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CONIPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, TRADE FLOWS AND PROSPECTS FOR
REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL MARKET INTEGRATION IN WEST
AFRICA: THE CASE OF COTE D’IVOIRE AND MALI

BY

Abdoul Wahab Barry

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Agricultural Economics

1994

 

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ABSTRACT
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, TRADE FLOWS AND PROSPECTS FOR
REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL MARKET INTEGRATION IN WEST
AFRICA: THE CASE OF COTE D’IVOIRE AND MALI
BY

Abdoul Wahab Barry

Within the general framework of regional economic integration in West Africa,
this study evaluates if actual trade flows between COte d’Ivoire and Mali, and between
them and the rest of the world are consistent with these countries’ comparative advantage
in producing and marketing cotton, maize, millet! sorghum, and rice.

Using the domestic resource cost coefficient as a measure of comparative
advantage, the study finds that COte d’Ivoire’s maize exports to Mali, and the latter
country’s millet/ sorghum exports to the former, are consistent with comparative
advantage. Furthermore, the results show that although Mali produces paddy efficiently,
its rice generally reaches its competitive limit in southern Mali. As such, the Malian rice
is not competitive in COte d’Ivoire. This may explain why trade flows of local rice
between the two countries have not been recorded and that these nations rely on imported
rice to satisfy their excess demand of rice.

In contrast to cereals, the study indicates that COte d’Ivoire has a comparative

advantage in cotton. However, this country does not export its cotton to Mali because

‘91
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selling it on the world market is more profitable not only economically, but also
financially.

Trade flows of these commodities are also assessed under different scenarios,
including devaluation of the CPA franc, alternative opportunity costs of labor and
investments policies aimed at increasing on-farm yields, improving processing
technologies for cotton and rice, and lowering transport costs between markets. The
results suggest that local rice would generally be, under nearly all scenarios,
noncompetitive in the coastal markets. As such, importing rice from the world market
would be the most efficient way of supplying these markets.

The study also assesses farmers’ incentives to generate marketable surpluses.
Although most commodities generate positive financial profitability, it appears that the
returns to household labor are generally lower than the daily market wage rate in both

countries.

To the memory of Alpha Oumar Barry, my father who taught me that hard work and
patience are the key to success in life

and

To all the people dedicated to improving living conditions in Africa

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study was made possible by a fruitful collaboration among several
organizations: Michigan State University, Associates for International Resources and
Development, Institut d’Applieation des Méthodes de Développment/Institut National de
la Recherche Agronomique (IRAM/INRA), CILSS/ Club du Sahel, and the United States
Agency for International Development.

My deepest appreciation goes to Dr. John Staatz, my mentor and major professor
since my arrival at Michigan State University. He has been one of the most encouraging
people during my graduate studies, especially during the painful and long process of the
Ph.D. program. Despite his busy schedule, he has always made time to read my
dissertation and give me usefiil comments and feedback on early drafts of this study. I
am very grateful to him.

My gratitude also goes to Dr. Eric Crawford for his constructive suggestions and
working with me during the final stage of the dissertation. I would like to thank Drs.
Thomas Reardon and Steve Matusz for their insightful comments. I am also thankful to
Drs. Les Manderscheid, Stan Thompson and Jack Meyer for being in my guidance
committee.

I I would like to take this opportunity to sincerely thank Dr. Achi Atsain, who was

a key instrument in making possible my acceptance at Michigan State University. He

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also deployed major efforts to negotiate the extension of my fellowship to the Ph.D.
program.

My sincere appreciation goes to Dr. Dirck Stryker and Lynn Salinger, who hired
me to become AIRD’s field economist and representative in Paris. I became an active
part of the discussions on regional integration in West Africa and gained a lot of insight
into certain issues of economic development. Despite my living in Paris, I felt as if I
were in Cambridge, Massachusetts, thanks to Susie Solano and Joanne Stewart, who
made sure that my administrative and financial needs were met. My appreciation also
goes to my friends Katie Baird and Jeff Metzell.

I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to all the IRAM employees, who made
my stay in Paris a memorable experience. I owe a deep dept of gratitude to J érOme
Coste for his diligence in solving my administrative problems and making my stay as
comfortable as possible. I am also grateful to Johny Eg for his kindness and warm
heart. My thanks go to Nadine Bytebier, Dominique Gentil, Dominique Granier,
Ghislaine Fernandez, Rémi Philibert, Agnes Lambert, Beatrice Hibou and other IRAM
employees for their special care.

This study would not be possible without the funding provided by the Club du
Sahel. I am deeply grateful to this organization and its members, especially Jean-Marc
Pradelle and Henri J osserand and their families for making me feel at home whenever
they had the opportunity to do so. My thanks are extended to Serge Snrech, John Lewis

and Jean-H. Guilmette for their support at the Club du Sahel.

vi

 

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I would like to take this opportunity to thank the African-American Institute,
which funded my graduate studies at Michigan State University. My sincere gratitude
goes to Elizabeth Ward for her administrative support and encouragements. I would also
like to extend my thanks to Elda Keaton at the MSU Office of International Students and
Scholars for her administrative assistance and constant kindness.

During the course of the data collection, my task was greatly facilitated by the
help provided by Dr. Josue Dione at the Institut du Sahel, Bamako, and Mr. Joachim
Touré at the Ivorian Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources. I would also like
to thank the MIS employees, namely Nango Dembélé, Salifou Diana and Eleni Gabre-
Madhin. My thanks are also extended to Kouakou Konan at CIDT.

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to all faculty and staff in the
Department of Agricultural Economics, especially Sherry Rich, Ann Robinson, Patricia
Eisele, Roxie Damer and Calea Coscarelli. My gratitude is also extended to my friend
Jeff Wilson for his constant help in solving all my computer problems during the past
two years. The completion of my graduate studies was possible thanks to the constant
moral support and encouragements from my ”brother and sister” Chuck and Danielle
Chopak, and Beverley Blake, who helped me make a good balance between my studies
and social life. My appreciation goes to my fellow graduate students, especially
Ousseynou Ndoye, Aliou Diagne, Cheryl Danley, Kim Aldridge, Jim Stems, Cynthia
Phillips and Jennifer Wohl.

. Finally, my mother, siblings and numerous relatives deserve special thanks for

their patience and moral support during my graduate studies. I would like to particularly

vii

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express my gratitude to my uncles Bassirou, Salia and Thiemo Ibrahim for their

encouragements and help throughout my entire education.

viii

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ....................................... x
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................... xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................ xiii
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 1
1.1 Problem Statement and Research Objectives ................... 2
1.2 Organization of the Dissertation .......................... 6
11. REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WEST

AFRICA: PERFORMANCE AND PROSPECTS ............... 8
2.1 Theory of Economic Integration .......................... 8
2.2 Regional Economic Integration in West Africa ................. 12
2.2.1 Economic Community of West Africa ...................... 12
2.2.2 The Economic Community of West Afriean States ............... 14
2.3 Performance of the Regional Economic Groupings in Fostering

Intraregional Trade in West Afi-ica ........................ 16
2.4 Why the Bias Against Agricultural Commodities in the Regional

Integration Schemes of West Africa? ....................... 19
2.5 Regional Economic Integration Reconsidered ................. 20
III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ......................... 22
3.1 Theory of and Approaches to Comparative Advantage ............ 22
3.2 Microeconomic Foundation of Comparative Advantage ............ 25
3.3 Economic Profitability and Domestic Resource Cost As Measures

of Comparative Advantage ............................. 26
3.3.1 Economic Profitability As a Measure of Comparative Advantage ...... 26
3.3.2 Domestic Resource Cost As a Measure of Comparative Advantage ..... 28
3.4 Usefulness of the Domestic Resource Cost Method .............. 31
3.4.1 Domestic Resource Cost As a Revealer of Distortions ............ 31
3.4.2 Comparing Different Activities, Different Technologies

and Different Regions within a Country ..................... 34
3.5 Objections to Domestic Resource Cost ...................... 34
3.6 » Determining Economic Prices ........................... 37
3.6.1 Valuing Tradable Goods ............................... 38
3.6.2 Valuing Nontradable Goods ............................ 39
3.6.2.1 Economic Price for Labor ............................. 40
3.6.2.2 Economic Price of Capital ............................. 42

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3.6.2.3 Economic Price for Land ............................. 44
3.6.2.4 Valuing Nontraded Tradable Goods ....................... 44

IV. DATA COLLECTION, FARMING SYSTEMS, PRODUCTION AND
MARKETING POLICIES, AND ASSUMPTIONS OF DOMESTIC

RESOURCE COST ................................. 47
4.1 Institutional Link and Data Collection ...................... 47
4.2 Farming Systems and Production Policies ................... 49
4.2.1 Cotton ......................................... 49
4.2.1.1 COte d’Ivoire ..................................... 49
4.2.1.2 Mali .......................................... 53
4.2.2 Coarse Grains .................................... 55
4.2.2.1 COte d’Ivoire ..................................... 55
4.2.2.2 Mali .......................................... 57
4.2.3 Paddy ......................................... 59
4.2.3.1 COte d’Ivoire ..................................... 59
4.2.3.2 Mali .......................................... 63
4.3 Marketing Policies .................................. 67
4.3.1 Cotton ......................................... 67
4.3.1.1 COte d’Ivoire ..................................... 67
4.3.1.2 Mali .......................................... 68
4.3.2 Coarse Grains .................................... 69
4.3.2.1 COte d’Ivoire ..................................... 69
4.3.2.2 Mali .......................................... 72
4.3.3 Marketing of Local Rice .............................. 74
4.3.3.1 COte d’Ivoire ..................................... 74
4.3.3.2 Mali .......................................... 78
4.4 Assumptions of the Domestic Resource Cost Method ............. 81
4.4.1 World Price of Commodities ........................... 82
4.4.1.1 Cotton ......................................... 82
4.4.1.2 Cereals ......................................... 88
4.4.2 Shadow Price of Domestic Resources ...................... 93
V. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND TRADE FLOWS UNDER

CURRENT POLICIES AND ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS ....... 97
5.1 Results of the Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) Coefficients ......... 97
5.1.1 COte d’Ivoire ..................................... 98
5.1.2 , Mali ......................................... 102
5.2 Direction of Trade Flows under Comparative Advantage

and Actual Trade Flows ............................. 105
5.2.1 Direction of Trade Flows as Suggested by the

DRC Coefficients .................................. 105

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5.2.2 Are Actual Trade Flows Consistent With Comparative Advantage? . . . 112
5.2.3 Why Are Actual Trade Flows Consistent or Inconsistent

With Comparative Advantage? .......................... 117
5.2.3.1 Coarse Grains ................................... 117
5.2.3.2 Rice ......................................... 118
5.2.3.3Cotton..................... ................... 121
5.3 Sensitivity Analyses ................................ 123
5.3.1 Alternative Exchange Rate Policies and

Comparative Advantage ............................. 124
5.3.2 Comparative Advantage and Trade Flows Under Alternative

Opportunity Costs of Resources Comparative Advantage ......... 128
5.3.2.1 Effect of Different Labor Opportunity Costs ................. 128
5.3.2.2 Alternative Economic Values of Land

and Comparative Advantage ........................... 130
5.3.2.3 Output Prices and Comparative Advantage .................. 130
5.3.3 Comparative Advantage Under Alternative

Investment Policies ................................ 132
5.3.3.1 Farm Level Technology and Comparative Advantage ........... 133
5 3.3.2 Effect of Improving Processing Technologies on

Comparative Advantage ............................. 138
5.3.3.3 Effect of Reduced Transport Costs on Trade Flows ............ 139
5.3.4 A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Advantage

' and Trade Flows .................................. 141

5.4 Summary ...................................... 144
VI. FARM LEVEL INCENTIVES .......................... 146
6.1 Incentives to Cotton Farmers .......................... 147
6.2 Incentives to Coarse Grain Farmers ....................... 150
6.3 Incentive to Paddy Farmers ............................ 151
6. 4 Sensitivity Analysis ................................ 154
6.4.1 Effects of On-Farm Yields on Returns to Household Labor ........ 154
6.4.2 Output Price and Returns to Household Iabor ................ 158
6.5 Summary ....................................... 161
VII. SUMMARY, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, AND

FURTHER RESEARCH ............................. 162
7.1 Methodology and Specific Features ....................... 163
7.2 , Summary of Major Findings and Policy Implications ............ 165
7.3 Future Research ................................... 168
APPENDIX A ......................................... 170
APPENDIX B ......................................... 173

xi

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................... 282

xii

Table 3-1.

Table 4-1.

Table 4-2.

Table 4-3.

Table 4-4.

Table 4-5.

Table 4-6.

Table 4-7a.

Table 4-7b.

Table 4-8a.
Table 4—8b.

Table 5-la.

Table 5-lb.

Table 5-2a.

Table 5-2b.

LIST OF TABLES

Domestic Resource Cost and Policy Distortions .............. 32
Characteristics of Cotton Production Techniques in

COte d’Ivoire and Mali in 1990 ........................ 52
Acquisition Prices of Inputs in COte d’Ivoire and Mali .......... 52
Characteristics of Coarse Grains Production Techniques

in Cbte d’Ivoire and Mali in 1990 ....................... 58
Characteristics of Paddy Production Techniques in

COte d’Ivoire and Mali in 1990 ........................ 60
Wholesale Prices for Maize, Millet and Rice in Selected

Markets of COte d’Ivoire in 1990 ....................... 70
Retail Prices for Maize, Millet and Rice in Selected

Markets of COte d’Ivoire in 1990 ....................... 71
Export Parity Price of Ivorian Cotton and Cereals

(CFAF/Ton) ................................... 86
Export Parity Price of Malian Cotton and Cereals

(CFAF/Ton) ................................... 87
Import Parity Price of Ivorian Cereals (CFAF/Ton) ............ 90
Import Parity Price of Malian Cereals (CFAF/Ton) ............ 91
DRC Results for COte d’Ivoire Under a Positive
Opportunity Cost of Land ............................ 99
DRC Results for COte d’Ivoire Under a Zero
Opportunity Cost of Land ........................... 101
DRC Results for Mali Under a Positive
Opportunity Cost of Land ........................... 103
DRC Results for Mali Under a Zero
Opportunity Cost of Land ........................... 104

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'Table 5-3a. Cotton and Maize DRC Coefficients in Different
Markets Under a Positive Opportunity Cost of Land .......... 107
Table 5-3b. Millet/sorghum and Rice DRC Coefficients in Different
, Markets Under a Positive Opportunity Cost of Land .......... 108
Table 5-4a. Cotton and Maize DRC Coefficients in Different
Markets Under a Zero Opportunity Cost of land ............ 110
Table 5-4b. Millet/ sorghum and Rice DRC Coefficients in Different
Markets Under a Zero Opportunity Cost of Land ............ 111
Table 5-5. DRC Coefficients of Cereals as Export Crops
Under a Zero Opportunity Cost of Land .‘ ................. 113
Table 6-la. Cotton and Maize Financial Profitability and
Protection Coefficients at the Farm Level ................. 148
Table 6-lb. Returns to Household Labor for Producing
Cotton and Maize ............................... 149
Table 6-2a. Millet/sorghum and Paddy Financial Profitability
and Protection Coefficients at the Farm Level .............. 152
Table 6—2b. Returns to Household Iabor for Producing
Millet/sorghum and Paddy .......................... 149
Table 6-3a. Effects of Yields Changes on Returns to Family
Labor from Producing Cotton and Maize ................. 156
Table 6-3b. Effects of Yields Changes on Returns to Family
Labor from Producing Millet/ sorghum and Paddy ............ 157
Table 6—4a. Effects of Price Changes on Returns to Family
Labor from Producing Cotton and Maize ................. 159
Table 6-4b. Effects of Price Changes on Returns to Family

Labor from Producing Millet/sorghum and Paddy ............ 160

xiv

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4-1. Seed Cotton Production in COte d’Ivoire and Mali

(1971 - 1989) ................................... 51
Figure 4-2. Coarse Grain Production in COte d’Ivoire and Mali
(1971 - 1990) ................................... 56
Figure 4-3. Paddy Production in COte d’Ivoire and Mali
(1971 - 1990) ................................... 64
Figure 4—4. Evolution of Nominal World Prices of Commodities
(1980 - 1990) ................................... 79
Figure 5-1. Cereals Flows between C6te d’Ivoire and Mali .............. 115
Figure 5-2. Evolution of On-Farm Yields in Mali (1980 - 1990) ........... 134

XV

AIRD

BCEAO

CCCE

CEAO

CFA

CFAF

CFDT

CIDT

CIF
CGPP-

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Associates for International Resources and Development

Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (Central Bank of
Francophone West African Countries Using the CFAF)

Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (French Economic
Cooperation Fund)

Communauté des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (West African Economic
Community)

Communauté Financiere Africaine (Financial Community of Francophone
West African States, except Guinea and Mauritania)

CFA Franc (Currency Unit of the CFA Zone)

Compagnie Francaise de Développement des Textiles (French Company
for the Development of Textiles)

Compagnie Ivoirienne de Développement des Textiles (Ivorian Company
for the Development of Textiles)

Cost, Insurance and Freight

Comité Inter-Etats de Lutte Contre la Sécheresse au Sahel (Organization
of Sahelian States for Coping with Drought)

Compagnie Malienne de Développement des Textiles (Malian Company
for the Development of Textiles)

Compagnie Ivorienne pour le Développement des Cultures Vivriéres
(Ivorian Company for the Development of Food Crops)

Cost Fret and Insurance (check)
Caisse Générale de Péréquation des Prix (Ivorian Price Stabilization

Boards in charge of harmonizing the price of bread, rice, and sugar
throughout the country)

xvi

CSSPPA

DRC
DNAE

DRSPR

ECOWAS
FAO
FCCD
FCD

F OB

GDP

GNP

BUICOMA

IDESSA

Caisse de Stabilization et de Soutien des Prix des Produits Agricoles
(Boards of Agricultural Price Stabilization and Support, in charge of cocoa
and coffee exports)

Domestic Resource Cost

Direction Nationale des Affaires Economiques

Département de la Recherche sur les Systémes de Production Rurale
(Research Department of Rural Production Systems at the Malian Institute
of Rural Economy)

Economic Community of West African States

Food and Agriculture Organization

Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development

Fonds Communs de Développement (Community Development Fund)
Free On Board

Gross Domestic Product

Gross National Product

Huile des Compagnies Maliennes (Malian Oil Companies)

Institut des Savanes

Institut d’Economie Rurale (Malian Agricultural Research Institute)
International Monetary Fund

Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (French Agronomic
Research Institute)

Institut d’Application des Méthodes de Développement (French Consulting
Firm)

Ministére de l’Agriculture et des Ressources Animales (Ivorian Ministry
of Agriculture and Animal Resources)

Market Information System

xvii

OER

OPAM

ORS

OSCE

IRMC

SATMACI

SER

Net Effective Protection Coefficient
Net Nominal Protection Coefficient

Nominal Protection Coefficient

Office de Commercialisation des Produits Vivriers (Ivorian Food Crops

Marketing Agency)
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
Official Exchange Rate

Office des Produits Agricoles du Mali (Malian Agricultural Marketing
Agency)

Operation Riz Ségou (Rice Development Agency in the Segou Region,
Mali)

Office Statistique des Communautés Européennes

Programme de Restructuration du Marché Cérealier (Cereals Market
Restructuring Program in Mali)

Société d’Assistance Technique pour la Modernisation Agricole de la COte
d’Ivoire (Ivorian Agency for Agricultural Modernization in the Middle
Forest Zone)

Shadow Exchange Rate

S ODEPALM Société pour le Développement des Palmiers (Ivorian Palm Development

S ODERIZ

TCR
LINE
UNIDO

USAID

Agency)

Société pour le Développement de la Riziculture (Ivorian Rice
Development Agency)

Taxe de Cooperation Regionale (Regional Cooperation Tax)
Universite du Bénin (Benin University)
United Nations Industrial Development Organization

United States Agency for International Development

xviii

WAMU West African Monetary Union

‘WARDA West African Rice Development Association

xix

PREFACE

This study was completed before the recent devaluation of the CFA franc. The
CFA franc was devalued on January 12, 1994 by 100 percent vis-a-vis the French franc
to which it has been pegged since its inception in 1948.

XX

CHAPTERI

INTRODUCTION

West Africa represents one of the most fragmented regions in the world. It is
composed of a multitude of countries, each inhabited in general by fewer than 10 million
people. Each domestic market is thus small in size. Moreover, it is small in terms of
purchasing power, which may be measured by the Gross National Product (GNP) per
capita, averaging about USS 350 in 1990 (World Bank, 1991a).

The GNP per capita of the West African countries, one of the lowest in the world
in the 70s, fell during the 80s in part because of the decline in commodity prices in the
international market on which these countries have depended to earn foreign exchange
needed to finance their economic and social development. As a result, the economies of
the individual countries performed poorly.

Owing to the sluggish economies, the West African leaders have increasingly
voiced their desire to foster the exchange of factors of production and goods among their
countries in order to be less dependent on the international market. Regional economic
integration was believed to be, in addition to gaining stronger bargaining power during
international negotiations, a means to bring about scale economies that are needed to

make the West African products competitive.

2

It is within this framework that several organizations were built to foster
economic integration. Important among these organizations are the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of West
Africa (CEAO), whose objectives and operations are discussed in the next chapter.
Despite the creation of these regional economic groupings, official intra-regional trade
appears to be still low and the bulk of the overall trade of the West African countries is

still overwhelmingly done with the international market.

1.1 Problem Statement and Research Objectives

It has often been argued that the low level of intraregional trade in developing
countries in general, and specifically in Africa, is due to the high degree of similarity in
the economic structure of the individual countries, owing mainly to a similar resource
endowment (Chou, 1967; World Bank, 1991b). As such, there is limited
complementarity among the countries and the potential for specialization in production
to spur trade among them is restricted. Thus, as argued by Chou (1967, p. 354), ”they
cannot be complementary without a dynamic economic transformation so that they will
specialize in production and become bigger trade partners". Before this transformation
takes place, these countries’ trade is bound to be with the world market.

This argument put forward by Chou was downplayed by O’Connell (1987) and

even challenged by a growing body of evidence. Badiane (1988), using production data

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from six West African states to yield indicesl , showed that the production patterns across

these states were different and that the resource bases of these countries differed. Even
if similar goods are produced in the different countries, production costs differ across
countries and could be the source of intraregional trade.

Another group of contenders, refuting Chou’s contention, argued that a great deal
of trade takes place among West African countries, but this trade is under-counted by
official statistics. Within this line of reasoning, Burfisher and Missiaen (1987) estimated
that more than 40 percent of intraregional trade is unrecorded because not only
governments lack the personnel and resources to capture these transactions, but they take
place in an informal manner across porous borders. This is the reason why they termed
these cross-border transactions ”informal intraregional trade. "

Other analysts, agreeing with the argument that intraregional trade is under-
counted by official statistics, contend, however, that informal intraregional trade in West
Africa is not based upon complementarity among the countries. It is rather induced by
price differentials stemming from the divergent and sometimes contradictory
macroeconomic, trade and pricing policies enacted in each country (INRA/IRAM/UNB,
1991). The influence of these policies on intraregional trade in the context of West
Africa was documented by Badiane (1992), who emphasized the importance of the real

exchange rate in driving trade.

 

1/ The production similarity index between two countries is given by the following
formula: SQ, = 100* 2: (Min(Y,,,Y,,)), where Yill and Y, are the shares of product i
in total agricultural production of countries a and b. An index of 100 is equivalent to
a complete similarity in the production structure, while a value of the index close to zero
means completely dissimilar production patterns in the two countries.

4
In light of the arguments outlined above, each group of contenders appears to

focus on the determinants of intraregional trade in West Africa. The debate over
intraregional trade is between those who contend it depends upon comparative advantage
and those who say that it is driven by price differentials emanating from differences in
macroeconomic policies. Based on this debate, one of the challenges in this study is to
assess the driving forces of intraregional trade. Once these driving forces are
understood, it may be possible to identify the factors that inhibit the expansion of this
trade.

In order to explore fully the issue of intraregional trade, two countries are chosen:
COte d’Ivoire and Mali. The rationale behind this choice is that these countries differ
in terms of geographical location, followed distinct development policies and are at
different levels of economic development. Despite these differences, they share some
characteristics.

COte d’Ivoire extends from the southern Sudanian belt to the coastal region, where
rainfall levels are high. Owing to these rainfall levels, COte d’Ivoire has relied upon its
agricultural sector to generate the bulk of its foreign exchange earnings, which
contributed to developing an industrial base and reliable infrastructure, thus ranking this
country among the middle-income countries. The development of the industrial sector
was facilitated by the liberal investment policies and the export-oriented strategy adopted
by the Ivorian government soon after independence. Thanks to these policies, some light
industries were established and some of their manufactured products (processed coffee,

soap, shoes, etc.) are exported to Mali and other neighboring countries.

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In contrast, Mali ranks among the poorest nations in the world and has a poor

industrial sector. Mali lies in the Sudanian and Sahelian belts, where rainfall is erratic
and uncertain. Agricultural production is thus volatile. As a result, Mali imports
agricultural commodities from the neighboring countries and the international market
during the poor rainfall years. Despite this volatile rainfall pattern, which is less volatile
in the south, Mali exports cotton to the world market and is ranked among the leading
cotton exporters in West Afiica. Mali also exports livestock to neighboring countries,
especially COte d’Ivoire, and these exports are higher during good rainfall years.

Despite the differences between COte d’Ivoire and Mali, the most important sector
in both countries is agriculture, which accounted for nearly 50 percent of GDP in 1990
in both countries (World Bank, 1991a). Among other things, these countries share a
similar history of colonial dependence, which has helped to establish the same currency
(CFA Franc), even though Mali withdrew from the CFA Franc zone in the mid 60s and
rejoined it in 1984. Sharing the same currency undoubtedly contributes to facilitating
payments of transactions between these countries. Trade between the two countries is
undertaken by the Dioulas, an ethnic group which, along with the Senoufos, is common
to both countries.

Given this background, the main objectives of this study are as follows:

1. To evaluate each country’s comparative advantage in producing and

marketing agricultural products, such as cotton, maize, millet/sorghum

and rice;

6

2. To determine the direction of these commodities’ trade flows as predicted
by the theory of comparative advantage;

3. To compare these theoretical trade flows with the actual patterns of
agricultural trade in order to explain the similarities or differences
between them. This is intended to examine the interaction between
macroeconomic and trade policies, and the pattern of actual flows;

4. , To assess trade flows under alternative policy measures.

5. To identify and examine the barriers and constraints that hinder the
expansion of intraregional trade. This expansion of intraregional trade
assumes that it can provide an impetus to economic growth through
specialization, which contributes to more efficient resource allocation and

an increase in income.

1.2 Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized into seven chapters, including this chapter. Chapter
II reviews the literature on regional economic integration and examines the objectives and
mode of operation of the regional integration schemes in West Africa to shed light on the
performance of these schemes.

Chapter III presents the conceptual framework that underlies the analysis of
comparative advantage. It focuses on a particular measure of comparative advantage, the
domestic resource cost, and its underlying assumptions, with a survey of the literature

on this measure.

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Chapter IV summarizes the data collection and describes not only the different
farming systems for cotton, maize, millet/sorghum and rice found in Cdte d’Ivoire and
Mali, but also the marketing systems of these commodities. In addition, Chapter IV lays
out the assumptions of this study.

Chapter V measures the comparative advantage of each country in different
markets located in both countries and compares trade flows, as predicted by each
country’s comparative advantage, with the actual trade flows. The aim of this
comparison is to explain the reason why actual trade flows are similar or different from
those predicted by theory. Then, it examines the direction of trade flows under
alternative scenarios, such as increased on-farm yields and milling ratios that could result
from higher investments in research and milling facilities. These scenarios also include
reduced transfer costs from one market to another, alternative exchange-rate policies, and
different opportunity costs of resources.

Chapter VI discusses the incentive system faced by farmers and whether they
make financial profits to yield surpluses that can enhance trade. Then, farmers’
incentives are analyzed under alternative scenarios.

Chapter VII summarizes the major findings of this study and draws some policy
implications. This chapter also explores future research relevant to enhancing

intraregional trade.

CHAPTER II
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA:

PERFORMANCE AND PROSPECTS

The goal of this chapter is to lay out the theory of regional economic integration,
as approached by traditional analysis and its critics. In addition, regional economic
integration will be discussed within the West African context to shed some light on the
main objectives and performance of the regional groupings in fostering intraregional
trade. In doing so, the goal is to identify the elements that have hindered trade
liberalization and expansion, which could be a dynamic contributing factor to the process

of economic development in West Africa.

2.1 Theory of Economic Integration

Balassa (1961) defines economic integration as a process by which distinct entities
are brought together to form a whole. These entities may be either markets or regions
within the boundaries of the same nation, or they may be different nations. While the
first type of integration is termed market or national integration, the second is referred
to as international or regional economic integration, which is the focus of the present

study. 2

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Though regional economic integration was attempted in several regions of the

world prior to the World War Two, it was not until the early 50s that it became a major
focus of economic studies, thanks to Viner’s pioneering work. Prior to the publication
of W by Viner (1950), economists were more concerned about
the welfare impact of free trade, assumed to be welfare increasing. As such, any
deviation from free trade was seen as welfare-decreasing. Within this framework, a
customs union, aimed at a free movement of goods produced within the union members,
abolishing tariffs on these goods, and discriminating against products imported from
union nonmembers, was believed to be a movement away from Pareto optimality.

Viner, as opposed to most of his contemporaries, did not view customs unions as
necessarily welfare-decreasing. He argued that the overall welfare effect of a customs
union depends on the relative weight of the outcome of two countervailing forces,
referred to as “trade creation” and ”trade diversion”. Trade creation is defined as the
shift from higher to lower cost goods. This shift induces a production effect and a
consumption effect. The production effect results from a better resource allocation
through the cost reduction from the higher cost to the lower cost union members.
Meanwhile, the consumption effect appears to stem from a substitution of the lower cost
union good for the more expensive domestic product. Trade creation, just like free
trade, is assumed to be welfare-increasing.

Trade diversion denotes a situation whereby the source of a product may shift
from a lower cost nonmember of the union to a higher cost union member. This shift

also results in production and consumption effects, which are welfare-reducing. Thus,

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a customs union may induce positive and negative welfare effects simultaneously and its
net effect depends on the relative size of trade creation and trade diversion. On balance,
the customs union results in a beneficial net welfare effect if the effect of trade creation
is greater than that of trade diversion. Conversely, the net welfare effect of the customs
unions is negative if the effect of trade diversion outweighs that of trade creation.

One major criticism of the neoclassical approach is its narrow focus on static
efficiency gains to justify regional integration. This approach fails to include other
policy objectives in its analysis and does not seem to recognize that there may be trade-
offs between policy objectives, especially in developing countries. Within this
framework, a government may decide to encourage the production of a good to preserve
jobs even though this activity is inefficient in a neoclassical sense. Often, policy makers
justify such decisions because they believe that workers displaced may have difficulty
finding other employment opportunities.

Trade creation may not always be welfare-increasing and may even be welfare-
decreasing. In the example given above, if the number of workers displaced is greater
than the additional jobs made available by trade creation and the workers displaced do
not find employment, this may lead to negative consumption effects that are greater than
the positive production effects. As such, the net effect of trade creation may be welfare-
decreasing. The objection to this argument is that it seems to ignore the notion of
opportunity cost of labor, which is zero for workers unable to find alternative
employment opportunities. Based on this objection, the industries’ true economic costs

of production are lower than they would appear at first glance.

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On the other hand, trade diversion, which may yield negative effects on social

welfare in the short run, may induce long run benefits that outweigh the short term gains
if the protected industry becomes more competitive and creates additional employment
opportunities and income, owing to learning by doing.

Some analysts, such as Cooper and Massel (1965), have criticized the traditional
theory of regional economic integration on the grounds that the lack of an industrial base
in developing countries may be due to a market failure. In their view, the creation of
an industrial base may be seen as a public good and the existence of external economies
may be seen as a rationale for the creation of regional economic integration. As a result,
protective measures have been often used to justify government involvement. Within this
framework, J aber (1971) argued that regional economic integration can be perceived as
a means to economic development rather than a tariff issue.

Although much of the debate on regional economic integration has centered
around customs unions, there exist several other forms of economic integration that range
from a free-trade area to an economic union. A free-trade area consists of a region in
which there is only a free movement of goods produced within the region and tariffs on
these goods are abolished between the member countries. In addition to these
characteristics, if member countries adopt common external tariffs against products
imported from outside the region and factors of production move freely within the
member countries, the integration takes the form of a common market. Moreover, if the
monetary and fiscal policies of the individual countries of a common market are

harmonized, the economic grouping is referred to as an economic union.

12
2.2 Regional Economic Integration in West Africa

This section focuses on the objectives and mode of operation of two regional
economic integration schemes in West Africa, the Economic Community of West Africa
and the Economic Community of West African States. Then, an attempt is made to

evaluate the impact of these regional organizations on regional integration.

2.2.1 Economic Community of West Africa

The Economic Community of West Africa, known under its French acronym,
CEAO, was created in 1973 and is composed of six Francophone countries: Burkina
Faso, COte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. CEAO was to include two
other Francophone countries, Benin and Togo, which signed the original Treaty.
However, these two countries withdrew from the group at the time of creation under the
heavy pressure from Nigeria, which. was one of the targets of this regional grouping.
Indeed, the creation of CEAO was in part aimed at countering and offsetting the growing
economic and political power of Nigeria, feared not only by the small Francophone
countries of West Africa, but also the French government (Robson, 1983).

At present, the overall population of CEAO is a mere 50 million people, about
half that of Nigeria (World Bank, 1992). The average income per capita is less than USS
300, and the most important economic sector appears to be agriculture, which accounts
for a little less than half of the Gross Domestic Product (World Bank, 1992).

The main objectives of CEAO are to create a unified regional market, intended

to spur trade of agricultural and industrial products, and to promote a harmonized and

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balanced economic development among the member countries. The strategy to achieve
these objectives centered around abolishing quantitative restrictions in local non-processed
products and adopting by 1985 common external tariffs against industrial products
emanating from nonmember states. These common tariffs are, however, yet to be
realized by the Community.

The centerpiece of CEAO strategy in fostering trade flows among its member
states is the preferential import duty regime, referred to as the Regional Cooperation Tax
(TCR). The TCR, operational since 1976, was engineered to spur trade especially
between the least developed countries and the more advanced states of the Community.
Fixed by the Council of Ministers, the TCR is, for a given good that can be produced
within CEAO countries and imported from nonmembers, lower than taxes imposed on
the product of nonmembers to make that of CEAO more affordable. It is applied to
manufactured goods produced within CEAO to give incentives to member countries to
import these products from the member states rather than nonmembers, where production
costs are lower. The TCR is granted to an enterprise under certain guidelines, based on
the nature of the good produced, the origin of the raw material that this product
embodies, and the level of economic development of the country where the enterprise is
located. Within this framework, a preference in establishing the TCR is given to firms
that rely on local raw materials. In addition, the TCR is in general set low for firms
operating in the least developed member countries to reduce their competitive

disadvantage.

