despite their different contexts, the works of Heers on fifteenth-century Genoese montieti, of Dickson on eighteenth-century English stock-holders, and of Tracy on sixteenth-century Dutch renteniere converge on one point: the popularity of bond as a safe form of investment was such that there was an ever growing number of small accounts, indicating the participation of a mass of ordinary investors, people of modest means.’ Heers, for instance, has.convincingly'argued that in fifteenth century Genoa wealthy patricians bought shares of San Giorgio as a safe and convenient way of diversifying their portfolios and of securing dowries for their daughters, but invested most of their liquid asset in more profitable enterprises. Therefore the structure of share-ownership was pulverized in ’ See J Heers .Qenes_aux_xy_siecle (Paris, 1961) pp- 175- 183: J'I'racy. Minimal—Retention. pp- 151-153: P. G.N.Dickson, ' ° W Wit (London. 1967). pp- 267- 269 282— 283, 291. 137 number of proprietors of accounts 1555-1655 .o..c.:.. O 0660‘. .0000 c O 1.3 nine-Izofiu 1655 1555 Figure 5.2 Proprietors of Accounts, 1555—1655 138 average dividend per account 1555- 1655 Figure 5.3 Average Dividend per Account, 1555-1655 CC thi Bo] wei she lflC am do< Ta] 139 a myriad of proprietors, which included agencies, members of the clergy, commoners and a large number of women. In Bologna the: emission of obligations :mainly’ translated in larger accounts rather than in a larger number of accounts. For one thing, this. diverse pattern of investment. suggests that Bolognese monti performed a different economic function as well. A good many wealthy Bolognese invested heavily in shares, and it is tempting to think that securities became increasingly not just a safe but a favorite outlet for their liquid assets. In examining who precisely the buyers were, the first step has been to segregate share-holders according to two main categories: type, i.e. individuals or agencies: and domicile, i.e. Bolognese or foreign investors. In'Tables 5.5 through 5.7 and in Figure 5.4 we present a first breakdown of the documented investment. Table 5.5 Investment in the Bolognese Public Debt, 1555 (documented investment 940,011 lire: annual dividend 68,533 lire) n. type holding % annual % (lire) dividend (lire) 56 B01. institutions 47,821 5.1 3,442 5.1 656 Bol. individuals 790,432 84.1 56,727 82.8 23 foreigners 101,758 10.8 8,314 12.1 140 groups of proprietors 155$‘IBSS 0909 c .00.. 900099 9: flfi>haafiax 3o .4 '//////////////A \V 5J5! Yfizfi 0.. 00 O IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII‘A ( Thoma ndl) 0.3 0.2 0.1 m noble: \\\V com: foreigners m local agencies- foreign agencies uncertain Figure 5.4 Groups of Proprietors, 1555-1655 Ia; St 141 Table 5.6 Investment in the Bolognese Public Debt, 1595 (documented investment 3,373,673; annual dividend 238,380 lire) n. type holding % annual % (lire) dividend (lire) 160 801. institutions 528,200 15.6 36,691 15.4 5 foreign instit. 36,642 1.1 2,790 1.2 976 801. individuals 2,215,646 65.7 157,185 65.9 55 foreigners 593,184 17.6 41,713 17.5 Table 5.7 Investment in the Bolognese Public Debt, 1655 (documented investment 5,947,880: annual dividend 367,477 lire) n. type holding % annual % (lire) dividend (lire) 302 801. institutions 2,103,282 35.4 125,326 34.1 14 foreign instit. 138,971 2.3 9,998 2.7 660 301. individuals 3,055,010 51.4 189,800 51.7 46 foreigners 650,617 10.9 42,353 11.5 The analysis of the spread of the preceding three tables lends itself to twoiobservations. First of all, it is apparent that, throughout the period, the ratio between foreign and Bolognese investment remained fairly stable. The share in the hands of Bolognese proprietors fluctuated roughly between 81 and 89 percent. Secondly, this stability conceals an interesting variation within the body of Bolognese investors, most notably a trend away from individual ownership. As a matter of fact, although Bolognese individuals remained the largest group of shareholders, their relative weight declined steadily. In 1555 Bolognese private proprietors accounted for 142 84.1 percent of the overall documented investment, in 1595 their share was slashed to 65.7 percent and by 1655 it had been further reduced to 51 . 4 percent. 0n the other hand, corporate investment posted a stupendous growth. Bolognese agencies, which accounted for a mere 5.1 percent of the investment in 1555, saw their share soar to 15.6 percent in 1595, and to reach 35.4 percent in 1655. A further important aspect concerns the distribution of shares. The preceding set of tables identifies the main blocs of bond-holders and their relative financial commitment: however, we learn little about the actual distribution of obligations among investors. In order to determine exactly how shares were distributed, we have proceeded to a further elaboration of the data. We have clustered accounts according to an income scale subdivided into sections, defined by the dividend received yearly by each proprietor. For the sake of convenience, we have grouped proprietors in three basic bands: a top bracket of grand proprietors, with an annual income of at least 1,000 lire: a middle range of moderate holders, with an income stretching from 100 to 999 lire; and a low segment of small investors, with an annual income of less than one hundred lire. To put things in perspective it may be useful to note that one hundred lire was a sum considerably larger than an ordinary annual wage. In 1555, for example, one hundred lire was the common annual salary for a university lecturer: other jobs paid much less. According to Salvioni, in 1572 the 11' fi li 50( 25( 10( <1 143 monthly salary of a cook was just four lire (forty-eight lire a year). In 1655 a lecturer could expect to make two-hundred lire a year, but other wage-earners could earn as little as fifty and even twenty-five lire a year.‘10 Thus a good many of the smaller shareholders who received less than one hundred lire in yearly return were by no means poor. Table 5.8 Income Distribution, 1555 (735 holders, annual dividend 68,533 lire) dividend number of % annual % range proprietors dividend (lire) > 1000 6 0.8 9,020 13.2 500 to 999 25 3.4 16,825 24.5 250 to 499 39 5.3 13,645 19.9 100 to 249 86 11.7 13,130 19.2 8 < 100 579 78. 15,913 23.2 1° ASB, Wig. Quartironi (1535-1755); G - 8 - Salvioni . MW (Bologna, 1909). Ta 10( 50C 25C 100 <1 > 4( 200i 100( 500 250 100 (10 144 Table 5.9 Income Distribution, 1595 (1,196 holders, annual dividend 238,380 lire) dividend number of % annual % range proprietors dividend (lire) > 2000 17 1.4 48,451 20.3 1000 to 1999 40 3.3 53,906 22.6 500 to 999 57 4.8 39,629 16.6 250 to 499 112 9.4 38,597 16.2 100 to 249 206 17.2 31,741 13.3 < 100 764 63.9 26,056 10.9 Table 5.10 Income Distribution, 1655 (1,022 holders, annual dividend 367,477 lire) dividend number of % annual % range proprietors dividend (lire) > 4000 12 1.2 84,185 22.9 2000 to 3999 32 3.1 88,377 24.0 1000 to 1999 43 4.2 59,716 16.2 500 to 999 67 6.5 47,823 13.0 250 to 499 113 11.0 38,112 10.4 100 to 249 165 16.1 26,399 7.2 < 100 592 57.9 22,835 6.2 The salient point emerging from the examination of Tables 5.8 through 5.10 is the inverse correlation between investors and income. An increasingly large portion of the annual dividend was claimed by a fraction of top holders. In 1555, One-fifth of the holders pocketed the three-fourths of the income. However, it was the relatively broad middle range of merate proprietors that claimed the lion's share. The thi anc Cat 50 145 expansion of the eistemLmontiste and the issuance of new shares contributed to a growing concentration of income, exacerbating the degree of maldistribution. This fact becomes more striking when it is realized that by 1655 the top one- twelfth of grand investors claimed nearly two-thirds of the documented dividend. Table 5.11 Proprietors and Income, 1555-1655 (comparative distribution) 1555 1595 1655 % % % investors < 1000 0.8 4.7 8.5 100 to 999 20.4 31.4 33.6 > 100 78.8 63.9 57.9 income < 1000 13.2 42.9 63.1 100 to 999 63.6 46.1 30.6 > 100 23.2 10.9 6.2 The spread of Table 5.11 and Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show this development with remarkable clarity. The top group of grand investors exhibited a double increase: in proprietors, from less than 1 percent to about 8 percent (Figure 5.5), and in securities: the share of income claimed by this segment of holders leaped from about 13 percent to over 60 percent (Figure 5.6). At the opposite end of the distribution ladder, the bottom segment showed a twin narrowing of both, investors and income. The number of proprietors clustered in this category dropped from nearly 80 percent in 1555 to less than 60 percent in 1655, while the share of income was slashed P Wu 146 investors in the public debt some of I neon. DOI'COI'I‘IOOC 1555 1553 1653 Mover 1am llr0\ 100 to 999 Ilro’ lean than 400 lire Figure 5.5 Investors in the Public Debt by Segments of Income, 1555-1655 147 interest paid on the debt segments of Income oi 7D 866.018 1655 1595 1555 Mover 1000 llro\1flfl to 999 Hro/ less than 100 lire Figure 5.6 Dividend Distribution by Segments of Income, 1555-1655 148 about two-thirds, from over 20 percent to less than 7 percent. The middle bracket exhibited the most obvious inverse correlation: a 50 percent increase in investors (Figure 5.5), coincided with a halving of the share of the annual income, which declined from 60 percent in 1555 to 30 percent in 1655 (Figure 5.6). Altogether the number of investors claiming an income of less than 1,000 lire dropped slightly, from 99 and 92 percent: yet, the decline in income was remarkably sharper: their share fell from 87 percent in 1555 to 57 percent in 1595 to less than 40 percent in 1655. The degree of maldistribution of income can be measured by the plotting the Lorenz curve and the computation of the Gini index of concentration for Tables 5.8 through 5.10. The Lorenz curve and the Gini index of concentration are two useful statistical methods to assess inequality in income distribution. Both the curve and the index measure inequality between the different sections, but do not indicate the amount of inequality among individuals who have been clustered in each section. The Lorenz curve is drawn by plotting the points CumSi and CumDi on a square graph, with CumSi (the factor referring to the proprietors of accounts) on the horizontal axis, and CumDi (annual dividend) on the vertical axis. The shape of the curves, plotted in Figures 5.7 through 5.9, confirms the growing inequality of the distribution of dividends among bond-holders. In fact, the more unequal a distribution is, the further the Lorenz curve lies below the diagonal. A little further algebraic manipulation permits 149 computation of the Gini index. This index is bounded by zero, perfect equality, and one, maximum degree of maldistribution, and has a natural geometric interpretation as two times the area enclosed between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal line representing perfect equality. In keeping with the Lorenz curve, the Gini index based on the data of table 5.8 (1555) produces .610, a value which indicates a high degree of concentration.11 Zhi 1595 the Gini index yields a value of “' The first step in drawing’ the Lorenz curve and calculating the Gini index is to arrange dividend brackets in ascending order on the basis of the ratio S/D. Two new values are computed for each dividend group, CumSi and CumDi, which are the cumulative subtotals of Si and Di for all groups. In order to calculate the Gini index we have to compute two further set of values, SiDi and SiCumDi for each group, add these values together and insert them into the formula. Sectional distribution of share-holders and their annual dividend (based on Table 5.8). S = share-holders: D Cum = cumulative : G dividend: D/S = ratio: Gini index less than 100 to 250 to 500 to over 100 lire 249 499 1000 1000 lire S 78.8% 11.7% 5.3% 3.4% 0.8% D 23.2% 19.2% 19.9% 24.5% 13.2% D/S 0.29 1.64 3.79 7.26 16.50 Si .789 .115 .053 .034 .008 Di .231 .189 .201 .247 .132 CumSi .789 .904 .957 .991 .999 CumDi .231 .420 .621 .868 1.000 SiDi .182 .021 .010 .008 .001 SiCumDi .182 .054 .033 .029 .008 total SiDi .222 total SiCumDi .306 Hence G = 1 - 2(.306) + .222 G = .610 150 .700, and in 1655 it reveals an even greater degree of maldistribution, G= .755. dividend distribution, 1555 [based on table 8) CumDi D U! Figure 5.7 Dividend Distribution, 1555 The Si and Di values are computed on the basis of the ratio S/lOO, D/lOO. 151 dividend distribution, 1595 (based on table 9) ($0le 0 U! l Figure 5.8 Dividend Distribution, 1595 152 dividend distribution, 1655 (based on table 10) CunOl Figure 5.9 Dividend Distribution, 1655 Concluding this first round of observations we can sum up noting three main developments. First, despite the rapid growth of the eietema_montiete, Bologna was not colonized by foreign capital but was able to find in_J.o_c_o the means to finance the needs of the local government as well as extraordinary contributions to Rome. Second, the pattern of 153 Bolognese investment underwent a significant alteration. The two main blocs of Bolognese subscribers (individuals and agencies) participated in a very different way in the financing of the debt. Between 1555 and 1655 the documented corporate investment soared by 4300 percent, that is, much faster than the issuance of new obligations (636 percent). 0n the other hand, private investment over the same period increased 380 percent, i.e. at a much slower pace. As a result, the percental presence of corporate investors gained over thirty points, leaping from 5.1 percent in 1555 to 35.4 percent in 1655, while private Bolognese investors saw their percental share drop from 84.2 percent to about 51.4 percent. Third, the analysis of the structure of ownership reveals a trend toward a sharper inverse correlation between investors and income. A thin veneer of grand accounts claimed 13.2 percent of the dividend in 1555, leaped to 42.9 percent in 1595 and then soared to 63.1 percent in 1655. Gender An important aspect of the distribution of income generated by interest-bearing shares concerns the grouping by gender. As one might have expected, men dominated the securities market, and despite a considerable percental decline, they claimed more than half of the income at the lowest point. In keeping with the observations set forth in the preceeding discussion, it has to be noted that men’s loss was hardly women's gain. In fact, while women doubled their 154 presence between 1555 and 1655, in percentage terms, their share of the annual income decreased by 1.6 percent. The main transfer of income was not from men to women, but from private investors to corporate buyers. income distribution, 1555—1655 70896 of propr lctors 180 170 450 150 140 120 110 A (Thousand) o3383883888 Bol.lnst. fU'O'OMI’S fa'."'Bt. WW! MISS uncertain m 1555 1595 1655 Figure 5.10 Income Distribution by Groups of Proprietors, 1555-1655 155 income distribution, 1555—1855 wows 0f proprietors 90 Elet. fOf'OIOMf'S forJnst. W8 “'08 uncertain m 1555 1595 1655 Figure 5.11 Income Distribution by Groups of Proprietors (Percental Share), 1555-1655 In Figures 5.12 and 5.13 we have arranged holders in four columns. Individual owners of shares have been segregated by gender. A third column (heirs) has been added to account for portfolios registered to unspecified beneficiaries of deceased persons, while under the label "all others" we have clustered ac in in in of in: 20. 12. Age pre pQIi whil Tabl iYea; 1555 1595 1655 Table iYear 1555 1595 1655 156 accounts held by agencies. Men made up 73.6 percent of the investors and claimed nearly 80 percent of the annual income in 1555, 61.8 percent of the investors and 69.6 of the income in 1595, and 45.4 percent of the proprietors and 51.1 percent of the income. Women showed a different trend: their presence increased from 11.2 percent in 1555, to 20 percent in 1595, to 20.2 in 1655: but their share of the income decreased from 12.5 percent in 1555 and in 1595, to 11 percent in 1655. Agencies, instead, posted a dramatic increase both in their presence and their share of the income: from a modest 7.7 percent in 1555, their presence reached 30.9 percent in 1655, while their share of the income leaped from an insignificant 5 percent in 1555, to 36.8 percent in 1655. Table 5.12 Summary of Women Proprietors and Income, 1555-1655 year n. of % of % of income % of % of accounts private total (lire) private total acc.nts acc.nts income income 1555 82 12.1 11.2 8,575 13.2 12.5 1595 239 23.2 20.0 29,704 14.9 12.5 1655 206 29.2 20.2 40,249 17.3 11.0 Table 5.13 Summary of Men proprietors and Income, 1555-1655 year n. of % of % of income % of % of accounts private total (lire) private total acc.nts acc.nts income income 1555 540 79.5 73.6 54,257 83.3 79.2 1595 740 71.8 61.9 165,876 83.4 69.6 1655 464 ' 65.7 45.4 187,830 80.9 51.1 P i911] 157 Investors in the debt by gender 80 7D 60 50 40 percentage- 30 20 mi \ o I 4555 1595 4855 Eggalwoman SSR§ men» flflzalnsh1:liagfleul others Figure 5.12 Investors in the Bolognese Debt by Gender 158 Income distribution by gender 90 80 70 so a 5 so 8 40 t O. 30 20 i 18 - o ‘ 1555 1595 Minoan x\\‘ man -heirs mall other. Figure 5.13 Income Distribution by Gender Columns 3 and 6 of Tables 5.12 and 5.13 offer a comparison of the variation of men and women presence and income, limited to individual holdings, that is, free of the possible distortions introduced by the surge of corporate ownership. Although men's presence remained, throughout the period, much larger than women’s, the number of accounts 159 registered to women rose significantly both in absolute numbers and in percentage. However, the sharp percental increase of women's accounts, from 12.1 percent in 1555 to 29.2 percent in 1655, did not translate into a correspondingly significant increase of income, which gained just four percentage points (from 13.3 percent to 17.3 percent). Men’s holdings showed the opposite trend: the marked decline of accounts, from 79.6 percent in 1555 to 65.7 percent in 1655, met with a very modest percental decline of the income, which decreased from 83 percent to 80.9 percent. Men and women were not just uneven in presence and in share of the annual dividend, their respective average per oeoite income exhibited a very uneven rate of growth as well. As Table 5.14 points out, the income earned by women’s accounts lagged far behind the avearge rate of growth. On the contrary, oer_oeoite income of men's accounts expanded at a much faster pace. On average, women holders earned 105 lire in 1555, 124 lire in 1595 and 195 lire in 1655. Men earned 100 lire in 1555, 224 lire in 1595, and leaped to 405 lire in 1655. Broadly speaking, this indicates that women's accounts concentrated much more than men' s in the lower brackets of the income distribution ladder. 160 Table 5.14 Comparative Summary of Average per Capita Income, 1555-1655 (figures expressed in lire) year women men all investors 1555 105 100 93 1595 124 224 199 1655 195 405 360 The next step iS'toiexamine the investment of the diverse groups of buyers, breaking down these large blocs in their component units. W Relatively few investors came from abroad. Their overall number remained modest despite an increase, in percentage terms, from.3 percent in 1555, to 4.9 in 1595, to 5.9 in 1655. Yet, their financial importance was considerably greater than their number would suggest. From the analysis of Tables 5.15 through 5.18 it can be seen that foreign buyers, on average, invested considerably larger sums than Bolognese proprietors. Only a fraction of foreign accounts, roughly between one- fourth and one-third, are clustered in the bottom segment of each table. In the main, foreign proprietors had some of the largest moire holdings, a fact which indicates that their small number was not due to a lack of confidence in Bolognese securities. Quite simply, it seems obvious that Bologna did not suffer from a shortage of capital in the hands of local investors willing to buy shares of the civic debt: besides, it was only'a handful of wealthy foreigners who had the means and the confidence to invest large sums, either because of their 161 connections in_iooo, or because of their expertise in the field. Table 5.15 Summary of Foreign Investment and Income, 1555- 1655 year n. of documented % of documented % of holders capital total dividend total (lire) (lire) 1555 23 101,758 10.8 8,314 12.1 1595 60 629,826 18.7 44,503 18.7 1655 60 789,588 13.3 52,351 14.2 From Tables 5.16 through 5.18 it can be seen more precisely that the typical foreign buyer was not an investor of small amounts. The number of proprietors who collected less than 100 lire in annual dividend declined from about one-third to less than one-fifth of all foreign investors. In the meantime, the presence of large accounts nearly doubled, from 42.4 percent in 1555 to 76.5 percent in 1655. Table 5.16 Income Distribution among Foreign Investors, 1555 (23 holders, dividend 8,314 lire) dividend number of % annual % % of range proprietors dividend total > 1000 2 8.7 3,446 41.4 5.1 500 to 999 3 13.0 2,089 25.1 3.1 250 to 499 5 21.7 1,788 21.5 2.6 100 to 249 5 21.7 813 9.8 1.2 < 100 8 34.8 177 2.1 0.3 162 Table 5.17 Income Distribution among Foreign Investors, 1595 (60 holders, dividend 44,503 lire) dividend number of % annual % % of range proprietors dividend total > 2000 8 13.3 21,496 48.3 9.0 1000 to 1999 10 16.7 13,725 30.8 5.7 500 to 999 5 8.3 3,107 7.0 1.3 250 to 499 13 21.7 4,354 9.8 1.8 100 to 249 8 13.3 1,236 2.8 0.5 < 100 16 26.7 586 1.3 0.2 Table 5.18 Income Distribution among Foreign Investors, 1655 (60 holders, dividend 52,351 lire) dividend number of % annual % % of range proprietors dividend total > 4000 --- --- 2000 to 3999 10 16.7 28,473 54.4 7.7 1000 to 1999 9 15.0 11,575 22.1 3.1 500 to 999 9 15.0 6,369 12.3 1.8 250 to 499 11 18.3 3,609 7.0 1.0 100 to 249 10 16.7 1,764 3.4 0.5 < 100 11 18.3 561 1.1 0.1 A second relevant issue is the provenance of foreign proprietors. In 1555 most of them came from a variety of nearby towns and principalities. Among the most prominent buyers are found Cecilia Orsini, wife of Count Alberto Pio from Carpi, Hattie da Varano, lord of the principality of Camerino, and his wife Battista Farnese, Camilla Gonzaga from Hantua and Taddea Halaspina from Massa. In 1595 and 1655 the IJFJ 163 pattern of foreign ownership is considerably different, the most striking change is the emergence of Genoa as a major market for Bolognese securities. While several investors were domiciled in neighboring states, or other provinces of the papal domains, Genoese buyers, absent in 1555, became both the largest and the single most important bloc of foreign investors. In 1595 Bolognese registers listed six members of the Doria family and three members of the Grimaldi: in 1655 they included eight Doria, three Gavotti, two Imperiali, and three Spinola. Altogether, Genoese investors accounted for about three-fourths of the annual dividend paid to foreign creditors in 1595 and over two-thirds in 1655 (see summary in Table 5.19) . But the dominance of Genoese lenders among foreign investors emerges even more dramatically when we consider that they monopolized the top brackets of the income distribution: in 1595 Genoese proprietors owned sixteen out of eighteen large accounts, and in 1655 they owned all but one of the top eight accounts, yielding an annual income of at least 2,000 lire, and fourteen out of a total of nineteen large accounts. The surge of Genoese interest in Bolognese stock does not come as a surprise. The dynamic role played by Genoese banking firms on the international money market during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is a well known phenomenon.m Besides, the active Genoese presence in the financing of the 1’ See F. Braudel, (New York 1972). pp. 900-515. at 164 burgeoning papal debt in the second half of the sixteenth century is a circumstance which must have encouraged Genoese participation in the financing of provincial public debts as well. It is more difficult to explain the complete absence of Genoese investors in 1555, but it is likely that the relatively modest size of Bolognese public indebtedness up to that date failed to attract the attention of firms accustomed to operate on a much greater scale. Table 5.19 Genoese Proprietors of Accounts, 1555-1655 year n. Genoese annual n. foreign annual investors dividend investors dividend (lire) (total) (lire) 1555 0 0 23 8,314 1595 18 32,799 60 44,503 1655 25 34,690 60 52,351 A growing number of purchases were made on behalf of religious and charitable foundations. However, outside Bologna and her territory institutional investors were but sparsely represented. For 1555 we have found none. In 1595 there were just five, four of which were domiciled in other provinces of the Papal States: the W from Ferrara. the Whaling from Faenza. the W from Rome . and the W Boneone. The sole, and dubious, exception was the monastery of W from Nonantola: it was situated just outside the borders of the Leoezione, but it was under the ecclesiastical authority of the archbishop of Bologna. . . 