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"ARENEP -ACCION REVINDICADORA DEL NEGRO
PANAMENO'l-A COMMUNITY GRASS-ROOTS
ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT

presented by

JOSEPH M . DOWNER-MARCEL

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ARENEP - ACCIdN REINVINDICADORA del NEGRO PANAMEfiO
A COMMUNITY GRASS-ROOTS ORGANIZATION (AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT)

By

JOSEPH M. DOUNER-MARCEL

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology

1997

ABSTRACT

ARENEP - ACCIdN REINVINDICADORA del NEGRO PANAHEfiO
A COMMUNITY GRASS-ROOT ORGANIZATION (AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT)
Michigan: Michigan State University: Ph.D. Dissertation, 1997

By

JOSEPH M. DONNER-MARCEL

The is a case study of an urban socio-political, grass-roots organi-
zation of Afro-Panamanians known as ARENEP --ACCIdN REIVINDICADORA
del NEGRO PANAHEfiO (Action for the Revindication of Black Panama-
nians). ARENEP’s major thrusts were its political agenda and social
racial/ethnic advocacy in a plural society. The study looks at the so-
cio-political context in which the organization was immersed, the varia-
bles which defined the nature of the movement, and the interplay be-
tween racial/ ethnic activism and national identity, local and global
politics and trade, and the decline of the organization as an urban
movement in a nee-colonial, developing country. The study focuses on
the ‘legitimacy’ of the participacion popular or popular participa-
tion model of social organization as a potential conceptualization and
explanation of socio-political activism in Euro-Latin-Hispanic-American
societies.

Primary data were gathered through in-depth interviews from former
members and officials, focused group discussions with sympathizers and
non-sympathizers, and a questionnaire administered to rank and file

members, sympathizers and non-sympathizers of the organization.

Secondary data were gathered from bibliographical documents, private
and public libraries, government archival data, newspapers, Journals,

theses, and other related literature such as flyers and handouts.

Copyright by
JOSEPH M. DOHNER-MARCEL
1997

Remembering Mom and Dad

...for their love and sacrifices...

from a fortunate and grateful son.

Acknowledgment

This dissertation is the culmination of my formal educational pro-
cess; a process in which I have managed to accumulate a remarkable num-
ber of debts. It is a humbling thought to consider the many people who
believed that my advance degree was worth their time, assistance and
commitment, and who influenced, encouraged and supported my progress in
so many ways. Without their generous assistance and cooperation this de-
gree would not have been possible.

Special thanks is due to my Academic Committee: Dr. Kevin Kelly,
Dr. David Riley, particularly Dr. Scott Whiteford and especially Dr.
Ruth Simms Hamilton, my Academic Advisor, Dissertation Chair and Princi—
pal Investigator of the African Diaspora Research Project; my mentor
and friend. To her and her family my debt is immense. Likewise, special
thanks are due to Dr. Roy Simon Bryce-LaPorte, a dear friend, for his
unselfish assistance, intellectual input and encouragement; and to Dr.
George Priestley for his assistance. I am also thankful to Dr. Christo-
pher Vanderpool, Chair, Sociology Department, Dr. Kenneth Corey, Dean,
College of Social Science, Drs. Marylin Aronoff, Richard Thomas, June
Manning Thomas and John Schweitzer for their assistance and encourage-
ment. Special thanks to Ms. Joan Reid, African Diaspora Project Secreta-
ry, Ms. Gloria Simmons, Urban Affairs, and Ms. Diana Rivera and her
staff at the MSU Map Library for making a lot, so much easier.

Thanks to the Central America and Mexico Branch of the Ford Founda-
tion for their generous Fellowship during the 1988-1990 academic years,
and their financial support to African Diaspora Project, which made my
initially Research Assistanship possible. And thanks to the many other

vi

institutional supporters of my Ph.D such as: the Center for Latin Ameri-
can Studies, the International Program and Scholars, and the Global
Young Scholars of the International Studies and Programs, all at Michi-
gan State University; the association of Panamanians in Detroit, The
Club Panama for their valuable financial assistance and cooperation.

I am especially grateful to the African Diaspora Research Project
for the opportunity to participate in an exceptional research project,
to learn and do meaningful work with an formidable group of twenty fel-
low research seminarists, particularly Vera Lucia Benedito and Oswald
Harner (ABDs), Vandana Kohli (now Ph.D.), and most particularly, Ruth
L. Harris, now Dr. Harris, for their unselfish help, assistance and in-
spiration.

.In Panama, I am grateful to Sociologist and Professor Carlos Cas-
tro, of the Universidad Santa Maria Ia Antigua, (USMA) and Sociolog-
ist and Professor Gerardo Maloney of the Univesidad de Panama, both
for their professional, academic assistance and friendship. To Dr. Eg-
bert and Lie. Aidé Hetherbourn, Lic. Alberto Barrows, Lic.
Graciela Dixon and Arturo G. Branch for their encouragement and assist-
ance. I am also grateful to a very special group of childhood friends
to whom I own a great debt, particularly: Canute A. Cockburn, George Pi-
per, Jr., Earl P. Watson and Jocelyn H. Evering, Jr, for their faith
and more in me. To the memory of a few dear and close friends: Herbert
Seals, a childhood friend and brother, Arq.Alberto Smith-Fernandez,
Hoodrow Bryant, Leroy Gittens, Professor Arnold Halters, four Afro-Pana-
manian intellectuals and activists in Panama, and Dr. James B. Hamil-
ton, former Vice-Provost of Michigan State University.

I also want to express my gratitude, individually and collectively

vii

to my colleague and friend, Dé C. Bryant, Ph.D., William Johnson (Bashu-
to), the third years students (1994) from the Sociology Department,
Universidad de Panama; Ms. Adriana Mitchell, Universidad Santa Ma-
ria La Antigua, the members of the Afro-Pastoral de Colon, for
their invaluable assistance, and equally important, to the many who par-
ticipated in the surveys and interviews. My expressed thanks to Tyronne
Robinson for his encouragement, financial assistance, patient review
and editing of the drafts. To Beth Robinson and rest of the family; Pa-
tricia and Reynaldo Powell and family for their encouragement; to Ms.
Corina Powell and Ms. Ana Donawa of The Club Panama; to Oliver and
Ana Prince, and Roberto Drummond, each for their invaluable coopera-
tion.

To my siblings and other family member who supported me in so many
ways when the going got tough: my sisters, Olga and Carlotta, my nieces
and nephews and their families; my in-laws, Mrs. Hazel May Shojgreen,
Eliza and Antonio Avalon and family, Gilberto and Jorge Shojgreen For-
te, Virginia and Alfredo Morris and their families, and to Cirila Camp-
bell and Dolores Armstrong, my dear friends. To my family for allowing
me the opportunity to pursue the degree; to our sons, Antonio George
and Kareem Jabbar, for their patience and support; to my wife, Angela,
for her love, devotion, understanding, support and companionship
through it all, and her critical review of the study. Thank you, Ange-
la, for being the wings beneath my feet, ... sin tu amor, esto tampo—
co podia haber sido posible. Finally, my gratitude and appreciation
to all my collaborators; however, any inaccuracies in the presentation,
analysis and interpretation of the material in this work is my responsi-
bility.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ARENEP - A COMMUNITY GRASS-ROOT
ORGANIZATION (AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT)

INTRODUCTION
A. Introduction ............................................... 1
1. Socially Defining Afro-Panamanians ....................... 2
FIGURE 1 Historical Spatial Location of Peoples of
African Heritage in the Republic of Panama ................ 4
B. Organization of the Dissertation ........................... 7
C. Introduction Endnotes ..................................... 13

CHAPTER ONE
TOWARDS A RECONCEPTUALIZATON OF MOBILIZATION AND ORGANIZATION

A. The Participacion Popular Model ...................... 14
B. The Racial Factor and Participacion Popular Model ...20
C. Guiding Research Questions ................................ 24
D. Chapter One Endnotes ...................................... 25
CHAPTER TWO
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH STRATEGIES

A. Methodology and Research Strategies ....................... 29
1. Auto Ethnography ........................................ 3O

2. Focus Groups ............................................ 32

3. Administration of the Instrument ........................ 33

4. Training Assistants and Preliminary Testing ............. 34

5. Spatial Areas of the Study .............................. 35
TABLE 1 Areas of the Investigation .................... 37

TABLE 2 Sub-Sample of the Areas ....................... 38

6. Time Frame Concerns ..................................... 38
FIGURE 2 Rio Abajo and Parque Lefevre Counties 39

FIGURE 3 Calidonia and Chorrillo Counties ....40

FIGURE 4 San Higuelito County .................... 41

FIGURE 5 Arco Iris (Rainbow City) ................ 42

ix

B.

FIGURE 6 Colon ................................... 43
Chapter Two Endnotes ...................................... 44

CHAPTER THREE

THE PRESENCE OF THE RACIAL FACTOR IN PANAMA AND EURO-LATIN-AMERICA

A.

1.
2.
3.

Early National Background ................................. 45
Race in Panama and Euro-Hispanic-America ................. 49
Ideological Dimensions of Race and Nation ............... 49
Creole Power and the Stranger Mythology ................. 51
The Intersection of Race and Class ...................... 54
Race and State Policy ..................................... 59
Maintaining Control of National Identity and Symbols ....66
Contradictions in the Construction of a
National Identity ....................................... 70
National Consciousness and Collective Identity .......... 72
The Intersection of Race, Class
and Popular Participation ................................. 75
Chapter Three Endnotes .................................... 79

CHAPTER FOUR

BACKGROUND TO THE FORMATION OF AFRO-ANTILLEAN
CONSCIOUSNESS AND AGENCY

Recruitment and Entry of Caribbean Wage Laborers .......... 87
TABLE 3 International Laborers:1850-1855 .............. 88
Table 4 International Laborers:1880-l903 .............. 89
FIGURE 7 Central America and the Caribbean ............ 91
TABLE 5 Caribbean Immigrant Laborers: 1904-1913 ....... 92
Figure 8 Arrival of Barbadian Laborers ................ 93
TABLE 6 Status of Caribbean Womenzl907-19l4 ........... 95

Antillean Immigrant Organizational Heritage ............... 96
Figure 9 Areas of Early Canal Construction ............ 97

Inward and Outward Linkages ............................... 98

Inward Linkages ......................................... 98
Outward Linkages ....................................... 103
Chapter Four Endnotes .................................... 107

CHAPTER FIVE

THE EMERGENGE OF ARENEP: REVINDICATION OF AFRO-ANTILLEAN

Nu—I

NH
0 o

IDENTITY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

ARENEP’S Relationship to the Nation and State ....... 110
TABLE 7 Birth Place of Grand-Parents and Parents ..... 111
Redefining National Culture and Inclusivity .............. 123
FIGURE 10 The West Indian Monument ................... 129
FIGURE 11 The Afro Antillean Museum .................. 130
FIGURE 12 Employment Announcements ................... 134

ARENEP, Political Parties and Political Clientelism ..136

The Nation and Transnational Geo-Politics ................ 139
Implications for the Popular Sector .................... 143
Reinforcing the System and
Silencing the Victims ................................... 146

Chapter Five Endnotes .................................... 152

CHAPTER SIX
CONFLICTS, CONTRADICTIONS, EVALUATIONS,
PERCEPTION AND DEMISE OF ARENEP

Internal Organization .................................... 158
Disarticulation Between ARENEP and the Membership .159
Perceptions and Expectation ............................ 161

TABLE 8 Organizational Type .......................... 162
CHART 1 Determinative Effect ......................... 163
TABLE 9 Family Income: -A- 1974-1984 ................. 165
TABLE 10 Family Income: -8- 1974-1984 ................ 166
CHART 2 ARENEP’s Sympathy to the Military ....... 167
CHART 3 Military’s Sympathy to ARENEP ........... 168
Ethnic Class Conflict and Negotiation of Identity ........ 171
TABLE 11 Self-Identification ......................... 174
Participation and Empowerment ............................ 176
Demise of ARENEP ................................... 183
CHART 4 ARENEP’s Demise ......................... 185
FIGURE 13 The "Chevalier Safari" ..................... 190
Chapter Six Endnotes ..................................... 194

xi

on

I.
2.

CHAPTER SEVEN
RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE

Retrospective Summary .................................... 197
Prospective .............................................. 207

The Pastoral Afro ................................. 207

MODESCO ........................................... 212
Final Considerations ..................................... 214
Chapter Seven Endnotes ................................... 219
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................. 221

xii

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1 Areas of the Investigation ........................... 37
TABLE 2 Sub-Sample of the Areas .............................. 38
TABLE 3 International Laborers:1850-1855 ..................... 88
Table 4 International Laborers:1880-1903 ..................... 89
TABLE 5 Caribbean Immigrant Laborers:1904-l9l3 ............... 92
TABLE 6 Status of Immigrant Caribbean Women:1907-1914 ........ 95
TABLE 7 Birth Place of Grand—Parents and Parents ............ 111
TABLE 8 Organizational Type ................................. 162
TABLE 9 Family Income: -A- 1974-1984 ........................ 165
TABLE 10 Family Income: -8- 1974-1984 ........................ 166
TABLE 11 Self-Identification ................................. 174
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1 Historical Spatial Location of Peoples of

African Heritage in the Republic of Panama ........... 4
FIGURE 2 Rio Abajo and Parque Lefevre Counties ...... 39
FIGURE 3 Calidonia and Chorrillo Counties ........... 40
FIGURE 4 San Miguelito County ......................... 41
FIGURE 5 Area Iris (Rainbow City) County ................ 42
FIGURE 6 Colon County - ................................... 43
FIGURE 7 Central America and the Caribbean ................... 91
Figure 8 Arrival of Barbadian Laborers ....................... 93
Figure 9 Areas of Early Canal Construction ................... 97
FIGURE 10 The West Indian Monument ........................... 129
FIGURE 11 The Afro Antillean Museum .......................... 130
FIGURE 12 Employment Announcements ........................... 134
FIGURE 13 The ”Chevalier Safari" ............................. 190

LIST OF CHARTS

CHART 1 Determinative Effect ................................. 163
CHART 2 ARENEP’s Sympathy to the Military ............... 167
CHART 3 Military’s Sympathy to ARENEP ................... 168
CHART 4 ARENEP’s Demise

................................. 185

xiii

ARENEP - A COMMUNITY GRASS-ROOTS
ORGANIZATION (AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT)

A. Introduction

This dissertation focuses primarily, but not exclusively, on the
Afro-Panamanian, Caribbean/Antillean or Antillano subpopulation who
began entering the Isthmus of Panama from the early 19th Century. As an
immigrant group, the early Antillanos faced severe xenophobic and
racial/ethnic discrimination which forced them to seek and develop me-
chanisms for group protection in a hostile environment, and into the
vanguard of socio/political activism in Panama since the First Republic
of 1903.

The dissertation also focuses on the Afro-Panamanians population in
this last quarter of the 20 Century; how they have given expression to
their identity/consciousness, and how this identity/consciousness is ex-
pressed and defined within the political, social and economical context
of Panamanian society. This last quarter of the Century is important be-
cause it is linked to an on-going and broader movement of the world
wide dispersion of Afro peoples, and it is against this background that
this dissertation emerges. In this study, the term Afro is prefer-
red as a designated identifier of, and for peoples of African heritage
or the African Diaspora.

Panama has historically been the home of peoples of African herit-
age since the Spanish colonization; and since then, demographically, Pa-
nama is one of the countries with a high proportion of Afro
peoples.1 Moreover, the Antillean population added to the numerical
preponderance of peoples of African descent already in Panama. John

1

Hope Franklin writes that:

possibly the most considerable concentration of negros in Ameri-

ca is found in the modern States of Panama, Colombia, Venezuela and

Ecuador, that is, in the Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada. In the Au-

diencia de Santa Fe --actually Panama and Colombia-- there were,

approximately in 1810, 210,000 negios and mulatos, free and

enslaved, in a population of 1,400,000.

This was roughly 15 percent of the 1810 Colombian population, until
the 1850’s when thousands of Antillean Afros emmigrated to Panama. To-
day, that demographic preponderance of peoples of African descent re-
mains a major social group in the Republic of Panama. This statement is
consistent with published statistics of many other social investigators

such as Blanchard,3 Rout,4 and Baxley,5

among others who have
studied the “blackness” of Panamanian demography. Sociologist, Bryce-
Laporte argues that:

the presence of Blacks in the Greater Central American Isthmus

... Belize and Panama are rivaled only by Guyana ... in having the

highest concgntration of Blacks and mulattoes on the Central Ameri-

can mainland.

In fact, in Euro-Latin/Hispanic-America,7 where Brasil has the
largest numerical quantity, the Republic of Panama with a smaller popu-
lation, has a similar proportion of peoples of African heritage as Bra-
sil, and with the probable exception of Belize, Panama has probably the
highest proportion of peoples of African heritage on the Central Ameri-
can Isthmus.8

1. Socially Defining Afro-Panamanians

There are two groups of Afro-Panamanians, each with a distinct so-
cial heritage. One group is the Afro-Hispanics, whose presence in Pana-
ma goes back to the initial dispersion of Africans as enslaved laborers
in the 16th Century and Spanish colonization. The second group of immi-

grant Afro-Antillanos, are of a more recent historical origin from

3
the British, French and Spanish Antilles of the West Indies. These Ca-

ribbean immigrants arrived on the Isthmus in four major waves: in 1849,
1880, 1904 and 1936. They brought along, to paraphrase Hutchenson and
Dominguez, a linguistic and cultural heritage unlike that of the majori-
ty culture.9 They came as contract laborers for the interoceanic pro-
jects: the Panama Railroad, the French and present Panama Canal.

Some of these Afro-Caribbean immigrants were French and/or patois
speaking, some spoke Spanish, but the majority were largely English-
speaking, in contrast to the local Spanish speaking Afros. The Afro-Ca-
ribbeans added new dimensions to the composition of Afro-Panamanians
through the meeting of the two culturally distinct Diaspora groups, cre-
ated over time in different geographical spaces, but with a common Afri-
can Diaspora heritage. Together, the Afro-Hispanics and the Afro-Antil-
leans make up the Afro-Panamanian diaspora population.

Peoples of African heritage have been in historical physical spaces
within the country since colonization and from the beginning of the Re-
public. These historical locations have been in all nine Provinces of
the country: 1- BOCAS DEL TORO; 2- CHIRIQUI: in Alanje, Puerto
Anmuelles, Concepcion and David; 3- COLON: in the capital city,
and the Costa Arriba and Costa Abajo (the Upper and Lower
Coasts); 4- DARIEN, in Boca de Sébalo; 5- in HERRERA: Chitre and
Parita and 6- COCLE: in Penonomé and Nata; and to some de-
gree 7- Pedasi in the Province of £05 SANTOS; 8- PANAMA: in the
capital city, San Miguel Island and the general area of the Pro-

Vince, and 9- VERAGUAS: in Remedios.1° (See FIGURE 1.)

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5
This, however, does not mean that Afro-Panamanians are in restricted

areas, on the contrary, they are found almost everywhere within the
country.

Throughout the centuries Afro-Hispanics and Afro-Antilleans Panama-
nians have played a dominant role as laborers in Panama’s contribution
to the production process of the incipient and present world economy.
Together these two groups laid the foundation of the modern, indepen-
dent, political territory: a nation and a country, the Republic of Pana-
ma. However, as the late Smith-Fernandez commented:

the participation of the negro(s) in the distribution of the
national benefits does not in any way correspond in a just propor-
tion to the physical and mental efforts (they have) invested.
Yet, very little is known and recorded about Afro-Panamanians from the
perspective of racial/ethnic organizations. Gerardo Maloney, George
Priestely, Alberto Smith-Fernandez and also the late George Westerman,
12 have been among the few Panamanians whose works are consistent
with this perspective.

During the last thirty years, one of the striking features of soci-
al change on the Euro-American Continent has been the emergence of vari-
ous types of grass-roots social organizations,13 from the single is-
sue and consensus types to the conflictive and revolutionary types.14
This organized activism has been the vehicle through which different mi-
nority ethnic groups in Euro-America have found a voice in plural, neo-
colonial, developing countries and is often the source of political and
economic empowerment for these minority groups.15 In Panama, ARENEP
--ACCIdN REIVINDICADORA DEL NEGRO PANAMEnO-- (Action for the Revin-

dication of Black Panamanians) was such an organization through which

some Afro-Panamanians organized. Thus, the dissertation centers on the

6
emergence, development and decline of ARENEP, between 1976-1984 ap-

proximately, as an Afro-Panamanian socio-political, grass-roots organi-
zation during a period of the Military Governments, 1968-1989.

The organization and mobilization of Afro-Panamanians, through the
emergence of ARENEP, also has to do with the reproduction of depen-
dency within the political economy and the presence of foreign inte-
rests in the country. To understand the reproductive process of depen-
dency, consideration should be given to the fact that economic accumula-
tion within the country is the consequence and reliance on the penetra-
tion of foreign financial capital and the importation of industrial ca-
pital goods, --elaborated and semi-elaborated parts (and raw material)
for national growth and development. This penetration usually centers
on the manufacturing sector, and allows for the opening, domination and
control of new productive sectors, as well as the displacement of local
businesses from traditional economic activities. This economic manipula-
tion forces the latter to either close or integrate as a minor part-
ner.16

This dependency affects not only the political and economic sphe-
res, but also the social sphere, especially the changing interrelation-
ship of ethnicity, race and class. Like race, to paraphrase Freire,l7
the understanding of class as an ideological category is important to
prevent the generalization which reduces all analysis to race, yet,
while the analysis of race cannot be reduced to social class, race can-
not be fully understood without class analysis.

In summary, the study looks at the socio/political context --the ra-
cial, ethnic and class factors, and the economic and dependent condi-

tion of the country. These are the variables which gave rise to the

7
organization and which defined the nature, activism and decline of the

organization as a marginalized, politically ethnic minority in a plu-
ral, neo-colonial society and dependent, developing country. This study
draws upon the participacidn popular --popular participation-- mo-
del of social organization to facilitate understanding of socio/politic-
al activism in Euro-American societies.

8. Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized into seven chapters. Chapter One: T0-
HARDS A RECONCEPTUALIZATON OF MOBILIZATION AND ORGANIZATION is a discus-
sion of the participacidn popular model as a theoretical focus of
socio-political, community based organizations, particularly racial/eth-
nic social activism. The focus is also on agency, in terms of people ac-
ting in their interest and concerns as Afro-Panamanians. The Chapter be-
gins the early discussion of the participacion popular model as a
theoretical construct and methodological device; theoretically to under-
stand the model and methodologically to understand social activism. The
Chapter end with the reseach questions or propositions of the disserta-
tion.

Chapter Two presents the METHODOLOGIES AND RESEARCH STRATEGIES.
This section discusses the underlining theory used for data gathering,
the methodology and strategies of the investigation, the nature of the
investigation in the Cities of Coldn, Panama and New York, and address-
es the sample, the informants, the use of focus groups, the administra-
tion of the questionnaire, the training of assistants, testing of the
instrument, and the concerns of the time and place in which the work
had to be completed. The Chapter enumerates the spatial areas of the

study: twelve neighborhoods in Coldn and twenty-two in Panama; the

8
total valid sample of 602 respondents, including a sub-sample of 174

identified members/sympathizers of organizations, of which sixty-four
percent self-identified as members/sympathizers of ARENEP. The use
of the research data moves between the larger sample of 602 and the sub
-sample of 174 members/sympathizers. Specific reference is made when-
ever either is used to guide the reader.

Chapter Three, THE PRESENCE OF THE RACIAL FACTOR IN PANAMA and EURO
-LATIN-AMERICA, is a discussion of race and ideology, the State’s raci-
al policy and popular participation. Subsequently, there is an exten-
sive discussion of race in relation to the nation/State formation, and
which includes: a)- race in Panama and Euro-Hispanic-America, b)- race
and State policy and, c)- the intersection of race, class and popular
participation. Of particular concern is the controlling definition of
nationality within institutional structures of inequality, particularly
for Afro-Antillean-Panamanians. Central to the discussion is the issue
of race/racism as articulating principles in the process, formation and
development of a national identity, particularly for an immigrant group
caught in the initial waves of an anti/neo/colonial tide.

Chapter Four: BACKGROUND TO THE FORMATION OF AFRO-ANTILLEAN CON-
SCIOUSNESS AND AGENCY introduces the procedence and recruitment of the
Antillean immigrants, and their early life experiences. This is follow-
ed by a discussion of early Antillean organizational heritage manifest-
ed in the lodge. The discussion takes a historical view of the Antille-
an lodge as a voluntary association through which the Antillean immi-
grants organized and mobilized. The argument suggests that the lodge,
as an agency of and for oppressed people, was a mechanism of group ex-

pression and empowerment at the grass-roots level, and whose members

9
sought inclusion and improved socio/political and economic equality wi-

thin the larger society; that the structure and mechanism of the lodge
provided a framework for the emergence of other organizations. The Chap-
ter also discusses the usefulness of popular participation as a mechan-
ism of activism, as well as the association between popular participa-
tion and activism within a developing, dependent neo/colonial country.
Likewise, the Chapter discusses the racial factor, ethnicity, conscious-
ness and class in Panama and Euro-Latin-America.

Chapter Five: THE EMERGENCE OF ARENEP: REVINDICATION OF AFRO-
ANTILLEAN IDENTITY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, looks at
the emergence of the organization, its relationship to the State and
ARENEP as Agency: Afro-Panamanian people, acting in their interests,
articulating their concerns and participation in local, national and
cultural politics. This section looks at some major political issues as
factors which have contributed to the framing of ARENEP as a grass-
roots, political organization, and how the experience of the member-
ship, within a particular setting, helped to mold the organization. The
first section focuses on ARENEP in the national struggle for politi-
cal sovereignty vis a vis the US. An important aspect of the discus-
sion is the interplay of class, race and the national interest. This is
followed by the discussion on the redefinition of national culture and
inclusivity. Again, central to the discussion is the issue of race and
ethnicity as articulating principles in the process, formation and deve-
lopment of a national identity, and the question of nation, identity
and nationality. A third section discusses ARENEP, political par-
ties and political clientelism. The final section looks at the organi-

zation and its activism in relation to transnational geo-politics,

. 10
and the impact of transnationals on the political, economical and soci-

al arenas. The nature of the activism is expressed, through, for exam-
ple, the effects of foreign interests and dependency, as a response to
the post-industrial capitalist transformation, automative industriali-
zation, and the globalization of the local economy. It is at this point
that the presence of two governments --the Government of Panama and the
US Government, through the presence of the US Military-- are seen as mi-
tigating factors in the development and persistence of socio-political,
grass-roots organizations.

Chapter Six, CONFLICTS, CONTRADICTIONS, EVALUATIONS, PERCEPTION AND
DEMISE OF ARENEP discusses 1)- the internal functioning of the or-
ganization as well as the membership base; both from a class and racial
/ethnic perspective; 2)- ethnic and class conflicts and identity; 3)
participation and empowerment of the membership and lastly, 4) the de-
mise of ARENEP.

Chapter Seven is the RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE. RETROSPECTIVE
is a summary of the findings and the Conclusion. The second section,
PROSPECTIVE is a presentation and discussion of two more recently orga-
nized (racial/ethnic) organization, the PASTORAL-AFRO, and NO-
DESCO. The Pastoral-Afro, is an organization of religious con-
tents, and NODESCO, is a class base organization. The Chapter also
looks at the contradictions and inconsistencies in racial/ethnic iden-

tity and solidarity.

11
C. Introduction Endnotes

1The term Diaspora is from a Biblical, the Old and New
Testaments, and a Greek context. From the Old Testament (Deuteronomy
28:25) the term refers to the aggregate communities of Jews outside
Palestine, the body of Jews dispersed among the Gentiles after the Fall
of Babylon. From the New Testament, the term refers to the Christians
living outside Palestine. From the Greek diasperirein: dia, apart
+ sperirein, to scatter, to disperse. Within the biological
sciences the term diaspora refers to the scattering or dispersion
of seeds (Webster's Ninth Collegiate Dictionary, 1988:351). In the
social sciences, and by analogy, the term is a particular concept of
the African Diaspora Research Project. It refers, not only to peoples
who have settled far from their ancestral homelands, the dispersion of
any homogeneous, racial/ethnic pe0ple, but specifically to the
dispersion of peoples of African descent throughout the Americas.

2John Hope Franklin, From Slavery ta Freedom,(New York:
A.A.Knopf,1947), pp.113-114.

3Paul Blanchard, Demmey and Miathe Carjbbean.(New Yorszhe
MacMillan Company),l947, p.200.

4Leslie 8. Rout,Jr., The, Afriean Experienee in Spanish America: 1502
Le Present Day. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1976, p.273.

SH. Willis Baxley, in Rayford W.Logan, "The Negro in Spanish
America," in Paulie ,Leetanea. Vol 1. (Washingtion: Howard University
Press),1940, p.32 (photocopy).

6Roy Simon Bryce- Laport, "Lesser- Known Chapter of the African Diaspora

in Costa Rica and Central America,"inG lgbal,Qjmen§j_n§,gf_the_Afriean
Qjaapera. Joseph E. Harris, ed. (Washington: Howard University Press),
1982, p.221.

7In this discussion, the term Euro-Latin or Euro-Hispanic America
is used to reflect the similarity of social construction between
European and the so-called ‘Latin American’ societies. The close
history and legacy of European ideology in Euro-Latin societies has
been the obviously decided influence in the social, economic and
political spheres of "Latin America". The usage of the ‘Latin-Hispanic’
label suggests that the peoples of the hemisphere are homogeneous given
their linguistic ties to the Romance Languages. In similar manner, the
label Hispanic assumes a population which speaks Spanish and
profess Spanish or Hispanic ethnic characteristics. These labels
place the population closer to Europe, farther from.Africa, ignore the
Indigeneous population and promote a European flavor to its
definition. The social race of White Creollos,
Euro-Hispanic-Creollos, as the inheritors of the Spanish legacy, pride
themselves as Euro-Latin-Hispanic ethnic whites, and consider
themselves participants in the economic, political and social culture
of Europe. The unquestionable acceptance of the Latin or

12

Hispanic America label is euphemistic. It attempts to dispel a
racist interpretation of the papulation under forced assimilation, and
shows a high degree of disrespect for the culture of others. While the
term Latin-Hispanic America ‘suggests the flavor’ of Eurocentrism,
the term ‘Euro-Latin-Hispanic America’ is more forthright regarding the
imposition of Spanish/Portuguese cultural and socio/political
patterns.

8See the forthcoming publication on the demographics and statistics
of peoples of African heritage. The African Diaspora Research Project.
Ruth Simms Hamilton, ed., Michigan State University.

9John D. Hutchenson and Lino H.00minguez."Ethnic Self-Help
Organizations in Non-Barrio Settings: Community Identity and Voluntary

Action.” Journal of mm Action Research. Vol.15,
No.4,(0ctober/December),1986.

”The Altman Diem infienamazfiertrajtefafieefls/Beflssflmen
a Natien, by Ruth Simms Hamilton and Joseph Downer-Marcel. Michigan
State University (forthcoming publication).

llAlberto Smith-Fernandez,”Dominio y Comercializacidn de los
Prejuicios Raciales en Panam ”. Nemaciaa. Pcimer Qoagresg del Negro
Banamefla. Centro de Convenciones ATLAPA. Panama. (septiembre 10-13),
1981, p. 96.

l26erardo Maloney,"El Novimiento Negro en Panama. "Reviata Ea_amefia
1e .No. 5. (Panama: Imprenta Universitaria),1989; George
Priestely, "Race and Class and the Panamanian Nation-State,"§a£1eeeaa
EELSDQCLIYQ- Vol.1.No.3(September 25),]980,pp.7-9; Alberto
Smith-Fernandez," El Afro/Panamefio Frente al Concepto de la

Panamenidad". Rexiaaa Naeional de Cultuga. No.5.(PanamazEditora la
Nacién,(octubre-noviembre-diciembre),1976, pp.45-59 and George

Hesterman, A Minexjty figeap in Panama.(Panama:Impresora la Nacidn),
1950.

13Grass-roots social movement organization is defined as a sustained
cultural, political and socially conflictive class action of a
representative collective of minorities and marginal sectors, who,
from a position of subordination and dependency, struggle to recapture
taeir history, and long term democratic process and improved life
c ances.

l4Michael Schwartz and Shuva Paul ,"Why Consensus Movement Cannot be
Instrument of Social Change,'in frantiera in Mexement Inee_y.
Aldon Morris and Carol M. Mueller, edts. (Yale University
Press),1992,pp. 205-223.

15In this context, minority groups refer to politically oppressed
subpopulations who, from the beginning, were present as part of the
total population during the initial construction of the nation.

l3

16Vania Bambirra,

Wanam-
pp.96; 100-101.

£1 Caeitalisme fleeendiente
6a edicidn. (México: Siglo Veintiuno), 1979,

17Paula Freire and Donaldo P. Macedo, "A Dialogue: Culture, Language,
and Race'. flaryarg Edgeatienal Kellen. Vol.65, No.3, 1995, pp.400;401.

CHAPTER ONE

TOWARDS A RECONCEPTUALIZATON OF
MOBILIZATION AND ORGANIZATION

A. The Participacidn Popular Model

The presence and persistence of various forms of community based or-
ganizations have been a vehicle through which different ethnic minority
1 groups in Euro-Hispanic-America have found a voice. These organiza-
tions have often been a source of political and economic empowerment
for its participants. As a theoretical construct, grass-roots popular
participation is the representative collective expression of disenfran-
chised minorities and marginal sectors who seek, through collective ac-
tion, changes in the political and economic arenas, long term democra-
tic process and improved life chances. The model may either be radical
or instrumental. The radical model emphasizes changes in the political
and economical structures, in direct (violent) confrontation with the
State for (State) power, the management of the State’s resources and
the legitimate use of force. This is the model which has placed the
State, its role and politics as the primary antagonist to the sector
popular --popular sector--, and which is directed against the domin-
ant national class as an ally tied to foreign interests. 2 Henry
argues that in:

its popular connotations (the popular participation model) which

derives from the confrontation with the establish order, is retain-

ed over a long period of time and may emerge in the form of radical
attitudes to other types of action.

That the political activism of popular participation can be retained

over time and emerge in the form of a radical type of action, gives it

the dimension and primacy of a social movement. The model is grounded

l4

15
in constraints and seeks to negotiate the best possible deal through

the role of the State as the determinant instrument of social control.
From this perspective the political process is central.

(T)he new social movement is seen as pacific and ... interested
in consciousness raising as the others were violent and interested
in the control for power. In brief, the old ... movements were asso-
ciated with the idea 2f revolution, the new ... are associated with
the idea of democracy.

The popular participation model addresses participatory democracy and
autonomous political activism.

Popular participation is begun from the initial ... processes of
decision making in all aspects, (between) municipal and popular or-
ganizations (in) the joint processes of political administration,
control and evaluation, as well as any political reformulations.
This model can only be developed with the association of popular or-
ganizations, the guarantee of autonomy and independence, and acknow-
ledgment of the organization(s) as a political subject. In turn
these organization(s) must face the risks of co-optation and clien-
telism as well as risking the loss of their popular body and ...
their conversion into a municipal dependency.

However, the instrumental model also emphasizes class structure,
where class-based organizations represent alternative social change,
and which may be construed as similar to the position of the New True
Socialists who reject the importance of class politics in favor of
"democratic struggles”, particularly those made by the ‘new social move-
ments’.6 Important then, is that popular participation represents not
only the expressions of a political subordinant minority, but also the
expression of a class relation and the political/economical articu-
lations within the internal structure of the society. In this respect,
the class factor of the sector popular emerges in neighborhood orga-
nizations, which is reflective of the production and distribution pro-
cess of collective goods and services, and the property relations which

implies a particular labor relation and the role of the State.

16
The popular sector is conceptualized as the:

organized and sustained activity by the working class and margin-
ally employed which is expressly political in the sense of being ad-
dressed at some authoritative7body (public or private) and appeal-
ing for redistributive changes.

The popular sector underlies the close relationship between produc-
tion and reproduction, and points to the struggle in the reproductive
sphere as an extension of the general labor struggles in neighborhood
organizations, where the shared experience of the struggles are felt.
For example, during the first two crises of political hegemony in Pana-
ma, 1925-1932 and 1947-1952, laborers, teachers, civic organizations
and student groups opposed the political oligarchy8 in support of the
popular sector. But Tourain argues that associations of this nature are
not social movements, that:

the existence of an urban popular sector led many observers to
think that this sector has a strong demand-making and even revolu-
tionary capacity. The sociological studies ... to date do not per-
mit us to defend such a view .... (T)he dependence and heteronomy
of the ... poorest barrios or poblaciones have been proven
over and over .... Populist oligarchies have found their principal
support in marginal poblaciones. The violence they have suffe-
red and occasionally pursued ... suggests a privation of collective
action which further dgepens and transforms their deprivation of re-
sources and influence.

And he (Tourain) defines a social movement as:

the action both culturally oriented and socially conflictual, of

a social class defined by its position of domination or dependency

in the appropriation of historicity, of the cultural models of in-

vestment, knowledgeoand morality, towards which the social movement
itself is oriented.

Yet, in the absence of a traditional working class conceived in the
European tradition, the sector popular substitutes the ‘classical’
working class. The general low life chances of subordinate groups also
appears to provide the mechanism to include their experiences as a ra-

tional argument to promote change. From the perspective of Euro-

17
Hispanic America social construction, not only the nature of the social

order and level of dependency are the genesis of socio-political move-
ments, but also the social strains in which different social formations
present specific forms of articulation within a given historical struc-
ture. Thus, social activism articulates the struggle of the working
class, directing attention to the process of production and the distri-
bution of public provisions of collective goods and services. In this
context, the emergence of popular participation, grass-roots political
movement in Euro-Hispanic America, comes from the structural conditions
of society, from the lowly stratified, marginal groups less tied to pri-
vate property, but whose life chances are tied to the effects of inter-
national trade and politics of local politics and economy. These econo-
mic and political effects are seen through: 1- the onerous unpayable ex-
ternal debt, 2- the transfer of net capital to the exterior, 3- the
stagnant economy, 4- the deterioration of the material conditions of
life for the majority of the population, and 5- the accelerated wear
and tear of the mechanisms of political convivencia --destiny-- of
the nation.11

Theoretically, the popular participation model is viewed from two
perspectives: l- the utility of the model as a political vehicle and as
a theoretical construct to understand the nature and choices of the mo-
del and, 2- the model as a methodological device for grass-roots activ-
ism, to understand social activism. As a theoretical construct, this
perspective seeks to understand ARENEP as agency, its mode of opera-
tion and the functional consequences of the organization as it relates
to the country’s international linkages of politics and trade. As a-con-

struct, the popular participation model is eminently a political

18
approach of a disenfranchised racial/ethnic, subordinate organization,

seeking social and political reivindicaciones, --revindications--
defined as a political strategy of demand-making. The notion of demands
or reivindicaciones, reflects the socio-economic position of the ac-
tivists, their needs for institutional services and the effects of the
social policies of the State.

Methodologically, popular participation refers not only to mobiliza—
tion at the level of labor, but also at the neighborhood level since
both levels affect the productive and reproductive life chances of the
popular sector. As a methodological device, popular participation also
highlights the ‘class relations of the society,’ i.e., the multiple pro-
blems posed by State policies in a dependent plural society, their im-
pact on salaries and their effects on jobs and the local culture. In
this context, the notion of social movement refers to:

forms of collective action with a high degree of popular partici-
pation, which use non-institutional channels, and which formulate
their demands while simultaneously finding forms of action to ex-
press them, thus establishing themselves as collective subjects ..
as a group or a category.

But as Castillo F. says:

it is the reach of their demands which ... allows an understand-
ing of their political dimension; that is, to understand if these
practices or actions are inscribed in an integrative and reformist
logics, or in the changes and transformation of the society.

The effect of popular activism on State institutions may be seen as
a political influence on important leaders and institutional operations
and policies. The influence of popular activism demands legitimacy and
significant changes in the institutional political order at the commu-
nity, regional, national (and international level), and a new understan-
ding of identity and citizenship.14 Although Tourain argues that the

participacidn popular is not a ‘legitimate’ model,15 and Castells

19
argues that the concept of urban social movement cannot be applied to

Latin America, because the popular sector’s heterogeneity, and instrin-
sic dependency upon the political sphere invalidates them;16 however,
Castillo, F. in contrast, says:

all revindicative movements which argue for the satisfaction of so-

ili‘loflef‘???‘322323.321i§°323§3§l325°§faslii2i 23:332.” "‘9 "°""’

To paraphrase Assies, these movements respond to new issues address-
ing new modes of organization and action as well as relating to the
State power and politics.18 It is suggested that authors such as Tou-
rain and Castells, are looking only at the demand-making or revindica-
tive part of the activism because the popular participation model con-
fronts the States’ inability to successfully address the needs of the
popular sector or class for better distribution of collective goods and
services. That populist oligarchies have found the popular sector as
principal supporters, may in fact imply a strategy of give and take
through their very ‘heterogenous complementarity’, politically and demo-
graphically. And from Tourain’s own words, the actions of the popular
sector are culturally oriented and socially conflictive, and their
social class 1; defined by their domination and dependency. To
paraphrase Bambirra, 19 by dependency we refer to that situation
in which a country’s economy is subsumed and conditioned by the develop-
ment and expansion of another country’s economy. This situation develop-
ed not only through the dominant control an external economy may have
over the local natural resources and the market, but also through the
systematic penetration of foreign capital and investments in the local

market and economy.

