


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
A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF MAINLAND CHINA'S
TELEVISION PROGRAMMING FROM 1981 TO 1985:
AN INCREASING ROLE FOR ENTERTAINMENT?
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**A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF MAINLAND CHINA'S
TELEVISION PROGRAMMING FROM 1981 TO 1985:
AN INCREASING ROLE FOR ENTERTAINMENT?**

By

Cheng, Chia-Lung

A THESIS

**Submitted to
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ABSTRACT

A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF MAINLAND CHINA'S TELEVISION PROGRAMMING FROM 1981 TO 1985 AN INCREASING ROLE FOR ENTERTAINMENT?

By

Cheng, Chia-Lung

The Mainland China television programming content analysis is based on local newspapers with television programming schedules which are available in the United States. The sampling was analyzed upon one month programs from each of the selected areas and years. It was designed to compare programming in the metropolitan vs. medium-size city; coastal area vs. the interior; and early stages of opening to the West with later ones. They are CCTV-1 vs. Tianjin Television (channel 12); Shenzhen Television vs. Shenyang Television; programming of CCTV-1 from 1981 to 1985.

From Mao's era to Deng's, entertainment program quantity has increased quite a lot, but remained level during Deng's regime. The present content analysis indicates that the programming of regional channels contain a higher percentage of entertainments than the national channel.

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CHAPTER ONE

I. INTRODUCTION

Until 1972, when Richard Nixon's momentous journey to the People's Republic of China opened the door to diplomatic ties, the "bamboo curtain" had prevented Communist China from communicating with Western nations for about twenty-five years. One year after Nixon's visit to China, both Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai pushed for economic and technological development over ideological discussion. They preferred people who were capable ("expert") over those who were politically pure ("red").¹

The Premier Zhao Ziyang proclaimed, "China has opened its door and will never close it again," in his tour of the United States in 1984. China's "open door" has developed since Deng Xiaoping, who was once sent into internal exile as a "capitalist roader," gained paramount political power in 1978. As a consequence of the "open door" policy, modernization has become an inevitable course for the People's Republic of China.

The movement of modernization, undertaken delicately

by Zhou Enlai, the late premier who died in 1976 and now accelerated by Deng, is clearly another "great leap forward" in China today. It would be an interesting issue to study where the regime drifts in a country that has seen the pendulum swing so often in recent decades and how it operates the media.


Schramm suggests that in the service of national development, the mass media are agents of social change. The specific kind of social change they are expected to accomplish is the transition to new customs and practices and in some cases, to different social relationships. ... A nation that wants to accelerate this process, as all developing nations do today, will try to make its people more widely and quickly aware of their needs and of the opportunities for meeting them, will facilitate the decision-making process, and will help the people put the new practices smoothly and swiftly into effects.²

We know very little of the television content in Mainland China during the passing era of cultural isolation and the xenophobia of radical leftists. It has been going through a dramatic change since the downfall of the Gang of Four (a small clique formed by the four top radicals, Chiang

Ching, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, and Yao Wen-yuan.) It is apparent that the post-Mao regime has intent upon harnessing television for nonpolitical -- especially economic -- purposes.

According to Lee's study, science and technology programs jumped from 5% in 1977 to 17% in 1979, and English instruction rose from nothing in 1977 to 15% in 1979.³ J. Roizen and R. Roizen's study shows that the content of Peking television in a typical March week was as follows:

Contents of Beijing TV in a typical March week



Source of above chart: TV/Radio Age, May 13, 1985

In 1985, an executive of the Peking local station announced that his programming consisted of 74% sports and intertainment, with plans to increase the ratio.⁴

Yu argues that to understand the historical background of China's communication system is to take virtually all feasible vehicles of human expression and every means of influencing attitudes and behaviors.⁵ As E. Lloyd Sommerlad, who visited Mainland China in 1981, describes, "Communication systems and political systems are always interrelated but nowhere more closely and purposefully than in the PRCcommunication is an integral part of political organization; it is both an instrument of social control and a process of socialization which affects the minds and attitudes of the whole population."⁶ One of the most dominant characteristics of communication systems in the Second World is the high degree to which the mass media are made subservient to the political system. In Socialist-Communist nations, mass media have hitherto been made subservient to the political system. Research over years

generally supports the notion that the media functions in Mainland China inherently in ideological and political ways.⁷

The power struggle of the Party has raged on and off since the Communists took the dominion of China in 1949. The regime has manipulated television as a means of class struggle, denunciation of purged political figures, and promoting political ideology. During the late seventies , Deng Xiaoping gained the paramount political power and introduced economic reforms aimed at modernizing China. Like Deng's economic reforms, the operation of television in the past years has changed radically.

Are those television program categories mentioned above: news, entertainment, science and technology programs, education, and other special topics, overtly ideological, and always centering around regime defined themes? What kind of packaging have they shown? What kinds of television programming have been changed? Schramm(1964) suggests that the mass media can create a climate for development. We can sum up by saying that the mass media can contribute substantially to the amount and kinds of information available to the people of a developing country.

