



This is to certify that the


dissertation entitled

Administration and Change in the Gezira
Scheme and the Sudan 1938-1970

presented by
Anthony Quinn Cheeseboro

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

PhD degree in History


Major professor

Date 24 August 1993

LIBRARY
Michigan State
University

PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record.
TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due.

DATE DUE	DATE DUE	DATE DUE
	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

MSU Is An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution

c:\pic\date.due.pm3-p.1



ADMINISTRATION AND CHANGE IN THE GEZIRA SCHEME
AND THE SUDAN:
1938 - 1970

BY

Anthony Quinn Cheeseboro

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to

Michigan State University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1993

ABSTRACT

ADMINISTRATION AND CHANGE IN THE GEZIRA SCHEME AND THE SUDAN 1938-1970

By

Anthony Quinn Cheeseboro

This study seeks to determine whether the Sudanese government and Gezira administration could have appreciably altered the economic decline of the scheme. Several studies prior to this have suggested that Gezira and Sudan were swept up in a wave of underdevelopment that made it impossible for the economic plans of the government to succeed. My research, which is based on archival sources, interviews, and secondary sources, points to a different conclusion. Political instability, appears to have been much more pivotal in the decline of the Gezira than metropolitan capitalism. This can clearly be seen in this study because the overall economic and political situation in the Sudan is examined as well as the Gezira itself. By taking note of general political instability, it became obvious that under such circumstances, any government would have a difficult time pursuing development.

Copyright by
Anthony Quinn Cheeseboro
1993

i.

DEDICATED TO:

MY PARENTS, THE LATE MASTER SERGEANT MABERIA
AND ROSA NELL CHEESEBORO




ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I hereby acknowledge the help of my mother, Mrs. Rosa Cheeseboro, and Dr. Harold Marcus, Dr. David Robinson, Dr. Darlene Clark Hine, Dr. Malik Balla, Dr. Abdel Rahman Ahmed Abdel Rahman, Dr. Sam Laki, Dr. Martin Daly, and all the other people who assisted me in any way with a special thank you to the friendly staff of the Gezira headquarters at Barakat.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1	Introduction
3	Literature Review
24	Chapter One: 1898-1930
48	Chapter Two: 1930-1950 The Nationalist Response to the Gezira and its Sudanization
77	Chapter Three: 1950-1960, Consolidation of Sudanese Control and Expansion in the Gezira
104	Chapter Four: 1960-1969 Gezira's Attempts to Remake Itself
135	Chapter Five: The Influence of the Gezira on Later Development Plans: The Breadbasket Strategy
152	Conclusions
158	Appendices
162	Bibliography



INTRODUCTION

This study, Administration and Change in the Gezira Scheme 1938 - 1970, is an attempt to trace the development of the Gezira Scheme from the late 1930's to the onset of the Nimieri regime. The goal of this dissertation is to determine the degree to which the people of the Sudan were able to effect the development of the Gezira once they attained independence. Many authors have tended to stress the relative weakness of the Sudanese vis a vis the international capitalist system. According to these researchers, the underdevelopment of the Gezira and Sudan was an inevitable result of the country's dependant position in the world economy.

Although I do not dispute the idea of Sudan's weakness relative to that of the established metropolitan powers, I do believe that the reasons behind the Gezira's and Sudan's economic stagnation go beyond the structural weakness of the country's economy. Specifically, I argue that political instability was the crucial factor in the Sudan's inability to improve the quality of its economy. To a lesser degree, the fact that Sudanese were denied access to the administration of the Gezira until the end of the colonial period also played a major factor in the failure of development programs in the 1950's and 1960's. Since the Sudanese were kept from the government and Gezira's administration, the tenants and effendiya did not have a very clear idea of the potential or problems involved in the management of the scheme. This lack

of knowledge was also exacerbated by the World War II and Korean War booms that occurred immediately prior to the drive towards independence because the unusually high prices raised the expectations of tenants and other members of the modern sector to an unrealistic degree.

Because of the factors mentioned above, economic development early on became subordinated to political cleavages and group interests. During periods of parliamentary rule, battles between political parties were so intense that development of coherent economic strategy was virtually impossible. Although the military governments of Abboud and Nimieri were able to formulate logical development programs, both governments suffered from their narrow base within civil society. Therefore, Nimieri and Abboud were eventually brought down by groups who felt that their interests were ignored. In both cases, once the military governments were overthrown, their economic policies were also discarded.

Once again, it must be stressed that one must not overlook the economic disadvantages suffered by the Sudan and Gezira. However, to portray the problems of the Gezira as totally beyond the control of the Sudanese ignores the actual role played by the Sudanese in the creation of their problems. More importantly, it denies that the Sudanese have the capacity to solve their problems in the future.

Literature Review

The Gezira Scheme has, over the years, attracted a significant amount of analysis and study. This is not surprising since the Gezira is by far the single largest economic entity in the Sudan. Furthermore, the Gezira and the development of the cotton trade were definitely the hallmarks of the economic policy of the Condominium era in Sudan. The Gezira has subsequently been a major influence on all succeeding governments of the independent Sudan.

There is a significant amount of material on the Gezira extant. The problem is that most of the information is not historical and has not been concerned with the mechanics of the scheme's administration. In the sixties, authors tended to accept optimistic models of development, and sought to plan how to use modern techniques to maximize the profitability of the Gezira. During the 1970's there was a great realization that the Gezira, and Sudan, were not progressing. The rush was then to explain why development was not taking place.

It is my belief that in concentrating almost exclusively on tenants, recent researchers have implicitly stated that whatever the administration did was inconsequential. Or else, many researchers implied that the administration was almost by definition an accomplice of metropolitan capitalism.

I have not attempted to refute the glaring fact of the Sudan's economic malaise. However, I do take issue with the

notion that the successive administrations of the Sudan government and Gezira Board were not interested in achieving a meaningful independence for the Sudan and the Gezira Scheme. Therefore, the focus of my study was on the administration of the Gezira. I wanted to see whether or not the administration of the Gezira made a real effort to assert the scheme's independence, or did it just follow the plans left behind by the British.

To make the above determination, it became apparent that the period to study should be approximately 1938-1970. At first I only wanted to study the period from 1950-1969 since this would have covered the time from the establishment of the Gezira Board to the advent of the Nimieri regime. It was Nimieri who placed the Gezira under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture, and who instituted the "Breadbasket" program. In other words, the time between 1950-1969 can be seen as the period of optimism following independence. Naturally this would have been the time when the Gezira's administration would have been bold in trying to create a new role for the scheme.

However, once I began my research, I saw that if I simply started in 1950, I would not be able to explain why nationalization and the Sudanization of the work force took the shape that it did. Therefore, I began my study in the year 1938 when the first memoranda discussing major changes in the administration of the scheme appear. It should also be noted

that the final chapter discusses the Gezira and other schemes in the decade after 1970. This is done so that the reader can see the influence of Gezira policy on the country as a whole.

I should also note that my approach to the subject here has been to follow the narrative approach. While this seems conservative, the reason for this method was not political, I simply wanted to see what the Gezira administration did in the various situations it found itself in after independence, and I did not want to superimpose any formula which would tend to force my research into certain conclusions.

In keeping with the traditional historical approach, the sources that were used for this study are primarily printed archival documents. Once again, the emphasis of this study was the Gezira administration or management, and in order to understand these people I sought to examine the official documents that they left behind. Although these documents by no means tell the entire story, they are excellent sources for study if the objective is to understand the administrative state of mind.

I should state that this project is first and foremost a history. There are two reasons for this; first, my training has been that of a historian, if I were to competently analyze anything it would be best done from a historical perspective. The second reason is that, other than a few economic history studies, there simply has been no history of the Gezira Scheme since the time of Gaitskell. I feel that the story of Gezira's

management and administration in the post-colonial era deserves a human face, and the objectives of the scheme's administration needed to be examined in some detail instead of simply being regarded as the mechanical reactions to a pre-ordained theory. It is my sincere hope that I have succeeded in this endeavor.

Central to understanding the administration of the Gezira is an understanding of the total history of Sudan. Only when the entire political and economic situation of the country is comprehended, can many decisions made about the management of the Gezira be understood. Perhaps the best overall history of Sudan is A History of the Sudan (1988), by P.M. Holt and Martin Daly. This book, the first edition of which was written by Professor Holt in 1961, offers the reader a good overview of Sudanese history, from the late nineteenth century onward. Although more specialized studies are needed for anybody doing serious research, it is difficult to imagine undertaking research on modern Sudan without consulting this book.

In an attempt to establish the cultural traditions found in the Gezira region, one should start with an examination of the Funj Sultanate, the earliest centralized government known to have developed in that area. In Jay Spaulding's The Heroic Age in Sinnar (1983), one can see how under the Funj, Islam was established in the Gezira. Also, the book describes the gradual process of Arabization that overtook the Gezira, eventually eclipsing the earlier, Nubian culture. The

phenomenon of Arabization is of particular importance when studying the reaction of Gezira Arabs to ethnic West Africans during the 1940's and 1950's. From an economic standpoint, Spaulding's work is important because it establishes that early on the Gezira was seen as a particularly fertile location in comparison to other regions of the Northern Sudan and an important area for trade. This same general story can also be seen in the R.S. O'Fahey and Jay Spaulding book, Kingdoms of the Sudan (1974).

After the defeat of the Funj by the Turco-Egyptian forces of Muhammad Ali, there were several attempts to develop cash crops in the Sudan. In his book, Egypt in Sudan 1820-1881 (1959), Richard Hill notes that a Turkish governor, Mahu Bey was responsible for encouraging the cultivation of Sudanese long-staple cotton. He also introduced this cotton to Egypt.

As Gaitskell and many other twentieth century observers have noted, the religious societies or tariqas are among the most important social structures of the region. A book that gives great insight into one of the most momentous religious and political events in Sudanese history is P.M. Holt's The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898 (1958). The Ansar movement, founded by the Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad would become one of the major political forces in the Gezira and the rest of Northern Sudan. It would be especially strong among those Western Sudanese who constitute such a large portion of the Gezira's workforce. Another important aspect of the Mahdiyya

period was that it witnessed large shifts in Sudan's population which resulted in the British assuming that the North had been depopulated during that period.

The period of Sudanese history following the Mahdiyya is of course the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. Although the Condominium was theoretically a period of shared rule in Sudan, the reality was that the British controlled the country. Therefore, any study of Sudan during this period would necessarily involve a detailed examination of British rule and policy. The historian who has worked most extensively in the field of British Condominium history in Northern Sudan is Martin Daly. His British Administration and the Northern Sudan (1979) is a study of the Condominium under Sir Lee Stack. Stack's tenure paralleled both the first fully operational years of the Gezira, and the first significant out-burst of nationalism, which resulted in his assassination.

Empire on the Nile (1986) and Imperial Sudan (1991), also by Daly, combine to form an exhaustive study of British government in Sudan during the entire Condominium period. These two books serve to draw a clear picture of how the British viewed the Sudan and the Sudanese. Fundamentally, one sees officials who were quite conscientious and well-intentioned, even though they could be paternalistic and condescending when it came to Sudanese aspirations. These traits are particularly important for this study since the SPS

officials could be considered de facto government members during most of this period.

Although Daly's books are quite thorough, by design they focus on the British. Naturally, in order to develop a more complete understanding of Sudan during this period, it is necessary to examine other groups involved in the Sudan. Muddathir Abdel Rahim's Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan (1969) is an excellent source for information on the development individuals and organizations dedicated to the independence of Sudan. This book concentrated on the development of nationalist organizations and political parties. In particular, Professor Muddathir described the growth of movements like the White Flag League after World War I, and the repression of political activists after the assassination of Sir Lee Stack. Also discussed is the involvement of traditional tariqa leaders in the politics of Sudan which ultimately led to the creation of the country's two leading political parties, the Umma party of the Ansar and the Ashiqqa (NUP) which was affiliated with the Khatmiyya. Overall, Professor Muddathir's approach to Sudanese nationalism is a fairly conservative one that emphasizes the Islamic elements of Sudanese politics.

Another very useful book on Sudanese nationalism is Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan (1976) by Mohamed Omer Beshir. Dr. Mohamed's study is similar to that of Muddathir Abdel Rahim's except that his work tends toward a more liberal

interpretation of the development of Sudanese nationalism. The Beshir book is especially useful in its sections dealing with the Graduates Congress, the first major vehicle for the concerns of the educated class or graduates.

Another book of Mohamed Omer Beshir, Educational Development in the Sudan 1898-1956 (1969), is a valuable source of information about the kind of training that the graduates received. The book outlines how education developed at Gordon College in Sudan as a way to supply the government with a civil service, and how it was subsequently curtailed once the government workers began to organize themselves politically. Also, the book describes the development of secondary schools throughout the rural areas, and the organization of agricultural education. This is particularly important to this study since many of the early Sudanese administrators, including the Gezira's first Sudanese Managing Director, Mekki Abbas, were products of the rural secondary and agricultural schools.

In addition to studies about nationalism, it is necessary to gauge the status of the Sudan in international politics. Although the Sudan is only mentioned fleetingly in William Roger Louis' book, The British Empire in the Middle East (1984), this volume is important because it makes the point that the British regarded Sudan as important strategically. Specifically, they hoped to move military operations from bases in Iraq, Palestine, and Egypt to Sudan

since they assumed that they would be able to hold on to Sudan longer than other territories in the heartland of the Middle East. Once this strategy becomes clear, it helps to explain the form that development projects took in post World War II Sudan.

John Markakis' National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa (1990), as the name implies, is a study of political culture and society throughout the region in which the Sudan is located. Markakis' work concentrates on the how the class interests of various groups in the Horn of Africa manifest themselves in civil conflict. In the case of Sudan, Markakis argues that the country is controlled by a small group of riverain Arabs, whose section of the country benefitted the most from the development policies of the British. Naturally, Markakis places the Gezira at the center of this privileged region, and its managers as members of the country's privileged elite. As for the Gezira's tenants, he considers them to be part of the exploited masses, who have seen little or no benefit from the export-oriented policies of colonial and post-colonial regimes.

Markakis' treatment of tenants is at variance with the widely held view that even though they are producers, they still are a relatively privileged group in the Sudan. In all likelihood, Markakis simply did not take the time to get deeply into the status of the tenants because of the wide scope of his book. Still his work is useful because it helps

to bring the problems of the Gezira within the framework of the national political situation of the country. A national perspective is something that can be easily overlooked when one is mainly reading material dealing with Gezira.

Two books that give more detailed analyses of the Gezira are Gabriel Warburg's Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society (1978) and Peter Bechtold's Politics in the Sudan (1976). Both of these books look at various segments of Sudanese society and how they interact with each other in the political climate of Sudan. As the title indicates, Warburg's book is concerned with impact of new ideologies on the Sudan. In particular, he traces the growth of mainstream nationalist organizations in Sudan, and the development of the Communist Party. For a student of the Gezira, the Communists are of particular interest. Warburg shows that through their aggressive bargaining in favor of increased shares of profits for tenants, the Communists were able to gain positions of leadership within the tenant's union. This influence was, however, quite limited. The Communists were never able to count on the Gezira tenants in general political elections while they could depend on the support of certain large segments of the urban proletariat like the rail workers.

Peter Bechtold's book covers much the same territory as Warburg's, except that Bechtold's emphasis is more sociological than historical in nature. Also Bechtold's work tends to have a much wider focus than that of Warburg, since

it seeks to give a panoramic view of Sudanese society rather than concentrate on particular national crises as was the case with Warburg's book.

The final general volume on Sudan to be cited in this literature review is Sudan: State and Society in Crisis (1991), edited by John Voll. Although this volume is primarily concerned with developments in the Sudan over the last ten years, there is one chapter in this book that is of particular interest to this study. "Farmers and the Failure of Agribusiness in the Sudan" by Stephen Kontos demonstrates the influence of the Gezira and large schemes in general as the model for Sudan's economic development. Using these, and other sources, I have attempted to place the Gezira and its administration within the context of Sudanese society and politics.

This literature review will also, of course, delineate sources of information about the Gezira, and it will start with a listing of primary sources. The greatest source of primary documents for this project came from the archives at Barakat, Sudan, the site of the Gezira administrative headquarters. At Barakat, there are a wide variety of documents to be examined. Files from the office of the managing director and the general manager, and files from various departments like accounting. The archives also contained files on specific topics like Sudanization and the

Tenant's Strike of 1946. Finally, special reports such as development officer Taha El Jack Taha's "Problems of Land Development in the Managil Southwest Extension in the Sudan in the Decade 1957-1967," provided a great deal of useful information about the administration of Gezira.

Another archive that figured prominently in the research for this paper was the Sudan Archive at the University of Durham in the United Kingdom. Of particular interest at this archive was the collection of memoranda written by Arthur Gaitskell, a major administrator during both the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and the early Gezira Board. Memoranda like "A Proposal for the Future of the Gezira Scheme" and "Some Notes About the Erkowit Study Camp" were very useful because they provided a more candid picture of the opinions of Gaitskell than the one he presented in his book Gezira: A Story of Development in the Sudan (1959). Also of great importance were documents like the 1946 Five Year Plan of the Condominium government.

Considering the primary documents and despite the influence of the Gezira, it is surprising that only three book-length monographs dealing with Gezira have ever been written. And of those three books, only two are commonly available. These are Gezira: A Story of Development in the Sudan (1959), by Arthur Gaitskell, and Gezira: An Illusion of Development (1977), by Tony Barnett. While the Gezira has been the subject of numerous dissertations and theses, the great

majority of these have not been published. Despite the paucity of lengthy detailed studies, there are numerous journal articles about the Gezira.

The logical place to start this part of the literature review is with Gezira: a Story of development in the Sudan by Arthur Gaitskell. This book is the single most concise and complete account of the Gezira Scheme prior to the establishment of the Gezira Board. Gaitskell was particularly well qualified to write a history of the Gezira, since he worked for the Sudan Plantations Syndicate from 1923 until 1950, and became the first managing director of the Gezira Board after the nationalization of the Gezira in 1950. He eventually retired in 1952. Incidentally, Gaitskell was a history major at Oxford's New College and the brother of Hugh Gaitskell, a prominent Labour MP who was instrumental in the nationalization of Britain's rail system.

It is safe to say that Arthur Gaitskell generally mirrored his brother Hugh's political temperament; he was a progressive minded liberal. However, since Arthur Gaitskell was active in Africa, he naturally had to implement his politics differently than his brother. Specifically, Gaitskell's actions and analyses betrayed tendencies towards paternalism and ethnocentrism.

Gaitskell's account of the Gezira stresses the pioneering aspects of the scheme. That is, he emphasized the level of risk undertaken in trying to establish commercial agriculture

in the Sudan. Gaitskell also tended to portray the British government and SPS officials in a very altruistic light. In other words, Gaitskell always downplayed any profit that might have been made, and emphasized the benefits that would be derived from a given project or policy that was pursued in the Gezira.

The negative side of Gaitskell's approach was that he almost always appeared to have a low opinion of anything that was of Sudanese origin. In particular, he always portrayed any kind of political movement as being an outside force that sought to influence innocent tenants. In this vein, he criticized the leaders of traditional religious groups as forces of backwardness and ignorance; he characterized the educated elites as distant and manipulative; and he saw tenant activists as communists.

It should be kept in mind, however, who Gaitskell was and when he wrote his book. Gaitskell was a very important figure in the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, and he was later a major figure in the new Gezira Board. He was writing a history in which he had played no small part, and it should surprise no one that his report of that era was quite favorable. Although Gaitskell never outwardly confronts them, one can assume that he felt a need to criticize African militants who constantly stressed the exploitive nature of metropolitan relations with colonial regions.

As far as structure is concerned, Gaitskell's work is the only true narrative history dealing with the Gezira Scheme. The great connecting theme in the monograph is an unabashed faith in progress. The reader is left with the opinion that the Sudanese had been given a flawless blueprint that would work for the foreseeable future.

No thesis could have been farther from Gaitskell's rosy forecast than that of Tony Barnett. Instead of seeing the Gezira as an example of progress with an optimistic future, Barnett instead saw the Gezira's fundamental relationship with the industrialized world as a dependant one in which the Gezira and Sudan would always remain underdeveloped. Furthermore, Barnett felt that the Gezira had already reached the logical limits of its development and would not offer a better future to the children of current tenants.

Barnett's work concentrated on the actual tenants living in the Gezira Scheme. Barnett examined how they survived and the general quality of their lives. His approach was fundamentally sociological in that he examined the Gezira's tenants as members of a larger societal unit. His analysis was based on the theories of Andre Gundar Frank, who espoused a theory of underdevelopment that argued that through interaction with developed economies, the economies of less developed countries were effectively trapped in a capitalist system in which they were perpetually held in check. Furthermore, Frank felt that regardless of any changes in the

outward appearances, i.e. from colony to independent country, the fundamental relationship of exploitation would be strong enough to survive the transition. Although Barnett's study contained historical information and analysis, the primary emphasis of his study was the Gezira as he personally observed it, and how it was described to him by his informants.

It would appear Barnett intended that his work be seen as a direct challenge to the development claims of Gaitskell. His emphasis on the limited options of tenants in securing credit or diversifying, definitely shows the barriers to individual initiative in the Gezira. Furthermore, his accounts of the energy invested in trying to send sons into other professions reinforces the impression that tenants felt that the Gezira Scheme would not confer a prosperous future to their children.

Although it is an unpublished dissertation, From Concessionaire to Shaykh (Wisconsin-Madison, 1986) by Susan Grabler provides a compelling new look at the early years of the Gezira Scheme. Grabler puts the endeavors of the early Sudan Plantation Syndicate (SPS) in the wider context of concession companies in the Sudan at the turn of the century. Grabler notes, as did Gaitskell, that the condominium was short of money during its early years, and that it was quite willing to give companies very favorable terms in the hope that they would eventually be able to develop profitable operations. In particular, Grabler's accounts of tax breaks and special rail prices stands in stark contrast to the

picture painted by Gaitskell of a struggling SPS which was barely able to make a profit. For a concise version of Grabler's observations about the Sudan, one can consult "European Capital Exports and Concessions Policy in the Sudan 1898-1913," Northeast African Studies volume 8, numbers 2-3, 1986.

As noted earlier, Gaitskell and Barnett are the only two generally accessible published monographs on the Gezira. There are, however, some books which have devoted a considerable portion of their attention to the Gezira. Foremost among these is a volume by Peter Oesterdiekhoff and Karl Wohlmuth, The Development Perspectives of the Democratic Republic of Sudan (1983). This book concerned itself with the "Breadbasket" strategy of the Sudanese government under President Nimeri during the 1970's. The authors examined the "Breadbasket" strategy using the delinkage model of Samir Amin. After examining the strategy, the authors found it wanting. In essence, they felt that by trying to align Sudan's economy with those of the oil-rich Arab states, Sudan was simply trading one master for another. Instead of trying to become a source for imports to the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, the authors instead argued that Sudan should have worked towards food self sufficiency.

John Tait, in his article for the Oesterdiekhoff and Wohlmuth book, "The Modernization of the Colonial Mode of Production in the Gezira Scheme," dealt with the impact of the

"Breadbasket" strategy in the Gezira. He was concerned with the introduction of mechanized farming into the Gezira. Tait followed the thesis of B.Founou-Tchuigoua that the tenants of the scheme are de facto wage laborers. Using this argument, Tait said that the introduction of machinery necessarily would have a negative impact on the tenants since production there had always been labor intensive. In other words, it would be inevitable that many people would be left unemployed with no viable alternative. In addition to leaving people unemployed, mechanization was also used in a questionable way. Tait cited evidence that machinery was used on crops that benefitted from it the least, while crops that were more economically amenable to machinery were left to manual harvesting.

An article that is quite useful in conjunction with Oesterdiekhoff and Wohlmuth is Hussein M. Mirghani's "The Effect of the International Monetary Crisis on Capital Inflows to the Sudan: A Preliminary Note" Africa Development number 3, 1977. This article describes the terms under which Sudan received financial assistance during the Nimieri years. More importantly, it shows how, through higher interest rates and shorter repayment periods, the attempt at reorienting Sudan's economy was almost doomed from the start.

B. Founou-Tchuigoua's article, "De Facto Wage Earners in the Gezira Scheme (Sudan)," Africa Development number 1, 1978, made simple observations about the arrangement between the three partners of the Gezira Scheme, government, Gezira Board,

and tenants, to prove that the tenants were actually wage laborers. In order to prove this point, Founou-Tchuigoua noted that the rent paid for land in Gezira was minimal and that the government made all of the rules concerning the transaction. Additionally, he showed that the government, with its power to evict tenants, was definitely a superior, and not a partner.