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Undoubtedly, the institution of the TCR, intended for trade diversion, caused

some member state governments to lose tax revenues on manufactured goods that could
have been imported from nonmember countries relatively cheaply and taxed at a higher
rate. To alleviate the costs to these countries and foster intraregional trade, a provision
was made in the Treaty to create a system of fiscal compensation, which is operated
through the Community Development Fund, known under its French acronym FCD
(Fonds Communs de Developpement). FCD is funded through the contribution of
member countries, based on their share in intra-CEAO exports. The payable
compensation to each country is the difference between the tax revenue collected on
imported products from CEAO member countries under the TCR regime and the
collectable tax revenue from the same imports from nonmember countries. According
to the provision made in the Treaty, the compensation paid to each country is up to two-
thirds of its revenue losses. Meanwhile the rest of the fund is used to finance
development projects in the least developed countries. This is the means to carry out the
harmonized and balanced development objective mentioned above. Within this
framework, the projects funded by the Community in Niger and Burkina Faso between

1975 and 1980 accounted for nearly 40 percent of the total expenditures (Badiane, 1988).

2.2.2 Tire Economic Community of West African States
Created in 1975 under Nigeria’s leadership, the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) is composed of the six CEAO countries and ten other

countries. The total population of ECOWAS is nearly 200 million people, of which

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Nigeria accounts for more than half. There appears to be a great disparity in the level
of economic development in this grouping, in which the GNP per capita ranges between
180 and 890 US dollars (World Bank, 1992).

The objectives of ECOWAS are virtually the same as those of CEAO. These
objectives consist, among other things, of eliminating customs duties, abolishing
quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade, establishing a common customs tariff
and a common commercial policy, harmonizing of agricultural and industrial policies and
monetary policies and promoting economic development. These goals are to be achieved
gradually. For instance, it was recommended by ECOWAS member countries that the
establishment of the customs union be achieved within a fifteen year transitional period
afler the Treaty came into force.

The centerpiece of ECOWAS strategy in achieving its objectives is the Fund for
Cooperation, Compensation and Development (FCCD), intended to distribute the
Community costs and benefits equitably in the process of trade liberalization. Robson
(1983, pp. 100) summarized the purpose of the FCCD, as follows:

“To finance projects in member states; to provide compensation to member states

that have suffered losses as a result of the location of Community enterprises; to

provide compensation and other forms of assistance to member states that have
suffered losses arising out of the application of the provisions of the Treaty on the
liberalization of trade within the Community; to guarantee foreign investments
made in member states in respect of enterprises established under the provisions
on the harmonization of industrial policies; to provide means to facilitate the

‘ mobilization of internal and external financial resources for the member states and
the Community; and to promote deve10pment projects in the less developed
member states of the Community".

The FCCD resources originate primarily from the annual contributions of the

member countries. The contribution of each country is based upon its economic strength,

l6
assessed as a coefficient of the Gross National Product and population. Other sources

of the FCCD resources are not only the income of enterprises that operate within

ECOWAS, but also foreign aid and the interest on previous loans made by the FCCD.

2.3 Performance of the Regional Economic Groupings in Fostering Intraregional
Trade in West Africa

There has been a wide consensus among analysts and policy makers that
intraregional trade among CEAO member states has increased since the inception of this
regional economic grouping. A major factor that has contributed to the expansion of
intra-CEAO trade is the fiscal compensation scheme engineered by the member countries.
Owing to this scheme, coupled with the common currency used by CEAO member
countries, trade increased between CEAO’s least developed countries and its more
advanced countries, namely COte d’Ivoire and Senegal. However, intra-CEAO trade
could be higher if subtle non-tariff barriers, which take the form of import and export
licenses and act like a.brake on the expansion of intraregional trade, were eliminated in
the Community. Progress in intra-CEAO trade would probably be greater if the
industrial and investment policies were harmonized and information on production
capacity and potential were available to assess ex ante the comparative advantage of
CEAO’s member countries.

_ Notwithstanding the progress made in spurring trade among CEAO’s member
states, intra-CEAO trade still accounts for a small share of CEAO’s overall trade.

Indeed, the share of trade within the Community, which was nearly 10 percent in the mid

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803 (Badiane, 1988), is today about eight percent (World Bank, 1991). This is an
indication that CEAO’s trade is overwhelmingly with external markets.

The share of intraregional trade in overall trade appears to be even lower for

ECOWAS member countries. It has varied between a mere three and five percent since
ECOWAS’s creation (World Bank, 1991). There appears to be no indication that this
share will increase in the near future, despite the rhetoric of policy makers, who meet
several times a year to make decisions on fostering intra-ECOWAS trade. The issue is
mus why intraregional trade has remained very low, especially within ECOWAS, while
one of the main goals of the regional economic integration schemes is to spur trade

among member countries.

Several factors militate in favor of the modest progress realized or even the
Saguation of intraregional trade in West Afiica. One such factor is that the deficiency
in the physical infrastructure (roads and bridges) and the lack of a reliable
Communication network among the member countries undermine any serious attempt to

e’(‘lrpand trade among countries. In addition, roadblocks are rife in the region. They
e3§ercise a brake on the free movement of goods in the region and deter traders from
talking advantage of market opportunities across national borders.

Intraregional trade has been low in West Africa because most governments
attempted to impose a single marketing channel for outputs and inputs, usually by
Creating a government agency that has a monopoly-monopsony power to satisfy the
national market. Despite the dismantling of most parastatals to increase private traders’

participation in business, high export and import restrictions still stand in the way of

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progress in intraregional trade. Such restrictions appear more common between CEAO
member states and the rest of ECOWAS countries.
p»\ j" Intraregional trade is also impaired by the lack of information on market
opportunities across borders, which contributes to making cross—border trade risky and
uncertain. Cross-border trade appears even riskier between Anglophone and
chophone countries, owing to language barriers and the poor knowledge of business
in stitutions. It appears also that the multiplicity of nonconvertible currencies is a serious
hindrance to intraregional trade on the grounds that it makes transaction payments
(1 ificult between countries. Within ECOWAS, there exist nine different currencies,
among which the CFA Franc, shared by a group of seven countries, appears to be the
am y widely convertible currency across borders.

Another hindrance to intraregional trade during the past 10 years has been the
¢°lllapse of incomes in the coastal states, especially in Cdte d’Ivoire and Nigeria, due to
be substantial decline in their commodity terms of trade. As a result, the demand for

i‘1'!130rted goods, which is in general positively correlated to income, and investments fell
it; these countries.

Expansion of intraregional trade has been further hindered by the very focus of

regional economic integration, emphasizing manufactured goods, while the level of
industrialization in the countries is in general low. Industries located in individual
Q(runtries are, in general, of low capacity and cannot often supply the small domestic

I‘narket, let alone export to neighboring countries. The low capacity of these import-

Slrbstitutes industries, coupled with high production costs because of their small scale,

19

makes it difficult for them to compete in their domestic market, let alone compete in
foreign markets. Despite these handicaps, regional policies have been geared toward
manufactured goods to foster intraregional trade. Only minor attention has been given
to the agricultural sector as a means of encouraging regional trade. Thus, the issue is
why the agricultural sector has received so little attention in the regional economic

integration schemes.

2 -4 Why the Bias Against Agricultural Commodities in the Regional Integration
Schemes of West Africa?

The root of the bias against the agriculture sector has its origin in development
stI-amgies popularized in the 503 and 603 by Prebisch (1950) and Lewis (1954), who,
aang others, viewed agriculture as backward. The arguments generally were that
ca-pflal and labor would not be productive in agriculture because of the diminishing
returns in this sector. It was argued that these factors of production should rather be
‘ used in the industrial sector, where they would be more productive to promote economic
development, defined as growth in average per capita output, leading to the accumulation

of capital stock.
African policy makers appear to have been influenced by the import-substitution
8h'ategy proposed by the United Nations Commission for Iatin America, under the
leadership of Prebisch, who argued that primary commodity prices trend downward in
the long run. As such, it is in the interest of developing countries to shift away from
agriculture and move toward industry in order to produce manufactured goods that are

inrported. Such a strategy, reinforced by Hirschman’s (1958) arguments about backward

20
and forward linkages that give precedence to the industrial sector, shaped the drinking

of development strategists in several regions, including West Africa. The idea commonly
shared by these strategists was that the promotion of domestic industries was
incompatible with an outward-oriented trade strategy, owing to the fact that the domestic
industries were in the infant-industry stage. As such, they deserved to be protected
against the external environment to bring about greater industrialization and economic

growth.

2 - 5 Regional Economic Integration Reconsidered
If we consider that regional integration strategies have failed to yield the results
0f spurring intraregional trade and overall economic development, one may hypothesize
“‘33 a shift in emphasis from supporting import-substitution industries to favoring a more
export-oriented agricultural sector in West Afiica may provide an impetus for

iIi-h-aregional trade and eventually economic growth.

A vast body of literature has been devoted since the mid 608 to the comparison
between import-substitution strategies and export-oriented strategies. Salvatore and
Hatchcr (1991), Moschos (1989), Chow (1987), Bhagwati (1986), Kreuger (1980),
Balassa (1978) and Michaely (1977) showed that the effect of export-oriented policies on
“re economic growth performance is overwhelmingly positive and that countries that
Stuck too long to import-substitution missed opportunities provided by the export-oriented
Strategies. Export-oriented strategies have a positive effect on economic growth for three

reasons: 1) they lead to better resource allocation in response to competition abroad, 2)

21

they give the incentives for technological improvements in order for domestic producers
to be competitive in the domestic and external markets, and 3) they create an economy
better able to take advantage of economies of scale.

. Import-substitution strategies usually have an inward-looking view, intended to
satisfy the domestic market by protecting noncompetitive industries. Efforts to promote
regional economic integration with such strategies are bound to fail given that each
country is concerned with protecting its noncompetitive domestic industries and supplying
i ts own market.

It appears that regional economic integration in West Africa will be best achieved
through strategies geared toward promoting agricultural exports instead of strategies
focusing on import-substitution in the industrial sector. This requires, however, that
ap‘ln'orrriate technologies be available at the farm level to yield surpluses that can be
tr112-med and that resources be used efficiently at the farm level and within the marketing

system.

CHAPTERHI

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter provides the theoretical conceptual framework used in this study to
analyze a country’s comparative advantage. More importantly, it focuses on the
domestic resource cost method, which has been one of the most widely used techniques

to measure comparative advantage.

3 .. 1 Theory of and Approaches to Comparative Advantage
The notion of comparative advantage originated from Ricardo’s (1817) pioneering
W0 1k, which attempted to justify the policy of laissez-faire. Basing his analysis on the
labor dreary of value and using the case of two countries and two commodities, Ricardo
argued that a beneficial trade between two countries should be based upon the relative
labor cost rather than the absolute labor cost of production. His contention was that each
cch\xntry should specialize in the commodity for which it had a lower opportunity cost of
production. In other words, each country should export the commodity in which it had

a comparative advantage.

Despite Ricardo’s major finding about the basis of mutually beneficial trade, he
ftailed to explain what determines the relative production efficiency of each country.

Hockschcr (1949) and Ohlin (1933) made a major contribution to the theory of

22

23
international trade by addressing this important issue. Assuming more than one factor

of production, these authors attributed comparative advantage to differences in countries’
factor endowments.
According to the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, given countries’ factor endowments,
a country will tend to specialize in and export goods intensive in its relatively abundant
factor, which is relatively cheap. On the basis- of . this factor; endowment, trade is
mutually; beneficial to trading countries and can be a substitute for the movement of
factors of production between countries; i.e. , trade tends to equalize the return to factors
across borders. i
Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin’s theory of comparative advantage was tested by
seweral researchers, among whom the most famous is Leontief (1964). Using an input-
on tput table for the economy of the United States, he found to everyone’s surprise that
he ratio of capital to labor of the U.S. exports was smaller than that of the goods
imported by the U.S. This paradox, which drew a lot of criticism because it was
exPected that the U.S. exports would be more capital intensive, set the stage for the
development of methods to measure a country’s comparative advantage.
One objection made to most analyses of comparative advantage is that they often
assumed two countries, two goods and two inputs and more importantly, they assumed
an identical technology for the production of a good in the countries considered. Once
One of these assumptions is relaxed, as shown by several studies that introduced the
assumptions of many goods, many countries, many factors of production or different

production technologies, it becomes difficult for these models to explain the pattern of

24
trade by simply comparing autarky prices (Samuelson, 1953; Jones, 1961 and Melvin,

1 968). Another objection to these models is that they Mused only on the aspect of

pflgfiomand failed often to take into account other factors that have a bearing on a f ‘

country’s trade position. Key among these are transfer costs of products from the
production site to the international market. Indeed, a country may be an efficient
k“? g. i producer of a good, but because of high marketing costs, it may not be an efficient

1‘. {:x\ supplier of ““1309" (Samuelson, 1954). In addition to these transfer costs, policies such

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‘ a. country’s comparative advantage, were not accounted for in the early methods of

testing comparative advantage.

Even when sectoral and macroeconomic policies were included in the models of
comparative advantage, these models failed often to make the link between the micro
bel'aavior of economic agents and the policies, which influence this behavior. These
t1hrditional trade models also had difficulties in explaining the persistence of protection

policies or the use of trade policies, such as taxes or subsidies in defense of national
interest. This failure of traditional trade theory gave rise to the modern trade theory that
can be labelled ”strategic trade theory" (Krugman, 1986).

Modern trade theorists attribute the success of a country in trade to its capacity
to anticipate trade opportunities and exploit them. As a result of situations characterized
by ecbnomies of scale, monopolistic competition including product differentiation,

increasing returns to scale and increasing technical progress, the modern trade theory is

Concerned with the optimal use of trade policies, mainly taxes and subsidies, to give a

25
strategic position to a country vis-a-vis other countries. Specialization and trade patterns
are based on the strategic behavior of countries. Owing to the issues raised above,
determining comparative advantage will rely on the domestic resource cost (DRC)

coefficient, which has its roots in microeconomic theory and will be explained in the next

sections.

3 .2 Microeconomic Foundation of Comparative Advantage

Conventional microeconomic theory suggests that the main objective of producers

is to maximize profit, defined as the difference between the value of the output produced
and that of inputs (labor, land and eapital) used in the production process. The profit

identity can be written as follows:

II,— =I=P,"'Q,- iPfiQi where,

135.. = Private- profit from producing output i

P: = Price of output i

Q; = Quantity of output i
P3 = Price of inputj used to produce output i
Q, =- Quantity of inputj used to produce output i
In a perfectly competitive market each producer maximizes profit, termed private

profit, by using each input to the point at which the marginal value product of the input
is equal to its marginal cost. When inputs and output are valued at their opportunity cost

in an environment characterized by no market failure (monopoly power, extemalities, or

public goods), producers’ behavior results in an efficient allocation of resources.

26

In most developing countries, it is common to note that resources are not allocated
efficiently because either input markets or output markets, or both, function imperfectly,
owing to not only market failures, but also government interventions, through its fiscal
and pricing policies. Examples of government interventions are protective tariffs, import
barns, pan-territorial and pan-seasonal prices, etc. With such interventions, market prices
may differ from social opportunity cost and in this ease, government-induced prices may
lead to suboptimal resource allocation. In this respect, private profitability may differ

from social profitability, which is the true measure of the efficiency of resource
alloeation because inputs and output are valued at their opportunity costs. In a case of
market imperfection, market prices may need to be adjusted to derive the true

Opportunity cost, which may be qualified as economic prices or shadow prices.

3 -3 Economic Profitability and Domestic Resource Cost As Measures of
Comparative Advantage

One of the major challenges facing decision makers in developing countries is
how to allocate limited resources best in order to promote sustainable economic growth.
Comparative advantage is aimed at addressing this challenge, which requires defining

workable and objective principles for measuring comparative advantage.

3.3.1 _ Economic Profitability As a Measure of Comparative Advantage
Comparative advantage can be measured by economic profitability, based upon
eConornic or shadow prices. By analogy to the private profit identity defined above, the

economic profitability or social profit function can be written as follows:

27
1
He =Pe*Qa-£P,-."Qj where.
j-l
II, = Economic profitability

Pi, = Economic price of output i

Q, = Quantity of output i

Pi. = Economic price of inputj used to produce output i
Q; = Quantity of inputj used to produce output i

Certain inputs may be nontraded and others may be traded. Assuming no taxes
or subsidies, Gittinger (1982) defines an input as nontraded if its domestic production
cost is above its FOB price but below its CIF price. Conversely, an input may be
considered tradable if its domestic production cost is either lower than the FOB price or

greater than the CIF price. As such, by dividing the inputs into traded and nontraded

ones, the economic profitability identity may be rewritten as follows:

IL=Pa*Q.-ZT:P,*Q,-fiP.*Q, where,

11a = Economic profitability-from producing output i

Pa = Economic price of output i

Q = Quantity of output i

P... = Economic price of tradable input t used to produce output i
Q; = Quantity of tradable input t used to produce output i

P- = Economic price of nontradable input n used to produce output i
Q. ' = Quantity of nontradable input It used to produce output i

\ Assuming that a country’s objective is to maximize its economic or social profit
\\
t0 make the best use of its resources, it will produce a good if its economic profitability

28

is positive (11,90). In this case, the country is said to have a relatively low cost or a
comparative advantage, as it uses its resources efficiently at the shadow prices.
Conversely, if the economic profitability is negative (II,- < O), the country does not
produce the good efficiently; hence, the country does not have a comparative advantage.
In a case where a country produces two goods, which yield a positive economic

profit, the temptation is to allocate the limited resources to the good that generates the
gratest positive economic profit. This criterion may, however, lead to a biased decision
if attention is not paid to other factors. For instance, if one activity is small scale and
another activity is large scale, the large—scale activity may be favored because it produces
greater economic benefits, due to the higher quantity of output produced. Ex ante, the
Small-scale activity is penalized if both activities are not converted into a comparable unit
of the output, such as kilogram (kg). Another problem in using the economic
Profitability criterion is that, even if competing activities (maize and cotton) are translated
in the same unit (kg), it is sometime difficult to compare the same unit of output across
activities. Hence, it is useful to find a measure of comparative advantage that is

independent of the unit and scale of operation.

3.3.2 Domestic Resource Cost As a Measure of Comparative Advantage
Domestic resource cost (DRC) is nothing more than an extension of economic
Profitability to measure comparative advantage. It has, however, the advantage of being

Scale-free and independent of the unit of measurement. Starting with the criterion of the

29

economic profitability function to determine comparative advantage, the DRC, defined

as a ratio, is derived and made unit-free as follows:

11,,>Oif(P,'Q,-£P,'Q,-£P,*Q,)>Oor

“er.- 2P. *Q.)><2";P.. ‘Q.)

"d “I!

This inequality rs equivalent to:
(:P. *Q.) < (P..*Q.- 2P. *0.)
If each side of the inequality rs divided by (P, * Q.- E P, "' Q,), the following ratio

willbegenerated:
(2P. *QJ/G.‘Qr 2P *Q.)<1

.II

In the ratio (2 P, "' Q.) / (P, * Q,- 2 P, *Q,), the denominator represents
the value of tradable-goods (output and inputs) expressed in terms of foreign currency,
which needs to be converted into local currency. The economic value of the tradables
is converted into local currency by means of the shadow exchange rate. As such, the

, above ratio can be rewritten as follows:

(2P, *Q_)/{(P,*Q, 2P, ‘QJ'SER} where,
SE11! = Shadow exchange rate.

The ratio (2 P, * Q,) l {(P, * Q,- E P, "‘ Q.) " SER} represents the domestic
l'&80111'ce cost raid-(DRC). The numerator is the economic value of nontradables or
domestic resources used in producing the output. The denominator, which is the

difference between the value of the output and that of the tradable inputs, represents the
Value added in terms of tradables. Intuitively, the DRC ratio can be interpreted as the

Cost of domestic resources in producing one unit of value added, which is one unit of

30

foreign currency. One may state that the smaller the cost of these domestic resources
to yield a unit of foreign currency, the more efficiently the country uses its limited
resources.

At first glance, the ratio given above seems to measure absolute advantage instead
of comparative advantage because it deals with one country. But if one considers the fact
all resources, which include inputs and outputs, are valued at their opportunity cost, the

efficiency of the country, assumed to be small and a price taker in the international
market, is measured relative to the rest of the world. Therefore, the ratio given above
can be interpreted as a measure of comparative advantage.

From the DRC ratio, one can state that a country has a comparative advantage
if the DRC is positive and less than unity (one). Conversely, a DRC greater than unity
or negative suggests that the country is an inefficient producer of that commodity, as it
yields a negative economic profitability. This cut-off point can lead to some problems
Of interpretation that deserve to be addressed. Given this point, one may encounter cases
Where the DRC coefficients of a country are all lower or higher than unity for the range
of products studied and as such, these coefficients suggest that this country has a
comparative advantage or disadvantage in all the products. One source of this type of

Problem may be that the exchange rate usedis not in line with the true opportunity cost
of resources and needs to be adjusted to determine the country’s comparative advantage.
‘ In an ideal situation where the quality of the data is excellent, the criterion for

Suiting that a country has a comparative advantage is of course to compare the DRC to

unity. This ideal situation may be difficult to satisfy in the case of developing countries,

31
especially in West Africa where the data often lack or are of poor quality. As a result,
it may be safer to put the cut-off point in a confidence interval to allow for measurement
errors. This is for instance done in this study. The range (0.90, 1.10) is an arbitrary
confidence interval chosen to make a eall on whether a country has a comparative
advantage. If the computed DRC coefficient lies in this interval, we may infer that the
value of the DRC is too close to unity to make a conclusive statement on comparative
advantage. Conversely, if the DRC coefficient is lower than 0.90, we may state that the
country has a comparative advantage. Meanwhile, the country has a comparative

disadvantage if its DRC coefficient is above 1.10.

3 -4 Usefulness of the Domestic Resource Cost Method
3-4.1 Domestic Resource Cost As a Revealer of Distortions
In computing the domestic resource cost coefficient, one can calculate private
PrOfitability and social profitability. Doing so can be a useful means of revealing
distortions introduced by government policies. Not only can one determine the overall '
inrpact of policy distortions, but one can also measure the effect of each policy distortion.
while the overall policy distortion is measured by the difference between the private
Profitability and the economic profitability, the individual distortions are derived from
the difference between the market price and the shadow price. Table 3-1, which shows
different types of policy distortions, indicates that the overall distortion is represented by

0 and that the individual distortions are given by K, L, M and N.

 
   
 

 

   

Tradables Nontradables I Profitability

 

 
       
 

Output W'X Input Labor Capital
Market Price A a , , c .__., pwv E=A-B-C-D
Shadow Price P G H '" ' ‘ 1 J=F-G-H-I

     

 

  

 

    

Policy Effect K=A~F L=B-G M=C-H N=D~I 0=E-J
NNPC P = A/F Q = BIG
NEPC

   
  

    

. a “W- .J

 

Note: In this table, letter A may be seen as the value of one unit of output,
expressed in market price. Meanwhile, the letters from B to D may be considered
as the values of the total quantities of tradable and nontradable inputs, expressed in
market prices, to produce one unit of the output. Similarly, letter F is the value of
one unit of output, expressed in shadow price. The Letters G to I represent the
values of the total quantities of tradable and nontradable inputs, expressed in shadow
prices, to produce one unit of the output. Thus, E and J are the financial and
economic profitability, respectively. The net nominal protection coefficient (NNPC)
is the ratio between the local market price of a good and the shadow price of the
good, expressed in local currency by means of the shadow exchange rate.

The net effective protection coefficient (NEPC) is the ratio between the value
added of tradable inputs, based on the local market price, and the value added of
the same tradable inputs, based on the shadow prices and expressed in local
currency by means of the shadow exchange rate.

Source: Adapted from Monke and Pearson

33
The effects of the policy distortions on tradables (inputs and output), instead of

being given in absolute terms, can also be presented in relative terms, such as a ratio.
The ratios generated are termed protection coefficients. Among these coefficients, one
may cite the net nominal protection coefficient and the net effective protection
coefficient. The net nominal protection coefficient (NNPC) of a tradable is the ratio
between its market price and its shadow price expressed in local currency, using the
shadow exchange rate. For instance, the__NNiC__of the output in table 3-1 is given by r

the ratio P = A/F. If the NNPC is greater than unity, it indicates that producers of the ,-

good are given an incentive through protective policies. Conversely, an NNPC less than ,

unity suggests that consumers are the ones receiving the incentive. I
While the NNPC gives an idea of the effect of an individual policy distortion, it

does not show an overall picture. The broad view is given by the net effective protection
coefficient (NEPC), which is the ratio between the value added of tradable inputs at
market prices and the value added of the same tradable inputs in shadow prices. For
example, the flirt given by, R _=. . -(A-B)/(F-G), which measures the overall policy
dismrtion. If the NEPC is greater than unity it indicates than producers of the output
reOeive an incentive, and an NEPC less than unity suggests that they are faced with a

disincentive.

34

3. 4.2 Comparing Different Activities, Different Technologies and Different Regions 1
within a Country

The DRC method, within the fiamework of an individual country, ean be a useful

tool in guiding decision makers on where to invest the country’s scarce resources. For
instance, decision makers may be faced with the dilemma of allocating resources between
two competing activities, such as coarse grains (millet or maize) and rice. Should
investments be made in increasing either the supply of domestic coarse grains or
domestic rice? Within this framework, should the limited resources be invested in either
animal traction or mechanized production systems? Another problem that decision
makers may face is whether they should promote a particular region to foster growth in
that region at the expense of another one. Such issues can be addressed by the DRC
analysis.

3 -5 Obj ectiom to Domestic Resource Cost
Although the DRC analysis is a useful tool in helping guide a country’s
investment decisions, it has been criticized on several grounds. The first objection to the
DRC method is that it uses a partial equilibrium framework, which focuses on only a
Single market and does not provide a broad picture of the linkages between markets.
This criticism is particularly important for developing countries on the grounds that
l‘esourrces are relatively limited and a policy change in one sector or enterprise can affect
the production pattern in another competing sector or enterprise.
The DRC method has also been criticized on the grounds that it is based on a

Static framework. Yet, the aim of much of development policy is to change a country’s

35

comparative advantage rather than keep it static. A country can alter its comparative
advantage by investing in human capital and physical infrastructure, research, and by
building the institutions necessary for achieving this goal. In the short run, when
investments are made, the country may have a comparative disadvantage. Under these
circumstances, the investments may not be made because the payoff occurs in the long
run. Another problem associated with these investments is that the payoff is uncertain t
because of changing economic environment. Thus, an issue is how to account for such
an uncertainty in this type of analysis.

Another criticism of the DRC analysis is that it is based on world prices, which
have many characteristics. First, world prices can be too variable and volatile for
making sound investment decisions in developing countries. This price instability poses
the problem of the choice of the relevant price to help guide resource allocation. Should f
one choose the present price, an average of past prices, or an unknown future price? In
this range of prices, should one focus on nominal prices or real prices, and what is the
base—year for determining real prices? Another objection to the use of world prices is
that they are not derived from a competitive world market, but rather from an
oligopolistic market. Thus, certain critiques argue that world prices do not reflect an ;
efficient allocation of resources. Third, world prices may embody subsidies provided by
some exporting countries to their exports. Certain critiques suggest that these subsidies V
should be taken into account in deriving the true world prices if the purpose of the DRC
analysis is to remove all distortions introduced by government interventions. One may

argue that if the distortions in international prices are likely to remain in the future, they

36

can be accepted as the relevant opportunity cost for a small country because this country
is a price taker and cannot change these prices. If the distortions are, however, not
likely to continue in the future, one may want to adjust the world price.

In order to address some of the objections formulated against the DRC method, 1'

analysts have performed sensitivity analyses on some key parameters. The objective of if

these sensitivity analyses is to evaluate the response of the DRC coefficient to a change
in a parameter. For example, if the production of a commodity relies on a technique that
depends heavily on uncertain rainfall patterns which affect on-farm yields, one may
perform a sensitivity analysis on yields by assigning different values to the yield
parameter to assess the impact of different yield levels on the DRC coefficient.
Sensitivity analysis may be also used to address the issue of on-farm technology changes 1
for one crop.

One may also perform a sensitivity analysis on other parameters such as world
prices, exchange rate, wage rate, transport cost, etc. Not only can one perform a
sensitivity analysis on each individual parameter, but also one can do it for a set of
parameters, especially since the computation of the DRC is done on micro-computers,
which allow varying several parameters at once. Despite this possibility to perform
sensitivity analyses, the basic issue of estimating the opportunity cost of most parameters

remains, and is the subject of the upcoming sections.

37
3.6 Determining Economic Prices

The principle governing the determination of economic prices is the notion of ,r.

Opportunity OOSt’ “well may be seen as the marginal contribution of a good to a social ii

welfare function. Such a function, considered as a set of a community values, may
include more than one objective. Determining the marginal contribution of the good to
the social welfare function requires assigning a weight to each objective to show the
relative importance of each objective in the ultimate social objective.

Given that there exist different and sometimes conflicting goals, the benefits and
costs of each objective need to be expressed in a consistent fashion in order to make
them comparable. This calls for defining a numéraire which is the common denominator
for measuring costs and benefits (Ward et a1., 1991).

In the literature of cost-benefit analysis, two kinds of numeraire have been widely

used by economists. The first one was developed by the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1969) and formalized by Little and Mirrlees

(1974). This approach chose foreign exchange as the numéraire. In this approach,
traded goods are valued in terms of their direct impact on foreign exchange, while
nontraded goods are valued in terms of their indirect contribution to foreign exchange.
The underlying assumption of this view of the numéraire is that tradable goods, thus
border prices, represent an option for a country to enhance its welfare. According to
Powers (1981), foreign trade should be treated as an alternative ”industry”. Thus,

imports and exports become the basis for domestic production decisions.

at

38

The second numéraire used to value benefits and costs was defined by the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 1972) as the willingness to pay,
known also as the aggregate consumption numéraire. This method is based upon the
marginal willingness of the market to pay for a good; thus, how society values a good
in reference to its consumption level. In essence, the value of a good is based upon its

marginal contribution to national consumption or income.

’ ' -/."I' «’17:; /
c n» j _( Ii " ~

W 1......6... f .

The point of departure for determining the economic price of a traded good or
tradable at a specific point is its world price. Determining the economic price requires
knowing if the good is intended to be either imported or exported or used as an import-j
substitute.

Assuming that a good can be imported without restrictions, its economic price is
obtained by adding to its FOB price all freight and insurance charges between the world
market and the port of entry. This results in the CIF price, expressed in foreign
currency at the point of import. Then, this foreign currency must be converted into local
currency, using an exchange rate that best reflects the opportunity cost of the currency.
In fact, although there exists an official exchange rate established by a central bank, the
currency may be undervalued or overvalued because of distortions introduced by the
structure of the economy.

The importance of determining the opportunity cost of the currency cannot be

overemphasized for developing countries, especially those of Francophone West Africa.

39

An overvalued currency contributes to making resource allocation more inefficient by
making imports artificially chcap and exports artificially expensive. One consequence .
of an overvalued currency is that it encourages imports and discourages exports and

creates additional imbalances in the economy through resource rcallocations.

Conversely, an undervalued currency discourages imports and encourages exports. As

such, one needs to adjust the exchange rate to put it in line with the true value of the

local currency.

When the proper adjustment of the currency has been made to convert the foreign
currency into the local currency and obtain theglfprice at the point of import, the
°9°P9Ffi§P§Q 0! thestmdable at. a specific point inside the country is obtained by
ignoring all taxes and subsidies and adding the marketing costs between the port and the;
point of delivery. This process results in the import parity price, whichis the economic:
price of the imported good at the point of delivery. Conversely, the export parity price, it
which is the economic price of exports at a specific point, is obtained by deducting from;

the CIF price all relevant economic costs.

3.6.2 Valuing Nontradable Goods

Conventionally, nontradable goods include factors of production such as labor,
land and some kinds of capital. In addition, they consist of commodities that can be
potentially traded but are actually nontraded because of government regulations and trade

barriers. This last category of nontradables will be discussed in length in section

3.6.2.4.

40
3.6.2.1 Economic Price for Labor
Determining the economic price of labor in developing countries constitutes one

of the most difficult tasks in evaluating the efficiency of resource allocation, for the labor

market is segmented between skilled and unskilled labor, urban and rural labor, and the

formal and informal sectors. Due to this segmentation, various theories have been put “A

forward to deal with the imperfections in the labor market.

One may cite among these theories the "disutility of effort” theory, which claims
that if the unskilled unemployed labor fails to bid down modern sector wages, it is
because it places a high value on leisure. Mazumdar (1965), Todaro (1969), and Harris
and Todaro (1970) argued within the same line of reasoning that the wage differential
between the urban and the rural sectors can be essentially explained by the fact that rural
workers prefer the certainty of earning a lower wage to the uncertainty of carning a
higher wage in the urban sector. The consequence of the risk aversion of rural workers
is that the labor market is faced with an imperfect mobility which, in the long run, causes
unemployment and underemployment in the rural sector. This view of unemployment
and underemployment can be complemented by the notion of “unlimited supply of labor“
advanced by Lewis (1954). As such, the opportunity cost of withdrawing labor from the
agricultural sector is close to zero.

This view of the zero marginal product of agricultural labor was challenged by
authors such as Schultz (1964) and Sen (1966), who focused on the importance of

scasonal variations in the demand for agricultural labor. Their argument is that the zero

\

41
marginal product of rural labor may be valid during part of the year, but that the

marginal product of agricultural labor is higher than zero during the agricultural season.

The controversy surrounding the segmentation of the labor market has prompted
several economists to formulate methods to value labor within the context of cost-benefit
analysis. Among them are Little and Mirrlees (1974), Squire and van der Tak (1975),
McDiarmid (1977) and Powers (1981). The point of departure for these authors in
determining the economic value of labor is the notion of opportunity cost, which may be
defined in several ways. Focusing on unskilled agricultural labor, the Opportunity cost
can be seen as either the output forgone by removing a laborer to a new employment or
the marginal value product of the worker on the new job. To the opportunity cost of
labor, however defined, some economists add not only the net consumption effect of a
new job, but also the distributional effect of hiring an additional worker.

It appears difficult, however, to measure the consumption and distributional
effects owing to a lack of data. As a result, we focus only on the notion of opportunity
cost, which is still diffith to determine for all alternative uses of labor. As a result, the ¢
market wage rate during the agricultural peak season is accepted as a proxy for the
opportunity cost of labor during the agricultural season. The underlying assumption for
acceptance of this measure stems from the idea that unemployment during the peak
season is almost negligible. Therefore, at that period, the market wage rate represents

a worker’s marginal productivity.

42
3.6.2.2 Economic Price of Capital

Broadly speaking, capital has many definitions in the economic literature. It can
mean a physical stock that lasts beyond a single accounting period. As such, it
represents part of the economy’s past output that was not consumed. It is hence the
goods set aside to produce future output. Capital can also mean a financial resource
which is not consumed, but saved to finance activities that will be undertaken during an
accounting period. Central in both definitions is the idea that capital represents a present (a 1
sacrifice for future gain or consumption. This non-consumed portion, saved for future 2" .
consumption, has a value which can be measured by the discount rate or current rental
rate or interest rate associated to the capital stock.

In a well-functioning capital market, the discount rate performs the function of
balancing the 'subjective rate of time preference and the objective productivity of capital“
(Irvin, 1978, p. 131). Implicit in this balancing role of the discount rate is that it
balances the supply of and demand for investment, measured by the rate of interest,
which takes into account the market’s or society’s willingness to pay. In this sense, the
interest rate measures the rate of fall in the present value of society’s consumption over
time. Thus, it is an indication of the marginal productivity of capital, serving as a guide
to the relative scarcity of capital in the economy. In a capital market that functions ’
poorly, the market rate of interest sends the wrong signals to economic agents and leads '
to an inefficient allocation of resources. As a result, the market interest rate may nwd
to be adjusted to show the relative scarcity of capital, which represents in general one i

of the major stumbling-blocks of development programs in developing countries.