This structural condition also helps to explain some concrete

20
economic, political and theoretical concerns of the system: 1- the al-

location of investments, the character and form relative to the process
of accumulation, 2- class construction, 3- racial/ethnic groups articu-
lations and relations, 4- the political history of national formation,
and 5- the role of the State in the international political system.
These structural conditions are intricacies tied to national develop-
ment, and must be understood within the meaning of the structural pro-
cess which determines national development, and which expresses a soci-
al form and specific articulation of the country.

8. The Racial Factor and the
Participacidn Popular Model

As a case study of an Afro-Panamanian organization, ARENEP was
in many ways within the framework of social movements and organization
structures, which sociologists and other social scientists have identi-
fied with marginality. Yet, despite the fact that many organizations in
Euro-Hispanic America have been organized by Indigenous and Afro-Americ-
an peoples, the ethnic/racial factor is seldom examined in the study of
grass-roots organizations. This is important because, and to some de-
gree, ethnicity and race, are not only reduced to class analysis, but
are also defined and created by State policy.

In Panama, as in other Euro-Hispanic American countries, racial/eth-
nic, socio-political organizations also face the internal politics of
race and ethnicity, and their ideological construction and interpreta-
tion. A prevailing issue is the identification of the forms of racial
/ethnic discrimination --racism-- in theories and expressions linked to
inclusionary or exclusionary practices, such as those which fuel racial

/ethnic self-image and cultural differentiation tied to traditional

21
European heritage, anti-immigration policies and criminality. For exam-

ple, this is evident on the one hand, in the way the national history
influences how race and ethnicity are perceived in the country, and on
the other hand, in the association of race/ethnicity with criminality.
These ideological constructions and interpretations foment the com-
mon attacks on racial/ethnic groups and give rise to organized resist-
ance and opposition to the politics of language and concepts which in-
form racial practice and discourse. For example, early in Euro-Hispanic
-America, popular Criollo discontent fell on the least threatening,
but most visible immigrants, the Afro population. In Cuba, the Haitians

2° and in

and Jamaicans became the scapegoat for many Cuban problems,
Panama it was the same for the Antillanos from as early as the
18905, and particularly for Antillanos living on the Canal Zone af-
ter 1920. To paraphrase Gordon, the presence of ethnic immigrants rede-
fined part of the problem of social control and ‘law and order’ (of mo-
dern European countries).21

In Euro-Hispanic America, more interest is given to the economic is-
sues, and the ethnic/racial factor is considered a non-issue. For exam-
ple, since race/ethnicity are not perceived as generated within the so-
cial structure, in terms of power definition of otherness, inequality
is presumed to be an individual, not a group phenomenon. This is the in-
vokation of liberal individualism; it is the individual’s short coming,
not that of the society. It is then argued that if the individual, Indi-
genee and/or Afro, would learn Spanish and/or Portuguese, and assimil-
ate Euro-American culture, the racial/ethnic importance would disappear

and s\he can “make it” in the society. To paraphrase Eckstein, making

race and ethnicity a non-issue is part of the dominant national

22
ideology to highlight class, and ignore, downplay, and/or obscure the

racial/ethnic issue.22
When one attempts to address the issues of racism, ethnic discrimi-
nation and segregation in Euro-America, four general responses come to
bear: 1- that the phenomenon does not happen in ‘Latin’ America, 2-
these issues are Euro-Anglo (the US), and 3- that class, not race, is
the issue, therefore, 4- to address the question is to import Euro-An-
glo ideology of race. In Panama the reply is the same with the additio-
nal argument of a racial democracy, where the dominant groups focus on
moral issues linked to the idea of equality. They argue the absence of
racial prejudices and discrimination, and formulate ideologies, myths
and lofty appeals of idealism such as "national benefits and national
glory“ to justify and support their power, domination and myths. Malo-
ney affirms that it is typical of the dominant class to use racial de-
mocracy as a rationale to demonstrate the existence of equal opportuni-
ties, the idea of individualism, voluntary action and social mobility.
Hith regards to the class, not race argument, Maloney also argues that
this is an ideological assault on the consciousness of the negro
sector to obscure the real nature of the situation23, downplaying the
fundamental contradictions of the society. Likewise, from Bryce
Laporte:
in ... these countries, the white or lighter skin elite has capi-
talized on the myth of no racial problem and has disseminated a
false ideology and image of racial egalitarianism to their advant-
age. Lower and middle class citizens of such countries come to ac-
cept this myth, which on the one hand is ego inflating and perhaps
self-fulfilling, but, on the other, is the basis of a vicious, self
-defeating trap which prevents them from responding to the subtle
racist abuies ... lest they be considered racist and
unpatriotic.

Racial/ethnic policies have had a negative impact on the life

23
chances of the Afros, as well as the Indigenous ethnic groups in Pana-

ma. It has been suggested that given the centralized political system
and structure of investments and development, which reflects little or
no input from the Provinces, the cities and/or Provinces with the most
visible Afro population; for example: Bocas del Toro, Colon and
Darién, are those with the least social, political and economical
development. It would also appear that the lack of an official
socio/political perspective for these Provinces has given rise to the
social concerns of poverty and the popular class.

In addition to the barrio or neighborhood associations, which
are usually defined as class based, the popular participation model al-
so lends itself to the emergence of other organizations. For example,
during the late 19705 and early 19805, some Indigenous groups, among
them the Guaymies, had been mobilizing for the delimitation and au-
tonomy within their territories; to stop the legal and illegal takeover
of their lands and the incursion of squatters. Other organizations that

25 the new women’s hu-

have emerged were: the ecological associations,
man rights organizations, and the Christian base community, i.e. the
Pastoral-Afro in Panama, Ecuador and other Euro-Hispanic countries.

The backwardness of Euro-Latin-America which is unfoundly attri-
buted to non-Whites, is in reality the product of Euro-Latins’ construc-
ted ‘civilization’, under whose economic, political and social domina-
tion, Afros, Indigenees and other peoples of color are experiencing rac-
ism, discrimination and segregation. These subjective Eurocentric appre-
ciations, racist and ethnocentric in nature, augment in an exaggerated

manner the delinquencies of these groups, and reveal a deeply ingrained

prejudice which deliberately skews any objective appreciation of the

24
presence and contribution of Indigenous, Afro-Hispanic and Afro-Antil-

lean Panamanians. Thus, an important variable affecting grass-roots or-
ganizations in Euro-Hispanic-America is the ethnic/racial characteris-
tic of the organizing population and their status in the national socio
-economic structure. Although some ethnic/racial socio political organi-
zations have had a degree of periodic success, this success serves to
highhlights the implications of the ethnic composition of social move-
ments in a plural society.
C. Guiding Research Questions

It is likewise argued that the presence of the racial/ethnic ideolo-
gy does not mean that all Afro-Panamanians have accepted it. The emer-
gence of ARENEP is evidence that some Afro-Panamanians rejected the
racial ideology, and created an option through which they, as an racial
/ethnic group, not only activated their sense of being in contrast to
the ideological constructions and interpretations of racism, but also
their presence to the State’s centrality in politics and the differen-
tial conditioning of dependency. Moreover, ARENEP was not determin-
ed mechanically by social structures, but developed out of historical
circumstances. Thus, the guiding questions of the dissertation are:

1) how can we understand the relationship of ARENEP as an ex-

pression of race, class and identity in relation to the conditions

of citizenship (nationality) and the political situation of depen-

dency;

2) specifically what does racial/class identity mean in terms of

racial formation and participation: in cultural politics and agen-

cy; that is, people acting in their own interest and articulating

the interest and concerns of Afro-Panamanian peoples; and,

3) what was ARENEP’s relation to the States’ linkage to inter-

national trade and politics, and to the national struggle for sove-

reignty?

These are the issues the following Chapters will discuss.

25
0. Chapter One Endnotes

1By ethnic .minority is meant a group whose members see
themselves simultaneously as members of a distinct ethnic group and
members of a nation dominated by another, numerically superior (or
inferior) ethnic group. Edmund T. Gordon, "History, Identity,
Consciousness and Revolution. Greene and the flatten State.
(Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 1987), p.166. (cf. footnote 15,
Introduction.)

ZAHan Tourain. The Voice and the EreAn Analtsis of Social
Allan Duff, trans., (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press,1989, pp.89- 90.) cited in John Friedmann,'The Latin American
Barrio Movement as a Social Movement: Contributions to a Debate”,

International Journal of urban and Regional Research. Vol.13 No.3.
(September, 1989), pp.89-90.

3Etiene Henry, “Urban Social Movements in Latin America“, in he!
Social Borenents and the State in Latin America. David Slater.
ed.,(Amsterdam: Centro De Estudios y Oocumentacién Latino
Americanos-CEDLA. 1985), p.129.

4Allan Tourain, “Beyond Social Movements", Iheehy, thltare aha
Seetety. Vol.9 (London/New Delhi: 1992), p.143.

5Francisco Donadio Moreno,“Realidad Urbano Marginal:
Consideraciones en Torno a la Formulacidn de Hadelos de
Alternativas“.flemahia§. [1L9 Qahgheaa ' ' '

Nacional oe Sociolooia. Reriota
Banamefla de Sagielegia. No.6 (Panama: Imprenta Universitaria, 1989),
p.70.

6Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Retreat than Claaa: a Neg ‘Itae’
Seetaltem. (London/New York: Verso,l986, p.5.) Laclau suggests that
there is no stable relation between the workers in relation to their
position as consumers, as residents in a specific area, or participants
in the political system. Instead, Laclau argues that the relation
between these positions is rather the result of complex political
constructions based on the totality of social relations, which cannot
be derived unilaterally from the relations of productions. (Ernesto
Laclau, ”New Social Movements and the Plurality of the Social", in he!
Social florenents and the State in Latin America. David Slater. ed.,
{CEDLA} p.28). If this were the case, then neighborhood organizations
and struggles would have no reason for existence since there is no
apparent relation between the workers, their places of residence, their
position as consumers, or whether or not they participate in the
political system. If this were the case, the close relationship between
production and reproduction would not affect their families; their
places of residence would not affect transportation cost to the
families, and there would be no social antagonism in the society
because capital would be the only productive force. If this were so,
how then, does Laclau’s explain the extension of general labor

26

struggles into the neighborhoods where the effects of the struggles
are felt. He does not. Garretdn notes that under Pinochet, the base of
mobilizations shifted from “classes“ to the "masses", i.e., from the
more organized, formal sector, to the more economically marginal
sector, through‘ neighborhood groups, not work groups. (Manuel Antonio
Garretdn,M., ”Popular Mobilization and the Military Regime in Chile:
the Complexities of the Invisible Transition”. pp. 259-277, in Susan
Eckstein, I'Power and Popular Protest in Latin America”, Enwer ann
Eooular Erotest. Latin American Social Movements. Susan Eckstein edt.
(Berkeley/L05 Angeles/London: University of California Press), 1989,

p.15).

7John Halton, "Urban Political Movements and Revolutionary

Changes in the Third Horld', Urhan Affaire Qnarterty, Vol.15,No.1
(September, 1990), pp.4-5.

8This activism includes major manifestations by the early labor
force, the Tenant League Protest in 1925, and the first of two crises
of political hegemony: 1925-1932 and 1947-1952, led by nationalist
groups opposed to the political oligarchy. The first crisis of
1925-1932, included labor organizations such as the Sindicato General
de Trabajadores (the General Syndicate of Workers), the Grupo
Comunista (the Communist Group) of young Canal Zone workers, the
Labor, Communist and Socialist parties, and Accidn Comunal
(Communal Action), a middle class civic organization. (George
Priestely, Military finvernment ann Ennnlar Eartjcipatjnn 1n Banana:
Ihe Inrrtjna Regime, 12§8-121§. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986, p.12.)
The second political crisis saw the participation of the Federacidn
de Estudiantes Panamefios, (the Federation of Panamanian Students)
the United Panamanian Teachers and the Front of Patriotic Youth,
supported by the People’s Party, the Communist and Socialist
parties.(ibid. p. 15.) Likewise, the 19505 and 19605 saw the
transportation workforce participate in popular struggles (ibid.
p.9). In any case, with or without the alliance of the middle class,
the sector popular --popular sector-- the heterogeneous ethnic
mixture of minorities and marginal population, or lower classes felt
the repression and shared the experience of mobilizing against the
local oligarchy and US neo-colonialism.

9Allan Tourain, the Vnice and the Eye. p.502.

loAllan Tourain, Ihe Return at the Aetnr. (Minneapolis:University

of Minneapolis Press, 1988a), p. 68, in _he Making of Sneia_ Mayenente
Demncraey. Arturo Escobar and

inLatinAmericazflIoentitrStrategr and
Sonia Alvarez, ed. , (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1992), 1992, p. 15.

llGuillermo Castro, Juana Camargo, Noemi Farinoni and Virginia
Vergara, "Crisis y Politicas Sociales en Panama. trjsis: Snetegan y

Eennnnta. (Panama: IDEN.,1989), p.7.

27

lzElizabeth Jelin,”Otras Voces:el Tiempo de la Democracia en

Argentina. "in Les Horimientos Sociales Ante la Crisis. Fernando
Calderon, ed., (Buenos Aires: Universidad de las Naciones Unidas,

1986), p.18, in Escobar and Alvarez, “Introduction”, p.15.

13Didimo Castillo, F.,'Novimientos Sociales Urbanos y

Democracia: el Caso de Panama”. fleyiata Bananena fie fineiolngia. No.5
(Panama:1mprenta Universitaria, 1989), p.23.

l4Gerrit Burgwal,'Introduction to the Literature on Urban Social

Movements in Latin America”, in §trnetnre at iner, unvements at
Resistance: an Introduction to the Ineories of troan Social Bouements

in Latin Aneriea. Willem Assies, Gerrit Burgwal and Ton Salman,
Netherlands: CEDLA Publication,1990, p.73.

15Tourain, the tniee and the Eye, p.502. See also ”Culture,

Economics, Politics in Latin American Social Movements Theory and

Research“, Arturo Escobar, in the hating hf §neiat hnyenenta, Escobar
and Alvarez, p.77.

16Manuel Castells, (1972) cited in Etiene Henry, "Urban Social

Movements in Latin America," in Neg fineiai Mnyementa and the State in
Ameriea. David Slater,ed.,(Amsterdam: Centro De Estudios y

Latin
Documentacidn Latino Americanos-CEDLA.1985),p. 128.
17Castillo, F., p.24.

18Willem Assies, "On Structures Move and Moving Structures.” in

Structures of Borer Bouements oi Resistance an introduction to the

Ineories of .uroan norements in Latin America. Willem Assies, Gerrit
Burgwal and Tom Salman. (Netherlands: CEDLA Publications), 1990, p.58.

19Bambirra, p.8.

2°Alien Helg, ”Race in Argentina and Cuba, 1880-1830: Theories,

Policies and Popular Reaction". the teen at Rate in Latin Aneriea,
1212-1222. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), p.56.

ZlGordon, p.166.

ZZSusan Eckstein, "Power and Popular Protest in Latin America” ,

Boner and Eooular Erotest Latin American Social unrements Susan
Eckstein, edt. (Berkeley/L05 Angeles/London: University of California

Press), 1989.

zaGerardo Maloney,“Raza y Clase: Conexiones Tedricas". fleyiata
Banalefla 4e Seeietegia. No.3 (Panama: Impenta Universitaria, 1987),
p.96.

24Roy Simon Bryce-LaPorte, ”Black Immigrants: The Experience of

Invisibility and Inequaiity”, anrnal at Blact Stndiea. Vol.3, No.1,

28

(September,1972), p.39.

25ANCON (Asociacidn Nacional para la Conservacidn de la
Naturaleza)-- the Association for the Conservation of Nature-- (in
concert with other local ecological organizations) and Greenpeace were
instrumental in stopping the passage of the ship, Pacific Pintail,

with radioactive waste through the Panama Canal. La Prensa, Panama,
5/marzo/1995, p.3A.

CHAPTER TWO
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH STRATEGIES

A. Methodology and Research Strategies

Data were collected through four methods: 1- interviews, 2- focus
group discussions, 3- questionnaires and 4- autoethnography. The inter-
views, group discussion and questionnaires were conducted during Febru-
ary, March and May, 1995. Primary data were collected through inter-
views, focus group discussions and questionnaires, which were done in
both English and Spanish. All interviews and group discussions were con-
ducted by the principal investigator. Secondary data were collected
through books, archives materials, magazines, newspapers and journals.

The data were collected in the cities of Coldn and Panama, Republic
of Panama, and in New York City, USA. New York was included because
many Afro-Panamanians live in New York. The migration of Afro-Panama-
nians, particularly of Antillean descent to the US, initially began as
a direct result of the poor employment opportunities in Panama and was
later accelerated as a consequence of the 1955 Remdn/Eisenhower Canal
Treaty,1 which, among other things, closed many work sites on the
canal enterprise.

During the Torrijos Military Governments --1968-1989-- Afro-Panama-
nians residing in the US showed an interest in the political destiny of
the nation and the social situation of the Afro-Panamanian population,
particularly the Afro-Antillean Panamanian. This interest was expressed
through the various trips of Afro-Panamanian in the US to Panama;
through the invitation to Col. Armando Bellido G.4 (Ret.) of the Torri-
jos Government and others to New York City; through the Panama Task

29

30
Force, the March in New York City,2 and the many diplomatic efforts

of Afro-Panamanians living in the 05,3 all during 1977. Some Afro-Pa-
namanians residing in New York were also members and/or sympathizers of
ARENEP.

The interviews, group discussion and questionnaires were directed
mainly to adults over thirty years of age, because they would represent
for example, 1- those who were over sixteen years of age in 1977, and
2- they would be representative of the population during the 1976-1984
period of activism, whether or not they were members of the organiza-
tion. A total of 15 interviews were conducted with former officials of
the organization and other members and sympathizers of the organiza-
tion. In Panama, six former members were interviewed: two rank and file
members and four former Board members, including two co-founders. In
New York city, nine persons were interviewed: two former Board members,
two rank and file members and five sympathizers. The interviews averag-
ed one hour approximately.

The proposed sample of interviews with former members, opponents of
the organization, and government officials was severely limited, given
the deaths, unavailability, and/or inability to locate a majority of
the potential interviewees. Of the few who were available, not many
were willing to be interviewed, basically because of the inherent poli-
tical nature of the issues to be discussed, and they did not want to be
interviewed even with the promise of anonymity and confidentiality.

1. Auto Ethnography
An additional strategy employed in this dissertation was the use of

4

auto ethnography, a qualitative research technique used by social

scientists to include personal experience, description and participant

31
observation of past phenomenon. The use of retrospective participant

observation --one’s experience recollected in academia5 after the
event-- and, prospective participant observation --the planning and
preparation-- are analized and utilized for systematic research. Auto
ethnography allows the researcher’s (my) personal experience to be rela-
ted conceptually to the discussion of the research. Expressed more suc-
cinctly, auto ethnography, is the:
retrospective participant observation which constitutes an auto-
biographical sociology, whereby the sociologist probes one or more
past personal experiences as a way of identifying and analyzing
something sociologically relevant.... A pathway which requires the
introspective recollection, reconstruction and interpretation of
east phenomena or processes in which the sociologist was involved.
As a participant in ARENEP, I had access to some of the data,
as well as insights to the organization. Thus, through the auto ethno-
graphic method, the processes of recollection, reconstruction, and in-
terpretation of my experiences and participation in the organization
are analyzed and structured in a shared process with other participants
and non-participants. This process, however, required other means of
corroboration and verification through additional cross verification of
facts and interpretations. This process of recollection, reconstruc-
tion, and interpretation, compared my experience as a participant obser-
ver with the experiences of other participants. Thus, in many ways the
study is not merely personal; it is a corroboration from the point of
views not only of Bernadette y Antonio Antillano del Caribe, but

also Juan y Naria Afro-Hispano, the ordinary persons del pueblo

Panameflo, in the reconstruction and interpretation of the past.

32
2. Focus Groups

Two focus group discussions were held. One in Colon, Panama, with
non-members of the organization, and the other in New York, with sympa-
thizers and former members of the organization. The focus group as an
instrument, provided not only the opportunity to meet with several in-
formants at one time, but more importantly, it provided an opportunity
to validate and cross-reference statements and issues from different
sources. With the focus groups, the investigator introduced a hypothes-
is, theme or idea on different subjects, and asked the participants to
freely discuss the issue from as many foci as possible. The procedure
attempts to detect significant aspects of the issue, the depth and spe-
cificity to understand the personal context of the participants. As an
unstructured interview, it allows the participants to express their
views on the "whats, whys and hows” of the issues, and even to oppose
what is presumed important to the investigator.

The investigator participated and moderated the group discussions
to maintain a particular focus at any one time. These discussions aver-
aged approximately two hours each, and brought light to many of the is-
sues, and in many cases, new information relevant to the investigation
as well as to other collateral issues. Many discussants as well as in-
terviewees remembered vivid details of the socio-political and economic
situation of more than twenty years ago.

The composition of the discussion groups not only included a majo-
rity of Afro-Panamanians, but also others who self-identified as mes-
tizos. Nestizo, as commonly used in Panama refers to the general raci-
al mix of the population without identifying primary heritage. Most of

the participants were educators or social activists, i.e., members of

33
some local community organization. For professional and security rea-

sons, the names of the interviewees and those in the group discussions
will not appear in the study.
3. Administration of the Instrument

The questionnaires were prepared in both English and Spanish. The
procedure used to elicit responses to the questionnaires, depending up-
on the circumstances and willingness of individuals to participate, was
asking the respondents each question. Some were administered by the in-
vestigator and others by the assistants. Some respondents preferred hav-
ing the questionnaire left with the agreement to return a day or two to
collect it. Both methods were productive.

The organization, ARENEP, only kept a listing of the Directi-
va or Board of Directors, but not a listing of the membership. This
required the casting of a broad net of questionnaires to include as
many members/sympathizers as possible. A total of 1,177 questionnaires
were distributed in a non-random sample, in predominantly Afro-Panama-
nian barriadas in the cities of Coldn and Panama, and their respec-
tive outskirts. The return was approximately 700, which is 59 percent
of the questionnaires distributed. Of these 700, 602 or 86 percent were
considered valid returns.

Of the 602, 512 (85 percent) represented heads of households over
thirty years of age. Of these 512, 174 (33.9 percent) participated as
members/sympathizers of various grass-roots organizations. Of the 174
members/sympathizers, 111 or sixty-four (63.8) percent) were Afros, two
(1.1 percent) were Indigenous, eleven (6.3 percent) were blancos,
and 36 (20.7 percent) were mestizos. Fifty-five (31.6 percent) of
the members and/or sympathizes were between the ages of 30-39. Fifty-

34
nine (33.9 percent) were between 40-49. Thirty-two (18.4 percent) were

between 50-59, and four (2.3 percent) were 60 and over. In the sample,
88 (50.6 percent) were males and 75 (43.1 percent) were females. Of
these 174 members/sympathizers, 128 (73.6 percent) were members of
ARENEP.

4. Training Assistants and Preliminary
Testing of the Questionnaire

Before applying the questionnaires, the student assistants went
through a thorough explanatory session. During these sessions, the na-
ture of the questionnaire, the vocabulary and the themes were discussed
and explained. This included specific explanation relative to the na-
ture and purpose of the questionnaires, the reading of each question on
the instrument, explanation of the concepts and themes, and clarifica-
tion of misunderstandings and misinterpretations. All assistants were
given instructions relative to clarification of issues and concepts in
the questionnaire, and how these should be explained to the respon-
dents. There were several other minor problems with the interpretation
of some of the questions. In these cases the final interpretation was
made by the principal investigator.

The initial concern for many respondents was the political nature
of the questionnaire. Some respondents were unwilling at first, to par-
ticipate, because they did not want to comment on the current political
situation. Only after the time frame of more than twenty years ago, was
clarified and emphasized, as was previously explained, did the reluct-
ance subside. The clarification helped. However, one prospective respon-
dent did not participate because of the ''uncomfortable political con-

tent of the questionnaire". Many assistants reported that in many

35
instances, they had to explain the terms to many respondents, and many

respondents said the questionnaire was too long. I suspected, for exam-
ple, that the length of the questionnaire might have been a factor in
the 98 questionnaires (14 percent) which were classified as invalid. In
this instance, more than half of the answers were ‘DON’T KNOW’ or other
entries considered as non-response to the particular questions. Nonethe-
less, as requested on the questionnaire, many respondents took the ex-
tra time to comment both negatively and positively on our efforts.

5. Spatial Areas of the Study
and Distribution of the Questionnaires

The study was conducted in two major cities: Coldn and Panama City,
and which were divided into Northern and Southern Neighborhoods. The as-
sistants were instructed on the general areas of the neighborhoods in
which to apply the questionnaires. The distribution of the questionn-
aires was done with the assistance of ten students, nine from the Socio-
logy Department of the Universidad de Paname, three from the Uni-
versidad Santa Maria La Antigua (USMA), and the members of the Pas-
toral-Afro of Coldn.

Nine Universidad de Panama, students, covered eighteen neighbor-
hoods, four in the outskirts: Arraijan, Chorrera, Las Cumbres and Pedre-
gal, of the Corregimientos or Counties of San Miguel, Chorrillo,
Calidonia, San Niguelito, Rio Abajo --particularly the areas of La
Boca Town, "Calle Cuarta" or Fourth Street-- the general areas of
Parque Lefevre County in Panama City. Two questionnaires: one each
from the Province of Chiriqui and the town of Pesé, Herrera in
the interior part of the country were considered as extreme outlier of

the Southern Neighborhood.

36
In Coldn, the area included two neighborhoods: Coldn City proper

and Area Iris; eleven neighborhoods in the out-skirts, and one outlier:
Buena Vista. The student from the USMA, along with the Pastoral-
Afro covered Coldn City proper and Area Iris (Rainbow City); eleven
neighborhoods in the out-skirts, and Buena Vista, which was registe-
red ‘as an outlier. Two other assistants covered the Costa Arriba
(the Upper Coast). Unfortunately the data from the Coasts and from the
Pastoral-Afro did not arrive on time to be included. (See Figures 3

through 7.)

37
(I) TABLE 1

AREAS OF INVESTIGATION: 1994

Valid Questionnaires Administered in:

Colon Number Percent Panama Number Percent
Northern Neighborhoods Southern Neighborhoods
Arco Iris
(Rainbow City) 12 2.0 Ancdn l .2
Buena Vista 1 .2 Arraijan 5 .8
Coldn 120 19.9 Bella Vista 2 .3
Cativé (Feria) 1 .2 Betania l .2
Nuevo Coldn 7 1.2 Calidonia 28 4.8
Nuevo Mexico 5 .8 Cerro Batea l .2
Pildn 8 1.3 Chiriqui 1 .2
Puerto El Cafio 1 .2 Chorrera 2 .3
Rio Alejando 12 2.0 Chorrillo 14 2.3
Sabanitas 26 4.3 Ciudad Bolivar 1 .2
San Judas 10 1.7 El Crisol 1 .2
Villa del Cérmen 4 .7 Hate Pintado 1 .2
Villa Guadalupe 1 .2 Juan Diaz 11 1.8
La Pesé 1 .2
Las Cumbres 2 .2
Panama City 117 19.4
Parque Lefevre 43 7.1
Reparto El carmen 3 .5
Rio Abajo 80 13.3
Santa Maria 2 .3
San Miguel 6 1.0
San Miguelito 62 10.3
Pedregal 4 .7
Urb. Santa Clara 3 .5
Totals 208 34.6 394 65 4

The areas shown in TABLE 1 were selected because of their demogra-
phic composition which included peoples of African heritage. As was ex-
pected in the Northern Neighborhoods, and given the high concentration
of people of Afro heritage, Coldn City had the highest response rate
(20 percent), followed by Sabanitas (5 percent), and rco Iris and
Rio Alejandro,each with 2 percent. In the Southern Neighborhoods,
Panamd City had the highest (19 percent), followed by Rio Abajo (13

38
percent), and San Miguelito (10 percent). The sub-sample of the 174 mem-

bers/sympathizers is as follows:

(2) TABLE 2
SUB-SAMPLE or THE AREAS or INVESTIGATION: 1994

Coldn Number Percent Panama Number Percent
Northern Neighborhoods Southern Neighborhoods

Arco Iris 6 3 4 Arraijan 5 .8

Cativa 6 3.4 Calidonia 6 3.4

Coldn 14 8.0 Chorrillo 1 .6

Sabanitas 7 4.0 Juan Diaz 4 2.3

Pildn 3 1 7 Panama City 24 13.8
Parque Lefevre 22 12.6
Rio Abajo 65 37.4
San Miguelito 9 5.2

Totals 36 137

Percentages 20.5 79.5

The sub-sample in TABLE 2 represents the areas and quantity of the
174 members/sympathizers. The data were collected during February and
March, 1995.

6. Time Frame Concerns

Because of limited funding, the most difficult assignment was to
compress a field study designed for five months into two. Another major
consideration during the field work was safety concerns and precautions
in Coldn and Panama cities and surroundings. Panama has deteriorated
much in regards to police protection and general safety of the popula-
tion since Bush’s 1989 US Invasion. This limited much personal mobiliza-
tion, and the ability to be in particular areas at certain times, given
the safety concerns of the investigator, the student assistants, as

well as the informants.

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8. Chapter Two Endnotes

lDocumento Central del Primer Congreso del Negro Panamefio",
. Centro de Convenciones ATLAPA,Panama,1981,(Panamazlmprenta
INAC), 1982, p.61.

2Interview with 0.8., New York: May, 1995.
3Interview with P.E., York: May, 1994.

4Within the literature the concept, autoethnography
(Friedman, Norman L. 1990; David M.Hayamo,'Auto Ethnography:Paradigms,
Problems and Prospects,” in Human Qrganizatinn. Vol.38 1979,
pp.99-104), is also referred to ' experimental

as.
analysis,(Shulamit Reinharz, On Beenning a Sonia! Seientist. San
Francisco:Jossey-Bass,1979); complete- member research, (Patricia

A.Adler and Peter Adler, Memhershin Relea in field Reaeareh.
California: Newbury Sage Publication, 1987); personal
sociology,(Paul C. Higgins and John M.Johson,ed., Eersonal Soein-
ingy. New York: Preager, 1988); postmodern ethnography, (Norman Den-
zin, ”Review Symposium on Field Methods," Journal at tontemporary tth-
negranhy, Vol.18, 1998a, pp. 90-98); conventional covert worker ethno-
graphy, (Norman L. Friedman, "Conventional Covert Ethnographic Re-
search by a Worker: Considerations from Studies Conducted as a Substi-
tute Teacher, Hollywood Actor, and Religious School Supervisor", in S_n-

in Qnalitatiye hethnnnlngy, Refleetinns an Fieln Ernerimenta. Vol.
2, Robert G. Burgess, ed., 1990), and opportunistic research, (Jef-
frey W.Riemar, ”Varieties of Opportunistic Research." Urhan Life. Vol.
5, pp.A467-A 477).

5Martin Blumer, "The Merits .and Demerits of Covert Participant
Observation", p.232, in Sneia! Beeeareh Ethjea: an Explanation at
Snvert Eartieinant Qheeryation. Martin Blumer, ed., (New York: Homes
and Meier, 1982), pp.217-215. This technique is also used in History,
Language, English and Law, although in these disciplines the examples

contain elements of fiction. the thrnniete at Higher tentatinn, Vol.38
(May 6), 19929 ppoA7‘A9.

6Norman L. Friedman,"Autobiographical Sociology',in the Aneriean
Sneintngiet Vol.21, No.1 (Spring). 1990, p.61.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PRESENCE OF THE RACIAL FACTOR
IN PANAMA AND EURO-LATIN-AMERICA

A. Early National Background

From the late 1840s, while Panama was still a state of Colombia,
the US cultivated the prospects of a neo/colonial, hemispheric control
of the Isthmian transit area through the Mallarino/Bidlack Treaty of
1849. This Treaty gave the US the rights to intervene in the early
transit area to ”protect" property, and which the US used to manage and
manipulate outcomes favorable to its interests. This came to fruition
with the Panama Canal Treaty Convention of 1903 between the Republic of
Panama and the United States (US). -

The 1903 Canal Treaty was tied to two significant facts: 1- the pro-
cess of Panamanian nation construction and 2- Panamanian national cultu-
ral structures and political system. To understand these issues, it is
necessary to review some selective, but important historical moments.
First, the 1903 Treaty, in fact, represented the immigration of thou-
sands of Caribbean workers for the construction of the canal project.
Second and most important, the Treaty represented the conflict between
nation/State and hen/colonialism, given: a- the impositions of arbitra-
ry interpretations of the Treaty by the US, and b- the early effects of
Article 136 from 1904 until 1935. It has been suggested by local histo-
rians that with prodding from Washington, the local bourgeoisie, defin-
ed as a coalition of people with the political clout to dominated the
economic, social and political arena of the society, wrote Article 136
of the 1904 Panamanian Constitution, which authorized US intervention

45

46
in Panama’s domestic problems. This Article reflected not only the lit-

tle faith the local bourgeoisie had in each other as class members, but
it also set the stage for the extended use of the US military in Pana-
ma’s domestic problems and its effect on the popular class. This was
the case of the Chiriqui Invasion of 1916, the Gran Huelga de 1920
--the Great Strike of 1920--,1 La Huelga de las Inquilinos --the
Renter’s Strike of 1925--.2

Likewise, the 1903 Treaty arbitrarily allowed for the incarceration
and/or deportation of nationals, whether Afro-Hispanic or Afro-Antille-
an from national soil --the canal area-- by a foreign government, the
US. The Treaty also allowed a racist treatment of Panamanians by the US
canal authorities, particularly the canal zone police. The McDonald and
Sixto cases3 are instances of police abuse and racist treatment among
other political issues.

The US canal project represented not only the promotion of the bour-
geois’ long awaited prosperity, and their aspired participation in the
new economic market, but also the realization of the Divine Manifesta-
tion announced by Tomas Herrera in 1811.

The Isthmus owes to the mercantile system of the civilized world

the services for which it has been destined by the Supreme Being

making the oceans closer by dividing the high cordilleras of
the Andes.

The construction of the Panama Canal was the realization of Herre-
ra’s Divine Manifestation and cemented Panama’s place in the world
economy. But it also had other important articulations for the country
and the State where:

the state in underdeveloped capitalist societies was primarily an
agent for transmitting the global dynamics of the international di-

vision of labor to the national level and reproducing the internag
class and political power structure according to these dynamics.

47
Another effect of the canal, paraphrasing Hein and Stenzel, was the

emergence of the metropolitan bourgeoisie as an ‘external ruling
class’, who more or less determined which faction of the internal bour-
geoisie would dominate in domestic affairs (and) consequently broke up
any internal block which opposed their interests.6 In this context,
the Panamanian State would reflect the historical economic demands and
interests of a specific social group and economic class, the oligarchic
bourgeoisie, a coalition of families of European descent who have main-
tained filial relationship among themselves and have dominated the eco-
nomic, social and political arena of the society.

In Panama, this politically dominant group is the historic ruling
class which was instrumental in the juridical construction of the coun-
try, and who has managed the State for more than three quarters of the
country’s existence:1903-l968. The oligarchic bourgeoisie is the retain-
er of international, industrial, agrarian, commercial and finance capi-
tal. This class is composed of local commercial capitalists, urban land-
lords, rural latifundistas, --owners of large tracts of rural
areas; owners of the major construction companies, and representatives
of multinational corporations, among other interests. This includes a
tightly knitted oligopolist and agrarian elite, some of whose primary
economic concerns and interests are transnational rather than local, gi-
ven the various economic linkages with transnational and international
strategies.

This class has various factions and the winning factional interest
is manifested in the degree of control or influence the particular fac-
tion or coalition may have attained on the State and hence the economy.

In relationship to the role of the State, citing Castells, Cabrera

48
Arias writes:

the State is the ... crystallization of social relations ... expres-

sing group and class interests ... in the mechanisms of institution-

al power .... In every society ... there is a dominant class, whose
domination is materialized through the configuration of the State
according to their interests.7

But the construction of the 1903 canal also created a paradoxical
situation. This meant in the first instance, that the relation of econo-
mic power would be in the hands of the White US bourgeois capitalists
and not in the hands of the local White bourgeoise and second, that the
relation of political power and control of the country (Panamé) would
not be in the hands of the local White bourgeoisie, but in Washington.

This would also solidify the new 1055 over the economic and politic-
al control of the canal area --if not the canal construction-- which re-
presented to a major degree, if not another 1055, then the inability of
the local bourgeoisie to legitimize its hegemony. The previous economic
loss came as a result of the earlier transformation of the transit area
from a subsistence to a market economy, forged by the expansion of US
capital from as early as 1850, to the disadvantage of the local White
bourgeoisie.

A majority of White foreign European immigrants formed many small
colonies under the protection of their respective Counsels, who not
only fomented the commercial activities of their fellow citizens, but
were also highly active commercially.8 Lieberson suggests that in
societies where the migrant population is superondinant, it is often ne-
cessary to introduce new migrant groups to fill the niches created in
the economy of the area.9 In Panama, it was the Germans, English,

Italians, French and US nationals who served as ”middlemen” in the 10-

cal economy. In this case, this international bourgeoisie inverted

49
their role, forcing the local bourgeois’ loss of the local market, and

in turn, relegated the latter to a second place as intermediaries to
supply the ”middlemen” with services and products. Thus, it would ap-
pear that the bourgeoisie’s economic frustration has had a previous his-
tory. The subordinant migrant groups to fill the niches were the Antil-
leans.

Likewise, from very early, during the 1903 construction process, as
the more powerful of the two countries, the US’s control of local go-
vernments and resources continuously drew the Isthmus into the world
economy and international politics, resulting in a controlling influ-
ence over the dependent, Panamanian economy and politics. Through the
use of resources, political ideology, and military interventions, the
US, as a global manager state, --defined as those States which make
world political decisions and influence the economics, politics, social
and cultural life of other States-- not only appropriated control of
the canal project, but also of the Isthmian economy. These above condi-
tions created a specific internal structure within the dependent coun-
try, and defined the structural possibilities of the dependent national
economy. This structural condition in part, set the stage for the emer-
gence of social movements in Euro-Hispanic countries like Panama, where
the outcome is partially determined by the situation of the country’s
historical political process, and the social ideological forces which
assisted in the process of national subordination to external control.

8. Race in Panama and Euro-Hispanic-America
1. Ideological Dimensions of Race and Nation

This part of the discussion deals with Afro-Panamanian identity in

relation to race and nation formation, and the controlling definition

50
of nationality within institutional structures of inequality, particu-

larly for Afro-Antillean Panamanians. Of interest is how race and rac-
ima are used as articulating principles in various stages in the forma-
tion and development of nations, and how they contribute to the process
and formation of national identities.lo

Because slavery became linked with servitude, the inevitable asso-
ciation of skin color and servitude emerged. Race then became a central-
ly important, relevant factor in which to classify people in ascending
and descending order. Once this association and expectation took hold,
a generalized belief system, and a special logic was established. The
generalized belief of race and ethnicity is a historic ideological con-
dition emerging from the ascendancy of capitalism and capital accumula-
tion, which preceded the industrial revolution, and which in turn has
its roots in the slave trade of Africans from the 15005 to the middle
of the 18005. And as Europeans and US powers struggled to create a ca-

11 and

pitalist world order, they imposed enormous meaning upon race,
the racial factor crystallized through the presence of millions of peo-
ples of Africans heritage in different parts of the world.

In this context, the selective grouping of people through skin co-
lor created a hierarchical arrangement of social selection, given the
psychological, cultural, and political significance attributed to it.
12 Therefore, the emergence of racial ideologies walked hand in
hand with European overseas economic expansion, and became a central
defining (ideological) factor,13 based on quasi scientific vali-
dations and social selection.14 The manipulation of race, featu-

red in the system of social selection, would in effect, come to design-

ate white complexion with privileges and dark complexion with

51

labor. 15

Similarly, the generalized racial ideology in Panama is related to
the colonial and post-colonial development of Euro-Latin American na-
tions. It is suggested that in societies and cultural structures which
were created through conquest, and whose social institutions are molded
in the racial, religious and ‘national’ images of the colonial conquer-
or, racism, ethnic discrimination and segregation are the norms.