They can widen horizons and thus help to build empathy; they can focus attention on problems and goals of development; they can raise personal and national aspirations; and all this they can do largely themselves and directly. This amounts to creating an informational "climate" in which development is stimulated. By showing modern equipment and life in economically well-developed societies, by disseminating news of development from far away, by carrying political, economic, social, and cultural reports from elsewhere in the country and the world, the media can create an intellectual climate which stimulates people to take another look at their own current practices and future perspectives⁸. The content analysis will attempt to compare programming in different areas and over time, in order to find out what kind of role television is playing in such a radically changing era in Mainland China.

II. LIMITATIONS

Foreign journalists and scholars who are working in

Mainland China, are not permitted to collect quantitative data. Current statistics are unavailable; the available statistics are unreliable, and in any event do not cover all the necessary range of indicators. No details are collected. Generally speaking, information on China is very scarce. The bare necessities of government statistics, handbooks and reference books, national trade and professional associations, academic studies, consultants' reports, and market research have been mostly unobtainable.⁹

China's recent Open Door policy presents unprecedented opportunities to study its mass media system. Outsiders now have access to certain television programming. For instance, the United States Information Agency has invited numerous media personnel from China to the United States in the past two years including the directors and programming editors of all 29 provincial television stations.

The content analysis is based on local newspapers with television programming schedules which are available in the United States. The sampling was analyzed upon one month programs from each of the selected areas and years. It was designed to compare programming in the metropolitan vs. medium-size city; coastal area vs. the interior; and early

stages of opening to the West with later ones. Since some of the sources are unavailable, and not as detailed as desired, the analysis does not cover the total extent mentioned above.

III. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The study is organized into five chapters.

Chapter one: Introduction of research query and the limitation of this study.

Chapter two: 1. General background information, the development of Mainland China's television network which includes its history and growth.

2. The policies announced by Chinese Communists and by the executives.

3. Some implications of literature review and the significance of the study.

Chapter three: 1.Design of the study.

2.Sampling.

3.Coding scheme.

Chapter four: 1.Research Questions

2.Results.

Chapter five: Conclusions

Appendix

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CHAPTER TWO

I. Television in Mainland China

To Mao Tse-tung' regime, television was an unnecessary evil that had no place in revolutionary China . It has been changed by time and political line. Under Deng's "Four Modernizations", which has emphasized increased production of consumer goods and so-called Chinese Socialism, China has emphasized broadcasting among the reforms. Roizen analyzes the importance that China emphasized broadcasting as follows:

1. The necessity of membership in a world scientific and technological community to participate in wide-ranging exchanges in resources, science, technology, information, and spiritual wealth with other parts of the world.
2. For China to catch up and stay caught up, it must establish the necessary communication to sustain their pace of scientific progress.

3. Chinese leadership views the proliferation of television and radio as providing a shortcut method for educating the country's vast population to a new socialist consciousness.
4. The proliferation of television also provides Chinese leadership a convenient means to a number of emergent values and themes.
5. They are anxious to promulgate a new and secular scientific ethos at the culture's core, and broadcast media may be the best method for this new ethos's diffusion.¹⁰

Of all the mass media, radio is China's most important instrument for the promotion of national objectives. The number of television sets in use in Mainland China is estimated around 65 million in homes, factories, and community centers. The currently estimated number represents a seventy fold increase since 1978.¹¹ Television is growing rapidly and is now gaining more and more importance. Thus, the structure of the television network, policies, programming, and a few salient aspects have to be shown.

1. Infrastructure of The Network

- 1956 With the technical assistance and equipment supply of the Soviet Union, Mainland China began to experiment with television through the efforts of the Central Broadcasting Science Research Factory and the Peking Broadcasting Equipment Factory.
- 1958 Peking Television started experimental broadcasts on 1 May, regular schedules started on 2 September. Its signals could be picked up throughout Peking.
- 1960 A dozen towns had stations and had to rely on films and tapes bicycled from one to another without electronic transmission. China and USSR broke off relations in June. Russian advisors went home and spare parts were virtually unobtainable. Not until the late sixties did local manufacturing start the program of expansion rolling again.
- 1966-69 During the Cultural Revolution period, television activities almost stopped entirely.

Much equipment was not maintained.

- 1970 A research project was organized to study both the systems and the equipment for color television.

- 1973 May 1, Peking Television began to experiment with color. Big cities like Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tianjin, picked up this programming as regional stations began to develop and assert themselves. Peking Television began to have a dual role which had to provide a national service to the regional stations as well as provide its own local service.

- 1978 China Central Television Station (CCTV) was founded in place of the original Peking Television, responsible for both a national service and a regional service. A brand new organization, Peking Television provided a separate Peking service.