141.0. QH‘J G41. 165 In 1655 we have documented fourteen non-Bolognese corporate investors, yet only six were not domiciled in other provinces.of the Papal States, and all six were ecclesiastical institutions.13 Table 5.20 Summary of Foreign Corporate Investment, 1555-1655 year n. institutions annual n. institutions annual w/o Papal States dividend w/n Papal States dividend (lire) (lire) 1595 1 66 4 2,724 1655 6 3,469 ' 8 6,529 Bolognese_1nxestors In percentage terms, Bolognese investment at the middle of the seventeenth century*was broadly the same as it had been a century earlier: 89.2 percent of documented obligations in 1555, and 86.8 percent in 1655. Yet, as noted earlier, this stability conceals more than it reveals. The most notable development is a trend away from individual ownership. As 1’ The eight agencies domiciled either in Rome or in other provinces of the Papal States in 1655 were: the Roman genera Amstolita. the monastic house of W and the Wadi (both located in Rome). the Tesoreria of Romagna the W in Faenza. and the houses of the Servites in Cesena and of the Jesuits in Imola (all four located in the province of Romagna), the monastery of the Servites in Bomporto (located in the Legezione of Ferrara). The six agencies which did not have a domicile in papal territory were: the monastic houses of Sen Siiyeetro in Nonantola, of fien_Erenoeeoo in Piacenza, of the Jesuits of Vicenza and the nunneries of the Spirito_Sento in Genoa. of MW in Venice and of We in Hodena. 166 illustrated in Table 5.5, in 1555 nearly all subscriptions were for individuals. Bolognese agencies owned just 5.1 percent of shares. In 1655 (Table 5.7) the investment controlled by individuals had dropped to 51.4 percent of documented shares, while corporate investors claimed 35.4 percent. It has to be observed that the declining presence of Bolognese private proprietors was not linked to substantial changes in the structure of ownership of the diverse groups of private buyers. As a matter of fact, private Bolognese investment continued to be dominated throughout the period by noble holders, whose share never dropped below a commanding 80 percent of portfolios registered to individuals. Corporate Investors It is likely that institutions preferred, perhaps for added safety, to invest in obligations issued by their own states, or by their own provinces. Indeed Bolognese foundations were the ones which invested most conspicuously in civic securities. To be sure, the presence of corporate buyers is not to be regarded as an anomaly. Charitable and ecclesiastical corporations, for instance, were not simply social and cultural agencies , they were active economic players as well. The safe and steady returns offered by securities must have provided a particularly suitable form of income. In fifteenth century Genoa, Heers found, monastic houses and congregations formed the single largest group of 167 subscribers of ioogni of the Genoese public debt. Similarly, Bennassar contends that ecclesiastical institutions were the most prominent subscribers of Spanish joroe in sixteenth century Valladolid.“ Bolognese corporate investment presents a number of intriguing features of its own. First, we may note that while the interest of corporations in Bolognese securities accelerated markedly throughout the period, their initial presence 'was puny' at. best. Secondly, although. corporate participation was widespread, investment came to be dominated by certain types of agencies, most notably ecclesiastical and charitable foundations. Moreover, it was just a handful of agencies that were most active and owned large accounts. The surging presence of corporations, and of specific ones in particular, among city-creditors may offer some concrete economic contours to that growing social and political leverage of a wide array of urban agencies in the age of the Counter-Reformation, an aspect to which historians have often referred in a rather impressionistic manner. “ J.Heers, fienee_en_xye_eieoie (Paris, 1961), p. 127: B-Bennassar. WWW (Paris, 1967). pp- 252- 259. 168 Table 5.21 Bolognese Institutions, 1555 (documented holdings, 47,821 lire: annual dividend, 3,442 lire) n. type holding % annual % % of (lire) dividend total (lire) 04 civic inst. 7,596 15.9 633 18.4 0.9 07 charities 5,719 12.0 432 12.5 0.6 11 guilds 5,778 12.1 347 10.1 0.5 34 eccl.agencies 28,728 60.1 2,030 59.0 3.0 Table 5.22 Bolognese Institutions, 1595 (documented holdings, 528,200 lire; annual dividend, 36,691 lire) n. type holding % annual % % of (lire) dividend total (lire) 06 civic inst. 76,413 14.5 5,494 15.0 2.3 04 colleges 50,824 9.6 3,446 9.4 1.4 19 charities 115,625 21.9 7,884 21.5 3.3 15 guilds 17,563 3.3 1,172 3.2 0.4 116 eccl.agencies 267,775 50.7 18,694 50.9 7.8 Table 5.23 Bolognese Institutions, 1655 (documented holdings, 2,103,282 lire: annual dividend, 125,326 lire) n. type holding % annual % % of (lire) dividend total (lire) 06 civic inst. 132,229 6.3 8,797 7.0 2.4 07 colleges 52,445 2.5 3,578 2.8 1.0 26 charities 917,855 43.6 51,963 41.5 14.1 16 guilds 11,420 0.5 758 0.6 0.2 247 eccl.agencies 989,368 47.0 60,233 48.1 16.4 The dimension and the structure of Bolognese corporate investment underwent significant alterations. To begin with, te an he re- The Sut Che 88m 169 corporate investors emerged as one of the most important bloc of creditors of the Bolognese civic government. Between 1555 and 1655 the number of agencies registered as proprietors of accounts had a fivefold increase: in percentage terms corporate investment leaped from around 5 percent of the overall documented stock in 1555, to over 15 percent in 1595, to 34.1 percent in 1655. What were the institutions which dominated corporate investment is yet another question. Ecclesiastical agencies and charitable foundations acquired an increasingly commanding position. In 1655 their combined holdings accounted for 90.6 percent of Bolognese corporate investment. Their share of the annual dividend progressed accordingly. Charities, which received less than 1 percent of the overall yearly income in 1555, pocketed 3.3 percent in 1595 and leaped to 14.1 percent in 1655. Ecclesiastical agencies progressed from 3 percent to 7.8 percent in 1595, to 16.4 percent in 1655. Other types of agencies did not fare so well. Guilds, which controlled one tenth of corporate investment in 1555, saw their share of the annual dividend drop to 0.5 percent in 1655. Colleges claimed nearly’ 10 percent. of corporate investment. in 1595, but retained only 2.5 percent in 1655. Income distribution among agencies was highly skewed. The number of agencies which owned accounts expanded substantially, but the pyramid of corporate investors was characterized by increasingly steeper slopes: the share of annual corporate dividend collected by the institutions 170 grouped in the top segment, less than 2 percent of corporate proprietors, increased from about one-sixth in 1555, to one- fourth in 1595, to more than one-third in 1655. Table 5.24 Income Distribution among Bolognese Agencies, 1555 (56 holders, annual dividend 3,442 lire) dividend number of % annual % % of range agencies dividend total (lire) > 1000 -- -- 500 to 999 1 1.8 520 15.1 0.8 250 to 499 4 7.1 1,283 37.3 1.9 100 to 249 4 7.1 455 13.2 0.7 < 100 47 83.9 1,184 34.4 1.7 At the middle of the sixteenth century corporate investment was modest. No agency had large holdings, and only one, the monastery of W, claimed an income of more than 500 lire. Other four institutions were grouped in the bracket immediately below: the monasteries of SenJuioneie_in 895952. and W. the civic agency of the Steerstitijanitatis and a charitable foundation. the Mole di_3ruario_deiio_yite. And they accounted for more than half the corporate income in 1555. Altogether institutions owned 7.7 percent of the documented body of accounts and realized 5.1 percent of the yearly income. Ecclesiastical agencies were both the group most numerous (thirty-four accounts) and the one which possessed the largest bloc of shares (60.1 percent). 171 Table 5.25 Income Distribution among Bolognese Agencies, 1595 (160 holders, annual dividend 36,690 lire) dividend number of % annual % % of range agencies dividend total > 2000 3 1.9 9,183 25.0 3.8 1000 to 1999 6 3.7 8,325 22.7 3.5 500 to 999 9 5.6 6,187 16.9 2.6 250 to 499 14 8.7 5,072 13.8 2.1 100 to 249 33 20.6 4,852 13.2 2.0 < 100 95 59.4 3,098 8.4 1.3 In Table 5.25 we have segregated the income distribution pertaining to corporate investors in 1595. Three agencies, the nonte_oi_2ieta, the ga§a_oei_gateoameni and the office of the Aoate_oi_srta_uaria_in_§trada, controlled one-fourth of the annual dividend pocketed.by institutions. Other six agencies, the camera. the Gabella_§rossa. the Superstiti_sanitatis. the £1hhrica.di_aan_£etronio. the Collegio_nitcio and the Monte dei_natrinonio, collected another 22.7 percent. On the whole, the top nine corporate investors (5.6 percent) received nearly half of the annual income (47.7 percent). On the other hand, at the opposite end of the ladder the bottom 95 agencies (59.4 percent) collected just 8.4 percent of the yearly dividend. This skewing is, to some extent, the product of the investment of specialized institutions. Four of the top eight corporate investors were financial agencies: the camera and the Gabella were the two civic fiscal institutions, while the 172 W and the Wig were charitable foundations with a distinct financial vocation. Table 5.26 Income Distribution among Bolognese Agencies, 1655 (302 holders, annual dividend 125,326 lire) dividend number of % annual % % of range pr0prietors dividend total (lire) > 4000 6 2.0 48,670 38.8 13.2 2000 to 3999 7 2.3 20,350 16.2 5.5 1000 to 1999 9 3.0 12,642 10.1 3.4 500 to 999 24 7.9 17,763 14.2 4.8 250 to 499 26 8.6 8,741 7.0 2.4 100 to 249 56 18.5 8,957 7.1 2.4 < 100 174 57.6 8,206 6.5 2.2 A minimum majority of thirteen institutions (4.3 percent) dominated the pyramid of corporate investors in 1655. Altogether twenty-two grand proprietors pocketed nearly two- thirds of annual returns. The top six agencies alone received over one-third of the dividend: the nonre_di_2ieta, the Monte dei_flatrinonio, the three charitable agencies of the £ntte_di mm. W and W119. and the oolieoio of the Jesuits of S.Lucia. The seven agencies next in order of financial importance were the two nunneries of em and W, the W1. the W. the W1. the We and the Wea- Even allowing for a certain distortion due to the massive investment of a single specialized institution (the W), the 173 degree of concentration is impressively high, as reflected by the value of the Gini index:computed for Table 5.26 (G=.797). We may also note the changing composition of the bloc of top corporate creditors. Charitable and ecclesiastical foundations emerged as major money-lenders, overshadowing the chief civic agencies. Beside the nonte_oi_£iera, in the top segment we find other four charitable institutions and a school run by a monastic order. A similar pattern is repeated in the two segments which follow (second and third row of Table 5.26), where we find nine clerical agencies and four charities. Equally interesting is the fact that a good many of the leading agencies were of recent foundation. It would seem that we are dealing not just with the surge of corporate investment ner_ee, but with a surge directly linked to a new breed of institutions. The nonte_oi_£iera dated from the end of the fifteenth century and so did the goera_oei_yerooonoei, the nonte_oei_flatrinonio‘was created in 1586, the agencies of the Entte_di_§ruarta, Baraooano and segrooe_dated from 1526, 1571 and 1583, respectively. The gaea__aei__gataonneni, an institution committed to the conversion of non-Christians (mostly local Jews) opened in 1568. Similarly, the Jesuits established themselves in W in 1562 (they were however present in Bologna from 1546). And the two leading nunneries were among the newest additions to the abundant number of Bolognese cloisters: Santiomonono dated from 1503 and W from 1567. 174 Table 5.27 Ecclesiastical Agencies, 1555-1655 1555 % of 1595 % of 1655 %of annual total annual total annual total dividend dividend dividend Societies 114 0.2 393 0.2 4,909 1.3 Parishes 8 al. 193 0.3 5,190 2.2 7,324 2.0 Monastic houses friars 1,373 2.0 4,299 1.8 10,650 2.9 nuns 201 0.3 2.197 0.9 18,260 5.0 Eccl. offices 151 0.2 6,490 2.7 8,588 2.3 Eccl. schools --— --- 125 0.1 10,501 2.9 The number and the type of ecclesiastical agencies which were proprietors of accounts are examined in greater detail in Table 5.27. Between 1555 and 1655, while theioverall number of documented shareholders grew 39 percent, the number of ecclesiastical agencies which were proprietors of accounts increased 626 percent, and their share of the annual dividend, over ‘the same period, increased 412 percent. Societies, parishes, chapters, churches, schools, monastic houses and a multitude of clerical offices claimed not just larger returns but larger percental portions of them. How was this expansion fueled? And what were the driving forces behind it? While the overall tendency is clear, the expansion itself was far from orderly and proceeded from a host of factors: purchases, but also an increasing number of private donations and bequests. Absent in 1555, at least as far as we can document, modest in 1595, private donations represented a substantial portion of clerical holdings in 175 1655.“5 The renewed vitality, the moral and cultural prestige of ecclesiastical institutions are known features of the age after the Council of Trent, and there is little doubt that a flow of private donations benefited a multitude of agencies. In the main, ecclesiastical share-ownership was dominated by a relatively small number of institutions, among which the regular clergy secured a leading position. In rows 3 and 4 of table 5.24 we have segregated the annual dividend received by monastic houses. By 1655 they controlled about half of the documented income pocketed by ecclesiastical corporations. Including the ooiieoio_di_§anta Lnoia, a prestigious school run by the Jesuits, the share claimed by the regular clergy would rise to two-thirds. These data confirm the so called "urban vocation" of monastic orders, an aspect to which scholars as Grendi and Borelli have referred, stressing not just the profound cultural and social influence of regular orders on urban life, but their economic function as well. To paraphrase Borelli, monastic houses mantained a vitality and a prominence unknown to other ‘5 A few examples may be useful to illustrate the point. One-seventh of the documented income of the monastery of San Donenioo in 1655 came from a W of the Bovio family, nearly all the income of the monastic house of San Martino was generated by a bequest of Pirro Gioanetti. Substantial donations were registered to the house of the W and to the WW Sialliera. Several nunneries were recipient of multiple donations, commonly made by noble families. The snore__dei W received donations from Ottavio Malvezzi, the Griffoni and the Machiavelli families. Similarly, the moi were the recipients of the generous donations of the Ghisilieri and the Vizzani families. 176 ecclesiastical agencies, throughout the early modern period.“ In 1655 the regular clergy controlled about one-twelfth of the overall documented income. And altogether ecclesiastical agencies pocketed about one-sixth of the annual dividend. A nearly equal amount was controlled by charities. The growing financial importance of charitable and ecclesiastical foundations indicates their steady emergence as major economic players in a hitherto unexplored area. In fact, while corporate acquisition of real estate in the oontado is a known (albeit imprecisely charted) phenomenon, the active participation of agencies, ecclesiastical and lay, in more ”urban" sectors has rather been a matter of speculation. Yet, we should be careful not to jump to conclusions. Although the growing, tentacular expansion of the economic circuit controlled and administered by lay and religious 1“ G.Borelli, "Il saio e la ricchezza tra ’600 e '700” in (Salerno, 1983) v. 3, p. 279; E.Grendi, "MOrfologia e dinamica della vita associativa urbana. Le confraternite a Genova fra i secoli XVI e XVIII, " ' n. s. 5,2 (1965): 254. Among recent studies on Bolognese charitable and clerical institutions especially important are the following contributions: H Fanti ed., WM . :0 00'; " y‘..‘ 0 " '1 moderna (Bologna, 1984): idem, "Confraternite e istituzioni di assistenza nel Medioevo e nell’eta moderna" in W. Tega ed., (Repubblica San Marino, 1989) , v. 3. pp. 81-100; G. Zarri, "Istituzioni ecclesiastiche e vita religiosa nell’eta della Riforma e della Controriforma" in 1" Berselli edu Storiuellimilia—Romagna (Bologna. 1977). V- 2, pp. 245-270: and A. Giacomelli, "Conservazione e innovazione nell'assistenza bolognese nel Settecento". in M.Fanti, ed., ' (Bologna, 1984), pp. 163-265. re p0 Ch fan 6ii. the 177 foundations illustrates their growing ability to cast their influence, we ought not to discount the willing cooperation of the Bolognese elite, and its resourcefulness in infiltrating that circuit. In other words, to paraphrase Borelli once more, we need to keep in mind the WW (tight linkage) between urban aristocracies and both lay and ecclesiastical corporations in the cities of sixteenth and seventeenth-century Italy. Bolognese charities, hospitals and lay fraternities routinely came under the watchful eye of the Senate, and members of Bologna's most conspicuous families presided over their boards. Bolognese of all social ranks left bequests to parishes and convents, however the practice was especially common among the elites. Numerous religious establishments, such as chapters and nunneries, were institutions with a decidedly elite focus, and members of Bolognese noble families routinely held positions of authority. Nonetheless, it was on Lgnefiioia that patrician families exerted their strongest influence. The accounts we have segregated under the label 'ecclesiastical offices' may provide an illuminating example. These accounts were not registered to identifiable clerics but to specific clerical positions, mostly labeled as Rettore either of a parish or a chapel, less commonly of a monastery or a chapter. It has to be observed that Bertori were often named by patrician families and can be regarded as clients whom their aristocratic sponsors provided with adequate means. Well into the eighteenth century, this was a standard (albeit declining) 178 occurrence in the communities of the lowlands, where the Bolognese patriciate claimed sweeping rights over ecclesiastical benefiioia.1 Individuals Bolognese residents formed the largest group of shareholders and claimed the largest portion of annual dividends. The number of individuals who were proprietors fluctuated from 656 in 1555 to 976 in 1595, back to 660 in 1655, ranging roughly between 1.0 and 1.5 percent of a urban population estimated in the neighborhood of 60-65,000 inhabitants.“ The actual number of people involved, however, must have been larger because several accounts were joint or multiple ones, commonly associating kinsmen of the leading proprietors. Furthermore, 'we Zhave found. several accounts registered under the name of deceased persons or of ereoi (heirs), and it is very likely that each account referred to more than one beneficiary.” ‘7 F.Giusberti, "La citta assistenziale: riflessioni su un sistema piramidale" in M.Fanti, ed., £orme_e__s_o_g_ge_tti 0.‘ "1 “‘!° .1- ’1 z. e I ,1; e 9'?! 0 ‘0 H: (Bologna, 1984), pp. 13- 29; G. Zarri, "Istituzioni ecclesiastiche e vita religiosa nell'eta della Riforma e della Controriforma" in.A. Berselli, ed., 5roria_deii;Emiiia_Ronagna (Bologna, 1977), v. 2, pp. 245- 270. i“ See A. Bellettini, XYJllLunificaaionLitaiiana (Bologna. 1961). pp- 25-26- ‘“ Since notaries charged a registration fee, it was not unusual uncontested heirs would pocket dividends under the name of a deceased purchaser. This practice, more common in case of small accounts, was forbidden in 1659 by a decree issued by Pope Alexander VII. See ASB, Wage, Bolle, Brevi e Chirografi, "Chirografo," dated 179 Table 5.28 Bolognese Private Proprietors, 1555-1655 year n. of % of capital % of annual % of accounts total (lire) total dividend total (lire) 1555 656 89.2 790,432 84.1 56,777 82.8 1595 976 81.6 2,215,646 65.7 157,185 65.9 1655 660 64.6 3,055,010 51.4 189,800 51.7 As Table 5.28 points out, while the documented annual income pocketed by Bolognese bond-holders increased nearly four times in absolute figures, in percentage terms both their presence and their share of dividends declined sharply. They claimed 82.8 percent of yearly returns in 1555, but just over 51 percent in 1655. A second relevant aspect is the distribution of income. It is clear that the pyramid of investors was dominated by an ever narrowing segment of stock- holders. A rapid analysis of Tables 5.29 through 5.31 indicates that between one-sixth and one-eighth of the proprietors claimed about three quarters of the income. Equally interesting is that while overall private share- ownership«declined, in percentage terms, the tiny minority of grand bond-holders mantained, and actually increased, their portion of annual dividends. It was the group of small and middling holders who lost ground. The last column of Tables 5.29 through 5.31 illustrates the point: individuals collecting returns of 1,000 lire and above claimed 8.1 percent 1659 , b. 351 . ha pr e1 in sul int the ind eme ind Ian brm in divi 180 of the overall income in 1555, 20.8 percent in 1595 and 30.2 percent in 1655. Middling and small investors suffered a dramatic percental setback: moderate holders lost thirty percentage points, their share of the annual income dropped from over 50 percent in 1555 to less than 20 percent in 1655. Small holders saw their share reduced from over 20 percent of yearly returns in 1555, to an insignificant 3.8 percent in 1655. The trend of percental decrease in individual ownership has no simple answers. It could be conceivably argued that private investors sought better investment opportunities elsewhere, or diversified their portfolios. The steady decline in overall interest rates during the seventeenth century would support this hypothesis.20 However, a more complex interaction of factors is likely. Figures 5.14 and 5.15, and the spread.of Table 5.32 focus our attention only on Bolognese individual buyers; the areas of change in the distribution, emerge even more precisely: while moderate and small individual holders saw their income share drop precipitously, large holders increased theirs. Owners of large accounts brought their presence from 0.6 percent in 1555 to 7 percent in 1655 and, likewise, increased. their share of annual dividends from 9.8 percent to a commanding 58.2 percent. On 3° While shares of Monri erected in the sixteenth century most commonly offered annual returns of 7 and 8 percent, shares of new Monti issued or re-issued in the seventeenth century offered considerably lower rates: 5 and even 4.5 Percent. 