The one phenomenon that Founou-Tchuigoua found a bit contradictory was the tenant's heavy reliance on hired labor. He was able to show that due to the sharp increase in post-war cotton prices, the social status of tenants increased, and they were able to hire labor in much greater numbers than previously. As a result, it became accepted practice for tenants to hire labor for much of their work.¹

The work of Founou-Tchuigoua grew out the efforts of other researchers in the 1960's who were primarily concerned with labor problems and the impact of the stabilization of cotton prices on the tenants of Gezira. Of these, D.J. Shaw is of particular note. He wrote and co-wrote two articles for the Agricultural Economics Bulletin of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. In one of his articles, "Labour Problems in the Gezira Scheme" (1964), Shaw stated that with the opening of the Managil extension, many of the agricultural laborers would soon have their own tenancies. He

¹It should also be noted that other researchers like Barnett have shown that subletting tenancies also grew in popularity due to the increasing unprofitability of tenancies. Well-to-do tenants often devoted their personal time to more remunerative pursuits.

also feared that what appeared to be a growing industrial sector would also deprive the Gezira tenants of laborers. His solution was to look into mechanization and to continue research into crop rotations so that the most effective way to handle agricultural tasks could be found. Needless to say, the findings of later researchers revealed that his concerns had not materialized.

A more recent article on the subject of labor in the Gezira and related schemes is "The Formation of the Agricultural Labour Force in Sudan" by Jay O'Brien, Review of African Political Economy number 26, 1983. O'Brien's thesis is that, during the late 1950's, the Sudanese government consciously sided with the interests of commercial agriculture to deny farm labor its demands for more equitable treatment. It must be remembered that a significant portion of the Gezira's farm labor consists of people of West African origin. These people were eventually controlled by denying them citizenship rights.

An article which sustains a contemporary Riverain Arab viewpoint was Issam Ahmad Hassoun's "'Western' Migration and Settlement in the Sudan," Sudan Notes and Records volume 33, 1952. This article, which by current standards evinces a rather bigoted tone, nevertheless gives an accurate account of the West African immigrants countries of origin, and a good description of the conditions under which they lived in Sudan. Finally, I should note Mark Duffield's Maiurno: Capitalism and

Rural Life in Sudan (1981) as a more current account of Western populations in the general vicinity of the Gezira. This work describes the process of Arabization in the Western community, and the movement of the assimilated into other fields of activity.

As was stated earlier, this dissertation is an attempt to place the administration of the Gezira within the wider context of Sudanese society. This literature review is a survey of the kinds of material that was used to make this analysis. Obviously, a reliance on archival and secondary documents has resulted in a less intimate study than many of the current works dealing with development, but, as was said earlier, the perspective provided by these sources is necessary for a balanced and more informative history of the Gezira and Sudan.

CHAPTER ONE: 1898-1930

Although the word Gezira means "island", the region is in fact an inland peninsula created by the White and Blue Nile rivers. It begins at Khartoum where the Nile splits into its component parts, the Blue and White Niles, and stretches southward into the rainland areas south of Sennar, a distance of roughly 150 miles. From east to west, the Gezira is considerably more narrow, it is never more than forty or so miles wide. The most distinguishing feature of the Gezira is its utter flatness, but in reality the land does gently slope from east to west. The other distinct aspect of the Gezira is the heavy clay content of its soil. These two features would prove crucial in making the Gezira an ideal sight for an irrigated agriculture project.

Historical Background

The Gezira, like the rest of Sudan, has had a very long and eventful history prior to the advent of the current irrigation regime. In ancient times, the Gezira was at the southern end of Nubia. During the Funj period, the Gezira became a much more important region. First of all, the capital of the Funj was in Sennar, the future site of the all important Sennar dam. Secondly, it was during this period that the Gezira began its current function as a major agricultural center.

Under the Funj, the Gezira was organized along what could best be described as feudal lines. There was a monarch, the makk or sultan, and under him there were a multiplicity of lesser nobles.¹ In the Funj system of government, the peasant population was obligated to provide significant quantities of grain to both the local noble and the makk. The local nobles also maintained a system of markets or al aswaq (sing. sug)², where goods were traded between pastoralists and farmers. It should be noted that both grain and cotton were prominent in this trade.

THE TURKIYYA

During the eighteenth century, the Funj Sultanate entered a period of decline brought on by the rise of Arabic culture in Sudan. This decline was finalized with the conquest, in 1820, of the Sudan by the forces of the Ottoman governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha. Muhammad Ali was an energetic, commercially minded governor, whose economic and social policies have led many scholars to consider him the founder of modern Egypt. In Sudan, his goals were not to transform the country's political economy; instead he saw Sudan as source of slaves for his army and a region where various exotic goods and gold could be procured.³ Once Muhammad Ali's forces were

¹Jay Spaulding, The Heroic Age in Sennar, (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1985), p.41.

² Ibid Pg. 107.

³P.M. Holt and Martin Daly, A History of the Sudan (London: Longman 1988), p.48.

in control of Egypt, he soon found that the slaves were not suitable for the relatively cool winters of Egypt and that the gold of old Nubia no longer existed in large quantities.

This left the new Turco-Egyptian regime with tropical products such as ostrich feathers and ivory. These exotic products did prove valuable but were susceptible to fluctuations in public taste. Moreover, during the early years of the new regime, the lands from which these products came were not within the control of the government. Under such circumstances, it was quite natural for the new government to turn to a more reliable source of income, namely agriculture.

After futile attempts to grow coffee and foster a wool industry, Muhammad Ali learned that cotton was grown in Sudan. He sent for a sample, whose seeds were later named after the governor of Sudan, Mahu Bey, and they went on to become the basis for the Egyptian cotton introduced during Muhammad Ali's rule.⁴ However, despite several attempts to spread cotton's cultivation, it never became a major crop in Sudan under Turco-Egyptian rule.

⁴Richard Hill, Egypt in the Sudan 1820-1881, (London: Oxford University Press 1959), p.52.

THE MAHDIYYA

In the year 1885, Muhammad Ahmad, who declared himself to be the Mahdi, or rightly guided one, led a movement that succeeded in overthrowing the Turco-Egyptian regime in Sudan. After gaining power, the Mahdi and his successor, the Khalifa Abdallahi, were unable to make major inroads into international markets. The Gezira, however, continued to be a major producer of grain, and provided its share of the zakat, or tithe, to the central treasury in kind.⁵

THE CONDOMINIUM

In 1898, Egyptian and British troops under Sir Herbert Kitchener defeated the forces of the Khalifa Abdallahi and destroyed the Mahdist State. The victorious troops did not reinstall the old Turco-Egyptian regime, instead forming a new government. This government was called the condominium, so named because it was composed of the two victorious parties, or co-domini, Britain and Egypt. Legally, the Condominium Agreement of 1899 recognized the pre-existing sovereignty of Egypt over the Sudan but also gave Britain the right to rule there as a result of conquest.⁶

The British agreed to this type of government for a number of reasons. First, by recognizing Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan, London avoided the problems of great power rivalry

⁵P.M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898, (Oxford: London 1958), pp. 109-112.

⁶Ibid, p.118.

that would have developed had Britain directly annexed Sudan. Moreover, the condominium gave the Foreign Office the kind of control it would have had if Sudan had been a formal part of the British empire.

London's primacy was clearly demonstrated in the administration that was created in the Condominium agreement. Sudan fell under the control of a military officer who was known as the governor-general, who enjoyed total legislative and administrative control. Although formally appointed by the Khedive of Egypt, the governor-general was always a British officer recommended by the government in London. The country was divided into provinces much the same way it had been under the Turco-Egyptian regime.⁷ At first all of the governors were from military backgrounds, but after martial law was relaxed in 1926 civilian governors were introduced. Beneath the governors were junior British officers known as inspectors. The Europeans who controlled the administration and army were assisted by Egyptian soldiers and civilians.

To help maintain control over the population, the new government allowed Shari'a (Muslim) law to stand in regards to personal status. Only the criminal code was westernized.⁸ Shari'a law was administered by Muslim judges (qadi), most of whom were Sudanese. In addition, the Condominium developed a

⁷Muddathir 'Abdel Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, (Khartoum: University Press, 1986), p. 41.

⁸Ibid, p. 40.

class of Sudanese civil servants who did most of the clerical and minor administrative work. These men were trained at Gordon Memorial College in Khartoum which was founded in 1902, in addition to familiarizing the students with English and other basic skills, the schools had a heavy vocational emphasis, teaching skills such as carpentry and education.⁹ Gordon College was ran by the country's first director of education, Sir James Currie.

As Muddathir Abdel Rahim comments, contrary to its title, Gordon College was in reality a primary level school which was designed to teach its students only the rudiments of Western education.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the training they received and the government positions they held differentiated them from the general population. They were therefore commonly referred to as the effendiya, a term of Turkish origin which originally signified literacy.

THE SUDAN'S ECONOMIC CLIMATE AND CONCESSIONS

To support the administration, the new government obviously needed substantial revenues. The problem was that the Sudan was unable to generate the level of revenue needed during the early years of Condominium rule. Because of the

⁹Ahmed Abu Sin, The Development of the Civil Service in the Republic of the Sudan 1899-1961 (Khartoum: Institute of Public Administration Republic of the Sudan Khartoum 1968), p.33.

¹⁰'Abdel Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism, p.40.

violent and brutal campaign that had been necessary to conquer the Mahdiyya, the government was hesitant to tax the people too heavily for fear that it might provoke a rebellion. It should be noted that these fears were justified since the government did have to put down a number of revolts during its early years. As a result of this situation, the Condominium was reluctant to collect taxes. For example, in 1900, the government was only to raise £E156,000 (Egyptian Pounds) in taxes (approx. \$550,000) from the entire country.¹¹ To make up for this lack of money, the Condominium was constantly forced to borrow from the Egyptian treasury. Naturally, this was a situation with which nobody was happy.

In the minds of the Sudan's administrators, the most obvious way to solve the financial problems of the country was to develop exports. The government of Sudan was receptive, therefore, to the idea of foreign investment in agriculture. Susan Grabler, in her article, "European Capital Exports and Concessions Policy in the Sudan 1898-1913," argues that during the period before World War I, the Condominium was convinced that the only way to develop Sudan was to make land available to foreign development concerns.¹² The Condominium consequently granted concessions to a number of companies, one of which was the Sudan Plantations Syndicate (SPS), the

¹¹Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan, p.125.

¹²Susan Grabler, "European Capital Exports and the Concessions Policy in the Sudan, 1898-1913," Northeast African Studies Vol. 8, No. 2-3, 1986.

company that would eventually manage the Gezira Scheme.

SPS was founded in 1904 by an American named Leigh Hunt. In 1906, he contracted a number of African-Americans, who were experienced in cotton farming, to run a pump scheme at Zeidab, in Sudan's Northern Province.¹³ Regretably the Americans were unable to adjust to the conditions in Sudan, and Hunt turned to Upper Egyptians and later Sudanese. By 1907, Zeidab began to yield some impressive harvests, but the scheme was not profitable because of the high cost of labor.¹⁴ In response, the SPS introduced a tenancy agreement that was based on the payment of annual rents in return for the chance to grow crops on SPS land. This system proved to be much more successful than the direct hiring of labor, at least during good years, even if the system proved problematic during poor years because of the high rate of defaults.¹⁵

FOUNDATION AND EARLY ACTIVITY IN GEZIRA

The idea for the Sennar Dam, the source of Gezira's water, had its origin with the hydrographic survey carried out by Sir William Garstin between the years 1899-1904. In 1904, he reported that the Blue Nile could support a dam in the area around Sennar which could be used to irrigate the Gezira.

¹³Arthur Gaitskell, Gezira: A Story of Development in the Sudan (London: Faber & Faber 1959), p.51.

¹⁴John James O'Brien, "Agricultural Labor and Development in Sudan" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1981), p.64.

¹⁵O'Brien, "Agricultural Labor and Development" p.67.

Given the Sudan government's favorable attitude towards agricultural schemes, it took little effort to get the Condominium behind the idea of a dam at Sennar. The problem was one of financing. Building a dam would be a costly public works project, and it was scarcely something that the Condominium could afford. The only way to surmount this obstacle would be to secure funding from abroad. Fortunately, the Condominium had a powerful ally in England, the British Cotton Growers Association (BCGA).

As Tony Barnett notes in Gezira: An Illusion of Development (1977), Britain found itself being forced out of the low end of the textile market during the early years of the twentieth century. The response of British industry to this situation was to concentrate on the higher quality portion of the textile market. To do this, the British needed to have large quantities of long-staple cotton instead of the shorter staple American cotton. The increased demand for long staple cotton meant that Egypt could no longer supply British needs. The BCGA reacted by lobbying Parliament for the expansion of cotton cultivation within the empire. Naturally, the BCGA found the idea of the Gezira attractive, and began to campaign for the idea in Parliament.

BCGA, SPS, and the GOVERNMENT

In its attempt to become more active in Sudanese agriculture, the BCGA bought SPS shares in 1911. The SPS was still involved in the scheme at Zeidab. As mentioned before,

the main problem at Zeidab and other projects was how to profitably engage a workforce.¹⁶ Regardless of the problems that the SPS was experiencing at Zeidab, it was still interested in the diversification of its operations. Because of SPS' experience in Sudan, and its connections in influential circles in London, it was able to receive the contract to manage the Gezira, beginning with a pilot scheme in Tayiba.

In much of the older literature about the Gezira, a great deal is made of the partnership between the government, SPS, and the tenants. This is especially true when discussion centers on the contractual relations between the SPS and government. It would appear that these assumptions were influenced by the work of Arthur Gaitskell, whose description of the contract and its stipulations leaves readers with the impression of a fair agreement that spread the burden between all parties equitably. The agreement as described by Gaitskell

¹⁶Grabler suggests that the difficulty in labor agreements arose from preconceptions that English business took to Sudan from their experience in Egypt. As Grabler ably demonstrates, the fundamental difference between Sudan and Egypt stemmed from the large population of Egypt and its land scarcity. The Egyptian situation created a labor surplus that could be easily exploited by landlords. The situation in Sudan was the opposite since its population was much lower, and, tenants could be induced to participate in schemes only if they were given relatively favorable terms. Hence the development of share systems in Zeidab and subsequent projects. Grabler, "From Concessionaire to Shaykh" pp.40-67.

divided profits among the government, SPS, and tenants by 35%, 25%, 40% respectively.¹⁷

Susan Grabler, in her dissertation, From Concessionaire to Shaykh (1986), describes a very different situation. She comments that in granting the SPS the Gezira concession, the Condominium agreed to "the usual remission in taxes, reduced railway freights and expanded pumping rights," and allowed the SPS to decide who would be tenants on the land granted for the initial scheme at Tayiba.¹⁸

Grabler's more critical assessment rings true since her perspective is certainly more disinterested than that of Gaitskell. Furthermore, Grabler states that the Condominium's willingness to agree to such terms was symptomatic of the administration's enthusiasm for foreign investment. Also, in a more general sense the terms' generosity reinforced the point made earlier about the near absence of revenue generating enterprise in Sudan. In order to spur growth, it would appear that the government would grant the most generous terms imaginable.

EARLY OPERATIONS WITHIN THE GEZIRA SCHEME

In 1911, an irrigation pump was installed at Tayiba, north of Wad Medani, to service 600 feddans (1 feddan=1.038 acres) of land. This was the beginning of the Gezira Scheme.

¹⁷Arthur Gaitskell, Gezira: A Story of Development in the Sudan (London: Faber and Faber 1959), pp.68-71.

¹⁸Grabler, "From Concessionaire to Shaykh" , p.60.

At first, local residents could not be recruited for the new project; therefore members of the SPS concession at Zeidab were hired. During the first year at Tayiba, the rains failed, leaving the people adjacent to the scheme in dire straits. Tayiba, however, had a very successful harvest. The next year, applications for tenancies swelled. Fortunately, the opportunities also increased, since Tayiba was being expanded to 2,000 feddans. In addition the SPS placed 2,000 feddans more under pump irrigation at Barakat.

Meanwhile with the support of the BCGA, a loan for £13,000,000 to the Condominium was approved, in 1913, for the construction of the Sennar dam. As a consequence, the government had to consider whether to allow the SPS to retain control of the Gezira or to place the new scheme directly under its control. The current arrangement, although technically for four years, explicitly stated that its terms could be terminated any time that the experiment was deemed a success or failure. Since the results of the first two seasons clearly demonstrated the feasibility of cotton cultivation, there was no point in delaying the decision on the Gezira's future management.

In 1913, the government and SPS came to an agreement on the apportionment of profits between themselves and the tenants. The contract called for the government to be responsible for the maintenance of the major waterworks and the payment of rent to tenants for leasing their lands in

return for 35% of the profits.¹⁹ The SPS was to administer cultivation and to maintain small canals and roads in exchange for 25% of the profits. The tenants were assigned 40% of the profits for their labor and the costs incurred in cultivation. After 1919, the percentages were adjusted. The government taking 40% of the profits and the SPS settling for 20%.^{20 21}

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GEZIRA SCHEME

Until the actual operation of the gravity irrigation scheme began in 1925, the Gezira comprised only the relatively small tracts of land at Tayiba and Barakat. Once the gravity system began, the Gezira would extend to 300,000 feddans, requiring considerable land alienation through the Gezira Land Ordinance of 1921. Under this statute, the government bought only the land which would be needed for the construction of the major irrigation works. The rest was rented at price based on its value prior to irrigation. Owners of land were still allowed to sell their land to other Sudanese from the same

¹⁹It is important to realize that the Gezira Scheme comprises leased land. Although the government forcibly leased the land it acknowledged the tenants as owners of the land. The rent paid by the government, however, reflected the value of the land prior to irrigation. Gaitskell, Gezira, p.85.

²⁰Ibid p.84.

²¹Grabler points out that the "partnership" relationship between the constituent parts of the Gezira closely resembled the izbah system of sharecropping that was prevalent in Egypt at the time. Grabler, "From Concessionaire to Shaykh" pp.17-67.

area, thereby transferring the rights to rent to the new owner.

Although the original holders could maintain title and receive rent, they were strictly limited in the amount of land they could operate as tenants in Gezira. Generally speaking, a tenancy or howasha (literally farm) could be no more than 40 feddans. However, in some instances, tenants were allowed to work two tenancies. It should be noted that prominent land owners were allowed to choose who would be given tenancies from their holdings. This kept land under the control of prominent families since clan heads usually arranged for tenancies to be given to relatives or retainers.

Tenants worked under the following regulations: a tenant was to grow cotton on ten feddans of his or her howasha; cotton was understood to be the one crop in which the government and SPS would share in the profits; any other crop such as dura (sorghum) or lubia (fodder crop) was purely the business of the tenant. The SPS's staff inspected the tenancies to make sure that its instructions were observed. If the tenant failed to comply, then he or she would be subject to discipline as severe as eviction.

The physical layout of the Gezira consisted of the following units: tenancies, blocks, and groups. The tenancy was the basic unit, some 15,000 feddans of which comprised a block. In 1926, at the beginning of pump irrigation in Gezira,



there were twenty blocks. Blocks were defined by the general outline of the major canals.

The top level of field management was the group inspector, who was in charge of five or six blocks. Each block had an inspector, and two field inspectors. The general administrative center of the Gezira Scheme was in the village of Barakat where lived the Managing Director, his assistants, and the accountants and clerks of the various departments. Besides a significant number of Sudanese workers, there were also a large number of expatriates from Middle Eastern countries working in clerical positions at Barakat.²² Finally, the Gezira Scheme as a whole was overseen through the office of the Secretary of Finance, not the Secretary of Agriculture in Khartoum. This served to underscore the great economic importance attached to the Gezira by the Condominium.

THE PERFORMANCE OF THE GEZIRA IN THE EARLY YEARS

Gravity irrigation began in the Gezira Scheme during the 1925-1926 growing season. It was a particularly good year: with an average yield of 4.8 kantars per feddan (kantar=

²² The practice of hiring Middle Eastern expatriates for employment in British enterprises in Sudan began with the start of the Condominium. Martin Daly explains the widespread use of Middle Easterners as owing to the small number of British in Sudan. Martin Daly, Empire, p.91.



approx. 100 lbs.) and an average £67 profit per tenant.²³ The first several years of the Gezira generated profits owing to the high price of cotton on the world's markets and the scheme's consistently high yields.²⁴

This situation suddenly ended with the onset of the Great Depression. The depreciation was compounded by the appearance of two devastating cotton diseases, leaf curl and black arm, which combined to cut the production by half.²⁵ Cotton prices declined from 21 pence/pound in 1928-29, to 5.9 pence/pound in 1938.²⁶ Leaf curl was found to be spread from the debris of old cotton plants,²⁷ and the SPS required tenants to uproot, gather, and burn all old cotton stalks after the harvest. Also plots growing cotton were to stay fallow two years instead of one. This new policy had the effect of reducing land under cultivation by 25%. The reduction was aggravated by the general economic hardship of the times. Since many tenants were in debt, they simply abandoned their plots.²⁸

GEZIRA TENANTS AND ECONOMIC DISTRESS

²³O'Brien, "Agricultural Labor and Development in the Sudan", p. 80.

²⁴Gaitskell, Gezira p. 112.

²⁵Gaitskell, Gezira, p. 140.

²⁶John James O'Brien, "Agricultural Labor and Development in the Sudan" p. 77

²⁷Loc. cit.

²⁸O'Brien, "Agricultural Labor and Development in the Sudan" pp. 78-79.

The desertion of tenants in fact actually outstripped the reduction of production, and in consequence, West African (fellata) laborers were given the opportunity to operate tenancies.²⁹ Fellata (from Fulani) had been coming to Sudan in significant numbers at least two generations before the establishment of the Gezira Scheme.³⁰ Many had been or were descendants of pilgrims going on the Hadj to Mecca. Others came to Sudan to escape the encroachment of European colonial governments on the Sahelian Muslim states. Moreover, once European control of West Africa had been consolidated, colonial authorities actively encouraged migrants to travel to Sudan to become agricultural laborers.

In the self-consciously Arab culture of Northern Sudan, the West Africans were not readily integrated into the existing community, and the Sudanese continued to regard them as foreigners. Once Gezira returned to profitability in the 1940's, the position of the Fellata would be subject to heated controversy.³¹

For the majority of indigenous Sudanese who did not abandon their tenancies, the depression also laid the seeds of another future controversy. Owing to the tenant's inability to pay off advances for the 1930-31 growing season, the SPS and

²⁹Loc. cit.

³⁰Duffield, Maiurno pp. 15,31.

³¹Sudan Gezira Files on Sudanization Numbers 448 and 449 are largely concerned with returning land to Arab Sudanese.

the government decided to devise a Tenants Reserve Fund that would cover tenants' debts in bad years.³² It was maintained through a small levy on tenants' cotton harvests. The problem was that most tenants did not know the exact amount the fund contained.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AFTER WWI & THEIR IMPACT ON GEZIRA

While the Gezira was under construction, events were happening in Khartoum and Cairo that would affect the future development of the scheme. These events were set into motion by the struggle between Egyptian nationalists and Britain after World War I. Specifically, London granted Egypt its "independence" in 1922, with the understanding that Britain would still retain power over the following areas: the protection of foreigners; the defense of Egypt against outside powers; the maintenance of British communications with its Asian and African empire; and finally, the administration of the Sudan.³³ Naturally, these restrictions on Egyptian sovereignty were unacceptable to dedicated nationalists, and

³² Gaitskell, Gezira p. 165.

³³ Selma Botman, Egypt from Independence to Revolution, 1919-1952, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991), p. 30.

Egyptian patriots, under the leadership of the Wafd party, vigorously protested.³⁴

The insistence on British control of the Sudan was troubling to the Egyptians at another level. It not only hurt the national pride of Egypt, some Egyptians also viewed the development of the Gezira Scheme as a grave threat.³⁵ By developing the Gezira, the Egyptians were faced with the prospect of large amounts of precious water being diverted from the Nile and used to develop a rival cotton crop.³⁶ Although the British promised to limit the amount of land to be irrigated, the Egyptians realized that they were powerless to affect the British changes in their policy.

In the Sudan, Egyptian dissatisfaction was expressed by the Egyptian soldiers and civil servants who were a major portion of the Condominium administration. Also, the events in Egypt affected the small, but strategic, educated class of Sudanese. The effendiya found itself largely ignored by the British during its struggles with the Egyptian nationalists. When the question of Sudan was raised in the debate, the British sought to buttress their arguments in favor of maintaining a presence in Sudan by appealing to the traditional leaders of Sudan, many of whom were older and were more familiar with the tales of Turco-Egyptian era cruelty in

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Beshir, Revolution and Nationalism, p. 66.