- 1979 Television University was established. It graduated 78,000 students in 1982. At present,

a total of 1,150,000 students are enrolled in the program, and they plan on having 2 million registrants by 1990.

1980 Television services were being supplied by CCTV Peking Television, and 36 other stations in the municipalities, the provinces, and the autonomous regions.¹²


2. Policies and Operation

The traditional structure and functions of broadcasting in Mainland China were dominated by the Chinese Communist Party's philosophy of mass media, which flows directly from Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Thus, the ideology guides the coercive and persuasive mass media as an instrument of power and control in Mainland China. Marxism-Leninism holds that the media are tools of class struggle and must assume such militant roles as "collective propagandist", "collective agitator", "collective organizer".¹³ From the Communist point of view, the mass media must become the party's "loyal eyes, ears, and tongue, and an important bridge for daily contact between the Party and innumerable people, and a powerful tool for the Party to guide revolutionary struggle and

construction".¹⁴

The television network is administered under the Ministry of Film and Television, and managed by the CCTV, with its location in Peking as headquarters.¹⁵ Though founded administratively by the State Council, the Ministry of Film and Television operates under close content censorship by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee. The network for controlling the television system is as follows:

PRC's TV Organizational System



Provincial & Municipal Stations/Station Party Cells¹⁶

"We know that the Central Television Station, previously known as Peking Television, gets policy cues and guidance from the trinity of power in propaganda--the People's Daily, the Liberation Army Daily, and the Red Flag--and transmits programs for national use," Lee suggests, "but local stations in certain metropolises also make their own programs in line with the established policy directions."¹⁷

3. Programming

In Mao's era, television itself was a means and target of the Communist power struggle. According to Beijing Review, "Tempered and educated in the Great Cultural Revolution, television workers have come to the understanding that to make the proletarian television service a success, it is essential to take class struggle as the key link, uphold the Party's basic line and criticize the revisionist line of Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao, and Deng Xiao-ping." (Deng was disgraced during that period).¹⁸ During that era, the selection of international television news was centered around China and its relationship with the Third World, other Socialist countries, and two super powers (the U. S. A. and USSR). Thus China's international

television news was actually an extension of its domestic news.¹⁹

During the period of Cultural Revolution, television stations were permitted to broadcast only the revolutionary songs and eight revolutionary operas which were approved by Chiang Ching, Mao's wife. In "The Universal Eye," Timothy Green recounts how in 1970 a visiting British broadcaster counted up that 18 minutes out of a total 26 minutes of the main evening news bulletin one night were rolling captions of Mao's thoughts with background music of 'The East Is Red'.²⁰

The programming has been going through a dramatic change since the downfall of the Gang of Four. The viewing boom has been matched by an explosive change in programming. Programming has expanded to include variety shows, traditional dramas, cartoons, and even soap operas and Western imports. As a consequence, Deng and his associates created a new Ministry of Television and Radio (now named Ministry of Film and Television). It has also authorized regional stations to purchase foreign programs and sign joint-production agreements with foreigners.²¹

Though for the moment Mainland China television is a forward-looking symbol of China's move into the modern age, some disagreement, intense at times, rather than total consensus has generally characterized media content through most of Chinese Communist Party history. For instance, when a BBC production of Tolstoy's "Anna Karenina" was shown in early 1982, political hard-liners in Peking condemned the program as immoral and socially unacceptable. Other party cadres complained that people stayed home to watch television rather than participate in mandatory political-study sessions.²²

II. Literature Review of Research Perspectives

Mass communication research started in China in the 1920s when the first introductory book in journalism was published. Prior to World War II, several Chinese scholars went abroad to study journalism. The Chinese Communist Party has placed a high priority upon mass communication activities since its rise in the 1930s, and continued through its take-over of Mainland China in 1949. For years, the media was seen as a tool of the Party for mobilizing people in revolution. Thus, past communication research in China

focused on evaluating how well the media publicized Party policies, and how well the media transmitted news "to serve the masses."²³ In consequence of Deng's reforms, outsiders now have access to conduct scientific research. A preview of previous research can aid in categorizing program content analysis and concepts.

Lee (1980) discusses Mainland China's television content in three aspects which are remarkably regularized and standardized. They are newscasts, education programs, and entertainment. All the newscasts projected an image that PRC had many friends, that the people concertedly supported the Party lines, and that the invincible human would be inspired by Mao's thoughts that could conquer virtually every obstacle. And there was nothing which was "pure entertainment," since everything contained clear political messages. Television is being harnessed to educational purposes while political ideology is somewhat toned down in the post- Mao regime.

Sommerlad(1981) found that television is playing an increasing role in enlarging horizons and raising aspirations. The imported programs demonstrate a different way of life, and television advertising invite a direct

response. The system is likely to be controlled if it develops too widely.