43

Capltalnrnarkets in developing countries may fail to function properly for many
reasons. First, megmayexist abdichotomy in the capital market, divided very often into
formalwanadmiflnformalmsectors. On one side, large commercial farmers who belong in
general to the formal sector may have access to credit at the interest rate prevailing in
the formal financial markets to purchase agricultural inputs and machinery. On the other
side, small farmers may not have access to credit in the formal sector, owing to their
inability to provide collateral. As a result, they are required to borrow capital in the
informal sector at relatively high interest rates. Such interest rates are intended not only
to cover high transactions costs, such as the costs of gathering information on the
borrower, but also to account for a risk premium aimed at the uncertainty surrounding
the borrower’s ability to repay the loan. As, a result of the dichotomy, different interest
ratesprgyailjn the economy.

9 Another source of market distortion may be that the government funds a specific
project in a region to achieve specific social goals, such as enhancing growth in that
particular region. In such a case, farmers who participate in the project may be provided
with a subsidized interest rate, while other farmers are faced with interest rates that are
higher. The differential in the interest rates does not reflect a risk premium, but rather
distortions introduced by government interventions. Asa result, a shadow discount rate
tawd-

i In cost-benefit analysis, different approaches to estimate the shadow discount rate

have been suggested. The calculation of the shadow discount rate is, in principle,

dependent upon the numéraire chosen to express costs and benefits. When the aggregate

44

consumption represents the numéraire, thefisfihadow discount rate isdetermined by the.

*— g-.-

consumption rate of interest, which measures the'rate of fall of the average consumption
MWWWMT“ EM, ,, . __ . ., , . . . -
Joy’eretime. If the foreign exchange is the numéraire, the shadow discount rate is the
accounting rate, of interest, measuring the rate of fall in the present value of public
investments (Little and Mirrlees, 1974; Squire and van der Tak, 1975). The rationale

for the second line of reasoning is that, as argued by some authors, marginal units of

public income in the hands of government have greater value than if the funds were to I

accrue to private consumption. As such, only public investment can maximize the social
welfare function in the presence of market failure. This statism implicit in this approach
was rejected by the liberalization policies under the Structural Adjustment Programs
launched in the early 80s. As a result, this study uses the first method to estimate the

shadow price of capital.

3.6.2.3 Economic Price for Land

Determining the economic price for land can be as difficult as valuing labor and
capital, especially in regions where the land market is poorly developed. Because of the
underdeveloped land market, the shadow price of land is not calculated on the basis of
the market price for land. It is rather generated by the residual return to land in the best
alternative use. Stated otherwise, it is the difference between the social profit and the
economic cost of other factors of production in their best alternative use, as suggested
by Morris (1989). This requires that all alternative production activities be identified and

cost out.

\

l

45
3.6.2.4 Valuing Nontraded Tradable Goods

In some instances, governments impose regulations such as export or import bans
or quotas to achieve certain social goals. These goals may be aimed at giving incentives
to producers or protecting consumers. These goods, without the regulations, would be
traded across national boundaries but are actually not traded beeause of the regulations.
Such goods can be termed ”nontraded tradable goods” or ”nontraded tradables”.

The principle governing the economic valuation of non-traded. tradables” is” the
-Wfit‘? pay, by accepting the market price of the good as a good indicator of the
mgr-ice. However, one needs to assume that government regulations will be in
effect in the future so that economic agents will face the same price for the regulated
good. If the government policies are believed likely to change, the point of departure
of the economic valuation is the FOB or CIF price, depending upon if the good would
have been imported or exported. For such goods, one needs to decompose them into
their tradable and non tradable components, by paying close attention to the value of the
tradables and nontradables.

Although the distinction between nontradable factors and tradables is essential,
itgofien a difficult task, for production processes are complex. An example of the
complexity of a production activity is that of a fertilizer. It may be produced in a local
factory, using local land, labor and capital, imported machinery, and fuel. Fuel may be
imported in a raw form and refined later in a local factory that, in turn, employs local
labor, capital and other imported machinery. The issue for the analyst is whether or not

he should focus on the fertilizer itself or take his analysis further by decomposing the

46
value of the fuel into tradables and nontradables for more accuracy. Answering this
relevant question leads us to Gittinger’s ”doctrine of materiality" (1982) and requires that
the analyst compare the marginal cost and benefit of undertaking this activity. Such a

comparison is not always easy for an analyst to undertake.

CHAPTER IV
DATA COLLECTION, FARMING SYSTEMS, PRODUCTION AND
MARKETING POLICIES, AND ASSUMPTIONS OF DOMESTIC
RESOURCE COST

This chapter discusses the institutional link and data sources used to carry out this
study. Then, it describes the farming systems used to produce cotton and cereals (maize,
millet/sorghum and rice) in the different regions of COte d’Ivoire and Mali. The choice
of these commodities is based on the fact that they are important in each country’s
economy and that production and marketing data are available for them. It also
documents the production and marketing policies of these commodities. Finally, it lays
out the assumptions used to calculate the domestic resource cost coefficients in different

markets.

4.1 Institutional Link and Data Collection

In 1986, a meeting was held in Mindelo to discuss the creation of a regional
protected Sahelian cereals market, within which there would be free trade, to address the
food security issue in the Sahel. This idea, agreed to by most participants, remained
only at the discussion stage because it was proposed without thorough understanding of

the determinants of intraregional cereals trade. To provide information geared toward

47

V Mr». “W.

48
fostering regional cereals trade, the Sahelian heads of state and the international donor

agencies mandated CILSS‘ and the Club du Sahel2 to fund some studies.

It is within this context that a research team was funded in 1987 by CILSS and
the Club du Sahel to launch a study of regional trade in West Africa. This team was
under the leadership of Johny Egg, an agricultural economist at the French Agronomic
Research Institute in Montpellier (INRA), John Igue of the National University of Benin
(UNB), and JérOme Coste of the French consulting firm IRAM (Institut d’Application
des Methodes de Développement)’. The results of the work undertaken by the
INRA/IRAM/UNB research team were presented at a seminar held in November 1989
in Lorne, Togo.

This seminar recommended that, among other things, the products studied be
broadened to include livestock and that the regional study be expanded to the southern
coastal countries, as a great deal of trade takes place between the Sahelian States and
these coastal countries. It was also recommended by the seminar to include other
disciplines and methods to complement the regional study under way. As a result,

Associates for International Resources and Development (AIRD)‘, under Dirck Stryker’s

 

‘l Created in 1973, CILSS (Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la
Sécheresse dans le Sahel) is an organization of nine Sahelian States for coping with
drought in its member countries.

2/ The Club du Sahel, a coordinated program for donor countries, is located within
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to assist CILSS
member states and international donor agencies in natural resource management and food
security in the Sahel.

3/ 49, rue de la Glaciére, 75013 Paris, France.

‘/ 55 Wheeler Street, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA.

49
leadership, was funded by the Club du Sahel and the United Agency for International

Development (U SAID) to work in collaboration with the INRA/IRAM/UNB research
team in order to produce more comprehensive knowledge of the intraregional trade.
Withinthiscontext,1washiredin1990byAIRDtobebasedatIRAMtocollaborate
with the Afro-French research team. My duty was, among other things, to be the field
economist and collect the data needed to carry out the regional study. The data for the

present study were drawn from that study, and their sources are given in Appendix A.

4.2 Farming System and Production Policies
This section describes the farming systems and their loeations within COte d’Ivoire

and Mali, and discusses farm policies in the two countries.

4.2.1 Cotton

4.2.1.1 COte d’Ivoire

V Cotton production is concentrated in the vast savannah zone, encompassing the
center and the north of the country. This production has been under the leadership of
the Compagnie Ivoirienne de Developpement des Textiles (CIDT) since the creation of
this regional development agency in 1974. This organization is jointly owned by the
Compagnie Franeaise de Développement des Textiles (CFDT), a French firm providing
the teChnical assistance, and the Government of COte d’Ivoire, which owns nearly 75

percent of the equity. As a result of its larger share, the government, through the

50
supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MARA), defines the

overall objectives of the cotton subsector.

Cotton production has exhibited an unprecedented increase since 1974. As shown
in figure 4-1, it increased from less than 60,000 tons in 1974 to over 290,000 tons in
1988, owing to large investments in infrastructure and research to find varieties better
suited to the Ivorian climatic and ecological conditions (Lele et al. , 1989). Even though
the increase in cotton production was due to an increase in yields in the late 703, growth
in cotton production in the 80s appears to have been associated with an expansion of the
area under cultivation, as yields have stagnated (CIDT, 1991). This stagnation of yields
is believed to be due in part to the heavy reliance of production on manual cultivation.
Indeed, while over 80 percent of producers used manual cultivation in 1989/90, only 18
percent of producers used animal traction during the same period, owing to the fact that
most of COte d’Ivoire is disease-prone for animals. Animal traction cultivation is mostly
concentrated in northern COte d’Ivoire and yielded nearly 1300 kg/ha in 1989/90, while
the yields of the manual cultivation were about 1100 kg/ha. Yields were 1500 kg/ha for
semi-mechanized farming system, which is used only by a few farmers because it is
capital intensive and farmers often lack the capital to purchase machinery. In fact, they
do not resort to loans and rely on previous saving from other activities to finance
equipment. Credit appears to be mostly available for small inputs, such as fertilizers
(NPK‘10-18-18 and urea) and insecticide. The dose per hectare for these inputs and

their unit costs are presented in table 4-1 and 4-2.

51

 

figure 4-1. Seed Cotton Production in COte d’Ivoire and Mali (1971 - 1989)

 

300

250 -

200 r

150‘

100‘

Production (Metric Ton)
(Thousands)

50*

 

 

 

o I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
71 7273747576 777879 8081 828384858687 8889
Year

 

+ ivorion Production —+— Malian Production

 

 

 

 

Source: CIDT and OSCE

52

 

I TathI.WdemehCMed’IvoinandMnlhlm

 

 

Source: MARA and IER

 

Table 4-2. Acquisition Prices of Inputs in COte d’Ivoire and Mali

 

 

Input Price (CFAF/U nit) Life Expectancy (Year)
Cbte d’Ivoire Mali COte d’Ivoire Mali
NPK (10-18-18) (kg) 130 155 1 1
Urea (kg) 115 145 1 1
Insecticide (liter) 3,300 1,000 1 l
Multi-purpose Plow 52,000 55 ,000 5 5
Seeder 49,000 52,700 5 5
Sprayer 8,500 10,200 5 5
Cart 72,000 77,000 7 7
Animal 120,000 80,000 5 5

 

Source: MARA, CIDT and IER

 

53

As shown in table 4-1, the farming systems that rely on a stronger source of
power have relatively higher yields, owing to several factors. First, farmers, who use
these techniques generally have better land. Second, the soil ean be dug deeper thanks
to the strong power and as a result, the plant has access to the most nutritive elements
in the soil during the first stage of the plant growth. Third, these farmers do not
generally wait for the rainy season to start the land preparation and hence they are able
to plant earlier.

Although the level of subsidy has declined substantially since the implementation
of the Structural Adjustment Programs in the early 80s, farmers enjoy some subsidy.

For instance, farmers receive ads and extension services free of charge.

4.2.1.2 Mali

Parallel to COte d’Ivoire, cotton production in Mali is under the leadership of the
Compagnie Malienne de Developpement des Textiles (CMDT), which has helped rank
Mali among the largest cotton producers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Mali’s performance is
evidenced by the increase in cotton production from nearly 70,000 tons in 1971/72 to
more than 275,000 tons in 1989/90, as shown earlier in figure 4-1. Thus, production
grew at over 5 percent per annum.

The bulk of cotton production takes place in southern Mali, where several
production systems coexist. These range from the manual cultivation to the more
motorized production techniques. Despite the existence of this array of techniques,

information is available for only the improved manual production technique and the

54
animal-drawn production system, which is the most widely used production system. As

such, this study will focus on these systems of production, for which no direct
subsidies are granted by the government. The only subsidy available is that on extension
services, which amounted to approximately 15,000 CFAF/ha of seed cotton in 1989/90
(CMDT, 1990).

The improved manual technique and the animal-drawn system differ in their
requirements for labor. They rely heavily on family labor. It is estimated that the
improved manual technique uses about 150 person-days per hectare for the different
agricultural tasks, with harvesting taking up to one-third of the labor time. Meanwhile,
the animal traction technique employs about 122 person-days per hectare, of which
almost half is devoted to harvesting. Thus, it appears that the bulk of the labor time is
assigned to harvesting cotton (Stryker et al., 1987).

One of the major differences between the improved manual technique and the
animal-drawn technique resides in the investment in agricultural equipment. While the
improved manual system uses small tools only, the animal traction system relies on a pair
of animals bought at about 160,000 CFAF and sold after 5 years of use at nearly three-
fourths of their acquisition value (IER, 1989). In addition, this latter system uses

equipment, such as a multi-purpose plow, seeder, sprayer, cart and barrow.

55
4.2.2 Coarse Grains

4.2.2.1 COte d’Ivoire

While, maize production can be undertaken in all regions of the country, that of
millet/sorghum is concentrated in the northern region. In the case of both maize and
millet! sorghum, the predominant production system is manual cultivation. However,
some farmers use animal power in the center and north of the country. Moreover, a
very small proportion of farmers relies on the semi-mechanized system to produce maize
in the savannah region.

Since 1977, owing to the dismantling of most government agencies due to their
financial burden on the government budget, the agricultural sector has been organized
in such a way that four major regional development agencies are in charge of providing
assistance and extension services to farmers, regardless of the crops produced. It is
within this framework that the Middle Forest is covered by PALMIVOIRE and
SATMACI, while SODEPALM monitors the southern coastal zone. In the meantime,
CIDT is responsible for the vast region encompassing the center and the north of the
country. Since 1988, CIDT has been strengthened in its duty by the Compagnie
Ivoirienne dc Developpement des Cultures Vivrieres (CIDV) to assist a greater number
of farnrers. The involvement of this organization may have explained the increase in
maize production from about 250,000 tons in the mid 70s to almost 500,000 tons in 1990
(CIDV, 1990), as shown in figure 4-2.

The use of modern inputs such as improved seeds and fertilizers has helped

increase maize yields from 700 kg/ha to nearly 1500 kg/ha by relying on manual

56

 

Figure 4-2. Coarse Grain Production in COte d’Ivoire and Mali (1971 - 1990)

 

PRODUCTION (METRIC TON)
(Millions)
53 9 53
4s a: co —-

.0
N

 

 

 

O I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
71 72737475 76 777879 8081 82 83 848586 8788 89 90
YEAR

 

|+woswuz£ +uruwuz: +Iv0tu/soac-a—uiuu/soac]

 

 

 

 

Source: CIDV and OSCE

57
cultivation. Improving the source of power to animal traction increased on-farm yields

to about 2000 kg/ha in 1990. By further intensifying inputs and relying on a semi-
mechanized technique, maize yields average about 4000 kg/ha, as indicated in table 4-3.
About 30 kg of improved md, distributed free to farmers, are applied to a hectare.

In contrast to maize, millet! sorghum production has stayed steady since the early
703, owing to the little progress made in increasing yields. While yields for the
traditional manual technique have been about 600 kg/ha, those of the animal traction have
been around 800 kg/ha in the north of the country. According to some accounts
(McIntire, 1986), the response of millet/sorghum production to fertilizers use has been

so low that farmers do not have any incentives to use them in the short run.

4.2.2.2 Mali

Because of its moisture requirements, maize production is concentrated in
southern Mali, which accounts for nearly two-thirds of national production (Office
Statistique des Communautes Européennes, 1989). Although maize production is
intercropped and undertaken under several production systems, information is available
for only the improved animal traction and the improved manual techniques, owing to the
fact that the CMDT extension agents monitor farmers who use these techniques of
production.

' In the CMDT zone, maize produced in an intercropping system accounts for about
two-thirds of maize supply (Boughton, 1993). Yet, data lack for this type of maize

production. As information is available on the pure-stand maize produced intensively,

TdIIa4-3. WdCoanaGrainaProhctia-Tacflqu forCMad’Ivain-dMalh 1990

Regiodproductiorr technique

Cdtad'lvoiralrnaina
Wand
Cauarlirrprovadrnararal
WWW
WW

Mali/ruins

Madman-action

Cdta d'IvoiraIrnillat/aorghuu

Withdrawal
Madmaltractioa

Mali/Wanda:-
Southltnditioaal mural
Marina! traction

Source: MARA, IDESSA and IER

Yields

rsoo

§§

soo
s00

58

Labor
Day/ha

131
98
33

143

49
41

61

Power
Source

Tractor

EE EE

‘EE

Water

Como]

Seeds
um

8888

i:

30

10
10

NPK

i

§§§a

Urea

100

150
150

59

this study focuses on this maize, which accounts for about one-third of maize production
in the CMDT zone. Pure-stand maize is produced in rotation with cotton and yields
roughly 1600 kg/ha under manual cultivation and 2000 kg/ha with animal traction
(Stryker et al., 1987). Such yields reflect the use of modern inputs, such as NPK and
urea. The use of chemical fertilizers for maize production corresponds to Boughton and
de Frahan’s (1992) intensive technique. It is estimated by IER (1989) that nearly 100
kg of NPR and 150 kg of urea are applied per hectare.

In contrast to maize, millet! sorghum production is in general undertaken with no
fertilizers and takes place in most of Mali. Nevertheless, the focus will be on southern
Mali, for which information on production is better. There exist two main production
systems in this region: the traditional technique, which relies solely on manual
cultivation, and the animal traction production system. For 1989/90, yields were

estimated at nearly 600 kg/ha and 800 kg/ha for these systems of production.

4.2.3 Paddy
4.2.3.1 Cbte d’Ivoire

In COte d’Ivoire, rice production takes place in two distinct ecological zones,
namely the southern forest zone and the savannah zone. The dominant production
technique in both ecological zones is the traditional manual system in the uplands,
covering about 95 percent of the area devoted to rice production and contributing to
approximately 85 percent of national production (Louis Berger International, 1990). As

shown in table 44, farm yields for upland traditional manual cultivation are about 1300

 

Seeds
“Illa

yum. Labor
rum Day/ha

Power
Source
Mental
Mensal
Mental
Mental
Mental
Animal
Mental

EEEEE

 

Source: Humphreys and ER

ma

ta.
A
M

n
“T
l“ i

61
kg/ha in the forest region and 900 kg/ha in the savannah zone. The relatively high yields

in the forest zone reflect not only the higher and less variable rainfall, but also the fact
that rice production comes at the beginning of crop rotations. As a result of rice coming
first in the crop rotations, land clearing and preparation for rice production take more
timeintheforestregionthaninthesavannah. Thismayexplainwhythelabor
requirement is relatively high for forest zone rice production, estimated at about 120
person-days per hectare, compared to 85 person-days per hectare in the savannah region.

When the manual cultivation is improved by making use of_ modern inputs, such
as improved seeds, fertilizers and insecticide, average yields increase from 1300 to 2200
kg/ha in the forest zone and from 900 to 1500 kg/ha in the savannah region. Improving
the source of power from manual to animal-drawn power in the upland production of the
savannah, where animals are more resistant to disease, brings about higher yields,
estimated at nearly 1800 kg/ha when modern inputs are used.

Irrigation systems were introduced in the early 70s in both regions, owing to the ;
government concern about achieving self-sufficiency in rice (Humphreys, 1981). The
underlying policy goal in the early 70s was to reduce rice imports, which were thought
to be a growing burden on foreign exchange availability and the balance of payments in
the long run. Achieving the objective of self-sufficiency in rice meant improving
productivity through investments in more secure water control to enhance the domestic
supply. It is within this framework that public funds were used to finance lowland

irrigation schemes in the forest region. Such schemes were intended to divert water from

62
small streams to nearby bottom lands. With these schemes, yields increased to nearly

3500 kglha in this region.

In contrast to the forest region, the northern region benefitted from major
government investments through borrowing foreign capital that helped construct dams in
the early part of the 703. Thanks to these dams, the irrigation systems enjoy complete
water control, assuring double-cropping during the year. It is estimated that the yields
for this system of production are as high as 4000 kglha. This production system has,
however, high labor requirements, evaluated at more than 240 person-days/halyear, as
a result of the irrigation control, transplanting and longer harvesting time.

The second device used by the government to expand paddy production was to
encourage utilization of modern inputs to enhance yields. To ensure the use of these
modern inputs, the government created in 1970 a major parastatal, SODERIZ, which
instituted a contract device with farmers to provide them, in a timely fashion, with
subsidized modern inputs paid for at harvest time either in cash or in paddy equivalent.
SODERIZ was dismantled in 1977 beeause of its financial difficulties. Since then, its
role of delivering inputs to farmers has shifted to other parastatals (SODEPALM,
PALMIVOIRE, and CIDT). It is estimated that 150 kg of NPK, 75 kg of urea and 4
liters of herbicide are applied on a hectare of rice field (Louis Berger International,
1990). In general, farmers purchase these inputs on credit and repay them after harvest.
Only farmers of the irrigation system of the North receive free inputs. These farmers,
as well as other rice farmers, are granted free extension services, which run between

30,000 and 40,000 CFAF per hectare. Thanks to these extension services, the use of

63
modern inputs and the pricing policies, which will be discussed later, paddy production

rose from nearly 300,000 tons in the early 70s to almost 700,000 tons in 1990 (CIDV,

1990), as shown in figure 4-3.

4.2.3.2 Mall

Paddy production takes place also in two distinct ecological zones, which are the
south of Mali and the zone surrounding Mopti and Ségou. While southern Mali accounts
for less than 10 percent of paddy production in Mali, the regions of Mopti and Ségou
supply more than three-fourths of paddy production, thanks to major investments along
the Niger river.

In southern Mali, there exists no traditional water control system for paddy
production. Two systems of production essentially coexist in this region. The oldest
production technique of this region is the rainfed traditional swamp technique that uses
2000 kg/ha. Owing to this instability in yields, the Government of Mali attempted to
introduce a water control system through a simple diversion of water, under the
leadership of CMDT. In its attempt to stabilize and increase yields, CMDT introduced
not only animal traction for paddy production, but also the use of improved seeds and
modern inputs. As a result, yields increased to nearly 1800 kg/ha (McIntire, 1981).
Unfortunately, lack of information on the labor requirement and production costs for this

system limits this study to the rice production systems in the regions of Mopti and Ségou.

 

64

 

[figure 4.3. Paddy Production in core d’Ivoire and Mall (1971 - 1990)
700

 

600 ‘

N (N b 0'!
O O O O
O O O O
l l j 1

Production (Metric Ton)
(Thousands)

100‘

 

 

717i7372737§737§7§8383akakskabasaraaasso
Year

 

 

+ Ivorian Paddy —|— Malian Paddy

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: CIDV and OSCE

rfir"§

trib-

65

In the zone surrounding Mopti and Ségou, there exists a wide range of techniques,
ranging from no water control to complete water control. The traditionally uncontrolled
flooded system of production is based upon manual cultivation and uses no modern
inputs. Its yields, very variable, are estimated at about 700 kg/ha in normal years.
Because of this variability in yields, a limited water control system has been introduced
in the Mopti and Ségou regions through projects called Operation Riz. Floodwater enters
the fields through diked polders for this limited water control system, which yields nearly
1200 kg/ha. This system uses modern inputs and animal traction as a source of power.

The most productive region in the Mopti/Ségou zone is that of the Office du
Niger, which was first intended to produce irrigated cotton, but quickly stopped cotton , 7'
production because of agronomic constraints (De Wilde, 1969). The Office du Niger/
includes the sub-regions of N iono, N’Débougou, Macina, Kourouma and Molodo, where
major investments have been undertaken by the Government of Mali since 1984. The
major objective of these investments was to restore areas that were productive in the
past, but have witnessed a drastic decline in productivity as a result of the breakdown of
the irrigation system. It is within this framework that the French government, through
the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (CCCE), funded the project RETAIL
in 1986 (Republique du Mali, 1989).

The most productive system in the Office du Niger is that of RETAIL, which
yielded over 5 tons per hectare (Cebron, 1992) in 1990/91. Yields are highest for this

project because it enjoys a full water control and a regular maintenance of the irrigation

network that allow double-crOpping during the year. Moreover, it requires transplanting

66
and the use of a heavy dose of chemical fertilizers, which make it an intensive production

system. Water charges and threshing services paid by farmers are estimated at 42,000
CFAF/ha and nearly 8 percent of production, respectively. Farmers are, however,
granted free extension services, estimated at nearly 13,000 CFAF/ha.

The second most productive technique in the Office du Niger region is the system
of production of the ARPON project, which does not enjoy a systematic leveling of the
fields. As a result, certain areas of the fields are poorly flooded. Moreover, farmers
of this project use lower doses of inputs than those of RETAIL. The production system
of ARPON can thus be termed semi-intensive. Its yields are lower and averaged about
3.5 tons/ha in 1990/91 (Cebron, 1992). As a result of the lower yields, farmers are
charged about 28,000 CFAF/ha for water use. They pay, however, the same rate for
threshing services.

The third production system found in the region of the Office du Niger is that of
the non-restored areas that use gravity irrigation. The irrigation network of this
production system is not maintained on a regular basis and as a result, yields are lower
than those of the other systems described above. These yields, estimated at nearly 2500
kglha, reflect also the use of a relatively lower dose of inputs. Farmers are charged

28,000 CFAF/ha for the use of water and 8 percent for threshing (Cebron, 1992).

67
4.3 Marketing Policies

4.3.1 Cotton
4.3.1.1 COte d’Ivoire

Before seed cotton is transformed into cotton fiber, it is collected in rural areas
either by the CIDT agents or by farmers’ cooperatives, whose share of the assembly
market has gradually increased since the mid 80s. It is estimated that 640 cooperatives
collected over 240,000 tons of seed cotton out of a production of nearly 241,000 tons in
1989/90 (CIDT, 1991). This overwhelming share of the cooperatives appears to be
mainly due to their lower collection costs than those of the CIDT. Collection costs for
these cooperatives averaged 4200 CFAF/ton 1989/90, compared to 6500 CFAF/ton for
CIDT’s marketing agents.

In COte d’lvoire, there are 10 industrial mills that gin seed cotton into cotton fiber
in several regions of the savannah zone. It is estimated by CIDT that the ginning ratio
in these mills averaged nearly 45 percent in 1989/90 and that the total average ginning
cost in cotton fiber equivalent amounted to approximately 54,000 CFAF/ton. Such a cost
is composed of the direct cost of ginning and the finance charges that amounted to about
18,400 CFAF/ton in 1989/90. As a result, the direct costs of ginning were about 35,600
CFAF/ton. Ginning cotton provides wd, a by-product that was sold by CIDT to
TRITURAF’ at nearly 23,000 CFAF/ton of seed. As the ginning ratio is about 45

percent, the value of the seed for one ton of cotton fiber is about 28,700 CFAF. Thus,

 

5/ TRITURAF is a firm located in Bouaké that processes cotton seed into oil.

 

4.3.?

68
the net ginning cost to CIDT is about 25,300 CFAF/ton of cotton fiber after the value

of the seed sold is deducted from the total ginning cost.

While about 15 percent of the cotton fiber obtained is sold to the local textile
mills in Bouaké, the bulk of cotton fiber is sold to the international market to generate
foreign currency. Before this cotton fiber is shipped to the international market, it is
bulked, stored, and handled at nearly 10,000 CFAF/ton and transported from the mills
to the port of Abidjan. Transport cost is about 11,000 CFAF/ton from Bouaké to
Abidjan and nearly 20,000 CFAF/ton from Korhogo to Abidjan. Port charges in

Abidjan averaged nearly 19,500 CFAF/ton in 1990.

4.3.1.2 Mali

Seed cotton collection is a joint activity between CMDT and farmers’
cooperatives, whose role is to help assemble cotton in selected areas, where cotton is
picked up and transported by CMDT to the mills. It is estimated that transport costs
from the rural areas to the mills averaged 10,000 CFAF/ton in 1989/90 and that the costs
of storage, handling, insurance and cotton protection were nearly 13,000 CFAF/ton
(CMDT, 1990).

The average ginning ratio in the 13 industrial mills, located mainly in southern
Mali, was nearly 43 percent in 1989/90 and the total ginning cost averaged about 54,200

CFAF/ton. The seed obtained after ginning is sold to HUICOMA“ at 9,000 CFAF/ton;

 

‘/ HUICOMA has its headquarters in Bamako and its industrial unit in Koulikoro.
It processes cotton md bought from CMDT and groundnut into refined oil, sold in the
local market.

tar. the
product \

I I
mace:

an ion

69
thus, the net ginning cost in cotton fiber equivalent after deducting the value of the by-

product was a little over 42,000 CFAF/ton. CMDT exports nearly all the cotton fiber
produced, owing to the very small capacity of the textile mills in Mali and the desire to
earn foreign currency. Marketing costs from the mills to the port of Abidjan, where
over two-thirds of Malian cotton fiber is shipped, averaged nearly 44,100 CFAF/ton in

1989/90 (CMDT, 1990).

4.3.2 Coarse Grain
4.3.2.1 COte d’Ivoir-e

As for most food commodities, the bulk of the coarse grain produced is consumed
by farmers, who are in general semi-subsistence farmers. SOFRECO (1989) estimated
that the share of coarse grain marketed is only 25 to 30 percent of total production.
These quantities are marketed entirely by the private sector and do not involve any
government interventions at the domestic level. Generally, large wholesalers fund
assemblers, who are in charge of buying coarse grain from farmers. The average 1990
farmgate price for maize produced in the forest region and the center of Cate d’Ivoire,
and for millet! sorghum produced in northern Cate d’Ivoire were calculated from the data
provided by the Office de Commercialisation des Produits Vivriers (OCPV), a
government agency in charge of collecting monthly wholesale and retail prices of food
crops in the major urban centers of COte d’Ivoire. The monthly farmgate price for the
two coarse grains are derived by assuming that the marketing margins between the

wholesale and retail prices, given in table 4-5 and 4-6, are identical to the marketing

70

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splifi’a‘iile‘g‘iiqsiég dive-deb

 

72
margins between the wholesale and farmgate prices. As such, the average 1990 farmgate

price for millet/sorghum in Korhogo is about 80 CFAF/kg and that of maize is about 40
CFAF/kg in the center and forest of COte d’Ivoire’, respectively.

Interviews with traders revealed that collection costs that include assembling,
handling, and storing coarse grain averaged nearly 4,500 CFAF/ton in 1990 and
transportcostsfromtheruralareastothenearestlargemarketsuchasBouakéor
Korhogo were estimated at nearly 5000 CFAF/ton. According to the same interviews,
coarse grain was shipped to the major urban centers at about 35 CFAF/ton-km and

distribution costs between markets averaged approximately 6,800 CFAF/ ton in 1990

(Barry et al., 1992).

4.3.2.2 Mall

Marketing of coarse grain was long dominated by government interventions in
Mali. It was not until the early 803 that the government, under increasing pressure from
the donor community, took steps to liberalize the cereals market. During the initial
period of the liberalization, OPAM, the parastatal created in the mid 603 to market
cereals, was granted the role of defending cereals prices within a band, which was

defined by the government. One of the objectives of the Government of Mali was to

 

7/ The price spreads between wholesale and retail prices in both Abidjan and Bouaké
suggest that either high barriers to entry exist in these markets or the price data for these
markets are unreliable. Given that the price spreads in Korhogo are close to the price
spreads obtained from the price data collected by Michigan State University between
1986 and 1987 in southern Mali, Korhogo’s average 1990 farmgate price obtained from
the method explained above is used as a proxy for the average 1990 farmgate prices for
central C6te d’Ivoire and the forest region.

73

provide farmers with stable prices and protect consumers’ real income, as cereals were
seen as wage goods. Within this framework, OPAM was, among other things, to buy
when cereals prices were under the lower limit and sell when they transcended the upper
limit of the band. Such a defense mechanism assumed that OPAM had the means to
influence prices. By all accounts, OPAM did not have the financial resources required
to undertake this defending role (I-lumphreys, 1986). In the first place, one of the
reasons why the liberalization took place was OPAM’s financial difficulties. As a result
of OPAM’s financial constraints, OPAM’s role has been narrowed to managing food aid,
providing market information, and holding the national food security stock.

Since 1986, coarse grain prices have been determined by market forces, owing
to the participation of private traders, who undertake the marketing activities. They buy
coarse grain from farmers, and assemble, store and ship them to the consumption
centers, among which the most important is Bamako. An interview with traders revealed
that transfer costs between the farms in the southern CMDT region and Sikasso were
about 8,500 CFAF/ton and that between Sikasso and Bamako were roughly 13,000
CFAF/ton in 1990. Such costs are close to what Gabre-Madhin and Maiga (1990) found.

One of the objectives of the. policy reforms in the cereals subsector was to bring
about a more efficient cereals marketing system, through competition and better
information available to market participants. Within this framework, a Market
Information System (MIS) has been set up to collect price data both at the farmer and
consumer levels so that market participants have available some information to make

rational decisions and efficient use of their resources. Price data have been available

74

since 1988. The MIS data indicate that the 1990 consumer prices for maize and
millet/sorghum in Sikasso averaged about 60 and 80 CFAF/kg, respectively and those
of Bamako were about 80 and 90 CFAF/kg, respectively. Assuming a 10 CFAF/kg
price differential between the consumer prices and the wholesale prices to cover
marketing costs, the average 1990 wholesale prices can be evaluated at 50 and 70
CFAF/kg for maize and millet/sorghum in Sikasso, and 70 and 80 CFAF/kg for the same

cerealsinBamako.

4.3.3 Marketing of Local Rice
4.3.3.1 Cbte d’Ivoire

The bulk of paddy produced is consumed and used for seed by farmers, and only
40 percent of national production appears to be marketed by the private traders and the
official channel (Louis Berger International, 1990). According to Louis Berger
International, over three-fourths of the quantity marketed was handled by private traders
during the period prior to 1988. Since that year, the private sector has handled nearly
all the marketable loeal rice, owing to previous government policies that are explained
below.

A pricing and marketing policy was instituted by the government in the early 703
to complement the production policies, described earlier, to expand domestic production.
Both sets of policies were aimed at reducing not only the increasing burden of rice
imports on the balance of payments, but also the country’s dependence on the

international market, which witnessed a sharp increase in prices in the mid 703. It is

with
m:

with r;

[Hi 11'

mm:

.
req‘

mus:

75
within this framework that the role of SODERIZ was expanded from assisting rice

farmers to collecting, storing, transporting, hulling paddy, and supplying wholesalers
with rice. At each stage of this official marketing channel, prices and margins were set
by the government to achieve its goals, consisting of expanding domestic supply through
adequate revenues to farmers and providing consumers with rice at a reasonable price.
With these objectives in view, the farmgate producer price was raised from 60 to 80
CFAF/kg in 1974. In the meantime, the consumer price, which increased sharply after
the sudden increase in international prices, was lowered by the government by 25 percent
in 1975. Such increase in producer price and the lowering in consumer prices triggered
the substantial deficit of SODERIZ, which was dismantled in 1977 and replaced by
several industrial units owned by the government.

