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MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSI

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This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

THE EFFECTS OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE
COGNITIVE SOCIAL PRIMING ON SELF-SCHEMATA,
SELF-EFFICACY, MOOD STATES AND MOTOR PERFORMANCE

presented by

Richard Ray Albrecht

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. Physical Education and

degreein _ .
Exerc1se Sc1ence

 

 

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Major professor

Date November 18, 1993

 

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MSU Is An Afﬁrmative Action/Equal Opportunity Inaitution

awn-Mind. pins—p. 1

THE EFFECTS OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE
COGNITIVE SOCIAL PRIMING ON SELF-SCHEMATA,
SELF-EFFICACY, MOOD STATES AND MOTOR PERFORMANCE

By
Richard Ray Albrecht

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Physical Education and Exercise Science

1993

 

ABSTRACT

THE EFFECTS OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE
COGNITIVE SOCIAL PRIMING ON SELF-SCHEMATA,
SELF-EFFICACY, MOOD STATES AND MOTOR PERFORMANCE

By
Richard Ray Albrecht

Several cognitive factors have been shown to inﬂuence the quality of
motor performance. Despite theory suggesting that positive and
negative cognitive social priming may impact motor behavior, there
has been no attempt to hypothesize and test its direct or indirect role
on motor performance. This study addressed these previously
neglected areas in the motor performance literature. Speciﬁcally, it
was predicted that: (a) a positive or negative self-schema would be
differentially primed by an unobtrusive exposure to either a positive or
negative social situation, (b) information upon which task-speciﬁc self-
efﬁcacy predictions are based would be selectively and differentially
processed depending on the type of self-schema invoked through the
priming process, and (c) due to a positive relationship between self-
efﬁcacy and performance, subjects in the negative priming condition
would perform less well on a subsequent motor task than subjects
assigned to the positive priming condition. In addition, it was
predicted that exposure to the priming condition would differentially
inﬂuence mood states which would, in turn, impact performance.
Employing a randomized block design, 81 female volunteers with self-
schemata that were positive (n = 27), negative (11 = 27) or aschematic
(n = 27) toward physical activity were unobtrusively exposed to a

videotape depicting either a positive, negative or neutral social

7 ,,, .ﬁﬂiwwgag, __.- _.--__ 1

interaction between a basketball coach and her team. Pre- and post-
manipulation self-schemata, self-efﬁcacy, mood state and performance
measures were collected. Findings supported the contention that
even brief and indirect exposures to seemingly irrelevant positive and
negative social contexts are capable of exerting considerable inﬂuence
on the activation of self-referent cognitions. Speciﬁcally, multivariate
analyses revealed that although mood states were unaffected by the
exposure to the prime, there was a signiﬁcant priming effect on
subjects' subsequent self-schemata ratings and self-efﬁcacy
expectations. Even more important was the unique ﬁnding that
positive and negative priming can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the execution
of a subsequent motor task. Path analyses, however, failed to support
the predicted causal relationships among priming, self-schemata, self-
efﬁcacy, mood and performance. Applied and theoretical implications
of these ﬁndings are discussed.

To Mom. Dad and Julie

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There is no way to recognize everyone who contributed to this
project. When I think about all the help I've received I realize how
fortunate I am to be surrounded by so many thoughtful and caring
people.

Not only did Deborah Feltz serve as my guidance committee
chair and dissertation director, she has been my mentor and friend for
the better part of the past decade. I can honestly say that whatever
I'm able to accomplish professionally. I owe to Deb.

Martha Ewing, like Deb, has also been a positive inﬂuence on
my professional development for many years. Like everyone who
comes in contact with Marty, I've grown to value her insight, technical
competence, good-natured wit, but most of all, her friendship.

In the summer of 1976, Lawrence Messe did the impossible. He
taught a math-anxious psychology undergraduate that statistics were
not something to be dreaded but rather, a tool to better understand
the world. As a member of my doctoral committee, Larry continued to
broaden my awareness of methodological and statistical issues.

Galen Bodenhausen introduced me to many of the psychological
concepts examined in this dissertation. In fact, the rudimentary work
upon which this project is based was a proposal I wrote for Galen's
cognitive social psychology class. It was only with his constant
encouragement that I was able to develop this rather insigniﬁcant
proposal into a full-ﬂedged doctoral dissertation.

Although my initial contact with William Anderson was as his
graduate assistant, he and his wife, Kim, quickly became two of my

closest friends. It is not an exaggeration to say this project would

V

never have been completed without the professional and personal
support I received -- and continue to receive -- from Bill and Kim. I
only regret I will never be able to repay them for their many acts of
kindness.

I also have to thank four other members of my OMERAD "family."
Josie Csete, Karen Lienhart, Therese deSpelder and Chris Reznich
have been my full-time friends and colleagues (and part-time
therapists). As is the case with Bill and Kim, they have always been
there when I needed them. My thanks to each of you.

My long-time friend, Sam Ewing also needs to be acknowledged
(he just called on the phone and begged me to do so). Seriously, Sam
has always been willing to help me in every way imaginable. I couldn't
ask for a better friend. I'm only sorry I don't see him as often as I did
when we traveled the area giving baseball and coaching clinics.

Although the individuals I've mentioned thus far are "like" family
to me, I'll only have one true family. My mother, father and sister (and
her husband) have always provided me with unconditional love and
support. This past year. more than ever, I've come to realize how
lucky I am to have them. Unfortunately, my nature doesn't often allow
me to express how important they are to me. I trust they know how
much I appreciate them.

I would also be remise if I didn't mention the direct and indirect
contributions of my ex-wife, Karen. I recognize the many sacriﬁces she
made to advance my academic pursuits. Although we will not share the

future, we will always share the past.

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

LIST OF TABLES ......................................... x
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................ xi
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................... 1
Nature of the Problem ............................... 1
Cognitive social priming ........................... 1
Social schemata .................................. 3
Self-Schemata .................................... 4

The self-schema—self-efﬁcacy relationship ............ 6

The self—efﬁcacy—performance relationship ........... 7

The mood state—self-perception relationship ......... 8
Statement of the Problem ............................ 8
Delimitations ...................................... l 1
Basic Assumptions ................................... 1 1
Limitations ......................................... 12

II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ......................... 13
Cognitive Priming in Social Perception ................. 13
Historical overview ................................ 13
Priming of social judgments ........................ 15
Theoretical models of the priming effect ............. 18
Further delineations of the priming effect ............ 25
Cognitive Schemata ................................. 30
Historical overview of schema theory ................. 30
Schema theory .................................... 32
Self-Schemata .................................... 38
Self-Efﬁcacy ....................................... 45
Mediating (and Mediated) Effects of Mood States ........ 51
The relationship between mood and self-schemata ..... 52

The relationship between mood and self-efﬁcacy ...... 54
Priming of Self-Referent Cognitions .................... 57
Priming of self-schemata ........................... 57
Priming of self-efﬁcacy ............................. 59
Priming of mood states ............................ 61
Cognitions and Motor Performance .................... 63

vii

 

The relationship between self-efﬁcacy and

motor performance ................................. 63
The relationship between mood and
motor performance ................................ 64
The relationship between priming and behavior ....... 68
III. METHOD ............................................ 75
Pre-Experimental Schematicity Assessment .............. 75
Subjects ........................................... 75
Instrumentation .................................... 76
Perceived Physical Ability Scale (PPA(des)) ............ 76
Importance of Perceived Physical Ability
Scale (PPA(imp)) .................................. 76
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale ............. 77
Procedure .......................................... 77
Collection of physical ability schematicity data ......... 77
Classiﬁcation of subjects' self-schemata for
physicalability....................... ............. 78
Experimental Data Collection ........................... 81
Subjects ........................................... 8 l
Instrumentation .................................... 8 1
Demographic /background questionnaire .............. 8 1
Proﬁle of Mood States (POMS) ....................... 82
Physical ability self-schemata ........................ 82
Task-speciﬁc self—efﬁcacy .......................... 83
Golf putting task .................................. 83
Coaching style videotapes ........................... 85
Manipulation Check Questionnaire ................... 86
Procedure .......................................... 87
Collection of experimental data ...................... 87
Experimental manipulation and data collection ........ 89
Manipulation Check Questionnaire and debrieﬁng ..... 9 1
Data entry and analyses ............................. 92
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ............................ 94
Pre-Manipulation Results ............................... 94
Equivalence of Experimental Group Assignment ......... 94
Equivalence of Schematicity Blocks ................... 96
Assessment of Order Effects .......................... 96
Reliability of Outcome Measures ......................... 97
Reliability of self-schema instruments ................ 97
Reliability of the Proﬁle of Mood State subscales ....... 98
Post-Manipulation Results .............................. 98
Manipulation Check ................................. 98
Effect of Priming on Outcome Variables ................ 100
viii

 

 

Causal Relationships Among the Variables .............. 1 05
General Discussion of the Results ........................ 1 10
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ......................... l 17
Summary ............. 117
Conclusions ........................................ 1 2O
Implications for Practitioners and Suggestions
for Future Research .................................. 12 1
FOOTNOTES .............................................. 124
APPENDICES
A Self-Descriptive Version of the Perceived
Physical Ability Scale (PPAdes) ...................... 125
B. Self-Importance Version of the Perceived
Physical Ability Scale (PPAimp) ...................... 126
C Shortened Version (Form C) of the Marlow-
Crowne Social Desirability Scale ..................... 127
D. Demographic/ Background Questionnaire ............... 128
E. Abbreviated Version of the Proﬁle of Mood States ........ 130
F. Alternative Word Lists for the Proﬁle of Mood States ..... 132
G. Golf Putting-Speciﬁc Self-Efﬁcacy Scale ................ 134
H. Transcriptions of Manipulation Videotapes ............. 137
1. Description of Coaching Behavior Assessment
System (CBAS) .................................... 148
J. Manipulation Check Questionnaire ..................... 149
K. Informed Consent Form .............................. 151
L BIODOT Color Reference Chart ........................ 152
M. Calculations for x2 "goodness of ﬁt" test between
hypothesized and fully-identiﬁed causal models ........ 153
N. University Approval for Use of Human Subjects .......... 1 56
0. Raw Data ......................................... 1 57
LIST OF REFERENCES ..................................... 175

 

 

 

 

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE Page
1. Postulates Related to the Storage, Search and
Retrieval Processes Underlying the Priming Effect . . . 20
2. Conceptual Deﬁnitions of Self-Schema .............. 4O

3. Decision Rules Employed in the Classiﬁcation of
Physical Ability Schematicity ....................... 79

4. Descriptive Statistics for All Pre-Manipulation
Dependent Variables ............................. 95

5. Alpha Reliability (Internal Consistency) Coefﬁcients
for Six POMS Subscales and Total Mood Disturbance
Scores ........................................ 99

6. Descriptive Statistics for all Post-Manipulation
Dependent Variables ............................ 102

7. Correlations Among Priming and Pre-Post Difference
Scores on All Outcome Variables .................. 108

 

 

 

LIST OF FIGURES

Page
Classic "iceberg" proﬁle exhibited by elite runners,
oarsmen and wrestlers ........................... 67
Golf putting performance task .................... 84

Completely randomized block design with replications
(Blocking variable: Physical ability self-schematicity) . . 90

Results of planned orthogonal contrasts among
manipulation groups on perceived positive/negative
style of videotaped coach .......................... 101

Contrasts between manipulation conditions for pre
to post differences in each outcome variable ......... 104

Path cofﬁcients for hypothesized relationships
among priming and difference scores on all
outcome variables ............................... 107

Path cofﬁcients for the full model relationships

among priming and difference scores on all
outcome variables ................................ l 1 1

xi

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

N ur f Pr 1 m

A number of cognitive factors have been shown to inﬂuence the
quality of motor performance. The sport psychology literature is
replete with investigations examining the manner in which cognitive
variables such as anxiety, attention, causal attributions, goal intentions,
motivation, mood states and self-efﬁcacy contribute to the acquisition
and performance of motor skills. Despite the strong theoretical
assumption that another cognitive factor -- positive and negative
cognitive social priming -- may also exert a considerable inﬂuence on
motor behavior, there has been no attempt to hypothesize and test its
direct or indirect (via its impact on other cognitive mechanisms) role
on motor performance.

Qegnigve eeeial priming. Although the extent to which cognitive
social priming can inﬂuence the acquisition and performance of motor
tasks has yet to be examined, the priming phenomenon has been the
focus of extensive research within the broader conﬁnes of cognitive
and social psychology. According to the deﬁnition set forth by Fiske
and Taylor (1984), cognitive priming relates to "the effects of prior
context on the interpretation and retrieval of information . . . priming
ie speciﬁcally the name for the fact that recenm and frequently

tiv i e come to mind m re asil ani eas tha hav not
W" [italics added] (p. 231). In a frequently cited
investigation into the effects of cognitive social priming on impression
formation, Higgins and his colleagues (Higgins, Rholes & Jones, 1977)

found that interpretation and retrieval of information was even

1

 

 

susceptible to priming by seemingly irrelevant prior contexts. In their
study. subjects were unobtrusively exposed to a series of either
"positive" or "negative" personality traits (e.g., adventurous versus
reckless: self—conﬁdent versus conceited, etc.). Later, in a supposedly
unrelated context, the subjects read ambiguous descriptions about an
individual named Donald who engages in such behaviors as mountain
climbing, skydiving and demolition derby driving. Despite the fact
that ostensibly, the two contexts (exposure to the personality traits
and reading the story about Donald) had nothing to do with one
another, subjects who had earlier been "primed" through exposure to
the positive traits evaluated Donald more favorably than subjects
"primed" with negative traits.

A similar ﬁnding has recently been reported in a sport context.
Warm and Branscombe (1990) found that. relative to subjects who had
been primed by exposure to nonaggressive sports, subjects exposed to
aggressive sports were more likely to rate an ambiguous person as
hostile and as being an individual who enjoyed aggressive activities.

Fiske and Taylor (1984) offer the following explanation for these
somewhat surprising results: "The priming effect suggests that, in the
selection of a person schema to apply to the interpretation of new
information, those recently activated are more accessible" (p. 175).
Similarly, Wyer & Srull (1980. 1981, 1986; Srull & Wyer, 1979)
account for the effects of priming by drawing an analogy to a "storage
bin" in which those objects (in this case, a positive or negative
schema) which are placed at the top of the heap (invoked most
recently) become those most readily accessible. Simply put, as the

need to process and interpret new information arises. we search our

 

3

cognitive storage bin -- starting from the top -- for a framework or
schema to serve as a perceptual ﬁlter of reality. Upon locating a
plausible schema (usually one that has been recently and / or frequently
invoked), the cognitive miser within us, in its pursuit for economy of
mental functioning, curtails the further search for an alternative, and
perhaps more appropriate schema.

$291911 echemata. The most inﬂuential models set forth to explain
the mechanisms underlying the priming effect rely on the existence of
abstract memory structures or social schemata. Social schemata assist
the individual in classifying and categorizing new social information
because every second of our waking lives we, as human beings, ﬁnd
ourselves bombarded by literally thousands of pieces of information
pertaining to the social and nonsocial world around us. Although we
are fortunate in that the vast majority of these stimuli can be safely
ignored, there are always certain pieces of information impinging
upon us requiring further cognitive processing. With so much
information to process and such a limited mental capacity with which
to perform this task, we are often forced into the role of "cognitive
misers" -- taking mental shortcuts that enable us to make instant
judgments regarding the relevance or non-relevance of particular
stimuli (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Wyer & Srull, 1986). Although these
cognitive shortcuts or heuristics are essential in dealing effectively and
efﬁciently with vast amounts of information, they carry with them the
heavy price tag of being inherently prone to processing errors and
biases. One form of mental shortcut receiving considerable attention
in the cognitive social psychology literature involves the development

and use of "social schemata." In the broadest of possible terms, social

 

 

 

schemata may be deﬁned as cognitive structures which serve as
abstracted or generalized knowledge structures regarding speciﬁc
social events or entities. Emphasizing the economic necessity of
employing such schemata, Fiske and Taylor ( 1984) see them as
"organized generic prior knowledge [which] enables us to function in a
social world that otherwise would be of paralyzing complexity" (p.
149). Because these abstractions are used to keep us informed as to
"the way things are" in the social world, they tend to selectively guide
(and in some cases -- misguide) our perceptions, memories and
inferences regarding incoming social stimuli. In the words of Markus
and Smith (1981) "Schemata are the basis of the selectivity that is
operative in information processing" (p. 240). Neisser (1976) even
more succinctly summarizes the role of schemata in information
processing as follows: "Perceivers pick up only what they have
schemas for and willy-nilly ignore the rest" (p. 80).

Self-Schemata. Although it is possible to identify several
subcategories of social schemata on the basis of their content, such as
those used to process and categorize information pertaining to (a)
other individuals (person schemata); (b) appropriate norms and
behaviors of broadly deﬁned groups of individuals (role schemata); or
(c) particular situations or events (event schemata), the primary
concern at present is with the speciﬁc subset of social schemata that
guide individuals in the way they perceive, remember and make
inferences about themselves (self-schemata). A common theoretical
assumption is that one tends to view the "self" in much the same way
he or she views others (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984). This general
position is expressed by Kihlstrom and Cantor as follows:

 

 

 

The question naturally arises as to whether the mental

representations [schemata] of oneself differ in some way from

one's representations [schemata] of other people. From a

structural point of view, we think the answer is clearly no: The

self-concept is organized along the same lines as concepts

representing others. (p.29)

This view that the formation of mental representations about the
self are generally subject to the same principles associated with the
formation of mental representations about other people led Higgins *-
and his colleagues to hypothesize the following: "Given that category
accessibility [priming] can affect how a person characterizes another
person, it may also affect how a person characterizes his or her own
behavior and internal processes" (Higgins, et al., 1977, p.152).
Self—schemata, as is the case with social schemata as a whole, enable
the individual to form an abstracted or generalized version of a social
entity, which is then used as a perceptual ﬁlter through which
incoming information is subsequently processed. One important
aspect of self-schemata is that unlike other types of social and
nonsocial schemata, self-schemata are used as perceptual ﬁlters for
information concerned with the most important of social entities --
the "self." Several theorists. in fact, have gone so far as to deﬁne self-
concept as nothing more than "a system of schemata" (Markus &
Smith, 1981, p. 242) or "a complex, person-speciﬁc, central,
attitudinal schema" (Greenwald & Patkanis, 1984, p. 130). Such views
imply that several different self-schemata may be included within an
individual's concept of his or her "self." For example, a particular

individual may have a number of equally plausible self-schemata: "me as

 

6

introvert," "me as musician," "me as athlete," "me as honors student,"
etc. The speciﬁc self-schema that becomes activated, and therefore
used as a framework for the interpretation of subsequent stimuli, is
simply a function of which schema is most salient at a particular time
(Markus 8: Smith, 1981). Several factors such as motivations,
relevancy, frequency of activation, or recency of activation may
contribute to which, among the several possible self-schemata
available, is most salient at a particular time (Fiske & Taylor, 1984;
Higgins, Bargh & Lombardi, 1985). Closely related to this principle
that self-schemata can be made more salient by frequent or recent
activation is the notion that self-schemata may actually be susceptible
to social "priming" (Higgins, et al., 1977 ; Higgins et al., 1985).

flhe eelf-eehema — eelf-efﬁeaey relaﬂenehip. A major premise of
schema theory holds that self-schemata, by selectively encoding.
storing and retrieving information, serve to guide individuals in the
way they perceive, remember and make inferences about themselves.
Simply put, "when people are asked to predict their own behavior,
they usually make predictions consistent with their self-schema"
(Fiske & Taylor, 1984, p. 157). Accordingly, this should also include
making predictions based on one's self-efﬁcacy beliefs. Markus
(1977), in her initial (and highly influential) investigation of the role
self-schema play in information processing, found that "schematic"
and "non-schematic" individuals differ signiﬁcantly in the way they
process information. Not only did she ﬁnd self-schemata facilitate
individuals’ judgments and decisions about themselves, they further

"previde a, paeie fer the eenﬁgent eelf-predieﬁen ef behavier en
eehema-relateg dimeneiene" [italics added] (p. 63).

 

 

 

 

 

7

In a similar investigation into the way in which behavioral self-
predictions can be inﬂuenced by one's self-schemata, Kendzierski
(1988) classiﬁed 66 college undergraduates as having either (a) a self-
schema for exercising (exerciser schematics); (b) a self-schema for
not exercising (nonexerciser schematics); or (c) a self-schema which
favored neither exercising nor non-exercising (aschematics). Each
subject rated 12 pairs of behavioral alternatives (one of which
reﬂected a pro—exercise orientation, the other alternative did not) on a
lOO-point scale indicating the likelihood they would behave in the way
described. Results indicated that exerciser schematics thought they
would be more likely to choose the exercise-oriented alternative than
did either aschematics or nonexerciser schematics. In addition,
aschematics were more likely to predict they would choose the
exercise—oriented alternative than the nonexerciser schematics. Thus.
although the self-schema—self—efﬁcacy relationship has not yet been
directly tested, evidence exists that indicates these variables should be
positively related.

The self-efﬁcacy — performance relationship. The relationship
between self-efﬁcacy, which according to Bandura (1977) "is the
conviction that one can successfully execute the behavior required to
produce [an] outcome" (p. 193), and motor performance has become
axiomatic. Not surprisingly, the intuitively appealing notion that task-
specific conﬁdence is positively correlated with performance has
received overwhelming support from myriad empirical investigations
(e.g., Bandura, 1982; Bandura, Adams & Beyer, 1977; Feltz, 1982;
McAuley, 1985). Bandura's (1977) original model of the role self-
efﬁcacy plays in performance predicts that the relationship between

 

 

_‘

 

8

self-efﬁcacy and performance is reciprocal in that efﬁcacy is the
mediator of performance which in turn inﬂuences future perceptions
of task efficacy. Recently, a respeciﬁed model of self-efﬁcacy has been
proposed and supported by Feltz (1982, 1988a; Feltz & Albrecht,
1986; Feltz 81 Mugno, 1983) in which both prior performance and
self-efﬁcacy act as mediators of subsequent performance.

The mead ejate — eelf-pereepgen relatienehip. Observing that
individuals clinically diagnosed as depressives tended to selectively
focus on past and present negative information about themselves, Beck
(1967, 1976) proposed that mood states may be associated with
distortions in the processing of information about the self. In addition
to providing support for the contention that mood states inﬂuence
self-relevant information processing, Natale and Hantas (1982)
demonstrated that even temporarily elevated or depressed mood
states are capable of producing biased memory and information
processing. It was found, for example, that having been induced with
a "happy" mood state was "associated with decreased recall of negative
events and an increased recall of positive events" (p. 927). In
contrast, subjects within whom a "sad" mood was induced were found
to have a "decreased recall of positive life experiences, weaker
memory strength for positive information about oneself, and a bias to
recall false negative self-descriptions" (p. 927).

m n f Pr m

This study was undertaken to address previously neglected areas
in the motor performance literature. Speciﬁcally, it was predicted
that: (a) a positive or negative self-schema would be differentially

primed as a result of exposure to either a positive or negative social

 

 

 

situation. (b) information upon which task-speciﬁc self-efﬁcacy

predictions are based would be selectively and differentially processed
depending on the type of self-schema that had been invoked through
the priming process, and (c) due to a positive relationship between
self—efﬁcacy and performance, subjects in the negative priming
condition would perform less well on a subsequent motor task than
those subjects assigned to the positive priming condition. In addition,
it was predicted that exposure to the priming condition would have a
direct effect on mood state which would, in turn, impact on
performance. Finally, on the basis of Markus' (1977: Markus 8: Sentis,
1982) ﬁndings that schematics and aschematics process information
differently and possessing a self-schema for a particular behavioral
domain makes an individual more resistant to counter-schematic
information, it was hypothesized that there would be an interaction

between priming condition (i.e., positive, negative) and physical ability

self-schematicity (i.e., positive, negative, aschematic). Priming effects,

therefore, should be exacerbated when the prime is schema-
consistent.

Speciﬁcally, the following research hypotheses were set forth and
experimentally tested using data collected via a completely
randomized block design with replications.

(1) A negative or "failure-oriented" self—schema will be primed
(made most salient and accessible) in subjects who are
unobtrusively exposed to a coach punishing (verbally
criticizing) her players during a halftime talk. Conversely, a
positive or "success—oriented" self—schema will be primed

(made most salient and accessible) in subjects who are

 

N‘V‘

 

 

10

unobtrusively exposed to a coach encouraging (verbally
praising) her players during a halftime talk.

(2) Information upon which task-speciﬁc self-efﬁcacy

(3

v

predictions are made will be selectively and differentially
processed depending on the type of self-schema (positive or
negative) that has been invoked through the priming
process. Speciﬁcally, subjects within whom a negative self—
schema has been invoked will tend to process subsequent
ambiguous information related to a task in a manner
consistent with a negative or "failure-oriented" self-schema.
In contrast, subjects approaching the task with a positive
self-schema will tend to process ambiguity associated with
the task in a manner consistent with a positive, "success-
oriented" self-schema. Because of these unconscious
information processing biases, subjects who overhear
athletes being criticized will report lower task—speciﬁc self-
efﬁcacy expectations for an ambiguous motor task than will
those subjects who are made to overhear the coach praising
her athletes.

Subjects exposed to the positive prime will exhibit
signiﬁcantly lower Total Mood Disturbance (TMD) scores on
the Proﬁle of Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr &
Droppleman, 1971) than subjects exposed to the negative
coach videotape. Furthermore, mood disturbance scores will
be negatively associated with overall motor performance. As

TMD increases, performance will decrease.

‘V‘

—=-—-——'—’* ,

1 1

(4) Due to a positive relationship between self-efﬁcacy and
performance, subjects in the failure-related (criticizing
coach) condition will perform less well on a subsequent
motor task than will subjects assigned to the success-related
(praising coach) condition.

(5) There will be a signiﬁcant interaction between priming
condition and physical ability self-schematicity. Speciﬁcally,
priming will be exacerbated when it is schema-consistent
(i.e., positive schematics will be inﬂuenced most by exposure
to a positive social prime; negative schematics will be
inﬂuenced most by exposure to a negative social prime;
aschematics will be inﬂuenced by both positive and negative
social priming).

Delimitatione

Subjects in this study were limited to college-age females enrolled
in undergraduate psychology courses at Michigan State University. All
subjects voluntarily participated in the study in return for course
credit. Generalizability of the results obtained in the study are,
therefore, limited to the speciﬁc tasks and subject population
employed.
B ic m n

In addition to having minimal visual and auditory abilities needed
to attend to the experimental manipulation, subjects were assumed to
possess motivation levels necessary for the accurate completion of all
written questionnaires and motor performances. It was also assumed
that a 5-minute exposure to the manipulation was of adequate duration

and intensity to equally prime negative, positive and neutral self-

 

 

 

12

schemata in each subject. Furthermore, the golf putting task was
assumed to be an adequate indication of motor performance.
Limi n

This study was limited by the inability to make the experimenter
unaware of the manipulation to which each subject had been exposed.
Although extreme care was taken to treat each subject equally, the
lack of a "double—blind" makes it impossible to rule out the unlikely
event that some subjects were inadvertently provided subtle positive

or negative cues during their interaction with the experimenter.

 

 

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The present chapter reviews relevant literature pertaining to
selected cognitive factors that may, either individually or in an
integrated fashion, inﬂuence motor performance. Speciﬁcally
examined are the areas of (a) cognitive social priming, (b) self-
schemata, (c) self-efﬁcacy, and (d) mood states. In addition, it
presents a synthesis of previous research into the interrelationships
among these variables and the inﬂuences they exert on performance.

i v Primin in i P r n

Although the extent to which cognitive social priming can
inﬂuence the acquisition and performance of motor tasks has yet to be
examined, the priming phenomenon has been the focus of extensive
research within the broader conﬁnes of cognitive and social
psychology. A review of these studies is provided as a foundation from
which a cognitive social priming research paradigm can be extended
into the realm of motor behavior.

Hieterieal eveﬂew. Gardner (1985) has described cognitive
science as having both "a very long past and a relatively short history"
(p. 9). This statement is equally descriptive of research involving the
priming of social cognitions. Social priming's "very long past" is
readily apparent by the voluminous priming literature that has been
amassed by cognitive psychologists during several decades of research
into the effects an initial stimulus (prime) can exert on the response
to a second (target) stimulus (Simon, 1988). Also contributing to the
"long past" of priming in social cognition are the myriad investigations

into the effects of prior social context on subsequently encountered

l3

 

 

 

 

 

14

social information. Despite the tradition of scientiﬁc involvement in
both cognitive priming and the effects of prior social contexts on
social information processing, only recently has the priming metaphor
found its way into the social psychological literature. One indication of
just how recently the term "priming" achieved legitimacy is the fact
that it failed to meet established criteria for inclusion as a
psychological index term until the 5th Edition of the W
Pelehelegieal Index Terme published in 1988 (American Psychological
Association, 1988).1 A second indication that the use of the priming
metaphor within a social context is still in its infancy is the fact that
virtually all of the "classic" social cognition priming research
conducted in the late 1970's and early 1980's (e.g., Bargh 8r
Pietromonaco, 1982; Higgins 8: King, 1981; Higgins, et al., 1977;
Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980) was published with titles and abstracts that
were devoid of any reference to priming. Much of this early research
into the social effects of priming, therefore, is found under the more
conceptually descriptive and still active (e.g., Smith, 1988; Smith &
Branscombe, 1987) rubric of category accessibility.