Howkins(1982) found that the most popular programs were films, followed by news bulletins. He felt people were eager to see any pictures from the West after such a long isolation. Imported programs had increased substantially.

Jacobson(1983) found that a multitude of Chinese today have been given their views of life and culture abroad by documentaries and news programs, produced in China and abroad, carried by the television network. Television in Mainland China has the potential of playing an important role in transmitting information about foreign countries.

Lee(1980) summed up the program structure of the Central Television Station in Peking into news (domestic and international), documentaries, world roundabout, sports/health, literature, English instruction, and story films. An international comparative study done by UNESCO in 1981 described programs in relation to its intended purpose into seven categories:information, educational programs, cultural programs, religious programs, advertising, entertainment, and unclassified programs.²⁴ Straubhaar(1983) divided

programs into eleven types:telenovelas, variety, music, sports, news, public affairs, comedy, children's educational feature films or drama, and other.²⁵ Rogers(1985) divided them into seven: world news, drama, sports news, music/operas, films, leaders' activies, and advertising.

CHAPTER THREE

I. Design of The Study

Four stations were selected in this analysis. They are Chinese Central Television (CCTV-1, Channel 2), Tianjin Television (Channel 12), Shenzhen Television, and Shenyang Television.

Chinese Central Television

CCTV, Mainland China's main station, produces two services. Channel 2 is regarded as the primary service and is distributed to all stations by microwave and tape. Channel 8 is distributed only within Peking municipality. Channel 2, the nationwide broadcasting channel is on the air for an average of 7.3 hours per day in the sample month. Altogether, the CCTV-1 has about eight hundred workers, three studios. About seventy percent of the production is done with videotape; mostly 2-inch Ampex, but also some 1-inch (Type "C") and Sony's 3/4-inch U-matic System is used increasingly. About twenty percent of all programs are made on film, and ten percent are live.²⁶

Tianjin Television

Tianjin is located in Hopei province, one of the three municipalities. It is also one of the four stations which were engineered for live broadcasting in the late sixties.²⁷

Shenzhen Television

Shenzhen is a region that is described as a "special economic zone" near Hong Kong. It is an experiment in the free-market idea that was specifically designed to attract foreign investment and technology. Because of its geographical location and special character, Shenzhen seems like an area that is more open to the outside world.

Shenyang Television

Shenyang is the largest city and industrial center of northeastern China and the capital of Liaoning province. In contrast to Shenzhen, Shenyang is a slowly growing, drab industrial center. Though it is not exactly a geographically interior city, it has the character of an interior city in openness.

II. Sampling

The content analysis is based on television programming schedules in five Chinese local newspapers. They are Beijing Daily, Tianjin Daily, Liaoning Daily, Shenzhen Special Zone Report, and Television Weekly. The chart below identifies periods for which complete daily schedules were available by area.

Table 1

Samples of the study

Area	Period
Peking	1/5-2/1, '81. 1/2-1/28, '82. 1/2-1/27, '83. 1/3-1/30, '84. 1/7-2/3, '85.
Tianjin	1/1-1/28, '85.
Shenyang	1/12-2/6, '85.
Shenzhen	1/8-2/3, '85.

1. Samples were to be selected on the same dates if possible, Though one or two day's shortage is inevitable.
2. Programming schedules of one month (four week) were selected to be compared.
3. Schedules from Shenzhen are available only four days per week.

The following chart identifies average broadcasting time per day(1985) and total time for each station.

Table 2

Broadcasting time of each sample station

Area	Station	Average broadcasting time (minutes/day)	Total minutes
Peking	CCTV	438	12264+36627 ('81-84)
Tianjin	Tianjin	300	8394
Liaoning	Shenyang	190	5330
Guangdong	Shenzhen	205	3275

III. Coding scheme

Categorizing television programs, for years, always presents very difficult epistimological problems. However, statistics relating to programs are classified according to the following criteria:

A. Typology according to source of media

1). Foreign - U.S.A.

- Communist nations
- Others

2). Domestic - Local

- Other stations

B. Typology according to media function²⁸

1). Information programs: programs intended primarily to inform about facts, events, or to provide explanatory background information.

- a. News bulletins, local news and CCTV news (nationwide broadcasting).
- b. Commentaries, current state of affairs.

2). Educational programs: programs intended primarily to

educate and in which the educational element is fundamental.

- a. Language, technology and school course programs.
 - b. Public health and sanitational programs.
 - c. Housekeeping programs.
- 3). Propaganda: Ideological education, diffusion of Deng's reforms.
- 4). Cultural programs: programs intended primarily to stimulate artistic and/or intellectual curiosity.
 - a. Culture and arts, painting, calligraphy and literature report programs.
 - b. Local customs and practices.
 - c. Foreign customs and practices.
- 5). Entertainment programs: programs intended primarily to entertain.
 - a. Sports - international, foreign and domestic sport programs.
 - b. Series and serials
 - c. Local operas.
 - d. Variety - music, dance, and stunt programs.
 - e. Telefilms and movies.

