7 . .3 :H Al... \ "‘2...‘ {3.9.19 ..\ , . 141:3. x. m lllllllllllllllllllll This is to certify that the dissertation entitled RESTRUCTURING 0F TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE CASE OF ISRAEL presented by Pierre Azoulay has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for males, degree in Wh (M {Mam /& ,éwc/ Major professor Date /0'/g/(/?(j MSU is an Affirmuu've Action/Er; ual Opportunity Institution 0-12771 LIBRARY Michigan State University PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE .‘W-l 1 Iv .. . > m N " r: I . 3.91110 1 OCT 2 l 2001 MSU In An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution WMMMJ RESTRUCTURING OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS : THE CASE OF ISRAEL By Pierre Azoulay A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Telecommunications 1994 ABSTRACT Restructuring of Telecommunications : The Case of Israel By Pierre Azoulay In the past five or six years, Israel has built one of the most advanced telecommunication infrastructure from scratch. Moreover, dramatic changes have occurred recently in the policies followed by the Israeli government in the field of telecommunication, mainly the opening of certain segments of the market to competition. This case study tries to explain those changes and policies, while at the same time analyzing how they relate to Israel’s specific context and to the dynamic of peace at work in the Middle East. It finally sketches out the regulatory conditions under which Israeli telecommunication manufacturers and service providers could place themselves in a position to play a leading role in the global restructuring of telecommunications in the Middle East. The study advocates a separation of the regulatory body from the Ministry of Communications, and clear procedures for the setting of access charges to the incumbent’s local network. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My warmest thanks to Michigan State University Department of Telecommunications, to my Thesis Committee, and to the Rothberg School for Overseas Students, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem, Israel. «In Israel, being reasonable means believing in miracles...» David Ben Gurion iv TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF FIGURES VIII TABLES W INTRODUCTION 1 1.1. Research Outline 2 1.2. Review of Literature 2 1.3. Research Methods 3 1.4. Israel on the economic world map 5 1.5. Israeli Telecommunications in a Nutshell 8 CHAPTER ONE TEE ISRAELI TELECOMIVIUNICATION SYSTEM : A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 1 0 2.1. Basic Overview of Israel's Telecommunication Infrastructure ............................. 10 2.1.1. Bezeq, Public Telecommunication Operator 10 2.1.2. Domestic Telephone Network 1 1 2.1.3. International Communications 20 2.1.4. Cellular Phones 27 2.1.5. Data Communication Infrastructure 28 , 2.1.6. Broadcasting and Cable TV 31 2.2. The Building of the Israeli Telecom Infrastructure : A Contextual Explanation.. 32 2.2.1. A way to overcome the country's geographical isolation ........................... 32 2.2.2. Influence of the Arab-Israeli conflict 34 2.2.3. Human Influences : Immigration, Emigration, Jewish Diaspora ............. 36 2.2.4. An Export-Driven Economy 42 CHAPTER TWO RESTRUCTURING IN A FIRST WORLD CONTEXT : ISRAELI PATTERNS ..... . ..... 49 3.1. The recent move towards competition 49 3.1.1. A Push for Liberniivnh’nn 49 3.1.2. A new framework for Bezeq's privatization 53 3.1.3. Bezeq gets a new operating license, Israel gets a telecom policy ! ........... 56 3.2. Finding a path to competition 59 3.2.1. «Fortress Bezeq» under Siege 59 3.2.3. A practical example : cellular phones 62 3.2.4. Opening of international voice transmission to competition .................... 67 3.3. A playground for telephone giants ? 69 3.3.1. Southwestern Bell strategy 70 3.3.2. The Long Distance Carriers also want their piece of the pie ................... 70 3.3.3. The AT&T connection 7 1 3.3.4. Confusion to remain until late 1994 72 CHAPTER THREE TELECOMMUNICATIONS FOR GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING : A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ISRAELI APPROACH 73 4.1. Regulatory Hurdles 73 4.1.1. Implementing Competition 73 4.1.2. Finding an Adequate Role for Foreign Capital 79 4.2. Foreign Influences against original Israeli Policies 82 4.2.1. Existing Competition 82 4.2.2. The Telecommunication Manufacturing Industry Example ..................... 83 4.2.3. American Influences 84 4.2.4. Deregulation or Re-regulation '? 85 4.3. Regulatory Prognoses 86 CHAPTER FOUR INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK, MIDDLE EAST PERSPECTIVE ....... . ....................... 87 5.1. Making the Middle Eastern telecommunication desert b(l)oom ........................... 87 5.1.1. Major imbalances 88 5.1.2. Possible Peace Dividends in the Telecommunication Area ...................... 89 5.1.3. The Boom can wait 92 5.2. Bezeq, Global Carrier ? 93 96 CONCLUSION APPENDIX I APPENDIX n APPENDIX III BIBLIOGRAPHY 100 103 104 104 TABLE OF FIGURES FIGURE 1 : MAP OF ISRAEL X FIGURE 2 : ISRAEL ON THE WORLD TELECOMMUNICATIONS MAP COMPARISON OF THE TELEPHONE PENETRATION RATES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES, THE WORLD, AND ISRAEL IN 1992. 12 FIGURE 3 : COMPARISON BASED ON PURCHASING POWER SUM OF TELEPHONE CHARGES FOR ONE YEAR 1 8 FIGURE 4 : BEZEQ ANNUAL LINE INSTALLATION, 1983-1993 19 FIGURE 5 : GROWTH or INTERNATIONAL CALLS FROM ISRAEL (IN MILLIONS), 1987-1991. ........ 26 FIGURE 6 : CELLULAR GROWTH IN ISRAEL, 1987-1994 28 FIGURE 7 : ANNUAL PERCENTAGE GROWTH RATE FOR THE TOTAL INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE TRAFFIC To ISRAEL. MARCH 1950 —— MARCH 1985* ........................ 35 FIGURE 8 : ISRAELI POPULATION (IN MILLIONS), 1985-1993 37 FIGURE 9 : ISRAELI TELEPHONE PENETRATION RATE, 1985-93. 3 7 FIGURE 10 : TRADE DEFICIT AND EXPORTS IN MILLIONS OF US Dm IARS 46 FIGURE 11 : CLASSIC «STACK» MODEL ; APPLICATION To ISRAEL. 7 5 FIGURE 12 I A NEWSPAPER AD RAN BY CELLCOM, THE BELLSOUTH-LED JOINT-VENTURE WHO WON THE SECOND OPERATING LICENSE FOR CELLULAR SERVICES IN MARCH 1994. 104 TABLEI: TABLEZ: TABLE 3 : TABLE 4 : TABLE 5 : BEZEQ INVESTMENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, 1986-1992. ............................... 15 BEZEQ'S INSTALLATION ACHIEVEMENTS 20 COMMUNICATIONS WEEK INTERNATIONAL/YANKEE GROUP TOP 40 RANKING OF INTERNATIONAL CARRIERS. A COMPARISON BETWEEN BEZEQ AND THE EAST ASIAN TIGERS. 2 5 ISRAEL'S TEN TOP-RANKED INDUSTRIAL COMP ‘ ""V‘ 46 ISRAEL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDICATORS 1 0 O Figure l : Map of Israel SOURCE : Israel Information Service (IIS) Gopher ’l 'i "I" '75 I. Lu [MM .' I‘sgrggi Humanitarian» and Cease-Fire Lines. INTRODUCTION The purpose of this work is to propose an in—depth evaluation of the Israeli telecommunication infrastructure and of telecommunication policies in Israel. Israel is a very tiny country, located at the periphery of the Western World. However, it is closely linked to Europe and North America, particularly from an economic point of View. Many reasons can help us to understand this strong integration. However, analyses on this topic in the mass media often overlook the advanced state of the telecommunication system in Israel. It is the eternal problem of causality : is it because of the high development of telecommunications that the Hebrew state enjoys such tight relations with the major trade blocs in the world ? Or is this development merely a result of a linkage that exists because of cultural, demographic, as well as historical reasons 7 One of the goal of this thesis is also to sort out the causality issue. To answer these questions is important because of two main reasons : —— In the past five or six years, Israel has built one of the most advanced telecommunication infrastructures from scratch, thus attracting a lot of interest from developing countries ; —— Dramatic changes have occurred recently in the policies followed by the Israeli government in the field of telecommunication. Will Israeli telecom manufacturers and service providers in a position to play a leading role in the global restructuring of telecommunications in the Middle East ? l . 1 . Research Outline These observations lead us to organize this research around three basic sets of questions : To what extent has the specific historical, political, cultural, geographical and economic context of the State of Israel affected the development of its telecommunication system ? How did the wave of «Global Restructuring» affect it (Chapter 'IVvo) ? 0 What are the restructuring patterns in Israel (Chapter Three) ? What are the main problems facing local regulators ? We will attempt to provide an in-depth, critical analysis about the new regulatory framework that is taking shape exactly as we are writing this research, and try to sketch out the political and economic implications of this new set of regulations (Chapter Four). 0 In the light Of the Middle East peace process, the Arab boycott of Israel could soon come to an end. Will the Israeli telecom sector (both on the service side and on the manufacturing side) be assigned a key role in the modernization of the telecom infrastructure in the area (Chapter Five) ? 1.2. Review of Lite_rature The Literature about Israeli telecommunications is scarce. This is especially true as far as the most recent developments are concerned. However, some major studies on this topic have been done by Aharon Kellerman, Professor of Geography at Haifa Universityl. The semi-monthly Communications Week International had also some very good pieces about Israel AS far as economic data is concerned, the Israeli press in English («The Jerusalem Post» and «The Jerusalem Report») is a very valuable source. Eli Barnavi, Professor of History at Bar-Ilan University, has written a compact, concise, very well~referenced book called «A Brief History of the State ofIsrael»2, which I intend to use extensively for historical background information. The same is true for Amos Elon's Masterpiece «The Israelis»? An increasing amount of studies and articles is available on the theme of «Global Restructuring of Telecommunications». I Intend to use this material in order to evaluate Israeli policies in a more global context. Lastly, the various databases available at MSU School of Business provide also very valuable information. 1.3. Research Methods The Research Method I used is the Case Study method. It is done by first performing an in-depth survey of the literature and articles available on the subject. To gather even more recent data, I traveled to Israel in August 1994. There, I met and interviewed various actors of the telecommunication industry in Israel, among them Bezeq officials and civil servants at the Ministry of Communications, Consumer group leaders, large business users, potential competitors of Bezeq, etc. 1Kellerman, Aharon. The role of telecommunications in assisting peripherally located countries : the case of Israel, in Collapsing Time and Space : Geographical aspects of Communication and Information, London : Haepercollius Academic (1991). 2Barnavi, Eli. Une Breve H istoire de l 'Etat d'Isra'e'l, Presses Universitaires de France, 1982. 3Elon, Amos. The Israelis : Founders and Sons, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971. tel —_i—' From this trip, I gathered up-to-date information concerning the Israeli telecom infrastructure and the new regulatory framework now being implemented. During the whole research process, I tried to put a particular emphasis on the contextuality of my analysis. I inspired myself from a method pioneered by Dr. Bella Mody in two studies about satellite technology in Mexico and India4. Instead of focusing on a particular technology, I applied the same approach while looking at the «domestic and foreign economic, scientific- technical, political and cultural relationships»5 that influence the Israeli telecommunication sector in general. This contextual approach often shows that particular policy decisions have more to do with «political, economic and sociocultural forces in the surrounding environment, and their interactions», than with the overall goal of welfare maximization, tariff reduction or service quality improvement. The economic actors and factors influencing the regulatory process include market power of the incumbent firm, foreign and local equipment manufacturers, availabilty of local capital, inflation rate, etc. In the political arena, powerful domestic and foreign interest groups include the party in power and unions, while political factors like the peace process or the «special American-Israeli relationship» also have a considerable influence. Cultural forces influencing the decision-making process in this field include groups pushing for integration to the world system, links with the Jewish Diaspora among others. The specific context of Israel has a «causal texture»6 that makes generalization to othernational situations hazardous. For the same reasons, it 4Mody, Bella ; Borrego, Jorge. Mexico’s Morelos Satellite : Reaching for Autonomy ? in Transnational Communications : Wiring the Third World, edited by Gerald Sussman and John A. Lent, Sage Publications, 1991. Mody, Bella. Contextual analysis of a communication technology : The case of satellites in India, Telematics and Informatics, 1987 . 5Mody, Bella ; Borrego, Jorge (1991, Ibid.) 6Mody, Bella. First World Technologies in Third World Contexts, in Rogers, E. M. And F. Balls, ed. Communication Revolution in North America and Western Europe. New Jersey : Ablex, 1982. —;—— is risky to analyze the ongoing changes in Israel through the prism of the American or European model. I hope this work avoided these both traps. 1.4. Israel on the economic world map Because Israel is a relatively new nation-state (it was founded in 1948), available literature often misleads the reader in thinking that it is still a developing country. Indeed, most of this literature would acknowledge Israel top-ranking on the «developing countries» list, or the accomplishments of the Israeli economy, but it would often fall short of understanding the new economic phase the country entered about 15 years ago ; the research in this field has simply being unable to keep track of the frenzy pace of economic development there. This is why it seems interesting to review some of the general characteristics of Israeli economic and social fundamentals, before going into a detailed analysis of the country’s telecommunication infrastructure. Israel has a population of about 5.2 million7 and it extends over some 21,000 square kilometers (not including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). In terms of its gross national product, it is considered a developed country, so that in 1992, its population numbered 0.1 percent of the world population, whereas its GNP was about 0.2 percent of the world GNPS. Looking at these economic fundamentals, Israel occupies a better position than the less developed EurOpean countries (Ireland, Greece, Portugal), similar to those of the most advanced of the East Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore), and much above East European countries and LDC's. Aharon Kellerman claims that «it has already become common wisdom to identify three global economic cores, namely North America, Europe (either Western Europe only, or, to some degree Eastern Europe as well), and the 7State of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics. Jewish new Year 5754 Demographic Report, September 1993. 8Data gathered in Dordick & Wang. The Information Society, Sage 1993. em Au to fa: al 1! emerging Pacific Rim, centered on Japan and including some NICs, as well as Australia and New Zealand»9. Located at the periphery of these three cores, Israel nevertheless seems to be a part of the world global economy. The Israeli economy is expanding faster than any other in the industrialized West. While the latter entered a period of persistent economic recession, Israel's growth rate in 1992 was among the highest in the world —- a whopping 6.6% jump in the GNP“). Only a few East Asian countries, like South Korea (5.8%) and Singapore (4.8%) came anywhere close. What is more important, 1992 was Israel's third consecutive year of high speed expansion. Looking at social factors, instead of the usual focus on gross national product, the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce Economists arrived at the conclusion that Israel compared favorably with most countries, even with other developed Western nations11 : 0 Life expectancy is exactly 76 years, as in the US, compared to the average expectancy of 76.4 in the seven most industrialized nations. 0 Israel's fertility rates are the highest among developed nations. As of 1991, there were 2.8 births per adult female, compared to the average 1.7 among the seven most industrialized nations in the world (the «G-7»). 0 Women's participation in the workforce lags behind most countries. In 1991, women made up only 34% of the workforce, to be compared with the G-7 average of 38.4% 0 Illiteracy stood at approximately 4% of the population aged 15 and over in 1991, which compares well with the industrialized seven‘s average of 5%. 9Kellerman, Aharon (1991,1bid.) 10Sandler, Neal. Israel '8 Economic Boom : Miracle or Mirage. The Jerusalem Report (July 29, 1993). 11Rosenfeld Jose, Israel on par with the West. The Jerusalem Post Weekly Edition (August 21, 1993) l W d ti E c .c. n V Fr 4 l lint. —_7—— 0 Daily caloric intake per capita stood at 3,174 calories in 1989, higher than Britain's 3,149, Sweden‘s 2,960 and Japan's 2,956, but lower than Ireland's 3,778, the U.S.'s 3,671, Denmark's 3,628, Switzerland's 3582 and Austria's 3,495. 0 The child mortality rate up to age 5 stood at 12 out of 1,000 births in 1991. The rate is higher than Japan's and Italy's 6 per 1,000 and the US's 11 per 1,000, but lower than Portugal's 15 per 1,000. Argentina's 34 per 1,000 and the Commonwealth of Independant States’ (CIS) 20 per 1,000. Other indicators describing the overall «quality of life» (health care access, proportion of students in the population, air pollution, etc.) tend to demonstrate that Israel compares even better with the Western world than its GNP per capita ranking seems to prove. My purpose was here to roughly describe some Israeli realities for readers who may not be familiar with it. However, the figures do not tell the whole story. The overall high-level of development cannot hide some huge discrepancies between the Jewish and Arab population12 (although the gap tends to be shrinking rapidly) and among the ashkenasim (Jews from East European ascent) and the sefaradim (who came from the Arab world after the creation of the state). The reader should not lose sight of the fact that Israel is located on the crossroads of three continents. Here more than anywhere else, Western modernity often collides with multi-millennium traditional and religious beliefs. The Israeli way of life is Americanizing rapidly, but this does not go without severe confrontation with deep—rooted cultural and social realities. Yuppies walking along the streets of downtown Tel Aviv with cellular phones have little in common with Moroccan Jews living in the poor 12Muslim Arabs, Christian Arabs and Druzes account for more than 18% of the total population (Central Bureau of Statistics, Jewish new Year 5754 Demographic Report, September 1993). neig wid: (mo dep: 13h "in Tel neighborhood of Hatikva13, a few miles from there ; cable TV may be more widespread in Israel than in Europe. Still, there is 10% of the population (mostly ultra-orthodox Jews) who would describe television as a tool of depravation and debauchery. A lot more examples could be given. From several viewpoints, Israel remains a remote extension of the wealthy, Western core. The following chapter will therefore aim at showing how this specific context has affected the development of its telephone system and telecommunication industry. 1.5. Israeli Telecommunications in a Nutshell Israel is able to claim the highest telephone density in the Middle East“, leaving its Arab neighbors far behind. It was not always so : while several members of the manufacturing community enjoy world class reputations, as recently as 1980 observers described the telecommunication infrastructure as barely adequate. As part of a wide-ranging liberalization program, the Israeli government, convinced of the need for a strong emphasis on telecommunications, formed Bezeq 10 years ago. Bezeq was charged with operating and upgrading the national and international service infrastructure, and immediately began the implementation of ambitious targets embedded in a group of five year plans. One early feature was that Bezeq was given a partly privatized status, with share issues implemented on a regular basis, progressively reducing the state ownership of the company. Top of the list were the rapid digitalization of the infrastructure, an improvement in telephone density, with consequent improvements 111 customer relations. Waiting lists, for example, had been a 13hope, in Hebrew. it stood at 34% in 1992 according to the Datapro Reports on International Telecommunications. m: in 14 ex be Cl] as N. CO G] of re F— 9 major headache by the early 1980s, with a general backlog of 200,000 installations at any one time. By the early 1990s, however, the backlog had been cut to less than 14,000 and installation times were down to between two weeks and one month. Network digitalization has proceeded rapidly, with the majority of the country using digital exchanges. Digital microwave and fiber optic cabling has also been extensively used to replace obsolete copper cable infrastructure. New services being implemented include frame relay and metropolitan area networks linking key industrial and commercial centers. X25 and 64 kbps digital leased lines currently enjoy considerable popularity in Israel. Not surprisingly given the political circumstances, Israel's telecommunications traffic has grown substantially with Western Europe and North America but has languished with most of the neighboring countries. The country however has made considerable use of both advanced submarine cable and satellite technology. Although Bezeq already faces competition from value-added services providers, «it still treats customers as if it were the only player», claims Jimmy Schwartzkopf, general manager of the Israeli subsidiary of consultancy Meta Group, Inc15. Moreover, the rapid expansion of population caused by the inflow of immigrants will undoubtedly stretch Bezeq's manpower and financial resources. In this context, what lies ahead for Israeli telecommunications ? 