A number of early investigations demonstrated it was possible to
inﬂuence the manner in which social information is perceived,
remembered and used in inference making simply by altering the
context prior to stimulus presentation. Schachter and Singer, (1962)
for example, injected subjects with epinephrine (adrenaline), a
hormone known to stimulate the sympathetic nervous system thereby
producing a general feeling of physiological arousal. In one
experimental condition subjects were informed that the drug may
produce an emotional state characterized by increased heartbeat,

 

 

 

 

 

15
ﬂushing of the face, sweating, etc. In the other condition, subjects
were not told of the physiological effects of the drug. All subjects were
then exposed to a social context in which a confederate began acting
in an agitated and hostile manner. Subjects who were aware of the
drug's eﬁ'ects did not follow the lead of the confederate but those who
could make no attribution to the injection tended to act in a manner
similar to that exhibited by the confederate. In another study
designed to examine the effects of prior context on information
processing, Kelley (1950) found that students who were told ahead of
time that their new instructor was a "warm" person subsequently rated
the instructor more favorably than students to whom the instructor
had been described as "cold." Although the results of this study are
often cited as evidence of the inﬂuence a prior context (the
experimenter's labeling of the instructor) can have on the storage and
retrieval of social information, Higgins, et al. (1977) offer an
alternative explanation for Kelley's ﬁndings. They suggest that because
the students were aware of the experimenter's personal opinion of the
instructor (as being either a "warm" or "cold" person) their public
ratings may not have been an accurate reﬂection of their private
judgments or recollections, but rather, the students' conscious or
unconscious efforts to provide ratings conforming to the
experimenter's judgments.

Priming of seeial judgments. Drawing on the previous writings of
Bartlett (1932) and Bruner (1957; 1958) suggesting that the
perception process involves a linkage between a stimulus and an
existing cognitive category, Higgins, et al. (1977) designed a study to
test the two equally plausible alternative interpretations (prior context

 

16

effects versus experimenter demand effects) of Kelley's (1950)
ﬁndings. In doing so, Higgins and his colleagues developed a
paradigm now considered basic to social priming research. Basically,
the paradigm involves presenting subjects with a word or series of
words (primes) that are related to the trait of interest. Shortly
thereafter, and in an ostensibly separate study, the subjects read an
ambiguous description of a target person and are asked to form an
impression of this person. Priming is said to occur to the extent that
the impressions are differentially inﬂuenced by exposure to the
prime(s). In the Higgins et al. study the investigators unobtrusively
(thereby controlling for experimenter demand effects) exposed
subjects to a series of "positive" or "negative" personality traits that
could be used to describe the same objective behavior (i.e.,
adventurous versus reckless: self-conﬁdent versus conceited;
independent versus aloof; persistent versus stubborn). Later, in a
supposedly unrelated "reading comprehension" study, the subjects
read ambiguous descriptions about an individual named Donald who
engages in such behaviors as mountain climbing, skydiving and
demolition derby driving. Despite the fact that ostensibly, the two
contexts (exposure to the positive or negative personality traits and
reading the story about Donald) had nothing to do with one another,
subjects who had earlier been "primed" through exposure to positive
traits that were applicable to the ambiguous behaviors (i.e.,
adventurous, self-confident, independent, persistent) evaluated Donald
more favorably than subjects "primed" with applicable negative traits
(i.e., reckless, conceited, aloof, stubborn). The effect was not.

however, solely a function of the positive and negative valence of the

 

 

 

17

personality traits. Subjects exposed to equally positive or negative
personality traits that were not directly applicable to making
judgments regarding Donald's behavior (e.g., obedient, neat,
disrespectful, clumsy, etc.) failed to demonstrate the priming effects.
Not only do these ﬁndings suggest that exposure to a seemingly
unrelated prior context is capable of exerting a powerful inﬂuence on
the way new social information is encoded, and subsequently used to
make judgments about others, they also support the hypothesis that
the selection of a memory category to be used in the processing of
ambiguous information can be made more readily accessible by recent
activation (priming).

This preliminary ﬁnding that social judgments can be manipulated
simply by exposure to seemingly irrelevant prior contexts spawned
such a ﬂurry of research activity that priming is now "proven one of
the most-studied topics in social cognition" (Smith (Sr Branscombe,
1987 ; p. 490). A host of conceptual replications and extensions of the
Higgins et al. (1977) study followed in an attempt to elucidate the
nature of the priming effect. Early investigations by Srull and Wyer
(1979, 1980) contributed to the priming literature in several ways.
First, by assuming that cognitive categories were generalized
knowledge structures (schemata) that contained both trait concepts
and behaviors, they posited that categories could be made more
accessible not only by priming trait terms that presumably
represented the category (Higgins et al., 1977) but also by exposing
subjects to primes that exemplified those traits. To test this
hypothesis Srull and Wyer (1979) had subjects create meaningful

sentences from sets of words. Each four-word set was constructed so

 

 

18

that only two possible complete sentences could be formed, both
describing a behavior either related or unrelated to the trait of
interest. In Experiment 1, all word sets formed sentences that were
examples of either hostility (e.g., "leg break arm his") or nondescript
"ﬁller" items (e.g., "her found know 1"). An additional experiment
(Srull & Wyer, 1979: Experiment 2) was also conducted in which the
hostile primes were replaced by exemplars of "kindness" (e.g., "the
hug boy help"). A second extension of the Higgins et al. study was
achieved by manipulating the absolute and relative amount of priming
subjects received. Subjects were assigned to one of four conditions
that exposed them to either 60 sentences (20% or 80% trait related)
or 30 sentences (20% or 80% trait related). Finally, Srull and Wyer
manipulated the delay between the presentation of the priming task
and the target stimulus. Subjects were asked either (a) immediately,
(b) after a 1 hour delay; or (c) after a 24 hour delay, to read a vignette
about a stimulus person's (Donald's) afternoon activities. As in the
Higgins et al. study, the behaviors depicted in the vignette were
ambiguous in regard to the trait of interest (hostility or kindness).
When taken as a whole, the results of this study revealed that (a)
behavioral exemplars, as well as trait adjectives that are represented
within a schema, have the ability to increase category accessibility; (b)
category accessibility becomes more pronounced as the absolute and
relative number of behavioral primes increase; and (c) although
category accessibility decreases with the passage of time, the effects
are still detectable as much as 24 hours after priming.

Th r c m l f h rirnin ff .Inadditiontothe

previously mentioned empirical investigations of cognitive priming on

 

 

19

social categorization, several theories have been proposed in an
attempt to explain the cognitive mechanisms involved in the priming
effect. Wyer and Srull (1980, 1981, 1986: Srull & Wyer, 1979), for
example, have developed an elaborate theory of human cognition in
social contexts that, among other things, accounts for the effects of
priming. Although the entire theory, in its most recent
conceptualization (Wyer & Srull. 1986), sets forth 23 underlying
postulates, Table 1 presents four postulates regarding information
storage and retrieval that are particularly relevant to understanding
the cognitive mechanisms underlying the priming effect.

The referent bins to which Wyer and Srull (1986) refer in
Postulate B—7 can be thought of as an encyclopedia containing
representations of "stored knowledge about one's physical and social
world" (p. 329). Of particular relevance to the processing of social
information are those bins that contain stored knowledge related to
persons, groups and events. These referent bins of abstracted social
representations of stored knowledge are analogous in many ways to
what other theorists have called "social schemata" (Fiske & Taylor
1984). Postulate B-7 simply states that each of these bins has an
identiﬁable "header" that consists of the bin name and a set of salient
features associated with the contents of the bin. Searches of social
information are conducted by identifying (by means of the header) and
searching relevant bins. Upon locating an appropriate referent bin, its
contents are searched "from the top down" (Postulate C-9). Once
information from a particular bin is selected for use in processing, the
original information maintains its position in the bin while an exact

copy of the information is sent to the "work space" for use. When the

 

20

Table 1 .

 

Postulates Related to the Storage, Search and Retrieval Processes
Underlying the Priming Effect (Wyer 8: Srull, 1986; p. 336).

 

Peetttlate B-7: The header of a referent bin consists of (a) a name that
speciﬁes the referent and (b) a set of features that are strongly
associated with it.

Peetplate Q-l [Henriette Pestulate]: No more information is retrieved
for use in attaining a processing objective than is sufﬁcient to allow the

object to be attained. When this minimal amount has been retrieved,
the search terminates.

P - R n P 1 : When the contents of a bin are
searched for the purpose of attaining a processing objective, the

search proceeds from the top down. A particular unit of information is
identiﬁed as potentially relevant if its features include the probe cues
governing the search. The probability of retrieving a unit of
information from a bin, given that units stored on top of it have not
been used, is a constant.

Postulate C-lO [Copy Postulate]: When a unit of information in a bin is
identiﬁed as relevant for attaining a processing objective, a copy of this
information is transmitted to the Work Space. Thus, the original
position of the information in the bin is preserved. However, when
processing objectives are complete, a copy of the retrieved unit of
information is returned to the top of the bin from which it was drawn.

 

 

 

 

2 1

job for which it was copied is complete, the copy is returned to the
top of the referent bin from which it was drawn (Postulate C-10).
Because a copy of all accessed information is returned to the top of the
bin, information that has been most recently activated is stored near
the top of the bin and is most likely to be encountered early during
the next "top down" search of the bin (Postulate C-9). In addition.
because the original information retains its initial position in the bin
and identical copies of the information are returned to the bin after
each use, a more frequently activated category will have more copies
available for retrieval when a particular referent bin is searched.
Finally, all search and retrieval processes are guided by heuristics
(Postulate C-l). This simply means that an exhaustive search of the
bin will not be undertaken and the search will be terminated as soon
as enough information is gathered to perform the required task.

Simply put, Wyer and Srull (1986) account for the eﬁ'ects of
priming (i.e., recently and frequently activated categories are more
likely to be used to process subsequently presented information) by
drawing an analogy to a "storage bin" in which those objects (e.g., a
positive or negative trait category) placed at the top of the heap
(invoked most recently) become those most readily accessible. As the
need to process and interpret new information arises, we search a
relevant cognitive storage bin -- starting from the top -— for a
framework to serve as a perceptual ﬁlter of reality. Upon locating a
plausible framework (usually one that has been recently and/ or
frequently invoked), the cognitive miser within us, in its pursuit for
economy of mental functioning, curtails the further search for

alternative, and perhaps more appropriate information.

 

__x

22

Although Wyer and Srull's (1981, 1986) mechanistic metaphor is
widely cited in the literature (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Ratcliff &
McKoon, 1988: Wyer & Gordon, 1984), it is not the only explanation
that has been offered for the cognitive mechanisms underlying the
priming effect (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988). Energy transmission
models such as those proposed by Higgins, et al. (1985) suggest that:
(a) priming serves to increase a construct's excitation level, (b) this
excitation level must attain a certain minimum threshold in order to
process information, (c) the more frequently a construct is primed.
the more likely it is to reach and maintain a useable threshold level of
excitation, and (d) the excitation level of a construct will dissipate
over time. Just as Wyer and Srull use the storage bin analog to
illustrate their model, Higgins, et a1. use "battery" and "synapse"
models to depict two energy transmission interpretations of priming
effects. In the battery model, the cognitive mechanisms responsible
for priming effects are thought to be analogous to an automobile
battery. The more a battery is charged (i.e., the more a category is
primed) the higher its level of energy (activation) and the more likely
its subsequent use. When the battery (category) is not recharged
(primed) for an extended period of time, its level of energy (level of
activation) dissipates until it is no longer viable when called upon to
start the engine (process incoming information). In contrast, the
synapse model of energy transmission uses the propagation of neural
energy in vertebrates (see Guyton, 1981) to illustrate the priming
effect. The ﬁrst principle of neural transmission is that activation of a
particular cell is an "all or none" (binary) proposition. Receptor sites

on the cell (category) are stimulated by neural transmitters (primes)

 

 

23

to a certain minimum threshold point. Stimulation (priming) beyond
the threshold level has no effect on the activation of the cell. The cell
(category) either "ﬁres" (becomes activated) or it does not. Once an
action potential (activation of a category) is achieved, it slowly
dissipates over time. The only advantage of hyperstimulation is to slow
the rate at which this dissipation occurs.

Based on assumptions inherent in the three theoretical models
(i.e., storage bin. battery and synapse). Higgins, et al. (1985)
formulated predictions regarding the relative importance of recency .
and frequency of priming and the decay of the priming effect over
time. They posited, for example, that the storage bin theory predicts
a recently primed construct would predominate over constructs that
were more frequently activated regardless of the length of delay
between the prime and the stimulus presentation. Conversely, the
battery model, which is based solely on level of activation, would
generally favor the more frequently primed construct unless it had last
been primed so long ago that its activation level decayed to a point
below that of a more recently, but less frequently, primed construct.
In any event. the battery model suggests that whichever construct
possessed a higher level of activation (and was predominant) after a
short delay period should also have a higher level of activation (and
therefore be predominant) after a long delay between the prime and
stimulus presentation. Finally, according to the authors, only the
synapse model predicts a reversal between a more recently and a
more frequently primed construct as a function of delay between ﬁnal
priming and stimulus presentation. Because recently and frequently
primed constructs have a maximum action potential, they both begin

 

24

to dissipate immediately after their ﬁnal prime, thereby giving the
more recently primed construct the advantage after a short prime-to-
stimulus delay. The more frequently activated construct, however, is
hypothesized to dissipate at a slower rate, thereby giving it the
advantage after a longer delay period. Despite the Higgins. et al.
(1985) conclusion that their data were most consistent with
predictions based on assumptions set forth in the synapse model of
priming effect, Wyer and Srull (1986) contend their storage bin model
could also "account for this ﬁnding if the probability of retrieving a
particular concept from the attribute bin is fairly low" (p. 335).
Despite their obvious differences, all three models (i.e., storage
bin, battery cell, and synapse) resemble one another to the extent they
each assume memory structures containing abstract representations of
constructs (e.g., schemata) are in some way altered by exposure to a
prior context. The need to assume the existence of such abstract
constructs was brought into question, however, when Smith (1988)
demonstrated that a computer simulation and an "exemplar-only
memory model" was capable of reproducing several of the major
features of social priming effects. Specifically, without imposing the
existence of abstract cognitive constructs, Smith was able to
reproduce previous findings that (a) category accessibility effects are
inﬂuenced by the number of primes presented (Srull & Wyer, 1979);
(b) behavioral primes have longer lasting effects when compared to
trait-related word primes (Smith & Branscombe, 1987 ; Srull & Wyer,
1979); and (c) more recently presented primes exert a greater
inﬂuence when there is a short delay between the prime and the

stimulus, whereas more frequently presented primes have a greater

 

25

eﬁect when there is an extended prime-to-stimulus interval (Higgins
et al., 1985). Although Smith's data imply that "category accessibility
effects can no longer be taken as evidence for the use of abstract
schemas or constructs in social perception" (p. 460), it is equally
important to note that these data do not preclude the existence and
use of such structures in the processing of social information.

Further delineations of the priming effect. A number of
investigations have identiﬁed conditions under which the previously
described effects of social priming are mediated. Herr (1986; Herr, E
Sherman & Fazio, 1983) and Martin (1986), for example, have
conducted a series of investigations indicating the priming effect on
social categorization may not be as straightforward as originally
thought. Their research has demonstrated that under certain
conditions, it is possible to predict that priming a trait category will
result in judgments that are completely the reverse of those
hypothesized by the priming effect. That is, rather than obtaining
judgments skewed in the direction of the primed category
(assimilation effects) certain characteristics of the prime. relative to
the primed concept, result in judgments away from the prime
(contrast effects).

Like many ﬁndings in the area of cognitive priming, contrast
effects were first reported in a non-social context. Kubovy (1977), for
example, had subjects generate random digits after he varied the
explicitness with which a particular digit was mentioned in the
instructions. In the control condition, subjects were simply asked to
"report the ﬁrst digit that comes to mind." In two experimental
variations of this condition, Kubovy altered the instructions by either

26
subtly or blatantly priming the subjects with the digit 1 (one). In the
subtle priming condition, subjects were instructed to "report the ﬁrst
we digit that comes to mind" (italics added). In the second, and
more blatant, priming condition subjects were told to "report the ﬁrst
digit that comes to mind, like ene" (italics added). Results indicated
subjects in the control condition, who had received no priming at all,
randomly chose the digit 1 about 2.2% of the time. As expected,
responses from subjects exposed to the subtle prime were consistent
with the traditional (assimilation) effects of priming. Approximately
18% of the subtly primed subjects "freely" chose the digit 1. In
contrast, only 5.5% of the subjects exposed to the more blatant prime
selected the digit 1. This curvilinear nature of the priming effect
seemed to indicate that extreme priming of a construct could result in
at least a reduced, if not totally reversed, priming effect.

Herr, et al. (1983) likewise examined the effects of moderate and
extreme priming on non-social categorization. In their study, subjects
were primed with exemplars of (a) extremely small, (b) moderately
small, (c) moderately large or (d) extremely large animals. The effects
exposures to these exemplars had on the size estimate of an unreal,
and therefore ambiguous animal, demonstrated that priming is capable
of producing both assimilation (judgments in the direction of the
prime) and contrast (judgments away from the prime) effects.
Specifically, subjects exposed to extreme exemplars (either very small
or very large animals) exhibited contrast effects. For example, when
primed with extremer small animals, subjects' estimates regarding
the size of an unreal animal were Egg than those given by subjects

exposed to primes of either moderately small or moderately large

__—______A

 

27

animals (contrast effects). On the other hand, subjects primed with
moderate exemplars (moderately small or moderately large animals)
tended to judge the size of an unreal animal to be closer to that of the
primed category of animals (assimilation effects).

In a study designed to extend these assimilation and contrast
ﬁndings to social categorization, Herr (1986) unobtrusively exposed
subjects to exemplars of famous personalities who were categorized as
being either (a) extremely nonhostile, (b) moderately nonhostile, (c)
moderately hostile, or (d) extremely hostile. Subjects' subsequent
judgments of an ambiguously described individual supported the
assimilation hypothesis that exposure to moderately hostile (e.g.,
Bobby Knight, Menachem Begin, etc.) or moderately nonhostile (e.g.,
Daniel Boone, Billie Jean King, etc.) primes would produce
categorization judgments in the direction of that category. Conversely,
priming with extreme hostile categories (e.g., Adolph Hitler, Charles
Manson, etc.) resulted in lower hostility ratings of the ambiguous
person than exposures to exemplars of either moderate category.
Similar contrast effects were also observed in those subjects exposed
to extremely nonhostile primes (e.g., Santa Claus, Shirley Temple,
etc.).

Martin (1986) has proposed and tested a theoretical model
accounting for the seemingly contradictory assimilation and contrast
effects of priming. According to Martin, factors other than the
similarity or difference between the target and the priming context
may be brought to bear when individuals use or disuse a prime. Simply
put, assimilation or contrast will occur depending on whether or not

the individual is prompted to use contextually activated (primed)

 

 

 

28
concepts when making impression formations. If an applicable
concept, once it is primed, remains active beyond the original priming
episode. it results in assimilation judgments toward the prime.
Conversely, concepts that remain isolated to the priming episode are
thought to activate distinct. alternative concepts which are, in turn,
used to process and interpret information. In either case, exposure to
the prime has caused the effect since it has elicited true changes in
the way the subsequent information is interpreted. As Martin
explains, "impressions may be a function not only of the concepts that
are accessible to individuals but also of what individuals do with those
concepts" (p. 503).

In keeping with Martin's (1986) context x person interactionist
perspective (cf. Endler, 1973; 1975; Silva 8r Weinberg, 1984) of
priming effects, several other investigations have examined individual-
speciﬁc factors that may inﬂuence category accessibility. Higgins,
King and Mavin (1982), for example, hypothesized that subjects would
be more inclined to use personally accessible constructs (as opposed
to personally inaccessible constructs) when forming a social
impression. To test their hypothesis, Higgins and his colleagues
(Study 1) had subjects write down a maximum of 10 characteristics or
traits found in (a) themselves, (b) two male friends and (c) two female
friends. A trait was considered accessible to a particular subject if it
was used to describe either himself/ herself and one of the friends. or
at least three of the friends. Traits not meeting the criteria were
considered inaccessible to the subject. Two weeks later, when
subjects returned to participate in what was ostensibly an unrelated

"person perception" study, they read an ambiguous behavioral

 

29
description of a person containing references to both accessible and
inaccessible traits. After a lO-minute delay, subjects were asked to
reproduce the behavioral description word-for-word and write, as
completely as possible. their general impression of the person
described in the essay. Results indicated that when forming an
impression or reproducing the description, subjects were far less
likely to omit references to traits that were personally accessible to
them than traits to which they were inaccessible.

In a related study, Higgins, et al. (1982: Study 2) exposed subjects
to individually tailored descriptions containing six accessible and six
inaccessible behavioral descriptions. Subjects were then "yoked" to
one another in order to assure that a trait that was accessible to one
subject was inaccessible to another. In addition to replicating their
previous findings (Study 1). results of this second study revealed that
accessibility to various trait constructs is quite idiosyncratic as
demonstrated by only a 10% overlap between subjects in terms of
their accessible constructs. The authors interpreted these ﬁndings in
the following manner: ”If two perceivers have nonoverlapping
accessible traits, their impressions and recollections of the same
target person may have little in common . . . and there appears to be,
in fact, relatively little overlap in people's accessible traits" (p. 44).

Still another counter-intuitive, yet consistent, ﬁnding concerns
the degree to which subjects are aware of the prime. Not only are
reliable priming effects evident even when subjects are unable to
recall the prime (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982), there is considerable
evidence that suggests the effects are actually enhanced by the
subliminal presentation of the primes (Bargh, 1982; Lombardi, Higgins

30

& Bargh, 1987). Speciﬁcally, Lombardi and her colleagues found that
individuals who had the poorest recall of the prime tended to exhibit
the largest priming effects.
Qeggitive Schemag

Notwithstanding Smith's (1988) ﬁndings that priming effects
need not assume the presence of abstract knowledge structures, the
most inﬂuential models set forth in an effort to explain the
mechanisms underlying the priming effect (i.e., Wyer 8r Srull‘s (1981;
1986) storage bin model and Higgins. et al.'s (1985) energy

 

transmission models) rely on the existence of these abstract memory
structures. In each model, cognitive schemata (or closely related
concepts) are activated by the priming event, thereby making them
more accessible -- and more likely to be employed -- when
encountering and processing information in the future. Because
schemata are generally viewed as the cognitive mechanisms activated
by the prime, it is necessary to understand the historical development
and ongoing research into these underlying hypothetical constructs.
Histerical overview of echeme theery. Although it is generally
acknowledged that the neurologist H. Head (1918; 1926) is
responsible for formulating the initial schema hypothesis, it is
Bartlett's (1932) elaboration and extension that has inspired most
modern schema theories (Brewer & Nakamura, 1984). According to
Bartlett, schemata are unconscious, organized, abstracted knowledge
structures involved in actively encoding, storing and retrieving
information. Despite schema theory's eventual impact on cognitive
psychology and its early acceptance in England, Bartlett's
contributions went virtually unnoticed for nearly half a century. In

W

31

large part. this lack of recognition was due to the fact that Bartlett's
theory had its origins in the Continental philosophical tradition (e. g.,

 

Immanuel Kant, etc.) which assumes the existence of unconscious,
complex mental structures of knowledge.2 Unlike Bartlett's homeland
of England, where the Continental philosophy exerted considerable
inﬂuence on the development of psychological theory, mainstream
American psychology was, at the time, totally committed to the
theoretical descendants of the British Empiricists (e.g., George
Berkeley, Thomas Hobbs, David Hume, John Locke, James Mill. John
Stuart Mill, etc.). The atomistic. mechanistic, associationistic and
passive views of learning and memory such as those espoused by
popular stimulus—response theorists (e.g., Ivan Pavlov, John B. Watson,
E. L. Thorndike and B. F. Skinner, etc.) left little room for the serious
consideration of vague and "soft—headed" theories dealing with the
complex, unconscious. organized, abstracted knowledge structures
Bartlett proposed. In fact, the neo-Empiricist tradition so dominated
American psychological thought for the ﬁrst 70 years of the twentieth
century that by the time of his death in 1969, even Bartlett's disciples

 

(e.g., Broadbent, 1970; Oldﬁed, 1972; Zangwill, 1972, etc.) had
resolved that schema theory had died with him (Brewer & Nakamura,
1984).

Two necessary antecedents for the resurrection of schema theory
occurred during the 19605 and 70s. First, and foremost, there was a
major paradigm shift "away from stimulus—response units to describe
perception and action toward a recognition that human beings bring
meaning and organization into almost every new encounter" (Singer 81

Salovey, 1991; pp. 33-34). Speciﬁcally, psychologists who were

 

32
originally attracted to the tough-mindedness of the British Empiricist
position, were finally, as Brewer and Nakamura (1984) put it, "dragged
'kicking and screaming' by the brute facts of nature to the Continental
position" (p. 129). Second, it became easier to understand (and
explain via analogies) the basic properties of schemata when
technological advances allowed for the building of computer systems
that "employed schema-like entities [computer programs] as a
fundamental part of their operations" (Rumelhart, 1984; p. 162).
Finally, by 1975, the philosophical and technological conditions
existed which were compatible with the rebirth of the schema
construct. In that year, papers employing variations of the schema
theory were published in such diverse content areas as artiﬁcial
intelligence (Minsky, 1975), cognitive psychology (Rumelhart, 1975)
and motor performance (Schmidt, 1975). In addition. a number of
schema-related concepts gained popularity at this time. Examples of
these "schema-compatible concepts" (Taylor & Crocker. 1981)
include "frames" (Minsky, 1975), "prototypes" (Cantor & Mischel,
1977), and "scripts" (Abelson, 1975).

Scheme meog. Despite lacking a ﬁxed definition for the term
"schema," theories employing the schema concept have been "used to
guide or explain a considerable portion of current research in human
memory" (Alba & Hasher, 1983; p. 203). These theories generally
assume that knowledge, whether it pertains to an inanimate object
(e.g., chair. desk, lamp, etc.), an event (e.g., washing clothes, driving a
car, etc.). a social situation (e.g., a cocktail party; a college classroom,
etc.) or a social entity (e.g, Richard Nixon, my friend David, me. etc.).
is abstracted and organized into modular structures of related

 

33
information called schemata. Once they are constructed on the basis
of prior experience, these organized knowledge structures serve as
idiosyncratic cognitive frameworks by which sensory input is actively
interpreted to form a meaningful reality.

The way in which these knowledge structures are capable of
abstracting previous experiences, interpreting incoming information
and initiating novel responses can be illustrated by examining
Schmidt's (1975) motor schema theory. Schmidt's theory attempts to
explain -- using the schema concept -— how individuals learn and

control new motor skills. According to the theory, any time a motor

 

skill of any type is performed, four speciﬁc types of information are
abstracted from the movement experience: (a) imeg cengitien --
environmental and body conditions at the time the movement was
initiated, (b) respense speeiﬁcetiene -— the task demands in terms of
speed, force, etc., (c) sensogz eenseguenees -— sensory input from a
variety of sources, both during and after the movement, and (d)
respenee outcom -- basically, knowledge of results. This abstracted
information is called upon whenever the individual is faced with
performing a novel motor skill. For example, when throwing a javelin
for the first time, a performer may demonstrate surprising ability by
drawing on previously abstracted movement experiences stored in
memory. Despite having no direct experience throwing a javelin, he
or she has a general motor schema for the required "overhand throw."
Key elements involving the initial conditions, task speciﬁcations,
sensations and response outcomes of previous (similar) motor

experiences such as hitting an overhead tennis serve or throwing a

 

34

baseball, softball or football have all been stored in memory and serve
as a guide when performing the novel motor task.

Schemata, according to Singer and Salovey (1991) "allow the
perceiver to identify stimuli quickly, cluster them into manageable
units, ﬁll in missing information, and select a strateg for obtaining
further information in order to solve a problem or reach a goal" (p.
35). The essential role schema play in the processing of new
information is evidenced by the fact they have been described as no
less than "the basis of the selectivity that is operative in information
processing" (Markus & Smith, 1981; p. 240) and "the fundamental
elements upon which all information processing depends" (Rumelhart,
1984; p. 162).