The government devised a new rice policy whereby a distinction was made
between production and marketing activities. With this new policy, extension services
were not provided by the newly created units, but rather by development agencies
(CIDT, SODEPALM, SATMACI), each in charge of a specific production zone. In the
meantime, the rice production zones were divided into regions so as to make each
industrial unit responsible for purchasing paddy from farmers in a particular region,
without the possibility of expanding its activities beyond its designated region. Once
again, paddy was purchased at an official price and sold to wholesalers at a price set by
the government. It was assumed in the new pricing policy that the industrial units would
make profits if the wholesale price was greater than costs. But, in the event that costs

exceeded the wholesale price, the government would absorb the loss through a subsidy

 

finded b}
ctr-2g: ol

0
dour o;
governs:
(lewd:
he paid

to the in

76
funded by coffee and cocoa revenues, managed by CSSPPA, a government agency in

charge of stabilizing agricultural prices.

Obviously, this new marketing and pricing policy was not conducive to holding
down operating costs. It rather encouraged the industrial units to ask for more
government financial support, which became, throughout the years, increasingly
demanding on the limited public resources. To alleviate costs, the government reduced
the paddy farmgate price from 80 to 60 CFAF/kg. Even with this reduction, subsidies
to the industrial processing units ranged from 85 CFAF/kg of rice for the least inefficient
plant to 455 CFAF/kg of rice for the most inefficient industrial unit in 1987 (Louis
Berger International, 1990). By 1988, the government owed these industrial units over
17 billion CFAF, which were cumulated over several years. This amount was unlikely
to be paid by the government, especially when it decided unilaterally to withhold its
major export crops from the world market, owing to the law international prices. As a
result, the industrial units have virtually stopped operating and the private sector has
marketed nearly all the local rice since 1988.

Even during the heyday of the industrial mills, they marketed only a small share
of domestic production. In fact, the price offered by the private sector to farmers was
sometimes nearly 40 percent higher than that of the industrial mills (Louis Berger
International, 1990). Nonetheless, the selling price of this private sector was much lower
than that of the official channel, owing to its lower cost. In addition, the quality of its
rice produced was better than that of the industrial mills because of its faster and shorter

turnover. Its hullers, nonetheless, have yielded since the mid 703 a lower milling ratio,

 

width is
isduc to

EJHOI‘

CFAF/t
CFAF»
am
about 6
aka:

Hour

‘5

COM.“
Md

77
which is on average 55 percent (Barry et al., 1992). Such a relatively low milling ratio

is due to the fact that the hullers were originally intended to process coffee and, as such,
are not well suited for hulling rice.

During 1990, paddy collection costs for the private sector averaged about 9,000
CFAF/ton, and hulling cost in rice equivalent was estimated at approximately 10,000
CFAF/ton (Barry et al., 1992). Rice milled was shipped to the major consumption
centers at nearly 35 CFAF/ton-km. The average distribution cost in rice equivalent was
about 6000 CFAF/ton in 1990. The average 1990 wholesale price for loeal rice,
collected by OCPV in the urban centers, was 190 CFAF/kg in Abidjan, 180 CFAF/kg
in Bouaké, 170 CFAF/kg in Daloa and 160 CFAF/kg in Korhogo.

The domestic price of rice is influenced by rice imported by the Caisse Générale
de Péréquation des Prix (CGPP), a parastatal granted the monopoly power to import rice
in order to maintain a regular supply of rice to the cities. The level of rice imports
during a single year is, according to government officials, decided by the Ministry of
Commerce, in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources, which
forecasts the level of national production. Imported rice accounts for nearly half of
domestic consumption and is sold to wholesalers, who are registered at the Ministry of
Commerce (Louis Berger International, 1990). The parastatal, through a transport
subsidy, maintains pan-territorial and pan-seasonal prices, fixed by the government at 147
CFAF/kg at the wholesale level and 160 CFAF/kg at the retail level. In addition, the

parastatal influences the domestic price of rice by managing a national food security stock

LT

78

of nearly 90,000 metric tons, equivalent to three months of consumption (Louis Berger

International, 1990).

4.3.3.2 Mali

Marketing of loeal rice was subjected to substantial government interventions,
which were aimed at providing producers with stable revenues and supplying rice to
urban consumers at a ”reasonable" price. Achieving these objectives required the
government to possess some tools to influence the rice market. The Office du Niger and
OPAM were the instruments of the government to influence the loeal market. The Office
du Niger was in charge, among other things, of buying paddy from farmers at
administered prices, collecting and milling paddy at the industrial mills owned by the
government. In the meantime, OPAM was granted the monopoly power to purchase rice
produced by the Office du Niger and market it at prices fixed by the government.

Even though these two parastatals were granted monopoly-monopsony power,
there existed a dynamic private sector, which offered higher prices to farmers than those
of the parastatals and marketed rice at relatively low per unit costs. It was not until 1986
that the private sector, thanks to the reforms programs pressed by the donors, was
allowed to participate officially in the marketing of the loeal rice. These reform policies
did not, however, question the existence of the Office du Niger, which was seen as a
force that could counterbalance the private sector vis-a-vis farmers. The Office du Niger
is compelled to buy paddy at a floor price, set by the government at 70 CFAF/kg. This

price appears to be the buying price of the Office du Niger for all qualities of paddy.

U133:

date

1987,
00 Sty
from t

“It L‘

79

The private sector, in contrast to the Office du Niger, faces prices that are determined
by market forces, which have been increasingly influenced by farmers’ cooperatives.
Indeed, farmers have formed associations in recent years to buy, store, and release paddy
to maintain adequate prices in the paddy market. It appears that they have been
increasingly moving toward hulling paddy to eapturc the value-added when they supply
rice to wholesalers (Diarra, 1994).
The share of the Office du Niger in paddy marketing has been variable since
1987, when the liberalization of the rice market beeame effective. Its share has depended
on several factors, among which one of the most important is its ability to acquire credit
from the local banks in order to purchase and mill paddy. Also influential on this share
were the quantity of unsold rice in stock and the state of the mills, which stop sometimes
as a result of broken parts. The Office’s share of paddy marketed has also depended
upon the quality of paddy produced by farmers. In fact, farmers prefer to sell the good
quality of paddy to the private sector, which offers higher prices for higher qualities, as
opposed to the Office du Niger, which purchases paddy at a uniform price. As a result
of these factors, the share of the parastatal in paddy marketing in the zone of the Office
du Niger has generally been under 50 percent and has been falling (Allard, 1990),
beeause of the increase in the number of small hullers owned either by farmers, private
agents or wholesalers (Lanser, 1990).
’ The costs of collecting paddy and milling it into rice by the parastatal appear
higher than those of the private sector. According to some estimates, these marketing

costs for the parastatal are nearly 20 percent higher than those of the private marketing

 

canal I
the pm

In“: (Wit:

Lilli» at ..
ull, i
a price

3.50.552

smile:
1990 a
scar.
(199:),

he Off

80
channel (Dembélé, 1990; Allard, 1990). Such high costs may be part of the reason why

the parastatal is faced with difficulties in trying to sell its rice. Another reason for the
difficulties of the parastatal in selling its rice is the low price of imported rice. As a
result, it is sometimes compelled to sell its rice at loss to a few wholesalers who enjoy
a price reduction if they decide to buy large amounts. Other times, rice is sold to
wholesalers through a bidding process agreed to by the government.

Private wholesalers represent the engine of the private sector. They usually fund
smaller wholesalers and stallholders, who market paddy and some rice. The average
1990 collection costs of paddy were estimated at nearly 9,000 CFAF/kg for the private
sector. Paddy was hulled at about 9,500 CFAF/ton in 1990. According to Diarra
(1994), the milling costs of the private sector are about 25 percent lower than those of
the Office du Niger.

The rice produced in the zone of the Office du Niger was shipped from Niono to
Bamako at roughly 6000 CFAF/ton during the same year. Other rice distribution costs
such as handling, storage, the finance charge and the wholesaler’s margins from Niono
to Bamako were estimated at nearly 10,000 CFAF/ton (Barry et al., 1992; Dembélé,
1990).

The domestic price of rice has been substantially influenced by the unstable rice
import policies. In fact, the private sector was allowed in 1981 to undertake rice
imports, thanks to the cereals market liberalization and the concern of the government

to ensure the food security of a country, which witnessed successive years of cereal

81

deficits. Such a concern led the government to remove nearly all rice import duties and
taxes. As a result, cereals prices were lower than those of the pre-liberalization period.

In 1986, the government adopted new measures to protect the domestic rice
production, which had increased in response to a high rainfall level. Import duties
increased from 5 percent to 32 percent of the border price, but they did not induce an
increase in the domestic price of rice because of the relatively low world price of rice
(Coelo, 1989). Despite these high import duties, the Office du Niger was unable to sell
its stock of rice, which forced the government to ban rice imports in October 1987.
Such a restricted policy led to high cereals prices until June 1988. A similar policy
undertaken by the government in 1990 induced again high rice retail prices. In contrast,
retail prices became normal whenever the government permitted rice imports. As such,
the dgmgjcretailprice of rice is largely influenced by rice imports. The retail price
of 40 percent broken rice averaged nearly 195 CFAF/kg in Bamako, and 200 CFAF/kg

in Sikasso (MIS, 1991).

4.4 Assumptions of the Domestic Resource Cost Method

This section discusses the assumptions used to calculate the domestic resource cost
coefficients. First, the world price of the commodities, used to estimate border prices,
and the shadow exchange rates are discussed. Then, the assumptions about the shadow

price of domestic resources are explained.

4.4.1 ii
4.1.1.1 C

D
W by
First, the
id the 1
taxes by
arms.
trial-at?

m: E Sis

82
4.4.1 World Prices of Commodities

4.4.1.1 Cotton

Determining the border price of cotton could have started with the FOB price
given by the parastatals. This price was, however, not used for two main reasons.
First, the parastatals base their calculation of their FOB price on their marketing costs
and the prices at which they buy cotton from farmers because they can minimize their
taxes by doing so. Second, their true income originates from cotton sold in the
international market, where they are price takers. As a result, this study bases the
calculation of the border price on the world price of cotton, as often done in the DRC
analysis.

As shown in figure 44, the world price of cotton has fluctuated since 1980. It
fell from USS 2050/ton in 1980 to USS 1320/ton in 1985 and reached USS 1820/ton in
1990 (World Bank, 1991). Such prices represent the value of the highest quality of
cotton fiber in the world market. It appears that cotton exported by West African
countries is of a slightly lower quality than that supplied by the major exporters. As a
result, the price of Malian and Ivorian cotton was obtained by discounting the
international average 1990 price, which was used as the baseline price for computing the
DRC coefficients to match the production and marketing costs of 1990. The international
average 1990 price was discounted by 1 percent for Malian cotton, as done by Stryker
et a1. (1987). Meanwhile, the discount rate for Ivorian the cotton, based on CIDT’s
estimate of the selling price of its cotton in the world market, was about 3 percent

because the second grade in the Ivorian exports increased during the recent years.

 

 

83

 

figure 4-4. Evolution of Nominal World Prices of Commodities (1980 - 1990)

 

2000
1800 s

1600'

d ‘ fl
0 N -b
O O o
o o o
L .l 1

800 ‘
600 ‘

400T W
200 .

W

WORLD PRICE (US$/TON)

 

 

 

0 l i 1 l I I T I l i l
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
YEAR

 

+ COTTON -+- MAIZE + RICE ‘5- SORGHUM

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: FAO and World Bank

84
For an export crop such as cotton, the world price is the CIF price, which needs

to be translated into a border price. The border price or FOB price is obtained by first
subtracting from the CIF price the costs of freight and insurance from the border to the
world market. These costs were valued at nearly $109! ton for COte d’Ivoire and USS
122/ton for Mali (Barry et al., 1992). This difference, expressed in foreign currency,
is converted into local currency by using the shadow exchange rate instead of the official
exchange rate, which was evaluated at nearly 275 CFAF/U SS for both countries (IMF,
1991). Indeed, several studies suggested that the CFA franc has been overvalued since
the early 803, when most states of the West African Monetary Union (WAMU), a group
of seven Francophone countries that share the same central bank, BCEAO, started to run
a deficit in their balance of payments. Using data from 1981 to 1985, Stryker et a1.
(1987) estimated by means of the elasticity approach that the exchange rate needed to
bring about an equilibrium in the current account of Mali would be 33 percent higher

than the official exchange rate'. Thus, the CFA franc for Mali was overvalued by

 

'/ The elasticity approach consists of answering the following question: given the
official exchange rate (OER), what should be the exchange rate in the foreign exchange
market to induce the current account deficit (DEF) to be in equilibrium. The equilibrium
exchange rate, termed shadow exchange rate (SER), is obtained by the following formula
for small deviations:

SER=OER +OER*(DEF/(e,"X+eD*M))
where e’ and e” are the elasticity of supply of and demand for foreign exchange
respectively, and X and M are the current export and import levels, expressed in foreign
currency units.
Assuming e,3 and co to be 1.0 and 2.0 respectively, Stryker et a]. estimated that the
Malian CFA Franc was overvalued by 33 percent for the period 1981-85. The above
method of calculation underestimated, however, the degree of overvaluation on the
grounds that it did not correct for the high tariff rates and import controls, which are
distortions introduced by trade policies during the period of study.
Formulated by Schiff (1986), the correction for the distortions is as follows:

85
nearly 33 percent during the period 1981-85. Using the corrected method described in

footnote 7 and data from 1980 to 1989, Salinger and Stryker (1991) found that the CFA
franc was overvalued by as much as 50 percent in both Mali and COte d’Ivoire. Other
estimates of the degree of overvaluation, which are not made public because of the
controversies surrounding the devaluation of the CFA franc vis-a-vis other currencies,
seem, however, to suggest that this currency is overvalued by less than 40 percent for
both countries. As a result of these differences, it has been assumed for the base
calculation of the shadow exchange rate that the CFA franc is overvalued by 40 percent
for COte d’Ivoire and 33 percent for Mali. Consequently, the shadow exchange rate is
about 385 CFAF/USS for COte d’Ivoire and 365 CFAF/USS for Mali.

Once the FOB price is converted into local currency using the shadow exchange
rate, port charges are deducted from the FOB price to obtain the export parity price of
cotton in Abidjan. For each point between Abidjan and the farm, the economic transfer
costs are subtracted from the border price to generate the export parity price at that
specific point. The calculation of the border price of the Ivorian and Malian cotton at

different points is shown in table 4-7a and 4-7b.

 

SER = OER + OER * {DEF+(tM*eD"M/(1+tM) - tx*ex*X/(l-tM))}/(e3*x + eD*M)
where, tM and tx are the import and export tariffs, respectively.

86

Table 4-7a. Export Parity Price of Ivorian Cotton and Cereals (CFAF/Ton)

 

Cotton Sorghum Rice
1- World price (USS) a/ 1820 104 287
2— Quality adjustment -3 5 0 5 -30 S
3- F03 price of adjusted quality (USS) (l)‘(2) 1765.4 104 200.90
4— Preight and insurance (USS) 109.09 48 48
5- POB Price in the port of Abidjan or Dakar (USS) e/ 1656.3 152 248.90

1

6- Shadow exchenge rate of lvorian CFAF (CFAF/USS) 385 385 385
7- FOB Price at the port of Abidjan or Dakar (CFAF) (5)*(6) al 637680 58520 95825
8- Port charges in Abidjan 27305 16160 16725
9-FOBpriceinAbidjen (7)-(8)el - g t “7 610375 74680 112550
lO—Marketing costs: Abidjan to Boueké 49880 12175 15160
ll-Mer'keting costs: Abidjan to Korhogo 57235 20345 19830
lZ—Marketing costs: Abidjan to farm bl 91225 26560 25715
13-Marketing costs: Abidjan to Sikasso c/ 38920 38920
14-FOB price: Bouekd (9)-(10) 560495 88805 97390
lS-POB price: Korhogo (9)-(11) 553140 96975 92720
16-FOB price: farm (9)-(12) d/ 519150 95020 86835 |
17-FOB price: Sikasso (9)-(13) 35760 73630
18-C1P Dakar 76775 114725
19-Merketing cots: Dakar to Bamako c! 29045 29045
20-POB Bamako (18H19) 47730 85680

 

Note: aIPoreereala,theworldpriceistheFOBpriceandthepriceinAbidjenisdIeCIPprice
blTTsehrmisuarmedtobeintheKorhogoregionforcottonendcereals.
el'lhevelueofmetradsblesbctweenCOtsd’lvoireandtheMalianborderesnrmesthattbelvorienCFAFis

overvahedby40percen,whileellthemarkcfingcoasbetweentheborderendSikauo,uceudutradabbs,aeumedruthe

MalianCFAPieovervelued by 33 perccn.
leorcottontlreborderpriceisexpr'cssedincottonlin. Theequivalenofthispriceinseed cottonisebout

230,WCFAF/ten.
el All the marketing costs between Dakar and Bamako are treetedastradablcs. The CFAFinSenegel isassurned

tobeovervalued by40percentin Senegal.

Source: Synthesis of Appendix B

87

 

 

 

 

 

I Table 4-7b. Export Parity Price of Malian Cotton and Cereals (CFAF/Ton)

Cotton Sorghum Rice
1- World price (USS) el 1820 104 287
2- Quality adjustment -1 5 0 5 -30 %
3- CIF price of adjusted quality (USS) (l)*(2) 1801.8 104 200.90
4- Freight and insurance (USS) 122 48 48
5- FOB price in the port of Abidjan or Dakar (USS) (3H4) al 1679.8 152 248.90
6- Shadow exchange rate of Ivorian CFAF (CFAF/USS) 365.75 365.75 365 .75
7- FOB price at the port of Abidjan or Dakar (CFAF) (5)‘(6) al 614385 55595 91035
8- Port charges in Abidjan 6775 16160 16725
9- FOB price in Abidjan (7)-(8) el 607610 71755 111095
10-Marketing costs: Abidjan to Boueke bl 16760 12175 15160
ll-Merketing costs: Abidjan to Korhogo cl 27720 20345 19160
lZ-Merketing costs: Abidjan to Sikasso dl 44985 38920 38920
13-Marketing costs: Abidjan to firm cl 136885 46975 43055
14—FOB price: Boueke (9H10) 590850 59580 95935
rs-Poa price: Korhogo (9)411) 579390 51410 91935
16-FOB price: Sikasso (9)-(12) 562625 32835 72175
l7—FOB price: firm (9H13) 470725 24780 68040
18-C1F price in Dakar 76775 109935
19—Merketing costs: Dakar to Bamako fl 29045 29045
20-FOB Price in Bamako (18)-(19) 47730 80890

 

 

Net: uamummeummummmwumumwumum
’n'cs'anAfiia.
UMEMmenmdmflblthFflkaywm
cherMfieMahberder'ntherelsvadmk‘h‘eadeflorhngo
dl'lIe-rkefirgee‘baweenAbidjanandMali'sborderantreatednhbl. Whmkvaheofthetndable
mikaWhMmandSikanendhfuma-mufiaflaMCFAFbevervahsedby33peeenn.
el'lhefanlh.ndbbehtheSik-omgionforennonandmbmhnhthaomeedufligufnrrice. Theborderpricu
foreeOendr-ieeme'nlirnandriesequivalent. Theseprieeaareabou215.000CFAFltnaofeeedcetaannd43.800CFAFltonofpaddy.
flAflhnnrkethgce‘mDakarndMali'sbesdereretremed-tredablnndmafipercaovmahntionofCFAF
hm WhWWthdebMMhm-HHMWCFAFE
overvahedby33perenl.

Source: Syndaes'noprpendixB

88
4.4.1.2 Cereals

The most widely imported cereal in most of West Africa is rice, which appears
to be preferred by urban consumers. As a result of the increased urbanization in this
region, the West African share in world imports increased from nearly 7 percent in the
early 803 to about 15 percent in 1989 (Daviron, 1991). The increased West African
share in world imports may also be attributed to increased self—sufficiency in other major
importers, such as Indonesia.

Most West African imports originate from Thailand, the world’s largest exporter.
This country produces different qualities of rice, ranging from the highest quality of rice,
known as 5 percent broken, to the lowest quality, that is, the 100 percent broken. The
highest quality of rice, which serves as a benchmark for establishing the price of other
qualities, enjoys a premium in the world market.

The bulk of rice imported by Cbte d’Ivoire and Mali is the 35 percent broken
rice. Although it is known that the 35 percent broken rice sells under the price of the
5 percent broken, its price is not quoted in the international rice market. Quoted are the
prices for the 5, 10, 15 and 25 percent broken rice. It is estimated from the prices
quoted by USDA that the FOB price of the 25 percent broken rice was 20 to 25 percent
lower than that of the highest quality between 1987 and 1990 (USDA, 1991). By
analogy to the relationship between these two qualities of rice, the FOB price of the 35
percent broken rice is assumed to be 30 percent lower than the 5 percent broken rice.
This study assumes the current 1990 FOB price for the 5 percent broken rice, estimated

at USS 287/ton (World Bank, 1991). Thus, the current 1990 FOB price for the 35

89
percent broken rice can be evaluated at nearly USS ZOO/ton. The current 1990 CIF price

at the West African ports is obtained by adding the costs of freight and insurance,
estimated at about USS 50lton, to this discounted price assumed above.

Unlike rice, very little coarse grain is officially imported into COte d’Ivoire and
Mali on a commercial basis, although maize and red sorghum are traded in the
international market. The FOB price quoted for maize in 1990 was USS 109lton, while
that of red sorghum, used as a proxy for millet/sorghum consumed in West Africa, was
USS 104/ton for the same year (World Bank, 1991). The CIF price for coarse grain at
the West African ports assumes freight and insurance costs of rice, as used by Boughton
and de Frahan (l992)’.

Tire CIF price at the port is converted into local currency, using the shadow
exchange rates assumed above. Then, the import parity price at each consumption point,
shown in table 4-8a and 4-8b, is simply obtained by adding to the CIF price at the port
all port charges and the economic transfer costs to the point of consumption.

I The bulk of cereals imported officially by COte d’Ivoire transits in Abidjan,
considered as the major consumption center. Cereals are shipped from Abidjan to other
consumption regions, among which some of the most important are Bouake, Daloa, and
Korhogo. In Daloa, it appears that very little coarse grain is consumed. As a result, it

is retained only as a rice consumption center for the purpose of the study.

 

’l Boughton and de Frahan assumed, however, an FOB price, based on the average
world price for the period 1986-90, and the 50 percent overvaluation of the CFA Franc
found by Salinger and Stryker (1991) for Cbte d’Ivoire and Mali. Moreover, they
assumed the average official exchange rate for the period 1986-89, estimated at 302
CFAF/USS.

90

Table 4-8a. Import Parity Price of lvorian Cereals (CFAF/Ton)

Maize Sorghum Rice

1- FOB price (USS) 109 104 287
2- Quality adjustment 0 i 0 % —30 i
3- FOB price of adjusted quality (USS) (1)‘(2) 109 104 200.90
4- Freight and insurance (USS) 48 48 48
5- CIF price in the port of Abidjan or Dakar (USS) (3)+(4) 157 152 248.90
6- Shadow exchange rate of lvorian CFAF (CFAF/USS) 385 385 385
7- CIF price at the port of Abidjan or Dakar (CFAF) (5)'(6) el 60445 58520 95825
8- Port charges in Abidjan 16185 16160 16725
9- CIF price in Abidjan (7)+(8) 76630 74680 112550
lO-Marketing costs: Abidjan to Bouake 12175 12175 15160
ll-Marketing costs: Abidjan to Korhogo 2W5 20345 19830
l2-Markaing costs: Abidjan to firm bl 18390 26560 25715
13~Marketing costs: Abidjan to Sikasso cl 38920 38920 38920
14-CIF price: Bouake (9)+(10) 88805 86855 127710
15-CIF price: Korhogo (9)+(11) 96975 95020 132380
16—CIF price: firm (9)+(12) 95020 101240 138265
17-CIF price: Sikasso (9)+(13) 115550 113600 151470
18-C1F price: Bamako (9)+(18A)+(188) dl 111245 109225 148395

A-Port charges in Dakar 18350 18255 20120

B-Marketing costs: Dakar to Bamako 32450 32450 32450

 

 

 

 

Note: elAllthe figuresareinCFAF fromthislinetotheendofthetable

b/Thefirm formaizeis the Bouakeregion,whilethatofsorghumand n'ceisassumedtobeinthe
Korhogo region.

cl The value of the tradables between Cdtc d’lvoirc and the Malian border assumes that the lvorian
CFAF is overvalued by 40 percent, while all the marketing costs between the border and Sikasso, treated as
tradables, assume that the Malian CFAF is overvalued by 33 percent.

d/ All the marketing costs between Dakar and Bamako are treated as tradables. The CFAF in Senegal
is assumed to be overvalued by 40 percent in Senegal.

Source: Synthesis of Appendix B

Table 4-8b. Import Parity Price of Malian Cereals (CFAF/Ton)

 

 

Maize Sorghum Rice

1- FOB price (USS) 109 104 287
2- Quality adjustment 0 i 0 5 ~30 5
3- FOB price of adjusted quality (USS) (1)5(2) 109 104 200.90

4- Freight and insurance (USS) 4s 4s 48
5— CIF price in the port of Abidjan or Dakar (USS) (3)+(4) 157 152 248.90
' 6- Shadow exchange rate of Ivorian crap (CFAF/USS) 365.75 365.75 365.75
7- CIF price at the port of Abidjan or Dakar (CFAF) (5)‘(6) al 57425 55595 91035
8- Port charges in Abidjan 16185 16160 20060
9- Cir price in Abidjan (7)4-(3) 73610 71755 110955
lO-Marketing costs: Abidjan to Bouake bl 20600 20600 23630
ll-Merketing costs: Abidjan to Korhogo bl 34515 34515 31585
12-Marketing costs: Abidjan to Sikasso cl 41750 41750 30515
13-Marketing costs: Abidjan to firm dl 46975 46975 43055
1+ch price: Bouake (9)+(10) 94210 92355 134725
15-ch price: Korhogo (9)+(1r) 108125 106270 142680
l6-CIF price: Sikasso (9)+(12) 115360 113505 141610
17-CIF price: firm (9)+(13) 120585 118730 182035
18—CIP price: Bamako (9)+(18A)+(183) el 104820 102895 138980
A-Ptort charges in Dakar 18350 18255 18900
B-Markaing costs: Dakar to Bamako 29045 29045 29045

__ ______._ ._*“-__..J

Note: alAllthenunirersareinCFAFfromthislinetotheendofthetable
bl All the marketingcoasare treated as tradablesand ammethatthe IvorianCFAFisoverveluedby40pcrcent.
cl The nurketing cons between Abidjan and Mali’s border are treated as in bl. Meanwhile, the economic value
ofthetradebleconponensofthe marketingcosts betweenthe borderandSikessoasarmesthatthe MelianCFAFis overvalud
by 33 percen.
dl‘lhefirmisassurnedtobeinthcSikassoregionformaizeandsorghum,andinthe0fficeduNigerforrice.
el All file marketing code between Dakar and Mali’s border are treated as tradables and assume a 40 perccn
overvaluation of CFAF in Senegal. Meanwhile, the economic value of the tradable components of the marketing costs in Mali
ssnrmes that the Malian CFAF is overvalued by 33 percent.

Source: Synthesis of Appendix B

92
Cereals imported into Mali enter West Africa at three points: Abidjan, Dakar, and

Lorne. By the accounts of the National Office of Economic Affairs (DNAE), the port
of Dakar accounts for nearly 60 percent of Mali’s imports. As such, the estimation of
the import parity prices for the markets of Kayes, Bamako, and the region of Mopti and
Ségou is based on the cost structure from Dakar. The import parity price of cereals in
southern Mali assumes that cereals are imported into Mali via Abidjan.

After the comparative advantage of each country for cereals is measured within 1,
t "‘

its boundaries, it is assessed in some key consumption centers of the other country. For
instance, C6te d’Ivoire’s comparative advantage is measured in both Sikasso and
Bamako, while that of Mali is evaluated in Korhogo, Bouaké and Abidjan. For cotton,
only Mali’s comparative advantage is estimated in Bouake for reasons that will be
explained subsequently. In all cases, once the commodity crosses the boundaries of the
exporting country, all the transfer costs to the importing country are assumed to be
tradable, although some of the resources used may belong to the exporting country. This ,
assumption is intended to be consistent with trade theory, which assumes that factors of i
production are mobile only within one country. I
In addition to considering cereals as import-substitutes in both COte d’Ivoire and 2
Mali, the competitiveness of the Ivorian and Malian cereals, assumed to be export crops,
is measured at the different consumption points. Such a scenario is considered, owing
to the‘large surpluses generated in both countries during the recent years. In this case, ,
the point of departure for deriving the border price is the CIF price in Abidjan and

Dakar. Then, the border price at each consumption point, illustrated in table 4-7a and

93
4-7b, is obtained by deducting the marketing costs between the point of consumption and

Abidjan or Dakar from the CIF price.

4.4.2 Shadow Price of Domestic Resources

Conventionally, land has been assigned a zero economic cost in most DRC
analyses undertaken for West African agriculture. This is, however, not the case in this
study on the grounds that there has been a growing concern on land deterioration. There
is now widespread evidence of increased soil erosion and degradation as a result of
population growth, which has put tremendous pressure on land use.

In COte d’Ivoire and Mali, there has not been any evidence of a competitive
market for renting land. As a result, the shadow price of land is estimated as a residual,
which requires estimating the economic value of capital and labor and deducting these
economic values from the value added in alternative crops per unit of land.

For Cbte d’Ivoire, the opportunity cost of land in producing one commodity is
assumed to be a weighted average of the retums to land from growing other commodities
on the same piece of land, owing to the fact that most farmers tend to diversify their
commodities to minimize their risk. Likewise, the opportunity cost of land in southern
Mali in growing cotton and maize is estimated by making the same assumption. In
contrast to cotton and maize grown in southern Mali, the economic value of land used
to produce millet/sorghum is assumed to be close to zero. The rationale for such an
assumption stems from three reasons. First, millet/sorghum is the most widely consumed

product in this region. As such, producers, who are in general semi-subsistence farmers

 

 

94
and concerned about the food security of their family, tend to allocate their land first to

the production of this coarse grain. Second, farmers are constrained by the limited
ginning capacity of the cotton mills, which induces them to allocate a greater share of
the land to coarse grain. Third, the maize market appears to be quickly saturated, as its
demand is generally small in Mali.

Estimating the opportunity cost of land as a weighted average of the returns to
land calls for lmowledge of the share of land devoted to the different agricultural
commodities. The share of land for growing cotton, maize, and millet/sorghum in
southern Mali is based on the data collected by ERIDRSPR (1992) in the lower portion
of the CMDT region. These data seem to suggest that on average about 30 percent of
the land is grown to cotton and that maize share of the land is nearly 15 percent. Thus,
millet! sorghum account for more than half of the land.

In northern and central COte d’Ivoirc, it estimated that nearly 20 percent of the
cultivated area is grown to cotton (République de COte d’Ivoire, 1988). This study
assumes that the rest of the land is devoted to cereals, although very little rice and no
millet/sorghum are produced in central Ccte d’Ivoire, where root crops are widely
grown. Within the area allocated to cereals in northern COte d’Ivoire, paddy, maize, and
millet/sorghum accounts for 37 percent, 45 percent, and 18 percent, respectively. In
central Cbte d’Ivoire, it is assumed that maize accounts for nearly 90 percent of the land
allocated to cereals and that only 10 percent of the cereals land is grown to rice.

The forest region of COte d’Ivoire is known for producing tree crops, such as

coffee and cocoa intended to be exported to the world market, where the prices of these

95
commodities have collapsed. Even though data are unavailable on these crops and root

crops, we may assume that the returns from growing them are roughly equal to what
would be gained from growing the mixture of cotton, maize and paddy. The opportunity
cost of land used to produce irrigated rice in the zone of the Office du Niger and
northern COte d’Ivoire is estimated differently from rainfed crops, as farmers are
compelled to only grow paddy in the irrigated areas, supervised by a parastatal. If
farmers of irrigated rice were not bound to growing paddy only in the irrigation schemes,
they would probably produce vegetables, as is the case of the non-restored areas of the
Office du Niger, where some maize is also grown. Owing to the lack of data on
vegetables, the economic return to land in producing maize is used as a proxy to the
opportunity cost of the irrigated land in the Office du Niger and northern COte d’Ivoire.
In this case, the economic value of land, computed as a residual between the border price
and the total economic costs of labor and capital, is estimated by analogy to the costs
figures of rice and maize in Senegal (Martin, 1988). In the Senegal study, yields for
irrigated maize in the Senegal river region are about one and a half times higher than
those of rainfed maize in the Casamance region, which appears to be nearly similar to
southern Mali and northern COte d’Ivoire.

Few government interventions have been observed in the rural capital market,
except in areas where there are major projects. In the rural areas, few farmers resort in
general to credit to invest in agricultural equipment, as they rely often on earnings from
other activities (Dione, 1989). Farmers resort, however, to credit to buy inputs such as

improved seeds and fertilizers, which represent a small share of production costs. The

96
interest rates on these inputs are about 12 percent in care d’Ivoire and 8 percent in Mali

(CIDT, 1991; ER, 1989). These interest rates are accepted in this study as the shadow
interest rate, though some may argue that if the rural capital market worked efficiently,
a greater number of farmers would borrow capital to invest in agricultural equipment.

The shadow value of agricultural labor, which accounts for the bulk of costs at .2.
the farm level, is a critical element in determining comparative advantage in West Africa. 1
As for land, the shadow price of labor can be determined by either its market price if
there exists a competitive labor market, or its residual value. This study assumes that .
the rural labor market is relatively competitive during the period between land
preparation and harvest. During this agricultural season, the daily agricultural wage rate
varies from task to task and from region to region. According to the interviews
conducted in the production regions, the average 1990 wage rate during the peak season
was about 700 CFAF/day in both the savannah region of COte d’Ivoire and southern
Mali, 1000 CFAF/day in the southern forest region of COte d’Ivoire and 650 CFAF/day
in the Office du Niger (Barry, 1992). Interviews were not conducted in Mopti region.
The daily wage rate in this region was based on the 450 CFAF/day used by de Frahan
(1990) and by applying a five percent annual inflation rate on this wage rate over the
period 1988-90. Doing so, the average daily wage rate in the Mopti region is evaluated
at about 500 CFAF.

 

CHAPTER V
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND TRADE FLOWS UNDER

CURRENT POLICIES AND ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS

This chapter uses the domestic resource cost (DRC) coefficients to measure the
comparative advantage of Cbte d’Ivoire and Mali in producing and marketing cotton,
coarse grains and rice at different points. Then, it discusses the pattern of trade
suggested by each country’s comparative advantage, and compares the theoretical trade
flows with actual trade flows not only between the two countries, but also between both
countries and the rest of the world to explain the similarity or divergence between these
trade flows. Finally, sensitivity analyses are performed to determine the direction of

trade flows, under alternative scenarios and macroeconomic policies.

5.1 Results of the Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) Coefficients

Before procwding with the discussion of the DRC coefficients, it will be useful
to state that the two expressions ”comparative advantage” and “socially profitable" are
used synonymously with the term ”competitive" in the upcoming sections, though they
are defined differently by different people. Some view the concept of comparative
advantage as trade patterns based on relative costs in an undistorted world (Barkema et

al., 1991). Others define the notion of competitiveness as the ability of a firm or

97

98
comm maintain its market share by delivering a good in a cost-effective way
(Agriculture Canada, 1991; Sharples, J. and N. Milham, 1990). Notwithstanding this
difference, these two definitions are related on the grounds that they compare costs of

trading partners. Comparative cost is the basis of using these terms interchangeably.

