THES‘S l HIGAN will u @ljliflififlimm filiuinliifitl " 312 510190 This is to certify that the dissertation entitled Administration and Change in the Gezira Scheme and the Sudan 1938-1970 presented by Anthony Quinn Cheeseboro has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for PhD degreein History % MM Majo; pr7ZIsor I DateZ'l/ ’40)“? k 23 73 MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 0-12771 LIBRARY Michigan State University PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due. DATE E DATE DUE DATE DUE MSU Is An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution emana-pd ADMINISTRATION AND CHANGE IN THE GEZIRA SCHEME AND THE SUDAN: 1938 - 1970 BY Anthony Quinn Cheeseboro A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History 1993 ABSTRACT ADMINISTRATION AND CHANGE IN THE GEZIRA SCHEME AND THE SUDAN 1938-1970 BY Anthony Quinn Cheeseboro This study seeks to determine whether the Sudanese government and Gezira administration could have appreciably altered the economic decline of the scheme. Several studies prior to this have suggested that Gezira and Sudan were swept up in a wave of underdevelopment that made it impossible for the economic plans of the government to succeed. My research, which is based on archival sources, interviews, and secondary sources, points to 51 different conclusion. Political instability, appears to have been much more pivotal in the decline of the Gezira than metropolitan capitalism. This can clearly be seen in this study because the overall economic and political situation in the Sudan is examined as well as the Gezira itself. By taking note of general political instability, it became obvious that under such circumstances, any government would have a difficult time pursuing development. Copyright by Anthony Quinn Cheeseboro 1993 i . DEDICATED TO: MY PARENTS, THE LATE MASTER SERGEANT MABERIA AND ROSA NELL CHEESEBORO ii. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I hereby acknowledge the help of my mother, Mrs. Rosa Cheeseboro, and Dr. Harold Marcus, Dr. David Robinson, Dr. Darlene Clark Hine, Dr. Malik Balla, Dr. Abdel Rahman Ahmed Abdel Rahman, Dr. Sam Laki, Dr. Martin Daly, and all the other people who assisted me in any way with a special thank you to the friendly staff of the Gezira headquarters at Barakat. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction 3 . . . . . . . . . . . Literature Review 24 . . . . . . . . . . Chapter One: 1898-1930 48 . . . . . . . . . . Chapter Two: 1930-1950 The Nationalist Response to the Gezira and its Sudanization 77 . . . . . . . . . . Chapter Three: 1950—1960, Consolidation of Sudanese Control and Expansion in the Gezira 104 . . . . . . . . . . Chapter Four: 1960-1969 Gezira’s Attempts to Remake Itself 135 . . . . . . . . . . Chapter Five: The Influence of the Gezira on Later Development Plans: The Breadbasket Strategy 152 . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions 158 . . . . . . . . . . Appendices 162 . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography GEZIRA SCHEME LOCATION MAP Pump Scheme (White Nile) '-' Existing "DONG” Scheme (Blue Nae) Gezira Scheme ....... Railroads N A 32' 32' md rman O u . AULIA DAM ~———15‘ _...—- 14' Ed Dueim . ,...e??.‘29€‘}j ................. 34' 15'-'-‘ INTRODUCTION This studyy Administration and. Change in the Gezira Scheme 1938 - 1970, is an attempt to trace the development of the Gezira Scheme from the late 1930’s to the onset of the Nimieri regime. The goal of this dissertation is to determine the degree to which the people of the Sudan were able to effect the development of the Gezira once they attained independence. Many authors have tended to stress the relative weakness of the Sudanese vis a vis the international capitalist system. According to these researchers, the underdevelopment of the Gezira and Sudan was an inevitable result of the country’s dependant position in the world economy. Although I do not dispute the idea of Sudan’s weakness relative to that of the established metropolitan powers, I do believe that the reasons behind the Gezira’s and Sudan’s economic stagnation go beyond the structural weakness of the country’s economy. Specifically, I argue that political instability was the crucial factor in the Sudan’s inability to improve the quality of its economy. To a lesser degree, the fact that Sudanese were denied access to the administration of the Gezira until the end of the colonial period also played a major factor in the failure of development programs in the 1950's and 1960’s. Since the Sudanese were kept from the government and Gezira’s administration, the tenants and effendiya did not have a very clear idea of the potential or problems involved in the management of the scheme. This lack of knowledge was also exacerbated by the World War II and Korean War booms that occurred immediately prior to the drive towards independence because the unusually high prices raised the expectations of tenants and other members of the modern sector to an unrealistic degree. Because of the factors mentioned above, economic development early on became subordinated to political cleavages and group interests. During periods of parliamentary rule, battles between political parties were so intense that development of coherent economic strategy was virtually impossible. Although the military governments of Abboud and Nimieri were:able formulate logical development programs, both governments suffered from their narrow base within civil society. Therefore, Nimieri and Abboud were eventually brought down by groups who felt that their interests were ignored. In both cases, once the ndlitary governments were overthrown, their economic policies were also discarded. Once again, it must be stressed that one :must not overlook the economic disadvantages suffered by the Sudan and Gezira. However, to portray the problems of the Gezira as totally beyond the control of the Sudanese ignores the actual role played.by the Sudanese in the creation of their problems. More importantly, it denies that the Sudanese have the capacity to solve their problems in the future. Literature Review The Gezira Scheme has, over the years, attracted a significant amount of analysis and study. This is not surprising since the Gezira is by far the single largest economic entity in the Sudan. Furthermore, the Gezira and the development of the cotton trade were definitely the hallmarks of the economic policy of the Condominium era in Sudan. The Gezira has subsequently been a major influence on all succeeding governments of the independent Sudan. There is a significant amount of material on the Gezira extant. The problem is that most of the information is not historical and has not been concerned with the mechanics of the scheme’s administration. In the sixties, authors tended.to accept optimistic models of development, and sought to plan how to use modern techniques to maximize the profitability of the Gezira. During the 1970’s there was a great realization that the Gezira, and Sudan, were not progressing. The rush was then to explain why development was not taking place. It is my belief that in concentrating almost exclusively on tenants, recent researchers have implicitly stated that whatever the administration did was inconsequential. Or else, many researchers implied that the administration was almost by definition an accomplice of metropolitan capitalism. I have not attempted to refute the glaring fact of the Sudan’s economic malaise. However, I do take issue with the 4 notion that the successive administrations of the Sudan government and Gezira Board were not interested in achieving a.meaningful independence for the Sudan and the Gezira Scheme. Therefore, the focus of my study was on the administration of the Gezira. I wanted to see whether or not the administration of the Gezira made a real effort to assert the scheme’s independence, or did it just follow the plans left behind by the British. To make the above determination, it became apparent that the period to study should be approximately 1938—1970. At first I only wanted to study the period from 1950—1969 since this would have covered the time from.the establishment of the Gezira Board to the advent of the Nimieri regime. It was Nimieri who placed the Gezira under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture, and.who instituted the "Breadbasket" program. In other words, the time between 1950-1969 can be seen as the period of optimism following independence. Naturally this would have been the time when the Gezira’s administration would have been bold in trying to create a new role for the scheme. However, once I began my research, I saw that if I simply started in 1950, I would not be able to explain why nationalization and the Sudanization of the work force took the shape that it did. Therefore, I began.my study in the year 1938 when the first memoranda discussing major changes in the administration of the scheme appear. It should also be noted 5 that the final chapter discusses the Gezira and other schemes in the decade after 1970. This is done so that the reader can see the influence of Gezira policy on the country as a whole. I should also note that my approach to the subject here has been to follow the narrative approach. While this seems conservative, the reason for this method.was not political, I simply wanted.to see what the Gezira administration did.in the various situations it found itself in after independence, and I did not want to superimpose any formula which would tend to to force my research into certain conclusions. In keeping with the traditional historical approach, the sources that were used for this study are primarily printed archival documents. Once again, the emphasis of this study was the Gezira administration or management, and in order to understand these people I sought to examine the official documents that they left behind. Although these documents by no means tell the entire story, they are excellent sources for study if the objective is to understand the administrative state of mind. I should state that this project is first and foremost a history. There are two reasons for this; first, my training has been that of a historian, if I to were competently analyze anything it would be best done from a historical perspective. The second reason is that, other than a few economic history studies, there simply has been no history of the Gezira Scheme since the time of Gaitskell. I feel that the story of Gezira’s 6 management and administration in the post—colonial era deserves a human face, and the objectives of the scheme’s administration needed to examined in some detail instead of simply being regarded as the mechanical reactions to a pre- ordained theory. It is my sincere hope that I have succeeded in this endeavor. Central tO'understanding'theradministration.of theiSezira is an understanding of the total history of Sudan. Only when the entire political and economic situation of the country is comprehended, can many decisions made about the management of the Gezira be understood. Perhaps the best overall history of Sudan is A History of the Sudan (1988), by P.M. Holt and Martin Daly. This book, the first edition.of which was written by Professor Holt in 1961, offers the reader a good overview of Sudanese history, from the late nineteenth century onward. Although more specialized studies are needed for anybody doing serious research, it is difficult to imagine undertaking research on modern Sudan without consulting this book. In an attempt to establish the cultural traditions found in the Gezira region, one should start with an examination of the Funj Sultanate, the earliest centralized government known to have developed in that area. In Jay Spaulding’s The Heroic Age in Sinnar (1983), one can see how under the Funj, Islam was established in the Gezira. Also, the book describes the gradual process of Arabization that overtook the Gezira, eventually eclipsing the earlier, Nubian culture. The 7 phenomenon of Arabization is of particular importance when studying the reaction of Gezira Arabs to ethnic West Africans during the 1940’s and 1950’s. From an economic standpoint, Spaulding's work is important because it establishes that early on the Gezira was seen as a particularly fertile location in comparison to other regions of the Northern Sudan and an important area for trade. This same general story can also be seen in the R.S. O’Fahey and Jay Spaulding book, Kingdoms of the Sudan (1974). After the defeat of the Funj by the Turco—Egyptian forces of Muhammad Ali, there were several attempts to develop cash crops in the Sudan. In his book, Egypt in Sudan 1820—1881 (1959), Richard Hill notes that a Turkish governor, Mahu Bey was responsible for encouraging the cultivation of Sudanese long-staple cotton. He also introduced this cotton to Egypt. As Gaitskell and many other twentieth century observers have noted, the religious societies or tariqas are among the most important social structures of the region. A book that gives great insight into one of the most momentous religious and political events in Sudanese history is P.M. Holt’s The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898 (1958). The Ansar movement, founded by the Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad would become one of the major political forces in the Gezira and the rest of Northern Sudan. It would be especially strong among those Western Sudanese who constitute such a large portion of the Gezira’s workforce. Another important aspect of the Mahdiyya 8 period was that it witnessed large shifts in Sudan’s population which resulted in the British assuming that the North had been depopulated during that period. The period of Sudanese history following the Mahdiyya is of course the Anglo—Egyptian Condominium. Although the Condominium was theoretically a period of shared rule in Sudan, the reality was that the British controlled the country. Therefore, any study of Sudan during this period would necessarily involve a detailed examination of British rule and policy. The historian who has worked most extensively in the field of British Condominium history in Northern Sudan is Martin Daly. His British Administration and the Northern Sudan (1979) is a study of the Condominium under Sir Lee Stack. Stack’s tenure paralleled both the first fully operational years of the Gezira, and the first significant out-burst.ofznationalisnu which.resulted:hitfijsassassination. Empire on the Nile (1986) and.Imperial Sudan (1991), also by Daly, combine to form an exhaustive study of British government in Sudan during the entire Condominium period. These two books serve to draw a clear picture of how the British viewed the Sudan and the Sudanese. Fundamentally, one sees officials who were quite conscientious and well- intentioned, even though they could be paternalistic and condescending when it came to Sudanese aspirations. These traits are particularly important for this study since the SPS 9 officials could be considered de facto government members during most of this period. Although Daly’s books are quite thorough, by design they focus on the British. Naturally, in order to develop a more complete understanding of Sudan during this period, it is necessary to examine other groups involved in the Sudan. Muddathir Abdel Rahim's Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan (1969) is an excellent source for information on the development individuals and organizations dedicated to the independence of Sudan. This book concentrated on the development of nationalist organizations and political parties. In particular, Professor Muddathir described the growth of movements like the White Flag League after World War I, and the repression. of political activists after the assassination of Sir Lee Stack. Also discussed is the involvement of traditional tariqa leaders in the politics of Sudan which ultimately led to the creation of the country’s two leading political parties, the'Ummajparty of the Ansar and the Ashiqqa (NUP) which was affiliated with the Khatmiyya. Overall, Professor Muddathir’s approach to Sudanese nationalism is a fairly conservative one that emphasizes the Islamic elements of Sudanese politics. Another very useful book on Sudanese nationalism is Revolution.and.Nationalisn1in the Sudan (1976) by Mohamed.Omer Beshir. Dr. Mohamed’s study is similar to that of Muddathir Abdel Rahim's except that his work tends toward a more liberal 10 interpretation of the development of Sudanese nationalism. The Beshir book is especially useful in its sections dealing with the Graduates Congress, the first major vehicle for the concerns of the educated class or graduates. Another book of Mohamed Omer Beshir, Educational Development iJ1 the Sudan 1898—1956 (1969), is ea valuable source of information about the kind of training that the graduates received. The book outlines how education developed at Gordon College in Sudan as a way to supply the government with a civil service, and how it was subsequently curtailed once the government workers began to organize themselves politically. Also, the book describes the development of secondary schools throughout the rural areas, and the organization of agricultural education. This is particularly important to this study since many of the early Sudanese administrators, including the<3ezira’s first SudanesezManaging Director, Mekki