³⁶Beshir, Revolution and Nationalism, p.66.

Sudan.³⁷ It should be noted that the British use of traditional leaders as allies also stemmed from a seeming distaste for the educated Sudanese.³⁸

In the face of what was at best indifference on the part of the British, it is not surprising that the intelligentsia were attracted to the Wafd party's call for the unity of the Nile valley. This sentiment was most clearly expressed by the White Flag League, which was founded and led by Ali Abd Al Latif, a former soldier of Dinka and Nuba extraction.³⁹ The White Flag League, though a supporter of Egypt in its struggle with Britain, was primarily interested in promoting self-determination for the Sudan and reducing foreign influence.

One of the major targets of White Flag League was the Gezira Scheme. The nationalists in the organization criticized what they saw as the alienation of land from the Sudanese people and the opening of their country to exploitation by

³⁷Beshir, Revolution and Nationalism, p.70.

³⁸Ibid p.70, Beshir quotes P.M. Holt from the 1961 edition of A Modern History of the Sudan from the Funj Sultanate to the Present Day: "The British governors and district commissioners had learned how to deal with the Sudanese notables, and a degree of confidence albeit with profound if unspoken reservation on both sides existed between them. Towards the the country people and nomads they behaved with the paternal benevolence of a squirearchy. But the urban middle class especially the Sudanese who had acquired a westernized education in intermediate schools and Gordon College, they viewed with little sympathy or respect." It is my argument that this same attitude was prevalent in the Gezira's administration and was responsible for the resistance to administrative roles for Sudanese in the Gezira Scheme.

³⁹Beshir, Revolution and Nationalism, p. 73.

foreign capitalists.⁴⁰ Thus both Egyptians and nationalists were united, albeit for different reasons, in their opposition to the Gezira Scheme.

The White Flag league pressed its case mainly through the publication of anonymous leaflets and through personal contacts. These methods were used because the government made it impossible for the League to agitate openly. In fact, the League's founder, Ali Abd Al Latif, was imprisoned in 1922 for trying to have an article of printed in Al Hadara, a popular newspaper run by conservative Sudanese.

The tension between nationalists and the Condominium government reached its peak during 1924. On November 19, the Governor-General of Sudan, Sir Lee Stack, was assassinated in Cairo. In response, Lord Allenby, the British Consul in Egypt, demanded the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from Sudan, the resignation of the current Egyptian government, and the payment of an indemnity. It is also important to note that Allenby declared that there would no longer be a limit on the amount of land to be irrigated by the Gezira. Instead, the area of the Gezira would be increased to "an unlimited figure as need may arise... ." ⁴¹ Thus the future expansion of the Gezira was a consequence of the British conflict with Egypt, and it occurred against the backdrop of active protest by the effendiya.

⁴⁰Ibid, pp. 76-77.

⁴¹Muddathir, Imperialism and Nationalism, p. 107.



When Allenby's evacuation order reached Sudan, the Egyptian troops refused to move until they received word from their government.⁴² In the meantime, Sudanese troops marched in protest, and when they reached the bridge separating Khartoum from Khartoum North, they encountered a British force. A battle ensued with significant casualties to both sides.⁴³ The Sudanese then retreated to the Khartoum military hospital where they proceeded to fight until they were all killed. As a result of this rebellion, four Sudanese military officers were sentenced to death, and three were actually shot. A number of nationalists were imprisoned and some, like Ali Abd Al Latif, were exiled.

More importantly, the 1924 rebellion led the government to retreat from support of western education for the Sudanese, and also to lessen its reliance on the effendiya. In this spirit, the military academy in Khartoum was closed, while the discipline in the Gordon Memorial College was raised to a military level.⁴⁴ Furthermore, a 1922 law, the Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance, was more thoroughly applied. This law

⁴²It should be remembered that by 1924, Egypt had been nominally independent for two years, and legally, the British Consul had no power to order the evacuation of Egyptian troops.

⁴³Muddathir, Imperialism and Nationalism, p. 108.

⁴⁴Ibid, p. 110.

sought to restore traditional tribal authorities so that they could be used as instruments of administration.⁴⁵

Generally speaking, educated Sudanese would find themselves working under severe handicaps for the next two decades. Although they would actually increase in numbers during the 1930's, the effendiya were always the object of suspicion and scorn on the part of their British superiors. These attitudes resulted in sharply defined limits on the mobility of Sudanese within the government service. It is the argument of this monograph that the same hostility and distrust of the educated Sudanese was manifested by the Gezira's administration, whose interests were closely allied with those of the central government.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provided a historical background to the Gezira. The significance of the Gezira as a geographical region was discussed, as was its role in the history of the Northern Sudan. An emphasis was placed on the importance of the Gezira as a zone of agricultural production in Sudan, especially during the Funj and Mahdiyya periods.

During the Condominium period, a combination of forces interacted to create the Gezira Scheme. First, the Condominium government was in dire need of funds; second, it was established early on by Garstin that the Gezira was suitable

⁴⁵As will be seen in later chapters, this law was the basis of the Devolution policy in the administration of the Gezira.

for large scale irrigation; third, the BCGA actively demanded that the British Empire expand cotton cultivation in areas under its control. This combination of factors resulted in Parliament approving a loan, in 1913, for the construction of Gezira, although actual work on the project got under way after World War I.

In order to create the Gezira Scheme it was necessary for the government to create new relationships between it and the future tenants. This was done by a number of means. For example, the Gezira Land Ordinance of 1921 allowed the government to lease and buy the land it needed to operate the scheme. Also, the government, along with the SPS, developed the partnership system under which the government, tenants, and SPS divided the profits of the scheme amongst themselves.

The economic performance of the Gezira Scheme during its early years was also touched upon. When it first became operational around 1924, there was a boom in cotton prices, and the scheme returned very handsome profits during its early years. However, with the onset of the world wide depression by 1930, the Gezira experienced a major decline.

CHAPTER TWO: 1930-1950: THE NATIONALIST RESPONSE TO THE GEZIRA AND ITS SUDANIZATION

This chapter will examine the efforts made by the educated Sudanese to gain access to jobs in the Gezira Scheme and for the scheme's nationalization; and the growing activism among tenants concerning profit sharing, the reservation of tenancies for "Arab" Sudanese, and the acquisition of political power.

The chapter reveals a growing sense of common interest among the various sections of the Northern Sudanese population. Despite policies like devolution in the Gezira, the government and SPS were unable to prevent joint political action between the tenants and the effendiya. Joint action was foreshadowed by the twelve-point memorandum published in 1942 by the graduates.

Political union between the effendiya and the tenants was inevitable. Despite the efforts of British officials to paint the tenants as simple, and the graduates as outcasts unable to fit into either British or traditional Sudanese society, the two groups were both privileged members of the modern sector of the colonial economy. More importantly, both groups came to feel that they would benefit from a sharp reduction in the role of the British and other foreigners.

It should also be noted that political activism of this period would also serve to reinforce the Arab character of the independent Sudan. This tendency can most clearly be seen in

the agitation against the establishment of the Fellata as tenants in the Gezira and other schemes. By 1948, Sudanese law would clearly define the Sudanese as being only those people who could trace their ancestry in the country to the period before the Condominium, thereby preventing the possibility of multi-ethnic power sharing in the North of the country.

EDUCATED SUDANESE AFTER 1924

Despite the violent outcome of the 1924 revolt, educated Sudanese continued to move into the government and to engage in nationalist activity, albeit more discreetly than before. As was mentioned in the last chapter, the government closed the military school and generally embarked on a policy of reducing the level of Sudanese in government administration. Interestingly enough, although virtually all students of Sudanese nationalism insist that there was a strong attempt by the government to reduce the number of Sudanese officials, statistics do not bear them out.¹ As Ahmed Abu Sin noted, "After the evacuation in 1924 of the Egyptian personnel, it was imperative that the junior posts should be filled by Sudanese nationals to keep the government machinery working."²

¹Ahmed Ibrahim Abu Sin, The Development of Civil Service in the Republic of Sudan, (Khartoum: Institute of Public Administration of the Sudan), 1968 p. 49.

²Abu Sin, Development of Civil Service, p.45.

If anything hurt the advancement of the Sudanese in government service, it was the Great Depression. For instance, in 1935, 205 positions held by Sudanese were eliminated from the civil service.³ In addition to the loss of jobs, many employees suffered severe pay cuts. For example, in 1931, graduates of Gordon College took a 30% pay reduction. Interestingly enough, when the Sudanese organized a protest, they were able to regain a slight restoration of funds. As Muddathir 'Abdel Rahim mentioned, this was the only open protest of government policy staged by the Sudanese between 1924 and the founding of the Graduates Congress in 1936.⁴

Meanwhile, nationalist activity of a non-confrontational nature continued. Specifically, there was a surge in nationalist poetry and song writing. Furthermore, there was a literary movement in Sudan which published journals concerned with foreign affairs and politics in general. Finally, the early 1930's saw the creation of private study groups among young graduates who devoted themselves to learning about new scientific and political ideas coming out of the West.⁵ Overall, the effendiya class was able to weather the storm following the 1924 Revolt, and to leave themselves in a position to resume agitation for self-determination once the

³Loc. cit.

⁴'Abdel Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism, p.117.

⁵Ibid, p.113.

political climate in Sudan moved toward openness in the late 1930's.

DEVOLUTION IN THE GEZIRA

While the educated Sudanese slowly made inroads in government service, they were still totally locked out of administrative and managerial positions in the Sudan Plantation Syndicate's operations in Gezira. Furthermore, local government operations in the scheme area made extensive use of local sheikhs in the administration of the Gezira. Generally, in the Gezira, as in other rural areas, local sheikhs had the authority to levy small fines and impose short sentences for minor violations of the law. It should be noted that, by relying on traditional leaders, the British sought to save money as well as avoid establishing the educated Sudanese in rural areas.⁶

Pressure to change the administrative arrangement of the SPS from a direct to an indirect system, incorporating traditional village hierarchy, developed over a number of years. Those who suggested a change to indirect administration referred to such a process as devolution. Movement in that direction began in the mid 1920's, shortly after the scheme became totally functional. Government officials, concerned with the possible entrenchment of SPS, wanted to begin acquainting tenants with the details of maintaining the

⁶K.D.D. Henderson, Sudan Republic, (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 69.



scheme. Far-sighted officials wanted to make sure that the tenants would be able to operate the Gezira when the company's lease expired.⁷ The government, however, was not able to force the SPS to implement its plans because the depression threatened the very survival of the scheme.

In 1939, as stipulated in the contract between the government and the SPS, the arrangement between the two parties was reviewed. Government took the opportunity to press again for the implementation of a devolution program in Gezira.⁸ The government decided to keep the contract in force but during this time, it entered into negotiations at Barakat with the SPS which resulted in an agreement known as Schedule X:

The Government's general policy is to train up a class of small farmers, who, when the concession period is ended, can make the best use of the permanent irrigation system established in the Gezira.

The Government's administrative policy is:-

(a) The development of an orderly organisation of village communities controlled by headmen selected by themselves.

(b) The devolution of civic and agricultural control of the farmers to agents of this organisation (e.g. agricultural sheikhs) and the use of village and other councils and of native courts to support and enforce the authority of these agents.

⁷Gaitskell, Gezira, pp. 202-203.

⁸Gaitskell, Gezira, p.204.

(c) The gradual substitution of Sudanese for all non-British employees and eventually the use of Sudanese agriculturalists in the field in an advisory capacity. The Government's agricultural policy is:-

(a) The production of a class of mixed farmers with a permanent stake in the land which they farm. To this

end:-

(b) The cultivation of food and fodder crops should be given as much importance as the money crop.

(c) Provision should be made for the agricultural education of native agents and selected farmers.⁹

The policy of devolution would first be implemented in 1940 at the village of Hosh in the southern Gezira. The administration in Hosh comprised of an official, known as the samad, who was in charge of the daily management of the crops in his village; and a village council that helped the samad carry out his responsibilities. Specifically, the council was to levy penalties against those tenants that the samad found deficient in their work. Finally, all of these village officials were under the control of a British field inspector who ensured that they did not deviate from the scheme's general directives.¹⁰ Devolution, along the model just described, increased significantly during the early 1940's. World War II gave the program extra impetus since military needs created a shortage of British staff in Gezira.

⁹Gaitskell, Gezira, p. 208.

¹⁰Gaitskell, Gezira, p.210.



SUDANIZATION

Devolution was initiated by government and SPS officials, and was directed towards the tenants in the Gezira Scheme. Modeled on the concept of indirect rule, it was designed to utilize traditional hierarchies found within the villages. Devolution made no attempt to incorporate educated Sudanese into its framework. The effendiya was aware of their exclusion from the Gezira, and after the liberalization of the political climate in the late 1930's, they began to campaign actively for a role in the administration of Gezira.

Educated Sudanese then used the Graduates Congress founded in 1938, to disseminate their views. Composed primarily of graduates of Gordon Memorial College, it started with 1,080 members, who elected Ismail al Azhari, a member of a family with ties to the Khatmiyya tariqa, as president.¹¹ As some authors have noted, since the members of the Congress were overwhelmingly employed in the civil service, the Graduates Congress could be legitimately viewed as a labor union.¹²

The Congress nonetheless saw itself as the legitimate representative of the people. From its members' point of view, this was a reasonable claim, since they were the recipients of Western education, and were employed in the modern sector of

¹¹Holt and Daly, A History, p.145.

¹²Ibid, p.145.

the Sudan's economy. Not surprisingly, the Congress believed that whatever benefitted themselves was that which benefitted the nation in general. This was especially true in the area of Sudanization. For the purposes of this study, Sudanization will be defined as the installation of indigenous Sudanese in positions that were previously denied them. By the time that the Congress was born, there had already been some progress in Sudanization. With the gradual relaxation of political restrictions on the Sudanese, a few effendiya had already been appointed to more responsible positions.

SPS Management and the Effendiya: the Example of Gaitskell

The drive of the Graduate's Congress towards a larger role in Sudanese affairs crystallized in a twelve-point memorandum sent to the government in 1942. With this document, the Congress essentially asked for self-determination.¹³ Among the points raised in the memorandum were: 1. internal self government for the Sudanese; 2. a definition of Sudanese nationality; 3. cessation of immigration into Sudan; 4. termination of the Sudan Plantation Syndicate contract; 5. priority be given to hiring Sudanese for all government positions.¹⁴

Not only did these demands show a desire to gain control of the state, they also betrayed a keen interest in the Gezira

¹³Beshir, Revolution and Nationalism, p.161.

¹⁴Ibid.

Scheme. Specifically, the Graduates wanted to end foreign control of the Gezira. Nationalization would make jobs within the Gezira Scheme's administration available to the effendiya. That the Graduates were interested in the Gezira should not be surprising, Sudanese had been receiving training in agriculture since the beginning of the Condominium. Furthermore, with the upgrading of the Shambat agricultural school, the pressure for access to the Gezira became even more intense. The demands to determine citizenship and curtail immigration were clearly aimed at gaining the support of the Gezira's tenants because there was growing tension between the Sudanese and West African or Fellata communities.

In this environment, the SPS was under pressure not only from the Congress, but also from the government, because management knew that the government was intent on phasing the company out. The feelings of the SPS management can be gauged by the writings of Arthur Gaitskell. By the 1938, Gaitskell was the assistant manager of the Gezira Scheme. By 1945, he became the general manager of the Gezira Scheme, and in 1950, he became the first managing director of the Gezira Board. Obviously, Gaitskell was a man in a position of great influence in the Gezira Scheme, and his ideas were correspondingly influential.

It should be noted that Gaitskell tended to attack educated Sudanese on the same grounds that British government officials criticized their Sudanese subordinates. For example,

Gaitskell characterized the effendiya as estranged from and insensitive to the "traditional" way of life found in the scheme, (a rather peculiar defense since he had noted on numerous occasions that the scheme had disrupted the established patterns of life in the Gezira).¹⁵ He went on to say that the effendiya would certainly become corrupt and inefficient like their counterparts in Egypt.¹⁶

It is also interesting to note that Gaitskell was quite critical of his competitors in cotton cultivation, the Sudanese owners of pump schemes such Abd Al Rahman Al Mahdi. He feared that both the religious leaders and effendiya would lead the Gezira and Sudan down an unacceptable path. Although Gaitskell did not explicitly state the reason for his fear of Abd Al Rahman Al Mahdi, it is reasonable to assume that this distrust stemmed from the nationalist tendencies of both the Ansar and the Graduates Congress. Such feelings would prove to be justified since the Ansar and Congress would ally themselves occasionally during the 1940's.

Gaitskell therefore projected a future in which devolution projects such as those at Hosh became the norm. Gaitskell also foresaw a long British presence, either SPS or government, to oversee Gezira's village-level management. Gaitskell's views were consistent with those of Condominium

¹⁵Arthur Gaitskell "A Proposal for the Future of the Gezira Scheme", SPS Memorandum File 418/6/13 Sudan Collection, University of Durham.

¹⁶Ibid.

officials when it came to the transfer of power to the Sudanese. Virtually all government officials projected a lengthy period of transition.

Gaitskell, like most British in the Sudan, continued to hold reservations about the capacity of the educated class during his tenure in Sudan. However, one encounter he had with the effendiya during 1944, is remarkable for providing an exceptionally candid insight into the mind of a British official regarding the educated Sudanese. During this year, Gaitskell took part in a weekend retreat for British officials and effendiya at Erkowit, the site of Bakht Er Ruda secondary school, where a large proportion of the effendiya, including Mekki Abbas, the first Sudanese managing director of the Gezira Scheme was educated. The object of the meeting was for British officials and the effendiya to attain a personal understanding. Gaitskell wrote extensively about this meeting in a memorandum that was later made public to British government officials in Sudan and Palestine.¹⁷

Gaitskell briefly discussed some of the misgivings that he and other British had towards the educated Sudanese. According to Gaitskell:

I probably have a preference for the countrymen rather than the townees. Most British probably accept more readily the habits and standards of countrymen just because they are totally foreign,

¹⁷Memorandum from the Civil Secretary's Office dated May 5, 1944, Sudan Archives, University of Durham.



whereas they tend to judge educated Sudanese on European standards and criticize their shortfall on European standards. This is doubtless inevitable and right, but it tends to make a Britisher more critical and more disappointed in educated Sudanese than in any other type of person in the country. Some college boy's lack of manners and unwarranted conceit can go against the grain.¹⁸


At Erkowit, he experienced, as did his peers, the Sudanese in what was essentially a social environment.

Gaitskell noted that the two groups were accorded separate accommodations. Although fraternization between the two groups occurred during meals and recreation, the bulk of interaction took place at what Gaitskell described as their "work." The assignment for the Erkowit retreat was "Cooperation": between a citizen and his government, between town and country, between labor and capital, for rural development and in education. The discussions were facilitated by a full-sized library that was provided by the Department of Education.

Once engaged in discussion with the Sudanese, Gaitskell displayed a frank amazement at the intellectual ability of the effendiya:

...I found myself listening to impromptu replies by Sudanese in English which expressed what I would have said myself with a clarity and sequence which aston-

¹⁸Arthur Gaitskell, "Some Notes About the Erkowit Study Camp" March 1944, File 418/3/168, Sudan ARchives, University of Durham, p.2.



ished me.¹⁹

Gaitskell also was surprised at the reading habits of the Sudanese. He said the Sudanese "were reading not only the books which I read but the books I ought to read." Obviously, Gaitskell, like other British officials, had no idea how widespread study groups had become among the effendiya during the years of repression following the 1924 Revolt. Since Gaitskell was clearly patronizing and racist in his praise of the Sudanese, it is not surprising that he found grounds to raise criticism of their intellectual capacities. Specifically, Gaitskell thought that the educated Sudanese were inclined to have unrealistic ideas about the wealth of their country. For instance, he noted that the effendiya often cited stories of successful development such as the Tennessee Valley Authority or collectivism in the Soviet Union as examples of what proper management could foster in Sudan in a short time. Gaitskell's concern about the effendiya's inflated expectations seems odd since he was given to flights of fancy when he described the future of the Gezira and the Sudan.²⁰

¹⁹Ibid, pp. 5-6.

²⁰An example of Gaitskell's tendency towards hyperbole can be seen on pages 19-20 of his 1943 memorandum "A Proposal for the Future of the Gezira Scheme." In this essay, Gaitskell speaks of the impending conflict between capitalism, as represented by the U.S.A., and communism, as represented by the Soviet Union. Gaitskell argued for the need of a third way between the two systems. He felt that the Tennessee Valley Authority was the best example of the third way in the West and the Gezira, was the best third way in the Middle East.



His colonial ego apparently could not countenance the idea of Africans working without British supervision.

Gaitskell, nonetheless, left the meeting at Erkowit positively impressed with the minds of the effendiya he met there. In fact, he was so impressed that he circulated his "Notes" to "enlighten" other British officials, some of whom left copies on file in Sudan or sent them to other countries. It should also be noted that Gaitskell's assesment of the effendiya was considered quite liberal and progressive by his counterparts in government service.²¹ If Gaitskell's attitude represented the liberal tendencies in the SPS, then there is no mystery why advancement of Sudanese within the field management of Gezira was resisted for so long.

PROGRESS OF NATIONALISTS IN POST-WAR SUDAN

World War II wrought profound changes on the political landscape of Sudan. In the Gezira Scheme, Sudanese agents or samads were employed to assist in production. Samads were appointed by the SPS to make up for the shortage of British inspectors. Also, owing to personnel shortages brought on by the war, the government gave Sudanese unprecedented access to administrative positions and allowed them representation in the government. In September 1943, the government announced the formation of an Advisory Council for the the Northern

²¹I can personally say that at least one member of the effendiya considered Gaitskell to be quite progessive. Taped interview, Taha El Jack Taha, former Gezira official, Khartoum, May 27,1990.



Sudan.²² Although the council was widely criticized for its lack of power, the government was able to induce one of the major parties, the Umma, to participate in the body. During the 1940's, as Sudanese nationalism grew, the creation of an assembly with real legislative powers became inevitable. Therefore, an assembly with a cabinet was created on June 19, 1948.

It is important to note that Sudanese nationalism was not an inclusive phenomenon. In other words, Sudanese nationalism narrowly defined Sudanese identity. The dominant group in Sudan was the Arabic speaking population of the North-Central part of the country.²³ Geographically and economically, the Gezira was the heart of this region. Not surprisingly, the control of the Gezira and its future development were among the most important of the nationalists' concerns.

THE TENANTS IN THE 1940'S

The government Devolution programs were proposed partly to avoid placing the tenants in contact with the effendiya class and its political consciousness. However, once the tenants were involved in the management of the Gezira, their political awareness inevitably grew. The two most consistent tenant demands were for improved education and an increased

²²Beshir, Revolution and Nationalism, p.166.

²³Markakis, Nationalism and Class Conflict, pp.46-51.

share of the Gezira's profits, both of which featured in the Tenants' Strike of 1946.

As a result of the spread of council style management, encouraged by Devolution, the tenants became more aware of the inner workings of the Gezira Scheme and sought information about the Tenants' Reserve Fund. The Reserve Fund had been created in response to a series of bad harvests during the Depression. The idea was that in good years, a portion of the tenants' profits were placed in a fund to be paid out during bad years to cover the loans advanced by the scheme at the beginning of the season. By July 1946, the amount of money in the Reserve Fund amounted to £E1,300,000.

Needless to say, the tenants were shocked to learn that such a large amount of money had been kept on their behalf without their knowledge. Rumors concerning the money began to spread immediately. Soon people were saying that the village sheikhs were going to spend the Reserve Fund money among themselves.²⁴ The SPS management, after hearing the rumors, promptly made public the full amount of the Reserve Fund along with assurances that it was intact.²⁵ However, this declaration was not enough for the tenants. After realizing that such a large amount of money was being held in their names, the tenants organized and swore an oath not to begin

²⁴Gaitskell, Gezira, p.221.

²⁵Ibid.

planting until the fund was released to them.²⁶ The strike was particularly threatening since the Gezira sowing season began in July.

At first, government and SPS officials closed ranks, reiterating that the funds were being held on the tenants' behalf.²⁷ In response, tenants claimed that they had suffered greatly over the past two seasons due to inflation and that they needed relief from the Reserve Fund.²⁸ Within a few weeks of the controversy, the tenants had allied themselves to the Ashiqqa party, a group of nationalists affiliated with the Graduates Congress.²⁹ In other words, the Tenants Strike accomplished what SPS and government officials had feared, an alliance between the tenants and effendiya. The increased visibility of the tenants was evidenced by the attention they received in the Arabic press, much to the dismay of the government.³⁰

Responding to these developments, the governor of Blue Nile province, G.R.F. Bredin, agreed to conduct an

²⁶Blue Nile Province, FDK/763-20038/1, July 7, 1946, Gezira Archive, Barakat, Sudan.