5.1.1 Cbte d’Ivoire

The results of the DRC coefficients, shown in table 5-1a, appear to show that
C6te d’Ivoire generally produces and markets cotton efficiently if all resources are valued
at their opportunity cost, as the DRC coefficients for the improved manual and animal
traction farming systems, which supply the bulk of cotton, range from 0.59 to 0.66. It
appears, however, that the semi-mechanized technique is an inefficient farming system
because of the high acquisition and maintenance costs of the machinery. This may
explain why fewer than one percent of farmers rely on this production technique.

In contrast to cotton, the semi-mechanized technique seems to be the most
efficient farming system in cereals production, probably owing to the high on-farm yields
that help to lower the unit costs of maize. The results appear to indicate that most
cereals are inefficiently produced at the farm level when they are treated as import-
substitute commodities, and as a result, cereals appear noncompetitive in all Ivorian
markets. Such results differ significantly from those obtained by Barry et a1. ( 1992) and
Humphreys (1981), who assigned a zero opportunity cost to land.

If the opportunity cost of land were zero in this study, as is generally done in the

DRC analysis, the results would be consistent with those of the studies mentioned above.

99

I, Table 5-1a. DRC Return for cote d’lvoire Under a Positive opportunity Cost or Land

Region/production system
- Cotton
, Centerlirnproved manual

North/improved animal traction

North/semi-mechanized

Maize
Forest/semi-mechenized

Center/improved animal traction

Center/traditional manual
Center/'nnproved manual

Millet/sorghum
North/traditional mantra!

A North/animal traction

Rice

Forestllowlandsl'unproved manual
Forest/uplandltraditional manual
Forest/uplandlimproved manual
North/'urigationl‘unproved manual
North/uplandltraditional manual

North/upland/animel traction

Farm

0.59
0.61
1.27

0.60
0.96
1.29
1.32

0.96
0.99

1.23
1.27
1.31
1.39

>2

Daloa

1/
0.80

1.55
1.60
1.80

Korhogo

0.63
1.26

0.85
1.20
1.51
1.59

1.23
1.28

1.93
1.79

>2

 

Bouake

0.61

1.18
1.51
1.60

1.54
1.61

1.76
1.76
> 2
> 2
> 2

>2

Abidjan

0.65
0.66
1.23

1.24
1.80
> 2

>2

>2

>2

>2
>2
>2
>2
>2

>2

ll For maize produced in the forest, Dimbokro is the market instead of Daloa

Source: Appendix B

100
Indeed, these results assuming zero opportunity for land, presented in table 5-1b, show

that maize and millet/sorghum are in general socially profitable at the farm level, as most
of the DRC coefficient range from 0.35 to 0.81. The difference in millet/sorghum
competitiveness at the farm level in table 5-1a and 5-1b is due to the high economic value
of land, which stems from the high economic profitability from growing cotton in
northern Cbte d’Ivoire. In this region as well as in the forest region, the local rice
appears to be barely competitive in the production zones, as suggested by table 5- lb.

In table 5-lb, the results of the DRC coefficients suggest that for all the
commodities, except rice, the more capital intensive farming systems have the lowest
DRC coefficients when the opportunity cost land is close to zero. This is, however, not
true for cotton and millet/sorghum when land is assigned a positive economic value,
owing to the fact that the return to land from producing maize under the most productive
techniques is relatively high.

Under the assumption of a zero opportunity cost of land, Cate d’Ivoire could
efficiently supply coarse grains to most its markets, except the coastal consumption
markets, owing probably to high transfer costs. Unlike coarse grain, local rice shipped
to the cities of Abidjan, Bouaké and Korhogo seems to be in general socially
unprofitable. Despite the differences in the assumptions used to assess Cbte d’Ivoire
comparative advantage in producing and marketing local rice, the results for Abidjan in
this study are consistent with those found by Humphreys (1981) and Barry et a1. ( 1992),

who did not measure the competitiveness of local rice in Bouaké.

101

 

I Table 5-1b. DRC Results for COte d’lvoire Under a Zero Opportunity Cost of Land
Region/production system Farm Daloa Korhogo Bouake Abidjan
Cotton
North/semi-mechanized 0.38 0.43 0.50

' North/improved animal traction 0.42 0.45 0.50
Center/improved manual 0.54 0.57 0.61
Maize 1/

Forest/semi-mechenized 0.35 0.50 0.58 0.85
Center/improved animal traction 0.66 0.87 0.83 1.33
Center/traditional manual 0.81 1.00 0.97 1.40 ||
Center/improved manual 1.05 1.30 1.29 1.96
Millet/sorghum

North/animal traction 0.46 0.66 0.87 > 2

E North/traditional manual 0.65 0.33 1.12 > 2
Rice
Forestluplandltraditional rnanuel 0.99 1.32 1.47 1.75
North/luplandltraditional manual 0.99 1.32 1.52 > 2
Forest/lowlandslimproved manual 1.05 1.48 1.68 > 2
Foresduplandl‘unproved manual 1.15 1.70 1.96 > 2
Northlirrigationlirnproved manual 1.31 1.93 > 2 > 2
North/uplandlenimal traction

 

 

ll For maize produced in the forest, Dimbokro is the market instead of Daloa

Source: Appendix B

102
5.1.2 Mall

The results of the DRC coefficients, shown in table 5-2a, suggest that cotton and
millet/sorghum make the best use of domestic resources. In contrast, maize and rice
appear to be noncompetitive in most Malian markets because they are generally produced
inefficiently at the farm level when land is valued at its opportunity cost. Such results
for rice differ from those of Barry et al. (1992) and Stryker et al. (1987), who did their
calculations under the assumption that the economic value of land is zero. Under this
assumption, the DRC coefficients of this study, presented in table 5-2b, seem to indicate
that the farming systems studies are all efficient. The results for rice nwd to be,
however, interpreted cautiously because the recent investment costs in the irrigation
schemes to rehabilitate several areas in the Office du Niger are treated as sunk costs.
Thanks in part to these investments (for which data are not available), the RETAIL
project in the Office du Niger has the highest on-farm yields and as such, its rice appears
competitive in Bamako and Sikasso when land is assigned a zero economic value.

The results of the DRC coefficients in table 5-2a and 5-2b appear to suggest that
the farming systems that generate the highest on-farming yields make the best use of
domestic resources. For example, the animal traction production system, which has
higher on-farm yields for cotton and coarse grains, generates lower DRC coefficients

than those of manual cultivation.

 

Region/production system Farm M0pti Niono Bamako Sikasso Border

Cotton

South/improved animal
traction

South/improved manual

 

Note: Office refers to the Office du Niger

Source: Appendix B

104

Table 5-2b. DRC coefficients for Mali Under a Zero Opportunity Cost of Land

   

  

 

    

Region/production system Farm Mopti Niono Bamako Sikasso Border

      
 
 

Cotton

  

Southlirnproved animal
' traction

  

South/improved manual

 

Rice

  
 

Officelirrigationlintensive

  
    

Officelirrigationl

   

Officelirrigationlnon-
. I .

    
  

M I'll IT 111 l'
Mopti/controlled flooding

 
   

Note: Office refers to the Office du Niger

Source: Appendix B

105

5.2 Direction of Trade Flows under Comparative Advantage and Actual Trade
Flows

5.2.1 Direction of Trade Flows as Suggested'by the DRC Coefficients

The DRC coefficients were computed for different points in Ccte d’Ivoire and
Mali. For any given market, if the DRC coefficient lies within the interval (0.90, l. 10),
we will assume that the result is too close to one to make a conclusive statement on the
competitiveness of the product. For any given market and commodity, if the DRC
coefficients of the two countries are greater than 1. 10 in a specific market, we may state
that the local commodity is noncompetitive in that market. In this case, neither country
should ship the product to the market, which should be supplied by the world market.
For a commodity and a specific market, if the DRC coefficient of one country is above
1.10 and that of the other country is lower than 0.90, the latter country will supply its
good to that market.

A difficulty may be encountered in using the DRC coefficients to determine the
direction of trade flows based on comparative advantage when the DRC coefficients of
the two countries are lower than 0.90 for a given commodity and a given market. In
principle, the country that has the lowest DRC coefficient should be the only supplier of
this market. However, given that comparative advantage is a matter of degree in this
case, the definition of comparative advantage is relaxed in this study. In this case, we
assume that the country with the lowest DRC coefficient will be the first supplier of the
market because it has the strongest comparative advantage, but that the product of the
other country may be supplied to this market if demand in this market is not fully met

by the first supplier. This implies that at the margin, contrary to the average values used

106
in the calculation of the DRC coefficients, the first country’s DRC coefficient for the

product is greater than unity.

Owing to the fact that data on demand conditions in each market are unavailable
and that cereals demand is met by imports and the demand for cotton can be expanded
in each country, we will assume further that the product of each country can be supplied
to the market, where the DRC coefficients are lower than 0.90.

In light of the results of the DRC coefficients displayed in table 5-3a under the
assumption that land is valued at its opportunity cost, it appears that Cbte d’lvoire and
Mali produce and market cotton efficiently in general. Even though the Ivorian cotton
appears to be more competitive than that of Mali in general, Mali could supply some of
its product to Bouaké, where COte d’Ivoire has installed a textile factory that uses the
second grade of cotton to satisfy the local demand. Mali could do so if the price offered
by Cbte d’Ivoirc would cover costs.

The DRC coefficients shown in table 5-3a and 5-3b seem to suggest that coarse
grain produced in COtc d’Ivoire is in general barely competitive in the production zones,
let alone being shipped to the major consumption markets of the two countries. It
appears, however, that maize produced in cats d’Ivoire under the semi-mechanized
farming system would be more competitive than maize produced in southern Mali not
only in the markets located in COte d’Ivoire but also in Sikasso and Bamako. Hence,
COte d’Ivoire seems to have the strongest comparative advantage in maize to supply
southern Mali and a comparative advantage in Mali to supply most Ivorian markets. In

turn, Mali appears to have a comparative advantage in milletl sorghum, which reaches its

107

. Tables-3a. CottenudeaDRCCoeffidmfihDiffuutMerkdsUaderePefidveOmrumtyCeuof
Land

 

Farm Bamako Sikasso Border Korhogo Bouekd Abidjan

Cdte d’lvoirelcotton

Cenerrtnproved annrel 0.59 0.61 0.65
‘ Northl'lnproved animal 0.61 0.63 0.66

traction

North/semi-mechanized 1.27 1.26 1.23

Melilcctton

Snrdrlinproved animal 0.70 0.74 0.74 0.72

traction

Snrtlrlinmroved mantel 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.82

Cdte d’lvoirelmslas

Mani-mechanized 0 60 0 90 0 70 0 85 l 24

cmnnpmvcd animal 0.96 1.25 0.37 1.20 0.72 1.30

unction

Cenerltraditioml nunsal 1.29 1.57 1.14 1.51 0.91 > 2

Caner/leprovedmanrel 1.32 1.66 1.14 1.59 1.13 > 2

Mali/meme

Snrthl'rrrprovedanimal 0.71 1.11 0.86 1.18 1.85 > 2

traction

Wed mantel 0.92 1.38 1.09 1.48 > 2 > 2

Source: Appendix B

 

108

 

 

rubles-3b. mmmmuaccmmmwmmumtwnom
Cost 0fLend
. Farm Bamako Sikasso Korhogo Bouek‘ Abidjan

Cdted’lvoirelmilletlsorghum I

. North/traditionalmanlal 0.96 1.32 1.10 1.23 154 > 2
North/enimaltraction 0.99 1.33 1.13 1.23 1.61 > 2
Mall/milletlsorghum

‘ Snrthlanirmltraction 0.43 0.32 0.61 0.34 1.33 > 2
Southltraditionalmanrel 0.63 0.96 0.76 0.99 1.42 > 2
Cdted’Ivoiaa/riee
Foreillowlandslinprovedmanral 1.11 1.63 137 1.76 > 2

‘ Foredluplendltnditionalmanrel 1.23 1.66 1.44 1.76 > 2
Forenluplandlinmrovedmanrel 1.27 1.94 157 > 2 > 2
North/irrigationlirwrovedmanral 1.31 1.99 1.59 1.93 > 2 > 2
North/uplandltraditionalnnnrel 1.39 1.34 1.81 1.79 > 2 > 2

North/uplandlenimaltraction >2 >2 >2 >2 >2 >2
Mali/rice
Office/irrigatiodinensive 0.74 1.11 1.10 1.61 > 2 > 2
Ochel'lrrigationlsemi-inensive 0.97 1.39 1.36 > 2 > 2 > 2
Oflce/irrigationlnon—inensive 1.21 1.69 1.65 > 2 > 2 < 0
Moptilcorlrolledflooding > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2

, Mopti/traditional flooding > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 < 0

 

Source: Appendix B

109
competitive limit somewhere between Korhogo and Bouake, owing probably to the high

transfer costs. Mali’s comparative advantage is, however, explained by the fact land was
assigned a zero economic value, while the opportunity cost of land in Cbte d’Ivoire was
positive. The results seem to suggest also that both countries should import rice to
satisfy nearly all their domestic markets.

The results of the DRC coefficients under the alternative assumption of a zero
opportunity cost of land, illustrated in table 5-4a and 5-4b, appear to suggest that the
level of trade between Cbte d’lvoire and Mali would be relatively important. In this
case, Cdte d’Ivoire would still hold its comparative advantage in maize and a greater
quantity of maize would be exported from Cbte d’Ivoire to southern Mali, as the
competitiveness of maize produced by the animal traction and traditional manual farming
systems would improve in this Malian region. Under this assumption, southern Mali
would also be able to export some maize produced under the animal traction technique
to northern COte d’Ivoire. Likewise, millet/sorghum produced in COte d’Ivoire under
the animal traction technique could also be shipped to southern Mali and Bamako. In .
contrast to coarse grain, it appears that local rice would remain non-traded between the A
two countries.

Cereals production and trade between COte d’lvoire and Mali are contingent on
rainfall levels. In poor rainfall years, Mali is generally cereals deficit and imports some i
from the neighboring countries and the world market. In this case, cereals can be treated
as import-substitute commodities, as done above. In years of abundant rainfall, such as

those since the mid-803, Mali exports some cereals to neighboring countries. In this

110

Tablas-4a. CottaudenaDRCCeefllcinrtshDifferdMark‘sUedcaZmoOppnrdyCestef
Land

 

Farm Bamako Sikasso Border Korhogo Bcuakd Abidjan I

 

Cdte d’lvoirelcotton
North/semi-mechenized 0.38 0.43 0.50
Northlinmroved animal 0.42 0.45 0.50
. traction
Cerrterlinmroved manual 0.54 0.57 0.61
Snrtlrlinproved animal 0.47 0.54 0.55 0.53
traction
Snsdrlinmroved manual 0.67 0.71 0.72 0.70
Cdte d’Ivoirelmeize
Fore‘lsemi-mechenized 0.35 0.62 0.48 0.58 0.85
Cemetrtmpmvcdtnimn 0.66 0.91 0.63 0.37 0.33 1.33
traction
Geller/traditional nunrel 0.81 1.00 0.76 1.00 0.97 1.40
Cesar/improved menial 1.05 1.36 0.94 1.30 1.27 1.96
Melilmaiza
Wrmprovedanimal 0.48 0.81 0.61 0.83 1.31 > 2
, traction
: Southlinmroved mantel 0.76 1.17 0.92 1.24 1.95 > 2

 

 

Source: Appendix B

 
  

111

   

 

   
   
   

 

Mild/sorghum andRiceDRC Coefficiutsin DifleruMerkdsUndereZNoOwortmlityCed
of Land

Farm Bamako Sikasso Korhogo Bouekd Abidjan

C0te d’Ivoire/millet/sorghum

Northlanimal traction 0.46 0.73 0.60 0.66 0.87 > 2

North/traditional manual 0.65 0.95 0.79 0.88 1.12 > 2

Melilmilletlsorghum
0.48 0.82 0.61 0.84 1.33 > 2
0.63 0.96 0.76 0.99 1.42 > 2
0.99 l .39 1 .20 l .47 l .76
0.99 1.37 1.35 1.32 1.52 > 2
1.05 1.56 1.31 1.68 > 2
1.15 1.79 1.46 1.96 > 2
1.31 1.99 1.59 1.93 > 2 > 2
1.64 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2
0.46 0.81 0.82 1.20 1.71 > 2
0.54 0.91 0.91 1.36 1.98 > 2
0.59 0.99 1.99 1.52 > 2 < 0
0.80 1.20 1.19 1.69 > 2 < 0
0.86 1.36 1.34 > 2 > 2 < 0

 

 

Source: Appendix B

112

case, the competitiveness of the Malian cereals as well as those of in COte d’Ivoire,
where rainfall level is relatively stable, can be measured by treating them as export
crops.

The results of the DRC coefficients in table 5-5, based on export parity prices and
much greater than two, seem to suggest that cereals produced in Cbte d’Ivoire and Mali j
cannot be exported outside of the region and that cereals can only be produced to
compete with imported cereals within the region. These results may be an indication that
absorbing cereals surpluses depends largely on expanding the regional cereals market.
Cereals demand may be increased by enhancing, for instance, its consumption in the
poultry and livestock subsectors. The issue is whether the benefits of using cereals as

animal feed will outweigh the costs.

5.2.2 Are Actual Trade Flows Consistent With Comparative Advantage?

This section is intended to assess whether the actual trade flows accord with trade
flows suggested by the DRC coefficients. The data on actual trade flows draw from the
INRA/IRAM/UNB work during the period 1987-92, as discussed earlier. To assess the
direction of trade flows, this team posted researchers, among other places, at the Mall-
Cbte d’Ivoire border in 1987/88 to have an eye on cereals traded between the two
countries. This is the reason why the INRA/IRAM/UNB’s results were relied upon to
give the direction of trade flows. Their findings were complemented by field
observations and interviews with traders, transporters and customs agents in C0te

d’Ivoire and Mali and at the COte d’Ivoire-Mali border.

_. 5. DR 3-111.131: I ~ ~ ~

Cdaad'lveiralelils
WM
wmw
War-ml
Warsaw
Malilnn'ne
Waninltnctien
Wand

Ch d'lWanrgh-n

Source: Appendix B

>2
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113

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>2
>2
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>2

 

114
Based upon the surveys, Coste (1989) found that maize was exported from COte

d’Ivoire to both Mali and Burkina Faso and that Mali exported millet and sorghum to its
neighboring countries such as COte d’Ivoire, Mauritania and Senegal. Coste did not,-
however, specify whether rice was shipped either from COte d’Ivoire to Mali or vice
versa. Nonetheless, he hypothesized that some rice may be shipped from production
zones in COte d’Ivoire to neighboring countries. I

Coste’s contention of the direction of the trade flows between COte d’Ivoire and
Mali, shown in figure 5-1, was continued by the interviews I conducted with traders,
truck drivers and customs agents in October and November 1991. These interviews took
place in the cities of Bouaké, Ferkessédougou, Korhogo and Sikasso and at the COte
d’lvoire-Mali border. They revealed that the bulk of maize exported by COte d’Ivoire
to Mali takes place in general during the period June-August, which corresponds to the
harvest period in Cate d’Ivoire and before maize matures in Mali. According to traders,
truck drivers and customs agents, millet/sorghum is usually shipped from Mali to COte
d’Ivoire afler the cotton harvest in Mali. Indeed, cotton production is believed to require
a lot of farmers’ time, and as the price received by farmers is a function of cotton
quality, farmers reserve much of their time to get the highest cotton quality. As such,
they have little time to devote to coarse grain marketing before the cotton harvest is over.
Even though millet/sorghum is generally shipped from Mali to COte d’Ivoire in most
cases, Cdte d’lvoire exports sometimes, according to the interviews, some
millet/ sorghum to Mali. These Ivorian exports take place in general during the years

when the rainfall level is low in Mali and Mali is cereal deficient. Such was the case in

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116
the drought period of the mid 803. Since that period, Mali has been a net exporter of

millet/sorghum to Cdte d’Ivoire, according to the results of the interviews.

The interviews reveal some evidence of rice flowing from COte d’Ivoire to Mali.
This rice is, however, not produced in COte d’lvoire. It is rather imported officially
from the international market by Malian traders, who hold an official Malian import
license that allows them to make their imports transit at the port of Abidjan, according
to treaties between the two countries. This may be the reason why Coste did not record
them as trade flows from COte d’Ivoire to Mali.

Cotton has so far been the object of very few regional studies. Most of these
studies focused on comparing costs of production. Only Barry et al. (1992) have
attempted to deal with issues of regional cotton trade. The findings in this study did not
give any indication of cotton trade between COte d’Ivoire and Mali, except that cotton
produced in southern Mali crosses the Ivorian border to be exported to the world market,
via the port of Abidjan. Thus, cotton appears to be a nontraded commodity between
these countries.

Based upon previous findings, interviews and observations in the field, it appears
that maize and millet/sorghum trade flows are in accordance with the theory of
comparative advantage when land is valued at its opportunity cost. The empirical
findings for rice also seem to be consistent with the results of the DRC coefficients, but ‘
those of cotton appear to be in contrast with the results predicted by the theory of
comparative advantage, as suggested by the DRC coefficients. Thus, a question arises

as to why cereals trade flows appear to be consistent with trade flows predicted by the

117
DRC coefficients, while actual cotton trade flows seem to contradict those predicted by

theory.

5.2.3 Why Are Actual Trade Flows Consistent or Inconsistent With Comparative
Advantage?

5.2.3.1 Coarse Grains

Maize trade flows appear to be in accordance with comparative advantage because
its prices are determined by supply and demand in the markets in both COte d’Ivoire and
Mali. Indeed, the period during which maize trade flows are large corresponds to the
harvest period in COte d’Ivoire and the hungry season in Mali. During that period,
maize prices are lowest in COte d’Ivoire and cereals prices witness their highest level in
Mali, owing to the shorter supply of cereals in Mali. As a result of the price
differentials between COte d’Ivoire and Mali, traders have the opportunity to make some
profits by shipping maize from COte d’Ivoire to Mali to fill the gap between the supply
of and demand for maize in Mali.

As with maize, the price of millet/sorghum is determined by market forces in both
countries. Since the drought of the mid 80s, Mali has exported millet/sorghum to COte
d’Ivoire because its national supply has been greater than its national demand and as
such, it has been able to yield surpluses. Owing to these surpluses, the domestic price
of this coarse grain has been relatively low. For instance, the average 1990 consumer
price for millet was about 85 CFAF/kg in Sikasso. Meanwhile, the average 1990
consumer price of millet in Korhogo, the largest millet producer of COte d’Ivoire and

adjacent to Sikasso, was nearly 135 CFAF/kg. This relatively high consumer price in

118
Korhogo may be attributed to the small amount of surpluses generated by the Ivorian

semi-subsistence farmers and the relatively high demand for millet! sorghum, for there
exists a large number of Sahelian migrants, who account for almost one-fifth of the
Ivorian population (Republique de COte d’lvoire, 1991). These migrants, in addition to
the indigenous population of northern COte d’Ivoire, consume a great deal of this coarse
grain. The price differential of 50 CFAF/kg between Sikasso and Korhogo provides an
incentive to traders to engage in cross-border trade to make some profits. This price
differential is, however, not entirely captured by traders, owing to the high transfer costs
between the two cities that result from the roadblocks erected by the police and customs

officials to make transporters pay “unofficial" fees.

5.2.3.2 Rice
The discussion above showed that the local rice should not be traded between
COte d’Ivoire and Mali because it is noncompetitive in most of the markets. These trade
‘ flows predicted by the DRC coefficients appear consistent with actual trade flows. This
lack of trade is even more reinforced by the current trade and food policies.

In COte d’Ivoire, rice has been one of the few food commodities, besides bread
and sugar, for which the government has fixed consumer prices in recent years. Because
rice is considered a wage good in the urban centers and a source of income for farmers,
the government has used some tools to control the rice subsector. Key among these were
the trade and fiscal policies undertaken to complement the production policies, aimed at

expanding domestic production of rice. Obviously, encouraging domestic production and

1 19
supplying rice to the powerful urban centers at affordable prices required the government

to formulate cautious trade and fiscal policies.

It is within this framework that CPSSPA was granted monopoly power to import
rice from the international market. Through this parastatal, the government could
monitor rice imports without jeopardizing the objective of expanding domestic supply.
This parastatal served as a instrument throughout most of the 703 to implement import
restrictions, which the government relied upon to keep domestic prices above import
prices.

Since the late ‘70s, COte d’Ivoire has relaxed its rice import restrictions and it
made little use of trade quotas, owing partly to the growing gap between domestic supply
and demand as a result of the increased urban population, which has a greater propensity
to consume rice. According to Reardon (1989) and Delgado (1989), one major factor '
that contributed to growing demand for rice vis-a-vis other staples in the urban areas is
the increasing women’s and workers’ opportunity cost of time in these areas.

To bridge the gap between the demand for and the domestic supply of rice, Cdte
d’Ivoire has resorted increasingly to rice imports, which soared from only 1,500 tons in
1975 to nearly 350,000 tons in 1989 (Republique de COte d’lvoire, 1991). The increase
in rice imports may also have been facilitated by the Asian green revolution that has
helped make Asia a reliable source of supply and lowered the cost of Asian rice, and the
overvalued CFA franc that has helped to make rice imports more inexpensive. With

such relatively low prices, the government can impose import duties and taxes on

120
imported rice and still be able to achieve its goal of providing the urban centers with rice
at affordable prices.

Since the early 803, import duties and taxes on rice have become a great source
of government income. While nearly 60 percent of the income generated by rice imports
are used to maintain rice prices uniform across the country at 147 CFAF/kg at the
wholesale level, the balance, estimated at nearly 3 billion CFAF in 1989 (over USS 10
million), is fed to the general fund of the government. With such an important source
of income for the government in the short run, it is obvious that the government will not
have the incentive to set up policies aimed at improving the competitiveness of the local
rice and expanding domestic production.

While COte d’Ivoire has shifted from import restrictions to opening its market to
imported rice from the international market, Mali has opted to protect national
production. Protection of national production, especially rice produced in the Office du
Niger, has taken the form of either banning imports of rice, or limiting imports to the
quantity needed to fill the gap between domestic supply and demand, or resorting to high
tariffs so as to drive the price of imported rice above that of local rice. Tariff rates were
estimated in 1990 at nearly 33 percent of the border price. Such high tariffs were
intended to compensate partly for an overvalued currency that favors rice imports.
Owing to these trade policies, official rice imports have been relatively low in Mali,
averaging about 41,000 tons during the period 1987-90 and causing domestic prices of
rice to be relatively high. The relatively low level of rice imports explains in part the

higher prices in Mali than in Cbte d’Ivoire. Even when the domestic production excwds

121

the domestic demand, the government bans exports in order to hold down domestic
prices, as rice is also considered an urban wage good. Rice exports to neighboring
countries are not possible with Mali’s current trade policies, which discourage rice
exports on the grounds that if exports are allowed, rice is likely to be in short supply.
As a result, rice exports are banned, though some of the local rice may be competitive
in some markets located across the border.

In summary, the prospects of the local rice trade hinge on reversing the current
policies. Key among these policies is monetary policy, which needs to be revised to put
the official exchange rate in line with the real exchange rate. Adjusting the overvalued
exchange rate may be the key to making local rice more competitive and expanding the
trade of local rice. Undertaking this trade policy alone may, however, lead to the wrong
direction of rice trade flows if it is not coupled with other adjustments, such as freeing
the government from fixing prices in the rice subsector. Yet, the governments still have
a major role to play in making local rice more competitive. A key role for the
government would be to put in place the rules and regulations, and the mechanism to

enforce them.

5.2.3.3 Cotton

It appeared above that COte d’Ivoire is in general a more efficient producer of
cotton than Mali, although cotton makes a good use of Mali’s resources.
Notwithstanding the efficiency in both countries, it appears that there are no trade flows

between them. Several factors converge to explain the lack of cotton trade between these

122

two countries. Key among these factors is the predominance of the two government
interventions in the cotton subsector. Indeed, cotton prices are fixed by each
government. At the current fixed prices, cotton should flow from Mali to Cbte d’lvoire,
in opposite direction of the two countries’ comparative advantage, as suggested by the
DRC coefficients. Farmgate prices are on average 105 CFAF/kg in COte d’Ivoire and
85 CFAF/kg in Mali. Even with this price differential of 20 CFAF/kg, cotton does not
flow from Mali to Cbte d’Ivoire. One may hypothesize that this price differential does
not cover transfer costs or other factors hinder cotton trade. In fact, producer prices are
much lower than the world price that is the opportunity cost for both countries. As such,
it is more profitable for each country to export cotton to the world market than to trade
with its neighboring country.

Cotton production and marketing in each country are organized around a
parastatal which is granted monopoly power to buy seed cotton from farmers. As such,
unofficial trade is illegal. Unofficial trade is made difficult because seed cotton is a
bulky commodity, which is hard to move without being noticed. Farmers have little
incentives to engage in unofficial trade because they depend on the credit provided by
the parastatal to buy inputs, which is repaid at harvest. In addition, they get extension
services from the parastatal that provides regional development services that are difficult
to obtain without the presence of the parastatal. These services include improving the
quality of roads in rural areas to help market other agricultural and non-agricultural

products and make these rural areas more accessible.

123
Another factor that causes cotton not to be traded between COte d’Ivoire and Mali

appears to be the very limited local demand for cotton, owing to a very low capacity for
the textile mills, which could potentially supply textiles to other West African countries.
The textile mills face such high production costs that it is difficult for them to compete
with textiles imported from the international market. Textile imports appear to be also
encouraged by the overvalued exchange rate mentioned above. As a result, the only
option available to COte d’Ivoire and Mali is to sell cotton fiber to the world market,
which provides foreign currency to finance development activities carried out by the

parastatal, as outlined by the legal contract between each government and CFDT.

5.3 Sensitivity Analyses

This section discusses the direction of trade flows, based on comparative
advantage, between COte d’Ivoire and Mali, and between them and the rest of the world,
under alternative scenarios and policies. Key among the policies that influence trade
flows are exchange rate policies and investment policies, geared toward not only
improving farming and processing technologies, but also reducing transfer costs between
markets. In addition, the opportunity cost of resources, including outputs and factors of
production such as labor, influence these countries’ comparative advantage. Sub-sections
5.3.1, 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 assess the individual effects of a change in the different policies
and faCtors on trade flows. The last sub-section attempts to make comparative advantage
dynamic by measuring the joint impact of multiple policy variables on the DRC

coefficients. All the results of the sensitivity analyses are shown in Appendix C.

124
5.3.1 Alternative Exchange Rate Policies and Comparative Advantage

The effects of macroeconomic policies, especially exchange rate policies, on the
agricultural sector were long ignored. It is not until the mid 70s that Schuh (1974)
demonstrated that the U.S. exchange rate policy tended to reduce the competitiveness and
level of U.S. agricultural exports, prices and incomes. Schuh’s seminal work opened a
whole new field of inquiry not only for U.S. agriculture, but also for agriculture in the
developing economies, where agriculture is generally the dominant sector. This
relationship A betweenexchange rate policies and agriculture has become a greater issue
irlthe wVii/est African Francophone countries since the late 803, owing to the Structural
Adjustment Programs brought about by the policy dialogue between these countries and
both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The Francophone countries, which belong to the West African Monetary Union
(WAMU), have undergone since the early 80s a deep economic crisis, characterized by,
among other things, balance of payment and budget deficits. Owing to these deficits,
these countries, in collaboration with the international donor community, launched in the
mid 803 a vast program to restructure their economies to bring about viable economic
growth. These countries have enacted all kinds of devices except varying the nominal
exchange rate to achieve their objectives. Within international institutions, such as the
World Bank, it is believed that the currency of these countries, the CFA franc, pegged
to the French franc since its inception in 1947, has been overvalued since the early 80s.

It has been argued in these organizations that the overvaluation has hurt these weak

economies by taxing the export sector, which has become increasingly noncompetitive.

125
This overvaluation, it has been argued, has tended to encourage imports at the expense

of exports and added further imbalances in these weak economies. As a result, a
devaluation of the CFA franc has been suggested to make nontradables, especially labor,
relatively less expensive and restore the competitiveness of the export sector.

The majority of the leaders in the WAMU countries, along with the French
government, which has guaranteed the conversion of the CFA franc, have, however,
vehemently expressed their opposition to devaluing the CFA franc on the grounds that
the costs of doing so will outweigh the benefits. They have argued that a devaluation of
the CFA franc will lead to capital flight from the WAMU countries and such,
investments in these countries will shrink further and will adversely affect the
employment opportunities of these countries. Another argument put forward by these
countries is that a devaluation of the CFA fianc may induce high inflation in these
countries, which have managed to keep inflation at a very low level. Inflation in these
countries, it was argued, may be contained only if import duties are adjusted downward
to compensate for the increased price induced by a devaluation. Lower levels of import
duties mean for the WAMU countries lower levels of government revenues and, thus,
difficulties for these countries to pay their civil servants.

As a result of this opposition, most studies undertaken to evaluate the degree of
overvaluation of this currency have been unpublished and kept secret. The rare
published and recent articles are those of Stryker et al. (1987), and Salinger and Stryker
( 1991), who found that the CFA franc was overvalued by nearly 50 percent for both COte

d’Ivoire and Mali between 1980 and 1989. This most recent estimate for Mali was,

126
however, challenged by several unpublished papers, which found that the currency of this

country was overvalued by only 20 percent in 1992. The estimate for COte d’Ivoire in
the same unpublished article was nonetheless close to that found by Salinger and Stryker.
Another unpublished paper, without specifying its method of estimation, found the
overvaluation of the Ivorian currency to be close to 40 percent in 1990. Clearly,
estimates of the degree of overvaluation of the CFA franc vary from study to study,
owing to the differences in the data and methods used. Obviously, these different
estimates are likely to affect the assessment of these countries’ comparative advantage.

In light of these different estimates of the degree of overvaluation of the CFA
franc, the present study adheres to the idea that the CFA franc has been overvalued.
Nevertheless, it is not aimed at focusing on finding the best point estimate of the degree
of overvaluation. Rather, the study uses various estimates and shows how different
levels of overvaluation and a corresponding common nominal devaluation of the CFA
franc in the WAMU countries would affect the comparative advantage and direction of
trade flows between not only Cbte d’lvoire and Mali, but also between these countries
and the rest of the world. This study will assess, for instance, the impact of the present
official exchange rate on the competitiveness of Ivorian and Malian agricultural products.
In addition, it will measure the impact of a 50 and 100 percent common devaluation on
the competitiveness of these products, assuming that the level of the devaluation is the
same for the two countries. The results of these impacts are illustrated from table C5-la

to C5-3b of Appendix C.

127
At the official exchange rate of 275 CFAF/S, cotton produced and marketed by

COte d’Ivoire and Mali appears to be at best barely competitive, as suggested by the
DRC coefficients in table C5-1a in which land is valued at its opportunity cost. The
improved manual cotton, which accounts for the bulk of Ivorian cotton, appears to be
more competitive than cotton produced in Mali. In contrast to these results, the DRC
coefficients, under the scenario that land has a zero economic value, seem to suggest that
cotton would still be a competitive commodity in general for both countries.

Cereals, including coarse grain and rice, appear in general noncompetitive in most
markets at the official exchange rate when land is valued at its opportunity cost. At this
exchange rate and a zero economic value of land, Cbte d’Ivoire would competitively
supply its semi-mechanized maize to all markets, except to southern COte d’Ivoire, owing
probably to the high transfer costs. Other cereals of both countries appear at best
competitive only in the production zones. These results seem to confirm the reason why
COte d’Ivoire relies heavily on imported rice to satisfy a large share of its domestic
market and Mali resorts to protective measures to sell its rice in the domestic market.

