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IA CONTENT ANALYSIS OF MAINLAND CHINA'S
TELEVISION 1PROGRAMMING: FROM 1981 To 1985:

AN INCREASING ROLE FOR ENTERTAINMENT?

‘By
Cheng, Chia-Lung

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Communication

1986

ABSTRACT
A CONTENT ANALSIS OF MAINLAND CHINA'S

TELEVISION PROGRAMMING FROM 1981 TO 1985
AN INCREASING ROLE FOR ENTERTAINMENT?

BY
Cheng, Chia-Lung

The Mainland China television programming content
analysis is based on local newspapers with television
programming schedules which are available in the United
States. The sampling was analyzed upon one month programs
from each of the selected areas and years. It was designed
to compare programming in the metroplitan vs. medium-size
citiy; coastal area vs. the interior; and early stages of
opening to the West with later ones. They are CCTV-1 vs.
Tianjin Television (channel 12); Shenzhen Television vs.
Shenyang Television; programming of CCTV-l from 1981 to

1985.

From Mao's era to Deng's, entertainment program
quantity has increased quite a lot , but remained level
during Deng's regime. The present content analysis indicates
that the programming of regional channels contain a higher

percentage of entertainments than the national channel.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE
I. Introduction
II. Limitations
III. Organization of The Study
CHAPTER TWO
I. General Background Infromation
-- Television in Mainland China
II. Literature Review of Research Perspectives
CHAPTER THREE
I. Design of The Study
II. Sampling
III. Coding Scheme
CHAPTER FOUR
I. Research Questions
II. Results
CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusions
NOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX

11

19

23

24

27

3O

31

52

55

57

60

CHAPTER ONE
I. INTRODUCTION

Until 1972, when Richard Nixon's momentous journey to
the People's Republic of China opened the door to diplomatic
ties, the "bamboo curtain" had prevented Communist China
from communicating with Western nations for about twenty-
five years. One year after Nixon's visit to China, both
Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai pushed for economic and
technological development over ideological discussion. They
preferred people who were capable ("expert") over those who

were politically pure ("red").1

The Premier Zhao Ziyang proclaimed, "China has opened
its door and will never close it again," in his tour of the
United States in 1984. China's "open door" has developed
since Deng Xiaoping, who was once sent into internal exile
as a "capitalist roader," gained paramount political power
in 1978. As a consequence of the "open door" policy,
modernization has become an inevitable course for the
People's Republic of China.

The movement of modernization, undertaken delicately

by Zhou Enlai, the late premier who died in 1976 and now
accelerated by Deng, is clearly another "great leap forward"
in China today. It would be an interesting issue to study
where the regime drifts in a country that has seen the
pendulum swing so often in recent decades and how it

operates the media.

Schramm suggests that in the service of national
development, the mass media are agents of social change.
The specific kind of social change they are expected to
accomplish is the transition to new customs and practices
and in some cases, to different social relationships. ... A
nation that wants to accelerate this process, as all
developing nations do today, will try to make its people
more widely and quickly aware of their needs and of the
opportunities for meeting them, will facilitate the
decision-making process, and will help the people put the

new practices smoothly and swiftly into effects.2

We know very little of the television content in
Mainland China during the passing era of cultural isolation
and the xenophobia of radical leftists. It has been going
through a dramatic change since the downfall of the Gang of

Four (a small clique formed by the four top radicals, Chiang

Ching, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, and Yao Wen-yuan.)
It is apparent that: the post-Mao regime has intent upon
harnessing television for nonpolitical -- especially

economic -- purposes .

According to Lee's study, science and technology
programs jumped from 5% in 1977 to 17% in 1979, and English
instruction rose from nothing in 1977 to 15% in 1979.3 J.
Roizen and R. Roizen's study shows that the content of

Peking television in a typical March week was as follows:

ContentsofBelllngwlnatyplcalMar-ehweek

ENTERTAINMENT/
ORA MA \

  

ENTERTAINMENT ;
MUSIC/DA r " I
—orr£a

CHILDREN'S
PROGRAMS -'

Source of above chart: TV/Radio Age, May 13, 1985

In 1985, an executive of the Peking local station
announced that his programming consisted of 74% sports and

intertainment, with plans to increase the ratio.4

Yu argues that to understand the historical background
of China's communication system is to take virtually all
feasible vehicles of human expression and every means of
influencing attitudes and behaviors.5 As E. Lloyd
Sommerlad, who visited Mainland China in 1981, describes,
"Communication systems and political systems are always
interrelated but nowhere more closely and purposefully than
in the PRC . ...communication is an integral part of
political organization; it is both an instrument of social
control and a process of socialization which affects the
minds and attitudes of the whole population."6. One of the
most dominant characteristics of communication systems in
the Second World is the high degree to which the mass media
are made subservient to the political system. In Socialist-

Communist nations, mass media have hitherto been made

subservient to the political system. Research over years

generally supports the notion that the media functions in
Mainland China inherently in ideological and political

ways.7

The power struggle of the Party has raged on and off
since the Communists took the dominion of China in 1949.
The regime has manipulated television as a means of class
struggle, denunciation of purged political figures, and
promoting political ideology. During the late seventies ,
Deng Xiaoping gained the paramount political power and
introduced economic reforms aimed at modernizing China.
Like Deng's economic reforms, the operation of television in

the past years has changed radically.

Are those television program categories mentioned
above: news, entertainment, science and technology programs,
education, and other special topics, overtly ideological,
and always centering around regime defined themes? What
kind of packaging have they shown? What kinds of
television programming have been changed? Schramm(1964)
suggests that the mass media can create a climate for
development. We can sum up by saying that the mass media
can contribute substantially to the amount and kinds of

information available to the people of a developing country.