15Pinsky, Donne. Israel Forges Links, Plans Peace Cable, Communications Week International (February 21, 1994). re CO 10 CHAPTER ONE THE ISRAELI TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEM : A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 2.1. Basic Ove_rview of Israel's Telecommunication Infrastructure 2.1.1. Bezeq, Public Telecommunication Operator In the early 1980s, Israel had an outmoded and inadequate telecommunications network totally out of balance with the country's expanding economy. Thus, in 1984, the Israeli government, anxious to improve the dilapidated infrastructure as quickly has possible, formed Bezeq (the Israel Telecommunications Corporation, Ltd.) as an independent corporation and transferred the responsibility for the running of the country's network from the Ministry of Communications to the newly formed organization. Bezeq sales for the fiscal year 1993 were $1.670 billion”, an increase of 8.7 % over 1992. Dun & Bradstreet ranked the company number one in revenues among 200 of Israel's leading industrial, trading and services companies. Apart from telecommunications, Bezeq, which is the country's largest employer after Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd., operates most of Israel's radio and TV broadcasting transmitters, as well as cable systems. Kol Israel, The Voice of Israel, with its familiar «Shalom from Jerusalem» sign-off, entertains short-wave radio listeners in a dozen languages. In addition, Bezeq publishes phone directories in Hebrew, English and Arabic and runs the largest telecommunications college in the country. 16Luboshitz, Kasierer & Co. Bezeq 1993 Annual Report, Tel Aviv (April 12, 1994). sin 7 2‘ to d< 11 About 25% of Bezeq stock has already been sold to the Israeli public since the government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir decided in 1992 to sell 72% of Bezeq and to retain only a 28% stake in the company. 2.1.2. Domestic Telephone Network Israel had the twenty first highest telephone penetration rate in the world by 198717. In 1992, Israel’s ranking had went down to the twenty-fifth spot18. The domestic telephone infrastructure has undergone vast developments since 1985, when the system was moved from the Ministry of Postal Services to state company status. To take the measure of these improvements, it may be interesting to compare throughout the years the Israeli share of the world telephone main lines total number: in 1981, Israel accounted for 0.1% of the world population and 0.2% of the world telephone lines total number”. In 1991, it accounted also for 0.1% of the world population. But its share of the world telephone main lines total number had jumped up to nearly 0.4%”! On the world telephone map, Israel can clearly be located among the developed countries, as shows the graphic displayed on the next page : 17Bezeq, Israel Telephone Company Annual Report quoted in Kellerman, Aharon (1991, Ibid.) 18World Telecommunications Development Report (1994), World Telecom Indicators, ITU, Geneva. 19Kiellerman, Aharon (1991, Ibid.) 20UIT, Siemens, TelePress figures, 1993. 12 Figure 2 : Israel on the world telecommunications map Comparison of the Telephone Penetration Rates in selected countries, high income countries, the world, and Israel in 1992. SOURCE : World Telecommunications Development Report, World Telecom Indicators, ITU, Geneva, 1994. 70.. 60- .101 I301 204 104 0- . Israel I'SA Sweden Singapore Taiwan llong lhgh World Kong Income Countries The development patterns of the Israeli telephone system are quite similar to those that characterize the newly industrialized East Asian «Tigers» : high growth in annual investments for the infrastructure trying to catch up with a rapidly growing demand. This average investment in Israel during the years 1985-1987 was about 7.1%o of the GDP, roughly the same number as Singapore (75%), and much above Hong Kong's 43%;. Only South Korea (14.6%) and Malaysia (171%) did better21. 211989 Annual International Telecommunications Statistics, Siemens AG, Germany. tel lh: I: m II I 13 The Israeli telecommunication expenditures have skyrocketed since then, due in major part, to the immigration of more than 450,000 Jews (mainly from the former USSR) since 1989. For the 1993-1997 period, Bezeq plans to spend $4.2 billion22 to improve the Israeli telephone network. But this would translate into a substantial increase of the figure quoted above telecommunications investments would account for about 1.4% of the GDP, that is, twice as much as they did less than six years ago ! Telephone Penetration Rate Israel, which is roughly the size of New Jersey, had about 1.7 million access lines in 1991 for its 5 million inhabitants, or just 34 per 100 inhabitants, according to Zecharya Mizrotsky, Bezeq's spokesman23. That gives it one of the highest telephone densities in the Middle East. In Tel Aviv, Israel‘s commercial capital, the rate is approaching 91 access lines per 100 citizens. At the end of 1993, this number has jumped to 2 million (a 30% increase from 1992), and the penetration rate stood at nearly 38%24. In the predominantly Arab West Bank, however, density is under 10%, and in the much poorer Gaza Strip, less than 3%. Interestingly, Bezeq provides phone services to isolated Jewish settlements in the West Bank, while larger Arab towns like Bethlehem and Nablus are served by the civilian administration that has controlled day-to-day life in the occupied territories since 1967. An in-depth analysis of the telephone penetration rate as its relates to demographic and social data will be provided later. 22Luxner, Larry. Israel's Bezeq Plans To Go Private Amid Massive Telecom Growth. Telephony (June 1, 1992). 23Luxner, Larry (June 1, 1992, Ibid.) 2'i'Bezeq ready to install two millionth phone line. Briefs, The Jerusalem Post (January 22, 1994) [Anonymous]. five howe certa Beze Telel vend 2,001 the 1 chiel swit switu line outs tele< the mar Illal'. beei 100 Witl for t 25M. Telel 26M. 14 E ui ment and Technolo We have already underlined some similarities between Israel and the five «East Asian Tigers». In the field of telecommunications equipment however, we must take a look at a major difference : Israel can rely, to a certain extent, on its domestic telecommunication industry in order to supply Bezeq with state-of-the-art switching and transmission equipment. A key vendor in Israel's telecommunications history is Telrad Telecommunications and Electronic Industries, which is the country's largest vendor in the field, and a substantial exporter in its own right. Telrad employs 2,000 people and generates a turnover of over $240 million25, making it one of the largest industrial concern of any sector in the country, and it is ultimately owned by the country's largest industrial conglomerate, Koor Industries. It has chiefly pioneered the development and manufacturing of public and private switch technology, and claims a dominant market share in the supply of digital switch technology to Bezeq : some 70 percent of Israel's subscribers on digital line are connected to Telrad's digital exchanges”? Another key supplier to Bezeq which has also found export success outside Israel is Tadiran. The company produces across-the-range telecommunications products from feature phone units, PBXs and CPE, through multiplexers, to digital cross-connect facilities. Original formulas of «coopetition» have been found with foreign manufacturers ; Alcatel and Tadiran have signed a joint-venture to manufacture the System-12 public switch in Israel. A similar agreement has been signed between Telrad and Northern Telecom to manufacture the DMS- 100 switch. Digital technologies in switching and transmission systems combined with fiber optic cables in the interurban trunk system constituted a blueprint for the general development of Bezeq's network. According to Bezeq's president 25McClelland, Stephen. Into the wide area, in Israel : A Telecommunications Hothouse, Telecommunications (April 1994). 26McClelland, Stephen (April 1994, Ibid.) Ih-‘r—i (43m 15 and general manager, about 50% of Israeli switches were digital back in mid- 1992 ; 25% were crossbar and another 25% were in the process of changing. The objective is to have only digital and crossbar switches by 1995, and reach full network digitalization by late 1997. It is important to note that the «digitalization rate», that is the percentage of digital switches stations in the network, jumped to 53% in October 1992 from only 3% in 1984. Table l : Bezeq investments in Telecommunications, 1986- 1992. SOURCE : 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 Annual International Telecommunications Statistics, Siemens AG, Germany. Total Annual Gross Investments Investment as a in Telecommunications, share of Israelis including Land and Buildings GDP (US Dollars) 1986 310,649,000 7.1 %o 1987 226,420,000 6.5 %o 1988 250,796,000 6.9 %o J 1989 383,700,000 7.8 %o I 1990 372,752,000 7.6 %o 991 442,300,000 7.3 %o t ’ 1992 ] 465,900,000 not available usec rela com bac' tra1 S81“ enl Jer He lllt sy: tel 16 This explains why, in the recent years, the construction budget has been used to upgrade the telephone network by replacing old analog switches and related equipment both in tandem and local exchanges (Bezeq is now completing the construction of a nationwide 2.5 gigabit per second fiber optic backbone network), replacing old cables in the local network, expanding transmission facilities, completing a computerized customer maintenance service system in all major service areas, preparing the infrastructure for the introduction of Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) and other enhanced services. We must notice that in Israel's major cities, such as Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa, there is a higher proportion of digitalization. Here, Bezeq has introduced new services for its business customers. Special emphasis has also been placed on new end-user equipment with the introduction of multi-feature telephone sets (Yahalom systems), new key systems and the accelerated introduction of touch-tone DTMF dialing telephone sets. In July 1994, Bezeq signed two major deals for the supplying of digital exchanges with Telrad and Tadiran. Tadiran will provide Bezeq with 500,000 phone lines until the end of 1997 at the cost of N18 500 million27 (about 1.5 billion dollars), according to the accord. A similar deal was signed with Telrad, who will supply 600,000 new telephone lines for N18 600 million23, within the same time frame. It was one of the biggest purchasing contracts ever signed in the local electronics industry. Before the signing, both Tadiran and Telrad had agreed to reduce their prices by 20%. For the first time, Bezeq officials had threatened to issue an international public tender for the supplying of this transmission and switching equipment if the local suppliers did not adjust their 27Siegel, Judy. Bezeq signs two major telephone exchange pacts, The Jerusalem Post (July 6, 1994). 28Bezeq's deal with Telrad will digitize all phones by 1997. Business Briefs, The Jerusalem Post (July 4, 1994) [Anonymous]. costs 1 remain depend the co supplic do aw there advar waitir also a move 311101 servj Man. in E1 Port Sien shov 17 costs to those of their international competitors”. The speed by which the remaining analog phone exchanges are replaced by digital ones, they argued, depended on how quickly local suppliers were reducing their prices. Otherwise, the company would have been «forced» to purchase them from a foreign supplier”. These two deals will make Israel one of the few countries in the world to do away with its analog exchanges. Today, according to Bezeq own figures, there are still 600,000 telephone lines whose subscribers cannot take advantage of services only available via digital exchanges, including «call waiting», «call forwarding», and itemized bills31. The network full digitization will also allow the telephone company to give up its local area dialing plan, and to move forward a universal, seven numbers dialing plan. Telephone Tarifis Israeli residential customers are billed about $29.00 bi-monthly, amounting to a monthly charge of $14.50. Moreover, a «basic basket» of phone services costs $273 a year, according to Yitzhak Kaul, Bezeq's General Manager32. This compares to $289 in the United States, $305 in France, $383 in England, $432 in Italy and $501 in Germany. In all of Europe, in fact, only Portugal and Greece offer cheaper basic service than Israel. Related to the 1987 level of purchasing power, the figures taken out of Siemens's 1989 Annual Telephone Statistics indicate only a slight change, as shown by the graph below. Israel's basic telephone tariffs seem to compare favorably with most Western European countries, despite Bezeq's monopoly status. 29Siege], Judy. Bezeq to issue int '1 tender for phone exchanges, Briefs, The Jerusalem Post Weekly Edition (February 26, 1994). 30Siege] Judy (February 26, 1994). Bezeq moves to accelerate digitalization, The Jerusalem Post Weekly Edition. 3ISiege1, Judy (February 26, 1994, Ibid.) 18 Figure 3 : Comparison based on Purchasing Power Sum of Telephone Charges for One Year consisting of : Installation fee, distributed over 10 years ; Subscription rate for the largest local network res. the highest tariff class ; Charges for 700 local calls and 200 long-distance calls (3 min.) up to 100 km (daytime rate and nighttime rate mixed). Calculated with Consumer Parities for International Comparison of Purchasing Power Status : January 1, 1988 ; Consumer Parities : January 1988. SOURCE : Study on National Telephone Tariffs Worldwide :A Detailed Comparison, Siemens AG, Germany. Sweden Dennmark 5238 Spain 5242 Israel 5249 Greece $286 France $345 ltaly $375 UK 5394 US (New York) 7 $448 Germany F. R. $465 Recent developments In addition to conventional long distance dialing, Bezeq has begun to offer its customers specialized services such as itemized billing, wake-up service, «177» toll-free calls and leased data lines, of which there are nearly 30,000 now in service. Bezeq also gives free call waiting and call forwarding to all customers who have digital lines. Voice mail, caller ID, caller ID blocking and other «CLASS-type» services started in 1993. 32Luxner, Larry (June 1, 1992, Ibid.) all-ti With inha E son ubiq beco C0111] 19 In 1993 alone, Bezeq filled 252,027 orders for new telephone lines — an all-time record and 31% more than installations in 1992, itself a record year. With 2,028,400 mobile and telephone lines functioning, line density per hundred inhabitants reached 36.8% on January lst, 1994, a 2% increase in a year ! F_igure 4 : Bezeq Annual Line Installation, 1983-1993 SOURCE : 1993 Bezeq Annual Report. [300000 -250000 ,200000 ~150000 ~100000 -50000 ~O 93 , 86/8 83/84 84/85 85/86 To the chagrin of some old-timers, Bezeq also plans to do away with the ubiquitous asimon — or public telephone token —— that, over the years, has become as characteristic of Israeli life as falafel. It has gradually been replaced by magnetic cards now accepted by nearly 15,000 pay phones throughout the country. T1 h 1(. 1‘ CL 20 Table 2 : Bezeq's Installation Achievements SOURCE : Bezeq Annual Reports, 1990-1993. 1990 1991 1992 1993 Installationof 148,837 161,226 192,997 252,027 Telephone Lines Card-operated Payphones 30 2,016 4,477 6,058 Installation of «Yahalom» Office 2,836 5,547 6,405 7,894 Systems33 Direct Inward 74,250 128,000 225,750 397,620 Dialing Numbers Local Network 1,641 2,084 1,925 2,040 Cables Laid (km) Long-distance 2 0 9 4 1 4 44 5 6 3 8 Network Cables Laid (km) Employees 9,480 9,728 9,968 9,878 2.1.3. International Communication; There are several landmarks in the evolution of the Israeli international telecommunication system. Until 1968, the system was based on poor radio connections with between ten and thirty channels in operation. In 1960, a telex service began, and in 1968, a maritime cable with 128 available channels 33«Yahalom» (Diamond) systems are multi-feature telephone sets. started transpl lhne concei distar hnkS' 1964, earth Since Ocea Since Russ eXpo I1—1 21 started operations between Israel and France. In 1972, Israel first leased tranSponders in communication satellites. Satellite Communications From a telecommunications standpoint, Israel represents a challenge. More than half the country is desert and the majority of the population is concentrated in urban centers or in small settlements separated by large distances. Satellite communications are playing an important part in providing links to remote communities. Israel was one of INTELSAT's early members joining in November 1964, and makes extensive use of its international services via two standard A earth stations linked to INTELSAT Atlantic and Pacific Ocean satellites. Since 1980, it leased a transponder in a third satellite located over the Indian Ocean (INMARSAT), which permits communications with Asia as well34. Since the beginning of the 19908, because of the flow of new immigrants from Russia, Bezeq has also been using a fourth satellite over the CIS to handle an exponentially growing traffic between Israel and this part of the world. In early 1992, Israel and the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan signed an agreement to open six direct lines between the two, while satellite links will upgrade the number of lines to Russia from seven to around sixty to facilitate communications between Israeli citizens and their families in various ex-Soviet republics who have not yet emigrated. Bezeq will assist in the installation and operation of the international system. It is building this system both in Israel and in Kazakhstan, and will be using INTERSPUTNIK satellite services35. 34US. Central Intelligence Agency 1992 World Factbook. US. National Technical Information Administration, 1992. 35Telecommunications in the Middle East and Southeast Asia : Israel. Regional Overviews, Datapro Reports on International Telecommunications (September 1991) [Anonymous]. 40 kilon «Shear l Experi] 1990. '1 Israel, to leas to use taken ' becom would Bezeq intror secor havir Euro (EM. the 1 char War 22 The Hebrew state also operates three ground stations in Emeq Ha'ela, 40 kilometers from Tel Aviv, and in Gal'on ; a third ground station, code-named «Shaar HaShalom» (Peace Gate) has begun operation in Ramla in 199336. Moreover, Israel will have its own satellite system, code-named AMOS. Experimental satellites Oftekel and Oftek-2 were put into orbit in 1988 and 1990. The full capacity of AMOS-1 and AMOS-2 will probably not be needed by Israel, and negotiations are believed to have taken place with foreign countries to lease spare transponder capacity37. However, it will allow the Hebrew state to use the slots allocated in geosynchronous orbit, so that they will not be taken by additional ARABSATS. Last development in this area : Motorola Corp. has invited Bezeq to become a part of the Iridium satellite communications effort. The offer, that would entail a 5% share in a $800 million offering, is currently examined by Bezeq’s officials and the Israeli Minister of Communications” Use g’ mritime Cables The extension in the availability of international channels permitted the introduction of nationwide direct international dialing in 1972-1973. In 1975, a second maritime cable was put into service, this time ending in Italy and having a capacity of 1,380 channels. Israel has also leased channels in European continental cables and in transatlantic ones. An important development is the East Mediterranean Optical System (EMOS-l), an undersea fiber optic cable stretching from Israel to Sicily and the rest of Europe, capable of providing a maximum of 20,000 voice and data channels. This system started operations only a few weeks before the Gulf War, allowing millions of calls (from anxious relatives to their families in Israel) 36Luboshitz, Kasierer & Co. Bezeq 1993 Annual Report, Tel Aviv (April 12, 1994). 37Israel : The Commercial and Regulatory Environment (September 1993,1bid.) 38143er 's Bezeq offered Iridium share. Interavia-Air-Letter (March 22, 1993) [Anonymous]. triggerc portion 1 and Israel ' Israel ' starter will lir Greece from ( also e1 canal. and E 251 k world' Mark. its A] phOIlt relati were Ollert 00m] 23 triggered by Iraq's Scud missile attacks against Tel Aviv to be handled without particular problems. Yitzhak Kaul, Bezeq president and general manager claims that EMOS- 1 and the TAT-8 transatlantic cable will eventually be connected, so that Israel will have a fiber optic loop to the United States. Another cable from Israel to Cyprus, CIOS, which will serve Greece, Turkey and Eastern Europe started operation in 1993, with a capacity of 622 megabit per second. CIOS will link with the planned cable between Cyprus on one hand, France and Greece on the other hand. A link-up is also in the works with SEA-ME-WE 2 from Cyprus to Alexandria, and from there to Marseilles. SEA-ME-WE 2 will also enable a connection to Southeast Asia and to Singapore through the Suez canal. CIOS will provide diversity for the main EMOS 1 system. EMOS, CIOS and EA-ME-WE 2 will provide mutual backup in the event of faults”. CIOS, at 251 kilometers and supplied by AT&T Submarines Systems Inc., will be the world's longest unrepeated submarine cable, according to consultancy Kessler Marketing Intelligence of Newport, Rhode Island”. Telephone links with the Arab world A very hot issue concerns the «telephone relations» between Israel and its Arab neighbors, whom, as far as they are concerned, do not want official phone links with a country with which they do not maintain diplomatic relations. Until recently, phone connections between Israel and the Arab countries were virtually non-existent, except for the N18 15 ($6.20) per minute service offered by Solan Communications Ltd., a Tel Aviv-based telecommunications company. As of April 1993, however, dialing the Arab world from Israel has become considerably easier — thanks to new and much cheaper service widely 39Luboshitz, Kasierer & Co (April 12, 1994, Ibid.) 40Pinsky, Donne. Israel Forges Links, Plans Peace Cable, Communications Week promote thousaI only $3 1 links tc August Moroc< light. outbm was 4 distril the f const 1986. outgc main certe plam 0f S] 362: well EXp. 41M 199. 