Instead of the official exchange rate, if both COte d’Ivoire and Mali undertook a
50 percent nominal devaluation, cotton would generally become even more competitive.
At this new exchange rate and a positive opportunity cost of land, the semi-mechanized
cotton of COte d’Ivoire would still be noncompetitive in all the markets. Likewise, the
Malian millet/sorghum would be noncompetitive in central COte d’Ivoire, even if the
CFA franc was devalued by as much as 100 percent and the opportunity cost of land was

zero. Notwithstanding the benefits from devaluing the currency, the monetary policy

128

may need to be complemented by other macroeconomic policies and sector tools aimed

at reducing the overall unit cost of agricultural commodities.

5.3.2 Comparative Advantage and Trade Flows Under Alternative Opportunity
Costs of Resources

5.3.2.1 Effect of Different Labor Opportunity Costs

In most developing countries, especially in West Africa, labor accounts for the
bulk of on-farm production costs, for agriculture is generally labor-intensive. As such,
the opportunity cost of labor is a critical element in determining the comparative
advantage of these countries. Showing the importance of labor opportunity cost, Delgado
(1990) concluded that the major driving force of the comparative advantage of Senegal,
Mali and Burkina Faso during the 803 was the opportunity cost of labor, which appears
to be highly correlated with the unstable coarse grain production. The agricultural wage
rate appears to have decreased in Cdte d’Ivoire during the 80s because it is associated
with the domestic coffee and cocoa prices received by farmers. During the 80s, the
farmgate prices of these commodities were lowered as a result of the fall in world prices.

Because the opportunity cost of labor appears unstable in both COte d’Ivoire and
Mali, a sensitivity analysis is performed to evaluate the impact of different levels of labor
opportunity cost on the comparative advantage of Cbte d’Ivoire and Mali and predict the
direction of trade flows. Even though different levels of the opportunity cost were used,
as shown from table C5-4a to table CS-Sb in Appendix C, the discussion of the results

will focus on the impact of a wage rate close to 500 CFAF/day on the DRC coefficients.

129

Meanwhile, the daily wage rate assumed in the forest region of Cbte d’Ivoire is 750
CFAF.

The results of the sensitivity analysis seem to indicate that if the daily wage was
in reality 500 CFAF/day in most production zones of COte d’Ivoire and Mali instead of
the 700 CFAF/day assumed above, cotton and cereals would be, as expected, more
competitive in all markets. Despite this improvement in the competitiveness of the
commodities, most cereals would be competitive at best in the production zones if land
was valued at its opportunity cost. Even if the daily wage rate was 350 CFAF, most
cereals would still be noncompetitive in general from central COte d’Ivoire to southern
COte d’lvoire. It appears that the manual cultivation techniques are in general more
sensitive to the change in labor opportunity costs than other farming systems because of
their relatively high labor requirements. For instance, maize produced under the
traditional manual cultivation is more sensitive to the change in the wage rate than that
produced under the animal traction farming system. This sensitivity is measured by the
percentage change in the DRC coefficients.

In contrast to the case where land is valued at its opportunity cost, most maize
produced in COte d’Ivoire would be supplied efficiently to most Malian markets in this
scenario if land was assigned a zero opportunity cost. Under this scenario, this Ivorian
maize, which would become competitive in general in central COte d’Ivoire, would still
remain noncompetitive in the coastal markets. The bulk of the Ivorian maize would
become competitive in these coastal markets only if the return to labor was at most 350

CFAF/day.

130
At the daily wage rate of 500 CFAF, the Malian coarse grain seems to reach its

competitive limit between northern and central COte d’lvoire. Meanwhile, the Malian
rice produced in the Office du Niger, which would generally be competitive within Mali
when the economic value of land is zero, would still be noncompetitive in northern COte
d’Ivoire, owing probably to high transfer costs between the Office du Niger and Gate

d’Ivoire.

5.3.2.2 Alternative Economic Values of Land and Comparative Advantage

The economic value of land calculated above may be considered as the upper limit
of the true opportunity cost of land. As such, half of the value of the opportunity cost
of land is arbitrarily chosen to assess its impact on the DRC coefficients. The results of
this sensitivity analysis, exhibited in table C5-6a and C5-6b in Appendix C, suggest that
the bulk of maize produced in COte d’Ivoire would be marginally competitive in southern
Mali if other factors are held constant. Meanwhile, this maize and other cereals would

still be socially unprofitable in central and southern COte d’Ivoire.

5.3.2.3 Output Prices and Comparative Advantage

The world market price of a commodity helps serve as a guide to determining a
country’s comparative advantage, for this price may be considered as the country’s
opportunity cost. For instance, a country producing a good that is sometime in short
supply may decide to import more of the good and allocate its resources to other

activities if the world price of the good is relatively low. In this case, the local good is

131

said to be noncompetitive. Conversely, if the international price is higher than the local
cost; the country may want to encourage local production and save its foreign exchange
to finance its economic and social development.

Though prices in the world market may be a guide to a country’s comparative
advantage, they are often too unstable to guide policy makers. For instance, the world
market of cotton and cereals witnessed unstable prices during the period 1980-90. Cotton
and cereals prices were generally higher in the early part of the 80s, declined in the mid
808 and started rising in the late 803. This variability in world prices may be an
indication that the competitiveness of West African agricultural products fluctuated
between 1980 and 1990.

As a result of the instability in international prices, a sensitivity analysis is
performed to attempt to evaluate the impact of world output prices on the comparative
advantage of COte d’Ivoire and Mali. The sensitivity analyses use the highest and lowest
prices observed during the period 1980-90, the average prices of this period, and the
projected world prices for the year 2000 to predict what COte d’Ivoire’s and Mali’s
comparative advantage would be under these scenarios. The projected world prices of
cotton, maize, sorghum and rice for that year are 2400 USS/ton, 164 USS/ton, 155
USS/ton, 389 USS/ton, respectively (World Bank, 1993). The results of the sensitivity
analyses, shown in table C5-7a and table C5-7b in Appendix C, report only the case of
the projected world prices.

These results seem to suggest that, if other variables are maintained constant,

cotton, maize, millet! sorghum and rice produced in both Cbte d’Ivoire and Mali were

132

less competitive in the mid 803, when commodity prices were at their lowest level, than
in the early 80s. This may explain why COte d’lvoire resorted to large quantities of rice
imports in the mid 803 to fill the gap between its increasing demand and domestic
production.

Generally speaking, cotton and rice were on average less competitive during the
period 1980-90 than in 1990. In contrast, maize was more competitive in 1980-90 than
in 1990. However, it appears that the competitiveness of all the commodities will be
better in the year 2000 than during the 803 if other factors remain constant and if

commodity prices follow the World Bank’s projections.

5.3.3 Comparative Advantage Under Alternative Investment Policies

Traditional theory of international trade has mainly focused on static production
issues without recognizing that the objective of most development policies is to alter a
country’s comparative advantage in different time periods. Such a vacuum in the
traditional theory was filled in part by the new approach to trade theory led by Krugman
(1986), who, contrary to the conventional approach, views the government as a major
active player in altering the comparative advantage of a country. Based upon this new
approach, this section attempts to evaluate the impact of different investment scenarios
on the competitiveness of the Ivorian and Malian agricultural products in different

markets.

133
5.3.3.1 Farm Level Technology and Comparative Advantage

Technological change represents one of the major driving forces in altering a
country’s comparative advantage. Notwithstanding the private sector as a key player in
technological changes, a key role of the government is to create the appropriate
institutions that can diffuse existing technologies and improve them. In addition, the
government can make new techniques accessible to farmers and induce these farmers to
make the most efficient use of these techniques. As such, one of the challenges facing
West African policy makers is to mobilize resources and invest them in research in order
to improve and adapt farming systems to the local environment. This challenge has
become even bigger in recent years, owing to the fact that the government has fewer
resources now than in the past, while the demand on these limited resources is increasing
at a fast pace.

The role of government in investing in human capital and creating the appropriate
networks and institutions that will enable the improvement of current farming practices
is particularly important for COte d’Ivoire and Mali, where agriculture productivity is in
general low, while one of the roles of agriculture is to generate surpluses and provide
food to workers at an affordable price. Fulfilling this role may be difficult, especially
if agricultural production relies mainly on volatile rainfall patterns, which make
production more uncertain.

‘ Yields have been unstable in Mali, in contrast to those of COte d’Ivoire, during

the period 1980-90, as shown in figure 5-2. This instability in yields is captured by the

1800

1600

1400

1200

200'

 

134

Figure 5-2. Evolution of On-Farm Yields in Mali (1980-1990)

 

 

L i l L l 1 i i i
I I I I I I I I I

l
r
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Year

 

+Cotton +Maize —’—Millet +Paddy

 

 

 

Source: OSCE

135
relatively high coefficients of variation‘ that range from 17 to 40 percent, calculated

from the yield data provided by the Office Statistique des Communautés Européennes
(1989). Among the products, cotton appears to have the least variable yields. In
contrast, maize yields seem to be the most variable, owing to several reasons. Shortly
before the mid 803, maize yields increased substantially as a result of the significant
increase in the rate of technology adoption in the CMDT region after the launch of an
integrated approach to technology delivery, coupled with an attractive guaranteed market
price. In addition, the mid 803 was a period of relatively high rainfall, to which maize
production is very sensitive. However, the marketing services and the guaranteed market
price were withdrawn in 1986, which led farmers to adopt the more traditional farming
systems, based on a shifl from pure stand to maize-millet intercropping in order to
insulate themselves from the market uncertainties (Boughton and de Frahan, 1992).
Intercropping is the predominant way of growing maize in southern Mali and its yields
are much lower than those of the pure stands used in this study.

Although data on annual average yields for the different crops exist, information
on the evolution of yields for different farming systems is not available. Information is
also unavailable on the share of the different farming systems in the annual production
of crops. As a result, it is difficult to make inferences about how the yields of the
different farming techniques behaved in the past. Owing to this lack of information, this

study attempts to assess the impact of different levels of yields on the competitiveness

 

‘/ The coefficient of variation, which measures the degree of stability of a parameter,
is the ratio between its standard deviation and its mean. Thus, it measures the variation
as a percentage of the mean.

136

of each crop. First, the effects of lower on-farm yields on this competitiveness are
measured. These yields are assumed to be 25 and 50 percent lower than those used
originally. Then, anticipating the positive impact of increased investments in agricultural
research and extension on on-farm yields, the study tries to assess how the
competitiveness of Ivorian and Malian commodities would respond to increased yields,
which are assumed to be 25 and 50 percent higher than those used in the base run. The
results of the sensitivity analyses, reported from table C5-8a to table C5-9b in Appendix
C, are for the two cases where on-farm yields increased by 25 and 50 percent.

In principle, a change in the level of yields induces a change in the use of labor
inputs, since the amount of labor allocated to harvesting changes. The change in labor
inputs as a result of a change in yields is not accounted for in the results discussed below
because the labor requirements for the different farming systems were not always
decomposed in different tasks. As such, one should be cautious in interpreting the
change of the DRC coefficients because they should not have fallen as much as indicated
when on-farm yields increased. Conversely, they should not have increased as much as
they did with lower yields.

Assuming that other factors are maintained constant, the results of the sensitivity
analysis suggest that if land was valued at its opportunity cost and on-farm yields were
25 percent lower than those assumed originally, the bulk of cotton produced in COte
d’Ivoire would still be socially profitable, while the Malian cotton would no longer be
an efficient earner of foreign exchange. At these lower yields, it appears that both COte

d’lvoire and Mali would resort to cereals imports to supply nearly all their domestic

137
markets because of the high production costs. Such results appear to also hold for

cereals when land is assigned a zero economic value. Thus, stabilizing yields at current
levels seems important for the competitiveness of cereals. It appears that the high
yielding techniques are more sensitive to the decrease in yields than the traditional
farming systems. Even more important than stabilization in these countries is to invest
in agricultural research and extension to enhance yield levels for both cotton and cereals.
An expansion of current yields appears to improve the competitive position of the
agricultural commodities, as suggested by the results of the sensitivity analysis. For
instance, if on-farm yields increased by 50 percent, most of the maize produced in COte
d’Ivoire would be competitive in southern Mali and some of it could be supplied
efficiently to the Bamako market even if land was valued at its opportunity cost.
Despite the improvement in the competitive position of the commodities, it
appears that rice would not be traded across countries because it would remain
noncompetitive under the assumption that land is valued at its economic cost. Even when
land is not valued, Malian rice, which is produced more efficiently than Ivorian rice,
would be at best marginally competitive in northern Cbte d’Ivoire. These results for rice
suggest that it will continue to be imported at current world prices unless several actions
are combined with research and extension in the rice subsector. One such action is to

improve the processing technologies.

138
5.3.3.2 Effect of Improving Processing Technologies on Comparative Advantage

Processing technologies are one of the critical elements that have a bearing on the
competitiveness of a processed agricultural product, for they determine the unit cost at
the consumer level through the conversion of the unprocessed commodity to the final
product. The unit cost of a processed product tends to be lower if the processing
conversion ratio is higher.

It was argued in a previous section, which described the marketing of the
agricultural products, that while the cotton ginning ratio in COte d’Ivoire was nearly 45
percent, that of Mali was less than 43 percent. This relatively higher ginning ratio in
COte d’Ivoire may be one of the factors that contributed to making cotton produced in
C6te d’Ivoire more competitive than that produced in southern Mali.

Reported in table C5-10a of Appendix C, the DRC coefficients seem to suggest
that if Mali’s ginning ratio improved to that of Cbte d’Ivoire as a result of increased
investments in processing techniques, Malian cotton would still be less competitive than
that of COte d’Ivoire in the Bouaké region. Cotton produced in both countries would be
relatively more competitive if the ginning ratio improved to nearly 50 percent.

The competitiveness of rice produced in COte d’Ivoire was evaluated with a 55
percent milling ratio, while that of Mali relied on a 63 percent conversion factor. The
relatively low milling ratio observed in cote d’Ivoire was mainly attributed to the use of
hullers, not well suited to process paddy into rice. The government may help to boost
this milling ratio by giving incentives to private agents to import small hullers, as was

done in Mali in 1987.

a;

80‘

139
If land was valued at its opportunity cost, improving the rice milling ratio in C6te

d’Ivoire from 55 to 63 percent would still leave the Ivorian rice noncompetitive in nearly
all consumption markets. Improving further the milling ratio to 67 percent appears to
make some of the Ivorian rice marginally competitive only in the production zones even
if land is assigned a zero opportunity cost. Doing so for the Malian rice produced in the
Office du Niger would expand the competitiveness of this rice to southern Mali without
reaching northern COte d’Ivoire in the case where land is not valued at its Opportunity
cost. The relatively high transfer costs may be the cause of the noncompetitive position

of the’Malian rice in northern COte d’Ivoire.

5.3.3.3 Effect of Reduced Transport Costs on Trade Flows

Notwithstanding the great effort made to improve their physical infrastructure, the
West African countries are generally equipped with poorly developed physical
infrastructure. The transport infrastructure is even more deficient in rural areas, where
the roads are often poorly maintained. As a result, transport rates are high. Several
studies, covering different countries, have shown that transport costs account for over
half of the transfer costs from the production regions to the consumption markets
(Camara, 1992; Gaye, 1992; Savadogo et al., 1992; Gabre-Madhin, 1992; Gabre-Madhin
and Maiga, 1990; Inrets-Let, 1989 a and b; Newman et al., 1988). These high transport
costs Stem from several factors. A major contributing factor to the high transport cost
appears to be the high level of import and custom duties levied on trucks to raise

government revenues. Inrets-Let (1989) estimated that these duties are as high as 60

_zpa-I-r"‘

140
percent of the book value of trucks. Although the import and customs duties are aimed

at reducing the outflow of foreign exchange, they unintentionally serve as barriers to
entry in the transport sector and shift the supply of transport services inward. As a
result, upward pressure is put on the cost of transport services. Another cause of the
high transport costs seems to be the roadblocks by customs officials and police officers
to impose illegal fees on transporters. Inrets-Let (1989) estimated that the illegal fees
per vehicle were about 20,000 CFAF on average between Bouake and Abidjan. Such
fees were as much as 100,000 CFAF between Daloa and Bamako. Obviously, these fees
are passed onto transport service users as part of the transport cost.

Transportation policies, aimed at reducing transfer costs between markets, could
lower the price of agricultural commodities at the consumer level. The impact of low
transfer costs on the competitiveness of local agricultural products is not, however,
determinate because commodities imported from the world market may also be positively
affected by the lower transport costs. Owing to the uncertainty, a sensitivity analysis is
performed to assess the impact of lower transport costs on the competitiveness of local
agricultural commodities. It is assumed in the sensitivity analysis that the current
transport costs are halved in both COte d’Ivoire and Mali. The results of this sensitivity
analysis are shown in table C5-l 1a and table C5-11b in Appendix C.

The results of the DRC coefficients seem to suggest that the impact of the reduced
transpOrt costs on the competitiveness of local commodities would depend on the location
of the supply and consumption markets and the distance between the two markets. For

instance, local cereals produced and consumed inland, especially between the center of

141

Cdte d’Ivoire and the Malian markets, would be less competitive in general when
transport costs are halved because cereals imported from the international market gain
in competitiveness, owing to the fact that the latter cereals are shipped inland and the
distance between the port and the consumption centers is long. In this case, the DRC
coefficients in northern COte d’Ivoire and southern Mali become higher and reduce the
prospect for increased cereals trade based on comparative advantage.

In contrast, if the local cereals are generally shipped southward, let us say
between central Cbte d’Ivoire and the coastal markets, the DRC coefficients of these
cereals decrease. Despite this improvement in competitiveness, the Ivorian rice and the
Malian cereals appear to have in general a competitive disadvantage in these markets.
This may suggest that the reduction in transport rate alone is not enough to induce the
local cereals to be competitive in these markets. A combination of factors may help to

improve the competitiveness of these cereals.

5.3.4 A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Advantage and Trade Flows

One of the objections formulated against the method of domestic resource cost is
that it is a static measure of comparative advantage, while the aim of development
policies is to alter the comparative advantage of a country over time. Such a criticism
has prompted policy analysts to perform sensitivity analyses, which have mainly focused
on the effect of individual policy variables on comparative advantage.

Although one policy instrument may sometimes achieve a policy objective, the use

of one policy variable is quite often less likely to succeed than using several policy

142

instruments, especially with regard to competitiveness. This was shown in the sensitivity
analyses performed above. For example, the use of alternative investment policies alone,
aimed at reducing transport costs between the production zones and the coastal markets,
failed to give the competitive edge to the local cereals in the coastal markets. Nor did
the monetary policy instrument alone succeed to achieve this goal, unless the government
undertook a strong devaluation, which may lead to social unrest that could challenge and
reverse this action of the government.

Using several policy variables jointly may make local cereals competitive in the
coastal markets. The government may for instance use a much lighter nominal
devaluation and complement it with actions intended to lower transport costs between the
production zones and the coast. For example, measures to reduce roadblocks, an
impediment to the movement of agricultural commodities, may be taken. Import duties
on trucks may be lowered to reduce barriers to entry into the transport sector, induce
more competition in this sector and exercise a downward pressure on transport rate. In
the short run, one may not see a quick fall in transport costs. They may however be
lowered in the long run and the objective may be achieved.

In light of this example, several sensitivity analyses are performed to evaluate
how the competitiveness of the agricultural commodities may respond to the use of
several alternative policies or factors. In other words, the sensitivity analyses attempt
to assess how the DRC coefficients react to a change in more than one policy. The
results of these sensitivity analyses are reported from table C5-12a to C5-17b in

Appendix C.

143

The results of the sensitivity analysis suggest that if the economic value of land
were in reality half of its value assumed originally, if the opportunity cost of labor was
500 CFAF/day instead of 700 CFAF/day in the two countries, and both countries
undertook a 50 percent devaluation, coarse grain produced in Cbte d’Ivoire and Mali
would be much more competitive. It appears, however, that most the coarse grain
produced in both countries would remain noncompetitive from central COte d’Ivoire to
the coastal markets. Coarse grain and rice would still not be competitive in general in
these markets if transport costs were halved in both countries. In general, they would
be, however, competitive in central C6te d’Ivoire at the projected world prices, which
are higher than current prices. It appears that COte d’Ivoire would have a comparative
advantage in rice in central Cbte d’Ivoire if, in addition to the scenario described above,
the milling ratio improved to 67 percent. Under this last scenario, its rice produced in
the forest region would be marginally competitive in the coastal markets. This forest rice
would gain the comparative advantage in the coastal market only if, in addition to the
scenario described above, on-farm yields increased by 25 percent. Such an increase in
on-farm yields would still leave the rice produced in northern COte d’lvoire and Mali
noncompetitive in the coastal markets. The Malian rice would be competitive at best in
central COte d’Ivoire. In contrast to rice, the Malian coarse grain would generally be
competitive in nearly all Ivorian markets, while COte d’Ivoire would not be able to

supply its millet/sorghum to its coastal markets.

 

144
5.4 Summary

The results of the base run DRC coefficients suggested that there was scope for
wtton trade between COte d’lvoire and Mali but that the empirical observations indicated
that did not take place between these countries because export to the world market was
more profitable than regional trade. In addition, the prospects for enhancing regional
trade was hampered by the relatively low local demand for cotton and the monopoly
power granted to cotton parastatals.

In contrast, maize and millet/sorghum trade flows between COte d’Ivoire and Mali
seem to be in accord with these countries’ comparative advantage because the price of
coarse grain is determined in a competitive market. The lack of local rice trade between
the two countries seems to be also consistent with those predicted by the DRC
coefficients under the assumption that the economic value of land is zero. Under current
food policies in COte d’Ivoire where the government considers rice as a wage good for
the powerful urban centers, trade flows of the local rice would be in the wrong direction
even if the local rice became competitive in C6te d’Ivoire.

Trade flows, as predicted by comparative advantage, between COte d’lvoire and
Mali, and between them and the rest of the world, were analyzed under alternative
scenarios. The results of the different scenarios, which included lower opportunity costs
of labor, a lower economic value of land, alternative investments and policies aimed at
increasing productivity and reducing transfer costs, and alternative exchange rate policies,

suggested that making local cereals competitive in the coastal markets would be a

difficult task because the individual policies would have little impact on the

145

competitiveness of these cereals. The strongest impact of this competitiveness would be
obtained by acting simultaneously on several policy variables.

The results of the DRC analysis suggested also that the prospects for increasing
intraregional trade appear much greater for coarse grain than rice, owing to the fact that
the former set of cereals seems to be more competitive in general than the latter. Despite
this fact, coarse grain is generally handicapped in the coastal markets because of not only
high transfer costs between the production zones and these markets, but also the low
prices in the world market. Such prices are even lower for COte d’Ivoire and Mali

because of their overvalued currency, which favors imports at the expense of exports.

CHAPTERVI

FARM LEVEL INCENTIVES

This chapter attempts to assess whether farmers can produce agricultural surpluses
that can be marketed to foster intraregional trade. Doing so would require knowledge
of the relationship between prices and quantities produced to estimate farmers’ supply
response. Owing to the lack of data, this study will discuss whether farmers have the
incentives to yield tradable agricultural surpluses. These incentives are measured by the
returns to family labor, which accounts for the bulk of production costs at the farm level,
and the protection coefficients. Both measures of farmers’ incentives are analyzed under
alternative scenarios.

Before discussing the returns to family labor, the financial profitability per unit
of output, defined as the difference between the market price of the output and the
market value of the inputs used to produce one unit of the output, is estimated for each
product. This profitability is analyzed from two angles. First, it is computed by using
only the purchased inputs, which include equipment, fertilizers, pesticides, etc. In this
case, family labor is not valued. Second, it is estimated by imputing the market wage
rate to family labor, in addition to all purchased inputs (fertilizers, pesticides,
equipment), to assess the impact of valuing family labor on the profitability of the

enterprise.

146

147

6.1 Incentives to Cotton Farmers

The cotton subsector has been considered by most analysts as one of the success
stories of the agricultural sector in West Africa. A critical question then becomes to
what extent farmers’ financial profitability contributed to this success and will help to
maintain cotton production as one of the major agricultural activities in West Afiica.

The results of the financial profitability based on unpaid family labor, reported
in table 6-la, suggest that the financial profitability of the Ivorian and Malian cotton
farmers is about 50 CFAF/kg and 40 CFAF/kg of md cotton, respectively. These
profits appear high because farmers resort to very few purchased inputs and rely mainly
on family labor for cotton production, which is labor-intensive. As such, the returns to
household labor will be a better indicator of farmers’ incentives.

The returns to family labor range from about 500 CFAF/day to nearly 1000
CFAF/day in COte d’Ivoire and from about 650 CFAF/day to nearly 900 CFAF/day in
Mali, according to the results in table 6—lb. These returns are an indication that the
Ivorian farmers, who rely on improved manual cultivation and supply the bulk of cotton,
would face financial losses if the household labor was valued at the market wage rate,
estimated at nearly 700 CFAF/day. Meanwhile, manual farmers in Mali and the Ivorian
farmers, who depend on animal traction technique, would nearly break-even at the on-
going daily wage rate. In contrast, the Malian farmers, who use animal traction, and the
semi-mechanized farmers of COte d’Ivoire would make positive financial profits at the

daily wage rate assumed above.

TablaG-la. CoconandMaiufinancialProfitabflityandetaefionCoMatthaFamIAvd

 

   
 

Output Financial
Regionlproduction system Yields Price Profit NPC NNPC NEPC

     
      
 

cram. cram;

 
    
 

Cdte d’lvoire/cottcn
Noah/rammed animal traction
Ceder/inproved manual

  
   

Note: 1/ NPC stands for nominal protection coefficient
2/ NNPC refers to net nominal protection coefficient
3/ NEPC is net effective protection coefficient

Source: Appendix B

149

TablaG-lb. RstnrnstoIIonseholdLahorfr-olnl’rodncingCottoaandMaise

Region/production system Yields Labor Returns NPC NNPC NEPC
Kg/ha Day/ha CFAF/day

cot. d’lvoira/cotton
Warmer traction 1300 98 145 0.61 0.43 an
WW marasal 1100 120 505 0.61 0.40 an
saunas-mechanized 1500 10 1025 0.61 0.43 0.41
Mali/cotton

WW arn'mal traction lsoo 151 905 059 0.44 0.31
erovedmamal l200 122 650 0.59 0.44 031
cat. d’lvoiralrnaizs

Comer/traditional mental 100 10 325 0.56 0.40 039
Wain! traction 2000 9a 315 0.56 0.40 032
emrtmpmumar 1500 m 150 0.56 0.40 oar
Weed-mechanized 4000 33 550 0.56 0.42 0.26
Mali/mans

Wmmedanimal traction 2000 99 300 0.40 0.36 0.21
scrub/improved mama! mm 143 160 0.4a 0.36 0.21 .

Note: 1/ NPC stands for nominal protection coefficient
2/ NNPC refers to net nominal protection coefficient
3/ NEPC is net effective protection coefficient

Source: Appendix B

150
The bulk of cotton produced in both countries appears to yield negative financial

profitability when family labor is valued at the market wage rate because the price
received by farmers is relatively low. Indeed, the results of the nominal protection
coefficients (NPC) suggest that the farmgate price of cotton, fixed by the government at
nearly 105 CFAF/kg in COte d’Ivoire and 85 CFAF/kg in Mali, is at best two—thirds of
the border price adjusted to the farm level. This may be an indication that cotton
farmers are implicitly taxed by the government. Taldng into account the overvaluation
of the CFA franc, the net nominal protection coefficients (NNPC) suggests that farmers
are taxed by over 50 percent in both countries. If the import duties and indirect taxes
on farm inputs are further accounted for, farmers seem to be highly taxed in the two

countries, according to the net effective protection coefficients (NEPC).

6.2 Incentives to Coarse Grain Farmers

Maize farmers in both COte d’Ivoire and Mali appear to make positive financial
profits when household labor is not accounted for in the production costs. Although the
semi-mechanized technique of COte d’Ivoire appears to be the most economically
profitable farnring system, it yields the lowest financial profitability, owing to the high
costs of mechanized agricultural equipment, which is in general imported, and taxed
heavily. Despite this fact, household labor for this technique appears to earn the highest
returns because this farming system is not labor-intensive. Notwithstanding the relatively
high returns to family labor, household labor seems to earn less than the market wage

rate, which is at least twice as high as the returns to family labor for the other farming

151

systems of both countries. The low return to family labor may be due to the relatively
low maize price in both countries, as suggested by the protection coefficients. Maize
farmers appear to earn less than 50 percent of the import parity adjusted to the farm.
The issue is, thus, why maize market prices are so low in both Cbte d’Ivoire and Mali.

One of the factors contributing to these low prices is the thinness of the maize
market resulting from the relatively low supply of and demand for maize during most of
the year (Barry, 1989). Probably, expanding the demand for maize through its increased
use in the livestock and poultry industries would help maize prices to be higher and
expand farmers’ financial profitability.

The financial profitability seems to be, according to the results in table 6—2a,
relatively high for millet/sOrghum produced in Cbte d’lvoire and Mali, owing to higher
prices and the little use of purchased inputs. It appears from the results in table 6-2b that
this coarse grain reward household labor at a level higher than the daily wage rate in
northern COte d’Ivoire. In contrast, the returns to family labor in Mali seem to be lower
than the wage rate earned by daily hired workers, owing to the fact that the farming
systems are relatively labor-intensive and that millet! sorghum prices are much lower than

the import parity price adjusted to the farm.

6.3 Incentives to Paddy Farmers
' Paddy production appears to be also financially profitable in both COte d’Ivoire
and Mali. Even though the price fixed by the government is lower in COte d’Ivoire than

in Mali, the financial profitability seems to be generally higher in C6te d’Ivoire than in

152

iTahIa6-2a. Wmnhmand’addyfhandflhomyandmcwddsdtbfar-m
out. F'nanc'nl

Region/productionsy‘eln Yields Price neat NPC NNPC NEPC
Kg/ha cram. cram.

; Cdtad'Ivoisa/milletlsorghrnn
NW“ 600 60 70 1.04 0.74 0.74
1 Nat/millennia- 800 80 65 1.04 0.74 0.74
Kalil-Meaghan
1 Wm! 600 60 50 0.65 0.49 0.46
Within-aloe too 60 35 0.65 0.49 0.42
C6. d'ivoira
Paradigm/tradition!“ 1300 60 55 1 11 0.80 0 60
NMWW 900 60 50 1.07 0.76 1.23
NWWm-I-l 4000 60 50 1.07 0.76 1.06
l WWII-III 3500 60 40 1.11 0.80 0.80
‘ NW“ traction 1m 60 35 1.07 0.76 1.23
W“! 30 60 30 1 11 0.30 0 79
1 Mai
Office/WW 5386 70 35 1.10 0.83 0.32
W“ floodhg 700 70 35 l. 10 0.33 0.63
‘ Wall-“vs 3544 70 35 1.10 0.83 0.83
Woodwind flooding r200 70 30 1 10 0.83 0 36
i Waco-m 2603 70 25 1.10 0.83 0.33 ‘

 

Note: 1/ NPC stands for nominal protection coefficient
2/ NNPC refers to net nominal protection coefficient
3/ NEPC is net effective protection coefficient

Source: Appendix B

153

l'l'aHeC-Zb. Whamwmmmunm-um

Fame-l
Region/Mayn- Yiefls Iabor M NPC NNPC NEPC
Kgllra Day/h CFAFIkg

 

C6. d'IveisaI-illdlaorgh-

NW nun-l 600 49 360 1.04 0.74 0.74
Nodal-tinned“ 300 41 1300 1.04 0.74 0.74
MM

Wan-I 600 61 453 0.65 0.49 0.46
Sow-sin] tracn‘aa 300 50 570 0.65 0.49 0.42
C& d'Ivebe

Winn-I 1300 120 570 1.11 0.30 0.30
NW 91” 35 535 1.07 0.76 1.23
Hertha-WW 4a» 247 sec 1.07 0.76 1.06
Wis-uni 3500 240 605 1 11 0 30 0 30
NW traders r300 90 750 l.” 0.76 1.23
Wm! 2200 121 590 1.11 0.30 0.79
Mal

WW 5336 135 1475 1.10 0.33 0.32
Whirl-[flooding 100 92 mo 1 10 0 33 0 33
Wad-hive 3544 59 1210 l. 10 0.33 0.33
Mopti/cautioned floodhg r200 69 530 1.10 0.33 0.36
Ween-M 2603 53 475 1.10 0.33 0.33

 

Note: 1/ NPC stands for nominal protection coefficient
2/ NNPC refers to net nominal protection coefficient
3/ NEPC is net effective protection coefficient

Source: Appendix B

154

Mali because the Ivorian farming systems, based in general on manual cultivation, use
fewer purchased inputs than those of Mali, where paddy production uses relies on animal
traction as a source of power.

In contrast to the results of the financial profitability per unit of output, the results
of the returns to household labor appear to be much greater in general for paddy
produced in Mali than that of COte d’Ivoire, owing probably to the higher price received
by the Malian farmers than those of COte d’lvoire. Despite this fact, farmers in Mali
seem to receive disincentives because of the overvalued exchange rate and taxes on

imported inputs, as suggested by the NNPCs and NEPCs.

6.4 Sensitivity Analysis
This section discusses farmers’ incentives under alternative scenarios. Such
incentives are measured by the change in the returns to family labor under different on-

farrn yield and farmgate price levels, which are varied by increments of 25 percent.

6.4.1 Effects of Orr-Farm Yields on Returns to Household Labor

The level of on-farm yields is a critical element in determining the financial
profitability of a commodity and the returns to household labor. For instance, an
increase in on-farm yields, ceteris paribus, induces a fall in the unit cost of the
commodity. The increase in yields may not, however, be fully transmitted to the fall in
the unit cost because an increase in yields results in an increase in labor inputs required

to harvest the commodity. If the increase in on-farm yields is widespread, this may

155
induce the market price of the commodity to fall if the commodity is nontraded and its

demand is maintained constant. However, if the increase in yield is localized and limited
to a few farmers, who are not large enough to affect market conditions, the market price
of the commodity may remain unchanged. As the increase in yields may affect both the
unit cost and market price, the net effect of the yield increase may be undetermined.
Two assumptions are made to predict the effect of the change in on-farm yields on the
returns to family labor. First, it is assumed that the change in yield is localized and
limited to a few small farmers because the relationship between market prices and the
quantity supplies is not known. As such, the market price of the commodity is assumed
to be unaffected. Second, labor requirements for harvest are unchanged. As a result,
the change in yields is assumed to be fully transmitted to the farm unit cost.

Based on these assumptions, the results of the sensitivity analysis, which are
reported in table 6-3a and 6-3b, suggest that the returns to household labor would
generally be greater than the daily wage rate if cotton yields increased by at least 25
percent in central COte d’lvoire and southern Mali. In contrast, family labor would still
earn less than the daily wage rate if maize yield increased between 25 and 50 percent.
Such increases in millet! sorghum and paddy yields would help household labor earn
income, which is in general higher than the daily wage rate in the production zones of

both countries.