2. White Criollo Power and the Stranger Mythology

White Criollos, Euro-Latins, Euro-Hispanics and Euro-Anglos re-
fer to the sub-population of European descent who are referred to soci-
ally as ethnic Whites, and who self-identify as such. (See footnote #7
of the Introduction for a detailed discussion of these definitions.)
Western European mentality conceived a multi-ethnic society as an eth-
nic catastrophe which would undermine and destroy European culture and
national character. White Criollo merchants and intellectuals show-
ed much interest in popular European and US theories, particularly dur-
ing the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Both Euro-Latins and Euro-Anglos were the dominant groups in the
construction of the ‘American’ societies, both received the legacy of
Eurocentrism, both contributed to each other’s society; and both attemp-
ted to replicate Europe or make the ‘Americas’ an integral part of Euro-
pean society. The social and political organizations of ‘American’ 50-
cieties were constructed around the internal separation of social races
and the rationality of a world modelled after Europe. Based on this mo-
del, the points of references of Euro-Anglo and Euro-Latin American 50-
cieties are obviously similar, if not the same. Both reified Europe as

a model, and both, if possible, would transform the society within the

52
model of acceptance of Eurocentrism. The process of Euro-Latin-American

‘civilization’ was the elimination, not the inclusion and recognition
of the presence of other cultures; and if not, then, the assimilation
of peoples of color --for transformative purpose-- to the ideal of ‘Eu-
ropean civilization’. Each social, economic and political reform or
transformation sponsored by Euro-Hispanic-America was, and still is in-
terpreted as a positive step towards the type of society which exists
in Europe. Hamilton, Benedito and Powell-Benard write:
it is clear that great value is placed upon acceptance in the Eu-
ropean community: the more European we are as a people and a na-
tion, the greater our acceptability into European culture, politi-
cal and economic milieu. To attain this end, ideological unity be-
comes a priority. One possiblesway of achieving it is to use ”race

as the articulating principle .

This is at the very roots of the legacy of the Euro-Hispanic-Panama-
nians and corresponds not only to the rest of Euro-Latin-America, but
also that of Euro-Anglo-America: the US and Canada. For Euro-Hispanics
this makes Europe an external reference of immense importance, because
without it, the social, economic and political life of Euro-Latins
would be meaningless. The negation of this legacy is the game played
with the ideological contradiction of imagery and reality. The image
presented is that of democratic Euro-Latin societies, which is civiliz-
ed’ and morally upright.

The construction of national myths and ideologies comes usually
from the dominant class, as a means to preserve their stature and con-
trol, which may represent glorious traditions and exploits or overcom-
ing frustration and exploitation. In the case of Panama’s Criollos,

this lead to antagonism and the development of negative myths and ideo-
logies about Afro-Antilleans. Criollo antagonism against the Afro-

53
Antillean immigrants stemmed, on the one hand, from the Criollos’

frustration to the gringos’ total control of the canal construction
project, given the farmer’s exclusion from the canal project and inabi-
lity to penetrate the canal zone market. Gringo is defined as a pe-
jorative name for citizens of the US, particularly White US citizens
and especially White US soldiers. This created a paradox where the frus-
trations of the local White oligarchy would, contradictorily, lead to a
collusion and alliance with Washington.

On the other hand, the contradiction would illustrate the oligar-
chy’s displaced aggression on the most visible and vulnerable target,
the immigrant Caribbean workers. Because aggression is displaceable,
and against a highly visible and unprotected minority who may consti-
tute an ideal scapegoat, it became a very effective ideological instru-
ment. Fanon writes:

The settler keeps alive in the native an anger .... the native is
trapped in tight ... chains of colonialism .... and finds an outlet
in tribal warfare.... While the settler ... strikes ... insults and
makes him crawl ... you will see the native reaching for his knife
at the slightest ... or aggressive glance ... (from) other natives

Here ... we discern the well-known behavior pattern of avoi-
dancel7... to ignore the obstacle, and to put off ... the inevit-
able.

Paraphrasing Fanon, because of fears of retribution, violent and
otherwise, the local, White bourgeoisie was unable to direct their ang-
er openly and directly against their ”real target", the gringos, du-
ring the first seven decades of Republican life. The local White oligar-
chy displaced their aggression against the Antillanos, not only be-
cause of the Antilleans’ visibility as a racial/ethnic group, but also

because they were viewed as an ally to the oligarchy’s enemy, the US,

who represented at the same time, both the realization of the

54
oligarchy’s goals and their demons. Thus, the aggression displaced

against the Afro-Antilleans over time, as "agents of social pathology"
or “as a dangerous addition to the general population", added to the ma-
jor argument that the Afro-Antillean immigrants were taking jobs away
from local workers.
3. The Intersection of Race and Class

The presence of Afro-Antillean immigrant ethnic workers reflected
two dimensions to the issue of contract laborers: one is the economics
of the decision, and the other is the race/class intersection. As an
economic decision it was cheaper to hire immigrants than local laborers
and as an economic policy, it still is. Because where labor laws pro-
tect local workers, immigrants are exempted; where local workers could
and can strike, immigrant workers should not or cannot. This practice
was common throughout the colonial world, where, for example, immigrant
laborers from Asia --first China, then Japan and later the Philippines
-- worked for the sugar plantations of White US businesses in Hawaii.

After the demises of slavery in the Caribbean, the East Indians
were the primary labor force on the plantations in British Guyana and
Trinidad, and a contract labor force on the plantations, railroads and
mines in South Africa.18 In the USA, (1889) immigrant Chinese worked
on the railroad. And from as early as 1882, 2,000 Jamaicans worked on
the stretch between San-Luis Potosi/Tampico, in Mexico. Between
1904-1911, more than 8,000 Caribbean, some Jamaicans, the majority Be-
lizeans, were in Mexico for agricultural work in Campeche, Chiapas,
Tamaulipas and Yucatan. However, not all these immigrants were non-
skilled, some did commercial work and others were businessmen, artisans

and even professionals.19 Similarly, between 1905-1907 more than

55
5,000 Barbadians went to Brasil for the construction of the Madeira Ma-

morey railroad.20

In essence, Caribbean labor was very instrumental in the construc-
tion of the railroads, ports and other ‘international projects’ in Bra-
sil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela. Thus,
the decision by the project contractors as to whether or not to employ
immigrants in the creation of a market economy in the Panama Canal
Zone, was economic. And the argument that contract laborers and others
--the Antilleans in the case of Panama-- deprived the local and "lazy"
workforce from jobs is fallacious in that it disregards the decisions
of the foreign contractors and the Panamanian State, and instead blames
the victims. These are the same arguments used in Cuba and other coun-
tries from where 'lazy' immigrant workers were recruited. For example,
'lazy' Caribbean peoples became the migrant workers in Panama, and
“lazy“ East Indians became the migrant workers in Trinidad. In Panama,
the presence of the Caribbean workforce was not generally welcomed by
Euro-Hispanic-Panamanians for racial ideological and political reasons,
but their labor was highly valued by the international capitalists.

The second dimension is the racial/class and immigrant status inter-
section. Recruiting colored immigrants was a major part of a "con-
tract system'I of labor. In almost every instance of contract labor, the
laborers were invariable non-White, recruited to serve the labor needs
of the White colonialists. In almost every country, the imported colo-
red immigrants did the most menial jobs. They lived segregated from
the general population in barracks or enclaves, in very rigidly control-

led situations as if they were slaves.

56
In Panama, for example, White Criolllo intellectuals voiced the

concerns of their ethnic community, that the Antillean immigration re-
presented a stigma which would endanger the process of ethnic evolution
towards a White population.21 This did not mean that the majority
Afro-Hispanic population was immune to Criollo discontent. On the
contrary, the White Criollos simply ignored their presence and re-
legated them to the least of everything in the society. For example,
Afro-Hispanics as a group, were not part of Panama, White Criollos’
social, economic, or political arenas.

It is suggested, that this aggression responded not only to the oli-
garchy’s inability to face their major client/partner/nemesis, but also
their inherent fears of "eternal flames of an Afro revolution", Antil-
leans’ defiance and resistance to exploitation, and sense of ethnic/ra-
cial consciousness. In fact, this has become the phenomenon of the oli-
garchy’s bogeyman complex, --el cuco-- as it is called, that
the local bourgeoisie has manipulated so effectively, i.e.; the use of
outsiders not only as the cause and blame for social ills, but also to
use others as the enemy to ”develop” some sense of national loyalty.
The cuco appeal is in response to the demands of the racial and po-
litically subordinant groups.

Imagery clashed with reality in these societies, bringing to the
fore the processes and practices used to maintain the on-going social,
economic and political advantages obtained as a result of the early re-
pressive slave societies. The post/colonial development of Panama is si-
milarly tied to Europe, through White Spanish colonists who succeeded
in dominating the state structures. Smith’szz and Furnivall’s23 the-

oretical postulations of the plural society are pertinent here with

57
reference to the social, cultural and political subordination of vario-

us ethnic groupsz4 by a politically dominant minority within a popula-
tion.

In these plural societies,25 cultural and social differences have
lent themselves to political domination of one group over the others.
For Smith, the significant dynamics of the plural society are the poli-
tical manipulation by a White numerical minority for differential incor-
poration of non-white peoples solely on the basis of race, and the emer-
gence of social mobilization in the socio/cultural milieu to effect so-
cial change. For Furnivall, the hierarchical, racial/occupational di-
vision is a significant characteristic of the "plural colonial socie-
ty', with coercion and force as important features of control for the
dominant group. In fact the entire structure of control is based upon
coercion by the State’s repressive apparatus. Thus, racial/ethnic
groups which were later recognized within the society, came under the
political control of the White political minority and invariably at the
bottom of the social ladder. This de jure differential incorpora-
tion of subordinate minority groups has led to the de facto pre-
vailing conditions today. The binding force and principal organizing
idea in plural societies is political domination by a cultural minori-
ty. Underlying the social praxis in these societies are cultural diver-
sity, inequality, and political domination.

The Panamanian oligarchy has a rather selective process of differen-
tial incorporation of non-white ethnic groups, and many in the oligar-
chy are uncomfortable not only with the mixed ‘racial’ composition of
the society, but also the mixed racial composition of their families.

0n the one hand, Afro-Hispanic-Panamanians who were exposed to the

58
ideological and political dominance of the White Criollo oligarchy,

were incorporated into the system given their degree of interrelation
with the national, social and political system. Important at the time
for the majority of Afro-Hispanic-Panamanian people in 1903, as it was
with the 1820 Independence, was the idea of belonging to a national
entity, a territory under the assumption that nationality would level
all to juridical equality, particularly those of meager finance and low
social status. However, as Maloney writes:

the racist factors which were the ideological elements of ... sub-

jugation ... during slavery did not disappear with the birth of the

Republic, ... instead they were reaccommodated, reelagorated as me-

chanisms to legitimize the hegemony of the oligarchy.

During the first half of the 19th Century, the arrabal --defin-
ed sociologically as the environment in which the interrelations and af-
filiation of immigrants with the large society occurs --with its impos-
ing demographic strength, did not achieve what was feared most by the
White Criollos, political dominance and racial solidarity. But,
from the 18605 to the 18705, Afro-Hispanic-Isthmians, in the arrabal,
had their Black Liberal Party. Armed with Remington rifles,27 they
consistently showed a clear political consciousness, force and demogra-
phic strength. During this period, the arrabaleros voted into pow-
er, their choice of leaders and other functionaries. For example, in
the Presidency of the Sovereign Republic of Panama they voted in: Gene-
ral Buenaventura Correoso, 1861-1868 and 1878 1879; Juan Mendoza, 1871;
General Rafael Aizpuru, 1875-1877; Jose Ricardo Casorla, 1879 and final-
ly, General Gerardo Ortega, 1879. Some historians believe that these

men came from the arrabal.28 On the other hand, it is suggested,

that since the eleven year period (1861-1879), given the political

59
structure which then affected the Afro-Hispanics as a social formation,

their political impact as an ethnic group has been nil. This could be
an effect of the promulgation of later electoral laws which forbade par-
ties based on gender, race or religion.

C. Race and State Policy

The desire of Euro-Latin to become closer to Europe was expressed
in the idea of bridging the racial/ethnic difference for the construc-
tion of an ‘homogeneous’ race. Throughout the hemisphere, in every coun-
try of North, Central and South America, efforts were made to attract
Europeans to ‘whiten’ the emerging societies, or according to Toplin,
to advertise their countries as attractive places for "pure” White Eu-
ropean immigrants.29 There have been attempts to bridge the diffe-
rence between African and European immigration during the last half of
the 19th century and the early years of the Panamanian Republic. Thus,
understanding State racism, defined as the participation of the State
in the creation, maintainance and/or valorization of one racial/ethnic
group over another, is fundamental to the position of Afros and other
ethnic groups in the society.

In 1913, just prior to the completion of the canal construction,
the Panamanian Government requested and the US Government acceded to
the repatriation of Antillean canal workers.3o Ironically, that same
year, 1913 and the following, 1914, not withstanding the large number
of unemployed Afro-Hispanic and Antillean workers at the time, (9,534
Antilleans in the Canal Zone in 1913),31 the Panamanian Government re-
quested additional workers for the canal project from the Spanish and
Italian Governments. Given the earlier repatriation and the large num-

ber of unemployed able bodied men, why would the National Government

60
request the immigration of Spanish and Italian workers? Paz, comments

that "promoting the maintenance of white supremacy against the impend-
ing menaces from the super-imposed immigration of Blacks was perhaps
the motive for encouraging such immigration."32 Similarly, in 1940,
Panamanian census officials, offered an open invitation and suggested:
to the Europeans who wish to establish in the Republic and for whom
it could be possible to adapt to life in the Tropics, it would be a
good measure of demographic policy.
Maloney and Priestley write that the adverse racist-oriented poli-
cy, nurtured in the economically powerful sectors would manifest itself

34 which would become the instrument, le-

through legislative measures,
gal and otherwise, to control immigration. Legislative measures began
with the reformation of Article 6 of the 1904 Constitution, through Exe-
cutive power, which offered nationality to all born on Panamanian soil.
Law 13 of November 23, 1926, implemented new immigration measures. Arti-
cle 1 prohibited the immigration of Chinese, Japanese, Syrians, Turks,
Indo-Asians, Dravidians, West Indians and Guyanese Blacks whose native
language was not Spanish.35 Law 16 of January 31, 1927, amended Law
13 of 1926 which stated that those races referred to in the First Arti-
cle of the previous Law, would not be admitted as immigrants.36

By 1926, Antilleans were permitted to enter the country, but only
under the specific condition of work contracts, and immigration quotas

based on race were thus established.

Group A: Holland, Switzerland, Norway and Sweden.
200 persons per year.

Group 8: Australia, Denmark, New Zealand and Finland.
100 persons per year.

Group C: Germany, Austria and the Philippines.
50 persons per year.

Group 0: Haiti and other coéfiiries not specified in the previous
groups, or those of prohibited immigration.
10 persons per year. -

The Act of 1928 (October, 19th), restricted the benefits of the Con-
stitution to persons of foreign parentage until they declare a prefe-
rence on their let birthday. By the mid-19305, the socio-political si-
tuation for dark-skin immigrants, particularly Antilleans was close to
a crisis. In 1938, Law 54 (Article 15) stated:

The immigration of Chinese, Gypsies, North Africans, Turks and
non-Spanish speaking Blacks is absolutely prohibited. Those foreign-
ers belonging to any of these races ... will be considered as tran-
sient only, and will not be able to reside in the national terri-
tory.38
Other decrees restricted the internal movements of the prohibited

immigrants once in the country.39 Yet, throughout all the invecti-
ves, the economic value of the Antilleans’ presence was not lost. From
as early as 1920, the editorial voice of some commercial sectors sugges-
ted the restricted expulsion‘ of the Antilleans as an approach to the
country’s serious economic problem. And in 1926, when the National As-
sembly proposed a law to restrict Antillean immigration, The Chambers
of Commerce of Coldn and Panama solicited the President’s veto, because
50,000 Antillanos represented ninety (90) percent of their business-
es.4o

As president, Arnulfo Arias used racist arguments to assure Panama-
nians that the Antilleans were responsible for all the ills of the Repu-
blic. This character of racism is traced directly to the presence of
the Afro-Antillean people and other ethnic minorities as a popular ‘ex-
planation’ for economic recession, and social ills.41 In 1941, Arias
used expulsion to constitutionally get rid of Panamanians of Antillean

descent. Article 2, Section Five of the 1941 Constitution established

62
nationality by birth or naturalization. Article 12 excludes ”prohibited

immigrants' from nationality by birth. Article 14 restricts "prohibited
immigrants" from naturalization. Article 23 defined "prohibited immi-
grants“.42
The State will oversee the immigration of healthy ... workers, adap-
table to the conditions of the national life and capable of contri-
buting to the ethnic, economic and demographic improvement of the
country. Those of prohibited immigration are: the Black race whose
original language is not Spanish, the Yellow race and the3races ori-
ginating from India, Asia Minor and the North of Africa.
With the promulgation of the new Constitution ”approximately 50,000 An-
tilleans were denationalized and subjected to a long period of persis-
tent racial discrimination, the effects of which can still be
felt'.44 Article 13 allowed only three months to petition the Execu-
tive for exclusion.45
During this time, the Canal Zone, as a separate political jurisdic-
tion, may have been a sanctuary for Afro-Antillean-Panamanians who work-
ed and lived on the Zone, along with their various lodges, which appa-
rently were the only refuge for this ethnic/racial community. In Panama-
nian juridical territory, many Antilleans were forced into exile, inva-
lidating the national resources of citizenship. Where other national re-
sources may generate inequality, the concept of citizenship, like the
concept of justice, (‘We are all equal before the Law.’) is a resource
of equality for all who share the same nationality. Paz writes that An-
tilleans were forbidden to express their religious, philosophical, poli-
tical or scientific ideas publicly or formulate public opinion on natio-
nal politics. Article 21 of the 1941 Constitution states:
Political rights can only be exercised by nationals (citizens).46

Three prominent national jurists condemned the racist intentions.

63
Victor Goytia wrote:

the case of Title II of the Legislative Act of 1941, which denies

nationality to a group of the population ... in the zone only be-

cause of ... excessive pigmentation .47 is to stray from a rational
solution, through ignorance or malice.

Ricardo J. Alfaro wrote that the denationalization of pure blooded
Panamanians born on the Zone reveals not only palpable injustices, but
also manifest incongruities through an ex-post facto law. Juan Feli-
pe Escobar argued that Article 13 and the Executive Resolution No. 58
of August 15, 1942 of the Ministry of Government and Justice, is repro-
achable in that it tends to create, not an unassimilable minority, but
a pariah caste through violent denationalization.48

Politically, the only laws which recognize a minority group are
those which refer to the Indigenous population, and even so, this popu-
lation receives limited government support. Articles 113 and 116 respec-
tively of the Constitution read:

The State will give special attention to the peasant and Indigenous

communities with the purpose of promoting their economic, social

and political participation in the national life.

The State guarantees the Indigenous communities the reservation of

the necessary land and collective property of the same for the

achievement of their economic and social welfare. The Law will re-
gulate the processes ... to achieve this end and..491imitations wi-
thin which the appropriation of land is prohibited.

Yet, ironically, the only recognition of other ethnic groups is the
1926 Immigration Law on quotas.50 Law 13 (Article 1) of November 23,
192651 favored and welcomed Europeans immigrants but denies non-Euro-
peans. Law 16 of January, 1927 (which amended Law 13 of 1926) restrict-
ed Asians and Middle Easterners,52 and Law 54 (Article 15), 1938 re-
stricted the immigration of Chinese, Gypsies, North Africans, Turks and

non-Spanish speaking negros.53 Although today, the majority of

64
these immigrations laws are no longer on the books, they still tend to

generate their effects, as a stigma remains.

Another impact of the State policy is in the reproduction and main-
tenance of racial/ethnic identity of oppressed/stigmatized populations
through the awarding of citizenship. By denationalizing the Afro-Panama-
nians of Antillean heritage, the State effectively said that the Afri-
can heritage as a racial/ethnic attribute is a devaluating characteris-
tic and not worthy of association, i.e., citizenship. And although no
Afro-Hispanic Panamanian was denationalized, none was held up by the
State as a model or example of an “Afro-Panamanian”. Citing Ben-Tovin
and Gabriel:

state racism has overshadowed all subsequent discussion and acti-
on .... The official equation of blackness with second-class and un-
desirable immigrants --the principle that Black people are in them-
selves a problem, --the fewer we have, the better-- has dominated
the public ideologica§4discourse on race and has set the parameters
for political action.

This is state racism, interpreted as ”pseudo/biological cultural-
ism,‘I where it is argued that it is a "our (biological) instincts to de-
fend our way of life, tradition and customs against outsiders --not be-
cause they are inferior but because they are part of a different cul-
ture.'55 It is also argued that the role of the State, has been, and
is active in the definition and creation of racial/ethnic identities,
and very influential in a groups’ self appreciation. In Costa Rica, for
example, an 1900 century law was passed which allowed many Afro communi-
ties to change their social race without changing their "looks", such
that the population of social whites jumped from 9 percent in 1801 to
80.2 percent 1927.56 Similarly in Panama, by the stroke of a pen, the

16 percent Negros and the 57 percent of mixed Afro-Panamanians in

65
the 1911 census --which Alfaro called all Black derived groups--

and the 71 percent mixed Afro-Panamanians in the 1940 census, all be-
came the more than 70 percent mestizos in all future censuses.57

In these two countries and instances, people became "socially white
or .mestizo", because of the way social race was defined and con-
structed. Nestizo in the ‘Latin’ American context is defined as the
variation of racial mixtures within the population. This requires the
loss of an identity and the acquisition of another, the symbolic ”white
washing” of one’s forbearers. And in none of these countries are the
people of the African Diaspora registered as a majority, even in the
countries where they constitute the numerical majority, for example,
Brasil, Cuba and Panama --even the Dominican Republic. To paraphrase
Hoetink, an ideology which places emphasis of whitening --mestizaje
-- of the population is unavoidable in societies where a racist in-
gredient in the mechanism of social selection operates by
definition.58 It is suggested that:

the policy of integrating ethnic groups is ... in reality a cul-
tural policy, ... to integrate minorities into the larger whole,

.... The concept of integration veiled the fact that the social for-

mation is not a homogeneous entity, but a class divided ggciety, re-

garded as ... homogeneous in relation to the minorities.

This is, in effect, the manifestation of State racism, which, for
example, puts a premium on one heritage over another. State racism pro-
motes certain ideological values, and is part of the undergirding sys-
tem of domination which serves to exclude Afro-Panamanians --indirectly
or not-- from the social, economic and political arenas. One can specul-
ate as to whether or not the immigration laws, mythology and ideology

of whitening --me5tizaje-- achieved what the ”demographic transi-

tion“ could not.60

66
1. Maintaining Control of National
Identity and Symbols
In Euro-Hispanic ‘Latin’ America, the collaboration of various eth-
nic groups of European descendent, provided the homogeneity to trans-
mute their racial/ethnic identity upon the State for a political pro-
ject. They became intimately associated with the political and economic
project of nation formation. They became the power elites in the emerg-
ing nations of ‘Latin’ America. As national elites, they related to
their European compatriots through class and racial bonds. For example,
in Panama, they composed the national anthem, designed the flag and the
coat of arms.61 As Hamilton, Benedito and Powell-Benard write:
their identity and their ‘Europeanness’ were strongly incorporat-
ed into the emerging national identity, as this was important to
them in crystallizing and consolidating the emerging nation
state.6
And Smith-Fernandez writes that the local bourgeoisie:
with evident signs of ... narcissism, (they) flooded the streets
and plazas with their own names and effigies ... appropriated ...
the prerogative of choosing the symbols, values and cultural ele-
ments ... of nationality ... and surpressed in its totality all im-
ages of African descent.... (I)n two gigantic paintings allusive to
Panamanian nationality in the Yellow Room of the Presidency and the
ceiling of the National Theater, Roberto Lewis totally omitted the
presence of the African. The "Panamanians" painted by Lewgg are so
Nordic that they need not envy the Scandinavian Walkyrians.
Thus, it is argued, that the social construction of Panama was ex-
} pected to lead to a specific racial/ethnic, Euro-Hispanic identity.
Smith’s conceptualization of Western nations sees:
nations as named human populations claiming a common ancestry, a
demotis solidarity, common customs and vernaculars, and a com-
mon native history. Genealogy, demography, traditional culture, and
history furnishfithe main resource for the ethnic view of the forma-
tion of nations.
National identity constitutes a specific form of identity consonant

with particular racial/ethnic characteristic of a group(s) with similar

67
ethnic components and political class identity. National identity like

racial/ethnic identity, involves claims of common ancestry as a source
of shared rights, duties, and a shared sense of what is, and what a
group is supposed to be.

The growth of racism and the development of a powerful national ra-
cist ideology have presented serious threats to ethnic minorities as
part of a national entity --a nationality. Moreover, the increasing em-
phasis on nationality and patriotism with the concomitant definition of
who has citizenship and the withdrawal of such rights from minority
groups, is a serious challenge to the concepts of national, ethnic iden-
tity and citizenship. This places the State as a major source of contra-
diction regarding national identity and the display of ethnic identi-
ties. Recall, for example, that during the 19405, the political admini-
stration of Arnulfo Arias elevated racism to a constitutional degree in
that Afro-Panamanians of Antillean heritage, immigrant Chinese and oth-
er ethnic groups were denied citizenship.

In this case of constitutional racism, it led to the denationaliza-
tion, relocation and/or expulsion of ‘tainted’ groups, and the loss of
Afro-Antillean and Chinese property and profitable business operations.
In this way, aggression can be associated with any racial/ethnic group
in a society, as a visible minority or as a designated target; i.e.,
people of African heritage, the Japanese-American in the US during the
19405 and the Jews in Nazi Germany. For these groups, their racial/eth-
nic origin was considered “blemished and contaminated," and a de-
fect in the lineage which contaminated all the members.

But by the time of the 1962 Bazan Amendment, which restored natio-

nality by birth, a new generation of Afro-Antillean descendants were

68
already active in the national political life, generating new transfor-

mations. Yet for some Panamanians, it is still argued, for example,
that:

the insertion of the Antilleans into the national life, meant for

them a long and painful process, practically the sacrifice of a dis-

placed generation, who aspired to reproduce their culture ... with-

puts the blessing of the citizens and the assistance of the authori-

This notion is based on the belief that equality of rights is not
compatible with the conservation of identity. In other words, to accede
to such rights one must not perceive oneself as different, nor declare
belonging to a different people.66 Collective identity does not mean
that all Afro-Panamanians share the same goals and values, or that na-
tionalism will supersede religion, race and ethnic claims; however it
implies the realities of nationality, citizenship/patriotism to country
/state/nation and prolonged socialization on the character of a
group.67

Ideologies have a way of creating politically consequential histo-
ry, a reconstruction of the past on which particular ethnic and nation-
al identities have come to rest. Ethnic, racial and cultural diversity
have come to be viewed as a subversive challenge to the official nation-
al ideology, defined by its supposed homogeneity: one people with one
tongue and one God. In their desire to become hegemonic, the elite na-
tionalized themselves using race as the articulating principle.68 It
is this crafting and "the degree to which this historical system became
conscious of itself that it began to develop intellectually and/or ideo-
logical frameworks to justify and impel its forward movement."69

Thus, in plural societies undergoing the process of national con-

struction, the ethnic and national identity of the dominant group, a

69

70 is oftentimes at variance with the racial/

national ethnic group,
ethnic identity and nationalistic ideals of the rest of the population.
White Hispanic racial/ethnic identity is only one form of solidarity
from which a particular form of national identity was developed. And al-
though the elite manages to resonate a message of supposed homogeneity
to the national population, "at the same time, people and groups within
are rediscovering (their) particular forgotten ethnic
identities."71

In this sense, we begin to understand that Panama as a nation, is a
racial/ethnic mosaic with different historical and idiomatic currents,
which converged to form a singular, yet profoundly historical and con-
tradictory product: the Panamanian nation. It is suggested that the an-
swer to the White problem of social races, the Afro-Antilleans, Afro-
Hispanics, and the Indigenees, is in the unity of interests, together
with the rest of the popular sector.72 State stability is a function
of authority relations throughout the social structure, and national
identity is a variable and not a constant.73 It is further suggested,
that a nation which deliberately denies its continuity with its past
and refuses to develop the national will to recognize the heterogeneity
of its diverse culture and ethnic groups, is on the way of denying,
repudiating its own existence.

What has been lost since approximately the 19405 in Panama, is the
apparent racial solidarity between Afro-Hispanics and Afro-Antilleans.
This solidarity was evident from approximately, 1880 to 1925, when Afro-
Hispanics and Afro-Antilleans, as members of the arrabal, shared
the same life chances. During this period of 45 years, both Afro-Hispa-

nic and Antillean lived, intermarried and experienced the same racial

70
hostility and neglect from the socity and national governments as well

as racial hostility from foreign governments.74 This loss is directly
attributed to the racist policy of Arias’s 1940 administration. But
this racial ideology has always been a prevalent part of the social
structure; a structure which:
necessarily requires the development of ideologies and political
policies which revolve around segregation, preservation and con-
trol, ... The ideological focus ... is always on the "racial ...
(or) national" element, precisely becauge of the (racial) nature of
what is being preserved and controlled.
Racism has a subtle historical pervasiveness in Panamanian plural
society. The utilization of physical differences to mark minority sta-
tus was the case for the early Antillean immigrants, and still is, in

some social circles and institutions.

2. Contradictions in the Construction
of a National Identity

It has been suggested that the Panamanian people are fragmented in
regards to their sense of kin as a people and as a country; that there
is difficulty achieving a single prevailing collective conscience,76
because the overwhelming majority is alienated; that the population has
not yet developed a common sense of purpose. It would appear as if Pana-
ma faces difficulty in development a collective identity. It has been
further suggested that instead of a shared, clear language (nationality
and nationalism?) to facilitate communication, there is a language of
stigmatized identity of racial/ethnic groups, which reflects cultural
struggles within a process of fragmentation and impositions by dominant
groups. It is not surprising, even contradictory, in this struggle and

fragmentation, for example, for some Panamanian writers to invoke a na-

tional identity. For example, on the one hand, it is suggested that:

71
those who deny the existence of a national identity are ahistorical
... to the project which from the middle of the decade of the fif-
ties began to be executed, with a view towards ... the cause of na-
tional liberation, which from the decade of the forties entered a
qualitative superior phase.7
And on the other hand, lament its non-existence.

the absence of a profile of the national identity, has its explana-
tions which can be substantiated historically.

and that:

the authentic national identity is obscured through the aggravation

of the cgisis whose realization has been postponed

indefinitely.

This is precisely the point! First, this qualitative, superior
phase of national identity construction in the 19405 was co-opted by
the oligarchic regimes and replaced with emphasis on symbols such as of
the State, flags or historical figures. Since a nation cannot merely fo-
cus on symbolic identification, what matters instead is the inner cohe-
rence of such symbols in so far as it lends itself to felt and meaning-
ful boundary drawing. Second, the lack of, or the postponed identity
has its roots not only in slave society of colonial times, but also in
the post colonial construction of the plural society and the transmuta-
tion of European ethnic characteristics in State institutions. Third,
that the absence of a national identity can be explained historically,
is again precisely the point!

The differential incorporation of racial/ethnic groups, the domin-
ant racial/ethnic ideology as a mechanism of symbolic interpretation of
social control in national politics, have generated a lack of identifi-
cation with the country’s historical heritage, with the construction of

a national consciousness. A consciousness of pride, of belonging and

identity. It was to this mentality that ARENEP had hoped to

72
demonstrate a new understanding of identity and citizenship as Afro-Pa-

namanians. But the manipulations of the plural society have given rise
to the contradiction of national identity and the germination and deve-
lopment of racial/ethnic solidarity. For example, some groups have re-
tained their specific racial/ethnic identity; the Chinese-Panamanians,
Afro-Hispanics, Euro-Panamanians, Afro-Antilleans, Hindu-Panamanians,
as well as the Indigenees, among others. Although there is a degree of
national loyalty, some shared community and institutional values, raci-
al ethnic minorities are still demanding political, social and ethnic
space. The modern plural society in Panama is still a divided society,
with the market as the most shared common place.
3. National Consciousness and Collective Identity

National consciousness and collective identity does not mean same-
ness; it means recognition and tolerance --if not acceptance-- of a di-
verse racial/ethnic, national population. National identity is defined
as a common solidarity with a shared history, sense of belonging to the
nation/state and a sense of what and who a national population is. The
degree to which the State can develop this common solidarity and identi-
fication of the population as Panamanians, a collective consciousness
is possible as a nation of one people. A measure of that collective con-
science would be the degree to which racial/ethnic groups are included
as part of a national identity, and would not mean relinquishing their
historical heritage. Some authors call this collective consciousness
a common destiny;80 define not as sentiments of adherence to symbol-
isms such as religion, language or ancestry, but the sentiments of a he-
terogeneous collection of social groups, whose similar or dissimilar

historic references generate a degree of solidarity, nationalism,

73
among them despite their differences. This is expressed through the

equality of civil rights, liberties, cultural acceptance and tolerance
for all groups. The "nation" is then defined as the product of this so-
lidarity, created through feelings of sacrifices made and willing to be
made, but resolves itself by the willing disposition of its people to
live together; to accept a common destiny.81

But, given the distinctions on the acquisition of citizenship and
nationality, there is still exclusion based on cultural differences in
the nation. Epstein writes that political ethnicity presupposes a parti-
cular structuring of the social order, where boundaries are marked and
the sense of identity is reinforced. These boundaries are emotionally
charged and so strong, that people come to perceive a readily shared
common sense of (racial) ethnic, economical and political interest.82
The collective identity of minority groups is in part a result of their
historical experience of domination and exploitation in the society.
This experience could serve as a potential cohesive force, and the rela-
tion of these experiences becomes the bond through which generations
identify with each other, providing the components of the groups’ col-
lective solidarity.

The collective identity lends itself to a community of conscious-
ness.83 Community of consciousness is conceptualized and defined as
the emergence of symbols and experiences which a racially and/or ethni-
cally defined people have developed in common over time and space; a
world view shared through these experiences and symbols; a persistence,
a sameness of existence with others. Community of consciousness is a

process deep within the core of the racialized experiences and symbols,

known only to those who share the same life chances and destiny. This

74
consciousness is rooted within the identity of a people. It is an aware-

ness of membership, meaning and feeling perceived as the same in charac-
ter, a common fate of being part of a shared unique value, the continu-
ed expression of a people to persist in spite of continued racial ine-
qualities and domination in an hostile environment. It was this common
group historical conditions and common racial identity, upon which
ARENEP capitalized to elicit racial/ethnic solidarity and
consciousness.

The language of political discourse indicates political and cultur-
al properties, the reflection and reproduction of these, and the crea-
tion of ways of perceiving relationships and problems and selective so-
lutions.84 The actions of ARENEP were aimed towards taking back
their history, culture and identity from the politically dominant Euro-
Hispanics-Panamanians. This in essence, was ARENEP’S agenda.

The social construction of racial/ethnic identity, national identi-
ty and citizenship, is evidence of the ideological connection between
Euro-Anglo and Euro-Hispanic-Americans. This connection supports the in-
fluence of the ideological phenomenon across geographical and political
borders, and similar to the phenomenon of the world economic system, in-
fluences and colors racial policies of the State, its role towards eth-
nic minorities and their life chances. These structures are important
because they generate the unequal distribution of power, wealth, and
prestige among people of different racial/ethnic groups. Thus, any argu-
ment that racism, discrimination and segregation is a US, North Americ-
an importation is rejected.

Moreover, Panama, like any other Euro-Hispanic society, has not yet

accepted the presence of Afros and Indigenous people, la barbarie,

75
in the midst of their ‘civilization’. And apparently in most Euro-Latin

-American countries, even those with large Indigenous populations, (80-
livia, Ecuador, Guatemala, México, Peru) the Indigenous population is
apparently invisible as a racial/ethnic composition in the political,
economic and social life of these countries. Yet, in all these coun-
tries, either the mestizo or the socially white, are recorded nume-
rically as the largest. This social division is the replication of the
division between Europe and the rest of the non-European world. It is
fundamental to the entire social, economical and political life of Euro
-Hispanics and it affects the lives of people of non-European heritage.

D. The Intersection of Race, Class
and Popular Participation

The low life chances of Afro-Panamanians suggest a system of unequ-
al racial/class distribution and stratification of social benefits. The
stratification system is a function of the occupational structure which
fundamentally determines the class structure. Occupation is defined as
positions within the relation of production, and class is understood as
the social relations of production, as the location within the produc-
tion process. The racial/ethnic category are relations of distribution
in a hierarchy of perceived biological differences socially defined,
and is treated as an ideological relation of the system for economic
and political reasons, given that:

laws, policies norms, morality, and ethics are consggucted in re-
gards to it, and power and affluence is divided by it.

This bears upon the intersection of race and class, for as Maloney
writes:
in the processes of nation wide capital accumulation, the racial

factor effectively becoggs a determinative factor in the configu-
ration of social classes.

76
And Hamilton says that:

both race and class ... have a determinative effect on the ac-
cessibility of opportunity structures e.g., jobs, education, in-
come, life styles, mobility, equality of life , and life chances in
general.

Therefore, the dimensions of race and ethnicity are not incompati-
ble with class, since both race and ethnicity allow for a consideration
of class essentially through racial and ethnic characteristics. Pitt-
Rivers writes:

presumption of descent is an indicator of class, where known des-
cent establishes status, .... Thus, if one looks black it is conclu-
ded that one has black parents, and ... appearance takes over the
function of descent in allocating status .... If classification of
social race is losing importancg8 the ethnic aspect is increasing
in importance and conjuring class.

Thus, in this context Hall has observed that:

race is ... the modality in which class is ‘lived’, the medium
through which class relations are eégerienced, the form in which it
is appropriated and fought through’.

If as it is argued, race can become the content under specific con-

ditions of the class struggle,90

then this relation would help to ex-
plain why class struggle and race relations struggles are intertwined.
An important consideration in the stratification and unequal distribu-
tions system is the position of the dominant sector, who have:

occupied the best paid and more skilled and secured positions,

. with little in common with ... the unskilled, subordinate work-

ers (and who) identif(ied) and collaborate(d) in the extraction of

“surplual value” in exploiting “the majority of the working

class“.

In a stratified racial/class structure, race is inherently manifest-
ed by the selectivity and positional location of the other workers.
Class results from the occupational structure as dividends of income,
since certain occupations have more favorable market value than others,

and command higher wages within class relations. In other words, social

77
class is the result of the division of labor by occupational positions

and the income associated with the positions. In this respect, class
stratification can be seen as a mechanism for racial domination. To
cite Fanon: "In the colonies,” ‘
the economic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is
the consequence; You are rich (privileged) becayie you are ”white",
you are white because you are rich (privileged).

Thus, racial-ethnic identity and solidarity are articulated with
class factors as important issues in the formation of racial/ethnic or-
ganizations. If political relations are expressed racially, then it can
also be argued that in Euro-Hispanic-America, socio-political, grass-
roots organizations are also expressions of the race/class dynamics. To

93 and Fanon,94

paraphrase Cox it can be argued that the source and
emergence of socio/political, grass-roots organizations in plural socie-
ties is expressed, first and foremost, within the political, and not
the economic arena. And if the emergence of these organizations is a re-
sult of the political structure, which it seems to be, in which the do-
minant socially white groups strive to monopolize all sources of power,
which they do; in which the subordinate minority groups are allowed
token participation, which they seem to have, then racial antagonism
is, in essence, political/class conflict.95

Historical and cultural circumstances of solidarity must be under-
stood within the framework of the groups’ struggle. Race is a socio-po-
litical construct with dire life chance implications for non-white peo-
ples; and as long as ”Europeaness" is touted as the social virtue,
capitalism, racism and ethnicity will be just another justification for

legitimating and maintaining inequality. This is consonant with the on

going belief which supposed peoples of African descent, and all dark-

78
skinned peoples to be political, economical and socially inferior. This

association of physiognomy --biological appearance-- with economics
laid the foundation for racial/ethnic prejudices --racism-- and racial

stratification.

79
E. Chapter Three Endnotes

1The Great Strike was initiated by Afro/Antilleans living and
working on the Canal Zone, and was of social political significance
because Afro- Hispanic Panamanian workers in the political jurisdiction
of Panama had threatened to strike in solidarity with the
Afro/Antilleans. It took the collusion of both the US and Panamanian
Governments to break the strike. Gerardo Maloney, "Cronologia de una
Huelga", tareaa. No.55. (Panama: enero/agosto), 1982, pp.23-56.