24 promoted by Bezeq. Bezeq's officials claim their company is switching thousands of calls every day from Israel to 11 Arab countries and charging only $3.08 to do it —— less than half of Solan's tariff. Apart from this new service, Bezeq has also maintained normal phone links to Egypt, the only Arab state officially at peace with Israel, and since August 1994, with Jordan. Direct links should also soon be opened with Morocco“. Fifteen circuits connect Israel and Egypt, though traffic is generally light. Inbound versus ogtbound international telephone trafijc An interesting trend has been revealed when the volumes of inbound and outbound telephone traffic are compared. The ratio of inbound/outbound calls was 4:6 in 1950-1961. This ratio gradually changed towards a balanced distribution, which was reached in 1961-1962. Since this date, which marked the first massive expansion of international telephone use, the ratio has constantly changed in favor of inbound calls. This ratio reached 7:3 in 1985— 1986, or on the average, a ratio of more than two incoming calls for each outgoing one“. There might be several reasons for this constant ratio change, but the main one is that the call of international dialing used to be, and still is to a certain extent, higher than abroad. This made cheaper to used collect calls placed in Israel or to have the foreign party call in. While this policy of high international tarifi's looked attractive in terms of short-run national balances of payments, and in terms of revenues for Bezeq, it is detrimental from the viewpoint of economic development and social welfare. It increased the cost of international business in Israel at times when exports and imports of goods, services and information were grong and International (February 21, 1994). 41Makovsky, David. Official in Morocco to discuss phone links, The Jerusalem Post (July 4, 1994 . 42Kellerman, Aharon (1991, Ibid.) becon furthe called JeWis rates since deaf 1 appre decre Tab Gro com SOUl 25 becoming more important (see «2.4. An export-driven economy»). It further reduced the number of social calls, while declared policy has always called for increased ties between Israel and the West in general and with the Jewish Diaspora in particular. Several years ago, an international economist proposed to reduce the rates of international calls in Israel to those of domestic long-distance ones, since the cost of the infrastructure was paid off already. This proposal fell on deaf ears at that time, since the important role of telecommunications was not appreciated. However, changes have occurred in recent years, and a fast decreasing in these rates is expected for the next period. Table 3 : Communications Week International/Yankee Group Top 40 Ranking of International Carriers. A comparison between Bezeq and the East Asian Tigers. SOURCE : Communications Week International (September 20, 1993). mg Slander Int'l Change Total Int'l/Total Outgoing Revenues43 ( 199 1-92) Revenue MITT44 19 Singapore 750 + 7.9 % 1,406 53.3 % 291 Telecom 24 Korea 638 + 14 % 6,380 10 % 275 Telecom 25 Bezeq 583 + 1.1 % 1,704 34.2 % 151 30 Telekom 293 + 14 % 1,340 21 % 116 Malaysia ] Notice the weak progression of Bezeq, despite the increase in international trafi‘ic carried. This can be explained by the ongoing wave of international tariff lowering taking place in Israel. 43Revenues are in million of US Dollars. 44MI'I‘T stands for Minutes of International Telecommunications Traffic. and a count Kong‘- Figi mill SOUR lnterr net bot] inte 45L. 26 Summary In 1993, Bezeq opened direct communication channels between Israel and a number of countries, including India, South Korea, China (the two countries resumed diplomatic ties in early 1992), Taiwan, Thailand and Hong Kong“. Figure 5 : Growth of International Calls from Israel (in millions), 1987-1991. SOURCE : Israel, The Commercial and Regulatory Environment, Datapro Reports on International Telecommunications (September 1993). Note : 1991 estimated. 40] 304 20- 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 All the new facilities have greatly enhanced Bezeq's international network infrastructure and enabled it to cope with this growing demand for both incoming and outgoing international traffic. For example, the volume of international communications grew in 1993 by 14.6 %. During the same year, 45Luboshitz, Kasierer & Co (April 12, 1994, Ibid.) 910 i Thes: com: orde his bid, has 27 910 international circuits were activated to destinations around the word. These represented 219% of the company's original circuit plan for this period“. 2.1.4. Cellular Phones Bezeq began to put the infrastructure for cellular phone communications in place in 1984. The FTP also bided for a foreign partner in order to shape a joint-venture to operate the service. Motorola Corporation, the biggest cellular equipment manufacturer worldwide, eventually carried off the bid, investing $23 million in the project“. The new service used an analog- based technology and a tiny bandwidth located within the 800 MHz frequency range. Bezeq-Motorola declared 2,000 subscribers to this service at the end of 1986, and 3,600 by end-198748 — a 80% growth in one year ! Although this figure did not last the following years, this business is extremely profitable, as the market is growing by leaps and bounds. The Bezeq-Motorola Pelephone service was reported to have about 45,000 subscribers by mid-1993, and understandably are signing up new users at a frenzied pace, so the number is expected to reach 80,000 by the end of 1994. Based on models of market penetration in the West, there could be 220,000 cellular phone subscribers in 1998. Cellular revenues accounted for only 89 million New Israeli Shekels (NIS) in 1992, about 2% of the company‘s NIS 4.19 billion total ($1.71 million)”. Their contribution to profits were probably greater, as Bezeq- Motorola's infrastructure has reportedly been paid off with high user fees during the first years of the service. Bezeq also provides radio-paging in many areas of the country. 46Luboshitz, Kasierer & Co (April 12, 1994, Ibid.) 47Telecommunications in the Middle East and Southeast Asia : Israel (September 1991, Ibid) [Anonymous]. 481989 Annual International Telecommunications Statistics, Siemens AG, Germany. 49Rosenberg, David. Bezeq Laughs Last, The Jerusalem Report (August 26, 1993). Beze: previ Fig sou 28 As cellular services have recently been opened to competition, will the Bezeq/Motorola joint-venture enjoy a competitive advantage due to its previous monopoly status '? This topic will be discussed later. Figure 6 : Cellular Growth in Israel, 1987-1994. SOURCE : Bezeq Annual Reports. 70000- 60000. 500007 40000+ 30000~ 20000~ 100004 I I I 0, - I 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Nb. of Mobile Subscribers Note .' Number of subscribers on January 1 of each year. 2.1.5. Data Communication Infrastructure Bezeq presides over a national network that is the most modern of the Middle East, although it is not as sophisticated as some Western Eur0pean or North A Sifranet, based or E reached in 1991 for 64 leased . $400 a $1,800 Startei severe month ask Is the P accon Hetwc 01'] pg 64kj Beze 5031*; 29 North American networks. The backbone of Israel's national data network is Sifranet, a network of digital leased lines. Sifranet is a point-to-point network based on 250 time-division multiplexers from Ascom Timeplex Inc. Digital Leased Lines Network Sifranet, which comprises about 5,000 leased lines, has just about reached its saturation point of carrying traffic. The problem started in earnest in 1991, when Bezeq implemented an aggressive policy that lowered the prices for 64 kilobit/s digital leased lines to well below those of 19.2 kbit/s analog leased circuits. A 64 kbit/s digital leased line from Tel Aviv to Haifa now costs $400 a month ; a 19.2 kbit/s analog line between the same two cities costs $1,800 a month50. The chance to triple bandwidth while cutting costs by more than half started a customer stampede to Sifranet. As a result, the network is now severely overcrowded ; the wait for a digital leased line can now stretch to six months, and customers cannot buy anymore than 64 kbit/s of bandwidth. To help alleviate network stress, Bezeq officials say they probably will ask Israeli regulators to increase digital leased line prices. More importantly, the PT is planning a second backbone, Sifranet Bet (Sifranet B), that will accommodate 35,000 leased lines —— seven times more lines than the existing network. Bezeq is currently accepting bids for network installation. Packet Switching Network Along with Sifranet, Bezeq presides over Isranet, an X.25 network based on packet switches from Sprint Corp. Isranet offers X.25 connections at up to 64 kilobit/s, and 9.6 kilobit/s for other protocols, such as SNA. Joseph Dabbah, Bezeq's head of data communication services, claims that the company 50Braue, Joseph. Telecom in Israel : Trying Harder, Data Communications, May 1993. speed imple servi< inclut Metre in thl proje Haifa 30 planned to increase SNA speeds to 64 kbit/s and asynchronous dial-up access speeds from 2.4 kbit/s to 9.6 kbit/s51. Data Communication Experiments In addition to Sifranet Bet and the X25 upgrades, Bezeq plans to implement several new services in the next eighteen months. A frame relay service began in 1993 over Isranet. Several pilot projects are also planned, including an ISDN pilot and trials to test fiber links to the home. A Metropolitan Area Network pilot linking the main Israeli universities was also in the works for this year, with commercial services targeted for 1994. The project will be based on E3 (34 Megabit/s) fiber lines connecting Jerusalem, Haifa, and Tel Aviv. Other advanced projects include : 0 on-line information services in a joint-venture with local manufacturers Elbit and Tadiran Telecommunications, and the participation of France Télécom videotext unit Intelmatique SA ; ° experimentation of fiber to the curb to major buildings ; Hence, Bezeq is one of the few carriers implementing «high-speed copper». Until it can put fiber in the local loop, Bezeq intends to use HDSL technology to link PBXs to local exchanges52 ; 0 video—on—demand trials with Israeli cable TV companies ; ' Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) technology trials. Bezeq has already installed an Alcatel ATM switch in its public network. «The plan is to go toward ATM, but gradually», claims Amos Ron, Bezeq vice president of marketing53. 51Braue, Joseph (Ibid.) 52Laws, Malcom. Carriers to Install High Speed Copper, Communications Week International (April 11, 1994). 53Pinsky, Donne (February 21, 1994, Ibid.) (ngani used.t custon to lar transI nevvli syste 31 The digital transmission service provided by Bezeq began as the organization's entry into the competitive corporate network market. Bezeq used the advanced state of Israel's digital infrastructure and implemented a custom-designed time division multiplexing transmission network in response to large corporate needs. The efforts in this area evolved into a general transmission infrastructure for leased digital leased lines, implemented in a new high-speed, leased-line interconnect service. 2.1.6. Broadcasting and Cable TV Bezeq plans, installs, operates, and maintains Israel's broadcasting systems : ' fl : for use by the Israel Broadcasting Authority (IBA), Bezeq operates four networks : Radio 1, Radio 2, Radio 3 and the «Voice of Music» ; Radio 4 for Arabic speakers in Israel and other countries ; Radio 5 —— short wave, intended mainly for broadcasts to Jewish Communities around the world. Also, a network broadcasts on medium wave for new immigrants. ' Television : Channel One Israel TV operates on one channel daily ; part of the evening broadcasts are in Arabic. Morning are devoted to educational programming. Channel Two, the new, commercial channel, is available only in some parts of the country. Bezeq operates four of the six transmitting stations working throughout Israel. ' Cable TV : Israel has been divided into 27 concessions areas, which were awarded to operators by Ministry of Communications tenders. Bezeq builds and maintains cable TV networks as a contractor for some of the operators. Work has been completed in Tel Aviv, Givatayim, Petah Tikva, Ramat Gan, Ashkelon, Ashdod, Afulah, Upper Nazareth and other localities. capi the was fon SOI Sm BC( In: Is he Sl 32 2.2. The Building of the Israeli Telecom Infrastructure : A Contextual Explanation 2.2.1. A way to overcome the country's geogaphical isolation In its shortage of natural resources and its reliance on trained human capital, Israel presents some similarity to Japan, and in its size and location at the heart of the Middle East it is similar to Singapore. However, while Japan was able to create a prOSperity sphere that spreads on the whole Pacific Rim, and Singapore has become a regional telecommunications center, Israel is almost totally isolated from the region that surrounds it. With the exception of Cyprus and Egypt with which Israel maintains formal telecommunications, transportation and limited trade relations, there are almost no other direct contacts with other surrounding countries (though some indirect trade exists through the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Southern Lebanon). In order to maintain a modern economy, Israel has developed close economic ties with both Europe and North America. These have found their most visible expression in the orientation of exports and imports to these markets and in the evolution of a two-way tourism between «the two cores» and Israel. But these ties go even deeper. Not only are people and goods moving between the two cores and Israel, but information does so as well. For example, in 1991, according to Zecharya Mizrotski, Bezeq spokesman, Israel ranked tenth in the world in volume of incoming calls to the US, and fifth in data transmission to the US54. The United States accounted for half of the 380 million minutes international long distance calls made by 54Luxner, Larry (June 1, 1992,1bid.) Israel Israel and e the l area with cour Kell part the foci ext tell he] pri 33 Israelis in 1991, and is the largest supplier of telecom equipment to Bezeq after Israel itself55. The Jewish state also maintains a growing high-tech sector in both R&D and specialized production. Israel was, thus, one of the first countries to join the BITNET/EARN system, expanding the Internet overseas56. Moreover, Israel considers itself an integral part of Western culture in areas such as music and the arts. In addition, It maintains close relationships with the Jewish Diaspora, which is scattered mainly in major Western countries (and the former USSR)“. A longitudinal study conducted by Aharon Krellerman58 showed that the importance of the Jewish population living in a particular country was one important variable likely to increase substantially the telephone flow between Israel and this country. One last factor has to be mentioned : because it is frequently in the focus of international news coverage, the world press and media maintain a large body of representatives in Israel that may use telecommunications extensively. All these are major factors in the two way relationship between telecommunication on one hand and social and economic life on the other. They help us to understand why the building of a reliable telecommunication infrastructure has always been for Israel, given its geographical location, a primordial national interest. 55it may not be useless to recall that Israel currently receives $4 billion a year in economic and military assistance from Washington, making it the largest recipient of US aid in the World. Not surprisingly, the United States is also Israel's largest foreign sources of telecom revenues. 56Kellerman, Aharon. The diffiision of BITNET : a communication system for universities, Telecommunication Policy, 1986. 57not to mention the Israeli Diaspora : more than 400,000 Israelis are said to live abroad, mainly in the United States and France. 58Kellerman, Aharon (1991, Ibid.) we hat ways telecor (with 1 on tell mobil keep a that t In ca: comp'. the b. wars The I In th expa and brea cablr use :' than its 1 34 2.2.2. Influence of the Arab-Israeli conflict Israel has lived in a continuous state of war since its birth in 1948. As we have seen above, the main consequence has been that there are only three ways to communicate with this country : by sea, by air or by using telecommunications. The fact that the country was, and still is, surrounded with countries (with the exception of Egypt) «at war» with it, has emphasized Israel's reliance on telecommunications. The most striking example is provided by the country's general mobilization system. Israel's tiny population does not allow the government to keep a huge proportion of the work force in the military on a full time basis, so that the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) is heavily dependent on the reserve army. In case of major crisis or imminent war, it usually takes only a few hours to complete a general mobilization. Typically, the news is diffused fiom the top to the bottom using the telephone network. As we shall see, major political events in the Middle East (in particular wars) have had an important effect mainly on international communications. The 1956 Sinai War was marked by growth in both telephones and telegraphs. In the 1967 Six Days War however, telephone service was still limited so the expansion in international telecommunication traffic is more evident in telex and telegraph. It was only a year after the war, in 1968, that came a breakthrough in the telephone service with the completion of the maritime cable between Israel and France. This resulted in a 140%59 growth in telephone use in 1968 alone. High growth rate in 1973-1974 can also be related to the 1973 Yom Kippur War. After several years of stagnation, 1977 was marked by the first change in political power in Israeli history ; the new Likud administration and its liberal monetary and international trade policies created more international traffic. 59Kellerman, Aharon (1991, Ibid.) traffic hyper- a deer north. Begin' the w simple Fig: inte Mar SOUR peripl Geogr *CO 35 Interestingly, the Lebanon War had no impact in the form of increased trafic as had earlier wars. Thus, we can observe a peak in 1982, when a hyper-liberal policy, especially regarding imports was implemented, followed by a decrease in growth the following year, when the Lebanon war raged in the north. As opposed to these earlier wars though, we must recall that Menahem Begin's government tried its best, at that time, to convince both Israelis and the world that the «Peace for Galilee operation» was not a real war, but a simple «police operation». We have summarized these trends in the graph displayed next page. Figure 7 : Annual percentage growth rate for the total international telephone traffic to Israel. March 1950 — March 1985* SOURCE : Kellerman, Aharon (1991). The role of telecommunications in assisting peripherally located countries : the case of Israel, in Collapsing Time and Space : Geographical aspects of Communication and Information, London : Haepercollius Academic. 160 - 140 ‘— Aflermath of the Six Days war '20 I 1950 Sinai War 100 4 1973 Yom Kippur war Likud comes 80 - to power FrceTradc 60 - policy 40 a 20 - 0 ' - 1953 1963 1973 1983 *Computation of growth in telephone traffic are based on the number of calls (1953-1960) and number of minutes (1961-1985). I ingoing 390931 very ir seems l (comps win its incenti moder some ' are p inheri Systei uniqu can i Retu grow Was But VlSag 36 It is obvious that political events greatly influenced the quantity of ingoing and outgoing international traffic to, and from Israel. Given its geographical and political context, telecommunication has been, and still is a very important variable when talking about the Hebrew state, so that it seems nearly possible to write its history looking at the graph displayed above. As a matter of fact, the sophisticated telecommunication infrastructure (compared to its neighbors’) has given Israel a huge competitive advantage to win its various wars against the Arab countries. This has provided a big incentive for Israeli government, very much aware of this fact, to continuously modernize and improve the country's telecommunication infiastmcture. 2.2.3. Humanilnfluenc/es :ri/Ilnmiggation, migration... Jewish Diasngra To complete our contextual analysis, it is important to take into account some unique Israeli characteristics. Some of them are cultural while other ones are purely demographic data. All of them have in common the fact to be inherited from an ancient past. Interestingly, even as far as its telephone system is concerned, it is impossible to talk about Israel without recalling its unique Jewish character. The Gig of Immigration The State of Israel is predicated on the idea that any Jew in the world can get automatic citizenship there. This policy is enforced by the «Law of Return», approved by the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) in 1951. Steady immigration has built up the economy, with especially strong growth in the 19508 and 1960s. For much of the 1970s and 1980s, immigration was sparse, chiefly because the Soviet Union would not allow Jews to leave. But towards the end of 1989, Moscow ended almost all restrictions on exit visas for Jews. Figui SOIHRC Figi 8010 (1985 37 Figure 8 : Israeli Population (in millions), 1985-1993 SOURCE : Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel. 5.2. 5.1 . 5. 4.9. 4.8. 4.7.. 4.61 4.5. 4.4 4.3 , , , , , , , , 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Figure 9 : Israeli Telephone Penetration Rate, 1985-93. SOURCE : 1989 Annual International Telecommunications Statistics, Siemens AG, Germany (1985-1987) ; Bezeq, Israel Telephone Corporation (1988»1993). 40-, 35d 10‘ O I I I l I l I I i 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 consti dispa it adr 800,C year, subs of th the l ~ E estal s0 fa has new duri not rate allo the as V 6018 61L. 38 The floodgates opened, peaking in December 1990 when about 35,000 immigrants arrived in Israel and the government was forecasting that one million Russians would be coming in the next five years. The rate has since moderated to 5,000-7,000 a month. Even with the slowdown, some 470,000 immigrants reached Israel in the 1989-1992 period, and immigrants today constitute nearly 10% of the population”. This massive influx of new immigrants has compounded so far the disparity in phone service between Arabs and Jews in Israel and the territories it administers. Thus, Bezeq predicts that in the coming five years, it will install 800,000 to 1 million new telephone lines“. This represents a growth of 8% a year, as opposed to a more usual 1%-3% annual figure. From 1984 to 1988, the telephone penetration rate increased substantially. Most analysts directly relate this progression to the new status of the Israeli PTT (that is, the separation of the telephone administration from the Ministry of Postal Services and its reshaping into a state-owned company — Bezeq). However, a more comprehensive research62 would be needed to establish without any doubt this causality relationship. Let us point out that, so far, no scholar has ever proposed any alternative explanation. From 1989 until 1993, the growth in the number of main telephone lines has been boosted by the massive immigration : Bezeq has almost provided one new telephone line for each new immigrant who reached the promised land during this period ! Nevertheless, this dramatic increase in the number of main lines, does not entail a comparative increase as far as the Israeli telephone penetration rate is concerned : the population's rate of growth has remained too high to allow Bezeq's investment to catch up ; as the pace of immigration eases and the investments go on, the next years should see the penetration rate jump up as well. 60Israel .' Liberalization and Privatization (July 1993), Industrial Investor [Anonymous]. 