They can widen horizons and thus help to build empathy; they
can focus attention on problems and goals of development;
they can raise personal and national aspirations; and all
this they can do largely themselves and directly. This
amounts to creating an informational "climate" in which
development is stimulated. By showing modern equipment and
life in economically well-developed societies, by
disseminating news of development from far away, by carrying
political, economic, social, and cultural reports from
elsewhere in the country and the world, the media can create
an intellectual climate which stimulates people to take
another look at their own current practices and future
perspectivesa. The content analysis will attempt to compare
programming in different areas and over time, in order to
find out what kind of role television is playing in such a

radically changing era in Mainland China.

II. LIMITATIONS

Foreign journalists and scholars who are working in

Mainland China, are not permitted to collect quantitative
data. Current statistics are unavailable; the available
statistics are unreliable, and in any event do not cover all
the necessary range of indicators. No details are
collected. Generally speaking, information on China is very
scarce. The bare necessities of government statistics,
handbooks and reference books, national trade and
professional associations, 'academic studies, consultants'

reports, and market research have been mostly unobtainable.9

China's recent Open Door policy presents unprecedented
opportunities to study its mass media system. Outsiders now
have access to certain television programming. For
instance, the United States Information Agency has invited
numerous media personel from China to the United States in
the past two years including the directors and programming

editors of all 29 provincial television stations.

The content analysis is based on local newspapers with
television programming schedules which are available in the
United States. The sampling was analyzed upon one month
programs from each of the selected areas and years. It was
designed to compare programming in the metropolitan vs.

medium-size citiy; coastal area vs. the interior; and early

stages of opening to the West with later ones. Since some
of the sources are unavailable, and not as detailed as
desired, the analysis does not cover the total extent

mentioned above.

III. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The study is organized into five chapters.

Chapter one: Introduction of research query and the limitation

of this study.

Chapter two: 1. General background information, the
development of Mainland China's television
network which includes its history and
growth.

2. The policies announced by Chinese
Communists and by the executives.

3. Some implications of literature review
and the significance of the study.

Chapter three: 1.Design of the study.

2.8ampling.
3.Coding scheme.
Chapter four: 1.Research Questions

2.Results.

10

Chapter five: Conclusions
Appendix
Notes

Bibliography

CHAPTER TWO

I. Television in Mainland China

To Mao Tse-tung' regime, television was an unnecessary
evil that had no place in revolutionary China . It has
been changed by time and political line. Under Deng's
"Four Modernizations", which has emphasized increased
prodution of consumer goods and so-called Chinese
Socialism, China has emphasized broacasting among the
reforms. Roizen analyzes the importance that China

emphasized broadcasting as follows:

I. The necessity of membership in a world scientific and
technological community to participate in wide-ranging
exchanges in resources, science, technology,
information, and spiritual wealth with other parts of
the world.

2. For China to catch up and stay caught up, it must
establish the necessary communication to sustain their

pace of scientific progress.

11

12

3. Chinese leadership views the proliferation of television
and radio as providing a shortcut method for educating
the country's vast population to a new socialist
consciousness.

4. The proliferation of television also provides Chinese
leadership a convenient means to a number of emergent
values and themes.

5. They are anxious to promulgate a new and secular
scientific ethos at the culture's core, and broadcast
media may be the best method for this new ethos's

diffusion.10

Of all the mass media, radio is China's most
important instrument for the promotion of national
objectives. The number of television sets in use in
Mainland China is estimated around 65 million in homes,
factories, and community centers. The currently estimated
number represents a seventy fold increase since 1978.11
Television is growing rapidly and is now gaining more and
more importance. Thus, the structure of the television

network, policies, programming, and a few salient aspects

have to be shown.

1. Infrastructure of The Netyork

13

1956 With the technical assistance and equipment
supply of the Soviet Union, Mainland China
began to experiment with television through the
efforts of the Central Broadcasting Science
Research Factory and th e Peking Broadcasting

Equipment Factory.

1958 Peking Television started experimental broadcasts
on 1 May, regular schedules started on 2
September. Its signals could be picked up

throughout Peking.

1960 A dozen towns had stations and had to rely on
films and tapes bicycled from one to another
without electronic transmission. China and
USSR broke off relations in June. Russian
advisors went home and spare parts were
virtually unobtainable. Not until the late
sixties did local manufacturing start the

program of expansion rolling again.

1966-69 During the Cultural Revolution period,

television activities almost stopped entirely.

1970

1973

1978

1979

14

Much equipment was not maintained.

A research project was organized to study both
the systems and the equipment for color

television.

May 1, Peking Television began to experiment
with color. Big cities like Shanghai,
Guangzhou, Tianjin, picked up this programming
as regional stations began to develop and
assert themselves. Peking Television began to
have a dual role which had to provide a
national service to the regional stations as

well as provide its own local service.

China Central Television Station (CCTV) was
founded in place of the origional Peking
Television, responsible for both a national
service and a regional service. A brand new
organization, Peking Television provided a

separate Peking service.

Television University was established. It

graduated 78,000 students in 1982. At present,

15

a total of 1,150,000 students are enrolled in
the program, and they plan on having 2 million

registrants by 1990.

1980 Television services were being supplied by
CCTV Peking Television, and 36 other stations
in the municipalities, the provinces, and the

autonomous regions.12

2. Policies and Operation

The traditional structure and funtions of broadcasting
in Mainland China were dominated by the Chinese Communist
Party's philosophy of mass media, which flows directly from
Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Thus, the ideology guides the
coercive and persuasive mass media as as instrument of power
and control in Mainland China Marxism-Lenninism holds that
the media are tools of class struggle and must assume such
militant roles as "collective propagandist", "collective

13 From the Communist point

agitator", "collective oganizer".
of view, the mass media must become the party's "loyal eyes,
ears, and tongue, and an important bridge for daily contact
between the Party and innumerable people, and a powerful

tool for the Party to guide revolutionary struggle and

16

construction".14

The television network is administered under the

Ministry of Film and Television, and managed by the CCTV,

with its location in Peking as headquaters.15 Though founded
administratively by the State Council, the Ministry of Film

and Television operates under close content censorship by

the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee. The

network for controlling the television system is as follows:

PRC'§ TV Organizational System

 

Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party

Propaganda Department of
Central Committee
(Strategic Level)

CCTV/Part

Propaganda Department of
Provincial and Municipal--
Party Committee

Provincial & Municipal St

|
State Council
(Technical Level)

---------------- >|

|
Ministry of Film & TV

|
Cells< ------------- '

|
l
I
I
Provincial & Municipal

--------- >Bureau of Film and
TV / Party Cell

ations/Station Party Cells16

17

"We know that the Central Television Station,
previously known as Peking Television, gets policy cues and
guidance from the trinity of power in propaganda--the
People's Daily, the Liberation Army Daily, and the Red Flag-
-and transmits programs for national use," Lee suggests,
"but local stations in certain metropolises also make their
own programs in line with the established policy

directions."17

3. Programming

In Mao's era, television itself was a means and target
of the Communist power struggle. According to Beijing
Review, "Tempered and educated in the Great Cultural
Revolution, television workers have come to the
understanding that to make the proletarian television
service a success, it is esSential to take class struggle as
the key link, uphold the Party's basic line and criticize
the revisionist line of Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao, and Deng
Xiao-ping." (Deng was disgraced during that period).18
During that era, the selection of international television
news was centered around China and its relationship with the

Third World, other Socialist countries, and two super powers

(the U. S. A. and USSR). Thus China's international

18

television news was actually an extension of its domestic

news . 19

During the period of Cultural Revolution, television
stations were permitted to broadcast only the revolutionary
songs and eight revolutionary operas which were approved by
Chiang Ching, Mao's wife. In "The Universal Eye," Timothy
Green recounts how in 1970 a visiting British broadcaster
counted up that 18 minutes out of a total 26 minutes of the
main evening news bulletin one night were rolling captions
of Mao's thoughts with background music of 'The East Is

Red'.20

The programming has been going through a dramatic
change since the downfall of the Gang of Four. The viewing
boom has been matched by an explosive change in programming.
Programming has expanded to include variety shows,
traditional dramas, cartoons, and even soap operas and
Western imports. As a consequence, Deng and his associates
created a new Ministry of Television and Radio (now named
Ministry of Film and Television). It has also authorized
regional stations to purchase foreign programs and sign

joint-production agreements with foreigners.21

19

Though for the moment Mainland China television is a
forward-looking symbol of China's move into the modern age,
some disagreement, intense at times, rather than total
consensus has generally characterized media content through
most of Chinese Communist Party history. For instance, when
a BBC production of Tolstoy's "Anna Karenina" was shown in
early 1982, political hard-liners in Peking condemned the
program as immoral and socially unacceptable. Other party
cadres complained that people stayed home to watch
television rather than participate in mandatory political-

study sessions.22

II. Literature Review of Research Perspectives

Mass communication research started in China in the
19205 when the first introductory book in journalism was
published. Prior to World War II, several Chinese scholars
went abroad to study journalism. The Chinese Communist
Party has placed a high priority upon mass communication
activies since its rise in the 19305, and continued through
its take-over of Mainland China in 1949. For years, the
media was seen as a tool of the Party for mobilizing people

in revolution. Thus, past communication research in China

20

focused on evaluating how well the media publicized Party
policies, and how well the media transmitted news "to serve
the masses."23 In consequence of Deng's reforms, outsiders
now have access to conduct scientific research. A preview

of previous research can aid in categorizing program content

analysis and concepts.

Lee (1980) discusses Mainland China's television
content in three aspects which are remarkably regularized
and standardized. They are newscasts, education programs,
and entertainment. All the newscasts projected an image
that PRC had many friends, that the people concertedly
supported the Party lines, and that the invincible human
would be inspired by Mao's thoughts that could conquer
virtually every obstacle. And there was nothing which was
"pure entertainment," since everything contained clear
political messages. Television is being harnessed to
educational purposes while political ideology is somewhat

toned down in the post- Mao regime.

Sommerlad(1981) found that television is playing an
increasing role in enlarging horizons and raising
aspirations. The imported programs demonstrate a different

way of life, and television advertising invite a direct

21

response. The system is likely to be controlled if it

develops too widely.

Howkins(1982) found that the most popular programs were
films, followed by news bulletins. He felt people were
eager to see any pictures from the West after such a long

isolation. Imported programs had increased substantially.

Jacobson(1983) found that a multitude of Chinese today
have been given their views of life and culture abroad by
documentaries and news programs, produced in China and
abroad, carried by the television network. Television in
Mainland China has the potential of playing an important

role in transmitting information about foreign countries.

Lee(1980) summed up the program structure of the Central
Television Station in Peking into news (domestic and
international), documentaries, world roundabout, sports/
health, literature, English instruction, and story films.

An international comparative study done by UNESCO in 1981
described programs in relation to its intended purpose into
seven categories:information, educational programs, cultural
programs, religious programs, advertising, entertainment,

and unclassified programs.24 Straubhaar(1983) divided

22

programs into eleven types:telenovelas, variety, music,
sports, news, public affairs, comedy, children's educational
feature films or drama, and other.25 Rogers(1985) divided

them into seven: world news, drama, sports news,

music/operas, films, leaders' activies, and advertising.

CHAPTER THREE
I. Design of The Study

Four stations were selected in this analysis. They are
Chinese Central Television (CCTV-1, Channel 2), Tianjin
Television (Channel 12), Shenzhen Television, and Shenyang

Television.

Chinese Central Television

CCTV, Mainland China's main station, produces two
services. Channel 2 is regarded as the primary service and
is distributed to all stations by microwave and tape.
Channel 8 is distributed only within Peking municipality.
Channel 2, the nationwide broadcasting channel is on the air
for an average of 7.3 hours per day in the sample month.
Altogether, the CCTV-1 has about eight hundred workers,
three studios. About seventy percent of the production is
done with videotape; mostly 2-inch Ampex, but also some 1-
inch (Type "C") and Sony's 3/4-inch U-matic System is used
increasingly. About twenty percent of all programs are made

on film, and ten percent are live.26

23

24

Tianjin Television
Tianjin is located in Hopei province, one of the three
municipalities. It is also one of the four stations which

were engineered for live broadcasting in the late sixties.27

Shenzhen Television
Shenzhen is a region that is described as a "special
economic zone" near Hong Kong. It is an experiment in the
free-market idea that was specifically designed to attract
foreign investment and technology. Because of its
geographical location and special character, Shenzhen seems

like an area that is more open to the outside world.