- 6). Children programs: animated cartoons, series, or other programs primarily aimed at children.
- 7). Others: unclassified programs.

It is necessary to mention that the Television University Programs are excluded in the present content analysis. When the Television University was inaugurated in 1979, it offered only the basic courses in three majors: mathematics, chemistry and English. Now, the Television University offers nearly 200 courses in several dozen majors, and broadcasts seven hours per day in various courses.²⁹

It is very important to distinguish carefully between different kinds of programs. One detailed coding list (see appendix) was designed to code programs into the seven above mentioned categories. There were several categories of programs which were easily defined. Two graduate students from Mainland China helped categorize those which were identified only by program titles in daily schedules. Their input increased the reliability of the categorizing of the nature of the programs.

CHAPTER FOUR

I. Research Questions

The present findings are organized around six main research questions:

1. What are the kinds of content for each individual selected station?
2. What is the change of program structure of CCTV-1 from 1981 to 1985?
3. By comparing current programs of CCTV-1 with programs televised previously, is there an increase in imported programs, especially from Western nations?
4. By comparing contents of CCTV-1 with contents of Tianjin, what is the programming emphasis of each station?
5. By comparing contents of Shenzhen with contents of Shenyang, what is the programming emphasis of each station?
6. Based on the finding of the previous questions, can Mainland China's programming be referred to as an entertainment oriented function? Is entertainment increasing over time? What are the implications for

these broadcasting policies?

II. Results

Research Question 1

What is the content of each individual selected station ?

CCTV

There are three channels in Peking: CCTV-1 (Channel 2), national service; CCTV-2 (Channel 8), special Peking service; and the local service provided separately by the Peking Television Station. The program structure of CCTV-1, the nationwide broadcasting channel which contains 18.8% information programs, 28.1% educational programs, and 35.6% entertainment programs, is as follows:

Table 3Structure of CCTV-1 (Jan.'85)

	Time (minutes)	(%)
Information programs	2345	18.8
Educational programs	3516	28.1
Propaganda programs	196	1.6
Cultrual programs	676	5.4
Entertainment programs	4459	35.6
Children's programs	1094	8.8
Other programs	207	1.7
Total	2508	100

* sample period from 1/7 - 2/3.'85

Tianjin

There are three channels in Tianjin: Channel 12, Channel 5, and Channel 17. Channel 5 retransmits CCTV-1's programs: Channel 17 is a new channel which was being tested during the sampling period. The program structure of Channel 12 which contains 66.9% entertainment programs, only 4.6% educational programs and 12.3% information programs, is as follows:

Table 4Structure of Tianjin TV (Ch. 12, Jan.'85)

	Time (minutes)	(%)
Information programs	1018	12.3
Educational programs	380	4.6
Propaganda programs	150	1.8
Cultrual programs	480	5.8
Entertainment programs	5531	66.9
Children's programs	335	4.1
Other programs	370	4.5
Total	8264	100

*Sample period from 1/1 - 1/28.'85

The average broadcasting time is five hours per day

Shenyang

There are three channels in Liaoning province. Shengyang, the provincial capital of Liaoning has its own local service. The other two channels are Liaoning provincial station and the other channel which retransmits CCTV-1's programs. The program structure of Shenyang Television of which entertainment programs represent 88.6% of the content, information programs and educational programs represent less than 10%, is as follows:

Table 5Structure of Shenyang TV (Jan.'85)

	Time (minutes)	(%)
Information programs	400	7.5
Educational programs	30	0.6
Propaganda programs	0	0
Cultrual programs	50	1.0
Entertainment programs	4725	88.6
Children's programs	0	0
Other programs	125	2.3
Total	5330	100

*Sample period from 1/8 - 2/3, '85

The average broadcasting time is 3.4 hours per day

Shenzhen

The special economic zone which is located in Canton is so close to Hong Kong that its residents can receive the signals from Hong Kong's networks. The program structure of Shenzhen Television which contains 36% information programs, and 44.4% entertainment programs, is as follows:

Table 6Structure of Shenzhen TV (Jan.'85)

	Time (minutes)	(%)
Information programs	1190	36
Educational programs	32	1.0
Propaganda programs	17	0.5
Cultural programs	348	10.5
Entertainment programs	1458	44.4
Children's programs	47	1.4
Other programs	203	6.1
Total	3305	100

*Sample period from 1/12 - 2/6, '85

The average broadcasting time is 3.2 hours per day.

Research Question 2

What is the change of program structure of CCTV-1 from 1981 to 1985 ?

The broadcasting time has increased during this period. The average broadcasting time was 4.3 hours per day in 1981, 5.9 hours per day in 1983, and jumped to 7.5 hours per day in 1985. The following tables show the broadcasting time and program structure of CCTV in the last five years.