2The Huelga de los Inquilinos was provoked when the landlords
intended to pass a tax hike on property on to the tenants. The
majority of the tenants were Afro-Antilleans working on the canal, but
living in one-pom buildings in Coldn and Panama Cities. At the request
of the Panamanian Government, US soldiers landed to control a supposed
riot of people returning from the funeral of fellow activists. In
Alexander Cuevas,"El Novimiento Inquilinario de 1925“.
(Panama:tareaa. 1975.

3The two cases refer to the issue of Canal Zone police brutality
in Rainbow City (Arco Iris) approximately during the years, 1955 and
1956. About 50 to 75 of us students, seventh, eight and ninth graders,
were walking home from school one evening, at about 3:30 pm. Many
students, including McDonald, took a shortcut to cross the street,
about 100 yards from where a police officer was directing traffic. The
police called and singled out McDonald, left his post and physically
beat the student with his hand and nightstick. Word of the beating got
to the student’s Mother, who lived about 500 yards from the crossing.
The Mother approached the policeman, who pushed, hit and kicked her,
then arrested her son. At the trial, the police was absolved, but was
later “transferred” to the US. Sixto was a prisoner, sitting in the
patrol car. At the stoplight, just across from the Motor Transportation
Division and the commissary, the prisoner opened the door of the
patrol car and began running. After watching the prisoner run for some
distance, the police took out his service revolver and with one shot to
the head, dropped the fleeing Sixto. The community later learned that
the Canal Zone Police Department’s best marksman was later
“transferred" to the US.

4Tomes Herrera, President of the Estado Libre del Istmo, from a
speech delivered before the Extraordinary Congress of 1811, and cited
by Pablo Arosemena in "La Secesion de Panama y sus Causas.”
Photocopied. n/d. p.55.

5W.Hein and K.Stenzel, "The Capitalist State and Underdevelopment
in Latin America-the Case of Venezuela. Kapitaliatate. 1973, No.2,

p.40, in Ronaldo Munck, Epljties ann Dependency in the third hprln.
(London/ New Jersey:) Zed Books Ltd. 1984, p.210.

6Hein and Stenzel, p.35, in Munck, p.210.

80

7Magala Cabrera Arias,£riaia Urhane y Noyimientpa
Speiatea--Eanana 1972-1222. (Paname:1mprenta Uiversitaria, 1993),

8Omar Jaén Suarez, La Enhiaeinn del Lathe de Bahama. (Siglp
111- XX) (Panama: Imprenta La Nacidn INAC. ), 1978. p. 531.

9S.Lieberson, ”Stratification and Ethnic Groups," Stratifieatipn:
Beaeareh and thepry ter the 1212’ S- (New York: The Bobbs- Merrill Co. ,
1975), p.49 in Ringer and Lawless, p. 121.

loRuth Simms Hamilton, Vera Lucia Benedito and Lorein
Powell-Benard, ”Race, Nation and Identification: Articulating
Principles of Social Differences“. Paper presented at the International
Seminar on Racism and Race Relations in the Countries of the African
Diaspora“, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil, April 5-10, 1992 and the
International African Studies Seminar", Rio de Janeiro and Salvador,
Bahia, April 10-15. 1992. p. 1.

11Ruth Sims Hamilton. Creating a Earadiqm andBesearchAuenda
for the Comoaratite Studies of the HorldindeliisoorsionoiAtrioan
[applea. 1. African Diaspora Research Project. (Michigan:
Michigan State University Press, 1990), p. 19.

12Hamilton, p.19.
13Hamilton, p.20.

l4Hamilton, p.19. See also Michael T. Martin and Howard Cohen,
”Late Capitalism" and Race and Neo-colonial Domination:
Discontinuities is Marxist Theory", in Ereaenge Afrigaine. No.115 -
3rd Trimester 1980, p.47.

15Michael Banton, Bate Betatinna (1967), in Hernan Santa Cruz,
Baeial Dietrininatinn. Revised and updated. (New York: United Nations,
1977), p.9.

16Hamilton, Benedito and Benard-Powel, p.17.

l7Franz Fanon, the uretehed at the Earth. (New York:Grove
Press),1968, p.35.

18Benjamin B. Ringer and Elinor R. Lawless, Race-Ethnieity ann
Speiety. (New York/London:Routledge, 1989), p.122.

19Laura Munoz, ”La migracidn afroantillana a Nexico: una
Historia Olvidada". Qet Qarihe.($antiago de Cuba: Casa del
Caribe/Direccidn de Culturas Populares del Consejo Nacional para la

81

Cultura y las Artes de México.) 1994, pp.125-127;128.

20Vera Lucia Benedito, Rent indian Migratipn tn Braail. Michigan
State University, Masters Thesis.

21ninedo Aifaro. El dgeiigre Antillean en la America Central: La
Qefienaa de la Raga. 2n °ed. (Panama:Imprenta Nacional, 1924), See
also Law 54 (Article 15) of 1938 Gaceta Oficial, No.4977 (Panama:

Imprenta Nacional, octubre 28, 1926), and Articles 2, 12, 14 and 23 of
Section Five of the 1941 Constitution.

22M.G.Smith. Ihe Elural Societx in the British West Indies.
(Berkeley: University of California Press,1965).See also

Smith,'Pluralism, Race and Ethnicity in Selected African Countries”.in
thenriea pt Rage and Ethnie Relations. John Rex and David Mason, edts.,
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,l986,pp.187-225;and Smith in

Ethnieity and Speiety. Benjamin B.Ringer and Elinor R.Lawless,
edts.,(New York: Routledge, 1989), pp.59-61.

23J S. Furnival, Splonial Enliey ang Rraetite: a Comprehensiye

Stud! or Burma aha Netherlands India- (1948: 1956). in Ringer and
Lawless, p.56.

24An ethnic group is defined as: people who conceive of
themselves as being alike by virtue of common ancestry, real or
fictitious, and are so regarded by others; a distinct population
within the larger society whose culture is different from (the host),
and whose members ... feel ties of race or nationality. Gerald
D.Berreman, ”Race, Caste, and Other Invidious Distinctions in Social

Stratification". Racezthe gpgrnal pt the Institute at Rage Relatipne.
Vol.XII No.4 (April 1972), p.388.

25Plural societies such as Panamé are composed of cultural
sections, each distinguishable from the other by their exclusive,
cultural and moral order, held together not by means of consensus, but
by regulations of government, in a coexistence of parallel, but
incompatible institutional arrangement within a political state,
which by nature is hierarchic, competitive and autocratic. Roy Simon
Bryce-LaPorte, 'M.G.Smith’s Version of Pluralism --The Questions it

Raised". Comparative Staniea in Spciety and Hiatory. Vol.10
(1967-1968), p.114.

ZGGerardo Maloney,"El Novimiento Negro en Panama." Revieta
Raggmefla46 Speiptpgia. No.5. (Panama:1mprenta Universitaria),
.P- .

27Alfredo Figueroa aNavarro, aninip y Sogiedad en e1 Banana
getpnhianp 1221-1222. 3 Edicidn. Panama: Editorial Universitaria.
1983, p.344.

82

28Figueroa Navarro, pp.332-343/344.

zgRobert Brent Toplin, ,“Introduction,” Slayery and Rene
in Latin Ameriea. (Connecticut/London: Greenwood Press, 1974), p.10.

3°George W Hesterman. Ihe test Indian hotter on the Canal Zone.
(Panama: Liga Civica Nacional. 1951), p.22.

31Robert E. Woods, “The Working Force of the Panama Canal", in
Transaction oi the International Engineering Congress. Vol 11. (San
Francisco:) 1915: p.197. There is no statistical data for
un/employment during the early years of the Republic.

3"’Sadith Esther Pal. B. The Status of test Indian Immigrants in
1222-1222. (Boston:University of

Banana Erom
Massachusetts ,Thesis), 1977, p. 68.

33£gfl§£ g: I; PQnggién, 1212. (Panama:Republica de Panama),
1945, p.52.

34Gerardo Maloney and George Priestley, “El Grupo Antillano en
el Proceso Politico Panamefio.” Lnteria, (Panama: 1973,) p.15. The
same situation was again repeated in 1945. Also cited in Paz, 8.,
p.20.

3sfiageta Qfiieiat. No.4977. (Panama: Imprenta Nacional,
octubre 28, 1926), in Paz,B., p.69.

36Paz,B., p.70.
37Paz,3., p.70. ,
38Asamblea Nacional de Panama, Cddigo Administrativo, Articulo

1843 y Ley No.6 de 1928, Articulo 12. Panama, 1928, cited in Paz,B.,
p.71.

39R. E. Fabrega, Esq. ,gpnatitneinnea fie 1a Repnblica de Banana
1221. 1211.1 121a. (Panama: 1969), pp. 57- 59, in Paz, B. p.66. .

4oQiarie de Bahama (octubre 7,1926). cited in George W.
Westerman, Lea Innigrantea Antillanpa en Panama. (Panama:1mpresora
La Nacidn) 1971, p.48.

41Shiela Allen and Marie Macey, ”Race and Ethnicity in the

European 1990 Context".2riti§h Journal at Sptiptpgy. Vol 41,
No.30, (September).p.380.
42Victor F. Goytia, La; Sonatitncipnes ne

Banana. (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispanica), 1954, pp. 612- 613.

83

43ibid. p.615.
“Paz,3., pp.64-65.
45Goytia, p.614.
‘5ibid. p.614.
47Goytia, p.617.
‘stbid. pp.619-620.

‘9Juan Materno Yasquez, 1nyeatigaeianea Spare 1a Nataraleaa net
Ser Banamedo:una Ieoria de la Nacionalidad Banameha.
(Panama:Edit.Olga Elena), 1981, p.42.

5°Paz, 3., p.70.

“Gaceta Qficial. Noiill. (Bahama:1_ore_tam n Nacional- octum
28,1225), in ibid. p.69.

szibid. p.70.
53idem

54G. Ben-Tovin and J. Gabriel, "The Politics of Race in
Britain,1962-79: a Review of Major Trends", in Allen and Macey,'Race
and Ethnicity in the European Context', p.380.

55M. Baker, the Rey Rattan. (1981), in Allen and Macey, p.387.

56Information provided during the 1988 African Diaspora Research
Project seminars.

5701nedo AlfarO. El Eelioro Antillean... and tense de la
Rnhiaeinn 1212, ' general. Vol X.(Panama: Contraloria
General), 1945, pp.50,58.

58Hamilton. Benedito and Powel-Benard, p.22.

59C. Horst, (1980), in Carl Urik Schierup, ”The Immigrant and the
Crisis,” Reta Speintngiea. Vol.28. (19985), p.28.

6oHamilton, Benedito and Powell-Benard, p.22.

61Maria Ossa de Amador worked on the flag, Nicanor Villalaz
designed the coat of arms, and J. de la Ossa and Santos Jorge wrote the
national anthem. Alberto Smith-Fernandez, "Dominic y
Comercializacidn de los Prejuicios Raciales en Pana ".Renpria§.£riner

84

gangrene det Regrn Rananenp (Panama: Centro de Convenciones ATLAPA
septiembre 10-13),1981, p.96.

62Hamilton, Benedito and Powel-Benard, p.6.
63Smith-Fernandez. “Dominic y Comercializacidn... p.96.

64A.D. Smith,'The Myth of the ‘Modern Nation’ and the Myth of
Nations”, 1988, in Allen and Macey, p.388.

65Ornel Urriola, "Cultura e Identidad Nacional", Renpria:

afl
Congreso Nacional de Sociolouia 13- IS.se2tiemore _erista Baname_a de
Speiptpgia No.7 (Panama: Universidad de Panama. 1990), p. 345.

66Jaime Arrocha Rodriquez, "Afro-Colombians Denied". ,the Slant
America. 1122-1922. Beoort on the Americas. Vol-XXV No.4 (NACLA.
February 1992), p.29.

67Laduna Anise,'The African Redefined: the Problems of Collective
Identity”, Ran-Afriean 2pnrna1. Vol 6.No.4.(Winter,1973), p.446.

68Hamilton, Benedito and Powel-Benard p.18.

69Immanuel Wallerstein, "Culture as the Ideological Battleground

of the Modern System”, fienpptitiea and fienenttnre. (1991), p.162.

7oBy national ethnic group is meant a group of ethnically
unified persons who, through force or exclusiveness of their
self-identification as a group, have or actively aspire to create
separate national political identity. Edmund T.Gordon, ”History,
Identity, Consciousness, and Revolution", in Ethnic 2rpnp§ and Ratipn
States. (Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 1987), p.166 (cf. footnote
1, C ap.1).

71Stuart Hall, "Ethnicity:1dentity and Differences”.Radieal
Ameriea. Vol. 23, No.4. (October/December, 1990), p.13.

7202cumento Central del Erimer Congreso del Negro Renamedo.
demorias. p.93.

73Baum, p.10.

74Joseph Downer- Marcel, La Si tnaei on Politiea 2e 1

Antilleans: lead-1222 Qesde la.£onstruccidn del Eerrocarril Hasta.la
net 2ana1 2e Ranana. Universidad Santa Maria la Antigua,

Aoertura
1983. Thesis. pp.66- 69; 207-212.

75Harold Wolpe, ”The Theory of Internal Capitalism- The South
African Case", in Michael Hetchner, Internal Capitalian, p.33, cited in

Stanley 8. Greenberg, Race ang State in_ Capitaliat Development:

85

tnnparatiye Eerapeetiye. (New Haven/London: Yale University Press)
1980, p.22.

76Bryce-Laporte, "M.G. Smith’s Version ... ” p.115.
77Urrioia, p.345.
78Urriola, p.245.
79Urriola, p.356.

80Hans Kohn,Ratipnatian:it Reaning and Riatory. (New Jersey: 0.
Van Nostrand & Co. Princeton), 1955 pp.9-10; Samuel Bailey,

Ratipnalian in Latin Rneriea. (New York: Alfred Knoff),1971,
pp.7-8,14; Gerhardt Masuer, Rationalien in Latin Rnerieazhiversity and
Unity,(New York: McMillan Co., 1966; Barbara Ward, Nationaliam anu
1ueplngy. (New York: W.W. Norton 3 Co.,Inc.), 1966, Oliver Cromwell

Cox, tatte, Caate and Race, Monthly Review Press, 1948, pp.72;
373-374, and René Maunier, in Cox,p.72.

81Downer-Marcel, La Situaeién Enlitiea, ... p.2.

82A. L. Epstein, EthdS anu Identity. (Cambridge: University
Printing House, 1978), p.105.

83The concept, community of consciousness is taken from the
theoretical framework of the African Diaspora Research Project. See

treating a Raradigm and Reaeareh Agenda _nr rthe 20mparative eStudieS pt

Rnriuniue Diaperaion pt Atriean Pepples. Ruth Simms Hamilton,
(Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1990), p.24.

84Sheila Allen and Marcey, Marie, "Race and Ethnicity in the

European Context.“ Rritiah upurnal pt Speiplogy. Vol.41 No.30
(September 1990), p.375.

85Robert Masao Jiobu, Ethnieity anu Inequality. (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1990), p

86Maloney, "Raza y Clase“, p.101.

87Simms Hamilton, Creating a Earauigm ... p.19.

88Julian Pitt-Rivers, "Race, Color and Class in Central America
and the Andes". Raioritx.and hinoritr: the Drnamics of Race and Ethnic

Relatipne. Norman Yerman and C.Hoy Steele, edts., (Boston: Allyn and
Bacon, Inc., 1977), p.102.

89Stuart Hall, ”Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in

Dominance“ in Sociological theories: Race and tolonialism. (Paris:
UNESCO,1980), p.341.

86

-------------l-----------

90Harold Wolpe, ‘Class Concepts, Class Struggles and Racism’, in
thepriea pf Rate and Ethnie Relatipna. John Rex and David Mason, edts.,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1988, p.122.

91Stanley 8. Greenberg. Race and State in taoitalist
Qeyelnpnent.(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980),

p.274.
92rrantz Fanon. Ihe Rretched of the Earth (New York: Grove

Press,1968), p.35, cited in Rage Ethnieity anu Speiety. Benjamin B.
Ringer and Elinor R. Lawless, (New York/Londoanoutledge, 1989) p.40,

93Oliver Cromwell Cox, QlASS. taate and Race. (New York:Modern
Reader, Paper backs, 1948), pp.155.

94Fanon, p.36-37.
95Cox, p.333, in Ringer and Lawless, p.37.

CHAPTER FOUR

BACKGROUND TO THE FORMATION OF AFRO-
ANTILLEAN CONSCIOUSNESS AND AGENCY

A. Recruitment and Entry of
Caribbean Wage Laborers

The arrival of the Antilleans for the construction of the 1850 Pana-
ma railroad coincided with the elimination of local slavery and the Ca-
lifornia Gold Rush. The Gold Rush demanded local workers to handle both
cargo and passengers from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast and vice
versa. Between 1853 and 1854 more than 7,000 international workers
from India, Colombia, Germany, France, a 1,000 Chinese and more than
9,000 Caribbean laborers were contracted by for the railroad project.

After the tragic mass suicide of the Chinese and the repatriation
of other foreigners who could not or would not adopt to the Isthmian
climate, unfortunately, those of European origin,1 (note the Eu-
ropean valorization) the Afro-Antillean laborers and others of the Afri-
can Diaspora became the solution to the labor situation. For this first
period of the construction projects, Jules-Charles Roux, documented the

origin of the first wave of immigrant workers. (See TABLE 3).

87

o
.Al-rd-p

88
(2) TABLE 3

INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT LABORERS
PANAMA:1850-1855

Country Number
Cartagena (Colombia) ................ 142
Barbados .................. 1,344
Venezuela .................. 272
Martinique .................. 800
Jamaica .................. 9,005
St. Lucia .................. 495
Cuba .................. 275
USA. (New Orleans and other
Southern States) .................... 542
Total 12,875

Adapted from: Afredo Figueroa Navarro, Reminip y Socieuag en e1 Rana-
na Culpmbianp 1221-12213a edicidn (Panama: Editorial Universita-
ria, 1982),p.348. See also Omar Jaén Suarez, La

Rohlacidndellstmo
Durante e1 Sigtp 111. (Panama: Imprenta La Nacidn, 1978),

Eliminating the Colombian, US and Venezuelan immigrants, from TABLE
3 above, the total number of Afro-Antillean immigrants was 11,919, more
than 90 percent of the 1850-1855 labor force. Later, Antillean labor-
ers, particularly Jamaicans, --more than 15,000-- would again be recrui-
ted for the French canal construction period, 1880-1903. The workforce

on the French canal project was as follows:

89
(3) Table 4

INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT LABORERS
ON THE FRENCH CANAL-PANAMA:1880-l903

Number of Percentage of
Years Laborers Afro-Laborers
1881 939 85
1882 1,514 81
1883 17, 522 89
1884 5,698 89
1885 13,847 92
1886 13,286 91
1887 16,155 91
1888 13,411 91
1889 1,062 76
1890 791 74
1891 772 74
1892 741 75
1893 664 75
1894 730 78
1895 1,090 84
1896 2,689 90
1897 3,801 92
1898 3,230 91
1899 2,217 88
1900 1,678 84
1901 1,913 86
1902 1,172 80
1903 873 79

Adapted from: Omar Jaén Suarez,ta Rphtaeinn net 1§tnp de £ana_a Qu-
rante el Siglo 111. Panama: Imprenta La Nacion, 1978), p. 456.

In this way, the work force of 939 workers in 1881, reached 17,522
in 1883 and stabilized between 13,000 and 16,000 approximately until
1887, then dropped to an average of 2,000 approximately. The labor
force supposed not only a difference between tradesmen or qualified
and non-qualified workers, but also a racial/ethnic distribution bet-
ween Afros and non-Afros. The number of qualified workers fluctuated be-
tween 9 and 15 percent of the total workforce during 1881 and 1888, and
during the 1890-1903 period, the fluctuation was 8 to 26 percent.

90
This means that the non-skilled Afro workers were between 91 to 85 perc-

ent of the workforce during the high point of construction and between
82 to 26 percent during the low point of construction. Siegfried, says
that for 1886, approximately 40,000 "blacks“ were working in Panama.2
This however, appears to be an exaggeration even with the inclusion of
local Afro-Hispanics.

with the bankruptcy of the French project in 1890, and the signing
of the 1903 Canal Convention, Antillean laborers were once again re-
cruited for the US canal construction from the entire Caribbean (See
FIGURE 7). Recruiting agents were first in Jamaica, but the Jamaican
authorities remembered the costs of repatriating many laborers after
the French bankruptcy, and allowed recruiting with the condition that
the recruiting agency, the US, deposit £1 for every recruit taken (the
selling of black bodies again?). However, the Barbadian and other is-
land authorities allowed unconditional recruiting. Following is the
breakdown of Caribbean immigrant laborers contracted for the US canal

project.

 

91

 

 

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93
FIGURE 8

ARRIVAL 0F 1,500 BARBADIAN LABORERS:1909

 

0n the deck of the SS Ancon

Source: Panama Canal Commission.

94
In many instances, many Jamaicans came on their own. Roberts writes

that more than 43,000 Jamaicans came to the Isthmus for the canal pro-
jects between 1881 and 1911,3 and Hoods point out that in the French
Islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique, ten percent of the population
which emigrated represented between thirty and forty percent of the
male population.4

The contract of the Antillean workers had the following specifica-
tions: transportation to Colon (from the Caribbean Islands) to work for
500 days. They would work eight hours per day, at $0.75 per day (less
than $0.07 an hour), with time and one-half for every hour worked over
the eight hours. They were promised free unfurnished quarters (rooms),
medicines, repatriation, and not be left destitute in the place of des-
tination (Panama).5 In addition to the men, Caribbean women also

came, and some worked with the canal enterprise.

95

(6) TABLE 6
STATUS OF IMMIGRANT CARIBBEAN HOMEN
1907-1914
Working Working
in ICC Unem- in ICC

Towns Married Single Hotels ployed Laundry Total
Corozal -- 7 9 -- 24 40
Pedro Miguel 6 1 20 -- -- 27
Paraiso 12 1 2 10 -- 25
Cucaracha 28 -- -- -- -- 28
Culebra 11 13 14 -- -- 38
Las Cascadas 4 7 -- -- -- 11
Bas Obispo 18 2 -- -- -- 20
Matachin 6 -- -- -- -- 6
Gorgona 2 5 3 -- -- 10
Lirio 25 -- -- -- -- 25
Cirio 20 -- -- -- -- 20
Cuneta 21 -- -- -- -- 21
Chagres 24 -- -- -- -- 24

Total 117 36 48 10 24 295

Adapted from: Lancelot S. Lewis, Ihe figs; Indian in Panamgzfilggk Labor
in Panama, 1859-1211. (Hashington:University Press of America, 1980)

p.63.

Twenty—four percent of the women were employed and three percent were
unemployed; fifty-one percent were married and fifteen percent were sin-
gle. Additionally, fifty-one of the 150 marriages were “common law" mar-
riages.

When the Afro-Antilleans first arrived on the Isthmus in 1850, they
were ascribed to the arrabal neighborhood, which was composed of
the local Afros-Hispanics and all other non-white groups. Many of the
Antillean male laborers and some of these women lived in the towns of
Matachin, Gorgona, Bas Obispo, etc., along the canal construction
route. But the vast majority lived within the cities of Colon and Pana-

ma. The majority of the arrabaleros were marginal Afros-Hispanics

96
doing agricultural work, fishing or renting mules, cornered in the mise-

ry of an inhospitable environment.6 The arrabaleros, and the
Afro-Antilleans in particular, were the main source of cheap labor for
the construction projects of the XIX Century. And although the arra-
bal was clearly demographically superior when compared to the social
whites, they were economically and politically weaker.

B. Antillean Immigrant Organizational Heritage

The early Antillean organization, the lodge,7 was first created
as a voluntary association, by and for the immigrant Caribbean popula-
tion living within a hostile environment in Panama. The initial organi-
zation focused on the means and mechanisms through which the immigrants
could advance their life conditions and access to opportunity struc-
tures. Today, the basic ideals of that focus have not changed and the
associations have continued as an organization of the people, even
though the harsh hostility of the past has subsided.

For the early Caribbean immigrants entering the Isthmian society,
their social space was the arrabal neighborhood or community. This
was the setting for the presence, interrelations and affiliation of the
immigrants with the larger society. In this sense, Babchuck and Edwards
argue that associations organized at the neighborhood level tend to
draw their membership from the circumscribed physical area.8 It was
within this urban setting that the Caribbean Antillean community would
establish their first lodge, the Respectable Brock Lodge,9 the same
year --1880-- the French inaugurated their first canal project. Later
lodges or societies were established in Gorgona, Las Cascadas, Empe-
rador, Culebra, Hatachin, Gatun and along other major areas of canal

construction. The majority of these areas are now under water.

 

97
AREAS OF EARLY TOWNblTES DLJRlNG CANAL CONSTRUCTION 19041914

 

 

 

 

 

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San Lazaro
Maria Salas
Rio Grande
Gamboa Camp
San Pablo
Tabernilla
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98
In time, as the Caribbean immigrants in Panama established a longer

presence and more stable residency, more and more societies emerged:
from La Societe Francaise(sic) de Socours Hutuels (French Society
of Mutual Help) and the French Juvenile Club,10 the Barbadian Benevo-
lent Society, the Jamaican Friendly Society, the Primrose Lodge, the
Star of Eden, etc., to international affiliations such as the Mecha-
nics, the Oddfellows, the Masons, the Good Shepherd and the Elks.

C. Inward and Outward Linkages
l. Inward Linkages

Between the 18505 and 18905, the early Afro Caribbean immigrants
had already constituted a community within the arrabal. And as of
the 18505 this group lived, experienced and shared the same social con-
ditions with the local Afro-Hispanic Panamanians. The Afro Caribbean im-
migrants developed organizations and institutions in attention to their
needs. They developed:

a consciousness of each other and hence cohesiveness because of
the pressure exerted against them by the outside ... and through
(which) minority members form groups to deal withlan alien environ-
ment and problems forced on them by the majority.

Voluntary associations located within the immigrant community were:

not simply a link in a wider network. In a more abstract sense,
taken as a structure of social meaning, it serves as a frame of re- '
ference with which the members of the organizations and their fami-
lies can make sense out of their own activity and the
environment.1
The early Antillean immigrant lodge, fraternal or/and benevolent so-

cieties were developed by these “strangers" as one form of a survival
strategy to cope, survive, and rise above their conditions. The early
lodge served as an umbrella organization for other community associa-
‘tions, i.e., mutual aid societies, burial schemes, escuelitas or

home schools, social clubs and other voluntary grass-roots

99
organizations. These organizations were intended to train members in

skills and knowledge to solve problems, to forge group action, and self
control as affirmation of social identity and agency, as well as survi-
val skills and techniques to create social vehicles to cope with and,
for example, confront hostility, socio-political exclusion, poor socio-
economic conditions and to make sense of their reality.

Immigrant organizations very often provide an outlet for people at
the local level to meet specific goals and solve community problems; a
way of networking and linking them and their community to the larger so-
ciety. Fisher calls this networking "metaphoric"l3 or a loose connec-
tion of task-oriented individuals who come together in informal group-
ings to communicate spontaneously and expand resources. This mobiliza-
tion can also be viewed as community structures, referring to forms of
interrelated secondary associations composed of commercial, industrial,
familial, cultural and other pertinent units in a given social environ-
ment, which interact to create a system of relationships.

For the promotion of cohesive functions, the lodge worked to deve-
lop a sense of community and sociability. The lodge organized Mother’s
and Father’s Day programs, and sick and poor relief campaign drives.
This encouraged members to share interests and feelings of belonging,
which could be expanded whenever problems arose.14 Today, some of
this fellowship is still seen through the support for the Old People’s
Home in Coldn, the Home in Pilén, and through the aid to the Old Timers
of the Disabled Relief PanCanal Horkers.15 This, within the framework
of resistance, endurance and struggle of the African Diaspora Research
Project,16 is in attention to the interaction between the peoples of

the African Diaspora, their objective condition and the 'metaphoric'

lOO
framework used to survive the condition. Others have suggested that im-

migrant organizations are cultural constructions in specific social
space. Thus, in the view of Young and Larsen, the focus is on social
meaning and relationships.17

As part of the instrumental functions, the lodges promoted social
welfare, a communal identity, and group cohesion. They provided social
care, and their principal purpose was to afford some economic subsidi-
ary or benefits to their members or beneficiaries in times of sickness
or death.18 By means of these associations, the members could: 1- en-
sure a degree of financial assistance in case of illness, 2- accumulate
short term savings to be received at the end of the year in a lump-sum
or bonus, and 3- ensure protection against a pauper’s burials.19 For
example: old retired destitute members, may, upon the discretion of the
lodge, be granted permanent benefits from the lodge, or if members be-
longed to more than one lodge, the lodge in which the member had the
longest tenure would take care of funeral arrangements, and the others
would provide the death grant to the family; or the lodge may take the
funeral responsibility of a members’ family without requesting reimbur-
sement. These associations represented economic security at a time when
there were no government charities and or any other institutions to pro-
vide low cost protection of social security or any other social benef-
its for the less privileged classes. These three primary benefits, ac-

20 are the main stimuli of the friendly socie-

cording to Fletcher,
ties.

As a formal institution, the organization had an established direc-
tion, body of laws, and ideological frames of reference to project de-

signs for living. For example, through the By-Laws, a committee would

101
be appointed to investigate allegations brought about by a member, and

if proven true, the member could be fined or expelled. And for both mem-
bers and non-members, a negative evaluation by the lodge could be exten-
ded into the community.21 If, for example, the issue were about the
moral character of a member, and if, after a hearing, the allegations
were found to be ”true”, said member would be read out, i.e., expel-
led from the organization. ‘The reading out would be conveyed to the
community where the ex-member would lose stature and prestige.

The administration of the organization followed the democratic pro-
cess by offering opportunities and providing an exercise in democratic
parliamentary process. This exercise was seen through the yearly nomina-
tion and election of officers which is, again, constituted in the By
Laws. Nonetheless, Katz suggests that self-help groups are relatively
direct, concrete, non-bureaucratic and informal in terms of stressing
personal participation, help and aid.22 This degree of informality be-
tween and among members of the organization, is analogous to that ele-
ment of gemeinschaft, of the close knit family where direct sociali-
zation within friendship groups or community village occur without the
formal bureaucracy of the organization. This leads to what Clery calls:
"a sense of integration with others that can lead to new friends, en-
courage others and provide a supportive network system."23

As a network of social support, the lodge provided its members with
a stable set of positive, social experiences, stability of life, satis—

faction of participation and sense of worth.24 Ross25

suggests that
fraternities tend to emerge in times of crisis. But it is argued that
as an agent of social participation, the associations need not emerge

only in times of crisis. For example, as Sills and others have

102
suggested, these associations are also formed because of the perceived

needs or other shortcomings.26 Moreover, as a voluntary institution
designed for group action, the lodge cannOt be divorced from the larger
society where they served as a forum and where members could emit their
opinions and where "important topics of common welfare were discussed
for solutions that could be applied to general problems."27

It should be noted that the historical development of the Black
churches as voluntary associations in the US society is similar to deve-
lopments in Panama where both Antillean lodge and church:

also served as an agent of social participation where Blacks
could come to discuss any subject of interest, for example ... the
success zgr failure of employment, racial issues, marital
problems.

As an instrument expressive of social support and religious orienta-
tion the lodges had a significant religious content among its teaching,
in harmony with the ideology and resignation to the faith. The lodges
also “promulgated the concept of altruism among the needy ... founded
on the 10 Commandments."29 And as Schmidt says, "fraternal organiza-
tion(s) provided a religious function ... it provided a supplement or
reinforcement to existing religious ideologies."3o Hamilton noted
that:

Black people are not mere products of their economic and socio-
political conditions, but products of the interaction between these
conditions and experiences and efforts to develop their own sense
of what they are and what they want to be, to deal with life in
particular ways and to live as they transform life.

The function of the lodge as a creative, survival mechanism, within
an integrative approach, given the assumption that the association serv-
ed primarily a coordinating function, allowed the Caribbean workers to

transit effectively from their immediate situation to the larger

103
community. The extent to which the lodge facilitated a transcendence

from the immediate Caribbean surrounding and family situation into the
broader community and society, is seen within the cohesive and instru-
mental functions and adaptive mechanism of the lodge, as well a through
an integrative perspective of networking for the benefit of the mem-
bers. As a survival strategy the lodge focused on training members in‘
skills and knowledge to solve problems.
2. Outward Linkages

The Afro-Antilleans’ participation in the workforce and their spa-
cial localizations in the arrabal, contributed to the establishment
of relationships between themselves and other arrabaleros. For exam-
ple, when Spanish speaking arrabaleros were recruited into lodges,
the meetings were informally translated into Spanish for the benefit of
the Spanish speaking members, and eventually entire meetings were held
in Spanish.32 Today, meetings are bilingual. To paraphrase Schmidt,
voluntary associations foment social integration.33

The linkages of the Afro Caribbean lodge to the larger society can
be seen through the purchase of shares in the local cement company,
Cemento Panama in the 1950s, and in the government campaign for the
construction of the Portobelo Road in the 19605,34 in which most lod-
ges participated. The Elks and Mechanic, among other associations, also
participated in the construction‘ business35 by funding the construc-
tion of their respective lodge buildings or temples and other construc-
tions. The importance of these instances lie in the immigrants attempt
to participate in the larger society, and indeed, they were particip-
ants in the economic relations of the larger society as producers, con-

sumers and generators of capital.

104
The lodge was not only a center for business activities, it was al-

so a forum for family and community activities such as: quadrile danc-
ing' (Anglo-Afro-Caribbeans), and El (sic) Laghia or Damero and
El Baile de los Hacheteros or Los Negros, among many others36
(Franco-Afro-Caribbeans). It also supported scouting activities for boy
and girls, in which many adult and children participated. For example,
the investigator’s Mother, Leonida Marcel-Downer, was a member of seve-
ral lodges, Past Daughter Ruler, and Den Mother for the Troop #3 Girl
Scouts.

The lodge was also a major contributing force influencing the emer-
gence of the labor locals, the most notable was the Railroad Shop Labor-
ers of the 1919s headed by William Preston Stoute. Many lodge members
were influential as labor leaders, political leaders and teachers; for
example: Stoute was an English teacher, and a labor leader; Hector Con-
nor was a member of the Erie Temple and a school teacher; Viola Duncan
was also a school teacher and a member of the Jasmine Temple No.
322,37 and Alfredo Cragwell was a teacher, high school principal and
ex-Deputy to the Legislative Assembly in the 19505. In the labor con-
text, labor locals were often an off-shoot of lodge relations. It was
not by mere coincidence that the year the French inaugurated their ca-
nal project, 1880, the Antilleans inaugurated their first lodge. It was
likewise not by coincidence that by 1909, in addition to the Antil-
leans’ labor locals along the major points of canal construction, there
were at least six Afro-Hispanic labor locals in Panama with more than
twenty years of cumulative experience in the incipient labor movement.
All these organizations functioned under an internal structure similar

to the lodge. For example, participatory democracy and the nomination

105
and election of officers through the parliamentary process built on the

lodge experience. These mutual associations were the expression of both
social groups seeking improved socio/political and economic life im-
provements. And as Hunck documents, other rudimentary trade unions in
‘Latin America’ emerged also from early mutual aid societies in the
18505 and 18605.38 The collective conscience, unity and cohesion de-
monstrated through the early immigrant Antillean lodge is definitely
the forerunner not only of today’s Afro-Panamanian grass-roots organiza-
tions, but also the social security system.

Given the importance of working for a living and the extraction of
surplus from workers, there is a structural reason why conflicts fre-
quently focus on wages and work conditions (the working class).39 In
reality, it is not difficult to understand how and why the country’s
labor movement grew out and developed from the lodge, an organization
moved by its concern for the collective welfare of its members. Thus,
the importance of the lodges as the organic element of the labor move-
ment was then established.

The lodge served the interests of Afro-Antilleans and Afro-Hispa-
nics as an expression of solidarity and cohesion. It is proposed that
the Antillean lodge and other similar voluntary associations offer new
insights and considerations not only on the ”togetherness and common
destiny", the affiliation and group participation the Antilleans shared
with the rest of the arrabaleros, since ethnic or religious minori-
ty groups which have lived side by side in society are affected by the
same conflicts, violent or otherwise, as a result of inequalities and
tensions generated by social and economic policies. It is also proposed

that the question of the incipient labor movement in Panama, and the

106
question of adaptive mechanisms should require further investigation.

Consequently, from the early formative period of the Republic of Pa-
nama, collective mobilization has always been a course of social and po-
litical action through grass-roots activism. So far, very little re-
search has been done on the lodge as an adaptive mechanism of Afro-Cari-
bbeans to cope and adjust to new socio/cultural situation in Panama, or
as the forerunner of the labor movement. Apart from Cragwell’s work and
Figueroa Navarro’s4o few pages on their origin in Panama, there is a
poverty of local literature referring to the lodge and other voluntary
associations regarding the peoples of African Diaspora in Panama.

Voluntary grass-roots organizations like social movements, operate
as instruments for providing affectual support, and as settings for ex-
pressive activities. They are also integrative bodies at community,
State and national levels regarding cultural standards, norms, and as
social space for the exchange of meaning. At the sociological level,
the focus of grass-roots organizations is on function, the actions per-
ceived in supporting/seeking to change the normative order, to distri-
bute power at grass-roots level, and its capacity to implement import-

ant values.41

Equally important for understanding grass-roots organi-
zations is the nature of their political involvement to affect the out-

come of political policies and processes.

107
0. Chapter Four Endnotes

lAlfredo Figueroa Navarro 0991919 1 29919999 99 91 Rename
m lad-.1202 3a edicion (Panama: Editorial Universitaria,
1982 ,p.270.

zFigueroa Navarro, p.349.

3George Roberts, in Jaén Suarez, 299199199 991 19999.... p.453.

4Robert E.Hoods, ”The Norking Force of the Panama Canal”. in 1999999—
tiens ef the Internetienel Engineering Cenenees. Vol.1 and 2. 6.". Geo-
thals, compiler, (San Francisco, 1915), p.195.

5Lancelot S.Lewis, 199 £991 199193 in £999m§,1§§0-1219. (Hashington:
University Press of America, 1980), p.108.

6Figueroa Navarro, p.81.

7This discussion of the Antillean lodge first appeared in a condensed
version in £00£10£2. Vol.3,No.1(May,1991), Ruth Simms Hamilton and
Joseph Downer-Marcel, published by the African Diaspora Research Pro-
Ject, Ruth Simms Mamilton,ed., Michigan State University.

8Nicholas Babchuck, John‘ N. Edwards.'Voluntary Associations and the
Integrative Hypothesis." 599191991991 1999191. Vol.35, 1965. pp.153.

9Alfredox C Cragwell Ale_nee Aeeeetn_ ieeie-Eeenenieee de lee

Leela; Seeiedndee Eneternelee .en hflenflnliee.de Eeneni (Panama:
Universidad de Panama), 1952, p. 6. Licentiate Thesis.

loFrancisco Marrero Lobinot, 09999999 499999999 99 199 19199
Antilles Eneneeeee. (Panamé: n/d) p.49.

llAllen Hilliams,Jr.,Nicolas Babchuk and David R.Johnson, ”Voluntary
Associations and Minority Status:A Comparative Analysis of Anglo,

Black, Mexican Americans."59991999 599191991991 Rgngg. Vol.38,
No. 3. (October), 1973, p. 638.

12Ruth C. Young and Olaf F. Larsen, "The Contribution of Voluntary
Organizations to Community Structure,'199__99991999 0999991 91
599191991. Vol. LXXI, No.2 (September), 1965, p.188.

13Fred Fisher, "Resource Exchange Networking: Metaphorical Inventions
in Response to Differentiated Needs in a Collectivist-Driented

Society." Qeunnel e: Veluntenx Aetien Beseenen. Vol.12 No.1
(January/March),1983.

l4Aida K.Tomeh, ”Formal Voluntary Organizations: Participation,

Correlates and Interrelationships,” 299191991991 1999iry. Vol.16,
No.4. (October/December), 1972-73, p.90.

108

15Telephone interview with Ninston 0 Thomas, ex-Council member
and Past Illustrious Grand(P.1.G.) of Aurora Lodge #523 IBOP of N., and
active member of various other lodges. July, 1989.

16These are major defining characteristics of the African Diaspora
framework, and these concept particularly frame the life chances of
the Diaspora People and their interaction within a hostile
environment.

17Young and Larsen, p.185.
18Cragwell, p.8.

19Telephone interview with George Vasier, ex-Council member and Past
Illustrious Grand (P.I.G.) of Aurora Lodge #523 IBOP of H., member of
Loyalty Lodge #20 Mechanic, July, 1989, and active member of various
other lodges.