Shenyang Television
Shenyang is the largest city and industrial center of
northeastern China and the capital of Liaoning province. In
contrast to Shenzhen, Shenyang is a slowly growing, drab
industrial center. Though it is not exactly a
geographically interior city, it has the character of an

interior city in openness.

II. Sampling

25

The content analysis is based on television programming
schedules in five Chinese local newspapers. They are
Beijing Daily, Tianjin Daily, Liaoning Daily, Shenzhen
Special Zone Report, and Television Weekly. The chart below
identifies periods for which complete daily schedules were

available by area.

 

 

 

 

 

Table 1
Samples of the study
| Area | Period
I I
| Peking | l/5-2/l,'81. l/2-1/28,'82. l/2-l/27,'83.
| I l/3-l/30,'84. l/7-2/3,'85.
l I
| Tianjin | 1/1-1/28,'85.
| I
| Shenyang | 1/12-2/6,'85.

| Shenzhen | 1/8-2/3,'85.

26

1. Samples were to be selected on the same dates if possible,
Though one or two day's shortage is inevitable.

2. Programming schedules of one month (four week) were
selected to be compared.

3. Schedules from Shenzhen are available only four days per

week.

The following chart identifies average broadcasting

time per day(1985) and total time for each station.

_I§21§_Z

Broadcasting time of each sample station

 

 

 

 

 

 

| Area |Station | Average broadcasting | Total minutes I
| | | time (minutes/day) | |
| | I | |
| Peking | CCTV | 438 | 12264+36627 |
I | l : ('81-84):
| |
|Tianjin |Tianjin | 300 | 8394 |
| I | | I
|Liaoning |Shenyang| 190 | 5330 |
l | I l I
|Guangdong|Shenzhen| 205 | 3275 |
l | |

 

27

III. Coding scheme

Categorizing television programs, for years, always
presents very difficult epistimological problems. However,
statistics relating to programs are classified according to

the following criteria:

A. Typology according to source of media
1). Foreign - U.S.A.

Communist nations

Others

2). Domestic - Local

Other stations

B.Typology according to media function28

1). Information programs: programs intended primarily to
inform about facts, events, or to provide explanatory
background information.

a. News bulletins, local news and CCTV news (nationwide
broadcasting).

b. Commentaries, current state of affairs.

2). Educational programs: programs intended primarily to

3).

4).

5).

28

educate and in which the educational element is
fundamental.

Language, technology and school course programs.
Public health and sanitational programs.

Housekeeping programs.

Propaganda: Ideological education, diffusion of Deng's

reforms.

Cultural programs: programs intended primarily to
stimulate artistic and/or intellectual curiosity.
Culture and arts, painting, calligraphy and literature
report programs.

Local customs and practices.

Foreign customs and practices.

Entertainment programs: programs intended primarily to
entertain.

Sports - international, foreign and domestic sport
programs.

Series and serials

Local operas.

Variety - music, dance, and stunt programs.

Telefilms and movies.

29

6). Children programs: animated cartoons, series, or other

programs primarily aimed at children.

7). Others: unclassified programs.

It is necessary to mention that the Television
University Programs are excluded in the present content
analysis. When the Television University was inaugurated in
1979, it offered only the basic courses in three majors:
mathematics, chemistry and English. Now, the Television
University offers nearly 200 courses in several dozen

majors, and broadcasts seven hours per day in various

courses 0 2 9

It is very important to distinguish carefully between
different kinds of programs. One detailed coding list (see
appendix) was designed to code programs into the seven above
mentioned categories. There were several categories of
programs which were easily defined. Two graduate students
from Mainland China helped categorize those which were
identified only by program titles in daily schedules. Their
input increased the reliablilty of the categorizing of the

nature of the programs.

CHAPTER FOUR

I. Research Questions

The present findings are organized around six main

research questions:

1.

What are the kinds of content for each individual
selected station?

What is the change of program structure of CCTV-l from
1981 to 1985?

By comparing current programs of CCTV-1 with programs
televised previously, is there an increase in imported
programs, especially from Western nations?

By comparing contents of CCTV-1 with contents of
Tianjin, what is the programming emphasis of each
station?

By comparing contents of Shenzhen with contents of
Shenyang, what is the programming emphasis of each
station?

Based on the finding of the previous questions, can
Mainland China's programming be referred to as an
entertainment oriented function? Is entertainment

increasing over time? What are the implications for

30

these broadcasting policies?

II. Results

Research Question 1

What is the content of each individual selected station ?

921!

There are three channels in Peking: CCTV-1 (Channel 2),
national service; CCTV-2 (Channel 8), special Peking
service; and the local service provided separately by the
Peking Television Station. The program structure of CCTV-1,
the nationwide broadcasting channel which contains 18.8%
information programs, 28.1% educational programs, and 35.6%

entertainment programs, is as follows:

31

Structure of CCTV-1 (Jan.'85)

32

Table 3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Time (minutes) ( %
Information programs | 2345 | 18.8
Educational programs I 3516 I 28.1
Propaganda programs 7 196 I 1.6
Cultrual programs I 676 l 5.4
Entertainment programs. I 4459 I 35.6
Children's programs I 1094 : 8.8
Other programs : 207 I 1.7

Total i 2508 i 100

 

* sample period from 1/7 - 2/3.'85

33

T'a 'in

There are three channels in Tianjin: Channel 12,
Channel 5, and Channel 17. Channel 5 retransmits CCTV-1's
programs: Channel 17 is a new channel which was being tested
during the sampling period. The program structure of
Channel 12 which contains 66.9% entainment programs, only
4.6% educational programs and 12.3% information programs, is

as follows:

Table 4

Structure of Tianjin TV (Ch. 12. Jan.'85)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Time (minutes) ( % )
| Information programs | 1018 | 12.3 |
: Educational programs I 380 I 4.6 :
: Propaganda programs I 150 i 1.8 I
: Cultrual programs I 480 I 5.8 l
: Entertainment programs I 5531 I 66.9 :
: Children's programs : 335 7 4.1 I
7 Other programs : 370 I 4.5 7
E Total i 8264 E 100 i

 

*Sample period from 1/1 - 1/28.'85
The average broadcasting time is five hours per day

34

Shenyang

There are three channels in Liaoning province.
Shengyang, the provincial capital of Liaoning has its own
local service. The other two channels are Liaoning
provincial station and the other channel which retransmits
CCTV-1's programs. The program structure of Shenyang
Television of which entertainment programs represent 88.6%
of the content, information programs and educational

programs represent less than 10%, is as follows:
Table 5

Structure of Shenvanq TV (Jan.'85)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Time (minutes) ( % )
| Information programs | 400 | 7.5 |
: Educational programs : 30 : 0.6 i
: Propaganda programs : 0 i 0 :
: Cultrual programs : 50 : 1.0 :
: Entertainment programs : 4725 i 88.6 :
: Children's programs : 0 i 0 :
: Other programs : 125 : 2.3 :
E Total i 5330 i 100 i

 

*Sample period from 1/8 - 2/3, '85
The average broadcasting time is 3.4 hours per day

35

Shenzhen

The special economic zone which is located in Canton is
so close to Hong Kong that its residents can recive the
signals from Hong Kong's net works. The program structure
of Shenzhen Television which contains 36% information

programs, and 44.4% entertainment programs, is as follows:
Table 6

Structure of Shenzhen TV (Jan.'85)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Time (minutes) ( % )
| Information programs | 1190 | 36 |
: Educational programs : 32 : 1.0 :
: Propaganda programs : 17 : 0.5 :
: Cultural programs : 348 i 10.5 :
: Entertainment programs : 1458 : 44.4 i
: Children's programs : 47 i 1.4 :
: Other programs : 203 i 6.1 l
E Total i 3305 E 100 E

 

*Sample period from 1/12 - 2/6, '85
The average broadcasting time is 3.2 hours per day.

36

Research Question 2

What is the change of program structure of CCTV-1 from 1981
to 1985 ?

The broadcasting time has increased during this period.
The average broadcasting time was 4.3 hours per day in 1981,
5.9 hours per day in 1983, and jumped to 7.5 hours per day
in 1985. The following tables show the broadcasting time

and program structure of CCTV in the last five years.

37

Table 7

Structure of CCTV-l ( minutes I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

'81 '82 '83 '84 '85
| Information | | | | |
| programs | 840 | 960 | 1110 | 2130 | 2345
I I I I I I
| Educational | | | | |
| programs | 2205 | 2345 | 2670 | 1900 | 3516
I I I I | |
I Prepaganda I I I | I
| programs | 165 | 190 | 45 | 205 | 196
I I I | I I
| Cultural | | | | |
| programs | 370 | 290 | 290 | 660 | 676
l I I I | |
| Entertainmentl | | | |
| programs | 3205 | 4827 | 4505 | 4780 | 4459
I I I I I I
| Children's I I I I I
| programs | 335 | 560 | 430 | 755 | 1094
l I I I I I
I Other I I l I I
| programs | 80 | 70 | 195 | 470 | 207
I I I I | I
I I | I I I
| Total | 7220 | 9252 | 9245 | 10900 | 12508
| | | I I I

 

*It is possible that the schedules of 1984 are insufficient.

Thus,
above.

the broadcasting time could be more than it shows

38

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 8

Structure of CCTV-1 I %rl

'81 '82 '83 '84 '85
| Information | | | | |
| programs | 11.6 | 10.4 | 12 | 19.5 | 18.8
I I I | I I
| Educational | | ‘ | | |
| programs | 30.5 | 25.3 | 28.9 | 17.4 | 28.1
I I I I I I
| Propaganda | | | | |
| programs | 2.3 | 2.1 | 0.5 | 1.9 | 1.6
I I I | I I
| Cultural | | | | |
| programs | 5.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 6.1 | 5.4
l I I I I I
| Entertainmentl | | | |
| programs | 44.4 | 52.2 | 48.7 | 43.9 | 35.6
| I I | I I
| Children's | | | I |
| programs | 4.9 | 6.1 | 4.7 | 6.9 | 8.8
I I I I I I
| Other I I I I I
| programs | 1.1 | 0.8 | 2.1 | 4.3 | 1.7
I I I l I I
I I I I I |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100
I I I I I I

 

 

* some of the schedules were not printed in detail which
resulted in lower figures than normal.

Information programs increased distinctly during these
years, especially in 1984. The percent of information
programs jumped from 11.6% in 1981 to 19.5% in 1984 and
18.8% in 1985. Educational programs remained from 25 to 30%

of average broadcasting time (expect in 1984 when the

39

educational programs fell to 17.4% which could possibly be
caused by incomplete data, see table 8 above). The direct
propaganda programs kept a 2% average in the past five
years. Cultural programs remained 5% during that period.
After the death of Mao in 1976, and the subsequent arrest of
the Gang of Four, Mainland China found a new television
horizon. Entertainment is the distinct change in television
operation since the end of Mao's regime. During the
Cultural Revolution, television stations were permitted to
perform only eight revolutionary operas and eight
revolutionary songs. It was hardly comprehensible, but the
party leaders said "they are worthy to be heard a hundred
times." Entertainment programs remained an average of 45% of
television content, except in 1985 when it fell to 35.6%

while children's programs had a gradual increase.

Research Question 3
By comparing current programs of CCTV with programs
televised previously, is there an increase in imported

programs, especially from western nations ?