Rumelhart (1984) offers several analogies in an attempt to
describe the nature and operation of schemata. His ﬁrst analog is
that of a theatrical play where schemata function as "scripts"
containing prototypes of characters, roles, motives, actions, and
interactions. These event or situation schemata serve as a general
framework that enables us to quickly assemble otherwise fragmentary
and uninterpretable stimuli into a coherent and meaningful perception
of reality. Although the details of this script can change considerably,
the general nature of the "performance" is identiﬁed as being the
same. An example of an event schema (script) we all have is "buying a
car." A great deal of variation can take place regarding the speciﬁcs of
this schema. The variables in our script can take on many (but not all)
values. The schema provides information about the event by setting
legitimate value ranges within which this event must take place. For

example, the buyer or seller of the car may be a man or woman, young

 

W; ’ ”

35
or old, large or small, fat or thin, intelligent or stupid but not a grizzly
bear. The car may be old or new, large or small, expensive or
inexpensive but not made of soap. The transaction may take place
publicly at an automobile showroom, in a restaurant, or in a private
home but probably not in the midst of a funeral procession. This
framework is effective in giving us a quick, usable notion of what the
event "buying a car" usually entails.

A second analog proposes that an individual's schemata, when
taken as a whole, function much like a personal theory of reality.
Schemata, like all useful scientiﬁc theories, are constantly being
evaluated on the basis of their ability to adequately represent, and
thereby explain, the real world. When a particular schema (theory) is

 

activated in an attempt to explain incoming information (data),
something analogous to a "goodness-of-ﬁt test" is calculated to
determine the degree to which the schemata (theory) assists in the
comprehension (explanation) of the information (data). If the
information (data) generally "ﬁts," the schema (hypothesis) is
accepted. To the extent that the activated schemata (theory) fails to
account for all the information (data), it can either be modified or
totally rejected in favor of a better, more explanatory model of reality.
Another analog is drawn to computer program procedures. First,
just as computers are capable of discerning the degree of ﬁt between a
given observation and a previously assigned value, schemata allow us to
classify information based on the degree to which it matches a
previously speciﬁed prototype. Second, computers often employ a
number of "sub-routines" to perform a complex task. Similarly,

complex schematic representations -- such as those that deﬁne the

W} ”

36
recognition of a human face -- often exist at the top of a procedural
hierarchy of sub-schemata (e.g., human eye, human mouth, etc.) that
examine and determine whether there is an acceptable degree of ﬁt
between the observation and previously formed schemata. The sub-
schema for a human eye, may in turn, have several sub-schemata of its
own which look for acceptable variations in number (two, not seven),
color (blue, brown, etc., but not orange), shape (oval, not square), size
(not six inches in diameter) and spatial relationships (on the front
upper third of the face, not on the sides of the head). Similar to the
operation of a computer program's sub-routines, these individual

judgments are sent back to higher level schemata which determines

 

whether the total observation is within the "acceptable limits"
imposed by the schema.

These analogies tend to emphasize the common belief that
schemata generally process information in a theory-driven or "top-
down" fashion (e.g., Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Singer 8: Salovey,
1991). Top-down processing basically assumes that incoming sensory
data are assimilated into an existing knowledge structure. Singer and
Salovey offer the following clever illustration of how an activated
(instantiated) schema can drive the interpretation of ambiguous data:

Suppose one of us shows you a photograph of a man, standing in

his shorts, holding a glass filled with a yellowish liquid. If we then

tell you that this is a photograph of someone standing by the pool
on a hot day, instantiating your schema about poolside behavior,
you will conclude that the yellow liquid is lemonade and the
shorts are really a bathing suit. On the other hand. suppose we
tell you this is a photo of a man with a bladder infection at a

37

recent visit to the urologist. You now conclude that he is really

wearing boxer shorts. And what do you no_w think the glass of

yellow liquid is? (p. 37).

Rumelhart (1984), however, also stresses the less conventional
view that schemata are equally capable of processing information in a
"bottom-up" data- or event—driven manner. By analyzing the
interpretations people make after being presented with fragmentary
information, Rumelhart (1981) uses the following example to illustrate

how comprehension is the result of both data-driven theory

 

construction m conceptually-driven theory testing:

Business had been slow since the oil crisis. Nobody seemed to

want anything really elegant anymore. Suddenly the door opened

and a well dressed man entered the showroom ﬂoor. John put on
his friendliest and most sincere expression and walked toward

the man (p. 171).

Although very little factual information is provided in the
preceding paragraph, most people conclude that John is a automobile
salesman specializing in the sale of large, American-made, luxury
automobiles. The well dressed man is a potential customer, the entire
scene is taking place in an automobile showroom and John is
approaching the man with the hope of selling him a new car.
Rumelhart (1981) summarizes the way this fragmentary information is
generally interpreted as follows: A plausible schema doesn't simply
"suggest itself," but instead. is a direct function of an initial
observation. A "business" schema is therefore activated by reading the
ﬁrst sentence. The exact nature of the business is, at this point, still

unknown but it must be related, in some way, to the oil industry. Once

38
this bottom-up activation of the business schema has taken place, the
schema would, in the traditional top-down fashion, generate a list of
plausible businesses by conducting a goodness-of—ﬁt test on this 011—
related criterion. Automobile-related businesses are prime candidates.
This business schema also tends to activate a "buy" and/ or "sell"
schema that places automobile and gasoline sales at the top of the list.
The introduction of the second sentence effectively eliminates the
gasoline hypothesis leaving only the automobile sales schema in tact.
The remaining sentences are examined for the degree to which they
support or fail to support the automobile sales hypothesis. Because
each subsequent sentence supports and reinforces the validity of this
hypothesis, it is eventually accepted.

In summary, Rumelhart (1984: Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977)
suggests that in addition to their ability to engage in both top-down
and bottom-up information processing, schemata have six general
characteristics. Specifically, schemata: (a) have variables: (b) can
embed, one within another; (c) represent knowledge at all levels of
abstraction; (d) represent knowledge rather than deﬁnitions; (e) are
active processes: and (f) are recognition devices whose processing is
aimed at the evaluation of the goodness—of—ﬁt to the data being
processed (Rumelhart, 1984; p. 169).

Self—Schemata. Many different types of cognitive schemata are
required to process the vast amount of social and non-social
information human beings encounter. Taylor and Crocker (1981) have
identiﬁed several subcategories of social schemata on the basis of their
content, such as those used to process and categorize information

pertaining to (a) people (person schemata); (b) appropriate norms and

39

behaviors of broadly deﬁned groups of individuals (role schemata); or
(c) social situations or events (event schemata). In addition, much of
the information humans need to process is information used to
perceive, remember and make inferences about themselves (self-
schemata). Although theorists have conceptually and operationally
deﬁned these unique instances of person schemata in a variety of ways,
an examination of Table 2 reveals that self-schemata are typically
viewed as organized general knowledge structures containing
information about the self. As is the case with social schemata as a
whole, self-schemata enable the individual to form an abstracted or
generalized version of a social entity, which is then used as a
perceptual ﬁlter through which incoming information is subsequently
processed. One important aspect of self-schemata that makes them
unlike other types of social and nonsocial schemata, however, is the
fact that self-schemata are the perceptual ﬁlters for information
concerning the most important of social entities -- the "self." Some
theorists, in fact, have gone so far as to deﬁne self-concept as nothing
more than "a system of self-schema " (Markus 8: Smith, 1981, p. 242;
Markus & Sentis, 1982, p.45) or "a complex, person-speciﬁc, central,
attitudinal schema" (Greenwald & Patkanis, 1984, p. 130). Such views
imply that several different self-schemata may be included within an
individual's concept of his or her "self." For example, a number of
equally plausible self-schemata: "introvert," "musician," "athlete,"
"honors student," etc. may all coexist as part of a particular individual's
view of himself or herself. The speciﬁc self-schema that becomes
activated, and therefore used as a framework for the interpretation of

subsequent stimuli, is simply a function of whichever schema is most

Table 2.

40

Conceptual Deﬁnitions of Self-Schema.

 

Auther

Qoneepmﬂ Deﬁnitien

 

Markus (1977)

Markus 6:

Smith (1981)

Derry &
Kuiper
(1 98 l)

Cantor,
Mischel &
Schwartz
( l 982)

Fiske &
Taylor
(1984)

Klein &
Kihlstrom
(l 986)

Cognitive generalizations about the
self, derived from past expectancies,
that organize and guide the processing
of self-related information contained in
an individual's social experience.

Same as Markus (1977), noting also
that self-schemas provide an anchor or
frame of reference for judgments and
evaluations of others.

A hierarchically organized body of
knowledge stored in long-term
memory, a list of general and speciﬁc
terms characteristic of the individual
that have been derived from a lifetime
of experience with personal data.

A set of beliefs about the self through
which interpretations of other people's
behaviors and social interactions are
ﬁltered.

General information about one's own
psycholog makes up a complex, easily
accessible verbal self-concept that
guides information processing about
the self.

Superior recall for adjectives when a
self—relevant information-processing set
is adopted.

 

Adapted from Singer 8r Salovey (1991).

4 1
salient at that particular time (Markus & Smith, 1981). Several
factors such as motivations. relevancy, frequency of activation, or
recency of activation may contribute to which, among the several
possible self-schemata available, is most salient at a particular time
(Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Higgins, et al., 1985).

Self-schemata were initially viewed as theoretical constructs or
epiphenomena which were used primarily as post hoc explanations of
observed behavior. Markus (1977), however, expanded this rather
limited application by specifying and empirically testing hypothesized
functions of self-schema. Markus posited that it is possible to identify,
via self-report measures, individuals who either possess (schematics)
or do not possess (aschematics), a self-schema for a particular
behavioral domain. Once identiﬁed, these individuals can be subjected
to a variety of cognitive tasks related to the domain. Markus'
underlying assumption is that observed diﬁerences in the way
schematics and aschematics process domain—related information is
attributable, in part, to the presence or absence of a self-schema
(Markus & Sentis, 1982).

In what has since become a classic paradigm for examining the
effects of self-schemata on information processing, Markus (1977 ;
Study 1) had 101 female undergraduates rate themselves on semantic
differential scales describing a variety of behavioral domains. In
addition, subjects were asked to "rate the importance of each
semantic dimension to their self-description" (p. 66). On the basis of
these preliminary data, Markus was able to assign 16 subjects to each
of three experimental groups: (a) independent schematics - subjects

rating themselves as highly independent and perceiving the

42
dependence/independence dimension as being important to their
self-description; (b) dependent echemetiee - subjects rating
themselves as highly dependent and perceiving the
dependence/independence dimension as being important to their
self-description; and (c) eeehemaﬂce — subjects with self—ratings in the
middle range of the dependence/independence dimension and
importance ratings suggesting this dimension was not central to their
self—description. Three to four weeks after the initial assessment,
subjects were brieﬂy exposed to words that were either
independence—related, dependence-related or creativity-related
(control). Subjects were instructed to indicate whether or not the
word was descriptive of them by pushing either a "me" or a "not me"
button. Not only was there the expected difference between the
groups in the absolute number of "me" and "not me" self—classiﬁcations
(i.e., independent schematics indicating "me" to more independence-
related words and dependent schematics indicating "me" to more
dependence-related words) but response latencies indicated that
subjects responded faster to words that were consistent with their
self-schema. Speciﬁcally, independent schematics responded faster
to independence-related words; dependent schematics responded
faster to dependence-related words and aschematics responded with
approximately equal speed to both independence- and dependence-
related words. These ﬁndings suggest that having an existing schema
on a particular behavioral domain enables the schematic to process
schema-related information in a somewhat different (and faster)

manner that non—schematics.

43

To test the hypothesis that possessing a self—schema on a
behavioral dimension makes an individual resistant to counter-
schematic information, Markus (197 7 ; Study 2) arranged for the same
subjects to return to the lab after a three week interval. In an
ostensibly unrelated task, subjects completed a ﬁctitious suggestibility
measure and were given bogus feedback that was inconsistent with
their previously identiﬁed self-schemata (i.e., independent schematics
were told they were highly dependent and suggestible; dependent
schematics were told they were highly independent and not at all
suggestible; aschematics were randomly assigned to one of the two
feedback groups). After receiving the schema-inconsistent feedback,
all subjects again performed the "me"/"not me" latency response task
described in Study 1 . Results indicated that aschematics were more
likely than either independent or dependent schematics to: (a) agree
with the bogus feedback; (b) agree to take the test again; and (0)
exhibit greater inconsistency in their "me"/"not me" responses. In
her general discussion of these ﬁndings, Markus concluded that the
results of these two studies "provide converging evidence for the
concept of self-schemata, or cognitive generalizations about the self,
which organize, summarize and explain behavior along a particular
dimension." (p. 75)

In addition to replicating Markus' (1977) initial ﬁndings, Sentis
and Markus (1979; cited in Markus 8r Sentis, 1982) tested the
hypothesis that schematics differ from aschematics not only in the way
they process stimuli, but also in the way they remember self-relevant
information. After taking part in the "me/ not me" judgment task used

by Markus, subjects were exposed to a series of adjectives. Some of

44
these adjectives had been part of the previous "me/not me" task and
others had not. Subjects were asked to respond by pressing a button
labeled "OLD" if the adjective had been used in the previous judgment
task and a button labeled "NEW" if they did not remember being
previously exposed to the adjective. As hypothesized, schematics
showed superior recognition for schema-related information.
Speciﬁcally, schematics responded faster and more accurately than
aschematics when presented with schema-relevant adjectives.

A number of subsequent investigations have extended these
ﬁndings by hypothesizing and empirically testing the information
processing functions of self-schemata in a variety of behavioral
domains. Similar schemata-related results have been demonstrated in
the areas of creativity, extraversion, dominance, body weight, sex roles
and social sensitivity (Markus & Sentis, 1982).

Although it is frequently implied that self-schemata can exert
inﬂuences on behavior in the same way they have been shown to
inﬂuence perception, inference and memory, few empirical
investigations have examined the link between self-schema and
behavior. One exception is a series of studies by Kendzierski (1988;
1990) which focuses on behavior by individuals classiﬁed as having
either (a) a self-schema for exercising (exerciser schematics); (b) a
self-schema for not exercising (nonexerciser schematics); or (c) a self-
schema which favored neither exercising nor non-exercising
(aschematics). Each subject rated 12 pairs of behavioral alternatives
(one of which reﬂected a pro-exercise orientation, the other
alternative did not) on a 100-point scale indicating the likelihood they

would behave in the way described. Results indicated that exerciser

45
schematics thought they would be more likely to choose the exercise-
oriented alternative than did either aschematics or nonexerciser
schematics. In addition, aschematics were more likely to predict they
would choose the exercise-oriented alternative than the nonexerciser
schematics.

In summarizing the ﬁndings of these empirical investigations,
Markus and Sentis (1982) state that individuals with self-schemata in
particular domains generally: "(1) process domain-related information
with relative ease and certainty: (2) are consistent in their responses;
(3) have relatively better recognition and recall memory for
information relevant to this domain; and (4) can predict future
behavior in the domain" (p. 62).

Self-Efﬁeacy

Contrary to the lack of research examining the relationship
between the accessibility (priming) of various social schemata and
motor performance, another cognitive factor -- self-efﬁcacy -- has long
been a major focus of research by sport psychologists. According to
Feltz (1992) more than two dozen studies have been published on the
topic of self-efﬁcacy in sport and physical activity in the past 15 years.
Not surprisingly, situation—specific self-conﬁdence is, in fact, one of
the most frequently cited psychological variables thought to affect
motor performance (e.g., Feltz, 1988b; McAuley & Gill, 1983;
Weinberg, Gould & Jackson, 1979). In sport contexts, coaches,
athletes and fans often consider a performer's conﬁdence level to be a
major determinant of success and failure. Although, in its everyday
use, the term "self-conﬁdence" typically refers to one's perceived

ability to accomplish a particular performance objective (e.g., pass a

46

ﬁnal math examination, perform a gmnastic routine, etc.). Bandura
(1977) has suggested that the use of the term self-conﬁdence be
reserved to describe the global personality trait that depicts an
individual’s overall level of performance optimism. Perceived self-
efficacy, on the other hand, has been deﬁned by Bandura (1986) as:

People's judgments of their capabilities to organize and execute

courses of action required to attain designated types of

performances. It is concerned not with the skills one has but
with judgments of what one can do with whatever skills one
possesses [and as such becomes] a signiﬁcant determinant of
performance that operates partially independently of underlying

skills." (p. 391)

Based on this deﬁnition, self-efﬁcacy can be thought to be something
akin to a task- and/ or situation-speciﬁc form of conﬁdence (Feltz,
1988b).

Research lends support to Bandura's (1977; 1986) claim that a
global or general measure of self-conﬁdence is not as useful as
situation-speciﬁc self-efﬁcacy judgments in predicting subsequent
performance. McAuley and Gill (1983), for example, compared female
collegiate gmnasts' conﬁdence in their general physical ability and
their situation-speciﬁc self-efﬁcacy by correlating both measures with
their subsequent performance during an intercollegiate competition.
They found that although general physical ability conﬁdence was not a
signiﬁcant predictor of skilled performance, the gmnasts' task-
speciﬁc self-efﬁcacy judgments were highly correlated with actual

performance scores.

 

 

47

According to Bandura (1977, 1986) an individual's efﬁcacy
expectations are derived from four major sources of self—referent
information. The ﬁrst, and generally most powerful source of efﬁcacy
expectations result from the perception of previeps perfermapee
attgnments. Simply put, a personal history of perceived successes in
similar situations or on similar tasks will tend to raise efﬁcacy
assessments while a personal history of perceived failures on these
tasks will tend to lower efﬁcacy appraisals. It should be noted that it
is the subjective feeling of success or failure in related situations -- not
objective success or failure itself -— that drives the formation of efﬁcacy
judgments. A second. and somewhat related source of information
regarding an individual's capabilities is based on observing or
visualizing the results of others' (individuals perceived to be similar in
some way to the observer) attempts to perform the task in question.
Such vieeg'ous experience rarely provides the powerful and accurate
self-referent information available via previous personal performance
but in the absence of such first—hand experience, information derived
from the knowledge of others' performances can be used to accurately
infer self-efficacy judgments. Verbal persuasien or encouragement, a
technique frequently employed by coaches and teachers, can provide a
third major source of self—referent information on which self-efﬁcacy
appraisals are made. In general, self-efficacy expectations resulting
from persuasive techniques are only effective to the extent that the
performer is given what he or she perceives to be relevant and
realistic information regarding his or her ability to perform a speciﬁc
task. Finally, Bandura suggests that the assessment ef phﬁielegieel
states can provide valuable information upon which to base individual

48

efﬁcacy expectations. For example, because excessive physiological
arousal is frequently associated with -- and therefore useful in
predicting -- a poor performance on skilled tasks, individuals can
make capability judgments, in part, on the basis of their current
physiological arousal level. Arousal is not, however, the only
physiological state that can provide such cues to performance.
Bandura notes that other physical states such as fatigue, windedness,
aches, and pains can all provide valuable information regarding an
individual's performance of a particular task.

Feltz (1992; 1988b), in her reviews of the self-efficacy literature
pertaining to sport and physical activity, summarizes research
examining each of the four major sources of information used in the
formation of efﬁcacy expectations (i.e., previous performance
attainments, vicarious learning, persuasion and assessment of
physiological states). In regard to prior performance
accomplishments, she concluded that considerable empirical evidence
exists supporting Bandura's (1977 ; 1986) contention that
performance-based information is not only associated with subsequent
self-efﬁcacy judgments (e.g., Feltz, 1982; Feltz, Landers & Raeder,
1979; Hogan & Santomier, 1984; McAuley, 1985; Weinberg, et al.,
1979) but exerts more inﬂuence on self-efficacy judgments than any of
the other three sources of information (Deshamais, Bouillon & Godin,
1986; Feltz, et al., 1979; Feltz 8r Mugno, 1983; McAuley, 1985;
Weinberg, Sinardi & Jackson, 1982). Similarly, empirical support was
found for the notion that vicarious experiences can likewise (albeit at a
somewhat weaker level) inﬂuence efficacy judgments. Performance-

related information gleaned by (a) being exposed to the results of a

49

model's attempt at the task (Corbin, Laurie, Gruger 8r Smiley, 1984;
Gould 8r Weiss, 1981), (b) visually imaging the outcome of a
performance (Feltz, Marcotullio 8r Fitzgerald, 1985), or (c) learning
more about a competitor's ability (Weinberg, et al, 1979; Weinberg,
Gould, Yukelson & Jackson, 198 l; Weinberg, Yukelson 8: J ackson,
1980) have all been shown to impact on efﬁcacy judgments.
Somewhat surprising, given the emphasis placed on the role of
verbal exhortation and physiological awareness in sport and physical
activity, is the relatively small number of studies examining the extent
to which information from the two remaining sources -- verbal
persuasion and assessment of physiological states -- is used in the
formation of efﬁcacy expectations. One indication of the dearth of
research into verbal persuasion as a source of efficacy judgments in the
motor performance area is that in her extensive reviews of the
literature, Feltz (1992; 1986b) cites only four published self-eﬁicacy
studies falling under the rubric of persuasive techniques. In fact, even
those investigations did not directly address what is commonly
thought to be the classic case of verbal persuasion -- performance—
related encouragement from others. Instead, persuasion in these
studies has been broadly deﬁned as positive seﬂ-talk (Weinberg, 1986;
Wilkes 8r Summers, 1984) imagery (Feltz & Riessinger, 1990; Wilkes
& Summers, 1984) and cognitive restructuring of task-related arousal
(Y an Lan 8r Gill, 1984). Unfortunately, even these peripheral
investigations provide little in the way of unequivocal results
concerning the effects of persuasive techniques on self-efﬁcacy

judgments (Feltz, 1992).

50

It is Feltz's own line of research (Feltz, 1982: Feltz & Albrecht,
1986; Feltz & Mugno, 1983) examining self-efficacy judgments for a
high-avoidance motor task (modiﬁed back diving) that has provided
the most insight into the manner in which physiological states (i.e.,
arousal) affect efficacy expectations in a motor performance situation.
Using path analytic techniques to test Bandura's (1977) hypothesis
that a reciprocal relationship exists between physiological arousal and
self-efﬁcacy, Feltz (1982) found that the heart rate —-) self-efﬁcacy
paths "were not at all useful in determining efﬁcacy expectations for
diving performance" (p. 771). In addition, only the initial (prior to
performance) self-efﬁcacy —> heart rate path was found to be
signiﬁcant. Surprisingly, however, the relationship was in the
opposite direction (positive) of that predicted by Bandura. Although
these ﬁndings were successfully replicated in two subsequent
investigations (Feltz & Albrecht, 1986; Feltz & Mugno, 1983) both of
these studies found evidence that it is the individual's pgeeiled level
of autonomic arousal that is more closely associated with efﬁcacy
expectations than actual physiological arousal (i.e., heart rate). The
extent to which Bandura's more recent writings (Bandura, 1986) have
taken these ﬁndings into account is evidenced by the fact that the
source of efﬁcacy expectations originally referred to as "emotional
arousal" (Bandura, 1977) now emphasizes the "eognip've processing of
emotional reactivity" (Bandura, 1986: p. 406, italics added).

Although considerable attention has been given to Bandura's
(1977 , 1986) four major sources of efﬁcacy information, sometimes
overlooked has been his qualification that none of these sources --

either individually or in combination -- is inherently capable of

5 1
generating efﬁcacy expectations. Rather, it is the cognitive processing

of the information from each of these sources that conveys an efﬁcacy
expectation. As Bandura (1986) puts it:
The cognitive processing of efﬁcacy information involves two
separable functions: The ﬁrst concerns the types of information
people attend to and use as indicators of personal efﬁcacy. . . The
second concerns the combination rules or heuristics they employ
for weighting and integrating efﬁcacy information from different
sources in forming their self-efﬁcacy judgments. (p. 401)
It is, therefore, Bandura's contention that eﬁ‘icacy expectations result
from an individual W attending, weighting and integrating a
portion of all available information relevant to the likelihood of her or
his successful performance on a particular task. Furthermore, this
emphasis on selective information processing implies that any factor
capable of making either positive or negative self-referent cognitions
more accessible and salient during information processing (e.g.,
cognitive priming of positive or negative self-schemata) may exert
considerable inﬂuence on subsequent self-efﬁcacy judgments (and
thereby, indirectly affect performance).
M i M i Eff f M
A considerable amount of empirical evidence can be cited
supporting the contention that mood states, under certain conditions,
can inﬂuence -— or be inﬂuenced by -- self-schemata, self-efﬁcacy and
performance. Unfortunately, a perusal of this literature is somewhat
disconcerting in that mood appears to have the potential to be both a

cause and / or an effect for nearly any cognitive variable of interest.

52

The relationship between meod and self-sehemate. As
generalized knowledge structures containing information about the
self, self-schemata have, as their basis, an individual's past
experiences. The fact that naturally occurring and experimentally
induced mood states can alter the relative accessibility of memory
structures has been demonstrated in a number of studies (e.g., Bower,
1981; Clark & Teasdale, 1982; Clark & Teasdale. 1985; Forgas,
Bower & Krantz, 1984; Isen, Shalker, Clark & Karp, 1978: Natale &
Hantas, 1982; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979).

In one study examining the effect mood has on recall of past
events, Isen, et al. (1978; Study 1) induced a good mood by having a
confederate give people at a shopping mall a small gift (a notepad or a
nail clipper). In an ostensibly unrelated event, another confederate
later approached the individual and asked him or her to complete a
"consumer survey." Subjects randomly assigned to the experimental
condition (those receiving the free gift) gave higher ratings of the
performance and service records of products they owned than
subjects in the control (no gift) condition.

In another investigation of mood effects on memory, Bower
(1981) had subjects record, in detail, all positive and negative
emotional events that happened to them over the course of a week. In
addition to recording the time, place, participants and overall gist of
the event, the subject rated each event on a lO-point scale from
"pleasant" to "unpleasant." At the end of the week, the subjects were
induced into either a happy or sad mood via hypnotic suggestion and
were asked to recall as many diary entries as possible. Subjects put

into a pleasant mood were more likely to recall pleasant emotional

53

experiences from the previous week whereas those in a negative mood
recalled more negative emotional events. In addition, when asked to
rate the current emotional intensity of each event, subjects in a good
mood tended to rate the event as being even more pleasant than they
had at the time it occurred. Conversely, subjects in a sad mood rated
the emotional intensity of their recalled experiences to be even more
unpleasant than they had originally indicated.

In summarizing the results of the myriad experimental
investigations into the effects of mood on memory, Clark and Teasdale
(1985) conclude:

Memories of positive hedonic tone are more accessible in

experimentally induced elated moods than in experimentally

induced depressed mood. Conversely, memories of negative
hedonic tone tend to be more accessible in induced depressed

mood than in induced elated mood (p. 1595).

Similarly, after observing that individuals clinically diagnosed as
depressives tended to selectively focus on past and present negative
information about themselves, Beck (1967, 1976) proposed that
naturally occurring mood states may be associated with distortions in
the processing of information about the self. The depressed patient,
according to Beck constructs a "cognitive triad" consisting of (a) a
negative view of the world, (b) a negative self-concept, and (c) a
negative appraisal of his or her future. Subsequent support for this
contention has been provided by a number of investigations (e.g.,
Breslow, Kocsis & Belkin, 1981; Clark & Teasdale, 1982: Loyd 8r
Lishman, 197 5) which have found that "natural ﬂuctuations in

depressed mood within patients have effects on the accessibility of

54
positive and negative information similar to those observed in studies
of induced mood states" (Clark & Teasdale, 1985; p. 1595).

Given the extent of empirical and anecdotal evidence suggesting
that the recall of positive or negative memories can be made more
salient by mood, it is conceivable that mood-congruent generic
knowledge structures based on past experiences (self-schemata) may
be activated by the induction of a positive or negative mood.

Th rel tion hi between moo lf- fﬁ c . As a means of
introducing their research examining the impact of happy and sad
moods on efﬁcacy judgments, Kavanagh and Bower (1985) succinctly
frame the question of interest as follows: "Do people feel more
competent when they are happy than when they are sad?" (p. 507).
They then provide the reader with a preliminary answer based solely
on intuition and experience: "Certainly when we consider our own
experience, we would answer afﬁrmatively. When we are sufﬁciently
elated, we feel able to achieve our highest ambitions. On the other
hand, when we are feeling low, failure seems inevitable" (p. 507).
Although the notion that moods can directly impact on self-efﬁcacy is
intuitively appealing, the few empirical studies conducted in this area
have produced equivocal results. An investigation by Wright and
Mischel (1982), for example. supports the predicted relationship
between mood and efﬁcacy expectations. In the study, subjects were
induced into positive, negative or neutral moods by having them recall
highly positive, negative or neutral personal experiences. Once
induced with the desired mood, the subjects were given bogus
feedback related to their performance on a complex perceptual task.

As hypothesized, high self-efﬁcacy judgments were obtained when

55

success feedback was given to subjects possessing a positive or neutral
mood. In contrast, low self-efficacy judgments resulted when failure
feedback was given to subjects in a negative or neutral mood. Even
more interesting were the interactions obtained when the mood and
feedback were incongruent. Subjects in positive moods receiving
failure feedback, tended to overestimate their future performance
while those in negative moods receiving success feedback
underestimated the probability of future success.