2°L.P.Fletcher,"The Limitations of Management and the Decline of

Friendly Societies in Trinidad and Tobago," 909r99l 91 19I9nt99y A9119n
39999999. Vol.4, No.1, (January/March), 1985, p.33.

21Telephone interview with George Vasier (P.I.G.). 1989.

22Alfred H.Katz,"Fellowship,Helping and Healingzthe Re-emergence of

Self- help Groups.”909r99l 91 1919n19ry 391199 39999999.
Vol.15,No.2,(April/ June), 1986. p.6.

23E.Gil Clery, “Social Support as a Unifying Concept in Voluntary Ac-

tion.” 9999991 91 191991991 391199 39999999. Vol.16 No.4,(0ctober/Decem-
ber, 1987), p.61.

24Clery, p.60.

25Jack Ross, “Differentiation of Guilds and Fraternities in Medieval

Europe'.Jeunnel ef VeJnnLarx Mien Beseencnflohlz. No.1.(January/
March), 1983, p.9. ‘

26Patrick Sills, Hugh Butcher, Patricia Collins and Andrew Glen. ”The
Formation and Forms of Community Groups, '999r99l 91 191991991 391199
39999999. Vol.9 No.1-4, (1980), p.190.

27Cragwell, p.6.

28Charles Hilliams Jr.,and Hilda Booker Niliams,”Contemporary
Voluntary Associations in the Urban Black Church:the Development and

Growth of Mutual Aid Societies.”909999l 9f V9l99t99y 391199 39999999.
Vol.13, No.4. (October/December), 1984.

109

29Cragwell, p.6.

3oAlvin Schmidt, Fraternal Organization.(Connecticut:Greenwood Press,

ci;2d in the Jeunnel 9r Ieluninnx AeLien Beeennen. Vol 11. (1985).
p. .

31Hamilton,Ruth Simms.'A Conceptualization of the Transformation and
Development of People as a Social Formation: a Global Approach to the
African (Black) Diaspora. (San Francisco:1982), p.29.

32Telephone interview with George Vasier(P.I.G.), July, 1989.

33Alvin J.Schmidt, "Fraternal Organizations," (Connecticut:Greenwood
Press, 1980), p.76.

34Telephone interview with George Vasier, (P.1.G.). July, 1989.
35Telephone interview with Hinston 0.Thomas, (P.1.G.), July, 1989.

36Other Franco-Afro-Caribbean dances were: Le Belair, E7 Ban Main
an ti 80, £7 Calendra, El Biguine, Adieu Foulard, Adieus (sic) Nadres
and La Mazurca. Marrero-Lobinot, pp.35-39.

37Telephone interview with Winston 0.Thomas, (P.1.G.). July 1989.

38In Buenos Aires, the printers emerged as one of the earlist trade
unions which began as a mutualist society in 1857. Ronaldo Munck, 3911—
1195 and Deneneenex 1n Lne Inind 39:11. Ine Qeee e: Lenin Amenien- (Lon-
don: Zed Books Ltd, 1984),p.151. It has been suggested by some national
historians that the labor movement in Panama was a product of immigrant
Hhite Spanish Socialists, among them José Maria Bléquez de Pedro and
others, during the 1910s. This suggestion is challenged from the histo-
rical fact that prior to the arrival of the Spanish immigrant workers
in 1906, Antillean labor locals were already active. Nor was it a pro-
duct of the Afro-Hispanics because prior to 1850, Panama did not in-
clude mass wage workers as proletariate. In other words, the Afro-Hispa-
nic arrabaleros had no experiences with the lodge until after
the Antilleans introduced it.

39Manuel Antonio Garreton, M., “Popular Mobilization and the Military
Regime in Chilezthe Complexities of the Invisible
Transition'.pp.259-277, in Susan Eckstein, ”Power and Popular Protest

in Latin America". Rene: and 222911: Ennlees. LeLin Anenieen §eeinl

991999919. Susan Eckstein, ed. (Berkeley/Las Angeles/London:University
of California Press),1989, p.15.)

‘oFigueroa Navarro, 07199r r99i 9 099999 1 Zr9nsf999aa91i99 99
flea191199999 99 E99999: (1821-1849). (Panama: ) Imprenta INAC., 1979.

41Babchuk and Edwards, p.149.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE EMERGENGE 0F ARENEP:
REVINDICATION 0F AFRO-ANTILLEAN IDENTITY
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

A. ARENEP’S Relationship to the Nation and State

This chapter discusses racial/ethnic, popular participation in lo-
cal, cultural and national politics; in terms of a group acting in
their interest and concern as Afro-Panamanians through ARENEP. ARE-
NEP’s relationship to the State and nation as a grass-roots organiza-
tion was eminently political. This was manifested through the organiza-
tion’s activism or lack of, in response to State policies or activities
as they affected the Afro-Population, especially the Afro-Antillean Pa-
namanian population; particularly the country’s international linkage
of politics and trade. Theoretically, this activism was expressed
through, for example, the nature of the country’s dependency and the
effects of foreign interest in the local economy, the globalization and
transnationalization of the local economy as a response to the post-in-
dustrial capital transformation.

ARENEP was born out of the interest of several Afro-Panamanians
concerned with the unequal employment for Afro-Panamanians.1 Between
1976 and 1984, ARENEP was formed, and emerged as a grass-roots or-
ganization, mainly of people of African heritage from Rio Abajo and
Parque Lefevre Corregimientos or Counties in Panama City. The majo-
rity of ARENEP’s members from these two Corregimientos, consist-
ed predominantly of third and fourth generations Afro-Panamanians of Ca—
ribbean heritage, whose parents were the sons and daughters of ex-plan-
tation slaves. In these Corregimientos, there are also Afro-

110

111
Hispanic Panamanians, descendants of free and enslaved Africans, mixed

with Indigenous, Hispanic and some Caribbean heritage going back some
seven generations. Other racial/ethnic groups were are also present
such as some members of the Indigenous community. ARENEP also had a

presence in the city of Colon.2

(1) TABLE 7
HHERE HERE YOUR GRAND-PARENTS AND PARENTS BORN?
1994
GRAND-PARENTS PARENTS
Place Number Percent Number Percent

CARIBBEAN 94 15.6 10 1.7
CARIBBEAN & OTHERS 16 2.7 6 1.0
PANAMA 337 56.0 442 73.4
PANAMA & OTHERS 34 5.6 15 2.5
EUROPE-PANAMA 8 1.3 4 .7
SOUTH AMERICA 32 5.3 17 2.8
CENTRAL AMERICA 8 1 3 6 1.0
NORTH AMERICA 1 .2 8 1.3
OTHER 72 12.0 65 10.8
MISSING 29 4.8
TOTALS 602 100 0 602 100 0

TABLE 2 represents both countries of birth and geographical areas
of the respondents’ grand-parents and parents. The categories "Caribbe-
an and Others" and "Panama and Others” are the inclusion of other Afro-
Antillean descent peoples of mixed parentage from more than 25 diffe-
rent countries outside the Caribbean and/or Panama proper, for example,
Caribbean-Indian, Asian, or other. In this way, for example, using the
larger sample, 62 percent of the respondents’ grand-parents were born

in the Republic and 18 percent in the Caribbean. Likewise, 76 percent

112
of their parents were born in Panama and 3 percent in the Caribbean. Si-

milarly, 49 percent of the grand-parents and 26 percent of the parents
born in Panamé were/are of Caribbean heritage.3 And as would be ex-
pected, the longer an immigrant group stays in a country, the less ”im-
migrant" the group becomes. If 62 percent of the respondents’ grand-pa-
rents and 76 percent of their parents were born in Panama, this high-
lights the fact that the majority of Afro-Panamanians of Caribbean he-
ritage are native born.

ARENEP emerged within the general nationalist and social policy
of Torrijismo. The politics of the Torrijos Government fomented the
conditions for the emergence of various organizations, and made possi-
ble the conditions for groups to organize politically. It was during
this period of the late 19605 to mid-1980s, when Afro-Panamanian organi-
zations emerged: the ASOCIACIdN AFRO-PANANEfiA(Afro Panamanian Asso-
ciation); AYUDE --UNIDOS y ASOCIADOS Negros para el DESARROLLO (Uni-
ted and Associated Negros for Development)--; ALTERNATIVA (Alter-
native); GRUPO DOCE (The Group of Twelve); APODAN --ASOCIACI6N
PROFESIONALES DE NEGROS-- (Association of Professional Negros)
and UWEP --UNION NACIONNL de NEGROS PANANEfiOS (National Union of Pa-
namanian Negros.) All of these organizations attempted, in one way
or the other, to affect social change given the dynamic interplay bet-
ween internal and external politics, the nature of the racial problema-
tic, and the general amnesia and denial of race in Panama. They petitio-
ned the Governments on social and political issues, and articulated the
concerns of the Afro communities.

ARENEP mobilized on the basis of the social strains within the

given historical structure: the nature of the political/economical

113
order: the level of dependency, low life chance experiences and the

generalized belief system of race and ethnicity. Nhere APODAN and
GRUPO DOCE represented the middle class in composition and outlook,
ARENEP’s composition and programs were framed by the popular sect-
or: Afro-Antillean-Panamanians, a large contingent of Afro-Hispanic-Pa-
namanians and some Indigeneous representatives. ARENEP, AYUDE, UNEP
and others had a membership base reflective of a racial/ethnic identi-
ty. And although APODAN and GRUPO 12 were made up of middle
class professionals, the vast majority of their members were of African
descent. Statistically, there were no "visible" members from the social-
ly white community in either APODAN and/or GRUPO 12.

Before and after 1903, the year of Independence, Isthmian society
was markedly racist with vestiges of ”caste-like” relations, and a
clear social division between European and African descent populations,
which permeated all other relationships within the society. The Hhite
oligarchy, extremely sensitive to considerations of skin pigmentation,
had established their requirements for acceptance into the Panamanian
society: the good use of the Spanish language; that the aspirants be
white, Spanish and Catholic. This, of course determined the position of
the Antilleans along side the Afro-Hispanics who were already placed in
the lowest social sphere for obvious reason: their African ancestry.

Additionally, Afro-Antilleans were considered an "out-group" by the
host society because of their cultural identity: English, French and
French base patois languages; their Protestant religious denomi-
nations and their "rare customs", as Vasquez calls it.4 They were
"invaders without the possibility of adapting to the Panamanian cul-

ture'.5 Afro-Antillean provided the critical diversity and became

114
the racial issue in Panamanian society. Panamanian society and work-

force were split into two artificial, hostile subpopulations: the Afro-
Hispanics and the Afro-Antilleans. Paraphrasing Greenberg, this
artificial antagonism became real as it was sustained initially in the
pulpit, later intensified by the press, and even cartoons at the dispo-
sal of the bourgeoisie.6 In this way, the prejudice of an ethnocen-
tric Hhite oligarchy reinforced social discrimination based on racial
motives which became part of the folklore,7 literature, and institu-
tional fabric of Panamanian culture.

Hith all its limitations, the general nationalist policy of Torri-
jismo was specifically aimed at the revindication of Panama’s long
claim of national sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Politically, Afro-An-
tillean Panamanians, like the majority of other racial/ethnic Panama-
nians, identify with the nation (if not the country?) as patriots and
citizens. Many understand fully well the issue of national sovereignty,
and the neo-colonial relationship between Panama and the US, and that
the situation of political jurisdiction of the Canal Zone colors many
issues in the Republic. Many also understood that the continued divi-
sion of the country into two distinct political entities, representing
two different countries would continue to affect the development of the
country, and many felt that they were part of the national struggle for
sovereignty. For ARENEP, it was not only a ”struggle for racial/eth-
nic political liberty, but also for the political autonomy and national
sovereignty of the country.

As an ethnic group, Afro-Caribbean-Panamanians have a stake in the
country since many Afro-Caribbean have been involved with the Isthmus

since 1850, and many families have intimate ties to Afro-Hispanic-

115
Panamanians. Such is the case today, that it is difficult to differenti-

ate an Afro-Antillean from an Afro-Hispanic. In this case the dynamics
related to ARENEP and national sovereignty over the Zone is that of
the citizenry acknowledging their country’s sovereignty. The issue of
sovereignty was not only emotional and economical, it was also nationa-
listic. In a key-note speech delivered at the closing of the anti-impe-
rialist week conference, with reference to the Treaty negotiations, To-
rrijos said:

if there is no agreement to the satisfaction of our nation ... and

our people, the inevitable will happen. ... An explosion of the Pa-

namanian people. For the National Guards there are two roads. For

Omar Torrijos there are two roads at the head of that National

Guards: to crush a patriotic rgbellion of the people or conduct it.

And I am not gaing to crush it!

The period of the Torrijos Military Government, 1968-1981, appeared
as a catalyst for the emergence of social movements as the Military Go-
vernment sought legitimation through social and national Torrijismo
9 a policy of political inclusion, which articulated new organic pos-
sibilities in the anti/colonial, anti/discrimination struggle and the
character of labor in the country. Within this context was the discus-
sion of a diverse social and political culture, inclusive not only of
the local Nhite oligarchy, defined as a consortium of influential fami-
lies in the social, economic and political arenas of the country, but
also the Indigenous and Afro population in the country. The fundamental
interest required not only the adoption of a formal attitude to the na—
tional question, but also the attitude of minorities towards their op-
pression. The ideology of social Torrijismo can be seen in Torrijos’

attempt to:

liberate the people from their frustrations, give them confidence
in their capacity to resolve problems; guide and orient to ... seek

116
opportunities to develop their potential: strengthen thela national
. spirit ... composed of tradition, history and values.

In practice, this sought to identify the "whys" and causes, real
and apparent, of social problems. In this context Torrijos said:

we went about separating ... real causes... internal organic disrup-
tions; the manifestations and street disturbances, from the pro-
found cancer of the structures. The real cause is social terror ...
the broth of misery ... the lack of schools ... of national develop-
ment. The real cause is the negation of rights ... as an individual
and member of a group ... the lack of respecilfor human dignity,
the supremacy of one social sector over another.

Hhat was also highlighted here was that for the first time in the
country’s history, from the highest level of government, the question
of the supremacy of one social group over another was posed as a nation-
al issue. Notwithstanding the ideology of social Torrijismo, the
priority of the government was not only the abrogation of the 1903 Trea-
ty, which structured, as previously mentioned, the neo-colonial rela-
tionship between Panama and the US, but also the negotiations of the
1977 Treaties to create a more balanced political relationship between
Panama and the US. In 1971, in a speech at the Plaza 5 de mayo, com-
memorating the anniversary of the Military take-over, Torrijos said: 0

From 1904 the Panamanian people have been struggling against a
Treaty, which, if for us is shameful, for the so-called US democra-
cy, should be ignominious. Let them show now ... that they are the
leaders of freedpg in the world, and remove that colonial enclave
which exists here.
During this speech, the presence of the US appointed governor in the Ca-
nal Zone brought a high degree of scorn from Torrijos.
Ask the foreign correspondents which people of America or which
people of the world supports within its territory, the existence of

a (fpgeign) Governor. In the name of what? And Governor of

what?

This political climate subsumed everything else that was not perti-

nent to the nationalistic goals of political autonomy, and made

117
ARENEP’s racial/ethnic arguments a marginal issue at best. ARENEP

was knowledgeable of the fact that contrary to some of their parents
and the majority of their grand-parents who worked on the Zone, and who
were always pawns in Treaty negotiations, a majority of the present wor-
kers on the canal were Panamanian citizens. Thus, as citizens, ARENEP
admittedly used the atmosphere of the Treaty negotiations as a mechan-
ism to bring forth the discussion of racial and class relations, be-
cause when the neo-colonial system and the issue of race and class on
the Zone were focused upon, ARENEP’s racial consciousness argument
found expression. But, as Priestely writes:

Torrijos, unlike ... previous oligarchical administrations, recog-
nized the role of these workers in the struggle against racial dis-
crimination and segregation in the Canal Zone. (But) he ”appropriat-
ed' that struggle, interpreting and representing it4as part of a
larger anti/colonial effort against the United States.

This was seen as the appropriation of the social issues and its re-
interpretion within the national struggle. Yet, in a clearly defined po-
litical perspective, ARENEP stood behind the National Government du-
ring the 1977 Treaty negotiations. This position had two concerns: 1-
the pressures exerted by the United States relating to the Treaties ne—
gotiations, and 2- the State’s linkage to international businesses.
This nationalist Opening provided ARENEP its insertion not only for
the orientation of Afro-Panamefios of Antillean origin, but also oth-
er Afro-Panamefios. And citing the Documento Central del Primer
Congreso del Negro Panamefio, --the Central Document of the First Con-
gress of Black-Panamanians-- the viable or possible options for Panama-
nians, particularly the Antillanos, were basically political.15

ARENEP allied itself with the national movement for the ”politi-

cal recuperation” of the Zone, but argued that irrespective of the

118
organization nationalistic posture, the revindication of the Zone must

also include the national, social and political revindication of Afro
-Panamefios of Hispanic and particularly Antillean origin; of their
history and contributions to the culture and country. The organization
was able to convince a significant sector of the Afro-community during
its weekly meetings, that the Treaty should not be approved without a
discussion from the Antillean Community,16 given the consequences
and new order to be derived with the transformation of the old ‘Canal
Zone’. 17 This idea was also launched by members of the ARENEP’s
Directiva through several radio talk-shows through the efforts of Le—
roy Gittens, Hoodrow Bryan, Leroy Gittens, Arturo Branch, Gerardo Malo—
ney, Oliver Prince and others. As a result, and at ARENEP’s re-
quest, the Government sent representatives to Rio Abajo, Parque Le-
fevre and surroundings neighborhood to explain the issues of the ca-
nal negotiations to the Afro-communities. It is inferred from Castro
Gomez’s suggestion, that in contrast to the oligarchic governments, the
Military Government showed a serious concern for the ethnic as well as
the national issue within the new political process, in that:
the myth of integration ... would not be the ideological discour-
ses .... articulated by the principal mentors of the process, but
the reformulation of the ethnic and national question within the
frame work of concrete political actions towards resolving the spe-
cific necessities of these subordinated socialssectors as well as
the consolidation of the new political process.
ARENEP’s discussion with government representatives involved
not only the issue of the Treaty negotiation. Equally important was the
fear of the possibility of major firing and unemployment of Afro-Panama-

nians, particularly Afro-Antillean-Panamanians, to make way for the em-

ployment of the social whites and other ethnic groups who long sought

119
positions on the Zone. Another issue was the continued availability of

housing for present canal area employees and retirees on the zone,
which was discussed earlier with members of the Coalicion Patriotica
Nacional, --the Patriotic National Coalition-- an Afro-Panamanian or-
ganizations from the United States, and other government authorities.

However, to many members, the Government’s serious concern for
the ethnic issue was nothing more than a tactical political ploy. Some
of ARENEP’s members expressed concern about the presence of the
Afro-Hispanic Treaty representatives selected by the Government to at-
tend the discussions in Rio Abajo, Parque Lefevre and surrounding
neighborhoods. The presence of the Afro-Hispanic representatives was
seen as contradictory, given that the Antillean community expected Afro
-Antillean negotiators. The Afro-Hispanic representatives’ presence was
interpreted as implicit discrimination, couched in an argument to 'ad-
vance' the nationalism vs. ethnicity dichotomy in the political dis—
course.

The members of the organization argued that the Afro—Hispanic repre-
sentatives portrayed a contradiction in that, while they did not valid-
ate the ethnic discourse of previous governments which referred negati-
vely to the Antillano as negro, they did not oppose the dis-
course which talked about the Cholo or the Santefio. The Sante-
flo/a and/or Cholo/a are ideological references to what is called
the essential Panamanian being, in that the Santefio/a is cover-
ed in European heritage, and the Cholo/a is the assumed mixture of
European and Indigenee, the mestizo. In this sense it was argued
that the Military government was not serious in its attempt to be inclu-

sive.

120
The Government’s choice of representatives not only left the assump-

tion that no Afro-Antillean negotiators were able to present and defend
the country’s/Government’s position, despite their presence in the Go-
vernment, but also manifested the ploy of the internal nationalist game
once more: which Afro-community, Hispanic or Antillean was more nationa-
listic. ARENEP considered that the Government was myopic in its
view of the organization’s efforts, in that it did not understand that
ARENEP was forging an inclusive relationship between nationalism,
race and national citizenship (identity).

The significance of ARENEP’s involvement in the campaign for
the 1977 Treaties lies in the neo-colonial situation, the political ju-
risdiction of the Canal Zone, the presence of another country and poli-
tical entity which affected not only the development of the country,
but also the political citizenship of Panamanians living in the canal
area. Given this neo-colonial situation, the political arrangement bet-
ween the two countries, and the strong ideological message on the Zone
given the presence of the US Military, Panamanian life style, by de-
fault, was absent from the Zone.

Moreover, for example, a majority of Panamanian children of Antil-
lean heritage went to schools on the Zone, which basically taught US
culture until 1955, when the school system was changed to incorporate
Panama’s culture and history. Forty-four years of US ideological incul-
cation, 1911-1955, definitely affected the appreciation of many Panama-
nian children, including those of Afro-Antillean heritage, regarding
their country, Panama, and would continue to affect other generations
of Panamanians if the political juridical border of Canal Zone/Republic

of Panama was not resolved. The 1977 Treaties would resolve the issue.

121
During the same Summer of 1976, through coordinated efforts of the

organization and the Cancilleria --Office of the Foreign Ministry--
representatives of ARENEP met and discussed support of the Treaties
with representatives from other countries, whom the Government had invi-
ted to Panama. Among the guests were the Ambassador of the Spanish Afri-
can country, Ecuatorial Guinea, and the Rev. Jesse Jackson from the US.
These meetings were held at the Holiday Day Inn Hotel in Paitilla, in
Panama City. In both meetings, Panama’s historical neo-colonial rela-
tionship with the US, and international support for Panama’s position
vis a vis the 1977 Treaties were discussed. The Ambassador of Ecua-
torial Guinea said he would inform his Government of the issues, and
the Rev. Jackson pledged to support the Treaties. And along with Cirilo
McSween, an Afro-Antillean-Panamanian businessman from Chicago, they
worked the diplomatic arena and assisted the Panamanian Task Force and
other organizations in New York City. In this context ARENEP parti-
cipated in concert with the Government during the nationalist movement
for the Torrijos/Carter Treaty.

Given this participation, the Government began to address some of
ARENEP’s concerns and the organization began to receive some politi-
cal attention. For example, during the Summer of 1976, there were many
serious discussions with State Ministers and Government commissions
from the Autoridad del Canal --Canal Authorities-- and other Pana-
manian, autonomous government institutions. One such activity was the
several meetings with functionaries from the Instituto de Vivienda
--National Housing Institute-- to consider the use of the reverted land
in the 1977 Treaties, whether through sale and/or through public do-

main. This was important because of the probability for the common man

122
to purchase any of the reverted home and/or other property within the

civilian areas of the canal. It was also at these meetings that the
question of the continued availability of housing for present canal
area employees and retirees on the zone was discussed. Thus, from an in-
ternal political perspective, ARENEP represented not only the condi-
tions of labor and housing for canal employees, but also the concerns
of the Afro-Panamanian population regarding the Zone.

It is suggested that with great reservation, the Military Govern-
ment accepted the presence of ARENEP as a racial/ethnic organiza-
tion which, on the one hand, would speak favorably to Afro-Panamanians
of Caribbean origin, who still worked and/or lived within the Zone, and
on the other hand, that ARENEP could be used to sufficiently influ-
ence the canal zone workers to support the Treaties. In this context
ARENEP was seen as a political instrument of the Government to deliv-
er the votes of these workers, their families and sympathizers,19 and
whose support the Government needed. It was also supposed that this was
a dangerous political influence. However, for the Military:

while recognizing racism as a powerful ideology and black consci-
ousness as an important assertion of self-dignity, .... (T)his ...
category (of) race became an ideology used to explaéa and legiti-
mize class division, explOitation (and even Violence).

In this context, the Torrijos Government monitored not only the or-
ganization, but also the presence of the political Left, which it felt
would be critical of the Government and/or would try to radicalize the

organization.21

According to one informant, ARENEP’s militancy
was also instrumental in the emergence of the Grupo Dace,22 which
was allegedly instigated by the Government as a counter-pressure group

against the presence and demands of ARENEP.

123
B. Redefining National Culture and Inclusivity

ARENEP’s political context was developed as a racial/ethnic or-
ganization similar to those which emerged and manifested in other coun-
tries. Also important at the time of the discussion of the 1977 politic-
al Treaties was ARENEP’s contribution to a redefinition of the popu-
lation’s identity as a national issue, and inclusive of diverse cul-
tures. In Panama, as previously mentioned, racial/ethnic diversity was
not validated, that is, given legitimacy. Except for the Indigeneous
people, all other references to race and ethnicity were seen as a divi-
sive racial socio/political mechanism, which would affect the racial
“harmony of the country". But as Cenci, head of INAC, Institute Nacio-
nal de Cultura --the National Institute of Culture-- and cultural
spokesperson of the Royo Government would note:

culture can no longer be associated with only ... one group or
sector, but ... with all manifestations ... which belong to the his-
torical and daily experiences of a people. ... It is also ... ances-
tral ggmory .... Given that a people feels the need for their
roots.

During the 19705, the racial issue presented contradictory argu-
ments to the oligarchy’s “official position” of no racial discrimina-
tion in Panama, and was at the forefront of the discussions in congres-
ses, symposia and social groups. And contrary to this popular myth,
Materno vasquez, then a member of the Torrijos Government wrote:

there is a whole theory regarding the people from the coasts, one
that is developed within a discriminatory context because they are
all negros ... which has meant an improper treatment from the

Government ... due only to racial factors. The negros from

Costa Arriba and Costa 2abajo constitute today ... the most

excluded or marginal group.

vasquez’s quote is in defense of the Afro-Hispanic --negro caste-

fio coastal negros—- however, it is also applicable to the Afro-

124
Antilleans-Panamanians. Historically, all Afro-Panamanians share seve-

ral common elements: e.g., unequal access to opportunity structure, and
weak political empowerment. Hhat apparently, has not been understood by
the majority of Afro-Panamanians is that element which, because of
its nature, is being preserved and controlled ... political power:
to stabilize and monopolize ... advantages by instituting the dif-
ferences between groups and allocating roles and benefits that per-
petuate the difference .... The contrast emerges as a cultural divi-
sion 29f labor ... of cultural differences upon economic inequali-
ties.
The power of this ideology is reflected in its acceptance by people
of color to think "white" and allow themselves to be dominated by white

26 which hides the heterogeneity of the popula-

assimilative forces,
tion in the myth of mestizaje. To paraphrase the Central Document
of the Primer Congreso del Negro Panameflo, the argument that racial
discrimination does not exist in Panama is derived from the oligarchy,
based not only on their interpretation that there is no legal diffe-
rence regarding ethnicity, but which also served "to identify or reduce
what is negro to the sector of Antillean descent.'27

In other words only the Antilleans are the negros in the coun-
try. To paraphrase Hall, race is never a homogeneous concept, it re-
flects different interests and experiences, different traces from the
past as well as emerging elements from the present.28 It is never ful-
ly formed, and it is always in a state of formation and transformation.
Thus, to the question, "Do you agree that only the Caribbean immigrants
and their descendants are the negros in Panama"?, seventy-nine (78.
8) percent of the respondents in the sub sample strongly disagree. Yet,

the argument continues, the Antillanos are not discriminated

against because of their ethnicity, but because of their cultural

125
identification with the country’s number one enemy: the US and US impe-

rialism.29 Again, although there is no legal distinction regarding
ethnicity and/or race, --outside the Indigenous community--, the Antil-
leans, particularly those who lived and worked on the Canal Zone, were
discriminated against as those negros who identified with the
enemy.

Currently, for example, the same ideological phenomenon exists in
the Dominican Republic, where the Haitian immigrants are perceived as
the enemy. Despite the African heritage of both the Dominican and Haiti-
an populations, the Haitian are seen as negros, they are discrimin-
ated against as such, and as sugar cane contract laborers in Santa Do-
mingo, they are looked upon negatively. The interpretation to this ideo-
logical phenomenon in Panama has permeated the majority of explanations
such as those from certain income level of the middle class. In Panama,
this sector argues that:

in reality the problem does not exist, and in any case, even what
could appear as the "problem" is not sufficient to justify an orga-
nizational banner (of racism)305ince the problem is so minimum to
have ... practical consequences.

These arguments are full of contradictions. For example, if the pro-
blem is so minimum, why is the racial question so strongly denied as an
issue, particularly at the official level, and why do Afro-Panamanian
organizations bring about negative responses from the oligarchy and cer-
tain income level of the middle class? Moreover, historically it is the
oligarchy who has identified most with the US, not only through commer-
cial enterprises, but also through intermarriages.31

A majority of Afro-Panamanians have adopted the white bourgeois men-

tality where they self identify not as Afro-Panamanians: --a national

126
identity of inclusivity and diversity-- but as mestize Panamanians:

--a national ideological racial identity. And many Afro-Panamanians to-
day firmly believe the general ideological myth; that they are part of
the dominant Hhite minority, if not, they are the mestize majority.

For some Afro-Hispanics, to identify as Afro is to admit not only
to a debasing stigmatized identity, but to be mistaken for an Antillean
or Chembe, the ideological enemy --the cuco. The cuco ap-
peal is in response to the demands of the racial and politically subor-
dinant groups. Contrary to the majority population, fifty—eight (58)
percent of the members/sympathizers strongly disagrees with the assump-
tion that the majority of Panamanians are mestizes.

Ideology as practice has been very evident in the Tourist Bureau,
IPAT, Institute Panamefie de Turismo --the Panamanian Institute of
Tourism. Here the images of the peoples of Panama clashes with the rea-
lity each time the Bureau projects the Nation internationally. Each pro-
jection shows the presence and heritage of the socially white people of
the country --about 12 percent of the population-- ignoring the almost
80 percent African descent peoples, their heritage and contribution, re-
ferring to the 8 percent Indigenous population as quaint tourist at-
traction. On the issue of the Antilleans’ presence, Sisnet says:

this theme has been low-keyed or ignored knowingly by our offici-
al historians. A theme, because of its importance, should not es-
cape the knowledge of our fellow Citizens.

Eighty-eight (88) percent of the respondents in the sub-sample
strongly agreed that the omission of the Afro heritage in the tourist
bureau’s projections is part of the State’s racial/ethnic ideology, for
example, the annual beauty pageant, La Panamefiisima Reina Negra, --

Miss Afro Panama. Ninty-one (91) percent of the respondents strongly

127
believed that celebrating their African heritage is not contrary to the

development of the national culture, and sixty-three (63) percent of
the respondent in the larger sample strongly agrees with the statement
that there is something African about the Panamanian culture; and
while INAC recognizes the Afro-Antillean presence (see Suplemento
de SANAAP, Feb. 1996), La Panamefiisima Reina Negra, is totally ig-
nored by IPAT.

In this context, ARENEP’s issues of the low life chances of
Afro-Panamanians, ethnic/racial identity, national identity and label-
ing, placed in direct association with the nation’s political, economic-
al and social revindication of the Zone was strategic within the natio-
nalistic movement. And as Cenci, the cultural spokesperson of the Torri-
jos legacy would write:

Panama will accentuate the political, economic, social and cultu-
ral transformations which3gill accompany our efforts for the recupe-
ration of the Canal Zone.

Internally, ARENEP’s participation served two purposes national-
ly: 1- to demonstrate the sharing of a national citizenship and identi-
ty as (Afro) Panamanians, and 2- to assure the continued employment of
Afro-Panamanians who might be affected by Treaty Agreements. In this
strategy, ARENEP also made contact with the Afro-Panamanian organi-
zations in the United States, particularly the Cealicien to further
the cause of the Treaty negotiations and canal workers.

At a joint session between ARENEP and the Coalicidn in the
Hotel Soloy, in Panama City, February 1977, the issue of a monument in
l=anama City to commemorate the Antilleans who worked on the canal con-

:struction emerged. It was argued that Colon has a monument in front of

Iwhat was the Silver City Occupational School, then Rainbow City High

128
School, now the Centre Regional Universitaria. (See FIGURE 8) And

as such, it was also argued, that Panama City should also have a menu-
ment. Elena Hendricks, a senior member of the Coalicidn suggested
the old Christian Mission Church which dates back to the late 1880.

At another meeting with officials from INAC. the issue of a mu-
seum was discussed. Later a delegation of ARENEP and Cealicidn
members took the issue to Reina Terres de Arafiz, then, the Director of
the Department of Patrimenie Histdrice, the official agency for his-
torical monuments. As a result, the Nusee Antillano Panamefio --the
Afro-Antillean-Panamanian Museum became a reality (See FIGURE 9).

The issue of the Museum is significant because it was probably the
first government action ever taken to preserve and showcase Afro-Antil-
leans’ contribution to the nation. In this respect, ninety-six (96) per-
cent of the respondents believed that the way the national history is
written does influence how race and ethnicity are perceived in the coun-
try. Prior to the Museum, at the official level, the Antillean presence
was passed over in the country’s history, and what is recorded is gene-

rally unfavorable. The importance of the Museum is the positive

129
FIGURE 10
THE NEST INDIAN MONUMENT OF COLON
3‘12 ‘; ."T ‘

 

The Investigator beside the Monument; Centro Regional Universitaria,
Arco Iris (Rainbow City) Colon, Rep. of Panama. The legend reads:

IN APPRECIATION FOR THE CONSTRUCTION PERIOD NEST INDIANS
HHO MOVED THE EARTH TO UNITE THE WORLD 1904-1914.

NE THE DESCENDANTS OF THOSE NEST INDIANS PROUDLY DEDICATE THIS
PLAQUE TO THEIR MEMORY. WE ARE GRATEFUL TO OUR FORBEARERS FOR
THIS GLORIOUS TRADITION WHICH IS OUR RICH HERITAGE. HE PLEDGE
OUR BEST EFFORTS TO UPHOLD THIS TRADITION AND TO SERVE
INTELLIGENTLY FOR A BETTER WAY OF LIFE.
ERECTED SEPTEMBER 1952 BY THE RAINBOW CITY
OCCUPATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS.

130
official recognition of the Antilleans’ presence as a racial/ethnic

group and a component in the national society.

FIGURE 11
THE AFRO-ANTILLEAN MUSEUM

 

 

Calidonia, Panama City

One could suggest that it was in this vain that, for example, so-
cial Torrijismo expressively incorporated ethnic minorities, the iden-
tified Afro-Hispanic, the Indigenous and Antillean communities. In this
context, Bayano, Felipillo, Anton de Nandinga, Urraca, Victoriano

34

Lorenzo and to a lesser degree Pedro Prestan, who were all

131
virtually excluded from official historical memory, were later reinstat-

ed as national glories. Bayane, Felipille and Nandinga were en-
slaved Africans and previous rebels leaders of cimarrenes --run-
away enslaved Africans--; Urraca was an early Indigenous leader who
rebelled against the Spaniards; Lorenzo lead his mestize army in
the 1000 Days Nar --La Guerra del 1000 Dias, (1900 to 1903)-- in
the outskirts of what is today Panama City: and Prestan, of Antillean
descent, participated in the 1855 Liberal Revolution in Panama against
the Colombian Conservatives.

This was in contrast, for instance, to the ideal of a nation of
mestizes, and is argued from the differential historical incorpora-
tion of ethnic groups into the national body, and the denial of the pre-
sence and contributions of other ethnic groups to the construction of
the nation and national culture. With reference to the Antillean commu-
nity, and the canal construction, Torrijos said:

the worker, the sweat, the sickness, were also ours, of the Pana-
manian workers. Even though many werg5 not born here, many died
here. They left their bones in the canal.

Nithin these considerations is also the distribution of symbolic ho-
nors, national identity and benefits, and their reflection in the soci-
al order. It was the political action of ARENEP, initiated by Hood-
row Bryan,36 Board Member of ARENEP, and Honorable Alternate Re-
presentative for the Rio Abajo political district, that finally got
President Aristides Royo, to confer in 1983, the country’s highest
award, the Vasce NUfiez de Balboa, to several prominent Afro-Antille-
an Panamanians. In a Presidential Palace announcement and fete,

among those receiving the award were Armando Fortune (posthumously) and

George H. Nesterman. However, the distribution of symbolic honors, or

132
honorary mentions, can be interpreted as an invention of the dominant

class to create social distinctions and differences within the popula-
tion, and between dominant and subordinant groups. These can be eli-
minated when the convenience of such honors are no longer needed. In
this respect, deference creates privileges, a variable of power and a
mechanism of domination. Therefore, the distribution of deference can
also be interpreted as a mechanism for class and racial domination.

This all conjugated well with the Government’s position. It encour-
aged a nationalist position and participation, but not necessarily a
participation which transcended clientelism, and one which in fact
brought to the fore the issues of ethnic and racial identity. Although
in the eyes of the organization, this did not necessarily clash with a
nationalist posture, it definitely clashed with old assumptions of Pana-
manian racial identity and nationalism. And as Cenci, the Government’s
cultural spokesperson wrote:

(any intent) to try to apply ... an overarching ... culture which
underestimates the legitimate socio-cultural manifestations of peo-
ples or communities, whether Indigeneous, Afro-American or Afro—An-
tillean, and others who do not fit within §9e exclusivity of the
'hispanisized mestizaje", is to be criticized.

In the assertion of self-dignity, the issue of unemployment was con-
stantly raised by ARENEP’s Directive in radio talk-shows. Maloney
writes that during this period, an important aspect was:

the economic crisis during the period of negotiations ... (and) so-

cial revindications for the negros through the elimination of

racist measures 3and attitudes which limit equal opportunities for
the negro sector.

ARENEP’s militancy was likewise instrumental in the emergence

of APODAN as an Afro-Panamanian organization created to seek employ-

ment opportunities for Afro professional with the private or government

133
sectors. This militancy was also instrumental in President Royo’s (1982

-1984) call for a listing of qualified, Afro-Panamanians professional
for government appointments, and who met with the newly created organi-
zation, APODAN, in a breakfast meeting.

But ARENEP’s main concern was the employment of the non-profes-
sional Afro-population. ARENEP was in part successful for the em-
ployment of Afro-Panamanians in the chain of supermarkets, particularly
in Rio Abajo, Parque Lefevre and Jean Diaz. This was accomplish-
ed after several meeting between members of the Board of Directors and
the management of the supermarkets. ARENEP also brought to the fore
the questionable use of photographs on job applications. It was argued
that the use of photos was racist in that employment decisions were bas-
ed not on qualifications, but on racial stereotypes provided by the ap-
plicant’s photo. Unfortunately, this is still practiced today. (See FI-
GURE 11) This was also to counter the general negative ideology towards
Afro-Panamanians, particularly Panamanians of Antillean heritage. Busi-
nesses depend on the racial order and the State’s racial ideology to ac-
commodate prevailing racial practices and the needs of the dominant sec-

tor.

134
FIGURE 12

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135
It may be argued that the Torrijos Government believed that racial

beliefs were not in the national interest, and which, for that matter,
was, in reality an obstacle to new goals and the national strategy.
This was as much said by Cenci:

it is necessary that ... everything goes together with a Cultural

Policy of the State, in such a way that all efforts make sense of

the integration .... This, Torrijos and the members of his govern-

ment understood. ... and the new route the cultural politics of the

Republic would take ..39as of ... 1972, when the National Institute

of Culture was created.

In this context, for example, ARENEP’s presence spoke to the
cultural division between ethnic groups, and attempted to bridge the
gap of ideological differences, political disenfranchisement and eco-
nomic disadvantages.

Of similar importance was the new political structure of County Re-
presentative which ARENEP welcomed not only as a new beginning, but
as an opportunity to participate in politics at the neighborhood and na-
tional levels. This was considered a new beginning because, for the
first time in the political history of the country, Bernadette y Ante-
nie Antillane and Jean y Naria Afre-Nispane, --el pueblo Panamefio
-- had a more direct opportunity to participate in local and national
politics, simply because the new structure organized political power
from a “neighborhood" level. Torrijos said:

the modern statute ... institutionalizes new structures of power,

to guarantee popular participation. In the new system the geography

of the Fatherland is present through the National Assembly of the

505 County Representatives of the Republic. Such is the design of a

new type of political structure which is based on the organization

of all the communities of NeighboEBood Political Council, headed by
the natural leader of each County.