40

The structure of programs according to source of media

is as follows:

Table 9

The source of CCTV—1 programs ( %rl

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

'81 '82 '83 '84 '85

IU.S.A. I 2.6 | 2.9 | 1.0 | 1.7 I 3.2
I | I I I |
|Communist | | | | I

Inations I 0 I 2.4 I 0.4 | 2.1 I 1.5
I I | l l l
|Oth§r I I I I I

Inathns | 9.8 | 12.3 | 12.3 I 2.4 | 9.5
I I I I I I

|Local station I | I | | 70.3
| 87.6 | 82.4 | 86.3 | 93.8 |

|Other stationsl | | | | 15.5
I l I l I I

|Total I 100 I 100 I 100 I 100 I 100
I I ‘ I I |

 

41

According to Lee's research3o, the importation of

feature fllms from 1977 to 1979 is as follows:

221L152

Import of Story Films, Central Television Station/Channel 1
(May 1977-July 1979)

1977 1978 1979

 

 

manhoea) awnqoea) finnamnmy
kuflgenous 8096 7396 8498
Foreign 20% 27% 16%
100% 100% 100%

(N) _ (124) (198) (102)
Source of Import:
hLKmma 7 12 1
YMxtha 4 4
Rmana 1 11 1
Vietnam 1
USSR 9' 6‘
Aknnb 1
Hungary 5
Czechoslovakia 3 1
hMmbo 4 1
ERQMmd 2 3
Japan 4
United States 1
mda 3
new 1
Hong Kong 1
Hammi 1
China/ France °

(Coproduction) 1
China/ Italy ,-

(Coproduction) 1

23 51 16

 

‘Ail of them were early Soviet films praising the October Revolution.
SOURCE: People’ 8 Daily.

42

Obviously, there was a radical change between 1978 and
1979. 80% of story films imported from Communist countries
in 1978 declined to 19% in 1979, and 20% of story films
imported from non-Communist countries in 1978 jumped to 81%

in 1979.31

During the first half of the 80's, the trend has
continued. Most of the imported programs were from Hong

Kong, Japan and Western nations.

Research Question 4
By comparing contents of CCTV‘l with contents of Tianjin,

what is the programming empasis of each station ?

In October 1985, Xie Wenqing, Vice-ministry of Film and
Television Ministry, proclaimed at the seventh Television
Association Conference, "... As the tongue of the Party and
the government, all television stations must be politically
and organizationally subject to the absolute leadership of
the Party committee and government at various levels. No
privately-run stations shall be allowed. No stations can be
run by enterprises or inStitutions expect the government.
As a final goal every station should have a definite guiding

ideology, and all programs to be broadcast must support

43

socialism and the Four Modernizations."32

CCTV-1 follows the above guide lines absolutely. It
contained, in January 1985, 18.5% information programs,
28.1% educational programs. These two types of programs
represent 46.6% of total broadcasting time, while
entertainment programs represent 35.6%. In comparison,
66.9% of Tianjin Television (Channel 12) are entertainment:
12.3% are information programs which include local news,
CCTV news and commentaries, current affairs. While the
other station (Channel 5) is a transmission of CCTV-1's

programs, the programming of Channel 12 has more emphasis on

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

entertainment.
Table 11
1985 CCTV Tianjin
| Information programs | 18.5 | 12.3 I
I Educational programs I 28.1 I 4.6 I
I Propaganda programs I 1.6 I 1.8 I
I Cultural programs I 5.4 I 5.8 I
I Entertainment programs I 35.6 I 66.9 I
I Children's programs I 8.8 I 4.1 I
I Other programs I 1.7 I 4.5 I
E Total i 100 i 100 !

 

44

Research Question 5
By comparing contents of Shenzhen with contents of Shenyang,

what is the programming emphasis of each station ?

Information programs of Shenzhen Television represent
36% of the content. Beside the retransmission of CCTV news,
Shenzhen Television has two ten-minute newscasts. Mandarin
newscast broadcasts at 7:35 P.M. and Cantonese (the common
dialect in Hong Kong and Canton) newscast broadcasts at 9
P.M. 44.4% of the contents are entertainment. A typical
daily program of Shenyang Television begins with a ten-
minute local newscast, followed by two different serials,
series, or a film, and a variety program or local opera,
sometimes with a different eipsode in betwwen. Thus, the
programming of Shenyang Television represents 88.6%

entertainment.

45

Table

12

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1985 ( % ) Shenhen Shenyang
Information programs | 36 | 7.5
Educational programs I 1.0 I 0.6
Propaganda programs I 0.5 I 0
Cultural programs I 10.5 I 1.0
Entertainment programs I 44.4 I 88.6
Children's programs I 1.4 I 0
Other programs I 6.1 I 2.3
Total i 100 i 100

 

 

46

Research Question 6

Based on the findings of the previous questions, can
Mainland China's programming be referred to as an
entertainment oriented function? Is entertainment
increasing over time? What are the implications for these

broadcasting policies?

Lee argues that the Chinese Communist regime has long
idealized television as a superbly powerful weapon of
consciousness raising and socialist construction. Whenever
the power struggles break into the open, television, like
other media, automatically becomes engulfed and has to bear
the brunt of bitter attacks and counterattacks. Meanwhile.
the victors of a faction tightly grip television in order to
build up ruling legitimacy as well as consolidate the
regime's "correct lines."33 In 1981, for instance, viewers
could see the trial of the Lin Biao and Jiang Ching cliques

on television.34

Schramm points out that there was little separation
between entertainment and the socialist revolution, between

technocracy and politics, everything was politics,

47

everything was the socialist revolution, and everything was
development. Popular songs, dance performances, cartoons,
even the Peking opera, were supposed to carry a political

message.35

Theoretically, television is considered a tool of the
party in implementation of its policies. Since Deng took the
paramount leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the
basic task of television broadcasting is to serve the

economic development and the Four Modernizations.36

Though
television operation has changed a great deal in many
aspects during the past years, it must serve politics and is
always a powerful means of the regime. Within the framework
of placing media at the service of state goals in the
Communist tradition shared with the USSR, the Chinese
Communist considers television a vehicle for information
that brings the part line and special policies. More
specifically, television, the rapidly increasing medium, is
to inform and educate people to support the contemporary
political line. In this study (Jan,'85. CCTV-1), both
information programs and educational programs represent

46.6% of the broadcasting content, while entertainment

programs represent 35.6%.