Kavanagh and Bower (1985) similarly found support for the
hypothesis of mood inﬂuences on self-efﬁcacy. While in a hypnotic
trance, all subjects were placed, at different times, into a happy, sad
and neutral mood by having them recall happy, sad and neutral
romantic experiences. Once in the desired mood, subjects responded
to self-efﬁcacy items on scales pertaining to (a) romantic situations,
(b) social skills and assertiveness, and (0) academic, athletic and other
physical activities. When the subjects were in negative moods, they
produced the lowest eﬁicacy ratings on all scales. On the other hand,
the highest efficacy ratings for all scales were obtained when subjects
were in a positive mood. Finally, as predicted, when in neutral moods,
subjects scored between the two extremes on all three scales.
Interestingly, recalling a happy, sad or neutral romantic experiences
seemed to inﬂuence not only efﬁcacy judgments in a closely related
(romantic) context, but also generalized to efficacy judgments in less
related areas of social, academic, athletic and general physical activity.

In contrast to investigations supporting the inﬂuence mood exerts
on self-efﬁcacy, Stanley and Maddux (1986; Experiment 2) not only
failed to demonstrate that moods inﬂuence self-efﬁcacy. but actually

56
found evidence that this relationship was reversed —- self-efﬁcacy has
an effect on mood (Experiment 1). In order to examine self-efﬁcacy
effects on mood, Stanley and Maddux informed subjects they would be
performing a social interaction task (meet another student, talk with
him, make him feel comfortable, ﬁnd a common interest and get him
to like them). Prior to the task, however, subjects completed a
questionnaire and were given bogus feedback regarding their social
skills. The bogus feedback indicated the subject either possessed (a)
below average (low self-efﬁcacy expectancy) or (b) above average (high
self-efﬁcacy expectancy) social skills. Results of the study indicated
that self-efﬁcacy expectancy manipulation had a signiﬁcant effect on
subject mood state. Speciﬁcally, subjects in the low self-efﬁcacy
expectancy condition (those told they had below average social skills)
reported having a more depressed mood than those in the high self-
efﬁcacy expectancy condition (those told they had above average social
skills).

In the second part of their investigation (Stanley & Maddux,
1986: Experiment 2) the authors examined the effect mood has on
self-efficacy. Using a mood induction procedure developed by Velten
(1968), which involves reading 60 depression (e.g., "I want to go to
sleep and never wake up") or 60 elation (e.g., "Things will be better
and better today") self-referent mood statements, subjects were
placed in either an elated or depressed mood state. Once this was
accomplished, subjects completed self—efficacy judgments regarding
the same social interaction task used in Experiment 1. In contrast to
the ﬁndings of Wright and Mischel (1982) and Kavanagh and Bower

(1985), the investigators reported that the Velten procedure of mood

57

induction had no effect on subjects' self-efficacy expectancy ratings for
the social interaction task or for social situations in general.

In another study that failed to clearly demonstrate the mediating
effects of mood on self-efﬁcacy (and the only study using a motor
performance task), Kavanagh and Hausfeld (1986) manipulated
subjects' mood by having them listen to happy, neutral (Experiment 1)
and sad (Experiment 2) audiotapes. Once the desired mood had been
attained, subjects rated their degree of conﬁdence that they could (a)
exert 18 different levels of force on a handgrip dynamometer
(Experiment 1); and (b) do 18 levels of push-ups (Experiment 2).
Although a manipulation check revealed that listening to the
audiotapes signiﬁcantly altered the subj ects' mood, there was no
difference in handgrip efﬁcacy ratings in the three mood conditions.
On the other hand, mood did have an effect on the subjects' push-up
efﬁcacy judgments (Experiment 2).

The results of the aforementioned investigations into the
relationship between mood states and self-efﬁcacy leaves many
unanswered questions. Despite its intuitive appeal, the inﬂuences
mood states have on self-efﬁcacy has yet to be adequately
demonstrated.

Primin f lf-Rfrn ni n

limping ef self-sehemata. Although the priming of generalized
abstracted knowledge structures (schemata) has a strong theoretical
and empirical basis (Johnson 8r Dark, 1986), much of this research
has focused on the accessibility of social categories not directly related
to the "self." The intent of these studies has generally been to
examine the role category accessibility plays in the processing of

58
information relative to other social entities (Higgins, et al., 1977;
Higgins, et al., 1982; Higgins, et al., 1985; Wyer 8: Srull, 1981; 1986).
Somewhat more germane to the present investigation is research
conducted by Baldwin and his colleagues (Baldwin, Carrell & Lopez,
1990: Baldwin & Holmes, 1987) examining the impact of priming
cognitive representations of signiﬁcant others on the experience of
the self. In the Baldwin and Holmes study, for example, female
subjects were primed with (presumably) permissive and non-
permissive social attitudes by having them visualize the faces of either
their parents (non-permissive) or two friends from school
(permissive). Under the guise of a separate study, subjects were later
asked to rate the enjoyableness of several written passages. The
speciﬁc passage of interest contained a description of a sexual
encounter which depicted a rather permissive attitude toward
sexuality. Results supported the prediction that the visualization of
the signiﬁcant other (permissive vs. non-permissive) would serve to
prime either a permissive or non-permissive social attitude and thus
inﬂuence the relative enjoyment of the sexual passage. Speciﬁcally,
subjects who had been primed by visualizing non-permissive
signiﬁcant others (i.e., parents) reported enjoying the sexually
permissive passage less than their counterparts who had been primed
by visualizing permissive signiﬁcant others (peers).

In a similar investigation (Baldwin, et al., 1990; Study I), graduate
students evaluated their own research ideas after a 2 ms (subliminal)
exposure to a slide depicting either a disapproving authority ﬁgure
(department chair) or an approving non—authority ﬁgure (post-doctoral

fellow). Results indicated that subjects evaluated their research ideas

59
in a more positive manner after exposure to the approving prime
relative to the disapproving stimulus. Extending this research, the
authors (Baldwin, et a1, 1990: Study 2) had Catholic women read a
sexually permissive passage (Baldwin & Holmes, 1987) and then
sublirninally presented them with a slide depicting either a
disapproving signiﬁcant other (Pope John Paul II) or a disapproving
non-signiﬁcant other (the department chair from another institution).
After the exposure to the prime, each subject completed a self-
evaluation measure. Results of this study replicated the previous
ﬁnding that subliminal exposure to a disapproving image of a
significant other (Pope John Paul II) resulted in lower self-evaluations.
Furthermore, no priming effect was observed when the disapproving
image of a non-signiﬁcant other was used as the prime.

Taken together, these studies demonstrate that positive and
negative self-evaluations can be differentially primed by exposure to
positive and negative prior social contexts. This effect, however, may
be mediated by the degree to which the priming event is a relevant
part of the subject's existing knowledge structures.

Priming ef self-efﬁcacy. The extent to which self-efﬁcacy
expectations can be directly altered by exposure to an unrelated
context has not been investigated. If one assumes, however, that
positive or negative self-schemata can be primed, it is possible to
assess the indirect affect of priming on self-efficacy by examining the
relationship between self-schemata and self-efﬁcacy. Building on
theoretical assumptions set forth by Kuiper, MacDonald and Derry
(1983), Bruch and his colleagues (Bruch, Chesser & Meyer, 1989;

Bruch, Meyer & Chesser, 1987) examined the role of evaluative self-

60

schemata in the prediction and evaluation of behavioral events. In
their ﬁrst study (Bruch, et al., 1987) the investigators demonstrated
that individuals with negative self-schemas were more inclined to
engage in pessimistic self-talk during performance compared to those
with positive views of themselves. Subsequently, the authors (Bruch,
et al., 1989) extended these ﬁndings by setting forth and testing the
following line of reasoning:
Self-schema might function as the locus where experiential data
are stored at an abstracted and generalized level and must
therefore be considered as a major source for self-efﬁcacy. It can
be assumed that their impact is further strengthened by the self-
schema inherent bias mechanism which can be expected to
suppress available situational information. (p. 74)
In this study, subjects' evaluative self-schema was operationalized as
the discrepancy between real (myself as I am) and ideal (myself as I
would like to be) self. Speciﬁcally, subjects with a relatively high real
self to ideal self ratio were classiﬁed as positive self-schematics;
subjects with a relatively low real to ideal self ratio were classiﬁed as
negative self-schematics. After introducing a moderate amount of
stress into the situation by emphasizing the importance of a good
performance on the upcoming tasks, subjects were asked to offer
predictions as to how they would perform on the tasks. After making
their efﬁcacy judgments, subjects completed three cognitive
performance tasks. The results, as predicted, revealed that negative
self-schematics had signiﬁcantly lower self-efﬁcacy expectations
relative to positive self-schematics. In addition, although not
statistically signiﬁcant, negative schematics exhibited somewhat lower

61
performance scores than did the positive schematics on the cognitive
performance tasks. The authors discuss the implications of their
ﬁndings as follows:

In reference to Bandura's (1977) suggestions for processing of

self—efﬁcacy, our ﬁndings seem to suggest that achievement of

performance accomplishments does not necessarily lead to
enhancement of self—perceived mastery for coping achievement.

In other words, if cognitive processing in self-regulation is at

fault, potentially strong sources for enhancement of self—efficacy

might not be sufﬁcient to strengthen such expectations
accordingly. Thus, to facilitate adaptive self-regulation via self-
efficacy it appears to be crucial to challenge biased interference as

supported by a negative self-schema. (p. 82)

As discussed previously, Bandura's more recent writings (Bandura,
1986) have incorporated this position that none of four major sources
of efficacy is inherently capable of generating efﬁcacy expectations.
Rather, it is the cognitive processing of the informatien from each of
these sources that conveys an efﬁcacy expectation. Therefore, efficacy
expectations are the result of an individual selectively attending,
weighting and integrating information relevant to the likelihood of
successful performance on a particular task.

Priming ef moeg states. It is worth noting that a review of the
literature relative to priming and mood states produces more studies
using alterations in mood as the priming (manipulating) mechanism
than the primed (manipulated) variable. In fact, in any particular
study, it can be difficult to discern whether mood states are the

priming or the primed cognitive factor. For example, in the mood

62

induction studies cited earlier in this chapter, moods can either be
thought of as being "primed" by having the individual recalling positive
or negative events (Kavanagh & Bower, 1985; Wright 8: Mischel,
1982), giving them a small gift (Isen, et al., 1978), and by providing
them with bogus feedback (Stanley 8: Maddux, 1986); or as priming
subsequent dependent measures (e.g., self-efﬁcacy on a upcoming task
or the satisfaction with consumer products). Riskind (1989) further
elaborates on this point that moods can serve as priming variables by
stating the following: "When individual schemas or categories are
primed by a mood-induction, such priming would enhance retrieval of
schema—congruent material. . . priming by a mood-producing event
may increase the encoder's readiness to elaborate schema -- or
category -- congruent material. (p. 175)

Some priming studies, however, have more explicitly deﬁned
mood as the dependent measure. Baldwin, et al. (1990; Study 2), for
example, found that subliminal exposure to a photograph of a
disapproving face was capable of producing a signiﬁcantly negative
affect. This result was only observed, however, when the face was that
of a familiar and relevant authority ﬁgure.

In addition, in their study examining the priming of affective self—
perceptions, Skelton and Strohmetz (1990) found that subjects
reported experiencing more physical symptoms of illness after they
had been exposed to a health-related priming task. Speciﬁcally,
subjects in the priming condition engaged in a task that required
them to indicate which of two words "is more health-related -- makes
you think more about health and illness." Subjects primed in this
manner reported having more total symptoms of gastrointestinal, cold

63

and sinus, aches and pains, cardiovascular and pulmonary, and skin
problems relative to subjects who had not taken part in the priming
task.

Although these studies seem to suggest mood states can be
altered by priming, studies by Homstein and his colleagues have failed
to demonstrate a priming effect on mood (e.g., Holloway, Tucker &
Homstein, 1977; Homstein, LaKind, Frankel 8: Moore, 1975).

In summary, relatively few studies have been speciﬁcally designed
to investigate priming effects on self-referent cognitions. Those
studies that do exist -- and those conducted in closely related area --
suggest that priming may be capable of having an affect on self-schema
and self-efﬁcacy. On the other hand, studies examining the effects of
priming of mood states have generally produced equivocal results.
Qegnitiens and Meter Perfermepee

A number of cognitive factors such as anxiety (e.g., Bird & Horn,
1990; Pragman, 1986), attentional focus (e.g., Albrecht 8r Feltz, 1987;
Nideffer, 1976; Van Schoyck & Grasha, 1981) and goal intentions
(e.g., Hall 8r Byme, 1988: Locke, 1991; Smith & Lee, 1992) have been
proposed to inﬂuence the quality of motor performance. Two
additional cognitive variables that have received a great deal of
attention in the sport psycholog literature are self-efficacy and mood
states.

:r-l. onhlo 9‘ “n ‘ -fﬂ e_. 00 0‘ aria! '
The intuitively appealing notion that task-speciﬁc conﬁdence (self-
efﬁcacy) is positively correlated with performance has received
overwhelming support from a number of empirical investigations. The

robustness of the efficacy-performance relationship is evidenced by

64
the variety of settings in which it has been reported. Positive

relationships between self-efﬁcacy expectations and performance have
been reported in such diverse motor activities as diving (Feltz, 1982;
Feltz, 1988a; Feltz & Albrecht, 1986: Feltz, et al., 1979; Feltz &
Mugno, 1983), leg endurance (Gould 81 Weiss, 1981; Weinberg et al.,
1979; 1980; 1981), gmnastics (Lee, 1982; McAuley, 1985; McAuley
& Gill, 1983; Weinberg, et al., 1982) reaction time and motor
coordination (Ryckman, Robbins, Thornton 8r Cantrell, 1982),
marathon running (Gayton, Matthews 8: Burchstead, 1986), tennis
(Barling 8r Abel, 1983), handgrip strength (Kavanagh & Hausfeld,
1986), and golf putting (Woolfolk, Murphy, Gottesfeld 8r Aitken,
1985). Although several hypotheses can be set forth to explain the
positive relationship between self-efﬁcacy expectations and
performance, Bandura (1986) has offered the following: "Those who
judge themselves inefﬁcacious in coping with environmental demands
dwell upon their personal deﬁciencies and cognize potential
difﬁculties as more formidable than they really are. . . . Research shows
that people who regard themselves as highly efﬁcacious act, think, and
feel differently from those who perceive themselves as inefﬁcacious.
(pp. 394-395)
W. The
correlation between mood states and motor performance has been
investigated so frequently in the past two decades that LeUnes,
Hayward & Daiss (1989) were able to publish an annotated
bibliography limited to only those studies examining the use of a single
mood assessment instrument -- the Proﬁle of Mood States (POMS;
McNair, et al., 1971) -- in sport-related contexts. They reported that

65

between 1975 and 1988, the POMS was cited in 56 sport-related
papers, covering 19 different sport areas. During that l3-year period,
articles were published examining POMS scores of athletes
participating in such diverse sports as distance running (Tharion,
Strowman 8r Rauch, 1988), track and ﬁeld (Thaxton, 1982) exercise
and ﬁtness (Bahrke, Thompson (Sr Thomas, 1986) football (Daus,
Wilson 8: Freeman, 1986), swimming and diving (Berger & Owen,
1988; Morgan, Brown, Raglin, O'Conner 81 Ellickson, 1987), wrestling
(Nagle, Morgan, Hellickson, Serfass 8: Alexander, 1975), body building
(Freedson, Mihevic, Loucks & Girandola, 1983; Fuchs & Zaichkowsky,
1983), cycling (Hagberg, Mullin, Bahrke & Limburg, 1979; Johnson,
et al., 1985), wheelchair athletics (Henschen, Horvat 81 French,
1984), basketball (Craighead, Privette, Vallianos & Byrkit, 1986),
gmnastics (Edwards 8: Huston, 1984), karate (McGowan & Jordon,
1988), netball (Miller 8: Miller, 1985), rowing (Morgan & Johnson,
1978), rodeo participation (Meyers, Sterling & LeUnes, 1988), soccer
(Robinson & Howe, 1987) speed skating (Gutman, Pollock, Foster 81
Schmidt, 1984), and volleyball (Wilson, Ainsworth & Bird, 1985).

The popular and scientiﬁc writings of Morgan and his colleagues
(e.g., Farrell, Gates, Maksud & Morgan, 1982; Morgan, 1980a; 1980b;
Morgan, et al., 1987; Morgan & Horstman, 1978; Morgan 8: Johnson,
1978; Morgan, O'Connor, Ellickson 8r Bradley, 1988; Morgan &
Pollock, 1977; Nagle, et al., 1975) have done much to enhance the
understanding of mood affects and motor performance. Perhaps
Morgan's most important contribution has been to identify, describe
and popularize the characteristics of a POMS proﬁle frequently shown

to be associated with superior motor performance -- the so-called

66

"iceberg proﬁle" (Morgan, 1980a; 1980b). As Morgan (1980b)
describes it, the iceberg proﬁle exists when "athletes score below the
50th T-Score on tension, depression, fatigue, and confusion, and above
the 50th T-Score on vigor in comparison with published norms" (p.
63). A visual presentation of the iceberg proﬁle is depicted in Figure 1
which plots actual POMS data collected from elite runners, wrestlers
and oarsmen (Morgan & Pollock, 1977). Similar proﬁles have been
shown by other investigators to be associated with successful body
builders (ﬁeedson, et al., 1983; Fuchs 8r Zaichkowsky, 1983),
cyclists, (Hagberg, et al., 1979; Johnson, et al., 1985), football players
(Nation & LeUnes, 1981), swimmers (Riddick, 1984), weightlifters
(Mahoney, 1989) and wheelchair athletes (Henschen, et al., 1984).
Conversely, the absence of the iceberg proﬁle has recently been
associated with athletic "staleness" (Morgan, et al., 1987). Although
not universally supported by the empirical evidence (e.g., Craighead, et
al., 1986; Daiss, LeUnes & Nation, 1986; Miller & Miller, 1985), the
iceberg proﬁle has gained considerable acceptance in the sport
community as a correlate to elite performance. One example of the
extremes to which the iceberg proﬁle is sometimes considered the
"gold-standard" mood profile for effective athletic performance is
demonstrated by the women's cross-country track team at Brigham
Young University (BYU). Not only did the team implement the POMS
as part of a diagnostic testing program, but it was expected that
athletes with POMS proﬁles differing from the iceberg proﬁle undergo
some form of intervention such as relaxation, or cognitive behavioral

rehearsal (Poole & Henschen, 1984).

 

67

 

 

TEN DEP AN G VIG FAT CON

 

POMS FACTOR

Figpre 1. Classic "iceberg" proﬁle exhibited by elite runners,
oarsmen and wrestlers. Adapted from Morgan 8r Pollock (197 7).

68

Although it is frequently assumed (as the case of the BYU cross-
country team attests) that it is an athlete's mood that has an effect on
his or her performance, most of the studies mentioned thus far are
only capable of demonstrating a correlational, rather than a causal,
relationship between mood and performance. Several studies, in fact,
have found that the reverse is true. That is, manipulations in
performance cause changes in mood states (e.g., Berger 8r Owen,
1988; Kowal, Patton & Vogel, 1978; Lichtrnan 8: Poser, 1983; Wilﬂey
8r Kunce, 1986, etc.).

Even if evidence could be assembled supporting the intuitively
appealing notion that mood exerts a tremendous inﬂuence on the
quality of motor performance, the cognitive mechanisms involved are.
as yet, undetermined. It remains to be demonstrated, for example,
whether mood exerts its inﬂuence on performance via changes in self-
schemata or self-efﬁcacy separately, via both schemata and efficacy or
through some other mechanism entirely.

The relatienship bemeen priming £le behavier. Although the
effects of priming, per se, have yet to be investigated in regard to
neuro-muscular performance, Anshel's (1988) investigation into the
relationships among self-schemata, mood states, feedback and motor
skill performance offers preliminary support for the contention that
motor performance may be susceptible to cognitive priming. Despite
being of relatively minor importance to the purposes of his study.
Anshel reported that subjects within whom a negative mood had been
primed (Anshel never uses this term) by reading negative self-referent
statements (Velten, 1968) exhibited poorer performance on a pursuit

69
rotor task than subjects who had been primed with either positive or
neutral self-referent statements.

Two additional studies that involve priming of behavior in sport
and recreational contexts have been conducted by Worchel (1972) and
Josephson (1981; reported in Berkowitz 8r Rogers. 1986). In the
Josephson study, young boys were intentionally frustrated and then
made to watch scenes from a popular television program. Half of the
boys saw a violent scene in which the villains used walkie-talkies
during the commission of their violence. The remaining subjects
watched a non-violent scene from the same program. After priming,
all boys played a game of ﬂoor hockey which allowed them to act out
their aggressive tendencies. During some games, the referees carried
walkie-talkies which presumably would serve as retrieval cues for
subjects who had been exposed to the violent scene. Results indicated
that boys who had viewed the violent television program and then
played in a ﬂoor hockey games in which the referees carried walkie-
talkies acted in the most aggressive manner.

Worchel (1972) primed young summer campers by having them
view either a film of a prize ﬁght or a ﬁlm of a boating trip. After
administering the prime, subjects were given the opportunity to
indicate whether they would rather participate in a pie ﬁght or take a
ride on a raft. Campers who had watched the prize ﬁght were more
likely to choose to participate in the pie ﬁght while those who had
seen the ﬁlm of the boating trip indicated they would prefer to go on
the raft ride.

Additional support can be found for the priming of other overt
physical behaviors. Carver, Ganellen, Froming and Chambers (1983),

70
in fact, provide evidence that some behaviors previously attributed to
vicarious learning associated with modeling may actually be the result
of schematic priming. In the ﬁrst of two experiments examining this
priming explanation for modeling effects, the investigators exposed
subjects to either a hostile or neutral videotaped interaction between a
businessman and his secretary. In accordance with protocol set forth
by Srull and Wyer (1979), subjects later read a paragraph depicting an
individual engaging in a number of ambiguous behaviors such as
refusing to pay his rent until his landlord ﬁxed the plumbing. Finally,
subjects rated the degree to which they thought the person in the
paragraph exhibited hostile behaviors. Results indicated that subjects
exposed to the videotape of the hostile social interaction rated the
target person as being more hostile. The ﬁndings of this ﬁrst
experiment indicated that it is possible to use the behavior of a medﬂ
(as opposed to one's own actions) to prime interpretive knowledge
structures.

In their second study (Carver, et al., 1983; Study 2) the
investigators were no longer interested in priming hostile or
aggressive atmpdes -- something they (and others, e.g., Srull 81 Wyer,
1979) had already demonstrated -- but rather in the priming of
aggressive behavier. Borrowing heavily on the research protocol made
famous by Stanley Milgram (1963) in his classic work on obedience to
authority, subjects were paired with a confederate under the guise of a
"learning experiment." The subject was always assigned the role of
"teacher" and the confederate was always the "learner." Subjects were
to teach various concepts to their partner (the confederate) by

rewarding (correct) and punishing (incorrect) his responses. Prior to

71

the teaching task, however, the subject was asked to take part in
another experiment (while they waited for the conveniently late-
arriving confederate). During this "unrelated" scrambled sentence
task, subjects engaged in Srull and Wyer's (1979) sentence formation
task which involved creating meaningful sentences from sets of words.
Each of the 30 four-word sets was constructed so that only two
possible complete sentences could be formed. All sentences that
could be formed were of either hostile (e.g., "leg break arm his") or
neutral content (e. g., "her found know 1"). Subjects randomly assigned
to the hostile priming condition completed 24 (80%) hostile
sentences and 6 (20%) neutral sentences. These percentages were
reversed for subjects in the neutral priming condition. After the
introduction of the prime, subjects returned to their primary task of
teaching through the use of rewards and punishments. During the
bogus learning task, the subject asked his partner 34 questions. If the
response was correct (14 times), the subject rewarded the learner by
turning on a "correct" light. If the answer was incorrect (20 times),
the subject used his discretion to administer one of 10 linearly
increasing shock intensities. Results indicated that subjects exposed
to the hostile primes gave signiﬁcantly more intense shocks to their
incorrect partners than did control (neutral prime) subjects.

There is an apparent connection between the work of Carver and
his colleagues (Carver, et al., 1983) and the broader literature
involving "aggressive cueing" (e.g., Berkowitz & Alioto, 1973;
Berkowitz & Green, 1967). In fact, when Carver, et al. discuss the
notion of aggressive cueing in light of their research, they speciﬁcally
mention the Berkowitz and Green study where provoked subjects

72
watch a ﬁght scene from a movie. Ravin and Rubin (1976) succinctly
summarize this research as follows:
Subjects were shown a particularly bloody seven-minute scene
from the ﬁlm Chempien, in which a boxer, played by the actor
Kirk Douglas, was beaten to a pulp. Some subjects were then
introduced to a confederate named "Kir "; other subjects were
introduced to the same confederate, but in their case he was
called "Bob." When named ","Kirk the confederate was much
more apt to be given severe shocks by the subjects. (p. 138)
Although Berkowitz (1974) originally hypothesized these and similar
ﬁndings to be the result of classical conditioning, he has recently
come to favor a "cognitive-neoassociationistic" (e.g., Anderson 8r
Bower, 1973) or priming explanation. After reviewing a number of
fascinating studies in which highly publicized acts of violence seem to
serve as triggers for similar violence, Berkowitz and Rogers (1986)
conclude:
All this research suggests that media depictions of violence can
prompt people in the audience to act aggressively toward others
or themselves, even when the portrayals of violence are ﬁctional.

. . . We propose that when people witness, read, or hear of an

event via the mass media, ideas ﬁe eetivgted whieh, fer a sheg;
ri of e ten evoke other m r l h

(p. 57-58; italics added)
A series of controlled experiments conducted by Homstein and his
colleagues (e.g., Blackman 8r Homstein, 1977; Holloway, et al., 1977;
Homstein, et al., 1975) appears to lend support to Berkowitz's
contention that priming can activate cognitions which subsequently

73

ﬁnd expression as aggressive behaviors toward others. In these
studies, subjects' behavior toward others was observed after being
exposed to positive or negative news broadcasts while they waited to
take part in a decision-making study. Homsten, et al. (1975; Study 1),
for example, activated subjects' pro-social or anti-social cognitions by
priming them with news stories that depicted either the "best" (a man
donated a kidney to save the life of stranger) or "worst" (a man
strangled a 72 year old woman) aspects of human nature. Following
the priming, subjects participated in a nonzero sum
competition/cooperation (prisoner's dilemma) game. As predicted,
subjects primed with the positive news story behaved in a more
cooperative manner -- and expected more cooperation from their
partner -- than did subjects primed with the negative news story. A
similar investigation conducted by Holloway, et al. (1977) indirectly
exposed subjects to radio broadcasts containing good (human lives
were saved) and bad (human lives were lost) news that was either
social (the result of intentional human action) or nonsocial (the result
of an act of nature) in content. After the priming manipulation,
subjects engaged in a prisoner's dilemma game in which they chose to
either cooperate or compete with an unseen partner for additional
money. Results indicated a significant interaction with cooperative
behavior being elicited most often by exposure to the positive social
news and competitive behavior being elicited most often by exposure
to the negative social news.

In summary, although no studies have been designed to
specifically assess the effect of positive and negative priming on motor

behavior, there is considerable evidence to suggest that behavior -- in

74

general -- is susceptible to the effects of cognitive priming. The
present investigation was undertaken, therefore, to extend these

ﬁndings to the area of motor behavior.

CHAPTER III
METHOD

Pre-Experimental Schematicig Assessment
According to Markus (197 7), self-schematicity for a particular

attribute is a combined function of the extent to which the individual
feels the attribute is self-descriptive, and the degree to which the
attribute is perceived as being important to the individual's self-image.
Using these two dimensions of self-description and importance as
criteria by which to categorize individuals' schematicity for exercising,
Kendzierski (1988) operationally deﬁned individuals who perceived an
attribute (exercising) as being both extremely self-descriptive and
important as having a positive schema. Similarly, individuals
perceiving this attribute as being extremely non-descriptive but
important were categorized as having a negative self-schemata. A ﬁnal
category of "aschematic" was used to describe subjects who thought
the attribute to be only moderately self-descriptive or non-descriptive
and low in importance. Employing a methodolog consistent with that
used by Kendzierski, potential subjects were assessed regarding their
self-schematicity for physical ability.
Subjects

As part of the procedure for recruiting and screening potential
subjects for participation in the experimental manipulation phase of
the investigation, 1018 female undergraduates attending any of ﬁve
introductory psycholog classes at Michigan State University were
surveyed as to their schematicity for physical ability. In the ﬁrst two
classes, data were collected from all students in attendance. However,

because only females were to be included in the experimental phase of
7 5

76
the study, it was determined that continuing to collect screening data
from male subjects would be inefﬁcient and costly. Only female
subjects were screened in the ﬁnal three classes and only data from
females were used in the classiﬁcation of subjects’ self-schemata. In
terms of academic class standing, 51.6% of the female respondents
classiﬁed themselves as freshmen, 26.5% sophomores, 14.9% juniors
and 7.0% seniors.
In n n

Perceived Physical Abiligg Scale lPPAmes))° Respondents' self-
descriptions of their physical abilities were obtained by administering
the 10-item Perceived Physical Ability (PPA) subscale of the Physical
Self-Efﬁcacy Scale (Ryckman, et al., 1982). Although items contained
in the original PPA (e.g., "I have excellent reﬂexes"; "I am not agile and
graceful"; "I take pride in my ability in sports") are measured on a 6-
point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree)
possible responses in the present study were modiﬁed by expanding
the scale to 7-points (allowing for a midpoint response) and changing
the anchors to read: (1) this describes me; (7) this does NOT describe
me. (See Appendix A for a complete copy of the self-descriptive
version of the PPA.)