10 50( 25( 10( <1 181 the other hand, small and middling buyers decreased their presence marginally, from 99 percent to 93 percent, but their combined income share fell from 90 percent to just over 40 percent. In other words, it was the small fry of the lot that lost ground the most, suggesting an erosion of the means of common citizens rather than an overall erosion or a diversion of wealth of Bolognese investors. Table 5.29 Income Distribution among Bolognese Private Proprietors, 1555 (656 holders, annual dividend 56,777 lire) dividend number of % annual % % of range proprietors dividend total (lire) > 1000 4 0.6 5,574 9.8 8.1 500 to 999 21 3.2 14,216 25.0 20.7 250 to 499 30 4.6 10,573 18.6 15.4 100 to 249 77 11.7 11,862 20.9 17.3 < 100 524 79.9 14,552 25.6 21.2 Table 5.30 Income Distribution among Bolognese Private Proprietors, 1595 (976 holders, annual div. 157,185 lire) dividend number of % annual % % of range proprietors dividend total (lire) > 2000 6 0.6 17,772 11.3 7.4 1000 to 1999 24 2.5 31,856 20.2 13.4 500 to 999 43 4.4 30,335 19.3 12.7 250 to 499 85 8.7 29,490 18.8 12.4 100 to 249 163 16.7 25,433 16.2 10.7 < 1130 655 67.1 22,299 14.2 9.3 182 Income of Bolognese private investors percental shares by brackets of Income 60 so - 4o »— (D O O 3 c 30 - a O E 20 e ' z 10 — I 3 l l _1 1555 1595 1655 0 over 4000 lire + 100 to 999 lira 0 loss than ’lOD lire ‘ Figure 5.14 Income of Bolognese Private Investors (percental shares by brackets of income) 183 Income of Bolognese private investors dividends by brackets of income 120 140 — a 100 _ 90 — 80 e 70 L 50 — (Thousands) 40~ 30 — 20 — 1D - 1555 1595 1655 D over 1000 lire + 100 to 999 Iiro 0 less than 100 Iiro Figure 5.15 Income of Bolognese Private Investors (dividends by brackets of income) 11 \I I A 1 Se in ho] lad 1' 91¢ Ofl 184 Table 5.31 Income Distribution among Bolognese Private Proprietors, 1655 (660 holders, annual div. 189,800 lire) dividend number of % annual % % of range proprietors dividend total (lire) > 4000 6 0.9 35,514 18.7 9.7 2000 to 3999 15 2.3 39,558 20.8 10.8 1000 to 1999 25 3.8 35,500 18.7 9.7 500 to 999 33 5.0 23,691 12.5 6.4 250 to 499 75 11.4 25,762 13.6 7.0 100 to 249 100 15.1 15,797 8.3 4.3 < 100 406 61.5 13,978 7.4 3.8 Table 5.32 Bolognese Private Proprietors, 1555-1655 (comparative distribution) 1555 1595 1655 % % % segments of investors >1000 0.6 3.1 7.0 100 to 999 19.5 29.8 31.5 < 100 79.9 67.1 61.5 segments of income >1000 9.8 31.5 58.2 100 to 999 64.6 54.1 34.4 < 100 25.6 14.2 7.4 What was the pattern of top ownership? Who were the big holders, whose portfolios stood at the top of the distribution ladder, and whose purchases must have been increasingly relevant to the functioning of the bond-market? The top ranks 0f Bolognese elite were heavily represented. Actually, the SID Ho PO: Up; 185 names of the largest buyers read like a honor roll of Bolognese society. In 1555 the top twenty-five domestic holders were all members of prestigious families. Aristocratic dominance was not less striking in 1595 and 1655: commoners claimed just one account out of thirty, and two out of forty- six, respectively. To sum up, the pattern of investment in Bolognese long- term obligations presents a number of intriguing features. First of all, there is a crucial element of continuity: most of the capital invested came from domestic sources. The servicing of the debt did not turn into a dramatic flight of wealth out of the Leoazione. At their 1595 peak foreign investors owned 18.7 percent of Bolognese stock, and in 1655 their share was down to a more manageable 13.2 percent. This is especially remarkable when it is considered that between 1595 and 1655 Bolognese borrowing doubled. It is within the bloc of Bolognese buyers that we find the most significant area of change. While individuals remained the largest bloc of subscribers, their relative financial weight was progressively eroded by the spectacular surge of corporate buyers which, by 1655, controlled over one-third of documented stock. The structure of ownership of securities shows a mass of small investors and a limited number of large proprietors. ZHowever, the latter acquired. an increasingly' commanding Position: in 1655, over 60 percent of the income was claimed by aifraction of big owners of stock. Broadly speaking, this uPper crust of grand proprietors reflected, with a few bl 0t it Or Wel- 186 distortions, the overall spread of investors: a mixed bag of Bolognese noblemen, foreigners and institutions monopolized the top bracket. Bolognese share-holders always commanded more than 60 percent of it, the lion’s share of which was claimed by members of the nobility and corporate investors. Common folk tended to be under-represented, because, in the main, their accounts were the small fry of the lot. The opposite applies to foreigners, who tended to be over-represented, because they held a relatively large portion of grand accounts (see the summary presented in Figures 5.16 through 5.21). The overall transformation can be summarized as follows: in 1555 investment was relatively widespread and shares were predominantly held by persons. A handful of noblemen and a few foreign buyers dominated the market. In the century that followed, to a larger pool of shares corresponded a narrower, more polarized distribution, and institutions emerged as important buyers. A host of monasteries, hospitals, churches, confraternities and ecclesiastical offices acquired a heavy presence in the Bolognese funded debt. If a broader inference may be extracted from this development, it seems that between the late sixteenth century and the mid-seventeenth century there began to emerge and to take precise shape a peculiar bloc of creditors formed by aristocrats and corporations. In other words, those who controlled the Regginento and through it the fisc (Bolognese nobility), and those who were exempt, or nearly exempt from tax burdens (nobles and corporations), init-Ere the ones that had heavy investment in Bolognese 187 securities and reaped the most profit. In a sense, the main holders of public debt were those subjects that had freed themselves from the clutches of tax obligations. n om _m a .b a r. tm 5.. aw m m 0 D m m m. m. m 8090803“) )7 \ \ m \7’ m \9 \7/77 // [32.35) fore I onore Figure 5.18 Income Distribution 191 Figure 5.19 Overall Income Distribution, 1595 CHAPTER VI BOLOGNESE INVESTORS In the preceeding chapter we have charted the expansion of the Bolognese funded debt, we have followed the overall pattern of investment, and we have already outlined some of its most striking features: the limited presence of foreign capital, the dramatic rise in corporate investment and the trend away from individual ownership. This chapter is devoted to the analysis of accounts registered to Bolognese investors. Despite a marked percental decline, city-dwellers remained, throughout the period under consideration, the largest bloc of proprietors, and held the largest portion of shares. We must ask then, what was the social milieu of Bolognese montieti? What sort of people did participate in the bond-market? In keeping with the guidelines set forth in introducing our methodology, we have divided bond-holders into two broad groups: city nobles and commoners. We have further subdivided noble proprietors into two sub-sectors: patriciate (or senatorial nobility) and lesser nobility (or non-senatorial nobility). In a third segment (uncertain) we have clustered all those buyers whose social identity could not be determined. The number of those who have been entered in this 194 195 last group is, however, sufficiently small to be of little statistical consequence. The spread of Tables 6.1 through 6.3 and the summary of Table 6.4 permit.a few preliminary’considerations. Let us turn our attention first to the last.two columns of each table. The figures given in the last column indicate, in percentage terms, the share of each segment, relative to the overall documented annual income generated by interest-bearing obligations. The column before the last, instead, indicates the share of each segment, relative to the income claimed by Bolognese individual investors. Two elements emerge clearly: a relevant percental decrease in overall individual share- ownership (last column), and a pattern of individual ownership dominated by noble proprietors (column before the last). As the last row of Table 6.4 points out, percental participation of Bolognese private investors in 'the securities ‘market dropped from 82.8 percent in 1555, to 51.6 percent in 1655. However, this remarkable variation did not translate in a dramatic shift in the make-up of Bolognese individual ownership of shares. Throughout the period, members of the city elite were far and away the dominant bloc, controlling 85.4 percent of private Bolognese income at the lowest point. And within such bloc, it was the patriciate that claimed the lion's share. Annual interest payments to members of senatorial families fluctuated from 46.7 percent in 1555 to just over 50 percent in 1655. 196 Table 6.1 Bolognese Proprietors, 1555 (documented investment 790,432 lire, annual dividend 56,777 lire) n. group holding % annual % % of (lire) dividend total (lire) 260 patriciate 385,444 48.8 26,491 46.7 38.7 255 lay 26,174 46.1 5 clerics 317 0.6 300 lesser nob. 349,379 44.2 26,517 46.7 38.7 295 lay 24,527 43.2 5 clerics 1,990 3.5 91 commoners 50,977 6.4 3,521 6.2 5.1 5 uncertain 4,632 0.6 247 0.4 0.3 Table 6.2 Bolognese Proprietors, 1595 (documented investment 2,215,646 lire, annual dividend 157,185 lire) n. group holding % annual % % of (lire) dividend total (lire) 332 patriciate 894,566 40.4 63,440 40.4 26.8 312 lay 61,318 39.0 20 clerics 2,122 1.4 406 lesser nob. 995,438 44.9 70,959 45.1 29.8 382 lay 67,425 42.9 24 clerics 3,534 2.2 222 commoners 310,365 14.0 21,721 13.8 9.3 201 lay 19,910 12.7 21 clerics 1,811 1.1 17 uncertain 16,143 0.7 1,130 0.7 0.5 197 Table 6.3 Bolognese Proprietors, 1655 (documented investment 3,055,010 lire: annual dividend 189,800 lire) n. group holding % annual % % of (lire) dividend total (lire) 245 patriciate 1,569,418 51.4 98,311 51.8 26.7 220 lay 93,434 49.2 25 clerics 4,877 2.6 211 lesser nob. 1,046,133 34.2 64,546 34.0 17.6 180 lay 62,232 32.8 31 clerics 2,314 1.2 197 commoners 424,645 13.9 26,057 13.7 7.1 161 lay 22,708 12.0 36 clerics 3,349 1.8 7 uncertain 14,815 0.5 886 0.4 0.2 Table 6.4 Summary of Bolognese Proprietors Income, 1555-1655 1555 1595 1655 % of % of %of % of % of % of Bologn. total Bologn. total Bologn. total indiv. indiv. indiv. patriciate 46.7 38.7 40.4 26.6 51.8 26.7 lesser nob. 46.7 38.7 45.1 29.8 34.0 17.6 commoners 6.2 5.1 13.8 9.3 13.8 7.1 uncertain 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.2 total 100.0 82.7 100.0 66.2 100.0 51.6 198 blocs of Bolognese investors w/ m 5 0 5 0 5 0 S 0 3 3 2 2 1 1 guts: 139: m 1655 m 1353 Figure 6.1 Blocs of Bolognese Investors 199 income distribution blots of investors 60 50 40 30 percentages 20 ’10 commoners lesser nobi l ity patriciate al I others m 1555 1595 W/A 1355 Figure 6.2 Income Distribution of Blocs of Investors :1 . J E . ! Within each segment we have indicated the number and the holdings of clerical pr0prietors, but we have not made clerics a separate group, because ecclesiastics formed an extremely 200 heterogeneous conglomerate. A good many noble families had at least one of their male members pursuing an ecclesiastical career, while, from the middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century, the doors of Bolognese cloisters Opened to an ever growing number of noble women. The oanonioi of S.Pietro and S.Petronio provided a traditional breeding ground, typically leading to brilliant rises through the ranks of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. If anything, the annexation of the city to the papal domains rendered especially appealing the pursuing of ecclesiastical careers. We may remind the reader that between 1555 and 1655 Bolognese families claimed twenty-seven cardinals, that is, as many as Bologna had claimed in the previous four centuries, one hundred bishops and three Popes.1 0n the other hand, both the secular and the regular clergy continued to enlist many who came from the lower rungs of the social ladder. In view of the surge of ecclesiastical corporate investment we observed in the preceding chapter, the presence of private clerics among bond-holders is surprisingly small. .Altogether their share of annual income increased from.a mere 4.1 percent in 1555, to 4.6 percent in 1595, to 5.6 percent in 1655. However, these figures are in part misleading because they refer only to those members of the clergy who were 1 Bolognese participated in the filling of other Important offices as well. According to Renata Ago, Bolognese routinely held posts as W (judgeS). as mmzi (Papal envoys) and as members of the congregazione_oe_fiono 83mins. See R. A90. (Bari, 1990), pp. 19- 42. 201 registered as owners or direct beneficiaries of accounts. It is important to keep in mind that the income of accounts registered to "faceless" ecclesiastical offices was pocketed by the clerics who filled those positions, even if they were not the legal proprietors. Moreover, we have noticed that accounts registered to ecclesiastics tended to be transfered to the agencies they were associated with. Not uncommonly, monastic houses became the registered owners of shares, the income of which could be earmarked in part or in_j;_o_to to provide for the needs of individual members of the house. W A sizable portion of accounts was held by residents of low or modest station. In fact, a share ranging approximately from one-sixth to one-fourth of accounts was registered to individuals who did not belong to distinguished families, nor could they boast access to the main civic offices. The mass of these middling investors elude us, except for a few individuals whose professional occupation was recorded by scribes. With the exception of members of the clergy, registers rarely permit precise identification. In 1595, for instance, scribes reported the profession of only fifteen out of 201 non-noble lay proprietors, and additional consultation of genealogical trees has been of little help in determining activities and occupations.2 ’ The multi-volume work of Giuseppe Guidicini and the edited by Luigi Breventani have been constant reference and an endless source of additional information 202 In the main, commoners’ investment lagged far behind that of their social superiors. Commoners.owned.fewer accounts and, more important, controlled a much smaller portion of the annual income generated by share ownership. In 1555, commoners held about 12 percent of all accounts, but only 5.1 percent of shares. And the average ner_oanita yearly income was 39 lire, much less than the 95 lire earned by noble holders. Similarly, common folks (including clerics) owned 18.8 percent of accounts in 1595, but less than 10 percent of shares. And in 1655 they fared even worse, with about 20 percent of accounts and only 7.1 percent of shares. Table 6.5 Income Distribution (Non-Noble Proprietors), 1555 (91 holders, annual dividend 3,521 lire) dividend number of % % of annual % % of range holders segment dividend segment (lire) > 1000 -- -- - -- - - 500 to 999 -- -- - 250 to 499 1 1.1 499 14.3 100 to 249 7 7.7 5.3 1 230 34.9 4.0 < 100 83 91.2 14.3 1,792 50.9 11.3 (about ordinary holders. See G. Guidicini, gose_notani1i_deiia Ma. 5 vols- (Bologna. 1868-73): idem, WW (Bologna. 1872): and W L. Breventani, - I I O I o o (Balogna' 1908). 203 Table 6.6 Income Distribution (Non-Noble Proprietors), 1595 (222 holders, annual div. 21,721 lire) dividend number of % % of annual % % of range holders segment dividend segment (lire) > 2000 - - -- - 1000 to 1999 1 0.4 1.7 1,274 5.8 1.2 500 to 999 8 3.6 5,515 25.4 250 to 499 7 3.1 2,470 11.3 100 to 249 41 18.5 14.9 6,271 28.9 13.0 < 100 165 74.3 21.6 6,191 28.5 23.8 Table 6.7 Income Distribution (Non-Noble Proprietors), 1655 (197 holders, annual div. 26,057 lire) dividend number of % % of annual % % of range holders segment dividend segment (lire) > 4000 - - -- - 2000 to 3999 1 0.5 2,126 8.1 1000 to 1999 1 0.5 2.3 1,073 4.1 1.4 500 to 999 7 3.5 4,490 17.2 250 to 499 23 11.7 8,295 31.8 100 to 249 36 18.3 19.1 5,265 20.2 16.1 < 100 129 65.5 21.8 4,808 18.5 21.1 Income distribution among commoners presents two salient features. As might have been expected, commoners claimed a «iisproportionally large share of small and.middling accounts. In 1595, for example, while non-noble investors pocketed less than 10 percent of yearly returns, they claimed nearly one fourth of the income generated by small accounts. On the other hand, their presence in the top brackets was negligible. In 204 1555 no commoners reached the 500 lire threshold in annual income, and only one can be found in the next segment, Sebastiano Pigini, about whom, however, we do not have additional information. In 1595, just one investor collected returns above 1,000 lire: Antonio Arrigoni, a tax-farmer (we have located his name among the cameral dazieri in 1601). 1655 we have found Cesare Taruffi and Giovanna Uccelli. The prevalence of small and middling accounts keeps with the character of a group, which was very numerous but the members of which were seldom affluent. Furthermore, those who amassed large fortunes tended to move rapidly upward. While this was common everywhere, it was perhaps more so in Bologna where, to the late sixteenth.century, statutes.did.not.bar the ennoblement of wealthy upstarts, and where wealth could be regarded as a oe_raoto indication of status.3 Witter: As one might expect, members of the Bolognese elite made up the most conspicuous bloc of bond-holders. For one thing, they owned the most accounts. In 1555, out of 653 accounts registered to Bolognese individuals, nobles claimed 558 (85.4 percent). In 1595 and 1655, 737 and 456 accounts out of 976 and 660 respectively (75.5 and 69.1 percent) were held by 3 This viewpoint was openly expressed by Camillo Baldi, an academic and a member of the Bolognese lesser nobility at the outset of the seventeenth century. See M. Fanti, "Le classi sociali e il governo di Bologna all'1n1zio del secolo XVII in un’ opera inedita di Camillo Baldi,"s_trenna_s_torioa_m1mneee 11 (1961):153. 205 members of distinguished families. To this concentration of ownership corresponded an even greater concentration of stock. Over 93 percent of the annual dividend paid to residents in 1555 went to noble holders. In 1595 and in 1655 it was 85.4 and 85.8 percent respectively. And noble bond-holders dominated the pyramid of investors as well. In 1555, all the twenty-five top accounts were owned by members of noble families. In 1595 nobles claimed all but one of the topithirty accounts, and in 1655 all but two of the top forty-six. In keeping with what Bolognese historians have traditionally called the nedietae of the Bolognese nobility, referring to a prudent balance of powers and economic assets among a large number of families, we have found that the sub- division of accounts between senatorial and non-senatorial nobility was remarkably even. As the spread of Table 6.9 indicates, members of senatorial families claimed less than half the total income received by noble holders in 1555 and 1595. In 1655 the senatorial share leaped to 60 percent, but it is likely that this surge is to be attributed not to a deepening internal rift, but rather to a progressive closing of ranks. A slow fusion of patrician lineages with prominent non-senatorial families combined.with.a dwindling recruitment of new nobles. Either because of the enaction of tighter requirements, or because of a lack of suitable candidates there were increasingly fewer new admissions. 206 Table 6.8 Bolognese Noble Proprietors (All), 1555-1655 n. of % of priv. annual % of priv. % of accounts accounts dividend dividend total (lire) 1555 560 85.4 53,008 93.4 77.3 1595 737 75.5 134,399 85.5 56.4 1655 456 69.1 162,857 85.8 44.3 Table 6.9 Bolognese Senatorial Nobility, 1555-1655 n. of sf. % of all sf. annual % of noble % of accounts noble acc.ts dividend dividend private (lire) income 1555 260 46.4 26,491 50.0 46.7 1595 332 45.0 63,440 47.2 40.4 1655 245 53.7 98,311 60.4 51.8 sf: members of senatorial families Table 6.10 Income Distribution (Noble Proprietors), 1555 (560 holders, annual dividend 53,008 lire) dividend number of % annual % % of range proprietors dividend segment (lire) > 1000 4 0.7 5,574 10.5 61.8 500 to 999 21 3.7 14,216 26.8 250 to 499 29 5.2 10,074 19.0 100 to 249 70 12.5 10,453 19.7 79.7 ‘< 100 437 78.0 12,691 23.9 79.7 The spread of Table 6.10 introduces several interesting features characterizing noble investment in 1555: first, it is clear that the purchase of securities was popular among members of distinguished families; second, the la st row 207 reveals that a large majority of proprietors owned small accounts: third, it was a minority of large and moderate holders that dominated the structure of ownership. In fact, less than one-fourth of proprietors (124) claimed over three- fourths of yearly returns. The twenty-five top investors alone (4.4 percent), received over one third of the income. Who were the leading investors? Four proprietors held large accounts: Filippo Albergati*, Ulisse Bentivoglio*, Galeazzo Riario and Matteo Amorini.‘ Twenty-one other holders could count on an annual dividend over 500 lire: Ludovico Calderini*, AntonioGaleazzo Malvasia*, Alessandro and Giorgio Manzoli*, Alessandro Gozzadini*, Achille, Filippo and Gio.Filippo Angelelli*, the eredi of Gualengo Ghisilieri*, Giulio and Vincenzo Bovio, Galeazzo Riario,’ Gio.Batta Mantachetti, Marcantonio Fibbia, Antonio Bonasoni, Pellegrino Fava, Francesco Luna, Nicola Bonfioli, Pietro Bonfigli, Cesare Zani, Bonifacio Negri, Giovanni Argile. The large number of accounts owned by noble persons indicates a favorable and widespread response to the issuance of obligations. It has to be remarked, however, that these holders belonged to a considerably narrower number of ‘ Asterisks identify senatorial lineages. 5 The Riario family resettled in Bologna after being ousted from the nearby town of Imola, of which the Papacy reclaimed control . Here they have been included among the non- senatorial families because they were awarded a senatorial post in 1572. 208 lineages. The top 123 proprietors of accounts represented seventy-six families, thirty-four of which enjoyed senatorial status. Although substantial holdings tended to be concentrated into relatively few hands, ownership of shares among several members of the same family was common. To name the most obvious cases, among proprietors of accounts we have found twelve Bentivoglio, twelve Fava, eleven Bargellini, eleven Bolognini, eleven Fantuzzi, ten Malvezzi, nine Bolognetti, nine Orsi, nine Machiavelli, eight Bianchini and eight Desideri. Proprietors cannot be regarded as entirely independent entities. Individuals were bound together into groupings based on a variety of relationships. Here we consider only those clusterings of individuals based on blood relationship, indicated in the sharing of a common family name. The compacting of accounts according to family names is not without problems. We have limited it to the upper classes because the concept of family as a kinship group based on lineage appears to have been less important among social groups which had little property to transmit. Furthermore, in most such other cases we rarely possess sufficient information to determine blood relationships. In the main, to avoid gross misrepresentation, we have tried to identify kinsmen and to eliminate non-family members who happened to have the same name. To do so, we have regularly referred to the genealogical 209 studies of Dolfi, Carrati and Guidicini.“ To be sure, the operation remains to some extent questionable. In the sixteenth century important families were often numerous and it is therefore likely that some of the individuals we have included were in reality the impoverished relatives of the truly affluent. On the whole however, we are confident that in spite of occasional mistakes this clustering conveys an accurate picture of the pattern of investment in securities among Bolognese families. In Table 6 . 11 we have arranged accounts according to two variables: family name and yearly dividend range. We have found that a total of eighty-nine families, receiving annual returns of at least one-hundred lire, dominated the bond- market and claimed nearly 71 percent of annual interest payments. That share leaped to a monopolistic 91.5 percent, when only returns pocketed by noble proprietors are considered. Yet, distribution was even more skewed: the leading thirty-four families, those entitled to yearly returns of 500 lire and above, controlled more than half of the documented income . ‘ See P.Dolfi. tmnologiaJellLfamigliLnohiliJi W W (Bologna, 1670): BCB, B.Carrati, ' ' ° ' , 8698/2, B699, B700, B701, B702, dated 1778: idem. W. 8791. dated 1758; ASB, G.Guidicini, W, without date. 210 Table 6.11 Income Distribution (Noble Families), 1555 (yearly dividend paid to noble proprietors 53,008 lire) dividend n. of total % % of range families dividend total (lire) < 1000 lire 12 18,972 35.8 27.7 500 to 999 22 15,533 29.3 22.7 100 to 499 55 13,972 26.3 20.4 Which were the families that dominated the pyramid of investors? Twenty-two families collected yearly returns ranging from 500 to 1,000 lire: Argile, Banci, Bargellini*, Bianchini*, Bolognetti*, Bonasoni, Buoi, Calderini*, Campeggi*, Fantuzzi*, Fibbia, Ghisilieri*, Legnani*, Luna, Magnani*, Malvezzi*, Mantachetti, Marsili*, Negri, Pini, Poeti*, Zani. Twelve families received an annual income of more than 1,000 lire: Bonfigli, Bonfioli, Fava, Gozzadini*, :Malvasia*, Riario, Albergati*, Amorini, Bovio, Manzoli*, Angelelli* and Bentivoglio*. Members of these top twelve families alone gained 18,874 lire, over one fourth of the overall dividend paid to montieti. Where did these eighty-nine families stand in the political scene of mid-sixteenth century Bologna? A good many of them (forty) were part of the senatorial elite, which icontrolled the civic government. By 1555 sixty-five families 211 enjoyed the W? In the list which follows we have matched family names and annual dividends, asterisks have been used to mark the families which actually held a senatorial post in 1555. A.capital "A” has been used to identify patrician families that from 1506 to 1555 frequently had one of their kin on the board of the eight Anziani as well. As we observed earlier, the post of anziano carried little actual power, yet the trappings and the prestige that went with it remained highly coveted. Regular presence on this board can be taken as an additional indication of a family’s standing and of its members' public visibility. Instead, a capital "E" marks those families which, at the date of the observation, had no surviving members.