This structure in fact became the Asamblea Nacional de Represen-

tantes de Corregimientos --National Assembly of County

136
Representatives-- of elected representatives with the interests of the

masses, and who would facilitate community participation in important
political decisions. This structure was to foster a climate of order
and harmony between the social classes, races and political interests.
The representatives from each level of the political structure, the
Corregimientos, were to balance the power of the appointed execu-
tive.41

C. ARENEP, Political Parties
and Political Clientelism

Politically, the PRD --PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DENDCRATICO-- (RE-
VOLUCIONARY DEMOCRATIC PARTY), the political wing of the military, as
well as oppositional political parties sought a clientelistic relation-
ship with ARENEP --the co-optation of the organization through the
favoring of benefits for selected leaders and members. During the 19505
and 19605, given the strong animosity towards Afro-Panamanian-Antille-
ans, many local Afro-Antilleans functioned as the political middlemen
for one or another political party. This was evident, for example, in
Colon, where Hector Connor, Norman C. Brown and others worked the Antil-
lean communities, both on the Canal Zone and within the Republic, to
get the votes for J. D. Bazan, the Provinces’ political boss. In Panama
City, Leroy Husband and others did the same as middlemen for one or an-
other political party. But many in the communities felt left out politi-
cally, economically and culturally, and adopted a strategy of political
abstention.42

In fact, the strategy of political clientelism was still practiced
during 1972 and throughout the 1984 elections. Hector Gadpaille,43 of

Afro-Antillean heritage, represented the_middle and upper class Afro-

137
Antillean-Hispanic Panamanians in Rio Abajo, as the elected Representa-

tive in the 1972 election. Hoodrow Bryan, Board member of ARENEP
was the elected Alternate Representative of the same community during
the 1976 political campaign, and represented the lower income sectors.
Both were political clients of the PRD party.

Similarly, during the 1984 political campaign, on two occasions,
members of the oppositional political party, the Authentic Liberals, in-
vited ARENEP’s Directive to meet. The discussions centered around
the "idea of a coalition or alliance between the two organizations”,
the political awareness of the Afro-Antillean population and the possi-
bility of ARENEP wooing Afro—Antilleans into the political camp of
the Authentic Liberals. The fact that the Authentic Liberals saw ARE-
NEP as ”Antilleans" and not as Afro-Panamanians came over negatively
to the majority of ARENEP’s members at the meeting. This meeting in
reality was the subtle attempt to see if individual members, and by de-
fault, if ARENEP would be willing clients of the Authentic Li-
berals political party.

It could be argued that ARENEP could have embraced a
clientelistic relationship, because it could have provided a subor-
dinate group with not only a mechanism to improve their life chance con-
ditions, but also an opportunity to use their life experiences to influe
ence politicians and promote change. But, in this sense, political par-
ties and clientelism are not in the interests of the constituents, but
that of the party bosses, and the candidates. And in many instances,
some Board members and followers did not understand that the struggle
was not only about the privileges of the "upper class”, or personal

gain, but also about the distribution of and access to power for

138
the popular sector. Méndez and Mendoza write:

the incapacity of the political parties to become true institu-
tions which satisfy the aspirations of all social classes, has cre-
ated each time, the presence of organizakions which play a mediat-
ing political role without being a party.

The oligarchy’s concern for the distribution of wealth and privile-
ges has apparently created the inability of their political parties to
structure themselves to other than the power of economic resources, lea-
ving many in the communities without genuine political representation.
This may also be a reason for the support of grass-roots organizations
as well as an indictment about the nature, the issues, goals, ideology
and philosophy of (Panamanian) political parties. This has given rise
on many occasions for grass-roots political organizations to seek their
immediate interests whenever important social, political and/or nation—
al issues are at stake. And moreover, as Nilshire-Smith states:

oftentimes grass-roots organizational push and pull surpasses the
limited initiatives of party politics to tag point of putting the
many (parties and) governments in trouble, (which on many occa-
sions happened).

For example, ARENEP, as an organization, was political with res-
pect to its interests. It was in many cases more than a pressure group
in that it became the protagonist in the development of social and poli-
tical awareness and struggle, which was a cause for worry among the po-
litical elites. Hithin the 1977 Canal Treaties discussion, ARENEP
was seeking political and social revindication and improved socio/poli-
tical and economical conditions of Afro-Panamanians, particularly those
of Antillean heritage.

ARENEP is conceptualized as a political strategy of demand-mak-

ing and mobilization of people within the participacidn popular moo

del, with its articulations and ‘legitimacy’ as explanations of social

139
organizations. This conceptualization attempts to contribute to the de-

bate on racial/ethnic organizations, and the ideological construction
and interpretation of race and ethnicity within a particular framework
of the literature for systematic analysis. Socially, ARENEP’s pre-
sence was significant in that it aimed to counter the State’s covert ra-
cial attitudes and policies which talked of a race—free society, but
which strived to displace and weaken racial/ethnic solidarity, and to
eliminate any overt references to race and ethnicity from public dis-
course --particularly when it came from Afro-Antillean-Panamanians.

These policies, unconsciously or by design, promoted the stereotyp-
ing of ethnic minorities through hidden ideological messages and refe-
rences to race and ethnicity in public discourse, and which negated the
recognition and contributions of Afro-Panamanian to the national cul-
ture. For example, ARENEP was not sympathetic to the "quest of the
national glory" argument, promoted by the parties and the country,
since Afro-Panamanians were not included in that glory. And when asked
if Panama is a racial democracy, eighty-eight (88) percent of the 174
respondents strongly disagreed. Although the oligarchic regimes gave
lip service against discriminatory practices, in reality their interest
was more centered on the acquisition of the canal zone market.

0. The Nation and Transnational Geo-Politics.

In Panama, it can be argued that the US as a global manager, has as-
sisted Panama’s Hhite minority regimes in perpetuating their rule
through the presence of the US Military, the provision of military
equipment, technology and financial resources. In return for this assis-
tance, the White minority regimes have maintain the country’s dependent

pattern of participation in the global economy, allowing only moderate

140
modifications in the local economy. This assistance has also included

incentives to bolster local ideological support, control of mass mobili-
zation, political activism and “social-radicalism”, promises of short
and long term economic and investment monies. For example, the alleged
$300 millions spent within the national economy through the US military
bases on the Canal Zone, and the former $1,900,000 annual rental of the
canal.

This dependency is buffered through the presence of large and small
transnational/multinational corporations (TNC/MNCs), which represent
large scale capital; i.e., General Mill, IBM, and Sun Chemicals, among
others, geared towards the international export market in a nominally
national market. Not surprising, the White minority regimes have assist-
ed foreign manufacturers in setting up in national markets through whol-
ly owned or subsidiaries companies, or through joint ventures with lo-
cal capital, but which are completely controlled from abroad. In many
instances, these firms compete with national firms or prevent national
firms from entering into modern production such as the more traditional
markets for food, products and textiles, where foreign firms compete,
buy up and/or drive out local firms.

On the one hand, the impact of the TNCs on the economy, the high de-
gree of their participation and economic domination of the internal mar-
ket, the economic relations of international trade and finance, as well
as their input in the political decisions of the country, not only un-
dermined the domestic economy, but has aided in establishing a policy
of dependency upon the US presence and the TNCs. Arias has suggested

that:

141
the policy ... should adopt a dual character ... (to) assure the
preservation of the private capital and maximization of profits....

On the other hand ... (to) consider the collective interests to pre-

vent and neutralize social explosions of collective interests which

would ggdanger the stability and growth of the dependent capitalist
system.

The dependency is so obvious that seventy-three (73) percent of the
602 respondents in this study believe that the international financial
organizations (IFOs) are important to the domestic economy, and seventy
-eighty (78) percent believe it is very important for Panama to main-
tain contact with the IFOs. The growth of economies factored on trade
and investments policies based on the expansion of multinational capit-
al, are economies based on dependent growth which lead to greater con-
centration of ownership by foreign capital, more inequalities between
countries and intensified exploitation of labor to maintain the overall
effort. Santamaria’s argument is likewise illustrative of the economic
elites’ role in this dependent pattern of participation in the global
economy:

this structure, comprised of ... landowners and the financial sec-
tor, drain capital to the exterior to finance fundamentally the con-
sumption of luxury items, reinforcing, in a circular manner, the
economic and social agents which foment (their) concentrated exclu-
sivity, (and which) cxeate the enormous social inequality which pre-
vails in the country.

Torrijos was successful in 1968, in breaking the elite’s political
power which was used not only oppressively to misruled the country, but
like those of other Euro-Latin American countries, Panama’s bourgeoisie
invested little, if any, in basic research and development, preferring
to depend on foreign technology, especially from the US.48 The
"rational” of the local oligarchic bourgeois was land speculation which

creates very few permanent jobs:

why struggle to create new, :Egductive industrial firms in compe-
tition with the multinationals when troublg-free investments in
land and rental will yield comparable profits?

On the other hand, the management of the State’s resources and the
nation’s gee-political position is a major factor in understanding the
underpinning relationship between the State, the dominant economical
forces, and the interface between these and the capacity of the State
to pursue other policies. It is suggested that the global manager
states have become increasingly involved, directly or through represen-
tative transnational institutions in promoting coups to foster condi-
tions to restructure political power and economics systems of dependent
countries. For example, the Norld Bank (NB), the InterAmerican Develop-
ment Bank (IADB,) the Agency for International Development (A10) and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have served as instruments of US
investment policy, contributing to the destabilization of popularly ba-
sed nationalist regimes, determining and conditioning local politics
and providing financial support for right-wing military regimes50 In
this manner, manager states with the assistance of the IMF, NB, IADB,
and TNCs/MNCs, have manipulated regimes and governments. Panama is
reflective of these manipulations.

After Torrijos’ death in 1981, and under pressure from the US, the
Parades and Noriega military regimes, in conjuntion with the economic
elites who have been associated with transnationals through financial
and related services, and whose governments, according to 99919, specia-

lize in borrowing and kneeling before Uncle Sam,51

not only weakened
agrarian policy, eliminated the political system of local representa-
tives, restored the pre-l968 Legislative Code, drastically modified the

Labor Code, and cutbacks on progressive health, education and housing

143
programs, but also relinguished the country’s frontal attack in the Con-

tadora Peace Process, and US imperialism,52 as incompatibilities with
loan requests from the US and the IFOs. Panama’s economic elites and
their foreign mentors pushed hard for a return to business—as-usual po-
litics and lobbied successfully for the imposition of an unpopular IMF

53 and since 1983 the government has been struggl-

stabilization plan,
ing to implement a standard ‘structural adjustment’ policy, as recommen-
ded by the HB and the IMF. These powerful international financial for-
ces --the global managers and their agencies-- have "been pushing the
nee-liberal line”; an economic plan with an ”anti-grass-roots, top down
methodology" ... a vision of the country towards the future that eman-
ates from the above."54 And as the terms of these agreements become
unbearable, State firms are "privatized", foreign firms get greater con-
cessions and the Labor Code gets reformed, particularly the provisions
on the rights to unionize and collective bargaining.55 This tends to
substantiate the assumption that, citing Poulantzas, the ‘pelitical’
is the dominant instance in modern capitalism.56
1. Implications for the Popular Sector

Transnational activities in the local economy have implications for
the popular sector, which is impacted not only by local and national
politics, but also by the global political economy. The implication are
'seen in the "austerity measures" on the debt burden of the loans and
the transnationalization of the local economy. These austerity measures
reduced consumption standards, restricted monetary and fiscal policies,
control imports, restricted worker’s rights to strike as a means to
hold down wage increases, and proposed income policies to reduce real

wages.57

144
In many instances, the State has used loans for low cost infrastuc-

tural facilities to promote and enhance the private sector, and a free
market as a condition to pay the debts, which fell upon the popular
class who benefited least from the loans. The debt burden of the loans
and the transnationalization of the local economy affected the sectors
of national capital tied to public contracts, for example: public works
and construction. The impact on the popular class is the cumulative dam-
age such as: cutbacks in social programs, wage freezes and increase in
crimes and widened inequalities in the society.58
This impact is seen through the effects on local social organiza—
tions and cultural traditions, directly and indirectly, and the cutback
in social programs and salaries have negatively affected the popular
sector through constrained unions, increased prices to raise profits,
the destruction of traditional rural social organization, rural/urban
migration, problems of housing and social services, exploitation of the
labor force, and unemployment. The net effects are: the distribution of
income and power toward the bourgeoisie, the generation of labor stri-
kes around issues like work conditions, pay, consumer prices and collec-
tive consumption, and a mismanaged economy directed towards import con-
sumption and exports. For example:
in a country where barely 19 percent of the GDP is generated by
agriculture and industry, the HB and IMF pushed forward the absurd
hope that by growing9 melons for export, Panama could somehow pay
off its enormous debt.
These types of recommendations of the IMF, the HB and IADB have re-
sulted in wide spread poverty and social discontent giving rise to poli-

tical threats to the status quo. The related effects of these recommend-

ations are the overcrowded tertiary sector and public employment

145
deformed by underemployment, and the steady expansion of the informal

sector. These are conditions which have prompted the unemployed to seek
a meager subsistence in low paid traditional jobs as petty personal
servants or buheneros --street vendors.60 This also enhances the
linkages between the client State and the IFOs, and the manager state:
for example, the firing and replacement of personnel who, through back-
ground or ties, are willing to carry out the "austerity measures". Nico-
las Ardito Barleta, then the vice-resident of the Norld Bank, resigned
to become a candidate and then president in the 1984 Panamanian elec-
tions. Similarly, the current President, Ernesto Perez Balladares is an-
other with background or ties, and the willingness to carry out the
”austerity measures”. This conditioning of the State by multinational
capital as a consequences, has lead to a mismanaged economy, deformed
by external demands: internal conflicts, repressive policies, exacerbat-
ed socio-economic and geographical inequalities in Panama, problems of
poverty, slum housing, ill health and a host of other social ills for-
ced upon the popular sector, where six of every ten families cannot sa-
tisfy their basic needs.61

The policies of the IFOs and global manager included the destruc-
tion of independent labor unions, outlawing left-wing, Marxist, Nationa-
lists, and populist parties that represent the masses. Although the US
conditioned its ratification of the 1977 Treaties upon Panama adopting
a “democratic" form of government in the hope that Panama’s civilian po-
pulation would be more malleable that the nationalist Torrijos,62
Panamanian nationalism is also a reaction to the denationalization of
the country’s economy. But for the Panamanian elite, to paraphrase ‘The

NACLA Report’, economic independence, sovereignty and nationalism would

146
appear to be the opiate of an idealistic people; realism demands obe-

dience to the imperial master.63 In this context, Torrijos criticized
and disapproved of the behavior of past oligarchic governments regard-
ing financial arrangements, specifically when negotiating past Trea-
ties.

In the past, the governments were very determined to get better
Treaties but .... their results weresxelatively strong economically
and excessively weak in jurisdiction.

Most importantly, the oligarchy’s has repeatedly disgraced itself
over the issue that mattered most to Panamanian: nationalism.65 And
it would appear, for example, that for the popular sector nationalism
was the factor to offset the fear that world capitalism would break
down national borders, obliterate national distinctions and force the
country to be an annexed property of the US. To this, in 1973, Torrijos
said to the UN Security Council meeting in Panama:

Finally ... --and let this be clearly understood by all-- we have
never been, we are not, nor will we ever be an associated State, co-
lony or protectorate ..., nogaare we willing to be another star on

the flag of the United States.

2. Reinforcing the System and
Silencing the Victims

Similarly, and like any other political organization, ARENEP al-
so had to consider other foreign countries and international institu-
tions withholding financial assistance, US economic sanctions and
worse, military intervention, as a result of local activism. The poli-
cies of the TNC/MNC are linked to social, structural and governmental
changes of the country as a whole, through indirect and direct interven-
tion of the manager states in local, national politics and economy.

Foreign intervention, whether economic or military, has a deleterio—

us effect of the country and its society. To paraphrase Garcia,

147
economic intervention, the loans and agreements on technical assistance

from institutions such as transnationals, the Horld Bank and others,
are examples of ”sociological espionage“,67 in that through loans and
agreements, a country’s economic plan, whether to compete on the world
market or for internal development, is bared open to those who can do
most damage to the plans. Economic intervention also allows the control
of creative ideas and activities of the indigenous culture, and opens
the door to intervention and the implementation of agreements made with
the global managers and their surrogates. Most important, however, coun-
tries dependent on foreign capital (the IMF/NB) for national develop-
ment must accept the subversion of their sovereignty. This is a major
subversion of national sovereignty in that dependent countries cannot
make decisions without the intervention of international financial agen-
cies or foreign States.68 This is political intervention in the broad-
est sense.

This argument also comes from the historical record of national pla-
gues of interventions --eighteen US military interventions in Panama
since 1856, eight since 1904--69 not including the Chiriqui Occu-
pation in 1916, the occupation of Colon and Panama Cities in 1918, and
The Great Strike in 1919. The longest intervention was from 1903-1914.
And between 1904 and 1988, seven US military interventions were specifi-
cally directed against the population. Thus, the response of powerful
international actors to local socio-political activism is contingent up-
on their capacity to defend their interest in the global economy.
Eckstein writes:

global gee-politics have shaped resistance movements, such as the
fear of communism which has influenced the US’s response to progres-

sive national18t movements in Cuba, Chile, and Nicaragua, among oth-
er countries.

148
As noted by Calderon, Piscitelli and Reyna,71 the issue is the

concern of the global managers to contain and.avoid closer ties with
Cuba, lest we lose Panama as was the case with Cuba. This could al-
so be interpreted from the following political actions of the Sende-
ristas and Kataristas in Bolivia, the movements in the Andean re-
gion, the Chiapatistas, in Mexico and the New Jewel Movement of Gre-
nada and others in the Caribbean. And even though ARENEP did not
use violence, the lack of violence did not reduce its significance, the
presence of the US Military or disassociate the relationship between
the economic arena, the political dominance of the elite class and the
economic castration of subordinated groups.

The strong over-all presence of repressive forces throughout the
life of the country, both national and international, must be seen as a
mitigating factor in the nature and activism of grass-roots organiza-
tions such as ARENEP. In a letter to Senator Edward Kennedy, Torri-
jos wrote:

as second lieutenant ... I was used ... to command platoons ...
ready to crush students, workers and peasants. I received orders
from my superiors who possibly talked from the board room of the
shareholders, invited by the oliggrchy. Smash those subversives...

! Exterminate those strikers... !

Elsewhere Torrijos said:

it is sad to serve ... the unsatisfisg oligarchy which wants to
fix everything with bullets and tear gas.

Some analysts argue that repressive regimes in dependent countries
is a product of the internal factors that lead to repressive structures
and continued repression by the same type of regimes; that the origin
and proliferation of repressive regimes are not only products of inter-

nal conflicts among the dominant class, but also responses to the

149
demands that originate primarily on the global economic level.74

Thus, the possibility of the use of local force and the interven-
tion of the global manager (US), as a reaction to local political activ-
ism, was always a consideration for most organizations, from labor to
grass-roots, and even governments, as was the case of the 1989 Bush In-
vasion. As a corollary, it is suggested that in a politically and mili-
tary weakened country, a weakened national status intimidates the citi-
zenry, and reinforces a State’s repressive system, especially against
racial/ethnic minority groups such as the Indigenees and particularly
Afro—Panamanians who are seen as subversives. This argument is again
strengthened by Torrijos’ statement that:

an occupied country is a resentful country. And we have been re-
sentful because the Southern Command, which is in the Canal Zone,

STE. ngays utilized us as the first line on combat against our peo-

The IMF and other financial institutions reinforce a political sys-
tem in which the beneficiaries and the popular sector are not only oppo—
sing classes, but oftentimes different racial/ethnic groups. In this
context there is constant police repression, particularly for example,
in Coldn City, through batidas and/or physical intimidation based
on racial stereotypes of the City’s population in the attempt to main-
tain historical privileges.

By themselves, TNCs/MNCs in developing countries do not enable the
construction of a theory of racial/ethnic relations, but they demon-
strate the compatibility of race and ethnicity to the functionality of
capitalist development, and create and/or exacerbate the divisions of

inequalities. However, if TNCs/MNCs are considered within the theory of

internal colonialism, race and ethnicity become an integral part of the

150
business relations. This is suggested given the imposed pattern of Euro-

pean world wide hegemony, where racial/ethnic minorities through slave-
ry or annexation, collectively became the subjects of a racial labor po-
licy. The dominant group then stabilized its advantages by instituting
the differences between groups, ascribing role and benefits such that
the differences are maintained. To paraphrase Kuper, economic inequali-
ties are based on previous conditions of political and juridical domina-
tion and presupposed them.76

In this way prevailing patterns of racial/ethnic behavior are repro-
duced in businesses and modern institutions. For example, capitalist de-
velopment in general, preserve and enhance the racial order, extending
and reinforcing racial barriers; and the presence of the TNCs/MNCs in
particular, through their loans, reconcentrate power and privileges to
the dominant group, and contributes to a cultural, racial division of
labor based upon economic inequalities.

Economic growth developed from above and outside are rooted in the
assumption that authoritarian regimes would provide security guaran-
tees, a controlled, low paid labor force, while the multinationals
would provide the technology, skilled management and technical person-
nel to meet 'a development program'.77 This has given rise to urban
and neighborhood grass-roots organizations and their political struggle
for more social goods and services, better income distribution and in-
crease life chances.

Therefore, global political and economic dynamics are not inconse-
quential in the way they shape, indirectly or not, the emergence and

outcome of social movements. This would tend to substantiate the sugges-

tion that international politics and trade are linked to military force

151
which is the nemesis of grass-roots activism. Forty-one (41) percent of

the 174 members/sympathizers believe very strongly that the presence of
the US Military in Panama affected in some way, the activities of grass
-roots organizations. Consequently, during the years of military rule,
ARENEP, like any other organization, had to consider not only the
political response of the local military to its activism, but also the
omnipresence of the US Military within the country’s political and eco-
nomic structures, the pressures exerted by the United States, its view
of social change and the type of social activism that was allowed.

It is at this level that the presence of two governments in one
country, a unity. of international capital (and white power?) must
be contemplated. Throughout the literature, the classical image of so-
cial activism in advanced industrial societies, and even ‘Third Horld’
countries, is developed in the presence of a single ”legitimate" govern-
ment. But in the case of Panama, the presence of two governments, that
of Hashington through the Canal Zone Authorities, and that of Panama,
in one country --both adverse to social movements, but not always in
the same or compatible ways-- have not been contemplated in the litera-
ture. This may be a forced bias given the relative autonomy of the coun-
try in which the major theorists live. The other parallel case, similar
or close to the Panamanian political situation in the hemisphere is

Puerto Rico.

152
E. Chapter Five Endnotes

1Interview with L.A., one of the founders of ARENEP.

2Efforts to establish a presence in other locations of similar
generational and ethnic composition such as Becas del Toro, Darién
and Puerto Anmuelles were not as successful given organizational
logistics such as distance, transportation and finance.

3The data is a result of the percentages of responses which mentioned
either a grand-parent or parent of Caribbean descent and was calculated
before collapsing.

4Juan Materno VésqueZ. lnrestieaelenes intre la Neturaleza del ier
29999999. (Panama: Ediciones Olga Elena, 1981), p.82.

501medo Alfaro, El Bellefig Antlllene en la Anerlee Central: La
fleggnil d9 19 3999. 2 a°ed. (Panama:1mprenta Nacional, 1924),
p. .

55tanley B. Greenburg. Rene and State in Cenitalist Derelennent.
2999991119. (New Have/Londom: Yale University Press),
1980, p.9. '

7Faulkner A.Natts, ”Perspective Sobre el Afro-Panamefie", Panama:
Cina.) Photocopy. 1974.

8Omar Torrijos Herrera, "Sdle los Panamenes Pedemos Resolver e7

Problem: del Canal." La Eetalla de Banana.Anerlee Latina Litre.r
09199. (Buenos Aires:Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires), 1973,

p.64.
9“Deeunente Central del Eriner Gangrene del Neere Eenenene'.

. Centro de Convenciones ATLAPA,Panama,1981,(Panama: Imprenta
INAC, 1982, p.87.

loOmar Torrijos Herrera, “Hay Estabilidad, Calma ,y se Trabaja can
Orden.' (Discurse ante empresaries nerteamericanes en New York.) in L9

Eitilli d! Beneni. p.32.

llOmar Torrijos Herrera. 291 2919999 99 9999199 191199. (Panama:
Centro de Impresion .Educativa), 198I,p.18, in José de Jesas Martinez,

1999919 0999 19991199, (PanamazArtes Grafica de Centro America,
S.A), 1982. 00.85-6.

12Torrijos Herrera, L9 9at9ll9 99 299999. p.87.
l3Torrijos Herrera, 291 2919999 ... p.87.
l4George Priestley, 91111991 9919r9m9n1 999 3999199 Par1j91991i09 19

399999. 199 19r9jj09 39gime:196§-1972.(Boulder/London:Hestview
Press),1986, p.10.

15”Deeunente Central." 9 91.

153

16Interview, R.D.

17Gerardo Maloney, ”El Novimiente Negro en Panama“. 3911919

£9999999 99 2991919919. No.5 (Panama: Imprenta Universitaria, 1987),
p.151.

18Carlos Castro Gomez, "Estado y Nevilizacien Etnica en Panama.
(Integracion Especial y Cultural del Atlantice Panamefio.)“ 39v15t9

99 2991919919. No.5 (Panama: Imprenta Universitaria, 1989),
p.167.

19Interview with H.B., New York, May, 1995.

20David Riley and Allen Issacman, I'Introduction" 29919999
Aimeéeejetr. Esenenx. and Ltberatinn. David Wiley and Allen

Issacman, edts., Michigan/Minnesota: Michigan State
University/University of Minnesota), 1981, p.v.

lenterview with H.B.
22Interview with H.B.

23Didgenes Cedefio Cenci, "Apertacienes para la Formulacien de una
Concepcion Nederna de la Pelitica Cultural de Panama. “

demerits
Brim: Ensuentre Neelenal 1e Brittle: Cultural (PananézlflAC
deciembre 12-15, 1983), p.16.

24Juan Materno vasquez, £1 £919 999 09n99i9t9r: 19 19919 991 £9is
19199991. (Panamaz) 1974, p.105.

25Michael Hechter, 19t9rnal §9|9ni9lj99, p.23, in Stanley

B.Greenberg, 3999 999 §99i19li91 09V9l99me91.(New Haven/London:Yale
University Press, 1980), p.21.

26Jack Forbes, “The Hispanic Spin: Party Politics and Governmental

Manipulation of Ethnic Identity," L9119 99991999 39999991119. Vol.19,
No.4. Issue 75, (1993),p.65.

27"Deeunente Central" p.92-
28Stuart Hall in Hamilton et.at. p.3.

2999999999 999991" p.92.

3°“Deeunente Central" p.92.

31John Biesanz and Luke M.Smith,'Adjustments on Inter-ethnic
Marriages on the Isthmus of Panama,'99991999 299191991991 391199.Vol.16
No.6.(December, l951),pp.819-822. See also, John
Biesanz,'1nter-American Marriages on the Isthmus of Panama,'299191
E99999. Vol.29.No.2. (December, 1950), pp.159-l63.

154

32Manuel 0. Sisnet, Introdutory editorial notes to Dorothy May

cheil’s paper in the Eeletin de la Aendenie Banenene de la
99919999. No. 29-30 1981, p.4.

33Cenci, p.18.

34Carlos Castro Gomez, "Estado y Nevilizacien Etnica en
Panamd.(Integraci6n Especial y Cultural del Atlantice
Panamefio}-aenerles. Rerista Benenene de Seeteleeie. No.5 119
09999999 99919991. (Panama:1mprenta Universitaria, 1989), p.175.

35Omar Torrijos Herrera.19 091919 59991999. (Costa

Rica:Educa),1978, p.83. in Jesfis Martinez, 1999919 09ar Z9rrij99.
(Costa Rica: EDUCA, 1982), p.40.

36Hoodrow Bryan died accidentally in New York City, 1993.
37Cenci. p.21.

38Maloney, “El Nevimiente Negro en Panama“. p.150.
39Cenci, p.17.

4oOmar Torrijos Herrera, 3999999199 9, 099919 999999;, (Panama:
Ediciones Reforma Educativa), 1975, in 1999919 0999 19991199, José
de Jesfis Martinez, (Panama:Artes Grafica de Centro America, S.A),
1982,p.27.

41Priestley, pp.74-5.

42“Dneunente Central“ p 89-

43Gadpaille, an Afro-Antillean-Panamanian politician and PRD
supporter, became the first elected County Representative for Rio
Abajo under the new political system. Olivia de Pomares, another
Afro/Panamanian politician, was the first elected County
Representative for the Parque Lefevre County during the same
perio .

44Aristides Méndez y Rolando Mendoza, “Las Organizaciones de
Intermediacien Pelitica no Partidistas: el Casa de Panama. Nemeri9:
Ceneresn Naeienal de Ceeieleein ll- 15 seetlentre fle_lete Eenenena
' ' No.7 (Panama: Universidad de Panama, 1990), Méndez y
Mendoza, p.215- 16.

45David Hilshire Smith, 6919 99 199 P9r1i999 Eeliti9e9 99
0991999999199: 91 ‘0999 99 £99999, cited in Aristides Méndez and
Rolando Mendoza, Las Organizaciones de Intenmediacien Pelitica no
Partidistas: el Casa de Panama. 99999199: 2° Cen99999 flacienal 99

insteleeie 12,-15 de sentientre 1220. Reriste Benenene de
2991919919. No. 7 (Panama: Universidad de Panama, 1990), p. 216.

155

46'139ala Cabrera Arias, Criiii aching 12211919212; £2£_ale§- -E§n§mi
1222-1222. (Panama: Imprenta Universitaria, 1993), p. 54.

47Rafael Santamaria, "Mbvimiento Social y Democracia”, 9999919:
Cenacgsg Macinnal d: secialegia 12-15 scatigmbcg. 89119::

99 5991919919. No.7 (Panama: Universidad de Panama, 1990), p.287.

48Petras "US Investments" ....p.77.

49John Halton, "International Economy and Peripheral Urbanization“ ,
in 99999 E91191 99999 1991191199. Norman 1. Fainstein and Susan S. Fain-
stein, eds. , (Beverly Hills: Sge Publication) 1982, p.123.

50For example, in Chile, the Allende Government was not granted a
single loan, but the Pinochet Government received $126.9 millions. The
same thing happened with the populist Goulart Government (1962-63), and
the dictatorship that took over Brasil; and in Bolivia, for fifteen
years the populist government did not receive any loans, but the right-
wing government which succeeded received $195 million. Petras, "US
Investments"...p.80.

51"Panama: Reagan’s Last Stand”. 399991 99 199 99991999. 99919.
Vol.XXII No. 4 (July/Avgust), 1988, p.11.

52Raill Leis, "The Cousins’ Republic". 399991 99 199 9999199. NACLA.
Vol. XXII, No. 4. (July/August), 1988, p.24.

53Rat'il Leis, 399991 99 199 999r1ca. NACLA. Vol. XXII No.
4.(July/August), 1988, pp.24-25.

54National caritas-Social Pastoral Team, £9919. Universidad
Centro Americana., Vol.14. No.164 Managua: Nicaragua. (January, 1995),
p.22.

55Presently, Pérez-Balladares’ Government has privatized several

profitable government business: the National Telecommunications

Institute (INTEL), the National Acueduct and Sewer System, the

Institute of Hydraulic Resources (IDAN), the sale of Cemento

Bayano to Mexican investors. Interpress NewService, March 13, 1995,
999999. Vol.10. No.4 Issue 238 (march ZO/April 2,

1995), p.11.

56Munck, p.348.

57Dewitt and Petras, pp. 111-112.

58Dewitt and Petras, p.109.

59Elton, p.61.

156

60Halton, "International Economy ..." p.122.
61"Panama: Reagan’s Last Stand”. p.11.
62Leis, "The Cousins’ Republic”. p.24.
63"Panama: Reagan’s Last Stand". p.11.

64Torrijos Herrera, 19 9919119 99 E99999. p.62.

65John Heeks, ”Of Puppets and Heroes“ 399991 99 199 9999199. NACLA.
Vol. XXII No.4. (July/August), 1988. p.14

66Torrijos, speech to the UN Security Council Meeting in Panama,
March 15, 1973.

670lmedo Garcia, ”La EdUcacidn Superior Ante la Crisis Nacional".
Panama: APUDEP. cited in Hilliam G. Tierney, ”Cultural Politics in
a Latin American University: a Case Study of the University of Panama.

Li Educacién. 89119:: laigramgricang fig ngacrglle Educatize. Afio
XXXVIII No.118,II, (New York:Grganization of American States, 1994),
p.278.

68Franz J. Hinkelammert La 2:295 Exigcaa is 4992191 Latina: :1
99199991999 99 19 Q9999. San José: Edtorial Departmmento Ecuménico de
Investigaciones (DED), 1990. pp. 52- 55.

69See also, ”US Interventions in Panama.“ 99119: 399991 99 199
99991999. Vol.XXII, No.4 (July/August 1988), p.33.

7oSusan Eckstein, "Power and Popular Protest in Latin America", P099r
999 2991991, L9119 Am9r1999 599191 MQV9men19. Susan Eckstein,
edt. (Berkeley/Las Angeles/London: University of California Press),
1989, p.51.

71Fernando Calderdn, Alejandro Piscitelli and José Luis Reyna,
”Social Movements:Actors, Theories, Expectations", in Arturo Escobar
and Sonia Alvarez. "Preface“..lhg flaking 2f 599111 nggmgnti 19.13119

Amarica: Idgntitx Stratggx and ngggragx. (Boulder:Hestview Press,
1992), pp. 21-22.

72Torrijos Herrera. "Letter to Senator Edward Kennedy", Panama, May

7. 1972. Li 2319111 9: Bangui. PP.101-102-

73Omar Torrijos Herrera, “Discursa en la Universidad de Buenos
Aires, al recibir el doctorado Honoris Causa". Argentina, enero 11,

1974. in 1999919 9999 T09rij99. pp.83.

74James F. Petras, and Morris H. Morley, "Capitalist Expansion and
Class Conflict in Advanced Third World Countries". in Petras, Morley
and DeHitt, p.47.

157

75Horeira Neiva, ”Entrevista al General Torrijos“, Q9ad9rn95
991 199999 99999, No.41 Héxico: (enero/febrero), 1981.

76Leo Kuper, ”Plural Societies”, "The Theory of the Plural Society,
Race, Conquest”, in Greenberg, p.17.

77Petras, and Morley, p.51.

CHAPTER SIX

CONFLICTS, CONTRADICTIONS, EVALUATIONS,
PERCEPTION AND DEMISE OF ARENEP

A. Internal Organization

The internal organization of ARENEP was rather simple. It had a
minimal formal structure, which was a copy of the internal structure of
the lodge. There was a Directive or Board of Directors that main-
tained a degree of formality, consisting of the following offices: the
presidency and vicepresidency, the treasury, two secretaries -—one in—
ternal and one international--, the defense office, the press office,
two alternates and a political advisor.

There were no formal requirements or training for membership or of-
fice, and there was easy access to membership and the organization. For
membership, all that was required was a recognition of: one’s racial/
ethnic heritage, of the shared meaning of a racial/ethnic identity and
consciousness, of the social inequalities, and of the Afro participa-
tion in the country’s history. In this sense the organization was symbo-
lic in that it evoked and reaffirmed the collective racial/ethnic con-
sciousness, and a racial/ethnic national identity. Likewise, there was
relatively easy access to any officeholder, as the positions did not of-
fer any special advantage or personal influence to anyone in the organi-
zation.

Administratively, ARENEP had an established body of laws and va-
lues. Through the parliamentary process, the organization exercised par-
ticipatory democracy via yearly nomination and election of officers ac-
cording to the By-laws. At general meetings, the Board appointed or

158

159
nominated individuals for committee duty on specific tasks. The Board

would also form commissions for independent tasks, and appointed and/or
nominated other Board members for committee duty. These committees took
charge of organizing and coordinating their assigned tasks, but the ma-
jority of work was done by the Board. However, the organization did a
minimum of record keeping.

(l) Disarticulation Between
ARENEP and Membership

The leadership of the organization was too unstructured to allow

1 For example, the Board was al-

for persistence and transformation.
most, always playing "catch-up“ to events which impacted the Afro commu-
nity. It was more reactive than pro-active to the batidas or police
raids which focused almost exclusively on Rio Abajo, Parque Lefevre,
Calidonia and other areas of predominant Afro citizens. These situa-
tions for the most part went unchallenged by the leadership, which va-
cillated very often on important decisions such as, the formal creation
of the legal council for poor community members. Although on few occa-
sions the leadership, through the organization, did participate in le-
gal matters concerning community members, the vacillation in agency--
the creation of the legal council-- affected the credibility of the
leadership. It is suggested that this issue was important because
eighty-five (85) percent of the 174 respondents perceive that skin co-
lor was used to imply criminality.

Similarly, the leadership did not voice the members’ concerns re-
garding the pattern of the country’s economic dependency, which not

only affected the country economically and politically, but which also

conditioned the availability of goods and services, and determined the

160
State’s capacity to provide goods and services. For example, given the

historical ties between the local economy, national economic develop-
ment plans and the various foreign interests of the manager states, the
national economy became subjected to the dictates of the IFIs --the in-
ternational financial institutions--, i.e., the IMF, NB, AID, the IAD,
and the on-going development of dependency. These financial institu-
tions and the condition of dependency affected the government’s poli-
cies and its ability to shape the country’s economy. As such, these con-
ditions had political consequences on the economic well being of local
institutions regarding health, employment, and in some cases, educa-
tion, which all defined the characteristics of limited government assis-
tance, goods and services. For example, --up to 1980-- nineteen percent
of the homes were without potable water, twelve percent were without sa-
nitary services, thirty-three percent were without baths, thirty-four
percent were without electricity: and in ten percent of the homes, fami-
ly members were without formal employment.2

The different ideological currents within the organization, as well
as the inability of the leadership to harness these different currents
to the benefit of the organization also affected the organization. For
example, the progressive and critical position of Alternativa,
which advocated a critical discussion on the class structure in the so-
ciety and the dependent nature of the country’s economy, was rejected.
At the same time the Board’s involvement in the majority of the organi-
zational tasks, limited the input and association of the membership to
the inner workings of the organization. And the few and limited appoint-
ments of independent commissions outside the Board, led to divergence

and differences within the organization and its agenda. Similarly, the

161
leadership, through the presidency, gave many conflicting and embarrass-

ing messages which highlighted the internal differences not only within
the Directive, but also within the membership. Eventually, the lea-
dership problem led to an organizational split and the emergence of U-
NEP --UNION MACIONAL DE NEGROS PANAMEhOS-- which took away some dyna-
mic members from ARENEP.

Yet, ARENEP maintained the highest name recognition among the
organizations. To the question, "Have you ever heard of ARENEP, UWEP
APODAN, AYUDE and GRUPO DOCE”?, among the 602 respondents, ARE-
NEP had a 37 percent recognition compared to 17 percent for UWEP;
10 percent for APODAN; 5 percent' for AYUDE and 4 percent for
GRUPD DOCE. This name recognition is explained by ARENEP’s pre-
sence in the written, spoken and televised press, more often than the
other organizations.

(2) Perceptions and Expectation

Throughout the period of its activism, ARENEP was perceived not
only as a racially based ethnic organization, but as an organizacidn
Antillana, where Antillano is interpreted as negro or derisi-
vely as Chombo by the majority population.

In TABLE 8, 45 percent of the respondents saw ARENEP as a ra-
cial/ethnic organization; 5 percent saw it as political; 9 percent saw
it as a class based organization, and 33 percent did not know. It could
be argued that statistically more people, 55 percent, 919 999 999 9_£-
9E2 as a racial/ethnic organization. But this is only a statistical
argument because within this 55 percent are the 33 percent or 90 respon-
dents who ”did not know", and within the 33 percent are 14 percent, or

27 respondents between the age of 20-29, who would not have had any

162

(3) TABLE 8
wHAT KIND OF ORGANIZATION HAS ARENEP?
1994

TYPE NUMBER PERCENTAGE
CLASS 56 9.3
RACIAL/ETHNIC 270 44.9
POLITICAL 29 4.8
SOCIAL 23 3.3
DON’T kNov 198 32.8
MISSING 26 4 3

TOTAL 602 100 0

first hand knowledge of the organization. Likewise the resulting 19 per-_
cent, (63 respondents) between the age of 30-60, also had no first hand
experience with or knowledge of the organization. Moreover, to the ques-
tion: ”What do you know about ARENEP?", 337 (60 percent) of the 602
respondents said they knew nothing, 121 (20 percent) said much, and 104
(17 percent) said not much. Therefore, although statistically less than
half of the total sample, 270 or 45 percent of the respondents saw the
organization as racial/ethnic,» for practical reasons, the 33 percent
who 'did not know" is similar to, and is treated just like the sample
of 60 percent "don’t knows”. Thus, the significance of the 45 percent
becomes important when compared to the 9 percent for Class; 5 percent
for Politics, and 4 percent for Social in TABLE 8 above.