Im ortance of P r iv Ph si Abili S a1 PP imp))' The
importance subjects placed on having each of the physical abilities
described in the PPA was assessed by administering a second modiﬁed
version of the lO-item PPA. Items' stems and alternatives were
modiﬁed so as to reﬂect an importance dimension. For example, the
original self-description items "I have excellent reﬂexes" and "I am not

agile and gracef " were modiﬁed to read "Having excellent reﬂexes"

 

77

and "Being agile and graceful" and were measured on a 7 -point Likert-
type scale with anchors of: (1) this is very important to me; (7) this is
m very important to me. (See Appendix B for a complete copy of
the importance version of the PPA.)

Marlew-Qrewne Seeiel Desirabilijy Seals. Given the self-report
nature of the physical ability scales, subjects' self-descriptions and
importance ratings of their physical abilities may be, in part, the result
of intentional or unintentional response bias in favor of socially
desirable behavior. Therefore, each subject's tendency to respond in a
socially desirable manner was assessed by administering a l3-item
(Form C) shortened version (Reynolds, 1982) of the Marlow-Crowne
Social Desirability Scale (Crowne 8r Marlow, 1960). (See Appendix C
for a complete copy of the shortened version of the Marlow-Crowne

Social Desirability Scale.)

Wm
11 n f h i 111 hm i . Ontheﬁrstdayof

class, students attending introductory psycholog courses were given
information by their professor and a psycholog department
representative regarding an option to participate in several
departmentally approved psycholog research projects in return for
partial course credit. After the requirements for this option were fully
explained, the students were told the experimenter was currently
involved in such a research project and needed to collect pre-
experimental "screening information" from the class. Individuals
meeting the criteria for participation in the actual study would then be

contacted by telephone to arrange a mutually convenient time to

 

78

conduct the experimental phase of the investigation. Because a
complete understanding of the true purpose of the study would have
seriously jeopardized the validity of the results, subjects were told only
that the information they were providing was part of an ongoing
investigation into the perceptions college students have regarding
their physical ability.

A questionnaire packet including: (a) the Perceived Physical
Ability Scale, (b) the Importance of Physical Ability Scale and (c) a
shortened version (Reynolds, 1982; Form C) of the Marlow-Crowne
Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlow, 1960) was distributed to
each student. When they had completed the three instruments. the
students deposited their questionnaire packet in a collection box.

1. iﬁ .. n f u ' ' lf- hm for h i .. .pilia. Female
students demonstrating a tendency toward socially desirable
responses were excluded from further analyses. For the purposes of
this investigation, a tendency toward making socially desirable
responses was operationally deﬁned as a total score above the sample
mean of 5.43 (s.d. = 2.83) on the shortened version of the Marlow-
Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Reynolds, 1982). On the basis of this
criterion, 505 (49.6%) of the 1018 female subjects were deﬁned as
responding in a socially desirable manner and were therefore
eliminated from the study. Sample means and standard deviations for
perceived physical ability and the importance placed on these abilities
were then calculated for the remaining 513 female subjects. Based on
their responses to the self-description and importance of physical
ability scales, subjects were placed into one of the four mutually
exclusive physical ability self-schema categories presented in Table 3.

 

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80
These categories are in keeping with previous literature which has
consistently emphasize the need to consider both self-description and
importance dimensions in the classiﬁcation of an individual's self-
schema (Kendzierski, 1988; 1990; Markus, 1977). Kendzierski
(1988) describes the way these two dimensions are combined to
categorize self-schema as follows:
As deﬁned by Markus (1977) individuals are schematic in regard
to a particular attribute when they consider that attribute to be
either extremely self-descriptive (i.e., positive physical ability
schematics] . . . or extremely non-descriptive (i.e., negative
physical ability schematics] . . . and when they consider that
attribute to be extremely important to their self-image. Likewise,
individuals are considered aschematic when they consider the
attribute to be only moderately descriptive or nondescriptive and
they do not consider the attribute to be important to their self-
image. (pp. 46-47)

ical ili h m ti were operationally deﬁned as
those subjects with both PPAmes) and PPA(11np) scores above the group

mean (PPA(deS) x = 43.03, g = 10.19; PPA(1mp) x = 50.16, s_d = 11.15).
Negapve physieal ability schematies were deﬁned as subjects with

PPAmes) scores below, and PPA(imp) scores above the group mean.

Subjects were deﬁned as being aschernaﬁcimariphxsiealam
when their PPA(des) scores ranged between 1.0 standard deviation

above to 1.0 standard deviation below the group mean and their
PPAump) scores fell below the group mean. Finally, any subject with

physical ability self-description and importance scores placing them

outside the three previously deﬁned schema categories were

8 1
considered as having schemata aetﬂassiﬁed for the purposes of the

present study.

E rim n D 11

§iibJth§

Based on their physical ability schematicity classiﬁcation, 81
female volunteers between the ages of 18 and 26 were recruited to
serve as subjects in the experimental phase of the investigation.
Because a completely randomized block design was employed, 27
subjects were selected from each of the following schematicity
categories: (a) positive self-schema for physical activity, (b) negative
self-schema for physical activity and (c) aschematic toward physical
activity. Subjects were given course credit in exchange for
participation. Because a complete understanding of the true purpose
of the investigation would have seriously jeopardized the validity of the
results, subjects were recruited ostensibly to take part in a nationwide
study to develop performance norms for college students on a variety

of motor tasks.

In n n
W. Information pertaining

to each subject's demographic and sports-related background was
collected by administering an 1 1-item demographic / background
questionnaire. Demographic information gathered included: subject's
name, age, racial / ethnic afﬁliation, academic class, approximate grade
point average and college major. Additional questions designed to

assess the subject's previous sport experience were included in the

 

82

demographic / background questionnaire. (See Appendix D for a
complete copy of the demographic /background questionnaire.)
W. To assess the impact that
exposure to a positive, negative or neutral social environment has on
the subjects' mood state, each subject completed a 37-item
abbreviated version (Shacham, 1983) of the Proﬁle of Mood States
(McNair, et al., 1971). The original POMS consists of a set of 65
adjectives (e.g., "tense", "miserable", "muddled", "listless", etc.) or
phrases (e.g., "sorry for things done", "ready to ﬁght", "uncertain about
things", etc.) developed to assess the six "transient, ﬂuctuating
affective states" of tension, depression, anger, fatigue, confusion, and
vigor (McNair, et al., 1971, p. 5). The extent to which subjects felt a
particular adjective or phrase described how they were feeling at the
time was indicated on a 5-point Likert-type scale (0 = not at all, 1 = a
little, 2 = moderately, 3 = quite a bit, 4 = extremely). Subjects
expressing difﬁculty understanding the meaning of any particular
POMS item were given a synonymous item from the POMS alternative
word lists developed by Albrecht 8r Ewing (1989). (See Appendix E
for a complete copy of the abbreviated version of the Proﬁle of Mood
States and Appendix F for a copy of the alternative word lists.)
Physiea; ability self-sehemata. An indication of the respondents'
self-schema for physical ability (subj ects' self-descriptions and the
importance they placed on these physical abilities) was obtained by
administering the same lO-item self descriptions and 10-item
importance ratings derived from the Perceived Physical Ability (PPA)
subscale of the Physical Self-Efﬁcacy Scale (Ryckman, et al., 1982)
used in the pre-experimental schematicity assessment phase of the

83

study. Subj ects' self-schematicity for physical ability was computed by
multiplying each self description item by the importance rating for
that item and summing the 10 products.

Task-speeiﬁe self-efﬁcacy. Because previous "research from the
sport literature provides clear evidence that a signiﬁcant relationship
exists between self-conﬁdence [self-efﬁcacy] and performance" (Feltz,
1988b; p. 451), a task-speciﬁc (golf putting task) measure of self-
efﬁcacy was constructed that enabled a microanalytic research
methodolog (Bandura, 1977; 1986) to be employed when "testing
propositions about the origins and functions of perceived self-efficacy"
(Bandura, 1986, p. 422). "Speciﬁcally, each subject was asked to
indicate, the strength of belief that she would be successful in hitting
at least 1 out of 20 golf putts in such a manner as to make the ball
come to rest within 12 in. (30.48 cm) of a speciﬁed target; at least 2
out of 20 golf putts within 12 in. (30.48 cm) of the target; at least 3
out of 20 golf putts within 12 in. (30.48 cm) of the target; all the way
up to the maximum -- hitting all 20 out of 20 golf putts within 12 in.
(30.48 cm) of the target. Each efficacy rating was made on a 10-point
probability scale ranging from 0 (I am certain I eappet do this) to 10 (I
am certain I 9&1. do this). (See Appendix G for a copy of the task-
speciﬁc measure of self-efﬁcacy.)

Qelf putting task. Psychomotor performance was assessed via a
golf putting task. The putting task consisted of 20 trials in which the
subject putted a regulation golf ball a distance of 3.05 m, along a
carpeted ﬂoor, toward a 2.54 cm by 2.54 cm square target that was
formed by the intersection of two pieces of masking tape (each 1.83 m
long and 2.54 cm wide) crossing at their midpoint (Figure 2). Both

84

 

Videotape
Recorder
(on tripod)

 

10 feet
(3.05 m)

 
 

' ’ mere“:
. . go eac

W. Golf putting performance task.

 

85

pieces of tape were marked at 1 in. (2.54 cm) intervals. Each subject
was tested individually and no time limits were imposed. All trials
were recorded on videotape thereby eliminating the need for an
experimenter to be present during the performance.

Error associated with each putt was computed by summing the
shot's vertical and horizontal deviation from the target's midpoint.
Although several types of error scores were considered (e.g., variable
error (VE), constant error (CE), total error (E), etc.; absolute error
(AE) which, according to Spray (1986) "seems to be the strongest
indicator of target accuracy under most conditions" (p. 237) was
assumed to be the single best indicator of overall golf putting accuracy.
This assumption was also based on the fact that absolute error "is a
composite score that is mathematically derived from both CE and VE"
(Magill, 1985, p. 31). The ﬁrst ﬁve shots of the pre-test and the last
ﬁve shots of the post-test were eliminated from the total error score
in order to control for habituation and fatigue effects, respectively.

Qeaehing style videegpes. Three 5-minute VHS cassette
videotapes were produced, each depicting a female coach addressing
her basketball team. The same actor played the role of the coach in all
three tapes. In two of the tapes, the coach commented on, and made
references to, her team's performance. The only difference between
the two tapes was that in one, the coach was shown employing a
"negative" coaching style (e. g., criticizing and ridiculing the players for
their poor performance) while in the other, the coach approached the
same situation from a "positive" coaching perspective (encouraging,
and reinforcing the players for the things they had done correctly).
The third tape depicted the coach providing her team with

86

"emotionally neutr " organizational information (such as the time the
team bus will be leaving the school, etc.). (See Appendix H for a
transcription of the content of the three manipulation videotapes.)

Upon completion, each videotape was reviewed using a modiﬁed
version of the Coaching Behavior Assessment System (CBAS; Smith,
Smoll & Hunt, 1977) to insure that: (a) the positive coaching style
videotape contained the highest proportion of "mistake-contingent
encouragements" relative to other coded behaviors, (b) the negative
coaching style videotape contained the highest proportion of
"punishments" and "punitive" behaviors relative to other coded
behaviors, and (c) the neutral coaching videotape contained the
highest proportion of "organizational" behaviors relative to other coded
behaviors. Although the original CBAS consists of 12 behavioral
categories, only those related to "reactions to mistakes" and
"organization" were coded. (See Appendix I for a description of the
CBAS categories.)

Mapipulapen Check Questionnaire. A 12-item questionnaire was
administered to each subject at the end of the data collection session.
Speciﬁcally, the items were designed to assess (a) the degree to which
the subject was aware of the true purpose of the study, (b) the degree
to which the subject was aware of the manipulation, and (c) the
subject's perception of the effect the manipulation had on her
performance. In addition to these three questions of interest, several
irrelevant "filler" items were included in the manipulation check I
questionnaire in an attempt to cenceal the true nature of the
questionnaire. (See Appendix J for a copy of the Manipulation Check
Questionnaire.)

87

Preeedure
Qelleetien ef eaperimental data. At a pre-arranged time, each

subject reported directly to the testing room. When the subject
entered the room, the experimenter was seated in front of a 21-inch
T.V. monitor, viewing a videotape of a physical education instructor
giving a lecture. The instructor was presenting emotionally "neutral"
information pertaining to the historical development of the sub-
specializations of exercise physiolog and biomechanics within the
ﬁeld of physical education (See Appendix H for a transcription of the
lecture content). The experimenter was using a checklist to record
information from the videotaped lecture.

After introducing himself, the experimenter gave each subject a
brief overview of the bogus study (development of college student
motor performance norms) and informed them as to what their am
participation in the current study would entail. Each subject was
taken into an adjacent room and asked to stand behind the shooting
line in order to get "a feel" for the task demands. Subjects were not
misled regarding any of the tasks in which they would be participating
(only the speciﬁc purpose of the study was concealed).

After completing an informed consent form (Appendix K) and the
demographic and background questionnaire, each subject was asked to
sit quietly for five minutes. Ostensibly, the purpose of this rest period
was to "standardize the conditions under which the golf putting tests
were administered." Each subject was given a BIODOT biofeedback
button to place on the back of her hand and a small reference card

explaining the degree of stress associated with each color. (See

Appendix L for a copy of the BIODOT color reference chart.) The sole

88
purpose of the BIODOT button was to reinforce the legitimacy of the
rest period. While the subject was "resting," the experimenter
returned to his previous task of coding the videotaped instruction.
The audio on the T.V. monitor was set so the subject could clearly
overhear the instructor's voice. The subject was seated at a 45-degree
angle to the T.V., approximately 1.83 m from the screen. This
positioning was selected for its "natural" appearance -- not forcing the
subjects to look directly into the monitor, yet putting the monitor in
plain view should they choose to look at the screen during the resting
period.

After 5 minutes of "resting," each subject completed (a) the
abbreviated version of the POMS, (b) the PPA(des) and PPAﬂmp) scales
and (c) the task-speciﬁc self-efﬁcacy scale. To control for possible
order effects, presentation order of the three instruments was
randomly counterbalanced between each of the six possible sequences
(i.e., A—B-C; A-C-B; B-A-C; B-C-A: C-A-B; and C-B-A). When the pre-
manipulation questionnaires were completed, the experimenter
escorted the subject into the adjacent room and asked her to putt, at
her own pace, 20 golf balls toward the target, trying to get the balls to
come to a stop as close as possible to the center of the target. In
order to reduce the likelihood of the balls hitting one another,
subjects were asked to "clear the target area" after putting each cup of
balls (5 balls) toward the target. Subjects were responsible for
clearing the target because the experimenter was not present during
the golf putting performance. This was done to remove the possibility
of the experimenter providing subtle positive or negative feedback or

reinforcement cues to the subjects during their performance. Instead.

 

89

each performance was recorded using a video camera placed at a 45-
degree angle from the target and aimed away from the subject (See
Figure 2). Using the video camera to record performance, not only
eliminated the possibility of experimenter cues, and allowed a more
careful analysis of each performance, it also reduced the likelihood of
social facilitation performance (audience) effects resulting from self-
presentation (Bond, 1982) evaluation apprehension (Cottrell, 1972),
distraction (Baron, 1986) or the mere presence of the investigator
(Zajonc, 1965). After starting the camera, the experimenter returned
to the T.V. room under the guise of continuing his coding duties. Upon
completion of the 20 putts, subjects returned to the T.V. room.

Experimental manipulation and data eellectien. While the subject
was performing the pre-manipulation golf putting task, the
experimenter determined the manipulation group (positive, negative
or neutral) to which the subject would be assigned. This was done by
rolling a single die. If either 1 or 4 "pips" of the die were exposed,
the subject was assigned to the positive coaching condition. If either
2 or 5 pips appeared, the subject was assigned to the negative
coaching condition and if 3 or 6 pips were rolled, the subject was
assigned to the neutral coaching condition. The only restriction was
that each cell in the 3 X 3 randomized block matrix (Figure 3) contain
an equal number of subjects. When the subjects returned to the T.V.
room, the experimenter was again seated in front of the T.V. monitor.
He was now, however, viewing a videotape of a basketball coach
addressing her team. The videotape being viewed was determined by
the group to which the subject had been randomly assigned.

Consistent with the pre-manipulation procedures, the experimenter

90

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91

was again using a checklist to record information related to the
coaches' behavior.

In accord with the pre-manipulation rest period, each subject was
again asked to sit quietly for 5 minutes to "standardize the
administration of the second set of self-perception and motor tasks."
A new BIODOT biofeedback button was placed on the back of each
subject's hand. In keeping with the pre-test protocol, the
experimenter returned to his previous task of "coding" the videotape
while the subject "rested." Again, the audio on the T.V. monitor was
set so the subject could clearly overhear the coach's voice.

During the 5-minute resting period, the subject was unwittingly
exposed to the videotaped orations of either the negative, positive or
neutral coach (depending on the experimental condition to which
they had been assigned). After 5 minutes of exposure to either the
positive, negative or neutral coach, the subject again completed (a) the
abbreviated version of the POMS, (b) the PPA(des) and PPA(imp) scales
and (c) the task-specific self-efﬁcacy scale. The three instruments
were administered in the same order in which they were presented
during the pre-test. When the instruments were completed, the
subjects were again escorted into the adjacent room and asked to putt
20 golf balls toward the target. The testing of each subject's
performance was identical to that set forth during the pre-test. After
completing the golf putting task, the subject once again returned to
the T.V. room to complete the Manipulation Check Questionnaire and
for debrieﬁng.

Mer_1ipuletien Qheck Questionnaire ad debrieﬁng. Upon

returning to the T.V. room, the subject completed the Manipulation

 

92
Check Questionnaire. Before being dismissed, each subject was
informed as to the true purpose of the study. In addition, subjects
were apprised of the fact that:

Exposure to the videotape may have resulted in a change in the

way you view yourself or performed on the golf task. You should

not consider the perceptions you had of yourself or your
performance on the motor task to be true indications of your
abilities.
Because others were still participating, subjects were asked not to
disclose the purpose of the study to anyone for at least two weeks.

W. All data collected in the study were
coded, verified and keypunched into a "ﬂat" data ﬁle on the IBM 3090
VF mainframe computer at Michigan State University. Statistical
analyses were generated using SPSS" version 3.0 (SPSS Inc.)
implemented through the IBM 3090 mainframe computer at Michigan
State University.

Because this study had as its purpose examining the differential
effects positive and negative coaching has on a non—targeted observer's
self-schemata, mood state, self-efﬁcacy and motor performance,
several analyses were required. In addition to the calculation of
general descriptive statistics (for the entire sample and each of the
experimental conditions), reliability coefficients were computed for
each of the self-schema measures and the POMS subscales. A series of
inferential statistics were also used to examine the overall integrity of
the research design. Specifically, multivariate analysis of variance
(MAN OVA) and oneway analysis of variance (ANOVA), with appropriate

post hoc tests, were employed to assess mean differences between the

 

 

93

three experimental conditions prior to the experimental manipulation.
Hypotheses regarding the effect of priming on self-schema, self-
efficacy, mood state and performance were tested using a MANOVA
formulated to test a doubly multivariate with repeated measures design
(i.e., multiple dependent measures collected at multiple times). As a
method of controlling for individual variation, changes between pre-
and post-manipulation scores on the variables of interest were used as
dependent measures. In addition, path analytic techniques
(correlation and regression) were used to test the hypothesized causal
relationships among the variables. All analyses employed an alpha level

of .05.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Due to the nature of the study design and the fact that several
research hypotheses were tested, pre- and post-manipulation results
will be presented separately. In general, pre-manipulation analyses
were conducted to assess the overall integrity of the research design.
Post-manipulation analyses, on the other hand, were primarily
conducted to test the research hypotheses.

Pr -M 111 n R

Eggivalenge Qf Experimentg group ﬁsignment

Descriptive statistics for the four pre-manipulation outcome
variables (i.e., self-schema, mood state, self-efficacy and performance)
are presented in Table 4. A one-way MANOVA revealed that prior to
the experimental manipulation, no statistically significant differences
existed among the three experimental groups on any of the outcome
variables (Wilks' lambda E (8,150) = 0.59, p = .78). Because the
magnitude of the intercorrelations among the dependent variables
may, in some cases, result in "the seemingly anomalous situation in
which the MANOVA is nonsigniﬁcant but some or even all of the
ANOVPs are signiﬁcant" (Bray & Maxwell, 1985; p. 35), the univariate
"protected" E-tests were also examined. None of the univariate tests
were found to be statistically significant (self-schema E (2,78) = 0.54,
p = 0.58; mood state E (2,78) = 1.98, n = .14; self-efﬁcacy E (2,78) =
0.08, n = .92; performance E (2,78) = 0.13, n = .87). It was thus
demonstrated that in regard to the variables of interest, the random
assignment of subjects to the three experimental conditions resulted
in generally equivalent groups.

94

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W

A second MANOVA was conducted to determine if the three
physical ability schematicity blocks (i.e., positive schematics, negative
schematics, aschematics) differed on any of the outcome measures
prior to the experimental manipulation. A signiﬁcant omnibus
MANOVA (Wilks' lambda E (8,150) = 8.03, p < .001) indicated that at
least one statistically signiﬁcant difference existed among the three
schematicity blocks. A follow-up examination of the univariate E-tests
revealed that the only signiﬁcant pre-manipulation difference among
the three blocks was on the self-schema variable (E (2,78) = 33.22, p_ <
.001). Because the three schematicity blocks were constructed solely
on the basis of differences on the self—schema measure (albeit several
weeks earlier), this result was anticipated. An a posteriori multiple
comparison test (Tukey’s studentized range test) revealed that positive
schematics (1‘: = 336.78, 551 = 65.03) differed signiﬁcantly from the
other two schematicity groups (negative schematics x = 218.00, sd =
57 .77; aschematics i = 204.70, s1 = 72.83).
Assessment ef Qrger Effeets

The order in which the instruments measuring self-schema,
mood state and self-efﬁcacy were presented to the subjects was
counterbalanced to reduce the likelihood of establishing a "carry-over"
response bias. This random presentation, however, may have
produced its own systematic order effect. To examine this possibility,
a MANOVA was conducted to determine if any of the outcome
measures differed signiﬁcantly on the basis of presentation order.
Although the omnibus MANOVA did not attain the preset alpha level of
.05 (Wilks' lambda E (20,240) = 1.53, p = .07), the fact that it

 

 

97
approached statistical signiﬁcance prompted an examination of the
univariate protected E-tests. None of the four univariate E-tests were
statistically signiﬁcant at the .05 level (self-schema E (5,75) = 1.72, p
= .14; mood state E (5.75) = 1.44, p = .22; self-efﬁcacy E (5.75) = 0.40,
p_ = .85: performance E (5,75) = 2.02, p_ = .09). It was therefore
concluded that counterbalancing the presentation order of the
outcome measures was successful in preventing response biases due to

the order of presentation.

Reliability ef Quteeme Measgres

Reliability 9f self-sehemg instggments. Because the two
instruments used as indices of self-schematicity in the present study
(PPA(des) and PPA(imp)) were constructed by substantially modifying the
Perceived Physical Ability (PPA) subscale of the Physical Self-Efficacy
Scale (Ryckman, et al., 1982), it could not be assumed that the
psychometric properties of the original instrument (Gayton, et al.,
1986; McAuley & Gill, 1983; Ryckman, et al., 1982) were transferred
to the modified versions. Therefore, two aspects of reliability --
stability and internal consistency -— were examined for each
instrument. Stability of each instrument was assessed by calculating a
test—retest reliability (correlation) coefﬁcient between subjects'
PPA(des) and PPAump) scores obtained during the in-class pre-
experimental schematicity screening phase of the study and those
obtained during the pre-manipulation assessments of the experimental
phase of the study. Test-retest intervals ranged from 1 1 to 32 days
with the mean interval being approximately three weeks in length (if
= 21.7 days; sd = 6.3 days). With all 81 subjects included in the
analysis, a test-retest reliability coefﬁcient of .77 was obtained for the

98
PPA(des) and .84 for the PPAﬂmp)‘ The degree to which the two

schematicity scales were internally consistent (measured a single,
homogeneous domain) was assessed by computing Cronbach alpha
reliability coefﬁcients (Cronbach, 1951) for each scale. The obtained
alpha reliability coefﬁcients for the PPA(des) and PPAump) scales were
.81 and .90, respectively. Both self-schema assessment instruments
were, therefore, assumed to measure self-descriptions and importance

placed on physical abilities with adequate stability and internal

consistency.
Reliability ef me Preﬁle ef Meeg State subseales. Estimates of

alpha reliability (internal consistency) were computed for each of the
six POMS subscales, as well as for the overall Total Mood Disturbance
score which is a composite mood index derived by summing the six
subscales (Vigor-Activity scale negatively weighted). Table 5 reveals
that the reliability coefﬁcients for four of the six POMS subscales as
well as that for the Total Mood Disturbance score exceeded the .70
level set forth by Jensen (1978) as the generally acceptable standard
for reliability estimates. The two subscales failing to meet this
criterion were those purporting to assess the Confusion-Bewilderment
(t = .59) and Anger-Hostility (t = .67) dimensions.
P -M ul n 1.11

Mampulatten Qheek

Although priming effects have been observed even when the
primes have been presented subliminally and/ or when subjects are
unable to recall the prime (e.g., Bargh, 1982; Bargh & Pietromonaco,
1982; Lombardi, et al., 1987), establishing that the manipulation

conditions differed signiﬁcantly in terms of their positive or negative

99

Table 5.
Alpha Reliability (Internal Consistency) Coefﬁcients for Six POMS
Subscales and Total Mood Disturbance Scores.

 

 

POMS Subscale Coefﬁcient Alpha
Tension-Anxiety .73
Depression-Dejection .86
Anger-Hostility .67
Vigor-Activity .90
Fatigue-Inertia .88
Confusion—Bewilderment .59

Total Mood Disturbance .87

 

100

valence would further increase conﬁdence placed in the results of the
study. Therefore, subjects were asked, as part of the exit
questionnaire, to rate, on a 5-point scale, the degree to which they felt
the coach depicted in the videotape was behaving in a positive or
negative manner toward her team (1 = very negative toward her team;
3 = neutral toward her team; 5 = very positive toward her team). A
oneway ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant omnibus E ratio (E (2.78) =
64.18; p < .001) indicating that perceived differences existed among
the three manipulation groups relative to the positive / negative
behaviors exhibited by the coach in the videotapes. Figure 4
graphically depicts the ﬁnding that planned orthogonal contrasts
among the three manipulation groups revealed statistically significant
differences among the three groups (positive condition i = 4.22, sd =
1.28; neutral condition if = 3.63, s51 = 1.04; negative condition it“ =
1.19, stt = 0.74). The signiﬁcant differences among the three
experimental groups indicate that the videotaped manipulations were
successful in effectively depicting the coach exhibiting three distinct
types of social interaction with her team. Speciﬁcally, subjects
exposed to the positive coach perceived the videotaped behaviors as
signiﬁcantly more positive than did subjects who viewed either the
neutral or negative coach videotape. Conversely, subjects exposed to
the negative videotape perceived the coach's behaviors as signiﬁcantly
more negative than subjects in either the positive or neutral condition.
Effeet ef Priming en Qateeme Variables

The major purpose of the present study was to assess the eﬁ'ect
unobtrusive exposure to either a positive or negative social prime has

on subsequent ratings of self-schema, self-efﬁcacy, mood state and

101
motor performance. Descriptive statistics for the four post—

manipulation outcome variables are presented in Table 6.

t = 10.69, p <.001

( (

 

Positive Neutral Negative
Manipulation Manipulation Manipulation
Condition Condition Condition

(2 = 4.22, sd = 1.28) (r: = 3.63, sd = 1.04) (J? = 1.19, sd = 0.74)

T M i

t = 2.09, p < .05 t = 8.60, p < .001

Figure 4. Results of planned orthogonal contrasts among
manipulation groups on perceived positive/ negative style of
videotaped coach.

The most appropriate method for assessing the overall effect of
priming on the four outcome variables was through the use of a
MANOVA formulated to test a doubly multivariate with repeated
measures design (i.e., multiple dependent measures collected at
multiple times). Results of this omnibus MANOVA indicated that
although there were no signiﬁcant main effects for either priming
condition (Wilks' lambda E (8,150) = 0.91, p = .51) or time (Wilks'
lambda E (4,75) = 0.94, p = .44) there was a signiﬁcant interaction
between priming and time (Wilks' lambda E (8,150) = 3.95, p < .001).
Thus, there was an overall signiﬁcant difference between subjects'
pre- and post-manipulation outcome variables when examined as a
function of the priming condition to which they had been exposed
(i.e., a significant priming effect).