61Luxner Larry (June 1, 1992, Ibid.) J ewisl (300,( consic' of the impor partie telepl amor signi direc need stayc com] have USI Ami the 68131 beti red~ 62F: othe 39 Links with the Jewish Diaspora Special attention should be given to the links existing between the Jewish Diaspora and Israel when talking about its telephone system. Eight to nine million Jews live in the Diaspora, mainly in the USA (6 millions), the former USSR (about 1.5 million), France (600,000) and the UK (300,000). The overwhelming majority feels strong links with Israel and consider the Jewish state as the center of their spiritual life. Moreover, many of them have some relatives living Israel. Thus, it is not surprising that the size of the Jewish Diaspora is an important variable when comparing the telephone traffic between Israel and a particular country. How could we explain, for example, the high level of telephone traffic between Israel and the former USSR since 1989 ? The amount of trade between the two countries was and remains fairly low, and no significant «Israeli colony» lives there. This increase in the traffic can be directly related to the wave of immigration from the former USSR, and the need for the new Israeli families to communicate with their relatives who stayed in Russia. The USA provide us with a similar example : the local Jewish community is the largest in the world and many of its members and institutes have strong bonds with Israel. There is also a growing Israeli community in the USA which is coupled with more extensive social ties between Israelis and Americans in general as a result of the more extensive business ties between the two countries. These ties can be channeled through the telephone especially since 1972 when satellites permitted direct telephone interaction between the Jewish state and North America. Direct dialing in Israel and reduced rates, especially in the USA, have assisted this process as well. 62For example, a comparative survey focusing on the corporatization processes in Israel and other countries where such changes took place in the 1980s. shown 5 being C: commo Becaus safest the J e the en becom Israel basis - other found Ame] Visits 165,1 perm Sovi wou Ame I__—’ 40 A study conducted by Aharon Kellerman63 for the years 1951-1988 has shown a high correlation between these two variables —— the only exception being Canada. YeridaI Emigzation from Israel «The last to leave is kindly asked to turn off the light», was a joke commonly heard in Israel during the years following the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Because after this war, it was not so patently obvious that Israel was the safest place for Jews. The sense of absolute moral superiority of the sabras, the Jews born in Israel, began to disappear. At the end of the 197 Os, looking at the emigration/immigration statistics, the Israelis realized that «America had become the greatest threat to the Zionist revolution»64. By 1988, an estimated 300,000-400,000 of the roughly 4.7 million Israelis had moved to the United States on a permanent or semi-permanent basis — with an estimated 100,000 in California alone. An estimated 100,000 other Israelis are scattered in different countries throughout Western Europe. These figures must be compared with the fact that only 50,000 of the 6 million American Jews have moved to Israel since the Jewish state was founded in 1948 — some of them having moved back since —— and only 25% of American Jews are estimated by the Israeli Ministry of Tourism to have visited Israel even once in their lives. During the 1970s, 265,000 Jews left the Soviet Union. Of those, roughly 165,000 went to Israel and 100,000 to the United States and Canada, with the percentage of those going to America rising so sharply that Israel tried to force Soviet emigrants to take direct flights from Moscow to Tel Aviv, so that it would be impossible for them to «drop out» in European transit points and go to America as refugees instead. 63Kellerman, Aharon (1991, Ibid.) 64‘Fr‘iedman, Thomas L. From Beirut to Jerusalem, Anchor Books (1990). Jeru: (1991 ever remc rum gran Sub; livir roor foot inf JET} “Pl [Gr you Isrt on} till: 88F em 41 Thomas L. Friedman, who was the New York Times’ corespondent in Jerusalem during the 1980s, recalls in his book «From Beirut to Jerusalem» (1990, Anchor Books, page 464 and 465) : «It used to be a stigma for Israelis to immigrate to America. No Israeli ever left Israel for America for good, only for "visits" —— or as one Israeli teacher remarked to me, “My sister went to New York for one year —— fifteen years ago”. No longer. In 1988, Bezeq, the Israeli national telephone company, began running a television commercial during prime time featuring an elderly Israeli grandfather sitting in front of a shabby bare desk and dialing a number. Subtitled beneath the man were the words : Netanya, Israel, 6:30 am. The screen was then given over to what appeared to be the Israeli grandfather’s children living in Los Angeles. They were seated in a comfortable, affluent-looking living room, which included a color television and an Israeli boy playing with a football in the background. Their plush surroundings were subtitled : Los Angeles, 8:30 pm. The family members then have a trans-Atlantic conversation in Hebrew. This commercial occasioned the following letter to the editor in the Jerusalem Post from one Sarah M Schachter of Jerusalem : “Sirs, I was appalled to see the new Bezeq commercial [...]. The not-so-subliminal message : [Grandpa] is still in Netanya, but Los Angeles is the land of opportunity for the young and ambitious. Emigration is indeed a major problem for the state of Israel, but I think it is in poor taste for Bezeq to legitimize and exploit this unfortunate act, and I am surprised that the editors of Israel Television included this message on the air”. The letter was followed by an editor's note which read : “This public service announcement has been discontinued following complaints that it would encourage immigration”». It goes far beyond the point of this paper to argue about Jewish emigration (or Yerida, in Hebrew, the fact of going down) from the promised land. However, this fact has some very interesting repercussions as far as Israeli telephone penetration rate is concerned. Indeed, this rate is calculated with the statistics provided by the Statistika, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. These statistics do take in account not only Israeli residents, but all Israelis, including the Yordim (emigrants). If we estimate the number of main telephone lines in Israel to 1.9 million by the end of 1993, and the population living in the country to 4.7 million inhabitants, the rate suddenly jumps up from about 36% to more than 40% ! Havin; penetr becaw and p: to In: develt marl enjoj Eon a m: and com und cap: fror COD W0] inf] the gm be; 42 Having reprocessed these data, it becomes obvious that the telephone penetration rate is actually higher in Israel than the authorities claim it to be, because recognizing the real figures would entail the opening of a possibly risky and passionate political debate about emigration. As a matter of fact, the actual Israeli telephone penetration rate seems to make the Israeli telephone system look very much like it is in most developed European countries. 324- An Export-Driven .Econonz AW): Israel‘s statist economy has given way surprisingly easily to a free market economy, given its history and the strong ideological support it long enjoyed. The mainstream of the Zionist movement had its origins in Eastern Europe socialism, and prior to the founding of the state the labor unions played a major role in forming businesses, developing property, providing medical care and creating jobs. It was natural for the government to take the lead in developing the country in the wake of the 1948 War of Independence. Faced with an underdeveloped economy battered by war, few prospects of attracting private capital and responsibility for absorbing hundreds of thousands of immigrants from Europe and the Arab world, there were practical as well as ideological considerations. In the first 25 years of Israel's existence, the statist economy worked wonders. Growth averaged around 10% annually and an industrial infrastructure was built from scratch. A private sector functioned alongside the state and labor—union sectors, but it was subject to regulations and quotas governing virtually every aspect of business. But in the mid-1970s, the system began to unravel as a severe recession followed the 1973 war. It took another ten y! goven with t the pi curre eased a wid reacl even enm terr of 2 estz tool ine 43 ten years, a period of slow growth and mounting inflation, for Israel's governments to abandon the old approach. In 1985, the government worked out an economic stabilization program with the immediate goal of bringing inflation down from its triple-digit level. But the program went much further. In the years that followed, the government eased regulations on foreign currency, pared back its role in the capital markets, reduced import quotas and eased requirements for licenses, cut taxes and price controls, and embarked on a wide-ranging privatization drive. The liberalization has been gradual and far- reaching, with the government steadily opening up new areas of the market every year. The 1980s push toward free-market economy The Israel of the 1990s is a long way from its old image of an economy enmeshed in tired socialism, isolated from the world and beset by war and terrorism. The new economy began to take shape in the 19705, with the birth of a high-tech industry nurtured outside the traditional state/labor union establishment. It really gained ground in the mid-19805 as the government took steps to stabilize the economy by putting brakes on chronic hyperinflation. The bloodletting that occurred in the aftermath cleared out a lot of inefficient industry, especially in the union-controlled business sector. The process moved a step forward with the liberalization of the capital and foreign currency markets at the end of the decade, and the beginnings of the government's privatization drive. By this time, Israeli exporters became more adept at using one of Israel's unique advantages : it is the only country in the world that enjoys free trade agreements with both Europe and the United States. The developments in Israel of the past five years have not been lost on leaders in the international business community. Direct foreign investment, negligible throughout Israel's history, has begun growing. Foreign investments tripled in 1992 compared to 1991, jumping up to $589 million in 1992 from $210 mil is plann fabricatl rI interest the mo] than a1 investo the NA compe usual] explai count: next 1 the o and i has Seve bet“ deve 44 $210 million in 1991, according to the Bank of Israel“. Intel Corp. for example, is planning a $1 billion investment to expand its Jerusalem semiconductor fabrication plant“. The Tel Aviv Stock Exchange has similarly begun attracting overseas interest. Many foreign investors are inching their way into the field by way of the more than 45 Israeli companies traded on New York stock exchange, more than any other country except Canada. During that same year 1992, foreign investors have bought for $213 millions shares of Israeli companies traded on the NASDAQ67. The importance of exports Given the tiny Israeli domestic market, Israeli companies have been compelled to find business opportunities abroad, so that goods sold in Israel usually account for only a relatively small percentage of the sales. This also explains why the trade deficit is almost down to zero, despite the fact of the country's lack of natural resources and other raw materials. We summarized these data in the graph and the table displayed on the next pages. The economic ties between Europe on one hand, the United States on the other hand have found expression in research and development activities and in the evolution of high-tech industries in Israel. The flow of information has represented more than mere business and management contracts. Several companies have leased phone lines for R&D purposes. The ties between academic communities have also been enhanced as a result of these developments. In addition, press coverage by Western media has become 65Israel .' l‘investissement étranger a triple en 1992, Le Figaro, Paris (March 1, 1993) [Anonymous]. 66Judy Siege]. Intel plans $1 billion plant, The Jerusalem Post Weekly Edition (October 21, 1993). 67Le Figaro (March 1, 1993, Ibid.) extensive of telecor W multiple and telel area is e «1 variable models ; temporc importo busines econom l percen used ft (76.9% more ‘ USA consic' 45 extensive over the years, so that much use is being made up of various forms of telecommunications We have already focused our attention on Dr. Kellerrnan's studies. Using multiple regression analysis, it has proved that in the case of Israel, exports and telecommunications go together, and that the role of telephones in this area is even more important than with respect to tourism and social ties : «In the examination of growth, exports were found to be the leading variable for 1985-1987, and this was also the case for the annual geographical models in the 19803. Exports thus proved to be of highest importance in both the temporal and the spatial distribution of telephone calls in recent years. Second in importance in both analyses were incoming tourists, who present a blend in business and pleasure visitors, so that this variable is a social as well as an economic one»68. Another study focused on communications means in a sample of 17 percent of Israel's high-tech plantsG9. It was found that the telephone is widely used for Marketing purposes to Europe (in 73.1% of the plants) and to the USA (76.9%) and less so to other parts of the world (38.5%). Telex was used even more than the telephone for international marketing, to Europe (84%), to the USA (78%) and to the rest of the world (50%). It seems that managers consider international communications crucial to their prosperity. 6i‘leellerman Aharon ; Cohen, Anat. International telecommunications as international movement, The case of Israel, 1951-1988. Telecommunications Policy (March 1992). 69Shefer D. ; Frenkel, A. The Effects of Advanced Means of Communication on the Operation and Location of High Technology in Israel (Haifa : Technion, The Samuel Neaman Institute for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology, 1986). Figur an SOURC: Jerusale L—jfldml .1! aslcnlm-I who, 46 Figure 10 : Trade Deficit and Exports In Millions of US Dollars SOURCE : Sandler, Neal (July 29, 1993). Israel's Economic Boom : Miracle or Mirage, The Jerusalem Report. Trade Deficit Exports 1000 . - 20000 800 ~ .- 18000 600 - - 16000 400 - . 14000 200 - - 12000 0 - 10000 -200 .. 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 - 8000 .400 . - 6000 -600 a _ 4000 -800 .. E 2000 -1000 J 0 —0— Deficit + Export Table 4 : Israel's Ten Top-Ranked Industrial Companies SOURCE : Dun & Bradstreet International Company Sales '92 in Percentage of millions of were fc r econor growtl under touris teleco analo goods that telec lsrae liar. polit need this mar sen con COI int 70: 001 47 This can explain why exports and international telecommunications were found so highly interrelated in Israel. As a first conclusion of this study, we could state that it is a blend of economic, political, social and technological factors that have caused the size, growth, and change in the Israeli telephone system. Telecommunication can serve as a vehicle for international understanding as long as it is accompanied by other ties such as two-way tourism and business. Viewing the very existence of international telecommunications as providing for better relations among countries would be analogous to a car moving from one country to the other without people or goods in it. An important lesson that can be learned from the Israeli experience is that distance is completely meaningless when it comes to international telecommunications. The share of the remotely located North America in Israeli traffic was larger in 1985-1986 than that of the UK, West Germany, France, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands combined. In addition to the political, social and economic conditions necessary for overcoming space, there needs to be a technologically reliable system. In Israel, the breakthrough in this regard came relatively early, in 1968, with the inauguration of the first maritime cable. A more comprehensive study could focus on the analysis of quality of service indicators70 time series in conjunction with telephone penetration rate time series. However, this limited survey shows that as far as Israel is concerned, telecommunications have undergone a fast sophistication process in recent years, through the introduction of various enhanced and data communication services. The major problems of the Israeli system are more domestic than international, namely the need to meet the demand for new lines as quickly as 70Such as call completion rate, digitization of the network, even distribution across the country, etc. possible, a old equipm 48 possible, and the need to upgrade the system which is still partially based on old equipment. CHA RES’. ISRI Labor had 1i strain the M secto forei; insu incn comj 011V go on Is 49 CHAPTER TWO RESTRUCTURING IN A FIRST WORLD CONTEXT: ISRAELI PATTERNS In July 1992, Israel entered an era of change, with the election of the Labor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, after 15 years of right-wing regime. This had ultimately brought dissatisfaction to the majority of Israelis, because of strained relationships with Washington, mismanagement of the economy and a high level of unemployment. Rabin's return to power breathed new life into the Middle East peace process and the strained US-Israeli relationship. The previous Shamir government introduced a number of measures aimed at speeding up the liberalization of the economy, encouraging the private sector, and reducing the state's participation. In the home market, greater foreign competition was encouraged by reduction in tariffs and foreign currency insurance. This, ostensibly, was designed to give indigenous industry a spur to increase its productivity and efficiency and have a more effective force to compete in export markets. As we will see, the new government basically went on with the same policy. 3.1. The recent move towards competition 3.1.1. A Push for Liberalization Bezeq, the Israeli telephone public operator, was partly privatized in late 1990. Several reasons led to this new policy. Some have to do with a general attitude of Israel's government and Israelis in general vis-a-vis private enterprise. Some are however more specifically connected to the perception Israelis had until the recent past towards their domestic telephone service. subjec' __ wh: «prote comm sever: Today natio: busin taiifi teleo effici also lllWl 119V gm 50 Having spoken several times with middle-aged Israelis about that subject, I was always told of the «good old days» —— that is, until the late 197 Os — when it was nearly impossible to obtain a telephone line in Israel without «protekzia» («connections», in Hebrew). Statistics seems to corroborate this common knowledge. Until 1984, the telephone waiting lists typically listed several thousands of people. The waiting period often averaged five years. Today, it has been cut to a matter of days and weeks. Pressures from large businesses also existed. Surprisingly, it is mainly national companies — and not the few trans—national corporations that did business in Israel — which were the most vehement in their demand for lower tariffs and better service. The Israeli large state sector was looking for a better telecommunication infrastructure in order to improve its own internal efficiency“. National firms, whose main markets were and still are abroad, also wanted to be able to compete with better served and equipped companies in world market. Under the new arrangement, Bezeq has thrived financially. The company's net profit rose 21% in 1991 to NIS 170.5 million”. And Yitzhak Kaul, a former postmaster general who took over early in 1990 as Bezeq president, said an additional one million telephone lines will be operating within ‘ four years. He did not keep his word : Bezeq installed «only» 600,000 lines during l this period, but this still is an impressive achievement. What are the political steps that have led to the implementation of this new telecommunication policy ? Is it really the success story that the government and Bezeq officials loudly claim it is ? 71Josepph Straubhaar gives other examples in his article Patterns of Liberalization and Privatization of Telecommunications in Eastern Europe and the Third World, in Telecommunications Politics : Ownership and Control of the Information Highway in Developping Countries, Forthcoming, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1995, co-edited with Bella Mody and Johannes Bauer. 