‘ We can note that six of these sixty-five families were among the top proprietors (over 1,000 lire of income), while other thirty-four had considerable holdings (over 100 lire of income). Of the remaining twenty-five families, nineteen had small holdings (less than 100 lire of income) and six had no documented holdings at all. 7 The Bolognetti have been included in this group: they entered the Senate in 1556. See A.Masini, Boioona_ner1nstrata (Bologna, 1666), v. 3, pp. 10-11. ‘ In a number of cases we have found accounts registered in the name of unspecified neredi. Since we have not been able to identify the actual beneficiaries, we have entered the recorded amounts, commonly modest sums, under the name indicated by the registers. 212 Table 6.12 Income Distribution (Senatorial Families), 1555 (65 families, annual dividend 26,491) dividend n. of % annual % % of range families dividend total (lire) > 1000 6 9.2 10,851 41.0 15.8 500 to 999 12 18.5 8,777 33.1 12.8 100 to 499 22 33.8 5,901 22.3 8.6 < 100 19 29.2 969 3.6 1.4 no holdings 6 9.2 -- s l 0 1 I I : Albergati *A(1,544) Ercolani *A(303) Manzoli *A(2,349) Aldrovandi *A(225) Fantuzzi *A(762) Marescotti *A Angelelli A(2,053) Felicini *A(265) Marsili *A(592) Ariosti A Foscherari *A(192) Montecalvi A(44) Armi *A(165) Ghisilardi *A(124) Orsi *A(250) Bargellini *A(791) Ghisilieri *A(745) Paleotti *A(127) Bentivoglio *A(2,118) Gozzadini *A(1,539)Paltroni A(9) Grassi *A(87) Pasi A(408) Bianchetti *A(141) Grati A(65) Pellegrini *A(372) Bianchi A Griffoni A(56) Pepoli *A(3) Bianchini *A (884) Guastavillani A Poeti *A(657) Bolognetti *A(771) Guidotti A(70) Dal Purgo (3) Bolognini *A(465) Isolani *A(66) Ranuzzi A Caccialupi *A(46) Lambertini A(36) Renghieri A(261) Caccianemici A(95) Legnani A(524) Rossi A(58) Calderini *A(902) Lini A Salaroli Campeggi *A(690) Loiani A(206) Sampieri *A(260) Carbonesi A(318) Ludovisi *A(228) Sanuti (93) E Casali *A(87) Lupari *A(382) Sassoni A(297) Castelli *A(20) Magnani A(505) Vitali * A(47) Cattani A(239) Malvasia *A(1,249) Volta * A(448) Cospi *A(81) Malvezzi *A(954) Zambeccari *A (219) All but five of the sixty-two active patrician families, and all but one of the forty families which in 1555 had a member sitting in the Senate owned accounts. However, only a fraction of them (five) received yearly returs of 1,000 lire 213 and above, while another twenty-five families filled the middle bracket. Altogether six of the sixty-five families which dominated the Bolognese political scene had large investments, while thirty-four had moderate holdings. Several distinguished families had little or no documented income. In this last segment we find impoverished lineages as the Bianchi,’ but also the puzzling presence of powerful families as the Pepoli and the Ranuzzi. Within the senatorial elite, in numerous circumstances it was not the senators themselves who were the main proprietors of accounts. For instance, senator Cornelio Albergati collected 13 lire in yearly dividend from his inooni, while his cousin, Filippo, was one of the largest Bolognese stockholder. Yearly interest from his inoohi yielded 1,526 lire. A more complex example is provided by the distribution of stock among members of the Bentivoglio family. Senator Ercole Bentivoglio was the proprietor of a relatively small account, yielding 56 lire in annual dividend. However, a sizable account, yielding 262 lire yearly, was still registered to his recently deceased father, senator Antonio. Ercole’s distant cousins Andalo and Andrea had invested considerabe sums and collected 130 and 499 lire a year, respectively. However, the proprietor of the family’s largest ’ According to a comment reported by Salvioni, in 1550 oonte Gualtirotto Bianchi was so impoverished that the Senate granted 600 sondi as a dowry to his daughters. See 6.8-Salvioni. WW (Bologna. 1961). p. 412. 214 account was Ercole’s young nephew Ulisse, who received 1060 lire in yearly interest. Yet another example is provided by the Malvasia brothers. Five held accounts, but the largest stockholder was AntonGaleazzo, a distinguished academic, with an annual income of 935 lire, while senator Cornelio came a distant second with 148 lire. On the whole , we have found that twenty-two of the forty senators in office in 1555 were among proprietors of accounts, and nine of them were entitled to annual returns of at least one hundred lire: Giorgio Manzoli (868 lire), Alessandro Bianchini (382 lire), AntonioMaria Campeggi (221 lire), Niccolo Ludovisi (104 lire), Alessandro Lupari (150 lire), Cornelio Malvasia (148 lire), Gio.Battista Sampieri (139 lire), Gaspare Armi (110 lire), FilippoCarlo Ghisilieri (105 lire). Thirteen senators collected more modest sums: Cornelio Albergati (13 lire), Ercole Bentivoglio (56 lire), Bartolomeo Bolognini (49 lire), Floriano Caccialupi (46 lire), Vincenzo Ercolani (75 lire), Romeo Foscherari (22 lire), Girolamo Grassi (4 lire), Ulisse Gozzadini (50 lire), Giacomo Orsi (64 lire), Camillo Paleotti (40 lire), Ottavio Pellegrini (16 lire), Ercole Poeti (19 lire), Lelio Vitali (28 lire). Altogether, members of the 1555 Senate claimed 2,709 lire, about 5 percent of the dividend paid to Bolognese montieri. Let us turn our attention to the non-senatorial nobility. Fifty of the top ninety families, and sixteen of the leading thirty-four belonged to this group. Among the most important investing families we find lineages whose members regularly 215 held civic offices. In particular, we have examined the roll of the prestigious magistracy of the anziani. The main investing non-senatorial families fared as follows (the number of times kinsmen sat in office is given in parentheses): Amorini (seven), Argeli (six), Banci (nine), Bonasoni (sixteen), Bonfigli (eleven), Bonfioli (one), Bovio (fifteen), Buoi (two), Fava (twenty), Fibbia (one), Luna (one), Mantachetti (thirteen), Negri (seven), Pini (twenty- one), Riario (none) and Zani (eighteen). Excluding the Bonfioli and the Riario, families that had only recently settled in Bologna, from the nearby towns of Ferrara and Imola respectively, we may note that just three of these families did not have a member frequently in office. As we have remarked earlier, one way of assessing a family's importance is to measure its public visibility, that is to monitor admission to office of its members. Given the relatively easy access to ennobling forms of citizenship, which granted eligibility to magistracies, quantitative measures of actual admission may prove useful to identify the most prominent lineages. Between 1506 and 1555, over 200 families, not counting senatorial lineages, were represented on the board of the anzimi. Yet, only a fraction of those families had a member in office with a certain frequency. In the list that follows, we have included the names of those non-senatorial lineages that, from 1506 to 1555, claimed a post at least six times. We have then matched names with the annual income members of these families received in 1555. 216 E . ! _ ! . J 1. : Amorini (1,858) Banci (518) Benacci (5) Bocchi (326) Bonfigli (1,036) Bottrigari (54) Carlini Chiari (248) Dainese (53) Dosi(446) Fronti Dal Gambaro (15) Gessi (85) Lodi Marescalchi (110) Negri(824) Paselli (6) Ramondini (27) Romanzi (8) Saracini (24) Serpa (8) Venenti (13) Zani (808) Argeli (531) Barbieri (142) Bero (22) Bonasoni (750) Bonsignori (2) Canonici Cattelani(8) Conti (35) Desideri (184) Fasanini (373) Gabrielli (461) Garganelli Gigli (405) Lombardi (223) Merighi (103) Odofredi Piatesi (6) Rigosa (164) Ruggeri (128) Savignani (26) Tossignani (32) Vizzani (242) Aristoteli Beccadelli (6) Boccadiferro (46) Boncompagni Bovio (1,792) Caprara (329) Cavallini (26) Cortelli (80) Dolfi (8) Fava (1,082) Gambalonga Garzoni Leoni (263) Mantachetti (801) Muletti (90) Pannolini (214) Pini (502) Roffeni (81) Sala (6) Scappi (270) Usberti (120) Zanettini (19) The sixty-seven families listed above figured prominently both as office-holders, and as stock-holders. In fact, members of these families claimed about 60 percent (15,934 lire) of annual returns received by their group. If we add these sixty- seven families to the sixty-two politically active patrician lineages we have listed earlier, it emerges that the 129 families that dominated the Bolognese political scene of 1555 dominated the market of securities as well. Altogether, ;proprietors who were part of these 129 politically prominent lineages claimed 75.5 percent of the annual returns received I y individual Bolognese nontieti_or, to put things in broader perspective, 61.8 percent of the overall documented dividend. 217 Office-holders formed the group that stands out here: their participation in investment in the bond market was widespread and financially very substantial. Twenty-nine of the thirty-four families clustered in the first two rows of Table 6.11 belonged to this bloc of 129 lineages. At the opposite end of the ladder, we have found just fifteen families (11.5 percent) without any documented holding. If anything, these observations confirm a strong correlation between family office-holding and stock-holding. In the main, while members of distinguished families were common buyers of shares, it would seem that members of politically prominent lineages were particularly active. It has to be noted, however, that widespread share-ownership among dominant families, combined with very uneven investment. There seems no general rule for dividing those individuals and families which invested heavily in stock from those which did not. For purpose of comparison one would ideally like to have precise knowledge of how much capital noble families had tied in other forms of safe investment, such as real estate. Unfortunately, this kind of information lies scattered in a multitude of family archives and, especially for the sixteenth and seventeenth century, still awaits to be assembled. It is nonetheless tempting to think of a certain degree of Specialized investment. Investment in stock was one of the forms through which dominant families perpetuated their wealth and position. But it is possible that while most noble 218 families did own shares of the debt, only a minority of them relied heavily on this form of investment for their income. Our conjecture does not conflict with the sparse pieces of information we have about a few families, whose sixteenth- century' land. possessions {are .relatively' well known. For instance, the Felicini, the Pepoli, the Rossi and the Volta, all lineages with moderate or even very small documented investment in obligations, were among the top propertied families in the first half of the sixteenth century.10 Table 6.13 Income Distribution (Noble Proprietors), 1595 (737 holders, annual div. 134,399 lire) dividend number of % annual % % of range proprietors dividend segment (lire) > 2000 6 0.8 17,772 13.2 1000 to 1999 23 3.1 30,582 22.8 47.2 500 to 999 35 4.7 24,820 18.5 250 to 499 77 10.4 26,760 19.9 100 to 249 120 16.3 18,872 14.0 64.1 < 100 476 64.6 15,593 11.6 59.8 The spread of Table 6.13 does not introduce salient new elements in the structure of income distribution, rather it sharply emphasizes the features we have already observed in Irable 6.9. In 1595 twenty-nine top buyers accounted for over Ione-third of the yearly dividend paid to Bolognese montieti. Sixteen of them came from the ranks of the senatorial ‘° See B Farolfi.$tmtture_agrarie__e_crisi_cittad1na_nel orimLQinmaecentLhoiosnese (Bologna. 1977). pp- 16-21- 219 nobility: Giovanni and Marcantonio Angelelli, Cecilia Bargellini, Battista and Costante Bentivoglio, Lucrezia Bolognetti, Niccolo Bonfioli, Antonio Campeggi, Rodolfo Ercolani, Carlo Ghisilieri, commenoa Griffoni, Lorenzo Magnani, Annibale and Galeazzo Paleotti, Raffaele Riario, Bartolomeo Sampieri. Thirteen belonged to non-senatorial families: Girolamo Ballatini, Rinaldo Balzani, Camillo Chiari, Fabio Gioanetti, Ulisse and Vincenzo Leoni, Gio.Antonio Pietramellara, Ludovico Ratta, Giovanni jr. and Giulio Torfanini, Elisabetta Tostini, Matteo Zani. In Table 6.14 we have grouped accounts according to lineages. Widespread participation and uneven distribution are the key aspects: a total of 156 noble families claimed annual returns of at least one-hundred lire. Distribution, however, was considerably more skewed: a mere thirty-seven families controlled two-thirds of dividends paid to noble proprietors. Table 6.14 Income Distribution (Noble Families), 1595 (annual dividend 134,399 lire) dividend number of annual % % of range families dividend total (lire) > 1000 37 84,985 63.3 35.6 500 to 999 34 25,449 18.9 10.7 100 to 499 85 20,848 15.5 8.7 Which were the families that dominated the bond market in 1595? In the top row of Table 6.14 we find thirty-seven families receiving over 1,000 lire in annual dividends. 220 Twenty-five of these families collected returns ranging from 1,000 to 2,000 lire:11L Alidosi, Armi*, Ballatini, Balzani, Bargellini*, Bero, Buoi, Caprara, Chiari, Dioli, Fava, Gioanetti, Grassi*, Griffoni*, Lombardi, Magnani*, Malvezzi*, Marsili*, Matugliani, Orsi*, Pietramellara, Sampieri*, Tostini, Vizzani, Zani. Eight families claimed an annual income ranging from 2,000 to 4,000 lire: Angelelli*, Bentivoglio*, Bolognetti*, Bonfioli*, Ercolani*, Leoni, Paleotti*, Ratta. And four families received returns which surpassed 4,000 lire: Campeggi*, Ghisilieri*, Riario* and Torfanini. Altogether, they totalled over one-third of the overall documented income generated by interest-bearing shares. One-third of the 156 families documented in Table 6.14 were patrician, but senatorial lineages dominated the top brackets of income. In fact eighteen of the top thirty-seven families were patrician, and.they listed three of the top four earning families (over 4,000 lire of income), and six of the eight clustered in the next class (over 2,000 lire). 1’ Asterisks have been used to identify the eighteen senatorial families. 221 Table 6.15 Income Distribution (Senatorial Families), 1595 (76 families, annual dividend 63,440 lire) dividend n. of % annual % % of range families dividend total (lire) > 1000 18 23.7 47,071 74.2 19.7 500 to 999 13 17.1 10,379 16.4 4.3 100 to 499 22 28.9 5,407 8.5 2.3 < 100 14 18.4 583 0.9 0.2 no holdings 9 11.8 --- Eleven newly admitted lineages brought to seventy-six the pool of patrician families listed in 1595. Eight of these new families owned accounts, but only two, the Riario and the Bonfioli, were large stockholders. Altogether, over two-thirds of senatorial families held accounts yielding annual returns of at least one-hundred lire. Active families were present in an even higher proportion: three-fourths of the fifty families having a member sitting in office in 1595 collected substantial returns (over 100 lire), and fifteen of them, a little less than one-third, pocketed large returns. At the opposite end of the spectrum, twelve of the families holding a senatorial post in 1595 had small or no holdings. Once again, their number included a few important lineages, such as the Aldrovandi, the Castelli, the Guastavillani, the Isolani and the Marescotti. Broadly speaking, the correlation between a family’s Political importance, as expressed by offices held by its members, and ownership of shares remains strong. The fifty 222 families which held a senatorial post in 1595 accounted for 87 percent of returns claimed by all patrician families in 1595. However, any direct linkage between individual, rather than family, ownership of accounts and office-holding remains indecisive, at best. In fact, despite an increase in the number of senatorial posts from forty to fifty, the number of senators registered as proprietors of accounts declined. There were twenty-three senators proprietors of accounts in 1555 , we have found twenty-one in 1595. And only four of them collected large returns: Galeazzo Paleotti, Lorenzo Magnani, Agostino Marsili and Rodolfo Bonfioli. Altogether senators in office collected 6,471 lire, about one-tenth of the dividend paid to members of senatorial families, or, to put things in broader perspective, 4.1 percent of the income claimed by all Bolognese private proprietors. Patrician families kept distributing accounts among a large number of members. The Angelelli, the Bargellini, the Orsi and the Bonfioli were proprietors of eight accounts, the Guidotti, and the Manzoli were owners of nine, the Bolognini, the Grati and the Gozzadini owned ten accounts, the Bentivoglio and the Ghisilieri eleven, the Ercolani twelve, the Bolognetti fourteen, and the Malvezzi had fifteen accounts. However, with the notable exception of the Bolognini, the Gozzadini and the Malvezzi, distribution of mm was uneven. Giovanni, Marcantonio and Camillo, heads of the three main branches of the Angelelli, controlled over 90 percent of the family investment. Likewise, the brothers 223 Ottavio and Rodolfo accounted for nearly two thirds of the iaogni owned by the Ercolani. Senatorial_lineage§:“ Families admitted to the Senate before 1555: Albergati *A(256) Ercolani A(2,448) Manzoli *A(845) Aldrovandi *A(3) Fantuzzi *A(135) Marescotti A* Angelelli *A(3,574) Felicini A(35) Marsili *A(1,075) Ariosti A(444) Foscherari A(969) Montecalvi (49) Armi *A(l,121) Ghisilardi *A(402) Orsi *A(l,204) Ghisilieri *A(6,402)Paleotti *A(3,045) Bargellini *A(1,817)Gozzadini *A(966) Paltroni (1) Bentivoglio*A(3,758)Grassi *A(1,201) Pasi A(247) Bianchetti *A(526) Grati *A(755) Pellegrini A(101) Bianchi *A Griffoni A(1,344) Pepoli *A(4l9) Bianchini A(198) Guastavillani*A(19) Poeti *A(41) Bolognetti *A(2,641)Guidotti *A(608) Dal Purgo (11) Bolognini *A(979) Isolani *A(95) Ranuzzi A(233) Caccialupi A(52) Lambertini *A(238) Renghieri A(84) Caccianemici E Legnani *A(204) Rossi A(132) Calderini *A(215) Lini * Salaroli Campeggi *(4,763) Loiani A(132) Sampieri *A(1,845) Carbonesi A Ludovisi A(331) Sanuti (137) E Casali *A(891) Lupari *A(958) Sassoni (29) Castelli *A(12) Magnani *A(1,889) Vitali A(602) Cattani A(241) Malvasia *A(815) Volta A(242) Cospi *A(594) Malvezzi *A(1,421) Zambeccari *A(358) Families admitted to the Senate between 1555 and 1595: Bandini A(57) Fachinetti *(872) Piatesi A(152) Boncompagni A* Ghiselli *A(95) Riario *A(5,280) Bonfioli * (2,242) Marescalchi *A(140) Ruini *A Boschetti A* Scappi *A(450) In keeping with the medierae of the Bolognese elite, perhaps further broadened by a high number of new admissions during the second half of the sixteenth century, it is not surprising to see a very substantial presence of the non- 1“ Asterisks indicate families with a member in office in .1595: "AP marks families which held at least six times a post on the board of the anziani from 1556 to 1595. 224 senatorial nobility, members of which held over 40 percent of accounts registered to Bolognese individuals, and claimed 45 percent of the dividend. Even within the group of the top thirty-seven investing families, clustered in the first row of Table 14, non-patrician families held a slight numerical advantage (nineteen to eighteen). Particularly significant was the presence of the seventy non-senatorial families listed below, whose members sat frequently on the board of the anziani. Sixty-six of these families owned accounts, and fourteen of them were among the top thirty-seven investing lineages. Five large stock-holding families do not appear in our list: the Alidosi, the Ballatini, the Balzani, the Matugliani and the Tostini. However, only two, the Alidosi and the Tostini, did not hold a post.among the eight.anziani, at least once between 1555 and 1595.“3 The Ballatini and the Balzani sat on the board of the anziani twice, the Matugliani, four times. ’3 Both families had foreign origins: the Alidosi came from Pavia and the Tostini from Fiorenzuola. The latter had been granted an ennobling form of oiyirae in 1576. 225 E . ! _ ! . J 1' : Alamandini (655) Banci (532) Bero (1,483) Bocchi (228) Bonsignori (268) Budrioli (232) Chiari (1,375) Dolfi (158) Fava (1,284) Fronti (479) Gessi (589) Gioanetti (1,920) Lombardi (1,535) H6911 (972) Nascentori (47) Pannolini (224) Amorini (369) Barbazzi (213) Beroaldi (118) Bombelli Bovio (897) Buoi (1,924) Desideri (98) Dosi (712) Fibbia (274) Gabrielli (36) Ghelli (103) Graffi (70) Maggi (17) Monteceneri (68) Negri (435) Parati (160) Pietramellara(1,802)Pini (250) Rigosa (133) Ruggeri (21) Savignani(14) Seghicelli(600) Torfanini(6,193) Vezza Zani (1,902) These seventy families totalled an income of 46,164 lire, nearly two-thirds of the entire group’s income. Altogether, the predominance among stock-holders of politically active families was remarkably pronounced. If we add the holdings of the sixty-eight active senatorial families to the stock of the seventy non-senatorial families listed above, we find that the 138 families that dominated the political scene in 1595 controlled the bond market as well, claiming nearly 70 percent Roffeni (581) Salimbeni (430) Seccadenari (66) Serpa (249) Tossignani (142) Vittori (6) Aristoteli (53) Barbieri (51) Boccadiferro (635) Bonasoni Bottrigari(218) Caprara (1,421) 01011 (1,320) Fabretti (29) Fondazza (31) Garzoni (105) Ghiavarino(951) Leoni (3,352) Merighi (435) Morandi Orazi Paselli (29) Ratta (3,625) Romanzi (221) Sangiorgi (816) Segni (526) Tanari (274) Venenti (233) Vizzani (1,702) of dividends received by Bolognese private proprietors. 226 Table 6.16 Income Distribution (Noble Proprietors), 1655 (456 holders, annual div. 162,857 lire) dividend number of % annual % % of range proprietors dividend segment (lire) > 4000 6 1.3 35,513 21.8 2000 to 3999 14 3.1 37,432 23.0 1000 to 1999 24 5.3 34,427 21.1 46.2 500 to 999 25 5.5 18,508 11.4 250 to 499 52 11.4 17,682 10.9 100 to 249 63 13.8 10,586 6.5 41.6 < 100 272 59.6 8,709 5.3 38.1 Income distribution in 1655 presents a narrower base, combined with a remarkably pronounced polarization. Forty-four holders, members of thirty-six families, controlled about two- thirds of the annual income. The top six bond-holders alone (1.3 percent) claimed over one-fifth of yearly returns. At the opposite end of the ladder, the 272 proprietors (59.6 percent) clustered in the bottom row of Table 6.16, received just one- twentieth of the annual income. The forty-four leading proprietors were:“ Girolamo Albergati*, Andrea, Achille, AngeloMaria, Gio.Francesco and Pantasilea Angelelli*, Antonio Argeli, Elena and Filippo Ballatini, Ginevra Barbieri, Astorre and Pietro (bishop) Bargellini*, Costanzo Bentivoglio*, Antonio Bonfioli*, Gio.Ludovico Bovio*, Federico Calderini*, Achille Canonici, Ippolito Cattani*, Carlo Cattelani, PietroAntonio Davia, 1‘ Asterisks have been used to identify members of Senatorial families. 227 Cristina Dioli, Astorre Ercolani*, Cesare (cardinal) Fachinetti*, Camilla Fantuzzi*, Berlingerro Gessi*, Andrea Ghisilardi*, ereoi_Griffoni*, Vincenzo)Magnani*, CarloFilippo Malvezzi*, Ciro and Ercole Marescotti*, Annibale Marsili*, Gio.Antonio Pietramellara*, Lucrezia Pini, Giuseppe Rainieri, Marcantonio Ranuzzi*, Dionisio Ratta, Ferdinando Riario*, Alessandro Sampieri*, GaspareMaria and Gio.Battista Scala, Camilla Stiatici, Gio.Niccolo Tanara* and Giacomo Tortorelli. Table 6.17 Income Distribution (Noble Families), 1655 (annual dividend 162,857 lire) dividend number of annual % % of range families dividend total (lire) > 1000 47 134,755 82.7 36.7 500 to 999 19 12,803 7.9 3.5 100 to 499 50 12,611 7.7 3.4 The spread of Table 6.17 emphasizes the salient features already outlined in the reading of Table 6.16: a narrower numerical base and a greater maldistribution of dividends. The number of families earning over one-hundred lire was down about 25 percent, from 156 documented families in 1595 to 116. But the top segment of large investing families increased over 25 percent, from thirty-seven to forty-seven families. Similarly, the share of annual income claimed by the families grouped in the top bracket, rose nearly twenty percental points, reaching a commanding 82.7 percent of the annual returns received by noble proprietors. 