102

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Although the results of the doubly multivariate with repeated
measures MANOVA clearly indicate that differential exposure to the
positive, negative or neutral prime resulted in signiﬁcant pre- to post-
manipulation differences on the outcome variables, univariate analyses,
were required to explore the exact nature of these effects. A series of
orthogonal contrasts between the positive, neutral and negative
priming conditions were conducted comparing pre- to post-
manipulation changes in each of the outcome variables. As depicted in
Figure 5, when compared to the negative priming manipulation,
exposure to the positive social prime resulted in signiﬁcantly more
positive self-schemata ratings (1; = 3.66: p < .001) and self-efﬁcacy
judgments (j; = 4.33: n < .001) as well as a general improvement in
motor performance scores (1 = 2.97 ; p < .01). Of the four outcome
variables measured, only mood state was unaffected by differential
exposure to the positive or negative social prime. In addition.
signiﬁcant differences in self-schema ratings (1; = 2.33; p < .05) and
self-efficacy judgments Lt = 2.54; p < .05) were observed between
subjects exposed to the positive and neutral social prime. Comparable
differences, however, did not exist between the negative and neutral
priming conditions. Therefore, when taken as a whole, exposure to
the positive social prime appears to have exerted a greater inﬂuence
on self-referent cognitions than did the negative prime.

Based on previous ﬁndings that schematics, relative to
aschematics, are more successful in resisting counterschematic
information (Markus, 1977; Markus, Crane & Siladi, 1978; Markus &
Sentis, 1982; Sweeney & Morland. 1980), it was hypothesized

104

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(Research Hypothesis 5) that there would be a signiﬁcant "prime x
self-schematicity" interaction. Speciﬁcally, it was predicted that both
positive and negative schematics would be most effective in resisting
primes that were inconsistent with their prevailing self-schema for
physical ability (i.e., positive schematics would eﬁ'ectively resist the
inﬂuence of the negative prime and negative schematics would
effectively resist the inﬂuence of the positive prime). In contrast, due
to the lack of a prevailing self-schema, aschematics should be equally
susceptible to both forms of priming. To test this hypothesis, a 3 X 3
(priming manipulation by self-schematicity block) MANOVA was
conducted with pre-post diﬁ'erence scores on the four outcome
variables serving as multiple dependent measures. Although there was
a signiﬁcant main effect for priming condition (E (8,138) = 3.87, p <
.001), thereby supporting the previously described doubly multivariate
ﬁndings, the results failed to support either a main effect for
schematicity block (E (8,138) = 0.83, n = .57) or the prime by schema
interaction hypothesis (E (16,211) = 0.79, p = .69). The effects of
priming were, therefore, not mediated by the subjects' pre-existing
self-schema for physical ability (i.e., positive, negative, aschematic).
R l n hi Am 11 V bl

The ﬁnding that self-schemata, self-efﬁcacy and motor
performance can be differentially primed by exposure to positive or
negative social contexts served as an impetus to investigate the nature
of the causal relationships existing among these variables. Three
conditions must exist in order to establish causation between variables.
First. there must be a statistical relationship (i.e., correlation) between

the variables. Second, there must be temporal precedence (i.e., the

1 O6
"causal variable" must precede the "effected variable"). Finally, the
error terms associated with the variables must not be correlated (i.e.,
there can exist no confounding variables). By specifying the temporal
relationship, and assuming the non-correlation of error terms, path
analysis enables the examination of the correlation between two
variables (or multiple correlations among more than two variables) to
establish proof of causation (Asher, 1983).

To examine the causal relationships among priming and the
outcome variables, a recursive (non-reciprocal) path analysis using
ordinary regression techniques was conducted to test the model
speciﬁed in the research hypotheses. Speciﬁcally, it was predicted
that: (a) a positive or negative self-schema would be diﬁ'erentially
primed as a result of exposure to either the positive or negative
manipulation (Research Hypothesis 1), (b) information upon which
task-speciﬁc self-efﬁcacy predictions are based would be selectively
and differentially processed depending on the type of self-schema that
had been invoked through the priming process (Research Hypothesis
2), and (c) due to a positive relationship between self-efﬁcacy and
performance, subjects in the negative priming condition would
perform less well on a subsequent motor task relative to subjects
assigned to the positive priming condition (Research Hypothesis 4).
In addition, it was predicted that exposure to the priming condition
would have a direct effect on mood state which would, in turn, impact
on performance (Research Hypothesis 3). These hypothesized
relationships among the variables are illustrated by the recursive
model depicted in Figure 6 and the correlation matrix to be analyzed
presented in Table 7. In path analytic terms, the priming variable (a

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dummy variable which was coded either "0" (negative prime) or "1"
(positive prime) to represent priming condition membership) is said
to be "exogenous" to the system in that it is not inﬂuenced by any of
the other variables in the proposed model. On the other hand, the
four outcome variables are considered "endogenous" because they are
proposed to be the result of other variables in the model. The
observed standardized path coeﬁicients (B), which serve as estimates
of the magnitude of the causal linkages between the variables, are also
provided for each predicted relationship. Finally, all unspeciﬁed
sources of variation in each endogenous variable is estimated by a
residual (error) term (st). Residual path coefﬁcients are calculated

using the equation:

Rj= \/1-R‘:7

where R12 is the multiple correlation coefﬁcient representing the

 

amount of the total variance explained by the predictor variables.

By examining Figure 6, it can be seen that, as predicted, there
was a signiﬁcant path between priming condition and physical ability
self-schema ratings ([3 = .452, 1; = 3.66, p < .01). Speciﬁcally,
exposure to the positive social prime signiﬁcantly predicted positive
changes in self-schema ratings.

A second signiﬁcant path existed between self-schema ratings and
self-efﬁcacy expectations ([3 = .409, t = 3.24, p < .01). Positive
changes in pre-post self-schema ratings (after exposure to the social
prime) signiﬁcantly predicted positive changes in self-efﬁcacy
expectations (higher efficacy judgments).

110

However, Research Hypothesis 3, which predicted a signiﬁcant
causal relationship between priming condition and Total Mood
Disturbance score and Research Hypothesis 4 which predicted a
signiﬁcant causal relationship between self-efficacy expectations and
motor performance, were not supported by the path analysis.

Because only hypothesized relationships among the variables are
incorporated into the hypothesized model (in path analytic terms the
model is said to be "overidentiﬁed"), it is possible to assess the overall
quality of the model by comparing its "goodness of ﬁt" to that of the
complete (fully-identified) model (Figure 7). Using a formula
suggested by Pedhazur (1982), a chi square goodness of ﬁt test was

calculated revealing a statistically signiﬁcant difference between the
fully identiﬁed and the predicted causal models (x2(5) = 18.90; p < .01;

see Appendix M for the calculation of x2 ). This rejection of the null
hypothesis (i.e., that there is no difference between the two models)
indicates, according to Pedhazur, "that the model does not ﬁt the
data" (p. 617).

It is worth noting that inspection of the fully-speciﬁed model
(Figure 7), reveals significant paths between priming condition and
self-schema ratings (B = .452: t = 3.66; n < .01), self-efﬁcacy
expectations ([3 = .414; 1; = 3.16; p_ < .01) and performance ([3 = .321; 1
= 2.00; p < .05). None of the other path coefﬁcients in the full model
attained the .05 level of statistical signiﬁcance.

gsnsral Discussion of Q1: Rssglts

Findings in the present study support the contention that even

brief and indirect exposures to seemingly irrelevant positive and

negative social contexts are capable of exerting considerable inﬂuence

111

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l l 2
on the activation of self-referent cognitions. Additionally, and of even
more importance, was the unique ﬁnding that such positive and
negative social priming can also have an effect on the execution of a
subsequent motor performance task. Given the subtle nature of the
priming exposure, the inﬂuence priming had on performance is
noteworthy despite accounting for less than 15% of the total variance
in performance (52 = .144). Although there is considerable theoretical
support for these ﬁndings, this was the ﬁrst empirical investigation to
hypothesize and test the simultaneous effects of cognitive priming on
physical ability self-schemata, self-efﬁcacy expectations, mood states
and motor performance.

It was further hypothesized that priming would not only directly
affect self-schema ratings but it would indirectly inﬂuence self-efﬁcacy
and performance. Although path analysis revealed that priming
produced signiﬁcant changes in self—schema ratings which, in turn,
resulted in signiﬁcant changes in self-efficacy judgments, performance
was not related to self-efﬁcacy (see Figure 6). By demonstrating that
priming can inﬂuence self-efficacy expectations, however, this study
confirms -- and thus demands further investigation of -- Bandura's
(1986) generally overlooked position that none of the four major
sources of self-efﬁcacy he proposes (i.e., previous performance
attainments, vicarious experience, verbal persuasion, assessment of
physiological states) is inherently capable of generating efﬁcacy
judgments. As Bandura suggests, it is the W
infgrmaﬂgn from each of these sources that conveys an efﬁcacy
expectation. A noteworthy ﬁnding in the present study is that priming

-- by exposure to positive or negative social contexts -- appears to be

113

one factor capable of altering the manner in which this cognitive
processing occurs.

Given the robust nature of previous ﬁndings linking self-efficacy
expectations with performance (See Feltz, 1992; 1988b) it is
interesting to note that despite cognitive priming's signiﬁcant effect
on both self-efﬁcacy expectations and motor performance, no
relationship existed between self-efficacy expectations and
performance. Although unexpected, a number of possible explanations
exist for such a ﬁnding. Bandura (1986), for example. has identiﬁed
several variables which can affect the strength of the relationship
between self-efficacy judgment and performance. In the present
study, at least three factors outlined by Bandura may have contributed,
to some extent. to the lack of a positive relationship between self-
efﬁcacy and performance: (a) lack of consequences of misjudgment;
(b) temporal disparities; and (c) obscure aims and performance
ambiguities.

Not only were there no negative consequences associated with
subjects' misjudgments of their self-efﬁcacy, but little or no motivation
was provided for accurate efﬁcacy judgments. In addition, temporal
disparities between self-efﬁcacy judgments and performance were
inadvertently created by counterbalancing the sequence of instrument
administration. For example, some subjects completed the self-
eﬁicacy instrument immediately prior to performing the golf putting
task whereas another subjects completed the mood states and / or the
self-schema assessments in the interval between the efficacy ratings
and performance. Partial support for this temporal explanation is
provided by the fact that the omnibus MANOVA conducted to

114

determine if any of the outcome measures differed on the basis of
presentation order approached (but did not attain) the preset alpha
level of .05 (Wilks' lambda E (20,240) = 1.53, n = .07). Furthermore,
although none of the four univariate F-tests conducted on the
dependent variables were found to be statistically signiﬁcant at the .05
level, the E value associated with performance again approached
statistical signiﬁcance E (5.75) = 2.02, p = .09).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, using pre- to post-
manipulation change scores as dependent measures assumes that the
only intervening variable between pre- and post-manipulation
assessments is the experimental variable of interest (i.e., priming).
Although this assumption may be justiﬁed when considering the self-
schemata, mood state and performance variables, self-efﬁcacy
judgments present a unique problem. Subjects' pre-manipulation
efficacy judgments were made prior to performing the task.
Therefore, expectations were the made solely on the basis of verbal
information provided by the experimenter. Post-manipulation efﬁcacy
expectations, on the other hand, were the result of both exposure to
the experimental manipulation and previous personal experience (pre-
manipulation performance) on the task. Considerable support for this
explanation is provided by the fact that if only post-manipulation
performance scores (as opposed to performance change scores) are
examined, the expected positive correlation exists between self-
efﬁcacy and performance (r = .38; p < .01).

Another unanticipated finding was that priming did not inﬂuence
self-perception of mood states. Other investigators have reported

similar non-signiﬁcant effects of priming on mood states. Homstein

1 1 5
et al. (1975), for example, found no statistically signiﬁcant differences
in subjects' mood as measured by the Mood Adjective Check List after
exposure to good or bad news broadcasts -- despite the changes they
elicited in aggression (Study 1) and attitude toward others (Study 2).
Similarly, Holloway, et a1. (1977) found no mood effects after
administering priming manipulations consisting of good and bad social
and nonsocial news stories. Although it may appear that the true
relationship between priming and mood may have also been obscured
by the unreliability of the POMS instrument (two subscales had
internal consistency coefficients below .70), it must be remembered
that individual POMS subscales were not used as dependent measures
of mood state. Instead, overall Total Mood Disturbance (TMD) scores
were derived by summing the six subscales and the reliability of TMD
scores was a very respectable .87. Further indication that the lack of
priming effects on mood was not due to unreliability in mood state
measurement is provided by the fact that even correcting for
attenuation due to unreliability (Ghiselli, Campbell & Zedeck, 1981)
does not appreciably increase the correlation between priming
conditions and mood states (uncorrected r = .19; corrected 1 = .21).
A more feasible explanation for the lack of priming effects on mood
may be gleaned from the results reported by Baldwin et al. (1990). In
their study, affect was primed only when the social stimulus was a
meaningful authority ﬁgure. Because the present investigation
employed a manipulation which depicted an unknown and
unidentified basketball coach interacting with her team, it is possible
that she was not perceived by the subjects as a signiﬁcant authority

ﬁgure.

116

Schematicity blocks were constructed to take into account
possible individual x priming condition interactions (Higgins, et al..
1982; Martin, 1986). Despite statistically signiﬁcant pre-manipulation
differences between the schematicity groups, no schematicity x
priming condition interactions were observed. The fact that exposure
to either the positive or negative social prime had the same effect
regardless of the subjects' prevailing self-schemata, does not support
previous ﬁndings that schematics are more successful in resisting
counterschematic information than aschematics (Markus, 1977;
Markus, Crane & Siladi, 1978; Markus & Sentis, 1982; Sweeney &
Morland, 1980). Because the previous studies did not employ a
priming paradigm, one possible explanation for the divergent ﬁndings
may involve the way priming stimulates increased cognitive elaboration
during information processing. In their work on persuasion, Petty and
Cacioppo (1986) have set forth a theoretical framework -- the
elaboration likelihood model -- asserting that information can be
processed either with considerable mental effort (central route) or in
a relatively effortless fashion (peripheral route) depending on
situation-speciﬁc cues and contexts. Central route processing
generally involves thoughtful consideration of the message content
whereas peripheral processing is accomplished through the use of
available heuristics and mental shortcuts. It is possible, therefore, that
exposure to either schematic or counterschematic primes serve as
cues for further cognitive elaboration, and thus force a more critical
examination of the message content relative to information which is

presented without a prime.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

51mm

The present study examined the extent to which unobtrusive
exposure to an irrelevant positive or negative social context was
capable of producing differential (priming) effects on subsequent self-
perceptions and motor performance. Speciﬁcally, female college
students were exposed to the positive or negative communications of
an athletic coach to determine the effect of cognitive social priming
on self-schema, self-efﬁcacy, mood states and performance on a golf-
putting task. On the basis of previous theory and research it was
hypothesized that: (a) a positive or negative self-schema would be
differentially primed as a result of exposure to either the positive or
negative manipulation, (b) information upon which task-speciﬁc self-
efﬁcacy predictions are based would be selectively and differentially
processed depending on the type of self-schema that had been
invoked through the priming process, and (c) due to a positive
relationship between self-efﬁcacy and performance, subjects in the
positive priming condition would perform better on a subsequent
motor task than those subjects assigned to the negative priming
condition. Furthermore, it was predicted that exposure to the
priming condition would have a direct effect on mood state which
would, in turn, impact on motor performance.

Using a two-stage data collection procedure, 1018 female

undergraduates were initially screened to assess their physical ability
self-schemata. After eliminating 505 subjects for responding in a

socially desirable manner, the remaining 513 subjects were classiﬁed

117

I 18

as having either: (a) a positive self-schema for physical ability, (b) a
negative self-schema for physical ability, (0) no self-schema for
physical ability (aschematic), or ((1) none of the above self-schemata for
physical ability. On the basis of their physical ability schematicity
classiﬁcation, a total of 81 subjects (27 positive schematics; 27
negative schematics; 27 aschematics) were recruited to participate in
the experimental phase of the study. Prior to exposure to the
experimental manipulation, each subject was assessed as to her self-
schema for physical ability, current mood state, task-specific self-
efﬁcacy expectations and performance on a golf putting task. Subjects
within each self-schematicity block were randomly assigned for
unobtrusive exposure to a 5—minute videotape which depicted either a
positive, negative or neutral social context. All social contexts were
similar in that they portrayed a female basketball coach addressing her
team. In the positive priming condition, the coach was shown
encouraging and reinforcing positive aspects of the team's
performance. In the negative priming videotape, however, the coach
was seen criticizing and ridiculing her players for their poor
performance. Finally, the neutral prime consisted of the coach giving
the team emotionally neutral information about an upcoming road trip.
After exposure to the experimental manipulation, each subject again
completed written assessments related to her physical ability self-
schema, current mood state and task-speciﬁc self-efficacy. In
addition, each subject performed a second (post-manipulation) trial on
the golf putting task.

A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) formulated to test a

doubly multivariate with repeated measures design (i.e., multiple

119

dependent measures collected at multiple times) revealed that there
was an overall statistically signiﬁcant interaction between the priming
condition to which subjects had been exposed and differences
between pre— and post- manipulation scores on the dependent
measures. Although no evidence was found to support the hypothesis
that there would be a main effect of priming on mood state,
subsequent univariate analyses (orthogonal contrasts) revealed that
when compared to the negative social prime, exposure to the positive
social prime resulted in signiﬁcantly more positive self-schemata and
self-efﬁcacy judgments as well as a general improvement in motor
performance scores. In addition, significant differences in self-
schema ratings and self-efﬁcacy judgments were observed between
subjects exposed to the positive and neutral social prime. Because
comparable differences did not exist between the negative and neutral
priming conditions, it was concluded that the positive social prime
exerted a greater inﬂuence on self-referent cognitions than did the
negative prime. In addition, there was no evidence of a hypothesized
priming x pre-existing physical self-schematicity interaction. Thus.
the results of this study do not support the previous ﬁndings that
schematics are more successful than aschematics in resisting
counterschematic information (Markus, 1977 ; Markus, Crane 8r Siladi,
1978; Markus & Sentis, 1982; Sweeney & Morland, 1980). Finally, a
causal model of the hypothesized relationships among the variables
was tested against a fully-identiﬁed model and was found to not fit the

data.

120

Conclusions

Based on the ﬁndings, and within the limitations of the present

study, the following conclusions are warranted:

1)

2)

3)

When pre-existing self-efﬁcacy expectations are controlled
for by using pre- to post-manipulation change scores as a
dependent measure, unobtrusive exposure to either a
positive or negative prior social context produces a
differential priming effect on subsequent self-efficacy
expectations. Specifically, self-efﬁcacy judgments

become more positive after exposure to a positive social
prime.

When pre-existing self-schema ratings are controlled for
by using pre- to post-manipulation change scores as a
dependent measure, unobtrusive exposure to either a
positive or negative prior social context produces a
differential priming effect on subsequent self-schema
ratings. Specifically, self-schema ratings become more
positive after exposure to a positive social prime.

When the level of pre—existing motor performance is
controlled for by using pre- to post-manipulation change
scores as a dependent measure, unobtrusive exposure to
either a positive or negative prior social context produces a
differential priming effect on subsequent motor
performance. Specifically, motor performance is improved

after exposure to a positive social prime.

121

4) A model that adequately explains the causal relationships
between self-schemata, self-efﬁcacy, mood states and motor
performance has yet to be speciﬁed.

Implicaﬂons for Practitioners and Suggestions for Future Research

The ﬁndings of the present study hold practical implications for

teachers and coaches as well as methodological implications for future
research examining the effects of cognitive social priming. Although
the impact a positive or negative coaching style can have on an
athlete's self-perception and performance has long been a fertile topic
for speculation among athletes, coaches and spectators, it has only
recently gained the attention of the scientific community. Impeding
scientiﬁc inquiry into the effects of coaching style has been the fact
that much of the previous research has been conducted from an
atheoretical perspective. Furthermore, interest in the area of
coaching styles has tended to narrowly focus on the effects coaching
behaviors (e.g., verbal rewards and punishments) have on the speciﬁc
target(s) of those behaviors (e.g., the self-concept of the particular
athlete(s) being praised or punished) -- as opposed to the broad
manner in which a coach's public praise or criticism (such as that
frequently witnessed during locker room "critiques") may affect the
perceptions and/ or performances of seemingly uninvolved (i.e., non-
targeted) observers (e.g., other team members) who are often forced
to witness such behaviors. Because the emphasis has been on
atheoretical investigations employing quasi-experimental research
paradigms, even fundamental questions such as: "Is a negative
coaching style more or less conducive to performance enhancement?"

cannot be answered with any degree of certainty.

122

The present study hypothesized and tested relationships among
three distinct psychological theories -- cognitive priming theory, self-
schema theory and self-efﬁcacy theory -- in a way that may shed light
on cognitive mechanisms underlying the commonly held belief that
relatively stable and predictable relationships exist between coaching
style and athlete self-concept, conﬁdence and motor performance. It
was demonstrated that —- at least within a controlled laboratory setting
-- it is possible to systematically alter the self-schema ratings, self-
efﬁcacy expectations and motor performances of uninvolved observers
simply by exposing them to a coach interacting with others in either a
positive or negative manner.

In the immediate future, research is needed to replicate the
preliminary ﬁndings of this study. If reproducible in the laboratory
setting, the next step would be to embark on a path of programmatic
research into the effects of positive and negative coaching/ teaching
styles -- by elaborating, reﬁning and subsequently validating and cross-
validating the theoretical models through ﬁeld experiments. One
useful elaboration may be to design a study employing several
sequential priming manipulations. For example, an AB design may be
used to expose the same subject (each subject would act has his/her
own control) to one type of prime (e.g., positive), then the other (e.g.,
negative), to assess the impact of each successive prime. Using this
design would also allow more elaborate causal models to be
hypothesized and tested in "waves" or "panels" (e.g., Feltz, 1982).

Furthermore, although the present study demonstrated motor
skill performance can be positively or negatively inﬂuenced by

exposure to prior social contexts, a logical extension of this ﬁnding

1 23
would involve the examination of priming effects on motor skill
eeguieition. In the meantime, practicing coaches (and teachers of all
kinds) may do well to consider the way their behavior may be

inadvertently inﬂuencing their athletes' and students' self-image, self-

conﬁdence and performance.

FOOTNOTES

1 The four criteria used for inclusion in the W
P h l i In x T rm are: (1) the frequency of the term's
occurrence in the psychological literature, (2) the term's potential
usefulness in providing access to a concept, (3) the term's relationship
to or overlap with existing Thesaurus terminology, and (4) user
feedback and need. (American Psychological Association, 1988).

 

2 The Qxferd English Qietienaiy credits Immanuel Kant as the
originator of the term "schema" as follows: "In Kant: Any one of

certain forms of rules of "productive imagination" through which the
understanding is able to apply its "categories" to the manifold of sense-
perception in the process of realizing knowledge or experience."

124

APPENDICES

 

APPENDIX A

Self—Descriptive Version of the Perceived
Physical Ability Scale (PPA(des))

 

w

Directione: Please circle the QNE number that best indicates the
extent to which each of the following items describe you. PLEASE

 

LE THE ER -- '1‘ MARK BE EN THE E .
This does
This __O_N T
describes me describe me
I have excellent reﬂexes. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I am n_ot agile and graceful. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
My physique is rather strong. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I can't run fast. I 2 3 4 5 6 7

I don't feel in control when
I take tests involving physical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
dexterity.

I have poor muscle tone. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I take little pride in my
ability in sports. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

My speed has helped me out
of some tight spots. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I have a strong grip. l 2 3 4 5 6 7

Because of my agility, I have
been able to do things which
many others could not do 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

125

APPENDIX B

Self-Importance Version of the Perceived
Physical Ability Scale (PPA(imp))

APPENDIX B:

Directione: Please circle the 0__NE number that best indicates the extent to
which each of the following items are important to you. PLEASE QIR MTHE
_ __ _ ER ,

 

 

This is
This is very M very
important to me important to me

1. Having excellent reﬂexes. l 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. Having agility and grace. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Having a physique that

is rather strong. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

4. Being able to run fast. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

5. Feeling in control when
I take tests involving physical I 2 3 4 5 6 7
dexterity.

6. Having good muscle tone. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

7. Taking pride in my
ability in sports. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8. Having enough speed to
help me out of tight spots. I 2 3 4 5 6 7

9. Having a strong grip. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

10. Being able to do things which
many others can not do. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

126

APPENDIX

Shortened Version (Form C) of the
Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale

Listed below are a number of statements conmrning personal attitudes and
traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as
it pertains to you personally. Please circle either the word Ir_ue or liaise for

each item below.
1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on
with my work if I am not encouraged ................. True
2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't
get my way ....................................... True
3. On a few occasions, I have given up doing
something because I thought too little of my ability ..... True
4. There have been times when I felt like rebelling
against people in authority even though I knew
they were right ................................... True
5. No matter who I'm talking to. I'm always a good
listener .......................................... True
6. There have been occasions when I took
advantage of someone .............................. True
7. I'm always willing to admit it When I make
a mistake ......................................... True
8. I sometimes try to get even rather than
forgive and forget ................................. True
9. I am always courteous, even to peOple who
are disagreeable .................................. True
10. I have never been irked when people
expressed ideas very different from my own .......... True
11. There have been times when I was quite
jealous of the good fortune of others ................. True
12. I am sometimes irritated by people who
ask favors of me .................................. True
13. I have never deliberately said something
that hurt someone's feelings ....................... True

127

False

False

False

False

False

False

False

False

False

False

False

 

APPENDIX D

Demographic/ Background Questionnaire

APPEND °

BACKGROUND UESTIONNAIRE

NAME:

 

How old are you?

 

How do you describe yourself?

Native American

Black or African-American

Mexican or Chicano

Puerto Rican or other Latin American
Oriental or Asian-American

White or Caucasian

OOOOOO

What is your current academic class standing?

0 Freshman

0 Sophomore

0 Junior

0 Senior

0 Graduate Student

What is your approximate college GPA?

3.50 - 4.00
3.00 - 3.49
2.50 - 2.99
2.00 - 2.49
1.50 - 1.99
Below 1.50

000000

What is your college major?

 

In your entire life, on how many total occasions have you played
golf (either miniature or regulation)?

None at all

1 - 2 times

3 - 5 times

6 - 10 times

1 l - 20 times

More than 20 times

OOOOOO

128

In the past calander year (12 months), on how many occasions
have you played golf (either miniature or regulation)?

None at all

1 - 2 times

3 - 5 times

6 - 10 times

1 1 - 20 times

More than 20 times

OOOOOO

Have you ever owned your own set of golf clubs?

 

0 No
0 Yes
Have You LLV I Played in a W (for exmple. '*

baseball, football, basketball, hockey, soccer, etc.) in which you
had a designated coach(es)?

0 No
0 Yes

How much experience would you say you have playing in

competitive team sports with a coach or coaching staffs? (please
circle one of the numbers below)

1 2 3 4 5
None A great
deal

129

APPENDIX E

Abbreviated Version of the Proﬁle of Mood States

Fatigued
Annoyed
Discouraged
Resentful
Nervous
Miserable
Cheerful
Bitter
Exhausted
Anxious
Helpless
Weary
Bewildered
Furious
Full of pep
Worthless
Forgetful
Vigorous

Uncertain
about things

Bushed

NOT AT ALL

DDDDDUDUUDDDUUUDDD

DO

A LITTLE

DDDDDDDDDDUUDUUDDD

DU

131

W!

DUDUDUDUDUDDUUDDUD

DD

UITE A BIT

UDUUDDUDDDUDDDDDUU

[313

m

DDUDDDUDDDUUDDUUUD

DD

Fatigued
Annoyed
Discouraged
Resentful

Nervous

Miserable
Cheerful
Bitter
Exhausted
Anxious
Helpless
Weary
Bewildered
Furious
Full of pep
Worthless
Forgetful
Vigorous

Uncertain
about things

Bushed

W.