72Dockser Marcus, Amy. Privatized Israel Phone Firm Prospers, The Wall Street Journal (June 30, 1992). owne into telec dissz priv off OPP' corr nat COD cor pao th: pr. pr 51 The Likud administration policy A few people contest that Israel's drive to sell off many of its state- owned companies has helped transform Bezeq from government bureaucracy into profitable enterprise. Long the target of public criticism, the national telecommunications company is now struggling to undo years of consumer dissatisfaction stemming from notorious inefficiency. Bezeq is one of the largest Israeli companies to have been partly privatized under a government program that began in 1988. At first, the sell- off of the multi-billion-dollar collection went slowly, largely because of opposition from cabinet ministers unwilling to give up power at the various companies they controlled. Fears that the sale of utilities could endanger national security, as well as opposition from workers fearing layoffs, also contributed to the delay. Yitzhak Shamir's cabinet intended to retain only a 28% stake in the company, selling the other 72% to the public and one or two «strategic partners» when it designed the privatization plan in 1990. Raphael Pinhassi, at that time Minister of Communications, loudly advocated the complete privatization of Bezeq : «I come from the business world and know that as soon as you bring in private businesses, you lower the price and increase the quality of service. That '3 why I was among the first to completely support the privatization of Bezeq and all government-owned companies»73. Off the record, he would also add that the push for «efl‘iciency» (synonym of privatization) can be partly explained «because of American pressure so that we will be eligible for more aid»74. This aspect must not be lost from sight : US aid to Israel is given in exchange of Israel's government explicit commitment to move towards a «free-market economy». Among the right-wing coalition which governed Israel from 1990 to 1992, this policy did not cause much of an ideological problem. The 73Luxner Larry (June 1, 1992, Ibid.) privat move otfere Aviv t Laboi thou; Knee mom anot own but 4 rela [thi gov 52 privatization plan was rapidly prepared — and implemented. In 1990, the first move was to sell 6% of the company to shareholders. Then another 19% was ofi‘ered. Today, 25% of Bezeq shares are in public hands and traded on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. At the end of June 1992, a few days after the victory of Yitzhak Rabin's Labor-oriented coalition in the general legislative elections, Yitzhak Kaul thought that the program would go on, regardless of the outcome of these Knesset elections. He declared to the Wall Street Journal : «We are prepared to sell another 23% of the company in the coming months. A total of 9% will go as an offer to institutional investors in Israel, and another 14% will go to a strategic partner. [...] The government is still the main owner of this company, and governments are not the best at handling businesses; but as they continue to sell their shares, we are becoming more business-oriented». Mr. Kaul also explained that «there are other issues such as employee relations, tariffs, security and equity that we must deal with before we can take [this] strategic partner. The one who has to make the final decisions is the government. They are the main shareholders». But he remained confident that by end 1992, «72% of Bezeq will be in private hands»75. Workers concerns, other brakes to change Mister Kaul had reasons to be concerned about the reactions of Bezeq's workers. Indeed, worker relations had soared Bezeq's prospect somewhat. Like their counterpart in Latin American countries, Bezeq's 10,000 employees were — and still are — generally hostile to privatizing the company. In fact, union leaders called a strike to protest a possible lowering of tariffs they believe would hurt Bezeq's overall profitability. 74Luxner Larry (June 1, 1992, Ibid.) 75Dockser Marcus, Amy (June 30, 1992, Ibid.) Th workers a will cost open the . jobs»76. Tl layoffs . Workers governn reasons better s strateg govern membe stalled compe (than: W381 [+7 53 The minister Pinhassi recognized that he was « [...] in a struggle with the workers of Bezeq. They are very angry at the idea of privatization. They feel this will cost them their jobs. 071 the other hand, they do not understand that if you open the market to competition, there will be other companies and therefore more jobs»76. The new business-like approach had many Bezeq workers fearful of layoffs as the company strives for greater efficiency and higher profits. Workers lobbied MKs (Members of the Knesset) to oppose letting the government share drop below 51%. And some critics contended with some reasons that so far, privatization has not led to lower prices for consumers or better service for the elderly, the handicapped, or the Arab minority. The company's reform efforts had been hampered in part because strategic business decisions often bogged down waiting for approval by government ministers, who retained the right to appoint four of the eleven members of Bezeq's board. Also, further sales of government shares had stalled over disputes regarding tariffs rates. Meanwhile, this did not prevent Bezeq's management to gear up for competition by adopting several priorities «to keep consumers happy». 3.1.2,,Afinew framework for Bezeq‘s privatization The new political context in Israel since June 1992 substantially changed the pace of events. Like its right-Wing predecessor, the Labor Party was committed to «liberalize the economy». Unlike the Likud, however, it had to 76Luxner Larry (June 1, 1992, Ibid.) take no linked, V C going fu argued ‘ compos to press I share i noticea ensure toward which conce] frame mono contr negor next and thro W01] rem [+7 54 take into account the powerful Histadrut, the giant labor union to whom it is linked, which wanted to put the brakes on Bezeq's privatization program. Consequently, the Israeli government decided to wait a little bit before going further into the selling process. Some guidelines needed to be prepared, argued the new communications Minister Moshe Shahal. An ad-hoc committee composed by communications ministry officials was created, with the mission to present «new licensing conditions». More important though, the government decided to retain at least its share in the company above the symbolic figure of 51%. This was the only noticeable change as compared to Likud's policy. It was a very efficient way to ensure, if not the cooperation, at least a less hostile attitude of the union towards the privatization process. In late September 1992, Moshe Shahal approved a set of guidelines which were to be applied to the sell-off. It was also the first concrete articulate conception of a telecommunication policy within the new competitive framework to come. The new licensing conditions would require Bezeq to surrender its monopoly on cellular and international phone services and relinquish some control in other sectors — changes that ministry and Bezeq officials had been negotiating for several years. The ministry would accept bids from prospective competitors over the next year, with licenses awarded and operations launched by 1994. Bezeq would retain monopoly control of public network infrastructure ‘ and basic domestic services. In some areas, Bezeq would provide services i through sister companies or subsidiaries that have yet to be created. Bezeq ‘ would keep a controlling interest in these spin-offs. Other areas to be opened for competition include installation and removal of phone lines, value-added data and information services, certain satell facsii extei pres final libe' “Pg ent sel sh to 55 satellite and microwave-based communications services, value-added facsimile, and sales of end—user equipment such as phones and PBXs77. The announcement ended two months of speculation about how extensive deregulation would ultimately be. The main conclusion drawn by the press was that the more sweeping version of the changes proposed in July as a final act by outgoing minister Raphael Pinhassi was buried. Bezeq's officials opposed Pinhassi's measures, believing that a broader liberalization plan would threaten Bezeq‘s ability to finance its current network upgrading project/8. Shahal's move also quickly ended threats of strikes by Bezeq employees, and threats of lawsuits by shareholders and by companies interested in entering the market. Finally, Bezeq received as a «gift» the treasury's permission to repay NIS 1.4 billion of its NIS 4 billion debt to the government earlier than scheduled, thereby saving NIS 160 million a year in interest payments79. We should not lose from sight that the Israeli government has been looking for huge amount of cash in order to settle new immigrants in the country. It seems to have understood that a privatized Bezeq would probably bring huge sums of money into the public treasury —— and it did : Bezeq paid dividends of $39.1 million in 199380, that is nearly 25% of the total dividends paid by all Israeli state-owned firms. 77Shuman, Joshua. Israel Moves Toward Competition, Communications Week International (October 5, 1992). 78Shuman, Joshua (October 5, 1992, Ibid.) 7i’Siegel, Judy. The Jerusalem Post Weekly Edition (September 18, 1993). 80Rosenfeld Jose. Privatization revenue soars, The Jerusalem Post Weekly Edition (April 2, 1994). telecr gram 1992 subn in at grar licer stip and tlm ser pro so] so pr B. 56 3.1.3. Bezeq gets a new operating license, Israel gets a telesenimuniqatiognglg.3 From PSTN stattus to licensee stg_tus, from service provider to irjrastructure provider Bezeq operates according to a general license for operation of telecommunication activities and for provision of telecommunication services, granted to it by virtue of the 1982 Law of Telecommunications. On July 12, 1992, the company’s general license was replaced by a new license. Bezeq submitted objections to the license, which was suspended by the minister, and in actuality never became effective. On March 1, 1994, a new license was granted in place of any other license granted to the company previously. This license specifies the conditions according to which Bezeq will operate, and stipulates, among others, that the company will continue to provide telephone and related infrastructure services (leased lines...), and that it will operate through subsidiary companies which will provide other, «enhanced-type» services. The definition of «enhanced services» is far-reaching : it includes the providing of international services, from the service level to the infrastructure level, as well as cellular services, and all types of data communications services. Management and accounting of the subsidiary companies will be separate from management of the company. It was also stipulated that provision of new services will be conditional on receiving a license ; moreover, Bezeq’s operations outside the state of Israel will be restricted. In a nutshell, from now on, Bezeq’s vocation will be from now on to provide infrastructure to other service providers, rather than to provide services by itself. The company filled an appeal to the High Court of Justice, requesting a conditional injunction and a temporary injunction ordering the deferral of this license for various reasons, including, among others, a claim for exceeding authority and for economic damage. For probably the first time in the history of telecommunications, a partly state-owned telephone company was challen shareh succee 3001M the ll! that t for al to Be consi inclu adds char rejec tar of all the 57 challenging in court its own government —— which happened to be its main shareholder! Shulamit Aloni, the outspoken Minister of Communications who succeeded to Moshe Shahal after a coalition crisis and signed the new license, accused the company management of «dishonorable behavior»81. Bezeq officials estimated the economic impairment of implementation of the license alone at about 1.5 billion dollars over the next five year, arguing that the company’s revenues from the so-called «enhanced services» accounted for about 38% of Bezeq’s revenues in 199382. The «Directors’ Report» appended to Bezeq’s 1993 Annual Report, published in May 1994, states that «{...] a considerable change in the financial position of the company may result, including a decrease in the results of its operations». Although the same report adds that «due to the wide range of unknown variables, this evaluation may change », this masked threat did not impress the Supreme Court Justices, who rejected the suit against the communications ministry83. Bezeq operations are under government supervision and most of the tariffs for its services are determined pursuant to section 15 of the 1982 Law of Telecommunications and are updated by regulations, which must be approved by the Knesset Finance Committee. Changes in tariffs are subject to the approval of the Minister of Communication and the Minister of Finance in accordance with the 1985 Law for the Stabilization of Prices of Goods and Services (temporary legislation). On December 29, 1993, the 1994 Telecommunications Regulations (Payments for Telecommunications Services Detailed in the Appendix to the Law) were passed. These regulations determine telecommunications tariffs b6ginning January 1, 1994. Pursuant to these regulations, the base tariffs 81Siegel, Judy. Era of Bezeq Monopoly ends, The Jerusalem Post Weekly Edition (March 26, 1994). 82Luboshitz, Kasierer & Co. Bezeq 1993 Annual Report, Tel Aviv (April 12, 1994). were servir tariffi Telec Telec real ' and (Red the red revr deh rad 58 were updated and the cross-subsidy between various telecommunication services was adjusted. As a result of the application of these regulations, the tariffs were reduced by an average of 5.4%. At the same date, the 1994 Telecommunications Regulations (Means of Calculation of Payments for Telecommunication Services and their Linkage) were also passed. These regulations determine principally that the company’s tariffs will be reduced in real terms, for increased efficiency factors, by 6% per year in 1994 and 1995, and by 6.5%84 after that. Pursuant to the 1994 Telecommunications Order (Reduction of Royalty Rate and Imposition of Compulsory Royalty Payment), the rate of royalties paid by the company to the Israeli Government was reduced commencing January 1, 1994 from 11% to 8% of most of Company’s revenues from telecommunication services in Israe185. However, it was determined that the royalties would also be applicable to the revenues from radio and cellular services. Privatizing Takes Time Over the past decade, since privatization became the declared goal of the government, the result is «not very impressive», claimed Bezeq Director General Yitzhak Kaul in July at the annual conference of state company directorsss. This slow process «doesn’t reflect an ideological battle, because everybody is for this policy. But there are managerial and performance difficulties that slow privatization». One of the problem that has delayed privatization at Bezeq is that a decade after the company was founded, there remain disputes over continuity of pension rights for hundreds of workers who came from the communications ministry. Staffers are opposed to the government giving up majority control of the company because they fear their work agreement would be endangered. 83Siegel Judy. Bezeq to reorganize due to new license, The Jerusalem Post (July 11, 1994). 84Luboshitz, Kasierer & Co, (April 12, 1994, Ibid.) 85Luboshitz, Kasierer & Co, (April 12, 1994, Ibid.) 86Siege], Judy. Kaul : Privatize when economy is down, The Jerusalem Post (July 25, 1994). stoppe 1995. Z the is: raise Bezeq loves worth befon on W area in th com] poss (see 0p: thr (:11 th 59 But as far as Bezeq is concerned, afier the privatization endeavour stopped for nearly two years, far-reaching new developments should be seen in 1995. For example, the Japanese bank Yamaichi proposed carrying out part of the issues for capital Bezeq had planned for 1994. Bezeq had said it wanted to raise $700 million —- half of it abroad — to invest in local infrastructures". Bezeq’s Board of Directors reviewed the offer, but finally selected the American Investment Bank Morgan Stanley to carry out the issuing of $500 million worth of the company’s shares on the American Stock Exchange88. Never before such a large—volume issuing has been carried out by an Israeli company on Wall Street. Moreover, upon complete implementation of the liberalization in the areas of international telecommunication and cellular phone services, it seems in the Government’s intention to determine the state’s vital interest in the company and the methods to accommodate those interests ; only after will it possibly decide to sell effective control of the company to a strategic investor (see also : 3.3. A Playground for Telephone Giants 7). 3.2. Finding a path to competition 3.2.1. «Fortress Bezeq» under Siege The most lucrative segments of the telecommunication market are Opening up to competition ; the users are angry, and make no ministry about their will to see dramatic changes in the way the incumbent firm treats its customers ; a never-ending legislative and legal guerrilla is taking place with the government and the communications ministry. From all sides, it seems 87Siegel, Judy. Bezeq moves to accelerate digitalization, The Jerusalem Post Weekly Edition. 88Khoresh, Hadar, «Bezeq» Tegayes Khazi Milliard Dollar BaBursa HaAmerikanit, Yediot Akharonot, Tel Aviv (August 28, 1994). that ass: SGl‘ ser bet acc 60 that Mezoudat Bezeq («Fortress Bezeq ») is finding itself more and more under assault. Many large users, dissatisfied with Bezeq service, are going to competing service providers. For exemple, Kupat Kholim Klalli, Israel’s national health insurance institution, plans to use a very small aperture satellite (VSAT) service supplied by Tel Aviv-based Gilat Communications Systems Ltd. because Bezeq cannot provide links to all of the organization’s locations, according to Menahem Daskal Kupat Kholim’s Chief Information Officer, quoted in Communications Week International”. To make things worse, in early 1994, the Ministry of Finance issued a tender for the establishment of an internal government communications system, prompting panic among Bezeq’s Board of Directors : Bezeq revenues in 1993 from the Government and the Israel Defense Forces accounted for about 7% of its total revenues. In the wake of appeals by the Ministry of Communication and Bezeq, the Ministry of Finance ordered freezing of the tender and examination of the matter, but this example shows the amount of competitive pressure the once-telecom-monopoly now faces. Hence, the company is taking dramatic steps that will make up for the erosion of revenues to come —— at least, so hope its management. Bezeq will reduce its manpower by more than 10% — or 1,250 positions — by the end of 1994, preferably by early-pension schemes that will cost the company NIS 400 million (about 135 million dollars) announced Bezeq management at the end of July 199490. Yitzhak Kaul expects that enough people will resign from Bezeq to meet the reduced manpower quota of 8,750 ; they will be induced by «very generous» compensation similar to that given to Israel Aircraft Industries retirees91. Bezeq expects the government to pay generous early—retirement costs, because elimination of the company’s monopoly in many areas has forced it to tighten its belt. 89Pinsky, Donne. Israel Forges Links, Plans Peace Cable, Communications Week International (February 21, 1994). 90Siegel Judy. Bezeq to reduce staff by more than 10%, The Jerusalem Post (July 27, 1994). chea] a yea to re royal servi inter 0116 and nun field mai 61 Since the ministry would no longer allow international calls to subsidize cheaper domestic rates, Bezeq claims that it stands to lose about $140 million a year. Bezeq says it will cut overseas rates by 40% if the government agrees to release the company from its commitment of paying the treasury 8% in royalties. If it does not agree, Bezeq will have to raise domestic rates and/or services «a popular commodity»92. The board also decided to establish two subsidiaries : one for international calls (which would have an annual turnover of NIS 1.5 billion) and one for telephone equipment, including exchanges (with a NIS 200 million turnover). This decision must be approved by the communications minister and the ministerial economics committee. From an organizational point of view, Bezeq is committed to reduce the number of its divisions, establish a business development unit and setting up field units in a number of services93. To sum things up, Bezeq plans to redeploy itself in the future along seven main directions : 1. Modification of the capital structure, so that the equity/debt ratio will be increased from 35% to about 45%, and in the wake of this, reduction of the financial leverage and a decrease in interest costs. .Reduction of the number of employees by about 1,350 until late 1997, relative to the number of employees in 1993. N 00 .Participation in communication projects overseas, in conjunction with foreign communication project managers and Israeli companies. .4; .Closure of unprofitable activities if they cannot increase in efficiency, reaching at least a break-even point. 01 . Emphasizing of Bezeq’s marketing activities. 918iegel Judy (July 27, 1994, Ibid.) 92Siegel Judy (July 27, 1994, Ibid.) 938iegel, Judy (July 11, 1994, Ibid.) sta blu 19! bit €11 th 62 6. Acceleration of digitalization with increased efficiency and reduction of purchase prices. By 1997, all of the country’s phones will be hooked up to digital switches. The company will invest over NIS 10 billion in infrastructure over the next five years ; by then, the country will have 3 million phone lines, compared with 2 million today94. Bezeq will issue a tender to a foreign company for the supply of «intelligent telephone network» technology. Local companies will not be included in the tender because they lack the necessary experience95. 7. Increased efficiency in the area of the company’s assets management” 3:23.- A practical, example 3 celLulgryhones The first real fissure in the Bezeq telecommunications monopoly has started opening. The government owned company had long been the object of blue-ribbon panels urging competition. It will see some as early as December 1994, on the cellular telephone market. A Transparent Process The government set basic technical standards for a second operator, bids were sought in September 1993, and the winner will be in business by the end of 1994. But there will be only one competitor permitted against the Motorola/Bezeq joint—venture. Israel has issued a 10-year license to operate the network, with an option for renewal for another 6 years. A slew of firm, including local companies Tadiran, Elbit and Clal, prepared proposals in the high-stakes contest. At least four major foreign companies — GTE, SouthWestern Bell, BellSouth and McCaw Cellular, the largest US cellular operator (recently bought by AT&T) — wanted to join the locals. Another coalition had taken shape : New Zealand Telecom and US firms 94Siegel Judy (July 27, 1994, Ibid.) 95Siege1 Judy (July 27, 1994, Ibid.) 96Luboshitz, Kasierer & Co, (April 12, 1994, Ibid.) Bell . local Leul corp shal part 300 sub Tell cell sigl 0W] tell 19! as CO SS CO cocomcq 63 Bell Atlantic and Cellular Communications International Inc. teamed with the locals IBM Israel, Idan and Elitech from the Formula Software Group and Leumi & Partners Investments Bankers97. A foreign company was being allowed to control up to 80% of the corporation that won the public tender in May 1994, if at least 20% of the shares were held by Israeli companies98. Moreover, shareholders in the partnerships had to prove they have a combined equity of at least $200 million. The ministry said bidding groups should also be at least 25% owned by a company that had operated a cellular telephone network with some 100,000 subscribers for at least three years”. On the incumbent side, in accordance with section 50 of the 1982 Law of Telecommunications, amended in 1992, Bezeq’s exclusivity in provision of cellular services was canceled. Thus, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the Government, Bezeq, and Motorola Ltd. whereby a jointly owned corporation will be granted a new license for operation of cellular telephone services. The license will be for a period of 10 years commencing in 1994 with the option to extend for another 6 years. The whole process of selecting the bidders was particularly transparent, as Shlomo Waxe, Ministry of Communications’ General Director —— and , Minister Aloni’s right hand — clearly stated that the winner would be the ‘ company who would commit itself to the lowest price for the best quality of service. To ensure that the bidders’ commitments would be serious and consistent, a system of penalties was set as part of the awarding mechanism. 