48

During the Cultural Revolution, educational programs
disappeared due to the campaigns referring to the slogans
that "Intellectuals are the stinking ninth" and "The more
knowledge the more reactionary". Under the Open Door
policy, improved education is needed on a standardized basis
throughout Mainland China to help achieve the so-called Four
Modernizations. Television is playing an increasing role in

enlarging horizons and raising aspirations.

According to an interview during the 83/4th World
Telecommunication Exhibition in Geneva, an official said,
that one of the main roles of a Chinese television broadcast
satellite would be the relay of educational programming,
China wants to acqire a television satellite from foreign
suppliers to enable the start of satellite relay operations

in the second half of the 1980's.37

A few descriptions of the television programs would
probably be a help toward an understanding of their nature.
Cross rhe land, programs spotlight the scenic beauties and

special features of various places in China.
Round the World, a special weekly program, has featured,
among other things, the agro-industrial complexes in

Yugoslavia, a new type of hospital in West Berlin, the

49

music center in Sydney, off-shore oil drilling in
Mexico, and different cultural customs around the
world.

Look and Think It Over, is a program exploring such issues
as the housing shortage in Peking, vegetable scarcities
in the market, and Peking' already overtapped water
resources, or an expose of senior cadres abusing
privileges of their rank.

Peo e's A , is a twenty-minute exposition of the
qualities that make a modern Red fighter.
Other programs include Cultures of Foreign Countries,

On the International scene, Science and Technology, Hygiene

and Health, Advice on Evertday Living.... 38

From Mao's era to Deng's, entertainment program
quantity has increased quite a lot, but remained level
during Deng's regime. The CCTV-1 programming contains 35.5%
entertainment programs(Jan.'85), even as high as
52.2%(Jan.'82), in the present study. Jacobson suggests,
"entertainment programs are, of course, not free of politics
or propaganda, which remains officially the main purpose of
the arts.... television in China has the potential of
playing an equal role in transmitting information about

foreign countries -- their physical characteristics,

50

cultures, patterns of life, rearing of children, and work
styles -— for people who over a long period have had such
limited contacts with foreigners and things foreign, and
whose knowledge of and attitude toward the outside world has

been shaped by the powers_ in control."39

A comparative
analysis of nine countries' television news indicates that
Chinese newscasts almost never criticize or portray their
government, military or economy as weak, and often praise
government and individuals for social contributions. The
major characters in the news were from government. The
topics most frequently covered in newscast were politics and
ecnomics(totally 54% of the content).40 Thus, there are
still serious reservations as to whether the television

programming in Mainland China can be refered to as an

entertainment oriented function.

It seems that the television operation in Mainland
China is hardly be separted from two of the Four Theories of
The Press which were presented by Siebert et al, in 1956.
There are The Authoritarian Theory, The Libertarian Theory.
The Social Responsiblity Theory, and The Soviet Communist
Theory. The Authoritarian Theory functioned from the top
down. The rulers informed the people of what the rulers

thought they should know, and the policies the rulers

51

thought they should support. The press being a servant of
the state, it is responsible for much of its content to the
power figures in charge of government at any given moment.
The Soviet Communist Theory is ground in Marxist determinism
and in the harsh political necessity of maintaining the
political ascendancy of a party.41 It seems that the
philosophy of Mainland China's media is still in the grip of

The Authoritarian Theory and The Soviet Communist Theory.

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusions

There is a little ideological freedom under Deng's
political line. As he said, "No matter whether it is a
white cat or a black cat, as long as it catches mice, it is
a good cat." The economic reform and the Open Door policy
have moved remarkably. Television, of course, is not an
exception. A program, called Good Morning Peking, is about
a fellow who drives a truck, the young woman he chases, and
another who chases him. Not long ago, young Chinese were
being told in the pages of their Communist Party newspaper
that "love is selfish and repellent in nature." Much has

changed in Mainland China.42

The study has attempted to quantify some of the
television programming in Mainland China under Deng's
regime. The present content analysis indicates that the
programming of regional channels contains a higher

percentage of entertainments than the programming of the

52

53

national channel. Shenyang Television, an evident example,
contains 88.6% entertainment programs, while CCTV-1
represents a 45% average of entertainment programs in the
last five years. However, at this time no research has been
done to indicate which channel among national, provincial,
and local channel the people of Mainland China prefer. This

is an area which needs to be further investigated.

At the begining of this year, a new channel in the
Peking area, a national educational television center,
channel 15, was being tested, and expected to be equiped and
furnished by the first half of 1987.43 Meanwhile, Deng

started to brew a movement toward re-evaluating Zhou Enlai,

the late Premier who died in 1976.44
Howkins indicates, “Communications are of vital
importance to China's changing leaderships."45 How the

regime manipulates television when factionalism gets in the
way could be a dramatic alteration. In any event, the

following story will illustrate my conclusion.