Table 7Structure of CCTV-1 (minutes)

	'81	'82	'83	'84	'85
Information programs	840	960	1110	2130	2345
Educational programs	2205	2345	2670	1900	3516
Propaganda programs	165	190	45	205	196
Cultural programs	370	290	290	660	676
Entertainment programs	3205	4827	4505	4780	4459
Children's programs	335	560	430	755	1094
Other programs	80	70	195	470	207
Total	7220	9252	9245	10900	12508

*It is possible that the schedules of 1984 are insufficient. Thus, the broadcasting time could be more than it shows above.

Table 8Structure of CCTV-1 (%)

	'81	'82	'83	'84	'85
Information programs	11.6	10.4	12	19.5	18.8
Educational programs	30.5	25.3	28.9	17.4	28.1
Propaganda programs	2.3	2.1	0.5	1.9	1.6
Cultural programs	5.1	3.1	3.1	6.1	5.4
Entertainment programs	44.4	52.2	48.7	43.9	35.6
Children's programs	4.9	6.1	4.7	6.9	8.8
Other programs	1.1	0.8	2.1	4.3	1.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100

* some of the schedules were not printed in detail which resulted in lower figures than normal.

Information programs increased distinctly during these years, especially in 1984. The percent of information programs jumped from 11.6% in 1981 to 19.5% in 1984 and 18.8% in 1985. Educational programs remained from 25 to 30% of average broadcasting time (except in 1984 when the

educational programs fell to 17.4% which could possibly be caused by incomplete data, see table 8 above). The direct propaganda programs kept a 2% average in the past five years. Cultural programs remained 5% during that period. After the death of Mao in 1976, and the subsequent arrest of the Gang of Four, Mainland China found a new television horizon. Entertainment is the distinct change in television operation since the end of Mao's regime. During the Cultural Revolution, television stations were permitted to perform only eight revolutionary operas and eight revolutionary songs. It was hardly comprehensible, but the party leaders said "they are worthy to be heard a hundred times." Entertainment programs remained an average of 45% of television content, except in 1985 when it fell to 35.6% while children's programs had a gradual increase.

Research Question 3

By comparing current programs of CCTV with programs televised previously, is there an increase in imported programs, especially from Western nations ?

The structure of programs according to source of media is as follows:

Table 9

The source of CCTV-1 programs (%)

	'81	'82	'83	'84	'85
U.S.A.	2.6	2.9	1.0	1.7	3.2
Communist nations	0	2.4	0.4	2.1	1.5
Other nations	9.8	12.3	12.3	2.4	9.5
Local station	87.6	82.4	86.3	93.8	70.3
Other stations					15.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100

According to Lee's research³⁰, the importation of feature films from 1977 to 1979 is as follows:

Table 10

Import of Story Films, Central Television Station/Channel 1
(May 1977-July 1979)

	1977 (May-Dec.)	1978 (Jan.-Dec.)	1979 (Jan.-June)
Indigenous	80%	73%	84%
Foreign	20%	27%	16%
	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(124)	(198)	(102)
Source of Import:			
N. Korea	7	12	1
Yugoslavia	4	4	
Romania	1	11	1
Vietnam	1		
USSR	9*	6*	
Albania	1		
Hungary		5	
Czechoslovakia		3	1
Mexico		4	1
England		2	3
Japan		4	
United States			1
India			3
Italy			1
Hong Kong			1
France			1
China/France (Coproduction)			1
China/Italy (Coproduction)			1
	23	51	16

*All of them were early Soviet films praising the October Revolution.
SOURCE: *People's Daily*.

Obviously, there was a radical change between 1978 and 1979. 80% of story films imported from Communist countries in 1978 declined to 19% in 1979, and 20% of story films imported from non-Communist countries in 1978 jumped to 81% in 1979.³¹ During the first half of the 80's, the trend has continued. Most of the imported programs were from Hong Kong, Japan and Western nations.

Research Question 4

By comparing contents of CCTV-1 with contents of Tianjin, what is the programming emphasis of each station ?

In October 1985, Xie Wenqing, Vice-ministry of Film and Television Ministry, proclaimed at the seventh Television Association Conference, "... As the tongue of the Party and the government, all television stations must be politically and organizationally subject to the absolute leadership of the Party committee and government at various levels. No privately-run stations shall be allowed. No stations can be run by enterprises or institutions except the government. As a final goal every station should have a definite guiding ideology, and all programs to be broadcast must support

socialism and the Four Modernizations."³²

CCTV-1 follows the above guide lines absolutely. It contained, in January 1985, 18.5% information programs, 28.1% educational programs. These two types of programs represent 46.6% of total broadcasting time, while entertainment programs represent 35.6%. In comparison, 66.9% of Tianjin Television (Channel 12) are entertainment; 12.3% are information programs which include local news, CCTV news and commentaries, current affairs. While the other station (Channel 5) is a transmission of CCTV-1's programs, the programming of Channel 12 has more emphasis on entertainment.