Abbas, were products of the rural secondary and agricultural schools. In addition to studies about nationalisnu it is necessary to gauge the status of the Sudan in international politics. Although the Sudan is only mentioned fleetingly in William Roger Louis’ book, The British Empire in the Middle figs; (1984), this volume is important because it makes the point that the British regarded Sudan as inportant strategically. Specifically, they hoped to move military operations from bases in Iraq, Palestine, and Egypt to Sudan 11 since they assumed that they would be able to hold on to Sudan longer than other territories in the heartland of the Middle East. Once this strategy becomes clear, it helps to explain the form that development projects took in post World War II Sudan. John.Markakis' National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa (1990), as the name implies, is a study of political culture and society throughout the region in which the Sudan is located. Markakis’ work concentrates on the how the class interests of various groups in the Horn of Africa manifest themselves in civil conflict. In the case of Sudan, Markakis argues that the country is controlled.knraa small group of riverain Arabs, whose section of the country benefitted the most from the development policies of the British. Naturally, Markakis places the Gezira at the center of this privileged region, and its managers as members of the country's privileged elite. As for the Gezira’s tenants, he considers them to be part of the exploited masses, who have seen little or no benefit from the export-oriented policies of colonial and post-colonial regimes. Markakis’ treatment of tenants is at variance with the widely held view that even though they are producers, they still are a relatively privileged group in the Sudan. In all likelihood, Markakis simply did not take the time to get deeply into the status of the tenants because of the wide scope of his book. Still his work is useful because it helps 12 to bring the problems of the Gezira within the framework of the national political situation of the country. A national perspective is something that can be easily overlooked when one is mainly reading material dealing with Gezira. Two books that give more detailed analyses of the Gezira are Gabriel Warburg’s Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society (1978) and Peter Bechtold’s Politics in the Sudan (1976). Both of these books look at various segments of Sudanese society and how they interact with each other in the jpolitical climate: of Sudan” As the title indicates, Warburg’s book is concerned with impact of new ideologies on the Sudan. In particular, he traces the growth of mainstream nationalist organizations in Sudan, and.the development of the Communist Party. For a student of the Gezira, the Communists are of particular interest. Warburg shows that through their aggressive bargaining in favor of increased shares of profits for tenants, the Communists were able to gain positions of leadership within the tenant’s union. This influence was, however, quite limited. The Communists were never able to count (M1 the Gezira tenants in general political elections while they could depend on the support of certain large segments of the urban proletariat like the rail workers. Peter Bechtold’s book covers much the same territory as Warburg’s, except that Bechtold’s emphasis is more sociological than historical in nature. Also Bechtold's work tends to have a much wider focus than that of Warburg, since 13 it seeks to give a panoramic view of Sudanese society rather than concentrate on particular national crises as was the case with Warburg’s book. The final general volume on Sudan to be cited in this literature review is Sudan: State and Society in Crisis (1991), edited by John Voll. Although this volume is primarily concerned with developments in the Sudan over the last ten years, there is one chapter in this book that is of particular interest to this study. "Farmers and the Failure of Agribusiness in the Sudan" by Stephen Kontos demonstrates the influence of the Gezira and large schemes in general as the model for Sudan’s economic development. Using these, and other sources, I have attempted. to place the Gezira and its administration within the context of Sudanese society and politics. This literature review will also, of course, delineate sources of information about the Gezira, and it will start with a listing of primary sources. The greatest source of primary documents for this project came from the archives at Barakat, Sudan, the site of the Gezira administrative headquarters. At Barakat, there are a wide variety of documents to be examined. Files from the office of the managing director and the general manager, and files from various departments like accounting. The archives also contained files on specific topics like Sudanization and the 14 Tenant’s Strike of 1946. Finally, special reports such as development officer Taha El Jack Taha’s "Problems of Land Development in the Managil Southwest Extension in the Sudan in the Decade 1957-1967," provided a great deal of useful information about the administration of Gezira. Another archive that figured.prominently in the research for this paper was the Sudan Archive at the University of Durham in the United Kingdom. Of particular interest at this archive was the collection of memoranda written by Arthur Gaitskell, a major administrator during both the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and the early Gezira Board. Memoranda like "A Proposal for the Future of the Gezira Scheme" and “Some Notes About the Erkowit Study Camp" were very useful because they provided a more candid.picture of the opinions of Gaitskell than the one he presented in his book Gezira: A Story of Development in the Sudan (1959). Also of great importance were documents like the 1946 Five Year Plan of the Condominium government. Considering the primary documents and despite the influence of the Gezira, it is surprising that only three book—length monographs dealing with Gezira have ever been written. zumi of those three books, only tWWD are commonly available. These are Gezira: A Story of Development in the Sudan (1959), by Arthur Gaitskell, and Gezira: An Illusion of Development (1977), by Tony Barnett. While the Gezira has been the subject of numerous dissertations and theses, the great 15 majority of these have not been.published. Despite the paucity of lengthy' detailed studies, there are numerous journal articles about the Gezira. The logical place to start this part of the literature review is with Gezira: a Story of development in the Sudan by Arthur Gaitskell. This book is the single most concise and complete account of the Gezira Scheme prior to the establishment of the Gezira Board. Gaitskell was particularly well qualified to write a history of the Gezira, since he worked for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate from 1923 until 1950, and became the first managing director of the Gezira Board after the nationalization of the Gezira in 1950. He eventually retired in 1952. Incidentally, Gaitskell was a history major at Oxford’s New College and the brother of Hugh Gaitskell, a prominent Labour MP who was instrumental in the nationalization of Britain’s rail system. It is safe to say that Arthur Gaitskell generally mirrored his brother Hugh’s political temperament; he was a progressive minded liberal. However, since Arthur Gaitskell was active in Africa, he naturally had to implement his politics differently’ than rue; brother; Specifically, Gaitskell’s actions and analyses betrayed tendencies towards paternalism and ethnocentrism. Gaitskell’s account of the Gezira stresses the pioneering aspects of the scheme. That is, he emphasized the level of risk undertaken in trying to establish commercial agriculture 16 in the Sudan. Gaitskell also tended to portray the British government and SP8 officials in a very altruistic light. In other words, Gaitskell always downplayed.any profit that might have been made, and emphasized the benefits that would be derived fromta given project or policy that was pursued in the Gezira. The negative side of Gaitskell’s approach was that he almost always appeared to have a low opinion of anything that was of Sudanese origin. In particular, he always portrayed any kind of political movement as being an outside force that sought to influence innocent tenants. In this vein, he criticized the leaders of traditional religious groups as forces of backwardness and ignorance; he characterized the educated elites as distant and manipulative; and he saw tenant activists as communists. It should be kept in mind, however, who Gaitskell was and when he wrote his book. Gaitskell was a very important figure in the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, and he was later a major figure in the new Gezira Board. He was writing a history in which he had played no small part,and it should surprise no one that his report of that era was quite favorable. Although Gaitskell never outwardly confronts them, one can assume that he felt a need to criticize African militants who constantly stressed the exploitive nature of metropolitan relations with colonial regions. 17 As far as structure is concerned, Gaitskell’s work.is the only true narrative history dealing with the Gezira Scheme. The great connecting theme in the monograph is an unabashed faith in progress. The reader is left with the opinion that the Sudanese had been given a flawless blueprint that would work for the foreseeable future. No thesis could have been farther from Gaitskell's rosy forecast than that of Tony Barnett. Instead of seeing the Gezira as an example of progress with an optimistic future, Barnett instead saw the Gezira’s fundamental relationship with the industrialized world as a dependant one in which the Gezira and Sudan would always remain underdeveloped. Furthermore, Barnett felt that the Gezira had already reached the logical limits of its development and would not offer a better future to the children of current tenants. Barnett’s work concentrated on the actual tenants living in the Gezira Scheme. Barnett examined how they survived and the general quality of their lives. His approach was fundamentally sociological in that he examined the Gezira’s tenants as members of a larger societal unit. His analysis was based on the theories of Andre Gundar Frank, who espoused a theory of underdevelopment that argued that through interaction with developed economies, the economies of less developed countries were effectively trapped in a capitalist system in which they were perpetually held in check. Furthermore, Frank felt that regardless of any changes in the 18 outward appearances, i.e. from colony to independent country, the fundamental relationship of exploitation would be strong enough to survive the transition. Although Barnett’s study contained historical information aumi analysis, time primary emphasis of his study was the Gezira as he personally observed it, and how it was described to him by his informants. It would appear Barnett intended that his work be seen as a direct challenge to the development claims of Gaitskell. His emphasis on the limited options of tenants in securing credit or diversifying, definitely shows the barriers to individual initiative in the Gezira. Furthermore, his accounts of the energy invested in trying to send sons into other professions reinforces the impression that tenants felt that the Gezira Scheme would not confer a prosperous future to their children. Although it is an unpublished dissertation, Ergm Concessionaire to Shaykh (Wisconsin-Madison, 1986) by Susan Grabler provides a compelling new look at the early years of the Gezira Scheme. Grabler puts the endeavors of the early Sudan Plantation Syndicate (SPS) in time wider context of concession companies in the Sudan at the turn of the century. Grabler notes, as did Gaitskell, that the condominium was short of money during its early years, and that it was quite willing to give companies very favorable terms in the hope that they would eventually be able to develop profitable Operations. In particular, Grabler’s accounts of tax breaks and special rail prices stands in stark contrast to the 19 picture painted by Gaitskell of a struggling SPS which was barely able to make a profit. For a concise version of Grabler’s observations about the Sudan, one can consult "European Capital Exports and Concessions Policy in the Sudan 1898-1913," Northeast African Studies volume 8, numbers 2-3, 1986. As noted earlier, Gaitskell and Barnett are the only two generally accessible published monographs on the Gezira. There are, however, some books which have devoted a considerable portion.of their attention to theIGezira. Foremost among these is a volume by Peter Oesterdiekhoff and Karl Wohlmuth, T_he_ Development Perspectives of the Democratic Republic of Sudan (1983). This book concerned itself with the "Breadbasket" strategy of the Sudanese government under President Nimieri during the 1970’s. The authors examined the "Breadbasket“ strategy using the delinkage model of Samir Amin. After examining the strategy, the authors found it wanting. In essence, they felt that by trying to align Sudan’s economy with those of the oil—rich Arab states, Sudan was simply trading one master for another. Instead of trying to become a source for imports to the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, the authors instead argued that Sudan should have worked towards food self sufficiency. John Tait, :uu his article for time Oesterdiekhoff and Wohlmuth book, "The Modernization of the Colonial Mode of Production in the Gezira Scheme," dealt with the impact of the 20 "Breadbasket" strategy in the Gezira. He was concerned with the introduction of mechanized farming into the Gezira. Tait followed the thesis of B.Founou-Tchuigoua that the tenants of the scheme are de facto wage laborers. Using this argument, Tait said that the introduction.of machinery necessarily would have a negative impact on the tenants since production there had always been labor intensive. In other words, it would be inevitable that many people would be left unemployed with no viable alternative. In addition to leaving people unemployed, mechanization was also used in a questionable way. Tait cited evidence that machinery was used.on crops that benefitted from it the least, while crops that were more economically amenable to machinery were left to manual harvesting. An article that is quite useful in conjunction with Oesterdiekhoff aumi Wohlmuth it; Hussein 14. Mirghani's “The Effect of the International Monetary Crisis on Capital Inflows to the Sudan: A Preliminary Note" Africa Development number 3, 1977. This article describes the terms under which Sudan received financial assistance during the Nimieri years. More importantly, it shows how, through higher interest rates and shorter repayment periods, the attempt at reorienting Sudan's economy was almost doomed from the start. B. Founou-Tchuigoua’s article, "De Facto Wage Earners in the Gezira Scheme (Sudan)," Africa.Development number 1, 1978, made simple observations about the arrangement between the the three partners of the Gezira Scheme, government, Gezira Board, 21 and tenants, to prove that the tenants were actually wage laborers. In order to prove this point, Founou—Tchuigoua noted that the rent paid for land.in Gezira was minimal and that the government made all of the rules concerning the transaction. Additionally, he showed.that the government, with.its power to evict tenants, was definitely a superior, and not a partner. The one phenomenon that Founou—Tchuigoua found a bit contradictory was the tenant’s heavy reliance on hired labor. He was able to show that due to the sharp increase in post—war cotton prices, the social status of tenants increased, and they were able to hire labor in much greater numbers than previously. As a result, it became accepted practice for tenants to hire labor for much of their work.1 The vmnflc of Founou—Tchuigoua grew cum: the efforts of other researchers in the 1960’s who were primarily concerned with labor problems and the impact of the stabilization of cotton prices on the tenants of Gezira. Of these, D.J. Shaw is of particular note. He wrote and co—wrote two articles for the Agricultural Economics Bulletin of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. In one of his articles, "Labour Problems in the Gezira Scheme" (1964), Shaw stated that with the opening of the Managil extension, many of the agricultural laborers would soon have their own tenancies. He 1It should also be noted that other researchers like Barnett have shown that subletting tenancies also grew in popularity due to the increasing unprofitability of tenancies. Well-to-do tenants often devoted their personal time to more remunerative pursuits. 