DDDUDUDDDDDDDDUDDD

DD

AM

UDUDDUDDDUDUDUDUDU

DD

131

MODERATELY

DDDDDDDDUDUUUDDUUU

DU

QUITE A BIT

DDDUDDDDDUDDDUDDDD

DU

m

DDDDDDDDDDDDDDUUDD

DD

 

APPENDIX F

Alternative Word List for the Proﬁle of Mood States

Origin—hi POMS item
Tense

Angry

Worn out

Unhappy

Lively

Confused

Peeved
Sad
Active

On edge
Grouchy
Blue
Energetic

Hopeless

Uneasy

Restless

Unable to concentrate
Fatigued
Annoyed

Discouraged
Resentful

Nervous
Miserable
Cheerful

APPENDIX F:

First Alternative
Under a strain
Mad

Tired

Feeling 10W
Spirited

Not knowing
what to do

Ticked off

Heart broken

On the go

Jittery

Crabby

Down in the dumps
Enthusiatic

Feeling things
are impossible

Uncomfortable

Unable to relax
something to do

Easily distracted
Petered out
Bothered

Wanting to give up
Holding a grudge
Worried

In poor spirits

In a good mood

132

mime—ME
Stressed
Aggravated

Burned out
Displeased

Full of energy
Bafﬂed

Miffed
Sorrowful
Keeping busy
Touchy
Grumm'
Down

Peppy

Having no
alternatives

111 at ease

In need of

Unable to focus
Run down
Bugged
Dampened spirit
Harboring
Uptight

Woeful

Happy

mm POMS item
Bitter

Exhausted
Anxious
Helpless
Weary
Bewildered
Furious
Full of pep
Worthless
Forgetful
Vigorous
Uncertain about things
Bushed

First Alternative

Sore

Completely spent
Concerned
Unable to act
Drained

Puzzled

Enraged

Ready to go
Useless

Unable to remember
Powerful

Up in the air
Pooped out

133

Second Alternative
Hateful

Unable to continue
Fearful

Vulnerable

Beat

Dumbstruck
Furning

Full of gusto
Valueless
Absent-minded
Potent

Doubtful

All done in

 

 

APPENDIX G

Golf Putting-Speciﬁc Self-Efﬁcacy Scale

APPENDIX
W

How conﬁdent are you that you will be able to hit angst 1 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain I'm Mainly certain I'm certain
l 9.13 do lcando l em do
this this this

How conﬁdent are you that you will be able to hit aﬂeast 2 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain I'm mm certain I'm certain
I an} do lcando I m do
this this this

How conﬁdent are you that you will be able to hit Mi 3 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain l'm mgﬁemtely certain I'm certain
I 93113 do lcando I an do
this this this

How conﬁdent are you that you will be able to hit eueest 4 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain I'm Misty certain I'm certain
l 93:13 do lcando l ean do
this this this

How conﬁdent are you that you will be able to hit atleest 5 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I‘m certain I'm Mate)! certain I‘m certain
I an] do lcando l m do
this this this

How conﬁdent are you that you will be able to hit etjeaet 6 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain l'm mmemely certain I'm certain
I 93113 do lcando | ean do
this this this

How conﬁdent are you that you will be able to hit eLLeeet 7 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain I'm my certain I'm certain
I emit do lcando I ran do
this this this

How conﬁdent are you that you will be able to hit angst 8 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 10
I'm certain l'm medemjely certain I'm certain
l 93:13 do lcando l all do
this this this

134

 

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

How conﬁdent are you that you will be able to hit Mt 9 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain I’m my! certain I'm certain
I m do lcando I can do
this this this

How conﬁdent are you that you will be able to hit Wt 10 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain I'm moderately certain I'm certain
I 93113 do lcando I can do
this this this

How confident are you that you will be able to hit angst 11 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain I’m moderately certain I'm certain
I gan'j do lcando I can do
this this this

How conﬁdent are you that you will be able to hit aghast 12 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain I'm mggﬂajgly certain I'm certain
I gang do lcando I can do
this this this

How conﬁdent are you that you will be able to hit Mt 13 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain I'm My certain I'm certain
I 93113 do lcando I can do
this this this

How conﬁdent are you that you will be able to hit Wt 14 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain I'm mm certain I'm certain
I can} do lcando I an do
this this this

How confident are you that you will be able to hit aﬂgast 15 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain I‘m 1135519133911 certain I'm certain
I 5333 do lcando l 9311 do
this this this

How confident are you that you will be able to hit Wt 16 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain I'm 03551912391! certain I'm certain
I 93113 do lcando I can do
this this this

135

17.

18.

19.

20.

How confident are you that you will be able to hit angst 17 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain I'm moderately certain I'm certain
l 9303 do lcando l m do
this this this

How conﬁdent are you that you will be able to hit gumt 18 of your 20 golf shots wimin 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain I'm mm certain I'm certain
I 93:13 do lcando I can do
this this this

How confident are you that you will be able to hit angst 19 of your 20 golf shots within 12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain I'm mm certain I'm certain
I 93113 do lcando I can do
this this this

How conﬁdent are you that you will be able to hit all of your 20 golf shots within12 inches of the cross?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I'm certain I'm my certain I'm certain
I 9393 do lcando I can do
this this this

136

APPENDIX H

Transcripts of Manipulation Videotapes

 

APPENDIX H

Prg-Maninuktign Tape (presented in a straight-forward, but pleasant
lecturing style).

Certainly, we want to have some sense of historical development.
Maybe not to the degree that we did with the ﬁeld at large, but
certainly you want to pay attention to that. We also want to pay
attention -— I'm going to drop down to the bottom -- to some of the
issues and problems that are inherent to each subdiscipline and you
will see some themes emerge from one subdiscipline to the other.
And these are some of the debates and discussions that we ﬁnd in
the ﬁeld at large. Also, we will want to pay attention to the role in
modern society -- thus trying to take the study of a subdiscipline and
make it practical. And, to a lesser degree, you'll want to be aware of
the other categories. And Seidentop does a nice job of presenting
the subdisciplines in this fashion. So as you read those chapters and
as I present the material, I will try to adhere to this outline and you
should try to pull those points forward from your reading.

The ﬁrst subdiscipline we're going to discuss is the one that
came into play the earliest in our ﬁeld and that is exercise
physiology. If we think of the definition of physiology -- and you
don't need to write this down, it's in the book -- physiology is the
study of the functioning of plants and animals and of the activities by
which life is maintained and reproduced including the functioning
of, and inter-relationships among cells, tissues, organs and systems
such as nervous, circulatory and respiratory. Exercise physiology is
the study of those activities in that deﬁnition, under the stress of
exercise -- under the stress of exercise. One of the early leaders in
the ﬁeld of exercise physiology was Dr. George Fitts. In fact, Dr.
George is given the title of the "father of exercise physiology." And
exercise physiology had its origins in the early 20th century when
there was this debate about the systems -- the gymnastic systems --
which one's better? Which one is the "right" system? We should
have noted that Fitts was the keynote speaker at the AAPE
conference and also to his credit, he developed the ﬁrst ex. phys. lab
and that was at Harvard. Now as we consider exercise physiology --
its role in modern society is rather well-developed. Exercise
physiology is probably the most widely known subdiscipline. Part of
that is due to the explosion of interest in the adult population.
Where are the greatest number of active participants coming from as
far as the "ﬁtness craze?" -- In the adult population. More ﬁtness
centers are booming. The fitness equipment business is raging,
almost out of control -- there's a new shoe every week. And the
clothes ~~ you've got to look it -- you've got to have the "look" if you're
going to be in ﬁtness. Videotapes, cable T.V., books -- go out to the
bookstore sometime, out at the mall -- look at the shelves of fitness
books. So, one of the roles in modern society is to debunk myths.

137

That's one of the roles of exercise physiology. Certainly another role,
as well as debunking myths, is to provide information to the public --
particularly to the layperson —- to the average person. We know there
are enough journals out there -- technical journals -- but that
information has to become synthesized so it becomes usable by the
average person. So, two roles in modern society.

What are the principal areas of specialization? Well, there are
two traditional areas. One is the utilization of oxygen in the C.V.
system and that's particularly with aerobic activities -- V02 max,
oxygen uptake. And the second area of specialization has been that of
metabolic responses to exercise and training. As we might expect,
given this area is growing, two new areas -- one that you're prolbably
very familiar with -- cardiac rehab. and a new ﬂourishing area is that
of exercise biochemistry. Really trying to move to the micro—level of
analysis in this area.

When we look at the field and we look at exercise physiology,
you can look at it from two perspectives -- one, from this new idea of
"wellness." A second perspective would be performance
improvement or performance enhancement.

Exercise physiology has a pretty broad umbrella right now.

Some people come through athletic training and work under the
auspices of exercise physiologists. Certainly we recognize the adult
ﬁtness being under there —- the athletic training, strength training.
And the anticipation is that this area is going to continue to grow. So
in some circles there is this urge to become separate -- that we are
big enough to support ourselves —— that we don't need to be under the
umbrella. A blanket statement as to the roles of professionals. . . if
you work at the university -- and many exercise physiologists do --
what are they expected to do at the university level -— and this will be
true throughout our discussion of subdisciplines. Teach. Research.
Advise. And there may -- with exercise physiologists -- be clinical
work. That's not true with every subdiscipline. But these will be the
three principal roles of professionals at the university level: Teach,
conduct research and advise students. What are the employment
opportunities for someone in exercise physiology? What do you
think? We talked about career opportunities last week. . . good, bad?
If it's the largest growing area what do you think? Pretty good.

There are more and more adult fitness centers opening.
Corporations are beginning to open more and more corporate fitness
programs. There are opportunities in hospitals, certainly in athletic
programs. And because of its popularity, there is greater pressure on
universities to have a full staff of exercise physiologists to meet the
demand of the students. What is the education and /or professional
preparation that is required? What can you do with a bachelors
degree? Nothing. What can you do with a master's degree in
exercise physiology? Are there any possibilities? Yeah, there are.
With a master's degree you could get a position as an exercise
technician working in cardiac rehab or working in corporate fitness.
If you want to go to the university what do you have to have? Got to

 

138

have a Ph.D. and that's going to become more and more prevalent at
all levels. It used to be at some of the smaller institutions, a master's
degree would gain you entry. But almost from top to bottom now, as

far as size, a Ph.D. is going to be required.

What are some of the issues and problems that face exercise
physiologists? Well, one is going to be -- and you'll see this argument
throughout -- is the issue of basic versus applied research.
Developing the theoretical versus developing the practical. Which
way we going to go? There is also some debate about being too
narrow and then there is the other side of it -- being too broad.
Being too narrow -- going to the cellular level and even below that, as
far as understanding. Well what's the utility of, say, exercise
biochemistry at the cellular level, to a coach? It's beyond them. It's
just not relevant. So one of the issues is that many people are
critiquing saying "Look, you're too narrow. You're going so
microscopic that the information you're producing is useless -- it just
ﬁlls the library shelves." And others say: "Well, when we try to
broaden out, we can't really hone in on an understanding."

139

Negative Manipulation Tape (presented in a sarcastic, critical
manner)

All right you guys, I don't think I have to tell you this but you
guys are doing a piss-poor job of shooting your free throws. I don't
want to see any more of this so I'm going to sit here and for the
umpteenth time I'm going to explain something to you I have already
gone over probably a million times. We are in our sixteenth game
this season. That means you've probably heard the same thing
sixteen times already so I would think that it would start to sink into
your heads after a while -- but NO, NO -- what do you do? You go out
there, you get up to the free-throw line, you do whatever you want,
you don't follow directions. I want to see you guys start following
directions! First of all, remember, the word, the F word --
fundamentals. How many times have I told you, we can make our
free throws if we practice the fundamentals. We've been practicing
them again and again and again in practice but you get out there in
the game and you keep on blowing it. I don't want to see this
anymore. Now, the ﬁrst thing I want you to do when you get up to
the free-throw line -- and I want you to do it -- I don't want you to say
"but coach, but coach" I don't want to hear that -- just do it! Now the
ﬁrst thing is you're going to have to get up there and relax. You guys
are getting up there and you're all jittery -- I don't know what your
problem is but you got to just get up there and relax. Start by taking
a deep breath, get up to the line and bounce the ball a few times, do
whatever it takes -- I don't care as long as you can get the ball in the
basket! The second thing I want you to do is concentrate more.
Shooting free throws is 90% mental. The way you guys are, you look
like you have mental illness rather than you're concentrating and it's
90% mental. The third thing is I want you to get your body in the
correct position. Most of you guys are not squaring up to the basket.
Some of you are over here, some of you are over there. I want you to
be squared up to the basket. I want you to get your index ﬁnger on
the air hole. How many times have I told you that if you get the
proper hand to ball relationship you're going to have an easier time
making the basket? Get yourselves squared up. I don't want to see
your toes pointing to the left, I don't want to see them pointing to
the right. I just want them pointing directly at the basket. The
other thing you guys are not doing -- and I've told you a million times
-- if I've told you once I've told you a million times, you're not
shooting at the front of the rim. I want to see you guys sighting in on
the basket, I want to see you sighting in on the front of the basket.
Instead, you guys are just banging your shots off the back of the rim
or the backboard. I might as well stick a little rubber bumper on the
back of the rim because you're never going to make it any other way
-- you're just banging them in off the backboard. I want to see you
shoot for the front of the rim. The other thing is that you guys aren't
using any backspin. When it comes off your hand you have to get a

140

 

nice soft touch, you have to get some backspin on it so you have to
have your ﬁngertips pushing the ball so you get some backspin. I
don't see you guys doing that! In fact, you might as well be standing
up there shooting "granny" (underhanded) shots for all I care because
you're not going to get any backspin on the ball any other way. The
other thing I want you to do is follow-through. And I'm not just
talking to the shooter -- I'm now talking to the whole team. First of
all, for the shooter, get your ﬁnger over the air hole, I want to see
your elbow lined up with the basket, I want to see the ball come off
your ﬁngertips and then I want to see your wrist look like a "goose-
neck" when you get done. Not a "turkey-neck" -- you guys are
shooting so horrible that I should just call your's a turkey-neck. As
long as we're talking about follow—through, what I want the rest of
the team to be doing -- I don't want the rest of you to be lollygaging
around out there! You guys are just standing out there with your
hands on your hips, you don't have your hands up while you're waiting
for the rebound. You guys aren't even getting ready. While the
shooter is trying to follow-through, what I want the rest of you guys
to be doing is to think about what you're going to do to box out that
woman next to you. How are you going to get in front of that person?
GET IN FRONT OF THAT PERSON! You guys are not doing a good job
of boxing the other team out. It's just a simple matter of stepping in
front of the person -- but NO, what are you guys doing? "Oh, I'm too
tired, I have my hands on my hips, oh gee, I'm really tired." I DON‘T
WANT TO SEE ANY MORE OF THAT! When the ball is released, I
want you guys to be ready. I want you to have your hands up, I want
you to get ready to step out in front of the other person and get the
other team boxed out. We're just not doing what we've practiced
over and over again. These are fundamentals. You should have
learned these things in the second grade! GIVE ME A BREAK!
Finally, another thing I want to say about free throws -- and then
we'll go on to talk about the rest of all the other things you're doing
wrong -- which means we may be in the locker room for a whole
hour -- you're doing so many things wrong. The other thing I want to
tell you is that you've played a really poor ﬁrst half -- just a really poor
ﬁrst half. I can't tell you how disappointed I am in that. You guys just
have not done a good job at all! You guys are embarrassing me, you
guys are embarrassing yourselves, you guys are embarrassing the
whole school. If you guys want to get on the bus with your head
hanging because you've been such an embarrassment to everyone ~—
including yourselves -- ﬁne, go ahead and be that way. But I expect
you to at least do something to make the school proud, at least do
something to make me proud because I'm sick and tired of seeing
you guys just lollygaging around out there.

The other thing I wanted to point out to you is that on offense --
we might as well come up with another name for it -- because we're
certainly not making it look as if it's supposed to be offense. We're
certainly not making it look as if we're attacking the other team.
We're certainly not making it look like we're even trying to make a

 

141

basket! So what I want to see is this person who is playing point, I
want to see some action, I want to see some movement out on the
ﬂoor. I'm not seeing anything that looks like movement out there.
You guys are just standing still. You're standing back on your heels.
When the point guard is passing you the ball, you're not going to
meet the ball, instead, you're just standing there waiting for it to
come to you. WAITING FOR IT TO COME TO YOU! We're not playing
some kind of slow-motion game here. Basketball is a game of action
-- you're supposed to be moving! I want to see the point, if you throw
it over on the strong side, I want to see you cut through. Now the
other thing is, this guard over here on the weak side, I want you to
move out to protect against the fast break! Were getting killed on r
the fast break! They are fast breaking us to death because you're not
moving out here and you're not getting ready to play defense. So I
want to see this person slide over and get to move out. And, by the
way, this person at the free-throw line, yeah, sure, we call you high
post but it not because you're supposed to stand there like a stick in
the mud, alright? Instead, I want you sliding down, sliding down and
be ready for a pass or a rebound. Alright, now, the other thing I want
to talk about is on our press. The thing we're doing wrong -- the
ﬁrst thing were doing wrong -- we're doing a lot of things wrong on
our press. I just don't know where your heads have been at for the
last sixteen games, I just really don't. But the ﬁrst thing I want see
on our press is I want to see, when the in-bounds pass comes in, I do
not want to see that person dribble more than three times. I want to
see that dribble stopped! Because we are not going to be able to stop
them unless we get that person to pick the ball up and pass it from
there. So I want to see that woman's dribble stopped. I do not want
to see that person dribbling down -- or halfway down the court» like
I've seen in the past.

Now, I probably have a lot of other things to say to you but I
guess you guys can just sit here and think about the things I've been
telling you.

 

142

 

Positive Manipulation Tape (presented in an encouraging, positive
manner)

Hey, you guys, you know were having a little trouble out there on
the free—throw line. You know I've seen you in practice and every
time we're in practice you guys are great free-throw shooters and I
think we can really help ourselves in this game. We're not down by
too much so if we just do a little better job on our free throws I think
we'll be right back in the game and we'll be able to win this game.
I've told you some of these things before, and I'm not telling them to
you to make you nervous or anything like that -- I just want to remind
you of them. Just try to think like we're in practice. Because I've
seen you guys in practice -- one right after the other you get up there
and you just swish, swish, swish, swish -- you know I've seen it again
and again so I know you guys can do a really good job on this. Let me
just remind you about some of the things that maybe you're just
forgetting a little bit while you're up there. The ﬁrst thing is that I
think you guys are just a little too tense and you just need to relax.

So when you get up to the free-throw line, dribble the ball a few
times, ﬂex your knees a little bit, don't be so tense while you're up
there, take a deep breath just before you get ready to shoot and then
let the ball go when you feel relaxed. Now, sure, the refs standing
there counting 10 seconds, OK, but 10 seconds is a long time and
you can take the whole 10 seconds so don't let anybody pressure you
or make you feel like you have to just jump up there and shoot it, and
don't be quite so tense. The other thing I want you to do -- and it's
related to not being so tense -- is you do need to concentrate just a
little bit more. Like I've seen you in practice and you guys have really
good concentration when you're in practice. Maybe it's just the
crowd that's just throwing you off a little bit, I'm not really sure. But
you guys have done this again and again in practice so let's just think
about: "OK. I can do this, I've done this in practice, I'm just going to
do this just like I did it in practice. Because shooting and making a
free throw is 90% mental -- alright? So just forget about everything
else and just think about it like it's in practice. The other thing I
want you to do is to remember that I want you guys to square-up to
the basket. I noticed that some of you guys, when you're out there,
there were a couple people off to the right-hand side, and there
were a couple people off to the left-hand side. Instead, I want to see
your toe up to the free—throw line, pointing at the basket and I just
want to see you squared-up to the basket. I want to see that elbow
square in there ~- OK? So make sure that your body is in the right
position -- just like in practice -- we've done it hundreds of times in
practice and you guys have done a good job. I've even make you guys
run suicides and your tongues have been hanging out in practice and
you've still gone up there an make a lot of free throws so I know that
you guys can do this. The other thing I want you to remember -- and
it's something else we've talked about in practice -- make sure that

143

 

you are shooting at the front of the rim -- not the back of the rim,
O.K.? Make sure you're shooting at the front of the rim. Because the
other thing I want you to do is when you're shooting, put a little
more backspin on the ball -- a little more backspin. Make sure it's
got that nice soft shooter's "touch." That way we'll get a lot of
swishers. Let's see how many swishers we can get O.K.? And I know
you guys can do it because again, I've seen you guys ripping the nets
during practice and it's just that right now we just somehow got a
little bit off in this game. So shoot for the front of the rim and when
you get that backspin then, the ball is going to be more likely to
bounce in because it has that backspin on it. The other thing that
you need to remember, O.K.? and I've seen you guys do this again in
practice, so I know that you know this. I want you to remember that
when you release the ball it's wrist action. A lot of it's wrist action.
It's in the knees, it's in the legs and it's wrist action. So what I want
to see is some follow-through with your wrist, O.K.? I want to see
your wrist look like a "goose-neck." Now, I know you've probably
heard that since second grade and it's just something that you have
to keep in mind -- I know it's already in your mind -- it's just
something you have to keep it a little more in the front of your mind.
The other thing is -- O.K., we didn't have a very good ﬁrst half. So
let's just admit it -- we didn't have a very good ﬁrst half. But that
doesn't mean we're going to have a bad second half. In fact, I have
seen you guys come from behind in the past -- I have seen you guys
pull out a victory. So let's just pull together, let's just have a little bit
of teamwork and let's just try to remember the fundamentals that
we've learned in practice along the way. The other thing I wanted to
mention about free throws -- and I wanted to talk to not just the
shooter, but the rest of the team too. I want to see you guys boxing
out the other players a little more. We practiced that a lot in
practice and you guys have always done a good job. I mean, you guys
have always been able to keep the scrimmage team out. You're always
able to step out in front of them and keep them out of there. You've
kept them out every time in practice and these guys aren't any
different. They aren't any better than you so let's just get out there
and make sure were boxing out our players. The other thing I'd like
to see a little more of is -- I'm not seeing as much action as I'd like to
see out on the ﬂoor. I'd like to see more movement on the ﬂoor. I'd
like to see some real nice crisp passes just like we've been doing in
practice. We've had that medicine ball and our arms get really heavy
but you guys still come right back and you just snap the pass, O.K.?
So I've seen that lots of times and I know that you can do it. So what
I'd like to see is the person who's playing point -- I want to see a
nice crisp pass over here -- say we go on the strong side -- and then
I want to see some motion through here. Now I've seen a few times
you've been running this play correctly, but every now and again we
kind of just forget our positions so I just want to see you guys
remember to do it every time -- not just a few times. So I want to
see this person cut through, and over here, on the weak side, don't

144

forget to slide back out because we don't want to get killed on the
fast break or anything, so don't forget to slide back out. And I really
think we need to just forget about the ﬁrst half, O.K.? The ﬁrst half
is the ﬁrst half and we're not very far behind and I know we can
catch these guys and I know we can catch up and I know that you
guys can do it. So let's just forget about the ﬁrst half and concentrate
on some of these fundamentals that we've learned and hey, let's work
hard. As long as we work hard, that's all we can ask. Then, when we
get on the bus we can hold our heads up.

145

 

Neutral Manipulation Tape (presented in a straightforward, pleasant
manner)

Hey you guys, before you leave practice for today, I have to give
you some extra information about our tournament that we are going
to be in over the weekend. Now the procedures are a little bit
different from what we usually do for a game because we don't usually
stay overnight -- we just usually take a bus and come back after the
game. This time, we will be playing on both Friday and Saturday and
we're not coming back between games. So, I want to give you a little
bit of information about the trip. I know that this is the ﬁrst
overnight trip some of you have ever made with the team. First of all,
as you guys know, we're going to Grand Rapids. It's approximately
about an hour or an hour and ﬁfteen minutes from here so that's how
long the bus ride will be. Now the one thing that you need to know
for sure is that you guys are not responsible for paying for your hotel.
You guys are not responsible for paying for breakfast or meals or
anything like that -- all the necessities will be taken care of for you.
You might, however, want to bring just a little bit of spending money
along with you because, who knows, you might want to buy some
little thing like a t-shirt in the hotel souvenir shop or something like
that. Or you might want to have just a little bit of spending money,
but, I really wouldn't recommend bringing along very much money
because there's always a chance that it could get stolen or it could
get lost or something like that. So, I don't know, you might want to
bring $10.00 or so, but I wouldn't bring any more than that. After all,
between the bus ride to and from Grand Rapids and the games we
play, we won't have a lot of time for shopping. Again, you're not
responsible for paying for the hotel, you're not responsible for your
meals or anything like that. That will all be provided for you. And I
think it should be a pretty good time all-in-all. Now, we will be
playing in two games there. We will be playing on Friday night at 7
o'clock so the bus is going to leave here -- we want to go, get
checked into our hotel, get all these things done, and then go over to
the gym for the tournament -- so the bus is going to be leaving here
almost directly after school at 3:30. So your folks should bring you
back to school -- if you're going home after school to maybe pick up
your duffel bag or whatever -- but you need to be back at the school at
3:15. We're going to get on the bus at 3:30, we're going to head over
there, as soon as we get there we're going to check into the hotel
and we'll grab something to eat. Now we're going to eat pretty light
because we have the game at 7 o'clock. So we don't want to be eating
a big meal or anything like that. So we're going to eat kind of light
and then we got this game at 7:00. Now, as you know, if we win that
game we will be playing in the championship game the next day. If
we don't win the game, we will be playing in the consolation game
the next day, O.K.? So, if your folks are interested in coming, there
are two games they can come to -- Friday at 7 o'clock and one of the

146

 

 

two games on Saturday. Now the exact time of the Saturday game is
obviously going to depend on whether we win or lose on Friday night.
We are scheduled to stay for the championship game anyway on
Saturday. If we are not in that game, we'll just stay on and watch the
game anyway. Now, what we're going to do is we're going to divide
up -- and I've got a list -- I've put people in alphabetical order and
I've got a list of who's going to be staying in what rooms together
with each other. We're not bringing -- there's just myself and the
junior varsity coach that will be coming along and there's only the 12
of you so we pretty much ﬁgure that you guys are adults and you guys
can handle this and stuff. We'll be just down the hall, so if your folks
are concerned about that, we'll be just down the hallway. We'll be
checking on you guys periodically. We're going to have a little bit of a
curfew -- I know you guys don't really like that but were going to
check to make sure you're back in your room at 1 1:30, O.K.? Because
we're going to have to be ready for the game the next day. So you can
tell your folks we'll be checking on you so everything will be cool that
way. Now on Saturday, after the game, what we'll do is go back to the
hotel and you guys can take a shower there if you want and we'll leave
from there. We'll be back at the school then -- we should be back at
the school by 8 pm. at the latest. So your folks can pick you back up
at the school at 8 o'clock. So, I think this will be a good time and
these are the pieces of information that you need. Can you guys think
of any other questions that you might have? O.K., well, if you need
any more information, or if your folks need any more information --—
oh, by the way, I guess the other piece of information you need is
that I will provide your folks with the phone number for the hotel
and so forth. If they need any additional information, please have
them call me.

147

 

w

Description of Coaching Behavior Assessment System (CBAS)

 

APPENDIX 1:

OACHING BEHAVI R A E MENT Y EM BAS
§CALES QSED IN THE PRESENT STUDY.

A Reacp’gns tp Mist_a_kes:

1. Mistake-Contingent Encouragement. Encouragement of a

player by a coach following a player's mistake.

2. Mist e- n ' n T chnic In tru tion. Telling or
showing a player who has made a mistake how to make the
play correctly.

3. Punishment. A negative response by the coach following an
undesirable behavior. May be verbal or nonverbal.

4. Punitive. When mistake-contingent technical instruction and
punishment occur in the same communication.

B Game Related Spontaneous Behavigrs:

1. General Technical Instruction. A communication that
provides instruction relevant to techniques and strategies of
the sport in question.

2. General Encouragement. Encouragement that does not
immediately follow a mistake.

3. Organization. Behavior directed at administrative
organization.

148

APPENDIX J

Manipulation Check Questionnaire

 

APPENDIX J:

EXIT U TIONNAIRE

The following questions are to see what kinds of things caught your
attention during the testing session.

1. What color was the box (on the tape) you were
shooting at?

2. During your ﬁrst "rest period", the experimenter was
viewing a videotape. What was the tape about?

 

3. After you shot your ﬁrst set of putts, the experimenter
was viewing a different videotape. What was on this tape?

 

4. How many putts did you shoot in the total study?

 

5. What was the major pugpose of the experiment in which
you just participated?

 

6. Please judge your performance on your first set of 20 golf putts.

 

 

1 2 3 4 5
I performed worse I performed about as I performed better
than I thought I would well as I thought I would than I thought I would

7. Please judge your performance on your ﬁcond set of 20 golf putts.

1 2 3 4 5
I performed m I performed about as I performed Mgr
than I thought I would well as I thought I would than I thought I would

149

red X during your first set of 20?

How many putts did you hit so they stopped directly on the

9. How many putts did you hit so they stopped directly on the

red X during your second set of 20?

10. What color was the biofeedback dot when it was placed

on your hand?

1 1. Watching the videotape of the coach while I was resting:

1 2 3 4
Helped my Had no affect on
performance my performance

12. Do you feel the coach on the videotape was:

1 2 3 4

Very Negative Neutral Toward Her Team
Toward Her Team

150

5

Hurt my
performance

5

Very Positive
Toward Her Team

 

 

APPENDIX K

Informed Consent Form

 

APPENDIX K

EEQMD QQNSEN T EQRM

Michigan State University
Dewent of Phﬁical Education and Exercise Science

Prin Inv r: Richard R. Albrecht, M.A.
Doctoral Candidate / Research Assistant
Dept. of Physical Education and Exercise Science
Telephone: 353-9400 (A-212 East Fee Hall)

MyAdvism: Deborah L. Feltz, Ph.D.
Chairperson and Professor
Dept. of Physical Education and Exercise Science
Telephone: 355-4732 (138 I.M. Sports-Circle)

I, . hereby agree to participate as a
volunteer in the study of college student performance on a golf putting
task. The purpose of this study is to collect normative data regarding this
motor task and conduct a preliminary investigation into the way feelings
and perceptions affect performance. The results of the study will be used
to address previously neglected areas in the sport performance literature.