97Shuman, Joshua. Foreign Partners for cellular networks. The Jerusalem Post Weekly Edition (December 4, 1993). 988iegel, Judy. The Jerusalem Post Weekly Edition (October 30, 1993). 9913rael Rules Set In Cellular Bids. The New York Times (November 15, 1993) [Anonymous]. Th. less-than- competiti equal bar because the seco advance because Israel ar reasons .c locate: their ( handi 1984, Capt; fleet mum 10011] 101RI 64 Limited Competition, Hyge Consequences ? The winning bidder faced a formidable opponent in Bezeq/Motorola, on a less-than-level playing field. The communications ministry has try to make competition as fair as possible. Bezeq/Motorola and the second operator will get equal bandwidth space in the SOD-megahertz range, at a premium in Israel because the army occupies so much of it. And it has rejected efforts to force the second operator into the 900-MHz range, which would have required advanced European GSM digital technology. This may seem surprising, because GSM technology would have allowed inter-country roaming between Israel and Europe. According to France Telecom’s Pierre Jandotloo, four main reasons can be given : 0 GSM privacy algorithms were considered «too safe» by the Israeli military ; 0 The price of GSM equipment remains higher than the price of TDMA American technology, which was eventually selected ; 0 The IDF did not want to relinquish the frequencies (and Mister Waxe served previously as the IDES Chief Information Officer) ; 0 «American pressures». Let us also add that, since the fiequencies given to the new entrant are located in the same range that Bezeq/Motorola’s, users will not have to junk their old phones in order to switch, so the new firm will not have a 80,000-user handicap. Bezeq will enjoy one crucial advantage. Its infrastructure, in place since 1984, has already been paid off. The second company will have to make a capital commitment of up to $100 million now101, and will not have the flexibility to woo subscribers by cutting fees. Bezeq-Motorola may lose its monopoly, but not its dominance of the market. 100Interview with the Author at France Telecom’s facilities in Paris (July 25, 1994). 101Rosenberg, David (August 26, 1993, Ibid.) ’] pressur benefit stuck V the po connec' charge does it compe banki Com} minis has a Beze only ($93 was frail the : «Be? 102' Re} 65 There is plenty of upside, however. Lower rates induced by competitive pressures will enable the market to expand rapidly. And the winning license will benefit of advanced, digital TDMA-technology, when the incumbent will still be stuck with its same creepy, analog system. The rate-cutting will come out of the pockets of the operators, because Bezeq will still have a monopoly connecting cellular phones to the regular phone network. Bezeq is obligated to charge both Bezeq-Motorola and the new firms the same rates, but nowhere does it says that the charges will be low. The old monopolist could easily come out the biggest winner of all from competition. Bypassing the Local Loop CellCom Israel, a consortium of Discount Investments, Brazilian banking brothers Moise and Joseph Safra, and the Regional Bell Operating Company BellSouth was selected in mid-May 1994 by the communications ministry to operate Israel’s second cellular phone network. The new company has already signaled its attention to provide stiff competition for Motorola and Bezeq, which have had the cellular monopoly up to now. CellCom will charge only 534 shekels ($178) per year for its service, compared to 2,800 shekels ($935) currently charged by Bezeq (the Bezeq-Motorola fee is half of what it was before the ministry announced it would have a second cellular phone franchise). Local air time will cost eight agorot (2.5 cents) per minute during the first year of use, compared to Bezeq‘s 68 agorot per minute (22.5 cents)102. The writing is on the wall : in attacking so aggressively the market, the «BellSouth consortium» wants to knock out its opponent, allowing its users to bypass Bezeq’s local loop. 102Lipschitz Sugarman, Margo (June 16, 1994). Cellular Winners, Briefing, The Jerusalem Report. C efiectiv Aviv bl propel that i appro univei aspec the St supp] urbo; phon how: 0am Bezl a is foul anI 103 P0: 66 CellCom is now looking for hundreds of qualified employees. Its license is effective for 10 years, and the new company will start offering services in Tel Aviv before the end of 1994 and throughout the country within 15 months. The Competition Stops Here I The communications ministry is far from enthusiastic about a Bezeq proposal to supply a «poor man’s cellular phone» based on CT-2 technology, that is usable only within a small radius. Bezeq applied in July for ministry approval for the proposed service. Bezeq intends to start the service within university and hospital campuses to test its technological and economic aspects. The French aerospace and avionics company Dassault, which runs the service there, has already expressed interest in cooperating with Bezeq in supplying CT—2 service in Israel. But the ministry spokesman said it «tends not to approve CT-2 for use in urban areas»103, because it would harm efforts to introduce the second cellular phone service, in which the CellCom consortium is investing hundreds of millions of dollars, as well as harm existing Pelephone service. He added, however, that the ministry would consider allowing CT-2 service within campuses and other institutional locations «if frequencies were available». Bezeq said that if it received ministry approval, it could start the service within a few months. For the same set of reasons, PCN or PCS licenses will only be awarded four or five years from now, that is, when CellCom recoups its initial investment. 103Siege], Judy (July 21, 1994). Bezeq proposes «poor man’s cellular phone», The Jerusalem Post. lit-T H?" for the paltne rankel twen’q Intern I‘GVGII this s to 0p will 1 of th wan' com] lsra look res: 009 the 67 3.2.4. The next step : opening of international voice tressnsssiqa t9. sweating!!! The special geographical situation of Israel was one of the key reasons for the high development of international telephone links with its main trade partners. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that, although Bezeq was only ranked the forty-third telecom operator in the world104, it was ranked the twenty-fifth international carrier worldwide in 1992 by Communications Week International 105. This same year, according to the same ranking, 34.2% of its revenues came from international communications. Policy makers in Israel are well aware of the strategic importance of this segment of the market, and are currently looking for policies allowing them to open it to competition, hoping that the breakdown of the Bezeq monopoly will help to drive the prices down. The rationale for opening this crucial segment of the market does not stop here, as the Ministry of Communications also wants to use competition in order to improve the global Israeli infrastructure ; compelling a new entrant to invest in a new undersea cable system between Israel and Europe is one possibility which ministry’s officials are currently looking into. Therefore, we are very clearly talking about competition at the infrastructure level, not about other «intermediary» solutions such as voice resale and/or unbundling of network and services, even though resellers can coexist with Bezeq and its future infrastructure-based competitor. This is the reason why, as part of the government's liberalization policy, the communications ministry will issue a tender for a second international dialing services operator probably during the last quarter of 1994, the license 10‘1'Seventh Annual Ranking IDATE/Télécoms Magazine, Télécoms Magazine (November 1993). 105Top 40 International Telecommunications Carriers, Comunications Week International, (September 20, 1993). winner be year. In phone rat Haba sa‘ million, a infrastru «There is added107 T commur further subsidii T assigns agreeln outgo‘m arrang telecor Teleco licens the in allian 68 winner being selected early in 1995 and in business by the end of this same year. In prevision for this new competitive framework, Bezeq international phone rates plummeted 29% on January 1, 1994106. Bezeq's Chairman Moshe Haba said the lower rates will shrink Bezeq's annual income by NIS 300 million, arguing that it will reduce the company's ability to invest in local infrastructure and purchase more expensive equipment produced locally. «There is no precedent for a 10% immediate rate cut in an efficient company», he added107. The problem of cross-subsidies is high on the agenda of the new communications minister, Shulamit Aloni, who said that she expected a further 11% cut in overseas call rates to eliminate completely the cross- subsidization. The Minister of Communication and the Minister of Finance have been assigned the responsibility for establishing rules regarding the terms of agreement between license holders and foreign entities, maximum tariffs for outgoing calls, Bezeq’s fee for service provided to other operators, and arranging tenders for other operators to provide international telecommunication services. What are the potential winners of the new license ? According to France Telecom’s Pierre Jandot108, the guess is less difficult than for the cellular license bid ; it may well be one of the three mega-consortium now emerging on the international scene : the EUNetCom-Sprint alliance, the Unisource-AT&T alliance, or BT-MCI’s new international joint-venture. 106Siege], Judy. Int'l phone rates plummet 2.9%, The Jerusalem Post Wekly Edition (January 8, 1994). 107Siegel, Judy (January 8, 1994, Ibid.) 108Interview with the Author (July 25, 1994, Ibid.) It Bezeq pr: Israel, a conseque total val Vi successf first gla °t °t ( finds 1' their dome t0 ha grou] avai] Hist< too : beca 109] 69 3.3. A playground for telephone gj ants ? It is relatively easy to understand the lust the decision to privatize Bezeq provoked. The growth rate in the telecommunication area reaches 8% in Israel, as compared to 3 or 4% in other industrialized countries. As a consequence, the last time that Bezeq's shares were sold on the market for a total value of NIS 200 million, the overall demand peaked to NIS 34 billion109! With all the major companies which present themselves as potential successful bidders for the new private Bezeq, the scene may look confusing at first glance. These companies could be put in one of the following categories : 0 those who focus their attention on the Israeli telephone company itself ; 0 those who would like to take over the companies to be created on the competitive segments of the telecommunications market, such as cellular phones, data communications, or international telecommunications ; those, finally, who under took an «all out» strategy, preparing themselves to bid for Bezeq and its future competitors at the same time ! Because so many of these telephone giants are interested in Bezeq, it finds its bargaining power enhanced. When less developed countries privatize their phone system, they do so for a variety of reasons, mainly the lack of domestic capital or local expertise. In the case of Israel, only the former seems to have had an impact. However, large national companies, banks, financial groups do exist in Israel, so we could object that domestic capital was indeed available. The trouble is, all these conglomerates are strongly linked to the Histadrut, the Labor Union, whose tremendous economic power is seen as far too important in Israel. To find a foreign strategic partner for Bezeq then became the only possible solution. 109Peretz, Dana. Israel, Eretz Mouvtakhat Lakheurot HaTikshoret Haamerikaniot. Yediot Akharonot, Tel Aviv (December 3, 1992). found «seric State newl] comp busir the c com} with 80th finai orde comj mal conl that bid get tel. 11C 70 3.3.1. Southwestern Bell strategy With Bezeq's future sell-off, American telephone giants feel they have found a good deal. The foreign company whose name was mentioned as the first «serious bidder» was the RBOC Southwestern Bell. During his trip to the United States in August 1992, where he met President Bush in Kennenbunkport, the newly elected Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin met the regional phone company's top executives. They went then to Israel, attending several business meetings with officials and high public servants from the Finance and the communications ministry, as well as with Bezeq's staff. A spokesman for Southwestern Bell confirmed in January 1993 that the company was currently negotiating a possible «joint-business partnership» with Israeli-based Clal Industries Ltd110. This Israeli conglomerate, whose activities range from manufacturing (electronics, computers, buildings) to finance and insurance business would have also like to be part of the game. In order to demonstrate its interest in Bezeq, the company recently created a new company called «ClalCom». Such an agreement with Clal would place Southwestern Bell in line to make a possibly successful bid for majority ownership of Bezeq. While confirming talks with Clal, the spokesman for Southwestern Bell declined at that time to either deny or confirm reports that his company was planning to bid for Bezeq. 9:3.2. The Long Distance Carriers also want their Diego gaming The American Long Distance Carriers AT&T, MCI and Sprint cannot get their words fast enough to hit a share of Israel's international telecommunications market. 110Mason, Charles F. SW Bell Appears Ready For Israeli Deal. Telephony (January 4, 1993). State: cable telecc signe 7 2% 1 that State bush from vent in T adv bet rec thi Ea Je' th co of —i—' 71 AT&T, MCI and Sprint share the network that links Israel to the United States. Each telephone communication between the two countries uses a cable belonging to one of the three companies : 40% of Bezeq's international telecommunications are to the USA. Although there is a unified tariff, Bezeq signed separate agreements with all of the «Big Three». AT&T accounts for 72% of the market, followed by MCI (18%) and Sprint (10%)111. We must recall that Israel ranks tenth in the world in the list of countries calling the United States, and fifth for data base consultation. Interestingly, each one of these companies now maintains similar business relationships with Israel : each one manages a telephone traffic to, or from the United States ; each one is currently in the process of creating joint- ventures with one, or several local companies ; each one recently opened offices in Tel Aviv. 333.3. The AT&T connection Among the «Big Three», AT&T could, however, enjoy a competitive advantage because of its old implantation in Israel. The first official agreement between AT&T and Israel was signed in 1950. Since then, and until a very recent period, AT&T was alone on the market. The company took advantage of this long history to sign with Bezeq an agreement to provide its very popular EasyLinkTM service“? Moreover, thousands of Americans live in Israel, and more than a million Jewish and Christian American tourists visit the Holy Land annually. With this in mind, in 1992, AT&T added Israel to its growing list of «USA Direct countries». But the service is seen as a bit of an irony. AT&T did, after all, back off from its offer to help Israel start direct service to the Arab world, after 111Peretz, Dana (December 3, 1992, Ibid.) 112EasyLinkTM is an enhanced telecommunication service providing E-Mail, EDI, and access to big commercial data bases located to the USA. thinly' the. flank} wouhl 1991 comm ditl finer «Bez sun hhfl ds< dec tar the tel C0] 11 —: i 72 thinly veiled threats from Jordan and other Arab governments to oppose the idea. Yitzhak Shamir's former communications minister Raphael Pinhassi, frankly presented the dilemma faced by AT&T managers : «The Arab countries told AT&T not to provide service to Israel, or AT&T would lose their business. AT&T had to decide»113. Nevertheless, the controversial service was reinstated in December 1991 with the help of another telephone giant, though neither the communications ministry, nor Bezeq's General Manager would say which one. Finally, AT&T, like Southwestern Bell, has chosen to position itself on all the fronts, proposing to bring its expertise and money not only in the international telecommunications area, but also in seeking the place of «Bezeq's strategic partner». 3.3.4. Confusion to rem_ai_n until late 1994 If Nynex, Southwestern Bell and AT&T's top-executives have already started to discuss with Bezeq's officials, the final decision will be made at the highest level (that is, the Prime Minister’s office). Governmental agencies will also probably be in charge of negotiations management. Before a crucial and decisive phase, domestic matter will have to be definitely settled, such as the tariffs monopoly issue — currently discussed by Israel's Supreme Court, and the capital structure of the new company. Thus, the Israeli telecommunications scene could remain confusing at least until late 1994. Everybody seems to agree on only one matter : there is no domestic company in Israel able to provide money, know-how, experience and new markets at once. 113Luxner Larry (June 1, 1992, Ibid.) CH1 TE] RE! ess Be US he 73 CHAPTER THREE TELECOMNIUNICATIONS FOR GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING : A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ISRAELI APPROACH 4.1. Regulatory Hurdles 4.1.1. Implementing Competition Liberalization Typical Problems If the balance has often shifted between left and right in Israeli politics, in the telecommunications area however, the policy direction remains essentially the same : to push competition as far as possible, without hurting Bezeq's profitability. This causes several problems which are not unknown to US and European regulators : as soon as enhanced services, and possibly some basic services, are open to competition, the traditional structure, made of average pricing and cross-subsidies, is altered. In Israel, it is the former which is the most crucial problem : the PSTN hook-up fee has traditionally been very high114. There has been a consistent endeavor, on the other hand, to put prices more and more in line with costs. If new competitors try to skim off profitable large users from Bezeq, the national telephone operator may be tempted to cross-subsidize the new competitive services with money coming from its regulated, stileonopolistic services. How can it be avoided ? A consistent framework is lacking at this point. The problem of interconnection between the incumbent's facilities and those of he new competitors must also be solved. How much will Bezeq make 114Noam, Eli. Telecommunications in Europe, Chapter 24, Oxford University Press, 1992. them p area 0 implen compe‘ Some giver. and ‘ 11am 3 cl: 00m] unti 74 them pay ? How should the level of these access charges be regulated '? In the area of international dialing services, if a good regulatory framework is implemented, adequate interconnection agreements might allow true competition to take place. Competition cannot be decreed Telecommunications scholars usually break up the telecommunication industry in three different layers : the network layer, involving facilities such has public switches, transmission equipment and network intelligence ; the basic services layer, which usually includes voice/fax communications, both local and long distance voice services, and leased lines services ; and the enhanced services layer (cellular telephony, data communications, value-added services, etc.) In which of these areas can workable competition be actually reached ? Some argue, for example, that even the local loop may be competitive in Israel, given the fact that most of the population is concentrated on the coastal plain and the Jerusalem area. Therefore, basic services tend to be defined in a narrow fashion. The new Minister of Communications, Shulamit Aloni, is confronted with a classic regulatory dilemma : regulators are unwilling to liberalize non- competitive markets ; but how is it possible to tell if a market is competitive until it has been liberalized 7 E 75 Figure 11 : Classic «Stack» Model ; Application to Israel. Local Loop Monopoly Network Facilities Reglatigg a Competitive Environment But the most worrying problem is that, as of today, it is still the government who is in charge of regulating the market. The same Ministry of Communications that owns 70% of Bezeq and appoints its Chief Executive Officer will also regulate Bezeq profits and tariffs, as well as the access charges that the new competitors are going to pay. Such a situation is notoriously unhealthy. With so much financial interest at stake, can the state be expected to behave in a fair way vis-a-vis Bezeq's competitors ? The Israeli market will probably allow a semi-private monopoly on most basic services. In those conditions, regulation will be needed in order to set fair price/profit levels (through rate of return, incentive or price-cap rate regulation). And for competitive services, regulation may be required in order to get private competitors to contribute toward the upgrading of the basic system. COUlt the indt wan D0] 76 Many solutions can be imagined. The Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, could set up a new committee to handle the regulation. But MKs115 may lack the expertise to solve the very complex problems the telecommunication industry now faces. They may also be influenced by their constituents, who will want the prices to go down, thus neglecting strategic long-term interests. That is why the most logical solution seems the creation of an «Israeli FCC». Everyone agrees that the task cannot be left to the courts : like in many other developing countries, «they are chronically overloaded and years behind their case loads, so that the judicial system might be an unlikely source of effective regulation, particularly in an area where technology and services change so quickl »115. Moreover, setting up independent commissions and committees to handle problems in which direct intervention from the state is not needed, nor desired, is already an old tradition in the Israeli political life. Another reason for such a choice is that the United States are seen as a model for many Israeli policy makers ; they are tempted to adopt what they believe is the «American Model». But the most persuasive argument is that it could clear up the dreadful atmosphere between the Ministry of Communications and Bezeq. When the Telecommunication Administration was «corporatized» in 1984, part of the old top management was hired by the ministry. For whatever set of reasons, a solid animosity developed over time between those who stayed civil servants, and those who went on to the board of the newly created company, says Daniel Charbit, Bezeq’s internal consultant for international affairs117. According to Bezeq, these ministry officials have since then tried «all the tricks they could» to undermine Bezeq’s position on the market. «They want to break us down», claims Charbit, adding that an independent commission, patterned upon the OFTEL/FCC model, could put an end to this never-ending war of attrition. He also points out the contradiction between the logic of corporatization and the rigid set of bureaucratic procedures his company has to cope with. For 115Members of the Knesset. 