Table 11

1985	CCTV	Tianjin
Information programs	18.5	12.3
Educational programs	28.1	4.6
Propaganda programs	1.6	1.8
Cultural programs	5.4	5.8
Entertainment programs	35.6	66.9
Children's programs	8.8	4.1
Other programs	1.7	4.5
Total	100	100

Research Question 5

By comparing contents of Shenzhen with contents of Shenyang, what is the programming emphasis of each station ?

Information programs of Shenzhen Television represent 36% of the content. Beside the retransmission of CCTV news, Shenzhen Television has two ten-minute newscasts. Mandarin newscast broadcasts at 7:35 P.M. and Cantonese (the common dialect in Hong Kong and Canton) newscast broadcasts at 9 P.M. 44.4% of the contents are entertainment. A typical daily program of Shenyang Television begins with a ten-minute local newscast, followed by two different serials, series, or a film, and a variety program or local opera, sometimes with a different episode in between. Thus, the programming of Shenyang Television represents 88.6% entertainment.

Table 12

1985 (%)	Shenhen	Shenyang
Information programs	36	7.5
Educational programs	1.0	0.6
Propaganda programs	0.5	0
Cultural programs	10.5	1.0
Entertainment programs	44.4	88.6
Children's programs	1.4	0
Other programs	6.1	2.3
Total	100	100

Research Question 6

Based on the findings of the previous questions, can Mainland China's programming be referred to as an entertainment oriented function? Is entertainment increasing over time? What are the implications for these broadcasting policies?

Lee argues that the Chinese Communist regime has long idealized television as a superbly powerful weapon of consciousness raising and socialist construction. Whenever the power struggles break into the open, television, like other media, automatically becomes engulfed and has to bear the brunt of bitter attacks and counterattacks. Meanwhile, the victors of a faction tightly grip television in order to build up ruling legitimacy as well as consolidate the regime's "correct lines."³³ In 1981, for instance, viewers could see the trial of the Lin Biao and Jiang Ching cliques on television.³⁴

Schramm points out that there was little separation between entertainment and the socialist revolution, between technocracy and politics, everything was politics,

everything was the socialist revolution, and everything was development. Popular songs, dance performances, cartoons, even the Peking opera, were supposed to carry a political message.³⁵

Theoretically, television is considered a tool of the party in implementation of its policies. Since Deng took the paramount leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the basic task of television broadcasting is to serve the economic development and the Four Modernizations.³⁶ Though television operation has changed a great deal in many aspects during the past years, it must serve politics and is always a powerful means of the regime. Within the framework of placing media at the service of state goals in the Communist tradition shared with the USSR, the Chinese Communist considers television a vehicle for information that brings the part line and special policies. More specifically, television, the rapidly increasing medium, is to inform and educate people to support the contemporary political line. In this study (Jan, '85. CCTV-1), both information programs and educational programs represent 46.6% of the broadcasting content, while entertainment programs represent 35.6%.

During the Cultural Revolution, educational programs disappeared due to the campaigns referring to the slogans that "Intellectuals are the stinking ninth" and "The more knowledge the more reactionary". Under the Open Door policy, improved education is needed on a standardized basis throughout Mainland China to help achieve the so-called Four Modernizations. Television is playing an increasing role in enlarging horizons and raising aspirations.

According to an interview during the 83/4th World Telecommunication Exhibition in Geneva, an official said, that one of the main roles of a Chinese television broadcast satellite would be the relay of educational programming, China wants to acquire a television satellite from foreign suppliers to enable the start of satellite relay operations in the second half of the 1980's.³⁷

A few descriptions of the television programs would probably be a help toward an understanding of their nature.

Cross the land, programs spotlight the scenic beauties and special features of various places in China.

Round the World, a special weekly program, has featured, among other things, the agro-industrial complexes in Yugoslavia, a new type of hospital in West Berlin, the

music center in Sydney, off-shore oil drilling in Mexico, and different cultural customs around the world.

Look and Think It Over, is a program exploring such issues as the housing shortage in Peking, vegetable scarcities in the market, and Peking's already overtapped water resources, or an expose of senior cadres abusing privileges of their rank.

People's Army, is a twenty-minute exposition of the qualities that make a modern Red fighter.