228 Which were then the forty-seven families that dominated the bond-market in 1655? Twenty-nine of them possessed the dignita___eenatoria: Albergati, Angelelli, Bargellini, Bentivoglio, Bolognetti, Bolognini, Bonfioli, Bovio, Calderini, Cattani, Ercolani, Fachinetti, Fantuzzi, Gessi, Ghisilardi, Ghisilieri, Griffoni, Magnani, Malvasia, Malvezzi, Marescotti, Marsili, Paleotti, Pietramellara, Ranuzzi, Riario, Sampieri, Tanara and Zambeccari. The remaining eighteen noble families of non-senatorial ranking were: Argeli, Ballatini, Barbieri, Canobi, Canonici, Cattelani, Davia, Dioli, Dosi, Fava, Leoni, Pini, Prati, Rainieri, Ratta, Scala, Stiatici and Tortorelli. The relative narrowing of the stockholding base mostly translated into greater concentration of shares and fewer per- family accounts. The number of senatorial lineages with at least eight proprietors of accounts dropped from fourteen in 1595 to just five in 1655: the Cattani, the Magnani, the Bentivoglio, the Ghisilardi and the Ghisilieri. In keeping with this trend, a larger number of senators can be found among the top proprietors. Overall the number of senators possessing accounts climbed to twenty-five, half those in office. And eleven of them earned a large annual income: Ludovico Bovio (3,114 lire), Ciro Marescotti (1,449 lire), Marcantonio Ranuzzi (8,308 lire), Andrea Ghisilardi (1,085 lire), Astorre Bargellini (1,695 lire), Gio.Antonio Pietramellara (1,518 lire), Vincenzo Magnani (2,969 lire), Girolamo Albergati (2,315 lire), Ferdinando Riario (4,880 229 lire), Gio.Francesco Angelelli (1,649 lire), Gio.Niccolo Tanara (3,820 lire). As a group, senators claimed a larger portion of yearly income as well. Together they accounted for 34,397 lire, over one-third of the income received by the 245 members of senatorial families, or about 18 percent of the annual dividend cashed by all Bolognese individual nonrieti. Twenty-five of the fifty senatorial families with a member in office in 1655 owned accounts yielding annual returns of at least 1,000 lire: and other fifteen claimed a moderate income. The greater number of families collecting large dividends combined with a solid minority of families with no documented stake. It has to be remarked, however, that several of the thirty-two families clustered in the twoflbottom segments of Table 6.18 were either withering, or were being relegated to the margins of the political scene. Patrician status must have had a hollow ring to families such as the Loiani, the Bandini, the: Carbonesi, the Dal Purgo, the Mbntecalvi, the Salaroli, the Vitali. At the middle of the seventeenth century, these families had not had a member dressed in senatorial robes for several decades. A few other families had practically cast their names and their fortunes with other lineages: the Manzoli had merged with the Barbazzi, the Rossi with the Marsili. Still others, the Caccialupi, the Caccianemici, the Paltroni, the Sanuti and the Sassoni had died out, even if at times their shares continued to be registered in the name of unspecified.ereai. However, no less 230 than ten of these thirty-two families with little or no documented holdings had a member in office. Table 6.18 Income Distribution (Senatorial Families), 1655 (87 families, annual dividend 98,311 lire) dividend n. of % annual % %of range families dividend total (lire) > 1000 29 33.3 89,331 90.9 24.3 500 to 999 6 6.9 4,471 4.5 1.2 100 to 499 15 17.2 3,572 3.6 1.0 < 100 16 18.4 937 0.9 0.2 no holdings 16 18.4 --- 231 Senatorial lineages:15 Families admitted to the Senate before 1555: Albergati *A(2,728) Ercolani *A(5,048) Manzoli A(87) Aldrovandi A(50) Fantuzzi *A(2,027) Marescotti *A(4,449) Angelelli *A(8,110) Felicini A(15) Marsili *A(1,548) Ariosti A(458) Foscherari A(17) Montecalvi Armi A(16) Ghisilardi *A(3,812)0rsi *A(573) Ghisilieri *A(1,107)Paleotti *A(1,111) Bargellini *A(4,915)Gozzadini *A(153) Paltroni E Bentivoglio*A(2,560)Grassi *A(ll) Pasi A(376) Bianchetti *A Grati *A(47) Pellegrini A(100) Bianchi A Griffoni A(1,580) Pepoli *A(795) Bianchini *A(6) Guastavillani*A(100)Poeti A(96) Bolognetti *A(1,594)Guidotti *A(120) Dal Purgo Bolognini A(1,344)Isolani *A(782) Ranuzzi *A(8,319) Caccialupi (64) E Lambertini *A(349) Renghieri A(2) Caccianemici E Legnani *A(128) Rossi A Calderini *A(2,005) Lini A(87) Salaroli Campeggi *A(32) Loiani (17) Sampieri *A(2,524) Carbonesi A(26) Ludovisi * (7) Sanuti (182) E Casali *A Lupari *A(707) Sassoni E Castelli A(l4l) Magnani *A(3,429) Vitali A(68) Cattani A(3,255) Malvasia *A(l,420) Volta *A Cospi *A(224) Malvezzi *A(4,684) Zambeccari *A(1,057) Families admitted to the Senate between 1555 and 1595: Bandini Fachinetti *A(1,529)Piatesi A Boncompagni * Ghiselli A Riario *A(4,898) Bonfioli *A (3,478) Marescalchi A Ruini (340) Boschetti A(29) Scappi *A Families admitted to the Senate between 1595 and 1655: Barbazzi *A(702) Gessi *A(1,203) Segni A(494) Bovio *A(3,521) Pietramellara*A(2,257)Spada *(127) Caprara *A(280) Seccadenari A(9) Tanara *A(3,820) Fibbia *A(5) Vizzani A(912) As we saw earlier, the pattern of investment witnessed some significant changes at the middle of the seventeenth century. For one thing, participation in the securities market “’Asterisks indicate families with.a member in office in 1655: "A” marks families which held at least six times a post on the board of the anziani from 1600 to 1655. 232 narrowed considerably. The lesser nobility was the group that bore the brunt of this development: compared to 1595, both its presence and its financial weight, relative to the other blocs of Bolognese investors, decreased ten percental points. In absolute figures, the drop was even more dramatic: between 1595 and 1655 the number of documented proprietors was nearly halved. What we might call the "demographics" of the nobility help to explain this decline. The shrinking pool of share- holders reflected a narrowing of the overall base of noble families. Broadly speaking, while distinguished families continued to replenish the ranks of the senatorial elite, the number of newly recruited families dwindled. In fact, from 1596 to 1655 members of eleven lineages entered the Senate for the first time, exactly the same number admitted from 1556 to 1595. On the other hand, the number' of newly’ ennobled individuals and families decreased considerably. After the flood of admissions of the sixteenth century, access of new nobles levelled off. The number of ennobling citizenships issued by the Senate fell off: there were seventy-one documented admissions from 1506 to 1555, fifty-six from 1555 to 1595, but just thirty-three from 1595 to 1655. In other words, the rate of successful candidacies decreased from four every three years in the period 1506-1595, to one every two years in the period 1595-1655. The number of non-senatorial families whose members were regularly admitted to the magistracy of the anziani confirms this decline. We have 233 identified sixty-seven families in 1555, seventy families in 1595, and just fifty-seven in 1655. As might have been expected, new families accounted for the difference: thirty- two new lineages entered the 1595 list, while only nineteen are to be found in the 1655 list. E o ! ‘fiifliIQIjal lineages: Alamandini (406) Alle Amorini (219) Ballatini (6,363) Banci (955) Barbieri (1,803) Beccadelli (6) Bero (21) Beroaldi Boccadiferro (387) Bocchi Bombaci (309) Bonasoni (546) Bonsignori Bottrigari Buoi Chiari Dioli (2,269) Dolfi Dondini (4) Dosi (1,016) Fava (2,083) Fiessi Fioravanti(648) Formagliari Gabrielli Gaggi Gandolfi (103) Garzoni (356) Ghelli (53) Ghiavarino Giovagnoni (191)Graffi (111) Lazzari Leoni (1,115) Matugliani (18) Merighi Moneta Monteceneri Morandi (355) Palmieri (588) Paselli Pedrini-Ventura(50)Pini (1,294) Pollicini (140) Ratta (4,105) Roffeni (56) Sangiorgi Scala(4,324) Solimei (323) Torfanini (5) Tortorelli(2,687) Tossignani Vezza (45) Vittori Zani (588) Zenzifabri (55) We have listed above the f ifty-seven non-senatorial families whose members sat regularly on the board of the anziani from 1600 to 1655. Altogether, proprietors who belonged to these fifty-seven off ice-holding families received an annual income of 33,605 lire, that is, over 50 percent of Yearly returns claimed by all noble holders of non-senatorial ralnking. The connection between off ice-holding and share-ownership is; only marginally weaker. In fact, when the pool of these fi fty-seven families is added to the seventy-six active 234 senatorial lineages listed earlier, it emerges that members of these 133 prominent families accounted for some 70 percent of shares purchased by Bolognese individuals, and controlled nearly 90 percent of what the top 47 investing families received. To summarize, three main features can be outlined. First, the number of registered noble proprietors suggests that a large majority of Bolognese leading families participated in the securities market, and a sizable bloc of them invested large sums. For instance, in 1555 one-hundred and twenty-three proprietors owned accounts generating at least one-hundred lire in yearly returns. In 1595 we have found 248 such proprietors, and in 1655 we have counted 165 holders. Likewise, the number of noble families with middling and large accounts was considerable: we have counted ninety families in 1555, 156 families in 1595 and 116 families in 1655. Secondly, widespread participation went hand in hand with remarkably uneven distribution. The structure of ownership)was dominated by a handful of grand-investors, members of a limited circle of families. In 1555, twelve families collected over 1,000 lire in yearly returns and pocketed over one-third of the income: in 1595 there were thirty-seven such families and they collected more than half of the income. In 1655 the number of families claiming over 1,000 lire a year in dividends had climbed to forty-seven, and they controlled over 70 percent of the income. This top-heavy structure of ownership is put more precisely into focus if we limit our attention to senatorial 235 families: for instance, in 1555 six large-holding families claimed 40.6 percent of the entire group income, while the remaining fifty-nine families received 59.4 percent. In 1595 an elite of eighteen families cashed 74.2 percent, leaving the remaining fifty-eight families with a mere 25.8 percent. And in 1655 twenty-nine top families claimed 90.9 percent, leaving a miniscule 9.1 percent to be parceled among fifty-eight families (62.1 percent). Thirdly, it appears that among noble buyers the largest investment was held. by individuals who *were members of politically prominent families. Office-holding families accounted from two-thirds to three-fourths of investment at any given time (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4). The correlation between holding certain magistracies and purchasing civic bonds becomes even stronger as one isolates the top investing families: in 1555, the main office-holding families claimed 88 percent of dividends received. by' the segment of large- investing families, in 1595 their share ‘peaked. at 91.7 percent, and in 1655 their share fell back to 88 percent. Broadly speaking, it would seem that as one identifies the leading Bolognese families, whose members were routinely called upon to staff the main magistracies, one comes upon families whose members were more likely to play an active role in the bond-market and to own large accounts. 236 income distribution // u. ....... ........ .................... U o o o 0 O o D a O o 0 0 0 D 4 3 2 1 D 9 a 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1595 1555 m 1555 Proprietors Figure 6.3 Income Distribution by Blocs of Private 237 income distribution blocs of Bolognese private proprietors 80 mooaucoutoo other I'DDIO fmillesotrbl’ Bolognese individuals promlm:t\\ fami/ I ‘08 1595 1855 m 4555 Figure 6.4 Income Distribution (Percental Share) CONCLUSION This work has attempted to account for the creation and the subsequent stupendous expansion of the Bolognese securities market. First, it has shown that from the early decades of the sixteenth century recourse to credit served papal as well as local needs for funds, and it did so in a fashion that suited both the perpetuation of the traditional administrative autonomy of the Lgmmzione and the continued predominance of the local elite. Second, it has mapped the pattern of bond-ownership and has found that local investors dominated the Bolognese securities market. In other words, the public finances of the Leoazione were neither expropriated by Roman officials, nor colonized by foreign brokers and financiers. The trick of the Bolognese debt system was to shore up local and papal budgets alike, in.a*way that drew the favor of the local ruling elite. On the one hand, Rome was able to extract large sums from Bologna with the cooperation of Bolognese governing boards. On the other hand, the issuance of shares was not only’ geared to the perpetuation of the traditional fiscal privileges and exemptions enjoyed by the Bolognese dominant families, but affordedwwealthy Bolognese a new attractive source of investment. And one that favored a 238 239 massive redistribution of wealth upwards. In the main, interest-bearing bonds were subscribed by well-to-do Bolognese, while interest was collected through regressive surtaxes, which were mostly paid by the common lot of Bolognese residents. By way of conclusion it might not be improper to remark that the development of the Bolognese bond-market may serve as a commentary on the multifaceted character of early modern debt systems. While no government could possibly hope to create a long-term debt without providing satisfactory assurance to prospective creditors, the successful creation of securities market was not one of the exclusive hallmarks of absolutists, centralizing states. "Weak" governments were not necessarily worse off in attracting investors. Far from it, in Bologna, since papal authority was relatively weak, the task of creating a funded debt had to be shared with local boards, and the wishes of local investors had to be accomodated to a degree which had few parallels in early modern Europe. As this work has shown, the massive investment of Bolognese dominant families suggests that the relationship between the make-up of bond-ownership and the make-up of Bolognese ruling elite was most important. In particular it would seem that large holdings in the Bolognese debt was closely associated with being members of families holding important political offices. In a sense, those who managed the city fiscal apparatus, those who exercised more political leverage, and a large proportion of those who invested in 240 securities were either the same persons or belonged to the same families. The rise of the large corporate investment we have documented in the seventeenth century does not diminish the significance of the association we have just outlined, it rather reflects the progressive shaping up of a more complex scenario. Clerical and charitable institutions constituted city-wide social networks. Their boards were frequently dominated by Bolognese nobles, or they were the recipients of the generous donations of wealthy Bolognese. Besides, agencies shared in fiscal immunity and privilege: not unlike nobles, they were immune from most imposts, while collecting large returns from surtaxes. The fact of the matter is that, the W became the chief hub around which revolved a massive mobilization and relocation of resources. Since fiscal policy and control of tax revenue were squarely in the hands of members of the very families that had a large stake in the debt, the direction of the process was hardly equitable. Besides, in the process, the nature of the fisc itself underwent a crucial mutation: it nearly ceased to have a "public" function, i.e. to provide revenues, becoming instead a mechanism actively contributing to the perpetuation of the private wealth of holders of securities. APPENDICES APPENDIX A SUMMARY OF THE HQNII "ERECTED" IN BOLOGNA (1506-1655) Monti guaranteed by cameral surtaxes (18 issues): Moline_Nuoxe (1516), 200,000 lire: Forte (1530), 130,000 lire: Payaoiione (1530), 83,400 lire: Eeeoe (1530), 50,000 lire: Rettaglio_Yeccnio (1540). 50.000 lire: Qonoordia (1542) 52,395 ducats: (1587) (increase) 17,605 ducats: 919119 (1552) 162,500 scudi: (1568) (increase) 23,142 scudi: Augmento (1556) 85,714 scudi: Residuo (1557) 45,714 scudi: Eio_i (1563) 230,750 lire: 2io_z (1567) 60,000 scudi: Qomnosizione (1573) 33,571 scudi: Annona_1 (1605) 350,740 lire [reduced to 92,392 lire in 1642]: Maggiore_6nnona (1606) 1.070.680 lire: (1610) (increase) 113,990 lire [retired 1647: Rettaglio_Nuoxo (1632) 319,358 lire: g_§rayezze (1645) 461,500 lire [retired 1647]: 1nnooenzo_i (1647) 1,371,093 lire: Innooenzo_2 (1651) 100,000 scudi: Monti guaranteed by the fiscal income of the fiabeiia_§roeea: Qabella.¥ecchia (1528) 105.000 lire: Mooyo (1542) 25,000 lire [retired 1573]: Mayigiio (1551) 60,400 lire [retired 1573]; Mnoyo_§neeioio (1560) 98,763 lire [retired 1590]: gregorio (1573) 104,125 lire: Annona_2 (1593) 500,000 lire [retired 1628]: Reetaaro (1595) 450,000 lire [retired 1609]: Annona_2_Rifir (1628) 719,200 lire: 1.9uattrino (1630) 700,000 lire: 2_Qnattring (1643) 738,400 lire: 241 242 Monti guaranteed by the fiscal income of the Teeoreria_oe1 Yino: _ino_yeoonio (1526) 25,000 ducats: yino_Mnoyo (1540) 10,000 scudi: W (1557) 10.000 scudi: Monte_Moiine (1516), issued by Pope Leo X with a capital of 200, 000 lire of silver bolognini at a yearly interest rate of 5% with the right to perpetuity. Creditors annually received 10, 000 lire, guaranteed by the revenues of the toll on Moiine (wheat). Monte_yino_yeoonio (1526), issued by Pope Clement VII with, a capital of 25,000 ducats at a yearly interest rate of 8% (2,000 ducats), with the right to perpetuity. Creditors were paid in lire according to the floating rate of exchange. The loan was guaranteed by the income of the wine toll. Monte_§abella_yeoonia (1528), issued by Clement VII with a capital of 105,000 lire of silver bolognini at a yearly interest rate of 8% with the right to perpetuity. Creditors received 8,400 lire guaranteed by duties on foreign trade. Monte_2orte (1530), issued by Clement VII with a capital of 130,000 lire of silver bolognini at a yearly interest rate of 10% with the right to perpetuity. Creditors annually received 13,000 lire. The loan was guaranteed by the tolls levied at the city gates. Monte_2ayaoiione (1530), issued by Clement VII with the right to perpetuity in two distinct installments: the first with a capital of 16,595 lire of silver bolognini offering 10% interest, the second with a capital of 66,809 lire offering 5% interest. Creditors yearly received 5,000 lire, guaranteed by the duties on the silk market. Monte_2eeoe (1537), issued by Pope Paul III with a capital of 50,000 lire of silver bolognini at 8% with the right to perpetuity. The Monte offered a yearly income of 4,000 lire, guaranteed by the duties on the fish market. Monte_3ettagiio (1540), issued by Paul III with a capital of 50,000 lire of silver bolognini at 8% with the right to perpetuity. The Monte offered a yearly income of 4,000 lire, guaranteed by duties on meat. ;Monte_yino_Maoyo (1540), issued by Paul III with a capital of 10,000 gold scudi at 8% with the right to perpetuity. The yearly interest.of 800 scudi was paid in lire according to the floating rate of exchange. The income of the Monte was guaranteed by the tolls levied on wine. 243 Monte_gonooroia (1542), issued by Paul III with a capital of 52,395 ducats at 8% with the right to perpetuity. In 1587 the interest paid was reduced to 6% and the capital raised to 70,000 ducats. The Monte prOVided a yearly income of 4191 ducats in 1542 and 4,200 ducats after 1587, to be paid in lire at a fixed rate of exchange of 3 lire and 10 soldi per ducat. The loan was guaranteed for 2/3 by a tax on oxen and for 1/3 by other revenues of the Bolognese camera. Monte_§iniio (1551-1568), issued by Pope Julius III with a capital of 112,000 gold scudi at 8% with the right to perpetuity, then reissued from 1552 to reach a capital of 162,500 scudi at the same rate. The yearly interest amounted to 13,000 scudi, to be paid in lire at a negotiated rate of exchange (usually lower than the market fixing). The interest rate was reduced from 8% to 7% in 1568 and the capital was raised to 185,642 gold scudi (the yearly dividend remained roughly at the same level, 12,995 scudi). Three-fifths of the loan was guaranteed by duties on Moiine (wheat), the remaining two-fifths by a tax on oxen. Monte_Angnento (1556), issued by Pope Paul IV with a capital of 85,714 gold scudi at 8%, reduced to 7% in 1573 (acquiring the right to perpetuity). The yearly interests amounted to 6,857 scudi in 1556, and were reduced to 6,000 in 1573, to be paid in lire at a negotiated rate of exchange. The Monte was guaranteed by an additional tax levied on the sale of meat. Monte_Resi_dno (1557), issued by Paul IV with a capital of 45,714 gold scudi at 8%, reduced to 7% in 1573 (acquiring the right to perpetuity). The Monte yearly interests summed up 3,657 scudi in 1557 and were reduced to 3,200 in 1573, to be paid in lire at a negotiated rate of exchange. The loan was guaranteed by an additional tax levied on the sale of meat. Monte_¥ino_zin_Mnogo (1557), issued by Paul IV with a capital of 10,000 gold scudi at 8% and with the right to perpetuity. The yearly interests, amounting 800 scudi, were paid in lire at the floating rate of exchange. The Monte was guaranteed by an excise duty on wine. Monte_$neeioio (1560), issued by Pope Pius IV with a capital of 20,000 gold scudi, increased in 1563 to 23,000 scudi at 8%, reduced to 6% in 1573. The yearly interests, amounting at 1,840 scudi in 1563 and 1,380 in 1573 were paid in lire at a fixed rate of exchange of 4 lire and 3 solidi per scudo. The Monte was guaranteed by duties levied on silk fabrics. The loan was completely redeemed between 1574 and 1590. Monte_£io_2rino (1563), issued by Pius IV with a capital of 250,000 lire at 8% and with the right to perpetuity. The Monte paid yearly 20,000 lire to its creditors and the credit was guaranteed by a tax on wheat paid by bakers. 244 Monte_£io_§eoondo (1567), issued by Pius IV with a capital of 60,000 gold scudi at 7%. The yearly interests on the Monte amounted at 4,200 scudi to be paid in lire at a fixed rate of exchange of 4 lire and 5 solidi per scudo. The loan was guaranteed by duties levied on the silk market and the import of foreign silk. It could be redeemed. Monte_§ompoeizione (1573), issued by Pope Gregory XIII with a capital of 33,571 gold scudi at 7% and with the right to perpetuity. The yearly interests on the Monte amounted at 2,350 scudi to be paid in lire at a fixed rate of exchange of 4 lire and 5 solidi per scudo. The loan was guaranteed by duties levied on the silk market. Monte_§regorio (1573), issued by Gregory XIII with a capital of 104,125 lire at 6% and the right to perpetuity, paying yearly 6247 lire of interests. This Monte was guaranteed by duties levied on foreign trade. Monte_$eoonoo_Annona (1592), issued by Pope Clemens VIII with a capital of 500,000 lire at 6.5%. It paid yearly 32,500 lire. Entirely redeemed by 1620 it was reissued a first time in 1628 with a capital of 719,200 lire at 5%. It paid yearly 35,960 lire. It was again redeemed and reissued in 1660 with a capital of 983,375 lire at 4%, paying yearly 39,335 lire. The loan was guaranteed by additional duties on foreign trade. Monte_Annona_Terzo (1594), issued by Clemens VIII with a capital of 80,000 Florentine ducats at 6.5%. The yearly interests, amounting at 5,200 ducats, were paid in lire at the floating rate of exchange. The Monte was entirely redeemed in 1604 and reissued with a capital of 320,000 lire at 6%. It paid yearly 19,200 lire. The loan was guaranteed by excise duties on meat. Monte_3eetanro (1595), issued by Clemens VIII with a capital of 450,000 lire at 6.5%. It paid yearly 29,250 lire. The loan was entirely redeemed by 1610. The Monte was guaranteed by duties on foreign trade. WW (1605) . issued by POPe Paul V with a capital of 1,160,000 lire at 6%. It was created by the clustering of the Monte_Annona_£rimo (issued in 1592 with a capital of 600,000 lire at 6.5%) and the Monte_Annona_Qnarto (issued in 1597 with a capital of 280,000 lire at 6.5%). The Monte was further expanded in 1610 to 1,283,5000 and the interest reduced to 5%. It yielded yearly 64,175 lire. The loan was guaranteed by a pool of additional duties levied on goods crossing the city gates. The Monte could be redeemed. Erimo_Qnattrino (1630), issued by Pope Urban VIII in two distinct instalments: the first one with a capital of 400,000 lire at 5%, the second one with a capital of 300,000 lire at 245 6%. The Monte yielded yearly 38,000 lire and was guaranteed by additional duties levied on foreign trade. It was redeemable. Bettagiifloxo (1632) , issued by Urban VIII with a capital of 346,000 lire at 4.5%. It paid yearly 15,570 lire. The loan.was guaranteed by excise duties on meat and was redeemable. Seoonoo_onattrino (1643), issued by Urban VIII with a capital of 800,000 lire at 5%. It paid yearly 40,000 lire and was guaranteed by additional duties levied on foreign trade. It could be redeemed after six years. W (1645), issued by Pope Innocent X with a capital of 500,000 lire at 4.5%. It paid yearly 22,500 lire and.was.guaranteed.by additional duties on flour and.cards. It was redeemable. W (1647), issued by Innocent X by means of redeeming and clustering the Monte_TerzooAnnona and the Monte with an overall capital of 1, 485, 475 lire at 4.5%. It yielded yearly 66, 846 lire and was guaranteed by the fiscal endowments attributed to the two redeemed Monti. It could be redeemed after ten years. 