22 also feared that what appeared to lmaaa growing industrial sector would also deprive the Gezira tenants of laborers. His solution was to look into mechanization and to continue research into crop rotations so that the most effective way to handle agricultural tasks could be found. Needless to say, the findings of later researchers revealed that his concerns had not materialized. A more recent article on the subject of labor in the Gezira and related schemes is “The Formation of the Agricultural Labour Force in Sudan" by Jay O’Brien, Review of African Political Economy number 26, 1983. O’Brien’s thesis is that, during the late 1950’s, the Sudanese government consciously sided with the interests of commercial agriculture to deny farm labor its demands for more equitable treatment. It must be remembered that a significant portion of the Gezira’s farm labor consists of people of West African origin. These people were eventually controlled. by denying them citizenship rights. An article which sustains a contemporary Riverain Arab viewpoint was Issam Ahmad Hassoun’s "’Western’ Migration and Settlement in the Sudan," Sudan Notes and Records volume 33, 1952. This article, which by current standards evinces a rather bigoted tone, nevertheless gives an accurate account of the West African immigrants countries of origin, and a good description of the conditions under which they lived in Sudan. Finally, I should note Mark Duffield’s Maiurno: Capitalismland 23 Rural Life in Sudan (1981) as a more current account of Western populations in the general vicinity of the Gezira. This work describes the process of Arabization in the Western community, and the movement of the assimilated into other fields of activity. As was stated earlier, this dissertation is an attempt to place the administration of the Gezira within the wider context of Sudanese society. This literature review is a survey of the kinds of material that was used to make this analysis. Obviously, ea reliance (n1 archival eumi secondary documents has resulted in a less intimate study than many of the current works dealing with development, but, as was said earlier, the perspective provided by these sources is necessary for a balanced and more informative history of the Gezira and Sudan. CHAPTER ONE: 1898-1930 Although the word.Gezira.means "island", the region is in fact an inland penninsula created by the White and Blue Nile rivers. It begins at Khartoum where the Nile splits into its component parts, the Blue and White Niles, and stretches southward into the rainland areas south of Sennar, a distance of roughly 150 miles. From east to west, the Gezira is considerably more narrow, it is never more than forty or so miles wide. The most distinguishing feature of the Gezira is its utter flatness, but in reality the land does gently slope from.east to west. The other distinct aspect of the Gezira is the heavy clay content of its soil. These two features would prove crucial in making the Gezira an ideal sight for an irrigated agriculture project. Historical Background The Gezira, like the rest of Sudan, has had a very long and eventful history prior to the advent of the current irrigation regime. In ancient times, the Gezira was at the southern end of Nubia. During the Funj period, the Gezira became a:much.more important region. First of all, the capital of the Funj was in Sennar, the future site of the all important Sennar damn Secondly, it was during this period that the Gezira began its current function as a major agricultural center . 24 . Under the Funj, the Gezira was organized along what could best be described as feudal lines. There was a monarch, the makk or sultan, and under him there were a multiplicity of lesser nobles.1 In the Funj system of government, the peasant population was obligated to provide significant quantities of grain to both the local noble and the makk. The local nobles also maintained a system of markets or al aswag (sing. sgg)3 where goods were traded between pastoralists and farmers. It should be noted that both grain and cotton were prominent in this trade. THE TURKIYYA During the eighteenth century, the Funj Sultanate entered a period of decline brought on by the rise of Arabic culture in Sudan. This decline was finalized with the conquest, in 1820, of the Sudan by the forces of the Ottoman governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha. Muhammad Ali was an energetic, commercially minded governor, whose economic and social policies have led many scholars to consider him the founder of modern Egypt. In Sudan, his goals were not to transform the country’s political economy; instead he saw Sudan as source of slaves for his army and a region where various exotic goods and gold could be procured.3 Once Muhammad Ali’s forces were 1Jay Spaulding, The Heroic Age in Sinnar, (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1985), p.41. 2 Ibid Pg. 107. 3P.M. Holt and. Martin Daly, A History of the Sudan (London: Longman 1988), p.48. 25 ._—__—_A 26 in control of Egypt, he soon found that the slaves were not suitable for the relatively cool winters of Egypt and that the gold of old Nubia no longer existed in large quantities. This left the new Turco—Egyptian regime with tropical products such as ostrich feathers and ivory. These exotic products did prove valuable but were susceptible to fluctuations in public taste. Moreover, during the early years of the new regime, the lands from which these products came were not within the control of the government. Under such circumstances, it was quite natural for the new government to turn to a more reliable source of income, namely agriculture. After futile attempts to grow coffee and foster a wool industry, Muhammad Ali learned that cotton was grown in Sudan. He sent for a sample, whose seeds were later named after the governor of Sudan, Mahu Bey, and they went on to become the basis for the Egyptian cotton introduced during Muhammad Ali’s rule.4 However, despite several attempts to spread cotton’s cultivation, it never became a major crop in Sudan under Turco—Egyptian rule. 4Richard Hill, Egypt in the Sudan 1820—1881, (London: Oxford University Press 1959), p.52. 27 THE MAHDIYYA In the year 1885, Muhammad.Ahmadq who declared himself to be the Mahdi, or rightly guided one, led a movement that succeded in overthrowing the Turco-Egyptian regime in Sudan. After gaining power, the Mahdi and his successor, the Khalifa Abdallahi, were unable to make major inroads into international markets. The Gezira, however, continued to be a major producer of grain, and provided its share of the zakat, or tithe, to the central treasury in kind.5 THE CONDOMINIUM In 1898, Egyptian and British troops under Sir Herbert Kitchener defeated the forces of the Khalifa Abdallahi and destroyed the Mahdist State. The victorious troops did not reinstall the old Turco—Egyptian regime, instead forming axmam government. This government was called the condominium, so named because it was composed of the two victorious parties, or co—domini, Britain and Egypt. LegalLy, the Condominium Agreement of 1899 recognized the pre—existing sovereignty of Egypt over the Sudan but also gave Britain the right to rule there as a result of conquest.6 The British agreed to this type of government for a number of reasons. First, by recognizing Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan, London avoided the problems of great power rivalry 5P.M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881—1898, (Oxford: London 1958), pp. 109—112. 6Ibid, p.118. 28 that would have developed had Britain directly annexed Sudan. Moreover, the condominium gave the Foreign Office the kind of control it would have had if Sudan had been a formal part of the British empire. London’s primacy was clearly demonstrated in the administration that was created in the Condominium agreement. Sudan fell under the control of a military officer who was known as the governor-general, who enjoyed total legislative and.administrative control. Although.formally appointed by the Khedive of Egypt, the governor-general was always a British officer recommended by the government in London. The country was divided into provinces much the same way it had been under the Turco-Egyptian regimmn7 At first all of the governors were from military backgrounds, but after martial law was relaxed in 1926 civilian. governors were introduced. Beneath the governors were junior British officers known as inspectors. The Europeans who controlled the administration and army were assisted by Egyptian soldiers and civilians. To help maintain control over the population, the new government allowed Shari’a (Muslim) law to stand in regards to personal status. Only the criminal code was westernized.8 Shari’a law was administered by Muslim judges LQQQA), most of whom were Sudanese. In addition, the Condominium developed a 7Muddathir ’Abdel Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan,(Khartoum: University Press, 1986), p. 41. 8Ibid, p. 40. 29 class of Sudanese civil servants who did most of the clerical and minor administrative work. These men were trained at Gordon Memorial College in Khartoum which was founded in 1902, in addition to familiarizing the students with English and other basic skills, the schools had a heavy vocational emphasis, teaching skills such as carpentry and education.9 Gordon College was ran by the country's first director of education, Sir James Currie. As Muddathir Abdel Rahim comments, contrary to its title, Gordon College was in reality a primary level school which was designed to teach its students only the rudiments of Western education.lo Nevertheless, the training they received and the government positions they held differentiated them from the general population. They were therefore commonly referred to as the effendiya, a term of Turkish origin which originally signified literacy. THE SUDAN’S ECONOMIC CLIMATE AND CONCESSIONS To support the administration, the new government obviously needed substantial revenues. The problem was that the Sudan was unable to generate the level of revenue needed during the early years of Condominium rule. Because of the 9Ahmed Abu Sin, The Development of the Civil Service in the Republic of the Sudan 1899-1961 (Khartoum: Institute of Public Administration Republic of the Sudan Khartoum 1968), p.33. 10’Abdel Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism, p.40. 30 violent and.brutal campaign that had been necessary to conquer the Mahdiyya, the government was hesitant to tax the people too heavily for fear that it might provoke a rebellion. It should be noted that these fears were justified since the government did have to put down a number of revolts during its early years. As a result of this situation, the Condominium was reluctant to collect taxes. For example, in 1900, the government was only to raise £E156,000 (Egyptian Pounds) in 1 To make taxes (approx. $550,000) from the entire country.1 up for this lack of money, the Condominium was constantly forced to borrow from the Egyptian treasury. Naturally, this was a situation with which nobody was happy. In the minds of the Sudan’s administrators, the most obvious way to solve the financial problems of the country was to develop exports. The government of Sudan was receptive, therefore, to the idea of foreign investment in agriculture. Susan Grabler, in her article, "European Capital Exports and Concessions Policy in the Sudan 1898—1913," argues that during the period before World War I, the Condominium was convinced that the only way to develop Sudan was to make land available to foreign development concerns.12 The Condominium consequently granted concessions to»a:number of companies, one of ‘which. was the Sudan Plantations Syndicate (SPS), the 11Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan, p.125. 12Susan Grabler, "European Capital Exports and the Concessions Policy in.the Sudan, 1898—1913," Northeast.African Studies Vol. 8, No. 2—3, 1986. 31 company that would eventually manage the Gezira Scheme. SPS was founded in 1904 by an American named Leigh Hunt. In 1906, he contracted a number of African—Americans, who were experienced in cotton farming, to run a pump scheme at Zeidab, in Sudan's Northern Province.13 Regretablly the Americans were unable to adjust to the conditions in Sudan, and Hunt turned to Upper Egyptians and later Sudanese. By 1907, Zeidab began to yield some impressive harvests, but the scheme was not profitable because of the high cost of labor.14 In response, the SPS introduced a tenancy agreement that was based on the payment of annual rents in return for the chance to grow crops on SPS land. This system proved to be much more successful than the direct hiring of labor, at least during good years, even if the system proved problematic during poor years because of the high rate of defaults.15 FOUNDATION AND EARLY ACTIVITY IN GEZIRA The idea for the Sennar Dam, the source of Gezira’s water, had its origin with the hydrographic survey carried out by Sir William Garstin between the years 1899—1904. In 1904, he reported that the Blue Nile could support a dam in the area around Sennar which could be used to irrigate the Gezira. 13Arthur Gaitskell, Gezira: A Story of Development in the Sudan (London: Faber & Faber 1959), p.51. 14John James O’Brien, "Agricultural Labor and Development in Sudan" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1981), p.64. 15O’Brien, "Agricultural Labor and Development" p.67. 32 Given the Sudan government’s favorable attitude towards agricultural schemes, it took little effort to get the Condominium behind the idea of a dam at Sennar. The problem was one of financing. Building a dam.would be a costly public works project, and it was scarcely something that the Condominiumi could. afford» The (only"way' to surmount this obstacle would be to secure funding from.abroad. Fortunately, the Condominium had a powerful ally in England, the British Cotton Growers Association (BCGA). As Tony Barnett notes in Gezira: An Illusion of Development (1977), Britain found itself being forced out of the low end of the textile market during the early years of the twentieth century. The response of British industry to this situation was to concentrate on the higher quality portion of the textile market. To do this, the British needed to have large quantities of long—staple cotton instead of the shorter staple American cotton. The increased demand for long staple cotton meant that Egypt could no longer supply British needs. The BCGA reacted. by lobbying Parliament for the expansion of cotton cultivation within the empire. Naturally, the BCGA found the idea of the Gezira attractive, and.began to campaign for the idea in Parliament. BCGA, SP8, and the GOVERNMENT In its attempt to become more active in Sudanese agriculture, the BCGA bought SPS shares in 1911. The SPS was still involved in the scheme at Zeidab. As mentioned before, 33 the main problem at Zeidab and other projects was how to profitably engage a workforce.16 Regardless of the problems that the SPS was experiencing at Zeidab, it was still interested in the diversification of its operations. Because of SPS’ experience in Sudan, and its connections in influential circles in London, it was able to receive the contract to manage the Gezira, beginning with a pilot scheme in Tayiba. In much.of the older literature about the Gezira, a great deal is made of the partnership between the government, SP8, and the tenants. This is especially true when discussion centers on the contractual relations between the SP8 and government. It would. appear that these assumptions were influenced by the work of Arthur Gaitskell, whose description of the contract and its stipulations leaves readers with the impression of a fair agreement that spread the burden between all parties equitably. The agreement as described.by achieve social. development, two Ibodies *were established. First was the Social Development Committee, which was composed of Gezira Board members. Second was the Gezira Local Committee, consisting of tenants and local officials and chaired.by the Governor of the Blue Nile Province. It reported to the Social Development Committee,:making recommendations as to where funds should be spent. The Ordinance mandated that a minimmmlof £E60,000 of the Gezira Board’s profits be set aside for development. This amount could increase to £E250,000, depending on the level of profit recorded.by the Scheme during 49The rest of the following paragraph is based on Gaitskell, Gezira, pp.250—251. “ It should be noted that the Gezira remained under the Finance Ministry after nationalization, and would remain there until the reign of President Nimieri. 71 a given year. Finally, the division of profits remained as established between the government and SPS, that is the tenants received 40%, the government 40%, and.the Gezira Board 20%. The Gezira Board also paid a profits tax. The Gezira Scheme Ordinance took effect June 30, 1950. Once established, the first Gezira Board’s priority was the appointment of a staff. Despite the steady inroads made by Sudanese in the civil service, none had. held inspector positions while the SPS was in existence. In 1950, the first year of the Gezira Board, the first five Sudanese field inspectors were hired. According to Taha El Jack Taha, who was hired as a field inspector in 1953, the number of field inspectors increased geometrically throughout the period 1950— 1956, allowing for the complete Sudanization of the inspectorate by 1956.51 The vast majority of the new field inspectors had received their education at Shambat.52 THE FIVE YEAR PLAN & NORTHWEST EXTENSION While the Gezira’s management was changing its complexion, the scheme itself was expanding. The Northwest Extension of the Gezira was a major portion of the government's Five Year Plan, 1946—1951. Although its framers 51Interview with Taha El Jack Taha, former field inspector, later' Development Officer from. 1956—1976, and Gezira Board member in 1989. Khartoum, May 26,1990. 