²⁷Loc. cit.

²⁸Gezira File 120, July 7, 1946, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

²⁹Blue Nile Province Memorandum, Ref. No. 4590, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

³⁰Gezira File 120, July 7, 1946, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.



investigation into the condition of the tenants.³¹ In his announcement, Bredin stated that if conditions warranted it, he would arrange for disbursements from the Reserve Fund. While making concessionary gestures to the tenants, Bredin also met with his acting chief of police to discuss how to deal with recalcitrant tenants if the need arose.³² Once again, the government and SPS argued that the Reserve Fund was a mechanism used to ensure returns to tenants during lean harvests. They also asked the editors of Arabic newspapers to report that the tenants had received payments of £E500,000 from the Reserve Fund in June and July as an advance against the profits of their 1946 crop.³³

In addition to prevailing upon the editors for favorable press, the government actively tried to reduce the influence of the educated Sudanese. For instance, in a meeting between the SPS and government, the official minutes declared that the trouble was the work of the Graduates Congress and the Ashiqqa Party.³⁴ Furthermore, the officials were checking a list of a so-called "Committee of Ten" to see if any of them worked

³¹Ibid.

³²Blue Nile Province, Memorandum Ref. No. 4590, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

³³Blue Nile Province, Memorandum Ref. No. 4590, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

³⁴Gezira File 120, July 7, 1946, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.



for the government.³⁵ It was not stated what would be done if any of these people had been found to be officials.

The government and SPS failed to limit the impact of the Tenants' Strike. Activists in Egypt were beginning to cite the treatment of the tenants as yet "another example of British exploitation."³⁶ Finally, it was decided that in order to silence the protest, it would be best to make a payment of £E400,000 out of the Reserve Fund.³⁷ Government officials called on local qadis (Islamic judges) to determine whether or not such a partial payment could be deemed as fulfilling the vow that most of the tenants' had taken.³⁸ Although there were some protests, most of the tenants had accepted the government settlement by early August 1946, slightly a month after the strike had begun.³⁹

The Tenants' Strike was an important watershed in the history of the Gezira. It marked the first organized effort by tenants to force concessions from the government. Second, it produced an alliance between the tenants and effendiya aimed at reducing the authority of the British. Both developments


³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Blue Nile Province Memorandum, July 25, 1946, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

³⁷Blue Nile Province Memorandum No. 4590, August 13, 1946 Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Khartoum Memorandum, CS/2.Q.1, August 12, 1946 Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.



reflected the liberalization of government policy and the rising expectations of the Sudanese in the post-war period.

After the Tenants' Strike, the next great crisis concerned the Fellata tenants. The latter had been able to develop a presence in the Gezira largely through the unwillingness of many Sudanese Arab tenants to continue cultivation in the Gezira under the conditions of the Great Depression.⁴⁰ The resulting exodus of Sudanese allowed the Fellata to occupy as many as 54% of the tenancies in some blocks of the Gezira.⁴¹ Overall, the percentage of Fellata tenants in Gezira was 10.9%, or 2,266 out of a total of 20,748 tenancies.⁴² This state of affairs was ignored during the depression and World War II, but, in the post-war period the presence of the Fellata tenants became a sore point for the Arab tenants. This was because in the post-war market, the

⁴⁰It was argued by some Sudanese that the Fellata were just as susceptible to indebtedness as the indigenous population; but that they were able to avoid payment by moving from one block to another within the scheme. It was claimed that moving was easy for the Fellata, since they were often newcomers who could not be traced as easily as Arabs. I find this analysis to be far-fetched. If the Fellata regularly ran out on debts, not only would the SPS have noted but the local Shaykhs would have been heeded if they had wanted to press the issue. Issam Ahmad Hassoun, "'Western' Migration and Settlement in the Sudan," Sudan Notes and Records, Vol. 33 (1952), pp. 99.

⁴¹ Ibid, p.101.

⁴²Minutes of the 32nd Meeting of the Gezira Advisory Board April 8, 1948, pp.11-12. Sudan Archives, University of Durham.



price of cotton skyrocketed, and tenancies became very profitable.

As Sudanese hostility towards the West Africans increased, stories of immigrant crime began to circulate. Settlers from French Equatorial Africa were held in special disdain, and were often accused of drunkenness and theft.⁴³ The court records reveal a factual basis to these stereotypes, but it should be remembered that work was seasonal, and often large numbers of people found themselves with no means of support for long periods of time. It should be noted that the Nigerians were held to be of excellent moral character and devout Muslims, even if they were unwelcome as economic competition.⁴⁴

Through the activity of the village councils in Gezira and agitation in the media, the Sudanese were able to create enough pressure on SPS, that in 1947 it stopped allowing Fellata to will their tenancies to family members.⁴⁵ Although this move did not immediately stop Fellata tenancies, it did retard their growth. The final blow to the Fellata as competition to the Arabs came with the passage of the Nationality Act of 1948. This law restricted Sudanese

⁴³Hassoun, "'Western' Migration and Settlement," p.88.

⁴⁴Perhaps the positive assessment of the Nigerians stemmed from the fact that the Ansar tariqa was active in recruiting Nigerians to come to Sudan and work on Sayyid Abd al Rahman's pump scheme on the White Nile. Beshir, Revolution and Nationalism, p.144.

⁴⁵Hassoun, "'Western' Migration and Settlement," p.100.

citizenship to those people whose ancestors were resident in Sudan prior to the beginning of the Condominium in 1898. This law reduced Fellata of several generations to the status of permanent foreigners in Sudan.⁴⁶ Once deprived of citizenship, the Fellata were refused title to land or access to tenancies, and they were also largely kept out of the public schools.⁴⁷ Therefore, after the passage of the Nationality Act, the majority of Fellata were trapped as agricultural laborers.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GEZIRA BOARD

Arthur Gaitskell made an interesting observation in his book, Gezira. He said that once it was decided that the operation of the SPS would cease in 1950, plans for the further development of Gezira reached a stalemate.⁴⁸ The major question to be answered was what kind of organization would replace the Sudan Plantations Syndicate. It was a foregone conclusion that the Gezira would be controlled by the government, but its exact relation to the government had to be worked out.

Two options for the Gezira were discussed. First, it could be made a government department, preferably under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture. If Gezira was to be organized in this way, its administration would be concerned

⁴⁶O'Brien, "Agricultural Labour Force," p.32.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Gaitskell, Gezira, pp.243-253.

only with agricultural production. The other vision of the Gezira would include a combination of economic development and social reform. The form that was decided was that of a government corporation, to be known as the Gezira Board. The Executive Council of Sudan approved the Gezira Board Ordinance during July 1949.⁴⁹ The Gezira Board was declared to have three functions: management, social development, and agricultural research. The board itself was to consist of the managing director, a representative of the Financial Secretary (later Finance Ministry), the Governor of Blue Nile Province, and at large members to appointed by the Governor-General, three of whom were to be Sudanese.⁵⁰

To achieve social development, two bodies were established. First was the Social Development Committee, which was composed of Gezira Board members. Second was the Gezira Local Committee, consisting of tenants and local officials and chaired by the Governor of the Blue Nile Province. It reported to the Social Development Committee, making recommendations as to where funds should be spent. The Ordinance mandated that a minimum of £E60,000 of the Gezira Board's profits be set aside for development. This amount could increase to £E250,000, depending on the level of profit recorded by the Scheme during

⁴⁹The rest of the following paragraph is based on Gaitskell, Gezira, pp.250-251.

⁵⁰ It should be noted that the Gezira remained under the Finance Ministry after nationalization, and would remain there until the reign of President Nimieri.

a given year. Finally, the division of profits remained as established between the government and SPS, that is the tenants received 40%, the government 40%, and the Gezira Board 20%. The Gezira Board also paid a profits tax. The Gezira Scheme Ordinance took effect June 30, 1950.

Once established, the first Gezira Board's priority was the appointment of a staff. Despite the steady inroads made by Sudanese in the civil service, none had held inspector positions while the SPS was in existence. In 1950, the first year of the Gezira Board, the first five Sudanese field inspectors were hired. According to Taha El Jack Taha, who was hired as a field inspector in 1953, the number of field inspectors increased geometrically throughout the period 1950-1956, allowing for the complete Sudanization of the inspectorate by 1956.⁵¹ The vast majority of the new field inspectors had received their education at Shambat.⁵²

THE FIVE YEAR PLAN & NORTHWEST EXTENSION

While the Gezira's management was changing its complexion, the scheme itself was expanding. The Northwest Extension of the Gezira was a major portion of the government's Five Year Plan, 1946-1951. Although its framers

⁵¹Interview with Taha El Jack Taha, former field inspector, later Development Officer from 1956-1976, and Gezira Board member in 1989. Khartoum, May 26, 1990.

⁵²At the time of Sudanization, Shambat was still an independent school that offered diplomas in agriculture. It would become affiliated with the University of Khartoum, and be elevated to a baccalaureate program. Beshir, Educational Development, p.155.

realized that social services were important, the plan's main objective was to improve the capacity of the Sudan to generate revenue by increasing the amount of land under cultivation.⁵³

The budget put forward by the Condominium tended to bear out the approach outlined above. For example, the budget projection for both health and educational improvements was £E1,702,500, while the allocation for agriculture (not counting its largest segment, irrigation) was £E1,846,170.⁵⁴ Specifically, the plan gave a priority to productivity in public pump schemes and to with improving the ginning capacity at Port Sudan.

The Irrigation Department listed "Development of Gezira Canalisation" as its largest project at £E1,130,000, out of an irrigation budget of £E1,575,000. Agriculture and irrigation constituted £E3,421,170, or thirty percent of an overall budget of £E11,480,470. Agricultural development was the cornerstone of development policy for both the Condominium government and its the independent successor. This emphasis will be seen in discussions of the Northwest Extension and the Managil extension of the Gezira Scheme.

In 1944, W.N. Allen, the director of the Sudan Irrigation Department, outlined the strategies to be used for the

⁵³Sudan Government, Five Year Plan for Post-War Development, 1946, p.1, Sudan Archives, University of Durham.

⁵⁴Ibid, pp 2-4.

In 1944, W.N. Allen, the director of the Sudan Irrigation Department, outlined the strategies to be used for the extension of irrigated land in the Gezira.⁵⁵ His memorandum advised that, with the war ending, attention should be focused on the expansion of irrigation. First of all, Allen noted that once the war ended, another 25,000 feddans could immediately be put into cultivation.⁵⁶ However, the bulk of the memorandum dealt with the extension of agriculture into new areas.⁵⁷

Allen noted that much of the actual work of expansion could not be done before 1950 because extensive planning had to be done. Specifically, Allen was referring to the exact design and function of the various canals, dams, pumps, and other equipment. Indeed, once the Sudanese gained total control of the government and Gezira, they only had to carry out the plans that the British had left behind.

In accordance with the Gezira's administrative arrangement, several offices were charged with different aspects of construction. The Sudan Irrigation Department was in charge of the enlargement and the construction of the

⁵⁵Sudan Irrigation Department, No. SID/Conf./9-2, Wad Medani, 11th July 1944, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

⁵⁶The SPS supervised a wheat crop during the 1942-43 season, which yielded .482 tons per feddan. Apparently the SPS grew wheat at other times during the war years, but I was unable to find any record of them. Ref. SGB/1-B-26, June 6, 1962, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

⁵⁷Sudan Irrigation Department, No. SID/Conf./9-2, Wad Medani, 11th July 1944, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

canals, gates, dams, and administrative buildings. The Gezira Board was responsible for the levelling of fields and general infrastructural improvements necessary to make land fit for farming. The Sudan Irrigation Department was the driving force in the expansion of the Gezira Scheme, but it had problems with other organs of the government. Sometimes there was friction, and at other times there was simply a daunting amount of procedure to be dealt with.

Although the general plans for expansion had been made, the direction in which the Gezira would first grow was not fixed. In 1947, there was discussion about developing in the direction of the Managil or toward the Northwest Extension.⁵⁸ Eventually it was decided that the Northwest Extension be undertaken first, since it would not require, as would the Managil, a major enlargement of the Gezira's main canal. While this recommendation was accepted by the Sudan Irrigation Department, it was necessary to decide that the Northwest Extension would feature multiple watering regimes.⁵⁹

⁵⁸R.J. Smith, Director, Irrigation Department, SID/Conf./14-4-2, March 6, 1947, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

⁵⁹An on-going question in the Gezira centered around the best way to water crops. The combination of extreme heat in the Gezira, and its heavy clay soils made water absorption a tricky problem. The heat meant that water would rapidly evaporate once it was sent into the fields; whereas water took a long time to be absorbed by the heavy clay soil. Smith suggested continuous watering in the belief that there would a smaller amount of water lost due to evaporation. Sudan Irrigation Department, Note "B", Sudan Archives, University of Durham.

The Research Department was convinced that continuous watering would result in the savings. However, for the effectiveness of this innovation to be determined, the irrigation would have to occur on a large scale (20-25,000 feddans), and not on small experimental plots. The Northwest Extension was therefore split into two blocks, one featuring continuous watering, the other using day watering. Land to be irrigated was picked primarily on the basis of the ease with which it could be watered. Often fertility of the land was not known until after it had been canalized. This ignorance of potential would have very significant consequences during the next decade, once the Managil came under construction. Work on the Northwest Extension began in 1947, and it ended in 1952. Its completion took one year longer than the projections of the 1946 Five Year Plan.

CONCLUSION

The period of 1930-1950 saw a number of fundamental changes in the Sudan as a whole and the Gezira in particular. The major theme was the steadily increasing role of the Sudanese in governing Sudan. At first, the educated Sudanese were content to have retained their jobs in the aftermath of the 1924 Revolt and the move towards Indirect Rule. However, the government soon found that it could not realistically dispense with the effendiya, and their numbers steadily increased in the civil service. With their growth and a

softening of British policy, the Sudanese soon began politically to organize, the most important organization being the Graduates Congress.

Tenants, interestingly enough, were first effectively organized in the devolution movement by the government and SPS. Devolution was designed largely to prevent the influence of the effendiya from spreading into the Gezira by making them superfluous in the future management of the scheme. However, the basic interests of the tenants and educated Sudanese eventually intersected. Both groups were privileged members of colonial society who had benefitted substantially from their positions vis a vis the government. Like many privileged groups in a colonial setting, their access to benefits made them even more eager to improve their position.⁶⁰

The result of the tenant and effendiya alliance was that the two groups worked together during the 1946 Tenants Strike, and they also were able to pass the Nationalities Act of 1948. After this level of political cooperation, the government and SPS could no longer plausibly argue that there was no community of interest between the two groups. This realization was a key factor in the creation of the Gezira Board as a public corporation and its subsequent legally mandated role as

⁶⁰It must be remembered that the Gezira tenants were much better off than farmers who were not members of the scheme. They had a guaranteed income and food crops. Also towards the end of the Condominium era, tenants had access to education, health, and social programs unheard of outside of the scheme.

an agent for social development in the Gezira. Also, the common purpose meant that there was no longer any reason to deny Sudanese a role in the administrative structure of the Gezira, and by 1950, Sudanese were being actively recruited to staff the Gezira Board's administration.

CHAPTER THREE: 1950-1960: CONSOLIDATION OF SUDANESE CONTROL
AND EXPANSION IN GEZIRA
OVERVIEW

The decade of the 1950's saw the continuation of Sudanization in the Gezira Scheme and the government services as a whole and expansion in the Gezira. On the national level, self-rule continued and eventually resulted in independence January 1, 1956. In this fact, however, lies many Sudan's problems during the 1950's. Essentially, the Sudanese sought to benefit from independence. The educated Sudanese desired the privileged positions formerly held by the SPS and government, and primary product producers like the tenants wanted to claim profits that they felt had been siphoned off by foreign interests.

During this period, there was conflict between "special interests." At the political level, there was fierce conflict between the Northern parties. At the regional level, the conflict between North and South became significant during this period. In terms of economics, tenants organizations, labor unions, and professional groups, all pursued their interests in the national arena. Although these groups had high hopes for the future, the decade eventually saw a general decline in the nation's fortunes. How this came to be will be discussed in this chapter.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS UNTIL 1953

The major item on the political agenda of Sudan was its permanent status. As had been noted earlier, Great Britain and Egypt had reached an agreement in 1936 that reaffirmed the basic tenets of the 1899 Condominium agreement. Needless to say the Egyptians were not happy with this arrangement. Egyptian nationalists still hoped to include the Sudan in an integral Egypt, and the British were quite determined not to see Egyptian desires fulfilled. The British saw the Sudan as quite strategic to their future interests in the region, especially since they had already accepted the inevitability of withdrawing from the "Northern Tier" of the Middle East.¹

In addition to the designs of the British and Egyptians, various groups of Sudanese had ideas of their own for the future of the Sudan. One thing seemed certain, that was the Sudanese would have a major voice in what would happen in the post war era, unlike the deliberations leading to the 1936 treaty which Egypt and the UK signed without consulting the Sudanese. Sudanese participation was a certainty because, as mentioned in the last chapter, in 1948, a Legislative Assembly was inaugurated and although its powers were circumscribed by

¹ The British, according to William Louis, were considering using tropical Africa as the strategic base for their empire, since it appeared that political momentum was forcing them out of the Middle East. William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p.10.

the Governor-General, it was bound to leave its mark on the negotiations.

Sudanese nationalists were split into two major groups. One was the Umma party, affiliated with the Ansar tariqa, the followers of the Mahdi. During this period, the Ansar was led by Abd al Rahman al Mahdi, the son of the Mahdi, and also the de facto leader of the Umma party. During the period of negotiations, the Umma was the major party in the Legislative Assembly, largely due to unwillingness of its opposition to participate in national politics. The other post-war major was the Ashiqqa party which was associated with the Khatmiyya tariqa. The Khatmiyya was led by Ali Mirghani, who was also the de facto leader of the Ashiqqa. The Ashiqqa party was officially in favor of union with Egypt, although, its members tended to be coy when it came to stating exactly how such a union would be implemented.

The decisive event in the movement towards self-government was the Egyptian abrogation of the 1899 and 1936 treaties with Britain. The Egyptians were unhappy with the creation of the Legislative Assembly. They felt that it was a preliminary move towards establishing an independent Sudan, a conclusion that was quite reasonable considering how events would develop. Owing to these misgivings, there were no Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the arrangement in Sudan for two years after the Legislative Assembly's beginning in 1948. According to Holt and Daly, American pressure on the British

to reach an accord on the Suez Canal sent the British back to the negotiating table in 1950.² When the talks did not produce the results that were desired in Egypt, King Farouk announced the abrogation of the two treaties with Britain concerning the Sudan.³ Holt and Daly noted that this move on the part of Egypt had the effect of weakening its position in the Sudan. Since Cairo no longer recognized the old treaties, it could no longer legally influence the future of country. Egypt tried to compensate by declaring a constitution for Sudan, but it was simply ignored.

Although Egypt was out of the picture, Britain did not find itself in a completely placid situation. There was widespread opinion that since the treaties had been abrogated, Sudan no longer had a legal government and should be placed under an international commission.⁴ In response to such speculation, the government pushed the Self Government Statute through the Legislative Assembly on April 23, 1952. This law created a bicameral legislature, and provided for a number of committees, the most important of which were the Sudanization Committee and an International Election Commission that would oversee the legislative elections. During the period of transition, the governor-general would maintain final

²Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan, p.154.

³Ibid, p.154.

⁴ Ibid, p.155.

authority.⁵ However, now the governor-general's task was to direct the dismantling of the Condominium government because the new Statute stipulated that the Sudan be allowed self-determination within three years.⁶ How the Sudanese would react to their new situation, especially regarding the Gezira, will be the focus of the rest of this chapter.

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION UNTIL 1953

The 1950's were a time of considerable economic contrast in Sudan. Early in the decade, high cotton prices resulted in unparalleled personal incomes for tenants of the Gezira and unprecedented surpluses for government coffers. Between 1946 and 1951, average tenant income in the Gezira increased from £E29 to £E800.⁷ Simultaneously, government revenue increased from £E8,300,000 to £E46,340,000.⁸ This sudden burst of prosperity would have a profound effect on the development of the Sudanese economy and the expectations of the Sudanese people as they moved towards independence. Many Sudanese saw an independent Sudan as a country of unlimited possibilities. Also, the government was encouraged to keep developing the irrigated agriculture sector of the economy, since it had recently proved to be so lucrative.

⁵Martin Daly, Imperial Sudan, p.300.

⁶Daly, Imperial Sudan, p.300.

⁷Ibid, pp.307-308.

⁸Ibid, pp.302-303.

The cotton boom gave rise to patterns of consumption that would eventually prove to be quite debilitating after the sudden expansion cooled. Namely, privileged segments of the Sudanese population developed great appetites for foreign consumer goods that would eventually lead to balance of payments problems. Tony Barnett, in Gezira: An Illusion of Development (1977), speaks of how tenants were able to buy items such as transistor radios with ease during the boom period.⁹ More importantly, Martin Daly noted that as a result of the cotton boom, the Sudanese became dependent on a number of imported goods that could have easily been substituted had the will existed among the people and government. Daly mentions, for instance, that between 1946 and 1951, the amount of sugar imported rose from £E573,000 to £E5,500,000.

The corollary of the rise in cotton prices was an increased government emphasis on expanding the irrigated agriculture infrastructure of Sudan. The government also saw to it that the inhabitants of the cotton producing areas, especially the Gezira, received more social services than those outside the cotton schemes.¹⁰ The people of Gezira had far better schools, health care, water supplies than other populations in the rural Sudan.

The high price of cotton during the war and the immediate post-war period was partially maintained by the method by

⁹Barnett, Gezira, pp.31-32.

¹⁰Daly, Imperial Sudan, pp.308-309.

which the Sudanese product was sold during this time. Between 1941 and 1948, cotton was bought by the British government-sponsored Cotton Control Commission which negotiated prices with the Condominium government and made regular monthly payments for the cotton. The Cotton Control Commission also paid for the storage of cotton at Port Sudan and accepted any losses that occurred in transport to Britain.¹¹

After 1948, the international economic situation made the war time arrangement unfavorable to Sudan. The world was then suffering from a shortage of U.S. dollars, which made cotton produced outside of the United States much more attractive.¹² In response to the new circumstances, the contract was renegotiated, thereby guaranteeing a higher price to Sudan. This agreement lasted until 1952 when it was discontinued.

One criticism of the system was that it denied the Sudan the opportunity to develop commercial contacts outside of the British Commonwealth. Adel Amin Beshai, in Export Performance & Economic Development (1976), argues that marketing through London did not hurt Sudan because Britain re-exported much of the cotton that was bought in Sudan, thereby making the rest of the world familiar with Sudanese cotton. Furthermore, Beshai notes that once Sudan did independently market its

¹¹Adel Amin Beshai, Export Performance and Development in Sudan 1900-1967, (Oxford: St. Anthony's Press, 1976), p.55.

¹²Ibid, p.56.

cotton after 1952, it experienced no difficulty in moving its produce.¹³

Undoubtedly the major force behind the discontinuation of the cotton marketing system was Britain's inability to sell all of the crop that it purchased in 1952. This brought about a serious crisis in the Gezira the following year, since the law stated that profits could not be paid to tenants until 90% of the crop had been sold.¹⁴ After ending the contract with Britain, the Gezira began selling its cotton to independent agents.¹⁵

By 1953, and the advent of self-rule in Sudan, the Gezira had already seen the end of its most lucrative period. However, by this time, dependence on cotton had reached the point that expansion of the country's capacity to produce cotton was seen as the major focus of agricultural development.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT TO 1953

The boom in cotton prices helped to keep government development projects focused on irrigated agricultural schemes dedicated to cotton. During the early part of the period, the Five Year Plan of 1946 was still being carried out. The Northwest Extension was completed in 1952, a year later than

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴SC/A/1-A, Letter from Messrs. Linklater & Paines (London Lawyers) to C.J.P. Markey of Gezira, October 19, 1953, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

¹⁵Beshai, Export Performance, p.56.

had originally been projected. The next major project concerning the Gezira was the Managil extension.