1nnooenzo_$eoonoo (1651), issued by Innocent X with a capital of 500,000 lire at 4.5%. It paid yearly 22,500 lire and was guaranteed by a tax levied on the Earaoiione silk fair. It could be redeemed after six years. APPENDIX B LIST OF DOCUMENTED PROPRIETORS OF ACCOUNTS AND ANNUAL INTEREST PAYMENTS IN 1555 246 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total CIVIC AGENCIES 400.00 Superstiti Sanitatis 133.58 Fabbrica S.Petronio 96.37 Creditori Tesoreria 2.72 Consiglio dei Quattromila 632.67 CHARITIES 280.58 Ospedale della Vita 88.56 Poveri Bastardini 33.83 Ospedale della Morte 16.13 Poveri Vergognosi 6.30 Ospedale degli Angeli 4.15 Ospedale di S.Giobbe 2.70 Poveri di Gesu Cristo 432.23 GUILDS 69.73 Notai 63.06 Strazzaroli 59.50 Beccari 42.10 Salaroli 26.70 Fabbri 23.80 Orefici 22.37 Calzolari dividend lire 13.42 11.08 10.89 4.08 100.00 6.00 4.20 3.70 116.91 86.44 65.00 36.18 28.00 5.63 2.77 1.79 520.02 352.02 250.71 104.45 37.31 30.09 18.50 15.00 8.00 8.00 247 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Sarti Barbieri Huratori Bombasari 346.71 ECCLESIASTICAL AGENCIES SOCIETIES S.Sebastiano & S.Rocco Consorzio Ravegnana Compagnia della Maddalena Consorzio di S.Procolo 113.90 CHAPTERS and PARISHES Capitolo di S.Pietro Rettore S.Maria dal Farne Capitolo di S.Petronio Rettore Mascarella Rettore S.Biagio S.Ceci1ia S.Tommaso Oratorio della Morte 342.72 MONASTERIES S.Salvatore S.Michele in Bosco S.Maria dei Servi S.Giovanni in Monte della Misericordia S.Prancesco S.Domenico Abbazia SS. Fabiano & Sebastiano S.Giuseppe S.Giacomo dividend lire 8.00 7.40 4.26 3.75 3.26 2.04 92.31 66.88 16.00 11.05 8.56 6.16 1960.00 1486.33 832.00 600.00 480.00 400.00 312.00 303.21 293.19 164.00 146.40 140.40 89.90 31.00 16.29 12.00 248 PROPRIETOR subgroup total S.Barbaziano Certosa S.Benedetto Celestini Grazie S.Procolo 1372.80 NUNNERIES Congregazione Orsoline S.Mattia S.Francesco S.Pietro SS.Naborre & Felice S.Lorenzo 200.96 FOREIGNERS Farnese Battista Halaspina Taddea Orsini Cecilia Da Milano Gio.Francesco Gheri Filippo Dal Verme Sansonetto Turrini Giulio Gonzaga Camilla Smeraldi Lorenzo Da Varano Mattia Olivieri Ginevra Sicardi Cristoforo Boiardi Giulio Benacci Lattanzio Bertolelli Margherita Cattani Lucia dividend lire 9.00 7.80 7.17 3.90 194.10 657.38 168.46 871.22 596.60 400.00 200.00 115.00 102.28 8.12 7.39 4.25 2.18 40.00 190.00 18.46 33.23 11.88 1.14 2.00 7.00 38.98 249 PROPRIETOR Biserini Margherita Conforti Camilla Benni Lancillotto Conforti Ippolita Pio Lionello FOREIGN CLERGY Conversini Benedetto Dal Forno Teofilo NOBLE CLERGY Bovio Vincenzo Fava Pellegrino Dal Giglio Tommaso Campeggi Tommaso Pucci Antonio Marsili Marcantonio Bentivoglio Camilla Bottrigari Carissima Volta Camillo Montecalvi Ludovica RESIDENTS Angelini Francesco Archi Ginevra Bagazzoni Camilla Bagni Gio.Maria Ballatini Camilla Bellabusca Carlo Bonamici Piermaria Bongiovanni Gianfrancesco Bordoni Tommasa subgroup total 7488.68 825.84 8314.52 2307.03 dividend lire 170.00 64.00 2.83 6.00 35.50 4.00 8.00 7.50 5.57 130.00 10.00 136.24 16.20 18.46 8.69 90.00 4.10 235.41 21.33 9.25 90.00 1.93 4.00 200.00 16.00 5.00 46.15 32.00 9.00 1.20 250 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Borgognoni Alessandro Bugatti Francesco Cartolari Agostino Casappi Girolamo Casarenghi Sebastiano Cassani Nicola Celidoni Zaccaria Chiodarelli Antonio Cimieri Gio.Antonio Comes Girolamo Corradini Bernardina Cupellini Camillo Curialti Paolo Curioni Girolamo Da Reggio Traiano Da Bibulano Elisabetta Dal Falcone Tiberio Dal Grosso Giulio Dal Grosso Alessandro Dal Pratello Giovanni Dal Trebbo (eredi) Dalla Lana Matteo Dalla Lana Elena Dalla Sega Giovanni Dalla Sega Petronio Dalla Sega Gio.Andrea Dalla Volpe Albizze Dalle Bussole Giacomo Dessilani Gio.Francesco Diursi Girolamo dividend lire 10.00 32.00 168.00 4.16 35.52 1.71 11.88 63.00 8.00 48.00 64.00 5.00 40.00 20.53 8.33 4.00 8.00 27.40 42.00 3.13 3.83 8.50 13.67 70.00 1.80 16.00 5.18 32.00 56.00 32.00 251 PROPRIETOR subgroup total D'Orazio Bartolomeo Facci Tommaso Facci Ercole Faccini Angelica Federici Ludovico Federici (eredi) Fioravanti Bartolomeo Folco Lionello Gorzani Giovanni Gualandi Elena Landinello Niccolo Libani Orsino Hantovani Giulio Mazzi Carlo Mazzoni Agostino Helloni Ludovico Mezzavacca Floriano Hiore Antonio molitore Horbioli Giacoma Muzzarelli Lippo Ottoboni Ermes Ottoboni Costanza Pacini Giacomo Partinetti Leonardo Pasini Francesco Pasolini (eredi) Pasquali Tarsia Passeri Taddeo Pellicani Gio.Batta dividend lire 8.00 1.73 499.20 32.00 8.00 8.00 24.00 17.50 26.72 7.50 50.58 16.60 4.46 8.00 44.04 88.08 8.00 8.00 7.50 32.00 8.00 24.94 179.85 26.75 16.00 8.00 16.00 252 PROPRIETOR Pellicani Francesco Pellizzari Bartolomeo Pigini Sebastiano Poggioli Laura Recordati Bartolomeo Righetti Giovanni Righi Giacomo Righi Marchionne Rivali Petronio Romanelli Giacomo Simi Agostino Tassi Pietro Tibucchi Ottaviano Tostini (eredi) Turresani Vincenzo Turresani Silvestro Vandini Marchionne Vasselli Francesco Venturoli Francesco Virgili Gio.Francesco Zanetti Ludovico Zoni Coralius UNCERTAIN Dal Ferro Cornelia Legnani Nicola Muzzi Luca Pannolini Bartolomeo Fabri Giacomo NOBLE CITIZENS Accursi Antonio subgroup total 3521.65 246.60 dividend lire 8.00 8.00 16.00 16.00 125.26 1855.09 2.68 25.00 501.92 3.75 47.44 94.33 5.00 4.00 4.00 191.88 32.00 286.54 4.00 84.92 8.00 55.75 86.16 40.00 24.00 6.28 76.20 5.00 32.00 32.82 253 PROPRIETOR Accursi Baldassarre Accursi Ginevra Accursi Troiano Alamandini Ercole Alle Nicola Amorini Matteo Amorini (eredi) Argeli Caterina Argeli Giovanni Argeli Paolo Emilio Arrighi Baldassarre Badalocchio Carlo Balzani Lorenzo Balzani Girolamo Banci Floriano Banci Lorenzo Banci Pierantonio Banci Vincenzo Banci (eredi Gio.Batta) Barbazzi Barbazzi Barbieri Barbieri Andrea (eredi) Gio.Franc. AntonioM. Bardi Bardo Basenghi Beccadelli Artemisio Giacomo Belviso Luca Benacci Battista Beroaldi Beroaldi Luca Giovanni subgroup total 40.00 1857.77 530.67 518.42 92.92 141.91 64.82 dividend lire 20.32 1.71 7.25 1.63 3.75 12.29 6.22 46.65 8.60 42.56 306.29 20.19 8.00 653.35 96.99 64.69 662.44 373.80 296.96 83.56 92.30 83.04 667.30 1.91 16.00 30.79 PROPRIETOR Bero Agostino Bero Matteo 254 Boatieri Vincenzo Boatieri (eredi) Boccadiferro Boccadiferro Bartolomea Boccadiferro Boccadiferro Boccadiferro Boccadiferro Alberto Bartolomeo Rachele Taddeo Vincenzo Bocchi Achille Bocchi Ottaviano Bombaci Antonio Bonasone Antonio Bonasone Galeazzo Boncompagni Boncompagno Bonfigli Pietro Bonfigli Elena Bonfioli Antonio Bonfioli Bartolomeo Bonfioli Domenico Bonfioli Lucrezia Bonfioli Nicola Bonsignori (eredi) Bottrigari Bottrigari Alessandro Francesco subgroup total 22.03 46.31 326.48 750.34 1036.24 1223.16 54.18 dividend lire 200.00 17.15 75.68 628.00 8.00 91.01 50.00 323.97 47.44 84.69 3.75 221.54 3.75 122.38 206.40 8.00 26.36 248.27 15.25 4.78 20.49 14.69 6.27 6.00 7.90 14.79 53.20 2.58 255 PROPRIETOR Bovio Ercole Bovio Galeazzo Bovio Gio.Ludovico Bovio Giulio Budrioli Gio.Batta Buoi Bartolomeo Buoi Ercole Buoi Francesco Buoi Gandolfo Buoi Vitale Buoi (eredi) Campanazzo Antonio Campanazzo Violante Caprara AntonioH. Caprara Francesco Cattelani Cesare Cavallini Cesare Chiari Camillo Codibo AntonioMaria Codibo Petronio Conti Giacomo Conti Turdino Costa CarloAntonio Crescimbeni Girolamo Crescimbeni Gabriele Da Fagnano Galeazzo Dainese Cesare Dal Calice (eredi) subgroup total 1792.04 600.87 225.29 328.78 20.03 35.18 12.27 256 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 80.00 Dal Coltello Laura 3.68 Dal Ferro Niccolo 1.88 Dal Gambaro Bartolomeo 2.50 Dal Gambaro Battista 10-53 Dal Gambaro Francesco 14-95 5.00 Dal Giglio (eredi) 405.00 13.05 Dal Luzzo (eredi) 23.43 Dal Medico Cesare 44.00 Dal Medico Ercole 177-13 Dal Medico GiulioCesare 143-03 Dal Medico Guizzardo 392-58 375.63 Dal Poggio Alessandro 48.22 Dal Poggio Ginevra 1°20 Dal Poggio Girolamo 425-04 280.00 Dalla Calzina Camillo 21.00 Dalla Croce Livia 16.00 Dalla Torre Alessandro 8.00 Dalla Torre Giuseppe 24.00 4.00 Dalle Balle Tommaso 73.00 Dall’Olio Gabriele 17.90 Dall'Olio Pierantonio 90.90 4.00 Dall’Oro Agostino 40.15 De Crescenzi Paolo 56.15 16.00 De Crescenzi (eredi) 257 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 21.49 Desideri Battista 16.00 Desideri Elisabetta 3.22 Desideri eredi Bernardino 12.00 Desideri eredi Stefano 88.63 Desideri Francesco 6-35 Desideri Giovanni 35°30 Desideri Stefano 184-45 1.41 Desideri (eredi Girolamo) 16.00 Dioli Albizze 98.20 Dioli Rinaldo 114.20 8.00 Dolfi Ippolita 398.00 Dosi Angelou. 3.75 Dosi Cristoforo 9-00 Dosi Giovanni 8-00 Dosi Gio.Batta 19-20 Dosi Girolamo 8°15 Dosi Pietro 446°11 48.00 Fabretti Matteo 79.49 Fasanini Cesare 4.00 Fasanini Gaspare 24.00 Fasanini Giacomo 176-00 Fasanini Giulio 79°49 Fasanini Pompeo 10°00 Fasanini Taddea 372-93 258 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 43.35 Fava Annibale 12.79 Fava Bartolomeo 1.88 Fava Cesare 3.75 Fava Ercole 27.32 Fava Fabio 175-00 Fava Galotto 25-25 Fava GiacomoMaria 191-33 Fava Girolamo 1°33 Fava Guglielmo 1°75 Fava Pellegrino 744.00 Fibbia Marcantonio 10-27 Fibbia Roberto 754-27 3.13 Fondazza Aldrovandino 27-61 Fondazza Filippo 20°75 Fondazza Giulio 51°50 16.00 Fontana (eredi) 23.90 Franchini Filippo 24.00 Fucci Annibale 460.57 Gabrielli Gio.Batta 355.50 Gaggi Antonio 64.00 Gaggi Dario ’ 419.50 8.30 Gandolfi Giuseppe 16.00 Gandolfi Laura 2-73 Gandolfi Stefano 43°03 16.00 Gandolfi (eredi) 259 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 29.34 Gessi Bartolomeo 40-00 Gessi Berlingerio 15-00 Gessi Carlo 35-34 32.00 Ghiselli Marcantonio 35.33 3.33 Ghiselli (eredi) 64.12 Gioanetti Francesco 24.00 Graffi Ottaviano 43.20 19.20 Graffi (eredi) 47.50 Guidalotti Guidalotto 7.50 Leoni Camillo 200-00 Leoni eredi Vincenzo 263-50 55°00 Leoni Vincenzo 104.00 Leonori Leonoro 99.63 Lombardi AntonioMaria 61.60 Lombardi Carlo 8-00 Lombardi GaspareMaria 37-50 Lombardi Virgilio 16.00 Lombardi (eredi) 222.83 37.27 Luna Francesco 628.45 Luna Francesco 665.72 40.67 Machiavelli Bartolomeo 35.00 Machiavelli Battista 16.00 Machiavelli Filippo 13.70 Machiavelli Giovanni 19.40 Machiavelli Gio.Benedetto 16.00 Machiavelli Lattanzio 66.68 Machiavelli Leonardo 3.75 Machiavelli Pompeo 260 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 19.40 Machiavelli Raffaele 230.60 15.52 Manfredi Dionea 12.00 Manfredi Isabella 27.52 1.45 Mantachetti Floriano 775.00 Mantachetti Gio.Batta 25.00 Mantachetti Vincenzo 801.45 16.00 Maranini Cosimo 44.40 Marescalchi Fulvio 65.76 Marescalchi Matteo 110.16 380.00 Matugliani Evangelista 3.54 Merighi Amerigo 13.43 Merighi Bartolomeo 28.00 Merighi Gaspare 53-90 Merighi Marcantonio 4°00 Merighi Niccolo’ _ 102°37 10.12 Moneta Benedetto 5.29 Moneta Vincenzo 15.40 32.00 Monteceneri Pantasilea 7.50 Monterenzi Annibale 32.30 Monzuno Giuditta 74.00 Muletti Ambrogio 16.00 Muletti Cassandra 90.00 48.25 Mundini Bartolomeo 8.00 Muzzi Bernardino 16.00 8.00 Muzzi Giacomo 8.00 Muzzoli Ludovico 27.21 19.21 Muzzoli Luca 20.98 Nascentori Giovanni 20-93 Nascentori Nascentore 41-95 dividend lire 168.00 539.30 116.50 128.00 32.00 73.19 7.36 39.92 8.00 53.90 5.93 1.86 5.69 75.00 2.40 75.00 330.61 16.00 3.50 106.00 22.50 5.00 53.65 23.40 28.00 1132.74 261 PROPRIETOR Negri Antonio Negri Bonifacio Negri Giuseppe Nobili Marchionne Pannolini Battista Pannolini Francesco Pannolini Girolamo Pannolini Ludovico Pannolini Nicola Pannolini Virgilio Paselli Francesco Pensabene Vincenzo Piatesi Marcantonio Pini Bernardo Pini Gaspare Pini Girolamo Pini Lorenzo Pini Paolo Pini (eredi) Preti Fucio Raimondini Gio.Batta Raimondini Marchionne Ratta Alessandro Ratta Lorenzo Ratta Margherita Riario Galeazzo subgroup total 823.80 214.37 502.51 27.50 105.05 dividend lire 65.43 49.43 48.00 1.50 25.19 56.00 8.00 8.00 12.00 13.50 114.53 96.00 6.00 1.03 151.38 24.50 24.00 30.00 25.86 53.65 144.20 98.65 171.33 26.00 42.00 8.89 78.18 8.00 20.00 262 PROPRIETOR Rigosa Alessandro Rigosa Astorre Rigosa Francesco Rigosa (eredi) Roffeni AntonioMaria Roffeni Alessandro Romanzi Gio.Batta Ronchi Bartolomeo Ronchi Claudia Ruggeri Lelio Ruggeri Tommaso Ruini Carlo Sala Gio.Batta Salimbeni Francesco Sangiorgi Gio.Antonio Saracini Giulio Savi Lattanzio Savi (eredi) Savignani (eredi) Savonanzi Girolamo Savonanzi Ludovico Scappi Domicilla Scappi Piermaria Seccadenari Achille Seccadenari Girolamo Seccadenari Niccolo Segni Francesco Serpa Lattanzio Stella Giacomo subgroup total 164.36 81.19 20.00 128.03 54.00 197.85 269.98 76.89 dividend lire 81.19 65.60 32.00 120.26 13.19 101.90 5.00 15.00 16.00 76.00 95.00 16.00 39.08 17.20 2.28 531.20 107.37 1.88 96.00 32.00 40.00 2.28 1.20 263 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Testa Caterina Torfanini Giovanni Tossignani-Curialti Francesco Usberti Carlo Venenti Filippo Vittori Annibale Vittori Dioniso Vittori Niccolo 121.90 Vizzani Branni Vizzani Camillo Vizzani Lorenzo Vizzani Obizzo 242.08 Vizzani (eredi) Zanettini Pietro Zanettini Teodosio 19.48 Zani Cesare Zani Giovanni Zani Giulia Zani Ippolita Zani Matteo Zani Paolo 808.45 Zecca Ludovico Zoppi Cesare dividend lire 4.75 12.68 1526.22 92.67 3.00 129.82 16.00 528.00 312.00 522.35 674.45 4.62 34.36 109.79 16.00 363.81 175.29 32.00 95.65 117.89 115.85 39.17 36.97 127.82 32.51 8.00 10.21 3.76 130.82 264 PROPRIETOR subgroup total PATRICIANS Albergati Annibale Cornelio Filippo 1543.65 Aldrovandi (eredi) Angela FilippoM. 225.49 Angelelli Bartolomeo Achille Cristoforo Filippo G.Filippo 2052.80 Armi Floriano Francesco Gaspare Giovanni 164.76 Bandini Giovanni Bargellini Ant.Ga1eazzo Dorotea Eleonora Ercole Giovanni Gio.Agostino Giulio Cesare Giulio Cesare Lucrezia Raffaele Vincenzo 791.36 Bentivoglio (eredi) Andalo dividend lire 499.02 262.73 32.70 6.00 56.13 33.05 16.00 10.00 1060.00 8.63 30.83 102.04 24.00 381.98 202.70 40.00 171.60 57.74 5.07 1.50 5.00 72.00 55.27 299.43 132.04 98.35 65.38 32.91 11.03 8.00 PROPRIETOR 265 Andrea Antonio Cherubina Costante Ercole Giulia Giulio Marcantonio Ulisse Bianchetti Achille Lorenzo Ludovico Bianchini (eredi) Alessandro Gio.Batta Laura Lelio Marcello Pompeo Scipione Bolognetti (eredi) Alberto Bartolomeo Camillo DomenicoM. Dorotea Gio.Batta Gio.Batta Girolamo Bolognini Alessandro subgroup total 2118.33 141.50 836.54 771.40 dividend lire 48.93 6.75 16.00 40.00 190.50 8.00 4.00 82.71 22.40 37.99 45.97 2.70 92.80 121.60 780.00 220.63 212.50 55.39 317.70 8.00 78.58 1.45 3.02 4.93 7.50 2.95 12.30 74.50 2.40 266 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Bartolomeo Cesare Francesco Galeazzo Gio.Andrea Gio.Batta Gio.Francesco Gio.Maria Giulia Giulio Cesare Caccialupi Floriano Caccianemici Cesare Orso Calderini Camilla Ludovico Campeggi AntonioM. eredi Giacomo Rodolfo Carbonesi Bonifacio Casali Bartolomeo Ginevra Castelli (eredi) Alberto Carlo Francesco Niccolo' Cattani (eredi) Gaspare Girolamo 465.28 95.50 901.60 688.52 86.58 19.85 dividend lire 149.78 11.75 28.05 25.00 5.04 11.75 2.59 59.74 72.21 21.33 75.00 75.19 3.50 363.34 209.58 16.00 40.00 5.63 27.75 44.00 8.00 36.54 8.00 247.25 17.98 32.00 138.60 21.84 16.00 107.84 PROPRIETOR 267 Tommaso Cospi Bartolomeo (eredi) Filippo Francesco Vincenzo Dal Purgo Antonia Ercolani Agostino DomenicoM. Gio.Francesco Lucrezia Vincenzo Fantuzzi (eredi) Camillo CarloAnt. Galeazzo Ginevra Gio.Batta Gio.Francesco Giovanni PaoloEmilio Pasotto Pasotto Felicini Lattanzio Paolo Foscherari Alessandra Girolamo Romeo Ghisilardi Giovanni Ludovico subgroup total 238.98 81.59 303.47 762.34 265.22 192.44 123.84 268 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 41.00 Ghisilieri Coriolano 598.76 eredi Gualengo 104.90 FilippoC. 744.66 39.85 Gozzadini (eredi Gabbione) 7.25 eredi Camillo 313.90 Alberto 794.23 Alessandro 245.20 Gabbione 88.43 Samaritana . 49.95 Ulisse 1538.80 6.25 Grassi Agamennone 29.54 Antonio 46.80 Gio.Antonio 4.53 Girolamo 87.12 24.00 Grati Alessandra 37.00 Francesco 3.61 Ludovico 64.61 56.00 Griffoni Matteo 8.00 Guidotti (eredi) 8.00 Enea 36.57 Gio.Gabriele 17.10 GiulioCesare 69.67 10.10 Isolani (eredi) 56.00 Gio.Francesco 66.10 5.19 Lambertini GuidoAntonio 31.16 Ludovico 36.35 128.10 Legnani (eredi Girolamo) 30.00 Alessandro 259.35 AntonioM. 12.80 Giovanna dividend lire PROPRIETOR 269 23.58 70.00 74.00 8.00 32.00 91.91 103.67 16.80 108.04 1.71 150.00 36.00 2.41 112.00 10.33 69.77 3.75 202.15 142.11 94.57 24.00 38.53 87.97 935.15 147.63 71.75 6.59 24.00 53.50 339.45 Giovanni Ippolita Loiani Ascanio Giacomo Ludovico Pompeo Ludovisi Niccolo Petronio Pompeo Lupari (eredi) Alessandro Baldassarre Eugenio Giovanni Marcantonio Matteo Magnani (eredi) Antonio Antonio Gio.Antonio Ludovico Verzuro Malvasia Alessandro Ant.Galeazzo Cornelio Costanzo Gio.Batta Malvezzi Leona Giovanni Camilla subgroup total 523.83 205.91 228.51 382.22 505.12 1249.09 dividend lire 299.23 86.93 40.00 3.98 66.56 39.10 1.27 716.00 24.00 103.31 70.00 868.32 110.75 457.00 89.54 400.00 17.88 24.00 62.50 19.75 9.00 3.35 64.00 48.00 12.75 16.00 14.67 8.00 11.83 32.00 PROPRIETOR Manzoli 270 Pirro GiulioCesare Carlo Floriano Matteo Bartolomeo Battista Alessandro Battista Camillo Costanzo Giorgio Ippolita Ottavio Marsili Alessandra Cesare Montecalvi Camillo Orsi (eredi) Giul.Cesare Alessandro Aloisio Annibale Giacomo Ludovico Orsino Pompilio Sebastiano Paleotti (eredi Camillo) subgroup total 954.02 2349.38 591.82 44.05 250.01 eredi Alessandro eredi Annibale dividend lire 3.00 32.00 40.00 8.00 1.06 64.00 3.03 184.85 24.00 132.22 68.83 150.00 8.00 67.05 16.44 13.80 48.00 2.53 299.55 19.09 337.93 117.93 3.30 140.31 57.77 8.00 8.00 139.54 2.28 102.00 PROPRIETOR 271 subgroup total eredi Floriano Astorre Camillo Paltroni Evangelista Pasi Alberto Viride Giacomo eredi Giacomo eredi Ercole Gio.Andrea Pellegrini (eredi) Costanzo Federico Gio.Batta Ottaviano Pompeo Sebastiano Pepoli Girolamo Poeti Annibale Renghieri Ercole Paolo Sinibaldo Ludovico Pierpaolo Rossi Gio.Galeazzo Sampieri (eredi) Francesco Gio.Batta Gio.Francesco Ludovico 126.83 408.10 372.11 656.57 261.54 259.82 dividend lire 92.65 26.15 77.03 194.32 8.00 6.76 28.06 3.75 213.52 24.25 146.35 60.00 5.90 15.00 35.00 32.00 99.40 32.00 PROPRIETOR Sanuti (eredi) Sassoni Elena Vitali (eredi) Volta Astorre 272 Isabetta Lucrezia Battista Lelio Vitale Cristoforo Leona Marcantonio Zambeccari (eredi) Alessandro Francesco Galeazzo Giacomo Paolo subgroup total 297.50 46.57 448.37 219.30 APPENDIX C LIST OF DOCUMENTED PROPRIETORS OF ACCOUNTS dividend lire 1858.18 1451.12 1059.40 1015.69 107.07 3.05 1808.16 968.40 428.75 240.96 392.11 221.01 168.48 98.13 97.51 38.86 35.61 34.01 PROPRIETOR CIVIC AGENCIES Gabella Grossa Superstiti Sanitatis Camera Fabbrica S.Petronio Creditori Tesoreria Consiglio dei Quattromila COLLEGES Collegio Riccio Collegio Montalto Collegio Ancarano Collegio Ferrerio GUILDS Salaroli Notai Beccari Bisilieri Strazzaroli Fabbri Orefici Calzolari 273 AND ANNUAL INTEREST PAYMENTS IN 1595 subgroup total 5494.52 3446.27 dividend lire 21.36 16.67 15.31 15.03 8.96 4.57 4.48 2168.50 319.40 178.50 66.30 57.60 3636.00 1132.40 587.32 557.95 403.06 388.01 326.13 197.75 153.60 123.14 114.77 107.52 55.39 54.38 16.00 11.74 274 PROPRIETOR Barbieri Muratori Lana gentile Sarti Merciai Bombasari Quattro arti FOREIGN AGENCIES Compagnia del S.Rosario Ospedale degli Incurabili Ospedale di S.Michelino Monastero di S.Silvestro Tesoreria Romagna CHARITIES Monte di Pieta Monte del Matrimonio Ospedale di S.Giobbe Opera Poveri Vergognosi Opera Carcerati Ospedale della Vita Putte del Baraccano Putte di S.Marta Opera Mendicanti Ospedale di S.Biagio Poveri Bastardini Ospedale S.Lazzaro Ospedale dei Convalescenti Ospedale della Morte Ospedale di S.Bartolomeo Ospedale di S.Antonio subgroup total 1172.11 2790.30 dividend lire 8.95 7.05 3.02 100.00 94.08 72.00 49.62 33.60 24.25 6.72 5.04 4.70 2.69 3360.00 634.83 202.03 133.81 118.87 118.68 100.80 96.78 83.31 80.00 66.65 65.86 55.56 275 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Putte della Maddalena Ospedale di S.Maria Angeli Poveri di Gesu Cristo 7884.17 ECCLESIASTICAL AGENCIES SOCIETIES S.Sebastiano & S.Rocco S.Gregorio S.Maria del Borgo Consorzio Porta Procula Sindaci S.Maria Maggiore S.Martino Consorzio Porta Ravegnana Terzo Ordine Maddalena S.Sacramento 392.70 CHAPTERS, PARISHES & OTHER FOUNDATIONS Casa dei Catecumeni Capitolo di S.Pietro S.Andrea in Dono S.Giovanni in Monte Oratorio di S.Maria in Galliera Capitolo di S.Petronio S.Maria di Gessi Altare di S.Rocco in S.Pietro S.Giovanni Battista di Pastino Altare di S.Biagio S.Maria degli Uccelletti Collegio del Gesu Chiesa di Monte S.Pietro dividend lire 50.40 44.76 29.40 29.40 16.80 16.00 6.31 2.77 2.00 2187.36 939.60 362.40 320.00 314.52 271.08 259.76 187.43 148.60 134.16 125.00 124.08 111.85 108.00 106.68 96.81 276 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Sacrestia di SS.Vita1e & Agricola S.Clemente di S.Giovanni in Persiceto Chiericato Senzanome Chiericato Casolano Pieve di S.Lorenzo in Collina Sacrestia di S.Maria Maggiore S.Ceci1ia S.Tommaso del Mercato Oratorio della Morte 5315.01 ECCLESIASTICAL OFFICES Abate di S.Maria in Strada Priore dei Certosini Rettore di S.Maria di Galliera Rettore di S.Bernardino Rettore di S.Stefano di Bazzano Priore di S.Maria Angeli Rettore di S.Martino di Monsummatico Badessa di S.Naborre Rettore della Chiesa di Gessi Rettore di S.Lorenzo di Zena Rettore dell’altare B.V. Rettore di S.Gregorio Rettore di S.Pietro in Casale Rettore di S.Michele di Nugareto Rettore dell'altare di S.Martino in S.Petronio Rettore di S.Maria del Farne dividend lire 86.16 84.00 67.20 62.48 48.00 48.00 47.82 28.30 28.00 27.72 24.00 22.51 21.00 20.28 16.80 16.80 14.25 11.20 11.12 277 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Rettore di S.Maria in S.Martino Abate di S.Michele in Bosco Rettore dell’altare dei tre Re Magi Rettore di Pagania Rettore di Rettore di Rettore di Rettore di Carrobbio Rettore di Mascarino Rettore di S.Niccolo di S.Maria del Trebbo S.Donnino S.Venanzio S.Maria del S.Maria di S.Lucia di Roffeno Rettore della cappella del S.Salvatore Rettore di S.Salvatore della Quaderna Rettore di Chiavica Rettore di Rettore di Braina Rettore di Rettore di Sabbiuno Rettore di Piatesi Rettore dell'altare di S.Andrea in S.Pietro Rettore di S.Andrea degli Ansaldi Rettore di S.Niccolo di Centanello S.Silvestro della S.Biagio S.Tommaso della S.Caterina S.Maria di S.Andrea dei 278 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 2.12 Rettore di S.Niccolo 6489.96 degli Alberi NUNNERIES 548.70 degli Angeli 370.41 S.Maria Maddalena 168.06 S.Giovanni Battista 156.00 S.Caterina 137.20 S.Ludovico 136.80 S.Vitale 126.70 S.Margherita 121.97 S.Pietro Martire 106.76 S.Gervasio 92.31 Congregazione Orsoline 90.40 Corpus Domini 36.06 S.Naborre 34.72 S.Francesco 33.80 S.Mattia 16.80 S.Agostino 11.20 della Pace 6.16 S.Lorenzo 3.36 S.Bernardino 2197.42 MONASTERIES 735.04 Certosa 666.22 S.Salvatore 548.77 S.Giacomo 491.74 S.Maria dei Servi 397.14 S.Michele 347.21 S.Domenico 185.15 S.Francesco 180.60 Regolari di S.Brigida 279 2.28 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 177.32 S.Giovanni 101.64 Regolari delle Budrie 65.79 Misericordia 61.56 Regolari di SS.Ippolito & Ca531ano 57.55 Abbazia di Monte Armato 54.44 S.Maria delle Grazie 38.40 Regolari di S.Pietro di Barbarolo ‘ 36.94 S.Giorgio 33.60 Regolari di S.Maria delle Muratelle 33.60 Regolari di S.Maria di Gessi 19.20 Regolari di S.Michele 15.00 Abbazia di SS.Fabiano & Sebastiano 14.40 S.Stefano 8.96 S.Barbaziano 8.96 S.Giuseppe 5.60 S.Martino 4.77 S.Benedetto 3.75 Celestini 3.35 Frati Crociati S.Procolo 4298.98 dividend lire 3330.61 3226.67 3192.00 2560.56 2497.44 2420.00 2100.00 1856.67 1750.00 1505.60 1413.96 1375.50 1310.40 1260.00 1243.20 1008.00 1001.85 848.40 638.40 600.00 520.00 500.69 480.00 394.19 358.96 352.06 336.00 336.00 336.00 280 PROPRIETOR subgroup total FOREIGNERS Pinelli Castellino Imperiali Vincenzo Grillo Agapito Doria Costanza Doria Ottaviano Grimaldi Pasquale Grimaldi Gio.Francesco Piccimboni Luca Spinola Gio.Batta Doria Isabella Cybo-Malaspina Alderano Doria Cena Grimaldi Tomasina Doria Castellino Inurea Antonio Gavotto Niccolo Rucellai Orazio Flaschi Alessandro Zanelli Petronio Lucchi Emilio Dal Verme Sansonetto Teggia Giovanni Doria Aleramo Contrari Laura Quilici Bernardino Borghesi Tommaso Bontempi Fabrizio Toriani Domenico Bontempi Cosimo dividend lire 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 26.40 04.37 80.00 68.80 61.36 35.20 47.91 47.91 45.66 20.00 66.00 60.00 53.98 48.00 41.60 40.00 16.80 8.96 7.17 4.37 34.64 25.99 49.15 33.60 30.00 2.52 281 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Faccini Matteo Smeraldi Lorenzo Zaccaria Marcantonio Giustiniani Ansaldo Borghesano Filippo Conversini Raffaele Conversini Lorenzo Conversini Bartolomeo Manisani Matteo Marciano Girolamo Gio.Batta di Napoli Baboni AntonioMaria Sonetti Francesco Quilici Francesco Busanini Piermedico Troiani Camillo Vezzali Santa Dondoli Fabio Benni Lancillotto Conforti Ippolita 41337.66 FOREIGN CLERGY Abate di S.Maria in Regola Castagna Gio.Battista Beia Ludovico Abate di S.Silvestro(Nonantola) Priore di S.Romano(Ferrara) Montecuccoli Ludovica dividend lire 318.83 219.00 212.70 177.25 169.42 120.00 119.00 106.68 96.00 55.90 51.00 33.60 33.60 33.60 16.44 12.57 8.96 8.22 7.00 5.88 5.60 72.36 70.70 25.18 14.88 2.80 25.20 1.34 282 