52At the time of Sudanization, Shambat was still an independent school that offered diplomas in agriculture. It would become affiliated with the University of Khartoum, and be elevated to a baccalaureate program. Beshir, Educational Development, p.155. 72 realized that social services were important, the plan’s main objective was to improve the capacity of the Sudan to generate revenue by increasing the amount of land under cultivation.53 The budget put forward by the Condominium tended to bear out the approach outlined above. For example, the budget projection for both health and educational improvements was £E1,702,500, while the allocation for agriculture (not counting its largest segment, irrigation) was £E1,846,170.54 Specifically, the plan gave a priority to productivity in public pump schemes and.to with.improving the ginning capacity at Port Sudan. The Irrigation Department listed "Development of Gezira Canalisation" as its largest project at £E1,130,000, out of an irrigation budget of EE1,575,000. Agriculture and irrigation constituted £E3,421,170, or thirty percent of an overall budget of £E11,480,470. Agricultural development was the cornerstone of development policy for both the Condominiwm government and its the independent successor. This emphasis will be seen in discussions of the Northwest Extension and the Managil extension of the Gezira Scheme. In 1944, W.N\ Allen, the director of the Sudan Irrigation Department, outlined the strategies to be used for the 53Sudan Government, Five Year Plan for Post-War Development, 1946, p.1, Sudan Archives, University Of Durham. 54Ibid, pp 2—4. 73 In 1944, W.N3 Allen, the director of the Sudan Irrigation Department, outlined. the strategies to be 'used for the extension of irrigated land in the Gezira.55 His memorandum advised that, with.the war ending, attention should.be focused on the expansion of irrigation. First of all, Allen noted that once the war ended, another 25,000 feddans could immediately be put into cultivation.S6 However, the bulk of the memorandum dealt with the extension of agriculture into new areas.57 Allen noted that much of the actual work of expansion could not be done before 1950 because extensive planning had to be done. Specifically, Allen was referring to the exact design and function of the various canals, dams, pumps, and other equipment. Indeed, once the Sudanese gained. total control of the government and Gezira, they only had to carry out the plans that the British had left behind. In accordance with the Gezira’s administrative arrangement, several offices were charged. with. different aspects of construction. The Sudan Irrigation Department was in charge of the enlargement and the construction of the 55Sudan. Irrigation. Department, No. SID/Conf./9-2, Wad Medani, 11th July 1944, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 56The SPS supervised a wheat crop during the 1942—43 season, which yielded .482 tons per feddan. Apparently the SPS grew wheat at other times during the war years, but I was unable to find any record of them. Ref. SGB/l—B—26, June 6, 1962, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 57Sudan Irrigation Department, No. SID/Conf./9—2, Wad Medani, 11th July 1944, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 74 canals, gates, dams, and administrative buildings. The Gezira Board was responsible for the levelling of fields and general infrastructural improvements necessary to make land fit for farming. The Sudan Irrigation.Department was the driving force in the expansion of the Gezira Scheme, but it had problems with other organs of the government. Sometimes there was friction, and at other times there was simply a daunting amount of procedure to be dealt with. Although the general plans for expansion had been made, the direction in which the Gezira would first grow was not fixed. In 1947, there was discussion about developing in the direction Of the Managil or toward the Northwest Extension.58 Eventually it was decided that the Northwest Extension be undertaken first, since it would not require, as would the Managil, a.major enlargement of the Gezira’s main canal. While this recommendation was accepted by the Sudan Irrigation Department, it was necessary to decide that the Northwest Extension would feature multiple watering regimes.59 58R.J. Smith, Director, Irrigation Department, SID/Conf./14—4—2, March. 6,1947, Gezira..Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 59An on-going question in the Gezira centered around the best way to water crops. The combination of extreme heat in the Gezira, and its heavy clay soils made water absorption a tricky problem. The heat meant that water would rapidly evaporate once it was sent into the fields; whereas water took a long time to be absorbed by the heavy clay soil. Smith suggested continuous watering in the belief that there would a smaller amount of water lost due to evaporation. Sudan Irrigation.Department, Note “B“, Sudan Archives, University of Durham. 75 The Research Department was convinced that continuous watering ‘would result in the savings. However, for the effectiveness of this innovation to be determined, the irrigation would have to occur on a large scale (20-25,000 feddans), and not on small experimental plots. The Northwest Extension was therefore split into two blocks, one featuring continuous watering, the other using day watering. Land to be irrigated was picked primarily on the basis of the ease with which it could.be watered. Often fertility of the land was not known until after it had been canalized. This ignorance of potential would have very signicant consequences during the next decade, once the Managil came under contruction. Work on the Northwest Extension began in 1947, and it ended in 1952. Its completion took one year longer than the projections of the 1946 Five Year Plan. CONCLUSION The period of of 1930—1950 saw a number of fundamental changes in the Sudan as a whole and the Gezira in particular. The major theme was the steadily increasing role of the Sudanese in governing Sudan. At first, the educated Sudanese were content to have retained their jobs in the aftermath of the 1924 Revolt and the move towards Indirect Rule. However, the government soon found that it could not realistically dispense 'with. the effendiya, and. their numbers steadily increased in the civil service. With their growth and a 76 softening of British policy, the Sudanese soon began politically to organize, the most important organization being the Graduates Congress. Tenants, interestingly enough, were first effectively organized in the devolution movement by the government and SPS. Devolution was designed largely to prevent the influence of the effendiya from spreading into the Gezira by making them superfluous in the future management of the scheme. However, the basic interests of the tenants and educated Sudanese eventually intersected. Both groups were privileged members of colonial society who had benefitted substantially from their positions vis a vis the government. Like many privileged groups III a colonial setting, their access to benefits made them even more eager to improve their position.60 The result of the tenant and effendiya alliance was that the two groups worked together during the 1946 Tenants Strike, and they also were able to pass the Nationalities Act of 1948. After this level of political cooperation,the government and SPS could no longer plausibly argue that there was no community of interest between the two groups. This realization was a key factor in the creation of the Gezira Board as a public corporation and its subsequent legally mandated role as 60It must be remembered that the Gezira tenants were much better off than farmers who were not members of the scheme. They had a guaranteed income and food crops. Also towards the end of the Condominium era, tenants had access to education, health, and social programs unheard of outside of the scheme. 77 an agent for social development in the Gezira. Also, the common purpose meant that there was no longer any reason to deny Sudanese a role in the administrative structure of the Gezira, and.by 1950, Sudanese were being actively recruited to staff the Gezira Board’s administration. CHAPTER THREE: 1950-1960: CONSOLIDATION OF SUDANESE CONTROL AND EXPANSION IN GEZIRA OVERVIEW The decade of the 1950’s saw the continuation of Sudanization in the Gezira Scheme and the government services as a whole and expansion in the Gezira. On the national level, self—rule continued and eventually resulted in independence January 1, 1956. In this fact, however, lies many Sudan’s problems during the 1950’s. Essentially, the Sudanese sought to benefit from independence. The educated Sudanese desired the privileged positions formerly held by the SPS and government, and primary product producers like the tenants wanted to claim profits that they felt had been siphoned off by foreign interests. During this period, there was conflict between "special interests." At the political level, there was fierce conflict between the Northern parties. At the regional level, the conflict between North and South became significant during this period. In terms of economics, tenants organizations, labor unions, and professional groups, all pursued their interests in the national arena. Although these groups had high.hopes for the future, the decade eventually saw a general decline in the nation’s fortunes. How this came to be will be discussed in this chapter. 78 79 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS UNTIL 1953 The major item on the political agenda of Sudan was its permanent status. As had been.noted earlier, Great Britain and Egypt had reached an agreement in 1936 that reaffirmed the basic tenets of the 1899 Condominium agreement. Needless to say the Egyptians were not happy with this arrangement. Egyptian nationalists still hoped to include the Sudan in an integral Egypt, and the British were quite determined not to see Egyptian desires fulfilled. The British saw the Sudan as quite strategic txn their future interests III the region, especially since they had already accepted the inevitability of withdrawing from the "Northern Tier" of the Middle East.1 In addition to the designs of the British and Egyptians, various groups of Sudanese had ideas of their own for the future of the Sudan. One thing seemed certain, that was the Sudanese would have a major voice in what would happen in the post war era, unlike the deliberations leading to the 1936 treaty which Egypt and the UK signed without consulting the Sudanese. Sudanese participation was a certainty because, as mentioned in the last chapter, in 1948, a Legislative Assembly was inaugurated and although its powers were circumscribed by 1 The British, according to William Louis, were considering using tropical Africa as the strategic base for their empire, since it appeared that political momentum was forcing them out of the Middle East. William.Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p.10. 80 the Governor—General, it was bound to leave its mark on the negotiations. Sudanese nationalists were split into two major groups. One was the Umma party, affiliated with the Ansar tariqa, the followers of the Mahdi. During this period, the Ansar was led by Abd al Rahman al Mahdi, the son of the Mahdi, and also the de facto leader of the Umma party. During the period of negotiations, the Umma was the major party in the Legislative Assembly, largely due to unwillingness of its opposition to participate in national politics. The other post-war major was the Ashiqqa party which was associated with the Khatmiyya tariqa. The Khatmiyya was led by Ali Mirghani, who was also the de facto leader of the Ashiqqa. The Ashiqqa party was officially in favor of union.with Egypt, although, its members tended to be coy when it came to stating exactly how such a union would be implemented. The decisive event in the movement towards self— government was the Egyptian abrogation of the 1899 and 1936 treaties with Britain. The Egyptians were unhappy with the creation of the Legislative Assembly. They felt that it was a preliminary move towards establishing an independent Sudan, a conclusion that was quite reasonable considering how events would.develop. Owing to these misgivings, there were no Anglo- Egyptian negotiations on the arrangement in Sudan for two years after the Legislative Assembly’s beginning in 1948. According to Holt and Daly, American pressure on the British 81 to reach an accord on the Suez Canal sent the British back to the negotiating table in 1950.ZIMhen the talks did.not produce the results that were desired in Egypt, King Farouk announced the abrogation of the two treaties with Britain concerning the Sudan.3 Holt and Daly noted that this move on the part of Egypt had the effect of weakening its position in the Sudan. Since Cairo no longer recognized the Old treaties, it could.no longer legally influence the future of country. Egypt tried to compensate by declaring a constitution for Sudan, but it was simply ignored. Although Egypt was out of the picture, Britain did not find itself in a completely placid situation. There was widespread opinion that since the treaties had.been abrogated, Sudan no longer had a legal government and should be placed under an international commission.4 In. response to such speculation, the(government.pushed.the Self Government Statute through the Legislative Assembly on April 23, 1952. This law created a bicameral legislature, and provided for a number of committees, the most important of which were the Sudanization Committee and an International Election Commission that would oversee the legislative elections. During' the period. of transition, the governor-general would maintain final 2Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan, p.154. 3Ibid, p.154. 4 Ibid, p.155. 82 authority.S However, now the governor—general’s task was to direct the dismantling of the Condominium government because the new Statute stipulated that the Sudan be allowed self— determination within three years.6 How the Sudanese would react to their new situation, especially regarding theIGezira, will be the focus of the rest of this chapter. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION UNTIL 1953 The 1950’s were a time of considerable economic contrast in Sudan. Early in the decade, high cotton prices resulted in unparalleled personal incomes for tenants of the Gezira and unprecedented surpluses for government coffers. Between 1946 and 1951, average tenant income in the Gezira increased from £E29 to £E800.7 Simultaneously, government revenue increased from. EE8,300,000 to £E46,340,000.‘3 This sudden. burst of prosperity would have a profound effect on the development of the Sudanese economy and the expectations of the Sudanese people as they moved towards independence. Many Sudanese saw an independent Sudan as a country of unlimited possibilities. Also, the government was encouraged to keep developing the irrigated agriculture sector of the economy, since it had recently proved to be so lucrative. SMartin Daly, Imperial Sudan, p.300. 6Daly, Imperial Sudan, p.300. 7Ibidl pp.307—308. 8Ibid, pp.302-303. 83 The cotton.boomigave rise to patterns of consumption that would eventually prove to be quite debilitating after the sudden expansion cooled. Namely, privileged segments of the Sudanese population developed great appetites for foreign consumer goods that would eventually lead to balance Of payments problems. Tony Barnett, in Gezira: An Illusion of Development (1977), speaks of how tenants were able to buy items such as transistor radios with ease during the boom period.9 More importantly, Martin Daly noted that as a result of the cotton boom, the Sudanese became dependent on a number of imported goods that could have easily been substituted had the ‘will existed. among' the people and government. Daly mentions, for instance, that between 1946 and 1951, the amount of sugar imported rose from £E573,000 to £E5,500,000. The corollary' of the rise in cotton. prices was an increased. government. emphasis. on. expanding' the irrigated agriculture infrastructure of Sudan. The government also saw to it that the inhabitants of the cotton producing areas, especially tflua Gezira, received more social services than those outside the cotton schemes.” The people of Gezira had far better schools, health care, water supplies than other populations in the rural Sudan. The high.price of cotton during the war and the immediate post-war period was partially maintained by the method by 9Barnett, Gezira, pp.31-32. ”Daly, Imperial Sudan, pp.308—309. 