When asked "Whether or not you were a participant, how strongly
would racial, class or political issues affect your decision to parti-
cipate in the organization," the respondents were almost even between

racial and class issues; forty-nine percent favored race, 47 percent

163.
favored class, and 4 percent stated both race and class as reasons to

join the organization. Yet, a majority believed that class, not race

was a more determinative factor in the society (see CHART 1).

CHART 1
DETERMINATIVE EFFECT

 

 

 

Missmg
BOTH QACE AND CLASS 23%
1314» 3ACE
3.4%
CLASS
70.7%

 

 

Which Has a More Determinative
Effect in the Society?
Based on 174 responses.

To this question of determinative effect, 71 (70.7) percent said
class, 18 percent said race, and 9 (8.6) percent said both. These data
seem to fuel an apparent inconsistency. 0n the one hand, race was the
factor for joining the organization, and on the other hand, class
has a more determinative effect in the society. Given the slight

margins in the Race, Politics and Class questions, and the overwhelming

164
response to Class as a determinant factor in the society, it would ap-

pear that ARENEP may have thought more of itself as a mechanism for
socio/cultural concerns and not class issues, overemphasizing the raci-
al issue, instead of the possibilities that: 1) both race and class are
significant determinants of Afro-peoples everyday life; 2) that al-
though ARENEP had a racial/ethnic cultural membership base, it was
the economic/material conditions that were a major concern to those who
joined.

ARENEP had a small middle, and a large low class membership lo-
cated outside the power structure. Together, these two classes made up
the sector popular. The middle class consisted of petit entrepre-
neurs, some university professors and high schoOl students; some of
the 14,000 canal workers of Afro-Caribbean-Panamanian, Hispanic, and In-
digenous heritage;3 the product of historical racial mixture. But the
majority of these members were basically from the lower middle class.
These were construction workers, workers from small and medium size
manufacturing companies in the public and private sector of commer-
cial, monopoly and competitive businesses. The low class consisted of
the working poor and included: artisans, organized taxi and bus driv-
ers, retail store workers, the marginal workers in personal services
such as: domestics, porters, informal and underemployed workers, and
the Iumpenproletariate such as: the unemployed, garbage scavengers
and some beggars.4 For example, the income status of the families of

the members/sympathizers was as follows:

165
(5) TABLE 9

FAMILY INCOME: -A- 1974-1984
(Sub-sample)

Number Percentage
Less than $300 per month 64 36.8
> $300 but < $ 500. 55 31.6
> $500. but < $1,000. 29 16.7
More than $1,000. 13 7.5
Missing cases 13 7.5
Total 174 100 0

At this time according to government documents, the 1970 minimum
wage was $2,201.60 annually5 or $183.47 per month, and the poverty
line was estimated at $2,671.20 annually, which means an income of $222
.60 monthly. Right away there is a noticeble difference of $469.60 per
year between the minimum wage and the poverty line. Therefore, the
thirty-seven (36.8) percent in our sub-sample in TABLE 9, who earned
$222.60 monthly or substantially less, would fall within both the annu-
al minimum wage and the poverty line. Within this category, for exam-
ple, the 64 respondents, representing families of four (256 person)
could be at the poverty line. And the thirty-two (31.6) percent who ear-
ned just above $222.60 but less than $500 would be just a paycheck away
from disaster. Using the larger sample of the data, a similar compari-
son can be made; eighty-five (85) percent of the sample of 602, repre-
senting 512 heads of households over thirty (30) years of age, we get
the following:

166
(6) TABLE 10

FAMILY INCOME: -B- 1974-1984

Number Percentage
Less than $300. per month 201 39.3
> $300 but < $ 500. 154 30.1
> $500. but < $1,000. 83 16.2
More than $1,000. 42 8.1
Missing cases 32 6.3
Total 512 100 O

In TABLE 9, thirty-seven (36.8) percent compared to thirty-nine
(38.3) percent in TABLE 10 earned less than $300 monthly. Together,
these income categories constituted the recruitment base of the sec-
tor popular. In this context, the foregoing series of data are inter-
preted as follows: although class was a much larger issue for the en-
tire country, participating in ARENEP or any other grass-roots org-
anization was not only and act of racial solidarity, but also a declara-
tion of identity, irrespective of class position. It is suggested that
the respondents believe that regardless of race, they could improve
their class position; that they saw the organization as a means of ex-
pressing ethnic solidarity in the struggle against racial discrimina-

6 C1355 cannot overcome racial

tion. However, to paraphrase Toplin,
prejudices even when economic conditions have improved; the principle
of social justice must come before economics, because racism and racial
prejudice find their anchor in economic exploitation.

As perception goes, there was a perceived " mutually sympathetic"

relationship between ARENEP and the Military Government in local

167
and national politics (see CHART 2).

CHART 2
ARENEP’S SYMPATHY

Missrng

UI
to
“9

CC N'T KNCW

 

  
  

3.3%

 

 

Was ARENEP Sympathetic to Military Government?

Based on sub-sample of 174 members/sympathizers

Shown in CHART 2, of the sub—sample of members/sympathizers, 61
(60.9) percent believed ARENEP was sympathetic to the Military.
This is similar to the 56 percent Of the same sub-sample who believed

that the Military was sympathetic to ARENEP (See CHART 3).

168
(8) CHART 3
MILITARY GOVERNMENT’S SYMPATHY

 

MISSING
3.475
DON”T KNOW
25 . 32
NO
1’4 . 97$

 

Has the Military Government Sympathetic to ARENEP?

Based on sub-sample of 174 members/sympathizers

In the larger sample, only about a third of the respondents, 36 per-
cent, believed ARENEP was sympathetic to the Military, and only
about a fourth, 24 percent, believed the Military was sympathetic to
ARENEP. The more favorable percentages of a "mutual sympathetic rela-
tions", in the sub-samples are interpreted as a stronger "in house be-
lief", a perception given these members strong sympathy for both ARE-
NEP and the Military. Thus, it is suggested that for both sub-sam—
ples, “mutual sympathy" was a common perception.

There was also a perception common among 86 percent of the members/

sympathizers that the presence of ARENEP would help to change the

169
low access to opportunity structures Afros were experiencing. Moreover,

little more than the half of the respondents, 56 percent, believed that
Afro-Panamanians had more opportunities after 1968 (after the Military
coup), and 34 percent of the respondents (210) believed that ARENEP
benefited from the policies of the Military Government. This could also
be interpreted within the effects of the "mutually sympathetic" rela-
tionship, as well as the perceived clientelistic relation with the Mili-
tary regime, given 1) the political sympathy of the majority of the mem-
bers of the Directive to the military regime and 2), the political
appointments of some Afro-Anti]lean-Panamanians -- some members and sym-
pathizers of ARENEP-- to government posts. This is suggested, for
example, from the appointment of Luis Anderson, a tradesman, member of
ARENEP, and president of the most important labor organization, Lo-
cal 900, to the post of Minister of Labor (1981); an appointment ARE-
NEP supported. Both Anderson and his vice-president, Antonio Reina,
would later participate in the Treaty Discussion as Labor Negotiators
for Panama.

Other sympathizers, such as Orvill Goodin was a Cabinet Minister
while George Fisher and Hugo Nood were in the diplomatic corp. More-
over, there were invitations to Afro-Antillean-Panamanian organizations
in New York to come home and discuss the issues with appointed govern-
ment functionaries.7 These instances served not only the purpose of a
national strategy of support for the 1977 Treaties, but also to show
case the presence and participation of Afro-Antillean-Panamanians in na-
tional politics.

Similarly, there was also, a very high level of expectation among

87 percent of the members/sympathizers. This was expressed through, for

170
example, the expectation of 63 percent of the respondents who believed

that ARENEP’S challenge to the State’s ideological messages would
influence a change in the State’s racial messages; by the 89 and 87 per-
cent who expected a cessation of the batidas and discrimination re-
spectively, through ARENEP’S denunciation of the same, as well as
the 85 percent expectation that the approval and support of the 1977
Treaties by ARENEP, would translate into more jobs. In essence,
these perceptions and expectations were center on less State abuse and
physical oppression and discrimination.

Similarly, to the question, "Do you know of any member of ARENEP
who held political position, elected or otherwise?“ six percent of
the sub-sample of members/sympathizers said that they held a political
position, and 22 percent said that they knew a member or sympathizer of
ARENEP, who held a political position. Compared to the larger sam-
ple, 59 percent of the respondents said they knew of member who held a
political position and, 13 percent said they once held a political posi-
tion. This was a strongly erroneous perception because in fact, only
two members of ARENEP, Noodrow Bryan, while a board member, was
elected to political office, and Luis Anderson, while a member was ap-
pointed to the Cabinet. Only a few sympathizers, Fisher, Goodin and
Hood received political appointments. These expectations were apparent-
ly more of perception than reality, and as such, the organization suf-
fered the inability to meet the rising expectations; 8 that is,
the high probability of improved life chances in the near future. For
example, some members, at least ten percent, felt that the organization
failed in the most basic of their aspirations: the enhancement and re-

spect for their racial/ethnicity within the larger society. Again,

171
these perception were apparently misleading because the official recog-

nition of the Antillean Museum was also official recognition of the An-
tilleans’ presence and heritage a racial/ethnic group.

Yet, ARENEP’S presence did fill a void, if not for economic be-
nefits, then for social empowerment: stature and respect for Afro-Pana-
manians, and in a small measure, the organization was able to create to
some degree, an atmosphere where members/sympathizers of different ra-
cial/ethnic groups, Afro-Antilleans, Afro-Hispanics, and Indigenees
could feel comfortable with each other and their racial/ethnic heritage
within the organization.

8. Ethnic Class Conflict and Negotiation of Identity

During the years of military rule, neither Afro-Antillean nor Afro
-Hispanic politicians who were active prior to the 1968 (the advent of
the Military Governments), were interested in participating in ARE-
NEP, because, among other reasons, the fear of the political cost of
'association with the racial and ethnic issues. Politically, and on the
one hand, middle class Afro-Panamanians apparently believed that suppor-
ting an Afro political organization would not bring them the expected
political benefits or dividends. The lack of political support from the
pre—1968 Afro-Antillean and Hispanic politicians could also be interpre-
ted as not giving legitimacy to racial and ethnic issues, to the organi-
zation and more importantly, to an Afro base constituency.

It would also appear that the national mestizo ideology held
full sway for those who believed that an Afro organization did not or
could not represent them as a racial/ethnic group. This could be inter-
preted as an effect of the internalization of the national ideology of

mestizaje which allowed the majority of Panamanians to self-

172
identify as lestizos. Eighty-nine (89) percent of the members/sympa-

thizers agreed that an Afro or negro identity was very important
for them, and by default, for ARENEP. Socially, the majority of Pa-
namanians self-identify as mestizos, and as such, an Afro-Panama-
nian organization was not seen as in their best interest.

This may also have been influential, for example, in the suggestion
by an informant that the Gadpaille political machinery of the mid-
dle and upper class Afro-Antillean and Hispanic Panamanians in Rio
Abajo, did not consider ARENEP a representative organization of
their interests, politically or socially, and was adverse to the idea
of supporting ARENEP. There were few, if any, ARENEP sympathi-
zers in the Gadpaille political machine of upper and middle class
Afro-Antillean and Afro-Hispanic Panamanians in Rio Abajo. This ma-
chinery represented not only a economic clout, but also a significant
partisan political support for the PRD, the political wing of the Mili-
tary Government. It can also be argued that the composition Of ARENEP
created negative, racial overtones, which apparently limited its at-
traction tO new members and sympathizers, who did not want to be asso-
ciated with ARENEP.

On the other hand, many Afro-Antillean-Panamanians, particularly
from Canal Zone parentage were still influenced by US life-style and
ideology. This influence has been interpreted as an alliance to the US,
and has prompted many Panamanian politicians to see the Canal Zone sub-
population of Afro-Antillean-Panamanians as enemies of the national in-
terest, and for which no politician wanted to be considered racist

9

and unpatriotic; racist for publicly acknowledging an Afro consti-

tuency, and unpatriotic because political association with Afro-

173
Antillean Panamanians is association with the enemy of the country.

The national ideology which associated Antilleans as political al-
lies of the US, affected ARENEP’s cause and political support from
the pre-1968 Afro-Antillean and Afro-Hispanic politicians. Thus, ARE-
NEP as a grass-roots organization was viewed as subversive. The label
“subversive” was to be understood not as that of political adversary,
but as national enemies. Since a people’s collective identity can be
tied to the country/nation, and since the Afro identity is both social
and political, the political support was perceived as too costly, given
the political controversy of association with ARENEP. But in many
cases, it is suggested that the Afro identity was negotiated through ac-
ceptance or denial of economic benefits and/or socio/political stature.
This is referred to as resource mobilization within the literature.

In this context, the racial/ethnic issues were skirted around by
all the politicians who would have wanted such a political base, but
not one so public and so controversial. One would have to go back at
least thirty years, for example in Coldn, when José Dominador Bazan,
the political boss of the City of Coldn with enormous political influ-
ence in the Province, was the beneficiary Of the Antillean votes. That
was a time when the parents of the present generation living and work-
ing on the Canal Zone were highly discriminated in Panamanian society,
spoke very little or/no Spanish, and were highly influenced by the US
life-style and ideology. Yet, as citizens of the country, they sought
to minimize the social hostility and preserve their heritage and became
electoral Clients of Bazan. In fact, when Bazan became President in
1962, he sponsored the Amendment which granted nationality by birth. As
shown in TABLE 11, 174 members/sympathizers self-identified thus:

174

(1) TABLE 11
HON DO YOU SELF-IDENTIFY?
1994
SOCIAL RACE NUMBER PERCENTAGE
AFRO-PANAMANIAN 102 58.6
INDIGENOUS 2 1.1
MHITE 14 8.0
MESTIZO 43 24.7
NEGRO 1 0.6
OTHER 9 5.2
MISSING 3 1.7
TOTAL 174 100 O

The majority, 59 percent, self—identified as Afro-Panamanians. The
sub-sample in TABLE 11 is roughly 30 percent of the larger sample with
the Indigenous population as the only constant. The larger sample of
602 respondents shows the following: Afro-Panamanians 29.4 percent; In-
digenous 2.0 percent; Hhites 13.8 percent; mestizos 42.0 percent;
others 9.3 percent and 3.5 percent missing. The difference between the
two samples reflects some interesting insights. For example, Afro-Pana-
manians in the sub-sample --defined as those who participated in ARE-
NEP or any other racial/ethnic grass-roots organization-- as compared
the Afro-Panamanians in the larger sample, appear to reflect a stronger
racial/ethnic identity for most activists, and that most activists are
more concerned about their identity, which may be linked to their in-
volvement in ARENEP and other racial/ethnic organization. Curious-
ly, in the larger sample, a third of the respondents self-identified as
Afro-Panamanians while a larger percentage, 42, self-identified as

mestizos. The latter is closer to the standard definition of social

175
race, i.e., with emphasis on mestizaje. This substantiates the ar-

gument that most Panamanian, including some Afro-Panamanians self-iden-
tify as mestizos or negro-mestizos as some10 have called the
population. To cite Oboler:
it is a conscious choice to acknowledge one’s history and socio-
cultural background and the need to struggle for social justice. In
this sense, it is more than ... a culturally dictated fact of life,
identifying oneself (as Afro) and participating in (Afro) social
movement is a political fact.

Of importance was the fact that a majority of the minor political
parties, many on the Political Left, with many Afro-Panamanians on the
tickets, did not fare well in the 1984 elections. Only 174 respondents,
29 percent of the larger sample, admitted participating in ARENEP
or any other grass-roots organization. And as previously mentioned, the
organization faced the definite shadow of political clientelism pattern-
ed from the 19505 and 19605. There were regular members and Board mem-
ber of the organization who played this level of politics. For example,
during the 1976 political campaign, the PRD postulated Bryan, and dur-
ing the 1984 election one oppositional party, the Authentic Liberals,
postulated another member, Leroy Gittens, then president of ARENEP.
Gittens lost, although both postulation were clientelistic in nature.

Among the reasons suggested for the election of one and the defeat
Of the other was: 1- the belief that Bryan was a more community person
and his election would have benefitted the community and that Gittens
was not, and 2- that the Authentic Liberals party was perceived as not
really interested in the Afro community; that Gittens’ postulation
would more benefit the party than the community. These actions strongly

suggest that the organization also lacked the level of political matu-

rity to cope with the political climate in which it emerged. This

176
lack of political maturity forced the organization’s hands without it

having achieved its goals. Although ARENEP’s participation in the
Treaty discussions was positive, the Treaty discussions dominated its
agenda and the organization fell victim to Treaty politics without ful-
ly playing out its cards on other organizational community concerns.
The Board consistently discussed the Treaties and other international
political concerns, paying less attention, for example, to the issues
of high unemployment, the batidas, particularly in Rio Abajo
and Parque Lefevre, as well as the viability of formal legal coun-
cil for the disadvantaged community members. This may have been prompt-
ed by the heterogeneous composition and competing interests not only of
the membership, but also the leadership in particular. Thus the politic-
al factor may be seen as a major constraint and another reason for the
truncation and demise of the movement.12

C. Participation and Empowerment

ARENEP as an organization, had a political position, but it was
not a political party, and thus, did not participate as a political par-
ty in local politics. But, it favored a more direct participation of
the disenfranchised in the politics of government, directly supported
minority candidates to elected positions, and attempted to influence
the electorate and party nominees. And as the struggle for racial and
economic equality converged with the national/anti-colonial debates in
the decade of the seventies, many new Afro-Antilleans and Hispanic lead-
ers emerged and inscribed in one of the various political parties. They
generated some new modifications in the social system, and an inclusive
perspective to the nation/neo-colonialist conflict. One such leader was

Moodrow Bryan, a Board member of the ARENEP, and later president of

177
UNEP. Bryan was successfully elected as Alternate County Representa-

tive to the Asa-blea Nacional de Representantes de Corregimientos--
(National Assembly of County Representatives)-- for the Rio Abajo
political district on the PRD ticket in 1976.

In addition to political outcomes or effects, popular movements al-
so have a socio-cultural meaning; that is, empowerment as a result
of the experience of participating in social movements.13 It is sug-
gested that ethnic identity and relations are also instruments in the
service of a group’s particular needs, including its economic interest,
which creates the relation between race and class. Although Hiley ar-
gues that racial/ethnic beliefs:

are not causes; they are interpretations of the strains on the
basis of whlsh experience is understood, symbolized, projected and
acted upon...

it is argued that the effects and interpretation of race and ethni-
city are both contributing factors to the experience of the marginaliz-
ed racial/ethnic minorities in a plural, neo-colonial, developing coun-
try, and are basic to the emergence and presence of racial/ethnic grass
-roots organizations. It is also argued that the racial/ethnic preju-
dice provided a way of associating racial/ethnic experiences of minori-
ties to the social strains, and the tying of these experiences and the
effect of the international linkages of trade and finance to govern-
ments and their particular policies.

For example, during the 19705, and within a relative degree of poli-
tical and economic autonomy, the Torrijos Government attempted to stimu-
late the economy through the private sector with massive loans as a

means to circumvent the resistance to socio-economic reforms by the eco-

nomically powerful in Panama. But, given the country’s lack of a strong

178
infrastructure capable of sustaining national auto-development, the at-

tempt instead depended on the capacity of the country to incur
debts.15 By 1981, 37 percent of the national budget went to the inte-
rest on the debt; in 1982 it grew to 44 percent, a 6 percent increase:

in 1983 it was 43 percent, a decrease of .01 percent compared to 1982;

t.16 By

in 1984 it increased a new 3 percentage points to 46 percen
1984 this represented a new phenomenon in the Panamanian economy: the
country became a net exporter of capital and for the first time, the
amount of interest for the external debt service out-grew the ability
to contract new financing.17 Similarly, it is also argued that this
situation led to economic and political concessions to the business sec-
tor linked to international banks. Bambirra writes:
the slow integration of the dominant class to imperialism produ-
ces the ruptures in the national schemes, ... the ”concession"
which the bourgeoisie ”afford” to the popular class is reflected in
the social discomfort of the popular movement’s tendency to become
radical and demand revindications, which are seen as unsupportable
Ygthin the framework of bourgeois legality of dependent capitalism.
This situation suggests that the activities of the State affected
the distribution of security, the investment and distribution of space,
the character and form of the economy in the process of capital accumu-
lation, and the distribution of consumption and employment opportuni-
ties. These activities created a situation of double crisis where the
State Simultaneously faced not only its political legitimacy, but also
the economical requirements of accumulation, giving rise to a phenomen-
on like the fiscal crisis of the state.19 Thus:
given the fiscal crisis, the State took measures to face them,
which were not galy inefficient, but to the contrary, created even
greater problems.

It is further suggested that these conditions definitely affected

179
the Government’s ability to produce goods and services. This is the con-

nection of that certain structural combination which created the contra-
dictions within the social system and which generated the emergence of
urban activism and social change. In response to the government measur-
es, there were many manifestations by those who were affected by the pe-
ripheral condition of dependency. During these manifestations one parti-
cular slogan was heard constantly:
Arroz, porroto y carne, el pueblo tiene hambrel-
Rice, beans and meat, the people need to eat!
These manifestations did not discount a convergence at specific moments
for common goals between the upper middle and the popular classes:21
this appears to foment the emergence of networks of solidarity
and neighborhood organizations based on needs ... which would faci-
litate the coming together of distinct strata, in the degree that
there is no other way to articulate separately these demands
through alternate routes.22
These manifestations were in part, the result of the linkage bet-
ween international politics and finance and its effect on the provision
of goods and services, --a situation where 77 percent of the 602 respon-
dents believe that the country is very dependent on international finan-
cial organizations, and a dependency which 66 percent perceived as
strongly affecting the distribution of good and services. The financial
crisis revealed not only the limitations in sectors suCh as education,
health and housing during the 19705—1980s, but also the dependency on
international financial assistance to realize basic national goals.
It was in this respect that the sector popular’s social activ-
ism for the production and distribution of collective goods and servi-

ces was articulated. For example, the struggles of neighborhood associa-

tions are not external to class struggle, since reproduction occurs in

180
the living situation where the effects of the class struggle and the re-

pression are felt. Here the sector popular highlights the relation-
ship between the lack of goods and services and the struggle at the
neighborhood level as neighborhood struggles became associated with
class struggle since the effect of the international demands are felt
more in the living situation of those who have the least; since it is
at the household level that the lack of arroz y porroto is felt,
and since it is the household which is called upon for the reproduction
of labor power. This household level is that aspect of political activ-
ism which is associated with social movements.

It is also in attention to this struggle that neighborhood associa-
tions are mobilized, and like Bolahos, we ask: to what degree and for
which social groups is there the tendency to organize according to soci-
al identity or labor criteria?23 It is at the neighborhood level
that:

forms of collective action with a high degree of popular parti-
cipation, which use non-institutional channels, and which formulate
their demands while simultaneously finding forms of action to ex-
press them, ... establish(}ag) themselves as collective subjects
. as a group or a category.

Thus, popular participation grass-roots political organizational
framing emerges as a result of the conditions of structural economic
strains, that is, the dependency on international financial assistance
through the international financial orgaizations to realize basic natio-
nal goal such as the provisions of collective goods and services. If
linkages with the IFOs and transnationals can condition the economy of
a country, it is difficult to deny the effects of these linkages on the

distribution of services and goods at the social and cultural level and

daily life activities.

181
Another aspect of the socio/cultural meaning is participatory demo-

cracy, social and politically. For example, within ARENEP’S socio/
political agenda, the principal aim of activism was: (1) long term de-
mocratic process, the suppression of traditional politics; (2) full de-
mocratic participation, and (3) a national willingness to recognize the
heterogenous complementarity of the nations’s cultural and ethnic
diversity. For example, even though a majority of the 602 respondents,
70 percent, said that the Hispanic culture is dominant in Panama, 51
percent strongly disagreed with the argument that they should particip-
ate less in Afro activities to be "more Panamanian", and 54 percent
strongly disagreed that celebrating African traditions and customs are
contrary to the development of the national culture. The acceptance of
the African influence is the acceptance of the heterogenous complemen-
tarity and cultural/ethnic diversity of the society.

Here the popular participation model is a political definition of
participatory democracy and self-made political activism of racial/eth-I
nic peoples. This is a common theme developed by other Latin American
social movement political organizations: national autonomy, class
transformation, ethnic identity and affirmation of citizenship.25
This empowerment and participation was necessary because, to paraphrase
Delgado, not only do city residents have a low level of participation
in solving (urban) problems,26 but as a general rule, disenfranchised
ethnic groups have almost no participation at all. Moreover, the popula-
tion at large usually does not have the political opportunity, at a
structural level, to discuss and participate in the political policies.

Consequently, many citizens at the grass-roots level, have no idea of

government policies, and can not really measure the impact of policies

182
on the society and the country.

In fact, limited citizen participation was structured within the
former oligarchic system, which gave rise to the clamor for a more mean-
ingful democratic process, participation and practice. Even the Torri-
jos Government, and the new political structure of 1972, the Asamblea
de Corregimientos, in theory offered full political participation to
minorities and their postulation as political candidates in the politic-
al process, and only on certain issues. Historically, there were very
limited initiatives by governments to involve all sectors or to create
a political space for small and medium size, urban and rural businesses
and labor organizations to express their opinions and participate poli-
tically.

This aspect of participation and empowerment in social activism
highlights not only the defining condition of a conflict and an oppo-
nent, but also a definition of the opponent and a determination of the
object of the conflict.27 For ARENEP the defining conditions were
the life chances of racial/ethnic groups in a situation of peripheral
dependency; the opposition was the dominant white ‘culture’, economics
and politics, and the object of conflict was the destruction of minori-
ty racial/ethnic culture, identity and life chances.

The manipulations of the political and economic structures by both
the dependent State and the global managers gave rise to a condition of
structural conduciveness,28 defined as: ”the connection of a cer-
tain structural combination which serves as a receptacle for the contra-

"29 and which provided the

dictions which the social system generates,
emergence of urban activism for social change. For example, in the spe-

cific case of Panama, structural conduciveness is seen as: the

183
structural limitations of the economic process and its failure to be-

nefit large sectors of the population (which set off a series of pro-
test from urban groups).30

The consequences of structural conduciveness resulted in
structural strains,31 defined as the effects of economic losses,
shortages of valued goods and services, undevelopment of new ideas rela-
tive to the national political structures, ideologies and strains in ra-
cial/ethnic identities, as the results of political economical manipula-
tions by the State and the influence of the global managers.

D. Demise of ARENEP

Although ARENEP had a political position, it was not a politic-
al party, and did not participate as a political party in local poli-
tics, the larger question, however, was how would the Afro-communi-
ties, particularly the Afro-Antillean-Panamanian communities be empower-
ed for access and decision in government and politics? The political
channel was through the Asamblea and the Juntas Comunales.32
It would strongly appear as if ARENEP was not forceful enough poli-
tically to make a difference. For example, knowing that the Juntas Co-
munales and the Asamblea were the channels to politics and govern-
ment, ARENEP did not involve itself or its membership seriously in
local politics of the Juntas. It was here at the local level where
activists and activism were brought to the attention of the parties,
and it was through the respective Juntas and the parties that is-
sues and candidates received consideration.

Afro-Panamanian social organizations seem to have a pattern of
short life cycles, between three to five years. This was the case of:

Asociacidn Afro-Panamefia, 1968-1972; AYUDE, 1973-1976; Grupo

184
Dace, 1977-1979; APODAN, 1977-1979 and UWEP, 1977-1980. ARE-

NEP’s short life cycle, 1976-1984, as well as that of the other orga-
nizations, appears within an apparent contradiction, where the condi—
tions which gave rise to these organizations still appear the same at
the .time of their demise. After the 1977 Treaty campaign, ARENEP
and all the other organizations slowly slid into inactivity and are now
defunct. However, two informants suggested that ARENEP is instead
dormant and can be readily reorganized. Nonetheless, ARENEP’s de-
mise can be seen through two distinct perspectives: internally and ex-
ternally.

Of the 175 members/sympathizers who responded to the questions of
ARENEP’S demise, 16 percent said the problem was internal, and 12
percent said the problem was external. Of these 16 percent, 10 percent
suggested that the internal problems which led to the demise were due
to leadership, and 3 percent said the problem was organizational. Of
the 12 percent of external problems, 8 percent said the problem was na-
tional politics, 2 percent suggested the country’s economic condition,
3 percent suggested racial condition, 66 percent did not know, and 8
percent did not answer. (See Chart 4.)

The organization apparently lost credibility as a serious political
force with the established political actors and the newly structured po-
litical Assembly of 505 Representatives. This may have resulted from
ARENEP’S inability to influence a number of Afro-Antillean Panama-
nians working on the Canal Zone, who expressed many negative arguments
about the Treaty negotiations and job security. And since ARENEP

was seen as an Antillean or negro organization, it also came to

185
reinforce not only the argument of alliance to the US and enemy of the

national interest, given the negative comments by some Afro-Antillean-
Panamanians workers on the Zone in relation to Treaties, but also an ap-

parent potential social threat tO the status quo.

CHART 4
ARENEP’S DEMISE

Missing

7.5%

 

LEADERSHIP

9.8%

 

POLITICS

8.5%
ECONOMICS
2.3%

RACIAL CLIMTE
2.9%
ORGANIZAT‘L

3.4%

 

Why does ARENEP no Longer Exist?

Based on sub-sample of 174 respondents.

Of the 16 percent who said that the organization’s demise was due
to internal factors and leadership problems, it is revealing that the
respondents would hold the organization more responsible for its demise
than the effects of the nationalist program and national politics. How—

ever, it can be argued that the leadership was also reactive to the

186
transformation of the organization, when it could have moved its agenda

from the “social“ reactive to a more pro-active political agenda. This
reactive position was seen in many Board members, themselves members
and sympathizers of the different political parties, who could not or
were reluctant to consider the viability of the transition to a more
proactive political agenda.

Organizationally, ARENEP suffered from the lack of funds, and
the failure to attract funds. Although the organization did not put any
financial burden upon its members, it was not too successful in its at-
tempts to get financial backing from the few sympathetic “corporate
sponsors”. The failure to attract funds is both an economic and politic-
al issue. Economically, the sympathetic "corporate sponsors" were not
only few, but many were unwilling or could not donate cash. Politically
in Panama, I‘corporate sponsors” are not prone to identify with anything
controversial, much less with race and ethnicity. This lack of funds li-
mited the organizational opportunities to establish a presence in diffe-
rent geographical locations, whether or not the location had a popula-
tion of similar generational and ethnic composition. This inability to
establish a presence was most notable in Bocas del Tara and Da-
rién, and the lack of funds did not allow a more effective organiza-
tion in Coldn and in Panama City.

The lack of presence probably affected the staying power and abili-
ty of the organization to tap into the issues of geographic, economic,
and socio/political disparities of the Afro-population, and implies a
loss of its "organic density" or support base. For example, at the Fa-
ther’s Day Program in 1983, an annual event in the Antillean community,

President Royo was invited, but did not attend the program at the

187
gymnasium of the Escuela Espicopal San Cristobal --St. Christopher

Espicopal School-- even though many Cabinet Ministers and other Govern-
ment representatives did. It was suggested that the community’s lack of
attendance precipitated the President’s absence, in that the poor at-
tendance reflected the organization’s inability to mobilize its base.
This could also be interpreted as the community’s lack of political sup-
port for the President, and his government, which was supported by the
Military. But it did highlight the argument that the organization did
not have the popular support it thought it may have had or loss its po-
pular support base. Thus, it would also appear that the movement’s lack
of a sufficient or an appropriate numerical support base of organiz-
ed members/activists, and that its failure to attract new and retain
old members affected its staying power. But it could also be argued
that any organizational drive to attract new and retain old members is
contingent upon the availability of funds, which the organization did
not have. Recall that only 174 respondents, about 30 percent, admitted
participating in ARENEP or any other grass-roots organization.

Politically, the low socio/economic position of the majority of the
members in .the national society was also an apparent key factor in the
demise of the organization. As members of the sector popular, their
struggle was apparently seen as a struggle of a ”different class and
cultural status“, and which may have prompted the support for other or-
ganizations based on different class/status. AS previously discussed,
it is suggested that the Gadpaille political machinery of the mid-
dle and upper class Afro-Antillean and Hispanic Panamanians in Rio
Abajo, which was adverse to the idea of supporting ARENEP, was
such an example. ARENEP’S difficulty to attract new and retain old

188
members, and to attract funding, brought to the fore the strength of

the cultural and national ideology.

But, equally as damaging, may have been the politics of language.
For example, although the Antillanos are no longer considered an im-
migrant group, there is a subtle, but marked difference in treatment
and social stature between 1- English speaking Afro-Antillean Panama-
nians with English last names, particularly from the former Canal Zone,
and 2- Spanish speaking Afro-Antillean Panamanians with English last
names, who live in the Republic and have developed a command of the
Spanish language. The difference is the degree of command of Spanish.
It is still the former who are considered the negros in the coun-
try; it is still the former who, if they do not demonstrate a command
of Spanish, and many do not, are referred to despectively as Chombos
and allies of the US. This does not mean that they do not speak Span-
ish, but that they have a better Command of English.

In this context, the organization did not appoint a spokesperson
with the charisma and language command of Spanish and English to pre-
sent the issues and the agenda to the larger society, despite the pre-
sence of several such persons --a major political oversight given the
national language ideology. The issue and use of the Spanish language
--Spanish only-- has always been a rallying point of cultural and natio-
nal identity for the Euro-Hispanic bourgeoisie. This has constantly
been used against the Antillanos as non-national for speaking and
using English and not the Spanish language. This is the same issue --
English only-- currently facing US citizens, particularly in Califor-
nia, Miami, Texas and other states in the US with a large proportion of

non-English speakers, particularly Spanish speakers.

189
The language issue also confirms, to this date, the continued ag-

gression of the bourgeoisie and general public, who still associate all
Afro-Panamanians of Caribbean descent as political and economical al-
lies with the US, because they speak English.

There was also the tendency of viewing the Afro-Antillean community
(particularly those who speak English and resided in the former canal
zone area) as second class citizens, and the constant negative referen-
ces in the press and television to the early Antillean immigrants as il-
literate. The latter was evident in the Chombito Kilroy television
Show, of the late 70s and early 805, where the protagonist would dress
in ”blackface", and portrayed Antillanos as stupid, incompetent
and lazy. The writing of the columnist, JUan Carrete, Nestor Icaza,
was the same whenever he referred to the Antillanos. And there
appears to be a new resurgence of racial/ethnic discrimination based on
stereotypes and stigmatization as was evident, for example, in the
Vistazo magazine coverage of a house party in 1993, given by the Ni-
nister of Government and Justice, Juan 8. Chavalier, of the Endara Go-
vernment. The party’s theme was an African safari. Apparently standing
beside Roberto Alfaro, a Cabinet Minister and Lucas Zarak, a Legisla-
tor, was Tito Jaén, another guest at the party, prominently dressed as
a "blackface". It is significant that in these days, some social
Hhites of Panama still believe that blackface painting is something

of a social grace.

190
FIGURE 13

THE "CHEVALIER SAFARI"

 

 

(L-R) Lucas Zarak, Legislator; Roberto Alfaro, Cabinet Minister,
and Tito Jaén in blackface at the house party of Juan 8. Cheva-
lier, Prime Minister (Gobierno y Justicia). Panama City, R.P.

Source: Vistazo Internacional, No.13, (diciembre, 1993), p.57.

But most remarkable, during the recent 1994 Christmas Holidays and
in keeping with the tradition of New Year mufiecos, --dolls—-, an
Afro-Panamanian blackfaced himself as a character whom he called
Mamayucafrut, with a bone as a bow in the hair of his makeup. It is

one thing for the so-called whites to believe and act-out their racism,

191
it is another thing when racial/ethnic minorities, the object of white

scorn, become willing participants in these racist beliefs and behavi-
or. It is likewise alarming, that in many instances so many people
portray members of other races and ethnicities, particularly peoples of
African heritage in a ridiculing way --consciously or not-- with little
regards to the implications and/or consequences of their actions. It is
in this sense that the national anti-African and anti-Antillean culture
was developed and maintained. It is also in this sense, the internaliza-
tion of the dominant ideology, that the State’s messages affect how a
group’s interests is perceived, how their strategies and tactics are
developed, and how they are organized.

However, for the first time in the country’s history, Afro-Antille-
an-Panamanians, as a racial/ethnic group, participated to some degree,
in the main, national political discourse. The presence of Fisher, An-
derson, Goodin, Reina and other as advisors to the Government during
the period of Treaty negotiations, and the invitation to Afro-Antillean
-Panamanians abroad to discuss the Treaty were significant in that at
this time, there was a feeling of empowerment within the Afro-Antillean
community, a euphoria to which ARENEP, probably unintentionally,
gave more importance. This is understandable when the Afro-Antillean Pa-
namanian is viewed within the transformations from enemies and allies,
to patriots and nationals. As Helch said in the Marriott Essex House
speech in New York:

The liberation struggle has been difficult and arduous. He, the

Panamanians ... residing in the US can be proud, that we have taken

a giant step towards the contrggution of our total liberation, a

liberation that one day will come.

It is suggested that Helch’s quote should be interpreted with a

192
double meaning, one which refers not only to the liberation of the coun-

try, but also to the "liberation“ of all Afro-Antillean Panamanians in
the home country as well as those Afro-Antillean Panamanians residing
in the US.

In summary, ARENEP’S decline may be seen as the result of the
lack of internal leadership and organizational discipline which affect-
ed its ability and forcefulness to establish or influence a new agenda,
politically and socially. Externally, national politics and the coun-
try’s racial condition are seen as associated factors which have played
a role in the decline of the organization. It would appear as if these
factors overwhelmed the organization to the point that ARENEP lost
it bearings. It is in these internal and external factors that the appa-
rent contradiction, where the situations which gave rise to the organi-
zations still appear to be the same at the time of their demise, be-
comes evident.

The contradiction is structured within the system, given the sys-
tem’s resiliency and ability to absorb any part of a conflict, and is
also seen through the disposition of the government. For example, a go-
vernment’s strategy may be through the inclusion or exclusion of issues
on the political agenda by leaving the basic issues untouched and atten-
ding to the symptoms of the problem and not the causes, without resolv-
ing the same; and/or by encouraging or not, local or national participa-
tion and legitimization of certain forms of collective action, which
give the appearance of a contradiction or in fact, is the contradic-
tion.

Yet, ARENEP was sociologically important because as a racial/

ethnic, socio-political, grass-roots organization, it not only

193
represented the Afro-Panamanians point of view of the historical prob-

lems which have affected them or because it presented an alternative in-
terpretation of the social and political situation, or because it chal-
lenged the prevailing racial/ethnic ideology, but because it sought a
more inclusive participation for Afro-Panamanians in the social, politi-
cal and economic decisions, which affected the life chances of Afro-Pa-
namanians. The intensity and direction of ARENEP are related to ra-
cial/ethnic identity of Afro and Afro-mixed people, their low socio/eco-
nomic compositions in the social process, and the differential distribu-

tion of power, privileges and political benefits of the society.

194
E. Chapter Six Endnotes

lMayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash, I'Social Movement Organizations:
Growth Decay. and Change" in 9911921119 13.9mm amt Social 119399919
Louis E. Genevie, ed. ., (Illinois: F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc. 1978).

224mm: Cam:fl.a£i_am£¢9mm MAI—111.010?-
Archididcesis de Panama, 1985. p.7.

3On the average, workers in the juridical canal system earn about
two thirds more than a worker in a comparative position within the
Republic. These earnings would easily place a minority of the canal
zone workers in upper middle class, and the majority squarely in the
middle class. However, because the vast majority of the workers on the
canal system are Afro/Panamanians of Antillean heritage, they are
ideologically considered as lower middle or low class, both
economically and socially.

4Manuel Castells, "Hovimientos Sociales Urbanos en América
Latina: Tendencies Histdrices y Problemas Tedricos“, in John Nalton,
”Urban Political Movements and Revolutionary Changes in the Third

Horld'.99999 Aff9jr§ 9999t9rly. Vol.15 No.1 (September,1990),p.l9.

5999999 99ti999le9, Direccidn de Estedistice y Censo,
Contraloria General de la Repflblica 1980.

6Robert Brent Toplin, "Introduction.” 5199991 999 9999 391911999
19 L9119 9999199. (Connecticut/London: Greenwood Press, 1974), p.11.

7Interview with P.E., New York, June, 1994.

8Denton Morrison, "Some Notes Towards Theory on Relative
Deprivation, Social Movements, and Social Change," §9ci9l MOV9men19: 9

399999 999 599999 3999. Robert R.Evans, ed.,(Chicago: Rand McNelly
Publishing Co.) 1973.

9Roy Simon Bryce-Laporte, "Black Immigrants: the Experience of

Invisibililty and Inequality.” 999rn91 91 §l9ck Studj9§. Vol.3, No.1
(September, 1992), p.39.

loReina Torres de Arafiz, Q9r19n:£1n09cg19919 99 999 999199
Hi9t99199. (Panama: Direccidn Nacional del Patrimonio Histdrico.