Data will be collected by the principal investigator. The session will take
approximately 45-50 minutes and be held in room E-4, East Fee Hall on
the M.S.U. campus. I will be tested individually and will: (a) sit quietly for
about 5 minutes; (b) complete three short questionnaires regarding my
current feelings and perceptions about various physical activities and my
conﬁdence in performing these activities, and (c) attempt 20 golf putts.

None of the information collected will be of a "sensitive" nature. In
addition, the researchers have taken steps to protect the confidentiality of
all individuals participating in the study. No one except the principal
investigator will have access to the my answers and/or performance
results. In reporting the results of this study, only summary data will be
reported and no individual(s) will ever be identified in any way.

My participation in this study is strictly voluntary. If I choose not to
participate, there will be no penalty. If I do participate, I may choose to
omit questionnaire items I do not wish to answer or I may discontinue my
participation in the study at any time. If I complete the study, I will
receive 2 half-hour "participation in psychology research" credits.

I have read the above and I understand its contents and I freely agree to
participate in this golﬁng study. I acknowledge that I am 18 years of age or
older.

 

 

Signature Date

151

Ilia.

 

APPENDIX L

BIODOT Color Reference Chart

APPENDIX L

BIODOTS

Violet 94.6°F. - Very relaxed

 

Blue 93.6°F. - Calm

 

Turquoise 92.6°F. - Relaxing

 

Green 91.6°F. - Involved (nmI)

 

Yellow 90.6°F. - Unsettled

 

Amber 89.6°F. - Tense

 

 

Color approximations and general'lnterpretations of stress:

Black 87°F. - Very Tense

152

 

 

APPENDIX M

Calculations for x2 "goodness of fit" test between
hypothesized and fully—identified causal models

 

APPENDIX M
The following formula for testing a hypothesized (overidentiﬁed)
causal model against the fully-identiﬁed model is taken from
Pedhazur (1982; pp. 617-628).

It is ﬁrst necessary to calculate 32m which is the generalized squared
multiple correlation. For the fully recursive model:

32m = 1 - (1- 321) (1- 322) . . . (1- 32p)
Where:

321 = the ordinary squared multiple correlation coefﬁcient of 1th
equation.

 

A statistic similar to 32m is then calculated for the overidentiﬁed
model (M):

M = 1 - (1- R21) (1- R22) . . . (1- 3%)
To quote Pedhazur (1982):

M is calculated in the same manner as is 32m, except that some or

all of the 325 are based on a model in which some of the paths have
been deleted, whereas the 32s [used in the calculation of 32m] are
based on a fully recursive model. Therefore, M can take values
between zero and 32m. When the ﬁt of an overidentiﬁed model is
perfect (i.e., when 3 is exactly reporduced), 32m, = M. The smaller
M is in relation to 32m the poorer the fit of the overidentiﬁed model.
(p. 619)

Therefore, a measure of goodnes of ﬁt (Q) is calculated by taking the
ratio between M and 32m as follows:

Finally, Q is tested for signiﬁcance using the W statistic which has an
approximate x2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the

number of path coefﬁcients hypothesized to be equal to zero. W is
calulated using the following equation:

153

ﬂ='(N'Q)10g9Q

Where:
M = sample size
d = number of path coefﬁcients hypothesized to be zero

Egg = the natural logarithm

In the present study:
32m = 1 - (1- 321) (1- B22) (1— 8231(1- 1324)

1 - (.892)2 (.834)2 (.912)2 (.939)2

I50
to
II

32 = 1 - (.795) (.696) (.832) (.882)

g2 = 1 - .406

m
32m = .594
M = 1 — (1— 321) (1— R22) (1- 3231(1- 824)
M = 1 - (.892)2 (.913)2 (.966)2 (.982)2
M = 1 - (.795) (.834) (.933) (.964)
M = 1 - .596
M = .403
1- 32m
Q =
1- M
1-.594
Q: = .680
1-.403

154

 

|€

=-(N-dllog§Q

IS
I!

- (54 - 5) logQ .680

v_v = - (49) 10g; .680

IE

= 18.90

Because the statistic V_V approximates a x2 distribution with degrees of
freedom equal to the number of path coefﬁcients hypothesized to be
equal to zero:

W = 712(5) = 18.90; p_< .01

155

APPENDIX N

University Approval for Use of Human Subjects

 

3mm

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

 

OFFIG OF VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH EAST LANSING 0 MICHIGAN 0 488244046
AND DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

March 6, 1992

 

Richard R. Albrecht
Office of Medical Education
A-214 E. Fee Hall

RE: THE INFLUENCE OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE COACHING STYLES ON THE COGNITIVE
PRIMING 0F SUCCESS--AND FAILURE-RELATED SELF-SCHEMATA, SELF-EFFICACY AND
MOTOR PERFORMANCE, 90—604

Dear Mr. Albrecht:

UCRIHS' review of the above referenced project has now been completed. I am
pleased to advise that the rights and welfare of the human subjects appear to be
adequately protected and the Committee, therefore, has approved this project.

You are reminded that UCRIHS approval is valid for one calendar year. If you
plan to continue this project beyond one year, please make provisions for
obtaining appropriate UCRIHS approval one month prior to March 2, 1993. There
will be a maximum of four renewals possible. If you wish to continue a project
beyond that time, it must again be submitted for complete review.

Any changes in procedures involving human subjects must be reviewed by the UCRIHS
prior to initiation of the change. UCRIHS must also be notified promptly of any
problems (unexpected side effects, complaints, etc.) involving human subjects
during the course of the work.

Thank you for bringing this project to our attention. If we can be of any future
help, please do not hesitate to let us know.

Sincerely,

  

Involving Human Subjects (UCRIHS)
DEW/deo

cc: Dr. Deborah Feltz

MU”: a. All ,_.,.,. r. ‘ "1 I n r

APPENDIX 0

Raw Data

 

w

TITLE "DISSERTATION”

SUBTITLE "CLEANING FREQUENCIES"

FILE HANDLE DATAl/NAME=“PHASE2 DATA.A1"
DATA LIST FILE DATAl RECORDS = 9

/1

ID 1-3 RECl 4 AGE 6-7 RACE 8 CLASS 9 GPA 10 MAJOR 11-12 GOLF 13
GOLFYR 14 CLUBS 15 TEAM 16 COACH 17 PREDESl TO PREDESIO 19-28
PREIMPl TO PREIMPlO 30-39

/2 TENSEI 6 ANGRYl 7 WORNl 8 UNHAPl 9 LIVELYl 10 CONFUSl 11 PEEVEDI 12

/3

/5
/6

/7
/8

/9

SADl 13 ACTIVEl 14 EDGEl 15 GROUCHl l6 BLUEl 17 ENERGYl 18
HOPELESI 19 UNEASYI 20 RESTLESI 21 CONCENTl 22 FATIGl 23 ANNOYI 24
DISCOURl 25 RESENTl 26 NERVI 27 MISERI 28 CHEERl 29 BITTERl 30
EXHAUSTl 31 ANXI 32 HELPLSI 33 WEARYI 34 BEWILDl 35 FURYI 36

PEP1 37 WORTHLSI 38 FORGETl 39 VIGORl 40 UNCERTI 41 BUSHl 42
PRESEI TO PRESEZO 6-45

PRPERFl 6-7 PRPERFZ 9-10 PRPERF3 12-13 PRPERF4 15-16 PRPERFS 18-19
PRPERF6 21-22 PRPERF7 24-25 PRPERFB 27-28 PRPERF9 30-31

PRPERFlO 33-34 PRPERFll 36-37 PRPERFlZ 39-40 PRPERF13 42-43
PRPERF14 45-46 PRPERFlS 48-49 PRPERF16 51-52 PRPERF17 54-55
PRPERF18 57-58 PRPERF19 60-61 PRPERF20 63-64

ORDER 6-8 SCHEMA 10 COND 11 PSTDESI TO PSTDESlO 19-28

PSTIMPl TO PSTIMPlO 30-39

TENSE2 6 ANGRY2 7 WORN2 8 UNHAP2 9 LIVELYZ 10 CONFUSZ 11 PEEVEDZ 12
SAD2 13 ACTIVEZ 14 EDGEZ 15 GROUCHZ 16 BLUEZ 17 ENERGY2 18
HOPELESZ l9 UNEASY2 20 RESTLESZ 21 CONCENT2 22 FATIG2 23 ANNOYZ 24
DISCOUR2 25 RESENT2 26 NERV2 27 MISERZ 28 CHEER2 29 BITTER2 30
EXHAUSTZ 31 ANXZ 32 HELPLSZ 33 WEARYZ 34 BEWILDZ 35 FURYZ 36

PEP2 37 WORTHLSZ 38 FORGETZ 39 VIGORZ 40 UNCERT2 41 BUSHZ 42
PSTSEl TO PSTSE20 6-45

PTPERFl 6-7 PTPERFZ 9-10 PTPERF3 12-13 PTPERF4 15-16 PTPERFS 18-19
PTPERFG 21-22 PTPERF7 24-25 PTPERF8 27-28 PTPERF9 30-31

PTPERFlO 33-34 PTPERFll 36-37 PTPERF12 39-40 PTPERF13 42-43
PTPERF14 45-46 PTPERFlS 48-49 PTPERF16 51-52 PTPERF17 54-55
PTPERF18 57-58 PTPERF19 60-61 PTPERFZO 63-64

COLOR 6 TAPEl 7 TAPEZ 8 PUTTS 9 PURPOSE 10 FIRSTZO 11 NEXTZO 12
HOLEI 13 HOLE2 14 DOT 15 HELPHURT l6 POSNEG 17

VARIABLE LABELS
GOLF GOLF PLAYED IN LIFETIME
GOLFYR GOLF PLAYED IN LAST YR.
CLUBS EVER OWN GOLF CLUBS?
TEAM EVER PLAYED ON COMPET TEAM?
COACH EXPERIENCE ON COMP.TEAM W COACH

PREDESI
PREDESZ
PREDES3
PREDES4
PREDESS
PREDES6
PREDES7
PREDESB
PREDESQ

PREDESlO PRETEST-CAN DO WHAT OTHERS CAN'T

PREIMPl
PREIMP2
PREIMP3
PREIMP4
PREIMPS
PREIMP6
PREIMP7
PREIMP8
PREIMP9

PRETEST-EXCELLENT REFLEXES
PRETEST-NOT AGILE AND GRACEFUL

PRETEST-STRONG PHYSIQUE
PRETEST-CAN'T RUN FAST

PRETEST-NO PHYSICAL DEXTERITY

PRETEST-POOR MUSCLE TONE

PRETEST-LITTLE PRIDE IN ABILITY

PRETEST-SPEED HAS HELPED ME

PRETEST-STRONG GRIP

PRETEST-EXCELLENT REFLEXES
PRETEST-NOT AGILE AND GRACEFUL

PRETEST-STRONG PHYSIQUE
PRETEST-CAN'T RUN FAST

PRETEST-NO PHYSICAL DEXTERITY

PRETEST-POOR MUSCLE TONE

PRETEST-LITTLE PRIDE IN ABILITY

PRETEST-SPEED HAS HELPED ME

PRETEST-STRONG GRIP

157

PREIMPlO PRETEST-CAN DO WHAT OTHERS CAN'T
TENSEl PRETEST POMS-TENSE
ANGRYI PRETEST POMS-ANGRY
WORNl PRETEST POMS-WORN OUT
UNHAPI PRESTEST POMS-UNHAPPY
LIVELYl PRETEST POMS-LIVELY
CONFUSl PRETEST POMS-CONFUSED
PEEVEDl PRETEST POMS-PEEVED
SADl PRETEST POMS-SAD
ACTIVEl PRETEST POMS-ACTIVE
EDGEl PRETEST POMS-ON EDGE
GROUCHl PRETEST POMS-GROUCHY
BLUEl PRETEST POMS-BLUE
‘ ENERGYl PRETEST POMS-ENERGETIC
HOPELESl PRETEST POMS-HOPELESS
UNEASYI PRETEST POMS-UNEASY
RESTLES1 PRETEST POMS-RESTLESS
CONCENTl PRETEST POMS-UNABLE TO CONCENTRATE
FATIGl PRETEST POMS-FATIGUED
ANNOYl PRETEST POMS-ANNOYED
DISCOURI PRETEST POMS-DISCOURAGED
RESENTl PRETEST POMS-RESENTFUL
NERVl PRETEST POMS-NERVOUS
MISERI PRETEST POMS-MISERABLE
CHEERI PRETEST POMS-CHEERFUL
BITTERl PRETEST POMS-BITTER
EXHAUSTI PRETEST POMS-EXHAUSTED
ANXl PRETEST POMS-ANXIOUS
HELPLSI PRETEST POMS-HELPLESS
WEARYl PRETEST POMS-WEARY
BEWILDl PRETEST POMS-BEWILDERED
FURYl PRETEST POMS-FURIOUS
PEPl PRETEST POMS-PEP
WORTHLSl PRETEST POMS-WORTHLESS
FORGETl PRETEST POMS-FORGETFUL
VIGORI PRETEST POMS-VIGOROUS
UNCERTl PRETEST POMS-UNCERTAIN ABOUT THINGS
BUSHl PRETEST POMS-BUSHED

PRESEl PRE 1 OF 20
PRESEZ PRE 2 OF 20
PRESE3 PRE 3 OF 20
PRESE4 PRE 4 OF 20
PRESES PRE 5 OF 20
PRESE6 PRE 6 OF 20
PRESE7 PRE 7 OF 20
PRESEB PRE 8 OF 20
PRESE9 PRE 9 OF 20

PRESE10 PRE 10 OF 20
PRESEll PRE 11 OF 20
PRESE12 PRE 12 OF 20
PRESE13 PRE 13 OF 20
PRESE14 PRE 14 OF 20
PRESE15 PRE 15 OF 20
PRESE16 PRE 16 OF 20
PRESE17 PRE 17 OF 20
PRESE18 PRE 18 OF 20
PRESE19 PRE 19 OF 20
PRESEZO PRE 20 OF 20
PRPERFl PRE PERF TRIAL 1
PRPERF2 PRE PERF TRIAL 2
PRPERF3 PRE PERF TRIAL 3
PRPERF4 PRE PERF TRIAL 4

158

 

PRPERFS PRE PERF TRIAL 5

PRPERF6 PRE PERF TRIAL 6

PRPERF7 PRE PERF TRIAL 7

PRPERF8 PRE PERF TRIAL 8

PRPERF9 PRE PERF TRIAL 9

PRPERF10 PRE PERF TRIAL 10

PRPERFll PRE PERF TRIAL 11

PRPERF12 PRE PERF TRIAL 12

PRPERF13 PRE PERF TRIAL 13

PRPERF14 PRE PERF TRIAL l4

PRPERF15 PRE PERF TRIAL 15

PRPERF16 PRE PERF TRIAL l6

PRPERF17 PRE PERF TRIAL 17

PRPERF18 PRE PERF TRIAL 18

PRPERF19 PRE PERF TRIAL l9

PRPERF20 PRE PERF TRIAL 20

ORDER PRESENTATION ORDER

SCHEMA SELF-SCHEMA TYPE

COND TREATMENT CONDITION

PSTDESl POSTTEST-EXCELLENT REFLEXES
PSTDESZ POSTEST-NOT AGILE AND GRACEFUL
PSTDES3 POSTEST-STRONG PHYSIQUE
PSTDES4 POSTEST-CAN'T RUN FAST

PSTDESS POSTEST-NO PHYSICAL DEXTERITY
PSTDESS POSTEST-POOR MUSCLE TONE
PSTDES7 POSTEST-LITTLE PRIDE IN ABILITY
PSTDESB POSTEST-SPEED HAS HELPED ME
PSTDES9 POSTEST-STRONG GRIP

PSTDESlO POSTEST-CAN DO WHAT OTHERS CAN'T
PSTIMPl POSTEST-EXCELLENT REFLEXES
PSTIMP2 POSTEST-NOT AGILE AND GRACEFUL
PSTIMP3 POSTEST-STRONG PHYSIQUE
PSTIMP4 POSTEST-CAN'T RUN FAST

PSTIMPS POSTEST-NO PHYSICAL DEXTERITY
PSTIMP6 POSTEST-POOR MUSCLE TONE
PSTIMP7 POSTEST-LITTLE PRIDE IN ABILITY
PSTIMPB POSTEST-SPEED HAS HELPED ME
PSTIMP9 POSTEST-STRONG GRIP

PSTIMPlO POSTEST-CAN DO WHAT OTHERS CAN'T
TENSE2 POSTEST POMS-TENSE

ANGRYZ POSTEST POMS-ANGRY

WORN2 POSTEST POMS-WORN OUT

UNHAPZ POSSTEST POMS-UNHAPPY

LIVELYZ POSTEST POMS-LIVELY

CONFUS2 POSTEST POMS-CONFUSED

PEEVEDZ PRETEST POMS-PEEVED

SAD2 POSTEST POMS-SAD

ACTIVEZ POSTEST POMS-ACTIVE

EDGEZ POSTEST POMS-ON EDGE

GROUCHZ POSTEST POMS-GROUCHY

BLUE2 POSTEST POMS-BLUE

ENERGYZ POSTEST POMS-ENERGETIC
HOPELESZ POSTEST POMS-HOPELESS

UNEASY2 POSTEST POMS-UNEASY

RESTLESZ POSTEST POMS-RESTLESS
CONCENT2 POSTEST POMS-UNABLE TO CONCENTRATE
FATIGZ POSTEST POMS-FATIGUED

ANNOYZ POSTEST POMS-ANNOYED

DISCOUR2 POSTEST POMS-DISCOURAGED
RESENT2 POSTEST POMS-RESENTFUL

NERV2 POSTEST POMS-NERVOUS

MISERZ POSTEST POMS-MISERABLE

159

 

CHEERZ POSTEST POMS-CHEERFUL
BITTER2 POSTEST POMS-BITTER
EXHAUSTZ POSTEST POMS-EXHAUSTED
ANXZ POSTEST POMS-ANXIOUS
HELPLSZ POSTEST POMS-HELPLESS
WEARY2 POSTEST POMS-WEARY
BEWILDZ POSTEST POMS-BEWILDERED
FURYZ POSTEST POMS-FURIOUS
PEP2 POSTEST POMS-PEP
WORTHLSZ POSTEST POMS-WORTHLESS
FORGETZ POSTEST POMS-FORGETFUL
VIGOR2 POSTEST POMS-VIGOROUS
UNCERT2 POSTEST POMS-UNCERTAIN ABOUT THINGS
BUSH2 POSTEST POMS-BUSHED

0

PSTSEl POST 1 OF 2
PSTSEZ POST 2 OF 20
PSTSE3 POST 3 OF 20
PSTSE4 POST 4 OF 20
PSTSES POST 5 OF 20
PSTSE6 POST 6 OF 20
PSTSE7 POST 7 OF 20
PSTSE8 POST 8 OF 20
PSTSE9 POST 9 OF 20

PSTSE10 POST 10 OF 20
PSTSEll POST 11 OF 20
PSTSE12 POST 12 OF 20
PSTSE13 POST 13 OF 20
PSTSE14 POST 14 OF 20
PSTSE15 POST 15 OF 20
PSTSE16 POST 16 OF 20‘
PSTSE17 POST 17 OF 20
PSTSE18 POST 18 OF 20
PSTSE19 POST 19 OF 20
PSTSEZO POST 20 OF 20
PTPERFl POST PERF TRIAL
PTPERFZ POST PERF TRIAL
PTPERF3 POST PERF TRIAL
PTPERF4 POST PERF TRIAL
PTPERFS POST PERF TRIAL
PTPERF6 POST PERF TRIAL
PTPERF7 POST PERF TRIAL
PTPERFB POST PERF TRIAL
PTPERF9 POST PERF TRIAL
PTPERFlo POST PERF TRIAL 10

PTPERFll POST PERF TRIAL 11

PTPERFlZ POST PERF TRIAL 12

PTPERF13 POST PERF TRIAL l3

PTPERF14 POST PERF TRIAL 14

PTPERF15 POST PERF TRIAL 15

PTPERF16 POST PERF TRIAL l6

PTPERF17 POST PERF TRIAL 17

PTPERF18 POST PERF TRIAL 18

PTPERF19 POST PERF TRIAL 19

PTPERF20 POST PERF TRIAL 20

COLOR COLOR OF BOX

TAPEl WHAT WAS FIRST TAPE ABOUT?

TAPE2 WHAT WAS SECOND TAPE ABOUT?

PUTTS TOTAL NUMBER OF PUTTS TAKEN
PURPOSE WHAT WAS PURPOSE OF STUDY?
FIRST20 JUDGE YOUR PERF ON FIRST 20 PUTTS
NEXTZO JUDGE YOUR PERF ON SECOND 20 PUTTS
HOLEl HOW MANY PUTTS IN BOX ON FIRST 20?

\DmﬂONU'I-bLQNH

160

 

HOLEZ HOW MANY PUTTS IN BOX ON SECOND 20?

DOT WHAT WAS COLOR or BIODOT?

HELPHURT DID WATCHING TAPE HELP.HURT OR NEITHER?
POSNEG WAs THE COACH POSITIVE 0R NEGATIVE?
RECODE PREIMPI To PREIMPlO (1:7) (2=6) (3=5) (4:4)
RECODE PSTIMPl To PSTIMPIO (1:7) (2=6) (3=5) (4:4)
RECODE PREDESl (1:7) (2=6) (3=6) (4=4) (5=3) (6=2)

( (6 = 2) (7 1)

E (6 = 2) )
RECODE PREDES3 (1:7) (2=6) (3=6) (4=4) (5=3) (6=2) (

(

I

(7;1

RECODE PREDESB (1:7) (2= 6) (3=6) (4= 4) (5= 3) (6= 2)
RECODE PREDES9 (1:7) (2 =6) 3=6) (4:4) (5= 3) (6= 2)
RECODE PREDESlO (1= 7) (2= -6) (3= 6) (4: 4) (5= —3) (6= -2)
RECODE PSTDESI (1= 7) (2= —6) (3= 6) (4: —4) (5= -3) (6= 2) (
RECODE PSTDES3 (1:7) (2=6) (3=6) (4:4) (5=3) (6=2) (
RECODE PSTDESB (1:7) (2=6) (3=6) (4:4) (5=3) (6=2) (7
RECODE psroase (l=7) (2=6) (3:6) (4:4) (5=3) (6=2) (7=
RECODE PSTDESlO (1:7) (2=6) (3=6) (4:4) (5=3) (6=2) (7=
COMPUTE PRESCHl = PREDESl*PREIMP1

5= —3)
5= 3)
7= 1)
7=l)
7=1)
7=1)
(7:1)
7=l)
7:1)
:1)
1)
l

)

COMPUTE PRESCHZ = PREDESZ*PREIMP2
COMPUTE PRESCH3 = PREDES3*PREIMP3
COMPUTE PRESCH4 = PREDES4*PREIMP4
COMPUTE PRESCHS = PREDESS*PREIMP5
COMPUTE PRESCHG = PREDESG*PREIMP6
COMPUTE PRESCH7 = PREDES7*PREIMP7
COMPUTE PRESCH8 = PREDESB*PREIMP8
COMPUTE PRESCH9 = PREDES9*PREIMP9

COMPUTE PRESCHlO = PREDESlO*PREIMP10

COMPUTE PSTSCHl = PSTDESl*PSTIMP1
COMPUTE PSTSCHZ = PSTDESZ*PSTIMP2
COMPUTE PSTSCH3 = PSTDES3*PSTIMP3
COMPUTE PSTSCH4 = PSTDES4*PSTIMP4
COMPUTE PSTSCHS = PSTDESS*PSTIMP5
COMPUTE PSTSCH6 = PSTDESG*PSTIMP6
COMPUTE PSTSCH7 = PSTDES7*PSTIMP7
COMPUTE PSTSCH8 = PSTDES8*PSTIMP8
COMPUTE PSTSCH9 = PSTDES9*PSTIMP9

COMPUTE PSTSCHlO = PSTDESlO*PSTIMP10

COMPUTE PRESCHEM = PRESCH1+PRESCH2+PRESCH3+PRESCH4+PRESCH5+PRESCH6+
PRESCH7+PRESCH8+PRESCH9+PRESCH10

COMPUTE PSTSCHEM = PSTSCH1+PSTSCH2+PSTSCH3+PSTSCH4+PSTSCH5+PSTSCH6+
PSTSCH7+PSTSCH8+PSTSCH9+PSTSCH10

COMPUTE PREBLKl PRPERF1+PRPERF2+PRPERF3+PRPERF4+PRPERF5

COMPUTE PREBLKZ PRPERF6+PRPERF7+PRPERF8+PRPERF9+PRPERF10

COMPUTE PREBLK3 PRPERFl1+PRPERF12+PRPERF13+PRPERF14+PRPERF15

COMPUTE PREBLK4 PRPERFl6+PRPERF17+PRPERF18+PRPERF19+PRPERF20

COMPUTE TOTPERFl = PREBLK2+PREBLK3+PREBLK4

COMPUTE PSTBLKl = PTPERF1+PTPERF2+PTPERF3+PTPERF4+PTPERF5

COMPUTE PSTBLKZ = PTPERF6+PTPERF7+PTPERF8+PTPERF9+PTPERF10

COMPUTE PSTBLK3 = PTPERF11+PTPERF12+PTPERF13+PTPERF14+PTPERF15

COMPUTE PSTBLK4 = PTPERF16+PTPERF17+PTPERF18+PTPERF19+PTPERF20

COMPUTE TOTPERFZ = PSTBLK1+PSTBLK2+PSTBLK3

COMPUTE POMSTAl = TENSE1+EDGE1+UNEASY1+RESTLESl+NERVl+ANX1

COMPUTE POMSDDl = UNHAP1+SADI+BLUE1+HOPELESl+DISCOUR1+
MISERl+HELPLSl+WORTHLSl

COMPUTE POMSAHl = ANGRYl+PEEVED1+GROUCH1+ANNOY1+RESENT1+BITTER1+FURY1

COMPUTE POMSVAl LIVELY1+ACTIVE1+ENERGY1+CHEER1+PEP1+VIGOR1

COMPUTE POMSFIl WORNl+FATIG1+EXHAUST1+WEARY1+BUSH1

COMPUTE POMSCBl CONFUS1+CONCENT1+BEWILD1+FORGET1+UNCERT1

COMPUTE POMSTAZ TENSE2+EDGE2+UNEASY2+RESTLES2+NERV2+ANX2

COMPUTE POMSDDZ UNHAP2+SADZ+BLUE2+HOPELESZ+DISCOUR2+
MISER2+HELPLSZ+WORTHLSZ

COMPUTE POMSAHZ = ANGRY2+PEEVED2+GROUCH2+ANNOY2+RESENT2+BITTER2+FURY2

COMPUTE POMSVAZ = LIVELY2+ACTIVE2+ENERGY2+CHEER2+PEP2+VIGOR2

II II II II

161

 

COMPUTE POMSFIZ WORN2+FATIG2+EXHAUST2+WEARY2+BUSH2

COMPUTE POMSCBZ CONFUSZ+CONCENT2+BEWILD2+FORGET2+UNCERT2

COMPUTE POMSTMDl = POMSTA1+POMSDDI+POMSAH1+POMSFI1+POMSCB1-POMSVA1
COMPUTE POMSTMD2 = POMSTA2+POMSDD2+POMSAHZ+POMSFI2+POMSCBZ-POMSVA2
COMPUTE SE1 = PRESEI+PRESE2+PRESE3+PRESE4+PRESE5+
PRESE6+PRESE7+PRESE8+PRESE9+PRESE10+
PRESE11+PRESE12+PRESE13+PRESE14+PRESE15+
PRESEl6+PRESE17+PRESE18+PRESE19+PRESE20
PSTSE1+PSTSE2+PSTSE3+PSTSE4+PSTSE5+
PSTSE6+PSTSE7+PSTSE8+PSTSE9+PSTSE10+
PSTSE11+PSTSE12+PSTSE13+PSTSE14+PSTSE15+
PSTSEI6+PSTSE17+PSTSE18+PSTSE19+PSTSE20

COMPUTE SCHEMDIF = PRESCHEM - PSTSCHEM

COMPUTE SEDIF = SE1-SE2

COMPUTE POMSDIF = POMSTMDl-POMSTMDZ
COMPUTE PERFDIF = TOTPERFl-TOTPERFZ
RECODE ORDER (123=1) (132=2) (213=3) (
IF (COND E0 1) OR (COND E0 3) DUMMY
IF (COND E0 2) OR (COND E0 4) DUMMY
FINISH

COMPUTE SE2

231=4) (312=5) (321=6)
0
1

162

 

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