84 which the Sudanese product was sold during this time. Between 1941 and 1948, cotton was bought by the British government— sponsored Cotton Control Commission which negotiated prices with the Condominium government and made regular monthly payments for the cotton. The Cotton Control Commission also paid for the storage Of cotton at Port Sudan and accepted any losses that occurred in transport to Britain.11 After 1948, the international economic situation made the war time arrangement unfavorable to Sudan. The world was then suffering from a shortage of U.S. dollars, which made cotton produced outside of the United States much more attractive.” In response to the new circumstances, the contract was renegotiated, thereby guaranteeing a higher price to Sudan. This agreement lasted until 1952 when it was discontinued. One criticism of the system was that it denied the Sudan the opportunity to develop commercial contacts outside of the British Commonwealth. Adel Amin Beshai, in Export Performance & Economic Development (1976), argues that marketing through London did not hurt Sudan because Britain re—exported.much of the cotton that was bought in Sudan, thereby making the rest of the world familiar with Sudanese cotton. Furthermore, Beshai notes that once Sudan did independently market its 11Adel Amin Beshai, Export Performance and Development in Sudan 1900—1967, (Oxford: St. Anthony’s Press, 1976), p.55. 12Ibid, p.56. 85 cotton after 1952, it experienced no difficulty in moving its produce.13 Undoubtedly the major force behind.the discontinuation.of the cotton marketing system.was Britain’s inability to sell all of the crop that it purchased in 1952. This brought about a serious crisis in the Gezira the following year, since the law stated that profits could.not be paid to tenants until 90% of the crop had been sold.14 After ending the contract with Britain, the Gezira began selling its cotton to independent agents.15 By 1953, and the advent of self—rule in Sudan, the Gezira had already seen the end of its most lucrative period. However, by this time, dependence on cotton had reached the point that expansion of the country’s capacity to produce cotton was seen as the major focus of agricultural development. AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT TO 1953 The boom in cotton prices helped to keep government development projects focused on irrigated agricultural schemes dedicated to cotton. During the early part of the period, the Five Year Plan of 1946 was still being carried out. The Northwest Extension was completed in 1952, a year later than ”Ibid. 14SC/A/l—A, Letter from Messrs. Linklater & Paines (London Lawyers) to C.J.P. Markey of Gezira, October 19, 1953, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 15Beshai, Export Performance, p.56. 86 had originally been projected. The next major project concerning the Gezira was the Managil extension. SUDANIZATION IN THE GEZIRA SCHEME Although the Legislative Assembly had recommended it in 1948, the Sudanization of the Gezira Scheme began in 1950, the year that the SPS contract ended and the Gezira Board began. That year, five Sudanese became field.inspectors. According to Taha El Jack Taha, who was hired as a field inspector in 1953, the number of field inspectors hired by the Gezira Board increased geometrically, allowing for the complete Sudanization of the inspectorate by 1956.16 The vast majority of the new field inspectors had received their education at the agricultural school in Shambat. At the time of Sudanization, Shambat was still an independent school that offered diplomas in agriculture, although it soon affiliated with the University of Khartoum, and instituted to a baccalaureate program.” Sudanizing the rest of the Gezira’s administration would prove more complicated. One major problemtwas hOW'tO deal with the large number of British nationals still working in the Gezira. The solution was to grant these people very favorable retirement plans. The basic scheme allowed a former employee 16Interview with Taha El Jack Taha, former Gezira Board Development Officer, Khartoum, May 26, 1990. 17Mohamed A. Nour, "A Perspective View on Higher Education in the Sudan," Sudan Agricultural Journal, 4, 1, (1969) p.20. 87 to receive a 20% annuity for the time served, provided he was under a long-term contract. If an employee was dismissed expressly because of the Sudanization of his post, then that official received an annuity of 40% of his or her pay.18 In addition to the money paid to those who served out long-term contracts, there were even more benefits in store for those whose jobs were Sudanized before their contracts had expired. The Gezira paid these people three months pay for each month left on the contract.” The total paid for compensating expatriate employees was estimated. at £E545,550 (approx. $1,700,000).20 It should be noted that, contrary to what many writers have claimed, not all British employees were replaced by the Sudanese at the onset of independence. However, those British remaining in Gezira also benefitted from Sudanization also. For example: Please note that in pursuance of the Sudanization plan, Mr. D.J. James will relinquish his present post of Financial Controller on 17th. April 1956 and his present contract with the board. will terminate. Mr. James will continue in the service of the board in the capacity of 1‘3SGB/PERS/6—1 February 25 , 1958 , Gezira Archives , Barakat , Sudan. ”CM/1.A.5./4, (date unknown), Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 20Ibid. 88 Development Management under a new agreement, and his salary will be £2,900 a year with effect from 18. April 1956. Mr. James’ entitlements to gratuity and compensation on the Sudanisation of his post under his existing terms of service will be paid to him on 30th. June 1956.” Another way in which expatratriates maintained their positions in the Gezira was to claim Sudanese citizenship. This tactic was commonly taken by workers of Middle Eastern origin.” Some interesting problems came up as workers scrambled. to prove their Sudanese identity such. as new Sudanese citizens seeking expatriate travel bonuses to see their families in their countries of origin.” This practice was eventually stopped, the logic being that if these people are Sudanese, they needed to establish roots in Sudan and stop going to the "old country" so much. Such problems caused the government to stop granting Sudanese status to foreigners.” Although foreigners continued to contribute to the Gezira Scheme, the thrust of the 1950’s policy was Sudanization. At the heart of this program was the training of Sudanese to 21Memorandum from A.A. Faki, Chief Accountant SGB/PERS/142—10—1 March 31, 1956, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. ”File 448, SC/A/44 May 8,1955, A memorandum from the Gezira Secretary to the Permanent Under Secretary of Finance mentions a Syrian and Egyptian who were claiming Sudanese status. Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 23Ibid. 24SGB/PERS/134-6, March 13, 1955, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 89 assume a wide variety of positions over a short period of time. A memorandum of September 23, 1953, urged the Gezira’s management to find Sudanese clerical workers interested in becoming accountants. Those interested employees would be advanced loans for correspondence courses. Students who passed the Intermediate Examination of the Association of Certified Corporate Accountants would receive a scholarship for one year’s study in the UK for part two of the final examination. After completely passing the examination, the student would be obligated to work for the Gezira for several years.25 The Gezira’s management also looked to other sources for accountants. In a letter to the Civil Secretary in Khartoum, the Financial Controller asked about any graduates from the University College of Khartomn who might be interested in studying accounting. The controller also asked about the availability of any Sudanese students who might have studied accounting in Egypt.26 later that year, the controller was able to secure a list of graduates from the Egyptian schools. The Chamber of Commerce also helped to advertise the accounting possibilities offered by the Gezira. Once Sudanese staff was hired, they had to be trained to work within the scheme. The recruit was assigned to an 25Circular NO. M/3/40 (75/36), September 23,1953, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 26Ref. No. G/4/3112 Dec. 16, 1953, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 90 experienced staff member for training. This systemican.be seen through a series of memoranda exchanged between the Financial Controller, a new employee, and.his supervisor. The Financial Controller wrote to the new man, asking him if he were ready to begin work as inspector of accounts. Apparently, his supervisor discovered the communication and informed the Financial Controller of the new recruit’s incompetence. Specifically, he failed. to undertake a :number of tasks assigned to him.” The various forces that were important to Sudanization can perhaps be seen most clearly in the story of Mekki Abbas, who became the first Sudanese managing director of the Gezira Scheme. Abbas began his career in education, teaching at the elite Bakht er Rhoda school in Erkowit. He caught the attention of his British supervisors, in particular, V.L. Griffiths, a man.who would.become quite famous in the field of colonial education.” Under the guidance of Griffiths, Mekki Abbas also did some community development work among the pump schemes in the White Nile area. Abbas’ growing reputation found him being offered a chair on the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan in 1944. Despite Mekki Abbas’ success and good reputation, he was not a blind supporter of the government. He advocated ”Ref. No. SC/A/43, Confidential, November 6, 1955, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 28Gaitskell, Gezira, p.303. 91 including the Southern Sudan in an independent Sudan before Condominium. officials were prepared to countenance such thoughts. Despite his occasional conflicts, Abbas was able to maintain generally cordial relations with British officials. These connections took Abbas to Exeter University and also to Oxford, to study under Margery Perham. His graduate work resulted in a book, The Sudan Question (1952). Abbas’ first came to Gezira in 1950 as the Social Development director. In 1953, he became the managing director, a position he held until 1958, when he was appointed Secretary-General to the United Nations Commission for Africa.” LABOR ORGANIZATIONS IN THE GEZIRA During the 1950’s, labor organizations gained a great deal of prominence in the Sudan. Not only were they active in improving the conditions of their members, they were also a major force in the independence movement. The prominence of unions stemmed from the fact that they were concentrated in the modern sector of the economy and they were centered in the major areas of development in the Sudan. After joining the Gezira administration, the Sudanese founded the Sudan Gezira Board Staff Association, (SSA). It contacted General Manager G.W. Raby July 8, 1953, and he responded that, although formal recognition would take a ”The general format for the section on Mekki Abbas came Gaitskell, Gezira pp.306-307. However additional information came from ’Abdel Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism , and also information that I Obtained at the Sudan archives in Durham. 92 while, the group was most welcome and should act as though it had already been approved. Raby also spoke very favorably of the character of the people involved in the founding of the organization.” However, after initially approving the SSA, the Gezira’s administration soon found itself at odds with the new organization. The SSA was composed largely of former civil servants, and not surprisingly, they wished to replicate the privileges that they' had enjoyed. in government service. Specifically, the SSA sought greater discounts on rail fare 1 General than they were being allowed as Gezira employees.3 Manager Raby quickly reminded the SSA members that they had voluntarily joined the Gezira, and if they were so fond of government perquisites, they should have remained where they had been.32 The administrative employees of the Gezira were not the only group to organize during this period. The tenants also actively pursued their interests. After the strike of 1946, the Tenants Representative Body was formed. This organization was treated as an aspect of devolution and self—government, and.the organization therefore served.to reorient the focus of ”No. SSA/20.A.1, July 8,1953 & SC/MD/3A, July 11,1953, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 31Ref. SSA/20.A.2, General Secretary Khuluti to General Manager Raby, Nov. 26, 1953, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 32G.M. Raby to Gen. Sec. SSA, Jan. 12, 1954, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 93 tenants away fromraggressively pursuing their own interests to concentrating on greater efficiency in the management Of the scheme. This situation.changedmwhen.the Tenants Representative Body was reorganized as the Tenants Union. The change can best be seen in the election Sheikh.El Amin.Mohammed.El Amin as the union’s president. Instead of being a prominent citizen, as had the members of the previous organization, he only worked a half tenancy. More importantly, while the previous tenant leaders were essentially conservative, Sheikh El Amin was an avowed communist.” Early on in his dealings with the Gezira Board, it became clear that Sheikh El Amin and the Tenants Union had one clear objective: as much as possible they wanted to wrest control of the scheme away from the government and place it in the hands of the tenants.” To achieve his goal, Sheikh El Amin exploited the frustration on the part of the tenants at their decreasing profits during the late 1950’s. Throughout the entire period of Sheikh El Amin’s tenure as president, there was agitation for an increased share of the Gezira Scheme’s profits.” The reason behind the tenants’ demands was the declining price and profits that cotton was returning. Sheikh El Amin and the Tenant's Union argued for an 33Gaitskell, Gezira, p.306. 34Ibid. 35File 362, Parliamentary Proceedings 1956, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 94 increase in the tenants’ share to 50%.36 They reasoned that, since the SPS was gone, there was no need for the government to take its share. Of course, this argument tended to neglect the money that was spent on administration, research, and social welfare. In its defense, the government pointed out that in reality, the tenants had been paid in excess of their legal share throughout the 1950’s.37 In addition to trying to secure more profits for the tenants, Sheikh.El Amin also sought to change the organization of the Tenants’ Union. El Amin wanted to limit the number of meetings held by the union’s executive committee, and extend the terms tO‘WhiCh members of committee were elected. The most striking proposal was to Open the union to all Sudanese, not just tenants.” The proposed changes, however, were not approved by the government. Officialdom actively worked against El Amin, charging some union members with mismanagement of funds.” Eventually a confrontation developed over an attempt to wrest another increase in profit shares for tenants. In 1955, El Amin threatened a strike, arguing that the average tenant had lost EE136 the previous year. The Gezira Board, under Managing 36Gaitskell, Gezira, p.307. ” Tenant Profit Shares: 1950-51 ...46.6% 1951—52 ...45.9% 1952-53 ...45.5% 1953-54 ...45.6%, File 363 Feb.l3- 16, 1956 Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 38Gaitskell, Gezira, p. 307. ”Ibid. p. 308. 95 Director Mekki Abbas, countered by offering each farmer £E20 to plant, and promising an additional £E10 from the reserve fund later in the year.40 This technique worked because Abbas was able to take advantage of dissension among those tenants who did.not agree with the methods of the union. The following year, 1956, Sheikh.El Amin lost his bid for re—election to the union presidency. However, this was not the end Of Sheikh El Amin. He would resurface during the 1960’s still committed to tenant activism.41 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1953-1960 After deciding to embark on self-determination, the Sudanese began the process of managing a parliamentary democracy, at which they failed.badly. The reasons behind.that failure and the military dictatorship that resulted from parliamentary chaos, will be touched upon briefly in this section. The immediate question before the new government was who would run it. This matter was settled.in.November and.December of 1953, and the new parliament opened on January 9, 1954.42 The majority was the National Unionist Party (NUP), a collection of nationalist groups that were loosely associated with the old.Ashiqqa party and the Khatmiyya tariqa. The party 40Gaitskell, Gezira, p.308. 41Peter K. Bechtold, Politics in the Sudan, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p.216. 42Beshir, Revolution and Nationalism, p.179. 