PROPRIETOR subgroup total COMMON CLERGY Don Campori Bartolomeo Don Santoli Bartolomeo Rev. Galdario Vincenzo Casio Orazio Don Garelli Guido Don Marchesini Angelo Bassani Giulia Gnudi Alessandro Bacelli Margherita Scotti Colomba Marzano Girolamo Pozzo Annibale Ferrari Alessandro Carlini Violante Turresani Fulvia Casali Michele Santi Gio.Alberto Turresani Reparata Ansaldini Serafina Parisi Angelica Libani Francesca 1811.26 RESIDENTS Albonici Gio.Batta Alicorni Bartolomeo Andreoli Giacomo Angelini Lucrezia Angelo (ebreo) Ansaldini Cornelia Archi (eredi) dividend lire 191.76 1274.24 128.80 19.20 70.00 4.20 16.80 76.61 67.20 13.13 18.46 550.10 72.00 33.60 310.18 67.20 59.91 151.41 125.75 33.60 62.85 30.00 100.80 17.85 181.97 2.24 119.00 2.31 33.60 18.00 283 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Archi Aurelia Arrigoni Antonio Arrigoni AntonioMaria Aspertini Veronica Azzolini Lorenzo Bagnoli Giovanni Baldovini Gio.Batta Bardachio (eredi) Baroni Angelo Bartolini Alessandra Bartolini Virgilia Bassani Bartolomeo Benedetti Francesco Benni Perseo Benvenuti Marino Bernardi Lorenzo Bertolotti Antonia Bertolotti AntonioMaria Bertuzzi Bartolomea Bertuzzi Nicola Bertuzzini Girolamo Biagi Isotta Biasetti Bernardina Bigiari Giasone Bolelli Sebastiano Bombasari (eredi) Bonamici Alessandro Bonamici Camillo Bonardi Pompeo Borgarini Gentile dividend lire 171.36 13.44 16.80 131.29 132.00 8.96 21.84 6.52 144.00 134.40 67.20 224.00 50.40 78.51 27.30 14.87 16.80 6.86 22.94 380.88 52.06 4.48 17.92 4.59 64.00 65.87 6.22 13.57 6.98 11.20 284 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Borgoncelli Giovanni Brunetti Gio.Maria Buratti Francesco Caiaretto Alessandro Calzironi Giovanni Campioni Gio.Bartolomeo Campioni Paolo Caravaggio Giacinto Castaldi Ottavio Cavazza Laura Cavazzoni Simone Cesarei Mattia Cestoni Diana Chiesa Gio.Batta Chiocca Alessandro Chiocca Alessandro Chiocca Ludovico Chiocca Pietro Conti Lucrezia Cristiani Alessandro Curioni Giacomo Da Bibulano Elisabetta Da Reggio Antonio Dal Falcone Tiberio Dal Ferro Ginevra Dal Ferro Ascanio Dal Pane Violante Dalla Bedina Evangelista Dalla Noce Elisabetta Dalla Porta Gio.Maria dividend lire 151.20 8.96 114.08 5.38 75.26 109.20 30.00 139.58 3.69 100.00 228.01 58.24 3.36 20.80 91.58 59.52 24.34 7.34 101.53 937.72 25.39 4.66 50.64 39.68 43.55 157.26 2.41 19.20 87.36 86.39 PROPRIETOR Dalla Dalla Dalla Dalle Dalle 285 subgroup total Torre Battista Torre Enrica Torre Lorenzo Campane Vespasiano Strenghe Sara Dattari Scipione De Fabri Felice Dondi Giacomo Dondini Bartolomeo Donna Dotti Dozza Adamo Domenico Angelo Emiliani Camillo Fabri Facci Facci Facci Facci Facci Facci Facci Giacomo Domenico Giovanni Ludovico Scipione Tommaso Vincenzo Zano Faccini Angelica Faccini Emilio Fallacini Porzia Perri Ferri Folco Anna Orfeo Girolamo Fornelli Marcantonio Galesi Agostino Galiani Matteo dividend lire 4.67 59.50 31.04 739.65 83.20 40.98 70.72 29.75 162.75 23.64 89.09 33.60 29.75 44.80 33.60 83.71 38.08 83.20 839.53 82.40 59.50 215.68 6.24 38.50 114.84 184.10 60.00 31.00 67.20 43.23 286 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Galli Ercole Gamberini Giustina Garelli Carlo Garganti Gio.Antonio Ghirardelli Angelica Ghirardelli Antonio Ghirardelli Leonello Gibetti Policleto Giraldini Laura Girammi Federico Giroldi AngeloMichele Giroldi Orsola Giroldi Valeria Gnetti Annibale Guglielmini Steefano Guidoni Giulio Inghirani Giacoma Landinello MariaAntonia Lazzari Vincilago Lazzari (eredi) Libri Ginevra Limidi Alberto Lodi Bartolomeo Macinatore Bartolomeo Mansueti Giacoma Manzolini GiulioC. Marchi Camilla Maria di Lavino Marini Marine Marzari Pompeo dividend lire 135.36 24.00 96.00 4.48 98.10 47.04 106.32 33.60 29.36 97.36 33.60 80.15 2.24 20.80 34.72 4.28 67.20 369.60 156.00 90.46 759.21 334.21 5.04 546.90 50.40 70.44 570.71 148.62 571.20 8.96 287 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Masi Gio.Batta Mazzoni Santo Melli Girolamo Melloni Ludovico Melloni Annibale molitore Monti Ippolita Montignani Pompeo Morai Morao Moratti Margherita Morbioli Libera Muratori Michele Muratori (eredi) Muri Muro Muzzarelli Gio.Maria Muzzarelli Lippo Nobili Angelo Odorici Ottaviano Orsolini Giulio Ostesani Ludovico Pacchioni Leonardo Pacini Emilio Pasolini Omero Passarotti Cecilia Passarotti Isabetta Passarotti Tiburzio Patarazzi Giulio Pedrini Pietro Peghini Stefano Pellacani Francesco dividend lire 89.90 39.06 28.80 119.00 144.61 75.00 25.20 14.40 10.73 8.96 72.08 26.88 13.30 361.40 35.84 34.64 13.24 32.31 246.41 8.96 5.31 15.36 36.81 59.88 66.40 96.00 8.83 33.60 10.08 163.56 288 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Pelliccioni Isoliere Pellini Fabio Pipini Gio.Faolo Ponsino Galeazzo Poppi Celso Poppi Isabella Provenzali Pietro Rabeti Gabriella Razzi Diamante Recordati Giulio Righi Cristoforo Righi Emilia Riguzzi Francesca Risi Angelo Rivali Ludovico Romani Caterina Sabadini Costanza Sabadini Giovanni Saglioni Caterina Salani Ippolito Salani Ludovico Salvietti Cesare Sandelli Francesco Schibazi Laura Selleri Ettore Sforzani Girolamo Simi Vincenzo Soli Battista Soli Gio.Andrea Stella Giacomo dividend lire 59.10 31.20 89.25 48.00 212.80 98.64 38.28 8.96 8.96 4.27 395.50 66.01 57.46 24.94 47.52 1.34 13.44 260.40 189.92 100.80 84.00 82.00 72.00 66.40 66.00 42.11 30.15 26.36 28.68 289 PROPRIETOR Tagliaferro Bartolomeo Tamburini Taddeo Tibaldi Pietro Tomaselli Camilla Triachini (eredi) Turresani Cesare Valli Pirro Vandini Marchionne Vasselli Vincenzo Verardini Francesco Vida Vincenzo Zerri Giuseppe Zocchi Santo Zoni Coralius UNCERTAIN Cattani Gio.Batta Cattani Girolamo Cattani Ludovica Merighi Pietro Gigli Bernardina Canonici Giulio Merighi Cristoforo Usberti Francesca Banci Anteo Barbieri Girolamo Rossi Zanettino Gaggi Tanarino Cartari Girolamo Cavallini Pompeo Dal Luzzo Sulpicia subgroup 19842.88 290 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 14.40 Negri Lucrezia 4.48 Dal Poggio Camilla 1130.00 dividend lire 38.40 8.40 10.40 96.00 8.96 344.26 177.72 133.53 772.90 672.00 18.12 191.25 67.46 80.50 29.75 12.60 4.20 25.00 53.41 9.36 1608.09 93.10 4.48 174.14 1053.36 4.48 36.22 61.94 4.48 291 PROPRIETOR NOBLE CITIZENS Accarisi Virginia Accursi Baldassarre Accursi Antonio Achillini Clearco Agocchia Lucrezia Alamandini Fabio Alamandini Laura Alamandini Stefano Alidosi Obizzo Alidosi Nicola Alle Girolamo Amorini Alessandro Amorini GiulioCesare Amorini Ludovica Amorini Pantasilea Anelli Bartolomeo Argeli PaoloEmilio Argeli Caterina Aristoteli Costanzo Arrighi Sara Ballatini Girolamo Balzani G.Battista Balzani Giroolamo Balzani Marcantonio Balzani Rinaldo Balzani Virgilio Banci Alberto Banci Alessandro Banci Floriano subgroup total 18.80 655.51 1444.90 368.96 29.20 2844.55 292 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 279.84 Banci G.Battista 102.00 Banci Lorenzo 532.48 84.92 Barbazzi Andrea 16.80 Barbazzi Margherita 111.47 Barbazzi Ugo 213.19 51.42 Barbieri Niccolo 134.47 Basenghi AntonioM. 161.35 26.88 Basenghi Marcantonio 7.03 Beccadelli Artemisio 148.80 Belviso Camilla 325.56 61.56 Belviso Valerio 67.20 Belviso Vincenzo 48.00 Belviso Luca 36.88 Benacci Ludovico 284.23 Benini Ettore 118.09 Beroaldi Paola 690.05 Bero Agostino 49.28 Bero Alberto 117.37 Bero CarloAntonio 311.16 Bero Faustina 35.59 Bero Ludovico 279.72 Bero (eredi) 1483.18 38.08 Boccadiferro Bartolomeo 6.96 Boccadiferro Camillo 8.96 Boccadiferro Francesco 134.56 Boccadiferro Girolamo 5.01 Boccadiferro Taddea 301.22 Boccadiferro Tommasa 80.00 Boccadiferro Anna 634.80 226.61 Bocchi Ginevra 293 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 1.60 Bocchi Achille 228.21 9.66 Bombaci (eredi) 245.12 Bonasone Camillo 25.20 Bonasone Francesca 3.05 Bonasone Galeazzo 273.37 29.75 Bonfigli Caterina 37.63 Bonfigli Andrea 67.38 151.20 Bonsignori Giorgio 114.93 Bonsignori Pompeo 2.14 Bonsignori (eredi) 268.27 8.96 Bonvalori Giacomo 23.52 Borzani Caterina 17.92 Bottrigari Alessandro 110.07 Bottrigari Ercole 46.20 Bottrigari G.Galeazzo 218.47 90.44 Bovio Andrea 57.30 Bovio Andrea 644.37 Bovio Mario 897.12 147.12 Budrioli Alberto 67.20 Budrioli Domicilla 17.92 Budrioli Gio.Battista 232.24 548.73 Buoi Gio.Andrea 901.86 Buoi Gio.Battista 291.56 Buoi Tommaso 1923.98 44.31 Campanazzo Antonio 8.83 Canobi Bonifacio 1.88 Canobi Aurelia 10.72 13.44 Canonici Achille 92.36 Canonici Giacomo 30.24 Canonici Ginevra 136.04 dividend lire 556.01 20.80 10.40 728.29 56.33 49.28 98.28 31.20 31.20 40.46 150.80 1361.42 13.44 1.00 288.82 57.04 19.20 153.24 434.99 266.99 8.82 6.72 61.45 275.64 68.08 89.33 212.93 401.52 115.69 294 PROPRIETOR Caprara Camilla Caprara Francesco Caprara Gentile Caprara Girolamo Caprara (eredi Ant.Maria) Caprara (eredi Francesco) Cartari Gio.Agostino Casappi Girolamo Casappi Lucrezia Casarenghi Diomede Cerioli Ottavio Chiari Camillo Chiari Cristoforo Chiari Sinibaldo Codibo (eredi Cesare & Tommaso) Codibo Fulvio Coltelli Alberto Coltellini Giulia Crescenzi Giulia Crescenzi Laura Crescimbeni Leonardo Crescimbeni Girolamo Cristiani Lucio Cupellini Giulio Cupellini Camillo Dainese Andrea Dal Bo Achille Dal Bo Elisabetta Dal Bo FurioCamillo subgroup total 1421.11 1375.86 345.86 701.98 15.54 343.72 dividend lire 36.93 2.80 280.00 4.06 2.24 5.64 8.96 48.00 49.28 100.80 137.48 199.23 4.48 47.80 59.50 209.04 64.58 26.46 17.92 24.78 8.75 2.90 16.91 487.71 292.80 55.40 64.62 420.00 8.96 295 PROPRIETOR Dal Bo Giulia Dal Calice (eredi) Dal Gambaro Livia Dal Gambaro Antonio Dal Giglio (eredi) Dal Luzzo Enea Dal Luzzo (eredi) Dal Medico Cesare Dal Medico Ercole Dal Medico Gio.Batta Dal Medico Guizzardo Dalla Seta AngeloM. Dalle Balle Tommaso Dalle Tovaglie Galeazzo Dalle Tovaglie Girolamo Dall'Oro Dall'Oro Desideri Desideri Desideri Desideri Desideri Desideri Battista Costanzo Battista Elisabetta Enea (eredi Giovanni) Francesco (eredi G.Girolamo) Dioli Dioli Dioli Dioli Dioli Dolfi Albizze Bianca Francesca Isabella Ludovico Ippolita subgroup total 767.07 284.06 14.60 335.56 107.30 273.62 97.72 1320.53 dividend lire 149.40 8.96 131.64 50.62 482.57 112.00 8.40 20.80 2.80 3.36 4.48 474.49 36.00 33.60 42.14 116.48 23.74 4.20 30.00 5.86 180.84 67.20 53.76 288.84 1.96 145.54 7.00 142.40 2.87 48.00 296 PROPRIETOR Dolfi Ulisse Dosi Gio.Batta Dosi Giuseppe Dosi Vincenzo Dosi-Delfini Alfonso Droghi Marcantonio Fabretti Matteo Fabretti (eredi) Fasanini Bernardo Fasanini Filippo Fasanini Gaspare Fasanini Girolamo Fasanini Porzia Fava Fava Fava Fava Fava Fava Fava Fava Fava Fava Fava Fava Fava Fava Fava Fava Fava Alessandro Annibale Baldassarre Baldissera Cesare Filippo GiacomoMaria Giovanni Giulio Guglielmo Ludovico Pellegrino Pierfrancesco Scipione Tommaso Urbano (eredi) subgroup total 158.36 712.19 29.20 521.13 1284.03 dividend lire 464.72 4.55 269.47 30.93 4.34 478.80 35.84 355.50 85.75 126.20 20.80 8.96 26.37 3.06 209.88 55.43 99.16 5.93 160.00 39.20 8.07 198.00 42.64 60.00 887.01 64.51 433.26 1147.59 28.31 306.13 297 PROPRIETOR Ferri Raimondo Fibbia Ippolito Fibbia Marcantonio Fondazza Filippo Franchini Gaspare Fronti Girolamo Gabrielli Niccolo Gaggi Antonio Gandolfi Alessandro Gandolfi Antonio Gandolfi (eredi Carlo) Gandolfi (eredi Laura) Gandolfi Giuseppe Gandolfi Stefano Garganelli AntonioG. Garganelli DomenicoM. Garzoni Marcello Garzoni Fabrizio Gessi Antonio Gessi GiulioCesare Gessi Orinzia Gessi Paolo Ghelli Tommaso Ghelli Angelica Ghiavarino Antonio Ghiavarino Gaspare Gioanetti Andrea Gioanetti Fabio Gioanetti Floriano Gioanetti Pirro subgroup total 274.02 271.14 265.31 105.09 589.44 102.64 951.52 dividend lire 4.48 67.20 17.92 17.92 33.92 86.28 167.43 430.55 159.35 297.50 144.74 45.94 151.49 1287.57 1356.38 8.23 74.38 48.00 793.21 720.55 20.80 72.00 24.30 1.83 30.00 183.01 33.60 383.46 74.26 25.55 298 PROPRIETOR Gioanetti Ulisse Gongoli Elisabetta Graffi Francesco Graffi Scipione Graffi (eredi) Grimaldi Cristoforo Guidalotti Carlo Guidalotti Fabio Guidoni Ippolito Leoni Ascanio Leoni Caterina Leoni Giacomo Leoni Leona Leoni Ulisse Leoni Vincenzo Leoni (eredi) Locatelli Camilla Locatelli Giandomenico Lombardi Carlo Lombardi Leonello Lombardi (eredi) Lucchini Girolamo Luna Francesco Luna Girolamo Machiavelli Battista Machiavelli Floriano Machiavelli Francesco Machiavelli Gio.Batta Machiavelli Lattanzio Machiavelli Marchionne subgroup total 1919.76 69.76 597.98 3351.85 419.88 1534.56 161.25 26.13 dividend lire 4.20 6.05 16.80 509.08 81.76 26.43 214.52 264.84 99.20 688.14 16.13 417.21 1.43 300.00 67.20 537.60 67.20 19.12 68.15 26.15 24.62 33.60 1.50 172.89 23.49 23.49 434.99 446.25 35.91 114.92 299 PROPRIETOR Machiavelli Pompeo Machiavelli Roberto Maggi Lucio Mantachetti Antonio Mantachetti Gio.Batta Mantachetti Ulisse Mattesilani Sforza Matugliani Eliseo Matugliani Evangelista Matugliani Vincenzo Merighi Andrea Merighi Gio.Battista Merighi (eredi) Mogli Diamante Mogli Elena Mogli Giacomo Mogli Niccolo Moneta Sforza Monteceneri Pantasilea Monterenzi Innocenzo Muletti Francesco Muzzoli Elena Muzzoli Paolo Nappi Camillo Nascentori Giovanni Nascentori Nascentore Negri Giuseppe Palmieri Achille Pannolini Curzio Pannolini Francesco subgroup total 773.73 955.53 1052.18 434.77 972.00 35.10 46.98 dividend lire 8.24 14.62 66.00 4.48 6.64 17.92 41.60 1793.25 8.96 9.25 224.00 16.80 16.44 93.60 297.50 322.97 101.64 682.30 10.42 91.67 352.67 240.00 26.21 56.00 1862.62 31.36 99.06 34.32 65.02 219.96 300 PROPRIETOR Pannolini Girolamo Panzacchi Achille Panzacchi Melchiorre Paselli Dialta Paselli Francesco Paselli Lavinia Pellacani Alberto Pietramellara Gio.Ant. Pietramellara Lorenzo Pini Girolamo Pini Lucrezia Pini Paolo Poggi Alessandro Poggi Girolamo Poggioli Lorenzo Pollicini Prospero Ponticelli Andrea Ponticelli Costanzo Prati Domenico Prati Pandolfo Rainieri Francesco Rangoni Claudio Ratta Carlo Ratta Laura Ratta Ludovico Ratta Margherita Rigosa Gio.Battista Rigosa (eredi) Roffeni Andrea Roffeni Antonio subgroup total 223.87 80.62 29.04 1802.21 250.05 110.04 783.94 102.09 3625.29 133.38 dividend lire 26.75 110.00 117.38 169.03 25.81 25.81 18.00 2.53 614.24 173.60 164.28 6.72 408.38 1.03 20.80 815.66 217.82 27.38 279.96 5.38 14.48 9.44 33.60 381.43 67.20 1.12 58.12 6.72 253.93 77.56 301 PROPRIETOR Roffeni AntonioMaria Roffeni Gio.Battista Roffeni Ippolita Romanzi Bernardino Romanzi Camilla Romanzi Leona Ruggeri Faustina Ruggeri Tommaso Sacchi AngeloMaria Sacchi Gio.Antonio Sala Filippo Sala Gio.Batta Salimbeni Francesca Salimbeni Francesco Salimbeni Vincenzo Sangiorgi Gio.Antonio Saracini Cesare Saracini Giulio Sarti Giacomo Sarti Paolo Savignani Ludovico Savioli Paolo Savioli Ginevra Scala Gaspare Scardovi Annibale Seccadenari Achille Seccadenari Niccolo Seccadenari (eredi) Seghicelli Filippo Seghicelli Leonardo subgroup total 580.71 220.64 20.55 787.84 171.00 430.20 245.20 285.34 43.04 65.96 dividend lire 268.13 365.32 160.35 240.00 8.96 141.96 714.00 11.22 165.00 62.63 150.00 147.48 4.48 186.36 87.50 49.28 220.00 252.00 5.38 256.87 119.00 378.08 2590.78 2356.49 233.92 26.88 110.02 4.65 8.96 1394.27 302 PROPRIETOR Seghicell i Stefano Segni Annibale Segni Girolamo Serpa Gentile Serpa Lattanzio Solimei I Spanocchi Spontone Spontone Spontone Stiatici Stiatici Stiatici sabella a Angelo Floriano Francesco Giuditta Alessandro Girolamo Virgilio Tanari Antonio Tanari Fi Testa Eli Tomaselli Torfanini Torfanini Torfanini Torfanini Torfanini Torfanini Torfanini Torfanini lippo sabetta Plinio Achille Bartolomeo Dorotea Francesco Giovanni Giovanni jr. Giulio Marcantonio Tossignani Ginevra Tossignani GiovanniF. Tossignani (eredi) Tostini ( eredi) Tostini Elisabetta subgroup total 599.63 525.67 248.96 243.33 301.96 273.86 6192.53 141.55 dividend lire 240.00 23.62 218.40 14.77 5.60 399.15 3.78 111.48 85.12 104.18 958.90 39.26 11.88 49.91 1.34 8.96 203.20 336.00 138.56 10.08 2.10 115.20 1036.52 44.80 7.96 303 PROPRIETOR Tostini Filippo Usberti Lucrezia Venenti Alessandro Venenti Filippo Vittori Alessandro Vizzani Alessandro Vizzani Branni Vizzani Camillo Vizzani Camillo Vizzani Emilio Vizzani Giasone Vizzani Maddalena Zanettini Zanettini Zanettini Zanettini Ascanio Fulgenzio Pietro Teodosio Zani Andrea Zani Battista Zani Cecilia Zani CarloAntonio Zani Giulia Zani Ippolita Zani Matteo Zani Paolo Zecca Gio.Giacinto subgroup total 1643.23 233.17 1701.87 101.85 1901.56 dividend lire 903.46 486.61 169.07 100.80 83.20 57.60 51.00 49.20 44.24 35.28 32.40 21.25 18.57 14.88 14.54 12.60 10.08 8.76 6.05 2.44 7.93 237.93 9.80 3.36 15.68 54.98 91.37 41.60 304 PROPRIETOR subgroup total PATRICIAN CLERGY CampeggiZanchi Giacomo Fachinetti Gio.Antonio Campeggi Gio.Batta Grassi Barbara e Angelica Volta Isotta Malvasia Laura Paleotti Gabriella Bolognetti Giulio Pellegrini Laura Bentivoglio Ludovico Armi Leonida Guidotti Laura Guastavillani Filippo Lupari Nicolosa Armi Maria Maddalena Isolani Flaminia Orsi Alessandro Bargellini Laudomia Bentivoglio Camilla Montecalvi Ludovica PATRICIANS Albergati Cornelio Alberto Pietro 255.66 Aldrovandi Angela Angelelli (eredi) Alberto Aurelia Dorotea dividend lire 71.32 1652.34 1107.14 540.00 44.33 5.60 393.72 151.32 823.17 37.10 1.38 58.32 2.80 57.20 25.72 1110.17 80.52 437.77 101.87 4.67 47.11 3.76 1233.63 2200.15 6.87 70.47 47.10 17.92 11.20 126.00 PROPRIETOR 305 Gio.Francesco Giovanni Marcantonio Camillo Ariosti Gio.Maria Armi Rinaldo Virginio Aurelia Cassandra Diana Francesco Ginevra Giovanni Bandini Orazio Bargellini Cesare Bentivoglio Cecilia Ermes Gio.Galeazzo Lucrezia Nicola Ugo (eredi) Battista Costante Ercole Flaminia Giulia Giulio Marcantonio Prospero subgroup total 3574.42 443.65 1121.03 1816.59 3758.42 dividend lire 145.89 20.76 79.08 280.00 88.80 16.15 5.07 88.14 50.40 17.78 45.76 309.29 28.36 220.00 12.93 65.28 35.72 1251.78 350.81 1.30 202.40 15.69 2.24 155.32 66.07 262.16 184.80 4.48 47.92 172.85 306 PROPRIETOR Bianchetti Angelo Alessandra Costanza Vincenzo Bianchini Camilla Lelio Pompeo Scipione Bolognetti (eredi) Bartolomeo Camilla Camillo Camillo Elena FilippoMaria Gio.Batta Giulia Lucrezia Ludovica Marcantonio Vincenzo Bolognini Camille Caledonia Alessandro Emilio Fulvio Gio.Antonio Gio.Francesco GiulioCesare Isotta subgroup 525.73 198.16 2641.01 dividend lire 67.20 12.74 35.92 9.58 5.44 1028.24 180.31 791.06 178.86 52.16 101.48 113.55 335.49 2660.00 4.48 607.54 83.20 890.76 3.38 5.52 2.95 8.33 134.40 8.96 4.48 5.36 24.00 55.68 267.41 250.93 PROPRIETOR 307 Laura Bonfioli Antonio Bonfiolo Camillo Elena Niccolo Orazio Rodolfo Silvia Caccialupi CarloAntonio Calderini Giulia Campeggi Camilla Annibale Antonio AntonioMaria Rodolfo Campeggi-Zanchi Giacinto Casali FrancescoM. Castelli Alberto Carlo Niccolo Cattani (eredi) Cospi Antonio Azzo Ercole Gaspare Orinzia Orsina Ascanio Dorotea subgroup total 978.73 2242.15 215.03 4763.24 11.86 241.21 dividend lire 5.64 29.37 7.75 32.59 8.19 2.90 204.96 42.34 58.69 34.06 23.89 3.04 100.56 42.41 51.75 289.77 552.00 1044.61 97.44 288.00 3.57 49.88 6.30 29.42 8.96 36.88 30.52 4.42 27.28 302.16 308 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Francesco FrancescoMaria Orazio Vincenzo Dal Purgo Alessandro Antonia Ercolani (eredi Vincenzo) eredi Nicola Astorre Cesare Cesare DomenicoMaria Dorotea Ercole Federico Gio.Batta Ottavio Rodolfo Fachinetti Cecilia Cesare Fantuzzi (eredi) Ferdinando Gio.Batta PaoloEmilio Pasotto Porzia Felicini Elisabetta Marzia Foscherari Alessandro Camille 593.70 11.09 2448.08 872.05 135.00 34.95 dividend lire 35.84 294.45 309.46 3.33 5.60 68.24 17.92 29.75 20.80 68.48 164.00 119.00 4.62 128.74 3871.83 45.92 385.42 267.96 4.90 2.02 109.80 815.04 766.00 2.41 2.24 225.93 9.73 116.40 19.60 129.02 309 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Caterina Pompeo Romeo Ghiselli (eredi) Bartolomeo Girolamo Marcantonio Ghisilardi Fulvia Giovanni Giulia Laura Ludovico Ghisilieri (eredi) Camillo Carlo Coriolano Ettore Fausto FilippoCarlo Giacomo Girolama Girolamo Virgilio Gozzadini (eredi) Alberto Alessandro Annibale Giacoma Gozzadino Porzia 969.18 95.09 402.03 6402.25 dividend lire 329.54 2.69 128.60 11.53 672.52 310.80 67.20 9.10 28.72 26.88 5.18 5.18 33.60 25.91 10.40 43.68 595.27 5.18 3.61 1344.00 78.56 81.04 152.64 78.18 51.61 26.96 19.02 99.09 5.05 10.08 310 PROPRIETOR Sallustio Tommaso Ulisse Grassi Agamennone Gabriele Gio.Antonio Gio.Batta Paride Smeralda Grati Alessandra Andrea Annibale Bianca Diomede Fulvio Ginevra Gio.Francesco Gio.Girolamo Ludovico Griffoni (Commenda) Guidotti (eredi) Alamanno Alessandro Camilla Ercole Federico GiulioCesare Lucrezia Isolani Alamanno Antonio subgroup total 966.16 1200.67 754.88 608.35 dividend lire 62.72 5.05 36.34 201.60 51.16 16.80 70.00 16.80 49.25 19.60 29.40 10.40 28.32 44.80 65.78 140.59 59.50 65.11 1.71 252.00 87.96 10.33 441.22 97.54 52.05 23.60 4.20 1660.29 200.47 38.53 311 PROPRIETOR Gio.Francesco Ludovico Lambertini GiulioCesare Bartolomeo Legnani Alessandro Ersilia Ippolita Laura Marcello Loiani Antonio Bonifacio Giacomo Ludovico Ludovico Ludovisi Francesca Girolamo LauraBianca Pompeo Lupari (eredi) Baldassarre Isabella Marcantonio Matteo Paolo Valerie Magnani (eredi) Gio.Antonio Lorenzo Vincenzo Malvasia Ant.Galeazzo subgroup total 95.50 237.94 204.01 132.52 330.98 957.68 1888.56 dividend lire 462.66 33.60 1.23 80.36 78.11 62.76 37.60 35.84 358.40 112.00 7.95 24.36 49.80 160.00 31.20 48.00 69.96 291.42 171.12 16.80 7.04 14.83 9.71 25.60 62.03 7.05 128.02 185.35 106.27 306.46 PROPRIETOR 312 subgroup total Alessandro Cesare Cornelio Costanzo Ercole Isabella 814.84 Malvezzi Giovanni Matteo Camilla Barbara Bartolomeo Carlo Contessa Costanzo Ercole Giulia Ippolito Leona Lucio Mattia Protesilao 1421.50 Manzoli (eredi) Alessandro Dorotea Ercole Francesco Girolamo Isotta Marchionne Alessandro 845.31 dividend lire 139.88 981.53 17.92 75.20 2.10 17.92 26.88 9.52 24.40 26.88 122.81 223.13 234.56 552.67 3.36 1067.36 41.60 622.32 1258.91 1.06 21.67 162.23 4.70 30.00 27.96 2.23 9.52 45.34 2.53 12.88 313 PROPRIETOR Marescalchi Fulvio Marsili Agostino Cesare Ercole Montecalvi Annibale Camillo GiulioCesare Orsi (eredi Gregorio) Orsi (eredi Alessandro) Alessio Arrigo Camilla Giuseppe Pompilio Paleotti (eredi) Annibale Astorre Camillo Galeazzo Paltroni Viride Pasi Alberto Licinio Gio.Andrea Gio.Batta Giulio Pellegrini (eredi) Ercole Pompeo Pepoli (eredi) Alessandro subgroup total 1074.65 49.34 1204.04 3044.55 246.56 101.33 dividend lire 302.40 100.80 6.37 145.48 40.66 233.45 2.24 81.73 17.92 117.25 757.62 293.92 4093.07 91.00 27.00 13.56 8.96 1273.45 514.32 24.64 14.00 9.65 137.01 29.29 59.50 390.30 8.96 6.98 461.99 124.20 314 PROPRIETOR Elena Sicinio Piatesi Marcantonio Camilla Poeti Galeazzo Ranuzzi Marcantonio Renghieri Febronio PierPaolo Riario Valeria Eleonora Ercole Giulio Raffaele Elisabetta Gio.Batta Rossi Gio.Galeazzo Sampieri (eredi) Bartolomeo Carlantonio Francesco Gio.Batta Gio.Francesco Sanuti (eredi) Sassoni Elena Scappi Elena Mario Vitali (eredi) Battista Laura Paolo subgroup total 418.61 151.85 83.97 5279.78 131.56 1845.02 449.80 602.13 dividend lire 13.61 145.12 16.80 341.36 315 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Volta Alessandra Alessandro Zambeccari Alessandro Paolo 241.93 358.16 APPENDIX D LIST OF DOCUMENTED PROPRIETORS OF ACCOUNTS dividend lire 3762.81 2283.14 1328.13 1285.56 135.37 2.43 1921.17 762.43 265.22 256.02 247.90 83.74 41.28 AND ANNUAL INTEREST PAYMENTS IN 1655. PROPRIETOR subgroup total CIVIC AGENCIES Fabbrica S.Petronio Gabella Grossa Superstiti Sanitatis Camera Creditori Tesoreria Consiglio Quattromila 8797.43 COLLEGES Collegio Riccio Collegio Ancarano Collegio Dosio Collegio Ferrerio Collegio Pannolini Collegio Filosofia Collegio Poeti 3577.76 316 dividend lire 177.13 123.30 109.60 87.06 53.32 34.70 32.00 31.79 30.37' 19.08 14.88 14.79 13.67 8.00 4.08 4.00 19057.03 5180.34 5055.46 4994.32 4273.45 3241.59 2083.80 1679.76 976.53 PROPRIETOR GUILDS Notai Bisilieri Salaroli Strazzaroli Toschi Fabbri Beccari Orefici Calzolari Barbieri Muratori Filatoglieri Lana gentile Merciai Bombasari Quattro Arti CHARITIES Monte Putte Monte Putte Putte Opera Opera di Pieta di S.Croce del Matrimonio di S.Marta del Baraccano Poveri Vergognosi Mendicanti Ospedale della Vita Opera Carcerati 317 subgroup total 757.75 dividend lire 728.77 709.46 703.76 537.90 536.64 511.60 418.95 337.78 238.90 228.19 200.00 113.04 81.35 40.67 17.76 7.87 6.20 2.70 318 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Poveri Bastardini Ospedale di S.Bartolomeo Ospedale di S.Giobbe Ospedale della Morte Putte della Maddalena Ospedale di S.Francesco Putte di Ospedale S.Giuseppe di S.Maria delle Lodi Ospedale dei Servi dei Convalescenti di S.Orsola di S.Giacomo di Idice Ospedale Ospedale Ospedale Casa Soccorso di S.Paolo Ospedale di S.Giovanni Gerosolimitano. Ospedale di S.Antonio Poveri Ciechi Ospedale di S.Maria degli Angeli Poveri di Gesu Cristo ECCLESIASTICAL AGENCIES SOCIETIES 51963.81 dividend lire 1787.50 937.80 370.00 207.00 170.00 161.86 144.20 126.00 100.00 90.00 72.00 71.41 71.40 64.26 60.00 52.02 45.00 41.31 40.98 40.00 36.93 33.60 31.07 30.00 '24.08 21.65 319 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Baraccano Rosario Orazione Trinita CorpusDomini S.Sebastiano & S.Rocco Maddalena Santissimo in S.Caterina Piombo Consolazione S.Maria del Borgo