SUDANIZATION IN THE GEZIRA SCHEME

Although the Legislative Assembly had recommended it in 1948, the Sudanization of the Gezira Scheme began in 1950, the year that the SPS contract ended and the Gezira Board began. That year, five Sudanese became field inspectors. According to Taha El Jack Taha, who was hired as a field inspector in 1953, the number of field inspectors hired by the Gezira Board increased geometrically, allowing for the complete Sudanization of the inspectorate by 1956.¹⁶ The vast majority of the new field inspectors had received their education at the agricultural school in Shambat. At the time of Sudanization, Shambat was still an independent school that offered diplomas in agriculture, although it soon affiliated with the University of Khartoum, and instituted to a baccalaureate program.¹⁷

Sudanizing the rest of the Gezira's administration would prove more complicated. One major problem was how to deal with the large number of British nationals still working in the Gezira. The solution was to grant these people very favorable retirement plans. The basic scheme allowed a former employee

¹⁶Interview with Taha El Jack Taha, former Gezira Board Development Officer, Khartoum, May 26, 1990.

¹⁷Mohamed A. Nour, "A Perspective View on Higher Education in the Sudan," Sudan Agricultural Journal, 4, 1, (1969) p.20.

to receive a 20% annuity for the time served, provided he was under a long-term contract. If an employee was dismissed expressly because of the Sudanization of his post, then that official received an annuity of 40% of his or her pay.¹⁸ In addition to the money paid to those who served out long-term contracts, there were even more benefits in store for those whose jobs were Sudanized before their contracts had expired. The Gezira paid these people three months pay for each month left on the contract.¹⁹ The total paid for compensating expatriate employees was estimated at £E545,550 (approx. \$1,700,000).²⁰

It should be noted that, contrary to what many writers have claimed, not all British employees were replaced by the Sudanese at the onset of independence. However, those British remaining in Gezira also benefitted from Sudanization also. For example:

Please note that in pursuance of the Sudanization plan, Mr. D.J. James will relinquish his present post of Financial Controller on 17th. April 1956 and his present contract with the board will terminate.

Mr. James will continue in the service of the board in the capacity of

¹⁸SGB/PERS/6-1 February 25, 1958, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

¹⁹CM/1.A.5./4, (date unknown), Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

²⁰Ibid.



Development Management under a new agreement, and his salary will be £2,900 a year with effect from 18. April 1956. Mr. James' entitlements to gratuity and compensation on the Sudanisation of his post under his existing terms of service will be paid to him on 30th. June 1956.²¹

Another way in which expatriates maintained their positions in the Gezira was to claim Sudanese citizenship. This tactic was commonly taken by workers of Middle Eastern origin.²² Some interesting problems came up as workers scrambled to prove their Sudanese identity such as new Sudanese citizens seeking expatriate travel bonuses to see their families in their countries of origin.²³ This practice was eventually stopped, the logic being that if these people are Sudanese, they needed to establish roots in Sudan and stop going to the "old country" so much. Such problems caused the government to stop granting Sudanese status to foreigners.²⁴

Although foreigners continued to contribute to the Gezira Scheme, the thrust of the 1950's policy was Sudanization. At the heart of this program was the training of Sudanese to

²¹Memorandum from A.A. Faki, Chief Accountant SGB/PERS/142-10-1 March 31, 1956, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

²²File 448, SC/A/44 May 8, 1955, A memorandum from the Gezira Secretary to the Permanent Under Secretary of Finance mentions a Syrian and Egyptian who were claiming Sudanese status. Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

²³Ibid.

²⁴SGB/PERS/134-6, March 13, 1955, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

assume a wide variety of positions over a short period of time. A memorandum of September 23, 1953, urged the Gezira's management to find Sudanese clerical workers interested in becoming accountants. Those interested employees would be advanced loans for correspondence courses. Students who passed the Intermediate Examination of the Association of Certified Corporate Accountants would receive a scholarship for one year's study in the UK for part two of the final examination. After completely passing the examination, the student would be obligated to work for the Gezira for several years.²⁵

The Gezira's management also looked to other sources for accountants. In a letter to the Civil Secretary in Khartoum, the Financial Controller asked about any graduates from the University College of Khartoum who might be interested in studying accounting. The controller also asked about the availability of any Sudanese students who might have studied accounting in Egypt.²⁶ Later that year, the controller was able to secure a list of graduates from the Egyptian schools. The Chamber of Commerce also helped to advertise the accounting possibilities offered by the Gezira.

Once Sudanese staff was hired, they had to be trained to work within the scheme. The recruit was assigned to an

²⁵Circular No. M/3/40 (75/36), September 23, 1953, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

²⁶Ref. No. G/4/3112 Dec. 16, 1953, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

experienced staff member for training. This system can be seen through a series of memoranda exchanged between the Financial Controller, a new employee, and his supervisor. The Financial Controller wrote to the new man, asking him if he were ready to begin work as inspector of accounts. Apparently, his supervisor discovered the communication and informed the Financial Controller of the new recruit's incompetence. Specifically, he failed to undertake a number of tasks assigned to him.²⁷

The various forces that were important to Sudanization can perhaps be seen most clearly in the story of Mekki Abbas, who became the first Sudanese managing director of the Gezira Scheme. Abbas began his career in education, teaching at the elite Bakht er Rhoda school in Erkowit. He caught the attention of his British supervisors, in particular, V.L. Griffiths, a man who would become quite famous in the field of colonial education.²⁸ Under the guidance of Griffiths, Mekki Abbas also did some community development work among the pump schemes in the White Nile area. Abbas' growing reputation found him being offered a chair on the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan in 1944.

Despite Mekki Abbas' success and good reputation, he was not a blind supporter of the government. He advocated

²⁷Ref. No. SC/A/43, Confidential, November 6, 1955, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

²⁸Gaitskell, Gezira, p.303.

including the Southern Sudan in an independent Sudan before Condominium officials were prepared to countenance such thoughts. Despite his occasional conflicts, Abbas was able to maintain generally cordial relations with British officials. These connections took Abbas to Exeter University and also to Oxford, to study under Margery Perham. His graduate work resulted in a book, The Sudan Question (1952). Abbas' first came to Gezira in 1950 as the Social Development director. In 1953, he became the managing director, a position he held until 1958, when he was appointed Secretary-General to the United Nations Commission for Africa.²⁹

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS IN THE GEZIRA

During the 1950's, labor organizations gained a great deal of prominence in the Sudan. Not only were they active in improving the conditions of their members, they were also a major force in the independence movement. The prominence of unions stemmed from the fact that they were concentrated in the modern sector of the economy and they were centered in the major areas of development in the Sudan.

After joining the Gezira administration, the Sudanese founded the Sudan Gezira Board Staff Association, (SSA). It contacted General Manager G.W. Raby July 8, 1953, and he responded that, although formal recognition would take a

²⁹The general format for the section on Mekki Abbas came Gaitskell, Gezira pp.306-307. However additional information came from 'Abdel Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism, and also information that I obtained at the Sudan archives in Durham.

while, the group was most welcome and should act as though it had already been approved. Raby also spoke very favorably of the character of the people involved in the founding of the organization.³⁰

However, after initially approving the SSA, the Gezira's administration soon found itself at odds with the new organization. The SSA was composed largely of former civil servants, and not surprisingly, they wished to replicate the privileges that they had enjoyed in government service. Specifically, the SSA sought greater discounts on rail fare than they were being allowed as Gezira employees.³¹ General Manager Raby quickly reminded the SSA members that they had voluntarily joined the Gezira, and if they were so fond of government perquisites, they should have remained where they had been.³²

The administrative employees of the Gezira were not the only group to organize during this period. The tenants also actively pursued their interests. After the strike of 1946, the Tenants Representative Body was formed. This organization was treated as an aspect of devolution and self-government, and the organization therefore served to reorient the focus of

³⁰No. SSA/20.A.1, July 8, 1953 & SC/MD/3A, July 11, 1953, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

³¹Ref. SSA/20.A.2, General Secretary Khuluti to General Manager Raby, Nov. 26, 1953, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

³²G.M. Raby to Gen. Sec. SSA, Jan. 12, 1954, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.



tenants away from aggressively pursuing their own interests to concentrating on greater efficiency in the management of the scheme. This situation changed when the Tenants Representative Body was reorganized as the Tenants Union. The change can best be seen in the election Sheikh El Amin Mohammed El Amin as the union's president. Instead of being a prominent citizen, as had the members of the previous organization, he only worked a half tenancy. More importantly, while the previous tenant leaders were essentially conservative, Sheikh El Amin was an avowed communist.³³

Early on in his dealings with the Gezira Board, it became clear that Sheikh El Amin and the Tenants Union had one clear objective: as much as possible they wanted to wrest control of the scheme away from the government and place it in the hands of the tenants.³⁴ To achieve his goal, Sheikh El Amin exploited the frustration on the part of the tenants at their decreasing profits during the late 1950's. Throughout the entire period of Sheikh El Amin's tenure as president, there was agitation for an increased share of the Gezira Scheme's profits.³⁵ The reason behind the tenants' demands was the declining price and profits that cotton was returning.

Sheikh El Amin and the Tenant's Union argued for an

³³Gaitskell, Gezira, p.306.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵File 362, Parliamentary Proceedings 1956, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

increase in the tenants' share to 50%.³⁶ They reasoned that, since the SPS was gone, there was no need for the government to take its share. Of course, this argument tended to neglect the money that was spent on administration, research, and social welfare. In its defense, the government pointed out that in reality, the tenants had been paid in excess of their legal share throughout the 1950's.³⁷

In addition to trying to secure more profits for the tenants, Sheikh El Amin also sought to change the organization of the Tenants' Union. El Amin wanted to limit the number of meetings held by the union's executive committee, and extend the terms to which members of committee were elected. The most striking proposal was to open the union to all Sudanese, not just tenants.³⁸ The proposed changes, however, were not approved by the government.

Officialdom actively worked against El Amin, charging some union members with mismanagement of funds.³⁹ Eventually a confrontation developed over an attempt to wrest another increase in profit shares for tenants. In 1955, El Amin threatened a strike, arguing that the average tenant had lost £E136 the previous year. The Gezira Board, under Managing

³⁶Gaitskell, Gezira, p.307.

³⁷ Tenant Profit Shares: 1950-51 ...46.6% 1951-52 ...45.9% 1952-53 ...45.5% 1953-54 ...45.6%, File 363 Feb.13-16, 1956 Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

³⁸Gaitskell, Gezira, p. 307.

³⁹Ibid. p. 308.

Director Mekki Abbas, countered by offering each farmer £E20 to plant, and promising an additional £E10 from the reserve fund later in the year.⁴⁰ This technique worked because Abbas was able to take advantage of dissension among those tenants who did not agree with the methods of the union. The following year, 1956, Sheikh El Amin lost his bid for re-election to the union presidency. However, this was not the end of sheikh El Amin. He would resurface during the 1960's still committed to tenant activism.⁴¹

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1953-1960

After deciding to embark on self-determination, the Sudanese began the process of managing a parliamentary democracy, at which they failed badly. The reasons behind that failure and the military dictatorship that resulted from parliamentary chaos, will be touched upon briefly in this section.

The immediate question before the new government was who would run it. This matter was settled in November and December of 1953, and the new parliament opened on January 9, 1954.⁴² The majority was the National Unionist Party (NUP), a collection of nationalist groups that were loosely associated with the old Ashiqqa party and the Khatmiyya tariqa. The party

⁴⁰Gaitskell, Gezira, p.308.

⁴¹Peter K. Bechtold, Politics in the Sudan, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p.216.

⁴²Beshir, Revolution and Nationalism, p.179.

was led by Ismail Al Azhari, a former Graduates Congress member. The major losers were the members of the Umma Party, who were only able to garner significant support in the west of the country.

The major tasks before the new government were to regularize its relationship with Egypt, Sudanize the entire administration, and attend to the special concerns of the Southern Sudanese. It should be noted that economics did not figure highly on the new government's agenda. Throughout the early days of the government, the assumption was that once the British were removed, the country's great wealth would be more readily available to the people. The general economic policy stayed as before, concentrating on the expansion of the irrigated agricultural sector of the economy. One major breakthrough of this period was the negotiation of the 1959 Egyptian-Sudanese Nile Waters agreement, which permitted the intensification and diversification experiments of the 1960's.

The main impediment to the tasks before the new government was the instability of the political coalitions in the parliament. Another problem was that those out of power were often unwilling to accept the policies of the governing party. This could be seen in the violent Ansar demonstrations against General Neguib of Egypt, when he visited Sudan in 1954. The general, who was half Sudanese, was personally quite popular and as long as he was the leader of the new government in Egypt, there was a possibility, however remote, of Sudan

forming a union with Egypt. Neguib was deposed by Nasser, however, and the Sudan opted for total independence.

The question of Sudanization was handled nationally along the lines that were described in the section on Sudanization within Gezira. The process drew attention to the weakness of the South in relation to the North. Only six of a total of eight hundred positions were awarded to Southern applicants.⁴³ The resentment generated by Northern domination of the bureaucracy and the unwillingness of Northerners to create a federal state resulted in a serious mutiny in Equatoria in 1955.⁴⁴ Although the mutiny was handled quickly, albeit with considerable difficulty, it still suggested that the relations between North and South would be precarious for many years to come.

Despite the seriousness of the problems between the North and South, the focus of Northern politicians was on maneuvering for power. The NUP coalition of Al Azhairi was unable to last for long, and by November 1955, he had lost power. Al Azhairi was able to regain his position by accepting a coalition with the Umma. Therefore, when independence came on January 1, 1956, the Sudan was governed by a coalition of the country's two major parties. This coalition soon proved unworkable, and the young government once again foundered. After several switches among parties, the military took over

⁴³Holt & Daly, A History of the Sudan, p. 163.

⁴⁴Ibid.

the government in 1958 when an Umma prime minister, Abdallah Khalil, virtually invited a coup.⁴⁵ The coup was led by General Ibrahim Abboud, who would retain power until 1964.

It should be noted that the army takeover coincided with a general economic decline, which increased militancy among certain sectors of the population, particularly among labor.⁴⁶ As was the case in the Gezira, the Communist Party was a major factor in this unrest.⁴⁷ The Communists also gained a bit of respectability among more established parties once they realized that the army had no intention of quickly relinquishing power. The older mainstream parties allied with both the Muslim Brothers and the Communists in an attempt to agitate for a return to elected government.⁴⁸

GEZIRA EXPANSION 1953-1960

The completion of the Managil Extension was the major undertaking during this period. The Nile Waters Agreement of 1959 set the stage for the Intensification and Diversification programs of the 1960's.

Serious planning for the Managil began towards the end of the Northwest Extension project. The Managil area was the

⁴⁵Beshir, Revolution and Nationalism, p. 207.

⁴⁶Markakis, National and Class Conflict, p. 80.

⁴⁷Ibid. Markakis notes that Sheikh El Amin Mohammed El Amin was able to regain control of the Gezira Tenants Union in 1958, the same year as the coup.

⁴⁸Beshir, Revolution and Nationalism, pp. 210-211.

logical region in which to expand because soil and other surveys already had been done.⁴⁹ Furthermore, the basic outline of projected canals had already been determined from air and field surveys. Additionally, its proximity to the Gezira meant that it would not need pilot schemes to educate tenants.

The total estimated cost of the project was £E12,000,000.⁵⁰ Smith suggested that it be done in stages of roughly 100,000 feddans each,⁵¹ to avoid straining the annual budgets while still making it attractive to contractors.⁵² As for "the basic layout and actual holding," Smith assumed that the Managil extension would be modeled on the Gezira proper.

The Managil Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) had its first meeting September 15, 1955.⁵³ The committee was founded by the Development Priorities Committee which was a part of the Ministry of Finance. Its first major decision was to place the Managil under the jurisdiction of the Gezira Board. Next, the

⁴⁹IA/9-6, c/o, Circular from R.J. Smith, Irrigation Adviser, Finance Department, Khartoum, Feb. 5, 1953, Commissioner for Development, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

⁵⁰IA/9-6, c/o, Circular from Irrigation Adviser, R.J. Smith Finance Department, Khartoum, Feb.5, 1953, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³"Problems of Land Development in the Managil Southwest Extension in the Sudan in the Decade 1957-1967", by Taha El Jack Taha, Development Officer, Gezira Board, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

AHC began the business of actually organizing Phase I of Managil. According to the report, "Problems of Land Development in the Managil South-West Extension in the Sudan in the Decade 1957-1967," The most pressing obstacles to construction were:

- i. recruitment and training of Field and Accounting Staff;
- ii. domestic water supply;
- iii. and extension of the Gezira Light Railway for the transportation of cotton from the new fields to the Ginning Factories;
- iv. availability of ginning potential to cope with the new crop.⁵⁴

Recruitment of staff for the first section of the Managil was handled by the Finance Ministry who were then sent to the Gezira for training. To provide water, the ministry hired the British firm, George Stow & Company, which, carrying out a geological survey, dug eleven bore wells in the Phase I area. Meanwhile, the Civil Service department of the SGB erected "Windmills, tanks, towers, waterguards and fencing".⁵⁵ The Gezira Light Railway placed orders for more material so that it might extend its line. Finally, to meet the anticipated need for more capacity, twenty-two additional gins were built at the mills at Meringan.⁵⁶

Despite the progress made in organizing the construction of the Managil extension, forces beyond the control of the

⁵⁴Taha, "Problems of Land Development."

⁵⁵Taha, "Problems of Land Development."

⁵⁶Ibid.

Sudan forced planners to slow the pace of development.⁵⁷ Beginning in 1953, cotton prices declined, and the supply of cotton far exceeded demand. The Gezira was unable consequently to pay profits to tenants in a timely fashion. Additionally, there were the inevitable delays in the delivery of supplies and equipment. Finally, the fact that the Managil was an undeveloped area forced construction workers to limit their activity to the dry season. This accumulation of problems led to delays in construction and alterations in plans.

The most immediate problem concerning Managil was its financing. By building the extension in sections of approximately 100,000 feddans each, the government hoped to be able to clear the total cost of constructing the project. This plan was successful until the 1957-58 growing season which saw another decline in cotton prices, resulting in a loss of revenue for the Sudan government.⁵⁸ Because of its change in fortune, the government resorted to the World Bank, which,

⁵⁷ As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, beginning in 1953, there was a sharp drop in the price of cotton and a simultaneous decline in demand. The problem was so severe that the Gezira Board was unable to pay profits to the tenants until past the normal deadline that year. SC/A/13, Confidential, Memorandum from the Sudan Gezira Board to the Ministry of Finance, Jan. 3, 1955, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

⁵⁸ As was mentioned in Daly's Imperial Sudan, the Sudan experienced a boom in cotton prices during the early 1950's. Also, both Daly and John Markakis, National and Class Conflict, note that during the period of rising cotton prices, the Sudanese began rapidly to increase the number of imports coming into the country. Once cotton prices declined, this meant more Sudanese money was needed to buy the same amount of imports.

after a detailed study, approved a loan of \$15,500,00 in 1960.

NILE WATERS AGREEMENT OF 1959

Ironically only under military dictatorships have there been any significant gains in agricultural development. The very short-lived democratic governments of Sudan almost always have seemed to be preoccupied with the retention of power.

General Abboud's government increased the area under irrigation, thanks to its negotiation with Egypt on the allocation of Nile waters with Egypt in 1959. The agreement also allowed the government to institute the intensification and diversification program in the 1960's.

The need for a new agreement with Egypt arose with the beginning of the Aswan dam's construction in 1955. This dam would necessitate the relocation of the people of Wadi Halfa, whose homes would be inundated by the new dam. Sudan demanded that Egypt pay for the resettlement of its citizens.⁵⁹ Sudan also demanded that its share of the Nile waters be clearly stipulated before the dam was completed and that Sudan have the right to build the structures necessary to exploit its share of the water.⁶⁰ Although the negotiations for water rights began under the parliamentary regime, they were concluded by the military government in October 1959. The agreement secured Sudan £E15,000,000 for the resettlement of

⁵⁹Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan, p.173,

⁶⁰Ibid, p.173.

the Halfawis, and secured Sudan an allotment of 18,500,000,000 cubic meters of water, although Egypt received 55,500,000,000.⁶¹ The agreement also provided for the construction of the Roseires dam which was to begin in 1960.⁶²

SUMMARY

The decade of the 1950's was a period of high expectations in Sudan. The Sudanese were eagerly awaiting independence and looked forward to a higher standard of living. Unfortunately, while the 1950's did see the birth of an independent Sudan, profits from cotton tended to decline throughout the decade, and living standards never again reached the levels seen in 1951.

The frustration generated by unmet expectations took the form of militant labor union activity on the part of Gezira tenants and urban workers. It also contributed significantly to the general political instability of Sudan prior to the coup of 1958.

Although the dangers of Sudan's dependence on cotton had clearly been demonstrated, the major trend in economic development during this period was to expand the country's capacity for irrigated agriculture. The two major areas of expansion were the Gezira Northwest Extension and the Managil.

⁶¹Ibid. p.174.

⁶²Loc. cit.

Finally, after the Nile Waters Agreement of 1959, the stage was set once again for further expansion in the next decade.

CHAPTER FOUR: 1960-1969

GEZIRA'S ATTEMPTS TO REMAKE ITSELF

Unfortunately for the Sudan, the period 1960-1969 saw a continuation of many of the problems that had first manifested themselves during the 1950's. Throughout this decade, the Sudan would have problems with decreasing profitability in its agricultural export sector. The decreasing profits not only limited the revenue coming into the state, they also restricted attempts by the government to make its economy less one-dimensional. In addition, political rivalries intensified to the point that both military and parliamentary governments were unable to stabilize the country.

During the 1960's, the Gezira underwent a series of experiments aimed at increasing its productivity and lessening its dependence on cotton. The most famous of the programs were the diversification and intensification programs, which were victims of the increasing political instability and declining revenues.

This chapter is concerned with the diversification and intensification programs of the Gezira Board during the 1960's. Intensification and diversification was an attempt to increase the amount of land under cultivation in the Gezira while also increasing the number of crops grown. The program sought to introduce import substitutes and new cash crops. Despite the logical and reasonable goals of the program, it ultimately failed. Owing to political instability during the 1960's, it

was impossible for the Sudan, in general, and Gezira Board, in particular, to develop and maintain a consistent economic policy.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN SUDAN 1960-1965

The Sudan began the 1960's with the military regime of General Abboud in control of the country. Although this regime was quite popular when it first took power in 1958, public support declined throughout the early 1960's. This decline was the result of steadily worsening conflict in the Southern Sudan and economic decline in the country's heartland.

By 1961, The Front of Opposition Parties was formed. It was composed not only of communists, students, and labor activists; it also drew members from the major mainstream parties of Sudan, with the exception of the Khatmiyya.¹ The Front protested the brutal treatment of unionists and the general suppression of the democratic process. The Front sent two memoranda to the government accusing it of oppressive tactics.² Protests led to negotiations between the Front and the government, but the results were inconclusive.

The general feeling of dissatisfaction with the government had great depth and was expressed in a number of ways. One of the most powerful weapons was a threatened strike

¹Gabriel Warburg, Islam, Nationalism, and Communism in a Traditional Society, (London: Frank Cass 1978), p.109.

²Ibid p.110.

in the Gezira during 1963³, to force the government to allow the tenants to hold free elections for their union. Declining cotton prices also exacerbated the tenants' feelings of frustration.⁴ Rather than use force or risk economic devastation, the government capitulated, and El Amin Muhammad El Amin, was once again elected president of the union. According to most observers, the concession by the government exposed its weakness to the people of Sudan and encouraged further protest against it.

The formal overthrow of the Abboud regime occurred in 1964, when the government publicly admitted its inability to resolve the civil war in the South. The government therefore created a forum for public discussion of the problem. These discussions, which were held at the University of Khartoum on September 9, led directly to a condemnation of the military government. It is important to note that the condemnation met with approval all sectors of Sudanese opinion, from Muslim Brothers to communists.⁵

The government tried to silence the protest by banning future meetings, but a new one was held the following month. The government tried to disperse the crowd, but the people resisted, resulting in one death. The funeral of the victim, a student, "turned into a mass demonstration and a general

³Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan, p.181.

⁴Warburg, Islam, Nationalism, and Communism, p.110.

⁵Ibid, p.114.

strike."⁶ After several days of mass action, General Abboud announced the dissolution of his government, which was replaced by a coalition government composed of the total array of opposition parties.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICY IN SUDAN 1960-1965

Sudan's economic performance during the early 1960's continued to fit the pattern that had been established during the post-war period. Except for periods of international instability, such as the Korean War and the Suez Canal Crisis, the price of cotton continued to decline relative to the price of manufactured goods.⁷ Since cotton was the major commodity produced by Sudan, the amount of income available to Sudan generally declined during this period.