116Straubhaar, Joseph (Forthcoming, 1995, Ibid.) example Commitl common A1 ministry that the created of the n the job. creatior «If I cor In Tei‘ essenti betwee author lines te EOVBI'I Thus more I to ca] the n Char! PTOVi Flint 11711] 77 example, every change in tariffs has to be approved by the Knesset Finance Committee ; Bezeq is also not allowed to grant any discount on volume, as it is common practice in other countries. According to Shlomo Waxe’s Special Assistant, Avi Teitelman, the ministry is currently reviewing very seriously the matter118. Teitelman says that the creation of the commission is likely, but only because it can not be created within the framework of the communications ministry. It is the desire of the ministry to hire top consultants, university professors, policy makers for the job, and they could not be paid decently as civil servants. Thus, the creation of a separate body is the only solution remaining. He goes on saying 2 «If I could set up this committee as part of the ministry, I would definitely do it». In Teitelman’s view, the problems such a commission could solve are essentially those of access charges on one hand, and those of cross subsidies between new entrants’ different services on the other hand. It could also be the authority who draws the line between different services, at a time when these lines tend to blur. The structural level of regulation would remain in the hands of government. In Teitelman’s words, «the licenses are the terms for competition». Thus, the ministry/s vision for «an Israeli FCC» is a minimalist one : it would be more of a consultative body than a regulatory agency. The Problem of Access Charges The most burning problem Israeli regulators have to face is setting rules to calculate access charges to Bezeq’s local network, for CellCom as well as for the new international operator. In the case of the cellular market, the guidelines to calculate access charges are part of the license granted to CellCom. But it does not seem to provide a real solution, because these guidelines are in fact only general principles ; mainly, it recognizes that the conditions must be favorable to the 117Interview with the Author at Bezeq’s facilities in Jerusalem (August 11, 1994). nevv char Bea] the] PTOI acce con] thrr giv reg tan SB VE rn 78 new entrant, at least in the beginning. Bezeq is going to propose a set of access charges to the ministry, who will have to review it and accept or refuse it. Bearing in mind that access charges are what decide the level of profitability of the new entrant, the whole procedure seems awkward, as Bezeq is not likely to propose anything that could fit in its competitor’s business plan. Apparently, the ministry is now aware of the problem, and the level of access charges itself will be part of the license granted to the new international competitor. But those conditions will be set only for a short period, possibly three years, as ministry’s officials confess that they want to leave all their options open in case the market does not develop the way they think it should. Price Regulation Is price regulation the best way to regulate the market ? Avi Teitelman gives himself five years to find out. In the cellular area, Bezeq’s prices are not regulated any more, allowing it to strike back against CellCom aggressive tariff-cuts. In the international area, all cross-subsidies will soon be eliminated. What about the other services and companies ? According to the ministry, Bezeq has recently engaged in predatory pricing with its «Bezeq Card» service, patterned upon American calling cards services. By charging only a very low surcharge (about one shekel, or 25 cents), Bezeq was effectively killing all possible competition in an emerging market, asserts Avi Teitelman. As it is a new service, the ministry has barred this service to reach the market, pursuant Bezeq’s new operating license. This may preserve potential for competition, but the downside is that it can possibly hamper Bezeq’s possibility to be a true, global carrier on the international scene, offering a complete range of telecommunications services. As far as the other companies are concerned, their prices were not regulated at all, because of their small size. But the ministry will have to reconsider this position, as new entrants may also cross-subsidize unprofitable services with more cash-generating activities. This won’t be easy, because 118Interview with the Author in Jerusalem (August 16, 1994). the: 79 these joint-ventures, led by cash-rich foreign telephone companies, are going to dump their services into the Israeli market, in order to win a respectable market share as early as possible. BellSouth can afford to lose a few dozen million dollars during the next five years, but can Bezeq sustain the same amount of competitive pressure ? Line of Busing Restrictions Like in America, stringent lines of business restrictions exist in Israel. Bezeq is not allowed to carry video signals, and local cable TV companies are barred from entering the telephone market. What is the rationale for such a policy ? The biggest Israeli Banks (Bank HaPoalim, Bank Leumi, Israel Discount Bank) hold majority ownership of most Israeli cable TV companies. They are also the biggest potential investors in the country. Released of any regulatory safeguards, they could well be in a better position than Bezeq itself on the phone market, specially as far as the local loop is concerned. The ministry, as Mister Teitelman puts it, «tends to think that Bezeq is put under enough competitive pressure with the opening of the cellular and the international market». 1.1372,, Finding an Adgqlgte Role for Foreign Capital We have previously discussed the interest showed for Bezeq sell out by some of the biggest telephone companies in the world. Israeli authorities have publicly announced that they were planning to sell 15% of Bezeq's shares to a «foreign strategic partner». Why Bezeq needs a foreign partner seems a fair question to ask. First of all, even the biggest among the Israeli union- or state-owned conglomerates are probably too small to be involved in billion dollar deals like this one. And if the Labor Party-dominated Histadrut Trade Union was part of such politi com polil grou Ind] ster of 1 int W0 for pr 80 such a deal, it would inevitably raise «fears of insider deals among friends, political patronage, corruption, insider deals, etc»119. It is true to point out that foreign companies often do not hesitate to use corruption and insider deals to achieve their goals, but «they don't have the some political implications as favorable deals to already powerful national groups»120. A strong involvement of local conglomerates such as Koor or Clal Industries would be interpreted by investors as a step backward, instead of a step toward further competition and renewal of the public telephone operator. A more positive rationale for foreign involvement also exists in the mind of Israeli policy makers. Israeli authorities are very much aware of the growing integration of the Israeli economy to those of the three major trade zones in the world (the European Union, the NAFTA area and the Pacific Rim). A political consensus exists in Israel today, which favors this integration trend ; the telecommunication market appears to be one of the area in which foreign participation could enhance the chances of the growing, export-oriented, private sector to increase its competitiveness in the global economy. The specificity of the Israeli case is that, although the reasons for privatization are very typical of the industrialized world, the narrow domestic capital base is a strong incentive for foreign investment. Also, one can wonder if the potential buyers will not be scared away by the competitive framework envisioned by Israeli authorities. Paradoxically, these same American companies which advocate so loudly competition at home, will often require from foreign governments a «monopoly shelter» when they decide to invest abroad, in order to recoup their investment over a short period of time. This has often been observed in Third World countries such as Mexico, where monopoly status has been granted to Telmex when France Télécom and SouthWestern Bell took over, in exchange of firm commitments to upgrade the existing network and expand service to rural areas. But in Israel, universal 119Straubhaar, Joseph (Forthcoming, 1995, Ibid.) 120Straubhaar, Joseph (Forthcoming, 1995, Ibid.) SGI’I fore to t hai the the hit suc ho su lie to 81 service has long been achieved, and it will be very interesting to see what the foreign companies will obtain at the bargaining table. The number of companies bidding for the second cellular tender incite us to think that Bezeq will not be in a situation of weakness. Foreign investors have the ongoing peace process in mind : if it succeeds, controlling a share of the Israeli market, by far the most advanced in the Middle East, could provide them with a decisive advantage when the wave of «Global Restructuring» will hit countries like Egypt, Jordan, or the Gulf States. Will the winner have to commit itself to invest in advanced services, such as corporate broadband networks or video delivery services to Israeli households ? Interesting echoes of the American debate about the «information super highways» can already be heard in Israel. But for the moment, Bezeq’s license prohibits all kind of Cable TV/Telephone cross-ownership, and according to Avi Teitelman, it is not likely to change. Will the profits have to be reinvested locally ? This may be an option favored by Israeli policy makers, but chances are, the government would not get as much money as it could expect under such a provision. Indeed, the state of Israel will need a lot of money to integrate new immigrants from Russia, or to resettle Jewish settlers from the West Bank and the Gaza strip within Israel's pre-1967 boundaries. The money the state will get from the 25% Bezeq shares it still wishes to relinquish could help him to launch a massive construction program, or to reduce its debt. One thing is sure : when the time to choose a foreign partner comes, there will be tradeoffs between short-term budget requirements and long term considerations for the country's telecommunication infrastructure. tele rest ser 0tl pro 861‘ ca] 82 4.2. Forgjgn Influences against original Israeli Policies fliefisistiafissesatin}! By law, Bezeq is the only company to have a «general permit» for telecommunications services, although it has been a long time since there is no restrictions on the minister's granting special licenses to other for particular services. A wide-ranging license was granted to the Postal Authority in 1990. Other organizations provide telex service, data transmission, and remote data processing. The leading company is Aurec, which supplies electronic mail services in addition to other valuevadded services in partnership with Bezeq. Rival international telex service is provided by the Postal Authority, RAM Telex, which uses Bezeq's telephone and data transmission lines to capture a 25% market share121. Bezeq competes with these firms, subject to its own tariffs. The large Histadrut—controlled industrial group Koor owns a domestic value-added network known under the name of KoorNet, offering telefax, telex, and data transmission service. KoorNet also competes with Aurec and Kav Manche in Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and VANS. Moreover, former Minister of Communications in the Likud-led government, Raphael Pinhassi, literally «gave away» limited licenses to small, local companies two days before he stepped out of office in July 1992. Companies like Solan, Elron, Adir, Euronet, Intersat Business Services or Darcom have been providing since then services like Internet access, value- added services over Bezeq’s infrastructure, maintenance of private networks and PBXs, international voice «call-back» service, and so forth. The latter three even operate a satellite earth station, in competition with Bezeq. These little companies are a source of controversy today, because they claim that their license allows them to channel calls in and out of Israel directly. On the contrary, the ministry would like to step their activities 121Noam, Eli (1992, Ibid.) back marg next Teitt stan cont thee com Re} W0 re} $1 ex 83 backward, as they realize that the call-back systems do not bring any currency into the national treasury. Such unleashed competition on the margins of the international market could also scare away the new entrant next year, or improve the terms of the license in its favor. However, Avi Teitelman downplays these fears. He notices that even according to Israeli standards, the total revenues of these companies is very smalll22. Competition is therefore not entirely new in Israel. But so far, it only concerns a very tiny part of the market, and there are no indications that these «competition pioneers» will be strong contenders when the range of competitive services will broaden. 4.2.2. The Telecommunication Manufacturing w In 1991, according to the Association Of Electronics Industries Annual Report123, more than 33,000 engineers, scientific researchers and technicians worked for the domestic computer and telecommunication industry. The same report claims that each member of this population contributed for more than $1 million to the 1991 $3.3 billion revenue of these industries. Moreover, exports accounted for more than 67% of this figure. Telecommunications civil industry alone accounted for 21% of this $3.3 billion figure. With telecom military industry included, the figure was as high as 26%. In other words, the Israeli telecommunication industry alone, brought more than $760 million in revenues to Israel in 1991. Bezeq's privatization will tend to eliminate the gap between the national telephone company and Israeli private telecommunication manufacturers : as the national PTT will shy away from the administrative routine inherited from 122Interview with the Author (August 16, 1994, Ibid.) 123Danan, Arnnon. Israel : nouvelle terre promise des télécoms. Télécoms & Réseaux, Paris (January 1993). its p: GDVII' able prov the AT car an «tl «n 84 its past, Israeli authorities hope it will learn to operate in a competitive environment. As a consequence, the Israeli telecommunication infrastructure will be able to rely on the solid, competition-oriented «telecom industry/telecom service provider(s)» couple. Undoubtedly, it will be an incentive to lure foreign investors — from Asia in particular —- who used to avoid the Hebrew state. 4.2.3. American Influences Israeli policy makers often tend to compare the problems and dilemmas ahead to those faced by State Public Utilities Commissioners, the FCC, and the Congress in the United States. The Israeli press often compare Bezeq with AT&T, basically asserting that «Israel needs its Modified Final Judgment». This can seem unfair to the state monopoly, thinking about Bezeq's accomplishment during the last decade — which can be very well compared to «the great leap ahead» made by the French PTT during the 19708. Eli Noam's «network tipping» theory can help us understand this paradox124. International dialing services play the same role in Israel as long distance calling plays in the USA (what is the point of defining a domestic long distance service in a country roughly the size of New Jersey ?). The kind of unrest that exists among Israeli businesses about the high level of international rates, is very similar with the unhappiness showed by business America during the pre-breakup years. Continuing on with our Bezeq-AT&T analogy, it seems therefore logical to open this specific service to competition. We must point out, however, that nobody is advocating the breakup of Bezeq. On the contrary, authorities are fearful of any brutal change, that could, over the long run, hamper Bezeq's capacity to be a first-role player in the building and upgrading of the telephone infrastructure in the neighboring Arab countries. As Mister Teitelman points out, the difficulty is to come up with a regulatory environment adapted to a 124Noam, Eli. Telecommunications in Europe, Chapter 3, Oxford University Press, 1992. anal take oper Am: pro tha alt! lsr exi th be 85 small country (in terms of surface as well as in terms of inhabitants) that takes into account the very small size of the incumbent, as an international operator on the global, «restructured» market. There are some common points, as well, between the Israeli and the American situation as far as potential competitors for telephone service providing are concerned. Cable TV is developing at a very fast pace in Israel, so that the basic cable penetration rate can be estimated at 30% already. Therefore, it is not unrealistic to think of cable operators as a serious possible alternative for the delivery of telephone services. The Electric Company of Israel (ECI), the state-owned electricity utility monopoly, could also use its existing infrastructure for telecommunication purposes. Given the strength of these potential alternative carriers, chances are that, if competition is to go one step further in the future, it will be facilities based. As we pointed out previously, however, this won’t be on the regulatory agenda before a long time (probably not before the next decade). Israeli policy makers should not yield to the temptation of an easy comparison with the USA. In many ways, this is totally misleading. The 1984 Modified Final Judgment solved some problems, but created new ones for the next decade. Rabin government’s difficult, specific and nearly impossible challenge, is to accomplish in one year what took US. regulators ten years of work. 412.4,. Deregulation orRe-regulatiion ? The introduction of competition in the telecommunication market is often followed by a wave of deregulation measures. Joseph Straubhaar states that «deregulation has only really been pursued in advanced industrial systems, where reliance on market competition instead of regulation builds on existing infiwtruetum development»125_ 125S’craubhaar, Joseph (Forthcoming, 1995, Ibid.) ll nonethe set up a is to 1e same ti 1 as far 1 field oi impler somer seems foreig telec inde' mar SBI'V accr COII 86 If this is undoubtedly the case in Israel, a major difference exists nonetheless : Israel has not gone through the stage of regulation yet ; it has not set up a «FCC» or an «OFTEL». The challenge in front of the Israeli government is to leapfrog this stage, creating a new regulatory framework while at the same time increasing competition. Herein lies the Israeli hiatus : if Israel belongs to the industrialized world as far as the technological advance of its telephone system is concerned, in the field of regulation, it lags behind First World countries who are trying to implement greater competition. From this point of view, a comparison with some newly industrialized and third world countries, such as Korea and Mexico, seems more relevant. 4.3. Regulatory Prognoses Into the foreseeable future, it is likely that Bezeq’s new subsidiaries will gain more and more independence from their holding company, possibly with foreign partners joining them in the battle against their new competitors. They will be totally part of the successful, hyper-competitive Israeli private telecommunications sector, so that it is difficult to know what stage this independence process will actually reach. Many foreign companies will undoubtedly find their way into the Israeli market, most of them offering only a limited number of very specialized services. But even in the long run, there may be no suitable alternative to Bezeq’s access network, so that the main regulatory issue will remain, in the years to come, the setting of access charges. CHA PEE futu‘ neig inte ban cor out I6( he 87 CHAPTER FOUR INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK, MIDDLE EAST PERSPECTIVE 5.1. Making the Middle Eastern telecommunication desert bglloom The Arab-Israeli conflict even took its toll in the area of current and future telecommunications. The Israeli infrastructure could have served neighboring countries, especially Jordan, which recently developed its own international infrastructure. Instead of that , an Arab boycott, under which all Arab countries had to ban trade with Israel was decided immediately at the end of Israel's Independence war in 1948. A «Secondary Boycott» prohibited trade with companies doing business with Israel. In fact, this secondary boycott turned out to be much more harmful from the Israeli point of View, because, until very recently, it made large Trans National Corporations shy away from Israel. Right now, out of the 1,000 biggest companies in the world, only five have significant investments in Israe1126. On the other side, Israel was caught in a never-ending arms race in order to maintain its edge on the battlefield. A huge portion of the Israeli economy was built in relation to military industries ; the country devoted about 20% of its wealth to expenditures directly or remotely linked to IDF needs. 