S.Niccolo di S.Felice Arciconfraternita della Morte Croce S.Sacramento in S.Felice Consorzio Porta Procula S.Sacramento dei SS.Cosma & Damiano Consorzio S.Pietro Arciconfraternita della Vita S.Sacramento di S.Biagio S.Niccolo degli alberi Sindaci S.Maria Maggiore Consorzio Porta Stiera Santissimo Parrocchiani S.Pietro Maggiore S.Martino dividend lire 16.59 14.47 12.00 11.88 8.00 6.00 4.37 2.40 1.83 1.83 10109.15 3570.00 894.31 602.80 356.39 225.00 202.96 200.03 187.20 145.56 124.88 116.82 114.60 108.00 96.80 80.00 66.65 66.15 320 PROPRIETOR subgroup total S.Sacramento dei Lebbrosi Segreta di S.Giobbe B.V.del Soccorso S.Giuseppe del Mercato Confraternita B.V. dei Poveri Consorzio Porta Ravegnana Terzo ordine S.Sacramento del Carrobbio S.Sacramento di S.Isaia Corpo di Cristo in S.Procolo 4909.44 CHAPTERS, PARISHES, SCHOOLS & OTHERS Gesuiti di S.Lucia Casa dei Catecumeni Capitolo di S.Pietro Cattedrale Capitolo di S.Petronio S.Maria della Vita Collegio Seminario S.Maria in Dono SS.Fabiano & Sebastiano S.Tommaso del Mercato Scuole Pie Madonna Salegata B.V. del Gaudio S.Michele da Nugareto Altare B.V. della Vita S.Biagio S.Maria degli Uccelletti Capitolo di S.Maria Maggiore dividend lire 64.20 60.00 58.78 58.75 53.55 50.40 47.43 45.58 25.00 22.15 22.03 16.80 14.28 11.52 5.63 1.83 800.00 334.18 327.99 320.00 309.83 297.70 275.91 259.59 231.80 212.40 194.18 321 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Dottrina Cristiana Penitenziaria Lampade Osservanza Lampade Annunziata S.Maria dell’Olmo SS.Vitale & Agricola S.Clemente in S.Giovanni in Persiceto S.Martino di Casalecchio S.Michele dei Lebbrosi S.Giacomo dei Carbonesi Congregazione di S.Gabriele S.Agostino S.Maria della Mascarella S.Donato di Cagnano S.Ceci1ia Arcivescovado 17825.23 ECCLESIASTICAL OFFICES Primicerio di S.Pietro Rettore di S.Stefano di Bazzano Rettore altare di S.Andrea Rettore Rettore Rettore di S.Bernardino di S.Mamolo di Medicina chiesa di Gessi Rettore di S.Martino di Monsummatico Rettore di S.Bartolomeo di Porta Rettore di Rettore di S.Gregorio S.Maria di Galliera Rettore cappella di S.Martino dividend lire 191.89 170.65 160.65 159.67 159.13 154.15 148.18 142.55 133.88 125.00 120.49 111.85 108.84 107.99 101.24 91.55 89.25 87.21 86.44 86.06 76.50 75.35 75.00 74.21 72.00 71.40 322 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Rettore di S.Brigida Rettore di S.Andrea dei Piatesi Rettore di S.Andrea di Cento Abate di Monte Armato Rettore beneficio di S.Luca Rettore Rettore altare dei Re Magi Rettore di S.Lorenzo di Genericolo di S.Donato di Cagnano Rettore di S.Maria di Medelana Rettore altare della B.V. Rettore di S.Maria di Berenunzio Rettore Rettore di S.Donato Rettore di S.Maria delle Budrie Rettore di S.Vittore di Cinguanta Rettore di S.Pietro in Casale di S.Maria di S.Marino Abate di S.Michele in Bosco Rettore di S.Pietro di Fiessi Rettore di S.Maria di Casalecchio Rettore di S.Maria dell’Albarazzo Arciprete di S.Pietro Rettore di Rettore di Foscherara Rettore di S.Lazzaro S.Maria della S.Donnino Rettore chiesa di Rasiglio Rettore dei tre maggiori dividend lire 66.94 66.05 65.41 62.48 62.35 59.03 58.78 55.46 55.38 54.44 52.15 51.26 51.00 51.00 49.98 49.98 48.00 46.79 42.84 40.80 38.76 37.49 323 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Rettore di S.Sebastiano in S.Petronio Rettore di SS.Giacomo 8 Filippo Rettore di SS.Ippolito 8 Cassiano di Castagnolo Rettore di S.Niccole di Pagania Rettore di SS.Giuliano 8 Alberto in S.Pietro Rettore di SS.Pietro e Giovanni di MonteS.Pietro Rettore di S.Maria di Castel de’ Britti Rettore di Carrobbio Rettore di Rettore di Pianoro S.Maria del S.Maria di Camerlata S.Gio.Battista di Arciprete S.Lorenzo in Collina Rettore di S.Tommaso della Braina Rettore di S.Michele di Argelato Rettore di S.Maria del Trebbo Rettore di S.Luca del Castello Arciprete Monte S.Giovanni Rettore di S.Donnino di Moglio Rettore di S.Biagio di Fagnanello S.Giovanni del Trebbo S.Pietro di Barbarolo Rettore di Rettore di Rettore di SS.Giovanni 8 Paolo fuori S.Vitale Rettore di S.Maria della Baroncella dividend lire 36.47 35.70 32.44 32.13 31.24 31.24 31.00 28.00 26.90 26.01 24.75 23.84 22.95 22.31 21.04 20.66 20.03 20.02 20.02 20.00 20.00 19.64 19.38 19.00 324 PROPRIETOR subgroup Rettore Montalto Rettore Muratell Rettore Sebastia Rettore Rettore Rettore Rettore Rettore Rettore Rettore Rettore Rettore total di S.Agostino di di S.Maria delle e di SS.Fabiano 8 no di S.Maria di Quarto chiericato Senzanome chiericato Casolano di S.Pancrazio nel Borgo di S.Maria di Mascarino di S.Michele di Mezzolara di S.Mamolo di S.Lucia di Roffeno di S.Salvatore della Quaderna Rettore Rettore Chiavica Rettore Rettore Rettore Rettore Rettore Rettore Rettore Rettore Rettore di Serra Provosto di S.Maria di Malfolle di S.Silvestro della di SS.Biagio e Onofrio di SS.Senesio 8 Teogonio di SS.Ippolito 8 Barbara di SS.Maria 8 Alessio dei Bulgari di SS.Filippo 8 Giacomo della B.V.del Popolo di S.Giacomo di Pianoro di S.Apollinare valle di S.Petronio 8588.31 dividend lire 3391.50 3226.67 3226.67 3109.85 2100.00 2006.67 2006.55 1778.72 1740.00 1399.53 1320.90 1050.00 1018.33 1014.65 1003.33 937.09 886.20 795.33 772.05 710.29 553.99 534.30 511.66 472.62 464.10 357.00 297.46 285.60 261.76 325 PROPRIETOR subgroup total FOREIGNERS Grilli Agapito Imperiali OttavieMaria Imperiali FrancescoMaria Spinola Luciano Grimaldi MariaDelia Doria CarloMaria Gessani Francesca Spinola Gio.Francesco Varani Carlo Gentili Piermaria Giustiniani Alessandro Spinola Maddalena Pie Chiara Varani Doria Gio.Batta Doria Filippo Teggia Costanzo Piccamigli Giannettino Riccardi Gabriele Doria PaoloAndrea Doria Nicolette Grimaldi Dalla Revere Gio.Batta Jacobs Giovanni (eredi) Gavotti Gio.Agestino Centurioni Giulio Doria PaeleFrancesce Toriani Guide Gavotti Gio.Francesco Staggieri Tomasina Gavotti Gio.Batta 326 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 248.70 Orazi Vittoria 232.05 Doria Marcantonio 202.38 Quilici Sebastiano 193.19 Smeraldi Cecilia 180.00 Malatendi Bartolomeo 104.13 Doria Clemente 100.00 Smeraldi Lorenzo 84.50 Varesi Livia 38577.75 FOREIGN CLERGY 2444.40 Fertunati den Benigne 295.82 Primicerio cattedrale (Pistoia) 256.02 Priore S.Maria di Camaldeli 249.90 Conversini den Gio.Batta 221.98 Cardinale Montalto 121.51 Abate di S.Silvestre (Nonantela) 90.00 Griffeli Pie 66.17 Priore S.Frediane (Lucca) 30.00 Priore S.Romane (Ferrara) 3775.80 COMMON CLERGY 471.15 Facci Ginevra 315.00 Tomaselli MariaAugustina 270.50 Pederzani den Simone 269.45 Refrigeri den Pietro 249.90 Risi AngelaLucida 196.35 Lombardi Fulvia 158.00 Demenichini Girolamo 148.75 Risi FrancescaMaria 107.89 Dainese Cesare 102.00 Roda Flaminia 80.00 Fabri Luisa dividend lire 1 21 10 7 7 73.44 69.60 66.40 59.10 58.00 55.37 49.85 49.38 47.82 45.70 41.20 36.00 35.70 34.75 29.87 25.17 12.50 10.33 9.41 8.96 8.96 7.20 5.00 3.00 37.25 25.71 72.89 79.33 68.18 327 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Quattrini Imelda Lucchini Angelo Maria Dorotea Tiresia Campori den Bartolomeo Odorici den Gregorio Savi Serafica Parisi Angelica Riatti Sara Orlandini den Giovanni Predieri Maria Cattelani den Angelo Sabadini don Andrea Borgognoni MariaArcangela Tagliacozzi Valeria Demenichini Isabella Duzzi Petronio Costa Demenica Righi don Bartolomeo Saveia Francesco Fierentini den Niccele’ Fantuzzi den Francesco Conti den Francesco Libani Francesca Carubi Paola Aldrovandi Antonie 3348.94 RESIDENTS Taruffi Cesare Uccelli Giovanna Pederzani Marcantonio Anselmi Lorenzo 328 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 685.31 Facci Ercole 599.75 Pippini Vincenzo 578.56 Ostesani Pannina 554.89 Lamberti Antonie 524.01 Pippini FrancescoMaria 453.20 Negriseli (eredi) 452.60 Anselmi Bonifacio 450.00 Zagoni Lorenzo 444.10 Masini Giacomo 436.50 Valleni Senefente 435.67 Gualandi Antonie 424.02 Mariani Andrea 409.49 Mundini Giacomo 405.49 Melloni Antonie 393.98 Muzzarini Taddee 374.85 Triachini (eredita) 329.77 Piella Bartolomeo 329.08 Tassi Simone 324.00 Besi Deraluce 303.00 Orefici Gio.Giaceme 252.83 Dal Belle Margherita 250.00 Gettardi Alessandro 250.00 Asti Gio.Batta 221.80 Garbieri Carlo 210.43 Berdeni Francesca 182.07 Bergegelli Francesco 180.00 Pulzeni Laura 180.00 Martini Francesco 180.00 Carelli Cesare 179.90 Ambrosini Giacinto dividend lire 174.34 165.00 159.46 158.10 155.42 154.29 154.27 151.47 143.75 142.60 140.25 135.00 127.50 125.33 122.50 115.33 111.44 103.91 101.63 101.44 100.00 100.00 99.25 94.61 93.50 92.82 90.00 90.00 90.00 89.73 329 PROPRIETOR Lamberti Francesca Capra Gio.Giaceme Aloisi Valeria Benedelli Pietro Bertelli Floriano Garbieri Lorenzo Gatti Gio.Batta Betti Gio.Batta Felini Caterina Piccini Ventura Pigna Paolo Pisterini Pietro Bugami Andrea Nebili Caterina Sagazzi Matteo Rizzi Giovanni Rossi Gio.Francesco Zanibeni Marsilie Melloni AntonioMaria Monti Caterina Puzzi Tommaso Ierie Domenico Rizzardi Francesca Vernizzi Francesca Pigna Ippolita Galesi Agostino Pellini Fabio Guglielmini Demenica Frassetti Serafina Pederzani Ercole subgroup total dividend lire 88.70 83.30 83.08 82.49 81.77 81.75 79.69 75.00 73.58 73.23 72.55 70.76 66.33 62.00 61.14 60.00 59.75 58.24 56.73 56.38 56.00 52.80 52.06 51.00 50.98 49.47 48.65 48.00 46.79 45.00 330 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Piella Ludovico Muratori Marcantonio Rivali Angelo Corsini Demenica Guicciardini Alessandro Fierini Sebastiano Favari (eredita) Dal Buene Bartolomeo Landucci Francesco Ballestri Francesca Besi-Ceriolani Marta Berdani Giuseppe Giordani Angelo Cagnoli Giuseppe Bertolotti Antonio Peraccini Angela Scozia Gio.Batta Dozza Dorotea Baldanza Andrea Gatti Paolo Pichi Ludovico Bassi Andrea Reveri Gio.Batta Bruni Camilla Mezzetti Gio.Batta Netari Sabatina Chiesa Gio.Francesco Guarini Anna Masini Lucia Zaria Lorenzo dividend lire 44.95 44.00 42.00 41.90 41.46 40.00 40.00 39.78 39.78 37.20 35.87 35.65 35.55 33.23 33.16 32.39 31.00 30.00 29.76 29.75 28.76 27.77 27.74 27.30' 27.00 26.90 25.50 24.00 22.31 20.67 331 PROPRIETOR Calvi Gio.Benedetto Bartelelli Ginevra molitore di frumente Cucchi Giuseppe Riviera Giacomo Santarcangeli Paolo Laghi Maria Carrati Vincenzo Carrati Angelo Facci Giulia Stranieri Gio.Batta Cristiani Ippolita Dall’Aglio Caterina Zocchi Domenico Rossi Gio.Batta Penteri Angelo Certani Antonie Scarabelli Felicita Giraldini Valeria Gibetti Policleto Andrei Alessandro Aloisi Violante Istriani Giulio Macelli Isabella Amadei GiacomoMaria Cavalli Maddalena Asti Chiara Mazzoni Ludovica Zagneni Gabriele Dalle Tre Lucrezia subgroup dividend lire 20.49 18.45 18.08 18.00 18.00 17.85 17.71 16.67 16.67 16.43 15.30 14.87 12.61 11.88 10.72 10.00 9.30 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.30 7.17 6.57 6.25 6.23 5.76 4.48 4.17 3.88 3.69 332 PROPRIETOR Marescalchi Gio.Maria Monti Ippolita Giroldi Laura Spagneli Giacema Borgarini Gentile Bertacchi Fabrizio Canali Lucrezia Mazzoni Margherita Grazioli Orsola Zanelini Cristoforo Vernizzi Alessandro Bertacchi Pietro Zenzanini Laura Sabadini Costanzo Careli Giovanni Dalla Perta Gio.Maria Favari Gio.Antonio Vasselli Vincenzo Querzeli Demenica Parisi Dorotea Tembelli Aurelia Reni Lancillotto Nelli Alessandro Roda Maria Gambelonghi Ermellina Fracassati Carlo Ferrari Giacomo Faccini Andrea Bonetti Pietro Caiaretti Alessandro subgroup total dividend lire 6 1 3.00 2.58 2.08 2.00 2.00 1.91 1.60 99.28 61.60 51.15 48.00 13.44 7.30 5.53 96.00 4.50 59.93 47.94 22.60 7.93 57.20 40.80 8.96 21.25 53.16 25.00 33.23 16.45 333 PROPRIETOR Emiliani Camille Fenici Francesco Muratori Gaspare Mengolini Giovanna Bonamici Camille Berdella Ferdinando Gnetti Cesare UNCERTAIN Cattani Diamante Cattani Lucrezia Cattani Bernardino Manzoli Camilla Cattani Ludovica Vizzani Teresa Borzani Michele NOBLE CLERGY Alamandini Lerenza Alamandini Maria Gertrude Amorini Cesarea Amorini LucidaStella Boccadiferro Sulpicia Bottrigari Carissima Budrioli Gio.Giuseppe Desi Innecenza Fava Semplice Gandolfi Laura Ghelli MariaDiamante Gigli Chiara Leoni Deedata Locatelli Amata subgroup total 22708.48 886.3 dividend lire 282.08 46.50 2.18 18.00 4.00 653.00 60.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 245.62 78.67 65.87 48.00 68.05 48.00 15.05 334 NOBLE CLERGY PROPRIETOR subgroup total Mantachetti Caterina Mantachetti Medea Montecuccoli Ludovica Muzzoli Francesca Nappi Camilla Odofredi Domenico Panzacchi Ippolita Peraccini Elena Peraccini MariaGiacinta Peraccini Paola Pini Bernardo (canonice) Romanzi Laura Solimei Laura Zani Clemenzia Zani den Marco Zani Febronia Zani Osanna 2313.96 dividend lire 10.00 73.57 7.50 80.65 182.58 42.63 111.20 1072.37 5197.37 1165.97 83.24 75.70 500.00 296.16 43.14 86.53 1673.41 6.28 370.45 102.94 18.00 1.71 1.50 230.27 34.00 300.00 8.96 25.83 170.00 335 PROPRIETOR NOBLE CITIZENS Accarisi Giacomo Accarisi Arnaldo Accursi (eredi) Alamandini Fabio Alamandini Floriano Alamandini Stefano Amorini Ottavio Argeli Antonie Ballatini Filippo Ballatini Elena Banci Alessandro Banci Annibale Banci Elena Banci Lorenzo Barbieri Niccolo Barbieri Alessandro Barbieri Ginevra Beccadelli Ottavio Belviso Camilla Benini Ettore Bere Giulia Bere Ludovico Bere (eredi) Boccadiferro Giacinto Boccadiferro Bartolomeo Bombaci Domenico Bombaci (eredi) Bombelli Eleonora Bonasoni Tommaso subgroup total 83.57 406.36 219.06 6363.34 955.10 1803.08 21.21 386.87 308.96 336 3.05 Desideri Stefano dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 376.50 Bonasoni Gio.Batta 546.50 104.00 Borzani Matilde 123.42 Borzani Giacomo 227.42 39.00 Budrioli Alberto 96.20 38.40 Cambi Vincenzo 49.78 Campagna Galeazzo 14.56 Canobi Bonifacio 70.38 Canobi Francesco 903.85 Canobi Giacema 171.30 Canobi Bartolomeo 1106.08 294.38 Canonici AnnaM. 260.44 Canonici Ginevra 1091.29 Canonici AChille 1646.11 8.96 Casarenghi Diomede 31.50 Casarenghi Alberto 40.46 8002.03 Cattelani Carlo 4.48 Codibo AntonioMaria 233.43 Codibo Giu.Alessandre 237.91 496.75 Coltellini Antonie 409.63 Coltellini Flaminie 906.38 295.16 Cupellini Giovanni 109.88 Cupellini Giulio 3.50 Cupellini Ercole 408.53 38.90 Dal Be FurioCamillo 2.17 Dal Luzzo Orsoline 2.79 Dal Luzzo (eredi) 4.96 530.91 Dalle Balle Gio.Paelo 72.00 Dall'Ore Domenico 2052.65 Davia PietroAntonio 337 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 13.19 Desideri Francesco 16.24 25.14 Dioli Albizze (eredi) 297.90 Dioli Alessandro 1696.45 Dioli Cristina 8.96 Dioli Rinaldo (eredi) 240.53 Dioli Aurelia 2268.99 4.54 Dondini (eredi) 154.76 Dondoli Sigismonde 171.38 16.63 Dondoli Agostino 146.67 Desi Alfonse (eredi) 45.60 Desi Valeria 782.60 Dosi Flaminie 1015.66 100.00 Fabretti Pierfrancesco 108.93 8.93 Fabretti FrancescoMaria 1.43 Fasanini Giacema 282.07 Fasanini Giulia 3.00 Fasanini Filippo 285.07 250.41 Fava Alessandro 60.00 Fava AntenieFrancesco 985.00 Fava Ercole 650.00 Fava FrancescaResalia 2.35 Fava Francesco 6.08 Fava Tommaso 120.00 Fava Virginia 2082.80 6.80 Ferri Boncompagno 218.38 Fioravanti Francesco 3.76 Fioravanti Giovanna 5-54 Fioravanti PierNicela 420-00 Fioravanti Vincenzo 547-53 338 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 202.90 Fontana Girolamo 107.79 Fontana Ercole 310.69 15.50 Gandolfi Carlo 56.81 Gandolfi Gie.Paele 2.73 Gandolfi Girolamo 6.38 Gandolfi (eredi) 102.67 17.80 Garzoni Marcelle 338.47 Garzoni Fabrizio 356.27 412.19 Gioanetti Floriano 19.05 Gioanetti (eredi) 431.24 11.86 Giovagnoni Antonio 66.88 Giovagnoni GiulioCesare 112.27 Giovagnoni Orazio 191.02 110.97 Graffi Scipione 103.84 Grimaldi Vespasiano 165.67 Guidalotti Giulio 1.70 Guidalotti Carlo 167.37 308.68 Leoni Alfonse 551.98 Leoni CarleAndrea 45.85 Leoni Giacomo 55.65 Leoni Girolamo 88.68 Leoni Isabella 30.99 Leoni Vincenzo 1115.06 240.00 Locatelli Margherita 68.98 Locatelli Isabella 325.43 3.89 Mangini Gio.Batta 5.76 Mattesilani Gie.Carle 296.83 Mattesilani Francesco 302.59 17.92 Matugliani Vincenzo 539.70 Mogli Sallustio dividend lire 46.85 96.00 24.53 211.85 125.33 18.00 11.07 588.24 198.00 9.18 80.33 13.44 50.00 8.96 59.16 184.00 32.00 1001.20 15.00 1.20 41.28 139.87 775.62 435.03 1511.04 31.00 889.76 3183.87 31.90 128.80 339 PROPRIETOR Mentalbani Marcantonio Mentalbani Ovidie Montalbani Gio.Batta Morandi Costanza Morandi Giulia Morandi Camilla Odofredi Livia Palmieri Giacomo Panzacchi Margherita Panzacchi Livia Parati Fulvia Pastarini Ludovica Pedrini-Ventura Francesco Pellicani Alessandro Peraccini Marcantonio Peraccini Gio.Girelame Pini Camilla Pini Lucrezia Pini Paolo Poggi Gie.Carlo Poggi Alessandro Pollicini Pierantonio Prati Domenico Prati Carlo Rainieri Giuseppe Rainieri Fabrizio Ratta GiuseppeCarle Ratta Ludovico Ratta Dionisio Regeli Bartelemea subgroup total 167.38 355.18 664.07 267.18 327.16 1293.82 42.48 1210.65 1542.04 4105.53 dividend lire 33.42 22.31 3.40 70.03 3.65 818.50 265.02 9.18 1619.00 2641.16 53.74 10.33 8.96 302.81 90.00 167.25 982.52 280.50 247.50 256.41 1678.64 4.80 2285.37 394.78 6.67 603.18 549.91 44.80 133.90 1.83 340 PROPRIETOR Roffeni Penelope Roffeni Gio.Antonio Sacchi FilippoCarlo Salicini FabiaGertrude Saracini Virgilio Sarti Taddee Savignani Pietro Savignani Ludovico Scala GaspareM. Scala Gio.Batta Scala Ludovica Scala (eredi) Sighicelli Leonardo Sighicelli Baldassarre Solimei Orazio Solimei Flaminie Spanocchia Pandolfo Spontone Valeria Stancari Virginia Stella Giacomo Stiatici Camilla Torfanini Bartolomeo Tortorelli Giacomo Terterelli Giovanni Torterelli (eredi) Turrini GiacomeF. Vagini Domenico Vezza Achille Zani Caterina Zani Paolo subgroup total 55.73 274.20 4324.23 311.77 323.11 2686.82 588.12 341 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 273.30 Zani Carlantonio 55.38 Zenzifabri Ludovico NOBLE CLERGY (Patriciate) 1896.89 Bargellini Pietro 1121.00 Fachinetti Cesare 295.38 Ghisilardi Giulia 225.79 Sampieri CarloAntonio 175.28 Ghisilieri Cherubine 172.43 Bonfioli AnnaMatilde 120.00 Pepoli LuisaMaria 98.75 Orsi Fabio 92.30 Ghisilardi Olimpia 84.24 Cattani Aurora 75.00 Paleotti Virginie 68.45 Ghisilieri FrancescoMaria 68.00 Paleotti Gabriele 56.00 Fantuzzi Ippolita 55.89 Ghisilardi Francesco 51.00 Paleotti Gabriella 50.00 Aldrovandi Isabella 45.00 Malvezzi MariaGertrude 37.10 Orsi Guidascania 36.00 Cattani Clemenzia 15.85 Malvezzi Elena 14.88 Lupari Nicolosa 14.54 Armi MariaMaddalena 5.80 Pellegrini Costanzo 1.83 Fibbia Ginevra 4877.39 dividend lire 13.95 2314.95 59.46 339.50 1091.81 2104.44 1875.70 47.58 105.00 1266.59 1649.00 229.31 224.10 5.00 1.38 673.35 19.37 9.70 35.75 2894.88 58.09 29.75 16.75 494.00 1146.90 6.13 4.00 10.00 29.75 342 PROPRIETOR PATRICIANS Albergati Elisabetta Girolamo Giulia Ugo Angelelli Andrea Achille AngeloMaria eredi Marcantonio Pantasilea Gio.Francesco Ariosti ClementeM. Girolamo Rinaldo Armi Francesco Barbazzi Astorre Andrea eredi Bargellini Camille Astorre Dorotea SforzaErcele Bentivoglio Caterina Carlo Costanzo Ercole Giulio Marcantonio Pantasilea subgroup total 2727.85 8110.10 458.41 15.92 702.42 4915.36 dividend lire 787.58 65.28 5.07 1.42 90.27 205.83 850.15 316.00 71.40 60.72 21.31 365.35 957.62 35.00 45.00 15.15 53.27 923.35 2226.25 7.43 29.20 269.75 3113.82 137.32 63.55 76.40 1897.61 22.81 8.03 32.40 343 PROPRIETOR subgroup total Prospero Ulisse 2560.40 Bianchini (eredi) Prospero 6.48 Bolognetti Fulvia Camille Girolamo GiuseppeAnt. Laura Pompeo 1594.38 Bolognini GiulieAntonie Laura Vittoria 1344.29 Bonfioli Camilla Domenico Ercole Girolamo Luca Antonie Vitale 3477.88 Boschetti Cassandra Bovio Andrea Gio.Ludovico Orazio 3520.89 Caccialupi Giovanni Calderini Filippo Federico Giovanni Ludovico 2004.85 Campeggi Tommaso 344 dividend PROPRIETOR subgroup lire total 31.00 Caprara Francesco 56.32 Girolamo 193.01 Massimo 280.33 25.72 Carbonesi Alberto 2.45 Castelli (eredi) 29.00 Alberto 59.38 AntonioMaria 50.62 Galeazzo 141.44 3.29 Cattani (eredi) 275.12 AntonioM. 70.87 Bartolomeo 117.97 Caterina 2618.13 Ippolito 14.75 Sulpicia 154.65 Tommaso 3254.79 38.25 Cospi Ascanio 158.06 Battista 3.33 Cristoforo 24.00 Giulia 223.64 46.10 Ercolani (eredi) 129.19 Agostino 4503.72 Astorre 19.24 Federico 92.66 Filippo 2.13 Marcantonio 254.90 Vincenzo 5047.93 408.00 Fachinetti Ludovico 1529.00 18.40 Fantuzzi (eredi) 1916.68 Camilla 18.00 Giovanni dividend lire 18.27 15.50 3.49 17.50 20.00 1093.30 89.30 60.00 1085.15 335.84 977.98 280.32 159.65 218.34 8.96 241.75 3.33 51.70 18.50 25.20 48.59 352.70 5.80 0.00 357.00 9.69 119.55 2.00 19.90 2.15 PROPRIETOR 345 PaoloEmilio Felicini Isabetta Fibbia Anna Foscherari (eredi) Gessi Ginevra Berlingerio Valerie Ghisilardi Bartolomeo Andrea Antonie Valeria Bartolomeo Filippo Laura Ludovico SilvieAnt. Ghisilieri (eredi) Alessandro Carlo Elisabetta Ettore FilippoCarlo Giacomo Gualengo Pantasilea Gozzadini Claudio Giacema Gozzadino Marcantonio eredi subgroup total 2027.34 1202.63 3811.55 1106.55 153.29 dividend lire 10.78 8.00 10.85 4.63 4.63 18.68 1428.00 143.31 8.96 16.62 83.00 7.50 11.07 2.73 96.06 2.73 5.05 11.52 62.72 700.00 2.53 16.67 332.21 84.04 43.97 87.00 17.50 4.00 3.16 1.71 346 PROPRIETOR Grassi Agamennone Grati Cernelie Fulvio Giacomo Gio.Girelamo Virginia Griffoni (commenda) Antonia Isabella Guastavillani (eredi) Filippo Guidotti FrancescoMaria Gie.Simene Saul Valeria Vincenzo Isolani Alamanno Antonie Gio.Francesco Gio.Marce GiulioCesare Lambertini Isabella Marcelle Legnani Filippo Marcelle Lini Giuseppe Loiani Antonie Ludovisi Orazio Pompeo Lupari (eredi) subgroup total 46.78 1580.27 99.62 120.09 781.81 348.88 128.01 dividend lire 496.39 177.78 16.40 1.83 109.63 38.89 233.75 33.81 38.11 3.65 2969.07 80.00 209.71 71.75 276.61 418.67 363.03 4623.54 73.70 13.44 1448.69 3000.00 65.95 1481.68 60.76 80.64 3.65 8.50 376.40 549.15 347 PROPRIETOR Enea Giovanni Vincenzo Magnani Alessandro Enea Gio.Antonio Gio.Marce PaeleScipiene Pietro Verzuse Vincenzo Malvasia AntenieGiuseppe Antengaleazze Costanzo FrancescoM. Ginevra Gio.Batta Malvezzi CarloFilippo Manzoli (eredi) Ulisse Marescotti Ciro Ercole Marsili AnnaMaria . Annibale Orsi Aleisie Astorre Enrico Gregorio Marie Paleotti Bernardina subgroup total 707.16 3428.72 1419.76 4684.39 87.14 4448.69 1547.63 573.01 dividend lire 367.20 0.90 326.30 50.00 5.71 88.25 2.58 11.50 191.20 219.32 250.00 1517.77 379.63 360.00 96.52 11.23 8307.78 2.00 4879.65 17.92 231.02 108.50 19.05 2207.98 71.40 181.77 9.39 28.00 409.37 56.58 348 PROPRIETOR Camille Floriano Pasi Gio.Andrea Gio.Batta Pellegrini (eredi) Pompeo Pepoli (eredi) Alessandro Barbara Girolamo Vittoria Pietramellara Gio.Antonio Lorenzo Ludovico Poeti GiuseppeMaria Ranuzzi FrancescoMaria Marcantonio Renghieri Febronio Riario Ferdinando Valeria Ruini Isabella eredi Sampieri Ludovico Alessandro Vincenzo Sanuti (eredita) Seccadenari Vittoria Segni Girolamo Francesco Ludovico subgroup total 1111.25 376.30 99.76 794.60 2257.40 8319.01 4897.57 339.52 2524.22 493.95 dividend lire 112.05 14.82 3819.75 68.26 332.30 99.58 459.16 21.20 78.72 777.99 87.13 112.97 349 PROPRIETOR Spada Francesca Licinia Tanara Gie.Niccele Vitali Alessandro Vizzani (eredi) CarleEmanuele Elena Paola Zambeccari (eredi) Carlo Costanzo Tommaso subgroup total 126.87 912.24 1056.80 BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Archival Sources E l' . i' 5! ! 1' E J Assunteria di Camera, Capitoli Generali dei Dazi, 1550. Infermazieni sui Dazi, 1767. Monte Annona, t. 106, 107. Monti Diversi, t. 104. Tavele di Entrate e Spese, cart. 4, 1564-1666. Assunteria Magistrati, Nobilta, b. 122. Congregazione di Gabella Grossa, Articeli per Materie, b. 87. Campione Creditori Monte Nueve e Naviglie, b. 1014. Gabella Vecchia, bb. 711, 712, 713, 714. Incanti della Gabella, b. 790. Instrumenti, bb. 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156. Libri Campione del Rendimente dei Conti Universali, libb. 874, 875, 876. Monte Annona, bb. 715, 716, 717, 718. Tariffe, bb. 361, 362, 363. Monti di Pubbliche Prestanze, Annena Terzo Campione Creditori, 1642-1694. Augmento Campione Creditori, vol. +, 1557-1709. Taglieli, 1573-1697. Cemposiziene Atti, 1573. Campione Creditori, vol. +, 1573-1700. Taglieli, regg. 7, 1580-1707. Concordia Atti, 1543. Campione Creditori, vell. +, A, 1543-1701. Gabella Vecchia Campione Creditori, vell. +, A, B, C, 1528-1738. Giulio Abecedarie, vell. 11. Campione Dare e Avere, vell. +, A, B, C, 1587-1691. 350 351 Statuti, 1587. Taglieli, vell. 9, 1594-1796. Gregorio Perpetue Campione Creditori, vol. +, 1528-1738. Taglieli, 1573-1737. Innocenzo Prime e Quattro Gravezze Atti e Taglieli, 1645-1700. Innocenzo Secondo Taglieli, 1651-1701. Meline Campione Creditori, vell. A, B, C, 1528-1701. Merelli Campione Creditori, vell. E, F, G, 1545-1798. Statuti. Taglieli, 1587-1796. Pavagliene Campione Creditori, 1648-1702. Pesce Instrumenti Pie Prime Campione Creditori, vol. +, 1564-1707. Statuti, 1563. Taglieli, 1618-1707. Pie Secondo Campioni Creditori, 1568-1701. Taglieli, 1594-1700. Perte e Pavagliene Atti, 1542-1690. Campione Creditori, vol. A, 1546-1702. Primo e Secondo Quattrine Campione Creditori, 1659-1702. Instrumenti. Residuo Campione Creditori, 1558-1708. Taglieli, vell. 2, 1598-1707. Sale Nueve Campione Creditori, 1557-1701. Sale Vecchio Taglioli e Mandati, 1555-1564. Campione Creditori, vol. D, 1555-1701. Secondo Annena Recapiti. 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