96 was led by Ismail Al Azhari, a former Graduates Congress member. The major losers were the members of the Umma Party, who were only able to garner significant support in the west of the country. The major tasks before the neW' government were to regularize its relationship with Egypt, Sudanize the entire administration, and attend to the special concerns of the Southern Sudanese. It should be noted that economics did not figure highly on the new government’s agenda. Throughout the early days of the government, the assumption.was that once the British were removed, the country's great wealth would.he:more readily available to the people. The general economic policy stayed as before, concentrating on the expansion of the irrigated agricultural sector of the economy. One :major breakthrough of this period was the negotiation of the 1959 Egyptian-Sudanese Nile Waters agreement, which permitted the intensification and diversification experiments of the 1960’s. The main impediment to the tasks before the new government was the instability of the political coalitions in the parliament. Another problem was that those out of power were often unwilling to accept the policies of the governing party. This could be seen in the violent Ansar demonstrations against General Neguib of Egypt, when he visited Sudan in 1954. The general, who was half Sudanese, was personally quite popular and as long as he was the leader of the new government in Egypt, there was a possibility, however remote, of Sudan 97 forming a union with Egypt. Neguib was deposed by Nasser, however, and the Sudan opted for total independence. The question of Sudanization was handled nationally along the lines that were described in the section on Sudanization within Gezira. The process drew attention to the weakness of the South in relation to the North. Only six of a total of eight hundred positions were awarded to Southern applicants.” The resentment generated by Northern domination of the bureaucracy and the unwillingness Of Northerners to create a federal state resulted in a serious mutiny in Equatoria in 1955.44 Although the mutiny was handled quickly, albeit with considerable difficulty, it still suggested that the relations between North and South would be precarious for many years to come. Despite the seriousness of the problems between the North and South, the focus of Northern politicians was on maneuvering for power. The NUP coalition of Al Azhairi was unable to last for long, and by November 1955, he had lost power. Al Azhairi was able to regain.his position.by accepting a coalition with the Umma. Therefore, when independence came on January 1, 1956, the Sudan was governed by a coalition of the country’s two major parties. This coalition soon proved unworkable, and the young government once again foundered. After several switches among parties, the military took over 43Holt & Daly, A History of the Sudan , p. 163. 44Ibid. 98 the government in 1958 when an Umma prime minister, Abdallah 5 The coup was led by Khalil, virtually’ invited ea coup.4 General Ibrahim Abboud, who would retain power until 1964. It should be noted that the army takeover coincided with a general economic decline, which increased militancy among certain sectors of the population, particularly among labor.46 As was the case in the Gezira, the Communist Party was a major factor in this unrest.47 The Communists also gained a bit of respectability among more established parties once they realized that the army had no intention of quickly relinquishing power. The older mainstreamiparties allied with both the Muslim Brothers and the Communists in an attempt to agitate for a return to elected government.” GEZIRA EXPANSION 1953-1960 The completion of the Managil Extension was the major undertaking during this period. The Nile Waters Agreement of 1959 set the stage for theIlntensification.and.Diversification programs of the 1960’s. Serious planning for the Managil began towards the end Managing Director Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 51Memoranda frothunson to Gezira dated 9—10—1964 & 9—15— 1964, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 130 everybody on the marketing committee. After meeting on October 11, 1964, an agricultural engineer on the committee stated that he felt the Gezira’s soil was unable consistently to produce the quality of nut that would be desirable to confectioners. He recommended instead that the Gezira Board concentrate on producing peanuts for oil and.use their British connections to penetrate the UK’s oil market. Regardless of what kind of peanuts the:Gezira'would.grow, that they would be grown was already a foregone conclusion. A memorandumlfromlthe Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and.Supply recommended that the area devoted to peanuts be increased since yields in Gezira were larger than those of Kordofan.52 The Marketing Committee agreed with this assessment because during its October 11, 1964 meeting, the Managing Director discussed the possibility of increasing peanut cultivation to 180,000 feddans by reducing the allotment of land for phillipsera (fodder crop) or durra. Also, the Gezira Board moved to establish the brand name, "Gezira Groundnuts" for their products with the British Cereal Marketing Board. The committee also reported considerable progress in the establishment of cooperatives, now present in all of the 52MC/S/62—2—43; The letter notes that Gezira crops average .750 tons per feddan while harvests in Kordofan were .546. It should. be remembered. that Kordofan farmers were totally independent and received no help or funding from the government. 131 3 The tenants were investing heavily in blocks except one.5 machinery, and the report mentioned that they preferred Swiss German.Combines because:of their easy terms of payment and.the ready availability of parts and service. While cooperatives were taking shape, negotiations for marketing their produce were continuing. In a letter to P. Balint of R.Wfi Gunson, Salih. Mohammed, Gezira’s General Manager, said that the Gezira would be happy to enter into a contract that would let them sell 30,000 tons of peanuts to Gunson at the current Nigerian price of £74 per ton. Gezira officials had reason to expect a very profitable crop, since, according to the Public Ledger of March 1965 the price of Sudanese peanuts had overtaken that of the Nigerian variety. It should be noted that the Public Ledger quoted prices for Sudanese nuts as a whole, and Kordofan nuts were likely the greatest beneficiary of the price rise. In addition to the Gunson company, the Gezira officials also dealt with other firms. General Manager, Salih Mohammed Salih contacted Kenyon, Son, and Craven LTD. and told them.of Gezira’s products. In the letter, Salih stated that there were 120,000 feddans of peanuts under cultivation in the Gezira. Kenyon, Son and Craven answered on September 3, 1965, saying they wanted kernels and had little use for nuts in the shell. 53The number of cooperatives more than doubled from 1964 to 1965 from 24 to 53. E.T. Gibbons, "Groundnut Credit and Marketing Co-Operatives," pps. 169-172. 132 However, by September 25, the company had.changed.its position and offered to buy 5000 metric tons in the shell. On the same day, the Gezira Board was notified by the R.W. Gunson company that it was willing to finance the purchase of shelling machinery in Gezira.54 The R.W. Gunson company, was also interested in flying vegetables from Gezira to Great Britain.55 Nevertheless, the major thrust of Gunson's correspondence concerned peanuts, and selling Gezira the processing equipment it needed to be successful in the peanut business. The Gunson company felt that the Gezira Scheme did not then have the capacity to process peanuts in the numbers necessary for it to deliver satisfactory amounts of produce to the company. The Gezira officials, however, were considerably less concerned with the purchase of machinery but simply wanted to sell peanuts. The Gezira Board officials must have known that the tenants did not have the means to harvest and.process a peanut crop that would meet international standards. The board’s unwillingness to encourage the purchase of decortication 54Ref. No. SGB/SCR/l-B-41/4, 9-25—1965, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. SSSGB/SCR/2.F.7, 9—3—1965, Salih Mohammed Salih, General Manager, looked into the cost of flying vegetables via Sudan Airways. In July 1965, the Horticultural Manager, Salim Amir, wrote to the General saying that Gunson was interested in flying all vegetables but onions, however, negotiations appear to dissipate after this. 133 machines and to undertake more thorough processing stemmed from.peanuts status as a private crop. Peanuts, despite the big push during intensification, were a crop that belonged wholly to the tenants. The government would receive no direct portion of peanut sales as it did with cotton, explaining why the government encouraged cooperatives instead of directly purchasing most the machinery. However, once the government ceased actively to encourage cooperatives and to monitor their development, most of them foundered due to the tenants’ lack of experience. Tenants, unused to the standards of international merchants, simply did not understand why they had be so diligent in processing their peanuts. The fact that the government received direct remuneration from.the Gezira's cotton crop also affected peanuts at harvest time. Both peanuts and cotton mature at the same time, from November through March. Because cotton was the most important crop for the government and the tenants, it harvest took precedence over that of peanuts. Because they remained inventory on the vine, large portions become contaminated with aflatoxin, a poison that developed after fungi (aspergillus flavus) grew on the crops still in the field.56 The government was well aware that the tenants were not maximizing their profits in peanuts. This was borne out by a 56E.T. Gibbons, "Groundnut Credit and. Marketing Co— Operatives" p.170. 134 report published by the Ministry of Agriculture, Economics of Groundnuts Decortication.in the<3ezira Scheme (November 1965). Its author; Mamoun'Yassin, clearly demonstrated.that after the processing and decortication of peanuts, they could be sold for £2.60 a half ton more than unprocessed peanuts. Yassin said that the Gezira Board could best facilitate peanut cultivation by investing in a number of small and inexpensive processing plants that could be bought by cooperatives. The enlarged capacity, according to Yassin, would yield about 30,000 tons of peanuts annually, even though transportation facilities would be strained. It is important to note that Yassin also observed that the tenants were not enthusiastic about investing large sums of money into processing equipment. They preferred to maintain manual labor as much as possible. The resulting situation was a disaster for the budding peanut export business in the Gezira. Through the summer of 1965, P. Balint of the R.Wfi Gunson company wrote to the Gezira Board telling them about decortication machines that the company could sell the scheme. The Gezira officials responded that they had devised a hand—operated device that would suffice and had arranged for the purchase of an American machine for the removal of dirt and one peanut combine for harvesting. The total investment came to £S2,500. Unfortunately, even this modest investment was not to take 135 place in 1965, since owing to an administrative problem, all purchase orders were cancelled that year.57 The lack of investment in the necessary equipment resulted in an embarrassingly poor quality of peanuts being shipped to England. The contract clearly stated that the peanuts were to be washed, whole nuts, clear of sticks, stones, and.broken shells. In.a letter dated.December 11,1965, ‘W.H. Hughes of the Gunson company made it clear how important it would be for the international reputation of the Gezira to make the initial shipment of peanuts the highest quality possible. Despite these warnings, the Gezira peanuts were so poor that the Gunson company cancelled the contract. P. Balint, of the Gunson company, explained the low quality stemmed mainly from two things: a. To the soil, which has no fertilizer, or not enough fertilizer, and shortage of calcium and other minerals in the soil. b. To the lack of proper shellers, blowers or blower shifters, and other machinery necessary for the groundnut operation which is available everywhere.58 Reinforcing his earlier points, Balint continued.that the Gezira Board must be prepared to make the investments necessary for the effective marketing of peanuts: Without such a plant and without the use of fertilizers,which we can deliver too, 57The "administrative problem" involved hiring of a new Gezira staff. 58Gunson, PB/GB, 3—3—1966, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 136 the diversification of your economy by the production and export of groundnuts on a big scale will be difficult and you will remain only with your successful but very one—sided operation in your long—staple cotton. The whole Sudanese groundnut operation and especially the groundnuts of the Gezira area, could be as wonderfully organized as your cotton, but without the necessary tools it is an impossibility.59 Salih Mohammed Salih wrote back to Balint apologizing for the poor quality of the crop shipped to them. Salih also agreed with Balint about the necessity of developing processing capacity in the Gezira. Salih wanted to know whether a single large or multiple smaller processing plants would.be appropriate. Balint answered that he felt Gezira lent itself to multiple processing centers. Salih then wrote back, asking Balint if he would share any plans because Mohammed El Mufti would be making a trip to the United States to see what equipment the Gezira Scheme might purchase. The communication between Gunson and Gezira appears to have ended after that exchange. CHAPTER SUMMARY The 1960’s were a period that began with very high hopes in both the Sudan and Gezira. Unfortunately, it would end as an era of unrealized potential. Although the Gezira was expanded significantly during this period, thereby increasing land under cotton cultivation, the anticipated diversification 59Gunson, PB/GB, 3—3—1966, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 137 failed to materialize. There are several reasons for this failure. The unstable political situation, inexperience among tenants in international marketing, and the inertia brought about by the Gezira’s organization. Several researchers during this period observed that under the traditional system, Gezira land was not being effectively used“ Writing in 1966, Ali Mohayad. Bannaga, suggested a radical reorganization of the Gezira Scheme based on cost efficiency for tenants and the relative fertility of 0 Bannaga proposed that the the Gezira’s different regions.6 various regions of the Gezira specialize in crops that could be grown there most efficiently. Bannaga reasoned.that it cost certain farmers more money to grow the same crops, citing the fact that it cost a farmer in Northern Gezira £S0.783 per feddan to grow cotton, whereas in Southern Gezira the expense was £Sl.115.61 The differences were based on the wages paid in different parts of the scheme and factors like the amount of water needed to grow a crop in different areas. Bannaga's research.demonstrated.that even in carrying out its traditional function of overseeing cotton cultivation, the Gezira Scheme’s organization left much to be desired. Thus, the successful introduction of a new cash crop, that was not 60Ali. Mohayad. Bannaga” "A. Consideration. of Potential Advantages Which May Arise from Varying the Production Pattern Within the Gezira Scheme", Sudan Agricultural Journal, Vol.2, No.1 (November 1966). 61Ibid, p.21. 138 directly profitable to the government, was a risky proposition at best. It is not surprising, therefore, that despite the high hopes with which the Gezira entered the 1960’s it would leave the decade with considerable pessimism. CHAPTER FIVE: THE INFLUENCE OF THE GEZIRA ON THE LATER DEVELOPMENT PLANS: THE BREADBASKET STRATEGY INTRODUCTION This chapter will expand its horizons beyond the Gezira itself and examine programs that it influenced. Specifically, under President Jafar Nimieri (1969—1983), the Sudan set out on an ambitious series of plans designed to tap the nation’s agricultural potential and make the entire country a competitive exporter of agricultural products. In fact, the stated goal of Nimieri’s plans, was to transform Sudan into the "Breadbasket of the Arab IMIrld." Twenty years after these plans were first announced, they are regarded.as failures. The objective of this chapter is to place these projects within a historical context, and assess their basic feasibility. Due to tflma physical characteristics of tflma country, agricultural development in the Sudan has been dependent on the government throughout the twentieth century. Since Northern Sudan is overwhelmingly desert, it cannot be successfully farmed without irrigation, and large-scale irrigation requires extensiveicapital investment. The Southern Sudan, although considerably wetter, contains large portions of swamp land, and other of its regions are subject to flooding for months at a time. In addition to the capital needed for the preparation of the land, the Sudan requires major investments in transportation in order to move produce. 