126Sandler, Neal. Best Deal Forward, The Jerusalem Report (September 9, 1993). As a c neighb about signing opport iniras count com: tele] belc Ofilt ma; $2, ec< 88 As a consequence of the state of war, the gap between Israel and its Arab neighbors widen throughout the years, but this is especially true when talking about telecommunications. In the afiermath of the White House historic signing ceremony on the thirteenth of September, can we foresee new opportunities for the development of a Middle Eastern telecommunication infrastructure ? In this regard, will the gap between Israel and the Arab countries be an asset or a handicap if peace is to be reached in the region ? 5.1.1. Major imbalances As far as telecommunications are concerned, Israel does not have large common points with the Arab countries that surround it. If the Israeli telephone penetration rate is about 40%, in the West Bank, the figure drops below 10%, and in the much poorer Gaza Strip, under 4%. In Jordan, the rate ofiicially stands slightly below 10%. But other economic indicators also show major imbalances : 0 the GDP per capita stands at about $12,000 in Israel, whereas it is about $2,000 in the West Bank and $1,000 in Jordan. This means that the Israeli economy is about twenty times «bigger» than the Palestinian one ; 0 the illiteracy rate among the population aged 15 is below 5% in Israel, whereas it stands at 20% in Jordan and 40% in the occupied territories ; 0 unemployment stands at 11% in Israel, despite mass immigration in the recent years. Moreover, the figure is decreasing. In the occupied territories, the rate is as high as 40% ; 0 life expectancy reaches 75 years in Israel, but only 65 in the West Bank ; 0 the infant mortality rate is below 10 per thousand in Israel, where it is about 30 per thousand in Jordan and slightly above 40 per thousand in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip127. 127All these statistics come from the 1988 World Bank Report. They were quoted in the French daily «Le Monde», September 14, 1993. disc1 year new worl Pale auti ten 0P1 J01 tre 89 These figures, even aggregated, only give a superficial view of the discrepancy between Israel and what might become Palestine in another five years. The Palestinian telecommunication infrastructure will have to be built nearly from scratch. However, Palestinian do enjoy some advantages : their work force is comparatively more skilled than in most Arab countries ; the Palestinian Diaspora is powerful, rich, and willing to invest in the regions under autonomy ; more important, the «international community» promised the PLO massive financial aid in the coming years, in order to ensure occupied territories taking off. When talking about Jordan, the problems are slightly different. As opposed to the PLO, King Housings regime enjoys stable institutions and the Jordanian telecommunication infrastructure, although still underdeveloped, already exists. In the aftermath of a highly probable Israeli-Jordanian Peace treaty, Israel would be in a very good situation to help modernize it. 511.2. ,EossiblePeace Dividends in t_h.e Telecommunication Area Despite the Arab boycott, economic links between Israel and the Arab countries have always existed, but only on a small scale. There are no official figures, but Gill Feiler, economist at Israel's Bar-Ilan University estimates Israeli trade with the Arabs at $400-500 million a year128 — in agricultural products and inputs like fertilizer, pharmaceuticals, and consumer products like air conditioners. Most of the goods do not require large service components. The common Israeli knowledge tends to say that «it is one thing to sell stoves, and quite another to market sophisticated telecommunications equipment». The potential is much larger than current sales. A study by Tel Aviv University's Armand Hammer Fund for Economic Cooperation in the Middle 128Rossant, John ; Sandler, Neal ; Gauch, Sarah. In the Middle East, Business May Be East good the hav pos; lsr giv lsr 90 East suggests a potential after-peace market of $2.2 billion129 a year in Israeli goods to Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, particularly in agricultural products and telecommunications equipment. With the fraying of the Arab boycott (since the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have quietly disregarded the secondary boycott), such an evolution could possibly take place in the near future. In addition to the territories, one source says that Morocco is the main area of focus for business people. Koor CEO Benny Gaon (Koor is the biggest Israeli conglomerate), who visited this country in June 1993, predicts that given the right conditions «the Middle East could become a captive market for Israeli industry»130. As for the others, Lebanon is always in the background : Egypt, the only Arab state formally at peace with Israel, is near dormant because of religious unrest there ; the Gulf is an unknown entity, and Syria and Iraq do not exist on the business map. As far as telecommunications are directly concerned, Bezeq can expect its nearly 3-year old direct dialing phone service to Arab countries to boom with the Palestinian autonomy agreement implementation. For example, Bezeq provides since August 1994 direct «official» microwave phone links with Jordan, via Ramallah (located in the West Bank) and the Allenby Bridge. During the first four days of direct phone connections between the two countries, 25,000 calls were made from Israel to Jordan131 l Bezeq has also invited Jordan to forge direct phone links with Egypt, Europe, and the US through Israel’s connection to the undersea Mediterranean fiber-optic cable. Brokering Peace, Business Week (June 14, 1993). 129Sandler, Neal (September 9, 1993, Ibid.) 130Sandler, Neal (September 9, 1993, Ibid.) 1318iegel, Judy ; Rosenfeld, Jose). Bezeq reports 25,000 calls made to Jordan in four days, The Jerusalem Post (August 11, 1994). prot com wa; pro su< cal bet wb otl 91 Thus, it seems very likely that the Arab countries, which strongly protested when this service started a few years ago, will welcome this new communication opportunity with their old enemy. As the Middle East peace talks gather momentum, a plan is underway to let Israel establish its first two-way communications links with Syria and Lebanon. Telecom operator in Israel, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria and Turkey are in discussions with project leader and equipment supplier STC plc to pave the way for installation of an undersea cable linking the five countries. But the project will proceed in its full form only if peace talks between Israel and Syria succeed. If successful, the East Mediterranean Fiber project would allow callers in Syria and Lebanon to reach Israel directly. For political reasons, calls between Israel and these countries are routed through several other countries, which Bezeq declines to identify132. Two-way communications already exist between Egypt and Israel on one hand, and between Turkey and Israel on the other hand. Several Arab countries —— the Gulf states, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon — now realized the importance of having a good telecommunication infrastructure in order to speed up the process of their national development. The Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles mentions the importance of such an infrastructure. Indeed, it advocates (Annex IV, 2. b. B. point 8.) the creation of a «Regional Economic Development Program in the field of tourism, transportation and telecommunication»133. For Israel and Arab countries communication ministers, this agreement could arrive just in time, allowing the latter to upgrade their telephone systems, while granting Israeli telecommunication companies new horizons — and markets. 132Pinsky, Donne (February 21, 1994, Ibid.) 133lsraeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles. The New York Times (September 1, 1993). L lI lawn, a Switzer‘. Singap< surreal thirteei from tl media ‘ began absorb when wides all of Nethi econc in re: that area inter 134 92 5.1-3.-...Ih_9_B_ganL<;§n_wait - -..-——u—_--—. .— ...—..— In the aftermath of the signing ceremony on the White House south lawn, a dispute took place in Israel between those who said Israel would be the Switzerland of the Middle East, and those who said Israel would be the Singapore of the Middle East. Such an argument can appear totally surrealistic. The Tel Aviv stock market took off immediately after September thirteenth, but it will take years before the Israeli economy gets real benefits from the peace agreement. Economic changes do not take place overnight. The media were swept away by similar economic euphoria when mass immigration began from the Soviet Union, totally ignoring the difficulties and the price of absorbing the immigrants. The Arab contras are not targets for Israeli exports. It is even more true when talking about telecommunication hardware and software. Despite widespread misconceptions, most Arab countries are poor. The total imports of all of them put together are about $130 billion a year134, equivalent to the Netherlands imports and much less than Italy's, France's or England's. The economy of the entire Arab world is smaller than Canada's. And at least partly in response to half a century of Arab boycott, Israel’s industry makes little that the Arab economies lack. Thus, Israel does not have much to offer them in the telecommunication area. Most Israeli export goods are expensive, produced in small quantities, and intended for sophisticated buyers. Experts agree that the most important peace dividend is probably the least tangible : an end to the outcast status that has blocked closer trade and investments links with the advanced industrial powers. There is also a widespread hope that it will enable Israel to complete its transition from an inefficient if self reliant siege economy to a full fledged member of the world's high-income technological elite. 134Caspi, Arie. The Boom Can Wait, The Jerusalem Report (October 7, 1993). of Sv possi point eng 93 While it may be too soon to positively say that «Israel can play the role of Switzerland in the Middle East», a more realistic view would be that it will possibly serve as a base for companies, who will look to Israel as an entry point in the Middle East. 5.2. Bezeq, Global Carrier ? One interesting aspect of the Israeli situation is that Bezeq is itself engaged in a global strategy, while at the same time being the target of bigger, American or European «Global Players». Bezeq operates overseas on two different planes. The simplest is offering to funnel international phone calls through Israel to and from the client country, such as Kazakhstan. The second is bidding on franchises to install lines and operate regional networks : In Hungary, Bezeq recently won a contract for 2 million lines in three regions covering an area about the size of Israe1135. On these lines, Bezeq will not only offer telephone service but also carry cable TV, something it is forbidden to do in Israel. Along the same model, Bezeq and Elbit Ltd. signed in 1993 an agreement with the company holding concession for the establishment and operation of local communication systems in Poland. Bezeq and Elbit will own 50% (in equal parts) of the venture, and the remainder will be owned by the company holding the concession (40%) and the World Bank (10%). The investment in the project, due to begin in 1994, is estimated at about $12 million, which will be financed partially by Bezeq and Elbit (about $2 million by each of the partners) and the balance by the World Bank. And Bezeq is already negotiating to build a network for up to 200,000 subscribers in another region in Poland136. The operator is bidding on similar projects in Ukraine and Russia. 135Rosenberg, David (May 19, 1994, Ibid.) 136Rosenberg, David. Bezeq in Baku, Market Place, The Jerusalem Report (May 19, 1994). cor pm 01' in‘ P! 94 In each of those cases, Bezeq signs a memorandum with the host country, sends in a team of experts to see what opportunities exist, and proposes an appropriate project. Bezeq’s decision to go international two years ago is part and parcel of wider changes going on in telecommunications in Israel and around the world. The company, once a monopoly supplier of telecommunications services, faces or will face competition in every sector of the market, including cellular, international services, data communications and selling of CPE (Customer Premises Equipment) to subscribers. It must find new opportunities or face stagnation. As the Israeli market has opened up, so has the international market. The decrepit and primitive phone systems of the old communist bloc need to be upgraded quickly, and governments are prepared to give up monopolies to get rapid access to foreign financing, advanced technology and improved services. The fact that Bezeq is not a big, established company by international standards could even be an advantage, to the extent that it shares common characteristics with the customers it is adamantly pursuing : a small country, whose telecommunication infrastructure was backward until recently, and is now advanced. «In the past five to six years, Israel has built one of the world’s most advanced telecom infrastructure from scratch, and we attract a lot of interest from developing countries who came here to see how we did it», confirms Yoav Krill, Bezeq vice-president for international afiairsl37. Many potential customers carry a high degree of risk —— Azerbaidjan is at war, the independence of Macedonia is not recognized everywhere. Bezeq claims it is taking those factors into account in costing projects : returns have to justify the risk. This is why Bezeq’s exposure in any one project is relatively small. The company’s operating license prohibits it from investing more than $100 million in all overseas projects, and more than $20 million in any one of 137Pinsky, Donne (February 21, 1994, Ibid.) 95 them138. It always work with partners — a local telephone company or another foreign firm. financing often comes from international organizations like the World Bank. So far, Bezeq has focused on Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR because that is where the first opportunities arose. But Bezeq is also eyeing the huge Chinese market and looks forward to approach Arab countries. Bezeq would like to be part of international consortia bidding to improve the telecom infrastructures of its neighbors. Because of its technical competence, the geographic proximity, and the language skills of its engineers, the Israeli company thinks it has all the assets necessary to be successful. Another solutions is for Bezeq to propose its network as a gateway to the neighboring countries. It could allow them, in the meantime, to provide services which they do not — or cannot —- provide at this time, such as data communications. As Bezeq’s Daniel Charbit puts it, «the situation is moving a lot»139. 138Rosenberg, David (May 19, 1994, Ibid.) 139Interview with the author at Bezeq’s facilities in Jerusalem (August 11, 1994). 00 priv rear 96 CONCLUSION Israel enjoys an advantage over other poorer countries who decided to privatize their public telephone operators, because it stated clearly the reasons and rationale for change : o the need for a closer integration to the world economy ; o the need to drive tariffs down, thus increasing the productivity of Israeli businesses ; o the need to speed up the implementation of new technologies ; 0 the need for a clear historical and ideological break with the «public ownership of key means of production» dogma. In the case of Israel, internal forces seem to have, first and foremost, driven the push for liberalization ; among them, the local, export-oriented, private industry and the flow of new immigrants into the country can be considered the most important factors. External factors, like foreign aid provided by the USA, or pressure from Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) seem to have played only a minor role. Also, this research tends to show that, if an improvement in the telecommunication infrastructure has occurred at the same time as the corporatization of the telephone administration (1984-1994), there is no strong evidence to show that the partial privatization of Bezeq (1988-1994-199?) accounts for much in this process. The telephone penetration curve, for example, presents a relatively linear, upward slope. At the same time, a brief survey of trends is enough to show that, in such situations, there is a need for great care in the elaboration and enforcement of regulation. If the regulatory framework is too weak, the new competitive environment would be threatened by two dangers. The first danger, for Israeli policy-makers, is market failure. It could result in the absolute dominance of the incumbent, which would drive prices up in: 30' re, S3 SE «s 97 instead of down ; or in successful «cream skimming» of Bezeq's revenues by alternative carriers, which would put the principles of universal service and access at odds with market realities. Abdala cites the «capture theory of regulation»140, which states that regulatory agencies sometimes begin «their existence with the public interest in mind», but eventually surrender «to the interests of the firms they regulate». We saw that this is not a major risk in the current Israeli situation, but the guidelines for market regulation remain far too fuzzy, particularly as far as the setting of access charges is concerned. Another problem is whether the state, as a majority shareholder, is «susceptible to such thoroughgoing change in labor, operations, technical and managerial aspects as efficiency and financial viability might require»141. Bezeq's civil servants will not necessarily become market-oriented managers ; nor will Israeli politicians stop seeing the public enterprise as a zone of control and patronage. Brain power is now more valuable than oil, and Israel has a piece of the largest proven reserve of it. Even before the Soviet immigration, Israel had more scientists and engineers per capita, and higher rates of literacy and math skills, than any other nation. Its heavily subsidized military enterprises were bound to incubate successful high-tech spin-offs, and they did : Israeli manufacturers of computers and telecommunications are exporting high- quality, well-priced products into expanding global markets. The Israelis are betting that, ten years from now, a peaceful Middle East will hopefully be one of the fastest growing areas — if not the fastest —- in the world. In this perspective, Israel is positioning itself to be a «telecommunications hub>>142 for the whole area. Israel has the technological, commercial, and human assets to create a «Singapore in the Middle East», 1“Abdala, M. A. The Regulation of newly Privatized Firms : An Illustration from Argentina, Latin American Studies Association, Los Angeles (1992). 141Straubhaar, Joseph (Spring 1993, Ibid.) 142Straubhaar, Joseph (Spring 1993, Ibid.) 98 attracting large Trans-National Corporations by giving them telecommunication «incentives» such as low tariffs, high quality of service, tolerant rules on leased lines, a broad range of digital services, etc. However, the authorities' ability to provide the regulatory framework which could bring this vision closer to reality remains to be seen. APPENDICES __f 'ffl q-CLTI APPENDIX I Table 5 : Israel Telecommunications Indicators SOURCE : «W, World Telecommunications Development Report, ITU, Geneva, 1994. Total (M) 5.2 Density (per kmz) 250 Total (B US$) 63 Per capita 1,280 1983 (k) 1,040 1992 (k) 1,845 CAGR (%) 6.6 1983 25.30 1992 35.56 CAGR 1983-1992 (%) 3.9 1983 (k) 221.0 1992(k) 13.0 CAGR 1983-1992 (%) - 27.0 Total demand (k), 1992 1,858.5 Satisfied demand (%), 1992 99.3 Waiting time (years), 1992 0.1 Total (k) 2,058 Used (%) 82.8 Automatic (%) 100.0 Digital (%) 60.4 Residential (%) 74.0 Total (k) 1,260.6 Per 100 households 91.3 Faults cleared by next working day 88.0 Unsuccessful local calls (%) ~ 0 Faults per 100 main lines per year 21.0 99 100 1988 (k) 6.3 1992 (k) 4.4 CAGR 1988-1992 (%) _ 11.2 1992 (k) 60.0 Public data networks subscribers (k), 1992 1.84 Videotex subscribers (k), 1992 2.10 Internet hosts (1993) 48 Leased circuits (k), 1992 12.48 1990 (k) 15.2 1992 (R) 36.1 CAGR 1990-1992 (%) 53.9 1983 (M Minutes) 35.7 1992 (M Minutes) 153.1 CAGR 1983-1992 (%) 17.6 Minutes per inhabitant (1992) 29.5 Minutes per subscriber (1992) 83.0 1983 (k) 7.8 1992 (1:) 10.0 CAGR 1983-1992 (%) 2.8 1983 133 1992 185 CAGR 1983-1992 (%) 3.7 Telecom revenue (M US$) 1,703.3 Net income (M US$) 142.6 Pre-tax net profit (%) 8.4 Income tax (M US$) 58.2 Profit (M US$) 84.3 Post-tax net profit (%) 5.0 Per inhabitant, 1992 (US$) 328.2 Per main line, 1992 (US$) 923.0 Per employee, 1992 (US$) 170,898 As a % of GDP (1991) 2.4 Total, 1992 (M US$) 503.9 Per inhabitant, 1992 (US$) 97.1 Lines added, 1991-1992 (k) 142.1 Per main line added, 1992 (US$) 323468 As a % of revenue, 1992 101 1988 (M US$) 297.2 1991 (M US$) 444.1 CAGR, 1988-91 (%) 14.3 1988 (M US$) 127.9 1991 (M US$) 215.0 CAGR, 1988—91 (%) 18.9 Forecast 2000 1992 35.56 Forecast 2000 47.69 Total (M US$) 1,865 Per year (M US$) 233.1 Total (R) 1,242 CAGR (%) 6.6 Smbols Used : k Thousands M Millions B Billions US$ United States dollars % Per cent CAGR Compound Annual Growth Rate Fig sou 102 APPENDIX 1[ Figure 12 : «Talkman Versus Pelephone» SOURCE : Yediot Akharonot, August 5, 1994. H llll‘E Ll! 'l‘pb‘v’ D’W‘nn nvnnu 1w: [bun - mpm ova-m: I . Db 11'1hNT1 vn'm 'Dw man: m1: Yedioth Akharonot, the largest Israeli daily, previewing the new competitive offer in the field of cellular services (8/5/1994). Fig led to: 103 APPENDIX 1]] Figure 13 : A newspaper ad ran by CellCom, the BellSouth- led Joint-Venture who won the second operating license for Cellular Services in March 1994. 1‘ “WW ’) ’//c //\/5 p we fINJ‘h .minb ’N‘D ,p nbnnnn mini 01.730 15 worm Marvin TDMA now mm *3 mm mm m N77 :nrrbuon mwpnn who: n‘oo‘nn cm: 1111’] mm mm 1m vnnm ,owmn rim rm N7) mm? him your an .1994 12mm 27-1 >199) nbinno mpbv n-mwcnip'zg cal—Ltzumsac—Lfis The Cheapest Air Time in the World YES, IT’S WORTH WAITING. BIBLIOGRAPHY ’r> i-' c—iltr.‘ .2 IO Hlf—I BIBLIOGRAPHY Interviews Pierre Jandot, International Affairs Attaché, France Télécom, July 25, 1994, Paris. Daniel Charbit, International Strategy Consultant, Bezeq, August 11, 1994, Jerusalem. 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