Government repoded by initiating a number of new programs defined in a "Ten-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development 1961/62-1970/71." The goal of this plan was to decrease the dependence of Sudan on agriculture by increasing the country's industrial capacity.⁸ In agriculture, the goal was to strengthen Sudan's position by diversifying the cash crops grown and by introducing import substitution crops. For

⁶Loc. cit.

⁷Roushdi A. Henin, "Recent Developments in Sudan's Foreign Trade (1949-1961)," Sudan Notes and Records, Vol. 45 (1964), p.114.

⁸The government sought to increase manufacturing's share of the GDP to 57%, or to an estimated £S93,000,000 in the 1970-71 fiscal year. D.J. Shaw, "A Note on Sudan's Ten Year Plan of Economic and Social Development," Agricultural Economics Bulletin, No.3 (June, 1963), p.59.

example, the plan had a projected goal of reducing cotton's share of export earnings by four percent from 65% to 61%, while increasing oil seeds like peanuts to 19% from 13%.⁹

Once the Ten-Year Plan was initiated, older projects like the Managil extension were simply added to the Ten-Year Plan. The additional water supplied by the Roseires Dam was the basis for several projects undertaken by the Abboud government. The major emphasis of the new programs was to improve the use of existing agricultural facilities while further developing the country's infrastructure and financial system so as to allow the maximum exploitation of agriculture in Sudan. Specifically, water from the Roseires dam was to allow 290,000 feddans of the Gezira to be cultivated during the dry season between January and July.¹⁰ Although cotton would be grown during this period, a number of other crops would also be introduced.

Other projects undertaken during this period included the Khashm El Girba Dam on the Atbara river which was to sustain the resettled Halfawis, whose original homes had been flooded as a result of the construction of the Aswan dam in Upper Egypt. This project was initially funded out of a settlement paid to Sudan by Egypt, although the money was not be enough to finish the project. Also the Sennar dam was to be fitted with a hydro-electric generator to supply the Gezira with

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Shaw, "A Note," p.62.

power. Finally, the Ten-Year Plan included the Guneid sugar refinery, which was located on the Blue Nile and sought to lessen Sudan's demand for imported sugar.¹¹

As was the case with the expansion of the Managil, which continued during this period, the government had to look to international agencies to finance these plans since the capital was lacking in Sudan. The government's plans for repaying loans was based on economic growth projections of both the output of the new projects and the current mainstays of the Sudanese economy. Opponents of the government, however, concluded that the Ten-Year Plan, would make the economy of the Sudan too dependent on outside sources. Specifically, leftists thought that the program's reliance on loans and international agencies was tying the economy to the United States.¹²

The economic policies of the country became confused after the restoration of civilian government in 1964. The heads of the ministries that were in charge of the programs were replaced after the new government came into power. This change hurt the implementation of programs more than it changed the general direction of the government's economic policy. As was mentioned earlier, the most outspoken critics of the Ten-Year Plan were communists, but they were removed

¹¹Ibid, pp.62-63.

¹²Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism, p.113.

from the governing coalition before they were able to influence policy decisions.

EXPANSION OF THE GEZIRA DURING THE 1960'S

The Managil extension was completed in 1963, increasing the Gezira's area by 800,000 feddans. There were further extensions in the Gezira region although they were much smaller. This section will examine the Gezira's final extensions and their effectiveness. Generally speaking, by this time all of the optimal locations for irrigation had already been incorporated into one or another scheme. The government wanted to use all of the water that was being made available to it via the Nile Waters Agreement, and pressed on with the expansion of irrigation.

The shortcomings of Gezira policy in regard to the later expansions is most fully spelled out in a report made by the then Development Officer, Taha El Jack Taha.¹³ Taha describes a number of later extensions to the Gezira being built with inadequate soil surveys.¹⁴ An even more serious

¹³Taha, "The Problems of Land Development."

¹⁴Taha, "The Problems of Land Development," Taha cites the development of Gezira/Managil extensions during the 1966-67 season as particularly bad examples. These extensions were to be 100,000 feddans but were reduced to 60,844 because of the lack of funding. The firm in charge of surveying, Sir MacDonald and Partners, carried out only a "semi-detailed land classification and soil survey". Furthermore, the government only gave the contractors seven months to finish the project.

problem was the lack of ground water at many areas.¹⁵ To complicate matters further, as the planning and construction of the final extensions became more haphazard, World Bank funding was denied to several of the projects.¹⁶ The shortfall resulted in the tenants of the later schemes having considerably poorer living standards than tenants in the Gezira main or Managil. Specifically many areas had limited access to social services like health centers or schools. Also, many tenants were forced to live in grass huts instead of more permanent buildings.

By the early 1960's gravity irrigation had been extended to every conceivable part of the Gezira region. Any additional productivity would have to be brought about by improving the quality and quantity on already cultivated land. This was where intensification and diversification came into the picture.

DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE GEZIRA 1960-1967

In the Gezira, both communist influence and disaffection with government policy was much stronger among the tenants than in the rest of the Sudan. These basic realities were the crucial factors in the ultimate failure of the government programs initiated during this period. Specifically, the

¹⁵John R. Randell, "Patterns of Settlement in the Managil Extension to the Sudan Gezira Scheme", Sudan Notes and Records, Vol.45, (1964), No.4, p.95.

¹⁶Taha El Jack Taha notes that the World Bank refused to fund Phase I of the Roseires project in 1962. Taha El Jack Taha, "Problems of Land Development."

tenants continued to view themselves as exploited generators of government wealth who were unable to enjoy the fruits of their labor. They carried this attitude into new projects like intensification and diversification, thereby severely limiting their effectiveness.

Although the intensification and diversification initiatives ultimately failed due to the political climate, the plans themselves were well designed and, for the most part, reasonable. Intensification began in 1961, with the goal of making more use of the land.¹⁷ Since the outbreak of the blackarm cotton disease in the 1930's, the Gezira Scheme had utilized a system of rotation which left close to 50% of its land fallow at any given time. This system of rotation was adopted to retard the spread of disease to future crops. The Gezira Scheme could afford a system such as this as long as it was part of a well-financed corporation operated within a powerful world empire. However, the coming of independence and the general downward trend in cotton prices made the old system uneconomical. Furthermore, the growing availability of water, thanks to the new Nile Waters Agreement and from the new dam projects, made more intensive cultivation even more feasible than it would have been in the past.

¹⁷E.T. Gibbons, "Groundnut Credit and Marketing Cooperatives in the Sudan Gezira 1961/62 to 1973/74 - Some Lessons to be Learned," Agricultural and Economic Development of Developing Nations ed. Parie Andreou (East African Literature Bureau, 1977), p. 163.

The two crops that were the primary focus of intensification and diversification efforts were wheat and peanuts. The grain was seen as an important import substitution, and peanuts as a potentially valuable new export crop. Both crops had been grown in Gezira before, and there existed a considerable body of information on how they would perform under Gezira conditions. During World War II, wheat was grown in the Gezira as an import substitute. Wheat never became a major crop because the region was incapable of producing harvests comparable to those of countries in temperate regions. For example, the average yield of wheat crops grown in Gezira between 1919-1963 was .590 metric tons per feddan, this was a third of the amount of wheat that could be produced at a farm in the temperate zone.¹⁸ Wheat became the major emphasis of import substitution at the suggestion of the World Bank,¹⁹ which estimated that the Gezira could average .750 metric tons per feddan.

The first meeting concerning intensification and diversification took place on October 10, 1961, at the

¹⁸AP/B/27 (AJ)-A-1, Report from S.H. Evelyn, Chief Agronomist, Agricultural Research Division, Dec. 12, 1961, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

¹⁹Intensification Committee, 12-27-1963, Mentions World Bank Report No.10 77a (IDA) 4, dated 6-1-1961, as the first paper to suggest using wheat as a crop for intensification, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

Ministry of Agriculture's research station in Gezira.²⁰ It was suggested that 30,000-50,000 feddans of wheat could be cultivated the following year, since water from the Khashm El Girba dam would be available. In a meeting of November 11, 1961, the possibility of a trial wheat harvest utilizing combines in the North and Northwest Groups was discussed. Integration of peanuts into the rotation was also mentioned during the meeting. Specifically, it was suggested that peanuts eventually should replace lubia by the 1967-68 season. Furthermore, it was suggested that durra be reduced by 50% and that the Gezira Board be asked to:

- a) arrange for adequate marketing facilities
- b) to emphasis [sic] to the tenants that whatever crop that they grow in place of their rotation durra area will not be taxed.²¹

In addition to the staff at the Agricultural Research Station in Gezira, there were other plans for the newly available waters. At a meeting of the Crop Husbandry Committee, October 19, 1962, there was a report on a study done by the Ministry of Finance, the Gezira Scheme's parent body.²² This report recommended that 120,000 feddans be devoted to the cultivation of wheat by the 1963-64 growing

²⁰CRD/8-D-4, XR/RD/10-A-26, XR/CRD/6-E-1/1, "Memorandum on the Intensification of the Gezira Cropping System and the Extension of the Gezira Managil Area", Ministry of Agriculture, Research Division, Gezira Research Station, April, 1964.

²¹No. CRD/8.D.4, April, 1964.

²²Managing Director's File, No. 345, RD/4.J.52, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

season. The committee discussed the acceptable rate to charge tenants for the water to be provided for the wheat. The World Bank, which had studied the situation earlier, suggested a rate of four pence (twelve cents) per 750kgs./feddan. This number was based on a projection that, once established, yields would average around 750 kilograms per feddan.

This opinion, however, was not universally accepted. A memorandum, dated October 27, 1962, suggested that tenants be charged a nominal rent for watering the wheat, since tenants might lie in order not to pay tax based on yields. Therefore, it was suggested that for at least four or five years the tax be kept light so the Gezira Board could collect accurate data on wheat yields. About a month later, Managing Director, Mirghani El Amin El Hag, suggested the tenants be charged nothing for the water they would use on wheat. He felt that wheat would become unprofitable due to over production, and that it would eventually have to be subsidized by the government. Mirghani also disapproved of the government suggestion that the Gezira eventually devote 120,00 feddans to wheat.²³

The growing unrest among the Gezira inhabitants went unmentioned but was probably on the minds of the Gezira Board. This was a period of heightened anxiety among tenants because

²³Ref. SGB/1-b-26, 11-6-1962, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

their profits were steadily declining.²⁴ The following year, tenants would elect the communist El Amin Muhammad El Amin as head of their union and threaten a strike.²⁵ In such a tense situation, the Board would naturally be concerned about introducing new water charges, especially on a new and unproven crop. Wheat also concerned Gezira Scheme officials because it would ripen at roughly the same time that cotton would be ready for harvest. This circumstance might cause severe strains on the labor supply and cost tenants substantially more money.

In view of the constraints just mentioned, Nur el Huda, the Agricultural Manager, suggested that wheat should be harvested mechanically.²⁶ In a memorandum from the Managing Director to the General Director, Salih Mohammed Salih, it was noted that two firms in Khartoum, Sarkis Izmirlian and Gellatly were interested in providing tractors to Gezira for trial harvesting.

By November, the results from a preliminary study indicated that there would be significant advantages to the mechanical harvesting of wheat. The study by the Social Development Department at Wadi El Naim provided clear evidence: two bulls could thresh four sacks of wheat a day;

²⁴Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan, p.181.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ref. SGB/1-B-26, XR/2-F-6/XR/ 2-F-7, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

while one tractor could thresh forty sacks of wheat in 4.1 hours.²⁷ Furthermore, a tractor could plow thirty feddans a day, while two bulls could only manage two feddans. Of course the efficiency of a tractor over two draft animals is not surprising. What was notable was that it appeared cheaper to fuel and maintain tractors than it was to feed two bulls. However, the report did note some drawbacks to mechanization. First, Gezira had few trained tractor operators, and few people trained in their maintenance. Also there were few people capable of performing modifications necessary to enhance the tractor's performance. Additionally, the fields contained numerous irrigation ditches which could damage tractors.

The Wad El Naim report took on added significance when taken in conjunction with the Wheat Cultivation Committee's report. The letter stated that the only way economically to cultivate wheat would be to do so mechanically. However, for this to be successful, there would have to be some significant changes in the Gezira's structure. First, mechanization would require a large financial investment of £S1,500,000 (\$4,500,000) in equipment, and it would also require new staff trained in new techniques. Secondly, the basic organization of the fields in the Gezira would have to change: wheat would have to be organized by blocks (10,000-40,000 feddans) rather than by numbers (2,000-5,000 feddans). Also tenants would see

²⁷Ref. No. VFE/C-3, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

their role reduced simply to watering the crop, since they would not be trained to do anything else.

The Wheat Growing Committee's report suggested the yields projected by the government (World Bank estimates) were too optimistic. For instance, during World War II, the average yield of wheat was .482 tons per feddan, far short of the .750 tons per feddan projected by the government and the World Bank. A report issued by the Agronomy and Plant Physiology section of the Ministry of Agriculture's Research Division tended to side with the opinion of the Wheat Growing Committee. Written by S.H. Evelyn, the chief agronomist, the report was a study of wheat crops in Gezira from 1919-1963. Evelyn noted that over the years the average yield of wheat was only .590 tons per feddan and that only under optimum conditions could .750 be reached.²⁸

Meanwhile, the managing director of Gezira decided that yet another committee should be formed to examine how intensification and diversification would fit into the national government. Archival records indicate universal acceptance of the basic premises of Intensification and Diversification. Admittedly, there were some differences as to how the notions should be implemented, but no one seems to have questioned the validity of the concepts. Undoubtedly acceptance stemmed from the awareness of the Sudan's tenuous

²⁸AP/B/27, (AJ)-A-1, 1-22-1963, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

economic position as a monocrop economy. Also, the diminished cotton prices and the resulting loss of income during the 1950's showed the desirability of import substitutes.

Also noteworthy was the government's and Gezira Board's unquestioning acceptance of the suitability of wheat as an import substitute. The Gezira research institutes had amassed convincing evidence which indicated that wheat was not an ideal crop for the Gezira environment, yet the government officials almost to a man felt that wheat should be grown in the Gezira. Gezira's management tended to sprout a proliferation of committees that debated almost every point to exhaustion. It is notable, however, that none of the committees left any record of trying to contact tenants and soliciting their opinions. Had this been done, wheat might not have emerged as such a major part of the diversification scheme. As Gezira Board officials had noted, the tenants had already begun to plant a substantial amount of peanuts on their own initiative. Had the Board sought to truly make the tenants partners, one can only wonder what other appropriate crops might have been found.

Against this background, the November 3, 1963 speech of Dr. H. Green, a former Gezira Research Station chemist is especially noteworthy.²⁹ Dr. Green argued that wheat cultivation was potentially very harmful to the Gezira because

²⁹Ref.No. ML/150, November 20,1963, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

it could lead to excessive sodium deposits in the soil. Also, Green felt that intensification was potentially destructive because by eliminating fallow periods and constantly exposing Gezira's clay soils to waterings, they could become watertight and prevent plants from exchanging water and carbon dioxide. In response to Green's opinions, the managing director and development officer strongly argued in favor of intensification because to them monocrop agriculture was a sign of underdevelopment. The Wheat Growing Committee thus went ahead with its plans to plant 20,000 feddans for the 1963-64 season.³⁰

The process of integrating wheat into the rotation presented a clear idea of the administrative process within the Gezira Board. A number of committees were formed, some of them were redundant. For example, studies on the mechanized harvesting could have been merged into studies of the expenses involved in watering the crop. Also, the proliferation of committees made it difficult for the Gezira Board to formulate a clear policy on anything. This was especially clear on subjects like the amount to be charged for water, or the marketing of new crops. Finally, it should be noted that politics were crucial in the decision to grow wheat. The original suggestion was put forth by the World Bank, it was supported by the Finance department, and there was never any serious attempt to dissuade the Gezira Board from adoption in

³⁰Ref. SGB/2 G.4, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

spite of the existence of a great body of evidence which indicated that wheat could never be grown at the levels that the experts considered to be viable.³¹

Despite the early meetings, it would be 1964 before the various diversification programs would be put into effect.³² That year, Khashm el Girba was completed, and there would be water sufficient to begin large-scale changes in Gezira's crop rotation. In 1964, therefore they went ahead with plans to plant 75,000 feddans of wheat in Gezira. It should be noted that not only was the Gezira Scheme embarking on a new program, it also received a new administrative staff because of the fall of the Abboud government.

According to the notes of the Gezira's managing director, Sayed Mirghani El Amin El Hag, the expansion was considered to be the first major test of mechanization in the scheme. It certainly represented a major financial investment of £S1,758,054, or slightly more than \$5,000,000. This amount covered the costs of machinery and housing for the new equipment and staff. Despite the amount of money devoted to this endeavor, important details had not been covered. There was no still no uniform system of marketing the crop or

³¹On December 12, 1963, the following data was presented at a meeting of the Intensification and Diversification Committee: Wheat grown on 5,000 feddans 1959-60 yielded .41 tons/feddan; Wheat grown on 5,000 feddans 1960-61 yielded .656 tons/feddan; Wheat grown on 10,000 feddans 1961-62 yielded .20-.41 tons/feddan; and, Wheat grown on 14,368 feddans 1962-63 yielded .41 tons/feddan; Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

³²Ref. No. SC/MD/4, April 18, 1964.

harvesting it; instead, the SGB signed contracts with tenants and private contractors and made its own arrangements for harvesting. However, these measures were judged insufficient, and cooperative societies were encouraged among the tenants, loans being made available to them from the Agricultural Bank of the Sudan.

Wheat, despite its fundamental unsuitability to the Gezira, would become a permanent fixture in the crop rotations of the scheme. This was because wheat and bread would eventually become government-subsidized commodities.³³ By the 1980's, in fact, bread would come to be distributed by a government-rationing program. Ironically, although wheat is an important substitute, it also became an additional government expense that paid political, but not economic, dividends.

The situation concerning peanuts was more complex than that of wheat because peanuts were meant to be an additional cash crop. This policy was quite reasonable in that peanuts were major export crops in a number of African countries like Senegal and Nigeria, and there was a large market for confectionery peanuts and peanut oil. Also it should be noted that Sudan was already a significant exporter of peanuts,

³³D.S. Thornton, "Agricultural Development in the Gezira Scheme", Tropical Agriculture, (April, 1971), p.107.

which were grown primarily in the western province of Kordofan by independent small farmers.³⁴

Marketing peanuts was a problem for Gezira's administration. From 1961-1965, the government enthusiastically endorsed the efforts of local cooperative societies to produce and market peanuts, but, when the new government took over Sudan, new Gezira officials proceeded to back away from endorsement of cooperatives.³⁵ This revocation of government support coincided with a massive increase in peanut cooperative activity in the Sudan.³⁶ The result was a disaster for individual tenants and the reputation of the Gezira as a peanut producing area. This section of the chapter will concentrate on communication and transactions between the Gezira Scheme and a British produce company, R.W. Gunson, which agreed to buy Gezira peanuts.

By 1964, peanuts had been the focus of increased scrutiny and support for three years. Since Gezira tenants had already been growing peanuts in significant quantities without government encouragement, there was obviously a market for

³⁴Circa 1959, Sudan was producing 2% of the world peanut production. E.T. Gibbons, "Groundnut Credit and Marketing Cooperatives," p. 163.

³⁵Ibid, p.167.

³⁶Ibid, p.172.

this crop.³⁷ However, such arrangements would not be adequate for the kind of expansion that was foreseen at the time.³⁸ It was in this atmosphere that the general manager, F.G. Mirghani, noted that whereas peanut prices seemed to be rising in the Public Ledger, in his own personal observations, the prices seemed to be falling.³⁹ He also noted that Kordofan got better prices for its nuts, which were of a different variety. The memorandum is indicative of the general sense among the administration that Gezira tenants were not sufficiently organized to maximize the price of their peanuts.

By November 1964, the managing director, Mirghani El Amin El Hag sent out a memorandum establishing a committee on marketing crops other than cotton. Its job was to:

- (a) To study all matters appertaining to the marketing of crops other than cotton grown in the Gezira Scheme.
- (b) To watch price trends of crops other than cotton in local and foreign markets with a view to finding better varieties of crops already in Gezira.⁴⁰

The committee was composed of the Financial Controller, Assistant General Manager (Secretary), Agricultural Manager,

³⁷In 1959-60 and 1960-61, 10,435 and 42,883 feddans of peanuts were grown and either sold locally or to peanut dealers based in Khartoum. SC/M/4, 7-26-1964, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

³⁸Gezira officials projected 120,000 feddans of peanuts by the 1969-70 season. SGB/SCR/1, B.7/1, 7-30-1964.

³⁹September 18, 1964, Memorandum from General Manager's Office, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

⁴⁰File 33, SC/MD/4, November 29, 1964, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

Assistant General Manager of Supplies, Social Development Officer, and the Agricultural Engineer. Among the committee's initial actions were to contact all of the tenants cooperatives and the Sudan Chamber of Commerce. Also they decided closely to study the Public Ledger and Financial Times for any information on crop prices.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Economics and Commerce released a report on the problems of farmers. This report concluded that in the current economic climate tenants were saddled with high debt and were unable to properly market their crops.⁴¹ The report, written by A.M. Thomson, an official of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization, recommended that marketing organizations essentially do the sort of things that had been done before the government changed its policy in Gezira.⁴² Thomson further noted that once a marketing service was established, its work was never over, since the world's economy was in constant flux. He also recommended the aggressive integration of all aspects of agribusiness into any marketing scheme.

These findings mirrored those of E.T. Gibbons whose "Groundnut Credit and Marketing Co-operatives" article has been frequently cited in this chapter. However, the government

⁴¹File 33, SC/MD/4, November 29, 1964, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

⁴²Ibid.

was unwilling to give cooperatives the support necessary for success after the change in government.

Ironically, while the Gezira Board was planning for increased acreage to be devoted to peanuts, its planting had declined. Peanut cultivation reached a height of 56,623 feddans during the 1961-62 season, fell to 33,823 the next year, but in 1963-64, there was a negligible increase to 34,367 feddans.⁴³ Since the Gezira Board planned a massive increase in peanut cultivation, the reasons behind the decline had to be addressed. The main problems that tenants encountered were the decreasing prices and an increase in termites, the main nemesis of peanuts in Gezira.

In response, the Gezira officials conducted a number of studies. For instance, researchers found that peanuts grew best when planted at a density of 40,000 plants per feddan.⁴⁴ Also, research was conducted at Wad El Naim experimental farm, which produced some valuable information about peanuts, especially that their proper cultivation is quite an expensive proposition. For instance the total cost of growing a small test crop was £S4,521.531.⁴⁵ Considering the level of profits for tenants, this was a considerable amount of money even for those tenants involved in cooperatives. One other practical

⁴³Ibid SC/M/4, 7-26-1964, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

⁴⁴Ref. No. SGB/1.B. 7/1. Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

⁴⁵Ibid. The documents do not record the size of the experimental plot.

discovery was that planting peanuts in high ridges prevented dirt around the plant from getting hard after watering.⁴⁶ The hardening of the soil was a serious hindrance to harvesting, especially by hand.

The reports received from the Sudan Chamber of Commerce confirmed that the price of peanuts had indeed experienced a general downward trend. Whereas Gezira peanuts sold for between P.T.290-315 per 200 rottles in 1961, the price had declined to P.T.245-250 by 1964.⁴⁷ It was also worth noting that peanuts from Kordofan maintained a higher price throughout the period.⁴⁸ This report said that Gezira nuts were primarily bought for their oil, and that Kordofan was expecting a big crop in 1965. While studying the peanut situation, the marketing committee found that overall, there were 4,658.5370 tons of crops other than cotton grown in Gezira during the 1964-65 season and that their total sales amounted to £S160,719.52 or just under \$500,000. Vegetable gardens were a particularly profitable undertaking for many tenants, especially those close to Khartoum.⁴⁹

Despite the large amount of activity in crops other than cotton, the initiative to begin cooperatives among the tenants

⁴⁶Ref. No. SGB/2-F-7/1, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

⁴⁷Ref. No. 574/64 From Sudan Chamber of Commerce, 9-10-1964, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ref. No. 574/64, 10-9-1964, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

had not been successful up to this point. In the case of peanuts, in 1964, out of 39,168 feddans devoted to peanuts, only 2,627 were operated by cooperatives. The Gezira Board, however, was busy trying to facilitate the development of the cooperatives.⁵⁰ Of particular interest to cooperatives was a report done by M.A. El Mufti, "Possibilities of Marketing Gezira Crops of Groundnuts in the United Kingdom." Mufti said that the Ashford variety of peanuts grown in Sudan were not large enough for confectionery use. Mufti looked into other varieties and, he expressed an interest in an Israeli variety known as Robatab, which he rechristened the "Gezira Giant." Mufti also examined Nigerian peanuts to determine their suitability to Gezira conditions.