Instituto Nacional de Culture. 1975, p.287.

llSuzanne Oboler, ”The Politics of Labeling: Latino/a Cultural

Identity of Self and Others,” L9119 Ameri99n B9999999199.Issue
75,Vol.l9., No.4. (Fall, 1992), p.32.

lzEduardo Canal, ”Democratization and the Decline of Urban Social
Movements in Uruguay: a Policy-Institutional Account", in Escobar and

Alvarez, 199 999199 91 $0919! 999999919.... p.286.

195

13John Friedmann, "Latin American Barrio Movement as a Social
Movement: Contributions to a Debate” , 1919r n91i9n9l 91 99999
. Vol 13. No. 3 (September, 1989), in Gerrit
Burgwal, "Introduction to the Literature on Urban Social Movements in
Latin America", 919991999 91 Pow r,Movem9n19 91 Re9istan99: 99
1.9 mummmum
. Nillem Assies, Gerrit Burgwal and Ton Salman, (Netherlands:

CEDLA Publication, 1990), p.173.

l4David Niley, "Lessons from the Liberation of Zimbabwe for a

Sociological Paradigm of the Third World“. 99919999 919199: 9991911,
1199991199. David Riley and Allen Issacman, edts.,

Esmemx. and
Michigan/Minnesota: Michigan State University/University of Minnesota),
1981, p.33.

15Guillermo Castro, Juana Camargo, Noemi Farinoni and Virginia
Vergara, “Crisis y Politices Sociales en Panama. Q9i9j9: 99919999 1

19999919. (Panama: IDEN.,1989), p.8.
16Castro, et.al. p.8.

l7Castro, et.al., p.8.

18Vania Bambirra. El Mm W Latimamecicaae
(Mexico: ) Siglo Veintiuno, 6a ediciOn. 1979, p. 90- 91.

19Gerrit Burgwal, "Introduction to the Literature on Urban Social
Movements in Latin America", in 51r9cture 91 Power, Movements 91 Resis-
t99C9z99 191r9999tion 19 199 l9eorie9 91 urban §ocial Movements 19 L9-
119 9999199. p.165. See also, Allain Lipietz, Mirages 999 Miracles:199
1919i9 91 §l9b9| 1999199. (Verso: New York, New York),l971, and James

O‘Conner, I99 £19991 191919 91 199 91919. (New York:St.Martin’s Press),
1973.

2oliaIsIala Cabrera Arias.£cLsis 11mm 1 11911919919:
59919199-999999 1219 ~1922. (Panama:1mprenta Universitaria, 1993),
p.75.

21Burgwal, p.171.

22Vicky Bolaflos, "Organizaciones Berriales Urbanas (OBUs),
[studio EXploratorio para su Caracterizacidn: Distritos de Panama, Sen
Miguelito, Coldn y Arraijan." 9emor19: 99 99999999 99919991 99
WH-W-WWQWMO
(Panama: Universidad de Panama. 1990), p.181.

23Bolafios, p.181.

24Elizabeth Jelin, ”Otros Silencios, Otras Voces: El Tiempo de

la Democratizecidn en Argentina." in 199 90v19ien1o9 99ci9le9 9919
19 Q9i9i9, Fernando CalderOn,ed., (Buenos Aires:Universidad de las

Naciones Unidas,1986),p.18, in Arturo Escobar and Sonia Alvarez,

196

”Introduction: Theory and Protest in Latin America Today," 199 999199

915 Seeiel Belem intatlnAmeninadeenmxStnateexaneDemesmex-
(BoulderzHestview Press, 1992), p.15.

25Fernando Calderdn, Alejandro Piscitelli and José Luis Reyna,
”Social Movements: Actors, Theories, Expectations”, in Escobar and

Alvarez, ”Preface”, 199 999199 91 999191... op.cit. p.21.

26Dario Delgado, Assistant Director of Environmental Health and
the Ministry of Health, Panama. Interpress NewService, April 23, 1995,

9991991 9999199 999199. Vol. 10, No.6, lssue 240 (April 17-30,1995),
p.11.

27Grzegorz Bakuniak and Krzysztof Nowak, “The Creation of
Collective Identity in a Social Movement; the Case of Solidarnosc

in Poland", 199991 999 9991911. Vol.16 No.3 (May,l987), pp.4lO-4ll.
ZBNiley, p.31.

29Ra0l Leis, ”Ciudad y Movimientos Sociales Urbanos’. Rev19t9
£9999999 99 9991919919. No.3 (Panama:1mprenta Universitaria, 1987),
p.9.

3oGeorge Priestley. 9mm Gelennmentammmhnm—‘i tion
19 399999.199 19991199 B99199,19§§-191§. (Boulder/Londonzwestview
Press,1986), p.23.

31Niley, p.31.

32Interview with H.B., who suggested that ARENEP and its
leaders surfaced as an issue in several meeting of the Asemblea
and the Juntas Comunales of Rio Abajo and Parque Lefevre.

33Hinston Helch,‘ Semena de Panama en N.Y., -Panana's Meek in
New York -- Marriott Essex House, Central Park, N. Y, in Q99 1999

Cemented legend; QueCaeseEanaméIastEeneeeiNenLent. marzo9-18.
(New York: l977(c),p

CHAPTER SEVEN
RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE
A. RETROSPECTIVE SUMMARY

This work, a case study of ARINEP, a socio-political, racial/
ethnic, grass-roots organization, explored the experiences of a sub-po-
pulation of Afro-Panamanians through the agency of the above organiza-
tion. In this context, the study looked at Afro-Panamanians in this
last quarter of the 20 Century. This is important because of its link
to an on-going study and broader movement of the world wide dispersion
of Afro peoples; to their expression of identity and consciousness, and
how this identity and consciousness were expressed and defined within
the political, social and economical context of Panamanian society. In
this sense, the study is an extension of the work of the African Dia-
spora Research Project.

As demonstrated, the study focused primarily, but not exclusively,
on Afro-Panamanians of Caribbean or Antillean descent in Panama, who,
together with the Afro-Hispanic-Panamanians, constitute the Afro-Panama-
nian Diaspora. This Diaspora is a good laboratory for studying the mi-
gration, residence and development of a sub-population of peoples of
African descent, their interaction with each other, with other racial/
ethnic groups, as well as their interaction with the political and eco-
nomically dominant, but numerical minority, white subpopulation.

Conceptual and theoretical understanding of socio-political, grass-
roots organizations and activism in Euro-Latin-America was considered
not only within the local and national political context, but also wi-
thin the global economic and international political context, because

197

198
social movements do not occur in a socio-political or economical va-

cuum. Although the research considered the larger context of the global
geo-economic interrelations in which Panama plays a role, it placed pri-
macy on the local socio/political initiatives of ARENEP as essen-
tial in the discussion and understanding of grass-roots, socio-politic-
al organizations.

The study conceptualized ARENEP, as a socio-political organiza-
tion of Afro-Panamanians within the framework of social movements to
better understand its activism, theoretically and methodologically. In
so doing, the popular participation model was used as a theoretical
framework for social movements, which afforded a unique perspective in-
to ARENEP. For example, it was found that the model allowed racial/
ethnic groups the best opportunity for political organization, given
its potential to bring together a diverse group of political minority
peoples with different racial/ethnic and class background. In this par-
ticular context, the theoretical discussion focused on ARENEP as
agency of and for the interest of Afro-Panamanians, particularly Afro-
Antillean-Panamanians. The discussion of the participacidn popular
model was centered at the neighborhood level as the method of choice
for mobilization and activism among the popular sector.

Methodologically, the participacidn popular ’was the mobiliza-
tion at labor and neighborhood level for the production and reproduc-
tion of the workforce and the life chances of the popular sector. As a
device, the participacidn popular model was eminently a political
approach of the disenfranchised, subordinate, racial/ethnic organiza-
tion which sought social and political reivindicaciones. This was

defined earlier as a political strategy of demand-making, which

199
reflected the socio-economic position of the activists, their needs for

institutional services and the effects of the social policies of the
State. In this way, the participacidn popular model highlighted the
class relations of the society. It was within this context that the
content and mode of ‘legitimacy’ of the participacidn popular’
model of socio/political organizations, and its potential as a
conceptualization and explanation of racial/ethnic, political activism
was developed.

Central to the discussion was the use of race and ethnicity as an
articulating principle in the processes of life chances, and in this
context, many issues which had a bearing on ARENEP were touched up-
on, in particular: the racial/ethnic factor, the question of racial/na-
tional identity, the issue of national sovereignty, the presence and ac-
tivities of the global managers, and the problems of dependency. In
this sense the work explored three guiding questions: 1) ARENEP as
an expression of race, class and identity in relation to the conditions
of citizenship (nationality), and the political situation of dependen-
cy; 2) racial/class identity in terms of racial formation and participa-
tion in cultural politics, and people acting in their own interest, and
3) ARENEP’S relation to the State, to the national struggle for so-
vereignty, the global linkage of international trade and politics; and
the emergence, and decline of the organization.

In the analysis of the first question: ARENEP’s expression of
race, class and identity in relation to the conditions of citizenship,
and the political situation of dependency, the study found some inte-
resting insights. The issues of national identity and citizenship, na-

tion and nation/state were discussed within a contradictory context.

200
On the one hand, national identity and the nation/state frame our lives

at different and contradictory levels. At one level is the idea that
race is a ‘primordialist’ assumption of a biologically unchanging raci-
al/ethnic identity. But at another level the idea of ethnicity is separ-
ated and placed within culturally transmitted activities and symbols,
which enriches the national formation and identity. Yet, contradictori-
ly, as the idea of a national identity got stronger, people struggled
with the fragmentation of a national identity and the emergence of
their racial /ethnic identity.

It was shown that the increase waves of immigrants, culture and ca-
pital makes national identity a changing form of national association.
National identity, like racial/ethnic identity was found to appeal to
‘common roots’. It was also found that although national identity is
subjected to changes beyond its original formative context, there is a
strong reluctance by the dominant group to embrace cultural differences
that are not within their original context. This was argued as social
and politically crucial because national identity requires focusing on
the positive processes and articulations of cultural differences. This
led to another apparent contradiction: how race was used, and how it
contributed to the formation of national identities, and how these
factors influenced activism and urban mobilization. This was seen in
the contradictory way many respondents self-identified, and how
identity was negotiated for economic value or cultural status.

Similarly, it was then argued, that the generalized beliefs and ra-
cial/ethnic ideological interpretations in Panama, were related to the
colonial and post-colonial development of the society and culture,

which were created through conquest, and whose social institutions were

201
molded in the racial, religious and ‘national’ origins of the colonial

conquerors. It was found that the colonial and post-colonial develop-
ment supported the influence of the ideological racial/ethnic phenomen-
on across geographic and political borders. Thus, the argument was rais-
ed that the issues of race and ethnicity in Euro-Latin countries, in
this case, Panama, was not a ”foreign importation”, specifically North
American, Euro-Anglo society. It was instead suggested that race and
ethnicity in Euro-Latin countries should be viewed similarly to the phe-
nomenon of the world economic system, since the globalization of race
and ethnicity is a result of the international capitalist system; that
racism and ethnic ascription is a product of the advent of capitalism,
which has influenced and colored the racial policies of national
States, and its role towards minorities and their life chances. In this
context, the argument that the social construction of racial/ethnic
identity, racism, discrimination and segregation are North American
importations was rejected.

In most Euro-American countries, being of the African Diaspora,
means being defined essentially in racial terms: that is, black skin
identifies African heritage and connotes inferior social skills, status
and racial/ethnic characteristics, since as an ideological category,
race is always present in the consideration of the historical specifici-
ty of oppression. It was also argued that the political domination by
the Euro-Hispanics led to their economic domination in plural socie-
ties, and that the social construction of racial/ethnic identity, is
evidence of the ideological connection between Euro-Anglo and Euro-His-
panic-Americans. The manipulation of race/ethnicity was further substan-

tiated by the theories of Hall, Fanon, Furnival and Smith among others.

202
In this context, 96 percent of the respondents in this study believed

that the way the national history is written does influence how race
and ethnicity are perceived in the country. It could also be interpret-
ed that the differential incorporation of racial/ethnic groups affected
the life chances of these groups.

On the political-economic situation of dependency, the study sugges-
ted that the dynamics of the international linkage of trade and poli-
tics not only affected the local and national economy, but also had a
direct influence on Afro-Panamanian social organization. It was suggest-
ed that the impact of the international financial organizations (IFOs)
and the TNCs/MNCs on the economy, the high degree of their participa-
tion and economic domination of the internal market, as well as their

1

input in the political decisions of the country, not only undermin-

2 and helped in establishing a dependency up-

ed the domestic economy
on the US presence and TNCs, but also tied the national economy to the
question of the political autonomy of the State. This external factor
represented to a degree, the lack of political autonomy and a specific
structural determinative process of Panama’s dependency. To cite Munck:
the dependent capitalist State and its relative political autono-
my are centered around a historical contradictory relation of capit-
al accumulation (and how these might be risolved) within a similar
historical relations to the class struggle.
And paraphrasing the Brasilian economist, de Concecao Tavaves,:
foreign capital is no longer external to the local economy, it
has become part of it, modifying the local economy from within, ac-
centuating the historical pattern of accumulation.
This linkage, it was suggested, was evident in the economic and po-
litical structures: the structural conditioning and the structural

strains. For example, during the 19705, although the service sector

203
accounted for 70 percent of the GNP, to the disadvantage of the agricul-

tural and industrial activities, it generated an unbalanced economy and
a one-sided distribution of the country’s wealth.s It was likewise
suggested that the presence of the global manager and ties to the inter-
national financial community created a situation of dependency for the
country, where ultimately, the State’s dependency on dependency
gave rise to the situation of fiscal crisis of the State, and apparent-
ly fomented a national mind-set where little was created, and where 10-
cal political, economical and social autonomy are waived in favor of fo-
reign importation. For example, it was found that 73 percent of the 602
respondents in this study believed that the IFOs are important to the
domestic economy, and 71 believed that the country is very dependent up-
on the IFDs. Both the economic and the political systems favor corpor-
ate growth over domestic growth, but corporate growth measured in GNP
does not necessarily translate into national growth. Throughout the
19705 and 1980s for example, there was much macro growth in the econo-
my, but with a lot of social contradictions.

As an internal factor, this dependency and ‘underdevelopment’ gave
rise to the structural strain, --the shortages of goods and services,
the policies and manipulations of the economy by government, the IFOs,
the TNCs and the global managers. It was also found that 66 percent of
the larger sample believe that the country’s dependency affects the dis-
tribution of goods and services. The policies and manipulations of the
economy by the government, the IFOs, the TNCs and the global managers
were reflected during 1980, where, for example, 20 percent of the popu-
lation with a major interest in the economy, controlled sixty percent

of the income, in contrast to the poorest twenty percent who barely

204
received two percent of the income.6 It was then argued that if the

global linkage of finance and trade can affect the local economy, then
by extension the global linkage does affect the people in their every
day life. The observation of the National Céritas-Social Pastoral
Team in 1992, was just as valid for 1982.

The income of the richest 20 percent of the population is 45
times greater than that of the poorest 20 percent ... Some Panaman-
ian families do not have income large enough to allow them to eat
properly, although an additional 25 percent are able to eat, (they)
cannot satisfy other basic needs.7
Hhat is worrisome about these figures is that they have remained re-

latively the same while economic growth continues. This indicates that
economic growth has not created employment or solutions for the most
needy, the popular sector.8 For example, we have seen that 37 per-
cent of the respondent received wages under $300 monthly, and could be
considered at the annual poverty line of $2,671.20, which would affect
at least 256 members/sympathizers of the popular sector. It was suggest-
ed that these conditions also help to explain why class struggles and
race relation are usually intertwined.

The emergence of neighborhood organizations, such as ARENEP,
was in response to the structural conditioning and strains, given that
the effects of State policies, in conjunction with the demands of the
IFOs and the global managers which are felt in the neighborhoods. It
was in this sense that the argument was made that the emergence of
social activism in the country was an act for the liberation from the
conditions of dependency and ‘under-development’.

In looking at the second question: racial/class identity in terms

of racial formation and participation in cultural politics, and people

acting in their own interest, as agency of political empowerment,

205
ARENEP posed the question of the ties between racial/ethnic and na-

tional solidarity for nation formation. The organization was not condi-
tioned by the social structure, but developed out of historical circum-
stances: ideological abuses, limited upward mobility and general low
life chances. As agency, the organization sought and promoted popular
participation within the socio-political and economical arenas of the
society.

In this context it was shown that a national structure which main-
tains a plural society, where cultural sections are exclusive and held
together by government regulations, and unwilling to acknowledge cultu-
ral tolerance and responsibilities of equal civil rights would have dif-
ficulty creating and maintaining a common destiny. This may be seen as
utopic, but a nation should not represent less or be less. It was
also shown that some Afro-Panamanians not only rejected the imposed
mestizo label, but also rejected the idea that only those of Caribbe-
an heritage are the negro in Panama.

In the third question, ARENEP’s relation to the State and the
national struggle for sovereignty, the State is of immense importance
in framing the practices and subjectivities of contemporary social life
and collective activity. Although the organization was predicated on
the issues of racial/ethnic equality for Afro-Panamanians, and the avai-
lability and distribution of goods and services, it was also affected
by the historical nation-neo-colonialist issue and the country’s depen-
dency. The 1903 Convention which served as an instrument to bring about
important economic changes was contradictory, in that its effect was al-
so the source of alienation for thousands of Afro-Antilleans, many of

them citizens of the country. In this context, the question of national

206
sovereignty was of extra-ordinary importance. The situation of the 1977

Treaties afforded ARENEP, as a group of representative citizens,
not only the opportunity to demonstrate an active interest in the fate
of the country, but also to effect a transition from ‘enemies of the
country and allies of the US, to patriots and nationals’.

In many instances, the possible use of the military was a concern
for the organization. Thus, the immediate presence of the local milita-
ry was the first and obvious concern, which, as Torrijos said, that
many times the local military was often used as the first force against
the local population. The second major concern to the organization was
the looming menace of the US Military, stationed in the heart of the
country. The presence and use of the US military in the country, parti-
cularly against the local population was documented. Although only
forty-four percent of the 174 members/sympathizers strongly believed
that the presence of the US Military in Panama affected, in some way,
the activities of grass-roots organizations. This concern in fact be-
came a reality with the 1989 Bush Invasion.

From the viewpoint of an organization of citizens, ARENEP,
could not be divorced from the interest of the national fate, which was
also the rights of minority to voice the contradictions and contingen-
cies which might affect them; and that which hurts a cultural sector
hurts all sectors. Thus, it was found that the participacidn popular
model afforded racial/ethnic minority groups a voice in local, nation-
al and international politics, regarding the questions of national sove-

reignty and autonomy, citizenship, democracy and national identity.

207
B. PROSPECTIVE

THE PASTORAL AFRO and MODESCO

Since ARENEP’s demise, not much has been favorably changed for
Afro-Panamanians. Only two other organizations have emerged: the Pas-
toral-Afro, under the auspices of the Panamanian Catholic Church,
which emphasizes the religo-cultural aspect of the Afro-Panamanian Dias-
pora,9 and MODESCO —-HDVINIENTO DE DESEHPLEADDS DE COLON-- (the
Coldn’s Unemployed Movement). The latter is similarly situated as was
ARENEP and other organizations within the class aspect of the dis-
enfranchised.

(1) The Pastoral Afro

0n the one hand, the Pastoral Afro is the most visible expres-
sion of ‘negritud’ as an expression of ‘cultural evangelism’ within
the Christian religious ideology, through the promotion and celebration
of Afro-Panamanian ethnicity. The Pastoral Afro is designed to deve-
lop a Christian consciousness, but by default it also develops the raci-
al/ethnic consciousness of its members; a consciousness as Afro-Panama-
nian citizens and a better understanding of their ethnicity and history

Additionally, from its religious support, the Pastoral Afro is
a socio-cultural expression, which promotes economic and artisanal pro-
grams for single Afro mothers to work from their homes, a series of ac-
tivities for Afro men, women, youths and children. As a religiously bas-
ed activity, the Pastoral Afro is not an organization geared for
confrontation, politically or otherwise. But it does a cultural politic-
al service by highlighting the cultural patrimony of the majority popu-
lation which is denied by the State. In a way, the Pastoral-Afro

promotes the de-europeanization of Afro-Panamanians, in as much as

208
the participants of the Pastoral-Afro are able to exalt and celeb-

rate their ethnicity and understand the effect of Eurocentrism, which
has impeded the appreciation of the African culture. For example, in
the Pastoral-Afro church services, the use of African motifs and
symbolisms are pronounced.

The liturgy is sung in folkloric tunes with Afro dance forms from
Darién, the Bunde and Bullerengue. The predominant instru-
ment are the tumbas or drums of African tradition. The chorus and
music, in many instances, are structured along the pattern of the Con-
gos of Portobelo and Coldn, which is very similar in cultural pattern
to the Afro-Congo descendants in Barlovento, Venezuela. The call and re-
sponse pattern, the gender identification of the caller, female; the
construction of the instruments, all seem to be a replica of the
Congos of the People Republic of the Congos in Nest Africa. Similarly,
Caribbean calypso and other recent grass-roots musical expression have
been incorporated. In the traditional structure of the Roman Catholic
Mass, the handshake is the method of greeting fellow worshipers. The
Abrazo Negro or Black Embrace, with all its effervescence and
enthusiasm, substitutes the traditional handshake.

During the episode of the Haitian/Cuban refugees in Panama in July,
1994, the recent issue of temporary asylum for some 10,000 Haitian refu-
gees from the Cedras regime in Haiti, in addition to some 15,000 Cuban
refugees took on manifested racial overtones. The Government’s position
was favorable towards the Cubans. However, the Government floated the
idea of receiving the Haitian to test the reaction of the population.
The fact that the idea had to be tested is indicative of the culture

and presence of racism in the country. The reaction was negative.

209
The tabloid, Presencia Panamefia, citing the International Press Ser-

vice, reported that the Pastoral-Afro of the Archdiocese of Panama
argued in favor of the temporary political asylum for the Haitians immi-
gration, given:

thTo need to be free of regimes which oppress the human rights of
man.

It can be argued that the church, as a humanitarian institution
would have a positive position in this regard, but it can also be argu-
ed that Pastoral-Afro, understood not only the racist ideology of
the socially white Panamanians, and the racism associated with the poli-
tical issue, but also the need for racial and ethnic solidarity which
could not be ignored. Many Afro/Panamanians willingly and freely talked
about the open racist attitudes of the many so-called Hhite Panama-
nians, who actively protested and manifested against the presence of
the Haitians as refugee‘ in the Republic. In this respect Lowe-Gobern
noted that:

a legislator with presidential aspirations took the issue to the
extreme when he said: we don’t Haitians ... in Panama, because

. just like the Antilleans who came for the construction of the

Canal ... and never returned to their country of origin, (and)

caused much problems in our country.11
Rohter wrote that many Panamanians were openly skeptical, recalling ear-
lier episodes in which ‘temporary’ influxes of foreigners proved perma-
nent,12 an obvious reference to the thousands of Antillean or Caribbe-
an who migrated to Panama during the last 100 years to do the most dan-
gerous and physical jobs on the railroad and canal construction pro-
jects. Further on, Lowe—Gobern said:

the negotiations to give asylum to ... the Haitians in Panama
have served ... the prejudice, resentment, negativism and rejection

which many Panamanians hold, not only against the Haitians, but
also against the Antilleans or Blacks in general. 3

210
Again, this xenophobia is also associated with the earlier immigra-

tion of Antillanos, and the fear that the Haitian refugees may not
only become permanent residents, but may also procreate more Afro-Pana-
manians.l4 0f significance here is the acknowledgment and recognition
of the Afro character; the sameness between the Haitian population and
the Panamanian population. This highlights the significance of the in-
ternalization of a racially contradictory ideology.

Very few negative ethnic/racial comments were made about the Cuban
refugees in Panama, and it would appear that most Panamanians assumed
that the Cubans were not only "legitimate" political refugees, but also
socially white. What is not clear is, did Panamanians approved of the
Cuban’s asylum because the Cubans were assumed white, or because the
Cubans were assumed "legitimate“ political refugees. It would appear as
if the legitimacy of political asylum was not the issue, but the per-
ceived assumption of social whiteness given the fact that this "legiti-
macy' did not carry over to include the Haitians, as political refugees
for temporary asylum. The negative and contradictory racial overtones
towards non-white minorities in Euro-Latin countries like Panama, vali—
date the effects of the international valorization of race and ethnici-
ty. In a climate which equates race and ethnicity with xenophobia, this
lends itself to negative appraisals of the Afro ancestry, for example,
suppositions of illegal migration, and particularly being Afro with po-
tential illegal migration.

Similarly, this xenophobia towards immigrants of African heritage
reflects not only the racially constructed migration policies, some of
which are still in effect today, and which were referred to earlier,

but more importantly the internalization of a racially contradictory

211
ideology. The new resurgence of racial/ethnic discrimination based on

stereotypes and stigmatization is still evident, for example, as was
seen in the Endara "lily-white" Cabinet. The Endara Government of 1989
~1995, in fact, represented a return of the white bourgeoisie, national
capitalists to political powers, after thirty one years of displace-
ment. With the Endara Government, the racial display of ‘whiteness’ re-
turned through the presence of government functionaries, who racially
and ethnically did not represent the vast majority of the national popu-
lation. Thus, the racial political sympathy of Hhite Panamanians was ma-
nifested, hidden behind the demagoguery of democracy. To paraphrase Gui-
llaumin,ls racial discourses and practices of inferiorization and sub-
ordination, exploitation and oppression from the dominant group denotes
a difference between the them and us of the population. The diffe-
rentiation is a process of power relation by a dominant ethnic group,
and applied to the other groups.16

Thus, for many in the dominant culture, English speaking Afro-Antil-
lean Panamanians cannot belong by rights and must earn membership

17 calls

through slow assimilation, which is equivalent to what Baum
parricide, the symbolic assassination of one’s forbearers, the killing
of ancestral ‘remembrance’ and one’s roots. Assimilation means incorpo-
ration of European ‘values’. This requires the loss of an identity and
the acquisition of another, the symbolic "white-washing" of one’s for-
bearers. This racial prejudice is best understood as manifestations of
the Freudian concept of ‘prejudice by displacement’, generated and dis-
placed onto those ‘who are ethnically different, and thus, do not be-

long’. This confirms the findings where 74 percent of the total sample

affirms that racism is 999 something of the past in Panama.

212
The political emphasis on race and ethnicity, highlighted the raci-

al consciousness and issues relative to color prejudice. Yet this raci-
al consciousness is contradictory and problematic, and it seems to
emerge in some societies where racial concepts have regional interpreta-
tions and where many people cannot or do not clearly self-identify with
specific racial groups. In this context, the Pastoral Afro did a
service in its attempt to foment a tolerance of racial/ethnic diversi-
ty. Tourain writes that it is only when a society is capable of debat-
ing its choices and recognizing the complementarity of the cultural di-
versity common to most of the population that the society, the country

18 and develop a common identity.

can, indeed, have a history,

Finally, to paraphrase Miller and Miller,19 for Afro-Panamanians,
national and racial/ethnic identity appear to be linked to the moral
destiny of a people and the particular historical culture within which
they were negotiated, and they must be understood within the framework
of personal and group struggle.

(2) MODESCO

MODESCO, is the only organization publicly manifesting the limi-
ted life chances of the Afro-population of the city of Coldn. MODES-
CO’s struggle centers on the unemployment problem in Colon, which is
reported at fifty percent of the workforce, compared to the national un-
employment average of fifteen to thirty percent, depending on the
source. During the period of field work, February/March, 1995, MODES-
CO took to the streets three times, and on two occasions the riot po-
lice repressed the manifestations at the prodding of the bourgeoisie,

who were driven by fear of looting.

ADDESCO emerged as a class base organization, and does not

213
portray itself as a socio-cultural organization, nor does it emphasize

a racial/ethnic group solidarity. But the fact that NODESCO origina-
ted in the city of Colon, and the fact of the racial/ethnic composition
of its members and sympathizers, underscores also the presence of a ra-
cial/ethnic organization. Thus, race cannot be ignored because the popu-
lation of the City of Colon is ninety-five (95) percent Afro descent.

This brings up the relationship between race and class, with speci-
al reference to Afros. These organizations seem to originate in the
City of Coldn and/or Panama. It would be easier to say that this is by‘
default, since the national population is predominantly Afro, any grass
-roots organization will have a majority Afro. But it is suggested that
it is not by default. In part, the issue revolves with race within the
argument of structural inequality. It is suggested that race and racism
have always played a role in the political, social and economical deci-
sions affecting the City of Colon, which is the result of years of nega-
tive racist decisions which brings forth organizations such as ARENEP
and HDDESCO. As an urban socio-political organization, HDDESCO,
like ARENEP was a form:

of collective action with a high degree of popular participation,
which uses non-institutional channels, and which formulate their de-
mands while simultaneously finding forms of action to express them,
thus establisaang themselves as collective subjects ... as a group
or a category.

MODESCO is sociologically important because, contrary to labor
unions which protect only current workers under their banner, ideologi-
cally, MDDESCO’s struggles represent all laborers, skilled and un-
skilled, inclusive of race and irrespective of gender. In this case,

HODESCO is reminiscent of the 1912 labor organization Sociedad Gene-

ral de Trabajadores.21 Yet, however important the demands for

214
employment are, MODESCO is limited because the organization does

not address the structural inequality of the system as it affects other
issues, such as the lack of housing units, and the poor health benefits
of the Colonites. It is this lack of a broader vision which limits and
maintains HDDESCO within the structure of a social organization, a
pressure group, albeit an important one, but not a social movement.

Although the Pastoral Afro and HDDESCO are grass-roots in
nature, apparently they are not new major collective voices on ra-
cial/ethnic issues. The Pastoral Afro, MODESCO and ARENEP
were all conceptualized within the popular participation model. But
where the Pastoral Afro is considered a consensus organization,
HDDESCO and ARENEP are considered confrontational.

C. Final Considerations

This study suggests that ARENEP, as well as other resistance mo-
vements are not determined mechanically by social structures, but deve-
loped out of historical circumstances, such as the form of relation of
production which affects everyday life struggle, the reproduction of fa-
milies and the labor force. The study has raised many more questions
than it has answered. Two of the unanswered questions are: I) was the
participacion popular a sufficiently effective model to bring about
social change, and 2) was ARENEP, as a grass-root organization, suf-
ficiently articulated within the model to bring about changes for Afro-
Panamanians.

0n the first question, participacidn popular does appear to be
a sufficiently effective model to bring about social change given its
potential to bring together peoples of different social race, ethnicity

and class under a common banner. The model has the capability to be a

215
pressure group to confront social institutions; to seek revindications

from a government in a reformist stance, as did ARENEP, or to seek
changes through violent confrontation with the State, as some other mo-
vements, Sendero, Tupac Amaru, and the Sandinistas among oth-
ers, have done. In this sense, participacidn popular is sufficient-
ly effective, and would appear to be the ideal model to bring about so-
cial change. But some pertinent research questions remain: how does po-
verty affect minority and enclave people and their relative power? Hhat
is the power aspect of the participacidn popular model, and how
does it affect organizations internally and externally, and how does
the changing global politics/economy affect the power of leadership
groups? A comparative study of MODESCO and ARENEP could shed
some light on the promotion of political and economical gains for the
marginal sector as well as some of the other issues raised.

0n the second question, ARENEP’s effectiveness within the model
to bring about changes for Afro-Panamanians, ARENEP was effective
in promoting a racial/ethnic consciousness and identity among its mem-
bership, if not among the larger Afro population. It was also effective
in promoting issues such as national identity, citizenship, democracy,
and a voice in local and national politics. But ARENEP was not as
effective in the promotion of political and economical gains for its
members or the larger Afro population, as many factors truncated its so-
cial and political life. First, it could not articulate the participa-
cion popular model effectively. Second, it could not develop a suffi-
cient numerical following to give the relevant political and social
clout to its demands. Third, and most importantly, ARENEP was co-

opted, whether intentionally or not, to serve the national interest.

216
It is important to study this co-optation to understand how elites and

parties benefit in clientelism to "control" people at the bottom, and
what is the fate of an organization with a predominantly Afro based
constituency in Panama.

Although it was suggested that ARENEP could have recuperated
from the effects of Treaty politics and continue its racial/ethnic
struggle for economic and political participation, the fact that it did
not, lends to the interpretation that the organization was overwhelmed
by Treaty politics and lost its bearings regarding the political and
economical demands of its members. In this context a discussion on the
variables of the participacidn popular model that make a critical
difference organizationally could be another issue for further study.

The Pastoral Afro, HDDESCO and ARENEP were all conceptu-
alized within the popular participation model. It is suggested that
since the demise of ARENEP, MODESCO has confronted the same, if
not, then similar conflicts, contradictions and structural problems, in-
ternal and externally, which neutralized ARENEP and may have neutra-
lized the Afro-Panamanian organizations in New York. Again, a compara-
tive look at the Pastoral Afro, MODESCO, and ARENEP offers some
issues for further research.

This study is among the few scientific inquiry, whether political,
social or economical, on racial/ethnic groups and organizations of re-
sistance in Panama. The absence of scientific literature on racial/eth-
nic groups and their organizations, not only leaves an unfortunate si-
lent voice in the social sciences in Panama and the national population
with negative impressions and folklore about national diversity, but it

also leaves the plural society intact, as well as the issue of

217
dependency, including the myth of national development and increased

productivity from the penetration of foreign capital.

Nonetheless, this lack of inquiry has opened several other areas of
research interest, for example, to what degree does race and racism
play a role in the political, social and economical decisions affecting
the cities and Province of Bocas del Toro, Darién and Colon.
A similarly research question could be identity politics: i.e., the
cultural racial politics of the State and its impact on the political
minority groups, the labeling, stigmatization and the State’s defini-
tion of race and ethnicity, particularly those used or not used in the
census data. Similarly, research could look into the impact of the in-
ternational valorization of race and ethnicity, and how this valoriza-
tion influences local societies and cultures. Additionally, the study
of the structure of the plural society is a must, if we are to encour-
age the emergence of a national consciousness among all groups. If a
proper understanding of the national population is desired, research
into the ways of life, the modes of expression and agency in the his-
torical, political and subjective levels of the distinct racial/ethnic
groups is imperative. There is also the need to understand the conceptu-
al linkages between neighborhood issues and the relation of production,
and the linkages to larger national, structural issues. Therefore, of
major importance for a country at the end of a neo-colonial relation-
ship, but far from ending its dependency, is the need to uncover the
consequences of the penetration of foreign capital and multinationals,
and the effects of their oppressive presence.

Finally, although ARENEP, as a racial/ethnic socio-political or-

ganization, did not leave a legacy of political impact, and did not

218
sway a majority of Afro-Panamanians, its presence had to be accounted

for. In many ways, ARENEP represented the continuation of an inter-
generational struggle to bridged the difference between their parents’
and the life experiences of the members in the organization. For exam-
ple, many of ARENEP’s members/sympathizers, as well as those of the
other organizations mentioned in this study, were from the last genera-
tion to live on the former Canal Zone. This is significant because this
life experiences from the Zone, added to the life experiences of other
Afro-Panamanians in the country, converged at a particular time, 1968-
1984, to become the critical difference in forging ARENEP’s agenda
and mobilization. This joint experience recognized the country’s past
and attempted to forged a different vision of the future. Because of
this, many today are resolved, for example, in their racial/ethnic and
national identity, and the political system is a bit more democratic
with the inclusion of forgotten minorities. Thus, credit must be given
to all the members and sympathizers of ARENEP, and all the other

organizations and their sympathizers, for making a difference.

219
D. Chapter Seven Endnotes
Carmela Lowe de Gobern,"En Defensa de mis Raices Antillanas" , La
£99999. (sabado, 6 de agosto, 1994) p. 10A.

1A1a1n Lipietz, 91:39:; 999 H1n9919§ 199 9:191; 91 919911
1999199. (London/New York: Verso), David Macey, trad., 1987, p.39.

2Robert Gilpin. 1119 1191111991 E99999! 111 1919n99119991
991991999.(Princeton/New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987),

p.63. This was the case, for example, of the Chiriqui Land Company and
the ”Banana Crisis", October I4-21,l974, when the banana Company
refused to comply with the Law of $1.00 for each case of exported
banana.

3Rona1do Munck 291111;; and 9999999991 in 199 111:9 19:14.
(London/New Jersey: ) Zed Books Ltd. .1984, p.209.

4l‘laria de Concecao Tavavesdgmlacae 99 9191191 9 19111199119113.9912
99 £99111.Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, 1976, p.119. Ph.D

Dissertation cited in Ronaldo Munck, 99119199 999 9999999991
p.210.

5Guillermo Castro, Juana Camargo, Noemi Farinoni and Virginia
Vergara, “Crisis y Politicas Sociales en Panama". 991919: 59919999 1

{9999919. (PanamaleEN.,1989), p.7.

6Juan Jované, "Universidad y Sociedad". Unpublished article,
p.11, cited in Castro, et.al. p.9.

7National Céritas-Social Pastoral Team, gnvi9, Universidad
Centroamericana, Vol.14. No.164.
Managua:Nicaragua.(January,1995),p.22.

8Galan Ponce, Director of FIEES & CEPPA in La Prensa, (Monday 21,
November 1994), p.33-A.

929999999 99191199, Arquidiocesis Metropolitana. (Panamazdiciem-
bre, 26, 1993),p.2 and (August 14,1994), p.2. Interview with the Rev.
De Leon of the Parroquia de la Sagrada Familia, San Niguelito,
Panama, January, 1994.

loPresencia Panamefia, A90 1, No.2. (Agosto l994),pp.1-2.

llCarmela Lowe de Gobern,"En Defensa de mis Raices Antillanas”, 19
£99999. (sabado, 6 de agosto, 1994) p.10A.

12Larry Rohter, ”Panamanians Don’t Want Haitians - or Gringos.‘ From
the 999 1999 11999,(July 9,1994, p.5) and reprinted in C9ntr9| Am99199
9999999, Vol.9, No.11, Issue 219 (June 27/July 10, 1994), p.12.

13Lowe de Gobern, p.10A.

l4Rohter, p.12.

220

15Collete Guillaumin, ”The Idea of Race and its Elevation to

Autonomous, scientific and Legal Status”, 599191991991 19999199: 9999
999 99199191199. (Parisz) UNESCO. 1965, p.38.

16Richard Jenking, “Social Anthropological Models of Inter-Ethnic

Relations“. in 19999199 91 9999 999 119919.99l9910n9. Rex and Mason,
p.177.

17Rainer C.Baum, 'Editors’ Introductionzldentity and Descent in
Modernity“, 99911199119 599191991. Vol.14. No.1.(1990), p.7.

18Allan Tourain, ”Beyond Social Movements." Th9or1, 9919999 999
5991991. Vol.9, (London/New Delhi:l992), p.145.

19Donald E.Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller, ”Memory and Identity
Across Generations: a Case Study of Armenians Survivors and their

Progeny,” in Qu9lita9iV9 SO9jolog1. Vol.14, No.1, (1991), p.36.

20Elizabeth Jelin, "Otras Silencios, Otras Voces: El Tiempo de la
Democratizacidn en Argentina. in 199 M9v19ien999 59ci979s A919 19
991919, Fernando Calderon, ed., (Buenos Aires:Universidad de las
Naciones Unidas, 1986), p. 18, in Escobar and Alvarez, "Introduction:
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991999919 19 19119 Amen199:19991111 51191991.999 D9999n991 (Boulder:
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21Ivan Quintero, £1 'n i to £999n91 99 119991999191.
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237
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238
Gaeeta Qfi1e1al, No.4977. Law 54 (Article 15) 1938, Panama: Imprenta
Nacional, octubre 28, 1926

Interviews

Interview with D. 8., New York: May, 1995.

Interwiew with R. D., New York, May, 1995

Interview with H. 8., New York, May, 1995.

Interview, February, with L. A., co-founder of ARENEP. 1995.
Interview with P. E., York: May, 1994.

Interview with the Rev. De Ledn of the Parroquia de la Sagrada Fami-
lia, San Miguelito, San Miguelito, Panama, January, 1994.

Telephone interview with Hinston 0 Thomas, ex-Council member and Past
Illustrious Grand(P.I.G.) of Aurora Lodge #523 IBOP of H., and active
member of various other lodges. July, 1989.

Telephone interview with George Vasier, ex-Council member and Past Il-
lustrious Grand (P.1.G.) of Aurora Lodge #523 IBOP of H., member of Lo-
yaltyd Lodge #20 Mechanic, July, 1989, and active member of various oth-
er 0 ges.

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