156

‘ TabhmmdeHdChn-uWMFmflyWMMCde-andflahe

 

 

 

I Radium-y‘all Original WhFanilyLabodCPAP/kobueTo
Yield Original Yields Yield. Yielh Yields
tglh area- so a 25 a 25 a so a
crap/«y Lower [m mgr.- slum
cot. d'lvoisalcollan
Northlinprovedaninltnction 1300 14s 45 395 was 1445
Oder-moved“ mm 505 20 260 145 935
MM rsoo 1025 -105 460 1590 2150
Meatlo-
mem 1500 905 s 615 was 1240
WWII-uni 1200 650 .30 430 190 900
can d'IvoiraIma'na
Willa-l 100 325 130 230 420 520
Wash-inaction 2000 315 .00 120 510 110
Want-l 1500 lso .10 40 260 310
Maui-machined 4000 550 -1735 -615 mo 2s90
Maw-nine
wwmm 2000 300 .90 105 495 690
WWI-ml l6oo r60 .55 so 265 315

 

Note: The numbers from column 4 to column 7 are the returns to household labor
(CFAF/day), due to percentage changes in the original prices.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

157

 

 

 

 

 

_ _
70556-33. mdeWChmouRmmFanflymrh-mmurflnndedy
Begin/productions)!“ Origin! Mimic Pmily laboflCFAP/kg) DuTo

Yields Origin! Yiella Yiefls Yiefls Yiefla
kg/II Wm 50$ 25$ 25S 50’

CFAFIday lavas Issuer High. Higher

. Cale d1vohalmill¢lsorghan

I‘m-antral 600 360 330 620 1100 1340
North/mild traction 300 1300 530 915 1630 2065
W

Wall-I 600 435 220 355 615 745
W-inaltneden 300 570 145 355 735 1000
COO d'Ivoin/paddy

WWII-nil 1300 570 410 730 - 335

 

 

Note: The numbers from column 4 to column 7 are the returns to household labor
(CFAF/day), due to percentage changes in the original yields.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

158
6.4.2 Output Price and Returns to Household Labor

The returns to family labor at the farm level can be influenced by, among other
things, the farmgate output price, which is in general relatively low at harvest time and
rises throughout the year until the next harvest. This is, however, not the case for cotton
price, which is fixed by decree in both COte d’Ivoire and Mali. Nevertheless, the effect
of different price levels on cotton financial profitability is assessed in this section. For
each product analyzed in this study, the by-products, such as maize stover used as animal
feed, are not valued.

It appears in table 6-4a and 6-4b that cotton produced under the improved manual
cultivation in C0te d’Ivoire would provide to family labor returns that are higher than the
on-going wage rate if cotton price was 25 percent higher than the current price. With
such increases in maize yields, the returns to household labor would generally be lower
than the daily market wage rate if the market price of maize was 25 percent higher than
the price assumed above. It appears that most of family labor that engages in maize
production would still earn income lower than the daily wage rate if maize price was 50
percent higher than the original price. Unlike maize, millet/sorghum and rice would
generally provide household labor with returns that are higher than the daily wage rate

if the price of these commodities was 25 percent higher than the original price.

159

rummumcmauumurmnyuurmmcm-dm

 

 

 

Way“ Original MummeerAFMDl-e'l‘o
CFAF/kg Reels-Ila 50$ 25! 25$ 50%

CFAF/day Inner Inner Higher Higher
I

 

cote d'Ivoisa/cellen

North/inputted“ traction 105 745 45 395 1095 1445
C‘s/heaved mun-l 105 505 20 260 745 935
NW 105 1025 -105 460 1590 2150
Weston

Weds-hi motion 35 905 5 454 1360 1310
We‘ll] 35 650 -15 320 930 1315
Che d’IveiaI-a-e

W nun-1 40 325 135 230 420 515
Wail-I traction 40 315 -95 110 515 725
W meal 40 150 -75 35 265 330
Peru/W 40 550 ~1375 -660 1760 2975

 

 

 

Note: The numbers from column 4 to column 7 are the returns to household labor
(CFAF/day), due to percentage changes in the original prices.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

Table“ mwdfibChQ-uuwaamflywmmmnrfi-flw

   

 

 

 

 

Regienlpsodnctiensyflan on.“ MuteF-nilylabodCFAFldeneTo I
Price Originl Yields Yard. Yields Yields
cram. lieelrae 50 a 25 s 25 s 50 s
CFAF/day is... [m 111.1... Hhher
coaed'lvoisalmilletleorghlln

so 360 515 625 1090 1520
10 1500 550 925 1615 2050
60 415 195 540 630 115
60 510 95 355 505 1045
60 510 260 415 125 650
60 555 240 590 635 550
60 100 515 555 1045 1215
60 605 165 515 520 1040
60 150 150 450 1050 1550
60 590 40 515 360 1155
10 1415 190 150 2115 2160
10 1210 so 650 1590 2510
70 1210 -210 500 1920 2650
10 530 - 50 250 310 1090
10 415 150 505 645 515

 

 

 

 

 

Note: The numbers from column 4 to column 7 are the returns to household labor
(CFAF/day), due to percentage changes in the original yields.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

161
6.5 Summary

This chapter showed that the financial profitability per unit output was positive
for all the farming systems. This financial profitability is, however, not a good measure
of incentives because the production systems use few purchased inputs and rely heavily
on household labor, which was not valued in determining the financial profitability. As
a result, the returns to family labor were used to assess whether farmers have incentives
to yield surpluses, which can be traded.

It appeared that the bulk of cotton, maize and paddy produced in Cbte d’Ivoire
would yield income to family labor lower than the on-going market wage rate, owing to
prices that are lower than the border price adjusted to the farm. Likewise, family labor
in Mali would earn returns that are lower than the daily market wage rate when it
produces coarse grain. In both countries, it appeared that maize would still yield returns
that are lower than the wage rate if either yields or prices were 25 percent higher than
the values assumed originally.

In contrast, paddy production in Mali and millet] sorghum farming in COte d’Ivoire
appeared to help household labor earn returns, which are generally higher than the daily
wage rate in the production of these commodities, despite the disincentives provided by

the overvalued exchange rate.

CHAPTER VII
SUMNIARY, POLICY IMPLICATIONS,

AND FURTHER RFSEARCH

Regional economic integration, seen as a instrument for bringing rapid
transformation in the West African economies to spur economic growth, has gained
increased attention in the circle of policy makers, who created several regional
organizations. Notwithstanding the apparent efforts, an impartial assessment of the
record can point out that little progress has been made in fostering intraregional trade,
despite the immense resources in the region.

The poor performance of the integrative efforts is attributable to numerous factors
among which the most important constraints are outlined briefly below. First,
intraregional trade has been hampered by a deficient communication and transportation
network reinforced by the roadblocks that are rife in the region and make the movement
of products difficult across countries. The second leading factor in the marginal
achievement of the integrative efforts appears to be the very focus of the regional
discussions, which in general emphasize trade of manufactured goods, even though the
industrial base is very weak in the region and agriculture represents the most dominant
sectorin the individual economies. It is not uncommon that the agricultural sector is not

even mentioned in the discussions of regional economic integration, as its performance

162

163
is often considered a by-product of the achievement in the industrial sector. The third

constraint on improved intraregional trade seems to be linked to the industrial strategy
based on import-substitution, which, given the relatively recent industrialization process
in West Africa and the high production costs in the region, lead the policy makers to
adopt high tariffs and quotas to protect the inefficient industries against imports.
Obviously, the adoption of high protective measures by each country induces in general
inward-looking strategies, which are often incompatible with enhancing trade with
neighboring countries.

Intraregional trade might have grown noticeably had trade barriers been
dismantled and more importantly, if regional economic integration had been geared
toward increasing trade of local agricultural commodities, which are the most dominant
economic activities in West Africa. The increase in constructive trade requires,
however, that the major distortions be removed and that trade be based on each country’s

comparative advantage.

7.1 Methodology and Specific Features

This study relied on the domestic resource cost method to address the issue of
comparative advantage, as most studies have done. Despite the fact that the DRC
analysis is based on valuing all resources at their opportunity cost, most studies about
West Africa have generally assigned a zero opportunity cost to land to circumvent certain
difficulties related to the lack of a competitive land market. This approach would remain

valid and unchallenged as long as land was not a scarce resource and its value was not

164
affected by its use. Contrary to this, a growing concern on land degradation and erosion

has emerged in recent years in West Africa. It appears that this concern will become
even more important in the future because of the stagnation in agricultural productivity.
Owing to these reasons, this study, unlike most others, assigned an economic value to
land by treating the return to land as the residual between the economic value of outputs
and the return to other resources. As such, the results of this study differed significantly
from those of others. Nonetheless, this study did not overlook the results of other studies
and assigned a zero economic value to land to compare its outcome to the results of these
studies.

This study also differs from others in the use of the DRC method, which has been
the means for most analyses to assess the competitiveness of commodities within the
context of a single country. The novel element that this study added to the use of the
DRC method was to determine, given two countries and the rest of the world, the
direction of commodity trade flows, based on comparative advantage, between not only
these countries, but also between them and the rest of the world. Determination of these
trade flows was based on computing the DRC coefficients of each country in its domestic
markets and in the markets located in the other country. Such trade flows were
compared with actual trade flows to explain the similarity and differences between them.
The theoretical trade flows were analyzed under not only current economic policies, but

also alternative policies and different scenarios.

165
7 .2 Summary of Major Findings and Policy Implications

Focusing on cotton and cereals, such as maize, millet/sorghum, and rice, the
results of the DRC coefficients suggested that COte d’Ivoire and Mali produce and market
cotton efficiently and could exchange cotton. Despite this fact, cotton appears to be
nontraded between the two countries, owing to two major reasons: the profits from
selling cotton to the world market are much higher than those from trading within West
Afiica because of the small downstream demand for cotton in the region. The prospects
for increasing the local demand for cotton appear to be remote unless appropriate policy
actions are taken to render the local textile industries more competitive. It appears that
the competitiveness of these industries is hampered by an overvalued currency that
discourages local production in favor of imports.

The results of the study found that maize and millet! sorghum trade flows
predicted by comparative advantage were generally consistent with actual trade flows
because the effects of government interventions on these flows are negligible and prices
are determined in a competitive market. Despite the concordance between theoretical and
actual trade flows, the exports of the Malian millet/sorghum to central COte d’Ivoire and
beyond were out of line with the results of the DRC coefficients, which suggested that
this coarse grain should not be competitive in these markets. One contributing element
to the discordance between these results may be the fact that the international price of
red sorghum used to calculate the DRC coefficients was not the true opportunity cost of

the local millet/sorghum, which is not traded in the world market. As such, the true

166
opportunity cost of the local millet/ sorghum may be higher than the world price of red

sorghum.

The results of the DRC coefficients appeared to be in accord with the lack of
actual trade flows of local rice between the two countries, as local rice seemed to be at
best marginally competitive in the production zones. Owing to the comparative
disadvantage of COte d’Ivoire and Mali, sensitivity analyses were performed to determine
which factors, including a lower opportunity cost of land, increased productivity at the
farm and processing levels, reduction in transfer costs, changed rice world price, and the
exchange rate policy, would reverse the noncompetitive position of local rice in most
markets and foster intraregional trade based on comparative advantage.

According to the results of these sensitivity analyses, the prospects for increasing
cross-border trade of local rice appear slim under the following individual scenarios:
economic value of land was halved, opportunity cost of labor was 25 percent lower, on-
farm yields improved by 25 percent, transfer costs were halved, a 50 percent devaluation
of the CFA Franc, and a relatively high projected world price. It appeared that the two
countries would trade local rice only if these sectoral and macroeconomic policies were
undertaken simultaneously. Nonetheless, the bulk of rice would be noncompetitive in the
coastal markets.

Similar sensitivity analyses performed on the DRC coefficients of maize and
millet/ sorghum also appeared to indicate that although the competitiveness of these coarse
grains would generally improve in most markets, most trade would take place between

central Cdte d’Ivoire and Mali even when most improvements were made simultaneously.

167
A broad lesson that can be learned from these results is that efforts to foster

’intraregional trade would succeed if they are directed toward cereals exchange between
the production zones and the consumption centers located inland. These efforts would,
however, likely fail if most of the interest focused on making local cereals, especially
rice, competitive in the coastal markets. Given that the options are limited to make
cereals produced inland competitive in the coastal markets, protectionist policies do not
seem the most appropriate options to overcome the lack of competitiveness of the local
cereals in these markets. The protectionist policies appear to have social costs that
outweigh the social benefits, especially if these policies are put in a food security
framework instead of a food self-sufficiency context that overlooks the urban poor and
the net buyers of cereals in the rural areas, as illustrated by Dione (1989) and Weber et
al. (1988).

Allowing cereal imports does not suggest, by any means that governments should
neglect local production. It rather suggests they should use these imports, which are
cheaper than local production, to satisfy consumption in the coastal markets, as a means
to save resources that can be partly invested in research and extension to render
agricultural production less dependent on rainfall levels and enhance agricultural
productivity in order to increase marketable agricultural surpluses and lower the unit
costs of commodities. Reducing the unit costs at the farm level cannot be
overemphasized on the grounds that most production activities yielded negative financial

profitability when family labor was valued at the market wage rate.

168

Some of these resources may also be invested in improving the communication
network between the arid zones and inland consumption centers to help foster
intraregional trade. The prerequisite to fostering this integration is, however, a sound
exchange rate policy that brings the official exchange rate in line with the opportunity
cost of resources. In the long-run, an equilibrium exchange rate may help to diversify
agricultural production, promote exports of other commodities such as fruits and

vegetables, and eventually regenerate the sluggish economies.

7.3 Future Research

This study focused its attention on cotton and cereals production and marketing.
For these commodities, data were not available on certain farming systems practiced in
certain regions. A case in point is intercropped maize produced in southern Mali.
Information on different rice farming systems in southern Mali, where large quantities
of rice are produced, was also lacking. Gathering this information to estimate the
production costs of these farming systems would greatly complement the present study.

For a long time, Sahelian countries, such as Mali, were known to export livestock
to COte d’Ivoire, and this flow of livestock contributed greatly to the process of regional
economic integration. The movement of livestock has, however, considerably slowed
down. Evaluating the competitiveness of the Malian livestock in different markets of
COte d’Ivoire could shed some light on the causes of the reduction of the Malian
livestock in Cdte d’lvoire. Equally important in future research is to expand the range

of products to commodities, such as fruits and vegetables, plantain, yam, sweet potato,

169

pineapple, etc. to determine the comparative advantage of not only COte d’lvoire and
Mali, but also other neighboring countries.

Most likely, policy makers were not enthusiastic about making decisions to spur
regional economic integration because they did not have empirical evidence of the
welfare gains from increased intraregional trade. Such evidence requires information on
elasticities, which are generally missing in West Africa. Future research geared toward
providing estimates of demand and supply elasticities in different countries could be
useful in helping to inform policy makers about the impacts of future decisions on
different economic agents.

This study could also be complemented by research to determine, given each
commodity produced and its costs of production and marketing, the optimum quantity
that can be traded between production zones and consumption centers of different
countries to compare those quantifies with the actual trade flows. Such a study, in
combination with a broader updated comparative advantage study, may provide some
insight into the determinants of intraregional trade and the constraints to improving

regional economic integration in West Africa.

APPENDIX A

DATA COLLECTION AND SOURCES

The first data set collected by AIRD was data on crop budgets for cotton and
cereals (maize, millet/ sorghum and rice), for different production systems and different
regions within each country. The technical coefficients in the crop budgets originated
from different sources. For instance, those of cotton produced in Cdte d’Ivoire were
provided by the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MARA), which obtained
them from the regional development agency in charge of cotton production, known as
Compagnie Ivoirienne du Developpement des Textiles (CIDT). The technical coefficients
for maize also originated from MARA, as well as the Savannah Research Institute
(IDESSA). In the meantime, those of millet! sorghum cultivated in COte d’Ivoire were
obtained from interviews with researchers at IDESSA, CIDT extension agents, and some
producers North COte d’Ivoile. For rice, the West African Rice Development
Association (WARDA), located in Bouake, COte d’Ivoire, was consulted and did have
crop budgets other than those published in Wine; by the Food Research
Institute at Stanford University (Pearson et al., 1981).

For Mali, the technical coefficients for cotton and coarse grains were drawn
primarily from a study conducted by AIRD (Stryker et al., 1987). The coefficients for

rice originated from the study published by the Institute of Rural Economy (IER, 1989)

170

171
to determine production costs and from the study undertaken by Cebron (1992) on rice

production costs at the Office du Niger.

To the extent possible, data on input and factor prices for both COte d’Ivoire and
Mali covered the year 1990. For COte d’Ivoire, the price data for chemical fertilizers,
fungicides, and agricultural equipment were obtained from CIDT and other regional
development agencies, such as the Compagnie Ivoirienne de Développement des Cultures
Vivrieres (CIDV). Meanwhile, the price data for Mali were drawn from IER (1989),
Cebron (1992) and obtained from interviews in the evaluation unit at the Compagnie
Malienne de Développement des Textiles (CMDT).

Information on agricultural labor wage rates was the most difficult to gather.
Data on wage rates in Mali were obtained from interviews with producers and extension
agents in the regional development agencies in November 1990 in the Sikasso region and
Niono, located at the Office du Niger. For COte d’Ivoire, data on wage rates were

collected by interviewing producers and extension agents in the Bouake and Korhogo
regions between October and November 1991 .

Cotton price data at the farmgate level for 1990 in Cbte d’Ivoire and Mali were
gathered from CIDT and CMDT, respectively. For paddy farmgate prices in both Cdte
d’Ivoire and Mali for 1990, we used the official producer price published by the
governments. Producer price data on coarse grains for Mali were obtained from the data
set collected weekly in different rural markets since October 1988 by the Market
Information System (MIS), located at the Office des Produits Agricoles du Mali

(OPAM). Moreover, the MIS has been gathering retail prices for these cereals in most

172

urban markets on a weekly basis. Both sets of prices were averaged to generate monthly
prices.

Monthly retail price data for cereals were also available in COte d’Ivoire, because
the Office de Commercialisation des Produits Vivriers (OCPV), a government agency,
has been collecting them since 1988 in the major cities. OCPV has also been gathering
wholesale price data for these cereals. Nevertheless, OCPV, unlike MIS, has not
collected producer price data for agricultural commodities. As a result, the 1990
farmgate prices for coarse grains were obtained from interviews with maize producers
and traders in Bouaké, and millet! sorghum producers and traders in Korhogo in October
and November 1991. These prices are, however, only those of the 1990 harvest season.

While data on cotton marketing costs were readily available at CIDT and CMDT,
those for local cereals were obtained from interviews with traders and transporters. Data
on marketing costs for rice imported into Mali were also obtained from interviews with
one of the major rice importers in Mali. Meanwhile, marketing costs for imported rice
in C6te d’Ivoire were provided by the Caisse Générale de Péréquation et de Stabilisation
dea Prix (CGPSP), the parastatal with the monopoly of rice imports in COte d’Ivoire.
This parastatal and the Malian rice importer provided the costs of insurance and freight
from the international market to West Africa. Those of cotton were obtained from CIDT
and CMDT. The FOB price for rice and coarse grains, as well as the CIF price for
cotton, were drawn from the publication of the International Economics Department at
the World Bank (1990). Meanwhile, the average exchange rate between CFA franc and

the US Dollar for 1990 originated from the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1991).

APPENDIX B

173

TA‘! 3-1. “CNN“ 03 CW 03C. FINANCIAL "OBTAIN" AND MOT!CTION COMO”

M NAM!: CONWTKMI

 

030': COTTW. NORTH-COT! O'IVOIII. ANIMAL TRACTION
394.11%" ANALYI3 e KIY PARAMU’ER3

 

 

 

CROP: COTTON. NORTH-COT! 0m ANIMAL TRACTION

 

 

 

1345534 REM" AND “WW “"3
12:13:23 AM 3AM aomooo AIIOJAN
m HOHTAIIUTY. ed! 0‘
...C!A'h 123.31 1 13.03 1 13.03
...CFAFm 7N72.03 33373.33 33273.33
...CFAFM 1‘. 743.33 333.73 333.73
”SPAIN fun” 1.. 743.33 333.73 333.73
MCI“ MAUI-1W. m a“
«.CFAFA. 7.73 7.73 7.73
.uCFAPm 4473.03 4472.03 4473.03
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03....37
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10:31 AM PAIM IOUAKI A3IDJAN KONNOOO 30330 3AMAKO
FINANCIAL ”OBTAIN". ed: 3‘
...CFAFM 22.37 42.43 23.47 23.04 13.33 23.”
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NWlNAL HOTICTIN comm. OUTPUT3 0.42 0.32 1.13 0.73 0.33 0.33
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TAIL! I-S. CALCtLATION 0F 101110110011on DRC. HNANCML PROHTAIIUTY AND PROTECTION COEFFICIENTS

FOL! NAME: MIMIMI

CROP: MILLETISOEGHUM. MALI SUD. ANIMAL TRACTION

 

0110!: WWW. MALI M. ANIMAL TRACTION

”GUM" 011011» 0 KEY PARAMETERS

 

 

00.0007 01010111-0110m11m0111
........................ ..... ...... ...... ...-.. -..-. ....-. ....-
10400-00 ............. 11001111 011101101111 0110 00111111111 0110111010 ...............
00:00 1111 101111 01110000 00100110 1101111000 00110110 00100011

11110110101 11101110011011. 00111 0001-
...01010. 00.00 02.20 20.20 07.00 00.00 00.00
"010011100100 20020.00 20700.00 20000.00 00000.00 02002.00 00000.00
...010111010 100. 070.01 010.01 007.01 017.21 000.00 001.21
0.010111010101100 10001 070.01 010.01 007.01 017.21 000.00 001.21

11110110101 11101110011111. 111101000 01100
...0101111. -0.10 -11.02 -10.02 10.00 0.70 12.00
0.0101000“ 0070.01 -0210.01 .1 1010.01 10000.00 7002.00 10000.00

0001101110 11101110011111
...01010. 00.01 07.02 10.00 11.01 .10.00 02.00
0.010111110011110 00020.72 20010.00 11000.00 0000.70 .11021 .22 42002.02
...010100111 1.001 1001.00 1001.00 1100.02 000.70 070.01 -20.02
...01010010 1011110 10001 001.00 701.00 000.02 200.70 -120.00 -720.02

11011111101 111010011011 0001110101111. 011111110 0.00 0.00 0.07 1.00 1.02 2.00

1101 11011111101. 111010011011 000111010111. 011111110 0.00 0.00 0.70 1.01 1.22 1.70

0110011v0 111010011011 000111010111 0.00 0.71 0.01 1 .00 2.20 10.01

1101 0110011v0 111010011011 000111010111 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.12 1.00 11.20

0011100110 11000111100 0001 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.07

0100011111 0010 0.000

11010 0.11111 000.000

111000001110 0011mm 1001011 1.000

1110100 100 11000 10110111 100.000

1011100010 11100 101-0111.1 00.000

11111101 1110111101 1111100 10001.0: 01010.1 70.000

101110100010 111100 0011110110 10101111111 00.000

1111110100010 111100 1101111000 101mm 100.000

1111110100010 111100 00u0110 1010mm 110.000

111010100010 11000 00100011 10101001 120.000

00110101 011011011110 11010 270.000

0110001111 011011011110 11010 111 10011 0.00 000.700

0110001111 011011011110 11010 111 0010 o1vo1110 0.00 000.000

11101100111 0001. 10100100100000 101010010 0120.000

1110110110111 0001. 01110000-10-00100110 10101110111 7000000

111011010111 0001. 01110000-10-1101-00110011 10101110111 2000.000

1110110110111 0001. 0011001001011 00110011 10101110111 101100.000

1110110110111 00111. 00110001411011 own-1000110110 10101110111 0077.000

111011010111 11010111 0010 011101110 10101001111111 00.000

100011 WAGE 11010 1010110001 700.000

011101101011 00010 1010111101 0.000

10110 0001101110 00011010111101 0.000

208

 

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500 0233060
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211

 

 

 

 

 

 

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APPENDIX C

251

 

    
   
   
   
 
   
   
   

 

TnhloCS-ln. mmaummmumumnncmm.
PoliivoOpportun'tyConolend

 

Fem Bamako Sihuo Korhogo Bounk‘ Abidjan
C60 d‘lvoire/conon ll

Cam/inpmvod maul 0.89 0.89 0.91
Now/mm“: mm 0.91 0.92 ' 0.93
traction

Nonh/unfi-mechmized 1.89 1.86 1.73
Mai/cotton

Smith/improved animal 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.01

unction

Wmmodmnl 1.15 1.12 1.12 1.14

0.79 1.26 0.98 1.11 1.74
1.27 1.76 1.21 1.58 1.59 > 2

1.72 > 2 1.59 > 2 > 2 > 2
1.75 > 2 1.60 > 2 > 2 > 2

0.97 1.52 1.19 1.65 > 2 > 2

1.26 1.89 1.51 > 2 > 2 > 2

Note: 1/ The border Mali-COte d’Ivoire is the relevant market for cotton produced
in Mali instead of Korhogo.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

252

Table CS-lb.

 

mudmOMWMumnmmmnncch-u.

 

: my. Opportunity Cost or Land
1 Fun: Bamako sum-o Korhogo sou-u Abidjan
C610 d'lvoirelmillot/norghum
Nonh/tnditionnlmnmnl 1.26 1.86 1.54 1.64 > 2 > 2
. Noah/animal traction 1.30 1.93 1.58 1.70 > 2 > 2
Mdilmifledaorghum
Somh/nm’mnl traction 0.66 1.12 0.85 1.18 1.87 > 2
Which-[mun] 0.86 1.31 1.04 1.38 1.99 > 2
C610 d’lvoirelricc
900%mede 1.49 > 2 1.92 > 2 > 2
‘ Fonduphndlmdiuondmnnl 1.65 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2
Fonfluphnd/improvedmnwnl 1.68 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2
Nonh/irriguionlimpmvcdmnunl 1.72 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2
Noflhluplnnd/unditiomlmnnl 1.39 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2
Now/uphndlnnimnltnction >2 >2 >2 >2 >2 >2
Mali/rice
Officelirl'iptionfmnlivc 1.04 1.57 1.58 > 2 > 2 > 2
Office/irrigation/nmi-imcuivc 1.37 1.97 1.96 > 2 > 2 > 2
i Office/'migtfionlnon-iflemivo 1.72 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 < O
Mopti/controfledflooding >2 >2 >2 >2 >2 <0
; Mopti/mm flooding > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 < o

 

 

Source: Computed from Appendix B

253

‘ TablaCS-Za. ERactofaSOPaumtDavnlnatioaoaCottonandMaiuDRCeoafllcimUndta
PoaitivaOpporumityCoatofLand
Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouak‘ Abidjan

 

C61: d’lvoire/conon
Comer/1mm“ mamnl 0.55 0.57 0.60
1 Nonhl’inprovcd animal 0.56 0.58 0.62
traction
Nonhlaemi-machanized 1.17 1.17 1.15
Mali/cotton
erovad animal 0.61 0.65 0.66 0.67
traction
Soulh/inprovod manual 0.71 0.74 0.75 0.76
1 C610 d’lvoirelma'ma
Pond/unli-mochaniud 0.56 0.84 0.65 0.81 1.16
Canter/inmroved aninnl 0.90 1.17 0.81 1.13 1.11 1.68
traction
Corner/traditional manual 1.21 1.47 1.06 1.42 1.42 1.95
Comer/inpmcd mamlal 1.24 1.56 1.07 1.50 1.50 > 2
Mali/main
Wmmvedanimal 0.67 1.06 0.82 1.10 1.73 > 2
traction
1 South/improved mamal 0.87 1.32 1.04 1.38 > 2 > 2

 

Note: 1/ The border Mali—Cbte d’Ivoire is the relevant market for cotton produced
in Mali instead of Korhogo.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

254

 

 

 

TnbloCS-Zb. wad-MWMMo-mwmumoaccmuwa

Punitive Opportlfl'y Coat of Land

Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouakl Abidjan

C010 d’lvoire/millct/aorghum
North/tradition] manual 0.90 1.24 1.02 1.16 1.43 > 2
Norm/animal traction 0.93 1.29 1.06 1.21 1.50 > 2 J
Mali/milletlaorgbum
South/animal traction 0.45 0.78 0.58 0.78 1.24 > 2
Scum/traditional mamal 0.59 0.90 0.72 0.92 1.33 > 2 I
can d‘lvoire/rica
Foren/lowlanda/inprovadmamal 1.05 1.53 1.28 1.66 > 2
Foruat/upland/traditionalmamal 1.15 1.55 1.35 1.65 > 2
Fond/uplandlinpmvadmamnl 1.20 1.81 1.47 1.99 > 2
Norm/‘migationlinpmedmamal 1.74 1.86 1.49 1.82 > 2 > 2
North/uplandIu-aditionalmamial 1.31 1.72 1.71 1.68 1.91 > 2
Noah/uplandlanimaltraction > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2
Mali/rice
Office/'u'rigationftmanaivc 0.70 1.07 1.06 1.57 > 2 > 2
Office/irrigationlaami-irunaivc 0.92 1.34 1.31 1.99 > 2 > 2
01'5chanan 1.16 1.64 1.60 > 2 > 2 < 0
Mopti/commllodflooding >2 >2 >2 >2 >2 <0
Mopti/traditionalflooding >2 >2 >2 >2 >2 <0

 

 

Source: Computed from Appendix B

255

TablaC5-3a. EflaadalflmwmuCMudMiaDBCWUnd-m
WWWflLfid

 

Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouakl Abidjan

C610 d‘lvoiralcotton
Camorfinproved mamal 0.40 0.42 0.45
Nonhlinmroved animal 0.41 0.43 0.46
traction
Nonb/aami-macbaniud 0.85 1.17 0.86
Mali/cotton
Soutbl‘inprovod animal 0.44 0.49 0.50 0.51
traction
Soudilinmroved manual 0.51 0.55 0.56 0.57
C610 d'lvoinlmaiu
Marni-mechanized 0.44 0.63 0.49 0.63 0.87
Cemerlinprovad animal 0.70 0.88 0.61 0.88 1.11 1.26
traction

W Caner/traditional manual 0.93 1.10 0.80 1.10 1.42 1.47
Cedar/inmrovd manual 0.96 1.17 0.80 1.17 1.50 1.67 5

5

WWW“ animal 0.51 0.81 0.63 0.82 1.30 > 2 f
traction
Soutbl'inpmvod manual 0.66 1.01 0.79 1.04 1.62 > 2

 

 

 

Note: 1/ The border Mali-COte d’Ivoire is the relevant market for cotton produced
in Mali instead of Korhogo.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

256

 

 

TablaCS-3b. EflactolaloomwahationonManhmandRiuDRCWUndn’a
Punitive Opportunity Cost of Land
. Farm Bamako Sikaaao 1011111030 Bouuak‘ Abidjan l
C610 d’lvoire/millet/aorghum ‘
Noah/traditional manual 0.70 0.93 0.77 0.90 1.11 > 2
Noah/animal traction 0.72 0.97 0.79 0.94 1.16 > 2
Mali/milledaorgbum
South/animal traction 0.35 0.60 0.44 0.59 0.93 > 2
South/traditional manual 0.45 0.69 0.54 0.69 1.00 > 2
C610 d'lvoire/rica
Founllowlanda/inmmvad manual 0.81 1.14 0.96 1.27 1.54
Pond/uplandlu'aditional manual 0.89 1.16 1.01 1.27 1.46
Paton/uplandlinprowd manual 0.93 1.36 1.10 1.54 1.95
Nonhfu'rizationfunpmed manual 0.97 1.39 1.12 1.42 1.75 > 2
Noudu/uplandIu-aditional nuanual 1.00 1.29 1.31 1.28 1.45 > 2
Norduluplandlanimaltu'action > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2
i
Mali/rice
Offical'ufigation/imnaiva 0.53 0.81 0.80 1.18 1.71 > 2
0ffic0/irrigationlaami-in10naiv0 0.69 1.01 0.99 1.49 > 2 > 2
Office/irrigationlnon-intanaiva 0.87 1.25 1.20 1.87 > 2 < 0
Mopti/consolhdflooding 1.58 >2 >2 >2 >2 <0
Mopti/traditional flooding 1.96 > 2 > 2
_ i T =

 

 

 

Source: Computed from Appendix B

TablaC5-4a. ERactotalawerOppormnitndatolLaboroaCounaandMaiaaDBCcadlicida

   

 

Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bonak‘ Abidjan

 

€610 d'lvoiualcodon
Cunt/improved manual 0.49 0.52 0.56
Nonlufunmrovadanimal 0.54 0.55 0.60
traction

I Nonh/umi-mochaniud 1.21 1.21 1.19

 

 

Note: 1/ The border Mali-C0te d’Ivoire is the relevant market for cotton produced
in Mali instead of Korhogo.

2/In this scenario, The opportunity cost of labor is assumed to be 25 percent
lower than that assumed originally. Thus, it is about 500 CFAF/day in most of
C6te d’Ivoire and Mali, while it is estimated at nearly 750 CFAF/day in the forest
region of C6te d’Ivoire.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

258

 

 

 

—_ I
TablaC5-4b. EflactdalmOpportnnitnduofLaboronMilalnubuandRhDRCCodfld-fl
Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouakd Abidjan
C610 d‘lvoire/millet/aorghtum
Noah/traditional manual 0.81 1.14 0.94 1.06 1.33 > 2
North/animal traction 0.89 1.26 1.03 1.16 1.47 > 2
Mali/milledaorgbuum
South/am traction 0.38 0.68 0.50 0.68 1.08 > 2
South/traditional manual 0.48 0.76 0.59 0.77 1.12 > 2
C610 d‘Ivoiunlrico
Foreat/lowlandalinpmvad manual 0.90 1.37 l. 15 1.47 1.75
Fomnluplandltraditionalmanual 0.99 1.38 1.20 1.49 1.86
Fonduplandlinmrovadmanual 1.07 1.69 1.37 1.85 > 2
Nortbl'ufigafion/inprovadmanual 1.08 1.69 1.35 1.63 > 2 > 2
North/uplandltuaditionalmanual 1.16 1.69 1.65 1.60 > 2 > 2
North/upland/animaltu'action >2 >2 )2 >2 >2 >2
Mali/rice
Officalirrigation/intanaiva 0.67 1.04 1.03 1.51 > 2 > 2
Offwefurrigation/aami-inanaiva 0.90 1.31 1.31 1.90 > 2 > 2
Office/irfigation/non—intanaivo 1.15 1.62 1.62 > 2 > 2 < O
Mopti/controll0dflooding >2 >2 >2 >2 >2 <0
Mopti/traditional flooding > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 < 0

 

 

 

Note: In this scenario, the opportunity cost of labor is assumed to be 25 percent
lower than that assumed originally. Thus, it is about 500 CFAF/day in C010
d’Ivoire and southern Mali, while it is estimated at nearly 490 CFAF/day in the
Office du Niger and 375 CFAF/day in the Mopti region.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

259

 

TabloCS-Sa. EffectofaLowa'OppomityCoatofLaboronCoannandMaiuDRCcodfld-ta

 

Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouuak‘ Abidjan

 

C610 d'lvoinelconon
. Center/improved manual 0.39 0.43 0.48
I Noah/improved animal 0.47 0.49 0.54
traction
Nonlulaami-macluaniud 1.16 1.16 1.14
' Mali/cotton
Scum/uptown Bnimnl 0.53 0.59 0.60 0.58
traction
South/impmvod manual 0.55 0.61 0.62 0.60
C610 d'lvoin/maiu
Fonau/aanui-macluaniud 0.53 0.33 0.64 0.78 1.14
Can0r/inmrovod animal 0.74 1.00 0.69 0.96 0.92 1.45
traction
5 Caner/traditional manual 0.39 1.13 0.33 1.09 1.07 1.53
Comrmpmod manual 0.91 1.20 0.83 1.15 1.13 1.74
1 Mali/mam
Somlul‘unpuovodanimal 0.55 0.89 0.68 0.93 1.46 > 2
traction
Somblinprovadmanual 062 099 076 104 163 >2

Note: 1/ The border Mali-C6te d’Ivoire is the relevant market for cotton produced
in Mali instead of Korhogo.