Mufti's investigation stimulated some interest in Britain. Shortly after presenting his report, Mufti was approached by the R.W. Gunson company about the possibility of marketing the Gezira's cotton and peanuts and selling vegetable seeds to the tenants. Five days after the original message, the Gunson representative again contacted Mufti asking for peanut samples, but Mufti said that he would be unable to provide them until January.⁵¹

Although Mufti seemed to be optimistic about growing confectionery peanuts in Gezira, his views were not shared by

⁵⁰SGB/SCR/1.B.41/14, Financial Controller to Managing Director Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

⁵¹Memoranda from Gunson to Gezira dated 9-10-1964 & 9-15-1964, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

everybody on the marketing committee. After meeting on October 11, 1964, an agricultural engineer on the committee stated that he felt the Gezira's soil was unable consistently to produce the quality of nut that would be desirable to confectioners. He recommended instead that the Gezira Board concentrate on producing peanuts for oil and use their British connections to penetrate the UK's oil market.

Regardless of what kind of peanuts the Gezira would grow, that they would be grown was already a foregone conclusion. A memorandum from the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Supply recommended that the area devoted to peanuts be increased since yields in Gezira were larger than those of Kordofan.⁵² The Marketing Committee agreed with this assessment because during its October 11, 1964 meeting, the Managing Director discussed the possibility of increasing peanut cultivation to 180,000 feddans by reducing the allotment of land for phillipsera (fodder crop) or durra. Also, the Gezira Board moved to establish the brand name, "Gezira Groundnuts" for their products with the British Cereal Marketing Board. The committee also reported considerable progress in the establishment of cooperatives, now present in all of the

⁵²MC/S/62-2-43; The letter notes that Gezira crops average .750 tons per feddan while harvests in Kordofan were .546. It should be remembered that Kordofan farmers were totally independent and received no help or funding from the government.



blocks except one.⁵³ The tenants were investing heavily in machinery, and the report mentioned that they preferred Swiss German Combines because of their easy terms of payment and the ready availability of parts and service.

While cooperatives were taking shape, negotiations for marketing their produce were continuing. In a letter to P. Balint of R.W. Gunson, Salih Mohammed, Gezira's General Manager, said that the Gezira would be happy to enter into a contract that would let them sell 30,000 tons of peanuts to Gunson at the current Nigerian price of £74 per ton. Gezira officials had reason to expect a very profitable crop, since, according to the Public Ledger of March 1965 the price of Sudanese peanuts had overtaken that of the Nigerian variety. It should be noted that the Public Ledger quoted prices for Sudanese nuts as a whole, and Kordofan nuts were likely the greatest beneficiary of the price rise.

In addition to the Gunson company, the Gezira officials also dealt with other firms. General Manager, Salih Mohammed Salih contacted Kenyon, Son, and Craven LTD. and told them of Gezira's products. In the letter, Salih stated that there were 120,000 feddans of peanuts under cultivation in the Gezira. Kenyon, Son and Craven answered on September 3, 1965, saying they wanted kernels and had little use for nuts in the shell.

⁵³The number of cooperatives more than doubled from 1964 to 1965 from 24 to 53. E.T. Gibbons, "Groundnut Credit and Marketing Co-Operatives," pps. 169-172.

However, by September 25, the company had changed its position and offered to buy 5000 metric tons in the shell. On the same day, the Gezira Board was notified by the R.W. Gunson company that it was willing to finance the purchase of shelling machinery in Gezira.⁵⁴

The R.W. Gunson company, was also interested in flying vegetables from Gezira to Great Britain.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the major thrust of Gunson's correspondence concerned peanuts, and selling Gezira the processing equipment it needed to be successful in the peanut business. The Gunson company felt that the Gezira Scheme did not then have the capacity to process peanuts in the numbers necessary for it to deliver satisfactory amounts of produce to the company. The Gezira officials, however, were considerably less concerned with the purchase of machinery but simply wanted to sell peanuts.

The Gezira Board officials must have known that the tenants did not have the means to harvest and process a peanut crop that would meet international standards. The board's unwillingness to encourage the purchase of decortication

⁵⁴Ref. No. SGB/SCR/1-B-41/4, 9-25-1965, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

⁵⁵SGB/SCR/2.F.7, 9-3-1965, Salih Mohammed Salih, General Manager, looked into the cost of flying vegetables via Sudan Airways. In July 1965, the Horticultural Manager, Salim Amir, wrote to the General saying that Gunson was interested in flying all vegetables but onions, however, negotiations appear to dissipate after this.

machines and to undertake more thorough processing stemmed from peanuts status as a private crop.

Peanuts, despite the big push during intensification, were a crop that belonged wholly to the tenants. The government would receive no direct portion of peanut sales as it did with cotton, explaining why the government encouraged cooperatives instead of directly purchasing most the machinery. However, once the government ceased actively to encourage cooperatives and to monitor their development, most of them foundered due to the tenants' lack of experience. Tenants, unused to the standards of international merchants, simply did not understand why they had be so diligent in processing their peanuts.

The fact that the government received direct remuneration from the Gezira's cotton crop also affected peanuts at harvest time. Both peanuts and cotton mature at the same time, from November through March. Because cotton was the most important crop for the government and the tenants, it harvest took precedence over that of peanuts. Because they remained inventory on the vine, large portions become contaminated with aflatoxin, a poison that developed after fungi (aspergillus flavus) grew on the crops still in the field.⁵⁶

The government was well aware that the tenants were not maximizing their profits in peanuts. This was borne out by a

⁵⁶E.T. Gibbons, "Groundnut Credit and Marketing Co-Operatives" p.170.

report published by the Ministry of Agriculture, Economics of Groundnuts Decortication in the Gezira Scheme (November 1965). Its author, Mamoun Yassin, clearly demonstrated that after the processing and decortication of peanuts, they could be sold for £2.60 a half ton more than unprocessed peanuts. Yassin said that the Gezira Board could best facilitate peanut cultivation by investing in a number of small and inexpensive processing plants that could be bought by cooperatives. The enlarged capacity, according to Yassin, would yield about 30,000 tons of peanuts annually, even though transportation facilities would be strained. It is important to note that Yassin also observed that the tenants were not enthusiastic about investing large sums of money into processing equipment. They preferred to maintain manual labor as much as possible.

The resulting situation was a disaster for the budding peanut export business in the Gezira. Through the summer of 1965, P. Balint of the R.W. Gunson company wrote to the Gezira Board telling them about decortication machines that the company could sell the scheme. The Gezira officials responded that they had devised a hand-operated device that would suffice and had arranged for the purchase of an American machine for the removal of dirt and one peanut combine for harvesting. The total investment came to £S2,500. Unfortunately, even this modest investment was not to take



place in 1965, since owing to an administrative problem, all purchase orders were cancelled that year.⁵⁷

The lack of investment in the necessary equipment resulted in an embarrassingly poor quality of peanuts being shipped to England. The contract clearly stated that the peanuts were to be washed, whole nuts, clear of sticks, stones, and broken shells. In a letter dated December 11, 1965, W.H. Hughes of the Gunson company made it clear how important it would be for the international reputation of the Gezira to make the initial shipment of peanuts the highest quality possible. Despite these warnings, the Gezira peanuts were so poor that the Gunson company cancelled the contract. P. Balint, of the Gunson company, explained the low quality stemmed mainly from two things:

- a. To the soil, which has no fertilizer, or not enough fertilizer, and shortage of calcium and other minerals in the soil.
- b. To the lack of proper shellers, blowers or blower shifters, and other machinery necessary for the groundnut operation which is available everywhere.⁵⁸

Reinforcing his earlier points, Balint continued that the Gezira Board must be prepared to make the investments necessary for the effective marketing of peanuts:

Without such a plant and without the use of fertilizers, which we can deliver too,

⁵⁷The "administrative problem" involved hiring of a new Gezira staff.

⁵⁸Gunson, PB/GB, 3-3-1966, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

the diversification of your economy by the production and export of groundnuts on a

big scale will be difficult and you will remain only with your successful but very one-sided operation in your long-staple cotton.

The whole Sudanese groundnut operation and especially the groundnuts of the Gezira area, could be as wonderfully organized as your cotton, but without the necessary tools it is an impossibility.⁵⁹

Salih Mohammed Salih wrote back to Balint apologizing for the poor quality of the crop shipped to them. Salih also agreed with Balint about the necessity of developing processing capacity in the Gezira. Salih wanted to know whether a single large or multiple smaller processing plants would be appropriate. Balint answered that he felt Gezira lent itself to multiple processing centers. Salih then wrote back, asking Balint if he would share any plans because Mohammed El Mufti would be making a trip to the United States to see what equipment the Gezira Scheme might purchase. The communication between Gunson and Gezira appears to have ended after that exchange.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The 1960's were a period that began with very high hopes in both the Sudan and Gezira. Unfortunately, it would end as an era of unrealized potential. Although the Gezira was expanded significantly during this period, thereby increasing land under cotton cultivation, the anticipated diversification

⁵⁹Gunson, PB/GB, 3-3-1966, Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

failed to materialize. There are several reasons for this failure. The unstable political situation, inexperience among tenants in international marketing, and the inertia brought about by the Gezira's organization.

Several researchers during this period observed that under the traditional system, Gezira land was not being effectively used. Writing in 1966, Ali Mohayad Bannaga, suggested a radical reorganization of the Gezira Scheme based on cost efficiency for tenants and the relative fertility of the Gezira's different regions.⁶⁰ Bannaga proposed that the various regions of the Gezira specialize in crops that could be grown there most efficiently. Bannaga reasoned that it cost certain farmers more money to grow the same crops, citing the fact that it cost a farmer in Northern Gezira £S0.783 per feddan to grow cotton, whereas in Southern Gezira the expense was £S1.115.⁶¹ The differences were based on the wages paid in different parts of the scheme and factors like the amount of water needed to grow a crop in different areas.

Bannaga's research demonstrated that even in carrying out its traditional function of overseeing cotton cultivation, the Gezira Scheme's organization left much to be desired. Thus, the successful introduction of a new cash crop, that was not

⁶⁰Ali Mohayad Bannaga, "A Consideration of Potential Advantages Which May Arise from Varying the Production Pattern Within the Gezira Scheme", Sudan Agricultural Journal, Vol.2, No.1 (November 1966).

⁶¹Ibid, p.21.

directly profitable to the government, was a risky proposition at best. It is not surprising, therefore, that despite the high hopes with which the Gezira entered the 1960's it would leave the decade with considerable pessimism.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE INFLUENCE OF THE GEZIRA ON THE LATER
DEVELOPMENT PLANS: THE BREADBASKET STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will expand its horizons beyond the Gezira itself and examine programs that it influenced. Specifically, under President Jafar Nimieri (1969-1983), the Sudan set out on an ambitious series of plans designed to tap the nation's agricultural potential and make the entire country a competitive exporter of agricultural products. In fact, the stated goal of Nimieri's plans, was to transform Sudan into the "Breadbasket of the Arab World." Twenty years after these plans were first announced, they are regarded as failures. The objective of this chapter is to place these projects within a historical context, and assess their basic feasibility.

Due to the physical characteristics of the country, agricultural development in the Sudan has been dependent on the government throughout the twentieth century. Since Northern Sudan is overwhelmingly desert, it cannot be successfully farmed without irrigation, and large-scale irrigation requires extensive capital investment. The Southern Sudan, although considerably wetter, contains large portions of swamp land, and other of its regions are subject to flooding for months at a time. In addition to the capital needed for the preparation of the land, the Sudan requires major investments in transportation in order to move produce.

The success of the Gezira Scheme in establishing cotton as the major cash crop in the Sudan essentially set the blueprint for agricultural development in Sudan. The basic concept was that the government may or may not own a given scheme, but it would play a major role in facilitating development through irrigation and infrastructural development. Also the government of Sudan consistently worked to alienate land from small scale producers and make it available to large commercial farmers.

Nimieri's programs of expansion can thus be seen as the culmination of the plans of expansion first laid down in 1946, in the Condominium's Five Year Plan.¹ This plan clearly emphasized increasing the country's capacity for commercial agriculture through the development of the Northwest extension of the Gezira and the building of a number of separate schemes. The plan also aimed to improve rail lines, a move which would facilitate moving produce from farmland to port. During the 1950's, the trend towards expansion continued with the commencement of the Managil southwest extension and the signature of the Nile Waters agreement in 1959, which permitted the construction of the Roseires dam.

¹Sudan Government, Five Year Plan For Post-War Development (Khartoum, 1946).

Although attempts at agricultural expansion under Nimieri had historical antecedents dating to the beginning of the Condominium era, there were substantial differences between the projects of 1970's and those first envisioned during the 1940's and 1950's. The earlier expansion was designed to fit into the economic system of the British empire. The goal of expansion was simply to enhance the Sudan as an exporter of tropical goods useful to the industries of Great Britain. The "Breadbasket" projects of the 1970's, however, sought to attach Sudan not to developed western economies, but to those of neighboring, Arab petroleum-exporting nations. Furthermore, instead of producing uniquely tropical crops, the new projects sought to place Sudan in direct competition with established agricultural giants like the United States, Canada, and Australia by making the country a viable source of grains, cattle, and sheep.

When the "Breadbasket" strategy was first conceived, there were good reasons to believe that it might succeed. First of all, the Yom Kippur war and consequent oil boycott had resulted in strained relations between the Western nations and oil-producing Arab states. The possibility of a food boycott in retaliation for a future oil boycott inclined the Arab members of OPEC to find new agricultural suppliers. Secondly, the sharp increase in petroleum prices meant that oil-producing Arab states had unprecedented amounts of cash to use for assisting fraternal Arab states not endowed with

petroleum. The projects undertaken during Nimieri's regime were varied, including mechanization in Gezira. The development of agribusinesses in rainland areas, and the construction of the Jonglei Canal in the South.

NIMIERI'S REGIME

Nimieri was able to undertake development because he was able to able to achieve a level of independence from the traditional forces of Sudanese politics unparalleled in the history of the independent Sudan. After taking power in July 1969 with a coalition of leftward leaning army officers, the new government moved towards the Eastern Bloc.² During its early years, Nimieri's government was subjected to a series of challenges from various rival factions. The first showdown was with the Umma political party and its followers, the Ansar.³ They were soundly and brutally repressed at their traditional stronghold of Aba Island on the White Nile. Later, Nimieri was confronted by a communist coup attempt. The episode was particularly serious, since a number of communists were active in his government. The communists were defeated after three days, and then they were very ruthlessly sought out and destroyed.⁴

²Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan, p.195.

³Ibid. p.88, The Umma party one the two largest political parties in Sudan, comprise followers of the descendants of the Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad. The followers are known as the Ansar, or supporters.

⁴Holt and Daly, A History of the Sudan, p.197.

The two confrontations had the effect of liberating Nimieri from the twin confines of traditional sectarian Sudanese politics and the ideological constraints of the left. In reaction, Nimieri aligned the Sudan firmly within the Arab world. The most notable aspect of this realignment was a proposed union with Libya and Egypt.

Nimieri's new policies naturally were not popular in the Southern part of the Sudan, which had been fighting to free itself from Arab domination for almost twenty years. Under the leadership of Joseph Lagu, the Southern military operations were unified to an unprecedented degree, which served to highlight the ultimate futility of Northern efforts to reach a battlefield solution.

The military stalemate, provided an ideal background for negotiation. Unrestrained by political rivals, both Lagu and Nimieri moved towards peace. The result was the Addis Ababa accord of 1972, which laid the basis for Southern political autonomy in domestic matters and generally provided Sudan with a level of stability not seen since the colonial era.

THE BREADBASKET PROGRAM

Nimieri's successes made Sudan much more attractive to investors than had been the case for many years. A major source of new investment was the oil rich Arab countries. During the period from 1964 to 1974, the value of loans to Sudan from Arab countries nearly quintupled, increasing from

£S34,100,000 to £S164,900,000.⁵ Additionally, loans from the West sextupled, going from £S12,000,000 to £S72,600,000 during the same period. Interestingly, loans from the Soviet Bloc nearly quintupled also. In fact, only the international organizations were laggard, little more than doubling their contributions to Sudan. It should be noted, however, the loans provided Sudan came under far less favorable terms than money the country had received in the past.

While Sudan embarked on a variety of different agricultural endeavors, irrigated scheme agriculture is the type of activity that will be dealt with first. Students of the modern Sudan know that the Gezira Scheme was the cornerstone of economic development during the Condominium, and that it also figured prominently in the economic plans of the first two governments of independent Sudan. The primary objective of planners during the 1950's and 60's was to expand the size of the Gezira and to diversify its produce. By 1964, with the completion of the Managil southwest extension, the Gezira had reached the practical limits of its expansion, roughly two million feddans. Although there were some additional extensions between 1964 and 1967, they were relatively small and decidedly unsuccessful.⁶

⁵All of the information on loans on this page came from the following article: Mirghani, "The Effect of the International Monetary Crisis on Capital Inflows to Sudan," Africa Development, No. 3 (1977), pp. 51-57.

⁶Taha, "Problems of Land Development", Gezira archives, Barakat, Sudan.

The other major area of innovation in the Gezira was crop diversification. After the construction of the Roseires dam, the Gezira Board had access to much more water throughout the year and decided to reduce the amount of fallow in order to grow a variety of crops. Some, like wheat, would serve as import substitutions, whereas others could become valuable export commodities themselves. Diversification had mixed results, since the Gezira was not suited for growing high quality peanuts and the cooperative system used to farm peanuts seemingly was incapable of efficient operation.⁷ However, the import substitute market was quite successful. Growers of wheat and vegetables made and continue to make good profits selling to Wad Medani and the Khartoum area.

By the 1970's, the Gezira had stagnated. The situation in the Gezira was powerfully described in Tony Barnett's work Gezira: An Illusion of Development (1977). Barnett revealed a scheme where the tenants had no enthusiasm for the cultivation of cotton, Gezira's main cash crop, and worked to send sons into the professions, rather than have them remain in agriculture. To combat stagnation, the Nimeri government sought to mechanize the Gezira, with mixed results. For example, the employment of cotton picking machines actually reduced yield per feddan (1 feddan = 1.038 acres) and the

⁷Correspondence between the R.W. Gunson company and the Gezira Board from 1965-67 recorded that the Gezira soil lacked nutrients needed for the proper growth of peanuts. Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

widespread use of machines in picking resulted in the displacement of many seasonal laborers.⁸ Since cotton was the only crop in which the government and Gezira had a share of the profits, it tended to benefit the most from mechanization.⁹ This fact was unfortunate because peanuts, studies show, would have been far better served by mechanical harvesting than cotton.¹⁰

The Nimieri regime also founded and developed a number of other irrigation projects, foremost among them the Wadi Halfa and Rahad schemes. The former had its origins in the 1960's, when Lake Nasser inundated Wadi Halfa. The government moved the Halfawis to the eastern Sudan along the Atbara River, where each qualified male was given a fifteen feddan tenancy, on the same basis as those in the Gezira Scheme. Indigenous nomads of the area were also settled into tenancies.¹¹

Additional problems stemmed from cotton cultivation. First, the government tended to have problems with the maintenance of tractors and other equipment, resulting in planting delays, inadequate plowing, and excessive weed

⁸Peter Oesterdiekhoff and Karl Wohlmuth, The Development Perspectives of the Democratic Republic of Sudan, (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1983), pp. 116-117.

⁹Brian C. D'Silva, Sudan's Irrigated Subsector (Washington: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1986), pp. 10-11.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Mohammed H.S. Ebrahim, "Irrigation Projects in Sudan: The Promise and the Reality," Journal of African Studies, No. 1 (1980), pp. 3-6.

growth.¹² During the 1970's, cotton prices dropped precipitously, and the government paid very small amounts of money to farmers, and then only after very long delays.¹³

Another major irrigated project worthy of mention is the Rahad Scheme. Founded in 1973, it was designed to take advantage of extra water in the Roseires Dam on the Blue Nile. The Rahad differs from Gezira in that a significant portion of its water is delivered by pump. Also, the Rahad was the first scheme that had its profits paid to tenants through individual accounts. In the opinion of Mohammed H.S. Ebrahim, the yields of the Rahad have tended to be better than those of the Gezira and Wadi Halfa, but he attributed the success to the relative youth of the Rahad Scheme. He noted that, the Rahad is not without problems. Specifically, the government often does not have sufficient fuel to run the pumps that supply part of the Rahad's water. To further complicate matters, the Rahad suffers from poor maintenance of mechanical equipment.

As a group, irrigated schemes ran into serious problems during the regime of Nimieri. Specifically, mechanization tended to help only well-to-do tenants, while hurting laborers. Furthermore even when mechanization was effectively used, there was always the question of maintenance and fuel costs. Both of these expenses rose far out of proportion to prices for cotton during the Nimieri regime.

¹²Ebrahim, "Irrigation Projects in Sudan," pp. 3-6.

¹³Ibid.

In contrast to the irrigated sector, long a cornerstone of Sudanese agriculture, the rainfed, mechanized agriculture sector truly became a major factor in the economy as a result of Nimieri's policies. Although mechanized farming had been carried out in the rainlands of Sudan after World War II, it did not receive a major push until the organization of the Mechanized Farming Corporation in 1968 and the initiation of another Five Year Plan in 1970.¹⁴ The latter was designed to provide the nation with an adequate supply of foodstuffs and to provide a significant amount of cash crops. The program provided that land could be leased for twenty-five-year periods at nominal rates.

At first there was a heavy emphasis on a state role in farm management, but as time went on, more farms became privately owned, and by 1974-75, 92% of the mechanized farms were privately owned.¹⁵ The owners tended to be either wealthy merchants from the Khartoum Omdurman area, or foreigners. A significant number of the latter come from the Gulf region, specifically Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Generally speaking, mechanized rainland agriculture in the Sudan has been profitable, but not without a price.

There are three main problems associated with mechanized farming: first, there is the alienation of subsistence farmers

¹⁴Oesterdiekhoff and Wohlmuth, Development Perspectives, p.59.

¹⁵Ibid, p. 60.

from the land; second is the question of soil maintenance; and third, the method of financing mechanized farms. Throughout the twentieth century, small farmers in Sudan have lost control of the land to the government and large-scale agriculture. Although more prevalent in irrigated schemes, it has been true on the mechanized farms also, although the later are far less labor intensive than their irrigated counterparts. Therefore, land alienation has resulted in a surplus of labor that cannot be readily absorbed by the Sudan's economy. Further complicating matters were major droughts in Western Sudan which forced thousands of people to relocate further East. These people had traditionally been subsistence farmers who worked seasonally in Gezira. However, the increase in mechanization lessened demand for their labor, causing them to scramble for the relatively slim employment opportunities provided by the mechanized farms.¹⁶ In short, the Sudan experienced a huge surplus of labor during the late 1970's and early 1980's.

Another major problem was declining yields, which was directly related to farming techniques. Basically, the mechanized farms have tended to sow an area until the soil is exhausted. Obviously, this practice has severe consequences for an ecologically fragile area like the rainbelt of the Northern Sudan. Directly related to the problem of declining

¹⁶Oeserdiekhoff and Wohlmuth, Development Perspectives, p. 75.

yields, is the problem of repaying loans used in financing mechanized farms. Most of the loans advanced to merchants had short periods of maturation, placing additional pressure on them to make quick profits, which in turn hastened the process of soil degradation and land alienation among small farmers.

The Jonglei Canal was the major development project undertaken by the Nimieri regime in the Southern part of the country. The Canal was first proposed by Sir William Garstin after his survey of the Nile river system in 1901. Since then, there have been any number of proposals to build a canal that would siphon water from the Bahr al Ghazal directly to the White Nile. Each of them envisioned the water being used for the benefit of people in the Northern Sudan or Egypt and mostly overlooked the impact on the people in the South. The canal would effectively alter the flooding patterns of the area and, therefore, change the habits of the region's indigenous people who herded cattle according to the availability of water.