The Chinese characters for China Central Television,
writen in Mao's own calligraphy, served as the station's

logo until Mao's death. Shortly after Mao's death, an

54

altered sign appeared in the new Party Chairman, Hua
Guofeng's writing style. Then, on December 31, 1980, in

line with the Party's policy to avoid personality cults,
Hua's inscription was replaced by the characters in printed

form.46

55

NOTES

1. Chu, 1979. P.129.
2. Schramm, 1976. PP.114-5.
3. Lee, C. 1980.
4. Abel, 1985. P61.
5. Yu, 1979. P.27.
6. Sommerlad, 1981. P.234.
7. Lee, C. 1980.
8. Schramm, 1964. P.131-2
9. Howkins, 1982. PP.vii & xiii.
10. Roizen J. and Roizen R. 1985. PP.51-2.
11. Bonner, 1986.
12. Howkins, 1982. PP.26-35; Head, 1985. PP.24-5 & 316-7;
Renmin Ribao, 10/20/85, P.4.
13. Lent,1978. P.22.
14. Ibid. P.23
15. Jacobson, 1983. P.xxiv.
16. Ibid. PP185-6.
Ministry of Film & TV was called Ministry of
Broadcastibng & Television.
17. Lee, C. 1980. P.225.
18. Beijing Review, 6/2/76. P.23.
19. Chu 1978.
20. Howkins, 1982. P.28.
21. Rohter, 1982. P.44
22. Ibid.
23. Rogers. 1985 P.187.
24. Brunsvick, 1982. P.65.
25. Straubahaar, 1983.
26. Howkins, 1982. P43.
27. Ibid. P.27.
28. Part of the classification refer to 1982 UNESCO's study.
29. Beijing Review 2/16/79. P.7.
30. Lee, C. 1980. P.232.
31. Ibid. PP.229-30.
32. TV Weekly No.45 P.2,1985.
33. Lee, C. 1980. PP.219-20.
34. World Press Review, May, 1981. P.59.
35. Schramm, 1976. P.142.
36. Beijing Review, 1980. vol 43:6
37. Aviation Week & Space Technology. 11/21/83.
38. Ibid. note 34.
39. Jacobson, 1983. P234.
40. Greenberg, 1985. PP.14 & 16.

56

41. Siebert, 1978. P.1-6.

42. Abel, 1985. P.60.

43. People's daily (oversea edition), 4/23/86. P.1.
44. Lee, Y. 1986 P.1

45. Howkins, 1982. P.vii.

46. FBIS, vol.I China, Jan 12.

57

Bibliography
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July, 1985.
Baker, Mark. "China's TV Generation," World Press Review,
July, 1980.
Bonner, George R. Jr. "Madison Avenue as A Field Day

Playing To The China Market" in The Christian Science
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Brunsvick, Yves. ed. Three Week of TV: An International
Comparative Study, UNESCO, France,1982.

Chu, James. "People's Republic of China" in Lent:21-41,1978.
---------- "The Gathering of News About China," Gazette,33:
87-106 (1984)

Farace, R. Vincent. "Mass Communication and National
Development: Some Insights From Aggregate analysis" in Mass
Communication and The Development of Nations, Dept. of Comm.
Michigan State University, 1968.

Greenberg, B. et a1. Agendas and Images Set by Television
News: A Comparative Analysis of Nine Countries. Research
paper, Michigan State Univ. 1985.

Head, Sydeney W. World Broadcasting Stystems: A Comparative
Analysis. Wedsworth, CA, 1985.

Howkins, John. Mass Communication in China, Longman. New
York, 1982.

Jacobson, Harald. Systems of Internal Communication in The
People's Republic of China. USIA Research Report, 1983.

Lee, Chin-Chuan. Media Imperialism Reconsidered: The
Homogenizing of Television Culture. Sage, CA, 1980.

Lee, Ying-Ming, "Deng Wants To Pull Down Zhou's Epitaph" in
Central Daily Int'l ed. April 25, 1986.

Lent, John A. Broadcasting in Asia and the Pacific. Temple

58

Univ. press, 1978.

Ling, Yang. "China's Television Explosion," World Press
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Roizen J. & Roizen R. "China in Market for TV Technology,"
in Television/Radio Age, May 27, 1985

Rogers, Everett E. "The Beijing Audience Study" in
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Rohter, Larry. "The Biggest TV Audience" in New York Times,
August 16, 1982.

Saltzman, Joe. "Television's Dilemma: Information vs.
Entertainment," Mass Media. January 1984.

Schramm, Wilbur. Mass Media and National Development.
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---------------- Communication and Change: The Last Ten
Years and The Next. The Univ. Press of Hawaii, Honolulu,
1976.

Siebert, Fred S. et al., Four Theories of The Press. Univ.
of Illinos, 1978.

Straubhaar, Joseph. "Estimation of The Impact of Imported
Versus National Television Programming in Brazil" Studies in
Communication, 1983.

Terrell, Robert L. "Modernization and The Media in China,"
Gazette 33: 143-154, 1984.

Yu, Fredrick T. C. "China's Mass Communication in
Historical Perspective" in G. Chu & F. Hsu ed. Moving a
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"China Urges Broadcast System," Aviation Week & Space
Technology. Nov. 21. 1983.

"Soviet TV," The New Yorker. Sept. 16, 1985.

Renmin Ribao. Oct. 2, 1985; Oct. 20, 1985 (Chinese
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Beijing Review. July 2, 1976, P.23; Feb. 16, 1979, P.7.

Television weekly. No. 45. CCTV, Peking, 1985.

59

People's Daily, oversea edition. April 23, 1986.

FBIS, Daily Report. vol I China, editorial note, January 2,
(1981?) (cited from Jacobson, 1983:224.)

minutes

Unit

APPENDIX

60

Station

(continue to next page)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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61

 

|Sport-int'l
I

 

|Sport-foreign

 

|Sport-domestic

 

|Serials, Series

|Local opera

 

[Variety
|

 

ITelefilm/movie

 

|Others*
l

_—__——_—__——_———
————————_—_—_———
—————————————_—_
__-:—_—_——___———_—
__—_——_—__-_-—_——
__———_—____—_———
_—-——_————————__———

 

Total

 

*Promotion previes and uncategorized programs
*(minutes)l

-- Programs imported from U.S.A.

(minutes)2
-- Programs imported from Communist nations:
(minutes)3
-- Programs imported from other nations :
*[minutes]

-- Programs produced by other stations :

    
      

I'IIF HIGQN STQTE UNIV LIBR

I3 I I II III II I I II I I

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