Other programs include Cultures of Foreign Countries, On the International scene, Science and Technology, Hygiene and Health, Advice on Everyday Living.... .³⁸

From Mao's era to Deng's, entertainment program quantity has increased quite a lot, but remained level during Deng's regime. The CCTV-1 programming contains 35.5% entertainment programs (Jan.'85), even as high as 52.2% (Jan.'82), in the present study. Jacobson suggests, "entertainment programs are, of course, not free of politics or propaganda, which remains officially the main purpose of the arts.... television in China has the potential of playing an equal role in transmitting information about foreign countries -- their physical characteristics,

cultures, patterns of life, rearing of children, and work styles -- for people who over a long period have had such limited contacts with foreigners and things foreign, and whose knowledge of and attitude toward the outside world has been shaped by the powers in control."³⁹ A comparative analysis of nine countries' television news indicates that Chinese newscasts almost never criticize or portray their government, military or economy as weak, and often praise government and individuals for social contributions. The major characters in the news were from government. The topics most frequently covered in newscast were politics and economics (totally 54% of the content).⁴⁰ Thus, there are still serious reservations as to whether the television programming in Mainland China can be referred to as an entertainment oriented function.

It seems that the television operation in Mainland China is hardly be separated from two of the Four Theories of The Press which were presented by Siebert et al, in 1956. There are The Authoritarian Theory, The Libertarian Theory. The Social Responsibility Theory, and The Soviet Communist Theory. The Authoritarian Theory functioned from the top down. The rulers informed the people of what the rulers thought they should know, and the policies the rulers

thought they should support. The press being a servant of the state, it is responsible for much of its content to the power figures in charge of government at any given moment. The Soviet Communist Theory is ground in Marxist determinism and in the harsh political necessity of maintaining the political ascendancy of a party.⁴¹ It seems that the philosophy of Mainland China's media is still in the grip of The Authoritarian Theory and The Soviet Communist Theory.

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusions

There is a little ideological freedom under Deng's political line. As he said, "No matter whether it is a white cat or a black cat, as long as it catches mice, it is a good cat." The economic reform and the Open Door policy have moved remarkably. Television, of course, is not an exception. A program, called Good Morning Peking, is about a fellow who drives a truck, the young woman he chases, and another who chases him. Not long ago, young Chinese were being told in the pages of their Communist Party newspaper that "love is selfish and repellent in nature." Much has changed in Mainland China.⁴²

The study has attempted to quantify some of the television programming in Mainland China under Deng's regime. The present content analysis indicates that the programming of regional channels contains a higher percentage of entertainments than the programming of the

national channel. Shenyang Television, an evident example, contains 88.6% entertainment programs, while CCTV-1 represents a 45% average of entertainment programs in the last five years. However, at this time no research has been done to indicate which channel among national, provincial, and local channel the people of Mainland China prefer. This is an area which needs to be further investigated.

At the beginning of this year, a new channel in the Peking area, a national educational television center, channel 15, was being tested, and expected to be equipped and furnished by the first half of 1987.⁴³ Meanwhile, Deng started to brew a movement toward re-evaluating Zhou Enlai, the late Premier who died in 1976.⁴⁴

Howkins indicates, "Communications are of vital importance to China's changing leaderships."⁴⁵ How the regime manipulates television when factionalism gets in the way could be a dramatic alteration. In any event, the following story will illustrate my conclusion.

The Chinese characters for China Central Television, written in Mao's own calligraphy, served as the station's logo until Mao's death. Shortly after Mao's death, an

altered sign appeared in the new Party Chairman, Hua Guofeng's writing style. Then, on December 31, 1980, in line with the Party's policy to avoid personality cults, Hua's inscription was replaced by the characters in printed form.⁴⁶

NOTES

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3. Lee, C. 1980.
4. Abel, 1985. P61.
5. Yu, 1979. P.27.
6. Sommerlad, 1981. P.234.
7. Lee, C. 1980.
8. Schramm, 1964. P.131-2
9. Howkins, 1982. PP.vii & xiii.
10. Roizen J. and Roizen R. 1985. PP.51-2.
11. Bonner, 1986.
12. Howkins, 1982. PP.26-35; Head, 1985. PP.24-5 & 316-7;
Renmin Ribao, 10/20/85, P.4.
13. Lent, 1978. P.22.
14. Ibid. P.23
15. Jacobson, 1983. P.xxiv.
16. Ibid. PP.185-6.
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22. Ibid.
23. Rogers. 1985 P.187.
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44. Lee, Y. 1986 P.1
45. Howkins, 1982. P.vii.
46. FBIS, vol.I China, Jan 12.

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APPENDIX

Station:

Unit: minutes

Program \ Date								Total
Local News								
CCTV News								
Current affairs								
Edu.lang.tech. school courses								
Edu. public health								
Edu. house- keeping								
Ideology,difus- sion of reforms								
Culture & Arts								
Local customs & practices								
Foreign custom & practices								

(continue to next page)

Sport-int'l								
Sport-foreign								
Sport-domestic								
Serials, Series								
Local opera								
Variety								
Telefilm/movie								
Others*								

Total_____

*Promotion previes and uncategorized programs

*(minutes)₁

-- Programs imported from U.S.A. : _____

(minutes)₂

-- Programs imported from Communist nations: _____ } _____

(minutes)₃

-- Programs imported from other nations : _____

*[minutes]

-- Programs produced by other stations : _____

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