Regardless of the proposed canal's impact, the Jonglei Canal has remained a hypothetical project. For much of the last thirty-six years, the Southern Sudan has been involved in civil war. Nimieri, however, provided the Sudan with a peaceful interlude, allowing the Sudanese government to begin to dig the Jonglei canal. Robert O. Collins notes that as early as 1970, Nimieri had proposed a Five Year development plan for the South, which would have provided for roads and

factories.¹⁷ After the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972, it was possible to pursue substantive plans. The Permanent Joint Technical Commission (PJTC), which had devised its version of Jonglei during the 1960's, approached the government about the plan. Collins noted that the plan of the PJTC was moderate compared to those proposed in the past. Yet, the amount of water that would be drawn from the Sudd swamp would be so massive as significantly to alter the regime of flooding.¹⁸

Despite the moderation of the new plan, it still had one very major difficulty to overcome, the ignorance of the people through whose land the canal would be built. Unfortunately, those Southerners who were members of the new regional assembly had no knowledge of the plan either. As could be expected, this situation led to trouble. After peace was achieved in the South, ethnic tensions that had been submerged by the war resurfaced. Specifically, the new Southern government headed by Abel Alier, a Bor Dinka, irritated the Equatorians who felt that they had borne the brunt of the war.¹⁹

Once those opposed to the Abel Alier heard of the Jonglei Canal plans, they had two anxieties: first, they feared that

¹⁷Robert O. Collins, The Waters of the Nile (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1990), p.309.

¹⁸Ibid, pp. 311-312.

¹⁹Tim Allen, "Full Circle?: An Overview of Sudan's 'Southern Problem' Since Independence," Northeast African Studies, 11, 2, 1986, p.51.

the South would be opened to colonization by the North or even by Egyptians; and they also were jealous that Bahr al Ghazal province would be the recipient of such an expensive development project.²⁰ These feelings manifested themselves in riots at Juba and Upper Nile province against the Jonglei Canal.

After the riots, the government gave the responsibility for establishing social programs to the Jonglei Executive Organ, run by Daniel Yong and Jonathan Jenness, an American.²¹ The J.E.O., which was headquartered in Khartoum, managed to achieve very little since it was founded virtually overnight, before the actual plans for the canal itself were finalized.

Ultimately, nothing really came of the Jonglei Canal or the Jonglei Executive Organ. After 1984, the civil war returned to a level of intensity which made it impossible to continue work on the Jonglei Canal. As a result, the South left the Nimieri era much as it had entered it: war torn and underdeveloped.

CONCLUSIONS

It is tempting to dismiss the Breadbasket strategy of the Nimieri regime as a simple failure, but to do so would be unjust. Instead, it should be remembered that what was attempted during this period was based on sound historical

²⁰Collins, The Waters of the Nile, p.319.

²¹Ibid, pp. 322-324.

precedent. Throughout the Condominium era, development in Sudan was geared towards cash crops grown on large agricultural schemes with active government support and participation. Whether or not these arrangements were equitable, they had provided the Sudan with its greatest prosperity: after World War II and during the Korean War. Knowing this, it is unreasonable not to expect successive governments to emulate past policies. On the contrary, Nimieri and his government should be credited with devising a reasonable plan to make the Sudan a competitive cash-crop exporting country. Most of the factors that eventually undid the Breadbasket strategy were either beyond the Sudanese government's control, or stemmed from classic post-independence problems.

The main problem beyond the control of Nimieri was the stringent terms, after 1969, under which the Sudan was given loans. For example, the average interest on a loan after 1969 was 6.2% as opposed to 4.2% prior to 1969.²² The average average grace period was 2.8 years, instead of 4.6 years previously. Even more important, the average maturity period was 7.9 years, instead of 19.6 years before 1969. As the president of a poor country, Nimieri was obviously not in a position to dictate the terms of his country's loans.

²²All financial information here came from: Mirghani, "The Effect of the International Monetary Crisis," pp.51-57.

Compounding this situation was the increase of inflation throughout the world. This meant that original estimates of project costs had to be continually revised upward, and that less could be done with the amount of money borrowed.²³ Furthermore, the decline in producer prices, combined with continually rising prices for manufactured goods, triggered a spiraling devaluation of Sudanese currency that has yet to stop.

One factor for which the Nimieri regime cannot escape blame is the degradation of the environment brought on by large scale mechanized farming. Despite the pressure to make a profit, it was inexcusable to allow wasteful farming practices in a fragile area like the Sahel region of Sudan.

Finally, concerning the collapse of Jonglei, Nimieri was simply the victim of political chickens coming home to roost. Although he was able to make unprecedented compromises with the South, Nimieri ultimately found himself having to come to terms with the same forces that he had so ruthlessly crushed earlier in regime. This resulted in the return to the same distrust that gave rise to the first civil war.

Ultimately, Nimieri's Breadbasket strategy is a lesson to smaller countries about the limited nature of their options. In trying to bring about massive growth, Nimieri instead ushered in an economic collapse that has yet to abate. At risk of sounding cavalier, the Breadbasket strategy also makes it

²³Ibid.

clear that what is needed is a truly fresh approach to old problems.

CONCLUSIONS

The economic stagnation that Gezira has experienced the last three decades cannot be denied. Over that period, there has been a steady decline in cotton prices relative to manufactured goods, and the Gezira Board has been unable to institute new programs to offset this downward trend. It must be remembered, however, that the objective of this dissertation was not to deny the economic problems of the Sudan. Instead, this study sought to show that the economic decline experienced in Gezira was not pre-ordained by an irresistible formula of underdevelopment. It was brought on by a combination of international, national, and local factors, some of which were very much in the hands of the Sudanese themselves. There are those who would argue that most of the national and local factors were also created by outside forces. While there is a great deal of merit to this argument, once the Sudan gained its independence, it was responsible for its own problems, no matter where they originated.

Some basic historical factors should be noted. First of all, the Gezira Scheme was foreign inspired, and it was designed to meet the needs of Great Britain's textile industry and provide revenue for the Condominium government. Although the government clearly understood the desirability of Sudanese enjoying profits from the cotton crop, such benefits were never central to function of Gezira. Secondly, it should be noted that for the first three decades of the scheme's

operation, there was a concerted effort on the part of the British to restrict the role of Sudanese to that of tenant farmers. To a man, SPS administrators were as hostile to effendiya participation in the management of the scheme as government officials were to idea of the effendiya advancing through the ranks of the civil service.

The results of restricting Sudanese participation in the Gezira were manifold. First, since both effendiya and tenants were not privy to the finances of the Gezira, both groups were quick to believe that the government was making huge profits at their expense. This deep suspicion facilitated collaboration between the effendiya and tenants during the Tenant's Strike of 1946. The event was especially devastating to the British, since many of the SPS officials, including Assistant Manager Arthur Gaitskell, had put a great deal of stock in the notion of devolution. In other words, the SPS had hoped that it could avoid employing the effendiya by organizing cooperative style farming among the tenants.

Once the SPS and government decided to use the effendiya in the Gezira, the process was hurried. The government had to scramble for qualified applicants working within the government service and studying in colleges both in Sudan and Egypt. Additionally, the Gezira Board, which took over in 1950, had to arrange for currently employed workers to take both correspondence courses and travel abroad for the training needed to occupy their new positions. As is often the case in

these types of situations, those who had been in positions of power criticized the rapid advancement of "unqualified" upstarts while they conveniently forgot their long-standing policy of discrimination.¹

Further complicating the rapid advancement of the effendiya was the unusually strong economic climate of the early 1950's. As a result of the Korean War, the price of cotton skyrocketed. The economic boom, in combination with the general trend towards political independence, served to create an atmosphere of great optimism. It seemed to both tenants and the new administrators that they were on the verge of a new and prosperous future. Unfortunately, by the middle of the decade it became clear that the earlier boom was temporary. By the 1953-54 season, the Gezira Board was having a hard time simply selling enough of its cotton to clear the books on that year's crops. The resultant situation forced the Gezira Board to restructure its method of operation as soon as the Sudan gained its independence.

Worse, while the price of cotton was falling, the Gezira Board had already committed itself to a policy of social

¹It must be remembered that throughout the SPS and government service, many of the British held positions for which they had no specific training. For example, Arthur Gaitskell, the first Managing Director of the Gezira Board, had a bachelor's degree in history. He had no formal training in agriculture. This compares favorably to the first Sudanese Managing Director, Mekki Abbas, whose formal training was in education.

development within the scheme. The tenants, still mindful of the episode of the Reserve Fund, were unwilling to accept the idea that the Gezira Board did not have enough money to fund its proposed new programs.

Despite all of these problems, the crisis in the Gezira was not insurmountable. National instability, more than economic downturns, was what killed any chance of a revitalized Sudan. Before independence was declared, it became obvious that the major political parties were unwilling to cooperate in a democratic government. Instead, each party did its best to undercut the achievements of the other when it was not in power. In this kind of political atmosphere, a workable economic policy, of which the Gezira would have been the center, was out of the question. More importantly, a political stalemate between the major parties allowed the disturbances in the South to escalate into a full-scale civil war.

Under these circumstances, the democratic process in Sudan eventually crumbled, and the country came under the control of the army led by General Ibrahim Abboud. For a while, it seemed that Sudan would be able to achieve the economic stability that it desperately needed. General Abboud was able to reach a Nile Waters Agreement with Egypt, substantially increasing the amount of water that Sudan could take from the Nile. Also, General Abboud was able to secure loans from the World Bank, the United States, and other

sources for the construction of major new agricultural projects.

Unfortunately, the downward trend in cotton prices continued, and the Sudan found itself unable to repay loans at the agreed rate. Also, the tenants of the Gezira, who had been radicalized during the 1950's, continued to press the government for ever increasing shares of the Gezira's profits. Although its economic problems were severe, the major reason behind the Abboud government's collapse was the war in the South, which, by 1964, had seemingly become a hopeless conflict.

The Abboud government was overthrown by a combination of traditional political parties and two smaller groups, the Communists and the Muslim Brothers. The new government would have a devastating effect on the Gezira because it replaced General Abboud's administration with a new staff that was unsympathetic to the program of intensification and diversification that had been implemented four years prior to the coup.

In the latter part of the 1960's, according to the report of Development Officer Taha El Jack Taha, the Gezira Board basically went through the motions of expansion.² The problem was that after Managil, the practical limits of irrigation expansion in the Gezira had been reached. The result was a

²Taha, "Development in the Managil," Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan.

series of ill-planned and poorly built extensions which provided the new tenants with pitiful living conditions compared to those located in the more established parts of the scheme.

By the end of the decade, Colonel Jaafar Nimieri would seize control of the Sudan. He opened his administration by making what seemed to be great strides in unifying the country. By engineering the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972, he was able to end his country's debilitating civil war and to begin to work on the economic structure of the country. Nimieri developed a bold plan, which, using the old Gezira-based model of large-scale agricultural schemes, attempted to link the economy of Sudan to those of the oil-producing Arab states. Like Abboud a decade earlier, Nimieri was to find financial support for his project, but the sharp increase in oil prices along with his continual domestic political intrigues served eventually to undermine his program.

At the risk of monotony, it seems safe to conclude that the Sudan's and Gezira's current misfortune was not predestined, but the result of numerous factors, some of which could have been altered by the Sudanese themselves.

APPENDIX A

COTTON YIELDS PER FEDDAN 1940-1965
(source SGB 1965)

1940	...3.90	Kantars (approx. 200 pounds) per feddan
1941	...4.07	
1942	...4.10	
1943	...4.85	
1944	...3.17	
1945	...4.89	
1946	...3.41	
1947	...4.03	
1948	...3.37	
1949	...4.19	
1950	...4.146	
1951	...6.788	
1952	...3.100	
1953	...4.714	
1954	...4.69	
1955	...4.28	
1956	...4.865	
1957	...6.759	
1958	...1.505	
1959	...4.712	
1960	...4.578	
1961	...2.68	
1962	...6.638	Gezira/Managil 4.321
1963	...1.811	Gezira/Managil 3.396

1964 ...3.747 Gezira/Managil 3.366

1965....3.382 Gezira/Managil 3.950

APPENDIX B

PRICE OF GINNED COTTON F.O.B. PORT SUDAN

(May, 1965 Report: Development of Agriculture in Gezira Main
Area, SGB)

1955	£S14.88
1956	£S17.06
1957	£S17.37
1958	£S13.26
1959	£S10.37
1960	£S14.38
1961	£S13.59
1962	£S12.36
1963	£S11.66
1964	£S12.92

APPENDIX C

PEANUT AREA CULTIVATED

1948-49	1,956 feddans
1949-50	1,098 " "
1950-51	1,266 " "
1951-52	2,777 " "
1952-53	1,153 " "
1953-54	750 " "
1954-55	1,118 " "
1955-56	763 " "
1956-57	960 " "
1957-58	1,206 " "
1958-59	5,789 " "
1959-60	16,435 "
1960-61	42,883 "
1961-62	56,623 "
1962-63	33,823 "
1963-64	34,367 "

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARCHIVAL SOURCES

1. The National Records Office, Khartoum, Sudan
2. The Gezira Archives, Barakat, Sudan
 - Sudan Irrigation Department, July, 1944
 - Blue Nile Province, July, 1946
 - Gezira File 120, July, 1946
 - Blue Nile Province File
 - Sudan Irrigation Department, March, 1947
 - Gezira Sudanization Files 448 & 449
 - Sudan Irrigation Department, February, 1953
 - Ministry of Finance to Gezira Board, January, 1955
 - File 362, Parliamentary Proceedings 1956
 - World Bank Report No.10, 77a, January, 1961
 - Diversification & Intensification Files 1961-1966
 - Managing Director's File No.345
 - Agricultural Research Division, January, 1963
 - General Manager's Office, 1964
 - General Manager's Office, 1965
 - Problems of Land Development in the Managil Southwest Extension in the Sudan in the Decade 1957-1967 by Taha El Jack Taha, Sudan Development Officer

3. Sudan Archives, University of Durham, England

"A Proposal for the Future of the Gezira Scheme"

by Arthur Gaitskell SPS, 1943, File 418/6/13

"Some Notes About the Erkowit Study Camp"

by Arthur Gaitskell March, 1944, File 418/3/168

Civil Secretary's Office, May 5, 1944

Five Year Plan for Post-War Development, 1946

UNPUBLISHED THESES

Ahmed Ibrahim Abu Sin. "The Development of the Civil Service in the Republic of Sudan 1899-1961," M.A. Thesis, New York University, 1968.

Grabler, Susan. "From Concessionaire to Shaykh," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin in Madison, 1986.

O'Brien, John, James. "Agricultural Labor and Development in Sudan," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1981.

BOOKS

Abdel Amin Beshai. Export Performance & Economic Development in Sudan 1900-1965. London: Ithaca Press, 1976.

Ahmad Abd al-Rahim Nasr, and Duffield, Mark. A Bibliography of West African Settlement and Development in the Sudan. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 1980.

Ahmed Elsheikh M. Ahmed. Structural Analysis for the Production Function of the Sudanese Economy. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 1986.

- Abdel Rahim Mirghani. Development Planning in the Sudan in the Sixties. Khartoum: University of Khartoum, 1983.
- Ali Abdel Gadir Ali. The Sudan Economy in Disarray. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 1985.
- Abdel Majid Hasabu. Factional Conflict in the Sudanese Nationalist Movement. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press 1985.
- Barclays Bank D.C.O. The Sudan: An Economic Survey. London: Barclays Bank D.C.O., 1958.
- Barnett, A.S. Some Sociological Implications of the Administration of the Gezira Scheme. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 1972.
- Barnett, Tony. The Gezira Scheme: An Illusion of Development. London: Frank Cass, 1977.
- Barnett, Tony, and Abbas Abdelkarim. Sudan: State, Capital and Transformation. London: Croon Helm, 1988.
- Bechtold, Peter, K. Politics in the Sudan. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976.
- Botman, Selma, Egypt from Independence to Revolution, 1919-1952. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991.
- Collins, Robert, O. The Waters of the Nile: Hydropolitics and the Jonglei Canal 1900-1988. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1990.
- Daly, Martin, W. Empire On the Nile. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1986.

- Daly, Martin, W. Imperial Sudan. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1991.
- D'Silva, Brian, C. Sudan's Irrigated Subsector. Washington: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1986.
- Duffield, Mark, R. Maiurno: Capitalism & Rural Life in Sudan. London: Ithaca Press, 1981.
- Ministry of Finance and National Economy. The Economic Survey 1974-1975. Khartoum: Economic Research Station, 1975.
- Food and Agriculture Organization. Consultation on Irrigation in Africa. Rome: United Nations, 1987.
- Gaitskell, Arthur. Gezira: A Story of Development in the Sudan. London: Faber and Faber, 1959.
- Henderson, K.D.D. Sudan Republic. New York: Praeger, 1965.
- Hill, Richard, Egypt in the Sudan 1820-1881. London: Oxford University Press, 1959.
- Holt, P.M. and Daly, M.W. A History of the Sudan. London: Longman, 1988.
- Holt, P.M., The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898. Oxford: London, 1958.
- International Labor Organization. Growth, Employment, and Equity. New York: United Nations, 1975.
- Keen, M.F.A. and Mohammed Amer Beshir. A Vocabulary of Modern Government for the Sudan. Khartoum: Republic of Sudan 1956.

- Lees, Francis, A. and Brooks, Hugh, C. The Economic and Political Development of the Sudan. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977.
- Louis, William, Roger. The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.
- Markakis, John. Nationalism and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa London: Zed, 1987.
- Mekki Abbas, Sudan Question. New York: Praeger, 1952.
- Moris, Jon, R. and Thom, Derrick, J. Irrigation Development in Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990.
- Mohamed Abdel Rahman Ali. Government Expenditure and Economic Development: A Case Study of the Sudan. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 1974.
- Mohamed Omer Beshir. Educational Development in the Sudan 1898-1956. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1969.
- . Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1974.
- Mohamed Osman Sammani. Jonglei Canal: Dynamics of Planned Change in the Twic Area. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 1984.
- Moharir, V.V. and Kagwe, S. Administrative Reforms and Development Planning in the Sudan (1956-1975). Khartoum University of Khartoum Press, 1987.
- Muddathir 'Abdel Rahim. Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan. London: Ithaca Press, 1986.

Oesterdiekhoff, Peter, and Wohlmuth, Karl. The Development Perspectives of the Democratic Republic of Sudan: The Limits of the Breadbasket Strategy. Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1983.

Ottoman Bank. Sudan Trade and Investment Guide 1960-61. London: Diplomatic Press, 1959.

Platenkamp, Jos, D.M. The Jonglei Canal: Its Impact on an Integrated System in the Southern Sudan. Leiden: Instituut voor Culturele Antropologie en Sociologie der Niet-Westerse Volken, 1970.

Spaulding, Jay. The Heroic Age in Sinnar. East Lansing, Michigan: African Studies Center, 1985.

Tvedt, Terje. Water and Politics: A History of the Jonglei Project in the Southern Sudan. Bergen, Norway: Derap Publications, 1986.

van der Wel, Paul and Abdel Ghaffar Mohammed Ahmed. Perspectives on Development in the Sudan. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies and Development Studies and Research Centre, 1986.

Voll, John, O. Sudan: State and Society in Crisis. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991.

Warburg, Gabriel. Islam, Nationalism, and Communism in a Traditional Society. London: Frank Cass, 1978.

ARTICLES


- Adams, Martin, E. and Howell, John. "Developing the Traditional Sector in the Sudan." Economic Development and Cultural Change No.3 (April 1979): 505-19.
- Al-Agab A. Al Terafi. "Sudanization in the Public Sector: A Critical Analysis." Sudan Notes and Records 57 (November 1976): 117-124.
- Allen, Tim. "Full-Circle? An Overview of Sudan's 'Southern Problem' Since Independence." Northeast African Studies Vol.11, No.2 (1989): 41-67.
- Ali Mohayad Bannaga. "A Consideration of Potential Advantages Which May Arise from Varying the Production Pattern Within the Gezira Scheme." Sudan Agricultural Journal No.1 (November 1966): 17-31.
- B. Founou-Tchuigoua. "De Facto Wage-Earners in the Gezira Scheme(Sudan)." Africa Development No.1 (Jan-March 1978):25-51.
- Beer, C.W. "The Social and Administrative Effects of Large-Scale Planned Agricultural Development." Journal of African Administration No.2 (April 1953): 112-119.
- Bottomsley, Anthony. "Is Irrigation Worthwhile?" Agricultural Economics Bulletin No.11 (November 1972): 10-20.
- Buchanan, L.M. "Local Government in the Sudan Since 1947." Journal of African Administration Vol. 5 (July 1953): 152-159.

- Church, R.J., Harrison. "Observations on Large Scale Irrigation Development in Africa." Agricultural Economics Bulletin No. 4 (November 1962): 1-48.
- Farah Hassan Adam. "Agricultural Development in the Sudan." Sudan Journal of Administration and Development Vol.5 (January 1969): 26-43.
- Ferguson, H. "The Gezira Scheme in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan." World Crops (January & February 1952): 15-19 & 50-102.
- Grabler, Susan. "European Capital Exports and the Concessions Policy in the Sudan, 1898-1913." Northest African Studies Vol.8, No.2-3 (1986): 95-109.
- Hance, William, A. "The Gezira: An Example in Development." The Geographical Review No.2 (April 1954): 253-270.
- Hussein Idris. "The Evolution of Government Agricultural Research in the Sudan, The Golden Jubilee of Gezira Research Station, Wad Medani 1918-1968." Sudan Agricultural Journal No.1 (January 1969): 1-13.
- Hussein M. Mirghani. "The Effect of the International Monetary Crisis on Capital Inflows to Sudan: A Preliminary Note." Africa Development No.3 (March 1977): 51-57.
- Issam Ahmad Hassoun. " "Western" Migration and Settlement in the Sudan." Sudan Notes and Records (1952): 60-114.
- Kamal Hussein Ahmed. "Management Problems in Public Corporations in the Sudan." Sudan Journal of Administration and Development Vol.2 (January 1966): 92-96.

- Lambert. A.R. "The Sudan Gezira." Geographical Magazine No.1 (May & June 1939): 43-58 & 127-144.
- Langdon, Steven. "Technology Transfer by Multinational Corporations in Africa: Effects on the Economy." Africa Development No.2 (April-June 1977): 43-49.
- Low, Ewen, M. "The Marketing of Groundnuts in the Sudan." Development Studies No.2 (July 1967): 1-73.
- Medani, A.I. "Risk and Uncertainty in Sudan Agriculture." Sudan Notes and Records No.3 (June 1967): 39-50.
- Melamid, Alexander. "Egypt and the Gezira Irrigation Scheme of the Sudan." Middle Eastern Affairs (March 1953): 87-90.
- Mohamed A. Nour. "A Perspective View on Higher Education in Agriculture in the Sudan." Sudan Agricultural Journal No.1 (January 1969): 14-29.
- Mohammed H.S. Ebrahim. "Irrigation Projects in Sudan: The Promise and the Reality." Journal of African Studies No.1 (1983): 2-14.
- O'Brien, Jay. "The Formation of the Agricultural Labour Force in Sudan." Review of African Political Economy No.26 (1983): 15-34.
- Randell, John. "Rainfall Map of the Sudan Gezira." Sudan Notes and Records Vol.42 (1961): 29-35.
- Roushdi A. Henin. "Recent Developments in Sudan's Foreign Trade." Sudan Notes and Records Vol. 45 (1964): 113-132.

- Sam Ibrahim El Khatim. "Tenant's Reserve Fund as Income Stability Measure (A Case Study of the Gezira Scheme)." Sudan Agricultural Journal Vol.3 (January 1968): 58-76.
- Shaw, D.J. "A Note on Sudan's Ten Year Plan of Economic and Social Development." Agricultural Economics Bulletin No.3 (June 1963): 58-72.
- Shaw, D.J. "Labour Problems in the Gezira Scheme." Agricultural Economics Bulletin No.5 (April 1964): 1-41.
- Sheira, A.Z. "Fiscal and Financial Aspects of Land Reform in the Republic of Sudan." Agricultural Economics Bulletin No.2 (January 1963): 37-58.
- Simpson, I.G. "An Economic Evaluation of Cotton in the Gezira Scheme." Agricultural Economics Bulletin (November 1963): 53-64.
- Simpson, I.G. "Mr. Wynn and the Costing of Water Supplies." Sudan Agricultural Journal No.1 (November 1966): 61-67.
- Simpson, S. Rowton. "Land Law and Registration in the Sudan." Journal of African Administration Vol.7 (1955): 11-17.
- Thornton, D.S. "Agricultural Development in the Sudan Gezira Scheme." Tropical Agriculture (December 1970): 106-114.
- . "Contrasting Policies in Irrigation Development." Development Studies (September 1966): 1-54.
- Wynn, R.F. "A Case for Increased Tenant Autonomy in the Gezira." Sudan Cotton Review No.1 (November 1966): 61-67.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIV. LIBRARIES



31293010510190