139 140 The success of the Gezira Scheme in establishing cotton as the major cash crop in the Sudan essentially set the blueprint for agricultural development in Sudan. The basic concept was that the government may or may not own a given scheme, but it would play a major role in facilitating development through irrigation and infrastructural development. Also the government of Sudan consistently worked to alienate land from small scale producers and make it available to large commercial farmers. Nimieri’s programs of expansion can thus be seen as the culmination of the plans of expansion first laid down in 1946, in. the Condominium’s Five ‘Year Plan.1 flflfijs plan clearly emphasized increasing the country’s capacity for commercial agriculture through the development of the Northwest extension of the Gezira and the building of a number of seperate schemes. The plan also aimed to improve rail lines, a move which would facilitate moving produce from farmland to port. During the 1950’s, the trend towards expansion continued with the commencement of the Managil southwest extension and the signature of the Nile Waters agreement in 1959, which permitted the construction of the Roseires dam. 1Sudan Government, Five Year Plan For Post-War Development (Khartoum, 1946). 141 Although attempts at agricultural expansion under Nimieri had historical antecedents dating to the beginning of the Condominium era, there were substantial differences between the projects of 1970's and those first envisioned during the 1940’s and 1950’s. The earlier expansion was designed to fit into the economic system of the British empire. The goal of expansion was simply to enhance the Sudan as an exporter of tropical goods useful to the industries of Great Britain. The "Breadbasket" projects of the 1970’s, however, sought to attach Sudan not to developed.western economies, but to those of neighboring, Arab petroleum—exporting nations . Furthermore, instead.of producing uniquely tropical crops, the new projects sought to place Sudan in direct competition with established agricultural giants like the ‘United. States, Canada, and Australia by making the country a viable source of grains, cattle, and sheep. When the "Breadbasket" strategy was first conceived, there were good reasons to believe that it might succeed. First of all, the ‘Yom.1Kippur ‘war and. consequent oil boycott had resulted in strained relations between the‘Western.nations and oil-producing Arab states. The possibility of a food boycott in retaliation for a future oil boycott inclined the Arab members of OPEC to find new agricultural suppliers. Secondly, the sharp increase in. petroleuml prices meant that oil- producing Arab states had.unprecedented.amounts of cash to use for assisting fraternal Arab states not endowed with 142 petrolewm. The projects undertaken during Nimieri’s regime were varied, including mechanization in Gezira. The development of agribusinesses in rainland areas, and the construction of the Jonglei Canal in the South. NIMIERI’S REGIME Nimieri was able to undertake development because he was able to able to achieve a level of independence from the traditional forces of Sudanese politics unparalleled in the history of the independent Sudan. After taking power in July 1969 with a coalition of leftward leaning army officers, the new government moved towards the Eastern Bloc.2 During its early years, Nimieri’s government was subjectedtxaatseries of challenges fromlvarious rival factions. The first showdownxmas with the Umma political party and its followers, the Ansar.3 They were soundly and brutally repressed at their traditional stronghold of Aba Island.on.the'White Nile. Later, Nimieri was confronted by a communist coup attempt. The episode was particularly serious, sinceeaznumber of communists were active in his government. The communists were defeated after three days, and then they were very ruthlessly sought out and destroyed.4 2Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan, p.195. 3Ibid. p.88, The Umma party one the two largest political parties in Sudan, comprise followers of the descendants of the Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad. The followers are known as the Ansar, or supporters. 4Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan, p.197. 143 The two confrontations had the effect of liberating Nimieri from: the twin confines of traditional sectarian Sudanese politics and.the ideological constraints of the left. In reaction, Nimieri aligned the Sudan firmly within the Arab world. The most notable aspect of this realignment was a proposed union with Libya and Egypt. Nimieri’s new policies naturally were not popular in the Southern part of the Sudan, which had been fighting to free itself fromtArabidomination for almost twenty years. Under the leadership of Joseph Lagu, the Southern military operations were unified to an unprecedented degree, which served to highlight the ultimate futility of Northern efforts to reach a battlefield solution. The military stalemate, provided an ideal background for negotiation. Unrestrained by political rivals, both Lagu and Nimieri moved towards peace. The result was the Addis Ababa accord of 1972, which laid the basis for Southern political autonomy in.domestic:matters and.generally provided Sudan.with a level of stability not seen since the colonial era. THE BREADBASKET PROGRAM Nimieri’s succeses made Sudan much more attractive to investors than had been the case for many years. A major source of new investment was the oil rich Arab countries. During the period from 1964 to 1974, the value of loans to Sudan from Arab countries nearly quintipled, increasing from 144 £834,100,000 to £Sl64,900,000.5 Additionally, loans from.the West sextupled, going from £Sl2,000,000 to £872, 600,000 during the same period. Interestingly, loans from the Soviet Bloc nearly quintipled. also. In fact, only the international organizations were laggard, little more than doubling their contributions to Sudan. It should.beznoted, however, the loans provided Sudan came under far less favorable terms than money the country had received in the past. While Sudan embarked on a variety of different agricultural endeavors, irrigated scheme agriculture is the type of activity that will be dealt with first. Students of the:modern Sudan know that the Gezira Scheme was the cornerstone of economic development during the Condominium, and that it also figured prominently in the economic plans of the first two governments of independent Sudan. The primary objective of planners during the 1950's and 60’s was to expand the size of the Gezira and to diversify its produce. By 1964, with the completion of the Managil southwest extension, the Gezira had reached the practical limits of its expansion, roughly two million feddans. Although there were some additional extensions between 1964 and 1967, they were relatively small and decidedly unsuccessful.6 5All of the information on loans on this page came from the following article: Mirghani, "The Effect of the International Monetary Crisis on Capital Inflows to Sudan," Africa Development, No. 3 (1977), pp. 51-57. 6Taha, "Problems of Land Development", Gezira archives, Barakat, Sudan. 145 The other major area of innovation in the Gezira.was crop diversification. After the construction of the Roseires dam, the Gezira Board had access to much.more water throughout the year and decided to reduce the amount of fallow in order to grow a variety of crops. Some, like wheat, would serve as import substutions, whereas others could. become ‘valuable export commodities themselves. Diversification had. mixed results, since the Gezira was not suited for growing high quality peanuts and the cooperative system used to farm peanuts seemingly' was incapable of efficient operation.7 However, the import substitute market was quite successful. Growers of wheat and vegetables made and continue to:make good profits selling to Wad Medani and the Khartoum area. By the 1970’s, theeGezira had stagnated. The situation in the Gezira was powerfully described in Tony Barnett’s work Gezira: An Illusion of Development (1977). Barnett revealed a scheme where the tenants had.no enthusiasmlfor the cultivation of cotton, Gezira’s main cash crop, and worked to send sons into the professions, rather than have them. remain in agriculture. in) combat stagnation, time Nimieri government sought to mechanize the Gezira, with mixed results. For example, the employment of cotton picking machines actually reduced yield per feddan (1 feddan = 1.038 acres) and the 7Correspondence between the R.W. Gunson company and the Gezira Board from.1965-67 recorded that therGezira soil lacked nutrients needed for the proper growth of peanuts. Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 146 widespread use of machines in picking resulted in the displacement of many seasonal laborers.8 Since cotton was the only crop in which the government and Gezira had a share of the profits, it tended to benefit the most from mechanization.9 This fact was unfortunate because peanuts, studies show, would have been far better served by mechanical harvesting than cotton.10 The Nimieri regime also founded.and.developed.a:number of other irrigation projects, foremost among them the Wadi Halfa and Rahad schemes. The former had its origins in the 1960’s, when Lake Nasser innundated Wadi Halfa. The government moved the Halfawis to the eastern Sudan along the Atbara River, where each qualified male was given a fifteen feddan tenancy, on the same basis as those in the Gezira Scheme. Indigenous nomads of the area were also settled into tenancies.11 Additional problems stemmed from cotton cultivation. First, the government tended. to have problems with the maintainence of tractors and other equipment, resulting in planting delays, inadequate plowing, and excessive weed 8Peter Oesterdiekhoff and Karl Wohlmuth, The Development Perspectives of the Democratic Republic of Sudan, (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1983), pp. 116-117. 9Brian C. D’Silva, Sudan's Irrigated Subsector (Washington: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1986), pp. 10—11. 10Ibid. 11Mohammed H.S. Ebrahim, "Irrigation Projects in Sudan: The Promise and the Reality," Journal of African Studies, No. 1 (1980), pp. 3—6. 147 growth.12 During the 1970’s, cotton prices dropped precipitously, and the government paid very small amounts of money to farmers, and then only after very long delays.13 Another major irrigated project worthy of mention is the Rahad Scheme. Founded in 1973, it was designed to take advantage of extra.water in the Roseires Damlon the Blue Nile. The Rahad differs frothezira in that a significant portion of its water is delivered by pump. Also, the Rahad was the first scheme that had.its profits paid.to tenants through individual accounts. In the opinion of Mohammed H.S. Ebrahim, the yields of the Rahad have tended.to be better than those of the Gezira and Wadi Halfa, but he attributed the success to the relative youth of the Rahad Scheme. He noted that, the Rahad is not without problems. Specifically, the government often does not have sufficient fuel to run the pumps that supply part of the Rahad’s water. To further complicate mattters, the Rahad suffers from poor maintenance of mechanical equipment. As a group, irrigated schemes ran into serious problems during the regime of Nimieri. Specifically, mechanization tended to help only well-to—do tenants, while hurting laborers. Furthermore even.when.mechanization.was effectively used, there was always the question of maintenance and fuel costs. Both of these expenses rose far out of proportion to prices for cotton during the Nimieri regime. 12Ebrahim, "Irrigation Projects in Sudan," pp. 3—6. 13Ibid. 148 In contrast to the irrigated sector, long a cornerstone of Sudanese agriculture, the rainfed, mechanized agriculture sector truly became a major factor in the economy as a result of Nimieri’s policies. Although mechanized farming had been carried out in the rainlands of Sudan after World War II, it did not receive a major push until the organization of the Mechanized Farming Corporation in 1968 and the initiation of another Five Year Plan in 1970.14 The latter was designed to provide the nation with an adequate supply of foodstuffs and to provide a significant amount of cash crops. The program provided that land. could. be leased. for twenty—five—year periods at nominal rates. At first there was a heavy emphasis on a state role in farm management, but as time went on, more farms became privately owned, and by 1974—75, 92% of the mechanized farms were privately owned.15 The owners tended to be either wealthy merchants from the Khartoum Omdurman area, or foreigners. A significant number of the latter come from the Gulf region, specifically Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Generally speaking, mechanized rainland agriculture in the Sudan has been profitable, but not without a price. There are three main problems associated.with.mechanized farming: first, there is the alienation of subsistence farmers 14OesterdieKhoff and Wohlmmttn Development Perspectives, p.59. 15Ibid, p. 60. 149 from.the land; second is the question of soil maintenance; and third, the method of financing mechanized farms. Throughout the twentieth century, small farmers in Sudan have lost control of the land to the government and large—scale agriculture. Although.more prevalent in irrigated schemes, it has been true on the:mechanized farms also, although the later are far less labor' intensive: than. their irrigated counterparts. Therefore, land alienation has resulted in a surplus of labor that cannot be readily absorbed by the Sudan’s economy. Further“ complicating :matters ‘wererzmajor droughts in Western Sudan which forced thousands of people to relocate further East. These people had traditionally been subsistence farmers who worked seasonally in Gezira. However, the increaseein mechanization lessened.demand.for their labor, causing them to scramble for the relatively slim employment 6 In short, opportunities provided by the mechanized farms.1 the Sudan experienced a huge surplus of labor during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Another major problem was declining yields, which was ,directly related to farming techniques. Basically, the mechanized farms have tended to sow an area until the soil is exhausted. Obviously, this practice has severe consequences for an ecologically fragile area like the rainbelt of the Northern Sudan. Directly related to the problem of declining 16Oeserdiekhoff and Wohlmuth, Development Perspectives, p. 75. 150 yields, is the problem of repaying loans used in financing mechanized farms. Most of the loans advanced to merchants had short periods of maturation, placing additional pressure on themlto:make quick profits, which in turn.hastened the process of soil degradation and land alienation among small farmers. The Jonglei Canal was the major development project undertaken by the Nimieri regime in the Southern part of the country. The Canal was first proposed by Sir William Garstin after his survey of the Nile river system.in 1901. Since then, there have been any number of proposals to build a canal that would siphon water from the Bahr al Ghazal directly to the White Nile. Each of them envisioned the water being used for the benefit of people in the Northern Sudan or Egypt and mostly overlooked the impact on the people in the South. The canal would effectively alter the flooding patterns of the area and, therefore, change the habits of the region’s indigenous people who herded cattle according to the availability of water. Regardless of the proposed canal’s impact, the Jonglei Canal has remained a hypothetical project. For much of the last thirty-six:years, the Southern Sudan has been involved in civil war. Nimieri, however, provided the Sudan with a peaceful interlude, allowing the Sudanese government to begin to dig the Jonglei canal. Robert O. Collins notes that as early as 1970, Nimieri had proposed a Five Year development plan for the South, which would have provided for roads and 151 factories.l7 After the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972, it was possible to pursue substantive plans. The Permanent Joint Technical Commission (PJTC), which.had devised its version of Jonglei during the 1960’s, approached.the‘government about the plan. Collins noted that the plan of the PJTC was moderate compared to those proposed in the past. Yet, the amount of water that would be drawn from the Sudd swamp would be so massive as significantly to alter the regime of flooding.18 Despite the moderation of the new plan, it still had one very major difficulty to overcome, the ignorance of the people through whose land the canal would be built. Unfortunately, those Southerners who ‘were :members of the neW' regional assembly had no knowledge of the plan either. As could be expected, this situation led to trouble. After peace was achieved.in the South, ethnic tensions that had.been submerged by the war resurfaced. Specifically, the new Southern government headed by Abel Alier, a Bor Dinka, irritated the Equatorians who felt that they had borne the brunt of the war.19 Once those opposed to the.Abel Alier heard of the Jonglei Canal plans, they had two anxieties: first, they feared that 17Robert O. Collins, The Waters of the Nile (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1990), p.309. l8Ibid, pp. 311-312. 19Tim. Allen, "Full Circle?: An Overview of Sudan’s ’Southern Problem’ Since Independence,‘I Northeast African Studies, 11, 2, 1986, p.51. 152 the Southiwould.be opened to colonization by the North or even by Egyptians; and they also were jealous that Bahr al Ghazal province would be the recipient of such an expensive development project.