2/In this scenario, The opportunity cost of labor is assumed to be 50 percent
lower than that assumed originally. Thus, it is equivalent to about 350 CFAF/day
in most of C0te d’Ivoire and Mali, while it is estimated at 500 CFAF/day in the
forest region of C0te d’Ivoire.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

 

 

 

C610 d'lvoire/millet/aorgbum
North/traditional manual
North/animal traction

Mali/millatlaorgbum
South/animal traction

South/traditioulmanual

C610 d‘lvoiu'clrica

 

I Forenllowlandalinprovad manual
Bonn/uplandltraditional manual
Fonn/uupland/impmad manual
Nonblirrigationfinmrovad manual
Norduluplandltnditional manual
Nottb/uuplandlanimal traction

 

   
  
  
  
  
  

Mali/rice
Offica/irrigation/inanaiva
Offlcal'un-igationlaami-inenaive
Officefuruigation/non-inanaiva
Mopti/conu'olled flooding
Mopti/traditional flooding

Farm Bamako

0.66
0.79

0.27
0.33

0.69
0.75
0.87
0.85
0.93

>2

0.61
0.83
1.08
1.95

>2

 

0.96
1.13

0.54
0.57

0.97
1.23
1.55
> 2

>2

Sikaaao Korhogo Bouak‘

0.79 0.88 1.12
0.93 1.05 1.33
0.38 0.53 0.81
0.43 0.56 0.83
0.93 1.18
0.96 1.21
1.17 1.58
1.11 1.33 1.70
1.35 1.31 > 2
> 2 > 2 > 2
0.97 1.41 2.“)
1.21 1.80 > 2
1.51 > 2 > 2
> 2 > 2 > 2
> 2 > 2 > 2

Abidjan

>2

>2

>2

>2

1.40
1.52
> 2
> 2
> 2

>2

>2
>2
<0
<0

<0

 

Note: In this scenario, the opportunity cost of labor is assumed to be 50 percent
lower than that assumed originally.
d’Ivoire and southern Mali, while it is estimated at nearly 300 CFAF/day in the
Office du Niger and 250 CFAF/day in the Mopti region.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

Thus, it is about 350 CFAF/day in Cbte

 

 

261

 

 

 

TablaCSuGa. EffeflofflalviugtbeOppormndatofLandonCnunn-dMaiaaDBC
unofficial:
Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouak‘ Abidjan
C610 d‘lvchonon
Caner/impmved manual 0.57 0.59 0.63
Noahrmpmved animal 0.52 0.54 0.58
traction
Nonlu/aemi-mechanized 0.84 0.85 0.87
Mali/cotton
Southl‘unprovadanimal 0.58 0.64 0.65 0.63
traction
Wmmvedmanual 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.16
1 C610 d’lvoinalmaiza
Fond/acmi-macluanizad 0.47 0.76 0.59 0.72 1.04
C0m0r/inmrovod animal 0.31 1.08 0.75 1.04 1.01 1.56
traction
Caner/traditional manual 1.05 1.30 0.95 1.25 1.24 1.75
Canar/inmrovad manual 1.05 1.36 0.94 1.30 1.29 1.96
1 mm
Win-proved min! 0.60 0.96 0.74 1.00 1.58 > 2
. unction
1WWanual 0.34 1.23 1.00 1.36 _. > ,. __. __ > 2 , i

 

Note: 1/ The border Mali-COte d’Ivoire is the relevant market for cotton produced
in Mali instead of Korhogo.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

 

262

TnblaCS-Gb. mdfldvhgfinOpmranddLandmm/mndMDRCW

 

Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouuakd Abidjan

 

C610 d'lvoiue/millodaorgbuum

North/traditional manual 0.30 1.14 0.94 1.06 1.33 > 2
Noah/animal traction 0.72 1.05 0.36 0.97 1.24 > 2
Mali/millat/aorgbum

Wanimalta'action 0.43 0.32 0.61 0.34 133 > 2
Souudultraditionalmanual 0.63 0.96 0.76 0.99 1.42 > 2
C610 d’lvoimlrica

Fonn/lowlanda/inmrovadmanual 1.21 1.86 1.51 > 2 > 2
Foucauluplandl‘tnditionalmnual 1.11 1.52 1.32 1.62 1.92
Bonn/upunarmpmodmnu 1.21 1.86 1.51 > 2 > 2
Nonnrnnguionrmpmodmmu 1.23 1.99 1.59 1.93 > 2 > 2
Nomupnndmndinonn'mnu 1.19 1.60 1.53 1.55 1.73 > 2
Noflluluplandlanimaltraction >2 >2 >2 >2 >2 >2
Mali/rice

Officel'ufigation/imnaiva 0.60 0.96 0.96 1.40 1.71 > 2
Office/irrigationlnmi-inanaiva 0.75 1.15 1.14 1.69 > 2 > 2
omoornnpuon/non-inimivo 0.90 1.34 1.32 > 2 > 2 < 0
Mopti/controlled flooding 1.52 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 < o

 

 

 

Source: Computed from Appendix B

263

 

 

 

TableCS—‘Ia. ERaetolProjnctndWofldPn’caofOntflnnCofluandMainaDRCem
Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouuakd Abidjan

C610 d‘lvoirelcotuon

Center/improved manual 0.40 0.42 0.45

North/inpmved animal 0.41 0.43 0.46

traction

Nonhlaomi-mocbanized 0.80 0.80 0.82

Mali/couon

Soutiulinmroved animal 0.46 0.50 0.51 0.49

traction

South/inmovnd manual 0.53 0.57 0.58 0.56

C610 d’lvoinlmaiza

Wand-mechanized 0.40 0.65 0.54 0.63 0.82

C0n0r/inprov0d animal 0.75 0.95 0.71 0.93 0.90 1.26

traction

Center/traditional manual 1.04 1.24 0.96 1.21 1.20 1.57

C0n0r/inmmv0d manual 1.03 1.26 0.94 1.22 1.21 1.66

0.87 0.71 0.90 1.26 > 2

1.09 0.89 1.14 1.58 > 2

 

 

 

 

Note: 1/ The border Mali-Cbte d’Ivoire is the relevant market for cotton produced
in Mali instead of Korhogo.

2/ The projected world price for cotton is about $2400/ton and that of maize
is $164/ton.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

     

 

 

Table C5-7b. Effectofl’mjactnd WorldfiholOutpntonMifld/aolflu-andkkabkc COM
Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouuaki Abidjan
C610 d'lvoirelmilledaorgbum
North/tradition] manual 0.79 1.05 0.90 1.00 1.20 > 2
Norm/animal traction 0.81 1.08 0.92 1.02 1.24 > 2
Mali/milledaotgbuum
South/animal traction 0.40 0.65 0.51 0.66 0.92 > 2
Solidi/traditional manual 0.54 0.78 0.64 0.80 1.“ > 2
C610 d'lvoinlrica
Whndalhpmadmanual 0.88 1.22 1.07 1.31 1.54
Pond/uplandltraditionalmanual 1.01 1.31 1.17 1.39 1.59
Fonduplandlimpmvad manual 0.97 1.38 1.19 1.49 1.80
Nonlul'ufigationlinpmvad manual 0.99 1.39 1.19 1.37 1.62 > 2
Nonbluplandltraditional manual 1.15 1.46 1.45 1.43 1.78 > 2
Nonhluplandlanimaltnction 1.96 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2
Mali/1i“
Offical'uu'i'igation/inanaiva 0.58 0.84 0.85 1.13 1.43 > 2
Officefnrigationlaann—imnaiva 0.75 1.04 1.04 1.39 1.77 > 2
Oficalirrigationlnon—imnaiva 0.93 1.25 1.24 1.68 > 2 > 2
Mood/conuolled flooding 1.68 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2
Mopti/traditional flooding > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2

 

 

 

 

 

Note: The projected world price for millet/sorghum is estimated at about SlSS/ton,
while that of rice is about $389/ton.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

265

ITablaCS-8a. EHactnflIigluth—FainaldannCottonandMaiaaDRCeom I

 

 

 

 

 

I Farm Bannkn Sikaaao Korhogo Bouuak‘ Abidjan
C610 d'lvoirelcoflon '
C0n10r/‘unmmv0d manual 0.46 0.48 0.53
Nonnrinpmvodiniinnu 0.47 0.49 0.54
traction
Nonlulaemi-mecluanized 0.94 0.94 0.94 I
Mali/cm
Soudu/‘unmuovadaninnl 0.54 0.60 0.61 0.59
traction
Souutlulinmrovod m 0.63 0.67 0.68 0.66
C610 d’lvoiu'almaina
Pondacmi-machan'ud 0.45 0.70 0.56 0.67 0.94 I
C0n03/inmrov0d an'mal 0.74 0.99 0.70 0.95 0.92 1.42
traction
Canal-[traditional manual 1.03 1.30 0.93 1.25 1.23 1.85
Conatl'unmmad annual 1.01 1.28 0.91 1.23 1.22 1.71
Mali/main
South/improved animal 0.55 0.89 0.69 0.92 1.42 > 2
traction
South/inpmvod manual 0.72 1.10 0.86 1.16 1.77 > 2

 

 

 

 

 

Note: 1/ The border Mali-C6te d’Ivoire is the relevant market for cotton produced
in Mali instead of Korhogo.

2/ In this scenario, on-farm yields are assumed to be 25 percent higher that
those assumed originally.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

266
——
TablaC5-8b. EHanalHWOa—Far-Muhflatlaorflnnandkbanflccm
. Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouuak‘ Abidjan
C610 d’Ivoirelmillot/aorgbum
Noah/traditional manual 0.76 1.08 0.90 1.01 1.26 > 2
North/animal traction 0.78 1.12 0.92 1.03 1.31 > 2
Mali/milledaorgluum
South/animal traction 0.38 0.67 0.49 0.67 1.04 > 2
Sounlultraditional manual 0.50 0.80 0.62 0.81 1.17 > 2
C610 d’lvoinluica
Fonnnowlandalinpmvod manual 0.85 1.29 1 .09 1.39 1.71
Fondluplandltnditional manual 0.98 1.46 1.21 1.59 > 2
Panduplandlinmrovadmanual 0.93 1.37 1.19 1.46 1.73
Nonlul'uu-rigationlinprovad manual 0.95 1.45 1.19 1.40 1.72 > 2
Nonduluplandltraditional annual 1.11 1.50 1.48 1.45 1.69 > 2
Nonh/upland/animaltraction 1.84 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2
Mali/rice
Officel’unigation/inenaiva 0.58 0.91 0.92 1.32 1.83 > 2
Offloal'ufigationlaami—iflnaiva 0.75 1.12 1.11 1.61 > 2 > 2
Offlcal‘uurigationlnon-inanaiva 0.92 1.33 1.31 1.93 > 2 > 2
Mopti/coulrolladflooding 1.66 >2 >2 >2 >2 >2
Mopdlunditionalflooding 1.77 >2 >2 >2 >2 >2
T 1

 

 

Note: In this scenario, on-farm yields are assumed to be 25 percent higher than
those assumed originally.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

267

    
      
   
  
  
   
  

TablaC5-9a. MaudHigICOI-FarnYidiknnComn-deaaDRCcodfldda

 

Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouakd Abidjan

C610 d’lvoirelcouon

Cenerlinproved manual 0.37 0.40 0.45
Nordulinmroved animal 0.38 0.41 0.46
traction

Nonlulaami-mecbaniud 0.74 0.75 0.77

 

 

 

Note: 1/ The border Mali-C6te d’Ivoire is the relevant market for cotton produced
in Mali instead of Korhogo.

2/ In this scenario, on-farm yields are assumed to be 50 percent higher that
those assumed originally.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

 

268

 

 

 

 

TablaC5-9b. EflaadHWOEFamYudbuergbn-MMDRCW

Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouakl Abidjan
C610 d‘Ivoire/millet/aorgbum
Noah/traditional manual 0.63 0.93 0.77 0.85 1.09 > 2
North/animal traction 0.64 0.95 0.78 0.87 1.12 > 2
Mali/milledaorgbum
South/animal traction 0.31 0.57 0.42 0.57 0.86 > 2
South/traditional manual 0.42 0.69 0.53 0.69 1.1!) > 2
C610 d’Ivoire/rice
Boron/lowlanda/inprovad manual 0.69 1.08 0.92 1 . 17 1.43
Pmnluplandluraditional manual 0.82 1.18 1.02 1.29 1.62
Fonfluplandlinpmad manual 0.74 1 . 19 0.99 1.25 1.49
Nonluliu-rigationfmmrovad manual 0.74 1.16 0.96 1.12 1.37 > 2
Norduluuplandltraditional lllllllll 0.92 1.28 1.36 1.23 1.43 > 2
Nonluluplandlanimal traction 1.37 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2
Mali/rice
Office/irrigation/inanaive 0.48 0.79 0.80 1.15 1.57 > 2 L
Officelinigationlaami-in0naiv0 0.61 0.95 0.95 1.37 1.90 > 2
Office/irrigation/non-inanaiva 0.75 1.11 1.11 1.61 > 2 > 2
Mopti/controlled flooding 1.34 1.85 1.80 > 2 > 2 > 2
Mopti/traditionalflooding 1.78 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2

 

 

 

 

 

Note: In this scenario, on-farm yields are assumed to be 50 percent higher than
those assumed originally.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

 

269

 

 

TablaCS—mn. EflctdulmmvadmkafioonCottonudRhDRCCoafldidm

Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouuakd Abidjan
C610 d’lvoire/conon ll
Caner/inmmved manual 0.59 0.61 0.65
North/improved animal traction 0.61 0.63 0.66
Nonblaami—macbaniud 1.27 1.26 1.23
Mali/milladaorgbuum
Sounlulinpmod animal traction 0.66 0.71 0.71 0.69
Souutb/tnditionalnnnual 0.77 0.80 0.81 0.78
C610 d'lvoiraluica
Foam/lowlandalinpaowdnnnual 0.94 1.37 1.16 1.48 1.81 I
Foul/uplandlu'aditional manial 1.05 1.44 1.2.5 1.53 1.82
Fond/uplandlinqurovadmanual 1.07 1.57 1.29 1.71 > 2 '
Nonbl'ufigationlinmmadmanual 1.07 1.57 1.29 1.52 1.87 > 2
Noah/uplandltnditiomlnnnual 1.21 1.59 1.57 1.54 1.84 > 2
Noatb/uuplandlanimaltnction >2 >2 >2 >2 >2 >2
Malilric0
Offlcaliu'rigalion/inanaiva 0.74 1.11 1.10 1.61 > 2 > 2
Offlcal‘irrigation/aami-inamiva 0.97 1.39 1.36 > 2 > 2 > 2
Office/irrigation/non-inanaiva 1.21 1.69 1.65 > 2 > 2 < 0
Mopti/coulrolledflooding >2 >2 >2 >2 >2 >2
Mopti/traditional flooding > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 < 0

 

 

 

 

Note: 1/ The relevant market for the Malian cotton is the border instead of Korhogo
2/ In this scenario, the ginning ratio of the Malian cotton improves from 0.427

to that of C0te d’Ivoire, estimated at 0.445. Meanwhile, the Ivorian rice milling
ratio increases from 0.55 to that of Mali, evaluated at 0.63.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

 

 

270

 

 

Tabla C5-10b. EflnctofanlmpnvadMilling RafioonCottonandR'naDRC Candid”
Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouuakd Abidjan

C610 d‘lvoirelcodon ll

Cenerl'inmmved manual 0.52 0.55 0.59
' Nonnrmmoa animal traction 0.54 0.56 0.60

Nonblaami-macbaninad 1.10 1.10 1.09

Mali/mi1101/aorgluum

Soudul‘unprovad animal traction 0.57 0.62 0.63 0.61

South/traditional manual 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.69

C610 d'lvoiue/rica

Fondllowlandalinmmved manual 0.87 1.27 1.08 1.37 1.68

Pornnluuplandltraditional manual 0.96 1.35 1.18 1.44 1.70

Fond/upland/inmmvvad manual 1.00 1.44 1 . 19 1.56 1.98

Nonlufmigationfmmmvad manual 0.98 1.43 1.18 1.38 1.69 > 2

NorduluplandIu-aditional manual 1.14 1.49 1.47 1.44 1.67 > 2

Noudu/uplandlanimaltraction 1.91 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2

Mali/1100

Oficelinigationlinenaiva 0.68 1.02 1.02 1.47 > 2 > 2

Office/irrigationlaami-inenaiw 0.89 1.27 1.26 1.83 > 2 > 2

Officefurrigation/non—intmaive 1.11 1.54 1.51 > 2 > 2 > 2

Mopti/contolled flooding 2.00 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 < 0

Mopti/naditionalflooding >2 >2 >2 >2 >2 <0

 

 

 

Note: 1/ The relevant market for the Malian cotton is the border instead of Korhogo

2/ In this scenario, the ginning ratio in C6te d’Ivoire and Mali improves to
0.50 and the rice milling ratio in both countries increases to 0.67.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

271

TableCS-lla. EflaetollialvingTranaportCoatnnCmnnandMaiaaDBCCoalfldm

Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouuah‘ Abidjan

 

 

 

C610 d'lvoiralcouon

Cannrl'unmroved manual 0.58 0.60 0.63
Noah/unprinted animal 0.59 0.61 0.64
traction

North/acmi—mecbanized 1 .23 1 .22 1 .20

 

0.88 1.26

 

Note: 1/ The border Mali-C0te d’Ivoire is the relevant market for cotton produced
in Mali instead of Korhogo.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

272

Tabla CS-llb. ManolHdv'IgTrnapouCntnnMiflulaorgb—aachDBCCodfi-Ia l

 

 

 

Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouuak‘ Abidjan

C610 d’lvoirelmillei/aorgbum
North/traditional manual 1.08 1.44 1.29 1.35 1.54 > 2
Noah/animal unction 1.12 1.51 1.34 1.41 1.61 > 2
Mali/milledaoughum
Snutlu/animfltraction 0.60 0.92 0.75 0.97 1.24 > 2
Souutlultuaditional manual 0.76 1.07 0.90 1.11 1.35 > 2
C610 d'Ivoiu/rica
Fond/lowlandalinprovad manual 1.15 1.68 1.54 1.69 1.99
Boron/uplandltraditionalmanual 1.26 1.70 1.57 1.71 > 2
Pom‘huplandlinmrovadnnnual 1.31 > 2 1.79 > 2 > 2
Nordulirrigationfinpmadmanual 1.40 > 2 1.90 > 2 > 2 > 2
Nam/umhndltraditionalmanual 1.45 > 2 > 2 1.96 > 2 > 2
Nonbluuplandlan'nultraction >2 >2 >2 >2 >2 >2
Mali/0'00
Olfical'ufigationlinanaiva 0.82 1.24 1.19 1.47 1.72 > 2
Officalirrigation/aami-inanaiva 1.08 1.56 1.49 1.85 > 2 > 2
Office/irrigationlnon-inenaiva 1.37 1.93 1.82 > 2 > 2 > 2
Mopti/consumed flooding > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2
Mopti/traditional flooding > 2 > 2

_ ___

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Computed from Appendix B

 

273

TableCS-lla. BHactoflawarOpporunn'tyCoauofLandandlnbormndDavahafinaoaCm
andMfiaaDRC Coeflicinuta

 

Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouak6 Abidjan

C610 d'lvoirelconon
Center/'muproved manual 0.43 0.46 0.50
Nordulimprovad animal 0.41 0.44 0.49
traction

I Nonlulaami-macbaniud 0.73 0.74 0.77
Mali/couon
Saudi/improved animal 0.43 0.50 0.51 0.52
traction
South/improved manual 0.53 0.58 0.59 0.60

C610 d'lvoirn/maiza

Barnyard-mechanized 0.41 0.67 0.52 0.65 0.93
Genet/improved aninnl 0.66 0.89 0.62 0.86 0.82 1.30
traction

Caner/traditional manual 0.80 1.01 0.74 0.98 0.96 1.37
Center/improved manual 0.93 1.20 0.82 1.16 1.14 1.73

 

 

 

Note: 1/ The border Mali-Cbte d’Ivoire is the relevant market for cotton produced
in Mali instead of Korhogo.

2/ In scenario, the economic value of land is assumed to be 50 percent lower
than that assumed originally, while the opportunity cost of labor is assumed to be
25 percent lower than that used in the base run. In addition, it is assumed that a 50
percent devaluation took place in both countries.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

 

274

 

 

 

 

 

 

TathS-llb. EflmdlmOmrunhyCoaflofhndandlAbor,ndDflahafiuum¢/afl_-d

Bite DRC Com

Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouakd Abidjan

C610 d'lvoirelmilletlaorgbum
Norm/traditional manual 0.62 0.89 0.74 0.83 1.05 > 2
Noah/animal traction 0.59 0.87 0.71 0.81 1.04 > 2
Mali/nillallaocgbuum
South/ammal traction 0.35 0.64 0.47 0.64 1.01 > 2
Soutbltraditional manual 0.45 0.72 0.56 0.72 1.04 > 2
C610 d’lvoin/rica
Fondlowlandalinprovad manual 0.82 1.25 1.05 1.36 1.69
Bonn/uplandhraditional manual 0.82 1.16 1.01 1.25 1.47
Fomflumhndfinpmvadmanual 0.95 1.51 1.23 > 2 > 2
Nordulirrigationlinmmved manual 1.02 1.58 1.26 1.54 1.92 > 2
Noatluluplandltraditional annual 0.90 1.24 1.23 1.20 1.39 > 2
North/uplandlanimaltraction 1.86 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2
Mali/rice
Offical'urrigationfmnaiva 0.51 0.85 0.85 1.28 1.86 > 2
Offlcal'un-igaiionlaann-inanaiva 0.65 1.1!! 1.00 1.56 > 2 > 2
Officafmigation/non-inanaiva 0.80 1.23 1.23 1.90 > 2 < 0
Mopfilconrollad flooding 1.34 1.94 1.87 > 2 > 2 < 0
Mopti/traditional flooding 1.55 > 2 2.1!) > 2 > 2 < 0

 

 

 

 

 

 

Note: In this scenario, the economic value of land is assumed to be 50 percent of
that assumed originally, while the opportunity cost of labor is assumed to 25 percent
lower than that used in the base run. In addition, it is assumed that both countries
undertook a 50 percent devaluation.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

 

275

 

 

_—
TablaCS—Ba. EflnctofLUWOppoflnm'tyCodaofLandandhbor,Dflahafion,udlm
Tramp"! Coda on Cotton and Maine DRC Com
Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouakl Abidjan
C610 d‘lvoirelcodon
Canerl'unproved manual 0.43 0.45 0.49
North/improved animal 0.40 0.43 0.47
traction
Nmmlnmiomacbaniud 0.70 0.71 0.74
Mali/cotton
Snudu/inprovad animal 0.42 0.48 0.49 0.49
traction
Saudi/improved manual 0.51 0.56 0.57 0.57
C610 d’lvoimlmaiza
Fondunfi-macbaniud 0.45 0.66 0.57 0.64 0.81
Caner/maimed animal 0.72 0.92 0.74 0.89 0.86 1.14
traction
Conn/traditional manual 0.86 1.05 0.87 1.02 0.99 1.24
C0n0r/inprov0d manual 1.02 1.26 1.00 1.22 1.19 1.55
Mali/mama
WWW“ animal 0.50 0.92 0.61 0.79 1.23 > 2

 

 

 

Note: 1/ The border Mali-COte d’Ivoire is the relevant market for cotton produced
in Mali instead of Korhogo.

2/ In scenario, the economic value of land is assumed to be 50 percent lower
than that assumed originally, while the opportunity cost of labor is assumed to be
25 percent lower than that used in the base run. In addition, it is assumed that a 50
percent devaluation took place in both countries and transport costs were halved in
both countries.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

 

276

TablaCS-le. BflaetoIWOppormnhyCoaudLandndlabor,Duahafion,nmeruapu1Cnu

on Milatlaorgbnnu mud Rica DRC Coelfidauta
Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouakd Abidjan

 

C610 d'lvoimlmillatlaorgbum

 

 

Nonlultraditibnal manual 0.69 0.96 0.36 0.90 1.04 > 2
Noah/animal traction 0.67 0.94 0.34 0.33 1.02 > 2
minim/normal
South/animal unction 0.44 0.73 0.57 0.73 0.94 1.66 I
Soudultraditionalmanual 0.54 0.30 0.66 0.31 0.93 1.43
0610 d’lvoirn/rica
Whoa-runpmoammn 0.34 1.27 1.17 1.30 1.52
9“me 0.34 1.13 1.09 1.20 1.35
Fondlupland/inprovadmanual 0.99 1.56 1.39 1.59 1.92
Nonlulirrigationfunmmadmanual 1.09 1.72 1.51 1.59 1.33 > 2
Nonbluuplandltraditionalmanual 0.94 1.30 1.31 1.22 1.34 > 2
Noa‘lbluuplandlanimaltraction >2 >2 >2 >2 >2 >2
Min/no.
Office/irrigationlinenaive 0.57 0.93 0.90 1.13 1.32 > 2
Officafnfigationlaami-inenaive 0.73 1.16 1.11 1.41 1.67 > 2
Ol'licelinigationlnon—inanaivc 0.91 1.41 1.33 1.72 > 2 > 2
Mopti/contmlledflooding 152 >2 >2 >2 >2 >2
Mopti/traditionalflooding 1.72 >2 >2 >2 >2 >2
#1 ...—E

 

 

 

 

Note: In this scenario, the economic value of land is assumed to be 50 percent of
that assumed originally, while the opportunity cost of labor is assumed to 25 percent
lower than that used in the base run. In addition, it is assumed that both countries
undertook a 50 percent devaluation and that transport costs were halved in both
countries.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

277

 

TablaCS-l4a. BRaetoflawarOpporamityCoataofLandudLabor,Davalnatina,Low
TruaponCoataJndProjecudWorldPrbaolOatpnnoaCm-dmaablc
Coefficient

 

Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouak‘ Abidjan
C610 d’lvoire/couon

Center/iamroved manual 0.29 0.31
Nonlu/iayauved animal 0.27 0.29

traction

Northbound—mechanized 0.45 0.46

Mali/cotton

Soudulinmmvad animal 0.28 0.33 0.34 0.34
traction

Soutbl'uaprovad annual 0.34 0.39 0.40 0.40
C610 d‘lvoinlmaiza

Foraat/aami-mecbanizod 0.33 0.46 0.42 0.46
C0n0r/inprov0d animal 0.55 0.68 0.58 0.67 0.64
traction

Caner/traditional manual 0.69 0.81 0.70 0.80 0.78
Caner/improved manual 0.78 0.93 0.78 0.91 0.89
Mali/mama

South/inpuovod animal 0.41 0.69 0.49 0.61 0.85
unction

Soutbl'uapruved manual 0.65 0.76 0.89 0.91 1.08

 

 

 

 

Note: 1/ The border Mali—COte d’lvoire is the relevant market for cotton produced in Mali
instead of Korhogo.

2/ In scenario, the economic value of land is assumed to be 50 percent lower than that
assumed originally, while the opportunity cost of labor is assumed to be 25 percent lower
than that used in the base run. In addition, it is assumed that a 50 percent devaluation took
place in both countries and transport costs were halved in both countries. Moreover, the
projected 2000 world price of cotton and maize are assumed to be $2400/ton and $164/ton,
respectively.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

 

278

 

 

 

TablaCS-l4b. EflmoflmOMCmdLndudLabor,DavmmTr-patm
udProjaeudWoddPricanfOItplnonmet/aorgb-andliceDRCW
Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Bouakd Abidjan
C610 d’lvoirelmilletlaorgbum
North/traditional manual 0.56 0.75 0.69 0.71 0.80
North/animal traction 0.54 0.72 0.66 0.69 0.78
Mali/millet/aorgluuum
South/animal traction 0.36 0.56 0.45 0.55 0.66
Sonar/traditional manual 0.45 0.64 0.54 0.64 0.74
C610 d’lvoirelrica
Foam/lowlandaliapmvad manual 0.69 0.96 0.90 0.99
Wuphndluaditional manual 0.71 0.99 0.93 1.02
Fonduplandliamrovad manual 0.78 1 . 16 1.06 1 . 19
Nortbfurrigationlinprovad manual 0.81 1.16 1.06 1.11 1.24
Norduluplandltnditional manual 0.80 1.06 1.07 1.01 1.10
North/uplandlanimal traction 1.47 > 2 > 2 > 2 > 2
Mali/rice
Officelirrigationlintenaiva 0.43 0.69 0.65 0.81 0.90
Offical'u'rigationlaami-imnaiva 0.55 0.83 0.81 0.97 1.09
Office/irrigationlnon—inanaivn 0.67 0.99 1 .15 1 .30 1 .30
Mopti/controlled flooding 1.13 1.52 1.46 1.75 1.98
Mopti/traditional flooding 1.33 1.69 1.63 1.89 > 2

 

 

Note: In this scenario, the economic value of land is assumed to be 50 percent of
that assumed originally, while the opportunity cost of labor is assumed to 25 percent
lower than that used in the base run. In addition, it is assumed that both countries
undertook a 50 percent devaluation and that transport costs were halved in both
countries. Moreover, the projected 2000 world price of sorghum and rice are
assumed to be $155/ton and $389/ton, respectively.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

 

279

 

 

 

 

 

PrqiectedWorldPrbaelm andlmprnvedMilling BafinaenCoflnn‘BbeDRC
Com
Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Born“ Abidjan
C610 d'Ivoirelcotton ll
Center/iammvad manual 0.25 0.28 0.32
North/improved animal traction 0.24 0.26 0.31
North/aemi-mechanined 0.53 0.41 0.44
Mali/afillet/aorghum
South/improved animal traction 0.23 0.28 0.29
South/traditiornl annual 0.45 0.33 0.34
C610 d’lvoire/rice
Foreatllowlanda/improved annual 0.54 0.78 0.74
Foreat/upland/traditional manual 0.58 0.79 0.74
Fonatluuplandliamroved manual 0.60 0.88 0.81
North/irrigationfuaprovad manual 0.61 0.87 0.80 0.83
Norduluuplandltraditional manual 0.71 1.05 1.06 0.99
North/uplandlaninnl traction 1 .04 1.52 1.51 1.41
Mali/rice
Officel'uruigationlinenaive 0.40 0.64 0.61 0.75
Officel'a-rigationlaemi-intenaive 0.51 0.77 0.75 0.89
Offlce/irrigationlnon-inenaive 0.62 0.90 0.88 1.05
Mopti/contolled flooding 1.03 1.39 1.34 1.59
Mopti/traditional flooding 1.23 1.56 1.51 1.75

 

Note: 1/ For the Malian cotton, the border Mali-C610 d'lvoire ia the relevant market inatead of Korhogo

 

 

2lIntluia acenario,theopportuunitycoataoflandandlaborare aaaumedtobe50and25 percenlowerthanduoaeammed
originally, and tranaport coata were half of their original valuea. In addition, it in aaauumed that a 50 percen devaluation took
place, while the ginning ratioa improved to 50 percent and the milling ratioa for rice increaaed to 67 percent in both counriea.
Furthermore, the projected 2000 world pricca for cotton and rice are aaauumed to be were $24W1on and $389/ton,

respectively.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

 

 

280

 

 

 

 

 

TableC5-16a. MertoILowerOppormnityCoataollnndandLabor,LowerTranaportCoata,
Devalnatioa, Improved Ginning Ratios and on-Fann Viola, ad Projected World
PrieeofOntpnn onCottonandMaiaeDRC Coeflicinuta
Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo Botuakd Abidjan
C610 d'lvoire/cotton
Center/iamroved manual 0.20 0.23 0.27
North/rammed animal 0.19 0.21 0.26
traction
North/aemi-mechardzed 0.30 0.32 0.36
Mali/cotton
South/iamrovod animal 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.25
traction
Smith/rammed manual 0.22 0.27 0.28 0.28
C610 d’lvoire/ma’ma
Wand-mechanized 0.25 0.37 0.33 0.36 0.44
Ccuuterl‘rnmmvod animal 0.43 0.54 0.46 0.54 0.51 0.66
traction
Center/traditioml manual 0.55 0.66 0.57 0.65 0.63 0.77
Center/iamroved manual 0.60 0.73 0.62 0.72 0.69 0.87
Mali/maize
Souuthlinmroved animal 0.38 0.56 0.47 0.56 0.66 0.91
traction
Sandi/inmrovad manual 0.51 0.71 0.61 0.72 0.85 1.18
— — ,

 

 

Note: ll The border Mali—COte d’Ivoire is the relevant market for cotton produced in Mali
instead of Korhogo.

2/ In scenario, the opportunity costs of land and labor are assumed to be 50 and 25
percent lower that those assumed originally, transport costs were half of their original
values, and a 50 percent devaluation took place in both countries. Moreover, the ginning
ratio in both countries are assumed to improve to 50 percent, and on-farm yields increased
by 25 percent. Furthermore, the projected 2000 world prices of cotton and maize are
assumed to be $2400/ton and $164/ton, respectively.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

 

 

281

 

 

 

 

  
  
  
  
  
  

l _
TableCS-le. EfleaolLowerOppornnhyCoauoandandLabor,LoquruaponCm,Devahniu,
lnuprovedMilling RatioaandOn-Farnu rm,andrrnjac1odw«idrrioanoromaa
walla/domai— and Rice DRC Coefficiuuta
Farm Bamako Sikaaao Korhogo nouau Abidjan
C610 d'lvoiralmillet/aorgbuum
North/traditional manual 0.45 0.62 0.56 0.53 0.67 > 2
North/animal traction 0.43 0.59 0.54 0.56 0.64 > 2
Mali/milledaorghum
South/animal traction 0.23 0.46 0.37 0.44 0.53 0.74
South/traditional manual 0.36 0.53 0.45 0.53 0.61 0.32
C610 d’lvoire/rica
mwmmad manual 0.42 0.63 0.60 0.66 0.74
Bonn/uplandltraditionalannual 0.46 0.66 0.62 0.68 0.75
Wield/improved inaniau 0.46 0.69 0.64 0.72 0.32
Nordul'n'rigationlinmroved annual 0.46 0.67 0.62 0.64 0.73 > 2
Northluplandltraditiounl manual 0.61 0.37 0.37 0.31 0.91 > 2
Norduluplandlanimaltraction 0.74 1.09 1.03 1.02 1.15 > 2
Mali/rice
Office/irrigationlinenaive 0.32 0.54 0.51 0.64 0.70 0.99
Oficelirrigation/aamu-unenarve 0.40 0.63 0.62 0.74 0.32 1.13 '
Office/irrigation/non-rnemve 0.47 0.73 0.72 0.35 0.95 1.39
Mopti/condoned flooding 0.79 1.10 1.07 1.26 1.41 > 2
Mopti/traditional flooding 0.93 1.27 1.23 1.42 137 > 2

 

 

 

 

Note: In this scenario, the opportunity costs of land and labor are assumed to be 50 and 25
percent lower than those assumed originally, transport costs were half of their original
values, a 50 percent devaluation took place, and the milling ratios improved to 67 percent
in both countries. Moreover, on-farm yields are assumed to increase by 25 percent in both
countries. Furthermore, the projected 2000 world price for millet/sorghum and rice are

assumed to be SlSS/ton and $389/ton, respectively.

Source: Computed from Appendix B

 

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