‘20 These feelings manifested themselves in riots at Juba and Upper Nile province against the Jonglei Canal. After the riots, the government gave the responsibility for establishing social programs tt>tflm3 Jonglei Executive Organ, run by Daniel Yong and Jonathan Jenness, an American.21 The J.E.O., which was headquartered in Khartoum, managed to achieve very little since it was founded virtually overnight, before the actual plans for the canal itself were finalized. Ultimately, nothing really came of the Jonglei Canal or the Jonglei Executive Organ. After 1984, the civil war returned to a level of intensity which made it impossible to continue work on the Jonglei Canal. As a result, the South left the Nimieri era much as it had entered it: war torn and underdeveloped. CONCLUSIONS It is tempting to dismiss the Breadbasket strategy of the Nimieri regime as a simple failure, but to do so would be unjust. Instead, it should. be remembered that what was attempted during this period was based on sound historical 20Collins, The Waters of the Nile, p.319. 21Ibid, pp. 322-324. 153 precedent. Throughout the Condominium era, development in Sudan was geared towards cash crops grown on large agricultural schemes with active government support and participation. Whether or not these arrangements were equitable, they had provided the Sudan with its greatest prosperity: after World War II and during the Korean war. Knowing this, it: is unreasonable not t1) expect successive governments to emulate past policies. On the contrary, Nimieri and his government should be credited with devising a reasonable plan to make the Sudan a competitive cash—crop exporting country. Most of the factors that eventually undid the Breadbasket strategy were either beyond the Sudanese government’s control, or stemmed from classic post— independence problems. The main problem beyond the control of Nimieri was the stringent terms, after 1969, under which the Sudan was given loans. For example, the average interest on a loan after 1969 was 6.2% as opposed to 4.2% prior to 1969.” The average average grace period was 2.8 years, instead of 4.6 years previously. Even more important, the average maturity period was 7.9 years, instead of 19.6 years before 1969. As the president of a poor country, Nimieri was obviously not in a position to dictate the terms of his country’s loans. ”All financial information here came from: Mirghani, " The Effect of the International Monetary Crisis," pp.51—57. 154 Compounding this situation.was the increase of inflation throughout the world. This meant that original estimates of project costs had to be continually revised upward, and that less could be done with the amount of money borrowed.” Furthermore, the decline in producer prices, combined with continually rising prices for manufactered goods, triggered a spiraling devaluation of Sudanese currency that has yet to stop. One factor for which the Nimieri regime cannot escape blame is the degradation of the environment brought on by large scale mechanized farming. Despite the pressure to make a profit, it was inexcusable to allow ‘wasteful farming practices in a fragile area like the Sahel region of Sudan. Finally, concerning the collapse of Jonglei, Nimieri was simply the victimlof political chickens coming home to roost. Although he was able to make unprecedented compromises with the South, Nimieri ultimately found himself having to come to terms with the same forces that he had so ruthlessly crushed earlier in regime. This resulted in the return to the same distrust that gave rise to the first civil war. Ultimately, Nimieri’s Breadbasket strategy is a lesson to smaller countries about the limited nature of their options. In trying to bring about massive growth, Nimieri instead ushered in an economic collapse that has yet to abate. At risk of sounding cavalier, the Breadbasket strategy also makes it 23Ibid. 155 clear that what is needed is a truly fresh approach to old problems. CONCLUSIONS The economic stagnation that Gezira has experienced the last three decades cannot be denied. Over that period, there has been a steady decline in cotton prices relative to manufactured goods, and the Gezira Board has been unable to institute new programs to offset this downward trend. It must be remembered, however, that the objective of this dissertation was not to deny the economic problems of the Sudan. Instead, this study sought to show that the economic decline experienced in Gezira was not pre-ordained by an irresistible formula of underdevelopment. It was brought on by a combination of international, national, and local factors, some of which were very much in the hands of the Sudanese themselves. There are those who would argue that most of the national and local factors were also created by outside forces. While there is a great deal of merit to this argument, once the Sudan gained its independence, it was responsible for its own problems, no matter where they originated. Some basic historical factors should be noted. First of all, the Gezira Scheme was foreign inspired, and it was designed to meet the needs of Great Britain’s textile industry and provide revenue for the Condominium government. Although the government clearly understood the desirability of Sudanese enjoying profits from the cotton crop, such benefits were never central to function of Gezira. Secondly, it should be noted that for the first three decades of the scheme’s 156 operation, there was a concerted effort on the part of the British to restrict the role of Sudanese to that of tenant farmers. To a man, SPS administrators were as hostile to effendiya participation in the management of the scheme as government officials were to idea of the effendiya advancing through the ranks of the civil service. The results of restricting Sudanese participation in the Gezira were manifold. First, since both effendiya and tenants were not privy to the finances of the Gezira, both groups were quick to believe that the government was making huge profits at their expense. This deep suspicion facilitated collaboration between the effendiya and tenants during the Tenant’s Strike of 1946. The event was especially devastating to the British, since many of the SPS officials, including Assistant Manager Arthur Gaitskell, had put a great deal of stock in the notion of devolution. In other words, the SPS had hoped that it could avoid employing the effendiya by organizing cooperative style farming among the tenants. Once the SPS and government decided to use the effendiya in the Gezira, the process was hurried. The government had to scramble for qualified applicants working within the government service and studying in colleges both in Sudan and Egypt. Additionally, the Gezira Board, which took over in 1950, had to arrange for currently employed workers to take both correspondence courses and travel abroad for the training needed to occupy their new positions. As is often the case in 157 158 these types of situations, those who had been in positions of power criticized the rapid advancement of "unqualified" upstarts while they conveniently forgot their long-standing policy of discrimination.1 Further complicating the rapid advancement of the effendiya was the unusually strong economic climate of the early 1950’s. As a result of the Korean war, the price of cotton skyrocketed. The economic boom, in combination with the general trend.towards political independence, served.to(oreate an atmosphere of great optimism” It seemed to both tenants and the new administrators that they were on the verge of a new and prosperous future. Unfortunately, by the middle of the decade it became clear that the earlier boomlwas temporary. By the 1953—54 season, the Gezira Board was having a hard time simply selling enough of its cotton to clear the books on that year’s crops. The resultant situation forced the Gezira Board to restructure its method of operation as soon as the Sudan gained its independence. Worse, while the price of cotton was falling, the Gezira Board had already committed itself to a policy of social 1It. must be remembered. that throughout the SPS and government service, many of the British held positions for which they had no specific training. For example, Arthur Gaitskell, the first Managing Director of the Gezira Board, had a bachelor’s degree in history. He had no formal training in agriculture. This compares favorably to the first Sudanese Managing Director, Mekki Abbas, whose formal training was in education. 159 development within the scheme. The tenants, still mindful of the episode of the Reserve Fund, were unwilling to accept the idea that the Gezira Board did not have enough money to fund its proposed new programs. Despite all of these problems, the crisis in the Gezira was not insurmountable. National instability, more than economic downturns, was what killed any chance of a revitalized.Sudan. Before independencerwas declared” it became obvious that the major political parties were unwilling to cooperate in a democratic government. Instead, each.party did its best to undercut the achievements of the other when.it was not in.power. In this kind of political atmosphere, a workable economic policy, of which the Gezira would have been the center, was out of the questiont More importantly, a political stalemate between the major parties allowed the disturbances in the South to escalate into a full-scale civil war. Under these circumstances, the democratic process in Sudan eventually crumbled, and the country came under the control of the army led by General Ibrahim Abboud. For a while, it seemed that Sudan would be able to achieve the economic stability that it desperately needed. General Abboud was able to reach. a Nile Waters Agreement with Egypt, substantially increasing the amount of water that Sudan could take from the Nile. Also, General Abboud was able to secure loans from the World Bank, the United States, and other 160 sources for the construction of major new agricultural projects. Unfortunately, the downward trend in cotton prices continued, and the Sudan found itself unable to repay loans at the agreed rate. Also, the tenants of the Gezira, who had.been radicalized during the 1950’s, continued to press the government for ever increasing shares of the:Gezira’s profits. Although its economic problems were severe, the major reason behind the Abboud government's collapse was the war in the South, which, by 1964, had seemingly’ become a hopeless conflict. The Abboud government was overthrown by a combination of traditional political parties and.twwa smaller groups, the Communists and the Muslim Brothers. The new government would have a devastating effect on the Gezira because it replaced General Abboud’s administration with a.ru%v staff that was unsympathetic to the program of intensification and diversification that had been implemented four years prior to the coup. In the latter part of the 1960’s, according to the report of Development Officer Taha El Jack Taha, the Gezira Board basically wentthrough the motions of expansion.2'Phe problem was that after Managil, the practical limits of irrigation expansion in the Gezira had been reached. The result was a 2Taha, "Development in.tflm31Managil," Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan. 161 series of ill—planned and poorly built extensions which provided the neW' tenants with. pitiful living conditions compared to those located in the more established.parts of the scheme. By the end of the decade, Colonel Jaafar Nimieri would seize control of the Sudan. He opened his adminisrtation by making what seemed to be great strides in unifying the country. By engineering the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972, he was able to end his country’s debilitating civil war and to begin to work on the economic structure of the country. Nimieri developed a bold plan, which, using the old Gezira— based.model of large—scale agricultural schemes, attempted to link the economy of Sudan to those of the oil—producing Arab states. Like Abbowd a decade earlier, Nimieri was to find financial support for his project, but the sharp increase in oil prices along with his continual domestic political intrigues served eventually to undermine his program. At the risk of monotony, it seems safe to conclude that the Sudan’s and Gezira’s current misfortune was not predestined, but the result of numerous factors, some of which could have been altered by the Sudanese themselves. 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1 9633 162 APPENDIX A COTTON YIELDS PER FEDDAN 1940-1965 .07 .10 .85 .17 .89 .41 .03 .37 .19 .146 .788 .100 .714 .69 .28 .865 .759 .505 .712 .578 .68 .1 . 81.1 (source SGB 1965) .90 Kantars (approx. 200 pounds) per feddan .638 Gezira/Managil 4.321 Geez.i1:a /b1ar1aggi.l .239 6 163 1964 ...3.747 Gezira/Managil 3.366 1965....3.382 Gezira/Managil 3.950 (May , Area, 164 APPENDIX B PRICE OF GINNED COTTON F.O.B. PORT SUDAN 1965 Report: Development of Agriculture in Gezira Main SGB) 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 .£Sl4 .ESl7 .fSl7 .£Sl3 .fSlO. .fSl4 .fSlB .£812 .fSll. .£812 .88 .06 .37 .26 37 .38 .59 .36 66 .92 165 APPENDIX C PEANUT AREA CULTIVATED 1948-49 1,956 feddans 1949-50 1,098 " " 1950-51 1,266 " " 1951—52 2,777 " " 1952-53 1,153 " " 1953-54 750 " " 1954—55 1,118 " " 1955—56 763 " " 1956-57 960 " " 1957-58 1,206 " " 1958-59 5,789 " " 1959-60 16,435 " 1960—61 42,883 " 1961-62 56,623 " 1962-63 33,823 " 1963-64 34,367 " BIBLIOGRAPHY ARCHIVAL SOURCES 1. The National Records Office, Khartoum, Sudan 2. The Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan Sudan Irrigation Department, July, 1944 Blue Nile Province, July, 1946 Gezira File 120, July, 1946 Blue Nile Province File Sudan Irrigation Department, March, 1947 Gezira Sudanization Files 448 & 449 Sudan Irrigation Department, February, 1953 Ministry of Finance to Gezira Board, January, 1955 File 362, Parliamentary Proceedings 1956 World Bank Report No.10, 77a, January, 1961 Diversification & Intensification Files 1961—1966 Managing Director’s File No.345 Agricultural Research Division, January, 1963 General Manager’s Office, 1964 General Manager’s Office, 1965 Problems of Land Development in the Managil Southwest Extension in the Sudan in the Decade 1957-1967 by Taha El Jack Taha, Sudan Development Officer 166 3. Sudan Archives, University of Durham, England "A Proposal for the Future of the Gezira Scheme" by Arthur Gaitskell SPS, 1943, File 418/6/13 "Some Notes About the Erkowit Study Camp" by Arthur Gaitskell March, 1944, File 418/3/168 Civil Secretary’s Office, May 5,1944 Five Year Plan for Post—War Development, 1946 UNPUBLISHED THESES Ahmed Ibrahim Abu Sin. "The Development of the Civil Service in the Republic of Sudan 1899—1961," M.A. Thesis, New York University, 1968. Grabler, Susan. 'fihxmn Concessionaire txn Shaykh," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin in Madison,1986. O’Brien, John, James. "Agricultural Labor and Development in Sudan,“ Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1981. BOOKS Abdel Amin Beshai. Export Performance & Economic Development in Sudan 1900-1965. London: Ithaca Press, 1976. Ahmad Abd al—RahimlNasr, and.Duffield,iMarkt A Bibliography of West African Settlement and Development in the Sudan. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 1980. Ahmed Elsheikh M. Ahmed. Structural Analysis for the Production Function of the Sudanese Economy. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 1986. 167 168 Abdel RahimlMirghani. Development Planning in the Sudan in the Sixties. Khartoum: University of Khartoum, 1983. Ali Abdel Gadir Ali. The Sudan Economy in Disarray. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 1985. Abdel Majid Hasabu. Factional Conflict in the Sudanese Nationalist Movement. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press 1985. Barclays Bank D.C.O. The Sudan: An Economic Survey. London: Barclays Bank D.C.O., 1958. Barnett, A.S. Some Sociological Implications of the Administration of the Gezira Scheme. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 1972. Barnett, Tony. The Gezira Scheme: An Illusion of Development. London: Frank Cass, 1977. Barnett,Tony, and Abbas Abdelkarim. Sudan: State, Capital and Transformation. London: Croon Helm, 1988. Bechtold, Peter, K. Politics in the Sudan. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976. Botman, Selma, Egypt from Independence to Revolution, 1919- 1952. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991. Collins, Robert, O. The Waters of the Nile: Hydropolitics and the Jonglei Canal 1900-1988. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1990. Daly, Martin, W. Empire On the Nile.Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1986. 169 Daly, Martin, W. Imperial Sudan. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1991. D’Silva, Brian, C. Sudan’s Irrigated Subsector. Washington: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1986. Duffield, Mark, Rt Maiurno: Capitalism: & Rural Life in Sudan. London: Ithaca Press, 1981. Ministry of Finance and National Economy. The Economic Survey 1974—1975. Khartoum: Economic Research Station, 1975. Food and.Agriculture Organization. Consultation on Irrigation in Africa. Rome: United Nations, 1987. Gaitskell, Arthur. Gezira: A Story of Development in the Sudan. London: Faber and Faber, 1959. Henderson, K.D.D. Sudan Republic. New York: Praeger, 1965. Hill, Richard, Egypt in the Sudan 1820—1881. London: Oxford University Press, 1959. Holt, P.M. and Daly, M.W. A History of the Sudan. Lc3n